Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00508/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00508-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho 

corporation; WINCO FOODS, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability company; and 

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:16-cv-00508-DAD-SAB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND REMANDING 

MATTER TO THE STANISLAUS COUNTY

SUPERIOR COURT FOR LACK OF 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

(Doc. Nos. 8 and 13)

On January 15, 2016, plaintiff Keith Williams filed the instant action in the Stanislaus 

County Superior Court, alleging a single cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of 

public policy. (Doc. No. 3-1, at 4–8.) Plaintiff alleges that his right to privacy under Article 1, 

Section 1 of the California Constitution was violated when defendants terminated his employment

on their night stocking crew after he failed a random drug test. (Id. at 6–7.) On April 11, 2016,

defendants removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction

pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Doc. 

Nos. 1 and 2.) On April 18, 2016, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) on the grounds that plaintiff’s claim is completely 

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and that he failed to exhaust his claim pursuant to the 

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procedures of the LMRA. (Doc. No. 8-1, at 2.) Plaintiff argues that his claim is not preempted 

because a state law claim is only preempted by § 301 when its resolution requires the 

interpretation of, as opposed to merely a reference to, a collective bargaining agreement. (Doc. 

No. 11, at 6–7) (citing Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) 

and Lingle v. Norge, 486 U.S. 399 (1988)). 

On May 17, 2016, defendant’s motion to dismiss came on for hearing before the court.1 

Attorney Kristina Launey appeared telephonically on behalf of defendants and attorney Jeremy 

Pasternak appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiff. Having considered the arguments of the 

parties and for the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied and the 

action remanded back to Stanislaus County Superior Court due to lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

I. Judicial Notice of Collective Bargaining Agreements

Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of two collective bargaining 

agreements (“CBA”) — WinCo Foods #21 Hourly Employee Working Conditions and Wages 

Agreements — which were in effect during plaintiff’s employment with WinCo. (Doc. No. 9.) 

The court “may take judicial notice of a CBA in evaluating a motion to dismiss . . . [as] such 

documents properly are considered . . . materials ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ because they 

are ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.’” Jones v. AT & T, No. C 07-3888 JF, 2008 WL 902292, *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 31, 2008). See also Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 2016 WL 696503, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 22, 2016) (taking judicial notice of CBAs where necessary to resolve issues of preemption). 

Therefore, the court will take judicial notice of the two CBAs.

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1

 On May 11, 2016, plaintiff moved to remand the action to state court. (Doc. No. 13.) The 

hearing on that motion was continued to July 19, 2016 and again to September 6, 2016, by order 

of the court pending disposition of defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 17 and 18.) 

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II. Legal Standards

A. Preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA

Section 301 of the LMRA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), states in relevant part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees in an industry affecting 

commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United 

States having jurisdiction of the parties . . .

The Supreme Court has recognized that the LMRA “does more than confer jurisdiction in 

the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should 

enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can 

be best obtained only in that way.” Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 

U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957). See also Local 174, Teamsters of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 

103–04 (1962) (“The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of 

federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.”). As a result, because 

“[a]n action arising under § 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even though it is brought 

in state court,” the Supreme Court has deemed it proper for such cases to be removed to federal 

court under federal question jurisdiction. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 375, Int’l. Ass’n of 

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).

Section 301 preemption subsequently expanded “beyond cases specifically alleging 

contract violation to those whose resolution is ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms 

of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.’” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 689 (citing 

Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). “The preemptive force of § 301 is so 

powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an 

employer and a labor organization.’” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 

U.S. 1, 23 (1983). “Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that 

state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.” Id.

Nevertheless, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a 

provision of a [CBA], is preempted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” 

Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211. In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), the 

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Supreme Court clarified that § 301 preemption applies only to “claims founded directly on rights

created by collective-bargaining agreements, and claims ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a 

collective-bargaining agreement.’” Id. at 394 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23). In 

that case the Supreme Court also explicitly rejected the argument that “all employment-related 

matters involving unionized employees be resolved through collective bargaining and thus be 

governed by a federal common law created by § 301.” Id. at 396, n.10 (internal citations 

omitted).

In Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth 

Circuit set forth a two-part analysis for determining whether a plaintiff’s claim is preempted by 

§ 301. First, a court must “determine whether a particular right inheres in state law or, is instead 

grounded in a CBA.” Id. “If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is 

preempted, and [ ] analysis ends there.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. However, if the claim exists 

independently from the CBA, the court must still decide whether it is “‘substantially dependent’ 

on the terms of a CBA” by determining “whether the claim can be resolved by ‘looking to’ versus 

interpreting the CBA.” Id. at 1060 (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394 and Livadas v. Bradshaw, 

512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994)). If the claim requires interpretation of the CBA, the claim is 

preempted; if the claim merely requires “looking to” the CBA, it is not preempted. Id.

The first step of the Burnside analysis described above requires the court to “consider the 

legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement 

[and] not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of facts’ could be pursued.” 

Id. at 1059-60 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123). The second step of the analysis requires the 

court to determine whether the claimed rights are “substantially dependent” on the analysis of the 

CBA. The court in Burnside clarified that a defense relying on the terms in a CBA is “not enough 

to ‘inject[ ] a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim.’” Id. at 

1053 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398–99).

2

 See also Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 

 

2

 As the Supreme Court explained “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint,” and that if the 

defendant could engineer “the forum in which the claim shall be litigated” based on the substance 

of his defense, “the plaintiff would be master of nothing.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398–99.

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1011 (9th Cir. 2002) (“reliance on CBA provisions to defend against an independent state law 

claim does not trigger § 301 preemption.”). The “‘look to’/‘interpret’ distinction” in the second 

step of the analysis has been recognized as “not a task that always lends itself to analytical 

precision.” Id. at 1060. See also Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691. Of course, “when the meaning of the 

contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement 

will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require that” the state law 

claim is preempted. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124. See also Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2005); Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “‘[§] 

301 does not permit parties to waive, in a collective-bargaining agreement, nonnegotiable state 

rights’ conferred on individual employees.” Valles, 410 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Balcorta v. 

Twentieth Century–Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Thus, in order for 

complete preemption to apply, ‘the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the 

plaintiff’s claim. If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated 

simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.’” Id. (quoting Cramer, 

255 F.3d at 691). See also Ward, 473 F.3d at 998 (the “determinative question is whether the 

state law factual inquiry . . . turn[s] on the meaning of any provision of the collective-bargaining 

agreement.”).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cramer is instructive. There, the court addressed the 

appropriate considerations in determining if a state law claim required the court to “interprets” or 

merely “refer to” a CBA in a case presenting the issue of whether a plaintiff’s state law claims for 

invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress were preempted under § 301. 

255 F.3d at 688. The court held that the CBA at issue in that case could not have “contemplate[d] 

the surreptitious videotaping plaintiffs challenge[d] in their state law claims . . . [because] § 301 

does not grant the parties . . . the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law.” Id. at

694-95. In reviewing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Allis-Chalmers, Lingle, and Livada, the 

court found that preemption under § 301 was not appropriate where “the legal character of a 

claim [is] ‘independent’ of rights under the collective bargaining agreement . . . [and] the bare 

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fact that a collective bargaining agreement will be consulted” does not extinguish the claim. Id. 

at 690-91. Thus, the court concluded where a claim involves the “employer’s alleged failure to 

comport with its contractually established duties,” it is preempted. Id. However, “if the claim 

may be litigated without reference to rights and duties established” in a collective bargaining 

agreement, it is not preempted. Id. The court noted that “the plaintiff’s claim is the touchstone 

for this analysis . . . [and] the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff’s 

claim.” Id. Moreover, the court in Cramer was careful to distinguish a bona fide connection 

between the claim and the CBA and one where the link between the two was “creative” at best, 

noting that the connection “must reach a reasonable level of credibility.” Id. at 692. 

B. Random Drug Testing of Employees in California

The California Constitution specifically guarantees the right of privacy. Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 1; American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 326 (1997). Article I, section 

1 of the California Constitution provides:

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable 

rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, 

acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 

obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

“[I]n many contexts, the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy

is broader and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as 

interpreted by the federal courts.” Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th at 326–27. This state constitutional 

provision “creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.” White v. Davis, 

13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 (1975). “The party claiming a violation of the constitutional right of privacy 

established in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution must establish (1) a legally 

protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and 

(3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.” Int’l Fed’n of Prof’l & Tech. Eng’rs, Local 21, 

AFL–CIO v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 319, 338 (2007) (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 

Ass’n., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 39–40 (1994)).

