Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00545/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00545-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jaime Aldos Leonardo, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Phillip Crawford, 

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 07-0545-PHX-SMM (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE:

Pending before the court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. #1.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner, who is a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United

States on or about March 15, 1995, upon presentation of an immigrant visa issued to him at

the American Embassy in Manila, Philippines approximately one month earlier. Doc. #12,

Exh. 1. Respondent provides records showing that Petitioner procured his visa by

misrepresenting himself as the “single” (never been married) son of an American citizen.

Doc. #12, Exh. 2, Attachment 1. Respondent’s records show that Petitioner was married on

January 24, 1974 to Carmelita Balino. Doc. #12, Exh. 3, Attachment 4. Respondent did not

disclose his marriage on his immigrant visa application. Doc. #12, Exh. 2, Attachment 1,

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Doc. #1 at 3. Additionally, between 1999 and 2004, Petitioner was convicted of several drug

offenses in California, both felonies and misdemeanors. Doc. #1 at 4, Doc. #12, Exh. 3,

Attachments 5-9. On December 13, 2005, the government issued a Notice to Appear

charging that Petitioner was subject to removal under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act for his conviction of an aggravated felony (based on the drug offenses)

following his admission to the United States. Doc. #12, Exh. 5. The Notice to Appear also

charged that Petitioner had been convicted of a controlled substance offense and that he had

procured a visa or admission into the United States by fraud or wilfully misrepresenting a

material fact. Id. Petitioner was taken into custody on the same day the Notice to Appear

was issued. Doc. #12, Exh. 4.

After three continuances to allow Petitioner time to retain an attorney, Petitioner

appeared with counsel before an Immigration Judge (IJ) on January 30, 2006. Doc. #12,

Exh. 12, Transcript at 16-22. Removal proceedings were held on February 14, March 14 and

April 26, 2006. Doc. #12, Exh. 12, Transcript at 23-57. At the hearing on April 26, the IJ

sustained the allegations in the Notice to Appear and ordered Petitioner to be removed to the

Philippines. Doc. #12, Exh. 12, Transcript at 54-57. The IJ further determined that

Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal or any other forms of relief. Id. On

August 29, 2006, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal and

affirmed the IJ's decision. Doc. #12, Exh. 11. 

Petitioner then sought review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by filing a Petition

for Review on October 3, 2006. Doc. #12, Exh. 15. The case remains pending before the

Ninth Circuit as of the date this report and recommendation was signed. See Leonardo v.

Mukasey, No. 06-74750. The Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner an automatic temporary

stay of removal under Ninth Circuit General Order 6.4(c)(1). Id. 

Petitioner filed his pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on March

14, 2007. Doc. #1. Petitioner alleges that since the removal proceedings began, he has been

held in custody without bond or an order of supervised release. Doc. #1 at 5. He contends

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

that his lengthy detention while his removal proceedings have been pending is unlawful. He

asks the court to order him released on bond or under supervision.

On June 15, 2007, Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, in which they contend that Petitioner's current detention is lawful because

he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Doc. #12 at 2. On July 6,

2007, Petitioner filed a Reply. Doc. #13. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

It is clearly established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law

in removal proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). In Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court examined the detention of aliens after entry of a

final removal order. Generally, the Government is required to remove an alien in its custody

within ninety days of the final removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B). The

Government may, however, detain an inadmissible or criminal alien beyond the statutory

removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). But the Government's ability to detain an alien under

this provision is not unlimited. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. To avoid a "serious

constitutional threat," the Supreme Court interpreted the post-removal-period detention

statute to prohibit continued detention "once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable...."

Id. Detention of an alien subject to a final order of removal for up to six months is

presumptively reasonable given the time needed to accomplish the removal. Id. at 701.

"After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must

respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." Id. at 701.

In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court addressed the detention of criminal

aliens while removal proceedings are ongoing but before the statutory removal period begins.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) mandates detention during removal proceedings for deportable aliens

convicted of an aggravated felony. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18 (2003). "Such

detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered

removed, the aliens will be successfully removed." Id. at 528. Detention of a criminal alien

during removal proceedings is, therefore, a constitutional part of the process. Id. at 531.

In Demore, however, the Court operated on the assumption that the period of

detention under § 1226(c) is relatively short. See id. at 528-29. In distinguishing the

potentially lengthy periods of detention at issue in Zadvydas, the Court stated:

Under § 1226(c), not only does detention have a definite termination point, in

the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days we considered

presumptively valid in Zadvydas. The Executive Office for Immigration

Review has calculated that, in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained

pursuant to § 1226(c), removal proceedings are completed in an average time

of 47 days and a median of 30 days. Brief for Petitioners 39-40. In the

remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the

Immigration Judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an

average of four months, with a median time that is slightly shorter. Id., at 40.

These statistics do not include the many cases in which removal

proceedings are completed while the alien is still serving time for the

underlying conviction. Id., at 40, n. 17. In those cases, the aliens involved are

never subjected to mandatory detention at all. In sum, the detention at stake

under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases

in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which

the alien chooses to appeal.

