Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00772/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00772-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

NO. CIV. S-05-772 LKK/KJM

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

CONSTANCIO CU, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs bring an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

claiming that defendant restaurant, The South Villa ("Restaurant"),

has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)

by failing to provide appropriate disabled parking at the

Restaurant. Plaintiff further alleges violation of California

Civil Code §§ 51, 52 for denial of full and equal access to public

facilities at a retail restaurant. The defendant now brings a

motion to dismiss for failure to include a plain statement of the

case in the complaint, for alleging conflicting facts, and because

////

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1 The court decides this motion on the pleadings and papers

filed herein and without oral argument. 

2 These facts are taken from the complaint, further facts are

alleged in the reply brief but since this is a motion on the

pleadings, the court has relied solely upon those in the complaint

itself. These facts are taken to be true only for the purposes of

this motion.

2

they claim that there is no relief the court may grant.1 

I.

BACKGROUND/FACTS2

The complaint alleges that plaintiff (a quadriplegic who is

confined to a wheelchair and uses a service animal) visited the

Restaurant on February 17, 2005 and was unable to safely exit his

vehicle because of no available disabled van accessible parking.

Plaintiff was required to park in a non-conforming space with no

access aisle. Plaintiff asked to speak to the manager, but the

manager was not present so he told the waiter of the problem and

the waiter said that he would inform the manager. Two other

elderly customers also complained about the disabled parking.

Plaintiff claims to have returned in April where he saw that the

parking remained the same. The complaint also mentions that the

plaintiff “is unaware of accessible restrooms.” 

II. 

STANDARDS

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the

plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court

to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she]

has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

////

////

////

////

////

////

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

III.

ANALYSIS

A. INCONSISTENT FACTS

Defendants seek to have the complaint dismissed because they

believe that it alleges inconsistent facts. 

The first fact the defendant claims is inconsistent surrounds

whether the plaintiff actually ate at the Restaurant or was forced

to leave due to the parking. In the summary of facts section

plaintiff states the following: 

On February 17, 2005 the Plaintiff visited the

RESTAURANT and was unable to exit (safely) his van

because of no available disabled van accessible parking

space. The Plaintiff was required to park in a

non-conforming parking space with no access aisle. On

this visit, the Plaintiff spoke with the waiter of the

RESTAURANT (ask for manager, but manager was not

present) and informed him of the problem. The waiter

stated to the Plaintiff that he would inform the

manager. Two other elderly customers also complained

about the disabled parking. Plaintiff returned to the

RESTAURANT in April and no parking or entrance

alterations had been performed. Still, the parking

remains the same.

Compl. at 3. In the second claim for relief, plaintiff states

that: “On each of the above listed occasions, when the Plaintiff

arrived at the RESTAURANT, he was not allowed to park (safely) and

access the entrance. Plaintiff was forced to leave the RESTAURANT,

unable to patronize the RESTAURANT as an equal.” Compl. at 14. 

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a

claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his

claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short and

plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(2)); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679

(9th Cir. 2001). The court cannot find that the complaint fails

under this liberal pleading standard. The statements are not

directly contradictory, instead it simply appears that the

plaintiff is saying he was disadvantaged in his access to the

Restaurant and was forced to unsafely exit his vehicle and to

shorten his visit or choose not to visit in the future. In

addition, the defendants’ motion seems to agree that plaintiff did

visit and eat in the Restaurant which suggests that they could have

reasonably figured out plaintiffs claim. Defs.’ Br. at 5. Since

the court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from

these facts, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the complaint for

less that perfect clarity. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d

896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

Secondly, the defendants claim that the plaintiff, at one

point, states that notice was provided and then later says that

notice is not required. Plaintiff’s complaint states that: “The

Plaintiff gave notice to the RESTAURANT manager on February 17,

2005 about the problem and gave the Defendants over 60 days to

comply before resorting to this action.” Compl. at 5. That

statement is hardly an admission that notice is required, simply

a statement that notice was given. For the statement that notice

was not required the defendants rely on what appears to be an eCase 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3 It is also not clear how this actually hinders the

defendants’ ability to reply. Plaintiff is clearly alleging that

he gave notice, the defendants do not appear to be actually raising

a question of whether or not he did or even whether or not notice

is required. 

