Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01146/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01146-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL WALLACE, Civil No. 08cv1146 LAB (POR)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT FIRST AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BE

DENIED AND ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[Doc. No. 3]

[Doc. No. 77]

v.

LARRY SMALL, Warden,

Respondent.

On August 5, 2008, Petitioner Nathaniel Wallace (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison and proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 3.) The First Amended Petition raises

three grounds for relief: (1) the trial court failed to impose a sentence for Count 4 at the sentencing

hearing and, thus, Petitioner’s continued detainment for this Count violates the United States

Constitution; (2) the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) violated his

due process rights in calculating his remaining sentence for Count 4; and (3) Petitioner was denied a

trial prior to the CDCR’s purported extension of Petitioner’s sentence based on Count 4. (Id. at 7-9.) 

On March 11, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer, requesting that this Court deny Petitioner’s

petition for failure to state a cognizable federal claim, notwithstanding any failure to exhaust under

28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(2). (Doc. No. 68.) On March 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a Traverse, asserting

that his First Amended Petition raises numerous cognizable federal claims, all of which were fully

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exhausted through his state court petitions. (Doc. No. 69.) Based upon a review of the parties’

pleadings, and in accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), this Court RECOMMENDS the First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Conviction and Sentencing

On July 24, 1990, following a jury trial, Petitioner’s Abstract of Judgment shows that he was

convicted of four counts of second degree robbery (Counts 1, 2, 5, 6) and two counts of attempted

murder (Counts 3, 4) in Los Angeles Superior Court, case number BA009423. (Doc. No. 41,

Lodgment 4.) For Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-three years, which

were to run consecutive to Count 4’s sentence of a life term plus two years with the possibility of

parole. (Id.) Petitioner was also sentenced in two other cases (A650889 and BA009346) to a total

term of seven years to run consecutively to Petitioner’s sentence in case number BA009423. (Doc.

No. 41, Lodgments 5, 6.)

On October 27, 1992, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 3 at 5.) Petitioner did not appeal to the California

Supreme Court. (Id.) 

B. The Time Computation Hearing

On December 14, 2007, at Petitioner’s request, a Time Computation Hearing (the “Hearing”)

was conducted by the CDCR for the purpose of calculating Petitioner’s remaining sentence. (See

Doc. No. 3 at 7.) Petitioner asserted during the Hearing that he should have been released from

prison based upon his accumulated good-time credit. (Id.) The CDCR, however, noted that their

records reflected a remaining indeterminate sentence for Count 4 in case number BA009423. (Id.) 

At the Hearing, Petitioner produced a certified copy of the transcript of the sentencing hearing from

that case number, which did not reflect the imposition of a sentence for Count 4. (Id.) 

On March 10, 2008, the CDCR held a second Hearing and requested a copy of the Abstract

of Judgment and the sentencing hearing transcript in case number BA009423 from Petitioner. (Doc.

No. 3 at 8.) There is no evidence that Petitioner had the Abstract of Judgment in his possession,

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1

 Petitioner filed numerous habeas petitions in state and federal court during this period, and, thus, some of the dates

of his filings overlap with each other.

2

 The Court construes the “oral pronouncement of judgment” as the verdict of the jury.

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though he apparently did have a copy of the transcript of his sentencing hearing. (See id. at 7-8.) In

the meantime, because they allegedly did not have a copy of the sentence imposed in Count 4, the

CDCR calculated Petitioner’s sentence for that count by “writing-in” a term of 7-years-to-life. (Id.

at 8.) Based thereon, it was determined that Petitioner would be eligible for parole on July 2, 2012. 

(Doc. No. 3 at 25.) 

On April 22, 2008, the CDCR sent a letter to the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Clerk of

Court requesting a certified copy of the Abstract of Judgment in case number BA009423 and a

transcript of the proceedings at the time of sentencing. (Doc. No. 3 at 14.) 

C. Petitioner’s State Habeas Petitions

On May 16, 20081

, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas relief in the Imperial County

Superior Court wherein he asserted the sentence calculated by the CDCR differs from the sentence

he received during the sentencing hearing. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 1; Doc. No. 3 at 3.) Petitioner

argued that a sentence for Count 4 was neither mentioned in “the oral pronouncement of judgment”2

nor imposed at the sentencing hearing. (Doc. No. 3 at 7.) On July 24, 2008, Petitioner’s habeas

petition was denied on the ground that the Imperial County Superior Court was not the sentencing

court and no documentation was supplied by Petitioner in support of his petition. (Doc. No. 41,

Lodgment 2.) 

