Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04935/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04935-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 

LABORERS HEALTH AND WELFARE 

TRUST FUND FOR NORTHERN 

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CLS CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.18-cv-04935-JSC 

REASSIGNMENT ORDER AND 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Plaintiffs Board of Trustees of the Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern 

California, Board of Trustees of the Laborers Vacation-Holiday Trust Fund for Northern 

California, Board of Trustees of the Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California, and 

Board of Trustees of the Laborers Training and Retraining Trust Fund (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or 

“Trust Funds”) filed suit against CLS Constructors, Inc. (“CLS Constructors”), alleging breach of 

a collective bargaining agreement that required CLS Constructors to pay monthly employee fringe 

benefit contributions to the trust funds administered by Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 1.)1 The Clerk 

entered default as to CLS Constructors on February 6, 2019, (Dkt. No. 20), after it failed to appear 

or otherwise defend itself in this action. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for 

default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 23.) Because 

the Court has not obtained consent from all parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter must 

be reassigned to a district court judge. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(holding that magistrate jurisdiction “cannot vest until the court has received consent from all 

parties to an action.”). The Court thus VACATES the hearing scheduled for May 23, 2019, and 

RECOMMENDS that the newly assigned district court judge GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion for 

default judgment. 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that CLS Constructors breached a collective bargaining agreement 

between the Northern California District Council of Laborers (“Laborers Union”) and CLS 

Constructors entitled the “Laborers’ Master Agreement for Northern California” (“Master 

Agreement”). (Id. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs bring this action to enforce the terms of that agreement under 

the provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, 

and the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Upon the Clerk’s entry of 

default, the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those concerning damages, 

are deemed to have been admitted by the non-responding party. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 

F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court thus accepts the following allegations as true. 

A. The Parties

The Plaintiff “Trust Funds are organized under and pursuant to the provisions” of sections 

302(c)(5),(6) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c)(5),(6). (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3.) “The Trust Funds 

were established through collective bargaining agreements between the [Laborers Union] and 

employer associations representing construction industry employers doing business in Northern 

California.” (Id.) They function as “employee benefit plans created by written trust agreements 

subject and pursuant to” sections 3(3) and 3(37) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3),(37). (Id.) The 

Trust Funds are third-party beneficiaries of the Master Agreement. (Id.) The Boards of Trustees 

of the Trust Funds are charged with ensuring that employer-signatories to the Master Agreement 

comply with its terms “with respect to payments and contributions to the Trust Funds.” (Id. at ¶

6.) 

CLS Constructors “is a California corporation with its principal place of business located 

in Grand Terrace, California.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) CLS Constructors constitutes an “employer” under 

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(5), 1145, “and an employer in an industry affecting commerce” under 

“section 301 of the LMRA,” 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Id.) 

B. The Agreement

On November 2, 2017, CLS Constructors entered into a “Memorandum Agreement” with 

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the Laborers Union and pursuant to that agreement, became bound by the Master Agreement. (Id.

at ¶ 9; see also Dkt. No. 24, Ex. F.) “In agreeing to be bound to the Master Agreement, [CLS 

Constructors] agreed to be subject to and bound by all provisions and conditions of the written 

trust agreements” that established the Trust Funds. (Id.) CLS Constructors was thus required to, 

in pertinent part: (1) “pay employee fringe benefit contributions into each Trust Fund in regular 

monthly installments”; (2) pay interest on any “delinquent contribution in the amount of 1.5% per 

month until paid in full,” and also pay “$150 for each delinquent contribution as liquidated 

damages”; and (3) pay the attorneys’ fees, costs, and “all other expenses incurred in connection 

with [any] suit” filed against CLS Constructors arising out of “said contributions or payments.” 

(Id. at ¶ 10; see also Dkt. No. 24, Ex. G at 26.) Further, the terms and conditions of the 

agreements require CLS Constructors to allow the Trust Funds’ auditor access to CLS 

Constructors’ books and records to verify the additional amounts owed by CLS Constructors to 

the Trust Funds. (Id. at ¶ 23; see also Dkt. No. 24, Ex. E.) 

C. The Breach

CLS Constructors reported employee fringe benefit contributions for the periods 

November and December 2017, but failed to pay those contributions as required “in the principal 

amount of $17,333.12.” (Id. at ¶ 13(a).) CLS Constructors also “fail[ed] to pay interest and 

liquidated damages on the unpaid and delinquent employee fringe benefit contributions” for those 

periods. (Id. at ¶ 13(b).) Before filing this action, Plaintiffs made demand on CLS Constructors 

“to make immediate payment of the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages and interest.” (Id. at 

¶ 15.) CLS Constructors failed to do so. (Id.) 

