Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00430/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00430-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS VAN ZANDT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-15-0430 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

Before the Court is plaintiff Thomas Van Zandt’s “Ex Parte Application for Temporary

Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction,” filed

February 9, 2015. Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), the entity plaintiff

seeks to enjoin, has not yet appeared in the above-titled action. Having read and

considered the application, the Court rules as follows.

In his complaint, plaintiff, who proceeds on his own behalf and in his capacity as the

personal representative of the Estate of Jeanne E. Malis, alleges he resides at 22 Ethel

Avenue, Mill Valley, California, and that a mortgage on said real property is presently being

serviced by SPS. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in November

2009 and to the present, he has sought a loan modification, first from the prior servicer and

then from SPS, who began servicing the loan in May 2012, and that, to date, he has not

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Although the complaint includes causes of action in addition to the claim brought

under § 2923.7(b), plaintiff does not rely on any such causes of action in support of the

instant application.

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been advised whether a loan modification will be provided. (See Compl. ¶¶ 59-118.) 

Plaintiff alleges that his last such unsuccessful request resulted in SPS promising, on

December 23, 2014, to send him an “assumption package” within ten business days, but

that SPS never sent him the materials. (See Compl. ¶¶ 115-117.) Plaintiff further alleges

that SPS has scheduled a “trustee sale to occur on February 11, 2015.” (See Compl.

¶ 119.) Based on the above allegations, plaintiff asserts, inter alia, SPS has violated

§ 2923.7 of the California Civil Code.

Under § 2923.7, a loan servicer, “[u]pon request from a borrower who requests a

foreclosure alternative,” must “promptly establish a single point of contact,” see Cal. Civ.

Code § 2923.7(a), which person is “responsible,” inter alia, for “[c]ommunicating the

process by which a borrower may apply for an available foreclosure prevention alternative

and the deadline for any required submissions,” as well as for “[c]oordinating receipt of all

documents associated with available foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the

borrower of any missing documents,” and “[e]nsuring that a borrower is considered for all

foreclosure prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer, if any,” 

see Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(b).

By the instant application, plaintiff seeks an order restraining SPS from proceeding

with the scheduled trustee sale. In support thereof, plaintiff relies on his declaration, in

which he sets forth facts that assertedly show he is likely to succeed on the merits of his

claim that SPS, by failing to respond to his requests for a loan modification, has engaged in

a material violation of § 2923.7, thus entitling him to injunctive relief. See Cal. Civ. Code

§ 2924.12(a)(1) (holding, where “trustee’s deed upon trust has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation of Section

. . . 2923.7”).1

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon

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A motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction

are subject to the same requirements. See New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

3

On February 9, 2015, the same date plaintiff filed the instant application, a bill to

amend the statutory definition of “borrower” was introduced in the California Legislature,

which bill, if ultimately enacted, would expand the definition of “borrower” to include the

“successor in interest to the mortgagor or trustor following the death of the mortgagor or

trustor,” and defines “successor in interest” as a “natural person who provides the

mortgage servicer with notification of the death of the mortgagor or trustor and reasonable

documentation showing that the person is . . . [t]he personal representative . . . of the

mortgagor’s or trustor’s estate.” See Assemb. B. 244, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).

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a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” See Winter v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A party is entitled to a preliminary injunction only if such

party demonstrates that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See id. at 20.2

Here, as discussed below, plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on the

merits of his claims, and, consequently, has failed to show his entitlement to a restraining

order. See Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987)

(holding “injunction should not issue” where moving party “shows no chance of success on

the merits”).

The protections provided under § 2923.7 are available only to a “borrower,” see Cal.

Civ. Code § 2923.7(a), which term is defined as “any natural person who is a mortgagor or

trustor and who is potentially eligible for any federal, state, or proprietary foreclosure

prevention alternative program offered by, or through, his or her mortgage service,” see

Cal. Civ. § 2920.5(c)(1). Although plaintiff is a “natural person,” plaintiff has offered no

evidence, nor even alleged, that he is the “mortgagor or trustor”; rather, plaintiff alleges the

mortgagor was his now-deceased mother-in-law. (See Compl. ¶ 13, 50.) As a result, the

mortgagor is, and since the time of § 2923’s enactment has been, an estate, i.e., not a

“natural person.” (See Van Zandt Decl. Ex. 1 (letter from SPS to plaintiff listing name of

“customer” as “Estate of Jeanne E. Malis” and stating SPS would “review [plaintiff] for a

possible assumption of the loan”).)3

 In sum, there being no showing that plaintiff is a

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“borrower” for purposes of § 2923.7, plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on a

claim brought thereunder.

Accordingly, the application is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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