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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1255

MITCHELL ALICEA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AUBREY THOMAS, ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ

and the CITY OF HAMMOND,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:11-cv-445 — Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of serious 

injuries suffered by Mitchell Alicea during the course of an

arrest by the Hammond Police. Alicea sued Sergeant Aubrey 

Thomas and Officer Alejandro Alvarez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for violating the Fourth Amendment by using excessive and 

unreasonable force to arrest him. The district court granted 

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the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding that 

Thomas and Alvarez did not use excessive force against Alicea, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Because we find that the facts taken in the light most favorable 

to Alicea create a material dispute as to whether each officer’s 

actions violated clearly established law, we reverse the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2011, Mitchell Alicea burglarized a residence on the 4200 block of Towle Avenue in Hammond, Indiana. While inside the residence, Alicea saw a police vehicle.

He fled the home and ran north on Towle Avenue, cutting 

through an alley and into the backyard of another house. Alicea then vaulted into an empty, five-foot deep, above-ground 

pool in the backyard, where he hid by sitting inside the pool.

A. Finding Alicea

That same day, Sergeant Aubrey Thomas was on canine 

duty for the Hammond Police Department when he received 

a radio dispatch alerting him of a potential burglary. With his 

seventy-two pound police dog, Leo, he drove to the location 

provided in the radio dispatch, and learned on the way that 

the suspect may have fled the crime scene. He turned on his 

emergency lights and drove to the 4200 block of Cameron 

Street, where the suspect was last seen. Sergeant Joe Grisafi, 

his supervisor, was there when he arrived.

Thomas then let Leo out of the squad car on a thirty-foot 

leash and attached a tracking harness to him. The tracking 

harness alerted Leo that he was to start searching for a suspect. Thomas ordered Leo to the ground and announced his

presence twice, alerting anyone in the general area that the 

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Hammond Police canine unit was present and a dog would 

be tracking the area. After Leo tracked the garage and backyard, he began barking by the pool where Alicea was hiding.

B. Thomas’s Use of Force

Thomas’s version of events is as follows: he approached 

the pool with his weapon drawn, and Alicea was inside the 

pool standing across from him, with his hands in his sweatshirt, staring straight ahead. Alicea did not respond to repeated requests to show Thomas his hands, and kept them 

concealed. Thomas again asked him to show his hands as he 

commanded Leo, with his leash still on, to get inside the pool. 

Thomas then assisted Leo into the pool. He commanded Leo 

to lie down, and after making a final request that Alicea show 

his hands, he ordered Leo to bite and hold Alicea so he could 

safely enter the pool to pat down and arrest Alicea. 

Alicea recounts the confrontation quite differently. He 

says after Leo discovered him, Leo started barking as Thomas 

appeared and asked Alicea to see his hands. Alicea recalls immediately complying by standing and raising his hands, 

palms out, at which point Thomas yelled, “You like to rob 

houses, you f***ing punk?” Thomas then threw Leo into the 

pool and commanded him to attack Alicea. Leo attacked Alicea for several minutes, latching onto his right arm with his 

teeth as Alicea struggled to break free from his grip. Leo refused to obey Thomas’s order to stop biting Alicea, and it took 

several minutes for Thomas to remove Leo from Alicea’s arm. 

Alicea was bleeding and screaming in pain from the bites.

C. Alvarez’s Use of Force

Officer Alejandro Alvarez was providing back-up to another officer when he received a radio call that there was a 

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reported burglary. Alvarez headed to Towle Avenue, where 

he met Grisafi and Officer Fletcher, who was also with the 

Hammond Police. After learning Alicea had been seen fleeing 

through yards north of the burglary scene, the three drove in 

that direction. Upon arriving at Cameron Street, Alvarez set a 

perimeter around the area with Fletcher and Grisafi. He received radio notification that Thomas had found the suspect 

and had deployed his dog in the backyard. Alvarez went to 

the backyard, where he saw Alicea standing in the pool, and 

Thomas and Grisafi outside of the pool with Leo. Alicea was 

bleeding, looked in pain, and was screaming that a dog had 

bitten him and he needed medical help. 

