Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00073/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAAC VASQUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

M. ELIOT SPEARMAN,

Respondent.

No. 2:18cv0073 TLN KJN (HC)

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2012 conviction for second 

degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. 

Petitioner was originally sentenced to a total of 129 years and 4 months in state prison. His 

sentence was later reduced on remand following direct appeal. Petitioner claims that: (1) his 

constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated by the gang expert’s reliance on 

testimonial hearsay in forming his opinion as proffered by the People; (2) the trial court erred in 

excluding a portion of his statement to police pursuant to California Evidence Code section 356;

(3) the trial court erroneously permitted expert opinion testimony concerning the likelihood of 

petitioner and his co-defendants firing first in violation of petitioner’s due process rights; (4) trial 

counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to ensure the trial court ruled on a request to 

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introduce a Facebook post by the victim on the date of the incident; and, finally, (5) cumulative 

error. After careful review of the record, this court concludes that the petition should be denied.

II. Procedural History

On August 2, 2012, a jury found petitioner guilty of second degree murder (Cal. Pen. 

Code,1§ 187(a) [count 1]), four counts of attempted murder (§ 664/187(a) [counts 2-5]), and 

shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246 [count 6]). Further, numerous firearm related 

enhancements were found true as to all counts (§§ 12022.5(a)(1), 12022.53(c) & (d) & (e)(1)), as 

was an enhancement that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang

(§186.22(b)(1)). The special circumstance of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle with the 

intent to inflict great bodily injury (§ 190(d)) was also found true as to the second degree murder 

conviction. (LD 2 at 374-85.)2 On September 14, 2012, petitioner was sentenced to state prison 

as follows: to an indeterminate term of 120 years-to-life for the second degree murder (count 1) 

and to a determinate term of 9 years and 4 months for the attempted murder (counts 2-5) and 

shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 6) convictions. (LD 2 at 464-67.) 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 

District. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment “to strike the gang enhancement findings 

under [] section 186.22, subdivision (b), and vicarious firearm enhancement findings under [] 

section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), as well as the sentences imposed thereon,” but otherwise 

affirmed the convictions on September 6, 2016. (See ECF Doc. 12-1 & LD 17.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court (LD 193), which was 

denied on December 19, 2016. (LD 21.

4

)

1 Further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

2

“LD” refers to the documents lodged with this court by respondent on June 13, 2018; “ECF” 

refers to the docket entries in this court’s electronic case management filing system and the page 

numbers assigned by that system. 

3 The cover page for LD 19 erroneously identifies the document as “Amended Abstract of 

Judgment.” 

4 The cover page for LD 21 erroneously identifies the document as “Petitioner’s Co-Defendant’s 

Petition for Review.” 

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The Sacramento County Superior Court filed amended abstracts of judgment on January 

26, 2017, reflecting that petitioner was resentenced to a determinate term of 9 years, 4 months, 

plus an indeterminate term of 20 years-to-life in state prison. (LD 22.5) 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on January 12, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent 

answered on May 23, 2018. (ECF No. 12.) 

III. Preliminary Statement

Petitioner’s habeas petition is comprised of the form petition and attachments as 

supporting argument or points and authorities for the five grounds raised therein. More 

particularly, the attached portions are arguments asserted in the Petition for Review filed with the 

California Supreme Court and an argument taken from a codefendant’s opening brief, joined by 

petitioner, in the direct review proceeding before the Third District Court of Appeal. (Cf. ECF 

No. 1 to LD 19 to LD 13 at 11-19.) 

This court’s task on federal habeas review is to assess whether the state appellate court 

determinations of the claims presented to it were unreasonable or contrary to existing federal law, 

or whether the state court’s factual determinations were unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In 

this case, those determinations were made by the Third District Court of Appeal. Therefore, to 

the degree petitioner’s arguments here reference a basis for the California Supreme Court to grant 

review, the arguments are not addressed. Rather, the undersigned treats these arguments as 

asserting that the state court determinations were unreasonable, thus entitling petitioner to relief 

in this court. 

IV. Facts6

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary:

5 The cover page for LD 22 erroneously identifies the document as “Amended Order Denying 

Review.” 

6

 The facts are taken from the published opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District in People v. Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th 36 (2016), a copy of which was lodged by 

respondent as LD 17.

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Deandre Ellison was shot to death as he drove into his driveway in 

the Del Paso Heights neighborhood of Sacramento. Four other men, 

including Latrele Neal, were also in Ellison's car. Before the car came 

to a stop in the driveway, an SUV driven by Jesse Cornejo slowly 

drove past Ellison's house; the SUV's front and backseat passengers, 

Adam Cornejo and Isaac Vasquez, opened fire on Ellison's car.[]

Neal managed to return fire with Ellison's gun before the SUV drove 

away. About 20 bullets were exchanged between the vehicles. 

Bullets also struck Ellison's house. Ellison was the only casualty. 

After crashing the SUV while being pursued by law enforcement, 

Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were taken into custody a short time later. 

Each was a Norteño gang member. Isaac was 16 years old with a 

developmental disability; Adam and Jesse were 17 and 18 years old, 

respectively. 

(People v. Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th 36, 41-42 (2016), fn. omitted; see also ECF No. 12-1 & LD 

17.) 

V. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

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Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 

38, 44-45 (2011)); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per 

curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted 

among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as 

correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it 

cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 7 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 

997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 

U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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‘independent review of the legal question,’ is left with a ‘“firm conviction”’ that the state court 

was ‘“erroneous”’”). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Richter, 

562 U.S. at 103. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289,

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298 (2013) (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). If a state court fails to adjudicate a component of the 

petitioner’s federal claim, the component is reviewed de novo in federal court. Wiggins v. Smith, 

539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

have supported the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 101. The petitioner bears “the burden to demonstrate 

that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 

925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). 

VI. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Gang Expert Testimony

Petitioner claims that the gang expert’s testimony violated his constitutional right to 

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confrontation when the expert relied upon testimonial hearsay to form his opinion. (ECF No. 1 at 

19-26; see also LD 19 at 2-16.) Respondent maintains the state court’s determination that any 

error was harmless was reasonable and thus precludes federal habeas relief. (ECF No. 12 at 18-

20.) 

