Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-06880/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-06880-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HITACHI KOKUSAI ELECTRIC INC., et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ASM INTERNATIONAL, N.V., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-06880-BLF 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS VI 

AND VII OF SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

[Re: ECF 58]

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts VI and VII of Second 

Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement (“Motion”). Motion, ECF 58. The Court heard oral 

argument on Defendants’ Motion on November 8, 2018 (“the Hearing”). Having considered the 

oral argument, briefing, and relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby 

DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts VI and VII of Second Amended Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants previously filed a similar motion to dismiss counts VI and VII of Plaintiffs’ 

first amended complaint, see ECF 27, which the Court granted with leave to amend, see ECF 53. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint amending counts VI and VII, see ECF 

57, and the present Motion followed, see ECF 58. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants infringe seven patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,033,937 (“the 

’937 patent”), 6,576,063 (“the ’063 patent”), 7,808,396 (“the ’396 patent”), RE43,023 (“the ’023 

patent”), 6,744,018 (“the ’018 patent”), 8,409,988 (“the ’988 patent”), and 9,318,316 (“the ’316 

patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Patents”). Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 15, 23–187, ECF 

57. In particular, Counts VI and VII in the SAC plead infringement of the ’988 patent and ’316 

patent, respectively. 

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The ’988 patent relates to a method of manufacturing a semiconductor device capable of 

improving defects of conventional chemical vapor deposition (“CVD”) and atomic layer 

deposition (“ALD”) methods in order to realize a high film-formation rate. SAC ¶ 122. The SAC 

alleges that Defendants “have infringed [the ’988 patent] and are currently infringing literally 

and/or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Id. ¶ 123. According to the SAC, Defendants’ A412 

batch vertical furnace system, Eagle XP8 PEALD system, and Dragon XP8 PECVD system 

products have been “configured and operated by [Defendants] to perform the method of at least 

claim 1 of the ’988 patent.” Id. ¶ 124. The SAC further alleges that Defendants indirectly infringe 

the ’988 patent by “actively and knowingly inducing others to make, use, sell, offer for sale, or 

import” the accused products. SAC ¶ 140. In addition, the SAC pleads that Defendants have 

“contributed to and/or are contributing to the infringement of the ’988 patent by making, using, 

importing, offering for sale, and/or selling” the accused products. Id. ¶ 148. 

The ’316 patent relates to a method of manufacturing a semiconductor device where the 

method involves forming a thin film on a substrate by repeating a cycle that forms layers on a 

substrate. SAC ¶ 157. According to the SAC, Defendants “have infringed [the ’316 patent] and 

are currently infringing literally and/or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Id. ¶ 158. The SAC 

further alleges that Defendants’ A412 batch vertical furnace system, Eagle XP8 PEALD system, 

and Dragon XP8 PECVD system products have been “configured and operated by [Defendants] to 

perform the method of at least claim 1 of the ’316 patent.” Id. ¶ 159. The SAC also alleges that 

Defendants indirectly infringe the ’316 patent by inducing their customers to practice the claimed 

method. Id. ¶ 173. In addition, the SAC asserts a contributory infringement claim based on the 

’316 patent against Defendants. Id. ¶ 181. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court may take judicial notice of documents referenced in the complaint, as well as 

matters in the public record. See Lee v. City of LA., 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 

2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 

(9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either “generally 

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known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined 

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Public 

records, including judgments and other court documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. 

See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “[j]ust because 

the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact 

within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 

899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” Conservation 

Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)). 

Under Iqbal and Twombly, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662, 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Hence, the rule that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice” applies in patent cases. See Comcast Cable Commc'ns, 

LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., 319 F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Such 

pleading standards under Iqbal and Twombly apply to allegations of direct and indirect (i.e., 

induced and contributory) infringement. See Novitaz, Inc. v. inMarket Media, LLC, No. 16-CV06795, 2017 WL 2311407, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017); Superior Industries, LLC v. Thor 

Global Enterprises Ltd., 700 F.3d 1287, 1295–96 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Systems 

Inc., 2017 WL 2462423, *3–5 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to seek dismissal of an 

action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “Where [] the defendant’s 

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motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only 

make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Ranza v. 

Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true, Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin 

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004), and factual disputes contained within declarations 

or affidavits are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), this Court has personal jurisdiction if 

the defendant would be “subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state 

where the district court is located,” here California. Because California’s long-arm statute is 

coextensive with federal due process requirements, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction so 

long as it comports with due process. See Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 

1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). “[D]ue process requires that the defendant ‘have certain minimum 

contacts’ with the forum state ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

The Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: (1) general (or allpurpose) jurisdiction and (2) specific (or case-specific) jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927 (2011). General jurisdiction is based on certain 

limited affiliations that the defendant has with the forum state. Id. at 919. In contrast, specific 

jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s connections to the state with regard to the particular 

controversy at issue. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants (1) request judicial notice of various documents; (2) move to dismiss Counts 

VI and VII of the SAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6); and (3) move to dismiss 

Counts VI and VII of the SAC for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). See Notice of 

Motion, ECF 58. The Court addresses each issue in turn. 

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A. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (ECF 59)

Defendants request judicial notice of four of Defendants’ webpages concerning 

Defendants’ research and development locations/activities and one “scholarly article.” See

Request for Judicial Notice at 1, ECF 59. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ request for judicial notice

on grounds that the four webpages are “irrelevant” and that the scholarly article is “subject to 

reasonable dispute . . . [and] is a highly disputed issue.” See Opp’n at 21, ECF 68. The Court 

denies Defendants request for judicial notice in full. First, the four webpages are not directed to a 

fact of consequence in determining the present motion because Plaintiffs’ infringement theories in 

Counts VI and VII of the SAC do not relate to the location or nature of Defendants’ research and 

development activities. See generally SAC. Thus, the Court finds the webpages “irrelevant to the 

instant motion[],” and therefore declines to take judicial notice. See CYBERsitter, LLC v. People’s 

Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Second, the Court finds the 

contents of the “scholarly article” disputed, and as such, “cannot take judicial notice of the 

contents of [the] document[] for the truth of the matters asserted therein,” see Rearden LLC v. 

Walt Disney Co., 293 F. Supp. 3d 963, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2018). In sum, Defendants’ request for 

judicial notice at ECF 59 is DENIED. 

B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

Defendants assert that Counts VI and VII of the SAC (1) “fail[] to plead sufficient facts to 

support direct infringement” and (2) “fail[] to plead indirect infringement.” See Motion at 9–10. 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the SAC contains “ample factual allegations from which this 

Court can reasonably infer infringement—both direct and indirect.” See Opp’n at 1. While it may 

be an exaggeration to say that Plaintiffs’ newly pleaded factual allegations are an “ample” basis 

for inferring infringement, the Court does find, that by a narrow margin, Plaintiffs’ SAC 

sufficiently cures the deficiencies of the FAC to survive a motion to dismiss. Direct and indirect 

infringement are discussed in turn. 

1. Claims for Direct Infringement of ’988 and ’316 Patents in Counts VI and VII

Both sides agree that to survive a motion to dismiss, the SAC’s direct infringement claims 

must plausibly allege that Defendants directly infringed the patented methods within the United 

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States. See Motion at 9; Opp’n at 3–4. However, the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ SAC does 

so under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. Id. Defendants argue that the SAC fails to plead 

direct infringement of the ’988 and ’316 patents by either Defendant “because it does not contain 

any specific facts to support an inference that [Defendants themselves] use[] the Accused Products 

to perform the allegedly infringing methods in the United States.” Motion at 9 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs counter that “the SAC demonstrates how [Defendants] perform[] each and every method 

step in the United States during the rigorous qualification process that [Defendants] must undergo 

to qualify each sale of the Accused Products to a US customer.” Opp’n at 6–7; see also SAC 

¶¶ 138–139. 

A claim for direct infringement requires that “all steps of a claimed method are performed 

by or attributable to” the defendant. Rearden LLC v. Walt Disney Co., 293 F. Supp. 3d 963, 972 

(N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)). In its Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts VI and 

VII in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint with Leave to Amend (“Order Dismissing FAC”), the 

Court found that “the FAC does not contain sufficient factual allegations that allow a reasonable 

inference to be drawn that Defendants are performing the claimed methods where they are 

manufacturers of semiconductor fabrication equipment.” See Order Dismissing FAC at 5, ECF 

53. However, unlike the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ SAC does contain—by a narrow 

margin—such sufficient factual allegations. 

