Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04883/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04883-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Sex Discrimination

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The parties failed to comply fully with the Court’s orders

on summary judgment briefing. Contrary to the Court’s Order of

June 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed her opposition brief on June 14,

2010. In violation of the Court’s standing order, Defendants filed

their objections to Plaintiff’s evidence in a forty-one page brief

separate from their reply. The parties are admonished to follow

the Court’s standing orders and the Court rules. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE BARBER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF CRESCENT CITY, DOUGLAS PLACK

and ERIC CAPON,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-4883 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 50)

Plaintiff Michelle Barber brings claims for unlawful sex

discrimination, harassment and retaliation against Defendants City

of Crescent City, Douglas Plack and Eric Capon. Defendants move

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff opposes the

motion. Defendants object to evidence submitted by Plaintiff in

support of her opposition.1

 The motion was heard on July 1, 2010. 

Having considered oral argument and the papers submitted by the

parties, the Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment and DENIES it in part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has been a police officer for the City since May 21,

2000. Until 2006, she was the City’s only female police officer. 

Defendant Plack is the City’s chief of police, and Defendant Capon

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 1 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

is an officer with the department. 

Plaintiff claims that several incidents involving Plack,

occurring between 2004 and 2006, created a hostile work

environment. In August, 2004, Plack told Plaintiff that she needed

to “out-perform the other officers,” all of whom were male. Barber

Decl. ¶ 26. From 2004 through 2006, Plack made critical remarks

about Plaintiff’s long-term relationship with a man, stating that

he was “too old” and “no good” for her and that she “should not be

with him.” Barber Decl. ¶ 31. From 2005 through 2006, Plack

commented on Plaintiff’s loss of weight and took “actions of a

sexual nature.” Barber Decl. ¶ 39. In 2006, Plack asked

Plaintiff, “God, where have you been all my life?” and, on another

occasion, grabbed Plaintiff’s belt, pulled it up and down and told

her that her pants were too big for her. Barber Decl. ¶¶ 40 and

41. Also, on an unspecified date, Plaintiff heard Plack ask

another employee, who had received roses from her boyfriend, what

she “‘had to do to get the roses.’” Barber Decl. ¶ 44. On another

unspecified date, Plack was observed to have demeaned and

humiliated Robin Patch, a female clerk in the office. Burke Decl.

¶ 8. Plaintiff asserts that the alleged incidents of

discrimination discussed below also contributed to a hostile

environment. 

In October, 2006, Plaintiff and Defendant Capon applied for a

motorcycle officer position within the police department. At that

time, Plaintiff had a motorcycle endorsement on her driver’s

license; Capon did not. The City convened a panel, comprised of

Rich Enea, Sergeant Stonebreaker of the California Highway Patrol

and Gary Witmer of the Eureka Police Department, to make a

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 2 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

recommendation to Plack. The panel’s recommendation is not

disclosed in the record. Plack claims that Capon was selected

because he had a higher exam score than Plaintiff. However,

Defendants do not reveal Capon’s and Plaintiff’s scores on the

exam. 

On February 16, 2007, the City announced an opening for a

police sergeant position. Beforehand, Plack had encouraged

Plaintiff’s husband, Robert Barber, to apply for the position and

stated that he would be selected if he did so. Mr. Barber

responded that Plaintiff was more qualified than he for the

position. 

On March 29, 2007, Plaintiff notified Plack of her intent to

apply for the sergeant position. On April 6, 2007, Plack met with

Plaintiff and informed her that she was under two investigations,

which placed her in “bad standing” and disqualified her from

applying. The first investigation involved a complaint filed on

March 24, 2007 by Michael Amos, a City resident who alleged that

Plaintiff acted unlawfully toward him on February 4, 2007. The

second involved Plaintiff’s alleged failure to include all relevant

facts in a police report concerning a December, 2006 incident

involving Ronald Fudger. Mr. Barber asserts that, at the time the

job opening was announced, Plack indicated that the exam for the

position would take place in September, 2007. Plack, according to

Mr. Barber, subsequently rescheduled it for June, 2007, which

prevented Plaintiff from taking the test. Only Capon and Officer

Doyle, another male police officer for the City, applied for the

position. Plack ultimately selected Capon. 

In April, 2007, sometime after her April 6 meeting with Plack,

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 3 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff took medical leave. On September 20, 2007, Plaintiff’s

physician cleared her to return to work and, that same day, she

attempted to resume her duties. She was told, however, that she

could not do so until Plack returned from vacation. 

