Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00945/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00945-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERMAINE ROBERT BLAIR,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-00945-BAS(RBB)

ORDER:

(1)ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION IN 

PART (ECF No. 31); 

(2)GRANTING MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 19, 20); AND

(3)DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS 

WITH RESPECT TO 

DEFENDANT TRIMBLE 

(ECF No. 22)

v.

M. TRIMBLE, et al.,

Defendants.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Allegations in the Complaint 

On October 7, 2014, as he was leaving the dining room at Calipatria State 

Prison, Plaintiff Jermaine Robert Blair claims he heard Correction Officer (“C.O.”) 

Trimble say, “Yeah, shithead, I’m talking to you!” to which Blair responded, “Fuck 

you.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) C.O. Trimble then approached Blair “in an 

aggressive manner” and, although Blair complied with his orders to turn around, he 

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“appl[ied] the handcuffs with such force they lacerated my skin and immediately 

stopped circulation.” (Id.) C.O. Trimble then proceeded to “put his hand in an 

unconventional manner between my arm and over my shoulder to propel me 

forward” to the Program Office. (Id.) Enroute to the Program Office, words were 

exchanged, and C.O. Trimble “then attempted to slam me face first into the asphalt 

but I ended up on my knees; with him now applying a choke hold, attempting to 

choke me out.” (Id.) Blaire claims the incident was captured on videotape and will 

confirm that C.O. Trimble’s “actions were excessive, unnecessary and without 

justifiable provocation.” (Id.)

B. The Disciplinary Hearing1

At Blair’s November 13, 2014, disciplinary hearing, it was alleged that, on 

October 7, 2014, Blair resisted C.O. Trimble in the performance of his duties. (ECF 

No. 22-2, Ex. A.) The Hearing Officer considered a videotape of the incident, 

written reports from C.O. Trimble, as well as other witnesses, and Blair’s oral 

testimony. (Id.) The Hearing Officer found Blair guilty of resisting a peace officer 

in the performance of his duties, because, at the initial escort, the video showed Blair 

stop and pull away, which temporarily prevented the escort from proceeding. (Id.) 

When asked at the hearing why he had initially paused, Blair was unable to explain 

the pause, so “[a]t that point, Inmate Blair began to resist which reasonably caused 

the officer to make adjustments on his grip before continuing with the escort.” (Id.) 

The Hearing Officer made no findings about the later confrontation in which Blair 

was taken down to his knees or C.O. Trimble allegedly administered a choke hold, 

nor did the Hearing Officer make any findings about the tightness of the handcuffs.

As a result of the guilty finding, Blair was assessed 90 days forfeiture of 

credits and 10 days loss of yard. (Id.)

 

1 C.O. Trimble requests that the Court take judicial notice of documents supporting Blair’s 

November 13, 2014, disciplinary hearing. (ECF No. 22-2.) Blair does not object to this request, 

and the Court finds it is appropriate. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews de novo those portions of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). 

The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. However, “[t]he statute [28 

U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(c)] makes it clear that the district judge must review the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but 

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(en banc); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) 

(concluding that where no objections were filed, the district court had no obligation 

to review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the Constitution nor the statute 

requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the 

parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. This rule of 

law is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and this district. See Wang v. Masaitis, 

416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, de novo review of a R & R is 

only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 

F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting report in its entirety 

without review because neither party filed objections to the report despite the 

opportunity to do so).

Objections must be written and specific. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) 

(“[A] party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings 

and recommendations” of the magistrate judge.) “Numerous courts have held that 

a general objection to the entirety of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R has the same effect 

as a failure to object.” Alcantara v. McEwen, No. 12-cv-401 IEG (DHB), 2013 WL 

4517861 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing cases).

//

//

//

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III. ANALYSIS

Blair indicates that he accepts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R on the two 

Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 33.) Hence, the Court GRANTS the 

Motions for Summary Judgment with respect to Defendants McNair, Montgomery,

and Valdez. (ECF Nos. 19, 20.)

Blair objects only to the Motion to Dismiss with respect to Defendant 

Trimble. (ECF No. 33.) Therefore, the Court turns to the Magistrate Judge’s reasons 

for recommending dismissal with respect to Trimble. 

