Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00772/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00772-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONY L. CAREY, #152763, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-772-MEF

)

WARDEN ROBERT DANFORD, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause of action is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas

corpus relief filed by Anthony L. Carey [“Carey”], a state inmate, on August 22, 2010. In

this petition, as amended, Carey challengesthe constitutionality of the decision to deny him

parole issued by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles on March 28, 2007.

Amendment to Petition - Doc. No. 58. Specifically, Carey alleges that during the 2007

parole consideration process members of the parole board, elected state officials and a

victim’s right advocate conspired to deny him parole and further complains that parole

board members denied him equal protection, acted in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause

and deprived him of due process in the application of parole guidelines. Clarification of

Claims - Doc. No. 61 at 1.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed an answer, supplemental

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answers and supporting evidentiary materials wherein they argue that the claims on which

Carey seeks to proceed provide no basis for federal habeas relief as they “are barred under

the doctrine of res judicata....” in light of this court’s previous decision in Carey v. Wynn,

et al., Case No. 07-CV-1106-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala. February 24, 2011), appeal denied

(11 Cir. June 10, 2011). Respondents’ February 23, 2011 Supplemental Answer - Doc.

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No. 32 at 1. After submission of all necessary answers, the court allowed Carey an

opportunity to respond to each of the arguments set forth by the respondents, including

their res judicata defense. Order of August 24, 2011 - Doc. No. 55.

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties and applicable federal law, the

court determines that no evidentiary hearing is required, Rule 8(a), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Casesin United States District Courts, and concludesthat the present habeas

petition is due to be denied in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Prior Judgment on Claims for Relief

Carey asserts that he is entitled to federal habeas relief from the decision to deny

him parole issued by members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles on March 28,

2007. In support of this assertion, Carey maintains that this decision resulted from a

conspiracy, denied himequal protection, constituted an ex postfacto violation and deprived

him of due process. This court decided each of these claims adversely to Carey in a prior

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civil rights action. Carey v. Wynn, et al.,supra - Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

-- Doc. No. 104, adopted as opinion of the court and judgment issued February 24, 2011

(Doc. No. 108 and Doc. No. 109). Carey filed an appeal of this decision and the Eleventh

Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of this court on June 10, 2011. Id. - Doc. No. 116.

The portion of this court’s opinion in Carey v. Wynn, et al., supra, relevant to the issues

pending herein reads as follows:

III. FACTS

In February of 1989, the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama

(Bessemer Division) sentenced Carey to thirty years imprisonment on a

murder conviction. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A to the Response in Opposition -

Court Doc. No. 63-3 at 1. At the time Carey filed the instant complaint, he

had been considered for parole on four occasions during hisincarceration but

denied parole after each parole consideration hearing. The relevant decision

to deny Carey parole occurred on March 28, 2007. The record demonstrates

that the denial of parole occurred because Carey failed to persuade members

of the parole board that he is an acceptable risk for release on parole. Parole

Defendants’ Exhibitsto the March 19, 2008 Special Report - Court Doc. No.

25-2 at 2-5.

IV. DISCUSSION

Carey asserts [Bob Riley, Governor of the State of Alabama at the

time of the actions about which Carey complains, Troy King, the former

Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Miriam Shehane, a member of

Victims of Crimes Against Leniency, and Bill Wynn, Velinda Weatherly and

Robert Longshore, members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Parole]

violated his constitutional rights when they denied him parole and failed to

conduct the 2007 parole consideration hearing within three (3) years of the

most recent prior parole consideration. Specifically, Carey complains the

defendants (i) denied him due process, (ii) deprived him of equal protection,

(iii) subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, (iv) relied on false

information, (v) circumvented the Ex Post Facto Clause, and (vi) conspired

to effectuate the denial of parole. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1

at 2-3. Under applicable federal law, these claims entitle Carey to no relief

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from this court.

A. Due Process - The 2007 Hearing and Denial of Parole

Carey asserts defendants Wynn, Weatherly and Longshore deprived

him of “fair consideration” for parole in violation of his due process rights

as the decision to deny parole arose from arbitrary and capricious actions.

Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 3. In support of this assertion,

Carey complains [that] the parole defendants denied him due process when

they (i) failed to act in accordance with laws and regulations applicable to

determining an inmate’s suitability for release on parole, setting of parole

consideration dates and scheduling of parole hearings, (ii) set-off his parole

consideration date based on a regulation enacted after entry of his conviction,

(iii) considered adverse information provided by the victim’s family without

verifying the information, (iv) did not allow him to attend the [parole]

hearing, (v) denied his family the opportunity to explain the facts

surrounding the murder, and (vi) utilized statutes and regulations enacted

after his date of conviction in the parole consideration process[.] Carey’s

claims arising from an alleged lack of due process with respect to the parole

consideration process and resulting denial of parole entitle him to no relief.

“The Alabama [parole] statute ... calls for discretionary rather than

mandatory action on the part of the board. The law directs the board to

consider a number of factors in making their determination, which is a

subjective rather than objective determination. It does not contain any

language that mandates parole.... When the statute isframed in discretionary

terms there is not a liberty interest created.... Alabama parole statutes do not

create a liberty interest [in parole]....” Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489

(11 Cir. 1982). This court’s exhaustive review of the history of the

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Alabama statute governing release on parole establishes that from its

inception the statute has been framed in discretionary terms. [Section 15-22-

26 of the Alabama Code governs the authority of the parole board to grant

parole and provides that “[n]o prisoner shall be released on parole merely as

a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in

prison, but only if the Board of Pardons and Paroles is of the opinion that

there is reasonable probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live

and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not

incompatible with the welfare of society....”]. The law is well settled that

“the mere possibility of parole provides simply ‘a hope that is not protected

by due process....’ ... [In addition], the Alabama parole statute frames the

Parole Board’s authority in discretionary terms, and thus does not create for

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Alabama prisoners a protected liberty interest in the expectation of parole.

See Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487 (11 Cir. 1983).” Ellard v. Alabama

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Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 942 (11 Cir. 1987).

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Despite conceding no protected liberty interest in parole, Carey

contends that the parole board’s regulation governing parole set-off dates

creates a protected liberty interest in the procedures related to parole

consideration. Carey alleges that this provision creates a protectable

expectancyin parole consideration at the requisite set-offtime and, therefore,

the consideration process must comport with due process. This claim is

foreclosed by Slocum v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 678

F.2d 940, 941-942 (11 Cir. 1982), in which the Eleventh Circuit deemed

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such a “unique theory ... without merit.” 678 F.2d at 942. The relevant

portion of the Court’s opinion reads as follows:

Petitioner argues that even if there is no statutorily

created liberty interest in parole, particular [statutory parole]

provisions ... create a protectable entitlement to parole

consideration. Specifically, petitioner cites the requirement ...

that parole consideration “shall be automatic” upon the

expiration of a set period of confinement and language ... that

the board include in the parole file “as complete information as

may be practically available....” If these provisions create a

protectable expectancy in parole consideration, petitioner

argues that the consideration must comport with due process

standards. Petitioner’s unique theory is without merit. Unless

there is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in

making the parole determination are not required to comport

with standards of fundamental fairness. See Brown v.

Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917,

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97 S.Ct. 308, 50 L.Ed.2d 283 (1976). In Staton v. Wainwright,

665 F.2d 686 (5 Cir. 1982) (former Fifth Circuit decision), the

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court concluded that no liberty interest in parole was created by

the Florida statutes. The court, therefore, rejected appellant’s

claim that his due process rights were violated when he did not

receive an initial parole interview within the time required

under the parole laws. The analysis in Staton was adopted by

the Eleventh Circuit in Hunter v. Florida Parole and

Probation Commission, 674 F.2d 847 (11 Cir. 1982), where

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the court held that no due process violation could be shown

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through an allegation that the Florida Parole and Probation

Commission improperly calculated a prisoner’s “presumptive

parole release date.” Accordingly, in the instant case

petitioner[’s] ... allegation that the ... parole board has not

accorded him adequate parole consideration does not entitle

him to [relief].

Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942.

Carey does not possess a liberty interest in being granted parole that

is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Heard v.

Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 222 Fed. Appx. 838, 840 (11

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Cir. 2007); Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11 Cir. 1991); Ellard,

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824 F.2d at 941-942; Thomas, 691 F.2d at 488-489. Absent the existence of

a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, “the procedures

followed inmaking the parole determination are notrequired to comport with

the standards of fundamental fairness.” O’Kelley v. Snow, 53 F.3d 319, 321

(11 Cir. 1995); Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942; Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32

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(5 Cir. 1995) (because applicable Texas parole statutes confer “no liberty

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interest in obtaining parole” Texas inmate could not “complain of the

constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to parole decisions.”).

Thus, the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment

do not apply to either the parole decision making process, Thomas, 691 F.2d

at 488-489, or the parole consideration process. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942

(failure to provide parole review within time required under parole rules or

properly calculate presumptive date of release on parole does not constitute

a violation of due process).

Moreover, to the extent the complaint can be construed to challenge

the constitutionality ofsetting and/or delaying a parole consideration hearing

past the time mandated by governing administrative regulations, such action

likewise does not run afoul of the Constitution. Federal courts no longer

ascertain whether a state created a constitutionally protected liberty interest

by parsing language of statutes and regulations to determine if the language

was “of an unmistakably mandatory character” placing “substantive

limitations on official discretion” but must instead look to the nature of the

deprivation to determine if a state created a liberty interest. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995). As previously noted, an Alabama

inmate has no liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause.

Although “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause[,]... these interests will be

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generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the

Due Process Clause of its own force, ... nonetheless imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. “Since an inmate is normally incarcerated in prison, [the

plaintiff’s remaining in prison while awaiting parole consideration] did not

impose atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life and, therefore, did not deprive him of a protected

liberty interest.” Asquith v. Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 412

(3 Cir. 1999).

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Nevertheless, even though there is no liberty interest involved, a

parole board may not engage in “flagrant or unauthorized action.” Thomas,

691 F.2d at 489. The parole defendants maintain they acted in accordance

with state law and applicable administrative regulations when scheduling

Carey’s 2007 parole consideration hearing and denied parole to Carey

because they were not persuaded he presented an acceptable risk for release

on parole. The decisions of the parole board members with respect to Carey

demonstrate reasonable and appropriate actions, Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d

850, 853 (11 Cir. 1986), rationally related to the legitimate state interest of

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ensuring that only those inmates best suited for parole are actually granted

this privilege. Cf. Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378 (11 Cir. 1991); see

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also Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526 (11 Cir. 1988). Carey has therefore

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failed to present any evidence indicating arbitrary or capricious actions on

the part of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles or its board members.

Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

defendants with respect to each of Carey’s due process claims.

B. Equal Protection

Carey, an African American inmate convicted of murder, asserts the

defendants violated his right to equal protection by denyig him parole when

other inmates convicted of murder and/or more serious crimes have been

granted parole. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 3; Plaintiff’s

Response in Opposition - Court Doc. No. 63 at 6-7. He further contends that

“white inmates are more likely to make parole” than are black inmates.

Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition - Court Doc. No. 45 at 5.

To establish a claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, “a

prisoner must [at a minimum] demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to

other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state

engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion,

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national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis. Jones v. Ray,

279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob.

