Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00775/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00775-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1

 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

2

 In his Traverse, Petitioner joined Claims 40 and 41, which present the same issue.

(Dkt. 56 at 41.) 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roger Wayne Murray, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 03-775-PHX-DGC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Petitioner Roger Wayne M urray (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner sentenced to

death. Before the Court are Petitioner’s M otion for Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing and

Motion to Expand the Record Under Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

(Dkts. 72, 73.)1

 Petitioner requests expansion of the record, discovery and/or an

evident iary hearing in support of Claims 1, 2, 4-7, 23, 29, 34-37, 40/41, 42, 44, 45 and 48.2

Respondents filed responses, and Petitioner filed replies. (Dkts. 81, 82, 84, 86.)

Pursuant to the Court’s general procedures governing resolution of capital habeas

proceedings, the parties have completed briefing of both the procedural status and the

merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims. The Court will address whether the claims for which

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3

 “ROA” refers to the one-volume record in Petitioner’s direct appeal (Case No. CR92-0441-AP). “CROA” refers to the four-volume record, and one sealed envelope, in

Robert Murray’s companion direct appeal (Case No. CR-92-0440-AP). “PCR” refers to

documents contained in the three-volume record from Petitioner’s post-conviction

proceedings (Case No. Mohave CR-13057). “PR doc.” refers to enumerated documents

contained in the three-volume record on ap p eal from Petitioner’s post-conviction

p roceedings (Case No. CR 01-0146-PC). “RT” refers to the reporter’s transcripts. The

original reporter’s transcripts and certified copies of trial and post-conviction records were

provided to this Court by the Ariz ona Supreme Court on September 23, 2004 in this case

(dkt. 59), and on November 13, 2001 in Robert Murray’s habeas action, CV 99-1812-PHXDGC, which is also before this Court. 

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Petitioner seeks evidentiary development are appropriate for review on the merits by a

federal habeas court. The Court will also address the procedural status of Claims 30-33,

which Petitioner purports to withdraw or dismiss wit hout p rejudice. (Dkt. 56 at 34.) In his

Traverse, Petitioner voluntarily withdrew Claims 43, 47, 49-52 and 54-56 as duplicat ive of

other claims in t he Amended Petition. (Dkt. 56 at 41, 50, 56, 57-58.) Accordingly, these

claims are no longer before the Court and will be dismissed. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 12, 1992, Petitioner and his older brother, Robert, were jointly tried and

convicted by a jury of one count of armed robbery and two counts of first degree murder

in the deaths of Dean Morrison and Jacqueline Appelhans. The murders occurred in the

course of an armed robbery of a store and restaurant run by Morrison and Appelhans, and

of their adjacent home, located in Grasshopper Junction, a rural area outside Kingman,

Arizona. Mohave County Superior Court Judge James E. Chavez sentenced Petitioner and

his brother to death on each murder count and to a term of imprisonment for t he armed

robbery. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of each

brother in a joint opinion. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P.2d 542 (1995). On November

21, 1995, Petit ioner filed a motion for reconsideration. (ROA 36.)3 That motion was denied.

(ROA 37.) A petition for writ of certiorari was subsequently denied by the United States

Supreme Court. Murray v. Arizona, 519 U.S. 874 (1996). 

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On March 9, 1999, Pet it ioner filed a petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”) in the

trial court (“PCR court”). The PCR court summarily rejected or found precluded most of

Petitioner’s claims, but it appointed a psychologist and neuropsy chologist to evaluate

Petitioner preparatory to an evidentiary hearing to be held on two ineffective assistance

of counsel (“IAC”) claims alleging that trial counsel: (1) slept during portions of the trial,

and (2) failed to obtain neurological or neuropsychological testing for purposes of

mit igat ion at sentencing. (PCR Order filed 1/10/00.) Following examination by the

appointed experts, Petitioner notified the PCR court that he did not intend to rely on those

experts. (PCR Notice filed 12/18/00.) The PCR court granted the Respondents’ motion to

dismiss the second IAC claim and held an evidentiary hearing on the first. (PCR Order filed

4/16/01.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied relief on that claim and

dismissed the petition. (PCR Order filed 3/21/02.) 

The Arizona Sup reme Court summarily denied a Petition for Review except as to

Petitioner’s claim that he was entitled t o a jury determination of aggravating factors. (PR

docs. 29, 30.) With respect to that claim, the Arizona Supreme Court consolidat ed review

with claims of other similarly-situated inmates and subsequently denied relief, see Stat e v.

Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz. 2003). (PR doc. 37.) The court thereafter denied

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (PR doc. 40.) Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

certiorari, which he later withdrew. (PR docs. 42, 43.) Petitioner then initiated the instant

habeas proceedings. (Dkt. 1.) 

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). T he AEDPA

requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petitioner

has properly exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To

properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “ fairly present” his claims to the

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4

 Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state court,

t hus permitting federal review, is an intrinsically federal issue which must be determined

by the federal court. Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8t h Cir. 1995); Harris v.

Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th Cir. 1994).

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stat e’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 848 (1999).

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the op erat ive facts and

t he federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles t o t he facts bearing upon his

constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971).4 If a petitioner’s habeas claim includes new factual allegations not

presented to the state court, the claim may be considered unexhausted if the new facts

“fundamentally alter” the legal claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v.

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on stat e p rocedural grounds.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court

if the p etitioner failed to present the claim in any forum and “the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find t he claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1. This is often

referred to as “technical” exhaustion – although the claim was not actually exhausted in

state court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See Gray v. Netherland,

518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in

state court meets the t echnical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any

longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post-convict ion p roceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to

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their convictions or sentences in state court. Rule 32.2 provides, in part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this

rule based upon any ground: . . . .

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any p revious

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

b. Exceptions. Rule 32.2(a) shall not apply to claims for relief based

on Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). When a claim under [these subsect ions] is raised in a successive or untimely petition, the petition must set

forth the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or in a

timely manner. If meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the claim

and indicating why the claim was not stated in t he p revious petition or in a

timely manner, the petition shall be summarily dismissed.

 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (2002) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 32.2, petitioners may

not be granted relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petit ion

for post -convict ion relief. Similarly, pursuant to Rule 32.4, petitioners must seek relief in

a timely manner. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h)

of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omit t ed from a prior petition

or was not presented in a timely manner will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (3), 32.4(a). 

In the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised previously in

state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies currently

available to him pursuant to Rule 32. If no remedies are currently available, petitioner’s

claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732,

735 n.1. In addition, if there are claims that were fairly presented in state court but found

defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims also will be found procedurally

defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal

law and adequate to warrant p reclusion of federal review. Harris, 489 U.S. at 262. A state

procedural default is not indep endent if, for example, it depends upon an antecedent

federal constitutional ruling. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per curiam). A state

bar is not adequate unless it was firmly established and regularly applied at the time of

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5

 Respondents misidentified Claims 42, 44, and 48 in their Answer, which were

mislabeled as Claims 41, 43, and 47, respectively. (Dkt. 46 at 73, 74, 82.)

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application by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction,

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims.

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits

of procedurally default ed claims unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the

failure to properly exhaust in state court and p rejudice from the alleged constitutional

violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of just ice would result if the claim were

not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Because Petitioner

does not assert that either cause and p rejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice

excuses the procedural default of any claim at issue in this Order, the Court does not

further address those issues. 

PROCEDURAL STATUS OF CLAIMS

The Court reviews the procedural status of the claims for which evidentiary

development is sought and/or those that Petitioner seeks to dismiss wit hout p rejudice:

Claims 1, 2, 4-7, 23, 29-37, 40/41, 42, 44, 45 and 48. Resp ondents concede that Claims 1 (in

part), 2, 4 (in part), 5 (in part), 6 (in part), 7 (in part), 40/41 (in part), 42, 45 and 48 are properly

exhausted.5

 (Dkt. 46.) Respondents contest ripeness of one claim and exhaustion of the

remaining claims. 

