Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00629/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY JOSE CARAPIA,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 06cv0629 J(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENIAL OF SECOND AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS [DOC. NO. 13]; ORDER

DENYING EVIDENTIARY HEARING

AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[DOC. NOS. 13, 20]

Petitioner, Tony Jose Carapia, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc.

no. 13] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 27, 2006. Carapia

claims he was denied due process when he received an enhanced

sentence that was not supported by sufficient evidence of specific

intent to benefit gang activity. (Second Am. Pet. 6-9.) After

reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, the Lodgments, and

Petitioner’s Traverse, this Court finds that Carapia is not entitled

to the relief requested and recommends that his Petition be denied

for the reasons outlined below.

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I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Richard Goodman rented and lived in a house in San Diego

County. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 624-26, Feb. 14, 2002.) 

Although not a gang member, Goodman formed an “informal

relationship” with Plucas, a member of the Westside Gang. (Id. at

627-29.) Goodman allowed Plucas to hang out at his house, and

Plucas usually brought five to six other gang members with him. 

(Id. at 629-30.) When Plucas was arrested, a gang member named

“Monster” took over leadership of the gang and continued going to

Goodman’s house. (Id. at 630.)

Monster was then arrested, so Hector Robles, nicknamed “Lazy

Boy,” took over control of the gang. (Id. at 630-31.) Goodman

testified that at this time, the gang members became “unwanted”

because Lazy Boy and his girlfriend began living at Goodman’s house

twenty-four hours a day. (Id. at 631-32.) Goodman asked Stephen

Thomas, an acquaintance, to drop by the house to clear people out.

(Id. at 509-11.) Thomas helped Goodman clear his house on several

occasions. (Id. at 513-14.)

After Lazy Boy’s arrest, Tony Carapia began hanging out at

Goodman’s house. (Id. at 633-36.) He appeared to take over

leadership of the Westside Gang members who spent time there. (Id.

at 634; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 999-1000, Feb. 21, 2002.) 

Carapia asserted authority over any drug sales that occurred in

Goodman’s house. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 635-36.)

Stephen Thomas and his wife, Adrian, owned a cellular phone

that Adrian sold to Goodman in exchange for money and drugs. (Id.

at 514-15, 652; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 745-46, Feb. 20,

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2002.) After the exchange, Goodman lent the phone to Carapia on a

few occasions. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 637.)

Adrian discovered that half of the phone’s available minutes

had been used when she tried to add another phone to the account. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 746.) She called the cell phone

and Carapia answered. (Id. at 748.) Adrian stated that she wanted

her phone back; then Stephen Thomas took the phone and spoke to

Petitioner. (Id. at 749; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 517.) 

Thomas told Carapia to return the phone, so he would pick it up. 

(Id.) Joseph Carapia, Petitioner’s cousin, drove Carapia to

Goodman’s house. (Id. at 685-86.)

Stephen Thomas and his wife drove to Goodman’s house to pick up

the phone; Thomas had a flashlight, table leg, cane, and knife with

him. (Id. at 518, 520.) When they arrived at the house, there were

several Hispanic males in the living room. (Id. at 521.) Thomas

walked into the bedroom to retrieve the phone, and Goodman asked him

if he had come prepared. (Id. at 522.) Thomas replied, “I am

always prepared.” (Id.)

When Thomas walked back into the living room, Carapia

confronted him stating, “You said we have a problem.” (Id. at 523-

24.) Thomas replied that the problem had been solved because he had

his property back. (Id. at 524.) Petitioner then claimed that

everything in the house belonged to him. (Id. at 525.) Thomas said

the phone did not belong to Carapia. (Id.)

According to Thomas, Petitioner then “flinched" at him in an

aggressive way. (Id.) Thomas was holding a flashlight, but he

dropped it when he thought that he and Carapia would fight because

Thomas did not want to hit him with it. (Id. at 526.) The two men

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“ran into each other.” (Id.) During the fight, Carapia stabbed

Thomas. (Id. at 527-28.) Stephen Thomas sustained two stab wounds

to his chest and five on his arm and left side. (Id. at 616-17.) 

Thomas had a knife in his pocket but never used it, claiming he did

not remember it was there. (Id. at 530.)

Right before the fight broke out, Adrian ran to the car and

grabbed the table leg and another flashlight. (Lodgment No. 1,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 761-62.) She held the table leg behind her back

until the fight started, looking for a sign from her husband about

what he wanted her to do. (Id. at 762, 810-11.) During the fight,

Salcido, another gang member with the nickname “Smokey,” pulled the

table leg out of her hands and ran away. (Id. at 764.)

