Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00226/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE NOWLING,

Petitioner,

v.

AMY MILLER, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.14-0226-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(DOC. NO. 7)

Kyle Nowling (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Respondent Amy Miller

(“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

Petitioner has filed an Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss. 

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition,

and the lodgments presented therewith, finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and that

Petitioner’s Petition is barred by the statute of limita1 14CV0226

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tions. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 10, 2011, a San Diego Superior Court jury

found Petitioner guilty of three counts of first degree

robbery in violation of California Penal Code §§ 211,

213(a)(1)(A), one count of kidnapping in violation of

California Penal Code § 207(a), and one count of kidnapping for ransom in violation of California Penal Code §

209(a). The jury found true that in three of the offenses,

Petitioner personally used a firearm in the commission of

those offenses in violation of California Penal Code §§

12022.5(a), 12022.53(b). (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at

9-12, 79-83, 150-154).

On February 22, 2011, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an indeterminate term of 16 years to life in

prison and a concurrent determinate term of 16 years in

prison. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 107-110, 156-157).

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to

the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

3). On March 13, 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and directed the trial court to

issue an abstract of judgment and determine whether to

impose the upper, middle, or lower term for one of the

enhancements. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9).

Petitioner did not appeal the Court of Appeal’s

decision to the California Supreme Court.

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On November 7, 2012, Petitioner constructively1/

filed a Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the San

Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11). On

January 17, 2013, the Superior Court denied the Petition.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 12).

On February 27, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgments Nos. 13, 14). On March 14,

2013, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition because,

inter alia, the Petition was not verified. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 15).

On May 8, 2013,2/ Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 16). On May 15, 2013, the

California Supreme Court returned the Petition to Petitioner because it was unsigned. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

18).3/ Petitioner returned the Petition to the California

Supreme Court signed, but undated. On May 28, 2013, the

Petition was filed. On October 2, 2013, the California

Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 20).

1/

The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988).

2/

Included with the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is a proof of service

dated May 8, 2013.

3/

The letter states: “We are hereby returning unfiled your petition for writ

of habeas corpus received on May 13, 2013. We must have an original signature.

Please sign the form at the place indicated and return it with the enclosed copy

of this letter so that it may be properly filed.” Petitioner returned the Petition

signed, but undated. The Petition was filed on May 28, 2013. (emphasis added)

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 19). 

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On January 24, 2014, Petitioner filed the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus that is now before this Court.

II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the

AEDPA”) statute of limitations. The provisions of the

AEDPA apply to petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed

in federal court after the AEDPA’s effective date of April

24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059,

2068 (1997). Therefore, because the Petition was filed on

January 24, 2014, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24,

1996, “state prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in

deciding when to file a federal habeas petition.” 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d

1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 U.S. 897

(1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.

1998). “[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time

frame for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically

limited. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part,

adding subdivision (d), which provides for a one-year

limitation period for state prisoners to file habeas

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corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d) states,

in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply

to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment

to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant

was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if

the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.

Petitioner did not appeal the California Court of

Appeal’s decision regarding his convictions and sentence

to the California Supreme Court. If a petitioner does not

appeal the state court judgment, his conviction becomes

final on the date on which the time for filing such an

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appeal expired. U.S. v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.

2000); Miller v. Adams, 2009 WL 6526009 at *2 (S.D. Cal.

2009). In California, a conviction becomes final 40 days

after the Court of Appeal’s decision. Smith v. Duncan, 297

F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

On March 13, 2012, the Court of Appeal issued its

decision. Forty days later is April 22, 2012.

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year

or until April 22, 2013, to file his Petition For Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court. However, as explained in

detail below, Petitioner waited over one year to file the

Petition that is now before the Court, thus making it

untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed several petitions for post-conviction relief in the California Superior, Appellate and

Supreme Courts. The statute of limitations is tolled while

a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the holding of Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute

of limitations is tolled from the time the first state

habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme

Court rejects petitioner’s final collateral challenge,”

provided the petitions were properly filed and pending

during that entire time. The statute of limitations is not

tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct

state appeal and the time the first state collateral

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challenge is filed because there is no case “pending”

during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

The meaning of the terms “properly filed” and

“pending” in Nino have been clarified by the United States

Supreme Court. In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000),

the Court explained that when an application is “properly

filed” for purposes of 2244(d)(2) differs from when it is

“filed.” 

An application is ‘filed’ as that term is

commonly understood, when it is delivered to,

and accepted by, the appropriate court officer

for placement into the official record. And an

application is ‘properly filed’ when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with

the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example,

the form of the document, the time limits upon

its delivery, the court and office in which it

must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee. 

State law governs whether a pleading filed in state

court was “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (state

law used to determine when a pleading filed in a state

court is “properly filed” in deciding whether a petition

for writ of habeas corpus was timely filed), See also

Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007), Bonner v. Carey,

425 F.3d 1145, 1148-1149 (2005).

California Penal Code § 1474 requires that a petition for writ of habeas corpus “to be verified by oath or

affirmation of the party making the application.” California Penal Code § 1475 states: “Every application for a

writ of habeas corpus must be verified.” (emphasis added).

Therefore, a verification is a condition to filing under

California law. Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th

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Cir. 2009), citing Pace, 544 U.S. at 415, Payan v.

