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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐1896

PAUL BURRITT,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LISA DITLEFSEN, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:12‐cv‐00909‐wmc — William M. Conley, Chief Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 30, 2015

Before BAUER, POSNER, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant, Paul Burritt

(“Burritt”), appeals thedistrict court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of defendants‐appellees, Lisa Ditlefsen

(“Ditlefsen”) and Polk County, on all of Burritt’s causes of

action, as well as the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e)

motion. Burritt’s complaint advances claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 forfalse arrest and false imprisonmentin violation of his

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as state

Case: 15-1896 Document: 38 Filed: 11/30/2015 Pages: 33
2 No. 15‐1896

commonlaw claims forfalse imprisonment,maliciousprosecu‐

tion,negligence, anddefamation.Burritt’s claims stem from his

arrest for an alleged sexual assault of an eleven‐year‐old girl,

which allegation turned out to be false. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the facts giving rise to Burritt’s arrest are central to

the issues in this case, we present them in detail. In early

November 2011, Handi‐LiftTransportation,Inc.(“Handi‐Lift”),

aprovider oftransportation for medicalpurposes,hiredBurritt

as a driver. (Burritt had previously worked as an EMT). On

November 23, 2011, Burritt was assigned to transport an

eleven‐year‐oldgirl(“SMH”)from Impact Counseling Services

(“ICS”), located in Hayward, Wisconsin, to her home in

Birchwood, Wisconsin. Burritt was not the regular driver of

this route; he had never driven the route priorto November 23,

2011, and had not previously transported SMH.

Burritt picked SMH up at ICS at 4:15 p.m. At 5:01 and

5:02 p.m., SMH used Burritt’s cell phone to call her mother to

let her know she would be late. Burritt dropped SMH off near

her home at 6:14 p.m. The distance between ICS and SMH’s

home is roughly 30 miles and should be a 40‐minute drive.

A. Initial Investigation

Five days later on November 28, 2011, SMH told her

counselor at ICS that the Handi‐Lift driver sexually assaulted

her on November 23, 2011; ICS contacted the Hayward Police

Department. SMH wasunwilling to speak with the male officer

who responded, Ryan Ignace (“Ignace”). When Ignace could

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No. 15‐1896 3

not locate a female police officer, he requested that Sara Ross

Poquette (“Poquette”) with Sawyer County Health & Human

Services interview SMH.

When Poquette arrived at ICS, she met with Ignace, SMH,

and SMH’s mother and stepfather. Ignace told everyone that

Poquette’s interview of SMH wouldbe recorded, andeveryone

consented.

Poquette began by questioning SMH about the difference

between the truth and a lie. SMH gave appropriate responses

indicating she knew the difference between the truth and a lie

and that there are consequences of lying.

SMH reported that after Burritt picked her up at ICS, he

deviated from the normalroute and drove herto a house in the

country, describing the property as an old farm with outbuild‐

ings or sheds, but without farm animals. SMH was able to

draw a picture of the house, showing wooded areas and the

driveway, and indicating where Burritt parked the Handi‐Lift

van. She stated Burritt got out of the van, went to the house

and let out his six dogs, one of which was a pitbull.

SMH stated that after he let out his dogs, Burritt came back

to the van, opened the sliding van door next to her, and

touched her on her neck, chest, and pubic area, over her

clothes. Burritt then tried to unzip her pants. She yelled, “Get

away from me,” kicked him, and closed the sliding van door

on his hand. SMH then stated that Burritt punched her twice

on the inside of her left knee, which left two small bruises. She

stated that Burritt said, “I really wanted to have you.”

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SMH stated that Burritt closed the sliding van door, put his

dogs away, and drove the van from the home. She thought

Burritt was speeding because she saw a speed limit sign of

“53” but Burritt was going 70. She saw the Dinner Bell Restau‐

rant, located in Trego, Wisconsin. Burritt stopped at a gas

station near Rice Lake, Wisconsin, got gas, and bought some‐

thing in a brown paper bag, which SMH thought was beer. At

some point during the trip, SMH used Burritt’s cell phone to

call her mother. Finally, Burritt dropped her off at a silage pile

a short distance from her home because Burritt was afraid to

drop her off in her driveway. Burritt told SMH to say they

were late because they made a “ding dong disaster,” went the

wrong way, and took a wrong turn. Poquette, a qualified social

worker, had no concerns about SMH’s suggestibility or

reliability, and felt SMH was credible and gave sufficiently

detailed information.

Ignace then interviewed SMH’s mother and stepfather.

SMH’s mother confirmed that SMH had called her on the night

of the alleged assault. She reported that SMH told her the van

driver told SMH to call and say they had made a wrong turn

and were going to be late. She indicated SMH did not sound

like her usual self during this phone call, and reported that

SMH began having night terrors on the night of the alleged

assault. SMH’s mother and stepfather stated they were very

strict about lying at home. The stepfather stated that he saw

tire tracks by the silage pile, where SMH reported Burritt

dropped her off, roughly 300 feet from their driveway.

On November 28, 2011, Ignace contacted Bill Lussier

(“Lussier”), an owner of Handi‐Lift, to request information

about Burritt, which Lussier provided. Lussier also sent to

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No. 15‐1896 5

Ignace a copy of the Handi‐Lift transport log prepared by

Burritt, which showed, per the odometer readings of the van,

that Burritt traveled 121 miles to transport SMH, but “21” was

written as the total miles traveled.

Lussierinformed Burritt of SMH’s allegations. Lussier had

Burritt write out his own version of events pertaining to the

November 23, 2011, transport of SMH. Lussier also directed

Burritt to have his hand examined, given SMH’s report of

having closed the van door on Burritt’s hand. Burritt went to

a clinic the same day and had his hand examined, which

showed no injury. Lussier sent Burritt’s written statement and

the results of the medical examination to the Hayward Police

Department the following day.

