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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RUDY HERNANDEZ I ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

GARY STARBUCK, Superintendent of the ) 

Wyoming Honor Farm; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ) 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

No. 94-8086 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 94-CV-135) 

Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender with him on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 1 
Mr. Hernandez appeals the district court's denial of his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253 and 1291.1 

In January 1993, Mr. Hernandez pleaded guilty to drug charges 

in Wyoming district court. According to the original sentencing 

transcript, the court orally imposed the following sentence: 

"It's the judgment and sentence of the Court today you're 

[sentenced] to not more than four years and less than two years to 

the Wyoming State Penitentiary. 11 The court later filed a judgment 

and sentence imposing a sentence of 11 not less than four (4) years 

nor more than six (6) years." 

In May 1993, Mr. Hernandez filed a motion in state court to 

amend his judgment and sentence, requesting he be given credit for 

one year prison time he had already served in state prison in 

connection with another drug charge. The state court denied this 

motion shortly after it was filed. In September 1993, the state 

court, perhaps not remembering it had already ruled on Mr. 

Hernandez's motion, reviewed Mr. Hernandez's file to determine 

whether his sentence should be amended. During this review, the 

court discovered the discrepancy between the sentencing transcript 

and the judgment and sentence. It stated the official transcript 

was "clearly erroneous because it was my intent, and I believe my 

1 Though we 

as required 

construe Mr. 

certificate, 

under § 2253 

find in the record no certificate of probable cause, 

by 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b), we 

Hernandez's notice of appeal as a request for the 

see Fed. R. App. P. 22(b), and exercise our power 

to grant the certificate. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 2 
statement, that the sentence imposed was not less than four nor 

more than six years, 11 and notified Mr. Hernandez and the State of 

Wyoming it intended to amend the transcript to reflect the higher 

sentence. The court set the matter for hearing, directed Mr. 

Hernandez to show cause why the alteration should not be made, and 

appointed a public defender to assist Mr. Hernandez in the matter. 

Neither Mr. Hernandez nor his public defender responded to the 

order to show cause. Apparently without holding the scheduled 

hearing, the judge amended the sentencing transcript to reflect a 

sentence of four to six years. 

Mr. Hernandez presented his only state challenge to the 

Wyoming District Court's actions in a petition to the Wyoming 

Supreme Court for writ of review.2 The petition asserted: 

In this case, a conflict existed between the district 

court's ... oral pronouncement of sentence and the 

written Judgment and Sentence. This Court has 

repeatedly held that an orally pronounced sentence 

governs over a subsequent, inconsistent written judgment 

when the two conflict. The case must be remanded to 

accurately reflect what was unambiguously pronounced at 

the sentencing hearing. 

As the transcript unambiguously shows in this case, 

the oral pronouncement at sentencing reflects a sentence 

of not less than two nor more than four years to be 

served at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Ten months 

later, the [trial] court, on its own initiative, amended 

2 Mr. Hernandez missed the filing deadline for his appeal as of 

right to the Wyoming Supreme Court. He asked the Wyoming Supreme 

Court to hear his appeal at its discretion, arguing ineffective 

assistance of counsel caused him to miss the deadline. 

Importantly, this alleged instance of ineffective assistance is 

not the same one he raised in his habeas petition or his brief to 

this court. The ineffective assistance claim he raised in federal 

court related to the public defender's f~ilure to appear in state 

court in response to the Wyoming District Court's order to show 

cause why the sentencing transcript should not be amended. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 3 
the written record to reflect a sentence of not less 

than four nor more than six years. This modification is 

clearly improper. The Petitioner has the right to 

expect that his sentence is final when it is pronounced 

in open court. It is an abuse of discretion for the 

district court to modify this sentence almost a year 

later to reflect a two year increase. It subjects the 

Petitioner to double jeopardy in that he is being 

punished twice for the same offense. 

(Citations omitted.) The Wyoming Supreme Court denied Mr. 

Hernandez's petition without comment. Mr. Hernandez then filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. 

The district court construed Mr. Hernandez's petition to allege 

"he was denied effective assistance of counsel ·and deprived of due 

process when the state court" amended the sentencing transcript to 

reflect the higher sentence. The district court rejected Mr. 

Hernandez's due process claim both on the merits and because he 

failed to fairly present the claim to the Wyoming Supreme Court. 

The court also rejected Mr. Hernandez's ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, but its order did not specify the grounds for the 

decision or whether the dismissal of that claim was with or 

without prejudice. 

