Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00672/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00672-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY W. MIMS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

T E N N E S S E E V A L L E Y

AUTHORITY BOARD OF

DIRECTORS,

Defendant.

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No. 5:13-CV-00672-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Gregory W. Mims, commenced this action on April 10, 2013, by

asserting claims for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., and age discrimination

under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,

against his employer, the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”). The case currently

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is before the court on defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings.

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Upon consideration of the motion, pleadings, and briefs, the court concludes the

motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint). 1

 Doc. no. 11. 2

FILED

 2014 Jul-22 AM 11:40

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 1 of 11
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that: “After the pleadings are

closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the

pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

“Judgment on the pleadings is proper when no issues of material

fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

based on the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed

facts.” Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (11th

Cir. 2005). [A court must] accept all the facts in the complaint as true

and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Cannon[ v. City of West Palm Beach], 250 F.3d [1299,] 1301[ (11th Cir.

2001)].

Cunningham v. District Attorney’s Office for Escambia County, 592 F.3d 1237, 1255

(11th Cir. 2010) (alterations supplied). “Dismissal is not appropriate unless the

complaint lacks sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim for relief

that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant isliable for the

alleged misconduct.” Jiles v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 413 F. App’x 173, 174

(11th Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570

(2007)). 

While the applicable pleading standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550, it does demand “more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 2 of 11
A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,

550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads

facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to

relief.’” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint astrue, we “are not bound to accept astrue a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure fromthe hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, asthe Court of Appeals observed,

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

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In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis added) (first alteration supplied, second

alteration in original). 

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, a black male, wasfifty-nine years old when he filed this complaint on

April 10, 2013. He began working for TVA in 1990 as a lineman, and he began

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applying for promotionsto line foreman in 2005. In March of 2012, plaintiff applied

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for a line foreman position in Alabama (Vacant Position Announcement (“VPA”)

30814). Despite the fact that plaintiff was qualified to be a line foreman, a younger 5

white man with less experience was selected for the position in late April of 2012.

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Plaintiff also states:

16. During the course of his employment with TVA, Plaintiff has

observed a pattern of qualified black males losing positions and

promotions to lesser qualified white employees. Plaintiff alleges that

 Complaint ¶ 8. 3

Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 4

Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. 5

Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15. 6

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 4 of 11
TVA has a long history and past record of failing to employ and promote

blacks and other minorities. 

17. Plaintiff alleges that the selection process used by TVA, its

interview process and the “Matrix” have a disparate impact on black

employees seeking to be promoted.

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Based on those factual allegations, plaintiff first asserts a claim for race

discrimination under Title VII. His race discrimination claim is based upon both 8

disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Plaintiff also asserts a claim for 9

age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. He seeks compensatory damages,

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liquidated damages, past and future lost wages, lost benefits, attorney’s fees, and

costs.11

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings with regard to plaintiff’s

disparate impact and pattern and practice theories ofrace discrimination. Defendant’s

motion does not address plaintiff’s disparate treatment race discrimination claim, or

Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff does not explain what the “Matrix” is, but from a review of the 7

administrative decision appended to plaintiff’s response brief, it appears that the reference is to a

scoring matrix used to evaluate applicants during the application process. See doc. no. 17-7, at 2

(“Rating each resume on a scale from zero to five, Mr. Westmoreland used a selection matrix to

assess the candidates’ qualifications.”), 3 (“Interview responses were scored by the interviewing

panel and then captured on the selection matrix.”). 

 Complaint ¶¶ 18-23 (Count I). 8

Id. ¶ 23. 9

Id. ¶¶ 24-29 (Count II). 10

Id. ¶ 30. 11

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 5 of 11
any aspects of plaintiff’s age discrimination claim.

A. Disparate Impact

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that “the selection process used by TVA, its

interview process and the ‘Matrix’ have a disparate impact on black employees [12]

seeking to be promoted.” Defendant argues that judgment on the pleadings should 13

be granted on plaintiff’s disparate impact theory of discrimination because plaintiff

has not alleged sufficient facts to support the claim. Specifically, defendant asserts

that “plaintiff’s disparate impact claim is devoid of any factual enhancement and

consists of nothing more than the label ‘disparate impact’ along with a generalized

conclusory statement about TVA hiring practices.” 

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The disparate impact theory of discrimination under Title VII 

prohibits neutral employment practices which, while non-discriminatory

on their face, visit an adverse, disproportionate impact on a

statutorily-protected group. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.

424, 431, 91 S. Ct. 849, 853, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1971) (explaining that

Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practicesthat

are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”); see also In re

Employment[ Discrimination Litigation Against State of Alabama], 198

F.3d [1305,] 1311[ (11th Cir. 1999)]; Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2

F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir. 1993). The doctrine seeks the removal of

employment obstacles, not required by business necessity, which create

“‘built-in headwinds’” and freeze out protected groups from job

See note 7, supra. 12

 Complaint ¶ 17. 13

 Doc. no. 12 (defendant’s initial brief), at 6. 14

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 6 of 11
opportunities and advancement. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1524

(11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S. Ct. 849). As

the district court correctly identified, “[t]he premise of disparate impact

theory is that some employment practices, adopted without a

deliberately discriminatory motive, may be the functional equivalent of

intentional discrimination.” [E.E.O.C. v.]Joe’s Stone Crab, 969 F. Supp.

