Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02343/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02343-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 26:7401 IRS: Tax Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DONALD M. WANLAND, JR., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-2343-KJM-KJN PS 

ORDER 

INTRODUCTION 

On October 30, 2015, the United States filed a motion to withdraw admissions made by 

operation of Rule 36. (ECF No. 53.) Defendant Donald M. Wanland, Jr. has opposed the motion, 

and the United States filed a reply to defendant’s opposition. (ECF Nos. 62, 63.) After 

considering the parties’ briefing and the applicable law, the court GRANTS the motion, but issues 

monetary sanctions and further relief, as outlined below. 

BACKGROUND 

 On September 26, 2013, defendant, a now-suspended California attorney, was convicted 

of 28 criminal counts, including attempt to evade and defeat the payment of tax (1 count); the 

removal, deposit, and concealment of property subject to levy (24 counts); and willful failure to 

file income tax returns (3 counts). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment on March 25, 2014; the judgment in the criminal case was entered on March 28, 

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2014; and defendant filed a notice of appeal on April 7, 2014. The criminal appeal remains 

pending, and defendant is presently incarcerated. See United States of America v. Donald M. 

Wanland, Jr., 2:09-cr-8-LKK, ECF Nos. 263, 266, 301-03.1

 On November 13, 2013, the United States commenced the instant civil action, seeking a 

determination that assessments for defendant’s federal tax liabilities for certain tax years between 

1996-2003, which the United States alleges amounts to $1,260,040.60 as of October 8, 2012, 

were not discharged in bankruptcy, as well as seeking to reduce such tax assessments to 

judgment. (ECF No. 1.) An initial pretrial scheduling order was issued on November 24, 2014. 

(ECF No. 32.) Pursuant to later modifications to the scheduling order, discovery was to be 

completed by September 30, 20152

; law and motion (except as to discovery matters) was to be 

completed by December 18, 2015; and a final pretrial conference and trial are presently set for 

March 3, 2016, and April 4, 2016, respectively. (ECF Nos. 34, 52.) The court cautioned the 

parties on several occasions to diligently abide by the case deadlines, which would be strictly 

enforced. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 32, 41.) 

 On August 25, 2015, defendant served the United States with a set of written discovery 

requests. (Declaration of Gerald A. Role, ECF No. 54 [“Role Decl.”], ¶ 3, Ex. B.) In a 

declaration signed under penalty of perjury, counsel for the United States, Gerald Role, who is 

based in Washington, D.C., explains the ensuing events as follows: 

3. At some time in early September 2015, I received written 

discovery from defendant in the form of a thick stack of typewritten 

pages. I do not remember the exact date, but it was far enough into 

September that I believed when I received it that the discovery was 

not timely given the September 30, 2015 date for discovery 

completion. As a result, I only gave it a cursory glance and did not 

calendar it for response, which is my usual practice. I noticed a set 

of interrogatories and a request for production of documents. I did 

 

1

 A court may take judicial notice of the existence of court filings and other matters of public 

record, which are not subject to reasonable dispute. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 

442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

 

2

 In the context of the scheduling order, the word “completed” means that “all discovery shall 

have been conducted so that all depositions have been taken and any disputes related to discovery 

shall have been resolved by appropriate order if necessary and, where discovery has been ordered, 

the order has been complied with.” (ECF No. 32 at 3.) 

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not notice a set of requests for admissions. I have no reason to 

believe the requests for admissions were not included as a part of 

that mailing; I am only saying I did not notice them at the time. I 

set defendant’s discovery on my desk, next to my inbox. 

4. Later in September, I looked more closely at the discovery and 

saw that it stated that it had been served on August 25, 2015, and 

noted that I might have to respond to it after all. I only looked at 

the discovery request on the top of the stack, which was either the 

interrogatories or requests for production of documents; I did not 

notice a request for admissions. 

5. In late September, I was preparing to take the deposition of 

defendant’s accountant, Steven A. Campbell, in Sacramento. I put 

the discovery in my litigation bag, with the intent of working on it 

on the trip. Between preparation for the deposition and work on 

another case, I did not have occasion to look at or work on the 

discovery. 

6. On the afternoon of October 22, 2015, defendant’s letter dated 

October 10, 2015, postmarked October 13, 2015, was delivered to 

my office. A true and correct copy of the letter and its envelope are 

attached as Exhibit A. 

