Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459-37/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARYLON BOYD, for herself and as

Executor of the Estate of CAMMERIN

BOYD, deceased, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-04-5459 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AS TO OFFICER JAMES O’MALLEY

AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AS TO CITY AND COUNTY

OF SAN FRANCISCO

(Docket No. 192)

Before the Court is defendants’ motion, filed March 16, 2007, for summary judgment

as to San Francisco Police Officer James O’Malley (“Officer O’Malley”) and for partial

summary judgment as to the City and County of San Francisco (“City”). Plaintiffs have filed

opposition to the motion; defendants have filed a reply. Having considered the papers filed

in support of and in opposition to the motion, as well as the arguments of counsel at the

April 20, 2007 hearing, and for the reasons set forth at the hearing, the Court rules as

follows:

1. With respect to plaintiffs’ claim against Officer O’Malley for violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer

O’Malley’s use of force against decedent Cammerin Boyd (“Boyd”) was objectively

unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him. See Graham v.

Case 3:04-cv-05459-MMC Document 211 Filed 04/23/07 Page 1 of 3
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Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). Although

the evidence is undisputed that Officer O’Malley had probable cause to believe that Boyd

posed a threat of serious physical harm to Officer O’Malley and to others, reasonable jurors

could come to differing conclusions as to whether the use of deadly force was necessary to

prevent Boyd from escaping at the moment Officer O’Malley fired his gun at him. 

Compare, e.g., McCaslin v. Wilkins, 183 F.3d 775, 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding triable

issue on Fourth Amendment claim where police shot defendant after high speed

automobile chase and evidence was disputed as to whether vehicle had stopped or was

advancing on police at time of shooting) and Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 135 n.2,

136 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding triable issue as to Fourth Amendment claim where armed

suspect began moving towards police officers but had stopped for “perhaps four seconds”

before being shot by police officer) with Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir.

2002) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where car chase had “stopped for, at most, a

very few seconds when shots were fired” and “reasonable police officers could have

believed that the chase was not over”).

Nonetheless, Officer O’Malley is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the

Fourth Amendment claim, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001), because the

law was not sufficiently settled, at the time of the incident, that Officer O’Malley was not

entitled to use deadly force in the circumstances he confronted. See, e.g., Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2004) (finding, where officer shot fleeing suspect who

presented risk to others, Fourth Amendment law not “clearly established”; noting “this area

is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case”); Pace, 283 F.3d

at 1283 (finding no “clearly established rule” precluding police officer from using deadly

force “where the fleeing suspect appeared to be dangerous by virtue of his hazardous

driving . . . and where the suspect remained in his automobile with the engine running,

even when almost surrounded by officers and where – IF the chase had ended at all – it

had ended (at most) a very few seconds before the officers fired”) (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the Fourth

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Amendment claim asserted against Officer O’Malley is hereby GRANTED.

2. With respect to the state law claims, the same triable issues exist with respect to

the reasonableness of Officer O’Malley’s use of force, and as defendant concedes no

immunity is applicable to such claims, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the

state law claims asserted against Officer O’Malley is hereby DENIED.

3. With respect to the state law claim against the City for negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention, defendants have not demonstrated that the reasoning of

Armenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal. 2d 448, 457 (1954), should be extended to bar such claims. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the state law claim against

the City for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention is hereby DENIED. 

This order terminates Docket No. 192.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-05459-MMC Document 211 Filed 04/23/07 Page 3 of 3