Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01104/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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1 ,, 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Siat(?§ Coort of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

NOV~ 3 1 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

STEPHANIE E. GRINDLE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

COLORADO PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, CO., ) 

INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

No. 89-1104 

(Dist. of Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 87-M-687) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, AND BRIMMER**, District 

Judge. 

** The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief United States District 

Judge for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Colorado Petroleum Products Co., Inc. (CPC) appeals from a 

judgment entered following a jury trial and verdict granted in 

favor of Stephanie E. Grindle (Grindle). Grindle brought this 

wrongful death action based upon diversity of citizenship 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1104 Document: 010110051348 Date Filed: 11/23/1990 Page: 1 
following the death of her husband, Douglas. The relevant 

background facts are not in dispute. 

Douglas was employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a 

carpenter foreman assigned to the Federal Correctional Institute 

(FCI) at Englewood, Colorado. FCI stored leaded gasoline in a 

converted underground water tank. The tank, which was ten feet in 

diameter and thirty feet long, held 16,668 gallons. At the east 

end of the tank was an eight-foot long tube used for filling the 

tank. 

Approximately 138 feet north of the tank was a maintenance 

garage. Several pipes, including a one-inch copper line, ran 

from the tank to the unvented basement of the maintenance garage. 

The copper line was in good condition with the exception of an 

irregular break, approximately one inch in length, near the east 

end of the tank. 

Within the basement of the maintenance garage was a very 

large air compressor, built in 1945. The compressor, which selfactivated as needed during the day, had an electric motor with a 

magnetic starter. Each time the magnetic starter kicked into the 

on position and started the motor, it caused a spark. The 

compressor did not contain explosion-proof electrical switches. 

On May 22, 1986, Val Eagle, a driver for CPC, delivered 8,009 

gallons of leaded gasoline to FCI's underground storage tank . The 

delivery took approximately 45 minutes and was completed around 

11:00 A.M. Although the tank was equipped with a vapor recovery 

system, the delivery fixtures used by Eagle were not equipped to 

allow the recovery of the fuel vapors from within the underground 

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Appellate Case: 89-1104 Document: 010110051348 Date Filed: 11/23/1990 Page: 2 
storage tank. (R., Vol. I, Tab 3, Pre-Trial Order, Stipulations 8 

and 12.) 

At approximately 12:55 PM, an explosion occurred at the FCI 

maintenance garage. Douglas Grindle was in the office of the 

garage at the time and was killed in the explosion. The explosion 

resulted from the ignition of accumulated gasoline fumes in the 

unvented basement of the maintenance garage. (R., Vol. I, Tab 3, 

Pre-Trial Order, Stipulation 3.) The "gasoline fumes were ignited 

by an electrical spark generated by equipment (compressor] in the 

basement, which equipment did not contain explosion proof 

electrical switches." Id., Stipulation 5. Upon excavation of the 

underground storage tank, the ground surrounding it was found to 

be saturated with gasoline. Id., Stipulation 16. 

At the time of his death, Douglas was married to plaintiffappellee, Stephanie Grindle. Douglas was also the father of a 

daughter, Cara Jo, by a prior marriage. In January, 1986, 

Douglas had filed for divorce and that divorce proceeding was 

pending at the time of his death. Douglas and Stephanie were not 

residing with each other at the time of his death. 

Following the accident, the Bureau of Prisons appointed a 

Regional Board of Inquiry (Board) to investigate the explosion. 

Within its Final Report, the Board found: 

[T]he explosion occurred as a result of gasoline 

fumes entering the garage sub-basement through a oneinch copper pipe. Evidence of gasoline was present in 

the copper pipe at the broken section near the regular 

gasoline tank .. and in the end of the pipe in the 

sub-basement. 

* * * 

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Although ... statements by Val Eagle 

indicate minimal spillage, it is the conclusion of the 

Board ... that there was significant spillage during 

the fuel loading process. While the exact amount of 

spillage cannot be calculated, it was obviously 

sufficient to enter the copper pipe, migrate to the 

garage sub-basement and generate enough fumes to create 

the explosion ignited by a spark at the air compressor. 

(R., Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 at pp. 15 and 17). 

Grindle sued CPC under Colorado's wrongful death statute, 

Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-21-202 (1973). Within her complaint, she 

alleged that CPC had spilled gasoline during the delivery to FCI 

and that CPC was strictly liable for all the damages occasioned 

thereby. Grindle also alleged that CPC's delivery of the gasoline 

was negligently performed and that such negligence was the 

proximate cause of Douglas' death. 

