Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01822/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01822-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James G. Sego,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Geneva Aviation, Inc., a Delaware

corporation; American Eurocopter

corporation, a Delaware corporation;

Eurocopter S.A. a foreign corporation. 

Defendants. 

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No.CV-05-1822-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendant American Eurocopter corporation’s ("AEC")

Motion to dismiss (Dkt.#10) and Defendant Eurocopter S.A. corporation’s ("Eurocopter")

Motion to dismiss (Dkt.#29) Plaintiff James G. Sego’s ("Plaintiff") Complaint. Both motions

cite lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) as the basis

for dismissal. The Court will also address Plaintiff’s Motion for contingent discovery.

(Dkt#33). After reviewing the pleadings and holding oral argument on March 21, 2006, the

Court issues the following Order.

I. Background

On July 1, 2004, Plaintiff was seriously injured in a helicopter crash in Scottsdale, Arizona

while employed as a mechanic by Westcor. (Complaint ("Compl.") ¶’s 14, 15). The

helicopter involved in the crash ("subject helicopter"), model AS-350-B2 bearing

identification number N513-TS and serial number 2664, was manufactured and designed by

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Eurocopter. (Compl.¶’s 8,13; Plaintiff's Supplemental Submission of Documents, Dkt#34,

West 001). This model of helicopter, AS-350-B2, incorporates a collective lock mechanism

utilizing a metal strap. (Compl. ¶17). According to Plaintiff, the use and design of the

subject helicopter's collective lock mechanism rendered the helicopter unreasonably

dangerous and defective. (Id. ¶17). Specifically, at a point during a maintenance check

flight by Plaintiff, the collective lock mechanism became engaged and could not be

disengaged, thus causing the subject helicopter to make a hard landing resulting in the

destruction of the helicopter and Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id. ¶15). 

The subject helicopter was manufactured by Eurocopter in 1992 in France and was first

registered in Sweden on August 28, 1992. (AEC’s Motion, Dkt.#10, Exhibit C to Stephen

Yost Declaration). On October 1992, the helicopter was registered to a British purchaser,

Beacon Energy Ltd., in the United Kingdom. (Id., Exhibit D to Stephen Yost Decl.). In June

1997, the helicopter was de-registered in the United Kingdom and transferred by Beacon

Energy to the United States. (Id). After arriving in the United States the helicopter was sold

to Aviation Consultants of Aspen, Inc., in Hollis, New Hampshire, who in turn sold the

helicopter to Schuff Aviation Inc., located in Scottsdale, Arizona in 1997. (Id). In October

of 2003, Schuff Aviation sold the helicopter to Plaintiff's employer, Westcor, also located in

Scottsdale, Arizona. (Id). 

AEC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. (Compl. ¶3).

AEC is an independent subsidiary of Eurocopter and provides operators and owners of

Eurocopter helicopters with updated maintenance and operation manuals, service bulletins,

warnings, and other materials for Eurocopter helicopters located throughout the United

States. (Id. ¶7; Eurocopter’s Reply, Dkt#36, Declaration of Kevin Cabaniss, ¶5). Westcor

is an AEC approved work service center, and Plaintiff frequently purchased parts through

AEC for installation on Eurocopter manufactured helicopters. (Plaintiff’s Response,

Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit at ¶8-10). AEC also sold parts and transacted business with

Westcor regarding maintenance on the subject helicopter after its arrival in Arizona in 1997.

(Compl. ¶7; Plaintiff's Supplemental Submission of Documents, Dkt#34, Docs. 1-52). 

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Moreover, Plaintiff ordered directly from AEC the "replacement parts associated with the

collective lock mechanism" that is alleged to have caused the accident.(Plaintiff’s Response,

Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit, ¶19-22). Plaintiff ordered these replacement parts from AEC

after receiving Eurocopter's "Alert Service Bulletin," dated September 25, 2003, regarding

"mandatory" maintenance on the collective lock mechanism of Eurocopter helicopters. (Id.

at ¶18-22). AEC distributed the "Alert Service Bulletin" to Plaintiff's employer, Westcor.

(Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#31, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶5). After ordering the relevant parts

of the collective lock mechanism from AEC and receiving delivery, Plaintiff installed them

on the subject helicopter. (Plaintiff's Response, Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶22 ). 

Eurocopter is a "foreign business entity thought to be a corporation under the laws of

France." (Compl. ¶4). It is involved in the design, manufacturing, assembly, and distribution

of helicopters internationally. (Id. ¶8). Within the United States, Eurocopter uses its

independent subsidiary, AEC, to provide owner/operators of Eurocopter helicopters with

updated maintenance and operation manuals, service bulletins and replacement parts for

Eurocopter helicopters. (Id. ¶7, Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶9, 12).

 In May of 2002, Plaintiff took delivery of a Eurocopter helicopter directly from Eurocopter

and delivered payment of $1,800,000 directly to Eurocopter. (Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#31,

Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶4). Upon taking delivery, Plaintiff informed Eurocopter of the

helicopter’s future location in Arizona and Plaintiff’s employment with an Arizona

consumer. (Id). Eurocopter authored a letter on May 22, 2002, acknowledging Plaintiff’s

arrival for pickup of the helicopter for the use of his company. (Id.¶4, Exhibit 3).

Eurocopter also inquired directly regarding parts on the subject helicopter with Westcor after

the subject helicopter arrived in Arizona. (Id. at ¶2). On September 25, 2003, Eurocopter

issued the above mentioned "Alert Service Bulletin," distributed by AEC, to Eurocopter

owners in the United States, including Arizona, describing recommended "mandatory"

maintenance to be performed on the "collective lever lock" of Eurocopter helicopters.

(Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#17, Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Affidavit). The "Alert Service

Bulletin" directed helicopter owners to perform some of the recommended maintenance

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within 50 flying hours and that the replacement parts were to be purchased directly from

Eurocopter. (Id.). 

On June 16, 2005, Plaintiff asserted the present action against these Defendants alleging

negligence and strict products liability. The Court’s jurisdiction is based upon diversity.

Both Defendant AEC and Eurocopter move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) Fed.R.Civ.P.

II. Standard of Review

To establish personal jurisdiction, plaintiff has the burden of showing that: (1) the forum

state's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant; and (2) the

exercise of jurisdiction comports with principles of due process. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip

& Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995). Arizona's long-arm statute confers

jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution. Ariz.R.Civ.P. 4.2(a) (2004); Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048,

1050 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the only issue here is whether the exercise of jurisdiction

over Defendants accords with due process. See Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 269. 

Where an evidentiary hearing is not held, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is

appropriate only if the plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.

Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1986).

"[U]ncontroverted allegations in [plaintiff's] complaint must be taken as true, and "conflicts

between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff's] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists."" American

Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.

1996) (citing WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 2003 (5th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff is able

to meet its prima facie burden, the movant can nevertheless continue to challenge personal

jurisdiction either at a pretrial evidentiary hearing or at trial itself. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1064, n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. Discussion

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Due Process requires that the nonresident defendant have "certain minimum contacts with

[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945) (internal citation omitted). There are two types of personal jurisdiction, general and

specific. General jurisdiction exists where a non-resident defendant engages in substantial,

continuous or systematic activities within the forum. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining,

Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S.Ct. 413 (1952). When a defendant’s contacts with the forum

do not rise to the level required for general jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific

jurisdiction over a claim when it arises from the defendant’s activities within that forum.

Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990) rev’d on other grounds, 499

U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff does not concede that general jurisdiction does not exist with

respect to these non-resident Defendants, but rather argues that the Court need only look to

specific jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will first address the issue of specific jurisdiction

and in the event that specific jurisdiction does exist over these Defendants a general

jurisdiction evaluation will not be necessary. The Ninth Circuit utilizes a three-prong test

to evaluate the nature and quality of Defendant's contacts for purposes of specific

jurisdiction; the test provides:

1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some

transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities

in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections; 2) the

claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant

forum related activities; and 3) exercise of the jurisdiction must be

reasonable. 

EDIAS Software Intern., LLC v. BASIS Intern. Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D. Ariz. 1996).

All three factors must exist for personal jurisdiction to apply. Omeluk v. Langstein Slip &

Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A. Three-Prong Analysis Of Specific Jurisdiction

(1) Purposeful Direction

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1

 The "effects test" of the purposeful direction inquiry is not used in this case, as it

typically applied in intentional tort cases. Here, Plaintiff’s claims arise out of negligence and

strict products liability. See Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1037,

n. 8 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (noting that only an intentional tort, not a negligent tort, can satisfy

the Ninth Circuit’s effects test). 

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The first step of the relevant inquiry in determining if this Court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over these Defendants is to determine if the Defendants have purposefully

availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in Arizona. This requirement

ensures that a defendant is not "haled into court as the result of random, fortuitous or

attenuated contacts, or on account of the unilateral acts of third parties." Shute, 897 F.3d at

381. While the term "purposeful availment" is often used to include both purposeful

availment and purposeful direction, a purposeful direction analysis is appropriate for tort

claims, such as this. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th

Cir. 2004). Purposeful direction is generally found given "evidence of the defendant’s

actions outside the forum state that are directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the

forum state of goods originating elsewhere." Id. at 803; see also Keeton v. Hustler

Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75, 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984) (finding purposeful direction

where defendant published magazines in Ohio and circulated them in the forum state of New

Hampshire); Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

purposeful direction where defendant distributed its pop music albums from Europe in the

forum state, California).1

 (a) Purposeful Direction of AEC

Defendant AEC contends that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it,

because AEC does not have any contacts with Arizona that relate to Plaintiff’s cause of

action. Specifically, Defendant relies heavily on the fact that the subject helicopter took an

indirect route to its ultimate destination in Arizona and did not in any way involve AEC.

(AEC’s Motion, Dkt.#10, Exhibit C and D to Stephen Yost Declaration). While it appears

clear that the subject helicopter ended up in Arizona on a random path without intervention

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2

 Defendants attach the ruling by the Honorable John W. Sedwick in another case

from this District, CV02-1073-PHX-JWS, involving a separate helicopter crash of a

Eurocopter helicopter in Arizona. In that case Judge Sedwick dismissed Defendant

Eurocopter and found the court lacked specific jurisdiction based in part on the random and

un-deliberate path the accident helicopter took in traveling to Arizona as well as Plaintiff’s

inability to satisfy the "arising out of" requirement discussed below. Obviously, Judge

Sedwick’s ruling is not binding on this Court; however the Court will review the ruling as

any other case from this District.

3

 This is a distinguishing factor from Judge Sedwick’s ruling in which it appears that

Eurocopter was not even aware that the subject helicopter was in Arizona. (CIV-02-1073-

PHX-JWS, Dkt.#201, p. 19). 

4

 AEC contends that the statement from Plaintiff regarding the purchase of the

collective lock mechanism part is not persuasive as it is unclear from Plaintiff’s statement

whether the parts he ordered from AEC were in fact the parts that he used in maintenance and

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of Defendant AEC or Eurocopter, this is not dispositive of the issue.2

 Importantly, there

appear to be other significant activities directed towards Arizona by AEC and even activities

in Arizona directed toward the subject helicopter. For instance, Plaintiff’s Complaint and

affidavits relate that Plaintiff, on behalf of Westcor, an AEC service provider in Arizona,

frequently ordered various parts directly from AEC for Eurocopter helicopters (Plaintiff’s

