Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02619/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02619-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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1

WESLEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In concluding that a request to cure was not a condition precedent to

Morgan Stanley’s repurchase obligation and that issues of fact preclude

summary judgment, the majority opinion both misapplies New York law and

misreads the plain language of the contract.    The result is, in essence, judicial

reformation of the agreement, saving a sophisticated party from the

requirements of the bargain it made following arms‐length negotiation.  Because

I cannot agree with these conclusions, I respectfully dissent.

It is indeed the case that New York law requires conditions precedent to be

“express”—that is, stated by the parties in “unmistakable language.”  

Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 690–91 (1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted).    But there is no indication in Oppenheimer

that the standard of “unmistakable language”—which the Court drew from the

Second Restatement of Contracts—requires specific, talismanic words.    See

Oppenheimer, 86 N.Y.2d at 691 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 229 cmt. a (1981)).    In fact, the Restatement clearly rejects that view:    “No

particular form of language is necessary to make an event a condition, although

such words as ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that’ and ‘if’ are often used for this

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purpose. An intention to make a duty conditional may be manifested by the

general nature of an agreement, as well as by specific language.”  RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. a.1   

A recent case of the Court of Appeals confirms this analysis: the Court

construed a provision requiring negotiation and execution of additional terms as

an express condition precedent to a party’s obligation to supply fiber‐optic

capacity but relied on no conditional words, identifying the parties’ “clear

intent” solely from the nature and structure of the agreement.  See IDT Corp. v.

Tyco Grp., S.A.R.L., 13 N.Y.3d 209, 212, 214 (2009).2  Similarly, lower New York

courts have concluded that an express condition precedent exists “despite the lack

of explicitly conditional language” so long as it “was unmistakably required” before

another obligation came into force.   ALJ Capital I, L.P. v. David J. Joseph Co., 48

A.D.3d 208, 208 (N.Y. 1st Dep’t 2008) (emphasis added); see also Walton v. E.

 

1 See also 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:16 (4th ed. 2000) (“Any words which,

when properly interpreted or construed by the court, make clear the notion that

the performance of a promise in a contract is dependent on some other act or

event will create an express condition.”).

2 Oppenheimer itself also relied on a case in which absolutely no conditional

language appeared:   the contract simply required notice of shipment of goods,

and the failure to provide such notice was deemed a “failure to ‘perform[] all

conditions precedent’” and “barred [plaintiff] from recovery.”  86 N.Y.2d at 693–

94 (first alteration in original) (quoting Jungmann & Co. v. Atterbury Bros., 249

N.Y. 119, 122 (1928)).

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Analytical Labs, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. 2d Dep’t 1998) (finding condition

precedent premised on the structure of the provision, notwithstanding the lack of

conditional language); Winfield Capital Corp. v. Mahopac Auto Glass, Inc., 208

A.D.2d 715, 715 (N.Y. 2d Dep’t 1994) (same).    In New York courts, therefore,

specific words are strong evidence of, but not necessary to, conditions precedent;

the core inquiry, as in all contracts, is to give effect to the parties’ “clear intent,”

as expressed through the “unmistakable language” they use.

So what then does the language and structure of the contract—negotiated

at arms’ length by sophisticated commercial entities—tell us about breaches of

the agreement and the remedies provided for those breaches?    For ease of

reference, here again are the three obligations as identified in the majority

opinion, ante, at 15–16:

1. If a material breach exists, “the party discovering

such . . . Material Breach shall promptly notify, in

writing, the other party . . . .”

2. “Promptly (but in any event within three Business

Days) upon becoming aware of any such . . . Material

Breach, the Master Servicer shall, and the Special

Servicer may, request that the Seller, not later than 90

days from the Seller’s receipt of the notice of such . . .  

Material Breach, cure such . . . Material Breach . . . .”

3. “The Seller hereby covenants and agrees that, if any

such . . . Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in

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all material aspects within the above cure period[], the

Seller shall, on or before the termination of such cure

period[], either (i) repurchase the affected Mortgage

Loan . . . or (ii) . . . at its option replace, without

recourse, any Mortgage Loan . . . to which such defect

relates with a [substitute mortgage].”

