Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00928/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00928-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE LUIS OCAMPO-VILLANUEVA,

Movant-Defendant,

Civ. Case No. 12cv0928 BTM

Crim. Case No.11cr2342 BTM

ORDER DENYING § 2255 MOTION

AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Plaintiff.

Jorge Luis Ocampo-Villanueva (“Defendant”), a federal inmate proceeding pro se, 

has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In an Information filed on June 9, 2011, Defendant was charged with a violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326 (a) and (b), deported alien found in the United States. (ECF No. 10.) 

Defendant waived indictment and subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a Plea Agreement.

(ECF Nos. 11, 20.) As part of the Plea Agreement, Defendant acknowledged that

sentencing was within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge. (Plea Agreement 6, ECF

No. 17.) Defendant also stipulated to an order of removal from the United States upon

serving his criminal sentence and waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his

1 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction or sentence. (Id. at 9-10.) 

During sentencing, counsel for Defendant calculated a guideline range of 27 to 33

months and recommended 27 months imprisonment. (Def.’s Sentencing Chart, ECF No. 23.) 

The Government calculated a guideline range of 27 to 33 months and recommended 27

months of custody, 3 years of supervised release, and $100 special assessment. (Gov’t

Sentencing Chart, ECF No. 22.) On October 21, 2011, the Court sentenced Defendant to

27 months imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant alleges three claims. First, Defendant requests that the Court reduce his

sentence based on his status as a deportable alien. Second, Defendant contends that his

attorney failed to exercise certain skills during plea negotiations, sentencing, and interviews,

which the Court construes as ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Third, Defendant

argues that as a deportable alien, he is ineligible for certain programs, and this ineligibility

violates due process, equal protection, and the “Equal Right Act.”

1

Defendant has not stated a viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, which

if successful, would have rendered the waiver invalid. As a result, Defendant’s waiver is

valid and precludes the instant collateral attack on his sentence. Further, even assuming

Defendant’s motion was not barred, his due process and equal protection claims fail on the

merits.

//

//

//

//

 In his motion, Defendant seeks relief under the “Equal Right Act,” alleging that“No 1

person shall be discriminated regardless of race, color, sex, religion, or nationality.” (Def.’s

Mot. 8, ECF No. 27.) (containing spelling and grammar alternations). Given the context,

Defendant is essentially claiming that any discrimination based on nationality – specifically

his alienage status – violates the “Equal Right Act.” This is an equal protection claim, and

the Court will address it as such.

2 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. 

As part of Defendant’s Plea Agreement, Defendant waived the right to collaterally

attack his sentence. Defendant, however, has alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim concerning Defendant’s guilty plea itself. The Court must therefore address whether

Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim renders the waiver invalid. 

1. Waiver

A waiver of a defendant’s appellate rights is enforceable if the waiver’s language

encompasses the right to appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and

voluntarily made. United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth

Circuit has held that a defendant may also waive the right to collaterally attack his sentence

if the plea agreement does so expressly. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir.

1994). 

If, however, ineffective assistance of counsel renders the plea agreement containing

the waiver involuntary, the defendant may appeal or collaterally attack his sentence. See

Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding “a plea agreement that

waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is

unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver”);

see also Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing “doubt” that a waiver of an IAC claim could be

enforceable in a § 2255 context). 

Here, Defendant entered a Plea Agreement, filed on June 30, 2011, that expressly

waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement,

defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to

collaterally attack the conviction and sentence, except a post-conviction

collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless

the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end of the guideline

range recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the

time of sentencing. 

(Plea Agreement 9-10.) The Court imposed a sentence of 27 months imprisonment, which

is on the low end of the 27 to 33-month guideline range recommended by the Government. 

3 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thus, the language of the waiver encompasses the grounds raised in the instant motion.

Defendant also acknowledged that he had a “clear understanding of the charges and the

consequences of the plea” and that his “guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.” (Plea

Agreement 5.) 

Defendant, however, has alleged a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant alleges that his attorney failed

to exercise skill during plea negotiations. (Def.’s Mot. 5.) Thus, the Court must determine

whether Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim renders the plea agreement

containing the waiver invalid.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant must satisfy a 

two-prong test: first, Defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient; and

second, Defendant must show that the deficient performance caused him prejudice. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1984). To state a viable claim, Defendant

must “identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result

of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. To show prejudice, Defendant must show

a reasonable probability that “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Furthermore, there is a strong

presumption that counsel has “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690.

Defendant alleges that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by (1)

failing to use his skill during the plea negotiations, (2) not trying to get him a “good and

reasonable sentence,” and (3) doing nothing to help him during interviews. (Def.’s Mot. 5.) 

a. Failure During Plea Negotiations

Defendant contends generally that his attorney did not use skill during negotiations

for his guilty plea. (Def. Mot. 4.) The Court construes this as an attack on the voluntary

4 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

nature of Defendant’s guilty plea. To attack the voluntary nature of the guilty plea, a

defendant who has pled guilty upon the advice of counsel must show that “the advice he

received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases.” Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)). 

