Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00381/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00381-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Angel Lopez-Valenzuela, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-00381-PHX-PGR (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Angel Lopez-Valenzuela has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising four grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents 

argue that several of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas 

corpus review and that his remaining claims lack merit. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner has filed a 

reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends 

that the Petition be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Conviction and Sentence 

 On March 13, 2008, Petitioner was indicted on one count of sale or transportation 

of dangerous drugs, a class two dangerous felony. (Doc. 10, Ex. A.) After a trial, a jury 

found Petitioner guilty of one count of sale or transportation of dangerous drugs, a class 

two non-dangerous felony. (Doc. 10, Ex. B.) On November 25, 2008, the court 

sentenced him to a mitigated term of nine years’ imprisonment, with 265 days of 

presentence incarceration credit. (Id.) 

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B. Summary of the Facts 

 In its memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the incident giving rise to Petitioner’s 

conviction and sentence.1

 The following summary of the facts is drawn from the court of 

appeals’ summary. In March 2008, undercover Tempe Police Department detective 

Michael Pooley contacted Trinidad Valenzuela-Zayas through a confidential informant 

about buying methamphetamine. (Doc. 10, Ex. C at 2.) Detective Pooley later met 

Valenzuela-Zayas who gave him a sample of the “product,” which was stipulated at trial 

to be methamphetamine. (Id. at 2-3.) The detective wore a recording and transmitting 

device that recorded his conversation with Valenzuela-Zayas. (Id.at 3.) 

 The detective told Valenzuela-Zayas he wanted to buy more methamphetamine 

and asked how much it cost. (Id.) Valenzuela-Zayas said he had to call “Angel” to get 

that information. (Id.) Valenzuela-Zayas made a call on his cellular phone, talked 

briefly, and then gave the phone to the detective. “Angel” told the detective that the price 

was $17,000 per pound. (Id.) The detective agreed to buy seven pounds and “Angel” 

said he would call back on Valenzuela-Zayas’ phone to confirm that he had enough 

product. (Id.) “Angel” called back and told the detective the transaction would take 

place that night or the next day, and that he would call the detective. (Id.) 

 The next day, Valenzuela-Zayas called the detective and told him to go to a 

grocery store parking lot later that afternoon to buy the drugs. (Id.) Valenzuela-Zayas 

said he would be waiting with another man. (Id.) Police officers who were watching the 

location observed Valenzuela-Zayas waiting in the parking lot with another man whom 

officers identified at trial as Petitioner. (Id.) When the detective arrived, Valenzuela-

 

1

 The appellate court’s factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of 

correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas proceedings in federal court, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(rejecting argument that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). Additionally, review of the record supports the appellate court’s summary of the facts. (Doc. 10, Ex. L, M.) 

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Zayas and Petitioner were standing by a truck. (Id. at 3-4.) Valenzuela-Zayas introduced 

the detective to Petitioner, identifying him as “Angel” to whom the detective had spoken 

on the phone the day before. (Id. at 4.) The detective also recognized Petitioner’s voice 

as belonging to “Angel.” (Id.) Valenzuela-Zayas told the detective the drugs were at 

different parking lot nearby. (Id.) Petitioner gave the detective specific directions to that 

parking lot and they all drove to the second location. (Id.) Petitioner drove a truck with 

Valenzuela-Zayas as a passenger and the detective drove by himself in a separate vehicle. 

(Id.) 

 At the second parking lot, Petitioner and Valenzuela-Zayas parked next to a car. 

Another man exited the car and handed Valenzuela-Zayas a plastic bag through the open 

passenger window of Petitioner’s truck. (Id.) Petitioner and Valenzuela-Zayas then 

drove to where the detective was parked, and Valenzuela-Zayas told the detective to get 

in the truck with Petitioner. (Id.) When the detective got to the driver’s side, Petitioner 

showed him the contents of a plastic bag that was sitting on his lap. (Id.) At trial, the 

parties stipulated the bag’s contents were methamphetamine. (Id.) The detective got in 

the truck. (Id.) 

 “The [p]olice then moved in and arrested [Petitioner] and Valenzuela-Zayas.” 

