Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02272/USCOURTS-ca3-15-02272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

Nos. 15-2206, 15-2217, 15-2230, 15-2234, 15-2272, 15-2273

15-2290, 15-2291, 15-2292, 15-2294, 15-2304 & 15-2305

________________

IN RE: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS 

CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION

Craig Heimburger; Dawn Heimburger,

Appellants (15-2206)

Cleo Miller; Judson Flint; Elmer Underwood; Vincent 

Clark, Sr.; Ken Jones; Fred Smerlas; Jim Rourke; Lou 

Piccone; James David Wilkins, II, 

Appellants (15-2217)

Curtis L. Anderson,

Appellant (15-2230)

Darren R. Carrington, 

Appellant (15-2234)

Raymond Armstrong; Nathaniel Newton, Jr.; Larry 

Brown; Kenneth Davis; Michael McGruder; Clifton L. 

Odom; George Teague; Drew Coleman; Dennis 

DeVaughn; Alvin Harper; Ernest Jones; Michael 

Kiselak; Jeremy Loyd; Gary Wayne Lewis; Lorenzo 

Lynch; Hurles Scales, Jr.; Gregory Evans; David 

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Mims; Evan Ogelsby; Phillip E. Epps; Charles L. 

Haley, Sr.; Kevin Rey Smith; Darryl Gerard Lewis;

Curtis Bernard Wilson; Kelvin Mack Edwards, Sr.; 

Dwayne Levels; Solomon Page; Tim McKyer; Larry 

Barnes; James Garth Jax; William B. Duff; Mary 

Hughes; Barbara Scheer,

Appellants (15-2272)

Liyongo Patrise Alexander; Charlie Anderson; Charles 

E. Arbuckle; Cassandra Bailey, as Representative of 

the Estate of Johnny Bailey; Ben Bronson; Curtis 

Ceaser, Jr.; Larry Centers; Darrell Colbert; Harry 

Colon; Christopher Crooms; Jerry W. Davis; Tim 

Denton; Michael Dumas; Corris Ervin; Doak Field; 

Baldwin Malcolm Frank; Derrick Frazier; 

Murray E. Garrett; Clyde P. Glosson; Roderick W. 

Harris; Wilmer K. Hicks, Jr.; Patrick Jackson; Gary 

Jones; Ryan McCoy; Jerry James Moses, Jr.; 

Anthony E. Newsom; Rance Olison; John Owens; 

Robert Pollard; Derrick Pope; Glenell Sanders;

Thomas Sanders; Dwight A. Scales; Todd Scott; 

Frankie Smith; Jermaine Smith; Tyrone Smith; James 

A. Young, Sr., 

Appellants (15-2273)

Scott Gilchrist, individually and on behalf of the Estate 

of Carlton Chester “Cookie” Gilchrist,

Appellant (15-2290)

Jimmie H. Jones; Ricky Ray; Jesse Solomon,

Appellants (15-2291)

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Andrew Stewart,

Appellant (15-2292)

Willie T. Taylor,

Appellant (15-2294)

Alan Faneca; Roderick “Rock” Cartwright;

Jeff Rohrer; Sean Considine,

Appellants (15-2304)

James Mayberry,

Appellant (15-2305)

________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 2-12-md-02323 and 2-14-cv-00029)

District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody

________________

Argued November 19, 2015

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, 

and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 18, 2016)

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TerriAnne Benedetto, Esquire

Seeger Weiss

1515 Market Street

Suite 1380

Philadelphia, PA 19102

David R. Buchanan, Esquire

Diogenes P. Kekatos, Esquire

Christopher A. Seeger, Esquire

Seeger Weiss LLP

77 Water Street, 26th Floor

New York, NY 10005

Samuel Issacharoff, Esquire (Argued)

New York University Law School, Room 411J

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012

Gene Locks, Esquire

David D. Langfitt, Esquire

Locks Law Firm

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 720 East

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Dianne M. Nast, Esquire

NastLaw

1101 Market Street, Suite 2801

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Stephen F. Rosenthal, Esquire

Steven C. Marks, Esquire

Podhurst Orseck

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25 West Flager Street, Suite 800

Miami, FL 33130

Arnold Levin, Esquire

Frederick S. Longer, Esquire

Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman

510 Walnut Street, Suite 500

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Brad S. Karp, Esquire

Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Esquire

Lynn B. Bayard, Esquire

Bruce A. Birenboim, Esquire

Walter R. Reiman, Esquire

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Beth A. Wilkinson, Esq.

Wilkinson Walsh & Eskovitz

1900 M Street, N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, DC 20036

Paul D. Clement, Esquire (Argued)

Andrew N. Ferguson, Esquire

David Zachary Hudson, Esquire

Robert M. Bernstein, Esquire

Bancroft PLLC

500 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.

Seventh Floor

Washington, DC 20001

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Robert C. Heim, Esquire

Dechert

2929 Arch Street

18th Floor, Cira Centre

Philadelphia, PA 19104

Sol H. Weiss, Esquire

Anapol Schwartz

1710 Spruce Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellees

Alan B. Morrison, Esquire

George Washington University

2000 H Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20052

Scott L. Nelson, Esquire

Public Citizen Litigation Group

1600 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20009

Counsel for Amicus Appellant

Public Citizen Inc.

Shana De Caro, Esquire

Michael V. Kaplen, Esquire

De Caro & Kaplan

427 Bedford Road, Suite 360

Pleasantville, NY 10570

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Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Brain Injury Association of America

Christopher A. Bandas, Esquire

Bandas Law Firm 

500 North Shoreline, Suite 1020

Corpus Christi, TX 78401

Howard J. Bashman, Esquire (Argued)

Suite G-22

2300 Computer Avenue

Willow Grove, PA 19090

Gary P. Lightman, Esquire

Glenn A. Manochi, Esquire

Lightman & Manochi

1520 Locust Street, 12th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellants

Craig and Dawn Heimburger

Edward W. Cochran, Esquire

Cochran & Cochran

20030 Marchmont Road

Shaker Heights, OH 44122

John J. Pentz, Esquire

19 Widow Rites Lane

Sudbury, MA 01776

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Counsel for Appellants

Cleo Miller; Judson Flint; Elmer Underwood; Vincent 

Clark, Sr.; Ken Jones; Fred Smerlas; Jim Rourke; Lou 

Piccone; James David Wilkins, II 

George W. Cochran, Esquire

1385 Russell Drive

Streetsboro, OH 44241

Counsel for Appellant

Curtis L. Anderson

Joseph Darrell Palmer, Esquire

2244 Faraday Avenue, Suite 121

Carlsbad, CA 92008

Jan L. Westfall, Esquire

29896 Blue Water Way

Menifee, CA 92584

Counsel for Appellant

Darren R. Carrington

Richard L. Coffman, Esquire

The Coffman Law Firm

505 Orleans Street, Suite 505

Beaumont, TX 77701

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Deepak Gupta, Esquire (Argued)

Matthew W.H. Wessler, Esquire

Jonathan E. Taylor, Esquire

Gupta Wessler PLLC

1735 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20009

Mitchell A. Toups, Esquire

Weller Green Toups & Terrell

2615 Calder Street, Suite 400

Beaumont, TX 77704

Jason C. Webster, Esquire

The Webster Law Firm

6200 Savoy, Suite 640

Houston, TX 77036

Counsel for Appellants

Raymond Armstrong; Nathaniel Newton, Jr.; Larry 

Brown; Kenneth Davis; Michael McGruder; Clifton L. 

Odom; George Teague; Drew Coleman; Dennis 

DeVaughn; Alvin Harper; Ernest Jones; Michael 

Kiselak; Jeremy Loyd; Gary Wayne Lewis; Lorenzo 

Lynch; Hurles Scales, Jr.; Gregory Evans; David 

Mims; Evan Ogelsby; Phillip E. Epps; Charles L. 

Haley, Sr.; Kevin Rey Smith; Darryl Gerard Lewis;

Curtis Bernard Wilson; Kelvin Mack Edwards, Sr.; 

Dwayne Levels; Solomon Page; Tim McKyer; Larry 

Barnes; James Garth Jax; William B. Duff; Mary 

Hughes; Barbara Scheer; Willie T. Taylor

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Lance H. Lubel, Esquire

Adam Q. Voyles, Esquire

Lubel Voyles 

5020 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 800

Houston, TX 77006

Mickey L. Washington, Esquire

1314 Texas Avenue, Suite 811

Houston, TX 77002

Charles L. Becker, Esquire (Argued)

Kline & Specter

1525 Locust Street, 19th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellants

Liyongo Patrise Alexander; Charlie Anderson; Charles 

E. Arbuckle; Cassandra Bailey, as Representative of 

the Estate of Johnny Bailey; Ben Bronson; Curtis 

Ceaser, Jr.; Larry Centers; Darrell Colbert; Harry 

Colon; Christopher Crooms; Jerry W. Davis; Tim 

Denton; Michael Dumas; Corris Ervin; Doak Field; 

Baldwin Malcolm Frank; Derrick Frazier; Murray E. 

Garrett; Clyde P. Glosson; Roderick W. Harris; 

Wilmer K. Hicks, Jr.; Patrick Jackson; Gary Jones; 

Ryan McCoy; Jerry James Moses, Jr.; Anthony E. 

Newsom; Rance Olison; John Owens; Robert Pollard;

Derrick Pope; Glenell Sanders: Thomas Sanders; 

Dwight A. Scales; Todd Scott; Frankie Smith; 

Jermaine Smith; Tyrone Smith; James A. Young, Sr.