On June 24, 2008, prior to receiving a decision regarding his Superior Court habeas petition,

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,

Division 2. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 3; Doc. No. 3 at 4.) On July 23, 2008, the appellate court

denied that petition without comment. (See Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 4.) 

On July 28, 2008, Petitioner filed with the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No . 41,

Lodgment 5.) On October 16, 2008, the California Supreme Court also denied Petitioner’s state

habeas petition without comment. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 6.)

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D. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition

On June 26, 2008, prior to receiving a final determination in his state habeas petition,

Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. 

(Doc. No. 1.) On August 5, 2008, upon Court Order, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition,

challenging the computation of his sentence and his continued detainment in Calipatria State Prison. 

(Doc. No. 3.) Specifically, Petitioner claims: (1) the trial court failed to impose a sentence for Count

4 at the sentencing hearing and, thus, Petitioner’s continued detainment for this Count violates the

United States Constitution; (2) the CDCR violated his due process rights in calculating his

remaining sentence for Count 4; and (3) Petitioner was denied a trial prior to the CDCR’s purported

extension of Petitioner’s sentence based on Count 4. (Id. at 7-9.) 

On February 2, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”). (Doc. No. 29.) 

Respondent argued the First Amended Petition is barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, statute of limitations because

Petitioner learned of the factual predicate of this claim on July 24, 1990 when he was sentenced and,

thus, was required to file his claim for relief by April 24, 1997. (Id. at 2.) Alternatively, Respondent

asserts the petition fails to set forth a cognizable federal claim. (Id. at 2-3.) In his Opposition,

Petitioner asserted the factual predicate of his claim occurred on December 13, 2007 during the

CDCR Hearing and, thus, under AEDPA, his First Amended Petition is timely. (Doc. No. 34 at 3;

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)). In support of his claim, Petitioner argued that prior to the Hearing

held by the CDCR, his sentence was not calculated. (Doc. No. 34 at 3.) Petitioner also contended

his detainment beyond the sentence announced in the Sentencing Hearing presents a federally

cognizable claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). (Id.) On September 15, 2009, the Honorable Larry A.

Burns adopted this Court’s Report and Recommendation Order and denied without prejudice

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 48.) The Court now addresses the merits of

Petitioner’s First Amended Petition. 

//

//

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the AEDPA now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the application of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). With regard to § 2254(d)(1), the threshold

question is whether the rule of law was clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court

conviction became final. Id. at 406. Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth Circuit case law may be "persuasive authority for purposes of

determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme

Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’" Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A state court decision is "contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases" or "if the state court confronts

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless

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3

 Respondent preserves its argument that Petitioner’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, but

urges this Court to address the merits of the First Amended Petition. (Doc. No. 68 at 6 n.2.)

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arrives at a result different from our precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state-court

decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies 

the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 

particular state prisoner’s case" or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407. Under Williams, an application of

federal law is unreasonable only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

Where a state court reaches the merits of a claim but does not provide the rationale for its

determination, federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hile we are not required to defer to a state

court’s decision when that court gives us nothing to defer to, we must still focus primarily on

Supreme Court cases in deciding whether the state court’s resolution of the case constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law”) (quoting Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906,

914 (9th Cir. 2001)). Silent denials of state appellate and supreme courts are considered to be

decisions on the merits of a claim. Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992).

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s First Amended Petition raises three grounds for relief: (1) the trial court failed to

impose a sentence for Count 4 at the sentencing hearing and, thus, Petitioner’s continued detainment

for this Count violates the United States Constitution; (2) the CDCR violated his due process rights

in calculating his remaining sentence for Count 4; and (3) Petitioner was denied a trial prior to the

CDCR’s purported extension of Petitioner’s sentence based on Count 4. (Doc. No. 3 at 7-9.) 

Respondent argues Petitioner fails to present a cognizable federal constitutional claim.3 (Doc. No.

68.) 

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A. Ground One: Trial Court’s Failure to Impose a Sentence for Count 4

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Id. at 67; Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400

(9th Cir.1989) (“errors of state law do not concern us unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation”). Further, relief “is not available when a petitioner merely alleges that something in the

state proceedings was contrary to general notions of fairness or violated some federal procedural

right unless the Constitution or other federal law specifically protects against the alleged unfairness

or guarantees the procedural right in state courts.” Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th

Cir. 1985)

Petitioner first contends that he has been unlawfully detained on Count 4 because the

sentencing court never imposed a sentence for this count. (Doc. No. 3 at 6.) According to

Petitioner, “absolutely no sentence exists with regard to Count Four.” (Doc. No. 69 at 5.) 