Response, Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶10). Additionally, Plaintiff offers numerous

documents demonstrating direct transactions between AEC and Eurocopter regarding work

performed on the subject helicopter after its arrival in Arizona in 1997. (Plaintiff's

Supplemental Submission of Documents, Dkt#34, Docs. 1-52).3

 Plaintiff also alleges that

he periodically received "updated maintenance and operation manuals, service bulletins,

warnings and other material" from AEC regarding Eurocopter helicopters.. (Compl.¶7,

Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶ 5,16). Lastly, and perhaps most

notably, Plaintiff provides his affidavit stating that after receiving Eurocopter’s "Alert

Service Bulletin," via delivery of AEC, regarding the maintenance to be performed on the

collective lock mechanism, Plaintiff ordered directly from AEC the applicable collective lock

mechanism part(s) and installed them on the subject helicopter. (Plaintiff’s Response,

Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit. ¶¶19-22).4

 Sometime after installing the collective lock

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repair of the accident helicopter. However, a plain reading of Plaintiff’s affidavit reveals that

he ordered from AEC part #540A, the collective lock, and is "reasonably confident" he

ordered another part involved in the collective lock system, part #560. (Plaintiff's Response,

Dkt#17, Plaintiff's Affidavit ¶19). Moreover, he states that the parts he ordered were

delivered to Westcor and he installed them on the subject helicopter. (Id. at 21-22). 

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mechanism parts received from AEC, the subject helicopter crashed and it is alleged that the

collective lock mechanism was the cause of the accident. (Compl. ¶15). 

Thus, the documented history of the transactions involving the maintenance and sale of

parts between AEC and Westcor, the issuance of relevant materials such as operation

manuals and service bulletins regarding Eurocopter helicopters to Westcor, and activities

directed specifically at the subject helicopter while in Arizona demonstrate a history of

activities by AEC directed in Arizona. Thus, unlike the ruling made by Judge Sedwick in

CIV 02-1073, upon which AEC relies, there is a steady history of contacts in Arizona and

present awareness of the subject helicopter’s location in Arizona. Thus, the purposeful

direction prong is satisfied with respect to AEC.

 (b) Purposeful Direction of Eurocopter

 (i) Eurocopter's Direct Contacts With Arizona

There also appears to be a sufficient business history by Eurocopter directed toward

Arizona as well. Similar to AEC, Eurocopter relies on the apparent fact that the subject

helicopter arrived in Arizona on a random path and without any interaction between

Eurocopter and any purchaser in Arizona. Moreover, Eurocopter asserts that Plaintiff’s

claims that he purchased parts from AEC and received materials from AEC prepared by

Eurocopter demonstrate only that Eurocopter may have had contacts with Texas, not

Arizona. However, the allegations, sworn statements and exhibits relate more than what

Eurocopter concedes. For example, not mentioned by Eurocopter is that there appears to be

a direct history of correspondence and business transacted in Arizona by Eurocopter with

Westcor. 

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For instance, Plaintiff provides his affidavit stating that in May of 2002, he personally

accepted delivery of another Eurocopter helicopter, on behalf of Westcor, in exchange of

payment of $1,800,000, at which time he related that the helicopter was to be used in

Arizona. (Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#31, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶ 4). This transaction is

confirmed by a letter addressed in name to Plaintiff. (Id., Exhibit 3). This affidavit

demonstrates, at the very least, that Eurocopter was aware that it was transacting business

with an entity in the state of Arizona. See Sinatra v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191,

1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating "solicitation of business in the forum state that results in

business being transacted or contract negotiations will probably be considered purposeful

availment."). Moreover, Plaintiff provides his sworn statement describing a document

received from Eurocopter inquiring into the status and condition of parts that were installed

on the subject helicopter involved in the accident sometime after its arrival in Arizona in

1997. (Id. at ¶3). Such correspondence regarding the subject helicopter reveals more than

a blanket unawareness that the subject helicopter was in Arizona. Thus, although the subject

helicopter may not have ended up in Arizona through direct actions of Eurocopter, there is

evidence that once the helicopter did arrive in Arizona, Eurocopter became aware of its

location and affirmed it by transacting business in Arizona as well as transacting business

with respect to the subject helicopter. 

