Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03168/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SMILEY JAMES HARRIS

a/k/a JAMES LaVELL HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAKE COUNTY JAIL; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-3168 SI (pr)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Smiley James Harris a/k/a James LaVell Harris, formerly an inmate at the Lake County

Jail, filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court reviewed his

complaint, he filed a first amended complaint. His first amended complaint supersedes the

complaint and is now before the court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

BACKGROUND

In his first amended complaint, Harris complained about the response of officials at the

Lake County Jail to his medical problems since his arrival at the jail on January 15, 2009. He

alleged the following in his first amended complaint:

Before his incarceration, Harris was awarded SSI benefits in December 2005 for his

conditions of antisocial personality disorder and degenerative disk disease in his spine. First

Amended Complaint, p. 5. He claims to be a disabled individual under the Americans With

Disabilities Act. Id. Harris had chronic pain caused by his degenerative disk disease for which

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Jail employees apparently believed Harris was trying to game the system to obtain

marijuana in jail. In another one of the several actions he filed in this court, Harris v. State of

California, Case No. C 09-3257 SI, Harris attached to his petition documents from a state court

action he had filed concerning, among other things, his medical needs and requests for

accommodations. Those records include a declaration from a nurse and from a captain at the

jail. The nurse declared that Harris was unreceptive to any medical care other than his desired

marijuana and did not have any condition that prohibited him from walking. A captain at the jail

declared that the jail staff had not refused any reasonable accommodation because the medical

staff stated that Harris did not have any disabling condition that required the use of a wheelchair.

Nonetheless, jail transportation officers allowed Harris to use a wheelchair when making court

appearances “to prevent Mr. Harris from causing a disturbance in the Courthouse by insisting

on crawling on the floor, and to prevent dangerous distractions while transporting multiple

inmates.” Howe Decl., p. 3. 

2

he needed to consume marijuana on a daily basis. Without his daily use of medical marijuana,

his “pain levels increase so as to prevent [him] from standing and/or walking without

experiencing extreme pain.” Id. His Christian Fundamentalist religious beliefs prohibited the

use of narcotics and pharmaceuticals for the treatment of his chronic pain. At the jail, he

unsuccessfully asked to be allowed to use medical marijuana, to be provided with a wheelchair,

and to receive a “no standing” chrono (i.e., a permission slip) that would excuse him from

having to stand for the twice daily standing count at the jail.1

On January 16, 2009, a day after his arrival at the jail, Harris saw family nurse

practitioner K. C. Grisby and informed her of his chronic low back pain caused by his

degenerative disk disease and told her of his need for medical marijuana to treat that pain.

Grisby denied his request for medical marijuana. Grisby also denied his alternative requests for

use of a wheelchair and a “no standing” chrono. First Amended Complaint, p. 8. Harris was

offered narcotic and pharmaceutical pain medications as an alternative, but he refused them

based on his religious beliefs. Because his requests were denied, he had to crawl on the concrete

floor of the jail and had shooting pains in his knees. He had already received chronos allowing

him to be housed on the lowest floor and on the lower bunk in any cell, but was refused the

additional requested accommodations by medical staff.

Harris alleged that defendants R. Howe, K. C. Grisby, Alishia Stottsberry and Kirk

Andrews responded with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in that they (1) refused to

allow him to have medical marijuana to treat his chronic pain, (2) refused to provide him a

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

wheelchair, and (3) refused to provide him with a “no standing” chrono. He also alleged that

these wrongful acts occurred because of Lake County Sheriff Rodney Mitchell’s failure to

properly train, supervise and/or instruct his employees and agents; and/or his failure to modify

and/or enact policies at the Lake County Jail. 

Harris also asserted that various ill consequences resulted from the medical staff’s

decisions. For example, correctional officers refused to provide him with a wheelchair so he had

to move about the jail by crawling, he was repeatedly disciplined for failing for participate in the

twice daily standing inmate count, he lost privileges as a result of the disciplinary actions, and

he lost time credits as a result of the disciplinary actions. Harris was released from the jail after

filing this action. 

