Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-00063/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-00063-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 02-00063 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

**E-Filed 10/23/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARC CHARLES DAWSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

T. BORGES, individually, and ROBERT HOREL,

Warden of Pelican Bay State Prison, in his official

capacity,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 02-00063 JF

ORDER GRANTING 1

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[re: docket no. 89]

Defendants T. Borges (“Borges”) and Robert Horel (“Defendants”) move for partial

summary judgment on the Third Claim for Relief (“Third Claim”) in Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiff Marc Charles Dawson (“Dawson”) opposes the motion. 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Dawson is incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) in Crescent City, California. 

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Case No. C 02-00063 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

On July 2, 2001, Dawson was involved in an incident with Borges as he was being escorted by

Borges to a group therapy session. As a result of this incident, Dawson filed a complaint and

requested that misdemeanor charges be filed against Borges for using excessive force during the

incident. After an investigation relief was denied, and the denial was upheld in two subsequent

appeals.

On July 6, 2001, Borges submitted a “Serious CDC 115 Rules Violation Report”

(“RVR”) accusing Dawson of battery on a peace officer. On September 5, 2001, Dawson was

found guilty. Defendants assert that Dawson chose not to attend the disciplinary hearing, and

that he waived his right to do so by signing CDC Form 128-B, which was presented to him by

Officer Risenhoover a day before the hearing was to take place. Dawson asserts that he did not

sign the 128-B and was not aware that the hearing was to take place.

On January 4, 2002, Dawson, proceeding pro se, filed his original complaint in this

Court, seeking relief against Borges pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dawson alleges that Borges

used excessive force during the incident, thus violating Dawson’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Dawson’s original complaint did not name any Doe defendants.

On December 13, 2002, Borges moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity. That motion was denied on August 19, 2003. On April 28, 2005, the Court

appointed David I. Kornbluh as counsel for Dawson. On September 5, 2006, following

discovery, Borges again moved for summary judgment. On November 9, 2006, the Court

granted the motion with respect to the claim arising from the alleged bending of Dawson’s

fingers, and denied the motion with respect to the claims arising from an alleged push against the

wall and Borges’s alleged forcing of Dawson’s face to the ground.

On May 10, 2007, Dawson filed the operative SAC, which: (1) added a claim for

declaratory relief, the purpose of which is to have the finding that Dawson committed battery on

a peace officer expunged from Dawson’s prison record; and, (2) named as an additional

defendant in his official capacity the Warden of Pelican Bay State Prison, Robert Horel

(”Warden”).

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 In Dawson’s SAC, he named former PBSP Warden Richard Kirkland. The parties 2

subsequently stipulated to the substitution of current PBSP Warden Robert Horel. 

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Case No. C 02-00063 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

Defendants now seek summary judgment as to Dawson’s new claims. The Court heard

oral argument on September 21, 2007. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

 A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The same Rule 56(c) standards

that apply to a motion for summary judgment apply to a motion for partial summary judgment. 

Nyk Line (N. Am.), Inc. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1178 (C.D.

Cal. 2002). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the

motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents

evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that

party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49;

Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, the SAC adds a new claim for declaratory relief (the “Third Claim”), by

which Dawson seeks to have the finding that he committed battery on a peace officer expunged

from his prison record, and names the Warden as an additional defendant. Defendants argue 2

that both the Third Claim and any action against the Warden are barred under the applicable

statute of limitations. Defendants assert that the limitations period began to run one year from

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 Dawson does not dispute this date or that the applicable limitations period is one year.

3

 Dawson’s original complaint was filed on January 4, 2002. Dawson did not seek to 4

amend his first amended complaint and add his Third Claim until 2007. 

 Rule 15(c) states: An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original 5

pleading when: (1) relation back is permitted by the law that proved the statute of limitations

applicable to the action, or (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of

the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

pleading, or (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming party against whom a claim is

asserted in the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m)

for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has

received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in

maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake

concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

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Case No. C 02-00063 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

the date Dawson received notice of the adverse finding with respect to his RVR, which was

September 8, 2001. 

3

Dawson does not dispute that the Third Claim was filed outside the applicable limitations

period. He nonetheless makes two arguments as to why the claim should not be dismissed. 4

First, he argues that the claim was included in the original complaint. Dawson filed an amended

complaint thirty days after filing his original complaint. In the first amended complaint, he

requested that the court award, in addition to monetary damages; “any other relief deemed

necessary.” Dawson argues that such “other relief” included declaratory relief. However, in

order for Dawson to seek declaratory relief, the Warden or at least a Doe defendant would have

had to be named as a party. Neither Dawson’s original complaint nor his first amended

complaint named either the Warden or any Doe defendants. 

Second, Dawson argues that even if a prayer for declaratory relief was not previously

asserted in his original or first amended complaint, his new claim relates back to the date of the

filing of the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) , as amended in 5

1991. However, Defendants correctly point out, and Dawson concedes, that “it is indeed the case

that under California law if a defendant is added to an amended complaint as a new defendant,

and not a Doe defendant, the amendment does not relate back to the time of the original

complaint.” Dawson’s Opp’n, 5:18-19 citing Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 683

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Case No. C 02-00063 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

(9th Cir. 1980). Dawson suggests that Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c) provides him with a more

forgiving standard of relation back than that of California law, and that the federal rules should

apply in this case. 

 Ninth Circuit case law subsequent to the 1991 amendments to Rule 15 is clear that in

federal actions under §1983, California law governs tolling and relation back. Rodgers v.

Horsely, 123 Fed.Appx. 281, 285 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover even assuming arguendo that Rule

15(c) applies and sets forth a more liberal standard, the outcome of the instant motion would be

the same. Dawson’s addition of a new defendant, as distinguished from substituting or

correcting the name of an existing defendant, takes this action outside the scope of Rule 15(c). 

The conduct, transaction and occurrence underlying Dawson’s Third Claim is entirely separate

from that underlying his First and Second Claims for Relief for excessive force, for which he

seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Dawson’s Third Claim is based not on the incident

involving Borges on July 2, 2001 but on his challenge to the subsequent determination that he

was guilty with respect to the RVR. Such a challenge is a separate matter which among other

things requires exhaustion of administrative remedies. Cf Oja v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 440 F.3d 1122, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2006). Finally, the Warden received no notice of

the action, nor could he have known that Dawson would name him as a defendant.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for

partial summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief and all claims

against the Warden are hereby dismissed.

DATED: October 23, 2007

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 02-00063 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC3)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Amber Smith Crothall 

asc@millermorton.com 

Gregory Alan Wedner

gwedner@lozanosmith.com 

Jesse Jeremy Maddox

jmaddox@lozanosmith.com 

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