Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01325/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01325-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1 Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, was formerly known as World

savings Bank, FSB.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TONY RAYA, JR.,

Civ. No. S-09-1325 FCD/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, WORLD

SAVINGS BANK, EMILIO LANDEROS,

JANINE THRASH, and DOES 1-20

inclusive,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant

Wachovia Mortgage1 to dismiss plaintiff Tony Raya Jr.’s

(“plaintiff”) second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6). On February 9, 2010,

plaintiff filed an opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss,

which included a statement of non-opposition to dismissal of

Case 2:09-cv-01325-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 02/19/10 Page 1 of 3
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plaintiff’s claims under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and

the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). (Pl.’s

Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, filed Feb. 9, 2010, n.3.) Accordingly,

plaintiff’s TILA and RESPA claims are dismissed. 

Dismissal of the TILA and RESPA claims leaves the complaint

devoid of any federal claims. The remaining claims are state law

claims for negligence, violation of the California Rosenthal Act,

breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, violation of California Business

and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., breach of contract, breach

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and

wrongful foreclosure. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. (“Compl.”).) 

Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court’s decision

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed

by values of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id.

at 1001 (citations omitted). Further, primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. 

Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial,

district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d

1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n the usual case in which

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”)(quoting

Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In

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accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining

state law claims.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without 

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 19, 2010.

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-01325-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 02/19/10 Page 3 of 3