Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05421/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05421-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAON ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CHEFS’ WAREHOUSE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-05421-RS 

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS 

CERTIFICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

This putative class action was originally filed by Shaon Robinson, who sought to represent 

a class of delivery drivers employed by defendant The Chefs’ Warehouse West Coast, LLC. 

(“CW”). Sean Clark subsequently joined as a named plaintiff. Thereafter, a motion for class 

certification brought by Robinson and Clark was denied because, among other reasons, they both 

had signed declarations in a prior action stating they understood CW’s policies regarding meal and 

rest breaks, accurate timekeeping, and reporting any violations of those policies. They also had 

expressly admitted that they were always provided with, and took, their meal and rest breaks, that 

their supervisor insisted they take their meal breaks, that their time sheets were always accurate, 

that they were always paid for all hours worked, and that they never worked off the clock. 

Although theoretically Robinson and Clark might have been able to offer explanations as to why 

those declarations did not foreclose their claims in this action, the declarations at a minimum 

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presented CW a potentially compelling basis to defend. As such, neither Robinson nor Clark were

similarly-situated to putative class members who did not sign declarations in the prior action, 

requiring denial of the motion to certify.

The new named plaintiffs are Saul Prado and James Roberts. CW seeks summary 

judgment against both Prado and Roberts, based on separate motions and arguments.1 Plaintiffs, in 

turn, seek class certification. As explained below, CW’s motion for partial summary judgment 

against Prado will be granted, but the motion against Roberts will be denied, as will plaintiffs’

motion for class certification.

II. BACKGROUND

CW describes itself as a “premier distributor of specialty food products” catering to chefs 

in restaurants, hotels, culinary schools, bakeries, and other food establishments. CW has two 

California facilities, one in Northern CA, currently located in Union City, and one in Southern 

CA, located in City of Industry. CW employs delivery drivers operating from each facility. CW 

asserts that except during training, drivers typically drive by themselves with very little 

management oversight, and they generally spend no less than 90-95% of their work day on the 

road. 

It is undisputed CW has a written meal and rest break policy that complies with the law. 

The complaint is premised instead on the theory that, in actual practice, drivers are put under such 

time pressures to complete their deliveries within certain windows that they are effectively 

precluded, or at least strongly discouraged, from taking meal and rest breaks. CW denies that its 

drivers cannot or do not take the requisite breaks. It explains that while it provides its drivers with 

meal and rest breaks in compliance with California law, “the timing of breaks varies from day-today and employee-to-employee depending on the delivery routes, daily activities (i.e. traffic, 

 

1 Generally the court does not permit multiple motions for summary judgment. While judicial 

efficiency warrants an exception in this instance, that does not mean it ordinarily is appropriate to 

divide up summary judgment motions among issues or parties without advance leave of court.

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problems with the truck, etc.) and most of all, individual preferences.” CW also asserts the 

practices in Southern California and Northern California for ensuring compliance with the meal 

and rest break policy differ in certain respects. 

As noted in prior orders, this is not the first time CW has been sued for an alleged failure 

to provide meal and rest breaks. In 2012, an action filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court 

entitled Gustavo Chicas v. The Chefs’ Warehouse West Coast, LLC (“the Chicas matter”) 

advanced the same categories of wage and hour claims as alleged here, except for failure to 

reimburse business expenses. Named plaintiffs Robinson and Clark were members of the Chicas

class, and the declarations they signed in that action precluded them from serving as named 

plaintiffs as to the claims advanced here. The class representative plaintiffs now proposed in this 

action are James Roberts, a former driver in Northern California and Saul Prado, a southern 

California diver.

II. DISCUSSION

A. James Roberts summary judgment 

CW seeks partial summary judgment against Roberts on the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fifteenth claims for relief in the operative fifth amended complaint. 

Those are all the claims asserted by Roberts except the Seventh claim for relief—“Failure to 

Reimburse Expenses,” which apparently relates to cell phone usage, and which CW does not seek 

to adjudicate at this time.

