Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00191/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

808 HOLDINGS, LLC, a California

limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

COLLECTIVE SHARING HASH

E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29C

D63C23C91 on DECEMBER 28, 2011,

and DOES 1-39, inclusive,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 12cv00191 MMA(RBB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE EARLY

DISCOVERY [ECF NO. 3]

On January 25, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to

Take Early Discovery with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

and an exhibit [ECF No. 3] before United States Magistrate Judge

Jan M. Adler. On April 25, 2012, the case was transferred to this

Court pursuant to the “Low-Number” Rule [ECF No. 4]. Because no

Defendant has been named or served, no opposition or reply briefs

have been filed.

The Plaintiff failed to comply with local rules and obtain a

hearing date before filing its Motion for Leave to Take Early

Discovery. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Although 808 Holdings

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did not obtain a hearing date before Judge Adler, the Court finds

the Plaintiff's Motion suitable for resolution on the papers. See

S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the

Motion is DENIED.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 24, 2012, Plaintiff 808 Holdings, LLC ("808

Holdings") filed a Complaint against the Collective Sharing Hash

E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29CD63C23C91 on December 28, 2011, and

DOES one through thirty-nine (“Defendants”) [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff

does business under the names "Cody Media" and "SeanCody.com," and

it purports to be the registered owner of, and hold the exclusive

rights to, the copyright of the motion picture, "Brandon & Pierce

Unwrapped." (Compl. 1, 3, ECF No. 1.) First, 808 Holdings alleges

a claim for copyright infringement, stating that Defendants

reproduced and distributed Plaintiff's copyrighted material through

the Internet without authorization of the Plaintiff. (Id. at 22-

23.) Second, 808 Holdings pleads contributory copyright

infringement, alleging that Defendants illegally obtained the

copyrighted motion picture and assisted others in doing the same. 

(Id. at 23-25.) Third, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants were

negligent in failing to adequately secure their Internet access to

prevent its unlawful use by others. (Id. at 25-26.) 

One day after filing the Complaint, on January 25, 2012, 808

Holdings filed this Motion for Leave to Take Early Discovery to

learn the identities of the Doe Defendants from their respective

Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). (Mot. Leave Take Early Disc.

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1, ECF No. 3.)1 Specifically, 808 Holdings seeks an order

directing the ISPs to release the subscriber's identifying

information. (Id.) The Plaintiff also seeks leave to serve

interrogatories on, and take the depositions of, the individuals

identified by the ISPs to determine whether the actual Internet

subscriber is the proper defendant. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

1.) Plaintiff attached to its Motion a list of the Internet

Protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with subscribers it hopes to

identify as defendants. (Id. Attach. #2 Ex. 1, at 2-3.) The list

indicates the state attributable to each IP address, but it does

not provide the city. (See id.)

II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In the Complaint, Plaintiff 808 Holdings alleges that the

thirty-nine Doe Defendants collectively infringed its copyrighted

work using a BitTorrent file transfer protocol. (Compl. 2, ECF No.

1.) In general, the Plaintiff asserts that each time a Defendant

distributes the motion picture to others, those individuals can

then distribute that infringing copy to other people in "an

interconnected collective," which then builds on its prior

infringements. (Id.) The Defendants are purportedly a collection

of "BitTorrent users" or "peers" whose computers are connected for

the purpose of sharing a file, otherwise known as a "swarm." (Id.

at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that each BitTorrent swarm is associated

with a particular "hash," which has a specific identifier for the

1

 Because the pages attached to the Motion are not paginated,

the Court will cite to the Motion for Leave to Take Early Discovery

using the page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing

system. 

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file. (Id.) The sharing hash associated with the motion picture

at issue is E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29CD63C23C91 ("E379 Hash"). 

(Id. at 4.)

A. BitTorrent Protocol

According to 808 Holdings, the BitTorrent protocol is

distinguishable from previously used peer-to-peer file sharing

technology, utilized by Napster or Limewire, because it "allows for

higher transfer speeds by locating pieces (or 'bits') of the file

already present on other users' computers and downloading them

simultaneously." (Id. at 18.) "This is done by joining into the

'swarm,' or collective, of peers to download and upload from each

other simultaneously." (Id.) This process results in faster

downloads than peer-to-peer file sharing technology. (Id.) 

