Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01437/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01437-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Margaret Marie Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

State of Arizona, a jural entity; Maricopa 

County, a jural entity; Arizona State Board 

of Education, a political subdivision of the 

State of Arizona; Maricopa County 

Community College District d/b/a/ 

Maricopa Community Colleges; Paradise 

Valley Community College; the Higher 

Learning Commission, an Illinois 

Corporation; Kelly Burton and John Doe 

Burton, husband and wife; Dr. Paul Dale 

and Jane Doe Dale, husband and wife; Dr. 

Denise Digianfilippo and John Doe 

Digianfilippo, husband and wife; and Dr. 

Mary Lou Mosley and John Doe Mosley, 

husband and wife, 

Defendants. 

No. CV 11-1437-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are (1) the Motion to Dismiss Defendants State of 

Arizona and Arizona State Board of Education with Prejudice (Doc. 24) and (2) the 

Community College Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Two (Doc. 37). 

The Court now rules on the Motions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In July 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint that contained the following allegations. 

Plaintiff enrolled in Paradise Valley Community College’s (the “College”) Introduction 

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to Ethics Course (the “Course”), which spanned from July 5, 2010 to August 5, 2010. 

(Doc. 1 at ¶ 27). The Course description represented that the course would cover “Major 

theories of conduct. Emphasis on normative ethics, theories of good and evil from Plato 

to present.” (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). Based on this description, the outline for the Course and 

Official Course Competencies, Plaintiff expected to learn about the ethical theories and 

historical context of the theories of a variety of different philosophers spanning the 

history of philosophy. (Id. at ¶ 29). 

 Plaintiff alleges that Kelly Burton (“Burton”), the instructor of the Course, failed 

to teach the Course according to the Course description and instead taught her own 

Christian worldview. (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges that “none of the theories of the 

philosophers set out in the course description were taught during the Philosophy Class.” 

(Id. at ¶ 32). 

 The textbook for the Course was Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of 

Basic Beliefs (the “textbook”). (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges that the textbook and the 

sections taught from it are “totally inappropriate . . . for any course in the philosophy 

department, and in particular for the [Course] as described in the Course Description.” 

(Id. at ¶ 33). Plaintiff alleges that the textbook was not approved by the Vice President of 

Academic Affairs prior to its first use in a Spring 2009 course and was first approved in 

October 2009. (Id. at ¶ 35). 

 Plaintiff alleges that, in August 2009, Barry Scheckner filed a grievance with the 

College complaining that the Spring 2009 Introduction to Ethics course contained 

unconstitutional religious instruction. (Id. at ¶ 36). 

 Plaintiff alleges that the Maricopa County Community College District 

(“MCCCD”) has a policy of academic freedom, allowing faculty to “exercise their best 

effort to ensure topics are relevant to their subject” and allowing faculty to “determine 

curriculum and relevant subject matter for courses” and “recommend the appropriate 

pedagogy and textbooks, and other materials relevant to teaching their subject.” (Id. at ¶ 

39). Plaintiff alleges that Burton abused this policy because her religious instruction in 

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the Course “was not relevant or related to MCCCD’s prescribed course competencies as 

laid out in the Course Description.” (Id. at ¶ 40). Plaintiff alleges that Burton’s religious 

instruction in the Course violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Article 2, Section 12 of the Arizona Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 42). 

 Plaintiff alleges that, because of the indoctrinating nature of Burton’s teaching, 

Plaintiff felt inhibited from openly or fully participating in discussions and honestly 

answering exam questions out of fear of not receiving full credit (that would be earned 

with a God-based response). (Id. at ¶ 44). Plaintiff alleges that there is no secular 

purpose for Burton’s teaching the Course in the manner described. (Id. at 54). 

 As a result, Plaintiff alleges that Burton1

 and Defendants Mosley and Dale have 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count One) because (1) Burton, acting under color of state 

law, taught the Course “solely to indoctrinate her students with her Christian worldview, 

thereby advancing and endorsing religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments” (id. at ¶ 47), abused her academic freedom under MCCCD’s own policy 

(id. at ¶ 51), failed to cover the theories advanced in the Course description (id. at ¶ 52), 

and (2) Defendant Mosely, Vice President of Academic Affairs at the College, and 

Defendant Dale, President of the College, failed in their duties to ensure that Burton’s 

instruction was taught in a constitutionally permissible manner (Id. at ¶¶ 48-50). 

