Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00814/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00814-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD T. FURNACE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff, Edward Terran Furnace, a.k.a. Asar Tauf Shakanasa, is a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. No other parties 

have appeared in this action. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s claims can be summarized essentiallyas follows:

Plaintiff is a longtime practitioner of Shetaut Neter, which he describes as “a Black 

African religion that originated in pre-monumental Kemet or Ancient Egypt well over 

10,000 years ago.” Adherents of Shetaut Neter, or Neterians, frequently adopt a 

religious name to affirm their “divine true essential nature and reverence for God.” They 

are also exhorted to follow the “Kemetic” diet, which excludes all animal products and 

ideally is 80% raw. Neterians worship three times per day, fast on the full moon, and 

observe several religious holidays throughout the year. Plaintiff has studied Shetaut 

Neter for two decades and has considered himself a practitioner for fifteen years.

Plaintiff claims Defendants (Connie Gipson, former warden, M. Sexton, deputy 

warden, and M.S. Robicheaux, a correctional lieutenant) have restricted his ability to 

practice Shetaut Neter in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at Corcoran State Prison by 

frustrating his attempts to change his name and to order specific spiritual items. He also 

claims he has been denied the opportunity to worship communally with other Neterians, 

to consult a Neterian chaplain, or to observe Neterian holidays. He requests monetary, 

injunctive and declaratory relief.

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

A. Name Change

On July 24, 2013, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Gipson, then Corcoran’s warden,

requesting to change his name to Asar Tauf Shakanasa for religious reasons. He 

explained that “a religious name is an essential and powerful force that links Neterians to 

the spiritual source and [is] a constant reminder of the true glory of the higher self” and 

that his “former or committed name [is] offensive to [his] religious beliefs because it 

represents a badge of being in a spiritually unenlightened state.” Plaintiff made clear he 

did not want his committed name deleted from existing files, but that he be permitted to 

use his new name in conjunction with his booking number on mail, money orders, 

medical forms, ID cards, and at the canteen.

Plaintiff references Gipson’s “denial” of his name change request several times, 

but he does not disclose the substance of her response or indicate when she responded. 

On September 25, 2013, he reiterated his request for a name change in a grievance.

This grievance was apparently denied at the first, second, and third levels of review by 

various correctional staff. 

B. Spiritual Package

On September 7, 2013, Plaintiff also filed a grievance requesting to purchase

items to facilitate his Neterian worship as part of his annual “spiritual package.” 

Specifically, Plaintiff requested “vegetarian food items,” including “sun-dried fruits, nuts, 

seeds, breads,...[and] organic food bars,” an ankh amulet and chain, a prayer rug, 

prayer oils, cosmetics, clothing items, shoes, writing materials, and “clean electrical 

appliances.”

CDCR regulations permit inmates to order one 30 lb. package of religious items 

every year. Items they may order are listed on the standardized “Religious Property 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Matrix” form. For inmates like Plaintiff, housed in SHU, permissible items are few: they 

may have one religious medallion and chain, two items of the particular headgear

ssociated with their faith, one set of prayer beads, a prayer mat, a prayer shawl, and one 

tallit katan or tsitsit.1

Defendant Robicheaux denied Plaintiff’s religious package request at the first 

level appeal and Defendant Sexton did so at the second level appeal. At the third level, 

however, the request was partially granted: without permitting or denying particular 

items, the appeals examiner forwarded Plaintiff’s request to the Religious Review 

Committee, which reviews anomalous requests for religious property and refers them 

along with “suggested recommendations of approval/disapproval [and] justification”to 

the Warden’s Advisory Group (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 30.) Plaintiff does not appear to 

have received a response from the RRC.

C. Other Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he is not allowed “to partake in religious group worship 

services with other Neterians on the yard,” despite the availability of an appropriate 

space; that he does not have access to a Neterian minister and that the prison does not 

recognize Neterian holidays. He claims that inmates who practice conventional religions 

have group worship and spiritual guidance, and that their holidays are recognized. 

