Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01476/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01476-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERICA MORGERA, No. 2:09-cv-01476-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.;

PACIFIC FIRST FINANCIAL

SERVICES, L.P.; RECONTRUST

COMPANY, N.A.; MORTGAGE

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION

SYSTEMS, INC.; HILLTOP

FINANCIAL MORTGAGE; THANH NGOC

NGUYEN; SUNMEET NARINDER

ANAND; IBRAHIM K. KABA; DANIEL

KLEMESRUD and DOES 1 through

20 inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Erica Morgera (“Plaintiff”) seeks monetary relief

from Defendants for claims arising under the federal Truth in

Lending Act (“TILA”), California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), the federal Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and California’s Unfair Competition Law

(“UCL”). 

Case 2:09-cv-01476-MCE -KJN Document 34 Filed 01/12/10 Page 1 of 20
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 Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a Rule 1

are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 2

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Plaintiff also alleges state law claims of negligence, breach of

fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful

foreclosure.

Presently before the Court is a Motion by Defendants

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”), ReconTrust Company,

N.A. (“ReconTrust”), and Mortgage Electronic Registration

Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) (collectively “Defendants”) to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) In 1

addition, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages pursuant to Rule 12(f). For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted.2

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of activity surrounding a residential

loan transaction for the property located at 3561 Debina Way,

Rancho Cordova, Sacramento, CA (“Property”). 

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 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states that Klemesrud 3

solicited her “to purchase her residence.” However, Plaintiff’s

Opposition states that Klemesrud solicited her “to refinance her

residence.” This discrepancy does not affect the Court’s

decision.

3

In April 2007, Defendant Daniel Klemesrud, as a loan officer for

Defendant Hilltop Financial Mortgage, approached Plaintiff and

solicited her to purchase her residence. Klemesrud advised 3

Plaintiff that he could get her the “best deal” with the “best

interest rates” available on the market. 

Klemesrud promised Plaintiff an affordable loan with a fixed

rate, however he actually sold Plaintiff two loans. The first

mortgage loan was an interest-only adjustable rate loan with an

initial rate of 7.375% that adjusted to 13.375% with a prepayment

penalty. The second mortgage loan was a fixed interest rate and

included a prepayment penalty as well. Plaintiff further alleges

that Klemesrud advised Plaintiff that if the loans ever become

unaffordable, he would simply refinance it into an affordable

loan.

To qualify Plaintiff for these loans, Klemesrud allegedly

overstated Plaintiff’s income on the loan application without

Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. Additionally, because

Plaintiff did not have the necessary funds for a down payment in

order to obtain the loan, Klemesrud allegedly contacted the

seller of the Property and obtained $17,000.00 for the down

payment. Plaintiff alleges that Klemesrud either hid or

conspired with the underwriters in order to ensure approval of

Plaintiff’s loan. 

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4

On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff completed the loans on the

Property. The terms of the loans were memorialized in two

Promissory Notes, which were secured by two Deeds of Trust on the

Property. The Deeds of Trust identified Stewart Title of

Sacramento as Trustee, and Defendant Pacific First Financial

Services, L.P. as the Lender. Both Deeds of Trust also

identified MERS as nominee for the Lender and the Lender’s

successors and assigns, and as the beneficiary. 

Plaintiff alleges that she was not informed of the actual

terms of the loans being sold to her until recently because she

was not given a copy of any of the loan documents prior to

closing. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that she was only given

a few minutes to sign the documents. Plaintiff asserts that the

notary did not explain any of the loan documents to Plaintiff,

nor was Plaintiff allowed to review such documents. Rather,

Plaintiff was simply told to sign and initial the loan. 

Plaintiff further alleges that she was not provided with the

requisite copies of a proper notice of cancellation. 

On January 30, 2009, a Substitution of Trustee was issued by

MERS in its capacity as beneficiary under Plaintiff’s first Deed

of Trust substituting ReconTrust as trustee. On January 30,

2009, ReconTrust, in its capacity as agent to MERS as a

beneficiary, issued a Notice of Default and Election to Sell

Under Deed of Trust (“NOD”). This NOD was recorded in the Office

of the Recorder for Sacramento County, California, on February 3,

2009. 

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5

Plaintiff alleges that on April 3, 2009, a Qualified Written

Request (“QWR”) under RESPA was mailed to Countrywide demanding

to rescind the loan under TILA provisions. Plaintiff states that

Countrywide never properly responded to the QWR.

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's

obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to

relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level. 

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6

Id. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must

contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike from a pleading “an insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are a drastic

remedy and generally disfavored. 5C Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2004). Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pled. Fantasy, Inc. v.

