Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00006/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert P. Torres, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 12-0006-PHX-JAT

 ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant Kevin Lewis’ (“Defendant Lewis”) 

Motion to Set Aside Default and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Service (Doc. 

52), Plaintiff Robert P. Torres’ Response to Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and 

Motion to Strike (Doc. 55), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 56). The 

Court now rules on the Motions. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff Robert P. Torres, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex 

(ASPC), Lewis Complex, Eagle Point Unit, in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se civil 

rights Complaint against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The Court 

dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim with leave to amend. (Doc. 9). 

 On March 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint with this Court. 

(Doc. 10). On September 28, 2012, the Court dismissed Count I, ordered Defendants 

Ryan, Greeley, Lewis, King, Echeverria and Clausen to respond to Counts II and III, and 

dismissed the remaining Defendants. (Doc. 17 at 18). Plaintiff was provided with a 

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service packet for the remaining six Defendants and was ordered to return the service 

packet within twenty one days from the filing of the Order. (Id.). Upon timely receipt of 

the service packet from Plaintiff, the Court ordered the United States Marshal (the “U.S. 

Marshal”) to provide service of process for the Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 4. (Id. at 19). The Court ordered Plaintiff to complete service by 

November 27, 2012. (Id. at 18). 

 On October 19, 2012, the Court sent Plaintiff’s completed service packet to the 

U.S. Marshal. On November 8, 2012, the U.S. Marshal attempted service on Defendants 

Ryan and Lewis. (Doc. 36, Doc. 35). On December 20, 2012, the U.S. Marshall 

submitted a Process Receipt and Return for Defendant Ryan, and a Process Receipt and 

Return for Defendant Lewis, each accompanied by two separate “Waiver of Service of 

Summons,” both signed by Kelly Dudley, Attorney General Liaison for the Arizona 

Department of Corrections. (Id.). On both of the waivers filed with the Court, the line 

labeled “Printed name of party waiving service of summons” was left blank. (Id.). 

Plaintiff was charged sixteen dollars total, eight dollars each, by the U.S. Marshal for 

service of Defendant Ryan and Defendant Lewis. (Id.). Additionally, on the Process 

Receipt and Return form for Defendant Lewis, neither the box indicating that service had 

been executed, nor the box indicating that the U.S. Marshal was unable to serve 

Defendant Lewis had been checked. (Doc. 35). 

 On December 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting notification of the 

status of service on Defendants Ryan, Lewis, Clausen, Greeley, Echeverra, and King. 

(Doc. 32). On January 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit (Doc. 43) attachment to his 

Motion for Status of Service (Doc. 32). On page three of this affidavit, Plaintiff stated 

that on December 20, 2012, Plaintiff received notification that the U.S. Marshals effected 

service upon Defendant Ryan and Defendant Lewis on November 8, 2012. (Doc. 43 at 3). 

 On January 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Application for Entry of Default against 

Defendant Lewis. (Doc. 48). Attached to the request for Entry of Default, Plaintiff 

included an Affidavit which stated that “Defendant Lewis was served with a copy of the 

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summons and complaint as appears from the proof of service file.” (Id. at 2). On January 

16, 2013, the Court entered Default against Defendant Lewis pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55(a). (Doc. 51). 

 Defendant Lewis then filed a Motion to set aside this default and a Motion to 

strike Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Service (Doc. 43). (Doc. 52). In response, Plaintiff opposes 

Defendant Lewis’ motions. (Doc. 55). Plaintiff also moves for default judgment to be 

entered against Defendant Lewis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). (Doc. 

56). 

II. Defendant Lewis’ Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 52) 

 Defendant Lewis requests that this Court set aside the “default judgment against 

[him] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 55.” (Doc 52). However, 

the Court has only granted a default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) and has 

not granted a default judgment under Rule 55(b). See e.g. Symantec Corp. v. Global 

Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2009). As a result, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60 does not apply here because there has not been a judgment issued. 

 The Court may set aside the entry of default if good cause is shown. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55(c). In determining whether good cause has been shown, the Court considers: 1) 

whether there was culpable conduct on the part of the defendant; 2) whether any 

meritorious defenses are available, and 3) whether there is any prejudice to the plaintiff. 

See TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001). This 

standard “is the same as is used to determine whether a default judgment should be set 

aside under Rule 60(b).” United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 

615 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he party seeking to vacate a default judgment 

bears the burden of demonstrating that these factors favor vacating the judgment.” TCI 

Grp. Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d at 696. This burden, however, is not “extraordinarily 

heavy.” Id. at 700. 

 Essentially, Defendant Lewis argues the default entered against him should be set 

aside because he was never personally served as is required by Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 4. (Doc. 52 at 1-5). As will be discussed more fully herein, there is confusion 

regarding the document in the record purporting to be a waiver of service on behalf of 

Defendant Lewis. (Doc. 35). Nonetheless, the Court will analyze whether Defendant 

Lewis has made the proper showing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) to set 

aside the default entered against him.

A. Culpable Conduct 

“A defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice 

of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan, 

244 F.3d at 697. Intentional conduct, in this context, must rise to the level of conduct 

which is willful, deliberate, or done in bad faith. Id. at 697-98. Thus, the behavior must 

be inexcusable. Here, there is no evidence that Defendant Lewis deliberately failed to 

answer. Accordingly, there is no culpable conduct to consider. 

B. Meritorious Defenses 

To establish that a meritorious defense exists, Defendant must allege specific facts 

that would constitute a defense. Id at 700. “The defendant’s burden in this respect is not 

extraordinarily heavy.” Kajander v. Phoenix, No. CV-09-02164-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 

653386 at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2010). The Court need not conclude that Defendant will 

prevail on the alleged defense to determine that this factor weighs in favor of setting 

aside default. See Apache Nitrogen Prod., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 674, 682 

(D. Ariz. 1993). Instead, the Court need only find that after a trial on the merits, the 

alleged defense may cause a different result than default. Id. 

Defendant Lewis raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 52 at 5). 

Defendant Lewis argues he was not properly served and, as a result, this Court does not 

have personal jurisdiction over him. (Id.) In support of this, Defendant Lewis submits a 

Declaration on behalf of Kelly Dudley which states Mr. Dudley “did not receive and 

[does] not have authority to waive service of the Complaint on behalf of Defendant Kevin 

Lewis.” (Doc. 52-1 at 3). Because the waiver of service used to establish personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant Lewis was signed by Mr. Dudley (Doc. 35), Mr. Dudley’s 

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declaration that he does not have authority to waive service on behalf of Defendant Lewis 

constitutes sufficient facts to support Defendant Lewis’ defense of lack of personal 

jurisdiction. The Court finds that Defendant Lewis has brought forward facts from the 

record that support his defense. As such, Defendant Lewis has established that a 

meritorious defense exists. 

 C. Prejudice to the Plaintiff 

In order to qualify as prejudice to the plaintiff, the Court considers the extent to 

which the plaintiff’s “ability to pursue his claim will be hindered.” FOC Fin. Ltd. P’ship 

v. Nat’l City Commercial Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (D. Ariz. 2009). 

Further, “to be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm 

than simply delaying resolution of the case.” Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. 

Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1095. 

 Here, setting aside the default against Defendant Lewis would result in the case 

proceeding on the merits. “Merely being forced to litigate on the merits cannot be 

considered prejudicial for purposes of lifting a default judgment.” TCI Grp. Life Ins. 

Plan, 244 F.3d at 701. Additionally, because Plaintiff has proceeded with his case with 

respect to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiffs ability to pursue his claim will not be 

hindered. As a result, setting aside the default entered against Defendant Lewis will not 

prejudice the Plaintiff.

Thus, based on these factors, and the general preference for resolving cases on 

their merits, see O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court 

concludes that the entry of default in this case should be set aside. 

