Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02571/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02571-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

IL~O U!iited SllitCtj (:QJ.m tJi Appeals 

1'enth Cfn:H!r. 

OCT 2 ~i 1989 

ROBERT L I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARK A. HOPKINSON, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DUANE SHILLINGER, and the ) 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE ) 

OF WYOMING, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. } 

No. 86-2571 

(D., Wyoming) 

(D.C. No. CSS-0483) 

ON REHEARING EN BANC 

Daniel J. Sears, Denver, Colorado (Leonard D. Munker, Public 

Defender, and Norm Newlon, Assistant Public Defender, State of 

Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with him on the briefs), for 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

Terry L. Armitage, Assistant Attorney General (Joseph B. Meyer, 

Attorney General, John w. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General, with 

him on the briefs), State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief. Judge, MCKAY, LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, 

ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

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Mark A. Hopkinson was convicted in Wyoming State Court on 

four counts of first degree murder and two counts of conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder. The first three counts of murder 

arose out of his hiring Michael Hickey to bomb Vincent Vehar's 

home. That bombing killed Vehar, Vehar's wife, and one of his 

sons; another son was injured in the blast but survived. The 

fourth murder count was for procuring the killing of Jeff Green. 

Hopkinson was sentenced to life imprisonment for each of the Vehar 

murders, and to death for the murder of Green. See Hopkinson v. 

State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 u.s. 922 (1982) 

(Hopkinson I). Hopkinson was also convicted in the same trial of 

conspiracy with Harold James Taylor to commit the first degree 

murder of Vehar and conspiracy with Hickey to commit the first 

degree murder of William Roitz. 

On appeal Hopkinson's death sentence for the murder of Green 

was vacated by the Wyoming Supreme Court. Id. A second sentencing proceeding was conducted and Hopkinson was again sentenced to 

death. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed that sentence. 

Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo.}, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 

(1983) (Hopkinson II). After subsequent unsuccessful challenges 

in state court1 Hopkinson sought federal habeas relief with 

1 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Hopkinson's 

motion for a new trial in Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008 

{Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 873 (1984) (Hopkinson III). The 

denial of his first petition in state court for post-conviction 

relief and writ of habeas corpus was affirmed by the Wyoming 

Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton 

County, 696 P.2d 54 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) 

(Hopkinson IV). That court also upheld the denial of his motions 

for reduction of sentence and stay of execution in Hopkinson v. 

State, 704 P.2d 1323 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 1026 (1985) 

[footnote continued ••• ) 

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respect to his convictions for first degree murder and his 

sentence of death. His petition was summarily dismissed by the 

district court. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 645 F. Supp. 374 (D. 

Wyo. 1986). 

A panel of this court unanimously affirmed the district court 

on virtually all issues, and affirmed with one dissent on the 

subject matter of this en bane review. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 

866 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1989}, reh'g granted, March 23, 1989. 

The court thereafter agreed to consider en bane whether certain 

remarks by the prosecutor in the second sentencing proceeding 

violated the rule set out in Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320 

(1985), and, if so, the standard of review to be applied to such a 

violation, and whether applying that standard Hopkinson's death 

sentence must be vacated. The court also directed the parties to 

address whether Caldwell can be applied retroactively to this 

case. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). On the latter 

question we conclude that Caldwell does apply. On the former, we 

hold that Hopkinson's death sentence was not imposed 

unconstitutionally. 

I. 

Because Caldwell was decided in 1985, two years after 

Hopkinson's second capital sentence became final, principles of 

[ .•• footnote continued] 

(Hopkinson V). The denial of his second petition filed in state 

court for writ of habeas corpus was affirmed by the Wyoming 

Supreme Court in Hopkinson v. State, 708 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1985) 

(Hopkinson VI). The denial of his request for discovery of grand 

jury testimony was affirmed in Hopkinson v. State, 709 P.2d 406 

{Wyo. 1985) (Hopkinson VII). 

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nonretroactivity may apply to this collateral review. See Teague 

v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 s. Ct. 2934 

(1989). However, we must decide first whether the issue is 

properly before us. 

A. 

The state has interposed no defense to the Caldwell issue on 

nonretroactivity grounds, thus raising a preliminary question of 

waiver. See opinions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun 

respectively accompanying and dissenting to remand in Zant v. 

Moore, 109 s. Ct. 1518 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 s. Ct. at 

2963 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). We hold 

that the nonretroactivity defense is not waived, and should be 

considered. 

Our analysis of retroactivity in this case is based upon and 

dictated by the "novel threshold test for federal review of state 

criminal convictions," announced in Teague. Teague v. Lane, 109 

s. Ct. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It was not previously 

available to the state. Arguably, the state could have raised the 

defense of nonretroactivity on other grounds, but they would have 

been largely irrelevant to the analysis required by Teague. 

Furthermore, the retroactivity approach adopted in Teague was not 

applied in the capital sentencing context until June of this year. 

Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. at 2944. Finally, and more 

fundamentally, we sua seonte raised the issue in this case because 

the very scope of the writ of habeas corpus, and therefore our 

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power to grant relief, is implicated. Cf. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. 

Ct. at 1069. Pursuant to our order, the parties have fully 

briefed the question. 

B. 

Under Teague, new rules cannot be applied in cases on 

collateral review, including capital cases, unless they fall into 

one of two exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. at 1073, 1075; 

Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. at 2944. 

The initial question, therefore, is whether Caldwell erected 

a "new rule" when it declared that "{I]t is constitutionally 

impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by 

a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility 

for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests 

elsewhere." Caldwell v. Mississiepi, 472 u.s. at 328-29. 