7. The next day, October 23, 2015, I conferred with my assistant 

section chief about the reference in the letter to requests for 

admission. This is the first point at which I was aware that 

defendant’s discovery included requests for admission to which I 

had not responded. I tried to find my copy of the discovery 

requests, but could not. I believe I may have inadvertently 

discarded them along with excess copies of deposition exhibits 

when I returned from Sacramento. 

8. On the afternoon of October 23, 2015, I called the Bureau of 

Prisons attorney at USP-Atwater and asked if he could get copies of 

defendant’s discovery requests. He did so, and emailed them to me 

that afternoon. A copy of the requests for admission is attached as 

Exhibit B. 

9. On October 30, 2015, I served on the defendant the United 

States’ responses to his discovery requests, including the requests 

for admission. 

 

(Role Decl. ¶¶ 3-9.) 

Also on October 30, 2015, the United States filed the instant motion to withdraw 

admissions. (ECF No. 53.) The motion concedes that, because the United States did not timely 

respond to the requests for admission, the requests were deemed admitted by operation of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 36, necessitating a motion to withdraw such admissions. The motion also 

acknowledges that defendant had previously filed a motion for summary judgment and other 

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dispositive relief on October 26, 2015, relying, at least in part, on the deemed admissions. (See 

ECF No. 51.) Thereafter, on November 3, 2015, the United States filed its own motion for 

summary judgment. (ECF No. 55.) 

DISCUSSION 

 United States’ Motion to Withdraw Admissions 

 As an initial matter, defendant contends that the court should deny the United States’ 

motion to withdraw admissions on procedural grounds alone. 

Defendant argues that, because the motion is a discovery motion, the United States failed 

to comply with (1) the court’s scheduling order by filing its motion after the September 30, 2015 

discovery completion deadline; and (2) with Local Rule 251 by not meeting and conferring with 

defendant prior to the filing of the motion, and not drafting a joint statement regarding the 

discovery disagreement. 

The United States counters that the motion is not a true discovery motion concerning the 

propriety of a particular discovery request or the adequacy of a particular discovery response. 

Instead, the deemed admissions go to the merits of the claims in the complaint, and a ruling on 

the motion could be dispositive of the case. Thus, even if Local Rule 251 and the discovery 

completion deadline were applicable to the instant motion, strict compliance should not be 

required. The United States further posits that compliance with the meet-and-confer and joint 

statement requirements of Local Rule 251 would have been difficult given defendant’s 

incarceration, and also asserts that defendant’s vigorous opposition to the motion demonstrates 

that meet-and-confer efforts would have been futile. 

Even assuming, without deciding, that the United States’ motion is a discovery motion 

subject to Local Rule 251 and the discovery completion deadline in the pretrial scheduling order, 

and that the United States thus violated those provisions, the court declines to deny the motion 

solely on such procedural grounds. Denial of the United States’ motion, whether strictly 

characterized as a discovery motion or not, would be dispositive of the case, and would constitute 

a disproportionately harsh sanction for procedural violations. In any event, defendant has been 

provided an adequate opportunity to oppose the motion on the merits, and has done so. (ECF 

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Nos. 59, 62.) As such, the court proceeds to the merits of the motion. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides that a matter is deemed admitted “unless, 

within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the 

requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or 

its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Once admitted, the matter “is conclusively established 

unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(b). According to Rule 36(b), “the court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would 

promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that it would 

prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits.” Id. 

 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 

Rule 36(b) is permissive, not mandatory, with respect to the 

withdrawal of admissions. The rule permits the district court to 

exercise its discretion to grant relief from an admission made under 

Rule 36(a) only when (1) the presentation of the merits of the action 

will be subserved, and (2) the party who obtained the admission 

fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will 

prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the 

merits. 

Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). A district court is not required to grant relief when the moving party can satisfy the 

two-pronged test—“in deciding whether to exercise its discretion when the moving party has met 

the two-pronged test of Rule 36(b), the district court may consider other factors, including 

whether the moving party can show good cause for the delay and whether the moving party 

appears to have a strong case on the merits.” Id. at 624-25. 

 The court evaluates the United States’ motion to withdraw admissions under the 

framework outlined above. 

 Whether the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 

 “The first half of the test in Rule 36(b) is satisfied when upholding the admissions would 

practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case.” Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622. 