Claim 1 (in part)

Claim 1 alleges t hat Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of his mot ion t o change venue based on

pretrial publicity. (Dkt. 40 at 49.) Respondents contend this claim is only exhausted to the

extent that it alleges a violation of due p rocess. (Dkt. 46 at 13.) Petitioner replies that he

presented this claim as a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights on direct

appeal. (Dkt. 56 at 7.) 

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6

 Petitioner does not assert that any exception to preclusion applies to any claim at

issue herein. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no state

court remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a)).

First, Pet itioner does not assert that any of the preclusion exceptions enumerated in Rule

32.2(b)(2)–expired sentence, newly discovered material facts, no fault untimely appeal or

PCR proceeding, significant change in the law, or actual innocence of crime or death

sentence–apply and the Court finds none of them applicable. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b)(2); 32.1(d) - (h). Second, Petitioner does not argue that any of the claims are of the

type that cannot be waived absent a personal knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver.

Cf. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (addressing waiver because

raised by petitioner). 

T he Court finds, as to all of the claims in this Order for which the Court determines

there is no available remedy in state court pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), that none of those

claims fall within the limited framework of claims requiring a knowing, voluntary and

intelligent waiver. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) cmt. (West 2004) (noting that most claims

of trial error do not require a personal waiver); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d

1067, 1070 (2002) (ident ifying the right to counsel, right to a jury trial and right to a 12-

person jury under the Arizona Constitution as the type of claims that require personal

waiver); see also State v. Espinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 505, 29 P.3d 278, 280 (Ct. Ap p. 2001)

(withdrawal of plea offer in violation of due process not a claim requiring personal waiver);

but cf. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622-23 (finding claim not defaulted because unclear whether

personal waiver would be required under state law).

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Petitioner presented the Sixt h and Fourteenth Amendment aspects of this claim on

direct appeal. (ROA 15 at 14, 16.) T herefore, these portions of this claim are exhausted.

However, Petitioner did not present the Fifth and Eighth Amendment aspects of this claim

in state court . Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from obtaining relief in state court on these aspects absent an applicable

exception, which he does not assert.6

 The Court finds t he Fifth and Eighth Amendment

aspects of Claim 1 technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Because Petitioner

does not at t emp t to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to

excuse the default, the Court will dismiss these aspects of Claim 1. 

Claim 4 (in part)

Claim 4 alleges that Mohave County’s selection of prosp ect ive jurors from a

deficient master list violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an

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impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and to equal protection.

(Dkt. 40 at 57.) Respondents contend that Petitioner failed to exhaust the Fourteenth

Amendment aspect of this claim. (Dkt. 46 at 19.) On direct ap p eal, Pet itioner alleged

violations of both his Sixth Amendment fair cross-section rights and his Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection right s. (ROA 15 at 4, 6.) The Court finds that Claim 4 is

exhausted in its entirety. 

Claims 5 (in part) and 6 (in part)

Claims 5 and 6 allege violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eight h and Fourteenth

Amendments based on the denial of Petitioner’s rights to a master jury pool representing

a fair cross-section of the community and equal protection (Claim 5) and the trial court’s

denial of his Batson challenges to prospective jurors Christina Pethers and David Alvarado

(Claim 6). (Dkt. 40 at 57-65.) Respondents argue that only the Sixth Amendment aspect of

these claims was exhausted in state court. (Dkt. 46 at 19, 22, 23.) 

Petitioner presented the Sixt h and Fourteenth Amendment aspects of these claims

to the state court on direct appeal; therefore, these aspects of Claims 5 and 6 are properly

exhausted and appropriate for review in this Court. (ROA 15 at 4, 6, 17-18.) However,

Pet it ioner did not present the Fifth and Eighth Amendment aspects of these claims.

Petitioner is now precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from obtaining relief in state court

absent an ap plicable exception, which he does not assert. See supra note 6. The Court

finds the Fifth and Eighth Amendment aspects of Claims 5 and 6 technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. Because Petitioner does not attempt to show cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse t he defaults, the Court will dismiss these

aspects of Claims 5 and 6 as procedurally barred.

 Claim 7 (in part)

Claim 7 alleges violations of the Fifth, Sixt h, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

based on the denial of access to the crime scene. (Dkt. 40 at 65.) Respondents concede

t his claim is exhausted to the extent Petitioner alleges a due process violation under the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt . 46 at 25.) Petitioner does not dispute that the Fifth, Sixth

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7

 Following the filing of the Traverse but before the instant motions for evidentiary

development, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Dismissal of Certain Claims Without Prejudice

and Motion to Stay Proceeding.” (Dkt . 60.) The Court struck the notice, finding it was an

improper attempt, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), t o unilaterally dismiss without prejudice

individual claims from a multi-claim comp laint. (Dkt. 71 at 2.) The Court further concluded,

as it does again herein, that Petitioner lacked an available remedy in state court to present

his allegedly unexhausted claims and therefore denied the requested stay of proceedings.

(Id. at 3-4.) 

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and Eighth Amendment asp ect s of this claim were not fairly presented to the Arizona

Supreme Court. Petitioner is precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from now obtaining

relief in state court; therefore, these aspects are technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted. Pet it ioner does not attempt to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice to excuse the default. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Fifth,

Sixth and Eighth Amendment aspects of this claim as procedurally barred.

Claim 23

Claim 23 alleges that the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by: (a) granting him insufficient funds for experts, and (b) denying his

request to appoint experienced capital co-counsel. (Dkt. 40 at 93-95.) Respondents argue

that Petitioner failed to present either portion of this claim t o t he st at e court and is now

p recluded from doing so. (Dkt. 46 at 51.) In the Traverse, Petitioner proposes to dismiss

the claim without prejudice and asks the Court to stay the remaining claims pending

exhaustion of this, and any other, unexhausted claim so dismissed.7 (Dkt. 56 at 29.)

However, in his motion for discovery and evidentiary hearing, Petitioner argues that he

presented this claim on direct appeal and that the Arizona Sup reme Court actually

addressed the claim. (Dkt. 72 at 25.)

In his Opening Brief on direct appeal, the only reference to expert funding was the

following statement in a footnote: “The court did allow $3,000 for expenses to be used as

the Appellant wished; however, that amount was not enough to include t he cost of a

footprint experts [sic], as well as other costs that the office had to incur in this

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8

 In its opinion, the state sup reme court noted that Petitioner argued “that the trial

court ’s denial of his request for expenses for an out-of-state expert on footprint

identification was error.” Murray, 184 Ariz. at 29, 906 P.2d at 562. Stating that the trial

court had authorized $3,000 for experts, the supreme court found that, absent a showing

of substantial prejudice to the defense, the trial court had not abused its discret ion in

questioning the need to use an expert from Washington, D.C., when other experts were

available in Arizona or neighboring states. Id. at 30, 906 P.2d at 563. No part of this

analysis rested on federal constitutional legal principles.

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representation.” (ROA 15 at 29, n.2.) This statement was made in connection with

Petitioner’s claim that expert footprint evidence from Detective Lent was improperly

admitted at trial because (a) Lent was improperly qualified as an expert, (b) procedures to

obt ain the footprint evidence did not comply with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

Cir. 1923), and (c) the court imp roperly barred the defense from presenting evidence to

impeach Lent. Petitioner argued in particular that Lent ’s t est imony should have been

excluded because Petitioner’s request for a Washington, D.C. footprint expert had been

denied. (Id. at 29.) Petitioner did not allege that his federal constitutional right s were

violated by denial of funds t o ret ain the out-of-state expert or by denial of experienced

capital co-counsel. The Court finds that neit her p ort ion of Claim 23 was fairly presented

to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court further concludes that the state court did not

otherwise address these claims.8

 

Petitioner asks this Court to permit him to dismiss t his claim “without prejudice” if

the Court finds it unexhausted and to st ay t he action pending its exhaustion in state court.