(Id.) At trial, the State introduced English transcripts of the Spanish conversations 

between the detective, Petitioner, and Valenzuela-Zayas recorded by the device the 

detective wore during the events. (Id.) Petitioner testified and denied that he talked with 

the detective over the phone. (Id.) According to Petitioner, Valenzuela-Zayas called him 

and asked for a ride to pick up money that his employer owed him. (Id.) Petitioner stated 

that Valenzuela-Zayas told him they had to go to the second parking lot to meet the 

person who was going to pay him. (Id.) Petitioner further testified that once there, a man 

in a car handed a bag to Valenzuela-Zayas and Petitioner “started suspecting that 

something was going on.” (Id.) Petitioner maintained he never spoke to the detective 

and knew nothing about a drug sale. (Id.) 

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C. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner timely appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals and appointed counsel 

filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that 

counsel had searched the record and found no arguable question of law to raise on appeal. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. D.) The appellate court gave Petitioner the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief, but he did not do so. (Doc. 10, Ex. C at 2.) After reviewing the 

record for fundamental error, on November 24, 2009, the appellate court affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 10, Ex. C.) Petitioner did not file a petition 

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) 

D. Post-Conviction Proceedings

 On September 30, 2009, while his direct appeal was still pending, Petitioner filed a 

notice of post-conviction relief in the state trial court pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32. (Doc. 10, Ex. E.) Appointed counsel later filed a notice of 

completion of record stating that, after reviewing the record, he could find no colorable 

claims to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 10, Ex. F.) 

 Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) conduct an adequate pretrial 

investigation, (2) allow Petitioner to review the evidence, (3) obtain an expert to analyze 

the voice on a recording, (4) call Petitioner’s co-conspirator as a witness, and (5) properly 

cross-examine state witnesses. (Doc. 10, Ex. G.) Petitioner further alleged that counsel 

was ineffective for stipulating to the admission of several trial exhibits. (Id.) On March 

31, 2011, the court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief stating that it agreed 

with the state’s arguments in opposition to the petition. (Doc. 10, Ex. H.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals alleging that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) allow Petitioner to review the evidence, 

(2) perform an adequate pretrial investigation, (3) interview and call witnesses, 

(4) properly cross-examine witnesses, and (5) obtain expert testimony. (Doc. 10, Ex. I.) 

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The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review on February 27, 2013. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. J.) 

E. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

 On February 26, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court raising the following claims: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 

because a police detective fabricated the facts used to establish probable cause for his 

arrest (Ground One); (2) his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated and trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel agreed to stipulate to the admission 

of all evidence presented by the prosecutor, thus prohibiting Petitioner from challenging 

any evidence admitted at trial (Ground Two), (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to inform Petitioner of the charges and to provide him evidence in 

his case (Ground Three); and (4) his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and 

equal protection were violated when trial counsel failed to investigate and subpoena 

witnesses and stipulated to the admission of evidence without Petitioner’s consent 

(Ground Four). (Doc. 1 at 7-10.) Respondents argue that habeas corpus review of 

several of these claims is procedurally barred and that Petitioner’s remaining claims lack 

merit. (Doc. 10.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

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33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

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opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

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III. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar Applied to Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One and Portions of Grounds Two, Three and Four 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 

because a police detective fabricated the facts used to establish probable cause for his 

arrest.2

 (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner did not present this claim to any state court. (Doc. 10, 

Exs. C, E, G, I.) 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts a due process violation based on trial counsel’s 

stipulation to the admission of evidence, and he asserts several claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 1 at 7.) As Respondents note, Petitioner did present his 

due process claim or his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure 

forensic fingerprint and DNA evidence to any state court on direct appeal or during his 

post-conviction proceedings.3

 (Doc. 10, Exs. C, E, G, I.) 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner presents several claims, including (1) a claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to show Petitioner a copy of the charges against him, 

 

2

 As Respondents’ argue (Doc. 10 at 16), Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is 

not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. The Ninth Circuit recognizes that “[i]f the state has provided a state prisoner an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim, [the court] cannot grant federal habeas relief on the Fourth Amendment issue.” Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). In determining whether a state prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, a court should 

examine the extent to which the claim was considered by the state trial and appellate 

courts. See Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a 45-page evidentiary hearing transcript, a four-page appellate opinion, and substantial briefs demonstrated careful consideration of appellant’s Fourth Amendment claim). 