The last reasoned rejection of petitioner’s first claim is the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court 

addressed this claim as follows:

[Reversal of the gang enhancement findings by this court as to all 

defendants following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in People 

v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59] makes it unnecessary to address 

defendants' additional, and arguably meritorious, assertion that the 

trial court prejudicially erred and violated their constitutional right of 

confrontation by admitting expert gang testimony concerning the 

basis for the expert's conclusions they were active Norteño gang 

members. (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 670-671, 

204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320 [“case specific statements related 

by the prosecution expert concerning defendant's gang membership 

constituted inadmissible hearsay” and “[s]ome of those hearsay 

statements were also testimonial and therefore should have been 

excluded under Crawford[ v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [124 

S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177]]”].) And while defendants also assert 

such a confrontation violation would require reversal of their

underlying convictions, as well as the gang enhancements, we 

disagree. The evidence establishing their guilt of the underlying 

crimes was very strong, as we explain more fully later in this opinion. 

Setting aside any testimonial hearsay conveyed to the jury through 

the gang expert, we would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the 

jury would have convicted defendants of the underlying crimes.

(People v. Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th at 75, n.3; see also LD 17 at 4, n.3 & LD 18.) 

Applicable Legal Standards 

The standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), governs the harmlesserror inquiry. See Dixon v. Williams, 750 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Under 

Brecht, a petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief only if “the error had substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 507 U.S. at 637. To satisfy this standard, 

the court must have “grave doubt” as to the outcome, meaning that “in the judge’s mind, the 

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matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the 

error.” See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995). The Brecht standard applies “in 

virtually all” section 2254 cases, and only in rare cases involving truly egregious errors can a 

federal court grant habeas relief without the harmless-error inquiry. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 

112, 117, 121-22 (2007) (on federal habeas review, the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court has applied harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 

Analysis

The undersigned considers whether the Third District Court of Appeal’s determination 

that any error was harmless was a reasonable determination in light of Supreme Court precedent. 

It was a reasonable determination. 

The state appellate court referenced very strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt over and 

above the gang evidence. The undersigned’s review of the record reveals there is, as respondent 

argues, significant other evidence of petitioner’s guilt. (See, e.g., petitioner’s fleeing the scene of 

the shooting from which consciousness of guilt can be inferred [LD 3 755; LD 7 496-513, 515-

18, 521-23, 526-30, 548-50; LD 8 657; LD 10 1296-297], gunshot residue findings [LD 8 800-06, 

509-810], ballistics findings [LD 8 843-52, 854-56, 874, 877], and other witness testimonies [LD 

6 140-47, 295, 297-98, 300; LD 7 355-61, 454-62].) As a result of the review, the undersigned 

finds a substantial and injurious effect did not arise from any such error, nor does the undersigned 

have a grave doubt as to the outcome in this case. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 

435. 

The state court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, nor was its finding was based on an unreasonable application of the facts. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As a result, the undersigned recommends the claim be denied. 

B. Trial Court’s Ruling Concerning California Evidence Code Section 356

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to 

allow the conversation between he and Detective Kirtlan into evidence because the portion 

admitted during the prosecution’s direct examination of the detective inculpated petitioner as the 

shooter of the fatal bullet and otherwise did not allow for the jury to hear petitioner’s claims of 

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self-defense during the interview. (ECF No. 1 at 26-30; see also LD 12 at 27-38.) Respondent 

contends the claim is not cognizable for purpose of federal habeas review and must be denied. 

(ECF No. 12 at 21-25.) 

The last reasoned rejection of petitioner’s second claim is the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court 

addressed this claim as follows:

Isaac contends the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his 

constitutional rights by allowing one of the detectives in the case to 

convey a misleading portion of his police statement rather than 

require the prosecution to play the entire statement for the jury. We 

disagree.

A.

Additional Background

Ellison was killed by a nine–millimeter bullet. Police found multiple 

nine–millimeter and 10–millimeter shell casings in the street in front 

of Ellison's house. As mentioned, they found the corresponding 10–

millimeter handgun along the chase route. However, while police 

also found a magazine for a nine–millimeter handgun along the chase 

route, they did not find the gun itself.

Detective Kirtlan interviewed Isaac after the shooting. The detective 

told Isaac police had found the 10–millimeter handgun and the nine–

millimeter magazine, but were still looking for the 9–millimeter 

handgun. He also explained it was a “public safety issue” to have a 

gun left out on the street, especially since there would be children 

walking down that street on their way to school the next morning. 

Isaac then discussed the matter with his stepmother, who had joined 

him in the interview room, and ultimately agreed to point out the 

location of the missing handgun. The detective brought in a map of 

the area and Isaac pointed out the location he believed “they throwed 

it out.”

The prosecution moved in limine to be allowed to elicit testimony 

from Detective Kirtlan that Isaac told him the location where he 

believed police would be able to find the gun, despite the fact Isaac 

“arguably” invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda v. 

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 

(Miranda) prior to providing the location, under “the ‘public safety’

exception to the Miranda rule.” [9] The prosecutor explained: “What 

I proposed rather than playing the tape was to ask Detective Kirtlan 

did you receive information from [defendant] Isaac Vasquez as to 

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where you might find the missing nine millimeter gun? Yes. Did you 

look for it in that location? Yes. Did you find it? No.”

In response, Isaac's trial counsel argued: “I think that there is ... [an 

Evidence Code section] 356 problem. I think that the throwing of the 

gun is being used to show consciousness of guilt, whereas Isaac's 

statement during this long period that he was interrogated and 

questioned was that this was self-defense. So I think that you need to 

get in the entire statement so that the jury could, in essence, 

understand that.” Counsel also expressed concern that limiting the 

testimony to Isaac providing the location of the gun “gives a false 

impression that if he's saying where the gun was thrown, then it gives 

the impression that he threw the gun, and that's a significant issue.”

The prosecutor argued in reply: “As far as [Evidence Code section] 

356, I don't know that there is anything in his self-serving statements 

to [Isaac's stepmother] or even his inculpatory statements to [his 

stepmother] that explained the limited part that I'm trying to get out, 

where could they look for the gun. [¶] One of the things that has 

already been raised here by [counsel for Jesse] is that the police didn't 

do their job, didn't look for the .40 caliber, didn't even bother to look 

for the .40 caliber, didn't even bother to find it. Now, that's the one 

that was used by Latrele Neal. But it should at least be shown that 

the officers made attempts to find the outstanding nine millimeter. 

