Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03185/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appcnls Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 5 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEA RICHTER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LIMAX INTERNATIONAL, INC., ) 

LMX-MANUFACTURES CONSULTANTS, ) 

INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

DEA RICHTER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LIMAX INTERNATIONAL, INC. I ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

No. 93-3167 

No. 93-3185 

Appeal from the United States District court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-2065) 

Michael P. Oliver (Karl Kuckelman, with him on the brief), of 

Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown and Enochs, overland Park, Kansas, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

William H. Pickett (David T. Greis, with him on the brief), of 

William H. Pickett, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri, for the PlaintiffAppellee. 

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 1 
Before MOORE, Circuit Judge, LAY1 and McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit 

Judges. 

LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Dearmedia Richter appeals from the district court's grant of 

judgment as a matter of law to Limax International, Inc. and LMXManufactures Consultants, Inc. (collectively Limax). Richter v. 

Limax Int'l. Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Kan. 1993). Richter 

claimed that repetitive use of a mini-trampoline manufactured by 

Limax caused stress fractures in her ankles. In March 1991, 

Richter sued Limax alleging the mini-trampoline was defectively 

designed and came with an inadequate warning. The jury found, in 

a special verdict, that the mini-trampoline was not defectively 

designed. However, it nonetheless found Limax was liable under 

theories of strict liability and negligence for its failure to warn 

and determined damages to be $472,712 reduced by Richter's 

percentage of fault of thirty-eight percent. 

Limax then moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the 

court granted. The court concluded the defendant had no duty to 

warn because the plaintiff had failed to prove that Limax had 

knowledge of the danger of stress fractures or that the danger was 

known in the state of the art. The court further concluded that 

under these circumstances Kansas law does not impose a duty on 

1

Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the United 

States court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 2 
manufacturers to warn about dangers they might have discovered by 

conducting reasonable tests. Richter appealed. We reverse and 

remand to the district court with instructions to reinstate the 

jury's verdict and enter a judgment on the verdict. 

FACTS 

Richter purchased a mini-trampoline from Limax on February 1, 

1989. There were no instructions in or on the box containing the 

mini-trampoline, although the trampoline did have sticker on it 

stating: "This product was designed to be used only as an exercise 

device. It is not designed to be used for acrobatics, trampolining 

or any springboard type activities." Richter stated she only used 

the trampoline for jogging. She began by jogging for short periods 

of time but eventually increased her time up to sixty minutes per 

day. She used the product until March 10, 1989. 2 The next day she 

experienced severe pain in her ankles while walking. A doctor 

diagnosed her as having stress fractures in her ankles. Richter 

testified the pain forced her to discontinue her work as a sales 

representative for a furniture manufacturer. 

The plaintiff produced expert testimony which established 

relatively simple tests would have revealed that because the 

surface of a mini-trampoline depresses furthest in the center and 

2

Richter admitted she had experienced soreness in her ankles 

during and after using the mini-trampoline, but until she felt 

severe pain, she believed the soreness was normal for someone 

beginning a new exercise program. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 3 
decreasingly towards the edges, as a jogger's feet strike the 

trampoline's surface and it gives way, the inside of each foot drop 

further than the outside. This rotation of the foot, which is 

termed "eversion," occurs to a lesser degree in normal jogging, but 

rebound jogging markedly accentuates the degree of rotation. 

Further testimony established it has long been known that 

lateral pulling on a bone by ligaments or muscles can cause 

microscopic fractures. If the bone is not allowed time to heal and 

the stress on the bone continues, these tiny fractures can coalesce 

into a stress fracture. The eversion of the feet caused by the 

mini-trampoline results in certain tissues pulling laterally on 

particular ankle bones. Richter's expert witnesses testified that 

long-term use of the trampoline could cause stress fractures in the 

affected ankle bones. 

