Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02303/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02303-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 The County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment raised no issue other than

qualified immunity, Count II’s claim of failure to train and supervise made against Sheriff

Arpaio and Maricopa County, and Count VII’s allegation of vicarious liability on the § 1983

claim. Their Motion concluded that if the Court determines that Deputies Burke and Carr are

entitled to qualified immunity, then “Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County are entitled

to be dismissed[.]” (Doc. 75 at 13) The County Defendants did not seek summary judgment

on Count II’s ADA allegations and the State law allegations in Counts III through VI.

Therefore, this order addresses all the claims made against the State Defendants and only the

failure to train and supervise allegations in Count II and the vicarious liability allegation in

Count VII against the County Defendants.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Curtis Bohnert, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jeffrey Mitchell; George A. Burke; Kevin

Carr; Maricopa County; Maricopa County

Sheriff Joe Arpaio; State of Arizona;

Roger Vanderpool, Director of the

Arizona Department of Public Safety, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-2303-PHX-LOA

ORDER

On September 21, 2010, the Court granted Maricopa County Deputy Sheriff

George A. Burke’s and Kevin Carr’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Qualified

Immunity,1

 doc. 75, and Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Officer Jeffrey Mitchell’s

Motion for Summary Judgment on qualified immunity, doc. 81. (Doc. 107); Bohnert v.

Case 2:08-cv-02303-LOA Document 112 Filed 10/26/10 Page 1 of 20
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Mitchell, 2010 WL 3767566 (D.Ariz. 2010). The State Defendants’ (collectively the State

of Arizona, Officer Mitchell, and former DPS Director Roger Vanderpool) Motion for

Summary Judgment also sought summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Americans With

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim brought pursuant to § 1983 and all other theories of liability

alleged against them. (Doc. 81) Plaintiff filed a timely response, doc. 96, to which the State

Defendants replied, doc. 99. For the purpose of clarity, the September 21, 2010 summary

judgment order addressed only the common issue of qualified immunity of Officer Mitchell

and Deputies Burke and Carr. This order addresses the other issues raised by the State

Defendants in their summary judgment motion. 

Like the qualified immunity motions, because the briefing is adequate and oral

argument would not aid the Court, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for oral argument.

Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

I. Allegations

Count I of the Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Officer Mitchell, Deputies

Burke and Carr “discriminate[d] against [P]laintiff who is an individual qualified for

protection and relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sect. 12132 (Title II of the [ADA]). Specifically,

as a diabetic, [P]laintiff comes within the protection of said Act and is entitled to relief

thereunder as he is a person who suffers from a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 29 at 10) Count II

alleges the State of Arizona, Director Roger Vanderpool, Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa

County “developed and maintained policies, customs and usages whereby they inadequately

trained, supervised and investigated [Officer Mitchell and Deputies Burke and Carr] in their

employ and under their administration or supervision . . . in the use of force against persons

[.]” Thus, they are vicariously liable for the violations of Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. at 11- 14)

Counts III through VI of the Complaint allege Officer Mitchell and others committed four

separate torts under Arizona law: negligence (Count III), infliction of emotional distress

(Count IV), false arrest (Count V), and assault and battery (Count VI). (Id. at 14-17) Lastly,

Count VII alleges that the State of Arizona is liable under the theory of respondeat superior

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2

 Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) at ¶¶ 83-85, doc. 84 at 17-18.

3

 Plaintiff does not dispute that, until this incident with Plaintiff, Officer Mitchell has never

witnessed anyone experiencing a diabetic episode, impairment or reaction. State Defendants’

Statement of Facts (“SDSOF”), doc. 82 at ¶ 31; PSOF, doc. 93 at ¶ 31.

4

 Deposition of Officer Mitchell, Exh B, p. 137-138, County Defendants’ Statement of Facts

(“CDSOF”), doc. 76-2 at 12-13; SDSOF at ¶ 29. Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. PSOF

at ¶ 29.

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for the State law “tortious conduct” of Officer Mitchell. (Id. at 17-18)

II. Background

The facts are well known to the parties, have been detailed at length in the

Court’s September 21, 2010 order granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity, and will be repeated here only as necessary to explain this decision. 

