Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00345/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00345-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORENO BADDIE,

Petitioner,

v.

D. K. SISTO, et al.,

Respondents.

 No. 2:07-CV-0345-FVS 

 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition For

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Ct. Rec. 1). 

Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Respondent is represented by Andrew

R. Woodrow, a Deputy Attorney General for the State of California.

BACKGROUND

At the time his petition was filed, Petitioner was in the custody

of the California State Prison, Solano, in Vacaville, California,

pursuant to his 1990 conviction in Lake County Superior Court for

Second Degree Murder. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner is currently serving

a sentence of 15-years-to-life with a two-year enhancement for the use

of a firearm. He has not been found suitable for parole. 

Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction or

sentence but instead challenges the December 3, 2004, denial of parole

by the Board of Parole Hearings of the State of California (the

“BPH”). (Ct. Rec. 1).

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I. Factual History 

On May 12, 1989, two men, including the victim in this case,

burglarized Petitioner’s home. On May 14, 1989, the victim showed up

on Petitioner’s doorstep. Petitioner went to the door with a handgun

and informed the victim he was under citizen’s arrest for the

burglary. The victim refused to cooperate. Petitioner then shot the

victim five times, killing him.

II. Procedural History

On January 8, 1990, Petitioner was convicted in Lake County

Superior Court for Second Degree Murder and sentenced to 15-years-tolife with a two-year enhancement for the use of a firearm. Petitioner

has been incarcerated for the last 20 years. His minimum eligible

parole date was August 11, 2000. 

The parole denial which is the subject of this petition took

place after a parole hearing held on December 3, 2004. After the

December 3, 2004 denial, Petitioner filed petitions for a writ of

habeas corpus with the Lake County Superior Court, the California

Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, and the California Supreme

Court, all of which were denied. 

On February 21, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant petition for

writ of habeas corpus in this Court. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner

contends the BPH violated his due process rights by denying him parole

on December 3, 2004. (Id.). Petitioner additionally argues that the

BPH’s requirement that he participate in Alcoholics Anonymous in order

to be found suitable for parole violates his constitutional rights. 

(Id.). Respondent filed a response to the petition on April 18, 2007. 

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(Ct. Rec. 8). Petitioner filed a traverse to the response on June 21,

2007. (Ct. Rec. 14). Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

(Ct. Rec. 1) is now before the Court.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court

adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a

decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). 

“Clearly established federal law” consists of “the governing legal

principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the

state court render[ed] its decision.” Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d

781, 798 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70-73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)). A decision is

“contrary to” clearly established federal law in two circumstances. 

First, a state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law when “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Williams, 529 U.S.

at 405. Second, a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law when the state court “arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

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on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-413. A

state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law when

it applies the law in a manner that is “objectively unreasonable.” 

Id. at 409. “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters under §

2254(d)(1) - whether a state court decision is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. 

In examining whether state courts reached a decision that was

contrary to federal law or whether the state courts unreasonably

applied such law, the Court should look to the last reasoned state

court decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)

cert. dismissed, 538 U.S. 919, 123 S.Ct. 1571, 155 L.Ed.2d 308 (2003). 

Where no reasoning is given in either the state court of appeals or

the state supreme court, Ninth Circuit Courts must determine whether a

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable based on an

independent review of the record. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848,

853 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-982

(9th Cir. 2000). “Independent review of the record is not de novo

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by

which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is

objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

Here, neither the First District Court of Appeal nor the

California Supreme Court issued a “reasoned opinion”: both courts

summarily denied review. (Ct. Rec. 8, Exhs. 4 & 5). The Lake County

Superior Court issued a one-paragraph denial indicating that there was

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some evidence in the record to support the decision of the BPH. (Ct.

Rec. 8, Exh. 3). The Lake County Superior Court decision is the last

reasoned decision from a California state court. Therefore, this

Court shall examine the superior court’s decision to determine whether

there existed a contrary or unreasonable application of federal law at

the state level with regard to Petitioner’s claims. 

II. Due Process

Petitioner alleges that his due process rights were violated

because the BPH’s denial of parole was not supported by “some

evidence” that he currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to

public safety. (Ct. Rec. 1).

