Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02104/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2104

___________

Joseph D. Amrine, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

George R. Brooks; Thomas J. *

Brown, III; Richard Lee, *

*

Defendants, * 

* 

John C. Hemeyer; Marilyn Schmutzler, * 

Public Administrator and Personal *

Representative of the Estate of *

George Brooks, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Defendants – Appellees, * Western District of Missouri.

*

Twin City Fire Insurance Company; *

Missouri Department of Corrections, *

*

Interested parties. *

_____________________ *

*

National Association for the *

Advancement of Colored People; *

National Association for the *

Advancement of Colored People, *

Kansas City Branch, *

*

Not Parties – Amici on *

Behalf of Appellant. *

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1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

2

Brooks is deceased, and appellee Marilyn Schmutlzer is the personal

representative of his estate.

3

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri. 

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___________

Submitted: January 16, 2008

Filed: April 8, 2008

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and JARVEY,1

 District

Judge.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After obtaining habeas relief from the Missouri Supreme Court, Joseph D.

Amrine brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison investigator George

Brooks,2

 deputy sheriff John Hemeyer, prosecutor Thomas J. Brown, III, and

prosecution investigator Richard Lee for their roles in the investigation which led to

his conviction for murder and sentence to death. The district court3

 denied Amrine

leave to file a third amended complaint and granted summary judgment to defendants

Brown and Lee on the basis of prosecutorial immunity and to Brooks and Hemeyer

on the basis of qualified immunity. Amrine appeals from the dismissal of his claims

against Brooks and Hemeyer. We affirm.

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I.

Amrine was convicted in April 1986 of the murder of fellow inmate Gary

Barber in the Missouri state penitentiary. Barber was stabbed to death at

approximately 2:30 p.m. on October 18, 1985 in a multipurpose room, in which he as

well as Amrine and 40 to 50 other inmates were spending their recreation period.

Amrine had learned from inmate Terry Russell the previous week that Barber had

been spreading a rumor about having had sex with Amrine when he was passed out

from drinking alcohol. When Amrine and Russell confronted Barber about the rumor,

Russell and Barber ended up fighting. Both Barber and Russell were placed in

detention cells and not released until 10:00 a.m. on October 18, the day of the killing.

At the time Barber was stabbed Officer John Noble was guarding a locked door

which was the only entrance in and out of the multipurpose room. Amrine claims that

Russell was also in the room, but appellees contend that he was not. Around 2:25

p.m. Officer Noble saw Barber chase another inmate from the back of the room to the

front near where Noble was standing. Noble saw an "ice-pick type weapon" in

Barber's hand and only realized that Barber had been stabbed when he collapsed near

him. Noble retrieved the weapon from the floor, opened the locked door, and called

for Sergeant Dobson who was stationed just outside the room. Dobson went in and

ordered an immediate lockdown of the room so that no inmate could either leave or

enter. Prison guidelines required officers to compile a list of every inmate in a

lockdown room. The rest of the prison was also locked down.

Officer Danny Bowers entered the multipurpose room after the lockdown, and

Noble pointed out Russell as the inmate whom Barber was chasing. Officer Bowers

took Russell from the room out into the hall, searched him, and later escorted him to

an office for questioning. The parties disagree about whether Noble correctly

identified the person Barber was chasing. Noble asked the inmate Barber was chasing

for his name; he replied "Russell." Brooks and Hemeyer contend, however, that it was

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Amrine who answered with Russell's name. The two men apparently had similar skin

tone, physical characteristics, and hairstyle. Officer Noble testified in a 2006

deposition that he was certain that the person Barber was chasing was Russell. 

Appellee George Brooks, an investigator for the Missouri Department of

Corrections, learned of the stabbing almost immediately. He spoke to Officer Noble,

who told him that Barber had been chasing Russell, that Barber and Russell had been

fighting, and that both had just been released from confinement earlier that day.

Officers searched the multipurpose room several times while the inmates were still in

the room, and no blood or other physical evidence was found except where Barber

collapsed. Brooks performed his own search of the room and found nothing. Brooks

ordered that all inmates be searched as they left the room and that the room be

searched again afterwards. Officers also searched the area outside the room without

success. 

