Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01574/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01574-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dennis Andrew Ball, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-01574-PHX-BSB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a “Notice for Reinstatement with Motion to 

Transfer to District Judge FRCP 42.1.” (Doc. 52.) Although Plaintiff cites Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 42.1, he appears to refer to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 which 

provides for the transfer of cases to a single judge “[w]hen two or more cases are pending 

before different Judges” that: (1) arise from substantially the same transaction or event; 

(2) involve substantially the same parties or question of law; (3) involve the same patent, 

trademark, or copyright; or (4) “for any other reason that would entail substantial 

duplication of labor if heard by different Judges.” LRCiv 42.1(a). None of those 

circumstances are present in this case, therefore, transfer under Rule 42.1 is 

inappropriate. However, liberally construing the pro se filing, Plaintiff appears to request 

permission to withdraw his consent to the magistrate judge and reassignment of this case 

to a district judge. See Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Pro se 

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complaints are to be construed liberally . . . .”). For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s motion 

should be denied.1

 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff commenced this matter seeking review of a determination of the 

Commissioner of Social Security on July 23, 2012. (Doc. 1.) That same day, the case 

was assigned to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade. (Doc. 3.) Plaintiff and Defendant 

consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (Doc. 9.) On 

October 31, 2013, the Court entered an order affirming the Commissioner’s decision and 

the Clerk of Court entered Judgment on November 8, 2013. (Docs. 45, 46.) Plaintiff 

now seeks to rescind his consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction and requests 

reassignment to a district judge.2

 (Doc. 52.) 

II. Discussion 

 A party to a federal civil case has, subject to some exceptions, a constitutional 

right to proceed before an Article III judge. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. 

Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). This right can be waived 

and the parties can consent to proceed before a magistrate judge. Id. at 542; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c)(1). As previously stated, this case was randomly assigned to a magistrate judge, 

and Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Plaintiff wants to withdraw that consent because he disagrees with the Court’s Order 

affirming the Commissioner’s determination. (Doc. 42.) Plaintiff does not make any 

allegations of bias or impartiality against the magistrate judge. 

 

1

 Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(3) provides that “the district 

judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge,” under this rule, the Court proceeds by a Report and Recommendation to the Honorable Stephen M. McNamee. See General 

Order 11-03. 

2

 Plaintiff has filed two prior motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s October 31, 2013 order, which the Court denied. (Docs. 47, 50.) In both orders, the 

Court advised Plaintiff that he could seek review of the October 31, 2013 order in the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 47 at 1 n.1, Doc. 50 at 1.) To date, Plaintiff has 

not filed a notice of appeal with this Court. 

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 Although a party in a civil case does not have “an absolute right” to withdraw 

consent to trial and other proceedings before a magistrate judge, see Dixon v. Ylst, 990 

F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993), the court may vacate the reference of a civil matter to a 

magistrate judge “for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary 

circumstances shown by any party.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); see also Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 73(b)(3). These requirements are “strictly construed.” Montano v. Solomon, 2010 WL 

2403389, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Brook, Weiner, Sered, Kreger & Weinberg v. 

Coreq, Inc., 53 F.3d 851, 852 (7th Cir. 1995) (party’s legal successor bound by party’s 

consent to jurisdiction of magistrate judge)). 

 The factors relevant to the court’s consideration of a request to withdraw consent 

to magistrate judge jurisdiction include the timeliness of the request, whether granting the 

request would unduly interfere with or delay the proceedings, and whether the party’s 

consent was voluntary and uncoerced. United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 1983) (citing Carter v. Sea Land Servs., Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) 

(considering “inconvenience to the court and witnesses, prejudice to the parties, whether 

the movant is acting pro se, whether the motion is made in good faith, and whether the 

interests of justice would be served by holding a party to his consent”)). 

 Here, although Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, there is no evidence that 

his consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction was involuntary or coerced. Plaintiff does not 

argue that his initial consent was involuntary. (Doc.52.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s request 

to rescind his consent is untimely because it was made after the Court entered judgment 

in this matter. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s rulings does not constitute good 

cause or an extraordinary circumstance for withdrawing consent to the jurisdiction of a 

magistrate judge. See M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. McGill, 2011WL 2464184, at *2 

(D. Ariz. Jun. 21, 2011) (denying motion to withdraw consent stating that disagreement 

with magistrate judge’s rulings is not an extraordinary circumstance); Graham v. 

Runnels, 2010 WL 3941428, *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (denying reconsideration of 

order denying plaintiff’s motion to withdraw consent). 

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 Plaintiff has not presented evidence of “extraordinary circumstances,” and the 

Court does not find good cause at this time to vacate the reference to a magistrate judge. 

Because Plaintiff has not made a showing entitling him to withdraw his consent, the 

Court recommends that Plaintiff’s “Notice for Reinstatement with Motion to Transfer to 

District Judge FRCP 42.1,” construed as a motion to rescind his consent and for 

reassignment to a district judge, be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s “Notice for Reinstatement with Motion 

to Transfer to District Judge FRCP 42.1” (Doc. 52), construed as a motion to rescind his 

consent and for reassignment to a district judge, be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 13th day of December, 2013. 

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