Generally, this lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff’s failure to cooperate with the

arresting officers and his subsequent arrest accomplished by the use of reasonable and

necessary force, including the use of a Taser in stun mode, on March 5, 2008 after Plaintiff

was driving his vehicle the wrong way on Interstate 8 for approximately five miles near Gila

Bend, Arizona. It is undisputed that at the time Plaintiff was driving his vehicle, he

experienced an extreme hypoglycemic event (insulin shock due to extremely low blood

sugar), causing Plaintiff to experience a “dream like” state of mind without the loss of his

ability to operate a motor vehicle. Plaintiff sustained multiple and serious injuries during the

course of his arrest.2

 Bohnert, 2010 WL 3767566. 

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence, nor raised any reasonable inference

from the evidence, that Officer Mitchell and the other arresting officers knew that Plaintiff

was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, legal or illegal, while Plaintiff was operating

his vehicle westbound in the eastbound lanes of I-8 until after Plaintiff was arrested and

secured on the ground.3

 At no time before he was placed in handcuffs and physical custody

did Plaintiff inform the arresting officers that he was having a medical emergency or was a

diabetic.4

 The parties agree that as Plaintiff was leaving Gila Bend on his way to make sales

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5

 On March 5, 2008, Plaintiff, now aged 56, was a long-time employee of Southwest Rubber

and Supply engaged in outside sales of rubber products to industrial users. SDSOF at ¶ 1;

Complaint at ¶ 13, doc. 1.

6

 PSOF at ¶ 144.

7

 “Hypoglycemia means low blood sugar. It occurs when there is not enough sugar or

glucose in the blood. It is also called insulin shock or insulin reaction. . . .” Univ. of Iowa

website at http://www.uihealthcare.com/topics/diabetes/diab4396.html (September 7, 2010).

Also see, PSOF at ¶ 113.

8

 According to Plaintiff, when he experiences a hypoglycemic episode, it comes on suddenly

without warning. He described it as a “dreamlike” state. PSOF at ¶¶ 113, 116. Plaintiff’s

expert witness, Kevin P. Corley, M.D., avers that symptoms of a hypoglycemic episode “can

include mental disorientation leading to incorrect choices when operating an automobile,

alteration in behavior including oppositional behavior, alteration in speech pattern, and a

refusal to cooperate with individuals when requested to do so.” Id. at ¶ 143.

9

 Plaintiff concedes he has no memory of anything that occurred from the time that Officer

Mitchell approached his vehicle until he was lying handcuffed and shackled on the

pavement. PSOF at 45, doc. 93 at 6.

10 Id.

11 Exh B, deposition of Officer Mitchell, p. 54, lines 13-22, doc. 76-2 at 6.

12 Id. at p. 54, lines 21-22.

13 Id., lines 13-17.

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calls to his customers in western Arizona,5 Plaintiff, an insulin-dependent diabetic, suffered

“severe hypoglycemia,”6

 also known as insulin shock,7 from low blood sugar, resulting in

confusion, disorientation8

 and almost a complete loss of memory.9 Plaintiff has no memory

of his physical struggle with the police officers.10 Significantly, it was not until shortly after

Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed in leg restraints that Plaintiff started saying, “[H]elp me,

help me. Somebody help me.”11 Officer Mitchell called for an ambulance as soon as Deputy

Burke placed the leg restraints on Plaintiff.12

Once Plaintiff was in custody, Officer Mitchell and Deputy Burke conversed

and Officer Mitchell “wonder[ed] what [Plaintiff was] on.”13 Each of them realized that

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14 SDSOF at ¶ 25. Plaintiff does not dispute this factual statement. PSOF, ¶ 25.

15 SDSOF at ¶ 26. Plaintiff does not dispute this factual statement. PSOF at ¶ 26, doc. 93 at

4.

16 SDSOF at ¶ 27, doc. 82 at 7. Plaintiff does not dispute this factual statement. PSOF at ¶

27, doc. 93 at 4. Deputy Carr testified, however, that he found the glucose tablets. PSOF at

¶ 128.

17 PSOF at ¶ 89, Exh 2, Mitchell deposition, p. 55, lines 15-17.

18 Id. at ¶ 90.

19 Id. at ¶ 40.

20 Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.