Here again, the parties’ stories diverge. Alvarez says that 

he asked Alicea to get out of the pool, and when Alicea refused twice, Alvarez “helped him” by grabbing him between 

the shoulders and back and pulling him up and out of the 

pool. He then told Alicea he needed to pat him down for 

weapons and asked him to put his hands on the pool and to 

spread his legs. According to Alvarez, Alicea refused to cooperate, demanding medical attention instead. Finally, Alvarez 

pushed Alicea to his knees and cuffed his hands behind his 

back, while Alicea struggled to stand up. Alvarez then 

pushed Alicea to his stomach, where he held him until the 

paramedics arrived. During this time, Grisafi and Thomas 

provided Alvarez with cover. At some point during the arrest, 

Alicea told Alvarez he needed medical attention, that he was 

on cocaine, and that he felt like he was going to have a heart 

attack. Alvarez also testified that Alicea struggled to get up 

onto his knees from his stomach as Alvarez patted him down 

to search for weapons. Alvarez maintains that he never 

kicked, punched, or stomped Alicea during this time period. 

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Alicea, on the other hand, recalls Thomas inside the pool 

when Alvarez arrived, trying to extract his arm from Leo’s 

teeth by punching Leo. When Thomas finally succeeded in removing Leo from Alicea, Alicea recalls Alvarez grabbing Alicea by the collar, pulling him over the pool, and dragging

him onto the ground outside the pool. Alicea landed on his 

face, and Alvarez pressed his knee into Alicea’s back, punched 

his backside and ribs, and kicked and stomped on his head.

Alicea was then taken to the squad car, where he was handcuffed. At the car, it was determined that he needed immediate medical attention and someone called an ambulance. Alicea admits he may have told both police and hospital personnel that he had used cocaine in order to explain why he

started running and to gain admission into the hospital’s cardiac ward, where he believed he would receive better treatment. However, Alicea says he did not use cocaine on the day 

of the arrest. 

Due to Officer Alvarez’s stomping, kicking, and punching, 

Alicea says he suffered lumps to the back of his head, bruising 

on his ribs and back, and difficulty breathing after the arrest.

From Leo’s attack, he suffered ripped tendons and muscles, 

which required surgery and caused permanent muscle damage, pain, numbness, and scarring. 

D. District Court Proceedings

Alicea brought federal and state law claims against the 

City of Hammond, Thomas and Alvarez under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Indiana Code § 34-13-4-1, which governs indemnification of government employees for civil rights violations.

The defendants filed for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) 

Alicea’s indemnification claims against Hammond were not 

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ripe for adjudication; (2) Sergeant Thomas’s decision to deploy Leo was objectively reasonable; (3) Alvarez’s use of force 

against Alicea was objectively reasonable; and (4) the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all 

of Alicea’s claims, and also granted the defendants qualified 

immunity. Alicea filed a motion for reconsideration, which 

the court denied. Alicea now appeals, seeking reversal of

summary judgment on his § 1983 claims. 

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Alicea argues that the district court erred by

granting Thomas’s and Alvarez’s motions for summary judgment as to his § 1983 claims. He also argues that the district 

court erred in granting the defendants qualified immunity.

We will discuss each issue in turn. We review the district 

court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo and 

construe all facts in favor of Alicea. See Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 

F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). 

A. Summary Judgment Inappropriate for Excessive 

Force Claims

1. Sergeant Thomas

The district court found that all the facts drawn in Alicea’s 

favor did not establish that Sergeant Thomas used excessive 

force when he gave Leo the command to bite and hold Alicea.

The district court pointed to the fact that Alicea was a felony 

burglary suspect in active flight, and Thomas was dealing 

with an unknown threat. So, it held that Thomas’s use of canine force was reasonable in light of the knowledge he possessed at the time he made the attack command.

