Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06648/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06648-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZACKARY T. HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRENDEN BULLARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-06648-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISQUALIFY

Re: Dkt. No. 19

Plaintiff, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, has filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Now pending before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the undersigned 

judge on grounds of judicial bias and prejudice. Dkt. No. 19. For the reasons set forth below, the 

motion is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has filed a motion to recuse the undersigned judge on the grounds of judicial bias.

He argues that there is a probability of actual bias and prejudice on the part of the undersigned 

judge based on the undersigned’s denial of plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel and the 

undersigned’s premature denial of his request for a temporary restraining order.1 

Motions to disqualify, or recuse, a judge fall under two statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a timely and 

sufficient affidavit averring that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias 

1 Plaintiff also notes that this case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Robert Illman and 

then reassigned to the undersigned, despite plaintiff having never consented to being assigned to a 

district court judge or having requested reassignment to a district court judge. Dkt. No. 19. This 

action’s reassignment to the undersigned was because plaintiff requested a temporary restraining 

order, which is an action that a magistrate judge may not take without the consent of all parties. 

Dkt. No. 7. 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

or prejudice either against the party or in favor of an adverse party, and setting forth the facts and 

reasons for such belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144. Similarly, § 455 requires a judge to disqualify 

himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(a), including where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” id. §455 

(b)(1). 

A judge finding a § 144 motion timely and the affidavits legally sufficient must proceed no 

further and another judge must be assigned to hear the matter. See id.; United States v. Sibla, 624 

F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Where the affidavit is not legally sufficient, however, the judge at 

whom the motion is directed may determine the matter. See id. at 868 (holding judge challenged 

under § 144 properly heard and denied motion where affidavit not legally sufficient).

The substantive test for personal bias or prejudice is identical under §§ 144 and 455. See 

Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867. Specifically, recusal is appropriate under both statutes where “a reasonable 

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation 

omitted). Consequently, an affidavit filed under § 144 will raise a question concerning recusal 

under §§ 455(a) and (b)(1) as well. Sibla, 642 F.2d at 867.

Here, plaintiff’s allegations categorically fail to establish any basis, under either § 144 or 

§ 455, for a determination that the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned herein, and 

consequently are insufficient as a matter of law. Motions for recusal are “limited by the 

‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires as the basis for recusal something other than 

rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course of trial.” United 

States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868 (holding 

affidavit not legally sufficient unless it alleges facts demonstrating bias or prejudice that “stems 

from an extrajudicial source”). Judicial rulings may constitute grounds for appeal, but are not a 

valid basis for a motion for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). 

Plaintiff’s motion is legally insufficient to require recusal and will therefore be DENIED. 

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United States District Court

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the 

undersigned judge. 

This order terminates Dkt. No. 19.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/19/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 4:19-cv-06648-HSG Document 20 Filed 03/19/20 Page 3 of 3