Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-15-01543/USCOURTS-ca1-15-01543-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1543 

NICOLE LANG, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

[Hon. Landya McCafferty, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lynch, and Thompson, 

Circuit Judges. 

 Carole C. Cooke, with whom Heidi A. Nadel and Todd & Weld LLP 

were on brief, for appellant. 

 Christopher B. Kaczmarek, with whom Jennifer M. Duke and 

Littler Mendelson, P.C. were on brief, for appellee. 

March 2, 2016 

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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. 

OVERVIEW

Nicole Lang once worked for Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. 

While there, she claimed a disability arising from her "pregnancy 

status," though she insisted that she could perform the essential 

functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Seeing 

things differently, Wal-Mart refused her accommodation request. 

And then, later on, Wal-Mart terminated her. 

Lang eventually sued, claiming violations of the federal 

Americans with Disabilities Act (popularly known as the "ADA") and 

the New Hampshire Civil Rights Act. After discovery, the district 

judge granted Wal-Mart summary judgment on all claims. The judge's 

fairly-lengthy ruling failed to convince Lang. But for reasons we 

explain later, we think that summary judgment is called for — which 

leads us to affirm. 

HOW THE CASE GOT HERE 

Taking all disputed facts in the light most sympathetic 

to Lang (as the party opposing summary judgment), see Soto–Padró 

v. Pub. Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2012), we believe 

the competent summary-judgment evidence tells the following tale. 

Sometime in July 2010, Lang became an "unloader" at WalMart's distribution center in Raymond, New Hampshire. An unloader 

(as the name implies) unloads merchandise hauled to the center in 

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tractor trailers. Wal-Mart's job-description form says that the 

"essential functions" of an unloader include "unloading freight 

from trailer manually or with power equipment." But the form also 

adds that "[m]ov[ing], lift[ing], carry[ing], and plac[ing] 

merchandise and supplies weighing up to 60 pounds without 

assistance" are "physical activities . . . necessary to perform 

one or more essential functions of this position." Asked at her 

deposition whether Wal-Mart "expected [her] to be able to lift 

. . . up to 65 pounds" by herself, Lang said "yes." That jibes 

with this statement by the center's distribution manager, who said 

that unloaders are required to "lift[] merchandise or supplies 

weighing up to 60 pounds without assistance." 

Wal-Mart randomly assigns unloaders to trailers — 

usually one unloader per trailer, about 20 unloaders per shift — 

in a way so that the "oldest" trailer gets unloaded first.1 Some 

freight — typically freight weighing more than 65 pounds 

(furniture, for instance) — is labeled "team lift," meaning the 

 

1 Lang suggests that "[t]he trucks were assigned by a supervisor 

or another associate who would go through the stack, look at it, 

and then hand Lang the assignment he wanted her to have." But 

that claim is not inconsistent with a randomized-assignment 

policy. And to the extent that her deposition or affidavit could 

be understood as disputing the randomized-assignment policy, it is 

mere speculation without sufficient personal knowledge about the 

policy — which is not enough to forestall summary judgment. See 

Tropigas de P.R., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of 

London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011). 

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assigned unloader needs to have another unloader (and possibly 

more) help out. Most freight has no label or marks indicating its 

weight, however. So unloaders often do not know the freight's 

weight before lifting it, though the record is uncontested on the 

point that the great majority of freight weighs more than 20 

pounds. 

Unloaders occasionally use forklifts and other power 

equipment to unload some trailers — like when the trailers have 

merchandise stacked on pallets. We say "occasionally use" and 

"some trailers" for several reasons. One is that cargo frequently 

shifts in transit, breaking the pallets and forcing unloaders to 

remove items by hand. A second is that if an unloader spills cargo 

while using power equipment, she would then have to pick up the 

spilled cargo by hand. A third is that many vendors try to pack 

as much merchandise into the trailers as humanly possible, the 

result being that many trailers — including what the parties call 

"RBD" trailers — have cargo stacked from floor to ceiling. And 

unloaders must unload these trailers by hand, a time-consuming 

process, to be sure. All and all, according to the unrebutted 

affidavit of the operations manager at this Wal-Mart center, about 

"70% of the trailers require some degree of manual labor to unload 

them." 

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In late September 2010 — about two months after becoming 

an unloader — Lang learned that she was pregnant. Her doctor told 

her on October 7 not to lift anything over 20 pounds. Convinced 

that her bosses at Wal-Mart would have a problem with a 20-pound 

restriction, Lang asked the doctor if "we [could] just hold off on 

the note." The doctor said okay — but added, "don't lift" anything 

over 25 pounds. 

