Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05056/USCOURTS-ca10-94-05056-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN SPENCER CARPENTER, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

L.L. YOUNG, Warden, ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

FILED 

United States Court or Appe&b 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 2 0 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

94-5056 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 93-C-592-E) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

John Spencer Carpenter, pro se. 

Susan Brimer Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Alecia A. 

George, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, LOGAN, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner John Carpenter appeals the district court's order 

of February 14, 1994, dismissing his habeas petition, brought 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for failure to exhaust his state 

Appellate Case: 94-5056 Document: 01019282436 Date Filed: 03/20/1995 Page: 1 
remedies.l The district court held that because petitioner had a 

pending direct criminal appeal in state court, he could not 

proceed in federal court. Petitioner argues, however, that the 

state's delay in adjudicating his appeal should excuse his failure 

to exhaust his state remedies. 

The parties' briefs and the record indicate that a judgment 

of conviction and sentence were imposed against petitioner in 

Oklahoma state court on July 28, 1992, and petitioner filed a 

notice of appeal the same day. Because the record reflects that 

petitioner is represented by court-appointed counsel in his state 

appeal and more than two years have now passed since petitioner 

filed his notice of appeal, we conclude that petitioner's failure 

to exnaust his state remedies should be excused, unless the state 

can establish that the delay in adjudicating petitioner's appeal 

is justified. See Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). 

On appeal, respondent acknowledges our holding in Harris, 

which involved indigent criminal defendants who were represented 

on appeal by court-appointed counsel, that delay in adjudicating a 

direct criminal appeal beyond two years creates a presumption that 

the state appellate process is ineffective and, therefore, that 

the defendant should be excused from exhausting his state remedies 

before proceeding in federal court. Id. Respondent contends, 

however, that because petitioner did not file his petition in 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a) ; lOth Cir. R. 34. 1. 9. . The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-5056 Document: 01019282436 Date Filed: 03/20/1995 Page: 2 
error until January 28, 1993, petitioner's appeal has been pending 

in state court for less than two years. 

Respondent's argument ignores our explicit holding in Harris 

that the two-year period should be calculated from the filing of 

the notice of appeal (unless a delay in filing the notice of 

appeal also is attributable to the state). Id. at 1556 & n.9. 

Our holding comports with Oklahoma's rules, which provide that 

"[a]n appeal is commenced by filing a written notice of intent to 

appeal and a designation of record, both to be filed within ten 

(10) days from the date the judgment and sentence is imposed." 

Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, App., Rule 2.1(B). Petitioner stated 

in his appellate brief that he filed his notice of appeal on 

July 28, 1992, and respondent has not refuted that statement. 

Thus, it appears that petitioner's appeal has been pending in 

state court for more than two years.2 

Respondent also argues that the district court properly 

dismissed petitioner's habeas petition because petitioner has not 

shown sufficient prejudice from the delay in adjudicating his 

appeal to establish a due process violation. Whether a petitioner 

should be excused from exhausting state remedies due to delay in 

adjudicating his state appeal is a separate inquiry, however, from 

whether the petitioner also can establish a separate due process 

violation arising from the delay. A showing of prejudice is 

necessary only for the due process claim. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 

1559. A petitioner can establish that delay in the state process 

2 In fact, more than two years have now passed since the 

petition in error was filed. 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-5056 Document: 01019282436 Date Filed: 03/20/1995 Page: 3 
has made the process ineffective and, therefore, that exhaustion 

should be excused, without having to establish that he has been 

prejudiced by the delay. See id. at 1556-57. 

On remand, if petitioner's direct criminal appeal has not yet 

been decided, then the district court should excuse exhaustion, 

unless respondent can demonstrate that the delay in adjudicating 

petitioner's appeal beyond two years is constitutionally 

justified. The court should then either hear the merits of 

petitioner's claims or, if respondent is not able to rebut the 

presumption of prejudice which also arises from the two years of 

delay,3 grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is 

REMANDED for further proceedings. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

3 We recently held in Harris v. Champion, No. 93-5191, 1995 WL 

73732, at *3 (lOth Cir. Feb. 21, 1995), that delay in excess of 

two years in adjudicating a direct criminal appeal that is 

attributable to the state will give rise to a rebuttable 

presumption of prejudice. Thus, the district court may be able to 

find a due process violation and issue a conditional writ if the 

state is unable to rebut the resulting presumption of prejudice. 

Whether the district court chooses to hear the merits of 

petitioner's claims or, if prejudice has been established, grant a 

conditional writ is within the court's discretion. Id. 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-5056 Document: 01019282436 Date Filed: 03/20/1995 Page: 4