Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_24-cv-00013/USCOURTS-ared-3_24-cv-00013-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN DOES 1-8 PLAINTIFFS

v. No. 3:23-cv-230-DPM

EMMETT A. PRESLEY, et a!. DEFENDANTS

JOHN DOES 9-16 PLAINTIFFS

No. 3:24-cv-3-DPM

EMMETT A. PRESLEY, et a!. DEFENDANTS

JOHN DOES 19-30 PLAINTIFFS

No. 3:24-cv-12-DPM

EMMETT A. PRESLEY, et a!. DEFENDANTS

JOHN AND JANE DOES 101-107 PLAINTIFFS

No. 3:24-cv-14-DPM

EMMETT A. PRESLEY, et a!. DEFENDANTS

JOHN DOES 108-113 and

JANE DOES 108-109 PLAINTIFFS

No. 3:24-cv-13-DPM

EMMETT A. PRESLEY, et a!. DEFENDANTS

Case 3:24-cv-00013-DPM Document 14 Filed 09/10/24 Page 1 of 6
AMENDED ORDER

In an earlier Order, the Court granted the plaintiffs' unopposed

motions to proceed under pseudonyms. Doc. 44. The defendants have

moved for reconsideration, arguing that the plaintiffs' anonymity is

unfair and unjust. Doc. 74. The plaintiffs wish to continue as John and

Jane Does.

When this Court decided the pseudonym motions in March 2024,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit hadn't yet

addressed the pseudonym standard head on. It has now: "[A] party

may proceed under a fictitious name only in those limited

circumstances where the party's need for anonymity outweighs

countervailing interests in full disclosure." Cajune V. Independent School

District 194, 105 F.4th 1070, 1077 (8th Cir. 2024). The Court of Appeals

also gave an example of one such circumstance: "[T]o protect the

privacy of vulnerable parties, such as children and rape victims." Ibid.;

see also J.T.H. v. Missouri Department ofSocial Services, 2020 WL 7480563,

at *2 (E.D. Mo. 18 Dec. 2020).

This Court weighed these considerations when it granted the

plaintiffs' pseudonym motions; and it concluded that the plaintiffs

have a strong case for anonymity. Doc. 44 at 2. Their allegations include

sensitive and highly personal accounts of childhood molestation

and rape. Here are some examples.

-2-

Case 3:24-cv-00013-DPM Document 14 Filed 09/10/24 Page 2 of 6
 ̄ John Doe 1 says "he was sexually molested and raped...

dozens of times . . . over an approximately two-year

period." Doc. 72 at ¶ 188.

 ̄ John Doe 5 says that "Emmett Presley took [him] in his

car to a secluded area near The Lord's Ranch where he

sexually abused and orally raped him." He also says

Presley "forc[edj John Doe 5 to perform oral sex on him."

Doc. 72 at ¶205.

 ̄ Jane Doe 101 says she was sexually abused by her male

teacher. "On numerous occasions and for his own sexual

gratification, [he] would sexually grope [her], including

but not limited to rubbing his erect penis on [her] back

while moaning." Doc. 72 at ¶ 304.

The defendants did not oppose anonymity at the time. But they

now argue that the plaintiffs' anonymity prejudices their ability to

defend themselves from adverse publicity and to conduct meaningful

discovery. They also argue that allowing the plaintiffs to proceed

under fictitious names is unjust because five plaintiffs have publicly

commented on their childhood sexual abuse.

*

The Court has reconsidered the pseudonym issue. But with one

caveat, it stands by its earlier ruling.

First, Rule 60(b) does not apply here. That rule "only applies to

motions for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."

Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 992 F.2d 804,

807(8th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted). The Court's pseudonym Order

was not final-it did not end the case or any part of it. Auto Services Co.