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Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986).” Sweet v. Secretary,

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Department of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006).

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“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results

in a ... disproportionate impact.... Proof of ... discriminatory intent or

purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more

than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It impliesthat

the decision maker ... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part

‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable

group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,

279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). In a case such as this one, where the plaintiff

challenges actions of parole officials, exceptionally clear proof of

discrimination is required. Fuller v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles,

851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11 Cir. 1988). Evidence which merely indicates

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disparity of treatment or even arbitrary administration of state powers, rather

than instances of purposeful or invidious discrimination, is insufficient to

show discriminatory intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107

S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).

Since this case is before the court on a properly supported motion for

summaryjudgmentfromthe defendants,Careybearsthe burden of producing

evidence which would be admissible at trialsufficient to show that the action

of the defendantsresulted fromintentional discrimination. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 322-324; Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279. The plaintiff cannot rest on

conclusory allegations of a constitutional violation to defeat summary

judgment nor is “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of

[his] position” sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252; Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (conclusory allegations based solely on

subjective beliefs are insufficient to oppose summaryjudgment). Instead, the

law is clear that the plaintiff must present significant probative evidence of

intentional discrimination to preclude summary judgment in favor of the

defendants. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The defendants adamantly deny they undertook any action in Carey’s

parole consideration process based on race or any other constitutionally

impermissible reason. Parole Defendants’ Exhibits to the March 19, 2008

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Special Report - Court Doc. No. 25-2 at 2-5. In addition, the defendants

maintain that the denial of parole was based solely on their determination

that Carey was not suitable for release on parole. Id. Carey has utterly and

completely failed to present evidence, significantly probative or otherwise,

that race or some other constitutionally impermissible factor constituted a

motivating factor in the actions of the defendants about which he complains.

Other than Carey’s self-serving, conclusory allegation that the defendants

violated his equal protection rights, the record is devoid of admissible

evidence that the defendants acted in an intentionallydiscriminatorymanner.

The allegations presented by Carey do not warrant an inference of

discriminatory intent as the showing of a disparate impact upon inmates is

insufficient to demonstrate an equal protection violation. Sweet, 467 F.3d at

1319; E & T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114-1115; Horner v. Kentucky High

School Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 276 (6 Cir. 1994). Moreover, the

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arbitrary application of administrative rules and/or state laws does not

constitute a violation of the Constitution. E & T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114.

Carey has therefore not been denied equal protection of the law with respect

to the denial of parole. Thus, the defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on the equal protection claim.

* * *

D. False Information

Carey complains the defendants deprived him of due process when

they relied on false information to deny him parole. Plaintiff’s Complaint -

Court Doc. No. 1 at 3 (emphasis in original) (parole board members based

their decision to deny parole “upon erroneous - false information {‘that I

have violent behavioral problems’}....”). The defendants do not admit the

information utilized in the parole decision-making process is false and

categorically deny any knowing reliance on false information. Parole

Defendants’ Exhibits B and C to the June 17, 2008 Second Supplemental

Special Report -- Court Doc. No. 40-1 at 2-5.

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11 Cir. 1991), the Court held

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that reliance on admittedly false information to deny a prisoner

consideration for parole was arbitrary and capricious treatment violative of

the Constitution. The appellate court, however, carefully distinguished its

holding in Monroe from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of

Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043

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(1982).

Our holding today does not conflict with our earlier holding in

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Slocum, supra. In Slocum, the plaintiff, who had been denied

parole, made the conclusory allegation that the Board must

have relied upon erroneous information because otherwise the

Board would surely have granted him parole. Slocum, 678

F.2d at 941. The plaintiff then sought to assert a due process

right to examine his prison file for the alleged errors. Unlike

the instant case, in Slocum the state did not admit that it had

relied upon false information in denying parole nor did the

plaintiff present any evidence that his prison file even

contained any false information. We held in Slocum that

prisoners do not state a due process claim by merely asserting

that erroneous information may have been used during their

parole consideration. Id. at 942. We also determined that

prisoners do not have a due process right to examine their

prison files as part of a general fishing expedition in search of

false information that could possibly exist in their files. Id. In

the case at bar, we are confronted with prison authorities who

admit that information contained in Monroe’s files is false and

that they relied upon such information, at least in part, to deny

Monroe parole and to classify him as a sex offender. As we

stated, the parole statute does not authorize state officials to

rely on knowingly false information in their determinations.

Thomas [v. Sellers], 691 F.2d [487] at 489 [(11 Cir. 1982)].

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Monroe, 932 F.3d at 1442. Slocum controls the disposition of the instant

false information claim.

The defendants maintain the information on which they relied to deny

Carey parole is correct and reliance on this information therefore did not

violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Specifically, there is no

admission by the defendants that the information utilized in denying Carey

parole isfalse, incorrect or erroneous. Carey hasfailed to come forward with

any evidence which indicates the defendants knowingly used false

information during the parole consideration process. Moreover, Carey’s

conclusory assertion regarding false information does nothing more than

raise the possibility that information in hisrecords may be false and this mere

possibility fails to provide a basis for relief. Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1142;

Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944 (11 Cir. 2001) (“[P]risoners cannot make a

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conclusory allegation regarding the use of [false] information as the basis of

a due process claim.”).

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The record in this case establishes that the defendants did not rely on

admittedly false information in their decision to deny Carey parole.

Consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief as a matter of law and entry

of summary judgment in favor of the defendants is appropriate.

E. Ex Post Facto Application of Consideration Guidelines

Carey contendsthe parole board’srevised rule requiring that an initial

parole consideration date be set upon completion of 85% of a prisoner’stotal

sentence or fifteen (15) years, whichever comes first, is violative of his

constitutional rights. Carey also maintains the defendants violated his

constitutional rights when they retroactively applied applicable

administrative rules, which altered the frequency of parole consideration

dates from every three years to every five years, in setting his 2007 parole

consideration date.

