Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05118/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 1, 2011 Decided July 22, 2011 

No. 10-5117 

NAZUL GUL, 

APPELLANT

v. 

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 10-5118 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(Nos. 1:05-cv-00888, 1:05-cv-01009) 

Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender, 

Federal Public Defender for the District of Oregon, argued the 

cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Steven T. 

Wax, Federal Public Defender, and Amy Baggio, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender. 

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department 

of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the 

USCA Case #10-5118 Document #1320109 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 1 of 18
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brief were Robert M. Loeb and Benjamin S. Kingsley, 

Attorneys. 

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The United States detained 

Nazul Gul and Adel Hamad for several years at the Naval 

Base at Guantanamo Bay. During that time, each filed with 

the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior 

to any hearing on the merits of their petitions, however, the 

United States transferred the detainees to the custody of 

foreign sovereigns; it did not then rescind, nor has it since 

rescinded, their designation as “enemy combatants.” 

In an effort to refute the allegations levied against them 

and to have that designation rescinded, Gul and Hamad want 

to continue litigating their habeas petitions. Because they are 

no longer held by the United States, however, the district 

court dismissed their petitions as moot and hence beyond the 

court’s jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution of the 

United States. Gul and Hamad appeal, arguing among other 

things that their petitions are not moot because they continue 

to be burdened by the collateral consequences of their prior 

detention and continuing designation. Having determined the 

appellants identify no injury sufficient to bring their cases 

within the court’s jurisdiction under Article III, we affirm the 

order of the district court. 

I. Background 

Pakistani forces arrested Hamad in Pakistan in 2002; 

American forces arrested Gul in Afghanistan in 2003. The 

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United States transferred both men to the Naval Base at 

Guantanamo Bay. 

While detained, each filed in the district court a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his immediate release. 

There being some doubt about its jurisdiction to hear those 

petitions, the district court stayed both cases pending 

resolution of the uncertainty by the Court of Appeals. See 

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 

§ 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742–43 (codified at 10 U.S.C. 

§ 801 note) (limiting scope of judicial relief available to 

detainees at Guantanamo Bay and vesting jurisdiction 

exclusively in D.C. Circuit); Military Commissions Act of 

2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 

(amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)) (stripping federal courts of 

jurisdiction to “consider an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United 

States who has been determined by the United States to have 

been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting 

such determination”). 

In 2007, without substantive action having been taken in 

either case, the United States notified Gul and Hamad they 

had been “approved to leave Guantanamo.” The notice stated 

approval to leave “does not equate to a determination that [the 

detainee] is not an enemy combatant, nor is it a determination 

that he does not pose a threat to the United States.” 

In accordance with the notice, Gul was transferred to 

Afghanistan in March 2007, after which the district court sua 

sponte dismissed his petition as moot. Gul promptly moved 

for reconsideration of the order of dismissal but his motion 

was not immediately resolved. 

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Hamad was transferred to Sudan in December 2007. The 

court took no further action on his petition until 2008, when 

the Supreme Court issued Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723. 

The district court then consolidated proceedings in all 

Guantanamo Bay cases and the presiding judge ordered all 

former detainees who had been transferred out of 

Guantanamo, but who still had habeas petitions pending, to 

submit a consolidated brief addressing the issue of mootness. 

On April 1, 2010, after briefing was complete, the district 

judge dismissed in a single order all cases captioned in the 

consolidated brief.*

 See In re Petitioners Seeking Habeas 

Corpus Relief In Relation to Prior Detentions at Guantanamo 

Bay, 700 F. Supp. 2d 119, 137. 

II. Analysis 

Gul and Hamad claim their petitions are not moot and the 

district court made certain procedural errors in reaching the 

contrary conclusion. Specifically, they argue the district court 

(1) misapplied the collateral consequences doctrine, (2) 

improperly shifted to them the burden of showing their cases 

present a live controversy, (3) failed adequately to consider 

the facts of their individual cases, and (4) failed to abide the 

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2243 requiring courts to dispose of a 

habeas petition as “law and justice require.” We address de 

novo these issues of law, see Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. 