The SAC newly pleads that “in preparation for [events such as SEMICON West held in 

2016 in San Francisco] and as part of testing products for sale, [Defendants] ha[ve] used and 

operated the Accused Products using the methods claims in the ’988 patent.” SAC ¶ 132; see also

SAC ¶ 165 (similar language with respect to the ’316 patent). While this paragraph does not 

necessarily implicate Defendants in practicing the method claims within the United States, it is 

undisputed that Defendants sell to customers within the United States, and the SAC goes on to 

newly plead that “in the course of meeting the customers’ requests . . . Defendants must 

demonstrate that the equipment can produce the requested thin film . . . [and] [t]he qualification 

testing required for sale of the equipment requires that [Defendants] perform[] all steps of at least 

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claim 1 of the ’988 patent.” SAC ¶ 138; see also SAC ¶ 171 (similar language with respect to the 

’316 patent). The SAC then newly pleads that Defendants have represented that “‘it is the practice 

of the industry for the supplier of a semiconductor processing tool to provide standard recipes . . . 

[and] [i]mplementation of such recipes on the tool unavoidably require[] involvement of [the 

supplier].’” SAC ¶ 147; see also SAC ¶ 180 (similar language with respect to the ’316 patent). 

Thus, the factual matter in the SAC, accepted as true, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, supports 

the inference that Defendants—as the manufacturers of semiconductor fabrication equipment—

have performed at least one claimed method of the ’988 and ’316 patents, respectively, during or 

as part of installation or product/qualification testing at a customer site or other location within the 

United States. Accordingly, the Court finds that the SAC contains more than “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” See 

Comcast Cable, 319 F.R.D. at 272 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Although by an extremely thin 

margin, Plaintiffs have done just enough to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable 

to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

2. Claims for Indirect Infringement of ’988 and ’316 Patents in Counts VI and 

VII

Defendants argue that the SAC fails to plead indirect infringement (i.e., induced and 

contributory infringement) “because it does not allow a reasonable inference to be drawn that 

[Defendants’] customers used the allegedly-infringing methods in the United States.” Motion at 

10. Plaintiffs counter that the SAC’s newly pled factual allegations permit such an inference. See

Opp’n at 14. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 

Without a showing of direct infringement, indirect infringement claims cannot be 

sustained. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The 

Court previously found that “the FAC does not allow a reasonable inference to be drawn that 

Defendants’ customers used the claimed methods in the ’988 and ’316 patents and therefore fails 

to plead indirect infringement claims.” Order Dismissing FAC at 6, ECF 53. However, by a 

narrow margin, the SAC plausibly alleges that Defendants’ customers have directly infringed the 

patented methods within the United States. 

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For example (and not as an exhaustive list), the SAC newly pleads that the accused 

products are “configured for AlN thin films and high-temperature SiO thin films . . . [and] 

[f]ollowing qualification of [Defendants’] equipment, [Defendants’] customers, without authority 

from Plaintiffs, perform the infringing method within the United States, thereby infringing the 

’988 [p]atent.” SAC ¶ 146; see also SAC ¶ 179 (similar language with respect to the ’316 patent). 

Thus, because the Court finds direct infringement by Defendants in the customer-qualification 

process plausible for the reasons discussed in section III.B.1 supra, it necessarily follows that the 

same method(s) when practiced by customers in the United States also constitutes plausible direct 

infringement. Accordingly, the Court finds—and again by a thin margin—that the factual matter 

in the SAC, accepted as true, supports the inference that Defendants’ customers have also

performed at least one claimed method of the ’988 and ’316 patents, respectively. 

Defendants also argue that the SAC fails to plead facts plausibly showing that Defendants 

“knowingly induced the infringing acts” and “possessed specific intent to encourage 

infringement.” Motion at 13. Indeed, to state a claim for induced infringement, the complaint 

must plead “facts plausibly showing that [Defendants] specifically intended their customers to 

infringe the [claimed methods] and knew that the customer’s acts constituted infringement.” In re 

Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). However, the SAC newly alleges1that Defendants sell the accused products to customers 

precisely because of the equipment’s ability to perform infringing uses; that Defendants qualify 

the equipment for those infringing uses; and that “[t]he customer is [then] disincentivized from 

changing the method because if it makes substantial changes to the qualified method, the 

equipment would no longer be qualified to produce the desired thin film.” See SAC ¶¶ 138, 139; 

see also SAC ¶¶ 171, 172. The SAC also alleges that “Defendants have been aware of the ’988 

patent and its infringement since at least as early as October 17, 2014,” see SAC ¶ 137, and that 

“Defendants have been aware of the ’316 patent and its alleged infringement since at least as early 

as July 27, 2016,” see SAC ¶ 170. Accordingly, the Court finds that the factual matter in the SAC, 

 

1 This discussion pertains to an example of what the SAC newly alleges and is not to be taken as 

an exhaustive list with respect to specific intent or any other topic. 

