Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00361/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00361-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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- 1 - 07cv0361-LAB (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC E. QUINTON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv0361-LAB (WMc)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; AND 

ORDER DENYING PETITION;

AND

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY

vs.

I. CLAY, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”). This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge

William McCurine for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Civil

Local Rule 72.1(d). Respondent moved to dismiss, and supported their motion with

lodgments. On November 28, 2007, Magistrate Judge McCurine issued his report and

recommendation (the “R&R”) finding Petitioner had waited over one year after his state

conviction became final to file his first state habeas petition. The R&R therefore concluded

the Petition was barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year

limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The R&R therefore recommended denying

the Petition with prejudice. The R&R notified Petitioner of his right to object, and cautioned

him that failure to object within the time permitted might waive his appellate rights. (R&R at

20:1–5.)

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1

 Petitioner did object that he had not received copies of the lodgments, but he was

served with a full set in time to file his Objections. His objections assume the authenticity

of all lodgments except Lodgment 7, into which he maintains additional documents have

been inserted.

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Petitioner filed objections to the R&R (“Objections”), which the Court has reviewed.

Petitioner does not dispute the R&R’s conclusion that his conviction became final on

September 14, 2004 and the one-year limitations period therefore began to run on

September 15, 2004. (R&R at 4:13–18.) The R&R also found Petitioner filed his first

habeas petition in California state court on October 14, 2005, well over a year later. (Id. at

18–19.) The R&R also found he filed a second petition (the “Disputed Petition”) in state

court on December 12, 2005. (Id. at 21–22.) Although Petitioner’s objections are lengthy,

his principal argument is that the Disputed Petition was actually his first petition, and that

he delivered it to a correctional officer for mailing on August 30, 2005. Secondarily, he

argues he is entitled to equitable tolling, because of general delays caused by the prison

mailing system. Except for certain pages in Lodgment 7, Petitioner does not dispute the

authenticity of any of the lodgments, nor did he object to Judge McCurine’s reliance on

them.1

If the R&R is correct, the Petition is time-barred under the limitations period set forth

in § 2244(d)(1). If, however, Petitioner delivered the Disputed Petition to a prison official for

mailing to the state court on August 30, 2005, as he argues, he is entitled to tolling from that

date. See § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”); Huizar

v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a prisoner's federal or state

habeas petition is deemed filed at the time he delivers it to the prison authorities for

forwarding to the court clerk) (citation omitted). If Petitioner is entitled to tolling, the Petition

would be timely under § 2244(d)(1).

The parties do agree the Disputed petition was dated August 30, 2005. Initially, the

burden falls on Respondent to show this was not the true mailing date. Washington v.

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2

 This is not a case where the state court is alleged to have made unreasonable

findings of fact in light of the evidence before it, see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999

(9th Cir. 2004). Rather, as noted below, Petitioner never presented the evidence to the state

courts he now presents to this Court.

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United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Under the mailbox rule,

the burden is on prison authorities to prove the date a prisoner delivered his documents to

be mailed. Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [the

court] will assume that [petitioner's] motion was delivered to prison authorities the day he

signed it . . . .”) (citation omitted). In this case, Respondent has submitted evidence in the

form of mail logs, declarations, and other documents, which the R&R discusses. 

Unfortunately for Petitioner, the state courts made a finding in this regard. In ruling

on the Disputed Petition, the Superior Court found it to be a second petition, and relied on

this finding in denying the Disputed Petition. The Court of Appeal relied on the Superior

Court’s finding to reach the same conclusion.

Under § 2254(e)(1), findings of fact by state courts are presumed correct and can only

be set aside on clear and convincing evidence.2 Petitioner points to two pages of the mail

log (Obj. to R&R, Ex. A; Resp.’s Lodgment 19 at 1, 15), indicating two pieces of mail were

sent by him to someone in the District Attorney’s office and to the Superior Court on

September 2, 2005. In addition, his Objections, which he submitted under penalty of perjury,

offer his own representations regarding when he mailed the Disputed Petition. This

evidence favors Petitioner because it shows he did mail two items around the time he said

he did to the Superior Court and the District Attorney’s office, respectively.

