Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03084/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03084-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION 

DAVID B. PLEDGER PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-3084

PRESTON REECE, individually

and in his official capacity,

CITY OF HARRISON, ARKANSAS,

DANNY HICKMAN, Sheriff of Boone County, 

individually and in his official

capacity, and BOONE COUNTY,

ARKANSAS DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOW on this 10th day of November, 2005, the above referenced

matter comes on for this Court’s consideration of the Motion for

Summary Judgment (document #22) filed by separate defendants,

Danny Hickman and Boone County, Arkansas, and the various

responses and replies thereto. The Court, having reviewed the

pleadings of the parties, and all other matters of relevance

before it, and being well and sufficiently advised, finds and

orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff, David B. Pledger (“Pledger”), commenced this

action on December 20, 2004, and on June 27, 2005, plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint was filed. In his First Amended Complaint

(hereinafter “complaint”), the plaintiff brings suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and state tort law

against Preston Reece (“Reece”), individually and in his official

capacity as a police officer for the City of Harrison, Arkansas;

the City of Harrison, Arkansas (“City of Harrison”); Danny Hickman

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As set forth in Paragraph 4 of this Order, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be

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treated as a motion for partial summary judgment. 

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(“Sheriff Hickman”), individually and in his official capacity as

Sheriff of Boone County, Arkansas; and, Boone County, Arkansas

(“Boone County”).

Specifically, with respect to separate defendants, Sheriff

Hickman and Boone County, Pledger asserts that he was unlawfully

detained, without appearing before a magistrate, in the Boone

County jail from February 16, 2004 until March 2, 2004, and that

such detention violated his constitutionally protected right to

due process of law. 

Separate defendants Sheriff Hickman and Boone County now move

for summary judgment. Pledger opposes the motion for summary 1

judgment. 

2. The standard to be applied to a motion for summary

judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and provides for the entry of summary judgment on a

claim

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847 (8th

Cir. 2001); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256 (8 Cir. th

1996). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence

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is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). Accordingly, all evidence must be viewed in the light

“most favorable to the non-moving party.” F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106

F.3d 258, 263 (8 Cir. 1997); see also Bailey v. United States th

Postal Service, 208 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Where a movant makes and properly supports a motion for

summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings; rather, the non-movant

must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving

party must "make a sufficient showing on every essential element

of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial."

Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.

1995). 

3. From the pleadings, for the purpose of considering the

motions before the Court, the following material undisputed facts

appear:

* In the early morning of February 16, 2004, Officer

Reece was dispatched to an apartment in Harrison, Arkansas, in

response to a report of a domestic disturbance. 

* At 3:17 A.M. on February 16, 2004, Officer Reece

arrested Pledger, without a warrant, on two counts of third degree

domestic battery. Because of the presence of Pledger’s son,

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Officer Reece chose to enhance the charges to felony status.

* Pledger was handcuffed and transported to the Harrison

Police Department for to be booked on the charges.

* After his booking at the Harrison Police Department,

Pledger was transported to the Boone County Jail where he was

booked in at 8:12 a.m. on February 16, 2004. Pledger was detained

in the city facility approximately five hours.

* Also on the morning of February 16, 2004, Reece drafted

and signed a probable cause affidavit, which was then forwarded

to the 14th Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney’s Office at the

Boone County Courthouse.

* Pledger submitted one grievance while in the Boone

County Jail, on February 29, 2004, in which he stated: “[M]y

scheduled court date was last [F]riday[;] I didn’t go. Why?”

* On March 2, 2004, Sheriff Hickman was notified that

Pledger had not been taken to court. 

* Upon learning of the situation, Sheriff Hickman

immediately ordered Pledger released and he was released from the

Boone County Jail on March 2, 2004. 

* Boone County Jail policy requires that any new inmates

be brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours and that any

detainee arrested without a warrant be given a judicial

determination of probable cause within 48 hours or released. 

4. As noted above, in addition to the constitutional claims

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, the

plaintiff asserts a state law tort claim for false imprisonment.

