Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01904/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01904-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael C. Bauerline, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Equity Residential Properties

Management Corporation; Lotus &

Windoware, Inc.; Jumbo Surplus

Corporation; John and Jane Does I-X;

Black and White

Corporations/Partnerships I-X,

Defendants.

NO. CIV-04-1904-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

AND ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Lotus & Windoware, Inc.’s (“Lotus”)

Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). (Dkt. 91.) Plaintiffs Michael Bauerline,

Shannon Bauerline, and Patricia Bauerline (“Plaintiffs”) oppose the Motion. (Dkts. 99-100,

108.) For purposes of the instant Motion only, Defendant Equity Residential Properties

Management Corporation (“Equity”) joins in Plaintiffs’ opposition. (Dkt. 112.) After

considering the arguments raised by the parties, the Court issues the following ruling.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Brooke Bauerline (“Brooke”), which

occurred on May 15, 2003. Brooke died of strangulation when her neck was caught in a

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loop formed by multiple mini-blind pull cords joined together in a single tassel. The miniblinds were installed in an apartment complex maintained by defendant Equity. Plaintiffs

allege that Lotus and Jumbo Surplus Corporation (“Jumbo”) designed, manufactured, and/or

distributed the mini-blinds that led to Brooke’s strangulation and that Lotus and Jumbo were

also engaged in recall/retrofit efforts of the mini-blinds throughout Arizona. (Dkt. 47 at 1-

15.) Defendant Lotus contends it distributed the mini-blind in question without any loops

in the separate pull cords and with a warning label and two warning hang tags, in

compliance with industry standards. (Dkt. 91 at 2.) Lotus further contends that, after the

mini-blind was distributed, someone other than Lotus altered it by removing the warning

hang tags and tying the separate pull cords together, forming two dangerous loops. (Id.) 

A. Procedural Background

On August 10, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior

Court against Lotus and Equity. (Dkt. 1, Ex. A.) On September 13, 2004, Equity removed

the action to this Court. (Dkt. 1.) On May 12, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended

Complaint, adding plaintiff Patricia Bauerline, Brooke’s surviving sister who witnessed the

accident, and defendant Jumbo Surplus Corporation (“Jumbo”). (Dkt. 40.) On June 29,

2005, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”). (Dkt. 47.)

The Complaint contains seven counts: (i) Count 1, Negligence against Lotus

and Jumbo; (ii) Count 2, Strict Products Liability against Lotus and Jumbo; (iii) Count 3,

Civil Conspiracy against Lotus and Jumbo; (iv) Count 4, Negligence against Equity; (v)

Count 5, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress by Michael Bauerline against all

defendants; (vi) Count 6, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress by Patricia Bauerline

against all defendants; and (vii) Count 7, Claim for Punitive Damages against all defendants.

On August 25, 2005, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court dismissed

Count 5 of the Complaint without prejudice. (Dkt. 56.) On February 15, 2006, the Court

granted Equity’s motion for partial summary judgment on Claim 7. (Dkt. 80.) Lotus seeks

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 Except as otherwise stated below, the following facts are not genuinely disputed.

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summary judgment on Counts 1, 2 and 3. (Dkt. 91.)

B. Factual Background1

The Strangulation Death of Brooke Bauerline

Beginning in September 2002, Brooke, her sister and her father, Michael

Bauerline, lived in the La Mariposa apartment complex owned and operated by defendant

Equity. (Dkts. 92 at ¶1; 100 at ¶1 and Ex. 5 at ¶3.) When the Bauerlines moved into the

apartment, neither the blind at issue nor any other window covering contained any warning

“hang tags.” (Dkt. 100, Ex. 5 at ¶6.) Before Brooke’s death, Brooke’s father was not aware

of, and did not read, any warning on the mini-blinds in the apartment, even though the

bottom rail of the blind at issue contained a warning label. (Dkts. 92 at ¶14; 100 at ¶14.)

Brooke’s bed was located under a window covered by the mini-blind at issue.

When she stood on the headboard of her bed, Brooke was able to reach the mini-blind pull

cord. (Dkts. 92 at ¶2; 100 at ¶2.) On May 15, 2003, at the age of 31⁄2 years, Brooke was

strangled to death when her throat was caught in one of the loops of the mini-blind pull cord.

(Dkts. 92 at ¶¶3-4; 100 at ¶¶3-4.) 