United States, 570 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (question 

of mootness reviewed de novo), and affirm the order of the 

district court. 

 

*

 In all, two district judges dismissed the petitions of more than 100 

former detainees, 15 of whom appealed. We granted the 

Government’s motion to consolidate as to these two cases and held 

the other 13 in abeyance pending this decision. 

USCA Case #10-5118 Document #1320109 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 4 of 18
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A. The Collateral Consequences Doctrine 

In arguing for reversal, Gul and Hamad rely first and 

foremost upon the collateral consequences doctrine. The 

doctrine dates back at least to Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 

234 (1968), which the Supreme Court heard after a state 

prisoner, who had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, had 

completed his term of incarceration and been discharged from 

parole, id. at 236. The state argued the Court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear the petition because the petitioner’s 

release from custody and his subsequent completion of parole 

terminated any injury caused by his unlawful confinement; his 

case, that is, was moot. Id. at 236–37. The Supreme Court 

observed that as a “consequence of his conviction, [the 

petitioner] cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot 

serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of 

time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; 

[and] he cannot serve as a juror.” Id. at 237 (footnotes 

omitted). Because of these “disabilities or burdens,” the 

Court held the petitioner had “a substantial stake in the 

judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the 

sentence imposed on him.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

A few weeks later the Supreme Court determined a 

former prisoner challenging his conviction should be 

presumed to present a justiciable case, for it is an “obvious 

fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail 

adverse collateral legal consequences.” Sibron v. New York, 

392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968). A government could rebut this 

presumption only if it could show there was “no possibility 

that any collateral legal consequences [would] be imposed on 

the basis of the challenged conviction.” Id. at 57. 

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Gul and Hamad argue a former detainee who remains 

designated an enemy combatant should likewise be presumed 

to have a justiciable case. They deem it “obvious” the 

consequences facing such an individual are tantamount to 

those facing a person convicted of a crime and, therefore, they 

disclaim any obligation to identify a specific collateral 

consequence they face before the district court proceeds with 

the merits of their claims. 

Alternatively, Gul and Hamad argue they have shown 

they continue to experience concrete adverse consequences 

from their prior detention. As a result of being designated 

enemy combatants, they argue: (i) the governments of 

Afghanistan and Sudan, respectively, have imposed travel 

restrictions upon them; (ii) they are prohibited from entering 

the United States; (iii) they are subject under the Laws of War 

to the possibility of re-arrest, capture, detention, and 

extrajudicial killing by the United States; and (iv) their 

reputations have been damaged. 

The Government responds by noting it is not yet 

established whether the collateral consequences doctrine 

applies to a habeas petition filed by a former detainee. It 

contends the doctrine is not applicable, and a detainee who is 

no longer in U.S. custody should be foreclosed from arguing 

his petition is not moot, because habeas is at its “core” about 

remedying unlawful detention. The Government offers two 

arguments to support this position. First, the Government 

argues the collateral consequences doctrine derives from 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 and is therefore not available to a detainee who 

is, it says, entitled only to those habeas rights protected by the 

USCA Case #10-5118 Document #1320109 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 6 of 18
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Suspension Clause of the Constitution.*

 Second, citing Munaf 

v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), the Government points out 

equitable considerations, particularly principles of comity 

with foreign sovereigns, may in some circumstances provide 

legitimate reason to restrict the availability of the writ to 

current detainees and, by parity of reasoning, to former 

detainees as well. 

Even if a former detainee’s habeas petition may present a 

live controversy, the Government maintains, the present 

appellants’ petitions must be dismissed: First, it says, a 

former detainee should not be presumed to face collateral 

consequences because the types of “disabilities and burdens” 

identified in Carafas and its sequelae do not attend “detainees 

held under the laws of war.” Second, the Government argues 

none of the particular consequences by which Gul and Hamad 

claim to be burdened is sufficient to meet the injury 

component of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 

III. 

