Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07540/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07540-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

---

Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KRISTAN STOVALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:18-cv-07540-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

Re: Dkt. Nos. 28, 34

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kristan Stovall (“Plaintiff”) is a former employee of Defendant Align 

Technology, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff initiated this suit in state court, asserting that Defendant 

unlawfully terminated and discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender in violation of 

California law. Defendant filed an answer and the next day removed the action to this court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b). Plaintiff thereafter sought and was granted leave to 

file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 26. 

Presently before the court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss and to strike the jury demand. 

Dkt. No. 28. Plaintiff filed an opposition and a separate motion for relief under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 39(b). Dkt. Nos. 31, 34. The court finds it appropriate to take the motions under 

submission for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the 

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, 

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 1 of 7
Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

and Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

II. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff resides in Tennessee. FAC ¶ 4. Defendant is a global medical device company 

that designs, manufactures and markets clear orthodontic and dental products to help straighten 

teeth. Id. ¶ 5.

In April of 2013, Plaintiff submitted her application for employment to Defendant’s 

headquarters in San Jose. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant offered Plaintiff a position and she sent her 

acceptance to Defendant’s headquarters. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff was required to sign the Company 

Employee Handbook as well as the Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement 

(“Proprietary Agreement”) as a condition of employment. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff also signed a 

“Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement” (“NDA”). Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff began her employment as a Territory Manger in Nashville. Id. She completed 

training and met 99% of her revenue targets for 2013. Id. ¶ 12. For the next several years, 

Plaintiff received outstanding performance appraisals and met or exceeded her revenue targets. Id. 

¶¶ 12-13. 

In April of 2017, Plaintiff took maternity leave for three months. Id. ¶ 14. Upon her 

return, Plaintiff was assigned a new manager, Spencer Richardson (“Richardson”), who 

presumably was also located in Nashville. Id. ¶ 14. In the year that followed, Richardson 

allegedly discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of gender. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff discussed 

Richardson’s conduct with her male colleagues, her former manager, Russell Wharton, and 

Defendant’s Regional Sales Manager for Northern California, Marni Beck. Plaintiff also reported 

Richardson’s conduct to Human Resources in California. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. Thereafter, Richardson 

demanded more of Plaintiff than of her five male co-workers, including requiring Plaintiff to 

attend different company-related events on weekends and to submit related reports. Id. ¶ 15.

 

1 The Background is a summary of the allegations in the First Amended Complaint.

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 2 of 7
Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff took disability leave from April 20, 2018 through May 5, 2018 to recover from a 

broken foot. Id. ¶ 16. Upon her return to work, Richardson told Plaintiff that he had received 

negative feedback from three doctors (who are presumably Defendant’s clients or potential clients)

regarding Plaintiff. Id. One of the doctors denied saying anything negative about Plaintiff. Id. 

Richardson also criticized other areas of Plaintiff’s work performance, including her call entries 

and doctor reports. Id.

On May 11, 2018, Plaintiff contacted Defendant’s Human Resource Department in San 

Jose regarding Richardson’s treatment of her. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff spoke to Will Ayala (“Ayala”), 

Defendant’s HR Director and Business Partner, and told him that she believed Richardson had 

engaged in a pattern and practice of treating her differently than her male colleagues. Id. A few 

days later, Richardson placed Plaintiff on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) without 

giving her any prior warnings. Id. Richardson’s stated reason for the PIP was that Plaintiff’s 

results for 2017 were well below the regional, area and national averages. Id. ¶ 18. This 

representation was false. Id. Richardson set sales goals for Plaintiff to achieve by the end of Q2 

2018: “95% or above in CCA and 100% GP. Id. These sales goals were “unrealistic.” Id. By 

the end of Q2, Plaintiff achieved “92% of CCA and 97% GP” and had outperformed three of her 

six sales team members. Id. 

On July 10, 2018, Plaintiff was terminated. Id. ¶ 19. The decision to terminate Plaintiff 

was made by Richardson and Ayala. Id. Ayala “directed, oversaw, and ratified the decision from 

California.” Id. Ayala participated in the conference call when Plaintiff was notified of her 

termination. Id. At the time Plaintiff was terminated, she was forty-one years old. Id. ¶ 20. 

