Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04600/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04600-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Antonio Napier,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Swiftfunds Financial Services LLC,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-04600-PHX-DGC

ORDER AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), Plaintiff Antonio Napier has 

filed a motion for default judgment against Defendant Swiftfunds Financial Services 

LLC. Doc. 15. For reasons stated below, default judgment is appropriate and will be 

entered in the amount of $1,000.00.

I. Background.

Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 17, 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff in 

an attempt to collect a debt and threatened to report the alleged debt on Plaintiff’s credit 

report if Plaintiff did not make an immediate payment. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11-12. The complaint 

asserts multiple violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 

U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.: (1) Defendant used false or misleading representations in 

connection with the collection of a debt, in violation of § 1692e; (2) Defendant threatened 

to take action that could not be legally taken or that Defendant did not intend to take, in 

Case 2:19-cv-04600-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/14/20 Page 1 of 4
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violation of § 1692e(5); and (3) Defendant overshadowed Plaintiff’s right to dispute the 

validity of the alleged debt by pressuring Plaintiff to make an immediate payment before 

sending Plaintiff proper notice of the alleged debt, in violation of § 1692g. Id. ¶¶ 18-20.

Defendant was served with the summons and complaint on September 19, 2019 

(Doc. 7), but has not appeared in this action. Pursuant to Rule 55(a), the Clerk entered 

Defendant’s default on October 30, 2019. Doc. 10. Plaintiff filed his motion for default 

judgment on January 30, 2020. Doc. 15. Defendant has filed no response and the time 

for doing so has expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6; LRCiv 7.2(c).

II. Default Judgment.

After the clerk enters default, the district court may enter a default judgment 

pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2). The court’s “decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 

discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the 

court it is not required to make detailed findings of fact, see Fair Housing of Marin v. 

Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002), it should consider the following factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, (3) the 

sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of 

factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy 

favoring decisions on the merits, see Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 

1986).

A. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff.

The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Despite being served

with process, Defendant has not answered or otherwise responded to the complaint. If 

default judgment is not entered, Plaintiff “will likely be without other recourse for 

recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

B. Merits of the Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint.

The second and third Eitel factors favor default judgment where, as in this case, 

the complaint sufficiently states plausible claims for relief under the Rule 8 pleading 

standards. See id. at 1175; Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Case 2:19-cv-04600-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/14/20 Page 2 of 4
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As noted, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the FDCPA by making false or 

misleading representations in attempting to collect the alleged debt, threatening to take 

action that was unlawful or that Defendant did not intend to take, and pressuring Plaintiff 

to make an immediate payment before sending Plaintiff proper notice of the alleged debt.

Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8-20. These are viable claims for relief under the statute, and Plaintiff alleges

sufficient facts to show Defendant’s liability for statutory damages. Id. ¶¶ 21-22; see 

Doc. 15 at 4-6. The second and third factors favor default judgment.

C. Amount of Money at Stake.

Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff seeks only $1,000 in 

statutory damages. Docs. 1 at 5, 15 at 6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A)). The Court 

finds this amount reasonable.

D. Possible Dispute Concerning Material Facts.

Given the sufficiency of the complaint and Defendant’s default, “no genuine 

dispute of material facts would preclude granting [Plaintiff’s] motion.” PepsiCo, 238 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1177; see Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560.

E. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect.

Plaintiff has filed an affidavit showing proper service of process on Defendant

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). See Docs. 7, 9. It therefore is “unlikely that 

[Defendant’s] failure to answer and the resulting default was the result of excusable 

neglect.” Gemmel v. Systemhouse, Inc., No. CIV 04-187-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 65604, 

at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2008). This factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

F. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits.

As for the seventh factor, it is true that cases “should be decided upon their merits 

whenever reasonably possible,” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472, but the mere existence of 

Rule 55(b) “indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive,” PepsiCo, 

Inc., 238 F. Supp. at 1177. Defendant’s failure to respond to the complaint “makes a 

decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” Gemmel, 2008 WL 65604, at *5.

Case 2:19-cv-04600-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/14/20 Page 3 of 4
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G. Conclusion.

Most of the Eitel factors favor default judgment. Considering the factors as a 

whole, the Court concludes that default judgment is appropriate. The Court will enter 

default judgment against Defendant and award Plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages. See 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 15) is granted.

2. The Clerk shall enter Default judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and 

against Defendant Swiftfunds Financial Services LLC in the amount of 

$1,000.00.

3. Plaintiff shall file his application for attorneys’ fees within 14 days of this 

order.

Dated this 14th day of February, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-04600-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/14/20 Page 4 of 4