Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01597/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01597-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE TRUNK,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv1597-LAB (WMc)

(Consol. w/06cv1728-LAB (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING MOUNT

SOLEDAD MEMORIAL

ASSOCIATION’S MOTION TO

INTERVENE; AND

ORDER DENYING MOTION BY

SAN DIEGANS FOR THE MT.

SOLEDAD MEMORIAL TO

INTERVENE; AND

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO

PROCEED AS AMICI CURIAE

[DOCKET NOS. 314, 315, 316,

317.]

vs.

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CITY OF SAN DIEGO, UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA, ROBERT M. GATES,

Secretary of Defense and DOES 1

through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

________________________________

MOUNT SOLEDAD MEMORIAL

ASSOCIATION, 

Real Parties in Interest.

________________________________

JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,

RICHARD A. SMITH, MINA SAGHEB,

and JUDITH M. COPELAND,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LEON PANETTA, Secretary of Defense,

in his official capacity,

Defendant.

Two motions to intervene are pending before the Court: one brought by the Mount

Soledad Memorial Association (MSMA) (Docket no. 315); and a second brought by the

organization San Diegans for the Mt. Soledad National War Memorial (“San Diegans for the

Memorial”) (Docket no. 316). Originally two members of Congress, Reps. Brian Bilbray and

Duncan Hunter, filed a motion to intervene (Docket no. 314), but they then withdrew their 1

request to intervene and sought only leave to appear as amici curiae. (Docket no. 317.) 

The MSMA’s motion primarily seeks to clarify that it is already a Defendant, but in the

alternative seeks to intervene. The United States consents to the participation of all three as

amici, does not oppose the MSMA’s permissive intervention, but does oppose intervention

by San Diegans for the Memorial.

A separate group of thirty-three other U.S. Representatives were given leave to, and 1

did, file a brief as amici curiae, but Reps. Bilbray and Hunter were not part of this group.

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The Court held a hearing on the motions on October 19, 2012 and announced its

tentative rulings. This written order memorializes and supplements the Court’s findings and

orders at the hearing.

Legal Standards

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), a person may intervene who “claims an interest

relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that

disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to

protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” This is referred

to as intervention of right. The Court construes this provision liberally in favor of potential

intervenors, focusing on practical considerations rather than technical distinctions.

Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2001). A person

or entity seeking to intervene by right must meet four requirements:

(1) the applicant must timely move to intervene; (2) the applicant must have

a significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that

is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be situated such that the

disposition of the action may impair or impede the party's ability to protect

that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must not be adequately

represented by existing parties.

Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). The proposed intervenor bears

the burden of showing that all four requirements are met. United States v. Alisal Water Corp.,

370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004).

Rule 24(b)(1) provides for permissive intervention. A prospective intervenor under this

section must show: “(1) it shares a common question of law or fact with the main action; (2)

its motion is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for jurisdiction over the

applicant's claims.” Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 411 (9th Cir. 1998).

Discussion

The Court first notes that the motions to intervene were filed promptly after the

proposed intervenors learned that the MSMA’s standing was being questioned, and that the

government was pursuing or considering settlement options.

/ / /

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Timeliness is measured by reference to “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an

applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for the

length of the delay.” United States v. Carpenter, 298 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9 Cir. 2002) (quoting th

County of Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986)). There is a legal

presumption that the government’s representation in a matter of shared interest will be

adequate, see id., and initially both the MSMA and San Diegans for the Memorial assumed

this to be so. It was only later, after an appeal was filed, that both organizations began to

believe the government representation might not be adequate. Those reasons are discussed

below. Under circumstances such as these, a motion to intervene is timely even if filed later

in the litigation, provided the proposed intervenors file their motion in a timely manner once

on notice the government representation is inadequate. Id. at 1125–26. Here, the Court

concludes the motions were timely filed.

It also bears mentioning that neither the proposed intervenors nor the Court can

adopt a wait-and-see attitude. A later motion by either the MSMA or San Diegans for the

Memorial seeking leave to intervene would very likely be untimely.

The MSMA

The MSMA contends it was initially named as a Defendant, and points out that it filed

an answer to the First Amended Complaint. It asks the Court to clarify its status. Although

paragraph 9 of the First Amended Complaint did characterize the MSMA as a Defendant,

the caption of the complaint named the MSMA only as a “Real Party in Interest.” Then, when

the MSMA attempted to file briefing on appeal, Plaintiff sought to block their filing. The Ninth

Circuit rejected Plaintiff’s effort, and the MSMA ultimately participated as a party to the

appeal. These past conflicts leave the MSMA’s status in some doubt.

