Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01534/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01534-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAHIMA NASERY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16CV1534-CAB-KSC

ORDER REGARDING MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 

COSTS [Doc. No. 22]

On August 4, 2017, Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“Report”) to grant Plaintiff Rahima Nasery’s motion for summary 

judgment, deny Defendant Berryhill’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remand 

the case back to the Commissioner for further proceedings. [Doc. No. 19.] On January 

19, 2017, this Court issued an order adopting the Report, granting Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and remanding 

for further proceedings. [Doc. No. 20.] On November 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion 

for attorneys’ fees. [Doc. No. 22.] On November 22, 2017, Defendant filed an 

opposition to the motion. [Doc. No. 24.] On December 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a reply 

to the opposition. [Doc. No. 25.] After a careful review of the submissions of the parties, 

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the Court GRANTS WITH MODIFICATION Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ 

fees/costs as set forth below.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has submitted an application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, (“EAJA”) 28 U.S.C. section 2412. Defendant opposes the motion 

on the grounds that the government's position was substantially justified and that the fees 

requested are unreasonable. The Court grants plaintiff's application with modification, as 

set forth below.

The EAJA shifts the burden of attorney's fees from the private litigant to the 

government in order to reduce the chance that the expense of legal representation will 

deter defense against unreasonable government action. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 

580, 582 (9th Cir.1984). “[A] litigant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if (1) [s]he is 

the prevailing party, (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust, and (3) the requested 

attorney's fees and costs are reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Carbonell v. INS, 

429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th 

Cir.2002)) (further citation omitted).

A. Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

An applicant for Social Security benefits who receives a remand under sentence 

four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant 

later succeeds in obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Shaefar, 509 U.S. 292, 302, 

113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993); Garnica v. Astrue, 378 Fed. Appx. 680, 681 

(9th Cir. 2010). The Court remanded this action to the ALJ pursuant to sentence four of 

42 U.S.C. section 405(g). [Doc. Nos. 19, 20.] Plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party. See

Shalala, 509 U.S. at 302.

B. The Commissioner has not shown that her position was substantially justified.

The government bears the burden of showing that its position was, as a whole, 

substantially justified. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.2001) 

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(“Gutierrez II ”). To meet this standard, the government must advance a position that is 

“justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a 

reasonable person.” Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.2008) (citation and 

internal quotations omitted). In making this determination, a court “must focus on two 

questions: first, whether the government was substantially justified in taking its original 

action; and, second, whether the government was substantially justified in defending the 

validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez II, 274 F.3d at 1258–59 (quotations, citations, 

and modifications omitted). The Commissioner must show that her position was 

substantially justified “with respect to the issue on which the court based its remand.” 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir.1995). It is an abuse of discretion to find 

“that an agency's position was substantially justified when the agency's position was 

based on violations of ... the agency's own regulations....” Gutierrez II, 274 F.3d at 1259–

60 (citing Mendenhall v. NTSB, 92 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.1996)).

Here, the Commissioner’s position with respect to the issues on which the Court 

based its remand was not substantially justified. This Court found the Commissioner 

committed the following two errors of law and fact: (1) the ALJ’s decision is incomplete 

because it does not include an analysis of how plaintiff’s ability to function in a work 

setting is affected by her “mild limitations” in mental functioning [Doc. No. 19 at 37-41]; 

(2) the ALJ’s decision is incomplete because it is apparent the ALJ rejected plaintiff’s 

pain testimony but did not provide clear and convincing reasons for doing so [Doc. No. 

19 at 41-43]. For the reasons set forth in the Report, the Commissioner’s position was not 

substantially justified. [See generally, Doc. No. 19.] Moreover, given that several errors 

were made by the ALJ, the government’s position is not substantially justified. See 

Herron v. Colvin, 585 Fed. Appx. 511, 512-13 (9th Cir. 2014)(where ALJ made a series 

of legal errors, the government’s position was not substantially justified). Finally, given

that the underlying government position was not substantially justified, the government 

was also not substantially justified in defending the previous action. See Sampson v. 

Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (citations omitted). 

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C. Reasonableness of Fees.

1. Hours billed.

Plaintiff's counsel seeks compensation for 78 hours billed in this matter. [Doc. No. 

22-2 at ¶7.] The Commissioner argues that the number of hours Plaintiff's attorneys 

claim to have spent litigating this action is unreasonable. Specifically, the Commissioner 

asserts that the work could have been accomplished in 31.5 hours. [Doc. No. 24 at 7.] 

The EAJA directs the court to award reasonable fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

In determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the 

reasonable hourly rate, and the results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 

154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), abrogated on other grounds 

by Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, (1989); 

Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 515 (9th 

Cir.2000); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.1998).

As to the number of hours expended, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted a detailed 

itemization showing the number of hours expended for each task. [Doc. No. 22-2 at 4-5.] 

The Commissioner disputes the reasonableness of the hours spent on particular tasks and 

then suggests what she thinks would have been a reasonable amount of time for each 

task. [Doc. No. 24 at 5-8.] However, the Court sees no reason to dispute Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s representation that all hours were reasonably expended. The Administrative 

Record in this case was approximately 600 pages long, and Plaintiff had complicated 

physical and mental health diagnoses, all of which had to be evaluated against Social 

Security regulations and guidelines. Given the complexity of the matter, as well as the 

fact that Plaintiff’s counsel submitted almost 40 pages of briefing in this matter (not 

including the motion for attorneys’ fees), 78 hours of attorney time is not unreasonable. 

See Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate.

Under the EAJA, attorneys’ fees “shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour

unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such

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as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a 

higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

a. Cost of Living Increase

In the Ninth Circuit, “appropriate cost-of-living increases are calculated by

multiplying the $125 statutory rate by the annual average consumer price index figure for 

all urban consumers (‘CIP-U’) for the years in which counsel’s work was performed, and 

then dividing by the CPI-U figure for March 1996, the effective date of the EAJA’s $125 

statutory rate.” Thangaraja, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff correctly states that the hourly rate for EAJA fees is $190.28 for 2016 and 

$195.95 for 2017. [Doc. No. 22-1 at 8.] Defendant does not dispute these rates.

b. Special Factor Enhancement.

Plaintiff’s counsel, Alexandra Manbeck, argues that she should receive an 

enhancement of $50 per hour because she has unique knowledge and skills in social 

security law which are not available to Plaintiff at the statutory rate, and because 

counsel’s specialized knowledge of the Vietnamese language and culture makes her 

indispensable to Plaintiff’s ability to vindicate her civil rights. [Doc. No. 22-1 at 9-15.] 

However, as Defendant points out: (1) Plaintiff is from Afghanistan, not Vietnam; (2) 

Plaintiff has resided in the United States since she was 9 years old; (3) she attended the 

University of Alabama for two or three years; (3) she had a driver’s license and was able 

to drive; (4) she had worked at Nordstrom and Nieman Marcus; (5) she spoke fluent 

English at her hearing. [Doc. No. 24 at 9.] Therefore, Plaintiff’s counsel’s language and 

cultural skills in Vietnamese are not relevant to this case and do not justify an 

enhancement of the hourly rate. See Jawad v. Barnhart, 370 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1089 (S.D. 

Cal. 2005)(Ms. Manbeck’s ability to speak Vietnamese, where plaintiff was from Iraq, 

was irrelevant to the litigation and not grounds to increase the fee). 

D. Costs.

Plaintiff’s request for costs in the amount of $400 for the filing fee is not disputed 

by Defendant and is reasonable.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees/costs is 

GRANTED WITH MODIFICATION as follows: Plaintiff is awarded $14, 976.50 in 

attorney’s fees, plus $400.00 in costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2017

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