Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08070/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08070-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Jackson Ellsworth, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 11-8070 PCT RCB(MEA)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Prison Health Services, )

Inc., et al. )

)

Defendants. ) )

After the denial of defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff pro se James Jackson Ellsworth filed a host

of pre-trial motions. More specifically, the following motions

are currently pending before the court: (1) a motion in limine

regarding his criminal history (Doc. 138); (2) a motion to

appoint an expert witness (Doc. 139); (3) a renewed motion for

sanctions (Doc. 144); (4) an “Objection to Defendant’s [sic]

Notice of Appearance/Request to Remove Defendants[’] Counsel”

(Doc. 148). In addition, the plaintiff filed a motion for a

court order as to the affidavit of Stephen D. Brown (Doc. 155),

and a motion to obtain a court transcript (Doc. 157). Although

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 164 Filed 12/12/13 Page 1 of 30
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1 For uniformity and ease of reference, all citations to page

numbers of docketed items are to the page assigned by the court’s case

management and electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system.

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the Honorable Mark E. Aspey, United States Magistrate Judge

recently issued an order denying those two motions (Doc. 162),

as more fully explained herein, this court is vacating that

order. 

The court may quickly dispatch with plaintiff Ellsworth’s

motion for sanctions because it is moot. The plaintiff’s other

motions warrant closer examination, however. 

I. “Renewed Motion for Sanctions”

The plaintiff is requesting that the court issue an order

to show cause and find the defendants in contempt for allegedly

failing to cooperate with him in preparing and filing the joint

proposed pre-trial order (“JPPTO”). As a sanction, the

plaintiff is also seeking a court order requiring the defendants

to pay him $65.00 for the costs he allegedly incurred in filing

this motion. 

Granting the plaintiff’s motion to extend the time in which

to file the JPPTO, the parties had until May 20, 2013, by which

to file that document. See Ord. (Doc. 133) at 6:12-161, ¶ (2).

Tellingly, the plaintiff brought this motion ten days prior to

that court ordered deadline. The plaintiff’s motion was, thus,

premature. 

More significantly, however, the plaintiff’s motion is moot

because he has already received the primary relief which he is

seeking therein. Accepting plaintiff’s claim that he did not

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receive a copy of the JPPTO, which the court sent to his last

known address (Doc. 145 Notice of Electronic Filing), the

defendants provided the plaintiff with another copy on August

29, 2013. See Ord. (Doc. 160) at 1:27-2:1 (citation omitted).

The foregoing also renders moot the plaintiff’s “supplemental

motion for sanctions[,]” which includes a request for an

extension of time in which to file the JPPTO. See Pl.’s Supp.

Mot. (Doc. 150) at 3. Accordingly, the court denies in its

entirety plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 144). 

II. Brown Affidavit

The plaintiff’s motion as to the Brown affidavit has its

origins in the inadvertent disclosure to him of “sensitive and

confidential information . . . produced in error by Lexington

Insurance Company (“Lexington”), a non-party[.]” See Mot. (Doc.

93) at 1:22-23. That disclosure resulted in motion practice

before this court including a hearing on September 11, 2012.

Doc. 109. Understandably, the Magistrate Judge was not as

familiar as is this court with the many nuances surrounding that

inadvertent disclosure, especially the representations during

that hearing made to this court by defense counsel Mary A. Palma

and fully discussed below. In light of the foregoing, the court

is vacating the Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 162) denying the

plaintiff’s “Motion for District Court Order Re: Stephen D.

Brown Affidavit” and his “Motion for Transcripts” (Doc. 157),

and considers those two motions next. 

Lexington is the insurer for the parent company of the

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2 As this court has previously recognized, “[a]fter PHS’s parent

corporation was acquired, PHS was renamed” to Corizon Health, Inc.

Ellsworth v. Prison Health Services Inc., 2012 WL 1107754, at *1 n. 1

(citation omitted); see also Ord. (Doc. 66) at 1, n. 1 (same). “The

rights and obligations of PHS are properly asserted by and against Corizon

Health, Inc.[,]” as PHS concedes. See Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 94) at 1:26, n. 1.

For consistency, the court will refer to this defendant as “PHS.” 

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defendant Prison Health Services, Inc. (“PHS”).2 Sept. 11, 2012

Audio Transcript (“Tr.”) at 9:45:52 a.m. - 9:45:55 a.m. PHS is

an additional insured on that policy. Id. at 9:45:56 a.m. -

9:46:00 a.m. The court assumes familiarity with Lexington’s

inadvertent disclosure to the plaintiff of certain documents

(“the Lexington documents”). Some of that background bears

repeating though, as it directly relates to the plaintiff’s

current motion to obtain the affidavit of Stephen D. Brown, PHS’

Senior Director of Professional Liability Claims, and the

appendices attached thereto. Those three appendices outline the

categories of Lexington documents which PHS deems to be

protected: (1) Protected Health Information; (2) Work Product;

and (3) Commercially Sensitive Documents. Id. at 9:51:22 a.m. -

9:53:57 a.m. Mr. Brown’s affidavit was exhibit “C” to PHS’

motion to strike the Lexington documents from the record and

require the plaintiff to return those documents (“the motion to

strike”). Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 93) at 12-14 (emphasis omitted).

After granting that motion to strike, the court also granted

PHS’ separate motion to, among other things, seal the Brown

affidavit and the Lexington documents (“the sealing order”).

