Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02023/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02023-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOUNTAIN F. ENTERPRISES, 

INC., a California 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

WIARCOM, INC., a Texas 

corporation; and DOES 1 

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-02023-JAM-CKD

ORDER DENYING WIARCOM’S MOTION 

TO TRANSFER VENUE AND GRANTING 

WIARCOM’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Mountain F. Enterprises, Inc. (“MFE”) brings this action 

against WiarCom, Inc., alleging breach of contract and fraud. 

Compl., ECF No. 1. In response, WiarCom filed a motion to 

dismiss and a motion to transfer venue. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 

14; Mot. to Transfer, ECF No. 18.1 WiarCom argues the Court 

should transfer this case because WiarCom’s contracts with MFE 

designated the Southern District of Texas as the proper venue. 

1 These motions were determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for February 25, 2020.

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Mot. to Transfer at 6-8. Moreover, WireCom maintains whichever 

court retains jurisdiction over the suit should dismiss MFE’s 

fraud claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. to Dismiss at 3-11. 

MFE disagrees on both fronts. Opp’n, ECF No. 24. It 

contends the parties’ contracts did not properly incorporate the 

forum selection clause contained in WiarCom’s terms and 

conditions. Id. at 17-23. MFE also argues it properly pled each 

of the five elements of fraud. Id. at 14-17.

The Court agrees with MFE that the Service Rate Plans failed 

to clearly and unequivocally incorporate WiarCom’s online terms 

and conditions. The forum-selection clause contained in those 

terms therefore does not apply; WiarCom’s motion to transfer 

venue is denied. But the Court agrees with WiarCom that MFE’s 

complaint fails to allege a claim of fraud. The Court dismisses 

this claim without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

WiarCom and its sister company, Advanced Tracking 

Technologies, Inc. (“Advanced Tracking”) supply their customers 

with wireless GPS vehicle tracking units and provide related 

services. Compl. ¶ 5. In 2009, Advanced Tracking first 

contacted MFE to sell its GPS devices. Compl. ¶ 7. They reached 

an agreement four years later. Compl. ¶ 8. In the six years 

that followed, Advanced Tracking and MFE executed between 21 and 

25 more “Service Rate Plans.” Id.; see also Gomez Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 

No. 24-3. 

In 2019, MFE became increasingly dissatisfied with the 

tracking units Advanced Tracking Technologies provided. Compl. 

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¶ 19. In March, MFE reported that, nearly 20% of the tracking 

units were inoperable. Id. Replacing these units forced MFE to 

incur additional expenses—specifically, the cost of removing nonfunctioning units, returning those units, and installing 

replacement units. Id. Moreover, MFE maintains it received two 

charges for each of these expenses: one from Advanced Tracking 

and one from WiarCom. Id.

Unable to resolve the issues surrounding the additional fees 

and dysfunctional units, MFE returned all its units to Advanced 

Tracking Technologies. Compl. ¶ 20. Advance Tracking 

Technologies responded, directing MFE to contact WiarCom directly 

if it wished to terminate its Service Rate Plans. Compl. ¶ 23. 

WiarCom then emailed MFE, notifying the company that it would be 

subject to the early termination fees and equipment return fees 

contained in the contract’s terms and conditions. Compl. ¶ 24. 

MFE filed suit, alleging WiarCom (1) breached the Services 

Rate Plans by overcharging MFE and providing inoperable units, 

and (2) committed fraud by intentionally obscuring material terms 

of the Service Rate Plans. Compl. ¶¶ 26-29, 35-40.

II. OPINION

A. Evidentiary Objections

WiarCom argues MFE “inappropriately offers purported 

factual evidence” in the declarations it filed alongside its 

opposition. Reply at 5, ECF No. 27. It is true that, 

generally, “a district court may not consider any material 

beyond the pleadings in a ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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The two exceptions to this rule are materials that a plaintiff 

incorporates by reference into its complaint and those that are 

proper subjects of judicial notice. Id. The declarations 

included with MFE’s opposition do not fall under either 

exception; the Court has not considered them in deciding 

WiarCom’s motion to dismiss. 

But Rule 12(b)(6)’s evidentiary restrictions do not apply 

when a court adjudicates a motion to transfer venue. Cf. S & J 

Rentals, Inc. v. Hilti, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 978, 983 (E.D. 