[¶] Because one of the other arguments counsel can make, well, 

maybe if we had the nine millimeter we could have—if they had done 

their job and looked for that maybe we could have done some testing 

on that or figured out which one of them fired it. There's nothing in 

any of the witness statements, even the witnesses who saw the ten 

millimeter being thrown from the car that indicates who in the car 

threw it. [¶] Now, in his statement, that portion of it I think he 

indicates or the officer indicates that it was thrown at we know who 

threw the gun. I'm simply trying to get before the jury that the officers 

attempted to locate it. They attempted to get information. They got 

information, and they went to look for it. But there's nothing in the 

statements that he makes to [his stepmother] or the lies that he makes 

to Detective Kirtlan initially that explains that or adds to it or clears 

anything up.”

The trial court ruled that admitting the fact Isaac provided the

location of the gun to police would not violate Miranda.

The trial court further ruled Evidence Code section 356 did not 

require “allowing an entire expansive rambling statement 

encompassing a number of topics to address a sole and easily isolated 

question such as we have in this case.”

Finally, the court explained the prosecution's intended use of Isaac's 

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statement as to the location of the nine–millimeter handgun did not 

“over-implicate” Isaac or “misrepresent” he was the one who threw 

the gun out of the Explorer.

In accordance with the trial court's ruling, during the prosecution's 

examination of Detective Kirtlan, the following exchange occurred:

“Q Did you receive information from [defendant] Isaac Vasquez 

about the location of a missing nine-millimeter semiautomatic 

handgun?

“A Yes, I did.

“Q Did you go to the area after receiving that information and search 

the area where it was thought that that gun might be?

“A Yes, ma'am.

“Q And where was that location?

“A Essentially in the area of Northgate and Striker in North

Sacramento.

“Q Now, is that an area where other evidence had been located?

“A Yes, ma'am.

“Q What other evidence had been located there?

“A A magazine to a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun.

“Q Did you find the nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun?

“A No, we did not.”

B.

Analysis

Evidence Code section 356 provides: “Where part of an act,

declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one 

party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an 

adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and 

when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in 

evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which 

is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.” 

(Italics added.)

This provision “is sometimes referred to as the statutory version of 

the common-law rule of completeness. [Citation.] According to the 

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common-law rule: ‘ “[T]he opponent, against whom a part of an 

utterance has been put in, may in his [or her] turn complement it by

putting in the remainder, in order to secure for the tribunal a complete 

understanding of the total tenor and effect of the utterance.” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Parrish (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 

263, 269, fn. 3, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 868.)

The purpose of the rule “is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a 

conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading 

impression on the subjects addressed. [Citation.] Thus, if a party's 

oral admissions have been introduced in evidence, he [or she] may 

show other portions of the same interview or conversation, even if 

they are self-serving, which ‘have some bearing upon, or connection 

with, the admission ... in evidence.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Arias

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 156, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) We 

review the trial court's determination of whether or not to admit 

evidence under this provision for abuse of discretion. (See People v. 

Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 235, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.)

Here, Detective Kirtlan testified Isaac told him where the nine–

millimeter handgun could be found, and after receiving this 

information, he went to a certain location where police found a 

magazine for a nine–millimeter handgun, but not the gun itself. 

Implicit in this testimony is that Isaac told the detective the gun could 

be found at that particular location. From this, and the fact the 

location was along the chase route, the jury could infer someone in 

the Explorer threw the gun out of the vehicle during the chase. The 

testimony does not reveal who threw the gun. Thus, the concern 

raised below that the testimony would misleadingly suggest Isaac 

was the one who threw the nine–millimeter handgun, and therefore 

likely fired the shot that killed Ellison, was obviated by the actual

testimony received into evidence. Indeed, the prosecutor never 

argued, in either her closing or rebuttal argument, that Isaac fired the 

fatal shot. Instead, she specifically conceded, “we don't know who 

had the nine and who had the ten.”

The other argument for admission of the entire statement, which was 

raised below, was the jury should hear the entirety of Isaac's 

statement, including the portion indicating the shooting was done in 

self-defense, to balance out the suggestion that throwing the gun out

of the Explorer evidenced Isaac's consciousness of guilt. However, 

the trial court appeared to credit the prosecutor's assurance that 

Isaac's statement as to where the nine–millimeter handgun could be 

found was being offered solely on the issue of whether the police 

conducted a thorough investigation. (See 4 McKenna & Fishman, 

Jones on Evidence (7th ed. 2014) § 24:26 [“where the defendant

challenges the investigation as unprofessional or sloppy or claims 

that he [or she] was falsely accused, the prosecutor should be entitled 

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to spell out the investigation in greater detail to rebut this defense”].) 

The prosecutor lived up to this assurance. At no point in her 

arguments to the jury did she argue the fact Isaac threw a handgun 

from the SUV evidenced his consciousness of guilt. Moreover, the 

rule of completeness prevents “‘the use of selected aspects of a 

[statement] so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects 

addressed,’” and therefore “hinges on the requirement that the two 

portions of a statement be ‘on the same subject.’” (People v. Vines 

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 861, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943, 

italics added.) Here, whether Isaac told Detective Kirtlan where to 

find the 9–millimeter handgun is not the same subject as whether the 

shooting itself was done in self-defense. We acknowledge narrow 

lines should not be drawn around the exact subject of inquiry (People 

v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 

704), but the statutory language “on the same subject” cannot be

rendered meaningless by an interpretation that draws no lines at all. 

(Evid. Code, § 356.)

Finally, we note Isaac raises a separate issue for the first time on 

appeal. He argues his exact statement to Detective Kirtlan, i.e., “they 

throwed it out” should have been admitted because it “was 

exculpatory in that it supported an inference that [Isaac] did not shoot 

the [nine–millimeter] gun that killed Ellison.” Acknowledging 

admission of Isaac's statement, “they throwed it out” at the joint trial 

in this case, where Isaac did not testify, would have potentially 

violated his codefendants' confrontation rights under People v.

Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265 and 

Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 

L.Ed.2d 476, Isaac argues the redaction of this statement to simply 

indicate he told Detective Kirtlan where the gun could be found 

prejudiced his defense. This argument is forfeited for failure to raise 

it in the trial court. (See People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 994–

995, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984, overruled on another point in

Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1075, 108

Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling Evidence Code 

section 356 did not require admission of Isaac’s entire statement to 

Detective Kirtlan.

(People v. Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th at 70-74, fn. omitted.) 