Plaintiff describes the process of downloading and uploading

files through a BitTorrent protocol as "quick and efficient." 

(Id.) When a user downloads a media file, he or she opens the file

on a BitTorrent client application; the user then extracts a list

with tracker locations that connect to IP addresses that are

currently running the BitTorrent software and offering to

distribute the file. (Id.) The downloader's BitTorrent program

then begins to download the media file automatically. (Id.) 

B. Forming a Swarm

In the Complaint, 808 Holdings maintains that a swarm begins

with an initial user called the "seeder" who begins to share a file

with a torrent swarm. (Id.) New members of the swarm then connect

to the seeder to download the media file, which creates a digital

copy of the file; the process repeats as new members join the

swarm, increasing the number of users in the swarm. (Id.) Each

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member both acquires and redistributes the media file by

simultaneously uploading and downloading portions of the same

digital copy with the other members. (Id. at 18-19.) Therefore,

Plaintiff contends that even if the original seeder leaves the

swarm, the media file can continue to be downloaded by old and new

members. (Id. at 19.)

C. The December 28, 2011 Sharing Hash

Plaintiff claims that on December 28, 2011, each of the

Defendants "republished, duplicated, and replicated the exact same

copy and exact same hash file." (Id. at 4.) Because all the

Defendants are associated with the E379 hash, 808 Holdings alleges

that each was a member of the same collective swarm. (Id. at 20.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that they "acted collectively, and

in concert, in effectuating the illegal and unauthorized sharing of

Plaintiff's copyrighted work." (Id.) 808 Holdings contends that

the Doe Defendants acted in unison:

Defendants engaged in their copyright infringement

scheme together. They all used the same torrent-sharing

technology to coordinate their collective copyright

theft; they were all members of the same exact swarm on

the same exact date; they all used the same exact tracker

file; they all shared and republished the same exact

motion picture; and they all shared the same exact hash

file of the Motion Picture with each other and other

individuals on the same exact date, December 28, 2011.

(Id. at 4.)

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Generally, discovery is not permitted without a court order

before the parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Yet, "in rare cases,

courts have made exceptions, permitting limited discovery to ensue

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after filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to learn the

identifying facts necessary to permit service on the defendant." 

Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal.

1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.

1980)). Courts grant these requests when the moving party shows

good cause for the early discovery. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Elec.

Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

The Ninth Circuit has held that when the defendants'

identities are unknown at the time the complaint is filed, courts

may grant plaintiffs leave to take early discovery to determine the

defendants' identities "unless it is clear that discovery would not

uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on

other grounds.” Gellespie, 629 F.2d at 642. "A district court's

decision to grant discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is a

matter of discretion." Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. 

District courts apply a three-factor test when considering

motions for early discovery to identify certain defendants. Id. at

578-80. First, the plaintiff should "identify the missing party

with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that

defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal

court." Id. at 578. Second, the movant must describe "all

previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant" to ensure

that the plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify and

serve process on the defendant. Id. at 579. Third, plaintiff

should establish that its suit against the defendant could

withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. “[T]o prevent abuse of this

extraordinary application of the discovery process and to ensure

that the plaintiff has standing," plaintiff must show that some act

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giving rise to liability actually occurred and that the discovery

is aimed at identifying the person who allegedly committed the act. 

Id. at 579-80. 

IV.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks an order permitting it to subpoena twentythree ISPs for documents and information sufficient to identify the

subscribers of the assigned IP addresses listed in Exhibit A to its

Motion: (1) AT&T d/b/a SBC Internet Services, (2) BellSouth.net,

(3) CABLE ONE, Inc., (4) CenturyTel Internet Holdings, (5) Charter

Communications, (6) Comcast Cable, (7) Cox Communications, (8)

Cyber Wurx, LLC, (9) Earthlink, (10) Embarq Corporation, (11) Fuse

Internet Access, (12) HickoryTech Corporation, (13) Insight

Communications Company, (14) The Iserv Company LLC, (15) Level 3

Communications, (16) Optimum Online, (17) Qwest Communications,

(18) RCN Corporation, (19) SureWest Broadband, (20) Time Warner

d/b/a Road Runner, (21) Verizon Internet Services, (22)

WideOpenWest, and (23) Windstream Communications. (Mot. Leave Take

Early Disc. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF No. 3.) Out of the

thirty-nine corresponding IP addresses that Plaintiff lists in

Exhibit 1, only eight are located in the State of California; the

remaining thirty-one are located outside of California. (Id.

