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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 2002

Decided September 19, 2002

Filed October 4, 2002

No. 02-5133

Marijuana Policy Project, et al.,

Appellees

v.

United States of America,

Appellant

District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02595)

Michael S. Raab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Mark B. Stern and Alisa B.

Klein, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Alexei M. Silverman argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Gregg H. Levy and James M. Garland.

Julie M. Carpenter was on the brief for amicus curiae

DKT Liberty Project in support of appellees.

Before: Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges, and Williams,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Through a rider to the District of

Columbia appropriations act, Congress denied the District

authority to "enact ... any law" reducing penalties associated

with possession, use, or distribution of marijuana. The district court declared the rider unconstitutional, finding that it

interfered with D.C. citizens' First Amendment rights to use

the city's ballot initiative process to enact medical marijuana

legislation. Because Article I of the Constitution gives Congress "exclusive" power to define the District of Columbia's

legislative authority, and because the legislative act--in contrast to urging or opposing the enactment of legislation--

implicates no First Amendment concerns, we reverse.

I.

"Congress shall have Power ... [t]o exercise exclusive

Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over ... the Seat of the

Government of the United States." U.S. Const. art. 1, s 8, cl.

17. Pursuant to this authority, Congress exercises "all police

and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal

government would have in legislating for state or local purposes." Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973).

For most of the first 171 years following the District of

Columbia's 1802 incorporation, Congress exercised "exclusive" authority over the District through direct legislation and

appointment of local governors with no input from residents.

Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).

Responding to calls for local self-government, Congress

enacted the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act in 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87

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Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C. Code Ann.

s 1-201.01 et seq.), granting residents the right to elect a

mayor and a D.C. Council. This "Home Rule Act" delegates

to the D.C. Council "legislative power" over "all rightful

subjects of legislation." D.C. Code Ann. ss 1-203.02,

1-204.04. The Act then lists certain matters that are not

rightful subjects: The District may not impose a commuter

tax on non-residents' income; it may not regulate federal

courts, D.C. local courts, or the Commission on Mental

Health; and it may not permit the construction of buildings

taller than then-existing height restrictions. D.C. Code Ann.

s 1-206.02(a)(4)-(a)(8). Even with respect to rightful subjects

of legislation, D.C. Council enactments become law only if

Congress declines to pass a joint resolution of disapproval

within thirty days (or sixty days in the case of criminal laws).

D.C. Code Ann. s 1-206.02(c)(1)-(c)(2). Moreover, Congress

expressly reserves the right to enact legislation concerning

the District on any subject and to repeal D.C. Council enactments at any time. D.C. Code Ann. s 1-206.01. Finally, the

Act prohibits District officers and employees from expending

any funds unless authorized to do so by Congress. D.C. Code

Ann. s 1-204.46.

In 1978, the D.C. Council established (and Congress did not

disapprove of) a ballot initiative process. Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendments Act of 1977, D.C. Code

Ann. s 1-204.101 et seq. An initiative proposal approved by a

majority of the electorate "shall be an act of the Council."

D.C. Code Ann. s 1-204.105. The initiative process is subject

to the same legislative restrictions as the D.C. Council, including the congressional veto power and substantive limits

on taxing commuters, authorizing tall buildings, and regulating federal and local courts. See Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 889,

897 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).

The D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, the gatekeeper for

the initiative process, is charged with determining whether a

proposed measure constitutes a "proper subject" for an initiative. D.C. Code Ann. s 1-1001.16(b)(1). The Board of Elections may not accept initiatives that conflict with powers

granted to the D.C. Council in the Home Rule Act, that

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authorize discrimination prohibited by the D.C. Human

Rights Act, D.C. Code Ann. s 2-1401.01 et seq., or that negate

or limit budget acts of the D.C. Council. D.C. Code Ann.

s 1-1001.16(b)(1). Only after the Board accepts a proposal

under the "proper subject" standard may proponents

begin to gather signatures. D.C. Code Ann.

s 1-1001.16(c)(1)-.16(j). If five percent of registered voters

sign a petition supporting the proposed initiative, the Board

certifies it for inclusion on the ballot of the next election.

D.C. Code Ann. s 1-1001.16(i), 1-1001.16(p)(1).