Assuming without deciding the collateral consequences 

doctrine applies to a habeas petition filed by a detainee, we 

agree with the Government that the doctrine does not save 

from mootness the petitions filed in these cases. 

1. No Presumption of Collateral Consequences 

The Supreme Court has cautioned against extension of 

the presumption of collateral consequences. In Spencer v. 

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), a parole violator had been sent 

back to prison to serve the remainder of his term; he 

 

* But see Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 512 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (rejecting distinction between “core” and “ancillary” habeas 

rights and holding detainee’s habeas petition arises under § 2241). 

USCA Case #10-5118 Document #1320109 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 7 of 18
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petitioned for habeas to challenge the revocation of his parole, 

but he had completed his sentence before the merits of his 

petition were heard. The Court recognized it had “[i]n recent 

decades ... been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal 

conviction has continuing collateral consequences” but, it 

pointed out, before erecting that presumption it had in a 

number of cases always: 

required collateral consequences of conviction 

to be specifically identified, and ... accepted as 

sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy 

requirement only concrete disadvantages or 

disabilities that had in fact occurred, that were 

imminently threatened, or that were imposed 

as a matter of law .... 

Id. at 8. Because the Court could not similarly discern 

whether and to what extent similarly concrete consequences 

attach to an order revoking parole, it held the presumption 

should not be applied to a convict who contested such an 

order. Id. at 12 (quoting Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 

(1982)). The convict must instead prove revocation of his 

parole had a continuing consequence “adequate to meet 

Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.” Id. at 14. 

The Court gave three prudential reasons for its 

conclusion. First, presuming or accepting “the remote 

possibility of collateral consequences ... sits uncomfortably 

beside the long-settled principle that standing cannot be 

inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but 

rather must affirmatively appear in the record.” Id. at 10–11 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the presumption 

of collateral consequences had been “developed during an era 

in which it was thought that the only function of the 

constitutional requirement of standing was to assure that 

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concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 

issues,” a view which “has since yielded to the 

acknowledgement that the constitutional requirement is a 

means of defining the role assigned to the judiciary in a 

tripartite allocation of power.” Id. at 11–12 (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). And third, it was 

not clear a presumption of significant collateral consequences 

from revocation of parole would “comport with reality.” Id.

at 12. 

These prudential considerations apply with equal force to 

the circumstances presented here. The first is, of course, 

always applicable to a claim that collateral consequences 

should be presumed rather than proved. As for the second, 

the Supreme Court was hesitant to extend the presumption to 

an order revoking parole because the case-or-controversy 

requirement is a bulwark supporting the separation of powers. 

As this litigation involves individuals seized on a battlefield 

and now in the custody of a foreign sovereign, applying the 

presumption here could infringe upon the domain of the 

branches of government responsible for the external relations 

of the Nation. Finally, as to the Court’s concern that the 

presumption not outrun the reality of collateral consequences, 

we note detention at Guantanamo and designation as an 

enemy combatant are recent phenomena; we have no basis for 

inferring they routinely have collateral consequences. 

In sum, we cannot merely presume a former detainee 

faces collateral consequences sufficient to keep his petition 

from becoming moot upon his release. A former detainee, 

like an individual challenging his parole, must instead make 

an actual showing his prior detention or continued designation 

burdens him with “concrete injuries.” Id. at 14. 

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2. The Consequences Identified Are Insufficient 

Put to their proof, Gul and Hamad claim to face five 

concrete consequences because of their prior detention and 

continued designation. Bearing in mind that the Judicial 

Power vested in federal courts by Article III “exists only to 

redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the 

complaining party,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 

(1975), we cannot agree with the appellants: As we explain 

below, either the court cannot redress the particular harms Gul 

and Hamad allege or such harms are too speculative to sustain 

the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 

14–16 (rejecting alleged collateral consequences of parole 

revocation because not concrete, “attributable” to revocation, 

or redressable by habeas: “as to the possibility that the parole 

revocation could be used directly against petitioner should he 

be the object of a criminal prosecution, it is at least as likely 

that the conduct underlying the revocation, rather than the 

revocation itself ... would be used”). 

a. Travel Restrictions 

Gul and Hamad claim that because they remain 

designated enemy combatants, the Afghan and Sudanese 

Governments have restricted their ability to travel either by 

refusing them passports or by monitoring their movements. 

