Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01485/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01485-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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1

14‐1485‐pr

Chrysler v. Guiney    

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2014

(Argued: February 11, 2015            Decided: November 19, 2015)

No. 14‐1485‐pr

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

GREGORY CHRYSLER,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

‐v.‐ 

G. GUINEY,  

ACTING SUPERINTENDENT, FIVE POINTS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent‐Appellee.

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

    

Before: KEARSE, LIVINGSTON, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

        

Petitioner‐Appellant Gregory Chrysler appeals from a March 31, 2014

judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York (Karas, J.) denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Chrysler claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel when, on direct appeal of his convictions for

murder and conspiracy, his attorneys failed to argue that the admission at trial of

his co‐defendant’s grand jury testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.   A

New York appellate court previously rejected this claim, and we conclude that its

decision was not “contrary to,” and did not “involve[] an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

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Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.   

AFFIRMED.

MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman & Watkins,

Goshen, NY, for Petitioner‐Appellant.

ANDREW R. KASS, Executive Assistant

District Attorney, for David M. Hoovler,

District Attorney of Orange County,

Middletown, NY, for Respondent‐Appellee.

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge:

In July 2000, an Orange County, New York jury returned a verdict

convicting Petitioner‐Appellant Gregory Chrysler (“Chrysler”) of second‐degree

murder, second‐degree conspiracy to commit second‐degree murder, and fifth‐

degree conspiracy to possess marijuana.  The state trial court (Berry, J.) denied

Chrysler’s motion to set aside the verdict and sentenced him for each conviction

to concurrent prison terms of twenty‐five years to life, eight‐and‐a‐third to

twenty‐five years, and one year, respectively.  The New York Appellate Division,

Second Department, affirmed Chrysler’s conviction in December 2004, and the

New York Court of Appeals denied Chrysler’s application for leave to appeal in

February 2005.  Chrysler then filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which was

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denied, as was his application for leave to appeal that decision.  In October 2006,

Chrysler filed a coram nobis petition, arguing for the first time that he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to argue on

direct appeal that the admission at trial of co‐defendant Lawrence Weygant’s

(“Weygant”) grand jury testimony violated Chrysler’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause.   The Second Department denied Chrysler’s coram nobis

petition in February 2007, and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to

appeal in June 2007.  

Chrysler then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United

States District Court for the Western District of New York.    The petition was

transferred to the Southern District of New York, and in a March 31, 2014,

Opinion and Order, the district court (Karas, J.) denied Chrysler’s petition while

granting a certificate of appealability “on the specific issue of whether

Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel was violated” by

his attorneys’ failure on direct appeal to raise a Confrontation Clause claim based

on Weygant’s testimony “in a way that would have allowed the Court to decide

whether Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated.”    Chrysler v.

Guiney, 14 F. Supp. 3d 418, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  Chrysler does not dispute that

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the Second Department addressed this claim on the merits in denying his coram

nobis petition.    Because that decision was not “contrary to,” and did not

“involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

we affirm the district court’s denial of Chrysler’s habeas petition.

BACKGROUND

A. Dominick Pendino’s Murder and the Case Against Chrysler

Chrysler was a marijuana dealer who operated in and around Newburgh,

New York.    Dominick Pendino (“Pendino”), a Newburgh resident and the

homicide victim, was Chrysler’s associate.  In late August 1998, Chrysler and his

wife Elizabeth were arrested for felony marijuana possession based, in part, on

assistance provided by Michael Ronsini (“Ronsini”), an informant who had

purchased marijuana from Chrysler in the past, and who was secretly

cooperating with police.1    Evidence at trial established that Chrysler came to

suspect (erroneously) that it was Pendino who had informed on him.    The

 

1 Chrysler ultimately pleaded guilty in connection with this arrest on April 28,

1999, and was sentenced on September 1, 1999, to one to four years in state prison.  His

wife, also charged, pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marijuana in the fourth

degree and was sentenced to a one‐year conditional discharge.   

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evidence also established that Chrysler and Weygant murdered Pendino in

retaliation.

The murder took place on the morning of March 3, 1999, some six months

after Chrysler’s arrest on the marijuana charge, and prior to his guilty plea in

connection with that offense.    At about 5:25 a.m. that day, Pendino’s wife

Cynthia woke him up because he was running late for work.    Pendino was a

cook at the Newburgh Auto Auction; according to his wife’s trial testimony, he

“never missed work.”  Tr. 518‐19.2  Cynthia Pendino testified that her husband

showered, got dressed in his work uniform, and kissed her good‐bye, after which

she went back to sleep.   

Pendino never arrived at the Auto Auction.  A little after 6:00 a.m., his wife

got a call from his work asking where he was.    She assured the caller that he

would be there soon and went back to sleep.  About an hour later, however, she

received another call saying that Pendino still had not arrived.  At this point, she

saw that his car was still in the driveway.  She went outside and observed keys in

the ignition and Pendino’s hat on the ground nearby.    Sensing something was

wrong, she called the police, who arrived shortly after 7:20 a.m.  After officers

 

2 References in the form of “Tr. __” herein are to the transcript of the trial

proceedings before the state trial court.

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noticed apparent blood spots on the driver’s side of Pendino’s vehicle and what

appeared to be blood spattered on the gravel next to Pendino’s car, and on

nearby weeds and trees, they secured the area and called for additional

assistance from the Newburgh Police Department and the New York State Major

Crimes Unit.

A thorough investigation of the scene revealed clear evidence of foul play.  

Detectives found a 71‐foot trail of blood droplets leading from Pendino’s

driveway to a large pool of blood in the backyard.  From that location, a second,

heavier blood trail continued to the driveway belonging to the house next door.  

The blood, which was still wet when the officers arrived, matched Pendino’s

DNA.    State witness Dr. Barbara Wolf explained at trial that based on her

expertise, the blood pattern was caused by a massive injury to the head inflicted

by a blunt instrument such as a baseball bat or blackjack.    The blood pooling

indicated that Pendino’s head must have been in contact with the ground for at

least some amount of time along the blood trail.3  Officers recovered Pendino’s

blood‐stained pager near the driveway, along with a pair of eyeglasses.

 

3 Defense expert Dr. Herbert McDonnell similarly testified that the blood trail

was consistent with two persons having carried a person who had been struck in the

head with a baseball bat or blackjack, while defense expert Dr. Mark Taff testified that

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Police informed Ronsini of Pendino’s disappearance that same day.    He

told police and testified at trial that Chrysler had become preoccupied with

discovering and punishing the “rat” who had supplied the police with the

information that led to his and his wife’s arrests in August 1998.  Ronsini testified

that a few days after those arrests, Chrysler left a message on Ronsini’s

answering machine stating: “[W]e know it was[] you[,] fuckin’ rat.  Don’t leave

your house.”   Tr. 1512.4   Paul Petrillo, another acquaintance of Chrysler’s, also

testified about a conversation he had with Chrysler during the fall of 1998 at

Champion’s Tavern, a Newburgh bar.  Chrysler was “highly agitated” because

“somebody ratted on him.”  Tr. 498A.

