Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02123/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02123-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

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 WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Todd Candelaria, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Tolleson, City of, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-02123-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Defendants George Good, Wendy Jackson, Reyes Medrano, and City 

of Tolleson’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61, MSJ), to which Plaintiffs Todd 

Candelaria and Jeff Hamm filed a Response (Doc. 65, Resp.) and Defendants filed a 

Reply (Doc. 67, Reply). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have 

not shown there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact of their claims and 

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court therefore grants 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs Mr. Candelaria and Mr. Hamm, who work as firefighters for Defendant 

City of Tolleson (the City), brought this case in response to disciplinary actions their 

employer took against them. Defendant Mr. Good is Chief of the City’s Fire Department, 

Defendant Ms. Jackson is the City’s Human Resources Director, and Defendant 

Mr. Medrano is the City Manager. 

 Plaintiffs are active members of the United Valley Firefighters Association, 

International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 3449 (the “union”), a local labor 

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association of firefighters and emergency medical and rescue service providers. During 

the time material to this case, Mr. Candelaria was president of the union, and Mr. Hamm 

was vice president. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants took disciplinary actions against 

them in retaliation for their participation in the union’s ongoing effort to pass a meet and 

confer policy in the City of Tolleson and the union’s provision of relief services for the 

City of Prescott following a massive fire in Yarnell Hill (the “Yarnell Hill Fire”) 

(collectively, the “alleged union activities”). 

A. The Yarnell Hill Fire Relief Efforts 

 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. On June 30, 2013, 

19 firefighters were killed while fighting the Yarnell Hill Fire near Prescott, Arizona. 

(Doc. 62, Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of Summary Judgment (DSOF), 

Ex. A, Declaration of George Good (Good Decl.) ¶ 2.) The next day, at the instruction of 

the Professional Fire Fighters of Arizona (“PFFA”), the union began looking for 

volunteers to provide relief assistance in Prescott. (Doc. 66, Plaintiffs’ Response to 

Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts and Statement of Additional Material Facts 

(PSOF), Ex. U.) On July 4, 2013, Bryan Jeffries, then vice president of the PFFA, 

contacted Chief Good by email to request assistance from the Tolleson Fire Department. 

(DSOF, Ex. B, Deposition of George Good (Good Dep.) at 87:11-25.) Chief Good 

decided to send Captain Jon Mecum and his crew to provide relief assistance to Prescott 

on July 13, 2013. (Good Dep. at 88:12-17.) 

 At some point, Mr. Candelaria, on behalf of the union, arranged for a sign-up sheet 

to be placed at the City fire department for firefighters who wished to volunteer in 

Prescott. (Good Decl. ¶ 5.) When Jerald Franzmeier, a City firefighter who is not a union 

member, went to sign up to volunteer, Mr. Candelaria told him that he could not 

participate because only union members could volunteer. (DSOF, Ex. E, Deposition of 

Jerald Franzmeier (Franzmeier Dep.) at 23:15-22.) A couple of hours later, after 

Mr. Candelaria learned he had upset Mr. Franzmeier, he apologized to him. (DSOF, 

Ex. D, Deposition of Todd Candelaria (Candelaria Dep.) at 24:14-16; Good Decl. ¶ 5.) 

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 As the City fire department prepared to send Mr. Mecum’s crew to provide relief 

services to Prescott, Mr. Candelaria received a phone call from Ray Maione, a PFFA 

representative. (DSOF, Ex. F, Deposition of Ray Maione (Maione Dep.) at 43:3-44:1.) 

Mr. Maione told Mr. Candelaria that if the City fire department sent a relief crew with 

non-union members, their truck would be rejected when it reached Prescott. (Maione 

Dep. at 44:3-45:1.) However, Tim Hill, then-president of the PFFA, testified that he was 

not aware of anyone reaching out on behalf of the union to any fire department to state 

that relief services from non-union members would not be welcome. (DSOF, Ex. G, 

Deposition of Tim Hill (Hill Dep.) at 22:19-24.) Mr. Hill further testified that he would 

not have sanctioned that message. (Hill Dep. at 22:19-25.) Mr. Jeffries also testified that 

he would not have sanctioned that message. (DSOF, Ex. H, Deposition of Bryan Jeffries 

(Jeffries Dep.) at 45:3-15.) Mr. Jeffries did state “there was a lot of confusion” and 

people were “getting limited information,” and “there might have been a lack of clarity 

about what role the association [was] playing at any particular time.” (Jeffries Dep. at 

48:22-49:5.)