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Plaintiff did not smell of alcohol or marijuana. At that moment, Officer Mitchell thought

Plaintiff might be intoxicated on pills.14 While waiting for the ambulance to arrive, Officer

Mitchell conducted a partial search of the passenger compartment of Plaintiff’s vehicle. He

found a jacket on the front seat, and in patting it down he felt a small bag that seemed to

contain pills. When Officer Mitchell pulled the bag out from the jacket pocket, he found that

it was a packet of mini M&M candies. For the first time, Officer Mitchell thought Plaintiff

might be diabetic. The thought occurred to Officer Mitchell because he has a diabetic relative

who carries small quantities of candy with him to help maintain his blood sugar level.15 At

Officer Mitchell’s request, either Deputy Burke or Deputy Carr searched Plaintiff’s front

pant’s pocket and found “glucose tablets.”16

When the ambulance arrived, Officer Mitchell informed the medical personnel

that he suspected that Plaintiff was a diabetic and that they should check his blood sugar right

away.17 After testing his blood, the medical personnel advised Officer Mitchell that

Plaintiff’s blood sugar was low.18 Plaintiff contends he had no indication or warning that he

was becoming hypoglycemic when he was driving his vehicle on March 5, 2008.19 In the

past, when Plaintiff experienced an extreme hypoglycemic event (extremely low blood sugar)

approximately ten times, it was only at night when he was asleep.20 On March 5, 2008,

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28 21 PSOF at ¶¶ 49-50; SDSOF at ¶ 30.

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Plaintiff did not wear a diabetic identification bracelet but he did carry a card in his wallet

which identified him as a diabetic.21

III. Legal standard

The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56, summary judgment is properly granted when: (1)

no genuine issues of material fact remain; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably

to the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is “material”

when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue” of material fact arises

if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court must regard as

true the non-moving party's evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary

material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. However, the non-moving party may not merely rest on

its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence tending to contradict the

moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 256-57 (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a

properly supported motion for summary judgment).

IV. An ADA claim via § 1983

The State Defendants contend that the Complaint “asserts a § 1983 claim based

on the alleged violations of the [ADA].” (Doc. 81 at 7) Plaintiff disagrees and argues that

“Plaintiff’s Complaint does not rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in support of his ADA claim.”

(Doc. 96 at 21) Plaintiff explains that his civil rights and ADA claims against the State of

Arizona, DPS Director Roger Vanderpool, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff

Joe Arpaio are found at Count II of the Complaint. (Id.) Because neither the Complaint nor

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Count II is a model of Rule 8(a) clarity, the Court will separately address both ADA issues,

viz., one arguably brought pursuant to § 1983 and a stand-alone claim brought under Title

II of the ADA.

The State Defendants contend that “[t]he federal courts have held that a § 1983

action will not lie to vindicate statutory rights in regard to which Congress has already

provided a comprehensive remedial scheme.” (Id. at 7) “In Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d

1145, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2002), [cert. denied, Hawaii v. Vinson, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003)], the

Ninth Circuit held that the ADA itself incorporates a scheme for enforcement, and the Act

cannot therefore provide the basis for a § 1983 claim.” (Id.) The Vinson court stated:

 Section 1983 does not confer rights, but instead allows individuals to

enforce rights contained in the United States Constitution and defined by

federal law. See Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995).

An alleged violation of federal law may not be vindicated under § 1983,

however, where: “(1) the statute does not create an enforceable right, privilege,

or immunity, or (2) Congress has foreclosed citizen enforcement in the

enactment itself, either explicitly, or implicitly by imbuing it with its own

comprehensive remedial scheme.” Buckley, 66 F.3d at 190 (citing Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455

(1990)). “[A] comprehensive remedial scheme for the enforcement of a

statutory right creates a presumption that Congress intended to foreclose resort

to more general remedial schemes to vindicate that right.” Lollar v. Baker, 196

F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.

National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435

(1981)).

288 F.3d at 1155. 

Following the lead of three other circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Vinson

concluded “that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State

official in [his] individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Vinson’s claim against Thomas in her individual

capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails.” Id. at 1156 (footnote omitted). Thus, if Plaintiff has

attempted to allege an ADA claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State Defendants,

it is not viable under controlling law. The Court will grant the State Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, doc. 81 at 7-8, in this regard because the ADA is a comprehensive

remedial scheme for the prevention of disability discrimination and enforcement of disability

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discrimination claims.

