Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00294/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00294-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 2010, a jury convicted Petitioner of shooting at an inhabited dwelling, shooting from a 

motor vehicle at a person, receiving stolen property, and eight counts of assault with a firearm. The 

trial court sentenced him to of fifteen years-to-life, which included gang-related enhancements. In the 

petition, he alleges various errors he contends occurred at the trial. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court recommends the petition be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After his conviction on November 23, 2010 (Doc. 13, Ex. A), Petitioner appealed to the 

California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the “5th DCA”), which affirmed the conviction. 

(Id.). Likewise, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. (Lodged Document 

(“LD”) 24; 25). 

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MARCO ANTONIO AMBRIZ,

 Petitioner,

v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00294-AWI-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision1:

Around 4:00 p.m. on June 23, 2008, the Valdovinos family was startled by six gunshots fired at 

their home located on North Smith Road. When the shots were fired, Raquel was in the kitchen 

cooking with her husband Jose and her son Jesus. Raquel's daughter, Maria was in the living 

room breastfeeding her baby; Maria and her four children were visiting. Maria's daughter was 

inside watching television and her sons were outside in the backyard. Maria's brothers, Max and 

Juan Carlos, also were in the backyard. Jesus's girlfriend, Salina E., was resting in the garage, 

which had been converted into living quarters for Jesus and her.

The first three or four shots were in close succession; after a pause, more shots were fired. One 

of the shots hit the garage door and another shot hit near the cooler inside the garage next to 

where Salina E. was standing. The bullets that penetrated the garage made the mirror on the 

wall wobble.

Immediately upon hearing the shots, Juan Carlos ran to the chainlink fence on the north side of 

the property and saw a red car heading east on Olive Avenue at a high rate of speed. When 

Maria heard the shots, she stood up and, while holding her baby, she opened the front door. 

There was smoke in the air just outside the front door. Maria gathered her children and the 

entire Valdovinos family went outside to the front of the house, where they shortly were met by 

police officers.

Maria had parked her minivan directly in front of the Valdovinos house. After the shots were 

fired, she discovered a bullet hole in the back of the minivan. Juan Carlos's Camaro, also parked 

in the front of the house, had a bullet hole in it. There was a bullet hole in the garage and 

gunshot marks on the house. Several other vehicles were parked in front of the house.

At about the same time, Tulare County Sheriff's Detective Jesse Cox was conducting an 

interview at a nearby house on North Newman Road. After Cox finished the interview, he was 

walking back to his car when he heard six gunshots coming from a northwest direction. As he 

was getting into his car, Sheriff's Deputy Javier Guerrero pulled alongside Cox in a marked 

patrol vehicle. Cox told Guerrero about the gunshots; Guerrero told Cox he had just seen a 

vehicle, which he identified in his report as a red, four-door Honda Accord, leaving the area 

where shots had been fired. 

Before meeting up with Cox, Guerrero had seen the red four-door Honda Accord traveling 

northbound on North Smith Street headed toward Olive Avenue. The vehicle caught his 

attention because it failed to stop at a stop sign and was traveling in excess of 40 miles per hour. 

Inside the Accord were three Hispanic males, all with shaved heads. Guerrero observed the 

person in the back seat lean out the window and yell something toward the house on the corner 

of North Smith Road and Olive Avenue. Guerrero did not stop the vehicle because he was en 

route to meet Cox.

 

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The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

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Cox advised dispatch of the firing of gunshots in the vicinity, while Guerrero broadcast a 

description of the Accord. The two officers drove toward North Smith Road and Olive Avenue, 

which was 15 to 20 seconds away. Guerrero stopped to speak with the people gathered outside 

the house; Cox drove off to attempt to locate the Accord.

Shortly after 4:00 p.m. that same day, Sheriff's Deputy Carl Bostai saw a reddish brown colored 

vehicle matching the description broadcast by dispatch. There were three people in the car. 

Bostai made a U-turn and activated his siren in order to make a traffic stop. Initially, the Honda 

Accord failed to stop and Bostai had to engage in a high-speed chase.

When the Honda Accord approached a residence on Road 136, it slowed and the passengers 

looked around. The rear passenger, Noel, looked back toward the deputy. Marco was the front 

seat passenger and Ramirez was driving the Accord. Bostai saw Marco reach out the front 

passenger window and throw an object towards the residence on Road 136. By this time, other 

officers had arrived on the scene and a felony stop of the vehicle was made.

Bostai searched the area where he had seen Marco throw an object out the window. He found a 

.357 revolver in a pile of grass clippings. When he opened the cylinder, there were six dispensed 

casings and no live ammunition in the gun.

Bostai also placed a brown paper bag over the suspects' hands to preserve any gunshot residue. 

A subsequent test of each of the suspects' hands was negative for gunshot residue.

Sheriff's Detective Bobby Saldana documented a total of five bullet holes at the house on North 

Smith Road. He located one in the minivan, one in the Camaro, and a total of three in the garage 

door and stucco. There were no casings, indicating the weapon might be a revolver because 

revolvers do not leave casings after being fired.

Ramirez was interviewed by Sheriff's Detective Rodney Klassen the evening of June 23, 2008, 

after waiving his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 

Ramirez admitted being a Sureno gang member, but denied having a gun or knowing anything 

about the events surrounding the shooting. Ramirez was aware something was thrown out of the 

car window when the police were chasing him, but denied knowing what was thrown.