 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants State of Arizona, Maricopa County,2

MCCCD, Higher Learning Commission,3

 and Paradise Valley Community College have 

violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 

Constitution and Article 2, section 12 of the Arizona Constitution (Count Two) because 

(1) Defendants State of Arizona, Maricopa County, MCCCD, and Paradise Valley 

 

1

 Defendants Kelly Ann Burton and David Perry Burton have previously been dismissed without prejudice. (See Doc. 51). 

2

 Defendant Maricopa County has previously been dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation by the Parties. (See Doc. 43). 

3

 Defendant Higher Learning Commission has previously been dismissed without prejudice. (See Doc. 51). 

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Community College have appropriated and/or applied public money and property to 

religious instruction in the form of the Course (id. at ¶ 58), and (2) Defendant Higher 

Learning Commission negligently accredited the College, knowing or having reason to 

know that the College permitted, encouraged, and supported class instruction that 

violated the Establishment Clause of the Arizona Constitution (Id. at ¶ 59). Plaintiff 

alleges that the actions of Defendants are injurious to the interests of Plaintiff because 

Defendants’ actions subjected Plaintiff to potential official sanctions in the form of 

unacceptable grades if Plaintiff disagreed with the course content and exposed Plaintiff to 

unwanted endorsements of religion. (Id. at 64). 

 Plaintiff also alleges that Paradise Valley Community College is liable for breach 

of implied contract (Count Three) because the College failed to substantially provide the 

advertised instruction of the Course to Plaintiff, and thus, Plaintiff was denied the 

education for which she paid. (Id. at ¶¶ 69-70). 

 As a result of Counts One through Three, Plaintiff seeks compensatory, special 

and general damages, a declaratory judgment declaring that Defendants violated 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an injunction, enjoining the 

Defendants from violating the Establishment Clause. (Id. at 11-12). 

 Defendants the State of Arizona and the Arizona State Board of Education 

(collectively, the “State Defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants MCCCD, the College, Dr. Paul Dale, Dr. Denise 

Digianfilippo, and Dr. Mary Lou Mosley (collectively, the “Community College 

Defendants”) also move to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

II. THE STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 24) 

In their Motion to Dismiss, the State Defendants argue that the Complaint should 

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be dismissed with prejudice against the State of Arizona (the “State”) and the Arizona 

State Board of Education (the “Board”) because the Eleventh Amendment bars this action 

against the State and the Board. In Response to the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 

Plaintiff “does not oppose the dismissal” of the State Defendants, but argues that the 

claims against them should be dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 39 at 1). 

 In Response, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff plainly cannot bring her 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court and thus, this action should be dismissed 

with prejudice against the State Defendants. Because the parties have agreed that the 

Eleventh Amendment bars this action in this Court and that this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over the State Defendants, the Court will not speculate as to whether there is an 

appropriate jurisdiction for Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the claims against the State 

Defendants are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in a Court of competent 

jurisdiction.4

 

 III. THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

 DISMISS COUNTS ONE AND TWO (Doc. 37) 

 The Community College Defendants argue that Counts One and Two of the 

Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue declaratory and 

injunctive relief related to her federal and state constitutional claims. The Community 

College Defendants also argue that Count One should be dismissed because the 

individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any claims made pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 A. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 

The Community College Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory 

and injunctive relief fail because her constitutional claims are moot. In response, 

Plaintiff argues that, because she can go back to school at any time and take classes, even 

 

4

 However, if Plaintiff inappropriately attempts to reassert the dismissed claims 

against the State Defendants in Federal Court, the State Defendants may move, in this case, to recover any attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in having to defend the same action again. 

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after graduation, her claims for relief are not moot 

 Article III of the Constitution limits the Court’s jurisdiction to “cases or 

controversies.” Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(internal citation omitted). For the Court to have jurisdiction, a claim must be live 

throughout “all stages of the litigation process.” Id. (internal citation omitted). If a claim 

“loses its character as a live controversy, then the action or claim becomes moot” and the 

Court lacks jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. Id. (internal citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, if the Court cannot remedy Plaintiff’s alleged injury with injunctive 

or declaratory relief, Plaintiff’s claims for those forms of relief are moot. Id. at 798 

(internal citation omitted). However, even if claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 

are mooted, Plaintiff may still have a claim for monetary damages that would save the 

case from a complete mootness bar. Id.

