Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02730/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02730-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NICKALOS DEMOND GRAY, 

Petitioner,

v.

RONALD J. RACKEY, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 14cv02730 JAH (RBB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS [ECF NO. 1] 

 Petitioner Nickalos Demond Gray, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and informa 

pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the 

Southern District of California on November 17, 2014 [ECF Nos. 1, 3].1

 There, he 

challenges his convictions for carjacking, possession of a deadly weapon, and vicarious 

liability for his codefendant’s use of a firearm in the commission of the carjacking. (See 

Pet. 2, ECF No. 1.) Gray argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by 

excluding evidence of third-party culpability (ground one). (Id. at 2, 6.) Petitioner also 

maintains that the prosecution argued facts not in evidence multiple times during its 

1

 The Court will cite to all filed documents using the page numbers assigned by the 

electronic case filing system.

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closing argument, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair (ground two). (Id. at 7.) He 

claims that the cumulative effect of grounds one and two warrants reversal (ground 

three). (Id. at 8.)

 The Respondent, Warden Ronald J. Rackey, filed a Response and a Notice of 

Lodgment on January 20, 2015 [ECF Nos. 6, 7]. The Court ordered Rackey to submit a 

supplemental brief because he failed to provide a substantive analysis of Petitioner’s 

claims. (Mins. 1, May 4, 2015, ECF No. 8.) Respondent submitted his Supplemental 

Answer on May 28, 2015 [ECF No. 9]. Regarding ground one, Rackey argues that 

Petitioner’s claim should be denied because it does not raise a federal question. (Answer 

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No. 6.) Further, Respondent asserts that the appellate 

court reasonably rejected the alleged error. (Id. at 9-10.) Addressing ground two, he 

contends that Gray’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct was adequately cured. (Suppl. 

Answer 4-5, ECF No. 9.) Finally, discussing ground three, Rackey maintains that the 

claim of cumulative error was reasonably rejected by the California Court of Appeal.

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18, ECF No. 6.) No traverse was filed. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On September 8, 2011, Victor Garcia sat in his parked car in front of his home to 

charge his cell phone. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 2 

(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2013).) An African-American man, later identified as 

Petitioner’s codefendant Dixon, approached Garcia and told him to give him the car. 

(Id.) Dixon then revealed and cocked a gun. (Id.) Garcia exited the car, lay face down 

on the sidewalk at Dixon’s order, and looked at Dixon. (Id. at 2-3.) Garcia heard another 

man open the driver’s side door of his car, get into the car, and speak with what he 

described as an African-American accent. (Id. at 3.) Dixon then entered the car and they 

drove away. (Id.)

Police tracked down Garcia’s vehicle later that night and initiated a traffic stop.

(Id.) They found Gray driving with Dixon in the passenger seat and Oscar Evans in the 

backseat. (Id.) During a subsequent lineup, Garcia identified Dixon as the man who 

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pointed a gun at him but was unable to identify Petitioner and Evans. (Id. at 3-4.) Gray 

told officers he borrowed the car from his child’s mother’s roommate’s brother “L.” (Id. 

at 4.) The mother of Petitioner’s child, however, testified that she had no roommate on 

the date of the incident and did not know “L.” (Id.)

A jury found Gray guilty of carjacking, possession of a deadly weapon, and 

vicarious liability for Dixon’s use of a firearm. (Id. at 2.) He was sentenced to four years 

and eight months in prison. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 845, 859, May 

11, 2012.)2

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On November 5, 2012, Petitioner appealed his convictions to the California Court 

of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Dixon, No. D061943 

(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2013).) On August 30, 2013, the court of appeal affirmed the 

judgment. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 1.) Gray filed a 

petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6, Petition for 

Review, People v. Dixon, [No. S213868] (Cal. Nov. 13, 2013).) On November 13, 2013, 

the California Supreme Court denied his petition without citation or comment.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Dixon, No. S213868, order (Cal. Nov. 13, 2013).) 

