Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02871/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02871-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLSTATE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELLERY CHACKSFIELD,

Defendant.

 

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Case No.: 11cv2871-AJB (NLS)

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF

ALLSTATE INSURANCE

COMPANY’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (Doc. No.

14); AND

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT

ELLERY CHACKSFIELD’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, (Doc. No. 17).

Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) brings this diversity action

against Defendant Ellery Chacksfield (“Defendant”), seeking declaratory relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2201. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on January

4, 2013, (Doc. No. 14), and Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on

January 7, 2013, (Doc. No. 17). Both motions were fully briefed and are currently before

the Court. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court found both motions suitable

for determination on the papers and without oral argument. Accordingly, the motion

hearing set for March 21, 2013 was vacated. After a thorough review of the papers,

supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment, (Doc. No. 14), and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment, (Doc. No. 17). The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment and

close the case.

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BACKGROUND

This is a dispute over insurance coverage, whereby the parties disagree over

whether Robert Hammers (“Robert”) was a resident of Gordon Hammers’ (“Gordon”)

household, and thereby covered under Gordon’s Personal Umbrella Insurance Policy

(“PUP”).1

 Because none of the material facts at issue in the case are in dispute, the Court

sets forth: (1) the living arrangements between Robert and Gordon; (2) the automobile

accident and the underlying judgment in San Diego Superior Court between Robert’s

estate and Defendant; and (3) the terms of the PUP.2

I. Living Arrangements By and Between Robert and Gordon

Gordon owns an eleven-acre property in rural San Diego County (the “Property”).3

 

The Property is home to three residences: (1) Gordon’s 2,500 square-foot main residence

located at 860 Harris Ranch Road; (2) Timothy (Gordon’s son) and his wife’s 1,200

square-foot smaller residence located at 862 Harris Ranch Road; and (3) Gordon’s 22-

foot travel trailer Robert was allowed to live in. (Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon

Depo. at 30:4-31:23, 54:2-55:23, 62:13-15; Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon

Depo. at 62:11-14.) The travel trailer was located less than 100 yards from the main

1

 To avoid confusion the Court refers to the Robert Hammers and Gordon

Hammers by their first names.

2

 Defendant asserts there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Gordon’s attempted transfer of ownership of Gordon’s vehicle to Robert. Specifically, Defendant argues Gordon’s failure to remove the vehicle from his automobile insurance policy creates an inference that Gordon never actually believed the transfer occurred before the

accident. (Doc. No. 19 at 6-7.) The Court is not inclined to agree. The fact that Gordon

never removed the vehicle from coverage under his automobile insurance policy is not in dispute. Rather, the parties only dispute the inference drawn from this undisputed fact. Thus, because a parties’ subjective intent cannot be used to create a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court finds all material facts at issue in the case are undisputed. See Ca.

Traditions, Inc. v. Claremont, 197 Cal. App. 4th 410, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).

3

 Gordon purchased the Property in or around 1973. (Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at 29-30; Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at

29:4-30:21.) The Property was subsequently transferred to a family trust in the mid 1990s. (Id.) In 2001, the “Bell” fire burned down the Property’s original manufactured home, (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C., Gordon Depo. at 31:10-15), causing Gordon

and his son Timothy to build replacement manufactured homes in 2002 and 2003. (Id. at

55:21-56:14.) 

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residence and 200 to 300 yards from the smaller residence. (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl. at

28:8-15, 62:11-15; Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl. at 62:11-14.) The entire Property is surrounded by a five-foot-high barbed wire fence, which acts as a boundary to keep animals

from passing over the land. (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl. at 83:15-84:5; Doc. No. 14, Vida

Decl. at 83:15-84:5.)

II. The Accident and the Underlying State Court Action

On December 30, 2008, Robert was involved in a broadside collision with a

motorcycle driven by Defendant Chacksfield (the “Accident”). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 6; Doc. No.

14, Rivera Decl. ¶ 3.) At the time of the Accident, Robert was driving a 1989 Ford

Crown Victoria (the “Vehicle”), which was owned by Gordon, and insured by an

automobile insurance policy issued to Gordon by Plaintiff (the “Automobile Policy”). 

(Id.) As a result of the Accident, Defendant sustained personal injuries and property

damage to his motorcycle. (Doc. No. 14, Rivera Decl. ¶ 8.) Prior to the Accident,

Gordon completed a release of liability for the Vehicle with the Department of Motor

Vehicles, and told Robert to transfer the registration for the Vehicle into Robert’s name. 

(Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at 48:1-9.) Robert never completed the

transfer, which Gordon was unaware of, and at the time of the Accident, the Vehicle was

still registered to Robert. (Id.) On January 7, 2010, Robert passed away from causes

unrelated to the Accident. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 7; Doc. No. 17 at 3.)

On March 11, 2010, Defendant filed suit in San Diego Superior Court against

Robert’s estate, seeking monetary relief for personal injuries and property damages

sustained as a result of the Accident (the “State Court Action”). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 8.) 

According to the terms of the Automobile Policy, Plaintiff agreed to defend and indemnify Robert’s estate in the State Court Action up to the $100,000.00 policy limit.4

 On or

4

 The Automobile Policy covered the Vehicle and afforded liability coverage with a limit of $100,000.00 per injured person. (Doc. No. 17 at 2; Doc. No. 1 ¶ 5.) Since Robert was a permissive user of the Vehicle, (Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at 47-48), he qualified as an “insured person” under the Automobile Policy, (Doc. No. 14, Rivera Decl. ¶ 8; Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 9, 10). 

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about September 15, 2011, Defendant obtained judgment in the State Court Action

against Robert’s estate in the amount of $204,123.75. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Of this amount,

Plaintiff agreed to pay $85,000.00, as $15,000.00 had already been paid to settle Defendant’s claims against Gordon. (Id. at ¶ 12.) This left $119,123.75 remaining, which

Defendant sought to recover from Plaintiff under Gordon’s PUP. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff

refused to pay this amount, arguing Robert is not covered under the PUP because he is

not a resident of Gordon’s household. 

III. Terms of the Policy

Under the terms of the PUP, Plaintiff is obligated to “pay damages which an

insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury, personal injury

or property damage,” arising out of a covered occurrence. (Doc. No. 14, Rivera Decl.,

Ex. 3, PUP at 5.) The PUP defines “insured person” as:

a) You, and any other person who is named on the Policy Declarations; b) any person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident

of your household; or 

c) any dependent person in your care, if that person is a resident of your household.

(Id. at 2). The PUP further defines “you” and “your” as “the person named on the policy

declarations as the insured and that person’s resident spouse,” and an “occurrence” as an

“accident during the policy period . . . resulting in bodily injury, personal injury or

property damage.” (Id.) The PUP does not define “resident” or “household.” (Doc. No.

14, Rivera Decl., Ex. 3, PUP.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to grant

summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion,

thereby identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and affidavits on file, that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

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Where parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must consider each

party’s evidence, regardless of which motion the evidence is offered under. See Las

Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011).

Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

322. A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial has both the

initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for

summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,

1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts

to the opposing party to establish a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Thus, the

purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial. Id. at 587 (quotations omitted). Therefore, in

resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Gordon’s Automobile Policy, Plaintiff agreed to defend and indemnify

Robert’s estate up to the policy limit of $100,000.00. However, because this amount was

insufficient to cover the full amount awarded Defendant in the State Court Action, which

totaled $204,123.75, Defendant sought payment of the remaining balance, which totaled

$119,123.75, under Gordon’s PUP. In response, Plaintiff denied coverage under the

PUP, arguing that Robert was not an “insured person” as defined under the policy. As

the parties agree that Robert is not the “named insured” on the PUP or the resident spouse

of the “named insured,” the sole issue before the Court is whether Robert qualifies as an

“insured person” under subsections (b) or (c) of Gordon’s PUP. Accordingly, the Court

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first addresses the interpretation of insurance policies under California law, and then

analyzes whether Robert was a “resident” of Gordon’s “household” as required under

subsection (b), or a dependent person in Gordon’s care who was also a “resident” of

Gordon’s “household,” as required under subsection (c).

I. Interpretation of Insurance Policies Under California Law

California law governs the interpretation of insurance policies. See Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Smith, 929 F.2d 447, 449 (9th Cir. 1991). Although insurance policies have

special features, their interpretation is similar to any other contract and is primarily a

judicial function. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 22, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370,

900 P.2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc.,

555 F.3d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 2009). The primary goal of contract interpretation, and

therefore policy interpretation, is “to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. To the extent possible, the intent of the parties is to be inferred

solely from the written provisions of the policy, and where the language of the policy is

clear and unambiguous, it governs. See La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Indus.

