Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01082/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01082-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT GARDNER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-01082-TEH 

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE; 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

 

Plaintiff Robert Gardner and Defendant Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”) 

submitted simultaneous motions in limine on September 22, 2015. (Docket Nos. 72, 75.) 

Plaintiff timely responded on September 29, 2015 (Docket No. 80), but Defendant failed to 

respond until October 1, 2015, two days after the deadline for such responses (Docket No. 

81).1

 After carefully considering these submissions, the Court considers oral argument 

unnecessary (except regarding the Defendant’s motion in limine, as discussed below), and 

hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motions in limine, as set forth 

below. 

BACKGROUND 

As the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, the Court 

provides only a brief summary of the facts. Plaintiff was a full-time Ramp Transport 

Driver (“RTD”) at Defendant’s Oakland yard facility when he suffered an on-the-job 

injury to his neck and shoulder on January 30, 2013. Gardner Decl. ¶ 2 (Docket No. 36). 

FedEx Policy 1-8 provides employees with up to 90 days of job-protected medical leave. 

 1

 Accordingly, with good cause appearing, Defendant is ORDERED TO SHOW 

CAUSE why the Court should not impose monetary or other sanctions for its failure to 

timely respond to Plaintiff’s motions in limine. The show cause hearing shall be held on 

Tuesday, October 13, 2015, at 9:00 AM. Should Defendant wish to provide a written 

response to this order, it may do so on or before Friday, October 9, 2015. 

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Ex. 107 to Matheis Decl. (Docket No. 37-4). After the exhaustion of the 90 days of 

medical leave, a FedEx employee may be “displaced,” allowing FedEx to replace the 

position of the employee on leave or allow the position to remain unfilled. Id. 

On May 22, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that he had been “displaced” from his 

position pursuant to Policy 1-8. Gardner Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. 1 to Gardner Decl. Plaintiff 

remained a FedEx employee and continued with paid medical leave, but he was no longer 

an Oakland operation employee. On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that his 

position was no longer available (Gardner Decl. ¶ 9), and that he would be on an unpaid 

leave of absence for 90 days, during which time he could look for another position at 

FedEx (Ex. 3 to Gardner Decl.). On February 17, 2014, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s 

employment because he had been unable to find another position with the company. 

Gardner Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff filed suit on March 7, 2014. (Docket No. 1.) A jury trial in 

this matter is set to begin October 13, 2015. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 401 states that evidence is relevant if it “has any 

tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and “the fact is of consequence in 

determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Rule 402 creates a general presumption that 

relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Rule 403 

allows the court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE 

I. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding 

Defendant’s financial difficulties and the reorganization of the corporation’s Air, Ground, 

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and Freight Services (“AGFS”) division. Plaintiff argues that such evidence is irrelevant 

under Rule 401, because Defendant’s own Managing Director has “testified that the 

reorganization was not related to eliminating plaintiff’s position and that he is not aware of 

anyone being laid off as part of the reorganization.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2-3 (Docket No. 75). 

Defendant argues that “[i]t is simply not true that the downturn in business, resulting in a 

reorganization of AGFS, played no role in [Plaintiff]’s termination,” because the downturn 

and resulting reorganization led to overstaffing in Plaintiff’s position. Def.’s Opp’n at 4-5 

(Docket No. 81). Defendant further argues that excluding such evidence “would be highly 

prejudicial to [Defendant], as there would be no explanation for the elimination of 

[Plaintiff’s] position[],” and that Plaintiff will rely on this lack of explanation to support 

his claim of discrimination. Id. at 5. 