 After Mr. Candelaria’s phone call with Mr. Maione, he spoke with Mr. Hamm, 

and they agreed that Mr. Hamm would relay the message to Mr. Mecum. (Candelaria 

Dep. at 41:4-11.) When Mr. Mecum heard the message, he said he would “have to think 

about” what to do about Mr. Franzmeier, the only non-union member scheduled to be on 

the July 13 relief crew. (DSOF, Ex. J, Deposition of Jonathan Mecum (Mecum Dep.) at 

36:1-3, 38:22-39:3.) A day or two later, Mr. Mecum told Mr. Hamm that Mr. Franzmeier 

would be “staying right where he’s at,” implying that Mr. Franzmeier would still 

participate in the relief efforts. (Mecum Dep. at 39:6-9.) Consequently, Mr. Franzmeier 

went as part of Mr. Mecum’s crew to Prescott on July 13, and everyone in the crew was 

allowed to participate in the relief assistance. (Mecum Dep. at 39:23-40:1.) 

B. Mr. Franzmeier’s Attempted Resignation and the City’s Investigation

 On July 15, 2013, Mr. Franzmeier had a conversation with Mr. Mecum that 

prompted Mr. Franzmeier to seek resignation from the City fire department. (Franzmeier 

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Dep. at 49:12-19, 49:23-27, 51:1-4.) According to Mr. Franzmeier, Mr. Mecum 

expressed concern about possible repercussions of going against union wishes by 

allowing Mr. Franzmeier to participate in the relief efforts. (Franzmeier Dep. at 50:6-15.) 

Mr. Franzmeier also testified that there had been a rumor circulating among fire 

department employees about Mr. Mecum going against union wishes that was 

“something to the effect if you’re not on the train, you’re going to be run over it,” 

referring to supporting the union. (Franzmeier Dep. at 51:17-24.) During their 

conversation, Mr. Franzmeier told Mr. Mecum that because of these concerns, he was 

going to Human Resources to resign. (Franzmeier Dep. 49:12-50:8.) Mr. Mecum then 

told Chief Good about Mr. Franzmeier’s plan to resign, and Chief Good immediately 

informed City Manager Mr. Medrano. (Good Dep. at 70:10-71:6.) Mr. Medrano called 

Human Resources Director Ms. Jackson and warned her not to accept Mr. Franzmeier’s 

resignation. (DSOF, Ex. K, Deposition of Reyes Medrano (Medrano Dep.) at 43:6-11.) 

 Mr. Franzmeier met with Mr. Medrano and Chief Good to explain his concerns, 

which included, according to Mr. Medrano, a “worry that his lack of affiliation with the 

fire union could lead to bodily harm [of him or] his friends, specifically Jon Mecum.” 

(Medrano Dep. at 44:6-19.) After the meeting, Mr. Medrano called the City of Tolleson’s 

Police Chief, Larry Rodriguez, and asked him to conduct an administrative investigation 

into the issues underlying Mr. Franzmeier’s concerns. (Medrano Dep. at 21:9-12, 49:21-

53:6, 51:8-14.) 

 On August 30, 2013, Mr. Rodriguez issued the investigative report, entitled 

Tolleson Police Memorandum (the “Memorandum”). (Rodriguez Dep. at 13:7-18; DSOF, 

Ex. P, Tolleson Police Memorandum.) The Memorandum concluded that Mr. Candelaria 

had “den[ied] a subordinate employee the opportunity to volunteer for an assignment 

solely because the employee was a non-union member.” (Tolleson Police Memorandum 

at 18.) In addition, it found that Mr. Candelaria had directed a subordinate, Mr. Hamm, to 

“threaten another fire Captain that an assigned Tolleson fire engine would be turned away 

because it had a non-union member on the crew.” (Tolleson Police Memorandum at 18.) 