In Penry the Supreme Court described "new rules" as follows: 

"As we indicated in Teague, '[i]n general ••• a 

case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or 

imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal 

Government.' [Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. at 1070.] Or, 

'[t]o put it differently, a case announces a new rule if 

the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the 

time the defendant's conv1ction became final.' Ibid. 

(emphasis in original). Teague noted that '[i~s 

admittedly often difficult to determine when a case 

announces a new rule.' Ibid. Justice Harlan recognized 

'the inevitable difficulties that will arise in 

attempting "to determine whether a particular decision 

has really announced a 'new' rule at all or whether it 

has simply applied a well-established constitutional 

principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to 

those which have been previously considered in the prior 

case law."' [Mackey v. United States, 401 u.s. 667, 695 

(1971}] (separate opinion of Harlan, J.) (quoting Desist 

v. United States, 394 u.s. 244, 263 {1969) {Harlan, J., 

d1ssenting)." 

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Penr~ v. Lynaugh 109 S. Ct. at 2944. 

Applying the 11 breaks new ground., description to the subject 

matter of Caldwell as a general proposition, the initial impulse 

is that it is not a novel constitutional idea that a jury should 

understand its role and responsibility in a capital sentencing 

proceeding. The majority opinion in Caldwell does not state that 

it is announcing a new rule. That opinion also points out, and 

Hopkinson reminds us, that state supreme courts have routinely 

considered it error for a prosecutor to mislead a jury into 

thinking that the ultimate determination of death rests with 

others. Caldwell v. MississiEpi, 472 u.s. at 333-34. Appellant•s 

Brief on Issue of Retroactivity at 7. Thus, Hopkinson reasons, a 

constitutional rule on the point would not break new ground and it 

would not impose a new obligation on the states. See Dugger v. 

Adams, 109 s. Ct. 1211, n.3 (1989). 

However, we effectively reached a different conclusion in our 

recent decision in Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596 (lOth Cir.) 

{en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 116 (1987). In Dutton, a 

Caldwell issue was raised for the first time in a federal habeas 

proceeding challenging a death sentence imposed in state court. 

Although failure to raise the issue in state court constituted a 

procedural default, we held that cause for the default existed on 

the ground that Caldwell announced a new rule. Our language in 

Dutton does not suggest that Caldwell was dictated by past 

precedent: 

"We believe cause existed for the procedural default 

because trial counsel, at the time of trial in 1979, 

could not have known that the prosecutor•s remarks might 

have raised constitutional questions. The law 

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petitioner relies on did not become established until 

the Caldwell decision in 1985. We cannot expect trial 

counsel 'to exercise extraordinary vision or to object 

to every aspect of the proceeding in the hope that some 

aspect might mask a latent constitutional claim.• Engle 

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 113, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1564, 71 

L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). In Reed v. Ross, 468 u.s. 1, 17, 

104 S.Ct. 2901, 2911, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), the Court 

ruled that cause exists for defense counsel's failure to 

raise an issue when a subsequent Supreme Court decision 

articulates a constitutional principle that had not been 

recognized previously. Consequently, the failure of 

counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably 

unknown to him satisfied the 'cause• requirement. Id. 

at 14, 104 s.ct. at 2909." 

Id. at 596 (emphasis added). 

Echoing the notion that Caldwell was "new, 11 the dissent to 

the panel opinion in this case comforted the trial court and the 

prosecution with regard to the alleged error by saying: "In 

fairness to the court and counsel, the sentencing proceeding was 

II three y~ars before Caldwell was decided ••• 

Shillinger, 866 F.2d at 1238 (Logan, J., dissenting). 

Hopkinson v. 

We are not alone in the view expressed in Dutton that the 

novelty of Caldwell's Eighth Amendment application provided cause 

for a defendant's failure to raise the issue in state court prior 

to Caldwell. The Eleventh Circuit took the same position in Adams 

v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493, 1495-1501 (11th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 

Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. at 1211 (1989) (Caldwell claim prior 

to Caldwell was "so novel as to have no reasonable basis in 

existing precedent." Id. at 1500), and its initial opinion in 

that case, Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 

1986), rev'd, Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1211 (1989), upon 

which we relied in Dutton. 

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The Supreme Court duly noted our position, along with those 

of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, 2 in its reversal of the 

Eleventh Circuit on other grounds. Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. at 

1214, n.3. It declined to pass directly on the novel claim 

argument, holding that the defendant, Adams, was procedurally 

barred because he "plainly had the basis for an objection and an 

argument on appeal that the instructions violated state law." Id. 

at 1215 (emphasis added). 

One way, perhaps, to reconcile Dutton with our holding here 

is to say that the analysis of a new rule for purposes of cause, 

at least as we saw it then, 3 and analysis for determining a new 

rule for nonretroactivity purposes, are not identical. While the 

Supreme Court has left open the precise definition of cause, see 

Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. at 1215, it has stated that one way a 

petitioner can establish cause is by showing that "a 

constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not 

reasonably available to counsel." Reed v. Ross, 468 u.s. 1, 16 

(1984). In Teague a new rule for nonretroactivity purposes is 

described as a result which is not "dictated by precedent existing 

at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague v. 

Lane, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 (emphasis in original). Comparing the 

2 The Fifth Circuit in Moore v. Blackburn, 774 F.2d 97, 98 (5th 

Cir. 1985) (alternative hold1ng), cert~ denied, 476 u.s. 1176 

(1986), concluded that "a competent attorney should have been 

aware of" this type of claim prior to Caldwell. But that position 

has since been explained and limited in Sawyer v. Butler, F.2d ____ , 1989 WL 90696 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 1989) (en bane). 