Assuming these allegations are true, the harm does not meet 

the case-or-controversy requirement because it is caused not 

by a party before the court but by a stranger to the case, and is 

therefore beyond the power of the court to redress. See Simon 

v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–43 (1976) (the 

case-or-controversy limitation of Article III “requires that a 

federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced 

to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that 

USCA Case #10-5118 Document #1320109 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 10 of 18
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results from the independent action of some third party not 

before the court”). 

The Government has submitted declarations explaining 

that when a detainee is transferred out of Guantanamo, he is 

“transferred entirely to the custody and control of the 

[receiving] government.” We credit that declaration.*

 

Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 515 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

It follows that any travel restrictions imposed upon Gul and 

Hamad are traceable to the act of a foreign sovereign, and that 

any decision to lift those restrictions will depend upon an 

“exercise of broad and legitimate discretion [a] court[] cannot 

presume either to control or to predict.” Lujan v. Defenders 

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). Gul and Hamad argue 

they seek to compel only the United States Government, and 

point out that we might order the Government to take all steps 

within its power to alleviate their injury. Reframing the 

remedy that way, however, does not alter the nature of the 

 

*

 To the extent the appellants are arguing travel restrictions subject 

them to constructive “custody,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (a writ of 

habeas corpus shall not issue unless the petitioner “is in custody 

under or by color of the authority of the United States”), and, 

therefore, they continue to present justiciable cases without regard 

to the collateral consequences doctrine, we reject that argument 

because the Government’s declarations make clear that Gul and 

Hamad are no longer in the custody of the United States. Decl. of 

Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Dep’y Asst. Sec’y of Defense for Detainee 

Affairs ¶ 5, July 9, 2008; Decl. of Lt. Col. David F. Koonce, 

Director, Detainee Capabilities Directorate for the Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan ¶¶ 3-8, Oct. 31, 2008. 

We also reject the appellants’ argument terms in Gul’s and 

Hamad’s transfer agreements, which require the receiving 

Government to monitor the former detainees, somehow contradict 

the fact that once they are transferred the detainees are no longer in 

the custody of the United States. 

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injury claimed and therefore does not cure our lack of 

jurisdiction. 

Gul and Hamad also argue they face travel restrictions of 

another sort, chargeable exclusively to the United States: As 

long as they are designated enemy combatants, they will be 

on the “No Fly List” and subject to a provision of the 

immigration code prohibiting any individual who has 

“engaged in terrorism” from entering the United States. 

Relying upon decisions permitting a deported alien to 

challenge his deportation after he has left U.S. custody, Gul 

and Hamad argue their inability to enter the United States 

likewise gives them a justiciable case or controversy. 

As an initial matter, we point out there is no evidence in 

the record suggesting either Gul or Hamad actually wishes to 

enter the United States; the likelihood of either actually 

incurring the injury alleged is therefore exceedingly remote. 

In any event, the analogy upon which the appellants rely is 

flawed: The deported alien faces collateral consequences 

because domestic law either bars him permanently from the 

United States or requires him to wait some period of years 

before seeking re-entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(9)(A), and an order 

granting the deported alien a writ of habeas corpus and 

vacating his order of deportation would necessarily remove 

that barrier. See, e.g., Zegarra-Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2003). An order granting a former detainee’s 

habeas petition would not remove the statutory barriers to 

entry that exclude him. 