Jared H. Beck, Esquire

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Elizabeth Lee Beck, Esquire

Beck & Lee Trial Lawyers

Corporate Park at Kendall

12485 Southwest 137 Avenue, Suite 205

Miami, FL 33186

Antonino G. Hernandez, Esquire

4 Southeast 1st Street, 2nd Floor

Miami, FL 33131

Cullin A. O’Brien, Esquire (Argued)

6541 Northeast 21st Way

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33308

Jeffrey J. Cairlanto, Esquire

Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto

100 North 22nd Street

Unit 105

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellant

Scott Gilchrist, individually and on behalf of the Estate 

of Carlton Chester “Cookie” Gilchrist

Dwight P. Bostwick, Esquire

Zuckerman Spaeder LLP

1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20036

Cyril V. Smith, Esquire

Zuckerman Spaeder LLP

100 East Pratt Street, Suite 2440

Baltimore, MD 21202

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Ramya Kasturi, Esquire

Zuckerman Spaeder LLP

399 Park Avenue, 14th Floor

New York, NY 10022

Counsel for Appellants

Jimmie H. Jones; Ricky Ray; Jesse Solomon

Stuart D. Lurie, Esquire

Rosenthal Lurie

102 Pickering Way

Suite 200

Exton, PA 19341

Michael H. Rosenthal, Esquire

Rosenthal Lurie

1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1230

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellant

Andrew Stewart

Steven F. Molo, Esquire (Argued)

Thomas J. Wiegand, Esquire

Kaitlin R. O’Donnell, Esquire

MoloLamken LLP

540 Madison Avenue

New York, NY 10022

Eric R. Nitz, Esquire

Rayiner I. Hashem, Esquire

Jeffrey M. Klein, Esquire

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MoloLamken LLP

The Watergate, Suite 660

600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20037

William T. Hangley, Esquire

Michele D. Hangley, Esquire

Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller

One Logan Square

18th & Cherry Streets, 27th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Linda S. Mullenix, Esquire

2305 Barton Creek Blvd, Unit 2

Austin, TX 78735

Counsel for Appellants

Alan Faneca; Roderick “Rock” Cartwright;

Jeff Rohrer; Sean Considine

David S. Coale, Esquire

Edward J. Dennis, Esquire

Kent D. Krabill, Esquire

Lynn Tillotson Pinker and Cox

2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700

Dallas, TX 75201

Counsel for Appellant

James Mayberry

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

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________________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................15

II. BACKGROUND................................................................15

A. Concussion Suits Are Brought Against the NFL ........... 15

B. The Parties Reach a Settlement...................................... 19

C. The Proposed Settlement................................................ 20

1. Monetary Award Fund................................................ 21

2. Baseline Assessment Program.................................... 23

3. Education Fund........................................................... 23

4. The Proposed Class .................................................... 24

III. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW................25

IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION.................................................26

A. Numerosity..................................................................... 27

B. Commonality.................................................................. 27

C. Typicality ....................................................................... 29

D. Adequacy of Representation .......................................... 31

1. Class Counsel ............................................................. 31

2. Class Representatives................................................. 35

3. Conflicts of Interest .................................................... 36

E. Predominance ................................................................. 42

F. Superiority ...................................................................... 44

V. CLASS NOTICE ................................................................44

VI. CLASS SETTLEMENT.....................................................46

A. Presumption of Fairness................................................. 47

B. Girsh & Prudential Factors............................................ 48

C. Settlement’s Treatment of CTE...................................... 56

VII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES.........................................................63

A. Deferral of Fee Petition.................................................. 63

B. Clear Sailing Provision................................................... 68

VIII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................69

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I. INTRODUCTION

The National Football League (“NFL”) has agreed to 

resolve lawsuits brought by former players who alleged that 

the NFL failed to inform them of and protect them from the 

risks of concussions in football. The District Court approved 

a class action settlement that covered over 20,000 retired 

players and released all concussion-related claims against the 

NFL. Objectors have appealed that decision, arguing that 

class certification was improper and that the settlement was 

unfair. But after thorough review, we conclude that the 

District Court was right to certify the class and approve the 

settlement. Thus we affirm its decision in full. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Concussion Suits Are Brought Against the 

NFL 

In July 2011, 73 former professional football players 

sued the NFL and Riddell, Inc. in the Superior Court of 

California. Compl., Maxwell v. Nat’l Football League, No. 

BC465842 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011). The retired 

players alleged that the NFL failed to take reasonable actions 

to protect them from the chronic risks of head injuries in 

football. The players also claimed that Riddell, a 

manufacturer of sports equipment, should be liable for the 

defective design of helmets. 

The NFL removed the case to federal court on the 

ground that the players’ claims under state law were 

preempted by federal labor law. More lawsuits by retired 

players followed and the NFL moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 

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to consolidate the pending suits before a single judge for 

pretrial proceedings. In January 2012, the Judicial Panel on 

Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these cases before Judge 

Anita B. Brody in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a 

multidistrict litigation (“MDL”). In re: Nat’l Football 

League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 

1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012). Since consolidation, 5,000 players 

have filed over 300 similar lawsuits against the NFL and 

Riddell.1 Our appeal only concerns the claims against the 

NFL. 

To manage the litigation, the District Court appointed 

co-lead class counsel, a Steering Committee, and an 

Executive Committee. The Steering Committee was charged 

with performing or delegating all necessary pretrial tasks and 

the smaller Executive Committee was responsible for the 

overall coordination of the proceedings. The Court also 

ordered plaintiffs to submit a Master Administrative LongForm Complaint and a Master Administrative Class Action 

Complaint to supersede the numerous then-pending 

complaints. 

The Master Complaints tracked many of the 

allegations from the first lawsuits. Football puts players at 

 

1 There is also a pending class action against the National 

Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) over its handling 

of head injuries. In January 2016, the District Court 

overseeing the action preliminarily certified the class and 

approved a settlement subject to certain revisions. In re: 

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion 

Injury Litig., No. 13-9116, 2016 WL 305380 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 

26, 2016). Under the settlement, the NCAA will pay $70 

million to create a medical monitoring fund to screen current 

and former collegiate athletes for brain trauma. 

Case: 15-2272 Document: 003112265997 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/18/2016
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risk of repetitive brain trauma and injury because they suffer 

concussive and sub-concussive hits during the game and at 

practice (sub-concussive hits fall below the threshold for a 

concussion but are still associated with brain damage). 

Plaintiffs alleged that the NFL had a duty to provide players 

with rules and information to protect them from the health 

risks—both short and long-term—of brain injury, including 

Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, depression, deficits in 

cognitive functioning, reduced processing speed, loss of 

memory, sleeplessness, mood swings, personality changes, 

and a recently identified degenerative disease called chronic 

traumatic encephalopathy (commonly referred to as “CTE”). 

Because CTE figures prominently in this appeal, some 

background on this condition is in order. It was first 

identified in 2002 based on analysis of the brain tissue of 

deceased NFL players, including Mike Webster, Terry Long, 

Andre Waters, and Justin Strzelczyk. CTE involves the 

build-up of “tau protein” in the brain, a result associated with 

repetitive head trauma. Medical personnel have examined 

approximately 200 brains with CTE as of 2015, in large part 

because it is only diagnosable post-mortem. That diagnosis 

requires examining sections of a person’s brain under a 

microscope to see if abnormal tau proteins are present and, if 

so, whether they occur in the unique pattern associated with 

CTE. Plaintiffs alleged that CTE affects mood and behavior, 

causing headaches, aggression, depression, and an increased 

risk of suicide. They also stated that memory loss, dementia, 

loss of attention and concentration, and impairment of 

language are associated with CTE. 

The theme of the allegations was that, despite the 

NFL’s awareness of the risks of repetitive head trauma, the 

League ignored, minimized, or outright suppressed 

information concerning the link between that trauma and 

cognitive damage. For example, in 1994 the NFL created the 

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Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee to study the effects 

of head injuries. Per the plaintiffs, the Committee was at the 

forefront of a disinformation campaign that disseminated 

“junk science” denying the link between head injuries and 

cognitive disorders. Based on the allegations against the 

NFL, plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, medical 

monitoring, fraudulent concealment, fraud, negligent 

misrepresentation, negligent hiring, negligent retention, 

wrongful death and survival, civil conspiracy, and loss of 

consortium. 

After plaintiffs filed the Master Complaints, the NFL 

moved to dismiss, arguing that federal labor law preempted 

the state law claims. Indeed, § 301 of the Labor Management 

Relations Act preempts state law claims that are 

“substantially dependent” on the terms of a labor agreement. 

Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 852–53 

(1987). The NFL claimed that resolution of plaintiffs’ claims 

depended upon the interpretation of Collective Bargaining 

Agreements (“CBAs”) in place between the retired players 

and the NFL.2 If the CBAs do preempt plaintiffs’ claims, 

they must arbitrate those claims per mandatory arbitration 

provisions in the CBAs. Plaintiffs responded that their 

 

2 After the NFL removed some of the early concussionrelated lawsuits from state courts, several district courts 

accepted this preemption argument as a basis for denying 

requests to remand the cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l 

Football League Players Ass’n, No. 14-1559, 2014 WL 

6776306, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2014); Duerson v. Nat’l 

Football League, Inc., No. 12-2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *6 

(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012); but see Green v. Arizona Cardinals 

Football Club LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1030 (E.D. Mo. 

2014) (finding that concussion-related claims did not depend 

on interpretation of CBAs and granting motion to remand). 

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negligence and fraud claims would not require federal courts 

to interpret the CBAs and in any event the CBAs did not 

cover all retired players. 

B. The Parties Reach a Settlement

On July 8, 2013, while the NFL’s motion to dismiss 

was pending, the District Court ordered the parties to mediate 

and appointed a mediator. On August 29, 2013, after two 

months of negotiations and more than twelve full days of 

formal mediation, the parties agreed to a settlement in 

principle and signed a term sheet. It provided $765 million to 

fund medical exams and offer compensation for player 

injuries. The proposed settlement would resolve the claims of 

all retired players against the NFL related to head injuries. 

In January 2014, after more negotiations, class counsel 

filed in the District Court a class action complaint and sought 

preliminary class certification and preliminary approval of the 

settlement. The Court denied the motion because it had 

doubts that the capped fund for paying claims would be 

sufficient. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 

Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2014). It 

appointed a Special Master to assist with making financial 

forecasts and, five months later, the parties reached a revised 

settlement that uncapped the fund for compensating retired 

players. 

Class counsel filed a second motion for preliminary 

class certification and preliminary approval in June 2014. 

The District Court granted the motion, preliminarily approved 

the settlement, conditionally certified the class, approved 

classwide notice, and scheduled a final fairness hearing. In re 

Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 

F.R.D. 191 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Seven players petitioned for 

interlocutory review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court of 

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appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 

denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition 

for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 

14 days after the order is entered.”). In September 2014, we 

denied the petition, later explaining over a dissent that we 

lacked jurisdiction because the District Court’s order 

preliminarily certifying the class was not an “order granting 

or denying class-action certification.” In re Nat’l Football 

League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 571–

72 (3d Cir. 2014). 

Following preliminary certification, potential class 

members had 90 days to object or opt out of the settlement. 

Class counsel then moved for final class certification and 

settlement approval. On November 19, 2014, the District 

Court held a day-long fairness hearing and heard argument

from class counsel, the NFL, and several objectors who 

voiced concerns against the settlement. After the hearing, the 

Court proposed several changes to benefit class members. 

The parties agreed to the proposed changes and submitted an 

amended settlement in February 2015. On April 22, 2015, the 

Court granted the motion for class certification and final 

approval of the amended settlement, that grant explained in a 

123-page opinion. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 

Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 

Objectors filed 12 separate appeals that were consolidated 

into this single appeal before us now. 

C. The Proposed Settlement

The settlement has three components: (1) an uncapped 

Monetary Award Fund that provides compensation for retired 

players who submit proof of certain diagnoses; (2) a $75 

million Baseline Assessment Program that provides eligible 

retired players with free baseline assessment examinations of 

their objective neurological functioning; and (3) a $10 million 

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Education Fund to instruct football players about injury 

prevention. 

1. Monetary Award Fund 

Under the settlement, retired players or their 

beneficiaries are compensated for developing one of several 

neurocognitive and neuromuscular impairments or 

“Qualifying Diagnoses.” By “retired players,” we mean 

players who retired from playing NFL football before the 

preliminary approval of the class settlement on July 7, 2014. 

