Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01653/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01653-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Henry Harris, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-06-1653-PHX-JAT (LOA)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson’s

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) filed on March 20, 2007 (Doc. # 10). The R&R

recommends that the Court deny the Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) filed on

June 29, 2006 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. # 1). Reviewing the case de novo, for the

reasons set forth below, the Court will adopt the R&R and deny the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2006, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge Anderson. In his R&R

recommending that the Petition be denied, Judge Anderson advised the Petitioner that: (1)

he had ten days to file specific written objections to the R&R, and (2) that the failure to

timely file objections to any of the Judge’s factual determinations would be considered a

waiver of the rights to de novo and appellate review of such determinations. (R&R at 13).

The Petitioner has objected to Magistrate Judge Anderson’s findings that the Petitioner’s

untimely 28 U.S.C. § 2245 Petition was not subject to equitable tolling and that Petitioner’s

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challenge to his sentence was procedurally defaulted. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary

hearing.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s recommendation waives all objections to the

judge’s findings of fact.” Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). “Within

ten days after being served with a copy [of the R&R], any party may serve and file written

objections. . . . [T]he court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

[R&R] to which objection is made.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (“[§

636(b)(1)] does not . . . require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an

objection.”). “The filing of objections . . . enables the district judge to focus attention on

those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Id. at 147. It “would be an

inefficient use of judicial resources” to “force the district court to review every issue in

every case, no matter how thorough the magistrate’s analysis and even if both

parties were satisfied with the magistrate’s [R&R].” Id. at 148. The district court “may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

III. ANALYSIS

STATUE OF LIMITATIONS

The R&R recommends that the Petition be dismissed as untimely. Because the

Petition was filed in 2006, it is governed by the statute of limitations prescribed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which

provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

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States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection. 

For purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s conviction became final on February 5,

2004, when his time for appealing his conviction to the United State Supreme Court expired.

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Petition’s conviction

became final after the enactment of the AEDPA, his Petition for writ of habeas corpus would

normally be due within one year after his conviction became final, or February 6, 2005. See

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under Arizona law, when a defendant pleads guilty, his or her conviction becomes

final after the expiration of the time for seeking a Rule 32 of-right proceeding or review. See

Summers v. Schriro 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). In the instant case, Petitioner pled

guilty and was sentenced on March 21, 2003. Petitioner filed a timely notice of Rule 32

review on April 3, 2003. On January 5, 2004, the trial court dismissed the Petitioner’s Rule

32 of-right proceeding. Petitioner then had thirty days after the trial court had dismissed the

Rule 32 of-right proceeding in which to petition the appellate court for review.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial court’s January

5, 2004 order dismissing his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. Thus, Petitioner’s conviction

became final on February 5, 2004 and the AEDPA limitations period commenced on

February 6, 2004. On February 6, 2005, one year later, the AEDPA limitations expired. The

Petitioner did not file his § 2245 until June 29, 2006.

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STATUTORY TOLLING

The one year statute of limitation is tolled during the time that a “properly filed

application for State post conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003,

1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

Whether the Petition is timely turns on what is a “properly filed” action for purposes

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Artuz, the Supreme Court held that an application is properly

filed when its delivery and acceptance comply with the applicable laws and rules governing

filing. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). 

On October 12, 2004 the Petitioner filed a notice of post conviction relief in state

court. Petitioner’s post conviction relief notice was rejected as untimely and thus was not

properly filed. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo 544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005). The trial court found

that the Petitioner’s untimely notice of post conviction relief did not fall within the Rule

32.1(g) exception as there had not been a significant change in law that if applied to

Petitioner’s case would likely overturn his sentence. Ariz.R.Crim.P. Rule 32.1(g). Because

the state court found the Petitioner’s Petition for post conviction relief untimely, the filing

of this Petition for post conviction relief did not toll the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). Absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s June 29, 2006 Petition was untimely.

EQUITABLE TOLLING

The Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for what Petitioner must show to

establish equitable tolling:

1. that Petitioner has been diligently pursing his rights; and

2. that some extraordinary circumstance stood in Petitioner’s way and prevented

him from timely filing his Petition.

Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. at 418.

Petitioner argues two factual scenarios that he claims amount to extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling of the statue of limitations. First, he claims his

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appointed counsel mishandled his first Rule 32 Petition. However, Petitioner does not

specifically state how his court appointed counsel mishandled his Rule 32 Petition, but in one

sentence states that his appointed counsel egregiously mishandled his first Rule 32 Petition

(Doc. # 15, p. 8). The unsubstantiated assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel without

adequate specificity is not enough to demonstrate a claim for relief. Washington v. Lampert,

422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of

legal assistance do not toll the limitations period. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, Petitioner’s first Rule 32 Petition was timely so the

mishandling of his first Rule 32 Petition should not have caused the untimeliness of the

Petitioner’s second Rule 32 Petition, nor the untimeliness of the habeas petition before the

Court. This Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel in filing his first Rule 32 Petition does not amount to extraordinary circumstances

justifying tolling the statute of limitations. See Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th

Cir. 1999).

Second, Petitioner claims that the legal resources available to him prevented him from

timely filing his first Rule 32 Petition. Petitioner specifically asks the court to take note of

the contract paralegal assistance that he was given in absence of other legal resources. Prison

law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure inmates meaningful access

to the courts, however this does not bar other methods to achieve this goal. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). The Court notes that in some cases inadequate legal materials can

be an “impediment” which justifies late filing, or can form the basis for equitable tolling.