Appellee, the Marijuana Policy Project ("MPP"), submitted

the Medical Marijuana Initiative of 2002 to the Board of

Elections for certification as a proper subject. According to

its summary statement, the Initiative would have permitted:

[P]atients suffering from cancer, AIDS, and other debilitating medical conditions to legally use marijuana for the

alleviation of their symptoms, provided they have the

approval of a licensed physician and adhere to the other

limitations and safeguards established by this measure.

This measure also protects from sanctions physicians

who recommend marijuana to patients who might otherwise benefit from it.

The Board of Elections refused to certify the proposal,

citing the so-called Barr Amendment, a rider to the D.C.

appropriations act. Named for its sponsor, Congressman

Bob Barr, the Amendment states that: "None of the funds

contained in this Act may be used to enact or carry out any

law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or distribution of any

schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act

... or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative." Pub. L. No.

107-96, s 127(a), 115 Stat. 923 (2001).

Arguing that the Barr Amendment violates the First

Amendment, the MPP filed suit in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia. On cross motions for

summary judgment, the district court declared the Barr

Amendment unconstitutional, holding that it interferes with

"core political speech." Marijuana Policy Project v. D.C. Bd.

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of Elections & Ethics, 191 F. Supp. 2d 196, 216 (D.D.C. 2002).

The court permanently enjoined the Board from refusing to

certify the Initiative, and the United States now appeals.

Our review is de novo. See Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d

277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (summary judgment reviewed de

novo).

II.

We begin with some preliminary observations. First,

through the Home Rule Act, Congress delegated some, but

not all, of its Article I "exclusive" legislative authority over

the District of Columbia to the D.C. Council. For instance,

only Congress, not the D.C. Council, may impose a commuter

tax or permit buildings above a certain height. The Barr

Amendment's ban on expenditures "to enact ... any law ...

to ... reduce penalties associated with" marijuana adds

another item to this list of matters that, in the words of the

Home Rule Act, are not "rightful subjects of legislation."

The Amendment says only that Congress, not the D.C. Council, may reduce marijuana penalties. Second, the Barr

Amendment's limitation on local legislative power extends not

only to the D.C. Council, but also to the ballot initiative

process--"a power of direct legislation by the electorate."

Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm., 441 A.2d at 897 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see D.C. Code Ann.

s 1-204.105; Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1497 (11th

Cir. 1996) ("[I]n the initiative process people do not seek to

make wishes known to government representatives but instead to enact change by bypassing their representatives

altogether."). The Amendment thus denies D.C. voters any

authority to step into the D.C. Council's shoes and reduce

marijuana penalties themselves. Finally, as is evident from

the parties' fine briefs, this case involves not the pros and

cons of medical marijuana, but rather a straightforward constitutional question: Does the First Amendment restrict Congress's ability to withdraw the District's authority to reduce

marijuana penalties?

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Urging us to answer this question affirmatively, the MPP

argues that the Barr Amendment proscribes "core political

speech," i.e., that it prevents the MPP from "conducting a

petition drive ..., speak[ing] at public Board hearings regarding the initiative ..., [and] signing a formal petition to

place the initiative on the ballot." Appellees' Brief at 12.

The Barr Amendment, however, restricts no speech; to the

contrary, medical marijuana advocates remain free to lobby,

petition, or engage in other First Amendment-protected activities to reduce marijuana penalties. The Barr Amendment

merely requires that, in order to have legal effect, their

efforts must be directed to Congress rather than to the D.C.

legislative process.

The MPP, moreover, cites no case, nor are we aware of

one, establishing that limits on legislative authority--as opposed to limits on legislative advocacy--violate the First

Amendment. This is not surprising, for although the First

Amendment protects public debate about legislation, it confers no right to legislate on a particular subject. For example, by enacting expressly preemptive statutes, Congress

limits state authority to legislate on the same subject. See,

e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383

(1992) (federal statute, providing that no state shall "enact[ ]

or enforc[e] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other

provision" relating to certain airline services, preempts state

law); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983)

(Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, providing that ERISA shall supersede "any and all State laws

insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee

benefit plan," preempts state law); Jones v. Rath Packing

Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530 n.17 (1977) (federal statute, providing

that meat inspection requirements "in addition to, or different

than, those made under this Act may not be imposed by any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia," preempts

state law). Yet no one would argue that such limitations

violate the First Amendment rights of state voters who

supported the preempted legislation. If Congress can

preempt state legislation without running afoul of the First

Amendment, then, in view of Congress's "exclusive" Article I

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authority over the District of Columbia, it can certainly limit

D.C. legislative authority without violating D.C. voters' First

Amendment rights.

