Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02181/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ANDREW O’DELL,

CDCR #F-03425,

Civil No. 11-2181 WQH (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 4];

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) &

1915A(b); AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

TO EFFECT SERVICE OF

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) 

& 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

LARRY SMALL; RAY MADDEN;

NELSON; JOHN MUNGER; 

G. BADILLA,

Defendants.

Eric Andrew O’Dell (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison located

in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [ECF No. 4]. 

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I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

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to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 4] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and is a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h),

the Court must also review his Complaint sua sponte before service, and dismiss the entire

action, or any part of his Complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks

damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua

sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on the

opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28

U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

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which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims relating to a

disciplinary hearing and time he spent in Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). However,

these claims are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because

they appear to be duplicative of claims brought in another action Plaintiff has already litigated.

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains identical claims that are found in O’Dell v. McEwen, et al., S.D.

Cal. Civil Case No. 11cv0179 H (CAB). A court “may take notice of proceedings in other

courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct

relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.

Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it

“merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,

1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff has already litigated the same claims presented in the

instant action in O’Dell v. McEwen, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cv0179 H (CAB), the

Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims from this

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) without leave to amend. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105

n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

/ / /

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In addition, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss Defendants Small, Madden and

Nelson from this matter as Plaintiff seeks to hold them liable in their supervisory capacity.

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson,

9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order

to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual

Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to

support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendants Small, Madden or Nelson.

However, as to the remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint, specifically his Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Munger and Badilla, the Court finds these claims are

sufficiently pleaded to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b). Therefore, the Court will authorize U.S. Marshal service as to these claims on

Plaintiff’s behalf. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the

court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P.

4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy

marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is

cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant]

may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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III. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 4] is

GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are DISMISSED as

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(1).

5. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Small, Madden and Nelson are DISMISSED

for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(1). The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate these Defendants

from the docket.

6. The Clerk shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] upon the

remaining Defendants Munger and Badilla and shall and forward it to Plaintiff along with a

blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff

with a certified copy of this Order and copies of his Complaint and the summons for purposes

of serving each Defendant. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete

the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, and to return them to the U.S. Marshal

according to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package.

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Thereafter, the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon each

Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on each Form 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by

the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

7. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while Defendants may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to

reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based

on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the

merits,” Defendants are required to respond). 

8. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be

filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy

of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service.

Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to

include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 28, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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