Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01362/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01362-35/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT HACKWORTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. AREVALOS,

Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-01362-KES-CDB

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY 

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT WITHOUT A 

BOND, SETTING SUPERSEDEAS BOND 

AMOUNT AT $15,000 TO STAY 

JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING 

TEMPORARY STAY TO ALLOW FOR 

POSTING OF BOND

ORDER DENYING HACKWORTH’S 

MOTION FOR COURT ORDER

Docs. 161, 167

Plaintiff Robert Hackworth (“Hackworth”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he asserted First and 

Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant E. Arevalos (“Arevalos”), a correctional officer 

employed by California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). The case 

proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict for Hackworth on both claims, awarding 

both compensatory and punitive damages. Docs. 157, 158.1 Hackworth filed a post-trial motion

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 The damages award was as follows: $1,650 in compensatory damages for the First Amendment 

violation; $100,000 in compensatory damages for the Eighth Amendment violation; $20,000 in 

punitive damages for the First Amendment violation; and $40,000 in punitive damages for the

Eighth Amendment violation. Docs. 157, 158.

Case 1:19-cv-01362-KES-CDB Document 175 Filed 01/17/25 Page 1 of 8
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asking the court to order the defendant to pay the judgment. Doc. 161. Arevalos filed a 

combined motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(a) for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or, alternatively, a new trial.2 Doc. 165. Hackworth obtained 

extensions of time to respond to Arevalos’s post-trial motion; Hackworth’s opposition is now due 

on February 10, 2025. Doc. 174.

Arevalos has moved to stay execution of the judgment pending the resolution of her posttrial motion and to waive Rule 62(b)’s bond requirement. Doc. 167. Hackworth did not file an 

opposition to the motion to stay, but he separately filed his motion seeking a court order requiring 

either Arevalos or her employer to pay the judgment. See Doc. 161. For the reasons discussed 

below, Arevalos’s motion to waive the bond requirement and to stay execution of the judgment

without a bond, Doc. 167, is denied. The Court sets a bond amount of $15,000 to be posted by 

Arevalos to stay the judgment pending the resolution of Arevalos’s post-trial motion. The 

judgment is also stayed for 10 days from the entry of this Order to allow for posting of the bond. 

Hackworth’s motion for a court order to enforce the judgment, Doc. 161, is denied without 

prejudice as premature.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 62(a) provides that “execution of a judgment and proceedings to enforce it are stayed 

for 30 days after its entry, unless the Court orders otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a). Rule 62(a) 

contemplates that a district court may issue an order modifying or extending the stay. As stated 

in the 2018 Advisory Committee Notes, “Rule 62(a) expressly recognizes the court’s authority to 

dissolve the automatic stay,” or alternatively, “the court may choose to supersede it by ordering a 

stay that lasts longer or requires security.” Rebarber-Ocasio v. Feliciano-Munoz, No. 3:18-cv01218-JAW, 2022 WL 17813005, at *1–2 (D.P.R. Nov. 2, 2022) (addressing the 2018 

amendments to Rule 62 and quoting the 2018 Advisory Committee Notes).

Under Rule 62(b), “[a]t any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by 

providing a bond or other security. The stay takes effect when the court approves the bond or 

2

 Hereinafter, “Rule” refers to the applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.

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other security and remains in effect for the time specified in the bond or other security.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 62(b); see Vacation Vill., Inc. v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 497 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2007). Upon 

posting a supersedeas bond acceptable to the Court, the moving party receives a stay “as a matter 

of right.” In re Matter of Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 193 (9th Cir. 1977); 

Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. 2:10-cv-02414-KJM-KJN, 2019 WL 

2715616, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2019). “The purpose of security under Rule 62(b) is to 

preserve the status quo pending disposition of post-trial motions.” Lexington Ins. Co. v. Scott 

Homes Multifamily Inc., No. CV-12-02119-PHX-JAT, 2015 WL 6956091, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 

10, 2015).

A party seeking a waiver of Rule 62(b)’s bond requirement must “objectively 

demonstrate” the reasons for departing from the usual requirement of a full supersedeas bond. 

Cotton ex rel. McClure v. City of Eureka, 860 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012). “Courts 

in the Ninth Circuit regularly use the Dillon factors in determining whether to waive the bond 

requirement.” Kranson v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 11-cv-05826-YGR, 2013 WL 6872495, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2013); see also United States v. Moyer, No. 07-CV000510 SBA, 2008 WL 

3478063, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008) (noting “Ninth Circuit courts regularly use these 

factors”).

