Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01365/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 8, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

JAMES R. DAWSON, JR.,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CYNTHIA COFFMAN,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 15-1365

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-01919-MSK-NYW)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Mr. James Dawson, Jr. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging denial of due process and equal protection. The district court

dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid claim, and we affirm.

* The parties have not requested oral argument, and it would not

materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal

based on the briefs.

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral

estoppel. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

Appellate Case: 15-1365 Document: 01019634002 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 1 
I. The Taking of Blood and Urine Samples, the Conviction, and

Amendment of State Law

Facing state charges involving violent crimes, Mr. Dawson alleged

diminished capacity based on intoxication and a drug-related mental

impairment. In light of these allegations, the state trial court ordered law

enforcement officers to take blood and urine samples from Mr. Dawson.

The samples were collected but not tested.

The jury found Mr. Dawson guilty of second-degree murder,

attempted second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and commission

of a crime of violence. Mr. Dawson’s blood and urine samples were

subsequently lost or destroyed.

Many years later, Colorado amended its laws to authorize judicial

remedies when law enforcement officials negligently lose or destroy

biological evidence. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-414(b). Mr. Dawson

learned that his blood and urine samples were no longer available and

invoked the new law, but the state courts denied relief on grounds that

the new law (1) did not apply when a criminal suspect presents a

diminished-capacity defense because the law applies only to a defense of

actual innocence and (2) applies only to DNA evidence, not to blood and

urine samples collected to test the presence of intoxicants.

2

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II. Mr. Dawson’s Claims and Our Disposition

Dissatisfied with the state-court outcome, Mr. Dawson brought the

present action, claiming that the limitations on the new law constituted

denials of due process and equal protection. 1

 With these claims, Mr.

Dawson requested leave to avoid prepayment of the filing fee.

The district court denied relief from the prepayment obligation and

dismissed the claims. Mr. Dawson renews his request for leave to proceed

without prepayment of the filing fee and appeals the dismissal.

We grant Mr. Dawson relief from the prepayment obligation but

affirm the dismissal.

III. Leave to Avoid Prepayment of the Filing Fee

Ordinarily, appellants must prepay the filing fee before we will

entertain an appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(e). An exception exists for

1 Mr. Dawson also argues that the district court erred by

(1) recharacterizing his claims as challenges to the state court judgment,

(2) recharacterizing his § 1983 suit as an application for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, and (3) holding that his claims were time barred. The

district court did none of these things. The district court

! expressly declined to construe Mr. Dawson’s claims as

challenges to the state-court judgment,

! held that § 1983, rather than § 2254, was the proper vehicle

for Mr. Dawson’s claims, and

! declined to decide whether the claims were time barred.

3

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indigent litigants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012). This exception applies

because Mr. Dawson is indigent, preventing him from prepaying the

filing fee. As a result, we grant relief from the prepayment obligation. 2

IV. Dismissal of the Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

The district court concluded that the statutory limitations on relief

did not violate Mr. Dawson’s right to due process or equal protection.

2 As a prisoner, Mr. Dawson is subject to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. This statute restricts relief from the prepayment obligation

when a prisoner has brought at least three “prior” suits that had been

dismissed based on frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a

valid claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).

Before filing this appeal, Mr. Dawson brought two suits that had

been dismissed for frivolousness or failure to state a valid claim. This

appeal involves Mr. Dawson’s third dismissal for frivolousness,

maliciousness, or failure to state a valid claim.

The Supreme Court recently noted the existence of an open question

on whether the appeal of a prisoner’s third dismissal triggers the

statutory restriction on relief from the prepayment obligation. Coleman

v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1765 (2015). But we had

previously held in Pigg v. FBI that a third dismissal does not trigger the

statutory restriction when the third dismissal is the ruling being

appealed. Pigg v. FBI, 106 F.3d 1497, 1498 (10th Cir. 1997) (per

curiam). For this holding, we relied on the common understanding of the

word “prior” in § 1915(g). Id. A dismissal would not be considered

“prior” if it is the decision underlying the appeal. Id.; accord Richey v.

Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the

appeal of a third dismissal should not count as a “prior occasion,” relying

in part on Coleman v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015)).

Under Pigg, this appeal of Mr. Dawson’s third dismissal does not

restrict his eligibility for relief from the prepayment obligation.

4

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Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to

state a valid claim. 

We review this dismissal de novo. Janke v. Price, 43 F.3d 1390,

1391 (10th Cir. 1994). In conducting de novo review, we accept as true

all of Mr. Dawson’s well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in

the light most favorable to Mr. Dawson. See Smith v. United States, 561

F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009). The resulting question is whether the

complaint contains facts stating a plausible claim for relief. Id. 

The district court’s explanation for the dismissal is thorough and

persuasive. As the district court explained, Colorado may set rational

limits on its newly authorized judicial remedy for the loss or destruction

of biological evidence. These statutory limits precluded Mr. Dawson

from obtaining a judicial remedy because he did not claim actual

innocence in his state-court criminal proceedings, and his blood and

urine samples did not involve DNA evidence. As the district court

explained, Mr. Dawson’s inability to obtain a judicial remedy did not

result in a denial of due process or equal protection. Accordingly, we

affirm the dismissal.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach

Circuit Judge

5

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