Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06134/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

THE ESTATE OF CLAYTON LOCKETT, 

by and through its personal representative 

Gary Lockett, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

GOVERNOR MARY FALLIN, in her 

individual capacity; ROBERT C. 

PATTON, in his individual capacity; 

ANITA TRAMMELL, in her individual 

capacity; DOCTOR JOHN DOE, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

------------------------------ 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION; 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

OF OKLAHOMA; DOCTORS FOR THE 

ETHICAL PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: 

DR. LUCAS RESTREPO, Clinical 

Assistant Professor of Neurology at the 

University of California, DR. STEVEN 

MILES, Professor of Medicine and 

Bioethics at the University of Minnesota 

Medical School in Minneapolis, DR. 

ROBERT L. COHEN, Clinical Assistant 

Professor of Medicine, NYU; Member, 

New York City Board of Correction, DR. 

JOHN P. MAY, Regional Medical Director 

of Florida Region for Wexford Health 

Sources, and Consultant on Correctional 

Healthcare to the U.S. Department of 

Justice, Civil Rights Division; DR. MARC 

No. 15-6134 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

November 15, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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STERN, Affiliate Assistant Professor, 

Health Services at the University of 

Washington, formerly the Health Services 

Director for the Washington State 

Department of Corrections; DR. SCOTT 

ALLEN, Professor of Medicine, Associate 

Dean of Academic Affairs, University of 

California Riverside School of Medicine; 

DR. JOSIAH D. RICH, Professor of 

Medicine and Epidemiology, Brown 

University and Director of the Center for 

Prisoner Health and Human Rights; DR. 

ROBERT GREIFINGER, Professor 

(Adjunct) of Health and Criminal Justice 

and Distinguished Research Fellow at John 

Jay College of Criminal Justice in New 

York City and correctional health care 

policy and quality management consultant; 

DR. COLEMAN PRATT, Chief Medical 

Officer, Health Center in Florida, former 

Medical Director for Prison Health 

Services; DR. DAVID NICHOLL, 

Consultant Neurologist at Sandwell and 

West Birmingham Hospital, UK; DR. 

JOHN HENNING SCHUMANN, 

Gussman Family Associate Professor of 

Medicine, University of Oklahoma-Tulsa, 

 Amici Curiae. 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-01119-HE)

_________________________________ 

Alan Chen, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, Denver, Colorado (David A. 

Lane and Amy Kapoor, Kilmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, Colorado, and Justin F. 

Marceau, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, Denver, Colorado, with him on 

the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

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Aaron J. Stewart (Richard Mann, with him on the brief), Assistant Attorneys General, 

Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office, Litigation Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Mary Fallin, Robert Patton and Anita Trammell, Defendants-Appellees. 

David W. Lee (Stephen L. Geries, with him on the brief), Collins Zorn & Wagner, P.C., 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Doctor John Doe, DefendantAppellee. 

Ryan D. Kiesel, and Brady R. Henderson, American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma 

Foundation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, A. Katherine Toomey, Lewis Baach PLLC, 

Washington, D.C., filed Amici Curiae briefs. 

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

The Estate of Clayton Lockett, through its personal representative Gary 

Lockett, filed suit against Mary Fallin, Governor of Oklahoma, in her individual 

capacity; Robert Patton, Director of the Department of Corrections of Oklahoma, in 

his individual capacity; Anita Trammell, Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 

in her individual capacity; Dr. Doe, in his official and individual capacities; John Doe 

EMT, in his individual capacity; three John Doe executioners, in their individual 

capacities; two John Doe drug manufacturers, in their individual and official 

capacities; and two John Doe compounding pharmacies,1

 in their individual and 

 1

 Lockett’s Estate has abandoned his claims against the compounding 

pharmacies because Appellees assert that no compounded drugs were used in 

Lockett’s execution. See Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 26; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6 n.5. 

Thus, we have not recited the facts relating to compounding pharmacies. 

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official capacities. The Estate asserts several constitutional violations related to 

Lockett’s execution. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the case. 

I. Facts2

In 1999, Lockett kidnapped, assaulted, and killed nineteen-year-old Stephanie 

Neiman. Lockett shot young Ms. Neiman with a shotgun and then had an accomplice 

bury her alive. In 2000, a jury found Clayton Lockett guilty of 19 felonies arising 

from the same incident, including the murder, rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, and 

assault and battery of Ms. Neiman. The jury recommended that the court impose the 

death penalty on Lockett’s murder conviction. 

From 1990 to 2010, as detailed in Oklahoma’s Field Memorandum, a manual 

setting execution procedures, Oklahoma used a common drug protocol previously 

administered in at least 93 Oklahoma executions. Under this protocol, Oklahoma 

administered three drugs—the first, sodium thiopental, to render the condemned 

inmate unconscious; the second, pancuronium bromide, to paralyze the inmate; and 

 2

 Because this appeal is from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true all facts as 

sufficiently alleged in the complaint. Georgacarakos v. United States, 420 F.3d 1185, 

1186 (10th Cir. 2005). This standard, while deferential, does not require us to accept 

hyperbole or legal conclusions as true. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does 

not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ 

of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (citations 

omitted) (alteration in original)). The Amended Complaint leaves unmentioned many 

facts a reader might be curious to know. But we are limited to the facts set out in the 

Amended Complaint. In Lockett’s Estate’s briefing to this court, it asks us to take 

judicial notice of news articles that add facts to those in the Amended Complaint. As 

discussed below, we decline this invitation and thus recite only those facts that 

appear in the Amended Complaint. 

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the third, potassium chloride, to induce cardiac arrest and stop the inmate’s heart. In 

2010, facing difficulty obtaining sodium thiopental, Oklahoma officials amended the 

Field Memorandum to substitute in its place pentobarbital.3

On March 21, 2014, Oklahoma officials again amended the Field 

Memorandum to allow a number of new alternate procedures for use in executions by 

lethal injection. As one of these new procedures, officials substituted midazolam as 

the first drug used in the protocol. Before Lockett’s execution, Oklahoma had not 

used midazolam during an execution. Warden Trammell and Director Patton chose 

this new protocol. Neither of them had any independent medical training. 

On April 1, 2014, Warden Trammell and Director Patton notified Lockett that 

he would be executed using midazolam, pancuronium bromide, and potassium 

chloride, with the first two drugs being manufactured by a compounding pharmacy.4

On April 4, 2014, they notified Lockett that the midazolam would not in fact be from 

a compounding pharmacy. On April 11, 2014, they notified Lockett that vecuronium 

bromide would be used instead of pancuronium bromide. 

On April 14, 2014, Warden Trammell and Director Patton amended the Field 

Memorandum’s execution procedures by increasing the concentration of midazolam 

 3

 The problems States have had in procuring execution drugs are widely 

known. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2733–34 (describing the 

unavailability of execution drugs that led to Oklahoma using midazolam). 

4

 Compounding pharmacies produce drugs specifically tailored to the 

individual patient. 

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from 50mg/100ml to 50mg/10ml, a tenfold increase. Thus, Warden Trammell and 

Director Patton did not notify Lockett of the final drug protocol until April 14, 2014 

(15 days before his execution). On April 25, 2014, Oklahoma officials again 

amended the Field Memorandum, but the Amended Complaint does not specify what 

changed, simply noting that the change was made “with an addendum.” Appellant’s 

App. vol. 1 at 160. When Lockett was executed, the Field Memorandum did not 

require a backup IV line, a visible and uncovered IV line, or continuous observation 

of the IV insertion site. Nor did it require that backup dosages of the drugs be 

available or that the personnel involved in the execution have any specific level of 

training. 

