Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02444/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE NAJERA,

Petitioner,

v.

STU SHERMAN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15-cv-2444 BAS (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

[ECF No. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Jose Najera, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has 

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”), 

challenging his San Diego County Superior Court conviction of murder in case number 

SCN304993. (ECF No. 1 at 1.)

1

 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Cynthia Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the Local 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

After a thorough review of the Petition, the Answer and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of the Answer, the lodgments, the record, and all the supporting 

documents submitted by both parties, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

 

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited herein refer to those imprinted by the court’s 

electronic case filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts that follow are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in People 

v. Najera, No. D063875 at 3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2014). This Court gives deference 

to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1992) (holding inferences properly drawn 

from state court findings of fact are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

On the morning of April 25, 2007, Najera was driving a stolen car. He 

had two passengers: his friend, David Lopez, and Lopez’s girlfriend, Rachel 

Gaxiola. At approximately 9:00 a.m., San Diego County Sheriff’s deputies 

attempted to stop Najera’s car, having received a report it was stolen. Najera 

initially pulled the car over to the side of the road but then made a sharp Uturn and rapidly accelerated; Najera narrowly missed oncoming traffic and 

drove on the wrong side of a divided roadway at speeds up to 80 miles per 

hour[] for just under a minute. The chase finally ended when Najera collided 

head-on with a 76-year-old motorist, Jean Cooke.

During the pursuit, Gaxiola asked Najera if she could get out of the car, 

and both she and Lopez removed their seatbelts. At one point, Lopez opened 

his door.2 All three occupants were still in the car, however, when it collided 

with Cooke’s car.

All four people involved in the collision were taken to the hospital, 

where Lopez was pronounced dead. Gaxiola had several severe bone 

fractures; she spent the next two and a half months in the hospital and was still 

in “constant pain” at the time of the trial. Cooke also suffered several broken 

bones and a collapsed lung; she still experienced symptoms of her injuries,

including difficulty standing, at the time of trial.

 

2 Additionally, one of the sheriff’s deputies involved with the investigation testified that, in the 

hospital, Gaxiola had told him that as Najera made his initial U-turn, Lopez had asked to be let out of the 

car and had attempted to exit but was pulled back by Najera. Other deputies also reported seeing Lopez’s 

door open and his arm and leg hang out of the car while Najera made his U-turn. Gaxiola testified that 

she had no memory of Lopez asking to get out of the car, of Najera pulling Lopez back into the car, or of 

making a statement to investigators while in the hospital.

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Najera was treated for several fractures and lacerations. Najera 

admitted to doctors at the hospital that he had used methamphetamine the 

evening before the collision and heroin approximately five hours before the 

collision. These admissions were confirmed by later blood tests and 

consistent with the fact that a usable amount of methamphetamine was found 

in his pants pocket.

(ECF No. 8-7 at 3–4.) 

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2013, the District Attorney charged Petitioner with the following 

counts: Murder in violation of California Penal Code § 187(a) (count one); gross vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of California Penal Code § 191.5(c)(1) (count 

two); driving under the influence causing injury in violation of California Vehicle Code 

§ 23153(a) (count three); evading a peace officer causing death in violation of California 

Vehicle Code § 2800.3(b) (count four); unlawful taking and driving vehicle in violation of 

California Vehicle Code § 10851(a) (count five); and possession of a controlled substance 

in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11377(a) (count six). (ECF No. 8-1 at 

19–24.) The District Attorney further alleged under count two that Petitioner proximately 

caused bodily injury or death to more than one victim (here, Jean Cooke and Rachel 

Gaxiola) in violation of California Vehicle Code § 23558. (Id. at 20.) The District 

Attorney further alleged under counts three and four that Petitioner personally inflicted 

great bodily injury upon Jean Cooke and Rachel Gaxiola in violation of California Penal 

Code § 12022.7(a). (Id. at 20–21.) 