J.A. 454–55.    We can all agree the third clause clearly conditions Morgan

Stanley’s repurchase‐or‐replace obligation on the existence of a particular

circumstance:  that “any . . . Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all

material aspects within the above cure period[].”    J.A. 455 (emphasis added); see

Majority Op., ante, at 21–22 (identifying this clause as an example of

“unmistakable language of condition”).    Similarly, we agree that this language

makes the repurchase obligation dependent on the obligation to cure within the

cure period.    But where the majority opinion and I depart is whether that

obligation to cure within the cure period arises from the notice of breach or from

the request to cure.

The majority opinion concludes that because the ninety‐day period is

calculated from the date of the notice of breach, the cure period must be triggered

by the notice. See Majority Op., ante, at 23 (“[A]s the MLPA makes clear, that cure

period is triggered exclusively by ‘the Seller’s receipt of the notice of . . . Material

breach,’ not the Servicer’s request for cure.” (quoting J.A. 454)).  I cannot agree:  A

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ninety‐day clock may count down from the notice of breach, but it is only the

request to cure that gives that clock any legal meaning.    The ninety‐day cure

period is written as a clause in the middle of the request provision, which states

that “the Special Servicer may[] request that the Seller, not later than 90 days from

the Seller’s receipt of the notice of such . . . Material Breach, cure such . . . Material

Breach.”  J.A. 454 (emphasis added).  In other words, the ninety days and their

legal significance are a part of the Special Servicer’s request.   If there were no

request, ninety days would pass—in time’s typical fashion—but it would not be

a legally significant “cure period” for purposes of the repurchase obligation

because no one had requested cure by that date.

The majority opinion seems disturbed by the fact the deadline for cure is

not counted down from the request for cure and so concludes that the request

itself has no conditional force over the repurchase obligation.  But the repurchase

obligation depends on the Seller not curing the breach within the cure period;

that circumstance can only exist if the Special Servicer first makes a request to

cure, which includes (and creates) the obligation to cure and the legal deadline

for it.  Nothing about the fact that the deadline is established ninety days after

another event changes the fact that it is the request that brings it into existence.  

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For example, imagine two parties enter into a contract that reads: “Upon

becoming aware of a material breach, the Special Servicer may request that the

Seller, not later than ten days following the next full moon, cure such material

breach.”    An obligation to cure within the cure period does not come into

existence as a result of the lunar cycle; it is triggered by the request—the “not

later than” clause simply provides a way to determine the deadline by which the

Seller must comply.    Put simply, the request identifies an object (cure) and a

deadline (ninety days following a particular identified event); absent any

request, there is no object and no deadline.3

This interpretation is confirmed by a simple counterfactual:  If the Special

Servicer had exercised its option not to request cure, would Morgan Stanley still

 

3 Stepping back, it makes sense that the request to cure calculates its deadline

from the notice of breach.  Either party—the Seller or the Special Servicer—may

be the one to discover the breach in the first instance and must then notify the

other party.  See J.A. 454.  If the Seller discovers the breach and provides notice,

the Special Servicer then has three days to decide whether to request cure or lose

its right to do so.  If it chooses to exercise its right to request cure on day three,

there may be only eighty‐seven days until the end of the cure period—but the

Seller already had three days of notice, by its own discovery, of the nature and

circumstances of the breach.    By contrast, if the Special Servicer discovers the

breach, it can both notify the Seller of breach and request cure in the same

document, in which case the Seller has the same ninety days of notice.  In either

event, this system ensures that the Seller has exactly ninety days of knowing

about the breach, no more and no less, before the deadline occurs.

