Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01252/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carol Gold, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Mary Hennessy, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 04-1252-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”), which was filed on June 17, 2004. (Doc. # 1.) On March 8, 2006, Magistrate

Judge Sitver issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended that

the Petition be denied and dismissed as untimely filed. (Doc. # 17.) On May 5, 2006,

Petitioner filed a Notice of Objection to the R&R. (Doc. #23.)

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219,

1126 (D.Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of

factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”). District

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1

 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in accordance

with Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“In attempting to answer [whether the state court applied Federal law in an objectively

reasonable manner], the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams [v. Taylor], 529 U.S. [362], 412 [(2000)]. While circuit law

may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (“The . . .

statutory language makes clear . . . that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established

law to this Court's jurisprudence.”).

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courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject

of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added). The Petitioner

has filed a Notice of Objection (Doc. # 23), and the Court reviews de novo the portions of

the R&R to which objections were filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted

before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny the

Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, - - -; 123

S.Ct.1166, 1172 (2003). Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s

factual findings regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149

F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus

may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the

remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant factual and procedural background, for purposes of this Order, is

summarized herein. On August 2, 1995, Petitioner was indicted on one count of first degree

murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder arising from the death of Petitioner’s

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2

 Petitioner also filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 on June 25, 2001, which was dismissed as premature because of the pending state court

proceedings.

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husband. Petitioner went to trial, and was convicted of both charges: first degree murder and

conspiracy to commit murder. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of life

imprisonment on October 15, 1998. Petitioner timely appealed her convictions, and on July

8, 1999, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions and sentence on direct

appeal. 

Petitioner sought review of the Arizona Court of Appeal’s decision. The Arizona

Supreme Court granted review and heard oral argument in the Petitioner’s case. However,

on June 19, 2000, the Arizona Supreme Court issued an order vacating its prior decision

granting review, stating that after further consideration the Court determined that the review

had been improvidently granted. The Arizona Supreme Court simultaneously vacated review

denied the Petition for Review. Subsequently, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued the Order

and Mandate on August 9, 2000.

On August 16, 2000, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”)

pursuant to Az.R.Crim.P. 32. Petitioner filed her PCR on June 6, 2001.2

 The trial court

denied the PCR on October 17, 2001 on the basis that Petitioner failed to present a colorable

claim for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on October 29,

2001. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on August 30, 2002. On September 30,

2002, Petitioner sought additional time to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court of the

Court of Appeals’ denial of her PCR petition. On April 14, 2003, the Arizona Supreme

Court granted Petitioner an additional 30 days to file a pro se Petition for Review and

informed Petitioner that no further continuances would be granted. Petitioner did not file a

Petition for Review. The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s action and ordered

the case closed on May 20, 2003.

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3

 Further, Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 9, 2000. This date is after

April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA.

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On June 24, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued an order terminating

Petitioner’s case, citing its August 30, 2002 order denying PCR review and the May 20, 2003

decision of the Arizona Supreme Court terminating Petitioner’s case.

On June 17, 2004, Petitioner filed the currently pending federal habeas corpus petition

in this district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. # 1.) The Respondent answered the

Petition on February 25, 2005 (Doc. # 14), and Petitioner replied to Respondent’s Answer

on March 23, 2005 (Doc. # 16).

III. DISCUSSION

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Sitver recommends that the Petition be denied and

dismissed as untimely filed. Because the Petition was filed in 2004, it is governed by the

statute of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”),3

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of--

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under 

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4

 The Petitioner does not dispute that judgment became final on August 9, 2000.

(Doc. #16 at 4.)

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this subsection. 

For purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner's conviction became final on August 9, 2000,

when the Order and Mandate issued from the Arizona Court of Appeals.4

 Accordingly,

AEDPA’s statute of limitations began running on the following day, August 10, 2000. The

Petition was therefore due on August 9, 2001 absent any statutory or equitable tolling.

The one year statute of limitation is tolled during the time that a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S.

