Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00528/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00528-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT F. LINDLEY, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-0528 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) SECOND

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On February 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state

court. Respondents filed an Answer to [the] Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 11) on June 7, 2006.

Respondents argued the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Respondents also asserted the Court

should not consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims for habeas

relief because he failed to properly exhaust his claims in the

Arizona state courts. 

On July 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a traverse to the

answer to his petition for relief. See Docket No. 13.

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Petitioner asserted Respondents misstated the record in his

state criminal proceedings. Petitioner asserted his petition

was timely filed, and that he did exhaust his habeas claims in

state court. Petitioner re-asserted a claim of actual

innocence. 

On July 21, 2006, a Report and Recommendation was

filed, recommending the petition be denied and dismissed with

prejudice. The undersigned recommended the petition be

dismissed because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the one-year period specified by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Additionally, the undersigned concluded Petitioner had not

established he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations regarding his federal habeas action. Petitioner

filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on August 9,

2006. See Docket No. 18 (“Objections”).

On November 9, 2006, the Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation in part and rejected it in part. Docket No. 19.

The Court agreed Petitioner’s federal habeas action was not

filed within the time specified by the AEDPA, absent statutory

tolling. However, citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 115

S. Ct. 851 (1995), the Court determined Petitioner’s otherwise

time-barred claims could be considered on the merits if

Petitioner can establish he is actually innocent of the crimes

charged. The Court remanded the matter to the undersigned for

consideration of the materials offered by Plaintiff in support

of his claim of actual innocence.

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1

 The relevant statute was amended effective January 1,

1994. 

[F]ormer [Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated] 

§ 13-604(H), [] expressly permitted convictions

for crimes not committed on the same occasion but

consolidated for trial to be used as prior

convictions--colloquially known as “Hannah

priors”--for sentence enhancement purposes.

Arizona v. Ofstedahl, 208 Ariz. 406, 407 (Ct. App. 2004). See Arizona

v. Hannah, 126 Ariz. 575, 576-77 (1980) (holding that, under the prior

version of the relevant statute, the sequence of convictions, rather

than offenses, determined a defendant’s eligibility for sentence

enhancement); Arizona ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz.

280, 282 (1984) (relying on Hannah for the proposition that “it [was]

not necessary that the ‘prior conviction’ be also a prior offense”).

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I Procedural History

In 1987 Petitioner was indicted on seven counts of

child molestation and eight counts of sexual conduct with a

minor; all charges were class 2 felonies and all charges were

classified as dangerous crimes against a child. Answer, Exh. B.

On October 11, 1989, the state filed an allegation of a Hannah1

prior or repetitive convictions with regard to the charges in

the 1987 indictment. Id., Exh. C.

A jury trial was conducted in May of 1990 with regard

to the 1987 charges against Petitioner. Id., Exh. D. Prior to

the trial, pursuant to a motion by the state, the trial court

dismissed four of the charges against Petitioner. Id., Exh. D

at 66. The alleged victim, Petitioner’s step-daughter,

testified for the state at trial. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal

on the remaining charges at the close of the prosecution’s case.

Id., Exh. D. The trial court granted the motion with regard to

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one of the charges and denied the motion with regard to the

other ten remaining charges. Id., Exh. D at 71. Petitioner

testified at his trial, denying he had committed any of the acts

charged. Id., Exh. F at 2. After deliberating for

approximately one week, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the

remaining ten counts charged in the indictment. Id., Exh. D. at

77 & 102.

The trial court concluded there were no aggravating or

mitigating circumstances in Petitioner’s case for the purpose of

imposing sentence. Id., Ehx. E & Exh. S at 12. On August 10,

1990, after hearing the testimony of Petitioner’s mother, the

trial court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of

imprisonment on each count of conviction, ranging from 17 years

to life imprisonment, including five terms of life imprisonment.

Id., Ehx. E & Exh. S at 12.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his convictions and

sentences on August 21, 1990. Id., Exh. F. On December 5,

1991, prior to a decision regarding his direct appeal,

Petitioner filed an action seeking post-conviction relief in the

Arizona trial court. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner asserted his

trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not raise an

insanity defense. Id., Exh. H. The Superior Court concluded

Petitioner had not been deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel, denied relief, and dismissed the petition for postconviction relief on April 6, 1992. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner

sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which consolidated review of the Rule 32 action with

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Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id., Exh. J.