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This type of § 1983 excessive force claim originates from 

the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). An officer’s 

use of force is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, and “must be judged from 

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather 

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. A court 

examines the defendant’s use of force in light of the following 

factors: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or 

others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. 

We have held that force is only reasonable when it is proportional to the threat posed. If an officer’s threat perception 

changes, so too should her force calculus. Cyrus v. Town of 

Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that 

while first taser shot is justified due to uncertainty of threat, 

once suspect is on the ground and unarmed, subsequent taser 

shots are unreasonable). In Miller v. Gonzalez, we held that significant force is unreasonable after a suspect has stopped resisting or evading arrest. 761 F.3d at 829 (7th Cir. 2014). In Miller, the suspect was in flight and then became trapped in an 

enclosed area after jumping a fence. Id. at 824-25. Upon reaching him, the officer ordered him to lie on the ground, spread 

eagle, which he did. Id. at 825. The officer then jumped over 

the fence and landed on the plaintiff, breaking his jaw. Id. at 

825. We held that summary judgment was inappropriate because it was unreasonable for the officer to intentionally use 

force after the suspect was subdued. Id. at 830. Similarly, in 

Holmes v. Hoffman Estates, we held that a jury could find it excessive to knock the plaintiff’s head against a police vehicle if, 

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as he contended, he was compliant with the officer’s orders 

throughout the arrest. 511 F.3d 673, 686 (7th Cir. 2007). 

At the same time, we have concluded that under certain 

circumstances, an officer is not required to take an apparent 

surrender at face value. Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658, 660 (7th 

Cir. 2009). In Johnson, we affirmed summary judgment where 

a police officer, in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, released his 

dog to assist the chase. Not more than one second from the 

suspect throwing his hands up and saying “I give up,” the 

dog bit and held him as the officer caught up to make the arrest. The officer then struck the suspect to subdue him, because he interpreted the suspect’s struggle with the dog as resistance. We found that the officer’s split second decision to 

use force was reasonable to apprehend a suspect in active 

flight because “the police are entitled to err on the side of caution when faced with an uncertain or threatening situation.”

Id. at 659. 

Here, defendants argue that even taking Alicea’s version 

of events as true, Alicea’s prior flight cast doubt on the genuineness of his surrender. Despite the fact that Alicea asserts he

immediately complied with Thomas’s orders to put his hands 

in the air, they argue that Alicea still posed a threat because it 

was possible he was concealing weapons or would attempt to 

vault out of the pool the way that he vaulted in. Thomas argues that given the uncertain circumstances, deploying Leo 

was the safest way to control both the flight and safety risks 

he perceived as events unfolded, and so he acted reasonably

in giving Leo the command to bite and hold Alicea.

We disagree. With respect to Thomas’s consideration of 

Alicea’s prior flight, “[the] prohibition against significant 

force against a subdued suspect applies notwithstanding a

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suspect’s previous behavior—including resisting arrest, 

threatening officer safety, or potentially carrying a weapon.”

Miller, 761 F.3d at 829. Unlike the plaintiff in Johnson, Alicea 

was not in active flight at the time he was discovered. Rather,

under his version of the facts, which we accept as true for 

summary judgment purposes, he was standing still, arms 

raised, inside of an empty above-ground pool, surrounded by 

five foot walls. Also, the events took place in broad daylight, 

so limited visibility did not impede Thomas’s efforts to carry 

out the arrest when Leo signaled that he had discovered Alicea in the pool. Cf. Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959, 965 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (finding use of canine force reasonable where plaintiff refused to pull over and ultimately fled by foot into dark, 

unfamiliar terrain). Significantly, Thomas had his gun drawn 

and trained on Alicea the entire time he was facing the pool 

and giving Alicea orders. If Alicea attempted flight, he would 

need to get out of the pool first. The obstacle of vaulting out 

of the pool would provide Thomas with ample time to discharge his weapon or to command Leo to chase and hold Alicea. Moreover, Alicea gave no indication that he would flee.

