Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01310/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRUCE PHILLIPPI, aka, Robert 

M. Ray, 

 Petitioner,

v. 

DR. JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary,

 Respondent.

Case No.: 14cv1310 DMS (MDD) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE RE: 

1) PETITIONER’S MOTION 

TO AMEND THE 

PETITION; and 

2) RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[ECF Nos. 10, 20] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. For the reasons set forth herein, the 

Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s motion to amend the Petition be 

GRANTED, and further RECOMMENDS Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the Petition be GRANTED. 

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I. Procedural Background 

Bruce Phillippi1 (“Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6). On May 19, 2014, Petitioner 

constructively filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1; see also ECF No. 34 at 1:11-12). On 

October 10, 2014, Respondent Jeffery Beard filed a motion to dismiss 

the Petition. (ECF No. 10). On October 24, 2014, Petitioner filed an 

opposition to Respondent's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 12). 

On May 14, 2015, this Court held a case management conference 

to discuss the need to develop the record with respect to the issue of 

equitable tolling. (ECF No. 17). In an order following the case 

management conference, the Court required the litigation coordinator 

at Petitioner’s place of confinement to afford him prompt access to his 

files, and set a briefing schedule for the parties to provide supplemental 

briefing and evidence on the issue of equitable tolling. (ECF No. 18). 

At the Respondent’s request, the Court extended the dates for 

supplemental briefing. (ECF No. 31). Petitioner and Respondent each 

timely filed supplemental briefs and evidence concerning equitable 

tolling. (ECF Nos. 23 (Petitioner); 34-36 (Respondent)). On August 3, 

2015, Petitioner filed a reply brief and evidence. (ECF No. 37). 

In the meantime, on May 18, 2015, Petitioner filed another 

petition in federal court raising the same core facts and due process 

 

1 Petitioner uses and is incarcerated under the alias Bruce Phillippi II, 

but submitted his Petition for habeas corpus under his legal name, 

Robert M. Ray. (Petition at 7). 

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claims as are raised in this Petition. (15cv1117-CAB-MDD ECF No. 1). 

On May 26, 2015, District Judge Bencivengo dismissed that petition 

and directed the Clerk of Court to file a copy of that petition in this 

action as an original Motion to Amend the Petition pursuant to Woods 

v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2008). (ECF No. 20). The 

proposed petition consolidates into one claim the grounds raised in the 

operative Petition, and attaches three new documents in support of the 

grounds. (ECF No. 20). 

II. Statement of Facts 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”) validated Petitioner as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood 

(“AB”) prison gang in September 2011. (Lodgment (“Lodg.”) 1). 

Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of this decision, asserting that 

the validation was the product of racial discrimination, retaliation by 

correctional officers, false evidence, and duress. (Lodg. 2). The 

Calipatria State Prison administrative authorities at the third level, 

located in Imperial County, denied Petitioner’s initial appeal on 

February 1, 2012. (Id.). Petitioner filed and completed another round 

of administrative appeals after being transferred to Corcoran State 

Prison in Kings County. (Lodg. 3). He alleged the validation interview 

was improperly conducted, claimed an unsound state of mind during 

the proceedings due to a hunger strike combined with psychotropic 

drugs, challenged the adequacy of the information regarding 

Petitioner’s affiliation with the AB gang, and alleged a denial of 

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procedural due process rights. (Id.). On May 22, 2012, the third level 

appeal authorities denied Petitioner’s administrative appeal. (Id.). 

III. Motion to Amend Petition 

Petitioner filed a new petition opening a new action rather than 

filing a motion to amend attaching a proposed amended petition in this 

action. Consequently, District Judge Bencivengo directed the Clerk of 

Court to file a copy of the proposed new petition in this action as an 

original Motion to Amend the Petition pursuant to Woods, 525 F.3d at 

890. (ECF No. 20). 

“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). In considering a motion to amend a petition, courts 

“may consider whether there is any evidence of ‘undue delay, bad faith 

or dilatory motive’ with respect to the filing of the amendment when 

determining whether leave should be granted.” Anthony v. Cambra, 

236 F.3d 568, 577 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 

182 (1962)). 

There is nothing in this record to suggest undue delay, bad faith, 

or dilatory motive. It appears the new petition was filed to augment 

rather than replace the operative Petition. The second petition 

summarizes, instead of restating or adding to, the grounds in the 

operative Petition. Petitioner did not explain the similarities and 

differences between the two petitions. After reviewing the proposed 

new petition, the Court discerns no material differences in the grounds 

raised, but the petition attaches three new exhibits. 

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The three new exhibits include: (1) a January 21, 2015 en banc 

opinion by the California Supreme Court summarily denying a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus concerning Petitioner, (ECF No. 20 at 7); (2) a 

Classification Committee Chrono, dated April 22, 2015, showing that 

Petitioner is being retained in the Administrative Segregation Unit 

(“ASU”) because of his AB gang validation, (ECF No. 20 at 11-13); and, 

(3) a denial of his petition to advance his parole hearing specifying the 

gang validation as the reason for denial. (Id.). 

Petitioner does not explain his reason for attaching these new 

exhibits. The Court infers that Petitioner provides these now because 

they were not created until after he filed this Petition, and because they 

support his arguments that he has exhausted his federal claims and 

that the challenged gang validation caused CDCR officials to deny him 

the increased liberties afforded those in the general prison population 

and those granted parole. 

Although recommending that leave to amend be granted, the 

Court is concerned that Petitioner may not have intended to supplant 

the operative Petition with the new petition. Petitioner may not have 

included all the facts and allegations in the new petition, and Petitioner 

did not file a brief explaining the differences or his intention. To avoid 

prejudice to Petitioner, the Court recommends consolidating the two 

pleadings as one, rather than substituting the later-filed petition for the 

operative Petition. Also to avoid prejudice to Petitioner, the Court 

recommends considering the allegations and attachments to both 

petitions in ruling on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition. 

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Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to 

Amend be GRANTED, and further RECOMMENDS that the second 

and operative petitions be treated as one consolidated Petition. 

IV. Motion to Dismiss

A. Summary of Arguments

In his Petition,2 Petitioner raises several grounds to overturn his 

gang affiliation validation. (ECF No. 1; see also ECF No. 20). 

Petitioner claims a lack of an impartial hearing violated his due process 

rights. (Id. at 5). In addition, Petitioner alleges his due process rights 

were violated due to insufficient notice of evidence and the unreliability 

of the evidence presented by CDCR. (Id. at 8). Petitioner also claims 

his due process rights were violated as he was not given a hearing 

before the Institutional Gang Investigator. (Id. at 9). Finally, he 

alleges his due process rights were violated as he was medically 

impaired during the gang validation proceedings. (Id. at 11). 

Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition on four grounds, but 

has withdrawn one ground.3 (ECF No. 10). First, Respondent argues 

that the entire Petition is time-barred under the one-year statute of 

 

2 In keeping with the recommendation to consolidate the operative 

Petition and the new petition, the Court considers the contents of both 

petitions in considering the motion to dismiss. 

3 Respondent originally argued that the Petition must be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction, because does not address issues of legality or 

duration of Petitioner’s confinement. (ECF No. 10 at 7-9). Respondent 

subsequently withdrew this challenge following the issuance of the 

recent Ninth Circuit opinion, Nettles v. Grounds, --F.3d--, No. 12-16935 

(9th Cir. May 28, 2015). (ECF No. 28). 

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limitations provided in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). (Id. at 4-7). Second, Respondent argues that 

Petitioner did not allege he was deprived of his due process right to an 

impartial hearing in his petition filed in the California Supreme Court 

rendering this claim unexhausted. (Id. at 9-10). Third, Respondent 

contends that Petitioner’s claim of insufficient and unreliable evidence 

to support the gang affiliation fails to allege a federal question. (Id. at 

10-11). 

In his opposition and supplemental briefing, Petitioner disputes 

Respondent’s arguments. (ECF Nos. 12; 27). With regard to the statute 

of limitations, Petitioner claims entitlement to equitable tolling due to a 

confluence of events, including prison transfers, denial of access to the 

law library, physical health problems, mental health problems, and 

instructions by the state court that he claims affirmatively misled him 

to file in the wrong court causing a critical delay. (Id.). Next, Petitioner 

alleges that his claim in state court is in fact exhausted, because he 

raised the claim in his petition to the California Supreme Court that he 

was denied his due process rights as a result of an impartial hearing. 

(ECF No. 12 at 9-10). Finally, Petitioner argues that he does state a 

claim that raises a federal question, because he is being held in a 

restrictive Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) and denied parole specifically 

because of the gang validation. (Id. at 11). 

In his supplemental reply brief on equitable tolling, Petitioner also 

argues that Respondent has conceded Petitioner was diligent, thus 

meeting the first prong of the equitable tolling analysis. (ECF No. 37). 

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B. Additional Facts re Tolling 

1. State Habeas Petitions

Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies on May 22, 

2012. (Lodg. 3). On August 15, 2012, Petitioner constructively filed his 

first petition for habeas corpus with the Kings County Superior Court,4

which is located in California’s Fifth Appellate District. (Lodg. 4). 

Finding “some evidence” in the record to support the gang validation, 

the Kings County Superior Court denied the petition on the merits on 

October 25, 2012. (Lodg. 1). 

On December 3, 2012, the date of his signature, Petitioner filed an 

appeal in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodg. 5). On January 17, 

2013, the Fifth District Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s appeal 

without prejudice. (Lodg. 6). The court reasoned: 

Petitioner has failed to show why he should not be 

required to litigate these issues in the Fourth Appellate 

District where he was confined when the gang 

investigation occurred and he was validated a gang 

associate. (Cf. In re Roberts (2005) 36 Ca1.4th 575.)

(Id.). 

Instead of filing an original petition in the Court of Appeal located 

in the Fourth District, Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus 

with the Imperial County Superior Court, a trial court located in the 

 

4 This is the date of effective filing of Petitioner’s habeas corpus Petition 

given after his sworn statement, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 

for statute of limitations purposes under the prison mailbox rule. Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 3(d), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West 2014);

(see Lodg. 4).

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Fourth District, on the verified date of July 9, 2013.5 (Lodg. 7). The 

Imperial County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s claim as successive 

and recommended that Petitioner file an original petition with the 

Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One. (Lodg. 8). Specifically, 

the Imperial County Superior Court stated: 

The petition was denied by the Kings County court on 

the merits. Petitioner may not now relitigate his 

identical habeas claims in any superior court in 

California. “It has long been the rule that absent a 

change in the applicable law or the facts, the court will 

not consider repeated applications for habeas corpus 

presenting claims previously rejected.” (In re Clark

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767.). Instead, petitioner must file 

an original petition in the Fourth Appellate District, 

Division One. “Because no appeal lies from the denial of 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner whose 

petition has been denied by the superior court can 

obtain review of his claims only by the filing of a new 

petition in the Court of Appeal. (See id. at p. 767 fn. 7) 

 

5 The constructive date of filing is a matter of dispute. The stamped 

filing date is July 9, 2013; however, Petitioner signed and dated his 

Petition for March 1, 2013. (Lodg. 7). Petitioner claims that he was 

provided incorrect guidance regarding proof of service from the Imperial 

County Superior Court, requiring resubmission and delaying effective 

date of filing. Because Petitioner did not date his proof of service, (see

Lodg. 7 at 42), the verified date is July 9, 2013, as used by the Imperial 

County Superior Court in its decision. (Lodg. 8). Regardless, the date 

of filing proves irrelevant. As explained in the analysis below, 

Petitioner filed in error with the Imperial County Superior Court, 

rendering tolling of the limitations period unavailable, and rendering 

the precise date of filing immaterial. 

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(Id.). The copy of the Imperial County Order that Respondent lodged 

with the Court is dated October 29, 2013, but the copy of the Order filed 

with the Petition is dated November 4, 2013. (Lodgs. 8 at 3; 11 at 43; 

ECF No. 1 (Petition) at 28). 

On November 12, 2013, Petitioner constructively filed a habeas 

corpus petition with the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One. 

(Lodg. 9). Based on the substantive merits of the claim, the court 

denied the petition on December 9, 2013. (Lodg. 10). 

Petitioner constructively filed an appeal to the California Supreme 

Court on January 7, 2014. (Lodg. 11). In his appeal, Petitioner raised 

five arguments: 1) that the Institutional Gang Investigator did not 

“follow their own regulations” in validating Petitioner as an AB 

affiliate; 2) that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated during his 

interview due to his mental incapacity at the time; 3) that Petitioner 

was subjected to cruel and unusual conditions; 4) that the validation 

was unsubstantiated; and 5) that Petitioner’s due process rights were 

violated due to racial discrimination during the validation procedure. 

(Id.) The court summarily denied his petition on March 12, 2014. 

(Lodg. 12). Petitioner then filed this federal Petition on May 19, 2014. 

(ECF No. 1). 

2. Stomach Surgery and Related Health Issues 

On March 21, 2013, Petitioner began experiencing symptoms of 

what turned out to be a small bowel strangulation with gangrenous 

segments and another segment with a perforation. (ECF No. 23 at 3, 9, 

11 (hospital history and physical); Lodg. 16 at 23-28). His symptoms 

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included severe abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting and inability to eat. 