Klassen also interviewed Marco after Marco waived his Miranda rights. Marco told Klassen 

one of his “homies” had been shot the week before by the people who lived in the house on 

North Smith Road. Marco acknowledged that the “Nortenos own the whole street” and you only 

go down the street to cause problems for the Nortenos. When asked if he had a gun, Marco 

responded, “I don't know.”

The gun found on Road 136 was dusted for fingerprints, but none were recovered. The gun had 

been listed as stolen by the Department of Justice.

The Accord, which belonged to Ramirez's father, was towed and stored in an inside storage 

area. The day after the shooting the Accord was processed for gunshot residue, which was found 

on the exterior of the front passenger door and the headliner of the rear seat. 

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Ramirez, Marco and Noel were charged with (1) shooting at an inhabited dwelling, in violation 

of Penal Code section 246,2 (2) shooting from a motor vehicle, in violation of section 12034, 

subdivision (c), (3) eight counts of assault with a firearm, in violation of section 245, 

subdivision (a)(2), and (4) receipt of stolen property, in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). 

It also was alleged that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, in 

violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b), and that the defendants personally used a firearm in 

the commission of the assault offenses.

The information also alleged Noel was at least 14 years old and eligible to be prosecuted as an 

adult with respect to the count 1 offense, shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Initially, Noel's 

motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants was granted; however, the trial court 

reconsidered the motion and, ultimately, all three defendants were tried jointly.

Department of Justice Senior Criminalist Nancy McCombs has been a forensic scientist for 20 

years and previously has qualified as an expert witness in ballistics. McCombs examined three 

bullet fragments, a bullet, and a .357 revolver that had been sent to her for testing. McCombs 

was unable to determine if the fragments were fired from the revolver, but concluded that the 

bullet was fired from the revolver.

Max associated with Norteno gang members. He acknowledged that Sureno gang members 

were rivals. Max was aware that Ramirez was a Sureno. Max and Ramirez had gotten into a 

fistfight in September 2007. In February 2008, Max was involved in a Norteno–Sureno fight at 

a local high school. A student was stabbed and Max cooperated with the police in their 

investigation of the stabbing. Max's brother, Jesus, also associated with Nortenos.

Sheriff's Deputy Michael Yandell was qualified to testify as a gang expert. Yandell testified 

extensively about the Norteno and Sureno gangs and their activities.

A jury convicted defendants of all charges and found the gang enhancements to be true. The 

jury could not reach an agreement on the personal use of a firearm enhancement.

All three defendants were sentenced to a term of 15 years to life for the count 1 offense, with 

the term for the count 11 offense to run concurrently. The terms for counts 2 through 10 were 

stayed pursuant to section 654. Various fines also were imposed and credits awarded.

(Doc. 13, Exh. A (“Ex. A”), pp. 3-5).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 

7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

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Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s 

enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed 

by its provisions.

B. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court

“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

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justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges the following as grounds for relief: (1) trial court erred in failing to conduct a 

Kelly hearing and limit firearms expert’s testimony; (2) prosecutorial misconduct regarding McComb’s 

testimony and failure of the trial court to give a curative instruction; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in 

eliciting evidence; (4) error by trial court in failing to give CALCRIM Nos. 357 and 358; and (5) 

insufficient evidence to support assault with a firearm convictions. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).

A. Failure to Conduct A Kelly Hearing Or Limit Expert’s Testimony

Petitioner first contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing regarding the 

testimony of a prosecution expert witness or, alternatively, to limit that witness’s testimony. This 

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contention is without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s argument as follows:

Defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude or limit the testimony of the prosecution's bullet 

comparison expert. The motion asserted potential testimony that the ballistics expert was able 

to match one of the bullets found at the scene with a bullet test fired from the gun recovered by 

the police was unreliable because bullet comparison evidence generally is not accepted in the 

scientific community.

At the hearing on the motion in limine, defense counsel objected to the ballistics expert 

testifying that the bullet found at the shooting was fired from the gun recovered by the police. 

Defense counsel had no objection, however, to expert testimony that the bullet found at the 

scene had all the characteristics consistent with the rifling of the gun recovered by the police. 

The trial court ultimately ruled that the firearms/ballistics expert could testify that the markings 

on the bullet recovered from the scene of the shooting were consistent with it being fired from 

the gun recovered by the police at the time of Marco's arrest. The trial court ruled that no Kelly

hearing would be held. At a subsequent in limine hearing, the trial court ruled that the 

ballistics expert could testify that the recovered bullet was fired from the gun recovered by the 

police “or a gun just like this gun.”

Under the Kelly doctrine, evidence based on a new scientific method must satisfy three 

requirements before it may be admitted: (1) the technique generally must be accepted in the 

scientific community; (2) the expert witness must be qualified to give an opinion; and (3) 

correct scientific procedures must have been used. (People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 594 

(Leahy ).) The party offering the evidence has the burden of proof. (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 

Cal.4th 495, 526.)

Defendants contend the trial court erred in not conducting a Kelly hearing prior to accepting 

testimony from the expert, McCombs. On appeal, defendants assert that none of the three 

prongs of the Kelly test were satisfied. In the trial court, however, no challenge was raised to 

the second and third prongs of the Kelly test; rather, only the first prong of the Kelly test was 

challenged. Any challenges to the second or third and prongs of the Kelly test are forfeited for 

failure to raise them in the trial court. (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1018.)

With respect to defendants' contention that bullet comparison evidence generally is not 

accepted in the scientific community and therefore does not meet the first prong of the Kelly

test, the California Supreme Court has decided this issue adversely to the defendants' position. 

