Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01700/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01700-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN E. FIELDS,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

P. PATTERSON, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:10-cv-01700-LJO-GSA-PC

ORDER FINDING COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

 (1) FILE A SECOND AMENDED

 COMPLAINT, OR

 (2) NOTIFY THE COURT OF HIS

 WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED 

 AGAINST DEFENDANTS

 PATTERSON, MOLINA, AND 

 FINLEY ON THE CLAIMS FOUND

 COGNIZABLE BY THE COURT

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OR 

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO 

PROCEED

I. BACKGROUND

Kevin E. Fields (APlaintiff@) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on September 17, 2010. (Doc. 1.) 

The court screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A and entered an order on 

April 25, 2013, requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, or in the alternative, to notify 

the court in writing that he was willing to proceed with the claims found cognizable by the 

court. (Doc. 14.) On May 31, 2013, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, which is now 

before the court for screening. (Doc. 16.) 

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II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 

(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal 556 U.S. 

at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere 

possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR), presently incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison (CSP) in Corcoran, 

California, where the events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred. 

Plaintiff brings this civil rights complaint against defendants who are prison officials employed 

by the CDCR at CSP. Plaintiff names as defendants Correctional Officer (C/O) P. Patterson, 

///

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Sergeant (Sgt.) E. Molina, and Lieutenant (Lt.) G. A. Finley, Jr. Plaintiff’s factual allegations 

follow.

On September 16, 2009, at about 10:15 a.m., defendant C/O Patterson came to 

Plaintiff’s cell, and in the presence of Plaintiff’s cell mate Maurice Robinson [not a defendant] 

told Plaintiff that he had a disciplinary hearing, which he would not be allowed to attend unless 

he put on a jumpsuit. Plaintiff asked C/O Patterson to show him something in writing stating 

he had to wear a jumpsuit, and Patterson became irate. After a brief exchange of vulgarities 

with Plaintiff, Patterson told Plaintiff he was going to call Lt. Finley, and tell him that Plaintiff 

was refusing to wear a jumpsuit for his hearing. Then C/O Patterson walked away.

When C/O Patterson returned to Plaintiff’s cell, C/O G. Pinzon [not a defendant] was 

with him. C/O Patterson told Plaintiff that he had spoken to Lt. Finley, who said to tell 

Plaintiff he could not attend the hearing without wearing a jumpsuit. Plaintiff told C/O 

Patterson that he was going to put on a jumpsuit, so he could attend the disciplinary hearing. 

Plaintiff also told Patterson that he was going to file a staff complaint against Patterson and 

Finley. Patterson got angry again. When Plaintiff put on the jumpsuit and walked to his cell 

door to be secured in restraints, Patterson used an angry tone and told Plaintiff to go to the back 

of the cell so he could cuff Robinson up.

After Patterson cuffed Robinson up, Plaintiff returned to the cell door to be secured in 

waist-chain restraints. Patterson put the waist-chain cuffs on Plaintiff’s right wrist extremely 

tight. When Plaintiff told Patterson the cuffs were too tight, Patterson said to “shut the f--- up,” 

then signaled for the control-booth officer to open the cell door. (Amended Complaint (ACP), 

Doc. 16 at 4 ¶16.) 

After being removed from the cell, Plaintiff again told Patterson the cuffs were too tight 

and asked him to loosen them. He responded by telling Plaintiff that he “wasn’t loosening 

nothing.” (ACP at 4 ¶17.) Plaintiff and Patterson again exchanged vulgarities. Plaintiff heard 

C/O G. Pinzon yell, “Robinson, stop trying to assault me!” Plaintiff looked over his right 

shoulder and saw Robinson’s hands still secured behind his back and sticking out of the 

food/handcuff port, as if waiting to be uncuffed. Plaintiff said to Pinzon, “Bitch, stop lying on 

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my celly. You’re just mad because he filed a staff complaint on you and C/O Trupp.” (ACP at 

5 ¶18.)

Because Plaintiff made the comment to Pinzon, Patterson slammed Plaintiff into the 

bar-box and told him to “shut my black a-- mouth, before I get f---ed up real bad, for helping 

Robinson file complaints against staff.” (ACP at 5 ¶19.) Plaintiff told Patterson that he was 

also going to write him up for slamming Plaintiff into the bar-box and threatening him for 

helping his cell mate file staff complaints against C/Os Pinzon and Trupp. After another 

exchange of vulgarities, C/O Patterson escorted Plaintiff to the 4B2A rotunda area, where he 

was secured in a holding cell.