(ECF No. 23 at 11; Lodgs. 15; 16 at 23-28). Two days later, on March 

23, 2012, he was admitted to Mercy Hospital Bakersfield. (ECF No. 23 

at 3, 11 (hospital history and physical); Lodgs. 13 at 4 (prison transfer 

record); 16 at 29-36). 

On March 25, 2013, Petitioner underwent surgery, during which 

two gangrenous sections of his small bowel were removed. (ECF No. 23 

at 3, 9 (Operation Report); Lodg. 16 at 29-36). After the operation, 

Petitioner was monitored in the intensive care unit, and suffered from 

acute injury to his kidneys, post-operative sepsis, post-operative ileus 

and pneumonia. (ECF No. 23 at 12; Lodgs. 15; 16 at 29-36). 

Petitioner was discharged from Mercy Hospital Bakersfield on 

April 2, 2013. (ECF No. 23 at 12 (Inmate Discharge Summary); Lodg. 

16 at 38). After discharge, Petitioner continued suffering from side 

effects, including: mild tachycardia, constipation, pain and pneumonia. 

(ECF No. 23 at 3, 12, 13). 

Petitioner chose to forego pain medications beginning on April 5, 

2013, because they caused constipation. (ECF No. 23 at 3). Progress 

notes dated April 5, 2013 state that Petitioner presented to the prison 

emergency room with nausea and severe abdominal pain starting “last 

night,” which was relieved with laxatives. (ECF Nos. 23 at 14; 37 at 

24). The physician noted “wound good.” (ECF No. 37 at 24). 

Patient progress notes from April 8, 2013 noted that Petitioner 

was complaining of abdominal pain at a level of 7 out of 10, but also 

noted that the surgical incision and staples were intact and clean, no 

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drainage or symptoms of infection were present, and noted no signs of 

distress. (ECF Nos. 23 at 13; 37 at 25). Petitioner was still wheelchairbound as of April 8, 2013, and was under his doctor’s orders to move 

carefully to avoid hernias. (ECF No. 37 at 6, 25). 

Petitioner’s staples were removed on April 10, 2013, and the 

treatment provider noted symptoms of infection and a one inch opening 

in the incision, but also noted “Pt states everything is going ok.” (ECF 

No. 23 at 15). Steristrips were applied and Petitioner was instructed to 

continue abdominal binder two more weeks. (Id.; see also ECF No. 37 at 

23; Lodg. 16 at 51-52). 

On April 15, 2013, Petitioner was examined by his primary care 

physician who noted he discontinued laxatives due to diarrhea and that 

Petitioner had "no other complaints.” (Lodg. 15 at 3 ¶ 7.c). 

On April 17, 2013, Dr. Nguyen examined Petitioner and made the 

following notes: “He has no abdominal pain today,” and “The patient 

has no other complaints.” (Lodg. 16 at 59). 

On April 23, 2013, Petitioner filed a Health Care Services Request 

Form complaining that his incision opened and was painful. (ECF No. 

37 at 26). The triage registered nurse noted that Petitioner did not 

have a fever, noted “incision completely healed ø open areas @ all,” and 

noted that there were no symptoms of infection or other problems. (Id.; 

ECF No. 23 at 16). In his supplemental brief, Petitioner clarified that 

what he had believed to be an open incision was instead a mini-hernia. 

(ECF No. 37 at 6). Petitioner was still wheelchair-bound as of April 23, 

2013 as a precaution to avoid hernias and other complications. (Id.). 

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Petitioner was “still experiencing health difficulties” as of May 13, 

2013, but he does not explain what difficulties or how he believes they 

impacted his ability to work on legal matters. (ECF No. 23 at 3). A 

Mercy Hospital Telemedicine Report dated May 13, 2013 notes “[t]he 

patient is doing fine. He has occasional pain in the abdominal scar 

tissue,” that “[t]he scar appears to be healing well,” and made other 

notes indicating Petitioner was fine. (ECF No. 23 at 17). 

3. Mental Health During Limitations Period 

Petitioner declares that he was taking anti-convulsive and 

psychotropic medications that “affect the faculties” during the 

limitations period. (ECF No. 23 at 4). Petitioner also declares he was 

held in ASUs and SHUs during the entire period, and both housing 

assignments “can cause mental health issues.” (Id.). Petitioner also 

noted he “has had a history of depression.” (Id.). 

Petitioner provided a neurology follow up note from a medical 

treatment provider at Calipatria State Prison dated March 15, 2012, 

shortly before the limitations period began. (ECF No. 37 at 30). The 

provider noted Petitioner had “several neurologic issues” including 

headaches, neck pain related to a bulging disc, neuropathy and 

radiating pain. Petitioner tried various medications to address the 

headaches and pain, including Effexor, Neurontin, Paxil (20 mg), 

Trileptal, Salsalate, Atenolol and Tylenol. (Id.). The treatment 

provider noted “[s]econdary issues complicating [headaches] include 

stress/anxiety/depressed mood/poor sleep/family issues as he is now 

getting a divorce along w/fighting court case.” (Id.). The provider also 

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noted “[i]n the last 6 weeks he has had only 2 [headaches] and they 

have been mild,” and “[n]ow his neck hurts only when he makes 

excessive mvmts.” (Id.; Lodg. 16 at 4, 71 (Paxil given to Petitioner for 

migraines “not psych.”), 75). 

Respondent provided a Comprehensive Forensic Assessment 

prepared by a psychologist in advance of parole consideration in 2011. 

Petitioner graduated high school, and test results place him at a 12.9 

grade level for both reading and math. (Lodgs. 17-19). The assessment 

noted that Petitioner was not and never has been a recipient of the 

Mental Health Services Delivery System, and that he denied mental 

health problems including depression, anxiety and anger. (Id. at 4). 

On March 15, 2012, June 21, 2012, May 16, 2013, September 24, 

2013, and April 8, 2014, Dr. Middleton, Dr. Wilson, LCSW Urbano, M. 

Roberts, Ph.D., and LCSW Prince each performed separate SHU clinical 

assessments of Petitioner’s mental health and concluded Petitioner did 

not meet the criteria for inclusion in the Mental Health Services 

Delivery System and did not have a severe mental health disorder such 

as Major Depressive disorder or mental retardation. (Lodg. 16 at 2, 17, 

64-65, 69). 

Petitioner completed a May 19, 2012 Mental Health Screen. 