A week or two later — still in October 2010 — Lang told 

her manager, Brian Hug, about the pregnancy and the lifting 

restriction. Hug was "excited" to hear about the pregnancy 

("excited" is the word Lang used in her deposition). Hug asked 

her if she had a doctor's note, to which she answered "no." Lang 

did not ask Wal-Mart to accommodate her condition at that time. 

Instead she kept on doing her regular unloader duties, including 

lifting — though she later recalled getting more RBD trailers than 

usual to unload, and she sometimes had to ask other unloaders to 

help her. 

On November 7, 2010, Lang pulled a muscle lifting a 

heavy, unmarked box. As for which muscle, she said in her 

interrogatory answers that she had pulled a "groin muscle"; later 

at a deposition she said that she had pulled a muscle in her 

"uterus"; and still later in court papers she said again that she 

had pulled a "groin muscle." Anyway, Lang told Hug about the pull 

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that day, November 7. Hug brought her to the center's first-aid 

office. And someone from Wal-Mart's human-resource department — 

Bridget Ronaghan — drove Lang home, though Ronaghan made a point 

of telling her that her "pregnancy was a liability" and that she 

should ask for leave under the federal Family Medical Leave Act 

("FMLA"). Lang's doctor told her to take some Excedrin, soak in 

a tub, and ice the injured area. 

Lang felt "fine" (her word) the next day. But Wal-Mart 

told her to take the day off. That same day, November 8, Lang's 

husband — also a Wal-Mart employee — asked the human-resource 

manager, Andrea Rose, if Lang could get reassigned to a lessdemanding post (sweeper, cleaner, etc.) or if she could just unload 

non-RBD trailers with a forklift. Rose refused, saying "if I had 

to accommodate [her], I'd have to accommodate the rest." 

After talking with a lawyer at the New Hampshire 

Commission for Human Rights ("NHCHR," for short), Lang formally 

asked Wal-Mart for an accommodation near the end of November 2010. 

On the request-for-accommodation form, she listed "pregnancy" as 

her "condition or impairment." And the medical questionnaire 

filled out by her doctor said that she could not lift more than 20 

pounds. As for an accommodation, Lang asked Wal-Mart to either 

assign her to "trailers that don't need to be unloaded by hand," 

or to give her a "job that doesn't deal with lifting over 20 

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pounds." But Wal-Mart said no, concluding that her pregnancy "is 

considered temporary" and so "not eligible for an accommodation." 

Wal-Mart also added that the lifting restrictions imposed by her 

doctor "prevent [her] from performing the essential functions" of 

her job. Lang did two things in response: First, she asked for 

permission from Wal-Mart to take FMLA leave of absence through 

June 18, 2011. And even though she would exhaust her FMLA leave 

rights by the end of December 2010, Wal-Mart approved the full 

leave amount. Second, while on leave, she filed a charge of 

discrimination with the NHCHR, alleging (as relevant here) that 

Wal-Mart had discriminated against her because of her "pregnancy 

status" and had failed to reasonably accommodate her "medical 

disability." Rose knew about Lang's NHCHR complaint, Lang tells 

us, though she does not tell us what the NHCHR did with her 

discrimination charge. 

Lang gave birth to a son on June 15, 2011. After taking 

a six-week maternity leave, she returned to work as an FID 

Processor (Wal-Mart had given her unloader position to someone 

else). Her new job required her to (a) use a forklift to bring 

pallets of cargo to designated areas; (b) scan and label the cargo 

boxes; and (c) then put the boxes on a conveyor belt. Supervisors 

kept "eyeing" her as she did her FID-Processor duties, however, 

like she was doing "something wrong" — conduct that made her feel 

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"uncomfortable." Adding to her belief that Wal-Mart was 

"targeting" her, some higher-ups there (a) saw her talking to an 

associate at work and told her not to speak with other workers; 

(b) occasionally had her repeat tasks, e.g., re-dusting an area 

she had already dusted — though she conceded that sometimes the 

request made sense, like the time someone from corporate was coming 

to visit and her bosses wanted everything to look clean; and 

(c) took days to finally approve her request for extra time so 

that she could use her breast pump during breaks. 

In mid-November 2011, Lang hurt her arm while putting a 

box on the conveyor belt. She told a supervisor about what had 

happened. And the supervisor asked whether she was "joking." 

Another Wal-Mart manager brought her to the hospital, where a 

doctor diagnosed her with a pinched ulnar nerve, gave her a brace, 

and told her to ice her arm and take ibuprofen. Consistent with 

its workers' compensation procedure, Wal-Mart gave Lang a 

"temporary alternative duty" assignment (involving dusting), which 

would allow her to work while she recovered — if she could not 

return to her regular job after 90 days, Wal-Mart would place her 

on workers' compensation. 

