Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00050/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES CHATMAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 08-0050 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On January 4, 2008, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at High Desert State

Prison in Susanville, California, and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By separate order filed concurrently herewith, plaintiff has

been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988).

B. Background

Plaintiff alleges the following: On June 6, 2000, at which time plaintiff was

incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the San Mateo County Jail, he refused to go to court. In

response, jail officials forcibly removed plaintiff from his cell and strapped and chained him

into a “restraint chair.” When plaintiff complained that he was in severe pain from being so

restrained, jail officials ignored his pleas to be released and held him in the restraint chair for

several hours, using force to revive plaintiff when he lost consciousness. Thereafter, plaintiff

was placed in administrative segregation, where he remained for several months. During that

period, jail officials failed to alleviate plaintiff’s physical suffering or provide him with basic

necessities, confiscated his legal materials, and retaliated against him for filing administrative

grievances. On November 20, 2000, plaintiff was released from administrative segregation

and transferred to San Quentin State Prison. Plaintiff alleges the violation of his

constitutional rights as a result of the injuries he incurred at the San Mateo County Jail. He

seeks monetary damages. 

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s allegations, when liberally construed, state cognizable claims for relief. See

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (holding Due Process Clause of Fourteenth

Amendment protects post-arraignment pretrial detainee from conditions of confinement

amounting to punishment); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (holding prisoners

have constitutional right of access to the courts); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding prisoners may not be retaliated against for using administrative

grievance process). Plaintiff’s claims cannot go forward, however, as they are barred by the

applicable statute of limitations. 

Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that normally may not be

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raised by the court sua sponte, it may be grounds for sua sponte dismissal of an in forma

pauperis complaint where the defense is complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings

or the court’s own records. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Here, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, for the reasons

discussed below, the Court finds, from the face of plaintiff’s complaint and the court’s

records, the statute of limitations is a complete and obvious defense to the claims raised

herein. 

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. See Elliott v. City of Union

City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, the appropriate period is that of the forum

state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,

276 (1985). In the event the state has multiple statutes of limitations for different torts,

federal courts considering claims brought pursuant to § 1983 borrow the general or residual

statute for personal injury actions. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Effective January 1, 2003, California’s general residual statute of limitations for personal

injury actions is two years; prior to that date, the limitations period for such actions was one

year. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, a

federal court must give effect to a state’s tolling provisions. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S.

536, 543-44 (1989). In California, incarceration of the plaintiff is a disability that tolls the

statute for a maximum of two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1. 

A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that

forms the basis of that cause of action. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th

Cir. 1999); Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802. Here, plaintiff alleges he was injured by jail officials

during the period of his confinement at the San Mateo County Jail, a period comprising the

dates June 6, 2000 through November 20, 2000; consequently, plaintiff’s claims of injury

accrued no later than November 20, 2000. As plaintiff had three years from the date on

which his claims accrued in which to file his complaint against defendants, he was required

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The two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which statute became

effective January 1, 2003, does not apply retroactively to claims that accrued prior to that

date. See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55. Thus, plaintiff had one year under the pre-2003

statute of limitations, plus an additional two years under the statute that tolls for the disability

of imprisonment, in which to file his action.

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The three civil rights actions filed in this court during the relevant time period are

Chatman v. Horsley, C 00-2643 MMC (PR), Chatman v. Adams, C 01-3301 MMC (PR), and

Chatman v. Early, C 03-2820 MMC (PR). The first action, Chatman v. Horsley, concerned

plaintiff’s conditions of confinement at the San Mateo County Jail, where he was then

incarcerated. 

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The two civil rights actions filed in the Eastern District are Chatman v. Felker, C 03-

02415 JAM KJM (PC), and Chatman v. Tyner, C 03-06636 AWI SMS (PC).

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A review of the federal courts’ “U.S. Party/Case Index” shows that from the year

2000 to the present, plaintiff has filed nine civil actions in this court (six civil rights actions

and three habeas corpus actions) and eight civil actions in the Eastern District (six civil rights

actions and two habeas corpus actions). 

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to do so by no later than November 20, 2003.1 Plaintiff, however, did not file the instant

action until January 1, 2008.

As plaintiff filed his complaint more than four years after the statute of limitations had

expired, the instant action is time-barred. The Court further finds that plaintiff’s complaint,

when read with the requisite liberality, contains no allegation that would suggest plaintiff is

able to show he is entitled to any period of statutory tolling other than that discussed above. 

See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding complaint may

be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds where allegations therein, even when read with

required liberality, would not permit plaintiff to prove statute was tolled). Such conclusion is

further supported by the court’s records, which show that, during the relevant statutory

period, plaintiff was able to file several other civil actions in federal court. Specifically,

between June 6, 2000, the date of accrual of any claim based on the first injury at issue in the

instant action, and November 20, 2003, the date on which the statute of limitations expired,

plaintiff filed three civil rights actions in this court, one of which raised claims based on

plaintiff’s conditions of confinement at the San Mateo County Jail.2

 Additionally, during the

same statutory period, plaintiff filed two civil rights actions in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of California.3 4

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In sum, even when the complaint is read with the required liberality, it is obvious from

the face of the complaint and the court’s records that the claims have been brought outside of

the applicable period of limitations, and, accordingly, the action will be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED with

prejudice as time-barred. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 28, 2008 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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