Applicable Legal Standards

Supreme Court precedent holds that defendants have a constitutional right to present 

relevant evidence in their own defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) 

(“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a 

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complete defense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has indicated that a 

defendant’s right to present a defense stems both from the right to due process provided by the 

Fourteenth Amendment, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and from the 

right “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” provided by the Sixth 

Amendment, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (explaining that the right to 

compulsory process would be meaningless if the defendant lacked the right to use the witnesses 

whose presence he compelled). 

However, “[a] defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is 

subject to reasonable restrictions,” such as evidentiary and procedural rules. United States v. 

Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). In fact, “state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude 

under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials,” id., and the 

Supreme Court has indicated its approval of “well-established rules of evidence [that] permit trial 

judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as 

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury,” Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006). Evidentiary rules do not violate a defendant’s constitutional 

rights unless they “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or 

disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Id. at 324 (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315 (explaining that the 

exclusion of evidence pursuant to a state evidentiary rule is unconstitutional only where it 

“significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused’s defense”). In general, it has 

taken “unusually compelling circumstances . . . to outweigh the strong state interest in 

administration of its trials.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the question whether an evidentiary rule 

requiring a trial court to balance factors and exercise its discretion “infring[es] upon a weighty 

interest of the accused” and is “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to 

serve.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 758 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, as a “well-established rule[ ] of evidence” that 

permits a court to exercise its discretion in excluding “evidence if its probative value is 

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substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 

or of misleading the jury,” California Evidence Code § 352 is more analogous to those 

evidentiary rules described with approval in Holmes. See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326 (“While the 

Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate 

purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established 

rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by 

certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the 

jury”). 

“A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an 

evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended, 421 

F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Analysis

The undersigned notes initially that the state appellate court’s factual recitations are 

accurate and fully supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (See LD 2 at 354-60; LD 3 

at 837-900; LD 4 at 901-33; LD 6 at 92-99; LD 8 at 601; LD 9 at 1118-162; LD 10 at 1225-241.) 

California Evidence Code section 356 provides:

Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in 

evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be 

inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer 

may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or 

writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, 

or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be 

given in evidence.

California’s evidentiary rule parallels Federal Rule of Evidence 106. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. 

Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (“[W]hen one party has made use of a portion of a document, 

such that misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another 

portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and therefore admissible”); 

People v. Chism, 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1324 (2014) (“The purpose of Evidence Code section 356 is to 

avoid creating a misleading impression”) (citation omitted). 

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Insofar as petitioner is claiming state law error in limiting the evidence at issue, such a 

claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Jammal v. Van de 

Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We are not a state supreme court of errors; we do not 

review questions of state evidence law”). The only cognizable question then is whether the trial 

court’s limitation of the evidence was so fundamentally unfair as to violate petitioner’s rights. 

The state appellate court’s determination that the testimony by Kirtlan was limited in such 

a way as to not indicate, much less reveal, who threw the gun from the Explorer, bolstered by the 

fact the prosecutor never argued petitioner or any specific co-defendant was the one to throw the 

gun, was reasonable. Moreover, it was reasonable for the state court to find that where the 

prosecution offered the limited evidence to refute defense claims of an incomplete investigation, 

petitioner’s claim of the need for self-defense during the interview period did not involve the 

requisite same subject matter. 

In sum, well settled Supreme Court jurisprudence dictates that “federal habeas corpus 

relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67. “[F]ailure to 

comply with the state’s rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting 

habeas relief,” as “it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when the state standards are 

violated.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d at 919. Thus, petitioner’s challenge to the state 

court’s exclusion of evidence under California Evidence Code section 356 is not cognizable on 

federal habeas review. See Adams v. Beard, 2015 WL 5895793, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) 

(petitioner’s claim that trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence pursuant to § 356 

was not a basis for federal habeas relief); Miller v. Adams, 2011 WL 7477034, at *22 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec. 22, 2011) (holding the trial court’s exclusion of evidence under § 356 was not “a basis for 

federal habeas relief under AEDPA”). Nor could petitioner prevail on the merits for petitioner 

has failed to show that any evidence excluded rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Hence, it 

is recommended this claim be denied. 

C. Testimony Regarding Who Fired First

Next, petitioner argues his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court 

permitted testimony by Detective Kirtlan and Detective Sample that in their opinion petitioner 

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and his codefendants were the first to fire their weapons. (LD 12 at 76, 78-80; LD 13 at 23-31; 

LD 19 at 11-12.) Respondent argues that the state court’s determination of the claim was 

reasonable and that no Supreme Court precedent requires the evidence be excluded. (ECF No. 12 

at 25-28.) 

The last reasoned rejection of petitioner’s third claim is the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court 

addressed this claim as follows: 

Admission of Certain Opinion Evidence

Defendants further assert the trial court prejudicially erred by

allowing expert opinion testimony that defendants probably fired 

first because Ellison would not have wanted to “attract trouble” to 

his home. Not so.

A.

Additional Background

Detective Jason Kirtlan interviewed Neal in the presence of Neal's 

attorney, who had secured an immunity agreement for Neal prior to 

the interview. During his cross-examination of Detective Kirtlan, 

Jesse's trial counsel asked: “Now, when [Neal] came to talk to you, 

isn't it true that the first thing you said to him is, I know you're the 

victim?” The detective answered: “Something to that effect, yes.” 

Counsel then asked: “Wouldn't it have been better to wait until you 

had heard what he had to say before you accepted his innocence?”

The detective responded: “As I discussed earlier, there was

overwhelming evidence in this case, as I've outlined, as to why I felt 

he was the victim and fired back in self-defense, as shared with the 

D.A.'s office, who agreed, and in this case gave him a letter of 

immunity.”

During the prosecution's redirect examination, the prosecutor asked 

Detective Kirtlan: “Is there anything other than what you've already 

stated, which is the placement of the casings and the evidence around 

the scene, the statements from [Boyd] and other witnesses and the 

overall ballistics evidence in the case, including the shot into [a 

neighboring] house, that causes you to take the position that, in fact, 

[Neal] was being truth[ful]—that [Neal] did fire back second?” The 

detective answered: “Yes, there is.” Then, after various objections

were overruled, he explained: “[Ellison] was pulling into his

driveway. He was in his neighborhood. He is not going to attract, nor 

would the occupants of his vehicle, in my belief, attract trouble to 

their home. [¶] The [Explorer] was out of the area. They're south area 

occupants up in the north area in a vehicle with weapons. [Ellison] 

was pulling into his driveway. [¶] If they were—if [Neal] were to 

have shot, the vehicle gets away, now they know where to come back 

to retaliate. [¶] It doesn't make sense to me. And given the totality of 

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the rest of the evidence, that led me to my determination that the 

Taurus was fired on.” Isaac's trial counsel then objected that the

answer was an “[i]mproper opinion,” which was overruled.