On December 2, 1992, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. Id., Exh. K. However, the

Arizona Court of Appeals determined Petitioner was improperly

sentenced with regard to two of the consecutive life sentences;

the Court of Appeals ordered the sentences for these two

convictions be served concurrently. Id., Exh. K. The Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed all of the other imposed sentences,

and also affirmed dismissal of the action for post-conviction

relief, concluding the trial court had properly determined

Petitioner had not been deprived of his right to the ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. K at 158.

Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision in his direct appeal or his consolidated

action for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Supreme Court.

In 1995, Petitioner sought executive clemency. Id., Exh. A

(transcript of criminal docket). In September of 1996,

Petitioner filed a motion seeking to be re-sentenced pursuant to

changes in Arizona’s sentencing laws enacted in 1994. Id., Exh.

A.

 Approximately five years after Petitioner’s conviction

became final, on June 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a second action

for post-conviction relief in the Arizona trial court. Id.,

Exh. L. The trial court found the issues raised were precluded

by the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and dismissed the

petition on June 27, 1997. Id., Exh. M. 

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2

 On or about August 1, 1997, Petitioner filed a pleading

entitled: “Defendant’s ‘Notice’ to This Court of His ‘Future’

Inability to File ‘Any’ Timely Motions, Responses or Replies to ‘Any’

of Plaintiff’s pleading[s] - And - ‘Motion for Enlargement of Time’ -

And - ‘Motion for Appointment of Counsel.’” See Response, Exh. F.

Attached to this pleading is the letter provided to this Court

purportedly from Petitioner’s ex-wife, which is signed “Chris.”

Petitioner filed an identical pleading on September 1, 1997. Id., Exh. G. The record before the Court of this pleading does not contain

the affidavits of Ms. Salaiz or Ms. Enriquez, however, these

affidavits are referenced in the state’s response to the petition.

Id., Exh. S. Additionally, the Arizona Superior Court, in denying

relief, noted the letter from “Chris” could be referencing criminal

charges “in CR 158807. In that case the defendant was charged with

molesting his nieces []. Those charges were dismissed.” Id., Exh.

T. 

-6-

Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction

relief on July 31, 1997, which action was initially dismissed by

the trial court. Id., Exh. O.2 On October 28, 1997, the third

action for post-conviction relief was re-instated by the trial

court for consideration only of Petitioner’s claims regarding

the effective assistance of his appellate and post-conviction

counsel. Id., Exh. P & Exh. Q.

Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

this post-conviction action on March 8, 1999. Id., Exh. S at 3.

Counsel averred to the court she had prepared a petition stating

one claim for relief, which Petitioner refused to sign. Id.,

Exh. S at 3. Petitioner was allowed to file his own petition

asserting what he believed to be arguable claims for relief,

which he filed August 3, 1999. Id., Exh. S at 3; Exh. T.

Petitioner presented “newly discovered evidence” regarding the

credibility of the victim and Petitioner’s ex-wife. Id., Exh.

S at 3. Petitioner also asserted that medical opinion

testimony, i.e., his interpretation of medical evidence, refuted

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the victim’s claims. Id., Exh. S at 4. The state’s response to

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action includes a reference to affidavits

presented by Petitioner from Ms. Hope Salaiz-Risenhoover, his

aunt, and his mother, Ms. Amollia Enriquez. Id., Exh. S at 4.

In a thorough and extensive opinion issued May 2, 2000,

the Arizona Superior Court considered each of Petitioner’s

claims and concluded Petitioner had presented only one viable

claim. Id., Exh. T. The trial court ordered an evidentiary

hearing regarding Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel

was ineffective. Id., Exh. T at 28. 

The evidentiary hearing was conducted July 24, 2000.

Id., Exh. U. In an opinion issued August 25, 2000, the Arizona

Superior Court concluded Petitioner’s appellate counsel was

ineffective and ordered Petitioner be allowed to file a direct

appeal of his convictions and sentences arguing the trial court

erred by not striking particular jurors for cause. Id., Exh. V.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed the permissive

appeal on September 5, 2000. Id., Exh. W. On August 6, 2002,

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The Court of

Appeals concluded the trial court had not abused its discretion

in declining to remove three jurors for cause. Id., Exh. FF.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of this decision on

March 18, 2003. Id., Exh. GG. 

Petitioner filed a fourth action for post-conviction

relief on April 9, 2003, signed March 31, 2003, which was

dismissed because the claims were precluded, and a motion for

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reconsideration of this decision was denied by the trial court

on September 22, 2003. Id., Exhs. HH & KK. 