-3-

Case 3:24-cv-00013-DPM Document 14 Filed 09/10/24 Page 3 of 6
v. KPMG, LLP, 537 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2008). A district court has

"general discretionary authority to review and revise its interlocutory

rulings prior to the entry of final judgment." Auto Services, 537 F.3d

at 857.

Second, the publicity issues. The plaintiffs raise a legitimate point

here -the defendants hint at a desire to wage a media counteroffensive.

Doc. 81 at 6. The Court sees more harm than good in that approach.

It's unclear how naming the plaintiffs would minimize negative press.

And more importantly, "the danger of retaliation is often a

compelling ground in favor of anonymity." Cajune, 105 F.4th at 1077

(quotations omitted).

Third, the discovery issues. The defendants know the plaintiffs'

real names, which is enough to conduct meaningful discovery.

That conclusion is the consensus view among the district courts in the

Eighth Circuit who have considered the use of pseudonyms during

discovery. Roe v. St. Louis University, 2009 WL 910738, at *5 n.5

(E.D. Mo. 2 Apr. 2009); Doe v. University ofSt. Thomas, 2016 WL 9307609,

at *2 (D. Minn. 25 May 2016); Doe v. Haynes, 2019 WL 2450813, at *4

(E.D. Mo. 12 June 2019); Doe v. Aberdeen School District, 2019 WL

4452136 (D.S.D. 17 Sept. 2019). As the Court noted on the record at the

14 August 2024 hearing, any specific discovery issues can be addressed

on a situation-by-situation basis.

Last, the five plaintiffs who have spoken publicly about their

alleged sexual abuse. Four of them-John Does 3, 7, and 13, and

-4-

Case 3:24-cv-00013-DPM Document 14 Filed 09/10/24 Page 4 of 6
Jane Doe 108 -discussed their experiences on a podcast before this

litigation began. Doc. 75-4. The fifth -John Doe 110 -posted a

comment on Facebook in May 2024. It reads: "They Took me away

from my family for 4 and half years.. .I'm on file with tha courts.

D-35256. .Justice will be served in the Court of law[.j" Doc. 75-3

(emojis omitted).

The defendants argue that these plaintiffs' public disclosures

preclude anonymity for everyone, even the large majority who have

thus far guarded their identities. That argument is unpersuasive.

The defendants cite no authority, and the Court knows of none,

which requires an all-or-nothing approach to pseudonymous parties.

The Court also disagrees about John Doe 110. His vague Facebook

comment is hardly a waiver of his claim's every intimate detail.

But here's the caveat. It cannot be said that the four plaintiffs who

discussed their alleged sexual abuse at length on various podcast

episodes have a "need for anonymity" that outweighs the

"constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial

proceedings." Cajune, 105 F.4th at 1076 (quotations and hyphen

omitted). The plaintiffs are correct that the podcast episodes were

discoverable at the time the pseudonym motion was pending. But the

defendants were then focused on responding to five separate lawsuits,

drafting briefs (at the Court's direction) about possible consolidation of

those lawsuits, and securing local counsel-all within a two-week

period. E.g., Doc. 16 to Doc. 34. The defendants' inability to dig into all

-5-

Case 3:24-cv-00013-DPM Document 14 Filed 09/10/24 Page 5 of 6
fifty plaintiffs' public comments doesn't show a lack of diligence;

it shows a lack of time. Plus, facts about the podcasts have no bearing

on the merits of this lawsuit. They only pertain to the narrow

pseudonym issues here.

* * *

The motion for reconsideration, Doc. 74, is mostly denied and

partly granted. The Court amends its 5 March 2024 Order as specified.

Except for John Doe 3, John Doe 7, John Doe 13, and Jane Doe 108, the

plaintiffs may proceed anonymously. The Court directs the Clerk of

Court to update the docket, substituting the actual names of the four

listed plaintiffs.

So Ordered.

D.P. Marshall Jr.

United States District Judge

I' c2

Case 3:24-cv-00013-DPM Document 14 Filed 09/10/24 Page 6 of 6