Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00411/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00411-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VLADIMIR AMARAUT, on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly situated, 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT 

COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-411-WQH-AHG

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR ORDER LIMITING 

PLAINTIFFS’ AND PLAINTIFFS’ 

COUNSEL’S COMMUNICATIONS 

WITH CLASS AND COLLECTIVE 

MEMBERS

[ECF No. 73]

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Before the Court is Defendant Sprint/United Management Company’s 

(“Defendant”) Motion for Order Limiting Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s 

Communication with Class and Collective Members. ECF No. 73. This matter was referred 

to the undersigned by District Judge William Q. Hayes. ECF No. 86. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2019, Plaintiffs Vladimir Amaraut, Katherine Almonte, Corbin 

Beltz, Kristopher Fox, Dylan McCollum, and Quinn Myers’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 

filed their First Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint against Defendant

Sprint/United Management Company (“Defendant”). ECF No. 45-1. There, Plaintiffs 

brought a hybrid collective and class action: an “opt-in” collective action for FLSA claims 

and an “opt-out” state-specific class action for state law wage and hour claims. Id. On 

December 12, 2019, Defendant filed a Notice of Settlement in two related actions, 

Navarette v. Sprint/United Management Company, No. 8:19-cv-794-AG-ADS (C.D. Cal.) 

and Navarette v. Sprint/United Management Company, No. 30-2019-01062047-CU-OECXC (Orange Cnty. Super. Ct.) (collectively, “Navarette lawsuits”), which had settled via 

private mediation. ECF No. 59. The same day, Defendant filed an Emergency Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 60), requesting that the Court halt notice 

administration in the instant case in light of the Navarette settlement, which Plaintiffs 

opposed (ECF No. 61) and the Court ultimately denied (ECF No. 62). On 

December 20, 2019, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery 

Dispute, in which Plaintiffs sought to compel production of putative class and collective 

members’ contact information. ECF No. 69. In anticipation that the Court would order 

Defendant to produce the contact information to Plaintiffs, on December 27, 2019, 

Defendant filed its Motion for Order Limiting Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s 

Communications with Class and Collective Members. ECF No. 73. Though Defendant 

requested that the Court “consider both issues concurrently when evaluating the discovery 

motion,” (ECF No. 74 at 3), the Court denied Defendant’s request to shorten the briefing 

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schedule on Defendant’s motion to limit Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

communications. ECF No. 90. On January 14, 2020, the Court issued its order resolving 

the parties’ discovery dispute and ordered Defendant to produce contact information for 

the putative class and collective members to Plaintiffs. ECF No. 91. This order follows.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Because of the potential for abuse in class actions, “a district court has both the duty 

and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate 

orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 

89, 99–100 (1981); see FED.R.CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(C) (providing courts with authority in class 

actions to “issue orders that . . . impose conditions on the representative parties or on 

intervenors”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments 

(explaining that Rule 26(d) is “concerned with the fair and efficient conduct of the action”). 

As such, courts have the authority to limit communications between litigants and putative 

class members prior to class certification, subject to restrictions mandated by the First 

Amendment and the Federal Rules. Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 100; Camp v. Alexander, 300 

F.R.D. 617, 620–21 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Where communications are misleading, coercive, 

or an improper attempt to undermine Rule 23 by encouraging class members not to join 

the suit, they may be limited by the court, but the orders must be grounded in good cause 

and issued with a heightened sensitivity for the First Amendment”); Mevorah v. Wells 

Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. C 05-1175-MHP, 2005 WL 4813532, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

17, 2005) (“Pre-certification communications to potential class members by both parties 

are generally permitted, and also considered to constitute constitutionally protected speech. 

. . . [but c]ourts have limited pre-certification communications with potential class 

members after misleading, coercive, or improper communications were made”).

For example, “an order limiting communications between parties and potential class 

members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of 

the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.” Gulf 

Oil, 452 U.S. at 101–02; see, e.g., In re M.L. Stern Overtime Litig., 250 F.R.D. 492, 496 

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(S.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 239, 244 

(E.D. Tex. 1997)) (“‘To the extent that the district court is empowered . . . to restrict certain 

communications in order to prevent frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not 

exercise the power without a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular 

abuses by which it is threatened’”) (emphasis omitted).

“It is not enough that a potentially coercive situation exists. ... The court cannot 

issue an order [limiting communication with putative class members] without evidence that 

a potential for serious abuse exists.” In re M.L. Stern Overtime Litig., 250 F.R.D. at 496

(quoting Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 244); see Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 104 (reversing the district 

court’s order limiting communication with putative class members because “the mere 

possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban . . . in the 

absence of a clear record and specific findings of need”); Cram v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,

No. 07cv1842-LAB-NLS, 2008 WL 178449, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008) (“A mere 

possibility of confusion is insufficient to justify the district court’s exercise of supervisory 

authority over parties’ communications with potential class members”).