Gray did not file any petitions for writ of habeas corpus in state court. Petitioner 

constructively filed his Petition in this Court on November 14, 2014 [ECF No. 1].3

2

 Gray’s Petition states that the length of his sentence is five years and eight months; the 

Reporter’s Transcript and Clerk’s Transcript, however, establish the sentence as four 

years and eight months. (Compare Pet. 1, ECF No. 1, with Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s 

Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 859, and Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. Vol. 1, 166, May 11, 2012 

(abstract of judgment).) 

3

 The exhibits attached to the Petition show that it was placed in the mail on that date. 

Under the mailbox rule, the Court considers a petition filed on the date a petitioner hands 

it to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); 

Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244, 

applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 

538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA 

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the 

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); 

Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). Because Gray’s Petition was filed 

on November 14, 2014, AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

Section 2254(d) reads as follows: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state prisoner must allege 

his conviction was obtained “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court violated 

his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 

882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state supreme court” with general 

supervisory authority over the proper application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 

F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) 

(holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state court’s application of state law); 

Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885 (explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a 

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief only to correct 

errors of federal constitutional magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 

(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors of state 

law “unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation”). 

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), stated that 

“AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology in 

deciding the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court 

decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law.” Id. at 71. In other words, a federal court is not required to review the state 

court decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the 

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to ‘Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1) 

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” 

Id.

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial court, AEDPA 

provides as follows: 

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to 

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption 

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Exclusion of Evidence of Third-Party Culpability 

 Gray contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it excluded 

third-party culpability evidence. (Pet. 6, ECF 1.) He maintains that two incidents 

occurred soon after the carjacking where Garcia felt intimidated by an African-American 

man. (Id.) During an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Garcia testified that while he 

walked his dog three days after the carjacking, he noticed an African-American man 

staring at him. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 5.) While 

walking away from Garcia, the man turned to look at him at least ten times. (Id.) The 

man allegedly stopped between two bushes, turned to stare at Garcia for five seconds, and 

then discharged a firearm into the dirt. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 139-

40, Feb. 24, 2012.) After crossing over a fence, the man again turned to stare at Garcia 

until Garcia walked back to the front steps of his house. (Id. at 141.) Two days later, 

Garcia saw the same man walking down the street with another African-American man. 

(Id. at 142.) Garcia recalled that the two men were talking but became silent when they 

saw him. (Id.) They made brief comments, looked at each other, and continued walking 

down the street. (Id.) Garcia was unsure whether the men were involved in the 

carjacking. (Id. at 143.) 

 The trial court determined that because the defense’s proffered evidence was 

speculative and irrelevant, it was inadmissible. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. 

D061943, slip op. at 6.) Petitioner maintains that this was an impermissible limitation on 

his right to present a complete defense. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) “Not only did the court 

ignore defense counsel’s argument, it also ignored the victim’s statements that he thought 

the man that he encountered outside his apartment was somehow related to the 

carjacking.” (Id.) Respondent argues that that the trial court’s discretion under state law 

cannot be challenged on federal habeas review. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, 

ECF No. 6; Suppl. Answer 1, ECF No. 9 (citation omitted).) He further asserts that the 

California Court of Appeal’s finding that the third-party culpability evidence was 

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properly excluded is binding on federal review. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, 

ECF No. 6 (citations omitted); Suppl. Answer 1-2, ECF No. 9 (citation omitted).) 

Rackey cites case law for the proposition that “absent considerable detail and specific 

information connecting an identified third party to the charged crime, third party 

culpability evidence should be excluded.” (Suppl. Answer 3, ECF No. 9 (citations 

omitted).) For these reasons, Respondent concludes that a violation of constitutional 

rights did not occur. 

Simply stated, Gray offers no evidence to suggest that the exclusion of 

the proffered evidence violated any of his federal due process rights.

Consequently, the state appellate court’s rejection of the alleged evidentiary 

error was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established United States Supreme Court precedent, and the claim should 

also be rejected by this Court. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9-10, ECF No. 6 (citations omitted).) Respondent 

Rackey argues that there is no basis for granting federal habeas relief. 