In People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, the court found that the technique of ballistics 

comparisons is a procedure that isolates physical evidence whose existence, nature, 

appearance, and meaning laypersons are able to grasp and evaluate. (Id. at p. 470.) Under these 

circumstances, the reliability of the process used to process the physical evidence—the 

comparison of bullets—is not subject to a Kelly hearing. (Ibid.; see also People v. Eubanks

(2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 140–141; People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 81.)

Kelly applies “‘to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a 

technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.’ [Citation.]” 

(Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 605, quoting People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1156.) 

Ballistics and firearms comparisons are neither new to the law or the scientific community. 

(See People v. Benson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1227 [expert testimony on ballistics 

admitted without objection].)

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Thus, defendants' contention that the trial court erred in not holding a Kelly hearing prior to 

allowing the expert to testify fails. In a related claim, defendants contend that McCombs's 

testimony should have been stricken or a curative admonition given because it exceeded the 

scope of the pretrial order and eliciting the testimony constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 

(Ex. A, pp. 6-7).

2. Federal Standard And Analysis.

In People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24 (1976), the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that, in 

California, the test for admissibility of expert testimony based on the application of a new scientific 

technique comported with what was then the federal test, as set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 

1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Kelly standard, the advocate of a new science method must 

establish that: 1) the reliability of the method is generally accepted; 2) the expert witness is qualified; 

and 3) the correct scientific procedures were used. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d at 30. The Frye test has since been 

superceded as to admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts by the test announced in Daubert 

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993). Because this is a federal habeas 

corpus case, this Court cannot determine whether the expert testimony was properly admitted under 

state law, see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991), and the Court will not consider whether 

the evidence passed muster under the Federal Rules of Evidence or Daubert, which was not decided on 

constitutional grounds, see Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1101–02 (10th Cir.2008) (“Daubert does 

not set any specific constitutional floor on the admissibility of scientific evidence.”); Kinder v. 

Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 545 n. 9 (8th Cir.2001) (“Daubert does not bind the states, which are free to 

formulate their own rules of evidence subject only to the limits imposed by the Constitution.”); 

Humphrey v. Hill, 2014 WL 950468 at *12 (C.D. Cal. March 11, 2014)(Kelly standard is a state law 

and does not support habeas relief); Adams v. Jacquez, 2011 WL 3563158, at *20 (E.D.Cal. Aug.11, 

2011) (court may not determine whether admission of evidence under Kelly standard warranted habeas 

relief because it was a matter of state law and, in any event, admission did not render trial 

fundamentally unfair); Orozco v. Kramer, 2009 WL 1033610, at *9 (C.D.Cal. Apr.14, 2009) (“The 

Kelly–Frye rule is a creature of California law, based on a state court ruling adopting the reasoning of a 

federal circuit court, which was not based on the United States Constitution.”). 

Petitioner does not appear to argue to the contrary. Rather, Petitioner notes that California has 

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continued to use the Kelly/Frye test in lieu of the Daubert test, thus confirming that it is a state rule, not 

one of federal dimension. In his Traverse, Petitioner responds to Respondent’s argument only by 

noting that the three-pronged Kelly/Frye test was not satisfied; however, Petitioner does not offer any 

federal constitutional basis for affording habeas relief premised solely on the state court’s failure to 

properly apply a state rule or test. 

State evidentiary rulings are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding unless the admission 

of the evidence violated the petitioner's due process right to a fair trial. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. In order 

to prevail, Petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was so prejudicial that it rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. Id. Although Petitioner argues that the admission of the firearms expert’s 

testimony violated the due process requirement of “fairness” in identification procedures, he may not 

transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process. Langford 

v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1996). Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct And Lack of Curative Instruction

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion

Defendants contend the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited testimony from 

McCombs, in violation of a pretrial order, and that the prosecutor engaged in systematic 

misconduct warranting a mistrial. In a related argument, defendants claim the trial court erred in 

refusing to give defense-requested instructions on prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. 

Failure to object 

When the prosecutor was eliciting testimony from McCombs, which defendants claim was 

elicited in violation of the pretrial order, no objection was raised that this constituted 

prosecutorial misconduct. The general rule is that a defendant may not complain on appeal of 

prosecutorial misconduct unless, in a timely fashion, the defendant “made an assignment of 

misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.” (People v. 

Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.) Consequently, any claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

based upon the questioning has been forfeited. (Ibid.)

Regardless, the trial court was well within discretionary bounds when it refused to issue a 

curative admonition crafted by defense counsel. (See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 

809.) The prosecutor had moved to strike, and the trial court struck, McCombs's statement—”[I] 

had no doubt”—of the identification of the weapon, which is the crux of the testimony 

complained of by defendants. After striking the testimony, the trial court denied a request that it 

issue a curative instruction crafted by defense counsel on the basis that issuing the proffered 

instruction would create further confusion and draw attention to the matter. Furthermore, the 

jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 104, which includes the statement, “If I order 

testimony stricken from the record, you must disregard it and must not consider that testimony 

for any purpose.”

(Ex. A, pp. 9).

