Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02520/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02520-42/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition (Doc. 136) to defendants’ motions. 1

Defendants filed a motion to strike (Doc. 143) plaintiff’s supplemental opposition. That request

should be denied because defendants are not prejudiced by plaintiff’s supplemental opposition. 

Specifically, the court granted defendants an extension of time (Doc. 142) to respond to the

supplemental opposition. Therefore, defendants have had a chance to respond to the merits of

any arguments raised in that pleading. In this regard, defendants’ motion for an extension of

time, nunc pro tunc, of one day (Doc. 147) to make their supplemental reply brief timely should

be granted. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC CHARLES RODNEY K’NAPP, No. CIV S-05-2520-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RODERICK HICKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are defendants’ motions to dismiss and joinders

thereto (Docs. 98, 114, 120, 131). 

1

/ / /

/ / /

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Defendant White has been dismissed by order issued on June 13, 2007 (Doc. 97). 2

Plaintiff filed a document conceding to voluntary dismissal of unserved defendants Gunning,

Marshall, and Murray (Doc. 128). The court, however, construed that filing as a request for

assistance and has directed the United States Marshal to attempt to locate these individuals (see

Doc. 133). Defendant Warvarovski also remains unserved. The court will continue to monitor

for service of these four defendants. 

As to defendants Reyes and Reaves, they both filed waivers of service on April 3,

2007 (Doc. 69). On June 26, 2007, a number of defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 98). 

Listed as a moving defendant was “Reayes” even though no such individual is named in the third

amended complaint or has waived service. The court asked the defendants for clarification as to

which of these defendants had appeared. In their response (Doc. 119), defendants clarified that

both defendants Reyes and Reaves have appeared and that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 98) was

filed on behalf of both of these defendants as well as numerous others. 

All other defendants have appeared in the action. 

2

I. BACKGROUND

This action proceeds on the third amended complaint (Doc. 39) filed on December

1, 2006. Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants: Hickman, Ali, Boyd, C.

Brown, D. Brown, M. Brown, Broyles, Campbell, Carrillo, Cherry, Clevenstine, Danzinger,

Doherty, Emigh, Etheredge, Fowler, Gentile, Grannis, Gray, Gunning, Gutierrez, Hansen, Hein,

Henderson, Hensley, Hogan, Hurdle, Kaiser, Kanipe, Keeland, Kernan, King, Klinefelter, Knipp,

Knowles, Kudlata, Laguna, Lattimore, Leeworthy, Lincoln, Marshall, McNeil, Melching, Mesa,

Murray, Mynhier, Nelson, O’Connor, Olsen, Poe, Presley, Reaves, Rendon, Reyes, Rianda,

Robinson, Sauceda, Seinwerth, Silva, Smith, Stanley, Stewart, Subia, Taylor, Uribe,

Vasconcellos, Vasquez, Warren, Warvarovski, White, and Whittle. 

2

Plaintiff asserts 12 separate claims, many of which have sub-claims. He alleges

the following general background facts:

Plaintiff . . . is a prisoner within the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). He is also a plaintiff class

member of Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal.

1995), and Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997). 

He has been a patient in the CDCR’s Mental Health Services Delivery

System since 1996 with a consistent diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder and related conditions resulting from severe physical and

psychological trauma he survived upon entering the prison system in 1994

as a former state peace officer and federal military police sergeant wrongly

convicted of sexually assaulting a woman who has since come forward and

admitted that she lied against him. Accordingly, he was specially

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transferred to Mule Creek State Prison . . . at the beginning of 1999

specifically for the purpose of facilitating his mental health condition . . .

so he could be visited on a regular and frequent basis by his physically

disabled mother and other loved ones residing in that area. 

Plaintiff’s mother is director of a prison watchdog group called

United for No Injustice, Oppression, Neglect (“UNION”). Since 1998,

Plaintiff’s mother has worked through UNION to educate, organize, and

thus empower the family members and friends of California state prisoners

to more effectively advocate against the mistreatment of prisoners and

corruption plaguing the California prison system. 

