Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00736/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00736-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE

BISHOP COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP

COLONY, CALIFORNIA, a federally

recognized Indian tribe,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a

California municipal

corporation, 

 Defendant.

1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 61)

I. INTRODUCTION

The Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of The

Bishop Colony, California (the “Tribe” or “Plaintiff”) bring this

suit in ejectment to reclaim land in the Owens Valley that was

transferred in 1941 by agents of the United States (purportedly

acting in the name of the Tribe) to the City of Los Angeles. The

Tribe alleges, generally, that the conditions imposed by Congress

on this transfer, set forth in a 1937 Act, 50 Stat. 70, were not

satisfied, rendering the purported transfer null and void. The

City of Los Angeles moves to dismiss on the ground that the

United States is an indispensable party that cannot be joined,

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 19(b), and for failure to state a claim, Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 61, filed July 29, 2006.)

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Tribe has resided in what is now known as the Owens

Valley from “time immemorial.” (Compl. at ¶7.) In the late

1850s, non-Indian settlers took possession of the Tribe’s

aboriginal lands. (Id.) From 1909 to 1924, through purchase and

executive order, the United States acquired and set aside five

tracts of land, totaling approximately 1,030 acres, for the Tribe 

(the “Bishop Tribal Lands”). (Id. at ¶8.)

In 1937, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior

to exchange land and water rights in the Owens Valley held by the

United States in trust for the Tribe, for land and water rights

owned by the City. Act of April 20, 1937, 50 Stat. 70 (“the Act”

or “the 1937 Act”).

An Act

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to exchange

certain lands and water rights in Inyo and Mono

Counties, California, with the city of Los Angeles and

for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in

Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Interior

be, and he is hereby authorized, in his discretion to

accept title of behalf of the United States to lands

and water rights now owned and held by the city of Los

Angeles in the counties of Inyo and Mono, State of

California, if, in his judgment, the interests of the

Indians in said counties will be benefitted thereby;

and in consideration therefor the said Secretary may

issue a patent or patents to the said city of Los

Angeles for lands, water rights, and buildings now held

by the United States for the benefit of the Indians,

provided that the lands, water rights, and buildings

covered by the patent, or patents shall not exceed in

value the lands and water rights conveyed by the said

city of Los Angeles to the United States: Provided,

That the said Secretary may reserve the minerals of the

lands conveyed to the said city and the said Secretary

is authorized to accept conveyance by the said city of

the lands and water rights, subject to a similar

reservation in the city of the minerals of such lands,

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and in determining the relative value of the lands and

water rights to be exchanged, consideration shall be

given to any reservation made by either or both parties

of any minerals or easements in the lands that may be

exchanged.

Sec. 2. No allotted or other lands covered by trust

patent or other instrument containing restriction

against alienation by the allottee shall be involved in

any such exchange except with the consent of the

allottees or their heirs. Any such allottees or their

heirs are hereby authorized to relinquish to the United

States any lands covered by such patents or other

instruments and accept in lieu thereof assignments of

land within the new Indian reservations which are

hereby authorized to be established by the Secretary of

the Interior, out of any lands accepted by him pursuant

to section 1 hereof: Provided, That any such Indian may

receive an area of equal value to the area relinquished

should any of the lands accepted by the said Secretary

be outside of the boundaries of the new reservations. 

Sec 3. No tribal lands shall be involved in any such

exchange except with the consent of a majority of the

adult Indians entitled to the use thereof. All lands

acquired pursuant to the Act, other than land to which

title may be held by or in trust for individual

Indians, shall be held by the United States in trust

for the Indian tribe, band, or group concerned. 

Id.

In October 1937, Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) agents

conducted a house-to-house canvass, gathering 211 signatures of

adult Indians residing in the Owens Valley. (Compl. at ¶10.) 

The Tribe alleges that BIA Agents used the house-to-house

approach because they wanted to obtain consent “in as quiet and

unobtrusive a manner as possible,” in order to avoid the

“vigorous opposition” that would be expressed in a general

meeting of the Indians of the Owens Valley. (Id. at ¶11.) The

Tribe alleges that the house-to-house canvass occurred prior to

finalization of the terms of the exchange. (Id. at ¶12.) Of the

211 signatures obtained, 187 were on blank pieces of paper. (Id.

at ¶12.) Plaintiff alleges that the remaining 24 signatures were

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Among the 3,126 acres of Indian trust land to be 1

conveyed to the City, the approximately 1,030 acres of Bishop

Tribal Lands are the subject of this lawsuit.

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on pieces of paper bearing a “grossly insufficient description of

the exchange to which the signatures were being asked to

consent.” (Id. at ¶13.) Finally, the Tribe alleges that the BIA

ignored the existence of “distinct tribal groups with distinct

possessory rights to each of the tracts proposed to be

exchanged.” (Id. at ¶15.)

On May 18, 1938, the City and agents of the Department of

the Interior executed an agreement (the “Exchange Agreement”)

providing for the conveyance by the United States to the City of

approximately 3,126 acres of federal Indian trust land in the

Owens Valley, in exchange for the conveyance by the City to the

United States of approximately 1,511 acres in the Owens Valley. 

Among the tracts to be conveyed to the City by the United States

were the Bishop Tribal Lands. (Id. at ¶16.)

The Exchange Agreement describes various reasons why the

transaction purportedly benefits all parties, including the

Tribe. According to the historical preamble, prior to the

exchange, the United States held in trust for the tribe 3,1261

acres of land that was “rough and rocky and of poor soil

fertility.” (Exchange Agreement at ¶21, Ex. 5 to Plaintiff’s

Request for Judicial Notice (“PRJN”), Doc. 63.) Along with this

acreage, the United States held in trust for the Tribe a right to

receive a total of 2279.35 acre feet of water per year, by virtue

of the United States’ ownership of stock in the Owens River Canal

Company and other canal companies. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 16.) The

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Exchange Agreement also memorializes the City’s belief that to

continue to deliver this 2279.35 acre feet of water to the

initial 3126 acres of land via the existing system of ditches and

canals would result in relatively large transportation losses. 

The City estimated that approximately 8454 acre feet of water per

year was lost as a result of seepage, evaporation, and losses

resulting from the “necessarily decreased volume and velocity of

the water carried.” (Id. at ¶¶ 13-16.) The City recognized that

approximately 3766.57 acre feet of this 8454 acre feet per year

transportation loss was “chargeable to the water right belonging

to the United States.” (Id. at ¶16.) The parties agreed that it

would be mutually advantageous to avoid these transportation

losses and to share the salvaged water:

It is considered to the mutual advantage of the City

and the United States that said transportation losses

be avoided and that the waters heretofore lost be

salvaged and conserved and that each of the parties

hereto shall receive its proportional share of such

waters so salvaged and conserved....

(Id. at ¶17.) In order to accomplish this, the City agreed to

transfer 1511.48 acre feet of higher quality land to the United

States, to be used by the Tribe. The Exchange Agreement states

that the new lands “are much more valuable for agricultural

purposes by reason of the topography and soil fertility” than the

old parcels. In sum, the parties agreed that the new lands,

irrigated with the water right appurtenant to the old lands

(including the United States share of the salvaged water,

amounting to 3766.57 acre feet of water), would be more

productive than the status quo ante:

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Whereas, both parties hereto, after careful study,

consider the said 1511.48 acres of land are of value

equal to the value of the said 3126 acres of land, and

it is further considered that it would be very much to

the advantage of the Indians to have the exchange of

the aforesaid lands consummated by reason of the fact

that the water appurtenant to the said 3126 acres of

land if delivered to said 1511.48 acres of land will

make it possible to irrigate more acres of land and

produce more crops than has been possible in the past

by delivering the amount of water available under said

water right to the Indian lands to which it is now

appurtenant, and that said advantage and economy in the

use of water can be brought about by reason of the fact

that transportation losses can be eliminated if the

water be delivered to the aforesaid 1511.48 acres

instead of the said Indian lands to which it is now

appurtenant.

Whereas, if said exchange of lands be made and the

water rights appurtenant to the Indian lands

transferred to the said 1511.48 acres of land to be

conveyed to the United States by the City, pursuant

hereto, there will not only be a saving as aforesaid to

the United States and to the said Indians of about

3766.57 acre feet of water per annum but an actual

saving to the City of about 4687.43 acre feet of water

per annum;

(Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) 

Among other things, the Exchange Agreement provided for a

reservation by each party of all water rights appurtenant to the

exchanged land. (Compl. at ¶18.) The Tribe alleges that this

was done to “avoid delay and the risk of rejection of the

Exchange Agreement by the City’s voters, whose approval was

required by the City’s charter for the sale or exchange of any

water rights owned by the city.” (Id.) Article XXII, Section

219 of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles provides:

The City shall not sell, lease or otherwise dispose of

its rights in the waters of said Los Angeles River, in

whole or in part. No other water or water right, now

or hereafter owned or controlled by the City, shall

ever be sold, leased or disposed of, in whole or in

part without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified

voters of the City voting on the proposition at a

general or special election, at which such proposition

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shall be lawfully submitted, and no water shall ever be

sold, supplied, or distributed to any person or

corporation other than municipal for resale, rental or

disposal to consumers or other persons.

