Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01426/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01426-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

TERMPSREF 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

MH 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Eric Kevin Pesqueira, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 15-01426-PHX-DGC (ESW) 

ORDER 

On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff Eric Kevin Pesqueira, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff paid the filing and administrative fees. In a 

September 18, 2015 Order, the Court dismissed Defendants Ryan, Pratt, McKamey, 

Corizon, Sedlar, Reece, and Does I-IV. The Court also determined that Plaintiff had 

adequately alleged a claim against the Defendant identified in the Complaint as “John 

Doe Nurse.” Plaintiff was given 30 days to file a written response that included either (1) 

the name of “John Doe Nurse,” or (2) an explanation of what Plaintiff had done to try to 

learn this Defendant’s name, a description of what discovery Plaintiff would undertake to 

learn his name, and the identity of at least one person who could be served with 

discovery. 

On September 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Response to the Court’s September 18, 

2015 Order (Doc. 9), a Motion to Alter or Amend the September 18, 2015 Order 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 1 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Doc. 10), and a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11). The Court will order Defendant 

Sedlar to answer Counts One and Two of the First Amended Complaint and will dismiss 

without prejudice Defendant McKamey, Defendant Salas, Defendant John Doe/RF, and 

the Defendants identified as Jane Does. Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend will be 

denied as moot. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 2 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. First Amended Complaint 

 In his two-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims of 

constitutionally deficient medical care. He names as Defendants Corizon Health 

(“Corizon”), a private corporation that contracts with the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (ADC) to provide health care to inmates; Arlene McKamey, a unit provider 

at ASPC-Florence; Nurse Sedlar, a nurse at ASPC-Florence; John Doe (“Doe #1”), a 

nurse at ASPC-Florence; Christine Salas, a nurse at ASPC-Florence; an unidentified 

number of ASPC-Florence nurses identified as “Jane Does”; and John Doe/RF (“Doe 

#2”), an x-ray technician at ASPC-Florence. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and 

monetary damages. 

 According to Plaintiff, the facts alleged in each count of the First Amended 

Complaint involve “the same exact incident.” Plaintiff states that he separated his claim 

into two counts so that he could “separately address” two distinct injuries. Because these 

injuries arise out of one occurrence, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s allegations as 

though they were set forth in a single count. 

 Plaintiff alleges that on September 25, 2013, he fell while playing basketball at 

ASPC-Florence. According to Plaintiff, his right hand was “severely injured[,] 

displaying extreme swelling, with the highpoint almost like a tennis ball cut in half.” 

(Doc. 11 at 5.) For several weeks, Plaintiff “brought this to the nurse’s attention every 

time they delivered [his] med[ication]s.” (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly showed the nurses his 

hand, verbally requested attention, and wrote detailed health needs request forms 

(HNRs). Plaintiff claims that these exchanges “occurred with several nurses,” including 

Defendant Sedlar. (Id.) Over the course of several weeks, Defendant Sedlar told 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 3 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff that the medical provider was not in or that the medical provider would not talk 

to Sedlar that day. She also told Plaintiff that he was on the waiting list for x-rays, even 

though medical records show that he was not on the waiting list for x-rays at that time. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Sedlar erroneously indicated in response to one of 

Plaintiff’s HNRs that he had been seen by a doctor. 

 Plaintiff claims that another nurse, “who seemed new,” did not place Plaintiff on 

an emergency line because, according to her, she was “letting Sedlar take care of it.” (Id. 

at 6.) John Doe #1 allegedly saw Plaintiff’s hand but refused to talk to anyone about 

Plaintiff’s condition or about having Plaintiff “called in.” (Id.) John Doe #1 also refused 

to get Plaintiff ice, or some other form of pain management, despite being aware of the 

severity of Plaintiff’s injury. According to the First Amended Complaint, Doe #1 

“straight out told [Plaintiff] that [he] would have to wait for [his] HNR to be answered.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that his HNRs requesting pain management were ignored. 

And when he did see a provider who attempted to treat him, “the central office denied 

[that provider’s] first requested medication” and “vaguely” responded that Plaintiff 

should continue to be treated with non-steroidal anti-inflammatories (NSAIDs), even 

though Plaintiff’s record revealed that NSAIDs had proven ineffective. (Id. at 8.) 

 Nurse Salas saw Plaintiff’s hand and told Plaintiff that she would have him placed 

on the doctor’s line, but he was never placed on the line. The Jane Doe Defendants 

allegedly saw Plaintiff’s hand as well. In addition, Plaintiff claims that John Doe #2 

delayed the x-rays on Plaintiff’s hand. According to Plaintiff, these x-rays were ordered 

October 9, 2013, but were not performed until October 17, 2013. When x-rays were 

eventually performed, they revealed that Plaintiff had broken his fourth and fifth 

metacarpals. By the time Plaintiff was sent for “proper attention” on November 4, 2013, 

it was too late for the surgeon to perform the necessary surgery on his hand. (Id. at 7.) 