Mr. Hernandez now contends the district court erred when it 

denied his petition. He claims the original transcript reflected 

his true sentence and, by changing it, the state court violated 

several constitutional provisions, including the right to 

effective assistance of counsel, the Confrontation Clause, due 

process, and the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. 

Because Mr. Hernandez has not exhausted his state court remedies, 

we do not address the merits of his claims. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 4 
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be 

granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the 

remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b). This principle, known as the doctrine of exhaustion, 

requires a state prisoner to fairly present his federal 

constitutional claims to the state courts before he may raise 

those claims in a federal habeas corpus petition. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 u.s. 270, 275-76 (1971). The exhaustion requirement 

reflects a policy of comity, whereby a federal court will not 

interfere with a state court conviction without giving the state 

courts an opportunity to correct any alleged constitutional 

violations. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-76. Steadfast adherence to 

this policy protects state courts' role in the enforcement of 

federal law. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A state 

prisoner bears the burden of showing he has exhausted available 

state remedies. Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 398 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 347 (1992). 

We begin with Mr. Hernandez's claim he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. It is undisputed no appearance was entered 

on his behalf in response to the state court's order to show cause 

why the sentencing transcript should not be altered. Mr. 

Hernandez's petition to the Wyoming Supreme Court did not raise 

this issue. In fact, in his brief to this court, Mr. Hernandez 

concedes he "did not raise [the] ineffective assistance claim in 

the state courts." Thus, Mr. Hernandez did not fairly present the 

claim to the Wyoming state courts as required under Picard, 404 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 5 
U.S. at 275-76. Mr. Hernandez, nevertheless, contends we should 

reach the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. He argues 

the State of Wyoming has waived the exhaustion defenses by not 

asserting it properly. 

First, Mr. Hernandez contends the State did not assert the 

exhaustion defense in district court in response to his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, he asserts that even 

if the State raised exhaustion as a defense in district court, it 

has now waived the defense on appeal by failing to reassert it in 

its answer brief to this court. 

In response 

State of Wyoming 

district court. 

to Mr. Hernandez's first argument, we find the 

properly asserted the exhaustion defense in 

Paragraph 14 of the State of Wyoming's Answer 

filed in district court states, 11 if a federal right is involved, 

petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies. 11 

In making his second waiver argument, Mr. Hernandez correctly 

notes the State of Wyoming's brief in this court only addresses 

his ineffective assistance claim on the merits. The brief does 

not reassert the exhaustion defense raised in district court. Mr. 

Hernandez contends a state can waive the exhaustion defense by not 

asserting it at the appellate level, even after properly raising 

the defense in district court. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 6 
We reject Mr. Hernandez's contention. The exhaustion 

requirement is not one to be overlooked lightly. Principles of 

comity and federalism demand that the requirement be "strictly 

enforced." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684i see Rose, 455 U.S. at 518 

(the exhaustion requirement "is principally designed to protect 

the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law"). 

However, the doctrine of exhaustion is not jurisdictionali a 

prisoner's failure to exhaust his state remedies does not take 

away the federal courts' power to hear the prisoner's federal 

claims. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987) i Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). In a logical extension 

of this principle, the Supreme Court has recognized a state can 

waive the exhaustion defense: 

When the State answers a habeas corpus petition, it 

has a duty to advise the district court whether the 

prisoner has, in fact, exhausted all available state 

remedies. 

[T]here are exceptional cases in which the 

State fails, whether inadvertently or otherwise, to 

raise an arguably meritorious nonexhaustion defense. 

The State's omission in such a case makes it appropriate 

for the court of appeals to take a fresh look at the 

issue. The court should determine whether the interests 

of comity and federalism will be better served by 

addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a series 

of additional state and district court proceedings 

before reviewing the merits of the petitioner's claim. 

Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134. 

In keeping with Granberry, we have held, "[w]hen the [state] 

fail[s] to assert an exhaustion argument before the district 

court, 'we may consider it waived if the interests of comity, 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 7 
federalism, and justice would be served.' 11 Hannon v. Maschner, 

981 F.2d 1142, 1146 (lOth Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Stone v. Godbehere, 894 F.2d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1990)). The 

jurisprudence represented in this circuit by Hannon makes clear a 

state may expose itself to waiver when it fails to assert an 

exhaustion argument before the district court. See Zettlemoyer v. 

Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 309 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 

(1991); Stone, 894 F.2d at 1135; Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 

218, 221 (2d Cir. 1988); Gagne v. Fair, 835 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 

1987); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 1987). Because 

the State of Wyoming raised the exhaustion defense in the district 

court, the case before us does not fit squarely under this line of 

cases. Notwithstanding this fact, Mr. Hernandez argues we should 

equate the state's failure to reassert the exhaustion defense in 

this court with a failure to raise the defense in district court 

within the meaning of Granberry and Hannon. In effect, Mr. 