[[727,] 735[ (S.D. Fla. 1997)]. In essence, disparate impact theory is a

doctrinal surrogate for eliminating unprovable acts of intentional

discrimination hidden innocuously behind facially-neutral policies or

practices.

E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000) (alterations

to case citations supplied, emphasis and other alteration in original). The prima facie

case for a disparate impact claim requires proof that

(1) there is a significant statistical disparity between the proportion of

members of the protected class available in the labor pool and the

proportion of members of the protected class hired; (2) there is a

specific, facially neutral employment practice; and (3) a causal nexus

exists between the employment practice and the statistical disparity.

Jefferson v. Burger King Corp., 505 F. App’x 830, 834 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Joe’s

Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1274). 

“Although a Title VII complaint need not allege facts sufficient

to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it must

provide ‘enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ intentional .

. . discrimination.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d

955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002), and Twombly, 127 S.

Ct. at 1965). In addition to containing well-pleaded factual allegations,

complaints must also meet the “plausibility standard” set forth in

Twombly and Iqbal. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. 

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 7 of 11
Bowers v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 509 F. App’x 906, 910

(11th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff’s bare allegations fall far short of satisfying the pleading standard. 

Even though plaintiff has cryptically identified defendant’s “selection process,”

“interview process,” and “Matrix” as the, presumably, facially-neutral employment

practices that allegedly produce a racially adverse impact, he has not offered any

statistics about the number of blacks in the available labor pool, the number of black

applicants, or the number of blacks hired for the position. In fact, there is no factual

information whatsoever about why defendants’ employment practices have a

disparate impact on black employees seeking promotions; there is only plaintiff’s

conclusory statement that the disparate impact is present.

Plaintiff asserts that the court should excuse his failure to provide more

detailed factual allegations, because no statistical data was produced during TVA’s

administrative investigation into plaintiff’s complaint, and because he has no way to

access that data without the benefit of formal discovery. He asks the court for a

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period of limited discovery in order to gather more detailed information, and the

See doc. no. 17 (plaintiff’s response brief), at 8 (“In cases without a thorough EEOC 15

investigation or civil discovery, a plaintiff will rarely have data that will show disparate impact. 

Disparate impact cases by their nature require data in the employers’ possession. A requirement that

Plaintiff must allege facts or statistics showing disparate impact would effectively read disparate

impact out of the law and would give employers a powerful incentive to stonewall data requests.”).

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 8 of 11
opportunity to amend his complaint after the discovery is complete. 

Plaintiff correctly points out that “[v]ery few courts have addressed the

disparate impact cases after Iqbal/Twombly. Even fewer have addressed the burden

in a disparate impact case where all necessary information is in the defendant’s

possession.” This court agrees that, despite the pleading requirements discussed in 16

the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, a plaintiff asserting a disparate impact claimshould

not be required to plead facts that are in the exclusive control of the employer. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied with

regard to plaintiff’s disparate impact claim. Even so, the court sees no need for a

bifurcated discovery process. Plaintiff should to proceed to discovery on his

disparate impact claim according to the usual discovery procedures. The court will

revisit the issue of disparate impact, if necessary, atsummary judgment after the close

of discovery.

B. Pattern and Practice

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that, “[d]uring the course of his employment

with TVA, [he] has observed a pattern of qualified black males losing positions and

promotions to lesser qualified white employees,” and that TVA has “a long history

and past record of failing to employ and promote blacks and other minorities.”17

Id. at 7 (alteration supplied). 16

 Complaint ¶ 16 (alterations supplied). 17

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 9 of 11
Defendant asserts that this “pattern and practice” claim must be dismissed because,

in the Eleventh Circuit, “a private litigant is not permitted to maintain a claim of

pattern and practice discrimination unless such claim is brought (and certified) as a

class action.” Plaintiff did not dispute this argument in his response brief, and

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Eleventh Circuit authority supports defendant’s position. See Davis, 516 F.3d at 965

(“A pattern or practice claim for [declaratory and injunctive relief against an ongoing

act of intentional discrimination] may also be brought under Title VII as a class

action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), by one or more of the

similarly situated employees.”) (alteration supplied); Rollins v. Alabama Community

College System, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (“In Davis v.

Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit held

that a private litigant cannot maintain a pattern or practice claim unless it is brought

as a class action and the class is ultimately certified.”). Accordingly, defendant’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings is due to be granted with regard to plaintiff’s

pattern or practice discrimination claim.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, defendant’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All claims of race

 Doc. no. 12 (defendant’s brief), at 14. 18

See doc. no. 17 (plaintiff’s response brief). 19

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Case 5:13-cv-00672-CLS Document 20 Filed 07/22/14 Page 10 of 11
discrimination based upon a pattern-and-practice theory of discrimination are

DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s disparate impact and disparate treatment

theories of race discrimination remain pending, as does his age discrimination claim.

It isfurther ORDERED that the stay on discovery is LIFTED. The parties are 20

directed to proceed immediately to discovery on all remaining claims in accordance

with the Uniform Initial Order.21

DONE this 22nd day of July, 2014.

______________________________

United States District Judge

See doc. no. 15 (order staying discovery pending further order of the court). 20

 Doc. no. 10. 21

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