Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_06-cv-00110/USCOURTS-ared-5_06-cv-00110-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

TERRICK TERRELL NOONER, PLAINTIFF

and 

DON WILLIAMS DAVIS INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF

 and

JACK HAROLD, JONES, JR. INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF

No. 5:06CV00110 SWW

VS. 

LARRY NORRIS, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction;

GAYLON LAY, Warden, 

Arkansas Department of Correction;

WENDY KELLY, Deputy Director for 

Health and Correctional Programs;

JOHN BYUS; Administrator, Correctional

Medical Services, Arkansas Department of Correction; and

OTHER UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES, 

Arkansas Department of Correction DEFENDANTS

 

ORDER

Before the Court are (1) Plaintiff Terrick Terrell Nooner’s motion for a preliminary

injunction or stay of execution (docket entry #87), Defendants’ response in opposition (docket

entry #90), and Nooner’s reply (docket entry #91) and (2) Plaintiff Jack Harold Jones’s motion

for a preliminary injunction or stay of execution. After careful consideration, and for reasons

that follow, Plaintiffs’ motions will be denied.

I. Background

This § 1983 action was originally filed on May 1, 2006 by Arkansas death row inmate

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The challenged protocol calls for the serial administration of thiopental, pancuronium

bromide, and potassium chloride. The crux of Nooner’s claim is that unless thiopental is

correctly administered, he will suffer excruciating pain upon administration of potassium

chloride, and he will be unable to demonstrate his suffering because of the paralyzing effect of

pancuronium bromide. 

2

The Court has acknowledged that it neglected to enter a scheduling order in this case. 

See docket entry #88 at 5. However, lack of a scheduling order did not prevent counsel from

conferring and developing a discovery plan as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(f); nor did it prevent Nooner from requesting that the Court enter a scheduling order. See

Nickens v. White, 622 F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1980)(“We think that this requirement for diligent

2

Terrick Terrell Nooner (“Nooner”) against Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”)

officials in their official capacities. In the complaint, Nooner claims that the ADC’s lethal

injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment because it presents an unnecessary risk of

extreme pain and because use of the protocol demonstrates deliberate indifference to condemned

inmates’ health and safety.1 

 The following events have occurred since Nooner filed suit. On May 4, 2006, death row

inmate Don William Davis (“Davis”) filed a motion to intervene as a party plaintiff. On May 11,

2006, Governor Mike Huckabee scheduled Davis’s execution for July 5, 2006, and on May 26,

2006, the Court granted Davis’s motion to intervene. On June 26, 2006, the Court granted

Davis’s motion for a stay of execution in order to permit him to litigate his challenge to the lethal

injection protocol.

On June 30, 2006, Defendants appealed the order granting Davis a stay of execution. On

November 22, 2006, while the appeal was pending, death row inmate Jack Harold Jones filed a

motion to intervene as a party plaintiff, and the Court granted his motion on December 1, 2006. 

During the pendency of Defendants’ appeal, a period of 12 months, Nooner made no discovery

requests and took no steps toward prosecuting his claims.2

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discovery applies with the same force in lawsuits brought by prisoners once counsel has

appeared, as in other lawsuits.)

3

Defendants submit a copy of the amended protocol as an exhibit to Norris’s declaration. 

Docket entry #75, Ex. #1, attachment. 

3

On July 9, 2007, the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion vacating Davis’s stay of execution

on the ground that this Court applied the wrong standard in determining whether Davis had

unnecessarily delayed bringing his claim. See Nooner v. Norris, 491 F.3d 804 (8th Cir. 2007). 

On July 11, 2007, Plaintiff Nooner filed a motion for expedited discovery, and on July

12, 2007, he served Defendants with discovery requests. 

On July 17, 2007, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of their

motion, Defendants submitted the declaration of Larry Norris, Director of the Arkansas

Department of Correction (“ADC”), stating that the ADC amended its lethal injection protocol

on July 16, 2007. Defendants assert that the amended protocol3

 is substantively similar in all

material respects to the Missouri protocol upheld in Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir.

2007); they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and no discovery is warranted or

necessary. On July 30, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to summary judgment. 

Additionally, Nooner’s counsel Julie Brain filed an affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(f). 

On July 31, 2007, Governor Beebe scheduled Nooner’s execution for September 18,

2007, and on August 8, 2007, Nooner filed a motion for a stay of execution. 

On August 9, 2007, the Court entered an order denying Nooner’s motion for expedited

discovery. Additionally, the Court consolidated with this case a separate case filed by Arkansas

death row inmate Frank Williams challenging Arkansas’s lethal injection protocol. 