Limax admitted it conducted no tests relating to the long-term 

effects of jogging on the mini-trampoline and did not 

systematically review published studies of mini-trampolines by 

sports medicine and exercise specialists. The CEO of Limax 

testified the company had sold approximately two million minitrampolines world-wide and Richter's complaint about stress 

fractures was the first Limax had received. Further, although 

mini-trampolines had been in use since 1975, by the time of 

Richter's purchase no one had yet suggested their use entailed a 

risk of stress fractures. No expert testifying at trial could 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 4 
identify any study or article on rebound jogging or minitrampolines that reported ankle stress fractures or pointed out the 

risk joggers faced of incurring such an injury. 

Richter, however, produced testimony by experts that 

observations from very simple tests, interpreted in light of wellestablished knowledge about the structure of the foot and the 

causes of stress fractures, would have made it apparent that the 

repetitive use of the mini-trampoline for jogging could cause 

stress fractures. Two experts testified the danger was well within 

the state of society's knowledge about such matters. One of 

Richter's experts pointed out that although there were no known 

reports concerning mini-trampolines as a cause of stress fractures, 

sport and exercise magazines as well as scientific and medical 

journals have long published articles establishing that repetitive 

jogging can cause stress fractures. The testimony verified that 

such repetitive jogging on a mini-trampoline exaggerates the 

stresses that result from repetitive jogging on a flat surface. 

Although the mini-trampoline was found by the jury not to have a 

defective design, Richter's expert witness testimony established 

that the marked accentuation of eversion caused by the design of 

the mini-trampoline could result in her kind of injury developing 

from her repetitive jogging. 

KANSAS LAW 

Richter contends Kansas law imposes a duty on manufacturers to 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 5 
test their products and warn consumers appropriately. In Wooderson 

v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the Kansas Supreme Court held an 

ethical drug company had a duty to warn the medical profession 

about what "it knows, has reason to know, or should know, based 

upon its position as an expert in the field, upon its research, 

upon cases reported to it, and upon scientific development, 

research, and publications in the field." 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 

(Kan.), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 965 (1984). Richter interprets the 

language "upon its research," to require manufacturers to test 

their products for their potential to injure consumers. 3 

The district court held, "though not without misgivings," that 

Kansas law does not require a manufacturer to test its products for 

dangers not otherwise known in the state of the art. Richter, 822 

F. Supp. at 1524. The court observed that Wooderson dealt with the 

question of "when the state of the scientific literature becomes so 

persuasive of the existence of a danger that the manufacturer has 

a duty to warn." Id. at 1523. The court held that because the 

evidence indicated that prior to Richter's injuries, no one was 

aware of the possibility that jogging on a mini-trampoline could 

cause stress fractures, there was nothing to give rise to a duty 

warn. The district court found that Wooderson did "not require 

3In Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., 861 P.2d 

1299, 1309 (Kan. 1993), the Kansas Supreme Court limited 

Wooderson's rationale to ethical drug manufacturers in so far as 

their post-sale duty to warn was concerned. Patton did not, 

however, change a manufacturer's duty to warn at the time of sale 

as articulated in Wooderson. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 6 
that a manufacturer warn users of its products of dangers which, 

although not known by anyone in the field, could be found by 

reasonable testing." Id. at 1522. 

The district court acknowledged that Kansas law recognizes a 

manufacturer's duty to test, quoting from Lindquist v. Ayerst 

Laboratories, Inc., 607 P.2d 1339, 1350 (Kan. 1980) (in turn, 

quoting 1 Hursch and Bailey, American Law of Products Liability 2d 

s 2:29 (1974)): 

The rule is that a manufacturer has a duty to make such 

tests and inspections, during and after the process of 

manufacture, as should be recognized as being reasonably 

necessary to secure the production of a safe product; and 

a manufacturer who negligently fails to use reasonable 

care in making such tests and inspections, and thereby 

produces a defective article which causes damage while 

being put to an ordinary, anticipated use, is liable for 

such damage. 

Richter, 822 F. Supp. at 1524. 

