Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02406/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02406-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 17, 2015*

Decided February 18, 2015

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2406

RICHARD HODGES,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 2329

Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan,

Judge.

O R D E R

Richard Hodges, an Illinois prisoner, claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that

Wexford Health Sources and four prison physicians denied him essential medical care in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. He applied to proceed in forma pauperis,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but the district court denied that request with the explanation

that Hodges had misrepresented his financial status. The court then dismissed the action

                                                 

* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we

have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See Fed. R. App.

P. 34(a)(2).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐2406    Page 2

with prejudice when Hodges did not pay the filing fee. We conclude that the court

abused its discretion in denying IFP status, and thus we vacate the judgment and

remand for further proceedings.

In his IFP application, Hodges acknowledged receiving $10 monthly from a prison

job but answered “no” to a question asking whether he had “received more than $200 in

the past twelve months” from any other sources. The administrator of his prison trust

account certified that Hodges had a balance of $86.17 in his account and average

monthly deposits of $44.19 during the previous six months. Account records submitted

with Hodges’s application confirmed that during these months he had received $260

from outside sources.

The district court assumed that Hodges had misrepresented his financial status

because he received these funds despite his “no” answer to the question about other

sources of funds. The court set a deadline for Hodges to pay the filing fee to avoid

dismissal.

Hodges moved for reconsideration. He explained that he had misunderstood the

question asking if he “received more than $200 in the past twelve months” to mean more

than $200 from any source at one time, rather than in total for that period. Hodges also

said he had not understood that money received from family had to be reported. Hodges

amended his IFP application to disclose receipts of $775 in “family support” during the

previous twelve months, including $415 in the final six months. The district court was

not persuaded by Hodges’s explanation and, because the deadline for payment had

passed, dismissed the action. The court asserted that Hodges had not identified any

error in its order denying IFP but did not address Hodges’s contention that he had

misread the question concerning whether he had received more than $200 during the

relevant time frame. The court repeated its earlier assertion that Hodges had

“misrepresented his financial status” but did not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), which

mandates dismissal if the allegation of poverty in an IFP application is found to be

untrue.

On appeal Hodges argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing

his lawsuit with prejudice as a sanction. He contends that the inaccuracy in his IFP

application was inadvertent, not an intentional misrepresentation.

A district court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice when a plaintiff

intentionally misrepresents his financial status to gain IFP status. Thomas v. General

Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306, 308 (7th Cir. 2002); Mathis v. New York Life Ins.

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No. 14‐2406    Page 3

Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547 (7th Cir. 1998). But here the district court did not make a specific

finding that Hodges had intentionally misrepresented his financial status, and the

existing record would not support such a finding. Hodges’s explanation of his

misreading of the IFP application—that it asks about single rather than aggregate

payments exceeding $200—is not unreasonable, so it was an abuse of discretion for the

court to reject his explanation without further inquiry. See Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306;

Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547. It is not likely that Hodges was trying to deceive the court. After

all, his IFP application was accompanied by the required records from his prison trust

account showing deposits of $260 from sources outside the prison, as well as the account

administrator’s certification that Hodges had deposited an average of $44.19 monthly

during the previous six months. Moreover, in a different case filed by Hodges ten years

earlier, the district court granted Hodges IFP status after he completed his application in

identical fashion. His interpretation of the question this time was consistent with that

decision. See Hodges v. Briley, No. 04 C 3585, 2005 WL 241466 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2005). We

cannot conclude from this record that the error in Hodges’s current IFP application here

was intentional, let alone the kind of purposeful omission of a significant source of

income or wealth that might justify dismissal with prejudice. See Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306

(upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff had omitted from IFP application

that he would be receiving more than $50,000 from retirement account); Mathis, 133 F.3d

at 547 (upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff omitted from IFP application

$14,000 in home equity). The district erred in denying IFP without addressing Hodges’s

explanation that his misrepresentation had been unintentional, and thus the court also

erred in dismissing the suit when Hodges did not pay the filing fee.

The judgment dismissing Hodges’s lawsuit is VACATED, and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

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