Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06887/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06887-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEPI SHAFLER,

RELATED CASES

Plaintiff(s),

No. C 06-5908 PJH

No. C 06-6887 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO

DECLARE PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS

LITIGANT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

HSBC BANK USA, et al., MOTIONS FOR RECUSAL AND 

FOR SANCTIONS

Defendant(s).

_______________________________/

Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

or, in the alternative, to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406, and to declare plaintiff

a vexatious litigant came on for hearing before this court on January 17, 2007. Plaintiff

appeared pro se, defendants HSBC and Scott Miller appeared through their counsel

Michael Powers and James French and defendants Manufacturers and Traders Trust

Company Bank and Cheryl Storie appeared through their counsel James Murphy. 

Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion

to dismiss because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the statute of

limitations and the court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants Storie and Miller. The

court GRANTS defendants’ motion to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant in actions against

these Defendants. 

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Plaintiff’s two filings set forth a litany of causes of action against the defendants. The

September filing contains a wide range of allegations including money laundering, bank fraud,

mail fraud, lying as a sport, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The

November filing includes allegations of embezzlement, forgery and money laundering and

demands restitution pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code. All of the allegations arise out

of the same November 7, 1985 incident involving her husband. 

2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed case number 06-5908 on September 25, 2006 and case number 06-

6887 on November 3, 2006. The September action named HSBC Bank, Scott Miller,

Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company Bank and Cheryl Storie as defendants. The

November action named HSBC and Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company Bank. The

cases were related by order of this court on December 11, 2006. The two cases set forth

the same basic allegations and therefore are discussed jointly. 

Plaintiff’s complaints allege that defendants, two banks and their respective legal

counsel, conspired with each other and her former husband to steal from plaintiff.1

 Plaintiff

states that on November 7, 1985, her then husband, Donald Summer, withdrew $95,200

from a Merrill Lynch account that he jointly owned with plaintiff. Merrill Lynch provided

plaintiff’s husband with two checks totaling this amount. The checks listed Donald Summer

and Pepi Summer as the payees and were drawn on an account that Merrill Lynch

maintained with Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company Bank (hereinafter M&T). Mr.

Summer allegedly endorsed the checks and deposited them into a separate, individual

account that he held with Marine Midland Bank, which is now HSBC. 

In June of 1987, plaintiff filed an action in New York state court (hereinafter the New

York action) against Marine Midland Bank (HSBC), M&T, and Merrill Lynch alleging that

these three entities unlawfully converted plaintiff’s money because they honored the two

checks issued by Merrill Lynch, even though they had not been endorsed by plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s case against these defendants was litigated until November 10, 2005 when the

New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division granted summary judgment in favor of HSBC

stating that plaintiff had already been compensated for her one-half of the $95,200. See

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Schafler v. HSBC Bank USA, 23 A.D. 3d 1083. The New York Court of Appeals, denied

plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal on February 14, 2006. See Schafler v. HSBC Bank

USA, 6 N.Y. 3d 796 (2006). The United States Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition for

a writ of certiorari on October 2, 2006. See Schafler v. HSBC USA et. al., 127 S. Ct. 78

(2006). Defendant Storie is an attorney with a New York law firm that was retained to

defend M&T in the New York action. Defendant Miller was in-house counsel at HSBC and

for several years served as HSBC’s defense counsel in the New York action.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the court should dismiss this case under the doctrine of res

judicata because plaintiff’s action is an attempt to re-litigate the New York action. 

Defendants also argue that to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint states a claim, the statute

of limitations has expired. Defendants Storie and Miller argue that this court lacks

jurisdiction over them. Defendants also request the court to enter a narrow vexatious

litigant order, barring plaintiff from suing these defendants without leave of court. Plaintiff

responds that the New York proceedings were not legitimate proceedings because they

were based on defendants’ lies. Plaintiff states that the statute of limitations has not

expired because it runs from the date of the last act giving rise to the claim and in this case

defendants racketeering is ongoing. Plaintiff states that the imposition of a vexatious

litigant order would violate her Constitutional rights.

A. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s claims against HSBC and M&T are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Generally, the doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from re-litigating a claim that was

litigated or should have been litigated in a previous action. See Ross v. Int’l Bhd. Of Elect.

Workers, 634 F. 2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1980). Federal courts look to the state law of the

jurisdiction that rendered the judgment to determine whether a claim is barred by res

judicata. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F. 3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). Under

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For the Northern District of California

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New York law the party moving for dismissal based on res judicata must demonstrate: (1) a

final judgment on the merits has been rendered, (2) involving the same parties, and (3)

involving the same transaction or series of transactions. See O’Brien v. City of Syracuse,

54 N.Y. 2d 353, 357 (1981). In this case, the first two requirements are easily satisfied. 

The New York action was subject to a final judgment on the merits because the New York

appellate court granted summary judgment in favor of HSBC and the New York Court of

Appeals and the United States Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petitions for review. See

Schafler v. HSBC Bank USA, 6 N.Y. 3d 796 (2006); Schafler v. HSBC USA et. al., 127 S.

Ct. 78 (2006). The New York action, like the instant actions, named HSBC and M&T as

defendants. 

The third element requires the court to determine whether the claims in the instant

actions were actually litigated or should have been litigated in the New York action. 

Plaintiff’s September 2006 complaint alleges that HSBC and M&T conspired with her

former husband to take her funds and alleges a cause of action for bad faith, conspiracy,

money laundering, theft and conversion, bank fraud by a fiduciary institution, tortious

interference with prospective advantage, suborning the deceit of the tribunal by others,

invasion of privacy and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See

Complaint for Case No. C 06-5908 at 3-6. Plaintiff’s May 2006 complaint alleges that

HSBC and M&T unlawfully allowed her former husband to take her funds and engaged in

money laundering. See Complaint for Case No. C 06-6887 at 2-6. To the extent that

plaintiff asserts any valid claims, the claims arise out of the November 7, 1985 incident

involving her husband’s withdrawal of funds from their joint account. Claims arising out of

this event were subject to extensive litigation in the New York action where plaintiff alleged

Marine Midland Bank (HSBC) and M&T acted negligently and recklessly in allowing the

unlawful conversion of her funds. See Powers Decl., Exhibit 6 at 2-4. While plaintiff’s

allegations in the instant actions include embezzlement, fraud and infliction of emotional

distress, which go beyond the New York action’s unlawful conversion claim, these claims

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arise out of the same November 7, 1985 incident and could have and should have been

asserted in the New York action. Plaintiff presents no evidence to support her contention

that the New York proceedings were not legitimate. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against

HSBC and M&T are barred by res judicata. 

More than twenty years have elapsed since the November 7, 1985 incident and the

filing of the instant actions. Giving plaintiff’s pleadings the most liberal of constructions,

each claim that she asserts is barred by the statute of limitations. In a diversity case such

as this, the court must apply the statute of limitations that the forum state would apply

under its choice of law rules. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002). 

California’s choice of law rules require the court to apply New York’s statute of limitations in

this case because the incident giving rise to this action occurred in New York and New York

has the greatest interest in having its law applied. See e.g. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11

Cal. 3d 574, 580 (1974) (noting that under California’s ‘governmental interest approach’

choice of law decisions require balancing the relevant interests of the states involved). 

Plaintiff’s potentially legitimate causes of action include theft and conversion, intentional

and negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy. 

The statute of limitations for these actions is between one and six years. For example, the

statute of limitations in New York for breach of contract is six years. See N.Y. CPLR §

213(2). The statute of limitations for unjust enrichment is six years. See Elliott v. Qwest

Comm. Corp., 25 A.D.3d 897. The statute of limitations for restitution is six years. See

Abercrombie v. Andrew College, 438 F.Supp.2d 243, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The statute of

limitations for invasion of privacy is one year. See N.Y. CPLR § 215(3). The statute of

limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is one year. See Hansen v.

