Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01050/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01050-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss this petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that it 

was filed untimely. Because the Court finds Petitioner waited years after knowing the factual 

predicate for his claim, the Court concludes the petition, indeed, is untimely and the motion is 

GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner filed this action on July 6, 2015.

1

 After the Court conducted a preliminary review of 

the petition, it appeared that it was untimely. The Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why it 

 

1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed 

filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the actual date of its receipt by the court 

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s 

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might 

be adverse to his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Ninth Circuit 

has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9th Cir. 2000); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The date the petition is signed may be considered the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison 

PHEAKTRA ROS,

 Petitioner,

v.

C. E. DUCART,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01050-JLT

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS (Doc. 14)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

Case 1:15-cv-01050-JLT Document 20 Filed 02/26/16 Page 1 of 11
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should not be dismissed. (Doc. 7). Petitioner responded and argued that he did not discover the 

factual basis for his claims until later than the Court’s analysis suggested. (Doc. 8). Petitioner also 

contended that he was actually innocent. (Id.) Thus, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response. 

(Doc. 9). Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition was untimely. 

(Doc. 14). On February 22, 2015, Petitioner filed his opposition. (Doc. 19). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside the 

one-year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of 

the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court 

. . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondent’s to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer if 

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the state’s 

procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to 

evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 

599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state 

procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, 

a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court should use 

Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s 

one year limitation period. Because Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is similar in procedural standing 

to a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and 

Respondent has not yet filed a formal Answer, the Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

 

authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, 

for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the 

petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing 

date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. 

Petitioner signed the instant petition on July 6, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 6) 

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B. Limitation Period For Filing Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

The instant petition was filed on July 6, 2015, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) 

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. Here, following his conviction for attempted second degree murder, Petitioner 

was sentenced to a prison term of 27 years. (Lodged Document (“LD”) 1). Petitioner appealed his 

conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”), which affirmed the 

lower court judgment. (LD 2). Petitioner’s petition for review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court on April 25, 2007. (LD 3; 4). Thus, direct review would have concluded on July 24, 2007, 

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when the ninety day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot 

v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v. 

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner would then have had one year from the 

following day, July 25, 2007, or until July 24, 2008, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 2 

As mentioned, the petition was filed on July 6, 2015, almost seven years after the date the oneyear period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or equitable 

tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

Petitioner contends that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) should apply and that the one-year period 

should commence from the date he became aware of the “newly discovered” evidence that he claims 

shows actual innocence. That newly discovered evidence is a declaration from a witness, Shawn Va, 

who claims to have been with Petitioner at the time of the incidents giving rise to his conviction and 

declares that Petitioner did not file a weapon. 

Under the AEDPA, the one-year period may run from the date on which the factual predicate 

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner states under oath in his petition that during trial he was aware of 

the existence of an exonerating witness and that, although he did not know the witness’s name or 

address, he had “critical information that would have led [sic] to locating the witness.” (Doc. 1, pp. 

31; 49). Petitioner’s trial took place in 2006. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner alleges he did not receive the 

declaration until 2013 and did not file his first state habeas corpus petition alleging innocence until 

2014. In other words, Petitioner had the “critical knowledge” of how to locate Va in 2006, but 

apparently did nothing until 2013 to actually locate him, i.e., a period of seven years. Now Petitioner 

wishes to enjoy the benefits of § 2244(d)(1)(D)’s longer limitation period based on his own lack of 

diligence in locating Va. However, the clear wording of the statute provides that the one-year period 

runs not from the date when Petitioner actually discovered the claim, but from the date the factual 

 

2

In computing the running of the statute of limitations, the day an order or judgment becomes final is excluded and time 

begins to run on the day after the judgment becomes final. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(Citing Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

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predicate could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Had Petitioner exercised 

due diligence from 2006 forward, he undoubtedly could have located Va with his “critical 

knowledge.” Instead, Petitioner waited seven years to act. This does not show “due diligence.” 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to use § 2244(d)(1)(D)’s later starting date. Additionally, even 

if the Court used § 2244(d)(1)(D) as the “trigger” for the one-year period, that limitation period would 

have commenced on or about the date of the trial. Thus, Petitioner’s state habeas filings would still 

not be entitled to statutory tolling because the year would have expired long before the first state 

habeas petition was filed in 2014. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California 

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay 

in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized 

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and 

the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no 

state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007; Raspberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the 

period between finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the 

limitation period is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. 

Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 

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2001)(as amended on December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling 

where the limitation period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling when the 

petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

Here, the documents lodged with the motion to dismiss establish that Petitioner filed the 

following state habeas petitions: (1) petition filed in the Superior Court of Fresno County on April 4, 

2014, and denied on May 14, 2014 (LD 5; 6); (2) petition filed in the 5th DCA on June 25, 2014, and 

denied on October 9, 2014 (LD 7; 8); (3) petition filed in the 5th DCA on August 8, 2014, and denied 

on September 9, 2014 (LD 9; 10; 11); (4) petition filed in the 5th DCA on November 5, 2014, and 

denied on January 13, 2015 (LD 12; 13); (5) petition filed in the California Supreme Court on March 

1, 2015, and denied on June 10, 2015 (LD 14; 15). 

None of these petitions, however, entitle Petitioner to statutory tolling since they were all filed 

after the original one-year period had expired. A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the 

limitations period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 

1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 199 

F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003)(“section 

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state 

petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to exhaust 

claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). As 

mentioned, the limitations period expired on July 24, 2008, almost six years before Petitioner filed his 

first state habeas petition. Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of 

the AEDPA. 