Petitioner’s claim stems from an apparent misstatement by the sentencing judge during his July 24,

1990 sentencing hearing. At trial, Petitioner was charged with a total of six counts. (Doc. No. 41,

Lodgment 1, vol. 1 at 96-102.) The sentencing judge first imposed a sentence for Count 3, the

principal term. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 2, vol. 9 at 2231.) The judge then imposed sentences for

Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6. (Id. at 2233-34.) Finally, when imposing a sentence for Count 4, the only

remaining count, the judge mistakenly referred to that count as Count 3. (Id. at 2235.) The judge

stated:

With respect to Count III, you are sentenced to life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole, to serve your sentence to an additional 2 years pursuant to the

use allegation, 12022.5, for a total indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment

with the possibility of parole, and 2 years consecutive to that.

(Id. at 2235-36.)

“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

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28 4

 Petitioner mentions the Eighth Amendment in his Petition, but emphasizes a due process argument. (Doc. No. 3

at 7-8.) Therefore, the Court shall construe his second ground for relief as a due process claim.

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Cir. 1994); see also Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding the

decision to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state law); Hendricks v.

Zenon, 993 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding merger of convictions for sentencing is a matter

of state law). Petitioner has not cited any federal constitutional law holding that a misstatement in

the sentencing hearing renders an otherwise valid sentence void. Rather, it is well settled that

“[s]entencing is not a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.” 

McDowell v. Swope, 183 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1950) (quotations omitted). Petitioner’s argument

that the trial court never sentenced him to Count 4 relates exclusively to an alleged error in the

application of state law. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to raise a federal

cognizable claim necessary to justify federal habeas relief. 

Furthermore, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the sentencing court’s error was “so

arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment

violation.” Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992). Petitioner does not raise, nor does the

Court find, any indication that the parties were misled by the court’s misstatement. As previously

noted, the trial court had already imposed a sentence for Count 3, but erroneously referred to Count

4 as Count 3. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 2, vol. 9 at 2231-36.) A life sentence plus two years was

correctly recorded for Count 4 on both the Minute Order and the Judgment. (Doc. No. 41,

Lodgement 1, vol. 2 at 431, 433.) On direct appeal, Petitioner even cited the hearing transcript with

regards to the sentence imposed for Count 4 without raising any issue as to the court’s

misstatement. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgment 3 at 26-28.) Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner’s sentence

was not so arbitrary or capricious as to give rise to a cognizable federal claim. Accordingly, the

Court hereby recommends that Petitioner’s First Amended Petitioner be DENIED as to this ground.

B. Ground Two: Due Process

Second, Petitioner argues that the CDCR violated his due process rights by miscalculating

his good-time credits and imposing a sentence for Count 4.4

 (Doc. No. 3 at 7.) Specifically,

Petitioner argues that the CDCR did not have the Abstract of Judgment in their possession at the

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time of his Hearing and, therefore, impermissibly relied upon it to determine his remaining

sentence. (Id.) Respondent does not address Petitioner’s due process claim in its Answer. (See

Doc. No. 68.)

Federal courts “examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks

whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the

second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations

omitted). In his Traverse, Petitioner relies on Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.

1985) (en banc), to argue he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the accurate

computation of his sentence for Count 4. (Doc. 69 at 3.) Though the Fourteenth Amendment does

not guarantee state prisoners “a particular method of calculating prison sentences,” a prisoner may

have a claim for denial of due process if prison officials miscalculated the term of his sentence. 

Haygood,769 F.2d at 1355 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).

Unlike the plaintiff in Haygood, Petitioner does not argue that prison officials failed to

follow the minimum due process necessary to protect his liberty interest. Rather, Petitioner seems

to argue that prison officials overstepped their authority by using the Abstract of Judgment to

impose a sentence for Count 4. (Doc. No. 3 at 7.) Petitioner’s argument rests on the premise that

he was “sentenced” to Count 4 in the first instance by prison officials. Petitioner apparently

assumes the sentencing judge’s imposition of a sentence for Count 4 was invalid, but fails to cite

any law holding that a misstatement in the sentencing hearing renders an otherwise valid sentence

void. Based thereon, the Court finds that prison officials did nothing more than determine

Petitioner’s release date. See Guzman v. Morris, 664 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding

prison administrative board did not violate petitioner’s due process rights by determining release

date). Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s decision on this ground is not contrary to

clearly established federal law and hereby recommends that Petitioner’s First Amended Petitioner

be DENIED as to this ground.