Petitioner filed a fifth action for post-conviction

relief on October 14, 2003, which was dismissed, and review of

the dismissal was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on

April 19, 2005. Id. at 5. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on

February 21, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal

habeas relief because: (1) he was denied his constitutional

right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury; (2) he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of trial counsel

because trial counsel failed to raise particular issues at

Petitioner’s trial; (3) he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of appellate counsel because appellate counsel failed

to raise particular issues in Petitioner’s direct appeal; (4)

there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts against

him, in violation of his right to due process of law, i.e., his

trial was fundamentally unfair. 

The Court agreed with the undersigned that Petitioner’s

federal habeas action was not filed within the one-year deadline

specified by the AEDPA. The Court remanded the matter to the

undersigned for consideration of Petitioner’s claim of actual

innocence which, if established, might warrant equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations and allow consideration of the

merits of his habeas claims.

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3

 The Supreme Court stated in Schlup:

[I]f a petitioner [] presents evidence of

innocence so strong that a court cannot have

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the

court is also satisfied that the trial was free

of nonharmless constitutional error, the

petitioner should be allowed to pass through the

gateway and argue the merits of his underlying

claims.

513 U.S. at 316, 115 S. Ct at 861.

-9-

II Analysis

Review of the merits of procedurally defaulted habeas

claims is appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review of

the merits of his claims is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327,

115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326-27, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (concluding the

“probably resulted” standard rather than the more stringent

“clear and convincing” standard must be applied); Murray, 477

U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979

F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual innocence is

necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). 

To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, Petitioner must establish it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror could have found him guilty of the

offenses. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867;3 Wildman

v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001). To be

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4 Even if Petitioner can establish his trial included a

constitutional violation, without “new” evidence of actual innocence,

such a violation is not a “miscarriage of justice” because the

violation did not result in the conviction of one who is “actually

innocent.” Conversely, before the Court may excuse Petitioner’s

procedural error, i.e., violation of the statute of limitations, based

on the conclusion Petitioner was subjected to a “miscarriage of

justice,” Petitioner must make a showing that, not only is he

factually innocent, but that his trial included constitutional error.

See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). In Schlup, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petitioner’s

constitutional claims because it concluded the lower court erred by

not applying the standard stated in Murray v. Carrier to the

petitioner’s claim that his actual innocence overcame his procedural

default of his habeas claims. 

-10-

entitled to consideration of his untimely habeas claims of

constitutional error, i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel,

violation of due process based on insufficient evidence and

violation of his right to an impartial jury, Petitioner must

present a colorable showing of factual innocence. See Herrera

v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993)

(applying a very high standard of review to a claim of actual

innocence on habeas review because the reviewing court assumed

the trial was free of constitutional error). If Petitioner does

not present supplementary post-trial evidence establishing he is

factually innocent, he may not avoid the procedural bar to

consideration of the merits of his habeas claims; a claim of

factual innocence is not a claim of constitutional error. See

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315, 115 S. Ct. at 861; Coley v. Gonzales,

55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995).4

The Supreme Court has recognized that any “actual

innocence” exception to a procedural bar to consideration of

federal habeas claims is concerned with actual, as opposed to

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legal, innocence. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

623, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115

S. Ct. at 865. A finding that a petitioner has presented

sufficient evidence of his “actual innocence” must be based on

“new,” reliable evidence not presented at trial. See Schlup,

513 U.S. at 324-25, 866. 

To be credible, a claim of actual innocence

must be based on reliable evidence not

presented at trial. Given the rarity of such

evidence, in virtually every case, the

allegation of actual innocence has been

summarily rejected.

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1502-

03 (1998) (emphasis added). 

A habeas petitioner’s “late-offered” testimony in

support of his actual innocence in a habeas action is not “new”

evidence if the substance of the petitioner’s testimony was

available at his criminal trial. See Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378

F.3d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1070

(2005). Nor is evidence which is a mere “repackaging of the

record as presented at trial” considered “new” evidence which

may properly support a claim of actual innocence. Id. However,

if Petitioner has presented evidence comporting with the

requirements of Schlup, the Court must consider the new evidence

and the evidence presented at the Petitioner’s trial and

determine whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. See, e.g., Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 166 (2d Cir.

2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 489 (2005). 

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5

 Schlup arose in the context of a petitioner who sought to

excuse a different kind of “procedural” default than the statute of

limitations, i.e., the petitioner’s failure to state his claims in his

first federal action for habeas relief. 

6

 The Circuit Courts of Appeal are not in agreement that a

showing of actual innocence warrants equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. Compare Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868,

871-72 (7th Cir. 2005); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir.