At trial, Petitioner claimed that Stephen Thomas was the

aggressor and charged at him first. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 9, 1047.) Three other witnesses stated that Thomas charged

first. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 662, 688-89; Lodgment

No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 806, 815, 818.) Petitioner also testified

that he did not stab Stephen Thomas. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 9, 1051.)

Detective Luis Rudisell testified as the prosecution’s expert

witness. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 896.) Detective

Rudisell described the Westside Gang as an association of

approximately 135 to 150 Hispanic males, primarily between the ages

of twelve and twenty-two. (Id. at 905; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 9, 967.) He also stated that the gang’s primary activity since

the late 1990s involved trafficking and selling methamphetamine and

other drugs. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 905.)

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At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Carapia’s

membership in the Westside Gang, including his admissions, arrests

with other Westside Gang members, and Petitioner’s tattoos. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 909-10, 912; Lodgment No. 1,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 961-62, 971-72.) The prosecution also presented

photos of Petitioner making gang signs with his hands. (Lodgment

No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 913.) Detective Rudisell identified

Carapia’s tattoos as a Westside Gang tattoo, a tattoo representing

old Escondido, theater faces standing for “smile now, cry later,”

and prison bars with a clock, representing time served in prison. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 971-72.) All of the tattoos are

associated with gang culture. (Id.) Petitioner denied membership

in the Westside Gang, but Detective Rudisell testified that at the

time of the incident, Carapia was the leader, or “shot caller,” for

the Westside Gang members who spent time at Goodman’s house. (Id.

at 998-1000, 1027.)

Detective Rudisell further testified that a stabbing crime

would benefit the Westside Gang’s reputation. (Id. at 973-74, 979-

80.) Gangs often resort to violence and intimidation to protect

their turf because the perception of being tough reduces the

likelihood of challenges from rival gangs. (Id. at 969.) The crime

would also benefit the gang’s narcotic sales by eliminating

competition in the area. (Id. at 980.) Stabbing and threatening

witnesses would be consistent with an intent to promote the gang. 

(Id. at 981.)

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II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In count one of an amended information, the State charged

Petitioner with attempted murder in violation of California Penal

Code section 664 and section 187(a). (Lodgment No. 4, Pet. for

Review 3, People v. Carapia, No. S131307 (Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).) 

Count one further alleged Carapia used a dangerous and deadly weapon

in violation of California Penal Code section 12022(b)(1). (Id.) 

Count two charged Petitioner with assault with a deadly weapon with

force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of California

Penal Code section 245(a)(1). (Id. at 3-4.) It also alleged that

he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim in

violation of California Penal Code section 12022.7(a). (Id.) Both

counts alleged that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a

criminal street gang in violation of California Penal Code section

186.22(b)(1). (Id. at 4.) The information also included an

allegation of a prison prior. (Id.)

Petitioner moved to bifurcate the trial on counts one and two

from the trial on the gang enhancement and the prison prior. (Id.

at 4.) The court denied the motion to bifurcate the gang

allegations but granted the motion to bifurcate the prison prior

allegation. (Id.)

The case proceeded to trial in the superior court on February

11, 2002. (Lodgment No. 2, Appellant’s Opening Br. 2, People v.

Carapia, No. D042110 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004).) A jury found

Carapia guilty of all counts, including the allegation that

Petitioner committed these crimes for the benefit of a criminal

street gang. (Id. at 2.) After a bench trial, the judge found the

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prior conviction allegation was true as alleged in the information. 

(Id.)

On July 26, 2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

twenty-four years in prison. (Id. at 2; Lodgment No. 3, People v.

Carapia, No. D042110, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004).) 

The sentence consisted of nine years for the attempted murder

conviction and consecutive terms of three years for the great bodily

injury enhancement, one year for the deadly weapon enhancement, ten

years for the criminal street gang enhancement, and one year for the

prior prison term enhancement. (Id.) The court stayed imposition

of the sentence on count two, the assault count, and appended

enhancements under section 654. (Id.)

On May 12, 1002, Carapia sought leave to file a late notice of

appeal. (Lodgment No. 2, Appellant’s Opening Br. 3, People v.

Carapia, No. D042110.) The California Court of Appeal granted the

application. (Id.) Petitioner then filed his notice of appeal on

May 27, 2003. (Id.)

Carapia raised two issues on appeal. First, he argued that

insufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the crimes

benefitted a criminal street gang. (Lodgment No. 3, People v.