Petitioner’s state habeas petition filed October 14, 2005 mentions a habeas petition

filed August 30, 2005, and purports to amend it. (Lodgment 5 (Notice and Notice of Motion

amending habeas petition, dated Oct. 5, 2005) at 1:20–22 (“Petitioner is aware that a prior

petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed into court August 30, 2005 . . . .”)) In two

documents filed with the Superior Court, both dated October 30, 2005 and file-stamped

November 8, Petitioner again says he mailed his petition on August 30. (Lodgment 7 at

154–55, 158–59.) While not conclusive, these three documents favor his position. The

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Superior Court, however, said it had received no such petition (Lodgment 6 at 2:4–5), and

Petitioner never mentioned it in subsequent petitions filed with the Court of Appeals or

Supreme Court. (See Lodgments 9 (state Court of Appeal petition), 11 (state Supreme

Court petition).) Bearing in mind the Superior Court’s decision, and the Court of Appeal’s

decision denying the Disputed Petition as a successive petition, Petitioner had an incentive

to explain to the Supreme Court why the Disputed Petition was actually his first petition.

The same mail log also shows Petitioner mailed two items, to the same attorney in

the District Attorney’s office and to the same division of the Superior Court again on

December 8, 2005. (Lodgment 13 at 17, 20). These entries are annotated to show the

material is dated August 30, 2005. (Id.) Among the lodgments is a photocopy of the

envelope Petitioner mailed the Disputed Petition in; a copy of this is also included as

Attachment 1 to Respondent’s motion to dismiss and as Exhibits 1 and 2 to Respondent’s

reply to the opposition to the motion to dismiss. Petitioner accepts this as genuine and relies

on it in his Objections. 

The face of this envelope bears two postage labels bearing the date December 8,

2005. The return address gives Petitioner’s location as 1-4-124-Low, which Petitioner says

was his location on August 30 but not on December 8. (Obj. at 16:11–20.) He argues this

would have been corrected if it were inaccurate. The envelope is addressed to “District

Attorney Ms. Shess, South Bay Superior Court(s).” This envelope contained the Disputed

Petition, which the Superior Court denied on February 23, 2006. (Lodgment 8.) On the

reverse appear the date “8/30/05" and what purports to be the signature of Officer David

Villalva, who was responsible for accepting prisoners’ mail. (Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to

Dismiss, Ex. 2.) Respondent submits the declaration of Officer Villalva, who states the

signature is not his nor does he sign prisoner mail in this fashion. (Id., Ex. 3.) Officer

Villalva’s signature on his declaration and the signature on the envelope are noticeably

different, as are the handwritten numbers. (Id., Ex. 2.)

Petitioner flatly denies giving the Disputed Petition, or a copy of it, to Officer Villalva

for mailing in December, 2005. (Obj. at 6:26–28 (“. . . Petitioner did not mail these

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documents on December 8, 2005; he mailed these documents on August 30, 2005.”)

Rather, his position is that he submitted only one copy of the Disputed Petition on August

30, but for reasons beyond his control or knowledge the mailing was delayed until

December. This is a substantial assertion, because the Disputed Petition includes

documents dated after August 30, which Petitioner explains by stating these documents

were from an entirely different filing but were deliberately misnumbered so as to mislead the

Court. (Obj. at 3:7–14.) These newer documents, if they were included with the Disputed

Petition, would show it the Disputed Petition was not delivered to Officer Villalva for mailing

on August 30.

If Petitioner mailed the first copy of his Disputed Petition on August 30 and a

replacement copy in December after learning it had not been received, it might explain a

great deal. Under this scenario, Petitioner’s filing would have been complete on August 30,

2005 when he handed his petition to Officer Villalva for mailing to the court. For unknown

reasons, neither the Superior Court’s copy nor the District Attorney’s copy ever arrived, but

whatever the reason, the limitations period would have been tolled as of August 30. This

scenario is not possible under either party’s version of the facts, however.

Given the evidence as it now exists, one possible conclusion is that Petitioner actually

gave the Disputed Petition to Officer Villalva for mailing on August 30, 2005, but it was held

and not mailed until December 8, 2005. Two entries for each piece of mail might have been

generated for each piece of mail — one on September 2, and another on December 8. The

December 8 notations “T/W 8/30/05,” rather than standing for “typewritten” and “backdated

to August 30, 2005" as Respondent argues, would actually stand for “trust withdrawal dated

August 30, 2005.” Under this scenario, the post-August 30 documents attached to the

Disputed Motion might be explained as a recordkeeping accident by the state court.