The Master Agreement is still in effect and “Plaintiffs have performed all conditions, 

covenants and promises” required of them under the Master Agreement and covered trust 

agreements. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Pursuant to sections 502(g)(2) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 

1132(g)(2), 1145, Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks recovery of unpaid trust fund contributions for the 

periods of November and December 2017, interest on those contributions, liquidated damages, and 

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ¶ 18-21.) Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring CLS 

Constructors to permit Plaintiffs’ auditor access to its books and records so that Plaintiffs can 

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“verify the precise amounts” CLS Constructors owes “for the period of November 2017 through 

the last completed quarter prior to entry of judgment.” (Id. at ¶¶ 8-24 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§

1132(a)(3), 1132(g)(2)(E).) 

III. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 14, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1.) CLS Constructors did 

not appear following service of summons on the Secretary of State of the State of California 

(“Secretary of State”) on November 18, 2018, and Plaintiffs filed for entry of default with the 

Clerk of the Court on February 5, 2019. (Dkt. No. 18.) The Clerk entered default as to CLS 

Constructors the next day. (Dkt. No. 20.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment 

and supporting declarations on April 3, 2019. (Dkt. Nos. 23-25.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

District courts have an affirmative duty to examine their jurisdiction—both subject matter 

and personal jurisdiction—when default judgment is sought against a non-appearing party. In re 

Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiffs bring 

claims pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 and the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754-55 (2014). “For an individual, the paradigm forum 

for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it an 

equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as home.” Id. at 760 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A corporate defendant’s place of incorporation and 

principal place of business form “the bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction.” See Goodyear 

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (citation omitted). 

According to documentation from the Secretary of State, CLS Constructors is 

incorporated and has its principal place of business in California. (See Dkt. No. 12, Ex. A.) Thus, 

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the Court has general jurisdiction over CLS Constructors. 

II. Service

Before the Court can exercise its personal jurisdiction over CLS Constructors, it must 

ensure that “the procedural requirement of service of summons” has been satisfied. See Murphy 

Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that “one becomes a 

party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or 

other authority-asserting measure.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(a)). Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(h) provides that a corporation may be served in the same manner prescribed by Rule 

4(e)(1) for serving an individual, which allows for service in accordance with California law. 

Under California law, a plaintiff may serve the Secretary of State with process on a 

corporation after obtaining a court order authorizing such service based upon a showing “by 

affidavit to the satisfaction of the court that process . . . cannot be served with reasonable diligence 

. . . upon the corporation.” Cal. Corp. Code § 1702(a). Here, Plaintiffs requested such an order 

and made the required showing. (See Dkt. No. 12 at ¶¶ 3-8 (documenting multiple failed attempts 

to serve process on CLS Constructors).) The Court thus issued an order authorizing service of 

process on the Secretary of State. (Dkt. No. 13.) Plaintiffs served the Secretary of State with the 

summons and complaint on November 19, 2018, and Plaintiffs filed proof of service on November 

29, 2018. (Dkt. No. 14.) 

III. Default Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), a district court may grant default 

judgment after the Clerk’s entry of default. “The district court’s decision whether to enter a 

default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Courts consider the following factors in determining whether to enter default judgment: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due 

to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, consideration of the Eitel factors 

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weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 

A. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if the court denies 

default judgment. Craiglist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 

2010). Plaintiffs contend that absent entry of default judgment, they “‘will likely be without 

recourse for recovery.’” (Dkt. No. 23 at 9 (quoting Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 

2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).) The Court agrees. Plaintiffs will be unable to collect the 

contributions owed by CLS Constructors pursuant to the Master Agreement unless the district 

court grants their motion. Thus, this factor favors granting default judgment. 

B. Merits of Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors require the plaintiff “to plead facts sufficient to establish 

and succeed upon its claims.” Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. As previously 

discussed, on motion for default judgment the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, 

except those concerning damages, are deemed to have been admitted by the non-responding party. 

See Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. “The district court is not required to make detailed findings of fact.” 

Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiffs allege that CLS Constructors breached the Master Agreement; to prevail on that 

claim Plaintiffs must show: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) Plaintiffs’ performance; (3) CLS 

Constructors’ breach; and (4) resulting damages. See Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 

223 Cal. App. 4th 221, 228 (2014). The complaint sufficiently alleges that a contract exists and 

Plaintiffs’ declaration in support of this motion includes an executed contract between the Labor 

Union and CLS Constructors. (See Dkt. No. 24, Ex. F.) Plaintiffs are not parties to the contract; 

however, they are fiduciaries and can enforce the contract’s terms under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 

1132(a)(3) (authorizing a fiduciary to, in pertinent part, “enforce any provisions of this subchapter 

or the terms of the plan”). Plaintiffs adequately allege that they have performed their obligation 

under the contract, and that CLS Constructors breached the contract by not paying contributions it 

reported from November 2017 to December 2017. Plaintiffs further allege damages resulting from 

the unpaid contributions. In sum, the complaint sufficiently pleads an action for breach of 

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contract. Further, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for relief under ERISA; specifically, 

they allege that CLS Constructors owe contributions pursuant to the Master Agreement that it 

reported for the periods of November and December 2017 but failed to pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 1145 

(providing that “[e]very employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan 

under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the 

extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and 

conditions of such plan or such agreement.”); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (authorizing a fiduciary to, 

in pertinent part, “enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan”). 

