Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01624/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01624-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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OR\G\NAL 
 ~ ~ ~ t'"" ~ 

t~: i~ 0 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES EDWARD SPENCE, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary, et aI., 

Res ondent. 

CASE NO. 14cv 1624-BAS (KSC) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FROM THE 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

DENYING THE PETITION 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 

Cynthia Bashant pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil 

Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District ofCalifornia. Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons 

outlined below, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

Ie FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS 

On July 8, 2014, Petitioner James Edward Spence ("petitioner"), a California 

state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1] On July 10, 2014, the District Court dismissed the 

Petition without prejudice due to the petitioner's failure to name a proper respondent. 

[Doc. 2] On August 1, 2014, the petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (hereinafter 

"F AP") [Doc. 4], which is the operative pleading in this case. This Court set a briefing 

schedule, indicating that the respondent's Response would be due on October 13,2014, 

and any Traverse would be due by November 12,2014. [Doc. 5] On October 10,2014, 

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the People filed a Response and Lodgments. [Docs. 11, 12-1 to 12-20] No Traverse has 

been filed. As set forth in detail below, the F AP raises four distinct claims of 

constitutional violations based on the petitioner's state court criminal trial. 

II. STATE PROCEEDINGS 

On January 28,2010, an information was filed charging the petitioner with four 

counts of sexual offenses against a minor ("D.," the daughter ofpetitioner's on-again, 

off-again romantic partner). [Lodg. 2, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10] On July 7, 2010, an amended 

information was filed charging the petitioner with seven counts of sexual offenses 

against a minor, and this amended information was the operative information at trial. 

Id. at 87. The petitioner pled not guilty and proceeded to trial by jury on August 5, 

2010. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, p. 192] On August 17,2010, the jury convicted him of two 

counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger, occurring on April 

20, 2009 (Count One, sexual penetration in violation of California Penal Code § 

288.7(b);1 Count Two, sodomy in violationof§ 288.7(a)). [Lodg. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 357-62] 

The jury also convicted the petitioner oftwo counts ofsexual activity against the child 

in March 2009 (Count Four, committing a lewd act in violation of § 288(a); Count 

Five, oral copulation in violation of § 288. 7(b). Id. He was acquitted of two other 

charges and an additional count was dismissed on the People's motion. Jd.; [Lodg. 1, 

Vol. 1, p. 1187] 

The petitioner was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life on April 1, 2011. 

[Lodg. 2, Vol. 2, p. 437] He timely appealed his conviction and sentence to the 

California Court of Appeal through counsel on October 18, 2011. [Lodg. 3] In his 

direct appeal, the petitioner raised four discrete claims, which are re-iterated in the 

instant Petition before the Court and will be discussed in detail below. The California 

Court of Appeal denied the petitioner's appeal on all four grounds in a published 

opinion dated December 27,2012. [Lodg. 6] Through counsel, the petitioner submitted 

I All future statutory references will be to the California Penal Code unless 

otherwise noted. 

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a petition for review to the California Supreme Court on February 1,2013, raising only 

two of the four grounds that had been denied by the Court of Appeal. [Lodg. 7] The 

California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment on April 11, 2013. 

[Lodg.8] 

III. EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL 

The facts that follow are taken verbatim from the California Court ofAppeal's 

published opinion.2 Federal habeas courts rely upon facts developed in state courts 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,545-47 (1981) 

(stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate 

courts). Furthermore, this Court has conducted a careful, independent review ofthe 

complete trial record, and finds that the Court ofAppeal's opinion accurately captures 

the relevant factual and procedural background ofthe case. 

The petitioner's challenges to his convictions do not include any claims of 

insufficiency ofthe evidence. Where a detailed examination ofthe record and ofthe 

factual findings ofthe state court is required to address the petitioner's claims, specific 

citations to the record are provided in subsequent sections. 

A. Background 

When these incidents occurred in 2009, Spence was about 25 years 

old and had been living for about 10 years as a housemate to [the child 

complainant] D.'s mother, D. Smith (Ms. Smith), who was older and had 

four children, two with Spence. Spence acted as the stepfather to D., who 

was born in 1998 and whose father did not live with the family. Due to 

various problems with one of the other children in the home, the family 

had a child protective services (CPS) caseworker, Melinda Pellegrino. 

Ms. Smith wanted to break up with Spence and have him move out and 

leave the family, but he did not want to do so. The night of April 20, 

Spence and his male friend Dale Williams were at Ms. Smith's house 

overnight, and she was out with friends. 

2 Though the California Court of ApReal's opinion is published as People v. 

SpenceJ 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374 (Cal. Ct. AJJp. 2012), this Report and Recommendation 

will rerer to the version supplied by the Respondent as Lodgment 6. 

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On the morning ofApril 21 ,2009, D. told Ms. Smith that while Ms. 

Smith had been absent the night before, her dad (which is what she called 

Spence) "raped her," by telling her to come into the bathroom and pull 

down her pants, and putting his finger in her vagina. Ms. Smith drove her 

son to school, discussed the matter further with D., and then woke Spence 

to have him go to a Kaiser clinic with them. Spence said it was not true. 