During Detective Sample's expert testimony, the prosecutor asked: 

“Assume that you have a gang member with several other people in 

his car. This gang member is feeling vulnerable. He has got a gun in 

his car. He's been threatened, he's been labeled a snitch. And he 

comes down the street and he sees other people coming towards him 

who are muggin' him, they don't—he doesn't know them, the people

in his car don't know them, but they know that they are giving hard 

looks to him. [¶] Would it be consistent with your knowledge of gang 

members for those people feeling vulnerable to turn into a dead end 

and leave themselves open to attack?” Jesse's trial counsel objected 

that the answer was “speculative,” which was overruled. The 

detective then answered: “No, it did not—it would not seem a likely

response for somebody who's that alert to a possible threat.”

B.

Analysis

Defendants argue the testimony of both detectives amounted to 

improper expert opinion for three reasons: (1) “the subject matter 

was not beyond the common experience of the average juror”; (2) 

“the opinion was essentially a question of whether the experts 

thought that Neal and [Boyd] were telling the truth when they 

testified that the [defendants] fired first”; and (3) because “the whole 

case boiled down to whether the jury determined that Neal fired first 

or they fired first,” the testimony amounted to “their view of how the 

case should be decided.” In response, the Attorney General draws a 

distinction between the two witnesses. With respect to Detective 

Kirtlan, the Attorney General argues the challenged testimony “was 

not admitted as his opinion on whether Neal in fact acted in selfdefense,” but rather “was properly admitted to rebut the implied bias 

raised by the defense under Evidence Code section 780, subdivision 

(f),” i.e., the detective concluded Neal fired in self-defense before

speaking to him because of a prior working relationship with Ellison 

and Boyd because Ellison had cooperated in a previous case against 

a fellow gang member. With respect to Detective Sample, the 

Attorney General argues the challenged testimony was a proper 

expert opinion.

 1. Detective Kirtlan's Testimony was Properly Admitted

“In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consider, 

among other things, ‘[t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, 

interest, or other motive’ for giving the testimony. (Evid. Code, § 

780, subd. (f).)” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 422, 3 

Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) “Evidence showing a witness's bias 

or prejudice or which goes to his [or her] credibility, veracity or 

motive may be elicited during cross-examination.” (People v. 

Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 428, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d

279.) Here, Jesse's trial counsel properly sought to elicit such

evidence during his cross-examination of Detective Kirtlan by asking 

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whether he was “frequently in contact” with Ellison and Boyd during 

his investigation of the previous case in which Ellison provided 

testimony against another gang member, which the detective 

admitted, and whether this working relationship made Detective 

Kirtlan “a little more emphatic” about “find[ing] the people that [he] 

believed were responsible,” which the detective denied. Counsel then 

asked Detective Kirtlan about his interview with Neal, specifically,

whether he accepted the fact Neal was an innocent victim before he 

even “heard what he had to say.” The purpose for these questions, 

and the order in which they were asked, is unmistakable. Counsel 

was seeking to establish that the detective did not consider the 

possibility Neal could have started the gunfight by firing on the 

Explorer because of his bias in favor of Ellison, one of his “snitches.”

In these circumstances, it was proper for the prosecution to then 

rehabilitate the detective by eliciting the reason he believed Neal did 

not fire first before he had spoken to the man. In other words, the 

challenged testimony was offered to show the detective's belief Neal 

fired in self-defense was based on reason, as opposed to mere bias, 

as the defense questioning suggested. (See, e.g., People v. Nichols

(1970) 3 Cal.3d 150, 157, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673 

[prosecution properly offered evidence of the reasonable basis for 

witness's testimony to rebut inference of bias raised by the defense 

on cross-examination].)

 2. Detective Sample's Testimony was Properly Admitted

Expert opinion testimony must be “[r]elated to a subject that is 

sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert 

would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) “The 

subject matter of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs ... 

meets this criterion.” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 

617, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713, disapproved on another point 

in People v. Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 

374 P.3d 320.) Here, Detective Sample testified, based on his special 

knowledge, training, education, and experience working as a gang 

detective, that a gang member who is feeling vulnerable because he 

has been threatened and labeled a snitch would not be likely to turn 

into a dead end and leave himself open to attack.

Defendants argue this specific opinion was not sufficiently beyond 

common experience to be helpful to the jury because “[n]o sensible 

person, regardless of their gang status, would knowingly place 

themselves in a trap if they thought the[y] were under threat.” We 

disagree. While no sensible person would pull into his own driveway 

and start a gunfight with no means of escape, whether a gang member 

would do so is not something the average juror would know. Nor was 

Detective Sample's testimony simply an opinion as to whether Neal 

and Boyd had testified truthfully concerning how the gunfight

occurred, or as to how the jury should ultimately decide the case.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the challenged 

testimony of Detectives Kirtlan and Sample.

(People v. Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th at 51-54.) 

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Applicable Legal Standards

A state court’s admission of evidence under state evidentiary law will form the basis for 

federal habeas relief only where the evidentiary ruling “so fatally infected the proceedings as to 

render them fundamentally unfair” in violation a petitioner’s due process rights. Jammal v. Van 

de Kamp, 926 F.2d at 919. “[F]ailure to comply with the state’s rules of evidence is neither a 

necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas relief.” Id. 

The United States Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions that violate 

‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly,” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990), and 

“has made very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process.” 

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). It has opted not to hold that 

evidence of other crimes or bad acts “so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of 

law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 & n.5 (noting that the Court “express[ed] no opinion on whether a 

state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence 

to show propensity to commit a charged crime”). Moreover, the Supreme Court “has not yet 

made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (citing 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77). In the absence of clearly established law that admission of 

even overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation, the court cannot conclude 

that the state court’s ruling was an “unreasonable application.” Id.; see also Larson v. Palmateer, 

515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that because the Supreme Court has expressly 

reserved the question of whether using evidence of a defendant’s past crimes to show that he has 

a propensity for criminal activity could ever violate due process, the state court did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established law in determining that the admission of defendant’s 

criminal history did not violate due process). A federal court is “without power” to grant a 

habeas petition based solely on the admission of evidence. Id. 