The Dillon factors include: (1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of 

time required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that 

the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant’s 

ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of money; and 

(5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the requirement to post a 

bond would place creditors of the defendant in an insecure position. Dillon v. City of Chicago, 

866 F.2d 902, 904–905 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Upon a 

satisfactory showing of the Dillon factors, the Court may exercise its inherent discretionary 

authority over supersedeas bonds to waive the bond requirement. Rachel v. Banana Republic, 

Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1505 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the Court’s inherent authority over 

supersedeas bonds).

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II. ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION

A. Arevalos’s Motion to Stay Execution of the Judgment and Waive Bond

The Court finds that Arevalos does not establish sufficient grounds to waive Rule 62(b)’s 

bond requirement.

Judgment was entered in this case on October 22, 2024, and was automatically stayed for 

a period of 30 days, until November 21, 2024. See Doc. 159. Once the automatic stay lapsed, 

“[t]he general rule is that a party may seek to enforce a judgment 30 days after it has been 

entered.” Oskowis v. Sedona Oak-Creek Unified School District #9, No. CV-17-08070-PCTDWL, 2019 WL 6250762, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 22, 2019). Arevalos filed the instant motion on 

December 4, 2024, outside the thirty-day window, requesting a stay of execution of the judgment 

pending resolution of her post-trial motion. Doc. 167 at 1.

Arevalos seeks a waiver of the bond requirement under Rule 62(b), but she instead applies 

the test used to determine whether to stay an injunction pending appeal. See Doc. 167 at 3. 

However, “[t]he applicable rule is Rule 62(b), which courts have interpreted to apply to stays of 

money judgments.” United States v. Schoenfeld, No. 2:21-mc-0076 KJM DB, 2023 WL 170019, 

at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2023). “In the absence of Ninth Circuit guidance, courts in this Circuit 

apply separate tests to determine whether to grant a stay of an injunction under Rule 62(d) and 

whether to grant an unsecured stay under Rule 62(b).” Id. at *2 (applying factors set forth by 

Seventh Circuit in Dillon v. City of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 904–05 (7th Cir. 1988), to determine 

whether to waive supersedeas bond and grant unsecured stay); see also Bolt v. Merrimack 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. S-04-0893 WBS DAD, 2005 WL 2298423, at *2 & n.4 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 20, 2005)) (noting test for evaluating motion to stay injunctive relief pending appeal is 

“irrelevant in a case controlled by Rule 62[b]”); Burris v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 18-03012, 

2022 WL 3285441, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2022) (“[W]hen a judgment-debtor requests a stay of 

enforcement of a money judgment under Rule 62(b) without a bond, the request is not evaluated 

under the traditional four-factor test for evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction but 

under an entirely different standard with different considerations.”).

Under Rule 62(b), “[a]t any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by 

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providing a bond or other security. The stay takes effect when the court approves the bond or 

other security and remains in effect for the time specified in the bond or other security.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 62(b). Arevalos has not provided a bond or other security, thus, her motion is for an 

unsecured stay. Schoenfeld, 2023 WL 170019, at *2 (interpreting motion as one for an unsecured 

stay). “While parties have a right to a stay through a supersedeas bond, an unsecured stay is 

reserved for ‘unusual circumstances.’” Bolt, 2005 WL 2298423, at *2 (citations omitted). As 

noted above, “[w]hen determining whether to . . . grant an unsecured stay, district courts in this 

circuit regularly consider the [Dillon] factors.” Schoenfeld, 2023 WL 170019, at *2.

Arevalos does not analyze the Dillon factors, nor does she proffer an alternative security 

guarantee. Other courts in this district have denied motions to waive a supersedeas bond for these 

reasons. See, e.g., Schoenfeld, 2023 WL 170019, at *3 (declining waiver request on account of 

party’s failure to address Dillon factors); Bolt, 2005 WL 2298423, at *3 (same). To the extent 

Arevalos’s arguments could be considered to address the fourth and fifth Dillon factors, they do 

not warrant an unsecured stay. The fourth and fifth factors address “whether the defendant’s 

ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of money” and 

“whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the requirement to post a 

bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an insecure position.” Dillon, 866 F.2d at 

904–05 (internal quotations, citations, and parentheticals omitted); Schoenfeld, 2023 WL 170019, 

at *2.

Arevalos asserts there is no substantial risk that Hackworth’s ability to collect the 

judgment would be affected “because the judgment is indemnified, in whole or substantial part, 

by the State of California under California Government Code section 825 (providing for payment 

of any judgment against a public employee, with discretionary indemnity for punitive damages).” 