Brooks then went to talk with Russell. He stripsearched him, found nothing

suspicious, and did not question him about the stabbing. After Brooks received

information from a "confidential source" saying that he should investigate Amrine for

the murder because there had been talk that morning that he would attack Barber,

Brooks verified that Amrine was on the list of inmates who had been in the

multipurpose room. He then spoke with Captain Hallford, an officer in the supermax

unit where the incident had occurred, who told him that Amrine "was the man we

should be looking [at]." Brooks then spoke with Amrine. He stripsearched him and

observed a small red spot on his pants and three spots on his undershirt. Brooks took

Amrine's clothing into custody; the spots appeared to be blood, but they were not fresh

and were never identified as Barber's blood. 

 

Deputy John Hemeyer, Cole County Deputy Sheriff, arrived shortly after

Brooks took Amrine's clothing into custody. Hemeyer was involved in all the

interviews and investigation from that point forward. Brooks and Hemeyer began to

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 Noble verified that he gave Russell permission to leave the room but did not

remember his actually leaving the room.

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question Amrine at 4:04 p.m. Amrine denied stabbing Barber and said that he had

never gotten close to Barber so the spots on his clothing could not be from him. They

terminated his interview without asking death penalty qualifying questions although

Hemeyer later testified that they had intended to ask them but forgot. Amrine was

placed in a detention cell for the investigation of murder.

Brooks and Hemeyer interviewed Russell at 5:35 p.m. Russell admitted to his

fight with Barber the previous week. He also said that Amrine had wanted to stab

Barber to pay him back for spreading rumors about him but could not do it when

Barber was in isolation. Although Officer Noble had told Brooks that he saw Barber

chase Russell, the two investigators did not ask Russell any questions about the

stabbing. At 8:00 p.m. they took a formal statement from him. He admitted to being

in the multipurpose room at the beginning of the recreation period, but he claimed that

he was not inside at the time of the stabbing. He stated that he had asked Noble for

permission to leave the room to get aspirin and that Noble gave him permission and

opened the door for him.4

 Russell said that he went to the control center where the

sergeant on duty gave him aspirin in a brown medicine bag and that he had been

talking with another inmate named "Peebles" at the time Sergeant Dobson yelled for

a stretcher. Russell returned to the multipurpose room, and Noble initially refused

to let him enter. Russell also claimed that he asked Amrine why he had stabbed

Barber and that Amrine said, "I had to do it." 

Hemeyer later testified that he had had "doubts" about Russell's story at the

time, but he and Brooks never located the brown medicine bag which Russell claimed

to have obtained after Noble let him out of the multipurpose room. They also did not

talk to the sergeant who purportedly gave Russell the aspirin, did not identify the

inmate called "Peebles," and never questioned Officer Noble about the inconsistencies

between his identification of Russell and Russell's claim that he was not in the room

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or between Russell's statement that Noble let him back in the room after the lockdown

and Noble's testimony that he let no one reenter.

At 10:30 p.m. on October 18 Brooks and Hemeyer began their second interview

with Amrine and asked the death penalty qualifying questions overlooked earlier.

Amrine denied stabbing Barber and said that he had been playing cards with other

inmates at the time of the attack. After this interview, Amrine was returned to a

detention cell and remained in segregated confinement until his trial in April 1986.

On October 21 Brooks and Hemeyer interviewed inmate Jerry Poe, a

schizophrenic who told them he feared for his life. Poe said that he believed that his

life was threatened because of Barber's killing and that he would only give a statement

if he were moved to protective custody. Poe gave a statement about the stabbing

which conflicted with other evidence. He was the only witness to testify that someone

wiped blood off of Barber's face with a towel, and no towel was ever found. Brooks

and Hemeyer showed Poe pictures of inmates and asked him to identify the person

chased by Barber. On the day of the stabbing Poe had seen the officers take Amrine

from his cell, and he knew that Amrine was a suspect. When Poe was shown an eight

year old picture of Amrine, he stated "I want to say that he's the one that stabbed

Barber, but I can't be positive from this picture." Brooks asked him to flip over the

picture where Poe saw Amrine's name, prison number, and the date of the picture.

When asked if he was sure about his identification of Barber's murderer, Poe indicated

that he was. After he spoke to Brooks and Hemeyer, he was transferred to the county

jail. 

Russell took a polygraph exam on October 22, 1985. Brooks' final investigative

report indicates that Russell's polygraph was truthful, but Russell later testified at an

evidentiary hearing that the polygraph indicated a conflicted answer as to whether or

not he had been in the multipurpose room when the stabbing occurred. This evidence

was not presented in the jury trial. The polygraph also showed that Russell gave a

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truthful answer when he denied stabbing Barber. At a later evidentiary hearing

Russell stated that he had not wanted to testify against Amrine at his murder trial

because he did not know if Amrine had actually stabbed Barber, but that Brooks and

Hemeyer threatened to charge him with the murder if he did not. 

