Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01116/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RASHEEN D. FAIRLY, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-10-1116 OWW

(No. CR-F-95-5193 MDC)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DEEMING PETITIONER'S

PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT UNDER ALL WRITS ACT

TO BE SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE

MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE

OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

DISMISSING DEEMED SECTION

2255 MOTION FOR LACK OF

JURISDICTION, AND DIRECTING

CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

On June 22, 2010, Petitioner Rasheen D. Fairly, proceeding

in pro per, filed a “Writ for Relief from Judgment under the All

Writs Act Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).”1

Petitioner is a federal inmate incarcerated at USP

For administrative reasons, Petitioner’s petition was

1

docketed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241.

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Victorville, Adelanto, California. 

Petitioner was charged in this Court with conspiracy to

possess cocaine based with intent to distribute, possession of

cocaine base with intent to distribute, using a firearm in

connection with a drug trafficking offense, and with being a

felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Fairly, et

al., No. CR-F-95-5193 MDC, United States District Court for the

Eastern District of California. Following Petitioner’s

arraignment, Respondent gave oral and written notice that it

intended to seek enhanced penalties based on Petitioner’s prior

felony drug convictions for possession of cocaine for sale and

for transporting and distributing a non-narcotic controlled

substance. Petitioner was convicted of each charge and sentenced

to life imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See United

States v. Candler, et al., 1998 WL 4727 (9 Cir., Jan. 8, 1998). th

On October 15, 1998, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that defense

counsel was constitutionally ineffective because of the failure

to argue that Petitioner’s 1990 conviction was not a qualifying

drug conviction for sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841

and 851, because the substance involved was not a narcotic drug. 

The Section 2255 motion was denied on December 14, 1998 and a

certificate of appealability was denied on March 3, 1999. The

Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability on January

28, 2000.

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On March 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a second Section 2255

motion and a motion for downward departure based on Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Petitioner’s second Section

2255 motion was denied on November 26, 2001 and a certificate of

appealability was denied on February 4, 2002. The Ninth Circuit

denied a certificate of appealability on June 17, 2002. 

In 2003, Petitioner petitioned for a writ of coram nobis in

the state trial court where the challenged conviction occurred,

presenting essentially the same claim asserted in his Section

2255 motions. The state trial court denied the writ and, on 2

November 2, 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

denial in an unpublished opinion. 

On January 8, 2005, Petitioner sought leave from the Ninth

Circuit to file another Section 2255 motion, asserting that

“newly discovered facts, presented in a state court opinion,’

i.e., the California Court of Appeal decision noted immediately

above, “proved that petitioner was factually innocent of the

state” conviction he had challenged earlier as being invalid. On

May 12, 2005, the Ninth Circuit denied leave to file a third

Section 2255 motion. 

The Court may take judicial notice of matters of public 2

record, including duly recorded documents, and court records

available to the public through the PACER system via the internet. 

See Fed. R. Evid. Rule 201(b); United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d

873, 876, fn.1 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court takes judicial notice of

the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge

filed on June 4, 2008 in Fairly v. United States, No. CV-08-03471

JVS (RZ), United States District Court for the Central District of

California, which Report and Recommendation was adopted by Order

filed on July, 2, 2008.

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On August 31, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California, asserting that relief under Section 2241

was available because Petitioner had not had one “unobstructed

procedural shot” at presenting his claim. Fairly v. Norwood, No.

CV-05-6458 JVS (RZ). In the Report and Recommendation to deny

Petitioner’s Section 2241 petition filed on July 10, 2006, the

Central District ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to

proceed pursuant to Section 2241 because he had not satisfied the

“escape hatch” to Section 2255's exclusivity provision:

Here, opening the ‘escape hatch’ is

unwarranted. First, contrary to his

assertions here, Petitioner does not rely on

newly-discovered evidence of actual

innocence. He points to the California Court

of Appeal’s ‘new’ statement, in its 2004

opinion affirming the denial of coram nobis

relief, that indeed Petitioner did plead

guilty to a crime despite the absence of a

factual basis for that particular crime. But

as that court explained, such is a

distinction without a difference because

Petitioner knowingly accepted the plea deal:

Fairly [claims] the judgment should

be vacated because, while Fairly

represented the substance as

cocaine, the crime to which he pled

guilty, section 11382, does not

prohibit the sale or attempted sale

of cocaine.