III. Defendant Lewis’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 52) 

 Defendant Lewis argues that the Waiver of the Service of Summons attached to 

the Process Receipt and Return for Defendant Lewis (Doc. 35 at 2) was fraudulently 

prepared by Plaintiff and is merely a photocopy of the Waiver of the Service of Summons 

attached to the Process Receipt and Return for Defendant Ryan (Doc. 36 at 2). (Doc. 52 

at 4). Defendant Lewis further argues that the Process Receipt and Return for Defendant 

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Lewis (Doc. 35 at 1) was not fully executed and is invalid under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4. (Doc. 52 at 3-4). Defendant Lewis finally argues that, because service was 

invalid under Rule 4, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction and thus should dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lewis. (Id. at 2, 4).1

The Court has considered Defendant Lewis’ argument that the Waiver of Service 

for Defendant Lewis (Doc. 35 at 2) is simply a copy of the Waiver of Service for 

Defendant Ryan (Doc. 36 at 2). (Doc. 52 at 4). In comparing the two documents, there 

are several differences that indicate the Waiver of Service for Defendant Lewis is not just 

a copy of the Waiver of Service for Defendant Ryan. For example, in the date line on 

each document, the “12” is different. Compare Doc. 35 at 2, with Doc. 36 at 2. In 

addition, the signature of Dudley above the “signature of the attorney or unrepresented 

party” line is shorter in Waiver of Service for Defendant Ryan than Dudley’s signature on 

the same line in the Waiver of Service for Defendant Lewis. Id. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that Defendant Lewis has not shown that Plaintiff fraudulently prepared the Waiver 

of Service and merely submitted a photocopy. 

 Defendant next argues that on the Process Receipt and Return for Defendant 

Lewis, the box on the bottom half of the page certifying that service was or was not 

completed is not checked. (Doc. 35 at 1). Upon review, the Court observes this is correct. 

Accordingly, it appears that service upon Defendant Lewis was indeed defective. 

 However, based on the record before the Court, it appears properly that there is 

some confusion as to whether the Marshall believed that service was affected upon 

Defendant Lewis. First, Plaintiff was charged the eight dollar service fee by the U.S. 

Marshal for service of Defendant Lewis. (Doc. 35 at 1). Second, while the U.S. Marshal 

did not check the box indicating he personally served Defendant Lewis, the U.S. Marshal 

 

1

 Defendant Lewis has not filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, based on the 

language and requests in Defendant Lewis’ Motion to Set Aside the Default and Motion 

to Strike, the Court construes Defendant Lewis’ Motion to Strike as a Motion to Dismiss. 

As a result, the issue before the Court is whether or not Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Lewis should be dismissed for inadequate service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. 

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also did not check the box indicating he was unable to serve Defendant Lewis. As a 

result, Plaintiff’s assertion that he received verification from the U.S. Marshal which he 

believed to be an adequate waiver of service is supported by the Record. Accordingly, the 

Court will not grant Defendant Lewis’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Service. 

 Further, the Court will not penalize the Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, for his reliance 

on the actions of the U.S. Marshal Service. Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (“we hold that an incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is 

entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of the summons and complaint, and, 

having provided the necessary information to help effectuate service, plaintiff should not 

be penalized by having his or her action dismissed for failure to effect service”). As a 

result, consistent with Pruett, the Court denies Defendant Lewis’ request to dismiss the 

claims against him based on ineffective service. 

 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff an additional 60 days to effectuate service 

through the U.S. Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In the 

alternative, Defendant Lewis may file notice with the court that he will waive service. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 56) 

 The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion as moot because the default in this case is set 

aside and Plaintiff must first have a default to be granted a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55. 

V. Conclusion 

Based on the forgoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant Lewis’ Motion 

to Set Aside Default and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Service as follows: 

Defendant Lewis’ Motion to set aside default (Doc. 52) is granted, and the Motion to 

Strike the Waiver of Service (Doc. 52) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, 

Defendant Lewis may file a waiver of service with the Court. If Defendant Lewis does 

not file a waiver of service with the Court within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, 

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IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a new service packet 

including the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10), this Order, and a summons for 

Defendant Lewis. Plaintiff must complete and return this service packet to the Clerk of 

the Court within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. The United States 

Marshall will not provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. If 

Plaintiff does not complete service of the Summons and Complaint on the Defendant 

within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, the action may be dismissed as to 

Defendant Lewis. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Defendant Lewis requires personal service 

rather than filing the waiver of service with the Court within ten (10) days of the date of 

this Order, costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting aside default entered against Defendant 

Lewis on January 16, 2013. (Doc. 51). 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 

56) is denied. 

 Dated this 9th day of July, 2013. 

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