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The Memorandum noted that “union orders to Tolleson fire personnel do not supersede 

City of Tolleson policy” and that Mr. Candelaria’s action had “attempted to countermand 

an assignment of a duly authorized fire response unit,” which was “outside of 

Candelaria’s authority.” (Tolleson Police Memorandum at 18.) It concluded that 

Mr. Candelaria had engaged in misconduct by failing to fulfill his duties as a supervisor, 

violating the City’s Anti-Harassment and Discrimination policy, and not being 

forthcoming in the investigation. (Tolleson Police Memorandum at 18-19.) The 

Memorandum also found that Mr. Hamm “knowingly disregarded the operational 

directives of the Fire Department by injecting a union bias based solely on the fact that a 

non-union firefighter was part of the fire crew” and had thereby violated the City’s AntiHarassment and Discrimination policy. (Tolleson Police Memorandum at 19.) 

C. The Disciplinary Actions Against Plaintiffs 

 In response to the Memorandum, Chief Good took disciplinary action against 

Mr. Candelaria and Mr. Hamm. Chief Good recommended that Mr. Candelaria be 

demoted from his position as Captain to firefighter. (Good Dep. at 119:9-11.) During a 

meeting with Mr. Medrano and Chief Good regarding potential disciplinary actions, 

Mr. Candelaria stated “the emotions of the day may have gotten . . . [sic] the day the 19 

firemen died and maybe I could have handled that a little bit better.” (Good Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Mr. Medrano ultimately decided to only discipline Mr. Candelaria with a five shift 

suspension. (Good Decl. ¶ 8; Medrano Dep. 104:2-13; PSOF, Ex. Q.) Chief Good also 

issued a disciplinary notice—a written warning for insubordination—to Mr. Hamm. 

(Good Dep. 140:14-18; PSOF, Ex. W.) In Chief Good’s disciplinary meeting with 

Mr. Hamm, Mr. Hamm acknowledged that he “learned something” and described the 

incident as a “growing experience.” (Good Decl. ¶ 15.) Mr. Hamm said that he “would 

understand if [Chief Good] would have a trust issue” because of his conduct. (Good Decl. 

¶ 18.) 

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D. The Meet and Confer Proposal 

 For many years, the union has advocated for the Tolleson City Council to pass and 

implement a meet and confer policy. Mr. Candelaria testified that the proposed meet and 

confer policy would involve the firefighters’ rights and their ability to “discuss their 

working conditions.” (Candelaria Dep. at 77:12-13.) Mr. Hamm stated that the union 

wanted a meet and confer policy “so we would have a seat at [the] table and influence—

or have some say in the policies that are created and the way that our membership is 

treated.” (Hamm Dep. at 39:13-17.) According to Mr. Candelaria, a meet and confer 

policy has been a union priority since he became union president in 2000. (Candelaria 

Dep. at 47:14-21, 48:16-17.) He testified that in late 2012 or early 2013, the union started 

increasing pressure on the Tolleson City Council—making a “hard push”—to consider a 

meet and confer policy. (Candelaria Dep. at 48:12-20.) 

 Mr. Candelaria stated that as part of the “hard push,” the union obtained advice 

from PFFA and a public relations firm about how to best advocate for a meet and confer 

policy. (Candelaria Dep. at 54:1-7.) The union also formed a political action committee 

but did not spend any related funds. (Candelaria Dep. at 62:20-63:2, 64:17.) 

Mr. Candelaria testified that at some point he had conversations about a meet and confer 

policy with Mr. Medrano, Chief Good, and possibly some city council members, 

although he could not remember specifically. (Candelaria Dep. at 77:15-22.) He never 

made any advocacy efforts in a Tolleson City Council meeting, however, or raised the 

issue with members of the public. (Candelaria Dep. at 77:23-25; 78:1-20.) 

 The union also engaged in some written communication advocating for a meet and 

confer policy. In 2008, Mr. Candelaria sent an email to Mayor Gamez that advocated for 

the Mayor to let go of his “strong reservations with regards to the meet and confer 

process.” (Candelaria Dep. 48:24-51:10; DSOF, Ex. R, May 1, 2008 Email.) On 

January 31, 2014, the “Tolleson Firefighters” posted a message on their Facebook page 

with a link to information about the meet and confer policy. (PSOF, Ex. AA, Tolleson 

Firefighters Facebook Page.) The union also drafted a Meet and Confer Proposal and a 

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Meet and Confer Draft Ordinance, but they are not dated, and there is no evidence of 

when they were created. (PSOF, Ex. Y, Tolleson Meet and Confer Proposal; PSOF, Ex. 

