Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00024/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00024-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOEL B. SHAMITOFF, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

GEOFFREY RICHARDS, Chapter 7 

trustee, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-00024-MCE-CKD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

On January 3, 2014, Plaintiffs Joel B. Shamitoff, Shamitoff Industries, Inc., 

Shamitoy Interactive, and Universal Interactive LLC1 (“Shamitoff”) filed the instant action 

against Geoffrey Richards, the Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Jacquelynn 

(“Jackie”) Bird; Robert Brown, an American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) arbitrator; 

and the AAA.2

 Through the complaint, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin an arbitration ordered 

by the Sacramento County Superior Court. 

Presently before the Court are two motions. First, Shamitoff moves to voluntarily 

dismiss without prejudice claims against Defendant. ECF No. 33. Second, Shamitoff’s 

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 According to the complaint, Joel Shamitoff is the principal for all three Plaintiff business entities. 

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 On August 11, 2014, Shamitoff’s claims against Defendants Brown and the AAA were dismissed 

without leave to amend. ECF No. 31. Consequently, Richards will be referred to as “Defendant.” 

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counsel, C. Anthony Hughes (“Hughes”), moves to withdraw as counsel. ECF No. 37. 

For the following reasons, (1) Shamitoff’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED subject to 

payment of Defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the 

Court, and (2) Hughes’ Motion to Withdraw is DENIED.3

BACKGROUND 

In 2008, Jackie Bird and her husband James Bird filed a lawsuit in the 

Sacramento County Superior Court against Shamitoff seeking, among other things, 

damages for fraud and breach of contract in connection with an investment that resulted 

in a payment to Shamitoff of over $380,000. At Shamitoff’s request, and pursuant to the 

terms of the contract with the Birds, the Sacramento County Superior Court ordered the 

parties to arbitrate. ECF No. 2-2. Just prior to the commencement of the arbitration 

proceedings, Jackie Bird filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Consequently, on 

behalf of the bankruptcy estate, Defendant, the Chapter 7 trustee, attempted to collect 

the money Shamitoff allegedly owed the Birds. 

 Shamitoff then embarked on a campaign to thwart the arbitration proceedings by 

seeking continuances and filing numerous actions in the Sacramento and Orange 

County Superior Courts seeking to, among other things, preliminarily enjoin the 

arbitration proceedings and disqualify the arbitrator. The state courts uniformly ruled 

against Shamitoff. 

 Undeterred, Shamitoff filed the instant action and sought a temporary restraining 

order in yet another attempt to halt the arbitration proceedings prior to the formal 

hearing’s conclusion. On January 17, 2014, the Court denied Shamitoff’s application for 

a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 6, finding that Shamitoff was engaged in forum 

shopping and was not likely to succeed on the merits. Id. at 8-9. Subsequently, the 

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 Because oral argument was not deemed to be of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 20(g); ECF No. 47. 

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arbitration hearing was completed and on February 10, 2014, the arbitrator ruled against 

Shamitoff. The arbitration award against Shamitoff was confirmed by the Sacramento 

County Superior Court on May 12, 2014; an appeal from that judgment is pending. 

 After receiving notice of the arbitration award, the Court issued a Pretrial 

Scheduling Order. ECF No. 26. Subsequently, Defendant noticed Shamitoff’s 

deposition. A day prior to his scheduled deposition, however, Defendant was informed 

that Shamitoff would not appear. That same day, Shamitoff filed a procedurally deficient 

motion to dismiss without prejudice claims against Defendant. See ECF Nos. 27, 30. 

Shamitoff subsequently filed the Motion to Dismiss Defendant without Prejudice that is 

presently before the Court, ECF No. 33, and Shamitoff’s counsel filed the instant Motion 

to Withdraw, ECF No. 37. 

STANDARD 

A. Motion for Voluntary Dismissal 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2) provides. 

Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be 

dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on 

terms that the court considers proper. If a defendant has 

pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the 

plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over 

the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can remain 

pending for independent adjudication. Unless the order 

states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is 

without prejudice. 

A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show it will suffer some plain legal 

prejudice as a result. Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir. 1987); see 

also Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 143, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1982). The 

Ninth Circuit has clarified that “legal prejudice” means “prejudice to some legal interest, 

some legal claim, some legal argument.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

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Further, mere “uncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved” does not result in 

plain legal prejudice; nor does uncertainty due to the threat of future litigation. Id. 

Finally, plain legal prejudice does not result merely because a defendant will be 

inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum or where a plaintiff would gain a 

tactical advantage through dismissal. Hamilton, 679 F.2d at 145. 