This is a distinguishing factor of the decision in Abraham v. Agusta, S.P.A., 968 F. Supp.

1403, 1410 (D. Nev. 1997), upon which Eurocopter relies. Abraham involves a products

liability action asserted in Nevada district court, in which the district court held that it could

not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Texas corporation defendant. Id. The

court in Abraham observed that the Texas corporation defendant sold the plane involved in

the accident to a Florida company who then owned and operated the plane for two years and

then sold the plane into the Nevada forum. Based upon these circumstances, the Texas

defendant had no reason to "foresee or expect" that the third-party would sell the plane to a

Nevada resident. Id. However, in the instant case, although Eurocopter may not have been

involved in the sale of the subject helicopter in the Arizona forum; there is evidence to

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suggest that it affirmed its location by subsequently transacting business regarding the

subject helicopter as well as other of its helicopters in Arizona. Thus, unlike Abraham, this

case does not involve a blanket unawareness of involvement in the subject forum. 

Lastly, it is relevant to note that based upon Eurocopter’s awareness of the location of the

subject helicopter and other Eurocopter helicopters in Arizona, it is reasonable to infer that

when Eurocopter issued its "Alert Service Bulletin" on September 25, 2003, regarding the

maintenance to be performed on its helicopters’ collective lock mechanism that it was

foreseeable that such action would impact Arizona, and more specifically, Westcor. 

Thus, while Eurocopter may not have directed the sale of the subject helicopter in Arizona

there is sufficient evidence demonstrating that Eurocopter directed other activities toward the

state of Arizona, including activities involving the subject helicopter. 

 (ii) AEC's Activities Can Also Be Imputed To Eurocopter Under An Agency

 Theory.

Alternatively, even if Eurocopter did not direct its activities to Arizona, it is reasonable

that the contacts with Arizona mentioned above with respect to AEC may be imputed to

Eurocopter, the parent of AEC. (See Eurocopter’s Reply, Dkt.#36, Declaration of Kevin

Cabaniss, ¶5). It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that a relationship between a parent

company and its subsidiary is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the parent on the

basis of the subsidiary’s contacts with the forum. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Transure, Inc., v. Marsh and McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th

Cir. 1985). However, "if the parent and subsidiary are not really separate entities, or one acts

as an agent of the other, the local subsidiary’s contacts with the forum may be imputed to the

foreign parent corporation." Id. (citing El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676

(D.C. Cir. 1996). 

An alter ego or agency relationship is typified by parental control of the subsidiary’s

internal affairs or daily operations. Id. The test for application of the alter ego exception

is a showing that (1) there is a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities

of the two entities no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard their separate identities

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5

 See also Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp.2d 1285, 1296 (S.D. Cal. 2003)

(discussing application of specific jurisdiction to non-resident based upon parent-subsidiary,

agency theory). 

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would result in fraud or injustice. Id. (citing American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiff makes no

attempt to make such a showing, thus the alter ego theory provides no basis for personal

jurisdiction over Eurocopter based upon the contacts of AEC.

