Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01780/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01780-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD LEVINE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF ALAMEDA and JAMES M.

FLINT,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-01780 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Edward Levine has filed this action under 18 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that

defendants violated his procedural due process rights by failing to provide a meaningful

opportunity to be heard prior to his layoff, and that defendants engaged in age discrimination

in violation of California law. Now pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to both claims, arguing that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not

violated, the City can not be liable because there was no policy related to plaintiff’s claims,

and that James Flint, the individual defendant, benefits from qualified immunity. Plaintiff

also filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the Court determine as a matter of

law that his due process rights were violated and that defendants do not benefit from

qualified or any other immunity. After carefully considering the parties’ moving papers,

including supplemental briefing, and with the benefit of two oral arguments, the motions for

summary judgment are both GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired in 1995 by the City of Alameda to perform property management

functions on behalf of the Alameda Reuse and Redevelopment Authority (“ARRA”), a Joint

Powers Authority created by the state pursuant to federal legislation, to oversee the transition

of the former Alameda Naval Air Station from the U.S. Navy to the City of Alameda. In

1999, plaintiff received civil service status by the City and was given the job title of

Economic Development Manager and later Leasing and Property Manager. In 2002,

plaintiff’s classification was changed from Leasing and Property Manager to Golf Course

Project Manager in recognition of his transition from his previous duties to planning and

managing the development of a golf course and resort project on the former Alameda Naval

Air Station. 

On February 17, 2004, defendant Flint informed plaintiff by letter that plaintiff would

be laid off, effective February 27, 2004. Defendants contend that the layoff was required

because the ARRA decided to cease funding plaintiff’s position because it was suspending

development efforts on the golf course and resort. On February 25, 2004, plaintiff responded

to Flint’s letter, requesting a pretermination hearing. Later in the letter, he also requested a 

“due process hearing by a neutral third party regarding the basis of [Flint’s] layoff decision.” 

Plaintiff further asserted that the basis for his layoff represented “a sham and a pretext” for

the basis of his actual termination, which he argues was Flint’s personal dislike for him. 

On February 26, 2004, Director of Human Resources, Karen Willis, at the request of

Flint, wrote a letter to plaintiff telling him that he would not receive a pretermination hearing

and that he was not entitled to a hearing before a third party because such action was not

provided in plaintiff’s union contract with the City. Further, Willis indicated that she would

“be happy to meet with [plaintiff] to listen to [plaintiff’s] concerns and answer any questions

regarding layoff procedures[,] post layoff and retirement benefits.”

On either February 26 or 27, 2004, Willis and plaintiff had a five-minute, informal

discussion when plaintiff was in Willis’ office for other reasons. Based on the record, its

unclear what actually was discussed at that meeting, but by all accounts the conversation did

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not include an extensive discussion of plaintiff’s layoff. Plaintiff testified in a deposition that

although he cannot remember what they talked about, “it was obviously about this whole

matter, the process, the procedures,” and probably included plaintiff asserting his belief that

his layoff was based on a “fantasy” and that “something was going on with” Flint. Willis

testified in her deposition that she asked plaintiff if he had received her letter and he

allegedly told her that he had and he was pursuing other avenues. On February 27, plaintiff

was laid off from his job with the City of Alameda.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff initially filed this action on May 5, 2004, and included causes of action for a

violation of his procedural due process rights and for age discrimination. Plaintiff has filed a

statement of non-opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment on its second

claim for age discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. As a

result, that claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

1. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient

evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a

dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A principal purpose of the

summary judgment procedure “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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2. Pre-Termination Due Process

A. Legal Standard for Pre-Termination Due Process

A procedural due process analysis requires the examination of two questions: whether

plaintiff had a protected property interest in his continued employment and, if so, whether he

received all the process that was due if deprived of this interest. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Clements v. Airport Authority of Washoe Cty., 69 F.3d

321, 331 (9th Cir. 1995). Neither party disputes that plaintiff had a protected property

interest. The only disputed issue is whether plaintiff received the process he was due.

