Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01077/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01077-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332lr Diversity - Labor

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17cv1077-JLS (JLB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA T. GONZALEZ, on Behalf of 

Herself and All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

EXAMINATION MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC., a Nevada Corporation; 

LABORATORY CORPORATION OF 

AMERICA HOLDINGS, a Delaware 

Corporation; and DOES 1–10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv1077-JLS (JLB)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO FILE THIRD PARTY 

COMPLAINT; AND (2) VACATING 

HEARING

(ECF No. 22)

Presently before the Court is Defendant Examination Management Services, Inc. 

(“EMSI”)’s Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint, (ECF No. 22). EMSI seeks 

leave to add Soko United Corporation (“Soko”) as a defendant, stating Plaintiff incorrectly 

named EMSI as her employer when Soko is Plaintiff’s actual employer. (Id. at 3–4). EMSI 

seeks to implead Soko “for the purposes of assigning liability” to Soko if any liability is 

found with respect to Plaintiff’s allegations. (Id. at 3.)

Also before the Court is Plaintiff Maria Gonzalez’s Response to Motion, (ECF No. 

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23). In her Response, Plaintiff states she “does not oppose EMSI’s filing of the proposed 

Third-Party Complaint” but reserves her right to strike, sever, or try separately the thirdparty claim and assert claims against the third party, and clarifies her belief that EMSI is 

correctly named as a defendant because EMSI is her employer. (Id. at 5, 8–9.)

ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) governs when a defendant may bring a third 

party into a case. It provides, in pertinent part:

A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and 

complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the 

claim against it. But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the 

court’s leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after 

serving its original answer.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Here, because Defendant’s original answer was filed on August 28, 

2017, leave of the Court is required. 

As to the purpose of Rule 14(a), Professors Wright and Miller explain:

The claim against the third-party defendant must be based upon plaintiff’s 

claim against defendant. The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is that 

defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability 

asserted against him by the original plaintiff. The mere fact that the alleged 

third-party claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as the original 

claim is not enough.

6 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1446 (3d ed. 2017). “The 

decision whether to implead a third party defendant is within the sound discretion of the 

district court.” Southwest Adm., Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 

1986). “In deciding whether to permit a defendant to file a third party complaint, the court 

considers (1) prejudice to the original plaintiff; (2) complication of issues at trial; (3) the 

likelihood of trial delay; and (4) the timeliness of the motion.” Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F.

Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing 

Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 439 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971)); see also Green Valley Corp. v. Caldo 

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Oil Co., No. 09-cv-04028-LHK, 2011 WL 1465883, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) 

(same). 

First, EMSI’s claim against Soko is based on Plaintiff’s claim against EMSI. EMSI 

alleges if anyone is liable to Plaintiff, it is Soko, and is therefore attempting to transfer 

liability to Soko. Further, as to the three factors from Irwin, Plaintiff does not oppose the 

Motion and does not argue she would be prejudiced by the addition of Soko to the case. 

The Court agrees and finds no prejudice. Complication of issues and delay of the trial are 

not significant concerns because this case is still in its infancy and trial has not yet been 

set. Further, discovery has not yet begun in this case, and Magistrate Judge Burkhardt has 

already ordered that if Soko is added to the case, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) 

conference shall be completed within 14 days of Soko’s filing of its answer to the complaint 

or the district court’s ruling on any Rule 12 motion by Soko, whichever is sooner. (ECF 

No. 20, at 2.) Finally, the Court finds the present Motion timely, as it was filed with no 

undue delay, approximately one month after Defendant filed its answer.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. Accordingly, 

the Court VACATES the hearing set for November 16, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2017

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