The settlement recognizes six Qualifying Diagnoses: (1) 

Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment; (2) Level 2 

Neurocognitive Impairment;3(3) Alzheimer’s Disease; (4) 

Parkinson’s Disease; (5) Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 

(“ALS”); and (6) Death with CTE provided the player died 

before final approval of the settlement on April 22, 2015. A 

retired player does not need to show that his time in the NFL 

caused the onset of the Qualifying Diagnosis. 

A Qualifying Diagnosis entitles a retired player to a 

maximum monetary award: 

Qualifying Diagnosis Maximum Award

Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment $1.5 Million

Level 2 Neurocognitive Impairment $3 Million

Parkinson’s Disease $3.5 Million

 

3 Levels 1.5 and 2 Neurocognitive Impairment require a 

decline in cognitive function and a loss of functional 

capabilities, such as the ability to hold a job, and correspond 

with clinical definitions of mild and moderate dementia. 

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Alzheimer’s Disease $3.5 Million

Death with CTE $4 Million

ALS $5 Million

This award is subject to several offsets, that is, awards 

decrease: (1) as the age at which a retired player is diagnosed 

increases; (2) if the retired player played fewer than five 

eligible seasons; (3) if the player did not have a baseline 

assessment examination; and (4) if the player suffered a 

severe traumatic brain injury or stroke unrelated to NFL play. 

To collect from the Fund, a class member must register 

with the claims administrator within 180 days of receiving 

notice that the settlement has been approved. This deadline 

can be excused for good cause. The class member then must 

submit a claims package to the administrator no later than two 

years after the date of the Qualifying Diagnosis or within two 

years after the supplemental notice is posted on the settlement 

website, whichever is later. This deadline can be excused for 

substantial hardship. The claims package must include a 

certification by the diagnosing physician and supporting 

medical records. The claims administrator will notify the 

class member within 60 days if he is entitled to an award. 

The class member, class counsel, and the NFL have the right 

to appeal an award determination. To do so, a class member 

must submit a $1,000 fee, which is refunded if the appeal is 

successful and can be waived for financial hardship. A fee is 

not required for the NFL and class counsel to appeal, though 

the NFL must act in good faith when appealing award 

determinations. 

The Monetary Award Fund is uncapped and will 

remain in place for 65 years. Every retired player who timely 

registers and qualifies during the lifespan of the settlement 

will receive an award. If, after receiving an initial award, a 

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23

retired player receives a more serious Qualifying Diagnosis, 

he may receive a supplemental award. 

2. Baseline Assessment Program 

Any retired player who has played at least half of an 

eligible season can receive a baseline assessment 

examination. It consists of a neurological examination 

performed by credentialed and licensed physicians selected 

by a court-appointed administrator. Qualified providers may 

diagnose retired players with Level 1, 1.5, or 2 

Neurocognitive Impairment. The results of the examinations 

can also be compared with any future tests to determine 

whether a retired player’s cognitive abilities have 

deteriorated.

Baseline Assessment Program funds will also provide 

Baseline Assessment Program Supplemental Benefits. 

Retired players diagnosed with Level 1 Neurocognitive 

Impairment—evidencing some objective decline in cognitive 

function but not yet early dementia—are eligible to receive 

medical benefits, including further testing, treatment, 

counseling, and pharmaceutical coverage.

The Baseline Assessment Program lasts for 10 years. 

All retired players who seek and are eligible for a baseline 

assessment examination receive one notwithstanding the $75 

million cap. Every eligible retired player age 43 or over must 

take a baseline assessment examination within two years of 

the Program’s start-up. Every eligible retired player younger 

than age 43 must do so before the end of the program or by 

his 45th birthday, whichever comes first.

3. Education Fund

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24

The Education Fund is a $10 million fund to promote 

safety and injury prevention in football. The purpose is to 

promote safety-related initiatives in youth football and 

educate retired players about their medical and disability 

benefits under the CBA. Class counsel and the NFL, with 

input from the retired players, will propose specific 

educational initiatives for the District Court’s approval. 

4. The Proposed Class

All living NFL football players who retired from 

playing professional football before July 7, 2014, as well as 

their representative claimants and derivative claimants, 

comprise the proposed class. Representative claimants are 

those duly authorized by law to assert the claims of deceased, 

legally incapacitated, or incompetent retired players. 

Derivative claimants are those, such as parents, spouses, or 

dependent children, who have some legal right to the income 

of retired players. Even though the proposed class consists of 

more than just retired players, we use the terms “class 

members” and “retired players” interchangeably. 

The proposed class contains two subclasses based on a 

retired players’ injuries as of the preliminary approval date. 

Subclass 1 consists of retired players who were not diagnosed 

with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to July 7, 2014, and their 

representative and derivative claimants. Put another way, 

subclass 1 includes retired players who have no currently 

known injuries that would be compensated under the 

settlement. Subclass 2 consists of retired players who were 

diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to July 7, 2014, 

and their representative claimants and derivative claimants. 

Translated, subclass 2 includes retired players who are 

currently injured and will receive an immediate monetary 

award under the settlement. The NFL estimates that the total 

population of retired players is 21,070. Of this, 28% are 

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expected to be diagnosed with a compensable disease. The 

remaining 72% are not expected to develop a compensable 

disease during their lifetime. 

Class members release all claims and actions against 

the NFL “arising out of, or relating to, head, brain and/or 

cognitive injury, as well as any injuries arising out of, or 

relating to, concussions and/or sub-concussive events,” 

including claims relating to CTE. The releases do not 

compromise the benefits that retired players are entitled to 

receive under the CBAs, nor do they compromise their 

retirement benefits, disability benefits, and health insurance. 

Of the over 20,000 estimated class members (the NFL 

states that the number exceeds 21,000), 234 initially asked to 

opt out from the settlement and 205 class members joined 83 

written objections submitted to the District Court. Before the 

fairness hearing, 26 of the 234 opt-outs sought readmission to 

the class. After the District Court granted final approval, 

another 6 opt-outs sought readmission. This leaves 202 

current opt-outs, of which class counsel notes only 169 were 

timely filed. 

III. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over this class 

action settlement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).4 We have 

 

4 One objector argues that the District Court failed to 

determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the 

class action because it never decided the NFL’s motion to 

dismiss. But the NFL’s motion to dismiss would have no 

effect on subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs 

properly alleged jurisdiction based on the diversity of the 

parties and the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 

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appellate jurisdiction to review its final order approving the 

settlement and certifying the class under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review the decision to certify a class and approve a 

classwide settlement for abuse of discretion. In re Blood 

Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 185 n.1 (3d Cir. 

2015); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 

2001). It exists “if the district court’s decision rests upon a 

clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 

or an improper application of law to fact.” In re Hydrogen 

Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

This appeal principally presents two questions—

whether the District Court abused its discretion (1) in 

certifying the class of retired NFL players and (2) in 

concluding that the terms of the settlement were fair, 

reasonable, and adequate. Objectors (95 in all) have filed 11 

separate briefs totaling some 500 pages addressing these 

questions. We address each of these arguments, but refer to 

objectors collectively throughout our opinion rather than 

cross-referencing particular objectors with particular 

arguments. 

IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION

Rule 23(a) lays out four threshold requirements for 

certification of a class action: (1) numerosity; (2) 

commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of 

representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “The parties seeking 

class certification bear the burden of establishing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the requirements of Rule 

23(a) have been met.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia 

 

1332(d)(2). There was thus no error in declining to decide 

the motion to dismiss. 

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Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 391 (3d Cir. 

2015). If that occurs, we consider whether the class meets the 

requirements of one of three categories of class actions in 

Rule 23(b). This is a Rule 23(b)(3) class action under which 

we consider whether (1) common questions predominate over 

any questions affecting only individual class members 

(predominance) and (2) class resolution is superior to other 

available methods to decide the controversy (superiority). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

A. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(1). There is no magic number of class members needed 

for a suit to proceed as a class action. We have set a rough 

guidepost in our precedents, however, and stated that 

numerosity is generally satisfied if there are more than 40 

class members. Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 

583, 595 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 

220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001)). The District Court found that a 

class of 20,000 retired players would be sufficient for 

numerosity. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 

Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 371. No objector challenges this 

finding on appeal. 

B. Commonality

“A putative class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s commonality 

requirement if the named plaintiffs share at least one question 

of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” 

Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 

2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Their claims must 

depend upon a common contention . . . that it is capable of 

classwide resolution—which means that determination of its 

truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 

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validity of each of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011). Meeting 

this requirement is easy enough: “[W]e have acknowledged 

commonality to be present even when not all members of the 

plaintiff class suffered an actual injury, when class members 

did not have identical claims, and, most dramatically, when 

some members’ claims were arguably not even viable.” In re 

Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 397 (internal citations omitted). 

The District Court concluded that “critical factual 

questions” were common to all class members, including 

“whether the NFL Parties knew and suppressed information 

about the risks of concussive hits, as well as causation 

questions about whether concussive hits increase the 

likelihood that [r]etired [p]layers will develop conditions that 

lead to Qualifying Diagnoses.” In re Nat’l Football League 

Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 371. It also 

found common legal questions, including the “nature and 

extent of any duty owed to [r]etired [p]layers by the NFL 

Parties, and whether [labor] preemption, workers’ 

compensation, or some affirmative defense would bar their 

claims.” Id. 

Some objectors argue that commonality was lacking. 

Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, they 

contend that the retired players do not share common issues 

of fact or law because they were injured in different ways and 

over different periods of time. For example, the claims of a 

lineman who played fifteen seasons in the NFL, so goes the 

argument, will share little in common with those of a back-up 

quarterback who played two seasons. 

These objections miss the mark. In Wal-Mart, the 

Supreme Court held that commonality was lacking when a 

putative class of 1.5 million female employees alleged sex 

discrimination by their local supervisors. 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 

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The local supervisors had discretion in making employment 

decisions and the class of female employees faced different 

managers making different employment decisions (some 

presumably nondiscriminatory). Id. The proposed class thus 

could not identify common questions capable of classwide 

resolution. Id. at 2553–55. 

The concerns in Wal-Mart do not apply here because 

the NFL Parties allegedly injured retired players through the 

same course of conduct. See In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 

399 (“Unlike the Wal-Mart plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs in this 

case have alleged that the class was subjected to the same 

kind of illegal conduct by the same entities, and that class 

members were harmed in the same way, albeit to potentially 

different extents.”). Even if players’ particular injuries are 

unique, their negligence and fraud claims still depend on the 

same common questions regarding the NFL’s conduct. For 

example, when did the NFL know about the risks of 

concussion? What did it do to protect players? Did the 

League conceal the risks of head injuries? These questions 

are common to the class and capable of classwide resolution. 

C. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the class representatives’ 

claims be “typical of the claims . . . of the class.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This “ensures the interests of the class and 

the class representatives are aligned ‘so that the latter will 

work to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their 

own goals.’” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 

Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182–83 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 141 (3d Cir. 

