Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02682/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02682-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID K. MEHL, et al. No. 2:03-cv-2682-MCE-KJM 

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER ON REQUEST FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

LOU BLANAS,individually and 

in his official capacity as 

SHERIFF OF COUNTY OF 

SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs David K. Mehl, et al.

(“Plaintiffs”) allege Defendants Blanas et al. (“Defendants”)

violated the United States Constitution’s guarantees of equal

protection and freedom of association; the privileges and

immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the “right to self

preservation” Plaintiffs argue is guaranteed by the Ninth

Amendment; and the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the

Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs seek relief

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have sole discretion in

the issuance of permits to carry concealed weapons (“CCWs”)

within the County of Sacramento, California. Plaintiffs further

allege that Defendants maintained a longstanding practice of

issuing CCWs to persons who donated money to the Craig, Blanas,

and McGinnis campaigns for Sheriff of Sacramento County. In

addition according to Plaintiffs, Defendants simultaneously were

denying CCWs to deserving applicants who did not contribute

campaign funds. Plaintiffs also argue that California Penal Code

sections 12027, 12031(b), and 12050-12054 are unconstitutional

because they give preference to judges and honorably retired

peace officers in the issuance of CCWs. 

Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration of a December 1, 2006 Order issued by Magistrate

Judge Kimberly J. Mueller (hereinafter “Magistrate Judge”). For

the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider is

granted.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs David K. Mehl, et al. are persons who applied for

a CCW in the County of Sacramento, followed the procedure set

forth by the Sheriff’s Department, and were denied. Defendant

Blanas is the former Sheriff of Sacramento County. 

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 The Court previously notified the parties on the record 2

that Judge England currently holds a permit to carry a concealed

weapon issued by the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. 

This fact has no bearing on the Court’s decision in this matter

and neither party has requested Judge England recuse himself from

this case. 

3

Also named Defendants in this action are the County of Sacramento

and its Sheriff’s Department.

Defendants seek modification of the Magistrate Judge’s

December 1, 2006 Order (“the Order”) regarding a discovery

dispute between the Parties. The Order was issued after a 2

lengthy dispute between the parties over their respective

responsibilities in the discovery process. The Order resolves

some of the disputed issues and requires the parties to submit a

revised proposed protective order to govern other parts of the

discovery process. Defendants ask the Court to modify those

parts of the Order that require production of CCW applications

and related confidential documents to Plaintiffs: (1) without

removal of the home address, social security number, and other

sensitive information of current or former judges, district

attorneys and police officers; (2) without removal of information

that would identify times and places the applicants would be

vulnerable to attack; (3) without removal of information that

could be used for identity theft; and (4) without a watermark

that was included to prevent the unauthorized re-distribution of

the confidential information contained in the CCW applications. 

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 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) directs the district 3

court judge to “modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate

judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 

Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the district judge may

reconsider any pretrial order “where it is shown that the

magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

4

Defendants also ask the Court to reconsider those portions of the

Magistrate Judge’s Order that require further responses to

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Eight and Request for Production of

Document Twenty-Eight. 

Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’

Request to Reconsider on ground that the Request does not meet

the requirements of the Local Rules. Because Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Strike is potentially dispositive, the Court will address it

first.

STANDARD

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s determination, the

assigned judge shall apply the “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law” standard of review set forth in Local Rule 72-303(f), as

specifically authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a)

and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Under this standard, the Court 3

must accept the Magistrate Judge’s decision unless it has a

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 

Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers

Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). 

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5

If the Court believes the conclusions reached by the Magistrate

Judge were at least plausible, after considering the record in

its entirety, the Court will not reverse even if convinced that

it would have weighed the evidence differently. Phoenix Eng. &

Supply Inc. v. Universal Elec. Co., Inc., 104 F.3d 1137, 1141

(9th Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike

 

In response to Defendants’ request, Plaintiffs filed a

Motion to Strike on the ground that the request does not comply

with Eastern District Local Rule 78-230(k) and it therefore,

“must be stricken as it is just another delay tactic.” Pls.’

Mot. to Strike (12/11/2006) at 2. Plaintiffs failed to notice

that Rule 78-230 applies when a District Court is called upon to

reconsider its own decision in a matter. Rule 78-230 has no

application where, as here, a District Court is asked to

reconsider an order by a magistrate judge. E.D. Cal. Local Rule

72-303(e). Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 78-230 do not

apply in the instant case and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is

denied.