About a month later, in December 2011, Lang still had 

arm pain. So human-resource manager Rose — without consulting 

Lang — placed her in another temporary alternative duty position, 

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this one involving label sorting. According to Lang's deposition, 

Rose "felt like if she extended my [light duty] that I'd keep my 

income." 

Lang and her husband had long wanted to move to Florida. 

And Rose had known about the couple's wish to move there since at 

least November 2011. In February 2012, Lang's husband asked for 

and received a transfer to a Wal-Mart distribution center in the 

Sunshine State. Wal-Mart, though, apparently had a policy 

prohibiting persons on temporary alternative duty assignments from 

transferring — meaning Rose's unilateral decision extending Lang's 

assignment effectively blocked Lang's ability to transfer to 

Florida with her husband. Lang then got permission to take an 

unpaid two-week leave from work to receive medical care for her 

arm injury. And with that leave in place, the Langs moved to 

Florida at the end of February. 

Around this time Lang received notice that her claim for 

workers' compensation was (in all capital letters) "hereby denied 

by employer or [insurance] carrier." "No causal relationship to 

employment" was the reason listed, though the notice added that 

"extent of disability [was] questionable." Denise Kondor's name 

appears on the form, on the line provided for "Authorized 

Representative." And National Union Fire Insurance Company is 

listed as the "Insurance Carrier." Lang's affidavit stated that 

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Kondor worked as a claims adjuster for a company called "Sedgwick" 

and that "Sedgwick" had "denied my workers' compensation request." 

Lang, however, points us to nothing in the record explaining 

whether she ever contested the denial of her workers' comp claim. 

Jumping to April 2012, we see that Rose, relying on 

corporate policy, asked Lang to submit medical documentation to 

support the leave. But Lang had trouble finding a Florida 

physician willing to treat her and sign the Wal-Mart-required 

forms, because the carrier would not acknowledge liability for her 

medical bills. So Wal-Mart extended her leave to August 13, 2012, 

to give her more time to locate a doctor. Rose, though, had no 

sympathy for Lang, telling her that she (Lang) had put herself in 

this position. After Lang failed to submit the necessary forms by 

the August deadline, Wal-Mart terminated her, with Rose processing 

the termination as a "voluntary quit" — which, Rose later 

confirmed, made Lang "eligible for re-hire by Wal-Mart." 

Disappointed, Lang sued Wal-Mart in New Hampshire 

federal court. Pertinently, she alleged that Wal-Mart had failed 

to accommodate her disability arising "from her pregnancy status," 

in violation of the ADA. She also alleged that Wal-Mart had 

discriminated against her because of her disability and had 

retaliated against her because of her accommodation request and 

her NHCHR complaint, all in violation of New Hampshire law. 

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Following discovery — during which Lang filed an 

affidavit saying in part that "[t]he only essential functions of 

the Unloader position that [she] could not perform had to do with 

weight" — Wal-Mart asked the judge for summary judgment on all 

claims. Lang opposed, conceding that "Wal‐Mart's job description 

for Unloader requires an employee to have the ability to move, 

lift, carry and place merchandise and supplies of up to a maximum 

of 60 pounds without assistance," but insisting that Wal-Mart 

should have reasonably accommodated her by placing her "in another 

suitable position." 

Hoping to nail Lang's essential-functions argument down, 

the judge said during argument on the motion that "moving, lifting, 

etc., up to 60 pounds without assistance" is "an undisputed 

description" of the job's "essential function[s]." So, the judge 

added, turning to Lang's lawyer, "[y]ou're saying make some 

accommodation which would enable [Lang] to perform this 60-pound 

weight limit, but what you're essentially saying is she can't lift 

anything more than 20 pounds." Lang's lawyer responded, 

"[c]orrect." "[T]hat takes it into a totally different type of 

job," the judge pointed out. "Perhaps," Lang's attorney said, 

though she faulted Wal-Mart for not engaging in an interactive 

process to come up with an accommodation. And Lang's lawyer 

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stressed a little later that "the job description is not in 

dispute."2 

The judge later issued a thorough opinion jettisoning 

Lang's ADA failure-to-accommodate claim because (in the judge's 

view) the record did not establish that (a) Lang had a disability 

within the ADA's meaning; that (b) she could perform the job's 

essential functions, either with or without a reasonable 

accommodation — "[i]t is undisputed," the judge wrote, that lifting 

items "weighing up to 60 pounds was an essential function" of her 

job and that she "submitted paperwork from her doctor indicating 

that she could not lift items weighing more than 20 pounds"; or 

that (c) her requested accommodations were reasonable. And since 

Lang had not put enough in the record to show either that she had 

been disabled under the ADA or that she could perform essential 

job functions, the judge knocked out the state-law discrimination 

claim too. Wrapping up, the judge concluded that the summaryjudgment materials did not establish either that there was a causal 

connection between her protected conduct (her reasonableaccommodation request and NHCHR complaint) and Wal-Mart's adverse 

action (terminating her) or that Wal-Mart's rationale for her 

 

2 Lang has a different lawyer on appeal, by the way. 

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termination was pretextual — which led the judge toss out her 

state-law retaliation claim as well. 