(Lodg. 16 at 6). Petitioner responded that he had never been 

hospitalized for psychiatric treatment, never been involuntarily 

committed for psychiatric problems, never taken medication for 

psychiatric or emotional problems, never had a serious psychiatric or 

emotional problem, never received mental health services, and never 

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experienced a list of psychiatric symptoms (e.g., lost appetite for two or 

more weeks, sleeplessness, lost sexual interest, paranoid or delusional 

thoughts.). (Id. at 6-8). The clinician noted Petitioner’s mental health 

needs are “routine.” (Id. at 8). 

On July 20, 2012, Petitioner sought treatment for tiredness, 

sleeplessness, lightheadedness, dizziness and extreme perspiration. 

(Lodg. 16 at 18). The treatment provider attributed the symptoms to 

his preexisting pancreatitis and sent instructions to the kitchen to 

adjust his diet. (Id.). A July 25, 2012 medical note states that 

Petitioner stopped taking his neck pain medication because it caused 

sleep problems, and he was prescribed Naprosyn instead. (Id. at 19). 

In his supplemental reply, Petitioner declares that he suffered 

more mental issues and side effects that are not reflected in the records 

because he did not complain, based on his belief that complaining would 

not have improved his symptoms or changed the medications 

prescribed. (ECF No. 37 at 6). 

4. Access to Legal Materials 

Petitioner had only intermittent access to legal materials during a 

series of prison transfers at the beginning of the limitations period, 

which started May 23, 2012. On May 23, 2012, Petitioner was housed 

at Corcoran State Prison’s ASU. (ECF No. 23 at 2; Lodg. 13 at 3). On 

May 30, 2012, Petitioner was transferred from Corcoran’s ASU to the 

SHU. (Id.). On the same day, Petitioner turned in two boxes of 

personal property to be transferred to his new location separately. 

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(Lodg. 14 at 1). On June 4, 2012, he received two bags of legal 

paperwork, but the rest of his property was missing. (Id. at 3). 

The next day, June 5, 2012, Petitioner was transferred from 

Corcoran State Prison to North Kern State Prison. (ECF No. 23 at 2, 7; 

Lodg. 13 at 3). The next day, June 6, 2012, Petitioner was transferred 

to Centinela State Prison. (Id.). On June 7, 2012, Petitioner was out to 

court in Imperial County. (Id.; Lodg. 29). On June 8, 2012, Petitioner 

had his legal property. (ECF No. 23 at 2, 7; Lodg. 13 at 3). 

On June 11, 2012, prison staff received one box of Petitioner’s 

personal items, and Petitioner was transferred to Chino State Prison’s 

Reception, where he was housed overnight in a standing cage. (Id.). 

The next day, Petitioner was transferred to Corcoran’s SHU Unit 4b-1R. 

(Id.). On June 29, 2012, Petitioner received a box of personal items 

including his legal papers and legal envelopes. (Lodg. 14 at 5). 

Three or four weeks later, in early July of 2012, Petitioner was 

transferred to a different SHU in Corcoran (Unit 4b-1L). (ECF Nos. 23 

at 2, 7; Lodg. 13 at 3). Petitioner declares that he received most of his 

property two or three weeks later, though some remained missing. 

(Id.). According to Respondent, there are no property transfer 

documents to support Petitioner's claimed deprivation of legal papers 

after June 29, 2012. (ECF Nos. 34; 35). Instead, property transfer 

records show it was other personal property (e.g., clothing and 

electronics) that was not returned to him until July of 2012. (Id.). 

On July 15, 2013, Petitioner filed an inmate grievance 

complaining that his legal mail was missing, including legal paperwork 

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to and from the court and books of stamps he ordered to facilitate court 

filings. (ECF No. 23 at 23). He requested the mail be returned to him, 

that the disruption cease, and that a receipt form be made “so that we 

can prove to the courts we gave legal mail to staff.” (Id.). 

5. Access to Law Library During Limitations Period

In addition to lacking access to the law library during the series of 

prison transfers, Petitioner was denied law library access on other dates 

during the limitations period. Petitioner submitted several urgent 

requests seeking access to the law library after his petition was denied 

in Kings County so that he could work on his appeal to the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 23 at 18; Lodg. 21). Even though 

he had “Priority Library User” status (“P.L.U.”) from October through 

November 2012, he was not granted access until December 3, 2012. 

(ECF No. 23 at 20). On February 13, 2013, approximately one month 

after the petition was denied by the Fifth District Court of Appeals, 

Petitioner submitted a CDCR 22 Inmate Request stating, 

I need to get access to the library. I just received a court 

order denying my Habeas due to my appealing in the 

wrong county. I have only a certain amount of time to 

file in the right county. See included paperwork... 

Please can you [undecipherable] me P.L.U. quickly? I 

will probably only need one visit to do it all. 

(ECF No. 23 at 22). Staff responded nine days later on February 22, 

2013, “Fill out PLU form and return.” (Id.). Petitioner responded the 

next day, “I have filled out the PLU request form. Please I am running 

out of time.” (Id.). The first time Petitioner accessed the library after 

these requests was a few weeks later on March 13, 2013. (Lodg. 20). 

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On July 24, 2013, Petitioner submitted a CDCR 22 Inmate 

Request seeking CDCR 22 request forms, books, and: 

#3= May I have access to the law library please? Until 

then I need 4 very large manila envelopes with 4 trust 

account withdrawal slips, 50 pages of 28 numbered legal 

paper/and 50 pages of typing paper, an up to date 2013 

Title 15, so I know the new rules and regulations/A § 

1983 form And the address to the local Federal court 

(w/Rules o/court). 

(ECF No. 23 at 21). The staff response, dated August 1, 2013, states: 

“All R[undecipherable] Items [indecipherable] Enclosed – Updated Title 

15 Has To Be Looked At In Law Library.” (Id.). Petitioner wrote a 

response, though there is no prison staff signature acknowledging that 

Petitioner submitted it, stating: 

No disrespect but I’m not allowed to go to law library #1 

and #2, who are you? #3 I didn’t receive a § 1983, 

address to local federal court, local court rules for it. 

Also, who do I get at to receive the new 2013 Title 15? 

(Id.). 

Between May 22, 2012, when his administrative grievance was 

exhausted, and May 19, 2014, when he filed this Petition, Petitioner 

was granted access to the law library on 26 occasions for several hours 

each time on: July 23, 2012; August 8, 2012; December 3, 2012; March 

13, 2013; October 14, 2013; October 21, 2013; October 28, 2013; 

November 13, 2013; December 2, 2013; December 16, 2013; December 

23, 2013; December 30, 2013; January 6, 2014; January 13, 2014; 

January 27, 2014; February 2, 2014; February 24, 2014; March 3, 2014; 

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2014; April 14, 2014; April 21, 2014; and May 17, 2014. (Lodg. 20). At 

Petitioner’s request, the law library staff also made copies, provided 

him legal supplies, and mailed legal paperwork at times when he was 

not afforded law library access. (Lodgs. 22-25). 