Attach. #1 Ex. 1, at 2-3.) 808 Holdings does not identify the city

corresponding to each IP address. (See id.) 

A. Identification of Missing Parties with Sufficient Specificity

First, 808 Holdings must identify the Doe Defendants with

enough specificity to enable the Court to determine that the

defendant is a real person or entity who would be subject to the

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jurisdiction of this Court. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. 

In its Motion for Leave to Take Early Discovery, 808 Holdings

asserts it has “sufficiently identified individuals who are real

persons” that Plaintiff can sue in this federal district court. 

(Mot. Leave Take Early Disc. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 3.) 

It has “observed and documented infringement of its registered work

by the individuals identified as DOES . . . .” (Id.) Also, 808

Holdings contends that the discovery sought is necessary to

ascertain the identities of the Defendants. (Id.)

Some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have determined that

a plaintiff identifies Doe defendants with sufficient specificity

by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual

defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by

using “geolocation technology” to trace the IP addresses to a

physical point of origin. See Openmind Solutions, Inc. v. Does

1-39, No. C-11-3311 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *5-6

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Pink Lotus Entm’t v. Does 1-46, No. C-11-

02263 HRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. June 21,

2011). Others have found that merely identifying the IP addresses

assigned to the defendants on the day of the purported infringement

is sufficient to satisfy the first factor. See MCGIP, LLC v. Does

1-149, No. C-11-02331 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85363, at *4-5

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2011) (opinion by Judge Beeler); First Time

Videos LLC v. Does 1-37, No. C-11-01675 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

42376, at *5 (N.D. Cal. April 14, 2011) (opinion by Judge Beeler). 

This Court finds the former standard persuasive. In any

event, here, 808 Holdings has submitted a chart listing the unique

IP address corresponding to each Defendant on December 28, 2011, as

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well as the state in which each IP address is located. (See Mot.

Leave Take Early Disc. Attach. #2 Ex. 1, at 2-3, ECF No. 3.) 

Although the Plaintiff has not also identified the city in which

each IP address is located, it has identified the Doe Defendants

with sufficient specificity to satisfy this first factor. See

Openmind Solutions, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *6 (concluding

that plaintiff satisfied the first factor by identifying the

defendants’ IP addresses and by tracing the IP addresses to a point

of origin); Pink Lotus Entm’t, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, at *6

(same). 

B. Previous Attempts to Locate Defendants

Next, 808 Holdings must describe all prior steps it has taken

to identify the Doe Defendants in a good faith effort to locate and

serve them. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. Plaintiff

generally maintains that there are no other practical measures

available to determine the identities of the Doe Defendants. (Mot.

Leave Take Early Disc. Attach #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 3.) "Due

to the nature of on-line transactions, Plaintiff has no way of

investigating the identities of the potential Defendants except via

third-party subpoena to the ISP." (Id.) 

In its Motion, 808 Holdings does not describe the efforts it

made to learn the IP addresses. Plaintiff identified the IP

addresses from which each Doe Defendant connected to the Internet

and recorded the date and time each Defendant accessed Plaintiff’s

motion picture. (See id. at 5.) Plaintiff apparently conducted “a

simple search on a publically available database” to determine

which ISP controls the particular IP addresses. (See id.) This

description is vague and is not supported by any declaration. See

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Openmind Solutions, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *7-10. 

Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide the city in which each IP

address is located or explain why it was unable to do so. 

Nonetheless, 808 Holdings appears to have obtained and investigated

the data pertaining to the December 28, 2011 alleged infringements,

in an effort to locate each Doe Defendant. See Digital Sin, Inc.

v. Does 1-5698, No. C 11-04397 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128033, at

*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011); Openmind Solutions, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 85363, at *5; MCGIP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85363, at *5; Pink

Lotus Entm’t, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, at *7. 