However, the district court in granting judgment as a matter of law 

in favor of Limax limited the Lindquist case (admitting there was 

no compelling logical basis for doing so) to requiring testing only 

for specific design and manufacturing defects. 4 

Appellate review of a district court's determination of state 

4Id. The court noted that policy considerations might dictate 

this result to avoid placing the onerous burden on manufacturers to 

conduct "all possible tests for dangers which may result from all 

possible foreseeable uses, even if those uses or those dangers have 

yet to occur anywhere in the world .... " Id. at 1524 n.4. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 7 
law is de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 

( 1991) • We find the district court's restrictive interpretation of 

Lindquist is contrary to Kansas law on the duty of a manufacturer 

to warn consumers of foreseeable dangers. An earlier district 

court decision summed up Kansas law relating to the duty to warn 

consumers: 

Ordinarily, a manufacturer has a duty under Kansas 

law to warn consumers and users of its products when it 

knows or has reason to know that its product is or is 

likely to be dangerous during normal use. The duty to 

warn is a continuous one, requiring the manufacturer to 

keep abreast of the current state of knowledge of its 

products as acquired through research, adverse reaction 

reports, scientific literature, and other available 

methods. A manufacturer's failure to adequately warn of 

its product's reasonably foreseeable dangers renders that 

product defective under the doctrine of strict liability. 

Pfeiffer v. Eagle Mfg. co., 771 F. supp. 1133, 1139 (D. Kan. 1991) 

(O'Connor, J., citations and footnote omitted). 

Kansas applies the same test to whether a manufacturer met his duty 

to warn under negligence as it does under strict liability. 5 

5 In determining warning issues, the test is 

reasonableness .... "[I]n all warning cases 

[either negligence or strict liability]--even 

if the plaintiff or the court claims to 

analyze failure to warn or inadequacy of 

warning in the context of a strict products 

liability claim--the tests actually applied 

condition imposition of liability on the 

defendant's having actually or constructively 

known of the risk that triggers the warning." 

Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986), 

aff'd, 758 P.2d 206 (Kan. 1988), (quoting Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 

218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465-66 (1985)). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 8 
Kansas law makes clear this general duty to warn consumers of 

foreseeable dangers is not limited to ethical drug companies. In 

1976, Kansas adopted the rule set out in the Restatement (Second) 

of Torts § 402A (1965) in Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 

(Kan. 1976), an adoption that has been repeatedly affirmed, see, 

~' Cott v. Peppermint Twist Management Co., 856 P.2d 906, 931 

(Kan. 1993); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 923 (Kan. 

1990). Section 402A establishes strict liability for a seller of 

a product whose defective condition makes the product unreasonably 

dangerous. 6 Comment h to section 402A states that where a seller 

"has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular 

use, he may be required to give adequate warning of the 

danger (see Comment i), and a product sold without such warning is 

in a defective condition." Kansas courts have relied on both 

comments i and k to section 420A in concretizing the duty to warn 

6Section 402A states: 

(1) one who sells any product in a defective 

condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 

or consumer or to his property is subject to 

liability for physical harm thereby caused to 

the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 

property, if 

(a) the seller is engaged in the business 

of selling such a product, and 

(b) it is expected to and does reach the 

user or consumer without substantial change in 

the condition in which it is sold. 

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 

although 

(a) the seller has exercised all possible 

care in the preparation and sale of his 

product, and 

(b) the user or consumer has not bought 

the product from or entered into any 

contractual relation with the seller. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 9 
announced in comment h. 7 See cott, 856 P.2d at 931; Humes v. 

Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Kan. 1990); Johnson, 718 P.2d at 

1323. These comments make clear that a product may not be 

defectively designed, but may nonetheless be defective because the 

manufacturer failed to adequately warn the users of the product of 

a reasonably foreseeable hazard. The Kansas Supreme Court in 

Savina stated this proposition as follows: 

7Comment i reads, in pertinent part: 

Directions or warning. In order to prevent 

the product from being unreasonably dangerous, 

the seller may be required to give directions 

or warning, on the container, as to its use. 