(emphasis added).

The Tribe alleges that “[t]he appraisals of the lands

exchanged by the City and the United States upon which the

Exchange agreement was based did not include the value of

appurtenant water rights, making it impossible to determine, as

required by the Act, that the properties conveyed to the City by

the United States did not exceed in value the properties received

by the City.” (Compl. at ¶19.)

The Tribe also alleges that neither the Tribe nor its

members were asked to approve the final terms of the Agreement. 

(Id. at ¶17.) In July 1941, the United States executed a deed

purporting to convey to the City the tracts of lands that were

the subject of the Exchange Agreement, including the Bishop

Tribal lands, without water rights. (Ex. 5 to Defendant’s

Request for Judicial Notice, Docs. 55-58.) 

The Tribe maintains that “[b]ecause the conditions mandated

by Congress in the Act for conveyance of the Bishop Tribal Lands

were not satisfied, the purported transfer of those lands by the

United States to the City was null and void.” (Compl. at ¶23.)

The Tribe also asserts that some aspects of the legislative

history from the 1937 Act shed light on the legality of the

Exchange Agreement and its implementation. First, both the

Senate and House Reports associated with the bill consist in

their entirety of a letter from the Secretary of the Interior to

the Speaker of the House of Representatives, stating:

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The city of Los Angeles has, over a period of years,

acquired practically all of the lands in the Owens

Valley in order to protect the watershed of the city’s

water supply. On account of such purchases,

practically all private industry has been removed from

the valley, thus leaving most of the Indians located

there without adequate lands or any source of income. 

For this reason, representatives of the Department [of

the Interior] and the authorities of the City of Los

Angeles have been endeavoring for a number of years to

make some arrangements to provide lands of a desirable

character for these Indians. 

The Government owns various tracts in the valley that

have been acquired for Indian purposes at various

tracts. Although these lands are being used to a

limited extent by the Indians, most of them are not

suitable for Indian colonization. On the other hand,

the city now owns the best lands in the valley,

including water rights, among which are certain tracts

that are extremely desirable for Indian use. With a

view to meeting this long standing Indian problem, the

city authorities have expressed their willingness to

exchange some of their lands that we believe ideal for

Indian home sites for the present Government-owned

tracts in the valley. The present tentative plans for

exchange would involve our trading approximately 3,800

acres, which have been appraised at $73,489, for 1,470

acres belonging to the city, all of which city land

carries with it water rights, as determined by our

irrigation engineers, sufficient to meet all water

requirements for agricultural and domestic purposes. 

Because of the desirable water rights attached to the

lands, the tracts offered by the city are recognized as

being fully as valuable as the present Indian lands. 

In fact, from an Indian-use standpoint, their value is

considerably higher. However, we wish to point out

here that the proposed draft of bill would authorize an

exchange only in the discretion of the Secretary of the

Interior, and that the consent of a majority of the

Indians involved also would have to be obtained. 

Therefore, no exchange would be consummated unless it

were clearly apparent that the Government would receive

full value for any land conveyed to the city of Los

Angeles, and the Indians themselves approved the

transaction. 

It appears from recent investigations that there are

approximately 181 Indian families, comprising of 524

individuals, located in the Owens Valley. The attitude

of these Indians toward the proposed exchange is

favorable. The question of removal of the Indians from

the valley to some other point has been given

consideration, but due to their strenuous objections

and the difficulty in locating lands that will meet

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their needs in localities offering opportunities for

employment and other homes in the valley for these

Indians where they can be rehabilitated and become more

or less self-supporting. 

The bill permits the reservation of minerals underlying

the lands involved to the United States and the city of

Los Angeles, respectively.

There are enclosed copies of reports and maps showing a

graphic picture of the Owens Valley problems and the

lands involved in the proposed exchange. 

In view of the foregoing, I recommend that the enclosed

draft of bill be given favorable consideration. 

***

Charles West, 

Acting Secretary of the Interior. 

S.R. 278, Inyo and Mono Counties, Calif. – Exchange of Lands,

75th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 365, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (PRJN

Exs. 1-2, Doc. 63.)

Next, the tribe cites a Letter from Frederic L. Kirgis,

Acting Solicitor, to the Secretary of the Interior, which

addresses the question of whether the lands may be alienated

without water rights.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You have presented for my consideration and opinion

several questions raised by the Office of Indian

Affairs in connection with the proposed land and water

rights exchanges between the Government and the City of

Los Angeles, California, authorized to be made by the

act of April 20, 1937, Public No. 43, 75th Congress. 

These questions are substantially as follows: 

1. Under the act may lands alone be exchanged? If

so, in lieu of exchanging water rights as

authorized by the act, can the Government and the

city contract with respect to the water rights,

providing thereby that the city shall furnish

water to the Indians concerns and that the United

States shall, for the benefit of the city, forbear

to use the water rights retained by it?

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***

In answer to the first question, it is my opinion that

the act permits the exchange of lands alone....

The authority is to accept title to “lands and water

rights” and in exchange therefor to patent “lands,

water rights, and buildings.” But the word “and” as

used here is often construed in the coordinate sense. 

Hensel, Bruckman & Lorbacher v. United States, 126 Fed.

576; Robson v. Cantwell et al. 141 S.E. 180 (S.C.). 

The present case is one where such a construction

appears proper for there is no indication that Congress

intended to permit exchanges only of lands together

with water rights. The only limitation on the broad

discretionary authority given to the Secretary to

effect exchanges is that there shall be an equivalence

of values. This, of course, can be accomplished

without construing the act as requiring an exchange of

both lands and water rights. There is immediately

suggested a question of the validity of the severance

of water rights from lands. That this can be

accomplished by conveyance under the water law of

California seems to be true, but this question need not

be determined now. It is rather a question of the

sufficiency of title to be considered whenever in a

particular exchange such a severance is contemplated. 

It is my opinion, in answer to the second question

under part I of this opinion, that there is no

authority in the Secretary to contract with the City of

Los Angeles for the use and delivery of water. 

The act authorizes the Secretary “to accept title

...to...water rights” and in consideration therefor to

issue “a patent or patents...for lands, water rights,

and buildings.” There is no other authority in the act

to deal with water rights. In the absence of such

other authority, whether the proposed agreement is

authorized by the act turns, therefore, on whether by

the proposed agreement title to the water rights will

pass to the Government. Obviously, an agreement by the

city to furnish water contemplates the retention of

title by city and the absence of title thereto in the

United Sates. This is not contemplated by the act. 

The suggestion of the contract in lieu of a transfer of

title is made because a conveyance of water rights by

the city can be made only after securing the approval

of two-thirds of the city voters at an election. This

procedure, it is believed, will unduly delay

consummation of the exchanges. But the desired result

of immediate use of the water rights can be

accomplished despite this. Thus, a contract can be

entered into relating to the use of the water rights

pending the conveyance thereof, the contract to provide

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that a conveyance shall be made in the manner

authorized by law within some agreed time, and that the

contract shall terminate on the failure to so convey.

Such a contract can be made, in my option, for it is

properly but an integral step in the transfer of title

within the purview of the act. 

(PRJN Ex 3, Doc. 63 (emphasis added).) The Tribe seeks ejectment

of the City from the Bishop Tribal Lands. (Compl. at 6.) 

The tribe does not request rescission of the exchange

agreement, nor do they offer to relinquish their title in the

lands previously owned by the City. Rather, the complaint, on

its face, seeks only ejectment of the City from the Bishop Tribal

lands. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it

“appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of

facts to support its claims.” Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.,

452 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, dismissal

can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory. SmileCare

Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F3d 780, 783

(9th Cir. 1996). In evaluating such a motion “[a]ll allegations

and reasonable inferences are taken as true, and the allegations

are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, but conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” 

Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046. 

//

//

//

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Requests for Judicial Notice.

1. Defendant’s Requests.

The City requests that the court take judicial notice of the

following.

(1) The complaint in this case. 

(2) A copy of the 1938 Agreement between the United

States and the City of Los Angeles, referenced in

the Complaint.

(3) A copy of Section 219 of the Charter of the City

of Los Angeles, adopted 1925, and referenced in

Paragraph 18 of the Complaint. 

(4) A copy of the April 20, 1937 Act of Congress, 50

Stat. 114.

