Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02952/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02952-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES M. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12CV2952-MMA (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 15] 

vs.

WILLIAM D. GORE, SAN DIEGO

COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

Plaintiff James M. Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, has filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants William

D. Gore, Sheriff of San Diego County, and the San Diego County Sheriff’s

Department. See FAC, Doc. No. 9. Plaintiff alleges violations of his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights arising out of Defendants’ purported failure to

provide meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s request for non-monetary relief is moot

based on his transfer to state custody. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of events occurring while Plaintiff was incarcerated at

George Baily Detention Center and San Diego Central Jail, in the custody of the

- 1 - 12CV2952

Case 3:12-cv-02952-MMA-WMC Document 21 Filed 07/23/13 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Sheriff of San Diego County.1 Generally, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of

Defendants’ policy that limits law library access to inmates representing themselves

in criminal and habeas actions. Plaintiff contends his right of access to the courts

was violated, because in lieu of visiting a prison law library, he was offered only

limited access to legal research materials through Defendants’ contract with Legal

Research Associates. According to Plaintiff, the lack of access to a law library

prevented him from pursuing a federal civil rights action based on “physical injury

while incarcerated.” Complaint, 3. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants frustrated his access to the courts by

failing to provide sufficient postage for mailing legal documents to the courts;

failing to provide ink pens, sufficient paper, and envelopes; and failing to provide

sufficient photocopies of court documents and notary services. Plaintiff claims that

these deficiencies prevented him from timely pursuing his federal civil rights action.

Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaration and permanent injunction

preventing Defendants from, inter alia, continuing to contract with Legal Research

Associates to provide legal research assistance to inmates in lieu of providing access

to a law library. Plaintiff does not request monetary damages. 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims

for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot now that he is no longer in Defendants’

custody.2

 

///

1

 Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and must also construe the

complaint, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2

 Defendants also move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff does not state a plausible constitutional claim since inmates do not have a right to access the courts to pursue civil litigation unrelated to the fact or conditions of confinement. Because this action is subject to dismissal under the mootness doctrine, the Court does not reach the issue. However, the Court notes that

Plaintiff clearly alleges that he was hindered from pursuing a civil rights action based on his conditions of confinement. See Complaint, 3. 

- 2 - 12CV2952

Case 3:12-cv-02952-MMA-WMC Document 21 Filed 07/23/13 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Mootness

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as a preliminary matter,

the court must have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for

Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If a court does not

have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in

question. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102. In the context of prisoner civil rights litigation, if

a prisoner challenges his conditions of confinement and seeks injunctive relief,

transfer to another prison generally renders the request for injunctive relief moot

absent some evidence of an expectation of being transferred back. Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 

2. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The

rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a

pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation

in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding

conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under §

1983). “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts

which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at

649 (internal quotation omitted).

///

- 3 - 12CV2952

Case 3:12-cv-02952-MMA-WMC Document 21 Filed 07/23/13 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

1. San Diego County Sheriff’s Department is not a Proper Defendant

The Court notes as an initial matter that the San Diego County Sheriff’s

Department is not a proper defendant. Section 1983 provides a cause of action

against any “person” who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of federal

constitutional rights or limited federal statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The term

“person” includes state and local officials sued in their individual capacities and

local governments. Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.

2002); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

It does not include “sub-units” of local governments such as municipal departments

or agencies. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005)

(Ferguson, J., concurring) (municipal police departments and bureaus are generally

not considered “persons” within the meaning of section 1983). Rather, the county 

itself is the proper defendant. As such, Plaintiff’s claims should have been brought

against San Diego County, not the Sheriff’s Department.

2. Plaintiff’s Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief are Moot

As articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Wiggins, claims for non-monetary relief

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are moot if the prisoner-plaintiff is no longer

subject to the alleged illegal conduct. Wiggins v. Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.

1985). Here, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are subject to

dismissal pursuant to this holding. In Wiggins, a prisoner brought an action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the access to the law library at California Training

Facility at Soledad was unconstitutionally inadequate. While the case was pending,

the prisoner was transferred to another prison. Defendants then filed a motion to

dismiss the case for mootness, which was denied by the district court. The Ninth

Circuit reversed, holding that since the prisoner had been transferred and was no

longer subject to the illegal activity, his complaint for an injunction was moot. 

Similarly, Plaintiff here has been transferred from the custody of the Sheriff of San

- 4 - 12CV2952

Case 3:12-cv-02952-MMA-WMC Document 21 Filed 07/23/13 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Diego County to state custody, and the illegal activity of which he complained – a

lack of access to a law library and supplies while in the custody of the Sheriff – has

necessarily ended. 

Because there is neither a reasonable expectation nor demonstrated probability

that Plaintiff will return to the custody of the San Diego County Sheriff, his request

for non-monetary relief is moot. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir.

1991) (per curiam) (concluding prisoner’s claims for injunctive relief were moot

because prisoner was transferred to a different facility); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d

1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding prisoner’s “claim that he might be

transferred back to Calipatria some time in the future [was] ‘too speculative’ to

prevent mootness”). Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief. Furthermore, because Plaintiff does not include a

prayer for monetary damages, the entire action must be dismissed. 

3. Leave to Amend

The Court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other

facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation

omitted), citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Here,

Plaintiff may be able to state a plausible access to courts claim if he amends his

pleadings to include a prayer for monetary relief and brings his municipal liability 

claim against San Diego County instead of the Sheriff’s Department. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that Defendant Gore cannot be held liable in his official

capacity for monetary damages. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 64-66 (1989). Defendant Gore may be held liable in his individual capacity, but

only if he either was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a

sufficient causal connection existed between his unlawful conduct and the

constitutional violation. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653

(9th Cir. 2001). 

- 5 - 12CV2952

Case 3:12-cv-02952-MMA-WMC Document 21 Filed 07/23/13 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to

file a Second Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not

named and all claims not re-alleged in the Second Amended Complaint will be

deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 23, 2013

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

- 6 - 12CV2952

Case 3:12-cv-02952-MMA-WMC Document 21 Filed 07/23/13 Page 6 of 6