4, 6 (2000). An application for collateral review is pending during all of the time in which

a state prisoner is “attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state

remedies . . . .” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

On August 16, 2000, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to

Az.R.Crim.P. 32 in the trial court. From August 9, 2000, the date Petitioner’s conviction

became final, to August 16, 2000 the statute of limitations for Petitioner to file her federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus was running. Therefore, 6 days ran against the statute of

limitations before being tolled by filing the Notice of PCR. Petitioner’s Petition for PCR,

filed on June 6, 2001, was summarily denied by the trial court on October 17, 2001.

Petitioner then timely sought appellate review of the trial court’s decision before the Arizona

Court of Appeals on October 29, 2001, and on August 30, 2002, the Arizona Court of

Appeals denied review. The statute of limitations for the Petition was tolled from August 16,

2000 to August 30, 2002.

Petitioner’s appointed counsel sought additional time from the Arizona Supreme

Court to allow Petitioner to file a pro se Petition for Review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision. On April 14, 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court granted the request and

ordered Petitioner to file her pro se Petition for Review within 30 days, or by May 14, 2003.

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Petitioner failed to file a Petition for Review, and on May 20, 2003, the Arizona Supreme

Court dismissed Petitioner’s case. Respondent correctly argues that because Petitioner failed

to file a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court by the deadline imposed, she is

only entitled to statutory tolling until August 30, 2002, when the Arizona Court of Appeals

denied review. (Doc. # 14 at 6:11-13.) Petitioner’s habeas petition was filed on June 17,

2004, and is therefore untimely by 297 days. 

Petitioner argues in her Objection that she is entitled to statutory tolling until May 20,

2003, when the Arizona Supreme Court terminated her case, because she could have filed

a Petition for Review. Recently, the United States Supreme Court readdressed whether

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state post-conviction

petition. Evans v. Chavis, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). The Court in Evans reiterated

its position in Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), and said, “[i]f the filing of the appeal

is timely, the period between the adverse lower court decision and the filing . . . is not

counted against the 1-year AEDPA time limit.” Evans, 126 S.Ct. at 849; see also Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the intervals between a lower court’s

entry of judgment and the timely filing of a notice of appeal or petition for review in the next

court are also tolled). It follows that if a petition is not timely filed, then the interval is not

tolled. Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding Bonner’s petition was

untimely, therefore “it was never ‘properly filed’ for purposes of the tolling provision of the

[AEDPA]”). Thus, an appeal that is never filed cannot be considered timely; Petitioner

cannot reap the benefit of AEDPA’s tolling mechanism without actually filing her petition

for review of the PCR denial.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the issue of whether

time for seeking discretionary review is tolled when such review is not eventually sought,

however, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) only provides statutory tolling for “properly filed” postconviction relief petitions. The Court is not persuaded that a petition for review that is never

filed can be considered “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). See Gildon v.

Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that a petition that was never filed is not

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5

 If the Court ended statutory tolling on May 20, 2003 and allowed the statute of

limitations to run for one-year (May 20, 2004), then subtracted from that date the 6 days that

had previously run, the expiration of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations would have been

May 14, 2004. Petitioner’s habeas petition was filed on June 17, 2004.

6

 Petitioner’s remaining arguments also fail because they are conditioned on this

Court statutorily tolling the AEDPA’s statute of limitations until May 20, 2003.

7

 The Ninth Circuit has not directly spoken as to whether filing a petition for a writ

of certiorari in the United State Supreme Court is a proper part of Arizona’s post-conviction

relief process. However, in White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002), the court

indicated in dicta, over strong dissent, that it was not inclined to consider a petition for writ

of certiorari part of the post-conviction process. Id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari to the

United State Supreme Court is simply not an application for state review . . . . The time spent

pursuing such a federal writ is not ‘time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through

proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies’”).