Section 11382 criminalizes the sale

or the offer to sell substances

listed [in certain schedules and

statutes]. The People concede that

cocaine is not included in any of

these lists. Section 11352, on the

other hand, criminalizes the sale

of or the offer to sell various

controlled substances, including

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cocaine base and its derivatives.

When a defendant is prosecuted for

offering to sell a controlled

substance, both sections 11382 and

11352 require the specific intent

to sell the controlled substance. 

[Citations.] [The California

Supreme Court has] held that when

the defendant did not intend to

sell a controlled substance, but

instead delivered a substitute

substance, he or she could not be

convicted of violating section

11352 because the specific intent

to sell the controlled substance is

missing. [The same state supreme

court decision] also noted that

when a defendant offers to sell a

controlled substance, but instead

intends to, or actually does,

substitute a non-narcotic, the

behavior is criminalized by section

11355. [Citation.]

It is unclear why the prosecution

amended count one to reflect a

violation of section 11382 before

taking Fairly’s plea. Perhaps the

substance Fairly attempted to sell

did not contain cocaine, but it did

contain some other substance

included within section 11382's

definition of controlled

substances. It is also possible

that the parties, realizing that

the substance delivered would not

support a section 11352

prosecution, simply misstated the

statute that should have been

charged.

It is clear that Fairly accepted an

attractive plea agreement and did

not complain or voice any concern

when the charge was amended to a

violation of section 11382. It is

also clear that the penalty for

violating [the correct section,]

section 11355[,] was the same as

the penalty for violating section

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11382. Both statutes required

imprisonment in county jail for one

year, or in state prison. 

Violation of either statute is a

felony. [Citation.]

It is also clear that this error

does not meet the requirements for

coram nobis relief. First, because

the plea agreement did not specify

the punishment to be imposed, the

trial court was not required to

establish a factual basis for the

plea. [Citation.] This is

significant because Fairly is, in

essence, claiming there was not a

factual basis for his plea.

Second, Fairly has not presented

any new facts that would justify

granting his petition. The facts

on which this motion is based are

Fairly’s offer to sell cocaine and

the subsequent testing that

revealed the substance was not

cocaine, and apparently not a

controlled substance. The record

establishes that all parties were

aware of these facts at the time

the trial court accepted Fairly’s

plea

If error occurred, it was legal

error. Fairly’s counsel could have

pointed out that the facts of the

case should have resulted in a

charge that Fairly violated section

11355, not section 11382. We

cannot conclude, however, that

Fairly’s counsel was ineffective

because there may have been other

tactical issues that led to the

decision to plead guilty to

violating section 11382, including

permitting Fairly to receive a

suspended sentence and enter a drug

rehabilitation program.

Fairly claims that his trial

counsel failed to explain

adequately the charge to which he

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pled guilty. There does not appear

to be any possible benefit to

Fairly, however, to such a

discussion because a refusal to

plead to a section 11382 violation

simply would have resulted in an

amendment of the complaint to

[allege] a section 11352 violation. 

He does not challenge the conduct

that resulted in his conviction.

Finally, even if we assume that a

factual error occurred, Fairly has

not established that the facts on

which he relies were not known to

him and could not have been

discovered by him through the

exercise of reasonable diligence in

a more timely manner. Fairly’s

argument is essentially that no one

told him that he pled guilty to the

wrong crime. The statutes and

cases have at all times remained

available for review. That he did

not do so, or did not feel the need

to do so, until he was convicted of

another crime and received an

enhanced sentence as a result of

this conviction is not the type of

delay permitted when seeking coram

nobis relief.

