Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00453/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00453-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 According to Plaintiff, he was incarcerated on a “parole hold” and pending trial in the Kern County 1

Superior Court on the criminal charges pursuant to which this action arose. (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 2, 3). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS KENNETH )

PEYTON, a.k.a. ELLIS, )

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

)

JEFFREY BURDICK, Detective, )

BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:07-cv-00453 LJO TAG 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS IN FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND TO STAY

REMAINING CLAIMS 

(Doc. 18)

ORDER REQUIRING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 21, 2007, pro se prisoner and pre-trial detainee, Aurelius Augustinus Kenneth 1

Peyton (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Detective Jeffrey

Burdick and his employer, the Bakersfield Police Department (“BPD”) (collectively, the

“Defendants”). (Doc. 1). The matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b) and Local Rule 72-302. On May 17, 2007, Plaintiff obtained leave to file a first

amended complaint, which he filed on May 18, 2007. (Docs. 14, 17, 18). On April 3, 2008,

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 64). No trial date has been set. (See

docket, generally). 

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DISCUSSION

The Court must dismiss a prisoner or informa pauperis complaint, at any time, if the

Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. (Italics added). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A. 

A claim is legally frivolous when it has no arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-1228 (9th Cir. 1984). 

A complaint fails to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). When determining 

whether a complaint states a claim, the Court “must accept as true all allegations of material facts

and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F. 3d at

447; Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Although neither party has requested that the Court stay its hand pending the outcome of

the ongoing state criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, the Court finds it necessary to raise the

issues of whether the federal court should abstain in this action under the doctrine promulgated

by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), and whether the fact that such

state proceedings are ongoing renders Plaintiff’s claim subject to the bar of Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 486-487, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

In his first amended complaint (“complaint”), Plaintiff alleges that Detective Burdick,

individually and in his official capacity, provided false and misleading evidence, and committed

perjury, to ensure that Plaintiff would be arrested for violating the terms of his parole and

charged with the crime of indecent exposure. (Doc. 18). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Detective Burdick manipulated the victim’s review of a photographic lineup to encourage her to

identify Plaintiff as the perpetrator, by preparing a false police report, and by perjuring himself at

the preliminary hearing. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 20-23, 28). Plaintiff contends that Detective Burdick’s

actions violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable arrest,” and his

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Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. (Id. at ¶ 29). In addition, Plaintiff asserts

that Detective Burdick’s falsification of a police report and perjury constituted felonies under the

California Penal Code. (Id. at ¶ 1). 

As to the BPD, Plaintiff alleges that it failed to supervise Detective Burdick to ensure that

he performed his work legally, honestly, and ethically. (Doc. 18 at ¶ 27). Plaintiff further alleges

that BPD’s failure to supervise proximately caused Detective Burdick to engage in the abovementioned actions, thereby making the BPD liable for Detective Burdick’s actions and their

results on Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30). 

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks injunctive relief directing Defendants to withdraw the falsified

evidence and perjured testimony from Plaintiff’s pending criminal trial and any future collateral

criminal matters, and seeks a further order directing the United States Attorney to prosecute

Detective Burdick pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 for his commission of state felonies. The

complaint also seeks an order restraining Defendants from retaliation and harassment. The

complaint also seeks monetary damages, costs, and attorney fees. (Doc. 18, pp. 13-14, ¶¶ 1-5). 

A. Younger v. Harris abstention

The doctrine of abstention precludes a federal court from deciding a case, when it would

potentially intrude upon the powers of another court. In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court

held that a federal court, with valid subject-matter jurisdiction, was prohibited from enjoining a

state criminal proceeding without a valid showing of “extraordinary circumstances” that warrant

federal intervention. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-54; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-

74, 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971) (Younger abstention applies to cases seeking declaratory relief );

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004)(Younger abstention applies to actions

for damages); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F. 2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1992). Federal courts may

raise the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d

777, 781, n. 3 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Green v. City of Tuscon, 255 F. 3d

1086 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143-144, n. 10, 96 S. Ct. 2857

(1976); see also San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F. 3d 1095, 1103, n.5

(9th Cir. 1998).

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Younger and its progeny are based on the interests of comity and federalism that counsel

federal courts to maintain respect for state functions and not unduly interfere with the state’s

good faith efforts to enforce its own laws in its own courts. Middlesex County Ethics Committee

v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S. Ct. 2515 (1982); Dubinka v. Judges of

Superior Court of State of California, Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994); Lebbos v.