(Dkt . 56 at 29.) As set forth in the Court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to stay

proceeding, see supra note 7, Petitioner does not assert that any of the exceptions to Rules

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 apply to this claim. These rules bar him from now obtaining relief on this

claim in state court. This claim is technically exhausted but procedurally default ed.

Pet itioner has not attempted to show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

justice to excuse the default. Accordingly, Claim 23 will be dismissed as procedurally

barred, and this action will not be stayed. 

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Claim 29

Claim 29 alleges that the Arizona Supreme Court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by improperly refusing to consider his

dysfunctional childhood as mitigation during its independent sentencing review on direct

appeal. (Dkt. 40 at 107-109.) Respondent s cont end t hat because the PCR court found this

claim precluded by Petitioner’s failure to present it in a motion for reconsideration on direct

appeal, it is procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 46 at 54; see PCR Order filed 1/10/00.) Petitioner

argues that the Arizona Sup reme Court had a fair opportunity to address this claim during

its independent sentencing review on direct appeal. (Dkt. 56 at 33.) 

This claim could not have been exhaust ed as part of Petitioner’s direct appeal

because it is during that appeal that the error is alleged to have occurred. To give the

state’s highest court t he opportunity to rule on a claim of error arising during his direct

ap p eal, t he p roper method was to file a motion for reconsideration with the Arizona

Sup reme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.18(b) (“Any party desiring reconsideration of a

decision of an appellate court may file a motion for reconsideration in the appellate court

wit hin fifteen days after the filing of a decision by the appellate court.”); Correll v. St ewart,

137 F.3d 1404, 1418 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding procedural default of claim based on error of the

Arizona Supreme Court where petitioner failed to file motion for reconsideration, which is

“an avenue of relief that the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly outline.”).

Although Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the decision on direct appeal, he did not

raise any issue related to the Arizona Supreme Court’s independent sentencing review.

(ROA 36.) Rather, he waited to raise the issue in his PCR petition, and the PCR court found

the claim t o be p recluded. Petitioner does not assert cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice to excuse the default. Accordingly , Claim 29 will be dismissed as

procedurally barred. 

Claim 30

Claim 30 alleges IAC in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eight h and Fourteenth

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Amendment rights based on trial counsel’s failure to: (a) file a pretrial motion to preclude

expert tracking testimony from Detective Lent, and (b) present an expert witness to

challenge Lent’s qualifications as a footprint expert. (Dkt . 40 at 109-11.) Respondents

contend Petitioner failed to present this claim to the Arizona Supreme Court in the Petition

for Review. (Dkt . 46 at 55.) Petitioner does not dispute the contention, but purports to

“withdraw this claim without prejudice” and requests a stay to exhaust the claim in state

court. (Dkt. 56 at 34.)

The record reflects that Petitioner did not present this claim to the Arizona Supreme

Court in his Pet it ion for Review. (PR doc. 7.) Petitioner does not assert that any of the

exceptions to Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 apply t o t his claim, and these rules otherwise bar

him from now obtaining relief on this claim in state court. See supra note 7. The claim is

technically exhaust ed but procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not attempted to show

cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default.

Accordingly, Claim 30 will be dismissed as procedurally barred, and this action will not be

stayed. 

Claims 31, 32 and 33

Claims 31-33 allege IAC in violat ion of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights based on trial counsel’s failure t o: seek severance of trial

based on ant agonistic defenses (Claim 31); present expert testimony to rebut the State’s

exp erts (Claim 32); and properly prepare for the aggravation/mitigation hearing (Claim 33).

(Dkt. 40 at 111-18.) Respondent s cont end these claims were either never presented in state

court or were not presented to the Arizona Supreme Court in t he Petition for Review. (Dkt.

46 at 58, 59-60.) 

Petitioner did not present these claims to the Arizona Supreme Court in his Petition

for Review. (PR doc. 7.) If unexhausted, Petitioner st at es he will dismiss these claims

“without prejudice,” and he asks the Court to stay this action pending t heir exhaustion in

st at e court. (Dkt. 56 at 34-35.) Petitioner does not assert that any of the excep t ions t o

Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 apply to these claims, and these rules otherwise bar him from now

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obtaining relief in state court. See supra note 7. These claims are technically exhausted

but procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not attempted to show cause and prejudice or

a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the defaults. Accordingly, these claims will

be dismissed as procedurally barred, and this action will not be stayed. 

Claim 34

Petitioner alleges that execution by the State after more t han t welve years on death

row fails to serve any legitimate penological purpose and violates his Eight h Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Dkt. 40 at 118.) If unexhausted,

Petitioner states he will dismiss this claim “without prejudice,” and he asks the Court to

stay this action pending its exhaustion in state court. (Dkt. 56 at 35.) 

Regardless of whet her Petitioner properly exhausted this claim, the Court will deny

it as meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (Supp. 2005) (district courts may deny habeas

application on merits notwithstanding failure to exhaust ). The Supreme Court has not

decided whether lengthy incarceration prior to execution can constitute cruel and unusual

p unishment. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J. & Breyer, J.,

discussing denial of certiorari and noting the claim has not been addressed). In contrast,

circuit courts including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals hold prolonged incarceration

under a sentence of death does not offend the Eighth Amendment. See McKenzie v. Day,

57 F.3d 1493, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir.

1996) (delay of 17 years); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (delay of 15

years). Because the Court finds this claim to be without merit as a matter of law,

evident iary development is not warranted. The motions for development will be denied,

and Claim 34 will be denied on the merits.

Claim 35

Claim 35 alleges violations of Petitioner’s rights under the International Covenant

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9

 The Unit ed Nation’s ICCPR was ratified by the United States in 1992 and prohibits

cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment, but does not require member countries to

abolish the death p enalt y . See Jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp 2d. 647, 766 (S.D. Ohio

2000), aff’d as amended on denial of reh’g, 291 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2002).

10 “[A] jus cogens norm . . . ‘is a norm accepted and recognized by t he int ernat ional

community of states as a whole . . . from which no derogation is permit t ed and which can

be modified only by a subsequent norm of general int ernational law having the same

character.’” Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9t h Cir. 1992)

(quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of T reaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.

332).

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on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),9

 customary international law, and jus cogens.

10

(Dkt. 40 at 126-28.) Respondent s argue this claim is procedurally defaulted because it was

not presented in state court and Petitioner is now barred from obtaining relief on this claim

in state court. (Dkt. 46 at 63.) Petitioner did not present t his claim on direct appeal or in his

PCR proceedings. If found unexhaust ed, Petitioner states he will dismiss this claim

“without prejudice,” and he asks the Court to st ay t his action pending its exhaustion in

state court. (Dkt. 56 at 35.) Petitioner does not assert t hat any of the exceptions to Rules

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 apply t o t his claim, and these rules otherwise bar him from now

obtaining relief in state court. See supra note 7. Thus, this claim is technically exhausted

but procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not attemp t ed to show cause and prejudice or

a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default. Accordingly, the claim will be

dismissed as procedurally barred, and this action will not be stayed. 

Claim 36

Claim 36 alleges that neither lethal gas, nor lethal injection, cause instant, painless

death and either method will result in physical and psychological torture of Pet itioner at

execution in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt.

40 at 128.) Resp ondents do not address the lethal gas argument but contend that

Petitioner failed to present the lethal injection argument in his Petition for Review to the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Dkt. 46 at 67.)

