Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02526/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02526-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

In re WILLIAMS, J.S., et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al.,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:11-02526 WBS CMK

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

60(b)

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Jonathan Samuel Williams, a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against three 

defendants--Drs. Kurk, McIntyre, and Wood--for violations of his 

Eighth Amendment rights. (Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 43 (Docket No. 

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

9).) Plaintiff claimed that, over the last ten years, he 

repeatedly requested dental care to alleviate pain and prevent 

loss of teeth and the doctors at California State Prison, Solano, 

refused to provide any treatment aside from extraction. (Id. at 

43-44, 48.) 

On August 18, 2015, Magistrate Judge Kellison 

recommended that defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and the 

case dismissed with prejudice. (Aug. 18, 2015 Findings &

Recommendations (“F&R”) at 7 (Docket No. 58).) After conducting 

an independent review, this court found the magistrate judge’s 

F&R to be supported by the record. (Docket No. 59 at 1.) As a 

result, the court adopted the F&R in full and dismissed the case 

with prejudice. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff now brings a “Petition 

for Rehearing Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),”

which this court construes as a motion for reconsideration of its

September 11, 2015 Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(6). 1 (Pl.’s Mot. at 1, 4 (Docket No. 67).) 

II. Discussion

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final

judgment under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, 

mistake, and newly discovered evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). In addition, Rule 60(b) contains a 

catch-all provision, which applies when there is “any other 

 

1 Though plaintiff does not specifically cite subsection 

60(b)(6), he quotes language from the subsection: “Here, in this 

60(b) motion, petitioner asserts that the Federal Rules permit 

‘reopening when’ [as here] the movant shows any . . . reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” (Docket 

No. 67 at 4 (emphasis added).) 

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 

The Supreme Court has not particularized the factors 

that justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), but has noted that “it 

provides courts with authority adequate to enable them to vacate 

judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish 

justice, while also cautioning that it should only be applied in 

extraordinary circumstances.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held 

that Rule 60(b)(6) empowers the district court to vacate orders 

in “extraordinary circumstances” where the movant is able to show 

“both injury and circumstances beyond his control that prevent 

him from proceeding with the prosecution or defense of the action 

in a proper fashion.” Cmty. Dental Servs. V. Tani, 282 F.3d 

1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff offers three reasons for why there are

“extraordinary circumstances” that warrant relief from final 

judgment. First, plaintiff argues that this court appointed 

counsel to represent him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, (Docket 

No. 33), and the magistrate judge disregarded this court’s Order 

by appointing counsel only for the limited purpose of locating 

and effecting service upon the defendants, (Docket No. 35). 

Plaintiff is correct that the court intended to appoint

representation for the duration of the case and not simply for 

the effectuation of service. (Docket No. 33 (“[B]oth the 

plaintiff and this court would benefit from the appointment of 

counsel to help prosecute plaintiff’s case . . . Counsel can help 

by making requests for information on his behalf and more 

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

efficiently securing responses.”).) However, in his Order 

appointing counsel the magistrate judge stated that the court 

would afford counsel the option of “proceeding as plaintiff’s 

appointed counsel for purposes of discovery, settlement and/or 

trial” prior to termination of the appointment. (Docket No. 35.) 

Pursuant to this Order, appointed counsel asked plaintiff if he 

was interested in continued representation after he completed the 

task of serving defendants. (Docket No. 52.) Plaintiff did not 

respond to this inquiry. (Id.) As a result, it was plaintiff’s 

own choice to proceed in propia persona and he cannot now claim 

his lack of representation is grounds for relief from final 

judgment. 

Second, plaintiff argues that he was prevented from 

filing a timely objection to the F&R because California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Officer 

Gray conducted a search of his cell on September 9, 2015 and 

seized or destroyed his objections. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) 

Plaintiff contends that his cell was searched in retaliation for 

his legal activities against CDCR. (Pl.’s Mot. for Extension of 

Time (“EOT”) at 2 (Docket No. 62).) The search of his cell was 

out of plaintiff’s control and likely interfered with his ability 

to file objections. 

Nonetheless, even if the cell search prevented 

plaintiff from filing objections, plaintiff was not injured by 

this circumstance--as is required under Rule 60(b)(6). 

Irrespective of any possible objections, this court was required 

to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint under the doctrine of res 

judicata, or claim preclusion. “Under the doctrine of claim 

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

preclusion, a final judgment forecloses successive litigation of 

the very same claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 

(2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A party 

cannot contest matters that it has already had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate. Id. The elements of claim preclusion 

are: “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the 

merits, and (3) privity between parties.” Headwaters Inc. v. 

Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted). In determining whether a present dispute concerns the 

same claims as prior litigation, the Ninth Circuit puts the most 

weight on “whether the two suits arise out of the same 

transactional nucleus of facts.” Id. 

In the prior case of Williams v. CDCR, Civ. No. 2:06-

2903 DOC (E.D. Cal.), Judge Carter dismissed plaintiff’s 

Complaint with prejudice on June 26, 2009 for failure to state a 

cognizable claim--thus issuing a final judgment. (Docket No. 

40.) There is privity between the parties in the prior case and 

the present one as both were brought against Drs. Kurk, McIntyre, 

and Wood. Lastly, the suits arose out of the same nucleus of 

facts as the earlier case contained a medical treatment claim 

that was nearly identical to the claim at issue here.2 In both 

cases plaintiff alleged he was denied prompt and adequate dental 

treatment and was forced to choose between the extraction of 

teeth or remaining in pain, in violation of the Eight Amendment. 

While the present case elaborates the claim in slightly more 

 

2 In the current action, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

medical claim regarding dental treatment was the only claim found 

viable by the Northern District and transferred to this court. 

(Docket No. 10.)

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

detail, for example alleging that defendants not only violated 

prisoners’ constitutional rights but also the American and 

California Dental Association Standards and Tilton Dental Consent 

Decree, the underlying nucleus of facts that forms the basis for 

the claim is identical. (Docket No. 9 at 45.) Given that all of 

the elements of claim preclusion were met, the court was required 

to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint in this case. 

Lastly, plaintiff argues that the final judgment should 

be set aside because of the allegedly improper conduct of the 

magistrate judge. (Docket No. 33 at 10.) Plaintiff contends he 

“never consented to the participation of the magistrate in this 

litigation” and that his motions “went unanswered by the Article 

III District Judge and [were] instead intercepted by the 

magistrate.” (Id.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and 

Eastern District Local Rule 304, a magistrate judge may conduct

proceedings for dispositive motions and prisoner petitions 

challenging the conditions of confinement “without the parties’ 

consent” and submit his or her proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations to the assigned judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1); 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). The magistrate judge must provide 

the parties fourteen days to object to the proposed findings and 

recommendations and the Article III “district judge must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition 

that has been properly objected to.” Id. R. 72(b)(3). The judge 

“may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; 

receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate 

judge with instructions.” Id. Throughout the present case, this 

court carefully reviewed the findings and recommendations of the 

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

magistrate judge and came to its own independent conclusions 

about whether to accept, reject, or modify them. The magistrate 

judge did not “usurp Article III jurisdiction,” as plaintiff 

alleges, but rather acted in compliance with the federal rules. 

(Docket No. 67 at 10.) 

For all of the above reasons, the court finds that the 

plaintiff has not established “extraordinary circumstances” that 

warrant relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). It is 

THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration be, 

and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

Dated: October 30, 2015

Case 2:11-cv-02526-WBS-DMC Document 68 Filed 11/02/15 Page 7 of 7