Ultimately, Lockett was executed under one of the Field Memorandum’s 

newly amended protocols: 100mg of midazolam (to render Lockett unconscious),5

40mg of vecuronium bromide (to paralyze Lockett), and 200 milliequivalents of 

potassium chloride (to stop Lockett’s heart). Until Lockett’s execution, no State had 

ever used that protocol. Unless the dosage of midazolam renders the prisoner 

 5

 Lockett’s Estate alleges that midazolam is ineffective in this role. See

Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 164–65. But we do not need to accept this as a fact. 

Asserting that midazolam is ineffective in rendering an inmate unconscious 

essentially asserts that the use of midazolam is constitutionally deficient, a legal 

conclusion that we need not credit. Cf. Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1102 (8th 

Cir. 2015) (noting that the court did not need to accept speculative facts on the 

potential deficiencies in compounded pentobarbital as an execution drug because the 

complaint did not show that the lethal-injection protocol was “sure or very likely” to 

create a substantial risk of severe pain (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) 

(plurality opinion))). 

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unconscious, the second and third drugs will cause immense pain. Vecuronium 

bromide will asphyxiate the prisoner, and potassium chloride will cause “burning and 

intense pain” until death follows cardiac arrest. Id. at 163–64. 

On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma brought Lockett to the execution chamber, and 

Dr. Doe6

 and the EMT ultimately selected a vein in his groin area as the injection 

site.7

 To shield any view of Lockett’s naked groin from witnesses in the execution 

chamber, someone placed a cloth over the injection site. After Dr. Doe and the EMT 

placed the IV, prison officials raised the curtain separating the viewing area from the 

execution chamber. 

At 6:23 p.m., the executioners administered the first drug, midazolam. At 6:33 

p.m., Lockett was declared unconscious. After this, the executioners administered the 

second drug (vecuronium bromide) and the third drug (potassium chloride). 

Unexpectedly, at 6:36 p.m., Lockett began “twitching and convulsing” on the table. 

Id. at 152. At 6:37 p.m., he tried to rise from the table but was able only to raise his 

head and say, “Oh, man,” and “I’m not . . . .” Id. According to some observers, 

Lockett also said, “something’s wrong.” Id. Soon afterward, Lockett “began to buck 

and writhe, as if he was trying to raise himself from the gurney[,] . . . [and he] next 

 6

 We note that the State withdrew its motion to maintain the seal on Dr. Doe’s 

name imposed by the district court. But Lockett’s Estate and Amici have failed to 

provide sealed copies of the complaint and other documents to this court, instead 

submitting only redacted copies. Thus, nowhere does Dr. Doe’s real name appear in 

our record. We will continue to use the pseudonym throughout. 

7

 The Amended Complaint does not reveal what Dr. Doe’s assigned duties 

were before he entered the execution chamber. 

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tried to raise his head and shoulders away from th[e] gurney [while] clench[ing] his 

teeth and grimac[ing] in pain.” Id. at 160. 

In response, Dr. Doe examined the IV site and saw that the injection vein had 

collapsed, preventing some of the drugs from reaching Lockett’s circulatory system. 

Responding to a question from Director Patton, Dr. Doe advised him that he believed 

insufficient drugs had entered Lockett’s system to cause death. Dr. Doe also told 

Director Patton that no other vein was available and that insufficient drugs remained 

to complete the execution even if Dr. Doe could find another vein. Dr. Doe did not 

consider or was unaware that the State had a second set of the execution drugs 

available to execute condemned prisoner Charles Warner later that night. As events 

soon proved, Dr. Doe was mistaken that the drugs in Lockett’s system might not 

cause death. At 7:06 p.m., Dr. Doe declared Lockett dead, 43 minutes after the 

executioners administered the first drug. In the 19 Oklahoma executions preceding 

Lockett’s execution, doctors had pronounced the condemned prisoner dead between 6 

and 12 minutes (as we understand it, from administering the first drug). 

The Amended Complaint alleges that the autopsy report says the “execution 

was halted” at 6:56 p.m., 33 minutes after Lockett was injected with the midazolam 

(not saying who halted it or how). Id. at 153. A later report noted that “an IV 

insertion problem” prevented at least some of the drugs from entering Lockett’s 

system. Id. No one knows how much of each drug entered Lockett’s system. The 

report concluded that the cloth over Lockett’s groin, which blocked the execution 

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team’s view of the IV insertion site, was the “major reason” for the problems with the 

execution. Id. at 174. 

In its Amended Complaint, Lockett’s Estate alleges seven claims: (1) “Eighth 

Amendment violation—Torture,” against all defendants, id. at 161; (2) “Eighth 

Amendment—Using Untested Drugs and Human Medical Experimentation,” against 

all defendants, id. at 163; (3) “Eighth Amendment—Use of Compounded Drugs in 

Human Medical Experimentation,” against all defendants, id. at 166; (4) “Eighth 

Amendment—Human Medical Experimentation on Unwilling Prisoners,” against all 

defendants, id. at 168; (5) “Eighth Amendment—Failure to Train and Supervise,” 

against Warden Trammell and Director Patton, id. at 172; (6) Fourteenth 

Amendment—“Failure to Protect State-Created Rights Procedural Due Process 

Violation,” against all defendants, id. at 176; and (7) “Sixth Amendment Right to 

Counsel and First Amendment Access to the Court Violation,” against Warden 

Trammell and Director Patton, id. at 177. 

In response, Governor Fallin, Director Patton, and Warden Trammell filed a 

motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as did Dr. Doe. Both motions 

asserted qualified immunity among other defenses. The district court granted both 

motions to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds and sua sponte dismissed the 

claims against the other Doe defendants.8

 The district court reasoned that Lockett’s 

 8

 These Doe defendants were the EMT, executioners, compounding 

pharmacies, and drug manufacturers. Plaintiff never identified them by name (or, so 

far as we can tell, served them with process). 

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Estate had failed to show that the defendants had violated clearly established law. We 

agree. Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

II. Analysis 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Ridge at Red 

Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

Mere “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action” are insufficient. Id. at 555. But we need not accept legal conclusions 

contained in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

A. Qualified Immunity 

All Appellees claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified 

immunity protects government officials from suit, not just from liability. Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). “In resolving a motion to dismiss based on 

qualified immunity, a court must consider whether the facts that a plaintiff has 

alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right at issue 

was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. 

Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leverington v. City of Colo. 

Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 732 (10th Cir. 2011)). When determining whether qualified 

immunity applies, we may choose “which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

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236 (2009). Although Lockett’s Estate urges us to decide each of the constitutionalviolation questions first, we decline to do so. 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so 

long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 

S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). “A Government official’s 

conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, 

the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 

731, 741 (2011) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). It is undisputed that 

qualified immunity “do[es] not require a case directly on point, but existing 

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741); see Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct 

violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”); McInerney v. King, 

791 F.3d 1224, 1236–37 (10th Cir. 2015) (“For a right to be clearly established there 

must be a Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent close enough on point to make 

the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions apparent.”). In the Tenth Circuit, “[w]e have 

. . . adopted a sliding scale to determine when law is clearly established. The more 

obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles, the 

less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.” 

Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks 

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omitted). Clearly established law should “not [be] define[d] . . . at a high level of 

generality.” Al-Kidd, 536 U.S. at 742. Thus, “broad history and purposes of the 

Fourth Amendment” was an insufficient basis for a finding of clearly established law 

in al-Kidd. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

1. Dr. Doe’s Qualified Immunity 

Lockett’s Estate argues that Dr. Doe is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Because Dr. Doe is a private party, rather than a government employee, we must add 

an additional step to his qualified-immunity analysis. For private parties, courts “look 

both to history and to the purposes that underlie government employee immunity” to 

determine whether qualified immunity applies. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 

399, 404 (1997). Richardson held that qualified immunity does not apply to private 

prison officials. In so holding, the Court “found no conclusive evidence of a 

historical tradition of immunity for private parties carrying out” prison-management 

activities. Id. at 407. In evaluating whether qualified immunity was warranted by the 

purposes of governmental immunity, the Court found it relevant that a private prison 

is subject to competitive market pressures. Id. at 409. 

Earlier precedent described immunity as protecting the public from 

unwarranted timidity on the part of public officials by, for example, 

encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority, by contributing 

to principled and fearless decision-making, and by responding to the 

concern that threatened liability would, in Judge Hand’s words, 

“dampen the ardour of all but the most resolute, or the most 

irresponsible,” public officials. 

Id. at 408 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)) (quotation marks 

and citations omitted). Qualified immunity’s purpose lies in “protecting 

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‘government’s ability to perform its traditional functions’ by providing immunity 

where ‘necessary to preserve’ the ability of government officials ‘to serve the public 

good or to ensure that talented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damages 

suits from entering public service.’” Id. at 407–08 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 

158, 167 (1992)). Qualified immunity for private individuals is, as Lockett’s Estate 

points out, fact-specific. 

More recently, in Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012), the Court 

characterized Richardson as “a self-consciously ‘narrow[]’ decision.” Filarsky, 132 

S. Ct. at 1667 (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413). In 

Filarsky, the Court concluded that an attorney who was temporarily retained by a city 

to assist in investigating potential wrongdoing was entitled to qualified immunity, 

partly because “[t]here is no dispute that government employees performing such 

work are entitled to seek the protection of qualified immunity” and because “[t]he 

common law . . . did not draw such distinctions [between permanent, full-time 

government employees and temporary ones like the retained attorney], and we see no 

justification for doing so under § 1983.” Id. at 1667–68. 

Dr. Doe is entitled to assert qualified immunity because the purposes of 

qualified immunity support its application here: carrying out criminal penalties is 

unquestionably a traditional function of government, exactly the sort of activities that 

Richardson reasoned qualified immunity was meant to protect. If participants in an 

execution could be held liable for problems during the execution, that would 

necessarily implicate Filarsky’s concerns about “[t]he public interest in ensuring 

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performance of government duties free from the distractions that can accompany 

even routine lawsuits,” which the Court noted “is also implicated when individuals 

other than permanent government employees discharge these duties.” Filarsky, 132 

S. Ct. at 1666. The attorney in Filarsky received qualified immunity largely because 

a permanent government attorney doing the same acts would receive it. The Filarsky

Court determined that denying a temporarily retained attorney the same defense as a 

full-time government attorney would undermine the purposes of the doctrine. The 

same is true here—for instance, had a state employee performed the same duties as 

Dr. Doe did here, qualified immunity would apply. We see no sense in depriving a 

private doctor the same protection. Here, Dr. Doe stands in the same position as the 

attorney in Filarsky—he was a private party hired to do a job for which a permanent 

government employee would have received qualified immunity. Thus, we conclude 

that qualified immunity applies to Dr. Doe. 

2. Torture and Deliberate Indifference 

In its Amended Complaint, Lockett’s Estate labels its first claim for relief as 

“Eighth Amendment violation—Torture.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 161. And that 

claim indeed repeatedly references torture and asserts that “Clayton Lockett had a 

right under the Eighth Amendment to not be tortured to death by the Defendants.” Id.

at 163. In the midst of the torture allegations, though, we see that this claim makes a 

single isolated reference to deliberate indifference: “The Defendants have acted with 

deliberate indifference to the risk of torture being inflicted on Clayton Lockett.” Id.

at 162. At oral argument, we questioned whether this pleading language limits 

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Lockett’s Estate’s claims here to a torture claim rather than its broader appellate 

claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Lockett’s suffering during the 

execution. Oral Argument 7:58–9:05; Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21. In response to 

the panel’s expressed doubts, Lockett’s Estate has submitted a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) 

letter arguing that the deliberate-indifference claim was “fairly included in the 

Amended Complaint’s factual allegations.” Rule 28(j) Letter at 1. 

While “[g]enerally, failure to set forth in the complaint a theory upon which 

the plaintiff could recover does not bar a plaintiff from pursuing a claim,” McBeth v. 

Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 716 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP 

Am. Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1121 (10th Cir. 2005)), “[i]f the new theory 

prejudices the other party in maintaining its defense . . . courts will not permit the 

plaintiff to change her theory,” id. (citing Ahmad v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196, 1202 

(10th Cir. 2006)). Although Lockett’s Estate’s first claim needs some stretching to 

raise a deliberate-indifference claim rather than a claim solely for torture, we will do 

so. Importantly, we note that Appellees have alleged no prejudice from this liberal 

construction. 

Lockett’s Estate alleges that Appellees violated Lockett’s clearly established 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. But in its analysis, Lockett’s 

Estate does not account for how cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims operate in the 

execution context. A good starting place in our analysis is to recognize—as did the 

Baze plurality—that because capital punishment is constitutional, lawful means must 

exist to carry it out. Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 

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(1976)). And in evaluating alternative execution methods, we must further recognize 

that “[s]ome risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution—no matter how 

humane—if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure.” Id.

Simply put, the Eighth Amendment does not require “the avoidance of all risk of pain 

in carrying out executions.” Id. The Baze Court cited cases disallowing under the 

Eighth Amendment “punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of 

unnecessary cruelty.” Id. at 48 (quoting Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879)). 

By this measure, the Baze Court meant “the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake 

of pain—‘superadd[ing]’ pain to the death sentence through torture and the like.” Id.

(alteration in original). This view tracks In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), where 

the Court concludes that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a 

lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that 

word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, 

—something more than the mere extinguishment of life.” Id. at 447; see Baze, 553 

U.S. at 48–49 (discussing In re Kemmler). 

The Supreme Court’s death-penalty opinions recognize that executions can go 

awry. Thus, the Baze plurality notes that “[s]imply because an execution method may 

result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not 

establish the sort of objectively intolerable risk of harm that qualifies as cruel and 

unusual.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quotation marks omitted). As a situation exceeding 

these bounds, the Court has raised the prospect of a case with “a series of abortive 

attempts at electrocution”: “such a situation—unlike an ‘innocent misadventure’—

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would demonstrate an ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that officials may not 

ignore.” Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) 

and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994)) (citations omitted). Ultimately, 

“an isolated mishap alone does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, 

precisely because such an event, while regrettable, does not suggest cruelty, or that 

the procedure at issue gives rise to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted). 

