Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00050/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 1 “Dkt.” refers to the docket numbers of documents in this Court’s file.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven Leslie Sapp, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-50-TUC-FRZ-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Steven Leslie Sapp, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison - Gila

Unit, in Douglas, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the Petition

(Dkt. 1),1

 Respondents’ Answer (Dkt. 12), and Petitioner’s Reply (Dkt. 14). The Magistrate

Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss the

petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in the Cochise County Superior Court of one count of

knowing possession of a dangerous drug for sale, one count of knowing possession of drug

paraphernalia, and one count of knowingly driving on a suspended license, all of which

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 2 “Doc.” refers to the document numbers on the Cochise County Superior Court’s index

from the state court proceeding.

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occurred on July 6, 1998 (Case No. CR 98000325). (Dkt. 12, Ex. A, Doc. 63.)2

 On June 14,

1999, Plaintiff was sentenced to presumptive terms, based on one historical prior, of nine

years and three months for possession for sale and one year and nine months for possession

of drug paraphernalia, to be served concurrently. (Id., Doc. 85.) He was sentenced to one

year probation for the license violation. (Id., Doc. 87.)

The judge ordered that the sentences in that case would run consecutively to the

sentences imposed the same day in two other cases. (Id., Doc. 85 at 4.) Petitioner was

sentenced to two five-year concurrent sentences for one count of knowingly selling or

offering to sell a dangerous drug and one count of knowingly selling or offering to sell a

dangerous drug to a minor on August 21, 1996 (Case No. 97000484B). Exhibits for Answer,

Dkt. 10, Ex. A, Doc. 100, Sapp v. Blair, No. CV05-52-FRZ-DTF (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 27,

2005). Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of two and one-half years for one

count of knowingly possessing a dangerous drug for sale and one year for one count of

resisting arrest on October 5, 1998 (Case No. 98000452). Exhibits for Answer, Dkt. 11, Ex.

A, Doc. 70, Sapp v. Blair, No. CV05-51-FRZ-DTF (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 27, 2005).

Petitioner filed an appellate brief before the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising eight

issues: the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment the morning of

trial; the court excluded two jurors in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a

fair and impartial jury; the jury was tainted by the comments of a prospective juror; the court

erred in allowing the State to reopen to present evidence of a drug sale; the court erred in not

allowing Petitioner to challenge the prior convictions; Petitioner’s conviction and sentence

should be set aside if his other convictions are overturned; and the court erred in not giving

a jury nullification instruction. (Dkt. 12, Ex. B.) Upon denial (id., Ex. E), Petitioner filed

a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court seeking review as to the eight claims

raised below (id., Ex. F). The petition was summarily denied on August 23, 2000. (Id., Ex.

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 There is one appointment of counsel order with all three case numbers on it that was

docketed in all of the cases. (Dkt. 12, Ex. A, Doc. 107.)

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G.) Petitioner did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.

On March 21, 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Dkt. 12, Ex. A, Doc. 103.) On July 3, 2002,

Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(c),

informing the court that she could not find any colorable claims in the case. (Id., Doc. 119.)

Pursuant to counsel’s request, the court allowed Petitioner until October 25, 2002, to file a

pro se petition. (Id., Docs. 119, 122.)

During state court proceedings, Petitioner, the State and the PCR court filed

documents with all three case numbers on them; based on the limited record before the Court,

it appears that those documents were almost entirely docketed only in the case with the

lowest number, CR97000484B.3

 To the extent relevant to Petitioner’s arguments, the Court

sets forth the procedural history from Petitioner’s PCR proceeding in that case. On July 3,

2002, Petitioner’s counsel filed a PCR petition in CR97000484B, and filed an amended

petition on August 30, 2002. Exhibits to Answer, Dkt. 10, Ex. H, Docs. 39, 45 (No. CV05-

52). In the interim, on August 22, Petitioner mailed a document to the PCR court listing all

three of his criminal case numbers, which was captioned “Petitioner’s consolidated

supplemental pro per brief for post-conviction relief.” Id., Doc. 44. On October 1, 2002, the

State filed a motion to extend the deadline to respond to the PCR petition and supplemental

pro per brief, listing all three case numbers. Petitioner’s Exhibits, Dkt. 13, Ex. E (No. CV05-

52). It appears the request was granted, allowing the State until November 18 to respond.

On December 18, 2002, the State filed a response under the one case number

(CR97000484B) limited to the amended petition filed by counsel, Exhibits to Answer, Dkt.

10, Ex. H, Doc. 51 (CV05-52); the records reflect that the State did not respond to the pro

per brief with respect to any of the cases. On January 2, 2003, the court issued an order with

all three case numbers on it noting that the State had not filed a response on November 18

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 4 This order appears to have been entered in error because the State filed a response on

December 18 in CR97000484B, and the two other cases had been dismissed at that time. In

the PCR court’s final order in CR97000484B, it referred to the State’s December response.

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and should do so by January 30, 2003.4

On December 20, 2002, the court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding in this

case, CR98000325. (Dkt. 12, Ex. A, Doc. 123.) The court stated that Petitioner did not file

a pro se petition and had failed to present a claim demonstrating a material issue of fact or

law entitling him to relief. (Id.) The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and set

January 31, 2003, as Petitioner’s deadline to file a petition for review in CR 98000325. (Id.,

Doc. 125.)