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6

2. Production of Documents containing Judicial and Law

Enforcement Confidential Information

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court

may make any order limiting discovery which justice requires to

protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 

A party must show good cause for a protective order. Id. For

good cause to exist, the party seeking protection from public

disclosure of documents and information produced during discovery

bears the burden of showing that specific prejudice or harm will

result if no protective order is granted. 

Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d

1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Rule 26(c), “[i]f a court

finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of

information to the public, then it balances the public and

private interests to decide whether a protective order is

necessary.” Id. at 1211. 

Defendants first request reconsideration of the Magistrate

Judge's Order denying Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order

authorizing Defendants to remove the home address, home telephone

number, Social security number and other sensitive information of

persons who are or have been judges, district attorneys, peace

officers, or other persons employed in the criminal justice

system. 

Defendants argue that removal of the information is

necessary for the safety of these persons and is consistent with

state law exempting this information from public disclosure. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(u)(2). 

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Plaintiffs respond that they need this information in order to

locate and depose possible witnesses, and to determine which of

these persons were both political donors and CCW applicants. 

They point out that the Magistrate Judge’s Order restricts the

information’s use to attorneys’ and experts’ eyes only. 

A. Specific Prejudice or Harm

Defendants urge this Court to modify the instant order to

ensure that sensitive information about criminal justice

personnel is removed by the Defendants for the safety of those

applicants. Defendants point out that this information is

privileged from disclosure to the public pursuant to California

Government Code section 6254(u). Defendants correctly contend

that the statute evidences California’s recognition of the

applicant’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of this

information. 

Defendants argue that the release of this sensitive

information, even under the Magistrate Judge’s Order, could lead

to its ultimate disclosure to the public. Given the advent of

the internet, were this information disclosed to the public, it

would likely become widely available to anyone with a home

computer. Disgruntled former litigants and arrestees could thus

locate the information. Disclosure of this information threatens

to subject judicial and law enforcement officers to heightened

risk of attacks upon themselves or their families at their place

of residence and elsewhere. 

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8

This threat implicates the very reason that this sensitive

information is exempt from public disclosure under California

law; to prevent these public servants and their families from

suffering a retaliatory attack because of their constant contact

with California’s most violent, uncontrollable, and unpredictable

residents.

Disclosure of this information also endangers the security

of numerous highly sensitive computer systems. Dates and places

of birth, social security numbers, and mother's maiden names are

precisely the kind of information that many high-security systems

use to verify the identity of authorized users. From personal

bank accounts to sensitive criminal justice computer systems,

disclosure of this information threatens to provide access to a

variety of secure systems. Accordingly, Defendants have met

their burden of demonstrating a specific harm from public

disclosure exists in this case. It is of note that this harm is

to numerous persons who are not even parties to this litigation.

B. Balancing the Interests

 

Having found a specific harm, the Court must now turn to

balancing the interests involved to determine if a protective

order is necessary. The interests of the non-litigants whose

information is to be disclosed is discussed above and must be

balanced with the interest of the Plaintiffs and any other

interests in this disclosure.

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9

Plaintiffs’ counsel responds to the interests of the nonlitigants above by asserting that they can be trusted to prevent

disclosure of this information to the public pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s Order. Additionally, they allege they need

the information to determine which CCWs were given as political

kickbacks, and to contact or serve those persons whom they

suspect were improperly given CCWs. 

In an effort to accommodate Plaintiffs’ asserted interest in

obtaining the sensitive personal information of all 3,000 CCW

applicants, Defendants have offered to forward process to

applicants that Plaintiffs seek to contact and notify them that

failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ requests will result in

disclosure of home address, phone number, and other personal

information to Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

Plaintiffs cite CBS., Inc. v. Block to assert that all of

these records are open to public inspection and public disclosure

regardless of the presence of the aforementioned confidential

information. 42 Cal. 3d 646 (1986). Plaintiffs' reliance on CBS

is misplaced. There, the court held that "any information on the

applications and licenses that indicate times or places when the

licensee is vulnerable to attack may be deleted." Id. at 653. 

The CBS court recognized that the right to public inspection of

these documents is subject to the rights of privacy and safety of

the applicants. The CBS court acknowledged the interest the

public has in ensuring that CCWs are issued impartially, but it

did not address the question of the home address and other

sensitive information of public servants in the criminal justice

setting. 

