Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02299/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Augustine Bernal Thomas,

Defendant/Movant,

v. 

United States of America,

Respondent.

No. CV 13-02299 PHX SRB (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On November 8, 2013, Movant, currently confined at the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons facility in Coleman, Florida, docketed a motion seeking to vacate or set aside his 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Movant contends his federal criminal conviction 

must be vacated because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

Respondent docketed a response to the motion on August 28, 2014. Any reply to the 

answer to the motion was due September 28, 2014.

I Procedural Background

An indictment returned July 6, 2010, charged Movant and two co-defendants with 

one count of conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice by retaliating against a witness 

and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(f). See Criminal Doc. 1. 

Movant and his co-defendants were also indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit 

obstruction of justice by assaulting, i.e., retaliating against, a witness for his testimony in 

a criminal matter, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b)(1) and (c) 

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and 2. Id.1 

On February 16, 2011, a jury found Movant guilty on both counts of the 

indictment. See Criminal Doc. 71. The probation office calculated a sentencing range of 

360 months imprisonment to life imprisonment. See Criminal Doc. 92. On May 23, 

2011, Movant was sentenced to concurrent 360 month terms of imprisonment on each 

count, followed by five years of supervised release. The sentences in this matter were 

ordered to be served consecutively to the terms of imprisonment Movant was already

serving for a conviction for a 2005 assault with a deadly weapon and a 2008 seconddegree murder conviction, to which latter charge Movant pled guilty. See Criminal Doc. 

96.

Movant took a timely direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. In his direct 

appeal Movant argued the District Court erred by not excluding the testimony of the 

prosecution’s expert witness and that his sentence was unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s convictions and sentences in a memorandum 

decision entered October 17, 2012. See Criminal Doc. 117; 485 Fed. App.. 285, 2012 

 

1

“The defendant in this case is charged with agreeing with other people, and 

commanding, counseling, inducing or procuring those people, to retaliate against Jeremy Zepeda 

for testifying in a federal criminal trial.” Criminal Doc. 56.

On October 29, 2009, Defendant Augustine Bernal Thomas (“Defendant”) was an 

inmate at the Central Arizona Detention Center, operated by Corrections 

Corporation of America (“CCA”), in Florence, Arizona. Defendant was housed in 

800 Unit, Lima Pod, along with inmates Cruz Gonzales, Waylon Thompson, and 

Jeremy Zepeda. Defendant was the leader, or “rep,” of the Native American 

inmates housed in 800 Lima Pod. Inmate Jeremy Zepeda testified against his 

brother in a jury trial in U.S. v. Damien Zepeda, CR 08-1329-PHX-ROS. 

Defendant learned that the victim had testified, so Defendant called a meeting of 

all the Native American inmates of 800 Lima Pod. In that meeting, Defendant told 

the group that someone had testified against another Native and was no good.

Defendant then confronted Zepeda in front of everyone and told the group that it 

was Zepeda who had testified. Defendant told Zepeda that he was going to get 

assaulted for it, and Defendant ordered Zepeda to follow two other inmates 

(Gonzales and Thompson). Zepeda did as he was instructed and followed them to 

his own cell, where they began beating him.

 As they were beating him, Gonzales and Thompson told Zepeda that they were 

beating him because he had testified..

Doc. 57 at 3.

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WL 4918980.

In his section 2255 motion, Movant contends he was denied his right to the 

effective assistance of counsel.

II Analysis

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective 

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 

2052, [] (1984).... To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

petitioner must show 1) his attorney’s performance was unreasonable under 

prevailing professional standards; and 2) there is a reasonable probability 

that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results would have been 

different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). “Strickland

defines a reasonable probability as ‘a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996). See also United States v. 

Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). Movant must overcome a strong 

probability that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance or what could be considered sound trial strategy. United States v. Fredman, 

390 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “a reasonably competent 

attorney, whose advice is within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45 

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). In order to find that Movant was deprived of the 

effective assistance of counsel and grant him relief on this claim pursuant to section 

2255, the Court must conclude Movant’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient and 

that the deficient performance prejudiced Movant. See, e,.g., United States v. Manzo, 

675 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066-

67 (9th Cir. 2011). It is Movant’s burden to provide the Court with sufficient evidence 

from which the Court can conclude counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally 

ineffective. See, e.g., Withers, 638 F.3d at 1066-67.

