Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00543/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00543-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Forest Clayton,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0543-PHX-SMM (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE, UNITED STATES SENIOR 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Forest Clayton’s (“Petitioner”) Petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have 

answered (Doc. 10), and Petitioner has replied (Doc. 11). The matter is deemed ripe for 

consideration. 

The Petition contains one ground for relief. Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel 

was constitutionally ineffective in connection with plea agreements that Petitioner signed. 

The Petition is timely and the ground for relief is not procedurally defaulted. The 

undersigned, however, finds that the ground for relief is meritless. It is therefore 

recommended that the Court deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. It is also 

recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Petitioner Entered into Plea Agreements in Three Separate Cases

On March 1, 2012, Petitioner entered into plea agreements in three criminal cases 

filed in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County. The cases relate to events 

that took place in May 2011.

1. Case No. CR2011-123862 (Comerica Robbery)

On May 6, 2011, Petitioner entered a Comerica bank branch, handed an employee 

a note stating “this is a robbery,” and told the employee that the robbery would be easy 

and no one would get hurt. (Id. at 77). The employee gave Petitioner $2,494 from the 

cash drawer and Petitioner left. (Id.).

In his plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to robbery, a class 4 nondangerous felony. Petitioner also agreed to pay restitution to Comerica in the amount of 

$2,499 plus an additional amount not to exceed $1,000. (Id. at 54-56).

2. Case No. CR2011-048276 (Days Inn Armed Robbery/Comfort Inn 

Attempted Armed Robbery)

On May 10, 2011, Petitioner entered a Days Inn motel and told an employee that 

he was interested in renting a room. (Id. at 78). Petitioner then placed a bag on the 

counter, placed his hand inside the bag, and told the employee “I have a gun in the bag. I 

don’t want to shoot you. Just give me the money. . . .” (Id.). The employee gave 

Petitioner $300 in cash from the register and Petitioner left. (Id.).

On May 12, 2011, Petitioner entered a Comfort Inn motel and told an employee 

that he wanted to rent a room. (Id.). Petitioner placed a bag on the counter, placed his 

hand inside the bag, and told the employee that he was robbing the motel and that he 

would shoot the employee if the employee did not give him the money from the register. 

(Id.). After the employee fled from the front desk to the back office, Petitioner left the 

motel. (Id.).

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to (i) attempted armed robbery, a class 3 nondangerous felony and (ii) armed robbery, a class 2 non-dangerous felony. Petitioner also 

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agreed to pay restitution to the Days Inn motel in the amount of $300 plus an additional 

amount not to exceed $1,000. (Id. at 62-64).

3. Case No. CR2011-125379 (Bank of America Robbery/Circle K 

Armed Robbery)

On May 15, 2011, Petitioner entered a Circle K store and approached the clerk. 

(Id. at 78). Petitioner placed his hand inside a plastic bag and told the clerk “this is a 

simple robbery. Give me all the cash out of the register.” (Id.). The clerk gave Petitioner 

$60 in cash. Petitioner asked “where’s all the twenties, boss?” (Id.). The clerk explained 

that there were no twenty dollar bills in the register. Petitioner then told the clerk to give 

him five cartons of cigarettes. (Id. at 78-79). 

On May 18, 2011, Petitioner entered a Bank of America branch, gave an employee 

a note that read “this is a robbery,” and told the employee to give him all the money from 

the employee’s cash drawer except for the “tracker packs.” (Id. at 79). The employee 

gave Petitioner $5,350 in cash. (Id.).

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to (i) armed robbery, a class 2 non-dangerous 

felony with one prior felony conviction and (ii) robbery, a class 4 non-dangerous felony. 

(Id. at 58-60). Petitioner agreed to pay restitution to Circle K in the amount of $360 plus 

an additional amount not to exceed $500. (Id. at 58). In addition, Petitioner agreed to 

pay restitution to Bank of America in the amount of $5,353 plus an additional amount not 

to exceed $1,000. (Id.).

B. Change of Plea Hearing and Sentencing

On March 1, 2012, the trial court held a change of plea hearing in all three cases. 

(Doc. 10-3 at 109-39). The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Doc. 10-1 at 

66-75). At the April 4, 2012 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner as 

follows:

1. Case No. CR2011-123862 (Comerica Robbery)

The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence on Petitioner’s robbery 

conviction and imposed a three-year term of probation, to be served concurrently to the 

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three-year probationary term imposed in Case No. CR2011-125379. (Doc. 10-3 at 154; 

Doc. 10-1 at 94-97). The trial court ordered restitution to Comerica bank in the amount 

of $2,494. (Doc. 10-3 at 157; Doc. 10-1 at 95).

