Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04086/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STEPHEN H. BOHN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

Ulllted Stat• Court fJI Appeals Ted ClrCIIIt 

AUG 2 8 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 95-4086 

PARK CITY GROUP, INC. and 

RANDY FIELDS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 94-CV-521) 

Robert H. Wilde (Suchada P. Bazzelle with him on a brief), Midvale, Utah, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Deno G. Himonas (Randall N. Skanchy, also of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 

with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK, LOGAN and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Stephen H. Bohn sued defendants Park City Group, Inc. and Randy 

Fields, claiming he performed overtime work for which he was improperly denied time 

and a half pay required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 

213. On cross-motions for summary judgment the district court granted judgment for 

ot.:-· 

defendants, finding that plaintiff was exempt from the FLSA because he was a professional employee. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that because genuine issues of material fact 

remained the district court should not have granted summary judgment.1 Defendants 

assert we have no jurisdiction because plaintiff's notice of appeal, filed after the final 

judgment, purported to appeal only an earlier partial summary judgment, a nonfinal order. 

I 

We first address the threshold issue whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

On May 8, the district court entered its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. That order 

was not a final appealable order because it did not dispose of Park City Group's counterclaim that plaintiff had failed to repay a promissory note he executed when he borrowed 

$500 from Park City Group under the Employee Computer Purchase Plan. ~ Atiya v. 

Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013, 1016 (lOth Cir. 1993) (holding that order adjudicating 

fewer than all claims and liabilities of all parties is not a fmal appealable order unless 

1 Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to strike an 

affidavit of Linda Hack offered by defendant after the summary judgment briefs were 

filed. We do not discuss this issue because its resolution makes no difference in our 

disposition of the appeal. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 2 
certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). The district court's order granting Park City 

Group's summary judgment on the counterclaim, entered on May 15, 1995, disposed of 

all claims and thus was a final judgment. 

Plaintiff's notice of appeal, filed \\ithin thirty days after the final judgment as 

required by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l), sought review of"the order dismissing his complaint 

herein entered in this action on the 8th day ofMay, 1995." Appellant's App. 277. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff's notice of appeal did not designate a fmal order, and thus 

did not meet the Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requirement that the "notice of appeal ... must 

designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from." 

We recognize that Fed. R. App. P. 3 requirements are jurisdictional. ~Torres v. 

Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,314 (1988). But "[t]he requirements of Rule 3 

should be liberally construed. '[M]ere technicalities' should not obstruct the consideration of a case on its merits." Nolan y. United States De.p 't of Justice, 973 F .2d 843~ 846 

(lOth Cir. 1992) (quoting Foman y. Davis .. 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (alteration in 

original) (other citations omitted)). 

In this case plaintiff's notice of appeal, filed after the district court entered a final 

judgment, specified the only order--and issue-that plaintiff intended to appeal. In Lewis 

y. B.F. Goodrich Co, 850 F.2d 641,645 (lOth Cir. 1988) (en bane), we held that a 

premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order ripened when other claims were 

dismissed after the notice of appeal was filed. In Lewis not only did the notice of a~eal 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 3 
name an order that was not a final order (as in this case); the notice was filed before the 

final judgment in the case was entered. Thus, we accepted the notice which specified 

appeal of a non final order as sufficie:1t under the Rule 3( c) requirement to name the 

judgment or order appealed from. See .als.Q Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15, 21 (1st 

Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs notices of appeal were worded to appeal from directed verdicts 

rather than judgment; technical error should not defeat consideration on merits where 

"there was never any doubt as to the subject matter of the appeal"). 

In the instant case defendants had clear notice of the issue being appealed and will 

not be prejudiced. We hold that we have jurisdiction.2 

2 In supplemental authority defendants cite and rely on Long v. Union Pac. R.R., 

206 F.2d 829 (lOth Cir. 1953). In Lrn.g, a notice of appeal from the district court's ruling 

excluding evidence, timely filed after the final judgment was entered, failed to "designate 

the judgment or part thereof appealed from" (as then required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 (b)). 

Because the notice of appeal made "no reference whatever to the fmal judgment," l&ng 

held there was no jurisdiction, declining to "read into the notice something that is not 

there." l!h at 830. This old case is inconsistent with the more generous approach of the 

current Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, and our more recent cases. We consider our en bane opinion in 

Lewis to have overruled l&ng even though it did not cite that case. ~ .ill§Q Cooper v. 

American Auto. Ins. Co, 978 F.2d 602,608 (lOth Cir. 1992) (order granting government 

dismissal of claims was appealable although plaintiff's notice of appeal failed to reference 

it when plaintiffs intent to appeal dismissal of those claims was clear and government 

was not misled); Wri~ y. American Home Assurance Co, 488 F .2d 361, 363 (1Oth Cir. 