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Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is unreasonable, or not “within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687, 104 S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be “highly 

deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. See also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 

240, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2002). Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his 

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United 

States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991).

Movant contends counsel did not file written discovery requests. Respondent 

argues:

counsel made comprehensive written discovery requests directly to the 

government, in accordance with Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. See Attachment A. In those written discovery requests, counsel

asked the government to provide information about evidence it intended to 

use at trial and at sentencing, any exculpatory evidence, and any evidence 

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts it intended to use at trial. See Attachment 

A. Counsel effectively represented Defendant by making written discovery 

requests directly to the government.

Doc. 15 at 4.

Movant further alleges his defense counsel did not interview witnesses at the 

prison or other witnesses suggested by Movant. Movant also maintains counsel was 

ineffective for failing to secure the testimony of Movant’s co-defendants. Respondent

avers: “Other than the two co-defendants, it is unclear what witnesses counsel should

have secured. Defendant provides no evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to show who

these witnesses might be, or what they might have added to his defense.” Id. at 5. 

Movant also asserts his counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did 

not subpoena records from CCA and failed to subpoena video surveillance. 

Respondent argues:

[C]ounsel requested comprehensive discovery from the government 

(Attachment A), which would have encompassed records and video 

surveillance from CCA, to the extent they were available, and discoverable 

under Rule 16. Defendant does not specify what records he believes 

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counsel should have obtained from CCA. He presumably complains that 

counsel did not subpoena the video surveillance of his pod taken around the 

time of the assault, about which Mr. Gammill testified at trial. Even had 

Mr. Klink attempted to subpoena the video surveillance, however, he would 

have been unsuccessful in obtaining it because the video was automatically 

recorded over and is gone. 

Id. at 6.

Movant further argues that his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not

file pretrial motions challenging the indictment or the evidence procured by the 

prosecution. However, as noted by Respondent, Movant presents no evidence showing

that the indictment or the government’s evidence was susceptible to challenge. 

Movant further asserts that his counsel was ineffective at trial because he failed to 

call “Vitorio” as a defense witness. Movant has not established how this witness might 

have aided his defense—as argued by Respondent, this individual would probably not 

have implicated himself in a criminal assault. 

Movant also alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing “to

aggressively cross-examine and impeach the government’s two non-medical witnesses, to

wit, the victim and the case manager, both of whom had provided inconsistent

information as to the assault in previous reports.” Doc. 2 at 9. However, as noted by 

Respondent, “counsel did exploit on cross-examination inconsistencies between the trial 

testimony and the reports and statements made before trial.” Doc. 15 at 7. 

Respondent argues:

Counsel also effectively drew from Zepeda that he told medical staff he 

was beaten by two inmates, that he never mentioned Defendant to the 

medical staff, and that he did not tell the medical staff Defendant had 

instructed the inmates to beat him. (RT 2/15/11 at 100-101.)

Finally, counsel drew from Zepeda that he similarly reported to nonmedical prison staff that he was beaten by two inmates, that he did not tell 

non-medical prison staff Defendant had directed the beating...

***

Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the record shows that counsel 

effectively cross-examined both Zepeda and Gammill. Through crossexamination, he brought to the jury’s attention inconsistencies between 

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their testimony and their pretrial reports and statements. He then effectively 

exploited those inconsistencies during closing argument.

Id.

Movant also complains that counsel did not respond to the government’s notice of

expert witness, did not procure witnesses to contradict the expert, permitted the expert to

testify as if he were an eyewitness, and offered no rebuttal testimony. Doc. 2 at 6-7.

Respondent argues:

When the Court wondered whether giving an expert instruction might 

elevate Gammill’s opinion to seem to be worth more than perhaps it was, 

counsel agreed. Under the circumstances, the decision not to elevate

Gammill’s testimony to that of an expert witness was professionally 

reasonable.