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial in the San Diego County Superior Court in Case

No. SCN304993. On March 4, 2013, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all six counts,

including the special allegations. (Id. at 108–24.) The court sentenced Petitioner to a total 

of 45 years to life.3(ECF No. 8-7 at 2.)

 

3 Fifteen years doubled for strike prior on count one, three years doubled for strike prior on count 

five to run consecutively with count one, four consecutive one-year terms for Petitioner’s prison priors,

and five years for a serious felony prior. (ECF No. 8-7 at 2 n.1.)

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Petitioner timely filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal on May 6, 2013, 

in Case No. D063875. (ECF No. 8-1 at 163.) Among other claims, Petitioner asserted that 

former California Penal Code § 22(b)4is designed solely to exclude relevant voluntary 

intoxication evidence as it relates to the mental state of implied malice aforethought in 

violation of due process. (ECF No. 8-5 at 28–56.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction on August 27, 2014. (ECF No. 8-7 at 1–15.)

Petitioner timely filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of California on 

October 2, 2014. (ECF No. 8-8.) He again raised the claim that former § 22(b) is designed 

solely to exclude relevant voluntary intoxication evidence as it relates to the mental state 

of implied malice aforethought in violation of due process. (ECF 8-8 at 20–26.) The 

Supreme Court of California summarily denied the petition for review on 

November 12, 2014, in Case No. S221710. (ECF No. 8-9 at 1.) 

Petitioner timely filed the instant Petition on October 28, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) Judge 

Cynthia Bashant granted Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on 

December 1, 2015. (ECF No. 3.) Respondent filed an answer to the Petition on 

February 8, 2016. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner had until March 11, 2016, to file a traverse, 

however, Petitioner did not file a traverse. (ECF No. 5 at 3.) 

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: (1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law; (2) or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

 

4 Former California Penal Code § 22(b), as amended in 1995, is currently codified as California

Penal Code § 29.4(b). For the sake of consistency with Petitioner’s argument and the state court 

documents, the Court refers to the statute as “former § 22(b).” All further statutory references are to the 

California Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7–8 (2002). 

For the purposes of the first prong of the test, clearly established federal law, under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme 

Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72

(2003). The Court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied 

a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if it decided a 

case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable 

application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from 

Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a 

particular case. Id. 

As it relates to an “unreasonable determination of the facts” under the second prong,

the Court presumes factual findings made by the state court to be correct and “[t]he 

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 

971–72 (9th Cir. 2004). Clear and convincing means that the Court “must be convinced 

that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not 

reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 

366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only 

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); see also Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 

(9th Cir. 2004). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for 

the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

805–06 (1991). 

V. DISCUSSION

Although divided into four sections labeled “claims,”5 Petitioner relies on a single 

argument that former § 22(b) is designed solely to exclude relevant voluntary intoxication 

evidence on the mental state of implied malice aforethought in violation of due process. 

As such, the Court addresses the Petition as a single claim.

Specifically, Petitioner asserts the 1995 amendment of former § 22(b) violates due 

process because it “[does] not redefine the mental element of implied malice for murder” 

but instead excludes relevant exculpatory evidence. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Prior to 1995, 

former §22 allowed for the introduction of voluntary intoxication evidence for specific 

intent crimes, which, at the time, included implied malice. See People v. Whitfield, 7 Cal.

4th 437, 446 (1994) (“Section 22, subdivision (b), provides: ‘Evidence of voluntary 

intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually 

formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice 

aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.’”). In 1995, shortly after Whitfield, 

the California legislature enacted several changes to former § 22, including the addition of 

the word “express” in front of “malice aforethought.” See Act of Jan. 19, 1995, ch. 793, § 

1, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West). After the 1995 change, former § 22 read (and continues 

to read, although renumbered as § 29.4 in 2013) in relevant part, 

 

5

In his Petition, Petitioner makes this single argument under four claims headings: (1) “Section 

22, subdivision (b) as amended in 1995 was solely designed to exclude relevant exculpatory evidence in 

violation of due process”; (2) “1872 enactment of Section 22 and pertinent amendments”; (3) “Section 

22, subdivision (b) was designed to allow voluntary intoxication as relevant exculpatory evidence on 

certain mental states and the 1995 amended section 22, subdivision (b) was designed to exclude voluntary 

intoxication as relevant exculpatory evidence on mental state of implied malice aforethought”; and (4) 

“Section 22, subdivision (b) as amended in 1995 does not redefine the mental state of implied malice 

aforethought.” (ECF No. 1 at 6–12.)