It does not appear that any Supreme Court decision dealt with a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts and decided the case differently from how 

the state court of appeal ruled. Nor does it appear that the state court 

identified the correct legal principle from a Supreme Court decision but 

unreasonably applied the principle to the facts of this case. Relief is thus 

unavailable on this claim under the AEDPA. 

(Suppl. Answer 3-4, ECF No. 9 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).) 

Gray’s petition for review to the California Supreme Court was denied without a 

reasoned decision. (See Lodgment No. 7, People v. Dixon, No. S213868, order.)

Petitioner had asserted his argument that the trial court committed prejudicial error by 

excluding evidence of third-party culpability in his direct appeal to the California Court 

of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10-27, People v. Dixon, No. 

D061943.) The appellate court denied the claim on the merits. (Lodgment No. 5, People 

v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 5-7.)

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In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Supreme Court adopted a 

presumption that gives no effect to unexplained state court orders but “looks through” 

them to the last reasoned state court decision. The last reasoned decision to address 

ground one in Gray’s Petition is the state appellate court opinion denying his claims on 

the merits. This Court will therefore look through the silent denial by the state supreme 

court to the appellate court opinion. 

The state court of appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding the evidence of third-party culpability. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. 

D061943, slip op. at 7.) It noted that Petitioner failed to present any direct or 

circumstantial evidence connecting the African-American men to the carjacking. (Id.)

Because the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence, the court of appeal found it 

did not violate Gray’s constitutional rights. (Id. (citations omitted).) This ruling was 

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceedings. 

A defendant has a constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a 

complete defense, subject to a state’s broad latitude to establish rules excluding evidence 

from criminal trials. Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) 

(citations omitted) (“Only rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense 

was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence.”).

“[State and federal evidence] rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense 

so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed 

to serve.’” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, “the right to introduce relevant evidence can be curtailed if there is a good 

reason for doing that.” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770 (2006).

“‘Incorrect state court evidentiary rulings cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief 

unless federal constitutional rights are affected.’” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 

(9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The state 

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court’s decision to exclude certain evidence must be so prejudicial as to jeopardize the 

defendant’s due process rights.” Id. (citing Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 

1985)).

To evaluate whether exclusion of evidence reaches constitutional 

proportions, [courts] should consider five factors: (1) the probative value of 

the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is 

capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence 

on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part 

of the attempted defense. 

Id. (citation omitted). Courts then balance the importance of the evidence against the 

state’s interest in exclusion. Id. (citing Miller, 757 F.2d at 994.) 

 While the proffered evidence of third-party culpability may have been reliable and 

capable of evaluation by the trier of fact, it has little probative value. Garcia conceded 

that he did not know whether the two men were involved in the carjacking, and the men 

never spoke to him. Though he felt intimidated by their staring at him, it is speculative to 

conclude that an act of staring connects someone to a crime. As a result, the court of 

appeal reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated by 

the exclusion of this evidence. Accordingly, Gray’s request for habeas relief on the basis 

alleged in ground one should be DENIED.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

In ground two, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence 

nine times during her closing argument, and as a result, his trial was fundamentally 

unfair. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1 (citations omitted).) According to Gray, the prosecutor’s 

misconduct was directed at material points that supported Gray’s defense. (Id. (citations 

omitted).) Respondent counters that Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct was 

reasonably rejected by the court of appeal. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 10, ECF 

No. 6.) He argues that Gray presents no evidence that the prosecutor’s conduct so 

infected the trial that Gray was denied due process. (Id. at 17 (citing Duckett v. Godinez, 

67 F.3d 734, 743 (9th Cir. 1995).) Rackey also contends that Petitioner has failed to 

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identify the challenged comments, despite his page citations to the record. (Suppl. 