At the time of Brooke’s death, the three pull cords of the mini-blind were

joined together inside a single tassel, forming two loops. (Dkts. 92 at ¶5; 100 at ¶5.) When

Brooke was found strangled to death, one of the loops was around and under her throat from

ear-to-ear. (Dkts. 92 at ¶6; 100 at ¶6.) 

Distribution and Design of the Mini-Blind at Issue

The parties agree that, in 1998, Lotus distributed, but did not manufacture, the

mini-blind that caused Brooke’s death. (Dkts. 92 at ¶7; 100 at ¶7.) Plaintiffs contend Lotus

designed the mini-blind because it dictated, among other things, the warnings that Jumbo,

the manufacturer of the blinds, was supposed to affix to the product. (Dkt. 100 at ¶7 and

Exs. 1 at 26-27, 128-29; Ex. 2.) Lotus denies designing the mini-blind, but admits

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2

 Plaintiffs do not dispute the presence of a warning label on the bottom rail of the miniblind at the time it was distributed by Lotus. Plaintiffs do dispute the presence of two “hang

tag” warnings attached to the pull cords when the mini-blind was distributed. See Dkt. 100 at

¶9. The Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the mini-blinds were

distributed in 1998 with the hang tags warnings. Plaintiffs’ evidence fails to demonstrate

otherwise and does not create a genuine issue of material fact, see Dkt. 100, Ex. 3 at ¶11

(stating only it is “not clear that the [mini-blind] was sold with hang tags)”; Ex. 5 at ¶6 (“At the

time I moved into the apartment, neither the blind in question, nor any window covering in the

apartment, contained any warning hang tags.”) (emphasis added). See Rodriguez v. Airborne

Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (self-serving affidavits will not establish a genuine

issue of material fact if they fail to state facts based on personal knowledge).

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specifying whether warnings were to be attached to the blind and separate tassels were to

be affixed to the pull cords. (Dkts. 92 at ¶7; 114 at ¶¶25-28.)

The parties dispute whether, when Lotus distributed the mini-blind in 1998,

each of the three pull cords entered separate tassels such that no dangerous loops were

formed by the joinder of multiple cords inside one tassel. (Dkts. 92 at ¶8; 100 at ¶8.) 

When Lotus distributed the mini-blind in 1998, it contained a total of three

warnings: one label adhered to the bottom rail of the mini-blind and two hanging tags

attached to the pull cords. (Dkt. 92 at ¶9.)2

 The warning label on the bottom rail of the

mini-blind in question read: “WARNING Young children can become entangled and

strangle in cord or bead loops. Use safety devices to reduce access or eliminate loops.”

(Dkts. 92 at ¶11; 100 at ¶11.) After Lotus distributed the mini-blind at issue, a person or

persons other than Lotus altered the mini-blind by removing the two warning hang tags

attached to the pull cords of the blind. (Dkts. 92 at ¶21; 100 at ¶21.)

Industry Standards

On November 27, 1996, the United States Consumer Product Safety

Commission (the “CPSC”) approved the American National Standard for Safety of Corded

Window Covering Products, ANSI/WCMA standard A100.1-1996 (the “ANSI/WCMA

Standard”). The ANSI/WCMA Standard provided that the application of three separate

warnings on mini-blinds and the separation of pull cords by separate tassels are two ways

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to “reduce the possibility of injury, including strangulation, to young children from the . .

. cord, or any type of flexible loop device used to operate the product.” (Dkts. 92 at ¶10

and Ex. J; 100 at ¶10.) Compliance with the ANSI/WCMA Standard is the minimum

acceptable industry standard. (Dkt. 100 at ¶10 and Ex. 6.) 

On January 19, 2001, the CPSC recommended revisions to the ANSI/WCMA

Standard. (Dkt. 92 at ¶15.) Among the CPSC’s recommended revisions were that (i) cord

stop devices be placed on accessible inner cords to decrease the risk of inner cord

strangulation; and (ii) pull cord lengths be limited to 7.25 inches. (Dkts. 92 at ¶15; 100 at

¶15.) On August 29, 2002, the ANSI/WCMA Standard was revised to include the

requirement of placing cord stop devices on accessible inner cords, but the Standard did not

incorporate the CPSC’s recommendation that cord lengths be limited to 7.25 inches. (Dkts.

92 at ¶16 and Ex. N; 100 at ¶16.) 