The agency test is satisfied by a showing that the subsidiary functions as part of the parent

corporation’s representative in that it performs services that are "sufficiently important to the

foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s

own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services." Id. at 928 (citing

Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994).5

 The court in Chan

explained that "courts have permitted the imputation of contacts where the subsidiary was

‘either established for, or is engaged in, activities that, but for the existence of the subsidiary,

the parent would have to undertake itself." Chan, 39 F.3d at 1405 (citing Gallagher v. Mazda

Motor of America, Inc. 781 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Pa. 1992). "The question to ask is ...

whether in the truest sense, the subsidiaries' presence substitutes for the presence of the

parent." Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 928-29 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, it appears based upon Plaintiff’s Complaint, affidavits and exhibits that AEC’s

activities toward Arizona can be attributed to Eurocopter through this theory. For instance,

AEC is a subsidiary of, and distributor for Eurocopter in the United States and appears to

perform a variety of functions for Eurocopter in this forum including the distribution of parts

for maintenance on Eurocopter helicopters as well as the issuance of materials for Eurocopter

owners regarding operation and service bulletins. (Complaint ¶7; Plaintiff’s Response,

Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit at ¶8-10). If AEC did not perform these tasks for Eurocopter,

then presumably Eurocopter would have to perform these activities itself to remain

competitive in the United States market. 

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This notion is demonstrated in In re Nat'l Audit Defense Network, 332 B.R. 896, 905 (D.

Nev. 2005). In Nat’l Audit, the district found specific jurisdiction over the non-resident

parent corporation based upon agency principles. Id. at 905. The district court held that

specific jurisdiction could be found against the non-resident defendant corporation, OPI,

located in Montreal, Canada, based upon its relationship with its subsidiary, OPL, whom had

contracted with the Nevada plaintiff. Id. Specifically, the district court imputed the activities

of the principal, OPI, to those of its co-Defendant subsidiary OPL. The principal's activities

in the forum involved internet support services for its subsidiaries, including OPL, which

made up the majority of its business. Id. In this case, OPI was performing the services that

OPL had contracted to perform in the forum. Id. The court concluded that the complaint

fairly alleged that if OPL, the subsidiary, did not have OPI’s services in Nevada and other

states, then OPL would have to perform such services itself. Id. at 905-06. Therefore,

specific jurisdiction attached to both the principal and the subsidiary. Id. at 906. 

Nat'l Audit provides support for imputing the activities of AEC to Eurocopter in this case.

Like Nat'l Audit, Plaintiff’s Complaint fairly alleges and the accompanying affidavits and

documents provide persuasive evidence of an agency relationship between the two

defendants. For instance, AEC, acting as Eurocopter's American subsidiary appears to

provide important functions for Eurocopter in the United States, including Arizona. 

Specifically, AEC distributes parts and operational materials to Eurocopter helicopter owners

in the United States. Eurocopter would likely have to perform such functions itself in

Arizona and other states if AEC did not perform such activities for Eurocopter. Thus, like

Nat’l Audit, specific jurisdiction can attach based upon the activities of one of the parties

involved in the agency relationship; here such activities are directed by AEC and can be

imputed to Eurocopter. As such, even if Eurocopter did not direct activities to Arizona on

its own accord, the activities of AEC can be imputed to Eurocopter as Plaintiff has made the

requisite prima facie showing of an agency relationship between the two.

(2) "Arising Out Of" Requirement

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The "arising out of" requirement is also referred to as the "but for" test. "[A] claim arises

out of the forum related activities if it would not have happened "but for" the forum related

activities." Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387 (9th Cir. 1990); overruled on

other grounds, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991). The "but for" requirement is the "key

to exercising specific jurisdiction . . .[it] goes to the heart of minimum contacts and creates

the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. Williams v. Lakeview, Co., 199

Ariz. 1, 4, 13 P.3d 280, 283 (2000). The "but for" test was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in

Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Doe

v. American Nat. Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Omeluk, plaintiff Omeluk was injured when a grate on the ship’s deck gave way

ultimately causing plaintiff to fall overboard. Id. at 268-69. The nonresident defendant, a

Norwegian corporation, had installed the welds on the defective grate. However, the

defendant’s contacts with the forum state were limited to in-state purchases and attendance

at the christening of the ship. Further, although the defendant had performed work on the

subject ship, the work took place in Norway and the defendant was merely aware that "some

of the vessels it worked on may be in the United States." Id. at 269. In applying the "but for"

test the court found that the test had not been met with respect to the non-resident defendant

because the defendant’s contacts in the forum consisted of purchases of electronic equipment

and nets and attendance at the christening of the subject vessel, which had nothing to do with

the welds on the grate giving way. Id. at 272. In applying the holding in Omeluk to the

present case it provides instructive distinguishing authority demonstrating that Defendants

AEC and Eurocopter possess the requisite "but for" relationship to the subject accident. 