Demore, 538 U.S. at 529-30 (footnotes omitted). The alien in Demore had been held for six

months, which the Court, although acknowledging was "somewhat longer than the average,"

found constitutionally permissible. Id. at 530-31.

Despite the mandatory language of § 1226(c), it is "constitutionally doubtful" that

Congress has the authority to imprison for excessively long periods lawfully admitted

criminal aliens who are subject to removal. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir.

2005). In Tijani, the alien had "been deprived of his liberty by the government for a period

of over two years and eight months." Id. The court avoided deciding the constitutional issue,

but interpreted "the authority conferred by § 1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of

criminal aliens." Id. Because the alien's proceedings were not expeditious, the court

remanded the case to the district court to grant the habeas petition unless the government

provided the alien a bail hearing before an Immigration Judge. Id.

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

B. Application

Respondent contends, and Petitioner does not dispute, that Petitioner is being held

under § 1226(c). Because a stay of removal is in place and a final order has not been issued

by the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner's removal period under § 1231(a)(1) has not yet begun.

Additionally, there appears to be no dispute that Petitioner was taken into custody for

immigration proceedings on December 13, 2005, and has remained in custody ever since. 

Respondent argues that this case is distinguishable from Tijani because here,

Petitioner is not a lawful permanent resident. Respondent contends that Petitioner

fraudulently entered the United States by wilfully misrepresenting his marital status on his

application. Respondent further contends that Petitioner has multiple criminal convictions

while Mr. Tijani had only one, and that Petitioner’s removal proceedings have not been as

long as Mr. Tijani’s. Regarding the first two distinctions, Respondent fails to explain why

those differences should result in a different outcome than Tijani. As to the third distinction,

the court disagrees that Petitioner’s removal proceedings have been significantly less than

Mr. Tijani’s. Petitioner has been in custody since the issuance of the Notice to Appear,

which was nearly two years and one month ago. Mr. Tijani had been in custody for over two

years and eight months when the Ninth Circuit decided in his favor. Respondent has not

demonstrated that this minor difference should produce a different result.

For a different reason, however, the court finds that Petitioner’s case is distinguishable

from and should be decided differently than Tijani. The Ninth Circuit docket shows that on

October 23, 2006, 20 days after Petitioner filed his petition for review, the Court directed

Petitioner to file within 21 days a declaration or notarized statement attesting to the date on

which his petition for review was deposited in the institution’s internal legal mail system.

The Court was trying to determine if his petition for review was timely filed. On March 28,

2007, the Court issued an order stating that Petitioner had failed to file a declaration or

notarized statement as previously ordered. The Court provided him one final opportunity to

respond to its October 23, 2006 order. Petitioner eventually filed the required statement, as

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

reflected in the Court’s order dated July 26, 2007. However, Petitioner’s failure to file the

statement in a timely manner resulted in a significant delay.

In addition, Petitioner has sought extensions to file his opening brief. On October 15,

2007, Petitioner filed a motion to extend the time to file his opening brief by 60-90 days.

The motion was granted and the Court set a new due date of December 28, 2007. However,

on December 10, 2007, Petitioner again filed a motion to extend the due date for 60 days.

As of the date of this report and recommendation, the docket does not reflect whether the

motion was granted. Regardless, more than one year and three months have passed since

Petitioner filed his petition for review, yet the opening brief has still not been filed, due in

large part to Petitioner’s failure to comply with the Court’s order and his requests for an

extension.

The concurring opinion in Tijani noted that although Mr. Tijani requested

continuances, those occurred early in the case and did not contribute at all to the delay since

the BIA heard his appeal. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1249 (Tashima, J., concurring). The Court

therefore did not find that to be a relevant factor in determining that his detention was

unreasonably long. Id. 

Here, however, the court finds that the delays at the Ninth Circuit caused by Petitioner

are a relevant factor in determining whether Petitioner has been detained for an unreasonably

long period. “[C]ourts must be sensitive to the possibility that dilatory tactics by the

removable alien may serve not only to put off the final day of deportation, but also to compel

a determination that the alien must be released because of the length of his incarceration.”

Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, while a removable alien is certainly

entitled to file appeals and seek any form of relief available to him, courts should consider

the role of the alien in causing delays. Id. Without such consideration, removable aliens

would be encouraged “to raise frivolous objections and string out the proceedings in the

hopes that a federal court will find the delay ‘unreasonable’ and order their release.” Id. 

Although Petitioner’s reasons for causing delays in the Ninth Circuit are not clear

from the docket, the fact remains that but for those delays, Petitioner’s case may have been

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

decided by now. Petitioner may not delay responding to court orders and request lengthy

extensions to file his brief, but then turn around and claim his detention is unreasonably long.

Because at this stage of the case Petitioner’s continued detention is primarily a result of

delays that he has caused, the court finds that the time has not been unreasonably long. This

makes his case distinguishable from Tijani and warrants a different outcome. The court will

therefore recommend that the petition be dismissed without prejudice. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1) be denied and dismissed

without prejudice;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00545-SMM Document 14 Filed 01/15/08 Page 8 of 8