Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00887/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00887-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO VALENCIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA 

INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00887-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Plaintiffs Ernesto Valencia, Adelina Duncan, Lorenzo Sava, Michelle Savage, Margarito 

De La Rosa, and Lenelyn De La Rosa assert claims under the California’s Unfair Competition 

Law (“UCL”) and California’s Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Breach of Implied Warranty under 

the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, as well as for 

Unjust Enrichment, against Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”). 

Plaintiffs’ claims arise from their purchase of 2009 through 2012 model year Volkswagen 

Routans, which they allege were manufactured with defective and dangerous brakes. On April 27, 

2015, Volkswagen moved to dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 23 (“Mot.”). Plaintiffs opposed that motion on May 27, 2015, Dkt. 

No. 36 (“Opp.”), and Volkswagen filed a reply on June 15, 2015, Dkt. No. 39 (“Reply”). The 

Court held a hearing on the motion on June 25, 2015.

The Court has carefully considered the arguments offered by the parties, both in their 

written submissions and during oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals in 

the United States who purchased or leased a 2009 through 2012 model year Volkswagen Routan. 

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See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 118. Plaintiffs allege that Routan minivans were sold 

with defective brakes that “fail[ed] to adequately handle the braking duties required by vehicles 

the size and weight of the [Routan], thereby leading to abnormal, premature wear of the braking 

system’s components” (the “braking defect”), id. ¶ 76, and that Volkswagen knew of the braking 

defect and failed to inform consumers, id. ¶ 77. Plaintiffs further allege that the braking defect 

poses a material safety risk because it causes “shaking and shuddering which can be felt through 

the brake pedal, floor, and steering wheel [which] severely affect the driver’s ability to control the 

car’s speed and deceleration.” Id. ¶ 78. 

Ernesto Valencia and Adelina Duncan purchased a new 2011 Routan on September 24, 

2011. FAC ¶ 30. Valencia and Duncan noticed “symptoms” of the braking defect, including a 

grinding noise, “within approximately” the first year of their purchase. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs 

continued to experience grinding noises while braking and replaced their brakes on December 23, 

2012, id. ¶ 35, September 20, 2013, id. ¶ 36, January 3, 2014, id. ¶ 37, July 7, 2014, id. ¶ 38, and 

October 18, 2014, id. ¶ 39. 

Lorenzo and Michele Savage purchased a certified pre-owned 2011 Routan on March 7, 

2012. FAC ¶ 43. Around March 14, 2013, the Savages were informed by a Volkswagen service 

advisor that the rear brake pads, rear brake rotors, and front brake pads on their vehicle would 

need to be replaced. Id. ¶ 47. The Savages replaced the brake pads again on December 31, 2013, 

id. ¶ 48, February 20, 2014, id. ¶49, and December 2, 2014, id. ¶ 50. 

Margarito and Lenelyn De La Rosa purchased a new 2010 Routan on May 24, 2010. FAC 

¶ 54. On July 13, 2011, the De La Rosas took their Routan to an authorized Volkswagen dealer 

complaining that the brakes were pulsating and the rear rotors were badly grooved. Id. ¶ 58. The 

dealership replaced the rear brake pads and discs under Plaintiffs’ warranty. Id. On April 29, 

2013, Plaintiffs returned to the dealership, complaining that the vehicle was “shimmying and 

vibrating while braking.” Id. ¶ 59. The service advisor informed them that the brake rotors were 

“out of round” and needed to be replaced again. Id. Plaintiffs took the vehicle back to the 

dealership on September 13, 2014 complaining of “shimmying and squeaking while braking” and 

were told that their brakes would again need to be replaced. Id. ¶ 60. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when it 

does not contain sufficient facts to state a plausible claim on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “While a complaint 

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Moore v. Kayport Package 

Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 550 (9th Cir. 1989). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a 

complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s 

elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the Court 

dismisses the complaint, it will generally grant leave to amend “unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). When a party repeatedly fails to cure deficiencies, 

however, the court may order dismissal without leave to amend. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

III. DISCUSSION

Volkswagen moves to dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Duty to Disclose

To state an actionable claim under the CLRA or the UCL arising out of an omission, 

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Plaintiffs must sufficiently plead that the defendant had a duty to disclose the information omitted. 

See Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118, 126 

(2006), as modified (Nov. 8, 2006) (“[A]lthough a claim may be stated under the CLRA in terms 

constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable the omission must be contrary to a 

representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged 

to disclose.”); id. at 838 (holding that the court “cannot agree that a failure to disclose a fact one 

has no affirmative duty to disclose is likely to deceive anyone within the meaning of the UCL”); 

see also Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“To be actionable, an 

omission must be ‘contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a 

fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.’”) (citation omitted); Chulick-Perez v. Carmax Auto 

Superstores California, LLC, No. 13-cv-02329-TLN, 2014 WL 2154479, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 

2014) (“For an omission to be actionable under the CLRA or UCL, it must be either 1) “contrary 

to a representation actually made by the defendant” or 2) “an omission of a fact the defendant was 

obligated to disclose.”).

California recognizes four circumstances where a duty to disclose is imposed on a 

defendant:

(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the 

plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of 

material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant 

actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the 

defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some 

material fact.

LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 337 (1997). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that 

Volkswagen had a duty to disclose the alleged braking defect because it was a material fact and 

Volkswagen had exclusive knowledge of and/or actively concealed the existence of the defect 

from consumers. Volkswagen moves to dismiss Plaintiffs CLRA and UCL claims for failure to 

sufficiently allege a duty to disclose on the grounds that: (1) the braking defect does not constitute 

a safety hazard and is thus not material; (2) it did not have exclusive knowledge of the braking 

defect at the time Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles; and (3) it did not actively conceal the 

existence of the braking defect. 

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1. Safety Hazard

“When analyzing a UCL, CLRA, or fraudulent concealment claim, California law instructs 

that a manufacturer’s duty to consumers is limited to its warranty, unless a safety issue is present 

or there has been some affirmative misrepresentation.” Gray v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 

554 F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Daugherty, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 834-35); see also

Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 941 n.41 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (observing that

only “defects that create unreasonable safety risks after the warranty period has ended [give] rise 

to a duty to disclose under the CLRA and UCL”); Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 09-cv2253-RMW, 2009 WL 3021240, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009) (dismissing a CLRA claim 

based on a manufacturer’s alleged duty to disclose where the omission did not implicate safety 

concerns); Morgan v. Harmonix Music Systems, Inc., No. 08-cv-5211-BZ, 2009 WL 2031765, *4 

(N.D. Cal. July 7, 2009) (“According to all of the relevant case law, defendants are only under a 

duty to disclose a known defect in a consumer product when there are safety concerns associated 

with the product’s use.”).

Volkswagen asserts that despite “including page after page of consumer complaints to 

NHTSA, Cars.com and Edumnds.com, not a single one of these complaints asserted that the 

alleged Braking System Defect resulted in any accident or sudden brake failure.” Mot. at 17 

(citation omitted). Volkswagen is incorrect. Many of the complaints quoted in the FAC assert 

that the consumer’s Volkswagen Routan suffered from a reoccurring braking problem that resulted 

in an accident or unsafe driving conditions. For example:

While driving approx 3035mph [sic], my van began to smell hot and 

smoke began to rise from the right front wheel well. I had two of 

my three children with me. I frantically told my 14 yr old son who 

was in the front passenger seat to get to the back and help his four yr 

old sister out of her car seat (we were still moving) I pulled into a 

parking lot and had them quickly exit the left sliding door of the 

van. Later that evening I went back to retrieve the van alone and as 

soon as the van began to move it made the most horrible grinding 

noise I have ever heard. I immediately knew it was a seized brake 

caliper, (not because I am a mechanic. I am a speech therapist). I 

knew because approx 4 months prior the van made the exact same 

sound with no warning when the right rear caliper seized and both 

front and back brakes were replaced! =$780).

