Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05150/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2013 Decided April 23, 2013

No. 12-5150

MINGO LOGAN COAL COMPANY,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00541)

Matthew Littleton, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellant. Aaron P. Avila,

Mark R. Haag, Cynthia J. Morris and Kenneth C. Amaditz,

Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, and Stefania

D. Shamet, Attorney, United States Environmental Protection

Agency, were on brief.

Emma C. Cheuse, Jennifer C. Chavez and Benjamin A.

Luckett were on brief for amici curiae West Virginia

Highland Conservancy et al. in support of the appellant.

Robert M. Rolfe argued the cause for the appellee. 

George P. Sibley III, Virginia S. Albrecht and Deidre G.

Duncan were on brief.

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Kathryn Kusske Floyd and Jay C. Johnson were on brief

for amici curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States

of America et al. in support of the appellee.

Michael A. Carvin and Kevin P. Holewinski were on brief

for amicus curiae United Company in support of the appellee.

Benjamin L. Bailey and Michael B. Hissam were on brief

for amicus curiae Randy Huffman in support of the appellee. 

Thanos Basdekis entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The Mingo

Logan Coal Company (Mingo Logan) applied to the United

States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a permit under

section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1344,

to discharge dredged or fill material from a mountain-top coal

mine in West Virginia into three streams and their tributaries.

The Corps—acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army

(Secretary) and without objection from the Administrator of

the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(Administrator, EPA), who has “veto” authority over 

discharge site selection under CWA subsection 404(c), 33

U.S.C. § 1344(c)—issued the permit to Mingo Logan,

approving the requested disposal sites for the discharged

material. Four years later, EPA invoked its subsection 404(c)

authority to “withdraw” the specifications of two of the

streams as disposal sites, thereby prohibiting Mingo Logan

from discharging into them. Mingo Logan filed this action

challenging EPA’s withdrawal of the specified sites on the

grounds that (1) EPA lacks statutory authority to withdraw

site specification after a permit has issued and (2) EPA’s

decision to do so was arbitrary and capricious in violation of

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et

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seq. The district court granted summary judgment to Mingo

Logan on the first ground without reaching the second. We

reverse the district court, concluding that EPA has post-permit

withdrawal authority, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The CWA provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by

any person shall be unlawful” except as in compliance with

specifically enumerated CWA provisions, including section

404.1

 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Subsection 404(a) authorizes the

Secretary to issue permits allowing discharge of dredged or

fill material “at specified disposal sites,” which are to be

“specified for each such permit by the Secretary . . . through

the application of guidelines developed by the Administrator,

in conjunction with the Secretary.” Id. § 1344(a), (b). The

Secretary’s authority to specify a disposal site is expressly

made “[s]ubject to subsection (c) of [section 404].” Id.

§ 1344(b). Subsection 404(c) authorizes the Administrator,

after consultation with the Corps, to veto the Corps’s disposal

site specification—that is, the Administrator “is authorized to

prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of

1

Under the CWA, “discharge of a pollutant” means “any addition

of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12); “pollutant,” in turn, “means dredged spoil, solid waste,

incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,

chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,

wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,

municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water,” id.

§ 1362(6). CWA section 404 authorizes the Secretary, acting through

the Corps, to issue permits for the discharge of dredged and fill

material, while section 402 authorizes EPA to issue permits for the

discharge of other pollutants. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA,

667 F.3d 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders

v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 459, 461 n.1 (D.C. Cir.

2006)). 

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specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and . . . to

deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification

(including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal

site”—“whenever he determines” the discharge will have an

“unacceptable adverse effect” on identified environmental

resources. Id. § 1344(c). 

In June 1999, Hobet Mining, Inc., Mingo Logan’s

predecessor, applied for a section 404 permit to discharge

material from the Spruce No. 1 Mine into four West Virginia

streams and their tributaries. In 2002, after the Corps

prepared a draft Environmental Impact Statement, EPA

expressed its concern that “even with the best practices,

mountaintop mining yields significant and unavoidable

environmental impacts that had not been adequately described

in the document.” Letter from EPA, Region III to Corps,

Huntington Dist., at 1 (June 16, 2006) (JA 617). In the end,

however, EPA declined to pursue a subsection 404(c)

objection. Email from EPA to Corps (Nov. 2, 2006) (JA 982)

(“[W]e have no intention of taking our Spruce Mine concerns

any further from a Section 404 standpoint . . . .”). On January

22, 2007, the Corps issued Mingo Logan a section 404 permit,

effective through December 31, 2031, which authorized

Mingo Logan to dispose of material into three

streams—Pigeonroost Branch, Oldhouse Branch and Seng

Camp Creek—and certain tributaries thereto. Dep’t of the

Army Permit No. 199800436-3 (JA 984) (Spruce Mine

Permit). The permit expressly advised that the Corps “may

reevaluate its decision on the permit at any time the

circumstances warrant” and that “[s]uch a reevaluation may

result in a determination that it is appropriate to use the

suspension, modification, and revocation procedures

contained in 33 CFR 325.7.” Id. at 3 (JA 986). The permit

made no mention of any future EPA action.