In its response, CPC acknowledged that one of its employees 

had "spilled a very small and minor amount of gasoline at the time 

of such delivery" (R., Vol. I, Tab 2, p. 1.) However, CPC denied 

that it was strictly liable, that it was negligent in the delivery, 

or that its actions gave rise to the explosion. 

Prior to trial, the district court denied CPC's motion to 

call Jeff Auger as a witness, finding that he had not been timely 

designated in the pretrial order. During trial, counsel for 

Grindle asked Val Eagle to identify a document prepared by one of 

CPC's insurance carriers. The document instructed CPC's drivers 

what to do in case of an automobile accident. The document 

contained an intersection scene and asked the driver to indicate 

thereon the position of his vehicle and others at the point of the 

accident. CPC objected and moved for a mistrial. The court denied 

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CPC's motion and instructed the jury to disregard the reference to 

an accident. 

During the trial, Grindle's expert testified: 

Q. 

type of 

A. 

not. 

Q. 

Were the fixtures that you examined the proper 

fixtures to make this type of delivery? 

To make this type of delivery? No, they were 

In what way were they improper? 

A. This delivery was to be made through a nozzle 

or a thing that in the jargon of the business is call ed 

a drop tube. It just means a tube from the top of the 

tank to the bottom of the tank. This particular one is 

called a coaxial. It just means it's got a pipe inside 

a pipe. The liquid gasoline from the truck is supposed 

to be hooked up to go into the pipe that's on the inside 

which goes to the bottom of the tank. The pipe that's 

on the outside has an opening at its bottom, right up 

close to the top of the tank, and the purpose of that 

opening is to let vapors that are being pushed out of 

the tank by the gasoline coming in get out and into 

another connecting nozzle, which is then connected by a 

hose back to the truck that the liquid gasoline was 

coming from. That's all a coax connection means. 

This particular delivery was made in two efforts, 

neither of which used the proper fitting to make that 

connection through .... There was leakage. 

* * * 

A. You're asking me for an opinion on about how 

much [gasoline) got out? My best estimate based on 

experience is probably more than a hundred and probably 

less than two hundred gallons. 

(R., Vol. IV at pp. 399, 400 and 438). 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Grindle and awarded 

her damages of $800,000. The court denied CPC's motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a 

new trial. The court also denied CPC's request for a set-off for 

the collateral compensation benefits which Grindle received. 

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On appeal, CPC contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying 

its motion for a mistrial after plaintiff's counsel placed the 

issue of its liability insurance before the jury; (2) denying its 

motion for a new trial on damages; (3) excluding testimony from 

Jeff Auger; (4) denying its motion for a new trial on negligence 

and causation; and (5) denying its request for a set-off of the 

collateral benefits received by Grindle. 

At the outset, we note that under the abuse of discretion 

standard, a district court's decision will not be disturbed 

unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the district 

court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of 

permissible choice in the circumstances. United States v. Ortiz, 

804 F.2d 1161, 1164, n. 2 (10th Cir. 1986). In applying the abuse 

of discretion standard, we defer to the trial court's judgment 

because of its first-hand ability to view the witness or evidence 

and assess credibility and probative value. Id. 

I. 

CPC contends that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying its motion for a mistrial after Grindle's attorney 

deliberately placed the issue of CPC's liability insurance before 

the jury. 

CPC argues that Grindle deprived it of 

deliberately placing before the jury the fact of 

a fair trial by 

its liability 

insurance. The alleged misconduct occurred during Grindle's 

examination of Val Eagle: 

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J. - - - -

Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Eagle, that Colorado 

Petroleum Products' drivers are instructed that in t he 

event of an accident, you are not to a dmit 

responsibility regardless of the facts? 

A. Not that I am aware of. 

Q. Did you have in you~ possession a set of 

driver's instructions as to what you were supposed to do 

in the case of an accident ... ? 

A. What driver's instructions? 

Mr. Livingston (counsel for defendant): Your 

Honor, we object to this entire line of questioning. He 

assumes that there's been an accident with this l i ne o f 

questioning and there hasn't been any establishment of 

The Court: I don't know what you mean by an 

accident. Are you talking about an automobile accident. 

Mr. Hunt (counsel for plaintiff): Your honor--Mr. 

Clark, would you please show the witness plaintiff's 

Exhibit No. 4? 

* * * 

Q. Have you seen these documents before? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Can you tell the jury what they are? 

