Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35920/USCOURTS-ca9-18-35920-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER 

WASHINGTON AND NORTH IDAHO;

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE GREAT 

NORTHWEST AND THE HAWAIIAN 

ISLANDS; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF 

THE HEARTLAND,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &

HUMAN SERVICES; ALEX M. AZAR II, 

in his official capacity as Secretary of 

the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services; VALERIE HUBER, in 

her official capacity as Senior Policy 

Advisor for the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary for Health at the 

Department of Health and Human 

Services,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35920 

D.C. No.

2:18-cv-00207-

TOR 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

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2 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS

Argued and Submitted November 7, 2019

Seattle, Washington

Filed January 10, 2020

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, 

Circuit Judges, and Gregory A. Presnell,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould;

Concurrence by Judge Nguyen

SUMMARY**

Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of an 

action brought by three regional Planned Parenthood 

organizations against the Department of Health and Human 

Services alleging that the Department’s 2018 Funding 

Opportunity Announcements for funding programs to 

combat teen pregnancy were contrary to the law as required 

in their appropriation, the Teen Pregnancy Prevention 

Program, which is the relevant part of the 2018 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act. 

Under the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program, the 

Department of Health and Human Services funds 

* The Honorable Gregory A. Presnell, United States District Judge 

for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS 3

pregnancy-prevention programs, periodically issuing 

Funding Opportunity Announcements that describe the 

criteria for grant selection. The Program creates two funding 

tiers. Tier 1’s explicit purpose is to replicate programs that 

have been proven effective through rigorous evaluation to 

reduce teenage pregnancy. Tier 2’s purpose is to develop, 

replicate, refine, and test additional models and innovative 

strategies for preventing teenage pregnancy. Planned 

Parenthood alleged that the 2018 Funding Opportunity 

Announcements favored or required abstinence-only 

programs and required replication of unproven program 

tools which were contrary to the Teen Pregnancy Prevention 

Program. Planned Parenthood alleged that it could not 

effectively compete under the new grant-making criteria. 

The district court held that Planned Parenthood did not have 

standing to challenge the 2018 Funding Opportunity 

Announcements because Planned Parenthood did not 

adequately plead injury-in-fact or redressability.

The panel first held that Planned Parenthood had 

standing under the competitor standing doctrine, which 

holds that the inability to compete on an equal footing in a 

bidding process is sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. The 

panel next held that even though the Department of Health 

and Human Services had already spent the 2018 funds 

elsewhere, plaintiff’s challenge to the 2018 Funding 

Opportunity Announcements was not moot because it 

satisfied the capable of repetition, yet evading review 

exception to mootness. The panel noted that Planned 

Parenthood could reasonably expect to be subject to the 

same injury again and the injury was inherently shorter than 

the normal life of litigation. 

The panel exercised its equitable discretion to reach two 

purely legal questions in the first instance. The panel held 

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4 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS

that the 2018 Tier 1 Funding Opportunity Announcement 

was contrary to the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program and 

hence contrary to law. The panel noted that the Teen 

Pregnancy Prevention Program requires that Tier 1 grantees 

replicate programs proven effective through rigorous 

evaluation. The panel then noted that the 2018 Funding 

Opportunity Announcement required grantees to implement 

elements of either the Center for Relationship Education’s 

Systematic Method for Assessing Risk-Avoidance Tool 

(SMARTool) or the Tool to Assess the Characteristics of 

Effective Sex and STD/HIV Education Programs (TAC). 

The panel concluded that neither SmartTool nor TAC was a 

program and neither had ever been implemented, let alone 

proven effective. The panel therefore concluded that the 

Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program and the 2018 Tier 1 

Funding Opportunity Announcement were irreconcilable.

The panel held that the 2018 Tier 2 Funding Opportunity 

Announcement, which also requires programs to implement 

the TAC and the SMARTool, was not contrary to law on its 

face. The panel stated that while it was debatable whether 

the SMARTool or TAC will facilitate “research and 

demonstration grants to develop, replicate, refine, and test 

additional models and innovative strategies for preventing 

teenage pregnancy,” the Funding Opportunity 

Announcement requirement was not contrary to the Teen 

Pregnancy Prevention Program on its face. As to whether 

the 2018 Tier 2 Funding Opportunity Announcement was 

arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative 

Procedure Act, the panel held that this issue should be 

decided by the district court in the first instance. The panel 

remanded the balance of the case for further proceedings. 

Concurring in part, Judge Nguyen agreed with the 

majority that Planned Parenthood had standing and that the 

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS 5

case was not moot, but she would remand for the district 

court to address the merits of the challenge to the 2018 

Funding Opportunity Announcements in the first instance.

COUNSEL

Andrew Tutt (argued), Drew A. Harker and Alexandra L. 

