Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02518/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02518-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MCCAW, CDCR #AK-0997,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-02518-BAS-AHG

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

v.

AJMEL SANGHA, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 15, 2017, 

alleging that he received inadequate medical care while incarcerated at Centinela State 

Prison. (ECF No. 1.) Despite being granted an extension of time to object to the Report 

and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued in this case, Plaintiff has not furthered his 

prosecution of this case in the four months since that extended deadline. Accordingly, for 

the reasons discussed below, the Court exercises its inherent authority to DISMISS 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s action.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on December 15, 2017. (ECF 

No. 1.) The Court found that some claims against some defendants survived screening and 

directed the US Marshals to effectuate service of the Complaint and Supplemental 

Complaint. (ECF No. 9.)

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On June 26, 2019, Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt issued a R&R recommending 

that this Court grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and deny 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. (ECF No. 30.) The parties had until July 17, 2019 to object 

to the R&R. No objections were filed. Thus, on July 26, 2019, this Court adopted the R&R

in its entirety and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by August 30, 2019. 

(ECF No. 31.) On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file 

objections to the R&R, stating that he received the R&R two months late because it was 

sent to the wrong address. (ECF No. 32.) The Court granted the request and extended 

Plaintiff’s time to object to October 18, 2019. (ECF No. 33.) Pursuant to the Court’s 

instructions, a copy of the Order was mailed to two addresses on file for Plaintiff — one to 

California State Prison in Lancaster and one to the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, 

which was listed as Plaintiff’s return address in his most recent filing. (Id.) The order sent 

to California State Prison was returned to the Court as undeliverable on September 23, 

2019, indicating that Plaintiff had been paroled and providing no forwarding address. (ECF 

No. 34.) 

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.11(b), pro se litigants are required to keep the court 

and opposing parties apprised of their current address. The rule specifically provides:

If mail directed to a pro se plaintiff by the clerk at the plaintiff's last designated 

address is returned by the Post Office, and if such plaintiff fails to notify the 

court and opposing parties within 60 days thereafter of the plaintiff's current address, the court may dismiss the action without prejudice for failure to 

prosecute.

CivLR 83.11(b). Thus, Plaintiff had until November 22, 2019 to advise the Court of his 

updated address. However, as of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has not done so.

Plaintiff was ordered to show cause by December 26, 2019 why the action should 

not be dismissed for his failure to prosecute the case. (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff was warned 

that a failure to timely respond to the OSC would result in dismissal of his action. (Id.) As 

of the date of this order, Plaintiff has not responded to the Court’s OSC.

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II. ANALYSIS

“District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and, ‘[i]n the 

exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 

dismissal of a case.’” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 

Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 829 

(1986); accord Link v. Wabash, R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (holding courts are 

vested with an inherent power “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 

expeditious disposition of cases.”) Although due process generally requires that the party 

have notice and the opportunity to be heard before dismissal, when a party may be said to 

have knowledge of the consequences of his failure to act, the court may dispense with the 

necessity for advance notice and a hearing. Link, 370 U.S. at 630-32. “Despite this 

authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and, therefore, it should only be imposed in extreme 

circumstances.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260. 

“The circumstances in which a court may exercise its inherent power to dismiss an 

action include an action where a Plaintiff has failed to prosecute the case[.]” Link, 370 U.S. 

at 630. In determining whether to exercise this power, “the district court must weigh five 

factors, including: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the 

court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 

alternatives.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (internal quotations omitted).

A. Public’s Interest In Expeditious Resolution

“[T]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 

dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). This case has 

been pending for over two years, six months of which have elapsed since this Court adopted 

the R&R and provided Plaintiff with instructions for proceeding. Thus, the Court finds that 

this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

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B. Court’s Need to Manage its Docket

A district court is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular 

case interferes with docket management and the public interest. Ash v. Cuetkov, 739 F.2d 

493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has not updated his address with the Court or otherwise 

made his whereabouts known the to Court or the parties in this case, demonstrating that 

Plaintiff does not intend to prosecute this action and “impermissibly allowing [P]laintiff to 

control the pace of the docket rather than the [C]ourt.” See Smith v. Cty. Of Riverside 

Sheriff Dep’t, No. ED CV 17-1969 DSF (SP), 2019 WL 7865170, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 

18, 2019) (citing Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is incumbent 

upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of 

litigants.”)). Consequently, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.

C. Prejudice to the Defendants

“To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish that plaintiff’s actions impaired 

defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of 

the case.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (citing Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 

131 (9th Cir. 1987)). “[T]he pendency of the lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial itself to 

warrant dismissal.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991; accord Ash, 739 F.2d at 496. However, 

“even in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant,” prejudice is 

presumed from unreasonable delay. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1994).

“The risk of prejudice to a defendant is related to a plaintiff’s reason for failure to 

prosecute an action.” Garcia v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:19-CF-00008-PSG-MAA, 

2019 WL 6040412, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019) (citing Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CF-00008-PSG-MAA, 2019 WL 6039943 

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019). However, because the Court does not have Plaintiff’s updated 

mailing address, Plaintiff’s reasons for failing to prosecute the action are unknown. 

Because the presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff’s unexplained failure to 

prosecute, the third factor favors dismissal. See Garcia, 2019 WL 6040412, at *4 (citing 

Laurino v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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D. Public Policy

Public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 

The Court recognizes that this factor weighs against dismissal.

E. Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives

This factor examines whether less drastic alternatives to dismissal are feasible given 

the circumstances of the case. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1455. “[A] district court’s warning 

to a party that [its] failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the 

‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. 

The Court attempted to provide Plaintiff several opportunities to continue 

prosecuting this action by extending Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the R&R even after 

the Court had adopted it as its final order on the Motion to Dismiss and issuing an OSC to 

allow Plaintiff a final opportunity to litigate the case. (ECF Nos. 33, 36.) However, in light 

of Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court about his new address, the Court finds that less 

drastic alternatives to dismissal are not available in these circumstances. See Carey v. King, 

856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that there was no less drastic sanction 

available than dismissal where mail addressed to plaintiff was returned by the post office 

as undeliverable and plaintiff did not provide updated address to court). As a result, this 

factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 

On balance, four out of five factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Accordingly, the 

Court exercises its inherent authority to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. 

See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this civil action in 

its entirety based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The 

Court Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 18, 2020

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