1973) (notice purporting to appeal from an order denying a JNOV or new trial was 

sufficient to confer jurisdiction of appeal on the merits; rejecting technical application of 

the rule where appellant's intent ''to seek review of the judgment is manifest"); d Averitt 

v. Southland Motor Inn of Oklahoma. 720 F.2d 1178, 1180 (lOth Cir. 1983) (when notice 

of appeal stated that defendants appealed only final judgment on punitive damages issues, 

and parties agreed not to appeal other issues, defendants cannot then appeal more). We 

have circulated this opinion among all judges ofthis court in regular active service. All 

(continued ... ) 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 4 
II 

Plaintiff was employed by Park City Group from October 26, 1992, to Decemher 31, 1993, in the software and training departments as a technical writer or documenter. He received a $4 7,000 annual salary plus bonuses. After Park City Group 

terminated plaintiff's employment for inadequately performing his duties, he filed this 

suit, asserting that he was entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. After a hearing, the 

district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that plaintiff was exempt 

from the FLSA overtime provisions because his primary duty was as either a computer 

professional or an artistic professional. Plaintiff challenges that ruling. 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment applying the 

same standard used by the district court. Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, 60 F.3d 1486, 

1489-90 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1045 (1996). We must view the factual 

record and make reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment Deepwater Investments. Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 

938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (lOth Cir. 1991). We will uphold summary judgment only if"there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). 

2( ••• continued) 

judges have expressed agreement with the conclusions herein respecting overruling lJmi. 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 5 
We first review the legal framework for our analysis. The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to employees who work more than forty hours per week and are not 

specifically exempted. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(l). Employees performing in a "bona fide 

executive, administrative, or professional capacity" are exempt. Id.. § 213(a)(l). It is the 

employer's burden to prove that a plaintiff falls within the professional exemption, 

Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974), and the exemption is 

construed narrowly against the employer who seeks to assert it. ~Arnold v. Ben 

Kanowsky. Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). "[T]he inquiry into exempt status under 

[§ 213(a)(l)] remains intensely fact bound and case specific." Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 

918 F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir. 1990). 

The regulations implementing the FLSA define the requirements for exemptions, 

and include a "long test" and a "short test." 29 C.F.R. § 541.3. It is uncontested in the 

instant case that plaintiff's annual salary subjected him to the "short test," because he met 

the minimum salary requirement of $250 per week. Id.. § 541.3( e). The short test for the 

professional exemption also requires a showing that the employee has as his "primary 

duty" work that requir[ es] the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment" and which 

consists of the following: 

( 1) Work requiring knowledge of an advance type in a field of 

science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study, as distinguished from a general 

academic education and from an apprenticeship, and from training in the 

performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes, or 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 6 
(3) Teaching, tutoring, instructing, or lecturing in the activity of 

imparting knowledge and who is employed and engaged in this activity as a 

teacher in the school system or educational establishment or institution by 

which he is employed, or 

(4) Work that requires theoretical and practical application of highlyspecialized knowledge in computer systems analysis, programming, and 

software engineering, and who is employed and engaged in these activities 

as a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or 

other similarly skilled worker in the computer software field, as provided in 

§ 541.303. 

29 C.F .R. § 541.3. An employee also meets the short test if his primary duty consists of 

"work requiring invention, imagination, or talent in a recognized field of artistic 

endeavor." ~ id:. The district court apparently found that based on undisputed fa~ts 

plaintiff's primary duty involved work either as a professional in an artistic endeavor or 

as a computer professional. 

The regulations state that although determining the "primary duty" of an employee 

depends on "all the facts in a particular case," "a good rule of thumb [is] that primary 

duty means the major part, or over 50 percent, of the employee's time." hl § 541.103. 

The regulation goes on to caution, however, that time itself is not dispositive. "At least 

under the short tests, the employee's primary duty will usually be what [he] does that is of 

principal value to the employer, not the collateral tasks that [he] may also perform, even 

ifthey consume more than half [his] time." Dalheim. 918 F.2d at 1227. Plaintiff asserts 

that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because questions of material 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 7 
fact remained concerning his actual duties that precluded a determination that his primary 

duty fell into either the computer professional or artistic professional category. 

III 

We first address if genuine issues of material fact existed whether plaintiff's 

primary duty included the performance of work described in 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3(a)(4) and 

541.303 as a "similarly skilled worker in the computer software field." In order to qualify 

for this exemption an employee's primary duty must consist of one or more of the 

following: 

(1) The application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, 

incmding consulting with users, to determine hardware, software, or system 

functional specifications; 

(2) The design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, 

testing, or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; 

(3) The design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of 

computer programs related to machine operating systems; or 

(4) a combination ofthe aforementioned duties, the performance of 

which requires the same level of skills. 