Here, Defendant has neither alleged what specific advice he received from his

attorney nor shown how his attorney acted outside the wide range of competence. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. 689 (noting there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within a wide range of acceptable professional assistance”). Further, Defendant has not

shown that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney’s alleged failure. There is no

evidence that had counsel done something different, Defendant would have either not pled

guilty or received a lower sentence. Defendant has not shown deficiency or prejudice and

therefore has not stated a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Because Defendant has not stated a viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel

concerning the Plea Agreement itself, Defendant’s Plea Agreement – and the waiver

contained within – are valid. Defendant therefore validly waived his right to collaterally attack

his sentence, and thus the instant collateral attack is barred. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Defendant’s § 2255 Motion. 

b. Failure to receive a “good and reasonable sentence”

Defendant also alleges that his attorney did nothing to get him a “good and

reasonable sentence.” This claim also fails. Defendant’s claim is conclusory and insufficient

to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d

1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, as part of Defendant’s valid Plea Agreement, Defendant

acknowledged that his actual sentence was within the sole discretion of the sentencing

judge. Both Defense counsel and the Government agreed to a guideline range of 27 to 33

months, and the Court sentenced Defendant to the low-end of that range, 27 months. The

Court finds that Defendant’s attorney was not deficient and there is no showing of prejudice.

5 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

c. Failure to help during interviews

Last, Defendant has alleged that his attorney failed to help during interviews. 

Defendant, however, has not specified which interviews or which acts or omissions were

allegedly deficient. This claim is also conclusory, and therefore Defendant fails to state a

viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts

do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

B. Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

Defendant also argues that as a deportable alien, he is ineligible for certain programs

including a one-year sentence reduction through a drug program and/or early release to a

halfway house. (Def.’s Mot. 8.) Defendant contends this ineligibility violates his right to due

process and equal protection under the law. (Id.) However, even assuming Defendant did

not waive his right to collaterally attack his sentence, his due process and equal protection

claims fail on the merits.

1. Due Process

Defendant has not stated a claim for a due process violation. “A due process claim

is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property interest at stake.”

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit, however, has

held that a prisoner does not have a recognized liberty interest in sentence reduction. See

Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 986 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[D]enial of the one year reduction

doesn’t impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life. In fact, denial merely means that the inmate will have to serve out

his sentence as expected.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

Defendant’s due process claim fails.

//

//

6 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Equal Protection

Defendant also has not stated an equal protection claim. The Equal Protection

Clause applies to aliens who are present in the United States unlawfully. Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202, 210 (1982). To state a claim for an equal protection violation, however, Defendant

must allege that he was treated differently from other similarly situated persons. See City

of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Unless a suspect

classification is present, the unequal treatment must only be “rationally related to a legitimate

state interest.” Id. at 440. Illegal alienage is not a suspect classification, Plyler, 457 U.S. at

223, and therefore rational basis scrutiny applies, which “accords a strong presumption of

validity.” McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1086 (2000).

The policy of excluding deportable aliens from participating in community-based

treatment programs, and consequently from being eligible for sentence reductions upon

competition of the programs, survives rational basis scrutiny. See McLean, 173 F.3d at 1186

(holding that “excluding prisoners with [Immigration and Naturalization] detainers from

participating in community-based treatment programs, and consequently from sentence

reduction eligibility, is at least rationally related to the BOP's legitimate interest in preventing

prisoners from fleeing detainers while participating in community treatment programs”). 

While deportable aliens pose a flight risk during such community-based programs, prisoners

without detainers, such as United States citizens, “have more incentive to complete the

community requirement because upon its completion they will likely qualify for sentence

reduction and be permitted to rejoin their communities.” See id. at 1184. Thus, deportable

aliens are not “similarly situated” to United States citizens regarding eligibility for communitybased or early release programs. See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, No. 97cr152-05, 2000

WL 1133055 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2000) (“the Ninth Circuit has unequivocally held that the denial

of such benefits to deportable aliens pursuant to immigration detainers does not violate the

Constitution”); Santos v. United States, 940 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Haw. 1996) (“one's status

as a deportable alien, which may result in ineligibility for less restrictive terms of confinement,

7 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

nevertheless cannot justify a downward departure”). Therefore, there is no equal protection

violation, and Defendant’s claim fails on the merits.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, the Court notes that it is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing when

ruling on § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156,

1159-60 (9th Cir. 1989). Section 2255 allows courts to forego such a hearing when “the

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled

to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Racich, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1221 (S.D.

Cal. 1990). The Court finds an evidentiary hearing is not required in this matter because the

motion, on its face, conclusively demonstrates that Defendant is not entitled to relief.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant has not stated a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel that would

render the waiver of collateral attack invalid. Thus, Defendant’s waiver is valid, and he is

barred from collaterally attacking his sentence. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s

§ 2255 Motion and DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 26, 2012 

HONORABLE BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

8 12cv0928-BTM; 11cr2342 BTM

Case 3:12-cv-00928-BTM Document 2 Filed 11/26/12 Page 8 of 8