Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03513/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3513

___________

John H. Miller, III, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri. 

Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 21, 2006

Filed: April 26, 2006 

___________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM. 

John Miller, III brought this Title VII case against his former employer CocaCola Enterprises, Inc., alleging discrimination and harassment on account of his race.

Coca-Cola moved for summary judgment, arguing that Miller had not made out a

prima facie case of discrimination or harassment and had failed to present any

evidence that race motivated its employment decisions. The district court1

 granted

summary judgment to Coca-Cola, and Miller appeals. We affirm.

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Miller began working for Coca-Cola in 1987 as a driver and remained in that

position until his termination in July 2003. Prior to his termination, Miller had been

placed on suspension and entered into a Last Chance Agreement as a result of an

incident in which Miller swore at his supervisor and called him a racist. After signing

the Last Chance Agreement, Miller received disciplinary notices for losing the two

wheeled cart assigned to his truck, failing to obtain a customer's signature on an

invoice, and driving longer than allowed by the Department of Transportation on three

separate occasions. He was then terminated.

Miller sued Coca-Cola for discriminating against him as an African American

and creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. He alleged that Coca-Cola had denied him a

vacation day, denied him use of a company car for a parade, made him subject to the

Last Chance Agreement, held him to a higher standard than other employees, and

increased his workload all on account of his race. He also alleged that a fellow

employee who later became his supervisor had made racist comments in the past. The

district court granted summary judgment to Coca-Cola after concluding that Miller

had failed to submit evidence that any similarly situated non black employee had

received more favorable treatment and that a reasonable fact finder could not conclude

that the work environment was hostile. It also declined to admit into evidence

affidavits that Miller had submitted after the close of discovery and awarded costs of

approximately $2,036.16 to Coca-Cola as the prevailing party. 

Miller asserts on appeal that the district court erred by granting summary

judgment to Coca-Cola because genuine issues of material fact exist and it employed

the wrong legal standard. He also argues that the court erred by failing to consider his

post discovery affidavits and by assessing costs to him. We review de novo the

summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola. Hesse v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,

394 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is only appropriate if viewing

the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine

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issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th

Cir. 2005). An issue of fact is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party on the question. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). 

Since Miller did not present direct evidence that any of the adverse employment

actions were taken because of his race, we review his claims under the McDonnell

Douglas burden shifting test. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736-37

(8th Cir. 2004). Miller must demonstrate that he (1) is a member of a protected class,

(2) was qualified to perform his job, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and

(4) was treated differently from a similarly situated employee outside his protected

class. Tolen v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2004). If Miller can do so, the

burden shifts to Coca-Cola to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action and then back to Miller to show that the defendant's reason was pretextual.

Hesse, 394 F.3d at 631.

Miller failed to meet his prima facie burden of proof because he did not

introduce any evidence as to the treatment of similarly situated employees outside of

his protected class. Although he alleges that a white man was permitted to take

vacation on a day that Miller had first requested, the other employee had different job

responsibilities than Miller and there is no evidence the decision was made because

of race. Moreover, Miller voluntarily signed the Last Chance Agreement and was

subject to termination because he was in clear violation of its terms. After reviewing

the record, we conclude that Miller failed to meet his burden of creating a reasonable

inference that a discriminatory motive was a determinative factor in any of the alleged

adverse employment actions. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328,

1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996).

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Miller also argues that the district court erred by imposing upon him the burden

of showing that the adverse employment actions were taken because of his race when

the appropriate legal standard is whether race was a determining factor in the

employment decisions. There is no basis in the district court's opinion to infer that it

employed an incorrect legal standard, however, especially since the court cited

Rothmeier for the proposition that a plaintiff must present evidence that "creates a

reasonable inference that a discriminatory motive was a determinative factor in the

adverse employment action." Id. 

To succeed on a claim under Title VII for racial harassment/hostile work

environment, Miller must present evidence that (1) he is a member of a protected

group, (2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) there was a causal nexus

between his membership in the protected group and the harassment, (4) the

harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) the

employer knew or should have known about the harassing behavior, but failed to take

proper action to alleviate it. Willis v. Henderson, 262 F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir. 2001).

The work environment must be so "permeated with discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult . . . to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create

an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

(1993). 

Miller asserts that his supervisor told him that black drivers had "attitude" and

"milk[ed] the clock". Miller also alleges that during the years before he became a

supervisor, the same individual had made derogatory remarks about black residents

in East St. Louis and referred to a black driver as "pepper". To determine whether

such comments were sufficient to create a hostile work environment courts look at the

frequency of the conduct, its severity, and whether it interferes with an employee's

work performance. Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir.

2002). To avoid summary judgment a plaintiff must submit evidence that he was

"singled out" because of his race and that the conduct was "severe and pervasive".

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Williams v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, 223 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2000).

Assuming that these statements were made as we must on reviewing summary

judgment, we conclude that these occasional comments were not so severe and

pervasive as to permit a reasonable factfinder to decide that the conditions of Miller's

employment were altered by them. 

Miller's remaining complaints lack merit. He argues that the district court erred

by failing to consider the affidavits of two former coworkers, but he failed to disclose

these individuals during discovery. A district court maintains "wide discretion in

admitting and excluding evidence," Bennett v. Hidden Valley Golf & Ski, Inc., 318

F.3d 868, 878 (8th Cir. 2003), and we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion by

excluding the affidavits. Miller argues that the district court erred by awarding costs

to Coca-Cola given the disparity in the parties' assets. Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure instructs that "costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as

of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs", and we find no

abuse of discretion in its award in this case. See Janis v. Biesheuvel, 428 F.3d 795,

798 (8th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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