Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00477/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00477-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Nathaniel Brown,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 04-0477 DFL PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Sacramento County Sheriff

Department, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff filed this action as a state prisoner without

counsel; he subsequently was released from incarceration. 

Plaintiff claims Sacramento Sheriff Deputies Prehoda and

Randonjic violated his civil rights when they used excessive

force to arrest him on April 9, 2003.

Defendants moved April 22, 2005, for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff did not oppose. 

Case 2:04-cv-00477-DFL-PAN Document 25 Filed 01/25/06 Page 1 of 7
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Standard on Summary Judgment.

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id., at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence 

to support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on

an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the 

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opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id., at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

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A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting 

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987); see also

Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v.

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004).

Application.

In his verified complaint, plaintiff, who is black, states

that he ran as Prehoda chased him on foot but then stopped

running and got down on the ground. Plaintiff states Prehoda

used racial epithets and beat him with a baton on the face and

head for about 10 minutes while plaintiff neither resisted nor

struggled. Randonjic joined Prehoda’s attack and the officers

kicked plaintiff in the testicles, head and ribs. They sprayed

pepper spray over plaintiff’s open wounds then hosed him with

water, causing additional pain. Defendants destroyed plaintiff’s

bloody clothes so they could not be used as evidence. Plaintiff

claims defendants Prehoda and Randnojic violated his rights under

the Fourth and Eighth Amendments and the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment and committed state torts of assault and

battery and negligence. Plaintiff claims defendant Sacramento

County Sheriff’s Department is liable for inadequate supervision,

training and control of its officers.

Defendants meet their moving burden of establishing they are

entitled to summary judgment on Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment claims, as a matter of law, because plaintiff was not a 

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convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee at the time of the

attack. They also meet their moving burden on tort claims based

on plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California Tort Claims

Act. The Sheriff’s Department establishes it is entitled to

summary judgment under Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff fails to oppose and defendants

have earned summary judgment on each of these claims.

The excessive force claim is governed by Graham v. Conner,

490 U.S. 386 (1989). Claims that law enforcement officers used

excessive force in seizing a free citizen are analyzed under the

“objective reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment. 490

U.S. at 396. In applying the test of reasonableness a court must

give heed to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to evade arrest by flight. The issue of reasonableness may be

decided as a matter of law if, in resolving all factual disputes

in favor of the plaintiff, the officer’s force was “objectively

reasonable” under the circumstances. Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001); Scott v.

Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Defendants present uncontested evidence that Prehoda pulled

plaintiff over because the truck plaintiff was driving had a

broken tail light and no rear license plate and that plaintiff

repeatedly disregarded Prehoda’s orders and fled on foot, 

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fighting off Prehoda twice and resuming flight. See Prehoda

Decl. paras. 1-6. Prehoda finally caught up with plaintiff,

wrestled him to the ground and ordered him to stop fighting. Id.

paras. 7-11. Prehoda did not know whether plaintiff had any

weapons. Id. para. 12. 

Defendants also submit evidence plaintiff continued to

struggle and Prehoda and Randonjic used only the degree of force

necessary to subdue plaintiff and place him in handcuffs. This

evidence is controverted by the verified complaint which states

defendants beat plaintiff for 10 minutes while he was not

resisting. Medical records submitted on summary judgment are

consistent with either scenario. 

Defendants point out that plaintiff failed to respond to

requests for admission they served on him in February 2005 (viz.,

“admit . . . you did not obey the officer’s command to get down

and stop fighting,” “admit that after the officer sprayed you

with the pepper spray you continued to fight and struggle with

the officer to get away,” “admit that after you were handcuffed .

. . you continued struggling”). The failure to respond to a

request for admission under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 results in an

automatic admission of the matters requested; the admission is

self-executing and can be used as evidence in support of summary

judgment. Federal Trade Comm. v. Medicor LLC, 217 F. Supp. 2d

1048, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2002); United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d

1345, 1349 (7th Cir. 1987); American Auto. Ass’n v. AAA legal

Clinic of Jefferson CrOoke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 

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1991). 

Any matter admitted under Rule 36 is “conclusively

established” unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or

amendment of the admission. Plaintiff fails to oppose summary

judgment or otherwise move for withdrawal or amendment of his

admissions. Nevertheless, the matters admitted do not justify

the degree of force used by defendants, as alleged in the

complaint. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendants’ April

22, 2005, motion for summary judgment be denied.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: January 24, 2006. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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