Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02221/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02221-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW FERNANDES,

Plaintiff,

v.

TW TELECOM HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-2221-GEB-CKD 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE 

SCHEDULING ORDER AND SUA SPONTE 

AMENDMENT OF THE TRIAL

COMMENCEMENT DATE

Plaintiff filed a motion on February 27, 2015, in which 

he seeks de facto amendment of most dates in the scheduling order 

issued on February 26, 2014. (Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, 

(“Scheduling Order,”) ECF No. 20.) Specifically, Plaintiff seeks 

leave to file an amended complaint that would add four claims 

against Defendant, to re-open the expired February 3, 2015 

discovery completion date so that he could have six additional 

months to conduct discovery on both his existing claims and the 

four proposed claims, and to continue the scheduled September 15, 

2015 trial commencement date for six months. The following 

provisions in the scheduling order concern these requests: “no 

further . . . amendments to pleadings is permitted, except with 

leave of Court for good cause shown,” “all discovery shall be 

completed by February 3, 2015,” and “[t]rial shall commence . . . 

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

on September 15, 2015.” (Scheduling Order 2:19-20; 3:5; 5:10-11.)

Plaintiff‟s request would also necessitate amendment of the nowpast April 13, 2015 last hearing date for motions and the 

scheduled June 15, 2015 final pretrial conference date. Plaintiff

argues his motion should be granted, stating:

After his termination, Defendant . . . 

inform[ed him] that he was free to apply for 

jobs within the company and that he would be 

seriously considered for any jobs for which 

he was qualified. And yet, unbeknownst to 

Plaintiff, . . . his personnel file contained 

a single innocuous sheet, a “Separation 

Checklist for Termination” (“termination 

checklist”). The termination checklist, 

baldly contradicts all communications to 

Plaintiff, advising internal hiring agents 

that Plaintiff is not eligible for rehire due 

to “unprofessional questionable conduct 

during term” 

. . . .

This Court has advised that, “No further 

service, joinder of parties, or amendments to 

pleadings is permitted, except with leave of 

Court for good cause shown.” (ECF Document 

No. 20, 2:19-21.) Good cause exists here for 

two distinct reasons. First, Plaintiff has 

uncovered facts which, if proven, support 

four additional causes of action . . . 

Second, Defendant‟s persons most 

knowledgeable about key topics of the 

existing case [(“30(b)(6) witnesses”)]—

including a failure to acknowledge 

Plaintiff‟s complaint of retaliation, a bonus 

plan paid to Plaintiff, the nature and 

existence of contracts with the government, 

and the genesis of the “termination 

checklist”—were unable to articulate details 

about these topics. Thus, good cause exists 

to extend discovery and trial by 6 months.

(Mot. 1:18-26, 17:17-26, ECF No. 22-1.)

Although Plaintiff argues in a conclusory manner that

“good cause” exists for the scheduling order amendments he seeks, 

the authority under which he actually argues his pleading 

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

amendment motion concerns the liberal amendment pleading standard 

prescribed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15. 

However, “[o]nce the district court ha[s] filed a . . .

scheduling order [under Rule 16(b)] . . . that rule‟s [good 

cause] standard[] control[s]” and the movant seeking to amend the 

no further amendment provision in the scheduling order must first 

demonstrate “good cause” under Rule 16(b) for that amendment 

before addressing whether a pleading amendment is proper under 

Rule 15. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-

08 (9th Cir. 1992).

“A court's evaluation of good cause is not 

coextensive with an inquiry into the 

propriety of the amendment under . . . Rule 

15.” Unlike Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment 

policy which focuses on the bad faith of the 

party seeking to interpose an amendment and 

the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 

16(b)'s “good cause” standard primarily 

considers the diligence of the party seeking 

the amendment. The district court may modify 

the pretrial schedule “if it cannot 

reasonably be met despite the diligence of 

the party seeking the extension.” Moreover, 

carelessness is not compatible with a finding 

of diligence and offers no reason for a grant 

of relief. Although the existence or degree 

of prejudice to the party opposing the 

modification might supply additional reasons 

to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is 

upon the moving party's reasons for seeking 

modification. If that party was not diligent, 

the inquiry should end.