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The Court has reviewed t he record and finds that the lethal gas aspect of this claim

was never presented in state court. Petitioner does not assert that any of the exceptions

to Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 apply to this claim, and t hese rules otherwise bar him from now

obtaining relief in state court. See supra note 6. Thus, the lethal gas asp ect of Claim 36 is

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Petitioner does not assert cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default. Accordingly, this

aspect of Claim 36 will be dismissed as procedurally barred.

In his PCR pet it ion, Petitioner challenged lethal injection as a constitutional method

of execution. (PCR pet. filed 3/5/99 at 30-33.) In his Petition for Review, Petitioner failed

to explicitly present the lethal injection p ortion of this claim, but instead purported to

present it as one of the challenges to Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme. (PR doc. 7 at

32.) Assuming that was sufficient to fairly present that aspect of this claim to the Arizona

Supreme Court, this Court “looks through” that court’s summary denial of review to the

PCR court’s decision as the last reasoned state court ruling. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803 (1991). The PCR court found post-conviction relief on the lethal injection

aspect of this claim “precluded” under Rule 32.2(a)(3). (PCR order filed 1/10/00.) Petitioner

does not assert cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse this

default. Accordingly, the lethal injection aspect of Claim 36 will be dismissed as

procedurally barred.

Claim 37

In Claim 37, Petitioner alleges that (a) he will not be competent to be executed, and

(b) “[t]he trial court erred in rest ricting the Appellant’s right to a lesser included offense

instruction.” (Dkts. 40 at 128-30; 52 at 8, n.1.) Both Petitioner and Respondents

acknowledge that (a) is not ripe and is premature for federal review. (Dkts. 40 at 129; 46 at

68.) Pursuant t o Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523

U.S. 637 (1998), a claim of incompetency for execution “must be raised in a first habeas

petition, whereupon it also must be dismissed as premature due to the automatic stay that

issues when a first petition is filed.” If again presented to the district court once the issue

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becomes ripe for review, Claim 37(a) shall not be treated as a second or successive petition.

See id. at 643-44. Therefore, the Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice as

premature. 

With regard to Claim 37(b), Pet it ioner concedes that the United States Supreme

Court has decided the issue adversely to him and states that he only raises the issue to

preserve it. (See dkt. 40 at 130-32.) Because Petitioner acknowledges that success on the

merits of allegation (b) is foreclosed by Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), the Court will

deny the motions for evidentiary development and dismiss Claim 37(b) on the merits. 

Claim 40/41

Claim 40/41 alleges the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to find that mitigation substantially

outweighed the aggravat ing circumstances. (Dkt. 40 at 136-46.) Respondents argue this

claim is only exhausted to the extent t hat it alleges a violation of Petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment rights. (Dkt. 46 at 72.) In his Opening Brief on direct appeal, Petitioner alleged

violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but did not allege violations

of his Fifth, Sixth or Seventh Amendment rights. (ROA 15 at 54.) Petitioner does not assert

that any of the excep t ions to Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 apply to these aspects of this claim,

and these rules otherwise bar him from now obtaining relief in state court. See supra note

6. Thus, these aspects are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has

not attempted to show cause and prejudice or a fundament al miscarriage to excuse the

default. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendment aspects

of Claim 40/41 as procedurally barred. 

As to the balance of this claim, an assertion of error by a sentencer with respect to

its weighing of aggravat ing and mitigating factors is at most an error of state law, which

may not serve as a basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991); see also Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 928, 943 (9th Cir.

1998) (finding no constitutional violation where sentencing court considered evidence but

found it inadequate to just ify leniency; “a sentencer is free to assess how much weight to

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11 In his motion for an evidentiary hearing, Pet it ioner suggests for the first time that

the PCR court’s preclusion ruling as to this claim is not an indep endent and adequate bar

to federal review. (Dkt. 72 at 27.) Because Petitioner did not include that argument in the

Traverse, it is waived and will not be reviewed by the Court. For that reason, and because

Petitioner does not seek to present any evidence relevant to the bar (see dkt. 72 at 27-29),

the motion for evidentiary hearing as to this issue will be denied. 

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assign to such evidence”). Therefore, the remainder of Claim 40/41 is not cognizable as a

matter of law. The motions for evidentiary development will be denied and this claim

dismissed. 

Claim 44

Claim 44 alleges the trial court violat ed Pet it ioner’s Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by failing to replace counsel despite irreconcilable conflicts. (Dkt. 40

at 147-52.) Petitioner asserts that he fairly presented this claim in his PCR petition (dkt. 56

at 42), but Respondent s contend that the PCR court’s determination that the claim was

precluded bars review in federal court (dkt. 46 at 74). 

Petitioner fairly presented this claim in his PCR petition and petition for review.

(PCR pet. filed 3/5/99 at 5-10; PR doc. 7 at 1, 16-20.) The PCR court found the claim

precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because it could have been raised on direct appeal. (PCR

order filed 1/10/00.) Because the Ariz ona Supreme Court summarily denied review of this

claim (PR doc. 30), this Court “looks through” that denial t o t he PCR court’s decision as

the last reasoned st at e court ruling. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. Thus, the claim is

procedurally default ed. 1 1 Petitioner has not attempted to show cause and prejudice or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default of Claim 44. Accordingly, the

Court will dismiss this claim as procedurally barred.

Summary of Procedural Findings

The Court concludes that the following claims are procedurally barred: the Fifth and

Eighth Amendment aspects of Claims 1, 5 and 6; the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment

aspects of Claim 7; the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendment aspects of Claim 40/41; and

Claims 23, 29-33, 35, 36 and 44. These claims or portions of claims will be dismissed wit h

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prejudice. Claims 34, 37(b) and 40/41 (in part) are meritless and will be dismissed with

prejudice. Claim 37(a) is premat ure and will be dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s motions for evidentiary development as to Claims 23, 29-37, 40/41 and 44 are

summarily denied.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 

EXPANSION OF THE RECORD AND DISCOVERY

Evidentiary Hearing

The decision whet her to grant an evidentiary hearing when there are material facts

in disp ute is generally at the discretion of the district court judge. See Townsend v. Sain,

372 U.S. 293, 312, 318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1

(1992), and limited by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999);

Rule 8, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the district

court judge shall determine if an evidentiary hearing is required). However, a judge’s

discretion is significantly circumscribed by § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). 

Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the

claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made ret roactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that but for constit utional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found t he applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). 

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, subsection (e)(2) precludes an evident iary

hearing in federal court only if t he failure t o develop a claim’s factual basis is due to a “lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 432. “The purpose of the fault component of ‘failed’ is to ensure the

prisoner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence.” Id. at 435. The Court found

that this rule served AEDPA’s goal of furthering comity in that “federal courts sitting in

habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made

insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Id.; see also Cardwell v. Netherland, 971

F. Supp. 997, 1008 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a § 2254 petition is limited to the factual

record developed in state court proceedings”), aff’d Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th

Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000). In

correlation, subsection (e)(2) allows fact ual development when a petitioner diligently

attempts to develop the fact ual basis of a claim in state court and is “thwarted, for example,

by the conduct of another or by happenstance was denied the opportunity to do so.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79.

In compliance with § 2254(e)(2), when the fact ual basis for a particular claim has not

been fully developed in state court, the first question in evaluat ing whether to grant an

evidentiary hearing on the claim is whether the petitioner was diligent in attempting to

develop its factual basis. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d

331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir.

2000)). The Supreme Court set an objective standard for determining “diligence” – whether

a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to

investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. For examp le, when

there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable attorney to the existence

and importance of certain evidence, the attorney “ fails” to develop the factual record if he

does not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and present the evidence to

the state court. See id. at 438-40 (counsel not diligent where he was on notice of possibly

material evidence but conducted only a cursory investigation); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380,

390-91 (6th Cir. 2002) (petitioner not diligent where he knew of and raised claims of judicial

bias and jury irregularities in state court, but failed to invest igate all the factual grounds

for such claims). 