29 C.F .R. § 541.303(b ). We have found no case law interpreting the relatively new 

"computer professional exemption." 57 Fed. Reg. 46742 (setting Nov. 9, 1992 effective 

date). ct: Houk v. SEI Tech. Sery. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (W.D.N.C. 1987) 

(suggesting that practice in industry at that time was to treat a technical writing editor of 

computer program manuals as exempt professional); Gorman y. Continental Can Co .. 

1985 WL 5208 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (describing electronic data processing concepts, defmi8 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 8 
tions and required skill levels for different job descriptions), modified, 1986 WL 335 

(1986). 

"The level of expertise and skill required to qualify for this exemption is generally 

attained through combinations of education and experience in the field. While such 

employees commonly have a bachelor's or higher degree, no particular academic degree 

is required for this exemption." 29 C.F .R. § 541.303( c). Plaintiff graduated in 1981 from 

Southwest Missouri State University with a bachelor of science degree in elementary 

education. In 1982-84 plaintiff earned at least thirteen semester hours toward an M.A. in 

Educational Media and Technology at Brigham Young University. His resume lists 

"'skills and knowledge areas" in numerous '"computer technologies." Appellant's App. 

250,253. Before his employment with Park City Group, plaintiff worked for a producer 

of video special-effects equipment as a "project manager/training specialist,'~ where he 

managed training materials and "[a ]uthored several major volumes of installation, 

operation, and service manuals." Id... at 250. He also worked as a "training and documentation manager" for a software company. Id... Before attending college, plaintiff was 

trained in the Navy electronics and aviation technology program. ld, Overall, plaintiff's 

education and experience allow but do not compel a fmding that he had the skill and 

expertise required to meet the computer professional exemption. Further, "the determinative factor is the job requirement and not the education in fact acquired by the employee." 

Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep't of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1565 (lith Cir. 1991). 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 9 
Park City Group hired plaintiff as a "documenter at the documentation project 

manager level" to work on a team of employees--including two testers and three developers (programmers). ~Appellees' Supp. App. 27-28,66. The job description for a 

documentation project leader at that time stated the following: 

. Comfortable with several operating systems and hardware platforms 

. Produces innovative solutions for a variety of complex problems 

. Guides users in formulating requirements 

. Identifies omissions and errors in requirements 

. Arbitrator for conflicts between individuals 

. Reviews the work oflower employees 

. Reviews proposals, gathers facts, analyzes data, compares alternatives in 

terms of cost, time, resources and recommends a course of action 

. Increases knowledge of current advances in writing abilities, software 

products, and documentation techniques 

. Formulates decisions on broad policy and standards issues 

. Demonstrates ability to make effective marketing presentations on many 

subject-matter areas 

. Is a role model of the culture and provides leadership to others to 

understand and adapt to the culture 

. Demonstrates in-depth knowledge and understanding of software 

development business (Marketing, Sales, Human Resources, Finance and 

Accounting) 

lil at 94. 

Although Park City Group did not have a single job description for plaintiff's 

position, in response to interrogatories it produced a job description for a "Senior 

Technical Writer/Editor" that stated the following: 

. Mastered the documentation tools and technical writing techniques 

. Familiar with several operating systems and hardware platforms and 

demonstrates the ability to document within those systems 

. Reviews programming code to determine program functionality 

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Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 10 
. Performs support functions to CSRs and customers 

. Increases knowledge of current advances in training and documentation 

techniques and methods 

. Highly productive in developing products and achieving customer delight 

. Demonstrates ability to accurately define resource and time requirements 

for complex, multi-faceted projects and achieve successful project completion 

. Capable of editing, writing, and reviewing work from a variety of subject 

matter areas 

. Demonstrates an understanding of the basic economics of the software 

business and optimizes the spending of company funds 

. Is a role model of the culture and provides leadership to others to 

understand and adapt to the culture 

ld.. at 93. Plaintiff asserts that he did not perform the type of work in these job descriptions, and alternatively, he argues that even if he did perform those duties, they did not 

meet the "computer professional" exemption. 

Plaintiff relies on his affidavit indicating that he expended the majority of his time 

on clerical tasks such as basic word processing, photocopying, collating and talking with 

other employees, and minimizing the amount of time he spent doing technical writing. 

Defendants correctly point out, however, that plaintiff's affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony in which he acknowledged performing many of the tasks set out in the job 

descriptions above, and thus the affidavit should not be considered. ~ Mack v. United 

States, 814 F.2d 120, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1987). In any event, the district court found that the 

clerical and "gopher" type tasks that plaintiff listed in his affidavit were not duties and 

responsibilities assigned to him even if he was actually performing those duties. In fact, 

II 

Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 11 
plaintiff's counsel admitted during the hearing on the summary judgment motion that 

plaintiff was never directed to do many of those duties. 