See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However,

Petitioner only asks the court to take notice of the contract paralegal system, but does not

specifically state how the contract paralegal system caused his untimely filing. Petitioner has

not demonstrated how the alleged inadequacies of the prison legal system caused him actual

injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348.

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Petitioner has not alleged any circumstances that would rise to a level to justify

equitably tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Therefore, the Petition will be denied

as untimely because, having considered all statutory tolling available, Petitioner’s conviction

became final on February 5, 2004 and his time to file his Petition expired on February 6,

2005. The Court finds that the Petition filed on June 29, 2006 was untimely and barred by

the AEDPA’s one year statue of limitations.

EXHAUSTION

Although the Court has concluded that the Petition was untimely, the Court will, in

the alternative, consider the Petition as if it had been timely filed. Unless it appears a

petitioner has exhausted his available state court remedies the AEDPA requires that a writ

of habeas corpus be denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). State remedies are properly exhausted

if the prisoner afforded the state courts the opportunity to rule on the merits of his federal

constitutional claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989).

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Commenting on the importance of fair

presentation, the United States Supreme Court has stated:

If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the

prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman,

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501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the

petitioner failed to present the claim in any forum and “the court to which the petitioner

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would

now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735.

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post conviction proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their

convictions or sentences in state court. Pursuant to Rule 32.2, petitioners may not be granted

relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 Petition for post

conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h)

of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition

will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided.

Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised

previously in state court, this Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies

currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. If no remedies are currently available,

petitioner’s claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. In addition, if there are claims that were fairly presented in state court

but found defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims also will be found procedurally

defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal law

and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262

(1989).

Petitioner raised a claim that the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence

in his October 12, 2004 notice of post conviction relief. The trial court applied a procedural

bar to Petitioner’s claim when it dismissed his notice of post conviction relief as untimely

under Arizona law. (Respondent’s Exh. J). Therefore, this claim is procedurally defaulted.

This claim is also technically exhausted because Petitioner has no remedies still available in

state court.

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Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims in limited

circumstances. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not

review the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate

cause for the failure to properly exhaust in state court and prejudice from the alleged

constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if

the claim was not heard on its merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748.

Ordinarily “cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that “some

objective factor external to the defense impeded his or her efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Objective factors which constitute cause

include, interference by officials which makes compliance with the state’s procedural rule

impracticable, a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available to counsel, and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged

constitutional error or violation. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984).

To establish prejudice resulting from a procedural default, a habeas petitioner bears the

burden of showing not merely that the errors at his trial constituted a possibility of prejudice,

but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

errors of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Cause

and prejudice are conjunctive requirements; where a petitioner fails to establish cause for his

procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice

resulting from alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

Petitioner claims that he unknowingly procedurally defaulted; however it does not

need to be shown that the Petitioner knowingly defaulted, but only that the Petitioner

defaulted. Petitioner received appointed counsel when he filed his first Rule 32 Petition.

Petitioner states no objective factors for his procedural default but only broadly lists case

rulings of which he was not informed. Petitioner offers no explanation for his failure to

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present his pending claim to the state court in a procedurally appropriate manner.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show cause for his procedural default. Additionally,

because the Petitioner has failed to show cause for his procedural default the Court will not

consider the prejudice requirement.

If a petitioner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard, the Court still may hear

the merits of procedurally defaulted claims if the failure to hear the claims would constitute

a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992). To

establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that “it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).

Petitioner does not claim that federal judicial review is required to prevent a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner has pled guilty to one count of child

molestation and is not claiming that no reasonable jury would have found him guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence. Accordingly, even if the Petition in this case

was not barred by the statute of limitations, Petitioner still would not be entitled to habeas

relief because he did not fairly present his claim to the state court.

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Court does not find an evidentiary hearing, as requested by Petitioner in his

objections, necessary. In Williams, the Supreme Court held that under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2), a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he presents a “meritorious

claim” and he exercised reasonable diligence in developing the factual record in the state

proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434-37. A petitioner exercises the diligence

necessary to preserve a claim if “the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the

information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 435.

Thus, in order to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must both: “(1) allege

facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not receive a full

and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.”

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Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). No hearing is necessary,

however, if this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that the allegations are without

credibility or that the allegations if true would not warrant a new trial . . . .” United States

v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991).

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing but does not state why this hearing is

necessary. The Court finds that Petitioner has not made any allegations that, if true, would

warrant a new trial. Petitioner’s only mention of an evidentiary hearing is in his concluding

paragraph of his objections where he states, “Petitioner is entitled to...an evidentiary

hearing.” (Doc. # 15). Petitioner failed to appeal his first Rule 32 Petition and submitted an

untimely second Rule 32 Petition over sixteen months after the expiration of the AEDPA

deadline. Petitioner has only broadly stated that his court appointed counsel for his first Rule

32 Petition was inadequate, but has set out no facts as to why his counsel was constitutionally

unsatisfactory or why this prevented him for submitting a timely second Rule 32 Petition.

The broad assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel without specific facts is not sufficient

to grant relief. Washington, 422 F.3d at 871. Accordingly, the Court will not conduct an

evidentiary hearing.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed, de novo, the Petitioner’s objections in light of the facts, the Court

agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Accordingly, the Court will accept the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Petition be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to supplement his

objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendations (Doc. # 16), which added a

verification to his objections, is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Anderson’s R&R (Doc. # 10)

is ADOPTED, and Petitioner’s objections thereto (Doc. # 15) are OVERRULED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. # 1) is DENIED and

this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED this 29th day of June, 2007.

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