Brooks and Hemeyer also interviewed inmates Dodson, Willis, Jordan, Crume,

Ball, and Hines on October 22, but none of them said they had seen the stabbing.

While inmates Crume and Hines said they had seen Barber chase Amrine, Ball said

that Amrine had been playing cards with him when Barber was stabbed, and Jordan

said that Amrine was standing next to him at the poker table at the time. 

Despite the inconsistencies, Brooks and Hemeyer did not do any further

investigation before Brooks submitted his investigative report dated December 2,

1985. His report concluded that it "appeared" that Amrine had stabbed Barber.

Subsequently on January 24, 1986, Brooks met with inmate Jordan who changed his

earlier story and now said that Amrine had stabbed Barber and then was chased

around the room by him. Brooks and prosecution investigator Lee interviewed inmate

Wayne Garrison on April 8, 1986. At first Garrison said that he had not seen the

stabbing but had seen Barber chasing Amrine; later in the interview he said that he

saw Amrine stab Barber. Lee and Brooks interviewed inmate Henry Belk on April 9,

1986; Belk also stated that Barber had been chasing Amrine. They also interviewed

Randy Ferguson, who refused to say anything on tape until prosecutor Brown agreed

to drop a weapon charge against him; he then told Brooks and Lee that Amrine

stabbed Barber and was the man being chased.

A jury convicted Amrine of Barber's murder on April 30, 1986, and he was

sentenced to death on May 1. The state's case rested on the testimony of inmates

Russell, Poe, and Ferguson. Officer Noble testified that he saw Barber chase Russell

across the room, and six inmates testified that Amrine was playing poker with them

in a different part of the room when the stabbing occurred. Three of those inmates

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identified Russell as the person Barber had been chasing. None of the six named

Amrine. Amrine's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, State v.

Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1987), and he unsuccessfully sought post conviction

relief. Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1990). At an evidentiary hearing

during post conviction proceedings both Russell and Ferguson had recanted their trial

testimony, but Poe did not appear or testify. 

Amrine then filed a federal habeas petition. After the petition was denied by

the district court, Amrine obtained new counsel who located Poe and produced an

affidavit from him. In that affidavit Poe completely recanted his trial testimony and

swore that he had not seen Amrine stab Barber and that he had falsely identified

Amrine. After reviewing the voluminous record, we concluded that Amrine had made

a showing of actual innocence. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1228 (8th Cir.

1997) (en banc). We therefore reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing in

the federal district court. 

On remand the district court heard testimony from Poe, as well as from Russell,

Ferguson, another inmate named Kevin Dean, and Officer Noble. After finding that

Poe's testimony was unreliable, the district court again denied the petition. We

affirmed, based on the district court's credibility findings. Amrine v. Bowersox, 238

F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2001). The Missouri Supreme Court later concluded that there

was clear and convincing evidence that Amrine was actually innocent of Barber's

murder, granted him habeas relief, and set aside his conviction and sentence. State ex

rel Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003).

Amrine filed this § 1983 action in December 2004, alleging violation of

procedural due process, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. After defendants

moved for summary judgment and Amrine moved to file a third amended complaint

asserting a substantive due process claim, the district court denied Amrine's motion

and granted that of the defendants. It dismissed the claims against Brown and Lee on

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5

Amrine does not appeal the dismissal of his conspiracy and malicious

prosecution claims.

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the basis of prosecutorial immunity and concluded that the actions of Brooks and

Hemeyer were supported by probable cause or at least arguable probable cause and

that they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Since Amrine had not pled

substantive due process, his reckless investigation claim was dismissed, and the

district court determined that Brooks and Hemeyer had not violated Amrine's

procedural due process rights by bad faith withholding of exculpatory evidence from

the prosecutors. Amrine appeals the summary judgment granting Brooks and

Hemeyer qualified immunity on his procedural due process claim, which the district

court had construed to allege a Fourth Amendment violation.5

Amrine contends on appeal that the only reliable evidence showed that he was

actually innocent of the stabbing and that the district court erred by granting qualified

immunity to Brooks and Hemeyer because they had violated his clearly established

right not to be arrested without probable cause. Amrine also argues that his due

process claim stated a substantive due process violation even though it was labeled as

"procedural" and that the district court erred by denying him leave to file a third

amended complaint. He asserts that any delay would not have unfairly prejudiced

appellees and that the amendment would not have been futile. 