Everyone acknowledges that Lockett suffered during his execution. But that 

alone does not make out an Eighth Amendment claim. Here, the Amended Complaint 

describes exactly the sort of “innocent misadventure” or “isolated mishap” that the 

Baze plurality excuses from the definition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Thus, 

Lockett’s suffering did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. While Lockett’s 

Estate takes issue with the three-drug protocol and the midazolam amount used in 

Lockett’s execution, everyone agrees9

 that Lockett’s suffering arose from IV 

infiltration: the drugs leaked into the surrounding tissue rather than into his 

bloodstream, keeping Lockett from receiving full doses of the drugs. Nowhere does 

Lockett’s Estate allege that the execution team placed the IV or covered Lockett’s 

groin area to cause Lockett pain. Rather, concerns for Lockett’s dignity and privacy 

 9 See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Br. at 18 (“Defendants knew that once it was 

clear that the midazolam had not entered Mr. Lockett’s body he was not 

unconscious.”); id. at 19–20 (“One does not need a medical degree to comprehend 

that when a condemned prisoner is not successfully rendered unconscious, the 

administration of paralytic drugs will cause him unbearable, excruciating pain.”). 

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18 

led to the covering and to no one in the execution chamber seeing that not all of the 

execution drugs had entered Lockett’s bloodstream. Any holding that this mistake 

would convert an otherwise-constitutional execution into an Eighth Amendment 

violation could not withstand Baze’s reasoning, as later reaffirmed in Glossip v. 

Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). Thus, the only clearly established law we have on this 

topic at least strongly indicates that Lockett’s Estate has no claim for torture or 

deliberate indifference. 

3. Efforts to Establish an IV 

Lockett’s Estate argues that repeated attempts to establish an IV before the 

execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. But unlike Lockett’s appellate briefing, his Amended Complaint does 

not allege that he was “repeatedly stab[bed]” with a needle or any of the other facts 

Lockett’s Estate uses to support this claim. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17. The 

Amended Complaint alleges only that Dr. Doe and the EMT placed the central IV 

line “despite the ample availability of sites that could have provided peripheral 

venous-access.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 173. For supporting facts, Lockett’s Estate 

asks us to take judicial notice of news articles and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in 

Glossip discussing Lockett’s execution.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts may take judicial notice of a fact 

“that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the 

trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined 

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 

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19 

201(b). “Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists. Every reasonable 

doubt upon the subject should be resolved promptly in the negative.” Brown v. Piper, 

91 U.S. 37, 43 (1875). 

We will not take judicial notice of the news articles to which Lockett’s Estate 

directs us because this is not the appropriate setting for judicial notice. Judicial notice 

is proper when a fact is beyond debate, for instance, what time the sun sets on a given 

day. When courts have taken judicial notice of contents of news articles, they have 

done so for proof that something is publically known, not for the truth of the article’s 

other assertions. See Benak ex rel. All. Premier Growth Fund v. All. Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 

435 F.3d 396, 401 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The[ articles] serve only to indicate what 

was in the public realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in 

fact true.”). Here, Lockett’s Estate asks us to accept as true the contents of the 

articles. We decline to do so. 

We also will not take judicial notice of the discussion of Lockett’s execution 

in Glossip. “On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, when a court takes judicial notice 

of another court’s opinion, it may do so ‘not for the truth of the facts recited therein, 

but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over 

its authenticity.’” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting S. 

Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 

(3d Cir. 1999)). 

Based on the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, nothing supports 

Lockett’s Estate’s claim relating to the efforts to establish the IV. Even so, we doubt 

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20 

that attempting to place an IV for an hour would violate the Eighth Amendment 

under Baze. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 55 (finding no violation where the execution 

protocol allowed the IV team one hour to establish an IV). Regardless, because no 

factual basis supports this claim, it fails. 

4. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 

Lockett’s Estate asserts in its fourth claim that Appellees violated the Eighth 

Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to “Lockett’s serious medical need to 

not have a lingering death” and “to die as quickly and painlessly as was humanly 

possible.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21; Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 168. In support 

of its position that Appellees acted with deliberate indifference to Lockett’s serious 

medical needs, the Estate argues that Appellees “had the ability to administer a fatal 

dosage and put [Lockett] out of his apparent misery, but made the deliberate and 

callous decision to not use the available drugs to relieve [him] from his unnecessary 

and wanton pain.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 23. 

At the same time, the Estate acknowledges that the EMT and later Dr. Doe had 

difficulty locating and placing the IV. The Estate recounts that these two people tried 

but were unable to insert the IV, “all over [Lockett’s] body,” including in his neck, 

arms, and feet, before placing it in a vein in Lockett’s leg. Id. at 17-18. The Estate 

also states that Dr. Doe, after discovering that the vein had collapsed, advised the 

director that no other suitable vein was available. Id. at 8. So in making this claim, 

the Estate assumes that Dr. Doe could have readily found another vein for the IV, and 

that the drugs for Warner’s impending execution were nearby to use. The Estate 

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21 

doesn’t argue that Appellees intentionally set the IV to collapse the vein to cause 

Lockett’s suffering. Instead, it argues that Appellees “had no plan to respond, and did 

nothing to prevent Mr. Lockett from a lingering, tortured death.”10 Id. at 23 (citing 

Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 153-54). 

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment when they act deliberately and indifferently to serious medical 

needs of prisoners in their custody.” Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 

1999). “Deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective component.” Id.

To meet the objective component, “[t]he medical need must be sufficiently serious.” 

Id. A medical need is sufficiently serious “if the condition ‘has been diagnosed by a 

physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 

1188, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276 

(10th Cir. 2001)). To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must show that 

the defendant knew that the plaintiff “faced a substantial risk of harm and 

disregarded that risk, ‘by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Hunt, 199 

F.3d at 1224 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). The substantial-harm requirement 

“may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” 

Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001). 

 10 Though providing no record cite, the Estate also asserts that “[d]espite 

obvious resistance, John Doe Executioners pushed the drugs into the tissue and 

muscles.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 18. 

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22 

In resolving this claim, we do not decide the Eighth Amendment issue. 

Instead, we affirm the district court’s decision that Appellees’ actions and inactions 

did not violate a clearly established Eighth Amendment right. The Estate has failed to 

show “that the official[s] violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly 

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 

2012, 2023 (2014) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735). “And a defendant cannot be 

said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were 

sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have 

understood he was violating it.” Id. at 2023. “In other words, ‘existing precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question’ confronted by the official 

‘beyond debate.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly 

established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the 

clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to 

be as the plaintiff maintains.” Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Klen v. City of Loveland, Colo., 6641 F.3d 498, 511 (10th Cir. 2011)). But 

because cases almost never have exactly the same circumstances, we require less that 

way as conduct becomes more obviously egregious. Id. Here, we see no cases 

announcing clearly established law that the Eighth Amendment commands, in these 

circumstances, that Appellees hasten Lockett’s death more quickly than the 30 

minutes it took. Again, as did the district court, we choose to affirm the dismissal of 

this claim on the clearly-established-law prong. 

