Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01097/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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(Rev. 8/82)

Because the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and 1

that the ALJ applied the correct standard of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant’s brief

without quotation or citation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

PAMELA JACKSON o/b/o

DECARIUS JACKSON PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 05-1097

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration, DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s

denial of her request for child’s Supplemental Security Income

pursuant to Section 1614(a)(3)(C) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., as amended and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 401

et seq. Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies,

and therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review

is appropriate. After reviewing the record, the Court AFFIRMS

the decision of the Commissioner.1

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI on

Decarius’ behalf on April 30, 2003 (Tr. 59-63). Plaintiff

alleged that Decarius had been disabled since birth (July 18,

1991) due to mental retardation and a speech/language impairment

(Tr. 101). The ALJ, in a written decision dated August 16,

2005, found that Decarius was not disabled and ineligible for

SSI payments. (Tr. 12-19).

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I. Background

The complete facts and arguments are presented in the

parties’ briefs, and will be duplicated only to the extent

necessary. Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

decision within the administrative record sets forth his

findings and it will not be repeated except to the extent

necessary to address Plaintiff’s arguments.

II. Standard of Review

We review the Commissioner's denial of a child's SSI

disability benefits by considering whether the decision is

supported by substantial evidence. See Briggs v. Callahan, 139

F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 1998); Young ex rel Trice v. Shalala, 52 F.3d

200 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence exists when a

reasonable mind would conclude that the evidence is adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision, "consider[ing] evidence

that detracts from the Commissioner's decision, as well as

evidence that supports it." Briggs, 139 F.3d at 608.

A child is considered disabled if he has a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in

marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve

months. See 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). There is a three step

process for making the disability determination. First, the ALJ

must determine whether the child has engaged in substantial

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gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. 416.924(b). Second, the ALJ

must determine whether the child has a severe impairment or

combination of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 416.924(c). Third,

the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment(s) meet(s),

medically equal(s), or functionally equal(s) a listed

impairment. See 20 C.F.R. 416.924(d). In the present case, the

ALJ found that Decarius’ claim failed at step three, as Decarius

did not have an impairment that met or medically or functionally

equaled a listed impairment. We believe substantial evidence

supports this finding. 

Plaintiff contends that Decarius' impairments meet or

medically equal the requirements of Listing 112.05 Mental

Retardation (D). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,

Section 112.05(D). This Listing is met if the child has a

valid, verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70

and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional

and significant limitation of function. Id. The ALJ found that

the record indicated Decarius had scores in the 60 to 70 range

in December 2000 (Tr. 15 & 146) but noted that in June 2003,

Decarius obtained a performance IQ of 82, a verbal IQ of 70 and

a full scale IQ of 74. (Tr. 15 & 185). Defendant admits that

Decarius' IQ scores are within the range of the listing, but

contends the ALJ was justified in concluding that Decarius did

not meet the listing as he did not have "a physical or other

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mental impairment imposing an additional and significant

limitation of function." (Doc. 10, p. 6). The ALJ noted that

the June 2003 scores indicated that Decarius "functioned in the

borderline range of intelligence" and that Decarius

"participates in school activities and after school activities,

which indicate [Decarius] is functioning much higher than in the

mental retardation range." (Tr. 15). This is consistent with

the findings of Kenneth Robinson, the Licensed Psychological

Examiner who examined Decarius in June 2003 finding that

Decarius' adaptive functioning was not consistent with a

diagnosis of Mental Retardation. (Tr. 186). Accordingly, we

agree that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination

that Decarius' impairments do not meet or medically equal a

listed impairment. 

We next address whether Decarius’ impairments are

functionally equal to any listed impairment. 20 C.F.R.

416.926a(a). Functional equivalence may be established by

demonstrating marked limitations in two, or extreme limitations

in one of the following areas: acquiring and using information;

attending and completing tasks; interacting and relating with

others; moving about and manipulating objects; caring for

yourself; and health and physical well-being. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(b)(1). Plaintiff contends Decarius has marked

limitations in acquiring and using information; attending and

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completing tasks; and interacting and relating with others.

(Doc. 9). A “marked” limitation in a domain exists when an

impairment interferes seriously with the ability to

independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. See 20

C.F.R. 416.926a(e)(2). “Marked” limitation also means a

limitation that is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme.”

Id. It is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to

find on standardized testing with scores that are at least two,

but less than three, standard deviations below the mean. Id. 

The ALJ found that Decarius has less than “marked”

limitations in acquiring and using information and attending and

completing tasks. (Tr. 16-17). While Decarius receives

modifications in the classroom, the evidence supports the ALJ’s

finding that Decarius is in the borderline range of

intelligence, but he is not mentally retarded. The ALJ observed

Decarius at the hearing and found that Decarius understood the

ALJ’s questions and responded age appropriately. Id. Further,

in December 2003, Kenneth Robinson found that Decarius could

“follow simple instructions” and was able to “understand [and]

retain instructions to perform simple, repetitive tasks.” (Tr.

186). Mary Ellen Lowe, Decarius’ Special Education Instructor,

notes that Decarius had difficulty concentrating and staying on

task. (Tr. 67-68, 136). However, during his evaluation on June

18, 2003, Kenneth Robinson personally observed that “Decarius

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could focus and stay on task.” (Tr. 186).

The ALJ found Decarius has no limitations in interacting

and relating with others. The evidence indicates that Decarius

has had problems in the past with fighting and peer pressure.

However, we do not find from the record evidence that would

support a finding of “marked” limitation in this domain. The

ALJ observed Decarius at the hearing and found him to be polite,

articulate and responsive to his questions. (Tr. 17). On

September 18, 2003, Ms. Lowe indicated that “Decarius does not

have a social behavior deficiency.” (Tr. 67). Mr. Robinson

found that Decarius could communicate effectively and “conducted

himself appropriately and related to the examiner in a

satisfactory manner.” (Tr. 185-86). 

We believe the forgoing evidence supports the ALJ's

conclusion that Decarius does not suffer marked limitations in

two, or extreme limitations in one of the relevant areas. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is

supported by the substantial evidence of the record as a whole

and is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: January 17, 2007

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

HONORABLE ROBERT T. DAWSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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