Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00860/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00860-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC WHEELER,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. ALICESON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-00860-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DENY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 87)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5.) The action 

proceeds against Defendants Garcia, Goss, Trevino, Isira, and Coffin on Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim, and against Defendant Isira on Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment medical indifference and state law negligence claims. 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s June 24, 2015 motion for leave to file an amended 

complaint (ECF No. 87), as well as his proposed third amended complaint (ECF No. 88). 

Defendants filed an opposition. (ECF No. 93), and Plaintiff filed a rely (ECF No. 94). The 

matter is deemed submitted.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The decision to grant or deny leave to amend pleadings is within the trial court's 

discretion. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996); United States 

v. Cnty. of San Diego, 53 F.3d 965, 969 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995).

A party seeking leave to amend pleadings must demonstrate that amendment is 

proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a)(2), the court should freely 

give leave to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” The Court should apply this 

policy “with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 

712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F. 2d 1074, 

1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). “If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a [party] 

may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim 

on the merits.” Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

However, a district court may deny leave to amend where there is “any apparent 

or declared reason” for doing so, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 

the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,

[or] futility of amendment.” Id. These factors are not to be given equal weight. Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Prejudice to the 

opposing party must be given the greatest weight. Id. “Absent prejudice, or a strong 

showing of any of the remaining Forman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. 

III. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff states that he wishes to amend his complaint to include acts of retaliation 

by Defendants Garcia and Goss that Plaintiff learned of through discovery and that 

occurred subsequent to the filing of the operative complaint in this action. He suggests 

that the amendment will not result in undue delay or prejudice because he does not 

propose to bring in new defendants, and because he already has advised Defendants of

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these allegations in his opposition to their pending motion for summary judgment. (ECF 

No. 87).

Defendants respond that Plaintiff has been dilatory in seeking to amend, was not 

diligent in conducting discovery, that amendment would prejudice Defendants (who 

already have deposed Plaintiff and filed a motion for summary judgment), and that 

amendment would be futile because Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of a 

retaliation claim. (ECF No. 93.)

IV. PLEADING HISTORY

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on March 25, 2012 with the filing of his initial 

complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Before that complaint was screened, Plaintiff filed a first 

amended complaint. (ECF No. 7.) That pleading appeared to be a list of exhibits and did 

not include factual allegations or legal claims. (See ECF No. 15.) Accordingly, in 

screening Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the Court provided Plaintiff with the legal 

standards applicable to the claims Plaintiff appeared to allege in his original, superseded 

complaint. (Id.)

Plaintiff was given leave to amend (id.), and filed a second amended complaint on 

January 22, 2013 (ECF No. 17.) The second amended complaint is the operative 

pleading in this action. Defendants answered on June 10, 2014. (ECF No. 33.) Discovery 

opened on June 11, 2014. The deadline to amend pleadings was set for December 11, 

2014. (Id.) Shortly before the expiration of that deadline, Plaintiff filed a motion for 

extension of time to amend. (ECF No. 47.) The motion was granted (ECF No. 84), and 

the instant motion followed (ECF No. 87).

B. Operative Complaint

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred at 

California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California.1 He 

 

1

Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison.

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names as Defendants the following CSATF staff: (1) Warden Ralph Diaz, (2) Warden 

Kathleen Allison, (3) Raymond Coffin, Chief of Mental Health, (4) Clinician Rocio Garcia, 

M.S.W., (5) Lillian Goss, L.P.T., (6) Clinician Victor Trevino, M.S.W., and (7) Abdul Isira, 

Phy.D. 

He alleges that these Defendants violated his First, Eight, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights, as well as the ADA and state laws. His allegations may be 

summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff suffers from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. He 

attributes these disabilities to overcrowded prison conditions at Avenal State Prison 

(where he was housed immediately prior to CSATF) and other facilities where he was 

incarcerated over the course of nineteen years.

He arrived at CSATF on June 7, 2010 and was placed in the Enhanced 

Outpatient Program (“EOP”) in the G-1 Facility. Plaintiff was housed in Facility G-1 from 

June 7, 2010 to January 19, 2011 and from March 24, 2011 to June 23, 2011. Facility G1 was overcrowded, unsafe, and understaffed, and staff was untrained. Inmates assisted 

mental health staff with their daily duties and had improper access to Plaintiff’s 

confidential health information and information regarding his commitment offenses. 

Defendants also did not properly attend to Plaintiff’s mental health needs. 

On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with another inmate

in relation to Plaintiff’s commitment offenses. The incident resulted in the use of force 

against Plaintiff by correctional officers and Plaintiff’s placement in Administrative 

Segregation. Plaintiff filed a staff complaint regarding the involved correctional officers.

