Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01887/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01887-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1

 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

2

 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides that if an “unrepresented party or

counsel does not serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance

may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the

issue summarily.” LRCiv. 7.2(i).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victoria M. Kowacich; Bryan C.

Kowacich, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Home America Mortgage Corp., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-1887-PHX-JAT

ORDER

On December 14, 2009, this Court ordered Plaintiffs to respond to the pending motion

to dismiss by January 4, 2010 or this case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute and

failure to comply with a Court order;1

 and, alternatively, the Court would deem the failure

to respond to be consent to the motion being granted under the local rules2

 and dismiss on

that basis also. Doc. #23. January 4, 2010 has passed and Plaintiffs have not responded to

the motion. 

 “Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474

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(9th Cir. 1979)). “Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are

bound by the rules of procedure.” Id. at 54 (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987)). “Before dismissing the action, the district court is required to weigh several factors:

‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage

its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [party seeking dismissal]; (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.’” Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).

“The first two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the

fourth cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and

availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990).

The dismissal factors in this case are similar to those present in Ghazali. In that case,

the Ninth Circuit upheld summary dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for the failure to

follow a Nevada district court local rule. Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53. The Nevada rule, like

Local Rule 7.2(i), considered the failure to file a response to a motion to “constitute a consent

to the granting of the motion.” Id. (quoting D. Nev. R. 140-6). The Court reasoned that the

dismissal was proper because the pro se plaintiff was bound by the rules of procedure, and

was given notice of the motion and ample time to respond. Id. at 54 (citing King, 814 F.2d

at 567).

Similarly, Plaintiffs in this case have not responded despite receiving Defendant’s

motion to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge’s order ordering a response, and this Court’s order

ordering a response; the first of which was filed four months ago. Further, this Court’s order

specifically warned that the lack of a timely response would be deemed consent to the motion

being granted. While the public policy favoring resolution on the merits weighs against

dismissal, it is no more compelling here than it was in Ghazali. As noted in Wanderer, the

first two factors—expeditious resolution and docket management—generally favor dismissal.

Wanderer, 910 F.2d at 656. They weigh especially heavily here because of Plaintiffs’ total

failure to respond a dispositive motion. The third and fifth factors that Wanderer

emphasized—prejudice and availability of other sanctions—are virtually identical to those

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3 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides, inter alia, that “a party may amend

his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served . . . .” We have stated that “‘[a]

motion to dismiss is not a “responsive pleading” within the

meaning of the Rule. Neither the filing nor granting of such a

motion before answer terminates the right to amend; an order of

dismissal denying leave to amend at that state is improper . . . .’”

Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607 (quoting Breier v. Northern California

Bowling Proprietors’ Association, 316 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir.

1963)). If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim,

leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines

that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency. Bonanno v.

Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1962).

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

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present in Ghazali, because that case involved a pro se litigant in exactly the same procedural

position as Plaintiffs. Thus, under Ghazali, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case under the local rule

is justified.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the amended motion to dismiss (Doc. #16) is granted; the Clerk

of the Court shall enter judgment of dismissal, with prejudice, on February 1, 2010 unless

prior thereto Plaintiffs file an amended complaint.3

DATED this 12th day of January, 2010.

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