In a letter dated September 20, 2007 and sent to Laura Haban,

who worked in the City’s human resources department, Plaintiff

complained about Plack. She wrote that she intended to file claims

for discrimination and retaliation against the City based on

Plack’s “inappropriate, discriminatory and retaliatory” practices. 

Jacob Decl., Barber Depo., Ex 1. On September 27, 2007, Plaintiff

filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) and the California Department of Fair Employment

and Housing (DFEH), alleging sex discrimination. The City received

notice of the charge in early October. Plaintiff received a rightto-sue letter from the DFEH on or around October 2, 2007 and one

from the EEOC on July 28, 2008. 

Around the second week of October, 2007, Plaintiff went back

to work. Upon her return, she learned that Plack had disenrolled

her from a training course on interviewing and interrogation, for

which she had been registered in March, 2007. Plack states that,

at some unspecified time during the intervening summer, he

substituted a male officer for Plaintiff on the class roster

because he did not know when she would return from medical leave

and he wanted to ensure that “the department would have someone

attend the training.” Plack Decl. ¶ 11. 

Also in October, 2007, Plaintiff was offered the motorcycle

officer position, which had been vacated by Capon after his

promotion to sergeant. Upon taking the job, Plaintiff asked Plack

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 4 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

to afford her the same privileges given to Capon when he took the

position. According to Plaintiff, Plack did not do so. Although

Capon was provided appropriately-sized clothing and gear, Plaintiff

was given Capon’s equipment, which was too large for her, so she

had to use her own equipment. In addition, even though Plaintiff

had already succeeded him, Capon retained possession of the police

department’s motorcycle and did not relinquish it to Plaintiff. On

two occasions, Plaintiff sought assistance from Plack, who rebuffed

her requests. On November 15, 2007, Plaintiff asked Plack to allow

her to take a March, 2008 motorcycle training course, instead of

the January, 2008 session to which she was assigned, to give her

more time to become familiar with the City’s motorcycle. Plack

refused. Plaintiff subsequently failed the training course. 

On March 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed a second charge with the

EEOC and the DFEH, alleging retaliation based on her earlier

charge. The City received notice of this charge on April 2, 2008. 

According to Plaintiff, she received a right-to-sue letter on this

charge on July 28, 2008. 

In July, 2008, while on vacation, Plaintiff participated in

the surveillance of gang activity at the Hollister Motorcycle

Rally. She states that, prior to leaving for vacation, she

verbally informed Capon, her direct supervisor at that time, of her

intent to volunteer at the event. On June 29, 2008, at Haban’s

suggestion, Plaintiff sent a memo to City Manager Mike Young and

Plack, notifying them of her planned participation in the event. 

She placed a copy of the memo in Capon’s mailbox at the police

station. In a memo dated July 6, 2008, Capon chided Plaintiff for

“bypassing all command” within the police department by notifying

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 5 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Young of her intent to attend the event, before contacting either

him or Plack. Capon also warned Plaintiff that her surveillance

activity was “viewed as a conflict of interest” and that she was

not authorized to represent herself as a Crescent City police

officer at the event. Barber Decl., Ex. 17. Plaintiff claims that

she did not receive a copy of this letter until after returning

from Hollister. 

In a July 18, 2008 memorandum, Plack notified Plaintiff that

he intended to issue a written reprimand concerning her

surveillance at Hollister. In particular, the memorandum stated

that Plaintiff violated the department’s policies by failing to

follow the chain of command and creating a conflict of interest

with her employment. In an August 22, 2008 memorandum, Plack

stated that he would not issue a formal written reprimand, but

admonished Plaintiff to follow the chain of command in the future. 

He stated that Plaintiff circumvented the chain of command because

her memo “should have first been submitted to Sergeant Capon and

followed through with the chain of command.” Barber Decl., Ex. 21

at 341. He further asserted that Plaintiff did not afford either

him or Capon sufficient time to respond to her memo. Id. The

purported violation for a conflict of interest was “not sustained.” 

Id. at 342. 

In January, 2009, a sergeant position became available. 

Plaintiff applied in March, 2009 and was informed by Haban that she

qualified to take the examination for the position. After the

application period closed at the end of March, Plaintiff received

no information about when testing would be held. She subsequently

learned that another sergeant position had opened up, recruitment

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 6 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

would be open to outside agencies and the eligibility requirement

concerning years of service would be lowered from five to four

years. Plack decided to enlarge the recruitment pool because

“Barber was the only applicant and we needed more than one

applicant to fill the two open positions.” Plack Decl. ¶ 14. One

of the sergeant positions was filled by a male, and the other has

been left open because of a hiring freeze. Plaintiff remains a

candidate for the open sergeant position. 