FAC ¶ 79(d).

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When the vehicle is traveling near 30mph or even higher than that, 

when the brakes are applied, it shakes violently. This causes the 

driver to have to hold the steering wheel very tightly to avoid 

loosing [sic] control. The breaking system in general seems to be 

faulty as the brakes and rotors have had to be replaced/changed 

every two to three months.

Id. ¶ 79(g).

Volkswagon routan 2010: the steering wheel shakes violently upon 

breaking a regular speeds, especially going downhill. Front rotors 

were replaced at 22,000, 35,000, and now 54,000 miles.

Id. ¶ 79(m).

The brakes have been replaced 2 or 3 times. The most recent 

problem was the power brake booster (or something like that) has 

failed. My wife was not able to stop the van. She went through a 

red light where cross traffic was traveling at speeds of 40mph or 

greater. Her driving skills and using booth feet on the brake peddle 

[sic] she was able to slow the van and steer it from getting blind 

sided.

Id.¶ 79(t). These allegations (as well as the numerous other consumer complaints cited in the 

FAC) are sufficient to give rise to the inference that the braking defect alleged in the FAC 

constitutes a material safety issue under California law.

2. Active Concealment

Plaintiffs argue that a defendant’s failure to notify customers of a known safety defect

supports an allegation of active concealment sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose under 

LiMandri. See Mot. at 13. The Court disagrees. Instead, “[a]n allegation of active concealment 

must plead more than an omission; rather, a plaintiff must assert affirmative acts of concealment; 

e.g., that the defendant ‘sought to suppress information in the public domain or obscure the 

consumers’ ability’ to discover it.” Taragan v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 09-cv-3660 SBA, 2013 

WL 3157918, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2013) (quoting Gray v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., No. 

08-cv-1690 PSG, 2012 WL 313703, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012)). 

Plaintiff’s citations to cases like Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 

(N.D. Cal. 2007) and Marsikian v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, No. 08-cv-04876-AHM-JTLX, 

2009 WL 8379784, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2009) do not support a contrary proposition. In Falk, 

the plaintiffs alleged more than inaction; they alleged that the defendants both: (1) substituted 

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broken defective parts with equally defective replacements; and (2) represented to consumers that 

those defective replacements corrected the problem. See Falk, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1097. Similarly, 

in Marsikian, the plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes developed “measured and selective responses” 

to owners’ complaints (e.g., good will adjustments) but “concealed the problem from the general 

customer base.” Marsikian, 2009 WL 8379784, at *6. In both cases, plaintiffs alleged affirmative

acts sufficient to plead active concealment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Volkswagen 

failed to take certain affirmative steps to remedy the braking defect—such as issuing a bulletin 

describing the braking defect, providing an extended warranty to customers, or recalling the 

affected vehicles—does not support Plaintiffs’ allegation of active concealment. At most, 

Volkswagen’s inaction constitutes passive concealment insufficient to trigger a duty to disclose. 

Even so, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient affirmative acts to plead 

active concealment. As in Falk, Plaintiffs allege that Volkswagen addressed “consumer 

complaints by replacing the prematurely worn pads and rotors with the same or substantially 

similar defective components in order to ensure that the defect will manifest itself outside of the 

warranty period.” FAC ¶ 158. Plaintiffs have also pled facts demonstrating that Volkswagen 

dealers often denied the existence of the braking defect. See e.g., FAC ¶ 79 (h) (“Took it to the 

dealership but they said nothing was wrong with the brakes”); id. ¶79(o) (“[The VW dealership] 

said it would not be covered under warranty because it may have been caused by me pushing hard 

on the brakes”); id. ¶79(p) (“[The VW dealership] had to replace all four rotors [sic] and brake 

pads . . . but keep[s] telling me that it was driver error”). A defendant’s affirmative denial of a 

defect may be sufficient to demonstrate active concealment. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. 

Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Products Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 

1192 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Plaintiffs’ allegations that Toyota repeatedly denied the existence of the 

alleged SUA defect are sufficient to demonstrate active concealment.”) (citation omitted). Taken 

together, the allegations contained in the FAC sufficiently plead active concealment.1

 

1 Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately pled the existence of active concealment, 

the Court does not reach the question of whether Plaintiffs have also pled facts sufficient to create 

an inference of exclusive knowledge.

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* * *

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Volkswagen’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first and 

second causes of action pursuant to the CLRA and UCL. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to 

support the inference that Volkswagen had a duty to disclose the alleged braking defect.

B. Warranty Claims

Volkswagen moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under both the Song-Beverly and 

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts on the ground that the FAC does not allege that the Plaintiffs 

experienced the braking defect within the first year of vehicle ownership. See Cal. Civ. Code § 

1791.l(c) (West 2015) (establishing the term of the implied warranty provided by the SongBeverly Act to be “coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the 

consumer goods . . . but in no event shall such implied warranty have a duration of . . . more than 

one year following the sale of new consumer goods to a retail buyer.”); see also In re Carrier IQ, 

Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2015 WL 274054, at *45 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2015) (the Magnuson-Moss 

Warranty Act “does not create implied warranties, but instead confers federal court jurisdiction for 

state law breach of implied warranty claims . . . . [C]ourts must look to state law to determine the 

meaning and scope of the implied warranty.”) (citations omitted). 

As described above, none of the Plaintiffs have alleged that the braking defect manifested 

within a year of the purchase of their Routan minivan. See supra, Section I. The closest Plaintiffs 

come to such an allegation is that Plaintiffs Valencia and Duncan noticed “symptoms” of the 

braking defect, including a grinding noise, “within approximately” the first year of their purchase. 

FAC ¶ 34 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ opposition brief glides over the word “approximately” 

when it represents that Plaintiffs Valencia and Duncan “did allege that they noticed the defect 

within the first year of ownership.” Opp. at 22. That is not what is alleged in the FAC. If those 

Plaintiffs could allege in good faith that the braking defect actually presented within the first year 

of ownership, they were required to plead that fact in the operative complaint. The Court cannot 

base its decision on the stronger representation contained in Plaintiffs’ opposition. See, e.g., 

Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir.1998) (“The ‘new’ 

allegations contained in the . . . opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. 

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In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s 

motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis in original).

As noted by Judge Tigar in MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1099 

(N.D. Cal. 2014), “[t]here appears to be disagreement among California courts as to whether a 

Song-Beverly claim may succeed where the product defect arises after the one year implied 

warranty has expired.” Compare Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1304-05, 95 

Cal. Rptr. 3d 285 (2009) (concluding that “[i]n the case of a latent defect . . . the warranty of 

merchantability is breached by the existence of the unseen defect . . . although [the] defect may not 

be discovered for months or years after a sale.”) with Marchante v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc.,

801 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that Mexia would “render meaningless any 

durational limits on implied warranties” because “[e]very defect that arises could conceivably be 

tied to an imperfection existing during the implied warranty period . . . . [I]n that vein, Mexia

enjoys the limelight as a case contrary to established California case law with respect to the 

duration of the implied warranty of merchantability”) (citations omitted). 

The majority of cases appear to agree with Marchante and hold that the Song-Beverly Act 

requires the alleged defect to manifest within the one-year implied warranty period. See, e.g., 

Peterson v. Mazda Motor ofAm., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 965, (C.D. Cal. 2014); McVicar v. Goodman 

Global, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1057-58 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Grodzitsky 11,2013 WL 2631326, at 

*10-11; Elias v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 903 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852-53 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Tietsworth 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 09-cv-00288-JF, 2009 WL 3320486, at *12 n. 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct.13, 

2009) (noting that “Mexia appears to be something of an outlier”). A second group of cases 

follows Mexia and hold that a plaintiff may state a Song-Beverly claim where she alleges that the 

defect existed at the time of sale, even if the defect was not discovered until months or years later. 

