Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05254/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05254-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiff’s due process claim and all other named defendants were dismissed from this action for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 19.) 

2

 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the

court in an order filed on January 22, 2004. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (Doc. 21.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFONZO TOLBERT,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. PEELER,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-CV-5254-REC-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

(Doc. 35) 

I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Alfonzo Tolbert (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed July 1, 2003, against defendant Peeler (“defendant”) for

excessive force and retaliation.1 On December 14, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. 35.) After obtaining an extension of time, plaintiff filed an opposition on March

8, 2006, but failed to sign it.2 (Doc. 39.) Pursuant to the court’s order of May 5, 2006, plaintiff

signed and re-filed his opposition on May 18, 2006. (Docs. 40, 41.)

///

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

///

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

///

///

///

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Plaintiff neither filed his own separate statement of disputed facts nor admitted or denied the facts set forth

by defendant as undisputed. Local Rule 56-260(b). Therefore, defendant’s statement of undisputed facts is accepted

except where brought into dispute by plaintiff’s verified amended complaint. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923

(9th Cir. 2004) (verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit if it is based on pleader’s personal

knowledge of specific facts which are admissible in evidence). A verified opposition to a motion for summary

judgment may also be considered as an opposing affidavit for purposes of the summary judgment rule if it is based

on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

However, because plaintiff’s opposition was not verified, only plaintiff’s declaration in support of his opposition is

considered as an affidavit. Moran v. Selig, No. 04-55647, 2006 WL 1229122, at *7 (9th Cir. May 9, 2006).

4

C. Undisputed Facts3

1. Excessive Force Claim

1. At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a state prisoner housed at the California

Correctional Institution (CCI) in Tehachapi, California.

2. At all times relevant to this action, defendant was a correctional officer at CCI. 

3. On December 13, 2000, during an escort to an institutional classification committee (ICC)

hearing, plaintiff brought to defendant’s attention certain property which defendant had

issued to him on November 15, 2000. Defendant informed plaintiff that his issue with the

property could be addressed in an inmate appeal. Plaintiff began cursing and making threats,

stating, “We can handle this like men, and you could step into my cell. I’ll kick your ass.”

Plaintiff was later issued a CDC-115 Rules Violation Report for threatening staff.

4. Plaintiff was escorted to the ICC hearing. During the hearing, plaintiff became upset, started

talking, and refused to be quiet when he was instructed to do so by the committee.

Defendant instructed plaintiff to stand up and leave while lifting him up by his right arm to

help him up to his feet. 

5. Defendant started escorting plaintiff back to his unit. During the escort, plaintiff began

pulling away from defendant’s grasp. Plaintiff was ordered to stop resisting, but he refused

and continued pulling away. While exiting the dining hall, plaintiff continued to resist.

Defendant ordered plaintiff to face the wall outside of dining hall #4. Plaintiff complied and

defendant counseled him regarding the expectations during an escort. Plaintiff indicated that

he understood.

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

6. Correctional Officer Eilers, who was en route to dining hall #4 to process inmates, saw

defendant escort plaintiff out of the dining hall and have plaintiff face the wall. Officer

Eilers took over the escort and returned plaintiff to his housing unit.

7. Officer Eilers witnessed defendant escort plaintiff out of the dining hall, but did not see

plaintiff forced against the wall and did not see defendant use any force on plaintiff. Officer

Eiler observed that plaintiff did not touch the wall. 

8. During the escort back to the housing unit, plaintiff did not make any accusations to Officer

Eilers that he had been assaulted by defendant. Officer Eilers did not see any injuries on

plaintiff. 

9. Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) Patton responded to the housing unit on December 13,

2000, at 10:40 a.m. to evaluate plaintiff. MTA Patton completed a CDC-7219 Medical

Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence form.

10. The CDC-7219 reflects that plaintiff stated, “When I came out of committee c/o Peeler

slammed my head against the wall.” The CDC-7219 also shows that MTA Patton conducted

an unclothed body examination with boxers on. Plaintiff complained of a headache and

requested an x-ray. MTA Patton did not see any signs or symptoms of injuries. If MTA

Patton had seen any injuries, he would have documented them on the CDC-7219 form.

Plaintiff was returned to custody and no further treatment was warranted. 

