Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00946/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00946-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEHEMIAH LANARR MC-INTOSH, 

SR., CDCR #AU3829,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEP’T, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-CV-00946-JLS-PCL

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL; AND

3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) AND 1915A(b)(1)

(ECF Nos. 3, 5)

Plaintiff Nehemiah Mc-Intosh, Sr., a state inmate since 2014,1currently 

incarcerated at the California Institution for Men located in Chino, California, and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

 

1

 See http://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/Results.aspx (website last visited Sept. 27, 2017)

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§ 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated when he was 

temporarily housed at the San Diego County Central Jail in 2016. (See Compl. 3.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 5.) In addition, Plaintiff has filed a “Request 

for Appointment of Counsel.” (ECF No. 3.) Having considered these documents and the 

law, the Court: (1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel; (2) GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP; and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

I. Motion to Appoint Counsel 

Plaintiff seeks appointed counsel in this matter on the grounds that he is indigent. 

(Plaintiff’s Motion (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 1, ECF No. 3.) However, there is no constitutional right 

to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); 

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) 

grants the district court limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an 

indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 

2004), this discretion may be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see 

also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional 

circumstances requires the Court “to consider whether there is a ‘likelihood of success on 

the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 

(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970).

The Court finds nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint, or in his Motion to Appoint 

Counsel suggesting he is incapable of articulating the factual basis for his discrimination

claims, which appear “relatively straightforward.” Id. In addition, at this initial stage of 

the pleadings, Plaintiff has not yet shown a likelihood of success on the merits. See infra 

Section III. Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” and DENIES his 

Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF No. 3.)

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II. Motion to Proceed IFP

Generally, all parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court 

of the United States must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).2 An action 

may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave 

to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 

1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, 

if a prisoner is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the entire fee in 

“increments,” see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of 

whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2); Taylor v. 

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 

a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund 

account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account 

for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six 

months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), 

(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, 

assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s 

account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee 

is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust 

account certificate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. Andrews, 

 

2

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay an 

additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, 

District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (May 1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is 

waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account certificate, but it shows 

that he has a current available balance of only $3.51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 5) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant 

to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the 

Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the 

Court may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A 

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 

n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 

426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may 

be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Improper Defendants and Municipal Liability

Plaintiff seeks damages against several named and unnamed San Diego Sheriff’s 

Department deputies as well as the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department generally 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. 3–5, 12.) As an initial matter, the Court finds that to the 

extent Plaintiff names the entire “San Diego County Sheriff’s Department,” his claims 

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must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for 

failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person” who, under the color 

of state law, deprives an individual of federal constitutional right or limited federal 

statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The term “person” includes state and local officials 

sued in their individual capacities and local governments. Cortez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 

294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Yet, Local law enforcement departments, municipal 

agencies, or subdivisions of those department or agencies, are not proper defendants 

under § 1983. See Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 

(“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading 

a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Williams v. Gore, No. 12-

CV-2952-MMA-WMC, 2013 WL 3864344, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2013).

While the County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, 

a proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978); Hammond v. Cnty. of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988), Plaintiff has 

not named the County as a Defendant. Moreover, as a municipality, the County may be 

held liable under § 1983—but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a 

constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the 

County, or a “final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Navarro v. 

Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, a “municipality cannot . . . ‘be 

held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.’” Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Monnell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

“Liability may attach to a municipality only where the municipality itself causes the 

constitutional violation through ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom. . . .” Id.

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might 

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plausibly suggest” that the County itself violated his constitutional rights. As noted 

earlier, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, as a local law enforcement 

department, is not liable under § 1983. Plaintiff’s claims against local officials in their 

individual capacity are generally allowed under § 1983, but for reasons articulated in 

Subsections III.B.2–4, infra, do not state a claim for relief.