Herndon, 2009 WL 5576328 at *7, n. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 

Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his

convictions and sentence became final was filed on November 7, 2012 in the San Diego Superior Court. On January

17, 2013, the Superior Court denied the Petition. From

April 22, 2012 (the date Petitioner’s convictions and

sentence became final) to November 7, 2012, (the date

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the San Diego Superior Court) (200 days), the statute of

limitations was not tolled because there was no case

pending during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

On February 27, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. However, the Petition to the California Court of

Appeal was not “properly filed” because it was unverified.

For this reason, inter alia, the Petition was denied.

The Court notes that the California Court of Appeal’s decision offered alternative grounds for the denial

of the Petition. However, a state court’s alternative

rulings do not make the Petition “properly filed” under

state law. Carey v. Scaffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-226

(2002), Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1149, n. 19.

On May 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. However,

the California Supreme Court returned the unfiled Petition

to Petitioner because it was unsigned. The California

Supreme Court informed Petitioner that to have his Peti8 14CV0226

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tion properly filed, he had to sign it. Consequently, the

Petition was not properly filed on May 8, 2013. Petitioner

returned the Petition signed, but undated. The Petition

was properly filed on May 28, 2013. On October 2, 2013,

the California Supreme Court denied the Petition.

The Court determines that from January 17, 2013 (the

date the San Diego Superior Court denied Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) to May 28, 2013 (the

date Petitioner properly filed his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court), the

statute of limitations was not tolled for 131 days because

the Petition filed in the California Court of Appeal on

February 27, 2013 and the Petition filed in the California

Supreme Court on May 8, 2013, were not “properly filed.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 417, Allen, 552 U.S. at 6, Bonner, 425

F.3d at 1148-1149.

From May 28, 2013 (the date Petitioner properly

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court) to October 2, 2013 (the date the

California Supreme Court denied the properly filed Petition), the statute of limitations was tolled because

Petitioner was properly pursuing his state court

remedies.4/

On January 24, 2014, Petitioner filed the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus that is now pending before this

Court. From October 2, 2013 (the date the California

4/

A decision of the California Supreme Court is final upon filing. Phelps

v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule

8.532(b)(2)(A). There is no 30-day in finality as Petitioner suggests.

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Supreme Court denied the properly filed Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus) to January 24, 2014, (114 days), the

statute of limitations was not tolled because there was no

case pending during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

Adding together the three periods of time when the

statute of limitations was not tolled (200 days + 131 days

+ 114 days), results in a total of 445 days (1 year 2

months, 20 days), which is beyond the one year statute of

limitations mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner failed to file his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in a timely fashion and it is therefore

barred.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

of the Statute of Limitations

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations because he is

ignorant of the law, he has a low level of reading and

comprehension, he has been diligent, and that there is a

greater availibility of research tools available to

Respondent than is available to him.

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that equitable

tolling is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). see

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010). In Holland,

the Court recognized equitable tolling of the AEDPA oneyear limitations period when the prisoner can show “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 

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Id. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The Ninth

Circuit has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.

1998). However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted that

“equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. [quoting AlvarezMachain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir.

1996)]. The Beeler court wrote that district judges must

“take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the

federal habeas process” and “only authorize extensions

when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at 1289.

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary circumstances” he has identified were the

proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a

lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

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 The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain

solely to the filing of the federal habeas petition,

rather it is an obligation that exists during the period

appellant is exhausting state court remedies as well.” Roy

v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) citing Lacava

v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When courts

assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent”

inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2000), Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.

2002). The extraordinary circumstances must be the “butfor and proximate cause” of the untimely filing. Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner’s ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556

F.3d 1008, fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2009); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations in this regard.

Nor is Petitioner’s alleged low level of reading and

comprehension an extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control that made it impossible to file a petition on

time. Petitioner filed petitions for writs of habeas

corpus in the California Superior, Appellate, and Supreme

Courts and in this Court, as well as an Opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, that clearly show that

Petitioner understands the claims he has made about his

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underlying convictions, and the subject of Respondent’s

Motion To Dismiss. Since Petitioner has filed the documents noted above, he has failed to show how his alleged

low level of reading and comprehension have affected his

ability to proceed in this case. Therefore, Petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations in this regard. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d

1030, 1034-1035 (9th Cir. 2005), modified on other grounds,

447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, that a greater availability of research

tools is available to Respondent, than is available to

Petitioner, is not an extraordinary circumstance beyond

Petitioner’s control that made it impossible to file a

petition on time. The circumstances alleged by Petitioner

“are hardly extraordinary given the vicissitudes of prison

life, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that

they made it impossible to file on time.” Chaffer v.

Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010), Ramirez v.

Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner does

not explain how greater availability of research tools

available to Respondent affected the availability he had

to research tools. During the time that Petitioner filed

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Superior, Appellate, and Supreme Courts and in this Court,

as well as an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner presumably had access to a law library

that had all the research tools he may have needed.

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Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations in this regard. 

As a result of the foregoing, the Court finds that

Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court declines to equitably toll the statute of

limitations and finds that his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed in this Court is untimely.

Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

 III

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this

matter, the Court has determined that Petitioner has

failed to comply with the AEDPA’s statute of limitations

and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d).

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Further, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and

Motion to Strike be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 5, 2014, any

party to this action may file written objections with the

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Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than June 19, 2014. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 5, 2014

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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