Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02279/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02279-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Bryan Gordon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-02279-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Guerin’s Report and

Recommendation. (Doc. 27). Judge Guerin recommends the Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus be denied. For the reasons discussed below, the Report and Recommendation will

be adopted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the Court must “issue or deny a

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate

of appealability will be denied because the applicant has not made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2). 

BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1). Magistrate Judge Guerin identified sixteen grounds for relief set forth in the Petition

(including several with subparts):

Ground 1: Petitioner’s 6th Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when 21 members

of the jury panel stated that they were victims of abuse or knew someone who was a victim

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of abuse and the trial court denied defense counsel’s motion to strike the entire jury panel on

the grounds that it could not fairly hear the case;

Ground 2: Petitioner’s 6th Amendment right to compel witnesses to attend was violated

when the trial court ruled that Petitioner’s reputation for truthfulness was not at issue and

therefore Petitioner could not call witnesses prepared to testify to Petitioner’s good character

and truthfulness;

Ground 3: Petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when the trial court

allowed the jury to receive an instruction related to Petitioner’s flight from the state;

Ground 4: Petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when (a) the

prosecutor, in her opening statements, told jurors that Petitioner was arrested out-of-state

after being featured on “America’s Most Wanted,” and (b) members of the jury were

overheard discussing local radio coverage of Petitioner’s trial;

Ground 5: Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial court admitted into

evidence (a) a photo of the victims, and (b) police photographs depicting Petitioner’s

abundance of body hair and a small abnormality on Petitioner’s genitals;

Ground 6: Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because Counts 9 and 13 of

Petitioner’s indictment did not set forth specific evidence to support a conviction;

Ground 7: Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial court sentenced

Petitioner as a dangerous offender on counts 2-9, 14, 15, 17 and 18 of the indictment, when

those counts were alleged as non-dangerous felonies;

Ground 8: Petitioner’s federal and state due process rights were violated when he was

charged and convicted for crimes allegedly committed more than seven years before the

indictment;

Ground 9: Petitioner’s federal and state due process rights were violated when the

indictment was amended twice, once before the jury, over Petitioner’s objection;

Ground 10: Petitioner’s 4th, 5th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when the trial

court admitted Petitioner’s private telephone conversations into evidence;

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Ground 11: Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the court instructed the jury

that it could consider evidence of other sexual offenses to the extent such offenses showed

Petitioner’s propensity for sexual misconduct;

Ground 12: (a) Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was violated with respect to his failure to

appear (CR 98-90662), and (b) Petitioner’s guilty plea in CR 98-90662 was not entered into

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he was unaware that his speedy trial

deadline had expired;

Ground 13: Petitioner’s 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when the

prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by (a) amending the grand jury indictment

twice, (b) telling jurors that Petitioner had been featured on America’s Most Wanted, (c)

showing the jury a black suitcase with yellow FBI tape around it but not admitting the

suitcase into evidence, (d) telling the jury that Petitioner posted and forfeited a $20,000 bond,

(e) misstating facts to the jury regarding Petitioner’s purchase of a Blazer SUV, (f) belatedly

disclosing a State witness’s criminal background, (g) admitting Petitioner’s private telephone

conversations into evidence, (h) misrepresenting dates relevant to Petitioner’s speedy trial

deadline in his failure to appear case, and (i) engaging in all of the above misconduct, which

amounted to cumulative error;

Ground 14: Petitioner’s 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when (a) the jury

panel selected did not represent a fair cross section of the community, (b) the trial court failed

to strike jury member Jane Hancock for cause, (c) the trial court failed to sever the trial, (d)

the trial counsel failed to move for severance, and (e) the trial court erred in sentencing by

not applying the correct dates on which the crimes were committed;

Ground 15: (a) Petitioner’s 6th Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was

violated because appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal each of the issues presented in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition; (b) trial counsel admitted to ineffectiveness after the indictment

was amended during trial; (c) the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing

regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Petitioner’s Rule 32

Petition;

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Ground 16: Petitioner’s federal due process rights were violated by the preclusion of certain

claims by the state court on collateral review.

(Doc. 27). 

On March 24, 2009, Magistrate Judge Guerin recommended the petition be denied

(Doc. 27). On May 1, 2009, Petitioner filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Guerin’s

Report and Recommendation, and requested an evidentiary hearing (Docs. 30; 31).

Petitioner’s objections and request for an evidentiary hearing are considered below. 

STANDARD

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Where any party has

filed timely objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, the district

court’s review of the part objected to is to be de novo. Id.; see also United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219,

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of

factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, but not otherwise.”) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Need for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner generally objects to the Report and Recommendation on the ground that it

was based on state court factual determinations or the Magistrate Judge’s factual

determinations rather than on an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner claims he is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing because the state court made evidentiary findings without holding a

hearing or giving Petitioner an opportunity to present evidence. The granting of a hearing

is within the discretion of the District Court. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir.

2008). A district court abuses its discretion in denying a request for an evidentiary hearing

if petitioner “has alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief, and . . . he

did not receive a full and fair opportunity to develop those facts.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Petitioner does not identify a single factual determination on

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which Magistrate Judge Guerin wrongly relied, or a single factual dispute which would

necessitate an evidentiary hearing. As discussed below, Petitioner has not alleged facts that

if proven would entitle him to relief; his claims fail as a matter of law. An evidentiary

hearing is therefore not necessary and Petitioner’s request for one will be denied. 