Indem. Co., 9 Cal. 4th 27, 37, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1994).

A contractual policy provision will be found ambiguous only where it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. See Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v.

Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 4th 854, 867, 855 P.2d 1263 (Cal. 1993) (“The absence

from the policy of a definition of [a] term . . . does not itself render the term ambiguous.”). The Court construes the language of the policy in the context of the instrument as

a whole and under the circumstances of the case. See Bank of the West v. Super. Ct., 2

Cal. 4th 1254, 1265, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992). The language may

not be found ambiguous in the abstract. Id. Nor will the Court find ambiguous or

uncertain a policy term that has already been judicially interpreted. See Bartlome v. State

Farm, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1235, 1239, 256 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Thus, if

the court concludes a contractual term is ambiguous or uncertain, and such term has not

been otherwise judicially interpreted, the court will interpret the contract language based

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on “the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured.” Id. at 1265, 256 Cal. Rptr.

719. Finally, in the event the court is unable to determine whether coverage is consistent

with the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations, the court will resolve the ambiguity against the insurer. Id. 

II. Analysis of “Insured Person” Under Gordon’s Personal Umbrella Policy

Gordon’s PUP clearly defines “insured person” to include: (b) a person related to

the insured by “blood” who is also a “resident” of the insured’s “household;” or (c) a

“dependent” in the insured’s care who is also a “resident” of the insured’s “household.” 

(Doc. No. 14, Rivera Decl., Ex. 3 at 2.) Although the PUP does not define the terms

“resident” and “household,” California courts have interpreted the provision “resident of

the [named insured’s] household” to impose two requirements: (1) the person for whom

coverage is sought must belong to the same household as the named insured; and (2) the

person for whom coverage is sought must permanently reside with the named insured. 

See Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch., 227 Cal. App. 3d 584, 590, 278 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Cal. Ct. App.

1991). Accordingly, because both terms have been judicially interpreted, the Court finds

neither term ambiguous. The Court first addresses whether Robert was a “resident”

under the PUP and then addresses whether Robert and Gordon were members of the same

“household.”

A. Permanent Resident

“Every person has, in law, a residence.” Cal. Gov. Code § 243. The term

“residence connotes any factual place of abode of some permanence, more than a

temporary sojourn.” Utley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 19 Cal. App. 4th 815, 820, 24 Cal. Rptr.

2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hardware Mut. Cas. Co.

v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (citing Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary and ultimately defining “residence” to be “one, other

than a temporary or transient visitor, who lives together with others in the same house for

a period of some duration, although he may not intend to remain there permanently”). 

Thus, a relative may be a “resident” of an insured’s household even though he or she

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does not live in the household on a daily basis. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Apps, 85 Cal. App. 3d

228, 231-32, 149 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 

On the issue of “residence,” the Court finds the court’s analysis in Utley v. Allstate

Insurance Company especially instructive. 19 Cal. App. 4th 815, 820, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1

(Cal. Ct. App. 1993). In Utley, an adult son was living at his parents’ home for approximately seven or eight months—between the time of his discharge from the military and

his planned marriage—after which time he planned to move to a condominium with his

new wife. Utley, 19 Cal. App. 4th at 821-22. Analyzing a “resident relative” exclusion,

the Utley court found that the “dual residence” principle applied because “[a]ssuming for

the moment that [the son]’s primary ‘residence’ was San Diego [where he had been

stationed in the military], the record show[ed] that he used his parent’s house as a second

residence” rather than his primary residence. Id. at 822. Thus, even though the son did

not change the address on his driver’s license to reflect his parent’s address, the court

found this fact unpersuasive, and instead focused on the fact that the son “moved into his

parents’ house and used it as a place of residence.” Id. at 820. As a result, the Utley

court ultimately held that the son had two domiciles, one of which was his parents’

residence. Id. at 823.