A. It's a pamphlet that's put out by our auto 

insurance company that tells our drivers, 'do not admi t 

guilt in the event of an automobile accident.' 

* * * 

The Court: Well, I am sustaining the objection to 

that. I am surprised that you are bringing that kind of 

thing in here. 

* * * 

Mr. Livingston: We're going to move for a mistrial 

at this point in light of the evidence. 

The Court: Denied; proceed. 

(Open court resumes.) 

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l -'-' ...... ){ 

The Court: Members of the jury, this reference to 

an accident and instructions about an accident i s 

totally irrelevant, uncalled for, and t he j ury will 

disregard it. It has nothing to do with the facts of 

this case. (Emphasis supplied) 

(R., Vol. II, pp. 76-78). 

CPC argues that the prejudice from this testimony was 

incurable and that the district court's bland corrective 

i nstruction, which did not address the issue of insurance, could 

not cure the prejudice. 

Grindle responds that the district court properly exercised 

its discretion by denying CPC's motion for a mistrial. She argues 

that it is only the intentional introduction of insurance that 

gives rise to a mistrial, and that Eagle's non-responsive answer 

to a question about a set of driver's instructions cannot be 

characterized as the intentional introduction of insurance on her 

part. Grindle also argues that CPC failed to request that the 

jury be admonished to disregard insurance. Finally, Grindle 

observes that CPC's president, Loren Thompson, also referred to 

t he existence of insurance during cross examination: 

Q. So over a year goes by and you don't think that 

you have any connection with this incident until Mr. 

Hunt files this lawsuit; right? 

A That's correct. Well, he didn't file a lawsuit. 

He wrote a letter, wanted to know the name of our 

insurance company. 

(R., Vol. II at p. 161). 

Grindle argues that because (a) Eagle's reference to CPC's 

insurance company was unresponsive and unsolicited, (b) CPC did 

not request that the jury be admonished to disregard insurance, 

and (c) CPC's president subsequently referred to the exi stence 

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of insurance on a completely separate matter, the district 

court's denial of CPC's motion for a mistrial cannot be held to be 

an abuse of discretion. We agree. We hold that, assuming that 

Grindle's purpose for advancing this line of questioning was to 

introduce evidence of insurance, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying CPC's request for a mistrial under the 

circumstances. 

The admissibility of evidence in diversity cases is generally 

governed by federal law, Romine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944 (10th 

Cir. 1987), including the admissibility of evidence of insurance. 

Reed v. General Motors Corporation, 773 F.2d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 

1985). Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence proscribes the 

admission of evidence "[t]hat a person was or was not insured 

against liability .. upon the issue [of] whether the person 

acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully ... " 

CPC did not object at trial that Grindle had improperly 

injected insurance into the proceedings. Rather, CPC's objection 

was that Grindle's line of questioning assumed that there had been 

an accident while, in fact, that had not been established. 

Thereafter, the court sustained CPC's objection on that basis, 

noting that the questioning "was totally irrelevant, uncalled 

for." Subsequent thereto, CPC did not challenge the adequacy of 

the court's corrective instruction. 

Evidence of insurance was presented to the jury on two 

different occasions. Initially, CPC's employee, Val Eagle, 

voluntarily, and in an unresponsive manner, identified a pamphlet 

as one that had been "put out by our auto insurance company." 

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Subsequent thereto, CPC's president volunteered 

examination that Grindle's attorney had written a 

the name of CPC's insurance company. 

during crossletter seeking 

· Under these circumstances, and inasmuch as CPC's sole 

objection was that Grindle's line of questioning of Val Eagle 

assumed that there had been an accident, we hold that the district 

court's denial of CPC's motion for a mistrial did not constitute 

an abuse of discretion. 

II. 

CPC contends that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying its motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. 

CPC argues that the jury's award of $800,000 was nearly 

double the combined total of the present value of Douglas' net 

expected income and household contributions as developed by 

Grindle's economist; and the jury improperly considered Cara Jo 

Grindle's participation in the damage award. CPC also contends 

that the jury improperly considered the present value of Douglas' 

expected gross income, rather than properly considering the 

present value of his net expected income after taxes. 

Grindle responds that: the damage award was more than 

$200,000 less than the losses testified to by her expert; the 

award is supported by the evidence; the jury was instructed in 

accordance with Colorado's stock jury instructions applicable to 

wrongful death actions; the damage award does not shock the 

judicial conscience; and since the evidence supports the damage 

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award, the denial of CPC's motion for a new trial cannot be 

considered an abuse of discretion. 