Under a due process analysis, plaintiff must receive notice and an opportunity to be

heard “before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Clements, 69 F.3d at 331;

see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (noting that “the root requirement of the Due Process

Clause” is that “an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of

any significant property interest”) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). The Court does not require an “elaborate” pretermination hearing, only that “some

kind of hearing” be afforded to the employee prior to termination. Id. In general,

“something less” than a full evidentiary hearing is required prior to termination. Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 545.

B. Plaintiff’s Opportunity to Be Heard

Here, plaintiff received notice of his termination, in writing, from Flint on February

17, 2004, outlining the reason for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff does not dispute receiving

this letter, nor its contents. The notice requirement was thus met, leaving only the question

of whether plaintiff received the requisite meaningful opportunity to respond. 

Before analyzing the substance and quality of any opportunity to be heard to

determine whether it is sufficiently “meaningful,” the Court first must determine whether

there existed an opportunity to be heard in any form. Defendants assert in their brief that

Willis’ letter of February 26 to plaintiff where she said she “would be happy to meet with

you to listen to your concerns and answer any questions regarding layoff procedures, postlayoff and retirement benefits,” and their subsequent meeting satisfied this requirement. See

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1Even if Willis considered plaintiff’s request to be one seeking a full evidentiary hearing rather

than a simple opportunity to be heard, it is immaterial to the Court’s inquiry whether defendant provided

some opportunity to be heard in the first place. See Willis Depo at 124:15-21. 

5

Letter to Ed Levine, Decl. of Linda Tripoli Part Two, at 39. Willis’ letter, however, also

denied plaintiff’s request for a pretermination hearing, asserting that such a hearing was

unavailable in the context of a layoff. Id. In his letter of February 25, plaintiff had requested

a pretermination hearing. See Letter to James M. Flint, Decl. of Linda Tripoli Part Two at

38. Willis and plaintiff informally met for “less than five minutes” following this exchange

of letters when plaintiff had coincidentally stopped into the Human Resources office. See

Willis Depo. at 106:15-18.

Defendants concede that, even under circumstances of a layoff, plaintiff is entitled to

an opportunity to respond to the City’s decision. Yet in effect, defendants urge the Court to

rule that plaintiff received an opportunity to be heard because Willis offered such an

opportunity in her February 26 letter and then met with plaintiff thereafter. If such an

opportunity never materialized, defendants argue, it is because plaintiff never requested a

meeting with Willis after receiving her letter. The Court is not persuaded by defendants’

argument.

First, plaintiff expressly requested a hearing prior to his termination to voice his

objections to the purported reason for his layoff. Willis’ letter clearly states that plaintiff is

not entitled to a pretermination hearing. While a full evidentiary hearing may not have been

required in this context, some opportunity to be heard was required. Yet defendant did not

provide such an opportunity.1 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. Due process requirements

establish that it is defendants’ responsibility to provide an opportunity to be heard. See

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (“The tenured public employee is entitled to ... an opportunity to

present his side of the story.”). Defendants contend that there is no due process violation

because plaintiff did not request a meeting a second time after the exchange of letters. See

Willis Depo. at 82:21-24. Yet it was unnecessary for plaintiff to request such an opportunity

in the first place. To require plaintiff to do so twice places an excessive burden on the

plaintiff that exceeds the bounds of the Constitution. The fact that plaintiff requested a

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2This is a generous assumption because Willis acknowledges that she was not the “ultimate

authority for deciding personnel matters.” See Willis Depo at 107:11-22. Nor was she acting as the

decision-maker’s intermediary such that she intended to report back to Flint the substance of any

discussion with plaintiff. Id. at 108:16-22 (noting that plaintiff would have needed to show new

information as to why the layoff was improper before she would discuss the issue with Flint).

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 hearing only underscores the material failure by defendants to provide an opportunity to be

heard.