Answer 4, ECF No. 9 (citing Pet. 7, ECF No. 1).) The Respondent acknowledges that the 

trial judge sustained defense counsel’s objections to eight of the nine challenged 

statements by the prosecutor. (See id.) Even so, Rackey maintains that “this claim is 

vague and conclusory and does not warrant habeas relief.” (Id.) The Respondent argues 

that sustaining defense counsel’s objections and admonishing the jury not to consider 

counsel’s argument as evidence was sufficient to cure any error. (Id. at 4-5 (citations 

omitted).) 

A criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s 

misconduct results in a trial that is “fundamentally unfair.” See Darden v. Wainwright, 

477 U.S. 168, 193 (1986); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“[T]he touchstone 

of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the 

trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”). To obtain federal habeas relief on this 

claim, Gray must do more than demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments were 

improper. Tak Sun Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005); see also

Darden, 477 U.S. at 180-81. Petitioner must show they “‘so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477 

U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)); accord Greer v. 

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); Tak Sun Tan, 413 F.3d at 1112; Thompson v. Borg, 74 

F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996). In measuring the fairness of the trial, a court may 

consider, inter alia, “(1) whether the prosecutor’s comments manipulated or misstated the 

evidence; (2) whether the trial court gave a curative instruction; and (3) the weight of the 

evidence against the accused.” Tak Sun Tan, 413 F.3d at 1115 (citing Darden, 477 U.S. 

at 181-82). If prosecutorial misconduct is established, and it was constitutional error, the 

court must decide whether the constitutional error was harmless. Thompson, 74 F.3d at 

1576-77.

 At the outset, the Respondent’s argument that Gray’s ground two is vague and 

conclusory because he did not identify the specific statements at issue, (Suppl. Answer 4, 

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ECF No. 9 (citing Pet. 7, ECF No. 1)), is without merit. Pro se habeas petitions are 

“given the benefit of liberal construction.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Between the Petition, the 

opinion of the California Court of Appeal, and the trial transcript, the Court is able to 

discern the statements Petitioner argues constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Court 

addresses each statement below. 

1. Statement one: the black jacket 

In her closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statement, which Gray

claims constitutes prosecutorial misconduct: 

How do we know this black jacket doesn’t belong to [Petitioner]?

He’s got all his other property inside the car. He’s got his life inside this 

backpack, which is in the backseat of Victor’s carjacked car. How do we 

know this jacket doesn’t belong to him too? He was never asked by 

Detective Smith. . . . Again, why? Because the victim said the guy with the 

gun was wearing either a blue or black shirt, not a jacket. When H called --

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 704, 784, Mar. 1, 2012.) Before she 

continued, defense objected to this statement as misstating the evidence, and the trial 

court sustained the objection. (Id at 784-85.) Neither Gray nor his codefendant requested 

an admonition with the objection. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip 

op. at 10.) Earlier in the prosecutor’s closing arguments, after the defense raised a similar 

objection, the court admonished the jury to rely on the transcript rather than the 

attorney’s closing arguments as evidence. (Id. at 10-11.) Due to this prior instruction, 

the court of appeal found Gray was not prejudiced by this statement by the prosecutor.

(Id. at 11.) 

 While this statement may have misstated the evidence, the trial court sustained 

defense counsel’s objection, signaling to the jury that the prosecutor’s remark was 

improper. Although the trial court did not give a curative instruction, it had previously 

instructed the jury on four separate occasions to rely on the transcript for evidence, not on 

the prosecutors’ arguments. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 734, 748, 

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773, 775.) The prior curative instructions weigh against finding that Gray’s trial was 

unfair because of this comment. See Tak Sun Tan, 413 F.3d at 1115 (citing Darden, 477 

U.S. at 181-82). The court of appeal reasonably concluded that this statement did not 

prejudice Gray, and Petitioner has done nothing to show that this statement “‘so infected 

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637). Gray’s claim that the 

prosecutor’s misconduct and Petitioner’s resulting conviction entitle him to habeas relief 

should be DENIED.