Lang later asked the judge to reconsider the summaryjudgment ruling. Once again conceding — as the judge had found — 

"that lifting 60 pounds was an essential function of [her] job as 

an Unloader," Lang claimed that the judge had botched matters in 

two ways: first, by relying on caselaw predating critical 

amendments to the ADA's "disability" definition, and, second, by 

overlooking that Wal-Mart had never devised a suitable 

accommodation through an "interactive process" with her. But the 

judge stuck to her guns, ruling that the ADA amendments did not 

affect her summary-judgment conclusion and that Wal-Mart had no 

obligation to engage in an interactive process because Lang did 

not have an ADA disability. Lang then appealed to us. 

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD 

We give de novo review to the judge's grant of summary 

judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in Lang's favor and 

affirming if no "genuine dispute as to any material fact" exists 

and Wal-Mart merits judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a); see also Collazo–Rosado v. Univ. of P.R., 765 F.3d 86, 

92 (1st Cir. 2014). Because our review is de novo, we can affirm 

on any ground appearing in the record — including one that the 

judge did not rely on. See, e.g., Collazo–Rosado, 765 F.3d at 92. 

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ADA CLAIM 

The ADA forbids a covered employer (which all agree WalMart is) from discriminating against a "qualified individual," see 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), relevantly defined as a person "who, with or 

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 

functions" of her job, see id. § 12111(8). Failing to reasonably 

accommodate a disabled person is a form of disability 

discrimination, of course. See, e.g., Faiola v. APCO Graphics, 

Inc., 629 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2010). And — as the judge correctly 

noted — to survive an adverse summary judgment on a failure-toaccommodate claim, a plaintiff must point to sufficient evidence 

showing that (a) she is disabled within the ADA's definition; that 

(b) she could perform the job's essential functions either with or 

without a reasonable accommodation; and that (c) the employer knew 

of her disability, yet failed to reasonably accommodate it. See, 

e.g., Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2003). 

Lang and Wal-Mart spar over every prong. But we begin 

— and end — with the essential-functions issue (i.e., we assume 

without deciding that Lang had an ADA disability), noting that 

while the employer bears the burden of showing that a fought-over 

job function is essential, see Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., 

Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2000), the employee bears the 

burden of showing that she could perform that function, even if 

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only with some reasonable accommodation for her disability, see 

Jones v. Walgreen Co., 679 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2012). 

Recall how Wal-Mart's job-description form lists 

"unloading freight from trailer manually or with power equipment" 

as an unloader's essential job function, and then adds that 

"[m]ov[ing], lift[ing], carry[ing], and plac[ing] merchandise and 

supplies weighing up to 60 pounds without assistance" are "physical 

activities . . . necessary to perform one or more essential 

functions of this position." Without evincing any sense of irony, 

Lang blasts the judge for concluding that manually lifting up to 

60 pounds is an essential job function for an unloader — as she 

now sees things, an unloader's essential function is not manually 

lifting items weighing up to 60 pounds but getting cargo off 

trailers, a task one can do by hand or with power equipment. 

We see irony because (as we have taken pains to 

emphasize) Lang's lawyer told the district judge and opposing 

counsel — not once, not twice, but three times (in the summaryjudgment opposition, during argument on the motion, and in the 

motion for reconsideration) — that no one disputes that lifting up 

to 60 pounds without assistance is (repeat, is) an essential job 

function; statements, remember, that came after Lang had answered 

"yes" to a deposition question about whether Wal-Mart expected her 

to lift "up to 65 pounds" on her own. Representations like the 

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ones made by Lang's lawyer — "an officer of the court" — are 

"solemn undertaking[s], binding on the client." Genereux v. 

Raytheon Co., 754 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting CCM Cable 

Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 

1995)). And once made, neither the lawyer nor her "clients can 

complain when the trial court takes them at their word." Id. at 

59. The bottom line, then, is that team Lang cannot forsake its 

earlier concessions, switching "horses midstream" to offer an 

entirely new take on the essential-functions issue — a take that 

is completely inconsistent with her earlier position. See id. 

Citing National Association of Social Workers v. 

Harwood, Lang notes that we can choose to consider an argument not 

raised below; the choice is totally up to us, meaning she has no 

entitlement to that bonanza, and only in "extraordinary" 

circumstances — "few and far between" — will we relax the timetested raise-or-waive rule. See 69 F.3d 622, 627-28 (1st Cir. 