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have been obliged to cure or repurchase the loan?  The answer—on the plain face

of the contract—must be “no.”    The contract is conspicuously lacking any

language making cure of every material breach obligatory on the Seller absent a

request to cure.4  To construe the contract in that way would require reading the

repurchase obligation as creating, sub silentio, an obligation to cure that arises

simply from notification of breach.5   It is simply unfathomable that the parties

 

4 The majority opinion suggests this consideration is irrelevant because the

MLPA assigned the signaling function to the notice of breach and because the

Master Servicer had a “mandatory request‐for‐cure obligation.”    Majority Op.,

ante, at 25 n.10.    However, the loan at issue was transferred to the Special

Servicer in November 2008, see Majority Op., ante, at 7, at which point the Master

Servicer ceased to be “obligated to service and administer” the loan except as to

certain specified functions, none of which include requesting cure, see J.A. 217.  

Only the Special Servicer’s contractual rights and obligations are therefore

relevant, and while the MLPA provided that the Master Servicer “shall” request

cure, it provided only that the Special Servicer “may” request cure.    J.A. 454.  

“May” in this context can only possess a permissive, rather than mandatory,

meaning, see N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Aasen, 157 A.D.2d 965, 967 (N.Y. 3d

Dep’t 1990), and the MLPA thus imposed no obligation on the Special Servicer to

request cure.    As I have explained, notice of a breach does not trigger the

obligation to cure the breach—the request to cure is what obliges the Seller to cure

within the defined cure period.    A request to cure by the Special Servicer

therefore told the Seller that the former was exercising its option to demand cure,

providing exactly the same signaling and demand functions as the notice of

disallowance in ALJ Capital.    See infra note 7; see also Majority Op., ante, at 23

(acknowledging ALJ Capital’s notice as a condition precedent).

5 As described above, if the Special Servicer decides not to request a cure, then

the date of the notification of breach has no legal significance—ninety days later,

nothing happens, and no one cares.

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would silently imply, rather than lay out explicitly, such a significant obligation

as one requiring cure of every material breach for which a notice of breach was

transmitted.  Instead, the parties explicitly conditioned the repurchase obligation

on the running of the cure period without actual cure, and the cure period only

comes into existence through the Special Servicer’s request.6

Compare this framework with the provisions considered by district courts

in our Circuit that have concluded timely notice did not constitute a condition

precedent to repurchase obligations:  in those cases, the obligation was triggered

by either a party’s discovery of its own breach or its counterparty’s notification—

i.e., the obligation could come into existence through a mechanism other than a

request to cure.  See LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., No. 02 Civ.

7868 (HB), 2003 WL 21671812, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003); Tr. for Certificate

Holders of Merrill Lynch Mortg. Passthrough Certificates Series 1999‐C1 v. Love

Funding Corp., No. 04 Civ. 9890(SAS), 2005 WL 2582177, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11,

2005); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Dexia Real Estate Capital Mkts., No. 12‐CV‐

9412, 2014 WL 3368670, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, No. 14‐

 

6 The majority opinion appears distracted by the District Court’s “notice to cure”

misnomer—but we are engaged in de novo review, and even if we were applying

a more deferential standard, we are certainly not obligated to accept the District

Court’s labels.

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2859‐cv, 2016 WL 1042090 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2016) (summary order).    Here, by

contrast, there is no indication anywhere in the contract that Morgan Stanley’s

discovery of its own breach requires it to do anything other than “promptly

notify, in writing, the other party.”  J.A. 454; see Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v.

Bay View Franchise Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 00 CIV. 8613(SAS), 2002 WL 818082,

at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2002) (concluding that a request to cure was necessary

to begin cure period, the expiration of which required the seller to repurchase the

loan).

In sum, regardless of whether the parties used any particular conditional

words, the language of the repurchase obligation is “clear” and “unmistakable”

that it arises only when cure does not occur within the cure period—and cure

within the period is an obligation that arises only out of the Special Servicer’s

request.  See ALJ Capital, 48 A.D.3d at 208.7  Because the language and structure

of the provision makes the repurchase obligation unmistakably contingent on the

 

7 In fact, ALJ concerned just such a timely notice provision triggering a cure

period, after which time the plaintiff was permitted to seek recovery in court.  See

ALJ Capital I, L.P. v. David J. Joseph Co., 15 Misc. 3d 1127(A), 2007 WL 1218355, at

*4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 2007).  The First Department affirmed the trial court’s

conclusion that timely notice was a condition precedent “despite the lack of

explicitly conditional language” because the written notice “was unmistakably

required by the agreement’s ‘Cure Period’ provision prior to the assertion of a

claim for repayment.”  ALJ Capital, 48 A.D.3d at 208.