2. Retaliation Claim

11. On or about December 13, 2000, plaintiff filed an inmate appeal in which he complained that

on December 13, 2000, defendant assaulted him by slamming his head against the wall and

placing his knee on plaintiff’s back. Plaintiff’s allegations were investigated and staff were

interviewed in connection with the investigation. On February 11, 2001, plaintiff’s inmate

appeal was denied at the first formal level of review. On March 12, 2001, plaintiff forwarded

the appeal for second level review. On March 22, 2001, plaintiff’s appeal was denied at the

second level of review. On April 25, 2001, plaintiff forwarded the appeal for third level

review. On October 23, 2001, plaintiff’s appeal was denied at the third level.

///

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

12. There is no record of a search of plaintiff’s cell by defendant on February 19, 2001.

Defendant did not search plaintiff’s cell, escort him, or make any threats towards him on

February 19, 2001.

13. On March 5, 2001, defendant and Officer Lynse conducted a search of plaintiff’s cell. Three

books were confiscated because they were not listed on plaintiff’s property card.

Additionally, pornographic photographs were removed from the cell wall. Officer Lynse

completed a cell search contraband confiscation slip listing all confiscated items. The

confiscated items included three books, brass paper clasps (potential use as a weapon), paper

clips (potential stabbing weapons), one letter containing a green leafy substance suspected

of being marijuana, excess state food, condiments, and trash. 

14. On March 20, 2001, defendant concluded a review of the three books that were confiscated

during the March 5, 2001, search of plaintiff’s cell. The books consisted of two legal books

and a dictionary. Plaintiff was unable to produce a property receipt for the books. The

property was not listed on plaintiff’s property card and therefore, it was confiscated. 

15. The three books were confiscated because the books had been altered in a manner to conceal

or remove the name and number of another inmate who is likely the legitimate owner of the

books, and the books were not identified on plaintiff’s property card. 

16. A property card is a card which accounts for an inmate’s personal property. All of the

property an inmate comes into prison with is listed on a property card. If the inmate is

transferred, the receiving institution accounts for his property on the property card. If the

inmate purchases property or has property sent from home, it is also placed on the property

card. There are two types of property cards: non-expendable property card and expendable

property card. A non-expendable property card contains property such as a television, radio,

and books. An expendable property card contains items such as clothing and shoes. In

plaintiff’s case, the books confiscated on March 5, 2001, should have been listed on the nonexpendable property card. They were properly confiscated because they were not listed on

the card. 

17. It is common for housing unit staff to search inmates’ cells when they have been vacated for

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

showers, exercise yard, or committee hearings. The Department Operations Manual (DOM),

section 52050.18 requires that random cell searches be conducted on a regular basis. It is

required that a minimum of three cells, rooms, or dorm areas and lockers be searched every

day during the second and third watch by the assigned housing unit officers. In situations

with “lock-up” inmates, the searches must be conducted when inmates vacate their cells for

showers, exercise yard, or committee hearings because “lock-up” inmates do not leave their

cells often and it is most efficient to conduct cell searches as soon as an inmate is escorted

out of his cell. (Id.) Therefore, it is common for housing unit staff to search inmates’ cells

when they have been vacated for showers, exercise yard, or committee hearings. 

18. Plaintiff was a “lock up” inmate. His cell was searched on March 5, 2001, during the period

when he was let out for exercise yard.

19. On March 5, 2001, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance against defendant complaining that on

March 5, 2001, defendant searched and trashed his cell. On April 6, 2001, the inmate

grievance was denied at the second formal level of review. On May 24, 2001, plaintiff

forwarded the grievance for third level review. On September 21, 2001, the grievance was

denied at the third level of review.

D. Excessive Force Claim

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on December 13, 2000, while being escorted

to ICC by defendant, plaintiff asked defendant about his property, which had been lost or destroyed

by defendant. Plaintiff alleges that defendant became hostile and threatened plaintiff. Plaintiff

alleges that while in ICC, he reported the destruction of his property and defendant’s threats, but his

complaints were ignored. Plaintiff alleges that after he left ICC, defendant twisted his arm, causing

extreme pain to his shoulder and hands, and slammed his face into a wall, causing him to suffer

bruises and pain. Plaintiff alleges that he was then thrown to the floor and kicked by defendant.

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarilyexcludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s excessive

force claim against him. On December 13, 2000, after plaintiff raised a property issue to defendant

during an escort to an ICC hearing and defendant informed him that his issue with the property could

be addressed in an inmate appeal, plaintiff began cursing and making threats, stating, “We can

handle this like men, and you could step into my cell. I’ll kick your ass.” (Undisputed Fact 3.)