1995) (deciding a "new" issue that was (among other things) of 

constitutional importance, threatened a miscarriage of justice if 

not considered, and lent itself to satisfactory decision on the 

existing record without any need for further fact development). 

Nothing about our situation screams "extraordinary" — what with 

Lang's lawyer having conceded below at every turn that lifting up 

to 60 pounds without help is an essential job function. And that 

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means that Lang's case plainly falls within the general raise-orwaive rule, not within the seldom-seen exception to it. See id. 

Shifting gears, Lang claims that a jury, given all the 

evidence, could fairly conclude that she could have performed 

essential unloader functions had Wal-Mart reasonably accommodated 

her either by (a) assigning her only to trailers that did not 

require unloading by hand or by (b) transferring her to a vacant 

position that did not require her to lift up to 60 pounds. And 

she criticizes the judge for ruling otherwise. But we think the 

judge got it right. 

As we just discussed, lifting up to 60 pounds manually 

is — on this record and at this stage — an essential function for 

unloaders. So Lang's first proposed accommodation — excusing her 

from manual lifting — is a non-starter, and for a simple reason. 

What she really wanted was for Wal-Mart to excuse her from having 

to perform an essential function. But under the ADA, an employer 

is not required to accommodate an employee by exempting her from 

having to discharge an essential job function. See, e.g., 

Richardson v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 81 (1st Cir. 

2010); see also Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 153 (1st 

Cir. 2006) (explaining that a proposed accommodation that 

"redefin[ed]" an employee's job description is "per se 

unreasonable"). 

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As for her other suggested accommodation — reassigning 

her to a vacant position that did not require her to lift up to 60 

pounds — Lang offered no evidence that there were any vacancies 

when she asked for an accommodation, and it was her burden to show 

as much. See Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 27 (1st 

Cir. 2001) (noting that a "[r]easonable accommodation may include 

reassignment to a vacant position," and stressing that the employee 

"bears the burden of proof in showing that such a vacant position 

exists" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Lang begs 

to differ on whether she met her burden, pointing out two things. 

For openers, she notes that her affidavit named three 

women whom Wal-Mart transferred to less labor-intensive positions 

after they had become pregnant. Wal-Mart protests that this is 

all hearsay evidence — and one cannot fend off summary judgment 

with inadmissible hearsay, Wal-Mart reminds us. See, e.g., Dávila 

v. Corporación De P.R. Para La Difusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9, 17 

(1st Cir. 2007) (stressing that "[i]t is black-letter law that 

hearsay evidence cannot be considered on summary judgment"). But 

even putting the hearsay question aside, we agree with the judge 

that the affidavit is not enough to stave off summary judgment. 

That is because Lang's affidavit did not mention the specific 

circumstances of the transfers — the document said nothing about 

the essential functions of the jobs in question, the timing of the 

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trio's transfers, the availability or not of a similar job when 

Lang made her accommodation request, etc. And absent information 

of this sort, the affidavit could not help create a fact issue 

about whether — to quote Lang's brief — "a transfer would have 

been feasible" for her. 

Next, Lang plays up how Wal-Mart placed her in a less 

physically-demanding position — the FID-Processor position — when 

she returned from maternity leave. But that is not enough for her 

to get to a jury on this issue, because she presented no evidence 

that Wal-Mart had an open FID-Processor job (or any other lightduty job) when she made an accommodation request, eight months 

earlier — and employers like Wal-Mart are not obliged to create a 

job opening so a disabled employee can work. See Phelps, 251 F.3d 

at 27. 

In a last ditch effort to save her ADA claim, Lang argues 

that we must reverse the grant of summary judgment, because WalMart did not engage in an "interactive process." Sure, an 

employee's accommodation request can "sometimes" trigger a duty on 

the employer's part to talk with the employee, with the goal of 

finding a way to reasonably accommodate her disability. See, e.g., 

EEOC v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 

2014). But here is the problem for Lang: the "omission" of an 

interactive process "is of no moment if the record forecloses a 

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finding" that the employee could do the essential "duties of the 

job, with or without reasonable accommodation," see Kvorjak v. 

Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) — which, for reasons already 

given, is the case here. Thus Lang's interactive-process argument 

comes up short. 

The net result of all this is that because Lang failed 

to create a trialworthy issue as to whether she could have 

performed an essential function of her job — manually lifting up 

to 60 pounds — with or without a reasonable accommodation, the 

judge rightly granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on the ADA 

claim. 

So on to the state-law claims we go. 

STATE-LAW CLAIMS 

Reader Alert 

As we mentioned a few pages ago, Lang also brought statelaw claims of unlawful disability discrimination and retaliation 

against Wal-Mart, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 354-A:7 

(discrimination), 354-A:19 (retaliation) — claims that the judge 

likewise booted out on summary judgment. Lang asks us to reverse. 