At Kaiser, D. was seen by a male nurse, Matthew Sager, and she was 

crying and upset while telling him that her "dad" had pulled her pants 

down and touched her private parts. She said something similar had 

happened a month ago. 

Nurse Sager told Ms. Smith that Kaiser's policy was to send such 

patients to Children's Hospital. Ms. Smith became angry and left with D., 

so the nurse called 911 and the police followed their car. When Ms. 

Smith got home, she called her CPS caseworker, Pellegrino, and they 

talked to D. about what happened. Pellegrino told Ms. Smith and D. they 

should cooperate with police officers, who had arrived at the Smith home. 

Spence called home and Pellegrino told him he needed to come home, but 

he did not do so. 

D. was taken to Children's Hospital, where she did not want to 

speak to a caseworker, but agreed to speak with Dr. Lorena Vivanco, a 

board certified pediatrician specializing in child abuse treatment. While 

crying and upset, D. told Dr. Vivanco that the night before, her dad 

Spence took her into the bathroom and pulled down her pants, and then 

started touching her "privacy" and put his fingers inside her privacy. 

Then he put his privacy inside her "butt" after turning her over and 

putting something slippery on his own privacy. The month before, while 

D. was asleep, Spence came to her bed and tried to put his "privacy" into 

her mouth, after putting his finger in it first. D. told Dr. Vivanco that she 

had not told anyone about the first incident because she did not think it 

would happen again and Spence told her not to tell. 

While D. was being examined by Dr. Vivanco, Detective Dana 

Hoover was at the hospital talking to Ms. Smith. Spence called Ms. Smith 

and said that he wanted to talk to the detective to clear things up. 

Detective Hoover asked him to call her the next day, which he did, and 

she made arrangements for him to come to the police station for an 

interview on the following day. 

II 

II 

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II 

B. Interview, Arrest and Charges 

Spence came to the police station on April 22, was escorted upstairs 

and interviewed by plainclothes Detective Hoover and Detective Cindy 

Brady. Although he originally said he had not sexually touched D. and 

offered to take a polygraph examination to clear himself, the detectives 

learned that the equipment was out of order and nothing happened.3 

Eventually, Spence admitted to the detectives that he had molested 

D. in April, but not in March. The detectives asked him ifhe wanted to 

apologize to D., and he said he could not write and did not know how to 

begin, so Detective Hoover offered to take down his dictation, wrote 

down what he said, and kept the original (the dictated letter). Hoover and 

the other detective then told him to go take care ofhis affairs and to turn 

himselfin for arrest in a few days, because that would look better for him 

and for the family. 

On April 28, 2009, Spence came to the police station to tum 

himself in for arrest. Two handwritten, signed letters about his remorse 

and sadness regarding the incidents, dated April 27, 2009 and addressed 

to D. and Ms. Smith, were found in his pocket.4 Detective Hoover made 

copies ofthese (here, designated the two copied letters) and returned the 

originals to him. Charges were filed April 30, 2009. 

On July 7, 2010, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an 

amended information alleging three counts against Spence arising out of 

the April 20, 2009 incident with D. (sexual penetration by putting his 

finger in her vagina, sodomy and sexual intercourse, all with a child 10 

years old or younger; § 288.7, subds. (a), (b)). 5 

3 At trial, the parties stipulated that all references to the polygraph exam idea 

must be redacted. 

4 Detective Hoover testified in rebuttal that Spence told her he wrote the two 

copied letters(those found in his pocket when he was arrested). 

5 Two other counts were charged stemming from the March incident but no 

convictions were obtained on them (count 6 sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b) [fingerin the child's vaginal); and count 7, engaging in sodomy with a child 10 years 010 or younger (§ 288.7, subcf. (a) [penis in the child's 

anus])). Count 3, regarding sexual intercourse, was eventually dismissed. 

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In preparation for his defense at trial, Spence was interviewed by 

an expert psychologist, Dr. Carroll Waymon, to evaluate his educational 

level and his ability to make decisions when confronted with female 

authority figures, such as the detectives. Dr. Waymon reviewed Spence's 

continuation school records and talked to him for about two and one-half 

hours, and evaluated him as having a grade level of about third through 

fifth grade. He determined that Spence has dyslexia, which affects his 

general functioning abilities and makes him dependent on others, rather 

than being able to make his own independent judgments. 

C. Suppression Hearing and Trial Cases-in-Chief 

At the outset of trial, Spence brought a motion to suppress his 

statements at the April 22 interview with the detectives, contending it was 

a custodial interrogation and his unwarned statements were not voluntary. 

(§ 1538.5.) At the suppression hearing, Detective Hoover testified about 

writing the dictated letter at Spence's request, when he told her could not 

write or read well. 

Spence testified that he only agreed to let Detective Hoover write 

the dictated letter for him because he thought that was what she wanted 

to hear him say. When the prosecutor presented him with the two copied 

letters (as found in his pocket when he was taken into custody) and asked 

ifhe wrote them, Spence said the signature and handwriting looked like 

his own and he guessed he must have written them. 

