Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05430/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD E. HARSHMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

BEISTLINE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05430-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Docket Nos. 1, 8

I. INTRODUCTION

Floyd E. Harshman, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, 

filed this pro se civil rights action to complain about events and omissions that occurred in 

connection with the federal criminal case brought against him in Alaska. His complaint is now 

before the court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. His motion for the “court to go on public 

record against the English common law known as ‘absolute immunity’” also is before the court. 

Docket No. 8 at 29. 

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Harshman was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska of crimes 

related to “marijuana cultivation” and currently is serving a prison sentence for those crimes. 

Docket No. 1 at 1-2. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, and the U.S. Supreme Court 

denied Mr. Harshman’s petition for writ of certiorari. Mr. Harshman currently has a motion under 

28 U.S.C § 2255 pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.

In his complaint, Mr. Harshman alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by 

Judge Beistline in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska during Mr. Harshman’s 

Case 3:18-cv-05430-EMC Document 12 Filed 01/23/19 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

criminal case. Mr. Harshman alleges, for example, that the judge improperly denied bail, the 

judge was biased, and the judge declined to accept pro se filings from Mr. Harshman while he was 

represented by counsel. Mr. Harshman also alleges that the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Alaska made incorrect rulings on his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Mr. Harshman also alleges claims based on events that occurred during his appeal to the 

Ninth Circuit. Ninth Circuit Commissioner Shaw allegedly refused to let Mr. Harshman file 

documents pro se because he was represented by counsel. The Ninth Circuit allegedly ignored 

Mr. Harshman’s efforts to be heard directly while he was represented and refused to let Mr. 

Harshman’s attorney withdraw so that new counsel could be appointed. The Ninth Circuit also 

allegedly eventually allowed Mr. Harshman to file a supplemental brief on appeal but refused to 

address those issues he briefed, did not invite him to present oral argument, and improperly denied 

his petition for rehearing. The Ninth Circuit allegedly did not allow Mr. Harshman to file his 

“tort” in that court about the criminal appeal. Docket No. 1 at 8.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Review Of Complaint

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

The case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 

U.S. 388, 396 (1971), “established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent 

have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any 

statute conferring such a right.” Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). The Supreme Court 

has recognized a Bivens claim in only three cases: Bivens (4th Amendment unreasonable search 

and seizure); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (5th Amendment Due Process 

Clause gender discrimination); and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1980) (8th Amendment

inadequate medical treatment). “These three cases -- Bivens, Davis, and Carlson – represent the 

Case 3:18-cv-05430-EMC Document 12 Filed 01/23/19 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

only instances in which the [Supreme] Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under 

the Constitution itself.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017). The Supreme Court has 

made clear that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” and will not 

be available if there are “‘special factors’ counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 

by Congress,” id. at 1848 (citation omitted).

This Court need not determine whether there could be a Bivens claim for the various 

wrongs alleged in the complaint because there is a problem with the complaint that cannot be 

overcome even if a right of action is found under Bivens for the wrongs alleged. Specifically, all 

the defendants are federal judges and have absolute judicial immunity against Mr. Harshman’s 

claims because their allegedly wrongful acts were actions done in their judicial capacity. A 

federal judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for acts performed in his or her judicial 

capacity; this immunity is not limited to immunity from damages, but also extends to actions for 

declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th 

Cir. 1996); Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying 

judicial immunity to actions under Bivens); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)

(“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from 

liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized 

when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).”). The 

complaint must be dismissed because all the claims against all the defendants are barred by the 

doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. 

There are other defects that cover some parts of the complaint. First, the relief requested 

includes a request for an order compelling the district court in Alaska and the Ninth Circuit to 

accept pro se filings from persons represented by counsel. If Mr. Harshman wants to challenge a 

decision made by Judge Beistline in the District of Alaska, his recourse is limited to filing a 

motion or action in that court or filing an appeal in the Ninth Circuit. If Mr. Harshman wants to 

challenge a decision of the Ninth Circuit, his recourse, if any, is to file a motion in that court or to 

petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. (This court is not suggesting that any of 

these methods would be successful – indeed, it is probably too late to do most of them – but only 

Case 3:18-cv-05430-EMC Document 12 Filed 01/23/19 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

pointing out that these are the methods by which a litigant would make the challenges Mr. 

Harshman wants to assert.) This court does not have appellate jurisdiction over other district 

courts or over the Ninth Circuit. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392-93 & n.19. Nor does the district 

court have authority to issue a writ of mandamus to another district court. See id. at 1393. This 

court thus lacks jurisdiction to order the district court in Alaska or the Ninth Circuit to accept pro 

se filings from represented litigants.

Second, the relief requested includes some sort of relief from Mr. Harshman’s conviction. 

Even if a Bivens claim existed for claims regarding the criminal trial or filing practices in federal 

courts, Mr. Harshman cannot bring a Bivens action for alleged constitutional violations in 

connection with his criminal trial as long as the conviction remains in place. Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action for damages for a 

wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that conviction or sentence already has been 

determined to be wrongful. See id. at 486-87. A conviction or sentence may be determined to be 

wrongful by, for example, being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a state or federal court 

issues a writ of habeas corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person from bringing an 

action that -- even if it does not directly challenge the conviction -- would imply that the 

conviction was invalid. The practical importance of this rule is that a plaintiff cannot attack his 

conviction in a civil rights action; the conviction must have been successfully attacked before the 

civil rights action is filed. The Heck rule was first announced with respect to an action for 

damages, but has since been applied to actions that sought declaratory and injunctive relief. If 

success in the civil rights action would “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or 

its duration,’ the civil rights action is barred no matter the relief sought (i.e., damages or equitable 

relief) as long as the conviction has not been set aside. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 

(2005). The rationale of Heck applies to Bivens actions as well as those brought under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. See Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996). The Heck rule thus bars any claims 

that would call into question Mr. Harshman’s conviction, such as his claims that the judge was 

biased and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Case 3:18-cv-05430-EMC Document 12 Filed 01/23/19 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

B. Motion Regarding Absolute Judicial Immunity

Mr. Harshman recognizes that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity poses an obstacle 

to this action and has filed a motion arguing against the doctrine. He asks this Court “to go on 

public record against the English common law known as ‘absolute immunity.’” Docket No. 8. 

As a lower court, this Court must follow the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court and the 

Ninth Circuit. “Stare decisis maintains a hierarchical dimension which is believed to be crucial to 

the efficient operation of the judicial system. No one contests that all inferior courts are bound by 

Supreme Court decisions. When no Supreme Court decision has been issued, the decisions of the 

court of appeals for a particular circuit are binding on all lower courts within that circuit.” In re

Barakat, 173 B.R. 672, 677 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994), subsequently aff'd, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 

1996); see Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1987) (“District courts are, of 

course, bound by the law of their own circuits.”). This Court is bound by the decisions of the U.S. 

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, which plainly recognize the doctrine of absolute judicial 

immunity. Mr. Harshman’s motion for the Court to go on record against absolute judicial 

immunity is DENIED. Docket No. 8. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED because the action is barred by the 

doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-05430-EMC Document 12 Filed 01/23/19 Page 5 of 5