3 Harris v. Reed, 109 s. Ct. 1038 (1989); Dugger v. Adams, 109 

S. Ct. at 1211; Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. at 1060, and other very 

recent Supreme Court cases may have compelled a different analysis in Dutton. 

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two definitions, there is far more ground for congruence than for 

distinction. One might argue that a "reasonably available legal 

basis" is less demanding than a "dictated by precedent" test for 

nonretroactivity purposes. But even if that is so, a holding that 

a claim is so novel that there is no reasonably available basis 

for it, thus establishing cause, must also mean that the claim was 

too novel to be dictated by past precedent. Thus, we cannot 

simply dismiss our Dutton dicta as irrelevant to the present 

question. 

Reexamination of whether Caldwell broke new ground does not 

persuade us to a different view than that expressed in Dutton. As 

the Eighth Circuit explained in detail in Adams v. Dugger, 816 

F.2d at 1495, 1498-1500, and the dissent pointed out in Caldwell, 

472 u.s. at 347-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Eighth Amendment 

jurisprudence of the Supreme Court prior to Caldwell did not 

visibly compel the outcome in Caldwell. To the contrary, 

California v. Ramos, 463 u.s. 992 (1983), and Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 u.s. 637 (1974), inclined in the opposite 

direction, and had to be specifically addressed and distinguished 

in Caldwell. The underpinning cited by the majority as 

justification for its holding in Caldwell was the "Eighth 

Amendment's heightened •need for reliability in the determination 

that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'" 

Caldwell, 472 u.s. at 340, quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 

u.s. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). A command of that 

generality may justify any result the Supreme Court wants to reach 

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in a particular case, but it does not adequately describe or 

compel a result in any specific matter. 

Additionally, state court proscriptions of conduct similar to 

that involved in Caldwell did not necessarily establish prior to 

Caldwell that such conduct violated the Eighth Amendment. See 

Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. at 1216 ("We agree with respondent and 

the Court of Appeals that the availability of a claim under state 

law does not of itself establish that a claim was available under 

the United States Constitution."); Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d at 

4 1499 n.6. 

Hopkinson points out that we have considered Caldwell claims 

in other cases without raising the issue of nonretroactivity. See 

Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (lOth Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. 

4 It is a necessary element of a subsequently available 

Caldwell claim that the challenged remarks or instructions were 

objectionable under state law. See Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. at 

1217. Hopkinson•s counsel alleged at oral argument that the 

challenged remarks violated the Wyoming constitution in the same 

way that it violated the United States constitution. Trans. of 

Oral Argument at 8, and that the reference to appellate review was 

improper because it did not inform the jury of the limitations of 

appellate review. Id. at 48. In that respect, the alleged error 

by omission, rather-than commission, is similar to that asserted 

in Dugger v. Adams. Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. at 1214. As we 

have previously noted, defense counsel did not interpose an 

objection on those state law grounds. Failure to object on those 

grounds could have been cause for the Wyoming Supreme Court to 

apply a procedural bar later, thus providing a basis under Dugger 

v. Adams for foreclosing Hopkinson's Caldwell claim in this 

federal habeas proceeding. See id. However, the Wyoming Supreme 

Court expressly declined to apply a procedural bar on any ground 

with respect to Hopkinson's Caldwell claim, and addressed that 

claim on. the merits. See Ho~kinson v. State, 708 P.2d at 47. 

Thus the ~ssue of procedural bar 1s not before us. 

We do not intend to imply that the availability of a 

constitutional claim can never be suggested by state law. Quite 

the opposite might be true. Our conclusion in this case is 

confined to the constitutional claim in question. 

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. ~ . 

granted on other grounds, 109 s. Ct. 1930 (1989}; Dutton v. Brown, 

812 F.2d 593 {lOth Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 116 

(1987); Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 482 u.s. 909 (1987). However, those cases were decided 

prior to Teague, and in any event, no Caldwell violation was 

found. Cases in other circuits, cited by Hopkinson, where relief 

on the basis of Caldwell has been granted, were also decided prior 

to Teague. See, ~, Wheat v . Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 930 (1987); Mann v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 

1471 (11th Cir. 1987), reh•g granted, 828 F.2d 1498, on reh•g en 

bane, 844 F.2d 1446 (1988), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1353 (1989); 

Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d at 1526. While we acknowledge that 

a fortuity of timing placed previous habeas petitioners, here and 

elsewhere, in a different position than Hopkinson, 

nonretroactivity does not apply to Teague itself. The holding in 

Teague applies to new constitutional rules, Teague v. Lane, 109 s. 

Ct. at 1078, but the holding stems from an interpretation of the 

statutory scope of habeas corpus, and directly affects our power 

with respect to habeas petitions before us. 

In summary, we hold, consistent with our opinion in Dutton v. 

Brown, that the rule in Caldwell falls within the "new rule" 

proscription of Teague, and, therefore, cannot be applied in this 

proceeding unless it falls within one of the two exceptions 

permitted by Teague. 

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c. 

The first exception in Teague 

criminal punishment of certain 

relates to rules 

primary conduct 

forbidding 

and rules 

prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of 

defendant because of their status or offense. Penry v. Lynaugh, 

109 s. Ct. at 2952. That exception does not apply. 