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other

grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 114 S. Ct. 1023, 127 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1994)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

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7

A matter is impertinent if the statements do not pertain, and are

not necessary, to the issues in question. Id. “Scandalous”

matters “cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other

person.” In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d

955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see, e.g., Alvarado-Morales v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613 (1st Cir. 1988) (striking the terms

“brainwashing” and “torture” in a tort case in the employment

context).

ANALYSIS

A. California’s Rosenthal Act

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Defendants

Countrywide and MERS violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788 et

seq., by threatening to take actions not permitted by law,

including but not limited to: collecting on a debt not owed to

the Defendants, making false reports to credit reporting

agencies, foreclosing upon a void security interest, foreclosing

upon a note of which they were not in possession nor otherwise

entitled to payment, falsely stating the amount of debt,

increasing the amount of debt by including amounts that are not

permitted by law or contract, and using unfair and unconscionable

means to collect a debt. 

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8

The purpose of the RFDCPA is “to prohibit debt collectors

from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the

collection of consumer debts, and to require debtors to act

fairly in entering into and honoring such debts.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1788.1. California courts have declined to regard a residential

mortgage loan as a ‘debt’ under the RFDCPA. See Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1788.2(e)-(f); Pittman v. Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc.,

No. 09CV0241, 2009 WL 1108889, at *3 (S.D. Cal. April 24,

2009)(dismissing plaintiff’s mortgage-related RDFCPA claim for

failing to “invoke statutory protections”); Ines v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., No. 08cv1267, 2008 WL 4791863, at *3 (S.D. Cal.

2008) (stating plaintiff’s mortgage debt claim did not fall

within the meaning of the RFDCPA); Castaneda v. Saxon Mortg.

Services, Inc., No. 2:09cv01124, 2009 WL 4640673, at *3 (E.D.

Cal. Dec. 3, 2009) (holding that a foreclosure pursuant to a deed

of trust does not constitute a debt collection under the RFDCPA). 

As such, a foreclosure does not qualify as an unfair debt

collection. 

The behavior Plaintiff complains of arises out of or exist

in connection to Plaintiff’s residential loan mortgage. As the

courts have repeatedly held, the collection of this debt does not

fall under the purview of the RFDCPA. 

 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claim is

therefore granted. 

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9

C. Negligence

Plaintiff’s third claim alleges negligence against all

Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants “owed a

general duty to the Plaintiff to perform acts in such a manner as

to not cause Plaintiff harm” and that such a duty was breached

when Defendants “failed to maintain the original Mortgage Note,

failed to properly create original documents, failed to make the

required disclosures to the Plaintiff and instituted foreclosure

proceedings wrongfully.” Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff “when they

took payments to which they were not entitled, charged fees they

were not entitled to charge, and made or otherwise authorized

negative reporting of Plaintiff[’s] creditworthiness to various

credit bureaus wrongfully.” 

In order to state a cause of action for negligence, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant has a legal duty to use

due care; (2) the defendant breached such legal duty; (3) the

defendant’s breach was the proximate or legal cause of the

resulting injury; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. Ladd v.

County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917 (1996). The existence

of a legal duty on the part of the defendant is a question of law

to be determined by the court. Kentucky Fried Chicken of

California, Inc. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 814, 819 (1997);

Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal. 3d 112, 124

(1985). 

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10

When not provided by statute, the existence of such a duty

depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of

policy considerations for and against the imposition of

liability. Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 9 Cal. App.

4th 88, 105 (1992).

“[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty

of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the

loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional

role as a mere lender of money.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095-96 (1991) (affirming

summary judgment in favor of defendant lending institution

because defendant owed no duty to plaintiff in conducting its

loan processing procedures); see Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App.

3d 27, 35 (1980) (“Liability to a borrower for negligence arises

only when the lender ‘actively participates’ in the financed

enterprise ‘beyond the domain of the usual money lender.’”). 

However, the analysis does not stop there. Rather, California

courts look to six factors in determining whether a financial

institution owes a duty of care to a borrower-client. These

facts are: “[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended

to affect the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him,

[3] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,

[4] the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s

conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to

the defendant’s conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future

harm.” 

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11

Id. at 1098; Knox v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. C0500240, 2005 WL

1910927 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (holding that the fifth factor

alone was enough to establish a duty of care where plaintiffs had

asserted allegations of intentional document forgery).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are “diversified financial

marketing and/or services corporations engaged primarily in

residential mortgage banking and/or related business.” As

financial institutions, Defendants owed no duty of care to

Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any statute

creating a duty, or a special relationship giving rise to a duty

between mortgagors and a lending institution (Countrywide), a

trustee (ReconTrust), or a beneficiary (MERS). 

Defendants’ involvement in the loan transaction falls far

short of the active participation necessary to give rise to

liability. Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 69 Cal. 2d

850, 864 (1968) (finding a duty of care where lender exercised

extensive control and shared profits). 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim

is therefore granted. 

D. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)

Plaintiff’s fourth claim alleges that Countrywide violated

the RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2), by failing and refusing to

provide a proper written explanation or response to Plaintiff’s

alleged qualified written request (“QWR”). Plaintiff alleges

that on April 3, 2009, a QWR was mailed to Countrywide and that

Countrywide has yet to properly respond to such request. 

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12

RESPA requires mortgage loan servicers who receive a

“qualified written request” for information relating to the

servicing of a loan to provide a written response acknowledging

receipt of the correspondence within 20 days. 12 U.S.C.

§ 2605(e)(1)(A). For the purposes of the Act, a QWR “shall be a

written correspondence [] that... includes a statement of the

reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable,

that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the

servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” 

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). 

Although Plaintiff describes her letter as QWR, she fails to

allege any facts which qualify it as such. Plaintiff has not

alleged that she was seeking information about her account or

that she was attempting to correct an error. Plaintiff states

only that her QWR included a demand to rescind the loan pursuant

to TILA provisions. However, a letter demanding rescission is

simply that, a rescission letter. It does not amount to a QWR

invoking the protection of RESPA.

As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of

RESPA. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s RESPA claim is

granted.

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13

E. Fraud

Plaintiff’s sixth claim is for fraud. Plaintiff alleges

that Countrywide committed fraud when it “misrepresented to

Plaintiff that [Countrywide] has the right to collect monies from

Plaintiff on its behalf or on behalf of others when Defendant

[Countrywide] has no legal right to collect such monies.” 

Plaintiff alleges that MERS “misrepresented to Plaintiff on the

Deed of Trust that it is a qualified beneficiary with the ability

to assign or transfer the Deed of Trust and/or the Note and/or

substitute trustees under the Deed of Trust.” 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that ReconTrust

“misrepresented to Plaintiff that [it] was entitled to enforce

the security interest and has the right to institute a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under the Deed of Trust when they

filed a Notice of Default on February 3, 2009.” Plaintiff thus

contends that ReconTrust “did not have the right to initiate

foreclosure proceeding herein under California Civil Code § 2924

et seq.” 

In California the required elements of fraud are

“a) misrepresentation; b) knowledge of falsity; c) intent to

defraud; d) justifiable reliance; and e) resulting damage.” In re

Estate of Young, 160 Cal. App. 4th 62, 79 (2008) (citation

omitted). A claim for fraud requires a heightened pleading

standard in which the allegations must be “specific enough to give

defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to

constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the

charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

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Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Statements

of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities

are sufficient, Id. at 735, provided the plaintiff sets forth

“what is false or misleading about a statement and why it is

false.” In re GlenFed, Inc., Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541,

1548 (9th Cir. 1994).

Here that standard has not been met. Plaintiff has not

provided the time, place, or nature of the alleged

misrepresentations. Most importantly, Plaintiff has failed to

allege what is false or misleading about Defendants’ statements

and why they are false. Simply alleging that Defendants’

“misrepresented” themselves is insufficient. Plaintiff’s

pleading does not meet the heightened standard necessary for a

fraud claim. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud claim is

therefore granted. 

F. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law

Plaintiff’s seventh claim alleges Defendants’ acts

“constitute unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business

practices, as defined in the California Business and Professions

Code § 17200 et seq.” 

California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.,

more commonly known as California’s Unfair Competition Law

(“UCL”) defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or

fraudulent business act or practice ....” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200. 

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15

“Unlawful” practices are practices “forbidden by law, be it civil

or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulation,

or court-made.” Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th

832, 838-39 (1994) (citing People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 632

(1979)). To state a cause of action based on an “unlawful”

business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege

facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law. 

McKale, 25 Cal.3d at 635. A business act or practice is “unfair”

when the conduct “threatens an incipient violation of an

antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those

laws because its effects are comparable to a violation of the

law, or that otherwise significantly threatens or harms

competition.” Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular

Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999). To sufficiently plead an

action based on an “unfair” business act or practice, a plaintiff

must allege facts showing the “unfair” nature of the conduct and

that the harm caused by the conduct outweighs any benefits that

the conduct may have. Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 102 Cal.

App. 3d 735, 740 (1980) (“[S]ince the complaint is unlikely to

reveal defendant’s justification, if th[e] pleading states a

prima facie case of harm,...the defendant should be made to

present its side of the story.”). A “fraudulent” business act or

practice is one in which members of the public are likely to be

deceived. Hall v. Time, Inc., 158 Cal. App. 4th 847, 849 (2008);

Olsen v. Breeze, 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 618 (“‘Fraudulent,’ as

used in the statute, does not refer to the common law tort of

fraud but only requires a showing members of the public ‘are

likely to be deceived.’” (citations omitted)). 