First, “any individual who was a detainee held at 

... Guantanamo Bay” must be included on the No Fly List. 49 

U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(v). Gul and Hamad will accordingly 

be barred from flights entering the United States regardless 

whether a court declares they were unlawfully detained. An 

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order granting a detainee’s habeas petition would not mean 

his exoneration, nor would it be a determination he does not 

pose a threat to American interests; it would mean only that 

the Government has not proven the detainee more likely than 

not “materially support[ed]” or was a “part of” a force 

associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. See Authorization 

for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 

Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (reprinted at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); AlBihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–74 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(AUMF authorizes President to detain any individual who is a 

“part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or 

those who purposefully and materially support such forces in 

hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners”). The Congress 

has provided by statute that apprehension by the military and 

transfer to Guantanamo is sufficient indicium of threat to 

require placing a former detainee upon the No Fly List. A 

decision on the merits of a former detainee’s petition would 

not affect the barrier imposed by that law. See Kiyemba v. 

Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1048 (2010) (“it is within the 

exclusive power of the political branches to decide which 

aliens may, and which aliens may not, enter the Unites States, 

and on what terms” (internal quotation marks omitted)).*

 

*

 Gul and Hamad suggest in a skeletal footnote in their reply brief 

that for the Government to keep them on the No Fly List after they 

have been granted a writ of habeas corpus would violate their 

constitutional rights, “including due process, equal protection, and 

bill of attainder protections.” To bolster their argument that being 

on the No Fly List is a collateral consequence, they note “assertion 

of those rights would have to first be predicated on a judicial 

determination that the designation and incarceration were 

unlawful.” Even if a favorable habeas ruling might marginally 

improve the appellants’ prospects in a hypothetical constitutional 

challenge to the statute as applied to them, those prospects are far 

too speculative to make their being listed a collateral consequence. 

USCA Case #10-5118 Document #1320109 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 13 of 18
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Nor can we redress any injury that might arise from the 

statute denying entry into the United States to anyone who 

“has engaged in a terrorist activity ... is a member of a 

terrorist organization ... [or] has received military-type 

training ... from or on behalf of [one].” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(3)(B). Although the legality of detention might be 

relevant to the Executive’s determination under § 1182(a)(3)(B), 

as the Government points out, that determination “involves a 

separate legal standard than the question of whether an 

individual was detainable”; “there are a number of factors in the 

immigration laws which [the Government] look[s] at in order to 

determine whether someone is excludable” and designation as an 

enemy combatant, unlike involvement with terrorism, “is not 

one of them.” Therefore, the possibility the appellants will be 

denied entry into this country because of their prior detention 

or continuing designation, even if it were imminent, is too 

speculative to sustain the exercise of our jurisdiction. See 

Lane, 455 U.S. at 633 n.13 (where prior parole violation does 

not automatically make individual ineligible for future parole 

but is instead “simply one factor, among many, that may be 

considered by the parole authority,” possibility parole will be 

denied after future conviction is insufficiently concrete to 

constitute injury meeting case-or-controversy requirement); 

Spencer, 523 U.S. at 16 (adverse “discretionary decision[s]” 

are not “collateral consequences” of parole violation).

Gul and Hamad also note that because they are 

designated enemy combatants they may be unable to enter or 

seek asylum in countries with laws similar to those of the 

United States. Surely, however, if a purported injury 

attributable to domestic immigration laws is too speculative to 

give the court jurisdiction, any claimed injury that might arise 

from the immigration laws of any other country must be as 

well. 

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b. Laws of War 

Gul and Hamad next argue that because they are 

designated enemy combatants, the United States does not 

consider them “civilians” and, therefore, under the laws of 

war, it may recapture, again detain, and even kill them. This 

claim of injury is the most speculative of all: The appellants 

apparently have no basis whatsoever for believing the 

Government might pursue them because of their continuing 

designation (or for that matter, any other reason). Indeed, the 

Government no longer attaches any legal significance to the 

term “enemy combatant.” See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 

Department of Justice Withdraws “Enemy Combatant” 

Definition for Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 13, 2009); 

Respondent’s Memorandum Regarding the Government’s 

Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at 

Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 

08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (discussing scope of 

Executive authority to detain without reference to term 

“enemy combatant”). 

c. Stigma 

Gul and Hamad last claim that because they are 

designated enemy combatants they have suffered, and will 

continue to suffer, reputational harm. They argue 

stigmatization is alone consequence enough to establish their 

petitions are not moot, but our precedent forecloses their 

argument: “In this circuit, when injury to reputation is 

alleged as a secondary effect of an otherwise moot action, we 

[require] some tangible concrete effect ... susceptible to 

judicial correction” before we assert jurisdiction. McBryde v. 

