Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01629/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRK T. EDWARDS, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; 

et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 13cv1629 JAH(KSC)

ORDER SUA SPONTE

REMANDING CASE TO STATE

COURT

On June 6, 2013, Kirk T. Edwards (“plaintiff”) filed the instant civil action in San

Diego County Superior Court alleging various state law claims along with two federal

claims. On July 12, 2013, defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee,

Successor in Interest to Wachovia Bank, N.A., as Trustee for J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust

2005-S3 (“defendant”) removed the action from state court to this Court asserting that

the case involved a federal question1

 and the Court had supplemental jurisdiction over the

various state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Doc. No. 1. On August 5,

2013, plaintiff filed an amended complaint voluntarily dismissing his federal claims. See

Doc. No. 5.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.

v. New York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, a federal court cannot reach

the merits of any dispute until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel

1

 Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth causes of action sought relief for violations of the

Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12

U.S.C. § 2601). See State Court Complaint, Doc. No. 1-1.

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Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this rule to permit a district court to raise the issue of

subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any point during a pending case. Snell v.

Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Summers v. Interstate Tractor

& Equip. Co., 466 F.2d 42, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1972).

This Court has the discretion to decline or to continue to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims after federal claims have been dismissed. Under

28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims that “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) explicitly

allows a reviewing court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)-(4). Thus, it is well within a court’s discretion to exercise, or

decline to exercise, supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. United Mine Workers

of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 930 F.2d 986,

994 (9th Cir. 1991). When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a

court should consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Gibbs, 383

U.S. at 726. The balance of factors tips in favor of declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction when federal claims have been dismissed from a lawsuit. Carnegie Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Gini v. Las Vegas

Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994).

A review of the amended complaint in this case shows that plaintiff requests

declaratory relief and alleges two causes of action under California state law: (1)

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cancellation of instruments pursuant to California Civil Code § 3412 and (2) violations

for unfair competition pursuant to California Business and Professional Code § 1700. See

Doc. No. 5.

This Court finds the first and third factors, discussed supra, tip the scales in favor

of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law

claims. The third factor has clearly been met since the plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed

his federal claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, leaving only complex

state law claims for resolution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (3); Carnegie Mellon, 484

U.S. at 350; Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Gini, 40 F.3d at 1046. As to the first factor,

plaintiff’s cancellation of instruments and unfair competition claims are predicated on an

alleged invalid assignment of a deed of trust. In this Court’s view, these claims appear to

be complex issues of state law and, as such, further tips the scale in favor of declining

jurisdiction.2

 Therefore, this Court finds the factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.3 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This case is sua sponte remanded back to state court for all further

proceedings and the Clerk shall close the file.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED as moot.

Dated: April 25, 2014 

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge 

2

 This Court finds the second and fourth factors are not applicable here.

3 On September 5, 2013, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint. Because this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

state law claims, this Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss as moot.

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