Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00658/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00658-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEWYN BOLER also known as LEON 

BOLER DBA PRODUCTION CAR 

CARE PRODUCTS,

Plaintiff,

v.

3 D INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-00658-TLN-CKD

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff and Counter Defendant Lewyn Boler 

aka Production Car Care Products’ (“Boler”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 

19.) Defendant and Counter Claimant 3 D International, LLC (“3 D”) opposes Boler’s motion 

and also cross-moves for summary judgment. (ECF No. 21.) Boler has filed a reply to 3 D’s 

opposition (ECF No. 23). After reviewing the filings made by the parties, the Court hereby 

DENIES both Boler’s and 3 D’s motions for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Boler alleges that he has owned and operated Production Car Care Products as a dba for 

over 35 years. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) Boler states that Production Car Care Products 

 

1 The facts in this case are comprised of allegations from Boler’s Complaint and 3 D’s Answer and 

Counterclaim because the parties failed to file the requisite statements of undisputed facts with their motions, as 

addressed later in this Order.

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manufactures and distributes specialized products for automobile detailing and has acquired a 

statewide, nationwide and worldwide reputation for quality products. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) One of 

Boler’s featured products for the past 35 years has been a “Heavy Duty Cleaner & Degreaser”

called SLAM ! (Exclamation point is included in Trademark). (ECF No. at 1 ¶ 10.) Boler asserts 

that this product is known to be produced and distributed by Boler and Production Car Care 

Products. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Boler alleges that SLAM ! produces substantial income for Boler 

“based upon the sales of the product itself and based upon enhanced goodwill it produces for 

Boler’s business and all of Boler’s products.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Boler states that he has 

frequently used the trademark SLAM ! on other car care products. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Boler 

claims that “in an effort to trade on the popularity of SLAM ! and the great reputation and 

goodwill of Boler and Production Car Care Products,” 3 D began manufacturing and distributing 

a product that they label “GRAND SLAM” which 3D describes as a “Heavy Duty Degreaser” in 

the same markets used by Boler for Production Car Care’s SLAM !. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11.)

On August 12, 2013, Boler filed for trademark protection for SLAM ! with the U.S. Patent 

and Trademark Office and received a registered trademark on January 21, 2014 (Reg# 4470991 

Serial# 86034936). (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Boler states that 3 D was notified of Boler’s common 

law trademark protection for SLAM ! and the pending registration for the identical mark with 

United States Patent and Trademark Office on December 9, 2013, and was asked to cease and 

desist use of the mark. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13.) Boler filed a complaint against 3 D in this Court on 

March 11, 2014, alleging Federal Trademark Infringement under 15 U.S.C.§§ 1114 and 1125(a),

Common Law Trademark Infringement, as well as violations of the Federal Unfair Competition 

and False Advertising under 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) and Statutory Unfair Competition and False 

Advertising under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500 et seq). (ECF 

No. 1.)

In response 3 D filed an answer, in which it asserts fifteen affirmative defenses and seven 

causes of action, including: (1) Common Law Trademark Infringement; (2) Unfair Competition 

and False Advertising; (3) Violations of California Business and Professions Code; (4) Improper 

Registration; (5) Invalid Registration; (6) Trademark Antitrust, under 15 U.S.C. § 115(b)(7); and 

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(8) Trademark Misuse, under 15 U.S.C. § 115(b)(9). (ECF No. 4.)

Bolen seeks partial summary judgment based upon the pleadings, arguing that concurrent 

use of his automotive degreaser entitled and labeled, “SLAM !” and 3 D’s automotive degreaser 

entitled and labeled “GRAND SLAM” in commerce is “likely to confuse the public as to the 

source of each product.” (Pl.’s Mem of P&A, In Supp. of Mot for Summ. J., ECF No. 19-2.) 3 D 

argues that Boler is not entitled to summary judgment because there remains genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether 3 D’s mark GRAND SLAM is likely to be confused with Boler’s mark 

SLAM !. (ECF No. 21 at 4.) In addition, 3 D moves this Court for summary judgment, arguing 

that there is no likelihood of confusion between the two products. (ECF No. 21 at 9.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue 

as to any material fact exists, and therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under 

summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,”

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof 

at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance 

solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at 

324 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a party 

who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities 

Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual 

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to 

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tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in 

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must 

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that 

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to 

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence 

of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 

facts pleaded before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. 

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587.

III. ANALYSIS

Bolen’s motion essentially argues that because 3 D alleged counter claims that require a 

likelihood of confusion of the marks for success, 3 D is estopped from arguing that the marks are 

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not likely to be confused. 

This motion is based not only on the fact that 3 D International, 

LLC alleged in its counterclaim that these two names are 

“confusing” and has premised said counterclaim on this allegation, 

but also on the fact that under the circumstances of this case the 

names “SLAM !” and “GRAND SLAM” are in fact confusing.

(ECF No. 19-2 at 2.) In opposition, 3 D argues that its counter claims comply with Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2) (“Rule 8”) as alternative statements of a claim or defense. (ECF No. 

21 at 3.) 

Rule 8(d) permits a party to state a claim alternatively or hypothetically, and also to state 

as many claims as it has, regardless of consistency:

(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; 

Inconsistency.

(1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. 

No technical form is required.

(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set 

out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 

hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate 

ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is 

sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.

(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many 

separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency.

Thus, 3 D is not estopped from defending Bolen’s claims by arguing that there is no likelihood of 

confusion of the parties’ marks and alternatively arguing that if there is a likelihood of confusion 

that 3 D has the legal right to use the mark. As to any argument that pleading alternative claims

must be explicit within the complaint, that assertion is not supported by Rule 8. Rule 8(e) states 

“[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Therefore, Boler’s motion for summary 

judgment on this ground is DENIED.

Boler also asserts that the undisputed facts of this case also establish that “SLAM !” and 

“GRAND SLAM” are confusingly similar names. (ECF No. 19-2 at 3.) In doing so, Boler has 

failed to supply this Court with a statement of undisputed facts as required by this Court’s local 

rules.

// 

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Each motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication shall 

be accompanied by a “Statement of Undisputed Facts” that shall 

enumerate discretely each of the specific material facts relied upon 

in support of the motion and cite the particular portions of any 

pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or 

other document relied upon to establish that fact. The moving party 

shall be responsible for the filing of all evidentiary documents cited 

in the moving papers. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 260(a)(j); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing the procedures for 

supporting factual positions in a summary judgment motion). Instead, Boler makes one sweeping 

statement to support his motion: “In the case at bar, these factors demonstrate that concurrent use 

of ‘SLAM !’ and ‘GRAND SLAM’ as the marks for the automotive degreaser sold respectively 

by the plaintiff, Lewyn Boler and the defendant, 3 D International, LLC, is likely to confuse the

buying public as to the source of each product.” (ECF No. 19-2 at 4.) This unsupported 

statement falls far short of the standard required for summary adjudication.

In 3 D’s opposition, it moves this Court to find that there is no likelihood of confusion 

between its mark GRAND SLAM and Bolen’s SLAM ! mark. (ECF No. 21 at 9.) Unlike Bolen, 

3 D provides some analysis and a few facts to support its claim. However, like Bolen, 3 D has 

not supplied this Court with a Statement of Undisputed Facts in order to allow the Court to make 

an appropriate determination. As such, 3 D’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Bolen’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF 

No. 19) is DENIED. Defendant 3 D requested that this Court allow it to amend its Answer to 

clarify that it is pleading in the alternative, or hypothetically, in its counterclaims. That request is 

hereby GRANTED. 3 D is ordered to file an amended answer with this Court within fourteen 

(14) days of the entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2016

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