Following Plaintiff’s arrival at MCSP, especially beginning in the

month of June 2000, Plaintiff, his activist mother, and their respective

associates both in and out of prison lawfully exercised protected rights

under the U.S. Constitution’s 1st Amendment by speaking freely,

peaceably associating and assembling toward a common good, and

accessing available press, media, government officials, and courts to

report, seek redress of, and otherwise publicly expose and denounce

injustice, oppression, neglect, and other abuse of Plaintiff and other CDCR

prisoners, particularly at MCSP. 

Plaintiff asserts 12 separate claims, each with numerous sub-claims, alleging acts

of retaliation by defendants because plaintiff engaged in the following activities: (1) petitioned

for redress of grievances; (2) associated with others; (3) assembled with others; (4) spoke freely;

and (5) communicated through confidential mail. He asserts the following specific acts of

retaliation: (1) confiscation and destruction of personal property; (2) unreasonable confiscation

of mail; (3) frequent cell searches; and (4) nude body inspections. Plaintiff specifically states

that he is complaining of specific acts which are part of a “3-year campaign of retaliatory abuse”

and that this campaign continues “unabated.” 

Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts Eighth Amendment violations based on the

following claims related to conditions of confinement while plaintiff was housed in

administrative segregation between September 2000 and September 2001: (1) endangerment of

personal safety; (2) intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional anguish; (3) denial of

clothing and/or warmth; (4) denial of sanitary conditions; (5) deliberate indifference toward

known mental conditions; (6) deprivation of prescribed therapy and treatment; (7) excessive

force; (8) denial of food; (9) experimental drugging; and (10) coercion, duress, and menace

causing mental harm. 

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In its December 13, 2006, order determining that service of the third amended

complaint was appropriate for the named defendants, the court stated:

. . . The gist of his complaint is that defendants at Mule

Creek State Prison (MCSP) have retaliated against him for complaining

about staff misconduct and working to improve prison conditions. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with his prison grievances,

interfered with his right to visitation, confiscated materials from a bulletin

board, forced him to resign from the Men’s Advisory Council, and forced

other prisoners to deface a mural that plaintiff had painted. Finally,

plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by deplorable

living conditions which he suffered during three separate placements in

administrative segregation and by being served contaminated food. 

Plaintiff’s claims concerning the conditions he alleged[ly]

encountered in Administrative Segregation and his claims that he was

served contaminated food state cognizable claims for relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). By themselves, the claims that

defendants interfered with his prison grievances, interfered with his right

to visitation, confiscated materials from a bulletin board, forced him to

resign from the Men’s Advisory Council, and forced other prisoners to

deface a mural that plaintiff had painted do not state cognizable civil rights

claims. However, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that the defendants

engaged in the above-described actions as part of ongoing retaliatory

conduct stemming from plaintiff’s filing of a grievance (a constitutionally

protected activity) concerning an incident in 2000, plaintiff does state a

cognizable retaliation claim against defendants. 

II. STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In considering a motion to dismiss under this

standard, the court must accept all allegations of material fact as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 

___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (June 4, 2007). The court must also construe the alleged facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see

also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni,

31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved

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in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pro se pleadings

are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain

more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1956, 1965 (2007). Allegations of specific facts are not

necessary so long as the statement of facts gives the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2197. 

To determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,

the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper

v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or

attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454;

(2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily

lies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice,

see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), except prison regulations, see Anderson

v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under these standards, a statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion

to dismiss. Leave to amend a deficient complaint must be granted “. . . [u]nless it is absolutely

clear that no amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248

(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

/ / /

/ / /

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III. DISCUSSION

In their motions to dismiss, defendants raise the following arguments:

1. Plaintiff lacks standing with respect to certain allegations;

2. Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation asserted in Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are

time-barred and the ongoing violation doctrine does not apply;

3. Even if the ongoing violation doctrine applies, some defendants must be

dismissed because the doctrine does not preserve distinct claims against

defendants that are not linked to violations occurring within the limitations

period;

4. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims relating to his confinement in

administrative segregation between September 2000 and September 2001

are time-barred;

5. Claim 8m must be dismissed because it relates only to the impact from

past violations;

6. Allegations relating to mail from the courts and public officials do not

state a First Amendment claim based on interference with legal mail;

7. Allegations of verbal harassment are not actionable;

8. Certain defendants must be dismissed because plaintiff’s claims against

them are based solely on the prison grievance process;

9. Certain defendants must be dismissed because plaintiff fails to allege a

causal link between them and any cognizable claim; and

10. Defendants Gray and Vasconcellos should be dismissed due to: (1)

Eleventh Amendment immunity; (b) legislative immunity; and/or (c)

failure to state a claim.