Should a court find that clear abuses have taken place, it “should result in a carefully 

drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties 

under the circumstances[,]” i.e., “‘giving explicit consideration to the narrowest possible 

relief which would protect the respective parties.’” Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 102 (quoting Coles 

v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1977)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks an order from the Court prohibiting Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ 

counsel from (1) commenting in any way regarding the settlement of the Navarrete

lawsuits; (2) providing an opinion of any kind regarding class members’ rights as relates 

to the Navarrete lawsuits and settlement of those lawsuits; and (3) encouraging class 

members in any way to opt-out of the Navarrete settlement or to opt-in to the instant action.

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ECF No. 73-1 at 3.1 Plaintiffs contend that the Court should deny Defendant’s requests

because Defendant’s motion is based on speculation and fear, when the Supreme Court 

requires a clear record and specific findings. ECF No. 97 at 3–4. In response, Defendant 

asserts that there are specific facts that warrant a limitation on communications. ECF No. 

104 at 4–6. 

Here, the Court will “evaluate whether Defendant[] ha[s] identified potential or 

actual abuses sufficient to justify the imposition of” an order limiting communications. 

McEwan v. OSP Grp., L.P., No. 14cv2823-BEN-WVG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105148, at 

*4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016).

A. Whether Defendant has Identified Actual Abuses that Warrant an Order 

Limiting Communications

In its reply brief, Defendant points to three statements or groups of statements made 

by Plaintiffs in documents filed in this action: (1) statements implying that class counsel in 

the Navarette lawsuits is ineffectual, (2) statements disparaging the Navarette settlement, 

and (3) statements indicating they plan to encourage putative class members to opt out of 

the Navarette settlement. ECF No. 104 at 6 (citing ECF No. 61 (Plaintiffs’ opposition to 

Defendant’s emergency motion for temporary restraining order)). Defendant contends that 

these statements are the requisite “specific facts” needed to warrant limitations on 

communication. Id. 

As a threshold matter, Defendant repeatedly notes that Plaintiffs’ allegedly abusive 

statements were made publicly. See ECF No. 74 at 2 (“Plaintiffs’ counsel have been very 

vocal and public about their hostility toward the [Navarette] settlement”); ECF No. 104 at 

2 (same); ECF No. 74 at 7 (referencing Plaintiffs’ comments in “publicly filed pleadings”);

 

1 The Court notes that Plaintiffs and Defendant have cited to the page numbers affixed to 

the original filings. However, due to discrepancies between original and imprinted page 

numbers, page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Order refer to those imprinted 

by the court’s electronic case filing system.

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ECF No. 104 at 6 (repeated references to Plaintiffs’ comments in “publicly filed papers”); 

Id. at 11 (noting its concern about “Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel’s disparaging and 

misleading public statements”). The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ statements were in 

publicly-filed court documents, not in more ubiquitous mediums like newspaper articles,

television advertisements, or via social media. Moreover, the fact that these statements 

were made publicly is not enough, on its face, to warrant a limitation on communication. 

See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 683–684, 683 n.24 (3d Cir. 1988)) 

(holding that the district court had authority to limit communications when the 

communications at issue were “directly with class members,” but not with regard to the 

defendant’s other public speech, because the district court made no findings regarding 

whether the “statements in regulatory and legislative proceedings ... or [] communications 

through the mass media. . . [we]re directed at plaintiff class members, have been misleading 

in any way, or pose any threat to the fairness or integrity of the litigation”) (emphasis in 

original); Motisola Malikha Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 674, 679 (N.D. 

Ga. 1999) (limiting certain direct communications with putative class members, based on 

previous direct emails, but declining to limit communications based on public 

communication such as newspapers articles resulting from “in-depth interviews with the 

named plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel[,]” “so long as no attempts are made by either side 

to overtly solicit participation or nonparticipation by potential class members”); Shores v. 

Publix Super Mkts., No. 95-1192-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 WL 859985, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 

25, 1996) (declining to limit communications based on public communications alone, even 

though “[b]oth parties have sought and obtained extensive free publicity on their respective 

positions in this suit. . . [including] an aggressive publicity campaign” and class members 

were exposed to those public communications, leaving determinations of “accuracy, 

fairness or bias ... to the marketplace of ideas,” and instead limited direct communication 

after reviewing multiple emails from the defendant to putative members of the class, noting 

that “there is no marketplace of ideas in the workplace” and concluding that they were 

“intended to discourage class members from participation in this litigation”). As such, in 

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examining the substance of Plaintiffs’ statements, the Court will not provide undue 

significance to the fact that those statements were public and will instead address whether 

the statements were directed at putative class members.