Plaintiff does indicate whether or not he filed a grievance on this issue.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 

as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by 

denying his request for a name change, prohibiting him from ordering Neterian religious 

 

1 Undergarments typically worn by Orthodox Jews.

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

items, failing to recognize Neterian holidays, and restricting his access to group worship 

and spiritual guidance. He requests declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. 

The court cannot determine if Plaintiff has stated cognizable claims in connection 

with the denial of name change and religious property order without information as to 

how Defendants responded to these requests and a description of the role the requested 

items play in his religion. Plaintiff also fails to link his allegations regarding the denial of 

group worship opportunities, holiday recognition, and access to a Neterian chaplain to 

particular defendants. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint, but will give 

leave to amend to address these deficiencies and meet pleading criteria described in 

more detail below.

A. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

B. Name Change

Plaintiff has not stated either a Free Exercise or a RLUIPA claim on the basis of a

denial of his name change because he has not alleged facts reflecting that his name 

change request was actually denied; the Court assumes Plaintiff would not have raised 

the issue if his request had not been denied, but even assuming it was, he has not set 

forth the reason, if any, given for the denial so the Court can examine whether the denial

lacked penological justification.

a. The Free Exercise Standard

To merit protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a 

religious claim must satisfy two criteria. First, the belief sought to be exercised must be 

sincerely held; second, it must be “religious in nature,” that is, not rooted in secular 

philosophical concerns. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008); Malik v. 

Brown, 16 F. 3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). If these requirements are met, “the adoption of 

a religious name... is an exercise of religious freedom.” Malik, 16 F. 3d at 333; 

Washington v. Adams, 5975646 WL No. 1:09-cv-01666, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2011); 

Scott v. Cal. S. Ct., 2788346 WL No. CIV S-04-2586, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2008).

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

However, the ability of an inmate to change his name or otherwise exercise his 

religious beliefs is not without restriction. “Lawful incarceration brings about the 

necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by 

the considerations underlying our penal system.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 

342, 348 (1987)(quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). Thus, prison 

regulations may lawfully curtail inmates’ constitutional rights, provided that the 

regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Turner set forth four factors for courts to balance in determining 

whether a regulation reasonably relates to legitimate penological interests: 1) Whether 

there is a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate 

governmental interest put forward to justify it; 2) whether there are alternative means of 

exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; 3) whether accommodation of 

the right would impact guards and other inmates and the allocation of prison resources 

general; and 4) whether or not there are easy, obvious alternatives to the denial of the 

right. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; Shakur, 514 F. 3d at 884; Malik, 16 F.3d at 334.

In California, the procedure for an inmate to legally change his name is set forth in 

CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3294.5. The inmate must submit his name change request 

directly to the warden. If the warden denies the request, he or she must respond to the 

inmate in writing with the reasons for the denial.2 Courts then apply the Turner factors to 

determine whether the warden’s reasoning comports with the Constitution.

In other name change cases, courts have found that a prison’s interest in keeping 

track of an inmate militates against discontinuing use of his former committed name. 

Malik, 16 F.3d at 334; Scott, at *6; Ashanti v. CDCR, 520958 WL No. CIV S-03-0474, at 

 

2

If the warden approves the request, it must clear two additional levels of approval before it can be 

submitted to the court, which has the final say in whether or not to effectuate the name change.

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

*14-*15 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007)(prison maintained interest in using original 

commitment name even after inmate, who changed his name on parole, was 

recommitted under new religious name). Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

prisons lack a legitimate penological interest in preventing an inmate from using his 

religious name alongside his committed name, finding “that allowing an inmate to use 

both his religious and committed names is a reasonable middle ground between 

absolute recognition” of the new name “and the prison interests of order, security, and 

administrative efficiency.” Malik, 16 F.3d at 334 (citations omitted); Babcock v. Clarke, 

373 Fed. Appx. 720, 721 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff, however, is mistaken that he has a 

“clearly established right” under Ninth Circuit law “to use his religious name and booking 

number H-33245,” without his committed name. See, e.g., Malik v. Clarke, 990874 WL 

No. C07-5160, at *7 (W.D. Wash. April 13, 2009)(upholding reasonableness of prison’s

policy of returning mail that did not list plaintiff’s committed name).

