Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00285/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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 Defendant spends a large portion of his reply brief arguing the need for an evidentiary 1

hearing to resolve factual disputes raised by “competing affidavits.” The only affidavits offered

in connection with this motion are on behalf of the government. Defendant has not offered any

affidavits, from himself or others, in support of his § 2255 motion.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEVIN PATTERSON,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

CIV. NO. S-05–0285 EJG 

CR. NO. S-99-0551 EJG

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT

SENTENCE

Defendant, a federal prisoner appearing through counsel, has

filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After reviewing the record and the

documents filed in connection with the motion, the court has

determined that this matter may be decided without an evidentiary

hearing because the files and the records of the case

affirmatively show the factual and legal invalidity of

defendant’s arguments. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156,

1158-59 (9 Cir. 1989). For the reasons that follow, the motion th 1

is DENIED.

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 The conviction followed a second trial. An initial trial resulted in a hung jury on the 2

conspiracy counts and the subsequent declaration of a mistrial by the court.

2

BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of one

count of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, one

count of conspiracy to use a destructive device, one count of

possession of a destructive device and one count of conspiracy to

violate federal firearms laws. He was sentenced September 9, 2

2002 to 293 months imprisonment and a five year term of

supervised release. His sentence and convictions were affirmed

on appeal. United States v. Kiles & Patterson, 81 Fed. Appx. 244

(9 Cir. 2003). th

Defendant filed the instant motion on February 14, 2005

raising thirteen claims. The court issued an order establishing

a briefing schedule. The government timely filed its response

April 22, 2005. Defendant, though notified by the court on

several occasions, failed to file a reply. Meanwhile, the court

discovered that the government’s opposition responded to only

four of defendant’s 13 claims. Therefore, an order was issued

directing the government to file a supplemental brief. In

response to this brief, defendant filed a reply in September of

2006. A status conference was scheduled, and subsequently rescheduled, to address two issues raised by the parties’ briefs. 

First, in its opposition, the government referred to defendant’s

103 page memorandum of points and authorities in support of his

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 The reply brief lambasts trial counsel, Mr. Samuel, for failing to file a notice of appeal 3

and divesting defendant of his appeal rights. Defendant argues that the remainder of the § 2255

motion should be held in abeyance while defendant’s appellate rights are reinstated and pursued. 

Obviously, defendant is mistaken. Not only was an appeal filed, but it was litigated and resolved

against defendant. Moreover, the appeal and the fact that it was denied are facts mentioned by

current counsel, Mr. Sterwerf, in the initial § 2255 motion! 

 Defendant’s brief filed in support of and many months after the initial motion also 4

addresses thirteen claims. However, they are not in the same order as they were in the initial

motion and, in many instances, they are not the same claims.

3

motion, a document the court had not received. Second,

defendant’s reply argued, erroneously, that defendant had been

denied his appellate rights. As a result of the status 3

conference, the court was provided with a copy of the defendant’s

103 page memorandum of points and authorities with accompanying

exhibits, and the matter was ordered submitted on December 8,

2006. The court is now prepared to rule and will address the

claims in the order in which they were presented in the opening

motion. 

4

 DISCUSSION

Defendant’s first claim alleges his conviction was the

result of an unconstitutional search and seizure, in violation of

the fourth amendment. Specifically, defendant attacks the

application for authorization of wiretap surveillance, and, in

addition, contends that search warrants emanating from the

wiretap and evidence obtained therefrom, are fruits of the

poisonous tree. 

This claim, as well as a majority of those raised in this

motion, are procedurally barred. In other words, defendant is

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 The second, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, and thirteenth claims are 5

procedurally barred for the same reasons.

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precluded from asserting claims on collateral review which he

failed to raise on direct appeal, absent an explanation for his

failure to do so. “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted

a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be

raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate

either “cause” and actual “prejudice” [citations omitted] or that

he is “actually innocent. . . .” Bousley v. United States, 118

S.Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998) (emphasis added). Defendant has offered

no evidence of cause and prejudice for failure to raise this

claim on appeal, nor has he demonstrated actual innocence of the

crimes charged.5

In addition to the procedural defect, the first claim also

fails on the merits. A motion to suppress the results of the

wiretap was made and denied by the district court after a hearing

on January 22, 2001. That motion challenged the wiretap

application and affidavit on the grounds that they did not

contain the requisite specificity and necessity required by 18

U.S.C. § 2518, the federal wiretap statute. In the instant

motion defendant raises the same arguments, couched in different

terms. 