 (a) "Arising Out Of:" AEC.

Unlike Omeluk, AEC’s forum related activities appear to possess the requisite "but for"

relationship to the accident at issue. Such activities include the Plaintiff’s well documented

history of business transactions regarding parts and maintenance between AEC and Westcor

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as well as AEC’s distribution of "updated maintenance and operation manuals, service

bulletins, warnings and other material." (Plaintiff's Supplemental Submission of Documents,

Dkt#34, Docs. 1-52; Compl. ¶7). Moreover, AEC’s activities involve the direct sale and

distribution of the subject collective mechanism that is the alleged cause of the accident at

issue in this case. (Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#17, Plaintiff’s Affidavit, ¶19-22). Thus,

AEC’s forum related activities appear to relate to the subject accident and arguably, "but

for", AEC’s activity of distributing the defective collective lock mechanism to Plaintiff, the

subject accident would not have occurred. In other words, looking at the facts in the light

most favorable to the Plaintiff, the crash would not have occurred had AEC not sold Plaintiff

the defective collective lock mechanism parts that Plaintiff subsequently installed. 

 (b) "Arising Out Of:" Eurocopter

The same is true with respect to Eurocopter. Plaintiff alleges that Eurocopter provided the

manuals governing the maintenance of the subject collective lock mechanism. (Compl. ¶7).

There is evidence of a direct dialogue between Plaintiff and Eurocopter regarding

transactions in Arizona and the maintenance of the subject helicopter in Arizona. (Plaintiff’s

Response, Dkt.#31, Plaintiff’s Affidavit ¶'s 2,4). Subsequent to the establishment of a

dialogue between these parties, Eurocopter issued the "Alert Service Bulletin" advising

"mandatory" maintenance to be performed on the collective lock mechanism of its

helicopters and the parts to be ordered directly from it. (Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#17,

Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Affidavit). Subsequent to receiving this alert, Plaintiff ordered the

relevant parts on the collective lock mechanism for the subject helicopter from AEC,

Eurocopter’s subsidiary. (Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt#17, Plaintiff's Affidavit, ¶’s 17-25). 

Presumably AEC then supplied or ordered the relevant parts from Eurocopter, the

manufacturer of the helicopter and the collective lock mechanism, and delivered them to

Plaintiff. After allegedly properly installing the parts, the subject helicopter crashed. Thus,

"but for" the Plaintiff's efforts to comply with the "Special Alert Bulletin" and receipt of

defective parts manufactured by Eurocopter through its subsidiary, AEC, the accident may

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not have occurred. As such, the requisite "but for" relationship exists between Eurocopter’s

contacts in Arizona and the subject accident. 

Alternatively, even if Eurocopter's direct activities do not satisfy the "but for" test; as

discussed above, the activities of AEC do satisfy this test as the direct distributor of the

defective parts manufactured by Eurocopter. Therefore, because there has been a prima facie

showing of any agency relationship between Eurocopter and AEC, AEC’s activities may be

imputed to Eurocopter, thus satisfying the "but for" test against Eurocopter. See Nat'l Audit,

332 B.R. at 905 (noting that activities of the principal, OPI, "squarely satisfy the but-for test

in the paragraph above," thus satisfying this test against the subsidiary, OPL.).