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(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary 

intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that 

condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate 

the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but 

not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or 

malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act.

(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue 

of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, 

when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, 

or harbored express malice aforethought.

Cal. Penal Code § 22 (West 1995). 

As stated above, Petitioner argues that former § 22(b) is designed solely to exclude 

relevant voluntary intoxication evidence on the mental state of implied malice aforethought 

in violation of due process. Although Petitioner does not specifically cite to federal case 

law in the Petition, the Court presumes Petitioner relies on Justice Ginsberg’s concurring 

opinion in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 57 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., concurring), to attack 

the constitutionality of former § 22.

6 Respondent contends that former § 22(b) as amended

is a redefinition of a criminal offense and thus does not violate Petitioner’s constitutional 

rights. (ECF No. 7-1 at 4–5.)

Because Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal (ECF 8-5 at 42–52) and in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court

(ECF No. 8-8 at 18–25), and because the California Supreme Court denied the petition 

without comment (ECF No. 8-9), this Court “looks through” to the Court of Appeal’s 

decision. The California Court of Appeal denied relief to Petitioner based on the following 

rationale:

 

6 The basis for this conclusion is that Petitioner’s arguments track his argument to the California 

Court of Appeal in his direct appeal of his conviction, in support of which Petitioner cites Justice 

Ginsberg’s concurring opinion. (ECF No. 8-5 at 28–30.)

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Najera argues that former section 22 unconstitutionally excludes 

exculpatory evidence and prevented him from showing that, in light of his 

intoxication, he was not acting with the implied malice needed to prove 

second degree murder. We find no defect in former section 22.

Najera relies on Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) 518 U.S. 37 (Egelhoff), 

where the United States Supreme Court upheld a Montana law substantially 

similar to former section 22. In her controlling concurring opinion, Justice 

Ginsberg reasoned that a law barring evidence of voluntary intoxication could 

be unconstitutional if it merely sought to exclude relevant evidence, but it 

would not be if it redefined the mens rea requirement of crimes. She found 

the Montana law did the latter as it was found in Montana’s criminal, as 

opposed to evidentiary, code sections, and because it “‘extract[s] the entire 

subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry.’” (Egelhoff, at 

pp. 57–58 (conc. opn. of Ginsberg, J.).) Justice Ginsberg noted that such a 

redefinition was within the Legislature’s power and did not relieve the 

prosecution of their burden to prove a mental state, as it still required them to 

prove either “(1) the defendant caused the death of another with actual 

knowledge or purpose, or (2) that the defendant killed ‘under circumstances 

that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose “but for” [the 

defendant’s] voluntary intoxication.’” (Id. at p. 58 (conc. opn. of Ginsberg, 

J.).)

As the court in People v. Timms (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1292 

determined, former section 22, like the Montana statute, is consistent with due 

process and the requirements of Egelhoff. “Section 22 does not appear in the 

Evidence Code, it appears in the Penal Code under the ‘Preliminary 

Provisions,’ along with statutes defining and setting forth the kinds and 

degrees of crimes and their punishment (§§ 16-19.8), the requirement of act 

and intent or negligence (§ 20), the elements of attempt (§ 21a), etc. Since 

1872, the first sentence of section 22 (now at subdivision (a)) has declared the 

policy of this state that an act is not less criminal because the actor committed 

