Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01544/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01544-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331bv Fed. Question: Bivens-Prisoner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH GEORGE

CDCR #BF-3836,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITED STATES; WILLIAM BARR, 

Attorney General; ANDREW 

RODENSTEIN, Assistant Attorney 

General; JOHN DOE, Director of the 

F.B.I.; JOHN DOE, Director of the 

D.E.A.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-1544-AJB-BLM

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[Doc. No. 2];

2) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION 

FOR JOINDER [Doc. Nos. 5, 7]; 

AND

3) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

Joseph George (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, and currently housed at the 

California Correctional Institution located in Tehachapi, California has filed this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.C.S. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing 

fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2).

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In addition, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Appoint Counsel,” along with a “Motion 

for Joinder.” (Doc. Nos. 5, 7.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his request to proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his 

CDCR Inmate Statement Report. See Doc. No. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These documents show that Plaintiff had an

available balance of zero at the time of filing. Based on this accounting, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of 

a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds 

available to him when payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary 

of the CDCR, or his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the 

installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Complaint

In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney 

General, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration liable for “conspiracy, failure to protect, investigate and 

prosecute, concealing murders, accessory, aiding and abetting, material support.” 

(Compl. at 1-3.)

The Court finds Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is patently frivolous. A pleading is 

“factual[ly] frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the 

wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to 

contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). 

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“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal 

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. . . . 

[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable 

legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 

319, 325 (1989). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the court need not 

accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual 

allegations,” Id. at 327, to determine whether they are “‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or] 

‘delusional,’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims “rise to the level of the irrational or the 

wholly incredible,” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33, and as such, his Complaint requires dismissal 

as frivolous and without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that if a claim is classified as frivolous, “there is by 

definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”).

III. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel. However, there is no constitutional 

right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); 

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) 

grants the district court limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an 

indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 

2004), this discretion may be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see 

also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional 

circumstances requires the Court “to consider whether there is a ‘likelihood of success on 

the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 

(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates neither the likelihood of 

success nor the legal complexity required to support the appointment of pro bono counsel 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell, 935 F.3d at 1017; Palmer ̧560 F.3d at 

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970. Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” currently exist and 

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 5).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2); 

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A and without leave to amend;

3. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 5); 

4. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Joinder as moot (Doc. No. 7)

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous and 

therefore, could not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal 

would not be frivolous).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2019

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