Barbee-Garrett, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, 

Washington, D.C.; Carrie Y. Flaxman and Richard Muniz, 

Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Washington, 

D.C.; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jaynie R. Lilley (argued) and Mark B. Stern, Attorneys, 

Appellate Staff; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Joseph H. Harrington, United States Attorney; 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

Christopher Babbitt, Lynn Eisenberg, Webb Lyons, Jamie 

Yood, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, 

Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Mayor and City 

Council of Baltimore and King County, Washington.

Boris Bershteyn, Tansy Woan, and Collin A. Rose, Skadden, 

Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York, New York,

for Amici Curiae Members of Congress.

Michael J. Fischer, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Amber 

Sizemore, Deputy Attorney General; Josh Shapiro, Attorney 

General of Pennsylvania; Office of Attorney General, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; for Amici Curiae the 

Commonwealths of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and 

Virginia, and the States of California, Connecticut, 

Delaware, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, 

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6 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS

Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 

Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, and the 

District of Columbia.

Kathleen Hartnett and Brent K. Nakamura, Boies Schiller 

Flexner LLP, Oakland, California; Melissa Shube, Boies 

Schiller Flexner LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae 

Dr. Ron Haskins and Andrea Kane, MPA.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Planned Parenthood of Greater Washington and North 

Idaho, Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest and the 

Hawaiian Islands, and Planned Parenthood of the Heartland 

(collectively, Planned Parenthood) sued the Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS), alleging that HHS’s 

2018 Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOAs) for 

funding programs to combat teen pregnancy were contrary 

to the law as required in their appropriation, the Teen 

Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP), which is the 

relevant part of the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 

The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing, 

holding that Planned Parenthood had not pleaded and could 

not plead an injury-in-fact or redressability. 

We reverse and remand. We first hold that Planned 

Parenthood had standing under the competitor standing 

doctrine and that the case is not moot because it satisfies the 

capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to 

mootness. We then exercise our equitable discretion to reach 

two issues in the first instance, holding that the 2018 Tier 1 

FOA was contrary to law and that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was 

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS 7

not. We remand the balance of the case to the district court 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I

A

In 2010, Congress created the TPPP. Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 

3034, 3253 (2010). Under the TPPP, HHS funds pregnancyprevention programs, periodically issuing FOAs that 

describe the criteria for grant selection. Applicants, 

including public and private entities, submit proposals, and 

HHS decides which applications to fund. The 2018 TPPP 

appropriation is at issue here. Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 733 (2018).

The statutory language is short, simple, and has remained 

consistent since the program’s inception:

That of the funds made available under this 

heading, $101,000,000 shall be for making 

competitive contracts and grants to public 

and private entities to fund medically 

accurate and age appropriate programs that 

reduce teen pregnancy and for the Federal 

costs associated with administering and 

evaluating such contracts and grants, of 

which not more than 10 percent of the 

available funds shall be for training and 

technical assistance, evaluation, outreach, 

and additional program support activities, 

and of the remaining amount 75 percent shall 

be for replicating programs that have been 

proven effective through rigorous evaluation

to reduce teenage pregnancy, behavioral risk 

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factors underlying teenage pregnancy, or 

other associated risk factors, and 25 percent 

shall be available for research and 

demonstration grants to develop, replicate, 

refine, and test additional models and 

innovative strategies for preventing teenage 

pregnancy . . . . 

Id.; see also 123 Stat. at 3253 (using the same language).

The TPPP creates two funding tiers. Tier 1’s explicit 

purpose is to “replicat[e] programs that have been proven 

effective through rigorous evaluation to reduce teenage 

pregnancy.” 132 Stat. at 733. Tier 2’s purpose is “to 

develop, replicate, refine, and test additional models and 

innovative strategies for preventing teenage pregnancy.” Id. 

Tier 2 lets grantees test new programs, and programs that 

prove effective then become eligible for Tier 1.

In 2015, HHS issued the 2015 FOAs and awarded each 

Plaintiff-Appellant at least one grant. In 2018, HHS issued 

new FOAs. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 

Announcement of Availability of Funds for Phase I 

Replicating Programs (Tier 1) Effective in the Promotion of 

Healthy Adolescence and the Reduction of Teenage 

Pregnancy and Associated Risk Behaviors (2018) 

(hereinafter 2018 Tier 1 FOA); Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., Announcement of the Availability of Funds for Phase 

I New and Innovative Strategies (Tier 2) to Prevent Teenage 

Pregnancy and Promote Healthy Adolescence (2018) 

(hereinafter 2018 Tier 2 FOA). 

