Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01304/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01304-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASKIA S. ASHANTI,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1304 DFL DAD P

vs.

CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY, 

et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner at the California Medical Facility (CMF), initiated this

action by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Solano County Superior Court. On

June 15, 2006 defendants Dr. Oyeyemi, CMF Director Veal, and psych-technician Pena filed a

notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), and a document styled, “Defendants’ Waiver

Of Reply And Request For Screening Order.” Subsequently, on July 27, 2006, defendants Dr.

Lader, Dr. Reed, and Dr. Turner filed a notice of appearance and joined in the waiver and

request. Thus, all defendants have waived their right to reply to the complaint and request that

the court screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If the court does not dismiss the

complaint in its entirety, defendants request that the court grant them sixty days from the date of

of its order to file their responsive pleading. Plaintiff did not seek remand of this case back to

state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (motion for remand must be made within 30 days after the

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 California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085(a) provides: “A writ of mandate may be 1

issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the

performance of an act which the law specially enjoins . . . and from which the party is unlawfully

precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.”

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filing of the notice of removal). Instead, plaintiff has filed several requests which are now before

the court.

I. Plaintiff’s Motions for Voluntary Dismissal and to Vacate/Strike

On June 22, 2006, plaintiff filed a request for voluntary dismissal of this action. 

However, on July 7, 2006 and July 24, 2006, plaintiff filed motions to vacate and strike his

request for voluntary dismissal. The court will grant plaintiff’s motions to vacate/strike his

earlier request for voluntary dismissal.

II. Construing the Writ of Mandamus

Plaintiff initiated his state court action by filing a petition for writ of mandamus

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085-1090. After the action was removed to 1

this court, plaintiff requested that this case proceed as a writ for mandamus pursuant to California

Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1087 to 1090 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Pl.’s Mot. to Vacate/Strike,

filed 7/7/06 and 7/24/06, at 2. Plaintiff insists that he is not proceeding with a civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff is informed that the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, is a jurisdictional

provision and does not create a cause of action. See Lights of America, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court

for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “courts must possess an

independent source of jurisdiction before entertaining a request for a writ of mandamus.”). 

Moreover, Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished writs of mandamus and

provides that “[r]elief heretofore available by mandamus . . . may be obtained by appropriate

action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules.” Therefore, the

court will construe this action as a civil rights action brought under § 1983 because plaintiff’s

claims concern conditions of his confinement. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir.

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1991) (holding that the proper mechanism for raising a federal challenge to conditions of

confinement is through a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

III. Request to Supplement the Complaint

On September 9, 2006, plaintiff filed a document styled, “Plaintiff Request To

‘Supplement’ His Filed Complaint With A Newly Discovered Evidence Exhibit To Substantiate

Claims Of Prison Overcrowding.” The court will deny plaintiff’s request to supplement his

complaint. However, because plaintiff’s civil rights complaint suffers from numerous

deficiencies, the court will dismiss the complaint and grant plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint which cures the defects described below. 

IV. Legal Standards for a Civil Rights Complaint

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

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Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651

F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The court must also construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.

411, 421 (1969).

V. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Refusal of Medical Treatment

Plaintiff contends that he has been prescribed lithium for the past ten years (1996

to 2006) for his bi-polar disorder and that he now wishes to discontinue this treatment. Plaintiff

claims that he has a right to refuse treatment and to be removed from the EOP (Enhanced OutPatient) and the CCC-MS (Clinical Case Management/Category J) programs at the California

Medical Facility. Plaintiff seeks a court order allowing him to “opt-out” of the Coleman and

Keyhea lawsuits. In Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995), the district court

found that the medical care being provided to California prison inmates with serious mental

disorders violated the Eighth Amendment. A special master was appointed by the court to

monitor compliance with the court-ordered injunctive relief, to provide expert advice to the

defendants “to aid in ensuring that their decisions regarding the provision of mental health care to

class members conform to the requirements of the federal constitution, and to advise the court

concerning issues relevant to assessing defendants’ compliance with their Constitutional

obligations.” 912 F. Supp. at 1324 n.63. In Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526 (Cal. App.