Retrofitting at La Mariposa Apartments

In September 1994, the Window Covering Safety Council (the “WCSC”)

submitted a Voluntary Corrective Action Plan to the CPSC that detailed the need for a

retrofit program to separate looped pull cords then commonly associated with two-cord

mini-blinds. (Dkt. 80 at 3:10-14.) In September 2000, the WCSC submitted a second

Action Plan to the CSPC that detailed the need for the industry to adopt product

modifications to place stop devices on mini-blinds to prevent inner cords from being pulled

and formed into loops. (Id. at 3:15-18.)

In 2001, defendant Equity sought to retrofit mini-blinds in the La Mariposa

apartment complex to implement retrofit programs that the WCSC had submitted to the

CPSC in 1994 and 2000. (Dkts. 92 at ¶17; 100 at ¶17.) The retrofit program Equity

undertook involved (i) separating looped pull cords on mini-blinds by placing a separate

tassel on each pull cord; and (ii) placing plastic “doughnuts” on each pull cord to prevent

the centerline in the blind from being pulled out. (Dkts. 92 at ¶¶18-19; 100 at ¶¶18-19.) 

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The parties agree that Equity attempted to retrofit the mini-blind that killed

Brooke by installing “plastic doughnuts” on each of the three pull cords. (Dkts. 92 at ¶20;

100 at ¶20.) However, the parties disagree whether Equity separated and put clear tassels

on each of the three pull cords. Lotus contends Equity altered the mini-blind at issue by

removing the color-matched tassels on the blinds distributed by Lotus and placing a clear

tassel on each of the three separate pull cords. (Dkt. 92 at ¶20.) Lotus further contends that

a person other than Lotus altered the mini-blind at issue by passing the three separate pull

cords through a single clear tassel, forming two dangerous loops. (Id., at ¶¶21-22.) 

Plaintiffs further contend the blind at issue was distributed and sold by Lotus with three pull

cords going into a single clear tassel. (Dkt. 100 at ¶20.) As a result, Plaintiffs contend there

is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether any alteration took place and, if so, whether such

alteration was foreseeable. (Dkt. 99 at 10.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting

documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). Substantive law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, mere allegations of a factual dispute between

the parties will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Rather, Rule

56 requires that there be a genuine issue of material fact, which is a dispute capable of

affecting the outcome of the case. Id. Accordingly, summary judgment is proper if, under

governing laws, there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict; if reasonable

finders of fact could resolve a factual issue in favor of either party, summary judgment

should not be granted. Id.

The movant on a summary judgment motion bears the initial burden of

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3

 When Lotus filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, Jumbo had not yet

appeared in the action. See Dkts. 91, 160. Thus, the Court finds that Lotus’ reference to Jumbo

is an attempt to avoid Plaintiffs’ argument that Lotus designed the mini-blind at issue. Thus,

the Court will strike all of Lotus’ references to Jumbo. See Dkt. 91 at 9:1-6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 19;

10:3-4, 6, 8, 11-13, 15, 21; 11:1-2, 5, 7-8, 10, 13, 17; 13:1, 3, 6-7.

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providing a legal basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If

the moving party satisfies this burden, the opposing party must produce specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that a genuine issue for trial

exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech’l

Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). However, inferences must be based on evidence

which, if believed, would be sufficient to support a judgment for the nonmoving party.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Inferences cannot be created by pointing to “some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586 (1986). Deference to the nonmoving party has limits: (i) a plaintiff cannot rest on

the allegations in her pleadings to overcome a motion for summary judgment (Brinson v.

Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995)); and (ii) self-serving

affidavits will not establish a genuine issue of material fact if they fail to state facts based

on personal knowledge or are too conclusory (Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890,

902 (9th Cir. 2001)).

DISCUSSION

A. Count 1: Liability for Negligence

Lotus contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence

claim because a reasonable trier of fact could only conclude that Lotus (i) used reasonable

care under the circumstances or (ii) the negligence alleged against it was not the proximate

cause of Brooke’s death.3

 (Dkt. 91 at 9.) The Court finds that summary judgment may not

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be granted on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim because there is a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether Lotus distributed the mini-blind at issue with the separate pull cords tied

together in a single tassel, creating two dangerous loops, one of which strangled Brooke. 