The critical difference between the 2015 FOAs and the 

2018 FOAs is the requirement, under the 2018 FOAs, that 

grantees incorporate all of the elements of either the Center 

for Relationship Education’s Systematic Method for 

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS 9

Assessing Risk-Avoidance Tool (SMARTool) or the Tool to 

Assess the Characteristics of Effective Sex and STD/HIV 

Education Programs (TAC). 2018 Tier 1 FOA at 12, 35; 

2018 Tier 2 FOA at 11. The SMARTool is a “research-based 

tool designed to help organizations assess, select, and 

implement effective programs and curricula that support 

sexual risk avoidance.” Ctr. for Relationship Educ., 

SMARTool 6 (2010) (hereinafter SMARTool). The TAC 

“is an organized set of questions designed to help 

practitioners assess whether curriculum-based programs 

have incorporated the common characteristics of effective 

programs.” Douglas Kirby, Lori A. Rolleri & Mary Martha 

Wilson, Tool to Assess the Characteristics of Effective Sex 

and STD/HIV Education Programs 1 (2007) (hereinafter 

TAC). 

The 2018 FOAs required that HHS evaluate grant 

applications based on how effectively the applicants 

implemented the SMARTool or the TAC. 2018 Tier 1 FOA 

at 12, 35, 59; 2018 Tier 2 FOA at 11–12. The 2018 Tier 1 

FOA allotted twenty-five points, of a total of one hundred, 

for applicants’ implementation of either tool. 2018 Tier 1 

FOA at 59. The 2018 Tier 2 FOA likewise allotted thirty 

points. 2018 Tier 2 FOA at 12–13, 53–54. 

B

After studying the 2018 FOAs, Planned Parenthood 

decided not to bid for a grant. Instead, Planned Parenthood 

sued HHS. Planned Parenthood alleged that both FOAs 

favored or required abstinence-only programs, contrary to 

the TPPP. Planned Parenthood also alleged that both FOAs 

were contrary to the TPPP because the FOAs required 

replication of the SMARTool or the TAC, which were not 

proven programs. Under the new grant-making criteria, 

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10 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS

Planned Parenthood alleged, Planned Parenthood could not 

effectively compete. 

The district court held that Planned Parenthood did not 

have standing to challenge the 2018 FOAs because Planned 

Parenthood did not adequately plead injury-in-fact or 

redressability. Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. and 

N. Idaho v. HHS, 337 F. Supp. 3d 976, 986, 988 (E.D. Wash. 

2018).

Two other groups of similarly situated plaintiffs also 

sued HHS, and the three cases were decided within a day of 

each other. See id.; Multnomah Cty. v. Azar, 340 F. 

Supp. 3d 1046 (D. Or. 2018); Planned Parenthood of N.Y.C., 

Inc. v. HHS, 337 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). In 

Multnomah County v. Azar, the district court held, among 

other holdings, that the plaintiffs had standing under the 

competitor standing doctrine and enjoined the 2018 Tier 1 

FOA because it was contrary to the TPPP. 340 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1054–56, 1068–69. In Planned Parenthood of New York 

City, the district court held that the plaintiffs had competitor 

standing, enjoined the 2018 Tier 1 FOA because it was 

contrary to law and its adoption was arbitrary and capricious, 

and held that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was not contrary to law 

and that its adoption was not arbitrary and capricious. 337 

F. Supp. 3d at 320–24, 331–42. 

Appeals followed, but eventually HHS dropped its 

appeals of the injunctions and Planned Parenthood dropped 

its cross-appeals. Multnomah Cty. v. Azar, No. 18-35912 

(9th Cir. filed Oct. 29, 2018), appeal dismissed per joint 

stipulation; Planned Parenthood of N.Y.C., Inc. v. HHS, No. 

1:18-CV-05680 (2d Cir. filed June 22, 2018), appeal 

dismissed per joint stipulation. Meanwhile, HHS disbursed 

the money available for grants under the 2018 Tier 1 FOA to 

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS 11

a preexisting grantee and completed the grant process under 

the 2018 Tier 2 FOA. 

HHS then issued the 2019 Tier 1 FOA. Dep’t of Health 

& Human Servs., Announcement of Availability of Funds 

for Replication of Programs Proven Effective through 

Rigorous Evaluation to Reduce Teenage Pregnancy, 

Behavioral Risk Factors Underlying Teenage Pregnancy, or 

Other Associated Risk Factors (Tier 1) – Phase I (2019)

(hereinafter 2019 Tier 1 FOA). Responding to the 

injunctions of the 2018 Tier 1 FOA, HHS addressed 

numerous alleged deficiencies. Id. at 9–10, 12. Most 

importantly, the 2019 Tier 1 FOA did not require grantees to 

replicate the SMARTool or the TAC. Id. at 12–13.

HHS also included language addressing how the 

litigation had affected HHS’s plans for the grant program:

OAH1 continues to intend to pursue a 

substantially similar approach [as the 2018 

Tier 1 FOA] through Tier 1 funding in the 

future so as to optimally replicate effective 

programs for teen pregnancy prevention. 