1986), the state appellate court “upheld a consent decree affirming the right of state prisoners to

refuse antipsychotic medications except under certain limited circumstances.” In re Qawi, 32

Cal. 4th 1, 21 (Cal. 2004). 

It is not clear from plaintiff’s writ/complaint what provisions from the orders

entered in Coleman and Keyhea he alleges he must “opt-out” of in order to assert his right to

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refuse his lithium treatment. It is also unclear whether this claim is ripe since it appears that

plaintiff has not exercised his right to refuse his medication. It is also unclear from plaintiff’s

complaint whether he is alleging that medication has been administered to him involuntarily. 

The extent of an inmate’s right to refuse medication has recently been addressed as follows:

Both California law and the Due Process Clause itself confer upon

an inmate a right to be free from the arbitrary administration of

antipsychotic medication. See Keyhea injunction, supra;

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 108

L. Ed.2d 178 (1989). However, “given the requirements of the

prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to

treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with

antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to

himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical

interest.” Id. at 227. The decision whether to medicate an inmate

against his will satisfies due process when facilitated by an

administrative review by medical personnel not then involved in

the inmate's treatment. Id. at 233. Due process does not require a

judicial hearing before an inmate may be involuntarily medicated,

does not require that the hearing be conducted in accordance with

the rules of evidence, and does not require a “clear, cogent, and

convincing” standard of proof. Id. at 228, 235. Due process is

satisfied if the inmate is provided with notice, the right to be

present at an adversarial hearing, and the right to present and crossexamine witnesses. Id. at 235. Appointment of counsel is not

required; the provision of a lay adviser who understands the

psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection. Id. at 236.

Wakefield v. Bortman, No. C 03-2870 SI (PR), 2004 WL 1811201 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004) at

*5. Therefore, if plaintiff wishes to pursue this action, in his amended complaint he should

provide factual allegations that address the legal standards governing such a Fourteenth

Amendment claim. 

B. Participation in Non-EOP Programs

Plaintiff contends that because he is in the EOP program, he is not permitted to

attend school, work, or trade programs which are offered to the general population. Plaintiff

claims violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well as his rights to equal

protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff indicates, however, that

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the EOP program does provide him with group counseling sessions, recreational yard, and other

occupational therapy programs, including leather work, clay-pottery work and reading.

Under the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §

12132. In any amended complaint, plaintiff must clarify what specific program or services he

has allegedly been denied and whether he has been denied participation in those programs or

services because of his disability, rather than for some other administrative or security reasons.

The Equal Protection Clause, which ensures that similarly situated persons are

treated alike, applies to prisoners. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202, 216 (1982). In any amended complaint, plaintiff must provide allegations

demonstrating that he was treated in a disparate manner for reasons that lacked a rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1, 40, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1300 (1972). 

As to his due process claim, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim. Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to various educational or

vocational programs. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, this due

process claim should not be included in any amended complaint which plaintiff may elect to file.

C. Overcrowding 

Plaintiff claims that California prisons are overcrowded, exceeding their design

capacity. Plaintiff contends that the crowded prisons create a safety risk for the inmates, staff

and the public. Plaintiff seeks an order from the court requiring the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation and California Medical Facility to reduce the prison population. 

In his amended complaint, plaintiff must provide specific allegations as to how his

constitutional rights were violated and how he was injured as a result of the alleged

overcrowding. This case is not a class action lawsuit and plaintiff, as a layperson, cannot

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represent the interests of all prisoners in the California prison system. Therefore, the statewide

remedy plaintiff seeks is not appropriate relief that may be sought in this action. Any remedy

would be limited to redressing plaintiff’s individual injuries, if any.