V. Title II of the ADA

In Counts I and II of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants are

liable for having discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of Title II of the ADA, citing

various portions of the ADA, including 42 U.S.C. § 12132. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 29-30 at 10; ¶¶ 36-38

at 12-14) 

The ADA was passed “[t]o provide a clear and comprehensive national

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101(b)(1). It prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in the areas of

“employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and

activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered

by Title III. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-517 (2004); Pruett v. State, 606 F.Supp.2d

1065, 1072 (D.Ariz. 2009). Title II, the provision at issue in this case, provides:

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in

or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under Title II, public entities include state and local governments and their

departments, agencies, and instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) & (B); Thomas v.

Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D.Haw. 2000). Persons with disabilities are “qualified”

individuals if they, “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,

the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of

auxiliary aids and services, meet[ ] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of

services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12131(2).

To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that

(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation

in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise

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discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or

discrimination was by reason of his disability. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052; Weinreich v. Los

Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). “The ADA must

be construed broadly in order to effectively implement the ADA’s fundamental purpose of

providing a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination

against individuals with disabilities.” D.K. ex rel. G.M. v. Solano County Office of Educ., 667

F.Supp.2d 1184, 1190 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (citing Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073

(9th Cir. 2002)).

A. ADA liability for individuals

The State Defendants contend that “Title II prohibits public entities from

discriminating against disabled individuals in connection with the services, programs or

activities of the entity.” (Doc. 81 at 10) (emphasis in original). Quoting Miller v. King, 384

F.3d 1248, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006),

the State Defendants contend “[t]he plain language of the statute applies only to public

entities, and not to individuals.” 384 F.3d at 1277. “While the Ninth Circuit has not

addressed the issue, the Eighth Circuit has determined that a public actor may not be sued

in his or her individual capacity under Title II of the ADA.” Thomas, 128 F.Supp.2d at 691

(citing Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n. 8. (8th Cir.1999) (en banc), cert.

granted in part, 528 U.S. 1146 (2000), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000)). Furthermore,

the Second Circuit has determined that Title II does not provide for individual capacity suits

against state officials. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.

2001).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify whether Roger Vanderpool was sued in

his official or individual capacity. In a § 1983 action in the Ninth Circuit, “[w]here state

officials are named in a complaint which seeks damages . . . it is presumed that the officials

are being sued in their individual capacities.” Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game

Com’n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “Any other

construction would be illogical where the complaint is silent as to capacity, since a claim for

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22 It does not appear that the Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue where a complaint is silent

as to capacity of a public official in an ADA case whether a presumption arises that the

official is being sued in his individual or official capacity.

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damages against state officials in their official capacities is plainly barred.”22 (Id.) The

Complaint does allege that Officer Mitchell was “sued in his individual capacity.” (Doc. 1

at 2) It is clear, however, that in the Ninth Circuit, there is no individual capacity liability

under the ADA. Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1156; U.S. ex rel. Teresa Teater v. Schrader, 2006 WL

1030165, * 4 (D.Or. 2006); Becker v. Oregon, 170 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1067 (D.Or. 2001); Van

Hulle v. Pacific Telesis Corp., 124 F.Supp.2d 642, 645 (N.D.Cal. 2000); Thomas, 128

F.Supp.2d at 691-92.

Assuming Director Vanderpool was sued in his individual capacity, the Court

agrees with the State Defendants that “Officer Mitchell and Director Vanderpool cannot be

held individually liable under the ADA, and Plaintiff Bohnert’s claims against them

personally cannot be sustained.” (Doc. 81 at 10) Officer Mitchell and Roger Vanderpool are

entitled to summary judgment in their individual capacity.

B. ADA vicarious liability of the State and Vanderpool

The State Defendants acknowledge that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has ruled that

public entities can be held vicariously liable if their employees discriminate against disabled

persons. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001).” (Doc. 81 at 10)

Under this section, the Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to sue Director Vanderpool in

his official capacity.