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Special Servicer’s request to cure, that request must necessarily constitute an

express condition precedent.  See IDT Corp., 13 N.Y.3d at 214.

Express conditions precedent are subject to “the requirement of strict

compliance,” in contrast to promises or constructive conditions, with which only

“substantial compliance” is required.    Oppenheimer, 86 N.Y.2d at 690, 692

(internal quotation marks omitted).    Further, “no mitigating standard of

materiality or substantiality [is] applicable to the non‐occurrence of [an express

condition precedent].”    Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted).  

Consequently, once we determine that a request to cure “within three Business

Days[] upon becoming aware” of the material breach, J.A. 454, is an express

condition precedent to the repurchase obligation, the only remaining question on

summary judgment is whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact as

to the Special Servicer’s strict compliance with that condition.    Under

longstanding New York law, no reasonable factfinder could determine that the

Special Servicer only became aware of the material breach on or after March 15,

2009—i.e., three days before the date of the request to cure.8

 

8 Because the majority opinion concludes the request to cure was merely a

promise, it analyzes the facts under the rubric of substantial compliance and

concludes summary judgment is inappropriate because reasonable factfinders

may differ as to the extent of any “reasonable investigation” including “some

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As the majority opinion explains, the material breach identified here is

premised on Morgan Stanley’s representation that it had no knowledge of any

“material and adverse environmental condition or circumstance affecting any

Mortgaged Property that was not disclosed in such report.”    J.A. 625; see also

Majority Op., ante, at 8 & n.3.  The Special Servicer’s conclusion that a breach of

this representation had occurred rested primarily on a document showing that

Morgan Stanley’s counsel knew the environmental report neither addressed a

relevant state regulation nor the notices of violation issued thereunder; in fact,

this was the only piece of evidence identified in the formal notice of breach and

request to cure.    See J.A. 625–26.    However, in a document sent to the Special

Servicer’s Associate General Counsel on February 16, 2009, the Director of

Special Servicing—and the woman who ultimately signed the notice of breach

and request to cure—identified “additional facts . . . to demonstrate the material

and adverse effect” of the breach, including the anchor tenant’s departure and

subsequent lease terminations by other tenants, “discontinued . . . loan payments

to the Trust in November 2008 as a direct result of insufficient operating

 

degree of chain‐of‐command review.”  Majority Op., ante, at 33–38.  Even under a

substantial compliance analysis, however, as explained infra, New York law and

the undisputed facts would require us to conclude that the Special Servicer

became aware of the breach as of at least February 16, 2009.

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income,” and rejection of the borrower’s insurance claim under a pollution legal

liability policy.  J.A. 896–98.

The majority opinion’s approach places great weight on the internal

governance structure of the Special Servicer, essentially permitting the

corporation to deny its “awareness” of a fact simply because it required

authorization by the president to issue the notice.  See Majority Op., ante, at 34–

36.    But “a fundamental principle that has informed the law of agency and

corporations for centuries” is that “the acts of agents, and the knowledge they

acquire while acting within the scope of their authority are presumptively

imputed to their principals.”  Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 465 (2010);

accord Corrigan v. Bobbs‐Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 68 (1920) (explaining that, if the

employee of a corporation obtains knowledge “while acting within the scope of

his authority, on behalf of [the corporation], for its benefit, [the corporation] is

chargeable with his knowledge”).9  This presumption of corporate knowledge is

conclusive, even if the corporate employee never communicated the information

to her superiors:   

 

9 As a corporate legal entity, the Special Servicer “necessarily functions through

human actors—its officers, agents and employees—whose knowledge and

conduct may be imputed to the entity under the doctrine of respondeat

superior.”  Prudential‐Bache Sec., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 263, 276 (1989).