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Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires “that the prisoner, at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial

of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“inactions show insufficient diligence” on ineffective

counsel claim because petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing, and brought claim

only on appeal and not in a collateral p roceeding). What is more, the mere request for an

evidentiary hearing may not be sufficient to establish diligence if a reasonable person

would have t aken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir.

2000) (petitioner requested hearing but found not diligent because he failed to present

affidavits of family members that were easily obt ained without court order and with minimal

expense); see also Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (p et it ioner not

diligent where, although he requested hearing, he made no effort to develop the record or

assert any facts to support claim that his counsel was ineffective for knowing of and failing

t o investigate his psychiatric condition), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1011 (2004). If an

evident iary hearing is requested, a petitioner’s inability to persuade a state court to

conduct such a hearing does not in itself demonstrate a lack of diligence. See Cardwell, 152

F.3d at 338.

In sum, if this Court determines that a petitioner has not been diligent in est ablishing

t he factual basis for his claims in state court, then the Court may not conduct a hearing

unless the pet it ioner satisfies one of § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. If, however, the

petitioner has not failed t o develop the factual basis of his claim in state court, the Court

will then proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate or required under the criteria

set forth by the Supreme Court in T ownsend. 372 U.S. 293; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078

(quoting Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337). A federal district court must hold an evidentiary

hearing in a § 2254 case when the facts are in dispute if (1) the petitioner “alleges facts

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief,” and (2) the state court has not “after a full

hearing reliably found the relevant facts.” Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13. In addition, the

Court established six circumstances under which t here is presumptively no “full and fair

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hearing” at the state level: 

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;

(2) t he st ate factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a

whole;

(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the st at e court was not adequate

to afford a full and fair hearing; 

(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court

hearing; or

(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the

habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.

See id. at 313. In any other case in which t he facts are in dispute and diligence has been

established, the district court judge “has the power, constrained only by his sound

discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the applicant’s constitutional claim.” Id. at

318 (noting that if a “habeas ap p licant was afforded a full and fair hearing by the state

court resulting in reliable findings, [the judge] may, and ordinarily should, accept the facts

as found in the hearing”).

Expansion of the Record

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes a federal habeas court

to expand the record to include additional material relevant to the det ermination of the

merits of a petitioner’s claims. Rule 7 provides:

The materials that may be required include letters predating the filing of the

p etition, documents, exhibits, and answers under oat h t o writ t en

interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may also be submitted

and considered as part of the record.

Rule 7(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. T he p urpose of Rule 7 “is

to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings,

without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing.” Advisory Committee

Notes, Rule 7, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82

(1977).

Section 2254(e)(2), as amended by the AEDPA, limits a pet it ioner’s ability to present

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new evidence through a Rule 7 motion to expand the record in the same manner as it does

with regard to evidentiary hearings. See Coop er-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the conditions of § 2254(e)(2) generally apply to petitioners

seeking relief based on new evidence, even when they do not seek an evidentiary hearing)

(citing Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct . 2736, 2737 (2004) (per curiam)). Thus, when a

petitioner seeks to introduce, through a Rule 7 motion, new affidavits and other documents

never presented in state court for the purpose of establishing the fact ual p redicate of a

claim, he must show bot h diligence in developing the factual basis in state court and

relevancy of the evidence to his claim. If diligence is not shown, the requirements of

§ 2254(e)(2) must be satisfied before the Court can consider expansion of the record. To

find otherwise would allow circumvention of the AEDPA’s restriction against federal

habeas court s holding evidentiary hearings in cases where the petitioner is at fault for

failing to develop the facts in state court.

When a petitioner seeks t o expand the record for reasons other than to introduce

evidence to bolster the merits of his claim, the st rict ures of § 2254(e)(2) may not apply. See

Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding it nonsensical to apply § 2254(e)(2)

when expansion of the record is used for reasons other than to introduce new factual

information on t he merits of a claim). For example, expansion of the record may be

ap p rop riate to cure omissions in the state court record, see Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357,

359 (1993) (per curiam) (reversing for failure to supplement the record with a latediscovered transcrip t ); see also Rule 5, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254

(directing answering party to submit portions of record it deems relevant), or to establish

diligence pursuant to § 2254(e)(2). See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792. 

In evaluating the instant motion, the Court must first determine whether Pet itioner

is seeking expansion of the record to achieve the same end as an evidentiary hearing. If

so, t he Court must then assess whether Petitioner demonstrated diligence in developing

the factual basis of the claim in state court and, if not, whether he meet s t he requirements

of § 2254(e)(2). In addition, the Court must determine whether the proffered evidence is

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relevant to a determination of the claim’s merits, see Rule 7(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, and

whether the new evidence fundamentally alters the claim such that it is rendered

unexhausted. See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 258-59. If Petitioner is seeking expansion for some

ot her purpose, such as curing omissions from the state court record, establishing cause

and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice for a procedural default, or

demonstrating diligence for purposes of showing t he inapplicability of § 2254(e)(2), the

Court need only evaluate relevance.

Discovery

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides t hat “[a] judge may,

for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under t he Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and may limit the extent of discovery.” Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254

(emphasis added). Thus, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, a habeas p etitioner

is not entitled to discovery “ as a matter of ordinary course,” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.

899, 904 (1997); see also Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999), and a habeas

court should not allow a habeas petitioner “to use federal discovery for fishing expeditions

to investigate mere speculation.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the Northern

Dist. of Cal. (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Aubut v. State of Maine,

431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970) (“[h]abeas corp us is not a general form of relief for those

who seek to explore their case in search of its existence”). Pursuant to Bracy , whether a

petitioner has established “good cause” for discovery requires a habeas court to determine

the essential elements of the p et itioner’s substantive claim and evaluate whether “specific

allegations before the court show reason t o believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are

fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Id. at 908-09

(quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).

MOTIONS DISCUSSION

The Court now assesses whether expansion of the record, discovery and/or an

evidentiary hearing should be granted with respect to exhausted claims for which

evidentiary development is sought: Claims 1 (in part), 2, 4, 5 (in part), 6 (in part), 7 (in part),

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12 Petitioner’s counsel issued subpoenas duces tecum to the Kingman Standard;

KBBC Radio Station, Lake Havasu City; KGM N-FM Radio Station, Kingman; KFWJ Radio

Station, Lake Havasu City; Lake Havasu City Herald; Today News, Lake Havasu City;

KNLB-91 FM Christian Radio, Lake Havasu City; KZUL-FM, Lake Havasu City; K-LUK

LUCKY 108 FM, Bullhead City; K-West FM 98, Bullhead City; Mohave Valley News,

Bullhead City; KMOH-TV 6, Bullhead City; KAAA-AM KZZZ-FM Radio Stations,

Kingman; and the Kingman Daily Miner. 

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42, 45 and 48. Petitioner seeks to expand the record with Exhibit 3 only in support of

procedurally barred claims; t herefore, expansion as to that exhibit will be denied. Further,

the parties agree that Exhibits 9 and 11 are already part of the state court record. (See PR

doc. 7, App. Tab 8, 9, 11.) Accordingly, expansion as to those exhibits will be denied as

moot. Petitioner does not argue that he can meet the statutory exceptions set forth in §

2254(e)(2)(A) & (B); therefore, the Court may not grant an evidentiary hearing on any

claims for which the Court determines Petitioner “failed to develop t he factual basis.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Claim 1 (in part)

Claim 1 alleges that the trial court violat ed Pet it ioner’s right to a fair trial by denying

his motion for a change of venue based on pretrial p ublicit y . (Dkt. 40 at 43-49.) Petitioner

seeks to expand the record with Exhibit 1, a collection of newspaper articles about t he case

published before, during and after trial. He also seeks discovery and an evidentiary

hearing in support of this claim.

