Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00030/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00030-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff arrived at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center on November 21, 2006 and was released

from custody on or about February 21, 2007. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 NORTHERN DIVISION

 _____________________________

 

JAMES L. BOYINGTON *

Plaintiff, * 

 v. * 2:07-CV-30-MHT

 (WO)

LEEPOSEY DANIELS, WARDEN, et al., *

Defendants. *

 _____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, James Boyington, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on January 9, 2007

while he was incarcerated at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center in Mt. Meigs, Alabama.1

Alleging that Defendants denied him access to the courts and subjected him to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff instituted this action for damages and

injunctive relief against Warden LeePosey Daniels and Correctional Officer Debra Caldwell.

In accordance with the orders of the court, Defendants filed a special report and

supporting evidentiary material in response to the allegations contained in the complaint.

(Doc. No. 11.) The court then informed Plaintiff that Defendants’ special report may, at any

time, be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and the court explained to Plaintiff the

proper manner in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a

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To the extent Plaintiff sought to raise new claims in his opposition, the court declines to consider

those claims and further notes that Plaintiff did not seek to amend his complaint to raise new theories of

liability. Se Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004 (“A plaintiff may

not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”).

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Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language of Rule 56 [was] amended ... to make the rule[] more

easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes ... are

stylistic only.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic

changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior rule remain equally applicable

to the current rule. 

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response to the special report filed by Defendants.2 (Doc. No. 13.) This case is now pending

on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and Plaintiff’s opposition to this motion, the

court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c) (Summary judgment "should

be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.").3

 The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence

which would be admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by

showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element

of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324. 

Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff's claims. Thus, the burden shifts to

Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue

material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats and Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.

1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) ("When a motion for summary

judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on

allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial."). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

 "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not

significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted." . Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing

party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact]

could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir.

1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create

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a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary

judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.

2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff's "conclusory

assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand

summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of

summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory

allegations...."); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) ("mere verification

of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....").

Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by appropriate evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the

plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in

favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987)

(if on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require

submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami,

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude

entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence

before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form

indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party moving for

summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials

and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine issue as to a requisite material fact);

Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party

must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

issue of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2576, 165 L.Ed.2d

697 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff's pro se

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status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production

and proof in a civil case. In this case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine issue

of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Request for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. The transfer or release of a prisoner renders moot

any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S.

625, 631 (1979); see also Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (past exposure

to even illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a pending case or controversy regarding

injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing present injury or real and immediate

threat of repeated injury). Because the records before the court clearly reflect that Plaintiff

is no longer incarcerated, his request for injunctive relief has been rendered moot. 

B. The Access to Courts Claim

When Plaintiff arrived at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center on November 21, 2006,

he was under order to file a status report in a pending federal habeas application by

November 28, 2006. He, therefore, sought access to the facility’s law library in order to

prepare the report. Defendant Caldwell, who oversaw the operation of the law library, was

off until November 25, 2006. As a result Plaintiff complains that he was unable to access the

library until November 26, 2006, when Defendant Caldwell summoned him to the law

library. Although the computer was not available for inmate use, Defendant Caldwell

informed Plaintiff that she would attempt to locate and retrieve the legal material he wished

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to receive. Defendant Caldwell was unable to locate information pertaining to Plaintiff’s

request for “Rules of Court (federal) in regards to federally ‘stayed’ petitions.” Nonetheless,

Defendant Caldwell provided Plaintiff with the information she was able to retrieve based

on his research request. Plaintiff complains that the information was not relevant and that

Defendant Caldwell denied his request to remain in the law library to prepare his response.

Plaintiff further alleges that subsequent requests to access the law library were denied which

affected his ability to properly research, formulate, and prepare legal work in his federal

habeas petition as well as in a state court case which “severely prejudiced [Plaintiff] in

adequately preparing in pro se defense.” (Doc. No. 1 and Exh .A.) 

Defendants maintain that law library is open to inmates at the Montgomery PreRelease Center approximately 20 hours a week. Inmates who need to research information

on the computer may inform the law library supervisor who will conduct the research and

print the requested information. Defendant Caldwell denies having any knowledge of or

witnessing any legal documentation presented by Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 13, Daniels and

Caldwell Affidavits.) 

 The law is well settled that prison inmates are entitled to “a reasonably adequate

opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.”

Bounds v. Plaintiff, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the

Supreme Court clarified and limited the right to assistance created in Bounds. Specifically,

the Court mandated that “an inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury”

arising directly from the alleged inadequacies in the law library, legal assistance program or

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correctional policy. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. In identifying the specific right protected by

Bounds, the Court explained that “Bounds established no ... right [to a law library or to legal

assistance]. The right that Bounds acknowledged was the (already well-established) right of

access to the courts . . . [P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in

themselves, but only the means for ensuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to present

claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’ ” Id. at 350-351

(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The Court further determined Bounds did not

require “that the State . . . enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate

effectively once in court . . . To demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities

upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison population is [not something]

. . . the Constitution requires.” Id. at 354 (emphasis in original). 

