Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01410/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01410-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN E. HARPER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-1410 FCD DAD P

vs.

D. K. SISTO, WARDEN, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the decision of the California Board

of Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole for four years at his second parole

consideration hearing held on February 7, 2007. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus

relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 14, 1986, a San Bernardino County Superior Court jury convicted

petitioner of first degree murder with use of a firearm. (Pet. at 5.) On July 24, 1987, the trial

court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate term of twenty-seven years to life in state prison. 

(Id. at 5-6.) 

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The parole consideration hearing which is placed at issue by the habeas petition

now pending before the court was held on February 7, 2007. (Pet., Ex. A (hereinafter

“Decision”)). On that date, a Board panel found petitioner not suitable for release and denied

parole for four years. (Id. at 69.) Petitioner challenged the Board’s decision in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed in the San Bernardino County Superior Court on July 10, 2007. (Answer,

Ex. 1.) The Superior Court rejected petitioner’s claims in a reasoned decision on the merits. 

(Answer, Ex. 2.)

On August 21, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District. (Answer, Ex. 3.) That petition was

summarily denied by order dated September 4, 2007. (Answer, Ex. 4.) On October 17, 2007,

petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Answer,

Ex. 5.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated April 9, 2008. (Answer, Ex. 6.)

On June 20, 2008, petitioner commenced this action by filing a federal petition for

writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Board described the facts of petitioner’s commitment offense at the February

7, 2007 parole suitability hearing as follows:

The victim, Harper, Rick Brown and Otto Bartel, that’s B-A-R-TE-L, were all, quotes, “friends”, end quotes, in varying degrees, all

involved in drugs and other nefarious undertakings. On June 9,

1985, Harper and Brown took the victim aside and told him they

had just, quotes, “ripped off”, end quotes, a drug dealer’s house,

taking food, drugs and other loot which they had stashed in the

sand canyon, that’s C-N-D, [sic] canyon area north of San

Bernardino. They offered to split the loot with the victim if he

would go with them and help them retrieve it from the canyon. 

They set out. On the way, Harper told the victim that once they

arrived where the loot had been stashed, they could knock Brown

out and split the items between themselves. He did this to gain the

victim’s confidence. When they reached the spot where Harper

and Brown had previously planted a gun, Brown retrieved it and

shot the victim once before the gun jammed. The wounded victim

ran into the bushes. Brown unjammed the gun and went in after

him, shooting him several more times. Harper then gained

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possession of the gun, picked up the victim’s head by the hair and

fired a fatal bullet – excuse me – into his temple. Fearing the

victim was still alive, he struck him on the back of the head several

times with a rock. Harper and Brown then returned to Harper’s

house and told Bartel what they had done, calling it, quotes, “first

degree premeditated murder”, end quotes. The next day, they and

Bartel returned to the spot and re-enacted the offense. Harper said

Brown was supposed to have waited to shoot the victim but Brown

responded he could not. The three then buried the body. On the

days following the murder, Harper told two friends he had killed

the victim. He also told Bartel’s brother and another friend the

same account of the crime he had given Bartel. He reiterated his

story to the latter. Finally, Bartel went to the police. The body was

uncovered and Harper and Brown were arrested. At trial, the

coroner who performed the autopsy testified he could not tell if the

victim died from two of the bullet wounds first administered by

Brown, parens (he testified that in his opinion, they were fatal if

not immediately treated), end parens, or from Harper’s shooting

from the victim’s temple. Acquaintances of Harper testified he had

told them after the killing that the victim was still alive when he

was shot in the temple. The defense consisted of Harper’s claim

from the witness stand that while he accompanied Brown and the

victim to the murder site, he had no idea that Brown intended to

kill the victim. He disclaimed any participation in the shooting. 

He maintained that he did not correct the misperception of others

that he had participated in the murder due to his fear of Brown. 

The defense attacked Bartel’s credibility and the defense witness

testified that Bartel had told her it was he who had killed the

victim.