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Moreover, recent experience shows that documents produced in

the course of litigation may well end up in the hands of the

public. Whether these disclosures are made accidentally, by

staff with access to an attorney's files, or by an attorney

seeking to use public pressure as a litigation tool is of no

moment to the affected non-litigants.

As drafted, the Magistrate Judge's Order provides disclosure

of this information for "attorney's and expert's eyes only." The

only safeguard preventing widespread public disclosure of this

sensitive personal information is the assurance of Plaintiffs'

counsel. The Court does not doubt Plaintiffs' counsel's

sincerity. However, balancing the interests involved, the Court

finds that a protective order is necessary. The applicants’

interest in privacy and the security of their persons and

families requires a more stringent safeguard than the assurance

of any one litigant.

For the reasons stated above, after considering the record

in its entirety the Court has a definite and firm conviction that

the Magistrate Judge does not go far enough to provide adequate

safeguards to prevent the public disclosure of information which

could endanger the lives of judicial and law enforcement

personnel. Accordingly, the Court hereby grants Defendants’

Motion for a Protective Order. 

Defendants may remove the home address and phone number,

social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden

name, and other sensitive information from the confidential

documents relating to applications for CCWs submitted by current

or former law enforcement and judicial personnel. 

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Defendants are ordered to include in the place of any removed

material, “(REMOVED BY DEFENDANTS).” Additionally, Defendants

are ordered to receive and forward process from the Plaintiff to

any persons whose sensitive information has been removed. 

Defendants are to forward the process to the home address of

those persons affected with written notification that failure to

respond will result in revelation of the applicants address to

Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

Plaintiffs may, for good cause, move for disclosure of

redacted information on an applicant by applicant basis. The

Court must narrowly tailor discovery in this case to balance the

Plaintiffs’ interest in developing their civil suit against the

paramount interest each member of the judicial and law

enforcement community has in preventing a retaliatory attack by

vigilantly guarding the location where they live and other

information that could facilitate physical harm to them or their

families.

3. Production of Information That Would Reveal Vulnerability

Defendants next request that the Court reconsider the

Magistrate Judge’s denial of Defendants’ Motion for a Protective

Order permitting the removal of information revealing the times

and/or places that a CCW applicant may be vulnerable to attack. 

Defendants’ request is governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(c) and the standards set forth in section 2 of this

Order. 

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Defendants again stress the relationship of this information

to the safety of CCW applicants. As a part of the application

process, applicants are required to reveal the circumstances

which create a need for a CCW. In doing so, applicants are

likely to reveal information such as times and places where they

transport large sums of money from a business to a bank, or the

fact that they travel alone at night in a remote area and have

been subject to stalking, domestic violence, or other serious

threats of victimization. 

In the case of a businessperson, disclosure to the public of

the times and places when they regularly transport the proceeds

of their business would create an opportunity for an

exceptionally lucrative robbery and the ensuing temptation to

actually rob the applicant. In the case of a stalking or repeat

domestic violence victim, revelation of times or places of

vulnerability could lead the applicant’s tormentor to a long

sought-after opportunity to confront the applicant alone. In

either case, avoiding just such a confrontation and possible

tragedy is both the reason the applicant sought a CCW and the

reason they have a powerful interest in keeping that information

strictly confidential. 

As stated above in section 2, the internet’s ability to make

this information widely available and easily found further

aggravates the potential harm from disclosure of this

information. California has also recognized these persons’

interest in the confidentiality of this information, both

statutorily and in case law. Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(u)(1); CBS,

42 Cal. 3d at 653. 

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13

Defendants have again identified a specific harm to non-litigants

if this information were disclosed to the public.

The Court must now balance the interests involved in order

to determine if a protective order is necessary. Plaintiffs

assert that they need this information to independently review

the adequacy of the grounds for the issuance of each and every

one of the 3000 CCW applications involved. Further they argue

that the Magistrate Judge’s Order adequately protects the nonlitigants’ interest. 

Balancing the interests involved, the Court finds that a

protective order is necessary. Plaintiffs' interest is

adequately served by other exhaustive discovery in this

litigation which does not intrude upon the privacy and security

interests of non-litigants as severely as disclosure of this

information would.