Ex. M to Pet’n at 5-7. Petitioner’s

assertions that the California Court of

Appeal’s concession that ‘he pled guilty to

the wrong crime’ supplies ‘new evidence’ of

his actual innocence lack merit. (If the

Ninth Circuit had believed otherwise, it

could have granted Petitioner’s 2005 request

for leave to file a third § 2255 motion. 

Even if he did, it would be incumbent upon

him to obtain the Ninth Circuit’s leave for

doing so before proceeding - and in the

Eastern District rather than this district.

Petitioner strenuously argues that he is one

of the rare prisoners who should obtain §

2241 ‘escape hatch’ review of a claim of

factual innocence because he never had even

one ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at

presenting such a claim. See Lorentsen, 223

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F.3d at 954. Such is plainly incorrect. 

Petitioner has had many ‘unobstructed

procedural shots’ at presenting his claims,

which are based on long-known facts and

unchanged law. He presented his current

claim (1) to the Eastern District of

California in 1998 and 2001; (2) to the Ninth

Circuit after each rejection in the Eastern

District, and again in 2005 in seeking leave

to file a third § 2255 motion; and (3) to the

California courts on coram nobis. Those

courts rejected his current claim on its

merits. Thus, the ‘escape hatch’ remains

closed. The Court should dismiss the action

without prejudice to Petitioner’s pursuit of

his claims in the Eastern District or the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Judge Selna of the Central District adopted this Report and

Recommendation on August 16, 2006 and entered judgment dismissing

Petitioner’s 2005 Section 2241 petition. Petitioner sought to

appeal but both the Central District and the Ninth Circuit denied

certificates of appealability.

On November 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Challenge

the Validity of a Prior Conviction Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §

851(c)(2), On the Basis of Good Cause,” in the Eastern District

of California, Fairly v. United States, No. CV-F-06-1588 OWW/WMW

HC. Petitioner’s motion was docketed as a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to Section 2241. The United States moved

to dismiss the deemed Section 2241 petition for lack of

jurisdiction, contending that, because Petitioner attacks his

underlying conviction and sentence, rather than the

implementation of his sentence, Petitioner’s motion must be

construed as a successive Section 2255 motion for which

Petitioner must obtain prior authorization from the Ninth

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Circuit. By Order filed on February 13, 2008, the Court, unaware

of the 2006 proceedings in the Central District, ruled:

Respondent argues that to the extent that he

relies solely on the prohibition against

successive petitions, Petitioner is not

entitled to utilize the § 2255 savings

clause. However, Petitioner does not rely on

that prohibition to justify proceeding under

§ 2241. Rather, Petitioner argues

extensively that he has made the necessary

showing of actual innocence and the lack of

an earlier opportunity to raise his claim so

as to demonstrate that § 2255 is inadequate

or ineffective in his case. Respondent, who

did not file a reply to Petitioner’s

opposition, has not addressed that argument. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Respondent

has not demonstrated that Petitioner may not

properly proceed in this action under § 2241. 

Respondent moved for reconsideration on the ground, contending

inter alia, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear

Petitioner’s Section 2241 motion. The Court agreed, ruling:

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced by

this Court, the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California, in

No. CR-F-95-5193 OWW. At the time Petitioner

filed this deemed petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to Section 2241, Petitioner

was serving his federal sentence at USP

Victorville, in Adelanto, California, located

in the Central District of California.

In Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861 (9th

Cir.2000), the Ninth Circuit held:

Generally, motions to contest the

legality of a sentence must be

filed under § 2255 in the

sentencing court, while petitions

that challenge the manner,

location, or conditions of a

sentence’s execution must be

brought pursuant to § 2241 in the

custodial court ....

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Under the savings clause of § 2255,

however, a federal prisoner may

file a habeas corpus petition

pursuant to § 2241 to contest the

legality of a sentence where his

remedy under § 2255 is ‘inadequate

or ineffective to test the legality

of his detention.’ ....