5. Prolonged Execution 

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23 

Lockett’s Estate’s fourth claim for deliberate indifference to Lockett’s serious 

medical needs fairly includes a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation based on 

Lockett’s “prolonged, painful, and torturous execution.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 

1. We now analyze that claim separately. The Supreme Court has determined that, in 

the execution context, “torture” and “cruel and unusual punishment” require that 

executing officials mean to choose an execution method that will cause extra pain 

beyond that necessary to carry out the death sentence. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 48 

(noting that the bar on “torture” bans “the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of 

pain—‘superadd[ing]’ pain to the death sentence through torture and the like”). 

Although we accept that Lockett’s execution was “unnecessarily prolonged and 

horribly painful,” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17, the problems during Lockett’s 

execution fit under Baze’s “isolated mishap” exception for events that, “while 

regrettable, do[] not suggest cruelty, or that the procedure at issue gives rise to a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, Appellees violated no clearly established law despite Lockett suffering pain 

during his execution. The IV infiltration was an “isolated mishap,” not something 

designed to cause additional pain. Because Oklahoma has changed its execution 

protocol to incorporate several procedures Baze spoke favorably about,11 we likely 

 11 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734–35 (noting that Oklahoma now lists four 

possible drug combinations and has enacted safeguards, including these six: “(1) the 

insertion of both a primary and backup IV catheter, (2) procedures to confirm the 

viability of the IV site, (3) the option to postpone an execution if viable IV sites 

cannot be established within an hour, (4) a mandatory pause between administration 

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24 

will never confront another Oklahoma execution presenting the same circumstances 

as Lockett’s execution. 

6. New Drug Combination 

Lockett’s Estate challenges Oklahoma’s using a new drug protocol in 

Lockett’s execution. Lockett’s Estate alleges that Appellees should have been on 

notice that midazolam “could cause unnecessary pain and a lingering death” because 

the midazolam levels were too low and the Oklahoma Supreme Court had issued a 

stay due to lack of information about the drug. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 25. But 

this mischaracterizes the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s holding, which did not rest its 

stay on a lack of information about midazolam. Instead, the court held that, because 

Lockett had no information about the execution drugs, a stay was warranted. See 

Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 59 (Okla. 2014). The Oklahoma Supreme Court lifted 

the stay two days later when Lockett had been “provided with the identity of the drug 

or drugs to be used in the execution[] and with the dosages to be injected.” Lockett v. 

Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014). Those opinions did not concern midazolam 

or midazolam levels. 

Additionally, Lockett’s Estate fails to state a claim based on the use of 

uncompounded midazolam; rather, the paragraphs of the Amended Complaint 

 

of the first and second drugs, (5) numerous procedures for monitoring the offender’s 

consciousness, including the use of an electrocardiograph and direct observation, and 

(6) detailed provisions with respect to the training and preparation of the execution 

team”). 

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25 

Lockett’s Estate relies on complain that compounded drugs, specifically midazolam, 

can be impure or lack potency. See Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 167; Appellant’s 

Opening Br. at 25. And Lockett’s Estate has abandoned claims relating to 

compounded drugs. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6 n.5. 

Even if the Amended Complaint did sufficiently allege that midazolam was a 

constitutionally unacceptable execution drug, Glossip would defeat that argument. In 

Glossip, the Court noted that because capital punishment is constitutional, “‘[i]t 

necessarily follows that there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.’” 

Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 

47). The Glossip Court also concluded that the district court had not clearly erred in 

finding that “sodium thiopental and pentobarbital are now unavailable to Oklahoma’s 

Department of Corrections.” Id. at 2738. The Court further held that “[t]he District 

Court did not commit clear error when it found that midazolam is highly likely to 

render a person unable to feel pain during an execution.” Id. at 2739. Based on the 

Court’s acknowledgment that states were having difficulties acquiring execution 

drugs, see id. at 2733, we can follow the Court’s logic to say that if sodium thiopental 

and pentobarbital are unavailable, some other method, potentially including a new 

drug combination, must be constitutional. Oklahoma did not switch to midazolam in 

an effort to inflict additional pain. Thus, we conclude that Oklahoma’s use of 

midazolam comports with the Eighth Amendment. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 103 

(Thomas, J., concurring) (“But absent malevolence or a purpose to inflict 

unnecessary pain, the Court [in Resweber] concluded that the Constitution did not 

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26 

prohibit Louisiana from subjecting the petitioner to [the risks of electrocution] a 

second time in order to carry out his death sentence.” (quotation marks omitted)); 

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 326 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that 

the Resweber Court held “that the legislature adopted electrocution for a humane 

purpose, and that its will should not be thwarted because, in its desire to reduce pain 

and suffering in most cases, it may have inadvertently increased suffering in one 

particular case”). Thus, any claim based solely on the use of midazolam fails. 

7. Failure to Adequately Train and Supervise Personnel 

Lockett’s Estate claims that “Defendants Patton and Trammell did not 

promulgate the policies necessary to prevent Mr. Lockett from being executed in a 

way that violated the Eighth Amendment.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 27. Lockett’s 

Estate lists eight procedural failures: 

Defendants’ [sic] failed to (1) consult with experts, (2) require the 

attempted placement of a peripheral IV access line before placing a 

central line, (3) require establishment of a backup IV line, (4) require 

observation of the IV access site by an execution team member, (5) 

require a backup dosage of medications, (6) require a specific level of 

experience and training for personnel, (7) limit their own discretion, and 

(8) vest ultimate decision-making in someone with medical training or 

establish other checks and balances. 

Id. Although Lockett’s Estate “does not suggest that there is a ‘clearly established’ 

list of the aforementioned requirements of which Defendants should have been 

aware,” it directs us to procedures approved by the Baze plurality. Id. But Baze did 

not impose those approved procedures as a constitutional floor, so Lockett’s Estate 

cannot prevail simply by noting that Lockett’s execution lacked some of those 

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procedures. And it’s worth noting that Oklahoma has now adopted some of these 

procedural measures. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2753 (noting that Oklahoma now 

requires a backup IV and monitoring of the IV site, and Oklahoma now sets out 

“detailed provisions” on the training and preparation of the execution team). 

Lockett’s Estate claims that “a reasonable officer would have been on notice 

that the failure to promulgate basic policies to protect against painful, barbaric, and 

torturous executions violate[s] the Eighth Amendment.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 

27. But this provides nothing beyond the “high level of generality” that the Supreme 

Court has concluded will not suffice to show clearly established law. Al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. at 742. As in al-Kidd, where the plaintiff tried to rely on the “broad history and 

purposes of the Fourth Amendment” as clearly established law, Lockett’s Estate’s 

general pronouncement is too broad to show clearly established law. Id. (quotation 

marks omitted). 

In addition, in its fifth claim, Lockett’s Estate argues that Warden Trammell 

and Director Patton are liable under the Eighth Amendment for failure to train 

execution-team members on how to properly carry out an execution. In this regard, it 

cites City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), which provides § 1983 liability 

on this basis, but “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference 

to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, 489

at 388. Lockett’s Estate cites no cases supporting such liability in our context. 

Even if we were to accept the City of Canton standard here, the claim would 

fail. Although Oklahoma did not employ every safeguard possible, it did employ 

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some: for example, a doctor and EMT placed the IV, and a doctor remained present 

in the execution chamber to declare when Lockett became unconscious. Lockett’s 

execution likely would have gone smoother if Oklahoma had required a backup IV 

line and required an unobstructed view of the IV site by the medical personnel. But 

these deficiencies were not so likely to result in a violation of the Eighth Amendment 

that they amount to deliberate indifference. 

