Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00761/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00761-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CUSTIS LYNN COLLIER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0761 LKK DAD P

vs.

JAMES TILTON,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a renewed motion for a stay

and abeyance in accordance with this court’s September 18, 2007 order. On November 1, 2007, 1

respondent filed timely opposition to petitioner’s motion. On November 20, 2007, petitioner

filed a timely reply.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered in the Yuba County

Superior Court on June 24, 2002. (Pet. at 1.) Petitioner was charged with manufacturing

methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, maintaining a place to manufacture

methamphetamine, and possession of ephedrine. (Id.) Petitioner pled not guilty, and after a jury

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trial, was found guilty and sentenced to eighteen years in state prison. (Id.) The California Court

of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction on March 2, 2005. (Id. at 2.) The California Supreme

Court denied his petition for review on September 28, 2005. (Id.) 

In his second amended petition, petitioner alleges that the evidence introduced at

his state court criminal trial was legally insufficient to establish that he possessed

methamphetamine for sale, possessed ephedrine, and maintained a place to manufacture

methamphetamine. (Pet. at 5.) In addition, petitioner alleges that he had ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. Specifically, petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he

failed to: (1) conduct a pretrial investigation to discover information to support a motion to

compel the prosecution to disclose the identity of confidential informants; (2) investigate and

bring a motion to dismiss petitioner’s 1990 burglary conviction because it did not qualify as a

“serious felony” for purposes of the three strikes law; (3) investigate and bring a motion for

severance; (4) investigate, interview, and call a potential defense witness who could testify that

he did not live at the Langley residence and was only there to fix his truck; (5) consult with an

expert locksmith witness who could likely testify that the locks on the shed storing drug

equipment could not be easily opened without a key and that none of petitioner’s keys could open

any of the locks on the sheds; (6) investigate and bring a motion for independent testing of

petitioner’s clothes to show no trace evidence of drugs; (7) use the transcripts from the

preliminary hearings to impeach prosecution witnesses; (8) investigate and bring a motion to

exclude petitioner’s letters, found inside the Langley residence, on proper legal grounds (such as

the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of the letters); (9) investigate and bring a

motion to dismiss the drug quantity enhancement; (10) investigate and bring a Pitchess motion;

(11) investigate and bring a motion to exclude petitioner’s prior bad acts; (12) investigate and

bring a motion to introduce co-defendant Langley’s prior drug conviction of manufacturing

methamphetamine; (13) investigate and bring a motion to exclude petitioner’s demeanor

evidence; (14) object on proper legal grounds to jury instructions improperly given and/or

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omitted; (15) object when the prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of its own

expert witness; and (16) consult with a finger-print expert to testify as a defense witness

regarding the unique possibility of petitioner’s fingerprints not being found on any piece of the

drug equipment found throughout Langley’s residence. (Pet. at 15-37.)

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A STAY AND ABEYANCE

Petitioner requests that the court hold his petition for writ of habeas corpus in

abeyance to afford him an opportunity to exhaust his unexhausted claims for relief in state court. 

(Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 1.) Petitioner contends that he has good cause for failing to

exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claims prior to filing his original petition. (Id. at 3.) 

Specifically, he contends that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in violation

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) Petitioner notes that, if a

prisoner defaults on a claim as a result of denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the

state must bear the cost of the resulting default. (Id. at 3-4.) Here, petitioner contends that the

court appointed his appellate counsel who failed to raise and investigate his ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claims. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner contends that, with the help of a jailhouse lawyer, he

researched the court records and the law to prepare and file these additional claims. Accordingly,

petitioner concludes that he has good cause for failing to exhaust his state remedies. 

Petitioner also contends that his claims are potentially meritorious. (Pet’r’s Mot.

for Stay & Abey. at 4.) Petitioner argues that the court should assume the factual allegations of

his claims are true. To succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must

demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that it was unreasonable

given prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,

meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact-finder would have

had reasonable doubt with respect to petitioner’s guilt. (Id. at 4-5.) Referring to the claims and

allegations in his petition, petitioner maintains that his denial of effective assistance of counsel

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prejudiced his defense. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, petitioner concludes that his unexhausted claims

are potentially meritorious. 

Next, petitioner contends that he has already started the process of exhausting his

state remedies. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 5.) Specifically, he notes that he has already

presented the claims in his petition filed in the Yuba County Superior Court. (Id.) In addition,

petitioner notes that if the trial court denies his state habeas petition, he will present his next

habeas petition to the California Supreme Court without seeking review of his claims by the

California Court of Appeal. (Id.) 

