Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01313/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Phillip Morris,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-1313-TUC-CKJ-LCK

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Phillip Morris, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison in 

Eloy, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation.1

 Before this Court are the 

Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 14). The Magistrate Judge 

recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss the 

Petition on the ground that it is time-barred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In the Superior Court of Cochise County, Morris pled guilty to burglary in the 

second degree. (Doc. 14, Exs. G, D.) On June 13, 2011, the court sentenced Morris to 15 

years imprisonment. (Doc. 14, Ex. E.) 

 On October 18, 2011, Morris filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (PCR). 

 1

 This case was referred to the current Magistrate Judge on May 10, 2016. (Doc. 

25.) 

Case 4:13-cv-01313-CKJ Document 27 Filed 07/01/16 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Doc. 14, Ex. I.) Morris asserted that his failure to file a timely Notice of PCR was 

without fault on his part. (Id.) The State filed a response to Morris’s PCR Petition and 

moved to strike it because the Petition was filed late without any explanation. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. L.) On February 24, 2012, the trial court dismissed the PCR Petition as untimely. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. M.) Morris moved to vacate the dismissal order, arguing that he had filled 

out an earlier, timely Notice of PCR while in the county jail, but that this form was never 

filed by the court. (Doc. 14, Ex. N.) Because he never received a response from the court 

about his first PCR filing, he filed another one on October 18, 2011. (Id.) On March 14, 

2012, the trial court denied the motion to vacate the dismissal order, dismissed the Notice 

of PCR, and struck the Petition for PCR. (Doc. 14, Ex. S.) 

 On April 13, 2012, Morris filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 14, Ex. U.) The court of appeals granted review but denied relief, holding 

that Morris’s Notice of PCR was untimely with no “meritorious reasons” for why it was 

filed late. (Doc. 14, Ex. V.) Furthermore, the court held: 

 Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 32.2(b), the trial court was required to summarily dismiss the notice. And, given that the time limits of Rule 32.4 are jurisdictional, 

see A.R.S. 13-4234(G), and therefore cannot be waived by the state, see State v. 

 Silva, 222 Ariz. 457, ¶ 9, 216 P.3d 1203, 1205 (App. 2009), the court had no 

 authority to do otherwise. 

(Id.) 

 On October 7, 2013, Morris submitted the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in 

this Court. (Doc. 1.) The State filed a limited Answer to the Petition on February 19, 

2014. (Doc. 14.) Morris did not file a reply. 

DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Morris’s Petition is time-barred because it violates the 

statute of limitations. 

 Statute of Limitations and Statutory Tolling 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 

federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a oneCase 4:13-cv-01313-CKJ Document 27 Filed 07/01/16 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

year statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period begins 

to run from the latest of: 

 (A) the date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State 

 action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 

 the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

Id. 

 In applying (d)(1)(A), the Court must assess when direct review of Morris’s 

conviction became final. By pleading guilty, Morris waived his right to file a direct 

appeal; his only option was to file a PCR Petition pursuant to Rule 32. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

17.2(e). The Ninth Circuit held in Summers v. Schriro that a Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

is a form of direct review, and so the “AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not 

begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that 

proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” 

481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Morris was sentenced on June 13, 2011, and had 90 

days to initiate post-conviction proceedings, or until September 12, 2011.2

 Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.4(a). Morris did not file a Notice of PCR by that date. Thus, Morris’s 1-year statute 

of limitations period provided by the AEDPA began to run on September 13, 2011. 

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a “properly filed 

application for State’s post-conviction” review is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation. However, an untimely state post-conviction petition is not 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

410 (2005). Because Morris’s PCR proceeding initiated on October 18, 2011, was 

 2

 The 90 days expired on September 11, which was a Sunday. Therefore, Morris 

had until September 12 to file a Notice of PCR. 

Case 4:13-cv-01313-CKJ Document 27 Filed 07/01/16 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

untimely and, therefore, not properly filed, it did not toll the limitations period.3

 Morris’s PCR proceeding did not entitle him to statutory tolling, therefore, the 

limitations period expired on September 13, 2012. Morris did not file his Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus until October 7, 2013. Because Morris filed the Petition more than one 

year after the statute of limitations expired, the Petition is statutorily time-barred. 