“Whether a communication is misleading or coercive—and therefore warrants 

judicial intervention—often depends not on one particular assertion, but rather the overall 

message or impression left by the communication.” Talavera v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 

15cv105-AWI-BAM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29633, at *14–*15 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016). 

A court therefore “must examine ‘the context in which the communications were made and 

the effect of the communications’ in determining whether, and how much, communication 

should be restricted.” Id. at *14–*15 (quoting Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc., 929 

F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1108–09 (D. Colo. 2013)). Therefore, the Court will address Plaintiffs’

statements in context.

First, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel have already publicly 

criticized Navarrete’s counsel implying they are ineffectual class counsel and that a 

“reverse auction” occurred.” ECF No. 104 at 6 (quoting ECF No. 61 at 21 (“A reverse 

auction is said to occur when . . .”)). However, reading Plaintiffs’ entire remark provides 

important context:

Moreover, because Sprint has not disclosed any terms of this apparent

settlement, Plaintiffs’ exclusion from these settlement discussions, and given 

Sprint’s persistent misconduct throughout this case, it is entirely reasonable 

to infer that a reverse auction has taken place. “A reverse auction is said to 

occur when ‘the defendant in a series of class actions picks the most 

ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a settlement with in the hope that the 

district court will approve a weak settlement that will preclude other claims 

against the defendant.’ It has an air of mendacity about it.” Negrete v. Allianz 

Life Ins. Co., 523 F.3d 1091, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Reynolds v. 

Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002)).

ECF No. 61 at 21. When viewed in context, this statement does not disparage Navarette’s

counsel, but instead explains the potential harm involved when a defendant facing multiple 

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class actions chooses to settle one of the actions in a secret process that will render the 

other actions moot. 

Second, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel have already

misrepresented and disparaged the Navarrete settlement as ‘collusive, reverse-auction

endeavors’ that ‘Sprint has apparently engineered’ and as ‘secretive and collusive

settlement discussions.’” ECF No. 104 at 6 (citing ECF No. 61 at 4, 5, 92). For context, 

Plaintiffs’ comments are provided in full3 below:

(1) “Sprint has not provided any information that would suggest its 

collusive, reverse-auction endeavors will be endorsed by the Navarette Court, 

and there is no basis to believe this apparent tentative settlement – whatever 

it may be – will be upheld.” ECF No. 61 at 5. 

(2) “Thus, even assuming the Navarette Court were to, six or so months 

from now, approve the reverse-auction Sprint has apparently engineered – a 

dubious proposition, as explained in greater detail below – it cannot impact 

significant California-centric aspects of this case.” Id. at 5.

(3) “For one, as discussed below, supra Section III.B.2, such collusive, 

reverse-auctioned settlements are highly unlikely to be approved. Unless 

another Court endorses this surreptitious, collusive settlement, no other notice 

will go out.” Id. at 9. 

Plaintiffs go on to cite Litty v. Merril Lynch, where the court denied preliminary approval 

of the class settlement because “while there is no evidence of overt misconduct, it is 

troubling that plaintiff and defendant in addition to settling plaintiff’s individual claims are 

also sweeping into the settlement two separate cases without involving plaintiffs’ counsel 

 

2 Defendant cited to “ECF No. 61, 2:14–17; 3:9–11; 3:18–19; 17:10–12.” ECF No. 104 at 

6. As noted above, due to discrepancies between original and imprinted page numbers, the 

Court has matched up Defendant’s citations and has cited to page numbers imprinted by 

the court’s electronic case filing system.

3 Plaintiff’s statement in ECF No. 61 at 4:14–17 is omitted from this list, since it is 

discussed below.

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in those cases. Thus, on that basis alone, there is a question of whether the Settlement 

Agreement is the product of informed, arms-length negotiations between the parties.” Litty 

v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. CV-14-0425-PA-PJWx, 2015 WL 4698475, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 

Apr. 27, 2015); see ECF No. 61 at 21–22.4

Third, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel have already 

indicated that they will encourage the Navarrete putative class to opt out of the Navarrete

settlement.” ECF No. 104 at 6. There, Defendants quote one sentence written by Plaintiffs,

which stated that, once putative class members receive notice of this case, they will have 

to make a “simple choice: allow Navarette to extinguish their claims, or opt out, and 

continue to pursue their claims in this case.” Id. (citing ECF No. 61 at 4) (added emphasis 

omitted). However, reading Plaintiffs’ entire remark provides important context: in their 

opposition to Defendant’s emergency motion for temporary restraining order, Plaintiffs 

argue that Defendants have not met the required elements needed to obtain injunctive relief, 

such as that it will “suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief[.]” ECF 