On November 29, 2011, Ignace went to ICS and photo‐

graphed a bruise on SMH’s knee. Ignace and Hayward Police

Assistant Chief Faulstich (“Faulstich”) went to Burritt’s home

in Turtle Lake, Wisconsin, located in Polk County. Ignace took

photographs of the property, noting several vehicles in the

driveway bearing “EMT” license plates. Several dogs were

present outside, and others could be heard barking inside the

house. Between the house and the farm field were three

buildings. Ignace did not see any farm animals. Faulstich and

Ignace felt SMH’s description of the location of the alleged

assault matched Burritt’s property.

Ignace reviewedBurritt’s statement, in which he claimedhe

took a wrong turn that took him to Rice Lake. Ignace then used

Yahoo maps to determine how long it would take to drive from

ICS in Hayward to Rice Lake, through Trego via Highway 53,

to SMH’s home in Birchwood. (SMH had reported seeing a

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6 No. 15‐1896

sign with “53” on it). Yahoo maps indicated a distance of 75

miles for this route. Faulstich and Ignace concluded that the

alleged assault took place at Burritt’s home in Polk County and

referred the case to the Polk County Sheriff’s Department.

B. Investigation by Ditlefsen and Polk County

Ditlefsen is an investigator employed by the Polk County

Sheriff’s Department since 2002. In 2003, she was assigned to

the Investigations Unit, specializing in sensitive crimes

(including sexual assaults of children).When she was assigned

to Investigations, she received specialized training from the

Department of Justice and the FBI on investigation of crimes

against children. Since 2004,Ditlefsenhas investigatedroughly

500 cases involving sensitive crimes.

On December 1, 2011, Ditlefsen received a voicemail

message from Faulstich informing her of a possible sexual

assault case (SMH’s case) in Polk County. The next day,

Ditlefsen spoke with Faulstich, who informed her ofthe details

of SMH’s case,providing her withthe informationgainedfrom

theirinvestigation. Ditlefsen reviewed various documents and

photographs she received from the Hayward Police Depart‐

ment. In particular, she reviewed the Handi‐Lift transport log

for Burritt’s trip, which Burritt had signed. The log reflected

that Burritt picked up SMH at ICS at 4:15 p.m., with an

odometer reading of 218,267 miles, and dropped her off at

home at 6:20 p.m., with an odometer reading of 218,388 miles.

Although the difference between the odometer readings

revealed a total of 121 miles traveled, Burritt had recorded the

total mileage of the trip as 21 miles. Ditlefsen thought the

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No. 15‐1896 7

mathematical calculation error was suspicious and that the

total miles traveled supported SMH’s claims.

Ditlefsen also spoke with Poquette, whom she knew as an

experienced child interviewer, about Poquette’s interview of

SMH. Poquette informed her of the information gained from

the interview and agreed to send Ditlefsen her notes and a CD

of the recorded interview.

Also on December 2, 2011, Ditlefsen spoke with SMH’s

mother. She confirmed that SMH was usually picked up from

ICS at 4:00 p.m. and dropped off at home at 5:00 p.m. She

confirmed that on November 23, SMH was roughly 1.5 hours

late, arriving home around 6:30 or 6:45 p.m. She also confirmed

that Burritt was not SMH’s regular driver, and that he dropped

SMH off by the silage pile, rather than pulling into the drive‐

way. These details were in line with SMH’s claims.

In addition, Ditlefsen reviewed a statement from Debbie

Schlapper(“Schlapper”), SMH’s counselor at ICS. The version

of events given to Schlapper by SMH was consistent with the

information provided by SMH to Poquette.

Ditlefsen then used MapQuest to examine the possible

routes and mileage between ICS and SMH’s home, given the

stops at Burritt’s property and the gas station in Rice Lake. She

mapped ICS to Burritt’s home, via Highway 63 to Highway 53

to Highway 8, which resulted in a distance ofroughly 75 miles

and a drive time of 1 hour and 25 minutes. Ditlefsen also

mapped a second route between ICS and Burritt’s home, via

Highway 63 to Highway 8, which was roughly 61 miles with

a drive time of 1 hour and 25 minutes. Ditlefsen then mapped

a route from Burritt’s home to SMH’s home of Highway 8 to

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8 No. 15‐1896

Highway 53, which resulted in roughly 51 miles with a drive

time of 1 hour. Ditlefsen concluded that the total distance

driven and the correlating drive times were very close to the

actual odometerreadings from the transport log, using SMH’s

version of events and the possible routes mapped on

MapQuest.

On December 5, 2011, Ditlefsen received and reviewed

Poquette’s notes and the CD of the recorded interview. She

compared SMH’s description and diagram of the property to

an aerial image of Burritt’s property and found them to be

similar. Any inconsistencies between SMH’s description or

diagram and Burritt’s property could be explained by SMH’s

age (11), being unfamiliar with the surroundings, and having

been involved in a traumatic experience.

On December 5, 2011, Ditlefsen obtained search warrants

for Burritt’s van GPS device and cell phone records.

During her investigation, Ditlefsen kept two other county

employees abreast of and involved in its development. The

first person was Ditlefsen’s supervisor, Captain Steve Smith

(“Smith”). Smith has been an officer with the Polk County

Sheriff’s Department since 1986. Smith was responsible

for reviewing all reports that were sent from the Sheriff’s

Department to the District Attorney and acted as the liaison

between the two offices. Ditlefsen met with Smith multiple

times during her investigation and prior to Burritt’s arrest.

Smith also independently reviewed the materials received

from the Hayward Police Department and obtained by

Ditlefsen.

