Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00148/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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15cv148-BAS (DHB) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLEY, INC., a Washington 

corporation, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NEFF, LLC, a California limited liability 

company dba Neff Headwear, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15cv148-BAS (DHB) 

ORDER REGARDING JOINT 

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION 

OF DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

[ECF No. 27] 

 On July 14, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery 

Dispute regarding the scheduling of three depositions. (ECF No. 27.) Having considered 

the parties submissions, supporting exhibits, and supplemental documentation, the Court 

hereby DENIES Defendant’s motion to compel, and DENIES in part and GRANTS in 

part Defendant’s motion for a protective order, as set forth below. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In this action, Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Oakley, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) alleges 

infringement of its “Razor Blade” trade dress, and related claims, against Defendant and 

Counter-Claimant Neff, Inc. (“Defendant”). On June 4, 2015, Defendant served a Rule 

30(b)(6) deposition notice on Plaintiff, and on June 23, 2015, Plaintiff noticed the 

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depositions of JW Neff (Defendant’s President) and Shaun Neff (Defendant’s CEO). The 

parties have been unable to cooperatively schedule these depositions, and now seek court 

intervention. 

 Specifically, Defendant requests that the Court compel Plaintiff to produce its Rule 

30(b)(6) witness for deposition on July 21, 22, or 23, 2015. Defendant states that the 

deposition was scheduled for July 8, 2015, but was unilaterally cancelled by Plaintiff on 

July 1, 2015 because the witness had flown to Italy for a business meeting. Defendant 

also seeks $5,000 in legal fees associated with preparing for the cancelled deposition. In 

addition, Defendant moves for a protective order to prevent or delay the depositions of 

JW Neff and Shaun Neff under the “apex doctrine,” and asks the Court to restrict the 

parties to five fact depositions and one Rule 30(b)(6) deposition per side. Plaintiff 

counters that its Rule 30(b)(6) witness is not available for deposition until August 5, 

2015, and opposes the other relief requested by Defendant. 

II. DISCUSSION 

 1. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Rule 30(b)(6) Witness 

 The Court declines to compel Plaintiff to produce its Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Roeya 

Vaughan for deposition on the dates proposed by Defendant. The Court appreciates 

Defendant’s frustration with Plaintiff’s cavalier attitude towards cancelling her July 8, 

2015 deposition. However, based on Ms. Vaughan’s declaration, the Court finds Plaintiff 

has shown sufficient justification for why she is not available on July 21, 22, or 23, 2015. 

(See ECF No. 29.) The Court finds that postponing the deposition for approximately two 

weeks, until August 5, 2015, is reasonable, particularly in light of the early stage of this 

case. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to compel the Rule 30(b)(6) 

deposition to occur on July 21, 22, or 23, 2015. Plaintiff shall make its witness available 

for deposition on August 5, 2015.1

 The Court further declines Defendant’s request for 

                                                                

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 If Defendant’s counsel has a conflict on August 5, 2015, the deposition may be rescheduled, but shall 

be completed no later than August 14, 2015. The Court reminds counsel that they are expected to work 

cooperatively with each other in conducting discovery and in the scheduling of all future depositions. 

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$5,000 in legal fees. 

 2. Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Court may issue a protective 

order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue 

burden or expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking the protective order bears 

the burden to demonstrate good cause. Id.; Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 

282 F.R.D. 259, 262-63 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 2012). To establish good cause, the moving 

party must make a clear showing of a particular and specific need for the order. 

Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 

 Defendant moves for a protective order to postpone the depositions of JW Neff and 

Shaun Neff under the so called “apex doctrine.” Depositions of high-ranking corporate 

executives are sometimes referred to as apex depositions, and courts have observed that 

such depositions create “a tremendous potential for abuse or harassment.” Apple, 282 

F.R.D. at 263. Therefore, courts may exercise their discretion under Rule 26(c) to 

prohibit or defer apex depositions. When determining whether to allow an apex 

deposition, courts consider the following: (1) whether the high-ranking deponent has 

unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of the facts at issue in the case; and (2) 

whether the party requesting the deposition has exhausted other less intrusive discovery 

methods. Id. at 263; In re National Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litigation, 

2011WL 1304587, *1 (S.D. Cal. April 6, 2011). “When a high-level corporate executive 

lacks unique or superior knowledge of the facts in dispute, courts have found good cause 

exists to prohibit the deposition. However, when a witness has personal knowledge of 

facts relevant to the lawsuit, even a corporate president or CEO is subject to deposition. 