An inquiry into whether a § 2241

petition is proper under these

circumstances is critical to the

determination of district court

jurisdiction, because the proper

district for filing a habeas

petition depends upon whether the

petition is filed pursuant to §

2241 or § 2255. In particular, a

habeas petition filed pursuant to §

2241 must be heard in the custodial

court ..., even if the § 2241

petition contests the legality of a

sentence by falling under the

savings clause ... On the other

hand, § 2255 motions must be heard

in the sentencing court ....

Thus, in order to determine whether

jurisdiction is proper, a court

must first determine whether a

habeas petition is filed pursuant

to § 2241 or § 2255 before

proceeding to any other issue. If

Hernandez’s petition falls under

the savings clause so as to be a

petition pursuant to § 2241, then

only the [custodial court] has

jurisdiction. If the savings

clause does not come into play,

however, then Hernandez’s petition

must be construed as a petition

under § 2255, such that

jurisdiction lies only in the

[sentencing court].

204 F.3d at 865.

Because this Court has deemed Petitioner’s

motion to be a Section 2241 motion pursuant

to Section 2255's savings clause, this Court

does not have jurisdiction to consider the

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merits of the Section 2241 motion;

jurisdiction lies in the Central District of

California, which is the custodial court.

Petitioner’s Section 2241 motion was then transferred to the

Central District and assigned Case No. CV-F-08-3471 JVS (RZ). 

The Central District, relying on collateral estoppel, ruled that

the “escape hatch” or “savings clause” does not apply to allow

Petitioner to proceed pursuant to Section 2241:

The current situation satisfies the tests for

collateral estoppel. First, the same two

parties, namely Rasheen Fairly and the United

States, either per se or as a real party in

interest, opposed each other in Petitioner’s

2005 action in this District. Second, they

actually litigated whether Petitioner could

collaterally attack his 1990 conviction in a

§ 2241 habeas action (by qualifying for the

‘savings clause’ of § 2255), among other

issues. Third, this Court’s determination

that Petitioner could not validly do so was

‘a critical and necessary part of the

judgment’ to dismiss the 2005 action. 

Accordingly, Petitioner was and is estopped

from collaterally attacking that

determination here, in the Eastern District,

or in any other trial court. (It is not

relevant that this Court’s 2006 dismissal

judgment was ‘without prejudice’ and did not

reach the merits of Petitioner’s innocencebased challenge to his 1990 conviction. What

matters is that this Court did reach the

merits of the ‘savings clause’ issue. See

Offshore Sportswear, 114 F.3d at 850-851

(party that suffered a dismissal without

prejudice in federal district court, based on

a forum selection clause, could not relitigate the forum selection clause issue in

another trial court, even though the merits

of the parties’ underlying dispute were not

decided in the first dismissal).)

The United States Attorney in the Eastern

District should have been aware of this

Court’s 2006 rejection of the ‘savings

clause’ eligibility for Petitioner and should

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have brought that rejection to Judge Wanger’s

attention. Judge Wanger may well have ruled

differently it he had been made aware of that

ruling. Unfortunately, he was not. But

Petitioner nevertheless may not benefit by

proceeding in this Court in direct

contravention of this Court’s own 2006

rulings.

...

Petitioner has filed essentially the same

petition that he filed in 2005. It remains

infirm for the same reasons, excerpted above,

that underlay its dismissal in 2006.

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his Section 2241 petition to

the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Central

District’s dismissal on collateral estoppel grounds. See Fairly

v. United States, 2010 WL 1274235 (9 Cir., April 5, 2010). th

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or

constitutionality of his conviction or sentence must do so by way

of a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th

Cir.1988). A federal prisoner may not collaterally attack a

federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Grady v. United

States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9 Cir.1991), unless he can show that th

the remedy available under Section 2255 is “inadequate or

ineffective to test the validity of his detention.” Hernandez v.

Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-865 (9 Cir.2000). The AEDPA’s th

filing limitations on successive Section 2255 motions does not

render the remedy available under Section 2255 inadequate or

ineffective. Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9 Cir.1999). th

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In Ivy v. Pontesso, 325 F.3d 1037 (9 Cir. 2003), the Ninth th

Circuit held that a petitioner raising a claim of “actual

innocence” who is otherwise procedurally barred from raising that

claim under Section 2255 may seek relief pursuant to Section 2241 

when the petitioner claims to be: (1) legally

innocent of the crime for which he has been

convicted; and (2) has never had an

‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting

this claim. ... In other words, it is not

enough that the petitioner is presently

barred from raising his claim of innocence my

motion under § 2255. He must never have had

the opportunity to raise it by motion.

325 F.3d at 1060. Similarly, Petitioner cannot avoid the

procedural limitations of Section 2255 by invoking the All Writs

Act. “[T]he common law writs survive only to the extent that

they fill ‘gaps’ in the current system of postconviction relief.” 

United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th

Cir.2001):

Other circuits have concluded that audita

querela is not available to challenge a

conviction or sentence when the prisoner’s

contentions could otherwise be raised in a

motion pursuant to § 2255 ... We agree with

our sister circuits and conclude that a

federal prisoner may not challenge a

conviction or sentence by way of a petition

for a writ of audita querela when that

challenge is cognizable under § 2255 because,

in such a case there is no ‘gap’ to fill in

the postconviction remedies.

Moreover, we reject Valdez’s contention that

audita querela is available in his case due

to the fact that he is precluded from raising

his claims in a § 2255 motion by those

provisions of the [AEDPA] that limit the

rights of a prisoner to file a second or

successive motion. A prisoner may not

circumvent valid congressional limitations on

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collateral attacks by asserting that those

very limitations create a gap in the

postconviction remedies that must be filled

by the common law writs.

Id. at 1079-1080. 

Petitioner attempts to evade the prohibition against second

or successive Section 2255 motions in the absence of prior

authorization by the Ninth Circuit by bringing his petition under

the All Writs Act. Petitioner asserts:

[T]he court must issue the Writ for Relief

From Judgment under the All Writs Act

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to avoid an

unconstitutional suspension of the writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to U.S. Constitution

art. 1, § 9, Cl. 2, and to avoid an Eighth

Amendment constitutional violation of cruel

and unusual punishment. 

Petitioner contends that his instant petition is not a second or

successive Section 2255 motion. Petitioner cites Hill v. State

of Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 897-898 (9 Cir.2002): th

AEDPA does not define the terms ‘second or

successive.’ The Supreme Court, the Ninth

Circuit, and our sister circuits have

interpreted the concept incorporated in this

term of art as derivative of the ‘abuse-ofthe-writ’ doctrine developed in pre-AEDPA

cases ....

Petitioner asserts that his instant petition is not a second or

successive petition under an abuse of the writ analysis because

his petition “supplements a constitutional claim with a colorable

showing of factual innocence that would not be dismissed as an

abuse of the writ.” Petitioner argues:

[T]o ... foreclose review in this case with

the AEDPA’s second or successive limitations

pursuant to § 2244(b) and § 2255(h) would not

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promote the AEDPA’s goal of curbing abuses of

the writ and finality, comity, and

conservation of scarce judicial resources of

the habeas process, but rather the AEDPA

limitations would bar habeas review of

Petitioner’s meritorious factual innocence

claim completely under the strict rules of

res judicata, which would undoubtedly fall

outside the compass of the abuse of the writ

doctrine as well as run afoul of the AEDPA’s

provisions itself. 

... 

[C]onsistent with Supreme Court’s [sic]

precedent and the overwhelming weight of

authority it is constitutionally incumbent

upon the court to not literally interpret the

second or successive provisions to encompass

Petitioner’s Writ for Relief from Judgment,

so that the merits of Petitioner’s factual

innocence claim is given judicial review

under habeas corpus in obviation of

potentially disastrous procedural bars

inevitably equating to an unconstitutional

application of the strict rules of res

judicata into habeas corpus and thereby

fending off an assault against the abuse of

the writ, the AEDPA, and the U.S.