2. Case No. CR2011-048276 (Days Inn Armed Robbery/Comfort Inn 

Attempted Armed Robbery)

The trial court found aggravating factors and sentenced Petitioner to thirteen years 

of incarceration on Count 1 (attempted armed robbery). (Doc. 10-3 at 149-50; Doc. 10-2 

at 2-5). The trial court also sentenced Petitioner to thirteen years of incarceration on 

Count 2 (armed robbery), to be served concurrently with the sentence on Count 1. (Id. at 

150; Doc. 10-2 at 2-5). In addition, the trial court ordered restitution to Days Inn in the 

amount of $300. (Doc. 10-2 at 4).

3. Case No. CR2011-125379 (Bank of America Robbery/Circle K 

Armed Robbery)

The trial court again found aggravating factors and sentenced Petitioner to thirteen 

years of incarceration on Count 1 (armed robbery), to run concurrently with the thirteenyear sentences imposed in Case No. CR2011-048276. (Doc. 10-3 at 150-53; Doc. 10-1 at 

99-103). On Count 2 (robbery), the trial court imposed a three-year term of probation. 

(Doc. 10-3 at 153-54; Doc. 10-1 at 99-103). In addition, the trial court ordered restitution 

to be paid to (i) Bank of America in the amount of $5,353 and (ii) Circle K in the amount 

of $240.1

 (Doc. 10-1 at 100-01).

C. Post-Conviction Relief

On May 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in all 

three criminal cases. (Doc. 10-2 at 28-31). The trial court appointed PCR counsel. (Id. 

33-38). Petitioner’s counsel notified the court that she was unable to find a colorable 

claim for relief in any of the cases. (Id. at 40-48). On November 26, 2012, Petitioner 

1 The ordered restitution to Circle K was less than the $360 amount set forth in the 

plea agreement. (Doc. 10-1 at 58). The trial court ordered the lesser amount because $240 is the amount of loss stated in the victim’s ledger. (Doc. 10-3 at 156-57).

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filed an identical PCR petition in each of the three cases. (Id. at 80-100). Petitioner 

contended that his trial counsel erroneously advised him that “his actions constituted 

armed robbery and attempted armed robbery when he stated this is a robbery while his 

hand was in a canvas bag.” (Doc. 10-2 at 81, 88, 95). The trial court ordered the State to 

respond to the PCR petitions. (Doc. 10-3 at 8-11). The State filed an identical Response 

in each case. (Id. at 13-60).

On April 15, 2013, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was 

ineffective and dismissed the PCR petitions with prejudice. (Id. at 62-73). Petitioner 

filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, to which the State 

responded. (Id. at 83-103). The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied 

relief. (Id. at 105-07). The record does not indicate that Petitioner sought further review 

in the Arizona Supreme Court.

On March 26, 2015, Petitioner filed the Petition (Doc. 1) seeking federal habeas 

relief.2

 Respondents filed their Answer on July 24, 2015 (Doc. 10). Petitioner filed his 

Reply on August 28, 2015 (Doc. 11). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, AEDPA requires federal 

courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 

1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be 

entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or 

her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

2 Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that this habeas proceeding is untimely under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The statute of limitations is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or 

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th 

Cir.2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

The “clearly established federal law” for an ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”) claim is the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner arguing an IAC claim must establish that his or her 

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counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting 

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, 

the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, judicial review 

“must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel’s representation must fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers

“whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. 

Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish the test’s performance prong in 

the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must establish that his or her counsel’s advice 

regarding the guilty plea was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985).

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. To establish prejudice in the 

context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

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on going to trial.” Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 869, 873 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59)).

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a defendant has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 7). 

AEDPA imposes “an express limitation on the power of a federal court to grant an 

evidentiary hearing and [has] reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s 

discretion.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides that if a habeas petitioner 

“has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” no 

evidentiary hearing on the claim will be held in federal court unless the petitioner shows 

that:

(A) the claim relies on:

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 

was previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 

previously discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (bold in original).

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Case law has clarified that review under Section 2254(d) is limited to the record 

that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited 

to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits”); 

Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that Pinholster and 

the statutory text make clear that limitation on evidentiary hearings applies to Section 

2254(d)(2) claims as well). In Gulbrandson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 

a U.S. District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a habeas petitioner’s request 

for an evidentiary hearing regarding the petitioner’s IAC claims. The Court explained 

that “the state court’s rejections of these claims were neither contrary to, nor involved 

unreasonable applications, of Strickland. Thus, Pinholster bars a habeas court from any 

further factual development on these claims.” Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 994; see also 

Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a habeas petitioner was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as the petitioner failed to present a colorable IAC 

claim).

As explained below, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s IAC 

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law. Under Pinholster, Gulbrandson, and Stokley, Petitioner is therefore not entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing. The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing. 

