Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00806/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00806-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Most of the following facts are taken from the plaintiffs’ complaint, the allegations of which

must be taken as true at this stage. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW M. MUSAELIAN, MARY C.

MUSAELIAN, and MICHAEL A.

MUSAELIAN,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SONOMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT., and

ELIZABETH WARREN, Civil Manager, 

Defendants. /

No. C 07-00806 SI

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion is scheduled for hearing

on June 29, 2007. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is

appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES the motion in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Andrew, Mary, and Michael Musaelian allege that defendant Elizabeth Warren was,

at all relevant times, acting in the course and scope of her employment as the Civil Bureau Manager for

defendant Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department (“SCSD”). Complaint ¶¶ 4-5.1

 Plaintiffs allege that

on or about February 15, 2005, Warren, acting under color of state law, issued a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale

on Real Property (“Notice”), and negligently caused it to be posted on plaintiffs’ residence located at

4768 Devonshire Place, Santa Rosa. Id. ¶ 7. Thereafter, plaintiffs claim the Notice was posted at the

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 The Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) [Docket No. 13].

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Sonoma County Courthouse, and published in a local newspaper. Id. According to plaintiffs, the Notice

stated that it was based on a Writ of Execution dated November 15, 2001, and that defendants “have

levied on all rights, title, claim and interest of plaintiff ANDREW MUSAELIAN in the real property.”

Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Warren failed to “record a Notice of Levy as required by law.”

Id. Plaintiffs also allege that the Writ of Execution expired on May 25, 2002, and was not renewed, and

that defendants “failed to comply with the statutory requirements for issuing a Notice.” Id. ¶ 9.

Plaintiffs allege that Andrew and Mary Musaelian received a final discharge in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy

case on December 6, 2004. Id. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Warren was aware that the

bankruptcy case had been closed at the time of the levy. 

In response to these alleged wrongs, plaintiffs filed a timely claim with the appropriate agency

in compliance with the California Tort Claims Act presentment requirements. Complaint ¶ 6. The claim

was rejected on August 31, 2005. Id. Plaintiffs filed a claim in California state court within six months,

on February 27, 2006, alleging Abuse of Process, Defamation, and Negligence. See RJN2

 , Ex. A. That

case was voluntarily dismissed on July 6, 2006. See RJN, Ex. B. 

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on February 8, 2007, alleging claims under title 42 U.S.C. section

1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and state-law claims

for Abuse of Process, Defamation, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligence.

Defendants now move to dismiss the state-law claims for failure to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act, and in the alternative because defendants are entitled to absolute privilege. Defendants also

move to dismiss the section 1983 claims as to all defendants for failure to allege unequal treatment, and

as to defendant SCSD for failure to allege Monell liability. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The question presented by a motion to dismiss

is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer

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evidence in support of the claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

In answering this question, the Court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and

must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d

556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance of recovery is

remote, the Court must allow the plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings. See

United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981).

If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The

Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. California Tort Claims Act statute of limitations 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ state-law claims are barred by failure to comply with the

presentment requirements of the California Tort Claims Act. In particular, defendants argue that

plaintiffs failed to file this suit within the six month time-frame mandated by section 945.6(a)(1) of the

California Government Code. 

The California Tort Claims Act determines the circumstances under which governmental entities

and employees can be sued. It provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity [or employee] on a cause of action until a written claim therefor has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the

board . . . .” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4. If the claim is rejected, the public entity must provide written

notice. See id. § 913. Section 913 requires that the rejection notice state, in pertinent part: 

Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this

notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on

this claim. See Government Code Section 945.6. 

Id. Once the notice of rejection is given, the statute of limitations section is triggered. Subject to a few

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exceptions, 

any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to be presented in accordance with [§§ 900-915] . . . must be commenced:

(1) If written notice is given in accordance with Section 913, not later than six

months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail.

Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6. Courts generally construe the California Tort Claims Act statute of limitations

strictly. See Doe v. Petaluma City School District, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Anson v. County

of Merced, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. City and County of San Francisco, 68

Cal. App. 3d 227, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). Although California law provides for equitable tolling

during the pendency of litigation in another forum, the statute of limitations is only tolled while the first

suit is pending. See Martell v. Antelope Valley Medical Center, 67 Cal. App. 4th 978, 985 (2d Dist.