Here, there can be no serious dispute that the admissions involved are case dispositive. In 

this case, the United States essentially seeks a determination that defendant’s alleged federal tax 

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liabilities were not discharged in bankruptcy, and seeks to reduce them to judgment. However, in 

defendant’s requests for admission, which are now deemed admitted, defendant asked the United 

States to admit, inter alia, that the tax liabilities at issue were discharged in bankruptcy (Request 

No. 3); that the tax liabilities are barred from enforcement by the doctrine of res judicata (Request 

No. 5); and that defendant did not engage in tax evasion at any time (Request No. 19). (Role 

Decl. Ex. B.) If such matters are deemed conclusively established, it would essentially eliminate 

the United States’ ability to present the merits of its case. Defendant’s briefing does not contend 

otherwise. As such, the court finds that the presentation of the merits of the action will be 

subserved if the admissions were upheld. 

Whether withdrawal of the admissions would prejudice defendant in maintaining 

his defense of the action on the merits 

 “The party relying on the deemed admission has the burden of proving prejudice.” 

Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622. The Ninth Circuit has clarified that: 

The prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) is not simply that the 

party who obtained the admission will now have to convince the 

factfinder of its truth. Rather, it relates to the difficulty a party may 

face in proving its case, e.g., caused by the unavailability of key 

witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence with 

respect to the questions previously deemed admitted. 

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hen undertaking a prejudice 

inquiry under Rule 36(b), district courts should focus on the prejudice that the nonmoving party 

would suffer at trial.” Id. at 623. Mere “reliance on a deemed admission in preparing a summary 

judgment motion does not constitute prejudice.” Id. at 624. 

 In this case, defendant would not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense of the action on 

the merits if the court were to permit the United States to withdraw its admissions. The parties 

agree that the United States’ responses to the requests for admission were due September 28, 

2015 (ECF Nos. 54-1 at 2, 62 at 27, 63 at 10), and the United States filed its motion to withdraw 

the deemed admissions about a month later on October 30, 2015, well in advance of the April 

2016 trial date. (ECF No. 53.) See, e.g., Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“Courts are more likely to find prejudice when the motion for withdrawal is made in the 

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middle of trial.”). 

Moreover, this is not a case where defendant missed out on an opportunity to take 

additional discovery because of his reliance on the deemed admissions. Given that the United 

States’ responses to the requests for admission were due on September 28, 2015, two days prior 

to the September 30, 2015 discovery completion deadline, defendant would not have been able to 

conduct further discovery based on the United States’ responses, even if they had been timely 

served. Similarly, defendant ultimately received responses to his August 25, 2015 discovery 

requests. On October 30, 2015, the United States served responses to defendant’s August 25, 

2015 discovery requests, including the requests for admission, and defendant acknowledged that 

he received the responses on November 6, 2015. (Role Decl. ¶ 9; ECF No. 62 at 27.)3

Finally, the substance of at least some of defendant’s requests for admission suggests that 

defendant could not have reasonably expected the United States to admit them, and thus can 

hardly claim to be unfairly surprised by a motion to withdraw such deemed admissions filed only 

about a month later. As the Ninth Circuit has observed: 

Admissions are sought, first, to facilitate proof with respect to 

issues that cannot be eliminated from the case and, second, to 

narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be. The rule is not 

to be used in an effort to harass the other side or in the hope that a 

party’s adversary will simply concede essential elements. 

Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To be sure, withdrawal 

of the admissions would no doubt cause some inconvenience to defendant – apart from having 

prepared a motion for summary judgment relying in part on those admissions, he would be tasked 

with actually proving the previously-admitted matters. Nevertheless, binding Ninth Circuit 

 

3

 Defendant complains about the alleged insufficiency of portions of the United States’ responses 

to the August 25, 2015 discovery requests, but that issue has no bearing on the United States’ 

motion to withdraw its admissions. Even if the United States’ responses to the August 25, 2015 

discovery requests had been timely served on September 28, 2015, defendant would not have had 

time to compel supplemental responses prior to the September 30, 2015 discovery completion 

deadline. If defendant desired such an opportunity, he should have served his discovery requests 

at an earlier time, building in enough time to have a motion to compel heard prior to the discovery 

completion deadline, if necessary. Although defendant states that he was in a segregated housing 

unit in prison, without access to a computer or the library, between May 13, 2015, and August 5, 

2015 (ECF No. 62 at 28-29), he fails to explain why he propounded no discovery between 

November 2014, when the pretrial scheduling order issued, and May 2015. 