//

//

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5 In his Traverse, Petitioner also makes reference to his “PC 1381 Right to Trial.” California’s speedy trial statute

provides that a criminal defendant shall be sentenced within 90 days of a conviction. See Cal. Penal Code § 1381. Generally,

a “traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.” Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507

(9th Cir. 1994). Even so, Petitioner’s argument seems to relate exclusively to the misapplication of state law. Therefore,

habeas relief is not available on this ground. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

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C. Ground Three: Right to Trial

Petitioner argues that he was denied his “right to trial before prison officials sentenced

[him].” (Doc. No. 3 at 8.) Petitioner does not provide the basis for this claim, nor does Respondent

address it in its Answer. (Id.; see Doc. No. 68.) The Court cannot ascertain the nature of

Petitioner’s third ground for relief, thus it will address Petitioner’s possible arguments in turn.5

Because Petitioner references the Sixth Amendment in his petition, he may be asserting his

right to a jury trial. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial “require[s] criminal convictions to

rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which

he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)

(citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-278 (1993)). Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

argument appears to be without merit. If Petitioner is referring to his right to a criminal jury trial,

the Court notes that he received a jury trial in this case. (Doc. No. 41, Lodgments 1-2.) At the

conclusion of Petitioner’s trial in Los Angeles Superior Court, a jury convicted him of four counts

of second degree robbery and two counts of attempted murder. (Doc. No. 40, Lodgment 4.) 

Petitioner does not raise, nor does the Court find, any evidence in the record that the jury trial was

inadequate. On the other hand, Petitioner may be referring to a right to a jury trial during the time

computation hearing process. However, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not extend

to time computation hearings. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996) (“It is well

established that the Sixth Amendment, like the common law, reserves th[e] jury trial right for

prosecutions of serious offenses”) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)). 

Therefore, the Court finds that the state court’s decision on this ground was not contrary to clearly

established federal law. 

Alternatively, Petitioner may be arguing that his Hearing lacked adequate procedural due

process protections. As previously discussed, federal courts “examine procedural due process

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 Because Lodgment 6 is not consecutively paginated, the Court has determined page numbers by counting pages

through the document.

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questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has

been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that

deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 460. 

Assuming Petitioner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a time computation hearing,

the “Court is not aware of any cases which define the scope of the process that is due to Petitioner

under these circumstances.” Robles v. Cate, 2009 WL 1155653, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2009). 

Nonetheless, it is apparent that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated in this case. Here,

the CDCR held not one, but two, hearings where Petitioner had the opportunity to present his case. 

(Doc. No. 3 at 7-8.) At both hearings, prison officials conducted a review of Petitioner’s Central

File. (Doc. No. 40, Lodgment 6 at 18, 28.)6

 According to his Petition, Petitioner also had the

opportunity to present evidence on his behalf on both occasions. (Doc. No. 3 at 7-8.) Furthermore,

Petitioner filed an appeal on March 26, 2008 regarding the result of these hearings. (Doc. No. 40,

Lodgment 6 at 2.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s decision on this ground is not

contrary to clearly established federal law. Thus, the Court hereby recommends that Petitioner’s

First Amended Petitioner be DENIED as to the third ground for relief.

D. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

On November 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a “Request for the Appointment of Counsel.” (Doc.

No. 77.) Because Petitioner filed the motion while the Court was reviewing the merits of his First

Amended Petition, the Court will address it at this time. Generally, “there is no absolute right to

counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360,

1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make

coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310

(1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819,

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823 (9th Cir. 1989). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the

‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both

must be viewed together before reaching a decision.’” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Petitioner requests the appointment of counsel because he cannot afford to hire an attorney. 

(Doc. No. 77 at 1.) Petitioner, however, has sufficiently represented himself to date. The First

Amended Petition in this case was pleaded sufficiently to warrant this Court’s order directing

Respondent to file an answer or other responsive pleading to the First Amended Petition. (Doc. No.

19.) Moreover, Petitioner filed a Traverse in response to Respondent’s Answer, which cited

supporting facts and case law. Because further briefing is not required of Petitioner, his claim that

he needs counsel is without merit. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds the interests of

justice do not require the appointment of counsel. Based thereon, the Court hereby DENIES

Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This

Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable Larry A.

Burns, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than January 3, 2011, any party may file and

serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 8, 2010

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Larry A. Burns

All parties

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