Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01595/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01595-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-Filed 6/7/05*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

XIAO-YU ZHANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

MA LABS, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. C04-01595 HRL

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

TO VACATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 60

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Chinese citizen, filed this action against his former California employer, alleging

wage discrimination on the basis of alienage, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On May 15, 2005, this

court ordered summary judgment for defendant. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, this

court applied the test from Coward v. ADT Security Systems, which requires that plaintiff in a § 1981

action demonstrate that he is a member of a protected class, and that “[he was] performing work

substantially equal to that of [citizens] who were compensated at [a] higher rate than [he was].” 140

F.3d 271, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This court found that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to

raise an issue of material fact as to whether he was performing substantially equal work to any citizenemployee of defendant who was paid more. Subsequently, the court entered judgment for the

defendant. Plaintiff now moves to vacate the order and the summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

Case 5:04-cv-01595-HRL Document 62 Filed 06/08/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 In its moving papers, defendant said the plaintiff had to show he was doing the “same type” of work

as the US citizens he was using as comparatives. In its reply, which appropriately focused on attacking

plaintiff’s argument that a prima facie case was made merely because plaintiff and his comparatives were all

“software engineers,” it used the phrase “same work.”

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 In any event, this court does not accept the premise of plaintiffs’s “surprise” argument: that

defendant changed the test in its reply brief. This court viewed it as slightly different language that meant the

same thing. Plaintiff’s construct here is semantic speculation.

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Plaintiff’s motion raises two main issues: (1) whether FRCP 60 is the appropriate vehicle for

the relief he seeks, and (2) whether this court correctly concluded as a matter of law that he had not

made a prima facie showing of wage discrimination under §1981. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)

Plaintiff moves to vacate the summary judgment on the grounds of "mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Basically, plaintiff’s counsel says he was

the victim of “surprise.” The surprise occurred when defendant filed its reply brief to the summary

judgment motion, a brief - says plaintiff - which for the first time urged a different (and, supposedly,

incorrect) test for showing a prima facie case of wage discrimination under § 1981.1

Plaintiff’s counsel then alleges that his surprise continued, unabated, up until the time of the

hearing on the motion ten days later, when he failed to mention anything about the reply brief finagling

the test definition. (He also failed, despite the court’s urging, to clearly articulate what the “real” test

was.) Then, goes plaintiff's argument, the court made a “mistake” by adopting the defendant’s version

of the prima facie test and, as a consequence, wrongly granted the motion.

Surely, just to state the plaintiff’s argument reveals its infirmity. It is a contrived argument, one

intended to shoehorn a challenge to the court’s ruling on the summary judgment into Rule 60, where

the challenge does not belong. This court has found no case where actions and inactions such as those

described here can legitimately be labeled as a version of “surprise” that properly supports Rule 60

relief. A motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) "should not be treated as a substitute for appeal." Gould

v. Mutual Life Insurance of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). If plaintiff believes that

the court applied the incorrect legal standard, the proper forum for relief is in the Court of Appeals.2

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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B. The “Substantially Equal” Prima Facie Test for Plaintiff's § 1981 Claim.

The argument that this court committed legal error in finding that plaintiff failed to make a prima

facie showing does not require extended discussion in the context of the present motion. Plaintiff

asserts that the correct legal standard for a prima facie showing for a wage discrimination case under §

1981 is whether or not the plaintiff's work was "comparable" to that of citizen-employees who were

better compensated. He claims that this test was announced in Gunther v. County of Washington,

623 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d in Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161

(1981). Though Gunther was a Title VII case, plaintiff says that this so-called lower standard is made

applicable to § 1981 cases in Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff's arguments are unconvincing. To begin with, plaintiff cites numerous cases arguing for

a relaxed "Title VII" standard, yet he explicitly abandoned his Title VII claims, both in his motion

papers, and in open court. See Pltf's Opposition to Mot. for Summary Judgment at 1 n.1; Ex. C to

Decl. of C. Wahng in Support of Def’s Mot. to Compel Discovery at 102:16-25. Having waived

these claims, he cannot now bring them in through the back door. 

Moreover, to support his argument, plaintiff picks and chooses language from different cases,

language taken out of context and without regard to whether the actual holdings support his position. 

The result is an intellectual muddle. Plaintiff says that the "substantially equal" standard applied by this

court is only applicable to cases arising under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C § 206(d) ("EPA"), yet the

Coward case relied on by this court was not an EPA case, but a case under § 1981. Coward, 140

F.3d at 273. Additionally, plaintiff ignores these explicit words from Gunther, the case he so heavily

relies on: "[B]ecause a comparable work standard cannot be substituted for an equal work standard,

evidence of comparable work, although not necessarily irrelevant in proving discrimination under some

alternative theory, will not alone be sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Gunther, 623 F.2d at

1321. The Gunther court also held, contrary to plaintiff's claims, that the "substantially equal" analysis

will usually provide the most practical way to establishing a prima facie case of wage discrimination.

Id. Nothing cited by plaintiff requires otherwise, or leads this court to conclude that it should, after

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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giving full value to his evidence and putting aside speculation, have concluded that plaintiff did make a

prima facie showing of wage discrimination under § 1981.

Plaintiffs motion to vacate the summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/7/05 /s/ Howard R. Lloyd 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WILL BE SENT TO:

Chao Jen Wahng rwahng@legal-opinion.com,

Adam Q. Wang waqw@sbcglobal.net 

* Counsel are responsible for providing copies of this order to co-counsel who have not

registered under the Court's ECF system.

Dated: 6/7/05

 /s/ RNR 

Chambers of Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd

Case 5:04-cv-01595-HRL Document 62 Filed 06/08/05 Page 5 of 5