Petrone, 124 A.D. 2d 782. The statute of limitations for negligent infliction of emotional

distress is three years. See N.Y. CPLR § 214. The statute of limitations for conversion is

three years. See N.Y. CPLR § 214. There is no evidence to support plaintiff’s theory that

the statute of limitations should be tolled based on the fact that defendants’ racketeering

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and corruption in this case has been ongoing. 

Finally, even if plaintiff’s claims against Storie and Miller were not barred by the

statute of limitations, plaintiff’s claims against these two defendants would be dismissed

because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. In determining whether the court

has personal jurisdiction over a defendant the court looks first to the forum state’s long arm

statute and then determines whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the

Constitution’s due process clause. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 F. 2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir.

1990). California’s long arm statute allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the

maximum extent permitted under the Constitution’s due process clause. See Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 410.10 (1989). Under the due process clause, a court may only exercise

personal jurisdiction over a defendant if he has had certain minimum contacts with the

forum state and should have therefore “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court

there.” See Volkswagen Corp Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Generally, a court will

look at the nature and quality of a defendant’s contacts to determine if the minimum

contacts requirement is met. Sher, 911 F. 2d at 1358. In this case, however, there is no

evidence that defendants Storie or Miller had any contacts with California that would allow

the court to exercise jurisdiction over their persons. Storie and Miller are New York citizens

and live and work in New York. Their actions in this matter, which were limited to

defending their respective clients M&T and HSBC in plaintiff’s New York lawsuits, took

place in New York and have no connection to California. Accordingly, the claims against

these two defendants are dismissed because the court lacks personal jurisdiction.

B. DEFENDANTS’ VEXATIOUS LITIGANT MOTION

Defendants’ motion for an order declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant and enjoining

her from filing additional lawsuits against them without leave of court is GRANTED.

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, permits a district court to enjoin litigants who

abuse the judicial system from submitting future filings. See Clinton v. United States, 297

F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1961). Prior to enjoining a vexatious litigant a court must: (1) provide the

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litigant notice and a chance to be heard before the court enters the order, (2) establish an

adequate record for review listing cases or abusive activities undertaken by the litigant, (3)

make a substantive finding that the claims brought were frivolous or were brought with the

intent to harass the parties and (4) narrowly tailor the order to deter the specific behavior

the litigant has engaged in. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th. Cir.

1990). 

The first factor is met because plaintiff had notice of the vexatious litigant motion

when defendants’ served her with it on December 15, 2006. Plaintiff responded to

defendants’ motion in her opposition brief accusing defendants of sexism, stating that the

U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly protected access to the courts and indicating that

opposing counsel should know this unless they are “illiterate or brain dead.” See Plaintiff’s

Reply Motion, December 27, 2006 at 13. Plaintiff was also given an opportunity to address

this issue at the January 17, 2007 hearing.

The second factor is met because plaintiff has a long history of filing frivolous actions

and making baseless and abusive allegations. While there may have been some legitimate

factual basis for plaintiff’s initial New York filing against HSBC and M&T, after apparently

dismissing several of her attorneys and electing to proceed pro se, plaintiff engaged in

abusive litigation tactics and used the judicial process to launch unsubstantiated personal

attacks against HSBC, M&T, their counsel, and various New York judges involved in the

case. For example, in one of her declarations opposing defendants’ remand motion,

plaintiff accused HSBC of engaging in “legal chicanery, deception and fraud on the Court.” 