The California Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test in considering claims of 

invasion of privacy except those which involve “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental 

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to personal autonomy,” such as freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue 

consensual family relationships. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 34–35, 56. Therefore, under California law, 

the constitutionality of drug testing in any context is evaluated by weighing and balancing the 

legitimacy or strength of the justification for the conduct against the intrusion on a protected 

privacy interest. Loder v. City of Glendale, 14 Cal. 4th 846, 893-94 (1997). In Loder the 

California Supreme Court found a policy of drug testing all current employees seeking promotion 

to be constitutionally overbroad under the California Constitution. Id. In so holding, the court 

recognized that requiring employees to submit to drug testing in order to secure a promotion into 

safety-sensitive positions had been found to be constitutional by federal courts. Id. at 881, n.12. 

Nonetheless, California “[c]ases generally hold that a drug test of an existing employee without 

any individualized suspicion is unreasonable unless the employee is in a safety- or

security-sensitive position.” Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist., 72 Cal. App. 4th 147, 160 (1999) 

(citing Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th 179, 187, n.8 (1997)). See also Kemp v. 

Claiborne County Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (“[T]he safety sensitivity of 

an employee’s job is a highly important factor in the balancing test to determine the 

reasonableness of a drug testing procedure.”)

In the only published California Court of Appeal decision addressing this issue after

Loder, the court held that legitimate safety concerns, including regularly working next to ten-foot 

deep dirt trenches, crawling through pipe that could accidently be flooded, and operating power 

tools and heavy equipment in close proximity to other employees, justified plaintiff’s construction 

and maintenance position being classified as a safety-sensitive position for purposes of his 

employer’s drug testing policy. Smith, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 153-66. The court reasoned 

[T]he cases focus on the degree, severity and immediacy of the 

harm posed. The “‘immediacy’” of the threat of injury and the fact 

that a single misperformed duty could have irremediable 

consequences have been determined to be important factors in 

determining the safety sensitivity of a job. Irremediable 

consequences result when an employee is not able to rectify his or 

her mistake and the coworkers of the employee have no opportunity 

to intervene before harm occurs.

Id. at 163–64 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the employer in Smith had informed its employees 

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in advance of its substance abuse policy and provided a six-month grace period during which 

employees could seek substance abuse treatment and counseling without being terminated. Id. at 

152. The court noted that plaintiff’s expectation of privacy was diminished by this advance 

notice, stating:

Although advance notice of drug testing does not automatically 

defeat an employee’s argument that the testing is unconstitutional, 

it does decrease his expectation of privacy. Advance notice of drug 

testing minimizes the program’s intrusion on privacy interests. The 

element of surprise inherent in a random testing program has been 

found minimized when advance notice of the implementation of the 

policy was given to the affected employee.

Id. at 161 (citations omitted). Consequently, because of the safety-sensitive nature of the work at 

issue in Smith and the notice to employees provided, the court upheld the employer’s random 

drug-testing of the plaintiff against his challenge based upon his right to privacy under the 

California Constitution. Id. at 167.

III. Analysis

In the present case, plaintiff asserts a claim under state law for wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy based upon his right to privacy under California law. Defendants move 

to dismiss the claim as preempted under § 301 of the LMRA because allegedly it “is inextricably 

intertwined with and substantially dependent upon the Court’s interpretation of various provisions 

of the collective bargaining agreement.” (Doc. No. 8-1, at 2.) Applying the first step of the 

analysis set out by the court in Burnside, it appears clear that the basis of plaintiff’s claim is not 

the CBA, but rather is grounded in the California Constitution’s guarantee of the right to privacy. 