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Thus, in order to state a cause of action based on a “fraudulent”

business act or practice, the plaintiff must allege that

consumers are likely to be deceived by the defendant’s conduct. 

Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.,

35 Cal. 3d 197, 212 (1983).

In alleging violation of the UCL, Plaintiff incorporates by

reference all prior causes of actions, however none of those

claims have been sufficiently plead to survive a motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff therefore lacks a predicate “unlawful” action

to underlie her UCL claim. 

Similarly she fails to allege with reasonable particularity

“unfair” or “fraudulent” behavior by Defendants. Plaintiff

asserts that “unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business

practices” have occurred but she does not identify which specific

behaviors she believes are punishable under the UCL. To the

extent to which she may be referring to all alleged wrongful

conduct listed in the Complaint, Plaintiff still fails to state

why such behavior is “unfair” or “fraudulent” as defined by the

statute.

Due to Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead unlawful,

unfair or fraudulent behaviors, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s UCL claim is granted.

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G. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff’s tenth claim alleges wrongful foreclosure. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “were not, and

are not, in possession of the Note, are not beneficiaries,

assignees or employees of the person or entity in possession of

the Note, and are not otherwise entitled to payment.” Plaintiff

further alleges that Defendants “are not ‘person[s] entitled to

enforce’ the security interest in the Property, as that term is

defined in [California] Commercial Code § 3301.” 

California Civil Code §§ 2924-2924i govern non-judicial

foreclosures. California courts have consistently held that the

Civil Code provisions “cover every aspect” of the foreclosure

process, I.E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281,

285 (1985), and are “intended to be exhaustive,” Moeller v. Lien,

25 Cal. App. 4th 822, 834 (1994). As such, Plaintiff’s reliance

on Cal. Comm. Code § 3301 is misplaced. Pursuant to § 2924(a)(1)

of the California Civil Code, a “trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary

or any of their authorized agents” may conduct the foreclosure

process. There is no requirement that the party initiating nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings be in possession of the original

note. See, e.g., Candelo v. NDEX West, LLC, No. CV F 08-1916,

2008 WL 5382259, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008) (“No requirement

exists under statutory framework to produce the original note to

initiate non-judicial foreclosure.”); Putkkuri v. Recontrust Co.,

No. 08cv1919, 2009 WL 32567, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009)

(“Production of the original note is not required to proceed with

a non-judicial foreclosure.”). 

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Furthermore, a defaulted borrower is “required to allege tender of

the amount of [the lender’s] secured indebtedness in order to

maintain any cause of action for irregularity in the sale

procedure.” Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, 43 Cal. App. 4th

1101, 1109 (1996). Therefore, an action to set aside a

foreclosure sale, unaccompanied by an offer to tender, does not

state a cause of action which a court of equity recognizes. 

Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 15 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117

(1981). 

Plaintiff argues that tender is not required when it would

be inequitable to do so. However, Plaintiff has not explained

how an offer to tender would be inequitable in the current

circumstances. Therefore, regardless of whether or not

Defendants were entitled to conduct the foreclosure process, the

Plaintiff has not offered to tender, and thus, her claim for

wrongful foreclosure must fail.

As for Plaintiff’s argument that MERS lacked standing to

proceed with its non-judicial foreclosure, it too lacks legal

merit. Courts have consistently found that MERS does in fact

have standing to foreclose as the nominee of the lender. See,

e.g., Trent v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 Fed.

Appx. 571 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Mortgage Elec.

Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151 (Fla. App. 2

Dist. 2007); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Revoredo,

955 So. 2d 33 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2007); In re Huggins, 357 B.R.

180 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); In re Sina, No. A06-200, 2006 WL

2729544 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006) (unpublished); 

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Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ventura, No. CV

054003168S, 2006 WL 1230265 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 20, 2006)

(unpublished); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Leslie,

No. CV044001051, 2005 WL 1433922 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 25, 2005)

(unpublished).

Under the mortgage contract, MERS has the legal right to

foreclose on the debtor’s property. The fact that MERS, the

mortgagee, lacked a beneficial interest in the note that was

secured by the mortgage does not deprive MERS of standing to

enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage. Trent, 288 Fed.

Appx. at 572. MERS is the owner and holder of the note as

nominee for the lender, and thus MERS can enforce the note on the

lender’s behalf. Azize, 965 So. 2d at 153-54.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 19) is GRANTED

with leave to amend. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED as

moot. 

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later than

twenty (20) days after the date this Memorandum and Order is

filed electronically. 

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If no amended complaint is filed within said twenty (20)-day

period, without further notice, Plaintiff’s remaining claims will

be dismissed without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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