1. The Initial Consideration Date. Carey assertsthat, at the time the

trial court imposed sentence upon him, the rules of the Alabama Board of

Pardons and Paroles entitled him to parole consideration after serving ten

years (10) or one-third of his sentence, whichever is lesser. The

administrative regulation at issue, which the parole board revised in 2001

and amended in 2004, extends the date of an initial parole consideration for

individuals such as Carey who have been convicted of a Class A felony to

completion of 85% of the prisoner’s sentence or fifteen years (15) years

imprisonment, whichever is lesser. Respondents’ Exhibit C to the August 4,

2008 Response to Discovery Request - Court Doc. No. 52-3 at 4-5 --

Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles Rules, Regulations and Procedures,

Article I, § 7. Carey advises his “first parole hearing was January 1, 1999.”

Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition - Court Doc. No. 63 at 10. This initial

parole consideration hearing was held within the time required by the rules

and regulations in effect at the time of Carey’s murder conviction. Thus, the

revised rule did not affect the scheduling of Carey’s initial parole

consideration. In light of the foregoing, Carey lacks standing to challenge

any amendment to the parole board’s administrative regulations concerning

the scheduling of hisinitial parole consideration date and summary judgment

is due to be granted in favor of the defendants with respect to this claim.

2. The Frequency of Reconsideration. Carey complainsthatset-off

of his parole consideration date for a potential of five years upon retroactive

application of amended administrative regulations is unconstitutional

because prior regulations allowed parole consideration at more frequent

intervals. This allegation implicates the protections guaranteed by the Ex

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Post Facto Clause and the court therefore construes the claim as one arising

under this provision of the Constitution.

The Ex Post Facto Clause bars “enactments which, by retroactive

operation, increase the punishmentfor a crime afterits commission.” Garner

v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000). An amended law or regulation must

create a significant risk of increasing the punishment imposed upon an

inmate in order for the amendment to run afoul of this constitutional

provision. Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. Decisions with respect to whether a

parole regulation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to inmates

entitled to more frequent parole consideration at the time they committed

their crimes must be made on a case-by-case basis. Harris v. Hammonds,

217 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11 Cir. 2000). In making these decisions, a court is

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required to consider evidence of the general operation of the parole system

and any other evidence produced by a prisoner in support of his assertion that

the regulation “‘as applied to his sentence,’ created a significant risk of

increasing his punishment.” Harris, 217 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Garner v.

Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000)); Jones

v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946 -947 (11 Cir. 2001).

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In Garner, the Court addressed whether an amended rule increasing

parole consideration hearings from every three years to every eight years in

Georgia violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court determined that

extending the time for a scheduled parole consideration hearing did not

prevent the exercise of discretion by the Georgia Board of Pardons and

Paroles during the period between parole reviews, because the agency’s

policies permit the Board, in its discretion, to schedule expedited reviews in

the event of a change in circumstances or new information. Garner, 529

U.S. at 256.

A determination of whether retroactive application of a particular

change in a law or regulation governing parole respects the prohibition of ex

post facto legislation is often a question of particular difficulty when the

discretion vested in the parole board is taken into account. Id. at 249. In

deciding whether a parole regulation prevents a parole board’s exercise of

discretion, the court mayconsiderthe implementing regulations, the statutory

structure and the board’srepresentationsregarding its operations. Id. at 254.

“The idea of discretion is that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to

change and adapt based on experience.” Id. at 253.

Alabama law gives the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles broad

discretion in determining whether an inmate should be granted parole, see §

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15-22-26, Ala.Code 1975, “and when and under what conditions” parole will

be granted, § 15-22-24(a), Ala. Code. Applicable state law also requiresthat

the parole board consider the public interest in every case. Ala. Code § 15-

22-26. This unconditional discretion, however, does not displace the

protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. The

proper inquiry in cases challenging retroactive application of new parole

policies orstatutesis whether the retroactive change creates “a sufficient risk

of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The rules and regulations governing the frequency of parole

consideration dates are found in the operating procedures for the Alabama

Board of Pardons and Paroles. In 2001, the parole board adopted the rules

and regulations applicable to the claims presented in this case. The board

amended these rules and regulations in 2004. Article 6, § 11, Rules,

Regulations and Procedures of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, vests the

Board with discretion to determine whether to set the case for

reconsideration and, if reconsideration is allowed, “when the case shall next

be docketed for consideration, not to exceed five (5) years.” Parole

Defendants’ Exhibit C to the August 4, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 52-3

at 11. [The initial operating procedure governing the scheduling of parole

consideration dates, Ala. Adm. Code § 640-X-2.02(8)(1982, revised 1986),

provided that upon denial of parole to an inmate “the Board will determine

when [the inmate’s] case is to be reset but in no event shall it be reset for

more than three years from the date of denial.” Parole Defendants’ Exhibit

A to the August 4, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 52-1 at 7. The increase

in the reset date from no “more than three years” from denial of parole to the

current five-year maximum originally occurred in adoption of the 2001 rules

and regulations at Article 6, § 11. Parole Defendants’ Exhibit B to the

August 4, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 52-2 at 8. The parole board

retained the five-year set off in its 2004 amendments. Parole Defendants’

Exhibit C to the August 4, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 52-3 at 11.]

Article 2, § 7, provides that, if the Board “scheduled the next consideration

three years or more after denial [of parole] ...., the [Review] Committee may

consider earlier scheduling, but such review shall not begin earlier than

eighteen months after the Board has denied or revoked parole.” Id. at 6.