(5) A copy of the 1941 patent from the United States

to the City of Los Angeles, conveying certain Inyo

County, California lands reference in the

complaint. 

It is not necessary to take judicial notice of the Complaint

or of the April 20, 1037 Act of Congress. Both may be referenced

by the parties as a matter of course. 

The remaining documents are judicially noticeable public

records. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Moreover, the 1938 agreement

between the United States and the City and the 1941 patent from

the United States to the City are otherwise admissible on a

motion to dismiss under the “incorporation by reference

doctrine,” whereby a district court may consider documents “whose

contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

[plaintiff's] pleading.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076

(9th Cir. 2005). 

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2. Plaintiff’s Requests.

The Tribe requests that judicial notice be taken of 

(1) Senate Report No. 278 regarding the 1937 Act.

(2) House Report No. 365 regarding the 1937 Act. 

(3) Two copies of a 1937 Solicitors opinion to the

Secretary of the Interior, one obtained from the

National Archives and the second from a

compilation of Department of the Interior's

Solicitor's Opinions.

(4) A copy of a September 23, 1937 letter from the

Bureau of Indian Affairs Agency Superintendent to

Commissioner John Collier obtained from federal

records at the Pacific National Archives in San

Bruno, California.

(5) A complete copy of the 1938 Agreement between the

United States and the City of Los Angeles from the

National Archives. 

All of these documents are public records the accuracy of

which cannot be reasonably questioned. Accordingly, they are

judicially noticeable. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Moreover, as

discussed, the Exchange Agreement is admissible under the

incorporation by reference doctrine.

B. Legal Background.

The starting point for analysis of the claims in this case

is the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, which prohibits

alienation of any land from any Indian tribe without the consent

of the United States Congress:

No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of

lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any

Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any

validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by

treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the

Constitution. Every person who, not being employed

under the authority of the United States, attempts to

negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or

indirectly, or to treat with any such nation or tribe

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of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands by

them held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000.

The agent of any State who may be present at any treaty

held with Indians under the authority of the United

States, in the presence and with the approbation of the

commissioner of the United States appointed to hold the

same, may, however, propose to, and adjust with, the

Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to

lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by

treaty.

(emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court held in Oneida

County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S.

226 (1985)(Oneida II), that the Nonintercourse act “merely

codified the principle that a sovereign act was required to

extinguish aboriginal title and thus that a conveyance without

the sovereign's consent was void ab initio.” Id. at 246. 

In Oneida II, the Onedia Indian Nation brought a claim for

damages against two counties in upstate New York, seeking

compensation for the fair rental value of land presently owned

and occupied by the counties. The Oneida alleged that their

ancestors once possessed the disputed lands as tribal holdings,

but conveyed the lands to New York State under a 1795 agreement

that violated the Nonintercourse Act of 1793. The Supreme Court

held that Indian tribes have a federal common-law right to

“vindicate their aboriginal rights” by way of a suit to enforce

their aboriginal land rights. 470 U.S. at 236. The right to

bring such an action is not pre-empted by the Nonintercourse Act

itself, nor is such a suit barred by the state statute of

limitations, as this would run contrary to legislative intent of

the Nonintercourse Act. Id. at 237-44. The Oneida II court

declined, however, to rule on the application of the defense of

laches to such a claim, because the trial court ruled against the

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defendant counties on that issue and the counties did not

reassert the defense on appeal. Id. at 244-45. Finally, Oneida

II reiterated the well established cannon of construction

applicable in Indian law that “treaties should be construed

liberally in favor of the Indians.” Id. at 147 (citing Choctaw

Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1985)); see also Montana

v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (applying

the same canon to statutes). 

1. State Law Versus Federal Common Law.

The Tribe seeks to eject the City from the lands transferred

to the City by the United States pursuant to the Exchange

Agreement. The Tribe cites California law for the proposition

that “[t]he elements of an action for ejectment are possession of

land by another and evidence of plaintiff’s title or other right

to the land at issue.” (Doc. 62 at 3.) But, under Oneida II,

the claim the Tribe seeks to bring arose under federal common

law, not state law. Oneida II found that the Oneida Nation could

bring a federal common law right of action to enforce the terms

of the Nonintercourse Act, notwithstanding the state statute of

limitations which conflicted with the Congressional purpose of

the Act. 

Here, whether this claim is premised upon the 1937 Act or

the Nonintercourse Act or a combination of both, the source of

the Tribe’s ejectment claim is federal not state law. (It is for

this reason alone that the state statute of limitations does not

bar this action.) Accordingly, the appropriate source for the

elements of ejectment is federal common law. The Second Circuit

held that a federal complaint in ejectment should allege that the

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plaintiff is the owner of the land and that the defendant

wrongfully ousted the plaintiff from possession.” New York v.

The County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983), modified on

other grounds and aff'd, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 

2. Equitable Versus Legal and the Sherrill case.

The City argues that the Tribe’s demand for ejectment is an

equitable claim. Accordingly, the City advances the “common

maxim of jurisprudence that he who seeks equity must do equity,”

Manufacturers Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442 (1935), arguing

that the Tribe’s claim should be barred because the Tribe

“continues to occupy the reservation land created from the City’s

land” and has expressed no intention of returning that land to

the possession of the City. 

The Tribe rejoins that ejectment is a legal, not an

equitable, remedy, so their claim is not subject to the equitable

defenses such as the clean hands doctrine. 

Although the Tribe is technically correct that ejectment is

a legal claim, the distinction between law and equity has been

blurred significantly in the context of Indian claims for

ejectment. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d

266, 275 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005)(noting that although ejectment “has

traditionally been considered an action at law, numerous

jurisdictions have recognized the applicability of equitable

defenses, including laches, in an action for ejectment based on a

claim of legal title or prior possession, regardless of whether

damages or an order of possession was sought”). Although the

Supreme court declined to decide whether laches could bar a claim

for damages in Oneida II, the Court did take up the issue in

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Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S.

197 (2005). There, the Court applied the equitable principles of

laches, acquiescence, and impossibility to the Oneida’s claim

that its open-market purchases of specific parcels of land once

contained within the boundaries of the tribe’s former reservation

reinstated aboriginal title so that the tribe could assert

sovereignty over the purchased lands and avoid paying city

property taxes. Id. at 213-221.

In Sherrill, New York State had governed the disputed lands

continuously for more than two hundred years. The Supreme Court

reasoned that:

The appropriateness of the relief [the Oneida Indian

Nation] here seeks must be evaluated in light of the

long history of state sovereign control over the

territory. From the early 1800's into the 1970's, the

United States largely accepted, or was indifferent to,

New York's governance of the land in question and the

validity vel non of the Oneidas' sales to the State. 

In fact, the United States' policy and practice through

much of the early 19th century was designed to dislodge

east coast lands from Indian possession. Moreover, the

properties here involved have greatly increased in

value since the Oneidas sold them 200 years ago.

Notably, it was not until lately that the Oneidas

sought to regain ancient sovereignty over land

converted from wilderness to become part of cities like

Sherrill. 

Id. at 214 (citations omitted). 

Citing numerous examples, Sherrill recognized the

applicability of the doctrine of laches, finding that “[t]he

principle that the passage of time can preclude relief has deep

roots in our law, and this Court has recognized this prescription

in various guises.” Id. at 217. 

It is well established that laches, a doctrine focused

on one side's inaction and the other's legitimate

reliance, may bar long-dormant claims for equitable

relief....This Court applied the doctrine of laches in

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Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892), to bar the heirs

of an Indian from establishing a constructive trust

over land their Indian ancestor had conveyed in

violation of a statutory restriction. In the nearly

three decades between the conveyance and the lawsuit, 

“[a] large part of the tract ha[d] been platted and

recorded as an addition to the city of Omaha, and...

sold to purchasers.” Id., at 326. “[A]s the case

stands at present,” the Court observed, “justice

requires only what the law ··· would demand-the

repayment of the value of the [illegally conveyed]

scrip.” Id., at 334. The Court also recognized the

disproportion between the value of the scrip issued to

the Indian ($150) and the value of the property the

heirs sought to acquire (over $1 million). Id., at 333. 

The sort of changes to the value and character of the

land noted by the Felix Court are present in even

greater magnitude in this suit....

Id. at 217-18 (select internal citations and parallel citations

omitted). 

Sherrill also applied the doctrine of impracticability. 

[T]his Court has recognized the impracticability of

returning to Indian control land that generations

earlier passed into numerous private hands. See Yankton

Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357 (1926)

(“It is impossible...to rescind the cession and restore

the Indians to their former rights because the lands

have been opened to settlement and large portions of

them are now in the possession of innumerable innocent

purchasers....”)...The District Court, in the

litigation dormant during the pendency of Oneida II,

rightly found these pragmatic concerns about restoring

Indian sovereign control over land “magnified

exponentially here, where development of every type

imaginable has been ongoing for more than two

centuries.” Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 199 F.R.D.,

at 92. 