For the reasons set forth above, after considering the

record in its entirety the Court has a definite and firm

conviction that the Magistrate Judge did not go far enough to

provide adequate by not granting Defendants' request for

permission to remove information that will reveal the

vulnerability to attack of persons who have applied for a CCW. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby grants Defendants' Motion for

Protective Order. Defendants may remove such information from

the CCW applications and related documents disclosed to

Plaintiffs. As with sensitive law enforcement and judicial

information, Defendants' are to include in the place of any

removed material, "(REMOVED BY DEFENDANTS)." 

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Plaintiffs may, for good cause, move for disclosure of redacted

information on an applicant by applicant basis.

4. Production of Information that Could Lead to Identity Theft

Defendants next request that the Court reconsider the

Magistrate Judge's denial of Defendants' Motion for Protective

Order permitting the removal of information that could lead to

identity theft including social security numbers, driver's

license numbers, and dates and places of birth. This request is

spererate and different from Defendants’ request regarding

Judical and Law Enforcement information in section 2 of this

Order. Here, Defendants seek to remove information from

applications that belong to laypersons. As above, Defendants'

request is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and

the standards set forth in section 2 of this Order.

Defendants argue that public disclosure of this information

creates the risk of subjecting these non-litigants to identity

theft. The applications may include social security numbers,

dates and places of birth, and mother’s maiden names. Public

disclosure of this information subjects lay applicants to a

heightened risk of fraud if it becomes public. Given the

prevalence of identity theft and its far-reaching impact on its

victims, Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating a

specific harm from public disclosure of this information.

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Accordingly, the Court must now balance the interests to

determine if a protective order is necessary. Plaintiffs argue

that they need this information to locate, contact, and depose

potential witnesses in this case. They further argue that this

data is necessary in order to compare the list of persons and

entities which have donated to the Craig, Blanas, and McGinnis

campaigns for Sheriff with the list of persons granted CCWs. 

However, Defendants are not seeking to remove the address or

phone number of persons on the donor lists. This should provide

Plaintiffs with the information they need to locate and contact

any potential witnesses in this case. Additionally, removal of

social security numbers and other identifying information may

cause Plaintiffs to expend more effort in identifying CCW

applicants whose companies have donated to the relevant political

campaigns, but other discovery in this action will permit them to

make such a comparison and to investigate any corporate donations

leading to personal benefits. Plaintiffs’ actual interest in the

information is in convenience in comparing donor lists to CCW

applicants. Balancing the interests involved, the Court finds

that a protective order is necessary.

 For the reasons set forth above, after considering the

record in its entirety the Court once again finds that the

Magistrate Judge did not go far enough to provide adequate by not

granting Defendants' request for permission to remove information

that will expose CCW applicants to the threat of identity theft

if disclosed to the public. Accordingly, the Court hereby grants

Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. 

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Defendants may remove such information from the CCW applications

and related documents disclosed to Plaintiffs. Defendants' are

to include in the place of any removed material, "(REMOVED BY

DEFENDANTS)." Plaintiffs may again, for good cause, move for

disclosure of redacted information on an applicant by applicant

basis.

5. Watermark To Ensure Compliance With Confidentiality Order

Defendants also seek to include a substantial watermark

designed to prevent the unlawful reproduction and redistribution

of the confidential CCW applications and related documents

provided to Plaintiffs. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Order, all such documents produced in the course of this

litigation are for attorneys' and experts' eyes only. Neither

party has challenged this limitation on the use of these

materials. The Magistrate Judge ordered the watermark removed

and in its place required a marginal notation of the case number. 

Because Defendants are again seeking a Protective Order, this

request is also governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)

and the standards set forth in section 2 of this Order.

Defendants argue that even the redacted versions of these

documents possess information about CCW applicants that is

confidential including home addresses, weapons owned, names of

current and former family members, and medical and psychiatric

histories. 

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Further, they point out that because of the sheer volume of

applications and related documents, it is likely that some

information ordered removed will still accidentally be disclosed

as part of these documents. Moreover, the Defendants urge that

the marginal notation mandated by the Magistrate Judge could

easily be removed by anyone with a photocopier. As a result,

Defendants contend it does not adequately ensure that these

documents will not be disseminated to persons outside of the

litigation. As discussed above, Defendants have demonstrated

several specific harms that will result if this information is

distributed to the public including the invasion of the

applicants’ privacy and threats to their security.