Finally, Plaintiff complains about Plack’s ongoing refusal to

appoint her as a field training officer (FTO). FTOs train new

officers in the department and, for the additional responsibility,

receive a pay increase of five percent. Plack sent Plaintiff to

attend training in 2006, and she is qualified to serve as an FTO. 

Plaintiff served as an FTO sometime in late 2006 or early 2007, but

Plack removed her from the position because, after receiving a

personal phone call, she “became extremely upset emotionally” in

front of a new officer. Plack Decl. ¶ 15. Since then, Plack has

not assigned Plaintiff as an FTO because her conduct concerning the

phone call “fell below the professional standards of conduct in the

police department,” her “attendance has not been consistent since

2007” and she encourages “members of the department to leave the

department,” which clashes with Plack’s expectation that FTOs

project a “positive image of the department . . . and maintain

morale among peace officers in the department.” Id. 

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on October 24, 2008. She

filed an amended complaint on December 31, 2008, which the Court

dismissed with leave to amend on March 17, 2009. On March 31,

2009, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint, which contains five

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 7 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

claims: (1) a Title VII claim against the City for “sexual

discrimination, harassment and hostile environment;” (2) a Title

VII claim against the City for retaliation; (3) a claim under the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) against the City

for “sexual discrimination, harassment and retaliation;” (4) a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants for violating

her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by

discriminating against her and harassing her on the basis of her

sex; and (5) a claim under § 1983 against Plack and Capon for

violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and

due process by retaliating against her. The complaint also pleads

that, on March 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a third charge of

discrimination with the DFEH, alleging continuing discrimination,

harassment and a hostile work environment, and retaliation for

protected activity. She asserts that she received a right-to-sue

letter for this charge on the same day. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 8 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods: 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 9 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

I. Sex Discrimination Claims

A. Applicable Law

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),

and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248

(1981), the Supreme Court established a burden-shifting framework

for evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s evidence in

employment discrimination suits. The same burden-shifting

framework is used when analyzing claims under FEHA and § 1983. 

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996)

(FEHA); Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 753

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 10 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 In Anthoine, the Ninth Circuit applied the McDonnell-Douglas

framework to the plaintiff’s § 1983 employment discrimination claim

but noted that courts are not bound to follow the McDonnell-Douglas

framework in assessing such claims. 605 F.3d at 753 (citing Keyser

v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir.

2001)). The Court applies the McDonnell-Douglas analysis here

because the parties have not proffered an alternative. 

11

(9th Cir. 2010) (§ 1983).2 Within this framework, plaintiffs may

establish a prima facie case of discrimination by reference to

circumstantial evidence; to do so, plaintiffs must show that they

are members of a protected class; that they were qualified for the

position they held or sought; that they were subjected to an

adverse employment decision; and that they were replaced by someone

who was not a member of the protected class or that the

circumstances of the decision otherwise raised an inference of

discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506

(1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas and Burdine). Once plaintiffs

establish a prima facie case, a presumption of discriminatory

intent arises. Id. To overcome this presumption, defendants must

come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

employment decision. Id. at 506-07. If defendants provide that

explanation, the presumption disappears and plaintiffs must satisfy

their ultimate burden of persuasion that defendants acted with

discriminatory intent. Id. at 510-11. 

To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs must then introduce

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the reason the employer articulated is a pretext for

discrimination. Plaintiffs may rely on the same evidence used to

establish a prima facie case or put forth additional evidence. See

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000);

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 11 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1994). 

However, “in those cases where the prima facie case consists of no

more than the minimum necessary to create a presumption of

discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff has failed to

raise a triable issue of fact.” Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890. 

Plaintiffs can provide additional evidence of “pretext

(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally

inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by

showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the

employer.” Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d

1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). When plaintiffs present indirect evidence that the

proffered explanation is a pretext for discrimination, “‘that

evidence must be specific and substantial to defeat the employer's

motion for summary judgment.’” EEOC v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044,

1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413

F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)). When plaintiffs proffer direct

evidence that the defendant’s explanation is a pretext for

discrimination, “very little evidence” is required to avoid summary

judgment. Boeing, 577 F.3d at 1049.

 The Ninth Circuit has instructed that district courts must be

cautious in granting summary judgment for employers on

discrimination claims. See Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551,

1564 (9th Cir. 1994).