it while voluntarily intoxicated. This means that, with respect to the same 

conduct, an intoxicated person shoulders the same criminal responsibility as 

a sober person. The next sentence declares the substantive law that voluntary 

intoxication is not available to a defendant as a basis for a diminished capacity 

defense. Subdivision (b) of section 22 establishes, and limits, the exculpatory 

effect of voluntary intoxication on the required mental state for a particular 

crime. It permits evidence of voluntary intoxication for limited exculpatory 

purposes on the issue of specific intent or, in murder cases, deliberation, 

premeditation and express malice aforethought. The absence of implied 

malice form the exceptions listed in subdivision (b) is itself a policy statement 

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that murder under an implied malice theory comes with the general rule of 

subdivision (a) such that voluntary intoxication can serve no defensive 

purpose. In other words, section 22, subdivision (b) is not ‘merely an 

evidentiary prescription’; rather, it ‘embodies a legislative judgment regarding 

the circumstances under which individuals may be held criminally responsible 

for their actions.’ (Egelhoff, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 57 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, 

J.).) In short, voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to proof of the mental state 

of implied malice or conscious disregard. Therefore, it does not lessen the 

prosecution’s burden of proof or prevent a defendant from presenting all 

relevant defensive evidence.” (People v. Timms, supra, at p. 1300.)

We agree with the court in People v. Timms as well as the court in 

People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1117, which reached the same 

conclusion: former section 22 is a legitimate exercise of the Legislature’s 

authority to redefine the elements of crimes and not an attempt to 

impermissibly exclude exculpatory evidence. Accordingly, former section 22 

does not infringe on the defendant’s right to due process.

(ECF No. 8-7 at 8–10.)

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether former § 22(b) violates a 

defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause. However, in Montana v. Egelhoff, the 

Court analyzed a Montana state law, similar to former § 22(b), which established that 

voluntary intoxication “may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence 

of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense.” 518 U.S. 37, 57 (1996) (quoting 

Mont. Code Ann. § 45–2–203 (1995)). The Court held that statute does not violate the Due 

Process Clause. 518 U.S. at 39–40, 58. 

In Egelhoff, Montana Sheriffs found Egelhoff in the backseat of a vehicle in which 

two other people were shot dead. Id. at 40. More than one hour later, Egelhoff’s bloodalcohol content registered at 0.36. Id. He was convicted of deliberate homicide after the 

court instructed the jury to disregard evidence of his voluntarily intoxicated condition as it 

related to the mens rea element of the crime. Id. at 41. The Supreme Court of Montana 

reversed his conviction, reasoning that Montana Code Annotated § 45–2–203 (“Montana 

statute”) unconstitutionally prevented Egelhoff from presenting “all relevant evidence to 

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rebut the State’s evidence.”7 Id. (quoting State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 125 (1995)).

The Supreme Court of the United States, however, rejected that reasoning and reversed the 

Supreme Court of Montana in a fractured opinion. See id. at 53, 58 (Ginsberg, J., 

concurring) (plurality). Noting that the right to present relevant evidence for a defense is 

not absolute, id. at 42 (plurality), the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of exculpatory 

voluntary intoxication evidence does not offend a “fundamental principle of justice” 

protected under the Due Process Clause. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 44–47 (plurality) & 58 

(Ginsberg, J., concurring).

Justice Scalia, writing for the four-justice plurality, found that a state statute that 

excludes the introduction of exculpatory voluntary intoxication evidence does not

necessarily violate a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause. The plurality

reasoned that “the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by a state for a ‘valid’ 

reason.” Id. at 53. If a defendant wishes to challenge a state’s valid reason, the defendant

must show that the exclusion “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 

and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id. at 58 (quoting Patterson

v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)). Justice Scalia reasoned that because numerous 

states have either maintained or resuscitated the “old common-law” rule that a state may 

preclude exculpatory voluntary intoxication evidence, the exclusion of such evidence does

not offend a “fundamental principle of justice.” See id. at 47–48 (noting that “one-fifth of 

the States either never adopted the ‘new common-law’ rule at issue here or have recently 

abandoned it”). For the plurality, the combination of historical precedent and valid state 

reasons indicated that the Montana statute did not violate the Due Process Clause. See id.

