Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00111/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KM

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Keith Robert Pierpont, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John Evans, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 05-111-TUC-DGC

ORDER

On February 15, 2005, Plaintiff Keith Robert Pierpont, presently confined in the

Arizona State Prison-Fort Grant, filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

("Complaint"). Plaintiff has paid the two hundred fifty dollar ($250.00) filing fee.

Plaintiff filed return of service documents on February 24, 2005. On March 10, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. #9). Motions to Dismiss were filed on

March 31, 2005 (Doc. ##14 & 15) and April 5, 2005 (Doc. #19) by Defendants. Plaintiff filed

a second Motion for Default Judgment on June 21, 2005 (Doc. #23). 

Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion t hereof if the Plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim up on which relief may

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be granted, or t hat seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

Complaint

The following are named as Defendants to the Complaint: 1) John Evans, Assistant

Attorney General, State of Arizona; 2) Christopher Browning, Pima County Superior Court

Judge; 3) Frank Dawley, Pima County Superior Court Judge; 4) Barbara LaWall, Pima

County Attorney; 5) Members of Grand Jury issuing Indictment 176-GJ-725 in Pima County

Superior Court Case No. CR 20033181; 6) State of Arizona; 7) John Does 1-10,000; 8) Jane

Does 1-10,000; and 9) ABC Corporations 1-10,000. 

Plaintiff raises numerous claims in his Complaint challenging his indictment and

conviction in the Pima Count y Superior Court for Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent

Scheme and Art ifice and False Instrument, two counts of False Instrument, and Fraudulent

Scheme and Artifice, Benefit of a Value of $100,000 or more. Plaintiff seeks immediate

release from prison and money damages.

Improper Defendants

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liabilit y for their conduct in “initiating a

prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” insofar as that conduct is “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); Burns v. Reed, 500

U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-43); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,

1076 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Defendants Evans and LaWall must be dismissed for

failure to state a claim.

Further, judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages for their judicial acts

except when they are t aken “ in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. An act is “judicial” when it is a

function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his or her

judicial cap acity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir.

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1990). In this case, Plaintiff challenges actions taken by judges presiding over his criminal

proceedings. Presiding over a criminal case is a function normally performed by a judge

and Plaintiff dealt with the judges named in this suit in their judicial capacities. Plaintiff

makes no colorable allegations that the judges named in the Complaint acted outside of

their jurisdiction. Accordingly , Defendants Browning and Dawley must be dismissed from

this action for failure to state a claim.

Similarly , members of a grand jury are absolutely immune from suit because, like a

judge, they must "exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to

them." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20. Accordingly, Defendants Members of Grand Jury will

be dismissed from this action.

Finally, under the Elevent h Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a

state or state agency may not be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State

School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, “a state is not a ‘person’ for p urposes of section 1983. 

Defendant State of Arizona will therefore be dismissed.

Failure to State a Claim

Plaintiff’s complaint seeking damages for wrongful prosecution is premature

because his conviction has never been reversed, expunged or otherwise invalidat ed. T he

Supreme Court has held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconst itutional conviction or

imprisonment , or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a . . . plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ

of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing t hat

relat ionship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is

not cognizable[.]

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-7 (1994) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

Therefore, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a suit alleging an

unconstitutional conviction or imp risonment, the district court must consider whether a

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Plaintiff should not e t hat a prisoner attacking his state conviction must exhaust state

remedies before a federal court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509 (1982); Szeto v. Rushen, 709 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1983). The federal court will not

entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless each and every issue has been exhausted. Rose,

455 U.S. at 521-22. “[E]xcept in habeas petitions in life-sentence or capital cases, claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has

ruled on them.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). The failure to exhaust

subjects a habeas petitioner to dismissal. Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1983).

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judgment in favor of the Plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction

or sentence. Id. If it does, t he comp laint must be dismissed if the conviction or sentence

has not already been invalidated. In this case, Plaint iff explicitly alleges both that his

conviction was invalid and that it has not been overturned, reversed, or declared invalid.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks the invalidation of his sentence, or any relief which

would result in immediate or speedier release, his exclusive remedy is a petition for habeas

corpus.1 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973).

Dismissal Without Leave to Amend

Because t he Court is convinced that the deficiencies in the Complaint cannot be

cured by amendment, see Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Brought on v. Cutter Lab, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)), the Court’s dismissal of the

Complaint will be wit hout leave to amend. The Court will order that the action be dismissed

and judgment entered.

Motions

As all of the pending motions in this case were filed before the Court completed

statutory screening of Plaintiff's Complaint, these motions are premature and, in light of the

Court's dismissal, are moot. These motions will be denied as moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows:

(1) The Complaint and this action are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND,

for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2), and the Clerk of Court

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shall enter judgment accordingly; 

(2) The Clerk of Court shall make an ent ry on the docket in this matter indicating that

the dismissal for failure to state a claim falls wit hin t he purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

(3) The following motions are DENIED AS MOOT:

(a) Plaintiff's March 10, 2005 Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. #9),

(b) Defendants' March 31, 2005 Motions to Dismiss (Doc. ##14 &15),

(c) Defendants' April 5, 2005 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #19), 

(d) Plaintiff's June 21, 2005 Motion for Default Judgment (Doc #23).

DATED this 16th day of November, 2005.

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