B. Analysis

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims under Title VII, FEHA and

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 12 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

§ 1983 on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie

case because she fails to produce evidence supporting an inference

of discriminatory motive and (2) even if she did, she does not

create a triable issue on pretext. Defendants apparently concede

that Plaintiff is in a protected class, that she was qualified for

the positions she held or sought and that adverse employment

actions were taken against her. 

1. Plack

Although Plaintiff complains of several incidents involving

Plack, she does not identify which ones constitute adverse

employment actions for which she claims liability. Based on

Defendants’ motion and Plaintiff’s opposition, it appears that

there are seven: (1) the failure to promote Plaintiff to the

motorcycle officer position in October, 2006; (2) her “bad

standing” designation based on the Amos and Fudger incidents,

leading to her disqualification for the sergeant position in 2007;

(3) her removal from a training course in October, 2007; (4) the

failure to provide her with adequate equipment and an opportunity

to train after she became a motorcycle officer in October, 2007;

(5) her write-up for the Hollister event; (6) the expansion of the

applicant pool, which resulted in the failure to promote her to

sergeant in 2009; and (7) the failure to assign her as an FTO. An

adverse employment action is one that “‘materially affect[s] the

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of . . .

employment.’” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115,

1126 (9th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original). Defendants do not

argue that any of these actions fall outside this definition.

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 13 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Defendants do not dispute that Plack was the ultimate

decision-maker with respect to these actions. Thus, with regard to

Plaintiff’s prima facie case, the relevant inquiry is whether there

are any circumstances that can give rise to an inference that Plack

acted with discriminatory intent. 

Thomas Burke, who worked as a sergeant for the police

department under Plack, identifies several discriminatory,

demeaning or derogatory comments Plack made about women. In the

context of hiring two female candidates for open police officer

positions in 2006, Plack remarked to Burke that “he could not stand

the idea of having two more women on the Police Force who would

have the same ‘monthly’ difficulties as Officer Barber.” Burke

Decl. ¶ 5. Burke also states that, each time Plack raised concerns

about Plaintiff, Plack attributed them to “the fact that she was a

woman.” Burke Decl. ¶ 4. Burke also witnessed the exchange

between Plack and a female employee who had received roses, when

Plack asked what she “had to do” to deserve roses. Burke Decl.

¶ 6; Barber Decl. ¶ 44. Even though not all of these comments were

directed at Plaintiff or related to the actions taken against her,

when considered along with Plack’s actions toward her, they support

an inference of discriminatory animus. Boeing, 577 F.3d at 1050. 

“Where a decisionmaker makes a discriminatory remark against a

member of the plaintiff’s class, a reasonable factfinder may

conclude that discriminatory animus played a role in the challenged

decision.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027,

1038 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, Plaintiff makes out her prima facie

case against Plack. 

Plack provides legitimate, non-discriminatory bases to support

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 14 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

his decisions, except for those concerning the failure to provide

Plaintiff with adequate equipment for and time to train on the

City’s motorcycle. For those actions for which Plack articulates a

basis, Plaintiff must create a triable issue on whether the

proffered reasons are mere pretext. Direct evidence suggesting

Plack harbored discriminatory animus satisfies this burden. In

Boeing, the Ninth Circuit held that the EEOC could prove that

Boeing’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual based

on the same evidence of discriminatory animus used to make out its

prima facie case. The court stated,

The discriminatory animus exhibited by Castron's

supervisor constitutes direct evidence of pretext, even

though the comments did not refer specifically to

Castron. Based on Charlton's sexist comments, a jury

might reasonably infer that Charlton's decision to

transfer Castron, rather than a male coworker about whom

she complained, to a new position where her job was less

secure, may have resulted from improper motivations,

including discriminatory intent, retaliatory intent, or

both. 

Boeing, 577 F.3d at 1050. As noted above, very little direct

evidence of pretext is required to avoid summary judgment. Id. at

1049 (quoting Lam, 40 F.3d at 1564). 

In addition to direct evidence, Plaintiff offers specific and

substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer

that some of Plack’s reasons were pretextual. Concerning the

motorcycle position, Plack asserts that he chose Capon because he

had a higher examination score than Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff

states that, at the time of testing, she had a motorcycle

endorsement on her driver’s license, whereas Capon told her that he

did not. This supports an inference that Capon did not have

experience with riding a motorcycle on public streets and highways. 

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 15 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

See Cal. Vehicle Code § 12500(b). As a result, Plaintiff may have

been more qualified. Notably, Defendants do not proffer Capon’s

and Plaintiff’s scores on the exam, nor do they disclose the

recommendation of the panel convened by the City. 