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4

See docket entry #21, Ex. 1 (ADC Administrative Directive 96-06 dated May 23, 1996,

Attachment C–Lethal Injection Procedure).

4

On August 21, 2007, Governor Mike Beebe set an October 16, 2007 execution date for

Jones. On August 22, 2007, Defendants responded in opposition to Nooner’s motion for a stay

of execution, and Nooner filed a reply on August 27, 2007. On September 4, 2007, Jones filed a

motion for a stay of execution. The time for a response to Jones’s motion has not expired, and

Defendants have not filed a response.

II. Arkansas’s Lethal Injection Protocol

Since 1983, Arkansas’s lethal injection statute has provided that the “punishment of

death is to be administered by a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until the defendant's

death is pronounced according to accepted standards of medical practice.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-

4-617(a)(1). Arkansas law gives Director Norris the responsibility to determine the substances

to be administered and the procedures to be used in any execution. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-

617(a)(2). 

When Nooner initiated this lawsuit, Arkansas’s lethal-injection protocol called for

administering three chemicals, each followed by a saline flush, through an intravenous line

(“IV”) in the following amounts and order: (1) 2-grams of Sodium Pentothal (also known as

thiopental), administered to cause unconsciousness; (2) 2, 50-milligram injections of

pancuronium bromide, administered to cause paralysis; and (3) up to 3, 50-milliequivalent

injections of potassium chloride, administered to stop the heart.4

 Injections are administered by

way of control devices located in a control room, separate from the execution chamber. The

control devices are connected, by extension tubing, to IV catheters inserted into each arm of the

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condemned inmate. The catheters are inserted by an IV team, and the injections are administered

by executioners, whose identities are kept secret. The original protocol, as written, contained no

provision requiring that the IV team or other personnel involved in the execution process have

any type of medical training or certification.

On July 16, 2007, Norris amended the written protocol. By declaration, Norris testifies

as follows:

On or about June 26, 2007, and July 12, 2007, I consulted with Mark Dershwitz,

M.D., Ph.D. to determine what changes, if any, to Arkansas’s lethal injection

protocol would further reduce what I considered to be the already minimal possibility

that a condemned inmate would experience unnecessary pain during an execution in

the future. Based on those consultations with Dr. Dershwitz, my own previous

observations of lethal injection executions, and discussions that I have had over the

years with other correctional professionals concerning lethal injection executions,

I amended the ADC’s lethal injection protocol on July 16, 2007.

Docket entry #74, Ex. #1 

The amended protocol, like the original, makes the ADC Deputy Director for Health and 

Correctional Programs (“Deputy Director”) or her designee responsible for carrying out or

supervising many of the activities included in the execution procedure. The protocol states:

“Unless otherwise stated, the Deputy Director, or the designee, shall be healthcare trained,

educated, and/or experienced in matters related to the establishment and monitoring of IVs, the

mixing and administration of lethal chemicals, and assessing the presence or absence of

consciousness.” Docket entry #74, Ex. #2 (Lethal Injection Procedure, Section I.1.). 

The amended protocol provides that the Deputy Director or her designee “shall verify as

to type and concentration, and thereafter supervise the mixing or reconstituting of the [lethalinjection] chemicals in such a manner as will meet lethal injection requirements [set forth in

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Section IV].” Id. The mixed chemicals are transferred to appropriate syringes, which are

placed in lethal injection drug box, which is “secured.” The protocol provides that the Deputy

Director or her designee “shall maintain personal, physical custody of the lethal injection drug

box and physically convey the box to the Cummins Unit for secure storage in the institutional

vault until such time as it is delivered to the execution chamber for use.” Id. (Section I.3.)

The protocol, in Section IV., identifies the contents of the lethal injection drug box and

the administration sequence and chemical makeup of each lethal chemical used as follows:

SYRINGE

LABELED/

MARKED CONTENTS

#1/#2 Sodium Pentothal, 3.0 grams (two (2) syringes of 1.5 grams

in 60 cc)

#3/#6 Normal Saline, 50 cc each

#4/#5 Pancuronium Bromide, 100 mg (two (2) syringes of 50 mg

in 50 cc)

#7/#8 Potassium Chloride, 240 mEq (two (2) syringes of 120

mEq in 60 cc)

Back up syringes:

#B1/B2 Sodium Pentothal, 3.0 grams (two (2) syringes of 1.5 grams

in 60 cc)

#B3 Normal Saline, 50 cc

Pursuant to the protocol, on the eve of execution, the executioners enter the injection

room and inventory the lethal injection drug box to ensure that all lethal chemicals are accounted

for. The protocol provides that “if needed,” prior to the day of execution, the Deputy Director or

her designee will orient the executioners to the ADC’s lethal injection procedure. See id.