A district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion 

for a new trial. McHargue v. Stokes Division of Pennwalt Corp., 

912 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1990). Our review is limited to whether 

the district court's refusal to set aside the jury verdict 

constituted a manifest abuse of its discretion. Royal College 

Shop v. Northern Insurance Company of New York, 895 F.2d 670, 677 

(10th Cir. 1990). If a reasonable basis exists for the jury's 

verdict, we will not disturb the district court's denial of a 

motion for a new trial. McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 

F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988). Absent an award so excessive or 

inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an 

irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or 

other improper cause invaded the trial, the jury's determination 

of damages is considered inviolate. Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 

1516, 1528 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009 (1989). 

See also Karns v. Emerson Electric Company, 817 F.2d 1452, 1460 

(10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 228 (10th 

Cir. 1987)). 

Grindle presented substantial evidence upon which the jury 

could reasonably base its damage award. Furthermore, the award 

was not so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and to 

raise an irresistible inference that passion or prejudice or other 

improper cause invaded the jury's determination. Thus, we hold 

that the district court's denial of CPC's motion for a new trial 

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on the issue of damages did not constitute a manifest abuse of 

discretion. 

We observe that CPC's appellate argument that any damage 

award must reflect Douglas' expected income after taxes is not 

timely. Each party in a civil case must live with the legal 

theories reflected in the instructions to which they do not 

object. Zimmerman v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 

848 F.2d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1988). CPC did not object to any 

of the court's tendered instructions (R., Vol. VII at p. 786). 

None of the instructions required that a damage award reflect 

Douglas' expected income after taxes. Nor did CPC request an 

instruction that the jury's damage award, if any, reflect 

Douglas' expected income after taxes. As such, CPC is precluded 

from advancing the argument on appeal. 

III. 

CPC contends that the court abused its discretion in 

excluding Jeff Auger as a witness on the ground that Auger had not 

been timely designated in a pretrial order. 

Grindle filed her complaint on May 11, 1987. CPC filed its 

answer on May 29, 1987. After more than a year and a half of 

discovery, the pre-trial order was filed on December 2, 1988, 

providing, inter-alia, that "a written list of witnesses must be 

filed at the status conference." (R., Vol. I, Tab 3 at p. 11.) 

The status conference was held on January 19, 1989. During the 

status conference, Grindle attempted to add an additional witness. 

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CPC strongly objected. The court denied Grindle's request and 

noted that compliance with the pre-trial order was essential. 

Thirteen days later, on February 1, 1989, CPC filed a 

supplemental witness designation in which it designated, for the 

first time, two additional witnesses, including Auger. The trial 

commenced on February 27, 1989. Prior to trial the court 

disposed of several preliminary matters, including CPC's 

supplemental witness designation. The court denied CPC's request, 

based on the pre-trial order. 

In support of its contention that the court abused its 

discretion in excluding the testimony of Auger, CPC argues that: 

Auger was Douglas' best friend at FCI; security at FCI made 

discovery extremely difficult; discovery was also difficult 

because Douglas had worked at FCI for less than four months before 

his death; CPC discovered Auger's identity and learned of his 

friendship with Douglas only by chance while inspecting the 

remains of an FCI gas pump approximately four to five weeks prior 

to trial; as soon as it became aware of their friendship, CPC 

disclosed its intent to call Auger as a witness; Auger's testimony 

would have been limited to only one issue, whether Douglas 

intended to proceed with the divorce 

Auger's testimony would not have 

efficient conduct of the trial. 

of Stephanie 

disrupted the 

Grindle; 

orderly 

and 

and 

Grindle responds that: the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding Auger's testimony; CPC's attempt to call 

Auger was merely another example of CPC postponing matters until 

the last moment; the pre-trial order, which was the result of a 

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hard fought and lengthy process, required that all the witnesses 

be listed no later than the date of the status conference; when 

Grindle attempted to add an additional witness during the status 

conference, CPC strongly objected, after which the court denied 

Grindle's request and noted that compliance with the pre-trial 

order was essential; approximately one and a half weeks later, and 

without seeking to amend the pre-trial order, CPC attempted to 

add Auger as a witness; and, inasmuch as CPC had earlier 

successfully objected to one of Grindle's witnesses as being 

untimely named, "it seems remarkable that the defendant should 

[now] contend that the Court abused its discretion in precluding 

it [CPC] from calling one of its own witnesses named still later." 

(Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at p. 26.) We agree. 