Nevertheless, two United States District 

Courts enjoined the issuance of awards under 

the 2018 Tier 1 FOA on the basis of that 

approach, and the appeal process for those 

cases is not yet complete. Therefore, for the 

purposes of this FOA, OAH is using the 

description of programs eligible for 

replication that is contained earlier in this 

1 The OAH, representing the Office of Adolescent Health, is a part 

of HHS, and has now merged with the Office of Population Affairs 

within HHS. 

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section, and the description of expectations of 

recipients contained below . . . .”

Id. 

II

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review standing de novo. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 

1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004). We may exercise our equitable 

discretion to reach the merits of a case when the court below 

did not. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); 

United States v. Patrin, 575 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1978). 

III

Article III standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, 

and redressability. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 

(2018). An injury-in-fact must be “concrete and 

particularized,” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 

(1992) (citing, inter alia, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 

(1984)), and must be “actual or imminent,” id. (quoting 

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). Standing 

is measured from a litigation’s beginning. White v. Lee, 227 

F.3d 1214, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169–

71 (2000)).

Under the doctrine of competitor standing, “the inability 

to compete on an equal footing in [a] bidding process” is 

sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. Ne. Fla. Chapter of 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 

508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. 

Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 718–19 

(2007). An agency action that increases competition tilts the

playing field for parties that were already competing, and 

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PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS 13

those parties suffer an injury-in-fact. City of Los Angeles v. 

Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]his inability 

to compete on an even playing field constitutes a concrete 

and particularized injury.”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Transp., 861 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2017); Preston 

v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984). 

A plaintiff need not participate in the competition; the 

plaintiff need only demonstrate that it is “able and ready to 

bid.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of 

Am., 508 U.S. at 666; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 

244, 261–62 (2003); Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 942 

(9th Cir. 2003). It is a plaintiff’s ability and readiness to bid 

that ensures an injury-in-fact is concrete and particular; the 

requirement precludes the airing of generalized grievances. 

See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d at 1173. Entering 

a bid makes the injury actual; deciding not to bid makes the 

injury imminent. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. 

Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 664, 666.

Causation and redressability are generally implicit in 

injury-in-fact under the competitor standing doctrine. Id. at 

666 n.5 (“It follows from our definition of ‘injury in fact’ 

that petitioner has sufficiently alleged both that the city’s 

ordinance is the ‘cause’ of its injury and that a judicial decree 

directing the city to discontinue its program would ‘redress’ 

the injury.”). The key is that the injury is the increase in 

competition rather than the ultimate denial of an application, 

the loss of sales, or the loss of a job. See Wash. All. of Tech. 

Workers v. DHS, 892 F.3d 332, 339–40 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 

Framing the injury as such, causation and redressability then 

derive from “[b]asic economic logic”—an agency’s change 

of a competition’s rules causes the injury and a court’s 

invalidation of the change redresses the injury. See Am. Inst. 

of Certified Pub. Accountants v. IRS, 804 F.3d 1193, 1197–

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14 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS

98 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A court does not have the power to 

decide the winner of, or to establish the criteria for, a grant 

competition, at least in this circumstance, but a court does 

have the power to decide that particular criteria are 

impermissible. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 

U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943); Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 738 

(D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 

(1998). A court can make sure that there is a fair and lawful 

bidding process.

The need for an ample competitor standing doctrine to 

secure this power is obvious. If Planned Parenthood did not 

have standing, then the instant agency action would be 

insulated from judicial review. The effects of an adverse 

standing decision would echo through many corridors of the 

law. Cf. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 718–720; City of Los 

Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d at 1173.

We hold that Planned Parenthood had standing under the 

competitor standing doctrine because the elements of 

standing are satisfied.

Planned Parenthood alleged a competitive injury. 

HHS’s FOAs under the TPPP establish grant-funding 

competitions, and HHS required applicants to implement the 

SMARTool or the TAC in the 2018 FOAs. 2018 Tier 1 FOA 

at 12, 35; 2018 Tier 2 FOA at 12. Planned Parenthood 

alleges that the requirement to use the SMARTool or the 

TAC was statutorily impermissible. Planned Parenthood 

also points to how the FOAs each allotted at least a quarter 

of a grant applicant’s scoring rubric to the implementation 

of one of the two tools. 2018 Tier 1 FOA at 59; 2018 Tier 2 

FOA at 12–13, 53–54. It is plausible that the 2018 FOAs 

impermissibly tilted the playing field, and the magnitude of 

the alleged tilt is irrelevant.

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Planned Parenthood also alleged a redressable injury 

(caused by the FOAs). Redressability (and causation) are 

generally implicit in competitive injuries. See Ne. Fla. 

Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 

666 n.5; Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 804 F.3d at

1197–98. Here, the general rule applies. The 2018 FOAs 

allegedly caused Planned Parenthood’s competitive injury, 

and vacatur of the FOAs would redress the injury.

Because we hold that Planned Parenthood had standing, 

we next address mootness.

IV

If something happens during litigation that makes relief 

impossible, the case is moot. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 

1; Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 

9, 12 (1992). Mootness is related to standing, but the 

exceptions to mootness suggest that it is more than “standing 

set in a time frame.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. 

In other words, sometimes a case may not be moot even if 

the plaintiff would not have standing to bring it today.

One such justiciability-saving exception is for 

challenges to injuries that are “capable of repetition, yet 

evading review.” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting Spencer v. 

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). The exception requires (1) 

the complaining party to reasonably expect to be subject to 

the same injury again and (2) the injury to be of a type 

inherently shorter than the duration of litigation. Id. Courts 

often hold that administrative regulations in short cycles 

satisfy the exception. Compare FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 

Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462–63 (2007) (holding that regulation 

of two-year election cycle satisfied the exception), and

Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (9th 

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16 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. USDHHS

Cir. 1992) (holding that fishing regulation in less-than-oneyear cycle satisfied the exception), with Idaho Dep’t of Fish 

& Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071, 1075 

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that fishing regulation in four-year 

cycle did not satisfy the exception). Agencies’ cyclical 

contracts and grants also often satisfy the exception. E.g., 

Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1976; City of Los Angeles v. 

Barr, 929 F.3d at 1172–73.

The 2018 Tier 1 FOA would be moot because it has no 

present legal effect—HHS spent the funds elsewhere and a 

court cannot offer Planned Parenthood relief stemming from 

legal obligations under that FOA. But Planned Parenthood’s 

challenge to the 2018 Tier 1 FOA satisfies the capable of 

repetition, yet evading review exception. First, Planned 

Parenthood can reasonably expect to be subject to the same 

injury again. HHS indicated so in its 2019 Tier 1 FOA, 

stating that HHS “continues to intend to pursue a 

substantially similar approach [as the 2018 Tier 1 FOA] 

through Tier 1 funding in the future.” 2019 Tier 1 FOA at 

12–13. A declination to renounce a practice is sufficient to 

satisfy the exception, City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 

at 1173 (holding the exception satisfied because the agency 

“ha[d] not agreed to stop giving bonus points for [challenged 

scoring] factors in the future”), so it follows that an 

affirmative announcement of intent to renew a practice is 

sufficient, see City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 

U.S. 283, 289 & n.11 (1982).

Second, the injury is inherently shorter than the normal 

life of litigation. The Supreme Court has noted that a period 

of two years is short enough to satisfy the exception. E.g., 

Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1976. For grant cycles like that 

before us, the relevant length of time is the time between the 

announcement of the grant program and the actual award of 

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the grants. City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d at 1172. 

Here, the grant process is only a few months long. See 2018 

Tier 1 FOA at 1–4.

For the same reasons, or because the 2018 Tier 2 FOA is 

ongoing—with a “Phase II” application process scheduled 

for Spring 2020—the 2018 Tier 2 FOA is also not moot. Cf. 

2018 Tier 2 FOA at 4.

We hold that this case is not moot. We next discuss 

whether to reach the merits.

V

In general, an appellate court does not decide issues that 

the trial court did not decide. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120–21. 

The general rule, however, is flexible—an appellate court 

can exercise its equitable discretion to reach an issue in the 

first instance. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 814 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (citing Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 

(1976)). When “proper resolution is beyond any doubt,” 

Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (citing Turner v. City of Memphis, 

369 U.S. 350 (1962)), when “injustice might otherwise 

result,” id. (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 

(1941)), and when an issue is purely legal, Patrin, 575 F.2d 

at 712, are exceptions to the general rule. The Ninth Circuit 

has also considered the effect a delay would have, Quinn, 

783 F.2d at 814, and whether “significant questions of 

general impact are raised,” Guam v. Okada, 694 F.2d 565, 

570 n.8 (9th Cir. 1982).

The purely legal issue exception deserves elaboration. A 

purely legal issue is one for which the factual record is so 

fully developed as to render any further development 

irrelevant. See Patrin, 575 F.2d at 712. For a fully 

developed record, not only must the record be complete, but 

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it must be clear that a litigant could not “have tried his case 

differently either by developing new facts in response to or 

advancing distinct legal arguments against the issue.” Id. 

Another way to state the purely legal exception is to say that 

the decision to remand should not prejudice the party that 

opposes the appellate court’s reaching a novel issue. See 

Dream Palace v. Cty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th 

Cir. 2004); Patrin, 575 F.2d at 712.

A district court is usually best positioned to apply the law 

to the record. See, e.g., Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 

1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While the record in this case is 

fully developed, and Davis pressed her unconscionability 

argument before the district court and did so again here, the 

resolution of the issue is not clear, and for that reason we 

decline to exercise our discretion to address the 

unconscionability question in the first instance.”); Am. 