Where warning is given, the seller may 

reasonably assume that it will be read and 

heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, 

which is safe for use if it is followed, is 

not in defective condition, nor is it 

unreasonably dangerous. 

Comment k reads: 

Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some 

products which, in the present state of human 

knowledge, are quite incapable of being made 

safe for their intended and ordinary use. 

• . • Such a product, properly prepared, and 

accompanied by proper directions and warning, 

is not defective, nor is it unreasonably 

dangerous. • . . The seller of such products, 

again with the qualification that they are 

properly prepared and marketed, and proper 

warning is given, where the situation calls 

for it, is not to be held to strict liability 

for unfortunate consequences attending their 

use, merely because he has undertaken to 

supply the public with an apparently useful 

and desirable product, attended with a known 

but apparently reasonable risk. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 10 
Under the strict liability theory, a plaintiff is not 

required to establish misconduct by the maker or seller 

but, instead, is required to impugn the product. The 

plaintiff must show the product is in "a defective 

condition unreasonably dangerous," which means that it 

must be defective in a way that subjects persons or 

tangible property to an unreasonable risk of harm. 

Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts § 99, p. 695 (5th ed. 

1984) A product can be defective in one of the following 

three ways: (1) a flaw is present in the product at the 

time it is sold; (2) the producer or assembler of the 

product fails to adequately warn of a risk or hazard 

related to the way the product was designed; or (3) the 

product, although perfectly manufactured, contains a 

defect that makes it unsafe. Prosser, § 99, pp. 695-98. 

795 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). 8 

The district court's restriction of the general duty to warn 

to specific design defects overlooks that under Kansas law of 

strict liability, even if a product does not have a design defect, 

failure to warn of a foreseeable danger arising from the product's 

normal use makes the product defective. 

8

See also Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F. 2d 1453, 1457 n. 3 (lOth 

Cir. 1988) (referring to section 402A and comments i and ~ and 

stating "[f]ailure to adequately warn of [reasonably foreseeable] 

hazards renders the product unreasonably dangerous."); Deines v. 

Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990) ("A product 

may be perfectly manufactured and meet every requirement for its 

designed utility and still be rendered unreasonably dangerous 

through failure to warn of its dangerous characteristics."); 

Johnson, 718 P.2d at 1323-24 (stating "There is no claim ... a 

defective product was delivered. . . . This leaves the only 

possible liability in the adequacy of the warning provided by the 

manufacturer."); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 362-63 

(Kan. 1983) (quoting Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989 (D.C. 

App. 1980), which stated "[a] product can be perfectly made and 

still require directions or warnings on proper use in order to be 

safe" and Harris v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 588 P.2d 18 (Or. 

1978), which stated "[a] product may be perfectly manufactured and 

meet every requirement for its designed utility and still be 

rendered unreasonably dangerous through failure to warn of its 

dangerous characteristics.") 

-11-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 11 
The mini-trampoline was specifically intended for exercise, 

and in particular, for jogging. When used for this purpose, 

however, the mini-trampoline's design results in the foot turning 

in a way that places stress on the ankle bones. That the design is 

not defective, within the state of the known art, does not detract 

from the manufacturer's duty to warn the consumer of foreseeable 

dangers that can arise from normal use. 

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 

Although Kansas law governs a manufacturer's duty to warn, 

federal law governs our determination of whether the court properly 

granted the judgment as a matter of law. Zimmerman v. First Fed. 

Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 {lOth Cir. 1988). We review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict holder and 

we are not permitted to weigh the evidence or make credibility 

determinations. See Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, 997 F.2d 

730, 734 {lOth Cir. 1993). A judgment as a matter of law rendered 

after a verdict has been entered is appropriate only when 

reasonable minds could not possibly differ as to an issue's 

necessary outcome. Id. 