Even setting aside the issue of clearly established federal law, “[a] habeas petitioner bears 

a heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. 

Brown, 404 F.3d at 1172. Again, “’[t]he admission of evidence does not provide a basis for 

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habeas relief unless it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.’” 

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. “Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from 

evidence can its admission violate due process.” Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 887 (9th Cir. 

2003) (emphasis in original); Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999). “Even then, 

the evidence must ‘be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Jammal v. Van de 

Kamp, 926 F.2d at 920 (citation omitted). Such can only occur if the admission of the evidence 

had a “’substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). 

Analysis

First, the undersigned finds the state court’s factual determinations are accurate as 

revealed by a review of the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (See LD 7 590-600; LD 8 601-51; 

LD 9 925-1033.) 

Under California law, expert testimony on criminal street gangs is admissible to prove the 

elements of the criminal street gang substantive offense and the gang enhancement. See People v. 

Jasso, 211 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1377 (2012) (relying on expert testimony in part to support a 

conviction for the substantive offense); see also People v. Hernandez, 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1047-048 

(2004) (“In order to prove the elements of the criminal street gang enhancement, the prosecution 

may, as in this case, present expert testimony on criminal street gangs”). Petitioner nonetheless 

argues that Detectives Kirtlan’s and Sample’s testimony was improper because the opinion 

testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury on ultimate issues in the case. Petitioner

argued on direct appeal that this testimony violated state law, but federal habeas relief is not 

available for errors of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. He additionally argues in his petition 

that the testimony deprived him of due process in violation of federal law. But under federal law, 

there is no support for “the general proposition that the Constitution is violated by the admission 

of expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Moses v. 

Payne, 555 F.3d at 761. “[I]t is ‘well-established... that expert testimony concerning an ultimate 

issue is not per se improper.’ Although ‘[a] witness is not permitted to give a direct opinion about 

the defendant’s guilt or innocence...an expert may otherwise testify regarding even an ultimate 

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issue to be resolved by the trier of fact.’” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Duvardo v. 

Giurbino, 410 F.Appx. 69, 70 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court “has never held that 

the admission of expert testimony on an ultimate issue to be resolved by the trier of fact violates 

the Due Process Clause”); Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled 

on other grounds as recognized in Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, 

the Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated that “because ‘there is no clearly established 

constitutional right to be free of an expert opinion on an ultimate issue...the admission of the 

opinion testimony of [a gang expert] cannot be said to be contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, Supreme Court precedent.’” Maquiz v. Hedgpeth, 907 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1077-78). 

Petitioner claims that the detectives’ testimony was offered merely to opine that Neal was 

credible, but the Third District Court of Appeal’s determination that the evidence was not “simply 

an opinion as to whether Neal and Boyd had testified truthfully concerning how the gunfight 

occurred,” Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th at 53-54, was neither unreasonable nor contrary to federal law. 

Petitioner is thus not entitled to relief on any argument advanced in support of this claim; and the 

undersigned recommends the claim be denied.

D. Evidence Concerning the Victim’s Facebook Post

Petitioner argues his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court did not permit 

him to introduce evidence of a Facebook post made by the victim on the date of the incident. 

(ECF No. 1 at 34-38; see also LD 12 at 76-77; LD 13 at 11-19, 22-23.) In reply, respondent 

maintains the claim is procedurally barred, and that, in any event, the state court’s denial of the 

claim was not unreasonable. (ECF No. 12 at 29-37.) 

The last reasoned rejection of petitioner’s fourth claim is the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court 

addressed this claim as follows:

Exclusion of Defense Evidence

Defendants claim the trial court prejudicially erred and violated their 

constitutional right to due process by excluding evidence of a post 

made to Ellison's Facebook page on the day of the shooting, which 

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they argue indicated Ellison “had reentered gang life” and “was 

associating with gang members.” According to defendants, this 

evidence was highly probative of their defense, i.e., Ellison was 

killed in self-defense after Neal opened fire on them, because “the 

people in Ellison's car had the same motivations to shoot first as the 

gang expert attributed to [defendants].” Defendants also claim the 

excluded evidence “would [have] support[ed] the defense contention 

that Ellison drove his car in a way to force [defendants] to stop in 

front of his house” and “would [have] rebut[ted] [Boyd's] testimony 

that Ellison only purchased the gun because he was afraid of being 

attacked because he was cooperating with the police.”

A.

Additional Background

Jesse moved in limine to introduce a printout from Ellison's 

Facebook page that included a post made around two hours before 

the murder. The post stated: “GET MONEY TRUST NOT A SOUL 

MONEY AND MURDER I SWEAR IM BACK AT IT AGAIN 

WHO CAN I TRUST IN THIS WORLD? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 

? ? ? ? GET ACTIVE.” The printout also included Ellison's profile 

picture, in which he was apparently making a gang sign with his 

hands.

Jesse's trial counsel argued the post was relevant to show Ellison's 

state of mind at the time of the shooting, i.e., he and the other 

occupants of the Taurus “were expecting to get hit” and “were 

expecting trouble,” which he argued was “very probative of who 

fired first.” Counsel also argued the post was admissible despite the 

hearsay rule because it qualified as a statement of Ellison's thenexisting state of mind and a statement against penal interest. Counsel 

further argued Boyd, who also had access to Ellison's Facebook 

account, could authenticate the post. Isaac's attorney joined in these 

arguments.

In response, the prosecutor did not object to the profile picture being 

admitted, but argued defense counsel was attempting to “circumvent 

the hearsay rules and circumvent the foundational requirements” by 

seeking to admit the Facebook post. With respect to hearsay, the 

prosecutor did not actually make an argument. With respect to 

foundation, the prosecutor questioned whether counsel would be able 

to establish Ellison “did in fact, make that entry.”

After further argument from defense counsel, the trial court took the 

matter under submission.

Trial began without a ruling on admissibility of the Facebook post. 

The following exchange occurred during Jesse's cross-examination 

of Neal:

“Q Did you also say that [Ellison] don't even gang bang no more?

“A Yes, I did say that. He did not gang bang anymore.

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“Q You don't know—you say you know that for a fact?

“A I know that for a fact. [¶] He got married and he was a family—

was a family man. He was changing his life. His grandma had just 

passed away. He had just got saved. [¶] He was—he was a totally 

different dude that I know from growin' up with. I know for a fact he 

did not gang bang anymore.

“Q Did you ever go on his Facebook page?

“A Yes, I did.

“Q When was the last time you went on his Facebook page?