 

4 Plaintiff went on to argue: 

The same analysis will ultimately apply in these cases. Sprint concealed its 

attempt to settle the claims of California employees. Sprint delayed 

conditional certification proceedings for months, refused to comply with the 

terms of conditional certification when it was eventually entered, all in 

furtherance of a single goal: prevent Collective members from pursuing their 

claims or knowing about these proceedings until Sprint could settle their 

claims through a case that has not even been conditionally certified. In 

achieving this end, Sprint excluded counsel for Plaintiffs in this case – two 

law firms with decades of experience litigating hundreds, if not thousands, of 

wage and hour class actions – and instead sought to settle these claims with a 

law firm named James Hawkins ALPC: a firm that does not even have a 

website. Sprint should not be rewarded for its reverse-auction endeavors by 

now preventing Collective members from knowing that another case is 

pending that will adequately protect their interests, and stopping the statute of 

limitations from running on their claims.

ECF No. 61 at 22.

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No. 61 at 3. In arguing that there will be no harm if the notices are sent out, Plaintiffs 

asserted, “Collective members will suffer no injury or confusion by receiving the Courtordered notice.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs went on to argue:

Simply, Sprint’s argument that Collective member confusion will be so 

overwhelming as to outweigh the fact that these individuals are losing claims

[due to the statute of limitations continuing to run] – property rights – on a 

daily basis is nonsensical. [¶] Once these individuals receive notice of these 

proceedings and opt in, they will also have the opportunity to review the 

reverse-auctioned settlement apparently reached in Navarette, and make a 

simple choice: allow Navarette to extinguish their claims, or opt out, and 

continue to pursue their claims in this case. But there is no “injury” to 

Collective members by allowing them to make this entirely ordinary choice.

And there is certainly no harm to Sprint, which is all that matters.

Id. at 4. 

Though it agrees that Plaintiffs’ words are often strong, the Court finds that, in 

context, the aforementioned statements by Plaintiffs are neither abusive, misleading, or 

coercive. See Finder v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 13cv2059-AWI-BAM, 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 8346, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2017) (“While the Court acknowledges that 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s comments may consist of insinuations that cast Defendants and the 

supporting declarants in a negative light, those comments do not mislead employees about 

their rights as potential class members. [His] comments do not create confusion or seek to 

influence whether members opt-in or opt-out of the class”). Further, Defendant presents no 

evidence that Plaintiffs’ statements were directed at putative class members or that the 

putative class members read Plaintiffs’ brief (ECF No. 61), and if so, that they were 

confused or felt coerced. See id. at *6, *14, *17–*18 (declining to limit communications 

based on counsel’s posts in a public Facebook group, which insinuated that supervisors 

were given promotions in exchange for providing perjured declarations in the case, because 

there was not evidence that members of the Facebook group were directly affected by the 

posts or that a chilling effect on litigation actually occurred, noting that “[plaintiff’s 

counsel] is an advocate for his position in this law suit; a position that members can freely 

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take or leave”); Camp, 300 F.RD. at 620, 626 (declining to limit communications when the 

defendant had sent a letter to all employees stating that “the lawsuit is motivated by greed 

and other improper factors” and that the plaintiff’s “attorney is seeking a very large sum of 

money by attempting to convince other employees to join the lawsuit,” because “[a]lthough 

the inflammatory nature of the Employee Letter is clear on its face, Plaintiffs have not 

provided evidence that any particular putative class member was coerced, and the Supreme 

Court calls for a clear record and specific findings in order to limit communications”). The 

Court also notes that zealously representing their clients, alone, is not abusive, and 

“[u]ltimately, however, case law does not require that communications to potential class 

members be objective and neutral.” Finder, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8346, at *16 (citing

Babbitt v. Albertson’s Inc., No. C-92-1883 SBA-PJH, 1993 WL 150300, at *3–*7 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 31, 1993)); see Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1440–41, 

1440 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984) (reversing district court’s order limiting communications because, 

although “counsel may have overstepped ethical bounds in [] zealousness[,]” i.e., 

courtroom testimony that was inaccurate or exaggerated due to prior interviews with 

counsel, “[t]he advocacy system is designed to correct for excesses through response from 

opposing counsel, rather than through court-imposed restrictions which interfere with legal 

assistance to class members”). 