Under Baze, “an inmate cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim 

simply by showing one more step the State could take as a failsafe for other, 

independently adequate measures.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 60–61. And Baze also tells us 

that “[a] State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we 

uphold today would not create a risk that meets” the standard for a stay of execution 

based on an unconstitutional method of execution. Id. at 61. This comment responded 

to Justice Stevens’s concerns that Baze might confuse other states. See id.; id. at 71 

(Stevens, J., concurring). Certainly, in Baze, Kentucky’s protocol bettered 

Oklahoma’s as used here. For instance, Kentucky required a primary and backup IV, 

two sets of lethal-injection drugs, and an execution team that had participated in at 

least ten practice sessions per year. Id. at 55 (plurality opinion). The first two 

requirements would likely solve any problem resulting from an insufficient dose of 

sodium thiopental. See id. (“These redundant measures ensure that if an insufficient 

dose of sodium thiopental is initially administered through the primary line, an 

additional dose can be given through the backup line before the last two drugs are 

injected.” (emphasis added)). At most, Appellees were on notice that properly 

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29 

declaring the inmate unconscious had constitutional import. Because Appellees have 

violated no clearly established law, this claim fails. 

Appellees point to Hooper v. Jones, 491 F. App’x 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(unpublished), as proof that the Tenth Circuit had approved of Oklahoma’s execution 

protocol. But that case is not precedential and has little persuasive value because its 

facts markedly differ from ours. Perhaps most importantly, Oklahoma was then using 

pentobarbital. In Hooper, we approved of Oklahoma’s protocols, which did not 

require backup doses. But we found meritless the inmate’s concerns about potential 

IV problems, partly because two IV lines were placed. See id. at 930 n.2. Thus, 

Hooper provides little help here, where midazolam was used and the execution’s 

main flaw was using a single IV line and not checking that it was delivering the drugs 

into Lockett’s system. 

8. Aggregate Eighth Amendment Claim 

Lockett’s Estate argues that “[e]ven if none of Mr. Lockett’s individual 

allegations rise to the level of misconduct required under the Eighth Amendment, the 

aggregate of these allegations amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation based on 

the totality of the circumstances.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 28 (citation omitted). 

In support, Lockett’s Estate cites to a Fourth Amendment case, United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002), an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause case, 

United States v. One Parcel Property Located at Lot 85, 100 F.3d 740 (10th Cir. 

1996), and an Eighth Amendment prison-conditions case, Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 

345 (4th Cir. 1980). Lockett’s Estate provides us with no case suggesting that an 

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30 

aggregate Eighth Amendment claim exists in this context. We decline to establish 

such a claim now. Because there is no clearly established law that Appellees could 

have violated, this claim fails. 

B. Procedural Due Process 

Lockett’s Estate argues in its sixth claim that Lockett had a liberty interest12 in 

the use of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate during his execution. Before November 

2011, Oklahoma in fact required this. 22 Okla. Stat. § 1014(A) (2010). But in 

November 2011, the Oklahoma legislature amended the statute to instead require 

only “the administration of a lethal quantity of a drug or drugs.” 22 Okla. Stat. § 

1014(A) (2016). 

“States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are 

protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 

(1995). “But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, 

while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to 

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical 

 12 Lockett’s Estate also asserts a procedural-due-process violation based on a 

life interest. But the only supporting argument it offers is that “[i]t is probably that in 

the context of protecting a life interest under due process, as in this case, more robust 

procedural protections than those specified in [Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 

(1995)] might apply.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31 n.9. Lockett’s Estate then notes 

that “this court doesn’t need to reach that question because as explained above, even 

under Sandin the Appellant is entitled to reversal.” Id. Because Lockett’s Estate 

offers us nothing beyond the Sandin standard for liberty interests, we analyze that 

argument alone. Even if Lockett’s Estate had presented this argument more 

thoroughly, we doubt that Lockett’s Estate has pleaded a claim for deprivation of 

Lockett’s life interest here—he was afforded due process, a jury trial and numerous 

appeals, before his execution. 

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31 

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted). 

As the district court discussed in its order dismissing Lockett’s Estate’s case, 

this sort of claim is potentially viable under Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 

2010). See id. at 1340–41. But we decided Pavatt under the previous version of 

section 1014(A), which, as noted, required an ultrashort-acting barbiturate. Whatever 

persuasive value Pavatt has is lessened by Oklahoma’s having repealed this 

requirement before Lockett’s execution. In addition, we are uncertain how Sandin’s 

“atypical and significant hardship” language would even fit in the execution realm. If 

it were an atypical and significant hardship to be executed without sodium thiopental, 

no further lethal-injection executions could happen since sodium thiopental is now 

unavailable. Additionally, a death sentence is by its nature an atypical and significant 

hardship. Regardless, even if Lockett’s Estate could establish a liberty interest in the 

use of a certain category of execution drugs, any such interest was certainly not 

clearly established. 

Nor did Pavatt reach the ultimate issue of whether the inmate had a liberty 

interest in an ultrashort-acting barbiturate being used. Nothing in the record indicated 

“that defendants ha[d] denied [the inmate] the opportunity to challenge the protocol 

either administratively or in the Oklahoma state courts.” Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1341. 

When we decided Pavatt, the inmate had three weeks until his execution date. See id.

at 1337–38 (opinion published on December 14, 2010, and execution scheduled for 

January 4, 2011). Here, Lockett had two weeks. During that time, he was able to 

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32 

obtain two opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Lockett v. Evans, 356 

P.3d 58 (Okla. 2014) (April 21); Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014) (April 

23). Because Lockett had the opportunity to exercise his Due Process rights to 

challenge the drug protocol and failed to do so, Lockett’s Estate cannot now 

complain of a liberty-interest violation. 

C. Right to Counsel During an Execution 

Lockett’s Estate attempts to assert a constitutional right to counsel throughout 

an execution. It asks this court to recognize a constitutional right to counsel “when an 

execution procedure is producing unexpected and painful results.” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. at 33 n.11. Lockett’s Estate points to no law that would support a right 

to counsel throughout an execution, and we struggle to envision what such a right 

would look like in practice. Thus, Appellees have violated no clearly established law. 

D. Quasi-Judicial Immunity 

Dr. Doe also asserts that he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because 

Lockett’s death sentence “was issued and carried out pursuant to statutes and judicial 

authority.” Doe Resp. Br. at 31. Because we find that Dr. Doe is entitled to qualified 

immunity, we do not reach this argument. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court. 

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No. 15-6134, Estate of Clayton Lockett v. Fallin, et al.

MORITZ, J., concurring. 

I join much of the majority’s well-reasoned opinion, including its ultimate 

decision to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Estate’s complaint. See Maj. Op. 

33. I write separately, however, because I question the accuracy of—or at the very least, 

the necessity of reaching—some of the majority’s interim conclusions. 

At the outset, I note that the majority commits to narrowly resolving the many 

qualified-immunity issues presented in this appeal by focusing, as the district court did, 

solely on the Estate’s failure to show that defendants violated clearly established law. See

Maj. Op. 11 (expressly “declin[ing] . . . to decide each of the constitutional-violation 

questions first”); Maj. Op. 9-10 (noting agreement with, and affirmance of, district 

court’s dismissal based on failure to show defendants violated clearly established law). 