Plaintiff again asked Patterson to loosen up the cuffs, which had caused Plaintiff’s right 

hand and wrist to swell up so much that it cut into his wrist and caused his hand to go numb. 

Patterson refused.

When Lt. Finley entered the unit, Plaintiff immediately told him what happened and 

why. Plaintiff asked Lt. Finley to do a “use of force” packet, which is mandatory under 

Administrative Bulletin 5103 and Corcoran’s Operational Procedure no. 439 when an inmate 

makes allegations of excessive/unnecessary force. (ACP at 5 ¶22.) Lt. Finley told Plaintiff to 

hold on, and went into the 4B2R office, where he spoke to defendants C/O Patterson and Sgt. 

E. Molina for approximately ten minutes.

Lt. Finley came out of the office and told Plaintiff that neither he nor Sgt. Molina were 

going to do a “use of force” packet against C/O Patterson, but that he would loosen up the 

waist-chain cuffs but not remove them. Lt. Finley also said he would have the LVN do a 

“medical report of injury or unusual occurrence” on form CDC-7219, which was never shown 

or given to Plaintiff. (ACP at 6 ¶23.) Lt. Finley also told Plaintiff that he and Sgt. Molina had 

instructed C/O Patterson to file a false serious Rules Violation Report (RVR) alleging that 

Plaintiff threatened to kill him, his wife, and his kids.

When Sgt. Molina and C/O Pinzon were returning Plaintiff to his cell, Plaintiff told 

Molina he was going to file a staff complaint against C/O Patterson for retaliation and 

excessive force, and a staff complaint against Molina and Finley for instructing Patterson to file 

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a false RVR against Plaintiff and for refusing to do a “use of force” packet against Patterson. 

Sgt. Molina said -- in a very loud tone of voice that could be heard by all the inmates on the 

tier, some who were high ranking gang members – “Shut the f--- up snitch, or you’ll be put on 

f---ed up status like your celly.” (ACP at 6 ¶26.) They had been generating false chronos to

inmates, identifying Plaintiff’s cell mate as a child molester for the purpose of getting him 

stabbed.

Plaintiff requests monetary damages as relief.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the 

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006). AA person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another=s affirmative acts, 

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). AThe 

requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal 

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which

///

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the actors knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional 

injury.@ Id. at 743-44.

A. Excessive Force – Eighth Amendment Claim

AWhat is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .@ Hudson 

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). AThe objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim 

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.@ Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is 

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth 

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis 

injuries)). However, not Aevery malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause 

of action.@ Id. at 9. AThe Eighth Amendment=s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments 

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, 

provided that the use of force is not of a sort >repugnant to the conscience of mankind.@ Id. at 

9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).

A[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in 

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.@ Id. at 7. AIn determining whether the use of force was wanton and 

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the 

responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.@ Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). AThe absence of serious injury is . . . relevant 

to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.@ Id.

The court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for excessive force in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment against defendant C/O Patterson for putting waist-chain cuffs on 

Plaintiff’s right wrist extremely tight and refusing to loosen them upon Plaintiff’s requests, 

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causing Plaintiff’s right hand and wrist to swell up so much that it cut into his wrist and caused 

his hand to go numb; and for slamming Plaintiff into the bar-box because Plaintiff made a 

comment to C/O Patterson. However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive force against 

any other defendant.

B. Retaliation

As discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Watison v. Carter:

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file 

grievances against prison officials and to be free from retaliation 

for doing so. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009). A retaliation claim has five elements. Id. First, the 

plaintiff must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is 

protected. The filing of an inmate grievance is protected conduct. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005).

Second, the plaintiff must claim the defendant took 

adverse action against the plaintiff. Id. at 567. The adverse 

action need not be an independent constitutional violation. Pratt 

v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). “[T]he mere 

threat of harm can be an adverse action....” Brodheim, 584 F.3d 

at 1270.

Third, the plaintiff must allege a causal connection 

between the adverse action and the protected conduct. Because 

direct evidence of retaliatory intent rarely can be pleaded in a 

complaint, allegation of a chronology of events from which 

retaliation can be inferred is sufficient to survive dismissal. See

Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“timing can properly be considered as 

circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”); Murphy v. Lane,

833 F.2d 106, 108–09 (7th Cir. 1987).

Fourth, the plaintiff must allege that the “official's acts 

would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future 

First Amendment activities.” Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568 (internal 

quotation marks and emphasis omitted). “[A] plaintiff who fails 

to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he 

suffered some other harm,” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269, that is 

“more than minimal,” Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11. That the 

retaliatory conduct did not chill the plaintiff from suing the 

alleged retaliator does not defeat the retaliation claim at the 

motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 569.