D. Equitable Tolling.

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 

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(2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period 

is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 

2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a 

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 

(2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation 

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 

1107. 

Petitioner makes no claim that he is entitled to equitable tolling; however, he does contend that 

he is entitled to proceed with the untimely petition because he is actually innocence. In McQuiggin v. 

Perkins, 569 U.S.___, 2013 WL 2300806 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held that “actual 

innocence” could be an exception to the one-year limitation bar in the AEDPA:

We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may 

pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House,

3

or, as in this 

case, expiration of the statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement 

unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S., 

at 329; see House, 547 U.S., at 538 (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is “demanding” and 

seldom met). And in making an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, “the timing of the 

[petition]” is a factor bearing on the “reliability of th[e] evidence” purporting to show actual 

innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332.

McQuiggin, at *3. The Supreme Court went on to explain that an “unexplained delay in presenting 

new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing, and, 

thus, “a court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of [a 

 

3

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006). 

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petitioner’s] affiants bear on the probable reliability of evidence [of actual innocence].” Id. at *11, 

quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932-933 (9th Cir. 2011)(en 

banc)(“a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations 

period, and a petitioner who makes such a showing may pass through the Schlup gateway and have his 

otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.” ) The “Schlup gateway,” however, may only be 

employed when a petitioner “falls within the narrow class of cases...implicating a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-315; McQuiggin, at *9. However, “[t]o ensure that the 

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain ‘rare’ and would only be applied in the 

‘extraordinary case,’ while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those 

who were truly deserving,” the Supreme Court explicitly limited the equitable exception to cases 

where a petitioner has made a showing of innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. “The Supreme Court 

did not hold that a petitioner may invoke Schlup whenever he wants a trial do-over.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 

946 (Kozinski, J., concurring.)

The rule announced in McQuiggin is not a type of equitable tolling, which provides for an 

extension of the time statutorily prescribed, but an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin at 

*7. Moreover, the Court noted that actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to 

address the merits of a petitioner’s constitutional claims; the Court has yet to address whether “a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides a separate basis for granting habeas relief. 

McQuiggin at *7.

Here, Petitioner has failed to meet Schlup’s exacting standard. The Court of Appeal’s opinion 

on direct appeal relates facts relevant to Petitioner’s guilt. (LD 2). In that opinion, the 5th DCA notes 

that the prosecution presented three eyewitnesses to the shooting: one who was within seven or eight 

feet of Petitioner and testified that shots were fired from Petitioner’s location, although the witness 

ducked and did not see if the shots were fired by Petitioner, and two other witnesses who both saw 

Petitioner fire the weapon. 

By contrast, Va’s declaration merely states that, while he observed that Petitioner was very 

angry and threw a trash can at the other people at the party, he never saw Petitioner with a gun or 

firing a gun. (Doc. 1, p. 86). As Respondent correctly contends, however, such a vague declaration 

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does nothing to dispute the testimony of the eyewitnesses who saw Petitioner fire the shots. Instead, it 

merely shows that Va did not see Petitioner with a gun or firing a weapon. It does not exclude the 

possibility that Petitioner was the shooter but Va did not observe him in the act of shooting. Put 

another way, as the Superior Court noted, it does not “point unerringly to Petitioner’s innocence or 

undermine the prosecution’s entire case.”

Moreover, in the context of a criminal trial, even if Va had testified, the jury would have had to 

consider his testimony, innocuous as it is, in light of three eyewitnesses who either saw Petitioner fire 

the weapon or were standing nearby and testified that the shots came from the area where Petitioner 

was standing. Without knowing more about Va himself, i.e., his credibility, his criminal history, if 

any, and how he would have appeared to the jury had he testified, it is impossible for this Court to 

assess how probative his testimony would have been. However, though ten years have elapsed since 

the trial, even a cold reading of Va’s declaration shows that it falls far short of establishing that “no 

juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 329. To reach such a conclusion, the Court would have to conclude that, even if Va’s 

declaration could be construed as exculpatory, no reasonable juror would have believed any of the 

three eyewitnesses who identified Petitioner, or someone standing in his place, as the shooter. This 

the Court cannot do.4 

CONCLUSION

The burden of demonstrating that the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period was sufficiently 

tolled, whether statutorily or equitable, rests with the petitioner. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Duncan, 297 

F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). For the reasons 

discussed above, the Court finds and concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden with respect to 

the tolling issue. Accordingly, the petition is late and must therefore be dismissed. 

 

4

To the extent that Petitioner’s Brady claim can be considered a claim of actual innocence for purposes of timeliness, the 

Court agrees with Respondent that the failure of the prosecution to produce evidence that Petitioner placed two 911 calls 

does not establish actual innocence. Petitioner has not shown that he actually made such calls and, even if he did, there is 

no showing that placing those calls would have been so exculpatory that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. 

Indeed, as Respondent notes, the fact that neither Petitioner nor his counsel pursued the matter at trial, combined with the 

fact that Petitioner waited until 2013 to request the 911 transcripts, strongly suggests that Petitioner himself did not believe 

that the calls had any significant exculpatory value. 

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Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit 

in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged 

with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's 

detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not 

be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

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habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 14), is GRANTED;

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED as untimely;

3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file; and,

4. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01050-JLT Document 20 Filed 02/26/16 Page 11 of 11