Further, there is an exception to the mootness doctrine for issues that are “capable 

of repetition, yet evading review” in extraordinary cases where “(1) the duration of the 

challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases, and (2) there is a 

reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to the same action again.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff completed the Course on August 5, 2010 

and, thus, it does not appear that the Court could remedy any injury she suffered through 

declaratory or injunctive relief. Plaintiff appears to argue that this case falls into the 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine because 

students seeking declaratory or injunctive relief would have to file and complete litigation 

before the semester (or quarter) ends. (See Doc. 48 at 4). However, because Plaintiff 

will not have to repeat the allegedly unconstitutional Course, she has not demonstrated 

that it is likely she will be subjected to the allegedly unconstitutional actions of 

Defendants again. See, e.g., Doe, 177 F.3d at 799 (holding that mootness exception did 

not apply where student-plaintiff had already graduated and would never again be 

compelled to participate in a prayer at his high school graduation ceremony). For 

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instance, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants teach any other courses in a manner 

that violates the Establishment Clause, nor does Plaintiff allege that she has any reason to 

repeat the Course in the future. Accordingly, the “capable of exception, but evading 

review” exception does not apply and Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims for 

injunctive and declaratory relief. 

 Plaintiff argues that, even if her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are 

moot, Counts One and Two should not be dismissed in their entirety because her claim 

for damages is not mooted by her completion of the Course. In reply, Defendants argue 

that it is unclear what compensatory damages Plaintiff is seeking from her complaint or 

the legal basis for such damages and thus, such a conclusory request is not sufficient 

under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Because Defendants first raised this 

argument in their reply, although it was clear from Plaintiff’s Complaint that she was 

seeking compensatory damages for Counts One and Two (see Doc. 1 at 11 (“Plaintiff . . . 

for each and every cause of action above, demands the following relief . . . compensatory 

. . . damages”), the Court will not consider this argument, as Plaintiff has not been given 

an opportunity to respond to it. See Lopez v. I-Flow, Inc., No. CV 08-1063-PHX-SRB, 

2011 WL 7424141, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. May 12, 2011) (“The Court does not address 

arguments first raised in reply because it deprives the nonmoving party the opportunity to 

respond.”) (internal citation omitted). 

 B. Qualified Immunity 

The Community College Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim 

(Count One) should be dismissed in its entirety because Dr. Dale, Dr. Digianfilippo, and 

Dr. Mosley (collectively, the “individual Defendants”) are entitled to qualified immunity. 

 Section 1983 is a vehicle “by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 

F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). “The purpose of § 1983 is to 

deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 

federally guaranteed rights.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

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 “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages 

unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the 

challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “[L]ower courts have 

discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis to tackle 

first.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

 With regard to the second prong, a “Government official’s conduct violates clearly 

established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are 

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is 

doing violates that right.” Id. at 2083 (internal quotations and citation omitted). While 

there need not be a case directly on point establishing the right, “existing precedent must 

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. The Supreme 

Court has been explicit that the Court is “not to define clearly established law at a high 

level of generality,” but must determine “whether the violative nature of particular 

conduct is clearly established.” Id. at 2084 (internal citations omitted). In making this 

determination, the Court must consider that “[q]ualified immunity gives government 

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal 

questions [and] [w]hen properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or 

those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 2085 (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). 

 In this case, the Community College Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to 

meet the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis because “what an instructor can 

or cannot say about religion in an elective, college-level philosophy course is a gray 

area.” (See Doc. 49 at 7). In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants “absolutely could 

not set up a class at the college with the primary effect of advancing and/or indoctrinating 

students in the beliefs of a particular religious faith.” (See Doc. 48 at 6). Plaintiff cites to 

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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403, U.S. 602 (1976)5 and contends that “Defendants have sufficient 

case authorities to put them on notice that allowing a class to be taught solely to advance 

a religious viewpoint is unconstitutional.” (Doc. 48). The Court first notes that 

Plaintiff’s arguments that the Course has a “primary effect of advancing and/or 

indoctrinating students in the beliefs of a particular religious faith” and that it was “taught 

solely to advance a religious viewpoint” are not well-pled factual allegations, but are 

legal conclusions. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (the Court need not 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation). Further, although 

Plaintiff contends that there is sufficient legal precedent establishing that Defendants 

could not teach an ethics class from a religious viewpoint, Plaintiff solely cites to Lemon

to establish this point. 

