Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00249/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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Although the motion was filed with this court on March 3, 1

2006, the proof of service establishes that the motion was mailed

from the federal prison on February 19, 2006.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN ANDREW BENSON, )

)

)

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Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

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Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-249 REC

(No. CR-F-04-5315 REC) 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

AND DIRECTING CLERK TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

On March 3, 2006, petitioner Stephen Andrew Benson timely 

filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1

Petitioner was charged with one count of bank robbery in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Petitioner, who was

represented by Assistant Federal Defender Ann Voris, pleading

guilty pursuant to a written Plea Agreement on November 19, 2004. 

The Plea Agreement provided in pertinent part:

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B. Blakely Waiver: To the extent that

defendant may have a right to have any facts

that will be used to determine his sentence

charged in the indictment and found at trial

by a jury, pursuant to Blakely v. Washington,

124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), the defendant waives

those rights and consents to have the

district court determine any facts necessary

for the imposition of sentence under the

standard of proof described below. The

defendant also agrees to waive any

constitutional challenge to the validity of

the federal sentencing guidelines and their

application to his case.

...

A. Statutory Authority: The defendant

understands that a sentencing guideline range

for this case will be determined by the Court

pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

(18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-374 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-

998). The defendant further understands that

the Court will impose a sentence within that

guideline range, unless the Court finds that

there is a basis for departure (either above

or below that range) because there exists an

aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a

kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken

into consideration by the Sentencing

Commission in formulating the guidelines.

...

B. Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack: 

The defendant understands that the law gives

him a right to appeal his conviction and

sentence. He agrees as part of his plea,

however, to give up this right as long as his

sentence is consistent with the agreement set

forth above.

The defendant also gives up any right he may

have to bring a post-conviction attack on his

conviction or his sentence. He specifically

agrees not to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 or § 2241 attacking his conviction or

sentence.

...

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2. Sentence Recommendation: The government

agrees to recommend that the defendant be

sentenced to the low end of the applicable

sentencing guideline range. 

The Presentence Investigation Report calculated petitioner’s

guideline range under the Sentencing Guidelines (based on offense

level of 29 with a Criminal History Category of IV) as 151 to 188

months. The Presentence Investigation Report notes that the

instant conviction is petitioner’s sixth conviction for bank

robbery in six years, that he committed the instant offense while

on supervised release, and that he is a career offender subject

to an enhanced penalty. The Presentence Investigation Report

acknowledges that the Plea Agreement provides for a

recommendation at the low end of the guideline range, but

recommended that the court sentence petitioner at the high end of

that range because of petitioner’s criminal history. 

Prior to petitioner’s sentencing, Ms. Voris filed a

Sentencing Memorandum. In her Sentencing Memorandum, Ms. Voris

states in pertinent part:

The plea agreement made a recommendation for

low-end of the sentencing guideline range. 

After some discussion with the Assistant

United States Attorney and Hubert Alvarez,

the probation officer, at Mr. Benson’s

request, the probation officer agreed that it

would change his Supervised Release Violation

Form 12 and recommend concurrent time so long

as Mr. Benson did not dispute the application

of the guidelines and particularly the career

offender status. The United States Supreme

Court recently held that the Sentencing

Guidelines are no longer mandatory and that

prior to imposing any sentence, a court must

take into consideration seven factors

outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United

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States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 ... (2005). 

As the Court in noted in Booker, 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(1984) lists the U.S.S.G. as one of

several factors for this Court to consider in

imposing sentence. Section 3553(a) states

that, in addition to the U.S.S.G., this Court

‘shall consider,’ the nature and

circumstances of the offense, the history and

characteristics of the defendant, and the

need for the sentence to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, and to provide

just punishment for the offense.