The court denied Spence's motion to suppress his statements to 

detectives, ruling that he was not in custody at the time and the statements 

were voluntary. No ruling on admissibility on any letters was made at that 

time. 

At trial, D. testified in the prosecution's case-in-chief and was 

accompanied to the witness stand by a victim advocate from the District 

Attorney's office, as well as a therapy dog that sat at her feet and behind 

the stand. Defense objections, that this level ofsupport was unnecessary 

and excessive under the statutory scheme, were overruled. 

Other percipient and expert witnesses testified at trial, including 

Ms. Smith and Pellegrino. Detective Hoover testified and played for the 

jury a tape ofthe April 22 interview, and displayed an enlargement ofthe 

dictated letter. 

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Laboratory tests on D.'s clothing and her person (mouth, genital 

and anal areas) showed there were traces ofspeml cells on the mouth and 

clothing but no seminal fluid. Not enough material was collected for a 

complete DNA analysis, but neither Spence nor his friend Williams, who 

were at the house that night, could be excluded as an African-American 

sperm cell donor ofthe cells on the clothing. 

Dr. Vivanco testified about her forensic examination ofD., which 

showed physical evidence ofbruising and spotting in the vaginal area and 

hymen. Dr. Vivanco concluded there was definite evidence of some 

sexual abuse or contact. Although there was no visible indication ofanal 

penetration, the doctor stated that she could not rule out that it happened, 

since a child's anus may stretch under such duress. 

The prosecutor asked Dr. Vivanco about possible explanations for 

D.'s story. Specifically, she asked, 44ifsomeone by the name of[D.] says 

that she is sexually assaulted by someone by the name ofJames Spence, 

is there any evidence that you tested in this case that contradicts that 

story?" The expert replied that there were no test results excluding 

Spence, i.e., HAll ofthe DNA that I have ends up having some consistency 

with the DNA test from Mr. Spence." [See discussion in Section XX, 

supra.] 

Spence did not testify at trial. His defense theories were that Ms. 

Smith had D. falsely accuse him ofsexual assault to get rid ofhim, or that 

his mental deficiencies led him to make a false confession. He also 

contended that the perpetrator might have been his friend Dale Williams, 

who was at the house that night and who could have left the sperm cells 

found in the lab tests. Spence presented numerous character witnesses 

and several expert witnesses, to be described in the discussion portion of 

this opinion. 

Briefly, with regard to the issue about Spence's ability to write 

letters, his expert psychologist, Dr. Waymon, testified about his 

evaluation of the apparent mental deficiencies and low level of 

functioning that Spence had, based in part upon a two and one-half hour 

interview and his review ofschool records. Dr. Waymon stated he did not 

believe Spence had the ability to read or write at a normal adult level, 

based upon two unusual writing samples he had obtained from Spence 

during his interview (a sentence or two in tiny writing with eccentric 

spacing; they are not in the appellate record). 

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During cross-examination about his opinions, Dr. Waymon was 

shown the two copied letters obtained by detectives when Spence was 

arrested, and he opined that it was unlikely that Spence had written them, 

since the handwriting and printing in them were consistent with that ofa 

high school graduate or adult, rather than with a low functioning 

individual such as Spence. 

D. Rebuttal Phase ofProsecution; Instructions and Verdict; Motion and Judgment 

In rebuttal testimony, Detective Hoover identified the copied letters 

and stated that at the time ofhis arrest, Spence told her that he had written 

them. However, she never put that in a written report. 

In response to Dr. Waymon's testimony, the prosecutor sought to 

rebut or impeach his expert opinion by bringing in other evidence that 

Spence had the ability to write and had done so, based on the copied 

letters found in his pocket when he was arrested. She proposed to read 

into the record Spence's testimony at the suppression hearing, in which 

he admitted that those signatures looked like his and he guessed he must 

have written them. Defense counsel unsuccessfully objected that Spence 

had a right to testify at his suppression hearing, and his testimony about 

the letters at that hearing should not be used against him either in the 

case-in-chiefor in rebuttal.. ..The dictated and copied letters were admitted 

into evidence at the close ofthe defense case and during rebuttal. 

The jury received instructions about the limited purposes for which 

they could consider the evidence ofthe two copied letters, to determine 

Spence's writing level and ability. His oral statements before trial were 

to be considered along with all other evidence. Regarding his statements 

to the expert, they were to be used for evaluating the expert's opinion, not 

for the truth oftheir content. More generally, the jury was told, inter alia, 

that the fact a crime was charged is not evidence the charge is true 

(CALCRIM No. 220), and they must decide the case based on the 

evidence, not on any extrinsic factors such as sympathy, passion, or 

prejudice (CALCRIM No. 200). 

The jury deliberated and found Spence guilty ofcounts 1, 2, 4, and 

5, but acquitted him of two other counts stemming from the March 

incident. On the People's motion, the court dismissed count 3. 