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, the government is prohibited from depriving an inmate of

life, liberty or property without the due process of law. U.S. Const.

amends. V, XIV. A prisoner’s due process claim must be analyzed in

two steps: the first asks whether the state has interfered with a

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest of the

prisoner, and the second asks whether the procedures accompanying that

interference were constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006).

A. Liberty Interest in Parole

Respondent contends that California inmates do not have a

federally protected liberty interest in parole and that Petitioner is

thus not able to state a claim for federal habeas relief. (Ct. Rec. 8

at 7-9). 

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The United States Supreme Court has determined that there is no

federal constitutional right of a convicted person to be conditionally

released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Under Greenholtz, the

due process protections guaranteed in a parole hearing are minimal,

requiring only an opportunity to be heard and notice of the reasons

for the adverse decision. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. Petitioner

does not argue that he was deprived of either of these protections. 

Petitioner instead argues that the BPH decision was not supported

by “some evidence.” While there is no federal constitutional

requirement that parole be granted in the absence of “some evidence”

of future dangerousness or anything else, Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16;

Hayward v. Marshall, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 1664977 at *10 (9th Cir.

April 22, 2010), the United States Supreme Court has determined that

state parole statutes can create a federally protected liberty

interest in parole if the statute uses mandatory language that creates

a presumption that parole will be granted if certain findings are

made. See, Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-378 (1987);

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. 

California statutes and regulations afford a prisoner serving an

indeterminate life sentence an expectation of parole unless, in the

judgment of the parole authority, the prisoner “will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 

Title 15 Cal. Code Regs., § 2402(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty

interest in release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

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902 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying “the ‘clearly established’ framework of

Greenholtz and Allen” to California’s parole scheme). The Ninth

Circuit also held in Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir.

2007), that California Penal Code § 3041 vests all “prisoners whose

sentences provide for the possibility of parole with a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole

release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural

safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” This “liberty interest is

created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the

incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Although the Ninth Circuit in Hayward avoided “deciding whether

the California parole scheme establishes a predicate for imposing it

as a matter of federal constitutional law,” Hayward, 2010 WL 1664977

at *11, it appears that the California parole scheme does give rise to

a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. In any event, the

Court declines to address this issue, because continuing with the

“some evidence” analysis leads to the same result in this case, a

denial of the instant petition.

 B. “Some Evidence”

A parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process with

respect to his constitutionally protected liberty interest in a parole

release date if the board’s decision is not supported by “‘some

evidence in the record,’ or is ‘otherwise arbitrary.’” Irons, 505

F.3d at 851 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)

(holding the “some evidence” standard applies in prison disciplinary

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proceedings)). The “some evidence” standard requires this Court to

determine “whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the . . . board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at

455-456. 

“To determine whether the some evidence standard is met ‘does not

require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead,

the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached’” by the parole board. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456). The “some

evidence standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Id. at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S.

at 457).

In order to determine whether “some evidence” supported the BPH’s

decision with respect to Petitioner, the Court must consider the

California statutes and regulations that govern the BPH’s decisionmaking. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Under California law, the BPH

must set a release date “unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration . . . and that a parole date therefore, cannot be fixed

. . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). The overriding concern in

determining parole suitability is public safety and the focus is on

the inmate’s current dangerousness. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th

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1061, 1086, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d 783, cert. denied, 546 U.S.

844, 126 S.Ct. 92 (2005). 

The BPH has promulgated regulations setting forth the guidelines

it must follow when determining parole suitability. See Cal. Code.

Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c) and (d). Circumstances tending to show that

a prisoner is unsuitable for release include the following: 

(1) the commitment offense, where the offense was committed in an

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) the

prisoner’s previous record of violence; (3) “a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; (4) commission

of “sadistic sexual offenses”; (5) “a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense”; and (6) “serious

misconduct in prison or jail.” 

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c). Circumstances tending to

show suitability for release include: 

(1) the prisoner has no juvenile record of assaulting others or

committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims;

(2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships

with others; (3) the prisoner has performed acts that tend to

indicate the presence of remorse or has given indications that he

understands the nature and magnitude of his offense; (4) the

prisoner committed the crime as the result of significant stress

in his life; (5) the prisoner lacks any significant history of

violent crime; (6) the prisoner’s present age reduces the

probability of recidivism; (7) the prisoner “has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be

put to use upon release”; and (8) “[i]nstitutional activities

indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release.”