On September 5, 2006, plaintiff filed a request that the court take judicial notice

of federal receiver Robert Sillen’s report, submitted to U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson in

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 THE (N.D. Cal.) in which the delivery of medical

services to all California state prisoners confined by the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") is at issue. It is very doubtful that the report in question has any

relevance to this action. Nonetheless, because plaintiff must clarify his overcrowding claim in

his amended complaint, the request that judicial notice be taken of the report will be denied

without prejudice. 

D. Single-cell Status

In his final claim, plaintiff seeks restoration of his single-cell housing status

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff contends that for seven years, he was assigned

to a single-cell and that he continues to meet the criteria for this type of housing. However,

plaintiff alleges that because the prison population at CMF now exceeds its design capacity,

plaintiff and other prisoners no longer have single-cells. Plaintiff argues that for public safety

reasons, all prisoners at CMF should be placed in single-cells and that double-celling should be

eliminated. Plaintiff requests an evidentiary hearing and temporary restraining order requiring

that he be placed back in a single-cell. 

According to attachments to his complaint, on October 12, 2005, plaintiff was

placed on temporary single-cell status due to mental health issues. (Notice of Removal, Ex. A

(Pet. for Writ of mandamus), Ex. B at 3-4.) The unit classification committee noted that plaintiff

met the criteria for double-cell housing and that his single-cell status would be reviewed upon

expiration of the temporary single-cell chrono. (Id., Ex. B at 4.)

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The court finds that plaintiff’s exhibits do not support his contention that he

requires single-cell housing. Furthermore, plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is not

cognizable. Single-cell status has not been found to be a right protected by the Due Process

Clause. Generally, prison classifications do not give rise to a federal liberty interest. Hernandez

v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9

(1976)).

In any amended complaint he may elect to file, plaintiff should not reassert this

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

VI. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Plaintiff is cautioned that his federal claims are subject to the exhaustion

requirement. By the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Congress amended 42

U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The Supreme Court has ruled that exhaustion of prison administrative procedures

is mandated regardless of the relief offered through such procedures. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 741 (2001). The Court has also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into

the statutory exhaustion requirement. Id. at 741 n.6. Because proper exhaustion is necessary, a

prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. Woodford v. Ngo, U.S. , 126

S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006).

In California, state regulations permit prisoners to appeal “any departmental

decision, action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect

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upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). Most appeals progress from an

informal review through three formal levels of review. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5. A

decision at the third formal level, also referred to as the director’s level, is not appealable and

will conclude a prisoner’s administrative remedy. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) and

3084.5(e)(2). A California prisoner is required to submit an inmate appeal at the appropriate

level and proceed to the highest level of review available before filing suit. Butler v. Adams, 397

F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002).

On July 31, 2006, plaintiff filed a request that judicial notice be taken of attached

documents which allegedly demonstrated that he had exhausted prison remedies. The court will

deny plaintiff’s request at this time. If he wishes, plaintiff may address the issue of exhaustion 

in an amended complaint and may submit the documents in question as an attachment to his

amended complaint.

VII. The Amended Complaint

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how

the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or

statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint

must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of

plaintiff’s rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff is reminded that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to make

his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s June 22, 2006 request for voluntary dismissal is stricken;

2. Plaintiff’s July 7, 2006 and July 24, 2006 motions to vacate/strike his

voluntary dismissal are granted;

3. Plaintiff’s July 31, 2006 motion and request for judicial notice is denied;

4. Plaintiff’s September 5, 2006 request to supplement the complaint is denied;

5. Plaintiff’s September 5, 2006 request for judicial notice of the Sillen report is

denied without prejudice;

6. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; plaintiff must

use the form complaint provided by the court and answer each question on the form; failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed without prejudice; 

7. The Clerk of the Court is directed to provide plaintiff with the court’s form

complaint for a section 1983 action.

DATED: February 21, 2007.

DAD:4

asha1304.14+

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