Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00225/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00225-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEXTER BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAHIR NASEER, et al.,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:14-0225 WBS CKD P

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Dexter Brown (“Brown”), a prisoner proceeding 

pro se, brought this action for violation of his civil rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 primarily alleging violations of his 

Eighth Amendment rights. Before the court is Defendant Sahir 

Naseer’s (“Naseer”) motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 47). 

The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

On July 7, 2016, the magistrate judge filed findings 

and recommendations (Docket No. 64) in which she recommended that 

the action be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 

Case 2:14-cv-00225-WBS-CKD Document 65 Filed 10/12/16 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

remedies. As the court will resolve the motion based on the 

merits of Brown’s claim, the court expresses no opinion as to 

whether Brown properly exhausted his administrative remedies. 

The court also does not address whether Naseer is entitled to 

qualified immunity.

I. Factual Background and Procedural Background

In Brown’s Third Amended Complaint, he alleges that 

between September 29 and October 1, 2013, he suffered from chest 

pain, muscle weakness, nausea, vomiting, and other symptoms 

consistent with too much potassium in the blood, a condition 

known as hyperkalemia. Brown alleges that while he was suffering 

from these symptoms, Naseer, a physician at the California Health 

Care Facility in Stockton, wrote medical orders placing him on 

fluid restrictions, “thereby preventing plaintiff from 

implementing counter-measures to abate the toxicity of potassium 

in plaintiff’s blood.” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 6. 

Brown also alleges that Naseer directed medical staff 

not to run various tests or send Brown to receive emergency 

medical services. On October 1, 2013, Brown’s chest pain and 

other symptoms worsened and he was sent to San Joaquin General 

Hospital, where tests revealed he was hyperkalemic with a 

critical potassium level. 

As a result of these actions, Brown filed a complaint 

against Naseer and other defendants. After Brown filed multiple 

amended complaints, the magistrate judge screened the Third 

Amended Complaint in her December 2, 2014 Findings and 

Recommendations and found 1) it stated a claim upon which relief 

can be granted under the Eighth Amendment against defendant 

Case 2:14-cv-00225-WBS-CKD Document 65 Filed 10/12/16 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Naseer but 2) all other claims and defendants should be 

dismissed. The court adopted the Findings and Recommendations on 

February 24, 2015. Defendant Naseer later filed the instant 

motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Brown’s Eighth 

Amendment claim. 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the

nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden,

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Case 2:14-cv-00225-WBS-CKD Document 65 Filed 10/12/16 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 252.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 

255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff

must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference 

to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104 (1976). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 

standard,” and it requires more than a showing that prison 

officials were negligent or even grossly negligent. Toguchi v. 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff must 

show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s 

pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006). A difference of medical opinion regarding a prisoner’s 

treatment “does not amount to a deliberate indifference to [the 

prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

III. Discussion

Case 2:14-cv-00225-WBS-CKD Document 65 Filed 10/12/16 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Here, Brown has not shown anything more than a 

difference of opinion as to the proper diagnosis and treatment of 

his condition. Brown concedes that he was on dialysis at the 

time of his treatment and that excessive fluid intake in dialysis 

patients can lead to fluid retention, which can cause fluid to 

accumulate in the lungs, respiratory failure, and subsequent 

death. Brown also concedes that he had engaged in drinking large 

amounts of water in the past in order to self-medicate himself, 

and he further concedes that Naseer placed him on fluid 

restrictions to prevent him from drinking copious amounts of 

water. The facts that Brown believed he was never at risk for 

respiratory failure or death from this practice and that Brown 

believed Naseer intended to harm him do not raise a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether Naseer was deliberately 

indifferent.1 

In essence, Brown contends that he should have been 

allowed to self-medicate with water to treat hyperkalemia and 

that he should have been tested and treated for hyperkalemia, in 

light of his symptoms. However, he provides no admissible 

evidence that his preferred treatment was an appropriate 

treatment for his condition, much less that Naseer was 

deliberately indifferent by refusing such treatment, in light of 

the undisputed risks of such treatment for dialysis patients. 

Nor do the facts that a subsequent blood test showed an elevated 

 

1 Similarly, Brown’s vague statements about individuals 

adding potassium to his diet and similar claims that others 

intended to harm him are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Naseer was deliberately indifferent. 

Case 2:14-cv-00225-WBS-CKD Document 65 Filed 10/12/16 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

potassium level, or that as Brown contends, he exhibited symptoms 

consistent with hyperkalemia, show that Naseer was deliberately 

indifferent by refusing to test his potassium levels or give him 

an EKG, without any competent evidence showing, for example, how 

other doctors would have responded to such symptoms. Viewing the 

facts in the light most favorable to Brown, the record supports 

only a potential claim for negligence, not deliberate 

indifference.2

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Naseer’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

Dated: October 11, 2016

 

2 Brown contends in his amended response to Naseer’s 

motion for summary judgment that Naseer did not address his 

arguments regarding “compulsory medical treatment.” However, 

while Brown’s Third Amended Complaint does mention his attempt to 

refuse fluid restrictions, it is unclear how any compulsory 

medical treatment in the form of fluid restrictions would 

constitute a cognizable claim aside from the denial of adequate 

medical care under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 

Moreover, the magistrate judge’s December 2, 2014 Findings and 

Recommendations, which were adopted in full by the court, found 

that Brown stated a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment 

only, and thus only Brown’s Eighth Amendment claim is properly 

before the court. 

Case 2:14-cv-00225-WBS-CKD Document 65 Filed 10/12/16 Page 6 of 6