Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01781/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01781-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1781

GLORIA JEAN SYKES,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

COOK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT PROBATE DIVISION, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:14‐cv‐07459 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 5, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and WILLIAMS, Cir‐

cuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Gloria Jean Sykes went to her

mother’s probate proceeding to present a motion and brought

her service dog, Shaggy. Instead of letting her present her mo‐

tion, the judge asked her a series of questions about Shaggy,

struck her motion, and entered an order barring Shaggy from

the courtroom. Gloria argues that she should be able to bring

a lawsuit in federal court for denial of reasonable accommo‐

dations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. But be‐

cause the source of her injury is a state court judgment, we

lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear her case.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Gloria’s First Federal Lawsuit

This case originates in an earlier guardianship dispute be‐

tween two sisters over their mother, Mary G. Sykes. Gloria

Jean Sykes is Mary’s younger daughter. Carolyn Toerpe, her

older daughter, was granted guardianship of Mary in 2009.

After losing the state guardianship battle, Gloria filed a law‐

suit in 2011 in federal court, alleging that Toerpe, the Cook

County Guardian, two participating guardians ad litem, the

Cook County Circuit Court, then‐Governor Quinn, and the

state of Illinois were violating the ADAby refusing reasonable

accommodations to her mother. Gloria alleged among other

things that the state defendants were depriving her mother of

the right to be present at court proceedings and to receive rea‐

sonable accommodations in the form of support and consul‐

tation with family members. The district court dismissed the

lawsuit, finding that if Gloria obtained the relief she sought,

it would be forced to overturn the state court decision grant‐

ing guardianship to Toerpe, in violation of the Rooker‐Feldman

doctrine. It also relied on long‐established precedent that fed‐

eral courts may not intervene in state probate proceedings.

We affirmed the dismissal of that lawsuit. M.G.S. ex rel. Sykes

v. Toerpe, No. 12‐3373, Dkt. 19 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013) (un‐

published order).

B. State Probate Proceeding

After losing her federal appeal, Gloria returned to state

court, pursuing her federal claims in a “Motion for Reasona‐

ble Accommodations,” seeking relief both for herself and her

mother in the probate proceeding. On the day the motion was

scheduled for hearing, Gloria went to the Daley Center with

her service dog, Shaggy, whom she uses for assistance with

her post‐traumatic stress disorder. She entered the building

without a problem and then went up to the courtroom of

Judge Aicha MacCarthy, who was presiding over Mary’s pro‐

bate case. Gloria alleges that Judge MacCarthy called the case,

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and then “immediately, angrily, and indifferently” interro‐

gated Gloria about her need for Shaggy. She also states that

the interrogation lasted for several minutes, and at its end,

MacCarthy “expelled Gloria and her dog from the court‐

room—banned forever.” While it’s unclear what caused Glo‐

ria to think the ban was in perpetuity, the probate record re‐

flects that Judge MacCarthy entered an order striking Gloria’s

motion without prejudice and prohibiting Gloria from return‐

ing with Shaggy without leave of the court.

C. The Current Lawsuit

Gloria returned to federal court with a new complaint that

recycled many of her old claims, but added one that is the fo‐

cus of today’s decision: she alleged that by banning Shaggy

from her courtroom, various state defendants violated Glo‐

ria’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The district court again dismissed all claims that Gloria as‐

serted on behalf of her mother for largely the same reasons as

the first lawsuit. It then turned specifically to Gloria’s claim

regarding Shaggy and concluded that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to determine if Gloria’s ADA rights were violated

because she was denied use of a service animal during court

proceedings. First, it held that because Gloria’s claim against

the state defendants was inextricably intertwined with the

state court order banning Shaggy and striking Gloria’s reason‐

able accommodation motion, as a federal court, it was barred

from hearing the claim under the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine.

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Ap‐

peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Second, it held that it was

barred from hearing the claim because it arose out of a state

probate proceeding. And finally, it held that it should exercise

Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and

because Gloria had an adequate opportunity to raise her fed‐

eral claims about Shaggy in state court. See Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Gloria only challenges the district court’s dis‐

missal of her ADA claim pertaining to the use of Shaggy in

Judge MacCarthy’s courtroom. We review a district court’s

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, ac‐

cept as true all facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. G&S Holdings, LLC v. Cont’l

Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2012). We may affirm a dis‐

missal for lack of jurisdiction on any ground that the record

supports. Sladek v. Bell Mgmt. Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 979

(7th Cir. 1989).  

A. ADA Accommodations for Service Animals

Before reaching the question of jurisdiction, it helps to un‐

derstand the substantive footing of Gloria’s claim. Title II of

the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits public entities

(which includes instrumentalities of state and local govern‐

ments, like courthouses) from discriminating against quali‐

fied individuals with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.,

42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA’s accommodation mandate re‐

flects enforcement efforts by Congress to ensure citizens’ due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee v.

Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004). In Lane, the Supreme Court con‐

sidered the Title II claims of paraplegic litigants and members

of the public who were forced to crawl up stairs to access a

courtroom, and held that Congress was authorized to, and

did, abrogate Tennessee’s right to sovereign immunity in de‐

fending against the claims by passing Title II of the ADA. Id.

at 531.  

With a few exceptions, Title II requires public entities to

permit service animals to accompany people with disabilities

in all areas where members of the public are allowed to go. 28

C.F.R. § 35.136(g). Service animals are defined as dogs that are

individually trained to do work or perform tasks for people

with disabilities. Id. at § 35.104. “Emotional support animals”

are not considered service animals which fall under Title II’s

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mandate. Id. In situations where it is not obvious if a dog is a

service animal, employees of a public entity are permitted to

ask if the dog is a service animal required because of a disa‐

bility, and what work or task the dog has been trained to per‐

form. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f). They are not permitted to request

documentation for the dog, require the dog to demonstrate a

task, or inquire about the nature of the person’s disability. Id.  

The basis of Gloria’s ADA claim on appeal is that Judge

MacCarthy and by extension, the Probate Division of Cook

County Circuit Court, asked impermissible questions to bar

Shaggy from the courtroom, and denied Gloria reasonable ac‐

commodations by banning Shaggy. Gloria’s complaint claims

that Shaggy is a service dog, and we will proceed on that as‐

sumption for the purposes of our analysis. Because Shaggy

was banned from the courtroom, Gloria claims she was effec‐

tively excluded from participating in and benefiting from ser‐

vices of the courthouse. This case differs from a Lane‐style

claim of denial of access to a courthouse, because her exclu‐

sion from the courthouse stemmed from a judicial order, not

from a courthouse policy or practice.  

B. District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction

With her claim now framed, we must determine if the dis‐

trict court had jurisdiction over Gloria’s claim. At the time of

the district court’s decision, Mary’s probate proceeding was

ongoing. As a result, the district court applied Younger absten‐

tion, the principle that federal courts should abstain from in‐

terfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings that are ju‐

dicial in nature, involve important state interests, provide an

adequate opportunity to raise federal claims, and do not con‐

tain special circumstances that would make abstention inap‐

propriate. See Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 662

(7th Cir. 2007). Between the district court’s ruling and this ap‐

peal, Mary died, so her probate proceeding is terminated. As

a result of Mary’s death, Younger is now a moot question be‐

cause there is no ongoing state proceeding for us to disturb.

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The district court also invoked the probate exception to

federal subject matter jurisdiction, which precludes federal

courts from interfering with persons and property that are in

the custody of a state probate court. Marshall v. Marshall, 547

U.S. 293, 311‐12 (2006). The rationale for the rule is that in sit‐

uations where a state court controls the subject of a custody

battle or the property in a decedent’s estate, another court

should not “be permitted to elbow its way into such a fight,”

particularly because state courts are assumed to have devel‐

oped a core proficiency in probate and domestic relations

matters. Struck v. Cook Cty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 860

(7th Cir. 2007). But the exception does not bar federal courts

from exercising otherwise proper jurisdiction, Marshall, 547

U.S. at 312, and we have cautioned that as a judicially created

exception to the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction, the

probate exception should be narrowly construed, Storm v.

Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003). In determining if the

probate exception applies to an issue that is ancillary to a core

probate matter, we look to the policies animating the excep‐

tion, including consistency of legal decisions within a state

court system, judicial economy, and the relative expertise of

state judges as specialists in probate issues. Id.

We are not convinced that applying the probate exception

was appropriate under the above analysis. The decision pre‐

venting Gloria from bringing her service animal into the

courtroom has nothing to do with probate law. A probate

court is in no better position to determine a litigant’s entitle‐

ment to a reasonable accommodation than any other court.

And there is nothing about bringing her ADA claim to federal

court which would create dissonance in probate or domestic

relations rulings across Cook County. In short, the injury com‐

plained of here bears no relationship to probate law, other

than that it happened to take place in a probate courtroom.

We find this type of coincidental connection to a probate mat‐

ter unpersuasive as a ground for stripping federal courts of

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their power to hear federal claims. So we do not find the pro‐

bate exception a persuasive ground for dismissing the case.

With those theories out of the way, we turn finally to the

district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction under the

Rooker‐Feldman doctrine. We start by noting that Gloria had at

least three avenues to overturn Judge MacCarthy’s order in

state court. She could have (1) sought mandamus in the Illi‐

nois Supreme Court, see ILL. CONST. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a); People

ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 791 (Ill. 2009), (2) pur‐

sued an interlocutory appeal in a state appellate court under

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307, or (3) filed a motion for a

supervisory order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 383. In‐

stead of pursuing these avenues, Gloria went to federal court.  

Lower federal courts are not vested with appellate author‐

ity over state courts. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Feldman, 460 U.S.

at 486. The Rooker‐Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal

courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state

court losers challenging state court judgments rendered be‐

fore the district court proceedings commenced. Exxon‐Mobil

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The ra‐

tionale for the doctrine is that no matter how wrong a state

court judgment may be under federal law, only the Supreme

Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review it. Brown

v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012). Claims that di‐

rectly seek to set aside a state court judgment are de facto ap‐

peals which trigger the doctrine. Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg.

Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004). But even federal claims

which were not raised in state court, or that do not on their

face require review of a state court’s decision, may still be sub‐

ject to Rooker‐Feldman if those claims are inextricably inter‐

twined with a state court judgment. Id. The “inextricably in‐

tertwined” determination hinges on whether the federal

claim alleges that the injury was caused by the state court

judgment, or alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges

an independent prior injury that the state court failed to rem‐

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edy. Id. Because Rooker itself arose from a constitutional chal‐

lenge to the state court’s use of procedures, the Rooker‐Feldman

doctrine applies to procedural state court rulings as well as

substantive ones. See Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir.

2014). Further, we have held that interlocutory orders entered

prior to the final disposition of state court lawsuits are not im‐

mune from the jurisdiction‐stripping powers of Rooker‐Feld‐

man. Id. at 886.

But Rooker‐Feldman has its limits, and federal jurisdiction

does not terminate automatically on the entry of judgment in

a state court. Exxon‐Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. The doctrine occu‐

pies “narrow ground” and is “confined to the cases of the

kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases

brought by state‐court losers ... inviting district court review

and rejection of [those state court’s] judgments.” Id. at 284. In

order for the doctrine to apply, the state court judgment must

be “inextricably intertwined” with the federal court lawsuit.

In other words, there must be no way for the injury com‐

plained of by a plaintiff to be separated from a state court

judgment. See id. at 293; Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass’n v.

City of Chi., 693 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Kelley v.

Med‐1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2008). So, for

example, a state court loser is not barred from targeting a stat‐

ute which has been construed against her in a state court de‐

cision, so long as she does not seek to overturn the state court

judgment itself. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532–33 (2011).

And the Supreme Court has warned not to confuse Rooker‐

Feldman with claim preclusion: “If a federal plaintiff pre‐

sent[s] some independent claim that denies a legal conclusion

that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party

..., then there is jurisdiction, and state law determines

whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclu‐

sion.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293. In a similar vein, non‐parties are

not barred from bringing a challenge to a state court judgment

simply because they could be considered in privity with a

party to the judgment. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2009).  

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Gloria argues that the allegations in her complaint are  in‐

dependent from Judge MacCarthy’s order because they focus

on Judge MacCarthy’s wrongful conduct—interrogating Glo‐

ria about Shaggy and banning Shaggy from the courtroom—

and not her order denying Gloria’s motion for reasonable ac‐

commodations. We addressed a similar argument in Kelley v.

Med‐1 Solutions, where the plaintiff argued it was not the state

court’s award of attorneys’ fees which caused his injury, but

rather the attorneys’preceding fraudulent misrepresentations

which led to the erroneous award. 548 F.3d at 605. We found

that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because in order

to find that the defendants’ underlying representations vio‐

lated the law, we would be forced to determine that the state

court, which evaluated those representations, erred in its

judgment granting the attorneys’ fees. Id. Similarly here, the

result of Judge MacCarthy’s alleged misconduct was a state

court order explicitly banning Gloria’s service animal from

her courtroom. If the judge violated the ADA by engaging in

impermissible questioning or wrongly banning Shaggy from

her courtroom, those alleged violations were also the basis of

her order.  

In her response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Glo‐

ria attached an affidavit advancing a new theory that she was

not attacking the order but instead a policy, practice or custom

of ADA violations by Judge MacCarthy. She tried again to

frame her challenge as distinct from the previous order ban‐

ning Shaggy, by pointing to fresh violations when she re‐

turned to the courtroom with Shaggy a few weeks after the

order was entered. Her affidavit included allegations that

Judge MacCarthy dismissed Shaggy as “just a pet” and ac‐

cused Gloria of not having a disability. This information was

ostensibly offered to show that Gloria suffered a series of vi‐

olations, and the order was simply incidental to them. But

even if we could consider the affidavit, it also states that the

judge expressed anger because she did not follow the previous

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order, which only reinforces the conclusion that the initial or‐

der was a direct result of the judge’s preliminary inquiry and

subsequent ban.  In sum, to provide any relief in response to

the harm stemming from Judge MacCarthy’s acts, her court

order banning Shaggy would need to be set aside. The proper

way to challenge the court order was through state court ave‐

nues.  

Rooker‐Feldman will not always bar a litigant from bringing

claims against a state court for denial of reasonable accommo‐

dations. If the Daley Center had a policy of banning service

animals, Gloria’s claim may have survived dismissal. Lane

comes to mind as an example of an injury that occurred as a

result of a litigant’s participation in a judicial proceeding, but

was not inextricably intertwined with it. But when as in this

case the injury is executed through a court order, there is no

conceivable way to redress the wrong without overturning

the order of a state court. Rooker‐Feldman does not permit such

an outcome.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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