Here, Plaintiff’s letter to Defendant Gipson, included as an exhibit to his 

Complaint, satisfies the Court that his Neterian beliefs are sincere, and that his desire to 

change his name is religiously motivated. (He states that he has practiced Shetaut Neter 

for fifteen years, and has studied its teachings for over twenty.) By sending the letter, 

moreover, Plaintiff followed the proper procedure for initiating a name change pursuant 

to CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3294.5. 

However, it is not clear to the Court that Warden Gipson actually denied his 

request. Although Plaintiff refers several times to Gipson’s “denial” of the name change, 

he does not indicate when (or even if) he received a written denial, he does not include 

the denial as an exhibit, and he does not describe what reasons, if any, were given for 

the denial. If Defendant Gipson denied Plaintiff’s name change in writing, Plaintiff should

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

summarize Gipson’s reasoning and attach the denial to his amended complaint. If 

Plaintiff never received a response from Gipson, he should state so clearly in his 

amended complaint. 

b. The RLUIPA Standard

RLUIPA was passed, at least in part, to “secure redress for inmates who 

encounter[] undue barriers to their religious observances.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 

709, 716 (2005). The Act provides that “no government shall impose a substantial 

burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution... 

even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government 

demonstrates that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so 

by the “least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); Greene v. Solano Cty. 

Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008). 

An inmate’s “religious exercise” refers not to his practice of religion as a whole, 

but his engagement in particular practices or rituals within his religion. Greene, 513 F.3d 

at 987. The practice need not be “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 

belief” in order to qualify as a “religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Alvarez v. 

Hill, 518 F.33d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, a prison can substantially burdens an 

inmate’s exercise when it prevents, prohibits, or punishes engagement in a particular 

religious activity, even if the inmate remains able to observe other aspects of his religion. 

See Greene, 518 F.3d at 988 (ban on group worship in maximum security prison 

constituted substantial burden); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 

2005)(prison grooming policy substantially burdened exercise of inmate’s Native 

American religion, one tenet of which forbids hair to be cut except upon the death of a 

close relative); Rouser v. White, 630 F.Supp. 2d 1165, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2009)(formal and 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

informal policies that impaired Wiccan inmate’s group worship constituted substantial 

burden); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 12290 (S.D. Cal. 2012)(temporary ban 

on prayer oil substantially burdened inmate’s practice of Islam). 

Although prison security is a compelling interest, prison officials may not “justify 

restrictions on religious exercise simply by citing to the need to maintain order and 

security,” even in a maximum-security prison. Greene, 513 F.3d at 989-990. To the 

contrary, Prison officials must show that they “actually considered and rejected the 

efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Greene, 

513 F. 3d at 989 (quoting Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999). 

As Malik v. Brown held in the First Amendment context, using a spiritual name is 

a “religious exercise,” and therefore the kind of activity that RLUIPA protects. Malik, 16 

F.3d at 333; see also Muttawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2013). A 

thornier question is whether the denial of a formal name change imposes a substantial 

burden on such exercise. Muttawakkil suggested, without addressing the question 

directly, that denying a formal name change could give rise to a RLUIPA claim for an 

inmate whose religion “call[ed] for use of a religious name only,” 735 F.3d at 527. No 

published opinions in the Ninth Circuit have addressed this issue. Scott v. California 

Supreme Court, an unpublished 2008 District Court decision, concluded that denial of a 

name change did not amount to a substantial burden because plaintiff there did not 

suggest that “he [would] not be able to participate in religious ceremonies with his given 

name, or that an unchanged name would subject him to ostracism from his co-believers, 

or that he [could] not ‘rise through the ranks’ of his religion.” 2008 WL 2788346, at *10. 

Scott, however, did not consider the effect of Greene, which had been decided 

only a few months earlier. Greene instructs courts to focus not on the overall effect of a 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

prison regulation on an inmate’s religious life, but on the consequences for the particular 

religious practice sought to be exercised, in this case, the use of a spiritual name. See

513 F.3d at 988. Under Greene, blocking one avenue of religious expression constitutes 

a substantial burden, even if other avenues remain open. Id.; Davis, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 

1230. Moreover, a complete prohibition is more offensive to RLUIPA than a mere 

restriction: as the Ninth Circuit held in Greene, “We have little difficulty in concluding that 

an outright ban on a particular religious exercise is a substantial burden on that religious 

exercise.” 513 F.3d at 988. From this standpoint, a blanket denial of a name change 

could amount to just such an “outright ban.” 