The Court finds that Petitioner is not entit led to expansion of the record or an

evidentiary hearing because he was not diligent in developing this evidence in state court.

On April 15, 1992, approximately six weeks prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion for change

of venue based on pretrial publicity and requested an evidentiary hearing. (CROA 92.) In

the motion, Pet itioner stated that “[t]he records of all the media in Mohave County has

[sic] been subpoenaed for this hearing and has [sic] been incorporated herein by reference

and made a part hereof.”12 (Id. at 2.) T he t rial court held an evidentiary hearing on the

motion on April 22, 1992, during which Petitioner presented copies of numerous art icles

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13 “CROA Exs.” refers to enumerated exhibits included in a one-volume “Index of

Exhibits of Record of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona” provided as part of the

state court record in Robert Murray’s habeas action, CV 99-1812-PHX-DGC. 

14 The Court notes that only pretrial publicity is relevant to this claim. See Casey v.

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 906-909 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363

(1966), Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963),

and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). To the extent Petitioner seeks to expand the

record with articles published after jury selection, they are not relevant.

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published in regional newspapers and testimony from David Hawkins, who worked for five

northern Arizona radio stations and at times for the Arizona Republic, a statewide

newspaper. (RT 4/22/92 at 13-48, 98-111; CROA Exs. C-F, H-I.)13 At the hearing, Petitioner

stated that other out let s had been subpoenaed and he reserved the right to place

additional evidence in the record based on responses to the subpoenas. (RT 4/22/92 at 39,

99.) The trial court found t hat Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proving that a change

of venue was necessary to seat a fair and impartial jury, but reserved ruling pending jury

selection. (Id. at 110-11.) Although the motion for change of venue was renewed more

than a month later at the close of jury selection, Petitioner did not proffer additional

evidence or seek leave t o further develop the factual basis for this claim. (RT 5/29/92 at 24.)

In addition, Petitioner did not attempt to further develop t he factual basis of this claim in

state post-conviction proceedings. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner was not

diligent and his motions for an evidentiary hearing and expansion of the record will be

denied.14

Petitioner also seeks leave to subpoena unidentified media outlets regarding pretrial

publicity and to interview jurors about their biases. Petitioner’s request lacks specificity.

Moreover, as discussed above, because Petitioner was not diligent in develop ing this

evidence in state court, the Court would not be able to consider any newly discovered

evidence wit h respect to the merits of the claim. Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792 (finding that

discovery should not be allowed to augment the merits of a petitioner’s claims unless he

was diligent); Murphy v. Bradshaw, No. C-1-03-053, 2003 WL 23777736, *2 (S.D. Ohio 2003)

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(“there cannot be good cause to discover facts which could not be presented because a

petition is barred from an evidentiary hearing on those facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)”);

Charles v. Baldwin, No. CV-97-380-ST, 1999 WL 694716, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 1999) (no

good cause for discovery to locate evidence in support of the merits of a claim unless

pet it ioner first satisfies § 2254(e)(2)). The Court finds that Petitioner has not established

good cause to conduct the requested discovery, and the motion will be denied. 

Claim 2

Claim 2 alleges t hat Petitioner’s right to a fair and impartial jury was violated by the

trial court’s refusal to sequester the jury during voir dire, trial and deliberations. (CROA

141; RT 5/27/92 at 21.) Petitioner seeks t o exp and the record in support of this claim with

Exhibit 1, discussed above. He also seeks discovery and an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner did not proffer any evidence or attempt to otherwise develop the record

in support of his sequest ration request in the trial court. Further, he did not develop the

factual basis for this claim in state post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner does not

suggest the materials in Exhibit 1 were not available during state proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner was not diligent and his motions to expand the

record and for an evidentiary hearing will be denied.

Petitioner seeks leave to depose: (1) an unidentified juror, whose spouse allegedly

sat throughout the trial, including hearings held outside the presence of the jury; (2)

another unidentified juror who allegedly had an ex parte discussion with the trial judge;

and (3) other jurors who may have overheard deputies and the prosecut or discussing the

case. (Dkt. 72 at 19.) Petitioner fails to provide any factual basis for t he requested

discovery. Moreover, as discussed above, because Petitioner was not diligent in

developing this evidence in state court, the Court would not be able to consider any newly

discovered evidence with respect to the merits of t he claim. See Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792;

Murphy, 2003 WL 23777736, at *2; Charles, 1999 WL 694716, at *2. The Court finds no

good cause, and Petitioner’s motion for discovery will be denied.

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Claims 4 and 5 (in part)

Claims 4 and 5 allege violations of Petit ioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial jury

drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and his Fourteent h Amendment right to

equal protection. Claim 4 alleges that drawing the master jury pool from an eighteenmonth- old list of licensed drivers violated his rights by excluding “young” persons of

approximately the same age as Petitioner who had become licensed after that list was

compiled but before his trial. (Dkt. 40 at 57.) He also alleges that the trial court’s refusal

to delay trial until after the ten-day state statutory period had run for prospective jurors to

mail back questionnaires violated his rights by automatically excluding persons from rural

areas with purportedly slower postal service. (Dkt. 40 at 58-59.) Claim 5 alleges that the

Mohave County Jury Commissioner, Linda Seapy, improperly excused or disqualified

prospective jurors in the master jury pool in violation of Petitioner’s right to a jury drawn

from a fair cross-section of the community. In particular, that she used subjective criteria

in reviewing their responses to the questionnaire concerning their availability to serve as

jurors or to be excused from serving, such as their elderly age, responsibility for the care

of young children, or a mental or physical disability. (Dkt. 40 at 59-62.) Further, he alleges

that Seapy improperly excused prospective jurors who expressed religious beliefs against

sitting in judgment of others. (Id. at 60.) Pet it ioner also alleges that Seapy improperly

delegated duties to her deputy clerk, failed to follow-up with persons who had not returned

juror questionnaires, and failed t o verify the accuracy of juror returns. (Id. at 62.)

Petitioner seeks discovery, expansion of the record and an evidentiary hearing on these

claims.

To prevail on a fair cross-section claim, a litigant must prove: “(1) that the group

alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the represent at ion

of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation

t o t he number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentat ion is

due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri,

439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation

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in the jury selection process, a defendant also must show discriminatory intent. See

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.

1998). Petitioner presented Claims 4 and 5 on direct ap p eal, and the Arizona Supreme Court

rejected both, finding that Petitioner had failed to establish any of the Duren prongs, which

also precluded success on the equal protection allegations. Murray, 184 Ariz. at 22-24, 906

P.2d at 555-57.

With respect to Claim 4, Petitioner argues t hat the Arizona Supreme Court

unreasonably applied Duren in finding that no cognizable group had been excluded. (Dkt.

56 at 15.) However, Pet it ioner cites only one case to support his claim that young persons

are a distinctive group within the meaning of Duren, and that case, United States v. Butera,

677 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), contains no discussion of a fair cross-section claim or youth

as a distinctive group. (Dkt 40 at 59.) In addition, the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that

young people do not comprise a cognizable, distinctive or identifiable group for purposes

of a claim t hat such persons were underrepresented or excluded in the selection of

prospective grand or petit jurors. United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir.

1992) (dealing with college student s but noting that young adults are not a cognizable

group); United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that neither

non-high school graduates, non-working people, nor the young are cognizable classes);

United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Pichay,

986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that young adults do not constitute

a cognizable group for purposes of an equal protect ion challenge to the composition of a

petit jury). Moreover, Petitioner cites no authority whatsoever t o support his allegation

that rural persons are a distinctive group. The Court concludes that Petitioner cannot

show that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Claim 4 is an unreasonable

application of Duren. Because Claim 4 is meritless as a matter of law, t he motions for

evidentiary development will be denied and the claim dismissed. 

