Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_94-cv-01665/USCOURTS-caed-2_94-cv-01665-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO ESPINOZA, No. CIV.S-94-1665 LKK DAD DP

Petitioner,

v. ORDER

S.W. ORNOSKI, Acting Warden

of the California State 

Prison at San Quentin,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Respondent.

 /

This action, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

challenging a capital conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, came before the court on February 28, 2006, for hearing on

petitioner’s motion for leave to file a second amended petition. 

Andrea G. Asaro and Gail R. Weinheimer appeared on behalf of

petitioner. Deputy Attorney General Sean M. McCoy and Supervising

Deputy Attorney General Harry Columbo appeared on behalf of

respondent. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner’s motion

will be granted in part and denied in part.

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 In support of that claim, petitioner alleged in his amended 1

petition in considerable detail that had his trial counsel conducted

an appropriate investigation he would have readily obtained evidence

that petitioner was: borderline mentally retarded; suffered major

mental illness and severe organic brain impairment that diminished

his impulse control; abused alcohol, glue, paint and other solvents

and numerous drugs at a young age and maintained a pattern of severe

chronic substance abuse through adulthood; and attempted suicide

several times as an adolescent and young adult. (Am. Pet. at 76, 80-

90.)

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1986 petitioner was convicted of multiple murders and

sentenced to death in the San Joaquin County Superior Court in

connection with the killing of two teenage girls. In October of 1992

the California Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and

sentence on direct appeal and denied his first state habeas corpus

petition.

Petitioner filed his initial federal habeas corpus petition

in July 1996. After exhausting certain additional claims before the

California Supreme Court, petitioner filed an amended petition in

this court in September of 1999. Eventually, petitioner filed a

motion for evidentiary hearing with respect to various claims in his

amended petition. One of those claims upon which petitioner moved

for an evidentiary hearing was his ninth claim that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct a timely and

thorough investigation of his personal history and mental state. 

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While that motion for evidentiary hearing was pending

before this court, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision

holding that the execution of mentally retarded persons constituted

cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 

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Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Accordingly, within

one year of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins, in June of 2003,

petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, asserting a claim under Atkins, along with

a claim challenging the constitutionality of certain penalty phase

jury instructions regarding aggravating circumstances and a claim

that his conviction and sentence of death were obtained in violation

of international law. The California Supreme Court denied that

petition by order filed June 29, 2005. In its entirety, the

California Supreme Court’s order stated as follows:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on

June 19, 2003, is denied.

Each claim is denied on the merits for failure to

state a prima facie case for relief.

The denial as to Claim I (Atkins v. Virginia

(2002) 536 U.S. 304) is without prejudice to

filing a new petition and supporting

documentation to comply with the requirements of

In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40.

(Decl. of Andrea G. Asaro in Supp. of Mot. for Leave to Amend, Ex.

A.)

After failing to obtain a stipulation permitting amendment,

petitioner now moves the court for an order granting him leave to

file a second amended petition to include the Atkins and

international law claims as well as the claim relating to the penalty

phase jury instructions on aggravating circumstances. If the motion

for leave to amend is granted with respect to the Atkins claim, 

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 At a status conference conducted on December 16, 2005, 2

petitioner’s counsel requested that the court vacate the submission

of the previously filed motion for an evidentiary hearing (Docket No.

190) so that proceedings on petitioner’s motion for leave to amend

could be conducted prior to the decision on the motion for an

evidentiary hearing. (Mot. for Leave to Amend at 4 n.5.) The court

indicated at that time its intent to grant that request and that

matter will be addressed below. As noted, petitioner’s counsel also

indicated an intent to move for an evidentiary hearing on the Atkins

claim in the event leave to amend was granted and at that time

request that the motion for an evidentiary hearing, as supplemented

with respect to the Atkins claim, be addressed by the court in its

entirety.