1998)). We also have set a “low threshold” for typicality. Id.

at 183. “‘Even relatively pronounced factual differences will 

generally not preclude a finding of typicality where there is a 

strong similarity of legal theories’ or where the claim arises 

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from the same practice or course of conduct.” In re 

Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions,

148 F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Baby Neal v. 

Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994)) (alteration omitted).

The class representatives, Shawn Wooden and Kevin 

Turner, were named in the class action complaint and were 

selected by class counsel.5 Wooden is a retired player with 

no Qualifying Diagnosis. Like other retired players without a 

current diagnosis, he sought a baseline assessment 

examination to determine whether he had shown signs of 

cognitive decline and, in the unfortunate event that he 

developed one of the Qualifying Diagnoses, he would seek a 

monetary award. Turner was a retired player living with 

ALS.6 Like other retired players with currently known 

injuries, he sought a monetary award. The District Court 

concluded that the claims of Wooden and Turner were 

“typical of those they represent.” In re Nat’l Football League 

Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 372. We 

agree. 

 

5

In September 2013, one month after the parties signed the 

settlement term sheet, the initial subclass representative for 

players with no currently known injuries, Corey Swinson, 

passed away. One month later, Wooden took Swinson’s 

place.

6 We note that Kevin Turner passed away on March 24, 2016. 

Class counsel has moved to substitute as a party Turner’s 

father, Paul Raymond Turner, a motion we will grant. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(1). For purposes of deciding this 

appeal, it is unnecessary to substitute a new class member as 

subclass representative and we shall continue to refer to 

Kevin Turner as the subclass representative in this opinion. 

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Some objectors argue that the claims of the class 

representatives are not typical because of factual differences 

between the representatives and other class members, 

including the number of seasons played and injuries caused 

by head trauma. But class members need not “share identical 

claims,” and “cases challenging the same unlawful conduct 

which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class 

usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the 

varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims.” Baby 

Neal, 43 F.3d at 56, 58. What matters is that Wooden and 

Turner seek recovery under the same legal theories for the 

same wrongful conduct as the subclasses they represent. 

Even if the class representatives’ injuries are unique to their 

time in football, the NFL’s alleged fraudulent concealment of 

the risks of head injuries is the same. 

D. Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires class representatives to “fairly 

and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23(a)(4). It tests the qualifications of class counsel and the 

class representatives. It also aims to root out conflicts of 

interest within the class to ensure that all class members are 

fairly represented in the negotiations. Several objectors 

challenge the District Court’s adequacy-of-representation 

finding, but we conclude that it was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

1. Class Counsel

When examining settlement classes, we “have 

emphasized the special need to assure that class counsel: (1) 

possessed adequate experience; (2) vigorously prosecuted the 

action; and (3) acted at arm’s length from the defendant.” In 

re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 

Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“GM Trucks”). Rule 

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23(g) also sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts 

to consider when appointing class counsel. They include 

counsel’s work in the pending class action, experience in 

handling class actions or other complex litigation, knowledge 

of the applicable law, and the resources available for 

representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).

When class counsel and the NFL began mediation, 

there was only one proposed class of all retired players. Class 

counsel, in consultation with members of the Steering 

Committee and the Executive Committee, decided early in the 

negotiations that creating two separate subclasses “would best 

serve all [c]lass [m]embers’ interests and meet with Due 

Process.” To that end, class counsel designated lawyers from 

the Steering Committee to serve as subclass counsel. 

In its final certification and approval order, the District 

Court found that class counsel and subclass counsel were 

experienced in litigating mass torts and personal injury 

actions, vigorously prosecuted the action at arm’s length from 

the NFL, and were able to extract substantial concessions in 

the process. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 

Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 373. The Court thus concluded 

that class counsel adequately protected the interests of the 

class. Id. No objectors challenge the experience or 

qualifications of class and subclass counsel. They do make 

two related arguments regarding the adequacy of the subclass 

representation, though neither convinces us that the District 

Court abused its discretion. 

Objectors first assert that the procedure for selecting 

subclass counsel did not ensure adequate representation 

because subclass counsel came from the team of lawyers 

already negotiating with the NFL. We agree that class 

counsel could have gone to the District Court and asked it to 

appoint counsel from the outside. Yet objectors point us to 

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no precedent requiring such a procedure. Moreover, the 

District Court assured itself that counsel were adequate 

representatives. They were selected early in the negotiations, 

had already been approved by the District Court to serve on 

the Steering Committee, and were by all accounts active 

participants in the settlement negotiations. In these 

circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

in accepting subclass counsel as adequate representatives.

Objectors next press that the subclass counsel for 

future claimants, Arnold Levin, was not an adequate 

representative, as he represented nine players who alleged 

current symptoms in two lawsuits against the NFL. Levin 

disclosed to the District Court in an application for the 

Steering Committee that he has agreed to fees in these cases 

on a one-third contingency basis. Objectors argue to us that 

Levin’s representation of these players created a conflict with 

his duties to represent the subclass of retired players with no 

Qualifying Diagnoses. Yet objectors failed to raise this 

contention in the District Court and did not meaningfully 

assert it on appeal until their reply brief.7 If they had raised 

concerns over Levin’s representation of other players, we 

have no doubt the District Court could ably have addressed 

this argument. This is part of the reason why we do not 

normally consider arguments not raised in the District 

Court—even in class actions—and deem them waived. In re 

 

7 Alongside the reply brief, objectors also filed a motion 

asking that we take judicial notice of complaints filed by 

retired players where Levin was counsel of record. The 

motion for judicial notice is unnecessary. The complaints 

were part of the MDL proceeding and were accessible on the 

MDL docket. Even if not in the joint appendix, they are part 

of the record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10 (record on 

appeal includes papers filed in the District Court). 

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Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 

2009) (“‘Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will 

not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.’” 

(quoting Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d 

Cir. 2006)). 

That said, some courts have relaxed the standards for 

waiver in class actions. See, e.g., In re Sw. Airlines Voucher 

Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 714 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Class members 

were not obliged, on penalty of waiver, to search on their own 

for a conflict of interest on the part of a class 

representative.”). We agree that the usual waiver rules should 

not be applied mechanically in class actions. We have an 

independent obligation to protect the interests of the class, 

and in many instances class members are far removed from 

the litigation and lack the information and incentive to object. 

See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 784 (“[T]he court plays the 

important role of protector of the absentees’ interests, in a sort 

of fiduciary capacity, by approving appropriate representative 

plaintiffs and class counsel.”). Accordingly, we retain 

discretion to consider arguments that go to the heart of the 

class settlement’s adequacy and fairness. Out of caution, we 

decline to apply the penalty of waiver in this instance. 

Turning to the merits, we do not see how 

representation by Levin created a conflict of interest. He 

disclosed his representation of the players to the District 

Court, and it was still satisfied that he was an adequate 

representative. Beyond this, there is no evidence in the 

record before us that the players named in the complaints 

have a current Qualifying Diagnosis. Rather, they simply 

allege current symptoms that are not themselves Qualifying 

Diagnoses, including memory loss, headaches, mood swings, 

and sensitivity to light. Many players without a current 

Qualifying Diagnosis presumably have similar symptoms. 

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Accordingly, this is not a situation where subclass counsel 

has clients in both subclasses and there is a risk of a conflict. 

2. Class Representatives

A class representative must represent a class capably 

and diligently. “[A] minimal degree of knowledge” about the 

litigation is adequate. New Directions Treatment Servs. v. 

City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The District Court found that the 

class representatives ably discharged their duties by closely 

following the litigation, authorizing the filing of the Class 

Action Complaint, and approving the final settlement. In re 

Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 

F.R.D. at 375. 

Some objectors argue that the Court abused its 

discretion in approving Wooden as representative for the 

subclass of players with no Qualifying Diagnoses because he 

did not claim the risk of developing CTE. This is incorrect. 

In the Class Action Complaint Wooden alleged that he is “at 

increased risk of latent brain injuries caused by . . . repeated 

traumatic head impacts.” Id. (citing Master Administrative 

Class Action Complaint ¶ 7). This allegation covers the risk 

of CTE, which is associated with repeated head impacts. 

Moreover, what matters more than the words Wooden used to 

describe his current health are the interests he would have in 

representing the subclass. Given what we know about CTE, 

Wooden, and all retired NFL players for that matter, are at 

risk of developing the disease and would have an interest in 

compensation for CTE in the settlement.8 

 

8 Objectors also argue in passing that the other subclass 

representative, Turner, failed to allege a risk of CTE. This 

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3. Conflicts of Interest

“The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to 

uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the 

class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). The “linchpin of the 

adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and 

incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of 

the class.” Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 

F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 2012). But not all intra-class conflicts 

are created equal. If they concern “specific issues in 

controversy,” they are called “fundamental.” Id. at 184 

(quoting Newberg on Class Actions § 3:26 (4th ed. 2002)). 

This hits the heart of Rule 23(a)(4) and will defeat a finding 

of adequacy. Id. 

A recurring fundamental conflict is the divide between 

present and future injury plaintiffs identified in Amchem. 

Counsel in that case sought to approve a class settlement and 

certify a nationwide class of persons—numbering between 

250,000 and 2,000,000—who shared an unfortunate fact in 

common: they were all exposed to asbestos-containing 

products manufactured by 20 companies. Georgine v. 

Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d 

sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 

(1997). The class settlement purported to resolve the claims 

of persons who had already sustained injuries as a result of 

asbestos exposure (those with present injuries) and those who 

had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet developed any 

injury (those with future injuries, if any injury at all). The 

District Court approved the settlement and certified the class, 

but we reversed because, among other things, conflicts of 

interest within the class precluded a finding of adequacy. 

 

argument fails for the same reason that it failed with respect 

to Wooden—all players are at risk of CTE. 

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Judge Becker explained that the “most salient” conflict of 

interest was between those with present and future injuries: 

As rational actors, those who are not yet injured 

would want reduced current payouts (through 

caps on compensation awards and limits on the 

number of claims that can be paid each year). 

The futures plaintiffs should also be interested 

in protection against inflation, in not having 

preset limits on how many cases can be 

handled, and in limiting the ability of defendant 

companies to exit the settlement. Moreover, in 

terms of the structure of the alternative dispute 

resolution mechanism established by the 

settlement, they should desire causation 

provisions that can keep pace with changing 

science and medicine, rather than freezing in 

place the science of 1993. Finally, because of 

the difficulty in forecasting what their futures 

hold, they would probably desire a delayed opt 

out . . . .

In contrast, those who are currently injured 

would rationally want to maximize current 

payouts. Furthermore, currently injured 

plaintiffs would care little about inflationprotection. The delayed opt out desired by 

futures plaintiffs would also be of little interest 

to the presently injured; indeed, their interests 

are against such an opt out as the more people 

locked into the settlement, the more likely it is 

to survive. In sum, presently injured class 

representatives cannot adequately represent the 

futures plaintiffs’ interests and vice versa.

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Id. at 630–31 (internal footnote omitted). The Supreme Court 

affirmed on this point and agreed that “the interests of those 

within the single class are not aligned.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 

626. 