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accepted as true, plausibly supports the inference that Defendants specifically intended their 

customers to infringe the ’988 and ’316 patents, respectively, and that Defendants knew that the 

customers’ practice of the qualified method(s) would constitute infringement. 

C. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)

Defendants additionally argue that the SAC fails to allege facts sufficient to establish 

personal jurisdiction over either Defendant with respect to Counts VI and VII of the SAC. See

Motion at 13–14, ECF 58. Plaintiffs counter that the Court has jurisdiction over Counts VI and 

VII due to “[Defendants’] forum-related activities” and that in any event Defendants have “already 

admitted to Plaintiffs’ allegations” of personal jurisdiction. See Opp’n at 18–19, ECF 68. The 

Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants . . . have purposefully and voluntarily placed the Accused 

Products into the stream of commerce with the intention and expectation that the Accused 

Products will be purchased and used by customers in the Northern District of California.” SAC 

¶ 9. In support, Plaintiffs allege2that Defendants “advertise new semiconductor manufacturing 

methods at industry and academic events such as SEMICON [in San Francisco in 2016].” SAC ¶¶ 

132, 134. The SAC includes a reprint of Defendants’ “chart from Semicon West, 2016 [in San 

Francisco] . . . [displaying] rapid expansion of product offerings.” See SAC ¶ 135. Plaintiffs 

allege that these product offerings involve Defendants’ infringing “methods for producing a 

semiconductor product,” SAC ¶ 135, and that Defendants infringe “[b]y manufacturing these new 

films and using these new deposition methods,” SAC ¶ 136. Indeed, Defendants acknowledge 

having given such presentations in California. See Motion at 12. Plaintiffs further allege that 

Defendants “conduct business in California through their sales and service office located at 97 

East Brokaw Road, Suite 100, San Jose, California, 95112.” SAC ¶ 9. 

As discussed in section III.B supra, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of 

stating infringement claims of the ’988 and ’316 patents, respectively, “that [are] plausible on 

[their] face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, and these claims are predicated on sales and distribution 

 

2 The Court’s discussion here pertains to examples of what the SAC alleges in support of personal 

jurisdiction and is not to be taken as an exhaustive list. 

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of the accused products by the Defendants in this District, see SAC ¶ 9. Thus, the Court finds 

unavailing Defendants’ argument that specific personal jurisdiction is lacking because the SAC’s 

infringement allegations “derive entirely from research activities that took place outside the United 

States.” See Motion at 13–14. Moreover, when, as is the case here, Defendants’ motion is based 

on written materials and not an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiffs “need only make a prima face 

showing of jurisdictional facts.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068. Based on the discussion above, the 

Court finds that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that Defendants have “purposefully 

avail[ed] [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities” in this forum, that Plaintiffs’ 

claims “arise[] out of or relate[] to” Defendants’ forum-related activities, and that exercise of 

jurisdiction over Defendants would be “reasonable.” See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 

Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court finds exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants in this forum warranted. See id. 

Finally, in its Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Defendants 

“admit[ted] that this Court has personal jurisdiction over [them].” See Answer ¶ 8, ECF 51. In 

their Reply brief, see ECF 69 at 8, Defendants argue that their admission to personal jurisdiction 

applied only to Counts I to V of the FAC; however, the Court notes overlap between the products 

accused in Counts I to V of the FAC and in Counts VI and VII of the SAC, see, e.g., FAC ¶ 84, 

ECF 24; SAC ¶ 124, ECF 57. Therefore, the Court separately finds Defendants’ personal 

jurisdiction arguments foregone due to Defendants’ prior admission. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts VI and VII of Second 

Amended Complaint at ECF 58 is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2018

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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