Plaintiff was subsequently issued a CDC-115 Rules Violation Report for threatening staff. (Id.)

During the hearing, plaintiff became upset, started talking, and refused to be quiet when he

was instructed to do so by the committee. (U.F. 4.) Defendant instructed plaintiff to stand up and

leave while lifting him up by his right arm to help him up to his feet. (Id.) Defendant started

escorting plaintiff back to his unit. (U.F. 5.) During the escort, plaintiff began pulling away from

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

defendant’s grasp. (Id.) Plaintiff was ordered to stop resisting, but he refused and continued pulling

away. (Id.) While exiting the dining hall, plaintiff continued to resist. (Id.) Defendant ordered

plaintiff to face the wall outside of dining hall #4. (Id.) Plaintiff complied and defendant counseled

him regarding the expectations during an escort. (Id.) Plaintiff indicated that he understood. (Id.)

Correctional Officer Eilers, who was en route to dining hall #4 to process inmates, saw

defendant escort plaintiff out of the dining hall and have plaintiff face the wall. (U.F. 6.) Officer

Eilers took over the escort and returned plaintiff to his housing unit. (Id.) Officer Eilers witnessed

defendant escort plaintiff out of the dining hall, but did not see plaintiff forced against the wall and

did not see defendant use any force on plaintiff. (Id.) Officer Eiler observed that plaintiff did not

touch the wall. (Id.) During the escort back to the housing unit, plaintiff did not make any

accusations to Officer Eilers that he had been assaulted by defendant. (U.F. 8.) Officer Eilers did

not see any injuries on plaintiff. (Id.)

MTA Patton responded to the housing unit on December 13, 2000, at 10:40 a.m. to evaluate

plaintiff. (U.F. 9.) MTA Patton completed a CDC-7219 Medical Report of Injury or Unusual

Occurrence form. (Id.) The CDC-7219 reflects that plaintiff stated, “When I came out of committee

c/o Peeler slammed my head against the wall.” (U.F. 10.) The CDC-7219 also shows that MTA

Patton conducted an unclothed body examination with boxers on. (Id.) Plaintiff complained of a

headache and requested an x-ray. (Id.) MTA Patton did not see any signs or symptoms of injuries,

and would have documented them on the CDC-7219 form if he had seen any. (Id.) Plaintiff was

returned to custody and no further treatment was warranted. (Id.) Defendant denies twisting

plaintiff’s arm, forcing plaintiff’s head into the wall, or assaulting plaintiff. (Peeler Dec., ¶¶6, 7.)

In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff contends that defendant slammed his head into

a brick wall. (Tolbert Dec., ¶3.) In addition, plaintiff contends defendants twisted his arm, threw

him to the floor, and repeatedly kicked him. (Amend. Comp., p. 2A.) Plaintiff contends that he

sustained bruises and experienced pain in his face and body. (Id.)

Although defendant argues that there is no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could

find for plaintiff, plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to bring defendant’s contention that he

did not use any force against plaintiff into dispute. The evidence of plaintiff, as the opposing party,

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from

the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of plaintiff. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(citing United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655 (per curiam)). Plaintiff’s declaration and verified

amended complaint create a triable issue of fact. To the extent that plaintiff’s version of the events

may lack credibility, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and make credibility

determinations. Accordingly, because there are material issues of fact in dispute in this matter,

defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the excessive force claim against him.

E. Retaliation Claim

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on December 13, 2000, he filed a Citizen’s

Complaint against defendant Peeler. Plaintiff alleges that on December 26, 2000, because of the

complaint he filed, plaintiff received a false Rules Violation Report. Plaintiff was subsequently

found guilty and assessed a five-month Security Housing Unit term. 

Plaintiff alleges that on January 10, 2001, defendant and Officer Rhineth served plaintiff and

his cellmate their meal in a trash bag that contained trash, contaminating the food. Plaintiff alleges

that on February 19, 2001, he was told by several other inmates that defendant had entered his cell,

tossed his property around, and taken a number of personal items. Plaintiff alleges that the cell

search was retaliatory. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The

court must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of

proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807

(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). The burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 In his motion, defendant addresses only the alleged incident on February 19, 2001, and an incident on

March 5, 2001. Left unaddressed are plaintiff’s claims that he was issued a false Rules Violation Report and that his

meal was served in a trash bag containing trash.

