Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02621/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02621-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICARDO G.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

1

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv2621-AJB(MSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING JOINT MOTION FOR 

JUDICIAL REVIEW [ECF NO. 12]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony J. 

Battaglia, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local

Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On 

November 15, 2018, Plaintiff Ricardo G. filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying his 

 

1

 On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See 

https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited on January 24, 2020). The Court 

substitutes Andrew Saul for his predecessor, Nancy A. Berryhill, as the defendant in this action. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing that “[a]ny action instituted in accordance with this 

subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of 

Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person 

holding the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant.”). 

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application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Compl., ECF 

No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Judicial Review. For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s decision 

be AFFIRMED and that this action be dismissed.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Certified 

Admin. R. 84-85, 227-28, ECF No. 8 (“AR”).) On September 11, 2014, Plaintiff also filed 

an application for supplemental security income. (Id. at 229-35.) For both applications, 

Plaintiff alleged disability beginning December 31, 2010. (Id. at 227, 229.) After his 

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration (id. at 146-50, 153-57), 

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”),

(id. at 158-59). An administrative hearing was held on January 31, 2017. (Id. at 58-83.) 

Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken from him and a 

vocational expert (“VE”). (See id.) 

As reflected in his September 28, 2017 hearing decision, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

December 31, 2010, through the date of the decision. (Id. at 37-52.) The ALJ’s decision 

became the final decision of the Commissioner on August 13, 2018, when the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 17-21.) This timely civil action 

followed. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step 

sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2010, 

the alleged onset date. (AR at 40.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 

following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, 

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ankle injury, diabetes mellitus, obesity, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, hernia, 

and depression. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity 

of one of the impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (Id.)

Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to do the following:

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except 

claimant could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl.

Claimant could occasionally climb ramps and stairs but could never climb 

ladders, ropes and scaffolds. Claimant should be able to alternate between 

sitting and standing/walking after being in one such position for no more 

than 30 minutes at a time. Claimant should have no public contact and can 

perform simple routine tasks.

(Id. at 42.)

At step four, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical 

person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would be unable to perform any of his 

past relevant work. (Id. at 50; see also id. at 75.) The ALJ then proceeded to step five of 

the sequential evaluation process. Based on the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical 

person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC could perform the requirements of 

occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as

“document preparer” and “polisher, eyeglass frames,” the ALJ found that Plaintiff was 

not disabled. (Id. at 51.)

III. DISPUTED ISSUE

As reflected in the parties’ Joint Motion for Judicial Review, Plaintiff is raising the 

following issue as the ground for reversal and remand: Whether the ALJ carried the 

Administration’s burden at step five of the sequential analysis. (J. Mot. Jud. Review 4, 

ECF No. 12 (“J. Mot.”).)

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of 

judicial review is limited, and the denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record and contains no legal error. Id.; Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)); 

see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, an ALJ’s decision must be upheld. 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). This includes deferring to an 

ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis v. 

Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if the reviewing court finds that 

substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision 

if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and 

reaching his or her decision. See Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The reviewing court may enter a “judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” 

the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand 

the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to meet his step five burden of establishing that 

additional jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can 

perform. (J. Mot. at 4-8.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ determined that Plaintiff can 

perform alternate occupations based on an incomplete hypothetical question to the VE. 

(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff maintains that his RFC limitation of “alternat[ing] between sitting and 

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standing/walking” requires “hav[ing] the option to walk” at will as an entirely separate 

option. (Id. at 9.) He argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical “only included what the 

vocational expert interpreted to be a sit/stand option,” and left out Plaintiff’s 

“additional requirement of being able to walk in combination with a limitation with 

respect to sitting.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s error was not harmless and 

asks the Court to reverse the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 10-11.)

The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s RFC is less restrictive than the 

hypothetical RFC the ALJ posed to the VE. (Id. at 8-9 (citing AR at 42).) The 

Commissioner contends that the hypothetical RFC posed to the VE allowed alternating 

between sitting and standing, and necessarily included Plaintiff’s less restrictive RFC, 

which allowed alternating between sitting and either standing or walking. (Id.) The 

Commissioner therefore asserts that any alleged error by the ALJ was harmless and asks 

the Court to affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 8-9, 11.)

