Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02740/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02740-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eduardo Gomez,

Plaintiff,

v. 

EOS CCA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-02740-PHX-JAT (DMF)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Defendants Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union”) and 

Equifax Information Services LLC (“Equifax”; collectively, “Defendants”) motions for 

summary judgment. (Docs. 46 & 47). Plaintiff Eduardo Gomez (“Plaintiff”) has responded 

to Trans Union’s motion, (Doc. 64), and Trans Union has replied (Doc. 66).1 The Court 

now rules on the motions.

I. BACKGROUND

As relevant here, this case concerns Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants violated

the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). (Doc. 6 at 1). Broadly, Plaintiff asserted that 

Defendants violated the provisions of the FCRA that require “consumer reporting 

agencies” to follow reasonable procedures to ensure maximal accuracy in consumer credit 

reports and to reinvestigate a nonfrivolous consumer complaint of an inaccuracy in his or 

her credit report. (Id. at 3–4).

 

1 Plaintiff has not responded to Equifax’s motion. Because the Defendants’ motions request 

summary judgment for overlapping reasons, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments 

with respect to both motions to the extent they are relevant.

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Plaintiff’s FCRA claims are based on his assertion that Defendants “continued to 

report information[, from an EOS CCA account,] that had bee[n] established was 

inaccurate when the plaintiff did not accept it a[s] true and all of the defendants failed to 

verify/validate the information.” (Doc. 1 at 3). To support his claim, he provides a Trans 

Union credit report that lists an EOS CCA account’s “pay status” as in collection. (Id. at

18). He also claims that neither of Defendants responded to any of his four requests for a 

reinvestigation of that information. (Id. at 2, 5). It appears, however, that since the Court’s 

screening order Plaintiff has not developed discovery. (E.g., Doc. 49-6 at 4 (noting 

Plaintiff’s failure to depose even one Trans Union representative)). And, although 

Defendants previously offered to settle, that “offer is no longer open.” (Doc. 70 at 2).2

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The Court must grant summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

(“Rule”) 56 when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 

party asserting “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support th[at] assertion 

by” either “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that materials 

cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B). 

Thus, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The movant must first identify portions of the record that “it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the 

non-movant to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

 

2 Given this, the Court will proceed to rule on Defendants’ motions despite a pending 

settlement conference. Because that conference has already been continued several times, 

and because it appears Defendants are no longer willing to settle, the Court believes it 

highly unlikely the parties will settle at the conference.

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Id. at 324 (citation omitted). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the 

suit,” and thus are material, “properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Such disputes are “genuine” when they 

can “reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court views all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the 

non-movant, see id., but “[a] summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying 

solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), the non-movant “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

B. FCRA Claims

“Congress enacted [the] FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, 

promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. 

of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). Thus, the statute imposes on consumer-reporting 

agencies a panoply of procedural obligations and creates a private right of action for 

consumers to enforce compliance. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (9th 

Cir. 2017). In this case, the relevant obligations stem from 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 

1681i. The first provision requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable 

procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the 

individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). The second requires a 

credit reporting agency to conduct a “free and reasonable reinvestigation within thirty days 

of a consumer” alerting the agency of his or her dispute. Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

891 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A)).

Usually, a consumer reporting agency’s liability under either section is a question 

of reasonableness that is left for the jury to resolve. Id. at 755–56. There is nothing for the 

jury to resolve, however, where the consumer fails to “make a ‘prima facie showing of 

inaccurate reporting.’” Id. at 756 (quoting Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 

876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010)). Information in a credit report is “inaccurate . . . where it either 

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is ‘patently incorrect’ or is ‘misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be 

expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Id. (quoting Gorman v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1163 (9th Cir. 2009)).3

Because Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the question whether Defendants

included inaccurate information on a credit report, he must produce at least some evidence 

to that effect in order to withstand summary judgment. As Defendants persuasively argue, 

however, he has failed to do so.4

Plaintiff counters the contention that he has presented no evidence of an inaccuracy 

by directing the Court to his complaint, claiming the attachments show an inaccuracy. True 

enough, Plaintiff attached an August 2017 Trans Union credit report showing an EOS CCA 

account reporting as in collection to his complaint. (Doc. 1 at 18). But absent from the 

complaint, his response to the motion for summary judgment, or the record as a whole, is 

any evidence or explanation showing why that listing is inaccurate. Instead, Plaintiff 

summarily concludes in his complaint that the information was “established []as inaccurate 

when [he] did not accept it as true.” (Id. at 3). 

Plaintiff cannot rely on that allegation alone to stave off summary judgment on his 

FCRA claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has long maintained that “a consumer 

must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report 

containing inaccurate information” to make out a prima facie case of an FCRA violation. 

Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (emphasis added). A consumer’s personal opinion or speculation 

 

3 Before proceeding further, the Court is at pains to point out to Trans Union that its very 

first argument has, for years, been squarely rejected as contrary to clear to Ninth Circuit 

authority. See, e.g., Cairns v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., No. CIV-04-1840-SMM, 2007 WL 

735564, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2007) (citing Guimond v. Trans Union Info. Co., 45 F.3d 

1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)). Trans Union’s motion cites both Cairns and Guimond and, 

had its counsel read the entirety of those cases, would have realized how little merit this 

argument has and saved the Court’s time—and client resources—pursuing it. While 

counsel may ethically advocate for a change in the law, counsel cannot ignore it.

4 Plaintiff takes umbrage with Trans Union’s suggestion that he conceded the information’s 

accuracy by failing to timely respond to Trans Union’s requests for admission. (Docs. 46 

at 4; 64 at 2–3). Although the Court declines to adopt Trans Union’s aggressive tack, what 

Plaintiff fails to grasp is that simply objecting to a movant’s contentions does not suffice 

to create a genuine issue of material fact when the burden to prove the existence of that 

element is his.

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is “insufficient to support a claim of inaccuracy under the FCRA.” Shaw v. Equifax Info. 

Sols., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 956, 961 (E.D. Mich. 2016); see also Sherfield v. Trans Union, 

LLC, No. CIV-19-001-R, 2019 WL 3241176, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 18, 2019); Meeks v. 

Equifax Info. Sols., LLC, No. 1:18-CV-0366-TWT-WEJ, 2019 WL 3521955, at *6 (N.D. 

Ga. May 14, 2019); Bailey v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 13-10377, 2013 WL 3305710, 

at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2013). Although some of these authorities mention this 

principle in the context of a motion to dismiss, if a consumer’s failure to explain or cite 

evidence showing an inaccuracy is fatal to an FCRA claim at that stage, it follows a fortiori

that it is fatal at the summary judgment stage. Indeed, “mere allegation and speculation do 

not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment,” Nelson v. Pima Cmty. 

Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1996), because any other conclusion would threaten 

to render Rule 56 nugatory, 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2712 (4th ed. Apr. 2020 Update); see also Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 327 (“Rule 56 must be construed with due regard . . . for the rights of 

persons opposing . . . claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 

Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.”).

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Trans Union included inaccurate information in a credit report. 

In the end, Plaintiff has only a Trans Union credit report listing the EOS CCA account, 

(Doc. 1 at 18), and asks the Court to take his word for it that the listing is erroneous. But 

Plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment standing on only this unsupported allegation. He 

therefore “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (1986), and entry of summary judgment in Trans Union’s favor is 

appropriate on this basis.

That conclusion is even clearer when it comes to Plaintiff’s claim against Equifax. 

While Plaintiff attached an August 2017 Trans Union credit report to his complaint, he did 

not attach an Equifax credit report. Obviously, without any evidence relating to an Equifax 

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report there is also no evidence that the information in that report is inaccurate. 

Accordingly, the absence of any evidence of an inaccuracy also justifies entry of summary 

judgment in Equifax’s favor.

Moreover, Plaintiff has provided neither evidence nor explanation of any 

procedures—whether used for ensuring accuracy in a credit report or in conducting a 

reinvestigation of that information—that Defendants employ. Such evidence is the sine qua 

non of any claim under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i, which only prohibit unreasonable conduct. 

See Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (“The FCRA does not impose strict liability . . . .”). Again, 

no jury could conclude that those procedures, or the reinvestigation, were unreasonable in 

the absence some sort of showing that they were not. What’s more, the record evidence 

addressing this point tends to show that Defendants behaved reasonably. For example, both 

Defendants provide explanations of the procedures they employ to ensure accuracy of 

credit reports and their protocol for reinvestigations. (See Docs. 49-2 at 3–5 (explaining 

Trans Union’s procedures and that EOS CCA nearly always provides facially credible 

information); 48-1 at 4–7 (explaining the same as to Equifax)). And Defendants both state 

that, after receiving Plaintiff’s complaint about the EOS CCA listing, their investigation 

revealed that his “credit file did not contain an EOS CCA account.” (Docs. 48-1 at 7; 49-4 

at 2). On this record, Plaintiff’s failure to adduce any evidence addressing reasonableness 

means that “only one conclusion about the conduct’s reasonableness is possible,” Gorman,

584 F.3d at 1157 (quoting In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1994)), 

and that conclusion is that Defendants acted reasonably.

Accordingly, the Court will enter summary judgment in Defendants’ favor.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to 

Defendants Trans Union LLC and Equifax Information Services LLC’s Motions for 

Summary Judgment (Docs. 46 & 47).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Trans Union LLC and Equifax 

Information Services LLC’s Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 46 & 47) are 

GRANTED.

Because EOS CCA remains a Defendant to this action, the Clerk of the Court shall 

not enter judgment at this time.

Dated this 17th day of June, 2020.

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