But as I read the majority opinion, it repeatedly, and in my view, unnecessarily, decides 

the constitutional questions. See, e.g. Maj. Op. 17 (“Lockett’s suffering did not run afoul 

of the Eighth Amendment.”); Maj. Op. 20 (suggesting repeated needle sticks would not 

violate Eighth Amendment); Maj. Op. 26 (“Thus, we conclude that Oklahoma’s use of 

midazolam comports with the Eighth Amendment.”). 

As more fully discussed below, while I agree with the majority’s professed intent 

to resolve the qualified immunity issues on the clearly-established prong, I do not agree 

with those portions of the opinion that conflict with that professed intent. 

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2 

1. Defendants’ Use of Midazolam 

First, I respectfully part ways with my colleagues in evaluating whether 

defendants violated Lockett’s constitutional rights by using a “[n]ew [d]rug 

[c]ombination.” Maj. Op. 24 (addressing App. vol. 1, 163-165). In resolving what 

remains of this claim,1

 the majority affirmatively holds that “Oklahoma’s use of 

midazolam comports with the Eighth Amendment.” Maj. Op. 26. But I see no reason to 

reach this constitutional question. As I read its opening brief, the Estate has abandoned its 

general midazolam claim. 

The Estate did allege below that defendants’ general use of midazolam violated 

Lockett’s Eighth Amendment rights. In support, the Estate asserted that midazolam is 

“incapable of producing a state of unawareness” and that “it cannot relieve pain.”2 App. 

 1

 As the majority correctly notes, the Estate’s opening brief also alleges that 

defendants violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment rights by using compounded drugs. 

Aplt. Br. 24-26. But as the majority points out, the Estate has since withdrawn that 

allegation in light of defendants’ statement that “no compounded drugs were used in 

Lockett’s execution.” Maj. Op. 4 n.1.

2

 The majority declines to accept these allegations as true, and therefore doesn’t 

address them in analyzing this claim. Maj. Op. 6 n.5, 24-26. Again, while I wouldn’t 

reach this abandoned claim, if I were to analyze it I would find the majority’s analysis 

flawed and I would accept these allegations as true. According to the majority, 

“[a]sserting that midazolam is ineffective in rendering an inmate unconscious essentially 

asserts that the use of midazolam is constitutionally deficient, a legal conclusion that we 

need not credit.” Id. at 6 n.5. I respectfully disagree. To be sure, the Estate’s factual 

allegations about midazolam’s efficacy may have legal implications—as all relevant 

factual allegations in a complaint surely must. But that doesn’t necessarily make them 

legal conclusions. And nothing in Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 135 S. Ct. 2941 (2015), indicates otherwise. Contrary to the majority’s 

suggestion, see Maj. Op. 6 n.5, the Zink court didn’t refuse to accept as true plaintiffs’ 

factual allegations about the potential risks of using compounded pentobarbital. See 783 

F.3d at 1099-1103. It simply found those potential risks too hypothetical to demonstrate 

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3 

vol. 1, 164. But on appeal, the Estate has pursued a much narrower course. Rather than 

arguing that defendants violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment rights by using midazolam 

generally, the Estate argues only that defendants violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment 

rights by using an insufficient dosage of midazolam. See Aplt. Br. 25. 

It appears that the Estate strategically shifted its argument in an effort to 

distinguish this case from Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 726, 736 (10th Cir.) (affirming 

district court’s denial of preliminary injunction and denying plaintiffs’ emergency motion 

for stay of execution despite Oklahoma’s proposed use of midazolam as execution drug), 

aff’d sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). In affirming this court’s decision 

in Warner, the Supreme Court distinguished between Oklahoma’s current execution 

protocol (which calls for 500 milligrams of midazolam) and the execution protocol in 

place when Oklahoma executed Lockett (which instead “called for the administration of 

100 milligrams of midazolam”). See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734. Thus, the Estate argues 

on appeal, the district court erred in relying on our opinion in Warner “to justify its 

dismissal of [the Estate’s] claim pertaining to . . . use of an insufficient level of” 

midazolam, as opposed to the use of midazolam generally. Aplt. Br. 26. 

Whatever the Estate’s motive for making this strategic switch, the result is clear: 

the Estate has abandoned its claim that defendants violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment 

rights by using midazolam in favor of an argument that defendants violated Lockett’s 

Eighth Amendment rights by using an insufficient amount of midazolam. Accordingly, I 

 

that the drug was “‘sure or very likely’ to cause serious harm or severe pain.” Id. at 1101 

(citation omitted).

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would find the former argument waived and, unlike the majority, I would decline to 

address it.3

Moreover, I would decline to address the Estate’s current formulation of this 

argument—i.e., that defendants violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment rights by using an 

insufficient dosage of midazolam—because the Estate didn’t advance that argument 

below. Instead, the complaint asserts that midazolam is inherently incapable of 

“producing a state of unawareness” or of “reliev[ing] pain.” App. vol. 1, 164 (“One of the 

characteristics of midazolam is that it cannot relieve pain.”). But the complaint never 

suggests that midazolam’s ability to produce unawareness or relieve pain varies 

depending on the dosage administered. 

 3

 Even if defendants’ general-use-of-midazolam claim is properly before us, I 

question the majority’s emphasis, in resolving that claim, on the Estate’s failure to allege 

that defendants chose to use midazolam in order to inflict pain. See Maj. Op. 25-26 

(“Oklahoma did not switch to midazolam in an effort to inflict additional pain. Thus, we 

conclude that Oklahoma’s use of midazolam comports with the Eighth Amendment.” 

(citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 103 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 

That intent to cause pain is an element of any successful method-of-execution 

claim was, of course, the view of two concurring Justices in Baze. See 553 U.S. at 94 

(Thomas, J., concurring) (“A method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if 

it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.”). But the controlling plurality opinion in Baze 

indicates that something less than the intentional infliction of pain may suffice, at least in 

the context of a pre-execution Eighth Amendment claim: a showing that a prison official 

is aware that the chosen execution method poses a “substantial risk of serious harm,” but 

nevertheless adopts that method in the face of a known and feasible alternative that will 

significantly reduce that risk. Id. at 52 (plurality opinion) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738 n.2 (explaining that “THE CHIEF 

JUSTICE’s opinion in Baze sets out the holding of the case,” while only “Justices 

SCALIA and THOMAS took the broader position that a method of execution is 

consistent with the Eighth Amendment unless it is deliberately designed to inflict pain”). 

Accordingly, I question whether the Estate’s failure to allege that defendants chose 

midazolam in order to cause Lockett’s suffering is dispositive of this claim. 

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5 

In fact, to the extent the complaint discusses the constitutional import of the 

dosage that defendants used in Lockett’s execution at all, it suggests that the dosage was 

unconstitutionally high, not unconstitutionally low. See, e.g., id. at 165 (“As used in the 

procedure the high dosage of midazolam carries a substantial risk of producing tonicclonic seizures and convulsions.”); (“There is a substantial risk of a paradoxical reaction 

when midazolam is administered in high doses to individuals with a history of aggression 

or impulsivity.”). 

Because the complaint neither explicitly asserts that the defendants violated 

Lockett’s constitutional rights by administering an insufficient dosage of midazolam, nor 

contains factual allegations that would support such a claim, I would decline to consider 

whether defendants’ failure to use a higher dosage of midazolam violated Lockett’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, I do not join the portion of the majority opinion 

addressing the Estate’s midazolam claim. 