[Lodg. 6, pp. 4-11] 

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IV. PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS 

The F AP presents the following claims: 

(1) The state appellate court ignored controlling United States Supreme Court 

authority when it ruled that the petitioner's testimony from a pre-trial suppression 

hearing could be admitted to impeach his expert witness; 

(2) The petitioner was improperly convicted ofcommitting sexual assault against 

a child "ten years of age or younger" when the child was older than 10 years but less 

than 11 years at the time of the offense; 

(3) The petitioner was denied due process oflaw when the trial court allowed the 

child to have both a therapy dog and a support advocate accompany her to the witness 

stand during her trial testimony, and when the trial court allowed the prosecutor to 

introduce the support advocate to the jury as a "victim" advocate; and 

(4) The petitioner was denied due process when the prosecutor posed an 

improper hypothetical question to a medical witness that essentially asked the witness 

to comment on the strength ofthe prosecutor's evidence in the case. [Doc. 4, pp. 6-9] 

V. DISCUSSION 

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the petitioner has failed to 

establish that the adjudication of his claims by the state courts was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as decided by the United 

States Supreme Court, or was based upon an unreasonable determination ofthe facts 

in light ofthe evidence presented in state court. Accordingly, the Court recommends 

the F AP be denied. 

A. Standard of Review 

Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to those who are in custody in 

violation ofthe Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A") imposes a "highly 

deferential standard" for evaluating state-court rulings on federal habeas review, and 

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"demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,24 (2002) (citations omitted). Under AEDPA, a federal habeas 

petition shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication ofthe claim: 1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(I)-(2). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that a state court decision is "contrary to" 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(I) if the state court 

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

Supreme Court precedent but nevertheless arrives at a different result. JuanH. v. 

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

On the other hand, a state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal 

principle" from a Supreme Court decision "but unreasonably applies that principle to 

the facts ofthe prisoner's case." Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). 

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly .... Rather, that application 

must be objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Clearly established federal law "refers to 

the holdings, as opposed to dicta," of the United States Supreme Court's decisions. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

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If this Court determines that a constitutional error occurred during the 

petitioner's state court proceedings, the Court must then determine whether harmless 

error analysis is warranted. The Supreme Court has recognized that most constitutional 

errors can be harmless. Arizona v. Fuiminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (citations 

omitted). Constitutional errors that are determined to be "trial errors" - that is, those 

occurring during the presentation ofthe case to the jury - are subject to the harmless 

error standard articulated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766 (1946). 

Brechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623,629-38 (1993). Under Brecht, habeas relief 

is only warranted if the trial error had "a substantial and injurious effect" on the 

verdict. Id. at 623. Examples of trial errors include the erroneous admission or 

exclusion of evidence, improper jury instructions, restriction of a defendant's right to 

cross-examine a witness for bias, and improper comment on a defendant's silence at 

trial. Fuiminante, 499 U.S. at 306-307 (citations omitted). 

B. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Habeas Relief On The Basis OfThe Trial Court's 

Admission of Petitioner's Suppression Hearing Testimony to Impeach Expert 

Witness (Claim 1) 

The petitioner contends in Claim 1 that his due process rights were violated 

when the trial court permitted the prosecutor to impeach the testimony ofDr. Carroll 

Waymon with statements the defendant had made under oath at a pre-trial suppression 

hearing. [Doc. 4, p. 6] Specifically, the petitioner contends that the trial court's ruling 

was in clear contravention of the United States Supreme Court's precedent in James 

v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). Id. 

The Court has independently reviewed the trial record pertaining to this claim 

and confirms that the California Court of Appeal's opinion, reprinted in Section III, 

correctly summarizes the relevant facts. Dr. Waymon testified at trial that the 

handwriting on two apology letters found in the petitioner's pocket "does not appear 

to be Mr. Spence's writing at all." [Lodg. 1, Vol. 5, p. 1155] In rebuttal, the trial court 

permitted the prosecutor to impeach Dr. Waymon's testimony by reading to the jury a 

portion ofthe petitioner"s testimony at a pre-trial suppression hearing: 

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Question [Prosecutor]: Do you recognize this letter? So, is this your 

signature, and you wrote that letter, sir? 

Answer [Spence]: I don't remember. But, yeah, it looks like it. 

Question: Now I'm showing you People's Exhibit No.2. At the bottom 

appears to be the name James Spence. Is that your handwriting and your 

signature? 

Answer: It looks like it. 

[Lodg. 1, Vol. 6, p. 1304] 

This Court finds that the petitioner's claim lacks merit in two respects. First, the 

California Court ofAppeal's denial ofthe petitioner's first claim is not contradictory 

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254( d)( 1). This Court concludes that constitutional law had not been so "clearly 

established" by the Supreme Court as to make the conclusion of the state court 

objectively unreasonable. See Campbell v. Rice, 408 F 3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) 

("AEDPA's 'clearly established law' requirement limits the area of law on which a 

habeas court may rely to those constitutional principles enunciated in Supreme Court 

decisions."). The petitioner has not cited to any Supreme Court precedent clearly 

establishing that a defendant's suppression hearing testimony may not be used to 

impeach a defense expert who has based his opinions in part on the defendant's 

statements to him. 