(Section I.4.). 

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Before the IV team initiates IV lines, the Deputy Director or her designee affixes cardiac

monitor leads to the condemned inmate at standard 3-lead positions. Additionally, the execution

gurney is positioned in the death chamber in a manner that allows the Deputy Director or her

designee and the executioners to directly observe the condemned inmate’s face and IV infusion

sites.

Section II. of the amended protocol covers the IV set-up procedure and provides that the 

Deputy Director or her designee shall have the IV team place a catheter in each arm of the

condemned inmate or “other standard anatomical venous point of entry.” The protocol requires

that the IV team “be healthcare providers who are qualified by training or credentials such as an

emergency medical technician, nurse, or physician to initiate IV lines.” Id. (Section II.1.).

After the insertion of peripheral catheters, an IV administration set is inserted into the

outlet of a bag of D5NS (dextrose 5 percent normal saline) solution. Two set-ups are prepared in

this manner. Next, tubing is connected to the receiving port of two, three-way control devices. 

The tubing is then connected to discharge ports on the control devices and to the IV insertion

sites. The tubing is then cleared of air and made ready for use. 

Next, infusion of the D5NS solution begins at a slow rate. The amended protocol

requires that the Deputy Director or her designee “shall ensure that the cardiac monitor is ‘on’

and functioning [and shall] properly and maintain observation of IV infusion(s) to ensure that the

rate of flow is uninterrupted.” Id. (Section II.7.) The amended protocol mandates that after the

IV set up is complete, “NO FURTHER ACTION shall be taken until the prearranged signal to

start the injection of lethal chemicals is given by the Warden.” Id. 

In the event that a patent IV site cannot be established, the amended protocol requires the

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following action:

The IV Team shall be directed by the Deputy Director, or designee, to evaluate other

possible infusion sites. All effort will be made to establish two (2) unrelated

intravenous infusion sites. If one (1) patent infusion site is established, and a second

site proves to be a futile effort, the Deputy Director, or designee, may direct the IV

Team to suspend further action. In the case that no patent infusion site is established

after reasonable attempts as determined by the IV Team, the Deputy Director, or

designee will direct the IV Team to suspend further action and thereafter summon

trained, educated, and experienced person(s) necessary to establish a 

primary IV line as a peripheral line or as a central venous line.

Id. (Section II.8.)

The amended protocol contains the following language: 

EVERY EFFORT WILL BE EXTENDED TO THE CONDEMNED INMATE TO

ENSURE THAT NO UNNECESSARY PAIN OR SUFFERING IS INFLICTED BY

THE IV PROCEDURE. STANDARD PRACTICE OF USING A LOCAL

ANESTHETIC WILL BE ACCOMMODATED AS NECESSARY.

Section III. of the protocol covers the injection procedure and provides that 3-way

control devices facilitate the movement of fluid from the IV solution bag and allow introduction

of lethal chemical. A valve directs which fluid source enters the IV set up. 

Under the amended procedure, when the signal to commence is given by the Warden, the

executioners administer the lethal chemicals under the direction of the Deputy Director or her

designee as follows: 

a. Syringe #1 (containing Sodium Pentothal) shall be inserted into the

designated receiving port of the three-way control device.

b. The flow of IV solution will be interrupted by moving the three-way valve

assembly towards the IV solution receiving port.

c. The contents of Syringe #1 shall commence with a steady even flow of the

lethal chemical. Only a minimum amount of force will be applied to the syringe

plunger.

d. When the contents of Syringe #1 have been injected, the three-way valve

assembly will be moved so as to shut off the infusion of lethal chemical and

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resume infusion of IV solution.

e. Syringe #1 will be replaced by Syringe #2 and the procedure described in

subparagraphs a-d for Syringe #1 will be repeated. This process will be

repeated for all subsequent syringes.

Following the administration of the first three syringes (2 injections of 1.5 grams of

Sodium Pentothal, followed by a saline flush) the Deputy Director or her designee, “will assess

and monitor the condemned inmate’s lack of consciousness by using standard procedures as

taught in basic life support or CPR courses, such as checking for movement, opened eyes,

eyelash reflex, and response to verbal commands and physical stimuli.” Id. (Section III.f.). 

Once the Deputy Director or her designee determines that the condemned inmate is

unconscious, and at least three minutes have elapsed from starting Syringe #1, all remaining

chemicals will be administered to the unconscious inmate in numerical sequence; Syringe #4

through Syringe #8.

