Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00779/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00779-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Sudberry, et al., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV09-0779-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant City of Phoenix’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. # 47). 

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must produce evidence and show there is no genuine

issue of material fact. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

party must show that there are genuine issues of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. A factual issue is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Id. 

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The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying the

basis for its motion and those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has carried its burden, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense by more than

simply showing “there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Where the record,

taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. 

On summary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence is presumed true, and all

inferences from the evidence are drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). If the

nonmoving party produces direct evidence of a genuine issue of fact, the Court does not

weigh such evidence against the moving party’s conflicting evidence, but rather denies

the motion and leaves the issue to the trier of fact for resolution. Id.

II. Facts Presumed True for the Purpose of Deciding the City’s Motion for

Summary Judgment

Following a court hearing on December 10, 2007, seventeen-year-old Daniel Byrd

(“Byrd”), who had spent years in Juvenile Intensive Probation Services, standard

probation, and juvenile treatment or detention facilities, was released to the care and

custody of his older half-brother Stephen Byrd and placed on juvenile probation. On

December 30, 2007, Stephen Byrd was arrested and detained in Kingman, Arizona, on

drug and weapons charges. 

On January 10, 2008, Officer Douglas Beland of the Phoenix Police Department

responded to a call from Moon Valley High School regarding an assault and theft

purportedly committed by Byrd against his seventeen-year-old ex-girlfriend, Kaitlyn

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Sudberry (“Kaitlyn”). Kaitlyn and Byrd had dated for a year or two until they broke up in

approximately late December 2007. 

Officer Beland’s report indicates that Kaitlyn said that on January 10, 2008, when

she was walking through a school common area between classes, Byrd grabbed her

sweatshirt and told her she owed him $70. When Kaitlyn denied owing him the money,

Byrd grabbed her backpack from her shoulder, took her driver’s license from it, and

returned the backpack to her. He told Kaitlyn he was going to keep the driver’s license

until she paid him the money and walked away. Kaitlyn reported the incident to the

school’s assistant principal who retrieved the driver’s license from Byrd and returned it to

Kaitlyn. Kaitlyn told Officer Beland that she was not injured and her shirt was not

damaged, but she wanted to press charges against Byrd for “grabbing her.” Officer

Beland obtained Byrd’s name, address, and telephone number from the assistant

principal, but was unable to speak with Byrd at school that day because Byrd had been

suspended.

Officer Christopher Granado’s report states that on January 11, 2008, Granado was

assigned to investigate this case and sent a letter to Kaitlyn’s parents to determine

whether they wanted to prosecute Byrd or if they were satisfied with the school’s

intervention. On January 15, 2008, Officer Granado received a message from Kaitlyn’s

stepmother, Bobbi Sudberry, indicating that she wanted to prosecute Byrd for the January

10, 2008 incident. 

On January 18, 2008, Officer Granado went to the school, pulled Byrd out of class,

and spoke to him regarding the January 10, 2008 incident. According to Officer

Granado’s report, Byrd became irritated that Kaitlyn had reported the incident, raised his

voice, and told the officer that Kaitlyn had “tried to run [him] over.” Upon being

informed of his Miranda rights, Byrd stated he did not wish to waive them, and the

interview was stopped. Officer Granado informed Byrd that he would be submitting

charges against Byrd for theft and Byrd was free to return to class.

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On January 22, 2008, on school grounds, Byrd reportedly grabbed Kaitlyn by the

straps of her backpack, shook her, and yelled at her. Kaitlyn said Byrd screamed at her,

“Why are you pressing charges?” and “You don’t care that my life is crap.” A witness

said Byrd appeared to be very angry and screamed at Kaitlyn, “You need to understand,”

while Kaitlyn kept yelling, “Let go of me.” Teachers interceded, and Byrd was

suspended from school. School staff communicated to police that Byrd had “a high

tendency for violence.” 

Also on January 22, 2008, the Phoenix Police Department received a telephone

call from Byrd’s biological mother, Lucille Revelles, who stated that Byrd was distraught

and had made a verbal threat to murder Kaitlyn and take his own life. After the call,

Officer James Walik went to Byrd’s residence three different times that day to check

Byrd’s welfare, but Byrd was not there, and his location was unknown.