 Equitable Tolling 

 Morris has not argued an entitlement to equitable tolling. However, based on the 

state court record, the Court evaluates whether tolling is warranted. Petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling “bears the 

burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

The diligence required for tolling is “reasonable diligence” as opposed to “maximum 

feasible diligence.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the effort 

needed is that expected of a reasonable person under those particular circumstances. Id. at 

1015. Furthermore, the petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstances were 

the cause of his untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

 In state court, Morris argued that he submitted a PCR Notice immediately after his 

June 13, 2011 sentencing, but the court failed to file it. In support of that argument, 

Morris produced a copy of a Notice of PCR dated June 16, 2011. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q.) Even 

accepting the truth of that statement, Morris failed to follow-up in a reasonable period of 

time. At sentencing, the judge informed Morris that he had 90 days to file a written 

 3

 In his Habeas Petition, Morris states that he filed a second PCR proceeding on 

April 4, 2013. Neither Morris nor the State provided any documentation of such a 

proceeding. Regardless, a state PCR petition, even one properly filed under state law, 

does not extend an already expired federal limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). As discussed below, the limitations period expired on 

September 13, 2012. 

Case 4:13-cv-01313-CKJ Document 27 Filed 07/01/16 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

petition for review and that he had the right to an attorney if he needed one. (Doc. 14, Ex. 

E.) In the unfiled June Notice, Morris requested appointment of counsel. (Doc. 14, Ex. 

Q.) Further, on July 20, 2011, trial counsel confirmed in writing to Morris that he no 

longer represented him. (Doc. 14, Ex. N.) Thus, Morris knew that he had 90 days to 

submit a PCR Notice and that he was no longer represented by trial counsel. However, 

Morris did not submit another PCR Notice until October 18, 2011— over a month past 

the 90-day deadline. Under these circumstances, a “reasonable person” could be expected 

to submit his notice within the allowed three-month period. Morris did not act with 

reasonable diligence when he waited over four months to file a PCR Notice. 

 Morris also must establish that there was an extraordinary circumstance that 

prevented him from timely filing a Petition in this Court. Equitable tolling is only 

available when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file a petition on time.” Stillman, 319 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Miles v. 

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). Although Morris argues that the state court 

failed to file his first PCR Notice, that did not preclude timely filing a federal Petition. 

Pace established that an untimely post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” for 

the purposes of § 2244(d)(2). 544 U.S. at 410. After the 2005 decision in Pace, Morris 

had notice that statutory tolling would be unavailable if his state petition was denied as 

untimely. See Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2011). Pace advised that 

state prisoners, such as Morris, could file a “protective” petition in federal court in order 

to avoid a potential timeliness bar. 544 U.S. at 416; Lakey, 633 F.3d at 787. Morris did 

not do so; therefore, the fact that his PCR Petition was found to be untimely did not make 

it impossible to file on time in this Court. Additionally, ignorance of the law is not an 

extraordinary circumstance and does not form a basis for equitable tolling. Rasberry, 448 

F.3d at 1154. Thus, even if Morris was unaware of his option to file a protective petition 

in federal court or of the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations period, he is not excused 

and is not entitled to equitable tolling. Morris also never filed a Reply to the State’s 

Case 4:13-cv-01313-CKJ Document 27 Filed 07/01/16 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Answer to the Petition, thus, forfeiting his opportunity to explain any reasons why he 

failed to timely file. 

 Morris has neither established that he diligently pursued his rights nor that an 

extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing his Habeas Petition. 

Therefore, he is not entitled to equitable tolling and the Petition is time-barred. 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CIV 13-1313-TUC-CKJ. 

 Dated this 1st day of July, 2016. 

Honorable Lynnette C. Kimmins

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:13-cv-01313-CKJ Document 27 Filed 07/01/16 Page 6 of 6