Plaintiff was replaced by a younger, single female in her early twenties. Id. 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes claims for: (1) Sex Discrimination in 

Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) Age Discrimination in Violation of the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”); (3) Retaliation in Violation of Title 

VII; (4) Breach of Contract; (5) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (6) Sex 

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 3 of 7
Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Discrimination in Violation of California Government Code section 12940, the Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (7) Age Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; and (8) Wrongful 

Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss the fourth through eighth causes of action. Defendant 

contends that these causes of action are not cognizable because California law does not apply 

extraterritorially to wrongful conduct that did not occur in California. Plaintiff concedes that the 

fourth and fifth causes of action should be dismissed, but contends that the sixth through eighth 

causes of action are cognizable because Defendant directed and controlled employee activities 

from its headquarters in San Jose, California, and some of the discriminatory treatment occurred in 

California. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 

A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may therefore be dismissed if it fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts 

to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2008). When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must accept 

as true all “well pleaded factual allegations” and determine whether the allegations “plausibly give 

rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The court must also 

construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 

F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, 

it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 4 of 7
Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Ordinarily, state statutes are not given extraterritorial effect.” Russo v. APL Marine 

Services, Ltd., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015). Furthermore, evidence of legislative 

intent makes clear that FEHA “should not be construed to apply to nonresidents employed outside 

the state when the tortious conduct did not occur in California,” even though the statute imposes 

no residency requirement and expresses no limitation based on where the allegedly unlawful 

conduct occurred. Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 42 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1860 (1996); see also 

Rulenz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 10-1791 GPC, 2013 WL 2181241, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2013). 

In other words, the extraterritorial application of FEHA is determined by “the situs of both 

employment and the material elements of the cause of action.” Russo, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. 

“[T]o properly plead a FEHA claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege the tortious conduct 

occurred in the state of California.” Rulenz, 2013 WL 2181241, at *3.

Here, Plaintiff resides and worked for Defendant outside of California. FAC ¶¶ 4, 11. The 

majority of the allegedly discriminatory conduct also took place outside of California. 

Nevertheless, the ultimate discriminatory action—Plaintiff’s termination—was “directed, 

overs[een], and ratified” by Ayala from California. Id. ¶ 19. Ayala also participated in the 

conference call when Plaintiff was notified of her termination. Id. Unlike in Buchanan v. NetJets 

Services, Inc., No. 18-812 EJD (N.D. Cal. April 24, 2018), Dodds-Owens v. Kyphon, Inc., No. 06-

3988 JF, 2007 WL 420191, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5. 2007), and Gonsalves v. Infosys Technologies, 

Ltd., No. 09-4112 MHP, 2010 WL 1854146, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2010), Plaintiff in this case 

identifies by name the individual who engaged in discriminatory conduct in California and 

specifies what actions he took in California. At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations, 

although thin, are sufficient to state cognizable claims under California law. Poehls v. ENSR 

Consulting and Eng’g, No. 04-8885 MMM, 2006 WL 8431770, at *33 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2006) 

(“So too, the fact that ENSR Consulting allegedly directed or participated in the decision to 

terminate Poehls’ employment or revoke the offer of employment might permit application of 

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 5 of 7
Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

FEHA.”). 

B. Motion For Relief Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has waived her right to a jury trial because she failed to 

make a timely jury demand after removal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

81(c). Although Plaintiff does not deny that she failed to properly demand a jury, she nevertheless 

requests that the court exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b) and allow a jury trial in this case. 

Rule 39(b) provides that “[i]ssues on which a jury trial is not properly demanded are to be 

tried by the court. But the court may, on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury 

might have been demanded.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). A court’s discretion under Rule 39(b) is 

“narrow,” however, and “does not permit a court to grant relief when the failure to make a timely 

demand results from an oversight or inadvertence.” Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., 

Ldt, 239 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556-57 (9th 

Cir. 1983). A court may not grant relief when the failure to make a timely demand is the result of 

a “good faith mistake of law.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that “there may have been a mistake” as to the applicability 

of Rule 81(c)(3)(A), but proffers several reasons for the court to grant her relief. Pl.’s Mot. at 4. 

She asserts that she followed the statutory procedures employed by California law regarding 

demanding a jury trial. She asserts that she could not have demanded a jury on her federal causes 

of action because they were not part of her original complaint, which only listed state law claims. 

Id. She asserts that she fulfilled the purpose of the jury demand requirement in Rule 38 by 

including a demand for jury in a footnote to her General Order No. 71 Initial Discovery Protocols

and again in the First Amended Complaint. Id. Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant cannot 

claim any prejudice because the case is in its early stages. Id. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that she 

never knowingly or voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial.

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the trial court does not have discretion to grant relief 

under Rule 39(b) where the failure to make a timely jury demand was the result of oversight, 

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 6 of 7
Case No.: 5:18-cv-07540-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 39(b)

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

inadvertence, or a good faith mistake of law. Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ldt, 

239 F.3d at 1002-03. Plaintiff in the instant case has acknowledged that there may have been a 

mistake. This court is bound by the Pac. Fisheries Corp. decision, no matter how reasonable or 

sensible Plaintiff’s actions may appear to have been. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the 

fourth cause of action for breach of contract and the fifth cause of action for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and DENIED in all other respects. Defendant’s motion to 

strike Plaintiff’s jury demand is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion for relief is DENIED. Plaintiff 

shall file and serve a Second Amended Complaint consistent with this Order no later than January 

31, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:18-cv-07540-EJD Document 41 Filed 01/17/20 Page 7 of 7