On January 23, 2008, Sergeant Roger Heinrich met at school with the assistant

principal. They spoke with Byrd by telephone. Byrd told them he hated Kaitlyn, but he

was not going to kill her. The assistant principal informed Byrd that he was going to be

suspended and transferred to a different school. Sergeant Heinrich did not inform Byrd

that he was sending police officers to arrest him. Sergeant Heinrich anticipated that Byrd

may have had a weapon. Five officers went to Byrd’s residence to arrest him, but they

received no answer at the door.

On January 23, 2008, Sergeant Heinrich also contacted Bobbi Sudberry, told her

that he thought the threat was real, advised that she obtain an order of protection for

Kaitlyn, and recommended keeping Kaitlyn home from school. Kaitlyn stayed home

from school that day. Sergeant Heinrich also contacted Byrd’s probation officer and

informed her of the assaults and threat. Further, Sergeant Heinrich assigned police

officers to cover the school throughout the remainder of the school day. 

Also on January 23, 2008, Officer Granado spoke with Bobbi Sudberry who told

the officer that two additional incidents, an assault and a threat, had occurred off school

grounds the day before. Officer Granado determined that these incidents were being

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investigated by the Assaults Unit. Although Officer Granado was unable to reach the

assistant principal, he was able to speak to Officer Thomas Hitaffer, who was at the

school and had just called in the assault report. Officers had gone to Byrd’s residence,

but were not able to find Byrd there. For two days a uniformed police officer patrolled in

front of the high school, both to serve as a visual deterrent and to be available for quick

response. 

The parties have offered no evidence regarding any actions taken or events that

occurred after Wednesday, January 23, 2008, other than, tragically, on Monday, January

28, 2008, Byrd murdered Kaitlyn and then killed himself. Sudberry’s response to the

City’s motion for summary judgment states, “Kaitlyn walked home from school the

following week and was shot to death by Byrd, just yards from her front door,” without

evidentiary citation. 

Sudberry’s expert states that he “reviewed all police reports (including

supplements), deposition transcripts, witness statements, photographs, journals, incident

reports, drawings and other documents relevant to this case,” and found “no indication in

the records [he] reviewed that the City of Phoenix Police Department made any effort,

whatsoever, to locate and apprehend Daniel V. Byrd, after January 23, 2008.” In its

reply, the City’s affidavit states only that on January 23, 2008, the misdemeanor threat

report generated in this case was assigned to a Police Assistant in the Violent Crimes

Bureau for follow-up investigation. The City does not contend that efforts to locate and

apprehend Byrd were made after January 23, 2008. Therefore, for the purpose of this

summary judgment decision, the Court presumes the Phoenix Police Department made no

further efforts to locate and apprehend Byrd after January 23, 2008. 

On January 27, 2009, Kaitlyn’s father, Richard Sudberry (“Sudberry”),

individually, on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries, and as the Personal Representative,

initiated this case in the Maricopa County Superior Court. On April 16, 2009, Defendants

State of Arizona, Cynthia Mancinelli, and John Doe Mancinelli removed the case to this

Court.

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III. Evidentiary Objections and Motions to Strike Evidence Supporting or

Opposing Summary Judgment

LRCiv 7.2(m)(2) permits objections to the admission of evidence offered in

support of a motion for summary judgment. 

Sudberry objects to the facts contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the City’s

statement of facts as inadmissible speculation. (Doc. # 54.) Paragraph 22 states, “If Byrd

had been located, officers might have encountered a barricade situation in which Byrd

refused to come outside.” Paragraph 23 states, “If Byrd had been located, officers might

have encountered a situation involving a shootout between officers and Byrd.” These

paragraphs refer to Sergeant Heinrich’s deposition testimony explaining why he sent five

officers to arrest Byrd. The City cited these paragraphs to show that it cannot be assumed

that if the City found Byrd, they necessarily would have been able to apprehend him. 

Sergeant Heinrich’s testimony is not necessary to make their point, and both their point

and Sergeant Heinrich’s testimony have little or no separate probative value. However,

the City did not respond to Sudberry’s motion to strike these paragraphs. Therefore,

Sudberry’s objection is sustained.