Z, Meet and Confer Draft Ordinance; Hamm Dep. at 38:6-39:4.) The Meet and Confer 

Proposal states that City of Tolleson employees want a policy “[t]o facilitate a process in 

which we can sit down with City Management and discuss our issues in a 

positive/productive manner.” (Meet and Confer Proposal.) The Meet and Confer Draft 

Ordinance states that the scope of the meet and confer process “covers wages, hours, 

benefits and working conditions.” (Meet and Confer Draft Ordinance.) 

 On September 24, 2014, Plaintiffs Mr. Hamm and Mr. Candelaria brought this 

action against Defendants raising three claims: (1) unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs’ 

exercise of their First Amendment right to speak out about matters of public concern, (2) 

unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment right to freedom of 

association, and (3) unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights under 

A.R.S. § 23-1411 to associate with other firefighters who are union members. (Compl. 

¶¶ 42, 49, 56-57.) Defendants now move for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ 

claims against them. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

 Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 

appropriate when: (1) the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, 

the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). Under this standard, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect 

the outcome of the suit under governing [substantive] law will properly preclude the 

entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A “genuine issue” of material fact arises only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

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 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the 

non-moving party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. However, the non-moving party 

may not merely rest on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence 

tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question 

of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative 

evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); First 

Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968). 

 “A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory 

allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989). “Summary judgment must be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d 

1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 

III. ANALYSIS

 Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that by taking disciplinary action against them, 

Defendants unlawfully deprived them of their rights under the United States Constitution 

and Arizona state law and subjected them to unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and A.R.S. § 23-1411(A). (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 1-2.) Plaintiffs specifically contend 

that Defendants unlawfully retaliated against them for exercising their rights to: (a) speak 

about matters of public concern, (b) participate in an association and its related activities 

involving matters of public concern, and (c) join an employee association for public 

safety employees. (Compl. ¶¶ 42, 47, 54-55.) 

 A. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Claims 

 Plaintiffs argue that the adverse employment actions taken against them were 

“taken in response to, and in retaliation for, the [P]laintiffs’ exercise of their 

constitutional and lawful rights to speak out about matters of public concern” and their 

“rights to freedom of association” in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

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(Compl. ¶¶ 42, 49.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has created a five-step inquiry to 

determine whether an employer unlawfully retaliated against an employee for engaging 

in protected speech. Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2009). First, “the 

plaintiff bears the burden of showing: (1) whether the speech addressed an issue of public 

concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; and (3) 

whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

adverse employment action.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[I]f the 

plaintiff has satisfied the first three steps, the burden shifts to the government to show: 

(4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently 

from other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the 

adverse employment action even absent the protected conduct.” Id. The Court notes that 

the Ninth Circuit has collectively analyzed freedom of speech and freedom of association 

claims in the third prong of the five-step inquiry when both claims are asserted. See, e.g., 

McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983). The parties do the same in 

their briefs, and the Court will address Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims collectively in 

section two below. 

 1. Speech That Addresses an Issue of Public Concern 

 Speech involves an issue of public concern when it can be “fairly considered as 

relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). To make this determination, a court must look at “the 

content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 

147-48. This “inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.” Id. at 

147-48 n.7. Speech that addresses “individual personnel disputes and grievances” that 

“would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of governmental 

agencies” generally is not of public concern. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114.

 Plaintiffs present evidence of their speech relating to two alleged union 

activities—the Yarnell Hill Fire relief effort and efforts to institute a meet and confer 

policy—and claim that such speech is protected. (Resp. at 5-8.) In support of their 

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position, Plaintiffs assert that “[m]ultiple courts have concluded that speech on behalf of 

labor unions is prima facie protected by the First Amendment.” (Resp. at 5.) This 

assertion is misleading. In fact, the cases Plaintiffs cite support the opposite conclusion—

that speech on behalf of labor unions is not prima facie protected. One case Plaintiffs cite 

states “an employee’s speech, activity or association, merely because it is union-related, 

does not touch on a matter of public concern as a matter of law.” Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 

686, 693 (6th Cir. 1985). Another case concludes “[t]he fact that the speech . . . relate[s] 

to union matters is not sufficient by itself to dispense with full-dress Connick analysis.” 

Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2008). Moreover, none of the cases 

Plaintiffs cite are from the Ninth Circuit, and thus Plaintiffs present no binding case law. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ speech is not prima facie protected, and the Court will analyze 

the speech under Connick. 

 a. Plaintiffs’ Speech Relating to the Yarnell Hill Fire Tragedy 

 Plaintiffs contend that their speech following the Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy 

“constituted speech on a matter of public concern” because “PPFA wanted union member 

volunteers only to ensure that fire fighters did not ‘freelance,’ which would have 

presented a safety issue.” (Resp. at 7) (emphasis in original). The Court interprets PPFA’s 

reference to “freelancing” as a concern that if firefighters acted independently to fight the 

Yarnell Hill Fire, there could be safety and management problems. Plaintiffs describe two 

main incidents of speech that occurred after the Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy. First, 

Mr. Candelaria told Mr. Franzmeier that he could not sign up to volunteer because he was 

not a union member. Second, Mr. Candelaria and Mr. Hamm had a conversation about 

Mr. Mecum’s crew possibly being rejected from relief efforts in Prescott, and Mr. Hamm 

relayed this message to Mr. Mecum. 

 Plaintiffs cite Gilbrook v. City of Westminster for the proposition that speech 

regarding a “fire department’s ability to respond effectively to life-threatening 

emergencies” addresses a matter of public concern. 177 F.3d 839, 866 (9th Cir. 1999). In 

Gilbrook, the plaintiff firefighters brought an action against their employer for retaliating 

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against them for exercising their First Amendment rights of free speech and association. 

Id. at 847. The plaintiffs were members of a union that had been protesting against 

proposed reductions to the city’s fire services. Id. Despite the union’s protests, the city 

council voted to reduce fire services. Id. Thereafter, a residential fire resulted in the death 

of a child, and the union issued a press release pointing to the city council’s changes as 

the cause of the preventable death. Id. at 850. The court found that “there can be little 

doubt that [plaintiff’s] statement to the press in the wake of the Candlewood Fire 

addressed a matter of public concern: the fire department’s ability to respond effectively 

to life-threatening emergencies.” Id. at 866. 

 This case is distinguishable from Gilbrook, because Plaintiffs’ speech did not 

question the Tolleson fire department’s ability to respond to life-threatening emergencies 

that affect the public. Unlike the incident in Gilbrook, there is no possibility that the 

initial incident—the Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy—was caused by policies implemented by 

the City of Tolleson which Plaintiffs sought to advise the public about. Here, Plaintiffs’ 

speech questioned Chief Good’s personnel decisions regarding relief assistance. 

Although Plaintiffs argue such personnel decisions and the potential for “freelancing” 

could affect public safety, they have produced no evidence to suggest that having nonunion members on the relief crew—here, just one non-union member—had the potential 

to cause safety issues. In addition, unlike the speech in Gilbrook, Plaintiffs’ speech was 

made privately to other firefighters, and Plaintiffs made no attempts to publicize their 

alleged safety concerns. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ speech about the Yarnell Hill Fire 

tragedy is more aptly characterized as speech that addresses “individual personnel 

disputes and grievances” that “would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the 

performance of governmental agencies,” and therefore, is not of public concern. 

McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114. 

 Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ speech about the management of relief efforts was made 

with governmental authority that they did not possess. Unauthorized and insubordinate 

employee speech that “purports to exercise governmental authority over others” is not 

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protected by the Constitution. See Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1080-81 

(9th Cir. 1996) (finding college employee who gave unauthorized orders to stop hiring in 

certain departments not to be protected by the First Amendment). Through their 

directions to Mr. Mecum that the City fire truck might be rerouted if a non-union member 

was on board, Plaintiffs’ speech purported to exercise governmental authority. Although 

there was some confusion immediately following the tragedy that may have led Plaintiffs 

to believe that the union and not the City was organizing relief efforts, (see Jeffries Dep. 

at 48:22-49:5), by the time Plaintiffs decided that Mr. Hamm would tell Mr. Mecum the 

truck might be rerouted because of non-union member volunteers, Plaintiffs were well 

aware that the City fire department, under the direction of Chief Good, was organizing 

relief efforts. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiffs had authority as union leaders, it did 

not supersede the authority that Chief Good possessed as Chief of the City’s fire 

department. In sum, at the time Plaintiffs relayed the message to Mr. Mecum, only Chief 

Good had authority to give orders about the City’s relief assistance to Prescott, and 

Plaintiffs’ speech was unauthorized and therefore not protected. (See Tolleson Police 

Memorandum at 18.) 