Although Petitioner did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim to the state courts, 

there is no evidence that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim. Accordingly, habeas relief is unavailable on that claim. See Moormann, 426 F.3d at 

1053. 

3

 In Ground Four, Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to obtain DNA evidence. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Although Petitioner exhausted some claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in state court, that was not sufficient to exhaust 

other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on different allegations. See

Gulbrandson v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 5779188, at *12 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2013) 

(“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [] of counsel’s ineffectiveness’ is 

a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.”) (quoting Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1056); 

see also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring exhaustion in state court of the factual basis of each distinct ineffective-assistance claim), overruled on 

other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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and (2) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and “malicious prosecution,” based on 

his allegations that Detective Pooley, the prosecutor, and defense counsel “conspired to 

keep [Petitioner] in the dark about the actual completion of his jury trial.” (Doc. 1 at 17.) 

To support his claim of ineffective assistance and malicious prosecution, Petitioner 

asserts that he was not allowed to be present after the jury returned its verdict on October 

6, 2008, but that proceedings continued as evidenced by jury questions dated after 

October 6, 2008. (Doc. 1 at 16-17.) Petitioner did not present these claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and malicious prosecution to the state courts on direct appeal or on 

post-conviction review. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, E, G, I.) 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and a due 

process violation based on counsel’s “stipulation of items into evidence,” failure to 

investigate, and failure to subpoena witnesses and evidence. (Doc. 1 at 10.) He also 

alleges that the prosecutor and the Tempe Police Department “conspired to violate his 

rights to equal protection and due process.” (Doc. 1 at 18.) Petitioner did not present his 

due process or equal protection claims to the state courts on direct appeal or postconviction review. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, E, G, I.) 

 It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state court to try to exhaust Ground 

One and these portions of Grounds Two, Three, and Four because a successive petition 

for post-conviction relief would be untimely, and these claims would be precluded from 

Rule 32 review because they could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction 

proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 

P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a general rule, when [claims] are raised, or could have been 

raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent claims [] will be deemed 

waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Ground One and 

these portions of Grounds Two, Three, and Four are technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(finding claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was barred from exhausting his 

claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)); see also O’Sullivan v. 

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Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). As discussed below in Section III.B, Petitioner has 

not established any basis to excuse the procedural bar to habeas corpus review of Ground 

One or these portions of Grounds Two, Three, and Four. 

B. Petitioner has not established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar 

 Because Petitioner’s claim asserted in Ground One and portions of Grounds Two, 

Three, and Four are procedurally barred, federal habeas corpus review of those claims is 

unavailable unless Petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” to overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. 

For the reasons below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not established a basis to 

overcome the procedural bar. Accordingly, the Court recommends that habeas corpus 

review be denied and does not consider the merits of those claims. 

 1. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this 

exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

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 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982) (emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). 

If petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Liberally construing the Petition, Petitioner argues cause based on the ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 1 at 7, 8.) Although in some circumstances the 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may establish cause for a procedural default, 

“a claim of ineffective assistance must be presented to the state courts as an independent 

claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 

U.S. at 488-89 (“the exhaustion doctrine . . . generally requires that a claim of ineffective 

assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used 

to establish cause for a procedural default.”); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 

446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the 

procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted”); Tacho v. 

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (exhaustion requires petitioner to first 

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raise ineffective appellate counsel claim separately in state court before alleging it as 

cause for default). Petitioner did not present a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel to the state courts. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, E, G, I.) Accordingly, the ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel does not establish cause to overcome the procedural bar to 

habeas corpus review of Ground One and portions of Grounds Two, Three, and Four. 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge and 

assistance, and limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural 

bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an 

illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a 

procedural default); Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381 (petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers 

did not constitute cause). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown cause for his procedural 

default and the Court does not consider whether Petitioner has shown prejudice. See 

Smith, 477 U.S. at 533. 