Lotus contends it was not “‘negligent in allowing the [mini-blinds at issue

here] to be sold without a mechanism to prevent the possibility of strangulation,’” because

“the only ‘mechanism’ needed to prevent Brooke’s strangulation was the separate, unlooped

pull cords . . . [it] provided.” (Dkt. 91 at 9.) In defending against Equity’s motion for partial

summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that “[t]he blind in question was manufactured in 1998

. . . with a separate plastic tassel at the end of each draw cord string.” (Dkt. 68 at 18, ¶54;

see also dkt. 67 at 6:10-12; at 6:20-23.) Plaintiffs now dispute “whether there was a separate

tassel at the end of each pull cord as [Lotus] contends.” (Dkt. 100 at ¶8; Ex. 3.) For three

reasons, the Court rejects Lotus’s argument that there is no genuine issue of material fact

as to whether Lotus distributed the mini-blind that strangled Brooke with separate, unlooped

pull cords. 

First, the Court exercises its discretion and refuses to treat Plaintiffs’ earlier

contention that the blind was manufactured with separate tassels at the end of each pull cord,

as a binding judicial admission at this stage of the proceedings because this statement was

not determined to be “undisputed” in granting Equity’s motion for partial summary

judgment (dkt. 80 at 3-4). See American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224,

226-27 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court has discretion to determine whether statements of fact

in briefs may be considered judicial admissions of party). Second, even assuming such

statement is a judicial admission, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently retracted

their judicial admission that the blind in question was manufactured and distributed with a

separate plastic tassel at the end of each draw cord string (see dkt. 100 at ¶22). See Sicor

Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Where, however, the party

making an ostensible judicial admission explains the error in a subsequent pleading or by

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amendment, the trial court must accord the explanation due weight.”). Third, the Court

rejects Lotus’ contention that insufficient evidence supports the bases of Plaintiffs’

supplemental expert report, issued by Shelly Deppa (dkt. 113 at 2-5). The Court finds that

Ms. Deppa’s report cites specific probative evidence in support of her opinion that there is

“not sufficient evidence to determine that the subject blinds were originally sold with 3

separate tassels, and in fact, there is just as much evidence to the contrary,” such that a

reasonable jury could resolve this factual issue in favor of either Plaintiffs or Lotus (see dkt.

100, Ex. 3 at 5/18/06 rept p.5). See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Similarly, given that there is a material factual dispute as to whether Lotus

distributed the mini-blind that killed Brooke with separate, unlooped pull cords, Lotus’

argument that it was not “negligent with respect to the proximate cause of Brooke’s death,”

because they did not distribute the mini-blind with the loop that caused her death, is also

rejected. (Dkt. 91 at 9.). See Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 641 P.2d 258, 266 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1982) (“What constitutes the proximate cause of an injury in a particular case is a question

of fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances, and can only be a question

of law when the facts are not only undisputed but are also such that there can be no

difference in the judgment of reasonable men as to the inferences to be drawn from them.”).

Even assuming, arguendo, there is no material factual dispute as to whether

Lotus distributed the mini-blind that killed Brooke with separate, unlooped pull cords, the

Court finds there is a material factual dispute as to whether altering the pull cords by tying

them together in a single tassel was reasonably foreseeable, such that the alteration

constituted an intervening, though not superseding, cause. See Barrett v. Harris, 86 P.3d

954, 958 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“an intervening cause becomes a superseding cause, thereby

relieving the defendant of liability for the original negligent conduct, ‘when [the]

intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described, with the benefit of hindsight, as

extraordinary’”) (citation omitted). There is no genuine dispute of fact that Lotus distributed

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the mini-blinds with three warnings: one permanent label and two paper hang tags. See

supra at 4 & n.2. Similarly, it is not disputed that, when the Bauerlines moved into the

apartment, neither the blind at issue nor any other window covering contained any warning

“hang tags.” (Dkt. 100, Ex. 5 at ¶6.) Although the blind at issue warned that “[y]oung

children can become entangled and strangle in cord or bead loops. Use safety devices to

reduce access or eliminate loops,” one of the missing hang tags specifically warned users

not to “tie cords together.” (Dkts. 92 at ¶¶11, 13; 100 at ¶11.) Because there is a material

factual dispute as to whether the alteration was foreseeable in view of the missing hang tags

and remaining warning, the Court will not grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that

Lotus negligently failed to (i) distribute the mini-blind at issue with adequate warnings not

to tie pull cords together; and (ii) provide landlord customers replacement hang tags warning

people not to tie pull cords together. See Piper v. Bear Medical Systems, Inc., 883 P.2d 407,

413 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (whether alteration is reasonably foreseeable is a question of fact

for jury unless reasonable minds could not differ). 

Lotus has not satisfied its burden of showing there is no genuine issue of

material fact that it used reasonable care under the circumstances or that the negligence

alleged against it was not the proximate cause of Brooke’s death. Thus, summary judgment

on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim will be denied.