In James v. Illinois, the Supreme Court reversed a state court decision which had 

extended the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule to "permit the 

prosecution to impeach the testimony of all defense witnesses.,,6 493 U.S. 307, 309 

6 James involved the admission of a defendant's unwarned statement that was 

illegally obtained in violation ofMiranda. James, 493 U.S. at 309. The case before 

this Court involves the petitioner's sworn testimony at a pre-trial suppression hearin..g. As a preliminary matter, the parties have not extensively briefed whether the specifIc portion of the testimony at issue is constitutionallY p'rotected, or whetner the 

p'rotections ofJames apply. Cf Simmons v. US, 390 US 377, 390 (1968) ("When a 

oefendant testifies in support ofa motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Aniendment 

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(1990). Although James could be broadly interpreted to prohibit the impeachment of 

any defense witness other than the defendant, several state courts have interpreted the 

decision more narrowly.7 Appling v. State, 904 S.W.2d 912, 916-17 (Tex. Ct. App. 

1995); People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d 1109, 1126 (IlL 1998); State v. DeGraw, 470 

S.E.2d 215, 221-22 (W. Va. 1996); Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880,885-89 

(D.C. 1993). These state courts have found more limited extensions of the 

impeachment exception consistent with James, affirming the use of a defendant's 

unwarned statements to impeach defense witnesses who specifically relate the 

defendant's statements to them, or rely on those statements in forming an expert 

opinion. See Appling, 904 S.W.2d at 916-17; DeGraw, 470 S.E.2d at 221-22; Wilkes, 

631 A.2d at 885-89; see also James, 493 U.S. at 311-12 (explaining that the Supreme 

Court "has carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule" where the "balance" 

between the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and the deterrent aim of the 

exclusionary rule favors admissibility). Given these decisions, the consistent 

conclusion reached by the California Court of Appeal was not objectively 

unreasonable. See generally Barcheers v. Alameda, 146 Fed. App'x 100, 103 (9th Cir. 

2005) (unpublished memorandum decision). 

Furthermore, even if the trial court's admission of the suppression hearing 

testimony was error, this Court finds that the error was harmless, as it did not have a 

"a substantial and injurious effect" on the verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 623 (1993). Claims based on state evidentiary rulings, such as the ruling to admit 

grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue 

of guilt unless he makes no objection.") Because this Court ultimately finds that the 

petItioner's argument fails even if James does a'Rply' to the petitioner's pre-trial testimony, this Court need not and does not decide tIle issue. 

7 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the opinions of lower courts can be 

relevant in assessing whether the state court's application is "unreasonable" and 

wl1ether federal law is "clearly established." Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F .3 d 597, 601 

(9t Cir. 1999) (characterizing the decisions of lower federal courts as relevant in 

assessing whether the state court's application is "unreasonable" and whether federal 

law is "clearly established"). 

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or strike a challenged question, are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding 

unless the ruling was so prejudicial that it rendered a trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle 

v.McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70-73 (1991); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 

(9th Cir. 1996); Jammalv. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918,919-20 (9th Cir. 1991) ("While 

adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a 

procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state 

standards are violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may 

countenance processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness.") 

The question of whether the petitioner wrote the two apology letters in his 

pocket was tangential to the issue ofhis guilt or innocence ofthe crimes charged. The 

jury was presented with significant other evidence throughout the trial that bore more 

directly on the petitioner's guilt, including the testimony ofthe child victim [Lodg. 1, 

Vol. 2, pp. 338-350]; crime lab evidence showing the presence ofsperm on the child's 

mouth and t-shirt [Lodg. 1, Vol. 3, pp. 519-20]; medical testimony and photographs of 

the injuries to the child's genital areas [Lodg. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 401-07,413]; the testimony 

ofthe emergency department nurse to whom the child first reported the assault [Lodg. 

1, Vol. 2, pp. 286-88]; and the petitioner's own confession to the crimes that was 

audio-recorded by detectives and played for the jury [Lodg. 1, Vol. 4, p. 908]. 

Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that the letters were admitted for a very 

limited purpose: to assess the petitioner's writing level and ability. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 

1334-35] 

The trial court acknowledged that Dr. Waymon' s testimony about the petitioner's 

writing ability and educational level was a foundational part of the defense's false 

confession theory. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 1287-88] ("This has become the cornerstone 

ofthe defense case, is (sic.) his intellectual functioning and how low it is to support the 

position that it's a false confession.") However, Dr. Waymon was not the only defense 

expert witness to testify about the theory offalse confessions or about the petitioner's 

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intellectual functioning. The defense called Dr. Leo to testify as an expert on false 

confessions and the link between an individual's low IQ and the possibility of a false 

confession. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 1218-78] The defense called the petitioner's uncle to 

testify that the petitioner "had trouble learning," "was a slow leamer," and "was [] a 

special edkid." [Lodg. 1, Vol. 5, p. 1131] Therefore, even without the testimony ofDr. 

Waymon, the defense still introduced significant evidence at trial from which to argue 

its theory of false confession. This Court cannot say that the error, ifany, denied the 

petitioner his ability to present a defense or otherwise so fundamentally infected the 

trial as to require habeas relief. 

Finding no constitutional error and no harm to the petitioner, this Court 

RECOMMENDS that the petitioner's first claim be DENIED. 

