Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02013/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02013-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

All references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil 1

Procedure.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY JANE AUGUSTINE, an individual,)

on behalf of herself and all )

others similarly situated, )

) 2:06-cv-2013-GEB-EFB

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A., and DOES )

1 through 10, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 59 and/or 60 of the dismissal of her Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”) claim. Defendant opposes this motion. 1

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged violations of California’s

Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the UCL. (Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at

1.) On January 12, 2007, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.’s

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Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) This motion was granted and judgment entered

against Plaintiff on April 20, 2007. 

I. Standard 

“Motions for reconsideration [under Rule 59] should not be

granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district

court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear

error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 

389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.

1999). Rule 60 allows a party to bring a motion for reconsideration

when there is: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by

due diligence could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)

fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct

of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)

the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is

based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or

it is no longer equitable that the judgment should

have prospective application; or (6) any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment. 

“Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are not the place for

parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs.” 

Bettencourt v. Terhune, 2007 WL 1101475, at *1 (E.D. Cal. April 12,

2007) (citing N.W. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d

918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

II. Analysis 

Plaintiff asserts reconsideration is appropriate because the

dismissal decision, which was entered without Plaintiff being provided

the benefit of oral argument, was erroneous and the issues presented

have sufficient magnitude and importance to hundreds of thousands of

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In her reply in support of her motion for reconsideration, 2

Plaintiff also argues that the Court should reconsider its conclusion

that “Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show her claim is

not preempted since it seeks to change Defendant’s terms of credit

provided in Defendant’s Cardholder Agreement” because “preemption does

not arise here, [since] Plaintiff’s UCL claim is based on the violation

of the notice requirements of the federal Truth in Lending Act, which

are borrowed by the UCL, and would be equally applicable under either

Delaware or California law.” (Pl.’s Reply at 3:24-27 (quoting April 20,

2007 Order); 6:13-15.) However, because this argument is made for the

first time in Plaintiff’s reply brief supporting her motion for

reconsideration, and Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why the

argument was not raised in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion

to dismiss or in Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, it will not be

considered. Bettencourt, 2007 WL 1101475, at *1; Stewart v. Wachowski,

2004 WL 2980783, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2004) (“Courts decline to

consider arguments that are raised for the first time in reply.”). 

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cardholders. (Pl.’s Mot. at 1:11-14, 5:13-15.) In her

reconsideration motion, Plaintiff argues the Court’s decision did “not

analyze the extent to which Defendant’s alleged conduct involves acts

or practices that are unscrupulous, unconscionable, or contrary to

public policy” and instead relied on Evans v. Chase Manhattan Bank

USA, N.A., 2006 WL 213740 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2006), which Plaintiff

asserts was incorrectly decided and is inapposite, in determining that

“Defendant’s practice of retroactively increasing the interest rate

charged to cardholders is not unconscionable.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 1:18- 2

24 (quoting the April 20, 2007 Order granting Defendant’s motion to

dismiss).) However, Plaintiff has neither distinguished Evans nor

shown that Evans was wrongly decided.

Plaintiff also asserts the failure to grant oral argument is

sufficient grounds for her motion for reconsideration. (Pl.’s Mot. at

6:10-11.) However, Plaintiff admits the “failure to grant oral

argument is not reversible error absent prejudice.” (Id. at 5:18.) 

Plaintiff asserts the requisite prejudice is present here, because her

Complaint was dismissed. (Id. at 6:1.) The Ninth Circuit has held

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failing to grant oral argument is only a reversible error when

Plaintiff can show prejudice resulting from that failure. Smith v.

Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus., 857 F.2d

587, 592 (9th Cir. 1988). If mere dismissal of a case were sufficient

prejudice to warrant a motion for reconsideration, then every

dismissal granted without oral argument would be subject to a motion

for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s argument would render superfluous

the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the failure to grant oral argument is

grounds for reversal only when Plaintiff can show prejudice. 

Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiff’s case does not constitute the type

of prejudice contemplated by the Ninth Circuit as sufficient to

justify a motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is

denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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