Carapia, No. D042110, slip op. at 2.) Second, Petitioner contended

that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his motion to

bifurcate the gang allegations from the trial on the underlying

offenses. (Id.) The court of appeal requested supplemental

briefing on a third issue: whether Petitioner was entitled to a

jury determination of the aggravating factors relied upon for the

upper-term sentence under Blakely v Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

(Id.)

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1

 In connection with his resentencing, Carapia unsuccessfully

sought collateral review of other issues not relevant to the claim

asserted here. (Second Am. Pet. 3-5.)

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The California Court of Appeal affirmed Carapia’s conviction,

finding sufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement and no

error in the trial court’s ruling on the bifurcation motion. (Id.

at 15.) The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing

because it found the judge’s determination of the aggravating

factors was contrary to Blakely.1 (Id.)

Justice McDonald concurred with the majority on the sentencing

issue but dissented from the majority opinion regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the gang enhancement. (Id.

at 1 (McDonald, J., concurring and dissenting).) Justice McDonald

determined that the denial of a bifurcated trial was not prejudicial

error. (Id.)

Carapia filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme

Court raising the same two issues originally raised on appeal.

(Lodgment No. 4, Pet. for Review 2, People v. Carapia, No. S131307.) 

The court denied the petition on March 30, 2005. (Lodgment No. 5,

People v. Carapia, No. S131307, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).)

On March 22, 2006, Carapia filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with this Court [doc. no. 1]. United States District Judge

Napoleon A. Jones dismissed the Petition without prejudice for

failure to comply with local rules, allege exhaustion of state court

remedies, state a claim, and name the proper respondent [doc. no.

5].

Carapia then filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus and Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on July 10, 2006

[doc. nos. 8, 9]. Concurrently, Petitioner requested an extension

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of time and a stay and abeyance [doc. nos. 10, 11]. On August 23,

2006, Judge Jones granted the Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,

but he dismissed the Petition without prejudice and denied the other

motions [doc. no. 12].

On September 27, 2006, Carapia filed his Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 13]. Respondent filed

an Answer with accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and

a Notice of Lodgment on December 27, 2007 [doc. no. 18]. Petitioner

submitted a Traverse, which was filed nunc pro tunc to January 31,

2007 [doc. nos. 19, 20].

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006), applies to all federal habeas petitions

filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.

339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

1991). Because Carapia filed his Petition on March 22, 2006, AEDPA

applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006). Petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed,

512 U.S. at 347; Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921

F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700 (5th

Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)

(holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state court’s

application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885 (concluding that

federal courts have no authority to review a state’s application of

its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief only to correct

errors of federal constitutional magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry,

877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are

not concerned with errors of state law unless they rise to the level

of a constitutional violation). 

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 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters under

§ 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a federal

court is not required to review the state court decision de novo. 

Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font

of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

“[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative

decision of the Supreme Court.” Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94

F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d

1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208

(7th Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

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rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006).

IV.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process by imposing a gang enhancement based

upon insufficient evidence. (Second Am. Pet. 6.) He specifically

claims there was insufficient evidence to prove “the charged crimes

were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in

association with the Westside gang . . . .” (Id. at 7.) Carapia

also maintains there was insufficient evidence to show the specific

intent “to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang

members . . . .” (Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)).) 

Respondent argues the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s

claim on the merits was reasonable and not contrary to United States

Supreme Court precedent. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 5.)

In deciding a section 2254 habeas petition, this Court reviews

the “last reasoned” state court decision. Medina v. Hornung, 386

F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). The California Supreme Court

summarily denied Carapia’s petition for review. (Lodgment No. 5,

People v. Carapia, No. S131307, slip op. at 1.) Therefore, this

Court “looks through” that dismissal to the California Court of

Appeal’s decision on Petitioner’s direct appeal. Medina, 386 F.3d

at 877.

Under AEDPA, a writ for federal habeas relief shall not be

granted unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent or

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“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006). 

[A] state court decision is ‘contrary to [the Supreme

Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the Court’s] cases’ or ‘if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from . . . 

precedent.’

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000)) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A

state court unreasonably applies federal law if its application is

“objectively unreasonable,” which is “more than [being] incorrect or

erroneous.” Id. at 75.

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause requires “proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which . . . [a defendant] is charged.” In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When reviewing a claim for sufficiency of

the evidence, the standard established by Supreme Court precedent is

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); see also People v.

Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 576, 606 P.2d 738, 750, 162 Cal. Rptr.