To overcome a conflict of interest within a proposed 

class, there must be “structural protections to assure that 

differently situated plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique 

interests.” Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631. A common structural 

protection is the creation of discrete subclasses, each with its 

own independent representation. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard 

Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (“[A] class divided between 

holders of present and future claims . . . requires division into 

homogenous subclasses . . . with separate representation to 

eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”).9 

The District Court found no fundamental conflict of 

interest in this class. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 

Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 376. It explained the 

incentives of class members were aligned because they 

“allegedly were injured by the same scheme: the NFL . . . 

negligently and fraudulently de-emphasized the medical 

effects of concussions to keep [r]etired [p]layers in games.” 

Id. Moreover, the two subclasses of players guarded against 

any Amchem conflict of interest. Id. Turner, the 

 

9 Amicus Public Citizen, Inc. argues that the District Court 

should have created additional subclasses to represent each of 

the five Qualifying Diagnoses, the mood and behavior 

symptoms associated with CTE, and spouses of retired 

players with consortium claims. We agree with the District 

Court that additional subclasses were unnecessary and risked 

slowing or even halting the settlement negotiations. In re 

Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 

F.R.D. at 379.

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representative for those with current injuries, “is interested in 

immediately obtaining the greatest possible compensation for 

his injuries and symptoms.” Id. Wooden, the representative 

for those who may develop injuries that manifest in the 

future, “is interested in monitoring his symptoms, 

guaranteeing that generous compensation will be available far 

into the future, and ensuring an agreement that keeps pace 

with scientific advances . . . [while] compensat[ing] as many 

conditions as possible.” Id. The District Court also cited 

other structural protections, including uncapped and inflationadjusted monetary awards, the guarantee of a baseline 

assessment examination, and the presence of a mediator and 

special master. Id. at 376–77. 

The Court’s analysis was on point. Some objectors 

argue that this class action suffers from a conflict of interest 

between present and future injury plaintiffs. But simply put, 

this case is not Amchem. The most important distinction is 

that class counsel here took Amchem into account by using 

the subclass structure to protect the sometimes divergent 

interests of the retired players. The subclasses were 

represented in the negotiations by separate class 

representatives with separate counsel, and, as discussed, each 

was an adequate representative. This alone is a significant 

structural protection for the class that weighs in favor of 

finding adequacy. 

Moreover, the terms of the settlement reflect that the 

interests of current and future claimants were represented in 

the negotiations. The Monetary Award Fund will start paying 

out claims immediately, providing relief to those currently 

living with injuries. The Fund is uncapped and inflationadjusted, protecting the interests of those who worry about 

developing injuries in the future. The NFL and class counsel 

must meet every ten years and confer in good faith about 

“prospective modifications to the definitions of Qualifying 

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40

Diagnoses and/or the protocols for making Qualifying 

Diagnoses, in light of generally accepted advances in medical 

science.” This allows the settlement to keep pace with 

changing science regarding the existing Qualifying 

Diagnoses. As observed in Georgine, these are the sorts of 

settlement terms that rational actors from both subclasses 

would be interested in when negotiating the resolution of their 

claims. 

 Finally, one of the principal concerns driving 

Amchem’s strict analysis of adequacy of representation was 

the worry that persons with a nebulous risk of developing 

injuries would have little or no reason to protect their rights 

and interests in the settlement. We have evidence that in this 

case the concern is misplaced because many retired players 

with no currently compensable injuries have already taken 

significant steps to protect their rights and interests. Of the 

5,000 players who sued the NFL in the MDL proceedings, 

class counsel estimated that 3,900 have no current Qualifying 

Diagnosis. These 3,900 players are represented, in turn, by 

approximately 300 lawyers. And with so many sets of eyes 

reviewing the terms of the settlement, the overwhelming 

majority of retired players elected to stay in the class and 

benefit from the settlement. We thus have little problem 

saying that their interests were adequately represented. 

Objectors further claim that the settlement’s treatment 

of CTE demonstrates a fundamental conflict of interest 

between present and future injury class members. Under the 

settlement, retired players who died before final approval of 

the settlement and received a post-mortem CTE diagnosis are 

entitled to an award. For any player who died after final 

approval, a post-mortem CTE diagnosis is not compensable. 

Objectors cite this difference in recovery as evidence that the 

subclass of players with a Qualifying Diagnosis may have 

bargained away the CTE claims of other players. GM Trucks, 

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55 F.3d at 797 (“[A] settlement that offers considerably more 

value to one class of plaintiffs than to another may be trading 

the claims of the latter group away in order to enrich the 

former group.”). 

This argument misunderstands the role of the monetary 

award for CTE. As the District Court noted in discussing the 

fairness of the settlement, the monetary award “serves as a 

proxy for Qualifying Diagnoses deceased [r]etired [p]layers 

could have received while living.” In re Nat’l Football 

League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 401–

02 (emphasis in original). Retired players who were living 

with symptoms associated with one of the other Qualifying 

Diagnoses, but died before approval of the settlement, may 

not have had sufficient notice of the need to be diagnosed. To 

provide some compensation to these players, the parties 

created an award for the post-mortem diagnosis of CTE. The 

NFL’s own estimate is that 46 players out of a class 

exceeding at least 20,000 will fall into this category and will 

receive an average award, after offsets, of $1,910,000. The 

monetary award for CTE is thus an attempt to compensate 

deceased players who would otherwise be unable to get the 

benefits available to the class going forward. It is not 

evidence of a debilitating conflict of interest in the class 

settlement.10 

 

10 Some objectors claim that the District Court erred in 

denying their motion to intervene in May 2014. In the classaction context, potential interveners must overcome a 

presumption of adequate representation and “must ordinarily 

demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance 

on the part of a party to the suit.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. 

Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 315 (3d Cir. 2005). Objectors have 

not overcome the presumption in this case because, as just 

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E. Predominance

Turning to the additional requirements for certifying a 

class action under Rule 23(b)(3), the class may be maintained 

if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 

class members predominate over any questions affecting only 

individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

Predominance “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently 

cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” 

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. “We have previously noted that 

the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, which is far 

more demanding, incorporates the Rule 23(a) commonality 

requirement.” In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 

F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re LifeUSA Holding, 

Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir. 2001)). We are nonetheless 

“more inclined to find the predominance test met in the 

settlement context.” Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 

F.3d 272, 304 n.29 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

The District Court found that this class action 

presented predominate factual questions regarding the NFL’s 

knowledge and conduct as well as common scientific 

questions regarding causation. In re Nat’l Football League 

Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 380–81. The 

negligence claims “depend on establishing that the NFL . . . 

knew of the dangers of concussive hits, yet failed to modify 

the rules of NFL Football to mitigate them, or even to warn 

[r]etired [p]layers that they were risking serious cognitive 

injury by continuing to play.” Id. at 380. The fraud claims 

“suggest a similarly far-reaching scheme, alleging that the . . . 

MTBI Committee repeatedly obfuscated the link between 

 

explained, the class representatives and class counsel were 

adequate. 

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football play and head trauma.” Id. We agree with the 

District Court that predominance is satisfied in this case. 

Objectors argue that damage claims in a mass-tort 

class action such as this are too individualized to satisfy the 

requirements of predominance. They cite to Amchem where, 

as we have discussed, a nationwide class of persons exposed 

to asbestos could not meet the predominance requirement. 

521 U.S. at 624. But Amchem itself warned that it does not 

mean that a mass tort case will never clear the hurdle of 

predominance. Id. at 625 (“Even mass tort cases arising from 

a common cause or disaster may, depending upon the 

circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement.”). 

Moreover, this class of retired NFL players does not present 

the same obstacles for predominance as the Amchem class of 

hundreds of thousands (maybe millions) of persons exposed 

to asbestos. 

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F. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement “asks the court 

to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a 

class action against those of alternative available methods of 

adjudication.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 533–34 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We consider the class members’ 

interests in individually controlling litigation, the extent and 

nature of any litigation, the desirability or undesirability of 

concentrating the litigation, and the likely difficulties in 

managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 

The District Court found superiority satisfied because “the 

[s]ettlement avoids thousands of duplicative lawsuits and 

enables fast processing of a multitude of claims.” In re Nat’l 

Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 

F.R.D. at 382. 

No objectors challenge this conclusion, and we have 

no disagreements with the District Court’s analysis. At the 

time the settlement was reached, 5,000 players had filed over 

300 lawsuits in the MDL. Assuming the retired players’ 

claims survived the NFL’s motions to dismiss, the resolution 

of so many individual lawsuits would have presented serious 

challenges for the District Court. Given our experience with 

similar MDLs, we expect the proceedings would result in 

years of costly litigation and multiple appeals, all the while 

delaying any potential recovery for retired players coping 

with serious health challenges. 

V. CLASS NOTICE

When the District Court preliminarily certified the 

class and approved the settlement in July 2014, it directed that 

notice be given to all potential class members. Notice “is 

designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement and to 

apprise class members of the right and opportunity to inspect 

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the complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings 

filed in the litigation.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 327 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Generally speaking, the notice 

should contain sufficient information to enable class members 

to make informed decisions on whether they should take steps 

to protect their rights, including objecting to the settlement or, 

when relevant, opting out of the class.” In re Baby Prods. 

Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 180 (3d Cir. 2013).

In our case, the notice informed retired players that a 

settlement was reached and explained what relief the players 

might be eligible for. The notice also outlined the rights of 

players to object to the settlement and potentially opt out. If a 

retired player chose to opt out, he would not benefit from the 

settlement but would not release his claims against the NFL. 

Approximately 1% of retired players filed objections to the 

settlement and another 1% elected to opt out.11 

For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), “the court 

must direct to class members the best notice that is 

practicable under the circumstances, including individual 

notice to all members who can be identified through 

reasonable effort.” Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). In addition to 

the requirements of Rule 23, due process further requires that 

notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 

to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 

afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 

314 (1950).

 

11 Some argue that the District Court abused its discretion in 

striking as untimely certain objections to the settlement. But 

these actions were within the Court’s broad discretion to 

manage the proceedings in a class action. Hydrogen 

Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310. 

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The District Court found that the content of the class 

notice and its distribution to the class satisfied Rule 23 and 

due process. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 

Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 383. One objector 

argues that the notice materials were inadequate because they 

insufficiently disclosed that monetary awards for players are 

subject to reduction on account of applicable Medicare and 

Medicaid liens against a player’s assets. But the Long-Form 

Notice did discuss possible reductions based on “[a]ny legally 

enforceable liens on the award.” Id. at 384 n.43 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Court found this language 

sufficient because the notice alerts class members to the 

possibility of lien reduction and refers them to the settlement 

where this topic is discussed in detail. Id. We agree. 

VI. CLASS SETTLEMENT 

A class action cannot be settled without court approval 

based on a determination that the proposed settlement is fair, 

reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The 

inquiry into the settlement’s fairness under Rule 23(e) 

“protects unnamed class members from unjust or unfair 

settlements affecting their rights when the representatives 

become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are 

able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a 

compromise.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

“The decision of whether to approve a proposed 

settlement of a class action is left to the sound discretion of 

the district court.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 299 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). It “bear[s] the important 

responsibility of protecting absent class members, ‘which is 

executed by the court’s assuring that the settlement represents 

adequate compensation for the release of the class claims.’” 