Id. at 219 (internal citations omitted).

The Sherrill court then applied the impossibility doctrine

to the facts presented, rejecting the Second Circuit’s conclusion

that impossibility had no application because the Oneida acquired 

the land in the open market and did not seek to uproot any

property owners. Rather, the Sherrill Court found that “the

unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign

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Sherrill specifically held that because “the question 2

of damages for the Tribe's ancient dispossession is not at issue

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control, even over land purchased at the market price, would have

disruptive practical consequences similar to those that led this

Court in Yankton Sioux [v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357

(1926)] to initiate the impossibility doctrine.” Id. at 219. 

The city of Sherrill and Oneida County are today

overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians. A checkerboard

of alternating state and tribal jurisdiction in New

York State-created unilaterally at OIN's behest-would

seriously burden the administration of state and local

governments and would adversely affect landowners

neighboring the tribal patches. If OIN may unilaterally

reassert sovereign control and remove these parcels

from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the

Tribe from initiating a new generation of litigation to

free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory

controls that protect all landowners in the area.

Id. at 219-220. Sherrill further noted that Congress provided a

mechanism for tribal communities to acquire lands that

“[r]ecogniz[es] these practical concerns,” by “tak[ing] account

of the interests of others with stakes in the area's governance

and well being.” 

Title 25 U.S.C. § 465 authorizes the Secretary of the

Interior to acquire land in trust for Indians and

provides that the land “shall be exempt from State and

local taxation.” The regulations implementing § 465

are sensitive to the complex interjurisdictional

concerns that arise when a tribe seeks to regain

sovereign control over territory. Before approving an

acquisition, the Secretary must consider, among other

things, the tribe's need for additional land; “[t]he

purposes for which the land will be used”; “the impact

on the State and its political subdivisions resulting

from the removal of the land from the tax rolls”; and

“[j]urisdictional problems and potential conflicts of

land use which may arise.” 25 CFR § 151.10 (2004).

Section 465 provides the proper avenue for OIN to

reestablish sovereign authority over territory last

held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.

Id. at 220-21.2

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in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in

Oneida II.” 544 U.S. at 221. Here, however, the remedy sought

is ejectment, not damages, so Sherrill controls. 

The motion to strike was originally set for separate 3

hearing, but because it is closely related to the instant motion

to dismiss, the court ordered that both motions be heard together

on the original hearing date set for the motion to dismiss. 

(Doc. 68.) 

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3. The City’s Laches Argument and The Tribe’s Motion

to Strike.

The City argues for the first time in its reply brief that

“the Tribe’s sixty-five years of inaction on its claim of

sovereignty and the [C]ity’s reliance on the exchange agreement

with the United States bars this action.” (Doc. 64 at 3.) 

Citing Sherrill, the City maintains:

[T]he Tribe here has waited more than 65 years before

challenging the City’s right to occupy the land it

acquired by exchange in 1941, much to the detriment of

Los Angeles. The former reservation lands patented to

Los Angeles 65 years ago have been under the control of

the State of California, the County of Inyo and the

City since that time.

(Id.)

The Tribe moves to strike “Defendant’s untimely argument,”

arguing that the City in its reply brief “raises for the first

time the claim that the equitable defense of laches requires

dismissal of the complaint in this action under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).” (Doc. 67.) The City filed an opposition to the 3

motion to strike. (Doc. 68.)

The Tribe is correct that this argument was not raised in

the City’s opening brief. (Doc. 61) The tribe requests either

that the argument be ignored or that they be afforded an

opportunity to respond. Under certain circumstances, one of

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The only twentieth or twenty-first century case cited 4

by the City in support of its Laches argument, Sherrill, 544 U.S.

at 226, was decided on summary judgment.

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those two approaches might be appropriate. Here, however,

because the issue of laches raises significant questions of fact

that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss, it is most

efficient to deny they City’s motion to dismiss on the ground of

laches, without prejudice to its renewal. See e.g., New York v.

Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 (E.D.N.Y.

2005)(recognizing that the question of whether a particular set

of facts presents a “disruptive” claim barred by Sherrill

involves “factual and legal determinations which may only be

resolved at a trial”).4

C. Is the United States an Indispensible Party?

The City argues that the United States must be found an

indispensable party to this lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 19(b). Assuming this to be the case, the City

maintains that any such claim for ejectment brought against the

United States by the Tribe is barred by the statute of

limitations set forth in the Indian Claims Commission Act, 12

Stat. 765. Finally, the City argues that because the United

States is an indispensable party and no claim can be maintained

against the United States, the entire case must be dismissed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b).

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Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly 5

codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-2 (1976), but

omitted from current Code because the Indian Claims Commission

terminated on September 30, 1978).

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1. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d

1455 (10th Cir. 1987).

The City relies principally on Navajo Tribe of Indians v.

New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987), in support of

dismissal. In that case, the Navajo asserted that the United

States improperly transferred tribal lands to the State of New

Mexico and several individuals. The United States, New Mexico,

and the individual grantees were named as defendants. The Tenth

Circuit found that the Navajo’s claim against the United States

was barred because it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Indian Claims Commission (“ICC”) and was barred by the

applicable statute of limitations contained within the Indian

Claims Commission Act (“ICCA”). 

Navajo Tribe succinctly summarizes the history of the ICCA5

and its general operation:

Until 1946, Indian tribes could not litigate claims

against the United States unless they obtained specific

permission from Congress. Although the Court of Claims

was created nearly a century before to hear claims

against the United States, Congress excluded from the

court's jurisdiction Indian claims based on treaties.

Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767.

Sovereign immunity barred litigation of non-treaty

claims. Year after year, tribes petitioned Congress for

special jurisdictional acts authorizing the Court of

Claims to hear their grievances against the United

States; yet few of them succeeded. For those who did

succeed, the process was costly, burdensome, and

time-consuming.

In 1928, this piecemeal scheme of resolving Indian

claims against the Government was severely criticized

in the Meriam Report, an independent study conducted by

the Institute for Government Research.FN10 The Meriam

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Report recommended the establishment of an independent,

fact-finding commission to facilitate the judicial

solution of outstanding Indian claims against the

United States. After studying various proposals,

Congress finally enacted the Indian Claims Commission

Act in 1946, creating a quasi-judicial body to hear and

determine all tribal claims against the United States

that accrued before August 13, 1946.

The ICCA confined the Commission's jurisdiction to

tribal claims that accrued before its 1946 enactment,

while it conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims

to adjudicate any tribal claim accruing after 1946 that

would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the

claimant were not an Indian tribe. ICCA § 24, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1505 (1982).

Congress also limited the period for filing tribal

claims with the Indian Claims Commission to five years.

Any claim that accrued before August 13, 1946, and

which was not filed with the Commission by August 13,

1951, could not “thereafter be submitted to any court

or administrative agency for consideration,” nor could

such a claim “thereafter be entertained by the

Congress.” ICCA § 12, 25 U.S.C. § 70k (1976).

Although the ICCA provided that the Commission would

terminate at the end of ten years, Congress extended

its life several times because of its enormous

caseload. The Commission was finally dissolved in 1978,

at which time its remaining cases were transferred to

the Court of Claims.

809 F.2d at 1460 (citations omitted). 

The Tenth Circuit concluded that, because the Navajo knew or

should have known of the basis for its claim against the United

States prior to the expiration of the 1951 ICCA filing deadline,

the claim was barred. The court also found that the United

States was an indispensable party to the case and that the claims

against the remaining defendants could not proceed without the

federal government. Id. at 1471-72 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). 

Finally, the Navajo Tribe Court reasoned that monetary

compensation was the exclusive remedy available under the ICCA. 

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The Tribe, even if it had timely filed its claim under

the ICCA, could not have quieted title in these lands

or maintained an action in ejectment... The Tribe

simply would have had to accept just monetary

compensation if the Commission found their claim to

title valid. This restriction as to remedy represents a

fundamental policy choice made by Congress out of the

sheer, pragmatic necessity that, although any and all

accrued claims could be heard before the Commission,

land title in 1946 could not be disturbed because of

the sorry injustices suffered by native Americans in

the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth

centuries. Those injustices would have to be

recompensed through monetary awards. As one commentator

notes:

The Indian Claims Commission Act also addressed a

major collateral concern of the Congress. Prior to

the Act, non-Indians who held title derived from

federal patents to land claimed by Indians could

not be secure in their ownership until the

Indians' claims were litigated. By authorizing the

Indian Claims Commission-the only forum in which

Indian claims against the United States for land

they once possessed could be heard-to grant only

monetary damages in satisfaction of Indian claims,

non-Indians were assured of continued possession

regardless of the outcome of the litigation.

Relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or

injunction would have resulted in the radical

remedy of dispossessing the dispossessors. By

restricting the remedy, the Act forced the Indian

to accept a post factum sale.

Id. at 1467 (emphasis in original).

Therefore, where the United States is an indispensable party

to a case, a plaintiff may not avoid the exclusive remedy of the

ICCA (damages) by seeking title or possession from third parties. 

The Navajo Tribe court adopted the district court’s reasoning:

[A] tribe may not avoid the exclusivity bar [] of the

Indian Claims Commission Act by seeking title,

possession and damages from successors in interest of

the United States, where suit against the federal

government is barred...

Id. at 1472. 

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The City maintains that Navajo Tribe controls the outcome of

this case. In opposition, the Tribe points to a number of cases

from the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere which reach different

conclusions regarding the indispensability of the United States

in tribal property rights cases. 

2. Analysis of the Indispensable Party Issue.

The joinder of indispensable parties is governed by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which provides:

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is

subject to service of process and whose joinder

will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over

the subject matter of the action shall be joined

as a party in the action if (1) in the person’s

absence complete relief cannot be accorded among

those already parties, or (2) the person claims an

interest relating to the subject of the action and

is so situated that the disposition of the action

in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical

matter impair or impede the person's ability to

protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the

persons already parties subject to a substantial

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed

interest....

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not

Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision

(a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the

court shall determine whether in equity and good

conscience the action should proceed among the

parties before it, or should be dismissed, the

absent person being thus regarded as

indispensable. The factors to be considered by

the court include: first, to what extent a

judgment rendered in the person's absence might be

prejudicial to him or those already parties; 

second, the extent to which, by protective

provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of

relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be

lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment

rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 

fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an

adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for

nonjoinder.

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a. Is the United States a Necessary Party?

The first step is to determine whether the United States is

necessary to the litigation under Rule 19(a). The Ninth Circuit

applies a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a non-party

is necessary. Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1172

(9th Cir. 1996). “If a non-party satisfies either of the two

prongs, the non-party is necessary.” Id. First, a court must

determine whether “‘complete relief’ is possible among those

already parties to the suit.” Id. Alternatively, a party is

necessary if a court determines that the non-party has a “legally

protected interest in the suit.” Id. “The inquiry under Rule 19

is a practical one and fact specific... [and] must be made in

light of the particular circumstances of each case.” Blumberg v.

Gates, 204 F.R.D. 453, 454 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 

In Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251,

1254 (9th Cir. 1983), a suit brought by an Indian tribe to quiet

title to a portion of a riverbed exposed by a dredging and

rechannelization project, the United States was a “necessary”

party because, as trustee, it held legal title to the real

property in dispute. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that unless the

United States was formally joined as a party, it would “not be

bound by any decree ensuing from this litigation....Absent

joinder of the United States, a judgment entered in this case in

favor of the [defendant] will not necessarily render complete

relief to the [defendant] or protect the [defendant] from

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As is discussed in greater detail below, the Puyallup 6

court nevertheless determined that the case could proceed without

the United States under Rule 19(b). 

27

inconsistent judgments.” Id. at 1254-55. Accord Fort Mojave 6

Tribe v. Lafollette, 478 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973).

Here, the parties did not directly brief the question of

whether the United States should be deemed a “necessary” party

for purposes of Rule 19(a). As in Puyallup, lands in dispute in

this case (specifically, the lands now held by the Tribe which

were ceded to them by the City of Los Angeles) are held in trust

by the United States for the Tribe. 

Moreover, even a cursory examination of the Complaint

suggests that the City could not obtain complete relief in the

absence of the United States. The key issue in the present

lawsuit is whether Congressional consent to the Exchange

Agreement was properly given. Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is

that “[b]ecause the conditions mandated by Congress in the Act

for conveyance of the Bishop Tribal Lands were not satisfied, the

purported transfer of those lands by the United States to the

City was null and void.” (Compl. at ¶23.) Among other things,

Plaintiffs allege that (1) BIA agents conducted a grossly

insufficient canvass of the affected Indian population, a

requirement of the Act (id. at ¶10); and (2) that “[t]he

appraisals of the lands exchanged by the City and the United

States upon which the Exchange agreement was based did not

include the value of appurtenant water rights, making it

impossible to determine, as required by the Act, that the

properties conveyed to the City by the United States did not

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Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly 7

codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-2 (1976), but

omitted from current Code because the Indian Claims Commission

terminated on September 30, 1978).

28

exceed in value the properties received by the City” (id. at

¶19). The valuations made by the United States and is agents’

conduct put the government’s performance in issue. 

The United States is a “necessary” party for purposes of

Rule 19(a). 

b. May the United States be Joined in this

Action?

The next step is to determine whether the missing party can

be joined in the litigation. Citing Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d 1455,

City maintains that this case cannot proceed with the United

States as a party because any such claim is barred by the statute

of limitations set forth in the ICCA. Specifically, the City 7

asserts that the claims in this case are barred because they

accrued prior to August 13, 1946, but no claim was filed by the

Tribe with the Commission by the August 13, 1951 deadline. 

The Tribe does not dispute that it failed to timely file a

claim under the ICCA. It argues, however, that the ICCA only

bars untimely actions for money damages and does not bar suits in

which the remedy sought is possession of land. Plaintiffs are

technically correct that the only available relief under the ICCA

is money damages. But, as the Navajo Tribe court explained, this

was meant to be the exclusive remedy against the United States. 

The Tribe, even if it had timely filed its claim under

the ICCA, could not have quieted title in these lands

or maintained an action in ejectment... The Tribe

simply would have had to accept just monetary

compensation if the Commission found their claim to

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title valid. This restriction as to remedy represents a

fundamental policy choice made by Congress out of the

sheer, pragmatic necessity that, although any and all

accrued claims could be heard before the Commission,

land title in 1946 could not be disturbed because of

the sorry injustices suffered by native Americans in

the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth

centuries. Those injustices would have to be

recompensed through monetary awards. As one commentator

notes:

The Indian Claims Commission Act also addressed a

major collateral concern of the Congress. Prior to

the Act, non-Indians who held title derived from

federal patents to land claimed by Indians could

not be secure in their ownership until the

Indians' claims were litigated. By authorizing the

Indian Claims Commission-the only forum in which

Indian claims against the United States for land

they once possessed could be heard-to grant only

monetary damages in satisfaction of Indian claims,

non-Indians were assured of continued possession

regardless of the outcome of the litigation.

Relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or

injunction would have resulted in the radical

remedy of dispossessing the dispossessors. By

restricting the remedy, the Act forced the Indian

to accept a post factum sale.

Id. at 1467.

The Tribes offer no authority suggesting that claims like

those raised in this case are cognizable against the United

States in district court.

c. Can the Lawsuit Nevertheless Proceed Without

the United States?

Because it appears that the United States cannot be joined

in this action, by reason of the bar of the ICCA and its statute

of limitations, the final question is whether the lawsuit can

nevertheless proceed under Rule 19(b). The Supreme Court has

adopted a four factor test based upon the factors listed in Rule

19(b), suggesting that a court should examine:

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(1) The plaintiff’s interest in having a forum;

(2) The defendant’s interest in avoiding “multiple

litigation, [] inconsistent relief, or sole

responsibility for a liability he shares with

another;”

(3) The interest of the “outsider whom it would have

been desirable to join,” by examining “the extent

to which the judgment may ‘as a practical matter

impair or impede his ability to protect’ his

interest in the subject matter;” and 

(4) The interest of the courts and the public in

“complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of

controversies.” 

See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.

102, 109-11 (1968). Provident Tradesmens rejected the

application of a rigid, formalistic approach to rule 19(b),

instead requiring the district courts to undertake a “practical

examination of [the] circumstances” to determine whether the

action may “in equity and good conscience” proceed without the

absent party. See 390 U.S. at 119-20 n.16. 

The City argues that the case cannot proceed because:

Both equity and good conscience mandate that the

federal government be a party to any proceeding which

could materially alter the nature and extent of trust

holdings of the United States in the Owens Valley. This

is especially so since there is no allegation that Los

Angeles has failed in any way to meet its obligations

under its agreements with the United States. Indeed,

the complaint is rife with allegations that federal

officers failed to perform their duties under the 1937

Act: botched signature gathering, acceptance of

contractual water rights in lieu of appurtenant rights,

etc. These are allegations the United States cannot

answer and certainly allegations Los Angeles cannot

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answer unless the federal government is made a party to

these proceedings

(Doc. 67 at 8.) 

The City again relies on to Navajo Tribe, in which the

Navajo asserted that the United States improperly transferred

tribal lands to the State of New Mexico and several individuals. 