But before weighing in, we must make a short detour to make a 

couple of observations. 

The parties — who fight like mad on most issues — 

actually do agree on a few things. Like the judge, they assume 

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that because Lang essentially seeks to craft her state-law 

discrimination and retaliation claims from indirect evidence, a 

federal court must analyze these claims using the burden-shifting 

regime devised by our Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) — more on this regime later. 

Like the judge, they also assume that New Hampshire and federal 

courts apply McDonnell Douglas the same way. And like the judge, 

they assume that the prima-facie elements for discrimination and 

retaliation claims are the same under state and federal law — more 

about these elements in a bit. Anyhow, these are all legallyintricate issues, involving a dizzying array of jargon-filled 

statutes (with the federal and state statutes not always matching 

up word for word) and caselaw.3 And we wonder whether state and 

federal law perfectly align on every issue. Still, following the 

judge's and the parties' lead, we too will assume — without holding

— that New Hampshire law is as they say it is. 

With these words of caution, we trudge on. 

Burden-Shifting Explained 

Under the McDonnell Douglas regime, Lang must first 

establish the prima-facie elements for both discrimination and 

 

3 Deciding what New Hampshire's disability statute requires is a 

state-law statutory-interpretation question, naturally — but it is 

a question neither party raises. 

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retaliation (we will say what those elements are shortly). See In 

re Seacoast Fire Equip. Co., 777 A.2d 869, 872 (N.H. 2001). If 

she does, Wal-Mart must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the complained-about action. See id. And if Wal-Mart 

satisfies its burden, Lang must then show that the reason is 

pretextual, see id. — though "a reason cannot be proved to be 

[pretextual] unless it is shown both that the reason was false, 

and that [a prohibited criterion] was the real reason," see St. 

Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).4 On this 

last point, we see that 

[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward 

by the [employer] (particularly if disbelief is 

accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together 

with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to 

show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the 

[employer's] proffered reasons will permit [, though not 

compel,] the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of 

intentional discrimination, and . . . no additional 

proof of discrimination is required. 

In re Seacoast Fire Equip. Co., 777 A.2d at 873 (quoting St. Mary's 

Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511) (all but the first alteration in 

original). 

 

4 See also Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 

F.3d 328, 335 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr.); 

Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir. 1991) 

(stating that "[i]t is not enough for a plaintiff merely to impugn 

the veracity of the employer's justification; he must elucidate 

specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason 

given is not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the 

employer's real motive" (internal quotations omitted)). 

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Time to roll up our sleeves and delve into the 

discrimination and retaliation issues. 

Discrimination 

 Proceeding (as we said we would) on the arguendo 

assumption that Granite State disability-discrimination law 

parallels federal law, we take the prima-facie elements as argued 

to us: i.e., that Lang (at step one in the McDonnell Douglas 

analysis) must show that (a) she was disabled as defined by the 

ADA; that (b) she was qualified to do the essential functions of 

her job with or without a reasonable accommodation; and that 

(c) she suffered an adverse-employment action "in whole or in part 

because of [her] disability." See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. 

Co., 696 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2012). 

"The simplest way to decide a case is often the best," 

we have noted. Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 717 F.3d 

242, 248 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 

560, 564 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (R. Arnold, J.)). And that is true 

here: Zeroing in on prima-facie element (b), we easily conclude 

that Lang's discrimination claim fails because, as we have already 

seen, the summary-judgment record does not show that she could 

perform the essential function of her job — manually lifting up to 

60 pounds — with or without a reasonable accommodation. In other 

words, what we have said about her ADA claim disposes of her 

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discrimination claim at the first step of McDonnell Douglas (a.k.a, 

the prima-facie step) — so we need not run through the rest of the 

burden-shifting test. 

One state-law claim down, one to go. 

Retaliation 

Again indulging the judge's and the parties' assumption 

that New Hampshire law on retaliation claims like Lang's mirrors 

federal law, we take the prima-facie requirements as presented to 

us (without of course suggesting whether this is — or is not — an 

accurate statement of state law): i.e., that Lang must show that 

(a) she engaged in protected activity; that (b) a materiallyadverse action by the employer followed; and that (c) a causal 

link exists between the two. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of 

Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004).5

To simplify matters we assume for argument's sake that 

Lang established a prima-facie case — i.e., that (a) her 

accommodation request and NHCHR filing constitute protected 

activity; that (b) her termination qualifies as an adverseemployment action (termination is the adverse-employment action of 

which she complains); and that (c) a causal link connects these 

events. And we assume too that Wal-Mart, in turn, offered a 

 

5 Calero-Cerezo is the case the judge quoted and Lang relies on. 

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legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the termination — i.e., her 

failure, despite repeated requests, to provide the required 

medical papers to support her leave (she does not really challenge 

the idea that a failure of that sort could constitute an aboveboard reason for the termination). 