[The 2001 amendment to the regulation in Article 2, § 8 allowed the “earlier

scheduling” of parole consideration twenty-fourmonths,ratherthan eighteen

months, after the denial of parole. Parole Defendants’ Exhibit B to the

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August 4, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 52-2 at 5.] The opportunity for

an expedited parole review islikewise available to qualified inmates. Article

2, § 1, provides that “[s]uch a rescheduling may be granted only for good

cause shown and circumstances bearing on [the inmate’s] probability to

succeed on parole, not merely because the prisoner is following the rules in

prison.” Id. Thus, the rule changes are designed to facilitate better exercise

of the Board’s discretion. Garner, 529 U.S. at 254-255.

It is clear that the law changing the frequency of parole consideration

datesfrom three yearsto five years does not extend the term of imprisonment

imposed upon Carey nor increase the level of risk that he will serve a longer

term of imprisonment. Specifically, prior to this change, the parole board

never guaranteed Carey that he would be unconditionally released before

completion of his thirty-year sentence. Additionally, eighteen months after

a denial of parole Carey has the opportunity under the current regulation to

submit information about changed circumstances bearing on his suitability

for parole and could be scheduled for consideration at an earlier date.

Hence, even if risk of an increased term of incarceration develops in Carey’s

case, he may, upon a showing of “good cause ... and circumstances bearing

on his probability to succeed on parole,” seek an earlier review before the 5-

year interval expires. Article 2, § 1, Rules, Regulations and Procedures of

the Board of Pardons and Paroles; Parole Defendants’ Exhibit C to the

August 4, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 52-3 at 6.

Carey has presented no evidence and the court is unaware of any

evidence which demonstratesthat the regulations at issue create a significant

risk of increased punishment for Carey. Moreover, Carey possesses the

ability to petition the parole board for an earlier parole consideration date.

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the change about which

Carey complains did not lengthen his actual term of imprisonment. Thus,

Carey’s challenge to the potential increase in time between parole

consideration dates does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and

provides no basis for relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Garner, 529

U.S. at 253-256; Olstad v. Collier, 326 Fed.Appx. 261 (5 Cir. 2009)

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(retroactive imposition by parole board of changes in Texas parole policy

allowing a potential five year set-off until prisoner’s “next parole review

presents no ex post facto violation because its effect on increasing

[plaintiff’s] punishment is merely conjectural.... The Board is vested with

discretion as to how often to set [plaintiff’s] date for reconsideration, with

five years for the maximum; the Board is also permitted to adjust subsequent

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review dates and conduct a special review if [plaintiff’s] status changes.”);

Creel v. Kyle, 42 F.3d 955, 957 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1070, 115

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S.Ct. 1706 (1995) (change in rules that lengthen period of time between

parole reconsideration hearings applied retroactively by parole board not

violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause). The defendants are therefore entitled

to summary judgment on this claim.

F. Conspiracy

Carey alleges defendants Riley, King and Shehane engaged in a

conspiracy with defendants Wynn, Weatherly and Longshore which resulted

in the denial of parole. “Conspiring to violate another person’s constitutional

rights violates section 1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct.

at186 (1980); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11 Cir.1988),

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overruled in part on other grounds by Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584

n.4 (11 Cir.1996).” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283

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(11 2002). “To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff ‘mustshow

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that the parties “reached an understanding” to deny the plaintiff his or her

rights[and] prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.’ Bendiburg

v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11 Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932,

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111 S.Ct. 2053, 114 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991).... [T]he linchpin for conspiracy is

agreement....” Bailey v. Board of County Comm’rs of Alachua County, 956

F.2d 1112, 1122 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121

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L.Ed.2d 58 (1992). In order for a plaintiff “to establish the ‘understanding’

or ‘willful participation’ required to show a conspiracy, ... [he] must

[produce] some evidence of agreement between the defendants.... For a

conspiracy claim to survive a motion for summary judgment ‘[a] mere

“scintilla” of evidence ... will notsuffice; there must be enough of a showing

that the jury could reasonably find for that party.’ Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d

1573, 1577 (11 Cir. 1990).” Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283-1284. Merely

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“stringing together” adverse acts of individualsisinsufficient to demonstrate

the existence of a conspiracy. Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133.

The parole defendants deny they conspired with any other party to

violate Carey’s constitutional rights and, instead, argue they acted

appropriately at all stages of the parole consideration process. Defendants

Riley, King and Shehane likewise deny acting in concert with members of

the parole board or each other to deny Carey his constitutional rights. The

court has carefully reviewed the pleadings filed by the plaintiff. There is a

total lack of evidence to support Carey’s suppositious theory that the

defendants engaged in various conspiratorial acts against him. Specifically,

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Carey has failed to present any evidence which demonstrates that the

defendants “reached an understanding” to violate his rights or committed an

“actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.” Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122;

Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 468. At best, Carey’s assertions are self-serving,

purely conclusory allegations which fail to assert those material facts

necessary to sufficiently plead a conspiracybetween the defendants. Harvey,

949 F.2d 1133; Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-557. Thus, Carey has failed to

produce any probative evidence of a conspiracy and the motionsforsummary

judgment filed by the defendants are due to be granted regarding this claim.

Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122.

Recommendation - Doc. No. 104 at 7-28 (footnotes omitted), adopted as opinion of the

court February 24, 2011 (Doc. No. 108), affirmed on appeal (Doc. No. 116).

Carey appealed the findings of this court. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held, in

pertinent part, as follows:

i. Due Process - the 2007 Hearing and Denial of Parole

Carey contended that defendants Wynn, Weatherly, and Longshore deprived

him of “fair consideration” for parole in violation of his due process rights because

the decision to deny parole [arose] from their arbitrary and capricious actions.