B. Merits of Petitioner’s IAC Claim

Petitioner’s IAC claim pertains to his convictions for armed robbery and attempted 

armed robbery.3

 The State of Arizona’s armed robbery statute provides as follows: 

3 Although the Petition states that he is challenging his convictions in all three criminal cases, Petitioner does not raise any claims challenging the constitutionality of his convictions for robbery (CR2011-123862; Count 2 in CR2011-125379). The Court 

may therefore dismiss with prejudice the Petition as to the robbery convictions. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing that a habeas petitioner must allege “that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States”).

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A person commits armed robbery if, in the course of 

committing robbery as defined in § 13-1902, such person or 

an accomplice:

1. Is armed with a deadly weapon or a simulated 

deadly weapon; or

2. Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument or a simulated deadly weapon.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1904(A).

Petitioner asserts that the offense of armed robbery requires that “the weapon 

weather [sic] it be real or simulated must be present.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Petitioner alleges 

that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective when “she told Petitioner he 

simulated a weapon just by placing his hand in a large bag where no victim said they saw 

a simulated weapon, and no real or fake weapon was within immediate possession or 

available for use or the Petitioner.” (Doc. 11 at 5). To support this contention, Petitioner 

cites State v. Garza Rodriguez, 791 P.2d 633 (Ariz. 1990). In Garza Rodriguez, the 

Arizona Supreme Court held that that a “mere verbal threat to use a deadly weapon, 

unaccompanied by the actual presence of a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or 

simulated deadly weapon, does not satisfy the statutory requirement for a charge of 

armed robbery.” Id. at 638. 

The last state court decision reviewing Petitioner’s IAC claim is the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ ruling that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s PCR petitions. 

As discussed below, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s IAC claim 

was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

1. Strickland’s Performance Prong

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision cites State v. Bousley, 829 P.2d 1212 

(Ariz. 1992). In Bousley, two defendants held their hands under their clothing in such a 

way that the defendants appeared to have handguns and demanded money from 

convenience store clerks. (Id. at 1213). The defendants pled guilty to armed robbery. 

(Id. at 1212-13). On appeal, the defendants argued that the factual bases for their guilty 

pleas were insufficient under Garza Rodriguez. (Id. at 1213). The Arizona Supreme 

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Court rejected that claim. The Court stated that the “crucial fact in [Garza] Rodriguez

was that nothing resembling a weapon was actually present; the defendant simply implied 

that she had a gun when she threatened to ‘shoot the smile off’ the cashier’s face.” (Id. at 

1214). In Bousley, however, the defendants “did more than simply imply that they had 

guns; they positioned their hands under their clothing in such a way that they appeared to 

have deadly weapons—guns.” (Id.). The Court concluded that “simulated deadly 

weapons were actually present.” (Id.). 

Here, as the Arizona Court of Appeals noted, Petitioner admitted in open court 

that “when he committed the armed and attempted armed robberies, he placed his hand in 

a bag to simulate a weapon, and he did so to coerce the victims to surrender property 

through force or the threatened use of force.” (Doc. 10-3 at 107, 130-31, 35); see United 

States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (giving “substantial weight” to 

defendant’s in-court statements). The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that under 

Bousley, Petitioner’s “counsel was correct that a person who conceals his or her hand and 

positions it in a manner that makes it appear that person has a deadly weapon is armed 

with, is using, and/or is threatening to use a simulated deadly weapon.” (Doc. 10-3 at 

106). 

Petitioner’s in-court admission that he held his “hand in a bag simulating a gun or 

weapon” distinguishes this case from Garza Rodriguez. In light of Bousley and the facts 

of this case, Petitioner has not shown that his trial counsel was objectively unreasonable 

or incompetent when she advised Petitioner that his actions may satisfy the elements of 

armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Moreover, even if the Court finds that the 

performance of Petitioner’s trial counsel was constitutionally deficient, Petitioner cannot 

establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland two-part test.

2. Strickland’s Prejudice Prong

As mentioned in Section II(B) above, establishing prejudice in the context of a 

guilty plea requires a defendant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 

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to trial.” Washington, 422 F.3d at 873 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59). Here, Petitioner 

does not allege that but for his counsel’s alleged erroneous advice, he would not have 

entered into the plea agreements and would have proceeded to trial. Petitioner therefore 

has failed to show how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that it was not contrary to, nor 

an unreasonable application of, Strickland for the Arizona Court of Appeals to reject 

Petitioner’s IAC claim contained in the Petition. The undersigned also concludes that the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court deny the claim on the 

merits.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be 

DENIED.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claim for relief.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

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District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 29th day of February, 2016. 

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