In early October, Chrysler called Ronsini again.  Unbeknownst to Chrysler,

Ronsini was with Petrillo, who listened in on the call.    Ronsini recorded this

conversation and gave a copy to police after learning of Pendino’s

disappearance.   See People’s Exhibit 1 (second recording).   During the October

1998 conversation (which was played for the jury at trial), Ronsini asked Chrysler

if he really thought that Ronsini was the informant, and Chrysler demurred.  

 

he could think of only three types of injuries that would cause the blood pattern found

at the scene: blunt force trauma, a gunshot wound, or a stab wound.

4 The taped message, which was played for the jury at trial, reflects slightly

different phrasing: “We know it was you, you fuckin’ rat.  Stay in your fuckin’ house.”  

People’s Exhibit 1 (first recording).

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Chrysler then identified Pendino as possibly the informant.    He said that the

informant had been at his house the night he was arrested, and noted that

Pendino was among the people there.    Chrysler stated: “I’m gonna tell you

something so you understand me right now.  Okay.  You can never bring me in

front of Dom because he was at my house.”    People’s Exhibit 1 (second

recording) at 8:04‐8:10. After mentioning the names of others who were at his

house on the night of his arrest, Chrysler said: “These people are just scum bags

and I’m gonna tell you what.  One of them is a fucking rat.  One of them was at

my fucking house that night.  One person out of them is a rat.”  People’s Exhibit

1 (second recording) at 14:20‐14:28. Chrysler expressed his anger: “I am fucking

mad as fucking hell.”  He emphasized: “They arrested my fucking wife.  I’m not

letting this fucking go.”  People’s Exhibit 1 (second recording) at 15:38‐15:41.

Petrillo testified that months later, in mid‐to‐late February 1999, he again

ran into Chrysler at Champion’s.   Chrysler told him that “he had a good idea

who ratted on him,” and that he was “going to take care of [the rat].”  Tr. 489.  

Andre Baynes, another acquaintance of Chrysler’s, also testified that during mid‐

February 1999 he saw Chrysler at Champion’s.    Baynes said that he went to

Champion’s with Pendino, and as he and Pendino were arriving at the bar,

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Chrysler “stepped outside and wanted to talk to” Pendino.    Tr. 2076.    Baynes

“went inside and watched through the window,” at which point he saw Chrysler

angrily pointing his finger in Pendino’s face from about a foot away.  Tr. 2076‐77.  

Pendino was “shaking his head, like, he was saying no to something.”  Tr. 2077.

Other evidence closely linked both Chrysler and his co‐defendant,

Weygant, with the crime scene.5    First, the glasses found in the driveway of

Pendino’s home (which, despite the fact that dew covered the surrounding area,

were dry when found, suggesting that the glasses had only recently been left

there) were determined to belong to Chrysler. Paul Utnick, a licensed optician in

nearby Monroe, New York, testified that the glasses, which were found damaged

(bent in the middle) on the driveway beside Pendino’s car, were of the same type

as a pair of Izod Lacoste glasses purchased by Chrysler on September 24, 1998.  

The prescription of the glasses, moreover, was identical to Chrysler’s

 

5 Testimony from multiple witnesses at trial established that Weygant was both a

close associate of Chrysler’s and that he was heavily involved in Chrysler’s marijuana

business.   For instance, Weygant’s former girlfriend, Salvatriece Ferretti, testified that

Weygant stored packages of marijuana at her apartment while he was living there, and

that she had accompanied him on trips, sometimes joined by Chrysler, to deliver the

marijuana and collect payment.   She testified that Chrysler specifically wanted to use

her car on these occasions, that she had observed both Chrysler and Weygant handle a

marijuana package, and that as Chrysler and Weygant were leaving the locations that

they visited, she observed each on various occasions counting bills.  During these trips,

she also heard Chrysler make comments such as “so and so is getting in a lot over his

head.”  Tr. 2119.

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prescription, and Chrysler’s DNA was identified on swabs taken from the glasses

themselves.   

In addition, substantial evidence connected cars driven by both Chrysler

and Weygant to Pendino’s murder.    Barry Greenfield, the owner of Riverside

Tire and Auto, where Chrysler worked, testified that on March 2, 1999, the day

before Pendino’s disappearance, Chrysler told Greenfield that he was having

trouble with one of his cars and asked to borrow a four‐door maroon Ford

Crown Victoria that Greenfield kept around the shop and often drove.  

Greenfield said that he agreed to loan Chrysler the Crown Victoria, and Chrysler

drove off in it later that day.

Pendino’s neighbor, Thomas Candrelli, testified that early on the morning

of March 3, 1999, the day of Pendino’s disappearance, he had a strange encounter

with a maroon four‐door sedan.    As he was pulling out of the cul‐de‐sac on

which his house was located (onto a street to which a cul‐de‐sac leading to the

Pendino home also connected), a maroon car with no lights on suddenly

appeared, causing Candrelli to slam on the brakes to avoid hitting it.  Candrelli

followed the maroon car closely for a time, before pulling around it and never

seeing it again.  Candrelli told police later that day that the maroon car looked

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like an undercover police vehicle. (Greenfield’s employee confirmed that

Greenfield’s Crown Victoria was in fact an “old police car.”  Tr. 630.)  Candrelli

said that he thought that the car he saw might have been a Chevrolet Caprice, a

Classic Mercury Grand Marquis, or a Ford Crown Victoria.  

Abraham Warner, a Riverside Tire and Auto employee who worked with

Chrysler, testified that later that morning, at about 8:05 a.m., Chrysler arrived at

Riverside in the Crown Victoria and asked Warner to clean out red paint that he

had spilled in the back of the car on his way to work.  Warner did so.  Greenfield

testified that Chrysler initially said nothing to him about spilling paint in the car.  

The next day, however, when Greenfield asked why his vehicle’s windows were

fogged up (apparently as a result of Warner’s cleaning), Chrysler claimed that

paint he had obtained for the auto shop’s alignment machine had spilled while

he was transporting it.    Police seized the Crown Victoria from Greenfield’s

residence pursuant to a warrant on March 6, three days after the crime.  Despite

Warner’s cleaning, forensics investigators found stains in the back seat of the

vehicle.  Chemical screenings confirmed that the stains were blood, and forensic

analysis established that they contained Pendino’s DNA.

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Chrysler’s own vehicle, a Toyota 4‐Runner, was also linked to Pendino’s

murder.  Warner testified that on the afternoon of March 3, after Chrysler had

arrived at work in the Crown Victoria, Weygant arrived at Riverside driving

Chrysler’s car.  Warner saw Weygant exit the car and go into the office.  Soon

thereafter, Weygant and Chrysler came out together and asked him to clean

spots of blood off of the car’s seat and seat belts.    Weygant told Warner that

Weygant and a friend got in a fight when they were in a bar in New York City,

and that his friend had dripped blood from his hand onto the back seat and seat

belts.    Warner testified that he cleaned the 4‐Runner in response to the pair’s

request.

