Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00983/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00983-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT R. JAMES,

 Plaintiff,

 

 vs.

KIMBERLY GRANGER, 

 

 

 Defendant. 

1:13-CV-0983 AWI SKO

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Doc. # 12

This is an action for damages by plaintiff Scott R. James (“Plaintiff”) against defendant 

Kimberly Granger (“Defendant”). The currently-operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

alleges a single claim for relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff‟s original complaint was filed on June 26, 2013, and was dismissed with leave 

to amend by stipulation. The FAC was filed on September 20, 2013. Plaintiff‟s single claim for 

relief alleges Plaintiff suffered disparate treatment as a class of one in violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The claim arises indirectly out of a suit in 

mandamus filed by Plaintiff against the State of California seeking judicial determination of 

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Plaintiffs right to own/possess/purchase firearms. Plaintiff had been convicted by plea of nolo 

contendere to a misdemeanor charge of battery in 1996. The victim of the battery was, at the 

time, a wife or domestic partner of Plaintiff. The conviction was expunged pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 1203.4 in 2008. Sometime between 2006 and 2008 Plaintiff completed 

a background check and purchased a firearm. Later, in 2008, Plaintiff was denied the purchase 

of another firearm, the stated reason being that he was determined to have been convicted of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a mandamus action in state court seeking a judicial 

determination that he was not prohibited from buying firearms under federal law because of his 

prior conviction for misdemeanor battery. Defendant was the attorney representing the State of 

California in the mandamus action. During the course of her preparation of the State‟s defense, 

Defendant deposed Plaintiff on July 25, 2011. During the deposition, Defendant asked Plaintiff 

if he possessed any firearms at his home. Plaintiff answered affirmatively. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant “contacted agents of the State Bureau of Firearms and informed them that [Plaintiff] 

was in possession of firearms despite having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence.” Doc. # 10 at 4:2:4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not, however, 

inform the agents that an action in mandamus was pending in state court to determine the 

legality of Plaintiff‟s possession of the firearms. Based on Defendant‟s representations to the 

state agents, a search warrant for Plaintiff‟s residence was issued. The search was executed 

about two months after the warrant was issued by the court. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was 

present at the time of the search and issued directions to the agents conducting the search even 

though Defendant had no official connection to Plaintiff‟s criminal prosecution. A number of 

firearms were found in a safe in Plaintiff‟s residence.

Plaintiff was charged with violation of California Penal Code section 12280(b) in Tulare 

County Superior Court. Defendant was not the prosecutor in the criminal action. The charge 

was eventually dropped. Plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court granted Plaintiff‟s petition for 

mandamus. The matter was appealed by the State and was apparently pending as of the time the 

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FAC was filed. Defendants request judicial notice of the Appellate Court‟s reversal of the 

decision of the Superior Court granting Plaintiff‟s mandamus petition. At the conclusion of the 

facts alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff alleges:

During questioning [in a hearing in the criminal case on a motion to 

suppress], it was revealed that if the State comes to learn that a person not 

currently under investigation for some other crime or otherwise dangerous 

may own or possess guns in violation of federal law prohibiting them 

because of a potential prior conviction of a misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence, the State notifies [the person in possession] by letter 

and asks to have the weapons stored by a licensed third party or the police 

pending the determination of the person‟s status. No letter was delivered 

to [Plaintiff], and no oral request was made to him or to his counsel, 

despite his cooperative admission of gun possession in a lawsuit in which 

he sought to address the question of whether he was allowed to own them.

Doc. # 10 at 10-19.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

can be based on the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient 

facts under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

533-34 (9th Cir.1984). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must set forth factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Twombly”). While a court 

considering a motion to dismiss must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and must construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve factual 

disputes in the pleader's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 

869 (1969), the allegations must be factual in nature. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a 

plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitlement to relief‟ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do”). The pleading standard set by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not 

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require „detailed factual allegations,‟ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Iqbal”). 

The Ninth Circuit follows the methodological approach set forth in Iqbal for the 

assessment of a plaintiff‟s complaint:

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying 

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1950).

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of the opinion of the decision of the 

California Fifth District Court of Appeal in James v. State of California, F065003 (2013), which 

is appended to the request for judicial notice, Document No. 13. Facts subject to judicial notice 

may be considered by a court on a motion to dismiss. In re Russell, 76 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 

1996); Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The 

court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v.

Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). The record of the prior state court proceeding 

is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Judicial notice may be taken of 

court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 

645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 

1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980).

Plaintiff objects to this court taking judicial notice for purpose of establishing the legal 

proposition decided in that case because appeal to the California Supreme Court is currently 

pending. This court finds judicial notice of the Fifth District‟s opinion is proper for the limited 

purpose of demonstrating that legal differences of opinion exist between the Superior Court and 

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the Appellate Court regarding the issue of whether Plaintiff‟s prior battery conviction constitutes 

a conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the definition of the federal 

Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

DISCUSSION

The essence of Plaintiff‟s claim of constitutional violation is that, as a class of one, he 

was treated more harshly for no rational reason than others similarly situated in violation of the 

Due Process Clause. It is important to note that Plaintiff does not allege facts that would 

establish violations of the Second, Fourth Fifth or Sixth Amendments. Rather, he alleges that, 

but for Defendant‟s failure to notify the court or the state agents of Plaintiff‟s pending 

mandamus action, Plaintiff would not have been subjected to treatment that implicated his rights 

under those Amendments because, presumably, no warrant for search would have issued and no 

arrest would have been made. Plaintiff alleges that the only reason Plaintiff was not issued a 

letter directing him to place his firearms in the custody of a licensed third person was because he 

chose to exercise his right to challenge the governmental determination that he was barred from 

firearm possession by means of a mandamus action.