With regard to his decision to place Plaintiff in “bad

standing,” which disqualified her from applying for the sergeant

position, Plack states that she was under investigation for the

Amos and Fudger incidents. However, Mr. Barber asserts that, when

the sergeant position was announced, Plack stated that the exam

would take place in September, 2007. Plack then advanced the test

to June, 2007, which precluded Plaintiff from testing because of

her “bad standing” designation. Plaintiff and Mr. Barber contend

that she would have been eligible to take the exam had the date

remained set for September. Plack knew as early as January, 2007,

after he spoke with Mr. Barber, that Plaintiff might apply for the

position. Based on the rescheduling of the exam date and the

timing of the Amos and Fudger investigations, a reasonable jury

could infer that the proffered reasons were pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Plaintiff was the only woman at the police

department who qualified to apply for the position and, ultimately,

Capon was selected for the position, which further supports an

inference of discrimination. 

Plack asserts that he removed Plaintiff from a training

course, scheduled for November, 2007, sometime during the preceding

summer because he did not know when she would return from medical

leave. However, Plaintiff was replaced with a male officer and she

provides evidence that, in 2007, male officers received

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 16 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff, who was on leave between April and September,

received fourteen hours of training in 2007; the other two female

officers received twelve hours each. That year, the male officer

with the least number of hours received sixty-eight hours of

training.

17

significantly more hours of training than female officers.3

Furthermore, the cancellation policy for the course required twoweeks notice to avoid being charged the full tuition fee, which

undercuts Plack’s assertion that it was necessary to disenroll

Plaintiff over the summer. If all inferences are taken in

Plaintiff’s favor, a jury could conclude that Plack’s proffered

basis was a pretext for sex-based discrimination.

As for the Hollister event, Plack asserts that action was

taken against Plaintiff because she represented herself “as a peace

officer of the department without getting prior approval to attend

the event” and failed “to follow department procedures relating to

outside employment.” Plack Decl. ¶ 13. As noted above, Plack

complained that Plaintiff bypassed the chain of command by not

first submitting her letter to Capon and not affording him and

Capon sufficient time to respond. However, Plaintiff states that,

around the first week of June, 2008, she informed Capon, who was

her supervisor at the time, of her intent to participate in the

Hollister event. She claims that, at that time, Capon approved of

her attendance. She asserts that she also informed Plack, through

a letter placed in his work mailbox, on June 29, 2008. A jury

could credit Plaintiff’s testimony, which contradicts Plack’s

assertion that she failed to obtain prior approval and that she

circumvented the chain of command. 

Concerning Plaintiff’s March, 2009 application for the

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 17 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

sergeant position, Plack contends that he had to expand the

applicant pool, through recruiting outside the agency and lowering

the years-of-service requirement, because two sergeant positions

opened up. He explains that “Barber was the only applicant and we

needed more than one applicant to fill the two open positions.” 

Plack Decl. ¶ 14. However, only one person was hired, a male.

Plack states that Plaintiff remains “in the running” for the

remaining position, but that a hiring freeze prohibits him from

taking any further action. Id. Plaintiff asserts, however, that

she never received any notice of a second position becoming

available. Such an absence of notice can create a genuine issue as

to whether the reasons given were pretextual. Cf. McGinest v. GTE

Svc. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the

absence of any documentation confirming that a company hiring

freeze was in place during the relevant time period is sufficient

to raise a genuine factual dispute as to whether the asserted

reason was pretextual”). Moreover, that Plack expanded the scope

of recruitment only after determining that Plaintiff was the sole

qualified candidate for the position also supports an inference of

pretext. 

Plaintiff, however, does not offer specific and substantial

evidence to refute all of Plack’s reasons for not assigning her as

an FTO. Plack proffers three bases: (1) Plaintiff’s unprofessional

conduct in front of a new officer after receiving a personal

telephone call, (2) her inconsistent attendance and (3) her

disparaging remarks about the department. She creates a triable

issue on whether she made disparaging remarks. But, with regard to

Plack’s first reason, Plaintiff only offers inadmissible hearsay

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 18 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

evidence that the officer was unfazed by her reaction, which the

Court cannot credit. Even if she had competent testimony, the

officer’s lack of a negative response does not contradict Plack’s

assertion that she was unprofessional. As for her inconsistent

attendance, Plaintiff does not dispute that she was on leave for

several months between 2007 and 2010, but asserts that much of that

leave was attributable to a hip injury she sustained in 2004. This

assertion does not create a triable issue on whether Plack’s reason

was false. Nevertheless, even though Plaintiff fails to create a

triable issue through indirect evidence, as explained above, she

may pursue liability for Plack’s failure to assign her as an FTO

based on direct evidence of his discriminatory animus. 