Police seized the vehicle from Chrysler’s house pursuant to a search

warrant on March 6, the same day they seized the Crown Victoria.    Warner

testified that when he cleaned the car on March 3, it had a full complement of

seatbelts.    But when police seized the vehicle, the rear seatbelts had been

removed and only stubs remained.  Further, when the 4‐Runner was examined

for trace evidence, eighteen blood stains were still present, including stains on

the rear passenger‐side seat and on a tag from one of the rear passenger‐side

seatbelt stubs.  Swabs from the blood stains matched Pendino’s DNA.  Detectives

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also found three green latex gloves with reddish‐brown stains in the rear cargo

area of the car.   DNA testing of the gloves established that the stains matched

Pendino’s DNA, and also that another person’s DNA was present. Examiners

noted that the DNA belonging to the unidentified individual contained an allele

at one locus that occurs in less than one in thirteen Caucasians.  Evidence at trial

established that Weygant possesses this allele.

The prosecution’s theory at trial was that Chrysler and Weygant used the

4‐Runner not only to transport Pendino’s body, but also, in the days leading up

to March 3, to dig a ditch in which the body (which was never found) was

ultimately disposed.    Several pieces of evidence supported this theory.    For

instance, Warner testified that Chrysler had also directed him to clean his 4‐

Runner a couple of days before Pendino’s disappearance on March 3.  The car’s

running boards were covered with mud, there was some mud inside the car, and

the seats were covered with plastic bags.    Warner, who frequently cleaned

Chrysler’s 4‐Runner, had never seen it in that condition; it was usually

“[i]mmaculate.”    Tr. 587.    Warner also testified that he lent Chrysler a shovel

days before the murder occurred.  In addition, Greenfield testified that sometime

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shortly before March 2, Chrysler requested a bale of hay (supposedly for a friend

planting shrubs), which Greenfield provided to him.  

B. Ferretti’s Trial Testimony and Weygant’s Grand Jury Testimony

The prosecution elicited additional inculpatory testimony from Weygant’s

former girlfriend, Salvatriece Ferretti (“Ferretti”).  She testified that in the weeks

after the crime, as suspicion focused on Chrysler and Weygant, she overheard

Chrysler ask Weygant if anyone saw him, to which he responded “no.”  Tr. 2150.  

Chrysler asked Weygant if he was wearing his boots and Weygant responded

that he burned them.    Chrysler said that he had shredded his own boots by

running them through a compressor. Chrysler also asked Weygant if he was

“doing that thing with [his] fingernails like [Chrysler] told [him] to.”  Tr. 2150.  

Weygant said that he was.  Tr. 2150‐51.  Previously, Ferretti had noticed Weygant

obsessively cleaning his nails and he had asked her to give him a manicure.  

Ferretti also testified that a few days before the crime, Weygant asked about a

blackjack that he had given her on a previous occasion, and she suggested that he

may have subsequently taken the blackjack from her car.

Ferretti related several more statements made by Weygant in the aftermath

of the murder, including two separate statements in which he admitted to

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committing it.    Before trial, the State announced its intention to have Ferretti

testify about these admissions; it also gave notice that it intended to offer at trial

statements made by Weygant before the grand jury, attaching the transcript of

that testimony.    In response, Chrysler’s trial counsel filed a motion to sever

Chrysler’s trial from Weygant’s.    The motion stated that “[t]he People have

served notice of intent to offer the admissions of co‐defendant W[ey]g[ant]”; that

Weygant “has testified before the Grand Jury which testimony has been held to

be admissible in this State”; and that “the Confrontation Clause bars the

introduction of a confession of a nontestifying co[‐]defendant, not directly

admissible against the defendant, that inculpates the defendant.”    J.A. 177.    It

argued that Ferretti’s testimony regarding Weygant’s statements would raise

Confrontation Clause issues under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  

While Judge Berry initially denied the motion with leave to renew, he later said

during a pretrial conference that he would grant Chrysler a separate trial if he

were to request one.  Chrysler’s trial counsel, however, announced that Chrysler

and Weygant, together with their attorneys, had decided to proceed with a joint

trial. Judge Berry specifically asked Chrysler whether he understood that

“certain statements which are alleged by Ms. Ferretti to have been made to her

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by Mr. Weygant, as well as, certain things she’s overheard between you and Mr.

Weygant . . . would come into evidence” in a joint trial. J.A. 376.  Chrysler said

yes.   The judge then asked Chrysler whether he understood that he would be

afforded a separate trial if he were to ask for one.  Chrysler said yes.  Chrysler

further affirmed that he understood that “the evidence that pertained to Mr.

Weygant would not be coming into th[e] [severed] case with regard to

[Chrysler]”—and that he had spoken with his attorney “[f]ully” about his

decision.6    J.A. 376‐78 (emphasis added).    Nonetheless, Chrysler affirmed his

desire for a joint trial.  As Chrysler’s attorney put it during the proceeding, “[w]e

on the Chrysler‐Weygant team want to be together.  We want to stand together

and fight together.”  J.A. 375.

Ferretti testified at trial that Weygant admitted his involvement in

Pendino’s murder to her on two separate occasions.    First, on April 9, 1999, a

little more than a month after the crime, she went to dinner at a French

restaurant called L’Air De Paris with Weygant, Chrysler, and Chrysler’s wife

 

6 The State subsequently advised the court that it planned to offer two additional

statements made by Weygant: one to Ronsini and one to Robert Herring, an individual

who ultimately did not appear as a witness in the case.  After hearing about the planned

testimony, Chrysler again affirmed his desire to proceed with a joint trial, personally

assuring the trial court that he desired a joint trial and that he had enjoyed “ample

opportunity” to consult with his attorneys on the subject.  J.A. 408‐09.

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Elizabeth.    She said that after the dinner, Weygant and Chrysler got into an

argument about the bill.  She and Weygant hastily left, and Weygant told her: “I

just killed a kid for that guy and he can’t even fuckin’ buy me dinner.”  Tr. 2160.  

At that point, however, Weygant told her that he had killed Pendino on his own,

without Chrysler’s help.7  Weygant made a second, more detailed statement on

April 24, 1999, while he and Ferretti were spending a weekend in New Paltz,

New York.  While they were there, Ferretti pressed Weygant for the truth about

Pendino’s murder.  He told her that on March 2, the night before the murder, he

stayed at Chrysler’s house.    They left at 4:00 a.m. and got Greenfield’s car in

Walden, New York.  Weygant drove from Walden back to Newburgh, where he

picked up someone he referred to as his “special friend.”    Tr. 2173.    They

“w[h]acked” Pendino with a baseball bat, and afterwards Weygant dropped the

“friend” off in Newburgh before driving back to Walden, where “he switched

the body from [Greenfield’s] car to the 4‐Runner and then . . . went to go bury the

body.”  Tr. 2173‐75.  