The Court finds that evidence regarding Defendant’s financial difficulties and the 

reorganization of AGFS is relevant to the number and quality of positions available when 

Plaintiff was released to return to work, and to Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination (i.e., to 

whether any adverse employment action was “because of” discrimination or other 

economic factors). Plaintiff’s first motion in limine is therefore DENIED. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding 

Plaintiff’s Workers’ Compensation recovery or potential recovery, and all references, 

evidence, and testimony regarding the fact that Plaintiff’s initial 90-day medical leave was 

“paid.” Plaintiff argues that such evidence is irrelevant under Rule 401, and is more 

prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 because such evidence could “confuse the jury 

in analyzing [Plaintiff’s] damages from discrimination” or cause the jury to think Plaintiff 

is “greedy.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3-4. Defendant concedes that it “does not intend to put on 

evidence of any Worker’s Compensation ‘award,’” but argues that the motion should 

nevertheless be denied because “[f]rom February 6 through August 30, [Plaintiff] was paid 

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two-thirds of his regular pay, without tax deductions, [and] was [therefore] on a paid 

medical leave of absence . . . .” Def.’s Opp’n at 5. 

Because Defendant does not intend to introduce any evidence regarding a Worker’s 

Compensation “award,” the Court finds no reason to deny Plaintiff’s motion to exclude 

such evidence. As to evidence regarding the fact that Plaintiff’s initial 90-day medical 

leave was “paid,” Defendant has provided no explanation why such evidence is relevant. 

Rather, Defendant has argued only that such evidence is factually correct. In the absence 

of any explanation of why the leave being “paid” has any tendency to make a fact of 

consequence “more or less probable,” the Court finds that any probative value of such 

evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues and/or misleading 

the jury with respect to the distinct issue of Plaintiff’s damages. Plaintiff’s second motion 

in limine is therefore GRANTED. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 3 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding 

Plaintiff’s application for and receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. Plaintiff argues 

that such evidence is “irrelevant under the collateral source rule,” which provides that 

damages “shall not be reduced by the receipt of payments for [a plaintiff’s] loss from a 

source wholly independent of the wrongdoer.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5. Defendant argues that 

the collateral source rule “only preclude[s] using the amount of money received through 

unemployment insurance as a set off against economic loss . . . [and] do[es] not preclude 

the introduction of the fact of receiving unemployment insurance benefits and the amount 

thereof.” Def.’s Opp’n at 5. Defendant further argues that “the fact [Plaintiff] was 

receiving unemployment insurance benefit payments helps explain why [he] was 

empowered to decline all part-time positions offered to him.” Id. at 6. 

Since Defendant concedes that evidence regarding Plaintiff’s unemployment 

benefits is inadmissible to reduce his damages, there must be some independent basis of 

relevance for the evidence to survive. Plaintiff’s financial position while unemployed may 

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have some probative value with respect to Defendant’s affirmative defense that Plaintiff 

failed to mitigate damages by making reasonable efforts to seek available employment. 

But the minimal probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger 

of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and/or misleading the jury, rendering it 

inadmissible under Rule 403. There is a significant risk, for instance, that the jury will 

confuse the issue and amount of any damages with the amount Plaintiff received through 

unemployment insurance. Such result would be both improper under the collateral source 

doctrine and would unfairly prejudice Plaintiff merely for making use of the 

unemployment insurance system. There is likewise a significant risk that any attempt to 

limit the jury’s consideration of such evidence will devolve into a mini-trial over the 

speculative effect of unemployment benefits on an unemployed individual’s willingness to 

work, a question which has little relevance, if any, to any claim or defense. Plaintiff’s 

third motion in limine is therefore GRANTED. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding 

Plaintiff’s at-will status while an employee of Defendant. Plaintiff argues that he does not 

contest his at-will status because he has not made a claim for “breach of the implied 

contract to terminate only for good cause,” and as such, “evidence of his at-will status is 

irrelevant to whether he was terminated in violation of FEHA.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff has continually “ma[de] much about his being an 18-year employee of 

[Defendant] and, therefore, deserving of better treatment,” which incorrectly “implies that 

[Plaintiff’s] mere status as a long-term employee creates rights” beyond those associated 

with at-will employment. Def.’s Opp’n at 6. 