With respect to Claim 5, Petitioner similarly contends that the Arizona Supreme

Court “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent.” (Dkt. 56 at 17.) Although

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15 The only “group” to which Petitioner specifically refers as possibly having been

excluded includes those whose religious beliefs p reclude them from sitting in judgment of

others. Similarity among such jurors’ beliefs fails to satisfy the “distinctive group ”

requirement. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (“groups defined solely in

terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair members of the group

from performing their duties as jurors . . . are not ‘dist inctive groups’ for fair-cross-section

purposes.”).

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Petitioner does not identify the precedent to which he refers, Duren also governs Claim 5.

On their face, Petitioner’s allegations do not satisfy any of the criteria necessary to state

a fair cross-section or equal protection claim. Petitioner has not ident ified a single

“dist inctive group” in the community that was excluded.15 To the contrary, Petitioner

indicates that the jury commissioner arbitrarily excused individuals. As found by the

Arizona Supreme Court, the actions of the jury commissioner as alleged did not amount to

systematic exclusion. See Murray, 184 Ariz. at 24, 906 P.2d at 557 (finding that the jury

commissioner used neutral criteria). The Court concludes that Petitioner fails t o establish

that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Claim 5 was an unreasonable

application of Duren. Because Claim 5 is meritless as a mat t er of law, the motions for

evidentiary development will be denied and the claim dismissed.

Claim 6

Claim 6 alleges that the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by denying his challenge to the prosecutor’s p eremp tory

strikes of two prospective jurors who were Hispanic. (Dkt. 40 at 63-65.) Petitioner seeks

discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and expansion of the record in support of this claim. 

To bring a successful Batson challenge, a defendant must first establish a prima

facie case by showing that (1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable group ; (2) the

prosecution has removed members of such a group; and (3) circumstances raise an

“inference” that the challenges were motivated by race. 476 U.S. at 96. The burden then

shifts to the prosecutor to articulat e a race-neutral basis for the peremptory challenges.

Id. at 97. Finally, the trial court must det ermine, in light of the prima facie case and the

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prosecutor’s explanation, whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.

Id. at 98. In considering whether a prosecutor’s explanations are race-neutral, a reviewing

court considers only the “facial validity of the prosecut or’s explanation.” Purkett v. Elem,

514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam). 

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court up held the trial court’s determination

that the prosecutor’s explanation for st riking the two prospective Hispanic jurors was race

neutral. See Murray, 184 Ariz. at 25, 906 P.2d at 558. For this Court, the question then

becomes whether that decision is erroneous in light of the record before the state court.

None of the evidence sought to be developed by Petitioner is relevant to resolution of

Claim 6, review of which is necessarily limited to the record that was before the trial court.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motions for expansion of the record, discovery and an

evidentiary hearing on this claim will be denied.

Claim 7

Claim 7 alleges that the trial court’s denial of a defense request for access to t he

crime scene, in light of the alleged denial of adequate funds to retain experts, violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt. 40 at 65-67.) This claim was raised on direct appeal

and denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on state law grounds as follows:

Defense counsel and two investigators were allowed to visit the crime

scene in May 1991, shortly after the crimes and about one year before trial.

Subsequently, a new attorney from the same public defender’s office and an

investigator were assigned to assist the original attorney. The new attorney

and investigator never visited the crime scene. On the fourth day of t rial,

more than a year after the crime was committed, Roger’s counsel orally

moved for an order permitting the defense t eam to revisit the crime scene.

T he trial court denied the motion on the ground that defendant failed t o

show a substantial need for a second inspection. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

15.1(e). The original attorney was still t he primary counsel and the original

investigators were still available. Furthermore, the crime scene had been

cleaned up. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Murray, 184 Ariz. at 36, 906 P.2d at 569. 

Petitioner argues that the Arizona Sup reme Court’s decision is contrary to

established Federal law because the court should have reviewed the claim with an eye

toward his constitutional right to access to evidence, rather than applying a deferential

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“abuse of discretion” standard. (Dkt. 56 at 20.) Petitioner further asserts that the state

court “misstated the true fact s t hat were correctly outlined in Appellant’s opening brief to

the supreme court.” (Id. at 18-19.) Because Claim 7, as argued by Petitioner, presents a

purely record-based claim that can be resolved by reference to the existing record, further

evidentiary development is unnecessary. Petitioner’s motions will be denied.

Claim 42

Petitioner seeks expansion of the record in support of Claim 42. In the Amended

Petit ion, he captions this claim as: “The prosecutors [sic] discretion to seek the death

penalty is without standards and is therefore unconstitutional.” (Dkt. 40 at 146.) In

contrast, in the body of the claim, Petitioner alleges only that there are no objective

standards for the weighing of aggravation and mitigation, which violates his Eight h and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 146-47.)

First, in Smith (Bernard) v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth

Circuit summarily rejected the petitioner’s claims regarding the constitutionalit y of

Arizona’s death penalty, including a claim concerning the prosecutor’s discretion to decide

whether to seek the death penalt y . Second, the Constitution requires only that states

provide procedures to guide a sentencer’s discret ion; “the absence of specific standards

inst ructing the sentencer how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors does not

render a death penalty statute unconstitutional.” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 944 (citing Zant v.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880 (1983)). Because both facets of Claim 42 are meritless as a

matter of law, the motion will be denied and the claim dismissed. 

Claim 45

Claim 45 alleges that Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the

effective assistance of counsel were violated by counsel sleeping during portions of his

trial. (Dkt. 40 at 152-53.) T he PCR court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim. (PCR

doc. 8, tab 12 at 28.) Petitioner seeks a federal evidentiary hearing to “submit the same

testimony [from the state evidentiary hearing] and perhaps some additional testimony from

jurors” and “to admit the testimony of Judge Chavez depending upon his deposition

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testimony.” (Dkt. 72 at 30.) 

Petitioner is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing to present evidence already

presented to the state court. To the extent Petitioner failed to seek or t o present

“addit ional testimony from jurors” at the PCR hearing, Petitioner has not demonstrated

why the evidence could not have been presented during that hearing. Similarly, Petitioner

fails to show or allege that he attempted to obtain sworn t estimony from Judge Chavez

during the PCR hearing. The Court concludes that Petitioner did not diligent ly develop

t his claim; therefore, the Court is barred from holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant t o

§ 2254(e)(2), and the request will be denied. 

Claim 48

Claim 48 alleges that Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the

effective assistance of counsel were violat ed by trial counsel’s failure to present

exculpatory testimony. Sp ecifically, in a statement to police, John Anthony reported that

he had observed three men with a dark blue car out side t he victims’ store the night of the

murders and that the lights were on inside the store, which was unusual for that time of

night. Petitioner further asserts that if his lead counsel, Frank Dickey, had interviewed

Anthony, he would have learned that Anthony’s wife, Angela, claimed to have heard a

man threaten Dean Morrison the day before his death. (Dkt. 40 at 160.) Pet it ioner also

asserts that Dickey failed to present testimony from a bartender who could have

established an alibi for Petitioner and his brother. (Id.) 

State Court Proceedings

In separate PCR pet it ions, Petitioner and his brother each raised similar IAC claims

based on counsel’s failures with regard to John Anthony. T he PCR court considered

Robert Murray’s claim first and held an evidentiary hearing at which Robert Murray’s

counsel, Ruth O’Neill, t est ified. O’Neill stated that she assigned a defense investigator to

locate Anthony and that the investigator reported t hat Anthony was at a “treatment

center” affiliated with the Veterans’ Administration in California. Neither defense counsel

requested a continuance of trial to locate or subpoena Anthony . However, Petitioner’s

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statement as hearsay and lacking foundation. (RT 6/5/92 at 133-41.)