 

7 Indeed, when Ferretti pressed him on this point, asking how he explained the

fact that Chrysler’s glasses were found at the scene, Weygant claimed he had stolen the

glasses from Chrysler and left them there himself.  Tr. 2161.

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When the State sought to have Weygant’s grand jury testimony read to the

jury at trial, Chrysler’s attorney stated that he had no objection.  (That grand jury

testimony, like Ferretti’s testimony regarding Weygant’s admissions, was

received without any instruction that it was admitted as to Weygant alone—and

indeed without any request for such instruction.)    In his testimony, Weygant

denied involvement in both Pendino’s death and the marijuana business, but he

admitted to being friends with Chrysler, and he recounted conversations in

which Chrysler told him that he had been arrested and charged in an earlier drug

case because one of his associates had “ratted him out.”  According to Weygant,

this subject—the “rat”—“came up a lot” in conversations with Chrysler.  J.A. 760.  

Weygant admitted that Chrysler had discussed the possibility that Pendino was

the informant, but he stated that based on his conversations with Chrysler, it was

evident that Chrysler primarily suspected Ronsini.

The State also asked Weygant if he had ever gone to the French restaurant

L’Air De Paris with Chrysler, Chrysler’s wife, and Ferretti.   Weygant said yes,

but he denied admitting to any role in Pendino’s murder after the meal.  

Weygant also confirmed that he and Ferretti had spent a weekend in New Paltz,

but denied confessing to Ferretti on that occasion as well.

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Weygant also testified that he had possessed a blackjack, that he had given

a blackjack to Ferretti, and that she told him that she thought the blackjack he

had given her was stolen from her car.  When asked if he had ever told Ferretti

that he was digging a ditch, Weygant stated that he had, but explained that he

had been talking about a ditch he had helped dig at his brother’s house.  He said

that Chrysler had stopped by several times while Weygant and his brother were

digging, but that Chrysler had not helped or provided any tools for the job.8  The

State also asked if Weygant had ever discussed Chrysler’s eyeglasses with

anyone.    Weygant responded that he and Chrysler had once gone to an

eyeglasses store in Monroe and discussed the glasses with Utnick.9    Finally,

Weygant was asked if he had ever driven Chrysler’s Toyota 4‐Runner, and more

specifically if he had driven it to Riverside Tire and Auto on the day that

 

8 Ferretti testified at trial that during a phone call on March 2, the day before the

murder, Weygant remarked on a conversation he had with Chrysler earlier that day in

which Chrysler observed Weygant swinging a pick and a shovel.  Ferretti testified that

she later directly asked Weygant about digging a ditch with Chrysler and that in

response he grabbed her by the throat, slammed her down, and without specifying

whether he and Chrysler had dug a ditch, told her “we will never have this

conversation again.”  Tr. 2157.

9 Ferretti had earlier testified that in the aftermath of the crime, Weygant told her

that police had found a pair of glasses at the scene, traced them to a store in Monroe

and to Chrysler, and that Chrysler “was going to try and say that he had lost the

glasses; that the glasses were being returned to him by [Pendino],” but that Weygant

“didn’t believe it.”  Tr. 2156.

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Pendino went missing.  He responded that he “might have driven” the 4‐Runner

on one occasion, J.A. 771, and confirmed that he had been to Riverside Tire and

Auto on March 3, 1999, although he said that his sister had driven him there in

his mother’s car.10  

During summation, the State emphasized that its case against Chrysler—

which included the DNA evidence found in his car and a car he had borrowed,

his glasses recovered from the crime scene, and the voice recordings in which he

angrily talked about the “rat” who had informed on him—was “overwhelming.”  

Tr. 3450. The prosecutor cited Weygant’s grand jury testimony on more than one

occasion, but principally to corroborate other evidence against Weygant,

particularly Ferretti’s testimony.    During the prosecution’s summation,

Chrysler’s counsel did not object to the use of Weygant’s grand jury testimony

on Confrontation Clause grounds, and registered only a limited objection to the

way the prosecution was presenting Weygant’s grand jury testimony that is not

relevant for purposes of this appeal.11

 

10 While Weygant initially responded affirmatively to the question whether he

had been “to the Riverside Tire & Auto center in that vehicle,” his later statements that

his sister had driven him there in his mother’s vehicle suggested that he did not intend

to state that he had been to Riverside Tire and Auto in the 4‐Runner.  J.A. 772‐73.

11 Chrysler’s counsel argued that “a curative instruction [wa]s required to avoid

any sense among the jurors that” the prosecutor, who conducted the grand jury

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C. State Post‐Conviction Proceedings

On July 13, 2000, the jury returned a verdict convicting Chrysler and

Weygant on all counts.  On direct appeal, Chrysler raised a variety of arguments.  

He argued that prosecutorial misconduct mandated reversal, that the trial court

made a number of evidentiary errors, that the court’s refusal to give a

circumstantial evidence charge requested by the defense was erroneous, and that

there was insufficient evidence to sustain his murder conviction.  Chrysler also

asserted that because Ferretti’s testimony implicated his Confrontation Clause

rights under Bruton, his trial counsel had been ineffective for, inter alia, failing to

object on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds to Ferretti’s testimony and

not seeking to sever Chrysler’s trial from Weygant’s.  Chrysler later submitted a

supplemental brief raising a new argument that the State had failed to establish

chain of custody for a toothbrush that was used as a source of Pendino’s DNA.  

The Second Department rejected all of Chrysler’s claims.  People v. Chrysler, 787

N.Y.S.2d 365, 365‐66 (App. Div. 2004).

 

proceedings, “would become effectively an unsworn witness” by stating that he had

asked Weygant certain questions when Weygant appeared before the grand jury.  

Tr. 3391.  After discussion with counsel for both sides, the court agreed to instruct the

jury to draw their own inferences and conclusions based on the evidence. Judge Berry

reminded the jurors that “[a] summation is merely the attorney’s belief of what has been

proven in this case” and invited the jurors to re‐examine Weygant’s grand jury

testimony for themselves.  Tr. 3399‐3400.

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After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Chrysler filed a motion to

vacate his conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 in

May 2005.  Chrysler raised two grounds for relief.  First, he again advanced the

argument that his trial counsel Bruce Cutler had rendered ineffective assistance

by encouraging him not to accept a severance.  Had Chrysler stood trial alone,

the jury would not have heard either Ferretti’s account of Weygant’s statements

or Weygant’s grand jury testimony, which were inadmissible against Chrysler.  

