Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02169/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eduardo Cruz Castillo,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-12-2169-PHX-FJM (JFM)

CR-12-1084-PHX-FJM

Report & Recommendation 

on 

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed a first amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on October 20, 2012 (Doc. 5). On March 20, 

2013 Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 13). Movant has not filed a reply.

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases , Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In screening the Motion in this case, the Court summarized the fact and 

procedural background as follows:

Movant was arrested on March 9, 2012 for illegal re-entry after 

removal and on April 10, 2012, a criminal complaint was filed 

against Movant. United States v. Cruz-Castillo, No. CR12-1084-

PHX-FJM, doc. 1. At the time of Movant’s arrest, Movant was

subject to supervised release for a previous conviction for illegal reCase 2:12-cv-02169-FJM Document 14 Filed 06/24/13 Page 1 of 10
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entry after removal in this District. See United States v. CruzCastillo, No. CR08-1357 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2009), doc. 22. A 

petition to revoke supervised release was filed in that case based 

upon Movant’s March 9, 2012 arrest. Id., doc. 45. On May 22, 

2012, Movant waived indictment and consented to proceeding by 

information in the new criminal case. Cruz-Castillo, CR12-1084,

doc. 17. The same day, Movant pleaded guilty to the information 

before Magistrate Judge Duncan, who found the guilty plea was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and who recommended that the 

guilty plea be accepted. Id., doc. 19, 21. However, on September 21,

2012, this Court rejected the plea agreement and afforded Movant 

the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Id., doc. 23. Movant 

chose to maintain his guilty plea without a written plea agreement 

and the case proceeded to sentencing. Id. Movant agreed that the

presentence report (PSR) accurately reflected Movant’s criminal 

history. The Court adopted the PSR. The PSR found a pre-departure 

advisory guideline range of offense level 10, criminal history VI, 

with an advisory guideline range of 24 to 30 months. The Court

sentenced Movant to 30 months in prison followed by three years on 

supervised release in CR12-1084 to be served consecutively to the 

term of imprisonment imposed in CR08-1357 for violating the terms 

of supervised release. Id.

(Order 1/9/13, Doc. 6 at 2-3.)

B. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing a “Motion for Time 

Reduction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on October 10, 2012 (Doc. 1). The Court 

dismissed that motion with leave to amend. (Order 10/22/12, Doc. 3.) Movant then filed 

the instant Amended Motion on October 30, 2012 (Doc. 5), asserting the following 

grounds for relief:

In Ground One, he asserts that his attorney misled him into signing 

the plea agreement without explaining “anything” to him about it. 

(Doc. 5 at 5.) In Ground Two, he asserts that the Court sentenced 

him outside the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) and outside the 

sentence under the plea agreement. In Ground Three, he asserts that 

his attorney failed to file a direct appeal as instructed by Movant. In 

Ground Four, Movant asserts that the USSG were not followed.

(Order 1/9/13, Doc. 6 at 3.) On screening, the Court dismissed Ground One and the 

portions of Ground Two based upon the plea agreement because the Court had rejected 

the plea agreement. A response to the balance of Ground Two and to Grounds Three and 

Four was ordered. (Id.)

Response - On March 20, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 13). 

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Respondent argues that Grounds Two and Four are without merit because: (1) the Court 

properly calculated the Sentencing Guideline ranges; (2) Defendant failed to object to the 

calculations of the ranges and failed to raise the issue on appeal; and (3) Movant’s 

sentence was within the guideline ranges and properly calculated.

Respondent argues that Ground Three is without merit because the affidavit of 

trial counsel reflects no request for an appeal, and Movant has failed to show a viable 

issue for appeal to establish the requisite prejudice from any failure to file such a notice.

Reply – The Court’s service Order provided for “a reply within 30 days from the 

date of service of the answer.” (Order 1/9/13 at 4 (emphasis in original).) That time has 

passed and Movant has not filed a reply.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUNDS 2 and 4:SENTENCE

Movant’s claims concerning his sentence are conclusory. In Ground Two, (apart 

from his rejected arguments about variance from his rejected plea agreement) Movant 

simply complains that the Court “didn’t stay in the guid lines [sic] of my sentencing.” 