Here, the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that the travel trailer was considered

Robert’s “settled or usual abode,” and that Robert never had a secondary or any other

domicile while living on Gordon’s property. See Cal. Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Frerichs, 74

Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1453, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see also State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elkins 52 Cal. App. 3d 534, 537–541, 125 Cal. Rptr. 139

(1975) (19-year-old daughter deemed a resident of father’s household even though living

in an separate apartment). Thus, even though Robert’s stay in the travel trailer was

broken into two separate occurrences, the first of which lasted less than two years and the

second of which lasted over a year and half, Robert never had another residence while

residing in the travel trailer. Therefore, the Court finds it immaterial that Robert’s stay in

the travel trailer was only intended to be temporary, especially in light of the fact that

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Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Robert had any other residence during either time

he lived on Gordon’s property. Cf. Ca. Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Frerichs, 74 Cal. App. 4th

1446, 1453, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“Given this meaning Hudson

stopped residing with his parents in November 1995 and his housesitting for two weeks

was not a taking up of residence.”). Accordingly, because Gordon’s subjective intent

regarding the length of Robert’s stay is irrelevant to the determination of whether Robert

was a “resident” under the terms of the PUP, the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments

unpersuasive. As a result, the Court finds Robert meets the definition of “resident” under

Gordon’s PUP.

B. Same Household

Having found Robert to be a “resident” for purposes of coverage under Gordon’s

PUP, the Court next considers whether Robert was a member of Gordon’s “household.” 

California courts have held, as a matter of law, that “household” is not ambiguous, and

that the term has a specific definition that is not dependent on the context of the policy. 

Jacobs, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 590 (disregarding prior cases that found the term “household” lacked an “absolute meaning” and holding that “the apparent conflict in cases

interpreting ‘household’ is not due to any inherent ambiguity in the term itself, but

instead arises from the difficulty of applying varying sets of facts to a fixed definition”);

Utley, 19 Cal. App. 4th at 822 (“[T]he common thread that runs through [cases interpreting ‘household’] is not whether the term[] . . . ‘member of household’ [is itself] inherently ambiguous, but whether, under the particular facts of each of those cases, insurance

coverage was extended or excluded under the terms of the policy in question.”) (quoting

Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 211 Cal. App. 3d 176, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)). 

Accordingly, when interpreting an insurance policy, California courts have

judicially defined “household” as:

a collection of persons, related or not, living together as a group or unit of

permanent or domestic character, with one head, under one roof or within a

common curtilage, who direct their attention toward a common goal consisting of their mutual interests. 

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Jacobs, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 594 (adopting holding of Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indem.

Co., 30 Cal. 2d 541, 547-48, 184 P.2d 153 (Cal. 1947)). Thus, in determining whether

Robert was a member of Gordon’s “household,” the Court considers: (1) whether Robert

and Gordon were a collection of persons living together as a group or unit of permanent

or domestic character; (2) whether Gordon was the “head” of Robert’s household; (3)

whether Robert and Gordon resided under one roof or within a common curtilage; and (4)

whether Robert and Gordon had one goal consisting of mutual interests. Jacobs, 227 Cal.

App. 3d at 594. 

1. Collection of Persons Living Together as a Group of Permanent or Domestic Character

As explained by the court in Jacobs v. Fire Insurance Exchange, whether a

collection of persons are considered a group of permanent and domestic character does

not depend on whether the individuals “technically” live under one roof, but instead,

depends on whether the insured considers the tortfeaser to be a member of his/her

household, and more importantly, whether the tortfeaser is a member of another, more

permanent household. 227 Cal. App. 3d at 594 n.4, 596.5

 In Jacobs, the issue before the

court was whether the tortfeaser grandson was a member of the grandmother’s household

for purposes of coverage under the grandmother’s insurance policy. Id. at 587. In

denying coverage under the policy, the Jacobs court reasoned that even though the

grandson and grandmother technically lived under one roof—within a divided townhouse—the two residences were separated by a solid wall, had their own entrances,

backyards, mailboxes, kitchens, and bathrooms, and the grandson never slept at, or stored

his possessions in the grandmother’s residence. Id. at 588-89. Thus, even though the

grandmother was dependent on her daughter and the grandson for her daily medications,

5

 Following this reasoning, California courts have held that minor children in the

military are members of their parents’ “households” even though living outside the home. 

See Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. Davis, 90 Cal. App. 3d 782, 153 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 9 Cal. App. 3d 898, 88 Cal. Rptr. 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).

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medical appointments, and other daily tasks, the daughter and her family, which included

the tortfeaser grandson, was completely self-sufficient, and did not likewise rely on the

grandmother for their daily necessities. Id. Accordingly, because the daughter and her

family paid the same rental amount as previous tenants, and ate their meals separate and

apart from the grandmother, the Jacobs court held that the grandson was not a resident of

the grandmother’s household for purposes of coverage under the insurance policy. Id. at

596.