Second, Chrysler argued that the admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony

violated the New York Constitution and the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).    The trial court

denied Chrysler’s § 440.10 motion on September 30, 2005, holding that both his

claims were procedurally barred: the former claim had already been raised on

direct appeal (and in any case lacked merit), and the latter claim could have been

raised on direct appeal.    Chrysler sought leave to appeal from the Second

Department, arguing that the lower court had erroneously found his Crawford

claim procedurally barred since the issue “had not been preserved for direct

appeal and Chrysler therefore could not have raised it.”    J.A. 1186.    On

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November 30, 2005, the Second Department summarily denied Chrysler’s

application.  

On October 16, 2006, Chrysler filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis

with the Second Department.    He claimed for the first time that his appellate

counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal a Crawford claim

relating to the introduction of Weygant’s grand jury testimony. The Second

Department denied Chrysler’s petition, stating simply: “The appellant has failed

to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.”  

People v. Chrysler, 37 A.D.3d 486, 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (citing Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745 (1983); People v. Stultz, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2004)).  On June 15, 2007,

the New York Court of Appeals denied Chrysler leave to appeal.

D. Proceedings Below

Chrysler filed the instant habeas petition in the United States District

Court for the Western District of New York.  As relevant here, the petition argues

that Chrysler’s appellate counsel acted ineffectively by not raising a Crawford

claim involving Weygant’s grand jury testimony on direct appeal.  The case was

transferred to the Southern District of New York on October 1, 2007, and was

eventually assigned to Judge Karas.  The district court held that Chrysler’s claim

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of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel had been exhausted via Chrysler’s

coram nobis petition, and that it could be reviewed on federal habeas because the

Second Department had denied the claim on its merits.  Chrysler, 14 F. Supp. 3d

at 455‐57.  However, the court determined that the Second Department’s denial

of the claim was not “an unreasonable application of the law defining the federal

constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel.”   Id. at 457.   It

held that under the two‐pronged test governing such claims, the Second

Department reasonably could have concluded either (1) that Chrysler’s counsel’s

performance was not objectively unreasonable or (2) that there was no

“reasonable probability” that any error on counsel’s part affected the outcome of

Chrysler’s direct appeal.  See id. at 457‐62 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984)).    The district court reasoned that neither Strickland prong was

satisfied because “[Chrysler’s] trial counsel failed to object to the admission or

use of Weygant’s grand[ ]jury testimony at trial,” so any Crawford claim based on

that testimony was unpreserved.  Id. at 459.

Though it expressed confidence in its reasoning and conclusion, the

district court nevertheless granted Chrysler a certificate of appealability (“COA”)

limited to the following question:  

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[W]hether Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of appellate

counsel was violated when that counsel did not raise his

Confrontation Clause claim on appeal in a way that would have

allowed the Court to decide whether Petitioner’s Confrontation

Clause rights were violated.

Id. at 462.12    Chrysler filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s

decision on April 28, 2014.

DISCUSSION

We review a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo.  Jones

v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2009).  

I.

Federal habeas corpus law generally gives state courts the first

opportunity to address state prisoners’ claims that their custody violates federal

law.  See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 247‐48 (1886); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)

(requiring exhaustion of state remedies unless such remedies are unavailable or

circumstances render them ineffective).  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) also obliges federal courts to give deference to

 

12 Chrysler’s appellate counsel did not argue on appeal either: (1) that Chrysler’s

Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission at trial of Weygant’s grand

jury testimony; or (2) that Chrysler’s trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to

preserve this Confrontation Clause claim.   As the district court recognized, however,

Chrysler has not argued here that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

make the latter argument, nor has this claim been exhausted.  Chrysler, 14 F. Supp. 3d at

461‐62.  Accordingly, we do not address it further.

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state courts’ decisions: for claims that have been “adjudicated on the merits” in

state court, a federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless, as

relevant here, the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Id. § 2254(d)(1).  

Chrysler adequately exhausted the ineffective assistance claim he raises in

this case by “fairly present[ing]” it to the Second Department in his coram nobis

petition, Daye v. Att’y Gen. of N.Y., 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc), and

then seeking leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, see O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839‐40 (1999).  Although the Second Department ruled on

Chrysler’s claim in summary fashion, summary dispositions rank as

adjudications “on the merits” for AEDPA purposes unless the petitioner

provides “reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is

more likely.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99‐100 (2011).  Chrysler does not

dispute that the Second Department adjudicated his ineffective assistance claim

“on the merits,” or that AEDPA’s deferential standard applies as a result.  

“[Section] 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses

have independent meaning.”    Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).    A state

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court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court

applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s]

cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.”  Id.  By contrast, a state court engages in

an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if it “correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.”   Id.   Here, only the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) is at issue because the Second

Department’s decision properly cited Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the most

relevant Supreme Court case governing ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, and the facts of this case are distinguishable from any case decided by

the Supreme Court.  See Chrysler, 37 A.D.3d at 487 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

745 (1983)); see also, e.g., Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

Appellate Division cited Jones [v. Barnes] in its summary disposition denying

[the] coram nobis petition, and accordingly invoked the correct legal principle at

issue.    This places our review of the denial of [the] habeas petition squarely

within the ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1).”).

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Under Strickland v. Washington, in order to demonstrate ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner must

show (1) that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.”    466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).    Strickland’s “general standard for

ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claims” supplies the relevant clearly established

law for AEDPA purposes if there is “no other Supreme Court precedent directly

on point.”   Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122‐23 (2009).   With respect to

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Supreme Court has also

held, as relevant here, that “appellate counsel who files a merits brief need not

(and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from

among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.”  Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (describing Barnes, 463 U.S. 745); see also Lynch v.

Dolce, 789 F.3d 303, 319 (2d Cir. 2015).   We evaluate the Second Department’s

decision against these clearly established principles.

Under AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” clause, our review is

extremely deferential: “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

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precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.”  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  Where, as in this case, the state

court does not provide reasons for its decision, we examine “what arguments or

theories . . . could have supported” that decision, and then “ask whether it is

possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.”  Id. at

102 (emphasis added).   The range of reasonableness “depend[s] in part on the

nature of the relevant rule.”  Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664.  “The more general the

rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case‐by‐case

determinations.”  Id.  “The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of

reasonable applications is substantial.”  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.  Accordingly,

as a result of the interaction between AEDPA and Strickland, the question before

us—as Chrysler acknowledges—becomes “whether there is any reasonable

argument that [Chrysler’s] counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” in

which case the district court correctly denied Chrysler’s petition.    Id.; see

Appellant’s Br. at 18.

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II.

We begin by considering the nature of the alleged Confrontation Clause

violation underlying Chrysler’s ineffective assistance claim.    The Sixth

Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant the right “to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.”    U.S. Const. amend. VI.    In Crawford v.