 In sum, Plaintiffs’ speech relating to the Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy is not protected 

by the First Amendment because it involved individual personnel disputes and was 

insubordinate and unauthorized. See McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114; Nelson, 83 F.3d at 

1080-81. 

 b. Plaintiffs’ Speech Relating to the Meet and Confer Policy 

 Plaintiffs also claim that their speech advocating for the City to adopt a meet and 

confer policy addresses matters of public concern. (Resp. at 6.) The Ninth Circuit has 

held that speech about the working conditions of public employees addresses issues of 

public concern. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114 (finding plaintiff’s speech about 

compensation for city police force addressed matter of public concern because it involved 

the “working relationship between the police union and elected city officials”). 

According to the Meet and Confer Draft Ordinance, the meet and confer policy would 

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allow the union to submit proposals to the City Manager regarding “wages, hours, 

benefits and working conditions.” (Meet and Confer Draft Ordinance.) Since these issues 

address the working relationship between the firefighters’ union and an elected city 

official, they constitute an issue of public concern. Therefore, Plaintiffs have raised a 

material issue of fact as to whether the content of their speech addresses a matter of 

public concern. 

 But the Court must also consider the context and form of the speech under the 

Connick test. Plaintiffs have failed to present a genuine issue for trial as to whether the 

form and context of their speech regarding the proposed meet and confer policy are such 

that it involves a matter of public concern. Courts have held that public employees’ 

speech about their employment conditions involves a matter of public concern when it is 

made publicly. See, e.g., McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1112 (plaintiff’s speech purposefully 

directed to the public through city council meetings and television interview); Lambert v. 

Richard, 59 F.3d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff spoke at televised city council 

meeting); Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 850 (plaintiffs issued a press release). Plaintiffs present 

insufficient evidence that their speech about a meet and confer policy was directed to the 

public or otherwise made publicly. Rather than advocating for a meet and confer policy at 

a city council meeting or some other public forum, Mr. Candelaria spoke privately with 

City Manager Mr. Medrano, Chief Good, and possibly some city council members. 

(Candelaria Dep. at 77:15-22.) He testified that he never spoke about a meet and confer 

policy around members of the public. (Candelaria Dep. at 77:23-25, 78:1-20.) Plaintiffs 

present no other evidence that they brought their advocacy for a meet and confer policy 

into the public sphere. In sum, given the evidence of the context and form of Plaintiffs’ 

speech about the proposed meet and confer policy—speech made privately to a 

governmental entity—no reasonable juror could find that it involved a matter of public 

concern. See Roe v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(upholding defendants’ motion for summary judgment when plaintiff’s “speech was not 

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directed to the public or the media, but rather to a governmental entity”) The speech 

therefore does not address an issue of public concern as a matter of law.1

 Plaintiffs present other evidence of speech about a meet and confer policy but do 

not provide sufficient detail to establish a genuine issue of material fact about whether the 

speech was made by them or whether it addresses a matter of public concern. The Meet 

and Confer Proposal and the Meet and Confer Proposed Ordinance are not signed or 

dated, and there is no evidence of who wrote them, when they were created, or where—or 

even if—they were disseminated. (Meet and Confer Proposal; Meet and Confer Proposed 

Ordinance.) There is also no evidence that Plaintiffs wrote the Facebook post from 

“Tolleson Firefighters” about the proposed meet and confer ordinance. (Tolleson 

Firefighters Facebook Page.) This additional evidence therefore does not raise a material 

issue of fact that Plaintiffs’ speech regarding the proposed meet and confer policy 

involved a matter of public concern. 