Cal. 2018); Anza Tech., Inc. v. Mushkin, Inc., No. 2:17-cv00656, 2017 WL 6538981, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). In 

resolving motions for improper venue or motions to transfer 

venue, “the court need not accept the pleadings as true and may 

consider supplemental written materials and facts outside the 

pleadings.” Anza Tech., Inc., 2017 WL 6538981, at *1. The 

Court therefore has looked beyond the four corners of MFE’s 

complaint in resolving WiarCom’s motion to transfer venue. 

B. Request for Judicial Notice

WiarCom requests the Court take judicial notice of the 

webpage containing its “General Terms and Conditions of 

Services.” Def.’s RJN ISO Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17; Def.’s 

RJN ISO Mot. to Transfer, ECF No. 21. Federal Rule of Evidence 

201 permits a court to “judicially notice a fact that is not 

subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known 

within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” FRE 201(b). Moreover, it is 

well-established that courts may take judicial notice of matters 

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of public record. Finder v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 1:13-cv02059-AWI-BAM, 2019 WL 6894468, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 

2019). 

The web page that lists WiarCom’s terms and conditions is a 

matter of public record and, therefore, a proper subject of 

judicial notice. See Trudeau v. Google LLC, 349 F. Supp. 3d 

869, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The page is not, however, found at 

the hyperlink WiarCom includes in its request for judicial 

notice. The Court, instead, takes judicial notice that 

WiarCom’s terms and conditions web page is available at 

https://www.wiarcom.com/TermsAndConditionsOfService.pdf. By 

judicially noticing this page, the Court takes as true that the

web page exists and makes certain representations about the 

company’s policies. The Court does not, however, presume that

all or any of MFE’s agreements with WiarCom properly 

incorporated those terms. Subject to this caveat, Defendant’s

request is granted.

C. Motion to Transfer Venue

Venue is proper (1) in a judicial district in which any 

defendant resides; (2) in a judicial district in which a 

substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim 

occurred; or (3) if no judicial district is otherwise 

appropriate, in any judicial district in which any defendant is 

subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b). But even when a plaintiff has filed suit in a venue 

deemed proper under Section 1391(b), a defendant may still move 

to transfer “any civil action to any other district or division 

where it might have been brought or to any district or division 

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to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 

Section 1404 is the proper mechanism for enforcing a forumselection clause that points to another federal district.

Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.W. Dist. Court for Western 

Dist. Of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013). 

Normally, section 1404 requires district courts to 

“evaluate both the convenience of the parties and various 

public-interest considerations.” Id. at 62. Courts “weigh the 

relevant factors and decide whether, on balance, a transfer 

would serve ‘the convenience of parties and witnesses’ and 

otherwise promote ‘the interest of justice.’” Id. at 62-63 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). But when the parties are bound 

by a valid forum-selection clause, a court must transfer the 

case to the agreed-upon district “absent extraordinary 

circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties.” Id.

at 62. “[A] proper application of § 1404 requires that a forumselection clause be ‘given controlling weight in all but the 

most exceptional cases.’” Id. at 59-60 (quoting Stewart 

Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) 

(KENNEDY, J., concurring)).

But “[b]efore the court may consider the impact of any 

forum selection clause on [a] plaintiff’s choice of forum . . ., 

it must first determine whether a contract exists and[] whether 

it contains the forum selection clause at issue.” Morgan Tire

of Sacramento, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 60 F. Supp. 

3d 1109, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2014). Here, the parties do not 

dispute that they entered into valid contractual agreements. 

Rather, they disagree about whether the agreements properly 

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incorporated by reference the terms and conditions on WiarCom’s 

website—terms and conditions that included, among other things, 

a forum-selection clause. Mot. to Transfer at 6-10; Opp’n at 

17-23.

“A contract may validly include the provisions of a 

document not physically part of the basic contract.” Shaw v. 

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 Cal. App. 3d 44, 54 (2009). Under 

California law, the incorporation by reference doctrine is not 

one to prioritize form over substance. A “contract need not 

recite that it ‘incorporates’ another document” to avail itself 

of the doctrine’s benefits. The reference must, nevertheless, 

be “clear and unequivocal.” Id. It must “guide[] the reader to 

the incorporated document” such that the terms referenced are 

“easily accessible to the contracting parties.” Id. at 54-55 

(quoting Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d 

632, 644 (1986); Williams Constr. Co. v. Standard-Pac. Corp., 

254 Cal. App. 2d 442, 454 (1967)). 

WiarCom argues that each of the Service Rate Plans clearly 

and unequivocally incorporates the terms and conditions listed 

on its website. The Court disagrees. The Service Rate Plans 

include a section labeled “Additional Terms and Conditions. 