The second exception relates to rules which require the 

observance of "procedures that ••• are 'implicit in the concept 

of ordered liberty.'" Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. at 1075, quoting 

Mackey v. United States, 401 u.s. at 693 (separate opinion of 

Harlan, J.) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 

(1937)). See Yates v. Aiken, 108 s. Ct. 534 {1988). But the 

scope of the second exception is limited by the plurality opinion 

in Teague "to those new procedures without which the likelihood of 

an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Teague v. Lane, 

109 s. Ct. at 1076-77. The procedures to which the plurality 

refers are bedrock procedures which are "central to an accurate 

determination of innocence or guilt ... Id. at 1077. Presumably, 

the exception applies to the accuracy of the defendant's sentence 

as well, and to Eighth Amendment violations. Teague v. Lane, 109 

S. Ct. at 1089 n.S (Brennan, J., dissenting). 

Emphasizing the narrowness of the second exception the Court 

stated, "[w]e believe it unlikely that many such components of 

basic due process have yet to emerge." Id. at 1077. The rule 

urged must be "the kind of absolute prerequisite to fundamental 

fairness that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 

Id. Its absence must "undermine the fundamental fairness that 

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must underlie a conviction [or sentence] or seriously diminish the 

likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction [or sentence]." 

Id. 

Standing alone, a rule in capital hearings that no reference 

to appellate review can be made, or cannot be made without a full 

description of the appellate process, or that curative instructions must follow references to appellate review, do not amount to 

Eighth Amendment bedrock procedural elements. However, speaking 

in the abstract, and not as to the fact situation before us, it 

strikes us as bedrock procedure that a jury must understand that 

it, not an appellate court, carries the responsibility for 

imposing the death penalty. 

We describe the matter in general terms because of 

uncertainty as to the scope of Caldwell itself. But we do regard 

the jury's understanding of its core function in a capital 

sentencing hearing to be fundamentally related to the accuracy of 

a death sentence. A jury's basic misunderstanding of its 

responsibility dislocates the purpose of the entire proceeding, 

thus implicating "•the principal concern' of [Supreme Court] 

jurisprudence regarding the death penalty, the 'procedure by which 

the State imposes the death sentence.' 11 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 

472 u.s. at 340, quoting California v. Ramos, 463 u.s. at 999, and 

11 the heightened need for reliability in the determination that 

death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson 

v. North Carolina, 428 u.s. at 305. Because of its fundamental 

nature a Caldwell claim is different, for example, from one 

arising under Booth v. Maryland, 482 u.s. 496 (1987}, where a 

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prosecutor introduced victim impact evidence, or its extension in 

South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 s. Ct. 2207 (1989), where evidence 

of the victim's religious and civic inclinations was deemed 

improper. 

Accordingly, while we acknowledge Teague's severe constraints 

on the scope of collateral review, we conclude that Caldwell 

claims fall within the second exception in Teague, regardless of 

how the exception may finally be defined, and can be considered. 

We note that the Fifth Circuit takes a different view. See Sawyer 

v. Butler, F.2d ____ , 1989 WL 90696 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 1989) 

(en bane). 

II. 

A. 

The prosecutor's remarks which have placed the constitutionality of Hopkinson's death sentence in issue occurred during 

the prosecutor's summation to the jury in the second sentencing 

trial. The remarks to which Hopkinson assigns error in his en 

bane brief, together with the portions underscored in that brief, 

are as follows: 

"Another matter, they talked about the possibility of 

error. There is no such thing as perfection. The 

system works to the best it can, but there are safeguards built in. That's due process. The Wyom1ng 

Supreme Court, as Mr. Munker said, reviewed the first 

trial. The* found no error in the guilt phase. That 

went to t e united States Supreme Court, and it-wiS 

denied cert. 

MR. SKAGGS: Objection, your Honor. There is flatly no 

evidence of that and if I can't bring in something there 

is no evidence of, he can't either. 

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MR. MORIARITY: Well 

THE COURT: Now, let me try and handle it. The jury has 

heard a lot of statements in closing arguments with 

reference to matters which technically there is no 

evidence on. And I won't talk about who said what, 

that's strictly up to you. But I have given everybody 

latitude and I'm not going to stop now. The jury will 

just sift it out. 

MR. MORIARITY: Thank you, Your Honor. The testimony of 

Mrs. Barbara Oakley, the clerk of this court, when I 

asked her if the guilt phase had gone to the United 

States Supreme Court and had come back from them prior 

to this testimony, she said, yes, the record revealed 

that. That is the facts in this case. But the Wyoming 

Supreme Court sent it back because of error in the first 

trial on the death penalty as it pertained to the Jeff 

Green matter. The Wyoming Supreme Court will review 

whatever action you take in this case. It's an 

automatic review. So, the matter of error, the matter 

of m~stake ~s not one for us to be concerned w~th here. 

Judge Ranck has done his best, his duty to 1nstruct you 

on the law. We have given you the facts from the 

witness stand as best we can. You have to do your duty 

as best you can, and I'm sure you will. But, because of 

some possibility of error, they say don't give him the 

death penalty. That's not what the law is. It's 

nowhere in your instructions from the Court. [Emphasis 

added.] Transcript of May 17, 1982 proceedings, Vol. 

XVI, pp. 1246-48." 

Supplemental Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant on Rehearing En 

Bane at 7-8 (emphasis in original). 

Notwithstanding the fact that the challenged statement by the 

prosecutor did not misstate (although it did not fully explain) 

Wyoming law, see Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1214, Trans. of 

Oral Argument on Rehearing En Bane at 48, the court is equally 

divided as to whether the prosecutor's statement, taken in 

context, violated the rule in Caldwell. That is, the court cannot 

agree whether or not the prosecutor's statements were of the type 

which, when taken in context, "tend[ed] to shift the 

responsibility for the sentencing decision away from the jury." 

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Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1988) (en bane), 

cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989). The essentials of the 

opposing viewpoints on this subject . are set out in the panel 

opinion and dissent, and it is unproductive to repeat and enlarge 

upon those arguments here because of the equal division of the 

court on the subject. 

Our equal division has the effect of affirming the district 

court's denial of Hopkinson's petition on the Caldwell issue. 