at 49–50 (citing the frequency of violent crimes committed by drunken offenders, specific 

 

7 Montana Code Annotated § 45-2-203 states, “A person who is in an intoxicated condition is 

criminally responsible for the person’s conduct, and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any 

offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an 

element of the offense unless the defendant proves that the defendant did not know that it was an 

intoxicating substance when the defendant consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise ingested the 

substance causing the condition.” 

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deterrence, and comportment with society’s moral perception as “considerable 

justification[s]”). 

Justice Ginsberg, in her concurrence, agreed with the plurality that the Montana 

statute does not offend a “fundamental principle of justice.” See id. at 58 (Ginsberg, J., 

concurring) (citing the same language from Patterson on which the plurality relied).

However, Justice Ginsberg’s analytical framework diverged slightly from the plurality’s 

reasoning. Justice Ginsberg’s analysis focused on whether the statute was a rule of 

evidence, the effect of which was to preclude “relevant exculpatory evidence,” or whether 

it was a substantive criminal law statute which redefined the mens rea requirement of the 

crime. Id. at 57. Justice Ginsberg allowed that the former might offend due process, but 

determined the latter would pass constitutional muster. Id. Justice Ginsberg held the 

Montana statute was not merely an evidentiary rule, but a redefining of the element of the 

crime at issue. “Comprehended as a measure redefining mens rea, § 45–2–203 encounters 

no constitutional shoal.” Id. at 58. Justice Ginsberg reasoned that the Montana statute’s 

location in the Montana Code under “General Principles of Liability” is not where one 

would expect to find an evidentiary prescription. Id. at 57 (noting adjacent provisions 

governing duress and entrapment). For Justice Ginsberg, this indicated that the statute is 

not “merely an evidentiary prescription” but an embodiment of “a legislative judgment 

regarding the circumstances under which individuals may be held criminally responsible 

for their actions.” Id at 57. She further reasoned that the Montana statute is constitutional

because several other courts have upheld similar statutes as “legislative redefinitions of the 

mental-state element.” Id. at 59. Specifically, she found that “the Montana law is no less 

tenable under the Federal Constitution than are laws, with no significant difference in 

wording, upheld in sister States.” Id. at 59–60. 

Justice Ginsberg additionally opined that the Montana statute is constitutional 

because it does not excuse the prosecution from proving a defendant’s mental state. Rather,

proof of the mental state—and consequently the relevance of evidence related to the mental 

state—is “dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged.” Id. at 58 (quoting 

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Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211 n.12). As a result, Justice Ginsberg concluded that the Montana 

statute does not lighten the burden of proof placed on the prosecution, but renders evidence 

of voluntary intoxication irrelevant to proof of mens rea because the Montana statute 

“extracts the entire subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Reading the Petition generously, Petitioner argues that the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law because Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence establishes that laws

designed solely to keep out relevant exculpatory evidence violate due process and former 

§ 22 is such a law. Therefore, to address Petitioner’s argument that the California Court 

of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law, one must first answer the question of whether Justice Ginsberg’s 

concurrence constitutes the holding of the Egelhoff decision and is therefore a governing 

principle of the Supreme Court.

In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1997), the Supreme Court provided 

guidance on how to interpret the holding of a fractured Supreme Court decision. “When a 

fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 

assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 

those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Id. at 193–94.