C. Ability to Withstand a Motion to Dismiss

Finally, to be entitled to early discovery, 808 Holdings must

demonstrate that its Complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss. 

See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579.

In its Motion for Leave to Take Early Discovery, the Plaintiff

declares that it has stated a prima facie claim for copyright

infringement that can withstand a motion to dismiss. (Mot. Leave

Take Early Disc. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 3.) According

to 808 Holdings, it has adequately alleged that Defendants engaged

in the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of its motion

picture, and that Plaintiff owns the registered copyrights for the

motion picture. (Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)(3)).) Also,

without a citation to supporting authority showing any “duty” to

copyright owners, 808 Holdings contends it has sufficiently pleaded

a negligence cause of action based on the Defendants’ failure to

secure their Internet access, which enabled the copyright

infringements. (Id.)

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1. Lack of personal jurisdiction

Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Motion indicates that most of the

potential Defendants are located outside of the state. Of the

thirty-nine Doe Defendants listed, only eight of the host IP

addresses are in California. (See id. Attach. #2 Ex. 1, at 2-3.) 

Thirty-one of the IP addresses are outside of California. (Id.) 

At a minimum, there is a serious question as to whether the claims

against the thirty-one out-of-state Doe Defendants can survive a

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See

Celestial, Inc. v. Swarm Sharing Hash 8AB508AB0F9EF8B4CDB14C6248F3

C96C65BEB882 on December 4, 2011, No. CV 12-00204 DDP(SSx), 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41078, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012). 

The Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdictional

facts. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578 (citing Wells

Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th

Cir. 1977)). Yet, remarkably, in its Motion, 808 Holdings does not

discuss whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Doe

Defendants. In its Complaint, however, Plaintiff asserts that the

Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district

because they took the "affirmative action of both downloading and

uploading" Plaintiff’s motion picture, which “contained Plaintiff's

business address in this jurisdiction, . . . .” (Compl. 2, ECF No.

1.) Thus, Plaintiff maintains that "Defendants knew or should have

known . . . that the copyright belonged to an entity residing in

this jurisdiction and thus [they] expressly targeted their

infringing actions and caused damages" in California. (Id.)

Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is

determined by a two-part test. First, the exercise of jurisdiction

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must comply with the state’s long-arm statute. Liberty Media

Holdings v. Does 1-62, No. 11-CV-575-MMA (NLS), 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 24232, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012). Second, the exercise

of jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of federal due

process. Id. at *6-7 (citation omitted). California's long-arm

statute extends jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Cal.

Code. Civ. P. § 410.10 (West 2004); Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422

F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 2005). “For a court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have

at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the

exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.’” Scwarzenegger v. Fred Martin

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Int’l Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 

While some courts deciding requests for early discovery have

considered whether the IP addresses are located in California, at

least one other court has determined that merely identifying the

host IP addresses — regardless of location — is sufficient. 

Compare Pink Lotus Entm’t, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, at *6-7

(noting that the IP addresses were traced to locations in

California), with First Time Videos LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

42376, at *5 (opinion by Judge Beeler) (failing to discuss

locations of IP addresses). Judge Beeler did not consider the

location of IP addresses in three subsequent cases. See Digital

Sin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128033, at *4-5; MCGIP, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 85363, at *4-5; VPR Internationale v. Does 1-17, No.

C-11-01494 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45118, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

15, 2011). Other courts have found that without identifying the

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Doe Defendants, it would be premature to decide whether the court

lacks personal jurisdiction when the defendants and their

connections to California are unknown. See Liberty Media Holdings,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24232, at *7-8 (citing IO Group, Inc. v. Does

1-10, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133717 (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 7, 2010); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F.

Supp. 2d 332, 347 (D.D.C. 2011)). 

This Court must balance the need for discovery against the

interests of justice, which includes consideration of the prejudice

to the ISP and to the Doe Defendants. See Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at

276. The judicial process should not be manipulated to obtain

confidential information about Defendants not subject to the

Court’s jurisdiction. The Plaintiff asserts that jurisdiction over

the Doe Defendants is proper because the motion picture displayed

Plaintiff’s California business address. (Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1.) 