While we could end our consideration of the case at this point, we 

choose not to do so. In order to make our views clear with 

respect to the proper test to be applied to Caldwell issues, and 

because further analysis does yield a decision in this case, we 

proceed with our analysis on the assumption that uncorrected 

Caldwell-type remarks were in fact made by the prosecutor. 

B. 

Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor's statements were of 

the type which would violate the rule in Caldwell, the dispositive 

legal issue concerns the standard of review by which the 

prosecutor's remarks must be evaluated. In substance, the issue 

is whether Hopkinson's death sentence must be vacated because of 

the prosecutor's statement even if there is no substantial 

possibility that the remarks affected the jury's decision. 

Hopkinson argues that by the following language in Caldwell 

the Supreme Court erected a "no effect•• standard of review for 

Caldwell violations: 

"In this case, the State sought to minimize the jury's 

sense of responsibility for determining the appropriate-

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 16 
ness of death. Because we cannot saf that this effort 

had no effect on the sentencing dec~sion, that decision 

does not meet the standard of reliabili ty that the 

Ei ghth Amendment requires." 

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 u.s. at 341 (emphasis added). Since 

it would be impossible for a reviewing court to say that a remark 

which violates the rule in Caldwell had no conceivable effect on a 

sentencing decision, however insignificant, Hopkinson acknowledges 

that as a practical matter the "no effect" standard amounts to a 

~ se rule requiring reversal. 

Rehearing En Bane at 19-22. 

Trans. of Oral Argument on 

We are not persuaded that the Supreme Court has erected a 

standard of review on this subject so formidable as to foreclose 

appellate review beyond a bare determinati on that a n uncorrected 

remark falling within the Caldwell category has been uttered. 

The opinion in Caldwell does not state that it is formulating 

a standard of review. It is in fact equivocal on the subject. In 

the paragraph preceding the one containing the ••no effect on the 

sentencing decision" language, the Court employs a fundamental 

fairness standard: "Such comments, if left uncorrected, might so 

affect the fundamental fairness of the sentencing proceeding as to 

violate the Eighth Amendment. 11 Caldwell v. Mississi ppi, 472 U.S. 

at 340 (emphasis added). The concurring and di ssenting opini ons 

evidence no recognition that a 11 no effect 11 o r ~ se reversal 

standard had been installed by the major i ty. Justice o•connor, 

concurring in part and concurring i n the judgment, uses 

"unacceptable risk." Id. at 343 (o•connor, J.) The dissenting 

justices refer to 11Whether the statements rendered the proceedings 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 17 
as a whole fundamentally unfair." 

dissenting). 

Id. at 350 (Rehnquist, J., 

"No effect" language has been used by the Supreme Court in 

two other cases without suggesting its use as a per se standard of 

reversal. In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986), the 

Court stated: "Nor can we confidently conclude that credible 

evidence that petitioner was a good prisoner would have had no 

effect upon the jury's deliberations." (emphasis added). However, 

it followed that comment by saying: "Under these circumstances, it 

appears reasonably likely that the exclusion of evidence bearing 

upon petitioner's behavior in jail (and hence, upon his likely 

future behavior in prison} may have affected the jury's decision 

to impose the death sentence. Thus, under any standard, the 

exclusion of the evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to 

constitute reversible error... Id. (emphasis added). In her 

concurring opinion in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 s. ct. 2320, 2334 

{1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring), Justice O'Connor, joined by 

Justice Blackmun, identified the controlling standard in Skipper 

as "reasonably likely." 

In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 u.s. 393, 399 (1987), the Court 

used "no effect" language but did so in connection with and as an 

alternative to harmless error: "Respondent has made no attempt to 

argue that this error was harmless, or that it had no effect on 

the jury or the sentencing judge." 

Other opinions of the Supreme Court, dealing with Eighth 

Amendment issues, including concurring and dissenting opinions, 

have relied on standards which permit the exercise of some degree 

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of judgment on appellate review. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 

153, 188 , 203 (1976) {plurality opinion) ( 11 Substantial risk" 

standard for testing the constitutionality of death sentencing 

procedures); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86 (1983) ( .. degree" 

to which the process of balancing aggravating and mitigating 

factors was "infected•• by a particular statutory provision); 

Turner v. Murray, 476 u.s. 28, 33 (1986) ("constitutionally 

significant likelihood," or whether the ·Circumstances "created an 

unacceptable risk"); McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1783 

(1987) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens 

dissenting) ("substantial risk •• and "significant probabili ty11 

standards invoked); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 s. Ct. at 2338 

(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("substantial risk" standard}; and Mills 

v. Maryland, 108 s. Ct. 1860, 1867 (1988) ("substantial 

possibility,.. and "[t]he possibility that petitioner•s jury 

conducted its task improperly certainly is great enough to require 

resentencing."). Id. at 1870 {emphasis added). We note also that 

in Zant v. Stephens, 462 u.s. 862 (1983), the Supreme Court 

expressly rejected a no possible effect standard in a case where 

the jury was instructed on both invalid and valid aggravating 

circumstances, stating: 11More importantly, for the reasons 

discussed above, any possible impact cannot fairly be regarded as 

a constitutional defect in the sentencing process." Id. at 889 

(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

The two circuits which have had occasion to address the 

appropriate standard for a Caldwell claim have reached different 

conclusions regarding the appropriate standard. In Tucker v. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 19 
Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 1986) (en bane), cert. 

denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987}, the Eleventh Circuit used a 

fundamental fairness approach derived from the prejudice prong of 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 u.s. 668 (1984). It reviewed the 

challenged incident to determine whether there was "'a reasonable 

probability that, in the absence of the offending remarks, the 

sentencing outcome would have been different' A 

'reasonable probability• is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome." Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d at 1295-96 

(quoting Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 {11th Cir. 1985) 

(en bane)}. In Sawyer v. Butler, F.2d , 1989 WL 90696 (5th 

Cir. Aug. 15, 1989) (en bane), the Fifth Circuit adopted a "no 

effect,. test. It did so, however, in the context of a one-step 

analytical framework for determining the existence of actual 

Caldwell error: 

"As we shall see, the effect upon a death sentence of 

Caldwell error and the nature of the inquiry into 

whether it exists, including the record sources to be 

examined, are entwined parts of its very definition. 