He immediately complied with Thomas’s orders. While surrender is not always genuine, it should not be futile as a 

means to de-escalate a confrontation with law enforcement. 

The sole fact a suspect has resisted arrest before cannot justify 

disregarding his surrender in deciding whether and how to 

use force. See Miller, 761 F.3d at 829. 

Another fact supports our conclusion that summary judgment was improper. Yelling “you like to rob houses, you 

f***ing punk?” before commanding Leo to attack casts doubt 

on Thomas’s assertion that he made a split-second safety calculation. Thomas’s statement indicates that he had at least 

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some time to assess the threat that Alicea posed before ordering the attack. The district court found the statement to be irrelevant because deploying Leo was ultimately reasonable, 

given the circumstances. But if one infers from the statement 

that rather than making a safety calculation, Thomas was acting out of retaliation, then his decision to deploy Leo was not 

reasonable at all. The statement “you like to rob houses, you 

f***ing punk” could reflect, as Thomas contends, an “unremarkable truism” that Alicea enjoyed robbing houses. See 

Miller, 761 F.3d at 828. However, the statement equally lends 

credence to Alicea’s argument that deploying Leo was an act 

of retaliation instead of a reasonable means of controlling a 

perceived threat. Deciding which inference is more believable 

is the task of a jury. Id.

Applying the Graham factors to Alicea’s account, we do not 

find that Alicea, standing in broad daylight with his hands up 

at gunpoint and enclosed by a five-foot pool, posed a sufficient threat to Thomas to justify ordering Leo to attack and 

hold him. The district court erred in holding it was reasonable 

to command a dog to attack a suspect who had ceased flight, 

was effectively trapped, and who immediately complied with 

police orders. 

2. Officer Alvarez

We see even less of a basis to grant summary judgment to 

Officer Alvarez, taking all facts in a light most favorable to 

Alicea. At the point at which Alvarez first saw Alicea, Alicea’s

arm was in the jaws of a seventy-two pound dog. Two other 

officers were already at the scene. A reasonable officer would 

not think that punching, kicking, and stomping on Alicea was 

required to control the situation. It is true that Alicea was 

screaming, but there is no dispute that he was crying for help.

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The district court found that Alicea did not produce sufficient evidence of the kicking, stomping and punching because 

there was no medical documentation of injuries related to 

such conduct. It found that Alicea’s affidavit detailing injuries 

was insufficient to create a factual dispute, because the defendants produced medical records which lacked any mention of head injuries, and also because photographs taken in 

the ambulance did not reveal any injuries.

The district court engaged in improper weighing of evidence at the summary judgment stage. It also mistakenly inserted an injury requirement into its excessive force analysis.

The defendants point to a series of decisions where we held 

that the use of force that resulted in injuries was constitutional. See, e.g., Smith v. Ball State, 295 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2002); 

Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the question before us is not whether it is permissible to 

inflict injuries on a suspect who is resisting arrest. Rather, the 

question is whether Alvarez used the degree of force which a 

reasonable officer would believe was required to subdue the 

threat.

The defendants direct our attention to cases where officers 

used force against suspects whom they perceived to be refusing orders. In Smith v. Ball State, the plaintiff, suspected of 

driving while intoxicated, was completely unresponsive, and 

the defendants forcibly removed him from the driver’s seat of 

his car. 295 F.3d at 766. An officer who arrived to the scene 

misconstrued the situation as a struggle, and tackled the 

plaintiff to the ground. Id at 767. We found that “a reasonable 

officer who happened on the scene could reasonably misconstrue Smith’s unresponsiveness as resistance requiring the 

minimal use of force.” Id. at 771. Similarly, in Padula v. 