See Ord. (Doc. 111). 

During the hearing on PHS’ motion to strike, the plaintiff

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3 Ms. Palma is a Georgia attorney representing defendants PHS and

Dr. Kirsten Mortenson, and was admitted to practice before this court pro

hac vice. Appl’n (Doc. 107). 

4 Although PHS alone moved to strike and to seal the Lexington

documents, PHS and co-defendant, Dr. Kirsten Mortenson, are opposing the

plaintiff’s motion to obtain the Brown affidavit. 

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maintains that the court “ordered” PHS’ counsel, Mary A. Palma,3

to provide the Brown affidavit to him. Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 155) at

2. Attempting to obtain that affidavit, the plaintiff claims

that he made repeated telephone requests of J. Scott Conlon,

PHS’ Phoenix based counsel. But, despite repeated assurances by

Mr. Conlon, plaintiff claims that he has yet to receive the

Brown affidavit. The plaintiff asserts that Mr. Brown is his

witness and that unspecified documents “potential[ly]” could be

used at trial. Id. at 3. Thus, the plaintiff is seeking a

court order requiring PHS to provide him with the Brown

affidavit.

Through attorney Conlon, the defendants4 retort that the

plaintiff is “either misrepresenting or . . . misread[ing]” the

court’s sealing order. Resp. (Doc. 156) at 2:17. The

defendants point out that that order mandates, among other

things, that the Brown affidavit “be placed under seal and not

incorporated into the regular record of this case[.]” Ord. (Doc.

111) at 1:21-22. The defendants further note that the sealing

order requires the Brown affidavit to “remain under seal un[til]

further order of this Court.” Id. at 1:22. Based upon the

foregoing, the defendants urge denial of plaintiff’s motion to

obtain the Brown affidavit.

In his reply, the plaintiff clarifies that the sealing order

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is not the basis for this motion. Rather, plaintiff Ellsworth

is relying upon his recollection of what transpired during the

September 11, 2012, hearing on PHS’ motion to strike. As the

plaintiff recalls it, during that hearing the court “ordered

defense counsel, Mary Ann Palmer [sic] to provide a copy” of the

Brown affidavit to him. See Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 155) at 2. In

part because attorney Conlon was not present at that hearing,

the plaintiff is requesting that the court order a written

transcript to resolve this motion. See Pl.’s Reply & Mot. (Doc.

157). 

There is no need for a written transcript. As with all

proceedings in this court, an electronic court recorder was

present, which means that this court has electronic access to

the entire September 11, 2012 hearing. Accordingly, the court

denies the plaintiff’s motion to obtain a written transcript of

that hearing (Doc. 157).

 During that September 11th hearing, attorney Palma

expressly stated that it was her “intent” to provide the

plaintiff with a copy of the Brown affidavit, and that she could

not explain why he did not receive it prior to the hearing. Tr.

at 9:42:00 a.m. – 9:42:10 a.m. Opting to proceed with the

hearing, the court instructed attorney Palma that if during her

argument she alluded to the Brown affidavit, for the plaintiff’s

benefit, she was to outline to what she was referring. Id. at

9:42:19 a.m. - 9:42:42 a.m. Attorney Palma advised that the

appendices to the Brown affidavit identified and described the

documents at issue. Id. at 9:55:03 a.m. - 9:55:11 a.m. 

After apologizing to the plaintiff for not having provided

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him with a copy of that affidavit, attorney Palma stated that

she did not anticipate that they would be going through each and

every document during the hearing. Id. at 9:55:12 a.m. -

9:55:21 a.m. Attorney Palma hastened to add, however, “We’ll

certainly make sure that the plaintiff is given a copy of Steve

Brown’s affidavit and the documents that we are talking about.”

Id. 9:55:22 a.m. - 9:55:28 a.m. She then opined that those

“documents probably compromise not more than 30% of the total

documents that were produced by Lexington.” Id. at 9:55:31 a.m.

- 9:55:40 a.m. 

The plaintiff is under the mistaken impression that this

court ordered PHS to provide him with a copy of the Brown

affidavit. As the electronic transcript reveals, however, it

was defense counsel who volunteered not once, but twice, to

provide the plaintiff with that affidavit. So, despite the

plaintiff’s characterization, PHS has not acted “contrary to

this court’s order[]” by not providing him with the Brown

affidavit. See Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 155) at 2. Nonetheless, as an

officer of the court, attorney Palma is bound by her

representations during the hearing. 

The sealing order still remains in effect though, as the

defendants are quick to point out. The defendants strongly

imply that the effect of that order is to prohibit the plaintiff

from obtaining the Brown affidavit, despite the fact that during

the hearing attorney Palma explicitly agreed to provide that

affidavit to the plaintiff. 

In any event, LRCiv 5.6(f) is clear. “If the Court orders

the sealing of any document” thereunder, “the Clerk shall file

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the order to seal and secure the sealed document from public

access.” LRCiv 5.6(f) (emphasis added). That Rule does not

preclude access of sealed documents to a party, such as

plaintiff Ellsworth. Accordingly, the court hereby grants the

plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 155) to obtain the Brown affidavit and

the three appendices thereto (Doc. 95). 