431, 443 (1980). The California Court of Appeal applied this

standard in its evaluation of Carapia’s claim. (See Lodgment No. 3,

People v. Carapia, No. D042110, slip op. at 7.)

“Our task under AEDPA, then, is to determine whether the

decision of the California Court of Appeal, holding that the

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evidence was sufficient to convict [Carapia], was an unreasonable

application of Jackson.” Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 889

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-

75 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The Jackson inquiry does not focus on whether

the trier of fact made the correct guilt or innocence determination,

but rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or

acquit.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993). 

To determine whether the state court’s application of Jackson

was unreasonable, the Court must look to state law to define the

substantive elements of the crime necessary to support a conviction. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 581

(9th Cir. 1993).

California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) provides that “any

person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at

the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang,

with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any

criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that

felony . . . be punished by an additional term of 10 years.” Cal.

Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2007). According to the

statute, the prosecution must prove two elements: (1) The defendant

committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in

association with a criminal street gang; and (2) the defendant

intended to assist, further, or promote criminal conduct by gang

members. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 615-16, 927 P.2d 713,

720, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 363 (1996); see also Garcia v. Carey, 395

F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005). Carapia alleges the prosecution

lacked sufficient evidence to prove either element. (Second Am.

Pet. 7-8.)

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A. For the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 

with a criminal street gang

California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) first requires that

the defendant commit the crime “for the benefit of, at the direction

of, or in association with a criminal street gang.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 186.22(b)(1). To prove this element, the prosecution must

establish the existence of a “criminal street gang.” See Gardeley,

14 Cal. 4th at 616, 927 P.2d at 720, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363. The

prosecution must also prove that the defendant committed the crime

“for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with”

that gang. Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1).

1. Criminal Street Gang

Carapia does not dispute that he was a Westside Gang member. 

(Second Am. Pet. 7.) At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence

to satisfy the statutory definition of a “criminal street gang.”

 California Penal Code section 186.22(f) defines a “criminal

street gang” as “any ongoing association of three or more persons

that shares a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; has

as one of its ‘primary activities’ the commission of specified

criminal offenses; and engages through its members in a ‘pattern of

criminal gang activity.’” Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 610, 927 P.2d at

715, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358 (summarizing Cal. Penal Code §

186.22(f)).

At Petitioner’s trial, the prosecution relied heavily upon

Detective Rudisell’s testimony to prove the elements of the gang

enhancement. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 896.) The

detective described the Westside Gang as an association of

approximately 135 to 150 Hispanic males, primarily between the ages

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of twelve to twenty-two. (Id. at 905; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 9, 967.) The Westside Gang’s common signs and symbols include

graffiti, tattoos, and hand signs. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

9, 970-72; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 913-14.) Evidence at

trial also established that the Westside Gang’s primary activity

since the late 1990s involved trafficking and selling

methamphetamine and other drugs. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

8, 905.)

In re Nathaniel, 228 Cal. App. 3d 990, 279 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236

(Ct. App. 1991), is among the cases Petitioner cites to support his

argument for the invalidity of the gang enhancement. (Traverse Ex.

D.) In Nathaniel, the court reversed a gang enhancement because the

expert failed to establish a criminal primary activity of the gang

as listed in California Penal Code § 186.22(f). Id. at 1004, 279

Cal. Rptr. at 246. Carapia’s trial differed from In Re Nathaniel

because Detective Rudisell did specify that the Westside Gang’s

primary activity was selling methamphetamine and other drugs. After

listening to the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable trier of

fact could have concluded that the Westside Gang was a criminal

street gang as defined by California Penal Code section 186.22(f). 

Carapia’s argument that the Goodman house was not a drug

“stronghold” (Traverse 10-11) does not change this result.

2. Benefit, Direction, or Association

Carapia asserts that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient as a matter of law to prove the crimes were committed

for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. 

(Second Am. Pet. 7.) In Petitioner’s Traverse, he claims that

Detective Rudisell’s general statements about the benefit to the

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gang referred to the “after effects” of the crime and failed to

explain how the stabbing incident itself was gang-related. 

(Traverse 7.) According to Carapia, “there was no evidence

presented to the jury that petitioner Carapia, or the Westside

gang’s reputation, was somehow ‘enhanced,’” aside from the expert’s

testimony that the gang would gain respect from the crime. (Second

Am. Pet. 8.)

Carapia also argues there was insufficient evidence to prove he

committed the offense in “association with” a criminal street gang. 