So, having assumed without deciding that Lang satisfied 

the first step of McDonnell Douglas (establishing a prima-facie 

case of retaliation) and that Wal-Mart satisfied the second step 

(providing a permissible, nonretaliatory reason for the 

termination), we are left with the third step and the question of 

pretext. To reach trial on her retaliation claim, Lang must show 

that Wal-Mart's given reason for the termination amounted to a 

pretext for unlawful retaliation — bearing in mind (as we said) 

that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for [retaliation]' 

unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that 

[retaliation] was the real reason." St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 

U.S. at 515 (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). 

In trying to show this, Lang does not deny that WalMart's stated reason had a basis in fact: she concedes — or at 

least does not contest — that she never turned over the requested 

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documents, a violation that is a terminable offense.6 And she does 

not argue that Wal-Mart treated similarly-situated violators of 

similarly-serious work rules differently, keeping them — but not 

her — on the payroll.7 Instead she contends that a jury could 

infer pretext and retaliatory termination in either of two ways — 

or both: 

The first way is fairly complicated, involving several 

parts. Bear with us now, please, as we go through them.8

 Part 1 — Wal-Mart either denied her workers' comp claim on 

its own or pushed the carrier to deny it. 

 Part 2 — Wal-Mart extended Lang's light-duty assignment, 

forcing her to take an unpaid leave so that she could transfer 

to Florida with her husband (Wal-Mart, she reminds us, had a 

policy of not transferring employees on light duty). 

 

6 Cf. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (declaring that "[i]n assessing 

pretext, a court's focus must be on the perception of the 

decisionmaker, that is, whether the employer believed its stated 

reason to be credible" (internal quotations and citation 

omitted)); id. at 828-29 (holding that statutes banning 

"retaliation for exercising rights guaranteed by law" do not, for 

example, "'clothe the complainant with immunity for past and 

present inadequacies'" or for "'unsatisfactory performance'" 

(quoting Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 840 F.2d 1387, 1391 

(8th Cir. 1988))). 

7 Cf. García v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 535 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 

2008) (noting that one can show pretext "by producing evidence 

that [the] plaintiff was treated differently from similarly 

situated employees"). 

8 Fyi: The quotes to come are from her brief. 

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 Part 3 — Wal-Mart insisted that she have a Florida doctor 

fill out forms to verify the need for the leave, even though 

no doctor would treat her "work-related injury" and sign the 

required forms, all because the carrier had refused to 

"acknowledge its liability for her medical bills" (given the 

claim denial). 

 Part 4 — Having "created a situation that Lang could not 

escape from," Wal-Mart then used her failure to send the forms 

as a pretext for "fir[ing] an annoying employee who asserted 

her rights under the ADA too often." 

For simplicity, we will refer to this as the "Wal-Mart-contrivance 

theory." 

The second way is more straightforward. As Lang sees 

it, comments by Rose and Ronaghan (discussed again below) reveal 

animus, giving rise to an inference that Wal-Mart came up with a 

phony explanation for the termination — that retaliation was the 

real reason behind Wal-Mart's decision. For convenience, we will 

refer to this as the "improper-comments theory." 

Though we give Lang points for creativity, her arguments 

just do not work. 

Wal-Mart-Contrivance Theory 

It should go without saying — but we say it anyway — 

that a party cannot ward off summary judgment with "proffers that 

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depend . . . 'on arrant speculation, optimistic surmise, or 

farfetched inference.'" See Fragoso v. López, 991 F.2d 878, 887 

(1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 

(1st Cir. 1991)). Yet that is all Lang gives us here. 

Take the denial of her workers' comp claim (part 1 of 

her multipart theory). Lang's thesis is that Wal-Mart — driven by 

retaliatory rage — nixed that claim on its own or in concert with 

the carrier. For evidence of this theory, she points to one of 

her answers to interrogatories, which states that Rose spoke "one 

on one" with Lang's doctor and with the claims adjuster. Surely, 

she argues, these chats show that something sinister was afoot 

during the workers' comp process — which (as she tells it) suggests 

that (a) Wal-Mart had it in for her ever since her accommodation 

request and NHCHR filing and that (b) Wal-Mart pounced on her 

failure to file the required forms to mask its illegal motive for 

getting rid of her. 