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Leimbach, the plaintiff was having a hypoglycemic episode 

where he both refused to respond to police instructions and

displayed aggressive behavior. 656 F.3d at 598–99. The police 

forced the plaintiff into a prone position. Id. We found in favor 

of the officers, stating that “the Officers faced a fluid situation

... [and] appropriately increased their force in order to keep 

the situation under control.” Id. at 604. In Dawson v. Brown, we 

found that the defendant officer acted reasonably in tackling 

a man to the ground when, on arriving at the scene where the 

man’s son was being arrested, he reasonably perceived the 

man to be interfering with his son’s arrest. 803 F.3d 829, 833 

(7th Cir. 2015). 

In contrast, Officer Alvarez came upon Alicea when he 

was already seriously injured. Alicea was agitated, to be sure, 

but the source of his agitation was clear: he had just been attacked by a dog, and needed medical attention. Alicea testified at his deposition that he was already face-down, on the 

ground, when Alvarez began to punch, kick and stomp on 

him. At this point, however loudly Alicea was screaming, under his version of events, he simply did not present a threat 

that justified kicking, stomping, and punching him. “Permitting substantial escalation of force in response to passive noncompliance would be incompatible with our excessive force 

doctrine and would likely bring more injured citizens before 

our courts.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 730 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips v. Comty. Ins. Corp. 678 F.3d 513, 527 

(7th Cir. 2012)).

In sum, Alicea’s factual account creates a material dispute 

as to whether Officer Alvarez used excessive force. Lack of 

medical documentation of his injuries, while potentially releCase: 15-1255 Document: 27 Filed: 03/01/2016 Pages: 15
No. 15-1255 13

vant to Alicea’s credibility, is immaterial to the threshold question of whether Officer Alvarez’s use of force was reasonable

when the facts are viewed and reasonable inferences are 

drawn in Alicea’s favor. 

B. Grant of Qualified Immunity Improper

Alicea further argues that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to both officers. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability 

when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known. McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th 

Cir. 2010). The district court granted qualified immunity because it found that Alicea failed to demonstrate that either defendant deprived him of his constitutional rights. It further 

rejected the cases that Alicea provided to support his argument that the defendants’ actions violated clearly established 

law.

As explained above, we conclude that the evidence, taken 

in a light most favorable to Alicea, would permit a reasonable 

jury to find excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. So we turn to the question of whether Thomas’s and Alvarez’s actions violated clearly established law. 

In determining whether a right is “clearly established,” we 

take care to look at the right in a particularized sense, rather 

than at a high level of generality. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 858 

(7th Cir. 2011). When available, controlling precedent from either the Supreme Court or our circuit will guide our inquiry.

However, a case holding that the exact action in question is 

unlawful is not necessary. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377–78 (2009). Even where there are notable 

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factual distinctions, prior cases may give an officer reasonable 

warning that his conduct is unlawful. Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. 

Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 528 (citing Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 

F.3d, 770, 781 (7th Cir. 2010)).

At the time of Alicea’s arrest, it was clearly established that 

an officer may not use excessive force against an individual 

during an arrest. Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 

687 (7th Cir. 2007). It was also clearly established that using a 

significant level of force on a non-resisting or a passively resisting individual constitutes excessive force. Rambo v. Daley, 

68 F.3d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1995). Commanding a dog to attack 

a suspect who is already complying with orders clearly violates the principles set forth in Holmes and Rambo. Punching, 

stomping and kicking a suspect who is on the ground and seriously injured similarly violates clearly established law.

There is a material dispute as to whether Alicea was resisting arrest, both at the moment that Thomas commanded Leo 

to attack him, and at the moment that Alvarez arrived at the 

scene of the arrest and removed Alicea from the pool. There 

is also a material dispute as to the level of force that Alvarez 

used, described in detail above. “Because the facts are in hot 

dispute, the officers cannot seek pretrial refuge behind a claim 

of qualified immunity.” Dufour-Dowell v. Cogger, 152 F.3d 678, 

680 (7th Cir. 1998). It was improper to grant qualified immunity to Thomas and Alvarez prior to a jury determining 

whether Alicea was, as he contends, fully complying with orders before the defendants used force to arrest him. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

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