Although not controlling, decisions from other jurisdictions provide additional

guidance on the interpretation and corresponding application of the phrase: “collection of

persons, whether related or not, who live together as a group or unit of permanent or

domestic character.” Id. at 594. For example, in Hernandez v. Comco Insurance

Company, 357 So.2d 1368, 1371 (La. Ct. App. 1978), the court held that a daughter and

her husband, who lived in a separate smaller structure that was adjacent to the parent’s

(the insureds) main residence, yet still effectively on the parents’ property, were not

residents of the parents’ household because the two families were effectively living as

separate, independent units. Id. at 1371. Crucial to this determination, the Hernandez

court noted that the daughter and her husbands’ residence had its own kitchen, living

room, bathroom, and bedrooms, and that the daughter and her husband paid all their own

utilities, purchased their own groceries, cooked their own meals, and did their own

laundry. Id. at 1369-70. Thus, although the daughter and her husband resided on the

parents’ property, in a structure built by the parents, the daughter and her husband were

sufficiently independent to preclude a finding of a “common household.” Id. at 1371.6

Moreover, and perhaps even more in line with the facts of the instant case, the

Court finds Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Company of Winterthur, Switzer6

 The Hernandez court utilized the following definition of “household,” which is strikingly similar to the definition employed by California courts following Jacobs: “a

collection of persons as a single group, with one head, living together, a unit of

permanent and domestic character, under one roof; a ‘collective body of persons living

together within one curtilage, subsisting in common and directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mutual interests and social happiness. Hernandez, 357 So.2d at 1370-71. 

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land, 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800 (N.J. 1961), especially instructive. In Mazzilli, a wife was

held to be a resident of her ex-husband’s household, despite living with her son in a

separate four-room bungalow on the same property, because it was not unreasonable to

conclude that the two dwellings, even though 150 feet apart, constituted one “household.” 

Id. at 3, 15. Thus, in affirming coverage under the insurance policy, the Mazzilli court

noted that the term “household or resident of household cannot be so limited and

strait-jacketed as always to mean, regardless of facts and circumstances, a collective body

of persons who live in one house.” Id. at 14 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, because the facts exhibited a “continuance of a substantially

integrated family relationship,” the Mazzilli court found that the wife was a member of

the ex-husband’s household. Id. at 19 (“[the insured] keeping [his wife] in the bungalow

retained the intimate family contact to the extent that he desired, and undoubtedly

explains why he considered the premises all one place where the entire family was living)

(internal quotations omitted).

Similarly, in this case, despite differences of opinion between Robert and Gordon,

or Gordon’s overall unhappiness with Robert’s residence on his property, Gordon’s

relationship with his brother compelled him to honor his family obligations, thereby

providing Robert with a place to live. The fact that Gordon’s late-wife was not personally fond of Robert, or the fact that Gordon required Robert to not enter the main

residence, or at one time even asked Robert to move off the Property, does not change the

underlying nature of the living arrangements between Robert and Gordon. (Doc. No. 17,

O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at 89:25-90:16.) Thus, in stark contrast to Jacobs and

Hernandez, where the tortfeaser was not dependent on the insured, here, Gordon provided Robert with the daily necessities of life, including a place to stay, and free water

and electricity. (Id. at 70:21-71:18.) Therefore, even though the travel trailer had its

own septic system, refrigerator, gas stove, microwave, and sink, (Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl.

at pp.53-4, 79), and Robert paid for most of his own expenses, including food, gas, car

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maintenance, and satellite television, (Id. at pp.78-9, 61-2, 68-9), Robert was nonetheless

dependent on Gordon for shelter and basic utilities.7

Therefore, similar to Mazzilli, wherein the ex-husband looked past personal

differences with his ex-wife when he allowed her and his son to continue to live on his

property, here, Gordon looked beyond his own personal differences with Robert because

he knew his brother was unable to otherwise provide for himself. Mazzilli, 35 N.J. at 16. 

Accordingly, unlike Jacobs and Hernandez, this is not the case where the tortfeaser is a

member of an independently sufficient household, which is separate and distinct form the

insured’s household. Jacobs, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 596; Hernandez, 357 So.2d at 1371. 

As a result, the Court finds Robert and Gordon were a collection of persons living

together as a group or unit of permanent or domestic character, and the first Jacobs’

element is satisfied for purposes of coverage under Gordon’s PUP.