2. Statement two: timing of events 

Gray complains about the prosecutor’s closing remarks concerning what transpired 

over ten minutes. 

It is not reasonable, it’s not a reasonable conclusion, not at all.

That 10 minutes would be enough time for somebody else to take that 

car from Victor Garcia at gunpoint, go over to Tyra Jones’ complex, 

go inside Tyra Jones’ apartment kicking it with Gray, and Gray 

happens to get a call my buddy is in Chula Vista, I’m going to go visit 

him, can I borrow your car? 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 786.) Defense counsel objected to this 

statement on the basis of facts not in evidence, which the trial court sustained. (Id.) The 

trial court then gave a curative instruction, stating, “Again, you are going to rely on the 

evidence, if need be the record, we’ll [sic] show you what the evidence is.” (Id.)

The appellate court agreed that the prosecutor’s remark mischaracterized the 

evidence, but the court found that this error was not prejudicial because of defense 

counsel’s objection and the trial court’s admonition and instruction to the jury. 

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 11.) This conclusion was 

reasonable and not contrary to clearly established federal law. “A judge’s prompt 

corrective action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any 

problems arising from such improper comments.” United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 

1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1192 (9th 

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Cir. 2005); United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1995)). Gray 

has not demonstrated how this statement rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in light 

of the curative instruction. Consequently, his claim that this misconduct resulted in a 

denial of due process should be DENIED.

3. Statement three: Petitioner’s accent 

The prosecutor’s third statement Gray complains about is as follows: 

It’s not reasonable that somebody is going to carjack a car at gunpoint, turn 

around and give it to two other guy[s]. And that Defendant Gray has the 

same accent that the person who aided and abetted the guy with the gun had 

back on the night of the blackout. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 787.) Defendant objected that there 

was no evidence regarding whether the accents were the same. (Id.) This 

objection was overruled. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal found that the 

prosecutor’s statement was not misconduct in light of Garcia’s testimony that he 

believed the second man involved in the carjacking was African-American because 

of his accent and testimony from the officer who searched Petitioner on the 

evening of the incident that Gray’s accent was consistent with what the officer has 

heard in the African-American community. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, 

No. D061943, slip op. at 12.) This Court agrees. 

“The prosecution is granted reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments.”

United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Patel, 

762 F.2d 784, 795 (9th Cir. 1985)). “Although it is improper to base closing arguments 

upon evidence not in the record, prosecutors are free to argue reasonable inferences from 

the evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). Garcia testified that he heard the person seated in 

the driver’s seat of his car speak in an accent that he believed to be from an AfricanAmerican person. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 28, 58-59, Feb. 24, 2012.)

Officer Lopez testified that Gray’s accent was “a slang-type of accent.” (Lodgment No. 

2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 178, 238, Feb. 27, 2012.) He elaborated, “I wouldn’t say 

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specifically an African-American accent, but it does fall in line with the AfricanAmerican community that I deal with on a regular basis in southeast San Diego.” (Id. at 

243.)

Based on this testimony, the California Court of Appeal held that it was reasonable 

for the prosecutor to argue that the accent of the person Garcia heard and Petitioner’s 

accent were the same. The conclusion that the prosecutor’s statement was not 

misconduct is a reasonable application of federal law. Gray’s claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct relating to this statement should be DENIED.

4. Statement four: Dixon’s hat 

Petitioner additionally claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when she 

stated, “Okay. [The hat] matches the blue shirt and his white polo shorts. So he just 

happens to put on the hat, the same hat the victim ID’s the carjacker was wearing.”

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 788.) The defense objected to this statement 

on the basis of facts not in evidence, and this objection was sustained. (Id.) But the 

California Court of Appeal found that there was evidence to support the prosecutor’s 

statement. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 13.) Even if 

there were not, any error was remedied when defense counsel’s objection was sustained.

(Id.) The appellate court also explained that although no admonition was given, multiple 

curative instructions had previously been given to the jury. (Id.)