Given that repetitive jogging on the mini-trampoline could 

cause stress fractures, the question becomes whether Richter 

presented sufficient evidence that a jury could permissibly 

conclude reasonable tests would have been effective in bringing 

this danger to light. See Lindauist v. Ayerst Lab., Inc., 607 P.2d 

-12-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 12 
, ... 

1339, 1350 (Kan. 1980) (relying on 1 Hursh and Bailey, American Law 

of Products Liability 2d § 2:29, p. 217 ( 1974)) . Richter presented 

a substantial amount of expert testimony to the effect that visual 

observation of a person jogging on the mini-trampoline by someone 

with expertise in biomechanics, would reveal eversion and further 

that relatively simple tests could measure the degree of eversion. 

A comparison of that measurement with a measurement of the eversion 

caused by jogging on a flat surface would have revealed minitrampolines cause users' feet to evert to a markedly greater 

degree. 9 Testimony established that it is well known that such 

stresses, experienced on a repetitive basis, could cause fractures. 

We hold the jury could have reasonably found Richter's injury was 

causally related to repetitive jogging on the mini-trampoline, the 

use for which Limax's product was intended. The jury could also 

reasonably have concluded Limax should have warned users of this 

danger because the danger was eminently knowable given the state of 

the art and Limax should have known of it. 

9Limax argues that because jogging on flat surfaces can cause 

stress fractures in the feet and legs, yet manufacturers of jogging 

shoes have no duty to warn, it should have no duty to warn about 

jogging on a mini-trampoline, especially since Richter is the only 

person known to have suffered ankle stress fractures. In light of 

testimony at trial, this argument is unpersuasive. Jogging shoes 

do not increase the degree of eversion that occurs naturally. 

Indeed, trial testimony revealed high quality jogging shoes are 

designed to counter the natural degree of eversion. The minitrampoline, in contrast, does not counter the natural degree of 

eversion, or even leave the degree of eversion unaffected. Instead 

it dangerously accentuates the natural tendency of the foot to 

evert while jogging because of the angle at which the surface of 

the trampoline depresses. It is this accentuation that gives rise 

to the duty to warn. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 13 
As Justice Blackmun observed: 

Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment 

that people need more protection from dangerous products 

than is afforded by the law of warranty. (citation 

omitted). • • . "Public policy demands that 

responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively 

reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in 

defective products that reach the market." 

East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 u.s. 858, 866 

(1986) (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 

(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J. concurring)). As discussed supra, Kansas 

law does not permit a manufacturer to avoid responsibility for its 

failure to warn that the intended use of its product could cause 

injuries when those injuries are reasonably foreseeable. Kansas 

imposes on manufacturers a duty to research and make such tests and 

inspections as reasonably necessary to make their products safe or 

to establish a basis for warning consumers of a product's 

unavoidable dangers. 

Under Kansas law, both strict liability and negligence require 

warnings only for dangers which are reasonably foreseeable in light 

of the intended use of a product. The jury could reasonably have 

concluded that a simple consultation with a biomechanics expert 

would have given Limax sufficient information to arrange for 

appropriate testing of the mini-trampoline. No expert witness for 

either side expressed any doubt that the mini-trampoline 

accentuates eversion of the ankles or that eversion could cause 

-14-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 14 
stress fractures. It is true that no one appears to have 

considered the problem until Richter's injury occurred, but it is 

also true that plaintiff's evidence demonstrated that the danger 

was patently obvious to any expert who had a reason to look for it. 

The jury could permissibly conclude Limax should reasonably have 

foreseen that design of the mini-trampoline could result in the 

harm produced. Limax conceded that it did no testing or research 

to consider foreseeable harm arising out of the uses to which the 

mini-trampoline would be put. 