The MPP argues that the Barr Amendment amounts to

unconstitutional "viewpoint discrimination" because by prohibiting the District from reducing but not increasing marijuana penalties, it "silences one side of the medical marijuana

debate while allowing the other side full access to the District's ballot initiative process." Appellees' Br. at 19. We

disagree. For one thing, if the Constitution permits Congress--as it surely does--to reserve for itself "exclusive"

authority to enact marijuana legislation, it certainly permits

Congress to retain for itself the more limited authority to

reduce marijuana penalties. Moreover, the Barr Amendment

silences no one; it merely shifts the focus of debate between

medical marijuana supporters and their opponents from the

D.C. legislative process--the D.C. Council or ballot initiative--to Congress. To be sure, a ballot initiative could be

used to increase marijuana penalties, but opponents, including

the MPP, may utilize all of their First Amendment-protected

tools to resist such efforts. In other words, whatever the

issue and wherever the debate occurs, whether over reducing

marijuana penalties (in Congress) or increasing penalties (in

either Congress or the District), both sides may fully participate. Congress's decision as to where those debates must

occur does not implicate the First Amendment.

The MPP draws our attention to a line of cases holding that

certain limitations connected with ballot initiatives impermissibly restrict private political speech. E.g., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999)

(overturning various registration requirements for petition

circulators); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (overturning prohibition on professional petition circulators). In none

of these cases, however, did anyone question whether the

ballot initiative at issue addressed a proper subject. The

cases thus cast no light on the issue before us--whether a

legislature can withdraw a subject from the initiative process

altogether.

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The only circuit court we know to have addressed this issue

has also concluded that the First Amendment imposes no

restriction on the withdrawal of subject matters from the

initiative process. In Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050

(10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit held that a state supreme

court decision removing an abortion initiative from the ballot

did not violate a voter's First Amendment rights:

[R]emoving [the proposal] from the ballot ... has not

prevented [the voter] from speaking on any subject. She

is free to argue against legalized abortion, to contend

that pre-submission content review of initiative petitions

is unconstitutional, or to speak publicly on any other

issue.... Moreover, she cites no law, and we find none,

establishing a right to have a particular proposition on

the ballot.

Id. at 1053.

Nothing in public forum cases, including the limited public

forum cases relied on by the MPP, such as Good News Club

v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (public schools

cannot deny after-school use of facilities to religious programs) and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of

Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (university-funded student publications cannot exclude religious viewpoints), requires a different result. The defining characteristic of traditional and

limited public fora, such as streets, parks, public school

facilities, and student newspapers, is that they are "devoted

to assembly and debate" or "opened for use by the public as a

place for expressive activity." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry

Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Although

places designated for the expression of views about legislation--the grounds of the U.S. Capitol, for example, Lederman

v. United States, 291 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002)--share these

characteristics, the legislative act itself, i.e., the voting that

occurs inside the Capitol, does not. The same is true for the

ballot initiative process: That process certainly stimulates

First Amendment-protected debate and discussion, but no

case holds that the act of voting in a ballot initiative--a

legislative act--is itself a public forum.

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The MPP relies on Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531

U.S. 533 (2001), which held that Congress could not bar

federally funded legal services lawyers from challenging the

constitutionality of state or federal welfare statutes. Velazquez, however, has nothing to do with this case not only

because the decision rests on limited public forum doctrine,

but also because of its unique concern with a "serious and

fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the

functioning of the judiciary." Id. at 544. In contrast, the

Barr Amendment does not prohibit "speech necessary to the

proper functioning" of the legislative process. Id. The

Amendment merely removes a subject from that process

altogether.

In sum, the Barr Amendment's limitation on District of

Columbia legislative authority restricts no First Amendment

right. Ruling otherwise would not only run counter to the

very nature of the legislative act, but would require Congress,

should it really want to deprive D.C. voters of authority to

enact marijuana legislation (as opposed to subsequently overturning their decision to do so), to repeal the initiative process

altogether or even the Home Rule Act itself. Mindful of the

Supreme Court's admonition against producing "less speech,

not more"--in this case, First Amendment-protected activity

surrounding the initiative process--by putting the government to an "all-or-nothing choice," Ark. Educ. Television

Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998), we reverse the

district court's decision and vacate its injunction.

So ordered.

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