Thus, Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and offers direct

and indirect evidence to support inferences that Plack’s nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, summary

judgment is not warranted on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims

under Title VII and FEHA against the City or on that under § 1983

against Plack. 

2. Capon

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims involving Capon appear to

concern his involvement in the disciplinary action arising from the

Hollister event. She claims that Capon “aided and abetted and/or

co-conspired” with Plack, but any evidence of this supposed

conspiracy is irrelevant to creating an inference of sex-based

animus. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to offer evidence that such a

conspiracy even existed. 

Because Plaintiff offers no direct or circumstantial evidence

that Capon harbored a discriminatory motive, she fails to make out

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 19 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

a prima facie case against him. Accordingly, the Court grants

summary judgment against Plaintiff on her § 1983 claim for sexbased discrimination against Capon and on her Title VII and FEHA

discrimination claims against the City, to the extent they rest on

actions taken by Capon. 

II. Harassment and Hostile Work Environment Claims

California courts apply federal decisions interpreting Title

VII to analyze FEHA sexual harassment claims. Lyle v. Warner Bros.

Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 278-79 (2006). A plaintiff may

prove sexual harassment by demonstrating that an employer has

created a hostile or abusive work environment. Meritor Sav. Bank

v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986). To prevail on a hostile

workplace claim premised on sex, a plaintiff must show: (1) that

he or she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual

nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work

environment. Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th

Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must show that the work environment was

abusive from both a subjective and an objective point of view. 

Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034. Whether the workplace is

objectively hostile must be determined from the perspective of a

reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics as the

plaintiff. Id. Although the “mere utterance of an . . . epithet

which engenders offensive feelings in an employee” does not alter

the employee’s terms and conditions of employment sufficiently to

create a hostile work environment, “when the workplace is permeated

with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’” such an

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 20 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

environment exists. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67. Neither “simple

teasing,” “offhand comments,” nor “isolated incidents” alone

constitute a hostile work environment. Faragher v. City of Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). “An employer is strictly liable

for harassment committed by its agents or supervisors . . . .” 

Jones v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1377

(2007).

A. Plack

Plaintiff provides evidence that she personally experienced,

witnessed and knew of allegedly harassing actions taken by Plack. 

Plaintiff testified that Burke told her that Plack referred to two

new female officers as “‘once a months.’” Goldman Decl., Barber

Depo. at 184:19-185:2. She also recounted Plack’s comments to her

about her appearance and the instance when he grabbed her belt and

pulled it up and down to demonstrate that her pants were loosefitting. Burke also observed instances with Robin Patch, during

which Plack was demeaning and humiliating; Plaintiff states that

she was aware of one of these events. Plaintiff also recounts

Plack’s question to a female clerk about what she “had to do” to

have her boyfriend send roses. Plack provides no evidence that he

treated men in a similar fashion. Considered along with

Plaintiff’s evidence of the adverse actions taken against her, this

evidence could lead a reasonable jury to infer that Plack sexually

harassed female employees in the workplace, which created a hostile

environment. 

Citing Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 4th 511

(1998), Defendants argue that Plack cannot be liable for all of his

conduct because some events were not in Plaintiff’s presence. 

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 21 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

Defendants misread Beyda, which explicitly stated, “We . . .

believe that a reasonable person may be affected by knowledge that

other workers are being sexually harassed in the workplace, even if

he or she does not personally witness that conduct.” 65 Cal. App.

4th at 519 (emphasis added). The court reasoned,

To the degree that [Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590 (1989)] may be understood to require

that a plaintiff personally witness any act relied upon

to prove hostile environment, we respectfully disagree.

As we have explained, personal observation is not the

only way that a person can perceive, and be affected by,

harassing conduct in the workplace. One can also be

affected by knowledge of that harassment. In reaching

this conclusion, we caution that mere workplace gossip is

not a substitute for proof. Evidence of harassment of

others, and of a plaintiff's awareness of that

harassment, is subject to the limitations of the hearsay

rule. It is not a substitute for direct testimony by the

victims of those acts, or by witnesses to those acts.