11

“that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he complains of.” Id. at

808. 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the cell search

was not motivated by plaintiff’s grievance of December 13, 2000, and served legitimate penological

interests, and plaintiff did not suffer any chilling effect.4 There is no record of a cell search by

defendant on February 19, 2001. (U.F. 12.) However, on March 5, 2001, defendant and Officer

Lynse conducted a search of plaintiff’s cell. (U.F. 13.) Section 52050.18 of the DOM requires that

random cell searches be conducted on a regular basis, and that a minimum of three cells, rooms, or

dorm areas and lockers be searched every day during the second and third watch by the assigned

housing unit officers. (U.F. 17.) In situations with “lock-up” inmates, the searches must be

conducted when inmates vacate their cells for showers, exercise yard, or committee hearings because

“lock-up” inmates do not leave their cells often and it is most efficient to conduct cell searches as

soon as an inmate is escorted out of his cell. (Id.) It is therefore common for housing unit staff to

search inmates’ cells when they have been vacated for showers, exercise yard, or committee

hearings. (Id.) Plaintiff was a “lock up” inmate, and his cell was searched on March 5, 2001, during

the period when he was let out for exercise yard. (U.F. 19.)

In the course of the cell search, three books, brass paper clasps, paper clips, one letter

containing a green leafy substance suspected of being marijuana, excess state food, condiments, and

trash were confiscated. (U.F. 13.) Additionally, pornographic photographs were removed from the

cell wall. (Id.) The three books were confiscated because they had been altered in a manner to

conceal or remove the name and number of another inmate who is likely the legitimate owner of the

books, and the books were not identified on plaintiff’s property card, which accounts for an inmate’s

personal property. (U.F. 15, 16.) Officer Lynse completed a cell search contraband confiscation slip

listing all confiscated items. (U.F. 13.)

/// 

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Plaintiff’s amended complaint and declaration must be based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge, not just

mere belief, and must set forth facts admissible in evidence to which plaintiff is competent to testify. Johnson, 134 at

1399-1400; Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).

12

On March 20, 2001, defendant concluded a review of the three books that were confiscated

during the March 5, 2001, search of plaintiff’s cell. (U.F. 14.) The books consisted of two legal

books and a dictionary, and were confiscated because plaintiff was unable to produce a property

receipt for the books and the property was not listed on plaintiff’s property card. (Id.)

On March 5, 2001, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance against defendant complaining that on

March 5, 2001, defendant searched and trashed his cell. (U.F. 19.) On April 6, 2001, the inmate

grievance was denied at the second formal level of review. (Id.) On May 24, 2001, plaintiff

forwarded the grievance for third level review. (Id.) On September 21, 2001, the grievance was

denied at the third level of review. (Id.)

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s cell was not trashed during the March 5, 2001 cell search,

and that he did not search plaintiff’s cell in retaliation for the inmate grievance plaintiff filed. (Peeler

Dec., ¶17.) Defendant contends that the cell search was a random cell search done in accordance

with institutional policy and procedure, and for the purpose of maintaining the safety and security

of the institution, as it is often the case that during random cell searches, contraband such as weapons

or controlled substances are uncovered. (Id.) Defendant contends that it is his practice to do

searches on a regular basis in compliance with institutional policy and procedure. (Id.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that his cell was not searched on February 19, 2001. To the extent

that plaintiff set forth the wrong date in his amended complaint and it is the search on March 5, 2001,

that is at issue, plaintiff fails to set forth evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff bears the

burden of proving “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he

complains of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. Although plaintiff contends that defendant entered his cell on

March 5, 2001, for the sole purpose of harassing him, plaintiff has offered no evidence that

defendant searched his cell to harass him, only conjecture.5 (Tolbert Dec., ¶4; Amend. Comp., p.

2B.) Further, plaintiff has not set forth evidence demonstrating that the cell search was not

motivated by any legitimate correctional purpose. Finally, plaintiff neither alleges nor submits any

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

evidence that his First Amendment rights were chilled by the allegedly retaliatory cell search. See

Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (with respect to the chilling element, the proper inquiry is whether the

act “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating the existence of material factual disputes.

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s claim that defendant

searched and trashed his cell in retaliation for the grievance he filed on December 13, 2000.

 F. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, filed December 14, 2005, be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

as follows:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s excessive force claim

against him be DENIED; and

2. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s retaliation claim against

him based on the cell searches on February 19, 2001, and March 5, 2001, be

GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-05254-LJO -SMS Document 42 Filed 05/26/06 Page 13 of 13