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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted December 4, 2015*

Decided February 19, 2016 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2424 

LEATRICE LUMPKIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

COOK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S

OFFICE, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 12 C 5889 

Joan B. Gottschall, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Leatrice Lumpkin, a stenographer formerly employed by the Cook County Public 

Defender’s Office, appeals the entry of summary judgment against her on her claim of 

retaliatory discharge as well as the denial of her request for recruited counsel. Because 

Lumpkin has not created an issue of triable fact and because she was not prejudiced by 

her lack of counsel, we affirm. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral 

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 15-2424 Page 2 

The following description of events is taken largely from the defendants’ 

statement of material facts, which Lumpkin failed to counter in the manner required by 

Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) and which the district court properly 

deemed undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. See N. D. ILL. R. 56.1(b)(3)(c); 

Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th. Cir. 2006). 

Lumpkin, who had worked for the Public Defender’s Office since 2002, began 

having job performance issues in 2009. In November she was counseled by her 

supervisor Mary Maldonado after having a loud altercation with a coworker. Six months 

later, in a general performance evaluation covering fiscal year 2009, Maldonado rated 

Lumpkin’s communication skills and ability to work with others “unsatisfactory” and 

noted that Lumpkin had been tardy thirteen times. 

In 2010 Lumpkin’s job performance worsened and she was issued escalating 

warnings and disciplinary actions. That year Lumpkin received a verbal warning, a 

written warning, a one-day suspension, two ten-day suspensions, and a thirty-day 

suspension. These sanctions stemmed from a number of incidents, including: answering 

phone calls unprofessionally prompting both callers and coworkers to complain; 

directing calls to the wrong person; misinforming another staff member of the Division 

Chief’s whereabouts; failing to weigh outgoing postal mail properly; sending interoffice 

mail through regular mail; leaving work without stamping or sending outgoing mail; 

failing to deliver mail; and at least four times engaging in loud altercations with 

coworkers. 

In December 2010 Lumpkin filed a charge of discrimination with both the Illinois 

Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 

alleging that her suspensions resulted from discrimination based on her race, sex, and 

age. She named her coworker David Mann as someone similarly situated to her but 

treated differently. 

In the first half of 2011, while the administrative charges were pending, Lumpkin 

continued to be disciplined for poor performance. She was disciplined for among other 

things repeated tardiness, mishandling of mail and calls, and shouting and cursing at 

coworkers. In June, at Maldonado’s recommendation, the Public Defender’s Office fired 

her. Lumpkin’s termination letter cites 19 incidents of poor work performance, 

insubordination, and inappropriate behavior occurring from February through June 

2011. 

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No. 15-2424 Page 3 

Lumpkin filed a charge of retaliatory termination of employment with the Illinois 

Department of Human Rights and the EEOC. Neither took action. Lumpkin then sued 

the Public Defender’s Office, Maldonado, and another supervisor under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), asserting that she was discharged in 

retaliation for filing administrative charges of discrimination. (We do not discuss 

Lumpkin’s other claims of race, sex, and age discrimination, which she does not discuss 

on appeal and thus abandons.) 

Lumpkin immediately requested counsel but District Judge Der-Yeghiayan (who 

later recused himself) denied the request, concluding that the case was not overly 

complex and that Lumpkin could litigate it competently. But she was unable on four 

attempts to serve the defendants, so Judge Der-Yeghiayan eventually recruited counsel 

for the limited purpose of assisting her with service. 

After her case was reassigned to Judge Gottschall, Lumpkin renewed her request 

for counsel. The judge granted her request, noting that Lumpkin needed counsel to 

conduct discovery effectively. At the close of discovery, however, Lumpkin’s counsel 

withdrew, citing personal incompatibility. Lumpkin requested the assistance of another 

lawyer, and the court took her request under advisement. 

The defendants then moved for summary judgment, contending that Lumpkin 

did not provide any evidence that their decision to fire her was based on her charges of 

discrimination. After Lumpkin responded, the district judge observed that Lumpkin’s 

former counsel apparently had failed to request the performance reviews and 

disciplinary records of Lumpkin’s coworker and comparator, David Mann. Stating that 

she could not rule on the defendants’ summary judgment motion without Mann’s 

personnel file, the judge ordered the defendants to produce it under seal. 

The district judge ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants. The 

judge treated the defendants’ undisputed statement of facts as admitted, see N. D. ILL. R. 

56.1(b)(3)(c), and concluded that Lumpkin’s claims failed under both the direct and 

indirect methods for proving discrimination. The court also concluded that Lumpkin 

failed to create a triable fact issue about whether she had been fired in retaliation for 

filing the administrative charges; the court rejected her contention that the seven months 

between her termination and her filing of the administrative charge was suspicious, 

particularly since Lumpkin had been cited during this time for 19 workplace violations. 

Because her claims lacked merit, the judge declined to recruit counsel because doing so 

would be futile. 

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On appeal, Lumpkin maintains that her evidence showing that the Public 

Defender’s Office fired her only seven months after she filed her discrimination charges 

is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she was fired in retaliation. 

But “suspicious timing” alone is rarely sufficient to infer causation. See, e.g., Carter v. 

Chicago State Univ., 778 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2015); Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 

681 (7th Cir. 2015); Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 

2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2861 (2015). We agree with the district court that the 

seven-month period between the filing and her firing is too long, without other 

evidence, to establish a causal connection between the two. See, e.g., Carter, 778 F.3d 

at 658–60 (seven months between professor’s return from FMLA leave and university’s 

decision not to appoint him to department chair too long); Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 

748, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (eight months between plaintiff’s latest discrimination filing and 

suspension too long); Leonard v. E. Ill. Univ., 606 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (six months 

too long to infer link between filing of administrative complaint and decision not to 

hire). Lumpkin has not produced any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer 

that the defendants fired her in retaliation for filing her administrative charges. 

Lumpkin next challenges the district court’s denial of her request to have counsel 

recruited for her after her former lawyer withdrew. She argues that her former lawyer, 

who had been recruited, was ineffective because he failed to conduct any discovery. 

The district judge erred by denying Lumpkin’s request for counsel on grounds of 

futility. That standard confuses the district court’s task with ours: “Pruitt nowhere 

suggests that a district court should consider whether recruiting counsel would affect 

the outcome of a case; instead, that inquiry is reserved for the appellate court’s review 

for prejudice.” Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The proper inquiry for 

the district court is whether a plaintiff made reasonable efforts to retain counsel and 

whether, given the difficulty of the case, she was competent to litigate it on her own. 

See Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2010); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 

654–55 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Our review, as noted, is for prejudice, and Lumpkin has 

made no showing that a lawyer could have made a difference in this case. See Pruitt, 

503 F.3d at 659. Lumpkin prepared an adequate response to the defendants’ summary 

judgment motion, and the district judge independently requested additional documents 

from the defendants so that she could review Mann’s personnel file. Lumpkin has not 

adduced any evidence to suggest that the defendants discriminated against her or fired 

her in retaliation, and without that no attorney could have “refashioned h[er] meritless 

claim into a meritorious one.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 700 (7th Cir. 2008). 

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We have considered Lumpkin’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED. 

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