Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00651/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00651-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INHERENT INC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GREENFIELD BELSER LTD,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-00651 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON APRIL 13, 2007, AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available

at the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit

the citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D. Civil

Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their

reliance on such authority. The parties are also advised that they are not to submit written

responses to the Court’s questions.

The Court tentatively denies Inherent’s motion to remand and tentatively grants in

part and denies in part Greenfield Belser’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for 

Case 3:07-cv-00651-JSW Document 34 Filed 04/10/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

summary judgment. The Court notes that it tentatively denies Greenfield Belser’s motion to

the extent it seeks summary judgment, and reserves ruling on whether it will grant Inherent

leave to file a second amended complaint.

The parties each shall have twenty (20) minutes to address the following questions:

Motion to Remand.

1. In its surreply, Greenfield states that “it is in the process of investigating and (to the

extent necessary) correcting the problem, if any,” with respect to its corporate status. 

What is the current status of its efforts?

2. If Greenfield obtains a Certificate of Revivor, would Inherent concede that Greenfield’s

corporate status would not provide a basis to remand this case? See, e.g., United

Medical Management Ltd. v. Court of Appeal, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732, 1737-38 & n. 3

(1996) (noting that “revival of corporate powers validates any procedural act taken on

behalf of the corporation while its rights were forfeited, and that undertaking discovery

qualified as procedural act); Benton v. Fletcher, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1490-91 (1991)

(noting that “[m]ost litigation activity has been characterized as procedural for purposes

of corporate revival,” which includes appearing on and filing motions).

3. If Greenfield’s status is forfeit in California, does it contend that based on authority such

as Benton, supra, the Court can hear argument or rule on the motion to dismiss before it

files a certificate of revivor?

Motion to Dismiss

1. How can Inherent assert Greenfield “intentionally omitted” Inherent from the LMA

submission, when Inherent is referenced in the narrative? 

a. Does Inherent dispute the authenticity of the narrative submitted with the Ritzer

declaration regarding the Marger Web site?

2. Inherent asserts a cause of action for violations of Section 17200, which defines “unfair

competition,” as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair,

deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1

(commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and

Professions Code.”

a. Based upon the opposition to Greenfield’s motion, it appears that Inherent argues

that Greenfield has violated Section 17200 because its alleged actions violate

Section 17500. Is the Court correct in this understanding? Is this the only prong

Case 3:07-cv-00651-JSW Document 34 Filed 04/10/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of Section 17200 that Inherent contends Greenfield allegedly violated? If not, on

what other bases does it proceed?

b. What is the specific relief Inherent seeks for the alleged violations of Section

17200?

3. Greenfield relies on Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) to

assert that “failure to credit” is not a valid legal theory to support a Section 17200 claim. 

 In Dastar the Supreme Court addressed the portion of the Lanham Act protecting false

designations with respect to the “origin of goods” and focused on how the “source” of

the goods was attributed on the actual “goods” in question, namely a video series. 

Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-38. Here, the “good” is the Web site and Inherent does not

allege in its Amended Complaint any defect in attribution on the website. Rather, it

appears to the Court that Inherent’s claims relate to advertising and whether Greenfield

is misleading the public in its advertising. See, e.g., Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox

Film. Corp., 2003 WL 22669587 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003) (granting summary

judgment on plaintiff’s state law unfair competition claims based on reverse passing off

and expressly noting that plaintiff did not bring false or misleading advertising claims). 

a. Does the Court correctly understand Inherent’s theory of the case? On this

theory, can Greenfield explain how Dastar is applicable?

b. If Inherent is claiming “reverse passing off,” as a basis for its Section 17200

claim, how does it distinguish Dastar?

4. Does Greenfield have any authority that Inherent must specifically identify the parties

with whom it contends it had existing relationships with expected prospective economic

benefits? If granted leave to amend its complaint, what parties would Inherent identify

as parties with whom it had an existing relationship with a future expectancy of

economic benefits? See, e.g., Janda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189

(E.D. Cal. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss with respect to existing relationships, but

granting with leave to amend as to expected future relationships).

5. What are the alleged “wrongful” acts that Inherent contends Greenfield engaged in that

caused disruption to its relationship with Marger?

a. To the extent Inherent premises its third and fourth causes of action on the

“failure to credit” theory, how can that theory apply to its relationship with

Marger when Marger would have known of Inherent’s work on the Web site? 

Case 3:07-cv-00651-JSW Document 34 Filed 04/10/07 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

b. What facts in the Amended Complaint support Inherent’s assertion that its

existing relationship with Marger contained the probability of future economic

benefit?

c. Greenfield appears to argue that its actions were privileged. (Re-Noticed Mot. at

8 (“Greenfield’s procurement of Marger as a client, and its truthful

advertisement of its role in creating the winning Marger website, were within the

privilege of fair competition.”) (emphasis in original). Under California law,

courts have found that privilege or justification is an affirmative defense to

allegations of intentional interference. See F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific

Professional Insurance, 27 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715 (1972). How does Greenfield

distinguish this case from the F. Arnold case, and why should the Court address

this question on a motion to dismiss?

6. Inherent asks for leave to amend. What additional facts does it intend to include in a

second amended complaint?

7. Are there any other issues the parties wish to address?

Dated: April 10, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-00651-JSW Document 34 Filed 04/10/07 Page 4 of 4