That is, what a reviewing court is to look for and how 

it is to set about judging its effect upon a criminal 

conviction is part of the definition of Caldwell error. 

Much of the argument here is over the ingredients of the 

prohibition." 

Id. slip op. at 11. Our two-step approach5 may cast the use of 

5 In our recent en bane decision in Parks v. Brown, we describe 

a two-step process for evaluating a Caldwell 1ssue: 

"A two-step inquiry is appropriate when examining 

alleged Caldwell violations. See Darden v. Wainwright, 

477 u.s. 168, 184 n.lS, 106 s.ct. 2464, 2473 n.ls, 91 

L.Ed.2d 144 {1986). First, the court should determine 

whether the challenged prosecutorial remarks are the 

type of statements covered by Caldwell. In other words, 

they must be statements that tend to shift the 

[footnote continued ••• ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 20 
the governing standard into a different role. However, to the 

extent the Fifth Circuit's standard for evaluating the impact of 

Caldwell-type remarks on the sentencing decision differs from that 

which we adopt here, we respectfully disagree. 

In our en bane decision in Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d at 1557, 

this court adopted the Mills v. Maryland "substantial possibility" 

standard in a California v. Brown6 issue relating to the impact on 

a jury of an instruction cautioning against sympathy. No 

different standard should be required here. 

Of course, distinctions can be drawn between "Caldwell" and 

"Brown" issues. In the former, instructions or arguments which 

successfully diminish the jury's sense of its responsibility 

infect the entire deliberation process. In the latter, only the 

jury's consideration of mitigating evidence is involved. But the 

latter more typically involves instructions from the court, and 

the influence of instructions on the jury (as opposed to remarks 

from counsel} arguably presents a more serious situation. More to 

the point, however, the focus in each instance is upon the 

reliability of the product of the jury's deliberation. In our 

view the proper standard for evaluating the Caldwell issue in this 

case, if a violation exists, is whether there is a substantial 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

responsibility for the sentencing decision away from the 

jury. If so, the second inquiry is to evaluate the 

effect of such statements on the jury to determine 

whether the statements rendered the sentencing decision 

unconstitutional." 

Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d at 1549. 

6 California v. Brown, 479 u.s. 538 (1987). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 21 
possibility that the prosecutor's statements, taken in context, 

affected the sentencing decision. 

III. 

Applying the ••substantial possibility" standard of review we 

have no difficulty holding that the remarks in question, assuming 

they fell within the category of remarks covered by Caldwell, did 

not unconstitutionally affect the sentencing decision. 

The sentencing hearing in this case spanned a ten-day period 

and filled 1,270 pages of transcript. In addition to multiple 

exhibits, including those from the guilt phase of the trial, the 

state presented testimony from fifteen witnesses by transcript or 

in person, and the defense presented eight. The facts of this 

case are set out at length in the panel opinion and in the 

decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court. The sentencing jury heard 

the essentials of that evidence, as well as other testimony which 

the guilt phase jury did not hear. We do not undertake to 

replicate the evidence here. Hopkinson's counsel vigorously 

attacked the credibility of key witnesses and the accuracy and 

reliability of key points of evidence. However, the state's 

evidence relating to the aggravating and mitigating factors in the 

case overwhelmingly established Hopkinson's capaci ty to be an 

intimidating, violent, manipulative individual. His full 

responsibility for procuring the bombing murder of the Vehar 

family, and the torture murder of Jeff Green was before the jury. 

The jury was told repeatedly about its duties, the gravity of 

its role, and that the remarks of counsel were not to be 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 22 
considered as evidence or legal instruction in the case. R. Vol. 

IX-A at 4, 17, 33, 35, 36, 63, 65, 72-74, 81; R. Vol. IX-F at 

1164, 1169, 1200, 1202-04, ~207, 1212-13, 1237-38, 1242, 1244, 

1252. The court formally instructed the jury members in no 

uncertain terms that they bore the full responsibility and were 

the final decision-makers on the death penalty: 

11 You should not act hastily or without due regard 

for the gravity of these proceedings. Before you 

ballot, you should carefully weigh, sift and consider 

the evidence and all of it and bring to bear your best 

judgment upon the sole issue which is submitted to you 

at this time: Whether the defendant shall be sentenced 

to death or to life imprisonment. 

Your decision as to the sentence to be imposed is 

mandatory. You are not merely recommending a sentence 

to the Judge. You are the final decision-makers as to 

whether Mark Hopkinson w1ll be sentenced to life in 

prison or to death." 

R. Vol. VI-Hat 699 (emphasis added). A written copy of those 

instructions was given to each juror to take into the jury room 

for assistance in their deliberations. R. Vol. IX-F at 1162. 

In its decision the jury separately found that every one of 

the five aggravating circumstances posed to the jury were proved, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that none of seven statutory mitigating 

circumstances were present, and of the two additional mitigating 

circumstances, one was present and one was not. 7 On those 

7 The jury found as follows: 

"THE CLERK: Findings 

sentence. We, the jury, 

above-entitled case, do, 

follows: 

and recommendation of 

empaneled and sworn in the 

upon our oaths, find as 

Part I: Aggravating Circumstances. 

