Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02837/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02837-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARNELL BLACK, SR,

CDCR #AP-6288,

Plaintiff,

vs.

H. LE, Counselor;

E. FRIJAS, Counselor,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-02837-BAS-MSB

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

[ECF No. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 

AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Plaintiff Darnell Black, Sr., currently incarcerated at California State Prison—Los 

Angeles County (“LAC”), in Lancaster, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on December 17, 2018, together with a Motion 

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF Nos. 1, 

2.) 

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Plaintiff claims two correctional counselors at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, violated his Eighth Amendment rights during 

an annual classification committee hearing held at RJD on July 14, 2017. Plaintiff contends 

Defendants mistakenly “label[ed] [him as] a[n] SNY” inmate on a CDC Form 128-G 

Classification Committee chrono, and that as a result, he suffers from “psychological 

injuries,” “deep depression,” and nightmares because he believes the SNY designation 

labels him as a “snitch.” (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 3, 7, 15, 18–21.) He state he faces 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff does not further contend

to have been actually threatened, attacked, or otherwise injured as a result of Defendants’ 

alleged error; but he seeks $400,000 in general and punitive damages. (Id. at 5.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 

an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to 

preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

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suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective of 

the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in 

federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 

1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after 

the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008); 

see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that when 

court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim’”) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) 

from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he alleges he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 

the time of filing.”).

B. Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and finds

it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of 

serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as noted above, Plaintiff seeks to sue two RJD correctional 

counselors based on claims that they mislabeled him as a “SNY” inmate on a Classification 

Committee Chrono dated July 14, 2017. (See Compl., 3, 6, 21.) While Plaintiff broadly 

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claims he “faces imminent danger” based on his “psychological injuries” as a result, (see

Compl. 3), he does not include any further factual allegations to plausibly show he has been 

physically harmed, actually threatened, or faces any immediate danger at LAC—where he 

has since been transferred and where he remained at the time he filed this suit in December 

2018—as a result of Defendants’ alleged July 2017 classification committee error at RJD. 

The “imminent danger” exception cannot be triggered solely by complaints of past 

harm. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053 (“The exception’s use of the present tense, 

combined with its concern only with the initial act of ‘bring[ing]’ the lawsuit, indicates to 

us that the exception applies if the danger existed at the time the prisoner filed the 

complaint.”); Patrick v. Altshuler, No. 2:17-CV-1046 AC P, 2017 WL 4539273, at *5 (E.D. 

Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (finding prisoner’s claims of “[f]ear with trust issues” and “painful” 

“[a]buse[s] of power” were insufficient to demonstrate he was “under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury” under § 1915(g)). Instead, to meet the “imminent danger” 

requirement, the “threat or prison condition [must be] real and proximate,” Ciarpaglini v. 

Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), and the allegations must be 

“specific or credible.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusory or speculative allegations of imminent danger, like those offered by Plaintiff 

here, are insufficient. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1057 n.11; see also Moten v. Sosa, No. 

217CV0068JAMACP, 2018 WL 571939, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2018) (finding claims 

that guard “labeled [plaintiff] a snitch-rat” and thereby “exposed [him] to emotional, or 

physical harm from other prisoners,” filed more than a year after the alleged incident failed 

to satisfy § 1915(g)’s exception for “imminent” or “proximate danger”), appeal dismissed, 

No. 18-16018, 2018 WL 6334995 (9th Cir. July 19, 2018), and report and recommendation 

adopted, No. 217CV0068JAMACP, 2018 WL 5883933 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2018).

And while Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to 

show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore 

counts as a strike.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119–20. That is the case here.

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The Court finds, based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings 

available on PACER, that Plaintiff Darnell Black, Sr., identified as CDCR #AP-6288, has 

had more than three prior prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds that 

they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1

They are: 

1) Black v. Nederuti, et al., Civil Case No. 2:17-cv-00135-CKD (E.D. 

