Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00008/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ali Reza Dehrizi,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Jeh Johnson, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00008-PHX-ESW

ORDER

 

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) 

on Plaintiff’s claim for a writ of mandamus. The Federal Court has jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties have consented to proceeding before a Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to Rule 73, Fed. R. Civ. P. and 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) (Doc. 15). 

After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that genuine issues of 

material fact exist concerning the reasonableness of Defendants’ delay in the adjudication 

of Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of his citizenship status. Defendant is not 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment will be denied for the reasons set forth herein.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a citizen of Iran who was admitted to the United States as a refugee on 

December 12, 2005. On January 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Form I-485 with U.S. 

Customs and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), seeking adjustment of his citizenship 

status to permanent resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). Plaintiff’s adjustment 

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application remains pending due to a hold placed upon it by Defendants pursuant to 

USCIS policy1 which allows the government to hold for future exemption consideration 

the applications of individuals who are otherwise inadmissible for having engaged in 

terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(I). On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 

“Complaint for Writ in the Nature of Mandamus Verified Complaint for a Writ in the 

Nature of Mandamus” (Doc.1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have unreasonably

delayed the processing of his adjustment application and requests that the Court require 

federal agents to process to a conclusion Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status to 

permanent resident. Defendants filed an Answer (Doc. 16). All issues are joined.

II. FACTS

Until July 7, 1995 and while Plaintiff lived in Iran, Plaintiff distributed fliers and 

pamphlets critical of the Iranian government. As part of his refugee application in a 

translated sworn statement dated August 22, 2001, Plaintiff describes his “political 

activities” in Iran as receiving and distributing pamphlets, newspapers, and articles with 

his friend Farhad Zandi and Mehran Bor. (Doc. 29 at 25-27). The literature distributed 

by Plaintiff was critical of the Iranian government. Mehran Bor was Plaintiff’s

“connection to other member (sic) of the MOJAHEDIN party.” (Id. at 26). Because 

Mehran Bor “had given the name of memebers (sic) of the Mojahedin party to the secret 

police,” Plaintiff went into hiding. (Id.). He thereafter fled Iran with a false passport. 

Plaintiff immigrated to Germany, converted to Christianity, and sought refugee status in 

the United States. 

In Plaintiff’s interview dated August 22, 2001 with Immigration and 

Naturalization Services (“INS”) Officer Scott Miller, Officer Miller noted that Plaintiff 

1 The Deputy Director of USCIS issued a series of memoranda providing guidance regarding cases involving inadmissibility pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act (“CAA”), 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(3)(B). (Doc. 24-1 at 9-10). The memoranda instructed 

adjudicators to withhold adjudication of cases that could potentially benefit from the exercise of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) discretionary authority under 

the CAA. The Deputy Director specifically instructed that applications be held for 

applicants deemed inadmissible due to Tier III terrorist organization activity. (Id.).

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was active in the distribution of fliers or pamphlets “given by the Majahadeen (sic).” (Id.

at 42). Officer Miller found Plaintiff’s testimony to be credible and found Plaintiff to be 

a refugee as defined by law. Plaintiff was granted refugee status and admitted to the 

United States in 2005.

Two years after immigrating to the United States as a refugee, Plaintiff sought 

adjustment of his citizenship status to that of a permanent resident by filing the 

appropriate application, Form I-485. Plaintiff submitted all information required by the 

application. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 209.2, USCIS has completed its review process, 

including (i) a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) fingerprint check, (ii) a check 

against the DHS-managed Interagency Border Inspection System (“IBIS”), and (iii) an 

FBI name check. At some date undisclosed to the Court, USCIS placed a hold on 

Plaintiff’s adjustment application due to the information contained in Plaintiff’s refugee 

application regarding Plaintiff’s distribution of literature critical of the Khomeini regime 

which Plaintiff received from the Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (“MEK”). On the 

basis of the information contained in Plaintiff’s refugee application, USCIS found that 

Plaintiff engaged in activity which materially supported the MEK.

Until 2012 when the U.S. State Department removed the MEK from its list of 

Foreign Terrorist Organizations and while Plaintiff distributed fliers in Iran, the United 

States considered the MEK to be a terrorist organization as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 

Though the MEK was not officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization until

October 8, 1997, the MEK’s activities prior to its designation qualified the MEK to be an 

undesignated, or Tier III, terrorist organization. Defendants assert that by distributing 

pamphlets for the MEK, Plaintiff provided material support to a terrorist organization. 

Because Defendants have concluded from a review of Plaintiff’s refugee application that 

Plaintiff provided material support to a terrorist organization, Defendants placed a hold 

on Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of status to permanent resident pursuant to 

internal policy.