Plaintiff was released from Administrative Segregation back to Facility G-1 on 

March 24, 2011. On March 25, 2011, he wrote a letter to Defendant Allison to complain 

about staff, advised her that he feared retaliation, and requested to remain in Facility G-1 

A Cluster, where Defendants Garcia and Goss worked.

Beginning in April 2011, Plaintiff noticed that Defendants Garcia, Goss, and 

Trevino, and other mental health staff, began to treat him differently than they had prior 

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to the January 19, 2011 incident. He attributes the change to his staff complaint 

regarding that incident.

Also beginning in April 2011, Plaintiff observed Defendant Garcia spending a lot 

of time on the internet on her office computer. She ignored Plaintiff and other female 

staff. In May 2011, Plaintiff observed Garcia being friendly toward other inmates. In June 

2011, Plaintiff confronted Garcia over her ignoring him and favoring other inmates. 

Garcia became angry and refused to talk to Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff observed 

Garcia giving a notebook to another inmate. The next day that inmate told Plaintiff that 

Garcia was his “girl” and they were going to live together after he paroled. Plaintiff 

experienced a great deal of “anguish,” anxiety and stress over the change in Garcia’s 

demeanor toward him.

In May and June 2011, Plaintiff observed “misconduct” on the part of Defendants 

Garcia and Goss, and other mental health staff who were using their computers for nonwork purposes. He also saw correctional officers flirting with mental health staff.

In June 2011, a mental health staff member told Plaintiff that Garcia did not like 

him due to his commitment offenses. Upon learning this, Plaintiff began to fear he was at 

risk for further harm. He decided to report the “misconduct” he had observed to prison 

staff. Accordingly, on June 14, 2011, he wrote a detailed letter to Defendant Allison 

regarding the misconduct and his fears of retaliation. Defendant Coffin responded to the 

letter, stating that retaliation would not be tolerated.

By June 16, 2011, Defendants Garcia, Goss, and Trevino began to retaliate 

against Plaintiff by writing fabricated reports, CDCR-128 chronos, and CDCR-115s in 

order to have him transferred out of Facility G-1. More specifically, on June 16, 2011, an 

interaction occurred between Plaintiff and Defendant Garcia. Plaintiff complimented 

Garcia’s shoes in order to see her reaction. Garcia accused Plaintiff of overfamiliarity. 

Garcia apparently wrote a mental health report regarding the overfamiliarity and placed it

in Plaintiff’s file. On June 21, 2011, Defendant Trevino spoke with Plaintiff about the 

possibility of Plaintiff being moved out of Facility G-1. Trevino wrote a report of this 

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conversation that contained false information regarding Plaintiff’s behavior. On June 22, 

2011, Garcia addressed her concerns regarding overfamiliarity to a sergeant, who wrote 

a CDCR-128 chrono regarding Plaintiff’s “unusual behavior.” On June 23, 2011 

Defendants Goss and Garcia made false allegations that Plaintiff was stalking and 

threatening them. Two CDCR-128 chronos were written regarding these allegations. 

Plaintiff also received a CDCR-115 Rules Violation Report regarding threats to 

Defendant Goss, but he was found not guilty. Plaintiff claims Defendant Coffin was 

aware of this retaliation and failed to protect Plaintiff.

Based on these actions, on June 23, 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to non-EOP 

housing in an overcrowded gym where his mental health condition could not be 

effectively treated or accommodated. Upon being transferred, Plaintiff came under the 

care of Defendant Isira.

Defendant Isira, in concert with the other Defendants, also retaliated against 

Plaintiff by intentionally falsifying medical records, misdiagnosing Plaintiff as not suffering 

from a substantiated mental health disorder, providing unacceptable mental health care, 

and terminating Plaintiff’s EOP level of care.

Four months later, Plaintiff was examined by a non-party mental health provider 

who correctly diagnosed his mental health conditions and transferred Plaintiff back to the 

EOP level of care.

C. The Court’s Screening Order

The Court screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF Nos. 26 and 28) 

and concluded it stated no cognizable claims against Defendants Diaz or Allison. 

However, the Court concluded that Plaintiff successfully pleaded a cognizable 

retaliation claim against Defendants Garcia, Goss, Trevino, and Isira based on 

allegations that they were aware of his staff complaints and grievances, and shortly 

thereafter made false reports designed to remove him from the EOP unit and the EOP 

level of care. The Court also found that Plaintiff pleaded a cognizable retaliation claim 

against Defendant Coffin based on the allegation that Coffin was aware of retaliatory 

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conduct by his subordinates and failed to respond and prevent further retaliation, 

notwithstanding opportunity to do so.

Lastly, the Court concluded that Plaintiff pleaded cognizable medical indifference 

and state law negligence claims against Defendant Isira based on the allegation that 

Isira intentionally misdiagnosed Plaintiff and caused EOP level care and treatment to be

terminated, and that Isira’s actions were reversed several months later by another health 

care practitioner.