After considering Plaintiffs’ statements in context, and given that there is no 

evidence Plaintiffs’ statements directly coerced or mislead putative class members, the 

Court finds that Defendant has not identified actual abuses that warrant an order limiting 

communications.

B. Whether Defendant has Identified Potential Abuses that Warrant an 

Order Limiting Communications

Having decided that Plaintiffs’ statements were not abusive, misleading, or 

coercive, the Court will address Defendant’s argument that there is a high risk of abuse. 

Since “Plaintiffs’ counsel have been very vocal and public about their hostility 

toward the [Navarette] settlement[,]” Defendant worries about Plaintiffs’ “unfettered 

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channels of communication with class and collective members who have rights in the 

Navarrete settlement.” ECF No. 73-1 at 2. Further, Defendant worries that “Plaintiffs will 

rob the class and collective members of that opportunity to make that independent choice

[to decide whether to opt in to the instant case and whether to opt out or stay in the 

Navarrete settlement] if they are allowed to discuss the Navarrete settlement. . . If Plaintiffs 

are permitted to discuss the Navarrete lawsuits and/or settlement of those lawsuits, class 

and collective members will undoubtedly be subjected to misleading and/or coercive 

communications regarding their rights.” Id. at 5.

Defendant’s arguments harken to prior cases where the parties moving for relief 

failed to provide any evidence beyond mere speculation that the challenged 

communications with prospective class members had actual potential to be abusive, 

misleading, or coercive. See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 104 (reversing the district court’s 

order limiting communication with putative class members because “the mere possibility 

of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban . . . in the absence of 

a clear record and specific findings of need”); Finder, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8346, at *16–

*17 (denying request to limit communications, in part because “Defendants’ purely 

speculative concerns regarding the prejudicial effect on employees [] therefore do not 

convince the court that judicial intervention is necessary here”); Cedano v. Thrifty Payless, 

Inc., No. CV-10-237-HZ, 2011 WL 8609402, at *12 (D. Or. May 9, 2011) (declining to 

rule on whether to limit communications, because “at this point, I find imposing any 

limitations on communications that either party may have with putative class members 

would be based on speculation and conjecture”); Cram, 2008 WL 178449, at *3–*4 (“A 

mere possibility of confusion is insufficient to justify the district court’s exercise of 

supervisory authority over parties’ communications with potential class members . . . .

Plaintiffs’ conjecture offers no basis for specific findings the court must make before it 

may properly compel or restrict [] communications, particularly when they were not 

inherently abusive nor coercive and do not appear to have compromised the state law rights 

of any potential class member”); Cox Nuclear Med. v. Gold Cup Coffee Servs., 214 F.R.D. 

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696, 697 n.3 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“No matter how abusive a particular communication might 

be if it occurs, there cannot be a ‘likelihood of serious abuse’ unless there is a likelihood 

that the feared communication will in fact occur”); Basco v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 00-

3184-K-4, 2002 WL 272384, at *1, *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2002) (declining to limit 

communications when the plaintiffs insisted that “any communication with potential class 

members initiated by [defendant] will misrepresent the status, purpose and effect of the

action and will create impressions tending to reflect adversely on the plaintiffs’ cause of 

action[,]” because they “provided no evidence, other than speculation, that [defendant] is 

attempting to coerce its employees to not participate in or opt out of the suit”); Barnes v. 

Julien J. Studley, Inc., No. 88-1849, 1989 WL 27405, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 1989) 

(declining to limit communications based on the “possibility of abusive tactics” because, 

since the plaintiff had not yet contacted any potential class member, “the abuse of which 

[defendant] complains remains potential, and has yet to take any concrete form” and thus 

the claim was “premature”).

Defendant’s reliance on speculation is exacerbated by its intentional omission of 

Gulf Oil’s specificity requirement from its briefing. Compare ECF No. 73-1 (Defendant’s 

motion, which includes no mention of the Supreme Court’s requirement of a “clear record 

and specific findings,” or the like) with ECF No. 104 (only after Plaintiffs’ opposition brief 

explained the Supreme Court’s specificity requirement, Defendant’s reply brief seeks to 

provide “specific facts”). For example, Defendant repeatedly cites Camp v. Alexander for 

the proposition that “‘[w]here communications are misleading, coercive, or an improper 

attempt to undermine Rule 23 by encouraging class members not to join the suit, they may 

be limited by the court. . .’” ECF No. 73-1 at 3–4, 8 (ellipses in original) (quoting Camp, 

300 F.R.D. at 621). However, the rest of the quoted sentence provides important context: 

“they may be limited by the court, but the orders must be grounded in good cause and 

issued with a heightened sensitivity for the First Amendment.” Camp, 300 F.R.D. at 621 

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(emphasis added).5In fact, the court in Camp denied the motion to limit communications 

with putative class members, finding that “although the Court is troubled by Defendants’

communication with putative class members via the Employee Letter,

6

the severity and 

likelihood of the harm is not so great as to warrant a complete ban on communications 

about the case at this time. Although the inflammatory nature of the Employee Letter is 

clear on its face, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that any particular putative class 

member was coerced, and the Supreme Court calls for a clear record and specific findings 

in order to limit communications.” Camp, 300 F.R.D. at 626. As such, the Court finds 

Camp persuasive against limiting communications in this case.