A. Standing

Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of “all portions of the

complaint containing allegations of retaliation against and injuries suffered by persons other than

K’napp, because he lacks standing to assert these claims.” As defendants note, plaintiff’s third

amended complaint is replete with allegations regarding injuries suffered by plaintiff’s fiancé and

“associates.” The court agrees with defendants that plaintiff lacks standing to assert damage

claims based on these allegations because he must allege claims relating to his own injuries, not

the injuries suffered by others. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992);

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see also Hale v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In opposition, plaintiff cites Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004), for the

proposition that he may invoke third party standing to asserts the claims of others. The court

finds, however, that Kowalski does not apply in this case. In Kowalski, the Supreme Court

stated that third party standing is only available when “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s

ability to protect his own interests.” Id. at 130 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411

(1991)). In general, however, the Court does not look favorably on the concept of third party

standing. See id. In this case, there is no indication that plaintiff’s fiancé and “associates”

cannot assert their own rights to the extent they have been violated by defendants’ conduct. 

Therefore, the court declines to confer third party standing in this case. This case cannot proceed

as to any allegations asserting damages by parties other than plaintiff. This case may only

proceed with respect to plaintiff’s own alleged injuries. 

B. Statute of Limitations

For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is

California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct.

1091, 1094-95 (2006); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). State tolling statutes also apply to 

§ 1983 actions. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490

U.S. 536, 543-44 (1998)). 

Before January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions was

one year. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(3); see also Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th

Cir. 1999) (citing Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802, and applying the one-year limitation period specified in

§ 340(3)). The personal injury statute of limitation was extended by passage of California Code

of Civil Procedure § 335.1 to two years, effective January 1, 2003. See Canatella v. Van De

Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1). The extension

of this statute of limitations, however, does not apply retroactively to claims which were already

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barred under one-year limitation period specified in § 340(3), plus any statutory tolling, as of the

effective date of January 1, 2003. See id. at 955 (citing Douglas Aircraft v. Cranston, 58 Cal.2d

462 (1962)). 

At the time Elliott was decided – 1994 – California Code of Civil Procedure 

§ 352(a)(3) provided tolling of the statute of limitations when the plaintiff is “[i]mprisoned on a

criminal charge, or in execution under sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for

life.” That tolling, however, only applies if the disability of incarceration existed at the time the

claim accrued. See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 357). Pre-conviction

incarceration qualifies. See id. By the time Fink was decided – 1999 – the California tolling

provision for the disability of incarceration had been amended. Specifically, California Code of

Civil Procedure § 352.1, which became effective January 1, 1995, provides prisoners with only

two years of tolling. See Fink, 192 F.3d at 914. Prior to the effective date of § 352.1, prisoners

enjoyed tolling for the entire time of sentences less than life. See id. The Ninth Circuit in Fink

concluded that § 352.1 applies retroactively. See id. at 915. Thus, for § 1983 claims which

accrued before January 1, 1995, the running of the statute of limitations is tolled for two years, or

until January 1, 1997, whichever is later. See Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. 

Defendants raise three related arguments regarding the statue of limitations. First,

they argue that the retaliation claims set forth in Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are all time-barred

because they relate to events occurring more than four years prior to the date this action was filed

and the continuing violation doctrine does not apply. Second, they argue that, even if the

continuing violation doctrine applies to his retaliation claims, the doctrine does not preserve

claims against specific defendants against whom conduct is not alleged to have occurred within

the limitations period. And third, defendants argue that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are

barred because they relate to the conditions of his confinement in administrative segregation

between September 2000 and September 2001, which are dates more than four years before this

action was filed. 