2003) (rejecting the argument a habeas petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling if they can establish their “actual innocence”),

with Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding to

the contrary), and Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 9789 (8th Cir.

2002). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari from the

First Circuit’s opinion in David and the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in

Flanders. See 124 S. Ct. 66 (2003) and 537 U.S. 536 (2003). The

United States Supreme Court also recently denied certiorari from

another case arising from the Sixth Circuit raising this issue, and

from a case arising from the Seventh Circuit raising this issue. See

Araujo v. Chandler, 127 S. Ct. 39 (2006) and Bolton v. Berghuis, 126

S. Ct. 668 (2006). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not

squarely addressed this issue. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770 (9th

Cir. 2002).

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If Petitioner can establish he is “actually innocent”

of the charges against him, he may arguably “pass through the

gateway” otherwise barred by the statute of limitations and

present his claims of constitutional error, i.e., ineffective

assistance of counsel, violation of his right to an impartial

jury, and violation of his right to due process, to the Court.5

See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 2005). Compare

Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2002) (requiring

a petitioner to show due diligence in pursuing his claims, in

addition to actual innocence, to warrant equitable tolling of

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d

799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (reaching the same conclusion as the

Eighth Circuit). See also Lisker v. Knowles, ____ F. Supp. 2d

____ , 2006 WL 3462589, at *34 n.12 (C.D. Cal.).6

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7

 The undated letter from petitioner’s ex-wife is not

specific as to what she lied about or on which occasions she was

lying.

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Evidence of factual innocence

Petitioner asserts his factual innocence may be “proven

in a hearing; Would [] prove that it was a medical scientific

impossibility for him to have committed those crimes.”

Petitioner maintains there was insufficient evidence to support

the verdicts against him, in violation of his right to due

process of law, i.e., his trial was fundamentally unfair.

Petitioner asserts his then-wife and step-daughter fabricated

charges against him “to get a divorce.” Petition at 6.

Petitioner produces a letter purportedly from his ex-wife

“inferring” she lied “and that the state was aware of her false

testimony.” Id.7 In support of his “actual innocence” claim,

attached to his habeas petition at Exhibits 1 through 4,

Petitioner produces a sworn statement alleging his ex-wife

committed welfare fraud and used drugs. Id., Exh. 1.

Petitioner alleges a witness at his trial “was nearly always

drunk, had numerous boyfriends seeing her whom changed up quite

often, and when [she] was drinking, she used to often times

bring up the subject of how she was molested as a child.” Id.,

Exh. 1. 

Petitioner presents a signed and notarized statement

dated June 30, 1994, of Ms. Hope Salaiz, his aunt; Ms. Salaiz

was a witness at Petitioner’s trial. Id., Exh. 2. The

statement is incoherent and internally contradictory, and

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8

 As stated supra, Petitioner presented these affidavits to

the state court in his third-action for post-conviction relief.

Respnse, Exh. T.

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alleges that, at some date, Petitioner’s ex-wife and

stepdaughter told Ms. Salaiz they had fabricated the charges

against Petitioner. Id., Exh. 2. Petitioner further presents

a signed and notarized affidavit from his mother, Ms. Enriquez,

dated June 30, 1994. Id., Exh. 3. This affidavit attests to

the allegation that Petitioner’s ex-wife was a bad mother to her

children. Id., Exh. 3. This affidavit further states:

“Christine told me that [her daughter] had been molested by

either her father or step-father. I can’t remember which one of

the men Christine was talking about.” Id., Exh. 3. This

affidavit states Petitioner’s ex-wife stated to Ms. Enriquez

that Petitioner [was in jail because of the step-daughter]

because she needed Robert out of the way so she could get a

divorce... I was livid with rage; it took all my willpower to

not punch her lights out.” Id., Exh. 3. Petitioner further

produces an undated letter signed “Chris,” the name of his exwife, stating, as represented supra, that she had, at some point

“lied”, presumably about her knowledge of Petitioner’s abuse of

her daughter. Id., Exh. 4.8

Petitioner has not presented evidence that no

reasonable juror could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the offenses if they were presented with the four

exhibits attached to his habeas petition. The “evidence”

presented by Petitioner is not “new” evidence. The “evidence”

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relates primarily to the credibility of witnesses at

Petitioner’s trial, i.e., his stepdaughter and his wife, rather

than Petitioner’s “factual” innocence. Petitioner’s wife and

his step-daughter were cross-examined at Petitioner’s trial and

Petitioner offered his own testimony rebutting these witness’

testimony. Additionally, Petitioner’s wife’s use of drugs and

her credibility were issues known to defense counsel. See

Answer, Exh. D. The trial court granted a motion in limine to

preclude counsel from mentioning the wife’s drug use at trial,

and the trial court allowed defense counsel to impeach the wife

by presenting the fact of a prior felony conviction to the jury.