See, e.g., Kas v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 11-cv-01032-GHK, 2011 WL 5248299, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011); Ehrlich v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 (C.D. Cal. 

2010). The Court finds the first line of cases—which limits Mexia to instances where the product 

was unmerchantable at the time of sale—to be persuasive. 

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In Mexia, the plaintiff purchased a boat with a latent defect that caused its engine to 

corrode. Repairs to the boat were needed over two years after plaintiff’s purchase and plaintiff 

brought suit just over three years after purchase. It is unclear from the opinion when the boat first 

started exhibiting problems or when the latent defect was discovered, but Mexia held that there is 

no requirement in Song-Beverly that a latent defect be discovered within a year of purchase. In 

reaching that conclusion, Mexia relied heavily on Moore v. Hubbard Johnson Lumber Co., 149 

Cal. App. 2d 236 (1957), an implied warranty case predating passage of the Song-Beverly Act. In 

Moore, the plaintiff purchased lumber that turned out to have been infested with beetles that could 

not have been discovered through visual inspection. Moore, 149 Cal. App. 2d at 241. Mexia cited 

Moore for the proposition that “although a defect may not be discovered for months or years after 

a sale, merchantability is evaluated as if the defect were known.” Mexia, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 

1305. 

Cabining Mexia’s holding to circumstances like that presented in Moore—where the 

product is unmerchantable the very moment it was purchased—is supported both by other 

California decisions and by common sense. For example, several intermediate appellate court 

decisions addressing facts outside of that narrow circumstance appear to disagree with Mexia’s 

holding. See Larsen v. Nissan N. Am., No. A121838, 2009 WL 1766797, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 

June 23, 2009) (finding that a defects in a car that manifested themselves four years after purchase 

could not form the basis of a Song-Beverly Act claim and noting that “the warranty of 

merchantability implied as a matter of law in California is limited to one year after purchase”); 

Balakian v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, No. F060461, 2011 WL 6826723, at *7 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 

Dec. 29, 2011) (noting that “implied warranties of merchantability and fitness have a duration of 

no more than one year following the sale of a new consumer good to a retail buyer”).2 

However, the most compelling reason to adopt the limited reading of Mexia is the 

incompatibility of the broader reading with the Song-Beverly Act’s one-year implied warranty 

 

2 Although unpublished California cases have no precedential value, they may be considered “as a 

possible reflection of California law.” Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 n .6 (9th Cir.

2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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period. As described in Marchante, Mexia’s broader holding “renders meaningless any durational 

limits on implied warranties[,]” as “[e]very defect that arises could conceivably be tied to an 

imperfection existing during the implied warranty period.” Marchante, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1022. 

Under such a reading of Mexia, even “defects” that manifest twenty or thirty years after the date of 

purchase would fall within Song-Beverly’s one-year limitations period. Accordingly, the Court 

agrees with numerous other decisions that, to the extent Mexia is good law at all, it applies solely 

to the narrow category of claims arising from products that were unmerchantable the moment they 

were purchased.

That is not the type of product at issue in this case. While Plaintiffs have alleged that the 

braking defect caused the brakes of their Routan minivans to rapidly wear and eventually require 

replacement, there is no allegation that the brakes did not function when purchased. In fact, 

Plaintiffs allege that it took thousands of miles of normal use for the brakes to show signs of the 

braking defect. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 34. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Volskwagen’s motion to dismiss the third and fourth 

causes of action. 

C. Statute of Limitations

Volkswagen moves to dismiss the CLRA, UCL, and warranty claims of Plaintiffs 

Margarito and Lenelyn De La Rosa as time barred. The Court will dismiss the De La Rosa’s 

warranty claims, but denies the motion with respect to the De La Rosa’s CLRA and UCL claims.