(Decision at 11-14.) 

Presiding commissioner Bryson also read the following statement prepared by a

prison correctional counselor into the record:

Harper does not dispute the facts, the reported facts of this case

other than minor details. He does not dispute that there was a plan

to shoot and kill the victim. His crime partner shot the victim first

numerous times. Harper stated that he shot the victim once in the

temple but he believes the victim was already dead. He did say

though, he understands that does not make any difference. Their

intent was to kill the victim. Otherwise, he does not contest the

written reports in his central file.

(Id. at 14.) 

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ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for

granting habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). If the state court’s decision

does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review

of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008). See

also Frantz v. Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that

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we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such

error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues

raised.”).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned

state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court

decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. 

Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under § 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v.

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the AEDPA’s

deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. 

Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that the Board’s failure to find him suitable for release on parole

at his February 7, 2007 suitability hearing was “arbitrary and capricious” and violated his right to

due process. (Pet. at 1, 22-27.) He argues that “there was no reliable or relevant evidence in the

record before the Board which rationally indicated that Mr. Harper would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to the public if released . . . .” (Id. at 2.) Petitioner also challenges the Board’s

decision to deny him parole for four years, where “there is no evidence that during the previous

four-year refusal period issued in 2003 through 2007 Mr. Harper engaged in misconduct or failed

to comply with the Board’s recommendations.” (Id.) Petitioner notes that he has participated in

“numerous vocational, educational, self-help and therapeutic programs while incarcerated.” (Id.

at 6.) He argues that he has matured while in prison and that he takes full responsibility for his

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part in the murder. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner states that he has realistic parole plans and marketable

skills. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner argues that because he complied with all of the suggestions made by

the Board Panel at his first suitability hearing, he was entitled to be found suitable for parole at

his second parole suitability hearing. (Id. at 9-20.) He also argues that the Board’s continued use

of the facts of the commitment offense to find him unsuitable for parole violates due process and

is barred by “issue preclusion.” (Id. at 27-32.) Petitioner notes that even if the Board had set a

release date for him at the 2007 suitability hearing, he would not be released immediately. He

argues that, although he “might pose an unreasonable danger to the public in 2007 . . ., there is

not an iota of evidence indicating the he poses a threat 10 or 12 years from now.” (Id. at 32.) 

Petitioner concedes that his most recent psychological evaluation opines that his current risk of

dangerousness “in this institutional setting is less than average but still higher than average for

the greater society.” (Id. at 7, Ex. C at 4.) 

A. Due Process in the California Parole Context

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. One alleging a due

process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest

protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the

deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,

459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (McQuillion I).

A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution or state laws. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). The

United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a parole

date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). However, “a

state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release

will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a 

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constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion I, 306 F.3d at 901 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). 

California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole, even for prisoners who have not already been granted a parole date. Sass v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th

Cir. 2003); McQuillion I, 306 F.3d at 903; see also In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1204,

1210, 1221 (2008). Accordingly, this court must examine whether California provided the

constitutionally-required procedural safeguards when depriving petitioner of a protected liberty

interest and, if not, whether the state courts’ conclusion that it did was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In this regard, it is clearly established federal law that a parole board’s decision

deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to his constitutionally protected liberty interest in

a parole release date if the Board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record.” 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir.

2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. “The ‘some evidence’ standard is

minimally stringent,” and a decision will be upheld under that standard if there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the factfinder. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d

39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986). However, “the evidence

underlying the board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability.” Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Perveler v. Estelle, 974 F.2d 1132, 1134

(9th Cir. 1992). Determining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or the

weighing of evidence. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. The question is whether there is any reliable

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. Id. 

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When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability decision was supported

by “some evidence,” the analysis “is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole

suitability determinations in the relevant state.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. Therefore, this court

must: 

look to California law to determine the findings that are necessary

to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must review the

record in order to determine whether the state court decision

holding that these findings were supported by “some evidence” in

[petitioner’s] case constituted an unreasonable application of the

“some evidence” principle articulated in Hill.

