Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01683/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Green, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 04-1683-PHX-ROS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1). In the Maricopa County Superior Court on August

9, 2000, pursuant to two plea agreements, Petitioner entered guilty pleas to a total of four

offenses in two separate cause numbers. Doc. #7, Exh. 1-2. Petitioner pled guilty to three

counts of burglary with a historical prior felony conviction and one count of burglary without

a historical prior felony conviction. Id. On October 13, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to

aggravated terms of six years in prison for each of the three burglary counts with a prior

conviction and three years for the burglary count without a prior conviction. Doc. #7, Exh.

3. The court ordered two of the six year sentences to run concurrently and the third to run

consecutive to the first two. Id. at 24. The court ordered the three year sentence to run

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1

 Respondents do not raise a failure to exhaust argument even though it is not at all

clear that Petitioner first raised his federal claims in state court. See Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) ("If a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he

is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its

similarity to the issues raised in state court."). Because the exhaustion issue has not been

raised, the court will address the claim on its merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) ("An

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.").

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consecutive to the first two six year sentences but concurrent with the third six year sentence.

Id. 

On March 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action in the Maricopa

County Superior Court challenging the length of his sentence. Doc. #7 at 4. The trial court

granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on November 5, 2002. Doc. #1, Exh. C.

Petitioner then filed a Special Action in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which the court

denied on March 11, 2003. Doc. #1, Exh. D. Petitioner's subsequent Petition for Review

was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on September 29, 2003. Doc. #1, Exh. G. 

On August 13, 2004, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1)

in this court. Petitioner identifies two grounds for relief. First, he alleges that his rights

under the Equal Protection Clause have been violated because he is being forced to serve a

longer sentence than the one imposed by the court. Second, he alleges that the same

circumstances also establish a violation of the Due Process Clause. On October 5, 2004,

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Habeas Corpus and Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

#7). Petitioner then filed a Reply (Doc. #8) on October 20, 2004.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that he is serving a longer sentence than the one imposed by the

court. Petitioner claims the sentencing judge intended the sentences to run concurrently but

the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC") has executed some of them to run

consecutively. Respondents argue that the transcript of the sentencing proceeding clearly

shows what the judge intended and that the sentence is being carried out properly.1

 

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28 2

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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A. Legal Standard

Under the AEDPA2

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review). 

As to the second prong, "a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on

a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

The AEDPA further provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct," and that the habeas petitioner bears "the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). "State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented

for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing

proof that the state-court finding is in error." Taylor v. Maddox, 336 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.

2004).

B. Factual Application

Relevant portions of the sentencing transcript attached to Respondents' Answer show

that on October 13, 2000, a Maricopa County Superior Court judge held the sentencing

hearing in Petitioner's two matters, CR2000-004191 and CR2000-003514. Doc. #7, Exh. 3.

In case number 003514, the court found Petitioner guilty of three counts of burglary with a

prior felony conviction (Counts 2, 3 and 8). Id. In case number 004191, the court found

Petitioner guilty of Count 1, burglary with no prior felony conviction. Id. Before imposing

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the sentence, the judge stated, "I do think that the maximum that I can give under this plea

agreement is what's called for based upon your prior record and the number of offenses

committed here...." Doc. #7, Exh. 3 at 24. The judge then sentenced Petitioner to an

aggravated term of six years each on Counts 2, 3 and 8. Id. Regarding Count 1 of the second

case, the judge sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of three years. Id. The judge

ordered the sentences to run as follows: 

Counts 2 and 3 of 003514 concurrently with one another, Count 8 is

consecutive to Counts 2 and 3, and Count 1 of 004191 is concurrent with

Count 8 of the other cause number but consecutive to Counts 2 and 3 on the

other cause number. 

Id. The judge further ordered Petitioner to receive credit for 232 days of presentence

incarceration on Counts 2 and 3 of 003514. Id. at 25.

The plea agreement for case number 003514 called for Petitioner to receive a sentence

of 4.5 to 6 years each on Counts 2, 3 and 8. Doc. #8, Exh. C. The plea required the

sentences for Counts 2 and 3 to run concurrently but it expressly stated there were "no

agreements" about whether the sentence for Count 8 would be consecutive to or concurrent

with the other two counts. Id. Additionally, the plea agreement in case number 004191

stated that if Petitioner was sentenced to prison on Count 1, it must run concurrent with the

sentence in Count 8 of 003514, but there were "no agreements" about whether it would run

consecutive to or concurrent with Counts 2 and 3 in 003514. Doc. #8, Exh. D. Thus, the

sentence announced by the judge in the sentencing hearing is authorized by the plea

agreements and is consistent with his statement that he wanted to give the maximum allowed

by the plea agreements.