1. CLRA and UCL Claims

Under the CLRA, the statute of limitations expires three years from the date “of the 

commission of such method, act or practice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1783 (West 2015). The delayed 

discovery rule tolls the running of the limitations period until the plaintiff suspects or should 

suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing. See S.M v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 184 

Cal. App. 4th 712, 717 (2010) (“A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or 

she has reason to at least suspect a factual basis for its elements. Suspicion of one or more of the 

elements, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the applicable 

limitations period.”).

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The parties agree that the De La Rosa Plaintiffs brought their Routan to the dealership on 

July 13, 2011, “complaining that the brakes were pulsating and the rear rotors were badly 

grooved” and that the dealership informed them that their brakes were warped and needed to be 

replaced. FAC ¶ 58. Volkswagen argues that this discovery was sufficient to start the three-year 

statute of limitations. In response, Plaintiffs argue that the need for the first brake repair did not 

put the De La Rosas on notice, because “the need to replace brake pads and rotors may not be an 

obvious manifestation of a defect that breaches an implied warranty.” Opp. at 18. Instead, 

“Plaintiffs [allege that they] were not aware that their brake wear was premature and necessitating 

‘frequent repair’ until they had to return for a second repair. Logically, a Plaintiff cannot consider 

repairs to be ‘frequent’ until they have occurred more than once.” Id. at 20.

The Court finds that the parties’ competing interpretations of the facts alleged in the FAC 

may not be resolved on the pleadings. As the California Supreme Court observed, “[t]here are no 

hard and fast rules for determining what facts or circumstances will compel inquiry by the injured 

party and render him chargeable with knowledge. It is a question for the trier of fact.” United 

States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal.3d 586, 597 (1970) (citation omitted). The 

same reasoning applies to Plaintiffs’ claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL to the extent 

that claim is based on a violation of the CLRA. See Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 55 

Cal.4th 1185, 1195 (2013) (holding that “just like common law claims challenging fraudulent 

conduct, a UCL deceptive practices claim should accrue only when a reasonable person would 

have discovered the factual basis for a claim.”).

For these reasons, Volkswagen’s motion to dismiss the De La Rosa’s CLRA and UCL 

claims as time barred is DENIED.

2. Warranty Claims

The statute of limitations that applies to the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the 

California Commercial Code, which requires claims to be brought within four years measured 

from the tender of delivery, not when the alleged defect manifests. Cal. Com. Code § 2725. The 

parties agree that this action was filed more than four years after the date the De La Rosas 

purchased their Volkswagen Routan. Accordingly, the four-year statute of limitations bars the De 

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La Rosas’ claims absent the existence of tolling. See Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t Ltd. v. Content 

Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A statute-of-limitations defense, if 

‘apparent from the face of the complaint,’ may properly be raised in a motion to dismiss.”).

Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations was tolled during the duration of 

Volkswagen’s one-year express warranty. Plaintiffs base this argument on two decisions from the 

Central District of California: Ehrlich v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 908, 924-25 (C.D. 

Cal. 2010), in which the court tolled the statute of limitations on a Song-Beverly claim for the 

duration of an express warranty, and Falco v. Nissan N. Am. Inc., No. 13-cv-0686-DDP, 2013 WL 

5575065 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013), which “[f]ollow[ed] the holding in Ehrlich, [and found] 

Plaintiffs’ claims are not time barred because [defendant’s] five-year warranty tolled the running 

of the implied warranty’s statute of limitations.”).