(Id.)

Under California law, prisoners serving indeterminate prison sentences “may

serve up to life in prison, but they become eligible for parole consideration after serving

minimum terms of confinement.” In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (2005). The Board

normally sets a parole release date one year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole release

date, and does so “in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and

magnitude in respect to their threat to the public.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1202 (citing

California Penal Code § 3041(a)). A release date must be set “unless [the Board] determines that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more 

lengthy period of incarceration . . . and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed . . . .” Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

In order to carry out the mandate of California Penal Code § 3041, the Board must

determine “whether the inmate poses ‘an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from

prison,’ and thus whether he or she is suitable for parole.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1202

(citing California Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(a)). In doing so, the Board must consider all

relevant, reliable information available regarding

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the circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other

criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and

other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and

after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release.

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(b). 

The regulation identifies circumstances that tend to show suitability or

unsuitability for release. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c) & (d). The following circumstances

have been identified as tending to show that a prisoner is suitable for release: (1) the prisoner has

no juvenile record of assaulting others or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to

victims; (2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships with others; (3) the

prisoner has performed acts that tend to indicate the presence of remorse or has given indications

that he understands the nature and magnitude of his offense; (4) the prisoner committed his crime

as the result of significant stress in his life; (5) the prisoner’s criminal behavior resulted from

having been victimized by battered women syndrome; (6) the prisoner lacks a significant history

of violent crime; (7) the prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism; (8) the

prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to

use upon release; and (9) institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within

the law upon release. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(d).

The following circumstances have been identified as tending to indicate

unsuitability for release: (1) the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner; (2) the prisoner had a previous record of violence; (3) the prisoner has

an unstable social history; (4) the prisoner’s crime was a sadistic sexual offense; (5) the prisoner

had a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and (6) the prisoner has

engaged in serious misconduct in prison. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c). Factors to consider

in deciding whether the prisoner’s offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or

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cruel manner include: (A) multiple victims were attacked, injured, or killed in the same or

separate incidents; (B) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense; (D) the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrated an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; and (E) the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense. Id. § 2281(c)(1)(A) - (E). 

The overriding concern in determining parole suitability in California is public

safety. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1086. This “core determination of ‘public safety’ . . .

involves an assessment of an inmates current dangerousness.” Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205

(emphasis in original). See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281(a) (“Regardless of the length of

time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of

the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from

prison.”) Accordingly, under California law,

when a court reviews a decision of the Board or the Governor, the

relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the decision of

the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current

threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence

confirms the existence of certain factual findings.

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1212 (citing In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 658 (2002);

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; and In re Lee, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1408 (2006)). 

In recent years the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, given the

liberty interest that California prisoners have in their release on parole, a continued reliance upon

an unchanging factor to support a finding of unsuitability for parole may, over time, constitute a 

violation of due process. The court has addressed the issue in three significant cases, each of

which will be discussed below. 

First, in Biggs, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a continued reliance on an

unchanging factor to deny parole, such as the circumstances of the offense, could at some point

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26 That holding has been acknowledged as representing the law of the circuit. Irons, 505 1

F.3d at 853; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

11

result in a due process violation. While the court in Biggs rejected several of the reasons given

1

by the Board for finding the petitioner in that case unsuitable for parole, it upheld three: (1)

petitioner’s commitment offense involved the murder of a witness; (2) the murder was carried

out in a manner exhibiting a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another; and (3)

petitioner could benefit from therapy. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913. However, the court in Biggs

cautioned that continued reliance solely upon the gravity of the offense of conviction and 

petitioner’s conduct prior to committing that offense in denying parole could, at some point,

violate due process. In this regard, the court observed:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct

would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in

parole.

Id. at 916. The court in Biggs also stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs. 334 F.3d at 917. 