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1. Retaliation Claims

In this case, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 describe retaliatory events which occurred

between June 2000 and October 2001. As of January 1, 2003 – the date the statute of limitations

was extended to two years – none of these claims would have been time-barred under the oneyear statute of limitations, plus two years tolling due to plaintiff’s incarceration. Therefore,

plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the extended statute of limitations and his claims would be

barred if not filed within four years of their accrual dates (two-year statute of limitations plus two

years tolling). Defendants agree that a four-year time limit applies and argue that, because

plaintiff’s action was not filed until December 2005, these six claims are time-barred.

In his opposition, plaintiff contends that the continuing violation doctrine applies

such that the conduct complained of in Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 relates to conduct alleged in

other claims which was within the limitations period based on his December 2005 filing date. 

Defendants argue the continuing violation doctrine does not apply because plaintiff’s claim

asserts “twelve separate [retaliation] claims, each based on different allegedly protected acts.” 

They also argue that it should not matter that plaintiff, in his opposition, attempts to save his

claims by presenting a self-serving argument that these alleged violations are all related and

ongoing. Defendants state that the allegations in the complaint should control.

In cases where the plaintiff alleges ongoing violations, claims outside the

limitations period which relate to claims within the limitations period may nonetheless be

actionable under the continuing violation doctrine. In an employment discrimination case, the

Supreme Court stated that “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002). However, where the plaintiff asserts claims resulting from an

alleged ongoing policy of discrimination, the continuing violation doctrine applies. See

Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259-60 (9th Cir. 1997). In Gutowsky, the plaintiff

had alleged “that the widespread policy and practices of discrimination of which she complains

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continued every day of her employment, including days that fall within the limitation period.” Id.

at 260. Thus, there needs to be an allegation that the specific acts alleged are instances of some

broader policy. See id.; see also Cholla Ready Mix Co. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974-5 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113-14). 

Defendants are correct that the allegations in the complaint govern this court’s

analysis. However, they are not correct that plaintiff’s complaint does not allege ongoing

violations. While plaintiff does in fact sort his allegations into 12 separate claims, he also

specifically alleges ongoing violations as the result of a “campaign” or policy of retaliation that

persists “unabated.” These are not merely self-serving statements in opposition to defendants’

motion to dismiss. Rather, they are allegations in the third amended complaint. Plaintiff repeats

these allegations in each claim. For example, in Claim 1, plaintiff alleges an “oppressive

campaign of retaliatory abuse,” and in Claim 2, plaintiff alleges a “campaign of retaliatory

oppression.” In Claim 3, plaintiff alleges that this “campaign” alleged in Claims 1 and 2

continued to “progress” against plaintiff as set forth in the sub-parts of Claim 3. In Claim 4,

plaintiff states that defendants caused the “campaign of retaliatory oppression alleged above at

Claim 1–3 to continue unabated. . . .” Plaintiff sets forth similar allegations in each of his 12

claims. Moreover, as the court in Cholla Ready Mix noted, acts occurring outside the limitations

period are relevant background material in support of claims within the limitations period. See

382 F.3d at 975. Therefore, the continuing violation doctrine applies and the claims are not

barred.

The court next turns to defendants’ argument that, notwithstanding the continuing

violation doctrine, certain defendants against whom conduct is not alleged to have occurred

within the limitations period must nonetheless be dismissed. Essentially, defendants argue that,

while plaintiff’s retaliation claims might be preserved by the continuing violation doctrine, such

claims against specific defendants are not preserved unless plaintiff alleges conduct against them

within the limitations period. Specifically, defendants argue that M. Brown, Broyles,

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Clevenstine, Hensley, Knipp, Leeworthy, McNeil, Reaves, Robinson, and Stanely must be

dismissed under this theory. The court agrees with defendants’ legal premise, noting that the

Supreme Court in Morgan applied the continuing violation doctrine to preserve the alleged

pattern of discriminatory conduct created by the same defendant. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113-

14. The question, then, is whether defendants are correct that all of plaintiff’s allegations against

M. Brown, Broyles, Clevenstine, Hensley, Knipp, Leeworthy, McNeil, Reaves, Robinson, and

Stanely fall outside the limitations period (i.e., before December 12, 2001 – four years prior to

the date this action was filed). In other words, the question is whether plaintiff alleges conduct

against these individuals occurring after December 12, 2001. 

Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 all allege conduct prior to December 12, 2001. As to

the remaining claims, the dates and defendants involved are summarized as follows:

Claim 6 Dates: Between October 3, 2001, and March 3, 2002. 

Defendants (as to dates after December 12, 2001, only): Gray,

Hurdle, Kernan, Knowles, Vasconcellos, Warren, and White. 

Claim 8 Dates: Between May 29, 2002, and December 13, 2002. 

Defendants: Hickman, Kaiser, King, Knowles, Laguna, Mynhier,

Sulva, Vasquez, Warren, Vasconcellos, White, Hurdle, Smith,

Murray, Gutierrez, Reyes, Gunning, Hansen, Etheredge, Kernan,

Lattimore, Olsen, Silva, Boyd, D. Brown, Hansen, Presley, Uribe,

Grannis, Rianda, Hogan, Ali, and O’Connor.

Claim 9 Dates: Between January 7, 2003, and January 12, 2003.

Defendants: Gray, Hickman, Hurdle, Knowles, Presley,

Vasconcellos, White, Etheredge, Gentile, Gutierrez, Warren,

Kernan, Sauceda, and Seinwerth

Claim 10 Dates: Between January 17, 2003, and April 29, 2003.

Defendants: Gray, Hogan, Hurdle, Knowles, Presley, Rianda,

Vasconcellos, Warren, White, Subia, Doherty, Etheredge, Gentile,

Gutierrez, Kaiser, Lattimore, Mesa, Hein, Henderson, Keeland,

Kernan, Silva, Boyd, Klinefelter, Sauceda, Seinwerth,

Warvarovski, Grannis, Kudlata, Poe, Carrillo, Danzinger, Fowler,

Stewart, Cherry, Kanipe, and Taylor

/ / /

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Claim 11 Dates: Between January 26, 2001, and April 15, 2003.

Defendants (as to dates after December 12, 2001, only): Gray,

Hurdle, Hernan, Knowles, Presley, Reyes, Subia, Vasconcellos,

White, Campbell, Grannis, and Hansen

Claim 12 Dates: Between July 8, 2003, and September 15, 2003.

Defendants: Grannis, Gray, Gutierrez, Hansen, Hurdle, Knowles,

Lattimore, Presley, Vasconcellos, Kernan, Reyes, Subia, Campbell,

and White.

Defendants are correct that M. Brown, Broyles, Clevenstine, Hensley, Knipp, Leeworthy,

McNeil, Reaves, Robinson, and Stanely are not named with respect to any conduct alleged to

have occurred within the limitations period. At best, plaintiff’s allegations against these

individuals refer to conduct occurring more than four years before this action was filed. 

Therefore, they should be dismissed because plaintiff’s retaliation claims as against them are

time-barred and plaintiff has not alleged that these defendants participated in continuing

violations ongoing within the limitations period. 

2. Eighth Amendment Claims

The court’s conclusion regarding the applicability of the continuing violation

doctrine, however, is different as to plaintiff’s discrete Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claims. Specifically, plaintiff alleges various violations relating to the conditions of

his confinement in administrative segregation between September 2000 and September 2001. 

Because his allegations of ongoing violations only relate to the “campaign of retaliatory

oppression,” the continuing violation doctrine cannot save his stand-alone Eighth Amendment

claims from the statute of limitations. Because all of the conditions of confinement claims relate

to times more than four years prior to the date this action was filed, they are barred. This is not

to say, however, that the allegations do not provide background material relating to plaintiff’s

retaliation claims. Plaintiff may not, however, recover damages in this lawsuit based solely on

the conditions of his confinement in administrative segregation between September 2000 and

September 2001. 