Id. at 609 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 

A. Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Corresponding 

Discovery

Plaintiff argues he should be granted leave to add four 

claims to his complaint and to conduct discovery on those claims 

since he “uncovered facts . . . support[ing] four additional 

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

[claims].” (Mot. 17:19-24.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 

after filing the Complaint, he discovered that Defendant 

“advis[ed] internal agents [through the “termination checklist”]

that Plaintiff was not eligible for rehire [due] to 

„unprofessional questionable conduct during [his] term.‟” (Mot. 

1:22-26.) Plaintiff declares this information supports his 

additional claims since “[a]t the time [he] was terminated, [an 

employee of Defendant] advised [Plaintiff] that [he] could apply 

for any position for which [he] was qualified.” (Fernandes Decl. 

¶ 12, ECF No. 22-3.) 

Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated

the “good cause” Rule 16 requires since the termination checklist 

“upon which [Plaintiff] bases his [m]otion . . . [was served on 

Plaintiff in discovery] on March 24, 2014; and [Plaintiff] did 

nothing for six months [after receipt of that information] to 

follow up on that purportedly key piece of evidence.” (Opp‟n 1:7-

8, ECF No. 24.)

Plaintiff does not dispute this service date. Instead, 

he argues that to plead his additional claims, he needed to 

obtain further information about the “unprofessional, 

questionable conduct” statement in the termination checklist and 

that he sought such further information through Defendant‟s 

30(b)(6) depositions, which occurred in January 2015. (See 

generally Mot. 18:7-19:5; Boucher Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, 18, ECF No. 22-

2.)

Plaintiff‟s counsel declares that he “inquired with 

Defendant about possible dates for Defendant‟s . . . Rule 

30(b)(6) . . . depositions” “in early October[2014],” and that

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

“[o]n November 19, 2014” he “set the [dates for the] deposition 

of Defendant‟s [30(b)(6) witnesses].” (Boucher Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11.) 

Plaintiff‟s counsel further declares those depositions were 

initially noticed for “January 14, 2015,” but after communication

with Defendant‟s counsel, the dates were changed and he 

ultimately deposed the witnesses on the following dates: January 

8, 2015, January 20, 2015, January 27, 2015, and January 30, 

2015. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 16-18.)

Plaintiff has not cogently explained why he needed 

Defendant‟s 30(b)(6) deposition testimony, in addition to the 

information he received in the termination checklist, to plead

his additional claims. Further, while unexpected information “can 

constitute good cause [for amending a scheduling order], that 

good cause does not exist indefinitely.” Fermin v. Toyota 

Material Handling, U.S.A., Inc., No. 10-3755, 2012 WL 1393074, at 

*6 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2012). Rather, “amend[ment of] the 

[s]cheduling [o]rder [should be diligently sought] once it 

bec[omes] apparent [to Plaintiff] that [he or she] could not 

comply with the order.” Hardy v. Cnty. of El Dorado, No. 2-07-CV0799 JAM EFB, 2008 WL 3876329, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008) 

(denying plaintiff‟s request for amendment since plaintiff had 

not “adequately explain[ed] why an extension of time was not 

sought earlier.”). Plaintiff has not “adequately explained why 

[he] waited [eleven] months after receiving the [termination 

checklist] before filing the motion to amend.” Eckert Cold 

Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 

1996). Even assuming that Plaintiff needed Defendant‟s 30(b)(6) 

deposition testimony to state the additional claims, he still 

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

fails to demonstrate diligence in seeking to amend the scheduling 

order since by his own account, more than seven months passed 

after he was served the termination checklist before he contacted 

Defendant about scheduling the depositions. The several months 

“gap [between Plaintiff‟s receipt of the new information and his 

filing of the motion to amended the scheduling order] shows a 

lack of diligence on his part, which cunctation is the antithesis 

of the finding of good cause contemplated under Rule 16 . . . 