“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA . . . a plaintiff must

prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall at 1138. In Duvall, the

Ninth Circuit held that intentional discrimination can be shown by establishing “deliberate

indifference” by the defendant. Id. The Duvall court further explained that “[d]eliberate

indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is

substantially likely, and a failure to act upon the likelihood.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit

subsequently stated in Lovell, “[t]he first element is satisfied when the public entity has

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23 In the context of a Title I claim against an employer, liability under the ADA also requires

actual or constructive notice of the plaintiff’s disability. Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d

445, 447-49 (11th Cir. 1996) (“At the most basic level, it is intuitively clear when viewing

the ADA’s language in a straightforward manner that an employer cannot fire an employee

‘because of’ a disability unless it knows of the disability. If it does not know of the disability,

the employer is firing the employee ‘because of’ some other reason.”) (quoting Hedberg v.

Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.1995)); Crandall v. Paralyzed

Veterans of America, 146 F.3d 894, 895 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (“[n]o reasonable factfinder could

have found that [the employer] discriminated on the basis of [the employee’s] disability,

since it had neither actual nor constructive notice of his disability when it fired him”);

Landefeld v. Marion General Hospital, 994 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1993) (Internists could not

prove hospital suspended him because of his mental illness absent evidence that it knew of

that illness); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F.Supp. 991, 997 (D.Or. 1994) (“[O]f course, the

employee can’t expect the employer to read his mind and know he secretly wanted a

particular [ADA] accommodation and sue the employer for not providing it. Nor is an

employer ordinarily liable for failing to accommodate a disability of which it had no

knowledge. . . .”).

24 The State Defendants do not raise the issue whether an arrest falls within the ambit of Title

II of the ADA. Rosen v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997)

(“[C]alling a[n] . . . arrest a ‘program or activity’ of the County . . . strikes us as a stretch of

the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent.”). The Ninth Circuit,

however, has held that state parole proceedings, including substantive decision making,

constitute an “activity of a public entity” that falls within the reach of the ADA. Thompson

v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2002).

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notice that an accommodation is required.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1057. In other words, to

establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, the State Defendants’ must have

discriminated against Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s disability.23 Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052;

Weinreich, 114 at 978. Thus, if the disabled person has a latent disability like diabetes or any

other non-obvious disability, there can be no liability under the ADA without actual or

constructive notice of such disability.24

The State Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s ADA claim “because Officer Mitchell, at the time he used force against [Plaintiff]

and restrained him, did not know that [Plaintiff] was diabetic.” (Doc. 81 at 11, citing SDSOF,

¶¶ 25-31) Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff’s diabetes is a disability within the

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25 See, Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural Imp. & Power District, 555 F.3d 850, 858 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“Diabetes is a ‘physical impairment’ because it affects the digestive, hemic and

endocrine systems, and eating is a ‘major life activity.’ Whether Rohr’s diabetes

substantially limits his eating is an ‘individualized inquiry.’ [citation omitted] Once an

impairment is found, the issue is whether Rohr’s diabetes substantially limits his activity of

eating. We find that the district court erred in concluding that it did not.”); Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003).

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meaning of the ADA,25 the State Defendants argue that “[i]t is impossible for Mitchell’s

conduct to have been motivated by [Plaintiff’s] disability if Mitchell was unaware of the

disability at the time. Because Mitchell did not know about [Plaintiff’s] diabetes until after

the fact, the State is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of Title II

discrimination.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Response failed to address the State Defendants’ legal argument that

Title II requires actual or constructive notice of Plaintiff’s disability before liability may be

imposed under the ADA or the State Defendants’ factual claim that Officer Mitchell was

unaware of Plaintiff’s disability until after Plaintiff was arrested in handcuffs and leg

restraints. It is undisputed that it was not until Officer Mitchell pulled the M&M candy bag

from Plaintiff’s jacket pocket while Officer Mitchell was waiting for the ambulance to arrive,

that Officer Mitchell first suspected that Plaintiff might be diabetic. Officer Mitchell’s

suspicion that Plaintiff might be diabetic was confirmed after the ambulance arrived, the

medical personnel tested Plaintiff’s blood sugar, and advised Officer Mitchell that Plaintiff’s

blood sugar was low.

Local Rule (“LRCiv”) 7.2(c),(i) requires Plaintiff to file a responsive

memorandum to the State of Arizona’s dispositive motion claiming there is no ADA liability

or “such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of the motion and the

Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(I). More importantly, assuming that

the ADA applies to an arrest, a legal analysis of the relevant ADA case law and the

undisputed facts dictate that the State Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Plaintiff’s

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26 Because the State Defendants did not raise the “exigent circumstances” exception to the

ADA, the Court will not do so sua sponte. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir.