The City objects to Charles Fraas’s affidavit because Sudberry failed to disclose

Fraas as an expert witness pursuant to the case scheduling order. (Doc. # 66.) Sudberry’s

deadline for full and complete expert disclosure was extended to February 4, 2010, based

on a joint motion for extension agreed to by the City. (Doc. # 51.) Sudberry filed his

response, including Fraas’s affidavit, to the City’s motion for summary judgment on

January 20, 2010, two weeks before his expert disclosure was due. (Doc. # 53.) 

Therefore, Fraas’s affidavit will not be stricken for failure to provide timely expert

disclosure. The City also argues that Fraas’s affidavit sets forth only ultimate facts and

conclusions of law, which cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Although the

affidavit opines regarding the City’s duty and breach of that duty, it does not address

causation or gross negligence requirements, which are not otherwise established. 

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Therefore, the City’s objection to Fraas’s affidavit is overruled, but whether the affidavit

is considered does not affect determination of the City’s motion for summary judgment.

Defendant Cynthia Mancinelli objects to the City’s separate statement of facts

relying on unauthenticated police reports, which include purportedly inadmissible hearsay

and hearsay within hearsay, although she does not oppose the City’s motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. # 55.) Defendant State of Arizona objects to Plaintiffs’ reliance on those

same unauthenticated police reports. (Doc. # 63.) The State and Mancinelli join each

other’s objections. (Doc. ## 58, 64.) Subsequently, the City filed a declaration by the

custodian of records for the Phoenix Police Department authenticating the reports

attached to the City’s statement of facts. 

Only admissible evidence can be considered in ruling on a motion for summary

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Although “unauthenticated documents cannot be

considered in a motion for summary judgment,” Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F. 3d 764,

773 (9th Cir. 2002), neither the City nor Sudberry challenge the authenticity of the police

reports or object to their use for the purpose of this motion for summary judgment, which

does not involve Mancinelli or the State. Law enforcement records setting forth “factual

findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law” may

be admissible under the public records exception to the general exclusion of hearsay

“unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of

trustworthiness.” United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980); Fed. R.

Evid. 803(8). No one contends that the Phoenix Police Department or any of the officers

who prepared the police reports were unreliable or untrustworthy. Further, there is no

embedded hearsay in the context of the City’s motion for summary judgment because the

police reports are used to prove what the Phoenix Police Department knew or should have

known, including what its officers were told by others, and not to prove the truth of the

information gathered by the officers. See id. at 1376 (“It goes without saying that the

broad exclusion of the hearsay rule has no bearing on those statements which are not

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offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.”). The objections by Mancinelli

and the State, therefore, are overruled.

IV. Analysis

The Complaint includes three counts: (1) Wrongful Death – A.R.S. § 12-611, et

seq.; (2) Survival Action – A.R.S. § 14-3110, et seq.; and (3) Civil Rights Violation – 42

U.S.C. § 1983) (against only Defendant Cynthia Mancinelli). When a person’s death is

caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default that would have entitled the deceased person

to maintain an action to recover damages if the person had not died, the person or

corporation that would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action

for damages. A.R.S. § 12-611. A wrongful death action survives the death of the person

entitled to recover damages under the action and may be asserted by the personal

representative of such person. A.R.S. § 14-3110. Thus, Counts One and Two together

plead one cause of action against all Defendants, and Count Three is not pled against the

City.

A. Law Enforcement Liability

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements:

(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care;

(2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection

between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual

damages. Thus, a negligence action may be maintained only if there is a

duty or obligation, recognized by law, which requires the defendant to

conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against

unreasonable risks of harm.

Vasquez v. Arizona, 220 Ariz. 304, 311, ¶ 21, 206 P.3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2008) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). When a municipality chooses to provide police

protection, it has “a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police

department in the same circumstances.” Id. at 313, ¶ 29, 206 P.3d at 762 (quoting Austin

v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984)). But a

municipality does not have a duty to protect each of its citizens from all harms. Austin,

140 Ariz. at 582 n.2, 684 P.2d at 154 n.2. “By establishing a police department, a

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A.R.S. § 12-820.02 was added by Arizona Laws 1984, Ch. 285, § 3, in the Second

Regular Session of the 36th Legislature, with an effective date of August 3, 1984. 

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municipality becomes neither a general insurer of safety nor absolutely liable for all

harms to its citizens.” Id.