President Lines, Ltd. v. Int’l Longshore Union, Alaska 

Longshore Div., Unit 60, 721 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 

2013) (reversing the district court’s holding that plaintiff 

lacked standing but declining to decide whether defendant 

violated the relevant statute or caused plaintiff’s alleged 

damages); see also Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1005 (“Even 

when a case falls into one of the exceptions to the rule 

against considering new arguments on appeal, we must still 

decide whether the particular circumstances of the case 

overcome our presumption against hearing new 

arguments.”). An appellate court should usually wait for the 

district court to decide in the first instance.

An appellate court need not wait when a question could 

not possibly be affected by deference to a trial court’s 

factfinding or fact application, or a litigant’s further 

development of the factual record. See, e.g., Turf Paradise, 

Inc. v. Ariz. Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 1982) 

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(deciding whether the provisions of a lease were a per se 

violation of the Sherman Act); Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 

362 (9th Cir. 1981) (declining to definitively weigh in on the 

district court’s holding that plaintiffs lacked standing but 

deciding to affirm the dismissal because the plaintiffs failed 

to state a claim). This is true for the same reason that we 

sometimes reach statutory interpretation arguments on 

appeal that were not made below. See, e.g., Pocatello Educ. 

Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1060 & n.5 (9th Cir. 

2007) (exercising discretion to consider First Amendment 

forum-analysis argument, not made below, in determining a 

state statute to be unconstitutional), rev’d on other grounds

sub nom. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 

(2009); Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We maintain 

the discretion to review a purely legal issue, including the 

interpretation of a statute . . . .”).

At times, a case presents with some issues amenable to 

first decision on appeal and with other issues not so 

amenable. In such circumstances, we can decide one issue 

and remand another. For example, in Quinn v. Robinson we 

decided to reach, in the first instance, a probable cause issue 

because we determined it was “clear,” while we remanded a 

statute-of-limitations issue because it was “quite complex 

and involve[d] a discovery request as well.” 783 F.2d at 815.

VI

Whether the 2018 FOAs are contrary to the law as set 

forth in the TPPP are purely legal questions, and we decide 

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there is good reason for us to settle those questions now.2 

Beyond those questions, however, we decide to remand.

A

Agencies cannot exceed the scope of their authority as 

circumscribed by Congress. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 

U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 

476 U.S. 355, 359 (1986). If an agency action is “contrary 

to clear congressional intent,” the judiciary is bound to reject 

the action. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 

n.9 (1984); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); FEC v. Democratic 

Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) 

(“[Courts] must reject administrative constructions of a 

statute . . . that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or 

that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to 

implement.”).

To assess a statute, we start with the text and, unless 

otherwise defined, give the words their ordinary meaning. 

Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013). Reading the 

statute here, we start and end our analysis by determining 

2 Judge Nguyen’s concurrence agrees that Planned Parenthood had 

standing and that the case is not moot, but would instead remand the 

merits issues to afford the parties a new opportunity to address them. 

However, HHS did have the opportunity to address the merits issues, 

because Planned Parenthood did so in its opening brief and HHS chose 

to address standing and mootness but not the merits in its response. Also, 

HHS had filed briefing on the merits in the district court, which is before 

us in the record. Nor did HHS ask for more time or length in which to 

address those issues after we ordered supplemental briefing. For these 

reasons, and because the issues here are purely legal issues, as to our 

holding that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was valid but the 2018 Tier 1 FOA 

was contrary to law, it is in our opinion appropriate in our discretion to 

reach the merits issues.

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that the statute is clear. See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 

503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).

Because we can decide whether the 2018 FOAs are 

contrary to law without reference to any additional facts 

beyond those now in the record, we exercise our discretion 

to do so. See Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 504 F.3d at 1060; Turf 

Paradise, 670 F.2d at 821. The statutory interpretation in 

this case is simple and straightforward, and we reach it 

because the resolution is beyond doubt. See Singleton, 428 

U.S. at 121.

We do not exercise this discretion lightly. Important to 

our determination is the unnecessary delay that remand 

would cause, Quinn, 783 F.2d at 814, and the general, 

national impact of the case on many persons, Okada, 694 

F.2d at 570 n.8. The delay remand would cause is 

unnecessary in this case because the resolution is beyond 

doubt.

In addition, the case has broad impact on society because 

it involves a federal statute and concomitant agency action 

with national effect. Three cases arising from these facts 

have already reached decision. Planned Parenthood of 

Greater Wash, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 976; Multnomah Cty. v. 