III. Felony Conviction Evidence

Plaintiff Ellsworth is seeking to preclude the defendants

from introducing evidence of the felony conviction for which he

is currently incarcerated. As the plaintiff describes it, that

conviction “is sexual in nature.” Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 138) at 2.

The plaintiff thus argues that not only will he be “unfair[ly]

prejudiced” by the introduction of that evidence, but it is “not

highly probative of [his] credibility.” Id. (citation omitted).

If the court will not exclude this evidence, the plaintiff is

willing to make a limited admission. He will “admit” that he

has a felony conviction, but not that “it was for a sexual

offense.” Id. at 3.

The defendants respond, based upon Fed.R.Evid. 609, that if

the plaintiff testifies, then they “are permitted to attack his

character for truthfulness by using [that] criminal conviction.”

Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 142) at 2:18-19. To impeach the plaintiff on

cross-examination, the defendants want to introduce evidence

that he is currently serving a ten-year sentence “for attempted

molestation of a child and dangerous crimes against children, a

class 3 felony.” Id. at 2:4-5 (citing exh. A thereto, Inmate

Data Sheet for James Ellsworth). The defendants want to crossexamine the plaintiff about the fact and date of that

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conviction, as well as “the nature of the crime charged[.]” Id.

at 4:14. The defendants do not elaborate as to the latter; so,

it is unclear as to exactly what they mean by “the nature of the

crime charged[.]” See id. 

At the same time, however, the defendants explicitly

“concede that they are not permitted to make inquiry into the

details of the underlying facts supporting Plaintiff’s

conviction.” Id. at 4:15-16. Given that concession, presumably

the defendants are equating “the nature of the crime charged”

with “attempted molestation of a child and dangerous crimes

against children, a class 3 felony.” Id. at 4:14; and at 2:4-5.

In any event, based upon Rule 609 and the federal cases

construing it, the defendants maintain that they have the “right

to impeach Plaintiff with his criminal conviction including the

nature of the offense.” Id. at 5:23-24 (emphasis added). Such

evidence is necessary, from the defendants’ standpoint, for the

jury to fairly evaluate the plaintiff’s credibility. 

In rejoinder, the plaintiff points out that during the

majority of the time that he was housed at the Mohave County

Jail (“MCJ”), where his claims arose, he was a pre-trial

detainee – not a convicted felon. The plaintiff did not become

a convicted felon until after his guilty plea, for which he was

sentenced on July 6, 2010. Based upon this sequence of events,

the plaintiff contends that his “truthfulness cannot be

attacked” because he was innocent until he pled guilty. Pl.’s

Reply (Doc. 145) at 2. The plaintiff offers no legal support

for this novel proposition, and the court can conceive of none.

In another example of circular reasoning, the plaintiff

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contends that because he is serving a sentence based upon his

guilty plea, his credibility is not at issue. Rule 609 does

not distinguish, and neither will this court, however, between

convictions based upon a guilty plea and those obtained

following a trial. 

In his reply, the plaintiff reiterates that given the nature

of his conviction, the prejudice far outweighs any possible

probative value; and, he disagrees with the defendants that a

limiting instruction can cure such prejudice. Lastly, the

plaintiff maintains that because he will be testifying, the jury

can assess his credibility without evidence of his felony

conviction. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the admission of

evidence of a criminal conviction. In pertinent part, that Rule

provides that evidence of a felony conviction “must be admitted,

subject to Rule 403, in a civil case . . . in which the witness

is not a defendant[.]” Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1)(A). In turn, Rule

403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of one

or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. 

Applying Rule 609 in tandem with Rule 403, the court will

grant the plaintiff’s motion to the extent that the defendants

may attempt to introduce evidence that he has been convicted of

“attempted molestation of a child and dangerous crimes against

children[.]” See Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 142) at 2:4-5. The nature

of that conviction, as opposed to the fact of the conviction

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itself, carries almost no probative weight. Furthermore, the

nature of plaintiff Ellsworth’s conviction is highly

prejudicial. See U.S. v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1360 n. 4 (9th

Cir. 1992) (“sex offense” conviction properly excluded because

the resultant prejudice from its admission was “beyond

question[]”). Moreover, allowing the jury to hear the nature of

plaintiff Ellsworth’s conviction has the potential to confuse

the issues.

That does not mean that the defendants are completely barred

from attempting to impeach the plaintiff’s credibility with

evidence of his felony conviction, but the scope of their

inquiry is limited. If plaintiff Ellsworth testifies, as he has

indicated he will, the defendants may introduce evidence of the

date of his felony conviction and that he is currently serving

a ten year sentence for that conviction. This evidence will be

admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment, and the court

will instruct the jury accordingly. The defendants may not

elicit testimony regarding the nature or any details or any

facts underlying that conviction, or the name of the offense.

Proceeding in this way is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s

stance that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, evidence of a

prior conviction admitted for impeachment purposes may not

include collateral details and circumstances attendant upon the

conviction.” United States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed,

“[g]enerally, only the prior conviction, its general nature, and

punishment of felony range [are] fair game for testing the

defendant’s credibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

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citations omitted). 

IV. Appointment of Expert Witness

Prior to plaintiff’s incarceration at the MCJ, Dr. Nayer

had been his treating neurologist for multiple sclerosis.

During the plaintiff’s incarceration at the Florence facility,

defendant Dr. Mortenson had a telephone consult with Dr. Nayer

regarding an exacerbation of the plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis.