 In conclusion, Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence from which 

reasonable jurors could find that their speech relating to the Yarnell Hill Fire relief efforts 

or the proposed meet and confer policy involved a matter of public concern. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs have not established a genuine issue of material fact under the first step of the 

five-step First Amendment inquiry.2

 2. Substantial or Motivating Factor in the Adverse Action 

Even if Plaintiffs could prove that their speech regarding the proposed meet and 

confer was protected under the First Amendment, they fail to provide sufficient evidence 

 

1

 Plaintiffs cite Rankin v. McPherson for the proposition that “a purely private statement on a matter of public concern will rarely, if ever, justify discharge of a public employee.” 483 U.S. 378, 388 n.13 (1987). The speech in Rankin occurred during a conversation between coworkers about the policies of the President’s administration 

following an assassination attempt on the President. Id. at 386. It was undisputed that the plaintiff was discharged based on the content of her speech. Id. at 390. The case here is 

distinguishable because: (1) Plaintiffs’ speech did not involve an issue of national 

concern, (2) Plaintiffs were not discharged, and (3) Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ allegation that they were retaliated against as a result of their speech. 

2

 Although the Court need not address any further steps in the inquiry, it will address step three to evaluate specific issues regarding Plaintiffs’ freedom of association 

claim. The Court does not consider step two because steps one and three are dispositive. 

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for a reasonable jury to conclude that this speech was a “substantial or motivating factor” 

in Defendants’ decision to take the adverse actions. Under the Ninth Circuit test for 

establishing that retaliation was a “substantial or motivating factor” of an adverse 

employment action, plaintiffs may introduce evidence that: (1) the protected speech and 

adverse action were proximate in time, such that a jury could infer that the adverse action 

was done in retaliation for the speech, (2) the employer expressed opposition to the 

speech, or (3) the employer’s explanation for the adverse action was false and pretextual. 

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 The Court notes that Plaintiffs allege their freedom of association claim is based 

on substantially the same facts as their freedom of speech claim. (Compl. ¶ 46.) In their 

freedom of association claim, Plaintiffs aver they were retaliated against because they 

“actively participated in the [union]” and “acted as the leaders and spokespersons for the 

[union],” when the union “was engaged in an effort to secure passage of a meet-andconfer ordinance in the City.” (Compl. ¶¶ 47-48.) In a case where the “speech and 

associational rights at issue . . . are so intertwined that [there is] no reason to distinguish 

[a] hybrid circumstance from a case involving only speech rights,” courts may analyze 

the claims together. Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth 

Circuit has taken this approach in analyzing retaliation claims involving union members. 

See, e.g., McKinley, 705 F.2d 1110 at 1115. Since the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ First 

Amendment speech and association claims are substantially the same, the Court will 

analyze the claims collectively under the causation test. 

 Plaintiffs contend that the union’s “hard push,” or intensified advocacy efforts, for 

a meet and confer policy began “within months of the City’s investigation and discipline 

of plaintiffs,” and therefore, they “can demonstrate a temporal proximity” between their 

speech and association regarding the meet and confer policy and the adverse actions. 

(Resp. at 10.) Plaintiffs, however, had been advocating for a meet and confer policy since 

Mr. Candelaria became union president more than 10 years earlier. (Candelaria Dep. at 

47:14-27, 48:16-17.) In addition, Mr. Jeffries testified that there had been no additional 

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efforts that might be characterized as a “hard push” to pass a meet and confer policy in 

the City during the time frame that supports Plaintiffs’ allegation of a “hard push.” 

(Jeffries Dep. at 17:20-18:18.) A reasonable jury could not infer, based upon the limited 

evidence of Plaintiffs’ speech and association regarding the “hard push,” that Defendants 

suddenly decided to retaliate against Plaintiffs for advocating for a policy that was 

proposed over a decade ago. 

 Plaintiffs also allege that “their employer expressed opposition to their speech” 

about the proposed meet and confer policy. (Resp. at 10.) The only evidence Plaintiffs 

have produced about their employer’s opposition to their speech was a 2008 email from 

Mayor Gamez to Mr. Candelaria, written in response to an email that Mr. Candelaria 

wrote that advocated for a meet and confer policy. (May 1, 2008 Email.) This sole email, 

written five years before the adverse actions occurred, is insufficient for a reasonable 

juror to conclude that Plaintiffs’ speech about meet and confer was a “substantial and 

motivating factor” in the adverse actions. 