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d). 

In examining its own statutory and regulatory framework, the

California Supreme Court has held that the proper inquiry for a

reviewing court is “whether some evidence supports the decision of the

Board . . . that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public

safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of

certain factual findings.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212

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(2008). The California Supreme Court also asserted that the Board’s

decision must demonstrate an individualized consideration of the

specified criteria, but “[i]t is not the existence or nonexistence of

suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole

decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors

interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the

public.” Id. at 1204-1205. As long as the evidence underlying the

BPH’s decision has “some indicia of reliability,” parole has not been

arbitrarily denied. Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389,

1390 (9th Cir. 1987).

In this case, the BPH determined that Petitioner was unsuitable

for parole finding that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger

to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. (Ct.

Rec. 8, Exh. 2 at 53-61). The BPH determined that Petitioner’s

commitment offense was carried out in an extremely callous and

calculated manner. The BPH found that the victim was abused by being

shot five times and that Petitioner showed a total disregard for human

suffering. The BPH also found Petitioner’s motive for the crime,

retaliation for stealing a stereo, trivial in relation to the offense,

and that Petitioner had a criminal history, including jail time and

two years probation. The BPH additionally cited Petitioner’s failure

to sufficiently participate in self-help programming and comments from

psychiatric reports. After considering all reliable evidence in the

record, the BPH concluded that evidence of Petitioner’s positive

behavior in prison did not outweigh the evidence of his unsuitability

for parole. Id.

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With regard to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the

BPH found that the offense was carried out in an extremely callous

manner. (Id. at 53). Although the focus under California law is the

current dangerousness of the inmate, the gravity of the commitment

offense alone can be a sufficient basis for denying parole where the

facts are especially heinous or particularly egregious. In re

Rosenbrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 682 (2002); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1126;

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913-916; Irons, 505 F.3d at 852-853. However, the

Ninth Circuit very recently noted in Hayward that “an aggravated

offense does not establish current dangerousness ‘unless the record

also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or postincarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental

state’ supports the inference of dangerousness.” Hayward, 2010 WL

1664977 at *10.

Here, Petitioner confronted the victim with a loaded handgun

because the victim had stolen a stereo from Petitioner. (Id. at 53). 

Petitioner then shot the victim, without provocation, when the victim

failed to cooperate with an attempted citizen’s arrest. (Id. at 59). 

The victim was abused by being shot five times. (Id.). Based upon

these facts, the BPH reasonably concluded that the murder was carried

out very dispassionately and in a calculated manner. (Id. at 53). 

The BPH also discussed Petitioner’s criminal history and failure

to profit from society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality. 

(Id. at 54). The applicable guidelines direct the BPH to consider all

relevant and reliable information, including “a prisoner’s past

criminal history,” and “behavior before, during, and after [the

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offense].” Title 15 Cal. Code Regs., § 2402(b). As a result, the BPH

properly considered Petitioner’s prior arrests for loitering and arson

and convictions for disturbing the peace and battery for which

Petitioner received jail time and probation. (Ct. Rec. 8, Exh. 2 at

54, 59). Petitioner’s prior criminal history and grant of probation

provide some evidence to support the BPH’s finding that Petitioner has

a pattern of criminal conduct and has failed to profit from society’s

previous attempts to correct his criminality.

The BPH lastly found that Petitioner had not completed the

necessary programming which is essential to his adjustment. (Id. at

59). The BPH specifically noted that Petitioner lacked participation

in self-help therapy programs, like Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) and

Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”). (Ct. Rec. 8, Exh. 2 at 55). During the

hearing, the BPH indicated the 2004 psychiatric report of Dr. Preston

Davis revealed Petitioner had started drinking alcohol at the age of

14 and that Petitioner claims to be an alcoholic, yet he has not

attended AA or NA. Id. The BPH also noted the 1999 report of Dr.