 The appellate court was reasonable in finding no prosecutorial misconduct. At 

trial, Garcia identified a blue and white hat as the hat worn by the person who stole his 

car. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 78.) This hat had been marked as 

exhibit number twenty-one, (id.), and Gray’s codefendant identified the hat as the one he 

found in the backseat of the car and put on, (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 

621, 638-39, Feb. 29, 2012). Based on this testimony, it was a reasonable inference that 

the hat Dixon put on was the same hat Garcia identified. See Gray, 876 F.2d at 1417 

(citations omitted). The prosecutor’s statement was not improper. But even if it were, 

any error was adequately cured by the sustained objection and the prior admonitions to 

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the jury. As a result, Petitioner’s claim that this alleged act of prosecutorial misconduct 

deprived Gray of a fair trial should be DENIED.

 5. Statement five: Jones’s meetings with investigators 

The prosecutor’s fifth comment Gray complains about is as follows: 

If [Jones] knew she had to talk to [the district attorney’s investigator], 

she wouldn’t have talked to him. Again, this is closer to the crime. This is 

before she’s had an opportunity to meet with defense investigators and go 

over the story. This is before she has an opportunity to hear from the 

defense investigator, hey why did you meet with the DA investigator?

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 791.) Defense counsel objected to this 

statement on the basis of facts not in evidence. (Id.) This objection was sustained. (Id.)

The court of appeal concluded the comment constituted harmless error, noting that the 

prosecutor had apparently misspoken and meant to say that Jones would have declined to 

speak to the district attorney’s investigator if she known she was allowed to refuse.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 14.) The defense counsel’s 

objection was sustained, and although the trial court did not admonish the jury, it had 

previously instructed the jury that arguments are not evidence after similar objections. 

(Id. (citation omitted). The appellate court added that “it is not reasonably probable that 

the jury believed defense investigators attempted to influence Jones to testify untruthfully 

based on the prosecutor’s statement as there was no evidence in that regard . . . .” (Id.) 

 The court of appeal’s conclusion that this statement constituted harmless error is 

not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. The trial court sustained defense 

counsel’s objection and had previously admonished the jury following a similar sustained 

objection. Moreover, it was reasonable for the court of appeal to conclude that the jury 

would likely not believe the prosecutor’s statements in light of the lack of evidence 

supporting those statements. Petitioner has not shown that this remark resulted in a 

denial of due process. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637). 

His claim of prosecutorial misconduct and a violation of his constitutional rights based 

upon this statement should be DENIED.

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 6. Statement six: Ashlock’s testimony 

Gray next argues that the following statement was prosecutorial misconduct: 

Again, [Witness Ashlock] says that they return -- or I’m sorry. That 

she put Tada -- Tadece and Red leave around 9:58 together. She has no 

reason to lie and say they left together when they didn’t. She said she was 

outside at the barbeque. She was hanging out, getting the barbeque ready.

They were in chairs. I think she was actually on the staircase. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 792-93.) This statement was objected to by 

defense counsel on the basis of facts not in evidence, and the trial court sustained the 

objection. (Id. at 793.) The appellate court found that there was evidence that Ashlock 

may have been on the staircase when the defendants left her home, based on her 

testimony on cross-examination. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip 

op. at 15.) Regardless, it concluded that any error was nonprejudicial and cured because 

the trial court sustained the objection and previously instructed the jury that arguments 

were not evidence. (Id.) This was a reasonable conclusion. 

 Ashlock testified on cross-examination that she was sitting on the stairs at 9:58 

p.m. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 3, 387, 481, Feb. 28, 2012.) As a result, 

the prosecutor’s statement was supported by the evidence. Even so, defense counsel’s 

objection was sustained, and the court had previously admonished the jury. See Tenorio 

v. United States, 390 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding that a prosecutor’s 

misstatement was not seriously prejudicial “especially when considered in the light of the 

court’s instruction to the jury that ‘statements and arguments of counsel are not 

evidence’”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that this statement constituted prosecutorial 

misconduct should be DENIED.