In Sass, the Board found the petitioner unsuitable for parole at his third suitability

hearing based on the gravity of his offenses of conviction in combination with his prior offenses. 

461 F.3d at 1126. Citing the decision in Biggs, the petitioner in Sass contended that reliance on

these unchanging factors violated due process. The court disagreed, concluding that these factors 

amounted to “some evidence” to support the Board’s determination. Id. at 1129. The court

provided the following explanation for its holding:

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While upholding an unsuitability determination based on these

same factors, we previously acknowledged that “continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 (emphasis

added). Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about

how future parole hearings could proceed. Cf. id. The evidence of

Sass’ prior offenses and the gravity of his convicted offenses

constitute some evidence to support the Board’s decision. 

Consequently, the state court decisions upholding the denials were

neither contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Id.

In Irons, the Ninth Circuit sought to harmonize the holdings in Biggs and Sass,

stating as follows:

Because the murder Sass committed was less callous and cruel than

the one committed by Irons, and because Sass was likewise denied

parole in spite of exemplary conduct in prison and evidence of

rehabilitation, our decision in Sass precludes us from accepting

Irons’ due process argument or otherwise affirming the district

court’s grant of relief.

We note that in all the cases in which we have held that a parole

board’s decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on

the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process,

the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum

number of years required by his sentence. Specifically, in Biggs,

Sass, and here, the petitioners had not served the minimum number

of years to which they had been sentenced at the time of the

challenged parole denial by the Board. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912;

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125. All we held in those cases and all we hold

today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the

offenses in these cases, due process was not violated when these

prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration

of their minimum terms.

Furthermore, we note that in Sass and in the case before us there

was substantial evidence in the record demonstrating rehabilitation.

In both cases, the California Board of Prison Terms appeared to

give little or no weight to this evidence in reaching its conclusion

that Sass and Irons presently constituted a danger to society and

thus were unsuitable for parole. We hope that the Board will come

to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely

on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his

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 The California Supreme Court has also acknowledged that the aggravated nature of the 2

commitment offense, over time, may fail to provide some evidence that the inmate remains a

current threat to public safety. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1218-20 & n. 20. Additionally, a

recent panel of the Ninth Circuit in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 546-47 (9th Cir. 2008),

determined that under the “unusual circumstances” of that case the unchanging factor of the

gravity of the petitioner’s commitment offense did not constitute “some evidence” supporting the

governor’s decision to reverse a parole grant on the basis that the petitioner would pose a

continuing danger to society. However, on May 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals decided to rehear

that case en banc. Hayward v. Marshall, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the panel

decision in Hayward is no longer citable precedent.

13

rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the

liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917. 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. 

2

B. Analysis

In addressing the factors it considered in reaching its February 7, 2007 decision

that petitioner was unsuitable for parole at that time, the Board in this case stated as follows:

Thank you very much. We’ve reconvened for the Decision in the

matter of John Harper. Sir, the panel reviewed all information

received from the public and relied on the following circumstances

in concluding that you are not yet suitable for parole and would

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society, or a threat to public

safety if released from prison. This offense was carried out in an

especially cruel and callous manner in that the victim, Bryan

Denahill, 17 year old male was particularly vulnerable that he and

offenders, you and your crime partners were friends, partners in

drugs and other crimes. On June 9th of 1985, the victim was lured

to the remote area of San Bernardino County by you and Brown

under the pretense of splitting $6000 worth of cash and drugs

stolen from a drug dealer. He went to sand canyon to help retrieve

it. The murder weapon had been stashed earlier the same day and

you knew of its presence. When they got to the area, Brown

retrieved the gun and shot the victim. The gun chamber jammed. 

The wounded victim ran into the bushes. Brown cleared the

weapon and chased him, shooting him several more times. Harper,

that is you, then took possession of the gun, picked up the victim’s

head by the hair and fired a fatal bullet into his temple. This

offense was carried out dispassionately and in a calculated manner. 