(Traverse 5-7.) This version of Petitioner’s claim was not

specifically raised on appeal. (See Lodgment No. 2, Appellant’s

Opening Br. 19-22, People v. Carapia, No. D042110; Appellant’s Reply

Brief 1-2, People v. Carapia, No. D042110.) Technically, a claim

raised for the first time in a Traverse is unexhausted and cannot

serve as a basis for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(b)(1)(A) (West 2006). To properly exhaust a claim it must be

fairly presented to the state’s highest court. O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A petitioner should describe

the operative facts and his legal theory with sufficient detail that

the state court has a “‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal

principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).

The evidence supporting a finding that Carapia acted in

association with a criminal street gang overlaps evidence that he

acted for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Consequently, this

subclaim was fairly presented to, and resolved by, the California

courts. In any event, a felony committed “for the benefit of, at

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the direction of, or in association with” any criminal street gang

are alternatives; any one is sufficient to support the conviction.

Petitioner contends that although there were gang members in

Goodman’s house when the stabbing occurred, the prosecution failed

to introduce evidence that Carapia shared a common interest with

them, particularly since he did not shout gang slogans or refer to

the Westside Gang during the incident. (Id.; Second Am. Pet. 8.)

In People v. Romero, the defendant made a similar argument,

alleging that because the victims were not gang members and the

aggressors did not wear gang colors or use gang slogans, the

expert’s testimony about gang culture was insufficient to support

the gang enhancement. People v. Romero, 140 Cal. App. 4th 15, 18,

43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 864 (Ct. App. 2006). The expert testified

about gang rivalries and territories, and he opined that a shooting

of any African-American man in the area would elevate the status of

the shooters and the entire gang. Id. at 19, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

865. The court found that the expert’s testimony supported the

opinion that the shooting was done for the benefit of, or in

association with, the gang. Id.

Similarly, Detective Rudisell testified that a violent crime,

such as a stabbing, benefits the gang’s reputation for being tough

and discourages other people from challenging the gang. (Lodgment

No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 979-81.) Goodman’s house, where the

stabbing occurred, was on the edge of Westside’s territory. (Id.

at 968, 970.) The Westside Gang marked Goodman’s house with

graffiti to identify it as the gang’s turf. (Id. at 969.) 

Rudisell explained that gangs often resort to violence and

intimidation to protect their turf because the perception of being

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tough reduces the likelihood of challenges from rival gangs. (Id.

at 969.) Being tough and violent also increases respect, which in

turn aids the gang in recruiting new members. (Id. at 973-74.) 

The stabbing would also benefit the gang’s narcotic sales by

eliminating competition in the area. (Id. at 980.)

Evidence at trial indicated that Petitioner associated with

the Westside Gang and claimed gang membership at the time of the

incident. Detective Rudisell described two criteria that

identified Petitioner as a Westside Gang member prior to the

stabbing. First, Petitioner claimed gang membership at a

classification interview, and second, he committed a crime while

claiming to be a member of the Westside Gang. (Lodgment No. 1,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 910-11; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 985-

86.)

Detective Rudisell also identified and explained four tattoos

on Petitioner that indicated membership. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 9, 971-72.) Although Petitioner attempts to present

alternative explanations for one of those tattoos, (see Traverse

11, Ex. C (referring to the theater faces tattoo)), he fails to

explain away the other three. Further, Carapia admits in his

Petition that the evidence supports a finding that he was a gang

member. (Second Am. Pet. 7.)

Relying on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the

California Court of Appeal reasoned that “while the jury could have

concluded the stabbing was simply the result of a dispute over a

cell phone unrelated to any gang activity, it was not required to

do so.” (Lodgment No. 3, People v. Carapia, No. D042110, slip op.

at 8.) A jury could reasonably conclude that the violent

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confrontation was gang-related and committed to “enhance the

reputation of Carapia and the Westside gang.” (Id.) The appellate

court applied the Jackson standard and correctly found that a

rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner committed

the stabbing for the benefit of, or in association with, the

Westside Gang.

B. Specific Intent

The prosecution must prove that the defendant specifically

intended to assist, further, or promote criminal conduct by gang

members. Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). Petitioner strongly

disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to prove this element. 

(See Second Am. Pet. 7-8.) Carapia claims that the gang

enhancement is unsupported by the evidence because he did not throw

hand signs, shout gang slogans, or refer to the Westside Gang

during the incident. (Second Am. Pet. 8.) He also argues that if

he had specific intent before the crime to promote the gang, he

would have asked for assistance or prepared for the fight. 

(Traverse 7-8.)