Doc. 167 at 5. However, as Arevalos acknowledges, California Government Code § 825 

indicates that the state has no obligation to indemnify her for the punitive damages portion of the 

judgment. Courts have routinely denied stays when a government entity possesses the discretion

to indemnify its public officers but is not obligated to do so. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hernandez, 

304 F. Supp. 2d 227, 230–31 (D.P.R. 2004) (“[U]ntil there is absolute certainty that the 

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[government] has agreed unconditionally to pay the judgment in this case, the mere existence of 

such possibility is an unacceptable substitute for the guarantees provided by a supersedeas 

bond.”); see also Cotton, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (same). Given that the state of California is not 

obligated to indemnify Arevalos for the punitive damages award, Hackworth’s ability to collect 

the judgment is not guaranteed by California Government Code § 825.

Arevalos also contends that enforcement of the judgment would place her under “great 

financial strain,” preventing her from “paying her bills, such as her home mortgage and car 

payment, as well as supporting her dependent son.” Doc. 167 at 5. She asserts that paying the 

judgment “could force her to seek bankruptcy protection,” and “would negatively affect her 

ability to make required payments to her existing creditors who have loaned her money to buy a 

home and a car and otherwise support herself and her dependent family members.” Id. In sum, 

Arevalos’s main argument seems to be that her inability to pay warrants a waiver of the bond 

requirement. But “[g]iven that the primary purpose of the supersedeas bond is to protect a 

prevailing party’s right to collect on a judgment . . . numerous courts have found that a 

defendant’s financial instability actually weighs in favor of a bond requirement.” Top Brand, 

LLC v. Cozy Comfort Co., LLC, No. CV-21-00597-PHX-SPL, 2024 WL 4972001, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Dec. 4, 2024) (collecting cases). Further, to the extent Arevalos contends the possibility of 

bankruptcy creates risk to her existing creditors, she does not provide any substantive information 

indicating that her existing debts or creditors would supersede Hackworth’s judgment in priority. 

Id.

Even when a plaintiff makes a showing that posting a full bond would impose an undue 

burden, the party seeking the stay must “identify some other mechanism, apart from a full bond, 

to ensure the judgment creditor’s rights would be protected.” Oskowis, 2019 WL 6250762, at *2; 

cf. Bolt, 2005 WL 2298423 at *4 (“[B]ecause defendant bears the burden of formulating an 

alternative plan, the court will not imagine one of its own.”). Here, Arevalos has not attempted to 

identify such a mechanism. Therefore, the Court finds Arevalos is not entitled to a waiver of the 

bond requirement under Rule 62(b), and her motion to stay execution of the judgment without the 

posting of a bond is denied.

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The Local Rules generally require a bond in the amount of 125 percent of the judgment 

amount. L.R. 151(d). However, the Court retains discretion to set the amount of the bond, 

Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1505, n.1. Courts often grant unbonded stays in cases involving 

“demonstrably solvent government entities,” Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 2022 WL 17975984, 

at *6 n.9 (D. Idaho Dec. 28, 2022) (surveying cases). As California Government Code section 

825 provides for State indemnification of Arevalos as to the compensatory damages portion of the 

judgment, the Court will reduce the amount of the required bond accordingly. Additionally, 

Arevalos has identified substantial issues concerning the evidentiary sufficiency of the Eighth 

Amendment verdict and the size of the punitive damages awards. See Doc. 165. Taking into 

account these considerations and the other factors addressed above, the Court finds that a 

supersedeas bond of $15,000 is appropriate in this case to stay execution of the judgment pending 

resolution of Arevalos’s post-trial motion. Cf. Wichansky v. Zowine, No. CV-13-01208-PHXDGC, 2016 WL 3548759, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jun. 30, 2016) (exercising discretion to set bond 

amount).

B. Hackworth’s Motion for Court Order to Enforce Judgment

Hackworth’s motion for a court order to enforce the judgment, Doc. 161, is denied 

without prejudice as premature. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders:

1. Arevalos’s motion to stay execution of judgment without a bond (Doc. 167) is 

DENIED;

2. Upon the posting by Arevalos of a $15,000 supersedeas bond, the judgment in this 

case will be stayed until 30 days after the Court’s order on Arevalos’s pending motion 

under Rules 50(b) and 59(e) (Doc. 165);

3. A temporary stay of the judgment is granted until 10 days from the date of entry of 

this Order; and

4. Hackworth’s motion for a court order to enforce judgment (Doc. 161) is DENIED

without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2025 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:19-cv-01362-KES-CDB Document 175 Filed 01/17/25 Page 8 of 8