Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01337/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:881 Forfeiture Property-Drugs

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSCAR C. ORTEGA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV1337 JM (JMA)

ORDER DENYING 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE

ADMINISTRATIVE

FORFEITURE

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

Plaintiff Oscar C. Ortega (“Plaintiff”) moves pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) to

set aside the government’s forfeiture of a 2001 Jaguar automobile (the “Jaguar”) and

approximately $40,000 in U.S. currency. Plaintiff asserts his own claim as to the Jaguar

and asserts a claim on behalf of his son, Oscar A. Ortega (“Ortega”), as to the $40,000.

Ortega is currently incarcerated and has appointed Plaintiff as his attorney-in-fact in

this matter. The issues to be decided are whether Plaintiff’s § 983(e) motion should be

granted because the government failed to take reasonable steps to give notice of the

forfeiture or, alternatively, whether the forfeiture should be set aside because the

government’s notice procedure failed to satisfy the Due Process Clause.

Having considered the parties’ oral arguments and papers, the court hereby

DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth below.

/ / / 

Case 3:06-cv-01337-JM Document 9 Filed 09/22/06 Page 1 of 6
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BACKGROUND

On April 6, 2005, local police were surveilling a residence at 2543 Walking Stick

Court, Chula Vista, California 91915. Police observed Ortega and another man leave

the residence and drive away in a truck. The police followed the truck and pulled it

over for a traffic stop. Ortega was the driver. During the course of the stop, Ortega

sped away from the scene and police were unable to capture him. 

A few hours later that same day, officers executed a search warrant on the

Walking Stick Court residence, where they found weapons, drugs, an electronic scale,

the $40,000, the Jaguar, and the Jaguar’s title. The items were thereby seized.

The government sent notice of forfeiture on or around April 22, 2005 by certified

mail to “Oscar Ortega” at two addresses: the Walking Stick Court address above, from

where the items had been seized, and 1314 Whitaker Avenue, Chula Vista, California

91911, which was the address listed on the Jaguar’s title. Before mailing notice, the

government checked Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) records to verify that the

Jaguar’s registered owner’s address was indeed the Whitaker Avenue address above.

The notice provided that both the Jaguar and the $40,000 had been seized and were

subject to forfeiture. Both notices were returned unclaimed in May 2005. Ortega was

arrested on June 7, 2005 and later pled guilty to state drug charges.

The government resent notice to the same two addresses on July 12, 2005, this

time by regular mail. Notice was also published in the San Diego Commerce newspaper

on July 12, July 19, and July 26, 2005. After hearing no response, the government

declared the property administratively forfeited on September 23, 2005. Now comes

the present motion. 

DISCUSSION

Any interested person may move to set aside an administrative declaration of

forfeiture if he failed to receive written notice. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e). The motion must

be granted if (1) the government knew, or reasonably should have known, of the

moving party’s interest and failed to take reasonable steps to provide such party with

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notice, and (2) the moving party did not know or have reason to know of the seizure

within sufficient time to file a timely claim. § 983(e)(1)(A)-(B).

In addition, the Due Process Clause requires the government to give a person

adequate notice before depriving him of property. Adequate notice is “notice reasonably

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The Mullane

reasonableness test applies to forfeiture proceedings. Dusenbery v. United States, 534

U.S. 161, 167 (2002).

I. The Jaguar

Plaintiff argues that the government failed to take reasonable steps to give notice

because had the government checked DMV records more thoroughly, it would have

learned that the Jaguar’s registered owner “Oscar C. Ortega” had a different address on

his driver’s license to which notice should have been sent. This address was 333 East

San Ysidro Boulevard, #24, San Ysidro, California. In addition, Plaintiff argues that

a more thorough check would have revealed that “Oscar C. Ortega” owned other

vehicles as well, some of which were registered to the East San Ysidro Boulevard

address above. According to Plaintiff, this means that the government had reason to

know that Whitaker Avenue was not Plaintiff’s correct address.

Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. The fact that Plaintiff’s driver’s license

address may have been different is irrelevant. The government is not obligated under

these circumstances to cross-check the Jaguar’s title address with the registered owner’s

driver’s license address. Cf. Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1719 (2006) (rejecting

homeowner’s argument that before foreclosing on house for failure to pay taxes, state

should have inspected local phonebook and government records to ascertain

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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1

 Since the court finds that the government complied with the additional duties imposed by Jones, the court need not decide, and the parties have not raised, whether Jones, decided in 2006, applies to forfeiture proceedings that occurred in 2005.

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his correct address when first notice was returned unclaimed).1 The registered

addresses of Plaintiff’s other cars is also irrelevant. The government was seeking to

forfeit the Jaguar, not Plaintiff’s other cars. In sum, the government acted reasonably

when it checked DMV records to confirm the address listed on the Jaguar’s title and

then sent notice to that address.

When the first notice was returned unclaimed, due process required the

government to take additional steps to give notice, if practicable. Jones, 126 S. Ct. at

1713. Here, the government took the additional and reasonable steps of sending a

second notice by regular mail and publishing notice in a local newspaper. See id. at

1718-19 (suggesting that one additional reasonable step is to resend notice by regular

mail).

Finally, Plaintiff argues he never received actual notice of the forfeiture.

However, neither the statutory text nor the Due Process Clause requires actual notice.

§ 983(e)(1)(A); see Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170.

The court notes that even if the government had failed to take reasonable steps

to give notice, Plaintiff’s § 983(e) motion must still be denied because Plaintiff knew

the Jaguar had been seized. The evidence shows that during the pendency of his son’s

criminal case, Plaintiff had asked his son’s attorney what could be done to recover

possession of the car. Therefore, Plaintiff must have known the car had been seized

within enough time to file a timely claim and he cannot prove the second prong of the

statute. See § 983(e)(1)(B). Plaintiff argues that § 983(e)(1)(B) requires him to have

known the Jaguar was seized for forfeiture purposes, and that he only knew it had been

seized for evidentiary purposes. However, plaintiff cites no authority in support of his

argument and the text of the statute merely requires knowledge of seizure. Even if

Plaintiff were correct–that the statute requires him to have known the correct purpose

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of the seizure–the mailed notices provided that the “the property was seized and subject

to forfeiture[.]” Since the court has already deemed the method for giving notice

constitutionally adequate, Plaintiff’s argument does not help his case.

Therefore, the motion is denied as to the Jaguar.

II. The $40,000

The government first sent notice to Ortega at Walking Stick Court and at a time

when Ortega was evading the law. This was reasonable under the circumstances given

that Ortega was a fugitive who had been seen leaving Walking Stick Court the day the

property was seized. When the first notice was returned unclaimed, the government

was obligated to take additional steps to give notice, if practicable. See Jones, 126 S.

Ct. at 1713. Although the government contends, and the court agrees, that additional

steps were not practicable because Ortega was a fugitive, it nevertheless took the

additional steps of mailing and publishing notice. 

 The question then becomes whether these additional steps were reasonable given

that Ortega was in state custody at the time the second notice was sent. The court finds

that they were. The court is not aware of any authority providing that, as a

Constitutional matter, the government is obligated to check with state authorities as to

whether an interested party is in custody before mailing notice of forfeiture, even when

the interested party is a fugitive. If Ortega had been in federal custody, then arguably

it would have been unreasonable for the government to resend notice as it did, rather

than to Ortega’s counsel or place of incarceration. However, that is not the situation the

court faces here. On these facts, the government acted reasonably to give notice under

the circumstances.

Finally, even if the government had failed to give adequate notice, Ortega’s §

983(e) motion must still be denied because Ortega knew the money had been seized

within sufficient time to file a timely claim and thus he cannot satisfy § 983(e)(1)(B).

The evidence shows that Ortega was present at his state preliminary hearing on July 14,

2005 at which the seizure of the $40,000 was described. The money was not declared

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forfeited until September 23, 2005. Ortega had over two months to file a claim and he

did not. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES the motion in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 22, 2006

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller United States District Judge

cc: All parties 

Case 3:06-cv-01337-JM Document 9 Filed 09/22/06 Page 6 of 6