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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FIL ... . J 

United States Col:rt of Appew Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 0 1993 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSROBERT 

, LHOECKER 

TEN"m CIRCUIT Clerk · 

STEVEN L. GRIFFIN, individually and as ) 

next friend for ANGIE GRIFFIN, a minor, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

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No. 92-4032 

DOROTHY GRIFFIN, individually and as 

next friend for ANGIE GRIFFIN, a minor 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JAMES R. STRONG, DENNIS ~E, and 

JOHN DOES I - V, individually and in 

their official capacities, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 96-CV-894) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Steve Russell and Kathryn Collard, of Collard & Russell, Salt Lake 

City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

David E. Yocom, Salt 

Marlowe, Deputy County 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Lake County Attorney, 

Attorney, Salt Lake 

and 

City, 

Patricia J. 

Utah, for 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 1 
McKAY, Circuit Judge . 

This appeal reviews the rlistrict court's detennination that, 

as a matter of law, statements used against plaintiff-appellant 

Steven L . Griffin in an ·earlier criminal proceeding were not 

coerced from him by defendant-appellee James R. Strong. Because 

we agree with plaintiff that the circumstances under which his 

statements were made precluded their voluntariness, we reverse the 

judgment of the district court. 1 

On February 15, 1986, plaintiff was arrested by defendant and 

charged with rape of a child. Statements were taken from 

plaintiff by defendant on February 15 and February 17, 1986. Both 

statements were used against plaintiff in his criminal trial. 

Plaintiff's conviction on two lesser charges was overturned by the 

Utah Court of Appeals, which found that the first statement was 

coerced and that the second statement was taken in violation of 

plaintiff's right to counsel. State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 971 

(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Plaintiff then brought this action against 

Mr. Strong under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 charging violation of his rights 

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Before trial, the court ruled that it would decide the issue 

of the voluntariness of plaintiff's statements as a matter of law. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has detennined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. ~ Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 2 
With respect to plaintiff's February 15th statement, the district 

court held that it did -not constitute a coerced confession because 

plaintiff "did not confess during the [February 15th] 

interrogation and statements made by him at that time did not 

constitute a confession." Appellant's Br., Attach. D, Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1. With respect to the 

February 17th statement, the court submitted special 

interrogatories to the jury to decide disputed facts concerning 

circumstances surrounding the making of that statement . Despite 

the jury's findings that defendant had promised plaintiff lesser 

punishment in order to induce him to make a statement, and that 

defendant also promised to protect plaintiff's health and safety 

in order to induce his statement, the court held that plaintiff's 

confession was voluntary and not the product of coercion or 

intimidation. I.SL. at 2. At the request of both parties, the 

court certified its judgment under Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., 

and this appeal followed. 

The ultimate determination of whether a confession is 

voluntary is a guestion of law reviewable by this court de novo. 

United States v, Short. 947 F.2d 1445, 1449 (10th Cir. 1991), 

cert, denied, 112 s. Ct. 1680 (1992). The factual predicates 

underlying that determination, however, are reviewed for clear 

error. United States v, Chalan, 012 F . 2d 1302, 1307- 08 (10th Cir. 

1987). The court's conclusion that the February 15th statement 

was not a "confession" is a conclusion of law which did not rely 

on jury input. The disputed facts regarding the circumstances 

surrounding the February 17th statement, however, were resolved by 

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Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 3 
the jury in answer to the special interrogatories. The court then 

considered those answers in arriving at its legal conclusion 

regarding that later statement. 

The district court made no factual finding regarding the 

voluntariness of plaintiff's .February 15th statement. Our review 

of the record, however, persuades us that the February 15th 

statement was involuntary as a matter of law. The record here 

contains a transcript of the February 15th interrogation. During 

that interrogation, the following exchange took place after 

defendant Strong had urged plaintiff to confess: 

Q. [L]ike I told you 

..• away from your daughter 

understand that? (Strong) 

before, you're gonna be 

for a while. Do you 

A. (No verbal response from Steven) 

Q. Steven? (Strong) 

A. I didn't do it! (Steven) 

Q. Ok~y, I'm asking 

what I'm saying . that 

your daughter for a while. 