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2. Federal Standard

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 

433 U.S. 72, 86–87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Federal courts “will not review a question 

of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is 

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); see 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (2000) (“A 

district court properly refuses to reach the merits of a habeas petition if the petitioner has defaulted on 

the particular state’s procedural requirements . . . .”); see also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 

210 (1935). This concept has been commonly referred to as the procedural default doctrine. This 

doctrine of procedural default is based on concerns of comity and federalism. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

730-32. If the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas review 

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or 

demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 

Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9th Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Park v. California, 

202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The mere occurrence, however, of a procedural default will not necessarily bar a federal court 

from reviewing claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In order for the procedural default 

doctrine to apply and thereby bar federal review, the state court determination of default must be 

grounded in state law that is both adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; see also Fox Film Corp., 296 U.S. at 210. Put 

another way, the procedural default doctrine will apply only if the application of the state procedural 

rule provides “an adequate and independent state law basis” on which the state court can deny relief. 

Park, 202 F.3d at 1151, quoting, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.

“For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must

not be interwoven with federal law.” LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)); Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 

1996) (“Federal habeas review is not barred if the state decision ‘fairly appears to rest primarily on 

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federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law.’” (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735,)). “A state law 

is so interwoven if ‘the state has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling 

on federal law [such as] the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” 

Park, 202 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)). 

To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and 

consistently applied. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A state procedural rule 

constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ 

at the time it was applied by the state court.”)(quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). 

Although a state court’s exercise of judicial discretion will not necessarily render a rule inadequate, the 

discretion must entail “‘the exercise of judgment according to standards that, at least over time, can 

become known and understood within reasonable operating limits.’” Id. at 377 (quoting Morales, 85 

F.3d at 1392). 

California law requires that, with certain exceptions, appellate courts will not consider claims of 

error that could have been, but were not, raised in the trial court. People v. Vera, 15 Cal.4th 269, 275 

(1997). That rule has been deemed both independent of federal law, People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th

153, 208 (1997), and consistently applied. Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). 

3. Analysis.

Respondent contends that the state court properly rejected Petitioner’s claim as “waived”

because, though Petitioner’s counsel objected to the eliciting of McCombs’ expert opinion in violation 

of the court’s prior order, no timely objection was made on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, 

thus precluding federal habeas review. The Court agrees. 

The record establishes that defense counsel objected to the question asked by the prosecutor and 

the precise answer given by McCombs. The objection was sustained and the answer stricken on the 

grounds that the question and answer went beyond the pre-trial agreement regarding testimony on that 

subject. No objection was made regarding prosecutorial misconduct in the posing of questions to 

McCombs. Because defense counsel failed to tender a timely objection on the grounds of prosecutorial 

misconduct, the state court’s determination that the claim has been procedurally defaulted bars federal 

review in this case.

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As to the trial court’s failure to give the jury a curative instruction, the 5th DCA reasoned that no 

curative instruction was necessary when the objection was sustained and the answer stricken. This was 

a reasonable legal conclusion. Moreover, the jury was instructed not to consider stricken testimony for 

any purpose. As Respondent correctly notes, jurors are presumed to follow the judge’s instructions. 

E.g., Richarson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (2000). Petitioner has not offered any evidence, and the 

record discloses no suggestion, that jurors did not understand and apply the court’s instruction 

regarding stricken testimony. Accordingly, this claim should be rejected.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Eliciting Evidence

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion

Defendants contend the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of systematic misconduct when he 

elicited detailed information about crimes committed by a Sureno gang member in an effort to 

establish the predicate offenses to show a pattern of gang activity.

Defendants objected to the level of detail elicited by the prosecutor, requested a conference 

outside the presence of the jury, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court expressed some 

concern over the level of detail, but denied the mistrial motion. The trial court struck all the 

testimony related to the Sureno gang member. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the 

stricken testimony and further instructed the jury: “[I]t's not to be considered by you for any 

purposes.” Defendants have failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct; consequently, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in denying their motion for a mistrial on this basis.

The standard for assessing claims of prosecutorial misconduct is well settled:

“‘“[T]he applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are 

well established. ‘“A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal 

Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial 

with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’”’ [Citation.] 

Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is 

prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves ‘“‘the use of deceptive or 

reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’”’ [Citation.] ... 

[W]hen the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the 

question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied 

any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 283–284.)

First, the prosecutor's elicitation of details about predicate offenses does not constitute 

misconduct. In the case of In re Alexander L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 605, 611–614, the gang 

expert testified only to general offenses committed by the gang and to a predicate offense in 

which the alleged gang member actually was acquitted of the gang allegation. (Id. at pp. 611–

612.) A second predicate offense involved a gang member involved in an assault, but no direct 

link was made as to how the offense was connected to the gang. (Id. at pp. 612–613.) The 

appellate court concluded the expert's “conclusory testimony cannot be considered substantial 

evidence as to the nature of the gang's primary activities.” (Id. at p. 612.) Similar conclusions 

were reached by the appellate court in In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003 and 

In re Leland D. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 251, 259. The prosecutor need not restrict testimony on 

predicate gang offenses to conclusory and incomplete information.

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Second, the trial court struck the testimony to which defendants had objected and admonished 

the jury not to consider the stricken testimony for any purpose. In the absence of evidence to the 

contrary, and there is none in the record, we presume the jury abided by the trial court's 

admonition and instruction. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 559.) 

The other instance which defendants claim constituted systematic prosecutorial misconduct was 

when the prosecutor was questioning the woman who lived at the house where the weapon was 

thrown after the shooting. The prosecutor asked a question of the witness, there was an 

objection, and the objection was sustained. The prosecutor attempted to rephrase the question, 

there was an objection, and the objection was sustained. The prosecutor then abandoned this 

line of questioning and commenced asking questions on an entirely different subject matter. 

Two questions, which were objected to on the grounds of relevance, and the objections were 

sustained by the trial court, simply do not qualify as misconduct. (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 

Cal.4th 458, 506.)

