Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02179/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02179-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jose Dominguez-Rojas 

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff.

No. CV-16-02179-PHX-SRB (BSB)

 CR-06-00381-PHX-SRB 

REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 

 On January 5, 2017, Movant Jose Dominguez-Rojas filed an Amended Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 7.)1

 On 

February 17, 2017, the government filed a motion to stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in United States v. Begay, No. 14-10080 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014), and the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. 

granted, 2016 WL 3232911 (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1498). (Doc. 9.) Movant filed a 

response in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 12.) The government did not file a reply and 

the time to do so has passed. As set forth below, the Court recommends that the motion 

to stay be denied. 

I. Background 

 On April 11, 2006, Movant was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit 

 

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 Citations to “Doc” are to filings in Jose Dominguez-Rojas v. United States of 

America, CV-16-02179-PHX-SRB (BSB). Citations to “CR Doc.” are to filings in the underlying criminal case, CR-06-00381-PHX-SRB (BSB). 

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hostage taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203, one count of hostage taking, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1203, one count of harboring illegal aliens, in violation of 

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), and one count of possession of a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). (CR Doc. 1.) 

Movant subsequently pleaded guilty to the § 924(c) count in exchange for the 

government dismissing the other three counts. (CR Docs. 157, 158.) On June 18, 2009, 

the Court sentenced Movant to 84 months in prison to run consecutive to a sentence 

imposed in Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. CR 2006-117667-001-DT, that 

Movant was then serving. (CR Doc. 155, 157, 159.) 

 On January 5, 2017, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Amended Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner 

asserts that his § 924(c) conviction is unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 

___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). (Id. at 3-4.) In Johnson, the Supreme Court held 

that the residual clause in the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (ACCA), is unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 

135 S. Ct. at 2557. Petitioner argues that his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is 

unconstitutional because, under Johnson, hostage taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203 

no longer qualifies as a crime of violence. (Doc. 7 at 3.) 

 On February 17, 2017, the government filed a motion to stay this matter pending 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (cert. granted Sept. 29, 

2016), and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 14-10080. 

(Doc. 9.) Movant opposes the stay. (Doc. 12.) Begay has been fully briefed and argued, 

and was submitted for decision on May 26, 2016. Begay, 14-10080 (Doc. 77.) Begay

will address whether second-degree murder is a crime of violence for purposes of a 

§ 924(c) conviction and how Johnson impacts the analysis. The Supreme Court has 

granted certiorari in Dimaya, No. 15-1498. In that case, the Supreme Court will decide 

whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is identical to the residual clause 

of § 924(c)(3)(B), is unconstitutional under the reasoning of Johnson. 

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II. Analysis

 “A district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own court.” 

Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis v. North 

American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). The court must weigh competing interests, 

including “the possible damage which may result from the granting of stay, the hardship

or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly

course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof,

and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. (quoting CMAX, 

Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962)). If there is “a fair possibility” that the stay will 

cause prejudice to the opposing party, the party seeking the stay “must make out a clear 

case of hardship or inequity.” Id. (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). In habeas cases, 

“special considerations” are implicated “that place unique limits on a district court’s 

authority to stay a case in the interests of judicial economy.” See Yong v. INS, 208 F.3d 

1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A. Judicial Efficiency

 The government argues that staying this matter would promote judicial efficiency 

and consistency. (Doc. 9 at 5.) The government asserts that rulings in Begay and 

Dimaya will resolve or clarify several issues in this case that would otherwise require 

litigation by the parties. (Id. at 6.) In response, Movant argues that a stay pending a 

ruling in Begay is unwarranted because that case involves whether second-degree murder 

amounts to a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B), and involves the classification of “a 

crime of violence” that has as an element the reckless use of force. (Doc. 12 at 4.) 

Movant argues that this case involves hostage taking under § 1203, as the offense 

underlying his § 924(c) conviction, and he argues that hostage taking is not a crime of 

violence under § 924(c) because it can be committed using no particular amount of force. 

(Doc. 12 at 4; Doc. 7 at 4.) 

 The Court is not persuaded by Movant’s argument that because Begay involved 

second-degree murder, and this case involves hostage taking, Begay is not relevant to the 

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issues in this case. The Ninth Circuit panel in Begay has accepted supplemental briefing 

addressing whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of 

Johnson and Dimaya. Begay, No. 14-10080. (Docs. 78-85.) In Begay, the issue of 

statutory construction of § 924(c) is separate from the defendant’s underlying crime. 

Based on the supplemental briefing in Begay, it appears that the Ninth Circuit may 

resolve whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson and 

Dimaya. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling on that issue could control the outcome of this case 

because if the Ninth Circuit concludes that § 924(c) is not unconstitutionally vague, then 

there is no legal basis for Movant’s claims. Therefore, the Court finds that a stay in this 

matter could promote judicial efficiency. 

B. Prejudice 

 Movant argues that the Court should not await a ruling in Dimaya because this 

Court is bound by current Ninth Circuit authority. (Doc. 12 at 4.) Movant also argues 

that the government has not identified any exceptionally important public interests that 

waiting for a ruling would promote. (Id.) Movant argues that, in contrast to the 

government, he will be prejudiced by a stay because if he prevailed on his § 924(c) claim, 

he would be eligible for immediate release from custody. (Doc. 12 at 5.) The 

government did not file a reply to Movant’s response and, therefore, it has not contested 

this assertion. Therefore, the Court assumes the truth of this assertion for purposes of this 

Report and Recommendation. 

 Assuming the truth of Movant’s uncontested assertion that he would be entitled to 

immediate release from custody if his conviction under § 924(c) were vacated (Doc. 12 at 

5), the Court concludes that Petitioner would face a distinct possibility of prejudice from 

any stay. Furthermore, the government has not made out “a clear case of hardship or 

inequity.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1109. The Court, therefore, recommends that the motion 

to stay be denied. However, if Begay and Dimaya are decided while this matter is 

pending, those rulings will be considered. 

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 Accordingly,

 IT IS RECOMMENDED that the government’s motion to stay (Doc. 9) be 

DENIED and that the Court set a briefing schedule on the Amended § 2255 motion. 

(Doc. 7.) 

 This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. The parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of 

this Report and Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the 

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of March, 2017. 

 

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