Now, plaintiff Ellsworth is seeking to have the court appoint

Dr. Nayer as an expert pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 706. 

The plaintiff advances several reasons to justify such an

appointment. First, he claims that Dr. Nayer is a “material

witness” because of a purported factual dispute. Pl.’s Mot.

(Doc. 139) at 8. Second, believing that the defendants will be

calling Dr. Mortenson “as an expert witness[,]” the plaintiff

claims that he is entitled to the appointment of Dr. Nayer as an

expert. Id. Even if the court does not appoint Dr. Nayer as an

expert, the plaintiff requests appointment of another

unidentified “expert witness to refute Dr. Mortenson’s

testimony.” Id. at 13. The plaintiff also contends that expert

evidence is necessary to establish the required standard of

care, as well as to show deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Finally,

although at this point the plaintiff does not have the funds to

pay for an expert witness, he is agreeable to having “the court

order him to pay for the expert when funds are available.” Id.

at 10. 

In opposing Dr. Nayer’s appointment as an expert, the

defendants assert: (1) the discovery cut-off date under LRCiv.

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16.2(b)(2) has expired; and (2) there is no need for an expert

because in denying summary judgment, this court held that expert

opinion is not required to prove deliberate indifference.

Alternatively, if the court determines that “medical records,

without more, constitute[] expert neurological opinion

admissible at trial[,]” then the defendants request that they be

allowed to depose plaintiff’s proposed expert, and, in their

discretion, that they be allowed to designate a rebuttal

neurological expert. Resp. (Doc. 143) at 1:21-22.

Plaintiff retorts that he is unaware of any rule requiring

the appointment of an expert prior to summary judgment.

Regardless, the plaintiff claims that no prejudice would result

to the defendants if the court appoints an expert on his behalf.

Fed.R.Evid. 702 defines an expert witness as one “who is

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education[.]” Fed.R.Evid. 702. Appointment of an

expert witness is proper when “scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]” Fed.R.Evid.

702(a). Rule 706, which is the basis for plaintiff Ellsworth’s

motion, permits a court to appoint an expert witness, define the

expert’s duties and set compensation, including proportioning

payment between the parties. That Rule permits a district court

“on its own motion” or on the motion of any party to enter an

order “to show cause why expert witnesses should not be

appointed [.]” Fed.R.Evid. 706(a). A district court’s decision

under Rule 706 is subject to review under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Walker v. American Home Shield Long Term

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Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff Ellsworth, in seeking appointment of an expert

witness, and the defendants in opposing it, are missing a

critical point. Regardless of the timing of this motion, Rule

706 does not authorize this court to appoint Dr. Nayer as

plaintiff’s expert because that Rule “‘[o]nly allows a court to

appoint a neutral expert.’” See Womack v. GEO Group, Inc., 2013

WL 2422691, at *2 (D.Ariz. June 3, 2013) (quoting Gorton v.

Todd, 793 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1178 (E.D.Cal. 2011) (citation and

footnote omitted)) (emphasis added). “‘However, [r]easonably

construed, Rule 706 does not contemplate the appointment of, and

compensation for, an expert to aid one of the parties.’” Id.

(quoting Hollis v. Sloan, 2010 WL 4069336, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Oct.

18, 2010) (other quotation marks and citation omitted)); see

also Antonetti v. Skolnik, 2013 WL 593407, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb.

13, 2013) (citing Gorton, 793 F.Supp.2d at 1177 n. 6) (“The Rule

[706] does not provide for the appointment of an expert to be an

advocate for the Plaintiff’s position.”) (other citation

omitted). Indeed, “‘[t]he principal purpose of a courtappointed

[sic] expert is to assist the trier of fact, not to serve as an

advocate.’” Id. (quoting Hollis, 2010 WL 4069336, at *1)

(emphasis added). Put slightly differently, “[e]xpert

witnesses, . . . , cannot be appointed solely to aid the

litigant in presenting his case, witnesses can only be appointed

where necessary to aid the court.” Bovarie v. Schwarzenegger,

2011 WL 7468597, at *20 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 21, 2011) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added), adopted in whole, 2012 WL 760620

(S.D.Cal. March 7, 2012). As can be seen, Rule 706 does not

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authorize appointment of Dr. Nayer as an expert because

plaintiff Ellsworth is seeking his appointment, not as a neutral

expert, but to advocate on the plaintiff’s behalf. Although

this reason alone is more than a sufficient basis for denying

the plaintiff’s motion to appoint an expert, there are other

reasons as well. 

Another equally compelling reason for denying this motion

is that the plaintiff has not shown how Dr. Nayer’s testimony

will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or

in determining an issue of fact. As to the latter, the

plaintiff claims that there is a disputed factual issue as to

whether he was seen by Dr. Nayer or his physician’s assistant.

Plainly, however, a fact finder does not need any “scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge” to resolve that

claimed issue. See Fed.R.Evid. 702(a). 

Further, in arguing that he needs an expert to refute the

testimony of Dr. Mortenson, the plaintiff misconceives the

capacity in which she will be called to testify. Dr. Mortenson

is a party to this action; she is not an expert witness. In

fact, the defendants “have not named a designated expert.”

Resp. (Doc. 143) at 2:8. The foregoing undermines the

plaintiff’s argument that he is entitled to an expert to refute

Dr. Mortenson’s testimony.