There was no pattern of misconduct warranting a mistrial and the trial court properly denied the 

motion.

(Ex. A, pp. 9-10).

2. Federal Standard

A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct Aso 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.@ Darden 

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171 (1986 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 

(1974)); see, Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 843 (9th Cir. 1995). To constitute a due process 

violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be Aof sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 

defendant=s right to a fair trial.@ Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quoting United States v. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial - i.e., that absent the alleged 

impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different.

Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s attempt to solicit inadmissible evidence is a basis for 

relief. However, this could constitute a basis for relief only if a specific federal constitutional 

guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that it results in a denial of fundamental due 

process and the right to a fair trial. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 

(9th Cir. 1984); Jefferies v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993). State law foundational and 

admissibility questions raise no federal question. Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Since this ground for relief pertains to an issue of evidentiary error, Petitioner fails to raise a federal 

question as required for federal habeas review.

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However, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court stated that if evidence introduced at a 

criminal trial “is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) 

(citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 170-83 (1986)). Darden provides that the “relevant 

question” is whether admission of the challenged evidence “so infected the trial with unfairness as to 

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 477 U.S. at 181; Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 

U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (“The relevant question in this case . . . is whether the admission of evidence 

regarding petitioner’s prior death sentence so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to 

render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process”). 

3. Analysis

As the 5th DCA noted, Petitioner’s argument is, in essence, that the prosecutor elicited too 

much detail regarding the predicate gang offenses from a gang expert witness. The trial court stated 

its concern with the level of detail, eventually striking some of the testimony. In another incident, the 

prosecutor asked several questions of a witness who owned the property where one of the guns used in 

the crime was found, related to the presence of the owner’s children and their ages. The court 

sustained objections on twice, whereupon, the prosecutor rephrased the question again. Collectively, 

Petitioner argues that this constitutes a “pervasive pattern of intentional and cumulative misconduct.” 

(Doc. 1, p. 20). 

Petitioner does not contend that the elicitation of predicate gang offense evidence itself was 

improper, as this is a required part of the prosecution’s case regarding gang enhancements. Instead, 

Petitioner objects only to the level of detail. Exercising its discretion, the trial court prohibited further 

details from being elicited and struck part of the expert’s testimony. Nothing about the excessive 

detail, which the jurors were expressly instructed to disregard for all purposes, shows prosecutorial 

misconduct. Certainly, it does not show misconduct Aof sufficient significance to result in the denial 

of the defendant=s right to a fair trial.@ Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. at 765. Nor does such detail establish

a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial - i.e., that absent 

the alleged impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different. Finally, the Court agrees with 

the 5th DCA that the prosecutor’s actions in attempting to rephrase the question after objections to two 

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earlier attempts were successfully sustained, “simply do not qualify as misconduct.” Even if some 

marginal misconduct could be inferred from this record, it is harmless, i.e., it did not have a 

“substantial and injurious” effect on the outcome of the trial. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

637 (1993);

D. Instructional Error

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

Marco was interviewed by Klassen at the Pixley station. Marco made statements to Klassen that 

were not recorded or transcribed. Marco never admitted involvement in the crimes. When asked 

if he had a gun, his response was “I don't know.” Marco admitted that one of his “homies” had 

been shot in the leg a week earlier. Marco also stated that the Nortenos were known to “own” 

the street where the shooting took place and a person would not go down that street except to 

cause problems for the Nortenos. 

CALCRIM No. 357

Defendants claim the trial court had a sua sponte duty to provide a cautionary instruction with 

CALCRIM No. 357 on adoptive admissions. CALCRIM No. 357 provides:

“If you conclude that someone made a statement outside of court that (accused the 

defendant of the crime/ [or] tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the 

crime) and the defendant did not deny it, you must decide whether each of the following 

is true: [¶] 1. The statement was made to the defendant or made in (his/her) presence; [¶] 

2. The defendant heard and understood the statement; [¶] 3. The defendant would, under 

all the circumstances, naturally have denied the statement if (he/she) thought it was not 

true; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant could have denied it but did not. [¶] If you decide 

that all of these requirements have been met, you may conclude that the defendant 

admitted the statement was true. [¶] If you decide that any of these requirements has not 

been met, you must not consider either the statement or the defendant's response for any 

purpose. [¶] [You must not consider this evidence in determining the guilt of (the/any) 

other defendant [s].]”

The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 357 state: “The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on 

the foundational requirements for adoptive admissions if such evidence is admitted.” (Judicial 

Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2011) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 357, p. 130; see also 

People v. Vindiola (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 370, 382, citing People v. Atwood (1963) 223 

Cal.App.2d 316, 332–334; People v. Humphries (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1336.)

At the conference on instructions, the trial court stated it would be instructing the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 357; defense counsel objected. Once the trial court stated it would be 

instructing with CALCRIM No. 357, thus overruling the objection, defendants did not offer or 

request any modification or clarification of CALCRIM No. 357. The burden was on the 

defendants to request appropriate clarifying or amplifying language if they felt it was necessary. 

(People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218.) Having failed to do so, defendants' claim that 

the language of CALCRIM No. 357 should have been amplified or modified is not cognizable 

on appeal. 

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CALCRIM No. 358

Defendants claim the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 

358, which states:

“You have heard evidence that the defendant made [an] oral or written statement[s] 

(before the trial/while the court was not in session). You must decide whether the 

defendant made any (such/of these) statement[s], in whole or in part. If you decide that 

the defendant made such [a] statement[s], consider the statement[s], along with all the 

other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to decide how much importance 

to give to the statement[s]. [¶] [Consider with caution any statement made by (the/a) 

defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise 

recorded.]”