This is insufficient to support a determination that “‘Defendants

expressly aimed their tortious acts against’ a California company,

as required for specific jurisdiction.” Celestial, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 41078, at *6 (citation omitted). It is unlikely that an

individual in a distant jurisdiction would envision that the acts

alleged would subject him to the jurisdiction of this Court. 

Similarly, any allegation that personal jurisdiction exists because

of the swarming activity is inadequate. Id. at *6-7 & n.2. 

At a minimum, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to

show that it can withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction as to the thirty-one Doe Defendants with IP addresses

outside of California. See Celestial, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41078,

at *5-6 (denying request for early discovery because the complaint

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could not withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction even though all of the IP addresses were located in

California).

2. Improper venue

In the same vein, 808 Holdings has not shown that its

Complaint can survive a motion to dismiss for improper venue as to

the Doe Defendants with IP addresses outside the State of

California and outside this judicial district. As discussed,

thirty-one of the IP addresses are out-of-state, and only eight are

in California. (See Mot. Leave Take Early Disc. Attach. #2 Ex. 1,

at 2-3, ECF No. 3.) The Plaintiff has not provided the city in

which each of the IP addresses is located. Therefore, it is

unclear whether any of the eight in-state IP addresses are within

the Southern District of California. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that venue in this district is proper as to

all Defendants under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2), 1400(a). (See Compl.

3, ECF No. 1.) “The venue of suits for infringement of copyright

is not determined be the general provision governing suits in the

federal district courts, rather by the venue provision of the

Copyright Act.” Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143

(N.D. Cal. 2007). Civil actions for copyright infringement “may be

instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent

resides or may be found.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a) (West 2006). An

individual “resides” for venue purposes in the district of his

domicile. 17 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, §

110.39[2], at 110-76 (3d ed. 2011). A defendant is “found” for

venue purposes where he is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id.

(footnote omitted); see Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon,

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606 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This circuit interprets [28

U.S.C. § 1400(a)] to allow venue in any judicial district where, if

treated as a separate state, the defendant would be subject to

personal jurisdiction.”). 

Plaintiff fails to address venue in its Motion. In the

Complaint, however, 808 Holdings asserts venue is proper because

although the true identities of the Defendants are unknown, “on

information and belief, each Defendant may be found in this

District and/or a substantial part of the infringing acts

complained of occurred in this District.” (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.) 

This allegation may run afoul of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, given that only eight of the thirty-nine

Defendants have IP addresses in California, and Plaintiff has not

indicated where in the state the eight IP addresses are located. 

Venue in this judicial district for these eight Defendants is not

clearly established.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that its Complaint can

withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as

to the thirty-one Doe Defendants located outside of California. It

also appears that venue in this judicial district would be improper

for these Defendants. Similarly, the Plaintiff has not shown that

the eight California Defendants are subject to suit in the Southern

District of California. It is uncertain that 808 Holdings’s

Complaint can survive a motion to dismiss for improper venue by

these eight Doe Defendants. Consequently, Plaintiff has not shown

that it can withstand a motion to dismiss for improper venue

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) for all thirty-nine Doe Defendants,

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especially when there is no alternate district to which a transfer

would be appropriate. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (West 2006).

3. Misjoinder

In addition to personal jurisdiction and venue, 808 Holdings

has failed to show that its claims can withstand a motion to

dismiss for improper joinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a); see

Celestial, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41078, at *7 n.3. Although the

Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether permissive joinder is proper

in cases where Doe defendants collectively download and upload the

same file using BitTorrent technology, several recent district

court cases in the circuit have found joinder improper. See

Celestial, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41078, at *7 n.3 (citing recent

cases finding misjoinder); see also Liberty Media Holdings v. Does

1-62, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24232, at *16-17. In its conclusory

pleading and motion, 808 Holdings has not established that the

Complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss for the misjoinder of

out-of-state and out-of-district Doe Defendants.

V.

CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Take

Early Discovery [ECF No. 3] is DENIED. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 

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F.R.D. at 578 (stating that a whether to grant discovery to

determine jurisdictional facts is a matter of discretion). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2012 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Anello 

 All Parties of Record

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