6

mail between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Lynch which was provided as an

exhibit to the defendants motion to dismiss. 

If the court was to decide to accept this e-mail, it would

require the court to move beyond the pleadings and therefore to

convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (If “matters outside the pleading are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be

treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in

Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to

present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”).

If the complaint cites or relies upon an outside document it is

appropriate to review it, but that is not the case here. Parrino

v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th Cir. 1998). As I have

held long ago, the court has complete discretion in determining

whether to accept the proffered material. National Agr. Chemicals

Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp. 465, 472 (E.D. Cal. 1980); see also

Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F. Supp. 333, 335 n.2 (D. Nev. 1993).

It does not appear that the court could decide this case on summary

judgment without knowing which facts are disputed, therefore, it

seems best to ignore the extra-pleading evidence and decide this

as a motion to dismiss as it is presented to the court.3

////

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Additionally, if the court was to decide this as a summary judgment

motion the plaintiff would be entitled to the opportunity to

respond to the extra material submitted. 5C Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 3d § 1366 (2004). 

Looking solely at the complaint it does not appear that the

plaintiffs have alleged any contradictory facts regarding the

notice given. Plaintiff simply states that he gave oral notice to

the restaurant employee. Should defendants wish to dispute whether

notice is required or not or whether the notice given was adequate,

defendants may, in due course, bring a motion for summary judgment

or partial adjudication, wherein they provide the proper statutory

standard to prove the contention. Here, defendants have only

brought a motion to dismiss based on the pleadings and the court

can find no inconsistency in the complaint regarding the provision

of notice. 

The defendants refer to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11's requirement that

the attorney sign the pleading to attest that the allegations are

based upon a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law when

stating that the Restaurant had operated for ten years without any

complaints. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. They then state that the plaintiff

fails to provide any statement “showing that Plaintiff ever did a

diligence review of the history of the site.” Defs.’ Br. at 5.

They point to no requirement that the plaintiff has to have known

the history of the site or have provided it in the complaint and

the court has not come across such a requirement in either the ADA

or in the Unruh act.

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

B. THERE IS NO RELIEF THE COURT CAN GRANT

1. Injunctive Relief

Defendants claim that they have complied with the ADA by

making modifications to the property and thus that there is no

relief that can be granted, citing Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home,

Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S.

598 (2001). Buckhannon, however, is a case about attorney’s fees,

not about injunctive relief. Id. In that case, the Supreme Court

held that a party whose lawsuit compels voluntary compliance by the

defendant cannot collect attorney’s fees under a catalyst theory

if they did not receive a judgment on the merits or via a court

ordered consent decree such that they could be considered the

prevailing party. Id. at 600. In that case, the state legislature

changed the law which the plaintiffs were alleging violated the ADA

and FHAA, removing the offensive provision prior to a final

judgment by the court. Id. at 601. The case was thus dismissed

as moot. Id.

Perhaps more to the point, the court is unable to simply take

the defendants by their word without a stipulation from the

plaintiff or a proper motion for summary judgment by the defendants

which provides the necessary factual and legal evidence of

compliance. Plaintiff’s reply brief clearly states that he

disagrees that compliance has been achieved. 

2. Attorney’s Fees

The plaintiff’s complaint requests “all reasonable attorneys’

fees, all litigation expenses, and all costs of this proceeding as

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

provided by law.” Compl. at 17. The opposition to the motion to

dismiss clarifies by stating that he only seeks fees “for any

counsel which the Plaintiff may need to acquire.” Pl.’s Opp’n at

5. Kay v. Ehrler holds that a rule allowing for the collection of

attorneys’ fees for pro se parties is inappropriate. 499 U.S. 432,

438 (1991). Thus, as far as the complaint seeks damages for

Johnson’s own services, it should be dismissed. However, recent

case law suggests that plaintiff’s alternative request for

attorneys fees, should he require the services of additional

counsel, may still be available (assuming, of course, that he

succeeds on his claim and meets any other requirement for the

collection of attorneys’ fees). See Blazy v. Tenet, 194 F.3d 90,

94 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (refusing to extend Kay v. Ehrler to exclude