2. Torture 

 Likewise, I decline to join the portion of the majority opinion evaluating Lockett’s 

torture claim. See Maj. Op. 14-18 (discussing App. vol. 1, 161-63). “[I]t is safe to affirm 

that punishments of torture” violate the Eighth Amendment. Baze, 553 U.S. at 48 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But the question here isn’t whether, “as a 

broad general proposition,” torture violates the Eighth Amendment. Mullenix v. Luna, 

136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[t]he 

dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of [the defendants’] particular

conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

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6 

The Estate makes no effort to identify any “existing precedent” that might place 

the question of whether defendants’ “particular conduct” in this case violated the Eighth 

Amendment’s ban on torture “beyond debate.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Instead, the Estate relies solely on “broad general proposition[s].” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). For instance, the Estate notes that the Eighth 

Amendment proscribes “torture[] and other barbar(ous) methods of punishment” and “the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 103 

(1976) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and that “[p]unishments are cruel 

when they involve torture or a lingering death.” In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 

(1890). See Aplt. Br. 15-17. 

While it’s true that there need not be a “case directly on point,” the Supreme Court 

has repeatedly warned us “not to define clearly established law at a high level of 

generality.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).4

And that is precisely what the Estate’s citations to Estelle and Kemmler invite us to do 

here. Because the Estate cites no authority that would have put defendants on notice that 

their particular conduct violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on torture, the 

Estate fails to satisfy the clearly-established prong of the qualified-immunity analysis. 

Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s conclusion that defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity on the Estate’s torture claim on that basis alone, without addressing 

 4 Mullenix is a Fourth Amendment case, and the Court has explained that 

“specificity is especially important in [that] context.” 136 S. Ct. at 308. Nevertheless, this 

court has applied the same specificity requirement in the Eighth Amendment context. 

See, e.g., Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1245 n.6 (10th Cir. 2015); Henderson, 813 F.3d at 

953. 

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whether defendants violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from torture. I 

therefore do not join the portion of the majority opinion addressing the Estate’s torture 

claim. 

3. Deliberate Indifference

Similarly, while I agree with the majority that the language of the Estate’s 

“torture” claim is broad enough to alternatively allege that defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to a risk of substantial harm, I would again find it unnecessary to resolve 

whether the Estate’s allegations are sufficient to establish that defendants violated 

Lockett’s constitutional rights. See Maj. Op. 14-18 (addressing App. vol. 1, 161-63). 

In its opening brief, the Estate relies primarily on its allegations of repeated needle 

sticks to support this alternative theory. Aplt. Br. 18-20. But like the majority, I would 

decline to consider these allegations because (1) they don’t appear in the complaint and 

(2) they are not subject to judicial notice. See Maj. Op. 18-19. 

The only remaining factual allegation the Estate relies on in advancing this claim 

on appeal is its assertion that defendants obscured the injection site with a towel. Aplt. 

Br. 18. But even assuming that Lockett had a constitutional right to have defendants 

monitor the injection site for the duration of his execution, that right wasn’t clearly 

established at the time. See Henderson, 813 F.3d at 953 (noting that while a case on point 

isn’t required, existing precedent must place constitutional question beyond debate). 

Accordingly, I would affirm solely on that basis, without addressing whether defendants 

were deliberately indifferent to a “substantial risk of serious harm” in failing to monitor 

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the injection site. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).5

Moreover, even if I reached the constitutional question, I would confine my 

analysis to the factual allegations that are properly before us. Because I agree that we 

shouldn’t take judicial notice of facts that don’t appear in the complaint, I would—unlike 

the majority—decline to speculate as to whether those same facts might establish an 

Eighth Amendment violation. Compare Maj. Op. 18 (declining to take judicial notice of 

Estate’s allegation that defendants “repeatedly stab[bed]” Lockett with a needle), with 

 5

 The majority acknowledges that the Estate’s first claim for relief is sufficient to 

allege deliberate indifference under Baze. See Rule 28(j) Letter, 1 (arguing that complaint 

asserts deliberate-indifference claim under Baze); Maj. Op. 15 (acknowledging letter and 

agreeing that complaint alleges deliberate-indifference claim). Yet—at least as far as I 

can tell—the majority neither discusses nor applies the Baze plurality’s test for deliberate 

indifference in evaluating this claim. Instead, the majority opinion appears to suggest that 

because defendants didn’t “place[] the IV or cover[] Lockett’s groin area to cause

Lockett pain,” the Estate “has no claim for . . . deliberate indifference.” Maj. Op.18. But 

as discussed above, see supra note 3, intent to inflict pain is not an element of a 

deliberate-indifference claim under Baze. Compare Baze, 553 U.S. at 94 (Thomas, J., 

concurring), with Baze, 553 U.S. at 49-52 (plurality opinion). This conclusion likewise 

calls into question the majority’s treatment of the Estate’s “[p]rolonged [e]xecution” 

claim. See Maj. Op. 23 (indicating that Supreme Court precedent “require[s] that 

executing officials mean to choose an execution method that will cause extra pain”); Maj. 

Op. 23 (citing Baze plurality’s substantial-risk language, but nevertheless focusing on 

fact that “IV infiltration was . . . not something designed to cause additional pain”). 

Relatedly, I question the majority’s suggestion that defendants weren’t deliberately 

indifferent to Lockett’s serious medical needs simply because they didn’t “intentionally 

set the IV to collapse the vein to cause Lockett’s suffering.” Maj. Op. 21. True, 

“deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). But “the cases are . . . clear that it is satisfied by 

something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. 

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Maj. Op. 20 (nevertheless opining, “[W]e doubt that attempting to place an IV for an 

hour would violate the Eighth Amendment under Baze”). 

Finally, even if I were to consider whether repeated needle sticks amount to a 

constitutional violation, I question whether Baze would necessarily resolve the matter, as 

the majority suggests. See Maj. Op. 20 (describing Baze as “finding no violation where 

the execution protocol allowed the IV team one hour to establish an IV”). In Baze, the 

plurality rejected the petitioners’ assertion that that using an IV inserted after “more than 

ten or fifteen minutes of unsuccessful attempts is dangerous because the IV is almost 

certain to be unreliable.” 553 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Baze plurality didn’t address whether—as the Estate 

alleges here, see Aplt. Br. 17-20—repeated needle sticks in and of themselves might at 

some point raise constitutional concerns. 

4. Oklahoma’s Revised Execution Protocol 

As a final matter, I am puzzled by the majority’s repeated references to 

Oklahoma’s recent efforts to revise its execution protocol. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 23-24, 24 

n.11 (noting that “[b]ecause Oklahoma has changed its execution protocol,” this court 

will likely “never confront another Oklahoma execution presenting the same 

circumstances”); Maj. Op. 27 (“And it’s worth noting that Oklahoma has now adopted 

some [new] procedural measures.”). 

The question before us on appeal is whether defendants violated Lockett’s clearly 

established constitutional rights. And Oklahoma’s recent remedial efforts cannot 

retroactively influence the constitutional character of defendants’ past actions. 

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Accordingly, Oklahoma’s efforts to revise its execution protocol have played no role in 

my analysis of the legal issues in this case. 

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