Finally, petitioner emphasizes that he has acted with due diligence since his final

date of conviction on December 28, 2005. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 6.) He alleges that

he has not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. (Id.) Petitioner notes, for

example, that he filed a state habeas petition on October 20, 2006. (Id.) That petition was denied

without prejudice to petitioner filing a renewed petition. (Id.) Petitioner notes that he filed the

renewed petition on September 11, 2007, and the petition is still pending. (Id.) Petitioner argues

that due diligence depends on whether he has made a reasonable attempt to investigate and

pursue claims in state court; it does not depend on whether he is successful. (Id.) Petitioner

concludes that he has acted with due diligence in exhausting his state remedies, and therefore the

court should grant his motion for a stay and abeyance.

RESPONDENT’S OPPOSITION

Respondent contends that petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause for the

granting of a stay. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 1.) In particular,

respondent argues that petitioner’s assertion that his appellate counsel on direct appeal was

ineffective for failing to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims fails to constitute

“good cause.” (Id. at 2.) 

First, respondent argues that the exercise of choosing and framing appellate issues

makes it “difficult to demonstrate that [appellate] counsel was incompetent” for omitting

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arguments. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 3 (quoting Smith v. Robbins,

528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000).) Of course, appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise

every non-frivolous issue “but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the

likelihood of success on appeal.” (Id.) 

Second, respondent argues that petitioner’s motion points to nothing in the

appellate record to indicate that appellate counsel should have explored multiple claims against

trial counsel. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 3.) Petitioner simply makes

the bare assertion that appellate counsel was ineffective and that he had to research the matter

himself. (Id.) Respondent contends that, given the state record, appellate counsel likely

determined that such claims were more appropriately raised on habeas review rather than on

direct appeal. (Id.) Indeed, California law generally prefers that ineffective assistance of counsel

claims be raised during habeas proceedings. (Id.) Respondent notes that petitioner cannot

complain that appellate counsel should have raised these claims on state habeas review. (Id.) 

Ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause only during those stages of the proceedings

where the state has a constitutional responsibility to ensure competent representation. (Id.) 

Respondent concludes that the court should deny petitioner’s motion. (Resp’t’s

Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 3-4.)

PETITIONER’S REPLY

In reply, petitioner argues that he has good cause for filing a “protective petition”

in this court and for asking this court for a stay and abeyance of federal proceedings until state

remedies are exhausted. (Pet’r’s Reply at 1.) Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court has stated

that a petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will

ordinarily constitute “good cause” to file in federal court. (Id.) Petitioner contends that he was

reasonably confused about whether his state filings would be timely and that is why he filed a

protective petition in this court. (Id. at 2.) In addition, petitioner reiterates that appellate 

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counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal

constitutes “good cause” to excuse his failure to exhaust. (Id.)

Petitioner emphasizes that he continues to exhaust his state remedies in a timely

manner. On October 15, 2007, the Yuba County Superior Court denied his petition. (Pet’r’s

Reply at 3.) Petitioner notes that he recently made the necessary copies of his state habeas

petition and exhibits to present to the California Supreme Court the week of November 19, 2007. 

(Id.) Petitioner explains that he experienced a delay in presenting his state habeas petition to the

California Supreme Court because black and white inmates at the prison where he is being held

were confined to their cells. (Id.) In addition, petitioner notes that the prison law library was

closed for various reasons.

Petitioner concludes that the court should grant his motion for a stay and abeyance

until he has finished exhausting his state court remedies. (Pet’r’s Reply at 3.)

ANALYSIS 

The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the district court’s discretion to

stay a federal habeas proceeding to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims to the state

court where there is good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust all claims in state court

before filing a federal habeas petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005); see also

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (authorizing district courts to stay fully

exhausted federal petitions pending exhaustion of other claims); Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court cautioned, however, that “stay

and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances,” and “district courts should

place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Id. at 277-78. The

Court noted that district courts should not grant a stay if the petitioner has engaged in abusive

litigation tactics or intentional delay or if the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. Id. at

278.

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Petitioner cannot present any new claims to this court until those claims have been

fairly presented to the California Supreme Court. It does not appear that the pro se petitioner

seeks to stay these proceedings for an improper purpose. Nor does it appear that petitioner has

engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. Moreover, if petitioner obtains relief in

state court, his federal petition may be rendered moot, thereby serving the interests of judicial

economy as well as the interests of justice. Finally, the undersigned at this time does not find

petitioner’s claims to be plainly meritless. The undersigned will therefore recommend that this

action be stayed while petitioner exhausts his unexhausted claims.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s October 25, 2007 motion for a stay and abeyance be granted;

2. Petitioner be ordered to present all unexhausted claims to the California

Supreme Court in a further state habeas corpus petition to be filed within thirty days from the

date of this order, if all unexhausted claims have not already been presented;

3. This action be stayed and the Clerk of the Court be directed to administratively

close the case;

4. Petitioner be ordered to file and serve a status report in this case on the first

court day of each month; and

5. Petitioner be ordered to file and serve a motion to lift the stay of this action,

along with a proposed second amended petition containing only exhausted claims, within thirty

days after petitioner is served with the California Supreme Court’s order disposing of the state

exhaustion petition.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 10, 2007.

DAD:9

coll0761.sty

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