Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00647/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00647-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint (Docket No. 3) is hereby

GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing plaintiff may amend complaint once as a

matter of course at any time before responsive pleading is served).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD EVANS TAYLOR, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________________ 

 

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No. C 08-0647 MMC (PR) 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE

DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g); GRANTING

MOTION TO FILE AMENDED

COMPLAINT

(Docket No. 3)

On January 30, 2008, plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conditions

of his confinement at San Quentin State Prison. On March 19, 2008, plaintiff filed a first

amended complaint.1

 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under

28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), enacted April 26, 1996,

provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment under

28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

Case 3:08-cv-00647-MMC Document 7 Filed 10/03/08 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A dismissal under § 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot

proceed with his action IFP under § 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the

full filing fee at the outset of the action. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th

Cir. 1996) (holding prisoner barred from proceeding IFP under § 1915(g) may proceed under

fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1911-14 applicable to all other litigants). 

For purposes of determining whether dismissal of a prisoner’s prior case meets the

requirements of § 1915(g), the phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”

parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same

interpretation; the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is “of little weight or importance:

having no basis in law or fact;” and the word “malicious” refers to a case “filed with the

intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quotations and citations omitted). 

Before leave to proceed IFP may be denied under § 1915(g), the prisoner must be

given notice of the potential applicability of § 1915(g), by either the district court or the

defendants. Id. Further, as the prisoner bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that

§ 1915(g) does not bar IFP status for him, the court must notify the prisoner of the earlier

dismissals it considers to support a § 1915(g) dismissal and allow the prisoner an opportunity

to be heard on the matter before dismissing the action. Id. at 1120. 

A review of the dismissal orders in the prior actions filed by plaintiff in this court

reveals that he has filed as a prisoner more than three actions that subsequently were

dismissed on the grounds they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. The Court has evaluated these actions based on the dismissal

orders filed therein. See id. (holding where docket records are not sufficient to determine

whether prior dismissals fall under § 1915(g), actual court files must be consulted). 

Specifically, plaintiff is now given notice that the Court is of the belief that the following

dismissals may be counted as dismissals for purposes of § 1915(g): Taylor v. R.J. Reynolds

Case 3:08-cv-00647-MMC Document 7 Filed 10/03/08 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A complaint that is time-barred fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

See Jablon v. Dean Witter Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).

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Tobacco Co., No. C 03-0968 MMC (PR) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2003) (dismissing action as

barred by statute of limitations)2

; Taylor v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. C 03-

0856 MMC (PR) (same); Taylor v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C 03-0758 MMC (PR) (same);

Taylor v. Ornoski, et al., No. C 06-2224 MMC (PR) (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2006) (dismissing

action with prejudice because, as a matter of law, no federal claim for relief stated). 

Additionally, the Court is of the belief that the following dismissal of an action filed by

plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California likewise may

be counted as a dismissal for purposes of § 1915(g): Taylor v. Donahue, No. CIV S-99-2158

GEB JFM P (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2000) (adopting findings and recommendations of Magistrate

Judge and dismissing destruction of property claim with prejudice as legally frivolous).

In light of the above-noted dismissals, and because plaintiff has not alleged that he is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury, plaintiff is hereby ORDERED TO SHOW

CAUSE, within thirty days of the date this order is filed, why plaintiff’s application for

leave to proceed IFP should not be denied and this action should not be dismissed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Alternatively, rather than showing cause why this action should not be

dismissed, plaintiff may avoid dismissal by paying, within thirty days of the date this order

is filed, the full $350.00 filing fee. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order will result in

the dismissal of this action without prejudice to plaintiff’s refiling the complaint in a new

case in which plaintiff pays the filing fee.

This order terminates Docket No. 3.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 3, 2008 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00647-MMC Document 7 Filed 10/03/08 Page 3 of 3