Consequently, it is necessary, under the second step of the Burnside analysis, to determine 

whether plaintiff’s claim is “‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA” by examining

“whether the claim can be resolved by ‘looking to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” 491 F.3d at 

1060.3 

 

3

 As stated above, if the appropriateness of the employer’s conduct towards its employee is 

defined by the CBA, then plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted by the LMRA. If on the other 

hand, plaintiff’s claim is based upon an independent right upon which the collective bargaining 

agreement cannot intrude or that the CBA does not contain “clear and unmistakable” language 

waiving, then there is no preemption. See Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691–95.

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There is no “clear and unmistakable” language in the CBA waiving the right to privacy

which plaintiff asserts in this action under the state constitution. While plaintiff’s privacy 

interests can be waived for random drug testing when there is notice and the position is safety 

sensitive, see Smith, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 167, the CBA in this case does not contain “clear and 

unmistakable” language waiving plaintiff’s privacy rights. Rather, plaintiff alleges in his 

complaint that he was employed in the night stocking crew when he failed a random drug test

administered by the defendant. (Doc. No. 3-1, at 6–7.) In relevant part, an addendum to the 

relevant CBA states: 4

WinCo and the Employee Association agree to implement an 

alcohol and drug policy which includes random drug and alcohol 

screening (see attached).

WinCo Foods will implement a random drug and alcohol screening 

policy and procedure specifically for positions that have been 

classified as food handling, hazardous and/or safety-sensitive 

including:

POSITION*

All Forklift Certified Employees,

Meat Department Manager and Employees

Deli Department Manager and Employees

Pizza Department Manager and Employees

Bakery Department Manager and Employees

Security Loss Prevention

*The testing of these positions has been determined in consultation 

with legal counsel after review of legal case law, discussions, 

observations and careful review of each job description.

(Doc. No. 9-1, at 20.) Thus, the CBA specifically lists six specific categories of employees 

subject to random drug testing. The night stocking crew position held by plaintiff is not amongst 

them. At oral argument on the pending motion, defendants’ counsel argued that the addendum’s 

list is non-exhaustive and that the CBA generally provides for random drug testing for “food 

handling, hazardous and/or safety-sensitive” positions. Defendants’ counsel also argued 

plaintiff’s night stocking crew position is safety sensitive because it involves loading and 

 

4 Courts may look to a CBA to determine whether a plaintiff’s claim necessarily implicates its 

terms without “interpreting” the agreement, as that word is used in the context of § 301 

preemption. See Cramer, 255 F.3d at 693.

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unloading pallets of merchandise and because forklifts, although not operated by plaintiff, are 

being operated in the area. These arguments, however, are unpersuasive because “[w]here a party 

defends a state cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff’s union has bargained away the 

state law right at issue, the CBA must include ‘clear and unmistakable’ language waiving the 

covered employees’ state right ‘for a court to even consider whether it could be given effect.’” 

Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125). See also Valles, 410 F.3d at 1076.

Notice of drug testing for “food handling, hazardous and/or safety-sensitive” positions followed 

by a specific list that does not include the night stocking crew is not a “clear and unmistakable”

waiver of the plaintiff’s privacy interests under California law. Moreover, nothing in the 

applicable CBA suggests that the night stocking crew positions are designated as “food handling, 

hazardous and/or safety-sensitive” positions. Indeed, the omission of the night stocking crew 

from the specified listing is a compelling indication that it is not a safety-sensitive position.

Because there is no “clear and unmistakable” waiver here, plaintiff’s claim is not “‘substantially 

dependent’ on the terms of a CBA” and it can be resolved by merely “looking to,” and not 

“interpreting” the CBA. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060; Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692.

Because plaintiff’s claim rests entirely on a claimed right created by state law and is not 

substantially dependent on the terms of the CBA, his claim is not preempted by § 301 of the 

LMRA. The complaint’s sole cause of action is a state law claim based upon the California 

Constitution and there are no allegations which would give rise to diversity jurisdiction. Because 

defendants’ only basis for removal of the action to federal court was federal question jurisdiction 

pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA, no federal question is presented on the face of the complaint. 

The court therefore remands the matter to Stanislaus County Superior Court for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 

(9th Cir. 2004) (a district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the 

removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”). 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is denied;

2. The court remands this action to the Stanislaus County Superior Court due to lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction;

3. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. No. 13) is rendered moot by this order; and

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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