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precedent makes clear that such inconvenience does not amount to prejudice under Rule 36(b). 

 For these reasons, the court finds that defendant would not be prejudiced in maintaining 

his defense of the action on the merits if the court were to permit the United States to withdraw its 

admissions. 

 Other factors

 Even if the two-pronged test of Rule 36(b) is satisfied, the court retains discretion to deny 

the motion to withdraw admissions. Nevertheless, the two factors set forth in Rule 36(b) were 

clearly intended to be “central to the analysis.” Conlon, 474 F.3d at 625. In any event, there are 

no other factors in this case that strongly militate in favor of denying the United States’ motion. 

Admittedly, the United States has not shown good cause for its delay. However, despite 

counsel for the United States’ serious shortcomings, discussed more fully below, the failure to 

timely respond to the requests for admission appears to have been merely grossly negligent and 

not intentional. Once counsel learned of the existence of the requests for admission on October 

22, 2015, he took relatively prompt action by filing the instant motion, and serving responses to 

the requests for admission, on October 30, 2015. (Role Decl. ¶¶ 6-9.) As such, and with 

particular regard to the general public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, lesser 

sanctions are more appropriate.4

 

The court also declines to prematurely assess the strength of the United States’ claims, or 

defendant’s defenses, at this point. At least at this juncture, and without prejudging any future 

proceedings, the court cannot conclude that the United States’ claims have no merit, and the 

relative strength or weakness of the claims does not substantially affect the court’s resolution of 

the present motion. 

In sum, having carefully considered the record and the applicable law, the court grants the 

United States’ motion to withdraw its admissions. 

 

4

 Defendant also asserts that the United States never served its initial disclosures pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), which were due by January 15, 2015. (ECF No. 32.) It 

at least appears that the United States does not dispute that assertion. (ECF No. 63 at 12.) If true, 

the United States should certainly be prepared to address the reasons for, and potential effect of, 

such a violation in future proceedings, particularly in light of its negligent conduct in the 

litigation to date. However, that matter is not properly before the court at present. 

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Monetary Sanctions and Other Relief 

Although the court grants the United States’ motion to withdraw admissions, the court 

also finds that some form of lesser sanctions is warranted by Mr. Role’s conduct as counsel for 

the United States. 

The facts, as outlined in Mr. Role’s own declaration, suggest that Mr. Role displayed a 

surprisingly cavalier attitude towards his discovery obligations. As an initial matter, Mr. Role 

failed to properly review and calendar defendant’s August 25, 2015 discovery requests, and 

ultimately carelessly lost them, initiating the chain of unfortunate events. However, even more 

troubling is the following statement in Mr. Role’s declaration: 

Later in September, I looked more closely at the discovery and saw 

that it stated that it had been served on August 25, 2015, and noted 

that I might have to respond to it after all. I only looked at the 

discovery request on the top of the stack, which was either the 

interrogatories or request for production for documents; I did not 

notice a request for admissions. 

 

(Role Decl. ¶ 4) (emphasis added). While the court takes Mr. Role at his word that he did not 

actually discover the requests for admission until he received defendant’s letter on October 22, 

2015 (Role Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, Ex. A), Mr. Role entirely fails to explain why he took no action on the 

other written discovery requests until October 30, 2015; even though, by his own account, he 

knew that he had to respond to them since “[l]ater in September” and also must have known that 

the responses were imminently due on September 28, 2015. (Role Decl. ¶ 4.) 

The above actions are simply not the type of conduct the court expects of a licensed 

attorney, let alone an attorney representing the United States government. Additionally, it has 

resulted in a significant amount of unnecessary briefing and proceedings, wasting the limited time 

and resources of a court in one of the busiest and most overloaded districts in the country. 

Consequently, the court finds it appropriate to impose a monetary fine of $500.00 on Mr. Role 

personally, which is to be paid within 28 days of this order. See Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1350 

(authorizing “a substantial monetary fine” imposed on the client or his attorney as a less severe 

alternative sanction to denying a motion to withdraw admissions); Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. United 

States Army Corps of Engineers, 2015 WL 7188227, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015) (“In 

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considering a motion to withdraw deemed admissions, a court may impose sanctions, including 

the payment of a monetary fine...even when the court grants the motion to withdraw deemed 

admissions.”). 