Next, Defendant claims that “the class and collective members will not receive 

accurate and impartial information about the Navarrete lawsuit and settlement from 

Plaintiffs’ counsel because they have an interest to diminish the size of the Navarrete

 

5 Similarly, Defendant cites In re School Asbestos Litigation for the proposition that the

court’s authority “generally is not limited only to those communications that mislead or 

otherwise threaten to create confusion and to influence the threshold decision whether to 

remain in the class. Certainly communications that seek or threaten to influence the choice 

of remedies are ... within a district court’s discretion to regulate.” ECF No. 104 at 8 (ellipses 

in original) (quoting In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d at 683). However, the rest of the 

quoted sentence provides important context: “Certainly communications that seek or 

threaten to influence the choice of remedies are, in some instances, subject to the strictures 

of Gulf Oil and are therefore within a district court’s discretion to regulate.” In re Sch. 

Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d at 683) (emphasis added). As with its citation to Camp, Defendant 

omits the Supreme Court’s requirement of specificity and not speculation from its citation 

to In re School Asbestos Litigation. See Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 104 (“the mere possibility of 

abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban . . . in the absence of a 

clear record and specific findings of need”).

6

In Camp, several former employees sued their employer for wage-and-hour violations as 

a putative class action; thereafter, the employer sent a letter to its employees, stating that 

“the lawsuit is motivated by greed and other improper factors,” “Margot’s attorney is 

seeking a very large sum of money by attempting to convince other employees to join the 

lawsuit,” and “a long legal battle would jeopardize the ongoing viability of the [business]”

and their jobs, and attached an opt-out form. Camp, 300 F.R.D. at 620.

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class.” ECF No. 73-1 at 6. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ “statements unequivocally 

demonstrate their bias and negative view of the Navarrete settlement and as a threat to the 

success of their own lawsuit. [] Plaintiffs obviously harbor deep contempt for the Navarrete

settlement and cannot reasonably be expected to provide an unbiased opinion about it.” Id.

at 7. As the Court explained earlier, parties’ communications with putative class members 

need not be objective and neutral. Finder, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8346, at *16 (citing

Babbitt, 1993 WL 150300, at *3–*7); see also Finder, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8346, at *13

(“[plaintiff’s counsel] is an advocate for his position in this law suit; a position that 

members can freely take or leave”).

Additionally, Defendant likens the instant circumstance to that of an employer being 

precluded from communicating with employees regarding a class action of employees 

against the employer. See ECF No. 73-1 at 6–7 (“Plaintiffs’ communications about the 

Navarrete settlement is analogous to the situation when courts restrict a defendant 

employer’s communications with class members due to the risk of defendant employer 

discouraging class members from participating in a class action”). The Court is not 

persuaded by this analogy. “[C]aselaw nearly universally observes that employeremployee contact is particularly prone to coercion.” Camp, 300 F.R.D. at 624; see, e.g., 

Talavera, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29633, at *15 (“The context here is of particular concern, 

as an employment relationship exists between the parties, which itself may increase the 

risk that communications will have a coercive effect”). Employer-employee 

communications have a heightened potential for coercion and a chilling effect on litigation 

because of the ongoing business relationship between employers and employees and the 

resulting imbalance of power in decisions effecting the employee’s livelihood, and courts 

have routinely limited defendant-employer’s communications for these reasons. See, e.g.,

Camp, 300 F.R.D. at 621–22 (collecting cases); Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross 

Country, Inc., No. C-12-982-EMC, 2012 WL 2239797, at *2, *4, *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 

2012) (limiting defendant-employer’s communications with putative class members 

because their communications, “comments about how Plaintiffs’ lives will be subject to 

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public scrutiny as a result of the litigation—including [current and] future employers[,]” 

could chill participation in the litigation); Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 

485, 488 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (limiting defendant-employer’s communications with putative 

class members and noting that “[t]he danger of improper tampering is only enhanced when, 

as here, the class and the class opponent are involved in an ongoing business relationship. 