Specifically, Carey complained that these defendants denied him due process when

they: (1) failed to act in accordance with laws and regulations applicable to

determining an inmate’s suitability for release on parole, setting off parole

consideration dates, and scheduling of parole hearings, (2) set-off his parole

consideration date based on a regulation enacted after entry of his [murder]

conviction, (3) considered adverse information provided by the victim’s family

without verifying the information, (4) did not allow him to attend the [parole]

hearing, (5) denied his family the opportunity to explain the facts surrounding the

murder, and (6) utilized statutes and regulations enacted after his date of conviction

in the parole consideration process.

Establishment of a parole system does not automatically create a

liberty interest in parole; “[o]nly when a state maintains a parole system that

creates a legitimate expectation of parole does it [also] establish a liberty

interest in parole that is subject to the protections of the Due Process

Clause.” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946 (11 Cir. 2001). In Thomas v.

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Sellers, we held that the Alabama parole statutes do not create a liberty

interest that is protected by due process. 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11 Cir. 1982).

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We also have rejected the argument that the regulation governing parole setoff dates creates a protected liberty interest in the procedures related to

parole consideration. Slocum v. Ga. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 678

F.2d 940, 941-42 (11 Cir. 1982). We reasoned that, “[u]nless there is a

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liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making the parole

determination are not required to comport with standards of fundamental

fairness.” Id. at 942. Furthermore, although a state may create liberty

interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause, these interests

generally will be limited to freedom fromrestraint that imposes “atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Nevertheless,

even if there is no liberty interest involved, a parole board may not engage

in “flagrant or unauthorized action.” Thomas, 691 F.2d at 489.

Here, Carey concedes that he has no protected liberty interest in

parole, but contends that the parole board’s regulation governing parole setoff dates creates a protected liberty interest in the procedures related to

parole. This argument is foreclosed by the holding of Slocum, described

above. See Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941-42. Moreover, the parole board

members’ assertion that they were not persuaded that Carey presented an

acceptable risk for release on parole after conducting the 2007 parole hearing

issupported by the record, and Carey hasfailed to show that the parole board

members’ actions were unreasonable, inappropriate, arbitrary, or capricious.

Thus, Carey’s claims arising from an alleged lack of due process with respect

to the parole consideration process and resulting denial of parole entitled him

to no relief.

ii. Equal Protection

Carey is an African-American inmate who was convicted of murder.

He asserted that the defendants violated his right to equal protection by

denying him parole when other inmates convicted of murder or more serious

crimes have been granted parole, and argued that white inmates are more

likely to make parole than black inmates.

“To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate

that (1) he issimilarly situated to other prisoners who receive more favorable

treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him

based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally

protected basis.” Sweet v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19

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Case 2:10-cv-00772-MEF-TFM Document 62 Filed 06/19/13 Page 17 of 27
(11 Cir. 2006). When a plaintiff challenges the actions of parole officials,

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he is required to present “exceptionally clear proof of discrimination”

because the “decision to grant or deny parole is based on many factors such

as criminal history, nature of the offense, disciplinary record, employment

and educational history, etc.” Fuller v. Ga. State Bd. of Pardons and

Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11 Cir. 1988). “The mere existence of a

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scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient;

there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Here, the defendants denied that they undertook any action in Carey’s

parole consideration process based on race or any other constitutionally

impermissible reason. Instead, they maintained that the denial of Carey’s

parole was solely based on their determination that he was not suitable for

release on parole. Despite Carey’s conclusory allegations, he did not present

any evidence whatsoever that similarly situated prisoners of a different race

were granted parole. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not err in

granting summary judgment on Carey’s equal protection claims.

* * *

iv. False Information in Violation of Due Process

Carey argued that the defendants deprived him of due process when

they relied on false information, specifically that he has violent behavioral

problems, to deny him parole. The defendants denied that they knowingly

relied on any false information.

Knowing reliance on admittedly false information to deny a prisoner

consideration for parole constitutes arbitrary and capricious treatment in

violation of the constitution. Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1442 (11

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Cir. 1991). However, a prisoner does notstate a due process claim by merely

asserting that erroneous information may have been used during his parole

consideration. Id. (affirming Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941).

Here, the defendant parole board members did not admit that

information contained in Carey’s file is false, nor did they admit to relying

on any false information. See Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1442. Carey’s conclusory

assertion that the decision to deny him parole was based on false information

is insufficient to state a due process claim, and furthermore, he did not

produce any evidence indicating that the defendants knowingly used false

information during the parole determination process. See Slocum, 678 F.2d

at 941. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary

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judgment on the instant due process claim.

v. Ex Post Facto Application of Parole Consideration Guidelines

a. The Initial Consideration Date

Carey argued that, at the time the trial court imposed the sentence, the

rules of the [Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles] entitled him to parole

consideration after serving the lesser of either ten years or one-third of his

sentence. The administrative regulation, which was revised in 2001 and

amended in 2004, extended the date of an initial parole consideration for

individuals who have been convicted of a Class A felony, including murder,

to the completion of the lesser of 85 percent of the prisoner’s sentence or 15

years’ imprisonment.

Carey contended that his first parole hearing was held on January 1,

1999. This hearing was within the ten-year time period required by the rules

and regulations in effect at the time of his murder conviction. Thus, the

subsequently revised rules did not affect the scheduling of his initial parole

consideration. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting

summary judgment to the defendants on this claim.

b. The Frequency of Parole Consideration

Careymaintained that the defendants violated his constitutionalrights

when they scheduled his 2007 parole consideration date based on the

retroactive application of the administrative rules that altered the frequency

of parole consideration dates from every three years to every five years.