B. Claim 2: Products Liability

Rather than dispute that Plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of products

liability, Lotus relies on two affirmative defenses to such claims.

1. Alteration Not Reasonably Foreseeable

In a products liability case in Arizona, a defendant is not liable if it proves:

[t]he proximate cause of the incident giving rise to the action

was an alteration or modification of the product that was not

reasonably foreseeable, made by a person other than the

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defendant and subsequent to the time the product was first sold

by the defendant.

A.R.S. § 12-683(2). Relying on this affirmative defense, Lotus argues that summary

judgment should be granted on Plaintiffs’ products liability claim because (i) the proximate

cause of Brooke’s death was an alteration of the mini-blind caused by someone other than

Lotus and (ii) the alteration that occurred after Lotus distributed the mini-blind was not

reasonably foreseeable. (Dkt. 91 at 6-7.) The Court disagrees.

As previously stated, there is a material factual dispute as to whether Lotus

distributed the mini-blind that killed Brooke with separate, unlooped pull cords. Supra at

4, 8-9. Because a jury must resolve this factual dispute, the Court rejects Lotus’s argument

that the proximate cause of Brooke’s death was an alteration of the mini-blind caused by

someone other than Lotus. See A.R.S. § 12-683(2).

Even assuming, arguendo, Lotus distributed the mini-blind that killed Brooke

with separate, unlooped pull cords, summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ products liability claim

must be denied because whether an alteration is reasonably foreseeable is a question of fact

for the jury unless reasonable minds could not differ. See Piper, 883 P.2d at 413.

Lotus argues that, in light of the permanent warning attached to the bottom

mini-blind rail and the two hang tag warnings attached to the mini-blind pull cords, “no

rational trier of fact could find it reasonably foreseeable that someone would ignore the

warnings and alter the mini-blind by tying the separate pull cords together to form a loop.”

(Dkt. 91 at 7.) Although Arizona law precludes a products liability claim against a

defendant due to unforeseeable modifications, the Court disagrees with Lotus that the

alteration at issue here – tying the pull cords together – is unforeseeable as a matter of law.

It is not genuinely disputed that, when Lotus distributed the mini-blind in

1998, it contained a total of three warnings: one label adhered to the bottom rail of the miniblind and two hanging tags attached to the pull cords. See supra at 4 & n.2. However, it is

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also not disputed that, when the Bauerlines moved into the apartment, neither the blind at

issue nor any other window covering contained any warning “hang tags.” (Dkt. 100, Ex.

5 at ¶6.) Although the label on the bottom rail of the mini-blind in question warned,

“[y]oung children can become entangled and strangle in cord or bead loops. Use safety

devices to reduce access or eliminate loops,” one of the missing hang tags specifically

advised users not to “tie the cords together.” (Dkts. 92 at ¶¶11, 13; 100 at ¶11.) Given

Lotus’s specific warning that users should not tie the cords together, a reasonable jury could

find that Lotus anticipated such an alteration. See A.R.S. § 12-681(8) (“‘Reasonably

foreseeable alteration’ . . . means an alteration . . . of the product that would be expected of

an ordinary and prudent purchaser, user or consumer and that an ordinary and prudent

manufacturer should have anticipated”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiffs, a jury could reasonably conclude that altering the mini-blind at issue by tying

the pull cords together was foreseeable, given that the only specific warning not to tie the

cords together was attached to a paper hang tag not attached to the blinds when the

Bauerlines moved into the apartment. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether alteration of the blind cords by tying them together was reasonably foreseeable.

See Piper, 883 P.2d at 413.

2. Product Conformed with State of the Art

Under A.R.S. § 12-683, a defendant is not liable for products liability if

[t]he defect in the product is alleged to result from inadequate

design or fabrication, and if the plans or designs for the product

or methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting, testing

and labeling the product conformed with the state of the art at

the time the product was first sold by defendant.

A.R.S. § 12-683(1). Lotus contends it has proven the “state of the art” defense as a matter

of law because it distributed the mini-blind in 1998 “with three warnings about the danger

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of strangulation, three separate pull cords, and no loops in the pull cords,” which conformed

to the voluntary ANSI/WCMA Standard. (Dkt. 91 at 8.) Because the mini-blind conformed

to the ANSI/WCMA Standard when it was distributed, Lotus posits, “a rational trier of fact

would be compelled to find the mini-blind in question conformed with the state of the art

in all aspects relevant to this case.” (Id.) For two reasons, the Court is not persuaded. 