. . here the relationship is even more potentially coercive where Defendants are the 

individuals’ employers and there is evidence that implicit and explicit threats were made 

linking participation in the lawsuit with job security”); Mevorah, 2005 WL 4813532, at 

*4–*5 (limiting defendant-employer’s communications with putative class members, 

explaining that “Defendant[-employer]’s statements [] have a heightened potential for 

coercion because where the absent class member and the defendant are involved in an 

ongoing business relationship, such as employer-employee, any communications are more 

likely to be coercive”) (internal quotations omitted); Belt v. Emcare Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 

664, 668 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (limiting defendant-employer’s communications with putative 

class members because “[defendant-employer] exploited this [employment] relationship 

by preying upon fears and concerns . . . and by suggesting that this action could affect the 

potential class members’ employment”); cf. Guifu Li v. A Perfect Day Franchise, Inc., 270 

F.R.D. 509, 515, 517–519 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating opt-outs where defendantemployer communicated with putative class members, finding “workplace meetings 

coercive,” noting that employees “fear[ed] their work assignments will be reduced or they 

will be terminated outright,” and explaining that employers “cannot force its workers to 

choose between continuing to work and participating in this case”). However, here, 

Plaintiffs do not have the employer-employee relationship with putative class members, so 

Defendant’s concerns regarding a heightened likelihood for coercion are not persuasive.

The Court finds that Defendant has presented only speculative concerns and, as such, 

Defendant has not identified adequate potential abuses that warrant an order limiting 

communications.

/ /

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C. Additional Considerations

In requesting that Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel be prevented from commenting 

or providing an opinion “regarding the settlement of the Navarette class action and PAGA 

lawsuit,” Defendant implicitly asserts that Plaintiffs know information about the Navarette

settlement. ECF No. 73-1 at 4; ECF No. 104 at 2, 4. The Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s 

citation to the Court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for temporary restraining order. 

ECF No. 97 at 7–8 (quoting ECF No. 62 at 5). There, the Court noted that:

the record is not sufficient to determine that the Navarrete settlement would 

affect the California collective members in the case. Neither the Navarette nor 

the Navarette–PAGA actions include FLSA claims. Although Defendant 

contends that the Navarette settlement will be conditioned on the release of 

all state and federal claims—including FLSA claims—the parties have not yet 

drafted a settlement agreement. Any settlement is in the early stages and is

subject to court approval.

ECF No. 62 at 5. Further, no motions for preliminary approval of settlement have been 

filed in either Navarette action, although the December 12, 2019 notice of settlement filed 

in the lawsuits represents that the motion would be filed in approximately 60 days and 

double that length of time has passed. See Navarette v. Sprint, 8:19cv794-JLS-ADS, C.D. 

Cal., ECF No. 18 at 2. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that “Defendant has failed to 

establish [] any actual settlement in Navarette about which Plaintiffs or their counsel could 

communicate[.]” ECF No. 97 at 7

Furthermore, Defendant devotes an entire section of its reply brief to the argument 

that “the case law cited by Plaintiffs is distinguishable.” ECF No. 104 at 9 (capitalized 

letters omitted). That is, to put it mildly, a strained reading of those cases. 

For example, Defendant contends that Cedano v. Thrifty Payless is “completely 

distinguishable from this case” and that it “do[es] not implicate the issue of limitations as 

to communications with the putative class at issue here.” ECF No. 104 at 9 (citing Cedano, 

2011 WL 8609402). The Court disagrees. In Cedano, the court compelled production of 

contact information for the putative class members, but it also addressed the defendant’s 

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concerns “that if this court orders the production of contact information of the [contact 

information], then it must regulate the communications between Plaintiff’s counsel and 

putative class members to ensure there is no improper solicitation of new named plaintiffs 

or other inappropriate statements.” Cedano, 2011 WL 8609402, at *11; compare with ECF 

No. 73-1 at 2–3 (“If the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of class and 

collective contact lists in this action, Plaintiffs will have unfettered channels of 

communication . . . . [so their] communications with class and collective members must be 

limited to avoid misleading, confusing, and threatening communications with class and 

collective members”). In Cedano, the court explained that “[w]hile this court recognizes 

its authority to regulate communications with putative class members, it also recognizes 

that such authority is warranted ‘based on a clear record and specific findings . . .’ [] At 

this point, I find imposing any limitations on communications that either party may have 

with putative class members would be based on speculation and conjecture, especially in 

light of the fact that the parties have failed to even assert that any abuse in communications 

has occurred.” Cedano, 2011 WL 8609402, at *12 (quoting Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 101). The 

Court finds this case on point, and its reasoning persuasive against limiting 

communications.