In re Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2010) 

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(quoting GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805). In cases of settlement 

classes, where district courts are certifying a class and 

approving a settlement in tandem, they should be “even ‘more 

scrupulous than usual’ when examining the fairness of the 

proposed settlement.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534 (quoting 

GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805). 

A. Presumption of Fairness

We apply an initial presumption of fairness in 

reviewing a class settlement when: “(1) the negotiations 

occurred at arms length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; 

(3) the proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar 

litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the class objected.” 

Cendant, 264 F.3d at 232 n.18. The District Court found each 

of these elements satisfied and applied the presumption. In re 

Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 

F.R.D. at 387–88. Objectors argue that the presumption 

should not have applied at all because class counsel did not 

conduct formal discovery into the fraud and negligence 

claims against the NFL before reaching the settlement. We 

conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

class counsel’s informal discovery to be sufficient. 

By the time of the settlement, class counsel had 

undertaken significant informal discovery. For instance, they 

had obtained a comprehensive database of the claims and 

symptoms of retired players and had enlisted the assistance of 

medical experts. They also had a grasp of the legal hurdles 

that the retired players would need to clear in order to succeed 

on their fraud and negligence claims, in particular the 

potentially dispositive issue of federal labor law preemption. 

Thus, in negotiations with the NFL class counsel “were aware 

of the strengths and weaknesses of their case.” In re Nat’l 

Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 

F.R.D. at 387. To the extent objectors ask us to require 

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formal discovery before presuming that a settlement is fair, 

we decline the invitation. In some cases, informal discovery 

will be enough for class counsel to assess the value of the 

class’ claims and negotiate a settlement that provides fair 

compensation. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust 

Litig., 284 F.R.D. 249, 267 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (applying 

presumption in part because, “although no formal discovery 

was conducted . . . , [class counsel] conducted informal 

discovery, including, inter alia, independently investigating 

the merits”). 

B. Girsh & Prudential Factors

In Girsh v. Jepson, we noted nine factors to be 

considered when determining the fairness of a proposed 

settlement: 

(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration 

of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to 

the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings 

and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 

risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of 

establishing damages; (6) the risks of 

maintaining the class action through the trial; 

(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a 

greater judgment; (8) the range of 

reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of 

the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of 

reasonableness of the settlement fund to a 

possible recovery in light of all the attendant 

risks of litigation. 

521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (internal quotation marks 

and ellipses omitted). “The settling parties bear the burden of 

proving that the Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of 

the settlement.” In re Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d at 350. A 

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district court’s findings under the Girsh test are those of fact. 

Unless clearly erroneous, they are upheld. Id. 

Later, in Prudential Insurance we held that, because of 

a “sea-change in the nature of class actions,” it might be 

useful to expand the Girsh factors to include several 

permissive and non-exhaustive factors: 

[1] the maturity of the underlying substantive 

issues, as measured by experience in 

adjudicating individual actions, the 

development of scientific knowledge, the extent 

of discovery on the merits, and other factors 

that bear on the ability to assess the probable 

outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and 

individual damages; [2] the existence and 

probable outcome of claims by other classes 

and subclasses; [3] the comparison between the 

results achieved by the settlement for individual 

class or subclass members and the results 

achieved—or likely to be achieved—for other 

claimants; [4] whether class or subclass 

members are accorded the right to opt out of the 

settlement; [5] whether any provisions for 

attorneys’ fees are reasonable; and [6] whether 

the procedure for processing individual claims 

under the settlement is fair and reasonable. 

148 F.3d at 323. “Unlike the Girsh factors, each of which the 

district court must consider before approving a class 

settlement, the Prudential considerations are just that, 

prudential.” In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 174. 

The District Court in our case went through the Girsh 

factors and the relevant Prudential factors in great detail 

before concluding that the terms of the settlement were fair, 

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reasonable, and adequate. In re Nat’l Football League 

Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 388–96. 

Objectors try to challenge the District Court’s analysis in 

several ways, but none convinces us. 

1. Complexity, Expense, and Likely 

Duration of the Litigation

“The first factor ‘captures the probable costs, in both 

time and money, of continued litigation.’” Warfarin, 391 

F.3d at 535–36 (quoting Cendant, 264 F.3d at 233). The 

District Court concluded that the probable costs of continued 

litigation in the MDL were significant and that this factor 

weighed in favor of approving the settlement. In re Nat’l 

Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307

F.R.D. at 388–89. Some objectors assert that the District 

Court overestimated the costs of continued litigation because 

the negligence and fraud claims were “straightforward.” This 

is not the case. Over 5,000 retired NFL players in the MDL 

alleged a multi-decade fraud by the NFL, and litigating these 

claims would have been an enormous undertaking. The 

discovery needed to prove the NFL’s fraudulent concealment 

of the risks of concussions was extensive. The District Court 

would then resolve many issues of causation and medical 

science. Finally, if the cases did not settle or were not 

dismissed, individual suits would be remanded to district 

courts throughout the country for trial. We agree with the 

District Court that the expense of this process weighs strongly 

in the settlement’s favor. 

2. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

“The second Girsh factor ‘attempts to gauge whether 

members of the class support the settlement.’” Warfarin, 391 

F.3d at 536 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 318). As noted, 

the case began with a class of approximately 20,000 retired 

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players, of which 5,000 are currently represented by counsel 

in the MDL proceedings. Notice of the settlement reached an 

estimated 90% of those players through direct mail and 

secondary publications (in addition to the extensive national 

media coverage of this case). As of 10 days before the 

fairness hearing, more than 5,200 class members had signed 

up to receive additional information about the settlement and 

the settlement website had more than 64,000 unique visitors. 

With all this attention, only approximately 1% of class 

members objected and approximately 1% of class members 

opted out. We agree with the District Court that these figures 

weigh in favor of settlement approval. In re Nat’l Football 

League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 389.

Some note that the percentage of objectors was even 

lower in GM Trucks, a case where we declined to approve a 

settlement. There, “[o]f approximately 5.7 million class 

members, 6,450 owners objected and 5,203 opted out.” GM 

Trucks, 55 F.3d at 813 n.32. But in GM we looked past the 

low objection rate because there were “other indications that 

the class reaction to the suit was quite negative,” including 

our concern that the passive victims of a product defect 

lacked “adequate interest and information to voice 

objections.” Id. at 813. Those concerns are not present here. 

By the time of the settlement, many of the retired players in 

this class already had counsel and had sued the NFL,

suggesting that their claims were valuable enough to pursue 

in court and that the players were informed enough to 

evaluate the settlement.12 

 

12 Others argue that we cannot rely on the reaction of the class 

because the class notice was “problematic.” They claim that 

the notice may have misled class members about 

compensation for those with a post-mortem CTE diagnosis. 

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3. Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of 

Discovery Completed

“The third Girsh factor ‘captures the degree of case 

development that class counsel [had] accomplished prior to 

settlement. Through this lens, courts can determine whether 

counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case 

before negotiating.’” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (quoting 

Cendant, 264 F.3d at 235). 

The District Court concluded that class counsel 

adequately evaluated the merits of the preemption and 

causation issues through informal discovery, and, after ten 

months of settlement negotiations, the stage of the 

proceedings weighed in favor of settlement approval. In re 

Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 

F.R.D. at 390. Objectors claim that the lack of formal 

discovery in this matter should have weighed more heavily 

against settlement. As with the presumption of fairness, 

formal discovery is not a requirement for the third Girsh 

factor. What matters is not the amount or type of discovery 

class counsel pursued, but whether they had developed 

enough information about the case to appreciate sufficiently 

the value of the claims. Moreover, requiring parties to 

conduct formal discovery before reaching a proposed class 

settlement would take a valuable bargaining chip—the costs 

of formal discovery itself—off the table during negotiations. 

This could deter the early settlement of disputes. 

4. Risks of Establishing Liability and 

Damages

 

But the District Court explained that the class notice was

clear that only some cases of CTE would be compensated. In 

re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 

307 F.R.D. at 383–84.

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“The fourth and fifth Girsh factors survey the possible 

risks of litigation in order to balance the likelihood of success 

and the potential damage award if the case were taken to trial 

against the benefits of an immediate settlement.” Prudential, 

148 F.3d at 319. We concur with the District Court that this 

factor weighed in favor of settlement because class members 

“face[d] stiff challenges surmounting the issues of preemption 

and causation.” In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 

Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 391. 

To start, if the NFL were to prevail in its motion to 

dismiss on the issue of federal labor law preemption, “many, 

if not all,” of the class members’ claims would be dismissed. 

Id. Objectors claim the District Court misjudged the risks of 

establishing liability and damages on this front. They argue 

that the NFL’s preemption defense would not apply to all 

class members because there were no CBAs in effect before 

1968 and between 1987 and 1993. But even if there were a 

small subset of players unaffected by the preemption defense, 

the defense still had the capability of denying relief to the 

majority of class members and this weighs in favor of 

approving the settlement. 

As for causation, the District Court noted that retired 

players would need to show both general causation (that 

repetitive head trauma is capable of causing ALS, 

Alzheimer’s, and the like), and specific causation (that the 

brain trauma suffered by a particular player in fact caused his 

specific impairments). In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 

Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 393. With general 

causation, the Court found that even though “[a] consensus is 

emerging that repetitive mild brain injury is associated with 

the Qualifying Diagnoses,” the “available research is not 

nearly robust enough to discount the risks” of litigation. Id. 

And specific causation would be even more troublesome 

because a player would need to distinguish the effect of hits 

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he took during his NFL career from the effect of those he 

received in high school football, college football, or other 

contact sports. Objectors argue that the District Court put too 

little faith in the ability of the class to show causation because 

the NFL has admitted that concussions can lead to long-term 

problems and formal discovery could disclose that it 

fraudulently concealed the risks of concussions. But neither 

of these points is particularly helpful for overcoming the 

general and specific causation hurdles the District Court 

identified. 

5. Risks of Maintaining Class Action 

Through Trial

The District Court found that the likelihood of 

obtaining and keeping a class certification if the action were 

to proceed to trial weighed in favor of approving the 

settlement, but it deserved only minimal consideration. Id. at 

394. This was correct. In a settlement class, this factor 

becomes essentially “toothless” because “‘a district court 

need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present 

intractable management problems[,] . . . for the proposal is 

that there be no trial.’” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321 (quoting 

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620). 

6. Ability of Defendants to Withstand a 

Greater Judgment

The seventh Girsh factor is most relevant when the 

defendant’s professed inability to pay is used to justify the 

amount of the settlement. In the case of the NFL, the District 

Court found this factor neutral because the NFL did not cite 

potential financial instability as justification for the 

settlement’s size. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 

Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 394. In fact, it agreed 

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to uncap the Monetary Award Fund and is thus duty bound to 

pay every compensable claim. 