The protocol provides that if the Deputy Director determines that the condemned inmate

remains conscious following the administration of Syringe #3, the back-up syringes of Sodium

Pentothal and a repeat normal saline wash shall be administered into the secondary or alternative

IV line. Id. Thereafter, once the Deputy Director or her designee determines that the

condemned inmate is unconscious, and at least three minutes have elapsed from starting Syringe

#B1, all remaining chemicals will be administered to the unconscious inmate in numerical

sequence into the secondary or alternative IV line; Syringe #4 through Syringe #8. Id.

The protocol requires that a cardiac monitor be used to display heart function. Id.(Section

III.h.). When all lethal chemical syringes have been administered, and a flat-line is observed for

a minimum of three to five, three-second sweeps on the cardiac monitor, the Coroner shall be

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summoned for purpose of pronouncing death. Id. 

Throughout the infusion process, the Deputy Director or her designee “will closely

monitor the infusion site for evidence of infiltrate, vein collapse, or other challenge to the

patency of the infusion site.” Id. (Section III.i.). If a problem is suspected, the Deputy Director

or her designee will “direct reduction of lethal chemical flow rate or redirect chemical to

secondary site.” Id. (Section III.i.1.). The protocol requires the following actions when a single

IV site is suspected to be compromised: First, the chemical flow rate will be reduced. If

problem persists, the administration procedure will be ceased; the curtain to death chamber will

be closed; the IV Team will be summoned, and infusion site problem corrected. Id. (Section

III.i.2.).

If all efforts to re-establish a patent IV site fail, the Deputy Director or her designee will

direct the IV team to suspend further action and a “trained, educated, and experienced person [or

persons]” necessary to establish a primary IV line as a peripheral line or as a central venous line

will be summoned to facilitate an IV infusion site. When the infusion compromise is corrected,

the IV team and the summoned person(s) will be excused, the curtain reopened, and the lethal

injection procedure continued.

III. Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs claim that the amended protocol subjects them to a constitutionally significant

risk that they will suffer excruciating pain upon administration of potassium chloride, and they

will be unable to demonstrate their suffering because of the paralyzing effect of pancuronium

bromide. It is undisputed that a condemned inmate would experience severe pain if potassium

chloride were administered without adequate anesthetization. 

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Plaintiffs’ medical expert, Mark J. S. Heath, an anesthesiologist, acknowledges that two

grams of sodium thiopental (1 gram less than the dose mandated by the ADC’s protocol) if

properly administered into the bloodstream, “would be more than sufficient to cause

unconsciousness and, eventually, death, if no resuscitation efforts were made . . . .” Docket

entry #21, Ex. #7, ¶ 26. However, Dr. Health states that his research “strongly indicates that

executions have occurred where the full dose of sodium thiopental listed in the protocol was not

fully and properly administered.” Id. Dr. Heath states: “If an inmate does not receive the full

dose of sodium thiopental because of errors or problems in administering the drug, the inmate

might not be rendered unconscious and unable to feel pain, or alternatively might, because of the

short-acting nature of sodium thiopental, regain consciousness during the execution.” Id. 

IV. Nooner’s Motion for a Stay of Execution

Nooner is not entitled to a stay of execution as a matter of course. He bears the burden to 

satisfy all the requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant possibility of success

on the merits. See Hill v. McDonough,126 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (2006). The factors to consider

when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a preliminary injunction include: (1) the

threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between the movant’s harm

and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties involved in the litigation;

(3) the probability the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. See

Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). Additionally, a court

considering a stay of execution must apply “‘a strong equitable presumption against the grant of

a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the

merits without requiring an entry of a stay.’” Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. at 2104(quoting

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12

Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2004)). 

Threat of Irreparable Harm 

The threatened harm alleged by Nooner--that he will be inadequately anesthetized and

thus suffer intense pain during the lethal injection procedure--if realized, would be irreparable. 

However, as explained below, it is unlikely that Nooner can show that the ADC’s protocol, as

written, presents an inherent substantial risk that he will suffer constitutionally significant pain. 

Balance of Potential Harms and Public Interest

Arkansas has a significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion.

See Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2123 (2004)(citations omitted). “Only with an

assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a case. Only with real

finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment will be carried out.” 

Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1501 (1998)(citing Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597

(1991)). To disrupt the expectation of finality by issuing a stay of execution at this point, without

the showing of a significant possibility that Nooner will succeed on the merits, would impose

severe injury to the “powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty, an interest shared

by the State and the victims of crime alike.” Calderon v. Thompson, 18 S.Ct. at 1501(quoting

Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853, 871(1993)(O'Connor, J., concurring)). The Court finds that

the balance of harms and the public interest weigh against a stay of execution.