(Strong) 

you if you understand ... you're gonna be away from 

do you understand that? 

A. No, I don't. (Steven) 

Q. okay, well, you are going to be away from your 

daughter for a while. Cause I . . . believe the 

children. And in order for you to ever ... have a relationship with your daughter again .•. then 

you're going to need to get some. • . extensive help . . . and ... after that time, and only after that 

time ... uh ... would it be possible for you to be 

reunited with your daughter again. And in order for you 

to ... receive any help for the problem, you're going 

to have to admit there's a problem. (Strong) 

A. 

shit 

I'd kill myself before I would do any of this 

and I mean it. (Steven) 

Q. (Pause) .... You would rather kill yourself 

than ... if you say you're innocent then [sic] stand 

up for rights? (Strong) 

4 

I 

I 

Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 4 
A. Well, the way you say I can't see my daughter 

anymore ... there's no use living is there? (Steven) 

Appellant's App., Doc. J at 8 (ellipses in original). 

As a result of this improper manner of interrogation, the 

following dialog occurred: 

A. Oh ... so if I admit to anything they say I did 

... then I have ... then that would be the best to 

do. ( Steven) 

Q. That would be the best to do. (Strong) 

A. Okay. I admit 

... all right? 

to everything; I done 

I did it all. (Steven) 

Q. What did you do? (Strong) 

everything 

A. Uh, let's see ... what was it? (Steven) 

Q. You tell me. (Strong) 

A. Let's see, you said I had intercourse with Camie 

okay, I did that. 

1.Sh at 15-16 (ellipses in original). 

To be admissable, a confession must be made freely and 

voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats in violation of 

due process or obtained by compulsion or inducement of any sort. 

Haynes v, Washington, 373 u.s. 503, 513 (1963). We hold as a 

matter of law that the type of interrogation used here, and the 

threats upon which it relied, was so coercive as to render 

plaintiff's statement involuntary. Plaintiff was clearly induced 

to talk when he otherwise would not have. 

The district court's failure to determine the voluntariness 

of the February 15th statement apparently arose from its 

conclusion that the statement did not constitute a confession, 

implying that its use at plaintiff's criminal trial did not 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 5 
violate plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination. While the sincerity of plaintiff's statements 

admitting guilt can be challenged giv en the context of the 

interrogation, limiting the scope of the Fifth Amendment 

protection to only those statements which can be characterized as 

"sincere confessions" is unduly restrictive. 

The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall 

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 

himself . " U.S. Const. a.mend. V. The district court seems to have 

been of the view that the admission of a mere statement obtained 

under coercive circumstances would not implicate the protections 

of the Fifth Amendment, and that not until a statement or 

statements reach the status of a "confession" would the Fifth 

Amendment come into play. While we do not wish to engage in the 

semantic exercise of differentiating between a statement and a 

confession, or trying to determine when a statement somehow 

matures into a confession, we note that such endeavor is 

unnecessary. 

It is well established that the Fifth Amendment protects 

against the admission of incriminating statements of all kinds, 

whether considered to be confessions or not. "No distinction can 

be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and 

statements which amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an 

offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the 

individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any 

matter; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination." 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 476 (1966) . "'The privilege 

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Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 6 
afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves 

support a conviction . . but likewise embraces those which 

would furnish a link in the chain . of evidence needed to 

prosecute .... '" Malloy v, Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) 

(quoting Hoffman v. United States. 341 u.s. 479, 486 (1951)). 

