Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_00-cv-02370/USCOURTS-casd-3_00-cv-02370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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00cv2370

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD LUKEN,

Petitioner,

v.

STEVEN CAMBRA, et al.,

Respondents.

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Civil No. 00-CV-2370-L(LAB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

UNDER RULE 60(b) [doc. #73]

Petitioner Richard Luken filed a petitioner for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 on November 29, 2000. On May 3, 2001, petitioner amended his petition. Respondents

filed their answer [doc. #44] to the amended petition and petitioner filed a traverse [doc. #45]. 

On August 9, 2001, petitioner submitted supplemental lodgements in support of his petition. 

On April 11, 2002, then-United States Magistrate Judge Larry A. Burns issued a Report

and Recommendation (“Report”) describing the legal and factual basis for recommending that

petitioner’s habeas corpus petition be denied. The parties were permitted to file objections to the

Report. On May 3, 2002, petitioner timely filed objections to the Report. 

The Court reviewed the Report and petitioner’s objections thereto, and on August 14,

2002, the Court adopted the Report in its entirety and denied with prejudice the petition for writ

of habeas corpus. [doc. #62]. Judgment was entered on August 15, 2002. [doc. #63]. On August

27, 2002, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. The district court denied petitioner a certificate of

Case 3:00-cv-02370-L-LAB Document 74 Filed 08/14/07 Page 1 of 5
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1 The Court notes that petitioner did not serve respondents with a copy of this motion.

Accordingly, the Court could have stricken the motion. Nevertheless, the Court will review the

merits of the motion sua sponte.

2 The day after judgment was entered in this action, petitioner attempted to file a motion

to amend the petition. But the motion was rejected and not filed. Accordingly, the motion was never

considered and the Court has taken no action on the issue of petitioner amending the petition after the

entry of judgment.

2 00cv2370

appealability concluding that he had failed to raise serious and substantial legal concerns that

implicated his constitutional rights. [doc. #67]. On August 4, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals also denied petitioner a certificate of appealability which served to terminate the appeal.

[doc. #68].

Almost four years later, on May 30, 2007, petitioner attempted to file a document entitled:

“Motion to have Judge Burns excluded.” The Court rejected the document because the case was

closed. [doc. #70]. On July 18, 2007, petitioner attempted to file a “Motion/Petition for

Certificate of Appealability” [doc. #71] which the Court again rejected because the district and

appellate courts previously had denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability and

the case had been closed. 

On August 8, 2007, petitioner filed a motion for relief1

 from the judgment that dismissed

the petition with prejudice and/or denied motion to amend.2

 [doc. #73] Petitioner brings his

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6). (See Motion at 1).

DISCUSSION

Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a means of altering a judgment

for one of six reasons. Rule 60(b) provides:

(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;

Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a

party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding

for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the

judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying

relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a

reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the

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3 00cv2370

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. . . ..

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).

1. Request for relief under Rule 60(b)(5)

As noted above, petitioner brings his Rule 60(b) motion under subsections (5) and (6). A

review of the motion, however, finds no statement indicating that the “judgment has been

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed

or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). The Court’s entry of judgment in 2002 was not “based

on” a judgment that has been reversed or vacated. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); Tomlin v.

McDaniel, 865 F.2d 209, 210-11 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he application of Rule 60(b)(5) is limited

to a judgment based on a prior judgment reversed or otherwise vacated-based in the sense of res

judicata, or collateral estoppel, or somehow part of the same proceeding.”). Accordingly, the

Court will deny petitioner’s motion to the extent it relies on Rule 60(b)(5).

2. Timeliness of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion

A party is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where “extraordinary circumstances

prevented [him] from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.”

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir.1997) (citations and quotation marks

omitted); see also Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 200-02, 71 S.Ct. 209 (1950). Rule

60(b)(6) is to be used “sparingly [and] as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.” United

States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). Further, Rule 60(b)

expressly limits the time within which a motion for relief from judgment may be made. Motions

based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); on

newly discovered evidence, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2); or on fraud, misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3), must be made “within a reasonable

time” and “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or

taken,” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Motions based on other reasons, including on “any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment,” FED. R. CIV.P. 60(b)(6), must be made

“within a reasonable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). “What constitutes ‘reasonable time’ depends

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upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for the

delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice

to other parties.” Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Here, petitioner’s petition was filed on November 29, 2000; judgment entered on August

15, 2002; the notice of appeal filed on August 27, 2002; the appeal dismissed by way of a denial

for a certificate of appealability on August 4, 2003. The present motion was filed on August 8,

2007. Because an appeal was taken and dismissed four years prior to the pending motion, the

interest in finality must be given “great weight.” Id. 

A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is required to show “extraordinary

circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final judgment. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641,

2649 (2005)(citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199(1950); Liljeberg v. Health

Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)). “This very strict interpretation of Rule

60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 873

(Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). “Such [extraordinary] circumstances will rarely occur in the

habeas context.” Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2649.

Luken has not demonstrated that “extraordinary circumstances prevented [him] from

taking timely action to prevent or correct” the judgment. Hamilton v. Newland, 374 F.3d 822,

825 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997))

(alteration in original). There is nothing in the record to demonstrate diligence in pursuing his

claims during the four year period after his appeal was dismissed. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449

F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). There was no “change of circumstances between the time when

[he] filed his habeas petition and the time when he filed his 60(b) motion” that justifies relief. 

Id. His delay in raising his current motion “may be attributable to inattention or inexperience

but neither deficiency constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ that justifies Rule 60(b)

relief.” Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at 1273. Circumstances have not changed apart from petitioner’s

belated attempt to argue a legal theory he raised or should have raised earlier. 

Finally, to the extent Luken's Rule 60(b)(6) motion attempts to “assert, or reassert, claims

of error in [his] state conviction,” the Court cannot consider them. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545

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U.S. 524, 538, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (2005)(“In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will

contain one or more ‘claims.’ A motion can also be said to bring a ‘claim’ if it attacks the

federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits, since alleging that the court erred in

denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant

is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief. That is not the case,

however, when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court's resolution of

a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.”). 

Luken states that “I am not attacking Judge Burns ruling on the merits rather I am

attacking on the integrity of the proceedings and or a defect in the integrity of the judgment on

cv 2370L(LAB).” (Motion for relief at 2, n.1). Accordingly, the Court treats petitioner’s motion

as one under 60(b) and not as a second or successive habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) that would require the approval of the Court of Appeals

to be filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Hamilton v. Newland, 374 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2004)

Luken’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is untimely. Moreover, petitioner cannot challenge the

Court’s prior determination on the merits of his habeas petition in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 524, passim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED denying petitioner’s motion for relief from

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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