The MSMA is a secular organization formed in 1952, and was responsible for building

the memorial and making changes to how it now exists. It has assumed responsibility for

administering and maintaining the memorial, both while the property was owned by the City

of San Diego, and also under federal ownership. The MSMA is differently situated than San

Diegans for the Memorial because the statute creating the memorial recognizes the MSMA’s

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unique place and specifically provides a role for it to maintain the memorial. See Pub. L.

109-272, § 2(c) (“Upon acquisition of the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial by the United

States, the Secretary of Defense shall manage the property and shall enter into a

memorandum of understanding with the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association for the continued

maintenance of the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial by the Association.”) Although the

MSMA was named as a Real Party in Interest and has been involved in litigation, the Court

concludes it is not presently a Defendant. The only way it can be a party at this point is to

intervene.

Plaintiffs attempt to minimize the MSMA’s role, arguing “Congress did nothing more

than direct that the government contract with the MSMA for ‘maintenance.’” (Consolidated

Opp’n at 9:21–23.) At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued essentially the same thing, contending

that the MSMA was little more than a hired groundskeeper. At the hearing, Plaintiffs and the

MSMA also disputed what the MSMA’s role is in preserving the cross as part of the

memorial. 

The MSMA correctly points out that it has a unique role that was created, and is

recognized and protected by law. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was entered into

between the Department of the Navy and the MSMA.(MSMA’s Mot. to Intervene, Ex. E.) The

MOU directs the MSMA to invest money and effort in maintaining, repairing, and preserving

the memorial; gives the MSMA priority in using the memorial; and provides for the MSMA’s

continued installation of memorial plaques at the memorial. It also gives the MSMA other

options not available to the general public, such as proposing capital improvements. In

return, the government has agreed not to take any actions that would damage or disturb

existing plaques, not to make any improvements without consulting with MSMA, and to use

its best efforts to avoid any improvement projects that are inconsistent with improvement

plans the MSMA has submitted to the government and which the government has approved.

The memorial plaques the MSMA is authorized to install involve yet a different kind

of interest. While the MSMA does not retain a property interest in the plaques, it does have

a responsibility to the families of veterans who paid substantial sums of money to have them

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installed. Members of some of those families previously filed a brief as amici with this Court

(Docket no. 236), emphasizing that they memorialized their deceased relatives by plaques

and memorial services held at the memorial, and that the memorial serves as a monument

and place where families, friends, and comrades can remember and pay tribute to fallen war

veterans. These amici argued that the cross served as a symbol of their loved ones’ sacrifice

and death, and that removing it would cause them a great deal of grief and dishonor the

fallen service members. The MSMA’s interests are aligned with the interests of veterans’

families who are in this position. And the MSMA’s role, recognized in the MOU, as

administrator of the plaques, would be affected by a major change to the memorial’s

character.

The MOU, in short, provides for a division of rights and responsibilities, and gives the

MSMA interests different from those of the government and even potentially inconsistent.

The interests of the MSMA are not coterminous with those of the United States, and, the

Court finds, the United States cannot adequately represent the interests of its partner. The

MSMA’s interests are legally protected because they are embodied in the statute as well as

in the MOU.

At the outset of the current litigation, there was no reason to question that the United

States would vigorously defend the statute preserving the memorial. The MSMA contends

that a number of developments have drawn this assumption into question, however. First,

when the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court, the United States delayed filing a petition for

certiorari, seeking two extensions of time and citing as one of the reasons the need to

consider whether it would pursue certiorari at all. The United States also opposed the

MSMA’s participation as a party in the litigation in the Supreme Court, and otherwise

attempted to exclude the MSMA from fully participating in the certiorari process. In addition,

the proposed intervenors point to several recent examples of the current administration’s

refusal to defend duly enacted statutes or portions of statutes from constitutional challenge.

None of these developments directly shows that the United States will not vigorously defend

the statute and the MSMA’s interest, but together they demonstrate that the MSMA’s

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concerns have at least some basis. At the hearing, the government’s counsel represented

that, at present, the government intends to defend the statute vigorously, but he stated he

could not offer assurances that this would not change.

One development that triggered the intervention motions was a report that the United

States had or was preparing to engage in settlement discussions behind closed doors.

Groups dedicated to defending the memorial—including the proposed intervenors— were

said to be excluded from the discussions. The United States has sought to reassure these

groups that any talk of settlement is premature, and at the most recent hearing trial counsel

for the United States represented that he had not engaged in any settlement discussions. 

But while the United States has never said it is preparing to or considering abandoning the

defense of the statute in whole or in part, such a fear does not appear as baseless as the

United States suggests. Although the mere fact that the United States chooses to engage

in settlement discussion does not mean it will settle, it does signal that the United States is

considering settlement. If settlement were not being considered, there would be no reason

to waste time and resources discussing it.

