Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00296/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00296-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VESTA FIRE INSURANCE CORP., )

) 2:04-cv-0296-GEB-PAN

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 

) ORDER*

INSURANCE VENTURES, INC.; PAUL ) 

MCNEECE ROESSER; ROLAND CLARK )

COLTON; STEPHANIE FRANCIS SMITH; )

CARL FRANK; LAW OFFICES OF COLTON )

& ROESSER; and DOES 1 through 10, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On January 25, 2006, Plaintiff noticed a motion to modify

the Rule 16 Scheduling Order (“Motion to Modify”), and concurrently

filed an application to shorten time for hearing the Motion to Modify. 

Plaintiff seeks to modify the Rule 16 Scheduling Order (“Scheduling

Order”) so that it may file a motion for partial summary judgment

after the law and motion deadline. For the reasons stated below, the

Motion to Modify is denied; therefore, the application to shorten time

is denied since its is moot.

Plaintiff argues that modification of the Scheduling Order’s

December 21, 2005, law and motion deadline is appropriate because it

Case 2:04-cv-00296-GEB-EFB Document 208 Filed 02/02/06 Page 1 of 2
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was “impossible” for it to have its motion for partial summary

judgment heard by the law and motion deadline. (Mot. to Modify at 2.) 

Plaintiff states that it was unable to comply with the deadline

because it wanted to include in its motion for partial summary

judgment “relevant evidence . . . [that] was not reasonably available

in sufficient time to prepare” its motion for hearing by the deadline. 

(Id.; Decl. of John S. Pierce, Jan. 25, 2006, at 3.) Plaintiff makes

a conclusory argument that it “diligently attempted to comply” with

the deadline by “actively pursu[ing]” “essential” deposition

testimony, but “[d]espite its diligence, [it] could not have” complied

with the law and motion deadline. (Mot. to Modify at 6.) 

Plaintiff’s conclusory argument fails to explain why

Plaintiff could not have obtained the referenced discovery earlier so

that it could have filed its motion for partial summary judgment as

prescribed in the Scheduling Order. Since this has not been

explained, Plaintiff has not shown that its requested modification of

the Scheduling Order meets the Rule 16 “good cause” standard. Johnson

v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). The

primary focus of the good cause standard is the diligence of the party

seeking modification. Id. at 609. Where, as here, conjecture is

required as to whether the party seeking modification was diligent in

complying with the Scheduling Order, it is evident that good cause has

not been shown.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-00296-GEB-EFB Document 208 Filed 02/02/06 Page 2 of 2