Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01879/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01879-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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One named Defendant, O’Brien, has not yet been served (Doc. #9).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Skinner, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV 06-1879-PHX-SMM (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff James Skinner brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

three officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) (Doc. #7). Defendants

Arnold and Evans filed a combined Motion to Dismiss Count II and Motion for Enlargement

to File Responsive Pleading (Doc. #15).1

 Plaintiff responded, and Defendants replied (Doc.

##18, 24). The Court will deny the motion as to Count II and grant the motion for an

extension to file an answer.

I. Background

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that in May 2006 he was moved

from Special Management Unit (SMU)-I general population to the Violence Control Unit

(VCU) for approximately 90 days (Doc. #7). As a result, he lost privileges including

headphones, cassette player, electric razor, telephone calls, and canteen (id. at 5). Plaintiff

alleged that the VCU cell had restricted air flow and stifling temperatures with the only vent

blowing hot, fetid air into the cell (id. at 6-7). He further alleged that diesel fumes were

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The Court dismissed Count III on screening for failure to state a claim (Doc. #8 at 3).

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vented in to the cell, which caused him nausea and severe migraines (id. at 7). Plaintiff

claimed that he was stripped of privileges and put in the VCU cell without any notice of

charges, a hearing, the written reasons for the action, or a disciplinary report as required

under the ADC disciplinary policy (id. at 5, 7). Further, Plaintiff alleged that SMU Deputy

Wardens O’Brien and Arnold, and Corrections Officer III Evans are part of an unofficial

board that enforces a policy or practice of confining inmates involved in incidents with staff

or other inmates to VCU for time periods that exceed that provided for under the disciplinary

policy (id. at 5-6, 10). Plaintiff asserted that Defendants sentenced him to VCU for nearly

90 days without authorization and in violation of his due process rights (id. at 10-11). 

Upon screening Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the Court found that Count I

sufficiently alleged that the conditions of confinement in VCU constituted an “atypical and

significant hardship” that was materially different from the ordinary incidents of confinement

(Doc. #8 at 4, citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The Court determined

that Count II sufficiently alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process rights and specifically, his right to procedural due process (Doc. #8 at 3-4).2

In their motion, Defendants contended that for Count II Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (Doc. #15). Defendants conceded that in June 2006, Plaintiff submitted a request

for administrative relief about his placement in VCU, which they argued relates only to

Count I (id. at 4-5). Because placement is not grievable under the ADC grievance

procedures, Defendants acknowledged that Plaintiff’s attempt to grieve the issue exhausted

the available remedies for Count I (id.). But they argued that Plaintiff only asked to be

moved out of VCU—he never raised the issue of a secret board that placed him there, nor did

he file any staff grievances about alleged misconduct by Defendants (id. at 5). In support of

their motion, Defendants proffered the declaration of Aurora Aguilar, Hearing Officer at the

ADC’s Central Office in Phoenix (Doc. #15, Ex. A). Aguilar attested that she reviewed the

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Notice required under Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003).

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The Court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s request to proffer a copy of the VCU

policy as Exhibit D in support of his response (Doc. ##26-27, 30). This is the same policy

excerpt that Defendants submitted with their reply (Doc. #24, Ex. A).

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computerized log of all grievance appeals submitted to the Director but found no appeals

from Plaintiff that related to a secret VCU board or to the actions of Defendants (id., Aguilar

Decl. ¶¶ 6-8). Defendants also submitted a copy of Department Order (DO) 802, the policy

governing the inmate grievance system, and a copy of Plaintiff’s June 2006 inmate letter and

response thereto (id., Attach. 1, Ex. B).

The Court issued an order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the

evidence necessary to successfully rebut Defendants’ contentions (Doc. #16).3

 In response,

Plaintiff asserted that Count II goes directly to procedural due process violations of the ADC

disciplinary policy, which DO 802 explicitly stated cannot be grieved (Doc. #18 at 1). He

claimed that the inmate letter he submitted specifically referenced DO 803—the policy

governing the inmate discipline system (id. at 6). Plaintiff argued that because his inmate

letter addressed both his placement and his due process concerns about that placement, the

response informing him that he could not grieve discipline exhausted any available remedies

for both Counts I and II. Plaintiff submitted copies of DO 802, his June 2006 inmate letter

and response, and DO 804, which governs inmate behavior control (id., Exs. A-C).4

Defendants replied that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Count II is not related to

discipline; rather, it concerns allegations of Defendants’ misconduct in participating in a

secret board that enforced its own policy (Doc. #24 at 2). They contended that this type of

claim, which alleges actions that fall outside of the inmate discipline policy, must be raised

in a staff grievance (id.). Defendants attached a copy of DO 804-IO E, § 804.06—the policy

directly related to VCU placement (id., Ex. A).

II. Exhaustion

Plaintiff must first exhaust “available” administrative remedies before bringing this

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

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2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life,

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through

the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a grievance must alert prison officials to the

claims the plaintiff has included in the complaint. Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 (purpose of

exhaustion requirement is to give officials “time and opportunity to address complaints

internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case”). The specificity in a grievance

required to exhaust depends on the administrative system; “the grievances must contain the

sort of information that the administrative system requires.” Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646,

649 (7th Cir. 2002).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21 (2007).

Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method

to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). 