2. Under One Head of Household

Next, the Court considers whether Robert was under Gordon’s authority as “head”

of the household. Jacobs, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 591. As articulated by the court in Jacobs,

“head” of the household should be broadly interpreted to mean “a common source of

authority or leadership to which the other members of the household are subject.” Id. at

594 n.5. Thus, the head of the household may be “a father, a mother, both parents acting

together, or some other person whom the members of the household recognize as their

head.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). As a result, where the insured and the tortfeaser

are members of two separate and independent households, courts have denied coverage

under the insured’s policy, finding the two households were not under the same “head.” 

See id. at 588 (finding the head of the grandson’s household was his own parents and not

7

 Moreover, although Gordon asked Robert to pay $100 a month to live in the travel trailer, there was never a written agreement between the brothers, and Gordon never received more than $20 a month from Robert. (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C,

Gordon Depo. at 65:18-66:14, 71:6-12.) Furthermore, Gordon purchased, registered, and

insured a vehicle in his own name on behalf of Robert, who promised to pay him monthly in return. (Id. at 47:21-49:13.) However, Gordon never received any monetary payment from Robert, who decided instead to give Gordon his old vehicle, which was then

donated, and claimed as a tax refund by Gordon. (Id.) 

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his grandmother); Hernandez, 357 So.2d at 1371 (finding that the insured-parents were

not the head of the daughter and husbands’ household, despite the fact that the daughter

and husband lived in a house built by the parents); Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v.

Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.C. Me. 1941) (finding the insured was not the head of

the tortfeaser’s household because the insured did not exercise any control over the

tortfeaser and his wife”).

Here, in contrast to Jacobs, Hernandez, and Lumbermen’s, the Court finds Robert

was at all times subject to Gordon’s authority, such that he was not the head of his own

independent household. For example, Gordon prohibited Robert from entering the main

residence, (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at 42:6-42; Doc. No. 14,

Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at 42), Gordon required Robert to erect a separate fence

around the travel trailer to restrict his dogs, (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon

Depo at 84:6-24; Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at 84), and Gordon

prohibited Robert from socializing with Gordon’s daughters, (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl.,

Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at 79:3-7). Thus, much like a child is subjected to his parents’

authority while residing in their residence, Robert was subjected to Gordon’s authority

while residing in Gordon’s travel trailer. See In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 408, 595

P.2d 105, 112 (Cal. 1979). Accordingly, the Court finds Gordon is the “head” of the

household to which Robert submitted to. As a result, the second Jacobs’ element is

satisfied for purposes of extending coverage under Gordon’s PUP.

3. Under One Roof or Within a Common Curtilage

Third, because it is undisputed that Robert and Gordon did not live under “one

roof,” the Court considers whether they resided “within one common curtilage.” Jacobs,

227 Cal. App. 3d at 594. Curtilage has been defined as “ ‘[t]he inclosed space of ground

and buildings immediately surrounding a dwellinghouse. [Citations.] [¶] . . . A small

piece of land, not necessarily inclosed, around the dwelling house, and generally includes

the buildings used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs.’ “ Id. at 592

n.4, quoting Black’s Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 346, cols. 1-2. It “is the area which

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extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the

privacies of life, and therefore has been considered part of home itself for Fourth

Amendment purposes.” People v. Shaw, 97 Cal. App. 4th 833, 835, n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.

2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466

U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). Whether an area around a residence constitutes “curtilage” is

based on several factors,“including the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to

the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the

nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect

the area from observation by people passing by.” People v. Zichwic, 94 Cal. App. 4th

944, 953 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v.

Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987)).8

Although most of the cases analyzing curtilage do so within the context of the

Fourth Amendment, the Court finds such cases instructive. Therefore, because it is

undisputed that Gordon’s travel trailer was located within the perimeter fence that

enclosed the main residence (second factor), the travel trailer was used by Robert for

residential purposes (third factor), and the fence surrounding the entire property served to

protect both residences from outside observation (fourth factor), the Court only considers

the first factor—the distance between the primary residence and the travel trailer.

In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987), the Supreme Court held that,

standing in isolation, a barn located “60 yards [180 feet] from the house itself” may be

outside the curtilage. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302. In doing so however, the Court also noted

that “these [curtilage] factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any

given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—whether the area in

question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s

8

 The Court in Dunn ultimately held that the barn was not within the curtilage of the home because: (1) the barn was a substantial distance away from the home; (2) there was a separate fence surrounding the home; (3) the barn was not primarily used for

domestic affairs; and (4) the fence surrounding the barn was not the type used to prevent others from observing intimate details of the home. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302-03.