The Court likewise rejected the argument that the mere claim of a systemic defect,

without a showing of actual injury, presented a claim sufficient to confer standing. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 349. Moreover, Lewis emphasizes that a Bounds violation is related to the lack

of an inmate’s capability to present claims. Id. at 356. “Bounds, which as we have said

guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability -- the capability

of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the

courts. When any inmate . . . shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired

to bring has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being

prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not been provided, he demonstrates” the

requisite actual injury. Id. Finally, the Court determined that the injury requirement is

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satisfied only when an inmate has been denied “a reasonably adequate opportunity to file

nonfrivolous legal claims challenging [his] convictions or conditions of confinement . . . [I]t

is that capability, rather than the capability of turning pages in a law library, that is the

touchstone.” Id. at 356-357. “[T]he Constitution does not require that prisoners . . . be able

to conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to present their grievances to the

courts -- a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of

legal assistance.” Id. at 360. The Court admonished that federal courts should allow prison

officials to determine the best method of ensuring that inmates are provided a reasonably

adequate opportunity to present their nonfrivolous claims of constitutional violations to the

courts. Id. at 356. A federal district court must “‘scrupulously respect[] the limits on [its]

role,’ by ‘not . . . thrust[ing] itself into prison administration’ and instead permitting ‘[p]rison

administrators [to] exercis[e] wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional

requirements.’ [Bounds, 430] U.S. at 832-833, 97 S.Ct. at 1500.” Id. at 363. 

Review of the pleadings and documents filed in this matter fails to demonstrate that

Plaintiff suffered the requisite “actual injury” to establish a constitutional violation. Plaintiff

has not come forward with any evidence that the actions about which he complains deprived

him of the capability of pursuing non-frivolous legal claims before federal or state courts.

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite injury, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356;

Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991).

C. The Conditions Claim

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Plaintiff describes a variety of conditions in existence during his brief confinement

at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center which he maintains amounted to a violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights. These conditions and problems included an inadequate hot water

supply, unsanitary toilet conditions, insufficient living space due to overcrowding, fire

hazards, and unsafe and/or inadequate air quality. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Defendants deny that Plaintiff was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement during his incarceration at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center and note that

the facility is subject to mandatory inspections by the State Department of Public Health.

According to Defendants’ unrefuted evidentiary material, the inmate dormitories at the prerelease center provide each prisoner adequate living space and ventilation and fire

extinguishers are available in the dormitories. Defendants affirm that the facility experienced

a boiler system failure resulting in a temporary disruption of available hot water but state that

the boiler system was subsequently replaced with a new unit. Finally, Defendants maintain

that at no time was there an incident in which raw sewage leaked from the toilets in the

inmate dorms. In sum, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not exposed to either inhumane

nor unsanitary conditions during his incarceration at the pre-release center. (Doc. No. 11,

Daniels and Caldwell Affidavits.) 

The Constitution proscribes those conditions of confinement which involve the

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). There

is no “static test” for determining which conditions violate the Constitution. Id. at 346.

Whether a violation exists requires a fact intensive determination of what conditions exist

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and whether objectively and subjectively the conditions offend the Constitution by

amounting to seriously sufficient deprivations to which officials were deliberately indifferent.

See e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Only actions which deny inmates “the

minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” are grave enough to establish constitutional

violations. Rhodes, 425 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)

(overcrowding, without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526-27 (1984)); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). In order to demonstrate the

objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation with respect to conditions of

confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was denied the “minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. The challenged prison condition must be

“extreme” and must pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.”

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2004). The subjective component

requires a prisoner to prove that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” in

disregarding that risk by showing that an official knew the inmate faced a “substantial risk

of serious harm” and, with such knowledge, disregarded that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 834, 837. In this case, Plaintiff

alleges in conclusory terms that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

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confinement at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center. All of the conditions or problems

identified by Plaintiff are unfortunately problems of prison life in general, a life which while

not comfortable must be humane. Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff has failed to establish that the conditions about which he complains caused him

serious harm nor can the problems he describes be considered “abuses.” Additionally,

Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence which shows that Defendants knew of an obvious

risk of serious harm to him and disregarded that risk, Farmer 511 U.S. at 837, or that

Defendants’ actions resulted in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The mere fact that the conditions and problems

described by Plaintiff existed is insufficient to demonstrate a constitutional violation.

Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims challenging

the conditions of confinement at the Montgomery Pre-Release Center is due to be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 11) be GRANTED;

2. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff;

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; and

4. The costs of this proceeding be TAXED against Plaintiff for which execution may

issue.

It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

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Recommendation on or before December 4, 2008. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore,

it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 21st day of November, 2008.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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