Judges of Superior Court, Santa Clara, 883 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir.1989). The Younger rationale

applies throughout appellate proceedings, requiring that state appellate review of a conviction be

exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,

607-611, 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975); Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223 (stating that even if the trial is complete

at the time of the abstention decision, state court proceedings are still considered pending ). 

The cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of criminal defense are not the kind of special

circumstances or irreparable harm that justify federal court intervention. Younger, 401 U.S. at

43-45; Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 225-226. Moreover, federal injunctive relief should not be used to

test the validity of an arrest or the admissibility of evidence in a state criminal proceeding. Perez

v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 83-85, 91 S. Ct. 674 (1971). Under the Younger abstention doctrine,

federal courts may not stay or enjoin pending state criminal court proceedings, nor grant

monetary damages for constitutional violations arising from them. Mann v. Jett, 781 F. 2d 1448,

1449 (9th Cir. 1986).

Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) the state court proceedings are ongoing;

(2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an 

adequate opportunity raise federal questions. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432;

Baffert v. California Horse Racing Board, 332 F. 3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2003); Kenneally, 967

F.2d at 331); Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223. 

1. The Younger requirements are satisfied

The first Younger requirement is satisfied here, because the state criminal proceedings

against Plaintiff are ongoing in the Kern County Superior Court, as alleged in the complaint. . 

The Court also takes judicial notice of the docket of the Kern County Superior Court in the

matter of People of the State of California v. Aurelius Kenneth Peyton, case number

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The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 2

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso,

989 F. 2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceedings is a source whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828

F. 2d 1385, 1388, n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635, n. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1978,

aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981); see also, Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F. 2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989);

Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F. 2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1980). As such, information obtained from the

internet website for the Kern County Superior Court, which contains the state court’s records for filing and hearing

dates, are subject to judicial notice. 

5

BF116132A, which is the case number referenced in the complaint, indicating that on September

19, 2006, Plaintiff was charged with violating California Penal Code Section 314.1 (indecent

exposure with a prior), and the criminal proceeding is set for trial on August 11, 2008. Thus,

2

Plaintiff has not yet been tried in the state criminal proceedings, and even if he is convicted, the

case may continue on in the state appellate courts. See Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-765 (9th

Cir. 1972) (“[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal

interposition by way of injunction ...until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed

from and the case concluded in the state courts.”).

The second Younger requirement is satisfied, because the state criminal proceeding

against Plaintiff implicates California’s interest in prosecuting state criminal laws, free from

federal interference. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977).

The third Younger requirement is satisfied where, as in the instant case, there are ongoing

state proceedings at which the plaintiff can raise his federal claims. Mann, 781 F.2d at 1449 (9th

Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff will have an opportunity to adequately litigate his claims of

unconstitutional behavior, in the ongoing state criminal proceedings. 

2. No exception applies

A federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding only under certain circumstances, i.e.,

where the state proceeding was undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, where the

law being enforced is patently unconstitutional, or where there is a lack of an adequate state

forum. Each of these exception is addressed below.

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The first exception to Younger abstention exists when the state proceeding was brought

in bad faith and to harass a criminal defendant. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48-50. In order to fall

within this exception, Plaintiff must establish that the state proceeding was brought without a

reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48; Kugler v.

Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n. 6, 95 S. Ct. 1524 (1975)(citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85,

91 S. Ct. 674, 677 (1971)). Here, although the complaint alleges improper conduct on the part of

Detective Burdick, it fails to allege facts suggesting that the state proceeding against Plaintiff was

filed in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction. 

The second exception to Younger abstention exists when the statute being enforced in the

state action is patently unconstiutional, i.e., when it is “flagrantly and patently violative of

express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever

manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 54-54

(citation omitted). Plaintiff ‘s complaint fails to allege facts suggesting that the indecent

exposure statute he is charged with violating is unconstutional in any respect.

The third exception to Younger abstention exists when there is a lack of an adequate state

forum. In order to fall within this exception, Plaintiff must show that, for example, the state

court is biased, and that its recusal provisions are ineffective. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,

575-579, 93 S. Ct. 1689 (1975), Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 435-437; Kugler,

421 U.S. at 125-131. Here, the complaint fails to allege any facts suggesting the lack of an

adequate state forum to resolve Plaintiff’s federal claims. 

Where Younger abstention applies, the Court must determine whether and how to

proceed. A district court must dismiss claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, and it should

stay claims for monetary damages. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 348 (Justice Stewart, dissenting);

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. at 564, 577 (1973); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F. 3d at 984; . 

Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff seeks to have this Court

intervene in an ongoing state criminal prosecution. This is precisely the type of case that

Younger intended to encompass. 

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 Neither Plaintiff nor this Court can determine whether to bring charges against a party. Such a decision is 3

within the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Office (federal) or the equivalent state agency. See Multimedia

Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court of Florida, St. Johns County, 544 U.S. 1301, 1305, 125 S. Ct. 1624 (2005) (holding

that the executive branch, not the judicial branch, has the authority to decide whether and how to charge and

prosecute an individual). 

7

Plaintiff’s complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief satisfies all three requirements

for Younger abstention and there are no “extraordinary circumstances” warranting 

pre-conviction federal intervention. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 3

should be dismissed without prejudice. However, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages

should not be dismissed, but instead stayed pending resolution of the state court proceedings. 

B. Heck v. Humphrey

Even if Younger abstention did not apply, the Court next addresses whether Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. at 586-487. In Heck, a state prisoner

filed a § 1983 action seeking damages for improprieties in the investigation leading to his arrest,

for destruction of evidence, and for conduct during his trial. The District Court dismissed the

complaint for failing to state a claim. In affirming the dismissal, the Supreme Court analogized

the action to one for malicious prosecution, which requires the favorable termination of criminal

proceedings, and held that a § 1983 claim for damages concerning a criminal conviction or

imprisonment cannot exist unless the conviction has been set aside: 

“[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a

determination, or called in to question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship

to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (footnote omitted). 

The Heck bar applies to § 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief, as well as those seeking

monetary damages. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-490; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490, 93

S. Ct. 1827 (1973). Although Heck concerned a conviction, its rationale extends to § 1983

claims that challenge procedures which necessarily imply unlawful confinement. Edwards v.

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Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997). Heck has also been applied to pretrial

detainees such as Plaintiff, and to claims arising out of pending charges, as in this case. AlvarezMachain v. United States, 107 F. 3d 696, 700-701 (9th Cir, 1996); see Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.

3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F. 3d 374, 380 (9th

Cir. 1988) (Heck barred plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims until conviction was

invalidated); see Vincent v. Wiese, 2007 WL 1099121 *3 (D. Hawaii, April 10, 2007)(“ Heck

generally bars all claims challenging the validity of an arrest, prosecution, or conviction.”)(citing 

Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F. 3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006)( Heck barred plaintiff’s claims of wrongful

arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy among police officers to bring false charges against

plaintiff); Cabrera, 159 F. 3d at 380 (Heck barred plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims

until conviction was invalidated); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F. 3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996)(Heck

barred plaintiff’s claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought

unfounded charges against him)).

However, in 2007, the Supreme Court addressed the application of Heck to cases such as

this one. In Wallace v. Kato, ___U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007), the Supreme Court held that

“the Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists ‘a conviction or

sentence that has not been ... invalidated.’ that is to say, an ‘outstanding criminal judgment.’”

Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1097-1098. The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that “an

action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that

conviction occurs and is set aside,” stating that such a contention goes “well beyond Heck.” 

Id. at 1098 (italics in original). The rejection of this contention was made in the context of

deciding the accrual date of a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment. 

Instead of requiring dismissal of civil claims filed in the shadow of an impending 

criminal case under Heck, the Supreme Court noted that if a plaintiff files a § 1983 false arrest

claim before he is convicted, or “any other claim related to rulings that likely will be made in a

pending or anticipated criminal trial, it is within the power of the district court, and in accord

with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a

criminal case is ended. Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1098. If the plaintiff is then convicted, and if the

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stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck requires dismissal. Id. Otherwise, the case

may proceed. Id. See Olson v. Lemos, 2008 WL 782724 *2 (E.D. Cal. March 20, 2008).

Here, Plaintiff seeks relief that would preclude the use of identification and other

evidence at Plaintiff’s pending criminal trial. If he is ultimately convicted on the indecent

exposure charge, his success in this action would also necessarily imply the invalidity of that

conviction, because his § 1983 claims are predicated on alleged constitutional violations in the

criminal investigation. Thus, a stay pursuant to Wallace is the proper course of action here, as to

Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages. 

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief must be dismissed, and his claims for monetary damages should be stayed

pending the outcome of Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief in the first amended complaint

(Doc. 18), be DISMISSED without prejudice; and 

2. Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages in the first amended complaint be STAYED 

pending complete disposition of the pending criminal charges against Plaintiff; and 

3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 64) be DENIED as moot. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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