The district court determined that the United States was a

necessary party that could not be joined, concluding that “the

action cannot proceed in equity and good conscience” without the

presence of the United States. 809 F.2d at 1471. On appeal, the

Tenth Circuit affirmed this conclusion, adopting the trial

court’s reasoning that the claims were actually “challenges to

the validity of the transactions by which the United States

assumed title to the disputed land”: 

The Tribe's claims against the remaining defendants

are, in reality, challenges to the validity of the

transactions by which the United States assumed title

to the subject land. Specifically, the Tribe seeks to

cancel and set aside all patents, grants, assignments,

leases, and other conveyances made or done pursuant to

§ 25 of the Act of May 25, 1908, and any Executive

Order promulgated thereunder. 

It is a fundamental principle of the law that an

instrument may not be cancelled by a Court unless the

parties to the instrument are before the Court.” Tewa

Tesuque v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 452 (D.N.M.1973),

aff'd, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir.1974). Moreover, “as a

matter of federal law, it is well established that the

validity of a deed or patent from the federal

government may not be questioned in a suit brought by a

third party against the grantee or patentee.” Raypath,

Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 544 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th

Cir.1977). 

In addition, a tribe may not avoid the exclusivity bar

of § 70k of the Indian Claims Commission Act by seeking

title, possession and damages from successors in

interest of the United States, where suit against the

federal government is barred. Oglala II...

809 F.2d at 1471-72 (emphasis added). The Navajo argued that the

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district court had failed to make a sufficiently particularized

inquiry into the Rule 19(b) factors. The Tenth Circuit

disagreed, reasoning that the facts supported a finding of

indispensibility: 

...[T]he trial court's opinion evince[s] sufficient

facts and analysis to buttress its holding, including:

(1) that the claims against the non-federal parties

rested on documents of title or possession derived from

the United States; (2) that the Tribe seeks to cancel

all such instruments; (3) that this court has affirmed

the principle that all parties to an instrument must be

present, else it may not be cancelled; (4) that, more

specifically, validity of a deed or patent issued by

the Federal Government cannot be questioned in suit by

a third party against the grantee; and (5) that the

Eighth Circuit has found indispensability in analogous

circumstances.

Id. at 1472. 

The Tenth Circuit then applied the rule 19(b) factors. Of

particular note was the Tenth Circuit’s discussion of the extent

to which a judgment rendered in the United States’ absence might

be prejudicial to it or other parties. The court found that

“prejudice to the United States is clear” because a large portion

of the disputed reservation lands were still in possession of the

United States. Id. In addition “such prejudice could not be

lessened or avoided either through protective provisions in the

judgment or through the shaping of relief. Title to the []

reservation must be decided entirely or not at all....[I]n light

of the large holdings of land claimed by the United States in

this case, a judgment rendered in its absence would not be

adequate.” Id.

With respect to the question of whether the Navajo would

have an adequate remedy if the action was dismissed for

nonjoinder, the Tenth Circuit “concede[d] that the Tribe has no

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such remedy.” Id. Yet, the court held that “this lack does not

preclude a finding of indispensability in this case,” in part

because equitable considerations counseled in favor of a finding

of indispensability. Id. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit

reasoned:

A finding here that the United States is not an

indispensable party would allow a tribe to avoid the

admittedly catastrophic effects under the ICCA of

sleeping on its pre-1946 claim by simply waiting until

the United States transfers title and then bringing

suit against the successors in interest to the United

States-even though suit against the United States

itself is barred. That would undermine the very

intricate and exclusive remedial scheme that Congress

created in the ICCA. As discussed earlier, one of the

very reasons the Commission was only empowered to award

money damages was so that interests of innocent,

third-party grantees would not now be disturbed. We

agree with the district court that “in equity and good

conscience,” the action should not proceed.

Id. at 1073. 

The instant case is similar to Navajo Tribe insofar as the

Tribe seeks title and possession of the land which the City holds

as a successor in interest to the United States. In addition,

like in Navajo Tribe, the Tribe here alleges that the United

States acted unlawfully and that these unlawful acts precipitated

an unlawful transfer of Tribal lands to the City. 

In certain other respects, Navajo Tribe is distinguishable. 

First, in Navajo Tribe, “prejudice to the United States [was]

clear,” in part because judgment as to the disputed parcels could

potentially impact the “large holdings of land” still in

possession of the United States. In contrast, in the present

case, the only lands at issue are those that were the subject of

the Exchange Agreement, lands which are either now held by the

City or by the United states in trust for the Tribe. No other

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The City also cites Raypath Inc. v. City of Anchorage,

8

544 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1977), cited in Navajo Tribe for

the proposition that the validity of a patent from the federal

government may not be questioned in a suit brought by a third

party against the patentee. But, the Tribe correctly points out

that Raypath held only that third parties have no private cause

of action against a grantee because “they are complete strangers

to the title and are not persons in whose favor any of the

covenants, conditions, or restrictions in the deed were intended

to run.” Id. at 1021. Here, the Tribe is more than a third

party to the Exchange Agreement; the Tribe was the intended

beneficiary of the agreement entered into by the City and the

United States acting on behalf of the Tribe. 

34

holdings of the United States are implicated. In addition, in

Navajo Tribe the Tenth Circuit found that the Navajo sought to

evade “the effects under the ICCA of sleeping on its pre-1946

claim by simply waiting until the United States transfers title

and then bringing suit against the successors in interest.” 809

F.2d 1455. Here, the same motives cannot be ascribed to the

Tribe at this stage in the litigation. Whether or not the tribes

slept on their rights is a factual issue that cannot be

determined on this record.8

The Tribe points to two Ninth Circuit cases which arguably

contradict Navajo Tribe, Fort Mojave Tribe v. Lafollete, 478 F.2d

1016 (9th Cir. 1973) and Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma,

717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), both of which address the

indispensable party issue. 

Fort Mojave involved a suit by an Indian tribe to quiet

title to certain claims made against tribal lands. 478 F.2d

1016. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States was not an

indispensable party: 

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Without joining the United States, an Indian tribe may

sue in its own right to protect its interest in

restricted land. As the United States will not be

bound by any determination made in a suit to which it

is not a party, "[i]t does not appear that failure to

join the United States would radically and injuriously

affect its interest nor will a final determination be

inconsistent with equity and good conscience.”

***

Congress intended by § 1362 to authorize an Indian

tribe to bring suit in federal court to protect its

federally derived property rights in those situations

where the United States declines to act.

Id. at 1017-18.

The holding from Fort Mojave was reiterated in Puyallup. As

previously discussed, Puyallup was a suit brought by an Indian

tribe to quiet title to a portion of riverbed exposed by a

dredging and rechannelization project. 717 F.2d 1251. The

Puyallup court held that “the rule is clear in this Circuit and

elsewhere that, in a suit by an Indian tribe to protect its

interest in tribal lands,...the United States is not an

indispensable party in whose absence litigation cannot proceed

under Rule 19(b).” Id. at 1254 (emphasis in original). 

The Tenth Circuit in Navajo Tribe distinguished the holding

in Puyallup and several related cases on the ground that, in

those cases, the tribe was not adverse to the United States:

In Choctaw, Puyallup, and Narragansett, the interest of

the United States was aligned with that of the Indians. 

 The Government was the putative fee owner of the trust

lands in which the Indians asserted beneficial

ownership in a suit strictly against third parties. 

As the putative fee owner, the Government certainly had

an interest in the litigation but, understandably, was

not found indispensable when the third parties sought

dismissal for nonjoinder. In Andrus, the interests of

the United States and the Indians were also mutual.

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The posture of this case is quite different. The Tribe

and the United States are adversaries, each claiming

sole title to the same land. Unlike in the above

cases, the United States and the Tribe are not aligned

together against the countervailing interests of third

parties. We do not, therefore, find the above

authorities persuasive in the present case.

809 F.2d at 1473. 

One district court that struggled mightily with all of these

authorities drew a similar distinction between cases in which

“the central issue is the legality of the United States’ actions

in facilitating the alienation of Indian land” and those cases in

which the United States is not implicated in unlawful acts. See

Red Lake Band of Chippewas v. City of Baudette, Minnesota, 730 F.

Supp. 972 (D. Minn. 1998). On the one hand, the Red Lake Band

court identified a line of cases in which the lawfulness of the

United States’ actions was the central issue. E.g., Navajo, 717

F.2d 1251; Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir.

1987)(United States an indispensable party where claim was that

United States wrongfully issued fee patents); Oglala Sioux Tribe

v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.1981)(dismissing case for

failure to join the United States, where allegation was that the

government unconstitutionally exercised its power of eminent

domain when it took an area of land from the tribe); Manypenny v.

