Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00222/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00222-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FEDERICO CUADRAS, JR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0222 LKK GGH P

vs.

M.S. EVANS, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in Sutter County, on November 18, 2003, of being in 

possession of a sawed-off shotgun, evading a peace officer, and being a felon in possession of a

firearm; various sentencing enhancements were found true. Petition, p. 7; Motion to Dismiss

(MTD), pp. 1-2, Respondent’s Lodged Documents (Docs.) 1-2. Petitioner was sentenced to a

state prison term of ten years and eight months. Id. Subsequently, the California Court of

Appeal stayed petitioner’s sixteen-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm,

directing the trial court to file an amended abstract of judgment, and otherwise affirming the

judgment; on August 24, 2004, the trial court issued an amended abstract of judgment which

amended petitioner’s prison sentence to a nine-year, four-month term. MTD, p. 2, Lodged Docs.

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2-3. 

Petitioner challenges his conviction on the following grounds: 1) insufficient

evidence; 2) ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Petition, pp.

11-12. As to a third ground, it is confusingly framed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

under the Fifth and Thirty-Sixth (sic) Amendments. Id., at 12. As to third ground, it may be that

petitioner seeks to make a claim of a violation of his constitutional right to due process.

Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent moves for dismissal on two grounds: 1) that the petition has been

filed beyond the AEDPA statute of limitations; and 2) that petitioner has failed to exhaust his

state court remedies. As the court, after full consideration and analysis, concludes that

petitioner’s petition is time-barred, it is unnecessary to reach respondent’s second, or alternative,

ground.

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

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 Rule 31 has since been renumbered. The time for filing a notice of a criminal appeal in 1

state court is currently set forth under Rule 8.308(a).

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2):

The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any

period of limitation under this subsection.

Following the issuance of the state court appellate opinion, noted above, requiring

the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment staying a portion of the sentence,

petitioner did not seek review in the state supreme court. MTD, p. 2. After the amended abstract

of judgment in compliance with the state appellate court opinion issued, on August 24, 2004,

petitioner did not appeal. Id. Therefore, petitioner’s conviction became final for purposes of

2244(d)(1)(A), when the time for filing an appeal of the amended judgment expired, on October

23, 2004, sixty days later. Cal. Rule of Court 31(d); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1

1060 (C.D.Cal. 2001). As respondent observes (MTD, p. 3), the AEDPA statute began to run the

following day, on October 24, 2004. Patterson v. Stuart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Therefore, absent any applicable tolling, petitioner had until October 23, 2005, to file a timely

federal petition. 

Petitioner’s first petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state superior court is

file-stamped December 5, 2005, and was denied on December 16, 2005. Lodged Docs. 4-5. His

petition to the Third District Court of Appeal was filed on January 12, 2006, and was denied on

January 12, 2006. Lodged Docs. 6-7. His habeas petition to the state supreme court, evidently

filed on February 24, 2006, was denied on October 11, 2006. Lodged Docs. 8-9.

Notwithstanding the application of the mailbox rule to the filing of the initial state

court habeas petition, rendering the petition filed as of November 27, 2005, which the petition is

dated as having been signed (and which respondent recognizes as appropriate - MTD, p. 4 n.4 -,

pursuant to, inter alia, Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988);

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 This case was transferred from the Northern District and was filed in this court on 2

February 2, 2007.

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Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-69 (9 Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Carey th

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n.2 (9 Cir. 2003)), the instant petition cannot be found to have been timely filed. Section th

2244(d)(2) can only pause a clock not yet fully run; it cannot “revive” the limitation period once

it has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero). Thus, a state court habeas petition filed beyond the

expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not toll the limitation period under §

2244(d)(2). See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.2001). 

Therefore, petitioner’s filing herein is untimely because the AEDPA statute of 

limitations had already run on October 23, 2005, more than a month before petitioner filed his

first state court habeas petition, on November 27, 2005. Petitioner filed his federal habeas

petition, by application of the mailbox rule, on December 14, 2006. Unless petitioner can show 2

entitlement to equitable tolling, he is time-barred by more than one year from pursuing this

action.

Equitable Tolling

“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814;

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (a habeas petitioner bears the burden of

proving that equitable tolling should apply to avoid dismissal of an untimely petition). 

“Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases,” and is only appropriate “if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Miranda, supra, at 1066 (internal quotations/citations omitted [emphasis added in Miranda]). A

petitioner must reach a “very high” threshold “to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA]...lest

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the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. 

In Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. U.S. District Court for Cent. Dist. of CA. (Kelly), 163

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), itself abrogated by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.202, 123

S. Ct. 1398 (2003), the Ninth Circuit found that the statute of limitations could be equitably

tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control made it impossible to file the

petition on time. “In addition, ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling may be appropriate.’”

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999).

Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because tolling should only

be granted if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible for him

to file a petition on time. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89. As held in Beeler, “[w]e have no doubt

that district judges will take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process,

and will only authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” 128 F.3d at 1289. 

“Mere excusable neglect” is insufficient as an extraordinary circumstance. Miller v. New Jersey

Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir. 1998). Moreover, ignorance of the law does

not constitute such extraordinary circumstances. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections,

800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In the Calderon (Beeler) case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court

properly found equitable tolling to allow Beeler more time to file his petition. Beeler’s lead

counsel withdrew after accepting employment in another state, and much of the work he left

behind was not usable by replacement counsel – a turn of events over which the court found

Beeler had no control. The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly found these

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 See also Baskin v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 188 (D. Conn. 1998), wherein the court

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applied equitable tolling where petitioner’s attorney failed to notify him of the denial of a petition

for certiorari until thirteen months after the denial was entered.

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were “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The Ninth 3

Circuit also found extraordinary circumstances in Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), supra, 163

F.3d 530. The three reasons given which independently justified tolling were: a district court

stay which prevented petitioner’s counsel from filing a habeas petition, mental incompetency

until a reasonable time after the court makes a competency determination, and the fact that

petitioner did at one time have timely habeas proceedings pending which were mistakenly

dismissed, not as a result of any doing by petitioner. Id. at 541-42. See also Corjasso v. Ayers,

278 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (clerk’s unjustified rejection of a petition justified partial tolling);

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d at 1107 (delay by prison in withdrawing funds from prisoner’s trust

account, preparing and mailing filing fee were circumstances beyond his control, qualifying him

for equitable tolling).

Conversely, in U.S. v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11(C.D. Cal. 1997),

the court found that a petitioner’s circumstances were not extraordinary in the following

circumstances: inability to obtain transcripts from court reporters, and general prison lockdowns

preventing the prisoner’s access to the library and a typewriter which were necessary to his

motion. See also Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9 Cir. 1988) (reliance on th

incompetence of jailhouse lawyer not sufficient to justify cause to excuse procedural default);

Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir. 1999) (prisoner’s unfamiliarity of law did not toll th

statute); Eisermann v. Penarosa, 33 F.Supp.2d 1269, 1273 (D.Haw. 1999) (lack of legal expertise

does not qualify prisoner for equitable tolling); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 656

(N.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Fadayiro v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 772, 779-80 (D.N.J. 1998)

(delay in receipt of transcripts does not justify equitable tolling). 

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In his opposition, petitioner does not put forth any substantive argument for either

statutory tolling or for his entitlement to equitable tolling. He mischaracterizes respondent’s

motion to dismiss as a “decision” by the Attorney General. See Opposition (Opp.), p. 1. He

attaches as exhibits copies of the December 16, 2005, order denying his petition for writ of

habeas corpus to the state superior court, as well as a copy of a certificate of service of the order,

also dated December 16, 2005. Opp., pp. 5-7. Additional exhibits include documentation

showing when petitioner filed his state court of appeal habeas petition, as well as copies of his

state appellate court and state supreme court habeas petition denials. Opp., pp. 8-10. These

documents and their filing dates are not in dispute. Petitioner, therefore, fails to set forth any

cogent basis for the court to find that equitable tolling could be appropriate in this case. The

court will recommend granting the motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition is untimely,

and, as noted earlier, therefore need not reach the question of exhaustion.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s April 20,

2007, motion to dismiss be granted on the ground that the instant petition is barred by the

AEDPA statute of limitations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 12/26/07 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009 - cuad0222.mtd

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