2. Verbal Harassment

Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to “sexual harassment” when he was 

transported from the George Bailey Detention Facility to the “Southbay region Court 

house” on December 14, 2016. (Compl. 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that a 

transportation officer told Plaintiff that he was going to “bend me over like he had my 

mom.” (Compl. 19.) Plaintiff also alleges he was called “[i]lliterate and stupid” and that 

the deputy was going to “fuck me up if I don’t complie [sic].” (Id. at 20 (emphasis 

omitted).) While the Court notes that Plaintiff also attached responses from the Sheriff’s 

Department denying those allegations, at this stage the Court construes factual pleadings 

as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)).

That said, allegations of verbal harassment and abuse, by themselves, fail to state a 

claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th 

Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur v. Schiro, 514 F.3d 878, 885–86 (9th 

Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), as 

amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive comments by 

prison guard not enough to implicate Eighth Amendment).

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims of verbal harassment must be 

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A(b)(1). 

3. Grievance Procedures

It appears that Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendants liable for alleged due process 

violations for the manner in which they responded to his administrative grievances. (See 

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Compl. 7–8 .) While the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . 

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. 

amend. XIV, § 1, “[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the 

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 

liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and 

prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke 

due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223–27 (1976). However, to 

state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property 

interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; 

[and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates have no protected property interest in an 

inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance 

procedure”)). Even the non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly 

implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise 

constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d at 640; see also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 

494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Defendants

deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to any 

particular prison grievance in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise 

from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223–27, due process 

protections are implicated only if Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) 

restrained his freedom in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] 

atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to 

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suggest how Defendants’ allegedly inadequate review or failure to consider inmate 

grievances restrained his freedom in any way, or subjected him to any “atypical” and 

“significant hardship.” Id. at 483–84.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s due process must be DISMISSED for failing 

to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1). 

4. Medical Claims

Plaintiff alleges that suffered an injury to his right eye on December 24, 2016. 

(Compl. 9.) Plaintiff was prescribed an “ice pack” along with pain medication and an 

order to have x-rays taken. (Id.) The next day when Plaintiff was receiving treatment for 

an unspecified foot injury, he attempted to seek further treatment for his eye. (Id. at 9–

10.) However, Plaintiff claims that he was refused further treatment. (Id. at 10.) Three 

days later, Plaintiff received an x-ray for his right eye. (Id. at 11.)

Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two 

elements: (1) the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and (2) the nature of the 

defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

First, “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access 

to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment 

violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103–04). “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat 

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104). “The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important 

and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 

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significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for 

medical treatment.” Id. at 1059–60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337–

41 (9th Cir. 1990); and Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200–01 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Even assuming Plaintiff’s medical needs were sufficiently serious, his Complaint 

fails to include any further “factual content” to show that any named Defendant acted 

with “deliberate indifference” to his needs. McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 1060; see also Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiff admits that he was treated 

for his injury. He was seen by medical personnel and provided x-rays and pain 

medication. Plaintiff must include “further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557), which demonstrates Defendants’ “purposeful act or 

failure to respond to [his] pain or possible medical need,” and the “harm [was] caused by 

[their] indifference.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096). 

To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants’ acts or omissions must entail more than 

an ordinary lack of due care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. “A difference of 

opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical professionals—

concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” 

Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)); 

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122–23. Further, an “inadvertent failure to provide adequate 

medical care” does not state a deliberate indifference claim under § 1983. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citations omitted). Instead, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “show 

that the course of treatment the doctor[] chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendant[] chose this course in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citation and internal quotations 

omitted).

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Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, contains no facts sufficient to show that 

Defendants acted with deliberately indifferent to his plight by “knowing of and 

disregarding an[y] excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s medical care claims must 

be DISMISSED for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) &

1915A(b)(1). 

C. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, and he has now been provided 

with notice of his Complaint’s deficiencies, the Court will grant him leave to amend. See 

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012)).

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court:

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel without prejudice. (ECF 

No. 3.)

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). (ECF No. 5).

3. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to 

twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND

NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

5. DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety

for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave 

from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself 

without reference to his original pleading, and must comply with Civil Local Rule 8.2(a). 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See Civil Local Rule 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a court approved 

form § 1983 complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2017

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