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On September 3, 2009, EPA wrote the Corps requesting it

“use its discretionary authority provided by 33 CFR 325.7 to

suspend, revoke or modify the permit issued authorizing

Mingo Logan Coal Company to discharge dredged and/or fill

material into waters of the United States in conjunction with

the construction, operation, and reclamation of the Spruce

Fork No. 1 Surface Mine,” based on “new information and

circumstances . . . which justif[ied] reconsideration of the

permit.” Letter from EPA, Region III to Corps, Huntington

Dist., at 1 (Sept. 3, 2009) (JA 941). EPA noted in particular

its “concern[] about the project’s potential to degrade

downstream water quality.” Id. The Corps responded that

there were “no factors that currently compell[ed it] to consider

permit suspension, modification or revocation.” Letter from

Corps, Huntington Dist. to EPA, Region III, at 2 (Sept. 30,

2009) (JA 950). EPA wrote back: “We intend to issue a

public notice of a proposed determination to restrict or

prohibit the discharge of dredged and/or fill material at the

Spruce No. 1 Mine project site consistent with our authority

under Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act and our

regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 231.” Letter from EPA, Region

III to Corps, Huntingdon Dist., at 1 (October 16, 2009) (Supp.

JA 1).

EPA’s Regional Director published the promised notice

of proposed determination on April 2, 2010, requesting public

comments “[p]ursuant to Section 404(c) . . . on its proposal to

withdraw or restrict use of Seng Camp Creek, Pigeonroost

Branch, Oldhouse Branch, and certain tributaries to those

waters in Logan County, West Virginia to receive dredged

and/or fill material in connection with construction of the

Spruce No. 1 Surface Mine.” Proposed Determination, 75

Fed. Reg. 16,788, 16,788 (Apr. 2, 2010). The Regional

Director followed up with a Recommended Determination on

September 24, 2010, limited to withdrawal of the

specification of Pigeonroost Branch and Oldhouse Branch and

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their tributaries. On January 13, 2011, EPA published its

Final Determination, which, adopting the Regional Director’s

recommendation, formally “withdraws the specification of

Pigeonroost Branch, Oldhouse Branch, and their tributaries,

as described in [the Spruce Mine Permit] . . . as a disposal site

for the discharge of dredged or fill material for the purpose of

construction, operation, and reclamation of the Spruce No. 1

Surface Mine” and “prohibits the specification of the defined

area . . . for use as a disposal site associated with future

surface coal mining that would be expected to result in a

nature and scale of adverse chemical, physical, and biological

effects similar to the Spruce No. 1 mine.” Final

Determination of the Assistant Administrator for Water

Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act

Concerning the Spruce No. 1 Mine, Logan County, WV, 76

Fed. Reg. 3126, 3128 (Jan. 19, 2011).

Mingo Logan filed this action in district court

immediately following the Proposed Determination,

challenging EPA’s authority to “revoke” the three-year-old

permit, Compl., ¶ 75, Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. EPA,

C.A. No. 10-00541 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2010), and amended its

complaint in February 2011 to challenge the Final

Determination, asserting it is both ultra vires and arbitrary and

capricious. Am. Compl., Mingo Logan Coal (Feb. 28, 2011). 

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court granted judgment to Mingo Logan on March 23, 2012. 

Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133

(D.D.C. 2012). The court concluded EPA “exceeded its

authority under section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act when it

attempted to invalidate an existing permit by withdrawing the

specification of certain areas as disposal sites after a permit

had been issued by the Corps under section 404(a).” Id. at

134. The United States filed a timely notice of appeal on

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behalf of EPA. The Corps joined EPA on brief. See

Appellant Br. & Reply Br.

II.

 In granting summary judgment, the district court agreed

with Mingo Logan’s interpretation of subsection 404 to

preclude EPA from withdrawing a site specification once the

Corps has issued a permit. “We review a grant of summary

judgment de novo applying the same standards as those that

govern the district court’s determination.” Troy Corp. v.

Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “Moreover,

insofar as the agency’s determination amounts to or involves

its interpretation of . . . a statute entrusted to its administration,

we review that interpretation under the deferential standard of

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).” Id. Under Chevron:

We first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue,” in which case we

“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress.” If the “statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,”

however, we move to the second step and defer to the

agency’s interpretation as long as it is “based on a

permissible construction of the statute.”

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428, 431 (D.C.

Cir. 2013) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). We

construe subsection 404(c) under Chevron step 1 because we

believe the language unambiguously expresses the intent of

the Congress.

As noted earlier, see supra p. 3, section 404 vests the

Corps, rather than EPA, with the authority to issue permits to

discharge fill and dredged material into navigable waters and

to specify the disposal sites therefor. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-

(b); see Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference

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Committee, 1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Legislative History) 161,

177 (Jan. 1973) (Statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie, 118

Cong. Rec. at 33,699 (Oct. 4, 1972)) (Senate Committee “had

reported a bill which treated the disposal of dredged spoil like

any other pollutant” but Conference Committee adopted

provisions of House bill that “designated the Secretary of the

Army rather than the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency as the permit issuing authority”). 

Nonetheless, the Congress granted EPA a broad environmental

“backstop” authority over the Secretary’s discharge site

selection in subsection 404(c), which provides in full: 

(c) Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as

disposal sites

The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the

specification (including the withdrawal of

specification) of any defined area as a disposal site,

and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any

defined area for specification (including the

withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site,

whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity

for public hearings, that the discharge of such

materials into such area will have an unacceptable

adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish

beds and fishery areas (including spawning and

breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. 

Before making such determination, the Administrator

shall consult with the Secretary. The Administrator

shall set forth in writing and make public his findings

and his reasons for making any determination under

this subsection.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); see Legislative History at 177 (“[T]he

Conferees agreed that the Administrator . . . should have the

veto over the selection of the site for dredged spoil disposal

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and over any specific spoil to be disposed of in any selected

site.”).2

 Section 404 imposes no temporal limit on the

Administrator’s authority to withdraw the Corps’s

specification but instead expressly empowers him to prohibit,

restrict or withdraw the specification “whenever” he makes a

determination that the statutory “unacceptable adverse effect”

will result. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (emphasis added). Using the

expansive conjunction “whenever,” the Congress made plain

its intent to grant the Administrator authority to

prohibit/deny/restrict/withdraw a specification at any time. 

2

Thus, subsection 404(c) affords EPA two distinct (if

overlapping) powers to veto the Corps’s specification: EPA may (1)

“prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification)

of any defined area as a disposal site” or (2) “deny or restrict the use

of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of

specification).” In withdrawing the specifications here, EPA did not

clearly distinguish between the two powers. See Final Determination,

76 Fed. Reg. at 3127 (“EPA Region III published in the Federal

Register a Proposed Determination to prohibit, restrict, or deny the

specification or the use for specification (including withdrawal of

specification) of certain waters at the project site as disposal sites for

the discharge of dredged or fill material for the construction of the

Spruce No. 1 Surface Mine.”). It appears, however, that EPA

exercised the first authority—“to prohibit”/“withdraw[]”—given the

post-permit timing. See id. at 3128 (“EPA’s Final Determination

withdraws the specification of Pigeonroost Branch, Oldhouse Branch,

and their tributaries, as described in DA Permit No. 199800436-3

(Section 10: Coal River), as a disposal site for the discharge of

dredged or fill material for the purpose of construction, operation, and

reclamation of the Spruce No. 1 Surface Mine. This Final

Determination also prohibits the specification of the defined area

constituting Pigeonroost Branch, Oldhouse Branch, and their

tributaries for use as a disposal site associated with future surface coal

mining that would be expected to result in a nature and scale of

adverse chemical, physical, and biological effects similar to the Spruce

No. 1 mine.”).

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See 20 Oxford English Dictionary 210 (2d ed.1989) (defining

“whenever,” used in “a qualifying (conditional) clause,” as:

“At whatever time, no matter when.”). Thus, the unambiguous

language of subsection 404(c) manifests the Congress’s intent

to confer on EPA a broad veto power extending beyond the

permit issuance.3

 This construction is further buttressed by

subsection 404(c)’s authorization of a “withdrawal” which, as

EPA notes, is “a term of retrospective application.” Appellant

Br. 27. EPA can withdraw a specification only after it has

been made. See 20 Oxford English Dictionary 449 (2d

ed.1989) (defining “withdraw” as “[t]o take back or away

(something that has been given, granted, allowed, possessed,

enjoyed, or experienced)”). Moreover, because the Corps

often specifies final disposal sites in the permit itself—at least

it did here, see Spruce Mine Permit at 1 (“You are authorized

to perform work in accordance with the terms and conditions

specified below . . . .”) (emphasis added) (JA 984)—EPA’s

power to withdraw can only be exercised post-permit. Mingo

Logan’s reading of the statute would eliminate EPA’s express

statutory right to withdraw a specification and thereby render

3

Based on the plain meaning of the statutory language, EPA has

consistently maintained this interpretation for over thirty years. See

Section 404(c) Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,076, 58,077 (Oct. 9, 1979)