Probability of Success on the Merits

In Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth Circuit upheld

Missouri’s lethal injection protocol and gave clear instruction regarding the correct standard for

evaluating an Eighth Amendment challenge to a lethal injection protocol. The Court emphasized

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5

Dr. Dershwitz states that pharmacokinetics is a branch of pharmacology involving the

time course of a drug, while pharmacodynamics refers to the effects of a drug. Docket entry #74,

Ex. #3, ¶2.

13

that the proper focus is not the risk of accident, but “whether the written protocol inherently

imposes a constitutionally significant risk of pain.” Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1080. The Court stated: 

“If [a] protocol as written involves no inherent substantial risk of the wanton infliction of pain,

any risk that the procedure will not work as designated in the protocol is merely a risk of

accident, which is insignificant in our constitutional analysis.” Id. (citing Louisiana ex rel.

Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947)). 

Missouri’s protocol, as described in Taylor, uses the same three-chemical sequence as the

ADC’s protocol, but Missouri requires a 5-gram dose of thiopental. Although the ADC’s

protocol calls for only 3 grams of thiopental, Dr. Heath has acknowledged that 2 grams of the

chemical, if properly administered, would be more than sufficient to cause unconsciousness. 

Defendants submit the declaration of Dr. Mark Dershwitz, an anesthesiologist with a

Ph.D. in pharmacology. Docket entry #74, Ex. #3. In a case challenging Virginia’s lethal

injection protocol, Dr. Heath “conceded that with respect to the pharmacokinetics and

pharmacodynamics5

 of sodium thiopental, he defers to Dr. Dershwitz's expertise.” Reid v.

Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 (E.D. Va., 2004). Dr. Dershwitz states that he has conducted

detailed analysis regarding the time course and effects of a 3 gram dose of thiopental, and in his

opinion, “the dose of thiopental sodium used by Arkansas would render most people

unconscious within 60 seconds from the time the [first] injection of thiopental sodium begins.” 

Id. ¶ 10. He further states “virtually every person given [3 grams] of thiopental sodium will have

stopped breathing prior to the administration of the pancuronium bromide.” Id. 

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Missouri’s protocol requires that a physician, nurse, or pharmacist prepare the lethal 

chemicals, which are injected by non-medical department employees. Nooner contends that

Arkansas’s protocol is deficient because it assigns the preparation of lethal chemicals to

“someone with no medical credentials whatsoever under supervision of someone with no

medical credentials whatsoever.” Docket entry #87, at 27. While the ADC’s written protocol

does not specify the qualifications of persons who prepare the lethal chemicals, it does require

that the person supervising the preparation (the Deputy Director or designee) must be

“healthcare trained, educated, and/or experienced in matters related to the establishment and

monitoring of IVs, the mixing and administration of lethal chemicals, and assessing the presence

or absence of consciousness.” Docket entry #74, Ex. #2 (Lethal Injection Procedure, Section

I.1.). 

The Missouri and Arkansas protocols both require that IV insertions be accomplished by

medical personnel–a physician, nurse, or EMT. Both protocols require confirmation, following

administration of thiopental, of the condemned inmate’s lack of consciousness. Both protocols

require a three-minute wait, after it is determined that the inmate is unconscious, before the

remaining chemicals are administered. Arkansas’s protocol further requires that throughout the

infusion process, the Deputy Director or designee closely monitor the infusion site for evidence

of problems. Both protocols provide for back-up syringes of thiopental, to be administered

though the secondary or alternative IV line if additional anesthetic is required. Both protocols

provide that if a peripheral IV site cannot be established, a peripheral or central venous primary

IV line will be establish by a person with the training, education, and experience necessary for

the procedure.

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See docket entry #91, at 4 n.2. The allegedly botched executions include the 1990

execution of Ronald Gene Simmons (the first execution by lethal injection in Arkansas), the

1992 executions of Steven Hill and Rickey Ray Rector, and the 2004 execution of Charles

Singleton. See Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, docket entry #81, ¶ 6. Although the

record contains no definitive information regarding the number of lethal injection executions that

have occurred in Arkansas since 1990, Nooner has indicated that the number is 26. See docket

entry #80, at 8.

15

The Eighth Circuit determined that Missouri’s protocol “renders any risk of pain far too

remote to be constitutionally significant.” Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1085. Given the similarity

between the Missouri and Arkansas protocols, the Court finds that the probability that Nooner

will succeed on the merits is slight. 