Counsel also attempted to preclude Gammill’s opinion that the assault was 

ordered by a rep. When the government asked Gammill whether the 

Natives would assault one of their own in this way without the rep calling 

it, counsel objected on the ground that the question invaded the province of 

the jury. (RT 2/16/11 at 186.) Counsel also attempted to preclude 

Gammill’s testimony about what he saw on video surveillance. When the

government asked Gammill to relate to the jury what he saw on the video, 

counsel objected because it was not the best evidence (presumably the best 

evidence would have been the video itself). 

Id. at 10.

Movant further claims his counsel was ineffective because an “acknowledgement 

by Gammill that Vitorio was also a ‘rep,’ and also responsible for prisoner behavior in 

the same housing unit that Petitioner was has housed in, would have shown that 

Petitioner was not the only prisoner in that housing unit with influence over prisoners.” 

Doc. 2 at 6-7. As noted by Respondent, this statement is factually incorrect as Movant’s 

counsel did elicit from Gammill that “Victorio” was in the same pod as Defendant and 

that “Victorio” was also a rep. See Criminal Doc. 108 at 194-195.

With regard to counsel’s alleged deficient performance during sentencing, Movant 

contends his counsel failed to file any documents after conviction, other than a sentencing 

memorandum, that counsel did not “file meaningful objections to Petitioner’s PSR,” and

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that counsel erred by tacitly agreed “to the government’s sentencing position at the 

sentencing hearing rather than vociferously objecting to it”. Doc. 2 at 10. Movant also 

alleges counsel failed to demand “a hearing on the question of whether or not Petitioner 

deserved a minor role reduction.” Id.2

As noted by Respondent, Movant has not established that counsel’s alleged 

“errors”, with regard to filing documents after Movant’s conviction or his asserted failure 

to docket “meaningful” objections to the PSR, were prejudicial. Additionally, as noted 

by Respondent:

Counsel pointed out that the victim’s injuries were not life-threatening, that 

the co-defendants received dramatically lower sentences, and that 

Defendant had significant deficits of mental, emotional, and physical 

health. (CR 93 at 2.) Counsel also argued that “the recommended Guideline 

ranges in this matter for this Defendant is far in excess of that which is 

necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the 

law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence from further 

crimes.” (CR 93 at 2.)

 The Sentencing Memorandum clearly shows that counsel did not agree 

tacitly, or otherwise, with the government’s sentencing position. Counsel 

stated, “To suggest, as the government does, that the sentence 

recommended by the presentence writer and as calculated pursuant to the 

Guidelines is reasonable, defies, in counsel’s view, common sense.” (CR 93 

at 2.) Counsel also referred to the government’s sentencing position as a

proposal to “lock the Defendant in a cage for the rest of his life.” (CR 93 at 

2.) He further stated, “If the government was serious about training and 

treatment, the government would recommend a less severe sentence to 

afford Defendant the opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of training and 

treatment upon release.” (CR 93 at 2-3.)

 

2 Respondent avers:

In fact, the only evidence in the record regarding Defendant’s role in this case, the 

testimony of Zepeda and Gammill, supports the upward adjustment that was 

assessed in the PSR because Defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or 

supervisor in the assault. Not only is there no support in the record for a § 3B1.2 

adjustment, but defendant has provided no legal precedent that suggests such an 

adjustment would be appropriate for an individual who orchestrated a prison 

assault. Given the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s role in this offense, 

counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to request a § 3B1.2 

adjustment.

Doc. 15 at 14.

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Doc. 15 at 10-11.

Movant’s claims regarding his counsel’s allegedly unconstitutionally deficient 

performance are either factually incorrect or assert allegations regarding trial strategy, 

which is per se not deficient performance, and Movant has not established that any 

alleged error was prejudicial. Accordingly, Movant is not entitled to relief on the claim 

that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See

Fredman, 390 F.3d at 1156-57; Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th 

Cir.1989) (holding the failure to raise a meritless claim does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel). Compare Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1059.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Thomas’ motion for relief 

pursuant to section 2255 be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(1), Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States 

District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation 

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file objections to any 

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file 

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law 

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

/

/

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/

Dated this 7th day of October, 2014.

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