1. Applicable law

At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ is required to determine 

whether a claimant can perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the 

national economy, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The ALJ may rely on the testimony of a 

VE to assist in this determination, but the ALJ is required to pose a hypothetical question 

that includes all of claimant’s limitations that are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. See Lubin v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 507 F. App’x 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993); DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 

850 (9th Cir. 1991). If the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE does not incorporate all of a 

claimant’s limitations or is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the VE’s 

testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform 

jobs in the national economy. See DeLorme, 924 F.2d at 850; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 

F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984). The VE’s testimony should generally be consistent with 

the DOT. See SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2. If there is a conflict between the VE’s 

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testimony and the DOT, the ALJ is required to inquire into and resolve the conflict 

before relying on the VE’s testimony to find that a claimant can perform other 

work. See id.

In assessing an individual’s RFC and ability to perform work existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy, the ALJ is required to consider each exertional 

capacity separately. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. “Exertional capacity” refers 

to an “individual’s limitations and restrictions of physical strength and defines the 

individual’s remaining abilities to perform each of seven strength demands: Sitting, 

standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling.” Id. 

A reviewing court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that 

is harmless.” See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. An ALJ’s error is harmless if it “was 

inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d at 682). 

2. Analysis

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC required him to “be able to alternate 

between sitting and standing/walking after being in one such position for no more than 

30 minutes at a time.” (AR at 42). During the administrative hearing, the VE categorized

Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a “waiter, general, DOT 311.477–030.” (Id. at 75.) 

The ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, 

and experience, with the ability to perform “light work with occasional postural 

activities, no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds.” (Id.) The VE testified that such an 

individual could still perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a waiter. (Id.)

The ALJ then questioned the VE as follows:

Q Hypothetical two. Lift no more than 15 pounds. And this is added to 

hypo one. Standing and walking no more than 30 minutes at one time and 

stretch breaks of five minutes per hour. Would that still allow for past 

work? 

A No. 

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Q Other work. 

A It would be SVP 2, light. It would be sit/stand option and the examples 

would be such as silver wrapper. 318.687-018. Nationally 150,000. 

Another sit/stand option would be garment sorter. 222.687-014 and 

national would be 125,000. 

Q Dr. Thompson said bench work or kind of sit down jobs. If I limit 

standing or walking to two hours total could the individual still do the silver 

wrapper or garment sorter?

A It would be mostly sitting. You can mostly sit for that job.

Q You can mostly sit for either job.

A Yes.

Q So the numbers would be the same.

A Yes.

Q Okay. What if sitting is limited to no more than 30 minutes at one 

time? 

A Well, they would–they could go into a sitting, sedentary, SVP 2 where 

he could stand and sit. 

Q And let me add for this hypothetical—I am sorry.

A Sorry.

Q So that this—the testimony was sitting no more than 30 minutes at a 

time and also based on the testimony I would limit the individual to simple, 

routine tasks in a non-public setting. So with that additional limitation is 

there sedentary or light work? 

A Well, sedentary where he could possibly sit/stand option and there 

would be the document preparer, which is the office handler work. In the 

office. That’s 249.587-018. And national would be 175,000 and I can give 

you another example. This is also non public. Another one would be 

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polisher, eyeglass. Sitting job. He can stand and do this. 713.684-038. And 

120,000 jobs–120,000 national. But that’s a non public.

(Id. at 75-77 (emphasis added).) The ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony and ruled that 

Plaintiff was “capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id. at 51.) 

Plaintiff contends that although the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC required 

him to “be able to alternate between sitting and standing/walking,” the hypothetical the 

ALJ posed to the VE did not include an option to walk in combination with a limitation 

with respect to sitting. (See J. Mot. at 7-8.) The Court has carefully reviewed the ALJ’s 

questioning of the VE and does not find that the ALJ committed an error by posing an 

incomplete hypothetical, as Plaintiff alleges. During the questioning, the ALJ expressly

inquired about a hypothetical individual limited to “standing or walking” up to two 

hours, and subsequently further refined the hypothetical by limiting the individual to 

“sitting no more than 30 minutes at a time,” and being capable of performing simple, 

routine tasks in a non-public setting. (AR at 76.) The ALJ testified that such an individual

could perform the jobs of “polisher, eyeglass frames” (DOT 713.684-0382) and 

“document preparer” (DOT 249,587-0183). (Id. at 76-77.)

 

2

 The DOT describes a “polisher, eyeglass frames” job (713.684-038) as follows:

Polishes plastic eyeglass frames and temple pieces to remove scratches and pit marks, 

using polishing wheel: Applies abrasive compound to wheel surface, using brush. Starts 

machine and holds and turns frame parts against wheel to polish parts and remove 

defects. Inspects and feels polished parts to verify removal of flaws. Presses sandpaper 

against polishing wheel to remove abrasive residue in preparation for next sequence.

