Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cv-00338/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cv-00338-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

 

SARAH BRIGETTE WILLIAMS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:13cv338-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Sarah Brigette Williams, applied for disability insurance benefits. Her 

application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and 

received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, 

the ALJ issued a decision in which the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled at any time 

through the date of the decision. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appeals Council, 

and the Appeals Counsel rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. 

The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 

1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

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entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s 

Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 18); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 17). Based on the 

court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision 

of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The 

same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited 

as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

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Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was forty-two years old at the date of the decision and has a high school 

education. Tr. 26. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the five-step 

process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

July 1, 2007, the alleged onset date.” (Step 1) Tr. 14. At Step 2, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: “multifactorial headache 

disorder, chest pain with anxiety, major depressive disorder, recurrent moderate without 

psychotic features, low average-to-average intellectual functioning.” Id. The ALJ then 

found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.” (Step 3) Id. 

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work with additional 

limitations. Tr. 19. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff “is able to perform past 

relevant work” as a cashier and sewing machine operator. (Step 4) Tr. 26. Continuing on 

to Step 5, the ALJ found that, “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity,” and after consulting with the VE, “there are 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Tr. 26. The ALJ identified the following occupations as examples: “cashier,” 

“storage facility rental clerk,” and “hotel housekeeper.” Tr. 27. Accordingly, the ALJ 

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determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from July 1, 2007, through the date of this decision.” Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff’s only claim on appeal is that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of 

Dr. Dan M. Guinn and Mental Health Counselor, Eve Stalker. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 10) at 7. 

Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker’s opinions essentially indicate that many of Plaintiff’s daily 

living functions and social functions are extremely impaired. Tr. 23. Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ incorrectly held that Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker’s opinions were “not supported 

by the objective medical evidence,” were “inconsistent with other substantial medical 

evidence of record,” and were “unsupported by their own treatment records.” Id. 

 Normally, an ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician “substantial or 

considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” See Phillips, 357 

F.3d at 1240. “‘[G]ood cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating 

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical 

records.” Id. at 1240-41. Further, “[t]he ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for 

giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and the failure to do so is 

reversible error.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 

MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding the ALJ “must 

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specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and any reason for giving it 

no weight”). 

 Here, the ALJ articulated “good cause” for the rejection of the opinions of Dr. 

Guinn and Ms. Stalker—that the opinions were not supported by the objective medical 

evidence, were inconsistent with the other substantial medical evidence of record, and 

were unsupported by their own treatment records. Tr. 23. Indeed, the decision explicitly 

states, 

Dr. Guinn’s and the Mental Health Counselor, Eve Stalker’s opinions . . . 

are given little weight because of a number of reasons: They are not 

supported by the objective medical evidence; they are inconsistent with 

other substantial medical evidence of record and other medical opinions, 

including Drs. McKeown, Estock and Thorton, [which] are more consistent 

with the record. They are unsupported by their own treatment records, 

much of which are simply [Plaintiff]’s financially self-serving subjective 

claims . . . . Their assessments [ ] are totally against the weight of the 

evidence. 

Id. This rejection sufficiently articulates good cause. 

 To the extent that Plaintiff challenges that substantial evidence did not support this 

determination by the ALJ, the court does not agree. Plaintiff fails to point the court to 

any objective medical evidence in support of her argument, and instead relies on her 

subjective complaints to Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker. In addition, the court finds that 

substantial evidence did support the ALJ’s finding of inconsistencies between Dr. Guinn 

and Ms. Stalker’s opinions and the other medical opinions and the evidence of record. 

Plaintiff concedes that the opinions of Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker were “inconsistent with 

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the state agencies physician’s opinions and the opinions of the medical expert testimony 

provided at the hearing.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 10) at 7. Although Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker 

opined that Plaintiff’s functions of daily living were extremely impaired, the ALJ pointed 

to significant evidence that Plaintiff “lives alone,” “does all household chores and 

grocery shopping,” “has no problem with personal care,” “cleans and does laundry,” 

walks or drives to visit with friends, goes to church, is capable of going out 

unaccompanied, can handle a savings account and use a check book, reads, writes, and 

does puzzles. Tr. 15-20. Because Dr. Guinn opined that Plaintiff would be “extremely 

limited” in her ability to do many of the tasks that Plaintiff herself indicated she currently 

does on a daily basis, substantial evidence supported the ALJ giving little weight to his 

opinion. Tr. 15-20, 388-90. Indeed, the ALJ stated that “as Dr. McKeown testified, if 

th[e] assessments [of Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker] were accurate, [Plaintiff] would have 

long ago required institutionalization!” Tr. 23. As the ALJ stated, Dr. Guinn and Ms. 

Stalker’s opinions were based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and not founded in the 

objective medical record of evidence. 

 The court has reviewed the opinions of Dr. Guinn and Ms. Stalker and agrees with 

the ALJ’s determination to accord them little weight. The opinions appear to be 

unsupported by the other evidence or record and inconsistent with the other medical 

opinions. Accordingly, the court finds no error. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

Done this 10th day of April, 2014. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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