Plaintiffs argue that inclusion of the watermark makes it

difficult to read the documents. Having reviewed a sample of the

proposed watermark, the Court finds it has no impact on the

readability of the text in the documents. Because it is printed

in a hollow letter style, the ability to read the underlying text

is unaffected. Balancing the interests involved, the Court finds

that a protective order is necessary.

 For the reasons set forth above, after considering the

record in its entirety the Court grants Defendants' request for a

Protective Order to include a substantial watermark to prevent a

violation of the Order limiting the persons who may view them. 

Defendants may include the watermark they proposed (Gorski – Do

Not Duplicate) in the font, size, and location indicated in

Exhibit A to Defendant's Request for Reconsideration on all CCW

applications and related confidential documents. 

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Plaintiffs may move for disclosure of any information obscured by

the watermark in the unlikely event it should occur. 

6. Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Eight

Defendants also request the Court reconsider that portion of

the Magistrate Judge's order that requires Defendants to respond

to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory Eight ("Interrogatory Eight"). 

Defendants object to Interrogatory Eight on ground that answering

would involve comparing the information on 3000 applications for

CCWs, an unknown number of personnel records of Sheriff's

Department volunteers and reservists, and approximately 800 pages

of campaign contribution documents. Defendants correctly point

out that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a

party subject to such a request is not required to perform

compilation of data or statistics where the answers are within

documents provided and the propounding party is equally able to

make such a compilation. FRCP 33(d). However, Defendants are

required to answer based upon personal knowledge and that

information which is available to them. FRCP 33(a). Moreover,

Plaintiffs point out that several parts of Interrogatory Eight

request information that is not contained in any documents that

have been produced to Plaintiffs, such as unreported campaign

loans that were subsequently forgiven and names of persons who

formerly held the position of Honorary Deputy Sheriff. 

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For the sake of clarity and to avoid further needless waste

of the Court's time, Defendants' response to Interrogatory Eight

shall comply with the following mandates of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 33: (1) Defendant Blanas is to answer all of the subparts of Interrogatory Eight to the best of his personal

knowledge; (2) where the information sought by Interrogatory

Eight is known to employees of the Sheriff's Department,

contained within files maintained by the Sheriff's Department, or

is otherwise available to Defendants, they shall locate and

disclose the information; (3) where the information sought by

Interrogatory Eight is contained in records produced to the

Plaintiffs and the answer requires compilation that would be

equally burdensome to either party, Defendants shall so state and

shall specify which documents contain the information.

7. Request for Document Twenty-Eight

Defendants last request reconsideration of those portions of

the Magistrate Judge’s Order that require Defendants to produce

the disciplinary records of the deputy sheriffs involved in

arresting a CCW holder and political donor. The material is to

be produced pursuant to a protective order to be proposed by the

parties. Defendants argue that discovery of the material

contained within the files invades the privacy rights of the nonlitigant deputies involved and is over-broad because it seeks

information not relevant to the litigation. 

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Because the relevance inquiry will shape the interests involved

in the discovery, the Court will begin with the relevance of the

material requested.

“Relevance for purposes of discovery is defined very

broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th

Cir. 1998); See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504-507 (1947). 

To prove their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs seek to

establish a constitutional violation pursuant to a longstanding

practice or custom. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

Cir 1996). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to prove that there has

been a longstanding practice of issuing CCWs to political donors

and denying them to deserving persons who did not contribute to

the Craig, Blanas, and McGinnis campaigns.

Plaintiffs have produced a Sheriff’s Department report of

the arrest of James Colafrancesco (“the Report”) for the rude or

threatening display of a firearm. Pls.’ Ex. F. The Report

indicates that during the course of the arrest, deputies

discovered that Mr. Colafrancesco possessed an official “Honorary

Deputy” badge, a Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department

identification card signed by Sheriff Glenn Craig, and CCW signed

by Sheriff Craig. Pls.’ Ex. F at 2-4. Upon inquiry as to why he

possessed the credentials and CCW, Colafrancesco indicated that

they were given to him in return for his status as a “major

contributor of Lou Blanas and Glen Craig.” Pls.’ Ex. F at 2, 4. 

Colafrancesco indicated that his occupation was contractor and

claimed no law enforcement duties related to his possession of

official Sheriff’s Department identification, badge, and CCW. 