 In response, the Community College Defendants cite to numerous cases to 

demonstrate that the law surrounding what constitutes an Establishment Clause violation 

in a college classroom is unclear. The Court agrees that, while there is precedent 

establishing that certain religious practices in a classroom are forbidden by the 

Establishment Clause,6

 the exact contours of what is allowed when using religious 

 

5

 “Under Lemon, a government act is consistent with the Establishment Clause if 

it: (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a principal or primary effect that neither advances 

nor disapproves of religion; and (3) does not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.” Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 971-973 (9th Cir. 

2011) (internal citation omitted). 

6

 See California Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials v. Noonan, 600 F. 

Supp. 2d 1088, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[C]ourts have held a number of activities to be 

violations of the Establishment Clause, including: (1) inviting clergy to offer invocation and benediction prayers at formal graduation ceremonies for high schools and middle schools (Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); (2) daily readings from the Bible (Sch. 

Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)); (3) daily recitation of the Lord's Prayer (id.); (4) distributing Gideon Bibles to fifth grade public school students (Berger v. Rensselaer Central Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1171 (7th Cir. 1993)); (5) 

posting the Ten Commandments in every classroom (Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 

(1981)); (6) requiring the teaching of evolution science with creation science or not at all 

(Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)); (7) beginning school assemblies with prayer (Collins v. 

Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981)); (8) teaching a Transcendental Mediation course that includes a ceremony involving offerings to a deity (Malnak v. 

Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd Cir. 1979)); (9) teaching of weekly religious education classes by private religious educators in public elementary school classrooms (Vaughn v. Reed, 313 

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materials in a classroom and teaching from a religious perspective are not entirely clear. 

 In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the chapters of the textbook used in the 

Course are “theological and therefore totally inappropriate as the primary textbook or any 

course in the philosophy department . . .” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 33). However, just because a 

book, or chapters within a book, that are used in a classroom are theological in nature, the 

use of the book in a classroom does not automatically result in a violation of the 

Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (“the Bible 

may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, 

comparative religion, or the like.”) (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225); Grove, 753 F.2d at 

1540 (Canby, J. concurring) (“Luther’s ‘Ninety–Nine Theses’ are hardly balanced or 

objective, yet their pronounced and even vehement bias does not prevent their study in a 

history class’ exploration of the Protestant Reformation, nor is Protestantism itself 

‘advanced’ thereby.”).7

 Moreover, Plaintiff has not cited to any cases where a court 

struck down a school’s use of a particular book on Establishment Clause grounds. 

Accordingly, the Court cannot say that the use of Philosophical Foundation: A Critical 

Analysis of Basic Beliefs as a textbook in a college-level Ethics Course would be clearlyviolative of the Establishment Clause8

 and, thus, the individual Defendants are entitled to 

Qualified Immunity with respect to the use of that textbook in the Course. 

 Likewise, it is not clear to the Court from Plaintiff’s general allegations that the 

 

F. Supp. 431 (W.D.Va. 1970)); and (10) teaching of the Bible, for an express religious purpose, in public elementary and high schools by private religious educators (Herdahl v. 

Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Miss. 1996)).”). 

7

 See also Noonan, 600 F.Supp.2d at 1117 (observing that “Courts have not been inclined to find an Establishment Clause violation . . . with respect to use of certain books, including novels, textbooks and reading series, in a public school curriculum” and collecting cases finding no Establishment Clause violation when teaching about religion is incorporated into a larger secular curriculum). 

8

 In her Complaint, Plaintiff does not provide any examples of Class Exercises or readings from the book that would violate the Establishment Clause. Rather, she makes 

generalized assertions that teaching of “Surrendra Gangadean’s ten Moral Laws was not directly relevant to objective, religiously neutral presentation.” The Court cannot determine from these conclusory allegations that using the textbook is clearly violative of the Establishment Clause. 

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individual Defendants’ failure to ensure that the Course “was not taught in a 

constitutionally impermissible manner”9

 amounts to a clearly established Establishment 

Clause violation. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the class was taught in a 

constitutionally impermissible manner because religion was discussed are not sufficiently 

based on facts so that the Court could discern that the individual Defendants violated a 

clearly established Constitutional right. See Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 

27 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) (“If an Establishment Clause violation arose each 

time a student believed that a school practice either advanced or disapproved of a 

religion, school curricula would be reduced to the lowest common denominator, 

permitting each student to become a ‘curriculum review committee’ unto himself or 

herself.”). 

