Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_13-cv-00017/USCOURTS-alnd-7_13-cv-00017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

CALVIN HINTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

READY MIX USA LLC,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 7:13-cv-00017-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on a Report and Recommendation related to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17). On January 13, 2015, the Magistrate Judge entered a 

Report and Recommendation in this case (Doc. 27), recommending that the court:

(1) grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s age 

discrimination claims (Count One);

(2) deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s race 

discrimination claims regarding “termination”

1

(Count Two);

(3) deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s race 

discrimination claims regarding Defendant’s failure to recall Plaintiff to work

(Count Two); and

(4) deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for 

front and back pay.

(Doc. 27 at 16). The parties were allowed fourteen (14) days in which to file objections to the 

recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. (Id.). On January 27, 2015, Defendant filed 

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 28), and on February 6, 

2015, Plaintiff responded (Doc. 30). In its objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

 

1 The parties dispute the exact nature of the termination – i.e., whether Plaintiff was fired or laid off.

FILED

 2015 Mar-19 PM 04:30

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:13-cv-00017-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/19/15 Page 1 of 6
2

Recommendation, Defendant argues that summary judgment should be granted on both 

Plaintiff’s separation and failure to recall claims.

After careful consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, 

Defendant’s objections, and the Rule 56 record, the court ADOPTS IN PART and ACCEPTS 

IN PART the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The court ACCEPTS the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report with respect to recommendations (1), (2), and (4) above. However, 

the court REJECTS the Report as to recommendation (3). Accordingly, the court concludes 

Defendant’s motion is due to be granted as to Plaintiff’s failure to recall claim.

I. Plaintiff’s Discriminatory Termination Claim

The Magistrate Judge concluded that there is a triable issue regarding Plaintiff’s 

termination. (Doc. 27 at 10-12). The court agrees.

The Magistrate Judge based his recommendation on the convincing “mosaic” of five 

categories of evidence showing: (1) Defendant’s only justification for the reduction of force was 

lack of work; (2) Plaintiff was the only black employee hired by Plant Manager Carl Walker and 

the only person Defendant ever let go due to a lack of work; (3) a trier of fact could infer racial 

animus on the part of Walker because of his conduct and racially inappropriate comments in the 

workplace; (4) management failed to follow company policy with regard to Walker’s offensive 

behavior and comments; and (5) shortly after Plaintiff’s termination, Defendant hired two white 

employees. (See Doc. 27 at 11). Defendant challenges the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, 

arguing that summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim 

because the Rule 56 record does not present a genuine issue of material fact. But Defendant’s 

arguments in this respect are off the mark.

Case 7:13-cv-00017-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/19/15 Page 2 of 6
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Both Plaintiff and Raymond Smith, one of his former coworkers, offered testimony 

disputing that there was actually a lack of work which would justify a reduction in force. In fact, 

they each have testified that there was “plenty of work” at the plant. (Doc. 19-1, Pl. Dep. 79:13-

14; Doc. 19-6, Smith Dep. 17:3-6). For the purposes of summary judgment, and contrary to 

Defendant’s assertion otherwise, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff’s testimony is self-serving. Price v. 

Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir.), as modified on denial of reh’g, 425 F.3d 1292 (11th

Cir. 2005) (“Courts routinely and properly deny summary judgment on the basis of a party’s 

sworn testimony even though it is self-serving.”); see also United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1509, 

1512-13 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding defendant’s “self-serving testimony, by itself, created a jury 

question”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s testimony describing the circumstances existing at the time 

of his separation is corroborated by one of his coworkers who had personal knowledge of the 

circumstances in his absence.

In addition, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that (1) at the time Plaintiff was 

terminated he was one of four employees at the plant and (2) within three months of Plaintiff’s 

separation, the plant was back to employing four employees. (Doc. 23-6, R. Jarrell Dep. 17:11-

12). This is evidence in the Rule 56 file which, if believed by the jury, could call into question 

Defendant’s reason for terminating Plaintiff. And, it is circumstantial evidence that forms part 

the “mosaic” picture noted by the Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 27 at 14). Finally, as the Magistrate 

Judge also observed, “the fact that there were only three employees prior to Smith’s resignation 

does not exclude the possibility that the work load might have supported a fourth employee.” 

(Doc. 27 at 11 n. 8). It is emphatically not the court’s province to resolve the genuine factual 

disputes that exist between Plaintiff and Defendant; rather, that is the job of the jury.

Case 7:13-cv-00017-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/19/15 Page 3 of 6
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The Rule 56 record supports the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that there is a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether the actual reason that Plaintiff was terminated was a lack of 

work. Accordingly, the court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that 

summary judgment is due to be denied with regard to Plaintiff’s wrongful “separation” claim.