On February 24, 2003, the court dismissed the PCR petition in CR97000484B; the

court stated that it considered all pro se filings but it did not specifically acknowledge nor did

it address the issues raised in the consolidated pro per petition. Exhibits to Answer, Dkt. 10,

Ex. H, Doc. 59 (CV05-52). On April 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a consolidated Petition for

Review before the Court of Appeals as to all three cases, CR97000484B, CR98000325, and

CR98000452. (Dkt. 12, Ex. J.) On November 9, 2004, in a consolidated decision, the Court

of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition as to this case as untimely pursuant to Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c). (Id., Ex. K at 2.) On December 8, 2004, Petitioner’s motion

for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was denied. (Id., Ex. L.)

DISCUSSION

Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding on January 27, 2005. Respondents

contend the petition is untimely under the statute of limitations; Petitioner disputes that

argument and contends he is entitled to equitable tolling.

Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) became effective on

April 24, 1996. Under the AEDPA, federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state

prisoners are governed by a one-year statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The limitations period begins to run from the latest of: 

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. Petitioner does not contend that subsection B, C, or D of the limitations period apply to

him.

In applying (d)(1)(A), the Court must assess when direct review of Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences became final. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

Petitioner’s direct appeal on August 23, 2000, and his time to petition for a writ of certiorari

from the United States Supreme Court expired ninety days later, on Tuesday, November 21,

2000. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Thus, the judgment against Petitioner became final for purposes of

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) on that date. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)

(holding that “direct review” includes the period during which a petitioner can petition for

writ of certiorari, regardless of whether the petitioner seeks such review); see also Jimenez

v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) (finding direct review to include the time up to

the expiration of the period to seek review by the Supreme Court). The statute of limitations

began to run, absent tolling, on the date of finality – November 21, 2000.

 The statute of limitations is tolled during the time a properly filed state PCR

application is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner initiated his first PCR proceeding

by filing a notice on March 21, 2001, which triggered tolling as of that date. See Isley v.

Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that tolling period

begins with filing of notice pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a)). After

dismissal of the petition, the PCR court allowed Petitioner until January 31, 2003, in which

to file a petition for review. He did not seek review by that deadline. When he later filed a

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consolidated petition for review with his other two cases it was found untimely. Petitions

rejected as untimely under state law are not “properly filed” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).

Pace v. DeGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 4 (2007)

(holding that federal courts do not examine the state procedure, rather, once a state court

finds it untimely that dictates the (d)(2) issue). Therefore, after January 31, 2003, Petitioner

did not have a properly filed PCR petition pending before the state courts and the subsequent

time was not entitled to statutory tolling.

The limitations period ran until January 27, 2005, when he filed his federal habeas

petition. Because more than two years of untolled time passed since Petitioner’s judgment

became final, his petition is untimely.

Equitable Tolling

The Supreme Court has assumed without deciding that the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations can be equitably tolled. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007); Pace,

544 U.S. at 418 n.8. Citing the standard for equitable tolling set forth in Irwin v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990), the Court observed that a litigant generally “bears

the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. In

turn, the Ninth Circuit holds the limitations period may be equitably tolled “if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds

by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003)). The threshold for equitable tolling is very

high and it is “unavailable in most cases.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107). 

Petitioner contends he diligently attempted to meet every deadline and timely file all

documents in state court and that an extraordinary circumstance prevented him filing.

Petitioner argues that the state court stood in his way because he timely filed a “consolidated”

pro se PCR brief, which the court failed to file and consider with respect to this case.

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Further, Petitioner contends the court should not have allowed the State until January 30,

2003, to respond to his pro se filing, while dismissing this case in December 2002.

Although the dockets for the three cases are a bit confusing and all participants,

including the court, intermittently used all three case numbers, nothing extraordinary

prevented Petitioner from timely filing in state court or in this Court. The PCR court never

consolidated Petitioner’s cases or gave him permission to file joint documents. Only in this

case did the PCR court give Petitioner permission to file a pro se brief; rather than filing a

pro se brief restricted to this case, Petitioner filed a joint document that the PCR court did not

consider. Although nothing prevented Petitioner from complying with the PCR court’s

procedures and filing a pro se brief limited to this case, the Court is not unsympathetic to the

fact that Petitioner attempted to timely file a pro se brief raising claims relevant to this PCR

case. However, once Petitioner learned that the case had been dismissed and that he had a

deadline for filing a petition for review, he was on notice that he needed to act. 

Petitioner contends he did not take action at that time because the State had not filed

a response to the pro se consolidated brief. It was not reasonable or diligent to rely upon that

fact once the PCR court had entered a final dismissal order in this case. Petitioner could have

sought reconsideration of the dismissal, which he contends was improper, or filed a petition

for review by the deadline. No court action gave Petitioner reason to think he could delay

seeking review in the court of appeals, but he did nothing in the face of the deadline. The

PCR court’s actions did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance preventing him from

timely filing a petition for review, nor did Petitioner’s actions amount to diligent pursuit of

his rights. To the extent Petitioner was mistaken about his deadlines, a mistake by the

petitioner generally does not warrant equitable tolling. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051,

1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, pro se status alone does not warrant equitable tolling, see Roy

v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006), nor does “lack of legal sophistication,”

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner has not demonstrated that an extraordinary circumstance prevented him

from timely filing nor that he diligently pursued his rights; therefore, he failed to reach the

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high threshold for equitable tolling.

The petition is untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and Petitioner has not

established entitlement to statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, the petition is timebarred.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an

order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-05-050-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2009.

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