In Egelhoff, although a majority of the justices did not use the same analytical framework

to arrive at the same conclusion, five Justices ultimately agreed that the Montana statute is 

constitutional because states have the power to define criminal conduct and limit the 

introduction of evidence with respect to that conduct. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 38–59. As 

noted by Justice Scalia,

[W]e are in complete agreement with the concurrence that § 45–2–203 

“embodies a legislative judgment regarding the circumstances under which 

individuals may be held criminally responsible for their actions,” post, at 

2024. We also agree that the statute “‘extract[s] the entire subject of voluntary 

intoxication from the mens rea inquiry,’” post, at 2024. We believe that this 

judgment may be implemented, and this effect achieved, with equal 

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legitimacy by amending the substantive requirements for each crime, or by 

simply excluding intoxication evidence from the trial. We address this as an 

evidentiary statute simply because that is how the Supreme Court of Montana 

chose to analyze it.

Id. at 50 n.4. Therefore, the plurality and the concurrence agree that a state may

constitutionally redefine the mens rea element of a crime and, as a result, limit the 

introduction of otherwise relevant exculpatory evidence. 

This Court may look to Ninth Circuit case law as “persuasive authority” to identify

clearly established federal law. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2000); overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75–76. The Ninth 

Circuit has frequently relied on Egelhoff to uphold rulings limiting the introduction of 

relevant exculpatory evidence, including evidence of voluntary intoxication. See, e.g.,

Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 451 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 51, 56,

to show that “due process does not require the jury to be instructed regarding the 

defendant’s intoxication at the time of the crime”); Phillips v. Herndon, 730 F.3d 773, 775 

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 53, to show that States can limit the right to 

present a complete defense through the exclusion of relevant exculpatory evidence); LaJoie 

v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 680 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized 

‘the principle that the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the State for a 

valid reason.’” (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 53)). The Ninth 

Circuit in United States v. Sayetsitty specifically noted that a person has “no Due Process 

right to a defense of voluntary intoxication if the legislature chooses to exclude it.” 107 

F.3d 1405, 1413 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing generally to Egelhoff). Based on the plurality’s 

agreement with Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence and subsequent Ninth Circuit case law, this 

Court concludes that Justice Ginsberg’s concurring opinion in Egelhoff is clearly 

established federal law and, as such, is the appropriate lens through which to view this 

Petition.

For the reasons below, this Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

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As found by the California Court of Appeal, the “Montana law [is] substantially similar to 

former section 22” in several areas. (ECF 8-7 at 9.) First, like the statute in Egelhoff, 

which Justice Ginsberg found constitutional in part because it does not appear in the 

evidentiary code, former § 22(b) appears in the California Penal Code under the section 

entitled “Of Persons Liable to Punishment for Crime.” See Cal. Penal Code § 22(b) (West 

1995). Second, the very name of the section where one finds former § 22(b), “Of Persons 

Liable to Punishment for Crime,” is analogous to the section where one finds the Montana 

statute in the Montana Code, under the heading of “General Principles of Liability.” Third,

former § 22(a), which is directly connected to former § 22(b), states, “No act committed 

by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or 

her having been in that condition.” Cal. Pen. Code § 22(a) (West 1995). This language is

again directly analogous to the Montana statute, which states, “[A]n intoxicated condition 

is not a defense to any offense.” Former § 22(a) continues, “Evidence of voluntary 

intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states,” Cal. 

Pen. Code § 22(a) (West 1995), which once again mirrors the Montana statute: “an 

intoxication condition . . . may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence 

of a mental state.” As it relates to this Petition, former § 22(b)’s language has “no 

significant difference in wording” that would make it any “less tenable” than the Montana 

statute that Justice Ginsberg found constitutional, Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 59–60, and 

Petitioner has failed to point to any language in former § 22(b) that would distinguish it 

from the Montana statute.

Former § 22(b)’s similarities to the Montana statute in Egelhoff indicate that, under 

clearly established federal law, the statute represents a permissible “legislative judgment” 

to redefine the mens rea element of general intent crimes in California. Former § 22(b)

carves out a list of specific exceptions under which a California defendant can offer 

evidence of voluntary intoxication, a list that does not include implied malice. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 22(b) (West 1995) (authorizing evidence of voluntary intoxication 

to establish specific intent “or whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored 

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express malice aforethought” (emphasis added)). However, former § 22(b) does not 

impermissibly relieve a prosecutor from proving mens rea as it relates to implied malice. 