Manufacturers do not have a duty to test for inconceivable 

dangers, nor do they have a duty to test for every conceivable 

danger. They do have a duty to warn of dangers of harmful effects 

arising from the foreseeable use and misuse of a product that are 

known or are readily foreseeable in the state of art. In any given 

case, plaintiff's evidence must sufficiently demonstrate that the 

harm incurred should have been reasonably foreseeable to the 

manufacturer of the product. Absent such proof a manufacturer 

cannot be held liable for harm that no reasonable person could 

anticipate. 10 

Every case must turn on its own evidentiary facts. In the 

1

°For example, if Richter had developed through the use of the 

mini-trampoline hives or a severe skin irritation, in the total 

absence of testimony in the record that such harm would be 

foreseeable, under such circumstances, the manufacturer would have 

no duty to warn. The point is that each case must be decided upon 

the evidentiary proofs in the record. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 15 
present case, plaintiff's experts testified that the accentuated 

eversion of the foot caused by prolonged jogging on the minitrampoline made Richter's injury foreseeable and that the 

manufacturer should have warned the user of the product of the 

possible foreseeable harm she encountered. We do not make this 

ruling as a matter of law. We simply find that there existed 

substantial evidence in the record from which the jury could find 

that the harm was foreseeable. As earlier stated, we must review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict holder. A 

fair and impartial jury concluded under the evidence that because 

of the specific design of the mini-trampoline, Richter's harm was 

foreseeable. We simply conclude there was sufficient evidence to 

allow the jury to make that finding. 

We find that the district court erred in granting a judgment 

as a matter of law and we therefore hold that the verdict and 

judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be reinstated. 

CROSS-APPEAL 

On cross appeal, Limax argues that even if it had a duty to 

test its product, Richter failed to produce evidence that there was 

any likelihood of a similar injury occurring to another person 

sufficient to give rise to a duty to warn. Limax also contends 

Richter made no showing as to what warning should have been given 

or as to whether the warning would have been effective in avoiding 

her injury. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 16 
As Limax notes, one of Richter's expert witnesses, Dr. Sands, 

could not say what the probability of another person suffering the 

same injury as Richter was. Dr. Sands did not perform any tests 

that would have provided a basis for such an estimation. Rather, 

he did an experiment to measure the extent to which the minitrampoline causes a jogger's feet to evert. It is misleading for 

Limax to argue the probability must be slight when the expert 

witness stated he did not know what the probability was. The jury 

could have inferred from all the evidence that there was a real 

risk of similar injuries occurring to others. The jury was not 

obligated to conclude that because the CEO of Limax testified he 

had not heard of any similar injuries, no such injuries had ever 

occurred. 

As to whether a warning would have been effective in avoiding 

the injury, the jury did find Richter was thirty-eight percent at 

fault for her injuries, presumably believing she should have sought 

medical advice more promptly and limited or stopped her use of the 

mini-trampoline soon after she started experiencing pain. Further, 

"[u) nder Kansas law, an inadequate warning creates a presumption of 

causation." O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 

1438, 1442 {lOth Cir. 1987) (citing Wooderson, 681 P.2d at 1057). 

Limax insists that because the jury heard no evidence as to what an 

adequate warning might have been, the jury had no basis for 

deciding a warning would have been effective. Limax contends that 

to establish causation, Richter should have had to testify she 

-17-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 17 
would have behaved differently had she been warned. 11 Kansas does 

not require such self-serving testimony from plaintiffs and Limax's 

argument entirely ignores that the effect of the presumption is to 

place the burden on Limax to rebut it. Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741 

F. Supp. 1472, 1490 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd and remanded by 948 F.2d 

1546 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 s. ct. 1941 {1992). The 

trial court did not err in submitting the issue to the jury. 

Reversed and remanded to the district court to reinstate the 

jury's verdict and enter a judgment on the verdict. 

11The jury could reasonably infer from·testimony that Richter 

did read the only warning that came with the mini-trampoline. 

-18-

Appellate Case: 93-3185 Document: 01019290344 Date Filed: 01/25/1995 Page: 18