(“The statute on its face clearly allows EPA to act after the Corps has

issued a permit; it refers twice to the ‘withdrawal of specification,’

which clearly refers to action by EPA after the Corps has specified a

site (e.g. issued a permit or authorized its own work).”); Final

Determination of the Administrator Concerning the North Miami

Landfill Site Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act at 1-2

(Jan. 26, 1981) (JA 239-40) (exercising 404(c) authority “to restrict

the use of [of the North Miami Landfill] for specification (including

the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site” almost five years

after Corps issued permit therefor). The Corps has made clear by

joining EPA in this litigation that it agrees with EPA’s interpretation. 

See supra p. 7.

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subsection 404(c)’s parenthetical “withdrawal” language

superfluous—a result to be avoided. See Corley v. United

States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (applying “one of the most

basic interpretative canons, that a statute should be construed

so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will

be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”) (brackets

and quotation marks omitted).

Notwithstanding the unambiguous statutory language,

Mingo Logan presses its own view of the language, the

statutory structure and section 404’s legislative history to

maintain that the Congress intended to preclude post-permit

withdrawal. We find none of its arguments persuasive.

First, Mingo Logan argues that the statutory language

itself contemplates that specification occurs before (rather than

when) the permit issues and therefore can (and must) be

withdrawn pre-permit. We find no such intent in the statutory

directive Mingo Logan quotes—that “each such disposal site

shall be specified for each such permit by the Secretary . . . 

through the application of guidelines developed by the

Administrator, in conjunction with the Secretary.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344(b). This language is at least as consistent with

specification by the Corps at the time the permit issues as it is

with pre-permit specification. Moreover, as noted earlier, see

supra p. 10, the Corps expressly “specified” the final sites in

the Spruce Mine Permit itself. Nor does the permitting

process—including the “extensive coordination process during

which EPA can review the Corps’s statement of

findings/record of decision,” Appellee Br. 31—require that the

specification be made before the permit issues. During the

permitting process, the disposal sites are proposed,

reviewed—perhaps even “specified,” as Mingo Logan

contends—but the final specifications are included in the

permit itself.

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Second, Mingo Logan asserts EPA’s interpretation

conflicts with section 404 “as a whole.” Id. at 35. Mingo

Logan claims, for example, that “EPA’s reading obliterates the

choice Congress made to give the permitting authority with all

of its attributes to the Corps, not EPA.” Id. at 36. While it is

true that subsections 404(a)-(b) unambiguously authorize the

Secretary to issue a discharge permit—and to specify the

disposal site(s) therefor—section 404(b) makes equally clear,

as explained supra pp. 8-11, that the Administrator has, in

effect, the final say on the specified disposal sites “whenever”

he makes the statutorily required “unacceptable adverse

effect” determination. Thus, insofar as site specification may

be considered, as Mingo Logan asserts, an “attribute[]” of the

permitting authority, the statute expressly vests final authority

over this particular attribute in the Administrator.

Mingo Logan also contends that EPA’s interpretation

“tramples on provisions like sections 404(p) and 404(q) that

are intended to give permits certainty and finality.” Appellee

Br. 36. Subsection 404(p) provides: “Compliance with a

permit issued pursuant to [section 404], including any activity

carried out pursuant to a general permit issued under this

section, shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of

[enforcement actions brought under] sections 1319 and 1365

of [title 33] . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(p).4 According to Mingo

Logan, “absent . . . permit violations or public interest

considerations, the permittee can rely on the permit shield of

section 404(p).” Appellee Br. 37. But again, section 404(c)’s

language is plain with regard to its enumerated “unacceptable

adverse effects”: the Administrator retains authority to

4

Sections 1319 and 1365 of title 33 authorize an action by,

respectively, (1) EPA against a violator of, inter alia, the terms of a

section 404 permit; and (2) a citizen against a violator of a CWA

effluent limitation or against EPA for failure to perform a nondiscretionary “act or duty” under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365. 