 7. Statement seven: the length of time Garcia looked at Dixon 

Gray contends the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when she 

stated, “The most important thing [Garcia] did do was spend a lot of time looking at 

Defendant Dixon the night of the crime, at least 30 seconds to take a look at him.” 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 799 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel 

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objected on the basis of facts not in evidence, and the trial court sustained this objection.

(Id.) There was no evidence to support the prosecutor’s statement regarding the length of 

time Garcia looked at Dixon. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. 

at 16.) Rather, the evidence was that Garcia spent ten to fifteen seconds looking at 

Dixon. (Id.) The appellate court concluded that the prosecutor’s comment was not 

prejudicial, noting that the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection. (Id.) Garcia 

testified that he intentionally turned to look at Dixon and could see his entire face. (Id.)

Garcia was also able to identify Dixon as the person who pointed the gun at him. (Id.) 

The appellate court’s conclusion that it was not reasonably probable that a more 

favorable result would have been obtained without the misstatement by the prosecutor is 

not contrary to clearly established federal law. (Id.) 

 The prosecutor misstated Garcia’s testimony, but even without this, there was other 

evidence to support Garcia’s identification of Dixon, Gray’s codefendant. Moreover, in 

light of the trial court sustaining defense counsel’s objection, Petitioner has not shown 

how this statement resulted in a denial of due process. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 

(quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637). Gray’s claim that the prosecutor’s misconduct 

infected the trial and ensuing conviction should be DENIED.

 8. Statement eight: search for “L” 

Petitioner additionally maintains that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the 

prosecutor stated, “L., no one knows L. There was no way to find L. The District 

Attorney Investigator tried to locate L.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 

800.) Defense counsel objected on the basis of facts not in evidence, and the objection 

was sustained. (Id.) The trial court added, “Keep in mind you’re going to rely on the 

evidence not the arguments as to what the evidence is.” (Id.) The court of appeal found 

that any harm from this statement was cured through the curative instruction and the 

instructions regarding closing arguments not being evidence. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. 

Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 17.) This conclusion was reasonable.

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“A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 

234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). In most 

circumstances, a prompt curative instruction is enough to cure any problems from 

improper statements by the prosecutor. Washington, 462 F.3d at 1136 (citing Younger, 

398 F.3d at 1192; McChristian, 47 F.3d at 1507-08). Here, after sustaining defense 

counsel’s objection, the trial judge promptly instructed the jury that they were to rely on 

evidence and not arguments. Gray has not demonstrated how his due process was denied 

in light of this prompt curative instruction. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting 

Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637). Consequently, his claim for habeas relief based on 

prosecutorial misconduct in making this statement should be DENIED.

 9. Statement nine: Evans’s testimony 

Petitioner’s final challenge is to the following two statements by the prosecutor:

Oscar Evans, OE, said, Gray and Dixon left walking together, left together.

[Ashlock] said [the] same thing. . . . Both return in mystery car. Gun still in 

car. Gun wiped clean by Dixon, but he still flees with it, risking his own 

life, wearing L.A. hat despite Oscar Evans’ sworn testimony saying none of 

his friends would wear an L.A. hat. 

 . . . . 

I think he even said he wouldn’t let an L.A. hat in his house. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 801-02.) These statements were objected to 

on the bases of facts not in evidence and misstating the testimony. (Id. at 802.) The 

objections were overruled. (Id.) After reviewing the trial court record, the California 

Court of Appeal determined that the prosecutor’s statements did not amount to 

misconduct because the prosecutor drew reasonable inferences from the evidence. 

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 18.) It added that assuming 

there were a misstatement of testimony, this did not render the trial unfair. (Id.) This 

Court agrees. 