C. Standard of Review 

1. Statute of Limitations 

“A statute of limitation defense may be raised by a motion to 

dismiss if the running of the limitation period is apparent on the face of 

the complaint.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vaughan v. 

Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Jablon v. Dean Witter 

& Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). AEDPA governs federal 

habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 322–23 (1997). As Petitioner filed the Petition before this Court on 

May 19, 2014, (ECF No. 1), AEDPA applies to this case. 

2. Exhaustion 

Generally, applications for writs of habeas corpus that contain 

unexhausted claims are procedurally barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) 

(West 2014); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). In addition, 

federal courts have the discretion to deny a habeas application on the 

merits notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to fully exhaust state 

judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

3. Cognizable Claim 

Under federal law, a prisoner seeking relief on claims related to 

imprisonment may file a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ 

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of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal intervention in state court proceedings is 

only justified when there are errors of federal law. Oxborrow v. 

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal 

courts are not concerned with errors of state law unless they rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation). Further, federal habeas courts are 

bound by a state's interpretation of its own laws. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). 

D. Analysis 

1. Timeliness 

a. Statute of Limitations 

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner generally must file a federal 

petition for habeas corpus within one year of the underlying judgment 

becoming final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (West 2014). Under 

§2244(d)(1)(D), the limitation period runs from the date on which the 

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. The statute of 

limitations does not begin to run in a petitioner’s case until he is aware 

of all the facts of the claim. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

Here, as Respondent concedes, Petitioner learned of the factual 

predicate of his claims on May 22, 2012, the date that the CDCR Office 

of Appeal denied Petitioner’s second administrative appeal of the gang 

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validation. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Accordingly, absent tolling, the statute 

of limitations expired one year later on May 22, 2013. Petitioner filed 

his Petitioner 362 days late unless tolling applies. 

b. Statutory Gap Tolling 

Petitioner contends tolling renders his claims timely. To prevail, 

he must show 362 days’ worth of tolling. “The time during which a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall 

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Accordingly, an application for post-conviction 

relief is pending during the “intervals between a lower court decision 

and a filing of a new petition in a higher court.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 

U.S. 214, 221 (2002). 

Additionally, “the period that an application for post-conviction 

review is pending is not affected or ‘untolled’ merely because a 

petitioner filed additional or overlapping petitions before it is complete.” 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2003). “Rather, each 

time a petitioner files a new habeas petition at the same or a lower level 

. . . the subsequent petition has no effect on the already pending 

application, but triggers an entirely separate round of review.” Id. 

Stated differently, “the AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of 

the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper 

use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with 

regard to a particular post-conviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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In Carey, the Court held that if the California Supreme Court 

found that a prisoner had unreasonably delayed in presenting habeas 

claims, as that term is defined under California law, the application for 

state post-conviction relief would not be considered to have been 

“pending” during that period of delay. Carey, 536 U.S. at 221. In Evans 

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court reiterated its holding in Carey 

that the time between filings in California courts does not count under 

the “pending” language of § 2244(d)(2) if the petition is ultimately found 

to be untimely. A six month unexplained delay (or 180 days) is now 

presumptively unreasonable. Evans, 546 U.S. at 209; see also Chaffer v. 

Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that gaps of 115 days 

and 101 days without adequate explanation of the delays as required 

under California law by In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949), did not 

support statutory tolling and noting that the California Supreme Court 

had declined to answer the certified question regarding what 

constitutes a timely non-capital habeas case). 

Respondent concedes, and the Court agrees, that Petitioner is 

entitled to statutory tolling while his properly filed state court petition 

was pending in Kings County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals 

from August 15, 2012 through January 17, 2013, and while it was 

pending in the Fourth District Court of Appeal and the California 

Supreme Court from November 12, 2013 through March 12, 2014. 

Combined, those date ranges total 275 days of statutory tolling. 

The Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the periods 

between his discovery of the factual predicate for his claims and the 

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date he filed his first state collateral challenge. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 

1006 (finding that no tolling between finality of judgment and filing of 

application for post-conviction relief is permitted). As a result, the 85 

days between the May 22, 2012 administrative denial and his initial 

filing for post-conviction relief with the State at the Kings County 

Superior Court on August 15, 2012 are not statutorily tolled. Nor is 

Petitioner entitled to tolling during the 68 day delay between the 

California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim on March 12, 

2014 and his filing of this federal Petition on May 19, 2014. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling only during pendency of state postconviction or collateral review). 

Next, Petitioner’s claims do not toll during the dates between the 

Fifth District Court of Appeal’s denial of his petition on January 17, 

2013 and Petitioner’s filing with the Fourth District Court of Appeal on 

November 12, 2013. This period does not warrant statutory gap tolling 

for two reasons. 

First, post-conviction petitions rejected by the state court as 

improperly filed do not toll the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). The Imperial 

County Court held that the petition filed in that court was improperly 

filed and summarizes well-established state law explaining why the 

filing was not proper. (Lodg. 11-10). Because the petition filed in 

Imperial County was not properly pending, statutory tolling does not 

apply to the 112 day period. 

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Second, Petitioner’s first round of review is not affected by his 

filing of overlapping petitions during the pendency of that round. See 

Delhomme, 340 F.3d at 820 (finding that “each time a petitioner files a 

new habeas petition at the same or a lower level . . . the subsequent 

petition has no effect on the already pending application, but triggers 

an entirely separate round of review”). Whether Petitioner’s 

overlapping claim with the Imperial County Superior Court was 

considered on the merits or on procedural grounds is irrelevant, as the 

overlapping or additional petitions have “‘no effect on the already 

pending application.’” Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Delhomme, 340 F.3d at 820 (finding that the first round of 

review remains unaffected by overlapping petitions)). “Thus, the first 

round of review remains pending, and tolling does not end until that 

round is completed at the California Supreme Court, as long as the 

petitioner does not delay unreasonably, even if the petitioner begins a 

new round while that round is still pending.” Delhomme, 340 F.3d at 

820. 

Instead, this 299 day gap between proper filings in the same 

round of review is untolled due to Petitioner’s unreasonable delay. In 

Stancle, the Ninth Circuit found that an 82 day delay between filings 

was unreasonable. 692 F.3d at 956. This 299 day gap also far exceeds 

the presumptive six month delay standard set by the U.S. Supreme 

Court. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 209. Accordingly, the 299 days between 

the denial in the Fifth Appellate District and the filing in the Fourth 

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District Court of Appeals are not statutorily tolled. See Velasquez v. 

Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In sum, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the days 

his Imperial County petition was pending or for the period between the 

Fifth District Court of Appeals’ denial and the Fourth District Court of 

Appeals’ filing, but Petitioner is entitled to 275 days of statutory tolling 

for the time his petitions were pending in the other state courts. Even 

with the 275 days of statutory tolling, 87 days remain untolled. 

c. Equitable Tolling 

Petitioner’s claims may be timely if equitable tolling applies to at 

least 87 days in the otherwise untolled periods: May 23, 2012 through 

August 15, 2012; January 17, 2013 through November 12, 2013; and 

May 12, 2014 through May 19, 2014. Petitioner contends that a 

confluence of the following allegedly extraordinary circumstances 

precluded him from filing timely: 

1. Petitioner’s status as an indigent pro se prisoner; 

2. Petitioner’s confinement in ASU and SHU housing, 

“known for being limited in its access to legal library 

and/or legal materials;” 

3. Petitioner was transferred multiple times, limiting his 

access to legal materials and the law library; 

4. Petitioner suffered incapacitating abdominal surgery 

and post-operative health complications; 

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5. Petitioner suffers from CDCR-documented mental 

health issues and takes multiple painkillers and 

psychotropic medications that have mental side effects; 

and, 

6. Petitioner “was affirmatively misled by a court in 

regards to the proper venue for his petition....” 

(ECF No. 37 at 4-5). 

Respondent contends that Petitioner fails to show extraordinary 

circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition, that his 

argument is contradicted by the fact he filed twenty-five legal 

documents in at least sixteen different cases between May 23, 2012 and 

May 19, 2014. Respondent emphasizes that even if Petitioner was 

sporadically incapacitated by any of these occurrences, they were not 

the cause of his failure to timely file. Respondent argues that Petitioner 

still had sufficient time to timely file his Petition, and the true cause for 

the untimeliness is that he misread the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ 

order that informed him he should file in the Fourth District Court of 

Appeals and mistakenly filed in Imperial County Superior Court 

instead. Respondent contends that ignorance of the law, mistake or 

confusion, and pro per status are not extraordinary circumstances 

entitling Petitioner to equitable tolling. 

Petitioner replies that the confluence of events was extraordinary, 

that Respondent has conceded he was diligent, and that the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals inadvertently but affirmatively misled him, 

causing a critical delay. 

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AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th 

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. 

Court, 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner “is ‘entitled to 

equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

632 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). “When external forces, 

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file 

a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be 

appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The 

extraordinary circumstances must cause the untimeliness. Spitsyn v. 

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary 

circumstances” he has identified were the cause of his untimeliness, 

rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part. Id.; Stillman v. 

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if a petitioner 

fails to meet this burden, the petitioner should “receive an evidentiary 

hearing when he ‘makes a good faith allegation that would, if true, 

entitle him to equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 

2003)). Nevertheless, a district court presented with an insufficient 

record need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the record can be amply 

developed by other means, such as requesting supplemental briefing. 

Orthel v. Yates, No. 12-17165, --F.3d--, 8-10 (9th Cir. July 28, 2015). 

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The Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted that “equitable tolling will not 

be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 

‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file a petition on time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (quoting 

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Ultimately, district judges must “take seriously Congress’s desire to 

accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only authorize extensions 

when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Roy, 465 F.3d at 1289. 

i. Status as Indigent ASU Inmate; 

Confusion; and Lack of Legal Knowledge 

Petitioner’s status as an inmate proceeding on his habeas claim 

pro se and in forma pauperis is not an extraordinary circumstance. 

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; see also, Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, Petitioner’s condition of being housed in 

ASU and SHU, though it does result in increased limitations on access 

to legal materials and the law library, is not an extraordinary 

circumstance entitling him to equitable tolling. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (equitable tolling not warranted where 

petitioner housed in ASU despite increased limitations on access to law 

library and legal materials). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS finding that Petitioner is 

not entitled to equitable tolling due to limitations flowing from his 

status as an inmate proceeding pro se or his ASU and SHU housing 

assignments. 

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ii. Prison Transfers 

Petitioner argues he was prevented from filing his Kings County 

Superior Court petition earlier because he was denied access to legal 

papers during multiple prison transfers from mid-May 2012 through 

mid-July 2012. Denial of access to legal materials can be considered an 

‘extraordinary circumstance.’ See, e.g., Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1027-1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (complete 

deprivation of legal materials for 11 months); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 

918, 925 (9th Cir. 2002) (82 day denial of access to legal materials 

during time when it was unclear when California Supreme Court 

habeas petition was final and tolling ended may warrant equitable 

tolling). Respondent concedes that Petitioner was transferred several 

times during mid-May 2012 through mid-July 2012, and that he did not 

have access to his legal papers during some, but not all, of that time. 

The record shows that Petitioner was without his legal papers for 

35 days, but Petitioner fails to establish that this denial was the cause 

for his untimely filing. To constitute extraordinary circumstances, the 

deprivation of access to legal papers must be complete and must be the 

cause for the delay in filing the federal habeas petition. Ford v. Pliler, 

590 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (inability to access files was not the 

cause of untimeliness because the legal materials were unnecessary to 

file timely federal habeas petition); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 

F.3d 1008, 1013-1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (denial of access to legal materials 

was not the cause of untimeliness, because petitioner could have filed 

basic petition and amended later). Short deprivations of legal papers at 

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the beginning or the middle of the limitations period do not equitably 

toll the statute of limitations. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (27 day deprivation of legal materials at the beginning of the 

limitations period insufficient for equitable tolling). 

Here, the prison transfers depriving Petitioner of access to his 

legal papers were at the beginning of the limitations period. (ECF No. 

23 at 2; Lodgs. 13; 14). Moreover, Petitioner was not completely denied 

access to legal papers during this two month period; he had 

intermittent access. (Id.). Prison records show he was without legal 

papers for 16 days from May 23, 2012, the day the limitations period 

began, up to but not including June 8, 2012. (Lodg. 14 at 2). Petitioner 

filed a Second Amended Complaint in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pending 

in the Eastern District of California on June 10, 2012, showing he was 

not prevented from working on legal matters at that time. (Lodgs. 14 at 

6; 26; 47; 48). Prison records show he was without legal papers for 

another 19 days from June 11, 2012 through June 29, 2012. (Lodgs. 13 

at 6; 14 at 5-7). In sum, Petitioner lacked access to his legal papers for 

35 days and that he filed a pleading in a case pending in the Eastern 

District of California in between those two brief periods of deprivation. 