She also attacked the New York state judges who had heard her case in state court. She

accused the state trial judge of ruling in favor of HSBC because HSBC “assists with the

election process” and stated that “no State Supreme Court will rule against the banks

because they provide campaign contributions and other major benefits to them.” See

Powers Decl., Exhibit 15. The court found these claims to be without merit. In another

declaration she accused HSBC’s attorney Scott Miller of perjury, knowingly presenting false

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documents and affidavits to the court and engaging in fraudulent behavior. See Powers

Decl., Exhibit 26. She subsequently filed an amended complaint against Miller seeking

punitive damages, which the court dismissed. See Powers Decl., Exhibits 27 and 29. 

Before the appellate court handed down its ruling, plaintiff filed a motion attempting to

disqualify the entire appellate panel. In her moving papers, she accused the trial judge,

Patrick NeMoyer, of bias and favoritism and stated that this “virus” of bias had spread to the

appellate panel. See Powers Decl., Exhibit 35. 

In the instant cases plaintiff engages in similar tactics. Plaintiff’s pleadings include

unsupported allegations of criminal conduct against HSBC and M&T such as money

laundering and embezzlement. See Complaint for Case No. 06-5098. She accuses

defendant Miller of being the “slimiest most prolific liar on the planet that might be impaired

by his substance abuse (the old cocaine habit).” See Plaintiff’s Reply Motion, December

27, 2006 at 20. In another part of that same brief she accuses defendants of using her

assets to pay for “illegal drugs and whoremongering.” See Plaintiff’s Reply Motion,

December 27, 2006 at 24. In responding to defendants’ motion to declare her a vexatious

litigant, plaintiff again accuses the New York courts of bias, stating that Miller should be

aware that the vexatious litigant request is not being made to another New York judge who

is in need of a loan or campaign contribution. See Plaintiff’s Response and Opposition to

Powers Decl. at 3. She also accuses Miller of being a “repulsive cocaine snorting liar.” 

See Plaintiff’s Response and Opposition to Powers Decl. at 7. 

Plaintiff’s filing of frivolous claims and abusive litigation tactics extend beyond these

cases and the New York litigation from which they derive. In October of 2004, United

States District Judge Breyer issued an order declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant because

she had engaged in similar tactics in cases related to her bankruptcy proceedings. See

Case No. C 04-2535 CRB. Judge Breyer noted that plaintiff had filed eight different federal

actions all arising out of the same bankruptcy proceedings and had used the federal courts

to harass defendants. The court found that while some of these eight actions were

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legitimate appeals, many of the actions consisted of frivolous tort allegations against the

parties involved. For example, after United States Bankruptcy Judge Newsome ruled

against plaintiff in her bankruptcy proceedings and found her in civil contempt for failing to

produce documents, plaintiff filed suit against Judge Newsome accusing him of bias and

corruption. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that her allegations were

“conclusory” and based on “unreasonable inferences” and dismissed her complaint. See

Schafler v. Newsome, 136 Fed. Appx. 104 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff also filed actions against the bankruptcy trustee, Scott Field, asserting

various claims related to the performance of his duties as bankruptcy trustee in plaintiff’s

bankruptcy proceedings. The District Court of Maryland dismissed plaintiff’s suit because

she failed to obtain leave from the District of Maryland Bankruptcy Court before suing Field. 

See Schafler v. Fields, No.Civ.A.AW-01-984, 2001 WL 34553964 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2001). 

After losing her appeal on February 5, 2002, plaintiff re-filed the same action on April 15,

2002, again without obtaining leave from the District of Maryland Bankruptcy Court. The

District Court of Maryland again dismissed her action and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. See

Schafler v. Field, No.Civ.A.AW-02-1308, 2002 WL 32818725 (D. Md. July 25, 2002);

Schafler v. Field, 50 Fed. Appx. 625 (4th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff also appealed Judge Breyer’s

vexatious litigant order and accused Judge Breyer of bias. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the

vexatious litigant order and found that there was no evidence to support the allegation that

Judge Breyer was biased. See Schafler v. Spear, 135 Fed. Appx 939 (9th Cir. 2005). At

the hearing on these motions, in response to argument made by defendants about Judge

Breyer’s prior order, plaintiff referred to Judge Breyer as a “case fixer.” 