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No. 15‐1896 9

The second person was Polk County District Attorney

Daniel Steffen (“Steffen”). Steffen was admitted to the Wiscon‐

sin bar in 1998 and practiced family law and criminal defense

privately before being elected the Polk County District Attor‐

ney in 2006. Ditlefsen met with Steffen throughout herinvesti‐

gation to keep him apprised of developments. Steffen person‐

ally handled the majority of felony cases for his office and

handled the Burritt case in particular. Steffen independently

reviewed the case against Burritt and made the charging

decision.Also, Steffen reviewedDitlefsen’s applications forthe

search warrants forthe GPS and cell phone records before they

were submitted to the judge. The judge found probable cause

to issue the search warrants.

Ditlefsenconcludedshe hadprobable cause to arrestBurritt

primarily based on the following factors: the detailed and

consistent reports given by SMH to different people at differ‐

enttimes; SMH’s detailed description of Burritt’s property and

dogs; the route traveled; the excessive mileage as reflected by

the transport log; the fact that SMH was dropped off signifi‐

cantly later than normal; the fact that SMH was dropped off at

the silage pile rather than in the driveway; SMH’s mother’s

report that SMH did not sound like her usual self during the

cell phone call on the night of the alleged assault; and SMH

began having night terrors on the night of the alleged assault.

Steffen likewise determined there was probable cause to

arrest Burritt. Steffen was concerned with Burritt’s ability to

come into contact with other children as a driverfor Handi‐Lift

and as an EMT. Steffen made the decision to have Burritt

arrested and told Ditlefsen to effect the arrest. Smith was kept

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10 No. 15‐1896

informed ofthese developments and supported the decision to

arrest Burritt.

C. Arrest of Burritt

On December 6, 2011, Ditlefsen went to Burritt’s home to

arrest him and execute the search warrant forthe GPS unit, but

Burritt was not home. Ditlefsen returned to the home the next

day, with two other officers. Ditlefsen told Burritt that she was

there to get the GPS unit and to arrest him. She did not have an

arrest warrant. Burritt invited the officers into his home and

assisted in retrieving the GPS unit for Ditlefsen. Ditlefsen took

photographs of the property and noted six dogs.

One of the other officers drove Burritt to the Sheriff’s

Department and placed Burrittin an interview room. Ditlefsen

read Burritt his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436 (1996), which Burritt waived. Burritt explained that he

simply took a wrong turn and had gotten lost while driving

SMH home from ICS. He denied any wrongdoing. He denied

that his hand had been injured. Ditlefsen completed the

probable cause report and booked Burritt into jail. Burritt

posted bail the same day and was released.

Also on December 7, 2011, Ditlefsen served the search

warrant for Burritt’s cell phone records on Verizon.

D. Post‐Arrest Investigation

After Burritt’s arrest, Ditlefsen continued herinvestigation

of the case. Handi‐Lift provided her with the fuel log and fuel

receipt from the Cenex gas station, where Burritt had stopped

for gas in Rice Lake on November 23, 2011. The Cenex receipt

showed the gas purchase at 5:44 p.m. The fuel log reflected an

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No. 15‐1896 11

odometer reading of 218,361 at the time of the gas purchase.

Given the math, Ditlefsen concluded that Burritt had driven 94

miles between ICS, where he picked up SMH, and the Cenex.

On December 9, 2011, SMH’s mother contacted Ditlefsen to

tell her of additional information SMH was reporting. SMH

was now claiming that Burritt had pulled down her pants

during the assault, that she had scratches and scabs on her

inner thighs, and that she was “spotting.” SMH stated she did

not report these details earlier because she did not want to

show her injuries. Ditlefsen requested another interview with

SMH.

Ditlefsen contacted the Cenex station to request video

surveillance, but no video was available. She also asked if a

receipt was available for the alcohol purchase (SMH reported

that Burritt purchased what she thought was beer), but the

Cenex did not sell alcohol. The Cenex confirmed the time ofthe

gas purchase on the gas receipt.

On December 12, 2011, SMH’s mother again contacted

Ditlefsen to inform her that SMH had been examined medi‐

cally, which showed a laceration and bruising in her genital

area. They set the interview of SMH for December 16, 2011.

The next day, December 13, 2011, Ditlefsen took Burritt’s

GPS unit to Deputy Shawn Demulling (“Demulling”) with the

St. Croix County Sheriff’s Department for forensic examina‐

tion. No one at the Polk County Sheriff’s Department was

qualified to perform the forensic analysis.

Also on December 13, 2011, Ditlefsen received Burritt’s cell

phone records from Verizon. The records showed the two calls

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12 No. 15‐1896

made by SMH to her mother at 5:01 p.m. and 5:02 p.m. The

5:01 p.m. call utilized a cell tower located in Webster, Wiscon‐

sin. Ditlefsen mapped the location of the cell tower and found

it was located northwest of Siren, Wisconsin, off County

Highway D. The 5:02 p.m. call utilized a cell tower in Hertel,

Wisconsin. This indicated that Burritt’s van was traveling

westbound on Highway 70 toward Siren at the time of the

calls.

Afterreviewing the cell phone records, Ditlefsen contacted

Handi‐Lift to get Burritt’s full schedule for the entire day of

November 23, 2011. The transportrecords showed that priorto

transporting SMH,Burritt hadtransportedanother clienttoher

home in Siren, Wisconsin. That client confirmed Burritt had

transported her on November 23, 2011. Burritt’s cell phone

records aligned with the full transport records and revealed

Burritt had been near Siren, rather than his home in Turtle

Lake. At this point, Ditlefsen first suspected that SMH’s

allegations may not be true. Ditlefsen contacted Faulstich and

kept him abreast of this development.