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counsel did attempt to introduce Anthony ’s statement based on the witness’s

unavailability.16

In denying Robert Murray’s claim, the PCR court concluded the petitioner had failed

to establish that Anthony had been available to testify or that O’Neill’s att emp t s to locate

Anthony were unreasonable. (CROA 3/25/98 at 67-68.) The court further concluded that,

even if O’Neill’s performance had been deficient, the overwhelming evidence of guilt

negated any prejudice finding. (Id. at 68.) Subsequently, the PCR court summarily denied

Petitioner’s analogous claim, relying on its findings from Robert Murray’s hearing that

Anthony had not been available to testify at trial. (RT 1/10/00 at 10-11; PCR ME filed

1/10/00; PCR ME filed 1/20/00.)

In a motion for reconsideration, Petitioner proffered affidavits from John and Angela

Anthony, who had been located by federal habeas counsel for Robert Murray. (PR doc.

8, tab 21 at 3-5.) In his affidavit, John Anthony generally described his observations the

night of the murders, but in considerably less detail than in the initial interview with police.

(Id., tab 9.) Angela Anthony recounted her husband telling her about seeing t he three men

and the car, which both thought was susp icious, and about hearing a man threaten Dean

Morrison the day before the murders. (Id.) Neither addressed John Anthony’s

whereabouts, or his availability to appear as a witness, at the time of trial. (Id., tabs 8, 9,

21.) The PCR court denied t he motion, and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied

review. (RT 9/5/01 at 19-20; PR doc. 29.) 

Analysis

To prevail on an IAC claim, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). However, a court need not address both components of the

inquiry; a court may dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

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prejudice, if that is easier, without evaluating counsel’s performance. Id. at 697. Petitioner

seeks evidentiary development solely as to the p erformance prong. Because the Court

concludes that Petitioner cannot establish prejudice even if deficient p erformance is

shown, it declines to allow further development of the claim. 

To establish prejudice under Strickland, a pet it ioner must “show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unp rofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in t he outcome.” Id. at 694. Under this prong, “an error by

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment

of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. 

The defense theory at trial was t hat t he Murrays burglarized the store and home

after finding the victims already dead. Petitioner asserts there is a reasonable p robability

he would not have been convicted if counsel had p resent ed the following evidence: (1)

John Anthony’s st at ement that he observed three men at the store, who differed in

appearance from the Murrays and who had a car different than the one driven by the

Murrays; (2) Angela Anthony’s st at ement that she heard a man threaten Morrison the day

before the murders; and (3) an unidentified witness’s testimony that the Murrays were

elsewhere at the time the three men were seen at the store. 

Evidence at trial reflected that sometime before 8:00 a.m. on May 14, 1991, police

found one of Morrison’s tow trucks abandoned west bound on I-40 near Kingman. A short

while later, the victims’ bodies were found at their residence. Both had suffered shotgun

wounds to the head and mult iple gunshot wounds to the head and body. The store and

house had been ransacked. Various .22, .25, and .38 caliber bullets, casings, and shells

were found in the house, as well as shot gun p ellets, but no expended shotgun shells were

found. A couch cushion cover was missing as was the drawer from the store’s cash

register. 

At roughly the same t ime, the Murrays, driving a white car eastbound on I-40 on

nearly t he op p osite side of the state, were arrested by police on unrelated charges

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17 As described in the opinion on direct appeal, “[t]he blood on Roger’s pants could

have come from either victim or Robert, but not from Roger. The blood on Robert’s shirt

could have come from either victim, but not from Robert or Roger. T he blood on the

cushion could have come from Appelhans, but not Morrison, Robert , or Roger.” Murray,

184 Ariz. at 22, 906 P.2d at 555.

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following a high speed chase. Robert, the driver, threw a loaded .38 revolver from the car,

and Roger threw out a loaded .25 semiaut omatic pistol. Inside the vehicle, police found a

loaded twelve-gauge sawed-off shotgun and live double-ought buckshot shells. Police

also found a scanner and connecting knob in the car that fit the empty bracket of

Morrison’s tow truck found on westbound I-40 and a road atlas with circles drawn around

the locations of two rural shops or restaurant s–Oasis and Grasshopper Junction–that were

not otherwise indicated on the map. In addition, police found a couch cushion cover

matching the one missing from the victims’ home that contained rolled coins stamped

“Dean’s Enterprises, Grasshop p er Junction, Kingman, Arizona, 86401,” along with a pillow

case containing several hundred dollars in rolled coins and cash. Further, human blood

and t issue were found on Robert’s shirt, Roger’s pants and the cushion cover that were

later determined to be consistent with the victims’ blood types.17 In addition, two spent

shotgun shell casings were found in Robert ’s hip pocket and keys recovered from Robert’s

pocket were later determined to fit a pickup that was on Morrison’s prop erty. Casings

found at t he crime scene and in Robert’s pocket were fired by the three guns found with

the Murrays.

At the murder scene, police found prints from tennis shoes and Western-style

boots. It was later determined that each matched tennis shoes and boots worn by Roger

and Robert, respectively, at the time of their arrest. Further, the Murrays’ shoeprints were

t he only unidentified ones entering or leaving the crime scene, and one trail of prints made

by the tennis shoes, the boots and Morrison’s slipp ers indicated resistance by Morrison.

In addition, rolled and loose coins were found in the courtyard amidst intermingled

shoeprints of the victims and the Murrays. The Murrays’ and Morrison’s shoeprints were

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also found out side t he store near tire tracks left by Morrison’s tow truck that was found

abandoned on westbound I-40.

For there t o be a reasonable probability of a different outcome based on the

allegedly exculpatory evidence, jurors would have to believe that the victims were

murdered by unknown persons who left the murder weapons, shotgun shells, and money

at the scene before fleeing. Further, jurors would have t o believe that the Murrays

hap p ened on the scene, found the victims dead, burglarized the store and residence,

getting t he vict ims’ blood on their clothes, and took the guns, expended and unexpended

shotgun shells, keys, money and t he couch cushion cover. In addition, the Murrays must

have then taken and lat er abandoned Morrison’s tow truck on westbound I-40 or

happened up on it after it was abandoned, and then removed the scanner and connecting

knob from the tow t ruck before driving almost 300 miles. Given the overwhelming nature

of the evidence at trial and the implausibility of the foregoing explanations of that

evidence, the Court concludes that the purportedly exculpatory evidence does not

undermine confidence in the outcome at trial. Petitioner cannot prevail on his IAC claim

because he cannot est ablish prejudice. Accordingly, the IAC claim will be denied on the

merits, and Pet it ioner’s request for evidentiary development as to this claim will be denied.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Petitioner’s request, Claims 43, 47, 49-52 and 54-

56 are DISMISSED as duplicative of other claims in the Amended Petition. (Dkt. 56.) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE: (a) Claims 1 (in part), 5 (in p art ), 6 (in p art), 7 (in part), 23, 29-33, 35, 36,

40/41(in part), and 44 based on a procedural bar; and (b) Claims 4, 5, 34, 37(b), 42, 40/41 (in

part) and 48 on the merits as a matter of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim 37(a) is DISMISSED WITHO UT

PREJUDICE as premature.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery and Evidentiary

Hearing is DENIED. (Dkt. 72.) 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Mot ion to Expand the Record Under

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases is DENIED. (Dkt. 73.) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED t hat if, pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Resp ondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Order, such motion shall be filed

within fifteen (15) days of the filing date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of this

Order to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007-

3329. 

DATED this 29th day of September, 2005.

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