Hernandez claims failure to brief the exhaustion defense abrogates 

a proper assertion of the defense in district court. We decline 

to adopt such a rule. 

Mr. Hernandez urges us to extrapolate from the settled 

principle that when an appellant fails to raise a contention in 

his opening brief the ground for relief is ordinarily considered 

waived. See United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d 250, 256 (lOth 

Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610, 613 (lOth 

Cir. 1990)). Mr. Hernandez would like us to hold a state appellee 

to a similar rule when it fails to raise the exhaustion defense in 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 8 
response to a state prisoner's appeal from a denial of habeas 

corpus relief. 

Mr. Hernandez's argument misconceives the roles played by the 

appellant, the appellee, and the court of appeals when a district 

court judgment is appealed. While the appellant challenges the 

district court's ruling, the appellee is only interested in 

maintaining the status quo, i.e., an affirmance. Because the 

appellant comes to the court of appeals as the challenger, he 

bears the burden of demonstrating the alleged error and the 

precise relief sought. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a); National 

Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (lOth Cir. 

1989). A court of appeals is not required to manufacture an 

appellant's "argument on appeal when it has failed in its burden 

to draw our attention to the error below." Id. (citing United 

States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 493 (lOth Cir. 1985)). In the 

event of such a failure, the court will ordinarily consider the 

appellant's point waived. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 

Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1994). Appellees bear no 

such burden. Though Fed. R. App. P. 28(b) requires the appellee's 

brief to contain arguments addressing the issues raised by the 

appellant, we have never characterized the appellee's obligation 

in terms of a categorical imperative. The distinction between 

appellant's and appellees' obligations under ~ule 28 grows out of 

the court of appeals' 11 'free[dom] to affirm a district court 

decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to 

permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 9 
district court.' 11 Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (lOth 

Cir. 1988) (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 

(2d Cir. 1987)). This broad power to affirm extends beyond the 

counter-arguments raised by the appellee; it includes any ground 

for which there is record to support conclusions of law. Once the 

appellant alleges the district court erred, we have a duty to 

assess the validity of the appellant's allegations. This duty 

arises in part out of our relationship with the district court, 

and we may not neglect it simply because an appellee fails to 

defend adequately the district court's decision.3 To do so would 

open the door to a perverse jurisprudence by which properly 

decided district court decisions could be reversed. 

We need go no further than the facts in this case to 

demonstrate our point. The district court denied Mr. Hernandez's 

habeas petition, in part for his failure to exhaust his state 

court remedies. Mr. Hernandez is now before this court claiming 

his admitted failure to exhaust his ineffective assistance claim 

should be overlooked. He asks us to reverse the district court's 

order and direct that the writ be granted. In other words, Mr. 

Hernandez is asking us to reverse the district court while 

simultaneously conceding the court decided the issue properly. We 

cannot endorse a rule of law allowing such anomalous and 

3 We admonish appellees not to take our language as a license not 

to address appellant's arguments. The appellee's brief plays a 

vital function in informing the court of the weaknesses in the 

appellant's arguments. By failing to address a ground for relief 

raised by the appellant, the appellee greatly increases the 

chances the court of appeals will be persuaded by the appellant's 

position. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 10 
contradictory results. Put another way, if our freedom to affirm 

extends to grounds not relied on by the district court, it surely 

includes any ground the court used as the basis for its decision. 

We therefore conclude 

defense by not reasserting it 

return to the proposition 

Wyoming did not waive the exhaustion 

in this court. Accordingly, we 

with which Mr. Hernandez began his 

argument: he did not exhaust his claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel.· 

Because Mr. Hernandez failed to exhaust his ineffective 

assistance claim, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

contains at least one unexhausted claim. A federal court 

presented with a habeas corpus petition containing both exhausted 

and unexhausted claims should normally dismiss the entire petition 

without prejudice. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). The 

narrow circumstances in which a federal court may consider the 

merits of a habeas petition containing unexhausted claims are not 

present in this case. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134-35; Miranda, 

967 F.2d at 400 ("it is appropriate ... to address the merits of 

unexhausted habeas corpus claims if they fail to raise 

even a colorable federal claim, and if the interests of justice 

would be better served."). 

We ·therefore VACATE that part of the district court's order 

denying Mr. Hernandez's petition on the merits and REMAND with 

instructions to dismiss the entire petition without prejudice. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8086 Document: 01019279183 Date Filed: 11/09/1995 Page: 11