2010) (“[w]e hold that Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to

reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects

with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is

no threat to human life.”); Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, VA, 556 F.3d 171 (4th

Cir. 2009); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2007).

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ADA claim must be granted.26

VI. § 1983 claims against Vanderpool, Arpaio and Maricopa County

Count II of the Complaint alleges Defendants Vanderpool, Arpaio and

Maricopa County “developed and maintained policies, customs and usages whereby they

inadequately trained, supervised and investigated those police officers in their employ and

under their administration or supervision . . . in the use of force against persons . . . .” (Doc.

1 at 12) Plaintiff claims the inadequate supervision and training of Officer Mitchell renders

Defendant Vanderpool liable due to his position as Director of DPS and Sheriff Arpaio and

Maricopa County are responsible for Deputies Burke and Carr. (Doc. 1 at 12) These

allegations are without merit.

As the Defendants indicate, there is no respondeat superior liability under

section 1983. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat

superior liability in the section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the

constitutional violation). (Docs. 81 at 9; doc. 75 at 12) “In order for a person acting under

color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal

participation in the alleged rights deprivation; there is no respondeat superior liability under

section 1983.” (Doc. 81 at 9); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring

personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations). In order to make out a § 1983

claim against a supervisor, a plaintiff must plead that the supervisor defendant, through his

or her own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).

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 Because there was no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the claims

of inadequate supervision and training of Officer Mitchell and Deputies Burke and Carr are

baseless. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); City of Los Angeles v. Heller,

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of

the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized

the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”); Quintanilla v. City of

Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Defendants Vanderpool, Arpaio and Maricopa

County are entitled to summary judgment on Count II’s claims that they inadequately

supervised and trained Officer Mitchell and Deputies Burke and Carr or they maintained a

policy that resulted in the constitutional violation of other individuals’ constitutional rights.

VII. State law claims

The Complaint claims that Officer Mitchell committed four separate torts under

Arizona law: negligence, infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and assault and battery,

doc. 1, Counts III – VI, and the State is liable for these torts under the theory of respondeat

superior. (Id., Count VII) The Court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to its

supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The State Defendants seek summary judgment

on each State law count. Again, Plaintiff failed to respond to the State Defendants’ legal

arguments on all four of Plaintiff’s State law claims.

A. Negligence

Count III of the Complaint contends that police officers, like Officer Mitchell,

“[a]re charged with a duty to exercise reasonable care in their conduct, so as to avoid injury

to members of the public[, that Officer Mitchell] act[ed] unreasonably in [his] dealings with

plaintiff Curtis Bohnert[, and Officer Mitchell is] liable to plaintiff for those damages as

described in this Count.” (Id. at 14-15) Count III fails to specify any facts to demonstrate

what Officer Mitchell did or failed to do that constitutes negligence under Arizona law.

The State Defendants’ Motion on Plaintiff’s negligence claim argues that if

Officer Mitchell committed any torts at all, he committed intentional torts. (Doc. 81 at 11)

They claim that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges that a police officer used excessive force while

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accomplishing an arrest, the claim cannot properly be characterized as negligence; in

actuality the plaintiff is claiming an intentional tort[,]” citing, inter alia, Huong v. City of

Port Arthur, 961 F.Supp. 1003, 1008-09 (E.D. Tex., 1997) (“Although Plaintiffs have

attempted to bring a claim for ‘negligence’ arising from the alleged conduct of Officer Leger,

Plaintiffs have described their claims arising from the shooting as the intentional tort of

excessive force. Furthermore, regardless of the language used, it is clear that Plaintiffs'

claims consist of intentional torts.”). While Texas law may be illustrative, Arizona law, of

course, controls Plaintiff’s State law claims. Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 904

(9th Cir. 1983) (district court exercising jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim is “bound

to follow an interpretation of state law by the highest state court.”); Erie Railroad Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

“To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1)

a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the

defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the

resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, 150 P.3d 228,

230 (Ariz. 2007) (citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz.