II. Plaintiff’s Failure to Recall Claims

Defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation which 

denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to recall claim. Specifically, Defendant argues 

that there is no issue of fact for a jury to decide as to that claim because Plaintiff admits he was 

not qualified to be rehired. To make a showing of a discriminatory failure to recall, Plaintiff 

must prove that he was qualified for the position which the employer was seeking applications. 

EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002).2 The court concludes 

that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this particular claim3because Plaintiff has 

failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of his case 

 

2

In an unreported failure to recall case, the Eleventh Circuit has held that to survive summary judgment a 

plaintiff must prove (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for a position for 

which the employer was accepting applications; (3) despite his qualifications, he was not hired; and (4) the position 

remained open or was filled by another person outside of his protected class. See, e.g., Lane v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 

411 F. App’x 272, 273 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 

2002)). The court finds this unbinding authority persuasive.

3

In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge noted that:

Ready Mix makes an aside that it was not surprising that Plaintiff did not reapply for a position 

with Ready Mix considering he testified he was unable to work in 2012 and 2013 because of his 

disability. (Doc. 18 at 11). While this fact might have been the basis for a convincing argument 

regarding whether Hinton was qualified to be recalled Defendants do not make such an argument.

(Doc. 27 at 14 n. 11). However, Defendant argues in its Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment that,

“[t]he company cannot be held liable for failing to hire the plaintiff for a position for which he did not apply, much 

less for one Plaintiff admits he was not able to fulfill.” (Doc. 18 at 11 (emphasis added)). Furthermore, in Plaintiff’s 

Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff recognizes that “Defendant also argues 

[Plaintiff’s] disability status precludes his claim.” (Doc. 24 at 28).

(Note: the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that, due to the ambiguity surrounding the application of 

Defendant’s Temporary Lay Off Policy, the court cannot conclude that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law on Plaintiff’s failure to recall claim solely because Plaintiff did not reapply. A reasonable factfinder could

conclude that Defendant’s Temporary Lay Off Policy applied and thereby may have excused Plaintiff’s failure to 

apply.)

Case 7:13-cv-00017-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/19/15 Page 4 of 6
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(i.e., his qualification to continue working at Defendant’s plant), see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) — an element upon which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Joe’s Stone Crab, 296 F.3d at 1273. 

Here, the undisputed Rule 56 record shows that Plaintiff was unable to work from the 

time of Plaintiff’s separation (December 15, 2011) to the date of his deposition (December 2, 

2013). (Pl. Dep. 91:4-10). This is not a case where a non-movant points out that an element of 

Plaintiff’s claim is not met, and relies only upon circumstantial evidence to do so. Rather, 

Plaintiff himself testified at his deposition that he was unable to work throughout 2012 or 2013. 

In addition to Plaintiff’s own testimony on this issue, the Social Security Administration also 

determined Plaintiff was disabled as of the date of his separation, December 15, 2011. (Doc. 19-

8, SSA Declaration, at 2). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot assert that Defendant discriminated 

against him by failing to recall him, particularly when any such recall to work was impossible 

due to his admitted inability to work.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Cleveland v. Policy Management System Corp., 526 U.S. 795 

(1999), is misplaced. In Cleveland, the Court held that an award of Social Security disability 

benefits, on its own, is insufficient to establish Plaintiff’s inability to work. 526 U.S. at 801-05. 

However, in this case, the evidence that Plaintiff was awarded Social Security benefits does not 

stand alone. Instead, Plaintiff’s own sworn deposition testimony undermines his failure to recall

claim. (Pl. Dep. 91:4-10). As discussed above, Plaintiff bears burden of proving that he is a 

qualified applicant. See Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1273. Yet, Plaintiff himself has 

testified that, in crystal clear terms, he was unable to work anytime in 2012 and 2013. (Pl. Dep. 

91:4-10). As such, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing he was ready, willing, 

and able to work.

Case 7:13-cv-00017-RDP Document 33 Filed 03/19/15 Page 5 of 6
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Here, Defendant has offered uncontroverted evidence (which includes Plaintiff’s own 

sworn admission against interest) challenging Plaintiff’s qualification for recall. The court finds 

that the undisputed Rule 56 record demonstrates that it is undisputed that Plaintiff was, in fact,

unable to work in 2012 and 2013. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 17) is due to be granted on Plaintiff’s failure to recall claim. And, to the extent that it 

conflicts with this holding, the court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

in that respect.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court finds Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 17) is due to be granted in part and denied in part. The court finds Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim (Count One) is due to be granted;

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim regarding 

his termination (Count Two) is due to be denied; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim regarding Defendant’s failure to recall (Count Two) is due 

to be granted; and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for front and 

back pay is due to be denied.

4

A separate order in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this March 19, 2015.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

4 Technically, no objection has been asserted to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling on back pay and front pay. 

At the pretrial of his case, the parties should be prepared to discuss how Plaintiff’s admitted inability to work from 

December 15, 2011 through, at least, the date of his deposition in December 2013, affects his back pay and front pay 

claims. 

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