Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06194/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06194-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 28 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

JACQUELINE J. SCHROEDER, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

V. 

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES; SUZANNE 

COLEMAN; LINDA LEE; SUSAN 

KILMER; LOIS WILLIAMS; 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 

OF MACHINISTS AND 

AEROSPACE WORKERS (IAMA W); 

LOCAL 2909 INTERNATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 

AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 04-6194 

(D.C. No. 02-CV-1299-M) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LUCERO, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

• The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not 

binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and 

collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and 

judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and 

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

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Jacqueline J. Schroeder appeals the district court's order dismissing her 

lawsuit as a sanction for failing to prosecute, failing to provide copies of 

pleadings to defendants, and failing to comply with discovery requests, including 

failing to attend her own deposition. 1 She also appeals the order denying her 

motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59( e) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM 

both orders. 

Schroeder has filed three complaints in this Title VII case. The first was 

dismissed without prejudice because Schroeder did not serve defendants with a 

summons. The second complaint was dismissed, also without prejudice, because 

Schroeder failed to file an amended complaint after leave to do so was granted. 

During the time the second lawsuit was pending, Schroeder failed to serve 

defendants with copies of her pleadings. She stated that she and her attorney 

"allowed" these dismissals to occur as a "tactical decision," hoping that an 

ongoing government investigation would bolster her case upon refiling. 

Schroeder filed the complaint underlying this appeal on September 18, 

2002, and defendants moved to dismiss. She filed a response to the motions, but 

did not serve defendants with her response. The district court granted in part and 

Plaintiff was represented by Frederick W. Southern, Jr., who has been 

disbarred. She is represented by different counsel on appeal. 

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denied in part the dismissal motions, and directed Schroeder to file an amended 

complaint. She complied with the district court's direction, but again did not 

serve defendants with copies of her pleading. Defendants then filed another 

motion to dismiss; plaintiff filed a response, but yet again failed to serve a copy 

on defendants. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. 

In early December 2003, defendants served discovery requests on 

Schroeder's attorney. They also served notices that they would depose Schroeder 

on February 4, 2004. Because Schroeder's counsel did not respond to the 

discovery requests or to defendants' attorneys' other attempts to obtain the 

discovery, defendants filed a motion to compel. 

Neither Schroeder nor her attorney appeared for the deposition set for 

February 4th. They made no request to change the date and they did not notify 

defendants' attorneys that they would not appear. Furthermore, the attorneys' 

telephone call to Schroeder's lawyer on the day of the deposition went 

unanswered and was never returned. Defendants' attorneys traveled to Oklahoma 

City from Washington, D.C. and San Antonio, Texas for the deposition. 

On February 19, 2004, Schroeder responded to the motion to compel by 

stating that she had provided the requested discovery. The district court found 

that those responses were inadequate. Three weeks later, Schroeder supplemented 

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those responses, but the district court was not aware of the supplement. 

Schroeder has not explained why she failed to respond adequately to the discovery 

requests in a timely manner. 

On March I 9, 2004, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss 

with prejudice as a sanction for abusing the discovery process, failing to 

prosecute her case, and failing to follow the rules of civil procedure. The court 

evaluated the appropriate factors and concluded that dismissal with prejudice was 

the only appropriate sanction under the circumstances. 2 

Schroeder then filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court 

construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). In 

support of the motion, Schroeder submitted a statement explaining that she did 

not know her deposition had been set for February 4th, and that the first two 

complaints were allowed to be dismissed for tactical reasons. She also stated that 

she had answered defendants' discovery requests on February 19, 2004, and had 

supplemented those answers on March 12, 2004. The district court denied the 

motion, holding that plaintiff had not met the criteria to alter or amend a 

judgment. 

2 The district court also ordered Schroeder's then-attorney to pay attorney 

fees and costs to defendants. These orders are not before us. 

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"We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision to 

impose the sanction of dismissal for failure to follow court orders and rules." 

Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002). "A district court 

undoubtedly has discretion to sanction a party for failing to prosecute or defend a 

case, or for failing to comply with local or federal procedural rules." Reed v. 

Bennett, 312 F .3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). In addition, a district court has 

discretion to dismiss a case for discovery violations. Lafleur v. Teen Help, 

342 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003). Sanctions are available to permit the court 

to "ma nag[ e] its docket and avoid[] unnecessary burdens on the tax-supported 

courts, opposing parties or both." Mulvaney v. Rivair Flying Serv., Inc. (In re 

Baker), 744 F.2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir. 1984). In reviewing the district court's 

exercise of discretion, we consider the totality of the circumstances. M.E.N. Co. 

v. Control Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1987). "Because a default 

judgment is a harsh sanction, due process requires that 'failure' [to obey rules or 

orders] is a sufficient ground only when it is the result of 'willfulness, bad faith, 

or [some] fault of petitioner' rather than inability to comply." Id. (quoting Nat'l 

Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640 (1976)). Willful 

failure means "any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary 

noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown." Id. at 872-73 ( quotation 

omitted). 

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In Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992), this court 

articulated the following five criteria for a district court to consider when 

evaluating whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction: "(I) the degree of actual 

prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial 

process; ... (3) the culpability of the litigant; ( 4) whether the court warned the 

party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for 

noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions." 965 F.2d at 921 

(quotation and citations omitted). These criteria are guidelines, not a "rigid test." 