B. Motion to Withdraw As Counsel 

Local Rule 83-182(d) governs the withdrawal of attorneys in this Court. According 

to the rule, an attorney “may not withdraw leaving the client in propria persona without 

leave of court upon noticed motion and notice to the client and all other parties who have 

appeared. Id. In support of a motion to withdraw as counsel, an “attorney shall provide 

an affidavit stating the current or last known address or addresses of the client and the 

efforts made to notify the client of the motion.” 

ANALYSIS 

A. Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss 

Shamitoff seeks to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice the complaint’s remaining 

claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Defendant does not oppose Shamitoff’s motion or 

argue that he will suffer plain legal prejudice as a result of dismissal. However, 

Defendant requests as a condition to dismissal that the Court award attorney’s fees and 

costs to Defendant in the amount of $13,148, which is based on 34.6 hours expended by 

Defendant’s counsel thus far. See ECF No. 46-1 at 4. Because Defendant has not 

demonstrated legal prejudice, and expenses incurred in defending a lawsuit do not in 

and of themselves amount to legal prejudice, see Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97, the Court 

finds that voluntary dismissal is appropriate. 

However, the Court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to protect a 

defendant’s interests by conditioning a voluntary dismissal without prejudice upon the 

payment of appropriate attorney’s fees and costs. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) 

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(action may be dismissed by court order “on terms that the court considers proper”); 

McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986) (Rule 41(a)(2) intended 

to allow the court to “exercise its broad equitable discretion . . . to weigh the relevant 

equities and do justice between the parties”). Indeed, the imposition of attorney’s fees 

and costs are often imposed upon a plaintiff who is granted a voluntary dismissal 

pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). See Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla Int’l B.V., 889 F.2d 

919, 921 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The Court finds that under the facts of this case, conditioning the voluntary 

dismissal upon the payment of attorney’s fees and costs is appropriate. Unlike the 

plaintiff in Armilla, Shamitoff has not raised a substantial legal question in this case. 

Indeed, this Court previously found that the filing of this action amounted to no more 

than improper forum shopping. ECF No. 6 at 8. In fact, Shamitoff previously proffered 

the same arguments he advanced in this litigation in two different state courts without 

success. Id. It is abundantly clear on this record that Shamitoff never had a realistic 

chance of prevailing on his claims in this Court. Moreover, as Shamitoff concedes, work 

performed by Defendant’s counsel will not be useful in any continuing litigation between 

the parties. See Koch v. Hankins, 8 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1992); ECF No. 35 at 3. 

Accordingly, Shamitoff’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss without Prejudice is 

GRANTED on the condition that Shamitoff pay Defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs in 

an amount to be determined by the Court. Defendant shall submit as soon as 

practicable and no later than twenty (20) days after the date this Memorandum and 

Order is filed electronically documentation in support of the hours worked and the rates 

requested for all attorney’s fees and costs sought. 

B. Motion to Withdraw As Counsel 

The Motion to Withdraw fails to comply with the Court’s procedural requirements. 

First, although this is a federal case, counsel’s electronically filed notice of motion and 

motion was submitted on a form for use in California state court proceedings. Moreover, 

although counsel submitted a declaration in support of his Motion to Withdraw, ECF 

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No. 37-1, he failed to provide “the current or last known address or addresses of the 

client” or to explain “the efforts made to notify the client of the motion to withdraw” as 

required by Local Rule 83-182(d). 

Accordingly, counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

In the event counsel wishes to pursue again withdrawal as counsel of record, he must 

resubmit and notice a motion that complies fully with Rule 83-182(d). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Shamitoff’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED, 

subject to the condition that Shamitoff pay Defendant’s attorney’s fees and 

costs in an amount to be determined by the Court; 

2. Defendant shall submit as soon as practicable and no later than twenty (20) 

days after the date this Memorandum and Order is filed electronically 

documentation in support of the hours worked and the rates requested for all 

attorney’s fees and costs sought; 

3. Shamitoff may, but is not required to, file a response to Defendant’s 

documentation in support of the request for attorney’s fees and costs within 

ten (10) days after Defendant’s electronic filing; 

4. Within twenty (20) days after this Memorandum and Order is electronically 

filed, Shamitoff may withdraw the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal if he declines 

to accept, as a condition of that dismissal, the requirement that he pay 

Defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs4

; and 

/// 

/// 

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 See Lau v. Glendora Unified Sch. Dist., 792 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must be given a 

reasonable amount of time in which to refuse the voluntary dismissal if the conditions imposed are too 

onerous). 

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5. Counsel Hughes’ Motion to Withdraw, ECF No. 37, is DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 18, 2014 

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