On December 16, 2011, Ditlefsen interviewed SMH. SMH

gave the same version that she had given earlier, describing

Burritt’s property anddogs, andproviding another drawing of

the property. This time, however, SMH reported that after

Burritt let out his dogs, he took her out of the van and laid her

down in the grass. SMH reported that Burritt removed her

pants and underwear, without taking off her shoes, pulled

down his pants, and tried to have intercourse with her. SMH

reported that it hurt. SMH claimed that in response, she kicked

Burritt and ran to the van, trying to pull up her pants as she

went. Ditlefsen specifically asked SMH to retell various

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No. 15‐1896 13

portions of her story multiple times, in order to test her, which

SMH did.

On December 20, 2011, Ditlefsen received the medical

records pertaining to SMH’smedical examination.The records

confirmed some evidence of bruising and a laceration in

SMH’s genital area.

On December 22, 2011, Ditlefsen met with Demulling to

review his forensic analysis of the GPS unit. The information

from the unit showed that Burritt had come within 5 to 10

miles of the Polk County border but never actually entered

Polk County during the entire transport of SMH. Further, the

GPS data indicated that Burritt never even came close to his

property in Turtle Lake, which was 25 to 30 miles further south

than his actual route.

The next day, Ditlefsen called Burritt and told him she was

going to recommend to the District Attorney that the charges

against him be dropped. Ditlefsen also contacted SMH’s

mother and told her that the GPS data and cell phone records

corroborated Burritt’s version of events and requested another

interview with SMH.

On January 3, 2012, Ditlefsen interviewed SMH. When

confronted with the GPS and cell phone data, SMH fully

recantedandadmittedto lying aboutthe assault. SMH saidshe

made up the story because she did not want to go to ICS for

counseling.

Ditlefsen contacted District Attorney Steffen and informed

him of SMH’s recantation. The next day, January 4, 2012,

Steffen fileda motion todismiss the criminal complaint against

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14 No. 15‐1896

Burritt, which the court approved. In addition, SMH was

referred to the Polk County juvenile justice system. Ditlefsen

recommended that SMH be charged with false swearing, a

felony. SMH ultimately pled to a count of obstruction of

justice, a misdemeanor.

E. Procedural History

Burritt filed his complaint naming Ditlefsen and Polk

County as defendants onDecember 10, 2012, alleging 42U.S.C.

§ 1983 causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment

in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights,

and state common law claims for false imprisonment, mali‐

cious prosecution, negligence, and defamation.

Ditlefsen and Polk County moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted the motion, finding Ditlefsen had

arguable probable cause to effect Burritt’s arrest and was

entitled to qualified immunity, and that Polk County could not

be held liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978). The district court declined to assert supplemental

jurisdiction over Burritt’s state law claims and dismissed them

without prejudice.

Burritt then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district

court denied.

Burritt appealed these decisions of the district court.

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No. 15‐1896 15

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Motion

We review the district court’s granting of the motion for

summary judgment de novo and construe all facts and reason‐

able inferences in Burritt’s favor, as he is the non‐movant.

Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when “the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

1. Claims Against Ditlefsen

a. Warrantless Entry—Consent

Burritt argues on appeal that because there were no exigent

circumstances, Ditlefsen’s warrantless arrest of him in his

home in and of itself violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Two elements are implicated by Burritt’s argument. The first

is whether Ditlefsen’s entry into Burritt’s home infringed on

Burritt’s Fourth Amendment rights. The second is whether

Burritt’s arrest was supported by probable cause.

With regard to the entry into Burritt’s home, Burritt omits

one important exception to the warrant requirement: consent.

When a person with authority overthe premises consents to an

entry by law enforcement, that entry is reasonable and does

not infringe on the person’s Fourth Amendment rights. See,

e.g., United States v. Sabo, 724 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2013)

(warrantless entry upheld, consent found where arrestee

opened door, stepped back and to side, allowing police into his

trailer); Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 925–26 (7th Cir.

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16 No. 15‐1896

2012) (warrantless entry upheld, consent found where officer

followed one of two arrestees into condominium unit and

neither arrestee objected to officer’s presence in their home);

United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2000)

(warrantless entry upheld, consent found where arrestee

opened door to officers, stepped back to allow officers’

entrance into home, motioned for officers to follow her into

kitchen); United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 1996)

(warrantless entry upheld, consent found where arrestee

gestured to officers to open door with key and did not object

to their presence in his hotel room).

When Ditlefsen told Burritt she was there to get the GPS

unit and arrest him, Burritt invited the officers into his home

and assisted by providing them with the GPS unit. There is no

evidence that Burritt objected to the officers’ presence in his

home at the time of the arrest. Ditlefsen’s entry into Burritt’s

home did not infringe on his Fourth Amendment rights

because he consented to it.

b. ArguableProbableCause and QualifiedImmu‐

nity

“Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any

claim under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful

arrest,false imprisonment, or maliciousprosecution.”Mustafa,

442 F.3d at 547 (citation omitted). However, we need not

address whether Ditlefsen did or did not have actual probable

cause to arrest Burritt because Ditlefsen is entitled to qualified

immunity as she had arguable probable cause.

“Qualified immunity protects officers performing discre‐

tionary functions from civil liability so long as their conduct

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No. 15‐1896 17

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights that a reasonable person would know about.” Mustafa,

442 F.3d at 548 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). It

protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who know‐

ingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

Once qualified immunity is raised, the plaintiff has the burden

of establishing that his or her rights were violated and that the

law concerning the proffered right “was clearly established at

the time the challenged conduct occurred.” Mustafa, 442 F.3d

at 548. Then, the court must determine “whether a reasonably

competent official would know that the conduct was unlawful

in the situation he confronted.” Id.

The factthat criminal charges are eventuallydroppedorthe

complaining witness later recants has no consideration in the

determination of arguable probable cause at the time of arrest.

See,e.g., Fleming v. Livingston Co., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 875, 880 (7th

Cir. 2012); McDonnell v. Cournia, 990 F.2d 963, 969–70 (7th Cir.

1993) (overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724

F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Ditlefsen has raised qualified immunity as a defense.

