Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01002/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01002-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAKEDHA NICKELBERRY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, et

al.,

Defendants /

No. C-06-1002 MMC

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND; VACATING

ORDER

Before the Court is plaintiff Jakedha Nickelberry’s (“Nickelberry”) motion for remand,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation’s (“DCC”) has

filed opposition, to which Nickelberry has replied. Having considered the papers filed in

support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision

on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for April 21, 2006, and rules as follows.

In her complaint, Nickelberry alleges she was injured by a defective vehicle and

seeks relief under state law. In its notice of removal, DCC alleges that diversity jurisdiction

exists over Nickelberry’s claims, asserting that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,

that Nickelberry is a citizen of California, that defendants DCC, Dollar Rent a Car, Inc.

(“Dollar Rent A Car”) and Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. (“Dollar Thrifty”) are citizens

of states other than California, and that the California citizenship of defendant Lithia of

Fairfield, Inc. (“Lithia”) should be disregarded on the ground Lithia is a fraudulently-joined

Case 3:06-cv-01002-MMC Document 23 Filed 04/17/06 Page 1 of 3
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defendant.

In her motion, Nickelberry challenges DCC’s allegation that Dollar Rent a Car has its

principal place of business in Oklahoma. In light of such challenge, the burden shifts to

DCC to offer “competent proof” that Dollar Rent A Car is a citizen of Oklahoma. See Gaus

v. Miles, Inc., 980 F. 2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding where plaintiff challenges

jurisdictional allegations in notice of removal, removing party must support its allegations

“by competent proof”). In response to Nickelberry’s motion, DCC relies exclusively on an

unsworn statement, made by counsel for Dollar Rent A Car, that such defendant has its

principal place of business in Oklahoma. (See Def. Dollar Rent A Car and Dollar Thrifty’s

Consent to Removal, filed March 31, 2006, at 1:24-2:1.) Such unsworn statement is

inadmissible to prove Dollar Rent A Car’s citizenship, see EOTT Energy Operating Ltd.

Partnership v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 257 F. 3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding

counsel’s unsworn “assertions” that defendant was instrumentality of foreign state, and thus

entitled to removal, “not part of the factual record”), and, consequently, does not constitute

the requisite “competent proof,” see Gaus, 980 F. 2d at 566.

Accordingly, DCC has failed to show that Nickelberry and Dollar Rent A Car are

diverse and, as a consequence, DCC has failed to demonstrate the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over the instant action.

As additional support for her motion, Nickelberry challenges DCC’s allegation that

Lithia is a fraudulently-joined defendant, arguing DCC has failed to show it is “obvious

according to the settled law” of California that Nickelberry cannot prevail against Lithia. 

See McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F. 2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). Although DCC

has offered evidence to show Lithia did not itself sell, repair or service the subject vehicle,

(see Notice of Removal Ex. C), Nickelberry argues that DCC has not made any showing

that Nickelberry is unable to prevail against Lithia under a theory of successor liability, and,

in particular, any showing that Nickelberry will be unable to establish she purchased the

vehicle from Lithia’s predecessor. In response, DCC points out that successor liability is

not specifically alleged in the complaint, concluding therefrom that Nickelberry fails to state

Case 3:06-cv-01002-MMC Document 23 Filed 04/17/06 Page 2 of 3
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The Court’s order to show cause, filed March 14, 2006, by which the Court directed

Nickelberry to show cause why her claims against Lithia should not be dismissed on

grounds of improper joinder, is hereby DISCHARGED.

2

In light of the Court’s findings that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the abovetitled action, the Court does not consider Nickelberry’s alternative argument that the notice

of removal is procedurally deficient.

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a claim against Lithia. Assuming, arguendo, a plaintiff cannot proceed against a defendant

under a theory of successor liability unless such theory is specifically pleaded in the

complaint, DCC has failed to show that, under California law, Nickelberry would not be

afforded leave to amend her complaint to address the purported pleading deficiency on

which DCC relies.

Accordingly, DCC has failed to show it is obvious under settled state law that

Nickelberry cannot prevail against Lithia,1

 and, consequently, for this additional reason,

DCC has failed to demonstrate that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the

instant action.2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Nickelberry’s motion to remand is hereby GRANTED,

and the action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the

County of Alameda.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01002-MMC Document 23 Filed 04/17/06 Page 3 of 3