None of the information provided by Petitioner in the

four exhibits attached to his habeas petition, individually or

collectively, supports an “actual innocence” claim. Although

Petitioner asserts otherwise, the letter purportedly from

Petitioner’s wife, which is not dated nor authenticated, says

nothing whatsoever regarding Petitioner’s actual innocence and

does not “admit” she lied at Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner

contends he has a letter from his stepdaughter recanting her

statements, however, the Court is unable to locate this actual

letter in any of Petitioner’s pleadings, i.e., the letter is not

attached to the habeas petition with the other documents offered

in support of Petitioner’s “actual innocence” claim. Neither is

this letter included in Petitioner’s “statement of facts” in

support of his habeas petition at Docket No. 3, or in his

traverse to the Respondents’ answer to the petition, or in his

objections to the undersigned’s first Report and Recommendation.

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9

That between late Sept. and early Oct., 1989,

after my arrest, CHRISTINE LINDLEY (MESIMER),

notified me on the telephone, that my stepdaughter NOVA BANTA, had her first menstrual

cycle; that I asked Dr. Penille to expand upon the

“tanner” stages medical axiom, and that the good

doctor did, by explaining that the Tanner stage

three, is a developmental stage that precedes the

females first menstrual cycle by -no more thansix months, which under the facts of this case

would mean that in January, 1989 and before, NOVA

would have been in tanner stage two whereas the

elasticity features of tanner stage three are

absent. Dr. Penille further explained that

defacing and/or distoration (sic) of the labiamajora, must be present if a 10 year old girl is

penetrated by an average sized adult penis or

other similar sized object, barring exceptionally

unusual circumstances.

Petition, Exh. 1.

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Additionally, although Petitioner asserts in his

traverse that later medical “evidence” establishes he is

innocent of the crimes charged, he does not offer any admissable

evidence, other than his own statement, of this assertion and

explanation of expert evidence.9 Additionally, the “evidence”

cited by Petitioner regards the physical condition of the

victim’s genitalia in October of 1989 and the onset of her

menstruation. This evidence would have been available to

Petitioner at the time of his trial in 1990 and is not “new”

evidence. 

Petitioner has not presented supplementary post-trial

reliable evidence establishing his is factually innocent. See

Scott v. Lavan, 190 Fed. App. 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2006); Sibley v.

Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has

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not presented new evidence which, when considered with the

evidence offered at trial, establishes that no reasonable juror

could have found him guilty. Petitioner has not supported his

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence,

i.e., exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence, that was not presented

at trial, which would establish his actual innocence. See

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S. Ct. at 865. Petitioner has not

presented evidence which, when considered with the evidence

presented to the jury, establishes that no reasonable juror

could have found him guilty of the offenses charged if they were

presented with the alleged impeachment and hearsay evidence

presented here by Petitioner. See Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d

1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006); Hyde v. Paskett, 383 F. Supp. 2d

1256, 1262 (D. Idaho 2005). See also Rose v. Newton-Embry, 194

Fed. App. 500, 502 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding evidence

impeaching trial witnesses did not establish actual innocence

warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations).

Constitutional violation

Notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure to establish his

actual innocence, the Court will consider his claims of

constitutional error.

Petitioner contends Juror Block indicated in voir dire

that she would be prejudiced against him. Although Juror Block

initially stated she would be prejudiced, based on the nature of

the allegations, i.e., child molestation, she later stated in

response to a question by the trial court that she could render

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a verdict based on the evidence presented at trial. Response,

Exh. S at 9. In order to succeed on a claim that a biased juror

prejudiced a habeas petitioner, the petitioner must show that

the juror was actually biased against him. See Goeders v.

Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir. 1995). Petitioner provides no

evidence, other than his statement that Juror Block must have

been biased against him based on her initial statement, that

this juror was actually biased against him personally. The

Court notes the jury deliberated for a period of one week prior

to rendering its verdict. Petitioner has not established that

he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury.

Petitioner contends appellate counsel was

constitutionally ineffective for failing to present the

“tainted” jury issue on appeal. Petitioner contends his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion allowing

him to cross-examine Petitioner’s wife regarding her prior

criminal record. Petitioner also asserts his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to properly investigate the medical

evidence presented at trial.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

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2064; Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005).