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withdraw a specified disposal site “whenever” he determines

such effects will result from discharges at the sites. And when

he withdraws a disposal site specification, as he did here, the

disposal site’s “terms and conditions specified” in the permit,

see Spruce Mine Permit at 1 (JA 984), are in effect amended

so that discharges at the previously specified disposal sites are

no longer in “[c]ompliance with” the permit—although the

permit itself remains otherwise in effect to the extent it is

usable.5 Moreover, as EPA notes, subsection 404(c) was

enacted in 1972 and its plain meaning did not change when

404(p) was enacted five years later. Appellant Br. 33-34. As

Mingo Logan acknowledges, if “the text of section 404(c)

clearly and unambiguously gave EPA the power to act

post-permit”—a reading it rejects—then section 404(p)

“cannot be read to implicitly overturn section 404(c).” 

Appellee Br. 39 (citing Appellant Br. at 34 (citing Vill. of

Barrington, Ill. v. STB, 636 F.3d 650, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). 

As we have repeatedly stated throughout this opinion, the text

of section 404(c) does indeed clearly and unambiguously give

EPA the power to act post-permit. Thus, subsection 404(p)

does not implicitly limit section 404(c)’s scope. Nor does

EPA’s express statutory authority to act post-permit interfere

with subsection 404(q)’s directive that the Secretary enter into

5

In this case for example, EPA left intact the specification as

disposal site of “the Right Fork of Seng Camp Creek and its tributaries

. . . in part because some of those discharges have already occurred

and because the stream resources in Right Fork of Seng Camp Creek

were subject to a higher level of historic and ongoing human

disturbance than those found in Pigeonroost Branch or Oldhouse

Branch.” Final Determination, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3127 n.1.

In addition, EPA has made clear that a permittee may not be

penalized for discharges that occurred in compliance with the permit

before the effective date of the withdrawal of the specification. 

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agreements with other agency heads “to minimize, to the

maximum extent practicable, duplication, needless paperwork,

and delays in the issuance of permits under this section” and

“to assure that, to the maximum extent practicable, a decision

with respect to an application for a permit under subsection

(a) of this section will be made not later than the ninetieth day

after the date the notice for such application is published under

subsection (a) of this section.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(q) (emphases

added). The enumerated obligations apply only pre-permit

and are therefore unaffected by EPA’s post-permit actions.

Finally, Mingo Logan argues that the legislative history

“confirms that Congress intended EPA to act under section

404(c), if at all, prior to permit issuance.” Appellee Br. 42. In

particular, it relies on the statement of then-Senator Edmund

Muskie that 

prior to the issuance of any permit to dispose of spoil,

the Administrator must determine that the material to

be disposed of will not adversely affect municipal

water supplies, shellfish beds, and fishery areas

(including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife or

recreational areas in the specified site. Should the

Administrator so determine, no permit may issue.

118 Cong. Rec. at 33,699, reprinted in Legislative History at

177 (emphasis added). “Assuming legislative history could

override the plain, unambiguous directive” of section 404(c)

and “putting to one side the fact that this was the statement of

a single member of Congress,” the quoted language is “not

necessarily inconsistent with” EPA’s interpretation. See

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 706 F.3d 428, 437 (D.C.

Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also

Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 752 (2012)

(“[T]he views of a single legislator, even a bill’s sponsor, are

not controlling.”). That EPA should review the preliminary

specifications pre-permit to determine whether discharges will

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have the required “unacceptable adverse effect”—as EPA in

fact did here—does not mean it is foreclosed from doing so

post-permit as well—as it also did here.6 “Thus, ‘this case

does not present the very rare situation where the legislative

history of a statute is more probative of congressional intent

than the plain text.’ ” Va. Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 678 F.3d 918, 923

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC, 347

F.3d 291, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (brackets omitted). 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court

insofar as it held that EPA lacks statutory authority under

CWA section 404(c) to withdraw a disposal site specification

post-permit. Because the district court did not address the

merits of Mingo Logan’s APA challenge to the Final

Determination and resolution of the issue is not clear on the

present record, we follow our ususal practice and remand the

issue to the district court to address in the first instance. See

Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 434 n.* (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (citing Piersall v. Winter, 435 F.3d 319, 325 (D.C.

Cir. 2006)).

So ordered.

6

Similarly, post-permit withdrawal is not precluded by 33 C.F.R.

§ 323.6(b) (“The Corps will not issue a permit where the regional

administrator of EPA has notified the district engineer and applicant

in writing pursuant to 40 CFR 231.3(a)(1) that he intends to issue a

public notice of a proposed determination to prohibit or withdraw the

specification, or to deny, restrict or withdraw the use for specification,

of any defined area as a disposal site in accordance with section 404(c)

of the Clean Water Act.”). 

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