DOT 713.684-038, 1991 WL 679267. 

3

 The DOT describes the duties of a “document preparer” (249,587-018) as:

Prepares documents, such as brochures, pamphlets, and catalogs, for microfilming, 

using paper cutter, photocopying machine, rubber stamps, and other work devices:

Cuts documents into individual pages of standard microfilming size and format when 

allowed by margin space, using paper cutter or razor knife. Reproduces document 

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Further, the DOT’s descriptions of the occupations identified by the VE show that 

they are classified as “sedentary.” See DOT 713.684-038, 1991 WL 679267; DOT 

249,587-018, 1991 WL 672349. The DOT defines “sedentary work” as work that 

involves “sitting most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods 

of time.” Id. This description is consistent with Plaintiff’s assessed RFC. (See AR at 42.)

Plaintiff argues that the VE “interpreted [the limitations posed by the ALJ] to be a 

sit/stand option,” and left out “additional requirement of being able to walk.” (See J. 

Mot. at 7.) Even if the ALJ committed an error by posing an incomplete hypothetical to 

the VE, the error was harmless. The ALJ still would have found that Plaintiff could

perform the jobs of eyeglass polisher and document preparer, because Plaintiff’s 

assessed RFC requires him to alternate between sitting and either standing or walking,

(see AR at 42), and Plaintiff’s RFC is encompassed in the more restrictive hypothetical, as 

allegedly interpreted by the VE, which included a limitation to alternating between 

sitting and standing. Therefore, the Court finds that any error in the hypothetical posed 

to the VE was inconsequential to the ALJ’s final determination. See Stout, 454 F.3d at

1055 (an ALJ’s error is harmless when it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.”); see also Timothy S. v. Berryhill, Case No. 3:17-cv-1789-AC, 2018 WL 

5973393, at *2-3 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2018) (finding that ALJ’s posing of a more restrictive 

hypothetical RFC to the VE than the claimant’s assessed less restrictive RFC, was 

 

pages as necessary to improve clarity or to reduce one or more pages into single page of 

standard microfilming size, using photocopying machine. Stamps standard symbols on 

pages or inserts instruction cards between pages of material to notify MICROFILMCAMERA OPERATOR (business ser.) 976.682-022 of special handling, such as manual 

repositioning, during microfilming. Prepares cover sheet and document folder for 

material and index card for company files indicating information, such as firm name and 

address, product category, and index code, to identify material. Inserts material to be 

filmed in document folder and files folder for processing according to index code and 

filming priority schedule.

DOT 249,587-018, 1991 WL 672349. 

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harmless error, and that the ALJ carried the step five burden); Barragan v. Colvin, No. CV 

12-6258-OP, 2013 WL 5467430, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (finding that ALJ’s 

hypothetical question to the VE limiting a claimant to light or sedentary work, which did 

not include the claimant’s actual RFC limiting her to medium work, was harmless error 

because the hypothetical was more restrictive). Plaintiff attempts to manufacture an

additional independent limitation beyond the ALJ’s assessed limitation that Plaintiff be 

able to alternate between “sitting and standing/walking.” (See J. Mot. at 9-10; see also

AR at 42.) “[I]n hypotheticals posed to a vocational expert, the ALJ must only include 

those limitations supported by substantial evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 

F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (“It is incorrect to find 

that an individual has limitations beyond those caused by his or her medically 

determinable impairment(s) and any related symptoms.”); see also Buckner-Larkin v. 

Astrue, 450 F. App’x 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2011) (“sit-stand option . . . is most reasonably 

interpreted as sitting or standing ‘at will’”); Welsh v. Berryhill, Case No. CV 17-4565 JC, 

2018 WL 3017530, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2018) (“Court opinions and related authority 

generally suggest that a ‘sit/stand’ option would allow a claimant, at-will throughout the 

day, to alternate between sitting and standing and for possibly lengthy periods of time 

each, and with no limitation that the claimant remain at the work station and/or be on 

task in the transitions.”); SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *4 (noting that an individual 

who needed to alternate between sitting and standing “may be able to sit for a time, 

but must then get up and stand or walk for awhile before returning to sitting.”). 

Therefore, to the extent there was any error in the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE, it was 

harmless. 

For the above stated reasons, the Court finds that the Commissioner has satisfied

his burden at step five of the sequential evaluation process of demonstrating that work 

exists in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could do despite his 

limitations.

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court RECOMMENDS that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security be AFFIRMED and this action be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 21, 2020, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than February 28, 2020. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2020

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