Fifth, the plaintiff must allege “that the prison authorities' 

retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the 

correctional institution....” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir.1985). A plaintiff successfully pleads this element by 

alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that the defendant's 

actions were arbitrary and capricious, id., or that they were 

“unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution,” 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir.1984).”

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Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant C/O Patterson slammed Plaintiff into the bar-box and 

told him to “shut my black a-- mouth, before I get f---ed up real bad, for helping Robinson file 

complaints against staff.” Plaintiff also alleges that when Plaintiff told Sgt. Molina he was 

going to file a staff complaint against him, Sgt. Molina said -- in a very loud tone of voice that 

could be heard by all the inmates on the tier, some who were high ranking gang members –

“Shut the f--- up snitch, or you’ll be put on f---ed up status like your celly.” Plaintiff alleges 

that officers had been generating false chronos to inmates, identifying Plaintiff’s celly as a 

child molester for the purpose of getting him stabbed.

These allegations are sufficient to state cognizable claims for retaliation in violation of 

the First Amendment against defendants C/O Patterson and Sgt. Molina.

C. Verbal Threats

Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Finley told Plaintiff that he and Sgt. Molina had instructed C/O 

Patterson to file a false serious Rules Violation Report (RVR) alleging that Plaintiff threatened 

to kill him, his wife, and his kids. Verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a 

claim under section 1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and 

threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 

(9th Cir. 1987). Without more, Plaintiff’s allegations of verbal abuse fail to state a claim 

against defendants Finley or Molina.

D. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Lt. Finley and Sgt. Molina refused to do a “use of 

force” packet, which is mandatory under Administrative Bulletin 5103 and Corcoran’s 

Operational Procedure no. 439 when an inmate makes allegations of excessive/unnecessary 

force. Plaintiff is informed that violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and policies 

of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under ' 1983. To 

state a claim under ' 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory 

rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(a), in any civil 

action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the district court Ashall have 

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supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 

that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III [of the Constitution],@ with 

specific exceptions. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims exists when the federal claim is 

sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction, and there is a 'common nucleus of 

operative fact between the state and federal claims.' " Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.1991)). A[O]nce 

judicial power exists under ' 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law 

claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.@ Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has cautioned that Aif the federal claims are dismissed before 

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.@ United Mine Workers of America v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

In this instance, the Court has found cognizable ' 1983 claims in the First Amended 

Complaint against defendants Patterson and Molina. Therefore, at this juncture, the Court shall 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff=s state law claims that form part of the same 

case or controversy as Plaintiff=s cognizable federal claims.1

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff states cognizable claims in 

the First Amended Complaint against defendant C/O Patterson for use of excessive force in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment; against defendants C/O Patterson and Sgt. Molina for 

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; and against defendants Sgt. Molina and Lt. 

Finley, Jr., for failing to comply with state law. However, Plaintiff fails to state any other 

claims against defendants upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. Plaintiff shall be 

required to either file a Second Amended Complaint, or notify the Court of his willingness to 

proceed only on the cognizable claims against defendants Patterson, Molina, and Finley. 

Should Plaintiff choose to proceed only on the cognizable claims for retaliation, excessive 

 

1At this stage of the proceedings, the Court makes no determination about the viability of Plaintiff=s state 

law claims.

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force, and violation of state law, the Court will begin the process to initiate service upon 

defendants Patterson, Molina, and Finley by the United States Marshal.

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend >shall be 

freely given when justice so requires.=@ The Court will provide Plaintiff with time to file an 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to do so. Plaintiff 

is granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty days. Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the Second Amended Complaint 

should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to 

the deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter . . . to >state a claim that is plausible on its face.=@ Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his 

or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis 

added). 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purposes of adding new defendants for unrelated issues. In addition, Plaintiff should 

take care to include only those claims that have been administratively exhausted. 

If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he is reminded that an amended 

complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 

n.1 (9th Cir. Aug., 29, 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to 

the prior or superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the 

original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must 

be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled ASecond 

Amended Complaint,@ refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. 

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk=s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

(1) File a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified in 

this order, or

(2) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the claims against 

defendant C/O Patterson for use of excessive force; against defendants 

C/O Patterson and Sgt. Molina for retaliation; and against defendants 

Sgt. Molina and Lt. Finley, for failure to comply with state law;

3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint ASecond Amended Complaint@ and refer to the case number 

1:10-cv-01700-LJO-GSA-PC; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

6i0kij8d

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