Petitioner contends that the court's minute entries issued after the sentencing hearing

show that the judge intended to run the sentences for all counts concurrently. In the

sentencing minute entry for case number 003514, the sections addressing Counts 2 and 3

state that they are to run concurrent to each other and consecutive to Count 8 and Count 1 in

case number 004191. Doc. #7, Exh. 4 at 3-4. However, the section addressing Count 8 states

that the sentence is to be concurrent to Counts 2 and 3 and consecutive to Count 1. Id. at 5

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(emphasis added). The sentencing minute entry for case number 004191 states that the

sentence for Count 1 is to be concurrent with Counts 2 and 3 of 003514 and consecutive

with Count 8 of 003514. Doc. #8, Exh. B (emphasis in original).

In a subsequent minute entry dated July 9, 2001, the court denied a request from

Petitioner to receive pretrial incarceration credit on Count 8 in case number 003514. Doc.

#8, Exh. F. The court explained that because Count 8 is to be served consecutively to the

counts for which he is receiving pretrial incarceration credit, credit is not to be applied on

Count 8. Id. On September 11, 2001, Petitioner's counsel wrote a letter to the judge

regarding the sentencing minute entry in case number 004191. Doc. #8, Exh. G. On

November 22, 2001, the court issued an amended minute entry regarding Count 1 of case

number 004191. Doc. #8, Exh. H. It states that the Count 1 sentence is to be concurrent with

Count 8 of case number 003514 and that the prior minute entry is otherwise affirmed. Doc.

#8, Exh. H.

Petitioner subsequently filed a special action petition in the Maricopa County Superior

Court. The court granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on November 5, 2002.

Doc. #1, Exh. C. The judge who ruled on the motion stated that he inquired about the

sentencing judge's intent at the time of sentencing and it was consistent with the state's

position in its motion to dismiss. Id. Petitioner then filed a special action petition in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. #1, Exh. D. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's

contention that ADOC exceeded its authority by extending his sentence. Id. Petitioner

argued that by not running all the sentences concurrently, ADOC increased his total sentence

to 12 years when it should have been 6 years. Id.

The Court of Appeals opinion explains that the description of the sentence for Count

8 in the sentencing minute entry "likely gives rise to Green's incorrect belief that the trial

court intended that he serve the sentences for Counts 2, 3, and 8 concurrently with each

other, thereby resulting in a total sentence of six years for the three convictions instead of 12

years." Doc. #1, Exh. D at 2. The court stated however, that the July 9, 2001 minute entry

regarding pretrial incarceration credits and the transcript of the sentencing hearing clearly

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3

 The "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law"

prong of the AEDPA standard is not applicable here because Petitioner did not raise federal

law claims in his state court proceedings.

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establish the trial court's intent to run the sentence in Count 8 consecutive to the sentences

in Counts 2 and 3. Id. The court cited Arizona case law establishing that in the event of a

conflict between a sentencing minute entry and the oral pronouncement of the sentence, the

oral pronouncement controls. Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's

claim and found that ADOC correctly calculated his sentence. Id.

Applying the relevant legal standard under the AEDPA, this court finds that the state

courts' decisions in Petitioner's special action proceedings were not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.3

 The court further finds that

Petitioner has not rebutted the presumption of correctness that applies to the state courts'

factual determinations by clear and convincing evidence. In granting the state's motion to

dismiss Petitioner's special action, the trial court found that the sentencing judge intended the

sentence for Count 8 to run consecutively to Counts 2 and 3, resulting in a total sentence of

twelve years. The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion after finding that the

sentencing transcript and a subsequent minute entry regarding pretrial incarceration credits

clearly established the sentencing judge's intent. These findings are fully supported by the

state court record and are not at all unreasonable in light of that record. The inconsistencies

in the sentencing minute entries noted by Petitioner are not enough to overcome the

presumption of correctness that attaches to the state courts' determinations. Because the facts

as determined by the state courts do not establish violations of the Equal Protection or Due

Process Clauses, the court will recommend that petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied

and dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

That Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #7) be GRANTED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 26th day of August, 2005.

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