Plaintiff also asserts that, even if his primary duty was as a documenter/technical 

writer, his work did not require the highly specialized computer skills described in the 

regulations. Unfortunately, we cannot discern from the record whether plaintiff's primary 

duty required "theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge in 

computer systems analysis, programming, and software engineering," 29 C.F. R. 

§ 541.303(c). The regulation defendants rely upon, 29 C.F.R. § 541.303(b)(2), refers to 

~'[t]he ... documentation ... of computer systems or programs, ... based on or related to 

user or system design specifications." 

Our understanding of"documentation" in this context is that it would deal with the 

internal documentation process involved in programming and/or systems analysis, 

requiring knowledge of the system architecture, programming logic and language 

necessary to manipulate the internal operation of the computer itself. Our review of the 

record and further research into computer terminology indicates, however, that the term 

"documentation" is also used to refer to the writing of manuals for end-users, which 

would not necessarily involve the same type of highly developed computer skills. 

In Park City Group's answers to plaintiff's frrst discovery it specified plaintiff's 

duties as follows: 

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Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 12 
Plaintiff was essentially a documenter. As a consequence, he was responsible for documenting software application and the technical features that 

make up the application. This documentation process, among other things, 

involves writing, reviewing and editing the documentation; using computers 

to describe the application; running and authoring (customizing) the application; communicating with developers and other team members; participating in team and documenter meetings; participating in the design process 

including of screens that the user sees; testing the application to make sure 

that it performs properly (i.e., testing the user guides against the code to 

ensure the application performs as it is [sic] should and identifying bugs) 

and supporting the application internally and externally. 

Appellant's App. 226. 

Plaintiff's resume, which he prepared after his discharge, claims that while an 

employee at the Park City Group he "[ d]esigned and developed new team--and corporate 

--marketing literature ... [d]esigned and produced many new graphics ... [l]ed documentation redesign efforts ... [ d]efined bug and enhancement tracking system ... 

[e]dited, expanded, and improved the company's orientation and policies manual ... 

[and] [w]rote and illustrated several large volumes of software documentation." Id.at 

152. On their face plaintiff's duties and accomplishments appear to reflect high level 

skills, but without more we cannot determine whether they involve the depth ofknowledge the law requires for the professional exemption. 

We are persuaded after reading the entire record that the district court erred in 

finding that as a matter oflaw plaintiff's job as a technical writer/documenter met tbe 

requirements of the highly skilled computer professional. Defendants failed to provide 

the kind of detailed information about the primary duties and processes assigned to 

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Appellate Case: 95-4086 Document: 01019280746 Date Filed: 08/28/1996 Page: 13 
plaintiff, and the computer skill required in this area of"high tech" work to enable us to 

decide that it satisfies the exemption for a computer professional. This is an area in 

which the courts must rely on litigants to provide such evidence and to explain the 

common understanding of the technical terms used in the regulation. 

We believe that under the regulations a computer professional could certainly 

include some kinds of documentation or technical writing work. Defendants provided 

evidence that documenters at Park City Group worked without close supervision and that 

their work involves consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. But based on the 

record before us we cannot agree that defendants met their burden to show that no issues 

of material fact remained on this question. The district court may have relied too much 

upon plaintiffs relatively large salary in finding his work was professional. ~ 

Appellant's App. 328-30 (court specifically noted the large size of plaintiffs salary, and 

the "creative nature" of his work in finding that he was a professional.) 

IV 

Finally, we do not believe defendants met their burden of showing that plaintiff 

satisfied the requirements for the artistic professional exemption. To meet this exemption, defendants must show that plaintiffs primary duty consisted of the performance of 

"work requiring invention, imagination, or talent in a recognized field of artistic 

endeavor." 29 C.F.R. § 541.3. Recognized fields of artistic endeavor include "music, 

writing, the theater, and the plastic and graphic arts." !d..§ 541.302(b). "In the field of 

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" 

-, writing the distinction is ... difficult to draw. Obviously the requirement is met by 

essayists or novelists or scenario writers who choose their own subjects . . . . The 

requirement would also by met, generally speaking, by persons holding the more 

responsible writing positions in advertising agencies." til§ 541.302(c)(2). 

Given these regulations we doubt plaintiffs duties as a technical writer/documenter could qualify for an artistic professional exemption. Cf.. Reich v. Gateway Press. 

Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that task of rewriting press releases, etc. 

did not meet artistic professional exemption in part because it did not "require any special 

imagination or skill at making a complicated thing seem simple"); Dalheim, 918 F .2d 

1220, 1229 (5th Cir. 1990) (television producers who "perform their work within a welldefined framework of management policies and editorial convention" not exempt artistic 

professionals). We do not foreclose defendants, on remand, from showing that plaintiffs 

work required the level of artistic invention, imagination or talent to satisfy this exemption. What we do hold is that on the record presented the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment for defendants. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this 

opmton. 

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