The Court respectfully disagrees with the reasoning of Ehrlich and Falco and declines to 

insert an unwritten exception in Section 2725. That exception does not appear in the intermediate 

appellate court decision upon which both Ehrlich and Falco base their holdings. As Judge Tigar 

convincingly explained in MacDonald, nothing in Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 

Cal. App. 3d 205 (1991), “supports tolling the statute of limitations on an implied warranty claim 

for the duration of an express warranty. . . . While the Krieger decision allows that the date of 

accrual of the statute of limitations may be tolled for attempted repairs within the one-year implied 

warranty, nowhere does it suggest that the implied warranty’s statute of limitations can be 

extended for the duration of an express warranty.” 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1101. Nor does a plain 

reading of the statutory text support such a result.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Volkwagen’s motion to dismiss the warranty claims of 

Plaintiffs Margarito and Lenelyn De La Rosa as time barred.

D. Unjust Enrichment

Under California law, the elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) receipt of a benefit; and 

(2) unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.

App. 4th 723, 726 (2000). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Unjust Enrichment’ does not describe a theory 

of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is 

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equitable to do so.” Melchior v. New Line Prods., Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 793 (2003) (citation 

omitted); see also Jogani v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 901, 911 (2008) (“[U]njust 

enrichment is not a cause of action. Rather, it is a general principle underlying various doctrines 

and remedies, including quasi-contract.”). 

Until very recently, “federal courts [had] consistently followed Melchior and held that 

California law does not recognize a cause of action for unjust enrichment, so long as another cause 

of action is available that permits restitutionary damages.” In re ConAgra Foods Inc., 908 F.

Supp. 2d 1090, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2012). However, the Ninth Circuit recently clarified the law 

regarding unjust enrichment in California, holding that while “there is not a standalone cause of 

action for unjust enrichment, which is synonymous with restitution . . . [w]hen a plaintiff alleges 

unjust enrichment, a court may construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking 

restitution.” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit also instructed that such a claim should not be 

dismissed as duplicative or superfluous of other claims because a party may set out alternative 

claims for relief. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found the 

allegation that the defendant had enticed plaintiffs “to purchase their products through false and 

misleading labeling, and that [defendant] was unjustly enriched as a result,” was “sufficient to 

state a quasi-contract cause of action.” Id.

Several decisions in this District have permitted what were previously considered to be 

superfluous unjust enrichment claims to survive the pleading stage in light of the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Astiana. See Trazo v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 12-cv-02272-PSG, 2015 WL 4196973, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2015) (finding “Astiana requires this court to side with Trazo and reinstate 

his claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment/quasi-contract.”); Khasin v. R. C. Bigelow,

Inc., No. 12-cv-02204-WHO, 2015 WL 4104868, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2015) (permitting 

plaintiff to amend complaint to allege unjust enrichment cause of action given the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Astiana); Romero v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC, No. 14-cv-05189-BLF, 2015 WL 

2125004, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) (relying on Astiana to deny motion to dismiss unjust 

enrichment claim because, even though “the claim may be duplicative of Plaintiff’s statutory 

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claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA[, that] is not a proper ground for dismissal at this stage of 

the litigation . . . .”); but see Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No.12-cv-02646-RMW, 2015 WL 

3627015, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2015) (declining to reinstate unjust enrichment claim because 

restitutionary damages were available under UCL claim and thus, to the extent the dismissal of the 

unjust enrichment claim conflicted with Astiana, it did not limit plaintiff’s available remedies).

The Court agrees that these decisions accurately reflect Astiana’s holding. At least at the 

pleading stage, Astiana requires this Court to interpret Platiniffs’ unjust enrichment cause of 

action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution. Astiana, 783 F.3d at 762. That the relief 

sought by that cause of action is entirely duplicative of the relief sought by other causes of action 

asserted by the Plaintiffs does not provide a basis for the Court to dismiss the unjust enrichment 

claim. Id. Astiana provides that plaintiffs are permitted to plead an unjust enrichment claim in the 

alternative, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2), even if, as here, it is questionable whether that alternative 

claim provides any prospect for relief independent of the causes of action already alleged. 

Volkswagen’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Volkswagen’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs may amend any claim dismissed, but must submit a Second 

Amended Complaint no later than 28 days from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

8/11/2015

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