(Amend Motion, Doc. 5 at 6.) In his Ground Four he simple asserts “not following the 

Guidelines.” (Id. at 8.) 

Procedural Default- The general rule is “that claims not raised on direct appeal 

may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” 

Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Thus, a Section 2255 movant raising a claim 

for the first time in post-conviction proceedings is in procedural default, and is precluded 

from asserting the claim. Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (finding default 

where petitioner challenging his guilty plea did not raise claim in direct appeal); United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (noting that a motion to vacate or modify a 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal).1

 

1

This requirement does not apply to Movant’s claim in Ground Three concerning 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to file a notice of appeal. In a federal prosecution, 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel need not be exhausted on direct appeal, but 

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Here, Movant did not file a direct appeal, and thus procedurally defaulted on his 

sentencing claim 

“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on 

direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first 

demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent’.” 

Bousley, 523 U.S at 622 (citations omitted). Movant does not assert his actual 

innocence, and thus must show cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. 

The only cause Movant has suggested is trial counsel’s failure to file a notice of 

appeal. As discussed hereinafter, Movant has failed to show that counsel performed 

deficiently in this regard. Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, Movant has failed to show 

viable issue for review, either on appeal or in this action, and thus fails to show the 

requisite prejudice.

Accordingly, Movant’s Grounds Two and Four should be dismissed as 

procedurally defaulted.

Sentence Within Guidelines – Even if not procedurally defaulted, Movant’s 

claims in Grounds Two and Four are without merit.

Movant points to no specific departure from the guidelines, or error in calculating 

the guidelines range. (As discussed above, any departure from the plea agreement is 

irrelevant because Movant pled guilty despite the Court’s rejection of the plea 

agreement.) During the sentencing hearing, the parties confirmed that they had reviewed 

the PSR and that the facts contained therein and the scoring of the guidelines were 

correct. (Exhibit A, R.T. 9/21/12 at 10-11.) The Court stated the advisory as well as the 

policy guideline ranges on the record, and, moreover, the defendant’s counsel confirmed 

they were correct. (Id. at 11.) The Court calculated the applicable guidelines as “offense 

level 10, criminal history category VI, with an advisory guideline range of from 24 to 30 

 

are properly brought in the first instance in a Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. 

"We do hold that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct 

appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under 

§ 2255." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003). 

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months.” (Id. at 10.)

Petitioner was convicted in this case of violating Title 8, U.S.C. §1326(a), ReEntry of Removed Alien, with sentencing enhancement pursuant to Title 8, U.S.C. 

§1326(b)(1), a Class C Felony offense. The Sentencing Guidelines specify a base 

offense level of 8 for illegal reentry, and an increase of two levels if the deportation was 

after a felony. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) and (b)( (1)(D). Movant’s acceptance of 

responsibility would have reduced the offense level by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 

Thus, his offense level was 10.

The Court calculated Movant as having Criminal History Category VI. That 

requires 13 or more criminal history points. In reviewing Movant’s criminal history at 

sentencing, the Court pointed out the following convictions and sentences, which 

generate the indicated points:

1. aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, two years in 

prison (3 points);

2. illegal reentry, a 21 month sentence (3 points);

3. illegal reentry, a 24 month sentence (3 points).

In addition, the Court identified at least five other convictions, including two other DWI 

convictions, possession of drug paraphernalia on multiple convictions, and assault. Even 

if the sentence on each of these were less than sixty days, they would garner at least one 

point each, up to a total of four points. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. (Exhibit A, R.T. 9/21/12 at 19-

20.) Thus, Movant had at least thirteen criminal history points.

For an Offense level 10 and a Criminal History Category VI, the sentencing range 

is 24-30 months. U.S.S.G., Sentencing Table. Petitioner was sentenced to 30 months. 

Thus, his sentence was within the guideline ranges.

Respondent also argues convincingly that the Court properly considered both the 

guidelines range and the other factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The Court discussed at 

length the nature of the illegal entry offense, Movant’s history and characteristics 

including his criminal record, drug and alcohol abuse, violence, and medical condition, 

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the reason for an increased sentence for deterrence and to protect the public, the policy 

objectives under the statute, the potential for a sentence outside the guidelines, the 

appropriateness of a progressive increase in sentences for his illegal reentry offenses, etc. 