Burritt has countered that he was arrested without probable

cause. Specifically, Burritt argues that Ditlefsen improperly

ignored exculpatory evidence, in that the MapQuest route

evidence never supported SMH’s story, and Ditlefsen should

have waited to arrest Burritt only after she received the GPS

data. Because Burritt had the constitutional right to be free

from an arrest unsupported by probable cause, and that right

was clearly established at the time Ditlefsen arrested him, the

only element for our consideration is whether a reasonable

officerin Ditlefsen’s position with the information available to

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18 No. 15‐1896

Ditlefsen at the time could believe it was lawful to arrest

Burritt.

Although closely related, a determination of actual proba‐

ble cause is separate and distinct from a determination of what

is sometimes referred to as “arguable probable cause” for

qualified immunity purposes. Fleming, 674 F.3d at 880. An

officeris entitled to qualified immunity if “a reasonable officer

could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed.”

Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). “Thus, as

long as [Ditlefsen] reasonably, albeit possibly mistakenly,

believed that probable cause existed to arrest [Burritt], then

[Ditlefsen] is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citation

omitted).

We have found arguable probable cause and upheld

qualified immunity in various cases with similar fact patterns

to this case. For instance, in Fleming, we found arguable

probable cause where the officer located the plaintiff‐arrestee

within seven minutes of receiving a report of a break‐in and

fondling of two teenage girls, and where the plaintiff‐arrestee

was the only individual in the area who substantially matched

the physical description given by one of the victims. Id.

Although there were “minor variations” between the physical

description given by one of the victims and the physical

appearance of the plaintiff‐arrestee, the officer was objectively

reasonable in his belief that he had probable cause for the

arrest and that the plaintiff‐arrestee was the person who

committed the offense. Id.

Here, whenDitlefsen arrested Burritt she had the following

pieces of information: SMH had repeated her detailed story to

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No. 15‐1896 19

different individuals and there was no indication from her

recitations that she was lying or suggestible; the information

given by SMH’s mother and stepfather tended to corroborate

SMH’s story; SMH was able to describe and draw a picture of

the scene of the assault, which generally matched Burritt’s

property; SMH reported that Burritt had a number of dogs,

which he actually did have; and the trip took roughly two

hours when it should have taken forty minutes. Ditlefsen

believed the routes she mapped on MapQuest supported

SMH’s story.

Burritt argues that the information gained by Ditlefsen

from MapQuest never supported SMH’s story. In this same

vein, Burritt presented evidence that the owners of Handi‐Lift,

Bill and Connie Lussier, both independently expressed their

doubts to Ditlefsen, prior to Burritt’s arrest, that the trip with

the stops as alleged by SMH could even be accomplished in the

established time frame. Ditlefsen denied the Lussiers ever

expressed such concerns to her. Although she could have been

mistaken, Ditlefsen believed the routes she mapped on

MapQuest supported SMH’s version of events.

Burritt also argues that Ditlefsen should have waited to

arrest him until after she received the GPS data. We rejected a

similar argument in Mustafa, explaining that “police officers

have no duty to investigate extenuating circumstances or

search for exculpatory evidence once probable cause has been

established via the accusation of a credible witness.” Mustafa,

442 F.3d at 548 (citation omitted). See also Abbott v. Sangamon

Co., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 716 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Law enforcement is notrequired to discover more information

to undermine probable cause once it has been established.

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20 No. 15‐1896

Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061 (7th

Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

Further bolsteringDitlefsen’s qualifiedimmunity is the fact

that she consulted with the Polk County District Attorney and

her supervisor before arresting Burritt. In Fleming, we ex‐

plained that the fact that the officer had consulted with the

District Attorney prior to arresting the plaintiff‐arrestee “goes

a long way toward solidifying his qualified immunity de‐

fense.” Fleming, 674 F.3d at 881, (citing Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363

F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149

F.3d 614, 620–21 (7th Cir. 1998). Prior to Burritt’s arrest,

Ditlefsen met with the Polk County District Attorney, Steffen,

multiple times to keep him advised of developments in the

investigation.WhenDitlefsen believed she had probable cause

to arrest Burritt, legal counsel (Steffen) and her supervisor

(Smith) vetted her determination. When it came time to arrest

Burritt, Steffen made the decision to arrest and told Ditlefsen

to take Burritt into custody. Steffen independently determined

thatprobable cause existed.Also,Ditlefsen’s supervisor, Smith,

believed probable cause supported the arrest.

We find Ditlefsen was reasonable in her belief that she had

probable cause to arrest Burritt. Further, Ditlefsen was objec‐

tively reasonable in her reliance on Steffen’s probable cause

determination and instructions to effect the arrest. Because

Ditlefsen is entitled to qualified immunity, the district court

did not err in granting her motion for summary judgment on

Burritt’s § 1983 claims.

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No. 15‐1896 21

2. Claims Against Polk County

A respondeat superior theory of liability may not be pursued

against a municipal government entity, such as Polk County.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However,

a municipality may be found liable for a § 1983 claim where

“execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the

injury.” Id., at 694. In orderto prove liability on the part of Polk

County under Monell, Burritt must prove “either(1) an express

policy that, whenenforced, causes a constitutionaldeprivation;

or (2) that the constitutional injury was caused by a person

with final policymaking authority.” Montano v. City of Chicago,

535 F.3d 558, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

On appeal, Burritt does not present any argument or

evidence to advance a claim of a constitutional deprivation

caused by an express policy. Burritt loosely argues that District

Attorney Steffen, bydirecting the warrantless arrest, causedhis

constitutional deprivation. However, Burritt has presented no

evidence that the District Attorney was “a person with final

policymaking authority.” In fact, the parties agree that the

County Sheriff was the individual “with final policymaking

authority,” particularly with regard to procedures for effecting

arrests. In this case, the District Attorney instructed Ditlefsen

to effect the arrest. There is no evidence the County Sheriff was

personally involved in the determination to arrest Burritt.