“District ‘[c]ourts do not commonly appoint an expert

pursuant to Rule 706 and usually do so only in ‘exceptional

cases in which the ordinary adversary process does not suffice’

or when a case presents compelling circumstances warranting

appointment of an expert.’” Womack, 2013 WL 2422691, at *2

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(quoting Hart v. Agnos, 2008 WL 2008966, at *5 (D. Ariz. April

25, 2008) (citations omitted)). Plaintiff Ellsworth has made

neither showing. Without diminishing the significance of this

action to the parties, it does not fall into the category of

“exceptional cases in which the ordinary adversary process

[will] not suffice[.]” See id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

Likewise, there are no “compelling circumstances warranting

appointment of an expert[]” here. See id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The remaining issues are

relatively straightforward and pertain primarily to the issue of

whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. “[E]ssentially[,]” this is

“a question of subjective action or intent.” Antonetti, 2013 WL

593407, at *6 (citing Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 359 (7th

Cir. 1997)). Hence, “an expert would not . . . assist[]” in

making this subjective determination. Id. 

As in Ledford, “the question of whether the [defendants]

displayed deliberate indifference toward [Ellsworth’s] serious

medical needs d[oes] not demand that the jury consider probing,

complex questions concerning medical diagnosis and judgment.”

See Ledford, 105 F.3d at 359; see also Bovarie, 2011 WL 7468597,

at *20 (denying appointment of a medical expert under Rule 706

on an Eighth Amendment claim because such an expert “would not

add anything on the questions of whether Defendants . . .

perceived a serious medical need or whether they consciously

disregarded that need[]”). Succinctly put, “[e]xpert testimony

is not required to adequately evaluate evidence of Defendants’

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state of mind at the time of the incident.” Id. And, despite

plaintiff Ellsworth’s contrary assertion, because this case

involves deliberate indifference and not medical malpractice, an

expert is not needed to assist the fact finder “in determining

and applying the appropriate standard of care[.]” See Antonetti,

2013 WL 593407, at *6 (citing Ledford, 105 F.3d at 359 (“The

test for deliberate indifference is not as involved as that for

medical malpractice, an objective inquiry that delves into

reasonable standards of medical care.”)). 

Lastly, despite what plaintiff Ellsworth implies, his in

forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not

alter the foregoing analysis. Section 1915 “‘does not waive

payment of fees or expenses for witnesses.’” Watkins v. Baum,

2012 WL 5328734, at *1 (W.D.Wa. Oct. 29, 2012) (citing Dixon v.

Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993)). “More specifically,

‘[t]he plain language of section 1915 does not provide for the

appointment of expert witnesses to aid an indigent litigant.’”

Id. (quoting Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1995)

(other citations omitted). Additionally, as in Womack, the

“[p]laintiff has not pointed to, and the [c]ourt’s independent

research has not discovered, any federal statute authorizing the

expenditure of public funds for the appointment of an expert

witness to assist a pro se party in litigation.” Womack, 2013

WL 2422691, at *2. Thus, plaintiff Ellsworth cannot rely upon

Rule 706 “as a means of sidestepping Section 1915 and its

prohibition against appointing an expert witness to assist

indigent litigants.” See Bovarie, 2011 WL 7468597, at *20

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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5 In its summary judgment order, the court did indicate that “the

evidence includes expert medical opinion in the form of treatment

recommendations from Dr. Nayer, an expert[,]” which it found “support[ed]

Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment.” Ord. (Doc. 127) at 15:26-28.

The defendants correctly read that order to mean that the court so found

for the purposes of summary judgment only, but not for trial purposes.

Thus, because the court is not accepting Dr. Nayer’s treatment

recommendations as the equivalent of a neurological expert opinion at

trial, there is no need for the defendants, as they urge, to depose Dr.

Nayer and, at their discretion, “designate their own neurological expert.”

Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 143) at 3:12-13. 

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For all of these reasons, the court finds that plaintiff

Ellsworth’s motion to appoint an expert falls outside the scope

of Fed.R.Evid. 706, and must be denied.5 

V. “Objection to Notice of Appearance”/Request to Remove

Defense Counsel

On April 30, 2010, the plaintiff, through his criminal

counsel, appeared at a hearing in the Superior Court in Mohave

County. The plaintiff was seeking an order “requir[ing] the

jail to provide additional medical treatment.” Defs.’ Resp.

(Doc. 152) at 2:9-10. During that hearing, the Mohave County

prosecutor argued and Dr. Mortenson testified. See id. There

is no dispute that Tophas Anderson, IV, an attorney with Renaud

Cook Drury Mesaros, PA, the law firm representing the defendants

herein, attended that hearing, but did not participate. See

Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 148) at 2; and Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 152) at 2:13-

14. 

On May 9, 2013, attorney Anderson entered his appearance,

to which the plaintiff now objects, in this action on behalf of

the defendants, “in association with J. Scott Conlon,” another

attorney with the Renaud law firm. See Not. (Doc. 141) at 1:16-

17. The plaintiff is seeking to “remove” or, as the court

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construes his motion, to disqualify attorney Anderson from

representing the defendants in this case. Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 148)

at 1. Plaintiff Ellsworth claims that attorney Anderson has a

“conflict of interest” because he is a “potential witness” for

the plaintiff at trial. Id. at 2. The plaintiff acknowledges

that he intends to question attorney Anderson as to why

defendant PHS “sent [him] to the plaintiff’s criminal case[,]”

but he is adamant that he will not ask any questions pertaining

to attorney-client privilege or work product. Id. at 2-3.