Fearing the victim was still alive, you struck him on the back of the

head several times with a rock. Returning to Harper’s house,

Harper and Brown told Bartel what they’d done, calling it ‘first

degree premeditated murder’. This victim was abused and

mutilated during the commission of the offense. The

acquaintances of Harper testified, he told them after the killing that

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the victim was still alive when he was shot in the temple. Sir, you

do not have a, a significantly large criminal history. However, you

did, you were very frank with the Panel today and you did admit to

polysubstance abuse at an early age. You’ve explained in some

detail your upbringing but you also said, at the end of all that, that,

in fact, you had good values from your upbringing. As to your

institutional behavior, you have programmed commendably as to

your prison work and that has been read into the record. You

obviously have a work ethic and that’s excellent and will serve you

when you do get paroled. You are also, you’ve also worked at

Coastline College on Coastline College courses and that’s to your

credit and also very important for you. Obviously, you’re very

bright and it’s obvious that you need to work your mind as well as

your body. You received certification in the meat cutting field in

2004 and you explained that that involves warehouse management

as well. You also expressed a desire to evolve in to [sic] mill and

cabinetry and that you have most of the training completed in that

field. So you have two very marketable skills. As to self help and

therapy, as has been read into the file, you have an especially

recently [sic] participated in self help courses. You have, and again

you have been frank with the Panel, not yet started really working

the steps in the step program but you have taken NA several times

through ‘94, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006. As to your misconduct in

prison, you do have a significant record of disciplinary violations,

totaling eight 115s, the last in 2002 for possession of tattoo

paraphernalia prior to that was 2001 for mutual combat. So you

appear to have made great strides and are now, at least for the last

basically five years, been disciplinary free and that’s to your credit

also. As to the psychological report dated December 12, 2006 by

John T. Rouse, Ph.D. He assigns you a very high global

assessment functioning of 85 which we feel is true. But he also

assigns you although a lower than average risk of prison

comparable dangerousness, prison inmate type of dangerousness. 

He finds you have greater than average risk of dangerousness in the

greater society and I’m ready to address that separately in a

moment. As to your parole plans, you do appear to be, to have

viable residential plans and you also have acceptable employment

skills. As to Penal Code 3042 responses, responses indicate

opposition to a finding of parole suitability specifically by the

District Attorney of San Bernardino County. In a separate

decision, the hearing Panel finds it is not reasonable to expect that

parole would be granted at a hearing during the following four

years. Specific reasons for this finding are as follows. Sir, this was

a horrific crime. It was not just a murder first but this crime far

exceeds the minimum necessary to constitute this offense. This

offense was carried out cruelly and callously. The victim was

particularly vulnerable as he and you were friends, partners in

drugs and other crimes. On June 9th of 1985, this victim was lured

to a remote area of San Bernardino County by you and Brown

under the pretense of splitting money and drugs stolen from the

drug dealer. If, on the proviso, that he went to sand canyon to help

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retrieve it and once there, he was murdered. The murder weapon

had been stashed earlier the same day. You knew of its presence

when you got to the area. Brown retrieved the gun, shot the victim. 

He fled trying to escape into the bushes. Brown chased him and

shot him again and then you took possession of the gun, picked

him up and in execution style, fired the fatal bullet into his temple. 

Fearing he was still alive, you struck him on the back of the head

several times with a rock then returning back to your residence, you

basically tagged it as first degree premeditated murder and

acquaintances of yours testified that after the killing, he was, you

said that he was still alive when you shot him in the temple. This

offense was carried out in a manner demonstrating exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering. Part of that time, he must