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petitioner’s counsel has indicated an intent to file a supplemental

motion seeking an evidentiary hearing with respect to that claim.2

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A petition for habeas relief may be amended “as provided

in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. §

2242. See also Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254 (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent

that they are not inconsistent with these rules, may be applied,

when appropriate, to petitions filed under these rules.”). 

Therefore, the court looks to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the rule governing the amendment of civil pleadings, in

resolving the pending motion. See Mayle v. Felix, ___U.S.___,___,

125 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (2005); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 696

n.7 (1993). Because a responsive pleading has been filed in this

case, petitioner may further amend his amended petition “only by

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave

shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a). See also DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186

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(9th Cir. 1987) (“‘[r]ule 15's policy of favoring amendments to

pleadings should be applied with ‘extreme liberality’”). An

amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original

pleading when “the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading ....” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(c)(2).

Whether the new claims petitioner seeks to add in his

second amended petition relate back to his timely filed petition is

central to the resolution of the instant motion. Pursuant to the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),

“[f]ederal habeas petitions ordinarily must be filed within one year

of the ‘date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.’” Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). Because this case was filed

after April 24, 1996, it is governed by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997). Therefore,

petitioner’s Atkins, jury instruction and international law claims

must relate back to his initial petition to avoid being barred by

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that amended

habeas claims relate back to timely habeas claims “[s]o long as the

original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a

common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” 

Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2574. See also Tate v. LaMarque, No. Civ.S 02-

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2337 MCE GGH P, 2005 WL 3020047 *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2005);

Gonzales v. Terhune, No. C 03-1565 THE, 2006 WL 83054 *16 (N.D. Cal.

Jan 12, 2006).

ANALYSIS

Turning first to petitioner’s Atkins claim, which appears

as his Twenty-second Claim for Relief in the proposed second amended

petition, respondent does not dispute that this claim relates back

to the timely filed petition. It is clear that petitioner’s Atkins

claim is based on the same factual allegations pled in his first

amended petition in support of his ninth claim in his amended

petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In this

regard, that claim in the first amended petition alleges detailed

facts with respect to petitioner’s mental illness, attempted

suicides, frontal lobe impairments, developmental disabilities,

substance abuse and borderline mental retardation. These are

precisely the same factual allegations upon which petitioner’s

Atkins claim is predicated. Therefore, petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim (i.e., the Ninth Claim for Relief in the

first amended petition) and his Atkins claim “are tied to a common

core of operative facts” and relation back is in order. Mayle, 125

S.Ct. at 2574.

Respondent challenges petitioner’s motion to amend with

respect to the Atkins claim only on the grounds that the claim is

not exhausted. Respondent bases that contention on the California

Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s Atkins claim “without

prejudice to filing a new petition and supporting documentation to

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 In In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40 (2005), the California 3

Supreme Court addressed the procedures to be employed in resolving

post-conviction claims of mental retardation. 

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comply with the requirements of In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal. 4th

40.” Respondent argues that such language indicates that petitioner 3

failed to present his claim in the manner directed by California law

and that until he does so, his Atkins claim is unexhausted. 

Respondent’s argument is unpersuasive.

Despite indicating that the denial of petitioner’s most

recent state habeas petition was without prejudice, the California

Supreme Court nonetheless stated that “[e]ach claim is denied on the

merits for failure to state a prima facie case for relief.” Such

language is compelling with respect to exhaustion in light of Ninth

Circuit authority holding that “when the California Supreme Court

denies a habeas corpus petition without opinion or citation, or when

it otherwise decides on the merits of the petition, the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied.” Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124,

1128-29 (9th Cir.)(en banc)(emphasis added). See also Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, a comparison of the Atkins claim as presented to

the California Supreme Court and the Atkins claim in the proposed

second amended petition reveals that the allegations are virtually

identical. Thus, petitioner’s Atkins claim has been “fairly

presented” to the California Supreme Court which has had a 

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 At oral argument respondent’s counsel contended that the 4

California Supreme Court’s denial of the petition “on the merits” did

not necessarily indicate that the petition was procedurally proper,

citing Evans v. Chavis,___ U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). That

argument, however, does not relate to respondent’s contention that

the Atkins claim is unexhausted, which is the sole basis upon which

respondent opposes the motion to amend with respect to that claim. 