The Court finds that evidence regarding Plaintiff’s at-will status is irrelevant under 

Rule 401. There is no dispute about whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee, and such 

evidence therefore has no bearing on a fact of consequence. Plaintiff’s fourth motion in 

limine is therefore GRANTED. If, however, Plaintiff introduces evidence at trial 

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suggesting that Plaintiff’s 18-year employment with Defendant entitled him to rights 

beyond those of an at-will employee, then Defendant may rebut this evidence with 

evidence that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. 

V. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 5 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding 

Defendant’s part-time and/or out-of-state job offers to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that these 

positions “were not comparable to his former position,” and are therefore irrelevant 

because Plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages was limited to acceptance of “substantially 

similar” positions. Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7. Defendant argues that the “substantial similarity” of 

the part-time and/or out-of-state positions to Plaintiff’s prior position is a question of fact 

for the jury. Def.’s Opp’n at 6. 

The Court finds that evidence regarding Defendant’s part-time and/or out-of-state 

job offers to Plaintiff is relevant to Defendant’s affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to 

mitigate damages, and that the question whether these offers were “substantially similar” 

to Plaintiff’s prior position with Defendant is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. 

See Cal. Civ. Jury Instr. (“CACI”) 2407 (Employee’s Duty to Mitigate Damages). 

Plaintiff’s fifth motion in limine is therefore DENIED. 

VI. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 6 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding the 

availability of full-time positions at Fedex after Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff argues 

that “whether [his] acceptance of a part-time job would have led to a full-time job was 

highly speculative at the time,” and such “evidence will mislead the jury into believing that 

plaintiff should have accepted a part-time position” that was actually inferior to his prior 

full-time position. Pl.’s Mot. at 8-9. Defendant argues that Plaintiff “must have had some 

idea of how often full-time RTD and/or other positions acceptable to him [would] become 

available” and that “the jury should be permitted to consider whether [Plaintiff] acted 

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reasonably [to mitigate damages, given] what he reasonably could have expected to 

occur.” Def.’s Opp’n at 7. 

The Court finds that the minimal relevance, if any, of this evidence is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury, rendering it inadmissible under Rule 403. 

As discussed above, whether the part-time and/or out-of-state jobs offered to Plaintiff were 

substantially similar to Plaintiff’s prior work is a question of fact for the jury. Defendant 

explains that it plans to use evidence of later full-time positions to influence the jury’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s assessment of the quality of these part-time and/or out-of-state 

jobs. See Def.’s Opp’n at 7. But this would require the jury to speculate as to Plaintiff’s 

mental state at the time of the relevant job offers. Such speculation creates a substantial 

risk that the jury will confuse the quality of these separate positions available at separate 

periods in time. Plaintiff’s sixth motion in limine is therefore GRANTED. 

VII. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 7 

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all references, evidence, and testimony regarding 

Plaintiff’s wife’s income. Plaintiff argues that “[u]nder the law, plaintiff’s damages are 

not altered based on his spouse’s income,” and that any “reference to such evidence will 

only confuse or mislead the jury in it [sic] proper analysis of plaintiff’s damages.” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 9-10. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s wife’s employment is relevant for two 

reasons: first, because her income is relevant to Plaintiff’s “decision-making when 

declining all offers of employment” from Defendant; and second, because Plaintiff has 

“always used the health care benefits available through [his wife’s] employer,” and that it 

is therefore incorrect for Plaintiff to include a $10,000 annual loss for health insurance in 

his calculation of economic damages. Def.’s Opp’n at 8. 