1983) (“[N]egligence requires proof of a duty owed to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, an

injury proximately caused by that breach, and damage.”) “In Arizona, government entities

and employees are generally subject to tort liability for their negligence, and immunity is the

exception.” Greenwood v. State, 217 Ariz. 438, 442, 175 P.3d 687, 691, (Ariz.Ct.App. 2008)

(citing City of Tucson v. Fahringer, 164 Ariz. 599, 600, 795 P.2d 819, 820 (1990)).

Summary judgment in negligence cases is proper only if the plaintiff “presents no evidence

from which a reasonable jury could find, directly or by inference, that the probabilities” favor

the plaintiff. Estate of Aten v. City of Tucson, 169 Ariz. 147, 817 P.2d 951 (1991) (quoting

Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 802 P.2d 1000, 1009 (1990)). 

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Citadel Holding

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27 Under Arizona law, “[n]egligent infliction of emotional distress requires that the plaintiff

witness an injury to a closely related person, suffer mental anguish that manifests itself as

a physical injury, and be within the zone danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk

of bodily harm created by the defendant.” Villareal v. State Dep’t Of Transportation, 160

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Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove

matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The

party opposing summary judgment “may not rely merely on allegations . . . in its own

pleading; rather, [his] response must--by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule--set

out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (emphasis added);

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). “If the

opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered

against that party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2)

Plaintiff totally failed to address his negligence claim in his response and,

thereby, failed to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Moreover, “[t]he district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a

genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with

adequate references so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. San Francisco

Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); Albrechtsen v. Board of

Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002) (“‘Judges are

not like pigs, hunting for truffles in’ the record.”) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d

955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)). The Court will grant the State Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

B. Negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress

Count IV of the Complaint alleges that Officer Mitchell intentionally or

recklessly engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct” that resulted in severe emotional

distress to Plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 15) As the State Defendants’ Motion point out, Count IV is

titled “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,” the allegations, however, spell out the

elements of the tort recognized in Arizona as intentional infliction of emotional distress.27

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Ariz. 474, 481, 774 P.2d 213, 220 (Ariz. 1989) (citing Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114,

115-16, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (Ariz. 1979). Plaintiff did not witness an injury to a closely

related person during his March 5, 2008 arrest. He alleges only that he himself sustained

physical injuries during his arrest by Officer Mitchell. Therefore, the State Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment if Plaintiff intended to allege a claim of negligent infliction

of emotional distress.

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(Doc. 81 at 12)

“A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, also called the Tort of

Outrage, requires proof of three elements: first, the conduct of the defendant must be extreme

and outrageous; second, the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or

recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct; and

third, severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant’s conduct.” St.

George v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2007 WL 604925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (quoting Citizen

Publishing Co. v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, 516, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005)) (internal

quotation marks omitted); Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors, 184

Ariz. 419, 428, 909 P.2d 486, 495 (Az.Ct.App. 1995)). As the State Defendants demonstrate,

“a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s acts were ‘so outrageous in character and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community[,]’” quoting Mintz v. Bell Atlantic

Systems, 183 Ariz. 550, 554, 905 P.2d 559, 563 (Az.Ct.App. 1995); Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 46 comment d. (Doc. 81 at 13) “It is for the court to determine, in the first

instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and

outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.” Lucchesi v. Frederic N.

Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 76, 79, 716 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1986).

The State Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that “Officer

Mitchell’s actions in the present case obviously do not come anywhere near the threshold

requirement of conduct that is ‘atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”

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(Doc. 81 at 13) Officer “Mitchell’s conduct in dealing with Plaintiff Bohnert was objectively

reasonable under the circumstances, and well within constitutional bounds. Summary

judgment should be entered in favor of the State Defendants on Count IV.” (Id.) Plaintiff

also does not address this part of the State Defendants’ Motion.