However, as described above, Plaintiff has not provided evidence either of the 

denial itself or of the compelling penological interests, if any, Gipson invoked to justify it. 

The court will give Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to provide such information.

C. Religious Property Request

Similar problems attend Plaintiff’s Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims regarding

the alleged denial of his religious property request. He has neither provided enough 

information about the RRC’s ultimate response to his request, nor sufficiently explained 

the role of each requested item in the exercise of his religion.

a. Free Exercise

Like denials of name change requests, the denial of an inmate’s request for 

religious property may violate his free exercise rights, provided the request was 

motivated by a sincerely held religious belief. See, e.g., Rouser v. White, 630 F.Supp.2d 

1165, 1189-1190 (E.D. Cal. 2009)(prohibition on possession of candles, incense and 

Tarot cards potentially violates Wiccan inmate’s ability to exercise his beliefs freely); 

Oliverez v. Albitre, 3778861 WL No. 1:09-cv-00352, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2012)(arbitrary refusal to give plaintiff his prayer oil potentially infringes on his Free 

Exercise rights); Buckley v. Alameida, 1100613 WL No. 1:04-cv-05688, at *7 

(confiscation of kosher food package implicated Free Exercise clause). Inmates retain a 

right to possess religious property even when they are housed in SHU or administrative 

segregation. Rouser, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 (confiscation of Witches’ Bible from 

inmate in disciplinary segregation potentially “impinged on [his] ability to freely exercise 

his religion.”); Wright v. Smith, 3787528 WL No. 1:10-cv-00011, at *1, *8 (E.D. Cal. July 

18, 2013)(claim that plaintiff was deprived of “siddur/prayer book, tallit/prayer shawl, 

yarmulke/religious head covering, and religious literature including scripture” while 

housed in SHU survived motion to dismiss).

Like name changes, however, restrictions on the possession of religious property 

are analyzed under the Turner framework, and will be upheld if they are justified by a 

legitimate penological interest. Naturally, the penological interest at stake will depend on 

the item the inmate is requesting. See, e.g., Rouser, 630 F.Supp.2d at 1189-1190 

(restrictions on candles and Tarot cards potentially justified by interest in preventing fires 

and gambling, respectively); Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 

2008)(restrictions on prayer oil justified by institutional interest in curbing trade in 

contraband). 

b. RLUIPA

A prison’s denial of access to religious items may also give rise to a valid RLUIPA 

claim. Rouser, 630 F.Supp. 2d at 1181-1182; Davis, 901 F.Supp.2d at 1229-1230. 

Courts focus on the plaintiff’s perception of the necessity of the items to his religious 

practice, not on his ability, strictly speaking, to worship without them. Rouser , 630 

F.Supp. 2d at 1182(locker policy that prevented Wiccans from accessing religious items 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

for group worship amounted to substantial burden); Davis, 901 F.Supp. at 1230(ban on 

prayer oil, which Plaintiff asserted was mandated by his faith, substantially burdened 

practice of Islam); Adler v. Gonzalez, No. 1:11-cv-1915 WL 2385137, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

May 30, 2013)(prison officials’ denial of Bible and rosary imposed substantial burden on 

Catholic inmate’s exercise).

Here, Plaintiff requested numerous items, including foodstuffs, an amulet and 

chain, a prayer rug, prayer oil, unspecified items of clothing, shoes, writing materials, 

and “clean appliances.” While Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the sincerity of his 

Neterian beliefs generally, he has not shown that his request for each item listed was 

motivated by his faith. In particular, Plaintiff demonstrates no connection between his 

religion and his need for “clothes, cosmetics, shoes, writing materials, and clean 

appliances.” Materials in his complaint do describe the “basic necessity” of vegetarian 

food, a prayer rug, an amulet, and prayer oil for “effective worship” as a Neterian, and 

Plaintiff does claim that “not having access” to the requested items has “made his 

religious exercise significantly difficult.” However, a bare statement of necessity without 

elaboration as to why they are necessary, that is, what role they play in his worship and 

how their absence has impaired his religious practice, leaves the cognizability of the 

claim unclear to the court.