In Austin, when an anonymous caller told the Scottsdale Police Department

dispatcher the name of a potential victim and where and when he may be in danger, the

dispatcher looked in the city telephone directory and, finding no person with that name

listed as living where the caller said the potential victim would be, the dispatcher did

nothing further regarding the call. Id. at 579-80, 684 P.2d at 151-52. The Scottsdale

Police Department violated its own procedure for handling emergency telephone calls

requiring immediate attention and assignment to the most readily available unit and

acknowledged it should have attempted to inform the victim or his family of a threat. Id.

at 140 Ariz. at 582, 684 P.2d at 154. Austin concluded that a reasonable jury could find

that the City of Scottsdale breached its duty by not doing more than it did. Id. Relying

on Austin, Sudberry contends that “a reasonably careful and prudent police department in

the same circumstances would have done more” after January 23, 2008, to apprehend

Byrd before Kaitlyn’s death on January 28, 2008. See id. 

However, Austin, published June 14, 1984, was partially superseded by A.R.S.

§ 12-820.02, effective August 3, 1984,1

 which provides the City with qualified immunity

for specific acts or omissions: 

Unless a public employee acting within the scope of the public employee’s

employment intended to cause injury or was grossly negligent, neither a 

public entity nor a public employee is liable for:

1. The failure to make an arrest or the failure to retain an arrested

person in custody.

 . . . .

3. An injury resulting from the probation, community supervision or discharge

of a prisoner or a youth committed to the department of juvenile

corrections, from the terms and conditions of the prisoner’s or youth’s

probation or community supervision or from the revocation of the

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prisoner’s or youth’s probation, community supervision or conditional

release.

A.R.S. § 12-820.02. Sudberry agrees that the City is liable here only if the facts

demonstrate that the Phoenix Police Department was grossly negligent in its handling of

Byrd’s threats toward Kaitlyn’s life. 

“A party is grossly or wantonly negligent if he acts or fails to act when he knows

or has reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize that his

conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others but also involves a

high probability that substantial harm will result.” Walls v. Arizona Dep’t of Public

Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 595, 826 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ct. App. 1991). Gross negligence

“fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms.” Id. “It is flagrant and evinces a lawless

and destructive spirit.” Id. Whether gross negligence exists “may be resolved on

summary judgment if no evidence is introduced that would lead a reasonable person to

find gross negligence.” Id.; accord Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 195 Ariz. 349, 356,

¶ 27, 988 P.2d 134, 141 (Ct. App. 1999). To defeat summary judgment, the evidence of

gross negligence must be “more than slight” and not “border on conjecture.” Badia, 195

Ariz. at 356, ¶ 27, 988 P.2d at 141.

B. Badia v. City of Casa Grande

In Badia, Ida Perez was arrested around 9:45 p.m. after a police officer had seen

her back her truck into a parked vehicle. Id. at 350, ¶ 2, 988 P.2d at 135. Perez’s

boyfriend and a female relative of Perez were passengers in the truck at the time of the

arrest. Perez was charged with various misdemeanor offenses, including driving with a

suspended license, driving under the influence of alcohol, and resisting arrest. After

processing, a police dispatcher telephoned Perez’s relative to inform her that Perez would

be released and wanted the relative to pick her up without the boyfriend. Although the

relative conveyed that information to the boyfriend, he accompanied the relative to the

police substation. When they arrived at the substation, sometime before 1:00 a.m., the

dispatcher immediately released Perez to her relative, who was with Perez’s boyfriend. 

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While still inside the substation, Perez and her boyfriend began arguing and pushing each

other, which they continued into the parking lot outside the substation. A toxicology

report showed Perez’s blood alcohol level was between .24 and .26 percent when she left

the police substation. Id. at 357, ¶ 29, 988 P.2d at 142. 

Perez’s relative, who did not drink at all that night, drove Perez and her boyfriend

directly to a convenience store because Perez wanted to purchase more beer. Id. at 351,

¶ 8, 988 P.2d at 136. Perez and her boyfriend then resumed their drinking. At some point

Perez told her relative that she had told the police she did not want her boyfriend to pick

her up and he had threatened to kill her a month earlier. Within approximately two hours

after Perez was released, her boyfriend stabbed her to death at her apartment. Id. 

