Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01740/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01740-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MDR

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brandeis L. LaBarbera, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 12-1740-PHX-DGC (BSB)

ORDER

On April 18, 2012, Plaintiff Brandeis L. LaBarbera, who is represented by attorneys

W. Raymond Johnson, III, and Robert M. Gregory, filed a Complaint in the Superior Court

of Maricopa County, Arizona, against Defendants State of Arizona, City of Goodyear, Eric

N. Gomez, and a variety of fictitiously named defendants. On August 15, 2012, Defendant

City of Goodyear, who is represented by attorney Lisa S. Wahlin, filed a Notice of Removal

(Doc. 1). The Court will remand this case to the Superior Court of Maricopa County.

I. Procedural Defect

All proper defendants in a state-court action must join in or consent to the notice of

removal. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.1999),

superceded in unrelated part by statute as stated in Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical

Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendant City of Goodyear indicates on the

Supplemental Cover Sheet (Doc. 1-3) that Defendants State of Arizona and Eric Gomez were

served prior to removal, but nothing in the Notice of Removal states or suggests that these

Defendants have joined in or consented to the removal.

Case 2:12-cv-01740-DGC--BSB Document 11 Filed 10/29/12 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

“Where fewer than all the defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing

party has the burden under section 1446(a) to explain affirmatively the absence of any

co-defendants in the notice of removal.” Id. Defendant City of Goodyear has failed to do

so. The Notice of Removal, therefore, is procedurally defective. See Emrich v. Touche Ross

& Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Court cannot sua sponte remand based on a non-jurisdictional defect in removal.

Kelton Arms Condominium Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1193

(9th Cir. 2003). The Court, therefore, cannot sua sponte remand on this basis.

II Jurisdictional Defect

In contrast, this Court has the duty to consider sua sponte its subject matter

jurisdiction. Cf. Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir.

2003); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the action.”); “Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and . . . the

district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms, 346 F.3d at 1192.

“The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” California

ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). The party invoking the

statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Id.

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). See also California ex rel. Lockyer, 375 F.3d

at 838. The plaintiff is the master of the claim and “may avoid federal jurisdiction by

exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. A plaintiff, therefore, may

choose to have a case heard in state court “by eschewing claims based on federal law.” Id.

at 399. See also California ex rel. Lockyer, 375 F.3d at 838-39.

Case 2:12-cv-01740-DGC--BSB Document 11 Filed 10/29/12 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises state tort causes of action for assault

and battery, sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction

of emotional distress, and negligence.

2

The Arizona Constitution protects Arizona citizens against due process violations,

unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishment. See Ariz. Const. art.

2, §§ 4, 8, 15. See also Arizona v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545, 549 (Ariz. 1986) (“It is clear that the

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 2, § 8 of the Arizona

Constitution proscribe unreasonable search and seizure by the state. . . . The Arizona

Constitution is even more explicit than its federal counterpart in safeguarding the

fundamental liberty of Arizona citizens.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

- 3 -

In its Notice of Removal, Defendant City of Goodyear states that “Plaintiff brings one

or more claims arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983.” Defendant City of Goodyear is incorrect. Although Defendant City of

Goodyear’s Notice of Removal and Civil Cover Sheet refer to § 1983 and Defendant City

of Goodyear’s Supplemental Cover Sheet refers to federal claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint does

not refer to § 1983 or federal law.

Plaintiff’s Complaint only refers to state law claims. Although Plaintiff alleges a

“Violation of Civil Rights” in Count One of her Complaint,1

 a review of Plaintiff’s

allegations in Count One clearly indicates that she is raising a claim regarding her Arizona

civil rights:

Defendant’s actions related to Defendant GOMEZ’s lewd

activity and sexual assault as described above was

discriminatory against Plaintiff and inflicted cruel and unusual

punishment upon Plaintiff, violated Plaintiff’s rights to due

process, violated Plaintiff’s protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures, violated Plaintiff’s protection against

excessive force, etc., all of which constitute a violation of

Plaintiff’s civil rights under Arizona statute(s) and others.

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶33) (Emphasis added).2

Defendant City of Goodyear, therefore, has failed to meet its burden of establishing

federal jurisdiction over this case. Thus, the Court will remand this case to the Superior

Court of Maricopa County.

. . . .

Case 2:12-cv-01740-DGC--BSB Document 11 Filed 10/29/12 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) This matter is remanded to the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona.

(2) The Clerk of Court must mail a certified copy of this Order to:

Michael K. Jeanes

Clerk of the Superior Court

Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court

201 West Jefferson

Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2205

(3) The Clerk of Court must close this case.

DATED this 26th day of October, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-01740-DGC--BSB Document 11 Filed 10/29/12 Page 4 of 4