However, in their motions and briefs, Sheriff Hickman and Boone

County did not address the tort claim -- and, therefore, did not

seek summary judgment concerning it. Accordingly, the Court will

treat defendants’ motion as one for partial summary judgment on

the constitutional claims only. 

5. Danny Hickman -- Individually -- In examining this

claim, it must be noted that “Liability under §1983 requires a

causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of

[constitutionally protected] rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d. 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, a “supervisor is

not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for an employee’s

unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280

(8th Cir. 1994). A supervisor is liable only if he “directly

participates in a constitutional violation or of a failure to

properly supervise and train the offending employee caused a

deprivation of rights.” Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078

(8th Cir. 1996). 

In his complaint, Pledger asserts that “the intentional

conduct of Defendant, Danny Hickman, done under the authority of

his office as Sheriff for Defendant, Boone County, Arkansas,

deprived Plaintiff of . . . the right not to be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law, and the right to

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the equal protection of the laws, secured by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” First

Amended Complaint, § 13. 

Pledger’s argument -- based upon this contention -- that

Sheriff Hickman was personally involved in his alleged unlawful

detention is not supported by the evidence. It is undisputed that

Sheriff Hickman did not know about and had no involvement with

Pledger’s extended detention. It is also not disputed that when

he did learn that Pledger had been detained since February 16,

2004, without appearing before a magistrate, Sheriff Hickman

immediately ordered Pledger’s release. The evidence available

suggests that Pledger’s situation occurred because of a mistake

in communication which caused jail employees to believe he had

been properly taken before the court in a timely manner when, in

fact, he had not. There is no evidence that Sheriff Hickman made

the mistake or even knew of it. Moreover, there is no evidence

that the happening was anything more than simply a mistake. There

is no suggestion here, as in Hayes v. Faulkner County, Arkansas

388 F.3d 669 (8th Cir. 2004), that Sheriff Hickman improperly

delegated the responsibility for taking detainees before the court

to the court itself or that he was deliberately indifferent to the

situation. In Hayes, the sheriff received four communications

from the detainee and made a conscious decision to do nothing

about the situation. Instead, the sheriff responded to the

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detainee that “I don’t set people up for court. I hope you go to

court & are able to get out. Write the booking officer to find

out about your court date.” The Eighth Circuit concluded, that

by his actions, the sheriff was enforcing a deliberately

indifferent policy which violated the standards of due process.

Here, Sheriff Hickman acted immediately when he first learned of

the situation. He did not take the position that responsibility

lay elsewhere but, rather, acted immediately to release Pledger.

Accordingly, the Court concludes there is no evidence that Sheriff

Hickman promoted or enforced a deliberately indifferent policy

which violated the standards of due process. 

6. Danny Hickman -- Official Capacity -- Liability under

§1983 will also lie against a municipality -- through a claim made

against a supervisor in his official capacity -- if the supervisor

fails to adequately train or supervise police officers and the

failure can be shown to constitute deliberate indifference to the

rights of others. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989); Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 508 (8 Cir. th

1987). 

To establish a “failure to train” claim, a plaintiff must

show that the supervisor “was deliberately indifferent to or

tacitly authorized the offending acts” which, in turn, requires

a showing that “the supervisor had notice that the training

procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result

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in a constitutional violation.” Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628,

635 (8 Cir. 2001)(citations omitted). th

It is not disputed that Sheriff Hickman and Boone County had

in place procedures designed to ensure that detainees were given

proper hearings as required by due process of law. There is no

evidence that anything in those procedures was designed to deprive

a detainee of constitutionally protected rights or that their use

would predictably produce such a result. Instead, the evidence

shows that human error -- negligence as opposed to deliberate

wrongdoing -- caused the procedures to fail as to Pledger. It is

not suggested or shown by Pledger how a failure to train or

supervise would have prevented that error. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that plaintiff has not produced evidence to support an

allegation that Sheriff Hickman failed to properly train or

supervise Boone County personnel or that any such failure was the

cause of his wrongful detention. 

Therefore, in accordance with established law as set forth

above, the Court concludes that Sheriff Danny Hickman is entitled

to summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against

him in his individual and official capacities and will so order.