(Exhibit A, R.T. 9/21/12 at 18-22.) Moreover, the Court explicitly stated that it 

“considered Section 3553.” (Id. at 19.) 

In sum, Movant offers nothing but conclusory allegations of error and the record 

reflects an entirely properly sentence. For these reasons, Movant’s attacks on the 

sentence in Grounds Two and Four are without merit.

B. GROUND 3: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

In his Ground Three, Movant complains that his “lawyer refused to do a direct 

appeal for me after my sentencing as he was asked to.” (Amended Motion, Doc. 5 at 7.) 

As does Respondent, the undersigned construes this as a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel.

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that 

counsel's representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) 

that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 

528 U.S. 470, 476-77 (2000). In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court observed: “We have 

long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a 

notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.” 528 U.S. at 477. 

Moreover, they clarified that “when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance 

deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has 

made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.” 

He need not make any further showing that the appeal would have been meritorious or 

successful, although the likelihood of success may be relevant to the showing that he 

would have appealed had he been properly represented. Id. at 484-485.

The Flores-Ortega Court also discussed the showing necessary where the 

defendant did not explicitly request that counsel file an appeal, but merely asserts that 

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counsel failed to discuss or to adequately advise Petitioner about the propriety of an 

appeal. But here, Movant explicitly alleges that he instructed counsel to appeal.

Movant fails, however, to dress his allegation in anything other than his bald 

assertion. For example, Movant does not identify when or in what manner or what 

context he requested counsel to file an appeal. 

In the face of Movant’s bare assertion, Respondent provides the affidavit of trial 

counsel, Fontes, who relates that he asked Movant “if he wished to appeal the 

convictions within the applicable time period,” and that Movant “did not ask, instruct, or 

otherwise suggest that I file notices of appeal.” (Exhibit B, Affidavit.) Movant has not 

replied to offer any reason to reject this avowal. 

Moreover, Movant has not requested an evidentiary hearing to support his 

allegations. Even so, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that even when credibility is at 

issue, no evidentiary hearing is required if it can be " 'conclusively decided on the basis 

of documentary testimony and evidence in the record.' " Shah v. U.S., 878 F.2d, 1156, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Espinoza, 866 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th 

Cir.1989)). The court may deny a hearing if the movant's allegations, viewed against the 

record, fail to state a claim for relief or "are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous 

as to warrant summary dismissal." United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 931 (9th 

Cir.1998). 2003).

Here, Movant’s failure to proffer any potentially meritorious basis for appeal is 

sufficient for this Court to reject Movant’s bald allegations. The record reflects no 

reason to believe that Movant would have requested that an appeal be filed. Movant had 

pled guilty, despite the trial court’s rejection of the plea agreement, and had been 

sentenced within the guidelines range. Movant’s arguments at sentencing for a lesser 

sentence were policy arguments and calls for mercy, and would not have provided fodder 

for an appeal. Movant suggests no procedural error, and no trial defense to what is 

essentially a status offense. His allegations that the Sentencing Guidelines were not 

followed is a conclusory allegation, and in correct, and would have offered no hope for a 

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viable appeal. His other allegations about violations of the rejected plea agreement 

would have also been baseless grounds for appeal.

Moreover, these are the very types of considerations the Flores-Ortega court 

found relevant to the inquiry whether the defendant, had he been properly advised, he 

would have proceeded with an appeal. 528 U.S. at 485-486. In light of the paucity of 

Movant’s allegations and the balance of the record, the undersigned finds it palpably 

incredible that Movant would have proceeded with an appeal. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Movant has failed to carry his burden of 

showing the requisite deficient performance and prejudice to sustain his claim in Ground 

Three. Therefore, this claim must be denied as well.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Amended Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

The recommendations if accepted will result in Movant’s Amended Motion to Vacate 

being resolved adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of 

Appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court=s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under 

the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not 

“find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Amended Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed October 30, 

2012 (Doc. 5) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

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However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 24, 2013

12-2169r RR 13 06 18 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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