Accordingly, the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default 

judgment. 

C. Money at Stake

Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court must consider the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “Default judgment 

is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in light of defendant’s 

actions.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. C 06-03594 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, 

at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). Conversely, default judgment may be appropriate where it is 

“tailored to [the defendant’s] specific misconduct.” Bd. of Trs. v. Superhall Mech., Inc., No. C10-2212 EMC, 2011 WL 2600898, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011). Here, Plaintiffs seek 

“$17,333.12 for contributions reported, but not paid,” as well as liquidated damages and interest, 

and attorneys’ fees and costs, for a total of $32,693.98. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 10, 13.) That amount 

is specifically tailored to CLS Constructors’ breach of the Master Agreement, and as discussed 

below, it is provided for under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1332(g)(2). Thus, the sum of the money 

at stake is appropriate and weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 

D. Dispute Over Material Facts

There is no indication that the material facts are in dispute. Upon the Clerk’s entry of 

default, CLS Constructors was “deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded allegations” in the 

complaint. See Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual 

allegations of the complaint, except those relating to damages, will be taken as true.”). Further, 

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evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in support of this motion—the executed November 2017 

Memorandum Agreement between Labor Union and CLS Constructors, and the contributions 

reported by CLS Constructors but not paid —support Plaintiffs’ allegations. (See Dkt. No. 24, 

Exs. F, I-K.) In the absence of any likely factual disputes, this factor weighs in favor of default 

judgment. 

E. Excusable Neglect

“This factor favors default judgment where the defendant has been properly served or the 

plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant is aware of the lawsuit.” Wecosing, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, 

Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2012). There is no basis here to conclude that CLS 

Constructors’ default resulted from excusable neglect. Plaintiffs properly served CLS 

Constructors with the summons and complaint through the Secretary of State. And although CLS 

Constructors has not been served with the instant motion, Plaintiffs were not required to do so 

under Rule 55(b)(2) because CLS Constructors has not “appeared personally or by a 

representative.” See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 55(b)(2). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 

default judgment. 

F. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits

“Cases should be decided on upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. This factor is not dispositive, however, and a defendant’s failure to answer the 

complaint “makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 

2d at 11. Thus, termination of a case before hearing the merits is permissible when a defendant 

fails to defend an action. Id. Given CLS Constructors’ failure to appear, a decision on the merits 

is impossible. 

***

In sum, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 

IV. Remedies

As previously discussed, ERISA requires that “[e]very employer who is obligated to make 

contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a 

collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such 

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contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.” 29 

U.S.C. § 1145. ERISA provides for monetary and injunctive relief for violations of section 1145, 

stating in pertinent part:

In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on 

behalf of a plan to enforce section 1145 of this title in which 

a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall 

award the plan-

(A) the unpaid contributions,

(B) the interest on the unpaid contributions, 

(C) an amount equal to the greater of-

(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or

(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in 

an amount not in excess of 20 percent (such higher 

 percentage permitted under Federal or State law) of 

the amount determined by the court under 

subparagraph (A), 

(D) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be 

paid by the defendant, and

(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems 

appropriate

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). 

Plaintiffs request monetary and injunctive relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

pursuant to section 1132(g)(2). The Ninth Circuit has held that an award under section 1132(g)(2) 

is “mandatory and not discretionary” where: (1) the employer is “delinquent at the time the action 

is filed; (2) the district court . . . enter[s] a judgment against the employer; and (3) the plan . . . 

provide[s] for such an award.” Nw. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Albertson’s, Inc., 104 F.3d 253, 257 (9th Cir. 

1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Those requirements are met here. 

A. Monetary Relief

Plaintiffs seek damages for unpaid contributions from November 2017 to December 2017 

in the form of: (1) principal amount owed of $17,333.12; and (2) interest on the unpaid 

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contributions (calculated through March 21, 2019) and liquidated damages totaling $6,972.56.

2

 

(See Dkt. No. 24 at ¶¶ 17-21; see also Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 20.) The complaint also requests additional 

amounts including unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, and interest that Plaintiffs may

discover after conducting an audit of CLS Constructors’ books and records, (Dkt. No. 1 at 8); 

however, the motion for default judgment does not request these speculative, additional amounts. 

The Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ request for $24,305.68 constituting unpaid 

contributions from November 2017 to December 2017 with interest and liquidated damages 

because (1) CLS Constructors is delinquent as to those funds, (2) default judgment is warranted 

under the Eitel factors, and (3) the Master Agreement provides for such an award. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 

10; see also Dkt. No. 24, Ex. G at 26.) 

B. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs request an injunction ordering CLS Constructors “to submit to an audit of its 

financial records for the period November 2017 through the last completed quarter prior to entry 

of judgment in order to determine the full amount of employer contributions owed to the Trust 

Funds.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 12; see also Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 24 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3), 

(g)(2)(E)).) As with Plaintiffs’ request for monetary relief, the requirements for injunctive relief 

under section 1132(g)(2)(E) are met here. Thus, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ 

request for an injunction ordering CLS Constructors to submit to an audit of its financial records

covering the period from November 2017 to the present. 

C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $8,388.30. ERISA provides for 

such an award. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D) (providing for “reasonable attorney’s fees and 

 

2 Plaintiffs seek interest on the unpaid contributions in the amount $3,486.28, pursuant to 29 

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B). Plaintiffs also seek “an amount equal to the greater of” that amount or 

“liquidated damages provided for under the plan,” pursuant to section 1132(g)(2)(C). As 

previously discussed, the Master Agreement provides for liquidated damages in the amount of 

$150 per month for delinquent contributions. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 10; see also Dkt. No. 24, Ex. G 

at 24.) Plaintiffs assert that the liquidated damages “calculated through March 21, 2019 on 

contributions reported, but not paid” total $1050. (Dkt. No. 24, Ex. L at 40.) Because the 

liquidated damages are less than the interest, Plaintiffs seek an additional award of $3,486.28 

under section 1132(g)(2)(C). (Dkt. No. 23 at 12; see also Dkt. No. 24 at ¶ 20.) 

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costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant”). To calculate an award of attorneys’ fees, district 

courts apply “the lodestar method, multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a 

reasonable hourly rate.” Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “A reasonable hourly rate is ordinarily the 

prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to 

produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits—that the requested 

rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 

F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The party 

requesting fees also bears “the burden of submitting billing records to establish that the number of 

hours” requested are reasonable. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 

2013). The number of hours should not exceed the number of hours reasonable competent counsel 

would bill for similar services. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 

Plaintiffs submit the declaration of Ronald L. Richman, “senior counsel and shareholder at 

Bullivant Houser Bailey PC” in support of their request for attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 3.) 

Mr. Richman’s declaration summarizes the work performed, (see id. at ¶ 5), and includes invoices 

containing billing entries for the three attorneys who worked on this case, (see id. at Ex. A). The 

attorneys billed 22.8 hours of work, totaling $7552.50 in fees. 

The Court finds that both the hours expended and rates charged are reasonable. Mr. 

Richman’s declaration sufficiently describes the work performed, and the billing entries are 

detailed and demonstrate that the work was necessary. As for the hourly billing rates, Mr. 

Richman attests that his firm charges Plaintiffs “$345 per hour for shareholders, $290 per hour for 

associates and $175 per hour for paralegals.” (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 4.) Those rates are well within 

hourly rates deemed reasonable for Bay Area attorneys, see Superior Consulting Servs., Inc. v. 

Steeves-Kiss, No. 17-cv-06059-EMC, 2018 WL 2183295, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) 

(“district courts in Northern California have found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners 

and $300-$490 per hour for associates are reasonable.”), and for ERISA cases, specifically, see 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that “fees of $375 

and $400 per hour were . . . in line with prevailing community rates”). Similarly, Plaintiffs’ 

litigation costs are reasonable and supported by documentation showing costs related to service of 

summons ($407.80), use of a messenger service ($28), and filing fees ($400). (See Dkt. No. 25, 

Ex. A at 5.) 

Accordingly, the Court recommends awarding attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount 

requested—$8,388.30. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that the newly-assigned district 

court judge GRANT Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and award $32,693.98, consisting of: 

(1) $17,333.12 in unpaid contributions from November 2017 to December 2017; (2) $3,486.28 in

interest on those unpaid contributions; (3) an additional $3,486.28 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(2)(C) (an amount equal to the greater of the interest or liquidated damages); and (4) 

$8,388.30 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court also recommends granting Plaintiffs’ request for 

injunctive relief compelling CLS Constructors to submit to an audit of its financial records for the 

period from November 2017 to the present. 

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district court 

judge within fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72. Failure to file an objection may waive the right to review of 

the issue in the district court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

May 7, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-04935-JD Document 27 Filed 05/07/19 Page 12 of 12