Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02108/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02108-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KAREN MADELINE SMITH, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 17-cv-02108-CAB (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 17, 20) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Cathy Ann 

Bencivengo, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil 

Local Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. 

On October 13, 2017, plaintiff Karen Madeline Smith filed a Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

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decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2010, plaintiff filed a prior application for SSI, alleging disability 

beginning January 1, 2007, which was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Certified 

Administrative Record [“AR”] 20, 87.) An administrative hearing was held before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Simon on December 14, 2012. (AR 20, 61-83.) As 

reflected in his April 25, 2013 decision, ALJ Simon found that plaintiff had not been under 

a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since October 4, 2010. (AR 87-96.) 

On October 16, 2013, plaintiff protectively filed another application for SSI, alleging 

disability beginning May 1, 2013. (AR 20, 202-07.) After her application was denied 

initially and upon reconsideration (AR 133-36, 141-45), plaintiff requested an 

administrative hearing before an ALJ (AR 147-49). An administrative hearing was held 

on March 3, 2016 before ALJ Valentino. (AR 31-60.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing 

with counsel, and testimony was taken from her, as well as from a medical expert (“ME”) 

and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 31-60.) 

As reflected in his April 5, 2016 hearing decision, ALJ Valentino found that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since October 16, 

2013, the date her application was filed. (AR 17-30.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner on August 29, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, ALJ Valentino followed the Commissioner’s five-step 

sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that 

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plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 16, 2013, the 

application date.1

 (AR 22.) 

At step two, ALJ Valentino found that plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: low back pain with significant osteoarthritis at L5-S1; status post left 

shoulder surgery and status post left wrist surgery with full recovery; and major depression. 

(AR 23.) 

At step three, ALJ Valentino found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the 

impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 23.) 

Next, ALJ Valentino determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) “except unskilled.” 

In addition, plaintiff could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and could only 

occasionally reach overhead with her left upper extremity. (AR 23-24.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, ALJ Valentino adduced and accepted 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC 

would be able to perform her past relevant work as a cashier and a checker, both as actually 

done and as generally done in the national economy. (AR 26.) 

Based on his determination that plaintiff could return to her past relevant work, ALJ 

Valentino concluded that plaintiff had not been disabled since October 16, 2013, her 

application date. (AR 26-27.) 

DISPUTED ISSUES 

As reflected in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the disputed issues that 

plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

                                               

1

 SSI is not payable prior to the month following the month in which the application 

is filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. 

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 1. Whether ALJ Valentino erred when he applied a presumption of nondisability in his 2016 administrative decision, based on ALJ Simon’s 2013 administrative 

decision. (See ECF No. 17-1 at 3-6.) 

2. Whether ALJ Valentino’s RFC limitation to unskilled work sufficiently 

accommodated plaintiff’s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace. 

(See ECF No. 17-1 at 6-8; ECF No. 22 at 3-6.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

 A. The ALJ did not erroneously apply a presumption of non-disability. 

Plaintiff contends preliminarily that ALJ Valentino erroneously applied the 

presumption of non-disability set forth in Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988). 

(ECF No. 17-1 at 3.) In Chavez, the Ninth Circuit held that principles of res judicata apply 

to previous administrative decisions regarding disability and impose an obligation on the 

claimant to come forward with new and material evidence of changed circumstances in 

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order to overcome the presumption of continuing non-disability. Id. at 693. Moreover, the 

previous ALJ’s findings concerning RFC, education, and work experience are entitled to 

some preclusive effect, and such findings cannot be reconsidered by a subsequent ALJ 

absent new information not presented to the first ALJ. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 

539 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Chavez, 844 F.2d at 694). 

Here, plaintiff contends that ALJ Valentino’s finding of a “severe mental 

impairment,” which was not present in the 2013 administrative decision, constituted 

changed circumstances and thus overcame the presumption of non-disability. (See id. at 

3-5, citing Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693). As such, plaintiff contends it was erroneous for ALJ 

Valentino to state that plaintiff had “failed to overcome the presumption of nondisability.” 

(See AR 26.) 

In response, the Commissioner concedes that plaintiff’s new “severe mental 

impairment” constituted changed circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption. 