Carbajal v. St. Anthony Cent. Hosp., No. 12-cv-02257, 2015 WL 

1499864, at *2 n.4 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2015). Permitting Plaintiff 

to now upend the scheduling order several months after Plaintiff 

clearly became aware of the facts that he could have used as a 

basis for amendment much earlier in the proceeding, would permit 

“the sort of disruption that Rule 16(b) was designed to prevent.” 

Eckert Cold Storage, Inc., 943 F. Supp. at 1233.

Since Plaintiff has not shown “good cause” to amend the 

“no further amendment” and “discovery completion deadline” 

provisions of the scheduling order, Plaintiff‟s de facto request

to amend these portions of the scheduling order is denied. 

B. Discovery for Plaintiff’s Existing Claims and Trial 

Date

Plaintiff also argues discovery should be re-opened for 

his existing claims and the trial commencement date deferred six 

months because Defendant‟s 30(b)(6) witnesses “were unable to 

articulate details about . . . [relevant] topics,” including 

“Plaintiff‟s [claim] of retaliation, a bonus plan paid to 

Plaintiff, the nature and existence of contracts with the 

government, and the genesis of the „termination checklist.‟” 

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

(Mot. 17:22-25.)

Defendant counters Plaintiff has not shown “good cause” 

under Rule 16 for the referenced amendments since he “did not 

conduct any discovery in the months of April, May, June, July, 

August, or September 2014—the precise six-month amount of time 

for which [he] now seeks [to conduct additional discovery].”

(Opp‟n 12:28-13:2.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to conduct 

any discovery from April through and including September 2014,

and instead replies “[b]oth parties did little in discovery from 

March to October 2014.” (Reply 6:9-10, ECF No. 25). Whether or 

not another party conducted discovery has not been shown 

pertinent to the issue whether Plaintiff could have “reasonably” 

completed discovery within the prescribed discovery period. 

Johnson, 975 F.3d at 609 (requiring that a satisfactory 

explanation be provided concerning why the discovery could not be 

completed “despite [his] . . . diligence.”) 

Further, the scheduling order that Plaintiff referenced 

in his motion states in relevant part: 

All discovery shall be completed by February 

3, 2015. “Completed” means all discovery 

shall be conducted so that any dispute 

relative to discovery shall have been 

resolved by appropriate orders, if necessary, 

and, where discovery has been ordered, the 

order has been complied with on or before the 

“completion” date.

(Scheduling Order 3:5-10.) Therefore, it is pellucid that in the 

exercise of diligence Rule 16 requires, Plaintiff should have 

noticed Defendant‟s 30(b)(6) depositions early enough so that any 

dispute concerning the objective of that discovery was “resolved” 

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

and any discovery order concerning the objective of that 

discovery was “complied with on or before” February 3, 2015. 

Instead, Plaintiff waited until the last few weeks of the 

discovery period to depose Defendant‟s 30(b)(6) witnesses and

filed the motion sub judice twenty-four days after the discovery 

completion date. Since Plaintiff has not justified his admitted 

delay by explaining why the discovery completion date could not 

have “reasonably be[en] met despite [his] diligence,” Plaintiff‟s

motion to re-open discovery and delay the trial date is denied.

Johnson, 975 F.3d at 609. 

C. Sua Sponte Amendment to the Trial Date

However, an unrelated conflict has developed concerning 

the trial date. Therefore the scheduling order is amended sua 

sponte, and trial shall commence at 9:00 a.m. on October 20, 

2015. 

Dated: April 22, 2015

Case 2:13-cv-02221-GEB-CKD Document 30 Filed 04/23/15 Page 8 of 8