IV. Analysis of Petitioner’s Remaining Claims in Grounds Two, Three and Four 

 In Grounds Two, Three, and Four, Petitioner presents several claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1 at 8-10.) With the exception of the claims discussed in 

Section III.A, Petitioner presented these claims to the state courts on post-conviction 

review and they were denied.4

 (Doc. 10, Exs. G, I, J.) 

A. Federal Habeas Review of State Court Decisions 

 Because these claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal habeas 

relief is not available unless Petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was 

contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States 

Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 

 

4

 Neither the trial court nor the appellate court provided a detailed discussion to support its decision. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, J.) When the state court provides no rationale for its decision, the federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state 

court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 

86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (holding that a state court decision that did not provide reasons is still on the merits and entitled to AEDPA deference). Thus, although the record is reviewed independently, the federal court nevertheless defers to the state court’s 

ultimate decision. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such 

law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating 

state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determination.” Id.

 When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

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Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 

n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 631. 

 Here, because the pending habeas petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard 

applies and the court does not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. 

See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 

211 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court “need not conduct 

harmless error review of Strickland violations under Brecht . . . because ‘[t]he; Strickland

prejudice analysis is complete in itself; there is no place for additional harmless-error 

review.”)). 

B. Establishing a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing professional 

standards, and that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must 

show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Id. at 699. A petitioner’s allegations and supporting evidence must withstand the court’s 

“highly deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance, and overcome the “strong 

presumption” that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689-90. A 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that counsel’s assistance was “neither reasonable 

nor the result of sound trial strategy,” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th 

Cir. 2001), and actions by counsel that “‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” do 

not constitute ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v.

Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 

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 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Courts should not presume prejudice. 

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, a petitioner must 

affirmatively prove actual prejudice, and the possibility that a petitioner suffered 

prejudice is insufficient to establish Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Cooper v. 

Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A petitioner] must ‘affirmatively prove 

prejudice.’ . . . This requires showing more than the possibility that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s errors; he must demonstrate that the errors actually prejudiced him.”) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (emphasis in original). However, the court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the court can reject the claim 

of ineffectiveness based on the lack of prejudice. See Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155 n.3 (the 

court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong). 

C. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating 

to the admission of a transcript of a recording of a March 4, 2008 conversation between 

Detective Pooley, Trinidad Valenzuela-Zayas, and Petitioner (trial exhibit 10).5

 (Doc. 1 

 

5

 Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the admission of other evidence (identified as exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 11.) (Doc. 1 at 

14.) He later explains that these exhibits 1-5 were recordings or transcripts of the March 3, 2008 conversation between Detective Pooley and Valenzuela-Zayas and of the March 

4, 2008 conversation between Detective Pooley, Valenzuela-Zayas, and Petitioner. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Exhibits 7 and 9 are identified as impounded cell phones. (Doc. 1 at 14.) 

 Other than the transcript of the March 4, 2008 conversation between Detective 

Pooley, Petitioner, and Valenzuela-Zayas, Petitioner does not explain why counsel was deficient for stipulating to the admission of this evidence or argue how he suffered prejudice from counsel’s stipulation to the admission of that evidence. These conclusory allegations are insufficient for habeas relief. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 

1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that vague and conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance do not warrant habeas relief); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(finding insufficient conclusory allegations that did not identify what counsel would have 

done if performing effectively). 

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at 9, Doc. 10, Exs. L at 9-10, M. at 62-63.) He also argues that counsel did not explain 

the significance of stipulating to the admission of this evidence.6

 At trial, defense counsel stipulated to the admission of an English transcript of the 

March 4, 2008 Spanish–language conversations between Detective Pooley, ValenzuelaZayas, and Petitioner, which were recorded by a device the detective wore during the 

events giving rise to Petitioner’s conviction. (Doc. 10, Ex. L at 9-12.) At trial, counsel 

explained to the court that he stipulated to the admission of the transcript to prevent the 

jury from hearing the entire taped conversation that may have been prejudicial to 

Petitioner. (Doc. 10, Ex. L at 9-12; Ex. M at 60-70.) Counsel also stated that he agreed 

to stipulate to the admission of the transcript of the March 4, 2008 conversations, but did 

not agree to the admission of transcript of the March 3, 2008 conversations “with 

Trinidad [Valenzuela-Zaya].” (Doc. 10, Ex. M at 62-64, L at 11.) He also explained that 

in exchange for the stipulation to the admission of the March 4, 2008 transcript “certain 

parts of the conversation were taken out.” (Doc. 10, Ex. L at 11.) 