First, there is a material factual dispute as to whether Lotus distributed the

mini-blind at issue with separate, unlooped pull cords. Supra at 4, 8-9. As a result, there

is also a material factual dispute as to whether Lotus distributed the mini-blind in conformity

with the ANSI/WCMA Standard. See Dkt. 91 at 8 (conformance with ANSI/WCMA

Standard requires, inter alia, “three individual tassel pull cords without loops”). 

Second, even assuming, arguendo, Lotus distributed the mini-blind in

conformity with the ANSI/WCMA Standard, the Court finds that compliance with such

Standard did not render the mini-blinds at issue “state of the art” as a matter of law. Rather,

the Arizona statute providing for this defense defines state of the art as “the technical,

mechanical and scientific knowledge of manufacturing, designing, testing or labeling the

same or similar products that was in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of

manufacturing.” A.R.S. § 12-681(10). Moreover, unless reasonable minds could not differ,

the determination of whether a product is state of the art is a question of fact for the jury.

See Anderson v. Nissei Asb Mach. Co., Ltd., 3 P.3d 1088, 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 

In the present case, even assuming, arguendo, Lotus distributed the mini-blind

at issue in conformity with the ANSI/WCMA Standard, reasonable minds could differ with

respect to the determination of whether compliance with the ANSI/WCMA Standard is

“state of the art.” As Plaintiffs note, Lotus has presented no evidence that the ANSI/WCMA

Standard provided the best and most feasible design for mini-blinds in 1998, nor has Lotus

shown that paper hang tag warnings, rather than permanent, on-product warnings, were

“state of the art,” especially given the foreseeability of paper warnings being removed or

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deteriorating. See Golonka v. General Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 974-75 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2003) (a product or warning is only state of the art if nothing better “is in existence and

reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacturing”). Moreover, no Arizona court has

recognized that compliance with an ANSI Standard constitutes “state of the art,” and at least

one federal court has reached the opposite conclusion. See Meisner v. The Patton Electric

Co., Inc., 781 F.Supp. 1432, 1443 (D. Neb. 1990) (rejecting “state of the art” defense with

respect to a space heater because “ANSI Standards are voluntary standards, and more

importantly, minimum standards.”) (emphasis in original). Here, as in Meisner, Lotus has

expressly conceded that the ANSI/WCMA Standard is voluntary (dkt. 91 at 8) and Plaintiffs

have demonstrated that compliance with the ANSI/WCMA Standard is the minimum

acceptable industry standard. (Dkt. 100 at ¶10 and Ex. 6.) Finally, Arizona law recognizes

that, “[a]lthough the customs of an industry may be relevant, because those customs may

lag behind technological development, they are not identical with state of the art.”

Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 737 P.2d 365, 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995),

vacated in part by, 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987), superceded by statute on other grounds.

Rather, “[c]ustom refers to what was being done in the industry; state of the art refers to

what feasibly could have been done.” Id. Given that Lotus has failed to present any

feasibility evidence regarding the provision of cord cleats, shorter cords, or permanent

warnings, there is a material factual dispute whether the mini-blinds distributed by Lotus

in 1998 were “state of the art.” Thus, summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ products liability

claim will be denied. 

C. Claim 3: Agency/Civil Conspiracy

In Arizona, there is no civil action for conspiracy. However, there is an action

for damages caused by acts committed pursuant to a conspiracy. Estate of Hernandez v.

Flavio, 930 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz. 1997). To be found liable for damages caused by acts

committed pursuant to a conspiracy, “one must have committed some tortious act” that

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caused injuries or damages. Id. at 1314.

Lotus contends they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

conspiracy claim because there is no evidence Lotus may be held “strictly liable for the

mini-blind,” “[n]or is there any evidence that [Lotus] was negligent in any way that caused

Brooke’s death.” (Dkt. 91 at 13.) Because the Court has determined that summary

judgment will not be granted in Lotus’ favor on Plaintiffs’ negligence and strict liability

claims, there is a material factual dispute as to whether Lotus committed a tortious act.

Thus, summary judgment will not be granted on Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. See Estate of

Hernandez, 930 P.2d at 1314 (to be found liable for damages caused by acts committed

pursuant to a conspiracy, “one must have committed some tortious act).

For all of the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING Defendant Lotus & Windoware,

Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 91.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, at the request of Jumbo Surplus

Corporation (dkt. 163), the Court Deputy shall schedule and issue a Preliminary Pretrial

Conference pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2006.

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