CW correctly observes that all of the claims on which it seeks summary judgment rise or 

fall with the question of whether Roberts can show any violations of his rights to meal and rest 

breaks.2 The motion for partial summary judgment is premised on Roberts’ inability to identify at 

 

2

 I.e., the first claim for relief asserts failure to compensate for all hours worked; the second claim 

alleges failure to pay overtime wages; the fifth claim complains of a failure to furnish wage and 

hour statements; the sixth claim alleges a violation of the obligation to pay final wages, and the 

eighth claim advances a claim for failure to pay minimum wage. The fifteenth claim asserts unfair 

business practices. All these counts turn on the alleged underlying rest and meal period violations.

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deposition specific meal or rest breaks he missed. There is no dispute that CW’s official policies, 

of which Roberts was aware, afford timely meal and rest breaks to non-exempt employees, require 

them to record their time accurately, explicitly prohibit off-the-clock work, and

provide for disciplinary action against employees who work off-the-clock or record their time 

inaccurately. Roberts admits that he received timely meal and rest periods throughout his 

employment, and the manifests CW provided to Roberts with his daily schedule reserved time for 

him to take them. There is also no dispute that Roberts signed and submitted 79 separate 

timesheets to CW wherein he specifically attested he took the meal and rest periods authorized 

under California law. According to Roberts’ deposition testimony he even finished his route early 

“easily four times a week,” which CW argues confirms he had the opportunity to take meal and 

rest breaks throughout his workday.

In light of this, CW insists Roberts’ claims stand or fall based on his ability to recall 

specific dates when CW purportedly failed to provide him with breaks. See, e.g., Amiri v. Cox 

Commc’ns Cal., LLC, 272 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“When [an employer’s] offthe-clock policy disavows such work, as consistent with state law, the employees clocking out 

creates a presumption they are doing no work.”); Manigo v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2017 WL 

5054368, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017) (holding testimony that employees “generally missed 

meal breaks” was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact because they “failed to 

identify a single instance in which they were deprived of the opportunity to take a meal break and 

did not receive a penalty payment.”).

CW argues Roberts’ deposition testimony makes clear that he cannot meet his burden.

Q: Right. So is it -- so when I asked you: Okay, on which days in the 

-- in the various workweeks did you not take or did you take a rest 

break, and you told me you couldn’t recall?

A: Right. 

Q: . . . As you sit here today, you can’t tell me based on your 

recollection which day you received a 30-minute break and which 

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day you didn’t receive a 30-minute break, correct? 

A: Correct. May I ask a question?

Q: No. 

A: Oh. 

Q: I ask the questions[.]

A: Oh, I was just -- I was just wondering what you had for lunch 

two and a half years ago. Today state (sic, today’s date) two and a 

half years ago.

CW’s insistence that to survive summary judgment Roberts was required to identify from 

memory specific dates on which he allegedly missed meal and/or rest breaks is not tenable. 

Roberts points to timesheets appearing to show instances in which he worked sufficient hours to 

be entitled to a second lunch break, but did not take one. Even though such records may not prove

any violations, the records and Robert’s testimony that he was forced to miss breaks, and his 

estimates as to how often that happened, create a triable issue of fact.

While the evidence to which CW points may be offered to impeach Roberts and to 

undermine his credibility, it is not sufficient to warrant entry of judgment in CW’s favor as a 

matter of law. CW’s overreach is manifest in its argument that Robert’s managers never told him 

to falsify timesheets. As support, CW quotes Roberts’ deposition:

Q: And so back to my question, did anyone at Chef’s Warehouse tell 

you to falsify your

time records?

A: If you’re asking me did they specifically say: James, falsify your 

time records, no.

But if you’re asking me was I told: Just put something in there so we 

can turn these time sheets in, yes.

From this, CW would have the court conclude as a matter of law that “Roberts’ managers 

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simply told him to complete and submit his timesheets” and “never told Roberts to falsify them.” 