Washington, the Supreme Court interpreted this Clause to bar the admission at

trial of a witness’s “testimonial evidence”—which includes “at a minimum” his

“prior testimony . . . before a grand jury”—unless the witness is unavailable and

the defendant has been afforded a prior opportunity for cross‐examination.  541

U.S. 36, 68 (2004).   The Supreme Court decided Crawford while Chrysler’s case

was pending on direct appeal, and New York appellate courts have applied its

holding on direct appeal where trial counsel timely objected to the use of

evidence as violating a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.    See People v.

Hardy, 791 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (2005) (“Because this appeal was not yet final at the

time the Supreme Court decided Crawford, defendant is entitled to invoke

Crawford, and we are compelled to apply it . . . .”).    Because Chrysler did not

receive an opportunity to cross‐examine Weygant, and the record contains no

indication that the grand jury testimony was admitted only against Weygant, we

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assume that the admission of that testimony (like the admission of Weygant’s

statements to Ferretti) implicated Chrysler’s Confrontation Clause rights.

This only begins the analysis pertinent here.  The mere fact that Chrysler’s

Confrontation Clause rights were implicated by the admission of Weygant’s

grand jury testimony does not mean that his rights were violated by the

admission of this testimony (since his trial counsel expressly stated that he had

no objection to its admission).  Nor has Chrysler shown by the mere admission of

the grand jury testimony that his appellate attorneys acted unreasonably in not

raising a Crawford claim based on that testimony, or that Chrysler was prejudiced

by their failure to do so.    Because the reasonableness of appellate counsel’s

decision not to raise a Crawford claim depends in part on whether that claim

would have succeeded, see Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751‐53, we first assess the

likelihood that the Second Department would have reversed Chrysler’s

conviction on direct appeal had his appellate attorneys raised such a claim.  In

other words, we address Strickland’s second prong first, applying AEDPA’s

deferential standard, before turning next to the objective reasonableness of

appellate counsel’s representation.  

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III.

As to Strickland’s second prong, we conclude that a fairminded jurist could

determine that there was no “reasonable probability” that the Second

Department would have reversed Chrysler’s conviction on direct appeal even if

his appellate counsel had raised a Crawford claim based on Weygant’s grand jury

testimony.  See Lynch, 789 F.3d at 319 (asking whether “fairminded jurists could

disagree as to whether there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel raised

the . . . issue, the outcome of the appeal would have been different”).  

Importantly, as the district court correctly observed, any such claim was not

preserved for appellate review.    Under New York law, a defendant does not

preserve a Confrontation Clause claim unless he specifically objects to the

introduction of the relevant evidence on constitutional grounds.  See, e.g., People

v. Lopez, 808 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (App. Div. 2006) (finding Confrontation Clause

claim unpreserved even where defendant raised a hearsay objection to the same

evidence); People v. Bones, 793 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (App. Div. 2005) (finding

Confrontation Clause claim unpreserved where defendant “failed to object with

any specificity” that the evidence in question “violated his Sixth Amendment

right to confront witnesses against him”).    Moreover, New York courts “have

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applied the preservation requirement to deny a direct appeal where a defendant

was convicted before the Supreme Court decided Crawford, attempted to assert

rights under Crawford on appeal, but did not assert those rights at trial.”  Chrysler,

14 F. Supp. 3d at 460‐61 (citing Bones, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 546); cf. United States v.

Botti, 711 F.3d 299, 308‐10 (2d Cir. 2013) (under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 52(b), the plain error standard applies even if applicable law changes

between trial and appeal).  Here, Chrysler’s trial counsel did not merely fail to

register a specific objection to the admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony;

he went so far as to state specifically that he had no objection—even though, long

before Crawford, the testimony would have constituted hearsay as to Chrysler,

thus raising Confrontation Clause concerns.    See infra note 13.    As a result,

Chrysler’s Crawford claim was unpreserved, and had it been raised on appeal, the

Second Department would have been under no obligation to consider it.  

To be sure, New York’s intermediate appellate courts are permitted to

reach unpreserved issues “[a]s a matter of discretion in the interest of justice.”  

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15.3(c).    Chrysler argues that had his appellate

counsel raised a Crawford claim based on Weygant’s grand jury testimony, there

is a reasonable probability that the Second Department would have exercised its

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interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction to hear that claim and reverse his conviction.  But a

fairminded jurist could comfortably reject this argument.  Indeed, as explained

below, several factors were present here that render it exceedingly unlikely that

the Second Department would have entertained Chrysler’s Crawford claim.

First, New York intermediate appellate courts exercise their discretionary

interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction only to correct errors that are “so egregious that

[they] deprive[d] [the] defendant of a fair trial.”  People v. King, 482 N.Y.S.2d 924,

925 (App. Div. 1984); see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15.6(a).   As relevant here,

courts have declined to exercise interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction where there is

overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.   See, e.g., People v. Benton, 771

N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (App. Div. 2004) (concluding that reversal in the interest of

justice was not warranted even assuming a jury instruction was erroneous where

there was “strong evidence of guilt”); People v. Belgrave, 580 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482

(App. Div. 1992) (declining to exercise “interest of justice jurisdiction to review

the defendant’s claim given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s

guilt”).  Such was the case here.  Glasses belonging to Chrysler were found at the

scene of the crime, and blood stains matching Pendino’s DNA were discovered

in Chrysler’s car—from which blood‐stained seatbelts had conveniently

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vanished—and in the car he was driving on the day of the crime.  Chrysler lied

about the source of these red stains and pressed Warner to clean both vehicles on

the very day that Pendino disappeared.  The prosecution also adduced testimony

from multiple witnesses that Chrysler sought revenge against the “rat” who had

provided information leading to his earlier arrest.  A taped phone conversation

was played for the jury in which Chrysler discussed Pendino as a potential

suspect and vented his rage.    A fairminded jurist could well conclude, under

these circumstances, that Chrysler’s Crawford claim would have made no

difference on direct appeal because it would not have been considered.   

Along similar lines, even assuming that the Second Department would

have entertained the claim on direct appeal, a fairminded jurist could also

perceive no reasonable probability of that court’s failing to find any Crawford

error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Applying the constitutional standard

for harmless error, New York courts dismiss Confrontation Clause errors as

harmless “when, in light of the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable

probability that the error affected the jury’s verdict.”    People v. Douglas, 793

N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (2005); see also People v. Ayala, 554 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (1990)

(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).   A fairminded jurist could

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easily find that standard satisfied here.    The grand jury testimony was used

primarily to corroborate Ferretti’s testimony against Weygant, and it implicated

Chrysler only tangentially—by suggesting, for instance, that Chrysler thought an

associate had “ratted him out.”    Further, as the prosecution emphasized

throughout its summation, Weygant’s testimony was duplicative of other

evidence and was by no means the only source corroborating Ferretti’s

testimony, which was also supported by testimony from several witnesses and

by forensic evidence.  The small part that Weygant’s testimony played in the case

against Chrysler thus amply supports the conclusion that there was no chance

his testimony affected the jury’s verdict.  

