Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-03191/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-03191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN DOUGLAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WARDEN OF SAN QUENTIN STATE PRISON,

et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 09-3191 CW (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE AND

ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket nos. 9, 10)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas

Valley State Prison (SVSP), has filed a pro se civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials at San

Quentin State Prison (SQSP) were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs when he was incarcerated there in 2009. 

Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis has been

granted. He has also filed a "Motion for Subpoena of Medical

Records" and a "Motion for Summons and Serving Defendants." 

Case 5:09-cv-03191-LHK Document 11 Filed 05/13/10 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Plaintiff's handwriting is difficult to decipher; therefore,

the names of the Defendants, which were taken from his handwritten

complaint, may be spelled incorrectly in this Order.

2

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claim

are alleged to have occurred at SQSP, which is located in this

judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In his complaint, Plaintiff names the warden of SQSP; SQSP

Physicians Banks, Garrigan and Tootell; and SQSP Registered

Dietician Corazon C. Perea.1 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and

injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any

case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable

claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II. Legal Claims

A. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages. 

However, he is no longer incarcerated at the prison where the

alleged violations took place. The jurisdiction of the federal

courts depends on the existence of a "case or controversy" under

Article III of the Constitution. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of State of

Cal. v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is

considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live

controversy, and if no effective relief can be granted: "Where the

question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments

subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy

is presented." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Where

injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined

in light of the present circumstances. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75

F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). 

When an inmate has been transferred to another prison and

there is no reasonable expectation nor demonstrated probability

that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from which

he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should

be dismissed as moot. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69

(9th Cir. 1995). A claim that the inmate might be re-transferred

to the prison where the injury occurred is too speculative to

overcome mootness. Id.

When Plaintiff filed the present complaint, he was

incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). Plaintiff has

alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement during the

period of his confinement at SQSP, beginning in January, 2009

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United States District Court

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2

 Plaintiff does not indicate when he was transferred to

MCSP.

3

 Moreover, should Plaintiff seek to allege that some or all

of his claims extend to the conditions of his confinement at MCSP

in Ione, California, those claims must be brought in a separate

lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California, the proper venue for claims arising in

Amador County, where Ione is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); 28

U.S.C. § 84.

Plaintiff makes no allegations that his claims extend to the

conditions of his confinement at SVSP, where he is currently

housed.

4

through the date he was transferred to MCSP.2 Plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief in the form of prison officials "excluding fish

and nut products from [his] diet." Because Plaintiff has not been

incarcerated at SQSP since he has been transferred, his claims for

injunctive relief from the conditions of his confinement at SQSP

are DISMISSED as moot.3 The Court reviews Plaintiff's remaining

claims for damages. 

B. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771

(9th Cir. 1986). A determination of "deliberate indifference"

involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the

prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response

to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A "serious" medical

need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton

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infliction of pain." Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at

104). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Plaintiff claims that on January 9, 2009, he informed

Defendant Banks that he was allergic to fish and nut products. 

Plaintiff requested a diet that excluded these products. 

Plaintiff's allegation that he experiences severe allergic

reactions to fish and nut products supports an inference that he

has serious medical needs. Liberally construed, Plaintiff's

allegations that on January 19, 2009, Defendants failed to exclude

such products from his diet and that he had to be rushed to the

hospital after experiencing an allergic reaction from "ingesting

chicken with nuts" state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim

against Defendants Banks, Garrigan, Tootell and Perea. (Compl. at

3.) Accordingly, this claim may proceed against these Defendants.

C. Supervisory Liability Claim

Plaintiff sues the warden of SQSP in the warden's supervisory

capacity. Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that the

warden of SQSP violated his federal rights, but seems to claim the

warden is liable based on the conduct of the warden's subordinates,

Defendants Banks, Garrigan, Tootell and Perea. There is, however,

no respondeat superior liability under § 1983 solely because a

defendant is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. 

See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A

supervisor generally "is only liable for constitutional violations

of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

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the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them." Id. A supervisor may also be held liable if he or

she implemented "a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the

constitutional violation." Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d

1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

Plaintiff's claim against the warden of SQSP is therefore

dismissed with leave to amend. He may file an amendment to the

complaint that alleges supervisory liability, if he truthfully can

do so, under the standards explained above. Plaintiff also must

name the warden of SQSP at the relevant time, if he submits his

amended supervisory liability claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants

Banks, Garrigan, Tootell and Perea.

2. Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim against the

warden of SQSP is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as indicated above. 

3. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order

Plaintiff may file an amended supervisory claim against the warden

of SQSP as set forth above in Sections II(C) of this Order. 

(Plaintiff shall resubmit only his supervisory liability claim and

not the entire complaint.) Plaintiff must name the warden of SQSP

when he submits his amended supervisory liability claim. The

failure to do so will result in the dismissal without prejudice of

the supervisory liability claim against the warden of SQSP.

4. The Clerk shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service

of Summons, a copy of the complaint and all attachments thereto and

a copy of this Order to: SQSP Physicians Banks, Garrigan and

Tootell and SQSP Registered Dietician Corazon C. Perea. The Clerk

shall also mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to

the State Attorney General's Office in San Francisco. The Clerk

shall mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

5. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure requires Defendants to cooperate in saving

unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this

action and asked by the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive

service of the summons, fails to do so, Defendants will be required

to bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for

their failure to sign and return the waiver form. If service is

waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served

on the date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule

12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required to serve and file an

answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request

for waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than

would be required if formal service of summons is necessary.) 

Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of

the waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the

parties with regard to waiver of service of the summons. If

service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due

sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver was

sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed,

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whichever is later. 

6. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing

schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than ninety (90) days from the date

Defendants' answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for

summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be

supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in

all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants

are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary

judgment, Defendants shall so inform the Court prior to the date

the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the

Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion

shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later

than sixty (60) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendant has made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

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defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the

defendants], your case will be dismissed and there will

be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element

of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the

burden of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared

to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files

his opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence

may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to

the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn

declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment

simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, Defendants

shall do so no later than thirty (30) days after the date

Plaintiff's opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

unless the Court so orders at a later date.

7. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant

to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.09\Douglas3191.service.wpd 10

8. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or Defendants' counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

Defendants' counsel.

9. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion.

10. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline

sought to be extended.

11. Because the parties have not yet engaged in discovery,

Plaintiff's "Motion for Subpoena of Medical Retcords" (docket no.

9) is DENIED as premature.

12. Plaintiff's "Motion for Summons and Serving Defendants"

(docket no. 10) is GRANTED.

13. This Order terminates Docket nos. 9 and 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:5/13/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.09\Douglas3191.service.wpd 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYON A. DOUGLAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WARDEN et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV09-03191 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 13, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Bryan Anthony Douglas G44753

Salinas Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960-1060

Dated: May 13, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

Case 5:09-cv-03191-LHK Document 11 Filed 05/13/10 Page 11 of 11