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that if a 

plaintiff seeks damages in a case that would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of an 

underlying conviction, the plaintiff cannot pursue a claim for damages and the 

complaint must be dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. The Supreme Court extended 

this doctrine to a prisoner’s claim for damages in a case that would “necessarily 

imply the invalidity” of a disciplinary proceeding. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 

641 (1997).

The Ninth Circuit has found, however, that “a conviction [for resisting arrest] 

does not bar a [42 U.S.C. § 1983] claim for excessive force under Heck when the 

conviction and the § 1983 claim are based on different actions during ‘one 

continuous transaction.’” Hooper v. Co. of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2011). Thus, by extension, if a plaintiff alleges a scenario whereby both the 

defendant acted with excessive force and the prison disciplinary infraction is valid, 

Heck is inapplicable. See Brown v. Holland, No. C 13-2762 NC (PR), 2014 WL 

1339687, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); William v. Young, No. 2:12-cv-318 KJN 

P, 2014 WL 505184, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014) (noting that if a reasonable fact

finder could find the plaintiff violated Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3005 and the 

defendant had used excessive force, the excessive force finding would not 

necessarily imply invalidity of the disciplinary conviction, and thus Heck is 

inapplicable).

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Although the R&R finds “the actions complained of in Plaintiff’s claim 

against Trimble arise from a factual predicate inseparable from those giving rise to 

the rules violation,” a review of the disciplinary record shows otherwise. The 

Hearing Officer specifically found that Blair resisted C.O. Trimble “at the initial 

escort” when he pulled away, or paused, preventing the escort from proceeding, 

“caus[ing] the officer to make adjustments on his grip before continuing with the 

escort.” (ECF No. 22-2, Ex. A.) Therefore, to the extent Blair seeks damages 

because Trimble “put his hand in an unconventional manner between my arm and 

over my shoulder to propel me forward,” the Court agrees that this claim was 

negated by the guilty finding in the disciplinary hearing and is thus barred by Heck.

However, the Hearing Officer makes no findings about the later take down 

and alleged choke hold on the way to the Program Office, nor does the Hearing 

Officer make any findings about the alleged tightness of the handcuffs. These are 

the two primary allegations in Blair’s Complaint. Thus, it is conceivable that a fact 

finder could conclude that Blair resisted a peace officer when he pulled away from 

Trimble at the onset of the escort, but that Trimble used excessive force when he 

first handcuffed Blair and when he later took Blair to his knees and applied a choke 

hold. Because such an excessive force finding would not necessarily imply 

invalidity of the disciplinary conviction, Heck is inapplicable to these claims of 

excessive force.

Next, because the Court rejects the R&R’s conclusion with respect to Heck, 

the Court must turn to Trimble’s second argument that he is protected by qualified 

immunity. The Court agrees with the R&R that dismissing the case based on 

qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings would be premature. 

The defense of qualified immunity shields “government officials . . . from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The law is clear 

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that use of excessive force by correction officers on a prisoner is a violation of the 

Eight Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986), abrogated on 

other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010).

Trimble argues that “[a] reasonable officer in Trimble’s position would not 

have believed it unlawful to secure with significant force . . . a resistive and evasive 

inmate, who had yet to be detained.” (ECF No. 22-1.) This is an issue that is more 

properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment, where Defendant is entitled 

to present evidence on his behalf, and the Court may properly consider such 

evidence. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming 

court’s denial of motion seeking dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity 

because the court’s review was limited to the allegations in the complaint). 

Whether Blair was “resistive and evasive” at the time Trimble applied the 

handcuffs or at the time Trimble was alleged to have taken Blair to his knees and 

placed him in a choke hold, whether the force was reasonable and necessary to detain 

Blair, or whether Blair was already detained, are issues that require consideration of 

the evidence. Presumably, the existence of a videotape will allow the Court to 

resolve this issue on a motion for summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 379-81 (2007). Hence, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Defendant 

Trimble.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In sum, Blair indicates that he accepts the R&R’s conclusions on the two 

Motions for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Court APPROVES and 

ADOPTS the R&R IN PART (ECF No. 31) and GRANTS Defendants’ Motions 

for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 19, 20). Defendants McNair, Montgomery, and 

Valdez are DISMISSED from the case. 

The Court REJECTS the R&R to the extent it recommends dismissal of 

Defendant Trimble. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) is

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DENIED as to Defendant Trimble. Last, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

TERMINATED AS MOOT with respect to Defendants Montgomery and McNair. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2016

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