1. The murder was committed by a person under 

[footnote continued ••. ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 23 
separate, strong findings the jury recommended the death sentence. 

After a thorough review of the record we are convinced that 

there is no substantial possibility that the comment by the 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

sentence of imprisonment. Yes. 

2. The defendant was previously convicted of 

another murder in the first degree. Yes. 

3. The murder was committed for the purpose of 

avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. Yes. 

4. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. 

Yes. 

5. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or 

cruel. Yes. 

Part II: Mitigating Circumstances. 

1. The defendant has no significant history of 

prior criminal activity. No. 

2. The murder was committed while the defendant 

was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 

disturbance. No. 

3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's 

conduct or consented to the act. No. 

4. The defendant was an accomplice in a murder 

committed by another person and his participation in the 

homicidal act was relatively minor. No. 

s. The defendant acted under extreme duress or 

under the substantial domination of another person. No. 

6. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 

criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to 

the requirements of law, was substantially impaired. 

No. 

7. The age of the defendant at the time of the 

crime. No. 

8. Any other mitigating circumstances. 

8. The torture of 

ordered by Mark Hopkinson. 

Jeff Green may not have been 

No. 

[footnote continued •.. ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 24 
prosecutor unconstitutionally affected the decision of the jury . 

We reach the same conclusion if we apply a fundamental fairness 

standard. That _is, the challenged comments di d not render the 

sentencing proceeding and death sentence fundamentally unfair on 

the facts of this case. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of the arguments of counsel. Because 

we hold that Hopkinson's death sentence was not imposed 

unconstitutionally, we affirm the district court's denial of the 

writ of habeas corpus on this issue. 

AFFIRMED. 

[ .•• footnote continued] 

9. Actions of Mark Hopkinson helped save the life 

of a prison guard. Yes. 

Part III. Recornmendation o That sufficient 

mitigating circumstances do not exist to outweigh the 

aggravating circumstances found to exist and the jury recommends that the defendant be sentenced to death." 

R. Vol. IX-F at 1264-65. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 25 
No. 86-2571, HOPKINSON v. SHILLINGER 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge Holloway and Judges 

McKay and Seymour, join, dissenting: 

I agree with the majority opinion that we have a 11 new" rule 

within the contemplation of Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. 1060 

(1989), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989). I would 

add, because I differ with the majority on the standard of review 

contemplated by Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 u.s. 320, 341 (1985), 

that it is Caldwell's "greatly heightened intolerance of 

misleading jury argument," Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1291 

(5th Cir. 1989) (en bane), which clearly makes it a new rule. 

Donelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974}, had been 

settled law for over ten years before Caldwell was decided . 

Donnelly held that due process does not require the reversal of a 

conviction based on alleged improper remarks of the prosecutor 

unless the remarks constituted fundamental unfairness to the 

defendant. Thus, if Caldwell applied that or a significantly 

similar standard (even in the context of an Eighth Amendment 

challenge), it would be difficult to say that Caldwell was not 

dictated by Donnelly precedent. Cases dictated by precedent 

cannot espouse "new" rules under Teague. 109 s. Ct. at 1070. 

Thus, it is the standard of review articulated in Caldwell that 

makes it "new," under the Teague analysis. 

I also agree with the majority that Caldwell error falls 

within the second exception of Teague and Penry. The jury's 

perception of its position in the criminal justice system, when it 

Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 26 
has discretionary power to put a defendant to death, is central to 

the reliability of the sentence--hence it is a procedure "implicit 

in the concept of ordered liberty." Teague, 109 s. Ct. at 1075. 

The majority•s analysis on this issue is better than that of the 

Sawyer majority which found to the contrary. 881 F.2d at 1292-94. 

We are equally divided on the issue whether there is Caldwell 

error in the case at bar. I remain persuaded that the 

prosecutor's remarks in the rebuttal part of his closing argument 

immediately before the case was submitted to the jury constituted 

Caldwell error. I can add little to my analysis in my dissent to 

the panel opinion, Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1233-37 

(lOth Cir. 1989), and do not repeat it here. 

Where I differ from the majority is on the standard of review 

that we must apply to Caldwell error. The Supreme Court concluded 

in Caldwell, "[b]ecause we cannot say that this effort 

(prosecutor's improper argument] had no effect on the sentencing 

decision, that decision does not meet the standard of reliability 

that the Eighth Amendment requires." 472 u.s. at 341 (emphasis 

added). The majority here says essentially that the Supreme Court 

did not mean what it said in Caldwell, and did not intend to 

create such a tough standard of review. The majority equates a 

"no effect" standard with a per se reversal rule and then 

discusses a number of cases it considers analagous in which the 

Supreme Court used different words to describe the review 

standards in those situations. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 27 
I do not agree that the Supreme Court inadvertently used the 

••no effect" words or intended something different than the high 

standard of review indicated by those words. The writer of the 

majority opinion in Caldwell, in dissenting to a denial of 

certiorari in Moore v. Blackburn, 476 u.s. 1176 (1986) (denying 

cert. to 774 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1985)}, stated that under the 

court's recent Caldwell decision the petitioner's sentence could 

not stand unless the error "had no effect on the sentencing 

decision." 476 u.s. at 1176 (Marshall, J., dissenting}. The 

dissenters in Caldwell itself were fully aware that a "no effect'' 

standard was being articulated in the majority opinion. Justice 

Rehnquist, writing for the dissenters, objected to two facets of 

the majority opinion: (1) the majority's conclusions about the 

misleading effect of the prosecutor's statements, taken in 

context, and (2) the imposition of the "no effect" test (what the 

dissent saw as the exaggeration of the likelihood of actual 

prejudice). In speaking to the second objection, the dissent 

criticized the majority's failure to apply the "fundamental 

fairness 11 test of Donelly. The dissent further clarified its 

disagreement with the majority stating, " [a]lthough the Eighth 

Amendment requires certain processes designed to prevent the 

arbitrary imposition of capital punishment, it does not follow 

that every proceeding that strays from the optimum is ipso facto 

c6nstitutionally unreliable." Caldwell, 472 u.s. at 350-51 

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).! 