(See ECF No. 20-1 at 7, citing Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9).) However, the Commissioner 

contends that ALJ Valentino “did not apply the Chavez presumption of continuing 

nondisability to deny [plaintiff’s] claim, but instead conducted a full review of the new 

evidence in concluding that plaintiff was not disabled.” (ECF No. 20-1 at 7.) The Court 

concurs. ALJ Valentino did in fact conduct a full review of the new evidence before 

concluding that plaintiff was not disabled. (See AR 22-27.) Accordingly, the Court finds 

that, regardless of ALJ Valentino’s statement that plaintiff had failed to overcome the 

presumption of non-disability, reversal is not warranted based on ALJ Valentino’s 

allegedly erroneous application of the presumption. 

B. The ALJ erred when he failed to incorporate the moderate mental 

limitation he found into his RFC determination. 

In connection with his Listings determination, ALJ Valentino made certain findings 

with respect to the “paragraph B” criteria that he stated were supported by the treating 

records, the findings and opinions of the consulting psychiatrist (Dr. Glassman), and the 

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opinion of the ME (Dr. Gordy). (See AR 23.) Plaintiff contends that ALJ Valentino’s RFC 

limitation to unskilled work2

 did not fully capture one of these findings—i.e., that .plaintiff 

had “moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.” (See ECF 

No. 17-1 at 6-8; ECF No. 22 at 3-6.) 

 The Commissioner contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stubbs-Danielson 

is “controlling and on point” with respect to this disputed issue. (See ECF No. 20-1 at 9-

12.) There, two doctors had assessed the claimant with moderate limitations in mental 

functioning. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173. An examining physician (Dr. 

McCollum) found that the claimant was “moderately limited” in her ability “to perform at 

a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods” but did not 

assess whether she could perform unskilled work on a sustained basis. Id. A state-agency 

reviewing psychologist (Dr. Eather) had identified the claimant’s limitation in pace, as well 

as moderate limitations in several other areas of mental functioning but also found the 

claimant capable of carrying out “simple tasks.” Id. Based on this medical opinion 

evidence, the ALJ assessed the claimant as having the RFC for simple, routine, repetitive 

work and he did not include any moderate limitations in pace or other mental areas of 

functioning in his hypothetical to the VE. See id. at 1171, 1173-74. In doing so, the ALJ 

did not reject the two doctors’ findings of moderate limitations in pace and other areas of 

mental functioning. Id. at 1174. Rather, the ALJ “translated” the claimant’s condition, 

“including the pace and mental limitations, into the only concrete restrictions available to 

him — [the state-agency reviewing psychologist’s] recommended restriction to ‘simple 

tasks.’” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ’s limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive” 

work sufficiently accommodated the medical-opinion evidence that the claimant had a 

                                               

2

 The Commissioner defines “unskilled work” as “work which needs little or no 

judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.968(a).

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“moderate” limitation in pace and “other mental limitations regarding attention, 

concentration, and adaption.” See id. at 1173-74. 

 Here, unlike in Stubbs-Danielson, there is no medical opinion evidence that ALJ 

Valentino was adopting when he made the determination that, despite the moderate 

limitation with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace that he had found based on the 

ME’s testimony, plaintiff still was capable of performing unskilled work. Dr. Glassman 

had opined in her December 18, 2013 “Psychiatric Disability Evaluation” report that 

plaintiff was “capable of understanding and following at least simple instructions.” (AR 

278.) However, she had only found that plaintiff had “mild impairment in her capacity to 

maintain concentration, persistence, and pace, and to adapt to changes and stresses in a 

workplace setting.” (Id.) Likewise, the State Agency physicians had only found that 

plaintiff had mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (See AR 

107, 122.) Although the ME had opined at the administrative hearing based on his review 

of plaintiff’s medical records through May 2014 that giving plaintiff the “benefit of the 

doubt,” she would have “moderate” limitation in her ability to maintain “concentration and 

pace” (and ALJ Valentino had adopted this finding), the ME did not assess whether 

plaintiff could perform unskilled work on a sustained basis. (See AR 45-46.) 