 On December 16, 2013, Plaintiff learned from the surgeon that, as a result of the 

delayed treatment and the surgeon’s inability to operate, Plaintiff’s broken fingers would 

no longer fully extend. In addition, Plaintiff’s fourth finger “loosely shakes back and 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 4 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

forth as if not even connected.” (Id. at 7.) On March 26, 2014, Plaintiff saw a hand 

specialist. The specialist informed Plaintiff that he would not operate on Plaintiff’s 

fingers without operating on Plaintiff’s wrist. Plaintiff elected not to have the surgery 

performed because, at the time, the risks associated with the operation outweighed any 

potential benefit. According to Plaintiff, these risks are much greater than they would 

have been had surgery been performed in a timely manner. As a result of Defendants’ 

conduct, Plaintiff claims, he suffered permanent injury to his hand and wrist and endured 

“unrelenting[,] significant pain.” (Id. at 8.) 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 5 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

A. Corizon 

 To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional 

public function, such as providing medical care in a prison, a plaintiff must allege facts to 

support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or 

custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 

1997). Because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a defendant’s 

position as the employer of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 6 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

rights does not make it liable. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations of delayed treatment are not sufficient to state a claim 

against Corizon because he has not alleged any facts showing that his constitutional 

rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed 

by Defendant Corizon. Indeed, after being identified as a Defendant in the caption, 

Corizon is not mentioned again in the First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

has failed to state a claim against Corizon, and it will be dismissed without prejudice. 

B. Defendants Salas and Jane Does 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Salas are not sufficient to state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Salas saw his injury and 

knew of its severity but failed to have him placed on the doctor’s line, despite having told 

Plaintiff she would place him on the line. However, it is not clear from the First 

Amended Complaint that Plaintiff’s failure to get placed in the doctor’s line was the 

result of Defendant Sedlar’s deliberate indifference. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations 

demonstrate that Defendant Salas was negligent. As noted above, an allegation of 

negligence is not sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference pursuant to § 1983. 

See Broughton, 622 F.2d at 460. Accordingly, Defendant Salas will be dismissed. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against the nurses identified as “Jane Does” are similarly 

deficient. His claim against these Defendants is limited to an allegation that, after he 

showed them his hand, treatment was not provided in a timely manner. However, there 

are many possible explanations for the delay in treatment that do not involve the 

deliberate indifference of the Jane Doe Defendants. In short, Plaintiff has failed to allege 

facts sufficient to support that the Jane Doe Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference, and these Defendants will also be dismissed. 

C. Doe #2 

Plaintiff has failed to state an Eight Amendment claim against Doe #2 because he 

has not alleged facts demonstrating that this Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s serious 

medical need. While Plaintiff alleges that x-rays were ordered on October 9, 2013, it is 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 7 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

not clear from his allegations that Doe #2 knew about this order at any point before he xrayed Plaintiff’s hand on October 17, 2013. Even if Plaintiff had alleged that Doe #2 

knew about the outstanding x-ray order, it is not clear that the alleged delay was the result 

of deliberately indifferent, rather than merely negligent, conduct. Accordingly, Doe #2 

will be dismissed. 

D. Defendant McKamey 

 Plaintiff has not alleged any facts against this Defendant. Therefore, Defendant 

McKamey will be dismissed. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendants Sedlar and 

Doe #1. In light of the difficulties associated with serving a summons and complaint on 

an anonymous Defendant, however, the Court will not direct that service be made on 

John Doe #1 at this time. If the identity of Doe #1 is revealed through the discovery 

process, Plaintiff may amend his pleading to name that individual as a Defendant herein. 

V. Motion to Alter or Amend September 18, 2015 Order 

In light of the Court’s decision to screen the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Alter or Amend the September 18, 2015 Screening Order is moot, and it will 

be denied on that basis. 

VI. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

B. Copies

 Because Plaintiff is currently confined in an Arizona Department of Corrections 

unit subject to General Order 14-17, Plaintiff is not required to serve Defendants with a 

copy of every document he files or to submit an additional copy of every filing for use by 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 8 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 and 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.4. 

If Plaintiff is transferred to a unit other than one subject to General Order 14-17, 

he will be required to: (a) serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, 

a copy of every document that he files, and include a certificate stating that a copy of the 

filing was served; and (b) submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) and (d); LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing 

being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff. 

C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend (Doc. 10) is denied as moot. 

 (2) Defendants Corizon Health, Arlene McKamey, Christine Salas, John Doe 

#2, and Jane Does are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (3) Defendant Sedlar must answer Counts One and Two of the First Amended 

Complaint. 

 (4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 11), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver 

forms for Defendant Sedlar. 

 (5) Plaintiff must complete1

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 1

If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 9 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 (6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 

120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, 

whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

 (7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, 

and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or 

this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

 

Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works 

there. 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 10 of 11
TERMPSREF 

- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (9) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (10) Defendant Sedlar must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise 

respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 

Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 30th day of October, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-01426-DGC-ESW Document 12 Filed 11/02/15 Page 11 of 11