A trier of fact, however, could conclude that an instruction to “just put something in there” was 

tantamount to directing Roberts to submit false time sheets, and it certainly could support an 

inference that the timesheets are not completely reliable. CW is not entitled to summary judgment 

against Roberts.

B. Saul Prado summary judgment

CW seeks partial summary judgment as to plaintiff Saul Prado’s meal and rest period 

claims, and the claims that derive therefrom, on the grounds that California’s meal and rest period 

laws are preempted by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, and its Regulations 

(“MCSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 31141, 49 C.F.R. 395.3, with respect to drivers in Prado’s circumstances.

Specifically, in December 2018, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) 

issued a final order stating that the federal regulations governing the hours of service of drivers of 

commercial motor vehicles (“HOS”) preempts California’s meal and rest break laws and these 

laws may not be applied to drivers subject to the HOS regulations.

When CW filed its motion asserting this defense, plaintiffs’ initial response rested largely 

on the procedural objection that the matter had not been pleaded as an affirmative defense. After 

motion practice, CW was permitted to amend its answer to assert the defense, and plaintiffs were 

given the opportunity to submit further briefing to address the merits of the preemption argument. 

While plaintiffs’ opposition on the merits makes some efforts to argue that Prado’s claims are not 

preempted, the primary thrust of their contentions is that the possible applicability of preemption 

to the claims of other class members cannot be adjudicated at this juncture. Thus, plaintiffs argue, 

even assuming summary judgment is granted against Prado, “the certification order would include 

all drivers except Mr. Prado.”

That the claims of putative class members are not subject to the pending motion for 

summary judgment against Prado is not controversial. Prior to certification, rulings do not bind 

anyone other than the named plaintiffs and defendants. What plaintiffs appear not to recognize, 

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however, is that if the claims against Prado are dismissed, that is fatal to class certification of those 

claims, unless Roberts can serve as an adequate representative of Southern California class 

members as well as those in Northern California.3

Plaintiffs also do not seem to appreciate fully that in arguing that preemption may only 

apply “as to some drivers for some periods of time,” they undercut the propriety of class 

certification. While the presence of individualized defenses does not automatically preclude class 

treatment, it is certainly relevant. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 

1992) (“The certification of a class is questionable where it is predictable that a major focus of the 

litigation will be on an arguable defense unique to the named plaintiff or to a subclass.”)

As to Prado, CW has shown that his rest and meal period claims are preempted. On 

December 28, 2018, the FMCSA, an agency of the United States Department of Transportation,

published an Order concluding that the California meal and rest break rules contained in California 

Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512, as applied to property-carrying commercial vehicle drivers, are 

preempted by the FMCSA’s hours of service regulations. See California’s Meal and Rest Break 

Rules for Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers; Petition for Determination of Preemption 

(“Order”), 83 Fed. Reg. 67470, 67470 (Dec. 28, 2018). The order was promulgated under 49 

U.S.C. § 31141. See id. Under Section 31141, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to 

make a determination that state laws meeting certain criteria are preempted and may not be 

enforced. 49 U.S.C. § 31141. The Secretary of Transportation’s authority to issue such 

determinations has been delegated to the FMCSA Administrator. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.87(f) (2016). 

Under Section 31141 judicial review of a DOT preemption determination may only be heard by a 

circuit court. See 49 U.S.C. § 31141(f).

 

3

 The prior order denying certification noted that “the Southern California and Northern 

California facilities might require separate treatment” in any renewed certification motion. While 

plaintiffs have proffered separate class representatives in response to that observation, no 

definitive finding has been made that separate classes are required.

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In Ayala v. U.S Xpress Enterprises, Inc., 2019 WL 1986760, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 

2019), the court applied the Order to enter partial summary judgment on claims like those made 

here, finding both that “retroactivity” was not at issue because the courts lack authority to enforce 

the preempted laws, and that any challenge to the Order must be brought in United States courts of 

appeal. Although Ayala is not binding authority, its conclusions appear sound and fully applicable 

here.

