Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James L. Gagan, )

)

 Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor, ) No. CIV 2:99-1427-PHX-RCB

) No. CIV 2:08-00018-PHX-EHC

vs. ) O R D E R

)

The Estate of Victor E. )

Sharar; and James A. Monroe, )

et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

 )

Currently before the court is a motion by James L. Gagan to

transfer Monroe v. Gagan, 2:08-cv-00018-EHC (“Monroe”) to this

court pursuant to LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Doc.

369. Additionally, Mr. Gagan “requests an extension [of] time,

such as ten days from the date of entry of” this order in which to

file his answer in Monroe. Id. at 3. In the exercise of its

discretion, for the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS this

motion in all respects.

. . .

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 379 Filed 07/18/08 Page 1 of 7
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1 Mr. Monroe’s daughter is also a plaintiff in that action alleging,

inter alia, wrongful eviction. 

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Background

I. Gagan v. Sharar

For more than a decade this court has presided over Gagan v.

Sharar, 2:99-cv-1427-RCB (“Gagan”), wherein Mr. Gagan was seeking

to enforce an Indiana judgment of roughly $1.7 million dollars

against James A. Monroe, among others. As part of those

enforcement efforts, there was a United States Marshal’s sale of

Mr. Monroe’s real property located at 9795 East Caron Street,

Scottsdale, Arizona 85258. See Doc. 347 (U.S. Marshal’s Deed). At

the time of that sale Mr. Monroe’s daughter, Kimberly Monroe Clark,

was residing there, but Mr. Monroe was not. See Doc. 5 (2:08-cv00018-EHC) (Amended Co.) at 5, ¶ 3.

 The proceeds of that sale were to be applied toward the

satisfaction of the Indiana judgment. Doc. 341 (Amended U.S.

Marshal’s Certificate of Sale) at 1. Mr. Gagan, the highest bidder

at the Marshal’s sale, bought the subject property for $560,000.00. 

Doc. 347 at 2. The United States Marshal issued a deed to Mr.

Gagan on May 15, 2007. See id. Thereafter, “[i]n June, 2007,

[Mr.] Gagan entered into a contract with . . . Ross Miljenovich to

sell to him for $750,000 whatever right, title and interest the

United States Marshal’s Deed had vested in Gagan.” Doc. 1 (2:08-

cv-00018-EHC) (Monroe Not. of Removal) at 3, ¶ 4. 

II. Monroe v. Gagan

Unwilling to concede defeat, on August 31, 2007, Mr. Monroe

filed an action in Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County, against

Messrs. Gagan and Miljenovich1. In that action, Mr. Monroe alleges

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 379 Filed 07/18/08 Page 2 of 7
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2 The cited references in this paragraph are from the amended complaint

in this removed action, but these particular allegations are identical to Mr.

Monroe’s state court complaint.

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that despite the Marshal’s sale and subsequent purchase by Mr.

Miljenovich, he “is the lawful owner of a fee simple estate” in the

subject property. Doc. 5 (2:08-cv-00018-EHC) (Amended Co.) at 2, ¶

2. Mr. Monroe further alleges that “[u]pon information and

belief,” the United States Marshal, “act[ing] upon the advice and

instructions of Defendants Gagan[,]” refused to pay Mr. Monroe the

$150,000.00 statutory homestead exemption. Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 14-17. 

The failure to pay that exemption, Mr. Monroe alleges, renders

“invalid[]” Mr. Gagan’s May 15, 2007 Marshal’s deed. Id. at 6-7, ¶

19. Mr. Monroe is seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the

“Indiana Judgment against [him], domesticated in Arizona . . . ,

was not renewed and expired and was, therefore, of no further force

or effect and that it was, and is, invalid in the State of

Arizona[.]” Id. at 7, ¶ A(1). Mr. Monroe is also seeking a

declaration that the May 15, 2007 Marshal’s Deed “is void and

invalid.”2 Id. at 7, ¶ A(2). 

A few days after Mr. Monroe filed his state court action, Mr.

Miljenovich filed a state court action of his own against Mr.

Gagan. Eventually those two actions were consolidated. After

consolidation, Mr. Gagan removed the action to the United States

District Court, District of Arizona. In turn, on January 4, 2008,

the consolidated action was randomly assigned to the Honorable Earl

H. Carroll, Senior United States District Court Judge. 

Discussion

Shortly after removal, Mr. Gagan filed the present motion

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 379 Filed 07/18/08 Page 3 of 7
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3 Mr. Gagan also mentions consolidation in passing, but he only

specifically seeks a transfer. Mot. (doc. 369) at 1 and 3. 

4 The applicability of this particular Rule is questionable here given

that it speaks strictly of “consolidation.” Arguably the transfer which Mr. Gagan

is seeking comes within the ambit of subsection three, however, which allows a

court to “issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 42(a)(1)(3). 