The California Court of Appeal described the event preceding

the stabbing as follows:

The actual transfer of the cell phone occurred

without incident; Carapia, as agreed returned the phone

to Goodman who, in turn, gave it to Stephen. Only after

the phone had been transferred, did Carapia confront

Stephen about the “problem.” Carapia was offended when

Stephen stated only Goodman could use the phone. Carapia

felt this statement was disrespectful, taunting, and made

him appear to be a fool in front of the others. It was

at this point that Carapia claimed that everything in the

house belonged to him and advanced toward Stephen in a

menacing manner.

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Carapia, No. D042110, slip op. at 8.) 

The appellate court highlighted Detective Rudisell’s testimony

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2

 In his Traverse, Carapia requests this Court take judicial

notice of Justice McDonald’s dissenting opinion. (Traverse 3.) 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice

of “adjudicative facts which are not subject to reasonable dispute

because they are generally known or ‘capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.’” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406,

1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)). Since the

appellate opinion is an interpretation of the facts and law, it is

not an adjudicative fact. Petitioner’s request is DENIED.

21 06cv0629 J(RBB)

about respect and reputation to support the jury’s finding of true

for the gang enhancement. (Id.) Petitioner discounts Rudisell’s

testimony about disrespect. (See Traverse 8.) Nevertheless, the

majority determined that a jury could reasonably believe Carapia

stabbed Stephen Thomas with intent to enhance the gang’s reputation

as a violent gang that would not tolerate any form of disrespect. 

(Id. at 8-9.)

Justice McDonald disagreed. He concluded that despite

Detective Rudisell’s testimony, nothing in the record indicated

that Carapia stabbed Thomas, a non-gang member, with specific

intent to benefit the Westside Gang or to promote criminal conduct

by the gang’s members. (Id. at 5 (McDonald, J., concurring and

dissenting).)2 Justice McDonald wrote that under the majority’s

analysis, “it is difficult to imagine a crime committed by a gang

member that . . . would not be committed with specific intent to

benefit the gang.” (Id. at 6.) The majority “thereby converts a

sentence enhancement into the basic penalty for the underlying

offense.” (Id.)

The sufficiency of the evidence to support a gang enhancement

is a recurring issue. In Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas corpus

relief on the gang enhancement where the prosecution failed to

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present evidence that the defendant committed the underlying crime

(robbery) with specific intent to promote or further other gangrelated activity. The gang expert testified that Garcia was a gang

member; the robbery was committed on gang turf; and the gang was

“turf-oriented.” Id. at 1104.

Detective Hernandez [the gang expert] did not offer any

testimony, however, on what was meant by being “turforiented,” what implications arose from a gang being

“turf-oriented,” or how the gang’s turf-oriented nature

could support the conclusion that this robbery was

committed with the specific intent to promote, further,

or assist other gang related criminal activity.

Id. The court focused on the absence of evidence linking the

underlying offense with furthering other criminal activity.

Some California courts reject Garcia v. Carey, finding that

specific intent “does not require intent to further criminal

conduct beyond the charged crime.” People v. Romero, 140 Cal. App.

4th at 19, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 865 (“By its plain language, the

statute requires a showing of specific intent to promote, further,

or assist in ‘any criminal conduct by gang members,’ rather than

other criminal conduct.”); see also People v. Hill, 142 Cal. App.

4th 770, 774, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 877 (Ct. App. 2006) (“We agree

with Romero.”). But see In re Frank S., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1192,

1199, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 844 (Ct. App. 2006) (reversing the gang

enhancement where “nothing besides weak inferences and

hypotheticals show the minor had a gang-related purpose for the

knife[]”). Generally, this Court must defer to the state court’s

interpretation of California statutes. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877

F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 

California state law permits juries to rely on expert

testimony about gang culture and habits when reaching a verdict on

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a gang-related offense or a gang allegation. People v. Ferraez,

112 Cal. App. 4th 925, 930, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 640, 645 (Ct. App.

2003). Experts, however, cannot testify that an individual

possessed subjective knowledge and a specific intent. In re Frank

S., 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1197, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 842 (citing

People v. Killebrew, 103 Cal. App. 4th 644, 657-58, 126 Cal. Rptr.

2d 876, 885-86 (Ct. App. 2002)).