Cal., March 16, 2017 Order granting IFP and dismissing Complaint for failing 

to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [ECF No. 11]); (E.D. Cal. May 

2, 2017 Order of dismissal for failure to amend) [ECF No. 14] (strike one);2

2) Black v. Davidson, Civil Case No. 2:17-cv-02637-RGK-RAO (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., May 26, 2017 and May 31, 2017 Recommendation and

Order denying IFP and dismissing case as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] 

fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”) [ECF No. 11]

(strike two); 

3) Black v. Tiggs-Brown, Civil Case No. 2:17-cv-04893-RGK-RAO (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., Sept. 21, 2017 and Sept. 27, 2017 Recommendation and 

Order denying IFP and dismissing case as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] 

fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”) [ECF No. 11] 

(strike three); 

4) Black v. Rios, Civil Case No. 2:18-cv-03769-RGK-RAO (C.D. Cal., 

West. Div., May 30, 2018 Recommendation and Order denying IFP and 

dismissing case as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] fail[ing] to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted”) [ECF No. 7] (strike four);

5) Black v. Rios, Civil Case No. 2:18-cv-08376-RGK-RAO (C.D. Cal., 

 

1 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States 

v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)), and “‘may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 

1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)). 

2 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A prisoner may not avoid 

incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunity to amend.”).

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West. Div., Oct. 2, 2018 and Oct. 3, 2018 Recommendation Order denying 

IFP and dismissing case as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] fail[ing] to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted”) [ECF No. 4] (strike five); 

6) Black v. Kitchen, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-02541-DMS-AGS (S.D. 

Cal. Nov. 6, 2018 Order Dismissing Civil Action as frivolous pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)) [ECF No. 3] (strike six); and

7) Black v. Golette, et al., Civil Case No. 2:18-cv-08377-RGK-RAO (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., Nov. 26, 2018 and Nov. 27, 2018 Recommendation Order 

denying IFP and dismissing case as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] fail[ing] to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted”) [ECF No. 10] (strike seven).3

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

III. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

The Court is also required to review complaints filed by anyone “incarcerated or 

detained in any facility who is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 

 

3 The Court notes Plaintiff has previously been denied leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) in this Court, and in the Central District of California as well. See Black 

v. Renolds, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-2259-CAB-RBM (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2019) [ECF 

No. 5]; Black v. Le, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-2771-GPC-BLM (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 

2018) [ECF No. 3]; Black v. Mai, et al., Civil Case No. 2:18-cv-09817-RGK-RAO (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., Nov. 30, 2018 Order denying IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) [ECF 

No. 4]; Black v. Tiggs Brown, et al., Civil Case No. 2:18-cv-09825-RGK-RAO (C.D. Cal., 

West. Div., Nov. 30, 2018 Order denying IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) [ECF No. 

4].

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violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, 

or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing” and regardless of 

whether the prisoner prepays filing fees or moves to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a), (c). Pursuant to this provision of the PLRA, the Court must review prisoner 

complaints which “seek[] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

government entity,” and dismiss those, or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, 

malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or which “seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Resnick 

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). “The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure 

that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

Regardless of whether Plaintiff paid the full filing fee, or was eligible to proceed 

IFP, the Court’s preliminary review of his Complaint also shows his case is subject to sua 

sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it is duplicative of another 

civil rights complaint he filed in this district just ten days before. See Black v. Le, et al.., 

S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-02771-GPC-BLM (“Black I”) (ECF No. 1). 

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it 

“merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 

1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). In Black I, Plaintiff alleges, as he does in this case, that RJD 

Counselors Le and Frijas, the same two officials named as Defendants again here, violated 

his Eighth Amendment rights on July 14, 2017, by erroneously identifying him as an 

“SNY” inmate in a Classification Committee Chrono. (Compare ECF No. 1 in 18cv2771-

GPC-BLM at 1–3, 17, with Compl. at 1–3, 21). 

Because Plaintiff brings identical claims against the same parties in this case and in 

Black I, the Court must also dismiss this duplicative and subsequently filed civil case 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 

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446 n.1; see also Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th Cir. 

2007) (“[I]n assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine 

whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, 

are the same.”), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 

(2008).4

IV. Conclusion and Orders

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

2) DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to 

pay the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a), and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 25, 2019

 

4

 Judge Curiel also denied Plaintiff leave proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

See Black I, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-02771-GPC-BLM (ECF No. 3).

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