United States, 125 F.R.D. 497 (D. Minn. 1989)(United States an

indispensable party where plaintiffs alleged that its title to

land was clouded by the federal government's issuance of fee

patents to allottees in violation of federal statute). With

respect to these cases, the United States was deemed

indispensable because “the plaintiffs' claim was ultimately a

dispute about the legality of actions taken by the United

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States.” Red Lake Band, 730 F. Supp. at 978. 

The Red Lake Band court then identified a distinct line of

cases in which no such wrong was alleged. E.g., Bird Bear v.

McLean County, 513 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1975); Choctaw and

Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, 193 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1951); Fort

Mojave, 478 F.2d 1016. In Bird Bear, plaintiffs sought

compensation for a road easement granted to defendant prior to

allotment of the land to a tribe and prior to incorporation of

the allotment into the tribe’s reservation. The Eighth Circuit

in Bird Bear found that United States was not an indispensable

party under the facts and circumstances. 513 F.2d at 191 n.6. 

The Bird Bear court also noted that it had invited the Department

of Justice to submit a brief as amicus curiae, but that

invitation was declined. Id. 

Similarly, in Choctaw, 193 F.2d 456, tribal plaintiffs sued

several private individuals who claimed an interest in land

alleged to be “part of an unallotted common domain” of the

Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. The Tenth Circuit reversed the

district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to join the

United States as an indispensable party, reasoning:

Since, unless the United States becomes a party to the

action it will not be bound by any judgment entered

therein, a judgment entered as between the Nations and

the defendants below would not radically and

injuriously affect the interest of the United States. 

The question then narrows to whether a judgment could

be entered as between the Nations and the defendants

below which would be consistent with equity and good

conscience.

193 F.2d at 458. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the balance of

the equities weighed in favor of allowing the parties’ claims to

title to be adjudicated. 193 F.2d at 460-61.

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The Navajo court also expressed concern that a judgment 9

absent the United States might have an impact on “innocent third

party grantees.” 809 F.2d 1473. However, as the Tribe points

out, assuming the truth of the Tribe’s allegations as a court

must on a motion to dismiss, “the City of Los Angeles actively

and admittedly chose to embark on a course of action it knew was

contrary to its own city charter and statutory requirements

imposed by Congress.” (Doc. 62 at 24.) 

38

The district court in Red Lake Band chose to follow the

latter line of cases, because the Red Lake Band had not

“challenge[d] the legality of the federal government’s acts.” 

Id. Rather, the Red Lake Band sought a determination of whether

an interest granted to a third party by the United States was or

was not an easement.

Here, in contrast, the Tribe is alleging that officers of

the United States committed various wrongs, including failure to

comply with the requirement that the Department of Interior

obtain consent of the majority of adult members of the Tribe and

of failing to obtain lands of equivalent value in the exchange. 

In this respect, the instant case resembles Navajo, Nichols,

Oglala, and Manypenny. 

9

Plaintiffs cite additional authority that distinguishes

Navajo Tribe on alternative grounds. First, the Tribe cites

Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Oneida County, Wisconsin, 879 F.2d

300 (7th Cir. 1989), in which the Sokaugon sued the United

States, the State of Wisconsin, and several private defendants to

quiet title ceded by the Sokaogon to the United States pursuant

to a treaty. The Tribe asserted that its right to occupy the

land was never terminated by the treaty, because the United

States reneged on various promises made in the treaty. Id. at

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301-02. The Sokaogon court found that the United States could

not be a party to the case because the ICCA’s statute of

limitations had run. However, the court declined to find that

the United States was an indispensable party. Evaluating the

Rule 19(b) factors, the Sokaogon court reasoned that the

defendants (who were then in possession of the disputed property

rights) would not be at risk of multiple liability and might have

a claim against the United States for breach of a warranty of

good title. 

The plaintiff has no other route for establishing its

rights in the tract. The defendants are not at risk of

multiple liability; on the contrary, if they lose this

suit and are forced to give back their mineral and

other land rights to the tribe, they may have a claim

[] against the U.S. for breach of a warranty of good

title. (We do not say they do; we express no view on

the question; we do not even know whether the U.S. was

their immediate grantor.) 

Id. at 304 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the

United States had declined to take any position on its

indispensability, and that the public interest favors where

possible the resolution of legal questions on the merits. Id. at

304-05.

If the Sokaogon have a good claim to this land, they

ought not be barred from prosecuting it by their

inability to sue an entity perhaps only remotely

involved in their dispute with [defendants]. To

exaggerate slightly (because the U.S. appears to be in

occupation of some of the land, although the extent of

that occupation is entirely unclear on the skimpy

record of this case), it is as if every time someone

claimed that someone else was encroaching on his

property he would have to sue not only the alleged

encroacher (here Exxon) but also the alleged

encroacher's predecessors in title right back to King

James or Lord Baltimore (here the U.S.). So far as can

be determined from an utterly inadequate record, the

relationship of the U.S. to the Indians' controversy

with Exxon and the other occupiers of the land in

derogation of the Indians' alleged occupancy rights is

that of a predecessor in title (to Exxon), no more.

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Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added). The Sokaogon court then

distinguished Navajo Tribe and several other related cases

In two of the cases the U.S. was clearly exposed to

potential liability to its grantee; in the third

[Navajo Tribe], property rights claimed by the U.S.

were in jeopardy....In none of the cases is there any

indication that the U.S. had disclaimed

indispensability. 

Id. at 305. 

Similarly, in Picuris Pueblo v. Oglebay Norton Co., 228

F.R.D. 665 (D.N.M. 2005), the Picuris tribe claimed to hold

aboriginal title to lands being mined by defendants. The Picuris

sought to eject the defendant mining companies from its lands. 

One defendant argued that Navajo Tribe mandated dismissal because

the United States was an indispensable party. The Picuris court

disagreed, reasoning that:

In Navajo Tribe, the Tribe sought a declaratory

judgment that the Tribe had equitable title to

unallotted lands that were added to the reservation by

executive order and that the United States breached its

fiduciary duty to the Tribe by restoring such lands to

the public domain. On this basis, the Tribe attacked

the validity of all subsequent instruments issued by

the United States.

...In Navajo Tribe, the claims were essentially a

dispute about the legality of executive orders issued

by the United States. The Tribe traced its claim to the

land to government action in the form of executive

order. That is a crucial difference between Navajo

Tribe and the instant case. In this action, Picurís

claims aboriginal title to the land; it does not rely

on any action of the United States to support its claim

to the land. Picurís does not challenge the validity of

the patent issued by the United States; it claims that

the patent was issued subject to its rights. Thus,

Navajo Tribe is inapplicable and not binding herein.

***

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The fact that the United States issued the patent to

[Defendant’s] predecessor in interest is insufficient

to transform the United States into an indispensable

party. The alleged interests of the United States

identified by [Defendant] are not the type of concrete,

practical interests that require dismissal.

228 F.R.D. at 667.

Both Sokaogon and Picurus are distinguishable from the

instant case. The Sokaogon court emphasized that the Sokaogon

should not be barred from prosecuting their claim because the

United States is “remotely involved in their dispute.” In a

similar vein, the Picuris court emphasized that the Picuris

Pueblo did “not rely on any action of the United States to

support its claim to the land.” Here, by contrast, tribe does

rely on actions (or lack thereof) of the United States to support

their claim and the United States is more than remotely involved

in this dispute. 

All of these cases reinforce the fact-specific nature of the

inquiry under Rule 19(b). It is appropriate then to return to

the four factor test set forth in Provident Tradesmens, which

requires inquiry into 

(1) The plaintiff’s interest in having a forum. 

(2) The defendant’s interest in avoiding “multiple

litigation,...inconsistent relief, or sole

responsibility for a liability he shares with

another.”

(3) The interest of the “outsider whom it would have

been desirable to join,” by examining “the extent

to which the judgment may ‘as a practical matter

impair or impede his ability to protect’ his

interest in the subject matter.” 

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Navajo Tribe dismissed the import of this factor, 10

reasoning, essentially, that the ICC provided the “exclusive

forum to litigate [any] pre-1946 civil claim against the United

States.” 809 F.2d at 1476 n29. But, this begs the question of

whether the United States is itself an indispensable party. Only

after the Navajo Tribe court concluded that the United States was

indispensable did the Navajo Tribe justify depriving the Navajo

of a forum to sue any other parties. 

42

(4) The interest of the courts and the public in

“complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of

controversies.” 

Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 109-11. 

Plaintiff’s interest in having a forum is strong. As in

Sokaogon, 879 F.2d at 304, “plaintiff has no other route for

establishing its rights in the tract.” Also like in Sokaogon,

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no party has explained how a judgment in this case will expose

the United States to “liability or other burdens as a consequence

of a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.” Id. at 305. Finally,

the interest of the courts and the public in “complete,

consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies” favors

allowing this claim to proceed. 