The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 358 when there is 

evidence of an out-of-court oral statement by the defendant. (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 

441, 455–456.) The portion of the instruction directing the jury to view with caution an out-ofcourt statement made by a defendant tending to show guilt also must be given sua sponte. (Ibid.) 

The admonition to view a defendant's statements with caution applies only to incriminating 

statements made by a defendant. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1200.) The 

cautionary instruction is intended to assist a jury in determining whether or not a statement 

actually was made by the defendant. (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 

(Carpenter ).)

There was no request to give CALCRIM No. 358 and no discussion of this instruction in the 

trial court, perhaps because defendants took the position that the statements to Klassen were not 

admissions.

Assuming the trial court's failure to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 358 in this case was 

error, it was not prejudicial. Failure to provide the cautionary instruction is not prejudicial 

where it is not reasonably probable the defendant would have achieved a more favorable result 

absent the error. (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 393.) Where there is no conflict in the 

evidence, but simply a denial by the defendant of the statements attributed to him or her, the 

Supreme Court has found a failure to give the cautionary instruction to be harmless error. 

(People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905–907 (Dickey).)

In determining whether there has been any prejudice from failure to instruct with CALCRIM 

No. 358, we look to whether there was any conflict about whether the statements were made or 

accurately reported. (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1268.) Here, there is no 

conflict in the evidence. There is no claim on appeal that the statements were not made or that 

Klassen's testimony regarding the statements was in any way inaccurate.

We also look to other instructions given to the jury in assessing prejudice. (People v. Sanders

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 536–537.) Here, the trial court instructed the jury on its responsibility to 

assess the credibility of witnesses (CALCRIM No. 226) and with CALCRIM No. 359, stating 

that a defendant cannot be convicted based on out-of-court statements alone.

There was no challenge to Klassen's veracity in the trial court and no challenge to his credibility 

is raised in this appeal. Consequently, there is no reason to assume the jury would have 

discredited Klassen's unchallenged testimony if CALCRIM No. 358 had been given. Therefore, 

it is not reasonably probable defendants would have obtained a more favorable verdict if 

CALCRIM No. 358 had been given and any error in failing to so instruct the jury was harmless. 

(Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 905.)

(Ex. A, pp. 11-12).

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2. Federal Standard

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim 

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To 

obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, the petitioner must show that the ailing 

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See id. 

at 72; Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S.Ct. 823, 832, 172 L.Ed.2d 532 (2009); Turner v. 

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 865–66 (9th Cir.2002). 

Moreover, a state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground 

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th 

Cir.1988). The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. 

Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d at 475–76 (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 

L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). Thus, where, as here, the alleged error is the failure to give an instruction, the 

burden on the petitioner is “especially heavy.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155, (“An omission, or an 

incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.”); accord Clark v. 

Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. as amended May 30, 2006); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 

971 (9th Cir.2001); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.1997). “The significance of the 

omission of such an instruction may be evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given.” 

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156; accord Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 971. Even if an error occurred in 

instructing the jury, habeas relief will be granted only if the petitioner can establish that the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 

U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; accord Clark, 450 F.3d at 905.

3. Analysis

Petitioner objected at trial to the giving of CALCRIM No. 357 regarding adoptive admissions 

but was overruled by the trial court. As the 5th DCA noted, however, Petitioner’s counsel did not make 

any subsequent request to give a modified version of the instruction. Because of that omission, the 5th

DCA considered the issue waived. As discussed previously, failure to lodge a timely objection at trial 

is grounds for waiver of the claim on appeal in California. People v. Vera, 15 Cal.4th at 275; People v. 

Williams, 16 Cal.4th at 208; Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d at 1125. Thus, federal review of the claim as 

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to CALCRIM No. 357 is barred.

As to the court’s failure to give CALCRIM No. 358, the 5th DCA noted that the defense did not 

challenge the credibility of the police officer testifying to Petitioner’s incriminating statement, so “there 

is no reason to assume the jury would have discredited Klassen’s unchallenged testimony if CALCRIM 

No. 358 had been given.” On this basis the state court found any error to be harmless.

On habeas review, this Court must determine whether there is any “clearly established” federal 

law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, holding that the United States Constitution 

requires a state judge to instruct on certain issues in the absence of a defense request for the same. 

Petitioner does not cite, and the Court is unaware of, any such “clearly established” Supreme Court 

law. In the absence of such a standard, no habeas relief is possible. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

E Sufficiency Of The Evidence

Finally, Petitioner argues that insufficient evidence was presented regarding his multiple 

convictions for assault with a firearm because it was not proven that he had knowledge of all of the 

occupants of the dwelling. Petitioner also contends that insufficient evidence was presented on the 

charge of shooting from a motor vehicle because it was not established that Petitioner and his 

accomplices aimed at specific individuals. Neither of these claims has any merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

Defendants claim there was insufficient evidence to support the multiple assault with a firearm 

convictions because there was no evidence they had knowledge of all the occupants in the 

house at the time they committed the drive-by shooting, the gun was not powerful enough to 

penetrate the walls of the house, and the gun held only six bullets. In essence, they are 

contending that they had to have specific knowledge of the presence of all the occupants in the 

house and the present ability to inflict injury on all eight occupants in order to sustain the 

convictions. 

Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the shooting from a motor 

vehicle convictions because they did not aim at a specific person, which they contend is 

required by section 12034, subdivision (c). 