For example, defendant argues that ‘absence of a criminal

history’, an ‘inability to maintain surveillance’, and a ‘lack of

useful information in defendant’s garbage’, among other things,

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form the basis for the government’s probable cause for issuance

of the wiretap application. Then he criticizes the government

for reciting these items in its application, “Not one of the

asserted basis [sic] for the government’s suspicions enumerated

in the declaration for the wiretap arose even close to a level of

probable cause to justify a wiretap on [defendant’s] phone.” 

Defendant’s Opening Brief, 46:20-23 (docket entry 298). 

However, as the court noted in its denial of the motion to

suppress, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)( c) requires the government to

state, and § 2518(3)( c) requires the court to find that “normal

investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or

reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried. . . .” 18

U.S.C. § 2518(3)( c). Recitation of these attempted

investigative techniques in the wiretap application was a prerequisite for the issuance of the wiretap, not a verbatim listing

of probable cause. See Transcript of ruling on motion (docket

entry 74). The first claim is DENIED.

The second claim alleges the government failed to turn over

exculpatory evidence in the form of a complete copy of a

surveillance tape, as well as 17,000 pages of written discovery. 

Defendant alleges the withheld evidence contains a conversation

in which he withdraws from the conspiracy, disavowing any

interest in blowing up the propane tanks. This claim, like the

first one and for the same reasons, is procedurally barred. No

evidence of “cause and prejudice” or “actual innocence” has been

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 The exhibits defendant proffers in support of this claim consist of a copy of the wiretap 6

application affidavit and a letter from the FBI in response to a 2003 freedom of information

request. Neither document provide any support for defendant’s assertions.

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presented. Moreover, no facts have been offered to support the

claim itself, which fails on the merits for lack of evidentiary

support. 

6

The third, fourth and eighth claims allege ineffective

assistance of counsel and will be analyzed together. To prevail

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that

but for the deficiencies, the outcome would have been different. 

See generally, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

2052 (1984). Defense counsel is presumed to have acted

reasonably and to have provided constitutionally adequate

assistance. Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Moreover, second guessing of

counsel’s tactical decisions after conviction cannot form a basis

for a claim of ineffective assistance. See Strickland, 104 S.Ct.

2065 (counsel’s performance must be evaluated without the

“distorting effects of hindsight”). 

In the first part of the third claim defendant suggests that

witnesses whose names he has recently discovered would have

discredited the testimony of co-defendant Donald Rudolph. 

However, defendant supplies neither the names of the persons nor

the substance of their anticipated testimony. These conclusory

and unsupported statements are insufficient to show that

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 The government does not respond to this portion of the third claim, suggesting that it 7

was not raised until the reply brief. While it was not fleshed out until the reply brief, a careful

reading of the original § 2255 motion shows that it was embedded within the last two sentences

of the third claim. Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, p. 5 (last two lines).

7

counsel’s performance was deficient. Moreover, even were the

court to assume the existence of the evidence, defendant has not

shown how discrediting Donald Rudolph would have avoided a

conviction. Rudolph was not the only witness that testified

about defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy. As the Ninth

Circuit noted in its affirmance, “numerous witnesses testified to

either overhearing or participating in conversations in which

Patterson and Kiles discussed a plan to blow up the tanks. . . .” 

United States v. Kiles, 81 Fed. Appx. 241 (9 Cir. 2003) th

(emphasis added). 

In the second part of the third claim defendant alleges that

counsel was ineffective for failing to have defendant

psychiatrically evaluated. The basis for this claim is twofold. 7

First, defendant argues that he was recently diagnosed in prison

with bipolar disorder. Second, defendant argues that he has

suffered from a mental condition since the time of trial. In

support defendant cites a newspaper article written at the time

defendant was to be sentenced, in which his counsel sought a

delay for a psychiatric exam because defendant had “selfdiagnosed himself as possibly having mental problems.”

Defendant’s Exhibit 5, p. 22. 

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Neither defendant’s unsupported statement of a recent

diagnosis of bipolar disorder, nor his self-diagnosis many years

before are evidence of a disease or defect leaving defendant

without the capacity to have formed the intent to join a criminal

conspiracy. The bipolar diagnosis is not supported by a doctor’s

report, nor by any evidence suggesting that such a diagnosis

nullifies criminal intent. Moreover, defendant’s “self-diagnosis

as possibly having mental problems” was not long lasting, since

the request for psychiatric examination made at the time of

sentencing was withdrawn by defendant some two weeks later. 