The Court finds that evidence of Plaintiff’s wife’s income is irrelevant under Rule 

401, because it has no bearing on either the amount of Plaintiff’s damages or Defendant’s 

affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. As to the amount of 

Plaintiff’s damages, Defendant has not contested that “[u]nder the law, plaintiff’s damages 

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are not altered based on his spouse’s income.” Pl.’s Mot. at 9-10. Rather, Defendant 

argues only that such evidence is relevant to Plaintiff’s “decision-making when declining 

all offers of employment.” Def.’s Opp’n at 8. But Defendant does not dispute that 

Plaintiff’s wife was employed before, during, and after Plaintiff’s period of 

unemployment. See id. (“[Plaintiff] did not avail himself of the health care benefits 

available through FedEx . . . he and his wife have always used the health care benefits 

available through her employer.”). Plaintiff’s wife’s income, which appears to have 

remained a constant during his periods of employment and unemployment, therefore has 

no probative value. Plaintiff’s seventh motion in limine is therefore GRANTED with 

respect to Plaintiff’s wife’s income. 

 As to Plaintiff’s wife’s health care benefits, Plaintiff has not moved this Court to 

exclude such evidence. Plaintiff’s seventh motion in limine addresses only Plaintiff’s 

wife’s income. It is therefore unnecessary for the Court to address the admissibility of 

such evidence. 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE 

Defendant seeks to exclude Plaintiff’s Exhibits 45, 49, and 54, and the testimony of 

Carlos Valdivia based thereon. Def.’s Mot. at 1 (Docket No. 72). Exhibit 54 is a draft of 

an investigative report prepared by HR advisor Tamra Green, which she submitted to HR 

manager Carlos Valdivia for review. Id. at 4. The report concerns Plaintiff’s original 

internal EEO Complaint for unfair treatment, and includes comments from Mr. Valdivia to 

Ms. Green regarding the content of the draft report. Id. Specifically, comment [CV2] 

states: “Management had waited almost 3 months to route bid. Why couldn’t management 

give him back his route? They could have if they wanted.” Id. Exhibit 45 is an email 

correspondence between Mr. Valdivia and Ms. Green discussing these comments (id. at 

Ex. B), and Exhibit 49 is a copy of the final report (id. at Ex. C). 

 Defendant argues: (1) the exhibits are irrelevant under Rule 401 because the report 

drafted by Ms. Green was not the one ultimately used by Defendant; (2) Mr. Valdivia’s 

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deposition testimony demonstrates that he lacked personal knowledge of the underlying 

facts surrounding Plaintiff’s employment and displacement, rendering his comments 

inadmissible under Rule 602; (3) Mr. Valdivia’s speculation on matters for which he lacks 

personal knowledge represent an improper lay opinion under Rule 701; (4) Mr. Valdivia’s 

comments were not statements of fact, but rather questions in the form of a “shorthand 

communication” to Ms. Green, and are therefore irrelevant under Rule 401; and (5) the 

evidence should be excluded under Rule 403 because it would invite a “minitrial over an 

inconsequential issue: i.e. whether Mr. Valdivia was making statements of fact or asking 

for additional information to be placed into an irrelevant report that was not used for any 

purpose relating to plaintiff,” a process which would “confuse the issues, mislead the jury, 

and waste the jury’s time.” Id. at 3-6. 

Plaintiff argues: (1) whether or not this report was used, it is relevant to the “quality 

of [Defendant]’s investigation of plaintiff’s complaints [and therefore] relevant to 

plaintiff’s failure to prevent discrimination claim”; (2) Mr. Valdivia had personal 

knowledge of both his own comments and his role within the investigation; (3) 

Mr. Valdivia’s comments are an admissible lay opinion because they are “rationally based 

on the perception of the witness”; and (4) Mr. Valdivia’s comments are not unduly 

prejudicial. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2-4 (Docket No. 80). 

The Court is not convinced by either party’s arguments at this stage. Accordingly, 

the Court reserves judgment on Defendant’s motion in limine. On the first day of trial, the 

parties shall present oral argument regarding the admissibility of Plaintiff’s Exhibits 45, 

49, and 54, and the testimony of Carlos Valdivia based thereon, including additional 

relevant case law if possible. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/06/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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