It is well established that unless the court modifies its 

pre-trial order, parties are bound to its contents and may not 

contradict its terms. Perry v. Winspur, 782 F.2d 893, 894 (10th 

Cir. 1986). This rule applies, of course, to those portions of 

the pre-trial orders which list the witnesses and describe the 

testimony each party may use. Id. When there exists a properly 

drawn, detailed pre-trial order, a district court's determination 

that certain facts or issues must be excluded from trial may be 

reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion. Grant v. 

Brandt, 796 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Smith v. Ford 

Motor Company, 626 F.2d 784, 795 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 

450 U.S. 918 (1981)). 

We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding Auger as a witness. Inasmuch as the district court did 

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not modify the pre-trial order, CPC was bound by its terms, 

particularly when, as here, CPC does not contend that the pretrial order was improperly drawn. CPC had over a year and onehalf for discovery. CPC had previously successfully argued that 

Grindle was bound by the pre-trial order in convincing the court 

to preclude Grindle from designating an additional witness some 

thirty-nine days prior to trial. Notwithstanding the above facts, 

CPC contends that security at FCI, coupled with Douglas' short 

tenure at FCI made discovery very difficult and that the district 

court abused its discretion by refusing to allow it to ignore the 

pre-trial order and designate Auger (who it discovered "by 

chance") as an additional witness twenty-six days prior to the 

commencement of the trial. This argument does not support a 

holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 

Auger as a witness. 

IV. 

CPC contends that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying its motion for a new trial on the issues of negligence and 

causation. 

A motion for a new trial made on the ground that the jury 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence normally presents a 

question of fact and is addressed to the discretion of the 

district court. Brown v. McGraw-Edison Company, 736 F.2d 609, 616 

(10th Cir. 1984). "On review, we will not disturb the denial of a 

motion for a new trial absent a showing of a manifest abuse of 

discretion The standard we use in determining this is 

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whether the verdict is 'clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly 

against the weight of the evidence." Id. at pp. 616-617 (quoting 

Champion Home Builders v. Shumate, 388 F. 2d 806, 808 (10th Cir. 

1967)). 

CPC argues that: Grindle was obligated to prove each 

essential element of her case by a preponderance of the evidence, 

including negligence and causation; Grindle's proof of negligence 

and causation rested entirely upon speculation and conjecture; in 

order for Grindle to prove that CPC was negligent she had to prove 

that CPC had spilled a large quantity of gasoline; Grindle failed 

to prove that CPC spilled a large quantity of gasoline; and 

Grindle's proof of the spill and the transmigration of the spilled 

gasoline rested upon testimony which was lacking in credibility 

and which amounted to pure speculation. 1 

We hold that Grindle presented sufficient evidence upon which 

the jury could, and did, find that CPC negligently delivered the 

gasoline to FCI and that CPC's negligence caused the explosion 

which killed Douglas. 

The pre-trial order set forth forty stipulations, including 

the following, which were read to the jury: 

1. An explosion 

Correctional Institution . occurred at the . . on May 26, 1986 . Federal . • • I 

1 Inherent within CPC's contention that Grindle's case rested 

upon testimony lacking in credibility was CPC's assumption that 

Grindle's case was predicated not only on her proving that 

gasoline was spilled, but also that the spilled gasoline 

subsequently traveled uphill for some thirty feet or so, and 

thence flowed downhill and into the basement of the garage. 

However, Grindle's case was predicated on the fact that the 

spilled gasoline caused gasoline fumes to travel to the unvented 

basement of the garage. 

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2. Douglas M. Grindle was killed in that 

explosion; 

3. The explosion resulted from an ignition of 

accumulation of gasoline fumes in an unvented basement . . . . , * * * 

7. Colorado Petroleum ... made a delivery of . gasoline to the institution ... on May 22, 1986; 

* * * 

12. The fixtures utilized [by CPC to deliver the 

gasoline) were not equipped to allow the recovery of the 

fuel vapors from within the underground storage tank; 

* * * 

18. The last filling of the underground tank 

[prior to May 22, 1986] had taken place in June 1985; 

* * * 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 3, pp. 3-5; Vol. II, pp. 63-64). 

Grindle also presented, without objection (R., Vol. III, p. 

217), the Final Report of the Regional Board of Inquiry, United 

States Bureau of Prisons. 

concluded: 

VII. Probable Causes 

Within this report, the 

As indicated in the previous section, the 

explosion occurred as a result of gasoline fumes 

entering the garage sub-basement through a one-inch 

copper pipe. 

