Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05918/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05918-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

Plaintiffs objected to and moved to strike paragraphs 2 and 3 and the exhibits A and B to the

Declaration of Carol Sleeth. At the hearing on the pending motions, the parties informed the

Court that they reached a stipulation to strike paragraph 3 and exhibit B to the Sleeth

Declaration. Based on the parties’ stipulation, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike in

part as to paragraph 3 and exhibit B to the Sleeth Declaration. However, because the Court

did not need to consider the remainder of the Sleeth Declaration in resolving the pending

motions to remand and to stay, the Court DENIES in part as MOOT the motion strike as to

paragraph 2 and Exhibit A to the Sleeth Declaration.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER JAY GERBER, et al.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BAYER CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-05918 JSW

ORDER (1) GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND AND (2) DENYING

MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT

Now before the Court are the motions to remand and to stay this action pending a ruling

on a motion to transfer the action by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”). 

Having considered the parties’ arguments, relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit

of oral argument, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand and DENIES AS MOOT the

motion to stay.1

BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2007, plaintiffs Peter Jay Gerber and Miriam Goldberg (“Plaintiffs”)

filed this action in San Francisco Superior Court against Bayer Corporation and Bayer

Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively, “Bayer”), BMC Diagnostics, Inc. and California

Pacific Medical Center (collectively, “Imaging Facility Defendants”), General Electric

Case 3:07-cv-05918-JSW Document 65 Filed 02/06/08 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Company, GE Healthcare, Inc., and GE Healthcare Bio-Sciences Corp. (collectively, “GE”),

McKesson Corporation and Merry X-Ray Chemical Corporation (collectively, “Distributor

Defendants”). Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (1) strict liability against Bayer

and GE (collectively, “Manufacturing Defendants”) and the Distributor Defendants; 

(2) negligence against the Manufacturing Defendants and the Distributor Defendants; (3)

negligence against the Imaging Facility Defendants; (4) breach of express warranty against the

Imaging Facility Defendants; (5) breach of implied warranty against the Imaging Facility

Defendants; (6) fraud and misrepresentation against the Manufacturing Defendants; (7) fraud

and concealment or omission the Manufacturing Defendants; (8) negligent misrepresentation

against the Manufacturing Defendants; (9) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedy Act

(“CLRA”), California Civil Code section 1750 et seq. against all defendants; and (10) loss of

consortium against all defendants.

On November 21, 2007, the Manufacturing Defendants removed on the basis of

diversity jurisdiction. They asserted that diversity jurisdiction exists because the Imaging

Facility and Distributor Defendants were fraudulently joined and thus should be disregarded for

purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs now move to remand this action and Manufacturing Defendants move to stay

this action pending a ruling on a motion to transfer the action by the MDL. Both parties argue

that the Court should address their motion first.

ANALYSIS

“Generally, jurisdiction is a preliminary matter that should be resolved before all

others.” Leeson v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2006 WL 3230047, *2 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 27, 2006); see also

Villarreal v. Chrysler Corp.,, 1996 WL 116832, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Mar.12, 1996) (“Judicial

economy will best be served by addressing the remand issue [before a party’s motion to stay]

because a determination on this issue will facilitate litigation in the appropriate forum.”). 

However, some courts have held that “the calculus changes somewhat when deference to a

MDL court will further ‘the uniformity, consistency, and predictability in litigation that

underlies the MDL system.’” Leeson, 2006 WL 3230047, *2 (quoting Conroy v. Fresh Del

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For the Northern District of California

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Monte Produce Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (N.D.Cal.2004)). “In deciding whether to rule

on the motion to remand, courts consider whether the motion raises issues likely to arise in

other actions pending in the MDL transferee court.” Conroy, 325 F. 2d 1053. Here, the Court

finds that the pending motion to remand has not raised issues that are likely to arise in other

actions even if the MDL grants the motion to transfer. Therefore, the Court will address the

motion to remand first.

A. Legal Standards Relevant to Removal. 

“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court of the

United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (citation

omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 

See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly,

the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking

removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the

right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

While diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 ordinarily requires complete

diversity of the parties, removal is proper despite the presence of a non-diverse defendant when

that defendant was fraudulently joined, in other words, where that defendant is merely a “sham”

defendant. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). In this circuit, a non-diverse

defendant is deemed a sham and will not defeat jurisdiction if, after all disputed questions of

fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, the

plaintiff could not possibly recover against the party whose joinder is questioned. Kruso v.

International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989). The failure

to state claim against the non-diverse defendant must be “obvious according to the well-settled

rules of the state.” United Computer Systems v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir.

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2002). The party asserting the fraudulent joinder bears the burden of proof and remand must be

granted unless the defendant can show that there is no possibility that the plaintiff could prevail

on any cause of action it brought against the non-diverse defendant. See Levine v. Allmerica

Financial Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 

B. Manufacturing Defendants Fail to Demonstrate Other Defendants Were

Fraudulently Joined.

Manufacturing Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Imaging

Facility and Distributor Defendants are time-barred and that Plaintiffs’ CLRA claims are

jurisdictionally barred based on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statutory notice

provisions. The Court will address each argument in turn.

1. Statute of Limitations.

To demonstrate at the pleading stage that a statute of limitations has run, a defendant

must show that the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled. Jablon v. Dean Witter, 614 F.2d 677,

682 (9th Cir. 1980). Under California law, a statute of limitations can be tolled by the

discovery rule which delays the accrual of the date of a cause of action until the plaintiff is

aware of her injury and its negligent cause. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1120

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1109 (1988)). Under the

discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should

suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing. Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1110. 

Plaintiffs plead that the “nature of Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages, and their relationship

to gadolinium-based contrast agents used in conjunction with MRIs and MRAs, was not

discovered, and through reasonable care and due diligence could not have been discovered, by

Plaintiffs until a time less than two years before the filing of this Complaint.” (Compl., ¶ 67.) 

Manufacturing Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts regarding the

circumstances of their delayed discovery. However, assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs

have not sufficiently alleged facts to establish that the discovery rule applies, Manufacturing

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Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs could not as a matter of law allege such facts if given

an opportunity to amend their complaint.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ violations of the CLRA are ongoing, and that

therefore, these claims are not time-barred. (Mot. to Remand at 4.) Manufacturing Defendants

failed to address this argument and, thus, for this additional reason, fail to demonstrate that all

of Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.

2. Compliance with CLRA’s Statutory Notice Provisions.

Section 1782 of the California Civil Code provides that a plaintiff shall provide notice of

his or her claims at least thirty days before filing an “an action for damages” under the CLRA. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1782(a). The statute clarifies that such notice is not required for claims

seeking only injunctive relief. Cal. Civ. Code § 1782(d). As Plaintiffs highlight, they only seek

injunctive relief pursuant to their CLRA claim. (Compl., ¶¶ 120-122.) Accordingly, the notice

provisions of the CLRA are inapplicable.

Manufacturing Defendants did not argue in opposition to the motion to remand that

Plaintiffs did not allege fact sufficient to state a CLRA claim against the Imaging Facility and

Distributor Defendants. Instead, they merely asserted that Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim is timebarred and failed to satisfy the statutory notice provisions. Because the Court finds that

Manufacturing Defendants have failed to show that the CLRA claim is time-barred or deficient

based on the statutory notice requirements, they have not demonstrated that there is no

possibility that Plaintiffs could prevail on any cause of action it brought against the non-diverse

defendants. See Levine, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’

motion to remand.

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United States District Court

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED and this matter

shall be remanded to the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco. Because this

Court is remanding the case, Defendants’ motion to stay is DENIED AS MOOT.

Dated: February 6, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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