As another example, Defendant contends that Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo is 

“completely distinguishable from this case” and “is irrelevant as it dealt with a discovery 

dispute involving plaintiffs’ request that the court require defendant [to] produce class 

information but does not address the issue of limiting communications.” ECF No. 104 at 9 

(citing Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 13cv581-WHO-DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

29794, at *12–*13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014)). Again, the Court disagrees, and notes that 

Wellens is on point and persuasive. There, as in Cedano and here, the defendant sought to 

withhold production of contact information to the plaintiffs because they feared that, if 

plaintiffs were to possess the contact information, they would use it to solicit class 

membership through direct communication. Wellens, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29794, at 

*12; compare with ECF No. 74 at 3–4 (arguing that “[w]hile Defendant vehemently 

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maintains that Plaintiffs are not entitled to that information,” “in the event that Plaintiffs’ 

Discovery Motion is granted, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel will have access to tens of 

thousands of putative class and collective individuals contact information . . . [and could 

engage in] confusing, misleading, and threatening communications [with] class 

members”). In Wellens, the court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that Plaintiffs have 

or will behave improperly with respect to soliciting class membership. The court will not 

preemptively deny Plaintiffs discovery to which they are entitled based on Defendant’s 

speculative concern that Plaintiffs will use it improperly, especially when other measures 

(e.g. sanctions) exist to discourage such behavior.” Wellens, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29794, 

at *12–*13 (citing Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 104). 

Here, Defendants provide no evidence that Plaintiffs have communicated with 

putative class members to convince them to opt-out of the Navarette settlement. See ECF 

No. 104 at 6 (arguing that Plaintiffs “already indicated that they will encourage the 

Navarrete putative class to opt out of the Navarrete settlement[,]” citing a sentence in 

Plaintiffs’ brief that does not support this assertion, and providing no other evidence to the 

contrary or that such encouragement is imminent). As in Wellens and Cedano, here, the 

Court declines to limit communications on such speculative concerns. 

Moreover, the Court is highly skeptical of Defendant’s professed concern for the 

class members. Defendant has an obvious interest in limiting the number of opt-outs from 

the Navarette class as much as possible, because if a person is a class member in Navarette

and in this case, that person will potentially lose their claim in this case if they do act 

affirmatively to opt out of Navarette. A court order restricting Plaintiffs’ counsel from even 

communicating with these persons about the Navarette settlement would greatly increase 

the likelihood that they will lose their rights in this case, even after taking the affirmative 

step of opting in, merely by operation of the notice period in Navarette. This does present 

a potentially confusing circumstance for these persons, albeit one created by Defendant by 

the way it chose to handle settlement negotiations. The best way to address any confusion 

of overlapping class members is to allow them to ask their counsel – who have ethical and 

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fiduciary duties to these class members, and whom they have chosen to represent them by 

opting in to this case – to discuss the settlement and their options with them. Having created 

the confusion in the first place, Defendant should not complain that Plaintiffs’ counsel may 

be called to straighten it out by explaining class members’ options to them in an ethical 

manner.

D. In the Alternative, Communications are Already Sufficiently Limited

Alternatively, had the Court found that Defendant sufficiently demonstrated that 

there was a clear record and specific findings of abusive, misleading, or coercive 

communications, as opposed to mere speculation, any limitation narrow enough to the 

circumstance is already in place here.

In the Court’s order resolving joint determination for discovery dispute, the Court 

ordered that Defendant produce the contact information to Plaintiffs, subject to a limited 

protective order, which included the following provisions: “(3) The information shall be 

used solely in this litigation and not for any other purpose without an order from the Court. 

(4) Plaintiffs’ counsel must inform each contacted individual that he or she has the right 

not to talk to counsel and, upon a declination, counsel will immediately terminate the 

conversation.” ECF No. 91 at 26. Additionally, the Court notes that, “[w]hen engaging in 

precertification communications, as is equally true with any communication, a member of 

the State Bar of California must comply with the requirements of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct.” Mevorah, 2005 WL 4813532, at *5; see, e.g., Hernandez v. Best Buy Stores, 

L.P., No. 13cv2587-JM-KSC, 2015 WL 7176352, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015); Parris 

v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 109 Cal. App. 4th 285, 298 n.6 (2003) (observing that counsel 

for plaintiff must abide by rule 1-400’s prohibitions on false, misleading, and deceptive 

messages in pre-certification communications with prospective clients). Thus, the Court 

finds it duplicative to limit communications in the same manner here.

/ /

/ /

/ /

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Defendants have not shown that actual abuse has occurred or 

that there is a high potential for abuse, and instead based its motion on speculation. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for 

Order Limiting Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Communication with Class and 

Collective Members. ECF No. 73.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2020

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