 Petitioner argues that he did not consent to, or understand, the stipulation. (Doc. 1 

at 8, 10.) However, the record contradicts Petitioner’s assertion. During trial, Petitioner 

affirmed that he had spoken with counsel about the stipulation, understood the stipulation 

(including that it would be admitted into evidence and considered by the jury), and 

agreed to the stipulation. (Doc. 10, Ex. L at 10.) 

 Counsel’s decision to consent to a stipulation regarding the admission of the 

transcript was a strategic choice regarding how to present a defense that is “virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Defense counsel’s decision to stipulate to 

the admission of the transcript to prevent exposing the jury to prejudicial evidence falls 

within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

 

6

 Petitioner also includes this allegation in Ground Four. (Doc. 1 at 10.) The 

Court will not revisit this allegation in its discussion of Ground Four. 

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 Additionally, Petitioner has not shown prejudice. The record reflects that 

Detective Pooley testified regarding his conversation with Petitioner, and that the entire 

conversation was recorded. (Doc. 10, Ex. M at 45, 68-86.) Thus, the only difference 

resulting from counsel’s stipulation was that the jury was given the transcript of the 

conversation rather than hearing the entire recording of the conversation. As such, 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, but for the stipulation, there is a reasonable 

probability that outcome of his trial would have been different. See Lang v. Callahan, 

788 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The only difference resulting from counsel’s 

stipulation was that the jury was given the victim’s statement as an exhibit. We do not 

find it reasonably probable that, but for the stipulation, the verdict would have been 

different”). 

 Petitioner argues that the translation of the recorded conversation from Spanish to 

English may not have been accurate because it was done by Detective Pooley. (Doc. 1 at 

8.) Detective Pooley testified that he was a certified Spanish speaker with the Tempe 

Police Department and had been bilingual for twelve years. (Doc. 10, Ex. L at 55.) 

Petitioner was present at trial when Detective Pooley read from the English transcript of 

the March 4, 2008 conversation, and Petitioner has not identified any portion of the 

transcript that is inaccurate. Although Petitioner speculates that Detective Pooley may 

have falsified the transcription of the recorded conversations, or fabricated the 

conversations themselves, Petitioner has not offered any support for his speculative 

allegations. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown prejudice from 

counsel’s stipulation to admit into evidence the transcript of the March 4, 2008 

conversations. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s resolution of this 

claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application, of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

D. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

allow him to review evidence and listen to the recordings of the conversations between 

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Detective Pooley, Petitioner and Valenzuela-Zayas.7 (Doc. 1 at 9.) Assuming that trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to permit Petitioner to review the 

evidence, including recordings of the conversations between Petitioner, Detective Pooley 

and Valenzuela-Zayas, Petitioner has not explained how his review of that evidence 

would have aided his defense, or that but for counsel’s failure to permit him to review 

that evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 

been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 

 The record reflects that Petitioner testified in his own defense and denied 

participating in the offense. (Doc. M at 42.) Petitioner claimed that, although he was 

present at the time of the offense, he was an unwitting participant in the transaction 

between Detective Pooley and Valenzuela-Zayas. (Doc. 10, Ex. M at 42-44, 53-54, 80.) 

