Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05418/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05418-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARTERED SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING, LTD.,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTEGRATED SEMICONDUCTOR 

SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant. 

INTEGRATED SEMICONDUCTOR 

SERVICE, INC.,

Counter-Claimant,

v.

CHARTERED SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING, LTD.,

Counter-Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C04-5418 WHA (BZ)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF

CHARTERED SEMICONDUCTOR’S

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF

REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES

By order dated March 1, 2007, the Honorable William Alsup

referred to me all proceedings relating to plaintiff Chartered

Semiconductor’s application for writ of possession. Plaintiff

filed its motion to compel post-judgment discovery on April

Case 3:04-cv-05418-WHA Document 74 Filed 06/08/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 On April 18, 2007, plaintiff filed an identical

motion noticed before me. Docket No. 60. I construe the April

19 motion and subsequent re-notice of the motion before me as

serving to supercede and supplant the April 18 motion. 

2 Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider my briefing

order, arguing that defendant should not have had another

opportunity to file opposition. Docket No. 70. The confusion

as to which judge would hear the motion to compel, however,

necessitated the opportunity. Moreover, because plaintiff’s

motion is being granted, the motion to reconsider is DENIED as

moot.

2

19, 2007, but noticed it before Judge Alsup. By order dated

May 15, 2007, Judge Alsup clarified that the motion to compel

was encompassed in his previous referral.1 I thereafter

issued a briefing order.2 Included in the motion was a

request for payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in

pursuing the motion. Having reviewed the parties papers, I

conclude there is no need for a hearing, and GRANT plaintiff’s

motion.

Pursuant to a stipulated judgment dated March 13, 2006,

defendant Integrated Semiconductor is adjudged to owe

plaintiff two robots and $100,000 to be paid in installments. 

See Docket No. 25. Defendant has failed to pay a portion of

the judgment and, through a series of acts, plaintiff has

attempted to secure the moneys owed. See Docket No. 20

(Motion for Writ of Execution); Docket No. 30 (Motion for

Leave to Appear re Application and Order for Appearance and

Examination of the President of Semiconductor Service, Inc.);

Docket No. 36 (Motion for Writ of Possession); Docket No. 42

(Motion to Enforce Judgment re Fraudulent Transfers). Despite

these efforts, the judgment remains partially unsatisfied. 

The following facts are undisputed: On March 12 and 13,

Case 3:04-cv-05418-WHA Document 74 Filed 06/08/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

2007, plaintiff served defendant with a request for production

of documents and a set of five interrogatories. Mooney Decl. ¶

2. By several communications in mid-April, plaintiff inquired

of defendant as to the status of the discovery. Id. at ¶ 6. 

Although defendant suggested that a meet and confer session

take place on April 18, it did not confirm the time suggested

by plaintiff in correspondence and failed to return a phone

call placed on April 18. Id. at ¶ 6. On May 30, 2007 - well

after I had received the motion and issued a briefing schedule

thereon - defendant served its responses to the requests. See

Def.’s Opp., Exh. A; Pl.’s Reply at 2. Thus, approximately

two-and-one-half months elapsed prior to defendant’s response

to plaintiff’s discovery requests.

Defendant attacks the motion to compel on two grounds. 

First, it claims that plaintiff’s discovery requests are not

enforceable because it failed, pursuant to Civil Local Rule

26-2, to seek leave from Judge Alsup to extend the discovery

cut-off date set in his Initial Case Management Order. See

Docket No. 7 (setting the discovery cut-off date at November

4, 2005). This argument is wholly without merit.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) provides: “In aid

of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor . . . may

obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment

debtor, in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner

provided by the practice of the state in which the district

court is held.” Thus, the Rule explicitly allows for

discovery relating to collection on a judgment. Judge Alsup’s

Case Management Order, however, deals with pre-trial matters. 

Case 3:04-cv-05418-WHA Document 74 Filed 06/08/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

It in no way implicates post-judgment collection proceedings,

and certainly does not establish a cut-off date for Rule 69

discovery.

Second, defendant argues that the motion to compel is

moot because it has responded to plaintiff’s requests. In its

reply, however, plaintiff states that defendant’s responses

are inadequate. In particular, defendant objected to and

refused to respond to three document requests and three

interrogatories. See Pl.’s Reply at 2; Def’s Opp., Exh. A. 

Plaintiff argues that, by failing to timely respond to its

requests, defendant has waived its objections. See Richmark

Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th

Cir. 1992). I agree that defendant’s objections fail.

Answers and objections to interrogatories are due within

thirty days of the initial service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). 

All objections are to be stated with specificity, and any

untimely objection is waived unless good cause excuses such

failure. Rule 33(b)(4). A written response to request for

production of documents, including all objections, also is due

within thirty days of the initial service. Rule 34(b). The

reasons for such objections must be stated, id., and a failure

to object timely generally serves to waive objections. 

Richmark Corp., 959 F.2d at 1473; Escalante v. Delano, 2006 WL

1376960, at *2-*3 (E.D. Cal.). Defendant failed to set forth

good cause - or any cause, for that matter - for why the

responses were late. 

Had defendant timely objected, the objections would have

been largely overruled. Defendant’s objections are largely

Case 3:04-cv-05418-WHA Document 74 Filed 06/08/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff claims in part that defendant is avoiding

paying the judgment by transferring funds to its sole

shareholder. See Pl.’s Reply at 1. Additionally, defendant’s

general financial state is of obvious interest to plaintiff. 

In reviewing the six discovery requests, I am satisfied that

they are reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of

admissible evidence relating to its attempts to collect on the

judgment.

4 Plaintiff having moved for fees in its motion,

defendant was clearly on notice of the issue. Defendant,

however, failed even to object to plaintiff’s request. 

5

boilerplate in nature, providing little specificity as to why

the requests are objectionable. In its papers, defendant

provided no further explanation of its objections. 

For these reasons, I find no merit to defendant’s

arguments, and I GRANT plaintiff’s motion to compel relating

to those categories of information withheld by defendant based

on its objections, i.e., Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2 and 5, and

Request for Production Nos. 6, 9 and 10.3 Defendant will

serve its responses by June 25, 2007. 

Finally, plaintiff requests $1,120 in attorneys’ fees

reasonably incurred in pursuing this motion to compel.4 See

Mooney Decl. ¶ 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(A)

permits an award of reasonable expenses unless plaintiff

failed to make a good faith effort to obtain the discovery;

the defendant’s opposition was substantially justified; or an

award is otherwise unreasonable. None of the exceptions

apply. I find plaintiff’s expenses reasonable and, therefore,

GRANT plaintiff $1,120 in attorneys’ fees. 

Dated: June 8, 2007

Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

G:\BZALL\-REFS\CHARTERED SEMICONDUCTOR\ORDER.GRANT.MOTION.COMPEL.wpd

Case 3:04-cv-05418-WHA Document 74 Filed 06/08/07 Page 5 of 5