II.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Skare v. Extendicare

Health Services, Inc., 515 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2008). Amrine asserts that the

district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Brooks and Hemeyer on his

Fourth Amendment claim because they arrested him without probable cause. We

review the finding of qualified immunity de novo. McClendon v. Story County

Sheriff's Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Count 1 of Amrine's Second Amended Complaint alleged a procedural due

process claim that he had a protected liberty interest in being free from wrongful

conviction and incarceration. The district court liberally construed this claim to allege

a violation of Amrine's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free of arrest

and prosecution without probable cause.

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Qualified immunity is a defense available to government officials if they have

not violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known." Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir.

2007) (citation omitted); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It

"allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always 'err on the side

of caution'" for fear of being sued. Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th

Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1011 (1996); see Davis v. Scherer, 468

U.S. 183, 196 (1984). This defense provides "ample room for mistaken judgments"

by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986). 

When considering whether a state official is entitled to qualified immunity, we

first determine whether the alleged facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the

injured party, demonstrate that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right.

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the answer to that inquiry is yes, we

next ask whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time so that a

reasonable officer would have understood that his conduct violated that right. Id. at

201. Amrine submits that his placement in restrictive confinement by Brooks and

Hemeyer on October 18, 1985 following their Miranda warnings was an arrest

violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure because

it was not supported by probable cause.6

 

Prison officials may place inmates in segregated confinement without

implicating protected liberty interests so long as the confinement does not "impose[]

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Sandin involved

application of a state prison regulation rather than an alleged deprivation of a

fundamental right, however, and we have not had occasion to consider whether

placement in a detention cell within a prison on suspicion of commission of a crime

qualifies as an arrest for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause

requirement. Cases from other circuits suggest that it does not because segregation

is used to discipline or investigate inmates for violations of prison regulations, to

protect them from the general population, or to provide a cooling off period after

altercations between inmates. See United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386, 390 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S. 952 (1976); see also United States v. Daniels, 698 F.2d

221, 223 (4th Cir. 1983) (segregated confinement is not an arrest for purposes of

constitutional protections ); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir.)

(placement in segregated confinement for five months until indictment not an arrest

for speedy trial purposes), cert. denied 429 U.S. 963 (1976). On the other hand, the

Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that a major change in conditions of

confinement, such as solitary isolation, may implicate liberty interests for which

minimum procedural safeguards are required by due process. See Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 n.19 (1974). 

Even assuming that Amrine's detention by Brooks and Hemeyer on October 18,

1985 was an arrest, we find that it was supported by arguable probable cause. A

warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by

probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411

(1976). Probable cause exists when the totality of the circumstances shows that a

prudent person would believe that the arrestee has committed a crime. See Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983); United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465

(8th Cir. 1997). Exculpatory evidence is therefore relevant to whether an officer has

probable cause. Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999). Officers are not

required to conduct a "mini-trial" before arrest, but probable cause "does not exist

when a 'minimal further investigation' would have exonerated the suspect." Id. at 650

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Amrine also cites as exculpatory evidence Russell's inconclusive polygraph

response as to whether he was in the room at the time of the stabbing. Since the

polygraph was taken on October 21 and Amrine's arrest occurred on October 18, the

polygraph does not factor into the probable cause analysis for the arrest.

-12-

(citations omitted). Officers may also be entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest

a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided

that the mistake is objectively reasonable. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228–29

(1991) (per curiam). We have characterized this inquiry as whether the officers had

"arguable probable cause." See Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir.

2000).

On the evening of October 18, 1985, the inculpatory evidence against Amrine

included evidence of a motive to kill Barber, information from a confidential

informant saying to look at Amrine for the murder, Russell's statement that Amrine

had said he "had to do it," and blood spots on Amrine's clothing. The exculpatory

evidence included Officer Noble's identification of Russell as the inmate whom Barber

was chasing, Amrine's denial of involvement in the murder, and inconsistent evidence

regarding whether Russell was in the multipurpose room at the time of the murder.

Brooks and Hemeyer did not have the benefit of later discovered evidence when they

made the decision to give Amrine Miranda warnings and separate him from the rest

of the prison population.7

 As probable cause is determined "at the moment the arrest

was made," any later developed facts are irrelevant to the probable cause analysis for

an arrest. United States v. Rivera, 370 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2004).