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[N]otice of facts to an agent is constructive notice

thereof to the principal himself, where it arises from or

is at the time connected with the subject‐matter of his

agency, for, upon general principles of public policy, it

is presumed that the agent has communicated such

facts to the principal, and, if he has not, still the

principal having [e]ntrusted the agent with the

particular business, the other party has a right to deem

his acts and knowledge obligatory upon the principal.

Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N.Y. 563, 569 (1890); accord N.Y. Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322

F.3d 750, 753 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying these principles to a timeliness

inquiry and calculating the insurer’s delay in notice from the date its investigator

discovered grounds for liability); Apollo Fuel Oil v. United States, 195 F.3d 74, 76–

77 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the same rule to conclude the corporation knew of

intentional misconduct through its employees’ knowledge).    This rule applies

even where such knowledge works the waiver of a contractual right and the

corporate agent does not have any authorization under the contract to make such

a waiver affirmatively.  See, e.g., Hurley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 A.D.

547, 550 (N.Y. 4th Dep’t 1936).

Put simply, as a matter of law, the Special Servicer knew the facts of the

breach and their material and adverse effect on the loan well before March 15,

2009.    The Director of Special Servicing drafted a memorandum containing

sufficient facts to constitute awareness of both the breach and its material and

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adverse effects on February 16, 2009.10  Even after that, on February 19, 2009, an

Associate General Counsel at the company confirmed that “there is evidence that

[Morgan Stanley] knew” there were undisclosed environmental conditions in

breach of the representation and concluded “I think that the breach notice should

be sent.”    J.A. 1266.    Yet, despite two employees responsible for investigating

material breaches concluding there was sufficient evidence of such a breach, no

notice was sent until March 18, 2009, during which time no new material facts

were obtained by the Special Servicer.  Though the Trustee’s brief makes much of

the fact that neither the Director of Special Servicing nor the Associate General

Counsel had authority to issue a notice of breach, authority to make the ultimate

decision is irrelevant to imputation; what matters is whether the knowledge was

obtained within the scope of the employee or agent’s employment.    See N.Y.

Univ., 322 F.3d at 753 & n.2; Hyatt, 118 N.Y. at 569; Hurley, 247 A.D. at 550.  There

can be no dispute that the Director of Special Servicing, who ultimately signed the

 

10 Note also that this memorandum was based on an investigation of the loan’s

status beginning in November 2008.    See J.A. 1109–15.   Thus, we are not even

considering a situation in which the corporation merely had access to (and thus

only arguably constructive notice of) these facts—the February 16, 2009

memorandum memorializes facts actually known by the Director of Special

Servicing.    See J.A. 1111–17.    To borrow the majority opinion’s analogy, see

Majority Op., ante, at 31 n.11, she was aware both that she had found the

Americas (the fact) and that they were new (its significance).

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formal notice of breach and request to cure, see J.A. 626, obtained her knowledge

of the breach and its effects in the scope of her authority to investigate potential

breaches.  See J.A. 1110–11; see also N.Y. Univ., 322 F.3d at 753 & n.2 (calculating

delay in insurance coverage denial from the date the investigator learned of the

grounds for denial, notwithstanding his lack of authority to deny coverage

himself).

Just as importantly, none of the post–February 16 activities described by

the majority opinion contributed in any material way to the Special Servicer’s

“awareness” of any breach.  None of the internal “chain of command” reviews—

not the removal of one paragraph of supporting facts from the notice and request

to cure by the Associate General Counsel, see J.A. 1341–45, nor the approvals

without change by both a senior managing director and the president of the

company, see J.A. 1347, 1829–30—made any additional facts available to the

corporation, either of the nature of the breach or of its material and adverse

effects.    The only potentially new fact arose from the appraisal setting the

collateral’s market value at $22.3 million, the initial estimate of which was

received on February 27, 2009.    See J.A. 1739.    The Trustee argues that this

appraisal was needed “to confirm that Morgan Stanley’s breach was ‘material’

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under the terms of the MLPA.”  Appellant Br. 17.  But this lone data point could

hardly have tipped the scales of the Special Servicer’s awareness of the breach’s

materiality in light of what it already knew as of February 16, 2009:    

(1) The loan was in default;  

(2) The anchor tenant had departed, which precipitated rent

reductions, lease terminations, and discontinued rent

payments by other tenants;  

(3) An Ohio regulatory body had filed a lawsuit against the

borrower arising from the same environmental regulatory

violations at issue in the breach;

(4) The borrower’s insurance claim for the legal liability was

denied;

(5) The Trust was seeking receivership for the property; and  

(6) The Trust would have to fund any legal costs associated with

attempts to recoup value.   