the collection of fees paid to lawyers who were consulted by a pro

se plaintiff in the formulation of his or her case); cf. U.S. ex

rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d

574, 578 (9th Cir. 1996); Kamal v. City of Santa Monica, 221 F.3d

1348 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Since the case has not proceeded to the merits and it is

unsure whether plaintiff will decide to seek assistance of outside

counsel, it is appropriate for the court to deny the motion to

dismiss at this time. Plaintiff, however, should be on notice that

he will be unable to seek attorneys’ fees for his own services

pursuant to the rule set out above.

////

////

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

3. Intent to Discriminate

Defendants assert that in order to find liability under the

ADA the plaintiff must demonstrate an intent to discriminate.

Defs.’ Br. at 6. This is simply incorrect. 

Title III of the ADA does not require a plaintiff to

prove that her disability motivated the defendant's

actions. A disability discrimination claim may be

brought either on the theory that defendant failed to

make reasonable accommodations or on a more conventional

disparate treatment theory, or both. This is because the

ADA not only protects against disparate treatment, it

also creates an affirmative duty in some circumstances

to provide special, preferred treatment, or ‘reasonable

accommodation.’

Dunlap v. Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 965 (N.D.

Cal. 1998); Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837,

846-47 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is undisputed that a plaintiff need not

show intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation

of the ADA”); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F.Supp. 1242, 1247-48

(D. Or. 1998) (“Congress intended to protect disabled persons not

just from intentional discrimination but also from

‘thoughtlessness,’ ‘indifference,’ and ‘benign neglect.’), aff’d,

204 F.3d 994; see also McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259,

1266 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff need not allege either disparate

treatment or disparate impact in order to state a reasonable

accommodation claim.”)(citing Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d

261, 275 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004)). 

In order to succeed on an accommodation claim under the ADA,

the plaintiff need only show that he is a person with a disability

and that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

disability. Dunlap, 996 F.Supp. at 965. It is the failure to

provide reasonable accommodations that constitutes discrimination

under Title III. Id.

The defendants similarly claim that in order to find liability

under Unruh that the plaintiff must prove intent to discriminate.

This is, again, erroneous as long as the plaintiff is able to

demonstrate a violation of the ADA. In Lentini the Ninth Circuit

held that since the Unruh Act was expressly amended to state that:

“A violation of the right of any individual under the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also

constitute a violation of this section” (Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f))

that it thus follows that no discriminatory intent is required

unless so required by the claim under the ADA. Lentini, 370 F.3d

837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). The court in Lentini was directly

addressing the finding of the California Supreme Court in Harris

v. Capitol Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142 (1991) that a

plaintiff seeking relief under the Unruh Act must prove intentional

discrimination by relying on the plain language of the statute.

Lentini, 370 F.3d at 847. The section of the Unruh Act finding a

violation if a violation of the ADA is found was added after the

Harris decision and thus it seems reasonable that the revision has

since changed the law.

If the claim under the ADA fails, then it follows that Harris

would apply, but at this time the complaint alleges sufficient

facts to move forward. 

////

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

C. THE RESTROOMS

In their reply brief, defendants also note that the complaint

does not allege any facts regarding the restroom accommodations.

This appears to be true. It is hard to dismiss a claim that was

not sought, but it seems appropriate to “dismiss” any complaints

about the restroom accommodation without prejudice. Plaintiff is

granted fifteen (15) days to amend his complaint should he choose

to do so.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, except as to the

restroom claim. As to that claim, plaintiff is granted fifteen

(15) days to amend the complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 16, 2005.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 2:05-cv-00772-LKK -KJM Document 44 Filed 08/17/05 Page 12 of 12