Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_06-cv-01107/USCOURTS-almd-1_06-cv-01107-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

Although the Clerk entered the petition filed on December 14, 2006, the law is well settled that a

pro se inmate's petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999);

Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). McCray certified he executed the in forma pauperis

affidavit, a document simultaneously submitted with the habeas petition, on December 11, 2006. Affidavit

in Support of Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis - Court Doc. No. 2 at 2. The record is devoid of

evidence indicating any other date of submission for mailing. The court therefore assumes McCray delivered

these documents to prison authorities the day he signed the application to proceed without payment of fees.

Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). In light of the foregoing, the court

considers December 11, 2006 as the date of filing. 

2

The claims raised by McCray relate solely to his conviction for felony murder. 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE MCCRAY, )

AIS #183709, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

 ) CASE NO. 1:06-CV-1107-WKW v.

)

WILLIE THOMAS, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Willie McCray ["McCray"], a state inmate, on December 11, 2006.1

 In this

petition, McCray identifies the challenged convictions as those imposed upon him by the

Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on October 24, 2000 for felony murder and first

degree theft of property.2

 By operation of law, these convictions became final in January

of 2002.

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 1 of 21
3

The capital murder indictment charged "McCray ... did intentionally cause the death of Michael

Scott by shooting him in the face and causing his death at the time [McCray] was in the course of committing

a robbery, the property of Higdon Grocery Company, Inc., ... doing business as Country Market, in violation

of 13A-5-40(a)2 of the Code of Alabama...." Respondents' Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 14-2 at 30. The theft

indictment charged "McCray ... did knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over a motor vehicle ...

the property of Frank Edwards with the intent to deprive the owner of said motor vehicle, in violation of 13A8-3 of the Code of Alabama." Id. at 30. 

2

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 2, 1994, a Houston County Grand Jury issued indictments against

McCray for the capital offense of murder during the course of a robbery in the first degree

in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2), and first degree theft of property in violation

of Ala. Code § 13A-8-3.3

 The State presented evidence at trial that "[o]n the evening of

August 6, 1993, McCray and an accomplice stole an automobile belonging to Frank

Edwards and drove to the Country Market grocery store in Dothan. As his accomplice

stood by the exit, McCray, armed with a pistol, entered the store and demanded that he be

given the money from the store safe. During the robbery, Michael Scott, a customer who

had been waiting in the check-out line, struck McCray in the face, whereupon McCray shot

Scott in the face. McCray and his accomplice fled the scene, firing their guns as they left.

Scott ... died four days later from the gunshot wound to his face." McCray v. State, 738

So.2d 911, 912 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). On September 5, 1995, a jury convicted McCray of

felony murder as a lesser included offense of capital murder and first degree theft of

property as charged in the indictment. On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals reversed these convictions based on the trial court's error in denying McCray's

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 2 of 21
3

Batson motion and remanded the case for a new trial. McCray v. State, 738 So.2d 911, 916

(Ala.Cr.App. 1998). 

Since the first jury convicted McCray of the lesser included offense of felony

murder, the second jury at re-trial could consider only a charge of felony murder against

McCray as jeopardy had attached to the capital murder charge upon his implied acquittal

for the capital offense. Diaz v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 285 Fed. Appx. 589, 593

(11th Cir. 2008), citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189-191 (1957), ("[A]

defendant is impliedly acquitted of a greater charged offense when a jury returns a verdict

convicting him of a lesser-included offense."); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)

(Defendant charged with first degree murder and convicted of manslaughter could not be

retried for first degree murder upon reversal of the manslaughter conviction because

"jeopardy for an offense continues after acquittal, whether that acquittal is express or

implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense when the jury was given a full

opportunity to return a verdict on the greater charge."). Upon remand, the trial court

amended the indictment to reflect the lesser included offense for which the jury convicted

McCray in September of 1995. At the beginning of the proceedings on re-trial, the State

advised the jury that McCray stood charged with felony murder and theft of property but

correctly did not mention the original capital murder charge. 