This factor sharply distinguishes this case from People v. White (relied on

by Chrysler), which held that the erroneous admission of fifteen co‐defendants’

plea allocutions was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the

prosecution described that evidence as “‘essential,’ ‘the most compelling

evidence of the existence of a conspiracy,’ and ‘the core to the case.’”    809

N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (App. Div. 2005).    Instead, the circumstances of this case are

analogous to many other cases where New York appellate courts have

determined that similar errors were harmless in light of the strength of the other

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evidence against the defendant.    See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 815 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91

(App. Div. 2006) (admission of testimony in violation of Crawford was harmless

“because the other evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdict is strong”);

People v. Lopez, 808 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (App. Div. 2006) (admission of co‐

defendant’s written and stenographic statements as declarations against penal

interest in violation of Crawford was harmless due to other “overwhelming

evidence of defendant’s guilt”); People v. McBee, 8 A.D.3d 500, 501 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2004) (“overwhelming evidence of guilt” rendered any error harmless).  

Certainly, a fairminded jurist could find this analogy apt and thus conclude that

there was no reasonable probability of Chrysler’s appeal coming out

differently—even if, contrary to the ordinary practice of New York intermediate

appellate courts, the Second Department would have addressed the merits of

Chrysler’s unpreserved Crawford claim.

As noted, moreover, Chrysler’s trial counsel specifically said that he had

no objection to the admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony.    This is yet

another factor supporting the reasonable conclusion that the Second Department

would not have exercised its interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction to review the

unpreserved Crawford claim had appellate counsel raised it. Chrysler cites no

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case, and we have not found one, in which a New York court exercised its

interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction to overturn a conviction where trial counsel

affirmatively consented to the admission of the challenged evidence.    To the

contrary, where counsel’s acquiescence in the admission of evidence suggests an

element of strategy as opposed to mere mistake, courts have viewed such

acquiescence as grounds for declining to exercise interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction.  

Cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733‐34 (1993) (under Rule 52(b),

accidentally “forfeited” claims are reviewable on appeal for plain error, whereas

intentionally “waived” ones are not).  As one New York court has put it, where

the trial court invited objection and counsel declined, and there was no question

as to the sufficiency of the evidence as to guilt, the interests of justice did not

require the appellate court to overlook the failure to object since it had “no way

of knowing what prompted counsel to allow the . . . testimony to pass without

objection,” a decision that “might well” have been strategic.  People v. Cornish, 349

N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (App. Div. 1973); see also People v. Brown, 725 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254

(App. Div. 2001) (“[D]efense counsel affirmatively stated that he had no

objection . . . . Consequently, defendant’s contention is not preserved for our

review, and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of

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discretion in the interest of justice.” (citation omitted)); People v. Hughes, 655

N.Y.S.2d 29, 30 (App. Div. 1997) (“Defendant’s claim that a limiting instruction

should have been given is unpreserved, and we decline to review it in the

interest of justice because defendant expressly waived such instruction.” (citation

omitted)); People v. Wright, 603 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (App. Div. 1993) (“[W]hen the

certified transcript [of the defendant’s grand jury testimony] was eventually

offered into evidence, [she] expressly stated that she had no objection.  Therefore,

her present claim is unpreserved for appellate review and we decline to review it

in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).  

The fact that Chrysler’s trial counsel expressly declined to object to the

admission of Weygant’s testimony thus made it less likely that the Second

Department would have reviewed his Crawford claim on direct appeal.  This is

doubly true, moreover, because the context surrounding trial counsel’s

acquiescence in the admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony suggests that

the decision was strategic.    New York intermediate appellate courts have

declined to exercise their interest‐of‐justice jurisdiction where “it appears that the

defendant’s counsel’s failure to object was a matter of trial strategy.”  People v.

Doby, 577 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 (App. Div. 1992); see also People v. Sprosta, 853

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N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 2008) (interest‐of‐justice review of defendant’s

hearsay and Confrontation Clause arguments was “inappropriate” where

defense counsel “expressly stated on the record that he had no objection to th[e]

evidence” and “the record establish[ed] that defense counsel’s express denial of

any objection was part of an intentional defense strategy”); People v. Eisemann,

670 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (App. Div. 1998) (interest‐of‐justice review was not

warranted where “the record indicate[d] that the defense counsel’s failure to

object . . . was actually a calculated tactical maneuver”).  Such is the case here—

or so a fairminded jurist could conclude.

Chrysler’s pretrial motion to sever illustrates that his attorneys knew full

well that Weygant’s grand jury testimony would be offered at trial, and that it

implicated Chrysler’s Confrontation Clause rights.    But Chrysler did not raise

this issue again once he made the strategic decision to stand trial together with

Weygant (knowing that Ferretti’s testimony would be admitted).  This suggests

that the admission of the grand jury testimony could reasonably be viewed as an

element of Chrysler’s trial strategy, premised on turning Ferretti’s testimony to

his advantage.    From the start, Chrysler’s situation, given the strength of the

evidence against him, was desperate.    But Ferretti’s testimony offered several

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opportunities for the defense.  Although Ferretti’s testimony inculpated him, it

also exculpated him, since Weygant claimed at L’Air De Paris that he had killed

Pendino on his own, and implied in New Paltz that an unnamed “friend” other

than Chrysler had been his accomplice.   As Chrysler argued on direct appeal,

Ferretti “testified that each and every time she attempted to induce defendant

Weygant[] to implicate appellant, he categorically denied any involvement by

Chrysler.”  J.A. 493.  By opting for a joint trial with Weygant, Chrysler ensured

that the Chrysler jury would hear Weygant’s statements to Ferretti that Chrysler

did not participate in the killing.  During summation, Chrysler endorsed many of

Ferretti’s exculpating statements, calling them “admi[ssions].”    Tr. 3303.  

Ferretti’s testimony also gave Chrysler’s trial counsel the opportunity, by

attacking Ferretti’s credibility, to distract the jury from the overwhelming

evidence against Chrysler adduced from other sources—a tactic employed

repeatedly during his summation.   Weygant’s grand jury testimony supported

this attack on Ferretti’s credibility because, for example (and as Chrysler stressed

on direct appeal), Weygant explicitly denied ever confessing to Ferretti.    See

J.A. 443 n.19 (“In his own grand jury testimony, . . . Weygant denied any

involvement in Pendino’s disappearance or murder.”).

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To summarize, a fairminded jurist could conclude that Chrysler’s Crawford

claim would have made no difference on appeal because it would not have been

considered.   Multiple factors militated against the exercise of interest‐of‐justice

jurisdiction: the other evidence of Chrysler’s guilt was overwhelming; Chrysler’s

counsel affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the introduction of

Weygant’s grand jury testimony; and the record suggests that this decision was a

matter of trial strategy.    Even had the claim been considered, moreover, a

fairminded jurist could conclude that the Second Department would have found

the error harmless on appeal.    Accordingly, the Second Department did not

apply Strickland unreasonably in denying Chrysler’s coram nobis petition.   

