Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00122/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PETER FRANK BURRUEL, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 09-00396 PHX SRB

v. ) CIV 11-00122 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On January 18, 2011, Mr. Peter Burruel (“Movant”) filed

a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255, regarding a criminal conviction and sentence

entered by the Court in 2009. Respondent filed a Response to

Motion to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on March

7, 2011. See Doc. 5. 

I Procedural History

An indictment filed April 14, 2009, in criminal docket

number 09-00396 in the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, charged Defendant with one count of

conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of possession

with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

Case 2:11-cv-00122-SRB Document 6 Filed 04/18/11 Page 1 of 11
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§§ 841(a)(1) and 841 (b)(1)(D). See Criminal Doc. 13. On

September 29, 2009, Movant pled guilty to one count of

conspiracy with the intent to possess more than one kilogram of

marijuana, pursuant to a written plea agreement. See Criminal

Doc. 84; Criminal Doc. 140; Response, Exh. A. The terms of the

plea agreement included an explicit waiver that Movant would not

seek to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence. 

On November 30, 2009, the District Court accepted the

plea agreement and Movant’s entry of a guilty plea. Consistent

with the terms of the agreement, on that date the Court

sentenced Movant to a term of 87 months imprisonment pursuant to

his conviction for conspiracy with the intent to possess more

than one kilo of marijuana and to a consecutive sentence of 10.5

months imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147, which requires

an additional consecutive sentence for conviction of a crime

committed while on supervised release. The sentence in this

matter, CR 09-396, was ordered to be served concurrently with

that imposed by the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona in 2004, in a case wherein Movant was

convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

marijuana. In the 2004 matter Movant pled guilty pursuant to a

plea agreement and was sentenced to a term of three years

imprisonment and three years supervised release. In the 2004

matter, pursuant to the plea agreement, the government agreed to

dismiss charges related to the possession of methamphetamine.

In this section 2255 action, arising from his 2009

conviction, Movant alleges that his trial counsel “coerced [him]

into pleading guilty ... without fully explaining ... the

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consequences of the guilty plea.” Movant also alleges that his

trial counsel “did not investigate the facts and law of the

case.” Movant also contends that his trial counsel informed

Movant that he would receive a sentence at the “low end” of the

sentencing range applicable to his conviction, yet Movant

received “ten [] more months than what [he] bargained for.”

Movant further asserts that the District Court abused its

discretion by not substituting a “competent attorney” for

Movant’s attorney at an evidentiary hearing.

Respondent asserts that the section 2255 motion is not

timely. Respondent also contends that Movant waived his right

to challenge his conviction and sentence and that Movant was not

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

II Analysis

Statute of limitations

A one-year statute of limitations on a section 2255

action applies to criminal convictions entered by the Court.

The statute of limitations begins to run when a conviction

becomes final. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d

1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000). “The Supreme Court has held that a

conviction is final in the context of habeas review when ‘a

judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of

appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari

elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.’” United

States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001),

quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6, 107 S. Ct.

708, 712 n.6 (1987). In cases in which the defendant does not

file a direct appeal, the conviction becomes final fourteen days

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after the entry of the judgment. See Schwartz, 274 F.3d at 1223

n.1; Fed. R. App. P. 4 (2011). 

Respondent notes Movant’s conviction became final on

December 14, 2009, fourteen days after he was sentenced on

November 30, 2009, and, accordingly, that the one-year deadline

for Movant to file his section 2255 motion expired on December

14, 2010. Respondent argues that, because Movant’s section 2255

motion was filed on January 12, 2011, it was not filed within

the one-year statute of limitations and should be dismissed.

However, Movant previously filed a section 2255 motion on March

2, 2010, which motion was dismissed without prejudice on May 14,

2010, because Movant’s place of incarceration had changed and

mail sent to Movant was returned to the Court. See Burruel v.

United States, 2:10 CV 00480 PHX DGC, at Doc. 6. Accordingly,

because it appears that Movant acted to preserve his right to a

timely section 2255 action, the Magistrate Judge concludes that

the statute of limitations should not bar the consideration of

Movant’s section 2255 motion. 

Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent also asserts that Movant waived his right to

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in the written

plea agreement. The plea agreement signed by Movant expressly

waived his right to collaterally attack any matter pertaining to

Movant’s conviction and sentence if the sentence imposed was

consistent with the written terms of the agreement. See

Response, Exh. A. The sentence imposed on Movant was consistent

with the terms of the plea agreement. Because the sentence

imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement, the plea

Case 2:11-cv-00122-SRB Document 6 Filed 04/18/11 Page 4 of 11
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agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea

agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action challenging his sentence the section 2255 motion may

be summarily denied. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,

508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled

that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an

accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may

not be collaterally attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398

F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the

context of a direct appeal wherein the defendant waived his

right to directly appeal or collaterally attack his conviction

and sentence in a plea agreement); United States v. Abarca, 985

F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bolinger, 940

F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel in negotiating a plea agreement with regard to a

defendant’s sentence may be brought notwithstanding a waiver of

the right to a collateral attack in the plea agreement, but only

if the agreement was involuntary or unknowing, or if the court

relied on an impermissible factor such as race, or where the

agreement is otherwise unlawful. See United States v. Anglin,

215 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nunez,

223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cockerham,

237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); Bridgeman v. United

States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

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Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th

Cir. 1998)(holding, in a section 2255 case, that “a

straightforward and simple ‘Yes, your Honor’ is sufficient to

bind a defendant to [the] consequences [of a plea agreement].”).

Because he was adequately informed of the consequences of his

plea, Movant’s guilty plea can be considered voluntary and

knowing. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct.

1709, 1712 (1969). A review of the record leads the undersigned

to conclude Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and made

intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th

Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition may be

denied and dismissed solely on this basis. Compare United

States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we doubt

that a plea agreement could waive a claim of ineffective of

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s erroneously

unprofessional inducement of the defendant to plead guilty or

accept a particular plea bargain.”).

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Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

In order to find that Movant was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and grant him habeas relief, the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was incompetent and

that his deficient performance prejudiced Movant. 

[N]ot every case of deficient performance

under Strickland represents a constructive

denial of the right to counsel. In fact, it

will be the rare claim of ineffective

assistance that is tantamount to a

constructive denial of counsel. Strickland

remains the norm for ineffective assistance

claims, and the Supreme Court has made clear

that it will not countenance a per-se

prejudice exception which will swallow the

actual prejudice Strickland rule. 

Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2001). See also

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, Movant bears the

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burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the Court can

conclude his counsel was ineffective. See, e.g., United States

v. Quintero Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish that his counsel’s conduct was

unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255 petitioner must

establish that no competent counsel would have acted as his

counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were unreasonable.

United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004);

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2001).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his counsel’s

representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are also

governed by the doctrine of Strickland. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Gonzalez

v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994). When

a defendant challenges a conviction or sentence resulting from

a plea agreement the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is

modified; the defendant must show there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pled guilty to the charges against him, but instead would

have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106

S. Ct. at 370; United States v. Alvarez Tautimez, 160 F.3d 573

577 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840,

844-45 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Pursuant to section 2255 “[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of

reasonable representation.” United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996). With regard to the

prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, the probability of

prejudice may not be based merely upon conjecture or

speculation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1246

(2002) (Kennedy, J. concurrence) (regarding speculation as

having no place in a Strickland analysis). 

Movant’s counsel’s advice to accept the plea agreement

was not deficient or incompetent. Movant has not demonstrated

that he would not have accepted the plea agreement but for his

counsel’s advice. The plea agreement was very beneficial to

Movant and Movant was familiar with the charges against him and

the potential sentence he faced if convicted on all charged

counts. 

III CONCLUSION

Movant’s section 2255 motion was timely filed because

Movant previously filed a section 2255 petition, i.e., Movant

acted with due diligence to timely file a collateral attack on

his 2009 conviction and sentence. Because the waiver of his

right to collaterally attack his sentence in the written plea

agreement was not unknowing or involuntary, the Court may

dismiss Movant’s claims as waived. Additionally, Movant has not

established that he was deprived of his constitutional right to

the effective assistance of counsel because he offers no

evidence his counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was

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prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Burruel’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

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waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2011.

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