During retrial before a jury in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, the

State presented evidence which established "that on August 6, 1993, [McCray] and an

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 3 of 21
4

Where further action is not undertaken upon denial of an application for rehearing by the appellate

court, the certificate of judgment issues eighteen (18) days after issuance of the court’s order denying the

application. Rule 41(a), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

5

The state court stamped the Rule 32 petition "filed" on February 3, 2006. However, McCray advised

he placed this petition in the prison mail on January 23, 2006. Respondents' Exhibit H - Court Doc. No. 14-15

at 11. As previously noted, a pro se inmate's petition is deemed filed in federal cases the date the petition is

delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-272. "Alabama courts have [adopted this

4

accomplice stole an automobile belonging to Frank Edwards and drove to the Country

Market grocery store in Dothan. [McCray], armed with a pistol, entered the store while his

accomplice stood by the exit. [McCray] demanded two store employees to retrieve the

money from the store safe. During the robbery, Michael Scott, a customer ..., struck

[McCray] in the face, whereupon [McCray] shot Scott in the face. [McCray] and his

accomplice fled the scene while firing their guns as they left. Scott died four days later as

a result of the gunshot to his face." Respondents' Exhibit D (Memorandum Opinion of

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on Direct Appeal from Retrial) - Court Doc. No. 14-11

at 1-2. Based on this evidence, the jury convicted McCray of felony murder and first

degree theft of property on October 24, 2000. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed these convictions on November 21, 2001. Id. McCray filed an application for

rehearing which the appellate court denied on December 21, 2001. Respondents' Exhibit

F - Court Doc. No. 14-13. McCray did not further appeal his convictions and the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals therefore issued the certificate of judgment on January 8, 2002.4

 On January 23, 2006, McCray filed a state post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule

32, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.

5

 On April 9, 2006, the trial court conducted an

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 4 of 21
rule and] held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have 'filed' a Rule 32 petition,

a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to prison officials for

mailing." Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002); Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 373, 375

(Ala.Crim.App. 1993) ("[A] pro se incarcerated petitioner 'files' a Rule 32 petition when he hands the petition

over to prison authorities for mailing."). Consequently, the prison mailbox rule applies to pro se Rule 32

petitions filed in the state courts of Alabama. Thus, January 23, 2006 is the appropriate date of filing for

McCray's Rule 32 petition. 

6

The state court record establishes that upon reversal of McCray's initial convictions and remand by

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, the trial judge amended the capital murder indictment to charge

McCray with felony murder in accordance with the previous jury's determination of guilt for this lesser

included offense. Additionally, at re-trial, the district attorney advised the jury that McCray stood charged

with only felony murder and theft. Neither the district attorney nor the court referenced the original charge

of capital murder for which McCray had previously been acquitted. 

5

evidentiary hearing on McCray's Rule 32 petition and denied the petition on this same day.

Respondents' Exhibit H - Court Doc. No. 14-15 at 29. McCray appealed the trial court's

decision and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpublished opinion on

October 27, 2006 affirming the denial of post-conviction relief. McCray did not further

appeal the denial of his Rule 32 petition and the appellate court therefore issued the

certificate of judgment on November 17, 2006. Respondents' Exhibit M - Court Doc. No.

14-20.

 On December 11, 2006, McCray filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief

in which he raises the following claims for relief: (1) the conviction for felony murder is

based on an illegal indictment as (i) the trial judge amended the indictment without

petitioner's consent, striking the word "intentionally" and correcting the code section, and

(ii) the district attorney did not present petitioner's case to the grand jury for re-indictment

on felony murder;6

 (2) the district attorney used the word "intentionally" throughout his

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 5 of 21
7

Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the

"AEDPA"). This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

6

arguments to the jury regarding petitioner's shooting of Michael Scott when an intentional

act is not a necessary element of felony murder; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to

charge the jury on manslaughter. 

Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed answers in which they

argue McCray's federal habeas petition is barred by the one-year limitation period

applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).7

 The respondents

contend that because McCray's felony murder and theft convictions became final after the

effective date of the federal statute of limitations McCray must have filed this § 2254

petition within a year of these convictions becoming final, exclusive of the time that any

properly filed state post-conviction petition related to the convictions was pending in the

state courts. The respondents acknowledge that McCray filed a state post-conviction

petition under Rule 32, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, on January 23, 2006, but

argue this Rule 32 petition had no effect on the running of the federal limitation period as

McCray filed this state post-conviction petition after expiration of the applicable limitation

period and, therefore, the state action was not "pending" during the requisite time period

as is required by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) to warrant tolling. Respondents'

Answer - Court Doc. No. 14 at 4-5; Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir.

2003); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333-1335 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001); Webster v. Moore,

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 6 of 21
7

199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 481, 148 L.Ed.2d 454

(2000). Hence, the respondents maintain McCray failed to file his § 2254 petition for

habeas corpus relief prior to expiration of the one-year period of limitation set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1).

Based on the limitation defense set forth by the respondents, the court entered two

orders advising McCray of his failure to file the present federal habeas petition within the

one-year limitation period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). Order of January 31,

2007 - Court Doc. No. 15; Order of July 11, 2007 - Court Doc. No. 39. Each of the orders

provided McCray an opportunity to show cause why his habeas petition should not be

barred from review by this court as untimely filed. In response to these orders, McCray

contends that this court should ignore the untimeliness of his petition because failure to

address the merits of his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, as he

is actually innocent of felony murder. In support of this claim, McCray maintains that his

shooting of Michael Scott was merely an accident caused by Scott's striking McCray in the

face. McCray also argues that the court should allow equitable tolling of the limitation

period due to errors by counsel on direct appeal, his own lack of legal knowledge and his

reliance on the advice of an inmate law clerk. Under well-settled law, these assertions do

not entitle McCray to relief from application of the one-year period of limitation.

Consequently, McCray failed to file his § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus relief

within the requisite limitation period.

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 7 of 21
8

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court records

and applicable federal law, the court determines that no evidentiary hearing is required,

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and

concludes the present habeas petition is due to be denied as McCray failed to file the

petition within the one-year period of limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence - Independent Claim

McCray argues that he is entitled to federal habeas relief because he accidentally

shot the victim and, thus, is actually innocent of felony murder. The law is well-settled

"that '[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been

held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional

violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.' Herrera v. Collins, 506

U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). It is not our role to make an

independent determination of a petitioner's guilt or innocence based on evidence that has

emerged since the trial. 'This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts

sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution--not to

correct errors of fact.' Id." Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus,

McCray is entitled to no relief from this court on any independent claim of actual

innocence. 

B. Actual Innocence - Gateway to Excuse Time Bar

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 8 of 21
9

This court must determine whether McCray has made a showing of actual innocence

before addressing the respondents' assertion that the claims for federal habeas relief are

barred by the statute of limitations. Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d

1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2000). "To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must

demonstrate that ... 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable [trier of fact] would have

convicted him.' Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130

L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). "[T]he Schlup

standard is demanding and permits review only in the '"extraordinary'" case." House v.

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). Thus, "[i]n the usual case the

presumed guilt of a prisoner convicted in state court counsels against federal review of

[untimely] claims." Id. at 537. "It is important to note in this regard that 'actual innocence'

means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.

333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992)." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-

624; Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 162 (2nd Cir. 2004) ("As Schlup makes clear, the issue

before [a federal district] court is not legal innocence but factual innocence."). Schlup

observes that "a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an

innocent person is extremely rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence – that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 9 of 21
10

in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful." 513 U.S.

at 324.

McCray's allegation of actual innocence is not based on new evidence. McCray

presented the defense of accidental shooting to the jury during his trial, testifying that the

victim grabbed the firearm, causing an accidental discharge of the weapon into the victim's

face. McCray has submitted no "new reliable evidence" to support his assertion of

innocence nor has he suggested that any such evidence exists to establish his actual

innocence so as to meet the standard set forth by Schlup. The court therefore concludes

that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is properly analyzed under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A).