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C. Claim 8m

In Claim 8m, plaintiff alleges:

By 11/21/02, all defendants thus far named herein at Counts 1a-8l jointly

caused Plaintiff’s mental health to be so badly eroded because of the

retaliatory campaign of oppression – which included so many inflictions of

mental abuse & cruelty alleged herein – that he required psychotropic

medication for relief from all the resulting stress, anxiety, depression, &

suicidal thoughts he was suffering. 

Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because it relates only to plaintiff’s

allegations that a past violation resulted in continuing damage. Defendants are correct that the

mere continuing impact alone from a past violation is not actionable under the continuing

violation doctrine. See Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). However, that case

discussed the time of accrual of a claim under the continuing violation doctrine. It does not

foreclose the allegations at Claim 8m representing plaintiff’s statement of the damages suffered. 

Therefore, the court finds that, while Claim 8m does not state a stand-alone basis for liability, it

nonetheless constitutes part of plaintiff’s allegations concerning the damages he suffered as a

result of the retaliatory conduct complained of elsewhere in the complaint. 

D. Plaintiff’s Mail

Defendants note that certain of plaintiff’s sub-claims within Claim 11 relate to

prison mail. They argue that, because plaintiff has not alleged any improper interference with his

legal mail, he cannot state a First Amendment claim based on prison officials opening his mail. 

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d

264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Prison officials may intercept and censor outgoing mail

concerning escape plans, proposed criminal activity, or encoded messages. See Procunier v.

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also Witherow, 52 F.3d at 266. Based on security

concerns, officials may also prohibit correspondence between inmates. See Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78, 93 (1987). Prison officials may not, however, review outgoing legal mail for legal

sufficiency before sending them to the court. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). 

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Incoming mail from the courts, as opposed to mail from the prisoner’s attorney, for example, is

not considered “legal mail.” See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The court agrees with defendants that plaintiff has not alleged any stand-alone

First Amendment claim concerning legal mail. Specifically, his mail allegations relate to mail

from plaintiff’s mother. However, as should be clear from the court’s discussion above, this case

presents cognizable retaliation claims only. Plaintiff’s allegations at Claim 11, therefore, are

considered descriptions of acts of retaliation. In other words, plaintiff asserts that, in retaliation,

defendants confiscated incoming mail from his mother. 

E. Verbal Harassment

As with their argument concerning plaintiff’s mail allegations, defendants argue

that plaintiff cannot state a stand-alone claim based on verbal harassment. Again, the court

agrees. Allegations of verbal harassment do not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See 

Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff’s allegations

concerning acts of harassment, however, represent instances of claimed retaliatory conduct. 

F. Prison Grievance Process

Next, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot proceed with a stand-alone claim

based on the prison grievance process because he has no constitutional right in such a process. 

Again, defendants are correct. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

However, as stated above, this case is about retaliation. Plaintiff is not claiming that his

constitutional rights were violated with respect to the prison grievance process. Rather, he

asserts that defendants’ alleged interference with his grievances constitute discrete acts of

retaliation. As such, the allegations relate to his retaliation claims. 

/ / /

/ / /

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Presumably, the other named defendants concede that plaintiff has alleged a 3

causal link to his retaliation claims. 

15

G. Causal Link

Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged a causal link between a violation of

his civil rights and the following individuals: M. Brown, Campbell, Carillo, Cherry, Doherty,

Gentile, Henderson, Klinefelter, Olsen, Seinwerth, D. Brown, Knipp, Kudlata, Laguna, Lincoln,

Rendon, Reyes, Subia, Mynhier, Boyd, Kernan, Silva, Hickman, Knowles, Emigh, Gannis,

Hansen, Hurdle, Melching, Presley, Reaves, Rianda, Taylor, and Uribe. Specifically, defendants 3

contend that plaintiff “offers no facts supporting his allegation that retaliation motivated their

behavior.” The court has addressed the causal link required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in prior

orders. In the court’s February 27, 2006, order dismissing the original complaint with leave to

amend, the court stated:

. . . There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions

and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May

v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th cir. 1978). 

As to the original complaint, the court observed:

Plaintiff’s complaint contains fifty counts against

defendants and is one-hundred three pages long. The events described in

the complaint do not allege a specific violation of plaintiff’s civil rights by

defendants. Instead, plaintiff’s complaint is more akin to a narrative of

wrong doing by prison officials and state officers. . . . 