Second, defendants’ assertion that an offer from the Director of Human Resources to

listen to concerns and answer any questions pertaining to purely procedural matters does not

satisfy the requirements of due process. In Loudermill, the Court stated that the purpose of

requiring an opportunity to respond is so that “even where the facts are clear, the

appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful

opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision-maker is likely to be before the

termination takes effect.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. Further, the Court noted that “a prior

hearing facilitates the consideration of whether a permissible course of action is also an

appropriate one.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, n.8. Even assuming arguendo that Willis has

sufficient authority to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard, her offer as it is written,

particularly in light of the fact that she goes on to deny a “predetermination [sic] hearing,”

does not provide an opportunity to respond with sufficient clarity and purpose to satisfy

constitutional due process requirements under Loudermill and its progeny.2 In light of the

insufficient offer of an opportunity to be heard, the subsequent haphazard and informal fiveminute discussion between plaintiff and Willis cannot satisfy due process, either. Willis

stated in her deposition that she “happened to see [plaintiff]” when he had entered the human

resources department, and she “invited him into my office.” Willis Depo. at 105:7-10. 

While only “some kind of hearing” is necessary to satisfy due process requirements, a

random encounter of less than five minutes without a clear understanding of the purpose of

the meeting cannot qualify as a sufficient opportunity to be heard. In fact, a fair reading of

the substance and context of Willis’ offer more appropriately resembles a procedural exit

 interview than a meaningful opportunity to be heard sufficient to satisfy due process

requirements. This argument therefore fails, as well.

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Based on all of the above, the Court finds that plaintiff was not afforded a proper

opportunity to be heard prior to his termination and that his constitutional due process rights

were violated. Therefore, the Court need not address whether the actual substance of the

meeting between Willis and plaintiff was sufficiently “meaningful” to satisfy due process,

nor whether Willis was sufficiently impartial to satisfy constitutional requirements.

3. Defendant Flint’s Qualified Immunity

A. Legal Standard for Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “‘provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;’”

defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law

requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the

plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, then proceed to

determine if the right was “clearly established.” See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999);

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). The threshold question is whether the facts

alleged show the govenrment official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201. If a violation could be found based on the allegations, the next sequential step is

to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

person that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. If the law is

determined to be clearly established, the next question is whether, under that law, a

reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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B. Application of Qualified Immunity

As explained above, the first prong of the qualified immunity has been satisfied

because defendant Flint was city manager for Alameda and he deprived the plaintiff of his

due process rights by failing to provide an opportunity to be heard prior to his termination. 

Furthermore, there is no dispute that constitutional due process rights are clearly established.

Therefore, the inquiry here centers around whether defendant Flint could have reasonably

believed that his conduct was lawful. If so, he receives qualified immunity. 

There is no dispute that Flint intended to satisfy plaintiff’s due process rights after

receiving his letter of February 25. See Flint Depo at 72 (testifying that he instructed Willis

“to do whatever you need to do to make sure that his due process rights are respected”). As

the ultimate authority on personnel matters and the one who terminated plaintiff, defendant

Flint is liable for the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional due process rights. Moreover,

by forwarding plaintiff’s letter to Willis, he effectively assigned her to be his agent in this

matter. Willis, in turn, consulted with the city attorney’s office before responding to

plaintiff’s letter. 

It is evident from Willis’ letter to plaintiff and her deposition that she interpreted

plaintiff’s request for a “pretermination hearing” as a request for a formal evidentiary hearing

akin to the process required under a termination for cause. Willis was wrong to believe she

had complied with due process, but she was not unreasonable in believing so. This

conclusion is further supported by the fact that she subsequently asked plaintiff in their brief

conversation why he had not requested a meeting with her. See Willis Depo at 106:20-24. 

While it was the City’s responsibility to provide the opportunity to be heard (and not

plaintiff’s to request it), Willis reasonably believed that she was providing that opportunity

by asking plaintiff if he wanted to meet with her about his termination. Willis’ mistake was

not a result of a failure to understand, or an unreasonable application of, the relevant law. 

She, with the help of the city attorney’s office, understood that notice and an opportunity to

be heard was required; rather, she merely mistakenly believed that she was complying with

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due process requirements. As a result, the Court finds that Flint, both individually and

through Willis, his agent, benefits from qualified immunity in this matter. 