C. Petitioner's Argument That The Victim Was Not "10 Years Of Age Or 

Younger" (Claim 2) Is Not a Cognizable Federal Claim 

The petitioner contends in Claim 2 that he was improperly convicted of 

committing sexual assault against a child "ten years of age or younger" under the 

California Penal Code when the child was older than 10 years but less than 11 years at 

the time of the offense. The California Court of Appeal denied the claim on direct 

appeal on the grounds that the California Supreme Court has concluded that "ten years 

of age or younger" in a sex crime statute means "under 11 years of age" and therefore 

includes children who have reached their 10th birthday but have not yet reached their 

1ph birthday. [Lodg. 12-17, p. 15] (citing People v. Cornett, 53 Cal.4th 1261,1275 

(2012)). Because the victim was under 11 years old at the time of the offense, the 

Court of Appeal found that the petitioner was properly convicted under the statute. 

The petitioner's argument in the F AP is easily rejected because it does not raise 

a cognizable federal claim. Federal habeas relief is available only to state prisoners 

who are "in custody in violation ofthe Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. Federal courts "are bound by a state court's 

construction of its own penal statute." Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705,707 (9th Cir. 

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1993). Absent an independent Federal constitutional violation, "it is not the province 

of a federal habeas court to re-examine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). This Court must defer to the 

state court's construction unless it is "untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid 

federal review ofa constitutional violation." Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F .2d 1395, 

1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Likewise, to the extent the petitioner may raise a federal constitutional claim of 

actual or legal innocence based on the victim's age, this argument is also foreclosed by 

the California Supreme Court's decision in Cornett. Cf Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 

1131, 1135-36(9thCir. 20 14)("One way a petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence 

is to show in light of subsequent case law that he cannot, as a legal matter, have 

committed the alleged crime.") The petitioner's interpretation ofstate law is incorrect. 

Because his victim was less than 11 years old at the time ofthe offenses, the petitioner 

is not legally innocent of offenses with a child 1 0 years ofage or younger. People v. 

Cornett, 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1275 (2012) ("We are persuaded here that our Legislature 

intended' 10 years ofage or younger' as used in section 288.7 to be another means of 

saying 'under 11 year of age' in accordance with the ordinary understanding of 

'age."'). Federal courts "are bound by a state court's construction of its own penal 

statutes." Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993); Bradshaw v. Richey, 

546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). This Court must defer to the state court's construction unless 

it is "untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review ofa constitutional 

violation." Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F .2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY the 

petitioner's claim. 

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D. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Habeas ReliefOn The Basis OfThe Trial Court's 

Decision To Permit The Child Witness To Be Accompanied To The Witness Stand 

By Both A Support Advocate And Therapy Dog or by the Prosecutor Calling the 

Support Person A "Victim Advocate" (Claim 3) 

In Claim 3, the petitioner contends that he was denied due process of law when 

(1) the trial court allowed the child have both a therapy dog and a support advocate 

accompany her to the witness stand during her trial testimony, and (2) when the trial 

court allowed the prosecutor to introduce the support advocate to the jury as a "victim" 

advocate. [Doc. 1, p. 8] On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal found that 

therapy dogs are not "persons," and therefore the trial court did not violate or 

misinterpret the applicable state statute by permitting the victim to be accompanied by 

both a support advocate and a therapy dog.8 [Lodg. 6, pp. 55-56] The Court ofAppeal 

also rejected the petitioner's claim that the presence ofthe human support person and 

the prosecutor's label of that person as a "victim advocate" caused the petitioner 

prejudice at trial. Id. at 45, 57. This Court will consider each of the petitioner's 

contentions in tum. 

First, the petitioner's claim that the support advocate and the therapy dog denied 

him due process by endorsing the child's testimony or undermining the presumption 

ofinnocence is without merit. The witness testified under oath and in full view ofthe 

jury while trial counsel conducted cross examination, thus enabling the jury to observe 

her demeanor and evaluate her credibility. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 338-50] The support 

person neither testified nor said anything at trial. Id. It appears from the record that 

the therapy dog sat at D.'s feet and was likewise unobtrusive. Id. Decisions from the 

8 Section 868.5(a) states: "Notwithstanding any other law, a prosecuting witness 

[in certain cases] ... shall be entitled, for support, fo tlie attendance ofll.P to two persons ofhis or her own choosing, one ofwhom may be a witness, at the preliminary hearing 

and at the triaL.." As discussed previously this Court is not permitted on federal 

habeas review to inte!pret or determine whether the state court appropriatery applied 

state law. Appnte v. Gomez 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9t Cir. 1993); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 68 0991). Accordingly, the portIOns ofpetitioner's arguments that center on 

the intel'P.retation and application of provisions of the California Penal Code are not 

properly before the Court. 

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United States Supreme Court have upheld the use ofspecial procedures to protect child 

witnesses. E.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (finding that the 

confrontation clause did not categorically prohibit child witness from testifying at trial 

by one-way closed circuit television). The petitioner has not identified any "clearly 

established" constitutional law to support his argument, nor has he presented any 

evidence showing that the presence ofthe support person and therapy dog adversely 

influenced the jury. It was not unreasonable for the appellate court to conclude that the 

petitioner's due process rights were not violated by the presence of the support 

advocate and the therapy dog. The petitioner cannot prevail on this claim. 