See J.A. 619, 897–98.    The substantive portion of the February 16, 2009

memorandum concluded with these words: “All of the above results stem from

the state code violations which were present prior to, during and after the sale of

the Mortgage Loan to the Trust. The Mortgage Loan should be repurchased

pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the PSA and the applicable

MLPA.”  J.A. 898.  It exceeds all bounds of credulity to think that, in the face of

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all these known facts, the Special Servicer was anything but aware of the

circumstances of the breach as well as its material and adverse consequences.11   

The majority opinion’s approach thus drastically departs from New York

law governing corporate knowledge and timely request obligations under a

contract.  Under the majority opinion, all any corporation need do now is require

authorization for such requests at its highest level—and regardless of the facts

known by employees below the highest executive officer, the corporation cannot

be charged with “awareness” of those facts.12  Not only is this type of passing‐

the‐buck approach wholly contrary to “a fundamental principle that has

 

11 Even accepting the dubious proposition that confirmation of the loan valuation

somehow moved the Special Servicer from “unaware” to “aware,” that appraisal

was confirmed on March 13, 2009.  See J.A. 1730; Majority Op., ante, at 10.  It took

another five days for the Special Servicer to send the notice of breach and request

to cure.  See J.A. 624–26.

12 The majority opinion criticizes this dissent for not citing cases related to

investigations by agents and employees.    See Majority Op., ante, at 35 n.12.  

However, our prior decision in New York University offers precisely this situation:

a line investigator at a company contracted as an insurer’s agent discovered

grounds for denying coverage, and that knowledge was imputed to the insurer

for purposes of determining timeliness.  See 322 F.3d at 753 & n.2.  The majority

opinion’s error arises from its failure to recognize that investigation was clearly

within the scope of the Director of Special Servicing’s employment, regardless of

her ability to take some subsequent external action on behalf of the company.  

The results of her investigation—i.e., knowledge of the facts and significance of

breach—are therefore imputed to the Special Servicer, who must then take

whatever steps are necessary in its internal governance structure to act within the

time provided by the contract.

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informed the law of agency and corporations for centuries,” Kirschner, 15 N.Y.3d

at 465, but it would completely defeat the purpose of a temporal limitation on a

contractual remedy—namely, the valuable certainty and diligence obtained

when a sophisticated counterparty must exercise that remedy within a defined

period of time.  Particularly when a timely request is a condition precedent to a

contractual remedy, requiring strict compliance, the majority opinion’s approach

dramatically undercuts the force and value of such provisions.

The Oppenheimer Court considered and rejected a rule that would obviate

the harsh consequences of an express condition precedent, concluding that strict

compliance was necessary.   See 86 N.Y.2d at 691–92.   Yet the majority opinion

here releases a sophisticated party from the burden of complying with the

agreement it made.    At the risk of stating the obvious, if the corporation’s

internal governance did not permit a three‐day turnaround between awareness

of breach and a request to cure, it should have bargained for more time.13  On

these facts, no reasonable factfinder could determine that the Special Servicer

 

13 “Freedom of contract prevails in an arm’s length transaction between

sophisticated parties such as these, and in the absence of countervailing public

policy concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their

bargain.   If they are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, the

time to say so was at the bargaining table.”    Oppenheimer, 86 N.Y.2d at 695

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

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only became aware of the breach on or after March 15, 2009.    As a result, no

reasonable factfinder could find strict compliance with the condition precedent

to Morgan Stanley’s repurchase obligation, and that obligation never came into

force.

I respectfully dissent.

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