 Nooner argues that this case is significantly different from the situation in Taylor

because “Plaintiffs have presented compelling evidence that Defendants have botched executions

and failed to implement their protocols humanely in the past.”6

 Nooner argues that the Court

must go beyond the four corners of the written protocol because it is a “combination of both the

written document and its actual implementation that determines whether he is likely to be

subjected to unnecessary and unconstitutional pain and suffering during his execution.” 

If Nooner is challenging conduct alleged to be a deviation from the official lethal

injection protocol, he must show deliberate indifference. See Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1081 (“The

conduct challenged in the present case is neither alleged to be accidental nor a deviation from the

official procedure, which would require a showing of an intent to harm or deliberate

indifference.”) Under the deliberate indifference standard, an inmate must show that a prison 

official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the

inmate. See Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2007)(citing Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). Especially in light of the ADC’s attempt to improve its protocol

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On March 16, 1993, Nooner shot and killed Scot Stobaugh. On September 28, 1993, a

jury convicted Nooner of capital-felony murder and returned a sentence of death by lethal

injection. Nooner appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction and

sentence. See Nooner v. State, 907 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143 (1996).

Nooner then sought post-conviction relief in state court, and the Arkansas Supreme Court

affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. See Nooner v. State, 4 S.W.3d 497

(Ark. 1999). 

16

with recent revisions, it is most unlikely that Nooner can show deliberate indifference. 

Unreasonable Delay

In deciding whether Nooner unreasonably delayed his challenge to Arkansas’s lethal

injection protocol, the proper inquiry “is whether [Nooner] could have brought his claim ‘at such

a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.’” Nooner v.

Norris , 491 F.3d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 2007)(quoting Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir.

2007)). “Once a state inmate’s sentence of death has become final on direct review in the

state’s courts, there is no impediment to filing a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality

of a state’s lethal injection protocol as long as lethal injection is the established method of

execution, the protocol is known, and no state administrative remedies are available.” Id., 491

F.3d at 808 (citing Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Calif., 503 U.S. 653, 653-54

(1992)). 

Here, a review of Nooner’s post-conviction litigation shows that direct review of his

sentence and conviction in state court was complete in 1996, ten years before he commenced this

action.7 Lethal injection has been the primary method of execution in Arkansas since 1983. 

Additionally, as explained in an order entered on June 19, 2006 in this case (docket entry #24),

Nooner had no available administrative remedies regarding the lethal injection protocol. Thus,

Nooner was free to challenge the lethal injection protocol immediately after direct review of his

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See Bieghler v. State, 839 N. E. 2d 691 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1159 (2006);

Boyd v. Beck, 404 F. Supp. 2d 879 (E.D. N.C. 2005); Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 

292 (Tenn. 2005), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 2288 (2006); Aldrich v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 159 (5th

Cir. 2004); Reid v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 2004); Harris v. Johnson, 376 F.3d

414 (5th Cir.2004); People v. Snow, 65 P.3d 749 (Cal. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1076 (2003);

Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1183 (2000); State v. Webb, 750

A.2d 448 (Conn. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 835 (2000); LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469,

470-71 (D. Ariz. 1995 )(finding lethal injection constitutional and citing several cases holding

likewise), aff'd, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). 

17

conviction and sentence in 1996.

Nooner offers five reasons why the Court should find no unreasonable delay on his part. 

First, he asserts that Defendants “completely reset the dilatoriness clock” when they revised the

lethal injection protocol. The crux of Nooner’s claim is that unless thiopental is correctly

administered, he will suffer excruciating pain upon administration of potassium chloride, and he

will be unable to demonstrate his suffering because of the paralyzing effect of pancuronium

bromide. Although the ADC revised the lethal injection protocol on July 16, 2007, the revisions

did nothing to change the component of the protocol essential to Nooner’s claim: the serial

administration of thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Nooner failed to

challenge the original protocol on a timely basis, and the recent revisions provide no basis for

excusing his delay. 

Second, Nooner argues that Arkansas’s lethal injection procedures have long been “top

secret” and “nothing in the record . . . even remotely suggests Mr. Nooner had reason to know of

Arkansas’s lethal injection procedure before he filed this suit.” Twenty-nine states, and the

federal government, use the specific three-chemical protocol at issue in this case, see Workman

v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 907 (6th Cir. 2007), and legal challenges to three-chemical protocols, 

one filed as early as 1995, are numerous.8

 

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18

The three-chemical protocol has been in use in Arkansas since 1983; the “botched”

executions that Plaintiffs cite in support of their claims occurred in 1990, 1992, and 2004; and

witness accounts of at least two of the “botched” executions appeared in Arkansas newspaper

articles. See docket entry #82, Exs. #3, #4. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that

Nooner should have been aware of the of the three-chemical protocol and the alleged associated

risk of pain long before he filed this lawsuit on May 1, 2006. See Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635,

640 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007)(finding that secrecy surrounding Alabama’s lethal injection protocol did

not excuse inmate's delay as alleged risks involved with three-chemical protocol were known at

least three years before inmate filed complaint on November 1, 2006).