In arguing for the denial of this motion, the defendants

point to the plaintiff’s lack of supporting legal authority. 

They also advance three specific merit based reasons for denial.

First, the defendants maintain that calling attorney Anderson as

plaintiff’s witness will result in improper “questions about

communications that are protected by the attorney-client

privilege.” Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 152) at 3:15-17 (citation

omitted). Second, the defendants posit that the plaintiff lacks

standing to waive the attorney-client privilege because the

defendants hold that privilege – not the plaintiff. Third,

reading the plaintiff’s motion as asserting a conflict because

attorney Anderson represented them in the plaintiff’s criminal

case and in this civil action, the defendants argue that no

conflict exists. That is not the basis for the plaintiff’s

claimed conflict, however. As the court interprets the

plaintiff’s argument, the conflict arises because he plans to

call attorney Anderson as a witness in the trial of this action.

Regardless, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has not met

his “heavy burden” warranting disqualification of attorney

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Anderson. Id. at 5. 

With one exception, there are no marked differences between

the plaintiff’s disqualification motion and his reply.

Plaintiff Ellsworth continues to strenuously deny that by

calling attorney Anderson as his witness, he is trying to probe

into privileged attorney-client communications. However, in his

reply, for the first time, the plaintiff mentions that he has

obtained the criminal hearing transcripts. Evidently, relying

upon those transcripts, the plaintiff intends to question

defendant Mortenson about her testimony in the criminal case. 

Without commenting one way or the other on the propriety of such

testimony by Dr. Mortenson, the court fails to see the

connection between any such testimony and this motion to

disqualify attorney Anderson as one of the defense lawyers. Dr.

Mortenson’s testimony in plaintiff’s criminal case simply has no

bearing on the disqualification issue now before the court.

That said, the broader issue still remains as to whether the

court should grant the plaintiff’s motion to remove attorney

Anderson as defense counsel. As can be seen, the defendants’

opposition raises issues of attorney-client privilege and

attorney disqualification, which the court will separately

address. 

1. Attorney-Client Privilege

“The attorney-client privilege protects confidential

communications between attorneys and clients, which are made for

the purpose of giving legal advice.” United States v. Richey,

632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United

States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584

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6 The defendants, in invoking the attorney-client privilege,

mistakenly rely heavily upon Arizona law. See, e.g., Defs.’ Resp. (Doc.

152) at 2:21-4:14. However, “[i]ssues concerning application of the

attorney-client privilege in the adjudication of federal law are governed

by federal common law.” United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 608 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed,

“since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts have uniformly

held that federal common law of privilege, not state law applies.” United

States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Thus, in Ruehle, the Ninth Circuit held that

it was reversible error for the district court to rely “almost exclusively

upon California state law to define the attorney-client relationship and

the attorney-client privilege.” Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 608. The Ruehle Court

admonished the district court for not “referencing the well-established

eight-part test” which the Ninth Circuit has adopted (and is set forth

above) for determining whether an attorney-client privilege exists. Id.

As is readily apparent, this court must apply the federal common law of

attorney-client privilege here, and not, as the defendants suggest, Arizona

state law. See, e.g., Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 152) at 3:18 (plaintiff’s

“request” to question Mr. Anderson regarding attorney-client communications

“violates Arizona law[]”). 

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(1981)). “The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the

privileges for confidential communications known to the common

law.”6 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. The purpose of that privilege

is “to protect confidential communications between a party and

its attorney in order to encourage ‘full and frank communication

between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader

public interests in the observance of law and administration of

justice.’” Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Pixcir

Microelectronics Co. Ltd., 2013 WL 4499006, at *3 (D.Nev. Aug.

14, 2013) (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). “The Ninth Circuit

has adopted Dean Wigmore’s articulation of the elements of the

attorney-client privilege: (1) where legal advice of any kind is

sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his or her

capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that

purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are, at

that instance, permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by the

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client or by the legal advisor, and (8) unless the protection is

waived.” Id. (citing, inter alia, In re: Fischel, 557 F.2d 209,

211 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

“Under federal law, the attorney-client privilege is

strictly construed.” Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 608. That is

“‘[b]ecause it impedes full and free discovery of the truth[.]’”

Elan, 2013 WL 4499006, at *4 (quoting Weil v.

Investment/Indicators, Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d

18, 24 (9th Cir. 1980)). “The burden is on the party asserting

the privilege to establish all the elements of the privilege.”

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the defendants, as

“[t]he party asserting the attorney-client privilege[,] ha[ve]

the burden of establishing the relationship and privileged

nature of the communication.” Richey, 632 F.3d at 566 (citation

omitted) (emphasis omitted). “A party claiming the privilege

must identify specific communications and the grounds supporting

the privilege as to each piece of evidence over which privilege

is asserted.” Martin, 278 F.3d at 1000 (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). “Blanket assertions are extremely

disfavored.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

Further “[w]hat is vital to the privilege is that the

communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining

legal advice from the lawyer.’” Richey, 632 F.3d at 566 n. 3

(quoting United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir.

