Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00797/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00797-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE D. MOYER, Sr.,

CDCR #AR-9913,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-CV-00797-JLS-BLM

ORDER: (1) GRANTING RENEWED 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS [ECF No. 4] AND; (2) 

DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM, FOR 

SEEKING DAMAGES FROM 

IMMUNE DEFENDANTS AND AS 

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff Maurice D. Moyer, Sr. currently incarcerated at California State Prison –

Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”) in Represa, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

“petition for writ for civil rights complaint” seeking $15 million in punitive damages from 

the State of California, a San Diego Superior Court Judge, and the San Diego District 

Attorney based on his “wrongful imprisonment.” (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 1–2, 4, 29.)

Plaintiff claims he was denied a fair and speedy trial and was convicted based on 

“insufficient evidence” in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCE324735 sometime in 

2013. (Id. at 3, 6, 8–11, 14–23.)

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I. Procedural History

At the time he filed his Complaint, Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee mandated 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 

1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (a civil action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the 

party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)).

The Court denied Plaintiff’s initial Motion to Proceed IFP, however, because he 

failed to attach a certified copy of his prison trust account statement. (See ECF No. 3, at 

3) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)). Nevertheless, the Court also granted Plaintiff forty-five 

days leave in which to complete and file a properly supported IFP Motion, and the Clerk 

of Court provided him with a form for doing so. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff has since filed a renewed Motion to Proceed IFP, together with the 

accounting which was missing from his original Motion (ECF No. 4).

II. Renewed Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

As Plaintiff now knows, to institute a civil action, he must pay a filing fee of $400.1

See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite his failure to prepay the entire 

fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 

Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, because he is a prisoner, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, Plaintiff 

remains obligated to pay the entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2015), and regardless of whether his action is dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & 

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “King”). 

From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of 

(a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average 

monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the 

prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution 

having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his renewed IFP Motion, Plaintiff has now submitted copies of his 

CDCR Inmate Statement Report for the 6-month period preceding the filing of his 

Complaint, as well as a certified prison certificate signed by senior accounting clerk at 

CSP-SAC attesting to his trust account activity and balances. (See ECF No. 4 at 4, 6–7); 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Civ. L. R. 3.2; King, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show 

that Plaintiff has carried no average monthly balance, has had no monthly deposits to his 

account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and, 

consequently, had no available balance on the books at the time of filing. (See ECF No. 4,

at 4, 6.) Based on this accounting, no initial partial filing fee is assessed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner 

has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee”); Bruce, 136 S. 

Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safetyvalve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... 

due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF 

No. 4), declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he has 

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“no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead collect 

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them 

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

While the legal basis for his suit, which Plaintiff captions as a “petition for writ for 

civil rights” is not altogether clear, (see Compl. 29), he seeks millions in punitive damages 

against the People of the State of California, the Southern District of California’s “District 

Attorney,” and the Honorable Joseph P. Brannigan, a San Diego County Superior Court 

Judge, for allegedly having denied him a speedy trial, a trial by jury, and wrongfully 

imprisoning him based on insufficient evidence in San Diego Superior Court Case Nos. 

SCE324735 and SCE262473.2(See Compl. 1–6.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035–36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Discussion

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) for several reasons. 

 

2 While Plaintiff names Judge Brannigan as a Defendant, (see Compl. 4), the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s

Complaint indicate he was sentenced by a different judge on October 9, 2013, (id. at 17–20), after Judge 

Brannigan found him mentally competent pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1370 on September 11, 2013. 

(Id. at 22.)

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First, to the extent Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully imprisoned based on 

insufficient evidence and denied a fair trial, his suit “challeng[es] the validity of [his] 

continued incarceration [and therefore] lie[s] within ‘the heart of habeas corpus.’” Ramirez 

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 

489–99 (1973) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically 

designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of 

his confinement” in federal court)). 

Second, Plaintiff may not seek damages against any of the parties he has named as 

Defendants. The State of California is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and is 

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 

99–100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals 

against a State and its instrumentalities, unless either the State consents to waive its 

sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it); see also Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 

641 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing prisoner’s § 1983 suit against the State of Arizona as 

legally frivolous), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130; Brand v. Schubert, No. 2:16-CV-1811 MCE EFB P, 2017 WL 531721, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 7, 2017) (sua sponte dismissing § 1983 claims against the State of California on 

sovereign immunity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

San Diego Superior Court Judge Brannigan is absolutely immune. “A seemingly 

impregnable fortress in American Jurisprudence is the absolute immunity of judges from 

civil liability for acts done by them within their judicial jurisdiction.” Gregory v. 

Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974). “Judges are among those officials who ‘have 

long enjoyed a comparatively sweeping form of immunity,’ which has been justified on 

the theory that it helps ‘protect[ ] judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious 

actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.’” Brooks v. Clark Cty., 828 F.3d 910, 915–16 

(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)). Thus, “[j]udges 

are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official 

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capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“A judge 

lacks immunity where [s]he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or performs an act 

that is not judicial in nature.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Pierson v. 

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967); Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 

2001); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute 

immunity is generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official 

capacities.”); see also Mainez v. Gore, No. 3:17-CV-01359-JAH-JLB, 2017 WL 4005269, 

at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2017) (finding § 1983 claims for monetary damages against 

Superior Court Judge subject to sua sponte dismissal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) & 1915A(b)). Because Plaintiff seeks to sue Judge Brannigan based 

on decisions rendered during Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings, whether they be related to 

his competency hearing, or to his ultimate conviction and sentence, his § 1983 claims are

subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and § 1915A(b)(2). See

e.g., Brand v. Schubert, No. 2:16-CV-1811-MCE EFB P, 2017 WL 531721, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 7, 2017) (sua sponte dismissing § 1983 claims against judge presiding over 

criminal and mental competency proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

Finally, the San Diego County District Attorney, mistakenly identified as the District 

Attorney for the “Southern District of California,” (see Compl. 4), is similarly entitled to 

absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) 

(state prosecutors are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for acts taken in their 

official capacity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430–31 (1976) (holding 

prosecutors absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under § 1983 for initiating 

criminal prosecutions and presenting cases); Olsen, 363 F.3d at 922; see also Jackson, 885 

F.2d at 641 (finding claim against prosecutors with clear immunity legally frivolous within 

the meaning of section 1915) (citation omitted); Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 

(9th Cir. 2016) (Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) requires sua sponte dismissal of claims barred 

by absolute immunity).

/ / /

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E. Leave to Amend

While the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of his pro se 

status, it concludes that doing so under the circumstances would be futile. See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1127 n.8 (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by 

definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”); 

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend is not required if 

it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment”) (internal citations omitted).

IV. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, (ECF 

No. 4);

2) ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon 

which § 1983 relief can be granted, for seeking monetary damages against defendants who 

are absolutely immune, and as legally frivolous and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

and § 1915A(b);

5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous, and 

therefore not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

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be frivolous); and

6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2017

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