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“meaningful opportunity” to consider that claim in the first

instance. Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986).4

The Atkins claim was fairly presented to the California

Supreme Court which explicitly denied the claim on the merits. The

Atkins claim therefore is exhausted. Moreover, petitioner’s Atkins

claim is tied to a common core of operative facts with his

ineffective assistance claim presented in his amended petition and

therefore relates back to his timely filed petition. Accordingly,

petitioner’s motion for leave to amend will be granted with respect

to the Atkins claim.

Turning to the international law claim, the only issue

raised by respondent’s opposition is whether that claim (the Twentyfirst Claim for Relief in the proposed second amended petition)

relates back to petitioner’s timely filed petition. Petitioner

argues that the international law claim relates back to his

Sixteenth Claim for Relief in his amended petition challenging the

constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute as well as

to his cumulative error claim which appears as the Nineteenth Claim

for Relief in the amended petition. Petitioner points to those

previously presented claims and asserts that the same facts alleged

in support thereof establish that petitioner’s conviction and death

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sentence were obtained in violation of international law. The court

finds petitioner’s argument persuasive. 

Petitioner is not alleging any new facts in support of his

international law claim. Rather, the claim is that the facts

previously alleged in connection with earlier claims support a claim

based on a new, additional legal theory. Such circumstances compel

the application of the relation back doctrine, for “[s]o long as the

original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a

common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” 

Mayle, 125 S.Ct. at 2574 & n.7 (citing 3 J. Moore, et al., Moore's

Federal Practice § 15.19[2], p. 15-82 (3d ed. 2004) (relation back

ordinarily allowed “when the new claim is based on the same facts as

the original pleading and only changes the legal theory”)). For

these reasons, petitioner’s motion for leave to amend will be

granted with respect to his violation of international law claim as

well.

However, the court is not persuaded by petitioner’s

contention that his proposed claim with respect to penalty phase

jury instructions relates back to his cumulative error claim. 

Unlike the international law claim, petitioner’s proposed penalty

phase jury instruction claim depends on allegations of facts

relating to the trial court’s alleged failure to instruct the jury

regarding aggravating circumstances that are wholly new and

different than those alleged in his timely filed petition. 

Moreover, the claim that certain penalty phase jury instructions

were constitutionally infirm is not based simply on a new legal

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theory. Therefore, petitioner’s motion for leave to amend will be

denied with respect to the jury instruction claim. See Mayle, 125

S. Ct. at 2566 (rejecting argument that amended claims relate back

simply because original petition and amended pleading “arose from

the same trial and conviction”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint is granted in part and denied in part;

2. The motion is granted with respect to the Atkins claim

and the international law claim (i.e., the proposed Twenty-second

and Twenty-first Claims for Relief);

3. The motion is denied with respect to the jury

instruction claim (i.e., the proposed Nineteenth Claim for Relief);

4. Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus shall be filed and served within seven (7) days of the

date of this order;

5. Respondent’s response is due within forty-five (45)

days of being served with the second amended petition;

6. A telephonic status conference is SET for April 28,

2006, at 11:30 a.m., at which time the parties shall be prepared to

discuss the future scheduling of this action. The parties shall

contact Pete Buzo at (916) 930-4128 to arrange telephonic appearance

or to re-set the status conference hearing if necessary; and

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7. The submission of petitioner’s previously filed motion

for evidentiary hearing (Doc. no. 190) is vacated and that motion

will stand re-submitted in its entirety in connection with

petitioner’s anticipated supplemental motion for evidentiary hearing

discussed herein. 

DATED: March 3, 2006.

DAD:th

capital\espinoza1665.order.amend

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