1 

v. 

The majority in the case at bar sugggests that although Skipper 

South Carolina, 476 u.s. 1 , 8 (1986), uses the "no effect" 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 28 
I believe the Supreme Court's recent decision in Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 u.s. 168 {1986), recognized and reinforced the 11 no 

effect 11 standard as applied to Caldwell error in the sentencing 

phase of a capital murder trial. Darden, which involved 

prosecutor's comments during the guilt phase, distinguished 

Caldwell, stating: 

11The principles of Caldwell are not applicable to this 

case. Caldwell involved comments by a prosecutor during 

the sentencing phase of trial to the effect that the 

jury's decision as to life or death was not final, that 

it would automatically be reviewed by the State Supreme 

Court, and that the jury should not be made to feel that 

the entire burden of the defendant's life was on 

them •••• 

• • • In this case, the comments were made at the 

guilt-innocence stage of trial, greatly reducing the 

chance that they had any effect at all on 

sentencing •••• Caldwell is relevant only to certain 

types of comment--those that mislead the jury as to its 

role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the 

jury to feel less responsible than it should for the 

sentencing decision. In this case, none of the comments 

could have had the effect of misleading the jury into 

thinking that it had a reduced role in the sentencing 

process." 

477 u.s. at 183 n.lS {emphasis added). 

All fourteen of the active judges in the Fifth Circuit ag ~ee 

that the Supreme Court, in Caldwell, intended to adopt a 11 no 

effect 11 test. In the Sawyer opinion on en bane rehearing, that 

court extensively analyzes why Caldwell sets out such a high 

Continued from previous page 

language it also does not adopt that as a standard. It does use 

other language including 11 under any standard." But I believe it 

adopts a 11 no effect 11 standard of review for errors in the 

admission of mitigating evidence in a death sentencing proceeding 

by stating, in the crucial paragraph of the opinion: .. Nor can we 

confidently conclude that credible evidence that petitioner was a 

good prisoner would have had no effect on the jury's 

deliberations." Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 29 
standard, when the Supreme Court considers the fundamental 

fairness standard sufficient to protect the defendant's rights in 

other situations. After that analysis the Sawyer court concludes: 

"The state cannot resist the conclusion that it 

improperly diminished a jury's sense of responsibility 

in its sentencing role with the argument that a jury 

with such diminished responsibility nonetheless did not 

render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. 

. . . . [Caldwell] instructs that if the State seeks 'to 

m1n1m1ze the jury's sense of responsibility for 

determining the appropriateness of death' and 'we cannot 

say that this effort had no effect on the sentencing decision,' then 'that decision does not meet the 

standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment 

requires. ' • • . 

In sum, we reject [the State's] proffered 

definition of Caldwell. We do so after noting that its 

core is diminish1ng the responsibility of the jury by 

misdescribing its role under state law and after 

rejecting the suggestion that its elements include 

showings of fundamental unfairness, a contemporaneous 

objection or trial court participation." 

Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1285-86 (quoting Caldwell, 472 u.s. at 341). 

The "substantial possibility" test the majority in the 

instant case adopts smacks too much of preponderance-of-theevidence.2 While I said in my dissent to the panel opinion that 

2 Additionally, it seems to me that the issue of the likelihood 

of the prosecutor's remarks actually having affected the 

sentencing decision is largely subsumed in the initial 

determination of whether Caldwell error has, in fact, occurred. A 

close evaluation of the entirety of the prosecutor's argument and 

the statements and instructions of the trial judge are necessary 

to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks, taken in context, 

would tend to provide the jury with a misleading perception of its 

roleo When viewed in this light, it becomes apparent that many obj ections to the no effect standard (including those of the 

Caldwell dissent) are actually better analyzed as objections to f~nding the presence of Caldwell error at all. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2571 Document: 01019405214 Date Filed: 10/24/1989 Page: 30 
the "no effect" test approaches a per se rule of reversal, I did 

not mean that it is a per se reversal rule. Rather the test seems 

to be akin to a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 

In Caldwell, the Court did not require the petitioner to 

prove actual prejudice; indeed, the limitations of the appellate 

process and the rules against polling jurors would effectively 

preclude any such proof. Rather, Caldwell evaluated, in the 

context of the prosecutor's argument and the court's instructions 

to the jury, the inherent tendency of the improper remarks "to 

minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the 

appropriateness of death." 472 u.s. at 341. When that Court said 

that violations can be overlooked only if a reviewing court can 

conclude with confidence that they had "no effect on the 

sentencing decision," id., it meant, I believe, that reviewing 

judges should ask themselves if they are convinced beyond 

reasonable doubt, considering the context, admonitions of the 

trial judge and other circumstances, that the improper remarks did 

not affect the sentencing decision. 

If I ask myself whether there is a ''substantial possibility" 

the prosecutor's Caldwell remarks affected the jury's decision to 

sentence Hopkinson to death I must say no--they probably did not 

affect the jury's decision. But if I ask myself whether I am so 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt my answer is not the same. I 

cannot say with confidence that the prosecutor's remarks had no 

effect on the jury's sentencing decision. Therefore, I would hold 

that Hopkinson's death sentence was imposed in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment and must be vacated. 

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