Also, Burritt briefly argues that because the District

Attorney and the County Sheriff were not aware of the

Wisconsin Office of Judicial Assistance’s Prosecutor’s Sexual

Assault Reference Book, they did not follow the guidelines

contained within the book. Burritt argues that this gives rise to

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22 No. 15‐1896

a viable Monell claim. Burritt cites no legal authority to support

his proposition that a law enforcement agency is required to

follow guidelines promulgated by an unrelated, independent

agency.

In addition, “in limited circumstances a municipality may

be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations

resulting from a failure to properly train police officers.”

Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 504, (7th Cir.

2010) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989)).

Failure to train officers may support a Monell claim, but “only

where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to

the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Burritt simply concludes a

failure to train on the part of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office.

He fails to cite to any legal authority or present any evidence

that the Polk County Sheriff’s Office failed to properly train its

officers.In fact,Ditlefsen receivedspecializedtraining from the

Department of Justice and the FBI on investigation of crimes

against children.

Because there is no dispute as to any material fact with

regard to Burritt’s Monell claims, the district court did not err

in granting summary judgment in favor of Polk County.

3. State Law Claims

After granting Ditlefsen’s and Polk County’s motion for

summary judgment, the district court declined to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed Burritt’s state law

claims without prejudice. We review a district court’s absten‐

tion from exercising its supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse

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No. 15‐1896 23

of discretion only. Capeheart v. Terrell, 695 F.3d 681, 686 (7th

Cir. 2012).

“The general rule, when the federal claims fall out before

trial, is that the [district court] should relinquish jurisdiction

over any supplemental(what used to be called ‘pendent’) state

law claims in order to minimize federal judicial intrusion into

matters of purely state law.” Carr v. CIGNA Secs., Inc., 95 F.3d

544, 546 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). We have recognized

that only in “unusual cases” may a district court exercise its

discretion to assert its supplemental jurisdiction based upon

the balance of the factors of “judicial economy, convenience,

fairness and comity.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Companies, Inc.,

29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994).

We cannot deem this case to be an “unusual” one. Burritt

has not provided any argument or citation to any legal

authority to support his position that the district court abused

its discretion in declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdic‐

tion. The district court concluded it had not decided any issue

that was dispositive with regard to any of Burritt’s state law

claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

dismissing without prejudice Burritt’s state law claims.

B. Rule 59(e) Motion

After the district court granted Ditlefsen’s and Polk

County’s motion for summary judgment, Burritt moved to

alter or amend the judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).

The district court denied his motion, and we affirm this denial.

We review the district court’s denial of the motion to alter

or amend the judgment for an abuse of discretion only. Matter

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24 No. 15‐1896

of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A

motion to alter or amend a judgment is only proper when “the

movant presents newly discovered evidence that was not

available at the time of trial orif the movant points to evidence

in the record that clearly establishes a manifest error of law or

fact.” Id. (citations omitted). A “manifest error” occurs when

the district court commits a “wholesale disregard, misapplica‐

tion, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal

quotations omitted) (citation omitted).

In his motion to alter or amend, Burritt did not present any

newlydiscoveredevidence. Neitherdidhe establishamanifest

error of law or fact. Based upon our review of the district

court’s deliberate and detailed rulings, we find that the district

court did not commit any manifest error of law or fact in

granting Ditlefsen’s and Polk County’s motion for summary

judgment. Specifically, the district court did not disregard or

misapply controllingprecedent.Thus,thedistrict courtdidnot

abuse its discretion in denying Burritt’s Rule 59(e) motion.

III. CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.

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No. 15‐1896                                                                                  25

POSNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The arrest of the plain‐

tiff was not based on probable cause, and the dismissal of his

suit should therefore be reversed.

I disagree with the majority that Investigator Ditlefsen,

the principal defendant, had “arguable probable cause” to

arrest Burritt. She had nothing of the sort. A reasonable of‐

ficer in her position would not have ignored the obvious red

flags that arose during her investigation, and so would not

have believed that she had probable cause. E.g., Sornberger v.

City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006). Prior to

the arrest Ditlefsen had researched the route that SMH, Bur‐

ritt’s accuser, had said that Burritt had taken (from Impact

Counseling Center to Burritt’s house, and then from his

house to SMH’s house), and she had concluded with some

help from MapQuest that it would have taken him roughly

two hours and twenty‐five minutes to drive the alleged

route, not including the stops for gas and at Burritt’s house

reported by SMH. According to his vehicle log Burritt had

left Impact Counseling Center with SMH at 4:15 and SMH’s

mother estimated that her daughter had arrived home be‐

tween 6:30 and 6:45, and that timeline contradicted SMH’s

version of events. For how could Burritt have driven a dis‐

tance that takes two and a half hours to cover nonstop, yet

while en route stop to get gas and assault SMH and arrive at

her home all in two and a quarter hours or at most two and a

half hours? As it turned out, he couldn’t have, and we now

know that he didn’t.

Burritt’s former bosses, Bill and Connie Lussier, say that

prior to Burritt’s arrest they told Ditlefsen that Burritt could

not have driven the route, with stops along the way, in such

a short time. Connie Lussier told Ditlefsen that she “had a

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26                                                                                   No. 15‐1896                                                 

                                                                                               

time, date, location‐stamped receipt for Skip [Burritt]’s refu‐

eling that showed he was telling the truth,” but Ditlefsen

brushed her off, even though the receipt showed that Burritt

couldn’t have made the stops alleged by SMH yet arrived at

her house within two and a half hours. Indeed when the re‐

ceipt was reviewed by prosecutors, along with data from

Burritt’s GPS, the criminal charges against him were dis‐

missed, precipitating the present suit, a civil rights suit

against Ditlefsen and her employer.