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Throughout the detention and arrest, Colafrancesco requested the

arresting Deputy contact Undersheriff Blanas and other high

ranking Sheriff’s Department officials to, “sweep this under the

rug.” Pl.’s Ex. F at 4. In an act of even-handed enforcement

without fear or favor, the deputy refused to contact high ranking

officials within his own department to solicit their

interference, despite Colafrancesco’s alleged political

connections to Blanas and Craig. Id. According to Plaintiffs,

rather than praise the deputy for his scrupulous adherence to his

oath, Defendants immediately transferred him to a much less

desirable position guarding low-security inmates at the Rio

Cosumnes Correctional Center in Elk Grove. Pls.’ Opp’n at 44. 

Plaintiffs contend that the disciplinary transfer was in

retaliation for the deputy’s failure to give appropriate

deference to a political donor to Blanas and Craig. Id. 

 The material sought to be discovered pursuant to Request

for Document Twenty-Eight is relevant to this claim in several

ways: (1) Defendants’ alleged disciplinary transfer of the deputy

involved and any other subsequent adverse employment action lends

further weight to Colafrancesco’s revelations of political

corruption and quid pro quo issuance of CCWs and official

Sheriff’s Department identification and badges; (2) Defendants’

disciplinary transfer of the deputy supports Colafranceso’s claim

that Blanas and other high-ranking Sheriff’s Department officials

allegedly knew of and were involved in the corruption. 

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It demonstrates that they actively worked to conceal the

corruption by punishing subordinates who took actions that

negatively affected Defendants’ ability to continue and conceal

the corruption. The material is highly relevant to Plaintiffs’

claims of a longstanding practice of quid pro quo issuance of

CCWs to political donors to the Craig, Blanas, and McGinnis

campaigns in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. 

Having found the material at issue highly relevant to the

core of Plaintiffs claim, the Court now turns to the question of

confidentiality. 

Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for

official information. Government personnel files are

considered official information. To determine whether

the information sought is privileged, courts must weigh

the potential benefits of disclosure against the

potential disadvantages. If the latter is greater, the

privilege bars discovery.

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (9th Cir.

1990) (internal citations omitted). 

As in Sanchez, Plaintiffs seek discovery of information

contained in the law enforcement personnel files of persons not

parties to the instant litigation. As described above, the

Plaintiffs have a substantial interest in discovery of this

information. Discovery of this information also implicates the

interests of all citizens: exposing and ending political

corruption by the elected leaders of local law enforcement is in

the interest of everyone living in Sacramento County. 

Defendants point out that the deputy in question is a nonlitigant with a weighty privacy interest in avoiding disclosure

of his confidential personnel records. 

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Defendants correctly point out that California Penal Code section

832.7, California Evidence Code section 1043, and 5 U.S.C. §

552(b)(6) all demonstrate the legitimacy of non-litigants’

interest in maintaining the privacy of personnel records which

include personal information about the non-litigant that is

unrelated to this case. The Ninth Circuit has also recognized

this important interest, specifically in the context of law

enforcement personnel files. Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033. 

Balancing the potential benefits of disclosure against the

potential disadvantages, the disadvantages are outweighed,

particularly in light of the Court’s ability, as discussed below, 

to craft a protective order that can minimize the impact on the

non-litigants’ interests. Accordingly, the information is not

privileged and is discoverable. 

As with the private law enforcement and judicial information

discussed in section 2 of this Order, the contents of law

enforcement personnel files may include the home address, social

security number, and other information that could subject the

deputy or his family to a retaliatory attack at his residence. 

Additionally, the files may contain financial, medical, and other

information about the deputy that is private, potentially

embarrassing, and not relevant to this litigation. Disclosure of

those materials to the public would constitute a specific harm to

the non-litigant if this information is disclosed to the public. 

Accordingly, the Court must balance the public and private

interests to determine if a protective order is necessary.

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As mentioned above, the public interest in this case is

weighty. Revelation and eradication of public corruption is an

absolute necessity in a free society. However, as explored

above, the non-litigant’s interest in privacy and security is

also strong. Balancing the interests involved, the Court finds a

protective order is necessary in order to accommodate both of

these important interests.

Defendants are hereby ordered to produce, for in camera

review, all personnel records relating to the deputy or deputies

involved in the Colafrancesco incident. The Magistrate Judge can

then determine what portions of the personnel records are

relevant to this action and thus discoverable, and what portions

are irrelevant or include confidential personal information that

is not to be released to Plaintiffs or their counsel.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set for above the Defendants Motion for

Reconsideration is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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