Having satisfied their burden of producing evidence that negates an essential

element of the claim, the State Defendants are entitled to summary judgment unless Plaintiff

demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists on this State law claim. Rule 56(e),

Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Independent of the absence of a Plaintiff’s

response, the Court cannot conclude that there is a question of fact on Plaintiff’s claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court has previously found that Officer

Mitchell did not use unreasonable or excessive force in arresting Plaintiff and the amount

of force that was used was necessary as a result of Plaintiff’s own conduct, beginning with

his refusal to comply with Officer Mitchell’s orders to exit the vehicle. Bohnert, 2010 WL

3767566. It is not, most certainly, “extreme and outrageous” conduct for police officers to

use reasonable, but not more than necessary, physical force to arrest a person who actively

resists his arrest, especially if the police officers have no actual or constructive knowledge

such person is having a medical emergency. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate on

Plaintiff’s State law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

C. False arrest

To establish a claim of false arrest in Arizona, a plaintiff must show that he was

detained “without his consent and without lawful authority.” Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112

Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975) (citing Swetnam v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 83 Ariz.

189, 318 P.2d 364 (1957); Mohajerin v. Pinal County, 2007 WL 4358254, * 4 (D.Ariz.

2007). “The essential element necessary to constitute either false arrest or false imprisonment

is unlawful detention.” Slade, 112 Ariz. at 300, 541 P.2d at 552. “Under Arizona law,

probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim of false arrest and imprisonment.” Gasho

v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hockett v. City of Tucson, 139

Ariz. 317, 320, 678 P.2d 502, 505 (Az.Ct.App. 1983); Joseph v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2009 WL

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5185393, * 15 (D.Ariz. 2009)). “Under Arizona law, probable cause is an absolute defense

to a claim of false arrest and imprisonment.” Hockett, 139 Ariz. 317, 320, 678 P.2d 502, 505

Having previously found that Officer Mitchell had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff, Bohnert, 2010 WL 3767566 at 7-10, the Court will grant the State Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s State law false arrest claim.

D. Assault and battery

To establish the tort of assault in Arizona, Plaintiff must prove that Officer

Mitchell acted with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact or imminent apprehension

thereof. Joseph v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2009 WL 5185393 at * 15 (citing Garcia v. United States,

826 F.2d 806, 809 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1987) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)).

Similarly, to establish the tort of battery, Plaintiff must show that Officer Mitchell

“intentionally caused a harmful or offensive contact” with Plaintiff’s person. Id. (citing

Johnson v. Pankratz, 196 Ariz. 621, 623, 2 P.3d 1266, 1268 (Az.Ct.App. 2000) (citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965)). “Contact is offensive if it ‘offends a reasonable

sense of personal dignity.’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 (1965).” Id.

Plaintiff has produced no evidence of Officer Mitchell’s intent to cause harm

or imminent apprehension thereof to Plaintiff. Under the circumstances, and drawing all

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that Officer Mitchell’s use of physical

force was reasonably necessary for the same reasons discussed above in connection with

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. Because Plaintiff failed to

respond to the State Defendants’ Motion in this regard and the absence of any evidence, or

reasonable inference from the evidence, that Officer Mitchell intended to use any more force

than was reasonable and necessary to overcome Plaintiff’s physical resistence to arrest, the

State Defendants’ Motion will be granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the State of Arizona’s, Officer Mitchell’s, and Roger

Vanderpool’s Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 81, is GRANTED as follows:

1. on Plaintiff’s ADA claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

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2. on Plaintiff’s Title II ADA claim of disability discrimination,

3. on Plaintiff’s claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, false arrest, assault and battery alleged in Counts III through VI, respectively, 

4. on Plaintiff’s claim in Count II that Roger Vanderpool inadequately

supervised and trained Officer Mitchell or that he maintained a policy that resulted in the

constitutional violation of other individuals’ constitutional rights, 

5. on Plaintiff’s claim in Count II that they are vicariously liable on Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim.

6. the State of Arizona is not liable on Plaintiff’s State law claims of

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, assault and battery

alleged in Counts III through VI, respectively, under the theory of respondeat superior as

alleged in Count VII. 

The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendants State of Arizona, Officer Jeffrey

Mitchell, and Roger Vanderpool from this lawsuit.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sheriff Arpaio’s and Maricopa County’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 75, is GRANTED in part as follows:

1. on Plaintiff’s claim in Count II that they inadequately supervised and trained

Deputies Burke and Carr or they maintained a policy that resulted in the constitutional

violation of other individuals’ constitutional rights, and

2. on Plaintiff’s claim in Count II that they are vicariously liable on Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for oral argument, doc.

96, is DENIED as unnecessary.

Dated this 26th day of October, 2010.

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