Ditlefsen told Bill Lussier that she had driven the alleged

route and had confirmed that Burritt could have driven it in

two and a half hours stops and all, though at her deposition

she admitted that she hadn’t driven the entire route; so her

time estimate was worthless. Ditlefsen also told the Lussiers,

prior to Burritt’s arrest, that his “GPS indicated that [Burritt]

was not where he claimed to be.” That was a lie; Ditlefsen

did not obtain the GPS until December 7, 2011, when she ex‐

ecuted the search warrant and arrested Burritt—and the

GPS, like the receipt for gas, proved Burritt’s innocence.

SMH had said that during the assault (which we know

never took place), which she claimed occurred in Burritt’s

car when it was parked in his driveway just before he went

into the house to let his dogs out, she had slammed the car

door on Burritt’s hand. A nurse who examined the hand five

days after the alleged assault found no signs of injury.

Ditlefsen had all this evidence of Burritt’s innocence be‐

fore she arrested him, but she presented none of it to the

judge who issued the search warrant, who if informed of

these inconsistencies would not have authorized the search.

In sum, Ditlefsen lacked even arguable probable cause to ar‐

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No. 15‐1896                                                                                   27                                                 

rest Burritt. The judgment exonerating her should therefore

be reversed.

I have a separate concern about the handling of this

case—a concern with automatically, uncritically, allowing

the arrest of a person in his home when no arrest warrant

has been issued. It’s true that the Fourth Amendment does

not require search or arrest warrants at all (in retrospect a

rather embarrassing omission); the only mention of warrants

is found in the clause outlawing general warrants. That

clause states that warrants must be based on probable cause,

supported by an oath or affirmation, and describing with

particularity the target of the warrant. But the only require‐

ment of a lawful search or seizure set forth in the amend‐

ment is that it be reasonable; there is no suggestion that a

warrant is ever required for a search or an arrest.

Even after the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth

Amendment to require warrants in some circumstances,

“warrantless felony arrests outside of the home routinely ...

survived constitutional attack as long as probable cause [to

arrest] exist[ed].” United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548,

554 (1st Cir. 1999). This understanding stemmed from the

“the ancient common‐law rule that a peace officer was per‐

mitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or fel‐

ony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not

committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground

for making the arrest.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,

418 (1976). The Court in Watson reasoned that “the public

safety, and the due apprehension of criminals, charged with

heinous offences, imperiously require that such arrests

should be made without warrant by officers of the law.” Id.

at 419. Concurring, Justice Powell explained that ”logic [ ]

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28                                                                                   No. 15‐1896                                                 

                                                                                               

would seem to dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant

requirement at least to the same extent as searches. But logic

sometimes must defer to history and experience ... . There is

no historical evidence that the Framers or proponents of the

Fourth Amendment, outspokenly opposed to the infamous

general warrants and writs of assistance, were at all con‐

cerned about warrantless arrests by local constables and oth‐

er peace officers. ... In sum, the historical and policy reasons

... fully justify the Court’s sustaining of a warrantless arrest

upon probable cause, despite the resulting divergence be‐

tween the constitutional rule governing searches and that

now held applicable to seizures of the person.” Id. at 429,

432.

Yet just a few years later, though two centuries after the

ratification of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court

declared “that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less

protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suf‐

fice to interpose the magistrate’s determination of probable

cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. If there is

sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to

persuade a judicial officer [not just a police officer] that his

arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require

him to open his doors to the officers of the law. Thus, for

Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on

probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority

to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is

reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980). The implication is that normally

an arrest warrant is a prerequisite to arresting a person in his

home. The Court did not hold that a search warrant would

also allow such an arrest. The Court did say that the Fourth

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No. 15‐1896                                                                                   29                                                 

Amendment “prohibits the police from making a warrant‐

less and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order

to make a routine felony arrest,” id. at 576, but the bare ref‐

erence to “warrantless” left open the question whether either

an arrest warrant or a search warrant would suffice.

In some cases no warrant of any sort is required to au‐

thorize an arrest of a person in his home. If police passing by

a house hear screams, rush in, and observe a man trying to

strangle a woman, they can and should arrest him even

though they have no warrant; such an arrest is lawful. And

likewise if having approached a home to question a witness

officers become aware that a violent, dangerous criminal is

inside, as in Cook v. O’Neill, 803 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 2015).

The officers in Cook were justified in taking reasonable pre‐

cautions, including arrest, to minimize danger to themselves

and the public. Had they out of an abundance of caution in‐

stead removed themselves from potential danger, a danger‐

ous criminal would have escaped.

These are examples of arrests justified by “exigent cir‐

cumstances” (an emergency), which for obvious reasons al‐

low an arrest to be made without a warrant. Payton v. New

York, supra, 445 U.S. at 587. But there are judicial opinions

which say that a search warrant plus probable cause for an

arrest is enough to justify an arrest in the home without an

arrest warrant even if no emergency requires the officers ex‐

ecuting the search warrant to seize (that is, arrest) the occu‐

pant of the office or home searched. See, e.g., Jones v. City &

County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988). Often

in such cases, however—in United States v. Price, 888 F.2d

1206 (7th Cir. 1989), for example—there is more. The warrant

in that case authorized a search for guns, and they were

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30                                                                                   No. 15‐1896                                                 

                                                                                               

found. Id. at 1208. The police could not let the defendant

wander around the apartment while it was being searched;

nor would it have been prudent to collect the guns, leave,

and leave him there—to find a gun they had missed, or to

flee. He was a dangerous person. Burritt—falsely accused

and suing for redress—is not and was not thought to be

dangerous even at the time of his arrest.