Rather, it “extracts the entire subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry”

in the same manner as the Montana statute. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58. Consequently, the 

prosecution must still prove mens rea as it relates to implied malice.

With respect to Petitioner’s case, the California Court of Appeal specifically 

addressed whether former § 22(b) relieved the prosecutor from proving mens rea. The 

court noted that the trial court provided the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 520 as a 

jury instruction, which defined the implied malice standard as follows: “One, intentionally

committed an act; two, the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous 

to human life; three, at the time he acted he knew his act was dangerous to human life; and, 

four, he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (ECF No. 8-7 at 5

(emphasis added).) Thus, a California prosecutor must still prove a mental state, but, like 

a defendant under the Montana statute, a California defendant is not entitled to present 

evidence of voluntary intoxication for a general intent crime under former § 22(b).

Petitioner’s charges in the instant case were based on implied malice and general intent 

crimes (ECF No. 8-1 at 19–24), charges for which the legislature explicitly chose not to 

allow voluntary intoxication as a defense. See Cal. Penal Code § 22(b) (West 1995).

Contrasted with the defendant in Sayetsitty, whose conviction was reversed because the 

court did not allow him to present evidence of voluntary intoxication for a specific intent 

crime as authorized by the Arizona legislature,

8 Petitioner was not entitled to present 

exculpatory voluntary intoxication evidence.

 

8

In Sayetsitty, the Arizona trial court did not allow the jury to consider evidence of voluntary 

intoxication as it related to aiding and abetting second degree murder. The court reasoned that because 

second degree murder was a general intent—as opposed to specific intent—crime, the defendant was not 

entitled to present evidence of voluntary intoxication. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 

aiding and abetting was a specific intent crime and thus the lower court erred by not allowing the defendant 

to present evidence of voluntary intoxication because it was specifically authorized by the legislature.

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The California Court of Appeal, in its ruling on Petitioner’s direct appeal, relied on 

Justice Ginsberg’s concurring opinion and concluded that former § 22(b) is consistent with 

the Due Process Clause because it is not merely an evidentiary prescription but rather a 

constitutional redefinition of mens rea. (ECF No. 8-7 at 8–10.) The court first found that 

former § 22(b) is not an evidentiary prescription because it is located in the Penal Code 

“with statutes defining and setting forth the kinds and degrees of crimes and their 

punishment.” (Id. at 9.) The court then found that “the first sentence of section 22 (now 

at subdivision(a)) has declared the policy of this state that an act is not less criminal because 

the actor committed it while voluntarily intoxicated.” (Id. at 9–10.) Lastly, the court found 

that because implied malice was not one of the listed exceptions under former § 22(b), this 

represented a legislative judgment to exclude exculpatory voluntary intoxication evidence 

for implied malice. (Id. at 10.) These findings by the California Court of Appeal, as 

analyzed above, were consistent with Justice Ginsberg’s concurring opinion in Egelhoff, 

and thus were consistent with clearly established federal law. As a result, this Court finds 

that the appellate court’s holding was neither an unreasonable application of nor contrary 

to clearly established federal law.

The facts and holdings of the Petitioner’s case before the California Court of 

Appeal—as they related to the statutory exclusion of exculpatory voluntary intoxication

evidence—were fundamentally identical to those in Egelhoff. Further, the California Court 

of Appeal relied on Justice Ginsberg’s conclusion concerning the Montana statute in 

Egelhoff to similarly conclude that § 22(b) constitutionally redefines mens rea. This Court 

would be hard pressed to find that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied 

clearly established law, much less that the ruling was “diametrically opposed” to clearly 

established federal law.

///

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written objections 

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than September 9, 2016. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 16, 2016. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 

1991).

Dated: August 19, 2016

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