In addressing plaintiff’s second amended complaint on July 21, 2006, the court stated:

If prison officials retaliate against an inmate for the exercise

of his constitutional rights, the prisoner may have a viable claim under the

civil rights act. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.

2005) (stating that the elements of a retaliation claim are (1) an assertion

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of

(3) that inmate’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal). Here, however,

plaintiff makes vague allegations of retaliation; he does not address the

basis or nature of defendants’ retaliatory acts or clearly state which

defendants were specifically involved in the retaliation. 

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The court did not specifically conclude that plaintiff had stated cognizable claims 4

as against each named defendant. 

The court has not examined the allegations as to M. Brown, Knipp, and Reaves 5

because, as discussed above, plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are time-barred. 

16

Plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend, which resulted in the filing of the third amended

complaint presently before the court and which the court determined appeared to state cognizable

claims for relief and was appropriate for service. 

4

After thoroughly reviewing the third amended complaint with respect to plaintiff’s

references to defendants Campbell, Carillo, Cherry, Doherty, Gentile, Henderson, Klinefelter,

Olsen, Seinwerth, D. Brown, Kudlata, Laguna, Lincoln, Rendon, Reyes, Subia, Mynhier, Boyd,

Kernan, Silva, Hickman, Knowles, Emigh, Gannis, Hansen, Hurdle, Melching, Presley, Rianda,

Taylor, and Uribe, the court concludes that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish 5

the required causal link. Specifically, plaintiff has not alleged how each of these individuals

acted to retaliate against plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff’s allegations are vague. For example, in

Claim 1g, plaintiff alleges that defendants Hickman, Hurdle, and Reyes “jointly caused 

Plaintiff . . . to further suffer unauthorized visit terminations. . . .” He has not, however, alleged

with any specificity what these defendants actually did that resulted in the visit terminations. It is

not enough just to say that defendants “caused” something to happen. Plaintiff must allege facts

regarding the specific conduct of each defendant. In other words, regarding the example above,

plaintiff must allege precisely what defendants Hickman, Hurdle, and Reyes did to terminate

visits. Did they sign an order? Did they turn visitors away? Did they prevent plaintiff from

leaving his cell to meet with visitors? Because of plaintiff’s vague causal allegations, the court

and defendants are left to guess as to the factual basis of liability. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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The court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to further leave to amend. Plaintiff has

been advised of the causal link requirements on numerous previous occasions and has had ample

opportunity to plead sufficiently specific facts. It appears that plaintiff is either unable or

unwilling to adequately plead a causal connection to defendants M. Brown, Campbell, Carillo,

Cherry, Doherty, Gentile, Henderson, Klinefelter, Olsen, Seinwerth, D. Brown, Knipp, Kudlata,

Laguna, Lincoln, Rendon, Reyes, Subia, Mynhier, Boyd, Kernan, Silva, Hickman, Knowles,

Emigh, Gannis, Hansen, Hurdle, Melching, Presley, Reaves, Rianda, Taylor, and Uribe. At some

point, this action must proceed to a stage where there is an answer on file from all defendants and

a scheduling order can be issued. This case has been pending for two years and that time has

now come. Therefore, the court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted. 

H. Defendants Gray and Vasconcellos

In their separate motion to dismiss, defendants Gray and Vasconcellos, argue that

they should be dismissed from this action. Defendant Vasconcellos is a state senator and

defendant Gray is his legislative aide. Plaintiff alleges that they are liable as a result of their roles

on a state senate prison oversight committee. The court agrees with defendants Vasconcellos and

Gray that they are entitled to legislative immunity with respect to the conduct alleged in the

complaint. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998); Tenny v. Brandlove, 341 U.S.