1973) (emphasis in original) (other quotation marks and citation

omitted). It is worth noting that “[t]he fact that a person is

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a lawyer does not make all communications with that person

privileged.” Martin, 278 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). “The

party asserting the privilege must, at a minimum, make a prima

facie showing that the privilege protects the information the

party intends to withhold.” Elan, 2013 WL 44990006, at *4

(citation omitted).

The defendants have not met their burden of proof on this

record. According to the defendants, plaintiff Ellsworth

“expressly admits that he intends to call Mr. Anderson to the

stand for the sole purpose of asking him questions about

communications that are protected by the attorney-client

privilege.” Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 152) at 3:15-17 (citation

omitted) (emphasis added). The plaintiff made no such

admission, however. What the plaintiff actually wrote is that

he “plan[s] on calling Mr. Anderson as a witness for a simple

line of questioning as to why defendant [PHS] sent Mr. Anderson

to the plaintiff’s criminal case.” Mot. (Doc. 148) at 2. The

defendants are assuming that attorney Anderson’s response will

reveal that he and PHS communicated in confidence for the

purpose of obtaining legal advice. That is speculation,

however, and cannot be ascertained on this record, especially

given the defendants’ failure to “make a specific proffer of

what communications, if any, are subject to the attorney-client

privilege[.]” See United States v. Sakai, 2011 WL 2581909, at *8

(D. Hawai’i June 7, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 2600553 (D. Hawai’i

June 28, 2011). 

Moreover, the defendants cannot avail themselves of any

presumptions to overcome this lack of proof. See In re Hotels

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Nevada, LLC, 458 B.R. 560, 573 (Bkrtcy.D.Nev. 2011) (quoting 

1 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES,

§ 11:10 (2011)) (other citations omitted) (“‘The proponent of

the privilege bears the burden of persuasion for each element of

the privilege, unassisted by presumptions that confidentiality

was intended and has been preserved, or that legal advice was

being sought through the consultations.’”) Therefore, because

the defendants “did not make a specific proffer of what

communications, if any . . . are the subject of the attorneyclient privilege” as to attorney Anderson’s potential testimony,

the court will not, at this juncture, prohibit the plaintiff

from calling attorney Anderson as a witness at trial. See

Richey, 632 F.3d at 567 (citations omitted). That does not

necessarily mean that the court will allow attorney Anderson to

testify at trial, however. At that time, the defendants will be

free to make a specific proffer as to any claimed privileged

attorney-client communication. 

2. Attorney Disqualification - Advocate-Witness Rule

As the defendants are quick to point out, plaintiff

Ellsworth did not cite any authority for his motion to

disqualify attorney Anderson. Given that the plaintiff is

seeking to disqualify Anderson because he will be a witness at

trial, clearly, the predicate for this motion is Ethical Rule

(“ER”) 3.7(a) of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct.

That Rule applies to attorneys appearing before this court in

accordance with LRCiv 83.2(e). ER 3.7(a) prohibits an attorney

from acting both as an advocate and a witness at trial. In

particular, that Rule states in relevant part:

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 A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in 

which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness 

unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 

(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value 

 of legal services rendered in the case; or 

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would 

 work substantial hardship on the client. 

Ariz. Sup.Ct. R. 42, Rules of Prof’l Conduct, ER 3.7(a)(2013).

“[T]he reason for th[is] advocate-witness rule is possible

prejudice at trial: A witness is required to testify on the

basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to

explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be

clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken

as proof or as an analysis of the proof.” Hillis v. Heineman,

2009 WL 798872, at *1 (D.Ariz. Mar. 25, 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“To avoid the use of ethical rules for the tactical

disqualification of opposing counsel, Arizona law provides that

‘[o]nly in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be

allowed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of

his opponent.’” Tavilla v. Cephalon, Inc., 2012 WL 4466544, at

*2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting Alexander v. Superior

Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz. 1984)). “As

the Ninth Circuit has noted, disqualification motions should be

subjected to ‘particularly strict scrutiny’ because of their

potential for abuse.” Karlsson Group, Inc. v. Langley Farms

Invs., LLC, 2009 WL 2843290, at *3 (D.Ariz. Sept. 1, 2009)

(quoting Optyl Eyewear Fashion International Corp. v. Style

Companies, Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985)); accord

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Security General Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 332,

718 P.2d 985, 988 (Ariz. 1986) (Motions to disqualify “require

careful scrutiny of the facts before such a result is

permitted.”) Thus, in carrying out its “duty and responsibility

of supervising the conduct of attorneys who appear before it[,]”

Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1996), this

court “must . . . be solicitous of a client’s right freely to

choose his counsel and be wary of disqualification motions

interposed for tactical reasons[.]” Jamieson v. Slater, 2006 WL

3421788, at *3 (D.Ariz. Nov. 27, 2006) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). At the same time, however, “as the

Arizona Supreme Court has acknowledged, . . . ‘the rules do

permit a party to call adverse counsel as a witness and

therefore there are times when counsel must be disqualified

because an adverse party intends to call him as a witness.’”

Tavilla, 2012 WL 4466544, at *2 (quoting Security General, 718

P.2d at 988). 