A second possible conclusion is that the mail log entries for September 2, 2005 reflect

something else besides the Disputed Petition being mailed, perhaps something the District

Attorney and Superior Court would have taken no notice of and discarded. Petitioner might

have done this by accident, only realizing his mistake in December, when he discovered his

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unmailed petition. Petitioner also might have done this by design, as a way of buying himself

more time to submit his petition. Either he or an accomplice then forged Officer Villalva’s

signature on the envelope, added the false date, and mailed the Disputed Petition without

prison officials noticing the erroneous information on the envelope.

In federal habeas proceedings, the Court must presume the correctness of factual

determinations by the state court. Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 919 (9th Cir. 2007). This

applies both to explicit and implicit findings. Id. (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,

433 (1983)). In ruling on what it considered the first petition, the Superior Court said it had

no record Petitioner had filed the Disputed Petition on August 30, 2005 as he maintains.

(Lodgment 6 at 2:3–5.) Later, when ruling on the Disputed Petition, the Superior Court found

it was filed on December 12, 2005. (Lodgment 8 at 2:12–14.) Relying on this finding, the

Superior Court denied the Disputed Petition. (Id. at 3:6–8 (finding Petitioner had not raised

his claims either on appeal or in his first petition and thus was “engaging in piecemeal

litigation”).) The Court of Appeal adopted the Superior Court’s findings along with the rest

of its reasoning. (Lodgment 10.) The Court therefore presumes these findings are correct,

unless Petitioner rebuts them by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

Although Petitioner had access to most or all of the same evidence as is before this

Court when the matter was before the state courts, there is no record he ever brought it to

their attention even though he knew they considered the Disputed Petition to be a

successive petition and were denying it on that basis. Even if the state courts did not

consider the same evidence, Petitioner could have asked them to rely on it.

 Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that, when viewed as a whole, creates an

abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions is highly probable. Colorado v.

New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). Although Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing,

“an evidentiary hearing is not required [either] on issues that can be resolved by reference

to the state court record,” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (1998), or else where the

petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court’s

factual findings. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007) (citing with approval

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Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 2000) and Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280,

290 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

The Court finds the evidence on the disputed issue of when Petitioner first filed his

Disputed Petition is in equipoise. Given this state of the evidence, Petitioner has not

presented clear and convincing evidence the state courts’ factual findings were incorrect.

For this reason, the Court must accept the state courts’ finding that Petitioner filed the

Disputed Petition in December, 2005, well after AEDPA’s limitations period had run.

Petitioner presents no other adequate grounds for tolling of the one-year limitations

period. The Court therefore ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Petition WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

Currently pending before Magistrate Judge McCurine is Petitioner’s motion for

discovery, filed nunc pro tunc to December 20, 2007, the same day Petitioner filed his

Objections. This discovery motion seeks documents by which Petitioner believes he can

show he filed the Disputed Petition on August 30, 2005. 

The Court construes this as a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 of this order, the holding of which Petitioner apparently anticipated.

The Court has reviewed the pleadings on Petitioner’s motion for discovery and, finding good

cause, GRANTS the motion in part with respect to production of Petitioner’s trust account

records and the housing unit logs. Magistrate Judge McCurine shall supervise discovery,

and all matters pertaining to discovery are referred to him. Respondent shall respond to the

discovery request within 15 calendar days from the date this order is entered. After he

responds to the discovery requests, the parties shall participate in a follow-up conference

with Magistrate Judge McCurine. Counsel for Respondent shall contact Judge McCurine’s

chambers to schedule this conference and shall arrange for Petitioner to participate

telephonically. The follow-up conference is to take place no later than 30 calendar days

from the date this order is entered.

Petitioner’s implied request to file a motion for reconsideration based on any evidence

he may uncover is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In the event Petitioner obtains what

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he considers to be clear and convincing evidence showing the Disputed Petition was filed

on August 30, 2005, Petitioner is ORDERED first to file a motion for leave to seek

reconsideration as required under ¶ 4(j) of the Court’s own standing order. His motion must

summarize in five pages or less his argument and he must lodge (but not file) his proposed

motion and all supporting documents. If Petitioner wishes to seek leave to file a motion for

reconsideration, he must do so no later than 60 calendar days from the date this order

is entered. 

If Petitioner does not seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration within the

time permitted, or if his request for leave is denied, the Petition will be denied with

prejudice, without further notice to Petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 14, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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