Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01744/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01744-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 22, 2015*

Decided September 25, 2015

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1744

MARGARET L. PULERA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BENJAMIN J. COOPMAN,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14-C-0761

Lynn Adelman, Judge.

Order

Margaret Pulera sued Benjamin Coopman, Rock County’s Director of Public Works. 

She contends that Coopman’s support of a highway reconfiguration near her home violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that the contention is so weak that the suit does not come within federal subjectmatter jurisdiction. As the district court understood Pulera’s contentions, “equal protec-

 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

Case: 15-1744 Document: 16 Filed: 09/25/2015 Pages: 2
No. 15-1744 Page 2

tion” is just a label attached to a contention that Coopman failed to follow the rules established by state law, particularly Wis. Stat. §§ 82.10 and 82.21.

Pulera contended in the district court that she is a “class of one” who bore the brunt 

of Coopman’s animus. See Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000); Del Marcelle v. 

Brown County, 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). She maintains that Coopman ignored her complaints about the safety of the proposed new traffic pattern and wrongfully persuaded the Rock County Board of Supervisors to approve his proposal. She labeled Coopman’s advocacy as “arbitrary, irrational, and discriminatory to [her] and anyone else who uses these roads” (italics added). The language we have emphasized, and 

similar statements, led the district judge to conclude that Pulera has not been singled 

out for adverse treatment, because traffic patterns affect everyone who uses the road.

Pulera insists on appeal that Coopman has been hostile and vindictive toward her 

personally, but that does not meet the district judge’s conclusion that road-construction 

decisions affect thousands of people, not just one. The Supreme Court has held that “essentially fictitious” claims do not come within federal jurisdiction. See Hagans v. Lavine, 

415 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1974). Pulera may well have a claim based on state law, but it must 

be litigated in state court (the parties are not of diverse citizenship); applying a federal 

label to a state-law claim does not permit a litigant to shift the forum for the lawsuit.

The parties’ other contentions need not be discussed.

Because this suit was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal is 

without prejudice to reinstitution in state court, under state law.

AFFIRMED

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