Some objectors complain that the settlement, which 

may cost the NFL $1 billion over its lifetime, represents a 

“fraction of one year’s revenues.” Even so, that does not 

change the analysis of this Girsh factor. Indeed, “‘in any 

class action against a large corporation, the defendant entity is 

likely to be able to withstand a more substantial judgment, 

and, against the weight of the remaining factors, this fact 

alone does not undermine the reasonableness of the . . . 

settlement.’” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 323 (quoting Weber v. 

Gov’t Empl. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 447 (D.N.J. 2009)).

7. Range of Reasonableness of the 

Settlement in Light of the Best Possible 

Recovery and All Attendant Risks of 

Litigation

In evaluating the eighth and ninth Girsh factors, we 

ask “whether the settlement represents a good value for a 

weak case or a poor value for a strong case.” Warfarin, 391 

F.3d at 538. “The factors test two sides of the same coin: 

reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and 

reasonableness in light of the risks the parties would face if 

the case went to trial.” Id. “[T]he present value of the 

damages plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, 

appropriately discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should 

be compared with the amount of the proposed settlement.” 

Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322 (quotation omitted). 

If the retired players were successful in their fraud and 

negligence claims, they would likely be entitled to substantial 

damages awards. But we must take seriously the litigation 

risks inherent in pressing forward with the case. The NFL’s 

pending motion to dismiss and other available affirmative 

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defenses could have left retired players to pursue claims in 

arbitration or with no recovery at all. Hence we agree with 

the District Court that the settlement represents a fair deal for 

the class when compared with a risk-adjusted estimate of the 

value of plaintiffs’ claims. In re Nat’l Football League 

Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 395. 

Objectors claim that the District Court should have 

taken into account the costs to class members of the 

registration and claims administration process because they 

decrease the “real value” for the class. But these costs are not 

relevant to the eighth and ninth Girsh factors. And in any 

event the Court assured itself that the claims process was 

“reasonable in light of the substantial monetary awards . . . 

and imposes no more requirements than necessary.” Id. at 

396.13 

8. Prudential Factors

The District Court found that the relevant Prudential 

factors also weighed in favor of approving the settlement. Id.

at 395–96. No objectors engage with the Court’s findings on 

this front. But briefly, we agree that class counsel was able to 

assess the probable outcome of this case, class members had 

the opportunity to opt out, and the claims process is 

reasonable. The provision of attorneys’ fees was a neutral 

factor because class counsel has not yet moved for a fee 

award. 

C. Settlement’s Treatment of CTE

 

13 The argument that the settlement’s failure to compensate 

CTE makes it a poor value for the class we discuss separately 

below.

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Objectors raise other arguments about the fairness of 

the settlement that do not necessarily fall neatly within one of 

the Girsh factors. The most common of those arguments is 

that the exclusion of CTE as a Qualifying Diagnosis for 

future claimants is unfair. Objectors note that CTE, the 

“industrial disease of football,” was at the center of the first 

concussion lawsuits and argue that claims for CTE 

compensation are released by the settlement in return for 

nothing. The District Court carefully considered this 

argument before deciding that the settlement’s treatment of 

CTE was reasonable. It made detailed factual findings about 

the state of medical science regarding CTE—findings that we 

review for clear error—in support of this conclusion. 

The Court first determined that “[t]he study of CTE is 

nascent, and the symptoms of the disease, if any, are 

unknown.” Id. at 397. Surveying the available medical 

literature, it found that researchers have not “reliably 

determined which events make a person more likely to 

develop CTE” and “have not determined what symptoms 

individuals with CTE typically suffer from while they are 

alive.” Id. at 398. At the time of the Court’s decision, only 

about 200 brains with CTE had been examined, and the only 

way currently to diagnose CTE is a post-mortem examination 

of the subject’s brain. Id. 

Citing studies by Dr. Ann McKee and Dr. Robert 

Stern, objectors argued that CTE progresses in four stages. In 

Stages I and II, the disease affects mood and behavior while 

leaving a retired player’s cognitive functions largely intact. 

Headaches, aggression, depression, explosive outbursts, and 

suicidal thoughts are common. Later in life, as a retired 

player progresses to Stages III and IV, severe memory loss, 

dementia, loss of attention and concentration, and impairment 

of language begin to occur. The District Court explained, 

however, that these studies suffer from several limitations and 

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cannot generate “[p]redictive, generalizable conclusions” 

about CTE. Id. at 399. The studies suffered from a selection

bias because they only examined patients with a history of 

repetitive head injury. They had to rely on reports by family 

members to reconstruct the symptoms patients showed before 

death. And they did not take into account other potential risk 

factors for developing CTE, including a high Body Mass 

Index (“BMI”), lifestyle change, age, chronic pain, or 

substance abuse. Id. at 398–99.

With this science in mind, the Court next determined 

that certain symptoms associated with CTE, such as memory 

loss, executive dysfunction, and difficulty with concentration, 

are compensated by the existing Qualifying Diagnoses. Id. 

And many persons diagnosed with CTE after death suffered 

from conditions in life that are compensated, including ALS, 

Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s disease. Relying on 

expert evidence, the Court estimated that “at least 89% of the 

former NFL players” who were examined in CTE studies 

would have been compensated under the settlement. Id. 

To be sure, the mood and behavioral symptoms 

associated with CTE (aggression, depression, and suicidal 

thoughts) are not compensated, but this result was reasonable. 

Mood and behavioral symptoms are common in the general 

population and have multifactor causation and many other 

risk factors. Id. at 401. Retired players tend to have many of 

these risk factors, such as sleep apnea, a history of drug and 

alcohol abuse, a high BMI, chronic pain, and major lifestyle 

changes. Id. Class members would thus “face more 

difficulty proving that NFL Football caused these mood and 

behavioral symptoms than they would proving that it caused 

other symptoms associated with Qualifying Diagnoses.” Id.

The District Court also reviewed the monetary award 

for post-mortem diagnoses of CTE. It found “[s]ound 

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reasons” for limiting the award to players who died before 

final approval of the settlement. Id. As we have summarized 

elsewhere, this compensation for deceased players is a proxy 

for Qualifying Diagnoses a retired player could have received 

while living. After final approval, players “should be well 

aware of the [s]ettlement and the need to obtain Qualifying 

Diagnoses,” and “there no longer is a need for Death with 

CTE to serve as a proxy for Qualifying Diagnoses.” Id. at 

402.

Finally, the Court addressed the potential development 

of scientific and medical knowledge of CTE. Objectors 

argued that the settlement’s treatment of CTE was 

unreasonable in light of the expected developments in CTE 

research. But even if a diagnosis of CTE during life will be 

available in the next five or ten years, “the longitudinal 

epidemiological studies necessary to build a robust clinical 

profile will still take a considerable amount of time.” Id. The 

Court also noted that the settlement has some mechanism for 

keeping pace with science, in that the parties must meet and 

confer every ten years in good faith about possible 

modifications to the definitions of Qualifying Diagnoses. Id. 

at 403 

Objectors have not shown any of the District Court’s 

findings to be clearly erroneous, which exists when, 

“although there is evidence to support [the finding], the 

reviewing court, based on the entire evidence, concludes with 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” GM Trucks, 

55 F.3d at 783. Objectors argue that the Court overlooked 

certain expert evidence, but the record does not support this 

contention. They also complain that it failed to weigh the 

credibility of the different experts when the objectors’ experts 

were not paid for their services. We do not see how the Court 

could have made a proper credibility determination on the 

basis of written declarations alone, and, in any event, we have 

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never required those determinations when considering the 

fairness of a settlement. 

Others claim that the expert evidence on CTE should 

have been analyzed under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which 

established threshold standards for the admissibility of expert 

scientific testimony at trial. Objectors failed to present this 

argument to the District Court, and we deem it waived. In re 

Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 261. Moreover, we have never 

held that district courts considering the fairness of a class 

action settlement should consider the admissibility of expert 

evidence under Daubert. And at least one court of appeals 

has rejected the argument objectors are making because, “[i]n 

a fairness hearing, the judge does not resolve the parties’ 

factual disputes but merely ensures that the disputes are real 

and that the settlement fairly and reasonably resolves the

parties’ differences.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, 

& Agr. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 

F.3d 615, 636–37 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Finding no clear errors in the District Court’s findings 

on CTE, we are also convinced that the Court was well within 

its discretion in concluding that the settlement’s treatment of 

this condition was reasonable. Most importantly, objectors 

are not correct when they assert that CTE claims are released 

by the settlement in return for “nothing.” A primary purpose 

of the settlement is to provide insurance for living players 

who develop certain neurocognitive or neuromuscular 

impairments linked to repetitive head trauma (in addition to 

the benefits provided by the Baseline Assessment Program). 

Given what we know about CTE, many of the symptoms 

associated with the disease will be covered by this insurance. 

And compensation for players who are coping with these 

symptoms now is surely preferable to waiting until they die to 

pay their estates for a CTE diagnosis. Moreover, we agree 

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with the District Court that it would be an uphill battle to 

compensate for the mood and behavioral symptoms thought 

to be associated with CTE. 

Before concluding, we address developments during 

the pendency of this appeal. In a March 2016 roundtable 

discussion on concussions organized by the House Energy & 

Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, the 

NFL’s Executive Vice President cited the research of Dr. 

McKee and agreed that there was a link between football and 

degenerative brain disorders like CTE. The NFL’s statement 

is an important development because it is the first time, as far 

as we can tell, that the NFL has publicly acknowledged a 

connection between football and CTE. On the other hand, the 

NFL is now conceding something already known. The sheer 

number of deceased players with a post-mortem diagnosis of 

CTE supports the unavoidable conclusion that there is a 

relationship, if not a causal connection, between a life in 

football and CTE. 

Objectors cite the NFL’s concession as further 

evidence that this settlement should be rejected. They argue 

that the NFL has now admitted there is a link between 

football and CTE, yet refused to compensate the disease. 

Again, we note that the settlement does compensate many of 

the impairments associated with CTE, though it does not 

compensate CTE as a diagnosis (with the exception of players 

who died before final approval of the settlement). Moreover, 

even if the NFL has finally come around to the view that 

there is a link between CTE and football, many more 

questions must be answered before we could say that the 

failure to compensate the diagnosis was unreasonable. For 

example, we still cannot reliably determine the prevalence, 

symptoms, or risk factors of CTE. The NFL’s recent 

acknowledgment may very well advance the public 

discussion of the risks of contact sports, but it did not advance 

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the science. Accordingly, the NFL’s statement is not a 

ground for reversal of the settlement’s approval.

In the end, this settlement was the bargain struck by 

the parties, negotiating amid the fog of litigation. If we were 

drawing up a settlement ourselves, we may want different 

terms or more compensation for a certain condition. But our 

role as judges is to review the settlement reached by the 

parties for its fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness. And 

when exercising that role, we must “guard against demanding 

too large a settlement based on [our] view of the merits of the 

litigation; after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of 

the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.” 

GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 806. This settlement will provide 

significant and immediate relief to retired players living with 

the lasting scars of a NFL career, including those suffering 

from some of the symptoms associated with CTE. We must 

hesitate before rejecting that bargain based on an unsupported 

hope that sending the parties back to the negotiating table 

would lead to a better deal. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the settlement’s treatment of CTE does not render the 

agreement fundamentally unfair.14

 

14 We address a few remaining objections to the District 

Court’s fairness inquiry. Some claim that the offsets in the 

settlement that reduce a player’s monetary award were 

unreasonable. The Court explained why each offset had 

scientific support and we are content to say that objectors 

have not shown its findings to be clearly in error or its 

conclusions an abuse of discretion. In re Nat’l Football 

League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 407–

11. Others argue that the settlement should have used the 

definition of “eligible season” set forth in the NFL retirement 

plan. We concur with the District Court that the definition of 

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VII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Class counsel and the NFL did not negotiate the issue 

of fees until after the initial term sheet was signed. After 

negotiations, the NFL agreed not to contest any award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs up to $112.5 million. Any fee award 

will be separate from the NFL’s obligations under the 

settlement to pay monetary awards to the retired players. 

Class counsel may also petition the District Court to set aside 

5% of each monetary award to administer the settlement. The 

petition for a fee award will be submitted to the Court at a 

later date. Objectors will then be able to present arguments as 

to why the requested award is improper, and the Court will 

have discretion to modify the award in whatever way it sees 

fit. Even though the issue of attorneys’ fees remains 

undecided, some object that the settlement’s treatment of fees 

is a reason for reversal. 

A. Deferral of Fee Petition

Objectors first argue that the District Court abused its 

discretion in approving the procedure for attorneys’ fees. As 

noted, class counsel will request a fee award after the class 

action is certified and the class settlement is approved. 

Objectors claim that the “attorney-fee-deferral procedure” 

violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(h) and 

deprived class members of due process. We note at the outset 

that objectors failed to present most of the elements of this 

argument to the Court at the final fairness hearing. The 

closest anyone came was when amicus Public Citizen, Inc. 

claimed that the absence of a fee petition “prevents a 

complete evaluation of the fairness of the settlement at this 

point.” In response, the Court noted that interested parties 

 

eligible season in the settlement was reasonable because it is 

a proxy for the number of head injuries. Id. at 410. 

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would have an opportunity to object to the fee petition when 

filed and that the separation of settlement approval from fee 

approval was an “accepted approach.” In re Nat’l Football 

League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 396.

As discussed elsewhere, the standards for waiver may 

be relaxed somewhat in the class action context because we 

have an independent obligation to protect the rights of absent 

class members. Applying this principle, we will reach the 

objections concerning attorneys’ fees because, if the 

objections are persuasive, class members were denied a 

meaningful chance to object or opt out from the settlement. 

Our review, however, confirms that the procedure for 

awarding fees in this settlement was neither an unlawful 

procedure nor an obstacle to approval. We have no doubt 

that, at the specified time, class counsel’s fee petition will be 

subject to careful review by the District Court and objectors 

will present challenges to the fee petition if warranted. 

To start, the practice of deferring consideration of a fee 

award is not so irregular. We have seen the same 

arrangement in the settlement of a products liability class 

action related to diet drugs. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 

Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 534–35 (3d Cir. 2009) (settlement 

approved in 2002, interim and final fee awards approved in 

2009). Other courts have also used the same procedure. E.g., 

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of 

Mexico, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 918 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub 

nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014); 

see also Newberg on Class Actions § 14:5 (5th ed.) (“In some 

situations, the court will give final approval to a class action 

settlement and leave fees and costs for a later 

determination.”). 

Moreover, the separation of a fee award from final 

approval of the settlement does not violate Rule 23(h), which 

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allows a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

in a certified class action subject to certain requirements. 

Nowhere does the provision require that class counsel move 

for its fee award at the same time that it moves for final 

approval of the settlement. Under the Rule, a fee petition 

must be made by motion served on all parties and, when the 

motion is made by class counsel, notice must be “directed to 

class members in a reasonable manner.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(h)(1). Class members may then object and the court may 

hold a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2)–(3). And the court 

“must find the facts and state its legal conclusions” and “may 

refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special 

master.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(3)–(4). So long as these 

conditions are met, the procedure for awarding attorneys’ fees 

that the District Court approved in this case will not run afoul 

of subsection (h). 

Objectors point us to the Advisory Committee Notes to 

Rule 23, which seem to contemplate combining class notice 

of the fee petition with notice of the terms of the settlement. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1), 2003 advisory committee’s note 

(“For motions by class counsel in cases subject to court 

review of a proposed settlement under Rule 23(e), it would be 

important to require the filing of at least the initial motion in 

time for inclusion of information about the motion in the 

notice to the class about the proposed settlement that is 

required by Rule 23(e).”) & (“In cases in which settlement 

approval is contemplated under Rule 23(e), notice of class 

counsel’s fee motion should be combined with notice of the 

proposed settlement, and the provision regarding notice to the 

class is parallel to the requirements for notice under Rule 

23(e).”); see also Newberg on Class Actions § 8.24 (5th ed.) 

(Rule 23 envisions “linking together settlement notice and 

objections with fee notices and objections”). But even if we 

were willing to read the Advisory Committee’s suggestion 

that fee petitions be filed alongside the settlement as a 

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requirement, “it is the Rule itself, not the Advisory 

Committee’s description of it, that governs.” Dukes, 131 S. 

Ct. at 2559. 

Objectors also cite as support two cases from other 

circuits that found a violation of Rule 23(h). See Redman v. 

RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 638 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. 

denied sub nom. Nicaj v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1429 

(2015); In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 

988, 993 (9th Cir. 2010). They are not, however, as helpful 

as objectors might think. In those cases, the district courts 

denied class members the opportunity to object to the 

particulars of counsel’s fee request because counsel were not 

required to file a fee petition until after the deadline for class 

members to object expired. By the time they were served 

with notice of the fee petition, it was too late for them to 

object. We have little trouble agreeing that Rule 23(h) is 

violated in those circumstances. But in our case the fee 

petition has not yet been filed, the District Court has not set a 

deadline for objections to the fee petition, and the issue of 

whether class members will have an opportunity to object is 

hypothetical. Accordingly, we decline to hold that Rule 23(h) 

mandates the simultaneous notice of a class action settlement 

and notice of the fee petition. 

The final argument raised by objectors on this point is 

that the decision to delay ruling on the fee award deprived 

class members of due process. As we discussed in evaluating 

classwide notice, constitutional due process requires that 

notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 

to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 

afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Put another way, the notice of a 

class settlement “should contain sufficient information to 

enable class members to make informed decisions on whether 

they should take steps.” In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 180. 

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The class notice here was sufficient to comply with 

due process. The notice advised that the NFL would pay 

attorneys’ fees from a separate fund and not object to an 

award up to $112.5 million and that the District Court would 

consider fees after final approval and afford retired players an 

opportunity to object. From this, class members knew from 

where the fees for class counsel were coming (a separate 

fund), what the NFL’s position on fees would be (no 

objection up to $112.5 million), and could ballpark the size of 

class counsel’s eventual fee request (a betting person would 

say it will be close to $112.5 million). Even if the class 

members were missing certain information—for example, the 

number of hours class counsel worked and the terms of any 

contingency fee arrangements class counsel have with 

particular retired players—they still had enough information 

to make an informed decision about whether to object to or 

opt out from the settlement. 

To be sure, we are sympathetic to concerns that others 

have raised over the practice of delaying consideration of a 

fee motion. As one treatise put it, 

[a] primary concern about class action 

settlements is that unmonitored class counsel 

may have incentives to sell out the class’s 

interests in return for a large fee. To assess 

whether such a sell-out has occurred, class 

members need information both about the 

content of the settlement and about the scope of 

the fee. In this sense, fee notice not only may 

accompany settlement notice; it likely should

accompany settlement notice.

Newberg on Class Actions § 8:22 (5th ed.) (emphases in 

original). Delaying the fee petition denies class members 

information about what their counsel did in negotiating the 

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settlement. And, all else being equal, the more information 

available the better. Moreover, class members may have less 

incentive to object to the fee award at a later time because 

approval of the settlement will have already occurred. But 

the procedure is not necessarily a violation of Rule 23(h), and 

in this instance it did not violate due process.

B. Clear Sailing Provision

Objectors next challenge the provision in the 

settlement agreement that the NFL would not object to a fee 

award up to $112.5 million. This is often referred to as a 

“clear sailing provision” (probably because the implication is 

that the fee request stands a much better chance of court 

approval if the defendant is not objecting). The concern with 

a clear sailing provision is collusion. The defendant is 

indifferent to the allocation of its liability between the class 

and counsel; all that matters is the total liability. To forgo the 

opportunity to object to the fee award, the defendant will 

presumably want something in return because it is giving up 

the chance to reduce its overall liability. We thus might fear 

that class counsel has given away something of value to the 

class in return for the defendant’s agreement not to contest a 

fee request below a certain level. 

Despite these concerns, “numerous cases . . . have 

approved agreements containing such clear-sailing clauses.” 

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. 

112, 138 (E.D. La. 2013). We join our sister circuits in 

declining to hold that clear sailing provisions are per se bars 

to settlement approval while nonetheless emphasizing that 

they deserve careful scrutiny in any class action settlement. 

See In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 712 (7th 

Cir. 2015); Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 

402, 426 (6th Cir. 2012); In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. 

Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir. 2011); Blessing v. 

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Sirius XM Radio Inc., 507 F. App’x 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2012); 

Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 525 

(1st Cir. 1991). A district court faced with such a provision 

in a class action settlement should review the process and 

substance of the settlement and satisfy itself that the 

agreement does not indicate collusion or otherwise pose a 

problem. 

The District Court here found the clear sailing 

provision unobjectionable. It emphasized that the issue of 

fees was not discussed until after the principal terms of the 

settlement were agreed to, the fee award will not diminish 

class recovery, and the agreed amount is just over 10% of the 

estimated class recovery. In re Nat’l Football League 

Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 374–75. We 

discern no abuse of discretion. There is simply no evidence 

in the negotiation process or the final terms of the settlement 

that class counsel bargained away the claims of retired 

players in return for their own fees. 

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is the nature of a settlement that some will be 

dissatisfied with the ultimate result. Our case is no different, 

and we do not doubt that objectors are well-intentioned in 

making thoughtful arguments against certification of the class 

and approval of this settlement. They aim to ensure that the 

claims of retired players are not given up in exchange for 

anything less than a generous settlement agreement 

negotiated by very able representatives. But they risk making 

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the perfect the enemy of the good. This settlement will 

provide nearly $1 billion in value to the class of retired 

players. It is a testament to the players, researchers, and 

advocates who have worked to expose the true human costs 

of a sport so many love. Though not perfect, it is fair. 

In sum, we affirm because we are satisfied that the 

District Court ably exercised its discretion in certifying the 

class and approving the settlement. 

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