Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03551/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03551-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kyler Allen Bounds, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-3551-PHX-MHM (ECV)

ORDER

On November 4, 2005 Plaintiff Kyler Allen Bounds, confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Winslow, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On June 21, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint

on July 20, 2006 (Doc. # 9), which he designated as an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six

Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because the First Amended

Complaint raises claims against state actors, the Court will construe the First Amended

Complaint as filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will order Defendant Arpaio to

answer Counts I and III of the First Amended Complaint. The Court will not dismiss the

First Amended Complaint as to the John Doe identified in Count I but will not order service

on him at this time. The Court will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendant. 

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I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

II. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff names Joseph Arpaio and John and Jane Doe as Defendants. He raises nine

counts in his First Amended Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that he was slammed

against a wall by an unidentified detention officer. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that he was

cuffed and shackled tightly, and when he complained, an unidentified officer pulled the cuffs

up as tightly as possible and said “is that better?” In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that he was

housed in a jail where he had to sleep on the floor and where the temperature was too cold

in the winter and too hot in the summer. Count IV alleges that Plaintiff was subjected to

overcrowding. Count V alleges that Plaintiff caught a staph infection while in jail. Count

VI alleges that Plaintiff’s “store” was eaten by mice and rats. Count VII alleges that his

personal property was taken and lost. Count VIII also alleges loss of property. Count IX

alleges verbal abuse by female officers while Plaintiff is in the shower. 

For relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages.

III. Failure to State a Claim

A. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges use of excessive force by a detention officer. Prison

officials violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive physical force.

However, a plaintiff only alleges a constitutional violation if the injury is more than de

minimis. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992). The injury suffered by the inmate

need not rise to the level of objective seriousness required by other Eighth Amendment

claims, but it must be something more than de minimis. Id. at 9. Not every use of physical

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force violates the Eighth Amendment. Every malevolent touch by a prison guard does not

constitute a federal cause of action. Id.

The only use of force alleged in Count II is Defendant John Doe handcuffing Plaintiff

and pulling on the handcuffs. Such conduct is a de minimis injury and fails to state a claim.

B. Counts IV- VIII

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the

injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

To state a claim against a supervisory official, the civil rights complainant must allege that

the supervisory official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that the

supervisory official was aware of widespread abuses and, with deliberate indifference to the

inmate’s constitutional rights, failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. See Ortez

v. Washington County, Or., 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Monell v.

New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and, therefore, a defendant’s position as the

supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose

liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Plaintiff was advised of this requirement in the Court’s Order dated June 19, 2006.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff again fails to connect the allegations in Counts IV though VIII to

Defendant Arpaio. Plaintiff does not allege that Arpaio personally participated in the

constitutional deprivation or that he was aware of widespread abuses and, with deliberate

indifference to the inmate’s constitutional rights, failed to take action to prevent further

misconduct, or that he formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. 

In addition, Count V alleges only that Plaintiff developed a staph infection. Although

pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), conclusory

and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Likewise, Counts VII and VIII,

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which allege loss of property, do not state claims. Where the negligent conduct of a prison

official causes the loss of a prisoner’s property, the loss does not amount to a deprivation

under the Due Process Clause. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 329, 331-332 (1986)

(overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), “to the extent that it states that mere lack

of due care by a state official may ‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty, or property under

the Fourteenth Amendment.”). “[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a

negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property.”

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (emphasis in original). Allegations of lost or misplaced property fail

to state a claim under the Due Process Clause and so do not state claims under § 1983.

For the reasons stated above, Counts IV through VIII fail to state claims and will be

dismissed.

C. Count IX

Plaintiff alleges that female guards see him using the shower and male and female

guards subject him to sexual verbal abuse. In Somers v. Thurman, the Ninth Circuit held that

an inmate did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment when he alleged that female

guards conducted body-cavity searches, saw him naked in the shower, and pointed and joked

among themselves. 109 F.3d 614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1997). When an inmate raises an Eighth

Amendment claim, a court must determine (1) if the officials acted with a sufficiently

culpable state of mind and (2) if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to

establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 622 citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. at 8. In

Somers, the court reasoned that the inmate had failed the subjective component of the

McMillan analysis because he did not allege that the guards intended to humiliate him and

had failed the objective component because “the exchange of verbal insults between inmates

and guards is a constant, daily ritual observed in the nation’s prisons.” Somers, 109 F.3d at

622 (citations omitted). 

 Here, even assuming that the allegations of verbal abuse of a “sexual nature” meet the

subjective component of McMillan, the conduct alleged, although offensive, is not

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objectively harmful enough to be a constitutional violation. Thus, the allegations in Count

IX fail to state a claim and will be dismissed.

IV. Claims For Which An Answer Will be Required

Liberally construed, Counts I and III state claims against Defendant Arpaio, and the

Court will require him to answer these Counts. Count I also states a claim against the

unidentified detention officer, John Doe. The Court will not order service at this time on

Defendant John Doe because, as a practical matter, it is in most instances impossible for the

United States Marshal to serve a summons and complaint upon an unidentified defendant.

If Plaintiff is able to determine the identity of this Defendant, he should amend his First

Amended Complaint to name him. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, a party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time

before a responsive pleading is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading

only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.

V. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address 10 days before the move

is effective, if practicable. See LRCiv 83.3(d). Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must be accompanied by

a certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff

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must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. LRCiv 5.4. The Court

may strike any filing that fails to comply with these requirements.

D. Possible Dismissal

Plaintiff is warned that failure to timely comply with every provision of this Order,

including these warnings, may result in dismissal of this action without further notice. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an

action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Count II and Counts IV through IX and Defendant Jane Doe are dismissed without

prejudice.

(2) Defendant Arpaio must answer Counts I and III. 

(3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First

Amended Complaint (Doc. #9), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms

for Defendant Arpaio.

(4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court within

20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or complete

service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of

the filing of the complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First Amended

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of this

action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

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waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and

this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure;

(b) Within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process

receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against

the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First Amended

Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the

Plaintiff.

(9) Defendant must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(10) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 11th day of September, 2006.

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