Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03991/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03991-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Although petitioner initially appeared pro se, he is now represented by counsel.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY SNODGRASS,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 05-3991 MMC (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Docket No. 3)

Petitioner, a California prisoner incarcerated at the California Training Facility 

Soledad, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, challenging the decision by the California Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) finding

petitioner unsuitable for parole.1

 The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition,

petitioner has filed an opposition, and respondent has filed a reply. 

BACKGROUND

In 1982, in Contra Costa County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of second

degree murder and sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life in state prison. The Board has

denied him parole on ten occasions. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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If the Board finds the individual eligible for parole pursuant to § 3041(b), the Board sets a

minimum parole eligibility date pursuant to § 3041(a), with the goal of providing uniform terms for

individuals with similar offenses. In re. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1098 (Cal. 2005). 

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DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Respondent argues the petition should be dismissed for want of subject matter

jurisdiction because petitioner has no federally protected liberty interest in parole. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds respondent’s argument unpersuasive.

While “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence[,]” a state’s statutory parole

scheme, if it uses mandatory language, “creates a presumption that parole release will be

granted” when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 11-12 (1979) (finding Nebraska parole statute, providing board

“shall” release prisoner subject to certain restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in

release on parole); see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (finding

Montana parole statute, providing board “shall” release prisoner subject to certain

restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in release on parole). Where such mandatory

language is used, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied

without adequate procedural due process protections. See id. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 11-16. 

California’s parole scheme is set forth in California Penal Code § 3041. Section

3041(b) states that the parole board “shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore,

cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b).2

 Respondent’s argument that

this language does not give rise to a federally protected liberty interest has been rejected by

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The Ninth Circuit further noted that, in light of Greenholtz and Allen, its holding was

based on “clearly established” federal law within the meaning of AEDPA. See id.

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the Ninth Circuit on two separate occasions. First, in McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895

(9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit found § 3041(b) contains the same type of mandatory

language as the parole statutes at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, which language, as

determined by the Supreme Court, gives rise to a protected liberty interest in release on

parole. See McQuillion, 306 F.3d 895 at 901-02. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded,

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” 

Id. at 902.3

 The following year, in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth

Circuit reaffirmed this holding, finding § 3041(b) contains mandatory language that gives

rise to a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole. See id. at 914-16 (finding

Board’s decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole implicated his federally protected

liberty interest in release on parole). Consequently, the law of this Circuit is that § 3041(b)

gives rise to a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole, an interest implicated

in the instant case by the Board’s determination that petitioner is unsuitable for parole.

Respondent argues that the decisions in Greenholtz and Allen are not applicable to the

instant case in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995). This argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in both McQuillion, see 306 F.3d at

903, and Biggs, see 334 F.3d at 914.

Respondent also argues that the decisions in McQuillion and Biggs are no longer

applicable in light of the California Supreme Court’s more recent decision in In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal. 2005). In Dannenberg, the Board determined

Dannenberg to be unsuitable for parole under § 3041(b) based on a finding that the nature of

his second degree murder conviction demonstrated a continuing danger to public safety, and

without analyzing, pursuant to § 3041(a), whether his term of incarceration conformed to that

of other second degree murderers. Id. at 1074-75. The California Supreme Court granted

certiorari to decide whether § 3041 prevents the Board from denying parole without

conducting the uniformity analysis specified in § 3041(a), see id. at 1077, and held the Board

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The Court notes that district courts in California have reached differing conclusions as to this

question. Compare Murillo v. Perez, 2005 WL 2592420 at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2005) (finding

Dannenberg holding limited to uniform term provision of subsection (a) of § 3041; finding holding in

McQuillon, that mandatory language of subsection (b) creates liberty interest, remains unchanged);

Saif’ullah v. Carey, 2005 WL 1555389 at * 8 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2005) (finding, after Dannenberg, liberty interest in parole in California); Hudson v. Kane, 2005 WL 2035590 at * 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

23, 2005) (same); with Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (E.D. Cal.

2005) (finding no protected liberty interest in parole under § 3041 after Dannenberg). 

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need not engage in such an analysis under § 3041(a) if it first determines that public safety

concerns require a lengthier period of incarceration, thereby making an inmate unsuitable for

parole under § 3041(b). Id. at 1098. 

This Court is required to give considerable weight to a state court’s definitive

interpretation of a state statute. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975). 

Dannenberg, however, did not decide the question raised herein, namely, whether § 3041(b)

gives rise to a protected liberty interest in release on parole. Rather, because it found the

language in § 3041 was not “mandatory” with respect to uniformity of release dates under

§ 3041(a), see Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1086-87, the Dannenberg court concluded that a

California inmate has no liberty interest in a “uniform parole release date” under § 3041(a). 

See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098 n.18. In so holding, Dannenberg did not address the

question of whether the language in § 3041(b) contains the kind of mandatory language that

creates a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole. Absent some further

pronouncement from the California Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit on that question, this

Court follows the decisions in McQuillion and Biggs that the instant unsuitability finding

pursuant to § 3041(b) implicates a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole.4

Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to

decide whether petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated by the

Board’s determination that he was not suitable for parole. 

B. Lack of Specificity

Respondent also argues that the petition is defective because it does not specify which

of the Board’s unsuitability decisions is being challenged. According to petitioner, the Board

has found him unsuitable for parole on ten different occasions. In his opposition, petitioner

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states that he wishes to challenge the Board’s 2002 decision. Accordingly, he will be granted

leave to file an amended petition in which he specifies which of the Board’s unsuitability

decisions he wishes to challenge. Petitioner is cautioned that any Board decision he wishes

to challenge herein must have been challenged already in the California Supreme Court, and

any claims he wishes to raise herein regarding such decision must have been raised already in

the California Supreme Court. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing,

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the petition is DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

If petitioner wishes to amend the petition, he must file, within thirty (30) days of the

date this order is filed, an amended petition in which he corrects the deficiencies noted

above. The amended petition must include the caption and civil case number used in this

order, No. C 05-3991 MMC (PR), and must include the words AMENDED PETITION on

the first page. In the amended petition, petitioner must include all the claims he wishes to

present; he may not incorporate matters from the original petition by reference.

2. If petitioner fails to timely amend the petition as ordered herein, this

action will be dismissed.

This order terminates Docket No. 3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 3, 2006 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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