Defendants assert three grounds for dismissal of Plaintiffs FAC including failure to set 

forth a sufficient factual basis for relief, absolute immunity and qualified immunity. The court 

need discuss only the first and last of these.

I. Factual Sufficiency of FAC

To adequately state a claim under a “class of one” theory of violation of equal 

protection, a plaintiff must allege facts to show: (1) that the defendant acted intentionally, (2) 

that the defendant treated the plaintiff differently than others similarly situated, and (3) that there 

was no rational basis for the differential treatment. Gerhart v. Lake County, Montana, 637 F.3d 

1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011). The rational basis test focuses on the reason the reason the treatment

was different in the plaintiff‟s case, not on the rationality of the treatment itself. Id. at 1023. 

“The class of one plaintiff must show that the discriminatory treatment „was intentionally 

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directed just at him, as opposed . . . to being an accident or random act.‟ [Citation.]” North 

Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

The court agrees with Defendant‟s contention that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts 

sufficient to sustain his “class of one” claim; however, the court does so for reasons other than 

those presented by Defendant. The court also agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant missed the 

mark by contending that there was a rational basis for the search of Plaintiff‟s residence and for 

his arrest. As noted in Gerheart, it is not the rationale for the plaintiff‟s treatment that is at issue 

in a class of one action, it is the rationale for the difference between the treatment of the Plaintiff 

and the treatment of others similarly situated.

What is fundamentally wrong with Plaintiff‟s claim is that he does not allege facts 

sufficient to show that Defendant acted intentionally and that others were treated differently. 

Plaintiff‟s FAC alleges only that he “became aware” of the existence of what he alleges is the 

“normal practice” of requesting that the individual suspected of unlawful possession of firearms 

to voluntarily surrender the firearms to the custody of a licensed third party. Plaintiff‟s 

allegation that Defendant subjected him to different treatment because he challenged the State‟s 

determination in a mandamus action is conclusory, being based on no other fact than that he and 

Defendant happened to be involved in the mandamus action. As noted above, the burden in a 

class of one action to show that his treatment was something other than an accident arising from 

Defendant‟s ignorance of the “normal practice.” Absent facts that show directly that 

Defendant‟s treatment of Plaintiff was retaliatory, Plaintiff must allege facts that permit the court 

to reasonably infer that the “normal practice” was so well established and commonly used that 

Defendant was likely to have known of the “normal practice” and made a conscious decision to 

depart from it in Plaintiff‟s case only. Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that the “normal practice 

was solidly established and commonly used.

Similarly, Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that he was singled out for disparate 

treatment. It is not sufficient to merely allege that the “normal practice” was available to others 

in a similar situation, Plaintiff must allege facts to show that others similarly situated were, in 

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fact, treated differently. Plaintiff‟s FAC alleges nothing about the alleged “normal practice” 

other than his knowledge of its existence. In the absence of any allegation of direct knowledge 

of others similarly situated that were treated differently, Plaintiff must allege facts to show that 

the “normal practice” was so authoritatively established, so consistently administered and so 

widely known that an inference arises that a person in Plaintiffs situation would normally be 

treated in that manner. Again, no facts are alleged to make the required showing.

II. Qualified Immunity

Defendant contends that, even if Plaintiff has stated a claim on an Equal Protection class 

of one theory, she is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. To determine whether qualified 

immunity applies, the threshold question is whether, in the light most favorable to the party 

asserting injury, the facts show an officer‟s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)]; Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 

2002) (en banc). If no constitutional right was violated, immunity attaches and the inquiry ends. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional right would have been violated were a plaintiff‟s 

allegations established, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established in light of 

the context of the case. Id. Finally, the contours of the right must be clear enough that a 

reasonable officer would understand whether this or her acts violate that right. Id. at 202.

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity for the same reason that Plaintiff‟s class of 

one claim is insufficiently stated. As noted above, the first question with regard to qualified

immunity is whether Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for violation of a constitutional right. 

Plaintiff‟s failure to more completely specify both the source and commonality of the treatment 

characterized as the “normal practice” defeats his claim that a constitutional right was violated. 

Since there is no demonstration of a violation of a constitutional right, qualified immunity 

attaches.

//

//

//

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III. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff‟s FAC fails to allege a claim for which relief can be granted primarily because 

facts are not alleged that are critical to the claim. Thus, it cannot be determined that Plaintiff‟s 

cannot be cured by amendment. Leave to amend will therefore be granted.

THEREFORE, for the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant‟s 

motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff‟s FAC is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety. 

Leave to amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint shall be filed and served not less than 

twenty-eight (28) days from the date of service of this order. If no amended complaint is filed 

within the period provided, Defendant shall so notify the court and judgment will be entered in 

Defendant‟s favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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