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‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 301. In a similar vein, Ninth Circuit

cases have generally regarded the area around a structure that is more than 120 feet away

from the residence to be outside the curtilage. Compare United States v. Van Damme, 48

F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding 200 feet outside the curtilage); United States v.

Brady, 993 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 45 feet outside the curtilage); United

States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 70 to 75 feet outside the

curtilage); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding 50

feet outside the curtilage), with United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.

2000) (finding 100 feet inside the curtilage); United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424, 1427

(9th Cir. 1993) (finding 60 feet inside the curtilage).

Moreover, and expanding beyond the simple calculation of distances, some circuit

courts have noted the importance in considering whether the type of land at issue is rural,

urban, or suburban. See U.S. v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277, on reh'g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d

Cir.1996) (concerning a rural property); U.S. v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256 (3d Cir.

1992) (concerning an urban property); see also U.S. v. Seidel, 794 F. Supp. 1098, 1103

(S.D. Fl. 1992) (concerning a suburban property). Thus, where the residence at issue is in

a rural setting, some courts have held that the curtilage may encompass more area than

would normally be included within the curtilage if the residence was in an urban or

suburban setting. See, e.g., Reilly, 76 F.3d at 1277 (finding that “on a large parcel of

land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the

residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door”); U.S. v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895,

902 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the “realities of rural country life dictate that distances

between outbuildings will be greater than on urban or suburban properties and yet still

encompass activities intimately associated with the home; this is the nature of the

farmstead.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Gordon’s eleven-acre property was located in rural San Diego county, and

included a main residence, a secondary residence, a travel trailer, and a covered carport

used for storage. (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at 30:11-21, 55:21-

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56:14, 62:16-25; Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo at 30, 55-6, 62.) Thus,

although the travel trailer at issue was located nearly 300 feet from the main residence,

(Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at 62:11-14; Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl.,

Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at 62), which exceeds the distance found to be inside the curtilage

in the Fourth Amendment cases noted above, the Court finds the rural nature of the

property, coupled with the sheer acreage of Gordon’s property, does not defeat a determination that the travel trailer was within the curtilage of the main residence. Therefore, in

light of the case-by-case analysis established by the Supreme Court in Dunn, and the

Ninth’s Circuit recognition that different types of land require a different analysis, the

Court finds the distance of the travel trailer from the main residence is not in and of itself

dispositive.9

 Accordingly, on the specific facts in this case, the Court finds that the travel

trailer is within the common curtilage of the main residence, and therefore, the third

Jacobs’ element is satisfied for purposes of extending coverage under Gordon’s PUP.

4. One Goal Consisting of Mutual Interests

Finally, the Court considers the extent to which Robert and Gordon directed their

attention towards “a common goal consisting of mutual interests.” Jacobs, 227 Cal. App.

3d at 594. However, because Gordon does not contest that he and Robert had the same

goal in mind—to allow Robert to live in the travel trailer until he got back on his

feet—the Court finds this factor is easily established. (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl., Ex. C,

Gordon Depo. at 27:5-6, 89:25-90:16; Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. A, Gordon Depo. at

27, 89-90.) Thus, it is immaterial that Robert and Gordon did not live under the same

roof, or that Gordon was in Tecate, Mexico for a large segment of Robert’s second stay in

the travel trailer. All that matters is that both Robert and Gordon both had the same goal

in mind—for Robert to “get on his feet” as soon as possible. (Doc. No. 17, O’Nell Decl.,

Ex. C., Gordon Depo. at 90:3-5; Doc. No. 14, Vida Decl., Ex. C, Gordon Depo. at 90.) 

9

 Additionally, the Court finds it immaterial that Gordon required Robert to erect a separate fence around the travel trailer. This fence was meant to inhibit the movement of

Robert’s dogs, not to prevent observation into the travel trailer from outside observers.

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Accordingly, the Court finds the fourth Jacobs’ factor also weighs in favor of extending

coverage under Gordon’s PUP.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Robert is a “member” of Gordon’s

“household” for purposes of extending coverage under Gordon’s PUP. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, (Doc. No. 14), and Defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, (Doc. No. 17). The Clerk of Court is

instructed to enter judgment and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 16, 2013

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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