In the wake of Booker, this Court has had its

full judicial power restored to it and now

can and must consider the other statutory

factors delineated by § 3553(a). The

Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they no

longer trump consideration of other statutory

sentencing factors. Where reasonable, this

Court may fashion an appropriate sentence

balancing equities in a particular case

without the gymnastics of mandatory guideline

system for downward departures. Therefore,

this Court is no longer required to disregard

any relevant mitigating circumstances that

fall within the broad parameters of §

3553(a), including a consideration of

fundamental fairness.

Mr. Benson is not requesting any special

consideration. He is requesting that the

court consider the guidelines as well as the

plea agreement. He asks that his time run

concurrent to the time recommended on his

violation and that his restitution be listed

on the judgment so that he can continue to

pay his restitution while incarcerated. He

is not objecting to the career offender

designation. 

...

It is requested that the court follow the

plea agreement and sentence Mr. Benson to 151

months in custody, to run concurrent to any

supervised release violation.

Petitioner was sentenced on February 28, 2005 to 151 months

incarceration and 36 months of supervised release. No appeal was

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filed.

In his Section 2255 motion, petitioner contends that he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel “when she failed to

argue at sentencing that this Court had the discretion to depart

below the 151 month sentence pursuant to the principles of

Booker.”

The threshold issue in this motion is the effectiveness of

the waiver of the right to file a Section 2255 motion set forth

in the Plea Agreement. 

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a Section

2255 motion challenging the length of his sentence. United

States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9 Cir. 1994); United States th

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub th

nom. Abarca-Espinoza v. United States, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel that challenges the voluntariness of the

waiver does not preclude jurisdiction over a habeas action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Washington v. Lambert, 422 F.3d

864 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Here, however, petitioner does not claim ineffective

assistance of counsel in connection with the Plea Agreement or

otherwise contend he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into

the Plea Agreement. Rather, his claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel relates solely to sentencing and is based on the

issuance of Booker between the time petitioner pleaded guilty and

he was sentenced. Therefore, the court concludes that petitioner

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is barred by the express waiver in the Plea Agreement from

proceeding with his claim pursuant to Section 2255.

Furthermore, even if petitioner had not waived his right to

bring this claim in a Section 2255 motion, he is not entitled to

relief.

The standards governing an assertion of ineffective

assistance of counsel are set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). As explained in United States v. QuinteroBarraza, 78 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 848 (1996):

According to Strickland, there are two

components to an effectiveness inquiry, and

the petitioner bears the burden of

establishing both ... First, the

representation must fall ‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness.’ ... Courts

scrutinizing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s conduct must examine counsel’s

‘overall performance,’ both before and at

trial, and must be highly deferential to the

attorney’s judgments ... In fact, there

exists a ‘strong presumption that counsel

“rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.”’ ... In

short, defendant must surmount the

presumption that, ‘under the circumstances,

the challenged action “might be considered

sound trial strategy.”’ ... Thus, the proper

inquiry is ‘whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or

omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.’ ....

If the petitioner satisfies the first prong,

he must then establish that there is ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

would have been different ....

The Sentencing Memorandum filed by Ms. Voris prior to

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sentencing argued that the Court was not bound by the Sentencing

Guidelines because of Booker. Therefore, Ms. Voris was aware of

the effect of Booker on petitioner’s sentence and argued to the

court that the court was not bound to follow the recommendation

in the Presentence Investigation Report calculated pursuant to

the Sentencing Guidelines. Although petitioner contends that Ms.

Voris was ineffective in failing to argue for a downward

departure less than 151 months, petitioner points to no factor

that would support a downward departure from the imposed

sentence. While petitioner contends that the “Court may very

well have sentenced Petitioner to less than 151 months” if Ms.

Voris had argued for a sentence less than the low end of the

guideline range, petitioner points to nothing upon which such a

departure could be based, especially given petitioner’s criminal

history detailed in the Presentence Investigation Report. 

Therefore, petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that his sentence would have been different if Ms.

Voris had argued for a sentence less than the low end of the

guideline range. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Petitioner Stephen Andrew Benson’s Motion to Vacate

Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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