 Third, Nooner asserts that he brought this lawsuit fifteen months before the State

scheduled his execution, and the merits of his claim easily could have been resolved before his

September 18, 2007 execution date. Nooner states that his failure to seek discovery while

Defendants appealed Davis’s stay of execution “is not the type of conduct that constitutes the

unnecessary delay in initiating challenge . . . . ” Docket entry #91, at 2. 

By waiting until May 2006 to file this action, Nooner ran the risk that his execution date

would be scheduled before a resolution on the merits, and his lack of diligence in prosecuting his

claim after he filed suit increased that risk. The Court finds that Nooner could have brought his

claim at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay, and

he failed to do so.

Fourth, Nooner cites Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007), for the proposition

that a lethal injection challenge becomes ripe only when a prisoner’s execution becomes

imminent. The Eighth Circuit has rejected this argument, and this Court is bound to do the same.

Case 5:06-cv-00110-SWW Document 93 Filed 09/11/07 Page 18 of 23
9

Docket entry #87, at 41. Nooner, through his attorney, states: “Mr. Nooner’s mental

illness has prevented him from rationally understanding that his execution will occur and that it

will result in his death. It has prevented him from comprehending that he will die according to

the ADC’s lethal injection protocol or that the protocol creates a substantial risk that he will be

fully conscious and in agonizing pain for the duration of the execution process.” Id. at 44. 

19

See Nooner v. Norris, 491 F.3d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 2007)(“Panetti deals with mental competence

to be executed, a condition of the mind which may not manifest itself until so late a time that a

stay becomes necessary in order to evaluate properly the asserted mental deficiency. That

cannot be said about an execution protocol which, as we have pointed out, has been long known

and unchanged in its implementation for years, thereby permitting an evaluation of its

constitutionality without the necessity of the issuance, in effect, of an eleventh hour stay.”). 

Fifth, Nooner argues that even assuming he unnecessarily delayed bringing this action,

his delay should be excused by “his longstanding schizophrenia and consequent mental

incompetency, which prevented him from being able to assert his rights against Defendants’

cruel and unusual execution procedure.”9 

The record contains no evidence of a medically diagnosed psychotic disorder,

adjudication of incompetence or incapacity, or any mental defect that would excuse Nooner’s

delay. Nooner states that the Eighth Circuit has “actually adjudged” him incompetent and,

consequently, he “remains under a presumption of continuing mental incompetency.” Nooner is

mistaken. On July 30 , 1996, Nooner, represented by counsel, sought habeas relief in federal

court. See Nooner v. Norris, No. 5:96CV00495 GH (E.D. Ark). While Nooner’s habeas

petition was pending, he filed a pro se motion to dismiss his petition. The district court rejected

Nooner’s request, and on appeal, the Eighth Circuit remanded and directed the district court to

determine whether Nooner was competent to withdraw his petition. 

Case 5:06-cv-00110-SWW Document 93 Filed 09/11/07 Page 19 of 23
10“The two questions–the competency to waive a right and whether the waiver was

knowing and voluntary are distinct . . . .” O'Rourke v. Endell , 153 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 1998). 

In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the Supreme Court explained the difference as

follows: 

The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity; the question

is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. The purpose of the

‘knowing and voluntary’inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant

actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision

and whether the decision is uncoerced.

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12 (internal citations omitted). 

20

On remand, the district court heard testimony from mental health experts who examined

Nooner and determined that he was competent to withdraw his petition. Additionally, the district

court addressed the merits of Nooner’s petition and concluded that his stated claims were

without merit. Nooner, through counsel, appealed the district court’s competency determination

and dismissal of the petition on the merits. The Eighth Circuit ruled that Nooner’s motion to

dismiss his petition was not knowing and voluntary; but the Court found no error with the

district court’s finding that Nooner was competent and possessed the ability to understand his

request to withdraw his habeas petition.10 See Nooner v. Norris, 402 F.3d 801, 805-06 (8th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2037 (2006). Additionally, the Court affirmed rejection of

Norris’s petition on the merits.