The petitioner's second claim that the prosecutor's reference to the support 

advocate as a "victim advocate" in the presence of the jury violated his due process 

rights is similarly without merit. The record demonstrates that the trial court and the 

prosecutor were very careful throughout the trial to not refer to D. as a "victim." The 

word "victim" was only said once throughout the trial in connection with D., and that 

was when the prosecutor announced to the jury, "[D.] will be accompanied by a victim 

advocate named Norie Figueroa from our office and a canine therapy dog." [Lodg. 1, 

Vol. 2, p. 338] Notably, the trial court never referred to D. as a victim. The petitioner 

presents no evidence to show that this single, isolated use of the word "victim" 

influenced the jury's perception of D.'s testimony. To the contrary, the Court 

instructed the jury before trial that "[w ] hat the attorneys say during the course of the 

trial is not evidence." [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, p. 194 ] (emphasis added). In the absence of 

evidence to the contrary, this Court must assume that the jury followed this instruction. 

Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234. 

In sum, the Court finds that neither the presence of the support advocate and 

therapy dog, nor the prosecutor's single, isolated use ofthe phrase "victim advocate," 

so fundamentally infected the trial process as to violate the petitioner's due process 

rights. Furthermore, even if constitutional error had occurred, that error would have 

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been harmless because it did not have a "a substantial and injurious effect" on the 

verdict. See Brechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). As discussed at length 

in Subsection B., above, the prosecution introduced sufficient other evidence at trial 

beyond the testimony of D. to justify the conviction and support D.'s story. It is 

therefore RECOMMENDED that the petitioner's third claim be DENIED. 

E. Petitioner's Claim That The Prosecutor's Improper Hypothetical Question 

Violated His Due Process Rights (Claim 4) Is Procedurally Defaulted 

The petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the prosecutor 

posed an improper hypothetical question to a medical witness that essentially asked the 

witness to comment on the strength ofthe prosecutor's evidence in the case. [Doc. 4, 

pp. 6-9] At trial, the prosecutor asked a criminalist with the San Diego Police 

Department Crime Laboratory, "if someone by the name of [D.] says that she is 

sexually assaulted by someone by the name ofJames Spence, is there any evidence that 

you tested in this case that contradicts that story?" [Lodg. 1, Vol. 3, p. 575] Over the 

defense's objections, the witness responded in the negative. Id. On direct appeal, the 

Court ofAppeal "acknowledge [ d] that the medical expert arguably was asked to testify 

directly about the guilt ofSpence, since the question posed named him and essentially 

asked whether he had any meritorious defense in the evidence, or was guilty." [Lodg. 

6, p. 44] The Court ofAppeal stated, "we disapprove ofthis form ofquestioning. We 

are satisfied, however, that any error in allowing it was harmless." Id. at 44-45. 

The petitioner failed to raise this claim in his Petition for Review before the 

California Supreme Court.9 See [Lodg. 7] Accordingly, this claim is not properly before 

this Court on federal habeas review. The exhaustion of available state remedies by 

presentation to the state's highest court has long been a prerequisite to a federal court's 

9 The respondent argued that this claim is procedurally defaulted for its failure 

to raise a cogmzable federal issue. [Doc. 11-1, p. 41] While this Court rejects that 

argument and finds that the claim does raise a constitutional due process concern, the 

Court finds that the claim is p'rocedurally defaulted because it was not raised before the 

California Supreme Court. See infra. 

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consideration of claims presented in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. § 

2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). As amatier offederal-state comity, 

federal courts generally do not consider a claim in habeas corpus proceedings until the 

state courts have had an opportunity to act upon the claim. Id. at 515. 

Because the time for filing a petition for review or a state habeas corpus petition 

in the California Supreme Court has now expired, the petitioner's claim is technically 

exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614,621 n.5 

(9th Cir. 2005) ("A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 

'available' to him."); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.l (1991) (holding 

that a procedural default arises when "the court to which the petitioner would be 

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred"). The Ninth Circuit has held that "because the 

California untimeliness rule is not interwoven with federal law, it is an independent 

state procedural ground." Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,581 (9th Cir. 2003). See 

also Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1125-31 (2011) (holding that 

California's timeliness requirement providing that a prisoner must seek habeas relief 

without "substantial delay" as "measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, 

or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of the claim 

and the legal basis for the claim," is clearly established and consistently applied). 

Notwithstanding the procedural default, this Court may reach the merits of the 

claim if the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his failure to satisfy the state 

procedural rule and prejudice arising from the default, or that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would result from the Court not reaching the merits of the 

defaulted claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). This Court will 

address the three considerations ofcause, prejudice, and fundamental fairness in tum, 

below, finding ultimately no basis for reaching the merits ofthis claim. 