Petitioner’s lack of access to his legal papers at the beginning of 

the limitations period is not an extraordinary circumstance and did not 

cause the untimely federal filing. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS finding that the transfers resulting in two short 

denials of access to legal materials at the outset of the limitations 

period do not equitably toll the limitations period. 

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If the District Judge declines to follow this recommendation and 

finds equitable tolling appropriate during the transfers, then Petitioner 

would be entitled to another 35 days of tolling. When combined with 

the 275 days of statutory tolling, 310 days would be tolled, and 54 days 

remain untolled. 

iii. Access to Law Library 

Although Petitioner has shown that he was denied access to the 

law library on some occasions, the records show he had regular access to 

the law library throughout the limitations period. Complete denial of 

library access warrants equitable tolling, but limited access to a law 

library and a copy machine are routine restrictions of prison life, and do 

not warrant equitable tolling. Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998. The law 

library logs in the record show Petitioner actually accessed the law 

library 26 times from July 23, 2012 to May 17, 2014. (Lodg. 20). At 

Petitioner’s request through the prison “paging” system, the law library 

staff also made copies, provided him legal supplies, and mailed legal 

paperwork at times when he was not afforded law library access. 

(Lodgs. 22-25). Petitioner was not completely denied access during any 

long duration of time, nor was he denied access at the end of the 

limitations period. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS finding that Petitioner’s 

limited library access does not entitle him to equitable tolling. 

iv. Physical Health 

Petitioner seeks equitable tolling for his March 24, 2013 stomach 

surgery, and related health difficulties. A severe physical illness 

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requiring hospitalization can equitably toll the statute of limitations. 

See e.g., Leon v. Hedgpeth, 467 F. App'x 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2012) (statute 

equitably tolled where petitioner suffered severe illness requiring two 

hospitalizations and morphine shortly before limitations period was set 

to expire). Petitioner has shown physical incapacity sufficient to 

warrant tolling of the statute of limitations from March 21, 2013 

through April 10, 2013, a period of 21 days. (ECF Nos. 23; 37; Lodgs. 

15; 16). Although Petitioner continued to have health difficulties after 

April 10, 2013, his physical condition was no longer severe enough to 

prevent him from working on his legal matters. (Id.). 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS finding that Petitioner’s 

statute of limitations was tolled for 21 days from March 21, 2013 

through April 10, 2013 due to his physical health problems. When this 

tolling is combined with the 275 days statutory tolling, then 296 days 

are tolled, and 66 days remain untolled. 

In the event that the District Court declines this Court’s 

recommendation in the preceding section to deny equitable tolling 

related to the prison transfers, then all three categories of tolling 

amount to 331 days of tolling, leaving 31 days untolled. 

v. Mental Health 

Petitioner claims equitable tolling for mental impairment. A 

habeas petitioner’s deadline should be equitably tolled where a mental 

impairment is “so debilitating that it is the but-for cause of the delay.” 

Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014); Bills v. 

Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010); Laws, 351 F.3d at 923. 

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Here, Petitioner has not shown that he had a mental impairment 

severe enough to constitute an extraordinary circumstance during the 

relevant time period. Petitioner’s intelligence was assessed at levels far 

above the levels that would implicate mental impairment. Petitioner 

received regular mental health assessments before and during the 

period. He denied having any signs of major mental impairment, and 

the medical professionals assessing him found that he did not need 

mental health services. His mental health needs are “routine.” 

To the extent he experienced sleeplessness, anxiety and 

headaches, neither he nor his medical services provider attributed those 

to a serious mental health impairment. Further, those symptoms were 

treated by adjustments to his medications, and the medical provider 

noted that the symptoms were greatly reduced. In addition, the 

medications he was on—including Paxil—were not for mental 

impairment, but for control of migraines and other well-controlled 

physical problems. Examination notes confirm that he had no 

significant complaints about medication side effects that implicate a 

debilitating mental impairment. While Petitioner may have been 

depressed, he did not suffer from clinical depression, and as he noted in 

his papers, depressed feelings are common in prison. 

Further, Respondent provided evidence of twenty-five documents 

that Petitioner filed in at least fifteen different habeas, civil rights, 

dissolution, and criminal cases during the period he now claims mental 

impairment. (ECF No. 34 at 15-18 (detailed chart of all filings in brief 

with citation to lodgments); Lodgs. 4; 5; 7; 9; 11; 27; 30-49; 51; 52). 

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These filings contradict Petitioner’s assertion that his mental health 

prevented him from working on his legal matters. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS finding no equitable 

tolling is warranted as a result of Petitioner’s mental health during the 

limitations period. 

vi. Filing Detour 

Finally, Petitioner contends that his detour to the Imperial 

County Court from July 9, 2013 through November 4, 2013 should be 

equitably tolled because the Kings County Court inadvertently but 

affirmatively misled him that he must next file his petition in a 

superior court in the Fourth District. He further argues that the 

California Judicial Council form for Petition for Habeas Corpus 

contains an advisement that he relied on to his detriment, which 

ultimately resulted in his filing detour. Respondent contends that the 

detour was the result of Petitioner’s own mistake or ignorance, and not 

subject to equitable tolling. Both agree that the filing detour caused his 

federal filing to be untimely. 

The Ninth Circuit allows equitable tolling to habeas petitioners 

who have been “affirmatively misled” by a federal or state court’s 

erroneous instructions. U.S. v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 

2011) (remanding to develop factual record on petitioner’s assertion 

that the Ninth Circuit Clerk provided his sister with misinformation 

that led to untimely filing); Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1233-1235 

(9th Cir. 2013) (magistrate judge’s order granting extension of time to 

file amended federal petition affirmatively misled petitioner, entitling 

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him to equitable tolling); see also Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 235 (2004) 

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Nevertheless, if the petitioner is 

affirmatively misled, either by the court or by the State, equitable 

tolling might well be appropriate.”). 

Equitable tolling, however, does not apply where the petitioner 

draws and relies upon an incorrect inference from court instructions 

that were not misleading. Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1070 

(9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling, because 

district court’s instruction that petitioner must choose between two 

alternatives was not misleading, even though one of the alternatives 

was time-barred). “[W]here a litigant’s own mistake clearly contributed 

to his predicament,” or where the failure is the result of “oversight, 

miscalculation or negligence” on the petitioner’s part, equitable tolling 

is not available. Cf. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008) (stating rule, but finding equitable tolling applied because 

petitioner’s failure to file timely resulted from a change in the law on 

timeliness rather than his conduct). 

