Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01622/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01622-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERTO ALATORRE,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 13cv1622-JLS (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

v.

WARDEN FIGAROA,

Tallahatchie County Correctional

Facility, Tutwiler, Mississippi,

Respondent.

Alberto Alatorre (“Petitioner”) a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (ECF No. 1). Warden Figaroa (“Respondent”), filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). (ECF

No. 15). For the reasons stated below, the Court RECOMMENDS

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

Summary of Proceedings

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in San Diego County of five

counts of robbery under Cal. Penal Code § 211 on June 9, 2010. The jury

also found that Petitioner personally used a firearm in committing three

of the robberies under Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b). Petitioner was

sentenced and currently is serving a prison term of twenty years and four

months for these offenses. 

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Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate district, Division One in case D057881. The court

affirmed the convictions on December 19, 2011. (Lodg. 6). Petitioner

subsequently appealed to the California Supreme Court and asserted the

same claims presented to the California Court of Appeal. On March 14,

2012,the state supreme court denied the appeal without citation. (Lodg.

8). Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 12, 2012, following the

expiration of the ninety-day period to file a petition for writ of certiorari

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

 Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

state court. On July 3, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in this Court. (ECF No. 1). The Petition asserts the

same claims that were considered and rejected on direct appeal. 

Respondent filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on November 20, 2013.

(ECF No. 15). Petitioner requested and received two extensions of time

to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 19, 23). 

Petitioner’s third motion for extension of time, filed on May 19, 2014,

included Petitioner’s explanation regarding why his Petition was not filed

timely. (ECF No. 26). Consequently, the Court denied the request for an

extension and construed the motion as a response in opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 27). Respondent filed a reply. 

(ECF No. 28). The sole issue before the Court, at this juncture, is

whether the Petition must be dismissed as untimely. 

Standard of Review

Inasmuch as the Petition was filed after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Pub.L. No.

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), the provisions of AEDPA apply to this

case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). 

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Under AEDPA, a state prisoner generally must file a federal

petition for habeas corpus within one year of the underlying judgment

becoming final. The relevant provisions are located at 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d), which states as follows: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

The record reflects that Petitioner did not seek review in the United

States Supreme Court following the denial of his direct appeal by the

California Supreme Court on March 14, 2012. Accordingly, for AEDPA

purposes, the process of direct review of Petitioner’s conviction concluded

on June 12, 2012, when the ninety-day period for filing a petition for

certiorari in the Supreme Court expired. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157,

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitations period for seeking federal

habeas relief expired one year later, on June 12, 2013. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). Unless tolling applies, the instant Petition, filed on July 3,

2013, is time barred. 

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Discussion

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss asserts the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (ECF No. 15). Respondent claims that the

instant Petition is untimely because Petitioner did not properly file his

petition until July 3, 2013, twenty-four days beyond the expiry of the

limitations period. (Id.) Petitioner does not dispute that the statute of

limitations period expired on June 12, 2013, but claims that he is entitled

to relief due to extraordinary circumstances. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to “statutory

tolling” under AEDPA because there were no state court petitions

pending and that Petitioner is not entitled to “equitable tolling” because

Petitioner has failed to show that some extraordinary circumstance

prevented him from filing timely. (Id.) 

Petitioner has not suggested that he is entitled to statutory tolling. 

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to

extraordinary circumstances that were the “but-for and proximate cause

of his untimeliness.” (P. Opp. at 2).

1. Equitable Tolling

“Federal courts recognize that the AEDPA statute of limitations

may be equitably tolled in certain circumstances.” Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631, 643 (2010). The Ninth Circuit has held the AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling “only if

extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999)). The extraordinary circumstances must be the reason for

the untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003);

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Bryant v. Ariz. Atty Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A

petitioner must show that his untimeliness was caused by an external

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.”) “[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th

Cir. 2000)). “[E]quitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187

F.3d at 1107.

Petitioner asserts that his petition was filed late because he was

waiting for documents from the California State Bar regarding any

disciplinary action taken against the prosecutor in his case. (ECF No. 26

at 1). Petitioner argues that the documents from the state bar are the

“key evidence” to prove his attorney misconduct claim and “without them

it would be harder to prove.” (Id. at 2). Based on these facts, Petitioner

contends the court should find equitable tolling applies in this case

pursuant to Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim of waiting for evidence

from the state bar is insufficient for equitable tolling. (ECF No. 28 at 2). 

Specifically, Respondent asserts “[a]rguing that some new evidence

might have a bearing on a claim raised in the federal Petition, which

claim was raised on direct appeal and resolved against Petitioner based

on the record, is insufficient to show that some extraordinary

circumstance prevented Petitioner form (sic) filing a federal petition in a

timely manner.” (Id. at 4). As noted by Respondent, the claims in the

instant Petition are the same as those raised on direct review in the state

court. (ECF No. 1). “On direct appeal in the California courts, Petitioner

claimed the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing

argument. . . .” (ECF No. 28 at 2). According to Respondent, the evidence

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Petitioner relies on here has no bearing on the claim of prosecutorial

misconduct that can be readily disposed of from the record. (Id.). 

Holland v. Florida does not support Petitioner’s claim for relief. 

The Court in Holland held that “[a] petitioner is ‘entitled to equitable

tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’

and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649 (citing Pace v. Digulielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (emphasis deleted)). “[C]ircumstances of a case must

be ‘extraordinary’ before equitable tolling can be applied . . . .” Id. “The

petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of every conceivable doubt; the

court is obligated to draw only reasonable factual inferences in the

petitioner’s favor.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioner carries the burden to affirmatively prove his entitlement

to equitable tolling. The Court finds that Petitioner had sufficient facts

to file a habeas petition before the expiration of the one-year statute of

limitations. Petitioner’s claim to equitable tolling appears limited to the

delay in receiving documents from the state bar regarding unrelated

misconduct allegations against the prosecutor in Petitioner’s case. (ECF

Nos. 18, 20, 22 and 26). This is not a “rare and exceptional” circumstance

warranting equitable tolling. Petitioner could have prepared a basic

habeas petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline and then

sought to amend his petition when he received more information. See

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If

diligent, [Petitioner] could have prepared a basic form habeas petition

and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline . . . .”)

Petitioner has not carried his burden of establishing that he is

entitled to equitable tolling. His Petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s

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Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

2. Request for Evidentiary hearing

“A habeas petitioner...should receive an evidentiary hearing when

he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to

equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal citations omitted). Because Petitioner has failed to allege

sufficient facts that would entitle him to equitable tolling, if found to be

true, he has not shown that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See 

Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2010). (“District courts have

limited resources (especially time), and to require them to conduct

further evidentiary hearings when there is already sufficient evidence in

the record to make the relevant determination is needlessly wasteful.”).

An evidentiary hearing is not required in this case. Accepting the

facts alleged by Petitioner as true, the allegations do not entitle him to

equitable tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “In

short, ...[this case] does not present the extraordinary circumstance

beyond the party's control where equity should step in to give the party

the benefit of his [error]. . . .” Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 331

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order:

(1) Approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2)

Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as set forth herein; and (3)

Directing that judgment be entered dismissing the Petition for failure to

file within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 8, 2014, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

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all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than August

18, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 21, 2014

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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