In People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 927 P.2d 713, 59 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 356, the California Supreme Court upheld a gang

enhancement where gang members assaulted and robbed a non-gang

member who was on their turf. Id. at 610-11, 619, 927 P.2d at 716,

722, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359-60, 365. In response to a

hypothetical, a gang expert testified that an assault of that type

“was a ‘classic’ example of gang-related activity, explaining that

criminal street gangs rely on such violent assaults to frighten the

residents of an area where gang members sell drugs, thereby

securing the gang’s drug-dealing stronghold.” Id. at 619, 927 P.2d

at 722, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365.

 An appellate court also found sufficient evidence to support

a gang enhancement in People v. Hill, 142 Cal. App. 4th 770, 47

Cal. Rptr. 3d 875. There, the defendant threatened to shoot a

woman after she “disrespected” him. Id. at 772, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 876. The expert testified that it is important for a gang

member to take action when he feels “disrespected,” and the

defendant’s threat benefitted the gang by proving that

disrespecting a gang member would have consequences. Id. at 772-

73, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 876; see also People v. Augborne, 104 Cal.

App. 4th 362, 372-73, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 265 (Ct. App. 2002)

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(stating that expert testimony provided sufficient evidence that

criminal threats were intended to promote gang activities).

The California Court of Appeal acknowledged that “specific

intent requires a subjective desire to benefit the gang in

committing the offense.” (Lodgment No. 3, People v. Carapia, No.

D042110, slip op. at 7.) The prosecutor sought an opinion from his

gang expert on the ultimate issue. In response to a hypothetical,

Detective Rudisell testified that he believed the stabbing

described in the hypothetical was done “for the sole purpose of

establishing a reputation with the gang to let everybody else know

that, ‘this is what we are about. Don’t mess with the Westside. 

This is what we do to people.” (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9,

981.) Arguably, this testimony goes to Carapia’s “subjective

knowledge and intent,” an improper opinion on the ultimate issue. 

See In re Frank S., 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1197-99, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 843-44. Nevertheless, there was other evidence to support the

gang enhancement.

The testimony in Carapia’s case closely resembles the evidence

presented in People v. Gardeley. Detective Rudisell explained that

the gang culture thrived on respect and that members received more

respect when they committed violent crimes. (Lodgment No. 1,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 973-74.) Violence and intimidation reduces

challenges from rival gangs. (Id. at 969.) Above all, a

reputation for violence prevents others from coming into the

neighborhood to establish a drug trade and gives the Westside Gang

a monopoly on the narcotic sales in the area. (Id. at 980.) 

Testimony at trial indicated that Carapia sold drugs at Goodman’s

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house and expected all sales and proceeds to be his. (Lodgment No.

1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 635-36.)

Just as the experts in Gardeley and Hill testified about

reputation and respect, Detective Rudisell testified that a

stabbing increased Carapia’s respect, which in turn increased the

Westside Gang’s reputation. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9,

973-74, 980.) Based on his testimony, a rational jury could

conclude that the evidence at Petitioner’s trial supports a finding

that violent crimes increase the Westside Gang’s control over drug

sales in the area. The increased drug sales satisfy the

requirement of proving intent to further or promote criminal gang

activity. Therefore, the testimony and evidence presented at trial

was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Carapia

stabbed Stephen Thomas to increase his and the Westside Gang’s

reputation, which secures the gang’s future narcotic sales.

A rational jury could conclude that Petitioner had the

specific intent to benefit the gang. Accordingly, the decision of

the California Court of Appeal does not involve an unreasonable

application of Jackson. Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief

should be DENIED.

C. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing.

In his Traverse, Carapia requests an evidentiary hearing to

prove his actual innocence. (Traverse 2.) This request may merely

have been made in response to Respondent’s assertion that

Petitioner “is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he

relies on the same facts as he did in the state courts.” (Answer

2; see Traverse 2.)

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When deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate,

the Court’s first task is to determine whether Carapia failed to

develop the factual basis for his claim in state court. 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). “Under

AEDPA, ‘a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not

established unless there is a lack of diligence, or some greater

fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.’”

Id. at 670 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000)).

If a petitioner developed the record in state court, the

federal habeas court examines whether an evidentiary hearing is

appropriate or required under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293

(1963). There are six Townsend factors to consider:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved

in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination

is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the

fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was

not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there

is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at

the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears

that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair fact hearing.

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313). 

When a Petitioner has developed the factual basis of his claim in

state court and meets one of the Townsend factors, “‘[a]n

evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus petition is required

whenever petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to

relief.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 815 (9th

Cir. 1995)). 