When Petitioner initially filed the petition in Kings County Court 

in the Fifth Appellate District, he did so because the California Judicial 

Council form for Petition for Habeas Corpus “gives very clear and 

simple instructions in big/bold letters, ‘if you are challenging the 

conditions of your confinement and are filing this in the Superior Court, 

you should file it in the county in which you are confined.’” (ECF No. 37 

at 12 (brief), 16 (Judicial Council Form MC-275)). Petitioner followed 

those instructions, and filed his initial petition in Kings County, where 

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he was confined at the time of filing. Though the Kings County Court 

accepted his petition and denied it on the merits, the appellate court in 

the Fifth District denied the petition on the grounds that it should have 

been filed “in the Fourth Appellate District where he was confined when 

the gang investigation occurred and he was validated a gang associate.” 

(ECF No. 37 at 15). 

Petitioner relied on the judicial council form’s advisement to file in 

the county in which he was confined to his detriment. The Court finds 

that the state court affirmatively misled Petitioner in directing him to 

file in his place of confinement rather than where the gang validation 

occurred. Nevertheless, the Court has already found statutory tolling 

applies to this period of time when his petition was pending in the Fifth 

Appellate District, because the Kings County petition exhausted his 

petition at the superior court level. Petitioner is not entitled to further 

tolling as a result of the Judicial Council form’s misleading advisement. 

In the event the District Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory tolling while the petition was pending in Kings County and 

the Court of Appeals in the Fifth District, this Court RECOMMENDS

finding that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling for that time 

period. 

Turning now to the improper Imperial County filing, the Court 

finds Petitioner was not affirmatively misled by the Fifth District 

appellate court’s Order rejecting venue on the grounds that Petitioner 

should re-file “in the Fourth Appellate District.” The Court agrees with 

Petitioner that the appellate court’s Order did not expressly instruct 

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him to file in the appellate court in the Fourth District, as Respondent 

contends. The appellate court Order referred broadly to the “District” 

without specifying whether the next filing should be at the trial or 

appellate level. Because the court did not specify, Petitioner remained 

responsible for selecting the proper court. See e.g., Brambles, 412 F.3d 

at 1070 (equitable tolling denied because court’s instructions that 

petitioner had two options available was not misleading, even though 

court did not inform petitioner that one of the options was timebarred). Petitioner relied on his own mistaken interpretation rather 

than an express instruction from the state court. As the Imperial 

County Superior Court later emphasized, there is well-established case 

law that a prisoner whose petition has been denied by a superior court 

can only obtain review by filing in an appellate court. (Lodg. 8 at 3 

(Order quoting In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767 (1993)). Petitioner 

should have followed this case law to select the appellate court in the 

Fourth District rather than the trial court. 

The Imperial County filing detour is the result of Petitioner’s 

misinterpretation of the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s Order and 

ignorance of the law. Petitioner’s confusion, ignorance of the law and 

mistake are not extraordinary circumstances. Consequently, the Court 

RECOMMENDS finding that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable 

tolling for his 112 day detour to Imperial County Superior Court. 

d. Conclusion re Timeliness 

Having considered the totality of all of the circumstances, the 

Court RECOMMENDS finding that 266 days were equitably tolled, 

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that 66 days remain untolled, and further RECOMMENDS finding 

that there is insufficient tolling of the limitations period to relieve the 

Petition of its untimeliness. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and that the 

Petition be DISMISSED. 

In the event the district court declines to adopt this 

recommendation and finds the Petition timely, the Court now turns to 

the other issues raised in Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

2. Exhaustion 

To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner 

must present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to 

rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas 

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-

34 (1987). The petitioner must have raised the same federal claims 

brought in the federal petition before the state supreme court. See 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a federal claim “is fairly 

presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal 

theory upon which his claim is based.” See Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that to state a federal due process 

claim it is not necessary to invoke ‘the talismanic phrase “due process of 

law” ’ or cite ‘book and verse on the federal constitution;’ petitioner need 

only make ‘essentially the same arguments' before the state and federal 

courts to exhaust a claim). Further, courts have a duty to construe pro 

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se filings of prisoners liberally. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s claim that his federal due 

process rights were violated because his gang validation hearing was 

impartial have not been exhausted in state court. (ECF No. 10). The 

Court disagrees. 

The Petition alleges that Petitioner’s federal due process rights 

were violated when he was not provided an impartial hearing, because 

the CDCR officers that investigated Petitioner’s AB affiliation were the 

same that conducted the hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 6). In the state 

petition, Petitioner argued that the Institutional Gang Investigator did 

not provide Petitioner with an opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful 

way” with respect to the “source items used in the validation interview” 

because the “same authors” of his validation packet held the review.6 

(Lodg. 11). 

In both petitions, Petitioner uses the same operative facts (that 

the same CDCR officer who conducted the investigation into Petitioner’s 

gang affiliation also conducted the interview), and the same legal theory 

(that his federal due process rights were violated). Petitioner has 

presented the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule 

 

6 California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 3378(c)(6)(A), which governs 

the gang validation process, sets forth a process including an 

investigation, an interview with the prisoner, at which the prisoner is 

given an opportunity to be heard regarding the evidence, and a review 

of the interview and evidence. Petitioner’s state supreme court petition 

uses the terms interview, review, and hearing interchangeably. 

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on the merits of the issues raised in his federal habeas Petition. His 

claims are therefore exhausted and not subject to dismissal under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The Court RECOMMENDS denying 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

3. Cognizable Claim 

Respondent argues that the Court should dismiss Petitioner’s 

allegation in his second Ground that “CDCR relied on improper 

evidence under California regulatory law for failure to allege a federal 

question.” (ECF No. 10). In his second Ground, Petitioner’s overall 

argument is that due to insufficient notice and unreliability of the 

evidence used by the CDCR, his constitutional due process rights were 

violated. (ECF No. 1). 

Only claims which allege a violation of the federal Constitution, 

laws or treaties are cognizable on federal review. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Relief is not available for an alleged 

error in the interpretation or application of state law, unless it involves 

“fundamental unfairness.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. If it is proven that 

Petitioner was given insufficient notice of the evidence to be used 

against him or that the CDCR changed the evidence used in its 

determination of Petitioner’s gang affiliation after his interview, this 

state error could have rendered the gang validation process arbitrary or 

fundamentally unfair. Petitioner sufficiently pled a cognizable federal 

due process violation. Consequently, the court RECOMMENDS 

denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

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VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

the Court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and 

Recommendation, (2) GRANTING Petitioner’s motion to amend and 

consolidating the operative and amended petitions into a single 

consolidated petition, and (3) GRANTING Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the 

Court and serve a copy on all parties by September 4, 2015. The 

document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

by September 11, 2015. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of 

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 20, 2015 

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