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The hold on Plaintiff’s application for adjustment of citizenship status is 

indefinite. By placing a hold on Plaintiff’s application, DHS can consider Plaintiff for 

future discretionary exemptions to terrorist-related inadmissibility grounds. Were 

Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiff’s application at this time, Defendants state that 

Plaintiff’s application likely would be denied on the basis of inadmissibility for terrorist 

activity. Therefore, Defendants argue that the hold is benign and may inure to Plaintiff’s 

benefit at some indeterminate time in the future. There are currently approximately 2,800 

pending I-485 adjustment of citizenship status applications involving Tier III terrorist 

organizations placed on hold for determination of exemption eligibility. Whether DHS 

will exercise its authority to exempt Plaintiff from terrorist inadmissibility grounds is 

discretionary with DHS. The USCIS has not yet determined whether MEK meets the 

qualifications of the exemption or whether Plaintiff will be eligible for consideration 

under this exercise of the exemption authority. Defendants have provided no timeline 

within which these determinations will be made.

In Plaintiff’s affidavit dated August 4, 2015, Plaintiff contests the accuracy of his 

translated sworn statement contained in his refugee application. Plaintiff denies knowing 

that the literature critical of the Khomeini regime which Plaintiff distributed in Iran was 

from or for the MEK. Plaintiff denies having been a member or supporter of the MEK. 

He denies knowing the political affiliation of Mehran Bor, and he denies that his friends 

were members of the MEK. Finally, Plaintiff denies any intent to support a terrorist 

organization, terrorist activity, or violence. Therefore, Plaintiff does not believe that his 

application should be denied, and he seeks final adjudication of it. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when reviewed in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 56(a). Substantive law determines which facts are material in a case and “only 

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,

Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the 

nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “‘can be resolved only by a 

finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal.

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).

Because “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 

drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . 

[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

drawn in his favor” at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 

1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of credibility, including questions of intent, should be 

left to the jury.”) (citations omitted).

When moving for summary judgment, the burden of proof initially rests with the 

moving party to present the basis for his motion and to identify those portions of the 

record and affidavits that he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant fails 

to carry his initial burden of production, the non-movant need not produce anything 

further. The motion for summary judgment would then fail. However, if the movant 

meets his initial burden of production, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

show that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is not entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; Triton Energy Corp. v. 

Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a 

material issue of fact conclusively in his favor. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 

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Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). However, he must “come forward with specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation and emphasis omitted); see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Finally, conclusory allegations unsupported by factual material are insufficient to 

defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989); see also Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 502 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“[c]onclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to 

raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment”). Nor can such allegations be 

the basis for a motion for summary judgment.

2. Adjustment of Citizenship Status for Refugees

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1), an alien granted refugee status who has been 

physically present in the United States for one year and is admissible may apply for 

adjustment of his citizenship status to permanent resident. USCIS “has jurisdiction to 

adjudicate an application for adjustment of status filed by an alien . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 

245.2(a)(1). “The decision may be favorable or unfavorable, but a decision must be 

made.” Wang v. Chertoff, No. CIV 07-077-TUC-GEE, 2007 WL 4200672, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. Nov. 27, 2007). Neither the statute nor the regulations governing the refugee 

adjustment of status process delineate a time frame within which USCIS must adjudicate 

a Form I-485 application for adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C.§ 1159(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 

209.1. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving admissibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 209.2.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), an alien is inadmissible if he “has engaged in 

terrorist activity,” which includes providing material support to a terrorist organization. 

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(iv) (defining “engage in terrorist activity”), 1182

(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining terrorist activity), 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv) (defining “tiers” of terrorist 

organizations). 

Although not officially listed by the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Terrorist 

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Organization until 1997, it is undisputed that the MEK was considered to be an 

undesignated, or Tier III, terrorist organization by the United States government at all 

times relevant to this action. 8 U.S.C. §1189; see also Bojnoordi v. Holder, 757 F. 3d 

1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “the statutory terrorism bar applies 

retroactively to an alien’s material support of a ‘Tier III’ terrorist organization”).

Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub.L. 110-161, 121 Stat 1844 

(December 26, 2007) (“CAA”), the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of 

State have the discretionary authority to exempt terrorist-related inadmissibility grounds 

related to aliens seeking an adjustment of status as well as to exempt undesignated or Tier 

III terrorist organizations from being considered terrorist organizations. See 8 U.S.C.§ 

1182 (d)(3)(B)(i). The MEK is not one of the ten listed exempt terrorist organizations in 

the CAA. The process by which discretionary exemption authority is weighed and 

decided necessitates careful consultation among the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 

Secretary of State, and the Attorney General regarding issues of national security and 

foreign policy, as well as humanitarian concerns. Id. Despite the laborious nature of the 

exemption process, the Secretary of DHS and the Secretary of State have issued 18,296 

discretionary exemptions in cases involving terrorist related inadmissibility grounds 

between 2006 and June 2014. (Doc. 24-1 at 12).

3. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)

The APA provides that any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency 

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 

relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. “Agency action” 

includes the failure of an agency to act. 5 U.S.C.§ 551(13). Agencies are required to 

conclude matters pending before them in a “reasonable” time. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). Courts 

may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C.§ 

706 (1). Under the APA, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that an agency “failed to 

take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. Southern Utah 

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Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). 2

To determine if an agency has unreasonably delayed action on a matter before it, 

the Ninth Circuit has adopted a six-factor test, or the TRAC factors, in assessing whether 

relief under the APA is appropriate. See Telecommunications Research & Action v. FCC 

(“TRAC”), 750 F. 2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Brower v. Evans, 257 F. 3d 1058, 1068 (9th

Cir. 2001). The Court must balance all six factors. They are:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be 

governed by a rule of reason, (2) where Congress has 

provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, 

that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of 

reason, (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of 

economic regulation are less tolerable when human health 

and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the 

effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a 

higher or competing priority, (5) the court should also take 

into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced 

by delay, and (6) the court need not find any impropriety 

lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency 

action is unreasonably delayed.

TRAC, 750 F. 2d at 80 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION

While the ultimate decision by the government to grant or deny a refugee’s 

application for adjustment of citizenship status is discretionary, the speed by which the 

government does so is not. See Hassan v. Chertoff, 593 F. 3d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 2010)

(finding that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) the court lacks jurisdiction to review the 

government’s denial of an application for adjustment of status); Beyene v. Napolitano,

2 Plaintiff seeks relief under the APA, 5 U.S.C.§ 706; the Mandamus and Venue 

Act (“MVA”), 28 U.S.C.§ 1361; and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 1651. The Supreme 

Court has construed a claim for writ of mandamus “in essence” as a claim for relief under 

the APA, as the relief sought is essentially the same under each statutory scheme. See 

Independence Min. Co., Inc. v. Babbitt, 105 F. 3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Japan 

Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n. 4 (1986)). Therefore, 

the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s claim under the APA. 

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No. C12-01149 WHA, 2012 WL 2911838, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012) (finding that 

the “pace of adjudicating an adjustment application” is not discretionary). “Indeed, many 

courts in the Ninth Circuit have determined, after Hassan, that federal courts have 

jurisdiction to review the government’s failure to adjudicate a status adjustment 

application.” Khan v. Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 3d 918, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding 

that the government has a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate adjustment of status 

applications within a reasonable time); see also Kashkool v. Chertoff, 553 F. Supp. 2d 

1131, 1141-42 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding that “pace at which USCIS adjudicates I-485 

applications is nondiscretionary” and mandamus jurisdiction exists). The Court finds that 

Defendants have a nondiscretionary duty to decide Plaintiff’s Form I-485 application 

within a reasonable period of time. See Islam v. Heinauer, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1069 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Islam II”). Defendants may not indefinitely delay a decision 

mandated by law. See Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2007); 

Wang, 2007 WL 4200672, at *3 (finding that “[t]he timing of the adjudication process is 

not a matter over which the USCIS has unfettered discretion.”).

The Court will analyze each TRAC factor in determining whether there are 

genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the time Defendants have 

spent failing to act on Plaintiff’s adjustment of citizenship status application. 

1. First Factor: Rule of Reason

It is undisputed that nine years have passed since Plaintiff filed his Form I-485 

with USCIS. “[M]any courts applying the TRAC factors have declined to find that 

delays exceeding six years are reasonable.” Islam II, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1072; see also 

Khan, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (citing Ninth Circuit cases which have found delays of less 

than four years to be reasonable, but six years or more to be unreasonable). A delay of 

nine years weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. However, the Court must also consider the source 

of the delay. See Mugomoke v. Curda, No. 2:10-cv-02166 KJM DAD, 2012 WL 113800, 

at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012) (“length of delay alone is not dispositive”); Singh, 470 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1068 (courts also look to “source of the delay”). 

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It is undisputed that Plaintiff provided all the necessary paperwork for his 

application. It is also undisputed that Defendants are unable to estimate the time within 

which they will decide the application due to the nature of the hold they have placed upon 

it. The hold could well be never-ending. Though the hold may ultimately benefit 

Plaintiff, and despite the deliberative process necessitated by Defendants’ policy and the 

exemption statute itself, the Court finds that holding the application indefinitely for the 

consideration of an exemption that may or may not come to pass at some future date does 

not comport with a rule of reason. Therefore, the Court concludes that the first TRAC 

factor tips in Plaintiff’s favor. 