III. Analysis

At issue is whether Plaintiff’s June 2006 inmate letter, which constituted the first step

in the ADC grievance process, addressed the claim raised in Count II—alleged procedural

due process violations (see Doc. #8 at 4). In the inmate letter Plaintiff wrote:

I am attempting to informally resolve the following problem:

On May 16, 2006, I was removed from 2/A/29 to VCU 1/B/46.

However I was given no disciplinary report (see DO 803).

I am requesting to be returned to 2/A/29 or any other available cell.

//

//

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The response, which was written on the bottom half of the inmate letter form, was as follows:

June 28, 2006.

Placement is not grievable, but VCU staff has informed me that you will likely

be there for ~= 90 days.

CO3 Evans

(Doc. #15, Ex. B). Defendants maintain that this complaint only reflects a request to be

moved out of VCU; thus, it goes only to Count I (Doc. #15 at 5). Plaintiff claims that it also

concerns procedural due process violations of the ADC disciplinary policy and therefore

addresses Count II (Doc. #18 at 6, 8). 

To conclude that Plaintiff’s inmate letter simply requested a move out of VCU would

require the Court to ignore the phrase “[h]owever, I was given no disciplinary report (see DO

803).” Although succinct, this sentence clearly puts forth part of the problem that Plaintiff

was grieving. The alleged denial of a disciplinary report directly relates to Plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim set forth in Count II. The response to the inmate letter does not

make the distinction that Defendants now argue existed; namely, that Plaintiff could have

either grieved his concern about individual officers involved in the VCU placement or

specifically complained about a secret board enforcing its own policy. 

A. Individual Staff Grievances

Under DO 802, the only specific requirement as to the information an inmate must

provide in an inmate letter is that it shall begin with the statement, “I am attempting to

informally resolve the following problem” (Doc. #15, Attach.1, DO 802.08 § 1.2). The

inmate letter form asks the inmate to “[s]tate briefly but completely the problem on which

you desire assistance. Provide as many details as possible” (Doc. #15, Ex. B). The form

does not ask for anything more that a description of the grievance. Specifically, the inmate

letter form does not ask the inmate to state the names of the prison officials.

Plaintiff’s inmate letter provides all the information required by the policy and the

form instructions. The description of his grievance is straightforward; he was placed in

VCU, he did not get a disciplinary report, he references the disciplinary policy, and he

requests to be moved out of VCU (id.). The purpose of a grievance is to alert prison official

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to a problem, not—as Defendants suggest—to provide personal notice to a specific official

that he or she may be sued. See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff’s inmate letter was sufficient to provide the prison with a fair opportunity under the

circumstances to address the problem and to put the prison on notice of the potential claims.

As the Ninth Circuit has observed, when an inmate has followed the instruction on the

grievance form to “describe the problem,” he has “availed himself of the administrative

process the state gave him.” Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005).

Requiring Plaintiff to exhaust separate staff grievances as to each Defendant on the same

issue is unnecessary; the purpose of the exhaustion requirement has already been met.

B. Standard Grievance Related to a “Secret Board”

Defendants attempt to limit Count II to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants were part

of a secret board that enacted its own policy in violation of ADC disciplinary procedures

(Doc. #15 at 2, 5). This narrow reading of Plaintiff’s allegations does not properly reflect

the claim set forth in Count II. Indeed, in his First Amended Complaint Plaintiff specifically

stated that Count II involved procedural due process (Doc. #7 at 10 ¶ 2). Moreover, Plaintiff

properly incorporated by reference all the facts that were presented in Count I (id. ¶ 3).

Count II therefore concerns not only the allegations of a secret board but, more importantly,

the sentence in VCU imposed on Plaintiff by this board in violation of his due process rights;

specifically lack of any notice of charges, a hearing, or a disciplinary report (id. at 5, 8, 10).

Plaintiff’s complaint in the inmate letter about the lack of a disciplinary report and his

reference to the disciplinary policy were sufficient to put prison officials on notice of a

potential claim related to procedural due process violations (Doc. #15, Ex. B). Plaintiff’s

failure to specifically use the words “secret board” does not defeat his due process claim in

Count II. Further, the CO III’s failure to address the complaint about the absent disciplinary

report cannot result in a finding of nonexhaustion. It was reasonable for Plaintiff to conclude

that there were no available remedies for his claim concerning due process after he was

informed that VCU placement was not grievable. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 935 (holding that

“a prisoner need not press on to exhaust further levels of review once he has either received

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all ‘available’ remedies at an intermediate level of review or been reliably informed by an

administrator that no remedies are available”); see also Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113

(3d Cir. 2002) (holding that if prison officials informed the prisoner that he could not grieve

an issue, the formal grievance proceeding was never available); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d

736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (“a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is

not an ‘available’ remedy under § 1997e(a)”).

In sum, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that after the

CO III’s response to Plaintiff’s inmate letter, Plaintiff had any available administrative

remedies for his claim in Count II. The Motion to Dismiss Count II will therefore be denied.

The Motion for Enlargement to File a Responsive Pleading, however, will be granted.

Defendants will be provided 20 days in which to submit an answer to Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II (Doc. #15) is denied.

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Enlargement to File Responsive Pleading (Doc. #15) is

granted.

(3) Defendants must file an answer to Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s First Amendment

Complaint within 20 days from the date of this Order.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2007.

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