IV.

In light of the foregoing analysis, we similarly conclude that a fairminded

jurist could also determine that Chrysler failed to satisfy the first prong of

Strickland because his appellate counsel’s representation did not fall “below an

objective standard of reasonableness.”    466 U.S. at 688.   In Jones v. Barnes, the

Supreme Court explained that appellate counsel need not raise every colorable

claim on behalf of a client.    463 U.S. at 752‐54.   While it is of course possible,

“[n]otwithstanding Barnes,” to succeed on a Strickland claim based on counsel’s

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failure to press an argument on appeal, Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288; see, e.g., Lynch,

789 F.3d at 319 (reversing denial of federal habeas on such a claim), the Supreme

Court has cautioned that these claims are difficult precisely because “appellate

counsel . . . need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather

may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on

appeal,” Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288.    Moreover, “[a] court considering a claim of

ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s

representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional

assistance.”  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  “The

challenger’s burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.’”    Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).    And in assessing

whether Strickland’s first prong is satisfied, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Adjudged by these standards, Chrysler has not shown that the Second

Department’s decision denying his coram nobis petition fell outside the range of

reasonableness.   As we explained in addressing Strickland’s prejudice prong, a

fairminded jurist could conclude that there was no “reasonable probability” of

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the Second Department’s even reaching Chrysler’s unpreserved Crawford claim

on direct appeal.    If that is so, then it follows that a fairminded jurist could

conclude that Chrysler’s appellate attorneys reasonably omitted such a claim to

focus instead on claims that were properly preserved and that challenged more

important sources of evidence than Weygant’s grand jury testimony.    See, e.g.,

J.A. 436, 452 (arguing that the prosecution engaged in misconduct related to

Ferretti’s testimony); id. at 474‐77 (arguing that the trial court improperly

sustained objections to a series of attempts by defense counsel to confront

Ferretti with impeaching evidence); id. at 500, 504, 506 (arguing that trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to confront Ronsini and Ferretti with prior inconsistent

statements, and in failing to object to testimony given by Dr. Wolf, the

prosecution’s blood expert); id. at 688‐89 (arguing that the chain of custody for

the source of Pendino’s DNA was not properly established).13  Moreover, there

 

13 Chrysler contends that “there is no legitimate explanation for appellate

counsel’s failure to raise the Crawford claim on direct appeal” and suggests that counsel

failed to bring the claim only because they were unaware that Crawford had been

decided.  Appellant’s Br. at 13.  This argument is unavailing.  Although we, following

Chrysler, refer to his argument regarding Weygant’s grand jury testimony as a

“Crawford claim,” we doubt that the merits of his Confrontation Clause challenge to

Weygant’s testimony depended on Crawford. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67‐68

(1980) (stating pre‐Crawford “indicia of reliability” test); United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d

797, 806‐07 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting, before Crawford, that “reliability concerns . . . led

courts to exclude grand jury testimony from use by the prosecution at trial”), rev’d on

other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).    There is no evidence in the record, moreover,

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are additional considerations that made Chrysler’s counsel’s decision here all the

more justifiable.

Critically, appellate counsel did challenge the fact that numerous

statements made by Weygant raising Confrontation Clause concerns were

admitted during the course of Chrysler’s trial (albeit with Chrysler’s consent).  In

arguing that Chrysler was thereby denied his constitutional rights, however,

counsel focused not on Weygant’s grand jury testimony, but rather on Chrysler’s

decision to stand trial jointly with Weygant and, in particular, on Chrysler’s

acquiescence to the admission of Ferretti’s testimony, which implicated

Chrysler’s Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton.

14    Unlike Chrysler’s so‐

called Crawford claim, the argument that trial counsel had been ineffective in

 

suggesting that Chrysler’s appellate counsel failed to consider the general question

whether to mount a challenge to the admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony

based on the Confrontation Clause.

14 By contrast, Weygant’s grand jury testimony did not trigger the Bruton rule

that “a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the

facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their

joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the

codefendant.”  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 (1987).  Weygant neither confessed

in the grand jury nor accused Chrysler of participating in the crime.  As the Supreme

Court explained in Richardson, “[o]rdinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at

a joint trial is not considered to be a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is

instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.”   Id. at 206.    Thus,

even if Chrysler had objected to the admission of Weygant’s grand jury testimony, a

limiting instruction to the effect that the testimony was admissible only as to Weygant

would have been adequate to address any Confrontation Clause concerns.

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declining to seek a severance in light of Ferretti’s testimony did not face

dismissal on the ground that it was not raised below.   

Given these factors, reasonable jurists could well conclude that Chrysler’s

appellate counsel did not act unreasonably in focusing not on the admission of

Weygant’s grand jury testimony, but instead on the Chrysler team’s decision to

stand trial jointly with Weygant notwithstanding the fact that the jury would

thereby hear Ferretti’s account of Weygant’s confessions to her.    While this

argument still faced the obstacle that Chrysler had expressly affirmed his desire

for a joint trial, it targeted a much more significant source of evidence against

Chrysler.  The importance of Weygant’s grand jury testimony to the case against

Chrysler pales in significance when considered next to Ferretti’s testimony that,

among other things, Weygant admitted to “just kill[ing] a kid for” Chrysler, to

“w[h]ack[ing]” Pendino after spending the night with Chrysler and picking up

Greenfield’s Crown Victoria (which Chrysler had borrowed), and to moving

Pendino’s body from that car to Chrysler’s 4‐Runner before burying it.  Tr. 2160,

2173.  

To be clear, this is not to opine on the objective reasonableness of

Chrysler’s decision to stand trial with Weygant or his trial counsel’s advice

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regarding that decision—matters that are not before us.  As we have explained,

Chrysler faced a steep uphill battle in light of all the evidence against him, which

established that he had a motive to kill Pendino, that his glasses had been found

at the crime scene, that his car and a car he had borrowed were both stained with

Pendino’s blood, that he brought both cars to Warner for cleaning on the day of

Pendino’s disappearance, and that he lied about the source of the blood stains.  

Under these circumstances, it may well have been reasonable for Chrysler’s trial

attorneys to recommend a joint trial with Weygant, at which they could stress the

exculpatory portions of Ferretti’s testimony and then attack her credibility in an

effort to distract the jury from the overwhelming evidence adduced from other

sources.   

Regardless, all of the foregoing demonstrates that Chrysler fell well short

of the required showing that any fairminded jurist would conclude that his

appellate counsel’s omission of a challenge to the admission of Weygant’s grand

jury testimony—which Chrysler expressly acquiesced to at trial—“fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Accordingly,

we conclude that the Second Department did not apply Strickland unreasonably

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in rejecting Chrysler’s coram nobis petition, and therefore that the district court

correctly denied Chrysler’s federal habeas petition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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