Evidence that Plaintiff’s religious property request was in fact denied is also 

necessary to state cognizable Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims. Plaintiff’s grievance 

on the issue was partially granted, and his request forwarded to the Religious Review 

Committee. Plaintiff should describe and/or include the RRC’s response in his amended 

complaint. If he did not receive a response, he should so state. 

C. Equal Protection

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to establish that defendants violated his 

Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying his name change 

or his religious property request.

Behind bars, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords a 

prisoner “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity 

afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 

(1972)). However, prisons “are not required to provide identical accommodations to 

inmates of every religious persuasion.” Rouser, 630 F.Supp. 2d at 1200(citing Cruz, 405 

U.S. at 322 n.2). To make an Equal Protection claim, an inmate must show that the 

prison treated him differently from a similarly situated class, raising an inference of 

discriminatory purpose. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp. 2d 1035, 

1049 (E.D. Cal. 2010). In society at large, the government could not disfavor Plaintiff 

because of his Neterian beliefs absent a compelling state interest. See DeHart v. Horn, 

227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000). In prison, however, the Turner test applies, and an 

inmate’s Equal Protection claim only succeed where the prison’s disparate treatment 

was not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; 

see also Rupe, 688 F.Supp. 2d at 1049. Allegations of disparate treatment, however, 

cannot be merely conclusory; they must have some specificity and factual support. See

Rouser, 630 F.Supp.2d at 1200; Adler, No. 1:11-cv-1915 WL 2385137, at *4.

Here, Plaintiff alleges he is a member of a protected class of Neterians, but his 

allegations of disparate treatment are not sufficiently specific to allow the Court to find

his Equal Protection claim cognizable. With regard to the name change, he states that 

“other inmates within CDCR and throughout the nation who are in custody and practicing 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

conventional religious precepts are allowed to use their religious names and receive all 

of the normal incidents of recognition.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 10). Similarly, with 

respect to the spiritual package, he states that he was not allowed to possess items for 

effective worship, while “inmates practicing conventional religious precepts...enjoy these 

practices.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 11). However, he provides no factual allegations 

that suggest either claim is based upon anything other than pure speculation on his part. 

See Adler, No. 1:11-cv-1915 WL 2385137, at *4. In the absence of this required factual 

basis, his Equal Protection claims must fail.

B. Linkage

Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment, RLUIPA, or Equal Protection claim 

regarding the alleged denial of group worship opportunities, access to a chaplain, and 

holiday observances because he has not linked the denial to a particular defendant.

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 

F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, as each defendant is 

only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 

1235. Supervisors may only be held liable if they “participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 

2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark 

Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 

1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Here, Plaintiff has failed to state which individuals he believes are responsible for 

not allowing group Neterian worship, preventing consultations with a Neterian minister, 

or impeding observance of Neterian holidays. He merely refers to “defendants.” If 

Plaintiff meant to suggest that Defendants Sexton, Robicheaux, and Gipson, directly 

participated in the violations, he should clearly explain their individual involvement in his

amended complaint. However, Plaintiff may not simply assert his claim against Warden 

Gipson as ultimate supervisor, unless, as aforementioned, he believes she “participated 

directly in the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state Free Exercise, RLUIPA, 

or Equal Protection claims against Defendants for denying Plaintiff’s name change or his 

religious property request. Plaintiff has also failed to state Free Exercise, RLUIPA, or 

Equal Protection claims based on the denial of group worship, access to a Neterian 

chaplain, or observance of Neterian holidays because he has not linked this denial to 

particular defendants.

The Court grants Plaintiff the opportunity to correct the deficiencies analyzed 

above in an amended complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaint). 

An amended complaint would supersede the prior complaint. Forsyth v. Humana, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 f.2d 565, 567 (9th 

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Cir. 1987). Thus, it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 20, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00814-LJO-MJS Document 15 Filed 01/21/15 Page 17 of 17