The plaintiff’s police procedures expert opined that the police department and

officers grossly violated generally accepted police custom and practice in several

respects, proximately causing Perez’s death. The appellate court affirmed summary

judgment in favor of defendants, concluding:

The record does not establish, nor could a trier of fact reasonably infer, that

Perez’s sobriety level or defendants’ other alleged violations of police

custom and practice proximately caused [the boyfriend] to attack Perez,

which resulted in her death. Sheer speculation is insufficient to establish

the necessary element of proximate cause or to defeat summary judgment.

Moreover, the police procedures expert’s opinions are neither

binding nor determinative. Expert opinions, without more, do not

necessarily render a plaintiff’s allegations of gross negligence triable issues

of fact. That is particularly so when, as here, the expert’s opinions on the

issues of gross negligence and causation are largely conjectural and

conclusory.

. . . .

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we

conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could not find gross negligence in

this case. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendants “act[ed] or

fail[ed] to act” knowing or objectively having reason to know that their

actions “create[d] an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to [Perez] . . . [and]

involve[d] a high probability that substantial harm [would] result.” In

addition, based on this record, a reasonable trier could not find that

defendants’ alleged acts or omissions proximately caused Perez’s death.

Id. at 357, ¶¶ 29-33, 988 P.2d at 142 (footnote and citations omitted).

C. McCleaf v. Arizona

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In McCleaf, Josie Sanchez was sentenced to three years intensive probation after

pleading guilty to one count of possession of a dangerous drug, a class four felony. 190

Ariz. 167, 168, 945 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Ct. App. 1997). The terms of probation included

obeying all laws, abstaining from alcohol and drugs, obeying a curfew schedule, and

refraining from associating with criminals, probationers, parolees, and drug users. 

Sanchez violated probation on November 26, 1987, December 14, 1987, and March 9,

1988. Id. at 169, 945 P.2d at 1300. Although Sanchez previously had been required to

take frequent random urinalysis tests, none were required between April 4, 1988, and

September 7, 1988. In August or September 1988, a newly hired probation officer with

no prior experience as a probation officer and only a one-week training session was

assigned to Sanchez’s case. 

On September 7, 1988, Sanchez accompanied another probationer to a potential

heroin purchase where they did not obtain heroin, but did purchase and consume a

quantity of alcohol. Inebriated, Sanchez drove a jeep into a stucco fence. When police

officers administered field sobriety tests to Sanchez, they noted she was almost too

intoxicated to stand. She became disorderly and uncooperative and had to be handcuffed

and forced into a patrol car. Subsequent testing indicated Sanchez’s blood alcohol

content to be more than twice the legal limit. Because Sanchez misled investigating

officers as to her true identity, the officers did not learn she was on intensive probation

and released her after citing her for driving under the influence of alcohol. 

Later that evening, Sanchez contacted her surveillance officer and admitted to the

citation for driving under the influence of alcohol. The surveillance officer reported the

incident to her probation officer, who filed a petition to revoke probation. The petition

recommended the court issue a summons requiring Sanchez’s attendance at the revocation

arraignment rather than issuing an arrest warrant. She made her initial appearance

September 19, 1988, and, on September 29, 2008, admitted to all the violations except

one. Her disposition hearing was scheduled for October 19, 2008, and she remained out

of custody, by court order, pending disposition. 

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In the early afternoon of October 14, 1988, Sanchez accompanied another

probationer to purchase alcohol. After a day of heavy drinking, she crashed the Cadillac

she was driving into two parked cars. Shortly thereafter, she disregarded a stop sign and

collided with a small Chevrolet. The collision killed the driver’s six-year-old son and

injured the driver and her ten-year-old daughter.

The driver brought an action against the state, claiming gross negligence in its

supervision of Sanchez’s probation and in its failure to take her into custody following

her probation violation. The driver alleged that, but for the state’s gross negligence,

Sanchez would have been in custody on October 14, and thus would not have killed her

son and injured her and her daughter. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the

state, holding that there was insufficient evidence of gross negligence and insufficient

evidence that any of the state’s purported negligent acts were the proximate cause of the

accident. Id. at 170, 945 P.2d at 1301. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the

judge’s decision not to incarcerate Sanchez became a superseding cause of harms to the

plaintiff and precluded assignment of liability to the probation officers.