Azar, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 1046; Planned Parenthood of 

N.Y.C., 337 F. Supp. 3d at 308. Only this appeal, however, 

went undismissed. Multnomah Cty. v. Azar, No. 18-35912 

(9th Cir. filed Oct. 29, 2018), appeal dismissed per joint 

stipulation; Planned Parenthood of N.Y.C., Inc. v. HHS, No. 

1:18-CV-05680 (2nd Cir. filed June 22, 2018), appeal 

dismissed per joint stipulation. In the meantime, HHS 

issued the 2019 Tier 1 FOA, addressing many issues that 

Planned Parenthood has challenged but also stating that HHS 

“intend[s] to pursue a substantially similar approach through 

Tier 1 funding [as the 2018 Tier 1 FOA] in the future.” 2019 

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Tier 1 FOA at 12–13. The parties expect that HHS will issue 

2020 FOAs. Whether the 2020 FOAs are more like their 

2018 or their 2019 counterparts necessarily will be generally 

significant, not only for the parties before us but for similarly 

situated parties within the Ninth Circuit and nationwide.

B

We hold that the 2018 Tier 1 FOA is contrary to the 

TPPP. The TPPP requires that Tier 1 grantees “replicate” 

“programs” “proven effective through rigorous evaluation.” 

132 Stat. at 733. The 2018 Tier 1 FOA requires that Tier 1 

grantees implement each element of either the TAC or the 

SMARTool. 2018 Tier 1 FOA at 12, 35. Neither the TAC 

nor the SMARTool is a program and neither has ever been 

implemented, let alone proven effective. The TPPP and the 

2018 Tier 1 FOA are thus irreconcilable. The 2018 Tier 1 

FOA is contrary to law.

This is plain as day based on dictionary definitions. See 

United States v. Ezeta, 752 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2014). 

To replicate is to “duplicate,” to “copy exactly.” Replicate, 

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/replicate (last visited Nov. 14, 

2019). A replication requires an original implementation. 

The TAC and the SMARTool cannot be replicated because 

they have never been implemented.

The TAC and the SMARTool have never been 

implemented because they are tools, not programs. A 

tool cannot be implemented. A program is “a plan or 

system under which action may be taken toward a goal,” 

a “curriculum,” a “syllabus.” Program, MerriamWebster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/program (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).

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Neither the SMARTool nor the TAC comes near to 

fitting that definition. By the SMARTool’s own definition 

of itself, the SMARTool’s purpose is “to help organizations 

assess, select, and implement effective programs and 

curricula.” SMARTool at 6. Likewise, the TAC’s purpose 

is “to help practitioners assess whether curriculum-based 

programs have incorporated the common characteristics of 

effective programs.” TAC at 1. The SMARTool and the 

TAC are sets of elements that guide the selection of and 

testing of programs—they are tools and are not in 

themselves programs capable of replication.

Logically, then, the 2018 Tier 1 FOA would incorrectly 

permit grants for programs not proven effective, contrary to 

the TPPP. The 2018 Tier 1 FOA’s direction that grant 

applicants “address and replicate each of the elements” of 

the TAC or the SMARTool, 2018 Tier 1 FOA at 12, 

contradicts the TPPP’s direction that Tier 1 grants go only to 

applicants whose programs are “proven effective,” 132 Stat.

at 733. To prove something effective requires a previous 

implementation that one can test against a standard. See 

Prove, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/proven (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 

No entity has created a program that implements each 

element of either tool, so by definition no such program has 

been proven effective.

HHS’s argument that the elements comprising the TAC 

and the SMARTool are derived from proven programs is 

unavailing. Even if the programs from which the tools were 

developed were proven effective, the TPPP appropriation 

does not permit HHS to fund grantees under Tier 1 that 

create new programs by reference to subsets of elements of 

proven programs. The TPPP’s Tier 1 allows only the 

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replication of effective programs, not of elements of 

programs.

C

The 2018 Tier 2 FOA, however, is not contrary to the 

TPPP. Tier 2’s purpose, by contrast to that of Tier 1, is to 

“develop, replicate, refine, and test additional models and 

innovative strategies for preventing teenage pregnancy.” 

132 Stat. at 733. The key difference between Tier 1 and Tier 

2 is that Tier 1 funds “proven effective” programs whereas 

Tier 2 encourages and tolerates innovations and is the 

programs’ proving ground. Id. The 2018 Tier 2 FOA also 

requires programs to implement the TAC and the 

SMARTool. See 2018 Tier 2 FOA at 11–13. While it is 

debatable whether these tools will facilitate “research and 

demonstration grants to develop, replicate, refine, and test 

additional models and innovative strategies for preventing 

teenage pregnancy,” this requirement is not contrary to the 

TPPP on its face. 132 Stat. at 733.

We hold that the 2018 Tier 1 FOA is contrary to law as 

set forth in the TPPP on its face. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). But 

we hold that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA is not contrary to the TPPP 

on its face.