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properly filed within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2)). Furthermore, even if this Court were to

accept Petitioner’s argument that AEDPA’s statute of limitations was tolled until the Arizona

Supreme Court’s dismissal on May 20, 2003, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition would still

be untimely by 34 days.5

Petitioner’s remaining objections in support of her petition’s timeliness are

unavailing.6

 Petitioner argues that AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled in order to permit

her to seek a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court for the denial

of her PCR petition.7

 Petitioner primarily bases her argument on Clay v. United States, 537

U.S. 522 (2003) (holding that a federal prisoner’s conviction is not final for purposes of

filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 until the expiration of the

time to file a petition for writ of certiorari). Petitioner argues in her Objection that the same

analysis applies, and that an additional 90 days should be tolled within which she could have

petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision

terminating her case. (Doc. #23.) As a result, Petitioner argues that AEDPA’s statute of

limitations did not expire until August 17, 2004, rendering Petitioner’s June 17, 2004 petition

timely. 

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8

 Gildon v. Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2004), specifically address

Petitioner’s argument, namely that Clay requires AEDPA’s statute of limitations to be tolled

during the time when a petitioner could have, but did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari

for the denial of their post-conviction relief petition. The Seventh Circuit flatly rejected the

argument, citing the dissimilarities between 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and § 2255.

9

 See White v. Klitzki, 281 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) for the time during which he could have filed

a petition for a writ of certiorari). See also Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (8th Cir.

2001) (concluding that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the statute of limitations for the 90 day

period); Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 695 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding a petition for certiorari

is neither state post-conviction relief nor other state collateral relief under § 2244(d)(2)), cert

denied, 531 U.S. 1201; Guitierrez v. Schomig, 233 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding

that the 90 days is not tolled because the petitioner never filed a petition for certiorari review

in the Supreme Court); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing

the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) from § 2244(d)(1)(A) as not taking into account the time

to file a petition for a writ of certiorari), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1084 (2000); Ott v. Johnson,

192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitations

period from the time of denial until the time in which a petitioner could have petitioned the

United States Supreme Court for certiorari).

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Petitioner’s reliance on Clay and its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is misplaced.

Petitioner neither is a federal prisoner, nor did she file her federal habeas petition pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Furthermore, Clay addresses the date on which a conviction becomes

final on direct appeal. Petitioner is making her argument is support of a collateral postconviction relief petition, which is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), yet Petitioner presents

her arguments in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), which governs direct appeals.8

 This

argument has been considered and wholly rejected by the Ninth Circuit and several other

circuits.9

 Accordingly Petitioner’s objection to the R&R is unsuccessful on this ground. 

In the alternative, Petitioner argued in her Reply to the Government’s Response to the

Petition that Az.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a) provides 30 days to seek review of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s order terminating Petitioner’s case. (Doc. # 16 at 7.) However, Rule 31.19 provides

time for review of an adverse decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals and not a decision

of the Arizona Supreme Court. Because the Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review, the

interval between the Arizona Court of Appeals’ adverse determination and the time provided

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to Petitioner to file her PCR review in the Arizona Supreme Court is not tolled. Thus from

the date of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision, August 30, 2002, under the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations, Petitioner had 365 days (less the 6 days that had already run) to file her

Petition. 359 days later on August 24, 2003, the deadline ran. Accordingly, the Petition filed

on July 17, 2004 was 297 days late.

B. EQUITABLE TOLLING

The R&R also recommends that equitable tolling be denied. For Petitioner to be

entitled to equitable tolling, she must show that there were extraordinary circumstances

beyond her control made it impossible for her to file timely. See Calderon v. United States

District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc). 

Petitioner claims in her objections that a lack of legal assistance and inability to access

funds amount to extraordinary circumstances. This Court agrees with the R&R that lack of

legal assistance and lack of money do not amount to extraordinary circumstances justifying

tolling the statute of limitations. See Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999).

Further, the miscalculation of a deadline is not the type of extraordinary circumstance that

warrants equitable tolling. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005), specifically forecloses the

possibility of equitable tolling based on Petitioner’s pro se status alone, absent other

extraordinary circumstances which are not demonstrated in this case. The Petitioner has

failed to show “that some extraordinary circumstances stood in [her] way.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Accordingly, the Petition will be denied equitable

tolling.

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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections (Doc. # 23) and

accepts the Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. # 17); 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1)

is denied, terminating this case; and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2006.

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