Amrine argues that these facts are similar to the Kuehl case and that this

supports his position that no probable cause existed for his arrest and qualified

immunity is not appropriate. See 173 F.3d at 648–49. In Kuehl, an officer

investigating an altercation spoke with the suspect for only twenty seconds, ignored

physical evidence that corroborated the suspect's claim that she was the victim of an

assault not the perpetrator, refused to acknowledge her explanation for why she hit the

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other party, ignored an eyewitness account that corroborated her statement, and

omitted most exculpatory evidence from the police report. See id. at 648. We held

there that in the absence of exigent circumstances an officer who unreasonably fails

to investigate an incident sufficiently before arresting a suspect is not entitled to

qualified immunity. Id. at 651. 

Kuehl is distinguishable because Amrine was given two opportunities prior to

his arrest to present his side of the story, and the physical evidence – the blood stains

– tended at the outset to inculpate him. The exculpatory statement of an independent

witness, Officer Noble, was tempered by inconsistencies surrounding Russell's

location and by incriminating statements made to the investigators about Amrine. 

Considering the circumstances and the evidence known to Brooks and Hemeyer

on the evening of October 18, 1985, we conclude that arguable probable cause existed

to support separating Amrine from the rest of the prison population and placing him

in restrictive confinement. See Smithson, 235 F.3d at 1062. It would have taken more

than a "minimal further investigation," Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650, to sort out the

inconsistencies surrounding Russell's location at the time of the murder, to ascertain

the source of the blood spots on Amrine's clothing, and to interview additional

witnesses who might have exculpated Amrine. Because Amrine's arrest was

supported by arguable probable cause, Brooks and Hemeyer are entitled to the

protection of qualified immunity on this claim.

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III.

Amrine argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying him leave

to file a third amended complaint. After the opposing party has filed a responsive

pleading, Rule 15 states that "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing

party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when

justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A denial of leave to amend may be

justified by "undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the

amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party." United States ex rel. Joshi v.

St. Luke's Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied 127

S. Ct. 189 (2006). 

While we review the denial of a motion to file an amended complaint for abuse

of discretion, Joshi, 441 F.3d at 555, we review the finding of futility de novo. In re

Acceptance Ins. Cos. Sec. Litig., 423 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2005). Because we find

that the amendment would have been futile, we need not address whether the delay in

seeking leave to file the third amended complaint could have resulted in unfair

prejudice to Brooks and Hemeyer or whether Amrine sought to file a third amended

complaint in bad faith. Amrine argues that the allegations in his third amended

complaint state a cause of action for reckless investigation in violation of his

substantive rather than procedural due process rights. 

We recognized a substantive due process cause of action for reckless

investigation in Wilson v. Lawrence County, Mo., 260 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2001),

where we identified the liberty interest at stake as the "interest in obtaining fair

criminal proceedings." Id. at 956 n.8, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87

(1963). The test for whether state officers' actions violate this protected liberty

interest is whether those actions shock the conscience. Id. at 956, citing County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Mere negligent failure to investigate

does not violate substantive due process. Id. at 955. Likewise, allegations of gross

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In 1995 the governor granted Wilson a full pardon after an independent

investigation made it clear that Wilson had not committed the murder.

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negligence do not give rise to a constitutional violation. Id. Where state officials

"have the opportunity to deliberate various alternatives prior to selecting a course of

conduct, such action violates due process if it is done recklessly." Id. at 956. To

establish a violation of this right by a botched investigation, Amrine must show that

Brooks and Hemeyer intentionally or recklessly failed to investigate, thereby shocking

the conscience. See id. at 955–56. As the Wilson court noted, the recklessness

standard has a subjective component. Id. at 956 n.9.

In Wilson, we found that the allegations of a mentally impaired twenty year old,

that a confession had been coerced from him by officers investigating a murder, met

the recklessness bar if proven at trial, id. at 957, and the motion for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity was therefore denied. Officers had

interviewed Wilson twice, and on both occasions he claimed that he knew nothing

about the murder and that he had been shopping with his mother when the murder

occurred. A sixteen year old, also mentally impaired and known by school officials

as a"very skilled liar," had told the officers that Wilson confessed the murder to him.

They picked up Wilson, read him his rights but told him he was not under arrest,

detained him in a windowless interrogation room for hours playing portions of the

other youth's statement, told him that an eyewitness placed him at the crime scene,

asked leading questions, threatened him when he gave answers inconsistent with the

crime facts, and encouraged him when his answers reflected the details of the murder.