As the Court noted in its order of July 29, 2008, the statute is aimed particularly at

maintaining the memorial site. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1209

(S.D.Cal., 2008). If for some reason maintaining the cross becomes infeasible (for example, 

if the cross became structurally unsound), the Court’s view is that the statute does not

require that it be replaced. Id. at 1209 and n.10. That being said, the statute emphasizes 2

the importance of the cross as part of an integrated memorial, see Pub. L. 109-272, § 1(3)

(“a memorial cross is fully integrated as the centerpiece of the multi-faceted Mt. Soledad

Veterans Memorial that is replete with secular symbols), and the unacceptability of removing

it by means of some undemocratic process, such as judicial fiat (or, presumably, backroom

settlement). See Pub. L. 109-272, § 1(6) (finding that “76 percent of the voters of San Diego

At the hearing, the MSMA expressed its view that the statute would require replacing

2

the cross in such a situation. Hypothetical questions concerning the future of the memorial

in the event it has to be refurbished are not before the Court. But this dispute illustrates the

MSMA’s viewpoint and interests may be different from the United States’.

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supported donating the Mt. Soledad Memorial to the Federal Government only to have a

superior court judge of the State of California invalidate that election”).3

Taking into consideration all of these factors, the Court finds that the MSMA has a

protectable interest which is not adequately represented by the United States. Because the

MSMA will be bound by the judgment and required to abide by whatever injunction the Court

may issue, continuing to litigate this action (or allowing it to be settled) without the MSMA’s

involvement as a party would impair the MSMA’s ability to protect its rights. If an injunction

is to be issued or a settlement reached, the MSMA would effectively be locked out and

unable to protect its rights unless it is granted party status.

The Court therefore holds that all four requirements for the MSMA’s intervention of

right are met here, and that such intervention is appropriate. In the alternative, even if

intervention of right were not appropriate, the Court finds that permissive intervention is

appropriate under Rule 24(b), and grants intervention to MSMA on that basis.

San Diegans for the Memorial

San Diegans for the Memorial is a group of citizens formed in 2005 for the purpose

of finding a constitutionally permissible way for the cross to remain part of the memorial.

Their briefing shows they are fervent and prepared to litigate the issues, and the fact that this

organization’s members live in San Diego and have advocated for it gives them a connection

to the memorial that is not shared by the general public.

While this group has an obvious interest in preserving the memorial, they have no

significantly protectable legal interest. They of course have a generalized interest in making

sure their government functions in aboveboard fashion, that democratically-enacted statutes

are given due respect and protection, and that any political gains they have worked for are 4

The superior court’s decision was reversed on appeal after the passage of this 3

statute.

At the hearing, this organization’s counsel made clear he considered the statute the 4

organization’s own work, because its members worked to draft and promote it. Accepting

the fact that San Diegans for the Memorial urged passage of the statute preserving the

memorial, the Court has previously rejected the proposition that the statute was the work of

private individuals rather than of Congress. See Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (holding that

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not undone by a court decision they believe to be erroneous, or by a private settlement. 

That being said, a significantly protectable interest requires an interest protectable under

some law and a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue

in the lawsuit. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9 Cir. th

1996) (citation omitted). See also Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 500 (9 Cir. th

2002) (observing that although citizens are aggrieved when duly enacted laws are

challenged or not followed, they lack standing to defend the laws). The interests of San

Diegans for the Memorial do not meet this requirement. Intervention of right, and permissive

intervention are both inappropriate here.

Independently, because the Court is granting the MSMA’s motion to intervene, the

fourth Rule 24(a) factor weighs against allowing San Diegans for the Memorial to intervene.

Despite the organization’s past misgivings the MSMA does not fully share their objectives,

it appears to the Court that the interests of San Diegans for the Memorial will be adequately

represented by the MSMA. 

Conclusion and Order

Bearing in mind the Court’s obligation to apply the standards liberally in favor of

intervention, Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 268 F.3d at 817, the Court GRANTS the

MSMA’s motion to intervene as a Defendant in this action. San Diegans for the Mt. Soledad

Memorial and Representatives Bilbray and Hunter may file briefs as amici. The two

Representatives should file one brief for the two of them, rather than two separate briefs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 12, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

lobbying and public advocacy cannot be regarded as having caused Congress’ passage of

the statute) (citations omitted). See also Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1109

(9 Cir. 2011) (holding that the role of advocacy groups is not probative of the statute’s th

purpose, and instead looking to Congress’ own statements of purpose).

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