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L Cause 

The cause prong can be satisfied if Petitioner shows an "objective factor" that 

precluded him from raising his claim in state court, such as interference by state 

officials or constitutionally ineffective counsel. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 

493-94 (1991). The petitioner provides no explanation, however, for his failure to raise 

Claim 4 in his petition for review before the California Supreme Court. Because, as 

discussed below, Claim 4 is without merit, the only reason apparent in the record for 

the failure to present this claim to the California Supreme Court is a strategic choice 

by appellate counsel not to raise a weak claim. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 

1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation 

to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal because "[i]n many instances, appellate 

counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or no likelihood ofsuccess 

on that issue; indeed, the weeding out ofweaker issues is widely recognized as one of 

the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.") Thus, the petitioner is unable to rely 

on actions or omissions by his appellate counsel to establish cause to excuse the 

default. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000) ("Although we have 

not identified with precision exactly what constitutes 'cause' to excuse a procedural 

default, we have acknowledged that in certain circumstances counsel's ineffectiveness 

in failing properly to preserve the claim for review in state court will suffice. Not just 

any deficiency in counsel's performance will do, however; the assistance must have 

been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution.") (citation omitted). The 

Court finds that the petitioner has not shown cause to excuse the default. 

IL Prejudice 

"Prejudice [to excuse a procedural default] is actual harm resulting from the 

alleged error." Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). The petitioner 

cannot demonstrate prejudice arising from the failure ofthis Court to reach the merits 

of Claim 4 sufficient to excuse the default because his claim is without merit. 

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Although the petitioner claims that the allegedly improper hypothetical question 

usurped the jury's function by asking a witness to opine on the ultimate factual 

question of the petitioner's guilt, this Court finds, as did the California Court of 

Appeal, that any error was harmless and did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. 

As discussed in Subsections B and D, supra, both the prosecution and the defense 

presented the jury with significant other evidence that bore more directly on the 

petitioner's guilt, including the testimony ofthe child victim [Lodg. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 338­

350]; crime lab evidence showing the presence of sperm on the child's mouth and tshirt [Lodg. 1, Vol. 3, pp. 519-20]; medical testimony and photographs ofthe injuries 

to the child's genital areas [Lodg. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 401-07, 413]; the testimony of the 

emergency department nurse to whom the child first reported the assault [Lodg. 1, Vol. 

2, pp. 286-88]; and the petitioner's own confession to the crimes that was audiorecorded by detectives and played for the jury [Lodg. 1, Vol. 4, p. 908]. Furthermore, 

the trial court properly instructed the jury on how to consider that evidence. [Lodg. 1, 

Vol. 1, p. 194; Lodg. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 1327-45] 

In conclusion, the petitioner has failed to show that the court's admission ofthe 

improper hypothetical was so prejudicial that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 70-73; Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3dat897;Jammal, 926F.2dat919­

20. The petitioner therefore cannot establish "actual harm" from this Court's failure 

to reach the merits ofthe claim sufficient to excuse the default arising from the failure 

to present the claim on direct appeal. Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617. 

IlL Fundamental Miscarriage ofJustice 

The petitioner can still avoid the procedural default ifhe can demonstrate that 

a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice would result from this Court's failure to reach the 

merits ofthe claim. The "miscarriage ofjustice" exception is limited to petitioners who 

can show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction ofone 

who is actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,327 (1995). "In order to pass 

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through Schlup's gateway, and have an otherwise barred constitutional claim heard on 

the merits, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, including evidence 

not introduced at trial, 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. '" Majoy v. Roe, 296 F .3d 770, 775­

76 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In applying this standard, "[a] 

petitioner need not show that he is 'actually innocent' of the crime he was convicted 

of committing; instead, he must show that 'a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome ofthe trial.'" Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776 (quoting Carrigerv. Stewart, 132 F.3d 

463,478 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316)). 

Even ifthe prosecutor's question improperly led the witness to render an opinion 

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was suitable for the jury's independent review. See Section V.E.Il, supra. On balance, 

in light of all the evidence at trial, this Court finds that the petitioner has not shown 

that, but for the improper question, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the Court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial. Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

314-15. 

IV. Claim 4 Is Procedurally Defaulted 

Accordingly, the Court finds Claim 4 to be procedurally defaulted, and that the 

petitioner has failed to demonstrate an entitlement to excuse the default. Alternately, 

the Court finds that, even assuming the petitioner could excuse the default and the 

Court could reach the merits of the claim, the claim is without merit, even under de 

novo review, for the reasons set forth above regarding why the petitioner is unable to 

demonstrate prejudice to excuse the default. See Slovikv. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 751 nA 

(9th Cir. 2009) (the standard of review applicable to claims which are technically 

exhausted and procedurally defaulted is unclear). It is therefore RECOMMENDED 

that Claim 4 be DENIED. 

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VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

Court issue an order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; 

and, (2) DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT no later than April 6, 2015, any party may 

file written objection with the District Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be entitled "Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT any reply to the objections shall be filed 

with the District Court and served on all parties no later than April 20, 2015 or two 

weeks after the objections have been electronically docketed, whichever is later. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the District Court's order. See Turner 

v.Duncan, 158F.3d449,455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinezv. Ylst,951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/

Date: March --:;..~__, 2015 

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