“A Um, I been on there after he was killed. I been on there before he 

was killed.”

At this point, counsel again sought to admit the Facebook post, 

arguing the post was admissible under Evidence Code section 780 as 

evidence tending to disprove the truthfulness of Neal's testimony that 

Ellison was no longer “gang banging.” The trial court ruled the post 

inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352, as requiring the jury 

to “embark on ... something that's a bit of a side show, and that is the 

question of whether or not [Neal] believes [Ellison] was involved as 

a gang banger at the time.” The trial court then instructed the jury to 

disregard Neal's “opinions as to whether or not [Ellison] was or was 

not involved actively as a member of a gang.”

B.

Forfeiture

We first note neither Jesse's trial counsel, nor counsel of either codefendant, pressed for a ruling on the matter of whether or not the 

Facebook post was admissible as substantive evidence Neal fired 

first, prompting Adam and Isaac to return fire in self-defense. (See 

People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813–814, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 

46, 101 P.3d 994 [failure to press for a ruling generally forfeits 

contention of error].) Indeed, Adam's trial counsel did not join in the 

argument in the first place. (See People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th 

at p. 793, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041 [failure to join in the 

objection or motion of a codefendant generally forfeits the issue on 

appeal].) When the matter of the Facebook post was revisited during 

Jesse's cross-examination of Neal, counsel sought to admit the 

evidence to impeach Neal's testimony that Ellison was no longer a 

gang member, but did not indicate to the trial court he was also 

pressing for a ruling on whether the evidence was admissible to prove 

self-defense. Thus, the trial court ruled the Facebook post was not 

admissible to impeach Neal under an Evidence Code section 352 

analysis. The trial court never ruled on the initial motion to admit this 

evidence to prove self-defense, nor did any of the defendants press 

the trial court to do so. By failing to press for a ruling—and in Adam's 

case, by failing to join in the argument altogether—defendants have 

forfeited their now-joint contention the trial court prejudicially erred 

and violated their due process rights by excluding the proffered 

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evidence.

C.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Anticipating forfeiture, Jesse argues his trial counsel rendered 

constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to “explicitly argue 

that the fact that Ellison had returned to an active gang life would 

tend to show that he and his associates ... were just as likely to fire 

first as were Jesse and his associates.” Adam and Isaac join in this 

argument as well, which we interpret as arguing their respective 

counsel were equally ineffective.

A criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel under 

both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. (People v. 

Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 

839.) This right “entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance 

but rather to effective assistance. [Citations.] Specifically, it entitles 

him [or her] to ‘the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney 

acting as his [or her] diligent conscientious advocate.’ [Citations.]” 

(Ibid. quoting United States v. DeCoster (D.C.Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 

1197, 1202.) “‘In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must first show counsel's performance was 

“deficient” because his [or her] “representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional 

norms.” [Citations.] Second, he [or she] must also show prejudice 

flowing from counsel's performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] 

Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”’” (In re Harris

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832–833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391; 

accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.) The burden of proving a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the 

defendant. (People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 816, 129 

Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110.)

Defendants have not carried their burden. Even assuming (1) counsel 

would have been able to establish Ellison in fact made the post to his 

Facebook page, (2) the post indeed meant Ellison had decided to 

return to an active gang lifestyle, (3) defendants are correct that the 

Facebook post was relevant to establish (a) Neal was just as likely to 

have fired first as were Adam and Isaac, (b) Ellison likely drove the 

Taurus in between the first car and the Explorer in order to force 

defendants to stop in front of his house, and (c) contrary to Boyd's 

testimony, Ellison did not purchase the handgun solely because he 

was afraid of being attacked for having cooperated with the police, 

and (4) the post was not inadmissible hearsay because it evidenced 

Ellison's then-existing state of mind, we cannot conclude exclusion 

of this evidence would have been an abuse of discretion under 

Evidence Code section 352 or a violation of their constitutional right 

to due process.

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Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may 

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Our 

Supreme Court has explained this section “permits the trial judge to 

strike a careful balance between the probative value of the evidence 

and the danger of prejudice, confusion and undue time 

consumption,” but “requires that the danger of these evils 

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” (People 

v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744, 94 Cal.Rptr. 405, 484 P.2d 77; 

see also People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 168, 136 

Cal.Rptr.3d 713.) Rulings under this provision “come within the trial 

court's discretion and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that 

discretion.” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070, 56 

Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337.)

Here, the Facebook post was minimally probative of defendants' 

claim of self-defense. Even assuming the post established in the 

jurors' minds that Ellison possessed the gun, not simply for 

protection, but also for gang purposes, i.e., confrontation, and Ellison 

deliberately cut off the Explorer while pulling into his driveway, 

neither fact would justify defendants' actions of opening fire on 

Ellison's car. The only purported fact that would justify such an 

assault is Neal's firing at the Explorer first, or at the very least, 

pointing Ellison's gun in defendants' direction, and thereby causing a 

reasonable belief in the need to employ deadly force in self-defense. 

But the Facebook post was made by Ellison, not Neal. There is no 

dispute Neal was the one who fired Ellison's gun. Indeed, Ellison was 

apparently hit before he could put the car in park. Ellison's post was 

therefore relevant on the issue of Neal's conduct only if Neal was 

aware of the post. In other words, Ellison's decision to return to gang 

life, by itself, does not tend to prove anything about Neal. However, 

Neal's belief Ellison was out of the gang life would tend to make it 

less likely that he would take it upon himself to use Ellison's gun to 

fire upon another vehicle in front of Ellison's house had occupants of 

that vehicle not fired first. Conversely, Neal's belief Ellison had 

returned to the gang life would tend to make his firing first in these 

circumstances more likely. But how much more likely? We conclude 

the answer is “not much.” The evidence established Ellison had 

offered testimony against a rival gang member, had been threatened 

for having done so, and was pulling into his driveway when the 

shooting occurred. In these circumstances, regardless of whether 

Ellison had decided to return to the gang lifestyle, and regardless of 

whether Neal was aware of this decision, opening fire on an Explorer 

full of gang members in front of Ellison's house, and in a driveway 

with no means of escape when the occupants of the Explorer 

predictably returned fire, is so unlikely as to be implausible.