II. Grounds 3, 4(b), 12(b), 15(b) and 15(c)

Judge Guerin recommends grounds 3, 4(b), 12(b), 15(b), and 15(c) of the petition be

denied because Petitioner did not exhaust these claims by presenting them in state court in

either his direct appeal or his Rule 32 petition. Petitioner objects that he did present each of

these claims in state court. Petitioner is partially correct. Petitioner raised ground 3 in his

direct appeal to the Arizona State Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1, Ex. F at 23). He also raised

ground 15(c) in his appeal of the Arizona Superior Court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition in

the Arizona State Court of Appeals (Doc. 15, Ex. CCC1 at 2). He did not, however, raise the

claims identified by Judge Guerin as grounds 4(b), 12(b), and 15(b) in state court. Judge

Guerin’s recommendation that these claims be denied will be adopted. Grounds 3 and 15(c)

will be considered on the merits. 

(1) Ground 3

Judge Guerin identified ground 3 as: “Petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment rights

were violated when the trial court allowed the jury to receive an instruction related to

Petitioner’s flight from the state.” This paraphrase of Petitioner’s claim is inaccurate. An

accurate paraphrase of Ground 3 in the Petition is: Petitioner’s 6th and 14th Amendment

rights were violated when the trial court told jurors not to consider evidence of the

punishment Petitioner might receive to rebut an inference that Petitioner fled because he had

a guilty conscience. (Doc. 1 at 7). Petitioner raised this ground in his direct appeal. The

claim nevertheless fails on its merits. The Arizona Court of Appeals correctly denied the

claim on the correct ground that “a careful review of the record reveals that the trial court

never precluded such evidence because none was ever offered.” (Doc. 1, Ex. 1, part 1 at 12).

Petitioner does not cite any evidence to the contrary from the record. 

(2) Ground 15(c)

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Ground 15(c) is: the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition. Petitioner

does not identify a single factual determination made by the trial court when denying his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Because Petitioner does not do so, ground 15(c) fails.

 

III. Grounds 4(a), 9-11, 12(a), 13, 14(a), 14(b) and 14(e)

Judge Guerin recommends grounds 4(a), 9-11, 12(a), 13, 14(a), 14(b) and 14(e) be

denied because they are procedurally barred on an independent state law ground. Petitioner’s

only objection is that Respondents waived this defense. Petitioner argues, “In the

Respondents’ Answer the state relied on 2 mutually exclusive reasons for rejecting each of

the above claims, including procedural default (preclusion based on a state law ground) and

denial on the merits. Because the state chose to address and argue the claim on the merits

they have relinquished the preclusion defense.” (Doc. 30 at 5). Procedural default and failure

on the merits are not mutually exclusive defenses to Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner cites no

authority for his position that the State waives procedural defenses when it accompanies them

with defenses that reach the merits. Petitioner offers additional argument in support of

grounds 9, 10, and 13 on the merits, but does not otherwise respond to Judge Guerin’s

recommendation that these claims are procedurally barred.

Judge Guerin’s conclusion that the claims are procedurally barred is correct.

Petitioner presented these grounds in his Rule 32 Petition, but the trial court denied them

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule 32.3(a)(3), which precludes from post-conviction relief

claims that could have been raised on appeal. Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an independent state law

ground, which bars federal habeas review. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

Petitioner claims he failed to raise some of these grounds because he relied on the advice of

his counsel. Petitioner’s attempt to show cause for the procedural default by alleging

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is an independent constitutional claim, which

Petitioner raised as ground 15(a) and is considered below and denied on its merits. Since

Petitioner has not shown cause for the procedural default or shown a fundamental

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miscarriage of justice, Magistrate Judge Guerin’s recommendation that grounds 4(a), 9-11,

12(a), 13, 14(a), 14(b) and 14(e) be denied because they are procedurally barred will be

adopted. 

IV. Grounds 1, 2, 6, 8, 14(d), 15(a)

Judge Guerin recommends grounds 1, 2, 6, 8, 14(d), and 15(a) be denied on their

merits. Petitioner’s only objection is that the Magistrate Judge reached this ruling without

an evidentiary hearing, wrongly relying on facts still in dispute. Petitioner does not name any

disputed facts upon which the Magistrate Judge relied when denying theses claims, or offer

any other explanation for why an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve his claims.

Judge Guerin’s recommendation does not rely on any disputed facts that would necessitate

an evidentiary hearing. Judge’s Guerin’s recommendation that these grounds be denied on

their merits will accordingly be adopted. 

V. Grounds 5, 7, 14(c), 16

Judge Guerin recommends grounds 5, 7, and 14(c) be denied because they were not

fairly presented as federal claims in state court, and recommends ground 16 be denied

because it states a non-cognizable claim. Petitioner presents no objection. The

recommendation that these grounds be denied will therefore be adopted.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 27) is ADOPTED and the

Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

FURTHER ORDERED a certificate of appealability IS DENIED.

DATED this 30th day of December, 2009.

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