Docket Entry 216, September 9, 2002. 

The Evans and Smith cases cited by defendant are inapposite. 

In both instances counsel was found deficient for failing to

present evidence of mitigation during the sentencing phase of

death penalty cases. In both cases counsel possessed actual

knowledge of relevant evidence. In Evans the record is replete

with documents showing defendant had a history of mental

problems, including a note from a trial judge that defendant was

in need of psychiatric treatment, incarcerations at two mental

facilities for inmates, and a notation on his rap sheet showing a

suicide attempt. In the face of this evidence, the court found

that counsel’s failure to investigate defendant’s mental

condition as a possible mitigating factor constituted deficient

performance. Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 636-37 (9 Cir. th

1988). In Smith, counsel offered no evidence in mitigation

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despite knowledge of his client’s sociopathic personality and

drug history. Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263 (9 Cir. 1998). th

Unlike Evans and Smith, counsel in the instant case had no actual

knowledge of mental impairment, nor does defendant offer any

evidence to the contrary. Having found no deficient performance,

the third claim is DENIED.

The fourth claim alleges ineffective assistance based on

counsel’s failure to raise the affirmative defenses of entrapment

and withdrawal. No evidence of either defense has been presented

by defendant nor does the court’s independent review of the trial

record show the possibility of either defense. As the government

notes, it is not ineffective to refrain from presenting a defense

for which there is no factual support. This claim is DENIED.

The eighth claim argues counsel was ineffective by failing

to inform defendant of a plea bargain. Specifically, defendant

states that after conviction and sentence, while incarcerated, he

reviewed discovery documents and became aware of a plea offer

made by the government for 36 months. Had he known the facts of

the case, he says, he would not have rejected the offer and gone

to trial, but would have pled guilty. Defendant has not produced 

any evidence to support this claim. 

In response, the government offers the declaration of trial

counsel, Mr. Samuel. Declaration of Dwight Samuel, attached as

Exhibit A to supplemental opposition to defendant’s § 2255

motion, filed August 28, 2006, docket entry 283. Mr. Samuel

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states he does not recall an offer of 36 months; however, an

offer for 10 years (120 months) was made by the government in a

letter. Mr. Samuel states that defendant did not want to hear

offers or engage in conversations about them, rather he

maintained his innocence and was adamant that the case proceed to

trial. “Nevertheless, I did present the government’s offer to

Kevin. We discussed it fully, I pointed out the pros and cons of

the offer, and he rejected it.” Samuel Declaration, ¶ 5:17-19. 

Defendant has neither addressed nor countered Mr. Samuel’s

declaration. Accordingly, this claim fails for lack of

evidentiary support and is DENIED.

The fifth claim alleges a lack of evidence of a conspiracy. 

This claim has already been considered and rejected by the Ninth

Circuit which specifically rejected a claim of insufficiency of

the evidence. 

 Patterson contends there was insufficient evidence to

support the conspiracy convictions. . . . Drawing all

inferences in favor of the prosecution, including those

pertaining to the credibility of witnesses [citation

omitted] there was sufficient evidence to sustain the

convictions. Numerous witnesses testified to either

overhearing or participating in conversations in which

Patterson and Kiles discussed a plan to blow up the tanks,

including discussions about the type of charge needed to

rupture the tank and the need for a second device to ignite

the leaking gas. Moreover, bomb-making materials were found

at Patterson’s home, including detonators and what he

himself described as ‘Timothy McVeigh quality’ ammonium

nitrate. The jury could have reasonably inferred that these

materials were intended to be used in the plot. 

United States v. Kiles, 81 Fed. Appx. 244, 245 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Defendant may not relitigate issues decided adversely to him

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absent changed circumstances of law or fact, neither of which are

present here. See United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th

Cir. 1985) (federal habeas may not be used to relitigate issues

already decided on direct appeal). This claim is DENIED.

In the sixth claim, defendant contends he was entrapped. 

Again, as with a majority of his claims, defendant has

procedurally defaulted and is therefore precluded from raising

this claim on collateral attack absent circumstances which are

not present here, namely cause and prejudice, or actual

innocence. Moreover, even if the court were to reach the merits,

the claim would be denied as contrary to the evidence at trial. 

Defendant argues he was not predisposed to commit the crimes

of which he was convicted and that he “steadfastly refused the

government’s solicitations” to participate in the conspiracy. 

Despite defendant’s unsupported protestations to the contrary,

this is not a case in which the government “originate[d] a

criminal design, implant[ed] in an innocent person’s mind the

disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induc[ed]

commission of the crime so the Government could prosecute.” 

Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1993). Whatever

defendant’s belief now, it does not correspond with the evidence

adduced at trial. It was the testimony of both Donald Rudolph

and Dana Norman that the idea for blowing up the tanks originated

with defendant in the fall of 1996 and that he continued to raise 

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and discuss the matter with other members of the San Joaquin

County Militia. This Claim is DENIED.

Defendant’s seventh claim alleges the defense of

impossibility on the grounds that the conspiracy had as a member

a government agent who had no intent to carry it out. Again,

this claim is procedurally defaulted, defendant having failed to

raise it on direct review. Moreover, the claim is also legally

and factually without merit. While it is true that one of the

co-conspirators was working at the behest of the government, the

law of conspiracy does not prevent the government from using

informants and undercover law enforcement officers unless that

person is the only other conspirator. “An individual must

conspire with at least one bona fide co-conspirator to meet the

formal requirements of a conspiracy.” United States v. Schmidt,

947 F.2d 362, 267 (9 Cir. 1991). Here, the conspiracy changed th

in size several times during its three year life. From the

outset, however, there were always at least two conspirators, the

defendant and his co-defendant Kiles, exclusive of the informant. 

Further, the government informant did not begin to act in that

capacity until two years after the formation of the conspiracy. 

This claim is DENIED.

The ninth claim alleges prosecutorial misconduct in the form

of “purchased” testimony. Specifically, defendant argues that

the government bought the testimony of co-defendant Donald

Rudolph in exchange for a lenient sentence. This claim, like the

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others, has been procedurally defaulted. Moreover, it fails on

the merits. Without citing any examples and without offering any

contradictory testimony, defendant baldly asserts that defendant

Donald Rudolph committed perjury and that it was done at the

request and with the permission of the United States government.

This claim, like all of its predecessors, fails for lack of

evidentiary support and is DENIED.

The tenth claim is a variation of the sixth and ninth claims

and alleges defendant’s conviction was the result of a coconspirator’s uncorroborated testimony, in violation of due

process. Like the sixth and ninth claims, the tenth is both

procedurally barred and bereft of any evidentiary support. 

Accordingly, it is DENIED.

In the eleventh claim defendant maintains that the crimes of

which he was convicted require certification by the Attorney

General prior to prosecution. He has provided no citation of

authority in support of this claim, nor has the court in its

review of the statutes discovered any certification requirement. 

This claim is DENIED.

The twelfth claim alleges defendant’s sentence violates

retroactivity rules and guidelines. Specifically, defendant

argues that his sentence was enhanced by factual findings made by

the court using a preponderance standard instead of by the jury

using a reasonable doubt standard. While the legal landscape of

guideline sentencing has evolved during the period following

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defendant’s conviction and sentence, he has not demonstrated that

he is an intended beneficiary of any of the changes. 

Despite the lengths to which he goes in fourteen pages to

argue for the retroactive application of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), his arguments have been considered and

rejected by the Ninth Circuit. In 2002 the Ninth Circuit stated

that Apprendi does not apply retroactively on collateral review. 

See United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9 Cir. th

2002). That ruling has not been superseded by the Supreme Court. 

See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1245-46 (9 Cir. th

2005). Accordingly, this claim is DENIED.

The thirteenth claim alleges that the government tainted the

testimony of witnesses by showing them photographs of defendant

prior to their testimony. Defendant asserts that “[t]he officer

showed the witnesses pictures of [defendant], after they stated

that they did not remember the parties they were being questioned

about.” Defendant’s Opening Brief, 61:5-8. Defendant argues

that this method of individual identification was “so

unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken

identification” as to deny defendant due process. See Stovall v.

Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Griffith

v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 

This claim, like the others, is both procedurally barred and

fails for lack of evidentiary support. Not only does defendant

fail to provide any facts in support of this claim, the sole name

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 Sergeant Stanley Farris is mentioned in a paragraph of the Affidavit of Special Agent 8

Michael LeMieux in support of the application for wiretap. The paragraph contains no

information that Farris was shown photographs of defendant as a means of identification. Nor

has defendant presented any such information. 

15

he does includes as someone whose testimony was tainted, Officer

[sic] Farris, was not called as a witness at trial, nor is there

any mention of him being shown a photograph of defendant. This 8

claim is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to vacate, set

aside or correct sentence is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to close companion civil case CV. S-05-0285 EJG.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2007

/s/ Edward J. Garcia 

EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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