Weighing against this low level of probative value is the reality that 

admission of the evidence would have required a significant 

consumption of time. The defense would have been required to 

establish what we have assumed in our analysis thus far, i.e., the post 

was in fact made by Ellison, the post indeed meant Ellison had 

returned to an active gang lifestyle, and Neal was aware of his return 

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to this lifestyle. In light of the minimal probative value of the 

evidence, we cannot conclude the trial court would have abused its 

discretion by excluding the evidence under an Evidence Code section 

352 analysis. Nor are we persuaded such a decision would have 

amounted to a deprivation of due process. While defendants are 

correct to point out Evidence Code section 352 “must bow to the due 

process right of a defendant to a fair trial and his [or her] right to 

present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his [or 

her] defense[,] ... the proffered evidence must have more than slight 

relevancy to the issues presented. [Citation.]” (People v. Burrell–

Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599, 237 Cal.Rptr. 654; People v. 

Reeder (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 543, 553, 147 Cal.Rptr. 275.) Here, as 

we have already explained, the Facebook post did not have 

significant probative value.

In sum, because admission of the Facebook post would have 

necessitated an undue consumption of time and the post was not 

significantly probative of defendants' claim of self-defense, the trial 

court would not have abused its discretion or violated defendants' due 

process rights by excluding the evidence under Evidence Code 

section 352 had defendants' respective counsel pressed for a ruling 

on the matter. Thus, regardless of whether reasonable counsel would 

have pressed for such a ruling, our confidence in the outcome is not 

undermined.

(People v. Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th at 54-58.) 

Applicable Legal Standards & Analysis

As a general rule, “[a] federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state 

court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 

federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 314

(2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55 (2009)). However, a reviewing court need not 

invariably resolve the question of procedural default prior to ruling on the merits of a claim. 

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997); see also Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 

1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more complex than the merits 

issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to proceed to the 

merits if the result will be the same”); Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 720 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting 

that although the question of procedural default should ordinarily be considered first, a reviewing 

court need not do so invariably, especially when the issue turns on difficult questions of state 

law). Where deciding the merits of a claim proves to be less complicated and less timeconsuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a court may exercise discretion in its 

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management of the case to reject the claim on the merits and forgo an analysis of procedural 

default. See Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1232 (citing Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525). The undersigned finds 

it less time-consuming to address the merits of the claim.

It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense. 

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 690. This right is not, however, without limitation. “The accused 

does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise 

inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). 

“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 

excluding evidence from criminal trials.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308; see Crane, 

476 U.S. at 689-690; Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438, n.6, (1983); Chambers v. 

Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302-303; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967). “Thus, a trial 

judge may exclude or limit evidence to prevent excessive consumption of time, undue prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The trial judge enjoys broad latitude in this 

regard, so long as the rulings are not arbitrary or disproportionate.” Menendez v. Terhune, 422 

F.3d 1012, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-43 

(1996) (holding due process rights are not violated by exclusion of relevant evidence where 

probative value is outweighed by danger of prejudice or confusion).

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the federal counterpart to California Evidence Code section 

352, permits the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is “substantially outweighed by a 

danger of...unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, 

or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” “A district court is accorded a wide discretion in 

determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the probative value 

of [the proffered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a matter 

first for the district court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403....” United States v. Abel, 

469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); see Boyd v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 

2009). California employs a similar rule. See People v. Harris, 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 (2005) (“We 

review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence”). 

////

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Under these guidelines, this court cannot find that the exclusion of the Facebook posts was 

an abuse of discretion or unreasonable or contrary to federal law. 

Here, petitioner and his codefendants had an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution 

witnesses about Ellison’s past gang history and argue that Ellison had re-entered gang life. (See, 

e.g., LD 7 365-414, 416-20, 422-24, 433-34.) Petitioner argues that he should have been able to 

introduce additional extrinsic evidence in support of that argument. But the trial court properly 

determined that such evidence was not sufficiently relevant in this case. The proffered evidence, 

although relevant, had limited probative value. (LD 7 425-28.) The trial court acted well within 

its discretion and within the bounds of the Confrontation Clause in determining that the limited 

probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the undue consumption of time that the 

presentation of such evidence would require as well as the danger of confusion to the jury. See

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 314 (noting that “collateral litigation prolongs criminal 

trials and threatens to distract the jury from its central function of determining guilt or 

innocence”). The trial court had legitimate concerns that proving up that Neal was aware that 

Ellison had returned to gang life based on the Facebook posts would have resulted in a “minitrial” 

that would have unduly complicated the matter.

In short, excluding the proffered evidence here did not violate the Confrontation Clause or 

petitioner’s right to present a defense, nor was it contrary to any clearly established Supreme 

Court authority. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); cf. Guasch v. Cates, 

No. C 10-5628, 2011 WL 2471029, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2011) (“To have allowed a trial 

within a trial, that is, a trial of a witness’s unrelated and as-yet unproven credit-card wrong within 

petitioner’s own trial for trying to kill his wife would have been unwise. Defense efforts like this 

are routinely and rightly rejected without doing any damage to the Sixth Amendment”). 

Accordingly, petitioner cannot show that his constitutional rights were violated by the 

exclusion, and for the same reasons, he fails to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

press the trial court for a ruling on the evidence’s admissibility to prove self-defense. See Rupe v. 

Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (defense counsel’s failure to raise a meritless 

argument or to take a futile action does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). In sum, 

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petitioner is not entitled to relief and it is hereby recommended the claim be denied.

E. Cumulative Error

Petitioner’s fifth and final claim is that the cumulative effect of the errors alleged herein 

constitute a denial of due process. (ECF No. 1 at 32; see also LD 19 at 28-29 [Petition for 

Review; Claim IV].) Respondent contends the state court reasonably rejected petitioner’s claim 

of cumulative error. (ECF No. 12 at 37-38.) 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that under clearly established United States Supreme 

Court precedent the combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process 

violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered individually 

would not require reversal. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th. Cir. 2007) (citing Donnelly 

v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 290). 

“The fundamental question in determining whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a 

defendant's due process rights is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less 

persuasive,’ Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, and thereby had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence’ on the jury's verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

at 637). See also Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 916 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

This court has addressed each of petitioner’s claims and has concluded that no error of 

constitutional magnitude occurred. This court also concludes that the alleged errors, even when 

considered together, did not render petitioner’s defense “far less persuasive,” nor did they have a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Accordingly, petitioner is not 

entitled to relief on his claim of cumulative error and it is recommended the claim be denied. 

VII. Conclusion

For all of the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, he shall also 

address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to which issues. 

A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). Any 

response to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 23, 2020

/vasq0853.157

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