Beyda, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 519-20. Subsequent state cases have

relied on Beyda for this principle. See, e.g., Hope v. Cal. Youth

Authority, 134 Cal. App. 4th 577, 590 (2005). Federal courts

applying Title VII likewise state that harassing conduct outside

the presence of a plaintiff is probative of a hostile work

environment claim, so long as the plaintiff has knowledge of the

incidents. See, e.g., Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502,

515 (6th Cir. 2009); Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d

95, 110-12 (3d Cir. 1999); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d

1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff was aware of the

workplace incidents that took place outside of her presence and she

presents non-hearsay evidence that they occurred. Thus, Plack’s

conduct directed to other employees can support her claim that she

was exposed to a hostile environment.

Defendants also argue that there is no evidence that Plack’s

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 22 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. They rely primarily

on Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2000). However, the conduct at issue there, although

offensive, “was concentrated on one occasion” and in “the wake of a

dispute about a nurse's failure to follow instructions.” Id.

Here, Plack’s conduct is not so isolated, nor are there any

circumstances to suggest that his actions were motivated by reasons

other than the employees’ sex. 

Consequently, summary judgment is not warranted on Plaintiff’s

harassment and hostile environment claims under Title VII and FEHA

against the City and under § 1983 against Plack. 

B. Capon

As to Capon, Plaintiff only complains of his conduct related

to the Hollister event. However, as explained above, she fails to

provide any evidence that Capon harbored any discriminatory animus

or took action on the basis of her sex. Even if she did, his

involvement in the action taken against her for the Hollister event

would not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a claim

that he created a hostile work environment. Accordingly, the Court

grants summary judgment in favor of Capon on Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim for harassment and her Title VII and FEHA harassment claims

against the City, to the extent they rest on actions taken by

Capon. 

III. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff brings retaliation claims under Title VII, FEHA and

§ 1983. For her § 1983 claim, she asserts that Plack and Capon

retaliated against her in violation of her equal protection and due

process rights. However, this does not appear to be a legally

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 23 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

cognizable claim; generally, a retaliation claim under § 1983 is

brought for the violation of a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff does not identify authority to support the existence of

the § 1983 retaliation claim she pleads. Accordingly, Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for

retaliation. 

Claims for retaliation under Title VII and FEHA are analyzed

under the McDonnell-Douglas framework outlined above. Lam, 40 F.3d

at 1559 n.11; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042

(2005). To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a

plaintiff must “show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected

activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse

employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the

protected activity and the employer’s action.” Yanowitz, 36 Cal.

4th at 1042; accord Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727,

731 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff contends that she engaged in protected activities by

sending her September 20, 2007 letter to Haban, filing charges with

the EEOC and the DFEH on September 27, 2007 and March 12, 2008, and

filing her DFEH charge on March 30, 2009. As with her claims for

discrimination, Plaintiff does not enumerate clearly the adverse

employment actions she attributes to unlawful retaliation. 

However, because she first engaged in protected activity on

September 20, 2007, only those actions that transpired after this

date could be considered retaliatory. Thus, Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims are read to encompass (1) her removal from a

training course in October, 2007; (2) the failure to provide her

with adequate equipment and an opportunity to prepare for her

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 24 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

motorcycle training course in November and December, 2007; (3) her

write-up for the Hollister event in July, 2008; (4) the expansion

of the applicant pool, which led to the failure to promote her to

sergeant in 2009; and (5) the ongoing failure to assign her as an

FTO. As noted above, Plaintiff’s claims concerning Capon appear to

rest solely on her complaints about the actions arising from the

Hollister event. 

Defendants appear to concede that Plaintiff satisfies the

first and second elements of her prima facie case. They argue,

however, that summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff does

not establish a causal link between her protected activity and the

conduct of which she complains and, even if she did, she fails to

create a triable issue on whether the proffered reasons were

pretext for a retaliatory motive. 

Plaintiff fails to offer any direct evidence of retaliatory

causation. However, a “causal link may be established by an

inference derived from circumstantial evidence, ‘such as the

employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected

activities and the proximity in time between the protected action

and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.’” Jordan v.

Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Yartzoff v.

Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)); accord McRae v. Dep’t

of Corr. & Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th 377, 388 (2006) (“A plaintiff

can satisfy his or her initial burden under the test by producing

evidence of nothing more than the employer's knowledge that the

employee engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time

between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision.”).