C. The Federal Period of Limitation

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) directs that the limitation period for filing a 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petition begins to run on the date when the time for seeking direct review of

the challenged judgments expires. McCray was convicted of felony murder and first

degree theft of property by the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on October 24,

2000. The trial court imposed sentence upon McCray for these convictions on this same

date. McCray filed a direct appeal and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

the convictions by memorandum opinion on November 21, 2001. Respondents' Exhibit DCourt Doc. No. 14-11. McCray filed an application for rehearing which the state appellate

court denied on December 21, 2001. On the same date, counsel prepared and mailed a

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 10 of 21
11

letter to McCray which advised "that on December 21, 2001, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals overruled the Application for Rehearing.... You will have fourteen (14)

days from that date to Petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for Certiorari. Also, please

be advised that as of this date I am filing a Motion to Withdraw as your appellate

counsel...." December 21, 2001 Letter of Joseph W. Lewis to Petitioner - Court Doc. No.

32-2. McCray concedes receipt of this "letter on the 3rd day of January, 2002."

Respondents' Exhibit 1 to the January 9, 2007 Response - Court Doc. No. 38-2 --

Petitioner's January 3, 2002 Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed in the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals. Despite his knowledge of the appellate court's denial of his

application for rehearing and counsel's withdrawal from his case, McCray did not further

appeal his murder and theft convictions or seek an extension of time to do so; rather,

McCray simply filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals therefore issued the certificate of judgment on January 8, 2002. Since McCray

failed to seek relief from the Alabama Supreme Court, he was not entitled to file a petition

for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court and the time for seeking direct review

of his murder and theft convictions therefore lapsed upon expiration of the time for filing

a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme -- fourteen (14) days from the

denial of the motion for rehearing. Rule 39(b), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure; see

Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129

(2001); see also Rule 13.1, Rules of the United States Supreme Court (a petition for writ

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 11 of 21
8

The day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall

be excluded in computing the running of the limitation period. Rule 6(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

12

of certiorari may only be filed to review a judgment or order entered by a state court of last

resort and must be filed within ninety (90) days of the action undertaken by such state

court); Jackson v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347, 1348-1349 (11th

Cir. 2002). Thus, McCray's murder and theft convictions became final, at the latest, on

January 8, 2002 , upon issuance of the certificate of judgment, and the one-year limitation

period contained in section 2244(d)(1)(A) therefore began to run on January 9, 2002.8

1. Equitable Tolling. McCray presents various arguments relative to equitable

tolling of the limitation period. Case law directs that the limitation period "may be

equitably tolled" on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas statute "when a

movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable with diligence." Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271

(11th Cir. 1999); see also Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); Knight v.

Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002). "Equitable tolling will not be available in

most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Calderon v.

United States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997). Such tolling applies only

in truly extraordinary circumstances. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (11th

Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). "The

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 12 of 21
13

burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the

petitioner." Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections,

259 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (11th Cir.2001). 

McCray argues entitlement to equitable tolling of the limitation period until the time

he received notice that the direct appeal process had been completed. In support of this

argument, McCray initially maintained he did not receive notice of the denial of his direct

appeal until May of 2002 when the Clerk of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

advised him in a letter that his application for rehearing had been denied. However, this

assertion is clearly refuted by pleadings filed by McCray in the state courts. Specifically,

in a motion for appointment of counsel filed by McCray on January 3, 2002 with the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, McCray states that he received counsel's December

21, 2001 "letter on the 3rd day of January, 2002" and that counsel advised that "on the 21st

day of December, 2001, his application for rehearing was denied ...," and counsel

"informed Appellant he's filing a motion to withdraw as Appellant's counsel."