Katherine Powell. Dr. Powell indicated that if Petitioner was

released and returned to the consumption of alcohol, there is a

possibility that he could act out aggressively. (Id. at 56). While

Dr. Powell opined that this was unlikely due to Petitioner’s age and

maturity, she stated that Petitioner should be required to attend AA

both in and out of the institution. (Id. at 56-57). Petitioner,

however, has no record of participation in NA or AA. Accordingly,

there is some evidence to support the BPH’s finding that Petitioner

lacked participation in self-help therapy programs.

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Based on the foregoing, it is apparent there was “some evidence”

to support the BPH’s December 3, 2004 decision that Petitioner was

unsuitable for release.

III. The First Amendment

Petitioner also argues that the BPH’s decision violated his First

Amendment rights because the panel relied in part on Petitioner’s

failure to participate in AA or NA, religion-based programs.

“It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution

guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or

participate in religion, or its exercise . . . .” Lee v. Weisman, 505

U.S. 577, 587 (1992). The “coercion test” for a First Amendment

violation looks to: (1) whether there was state action; (2) whether

the state action amounted to coercion; and (3) whether the object of

the coercion was religious or secular. Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705,

713 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying “coercion test” to parolee’s § 1983

action challenging a requirement that he attend a faith-based

treatment program as a condition for remaining on parole); Turner v.

Hickman, 342 F.Supp.2d 887, 894-895 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (applying

“coercion test” to § 1983 action alleging inmates were required to

participate in a faith-based treatment program as a condition for

release on parole).

In the parole suitability context, the first element is satisfied

if the parole board expressly states that the prisoner must

participate in the faith-based program. Turner, 342 F.Supp.2d. at

895-896. The second element is met if the board advises the prisoner

he will not be eligible for parole unless he participates in the

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faith-based program. Id. at 896. Programs such as AA and NA are

“fundamentally religious” within the meaning of the third element of

the coercion test. Id. at 896-897; accord Inouye, 504 F.3d at 713-

714.

Although the BPH discussed Petitioner’s failure to participate in

self help programs like AA and NA, nothing in the BPH’s decision

required Petitioner’s participation in AA or NA. (Ct. Rec. 8, Exh. 2

at 55-60). The BPH recommended that “if available [petitioner should]

participate in self help, specifically a substance abuse program . . .

.” (Id. at 60). The BPH, however, did not indicate that Petitioner’s

participation in AA or NA was a condition to being found parole

eligible. Therefore, Petitioner does not satisfy the “coercion test”

for proving a First Amendment violation. Turner, 342 F.Supp.2d at

891-892 (hearing officer advised Petitioner that his participation in

NA was a “mandatory” prerequisite to the board’s parole suitability

determination). Petitioner’s First Amendment claim is without merit.

IV. ADA

Petitioner further asserts that the BPH violated the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by denying parole based on his

alcoholism and psychiatric history. First, it does not appear that

Petitioner raised an ADA claim with the state courts; therefore, it

appears he failed to exhaust this issue. In any event, Petitioner has

not shown that alcoholism is considered a disability under the ADA or

that his mental illness or alcoholism qualifies as a disability under

the ADA. Petitioner’s ADA claim is denied. 

///

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CONCLUSION

Petitioner was appropriately commended by the BPH for his

accomplishments in prison. Petitioner was given credit for being in

Triple CMS and, as a result, being able to attend many therapy

courses. Petitioner was credited for beginning stress management,

taking several training courses, working towards his GED and being

discipline free. (Ct. Rec. 8, Exh. 2 at 58). However, as discussed

above, there was still “some evidence” justifying the BPH’s decision

to deny parole based on Petitioner being a danger to society if

released. Accordingly, Petitioner’s due process rights were not

violated by the denial of parole at his December 3, 2004 hearing. 

Petitioner’s First Amendment and ADA claims also lacks merit.

 The Lake County Superior Court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s

claim did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court

precedent. It also did not result in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Ct. Rec. 1) is DENIED. Judgment

shall be entered in favor of Respondents and against Petitioner. 

The Court further certifies that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good

faith, and there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).

///

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 15

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IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby

directed to enter this order, enter judgment accordingly, furnish

copies to counsel and Petitioner and CLOSE THE FILE.

DATED this 3rd day of June, 2010.

 S/Fred Van Sickle 

Fred Van Sickle

Senior United States District Judge

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 16

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