Nooner’s habeas litigation continues to this day. On April 7, 2006, while Nooner’s

appeal of the district court’s competency determination and dismissal on the merits was still

pending, Nooner filed a separate habeas petition. See Nooner v. Norris, No. 5:96CV00495 GH,

docket entry #83. In that petition, Nooner charges that ADC policy prohibiting mental health

evaluations unless ordered by a court has violated his “fundamental right of meaningful access to

the courts, his right to the assistance of counsel and his right to be free from cruel and unusual

Case 5:06-cv-00110-SWW Document 93 Filed 09/11/07 Page 20 of 23
21

punishment.” Id., at 1. By way of relief, Nooner sought an order that would allow him to meet

with mental health experts. The district court denied the petition as successive, and Nooner

appealed. 

The Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the following issues: (1)

whether the ADC’s refusal to permit Nooner access to experts for the purpose of a mental health

evaluation violated the constitution and (2) whether the district court was correct in ruling that

the petition was a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244B(b). 

On August 24, 2007, the Eighth Circuit issued a decision reversing the district court’s

dismissal of Nooner’s petition as a second or successive application. The Court held that the

statutory bar on second or successive applications does not apply to incompetency claims

brought under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986), or mental retardation claims

brought under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), filed before or after the state has obtained

an execution warrant. See Nooner v. Norris, 2007 WL 2403740 (8th Cir., August 24, 2007). The

Court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the ADC’s refusal to allow Nooner

access to mental health experts for the purpose of a mental health evaluation violates the

Constitution. Id. 

On August 31, 2007, Nooner filed a motion for a stay of execution in the remanded

habeas proceeding. See Nooner v. Norris, 5:96CV00495 JLH (docket entry #112). In that

motion, Nooner argues, among other things, that he is a “severely mentally ill man who is

incompetent to be executed under Eighth Amendment standards” and he “may very well be a

person with mental retardation and thus ineligible for execution . . . ” Id. at 1. 

On September 10, 2007, United States Chief District Judge J. Leon Holmes entered an

Case 5:06-cv-00110-SWW Document 93 Filed 09/11/07 Page 21 of 23
11Although the time for filing a response to Jones’s motion has not expired, and

Defendants have not filed a response as of this date, Defendants addressed the arguments now

asserted by Jones in their response in opposition to Nooner’s motion for a stay.

12On April 17, 1996, following a jury trial, Jones was convicted of the capital murder and

rape of Mary Phillips, and the attempted capital murder of Lacy Phillips. He was sentenced to

death by lethal injection, life imprisonment, and thirty years’ imprisonment, respectively, for the

crimes. Jones’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, see Jones v. State,

947 S.W.2d 339 (Ark.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002 (1997), and the denial of his request for

postconviction relief was affirmed. See Jones v. State, 8 S.W.3d 482 (Ark. 2000).

22

order granting Nooner a preliminary injunction staying his execution. The order explains that,

pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s opinion and judgment, the district court must review the merits

of Nooner’s claim. See Nooner v. Norris, 5:96CV00495 JHL, docket entry #121. 

Even though Nooner’s execution has been stayed for the purpose of permitting review of

the separate claim pending in his habeas proceeding, the Court finds it necessary to rule on

Nooner’s motion for a stay filed in this case. For the reasons previously stated, the Court finds

that Nooner is not entitled to a stay of execution for the purpose of pursuing his lethal injection

claims. Should the stay of execution in Nooner’s habeas proceeding be dissolved, the Court will

deny any request to continue the stay in order that Nooner can pursue his claims in this case.

V. Jones’s Motion for a Stay of Execution

In support of his motion for a stay of execution, Jones repeats the same arguments

asserted by Nooner.11 For the reasons previously stated in connection with Nooner’s motion for

a stay, the Court finds that Jones has failed to satisfy the traditional requirements for a

preliminary injunction. Additionally, the Court finds that, like Nooner, Jones has unreasonably

delayed bringing his claim, as direct review of his conviction and sentence in state court was

complete in 1997.12 Accordingly, Jones’s motion for a stay will be denied.

Case 5:06-cv-00110-SWW Document 93 Filed 09/11/07 Page 22 of 23
Jones filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, which was denied on April

13, 2006. See Jones v. Norris, No. 5:00CV00401 ODS, docket entry #56. On August 14, 2006,

the Eighth Circuit denied Jones’s request for a certificate of appealability, and on December 26,

2006, the Supreme Court denied Jones’s petition for certiorari. See Jones v. Norris , 127 S.Ct.

587 (2006).

23

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff Nooner’s motion for a preliminary injunction or stay of

execution (docket entry #87) and Plaintiff Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction or stay of

execution (docket entry #92) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2007.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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