Compl. ¶ 11; see also Ex. A to Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Paragraph 3

of that section states, “Service is to be provided in accordance 

with the current Terms and Conditions of Service found at

www.WiarCom.com.” Ex. A to Compl. At 1. But, as MFE argues, 

www.WiarCom.com links to WiarCom’s homepage. Opp’n at 19. This 

page does not contain WiarCom’s terms and conditions, nor does 

it feature any clear reference to those terms. See WiarCom.com.

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WiarCom insists its terms and conditions “can be easily 

found on www.WiarCom.com because that website contains little 

content and only seven links.” Mot. to Transfer at 7. Indeed, 

it argues, “[a]n internet user should be able to find the Terms 

and Conditions within only a few minutes of browsing the 

website.” Id. But this argument is undermined by the stark

differences between how WiarCom’s exhibits depict its homepage 

and how WiarCom.com actually looks online: 

Compare WiarCom.com, with Ex. A to Shepperd Decl., ECF No. 20-1.

WiarCom depicts its homepage as seven links on a blank 

canvas; each as obvious as the next. See Ex. A to Shepperd 

Decl. This is misleading. Simply visiting WiarCom.com reveals 

that some links are more apparent than others. The webpage 

includes five large tabs at the top, each distinguished from the

other and set apart from the dark background. The sixth link is 

in a white text box on the right side of the screen: “HERE” 

bolded, underlined, and capitalized. But in case you still 

missed it, there is a large grey bubble overhead, exclaiming 

“NEW!” in blue block letters. Then, relegated to the bottom of 

the page, is a single line of text: WiarComTM, Inc. © 2006 –

2019. All rights reserved. | Legal Notices. It’s the only time 

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black, non-specialized font sits directly against the web page’s 

dark grey background. The words “Legal Notices” link to a page 

containing WiarCom’s terms and conditions. The domain name for 

that page is https://www.wiarcom.com/Mobile-CommunicationLegal/Legal-Notices.html.

WiarCom argues this practice is no different than those 

approved in Chudner v. TransUnion Interactive, Inc., 626 F. 

Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (D. Or. 2009) and Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. 

Karl Wetekam & Co. KG, 26 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D.N.C. 2014). But 

neither Chudner nor Turfworthy aid this Court’s analysis. 

Neither case arises in this district or applies California’s 

“clear and unequivocal” test. Furthermore, the facts of both 

cases are too different from this one to provide a helpful 

analog.

First, the contract in Chudner did not even implicate 

incorporation by reference doctrine. 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. 

In Chudner, the company placed an agreement in a small text box 

on its webpage that forced customers to press a scroll button 48 

times before reaching the forum-selection clause. Id. Chudner

addressed the question of whether formatting the agreement this 

way rendered the forum-selection clause an unconscionable 

“surprise.” Id. at 1089-90. The “clear and unequivocal” 

standard did not apply to this analysis. 

Although Turfworthy does involve a valid incorporation by 

reference, it still does not compel the result WiarCom seeks. 

In Turfworthy, a company purported to incorporate its terms and 

conditions into an agreement it entered with the plaintiff. 26 

F. Supp. 3d at 504. The agreement and related documents stated 

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that they incorporated the company’s “Standard Terms and 

Conditions.” Id. In reality, the company’s terms and 

conditions were in a document titled, “General Terms and 

Conditions.” Id. The court nonetheless found the incorporation 

was proper because the incorporating document specifically 

directed the plaintiff to the location of the terms being 

incorporated. See id. at 504. The document read, “We also call 

your attention to the statement at the bottom of each of your 

company’s Order Confirmations for all the yarns we ordered that 

your ‘Standard Terms and Conditions apply to all offers and 

sales contracts . . . .’” Id. Put simply, the clarity of the 

instructions provided offset the nominal mis-match between the 

incorporating document’s reference and the title of the 

incorporated document. Id. But WiarCom’s contract does not 

provided this clarity. Unlike the agreement in Turfworthy, the 

Service Rate Plans do not “guide” the parties to the 

incorporated document. Instead, it sent MFE to a generic 

webpage where the least obvious hyperlink was the one MFE was 

supposed to find. Contra Int’l Star Registry of Ill. v. 