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

A. Deliberate Indifference To Medical Needs

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

When an inmate alleges that his medical care has been constitutionally inadequate, he

must allege two things to state a claim: (1) a serious medical need and (2) deliberate indifference

to that need by prison officials. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). Liberally construed, the first amended complaint states a cognizable

§ 1983 claim against defendants R. Howe, K.C. Grisby, Alishia Stottsberry, Kirk Andrews and

Rodney Mitchell for deliberate indifference to Harris’ serious medical needs. These individuals

allegedly denied his request for medical marijuana to treat his chronic pain, refused to provide

a wheelchair for him, and refused to provide a “no standing” chrono. 

The first amended complaint does not state a claim against the custodial officers who

acted in accordance with the medical staff’s determinations. The members of the custodial staff

did not deny Harris access to medical care, but instead acted in accord with the determinations

of the medical staff. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, p. 9 (“custodial staff says that because

medical staff will not issue the ‘chrono’ that I must ‘stand’ for the count or be prosecuted.”)

B. ADA Claim

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101 et seq. (ADA),

provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities

of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To

state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff

is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or

receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services,

programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Although § 12132 does not expressly

provide for reasonable accommodations, the implementing regulations provide that “[a] public

entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the

modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public

entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). The duty to provide “reasonable

accommodations” or “reasonable modifications” for disabled people under Title II of the ADA

arises only when a policy, practice or procedure discriminates on the basis of disability.

Weinreich v. Los Angeles County MTA, 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Harris claimed that the defendants refused to provide reasonable accommodations for him

as a disabled person. The ADA claim has two problems. The first problem is the defendant

problem. The defendants were sued in their individual and official capacities. None of the

defendants has liability in his or her individual capacity for the alleged ADA violation. See

Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003).

The claim against the defendants in their individual capacities would have to be dismissed. The

only basis on which ADA liability would exist would be to the extent the defendants were acting

in their official capacity. A suit against a person in his official capacity is considered to be a suit

against the entity of which the officer is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985). For example, naming the sheriff or captain of the jail in his official capacity would be

considered a suit against Lake County as the operator of the jail. 

The second problem with the ADA claim concerns the remedy. In his first amended

complaint, Harris requested damages and injunctive relief. Monetary damages are not available

under Title II of the ADA absent a showing of discriminatory intent. See Ferguson v. City of

Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998). To show discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must

establish deliberate indifference by the public entity. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d

1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). Harris did not allege discriminatory intent by the public entity, so

damages would not be available as a remedy to him if he prevailed on his ADA claim. That

leaves injunctive relief as the only remedy, but Harris’ release from jail made that moot. When

an inmate is released from prison or transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable

expectation nor demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions

from which he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as

moot. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783

F.2d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1986); see also PUC v. FERC, 100 F.3d at 1459 (federal court cannot

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

issue declaratory judgment if claim is moot). The ADA claim is dismissed as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. The first amended complaint states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against defendants Rodney Mitchell, Kirk Andrews, Alishia Stottsberry, K. C. Grisby, and

Robert Howe for deliberate indifference to Harris’ medical needs in violation of his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. All other defendants and

claims are dismissed.

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without

prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the amended complaint and a copy of all the

documents in the case file upon the following defendants who apparently work at the Lake

County Jail (“LCJ”):

- Rodney Mitchell (sheriff of Lake County)

- Kirk Andrews, M.D. (medical director of LCJ Medical Services Program) 

- Alishia Stottsberry, R.N. (medical program manager at LCJ)

- K.C. Grisby, F.N.P. (LCJ Medical Services Program)

- Robert Howe (captain at LCJ) 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for

dispositive motions is set:

a. No later than May 28, 2010, defendants must file and serve a motion for

summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion that this case

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they must so inform the court prior to the date the

motion is due.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion

must be filed with the court and served upon defendants no later than July 2, 2010. Plaintiff

must bear in mind the following notice and warning regarding summary judgment as he prepares

his opposition to any summary judgment motion:

The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have

your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. [¶] Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact --

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party

who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly

supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary

judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your

case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. (See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63

(9th Cir. 1998).) 

c. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and

served no later than July 16, 2010.

4. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on a defendant's

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant's counsel. The court may disregard

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant's

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to

defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to

counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of

address in every pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

/ / /

/ / / 

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

7. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this

case on any document he submits to this court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2010 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-03168-SI Document 8 Filed 04/01/10 Page 8 of 8