Id. at 950. Eventually Wilson confessed. Id.8

A similar due process claim was raised in Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638 (8th

Cir. 2002) (en banc), where a police officer brought a § 1983 case against police

officials and the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners after being acquitted of

beating a man during a mistaken arrest. He charged that other officers had

intentionally set up an innocent man, and he produced evidence of "questionable

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Clemmons eventually succeeded in winning a new trial after filing a habeas

petition claiming that exculpatory evidence had been withheld, particularly Clark's

statement. Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1997). He was acquitted

in his retrial. Clemmons, 477 F.3d at 965.

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procedures, of pressures placed on officers to incriminate a specific person or

corroborate the department's official line, of a hasty condemnation of [himself] and

of improper consideration of his race" in addition to proof that defendants had

"purposely ignored" exculpatory evidence. Id. at 648. We held that Moran could

establish a due process violation if a jury were to find his evidence credible.

Another claim of reckless investigation, also arising in the Missouri state

penitentiary and also involving investigator George Brooks, was brought in

Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 155 (2007).

After a prisoner was stabbed to death, Corrections Officer Steigerwald identified

Clemmons as the perpetrator. Although inmate Dwight Clark told Captain Gross that

another prisoner named Fred Bagby was involved in the murder, id. at 964, Gross

never questioned Bagby or searched his cell. Captain Gross had decided Clark was

not a credible witness because Bagby's name was not on a list of prisoners who were

said to be out of their cells at the time of the murder, and he prepared an investigation

memorandum for investigator Brooks to that effect. Id. Brooks never interviewed

Clark or Bagby.9

 Id. We concluded that the actions of the investigating officers were

not intentional or reckless, particularly because Officer Steigerwald's eyewitness

account had identified Clemmons as the killer. Id. at 966–67. Clemmons also had not

produced any evidence that Brooks consciously sought to suppress exculpatory facts

or pressured others not to investigate leads. Id. We determined that on these facts a

reasonable factfinder could not find that Brooks had acted recklessly. Id.

These three cases dealing with claims of reckless investigation are instructive

here. Amrine has produced no evidence suggesting that Brooks and Hemeyer

attempted to coerce or threaten him as the officers did to the Wilson plaintiff. There

Appellate Case: 07-2104 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/08/2008 Entry ID: 3421333
10Russell later stated that, on the morning he was to testify against Amrine at

trial, Brooks and Hemeyer threatened to charge him with the murder if he did not take

the stand. Amrine alleges that this proves that Brooks and Hemeyer covered up

exculpatory evidence. While this conduct was unlawful and reprehensible if true, it

still would not establish that the investigation phase of the stabbing was reckless.

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is also no evidence that the investigators purposely ignored evidence suggesting that

Amrine was innocent, as occurred in Wilson and Moran. Neither was there any

indication of systemic pressure to implicate Amrine in the face of evidence to the

contrary as in Moran. The facts alleged by Amrine more closely resemble those in

Clemmons, for Brooks and Hemeyer similarly failed in his case to follow through on

investigating other leads. They did not investigate inconsistencies related to Russell's

location at the time of the murder, such as trying to locate "Peebles" or the medication

Russell claimed to have received. Construed with all reasonable inferences in favor

of Amrine, their early focus on him and their conduct of the investigation still do not

rise above negligence. Significant evidence uncovered during the investigation

pointed to Amrine. That trial witnesses later recanted some testimony does not

establish that the investigation into Barber's murder was reckless. Amrine, like

Clemmons, offered no evidence that the investigators consciously suppressed

potentially exculpatory evidence or recklessly pinned the murder on a convenient

suspect.10

Because the facts alleged by Amrine are insufficient to make out a claim of

reckless investigation by Brooks and Hemeyer, we conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Amrine leave to file a third amended complaint

asserting a substantive due process cause of action for reckless investigation. The

amendment would have been futile. 

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11Because of our conclusions, we need not address the contention that Amrine's

claims are barred by collateral estoppel.

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IV.

In hindsight it is certainly possible to see imperfections in the investigation of

Barber's murder and to question the almost immediate placement of Amrine in

detention on suspicion of murder, but the volatile circumstances in the prison setting

and the more than considerable evidence implicating Amrine must be considered.

Although Amrine lived under the judgment of a death sentence for many years,

judicial proceedings eventually rescued him from that fate. Our en banc court

determined in 1997 that he had made a showing of actual innocence sufficient to

justify an evidentiary hearing, and the Missouri Supreme Court subsequently

concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that he was actually innocent

of the murder. 

The issues are different in this § 1983 case, and Brooks and Hemeyer had

arguable probable cause to detain Amrine on the evening of October 18, 1985. They

did not violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and

are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. We also conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Amrine leave to file a third

amended complaint because it would have been futile. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.11

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