Petitioner does not explain how an opportunity to review the evidence against him would 

have added to this defense. Thus, Petitioner’s claim is speculative and is insufficient to 

establish deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-94; James, 24 F.3d at 26 (holding that conclusory allegations of ineffective 

assistance of counsel may be summarily rejected); United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 

1008, 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the trial 

court’s rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or 

that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

7

 In his reply, Petitioner appears to assert a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963). (Doc. 12 at 7.) Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in his reply. Accordingly, the court will not consider that claim. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 

997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The 

district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). Additionally, Petitioner did not present this claim to the state court. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, E, 

G, I.) Therefore, for the reasons discussed in Section III, federal habeas corpus review of that claim is procedurally barred. 

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E. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate and “subpoena witnesses for the defense [and] security camera tapes . . . . ”8

 

(Doc. 1 at 9.) Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based 

on an unreasonable application of, federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make reasonable 

decisions that make particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

“This includes a duty to investigate the defendant’s ‘most important defense,’ . . . and a 

duty adequately to investigate and introduce into evidence records that demonstrate 

factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine confidence 

on the verdict . . . . However, ‘the duty to investigate is not limitless.’” Bragg v. Galaza, 

242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted.) 

 Additionally, the prejudice caused by a failure to investigate is not based on the 

lack of an investigation itself, but instead results from trial counsel’s inability to 

introduce the helpful evidence that the investigation would have uncovered. See Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We have repeatedly found that a lawyer who 

fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence, [evidence] that 

demonstrates his client’s factual innocence, or that raises sufficient doubt as to that 

question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.”) 

 

8

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The Court addressed that claim in its discussion of Ground Two, see Section IV.C, and 

will not revisit that claim. In Ground Four, Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to allow Petitioner to review the evidence, including recordings of conversations. (Id.) Petitioner raised this issue in Ground Three. The Court addressed 

that claim in its discussion of Ground Three, see Section IV.D, and will not revisit it. 

In his Reply, Petitioner expands Ground Four to include a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 7 at 12-14.) Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in his reply. Accordingly, the court will not consider that claim. See Zamani, 491 F.3d at 997. 

Additionally, Petitioner did not present this claim to the state court. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, E, 

G, I.) Therefore, for the reasons discussed in Section III, federal habeas corpus review of this claim is procedurally barred. 

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(internal quotation omitted). If a particular investigation would not have uncovered 

beneficial evidence, a petitioner has not been deprived of the benefit of that investigation. 

Courts may not find prejudice based on speculation about what evidence an investigation 

might have uncovered. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1997); see 

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Absent an account of what 

beneficial evidence investigation into any of these issues would have turned up, 

Hendricks cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.”). 

 Even assuming that counsel’s investigation of the case constituted deficient 

performance, Petitioner has not established ineffective assistance of counsel because his 

prejudice argument is predicated on speculation. Although Petitioner alleges that trial 

counsel failed to investigate and subpoena “witnesses for the defense,” (ValenzuelaZayas), Petitioner does not describe the nature of the testimony Valenzuela-Zayas would 

have given or explain why that testimony would have aided his defense. Additionally, he 

has not shown that Valenzuela-Zayas would have been available to testify at trial. 

Petitioner has not submit affidavits from any witness who did not testify at trial, identify 

what testimony would have been given, or demonstrate that, had such testimony been 

given, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different. Thus, Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s resolution of this claim was 

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, federal law. 

 Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “subpoena 

security camera tapes” from the parking lot where the incident took place. (Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Assuming that counsel’s performed deficiently by failing to subpoena security tapes, 

Petitioner has not shown prejudice because he has not described the nature of the 

evidence that would have been on the alleged security tapes or shown that, but for 

counsel’s failure to introduce that evidence at trial, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This 

claim is speculative and does not demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice. See 

Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (claims “grounded in 

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speculation” do not establish prejudice under Strickland); Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088-89 

(mere speculation that further investigation might lead to evidence helpful to petitioner 

was insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance due to failure to investigate); see 

also Lopes v. Campbell, 408 Fed. Appx. 13, 16 (9th Cir. 2010) (state court’s application 

of Strickland was not unreasonable when it decided that petitioner’s speculation as to the 

importance of discovery counsel failed to obtain did not demonstrate reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, result of proceeding would have 

been different). Accordingly, Petitioner has not established a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and has not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based 

on an unreasonable application of, federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, 

he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

V. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

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which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 13th day of January, 2015. 

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