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seeking to have Monroe transferred3 to this court pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 42(a)4 and LRCiv 42.1(a)(1). The latter Rule states, in

pertinent part, as follows:

 Whenever two or more cases are pending before 

different Judges and any party believes that such 

cases (A) arise from substantially the same 

transaction or event; (B) involve substantially 

the same parties or property; . . . (D) calls for

determination of substantially the same question 

of law; or (E) for any other reason would entail

substantial duplication of labor if heard by different

Judges, any party may file a motion to transfer

the case or cases involved to a single Judge.

LRCiv. 42.1(a)(1) (emphasis added). Mr. Gagan stresses that the

validity of the Indiana judgment was repeatedly argued in Gagan,

and it is again being challenged in Monroe. Accordingly, Mr. Gagan

contends that transfer of Monroe to this court is proper because

“the exact requirements” of LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) are met in that Monroe

“involves substantially the same transaction or event, the same

parties and property, calls for the same determination of the same

questions of law and could create a[] . . . substantial duplication

of labor” if Judge Carroll were to proceed with Monroe. Mot. (doc.

369) at 3 and 2. 

Mr. Monroe’s response misses the mark. Rather than addressing

these transfer arguments, he focuses primarily upon jurisdictional

and other arguments which are germane to the pending motion to

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5 On January 28, 2008, the same day this transfer motion was filed, the

Monroes filed a motion to remand the removed action to state court. Mot. (doc. 7)

(2:08-cv-00018-EHC). 

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remand,5 but not to this transfer motion. 

“The standard for transfer [pursuant to LRCiv 42.1] is similar

to the standard for consolidation under Rule 42(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and district courts have broad discretion

in determining whether to grant such motions.” Pangerl v. Ehrlich,

2007 WL 686703, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2007) (citing Investors Research

Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777

([9th Cir.] 1989)). By its terms, LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) does not

require that each of its subsections be shown before a transfer is

proper thereunder. In the present case, though, several of those

subsections do apply. First, Monroe “arises from substantially the

same transaction or events” as Gagan in that both pertain to the

validity of the Indiana judgment. Likewise, there is no doubt that

Gagan and Monroe involve “substantially the same parties or

property” given that Messrs. Gagan and Monroe were parties in Gagan

and they are parties in Monroe as well. Additionally, the United

States Marshal’s sale which Mr. Monroe is challenging in Monroe,

arose directly as a result of Gagan.

Furthermore, both Gagan and Monroe involve “substantially the

same question of law,” i.e. the validity of the Indiana judgment. 

The court is keenly aware that in Monroe there are also issues 

pertaining to Mr. Gagan’s alleged failure to comply with Arizona

state law regarding homestead exemptions. At the same time,

however, the court cannot ignore the fact that in Monroe, as noted

earlier, Mr. Monroe is explicitly seeking a declaration that the

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Indiana judgment is invalid – an issue which this court addressed

on more than one occasion in Gagan. Thus, while, as Mr. Gagan

concedes, Gagan and Monroe do not involve “the exact same question

of law,” exactness is not the standard under LRCiv. 42.1(a)(1). 

See Reply (doc. 373) at 2. 

Last, but certainly not least, subsection (E), the broad,

catch-all provision of LRCiv 42.1(a)(1), provides ample

justification for transferring Monroe to this court. Given this

court’s intimate familiarity with Gagan, gained by presiding over

that litigation for more than a decade, the court finds that there

would be a “substantial duplication of labor” if Judge Carroll were

to retain Monroe. Requiring Judge Carroll to, colloquially

speaking, “get up to speed” on this protracted litigation would not

be in the interest of judicial economy. Rather, judicial economy

and the avoidance of duplicative efforts favors transferring Monroe

to this court. 

Moreover, although Mr. Gagan does not specifically invoke

LRCiv 42.1(a)(1)(4), the factors enumerated therein also weigh

heavily in favor of a transfer here. That Rule provides in

relevant part as follows:

In determining the Judge to whom the case . . . 

will be assigned pursuant to subparagraph[] (a)(1) 

. . . above, the following factors may be considered: 

(A) whether substantive matters have been considered

in a case; (B) which Judge has the most familiarity 

with the issues involved in the case; (C) whether a 

case is reasonably viewed as the lead or principal 

case; or (D) any other factor serving the interest of

judicial economy.

LRCiv 42.1(a)(1)(4) (emphasis added). First, due to the fact that

Monroe was fairly recently removed, Judge Carroll has not yet

considered any substantive matters in that case. Second,

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undeniably this court has “the most familiarity with the issues

involved” in Monroe in that this court’s rulings in Gagan set the

stage for the U.S. Marshal’s sale, which is being challenged in

Monroe. Third, for these reasons, as well as those previously

discussed, transfer and reassignment of Monroe to this court would

best serve the “interest of judicial economy.” 

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr.

Gagan’s motion to transfer (doc. 369) the case of Monroe v. Gagan,

2:08-cv-00018-EHC is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Gagan’s unopposed request for

an extension of time in which to file an answer to the amended

complaint in Monroe is GRANTED; he shall have ten (10) days from

the entry date of this order in which to file and serve such

answer; and 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that a copy of this order shall be

provided to Senior United States District Court Judge Earl H.

Carroll.

DATED this 17th day of July, 2008.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 379 Filed 07/18/08 Page 7 of 7