The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the enactment of laws “which, by

retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its

commission.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1367,

146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000). In deciding whether a change in a parole regulation

violates this precept, the court must consider evidence of the general

operation of the parole system, including the discretion vested in the parole

board, the statutorystructure, the parole board’srepresentationsregarding its

operations, and any other evidence produced by a prisoner in support of his

assertion that the regulation, “‘as applied to his sentence,’ created a

significantrisk ofincreasing his punishment.” See Harris v. Hammonds, 217

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11 Cir. 2000) (quoting Garner, 529 U.S. at 255, 120 S.Ct.

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1370). “The idea of discretion isthat [the parole board] hasthe capacity, and

the obligation, to change and adapt based on experience.” Garner, 529 U.S.

at 253, 120 S.Ct. at 1369.

Here, the initial operating procedure governing the scheduling of

parole consideration dates provided that upon denial of parole, “the Board

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will determine when [the inmate’s] case is to be reset but in no event shall

it be reset for more than three years from the date of denial.” Ala. Adm.

Code § 640-X-2-.02(8) (1982, revised 1986). Article 6, § 11 of the Rules,

Regulations and Procedures of the Board of Pardons and Paroles

(“Regulations”) increased the reset date from a maximum of three yearsfrom

denial of parole to the current five-year maximum, and the parole board

retained the five-year set-off in its 2004 amendments.

Despite these amendments, Alabama law gives the [Alabama Board

of Pardons and Paroles] broad discretion to determine whether an inmate

should be granted parole, and “when and under what conditions” parole

should be granted. Ala. Code §§ 15-22-24(a), 15-22-26. The parole board

is required to consider the public interest in every case. Id. § 15-22-26.

Article 2, § 7 of the Regulations provides that, if the [Alabama Board of

Pardons and Paroles] “scheduled the next consideration three years or more

after the denial [of parole] . . ., the [Review] Committee may consider earlier

scheduling, butsuch review shall not begin earlierthan eighteen months after

the Board has denied or revoked parole.” Moreover, Article 2, § 1, provides

that “[s]uch a rescheduling may be granted only for good cause shown and

circumstances bearing on [the inmate’s] probability to succeed on parole, not

merely because the prisoner is following the rules in prison.” Id. Thus, the

rule changes were designed to facilitate better exercise of the [Board’s]

discretion. See Garner, 529 U.S. at 254-55, 120 S.Ct. at 1369-70.

In Carey’s case, the [Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles] never

guaranteed that he would be unconditionally released prior to the completion

of his 30-year sentence. Furthermore, under the current regulations, 18

months after the denial of parole, Carey has the opportunity to submit

information about changed circumstances bearing on his suitability for

parole, and could be scheduled for consideration at an earlier date. See Art.

2, § 7, Regulations. Thus, even if a risk of an increased incarceration term

developed in Carey’s case, upon a showing of good cause, he could seek

review of the denial of parole prior to the expiration of the five-year interval.

See Art. 2, § 1, Regulations.

Accordingly, because Carey failed to show that the potential increase

in time between his parole consideration dates lengthened his actual term of

imprisonment, this change in the regulations did not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, and the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment on the ex post facto claim. See Garner, 529 U.S. at 255, 120 S.Ct.

at 1370.

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vi. Conspiracy Claims

Carey alleged that defendants Riley, King, and Shehane engaged in a

conspiracy with defendants Wynn, Weatherly, and Longshore, that resulted

in the denial of parole.

“Conspiring to violate another person’s constitutional rights violates

section 1983.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11

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Cir. 2002). To establish a prima facie case of [a] section 1983 conspiracy,

a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendants “reached an

understanding to violate [his] rights.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The plaintiff

does not have to produce a smoking gun to establish the understanding or

willful participation required to show a conspiracy, but must show some

evidence of agreement between the defendants.” Id. at 1283-84 (quotations

omitted).

Here, Carey’s conclusory allegations that the defendants conspired to

deny him parole are insufficient to establish a § 1983 conspiracy. See id. at

1283. Carey’s submissions fail to show any evidence ... that the defendants

reached an understanding to violate his rights, and thus, the district court did

not err in granting summary judgment on this claim. See id. at 1283-84.

* * *

In sum, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Carey’s

§ 1983 complaint. We now find that the appeal is frivolous, DENY leave to

proceed, and DISMISS the appeal.

Carey v. Wynn, et al., supra - Doc. No. 116 at 8-16. The appellate court also subsequently

denied a motion for reconsideration filed by Carey. Id. - Doc. No. 118.

B. Res Judicata

The respondents maintain that based on the judgment entered in Carey v. Wynn, et

al., supra, res judicata precludes Carey from obtaining relief on the federal habeas claims

which remain pending before this court, i.e., the conspiracy, equal protection, ex post facto

and due process challenges to the March 28, 2007 denial of parole.

The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue

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preclusion, which are collectively referred to as “res judicata.” Under the

doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive

litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim

raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532

U.S. 742, 748, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Issue preclusion,

in contrast, bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually

litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior

judgment,” even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Id., at

748-749, 121 S.Ct. 1808. By “preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters

that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” these two doctrines

protect against “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,

conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action by

minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008)

“Our res judicata analysis has always required a consideration of the facts and legal

theories of two causes of action as well as the rights and duties involved in each case.”

Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 377 Fed. Appx. 937, 940 (11 Cir. 2010) certiorari

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denied, 131 S.Ct. 342, 178 L.Ed. 2d 223, 79 USLW 3205 (Oct. 4, 2010) (citing Manning

v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11 Cir. 1992)). “We have consistently concluded

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that when the substance and facts of each action are the same, res judicata bars the second

suit.” Id. In I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541 (11 Cir. 1986),

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the Eleventh Circuit summarized the doctrine of res judicata observing that:

Res judicata ... refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment in foreclosing

relitigation of matters that were litigated or could have been litigated in an

earlier suit.... In order for the doctrine of res judicata to bar a subsequent

suit, four elements must be present: (1) there must be a final judgment on the

merits; (2) the decision must be rendered by a court of competent

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jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, must be identical

in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action must be involved in both

cases.