1998). After voluntary dismissal, the six month period starts to run again, from where it left off, and

applies to state-law claims in any forum. See id. 

Here, defendants do not contest that plaintiffs presented a timely written claim to the appropriate

state agency in accordance with section 945. According to plaintiffs, that claim was rejected on August

31, 2005. See Complaint ¶ 6. Plaintiffs do not allege that the notice of rejection failed to comply with

the law; plaintiffs were aware of the six month statute of limitations and filed in state court for the statelaw claims on February 27, 2006. See Opposition at 2. Defendants argue that because plaintiffs filed

the original complaint 180 days after the tort claim was rejected, upon dismissal they had only two days

left of the total 182 day limitations period in which to file this suit in federal court. Plaintiffs

undisputedly failed to do so. 

Plaintiffs respond that they complied with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act

by filing the original case in state court within six months, and therefore the current action is timely

under the statute of limitations for ordinary torts. Opposition at 2. A similar argument was made in

Martell, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 981, wherein appellants contended that having once satisfied section 945.6

by filing their initial claim they were released from any obligation to comply with the six month statute

of limitations in future actions based on the same claims. In that case, the plaintiffs voluntarily

dismissed their original timely complaint and waited several years to refile. Id. The court adopted the

respondent’s argument, holding that “any suit brought against a public entity must be filed no more than

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six months after the pubic entity rejects the claim.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations

omitted). Here plaintiffs’ state court case was voluntarily dismissed on June 6, 2006. See RJN, Ex. B.

Plaintiffs filed in this Court on February 8, 2007, more than one year and five months after the notice

of rejection was issued. Plaintiffs therefore failed to comply with the Act’s requirements. 

 Moreover, the doctrine of equitable tolling does not aid plaintiffs here. In order to grant relief

under an equitable tolling doctrine, “reasonable promptness in refiling is necessary.” Kolani v. Gluska

64 Cal. App. 4th 402, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). “The leading cases finding equitable tolling have

involved short intervals between dismissal and refiling,” often only a few days. Id. at 409 (citations

omitted). In Kolani, the court said that reasonableness had to be “assessed in light of the 30-day ‘grace

period’ in 28 United States Code section 1367(d),” and held that waiting much more than 30 days was

not reasonable. Id. at 410. This Court is not aware of any authority which would allow equitable

tolling here, where plaintiffs waited eight months to refile. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs’

state-law claims are barred for failure to timely file. 

II. Absolute Privilege as to State Claims 

In the alternative, defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that the Court should dismiss

plaintiffs’ state-law claims because defendants are immune from liability under California Civil Code

section 47(b). Defendants argue that, under the privileged publication rule, they are entitled to absolute

privilege with respect to any efforts to enforce the writ of execution and publish the Notice. A

privileged publication is one made in the “proper discharge of an official duty,” in any “legislative . .

. [or] judicial proceeding,” in any other “official proceeding authorized by law,” or “in the initiation or

course of any other proceeding authorized by law.” Cal. Civ. Code § 47. This privilege has been “held

applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication” and “any publication

required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding . . . even though the publication is

made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved.” Rusheen v. Cohen,

37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057 (2006) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (Cal. 1990))

(quotations and citations omitted). The privilege has been found to apply to abuse of process,

defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. See Brown v. Kennard, 94 Cal.

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 Defendants also argue that the bankruptcy case triggered an automatic stay, and equitable

tolling extended the time period in which the Writ of Execution could be enforced. Motion at 7:4-6.

The Court cannot decide this factual issue on a motion to dismiss. 

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App. 4th 40, 45 (2001). In Kennard, the court found that application for a writ of execution by levy on

real property, proceedings to enforce it, the act of carrying out the directive of the writ, and issuance and

publication of a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale were all protected by the litigation privilege. See id. at 49-50.

Likewise, in this case, defendants are immune from liability for plaintiff’s state-law claims for actions

arising out of and in connection with the Writ of Execution. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ causes of action

one through four must be dismissed. 

III. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim 

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is brought under title 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ fifth

cause of action for failure to establish plaintiffs were “treated differently from those similarly situated,

and lack of rational basis for the disparate treatment.”3

 Motion at 6. To state a claim under section

1983, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred ‘under color of state law’ and (2) the

action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To state a claim for a violation of equal protection, plaintiffs must show that

there was unequal treatment of persons similarly situated, or that the defendants acted with an intent to

discriminate against plaintiffs based on membership in a protected class. See Washington v. Davis, 426

U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001).

When analyzing a discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, we must

first determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied. If the rule

disadvantages a suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right, the court will

examine it by applying a strict scrutiny standard. If no such suspect class or

fundamental rights are involved, the conduct or rule must be analyzed under a

rational basis test.

Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Where there is no suspect class

or fundamental right involved, “equal protection claims may be brought by a ‘class of one,’ where

plaintiff alleges that [he or] she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated

and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

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562, 564 (2000); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Even where a rational basis is shown, “a plaintiff may pursue an equal protection claim by

raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants’ asserted rational basis was merely a pretext

for differential treatment.” Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 945-46 (internal quotations omitted). An equal

protection plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating either: “(1) the proffered rational basis was

objectively false; or (2) the defendant actually acted based on an improper motive.” Id. at 946. “Where

an equal protection claim is based on selective enforcement of valid laws, a plaintiff can show that the

defendants’ rational basis for selectively enforcing the law is a pretext for an impermissible motive.”

Id. at 944 (internal quotations omitted). 

In Olech the plaintiff asserted the Village of Willowbrook acted irrationally and wholly

arbitrarily in demanding a larger easement from her than from other property owners. See 528 U.S. at

563. She also claimed “that the Village’s demand was actually motivated by ill will” and was retaliatory

in nature. Id. Here, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that “defendants’ conduct was an irrational and wholly

arbitrary action, motivated solely by [a] spiteful effort to retaliate against plaintiffs for their efforts in

defending themselves in the underlying action.” Complaint ¶ 37. Thus as in Olech, plaintiffs’

“complaint can be fairly construed as alleging” that they were treated differently from others similarly

situated, by adequately alleging irrational and arbitrary treatment. 528 U.S. at 565. These allegations

are “sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis,” quite apart from

defendants’ subjective motivation. Id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action against all defendants. 

IV. Defendant Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department

Defendants move to dismiss the section 1983 claims against defendant SCSD for lack of

respondeat superior liability and failure to allege a Monell claim. Motion at 7. A local government may

not be sued under title 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for a constitutional violation committed by its employees

or agents unless that violation is pursuant to the execution of an official policy or custom. See Monell

v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may demonstrate a policy or custom to

support municipal liability in a number of ways. A plaintiff “may prove that a city employee committed

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the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a ‘longstanding practice

or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.’”

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491

U.S. 701 (1989)) (internal quotation omitted). In addition, a plaintiff “may prove that an official with

final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis

for it.” Id. at 1346-47. 

Under the Monell standard, a municipality is held liable “only for those deprivations resulting

from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be

said to be those of the municipality.” Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-404

(1997). To meet this standard, plaintiffs must show: (1) that they had a constitutional right; (2) that

they were deprived of that right by an adverse action; (3) that the SCSD had a custom created by those

who determine official policy; (4) that the custom amounted to at least deliberate indifference to

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; and (5) that the custom was the moving force behind the constitutional

violation. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989); Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d

1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to support Monell liability in the complaint. Plaintiffs

raise additional facts in the opposition. However, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court cannot take

into account claims or evidence raised outside of the complaint. Absent a Monell claim, there is no basis

for holding the SCSD liable for the actions of its employees in connection with a section 1983 violation.

Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the claims against defendant SCSD. Plaintiffs may amend the

compliant to allege Monell liability, provided there is factual support for such an allegation. See Cato

v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend

his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint could not be cured by amendment”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims one through four. The Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ section

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1983 claims against defendants Elizabeth Warren and Does 1 through 10. The Court GRANTS

defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against defendant Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department. The

Court GRANTS plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies described

herein. Plaintiffs must file any amended complaint by July 16, 2007. The case management

conference scheduled for July 27, 2007, remains on calendar. [Docket No. 4] 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2007. 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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