In another case, which was commenced in Florida, plaintiff accused her

condominium association of wrongfully spending association dues, harassing her and

engaged in a “trashing orgy” intended to defame her. See Schafler v. Indian Spring

Maintenance Ass’n, 139 Fed. Appx. 147 (11th Cir. 2005). The court noted that defendant

had filed actions arising from the same factual situation on a yearly basis and dismissed the

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action because it was barred by res judicata. Id. at 149. The court also cautioned plaintiff

that her behavior boarded on vexatious. Id. In that case too, Schafler responded by

attacking the district court and accusing it of bias. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and noted that there was no evidence to support

plaintiff’s allegation that the district court was biased. Id. at 151. 

The third factor is met because these cases are simply an attempt to re-litigate the

New York action and appears to have been brought with the intent to harass the

defendants in this case. As has been described above, plaintiff has a long history of filing

actions and then re-filing the action after the case is decided against her. In these cases,

plaintiff continues this pattern of behavior. Plaintiff litigated against these same defendants

on the same issue, her husband’s unilateral withdrawal of money from a joint account, for

over eighteen years in New York. Less than a year after the New York appellate court

dismissed her action, plaintiff filed the instant actions in this court again accusing

defendants of unlawfully taking her money. Her pleadings in the instant cases are also

similar to her New York pleadings in that they too contain unsupported allegations and

personal attacks on defendants’ and their counsel. As Judge Breyer noted in his order,

while plaintiff has a constitutional right for her claims to be heard, she does not have the

right to file the same claims over and over again. Plaintiff also does not have the right to

use the judicial process as a forum to make unfounded personal attacks on the opposing

parties, their counsel and the judges involved in the case.

Based on plaintiff’s long history of frivolous filings and her use of the judicial process

to harass opposing parties, it is likely that plaintiff will continue to file frivolous actions

against these defendants unless she is enjoined. Accordingly, plaintiff is enjoined from

filing any action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California

against HSBC, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company Bank (M&T), Scott D. Miller,

and Cheryl Storie or any of their employees, agents, attorneys, affiliates, subsidiaries,

parents, successors, or predecessors that arise out of or is in any way related to the

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alleged unlawful conversion of her funds in November 1985, unless and until such an action

is first approved by this court.

To obtain court approval to file an action against any of the individuals identified

above, plaintiff must first file an application which shall include the proposed complaint, the

evidence that supports the allegations in the complaint or in the absence of such evidence,

a declaration setting forth a good faith basis for concluding that she can obtain the

evidence necessary to support her allegations. The application will be assigned to Judge

Hamilton unless the Chief Judge of the Northern District assigns another judge for this

purpose. A copy of the application shall be sent by overnight mail to the defendants whom

plaintiff intends to include in her complaint. The defendants will be given 15 days from the

date of service to respond to the application.

In deciding whether to allow plaintiff to proceed with any new action, the court will

consider whether the new action raises any issues that could have been raised in any of

the previous actions. The court may, in its discretion, require that plaintiff post a bond in

the amount of the fees and costs that the defendants will likely incur in defending against

the action. If the defendants prevail in the action, they will be entitled to be compensated

out of this bond for the fees and costs incurred in defending against plaintiff’s action,

notwithstanding any other provisions of the state or federal law limiting the right to recover

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

C. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL

Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is DENIED.

On February 1, 2007, approximately two weeks after the hearing on the these

motions, plaintiff filed a motion to recuse this court. Plaintiff seeks the court’s recusal

pursuant to 28 United States Code § 144 which provides for recusal where a party files a

timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice against that party. Recusal is appropriate only if “a reasonable

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might

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reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626(9th Cir. 1993)

(quotation omitted). Because a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party

claiming bias bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is not impartial. Reiffin v.

Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp.2d 1016, 1021-22 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 

Plaintiff’s motion is based entirely on this court’s treatment of her at the hearing on

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Despite plaintiff’s characterization of this court’s conduct as

rude and lacking in decorum and as an unprovoked verbal assault, the court is fairly certain

that the transcript will reflect a great deal of patience on the court’s part. A time limit was

imposed on plaintiff’s presentation only after plaintiff refused to address the arguments

raised in defendants’ motions even with the urging of the court, after the court tried to

impress upon her how busy the court is and how time for law and motion is not unlimited,

and after the court attempted to make is clear that the federal trial courts do not provide an

appellate avenue for her dissatisfaction with the state courts. The court finds the

allegations of bias unsupported and the affidavit insufficient. Accordingly the motion is

DENIED.

D. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

After the motion to dismiss was filed, plaintiff filed a motion to sanction Michael

Powers, counsel for defendants HSBC and Scott Miller and noticed it for hearing on the

same day as the motion to dismiss. Her request to shorten time for the hearing was denied

because it was procedurally defective and to afford Mr. Powers the time permitted by the

Local Rules to oppose the motion. Mr. Powers has now opposed the motion with a

declaration filed on February 8, 2007, and plaintiff filed a reply and declaration on February

12, 2007.

Plaintiff’s “Motion to sanction pro hac vice counsel Michael Powers for having

misusing confidential documents without authorization. For unlawful and improper

purposes, and order him to review all the divorce trial transcripts,” is largely nonsensical,

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but appears to raise a complaint that Mr. Powers used documents in support of HSBC’s

motion to dismiss that were confidential. Plaintiff no where identifies the documents

allegedly improperly used, but it appears that they might be included in the documents

attached to Mr. Powers’ declaration and might be copies of documents from the underlying

civil action or the divorce proceeding which were pending for almost two decades in the

New York state court system. Because plaintiff does not identify them, it is impossible to

determine if the documents are in fact “confidential” or if they are publicly filed documents

and it is equally impossible to determine if Mr. Powers “used” them in some improper way. 

The exhibits that plaintiff provides in support of her request are unexplained

unauthenticated excerpts from various different court records and letters. Without an

explanation of what the documents purport to be, they have no persuasive value and

without authentication, they are inadmissible. 

Moreover, Mr. Powers states in his declaration that some of the documents that he

relies on for the motion to dismiss were indeed obtained from the New York courts. 

Specifically, he sought permission to review, photocopy and use a portion of the record on

appeal and was granted permission to do so by the court over plaintiff’s objection. 

Plaintiff’s declaration acknowledges that permission was granted. She says that it was not

a “life time grant,” but provides no specific facts or evidence that would tend to establish

that some unidentified documents were misused by Mr. Powers. 

The requested relief is similarly unclear. At one point plaintiff suggests the relief

sought as follows: “Relief requested: Mr Powers needs to go away,” in other places in her

papers she requests: 1) an order requiring Mr. Powers to make himself available for

“reverse discover,” 2) an order requiring Mr. Powers to review in plaintiff’s presence 1600

pages of documents from the prior litigation to see if there is evidence that the issues of

embezzlement and theft have been adjudicated, and 3) for an order withdrawing Mr.

Power’s pro hac vice status. Notwithstanding her ad hominem attack on Mr. Powers’

integrity and her accusations that his misconduct represents “sexual bias and harassment,”

Case 4:06-cv-06887-PJH Document 23 Filed 02/21/07 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of any sanctionable conduct.

Given the incomprehensible papers that were filed and plaintiff’s refusal to address

the issues that were raised by the defendants’ motions, even at the court’s urging, the court

determines that a hearing would not be helpful on this particular motion and accordingly

VACATES the March 7, 2007 hearing date. The motion is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint with

prejudice and to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motions to

recuse the court and for sanctions are DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: February 21, 2007 

 

Phyllis J. Hamilton

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-06887-PJH Document 23 Filed 02/21/07 Page 14 of 14