All other claims and defendants were dismissed with prejudice.

D. Proposed Third Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s proposed third amended complaint does not add any additional 

defendants. It is brought only against Defendants Coffin, Garcia, Goss, Trevino, and 

Isira.

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint reiterates nearly verbatim the facts set 

forth above relevant to the retaliation, medical indifference, and negligence claims.2 His 

additional factual allegations, while somewhat difficult to follow, may be summarized 

essentially as follows:

From June 23, 2011 to August 1, 2011 Defendants Trevino and Garcia relayed 

false information to Defendant Isira to enlist Isira’s aid in retaliating against Plaintiff for 

filing a staff complaint.

On July 26, 2011 and November 4, 2011, Isira authored CDCR-128C chronos 

alleging hostile misbehavior by Plaintiff. These statements were pretextual and in 

retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints of staff misconduct. The second of these was written 

 

2

Plaintiff also reiterates facts relevant to various claims that previously were dismissed with 

prejudice. Plaintiff was warned that leave to amend would not be grated for such claims. (ECF No. 84.) 

Thus, these claims are not addressed herein.

Plaintiff also previously was advised to limit his proposed amended complaint to no more than 25 

pages, and was warned that an exceedingly and needlessly lengthy complaint would not be filed. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint totals 29 pages, and would be significantly longer if 

not written in miniscule handwriting. Plaintiff is warned that further gamesmanship to avoid compliance 

with the spirit of the Court’s orders will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to sanctions, to include 

monetary sanctions, sanctions striking all or part of his claims, or the like. See Thompson v. Housing 

Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that in exercising its power to control its own docket, the 

Court may impose sanctions). 

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after Plaintiff filed 602 administrative complaints against Isira. Isira then altered these

chronos around December 4, 2012.

On November 15, 2011, Defendant Garcia authored a CDCR-128C chrono 

containing false allegations regarding Plaintiff’s overfamiliarity in June 2011. Plaintiff 

previously had been found not guilty of these allegations. Plaintiff sent Garcia CDCR-22 

form requests informing her that he had been found not guilty of the allegations. Garcia 

then falsely claimed that Plaintiff had sent her three requests asking her to remove 

documents from his file. 

Plaintiff continued to file 602 administrative appeals regarding Defendants’

conduct in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, resulting in further unspecified retaliation.

Plaintiff appeared before a classification committee in November 2012 and 

February 2013. Therein, the decision was made to transfer Plaintiff to Mule Creek State 

Prison’s Level III EOP for treatment (CSATF has a Level II SNY EOP) due to Garcia’s 

false claims of safety issues with Plaintiff remaining at CSATF. Plaintiff was transferred 

to Mule Creek on March 29, 2013.

On May 31, 2012, Defendants Isira, Goss, Garcia, and Trevino relayed false 

information to A. Vickers, Psy. D., causing her to issue a false 128B chrono regarding 

Plaintiff’s efforts to gather information regarding Defendants in relation to this litigation.

Defendants were served in this action on April 1, 2014.

On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff transferred back to CSATF and Facility G-1. On April 

30, 2014, Plaintiff saw Defendant Goss but they did not speak. Later that day, a 

correctional officer asked Plaintiff whether he had litigation pending regarding anyone in 

Facility G-1, to which Plaintiff responded that he had litigation pending regarding Goss 

(apparently, the remaining Defendants no longer work in Facility G-1). Plaintiff informed 

the officer that he had filed 602s regarding his fears of retaliation prior to the transfer.

On April 30, 2014, Goss wrote a CDCR-128 chrono detailing her history of CDCR115s and CDCR-128s regarding Plaintiff. In the April 30, 2014 CDCR-128, Goss falsely 

stated that the June 22, 2011 CDCR-115 had been reduced to a counseling chrono. 

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On May 1, 2014, Goss and Garcia exchanged emails reflecting their meeting of 

the minds to punish Plaintiff by reviving their earlier charges of misbehavior, 

overfamiliarity, stalking, and threats.

The Court docket reflects that, at some point thereafter, Plaintiff again was 

transferred to Mule Creek State Prison.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard – First Amendment Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second element of a prisoner retaliation claim focuses on causation and 

motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show 

that his protected conduct was a “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the 

defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quoting Sorrano’s Gasco. Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 

(9th Cir. 1989). Although it can be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the 

defendant, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner establishes a triable issue of fact 

regarding prison officials’ retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing, 

evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt 

v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be considered as 

circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”).

The third prong can be satisfied by various activities. Filing a grievance is a 

protected action under the First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 

1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). Pursuing a civil rights legal action is similarly protected under 

the First Amendment. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

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With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined 

plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 

192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to determine whether an 

official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 

F.3d at 1300). 