However, as the City points out, “the complaint is rife with

allegations that federal officers failed to perform their duties

under the 1937 Act: botched signature gathering, acceptance of

contractual water rights in lieu of appurtenant rights, [failed

to obtain land of the same value,] etc. These are

allegations...Los Angeles cannot answer unless the federal

government is made a party to these proceedings.” 

This case presents a unique set of circumstances for which

there is no exact parallel in any case cited by the parties. In

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the final analysis, it cannot be ignored that the Tribe’s claims

are grounded in large part upon allegations of wrongdoing by

agents of the federal government. The Tribe alleges that agents

of the BIA committed fraud when they purported to obtain the

consent of members by acquiring signatures on blank pieces of

paper. These allegations cannot be easily separated from the

other allegations in the case, which largely raise related

questions of law. For example, the Tribe alleges that the

Exchange Agreement’s failure to require the transfer of

appurtenant (Winters) rights violates the 1937 Act and therefore

renders the exchange unlawful. This challenge indirectly

questions whether the United States fulfilled its obligation to

obtain land of equivalent value.

The distinction drawn in Red Lake Band between (a) those

cases in which “the central issue is the legality of the United

States' actions in facilitating the alienation of Indian land,”

and (b) those cases in which no such wrong was alleged is

instructive. 730 F. Supp. at 9787-78. For the former, the

united states is indispensable; for the latter, it is not. Here,

the face of the complaint focuses upon the alleged wrongdoing of

the United States. Although no immediate property interests of

the United States (other than those held in trust for the Tribe)

appear to be implicated in this case and the United States has

expressed no opinion as to its indispensability, it is difficult

to see how the case could proceed without the full participation

of the United States in the lawsuit, given that agents of the

United States are accused of various omissions and wrongdoings. 

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The Treaty in Swim provided: 11

So long as any of the lands ceded, granted, and relinquished

under this treaty remain part of the public domain, Indians

belonging to the above-mentioned [Shoshone-Bannock] tribes,

and living on the reduced [Fort Hall] reservation, shall

have the right, without any charge therefor, to cut timber

for their own use, but not for sale, and to pasture their

livestock on said public lands, and to hunt thereon and to

fish in the streams thereof.

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Although this is an exceedingly close case, the United

States is indispensable to this litigation, which cannot proceed

in its absence. The complaint must therefore be DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

d. Miscellaneous Arguments.

Both parties focus on the following passage from Navajo

Tribe contained within the Tenth Circuit’s discussion of

indispensability: 

[A] tribe may not avoid the exclusivity bar of § 70k of

the Indian Claims Commission Act by seeking title,

possession and damages from successors in interest of

the United States, where suit against the federal

government is barred. Oglala II...

The City maintains that this passage bars this suit in its

entirety. The Tribe disagrees, citing several cases, including

one, Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712 (1983), in which a claim for

use of land was permitted to proceed against the United States. 

None of the cases cited by the Tribe are controlling. Swim

concerned an 1898 Treaty that contained a reservation of tribal

grazing rights. In 1978, the Indian tribes that were parties 11

to the 1898 Treaty signed a memorandum of understanding

concerning grazing rights under the Treaty, which provided that

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the “[t]ribes may graze a maximum of 826 head of cattle annually

within the ceded areas of the Caribou Forest and that the Forest

Service may issue annual permits to non-Indians for any grazing

capacity not used by the Tribes.” Later that same year,

non-Indian grazing permit holders initiated a declaratory

judgment action against the Secretary of Agriculture, seeking to

enjoin implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding and any

resulting reduction in their permitted grazing capacity. The

tribes intervened. 

The non-Indian plaintiffs in Swim argued first that the

tribal grazing rights had been extinguished by a prior settlement

under the ICCA. The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ argument

that the prior settlement was a bar to a subsequent suit,

reasoning:

In 1967 the Tribes reached a stipulated settlement with

the United States for additional compensation for the

occupancy rights ceded by the Article I of the 1898

Agreement. The non-Indian permittees assert that the

language of this settlement encompasses all claims in

regard to Article IV use rights as well. We reject this

assertion. There is no evidence in the record that

either party to the settlement believed that Article IV

[tribal grazing] rights were involved in the 1967

settlement....

The non-Indian permittees rely solely on general

language of the settlement documents to sweep in

Article IV grazing rights, even though all specific

language in the pertinent documents, including the

original petition, refers only to the low compensation

paid for lands ceded in Article I. The Tribes' petition

before the Indian Claims Commission did not plead any

extinguished grazing rights. The stipulated settlement

which reached all claims before the Commission did not

encompass tribal grazing rights.

Id. at 718. 

The non-Indian plaintiffs also argued that the claim should

be barred on equitable grounds because the government’s

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restriction of tribal grazing rights began in 1907, more than

sixty years before they filed suit. See Id. at 718. The Swim

court also rejected this argument: 

The failure of the Tribes to exercise their grazing

rights from 1907, when local Forest Service officials

ousted them, to 1978 has no effect on the vitality of

their Article IV rights. Laches or estoppel is not

available to defeat Indian treaty rights. Board of

Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351

(1939); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District,

236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956). This is true even

where the Indians have long acquiesced in use by others

of affected lands or have purported to grant away their

occupancy and use rights without federal authorization.

United States v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,

543 F.2d 676, 699 (9th Cir. 1976).

Id. (citations edited). 

The Tribe cites Swim in support of a convoluted argument

that the instant claim is not barred by the ICCA because it is

not governed by the ICCA. Specifically, the Tribe argues:

If the reasoning in Navajo Tribe controlled, it should

not have mattered whether the tribe settled the claims

against the United States or not. The claims clearly

accrued in 1907 with the Forest Service’s first

interference with the tribe’s grazing, and thus could

have been brought under the ICCA. If they were not,

under Navajo Tribe they would be time barred and could

not be asserted in any event. The fact that the Ninth

Circuit thought that whether the rights were settled

made a difference indicates it does not share the Tenth

Circuit’s view of the effect of the ICCA on unlitigated

“live” title claims.

(Doc. 62 at 22. (emphasis added).) But, the Tribe reaches an

unwarranted conclusion. Swim does not clearly conclude that the

claims in that case accrued in 1907. Rather, Swim applied the

then-applicable rule that neither Laches nor estoppel are

available to defeat Indian treaty rights, a rule that has since

been rejected by the Supreme Court in Sherrill. The Tribe’s

convoluted logic fails at the first step. Swim sheds no

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additional light on the question of whether the ICCA bars the

filing of an action against the United States in this case.

Similarly, the Tribe cites Oregon Department of Fish and

Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985), in which

the Klamath Tribe sought to enjoin enforcement of state hunting

and fishing regulations on certain aboriginal lands that had been

ceded to the United States in a 1901 agreement. The Supreme

Court held that because the agreement did not specifically

mention the retention of subsistence hunting and fishing rights,

the rights were extinguished by the agreement. The Klamath Tribe

maintained that they did not intend to extinguish these rights,

arguing that “the absence of any payment expressly in

compensation for hunting and fishing rights on the ceded lands

demonstrates that the parties did not intend to extinguish such

rights with the 1901 agreement.” Id. at 754. The Supreme Court

rejected this argument on several grounds, noting that the

Klamath Tribe “has since been afforded an opportunity to recover

additional compensation for the ceded lands” through the ICC

process. Id. at 774. The Court also noted that the fact that

the ICC’s findings of fact referenced the “subsistence” value of

nonlumbering and nongrazing areas within the ceded lands,

“further undercut[]” the Klamath Tribe’s reliance on an alleged

failure of compensation for hunting and fishing rights. Id. at

774 n.24. 

The Tribe argues, again, that, “if the reasoning of Navajo

Tribe had been applied by the Supreme Court [in Oregon Department

of Fish and Wildlife,] the rights could not have been asserted

regardless of whether the tribe had received compensation for

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them.” (Doc. 62 at 22-23.) But, the Tribe again assumes too

much. The Oregon court did not discuss whether the United States

was an indispensable party. 

Nevertheless, giving literal effect to the language from

Navajo Tribe -- by barring any claim against successors in

interest to the United States where a suit against the United

States would be barred –- would eviscerate the operation of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). In fact, subsequent Tenth

Circuit cases, including Sokaogon, 879 F.2d 300, faithfully

applied the balancing process of Rule 19(b), rather than the

bright-line bar suggested in Navajo Tribe. Navajo Tribe is just

an example of a case in which a court found that the balance

tipped in favor of dismissal. The same finding is appropriate

here. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the City’s motion to

dismiss under Rule 19 is GRANTED. Any amended complaint shall be

filed within thirty days following the filing of this decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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