Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00039/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Prestige Administration Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Crescent Manufacturing Company, LLC,

et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-0039-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant Mepco Finance Corporation’s motion to dismiss

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (doc. 33), plaintiff Prestige Administration, Inc.’s response

(doc. 44), and Mepco’s reply (doc. 52).

Plaintiff is the manufacturer and distributor of a coolant additive product under the

“Autolife” trademark. This is plaintiff’s second attempt at filing a trademark infringement

action against Mepco. In the first lawsuit, plaintiff asserted claims against all defendants,

including Mepco, for unfair competition, trademark dilution, and cyberpiracy under the

Lanham Act, as well as state law claims for trademark infringement, fraudulent

misrepresentation, injury to business reputation, and tortious interference with contract. See

Prestige Admin. Inc. v. U.S. Fidelis Inc., No. CV-09-1804-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. Dec. 9,

2009) (doc. 8) (“Prestige I”). On March 26, 2010, this court dismissed all claims against

Mepco for failure to state a claim and granted plaintiff leave to amend. Id. at (doc. 87).

Case 2:12-cv-00039-FJM Document 54 Filed 05/09/12 Page 1 of 3
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Plaintiff chose not to amend. Seven months later, the action was dismissed against all

remaining defendants as moot. Id. at (doc. 100). On January 5, 2012, plaintiff filed this new

action, asserting the same claims based on the same operative facts, with the addition of two

new claims against Mepco—contributory trademark infringement and vicarious trademark

infringement. Mepco now argues that the claims asserted in the new complaint are barred

by res judicata. We agree.

The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits bars further

claims by parties based on the same cause of action. Res judicata applies where there is (1)

an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity of or privity between

the parties. Poblete Mendoza v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). Res judicata

bars all claim that were raised or could have been raised in the previous action. Providence

Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Eight of the ten counts asserted against Mepco in the instant action are identical to

those asserted in Prestige I. Because these claims were already adjudicated in favor of

Mepco, they are barred by res judicata. We reject plaintiff’s argument that the dismissal of

claims against Mepco in Prestige I was based on grounds of mootness, and therefore it was

not an adjudication on the merits. Response at 3. The dismissal of claims asserted against

Mepco in Prestige I was expressly based upon its failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). 

Although plaintiff has added two additional claims in the new complaint for

contributory trademark infringement and vicarious trademark infringement, these claims arise

from the “same transactional nucleus of facts” that formed the basis of the infringement

claims in Prestige I. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.

2005). In fact, plaintiff asserted the secondary infringement theories of liability in its

opposition to Mepco’s motion to dismiss in the first action. See Prestige I at (doc. 36 at 2)

(“While Plaintiff does not think Mepco is a direct infringer, it is an indirect infringer . . . .

[I]t [may] be held liable for vicarious liability in trademark cases.”) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff was given 10 days to amend its complaint in the original action, but it chose not to

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do so. Plaintiff’s right to amend “ended upon the . . . entry of final judgment following

dismissal of its action.” Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 977

(9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, each of the claims now asserted in the present complaint were

either raised or could have been raised in the previous action and are now barred by res

judicata. 

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Mepco’s motion to dismiss (doc. 33).

DATED this 8th day of May, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-00039-FJM Document 54 Filed 05/09/12 Page 3 of 3