The stumbling block for Lang is that she highlights no 

evidence on what the participants talked about during those "one 

on one[s]" — she, for instance, directs us to no discovery (e.g., 

a deposition of Rose) that pins down whether what Rose said was 

sinister (goading the adjuster or the carrier into denying Lang's 

claim) or benign (giving the adjuster Lang's basic employment info, 

like when she started working for Wal-Mart and what her job duties 

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were). What Lang hopes to do is to close a chasmal gap between 

her retaliation theory and proffered facts by floating the sinister 

possibility. But to escape summary judgment, she must deal in 

what is "probable," not just in what is "possible"; "[s]imply 

allowing for a possibility" — our cases say — "does not make it 

more likely than not that the possibility happened." See Tropigas 

de P.R., Inc., 637 F.3d at 58. At best for Lang, her interrogatory 

answer about the tête-à-têtes may "fuel speculation" that WalMart's Rose might have pushed the carrier to deny the workers' 

comp claim (which, again, is one of Lang's hunches for what might 

have happened), but that is "insufficient" to establish a triable 

issue for the jury, see id. — after all, and as we have already 

pointed out, a litigant like Lang "who bears the burden of proof 

on an issue cannot defeat summary judgment by relying on 

speculation about the facts," Cahoon v. Shelton, 647 F.3d 18, 27 

n.6 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp., 775 

F.3d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that "[s]peculation 

about mere possibilities" will not stop summary judgment). So 

despite Lang's best guesswork, the denial of her workers' comp 

claim does not allow a jury to make a rational, nonconjectural 

finding that Wal-Mart's given reason for her termination was a 

pretext for retaliation. See generally Curran v. Dep't of Justice, 

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813 F.2d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that "[g]uesswork" has 

"no place" in the summary-judgment "calculus"). 

Now consider Rose's decision to extend Lang's light-duty 

work (part 2 of her multipart theory). That decision suggests 

illegal animus on Wal-Mart's part because Rose made that call 

solely to stop Lang from transferring to the Everglade State — or 

so the argument goes. But in her deposition, Lang herself said 

that she thought Rose believed that "if she extended my [light 

duty]" then "I'd keep my income," which is hardly suggestive of a 

forbidden motive — at least Lang spends no time explaining how it 

is. Ultimately, Lang's inability to highlight "definite" and 

"competent" evidence supporting this aspect of her animus theory 

proves to be her undoing. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822 (declaring 

that "[o]n issues where" the summary-judgment opponent "bears the 

ultimate burden of proof," she "must present definite, competent 

evidence to rebut the motion"); see also Pérez v. Lorraine Enters., 

Inc., 769 F.3d 23, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2014) (ditto). 

With parts 1 and 2 of the Wal-Mart-contrivance theory 

out of the way, Lang's entire multipart argument falls like a house 

of cards. Enough said on that. 

Improper-Comments Theory 

Unfortunately for Lang, her improper-comments theory 

does not hold together, either. Start with Ronaghan's comment — 

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that Lang's "pregnancy was a liability" and that she should "apply 

for FMLA" leave (leave that she did apply for and get, for what it 

is worth): Ronaghan made this comment in November 2010, while 

Lang got terminated in August 2012. And Lang never explains how 

a statement that preceded her termination by nearly two years has 

any value in support of her retaliation charge. On top of that, 

there is no evidence that Ronaghan played a part in the termination 

decision — Lang speculates that Ronaghan could have "influence[d] 

the decisionmaker (Rose) because [Ronaghan] worked in the human 

resources department with Rose," but more than speculation of this 

sort is required to save her from summary judgment. See, e.g., 

Cahoon, 647 F.3d at 27 n.6; Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 

Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (making clear that "conclusory 

allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation" 

cannot block summary judgment). Consequently Ronaghan's remark 

cannot give rise to an inference that Wal-Mart's termination reason 

was a pretext hiding a retaliatory motive. 

Nor can Rose's comments — that (a) "[i]f I had to 

accommodate you [Lang], I'd have to accommodate the rest" and that 

(b) Lang had put herself in the position of being unable able to 

find a doctor to sign the required forms: Again, the record does 

not show that Lang was a "qualified individual" with a disability, 

i.e., one who could have performed the essential functions of her 

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job with or without a reasonable accommodation. And Lang never 

convincingly explains why statement (a) — basically expressing 

worry that accommodating one nonqualified person may require WalMart to accommodate others — shows that Wal-Mart's termination 

explanation was merely a pretext disguising retaliatory animus. 

So too with statement (b): she never persuasively explains why 

Rose's putting-yourself-in-that-position comment is sufficient 

proof that Wal-Mart's termination rationale camouflaged illegal 

retaliation, given how the Langs did voluntarily move to Florida 

while Lang's health and job status were still very much up in the 

air. 

With that and at long last, we affirm the grant of 

summary judgment on the retaliation claim. 

WINDUP 

Having reviewed Lang's claims with care, we uphold the 

entry of summary judgment for Wal-Mart. 

Affirmed. 

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