If Carapia failed to develop the factual basis for his claim

in state court, this Court is precluded from holding an evidentiary

hearing unless he shows the claim relies on either: 

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(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by

the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have

been previously discovered through the exercise

of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2006). Even after satisfying

section 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B), Petitioner must also “meet one of the

Townsend factors and make colorable allegations that, if proved at

an evidentiary hearing, would entitle him to habeas relief.” 

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670. 

Carapia takes no position on whether the facts underlying his

claim were developed in state court. (See Traverse 2.) Instead,

he claims that he is “actually innocent” of the gang enhancement,

California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1). (Traverse 2.) Since

he claims that insufficient evidence existed at trial to convict

him of the gang enhancement, his claim necessarily relies on the

facts presented during the trial, and so he must satisfy one of the

six Townsend factors to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670.

After examining the six Townsend factors, none require that

Carapia have an evidentiary hearing. The merits of Petitioner’s

claim were resolved in the state court -- at both the trial and

appellate levels. As discussed above, the state court’s finding

that Carapia committed the crime with intent to further criminal

gang activity is supported by the evidence presented at trial, and

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the appellate court correctly affirmed his conviction. Moreover,

the fact-finding procedure employed was adequate to give Carapia a

full and fair hearing; Petitioner has made no allegation of newly

discovered evidence; the material facts were adequately developed

in the state courts; and there is no indication that the state

courts did not provide Carapia a full and fair hearing. 

Petitioner does not satisfy any of the Townsend factors.

Consequently, his request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

D. Petitioner’s Request for Appointment of Counsel Is Denied.

In his prayer for relief in the Second Amended Petition,

Carapia requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him in

litigating his Petition. (Second Am. Pet. 9.) The Sixth Amendment

right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus actions

by state prisoners. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991);

Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Chaney

v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986)); Knaubert v.

Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless,

financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court

“determines that the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3006A(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912

F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990).

The interests of justice require appointment of counsel when

the Court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition or when

the assistance of counsel is “necessary for effective discovery.” 

28 U.S.C.A. Rs. 6(a), 8(c) foll. § 2254 (West Supp. 2005); Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 675 (2005); Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177;

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. Otherwise, the appointment of counsel

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is discretionary. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 675; Terrovona, 912 F.2d at

1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728.

Furthermore, “‘[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas

corpus relief are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the

circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel

is necessary to prevent due process violations.’” Bonin v.

Vasquez, 999 F.2d at 428 (quoting Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986)). A due process violation may occur in the

absence of counsel if the issues involved are too complex for the

petitioner. Id. at 428-29. 

The Eighth Circuit has suggested the following factors should

be considered when the court exercises its discretion to determine

whether appointment of counsel is appropriate: “the legal

complexity of the case, the factual complexity of the case, and the

petitioner’s ability to investigate and present his claims, along

with any other relevant factors.” Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469,

471 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

These factors are useful in deciding whether due process

requires the appointment of counsel. First, the issues and facts

that Carapia presents are not severely complex, and he adequately

explained his claim for relief in his Second Amended Petition and

his Traverse. Further, Petitioner has adequately represented

himself to date. He filed his First Amended Petition with a Motion

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, a Motion for an Extension of Time,

and a Motion for Stay and Abeyance [doc. nos. 9, 10, 11]. His

Second Amended Petition and Traverse indicate that he understands

the relevant law relating to his claim. (See Second Am. Pet.;

Traverse.) Petitioner asserts a claim of insufficient evidence,

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which he exhausted on direct appeal to the California Court of

Appeal, and nothing new or complex is added to his claim for habeas

relief.

Under these circumstances, a district court does not abuse its

discretion in denying a state prisoner’s request for appointment of

counsel as unwarranted. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626

(9th Cir. 1987). At this stage of the proceedings, due process and

the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel.

The assistance counsel provides is valuable. “An attorney may

narrow the issues and elicit relevant information from his or her

client. An attorney may highlight the record and present to the

court a reasoned analysis of the controlling law.” Knaubert, 791

F.2d at 729. As the court in Knaubert noted: “[U]nless an

evidentiary hearing is held, an attorney’s skill in developing and

presenting new evidence is largely superfluous; the district court

is entitled to rely on the state court record alone.” Id. (citing

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-57 (1981), and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)). This Court, in denying Petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel, notes that it has “review[ed] the record

and render[ed] an independent legal conclusion.” Id. 

For the above-stated reasons, the “interests of justice” do

not compel the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

request for appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the district court should DENY

Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In

addition, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is

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DENIED. Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel is also

DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the district court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before May 14, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before May 30, 2007. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 16, 2007 ________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Jones

All Parties of Record

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