Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02271/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02271-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

We note plaintiff’s counsel requested $2,820.76; however, $151.65 times 18.60 equals $2,820.69.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DIVISION OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ELIZABETH A CARPENTER PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-2271

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Elizabeth A. Carpenter appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this

court. On January 3, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $2,820.69 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice 1

Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 18.60 attorney hours of work before the

court at an hourly rate of $151.65. (Doc. # 10-12). The defendant has filed a response,

expressing no objections to this award. (Doc. # 13).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

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Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner does not oppose the

award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested

by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and does not dispute the number of hours expended by

counsel. (Doc. #13). The court construes this lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee

as an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified."

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

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or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $151.65 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel did not attach a summary of the Consumer Price Index

or present evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's

counsel is not entitled to an award above the maximum statutory $125 per hour.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 1.00 hour on December 9, 2004, (preparation of complaint, three

summons, cover sheet and letter to clerk), from which we deduct 0.50 hour; 0.20 hour on

December 13, 2004, (preparation of letters serving complaint and summons on opposing parties

by certified mail), from which we deduct 0.20 hour; 0.10 hour on December 17, 2004,

(preparation ofAffidavit of completion of service and letter to clerk), from which we deduct 0.05

hour; 0.10 hour on January 4, 2005, (preparation of Affidavit of completion of service and letter

to clerk), from which we deduct 0.05 hour; and 0.10 hour on January 7, 2005, (preparation of

Affidavit of completion of service and letter to clerk), from which we deduct 0.05 hour. This

time cannot be compensated, in full, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of

HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff

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is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 0.85 hour from the total number

of compensable hours sought.

Finally, plaintiff’s counsel included his expenses, in the amount of $200.21 for postage

copies and the filing fee, but did not include this sum with his request for fees. Such expenses

are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $200.21 to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v.

Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 17.75 (18.60-0.85) attorney hours, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, and $200.21 in expenses,

for a total attorney's fee award of $2,418.96. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17 day of April 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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