It bears emphasizing that a search warrant alone is not

enough to justify an arrest; there must be probable cause to

arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 778–79

(8th Cir. 2001). The search itself may reveal probable cause to

arrest the occupant of the residence that is being searched.

See, e.g., Mahlberg v. Mentzer, 968 F.2d 772, 775 (8th Cir.

1992). Police naturally are reluctant to sit around twiddling

their thumbs awaiting the receipt of an arrest warrant, which

may take hours, knowing they have probable cause to arrest

the person they’re sitting with. Waiting for an arrest warrant

in such a case would be a waste of police resources. Maybe

in all such cases, requiring an arrest warrant for the arrest of

a person in his home should be waived and the case regard‐

ed as one of exigent circumstances.

There were no exigent circumstances in this case. The po‐

lice had a warrant to search Burritt’s home, although if the

issuing judge had been presented with all the relevant in‐

formation he would have found probable cause lacking and

thus not have issued the warrant. But the police did not have

a warrant to arrest Burritt. I am mindful of the cases that

hold that a warrant to search a residence is a license to arrest

anyone found there for whom there is probable cause to ar‐

rest. See, e.g., Russell v. Harms, 397 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir.

2005); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Trea‐

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No. 15‐1896                                                                                   31                                                 

tise on the Fourth Amendment § 6.1(c) (5th ed. 2015). But most

are cases in which the affidavit on the basis of which the

search warrant was issued contains all the information that

would be required for the issuance of an arrest warrant. See,

e.g., Russell v. Harms, supra, 397 F.3d at 466; United States v.

Winchenbach, supra, 197 F.3d at 553–55; Jones v. City & County

of Denver, supra, 854 F.2d at 1209. But sometimes there is

probable cause to think that a person’s home or office con‐

tains contraband or some other proper object of a search, but

not to think that the person committed a crime. Maybe he’d

been asked by a friend to store a bag of salt and had agreed

to do so, having no inkling that the bag was actually full of

contraband. He tells the police all this and they have, let’s

say, no reason to doubt him—thus no probable cause to ar‐

rest him. Such a case was United States v. Reinholz, supra, 245

F.3d at 778–79. And it is not alone. See, e.g., United States v.

Connolly, 479 F.2d 930, 936 (9th Cir.1973) (overruled on other

grounds in United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 490 (9th Cir.

1985)).

And what if it’s obvious to the police when they enter to

search a house that the owner is having a party, and so there

are several persons besides himself in the house or apart‐

ment? Does the search warrant authorize the police to arrest

all of them? Surely not, which is just to say that probable

cause to search a place is not automatically probable cause to

arrest everyone found there.

And even if the affidavit on the basis of which a search

warrant was issued establishes probable cause to arrest an

occupant of the home to be searched, wouldn’t it be better to

require that the magistrate have been asked to issue a war‐

rant authorizing both a search and an arrest? Isn’t that the

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32                                                                                   No. 15‐1896                                                 

                                                                                               

implication of cases like Payton that in defiance of the actual

wording of the Fourth Amendment insist that ordinarily a

warrant is required not only to search a home but also to ar‐

rest a homeowner? But however these questions are an‐

swered, the important thing in the present case is that prob‐

able cause whether to search or to arrest was lacking and

thus the officers were not permitted to arrest Burritt, let

alone enter his home to arrest him.

The police report states that “after a short conversation[,]

and investigator Ditlefsen advising BURRITT that we had a

search warrant, he did invite us into his residence.” The im‐

plication is that he wanted them to enter his house. That is

absurd. Since they had a search warrant, Burritt could not

object to their entry; they needed no invitation and thus

when they say he “did invite” they mean he “did accept the

inevitable.” The majority opinion, which to its credit does

not automatically accept the proposition that a search war‐

rant always justifies the arrest of the occupant of the place

searched, plucks the “invitation” chord—“Burritt invited the

officers into his home”—without remarking the unreality of

the “invitation.” The opinion goes on to state that “when a

person with authority over the premises consents to an entry

by law enforcement, that entry is reasonable and does not

infringe on the person’s Fourth Amendment rights.” But that

is true only when the occupant can refuse consent. Consent

must be voluntary to be legally effective, see Illinois v. Rodri‐

guez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990), and in this case Burritt

couldn’t refuse entry, because the search warrant gave the

officers the right to enter his house without his consent.

The issuance of a warrant signifies that a judicial of‐

ficer—a judge or magistrate—has made a determination of

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No. 15‐1896                                                                                   33                                                 

probable cause on the basis of an affidavit of a police officer

or a prosecutor. So there is a record, which may enable the

person arrested (or whose home is searched) pursuant to the

warrant to challenge its validity. When there is no warrant,

no documentation, just the say‐so of the police, it is very dif‐

ficult for the person arrested or whose home is searched to

prove that probable cause was lacking. After the arrest, or

after the search, the police will have no difficulty fabricating

probable cause to have made the arrest or conducted the

search. They will say they learned this or that which per‐

suaded them that the occupant was a dangerous criminal or

had contraband—maybe they’ll say they smelled marijuana

as they drove past the house in their squad car. Had they

said that in an affidavit, the judicial officer might have

thought it fishy. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–

15 (1948). That is a reason for requiring warrants. If there is

no warrant, the occupant is relegated to a civil rights suit to

establish his innocence, and such a suit may be both costly to

litigate and, given the propensity of juries to believe police

testimony, futile. The ex post remedy for a search or seizure

that lacks probable cause is thus likely to be less effective

than the ex ante precaution of submission of an application

for a warrant to a judicial officer.

Probable cause was lacking in this case, but even if it

were present I can’t think of any good reason for the failure

of Investigator Ditlefsen, if she thought there was probable

cause to arrest Burritt, to have sought an arrest warrant

along with a search warrant, or, better, because simpler, a

single warrant authorizing both search and arrest.

I would reverse the judgment of the district court.

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