Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01247/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01247-46/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HENDON,

Plaintiff,

v.

I. BAROYA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:05-cv-01247-SAB-PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

ACTION

(ECF NO.193)

Plaintiff Baroya is a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties have consented to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

On October 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. (ECF No.

193.) Plaintiff has not previously sought the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff is advised that

there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 

1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the Court cannot require any attorney to represent Plaintiff 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the 

court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 195(e)(1). Rand, 113 

F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek 

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 

“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success 

on the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action proceeds on the June 26, 2008, second amended complaint. Plaintiff alleges 

that he was repeatedly placed in secure cells where inmates were on suicide watch from June 6, 

2002 to January 2003. Plaintiff alleges that during this time he was limited to having the 

minimum of certain items. For example, he was given only a thin blanket which he states was 

dirty and sometimes stained, the heat was inadequate for the winter months and his requests to 

increase the heat went unfulfilled. Plaintiff alleges that he was sometimes kept in his cell for 

days or weeks covered in his own excrement, subjected to constant illumination and sometimes 

placed in a cell next to a psychotic inmate who would scream and beat on the doors resulting in a 

loss of sleep. Plaintiff alleges that he was sometimes deprived of toilet paper on the basis that he 

might use it to cover his cell window, was deprived of showers while confined in the infirmary, 

and the cells were not cleaned when one inmate was removed and another took his place. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were aware of these conditions which, he contends, resulted 

in pain, cramps, chills, lower back and neck pain and extreme emotional anguish. Plaintiff 

claims that the conditions constituted deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. 

On March 20, 2009, an order was entered, finding that the second amended complaint 

stated a claim against Defendants Baroya, Fam, Hamilton, Nguyet, Hoppe, Grifffin and Riedman 

for violations of the Eighth Amendment arising out of constitutional housing conditions.1 On 

September 29, 2009, Defendants Baroya, Fam, Nguyet, Griffin and Riedman filed an answer to 

the second amended complaint. On December 13, 2010, an order was entered by the District 

Court, adopting the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and dismissing Defendant 

Hamilton for Plaintiff’s failure to provide sufficient information to locate Defendant Hamilton 

for service of process. On August 2, 2011, Defendant Hoppe filed an answer. On October 1, 

2012, Defendants Baroya, Riedman, Nguyet, Griffin and Hoppe filed a motion for summary 

judgment. On November 30, 2012, Defendant Fam filed a motion for summary judgment. On 

 

1 On July 8, 2011, an order was entered, indicating that this action is proceeding on claims of unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement, and not unconstitutional medical conditions. (ECF No. 70.) 

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January 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed opposition to both motions. On March 26, 2013, Defendants 

Baroya, Griffin, Hoppe, Nguyet and Riedman filed a reply. On September 23, 2014, the District 

Court adopted in part the findings and recommendations, ordering that summary judgment be 

granted on Plaintiff’s claims relating to deprivation of showers and hygienic items, deprivation 

of adequate clothing, constant illumination, and Plaintiff’s length of stay in the Outpatient 

Housing Unit (OHU). The motion was denied as to Plaintiff’s claims relating to the OHU cell 

temperature, deprivation of a suicide mattress and being placed in a cell containing feces. 

II.

PLAINTIFF’S LITIGATION HISTORY

Plaintiff has adequately represented himself in this case. As noted, Plaintiff has not 

previously sought the appointment of counsel. In the prosecution of this case, Plaintiff has 

adequately argued his case and has drafted and submitted the following pleadings and motions. 

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in response to an order dismissing the complaint with 

leave to amend. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint pursuant to an order 

granting his motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff engaged in 

discovery, and filed an opposition to a motion to dismiss by Defendants Baroya, Nguyet, Fam, 

Griffin and Riedman. (ECF No. 43.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to have 

Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant. (ECF No. 63.) Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. (ECF No. 118.) Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings 

and recommendations. (ECF No. 130.) Plaintiff has filed two pretrial statements (ECF Nos. 

151, 169) and a motion for the attendance of an incarcerated witness. (ECF No. 150.) 

III.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In the present case, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s moving papers, but does not find 

the required exceptional circumstances. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has been adequately prosecuting 

this case since it was filed on October 5, 2005. Plaintiff has opposed numerous motions, and has 

articulately presented his claims before the Court. In his motion, Plaintiff lists several grounds 

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for the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff contends that the issues are complex and “the 

allegations are serious and present questions of credibility.” The factual and legal issues in this 

case are not complex. Plaintiff’s complaints that he has limited law library access and a limited 

knowledge of the law do not present exceptional circumstances, and are belied by the fact that 

Plaintiff has prosecuted his case to this point. Plaintiff’s contention that he suffers from mental 

illness and that his concentration is deteriorating is belied by the fact, as noted, that Plaintiff has 

successfully prosecuted this case. In forma pauperis status alone does not alone entitle Plaintiff 

to appointed counsel. That it is difficult for Plaintiff to continue to prosecute this case does not 

constitute exceptional circumstances. The issues in this case are not complex. This case has to 

do with the condition of Plaintiff’s OHU cell. This case is not factually or legally complex.

While a pro se litigant may be setter served with the assistance of counsel, so long as a 

pro se litigant, such as Plaintiff in this instance, is able to “articulate his claims against the 

relative complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the 

appointment of counsel do not exist. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion 

under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro 

se prisoner “may well have fared better – particularly in the realm of discovery and the securing 

of expert testimony.”) Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for the 

appointment of counsel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 20, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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