Schroeder concedes that the first two Ehrenhaus criteria were met, although 

she maintains that she was not at fault. She contends that the district court 

abused its discretion in finding that the remaining factors weighed in favor of 

dismissal. Specifically, she maintains that she was blameless, that the court never 

warned her that her case could be dismissed with prejudice, and that a lesser 

sanction is appropriate. She argues that the blame lies with her former attorney 

and that the district court appropriately imposed sanctions on him. 

Addressing culpability, the district court determined that even though 

Schroeder's attorney was more culpable than she, no evidence had been presented 

to demonstrate that she "was not aware of the date, time, and place for her 

deposition." Aplt. App. at 192. Schroeder points to her statement that she was 

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not aware that her deposition had been scheduled. This statement was not filed 

until after the case was dismissed. Therefore, at the time the case was dismissed, 

"the record contain[ ed] no direct evidence regarding what plaintiff knew of [her] 

attorney's derelictions," and under those circumstances, a plaintiff is liable for the 

acts and omissions of her attorney. Gripe, 312 F .3d at 1188. "Any other notion 

would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in 

which each party is deemed bound by the acts of [her] lawyer-agent and is 

considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the 

attorney." Id. at 1189 (quotation omitted). 3 

We recognize, as plaintiff argues, that this court has stated that '" [i]f the 

fault lies with the attorneys, that is where the impact of the sanction should be 

lodged."' M.E.N. Co., 834 F .2d at 873 ( quotation omitted). In that case, 

however, the district court "made no findings on whether [the sanctioned 

litigants'] conduct met the willful noncompliance standard," so the case was 

remanded for specific findings. Id. at 873-74; see Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow 

Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1465 (10th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases that were 

remanded to permit district court to make findings on fault of litigant). In 

contrast, the district court in this case made the explicit finding that Schroeder, as 

3 "Redress for [attorney] incompetence is usually found in a suit for 

malpractice rather than on direct appeal." M.E.N. Co., 834 F.2d at 873. 

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well as her attorney, was culpable. "[W]here the district court considered this 

factor on the record, the client was liable for the acts and omissions of [her] 

counsel." LaFleur, 342 F.3d at 1152; see also Gripe, 312 F.3d at 1188 (dismissal 

appropriate even where "the record contains no direct evidence regarding what 

plaintiff knew of his attorney's derelictions," because "of the repeated and 

documented failure of his chosen representative."). 

Moreover, Schroeder stated that the first two complaints "were allowed to 

be dismissed without prejudice for tactical reasons." Where sanctionable conduct 

was the result of tactical decisions, "[ w ]e need not allocate fault ... between 

lawyer and client because both are bound by trial strategy." Smith v. United 

States, 834 F.2d 166, 171 (10th Cir. 1987). We conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in its culpability determination. 

In evaluating the fourth Ehrenhaus factor - whether the plaintiff had been 

warned that dismissal was a likely sanction for noncompliance - the district court 

found that even though she had not been warned, "the continuing nature of 

plaintiff and her counsel's inexcusable conduct, the extent of the prejudice to 

defendants, and the interference with the judicial process outweigh the fact that 

plaintiff was not specifically warned." In addition, the court noted that the two 

orders dismissing her lawsuit without prejudice should have put Schroeder on 

notice that she and her counsel must comply with court deadlines and rules. The 

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district court considered this factor and stated legitimate reasons for dismissing. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. 

As for the fifth criterion - the efficacy of lesser sanctions - the district 

court found that "nothing short of dismissal would be effective," after considering 

the history of this litigation and the repeated abuses of the judicial process. 

Plaintiff first filed suit in November 2000. As of the dismissal date, March 19, 

2004, the parties had not even accomplished the first phase of discovery. The 

district court had granted leave to amend the complaint on at least two occasions, 

defendants' attorneys' had failed to receive several key pleadings, defendants had 

moved to compel discovery, Schroeder's written and documentary discovery 

responses were inadequate, 4 and both Schroeder and her attorney failed to appear 

for her deposition. "The burden of litigation is too pressing, and trial courts' 

patience has too long been tried, to permit parties to evade the consequences of 

neglecting their cases." M.E.N. Co., 834 F.2d at 873. Under the circumstances, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing dismissal as an 

appropriate sanction. 

4 Schroeder argues that the district court inappropriately considered the 

inadequacy of her responses to the discovery requests. She asserts that one of the 

defendants' attorneys did not certify that he conferred or attempted to confer with 

plaintiff's counsel, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). Schroeder has not 

shown that this issue was raised in the district court; therefore, we decline to 

consider it on appeal. Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 

1280 (10th Cir. 2003 ). 

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Schroeder also challenges the district court's order denying her Rule 59( e) 

motion to alter or amend the judgment. "We review a district court's ruling on a 

[Rule] 59( e) motion under an abuse of discretion standard .... A Rule 59( e) 

motion to alter or amend the judgment should be granted only to correct manifest 

errors oflaw or to present newly discovered evidence." Phelps v. Hamilton, 

122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). 

Schroeder filed a declaration explaining her reasons for the delays in 

prosecuting her case, and stating that she had been unaware that her deposition 

had been scheduled. The district court appropriately declined to consider the 

declaration because it contained no new information that was unavailable before 

the dismissal order. Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F .2d 1517, 

1524 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion when district court refused 

to consider additional evidence in support of Rule 5 9( e) motion where there was 

no showing "that the evidence was newly discovered or unavailable in a more 

timely fashion through the exercise of diligence"). The district court held that 

Schroeder had identified no instances in which the court had misapprehended the 

facts or the controlling law, and denied relief. \Ve similarly conclude that 

Schroeder has not shown manifest error requiring that the judgment be reopened. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Schroeder's motion. 

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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

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