Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00885/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00885-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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In the alternative, Graves has moved to amend the Court’s findings under Fed. R. Civ. 1

P. 52(b). This Court did not enter any findings and conclusions under Rule 52; accordingly, Rule

52(b) is inapplicable.

 562 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2009). 2

 959 P.2d 311 (Cal. 1998). 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER DALE GRAVES,

Petitioner,

vs.

MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden (A), Mule

Creek State Prison,

Respondent.

No. 2:06-cv-00885-JKS

ORDER

[Re: Motion at Docket No. 56]

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At Docket No. 56, Petitioner, Peter Dale Graves, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

timely moved under Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend or alter the judgment

entered herein at Docket No. 55.1

II. ISSUES RAISED

Graves argues that: (1) the determination that his second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh,

eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth grounds are procedurally barred was contrary to the

holding in Townsend v. Knowles (In re Robbins is too vague and ambiguous to constitute an 2 3

adequate and independent state ground); (2) this Court erred by combining and considering

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 1 of 9
Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003); 4

see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 417 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005); 389 Orange Street

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999); see generally 11 Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 (2d ed.).

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2617 n.5 (2008) (citing 5

and quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc., § 2810.1, pp. 127-28 (2d ed. 1995)).

2

Graves’s third and thirteenth grounds together; (3) this Court applied an incorrect legal standard

in determining Graves did not establish prejudice sufficient to warrant relief from his procedural

default; and (4) this Court prematurely and erroneously denied a Certificate of Appealability.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) the motion is

necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) the

moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) granting the

motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) there is an intervening change in

controlling law. A Rule 59 motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise 4

arguments that could have been raised, or present evidence that could have been presented, prior

to the entry of judgment. 

5

Graves has not cited any intervening change in controlling authority or presented any new

evidence in support of his Petition. Thus, the disposition of the pending motion turns on whether

the decision of this Court was clearly erroneous that, if uncorrected, would result in a manifest

injustice. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that its prior decision was neither clearly

erroneous, nor did it result in a manifest injustice. Therefore, the motion at Docket No. 56 will

be denied.

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 2 of 9
Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1208. 6

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IV. DISCUSSION

Initially, the Cour(“t notes that, to a significant extent, Graves’s arguments are nothing

more than a rehash of arguments that were, or could have been raised prior to the entry of

judgment in this case, i.e., in his Petition or Traverse. Thus, to the extent that this Court has

previously considered and rejected Graves’s arguments, the Court declines to revisit them.

Second, Graves misunderstands the function and role of this Court in a federal habeas

proceeding. Contrary to Graves’s contentions, this Court did, in fact, review the voluminous

documents filed by Graves in this case, as well as the record in the case. This Court, applying the

standards imposed by the Antiterroism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and

Supreme Court precedent, concluded that the decisions of the California courts were not contrary

to or objectively unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law, i.e., more than

simply erroneous, and that Graves did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the

factual findings of the state courts were erroneous.

Townsend v. Knowles. The issue presented to and decided by the Ninth Circuit in

Townsend was: what constituted a “substantial delay” under the timeliness rule was not

sufficiently clear and certain to be an adequate state bar in 2001, when the California court found

Townsend’s petition to be untimely. As noted in the Memorandum Decision, once properly

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raised by the Respondent, the burden to place the adequate independent state ground defense in

issue shifted to Graves. This burden may be met by asserting specific factual allegations that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 3 of 9
Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). 7

See Exxon Shipping Co. 8

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 201 (2006). 9

Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1207-08 (citing King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 10

2006)).

4

inconsistent application of the rule. Graves did not raise the issue of the adequacy of the 7

California timeliness rule to this Court. Instead, Graves chose to challenge the application of the

timeliness rule on three bases: (1) collateral estoppel; (2) that he did, in fact, show good cause for

the delay in his state court petitions; and (3) that Robbins applies solely to capital cases. Clearly,

Graves could have raised the adequacy issue prior to the entry of the judgment in this case. 

Consequently, the Court declines to address it. Moreover, the time that lapsed between the time

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Graves’s conviction became final and when he filed his original habeas petition in the

Sacramento County Superior Court exceeded 11 months. In the context of the timeliness of

filing habeas petitions, the Supreme Court has “found no authority suggesting, nor found any

convincing reason to believe, that California would consider an unjustified or unexplained 6-

month delay ‘reasonable.’” 

9

To the extent that Graves argues that Robbins is inapplicable to non-capital cases, his

reliance on Townsend is misplaced. Townsend limited its holding to inapplicability of the

presumption of untimeliness in Robbins in non-capital cases. Neither the Supreme Court, the 10

Ninth Circuit nor the California Supreme Court have ever held that the timeliness rule applied in

Robbins did not apply to non-capital cases. 