Omnipoint Marketing, LLC, No. 05-cv-6923, 2006 WL 2598056, at *3 

(finding an incorporation was sufficiently “clear and specific” 

where it described the document being incorporated and links to 

a “specific web page”). The relevant link was obscured at the 

bottom of the page and its title, “Legal Notices,” did not match 

the title referenced in the agreement. It was certainly 

possible for MFE to find WiarCom’s Terms and Conditions within 

the maze WiarCom created. But California law requires an 

incorporation to be “clear and unequivocal,” not simply 

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conceivable. Shaw, 58 Cal. App. 4th at 54. 

Absent a valid forum-selection clause, the movant bears the 

burden of showing transfer is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

Celtic Int’l LLC v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 234 F.Supp. 1034, 

1042 (E.D. Cal. 2017). WiarCom failed to show a valid forumselection clause bound the parties. Nor did it identify any 

other basis for transferring the suit. The Court therefore 

denies WiarCom’s motion to transfer venue. 

D. Motion to Dismiss

WiarCom also brings a motion to dismiss, arguing that Rule 

12(b)(6) requires dismissal of MFE’s fraud claim. MFE’s 

complaint alleges WiarCom committed fraud by “fraudulently 

inducing MFE to sign the Service Rate Plans without disclosing” 

all of the contracts’ material terms. Compl. ¶ 36. WiarCom 

first contends this allegation cannot serve as the basis of a 

fraud claim because each term MFE challenges was, by law, 

properly incorporated into the Service Rate Plans. Mot. to 

Dismiss at 5-8. As discussed above, this argument is without 

merit. WiarCom urges dismissal is nonetheless proper because 

MFE’s fraud claim is insufficiently pled. Id. at 8-11. On this 

point, the Court agrees. 

To state a claim of fraud under California law, a plaintiff 

must allege (1) misrepresentation (false representation, 

concealment, or nondisclosure), (2) knowledge of falsity, 

(3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damage. 

Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal.4th 979, 990 

(2004). Every element of a fraud claim “must be specifically 

pleaded; a general pleading of the legal conclusion . . . is 

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insufficient.” Tindell v. Murphy, 22 Cal. App. 5th 1239, 1249 

(2018). 

MFE identifies several purported deficiencies in its 

contracts with WiarCom: the agreements obscured the existence of

early termination fees and equipment return fees; they 

improperly minimized the font size of certain provisions; they 

failed to hyperlink “www.WiarCom.com” until after MFE signed the 

agreement; and they did not properly direct MFE to WiarCom’s 

terms and conditions webpage. Compl. ¶ 36. These allegations—

at best—only satisfy the first element of fraud. But MFE’s 

complaint fails to specifically allege WiarCom had knowledge of 

any falsities or an intent to defraud. MFE attempts to fulfill 

this requirement in paragraph 37 of its complaint:

WiarCom intentionally designed its Service Rate Plans 

in the manner described above with specific intent and 

for the sole purpose of inducing and defrauding MFE to 

enter into the Service Rate Plans without actual or 

constructive knowledge of the additional terms and 

conditions so that WiarCom could unjustly enrich 

itself. 

Compl. ¶ 37. MFE’s opposition brief fails to identify any cases 

where this type of conclusory allegation has been enough to 

state a claim for fraud under either Rule 12(b)(6) or California 

law. Indeed, this Court finds the caselaw directs otherwise. 

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Tindell, 22 

Cal. App. 5th at 1249. Accordingly, the Court dismisses MFE’s 

fraud claim without prejudice.

E. Page Limits

The Court’s Order re Filing Requirements (“Order”), ECF No. 

3-2, limits memoranda in support of and opposition to motions to 

dismiss and motions to transfer venue to fifteen pages. Order at 

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1. A violation of the Order requires the offending counsel (not 

the client) to pay $50.00 per page over the page limit to the 

Clerk of Court. Id. 

WiarCom argues MFE’s twenty-five page opposition violates

the Court’s page limits. In doing so, WiarCom ignores the fact

that MFE’s opposition responded to the two motions WiarCom filed—

motions that, when added together, total twenty-three pages. 

WiarCom made a strategic choice to file its motions separately, 

availing itself of additional pages on which to air its 

arguments. The Court declines to penalize MFE for responding in 

kind. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES WiarCom’s 

motion to transfer venue and GRANTS WiarCom’s motion to dismiss. 

The Court dismisses MFE’s fraud claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If MFE 

elects to amend its complaint with respect to this claim, it

shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of 

this Order. WiarCom’s responsive pleading is due thirty (30) days 

thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2020

 

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