have been in terrible fear for his life and it must have been a

painful way to die. You had a clear opportunity to cease but you

continued. Moreover, the motive for this crime was very trivial in

relation to the offense. In fact, the next day, the offenders returned

to the scene with Bartel and re-enacted the offense, buried the body

deep in the ground to avert discovery and on the days following the

murder, you told friends that you had killed the victim. Sir, this

Panel believes you’re developing insight and actually, you

expressed that insight unusually well. You’re unusually articulate

in that regard and we, however, concur with the assessment of the

psychologist at this point because we feel that, we don’t know

exactly where he derived his assessment but we do agree with the

assessment and first of all, let me tell you this, it is not our

objective to keep you incarcerated. I don’t know of any Panel’s

objective that would be that but it is certainly not ours. It gives us

no pleasure to give denials and we understand that we make a little

check mark in a box but that is your life and you have to go live

that but we have to look at what is really reasonable and what, what

do we want you to do so that society can feel that you won’t be a

threat any longer. We felt today that you were honest and genuine

and forthcoming. We also feel you’re incredibly vulnerable and

fragile still at this point. And that’s what concerns us. We’re

concerned that it may be your perception that it is rough in here. 

There’s no doubt about it and it is difficult in so many ways. We

don’t minimize that. But actually, the challenge is [sic] outside are

very great as well and it’s not getting any easier outside. What

we’re concerned about is that you have the tools to go forth and not

feel that you have to be subject in any way to the approval by

others, to groupthink, as you really adequately addressed, but that

you will have everything you need to be reliable and to feel that

you’re your own person, that you don’t need to worry about what

others think or how they perceive you so that you can feel less

victimized by your life’s circumstances whatever they may turn out

to be, good or bad. So, we ask that you review this transcript and

think about what you said and how you said it as well as what was

said by the other parties here today and let me tell you something. 

We can’t forgive you. And in many ways, you have to forgive

yourself and that may be the hardest thing. It’s going to be the

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hardest thing for you to do. You have to find a way to do that and

perhaps by reaching out to others as well as all the other things

you’re doing. It’s going to be really important for you because in

reaching out to others, you’ll make yourself vulnerable every time

you do and the more you do that, the more capability you have and

the stronger you’ll feel. Do you have anything to add,

Commissioner? I really wish you good luck, sir.

(Decision at 62-68.) After taking into consideration the Ninth Circuit decisions in Biggs, Sass,

and Irons, and for the reasons set forth below, this court concludes that petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief with respect to his due process challenge to the Board’s February 7, 2007 

decision denying him parole. 

First, and perhaps most importantly, at the time of the challenged parole suitability

hearing, petitioner had not yet served the minimum number of years required by his sentence on

the commitment offense. Petitioner was sentenced to 27 years-to-life in state prison in 1987, and

the parole hearing at issue was held 20 years later, in 2007. Pursuant to the holding in Irons,

petitioner’s right to due process was not violated when he was deemed unsuitable for parole prior

to the expiration of his minimum term. Irons, 505 F.3d at 665. Further, the Board’s 2007

decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole and that his release would unreasonably

endanger public safety was supported by “some evidence” that bore “indicia of reliability.” 

Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. The Board relied on the circumstances of petitioner’s offense of

conviction, the fact that he had only recently begun to participate in self-help programs and had

not yet started “working the steps in the step program,” his significant record of prison

disciplinary violations, and the most recent psychological report which opined that petitioner’s

risk of dangerousness was greater than average when compared to persons outside prison. 

According to the authorities cited above, these factors constitute “some evidence” supporting the

Board’s decision that petitioner was not yet suitable for release on parole in 2007, especially

where he had not yet served the minimum term required by his sentence. Sass, 469 F.3d at 1129;

Irons, 505 F.3d at 665. This is true even though petitioner has participated in self-help programs

and may have a place to live and job prospects upon release from prison. 

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The Board’s 2007 decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole and would

pose a danger to society if released meets the minimally stringent test set forth in Biggs, Sass,

and Irons. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the

Board’s failure to find him suitable for parole at the February 7, 2007 suitability hearing violated

his right to due process. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; Irons, 505 F.3d at 664-65.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 23, 2010.

DAD:8:

harper1410.hc

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