 The reference of religion in a classroom does not automatically violate the 

Establishment Clause. See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 970, n. 23 (“The Establishment Clause 

does not wholly preclude the government from referencing religion . . . Not only would 

such a drastic and draconian requirement raise substantial difficulties as to what might be 

left to talk about, but . . . it would require that we ignore much of our own history and 

that of the world in general . . . For instance, one could not discuss Egyptian pyramids, 

Greek philosophers, the Crusades, or the Mayflower if even incidental or colloquial 

references to objects or individuals of religious significance were constitutionally 

taboo.”); Brown, 27 F.3d at 1377 (Court decided that it need not determine which 

religious rituals can be employed in public school curriculum, but noted that “having 

children act out a ceremonial American Indian dance for the purpose of exploring and 

learning about American Indian culture may be permissible even if the dance was [a] 

 

9

 Plaintiffs’ generalized, conclusory allegations that the class was “taught in a constitutionally impermissible manner” and that the purpose of the class was “solely to indoctrinate” students with a “Christian worldview, thereby advancing and endorsing religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments” give the Court no basis to properly analyze the violative nature of the exact conduct alleged because Plaintiff fails to provide any factually specific examples of how the Course was taught from a “Christian worldview” that violated the “First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 

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religious ritual. Similarly, a reenactment of the Last Supper or a Passover dinner might 

be permissible if presented for historical or cultural purposes.”). 

 Moreover, Courts have long emphasized the importance of academic freedom in 

deciding the appropriate curriculum for the classroom. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 300 

(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that teaching many social sciences requires mentioning 

religions, but decisions about how religion is used “are matters which the courts ought to 

entrust very largely to the experienced officials who superintend our Nation’s public 

schools. They are experts in such matters, and we are not.”); C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. 

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating “We have no 

doubt that the freedom to have a frank discussion about the role of religion in history is 

an integral part of any advanced history course.”); Noonan, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 

(noting that school boards have “broad discretion” in selecting “public school 

curriculum.”). 

 Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific actions by Defendants that obviously 

violated a clearly established right under the Establishment Clause or to any cases 

indicating that a college level Ethics course cannot be taught with reference to a specific 

religion and, thus, the Court cannot find that the Individual Defendants would have been 

aware that their conduct was in violation of a clearly established constitutional right. See 

Farnan, 654 F.3d at 989 (“But without any cases illuminating the dimly perceived line of 

demarcation between permissible and impermissible discussion of religion in a college 

level history class, we cannot conclude that a reasonable teacher standing in Corbett’s 

shoes would have been on notice that his actions might be unconstitutional.”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the individual Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim (Count One) and the individual 

Defendants are dismissed from this case. Further, because Count One is solely asserted 

against the individual Defendants, the Community College Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is granted with regard to Count One of the Complaint. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the claims against the State of Arizona and the Arizona State Board 

of Education are dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff re-filing in a court of competent 

jurisdiction. 

 Further, Defendants Digianfilippo, Mosley, and Dale are entitled to qualified 

immunity on the claims in Count One; because there are no remaining Defendants in 

Count One, Count One is dismissed. Further, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and 

declaratory relief in Count One and Count Two are dismissed. 

 Accordingly, the remaining claims of Plaintiff’s Complaint are: (1) the claims in 

Count Two as asserted against Maricopa Community College District and Paradise 

Valley Community College for monetary relief and (2) Count Three (Breach of 

Contract), as asserted against Paradise Valley Community College. 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Defendants State of Arizona and 

Arizona State Board of Education with Prejudice (Doc. 24) is granted in part and denied 

in part as set forth herein. 

 Defendants State of Arizona and Arizona State Board of Education are hereby 

dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Community College Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Counts One and Two (Doc. 37) is granted in part and denied in part as 

follows: 

 Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are hereby dismissed 

because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue those claims. 

 Count One of the Complaint is hereby dismissed. 

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 Defendants Dr. Denise Digianfilippo, John Doe Digianfilippo, Dr. Mary Lou 

Mosely, John Doe Mosely, Dr. Paul Dale, and Jane Doe Dale are hereby dismissed. 

 Dated this 31st day of July, 2012. 

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