367, 372 (1951). Therefore, these defendants should be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. UNSERVED DEFENDANTS

Finally, the court addresses the four unserved defendants – Warvarovski,

Gunning, Marshall, and Murray. As to Gunning, Marshall, and Murray, on November 29, 2007,

the court directed the United States Marshal to obtain information directly from prison officials

and, if possible, to effect service of process. The United States Marshal was directed to notify

the court within 20 days of the date of that order if information sufficient to serve these three

defendants was not available. On February 15, 2008, court staff communicated with the United

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States Marshal’s office and learned that plaintiff had not provided sufficient information to locate

Gunning, Marshall, or Murray. Specifically, as to Gunning, this individual retired and left no

forwarding address. As to Marshall and Murray, there are several such individuals working for

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and plaintiff did not provide enough

identifying information. As to defendant Warvarovski, service was returned unexecuted on

February 2, 2007, because he is on military service overseas and cannot be located. 

It is possible that plaintiff may be able to obtain additional information regarding

these four defendants by way of the discovery process. Therefore, the court does not recommend

dismissal of them at this time. If, however, after a reasonable period of time, plaintiff is unable

to provide additional information, the court will recommend dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(m). In the meantime, the court will monitor for service of these four

individuals. 

V. CONCLUSION

In summary, the court concludes as follows:

1. Plaintiff may not assert third party standing and this action should be

limited to plaintiff’s damages only;

2. The continuing violation doctrine applies and none of plaintiff’s retaliation

claims are time-barred;

3. All claims as against defendants M. Brown, Broyles, Clevenstine, Hensley,

Knipp, Leeworthy, McNeil, Reaves, Robinson, and Stanely are timebarred and these individuals should be dismissed as defendants to this

action; 

4. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, which relate to the conditions of his

confinement in administrative segregation between September 2000 and

September 2001, are time-barred and cannot provide a separate avenue for

relief;

5. Claim 8m does not present a stand-alone basis for liability but represents

part of plaintiff’s allegations of the damages suffered; 

6. This case does not raise a stand-alone First Amendment claim based on

plaintiff’s mail;

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7. This case does not raise a stand-alone Eighth Amendment claim based on

verbal harassment;

8. This case does not raise a stand-alone constitutional claim based on the

prison grievance process;

9. Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts to establish a causal

connection between defendants M. Brown, Campbell, Carillo, Cherry,

Doherty, Gentile, Henderson, Klinefelter, Olsen, Seinwerth, D. Brown,

Knipp, Kudlata, Laguna, Lincoln, Rendon, Reyes, Subia, Mynhier, Boyd,

Kernan, Silva, Hickman, Knowles, Emigh, Gannis, Hansen, Hurdle,

Melching, Presley, Reaves, Rianda, Taylor, and Uribe, and his claim of

retaliation, and these defendants should be dismissed without further leave

to amend;

10. Vasconcellos and Gray should be dismissed as defendants to this action;

and

11. This action should proceed on plaintiff’s retaliation claims as against

remaining defendants Ali, C. Brown, Danzinger, Etheredge, Fowler,

Gunning, Gutierrez, Hein, Hogan, Kaiser, Kanipe, Keeland, King,

Lattimore, Marshall, Mesa, Murray, Nelson, O’Connor, Poe, Sauceda,

Smith, Stewart, Vasquez, Warren, Warvarovski, and Whittle only. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion for an extension of time, nunc pro tunc (Doc. 147), be

granted;

2. Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 143) be denied;

3. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 98, 114, 120, 131) be granted in

part and denied in part, as outlined above; 

4. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims be

dismissed;

5. Vasconcellos, Gray, M. Brown, Broyles, Clevenstine, Hensley, Knipp,

Leeworthy, McNeil, Reaves, Robinson, Stanley, Campbell, Carillo, Cherry, Doherty, Gentile,

Henderson, Klinefelter, Olsen, Seinwerth, D. Brown, Kudlata, Laguna, Lincoln, Rendon, Reyes,

Subia, Mynhier, Boyd, Kernan, Silva, Hickman, Knowles, Emigh, Grannis, Hansen, Hurdle,

Melching, Presley, Rianda, Taylor, and Uribe be dismissed as defendants to this action; and

/ / /

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6. This action be referred back to the magistrate judge to direct the remaining

appearing defendants to file an answer and to monitor for service of the four unserved

defendants.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 15 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 20, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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