Standard of review

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier reasonably 

could deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. “The test is whether substantial 

evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432; see also People v. Hayes (1990) 52 

Cal.3d 577, 631; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Our sole function is to 

determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

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beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34; People v. Ochoa

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.) “‘“‘“If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court 

that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not 

warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’ [Citations.]”' [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 1, 11.) 

The assault convictions

A conviction for a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2) requires proof that (1) a person 

willfully committed an act which, by its nature, probably and directly would result in the 

application of physical force on another person; (2) the person committing the act was aware of 

facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that, as a direct, natural, and probable result 

of this act, physical force would be applied to another person; (3) at the time the act was 

committed, the person committing the act had the present ability to apply physical force to the 

person of another; and (4) the assault was committed with a firearm. (CALCRIM No. 875.)

Defendants have mistakenly equated present ability to commit a violent injury with specific 

intent to injure another. The crime of assault does not require a specific intent to cause another 

injury or even a subjective awareness of the risk that an injury might result from the 

defendant's conduct. In People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 (Williams), the California 

Supreme Court determined the mental state that is necessary to commit this crime:

“Accordingly, we hold that assault does not require a specific intent to cause injury or a 

subjective awareness of the risk that an injury might occur. Rather, assault only requires 

an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act 

by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force 

against another.” (Id. at p. 790.)

It is not necessary to point a firearm directly at the victim in order to commit an assault with a 

firearm. (People v. Raviart (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 258, 263.) The act of drawing a gun into a 

position in which it could be used when a person is within its range is sufficient to support an 

assault conviction. (Id. at p. 266.)

In People v. Lathus (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 466, this court upheld an assault with a firearm 

conviction where the defendant, who was a passenger in a moving vehicle, fired at a stalled 

vehicle. One of the bullets struck a person standing outside the stalled vehicle. The defendant 

claimed he did not know anyone was near the vehicle and therefore lacked knowledge that he 

was endangering anyone. This contention was rejected. We explained: “[W]hen an act 

inherently dangerous to others is committed with a conscious disregard of human life and 

safety, the act transcends recklessness, and the intent to commit the battery is presumed; the 

law cannot tolerate a deliberate and conscious disregard of human safety.” (Id. at p. 470.)

In People v. Thompson (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 780, evidence showing that the defendant 

pointed a revolver toward two sheriff's deputies, aiming the gun between them while pointing 

the gun downward, was sufficient to support an assault with a firearm conviction because the 

gun “was in a position to be used instantly.” (Id. at p. 782.)

In Williams, the court clarified “that assault requires actual knowledge of the facts sufficient to 

establish that the defendant's act by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to 

another.” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 782.) “[A] defendant is only guilty of assault if he 

intends to commit an act ‘which would be indictable [as a battery], if done, either from its own 

character or that of its natural and probable consequences.’ [Citation.] Logically, a defendant 

cannot have such an intent unless he actually knows those facts sufficient to establish that his 

act by its nature will probably and directly result in physical force being applied to another, 

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i.e., a battery. [Citation.] In other words, a defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the 

facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and 

probably result from his conduct.” (Id. at pp. 787–788.)

In People v. Trujillo (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1344 (Trujillo), the appellate court held that “a 

defendant who harbors the requisite mental state for assault while committing one or more acti 

rei such that a direct, natural, and probable result is a battery against two persons may be 

convicted of assault against each.” (Id. at p. 1354.) As the Trujillo court noted, “the gravamen 

of assault is the likelihood that the defendant's action will result in a violent injury to another” 

and “it follows that a victim of assault is one for whom such an injury was likely.” (Id. at p. 

1355.)

The drive-by shooting here was committed around 4:00 p.m. on June 23, 2008, a Monday. 

There were several cars parked in front of the Valdovinos house at the time shots were fired. It 

was obvious the location of the house was in a residential neighborhood. Defendants were 

aware people lived at the house; they believed the people who lived there had shot one of their 

“homies.” Six shots were fired from a .357 revolver directly toward the house. Two cars in 

front of the house suffered direct hits. Three bullets were fired toward the north side of the 

house and the kitchen.

Defendants committed multiple acti rei when they fired six shots at the Valdovinos residence. 

The bullets from the .357 revolver could have penetrated a window and injured or killed any 

one of the people inside, contrary to Ramirez's allegation. One of the bullets penetrated the 

garage and nearly hit Salina E. One bullet landed in the minivan parked directly in front of the 

living room window. Had the bullet instead penetrated the living room window, Maria and/or 

her baby could have been shot. Raquel, Jose, and Jesus were in the kitchen, which had a 

window facing the street on which defendants' car traveled. Juan Carlos and Max were in the 

backyard, protected only by a chainlink fence, and could see the street in front of the house. *8 

Contrary to the claim of the defendants, the bullets were capable of, and did, penetrate the 

walls of the residence in that one bullet pierced the garage wall. A defendant who fires multiple 

wall-piercing bullets at a residence where he knows multiple family members reside, clearly 

knows that his acts will probably result in a violent injury to the occupants and it can be 

inferred that he intended such a result. (Trujillo, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354–1355.)

Furthermore, defendants' contention that the number of assault charges is correlated to the 

number of bullets fired has been rejected multiple times by multiple courts, and we reject it 

here. (See, e.g., People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690–691.) 

The shooting from a motor vehicle convictions

The defendants' contention that they must have shot at a specific person from their vehicle in 

order to be convicted of shooting from a motor vehicle has been rejected by this court and we 

do so again here.