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 While testifying about Dixon’s hat, Evans stated, “I know it wasn’t an L.A[.] hat 

for sure. We wouldn’t wear a L.A[.] hat. He’s not from L.A[.] and neither am I, neither 

are my friends.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 3, 528, Feb. 28, 2012.) Evans 

also said, “No one under my roof owned a[n] L.A[.] hat.” (Id. at 553.) This is because 

they are not fans of the Dodgers, Lakers, or Clippers. (See id.) The prosecutor was free 

to argue reasonable inferences from this testimony. See Gray, 876 F.2d at 1417 (citations 

omitted). Based on his strong statements regarding his and his friends’ dislike of teams 

from Los Angeles, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to draw the inference that none of 

Evans’s friends would wear a Los Angeles hat and that Evans would not let someone 

with a Los Angeles hat into his house. As a result, the court of appeal’s conclusion 

regarding this statement was reasonable. Gray’s claim for habeas relief premised on 

prosecutorial misconduct should be DENIED.

 In sum, the court of appeal’s decision regarding the claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

United States Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). Ground two in the Petition 

does not entitle Gray to habeas relief. Accordingly, Petitioner’s second claim for habeas 

relief should be DENIED.

C. Cumulative Effect of Claims One and Two 

 Gray asserts in ground three that the combined effect of the trial court’s exclusion 

of third-party culpability evidence and the prosecutorial misconduct resulted in 

prejudicial error and warrants reversal. (Pet. 8, ECF No. 1.)

When taken together, the prosecutorial misconduct and the court’s 

failure to allow relevant third-party culpability evidence, amount to 

prejudicial error. The Court must consider the cumulative prejudice of all 

the instances of misconduct coupled with the court’s error of limiting Mr. 

Gray’s third-party culpability evidence to decide if reversal is required.

When the cumulative prejudice of all of the errors that occurred here is 

considered, reversal is proper.

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Without these errors, the prosecutor’s case against Mr. Gray would 

have failed. This Court should therefore grant Mr. Gray’s petition or reverse 

the convictions. 

(Id.)

 Rackey responds that this claim was reasonably rejected by the court of appeal. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18, ECF No. 6.) He argues that the appellate court’s 

rejection of Petitioner’s first two grounds was reasonable. (Id.) As a result, “Gray has 

failed to establish any substantial constitutional error occurred based on any of the 

aforementioned assertions.” (Id.) Respondent explains that Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that any of the assertions in support of his claim of cumulative error have 

merit. (Id. at 19.) Consequently, he cannot show he was harmed by cumulative error.

(Id. (citations omitted).) But, “[t]o the extent any error arguably occurred, the effect was 

harmless. Review of the record, without the speculation and conclusory interpretation 

offered by Gray shows that he received a fair and untainted trial. The Constitution 

requires no more.” (Suppl. Answer 6, ECF No. 9 (internal citation omitted).) 

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple 

trial court errors violates due process where it renders the resulting criminal trial 

fundamentally unfair.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 302-03 (1973)). Where “no single trial 

error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative 

effect of multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 

F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). Where “there are a number of errors at trial, ‘a 

balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far less effective than analyzing the 

overall effect of all the errors in the context of the evidence introduced at trial against the 

defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)).

“[W]here the government’s case is weak, a defendant is more likely to be prejudiced by 

the effect of cumulative errors.” Id. 

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 The court of appeal found that even looking at the alleged errors cumulatively, 

they were “not unduly prejudicial and it is not reasonably probable that the defendants 

would have obtained a more favorable result had they not occurred.” (Lodgment No. 5, 

People v. Dixon, No. D061943, slip op. at 18.) This Court agrees. For the reasons 

discussed, Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated through the exclusion of 

third-party culpability evidence or through the statements of the prosecutor. As a result, 

there can be no cumulative error. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative 

prejudice is possible.” (citing United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1217 (9th Cir. 

2006))). Accordingly, Gray’s ground three should be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be 

DENIED. This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States 

District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all 

parties on or before September 8, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections 

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

on or before September 22, 2016.

 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 11, 2016 

 ________________________________ 

 Ruben B. Brooks 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

cc: Judge Houston 

 All parties 

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