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively show that “the prison 

authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 

532.

B. Analysis

The Court concluded that the claims in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint were 

sufficient to state a cause of action because the statements by Defendants were alleged 

to have led to the removal of Plaintiff from the EOP housing unit and the termination of 

Plaintiff’s participation in the EOP program. The removal of Plaintiff from EOP housing 

and programming constituted an adverse action sufficient to chill a person of ordinary 

firmness. Plaintiff now seeks leave to include additional allegations of retaliation by 

Defendants.

The Court concludes that the following allegations are insufficient to allege 

adverse action and therefore fail to state a claim: false chronos authored by Defendant 

Isira in 2011; false chrono by Defendant Garcia in November 2011; and false statements

by Defendants Isira Trevino, Garcia and Goss to A. Vickers in May 2012. These 

statements were made after the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s EOP housing and EOP 

level of care. They are not tied to any other adverse action. Plaintiff was not disciplined 

in relation to any of these statements. Although Plaintiff disagrees with the statements, 

they do not constitute adverse action in and of themselves. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Caplan, 

No. C 02-5603 RMW PR, 2010 WL 3742659, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) (granting 

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summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to present evidence that chrono 

constituted adverse action); Williams v. Woodford, 2009 WL 3823916, *3 (E.D. Cal. 

2009) (“the alleged filing of the false administrative chrono fails to state a claim because 

it is not a sufficient adverse action for a retaliation claim because the chrono was merely 

informational”); Samano v. Copeland, 2008 WL 2168884, *2 (E.D. Cal.2008) (dismissing 

retaliation claim for failure to state a claim because issuing a counseling chrono did not 

constitute an adverse action). Leave to amend to add these allegations would be futile 

and should be denied.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Isira altered chronos has been the subject of 

several discovery disputes in this action. (See ECF Nos. 84, 104.) Plaintiff consistently 

has failed to present a plausible factual basis for his belief that the chronos were altered.

This allegation appears to be based purely on speculation and therefore is insufficient to 

state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (factual 

allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level). 

Pleading standards require Plaintiff to set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Facial plausibility demands more than the 

mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct. Id. at 677-78. Additionally, even 

if alterations could be substantiated, Plaintiff fails to explain how any changes constitute 

an adverse action. Given Plaintiff’s inability to substantiate this allegation through the 

discovery process or link it to an adverse action, leave to amend to add this allegation 

would be futile and should be denied.

Plaintiff appears to allege that a false chrono written by Defendant Goss in April 

2014 was designed to force Plaintiff’s removal from CSATF for a second time. Plaintiff 

was, in fact, removed from CSATF to Mule Creek State Prison at some point following 

the April 2014 chrono. However, Plaintiff’s transfer to Mule Creek in 2014 cannot be 

construed as adverse action. Documents before the Court (ECF Nos. 93-1 at 94-96) 

reflect that Plaintiff objected to being transferred back to CSATF, and Plaintiff therein 

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suggested that he should have been transferred to Mule Creek in the first instance. 

Given Plaintiff’s apparent desire to be housed at Mule Creek over CSATF, his transfer

from CSATF to Mule Creek does not constitute an adverse action that would chill a 

person of ordinary firmness. Leave to amend to add this claim would be futile and should 

be denied.

Plaintiff claims that emails between Goss and Garcia in 2014 reflect their intent to 

revive their earlier false statements regarding Plaintiff’s behavior. The Court finds no 

such intent in the emails as described by Plaintiff. The discussion between Goss and 

Garcia, while perhaps unprofessional, does not reflect a meeting of the minds to deprive 

Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. It merely contains ongoing discussion regarding the 

instant litigation and chronos that already had been authored by the defendants. More 

importantly, Plaintiff does not suggest how such discussion constitutes an adverse 

action. Leave to amend to add this claim will be futile and should be denied.

This leaves only Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants Trevino and Garcia made 

false statements to Defendant Isira from June 23, 2011 to August 1, 2011 in order to 

enlist Isira’s aid in terminating Plaintiff’s EOP level of care in retaliation for his filing a 

staff complaint against Facility G-1 correctional officers involved in a use of force incident 

against Plaintiff. The nature of the false statements is not precisely described, although it 

appears to involve merely alerting Isira to Defendants’ allegedly false chronos. Put 

another way, this appears to be a new iteration of the claims already presented in 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In this circumstance, disallowing the amendment 

does not prevent Plaintiff from testing his retaliation claim on the merits. Accordingly, the 

Court will recommend that leave to amend be denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that leave to amend would be futile. 

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motions for leave to file 

an amended complaint (ECF No. 87) be denied.

The findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendation, the 

parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to another party’s objections by filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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