Plaintiffs suggest Prado’s claims may not be preempted if he qualified as a “short haul” 

driver, and that CW has failed to establish as a factual matter he was not a such a driver at any 

relevant point in time. Plaintiffs have not shown, however, that the Order excludes short haul 

drivers, even assuming there otherwise were a factual question as to Prado’s status during any 

particular period.

Finally, plaintiffs argue preemption would not preclude Prado from pursuing equitable or 

contract claims based on the same alleged failures to provide meal and rest breaks. Plaintiffs have 

not explained, however, why permitting recovery on any such theories would not impermissibly 

render the preemption a nullity. Accordingly, the motion will be granted.

C. Class certification

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 allows for the certification of a class when: “(1) the 

class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or 

fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 

claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Where these prerequisites are satisfied, a class 

action may be maintained if, “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class 

members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 

action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 

controversy,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), or “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 

on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 

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declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

“[C]ertification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,” that the 

requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) have been satisfied. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. 

Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The prior motion for class certification focused primarily on whether the then-named 

plaintiffs and their counsel could adequately represent the class. While the question regarding 

counsel was mooted by withdrawal of the attorney as to whom questions had been raised, the 

motion was denied based on the fact that the named plaintiffs had signed declarations in the 

Chicas matter arguably undermining their claims here. In light of that conclusion, it was neither 

necessary nor appropriate to make a definitive finding at that juncture whether it would otherwise 

be appropriate for the claims to be litigated on a class-wide basis. The order observed, however, 

that the decision in Ludosky McCowen v. Trimac Transportation Services (Western), Inc., 14-cv02694, provided support for the notion that class certification could be warranted for these claims.

As the case has subsequently unfolded, however, class certification does not appear 

appropriate, for a number of interrelated reasons. First, as noted above, Prado’s claims are 

preempted, which both eliminates him as a viable class representative and supports an inference 

that the claims of many of the other putative class members may also be preempted. That, in turn, 

implicates both commonality and numerosity.

Indeed, CW has shown there are now only seventeen Southern California drivers and five 

Northern California drivers who have not either: (1) released their claims by signing individual 

settlement agreements; (2) waived their right to participate in a class action by signing an 

arbitration agreement with a class waiver; (3) stated in declarations in the Chicas matter that CW 

provided them with meal/rest periods and pay for all hours worked; or (4) stated in declarations in 

this action that CW provided them with meal/rest breaks and paid them for all hours worked. 

Additionally twelve of the seventeen remaining Southern California drivers have either Class A or 

Class B commercial licenses, implying they operate vehicles weighing over 10,000 pounds, and 

would be subject to the FMSCA’s Order, thereby preempting their claims. Thus, while signing 

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declarations in the Chicas matter would not automatically preclude a class member from 

recovering in this action, it appears there may be as few as five drivers in Northern California and 

five in Southern California who do not face one or more hurdles or complete bars to recovery.

Although plaintiffs question the enforceability of the class action waivers, litigating that issue 

likely will also require individual inquiries.

Finally, while CW’s opposition to class certification arguably goes too far in attempting to 

defeat the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs appear to have, at best, individualized and 

anecdotal evidence that drivers did not always get their rest and meal breaks, despite clear 

company policy to the contrary, and the implementation of a number of procedures designed to 

ensure compliance. The discussion above regarding the summary judgment motion against 

Roberts demonstrates the nature of the evidence. While Roberts raises triable issues of fact as to 

his individual claims, plaintiffs have not explained how they would prove their claims on a classwide basis given the state of the record.

IV. CONCLUSION

The motion for partial summary judgment against plaintiff Roberts and the motion for 

class certification are denied. The motion for partial summary judgment against plaintiff Prado is 

granted. A further case management conference will be held on October 10, 2019, with a joint 

case management conference statement to be filed one week in advance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2019

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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