Generally, a claimed lack of knowledge on behalf of the deponent does not alone provide 

sufficient grounds for a protective order.” Webside Story, Inc. v. NetRatings, Inc., 2007 

WL 1120567, *2 (S.D. Cal. April 6, 2007). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 a. Shaun Neff 

 Defendant identified Shaun Neff in initial disclosures as an individual who likely 

has discoverable information. (ECF No. 27-4 at 4.) Defendant’s basis for requesting a 

protective order for Shaun Neff is merely that it believes his knowledge may be 

cumulative of the testimony of other employees. The Court finds this is an insufficient 

reason alone to justify prohibiting the deposition. Defendant has conceded that Shaun 

Neff has knowledge of matters relevant to the litigation, including “knowledge of the 

design and development of the accused products as well as Neff’s defenses and 

counterclaim.” (Id.) Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s request for a protective 

order with regard to Shaun Neff. Defendant is directed to cooperate with Plaintiff to find 

a mutually agreeable date for the deposition of Shaun Neff. 

 b. JW Neff 

 Defendant identified JW Neff in response to an interrogatory requesting Defendant 

to identify its corporate officers. (ECF No. 27-5.) However, Defendant did not 

acknowledge that JW Neff has any relevant knowledge. Indeed, Defendant claims that 

JW Neff “has no meaningful personal knowledge of facts relevant to this litigation.” 

(ECF No. 27 at 18.) However, Defendant has not supported this claim by declaration or 

otherwise. 

 On one hand, the Court finds Defendant has not met its burden to substantiate its 

claim that JW Neff does not have any personal knowledge of relevant facts. In re 

National Western Life Ins., 2011 WL 1304587 (“[T]he burden is on Defendants to show 

why the deposition should not be taken, not the other way around. . . . The apex 

deposition principle is not an automatic bar that [noticing party] must overcome by a 

showing of good cause. Rather, it is a protective tool that is selectively employed on a 

case by case basis when deemed appropriate.”) On the other hand, Plaintiff has not 

“exhausted other less intrusive discovery methods,” such as depositions of lower level 

employees. It appears JW Neff’s deposition notice was one of the first deposition notices 

Plaintiff issued. Therefore, the Court is without sufficient information at this time to 

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determine whether Plaintiff should be absolutely precluded from deposing JW Neff. 

Nevertheless, the Court is concerned that the deposition has the potential for harassment. 

Thus, the Court finds that a stay of JW Neff’s deposition is warranted while Plaintiff 

pursues other discovery, including the deposition of Shaun Neff and Defendant’s Rule 

30(b)(6) witness. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for a protective order as to JW Neff 

is granted, and his deposition is precluded at this time. Plaintiff is directed to make a 

good faith effort to extract the information it seeks through other discovery methods and 

depositions of lower-level Neff employees. If the other discovery proves inadequate or 

illustrates that JW Neff in fact has unique, non-repetitive personal knowledge of facts 

relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff may renew its notice of deposition. 

 3. Defendant’s Request for Further Limits on Discovery 

 Defendant renews its request that the Court limit the parties to five (5) fact 

depositions and one (1) Rule 30(b)(6) deposition per side. Defendant contends the 

limitation is appropriate because of its concerns that Plaintiff will leverage its superior 

resources and abuse the discovery process. Defendant also expresses its desire to 

accelerate the case. The Court finds that permitting ten (10) depositions per side, as 

contemplated by the Federal Rules, will not amount to an abuse of the discovery process 

in this case. Particularly in light of the fact that Defendant itself has identified 8 potential 

witnesses in its initial disclosures, and has sought to depose Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) 

witness on 17 topics. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s request to impose 

additional restrictions on the number of depositions the parties may notice. 

/ / / 

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/ / / 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 Defendant’s Motion to Compel the deposition of Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness 

on July 21, 22, or 23, 2015 is DENIED. Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order is 

DENIED in part as to Shaun Neff, and GRANTED in part as to JW Neff. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 21, 2015 _______________________ 

 DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

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