A lawyer may be disqualified under ER 3.7(a) only if he is

a “necessary witness.” Arizona applies a “dual test for

‘necessity.’” Security General, 718 P.2d at 988. Under the

first prong of that test, “the proposed testimony must be

relevant and material.” Id. Second, that testimony “must also

be unobtainable elsewhere.” Id. Significantly, “[a] party’s

mere declaration of an intention to call opposing counsel as a

witness is an insufficient basis for disqualification even if

that counsel could give relevant testimony.” Id. (citation

omitted). This district court “is vested with ‘substantial

latitude’ in deciding whether and when to disqualify counsel.”

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United States v. Saathoff, 2007 WL 2990014, at *1 (S.D.Cal. Oct.

11, 2007) (quoting United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 800 (9th

Cir. 1999)). As the moving party, plaintiff Ellsworth “has the

burden of “sufficiently showing why the [c]ourt should not

uphold the presumption against disqualification of opposing

counsel.” Karlsson Group, 2009 WL 2843290, at *3 (citation

omitted). 

On this record, plaintiff Ellsworth has not met that “high

burden[.]” See id. (citation omitted). In the lodged JPPTO, the

plaintiff lists attorney Anderson as a witness, indicating that

he “is expected to testify to the reason he made an appearance

with Defendant Mortenson in Plaintiff’s criminal case on . . .

April 20, 2010.” JPPTO (Doc. 154) at 11:15-16, ¶ F(3). The

plaintiff’s disqualification motion and reply echo that

statement. In both, as already explained, the plaintiff states

that he wants to question attorney Anderson as to why the

defendants had him appear at the plaintiff’s criminal

proceeding. 

None of the foregoing is responsive, however, to the first

test of necessity. The plaintiff has not explained how such

testimony is “relevant and material” to the critical issues at

trial pertaining to his claims of deliberate indifference.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record as to the second

prong of necessity. The plaintiff has not shown that attorney

Anderson’s testimony, whatever it purports to be, is

“unobtainable elsewhere.” Given Arizona’s presumption against

disqualifying opposing counsel, and the plaintiff’s lack of the

necessary proof to support disqualification, the court denies

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this motion. See In re Moore, 488 B.R. 120, 127 (D. Hawai’i

2013) (citations omitted) (no abuse of discretion where court

denied debtor’s motion to disqualify attorney and law firm where

the debtor did not “explain what testimony she intended to

obtain from [that attorney], nor whether it was [un]available

from other sources[]”); Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v.

Fullers’ White Mtn. Motors, Inc., 2008 WL 828732, at *6 (D.Ariz.

Mar. 26, 2008) (refusing to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel in

light of Arizona law’s presumption against disqualification, and

because the defendants did not meet their burden of showing the

necessity of plaintiffs’ counsel as a witness). 

As just explained, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion

to disqualify attorney Anderson to serve as defense counsel in

this case. Resolution of the issue of whether the plaintiff may

call Mr. Anderson as a witness at trial, and the extent of his

testimony, if any, will have to await trial though. At that

time, the court will entertain the parties’ respective proffers.

For the reasons set forth above, the court hereby ORDERS

that:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as

to:

(a) Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: 

 Plaintiff’s Criminal History (Doc. 138); 

(b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Expert 

 Witness for Trial (Doc. 139); and

(c) Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Sanctions 

 Against Defendants/Request for Show Cause 

 Hearing (Doc. 144);

the court FURTHER ORDERS that:

(2) the Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Re: Plaintiff’s

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Criminal History (Doc. 138) is GRANTED to the extent that

the defendants may not introduce evidence of the specifics

of the plaintiff’s felony conviction, but it is DENIED

insofar as the defendants are seeking to introduce evidence

of the date of plaintiff’s felony conviction and that he is

currently serving a ten year sentence for that conviction.

This evidence will be admitted for the limited purpose of

impeachment. 

(3) the Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Expert Witness for 

 Trial (Doc. 139) is DENIED;

(4) the Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Sanctions Against

Defendants/Request for Show Cause Hearing (Doc. 144) is

DENIED; 

(5) the Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendants[’] Notice of

Appearance/Request to Remove Defendants[’] Counsel (Doc.

148) is DENIED; and

(6) the plaintiff’s “Motion for District Court Order Re: 

 Stephen D. Brown Affidavit” (Doc. 155) is GRANTED;

(a) the defendants shall provide a copy of the Brown

affidavit and the three appendices attached thereto to

plaintiff within fifteen (15) days from the date of

entry of this order; and

(b) the plaintiff shall refrain from disclosing to

anyone, whether orally or in writing, the information

contained in any of the documents provided pursuant to

paragraph (6); 

(7) the plaintiff’s “Motion for Transcripts” (Doc. 157) is

 DENIED;

(8) the plaintiff’s “Motion to Reconsider Magistrate’s

Order” (Doc. 163) is denied;

(9) the parties are to appear telephonically on the 13th

day of January, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. for the purpose of

discussing the time frames which need to be determined with

respect to their Joint Pretrial Statement and Final

Pretrial Order (Doc. 154). Defense counsel shall provide

the Court with a telephone number where plaintiff may be

contacted and make the necessary arrangements for his

appearance by telephone at the hearing; and

. . .

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(9) with respect to the Joint Pretrial Statement and Final

Pretrial Order (Doc. 154), in light of the rulings herein,

the court strikes page 18:19-23. 

DATED this 12th day of December, 2013.

Copies to plaintiff pro se and all counsel of record

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 164 Filed 12/12/13 Page 30 of 30