Constitution. 

Petitioner relies on Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996),

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996), and Herrera v. Collins,

506 U.S. 390 (1993), in arguing:

[I]f the limitations of the AEDPA fell out

side the compass of the abuse of the writ

doctrine it would deprive Petitioner of his

constitutional right under the Suspension

Clause to the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus and in turn violate Petitioner’s

Eighth Amendment constitutional right not to

be punished for a crime for which he is

factually innocent. 

Petitioner’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In

Felker, the Supreme Court held:

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The new restriction on successive petitions

constitute a modified res judicata rule, a

restraint on what is called in habeas corpus

practice ‘abuse of the writ.’ In McCleskey

v. Zant, 499 U.S. 476 ... (1991), we said

that ‘the doctrine of abuse of the writ

refers to a complex and evolving body of

equitable principles informed and controlled

by historical usage, statutory developments,

and judicial decisions.’ Id. at 489 ... The

added restrictions which the [AEDPA] places

on second habeas petitions are well within

the compass of this evolutionary process, and

we hold that they do not amount to a

‘suspension’ of the writ contrary to Article

I, § 9.

518 U.S. at 664. 

In Lonchar, the Supreme Court held that a Court of Appeals

could not dismiss a state prisoner’s first federal petition for

writ of habeas corpus for special ad hoc equitable reasons not

encompassed within the relevant statutes, the Federal Habeas

Corpus Rules, or prior precedents. 

In Herrera v. Collins, a state prisoner whose conviction of

capital murder and sentence of death had been affirmed by the

state court of appeals and who had been denied habeas corpus by

the state court, sought federal habeas corpus relief. The

Supreme Court held that a claim of actual innocence based on

newly discovered evidence is not a ground for federal habeas

relief. 

Petitioner also cites I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289

(2001), as “providing valuable guidance on how courts should

proceed under the circumstances similar to the instant case.”

In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court addressed the AEDPA and the

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Illegal Immigration Report and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996 (IIRIRA), which provided that federal courts lacked

jurisdiction to review final orders of removal for aggravated

felons. The Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas corpus

under Section 2241 was necessary to avoid implicating the

Suspension Clause because a regime precluding any judicial review

of pure questions of law could be constitutionally suspect under

the Suspension Clause.

None of these cases support Petitioner’s contention that the

instant petition is not a second or successive Section 2255

motion. Petitioner’s claim concerning his 1990 state court

conviction has been addressed on the merits by both the Eastern

District and the Central District. Petitioner has had multiple

opportunities to raise these claims. The fact that he has not

succeeded does not change these facts. No exception to the

requirement that a second or successive Section 2255 motion must

be authorized by the Ninth Circuit is shown. That Court has

refused to authorize a Certificate of Appealability on three at

least separate successive petitions and has declined to authorize

a second or successive petition. Petitioner’s claim for relief

is not one that could not have been brought up earlier as a

matter of law, see Panetti v. Quarterman, 531 U.S. 930 (2007), it

is not a claim where his prior motions were not considered on the

merits, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), and it is not

a challenge to a later failure to grant mandatory parole, see

Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895 (9 Cir.2002). th

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Because Petitioner’s petition is a second or successive

motion for relief pursuant to Section 2255, Petitioner must first

obtain an order from the Ninth Circuit to proceed with his

petition. The requirement that he obtain such an order is

jurisdictional. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007). If a

petitioner does not first obtain authorization from the Court of

Appeal, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the

second or successive application. United States v. Lopez, 577

F.3d 1053, 1061 (9 Cir.2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1718 th

(2010). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Petitioner’s Petition for “Writ for Relief from Judgment

under the All Writs Act Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)” is

deemed to be a second or successive motion for relief pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255;

2. Petitioner’s deemed second or successive motion for

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF

JURISDICTION;

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT FOR

RESPONDENT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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