 Finally, Plaintiffs claim that their employer’s explanation for the adverse action 

was false and pretextual. (Resp. at 11.) Plaintiffs state that the pretext for the adverse 

action was “concern for another employee, Mr. Franzmeier.” (Resp. at 11.) However, 

Plaintiffs present no evidence to support their bare allegation that Defendants used 

concern for Mr. Franzmeier as a pretext in Plaintiffs’ adverse employment actions. The 

evidence instead shows that Plaintiffs were disciplined for violating administrative policy 

because of their attempts to prevent Mr. Franzmeier from participating in the City’s relief 

crew to Prescott. (Candelaria Dep. at 24:14-16; Good Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs themselves 

expressed remorse about their treatment of Mr. Franzmeier. After the volunteer sign-up 

sheet incident, Mr. Candelaria apologized to Mr. Franzmeier for upsetting him. 

(Candelaria Dep. at 24:14-16; Good Decl. ¶ 5.) Mr. Candelaria later told Mr. Medrano 

that “the emotions of the day may have gotten . . . [sic] the day the 19 firemen died and 

maybe I could have handled that a little better.” (Good Decl. ¶ 6.) During his disciplinary 

meeting, Mr. Hamm acknowledged that he “learned something” and described it as a 

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“growing experience.” (Good Decl. ¶ 15.) He also said he “would understand if [Chief 

Good] would have a trust issue” because of his conduct. (Good Decl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs 

have presented no significant probative evidence to contradict Defendants’ allegations 

that Plaintiffs’ inappropriate actions after the Yarnell Hill Fire Tragedy caused legitimate 

concerns that warranted the adverse actions. 

 In sum, even assuming that Plaintiffs’ speech about a meet and confer policy was 

protected, Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 

material fact that their activities relating to the meet and confer policy, and not their 

behavior following the Yarnell Hill fire tragedy, were the cause of the adverse actions 

taken against them. Since Plaintiffs have not shown sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to find that their protected activities relating to the meet and confer policy were a 

“substantial and motivating factor in the adverse action,” the evidence does not satisfy 

step three of the five-step inquiry. 

 Because Plaintiffs have not produced significant probative evidence contradicting 

Defendants’ evidence under steps one and three of the five-step inquiry, the Court need 

not address the final two steps of the inquiry.3

 The Court grants Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims of freedom of speech and 

freedom of association. 

B. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claim 

 Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants violated their associational rights as public 

safety employees under Arizona state law. (Compl. ¶ 54-55.) The Arizona Revised 

Statutes state that public safety employees “shall not be discharged, disciplined or 

discriminated against because of the exercise” of their rights, as “[p]ublic safety 

employees serving any city, town, county or fire district . . . [to] . . . join employee 

associations which comply with the laws of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1411(A). Plaintiffs 

specifically contend that Defendants have “taken actions and made threats aimed at 

 

3

 Since Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, the Court also need not address Defendant’s qualified immunity argument. (MSJ at 14.) 

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unlawfully preventing and limiting the plaintiffs’ rights to associate with other . . . 

employees who are labor Association members about matters of common interest.” 

(Compl. ¶ 56.) 

 Plaintiffs’ evidence fails to present a genuine issue of material fact as to the 

alleged causal connection between their membership in a public safety employee union 

and the adverse actions taken against them.4

 In recent Arizona cases, courts have adopted 

the First Amendment retaliation test for analyzing Arizona state law claims of retaliation. 

See Rowberry v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. CV-14-01801-PHX-DLR, 2015 WL 

7273136 (Nov. 18, 2015, D. Ariz.). Plaintiffs’ claim fails under the First Amendment 

retaliation test because, as discussed above, they have not produced sufficient evidence 

for a reasonable jury to find that their association with the union was a “substantial or 

motivating factor” in the adverse actions. Therefore, their retaliation claim under state 

law fails as well.5

 

 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, 

 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) 

as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims against them. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case. 

 Dated this 8th day of July, 2016. 

 

4

 Neither party presents a case that sets forth a retaliation test under A.R.S. § 23-

1411(A), and the Court is unable to find one. 

5

 Since Plaintiffs have not established a genuine issue of material fact about their 

substantive claim under A.R.S. § 23-1411(A), the Court need not address the related 

procedural issue raised by Defendants. (MSJ at 16-17.) 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

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