* * * 

Although ... statements by ... Mr. Val Eagle 

indicate minimal spillage, it is the conclusion of the 

Board ... that there was significant spillage during 

the fuel loading process. While the exact amount of 

spillage cannot be calculated, it was obviously 

sufficient to enter the copper pipe, migrate to the 

garage sub-basement and generate enough gasoline fumes 

to create the explosion ignited by a spark at the air 

compressor. 

(R., Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, pp. 15 and 17). 

Grindle's expert also testified that: neither of 

Board 

the 

fittings used by Eagle in delivering the gasoline were proper 

fittings; there was leakage; and his "best estimate based on 

experience" was that Eagle spilled "probably more than a hundred 

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Appellate Case: 89-1104 Document: 010110051348 Date Filed: 11/23/1990 Page: 17 
[gallons of gasoline] and probably less than two hundred gallons" 

(R., Vol. IV, p. 438) at the time he delivered the gasoline to FCI 

on May 22, 1986, several hours prior to the explosion. 

The court instructed the jury, without objection, that: 

The explosion which killed Mr. Grindle was in the 

early afternoon of May 22, 1986 . The explosion 

resulted from an accumulation of gasoline fumes in the 

basement of the garage building .... 

The plaintiff claims that these fumes resulted from 

the spillage of gasoline during the delivery made by the 

defendant's driver, and the defendant is, therefore, 

liable for damages resulting from Mr. Grindle's death. 

(R., Vol. VIII at p. 964). 

We hold that the above referenced evidence, presented to a 

properly instructed jury, constituted sufficient evidence upon 

which the jury could find that CPC had negligently delivered the 

gasoline to FCI and that CPC's negligent delivery gave rise to the 

explosion which resulted in Douglas' death. Thus, we cannot hold 

that the jury verdict in favor of Grindle was "clearly, decidedly, 

or overwhelmingly" against the weight of the evidence. Brown v. 

McGraw-Edison, supra. 

v. 

CPC contends that the district court erred in denying its 

request for a set-off under Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-21-111.6 (1987) 2 

2§ 13-21-111.6 provides in part: 

In any action by any person or his legal representative 

to recover damages for a tort resulting in death ... 

the court, after the finder of fact has returned its 

verdict stating the amount of damages to be awarded, 

shall reduce the amount of the verdict by the amount by 

which such person, his estate ... has been or will be 

wholly or partially indemnified or compensated for his 

loss by any other person ... or fund .... 

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of the collateral benefits which Grindle received. 

After Douglas' death, Stephanie Grindle received federal 

workman's compensation benefits. CPC argues that Grindle's 

judgment should have been reduced under § 13-21-111.6 to reflect 

those workman's compensation benefits received. 

In response, Grindle argues that, since she is obligated 

under 5 U.S.C.A. § 8132 3 to repay the government for the benefits 

which she has received out of any judgment, it would be unfair and 

inappropriate to reduce her judgment under§ 13-21-111.6: 

On the other hand, should the position set forth by 

the defendant have been accepted by the Trial Court, not 

only would the plaintiff not have received recovery, she 

would have been penalized. The judgment compensating 

her for her losses would have been reduced [under§ 13-

21-111.6] by the amount of the payments previously 

received, and then, from the lesser sum paid, she would 

still have to repay the United States Government [under 

§ 8132] the amount previously received. The court 

properly rejected this thinking. 

(Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at pp. 47-48). 

The district court agreed with Grindle, effectively finding 

that Grindle's judgment should not be reduced under§ 13-21-111.6 

inasmuch as the government would be paid first out of Grindle's 

3s 8132 provides in part: 

If an injury or death for which compensation is payable 

under this subchapter is caused under circumstances 

creating a legal liability in a person other than the 

United States to pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled 

to receive compensation from the United States for that 

injury or death receives money ... in satisfaction of 

that liability ... the beneficiary ... shall refund 

to the United States the amount of compensation paid by 

the United States .... No court ... shall pay or 

distribute to the beneficiary ... the proceeds of such 

suit without first satisfying or assuring 

satisfaction of the interests of the United States ... 

-19-

Appellate Case: 89-1104 Document: 010110051348 Date Filed: 11/23/1990 Page: 19 
judgment under§ 8132. We hold that the district court did not err 

in refusing CPC's request to reduce Grindle's judgment under§ 13-

21-111.6. 

AFFIRMED. 

-20-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-1104 Document: 010110051348 Date Filed: 11/23/1990 Page: 20