In addition, the plaintiff asserted that the probation officers’ supervision of

Sanchez while she was on intensive probation and the state’s hiring and assignment of the

inexperienced probation officer was negligent. The appellate court found the directed

verdict to be proper because to do otherwise would have required the jury to speculate on

causation:

In order to find that different supervisory measures would have prevented

the fatal accident, the jury would have had to speculate that the alternative

measures would have been successful. Plaintiff did not prove that other

programs, or a different probation officer, would have kept Sanchez from

reoffending.

Id. at 172, 945 P.2d at 1303.

D. Gross Negligence

 Sudberry’s police procedures expert opined that “for more than 4 days following

January 23, 2008, the City of Phoenix Police Department failed to act in a reasonable and

careful manner to protect Kaitlyn Sudberry from a specific threat of lethal harm from an

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identified potential perpetrator” and “the Phoenix Police Department’s failure to make

any effort, whatsoever, to locate and detain Daniel V. Byrd after January 23, 2008,

particularly in light of the potentially lethal nature of his threats, constituted a gross

deviation from the standard of care that would have been exercised by a careful and

prudent police department under similar circumstances.” But expert opinions do not

necessarily establish triable issues of fact, particularly where, as here, the expert’s

opinions are largely conjectural and conclusory. See Badia, 195 Ariz. at 357, ¶ 30, 988

P.2d at 142.

Sudberry does not dispute the care with which the Phoenix Police Department

conducted its investigation before January 24, 2008. Before January 24, 2008, the

Phoenix Police Department notified Kaitlyn and her family of the threat, including

suggesting to Kaitlyn’s stepmother to keep Kaitlyn home from school. Police officers

went to Byrd’s residence four different times but were unable to find him. A police

officer contacted Byrd’s probation officer. Police officers were stationed at Kaitlyn’s

school for two days. Sudberry offers no basis for concluding that failing to conduct

further investigation from Thursday, January 24, 2008, through Sunday, January 27,

2008, demonstrates flagrant negligence that “fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain

terms.” Based on this record, the Phoenix Police Department did not ignore or disregard

the threat of harm to Kaitlyn or flagrantly demonstrate “a lawless and destructive spirit.” 

See Walls, 170 Ariz. at 595, 826 P.2d at 1221. 

Further, the police did not increase the risk of harm to Kaitlyn. They did not

induce Kaitlyn’s reliance on police protection; rather, they suggested that Kaitlyn’s

family obtain an order of protection and keep her home from school. They did not release

her in a vulnerable condition to the custody of someone who had threatened to kill her. 

They did not leave her alone without safe transportation or injured without medical

assistance. By failing to apprehend Byrd before he harmed Kaitlyn, the Phoenix Police

Department certainly did not reduce the risk of harm, but also did not increase the risk of

harm.

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 Thus, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the Phoenix Police Department’s

failure to “take any steps to locate or apprehend Byrd after January 23, 2008,” constitutes

gross negligence. 

E. Proximate Causation

“Sheer speculation is insufficient to establish the necessary element of proximate

cause or to defeat summary judgment.” Badia, 195 Ariz. at 357, ¶ 29, 988 P.2d at 142. 

Sudberry’s police procedures expert opined that “a reasonably careful and prudent police

department in the same circumstances” would have: (1) assigned a detective to

immediately conduct a follow-up investigation; (2) informed both uniform officers and

investigative personnel of the urgency to locate and apprehend the suspect; (3) used joint

shift briefings for patrol and criminal investigative personnel to keep apprised of efforts

to locate and apprehend the suspect; (4) contacted the suspect’s family members,

acquaintances, classmates, etc.; (5) maintained ongoing contact with Kaitlyn and her

family; and (6) attempted to gain access to the suspect’s known residence to establish

whether lethal weapons were present. Completing any or all of the foregoing actions may

have increased the likelihood of apprehending Byrd, but predicting that the police would

have apprehended Byrd and prevented Kaitlyn’s death if only they had conducted some

or all of the foregoing actions requires sheer speculation. See McCleaf, 190 Ariz. at 172,

945 P.2d at 1303.

Arizona law, as narrowly drawn by the legislature, leaves little play for shifting the

costs of crime to police agencies. Even the depth of tragedy in this case cannot override

the rule of Arizona law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant City of Phoenix’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. # 47) is granted.

DATED this 20th day of April, 2010.

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