7. Boone County -- Plaintiff next argues that Boone County

should be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a

constitutionally deficient policy at the Benton County Jail caused

his substantive due process rights to be violated. 

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Political subdivisions may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

only where the municipality’s policy or custom deprives persons

of their constitutionally or federally protected rights. Monell

v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). As recently stated

in a decision by a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,

It is well settled under our precedents that

establishing a violation of due process as a basis for

municipal liability under § 1983 requires plaintiff to

show more than mere negligence or unreasonableness; a

plaintiff must point to conduct by the municipality, or

by employees acting with its knowledge, that shocks the

conscience given the totality of the circumstances.

Lund v. Hennepin County, et al., 2005 WL 2898641 (8 Cir. 2005). th

See also Hayes v. Faulkner County, 388 F.3d 669 (8 Cir. 2004); th

Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703 (8 Cir. 2004); Young v. City of th

Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8 Cir. 2001). th

As already noted, it is undisputed that the Boone County Jail

had a policy requiring that inmates be brought before a judicial

officer within 72 hours and that any detainee arrested without a

warrant be given judicial determination of probable cause within

48 hours or released. It is also undisputed that, as a result of

various miscommunications, Pledger was not brought before a

judicial officer during his 15 day stay at the Boone County Jail.

However, “Municipal liability under §1983 requires plaintiff to

show more than mere negligence or unreasonableness; a plaintiff

must point to conduct by the municipality . . . that shocks the

conscience given the totality of the circumstances.” Lund, supra.

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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Pledger and

while being sympathetic to him, the Court cannot properly conclude

on the undisputed facts that he was subjected to treatment

sufficiently conscience-shocking to amount to a violation of due

process of law -- nor can it properly conclude that, under the

circumstances, there was a deliberate indifference to his

constitutionally protected rights. While the situation resulting

in the delay in his being promptly taken before a magistrate would

appear to have been caused by negligence -- and it certainly was

unreasonable -- Pledger has not pointed to conduct by the

defendants which satisfies the following standard required of the

detainee-claimant in Lund, supra:

As our cases teach, in order for Lund to prove his due

process rights were violated and that the County should be

held responsible, he must show both that his detention shocks

the conscience and that it was caused by a county policy or

custom evidencing a level of culpability akin to criminal

recklessness. 

Id. 

The Court, therefore, concludes that Boone County is entitled

to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s constitutional

claims and it will be so ordered. 

8. Because all of plaintiff’s federal claims have now been

eliminated from this action, this Court must consider whether it

should continue to exercise jurisdiction over this matter. In

considering that issue, the Court notes: 

When a federal court has original jurisdiction over a

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claim that raises a federal question, Section 1367

provides for the mandatory exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims that are so

related to the federal-question claim that the claims

form part of the same case or controversy under Article

III of the United States Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a). However, Section 1367, subsection (c) provides

exceptions to the mandatory commitment of federal

jurisdiction and allows federal courts to decline

supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims

if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of

State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the

claim or claims over which the district court has

original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

Ampleman v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 437, 439 (E.D.

Missouri 2001). 

Because no federal question claim remains in this case, this

Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims. 

The United States Supreme Court has stated that “in the usual

case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,

the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. V. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988).

See also Johnson v. City of Shorewood, Minnesota, 360 F.3d 810

(8 Cir. 2004). th

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Here, the Court concludes that the remaining state law claims

are more appropriate for decision by a state court. Therefore,

plaintiff’s remaining state law claims will be dismissed without

prejudice. Id. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion for Summary

Judgment (document #22) filed by Danny Hickman and Boone County,

Arkansas should be, and it hereby is, granted as to plaintiff’s

claims based upon constitutionally protected rights allegedly

violated by these defendants and that such claims should be

dismissed, with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the foregoing ruling,

plaintiff’s remaining state law claims against Danny Hickman and

Boone County, Arkansas should be, and hereby are, dismissed,

without prejudice. 

By separate order of even date herewith, judgment will be

entered accordingly.

 IS SO ORDERED and entered on the date first herein above

written.

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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