Combining Third and Thirteenth Grounds. Graves’s argument is essentially that this

Court addressed these grounds as presented to the California court and disregarded the facts and

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 4 of 9
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing cases). 11

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). 12

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). 13

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arguments he presented in his Amended Petition in this Court. This Court agrees that Graves

attempted to modify and/or expand upon his arguments in his Amended Petition in this Court. 

That does not, however, require this Court to reconsider its decision on the merits. To the extent

that Graves presented his claims to this Court based upon facts and arguments that were not

presented to the state courts, he failed to properly exhaust those claims, and this Court is

precluded from considering the claims. Exhaustion of state remedies requires the petitioner to

11

fairly present federal claims to the state courts in order to give the state the opportunity to pass

upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights. A petitioner fairly presents a 12

claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper

factual and legal basis for the claim. Although Graves fairly presented the third and thirteenth 13

grounds to the California appellate courts on his direct appeal, Graves did not raise the additional

facts or arguments that he raised in his Amended Petition and now argues this Court erred in not

considering. Thus, Graves failed to fully exhaust his state-court remedies by not presenting the

same legal arguments and the factual basis to the state courts that he presented in his Amended

Petition. Therefore, to the extent, this Court may have erred in addressing these grounds on the

basis it did, such error was harmless.

Standard for Prejudice (Actual Innocence). Graves argues that the determination that he

failed to show actual innocence differs from the legal standard under the Supreme Court decision

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 5 of 9
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539–40 (2006). 14

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo- 15

Reyes, 504 U.S.1 (1992), superceded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), as stated in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). 16

Id. at 327. 17

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). 18

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in House and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the Supreme Court’s holding in 14

Townsend. Graves’s reliance on House is misplaced, and the language he quoted from 15

Townsend has either been overruled or substantially cabined as to its applicability by statutory

amendment. 

A petitioner may overcome a procedural default by (1) producing “new reliable evidence

[of innocence]—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts,

or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial,” and (2) showing “that it is more 16

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new

evidence.” To demonstrate actual innocence under Schlup, a petitioner must show “factual

17

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”18

In House, the petitioner introduced new evidence, and the district court held an

evidentiary hearing. In this case, Graves has not proffered any new evidence in support of his

innocence claim. His claim of innocence is based upon his view that the evidence was fabricated

and untrue and that the transcripts were altered. His argument, reduced to its essence, is that the

state courts should not have accepted the evidence upon which they relied. Graves’s Petition

does not present a factual dispute to be resolved by this Court. Graves’s arguments simply fall

far short of the showing required under Schlup, Bousley, and House. In order for Graves to

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 6 of 9
Jackson v. Washington, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in the original). 19

See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 340. 20

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 21

Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). 22

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prevail in this proceeding, this Court would have to accept Graves’s version of the facts as

correct and reject the facts as found by the state courts. This, this Court may not so do. 

In the context of determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutional standard

is whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Graves misperceives the role of a federal court in a habeas proceeding challenging a 19

state-court conviction. This Court is precluded from either re-weighing the evidence or assessing

the credibility of witnesses. The role of this Court is to simply determine whether there is any

evidence, if accepted as credible by the state court, sufficient to sustain the finding of the state

court. The factual findings of the state courts are binding on this Court unless overcome by 20

clear and convincing evidence. This presumption applies to state trial courts and appellate 21

courts alike. Applying these principles to Graves’s arguments, Graves has clearly failed to 22

shoulder this burden. 

To the extent that Graves contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Graves has not

made the showing required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that—

(A) the claim relies on— 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 7 of 9
 Graves did not request an evidentiary hearing at any time before entry of final judgment 23

in this case. Thus, the request is untimely.

See Rules—Section 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

24

See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1. 25

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or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Consequently, Graves is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.23

Certificate of Appealability. Under the rules, as amended effective December 1, 2009,

this Court is required to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the petitioner. Insofar as Graves contends he is entitled to a certificate of 24

appealability, his remedy is to make a request to the Court of Appeals.25

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Graves is not entitled to Relief under Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion to Amend the Findings and/or Alter the

Judgment from the Court’s Memorandum Decision and Judgment at Docket No. 56 is DENIED.

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 8 of 9
 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (a COA should be 26

granted where the applicant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right,” i.e., when “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further”) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). 

See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1. 27

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed to the 26

Court of Appeals.27

Dated: April 26, 2010.

/s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-00885-JKS Document 58 Filed 04/27/10 Page 9 of 9