D

We turn next to the argument that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA 

was arbitrary and capricious agency action. Because 

consideration of this question could benefit from 

development of the record and will benefit from decision by 

the district court in the first instance, we decline to exercise 

our discretion to decide that question and instead remand it 

to the district court.

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Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court must 

invalidate arbitrary and capricious agency action. Id. When 

a court undertakes this type of analysis, the court needs to 

ensure a “rational connection between the facts [the agency] 

found and the choice [the agency] made.” Motor Vehicle 

Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm), 

463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). An agency, of 

course, is generally empowered to change its policy. FCC 

v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 

But the decision requires rationality and must be supported 

by the record.3

We need not say more because we decline to exercise our 

discretion to decide whether the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was 

3

 The United States Government has created many federal agencies 

to help implement important areas of the law. But whatever the agency, 

it will be a creature of statute and bound by both its authorizing statute 

and by its own regulations unless they are changed by procedures that 

are lawful. A federal agency does not have unlimited power to exercise 

its authority over persons whenever it pleases and without regard to what 

its enabling statute authorized it to do. Further, federal agencies are 

subject to general laws, and among these are the Administrative 

Procedure Act, which would invalidate programs that are contrary to law 

or those that are arbitrary and capricious. Such principles apply to all 

federal agencies. For example, the EPA was formed to protect the 

environment, but its actions must be consistent with the National 

Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and 

the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, among others. 

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration must follow the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act. The National Labor Relations 

Board must follow a group of labor laws, including the National Labor 

Relations Act. The Food and Drug Administration must follow the 

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service 

Act. Similarly here the Health and Human Services Administration must 

follow its enabling legislation and particular legislation such as the Teen 

Pregnancy Prevention Program.

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arbitrary and capricious agency action. The analysis in this 

case will require intensive factfinding and fact application. 

The district court must determine which facts the agency had 

before it, which factors the agency assessed, which 

conclusions the agency made, and whether the agency 

provided a reasoned explanation for the change, among 

many considerations. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 

Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016); Whitman v. Am. 

Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468–69 (2001); State Farm, 

463 U.S. at 43. We hold that in the circumstances of this 

case, the application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard 

should be determined by the district court in the first 

instance.

VII

We hold: (1) that Planned Parenthood had standing under 

the competitor standing doctrine; (2) that the challenge to the 

2018 FOAs has not been rendered moot by the passage of 

time and promulgation of a new FOA for 2019, because of 

the capable of repetition, yet evading review standard; (3) 

that the 2018 Tier 1 FOA is contrary to the TPPP and hence 

contrary to law; (4) that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA is not contrary 

to law on its face; (5) that whether the 2018 Tier 2 FOA is 

arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA should be 

decided by the district court in the first instance. We remand 

the balance of the case to the district court for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part:

I agree with the majority that Planned Parenthood has 

standing and that the case is not moot, but I would remand 

for the district court to address the merits of the challenge to 

the 2018 Funding Opportunity Announcements (“FOAs”) in 

the first instance.

As the majority acknowledges, we generally “do[] not 

consider an issue not passed upon below.” Quinn v. 

Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 814 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting 

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)). “Even when 

a case falls into one of the exceptions to the rule against 

considering new arguments on appeal, we must still decide 

whether the particular circumstances of the case overcome 

our presumption against hearing new arguments.” Dream 

Palace v. Cty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 

2004).

Here, the alleged risks of the delay associated with a 

remand for the district court to evaluate the merits first are 

speculative.1

 I agree with the majority that this case is one 

of national import, but that dictates strongly in favor of 

adhering to our general practice. Reasonably, HHS did not 

even discuss the merits in its initial brief. Singleton, 428 

U.S. at 120 (finding a party “justified in not presenting . . . 

arguments [regarding new issues] to the Court of Appeals, 

and in assuming, rather, that he would at least be allowed to 

answer the complaint, should the Court of Appeals reinstate 

1 Although the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 

is expected to issue new multi-year FOAs in 2020, we do not know 

whether the FOAs will resemble the contested 2018 FOAs, the modified 

2019 Tier 1 FOA, or something entirely different. Other litigations could 

spur further changes by HHS. And HHS may ultimately decide not to 

issue 2020 FOAs.

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it”). HHS discussed the merits only in a short supplemental 

brief, which we ordered to be limited to ten pages.2 Given 

the significance of this litigation, the parties should have a 

full opportunity to address the merits of the 2018 FOAs 

before the district court. I am not convinced that allowing 

them to do so would result in any injustice to either party. I 

therefore cannot join Parts VI and VII of the majority

opinion.

2 On October 7, 2019—exactly one month before oral argument—

we ordered both parties to file a supplemental letter brief addressing the 

merits issues. We limited each party’s brief to ten double-spaced pages 

(or 2,800 words).

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