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 25 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

The only evidence offered to show Plack’s knowledge of

Plaintiff’s protected activity is a letter her counsel sent to him

on August 1, 2008. The letter, which concerned Plack’s intent to

reprimand Plaintiff for the Hollister event, referred to her

charges filed with the EEOC and the DFEH. See Barber Decl., Ex. 19

at 301. However, Plaintiff does not proffer evidence that he knew

of this protected activity before he received the letter. Without

such knowledge, Plack cannot be held liable for retaliating against

her by removing her from the training course, failing to provide

her with adequate equipment, writing her up for the Hollister event

or refusing to assign her as an FTO; these actions either occurred

or were set into motion before August 1. The only action initiated

thereafter was Plack’s expansion of recruiting for the 2009

sergeant position, which took place in or around March, 2009. This

occurred almost eight months after the August 1 letter was sent,

which negates any causal inference based on temporal proximity. 

Consequently, Plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case that

Plack retaliated against her. 

At the hearing on this motion, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded

the record contains no evidence that Capon knew of Plaintiff’s

protected activity. Thus, she cannot maintain her retaliation

claims against Capon either. 

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of

Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation. 

IV. City’s Liability under § 1983

Plaintiff seeks to hold the City liable under § 1983 for

Plack’s conduct, on the theory that the police department has a

custom or practice of sex discrimination. 

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 26 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when the enforcement

of a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the

violation of a constitutionally protected right. Monell v. Dep’t

of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1978). “To hold a local

government liable for an official’s conduct, a plaintiff must first

establish that the official (1) had final policymaking authority

‘concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular

constitutional or statutory violation at issue’ and (2) was the

policymaker for the local governing body for the purposes of the

particular act.” Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting McMillan v. Monroe County Ala., 520 U.S.

781, 785 (1997)).

Under California law, Plack has final policymaking authority

over the Crescent City Police Department. See Cal. Gov. Code

§ 38630(a) (“The police department of a city is under the control

of the chief of police.”); Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d

337, 341 (9th Cir. 1988). In response, Defendants proffer the

declaration of the City’s city manager, who asserts that “Plack is

not a policymaker for the City” and that the “City Council is

responsible for setting City policy.” Butler Decl. ¶ 2. Although

these statements may be true, they do not address Plack’s

policymaking authority over the police department and, more

importantly, over the particular acts taken against Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff may hold the City liable under § 1983

for Plack’s conduct. 

V. Qualified Immunity

Plack maintains that the doctrine of qualified immunity

shields him from liability for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. The

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 27 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

defense of qualified immunity protects “government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set

out a two-step analysis to determine whether qualified immunity

shields an official from liability. Under Saucier, the threshold

question was whether, if all factual disputes were resolved in

favor of the party asserting the injury, the evidence would show

the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at

201. If a violation could be made out on the allegations, the next

step was to ask whether the constitutional right at issue was

clearly established. Id.

As explained above, the evidence could support a finding that

Plack violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to equal

protection. Further, it has been long established that Plaintiff

has a constitutional right to be free of sex-based discrimination

in her employment. See Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,

1011 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, qualified immunity does not

shield Plack from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. 

VI. Evidentiary Objections

To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to which

Defendants object, those objections are overruled. Defendants

object on hearsay grounds to testimony by Plaintiff’s witnesses

concerning Plack’s statements. Because Plack’s statements were

described by witnesses with personal knowledge, they are admissible

as party-opponent admissions. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 28 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Defendants also object to Plaintiff’s reliance on the Crescent City

Police Department Annual Report for 2007 on the basis that it is

inadmissible hearsay and that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 1002,

she must proffer the original report. However, as a publication of

the City, the report constitutes a party-opponent admission. 

Further, Plaintiff need not submit the original report because it

is in the possession of and offered against the City. Fed. R.

Evid. 1004(3). 

To the extent the Court did not rely on evidence to which the

parties objected, the objections are overruled as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Docket No. 50.) 

Summary judgment is granted against Plaintiff on all of her claims

against Capon and her Title VII and FEHA discrimination and

harassment claims against the City, to the extent that they rest on

his conduct. Summary judgment is also granted against Plaintiff on

all of her claims for retaliation. In all other respects,

Defendants’ motion is denied. 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are: (1) a Title VII claim

against the City for “sexual discrimination, harassment and hostile

environment;” (2) a claim under the FEHA against the City for

sexual discrimination and harassment; and (3) a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and Plack for violating her right to

equal protection by discriminating against her and harassing her on

the basis of her sex.

The Court refers the parties to a magistrate judge for

settlement purposes. A final pretrial conference is scheduled for

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 29 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

October 12, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. A five-day trial is scheduled to

begin on October 25, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:08-cv-04883-CW Document 65 Filed 07/23/10 Page 30 of 30