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim premised on his counsel’s failure to raise an argument,

the petitioner must establish that the argument was likely to be

successful, in order to prove that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s failure to raise the argument. See Juan H. v. Allen,

408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (“trial counsel cannot have

been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection”);

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). A

defendant has no constitutional right to compel counsel to raise

particular claims if counsel, as a matter of professional

judgment, decides not to present those issues. See Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983)

(declining to promulgate “a per se rule that the client, not the

professional advocate, must be allowed to decide what issues are

to be pressed”).

Petitioner’s claim regarding the “tainted” jury was

eventually denied by the state court after an evidentiary

hearing. Therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by any

“failure” of his appellate counsel to raise this issue.

Additionally, trial counsel’s performance was not deficient as

Petitioner alleges: counsel was allowed to impeach Petitioner’s

ex-wife with her prior felony conviction, although counsel was

not allowed to state the nature or the class of the offense.

Furthermore, trial counsel did, evidently, present expert

medical testimony on behalf of Petitioner. See Response, Exh.

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D. Petitioner has not established that either his trial or his

appellate counsel’s performance was deficient, or that he was

prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance. 

Petitioner also contends the letter purportedly written

by his ex-wife, inferring she lied about Petitioner’s actions at

some point, establishes his trial violated his right to due

process, i.e., that there was insufficient reliable evidence on

which he could be convicted. “[T]he Due Process Clause protects

the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90

S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). To determine whether sufficient

reliable evidence existed to support a petitioner’s conviction,

the Court must decide if, “viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). See also McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d

465, 468-469 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner bears the burden of

proving that the record is so totally devoid of evidentiary

support for the challenged conviction as to violate due process.

See Crow v. Eyman, 459 F.2d 24, 25 (9th Cir. 1972).

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a petitioner’s

guilty verdict. Jackson, 442 U.S. at 324-325, 99 S. Ct. at

2792. 

The victim and Petitioner both testified at his trial.

Other testimony was presented in support of the victim’s

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10 As noted supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not

determined whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable

tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations based on an assertion

of “actual innocence.”

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testimony. The trial court concluded there was insufficient

evidence to support one of the charges against Petitioner, but

sufficient evidence to send the other charges to the jury.

Petitioner has not presented any argument or any evidence

indicating the record is so totally devoid of evidentiary

support for the challenged conviction as to violate due process.

Due diligence

Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal have

held a habeas petitioner must show due diligence in pursuing his

habeas claims, in addition to his actual innocence, to be

entitled to equitable tolling of the relevant statute of

limitations. See Flanders, 299 F.3d at 978; Gibson, 232 F.3d at

808.10 In addition to concluding Petitioner has not established

a showing of factual innocence, the undersigned concludes

Petitioner did not act with the requisite due diligence to be

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Petitioner was aware of all allegedly impeaching evidence

presented to this Court no later than 1994, the year the

affidavits were signed; certainly Petitioner was aware of these

documents in 1999 when he presented them to the Arizona courts

in his third action for post-conviction relief. Petitioner did

not seek any form of state or federal relief from his conviction

and sentences for a period of five years after his direct appeal

and first Rule 32 action were final. Petitioner did not seek

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federal habeas relief until almost one year after his fifth

state action for post-conviction relief was denied. Petitioner

did not promptly seek federal habeas review of issues which were

properly exhausted by their examination, albeit unfavorably, by

the state courts, i.e., his claim that he was denied his right

to an impartial jury and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner offers no reason why his allegedly “new” evidence was

not previously presented in a federal habeas petition.

III Conclusion

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal are divided

regarding whether Petitioner would be entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations regarding his federal

habeas petition if he established he is “actually innocent” of

the crimes charged. However, regardless of the position this

Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals might adopt, the

undersigned concludes Petitioner has not made the requisite

showing, pursuant to the conclusion in Schlup, that he is

actually innocent of the charges against him. Additionally,

pursuant to the test stated by the Eighth and Tenth Circuit

Courts of Appeal, Petitioner has not acted with due diligence in

presenting his claims or evidence in support thereof to this

Court. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to consideration

of the merits of his claims of constitutional error.

Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court has, additionally,

reviewed the allegations of constitutional error and found them

without merit. 

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IT IS THEREFORE AGAIN RECOMMENDED that Mr. Lindley’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

DATED this 16th day of January, 2007.

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