(3) Reasonableness

For specific jurisdiction to be reasonable, "it must comport with fair play and substantial

justice." Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985)). Several factors are to be considered in determining the

reasonableness of exercising specific jurisdiction: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful

interjection into the forum state; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum;

(3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum

state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient use of judicial resolution of

the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and

effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum." Id. Procedurally, if

purposeful availment has been established, "the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction is

presumptively reasonable. To rebut the presumption, a defendant ‘must present a compelling

case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would, in fact, be unreasonable." Shute, 897 F.3d at

386 (quoting Burger King, 741 U.S. at 476).

Both AEC and Eurocopter offer the same basic argument in the hopes of demonstrating

that it would be unreasonable for jurisdiction to be maintained by this Court. Specifically,

that neither entity has purposefully interjected itself into Arizona regarding the subject

helicopter. However, as explained above, this Court finds that there is evidence

demonstrating the opposite conclusion. For example, AEC directly sold to Plaintiff the

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subject collective lock mechanism that is alleged to be the cause of the accident. Moreover,

Eurocopter has communicated directly with Plaintiff with respect to sales of other helicopters

as well as with respect to the sale of parts on the subject helicopter. Eurocopter also issued

the "Alert Service Bulletin" regarding the "mandatory" maintenance to be performed on its

helicopters. Under such circumstances, there is substantial evidence of purposeful

interjection in Arizona. Further, it is well established that "a state is deemed to have a strong

interest in protecting its citizens against the tortious acts of others. Shute, 897 F.3d at 387.

In Arizona, "exercising jurisdiction over a manufacturer of defective and unreasonably

dangerous consumer products provides a forum for Arizona residents harmed by such

products and a deterrent to selling unreasonably dangerous products in the state." A. Uberti

& C v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1364 (Ariz. 1995). 

Also, although it may cause a burden on the Defendants to defend in Arizona this factor

alone does not outweigh the state’s interest. In light of the Defendants’ contacts in Arizona

with respect to the subject helicopter and others, it is clearly foreseeable that the Defendants

could be subject to suit for any of its tortious activities in this forum. Moreover, this burden

may be minimized due to Defendants’ having local counsel in Arizona. See Yahoo, Inc., v.

La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme 145 F. Supp.2d 1168, 1177-78 (N.D. Cal.

2001) (holding that burden upon French non-profit entity in defending suit in California did

not justify finding of unreasonableness in light of technology available); see also A.Uberti

and C, 181 Ariz. at 575-76 (stating that burden on Italian manufacturer in defending product

liability suit in Arizona was not outweighed by state's interest as well as the technology

available). 

Further, although this Court gives due deference to the laws of France, it is equally

important to provide the residents of Arizona with a proper forum to litigate legitimate

disputes to enforce their legal rights. Thus, this factor does not eliminate jurisdiction with

respect to Eurocopter. See Yahoo, Inc. 145 F. Supp.2d at 1178 (noting that interest in giving

deference to French law "must be weighed against the United States own sovereign interest

in protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of its residents."). If this factor were

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controlling, "it would always prevent suit against a foreign national in a United States court."

Id. (citing Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984)).

Lastly, although some of the potential witnesses regarding the manufacture and design of

the subject collective lock mechanism may be burdened by litigating this dispute in this

Court, this factor is by no means controlling. Further, in light of modern advances in

technology and transportation, this burden may be reduced. See Panavision Intern., L.P. v.

Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1998). It is also important to note that the

accident occurred in Arizona and presumably much of the physical evidence is located in

Arizona.

Thus, in balancing the Burger King factors mentioned above, this Court finds that it is

reasonable to maintain jurisdiction over these non-resident Defendants. 

Because the Court finds that personal jurisdiction over these Defendants exists based upon

a specific jurisdiction analysis, the Court will not perform a general jurisdiction analysis and

makes no findings thereof. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying AEC’s Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

(Dkt. #10).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eurocopter’s Motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction is denied. (Dkt.#29).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for conditional discovery as

moot. (Dkt.#33).

DATED this 24th day of March, 2006.

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