Comm. to Rev. Circuit Council Conduct, 264 F.3d 52, 57 

(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Spencer, 

523 U.S. at 16 n.8 (dictum) (rejecting dissent’s suggestion “a 

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finding that an individual has committed a serious felony 

renders the interest in vindicating reputation constitutionally 

[s]ufficient to avoid mootness” (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted)). As this case demonstrates, the label 

“enemy combatant” brings with it neither a “concrete effect” 

nor a “civil disability” susceptible to judicial correction. 

Hence, we cannot order the Government to rescind the 

appellants’ designation. 

B. Other Claimed Errors 

Gul and Hamad also raise a number of procedural 

arguments pertaining to the district court’s handling of their 

petitions. None has merit. 

1. Burden of Proof 

Gul and Hamad first argue the district court erred by 

placing upon them the burden of showing their petitions 

present a live controversy rather than placing upon the 

Government the burden of showing the petitions are moot. In 

placing the burden to demonstrate collateral consequences 

upon the appellants, however, the district court recognized “it 

is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of 

jurisdiction in his favor, clearly to allege facts demonstrating 

that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the 

dispute.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see In re Petitioners Seeking Habeas Corpus Relief, 

700 F. Supp. 2d at 129–30 & n.5. Although the appellants 

made the necessary showing when they filed their petitions 

for they were then detained at Guantanamo and so alleged 

once they left U.S. custody that showing no longer sufficed. 

As no continuing injury is to be presumed, see Part II.A.1, the 

burden of demonstrating jurisdiction is properly borne by the 

appellants. See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297 (5th 

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17 

Cir. 2004) (Supreme Court in Spencer explained: “for a court 

to exercise habeas jurisdiction over a petitioner no longer in 

custody, the petitioner must demonstrate ... his subsequent 

release has not rendered the petition moot”). The district 

court did not err by so holding. 

2. Individualized Consideration 

Gul and Hamad next argue the district court, by requiring 

all former detainees to join in one consolidated brief, failed to 

consider the individual facts of each detainee’s case. What 

the district court did to deal with the petitions of more than 

100 detainees on the same basic issue is of no moment any 

more. Gul and Hamad have been fully heard in this court and 

have raised no individual issue sufficient to establish their 

cases are not moot. 

3. Equitable Concerns 

Gul and Hamad last argue that in view of the mandate 

requiring the court to dispose of a petition for a writ of habeas 

as “law and justice require,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the district 

court erred by failing adequately to consider equitable factors 

bearing upon whether their petitions should be dismissed as 

moot. In particular, they argue (1) if they are permitted to 

proceed, then they will establish their prior detention was 

unlawful whereas (2) if they may not proceed, then the 

Government will be unjustly benefitted for having caused the 

district court not to reach the merits of their petitions before 

their release by, for example, refusing to proceed with 

discovery while the jurisdictional issues surrounding the 

enactment of the DTA and the MCA were resolved. 

The appellants indeed were denied a forum in which to 

bring their habeas petitions for a prolonged period before the 

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18 

Supreme Court assured them of one in Boumediene. 

Regardless of the equity that delay might afford the 

appellants, “mootness, however it may have come about, 

simply deprives us of our power to act.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 

18 (rejecting habeas petitioner’s argument that “even if his 

case is moot, that fact should be ignored because it was 

caused by the dilatory tactics of [government officials] and 

the delay of the District Court”). Equity is not a substitute for 

meeting the requirements of Article III. 

III. Conclusion 

Gul and Hamad have not identified any collateral 

consequence sufficient to show their petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus are not moot. Therefore, the judgment of the 

district court is 

Affirmed.

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