 The Commissioner maintains that ALJ Valentino’s limitation to unskilled work 

adequately captured the ALJ’s finding of a moderate limitation with regard to 

concentration, persistence, or pace and that Stubbs-Danielson “establishes unequivocally 

that an ALJ need not include moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace 

in a hypothetical to a VE.” (See ECF No. 20-1 at 10-11.) The Court disagrees. The Ninth 

Circuit expressly stated in Stubbs-Danielson that “an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant 

adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the 

assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.” See

Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added); see also Turner v. Berryhill, 705 F. 

App’x 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Stubbs-Danielson for same proposition); Rogers v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 490 F. App’x 15, 17-18 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing StubbsCase 3:17-cv-02108-CAB-RNB Document 26 Filed 11/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
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Danielson for the proposition that “the RFC adequately captures restrictions in broad 

functional areas if it is consistent with the concrete limitations in the medical opinions” 

(emphasis added)).3

 

 The Court therefore finds that Stubbs-Danielson is distinguishable and that ALJ 

Valentino was not qualified to make the determination that a limitation to unskilled work 

adequately captured his finding of a moderate limitation with regard to concentration, 

persistence, or pace. See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) 

(recognizing that an ALJ is “not qualified as a medical expert”). Accordingly, the Court 

concurs with plaintiff that ALJ Valentino erred when he failed to incorporate the moderate 

mental limitation he found into his RFC determination and his hypothetical to the VE. See 

Valentine v. Commissioner, 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (The ALJ’s RFC 

determination and hypothetical question “must set out all the limitations and restrictions of 

the particular claimant.” (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)); 

see also Lubin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 507 F. App’x 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“Although the ALJ found that Lubin suffered moderate difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ erred by not including this limitation in the 

residual functional capacity determination or in the hypothetical question to the vocational 

expert.”); Brink v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 F. App’x. 211, 212 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(hypothetical question limiting claimant to “simple, repetitive work” did not adequately 

                                               

3

 The Commissioner also contends that the Ninth Circuit “addressed this precise 

issue” in Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). (See ECF No. 20-1 at 11-12.) 

The Court disagrees. The issue in Hoopai was whether satisfaction of the step-two 

threshold requirement that a claimant prove her limitations are severe was dispositive of 

the step-five determination of whether the non-exertional limitations were sufficiently 

severe such as to invalidate the ALJ’s exclusive use of the grids without the assistance of 

a vocational expert. See id. at 1076. Unlike the ALJ in Hoopai, the ALJ here agreed with 

the ME’s opinion that plaintiff’s mental impairment resulted in a moderate limitation, but 

without explanation, he disregarded that limitation assessed by the ME when formulating 

plaintiff’s RFC. Thus, the Hoopai case is inapposite.

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capture moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace); cf. Van Sickle v. 

Astrue, 385 F. App’x 739, 741 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding ALJ erred by failing to include in 

his RFC the moderate mental limitations reported by the examining psychologist and the 

non-examining state medical consultant). 

 Further, the Court finds that ALJ Valentino’s error was not harmless. At the 

administrative hearing, plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE whether a hypothetical person with 

a moderate limitation in concentration could perform the cashier and checker jobs the VE 

had identified as corresponding to plaintiff’s past relevant work. The VE responded “no.” 

(AR 57.) It follows that ALJ Valentino’s determination at step four of the sequential 

evaluation process that plaintiff could return to her past relevant work cannot be affirmed. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

 The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., 

Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Remand for 

further proceedings is warranted where additional administrative proceedings could 

remedy defects in the decision. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 

1984); Lewin, 654 F.2d at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where 

no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. 

Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, 

Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would 

unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the disabled plaintiff is entitled, Bilby 

v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Here, the ALJ’s non-disability determination was based on his step four finding that 

plaintiff could return to her past relevant work. Thus, the ALJ never reached step five of 

the sequential evaluation process. The Court has concluded that remand for further 

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proceedings is warranted because additional administrative proceedings could remedy the 

defects in the ALJ’s decision. 

 The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for remand be DENIED,

and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding 

this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). See id. 

Dated: November 20, 2018 

 _________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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