Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-03-02289/USCOURTS-ca10-03-02289-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 16 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

MARCOS LUCERO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

V. 

TIM LEMASTER, Warden, New 

Mexico State Penitentiary; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 

ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 03-2289 

(D.C. No. CIV-02-799 MCA/KBM) 

(D. N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court 

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order 

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 03-2289 Document: 010110620203 Date Filed: 05/16/2005 Page: 1
Marcos Lucero appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. We affirm. 

In 1996, Lucero was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses. 

After the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and his collateral 

review application in state court was denied, Lucero filed a habeas corpus petition 

in federal district court. A magistrate judge recommended that the petition be 

denied, and the district court adopted this recommendation. Lucero then 

appealed. This court granted a certificate of appealability limited to "the issue of 

whether Lucero's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense of 

actual innocence." Lucero v. LeMaster, No. 03-2289 (10th Cir. June 3, 2004) 

(Order). The court subsequently expanded the certificate of appealability to 

include the question of whether "appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the allegedly inconsistent verdicts returned by the jury." Lucero v. 

LeMaster, No. 03-2289 (10th Cir. Dec. 17, 2004) (Order). 

In order to demonstrate that his attorneys were ineffective, Lucero must 

make two showings: 

First, [he] must show that counsel's performance was deficient .... 

Second, [he] must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Moreover, because these 

claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, Lucero is not entitled to 

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federal habeas relief unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" or "was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Lucero first asserts that it was ineffective for his attorneys to rely on a 

strategy of self-defense rather than trying to refute the evidence that Lucero 

perpetrated the homicide underlying this prosecution. According to the evidence 

at trial, somebody-the evidence pointed to Lucero-fired a warning shot during an 

altercation and then fired the shot that killed the victim. Because the warning 

shot was the first shot fired, the trial court concluded that the shooter was the 

initial aggressor; the court therefore refused to instruct the jury about selfdefense. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed this refusal. See State v. 

Lucero, 972 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (N.M. 1998). Lucero contends that his lawyers 

should have anticipated that a self-defense claim would fail as a matter of law and 

should instead have tried to demonstrate that the offenses charged against Lucero 

were in fact committed by his friend. 

The state habeas court rejected this claim on the grounds that the law 

relating to warning shots was not clear before the Lucero decision and that 

Lucero' s preferred defense had no better prospects for success than the defense 

actually presented. These conclusions are well-supported. We have not found 

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any New Mexico decision prior to Lucero that discussed warning shots in the 

context of a self-defense claim. Moreover, appellate opinions from other 

jurisdictions are mixed, with some finding sufficient evidence to support a claim 

of self-defense even where the defendant fired a warning shot before any other 

shot was fired. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 433 S.E.2d 848,849 (S.C. 1993). Finally, 

Lucero's proposal to take the stand and deny that he was the shooter would have 

required him to repudiate his own inculpatory statements to the police; the state 

habeas court could reasonably conclude that the jury was not likely to find such 

testimony credible. 

Lucero' s second assertion arises from the jury's finding that the single 

killing committed by Lucero constituted both deliberate murder and depraved 

mind murder. Lucero contends that these alternative theories underlying his firstdegree murder conviction were logically irreconcilable and that his appellate 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge this defect in the 

verdict. 

The State maintains that this claim is procedurally defaulted. We disagree. 

Lucero raised this ineffective assistance claim in state collateral review 

proceedings, and the state court denied relief without invoking any state 

procedural rule barring review. In the absence of a plain statement applying a 

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state procedural bar, we will not deem the claim defaulted. See Klein v. Neal, 

45 F .3d 1395, 1398-99 (10th Cir. 1995). 

Although the claim is not defaulted, Lucero is not entitled to relief. Lucero 

is correct that, under New Mexico law, a person who acts with a depraved mind 

necessarily lacks the intent required for deliberate murder. See State v. Johnson, 

707 P.2d 1174, 1178 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). At Lucero's trial, however, the jury 

was erroneously instructed that these two forms of first degree murder were not 

mutually exclusive and that the jury should therefore return a verdict as to both 

theories. Lucero has not challenged either these instructions or defense counsel's 

failure to object to them. 

Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial could reasonably be construed 

to establish either deliberate murder or depraved mind murder. As recounted by 

the magistrate judge, the evidence at trial established that Lucero fired a shot 

across a crowded field in order to kill a specific victim; the shot, however, struck 

and killed a different person. This evidence would support a conviction for 

deliberate murder on a transferred intent theory. It could also support a 

conviction for depraved mind murder, because Lucero never intended to kill the 

person who was actually struck by his bullet but his conduct was "greatly 

dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human 

life," N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 30-2-l(A)(3). In light of this evidence, as well as the 

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instruction stating that deliberate murder and depraved mind murder are not 

mutually exclusive, the record does not support the inference that the jury 

misunderstood its charge and produced an incoherent verdict. Accordingly, 

Lucero would not be entitled to relief from this verdict under either federal law or 

New Mexico law. See Masonerv. Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1993); 

State v. Fernandez, 875 P.2d 1104, 1111 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). It follows that 

Lucero's attorneys were not ineffective in failing to challenge the verdict on 

appeal. 

For these reasons, we hold that the state court's conclusions were not 

unreasonable and that the district court properly denied habeas relief. The 

judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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