2. Second Factor: Statutory Timetable

There is no statutorily mandated timetable for adjudicating Form I-485 

applications. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a); 8 C.F.R. § 209.1. However, there is a non-binding 

congressional policy statement that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that the processing of an 

immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after the 

initial filing of an application.” 8 U.S.C.§ 1571(b). While the Court finds this statute to 

be instructive, the second TRAC factor only slightly favors Plaintiff. See Khan, 65 F. 

Supp. 3d at 930 (synthesizing cases which found the “sense of Congress” to be highly 

relevant but finding the second TRAC factor to be of “little consequence”). 

3. Third and Fifth Factors: Human Health and Welfare and the Interests 

Prejudiced by the Delay

Because the third and fifth TRAC factors overlap, they are analyzed here together. 

This case involves human health and welfare, rendering “delays that might be reasonable 

in the sphere of economic regulation . . . less tolerable . . . .” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.

Plaintiff continues to “sit in limbo” as he awaits the adjudication of his request for change 

of citizenship status. (Doc. 30 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that he is “unable to stabilize his 

life in the United States because his lack of permanent resident status leaves him feeling 

insecure and anxious. He has lost work time and opportunities and a life of normalcy 

because of his lack of permanent status.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff’s interests in finality are 

significant. 

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However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ability to work and travel remains

unimpeded. Defendants stress that Plaintiff’s application will likely be denied if decided 

now, whereas an exemption could benefit Plaintiff in the future. Therefore, Defendants 

argue that the delay created by the adjudication hold does not prejudice Plaintiff, but 

rather merely inconveniences him. But see Mugomoke, 2012 WL 113800, at *5 

(presuming a plaintiff knows consequences of denial of application and infers harm of 

delay is significant).

The Court also recognizes that national security interests in a case such as this are 

high, and Defendants’ interests in fully complying with the congressional mandates of the 

CAA and USCIS policy are compelling. Therefore, balancing the competing interests of 

all parties, the Court concludes that the third and fifth TRAC factors do not weigh heavily 

in either side’s favor. See Khan, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 931 (concurring with the reasoning of 

the Court in Islam II, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1073, which found in the case of a former Tier III 

terrorist organization member “important interests at stake for both parties” and that 

“these factors do not weigh heavily in either party’s favor”).

4. Fourth Factor: Effect of Expediting Delayed Action

The fourth TRAC factor requires the Court to consider the effect of requiring an 

agency to expedite its delayed action on the agency’s activities of a higher or competing 

priority. TRAC, 750 F. 2d at 80. Defendants argue that expediting adjudication of 

Plaintiff’s delayed application infringes upon Defendants’ exercise of discretionary 

exemption authority. However, the Court finds that requiring Defendants to timely 

adjudicate a Form I-485 application does not dictate to Defendants how or whether to 

exercise the exemption authority. Nor is Plaintiff seeking to change USCIS policy. 

Plaintiff merely seeks a final determination made within a reasonable period of time. 

Therefore, the Court finds that this factor tips in Plaintiff’s favor. See Islam II, 32 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1074 (finding the fourth factor favored Plaintiff); Qureshi v. Napolitano, No. 

C-11-05814, 2012 WL 2503828, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (weighing fourth factor 

in plaintiff’s favor because plaintiff did not seek to force the application of an exemption 

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or a change in USCIS policy). 

5. Sixth Factor: Bad Faith

The sixth TRAC factor cautions that “the Court need not find any impropriety 

lurking behind agency lassitude.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. This factor has been 

interpreted as requiring the Court to determine whether any impropriety or bad faith has 

caused an agency’s delay. See Khan, 65 F. Supp. at 932. It is undisputed that Defendants 

have processed to conclusion thousands of exemption authorizations in factually similar 

cases under USCIS policy. The exemption process is laborious, requiring detailed 

analysis among agencies. There is no evidence presented of bad faith or impropriety 

driving the delay in adjudication of Plaintiff’s application. Therefore, the Court finds that 

the sixth factor weighs in Defendants’ favor. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Because the Court finds on balance that several TRAC factors favor Plaintiff, 

several are neutral, and one tips in favor of Defendants, genuine issues of material fact 

exist as to the reasonableness of the delay necessitated by Defendants’ hold on Plaintiff’s 

I-485 application. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

IT IS ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 

24). 

Dated this 21st day of January, 2016. 

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