Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02112/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02112-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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1 Defendant Michael T. McCarty filed his renewed motion for attorneys’ fees [doc.

#80] that is addressed in a separate order.

2 Defendants sought attorney's fees in the amount of $118,331.25, based on 330.75

hours incurred in working on this matter prior to the granting of defendants’ motions and in

preparing the motion for attorneys’ fees. 

05cv2112

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOAN BROWN KEARNEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

FOLEY AND LARDNER, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 05-CV-2112-L(LSP)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[doc. #78]

Defendants Foley and Lardner, LLC, and two individuals, Gregory V. Moser and Larry L.

Marshall (collectively “Foley” or “defendants”)1

 sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$118,331.252

 as the prevailing parties in the above-captioned case based on the Court’s Order

granting defendants’ motion to strike and to dismiss. Plaintiff opposed the motion contending it

was untimely, sought excessive fees, and attempted to obtain attorneys’ fees for the entire action

rather than just that portion of fees associated with the motion to strike brought under the antiCase 3:05-cv-02112-AJB-JLB Document 87 Filed 10/22/08 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
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3 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” Briggs

v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1109 n.1 (1999). The purpose of the

statute, California Code of Civil Procedure §325.16, is to protect individuals from meritless,

harassing lawsuits whose purpose is to chill protected expression.

2 05cv2112

SLAPP3 statute. The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion for attorneys’ fees

finding that defendants were entitled to all reasonable attorneys’ fees associated with the entirety

of defendants’ motion to strike and reasonable attorneys’ fees for their motion to dismiss the

federal claims insofar as the work preformed on their dismissal motion was premised on the

Noerr-Pennington doctrine and/or litigation privilege but not otherwise. 

The Court also reviewed the relevant law concerning the determination of reasonable

attorneys’ fees: A reasonable fee is determined by reference to “the ‘lodestar’ figure, which is

the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). A reasonable hourly rate “is that prevailing

in the community for similar work.” PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (2000).

In denying in part defendants’ motion, the Court found defendants had not provided any

evidence that their fees were the prevailing rate in this area for this type of case. The Court also

found that many of defense counsels’ time records were vague and therefore, the Court could not

determine whether the time billed was directed to the motion to dismiss in general, the motion to

dismiss based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, or the motion to strike. Further, the Court

found that various entries did not distinguish the time spent on allowable fees from those that

were not. As a result, the Court noted that it must have more complete, detailed information

prior to determining whether the attorneys’ fee award request is reasonable. The Court directed

defendants to file a renewed motion for attorneys’ fees in response to the Court’s Order if they

so desired. Defendants have filed a renewed motion to which plaintiff objects.

Renewed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

In renewing their motion for attorneys’ fees, defendants’ contend that they have reviewed

the bills for their rendered service; identified time entries relating in whole or in part to the antiSLAPP motion or their Noerr-Pennington or litigation privilege defense; removed entries that do

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not expressly relate in whole or in part to the anti-SLAPP motion or their Noerr-Pennington or

litigation privilege defense; apportioned 40% of the fees for entries related to both the antiSLAPP motion and the separate motion to dismiss; and separately allocated some time entries

that do not fit within the above categories. As a result of the actions taken, defendants state that

the new amount of fees requested is a reduction of 61%, or $72,298.08, from their original fee

request of $118,331.25. 

Defendants have provided additional information about the reasonableness of the fees that

were of concern to the Court, specifically defense counsel’s hourly rates; the nature of the

litigation and the complexity of the issues; the experience of defense counsel; and descriptions of

services provided. 

Even though defendants addressed the issues presented in the Court’s Order, plaintiff

objects to the renewed and reduced attorneys’ fees contending defendants’ hourly rates are

unreasonable; defendants failed to keep specific time records and their renewed fee claims are

based on arbitrary guesswork. The Court disagrees. 

The records defendants kept in the ordinary course of their engagement are sufficient to

award attorneys’ fees. Counsel is not required to perfectly segregate their fees, particularly

when legal theories overlap or coincide as in this case. 

Plaintiff contends that she is prejudiced by defendants’ proposed plan to allocate by

percentages their times because they are not based on objective criteria. Notwithstanding her

argument, plaintiff suggests a similar methodology but at a much lower percentage. (See Opp.

at7-8.) The Court finds that the percentage rates provided by defendants are reasonable and not

based solely on subjective features.

Plaintiff also argues that defendants’ requested rates are inconsistent with the prevailing

rates in this community. Defendants used as comparable rates three large California law firms

that practice in the San Diego area and deal with sophisticated litigation as defendants do. The

prevailing hourly rates charged by the three comparable firms is greater than or substantially

equivalent to the rates charged by defense counsel in this action. Plaintiff’s contention therefore

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is rejected.

Although plaintiff disagrees, defendants also have made a sufficient showing of the

requisite factors used in determining a reasonable fee award. Having considered the complaint,

defendants’ motions, and plaintiff’s oppositions to those motions, the Court regards the nature of

this action as complex. The experience of defense counsel is sufficiently explained in their

motion and declarations. 

Finally, plaintiff points out what she considers various mathematical errors contained in

the declaration of Zebrowski. Defendants concede a typographical error that results in a $200

reduction in their request for fees. Defendants also supplemented the declaration of attorney

Zebrowski to show that during the initial month, February 2006, that counsel represented

defendants, the fees charged for attorney Zebrowski’s services were $600 and for attorney

Klawitter’s services were $360. Beginning in March 2006, those fees were reduced. Klawitter’s

standard billing rate was increased in 2007, but that rate was reduced proportionately for

defendants in this action. The Court finds that the fees sought are set forth and properly

accounted for in support of their motion.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED granting defendants’ motion for attorneys’

fees is GRANTED in the amount of $45,833.17. Arrangements for payment shall be made

within 15 days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 22, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. LEO S. PAPAS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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