 The court also considers whether some further type of relief is necessary. As discussed 

above, the United States’ actions in this case, although dilatory and improper, have not actually 

caused defendant to forego an opportunity to conduct additional discovery or to compel 

supplemental responses to already-propounded written discovery. As the court previously 

explained, even if the United States’ responses to defendant’s August 25, 2015 written discovery 

had been timely served on September 28, 2015, defendant would not have been able to conduct 

further discovery based on those responses, nor would he have been able to compel supplemental 

written responses, prior to the September 30, 2015 discovery completion deadline. Therefore, 

defendant is not strictly entitled to have the discovery period re-opened. 

Nevertheless, out of abundance of caution, and in light of the United States’ dilatory 

conduct, the court grants defendant only an extension of the discovery period until March 31, 

2016 for the limited purpose of conducting any oral depositions he wishes to conduct in this 

matter consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States will not be 

permitted to conduct any additional discovery, other than to appear at or defend any depositions 

conducted by defendant. Because defendant is incarcerated, he will be required to take such 

depositions telephonically, with the court reporter, witness, and counsel for the United States 

located at some other venue (unless all interested parties voluntarily agree to appear at the prison 

and arrangements are made with the prison). Defendant shall bear the costs and expenses related 

to any such depositions, including the cost of any court reporters. However, the court expects the 

United States, upon reasonable notice, to assist with the logistics of arranging such depositions, 

including providing a venue at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for depositions, assisting with the 

coordination (but not cost) of court reporters, arranging a telephone connection at the prison, 

coordinating with defendant to reasonably make available and show exhibits selected by 

defendant to the witness at the deposition, and making any government witnesses reasonably 

available for deposition. If either party, or both parties, violate the terms and spirit of this order, 

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or take unreasonable positions with respect to the coordination and scheduling of the authorized 

discovery, the court will impose sanctions. 

No further discovery is authorized, unless the parties informally agree to conduct 

discovery beyond the terms of this order. However, the parties are cautioned that the court will 

not enforce any such informal discovery agreements through motion practice. 

Pending Motions and Other Case Deadlines 

In light of the court’s grant of the United States’ motion to withdraw admissions, and the 

limited extension of the discovery period, the court denies the motions for summary judgment and 

other dispositive relief filed by the United States and defendant, but without prejudice to their 

renewal. 

If, upon conclusion of the limited extended discovery period, the parties wish to file any 

motions for summary judgment or other dispositive relief, such motions shall be filed no later 

than May 5, 2016. Any opposition briefs shall be due June 16, 2016, and any reply briefs shall be 

due July 14, 2016. Upon the filing of the reply briefs, the motion(s) shall be submitted for 

decision on the record and written briefing without oral argument, and no further briefing will be 

permitted, unless specifically requested by the court. 

Furthermore, to accommodate the limited discovery extension and further dispositive 

motion practice, the final pretrial conference and trial dates of March 3, 2016, and April 4, 2016, 

respectively, are vacated. The court will reschedule dates for the final pretrial conference and 

trial upon resolution of any dispositive motions. 

All other dates, deadlines, and provisions of the scheduling order remain unchanged. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The United States’ motion to withdraw admissions (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED. 

2. Counsel for the United States, Gerald Role, shall personally pay the Clerk of Court a 

monetary fine of $500.00 within 28 days of this order. 

3. Defendant only is granted an extension of the discovery period until March 31, 2016 

for the limited purpose of conducting any oral depositions he wishes to conduct in this 

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matter consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the terms outlined in 

this order. 

4. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and other dispositive relief (ECF No. 51) 

and the United States’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 55) are DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

5. Upon conclusion of the limited extended discovery period, the parties may file any 

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive relief no later than May 5, 2016. 

Any opposition briefs shall be due June 16, 2016, and any reply briefs shall be due 

July 14, 2016. Upon the filing of the reply briefs, the motion(s) shall be submitted for 

decision on the record and written briefing without oral argument, and no further 

briefing will be permitted, unless specifically requested by the court. 

6. The final pretrial conference and trial dates of March 3, 2016, and April 4, 2016, 

respectively, are VACATED. The court will reschedule dates for the final pretrial 

conference and trial upon resolution of any dispositive motions. 

7. All other dates, deadlines, and provisions of the scheduling order remain unchanged. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 24, 2015 

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