Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02046/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02046-58/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TO RECONSIDER - 1

2:05-CV-02046-RRB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

2:05-cv-02046-RRB-KJN

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO RECONSIDER

Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ counsel with a Motion to

Reconsider Awards of Attorney Fees & Expenses at Docket 789.

Plaintiffs’ counsel seek reconsideration of two aspects of the

Court’s award. First, Plaintiffs’ counsel object to the Court’s

denial of an incentive fee award relating to counsel’s efforts in

obtaining the Preliminary Injunction which was issued on

September 26, 2008. Second, counsel object to the Court’s issuance

of an expense award which was 15% lower than the requested amount.

As to the incentive fee award, the Court is unmoved. The Court

awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel fees totaling 33.3% of the common

settlement fund. The Ninth Circuit has held that, in common fund

GREGORY JOHNSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CLAIR R. COUTURIER, JR., et

al.,

Defendants.

Case 2:05-cv-02046-WBS-KJN Document 791 Filed 03/23/10 Page 1 of 4
1 Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886

F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989)).

2 Vizcaino at 1048.

3 See Docket 398 at 18.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TO RECONSIDER - 2

2:05-CV-02046-RRB

cases, reasonable attorney fees typically range from 20 to 30

percent of the fund, with 25% as the “benchmark.”1 Plaintiffs’

counsel estimate that the settlement fund will be at least $11.9

million. Using this figure, the Court’s fee award is, at a minimum,

almost $1 million higher than the 25% “benchmark.” Even a fee award

of 30%, at the very top of the usual range, would be almost

$400,000 less than 33.3% award granted by the Court. Again, these

are the minimum figures given by Plaintiff. The actual discrepancy

between Plaintiffs’ fee award and the typical award may well be

greater.

Of course, a determination of reasonable fees must be based on

“all of the circumstances of the case.”2 The Court gave such a

generous fee award because of counsel’s zealous and proficient

advocacy, including the obtaining of a preliminary injunction. The

Court sees no reason to consider the fee for the preliminary

injunction separately from the regular fee award. The injunction

was plainly predicated upon Plaintiffs’ ERISA claims,3 which

counsel were specifically hired to pursue.

Case 2:05-cv-02046-WBS-KJN Document 791 Filed 03/23/10 Page 2 of 4
4 Vizcaino at 1049. 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TO RECONSIDER - 3

2:05-CV-02046-RRB

Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that, if the Court views the

injunction as within the scope of their fee agreement, then the

Court’s fee award should be 36%. That is the percentage called for

by the Plaintiffs’ fee agreement when settlement has occurred more

than six months after the filing of the Complaint. However, the

Ninth Circuit has held that a fee agreement with the named

plaintiffs is “not particularly helpful” in calculating a

reasonable fee for a common fund settlement, because the

participants in the common fund are not bound by the agreement.4

The same reasoning applies here. Thus, it is up to the Court to

determine a “reasonable” fee, taking into account the 25% benchmark

and the usual 20-30% range.

If the Court were to remove the preliminary injunction from

its consideration of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee award, then the

percentage awarded would have been somewhere at the higher end of

the typical 20-30% range utilized by the Ninth Circuit, although

not outside of it. Plaintiffs’ counsel are adequately compensated

for their efforts in obtaining the injunction, without any

additional incentive fee award. 

With regard to the Court’s award of costs, the Court also

remains unmoved. Admittedly this is not a scientific process but,

in the typical case, the adversary process works to help ensure the

Case 2:05-cv-02046-WBS-KJN Document 791 Filed 03/23/10 Page 3 of 4
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TO RECONSIDER - 4

2:05-CV-02046-RRB

reasonableness of the award. In the absence of such a process, the

Court must exercise its discretion based on the totality of

circumstances. Here, the Court was concerned initially about the

expenditures being incurred when counsel showed up, unannounced, in

the Sacramento courtroom where the Court was conducting a jury

trial, apparently expecting the Court to stop what it was doing to

attend to their needs. This could likely have all been addressed

via ECF or telephonically at less expense. Counsel went on to

obtain a good result for their clients in a professional manner,

but the Court’s concern for costs was raised. The Court could now

appoint an independent auditor to assess the fairness issue here,

but that would, itself, be costly. So considering all of the

above, and in order to finally resolve the issue, the Court has

determined to reduce the costs requested by 15%.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Reconsider at Docket

789 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2010.

S/RALPH R. BEISTLINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-02046-WBS-KJN Document 791 Filed 03/23/10 Page 4 of 4