Respondents' Exhibit 1 to the January 9, 2007 Response - Court Doc. No. 38-2 --

Petitioner's January 3, 2002 Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed in the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals. In this letter, counsel also specifically advised McCray that he had

fourteen days from denial of the application for rehearing, or until January 4, 2008, to file

a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court. Moreover, in a March

8, 2002 letter to appellate counsel, McCray advised that he was in the process of preparing

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 13 of 21
14

a Rule 32 petition, referenced the memorandum opinion issued by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on November 21, 2001 denying his appeal, and acknowledged both the

state and federal periods of limitation applicable to post-conviction actions. Petitioner's

Attachment to the June 11, 2007 Response - Court Doc. No. 30-2 at 1-2.

The evidentiary materials filed in this case demonstrate that on December 21, 2001

counsel mailed McCray a letter advising McCray that the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals had on that date denied his application for rehearing and that the direct appeal

process would conclude fourteen (14) days from such denial if McCray failed to file a pro

se petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court. McCray conceded in a

motion filed with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that he received this letter on

January 3, 2002. McCray now also acknowledges receipt of counsel's letter but advises

that he did not read the letter, as he immediately provided the letter to the inmate law clerk

assisting him in the preparation of pleadings. Petitioner's July 26, 2007 Response - Court

Doc. No. 40 at 1. Under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that McCray is not

entitled to an equitable tolling of the limitation period past January 8, 2002 -- the date the

appellate court issued the certificate of judgment on direct appeal -- as he received notice

on January 3, 2002 that his direct appeal would become final on January 4, 2002, absent

his pro se submission of a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court.

McCray did not file a petition for writ of certiorari or seek an extension of time within

which to file such a petition and, instead, filed a motion for appointment of counsel with

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 14 of 21
9

The court notes that even if it allowed equitable tolling until May of 2002 the federal limitation

period still expired over three years prior to McCray filing this federal habeas petition.

15

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on January 3, 2002, which the appellate court

summarily denied. After denial of this motion, McCray undertook no additional action

relative to his direct appeal.9

 

McCray next argues that equitable tolling is justified because counsel failed to

exhaust his claims on direct appeal and failed to provide documents to petitioner which

prevented him from properly completing the direct appeal process. These assertions do not

warrant equitable tolling as the failure of counsel and/or McCray to present claims during

the direct appeal process does not establish an impediment to McCray's filing a timely

habeas petition in this court. 

With respect to McCray's assertion of his lack of legal knowledge as a basis for

equitable tolling, he is likewise entitled to no relief. The law is well-settled that an inmate's

lack of legal knowledge, his failure to understand legal principles and/or the inability to

recognize potential claims for relief at an earlier juncture do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period. United

States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (pro se status and ignorance of the law

do not justify equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122 S.Ct. 145, 151 L.Ed.2d 97 (2001) (lack of legal knowledge

or legal resources, even in a case involving a pro se inmate, does not warrant equitable

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 15 of 21
16

tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

1194, 121 S.Ct. 1195, 149 L.Ed.2d 110 (2001) (a petitioner's pro se status and ignorance

of the law are insufficient to support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations); Felder

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 622,

148 L.Ed.2d 532 (2000) (ignorance of the law and pro se status do not constitute "rare and

exceptional" circumstances justifying equitable tolling); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13,

17 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 63 (2000) (petitioner's

pro se status throughout most of the period of limitation does not merit equitable tolling);

Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504,

145 L.Ed.2d 389 (1999) (unfamiliarity with the legal process during the applicable filing

period did not merit equitable tolling); Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d

967, 969 (11th Cir. 1997) (ignorance of the law "is not a factor that can warrant equitable

tolling."). 

To the extent that McCray argues that equitable tolling is warranted because he

relied on inmate assistance in preparing documents after denial of rehearing on direct

appeal and/or in his post-conviction action, this assertion fails to provide a basis for such

tolling. A petitioner's reliance on the assistance or erroneous advice of an inmate clerk fails

to establish extraordinary circumstances necessary to excuse the untimely filing of a

petition. Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d 1266, 1267 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 834

(1990) (poor advice from inmate law clerks does not warrant relief from procedural bar);

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 16 of 21
10As noted, McCray filed his Rule 32 petition in the state court on January 23, 2006 -- over three

years after expiration of § 2244(d)’s one-year period of limitation. 