I.A. Durbin, 793 F.2d at 1549 (citations omitted). It is clear to this court that each requisite

element is met in this case.

1. Final Judgment and Court of Competent Jurisdiction. There is no dispute that

this court acted as a court of competent jurisdiction in Carey v. Wynn, et al., supra. In

addition, this court’s determination of the issues and claims raised in the prior civil rights

action constituted a judgment on the merits. Mars Hill Baptist Church of Anniston, Ala.,

Inc. v. Mars Hill Missionary Baptist Church, 761 So.2d 975 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis in

original) (“A judgment is on the merits when it amounts to a decision as to the respective

rights and liabilities of the parties, based on the ultimate fact or state of the parties

disclosed by the pleadings or evidence, or both, and on which the right of recovery

depends, irrespective of formal, technical, or dilatory objections or contentions. Key

factors in determining whether a judgment may be considered as on the merits are that

there have been notice and an opportunity to be heard.... It is not necessary, however, that

there should have been a trial. If the judgment is general, and not based on any technical

defect or objection, and the parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on their

respective claims and contentions, it is on the merits, although there was no actual

hearing on the facts of the case.”); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Am. Res. Ins. Co., Inc.,

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5 So.3d 521, 533 (Ala. 2008) (same).

 2. Identical Parties. Parties are “identical” for purposes of res judicata when they

are the same or in privity with one another. N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11

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Cir. 1990). In Thompson v. SouthTrust Bank, 961 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007),

the court, while noting that in Alabama the term “privity” had not been uniformly defined

with respect to res judicata, observed that it was often deemed to arise from

“(1) the relationship of one who is privy in blood, estate, or law; (2) the

mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property; [or] (3) an

identity of interest in the subject matter of litigation.” Thus, the existence of

privity has generally been resolved “on an ad hoc basis in which the

circumstances determine whether a person should be bound by or entitled to

the benefits of a judgment.” Hughes v. Martin, 533 So.2d 188, 191

(Ala.1988).

Carey, the party seeking relief, is identical in both civil actions. In the style of the

habeas action, Carey lists the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and Miriam Shehane

as respondents. In the body of the petition, he presents claims against Robert Longshore

and Velinda Weatherly, members of the parole board, former Governor Bob Riley, former

Attorney General Troy King and victim’s advocate Miriam Shehane. Thus, the

aforementioned individuals appear in both the previous state court case and this case. In

accordance with habeas corpus procedural requirements, Carey adds Robert Danford, his

custodian at the time of filing the habeas petition, as a respondent. The habeas petition

also omits mention of parole board member Bill Wynn and, instead, references parole

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board member Sydney Williams as an adverse party.

It is clear that Sydney Williams is in privy by law with the parole board members

named in the prior civil action and that Robert Danford isin privy with the state defendants

against whom Carey previously sought relief. Williams and Danford likewise had an

identity of interest in the prior litigation. Consequently, Williams and Danford are in

privity with the individuals named as defendants in the prior 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action such

that they may take advantage of this court’s previous adjudication of Carey’s claims for

relief.

3. The Same Cause of Action. In Manning, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the

law regarding when a cause of action is the same for purposes of res judicata as follows:

In this circuit, the determination of whether the causes of action in two

proceedings are the same is governed by whether the primary right and duty

are the same. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Kemp v. Birmingham News

Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5 Cir. 1979)); I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l

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Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11 Cir. 1986). The test is one of substance, not

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form. I.A. Durbin, 793 F.2d at 1549. Res judicata applies “not only to the

precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal

theories and claims arising out of the same ‘operative nucleus of fact.’”

Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1561 (despite variations in legal theories used and

remedies sought, second suit barred because wrongful act in both cases was

flying Confederate flag atop state capitol) (quoting Olmstead v. Amoco Oil

Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632 (11 Cir. 1984)); Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461,

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1468 (11 Cir. 1988) (second suit barred because “[b]oth cases raised first

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amendment (free exercise and establishment clause) challenges to use of

textbooks and teachings on various subjects”); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point,

701 F.2d 556, 560 (5 Cir. 1983) (section 1983 action against city that

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refused to hire plaintiff asfirefighter due to hersex precluded by earlier Title

VII action on same facts).

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953 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11 Cir. 1992).

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The conspiracy, equal protection, ex post facto and due process claimsraised herein

are identical to the claimsraised in Carey’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. In addition, the issues

necessary to the disposition of each case are indistinguishable. “Res judicata bars the

filing of claims which were raised [and addressed] in an earlier proceeding.” Driessen v.

Fla., 401 Fed. Appx. 435 (11 Cir. 2010) quoting Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d

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1235, 1238 (11 Cir. 1999). Based on the decision of this court in Carey v. Wynn, supra,

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finding no violation ofCarey’s constitutionalrights during the parole consideration process

which resulted in the March 28, 2007 denial of parole, the court concludesthat the pending

claimsfor federal habeasrelief entitle Carey to no relief asthese claims are precluded from

review by the doctrine of res judicata.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpusrelief filed by AnthonyL. Carey

be DENIED.

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before July 5, 2013 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

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Case 2:10-cv-00772-MEF-TFM Document 62 Filed 06/19/13 Page 26 of 27
Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties

are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it

is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667

F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.

1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 19 day of June, 2013.

th

/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Case 2:10-cv-00772-MEF-TFM Document 62 Filed 06/19/13 Page 27 of 27