4. City’s Liability Under § 1983

A. Legal Standard for Municipal Liability Under § 1983

A city can be sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983

where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). To establish such municipal liability, a plaintiff must satisfy four conditions: “(1)

that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference' to the

plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the

constitutional violation.’” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted)). 

B. Application of Municipal and Official’s Liability Under § 1983

Defendants correctly assert that plaintiff did not “plead and prove the existence of a

policy, regulation, ordinance or decision officially adopted by the entity’s officers denying

employees due process in connection with their layoff.” Further, the City never officially

adopted a regulation, ordinance or decision advocating a denial of due process when

terminating employees. 

Plaintiff argued at oral argument that a single act made by an individual with final

policymaking authority can become an official policy for Monell purposes. See Pembaur v.

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) ( holding that “where action is directed by those

who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that

action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly”); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694

(holding that liability may be imposed based on actions of officials “whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy”). Yet “[t]he fact that a particular official--even a

policymaking official--has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without

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more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.” Pembaur, 475

U.S. at 481-482 (emphasis added). While defendant Flint evidently had final authority over

whether plaintiff should have been terminated, plaintiff offers no evidence that he had final

policymaking authority for the City such that his decision to terminate plaintiff in a manner

that violated due process could be deemed to be the policy of the City. Moreover, the facts

of this case do not support such a proposition. Defendant Flint made an individualized

decision to terminate plaintiff and he apparently intended for the termination to be conducted

in accordance with due process requirements. The fact that he was mistaken in his belief

does not mean that his decision established a city policy to deny terminated employees their

due process rights. Therefore, the Court holds that the Monell claim is denied and the City

bears no liability for the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional due process rights.

5. Remedy

The appropriate remedy for deprivation of a property interest without due process “is

to order the process that was due and any attendant damages which directly resulted from the

failure to give the proper procedure.” Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1551 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In his complaint, plaintiff prays for legal and equitable relief, including a declaratory

judgment, reinstatement, back pay and other monetary damages. Yet because the City is not

liable under section 1983, and because defendant Flint benefits from qualified immunity,

plaintiff’s deprivation of his constitutional due process right cannot be remedied by money

damages. As a result, plaintiff is only entitled to equitable relief against defendant Flint only.

A. Equitable Relief

1) Reinstatement

The Ninth Circuit has held that reinstatement is only appropriate when “another

substantive right coexists with the right to procedural due process.” Gebbie, 859 F.2d at

1552 (refusing to recognize reinstatement as an available remedy when the only right alleged

is a procedural due process right). Plaintiff only asserts a procedural due process right here

and is therefore not entitled to reinstatement.

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2) Back Pay

The Ninth Circuit has held that an award of back pay against a city is considered

equitable relief. See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472

n.1 (9th Cir. 1993). Yet such relief is not generally characterized as an equitable remedy as

to an individual defendant, and is certainly not available when an individual defendant has

qualified immunity. Id. Similarly, here, where the individual defendant benefits from

qualified immunity, back pay is not an available remedy.

B. Appropriate Remedy

Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment to the effect that his constitutional due

process rights were violated by defendant Flint. Plaintiff may also receive the due process

that was denied him. In this case, he must receive a meaningful opportunity to be heard

regarding his objections to his layoff. After this extensive litigation, the Court finds that any

individual working for the City is not sufficiently neutral to provide a proper opportunity to

be heard. As a result, the Court orders defendant Flint to provide a meaningful opportunity

to be heard before a neutral third-party to be determined by mutual agreement between the

parties. Defendant Flint shall bear all costs for the neutral arbiter.

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G:\CRBALL\2004\1780\orderresj.wpd 12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, both motions for summary judgment are GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to an

assertion of a due process violation is GRANTED. Defendant Flint’s assertion of qualified

immunity is GRANTED. The City’s assertion of non-liability under Monell is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff shall receive an opportunity to be heard consistent with this Order. The parties are

ORDERED to appear before the Court for a status conference on Friday, February 10, 2006,

at 8:30 am.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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