17

Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220 ("The fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting

[pleadings] does not relieve [petitioner] from the personal responsibility of complying with

the law.").

2. Statutory Tolling. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that "[t]he time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any

period of limitation under this section." Despite his awareness of the applicable state and

federal periods of limitation and gaining knowledge on January 3, 2002 of counsel's

decision not to pursue the direct appeal beyond the appellate court's denial of the

application for rehearing, McCray did not file his state post-conviction petition until

January 23, 2006 - after expiration of § 2244(d)(1)(A)'s one-year period of limitation.10

Thus, this petition did not serve to statutorily toll the limitation period. "[E]ven 'properly

filed' state-court petitions must be 'pending' [during the one-year period of limitation] in

order to toll the limitations period. A state court petition ... that is filed following the

expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period

remaining to be tolled." Webster, 199 F.3d at 1259; Moore, 321 F.3d at 1381 ("The plain

language of the statute provides for tolling '[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.' 28 U.S.C. §

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 17 of 21
18

2244(d)(2). While a 'properly filed' application for post-conviction relief tolls the statute

of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations once the limitations

period has expired. In other words, the tolling provision does not operate to revive the oneyear limitations period if such period has expired."); Tinker, 255 F.3d at 1335 n.4 ("[A]

properly filed petition in state court only tolls the time remaining within the federal

limitation period.").

Based on the above-referenced facts and in accordance with applicable federal law,

the court concludes that the limitation period began to run on January 9, 2002 and ran

uninterrupted until it expired on January 9, 2003. Although McCray filed a Rule 32

petition on January 23, 2006 challenging his Houston County convictions, this petition was

not pending during the running of the federal limitation period as is required to allow

statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In light of the foregoing, the state postconviction petition filed by McCray on January 23, 2006 had no effect on the running of

the limitation period applicable to this federal petition for habeas corpus relief because the

limitation period expired in January of 2003, several years prior to McCray's filing his state

post-conviction petition. Webster, 199 F.3d at 1259. 

3. Expiration of the Limitation Period. Based on the foregoing analysis, the

court concludes that McCray has failed to present any credible basis for either equitable

or statutory tolling of the limitation period. The record is devoid of evidence that

McCray's delay in filing the instant § 2254 petition resulted from extraordinary

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 18 of 21
19

circumstances beyond his control that were unavoidable with the exercise of diligence. The

reasons set forth by McCray for his untimeliness are insufficient to establish the

extraordinary circumstances required to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period.

He has likewise presented nothing which demonstrates that he acted diligently in pursuing

his federal claims. Thus, this court "cannot say that [McCray] has acted with the

'conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence' necessary 'to call into action the powers

of the court.' This conclusion is based on the longstanding, firmly rooted principle that a

court cannot grant equitable tolling unless it is satisfied that the party seeking such relief

has acted with diligence." Drew, 297 F.3d at 1291 n.5. Consequently, McCray is not

entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period. Moreover, no basis exists for statutory

tolling. 

McCray filed the instant federal habeas petition on December 11, 2006. Under the

facts and circumstances of this case, the one-year period of limitation contained in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expired on January 9, 2003, over three years and eleven months prior

to McCray filing this § 2254 petition. McCray has failed to show cause why his federal

habeas petition should not be dismissed as untimely filed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Willie McCray be denied as

McCray failed to file the petition within the one-year period of limitation set forth in 28

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 19 of 21
20

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

 2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before December 14, 2008 the parties may file objections

to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in

the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties

are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is

not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667

F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.

1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 2nd day of December, 2008.

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 20 of 21
21

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01107-WKW-SRW Document 52 Filed 12/02/08 Page 21 of 21