In People v. Hernandez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1494, this court held that a violation of section 

12034, subdivision (c) does not require a specific intent to shoot at a particular person. We held 

that the statute requires only shooting from a motor vehicle under facts or circumstances that 

indicate a conscious disregard for the probability that such a result will occur. (Hernandez, at 

pp. 1500–1502.) The term “at another person” includes the act of shooting “‘in such close 

proximity to the target that he shows a conscious indifference to the probable consequence that 

one or more bullets will strike the target or persons in or around it.’” (Id. at p. 1501.)

Here, defendants willfully and maliciously discharged a firearm six times from a motor vehicle 

at an occupied residence, which constitutes circumstances showing a conscious disregard for 

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the probability such a result, shooting at a person, will occur. Moreover, assault with a firearm 

is not a lesser included offense of shooting from a motor vehicle; hence, convictions for both 

crimes stand. (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 370–371.)

(Ex. A, pp. 7-9).

2. Federal Standard

The law on sufficiency of the evidence is clearly established by the United States Supreme 

Court. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319. the test on 

habeas review to determine whether a factual finding is fairly supported by the record is as follows:

“[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also 

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). Thus, only if “no rational trier of fact” could have found 

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will a petitioner be entitled to habeas relief. Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 324. Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is 

satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 

338 (9th Cir. 1992). The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See id., quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Only where no 

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may the writ be granted. 

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must 

presume–even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record–that the trier of fact resolved any such 

conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. A 

jury’s credibility determinations are therefore entitled to near-total deference. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 

F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Except in the most exceptional of circumstances, Jackson does not 

permit a federal court to revisit credibility determinations. See id. at 957-958. 

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to sustain a 

conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). However, mere suspicion and 

speculation cannot support logical inferences. Id.; see, e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1278-

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1279 (9th Cir. 2005)(only speculation supported conviction for first degree murder under theory of 

aiding and abetting).

After the enactment of the AEDPA, a federal habeas court must apply the standards of Jackson

with an additional layer of deference. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. Generally, a federal habeas court 

must ask whether the operative state court decision reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson

and Winship to the facts of the case. Id. at 1275.2 Moreover, in applying the AEDPA’s deferential 

standard of review, this Court must also presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This presumption of 

correctness applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as those of the state trial courts. 

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.1990). Although the presumption of correctness does not 

apply to state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact, the facts as 

found by the state court underlying those determinations are entitled to the presumption. Sumner v. 

Mata, 455 U.S. 539, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1198 (1981). 

In Cavazos v. Smith, __U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2 (2011), the Supreme Court further explained the 

highly deferential standard of review in habeas proceedings, by noting that Jackson,

makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions 

should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's 

verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed 

with the jury. What is more, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state 

court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was “objectively 

unreasonable.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 

(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law 

is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that 

they must nonetheless uphold.

Cavazos, 132 S.Ct. at 3.

“Jackson says that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction so long as ‘after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 443 U.S., at 319, 99 

S.Ct. 2781. It also unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court “faced with a record of 

 

2

Prior to Juan H., the Ninth Circuit had expressly left open the question of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) requires an 

additional degree of deference to a state court’s resolution of sufficiency of the evidence claims. See Chein v. Shumsky, 

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004); Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005).

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historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of 

the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id., at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. 

Cavazos, 132 S.Ct. at 6. 3

3. Analysis

As is clear from the 5th DCA’s decision, the state court understood Petitioner’s argument to 

essentially add an element to the state statute defining shooting at an inhabited dwelling, i.e., that the 

accused must have specific knowledge of the presence of each victim. Contrary to Petitioner’s 

argument, the 5th DCA interpreted Cal. Pen. Code § 245(a)(2) as not requiring such specific knowledge 

of each of the victims. Rather, the state court held that the only requirements were an intentional act 

and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature “will probably and 

directly result in the application of force against another.” (Ex. A, p. 6). The court pointed out that a 

defendant who fires multiple “wall-piercing bullets at a residence where he knows multiple family 

members reside, clearly knows that his acts will probably result in a violent injury to the occupants and 

it can be inferred that he intended such a result.” Implicit in the state court’s construction of the statute 

is that it need not be proven that the accused had actual knowledge of all victims. Nor did the state 

court accept Petitioner’s contention that the number of bullets fired at the dwelling was relevant to 

proving any of the elements of the charge, noting that this argument had been rejected by California 

courts multiple times. 

As discussed previously, this Court is bound by a state court’s construction of its own statutes. 

Estelle, 302 U.S. at 67-68; Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993); Oxborrow v. 

Eikenberry, 877 F. 2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, even if Petitioner’s claim could be 

construed as arguing that the state court improperly applied its own laws, this too would fail to raise a 

cognizable federal habeas claim. The only basis for a federal habeas claim in the context of sufficiency 

of the evidence is that the state court adjudication was contrary to or was an unreasonable application of 

 

3

To the extent that the 5th DCA’s opinion does not expressly cite the Jackson v. Virginia standard in analyzing the 

sufficiency claims herein, it must be noted that, long ago, the California Supreme Court expressly adopted the federal 

Jackson standard for sufficiency claims in state criminal proceedings. People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 (1980). 

Accordingly, the state court applied the correct legal standard, and this Court’s only task is to determine whether the state 

court adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that standard.

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Jackson. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner has not made this claim. Accordingly, there is no basis upon 

which to afford habeas relief.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1), be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 

days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within 10 days (plus three 

days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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