Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00025/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BENNIE C. COX, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-00025-BH-B

JERRY FERRELL, : 

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Bennie C. Cox, a state inmate in the custody of Respondent,

has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The petition has been referred to

the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 8 (b)(1). The

undersigned has conducted a careful review of the record and finds

that no evidentiary hearing is required to resolve this case.

Kelley v. Secretary for Dept. Of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317 (11th

Cir. 2004). Upon careful consideration of the pleadings, records,

briefs and exhibits, it is recommended that Petitioner’s habeas

petition be denied, that this action be dismissed, and that

judgment be entered in favor of Respondent Jerry Ferrell and

against Petitioner Bennie C. Cox on all claims.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Bennie C. Cox was convicted on November 7, 2000 by

a jury in the Baldwin County Circuit Court of eight counts of

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In his petition, Cox alleges that the indictment against

him was void because it contained both felony and misdemeanor

counts, and that the ensuing trial on the charges contained in

the indictment contravened his due process rights. Cox further

alleges that both his trial counsel and appellate counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the

proceedings against him. (Ex. 6, p. 19) 

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first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree sexual

abuse. (Ex. 1, Case Action Summary Sheet). On January 10, 2001,

the trial court sentenced Cox to eight consecutive, ten-year terms

of imprisonment on each of the first-degree sexual abuse

convictions, and a concurrent one-year term of imprisonment on the

conviction for second-degree sexual abuse. (Ex. 1, p. 398-404).

Cox filed an appeal in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which

affirmed his convictions on June 15, 2001. (Ex. 4). He did not

file an application for certiorari review with the Alabama Supreme

Court. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered a certificate

of judgment on July 3, 2001. (Ex. 5).

Cox filed a Rule 32 petition in the Baldwin County Circuit

Court on June 27, 2002. (Ex. 6, p. 28).1 Following a hearing, the

trial court denied the Rule 32 petition, and Cox appealed. On

October 17, 2003, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

the trial court’s decision and denied Cox’s request for rehearing.

(Ex. 9). The Alabama Supreme Court denied Cox’s application for

certiorari review, and issued a certificate of judgment on February

13, 2004. (Ex. 12). 

Cox filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief on

March 15, 2004. (Doc. 6, p. 12) In his petition, Cox alleges that:

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1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he

failed to object to Cox’s criminal trial proceeding under a

defective indictment; 2) appellate counsel was ineffective for his

failure to file a motion for new trial based on the need to examine

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and the jurisdiction of the trial

court; and 3) the various state court decisions against him

contradict established federal law.

Respondent’s Answer to Cox’s habeas petition (Doc. 12)

contains the defense that Cox is not entitled to habeas corpus

review because his petition is barred by the one-year limitation

period set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by the April

24, 1996 enactment of The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, § 101(Supp. II 1997) (“AEDPA”), a state

prisoner seeking a federal habeas corpus remedy must file his

habeas petition within one year of the date on which his conviction

becomes final by "conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review". A judgment becomes “final” on

the date on which the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision on the

merits of the petitioner's direct appeal, denies certiorari, or

after the expiration of the 90-day period in which the petitioner

could have filed such a petition. Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 773

(11th Cir. 2002).

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Because Cox was entitled to, but did not seek, review of

his conviction in the Alabama Supreme Court following the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals’ June 15, 2001, dismissal of his direct

appeal, his conviction became final on June 29, 2001, when the

14-day period for seeking review in Alabama Supreme Court

expired. See Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006); Rule

39(b) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure; Robinson v.

Holt, 2006 U.S. Lexis 38829 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 

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In the case sub judice, the one-year statute of limitations

for the filing of a federal petition for habeas corpus relief

commenced on June 29, 2001, the date on which Cox’s convictions

became final by the conclusion of direct review.2 Thus, absent

tolling, Cox was required to file his federal habeas petition no

later than July 1, 2002. Cox, however, did not file his habeas

petition until March 15, 2004, nearly two years after expiration of

the one-year limitations period. Accordingly, unless Cox can

demonstrate that the tolling provisions of the AEDPA were

triggered, his habeas petition must be dismissed as untimely.

§2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA provides for the tolling of the

limitations period pending state court review of a properly filed

application for post-conviction relief. See In Re Hill, 437 F.3d

1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006). A state court filing initiated after

the federal habeas deadline, however, does not revive the deadline.

Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004)(While a

properly filed application for post-conviction relief tolls the

statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of

limitations once the limitations period has expired.)Id.

Cox’s Rule 32 petition, filed on June 27, 2002, tolled the

limitations period. At the time the Rule 32 petition was filed,

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363 days had elapsed within the limitations period. Accordingly,

upon the dismissal of Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition on February 13,

2004, only 2 days remained within the AEDPA limitations period.

Notwithstanding, Cox did not file his habeas petition until more

than 30 days later, on March 15, 2004. As a result, his federal

habeas petition was untimely filed. 

Before recommending dismissal of Cox’s habeas petition as

untimely, the undersigned must determine whether he has pled

extraordinary circumstances which require a contrary conclusion.

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that: 

Section 2244 is a statute of limitations, not a

jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable

tolling “when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v.

United States, 177 F.3d 1269[, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999)].

Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is

typically applied sparingly. See Irwin v. Dept. Of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112

L.Ed.2d 435 (1990).

Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). See also

Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616,

618-19 (3rd Cir. 1998)(“equitable tolling is proper only when the

‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a

limitation period] unfair.’... [g]enerally, this will occur when

the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way...been prevented from

asserting his or her rights.’...[t]he petitioner must show that he

or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and

bringing [the] claims.’... [m]ere excusable neglect is not

sufficient.”). Moreover, in the Eleventh Circuit, as a general

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rule, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard applied in this

circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of

the federal habeas petition, rather than the circumstances

surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Secretary of

Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965 (2002); Drew v. Department of

Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2002).

In this case, Cox has not claimed, nor has he presented any

evidence which demonstrates that he is entitled to an equitable

tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period for habeas

petitions. Where Respondent has asserted the defense of statute of

limitations and Cox has failed to meet his burden of establishing

extraordinary circumstances which would justify the equitable

tolling of § 2244's one year statute of limitations, the

undersigned must recommend that this case be dismissed as timebarred. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that because Cox has

neither demonstrated actual innocence, nor established that

equitable tolling is warranted in this case, his federal habeas

petition should be dismissed as time-barred, and that judgment be

entered in favor of Respondent Jerry Ferrell. It is so

recommended. 

DONE this 26th day of February 2007. 

 S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out

in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides,

in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

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magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 26th day of February 2007.

s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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