Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00250/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PARKER DAVIS, on behalf of herself

and all others similarly situated, and

on behalf of the general public,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-250-BAS(NLS)

ORDER OVERRULING

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

OCTOBER 2, 2014 ORDERS 

[ECF No. 37]

v.

DS WATERS OF AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants.

On September 24, 2014, Defendant DS Waters of America, Inc. filed an ex parte

motion for “an injunction, ‘turn over’ order, and other corrective measures associated

with Plaintiff [Parker Davis’] illicit ‘self-help’ discovery.” (ECF No. 28.) Despite

mentioning “injunction” in the title of the motion, Defendant specifically sought an

order for the following relief:

(a) Requiring that any and all documents obtained through

“self-help” means be immediately relinquished and returned

(including paper and electronic copies), including the

“fruits” of any such efforts.

(b) Ordering Plaintiff and his counsel to immediately cease

and desist from engaging in any “self-help” discovery,

whereby Plaintiff obtains DSS documents from

former/current employees of DSS (or other impermissible

means) as opposed to through the discovery process.

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(c) Ordering Plaintiff’s counsel to provide defense counsel

with the identity of the individual(s) from whom they

obtained Exhibits 47, 48, and 52, and any other internal

documents of DSS, so that DSS can fairly conduct its own

investigation, determine what occurred, and take appropriate

preventative/corrective steps, actions and/or measures. 

(d) Ordering that Exhibits 47, 48, and 52 and any associated

testimony be stricken from the record in the Garrity

deposition and prohibiting the use of Exhibits 47, 48, and 52

(as well as any other documents obtained through “self-help”

means and methods) in future depositions, court hearings,

and/or motions.

(Def.’s Sept. 24, 2014 Ex Parte Mot. 16:13–17:5.) 

On October 2, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes issued an

order determining that Defendant’s ex parte motion was improperly filed and thus

would not be considered. Judge Stormes issued a Further Order on the same day

adding that “[t]o the extent that defense counsel in fact intended his ex parte motion

to be a motion for an injunction or an application for a Temporary Restraining Order

(‘TRO’) properly brought before the District Judge, the ex parte motion was not

properly filed as a noticed motion for an injunction, nor was it styled as an application

for a TRO[,]” and that “counsel contacted [Judge Stormes’] chambers regarding

briefing on the ex parte motion and related motions, not Judge Bashant’s chambers.” 

(Oct. 2, 2014 Further Order 1:23–2:2.)

Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s objection to Judge Stormes’

October 2, 2014 orders. Plaintiff Parker Davis has not filed a response to Defendant’s

objection. However, the Court neither ordered nor requires any further briefing to

make its determination. The Court DENIES Defendant’s request for an oral

argument because it will not materially assist the Court in making its determination,

and will instead decide the matter on the papers submitted. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). 

For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections.

//

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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge

within fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The

magistrate judge’s order will be upheld unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to

factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive

pretrial discovery matters. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378

(S.D. Cal. 2000); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 697 (S.D. Ga. 1996)

(reviewing magistrate judge’s order addressing attorney-client issues in discovery for

clear error). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe &

Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review

of purely legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“the phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates

plenary review as to matters of law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D.

Ohio 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010 update). “Thus, [the district court] must

exercise its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal

conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to law if it fails

to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United States

v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009).

II. DISCUSSION

The crux of Defendant’s objection isthatJudge Stormes’ orders were outside the

scope of her authority as prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and 28

U.S.C. § 636. In particular, Defendant emphasizes that § 636(b)(1)(A) states that “a

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[district] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial

matter pending before the Court, except a motion for injunctive relief[,]” suggesting

that motions for injunctive relief require a designation from the district judge. 

Defendant argues that this restriction of a magistrate judge’s authority applies in this

case, and that Judge Stormes improperly exercised jurisdiction over Defendant’s ex

parte motion. (Def.’s Objection 6:17–7:28.) The Court disagrees.

In Anaya v. Campbell, No. CIV S-07-0029, 2009 WL 425034, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

Feb. 19, 2009, the court explained:

The fact that parties are directed in their activities by a

magistrate judge, cannot, without more, transformthe matter

at hand into an ‘injunctive’ relief situation governed by §

636(b)(1)(B). It is only where the relief sought goes to the

merits of plaintiff’s action or to complete stays of an action

are orders under § 636(b)(1)(A) precluded. In other words,

a motion for injunctive relief must relate to the allegations in

the complaint. If there is no relation, it is not an injunctive

relief situation. A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief

“must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury

claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the

complaint.” In other words, [a] [p]laintiff must seek

injunctive relief related to the merits of his underlying claim.

Anaya, 2009 WL 425034, at *1 (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th

Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The reasoning in Anaya is persuasive and this Court is

compelled to follow it.

Defendant’s request clearly did not seek dispositive relief on the merits of the

complaint. Rather, it sought to prohibit certain purported “self-help” discovery and

compel other discovery. The requests are purely discovery matters, which were

properly before the magistrate judge. See Civ. L.R. 72.1(a), (b), (h).

Furthermore, Defendant did not even explicitly request injunctive relief in its ex

parte motion. (See Def.’s Sept. 24, 2014 Ex Parte Mot. 16:13–17:5.) Instead, it merely

appended the word “injunction” throughout the ex parte motion. Specifically,

Defendant uses the word “injunction” six times in the body of its ex parte motion,

where the word is used once referring to the title of the motion and five other times to

either quote or describe other legal authority. (See id. at 1:4, 8:25, 13:4, 13:24, 13:25,

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13:27.) The characterization of the ex parte motion as a dispositive motion for

injunctive relief is, at best, a disingenuous attempt to circumvent the authority ofJudge

Stormes and her well-reasoned orders. In deciding not to consider Defendant’s ex

parte motion, Judge Stormes properly exercised her authority, but also reasonably

expected the parties to comply with her chambers rules. Apparently, Defendant failed

to meet Judge Stormes’ expectations.

In sum, Defendant fails to demonstrate that Judge Stormes’ October 2, 2014

orders are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a).

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objection to

Judge Stormes’ October 2, 2014 orders. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 24, 2014

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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