"' [T]he availability of the privilege [turns] upon the 

nature of the statement or admission and the exposure it 

invites.'" United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th 

Cir.) (quoting In re Gault. 387 u.s. 1, 49 (1967)), cert. denied, 

111 s. ct. 113 (1990); see also cooper v, Dμpnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 

1236-38 (9th Cir.) (statements which could and probably would have 

been used against accused had he gone to trial in order to hinder 

any insanity defense were made in controvention of accused's right 

to remain silent), cert, denied. 113 s. Ct. 407 (1992). Our Fifth 

Amendment cases consistently refer to incriminating "statements," 

and are not limited to "confessions" per se. See. e.g., Short, 

947 F.2d at 1449; Rogers. 921 F.2d at 979; United States v. 

Fountain, 776 F.2d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The 

characterization of plaintiff's February 15th admission as a 

statement as opposed to a confession, therefore, did not insulate 

it from the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 

Turning now to the statement of February 17, the jury was 

asked to respond to the following interrogatories: 

During the course of the interrogation on 

February 17, 1986 in the jail, did defendant Strong make 

promises of lesser punishment to plaintiff Steven 

Griffin in order to induce him to make a statement? 

and 

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Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 7 
During the course of the 

February 17, 1986 in the jail, 

promise to assist -plaintiff Steven 

his health and safety in order to 

statement? 

interrogation on 

did defendant Strong 

Griffin to protect 

induce him to make a 

Appellant's Br., Attach. B, Special Interrogatories Nos . 5 & 6. 

The jury answered both of th~se questions in the affirmative. Id. 

These underlying findings of fact are reviewed to determine 

whether the jury's conclusion is supported by substantial 

evidence. Kitchens v. Bcyan County Nat ' l Bank, 825 F.2d 248, 251 

(10th Cir. 1987). "The jury . .. has the exclusive function of 

appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the 

testimony, drawing inferences from the facts established, 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, and reaching ultimate 

conclusions of fact." IsL.. Here the jury heard evidence that, 

immediately prior to taking plaintiff's February 17th statement, 

defendant told plaintiff that he, the defendant, would inform 

other inmates in the jail of the nature of the charges against 

plaintiff and that "they'd come down and smash [plaintiff's] guts 

all over the floor like [defendant] had seen before." Appellant's 

App., Doc . U at 2-62. Plaintiff also testified that defendant 

said, "you're going to have to confess to these things, and I'll 

have you moved over to the mental health wing. It's safe over 

there[,] is guarded a lot, and it will be a nice area; but you 

have to cooperate with me before I'll cooperate with you." .IQ..._ 

The central consideration in determining whether a confession 

has been coerced "always involves this question: did the 

governmental conduct complained of 'bring about' a confession 'not 

freely self-determined?'" Shotwell Mfg. Co. v, United States. 371 

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Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 8 
U.S. 341, 348 (1963) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 

(1961)). "Incriminati~g statements obtained by government acts, 

threats, or promises that permit the defendant's will to be 

overborne are coerced confessions running afoul of the Fifth 

Amendment. n Short. 947 F.2d at - 1449 (citing Malloy. 378 

u.s. at 7); see also Colorado v . Connelly, 479 U.S . 157, 167 

(1986) (coercive police activity required before finding that a 

confession is involuntary within the context of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Where a promise of leniency 

has been made in exchange for a statement, "'an inculpatory 

statement would be the product of inducement, and thus not an act 

of free will.'" Fountain, 776 F.2d at 885 (quoting Shotwell, 371 

U.S . at 348). By finding that promises of lesser punishment and 

physical protection were made to plaintiff in order to induce his 

statement, the jury found a predicate fact underlying the ultimate 

and necessary 

. 1 2 1.nvo untary. 

legal conclusion that plaintiff's confession was 

The district court's application of these facts to 

the law to reach the opposite conclusion was, therefore, error. 

Plaintiff, in his brief, also argues that the court erred in 

instructing the jury regarding the damages recoverable against 

In determining whether a confession is involuntary, all of 

the surrounding circumstances must be considered. Short, 947 F . 2d 

at 1449. This case involves two closely related interrogations. 

The coercive tactics and threats used by defendant during the 

course of the February 15th interrogation must also be taken into 

account when evaluating the voluntariness of the February 17th 

statement. The nature of the coercion which took place on 

February 15th cannot have failed to influence plaintiff's will two 

days later when he again was faced with defendant Strong's threats 

and again made incriminating statements. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4032 Document: 010110157259 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 9 
defendant . This issue was not included in the order certified 

under Rule 54(b) for appeal to this court, and, thus is not before 

us. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for 

proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. 

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