Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01484/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 19, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KEITH V. GOSSELIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SGT. KAUFMAN; OFFICER

GONZALEZ; SHARON PHILIPS,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 15-1484

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00539-MEH)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.**

Plaintiff-Appellant Keith Gosselin, a pro se state prisoner, appeals from the

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Gosselin v. Kaufman,

No. 15-cv-00539-MEH, 2015 WL 7293211 (D. Colo. Nov. 18, 2015). Exercising

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellate Case: 15-1484 Document: 01019658945 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 1 
Background

Mr. Gosselin alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights

while he was a prisoner incarcerated in the San Carlos Correctional Facility

(SCCF) of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), where Defendants

worked. According to Mr. Gosselin, Defendant Sergeant Kaufman kicked him in

the groin while in his cell and Defendant Officer Gonzalez negligently failed to

prevent the assault. Mr. Gosselin also alleges that Defendant Sharon Philips, the

medical professional at the prison, failed to provide adequate medical care for his

injuries.

Mr. Gosselin sued the Defendants, both in their official and individual

capacities, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary (compensatory and

punitive damages) relief as well as fees. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss his

amended complaint based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A magistrate

judge, hearing the matter by consent of the parties, granted the motion, holding

that Eleventh Amendment immunity protected the Defendants from suit in their

official capacities and limitations barred the remaining claims against Defendants

in their individual capacities. Gosselin v. Kaufman, No. 15-cv-00539-MEH, 2015

WL 7273229 (D. Colo. Nov. 18, 2015). Mr. Gosselin timely appeals.

Discussion

 We review dismissal under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. 

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Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1294 (10th Cir. 2003). We

construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, but may not “supply additional

factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory

on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Motions to dismiss under this rule constitute either “(1) a

facial attack on the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations as to subject matter

jurisdiction; or (2) a challenge to the actual facts upon which subject matter

jurisdiction is based.” Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002). 

When, as here, the motion is a facial attack, we presume all well-pleaded factual 

allegations in the complaint to be true. Id. 

The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to states and state agencies

from suit in federal court unless the state has waived such immunity. Johns v.

Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995). A suit against state officials in

their official capacities is considered a claim against the state, and thus likewise

barred. Id. To the extent Mr. Gosselin seeks money damages or a declaration

that his rights were violated, his claims against Defendants in their official

capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 1553. 

Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, does not prevent a plaintiff from

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obtaining prospective enforcement of his federal rights. Id. at 1552 (citing Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). In his amended complaint, Mr.

Gosselin asserted that Defendant Philips was deliberately indifferent to his

continued medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Am. Compl. at

19 (I R. 78). As relief, he requested “an injunction ordering defendant Philips, or

C.D.O.C. agents to arrange for the plaintiff to be evaluated by a medical

practicioner [sic] with expertise in the treatment of testicular injuries.” Id. at 23

(I R. 82). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar this claim seeking prospective

relief. However, as explained below, this claim and the claims against

Defendants in their individual capacities are barred by the statute of limitations.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a case for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Though limitations is an

affirmative defense, “when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the

right sued upon has been extinguished, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing

a factual basis for tolling the statute.” Aldrich v. McColloch Properties, Inc., 627

F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980). 

The personal injury statute of the state in which the federal district court

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sits determines the limitation period for § 1983 suits. Mondragon v. Thompson,

519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). The general limitation for personal injury

claims in Colorado is two years from when the action accrues. Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-80-102. Federal law establishes when the claim accrues and when the

limitations period begins to run. Mondragon, 519 F.3d at 1082. “A civil rights

action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be

apparent.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mr. Gosselin alleges the incident in his cell occurred on October 22, 2012. 

He saw Defendant Philips on October 23, 2012, with a follow up visit on October

28, 2012. Mr. Gosselin filed his complaint on March 16, 2015, well beyond the

two-year limitation period, but argues equitable tolling should apply. Under

Colorado law, equitable tolling is applicable when (1) “defendant’s wrongful

conduct prevented the plaintiff from asserting the claims in a timely manner” or

(2) “truly exceptional circumstances prevented the plaintiff from filing the claim

despite diligent efforts.” Noel v. Hoover, 12 P.3d 328, 330 (Colo. App. 2000). 

Mr. Gosselin alleges that he received multiple threats from Defendants that

prevented him from bringing suit until he was transferred to a new facility. But

this argument is undercut by the fact that Mr. Gosselin did actually attempt to

gain legal representation and file a lawsuit, though he was unsuccessful, and even

after he was transferred beyond the reach of defendants, he waited four months to

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finally bring his suit. We have considered Mr. Gosselin’s other arguments for

tolling the limitations period, and even construing these arguments liberally, we

agree with the district court and find no exceptional circumstances to justify

tolling the statute of limitations.

Mr. Gosselin seems to also bring a continuing violation claim for

Defendant Phillips’s alleged deliberate indifference. Because we have never

formally adopted the continuing violation doctrine for § 1983 actions, see Graham

v. Taylor, 2016 WL 521078, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), Defendant

Phillips is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009) (explaining government officials are protected by

qualified immunity if the right allegedly violated was not clearly established).

AFFIRMED. We grant IFP status and remind the plaintiff that he remains

obligated to pay the full filing fee. All remaining pending motions are denied. 

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge

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