Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02756/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02756-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gary Donahoe and Cherie Donahoe,

husband and wife,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava

Arpaio, husband and wife, et al.,

 Defendants.

Sandra Wilson and Paul Wilson,

husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava

Arpaio, husband and wife, et al.,

Defendants.

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Lead No. CV 10-02756-PHX-NVW

Consolidated with:

No. CV 10-02758-PHX-NVW

Conley D. Wolfswinkel, a single man,

et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava

Arpaio, husband and wife, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 11-00116-PHX-NVW

Case 2:10-cv-02756-NVW Document 466 Filed 06/07/12 Page 1 of 6
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Donald T. Stapley, Jr. And Kathleen

Stapley, husband and wife,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava

Arpaio, husband and wife, et al.,

 Defendants.

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No. CV 11-00902-PHX-NVW

 ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Lisa Aubuchon and Peter R. Pestalozzi’s Motion

for Stay Pending Appeal Pursuant to Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

(Doc. 376), joined by Defendants Andrew and Ann Thomas (Doc. 378). Plaintiffs Gary

and Cherie Donahoe and Sandra and Paul Wilson filed a response joined by Plaintiffs

Donald T. Stapley, Jr., and Kathleen Stapley. (Docs. 442, 445.) Defendants Lisa

Aubuchon and Peter R. Pestalozzi filed a reply joined by Defendants Andrew and Ann

Thomas. (Docs. 452, 453.) Oral argument on the motion was heard on June 1, 2012.

I. Background

On April 9, 2012, motions to dismiss by Defendants Lisa Aubuchon and Peter R.

Pestalozzi (hereafter “Aubuchon”) and Defendants Andrew and Ann Thomas (hereafter

“Thomas”) were granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 338.) The April 9, 2012 Order

found that Thomas and Aubuchon’s actions related to filing a civil RICO lawsuit were not

protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity, explaining that absolute immunity

generally protects only those actions by a prosecutor that are “intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Absolute prosecutorial immunity has been

applied to government attorneys for bringing civil enforcement proceedings pursuant to

their statutory duties, but only where the government attorney’s function is directly

analogous to his or her function in a criminal proceeding. Here, Defendants filed a civil

lawsuit under the federal RICO statute, which gives the United States Attorney General

Case 2:10-cv-02756-NVW Document 466 Filed 06/07/12 Page 2 of 6
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authority to bring enforcement actions, but does not provide special enforcement

authority to state officers. Thus, Defendants were in the same position as other state

officers and private lawyers seeking money damages and injunctive relief in a federal

civil RICO lawsuit and not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.

On May 4, 2012, Aubuchon and Thomas filed notices appealing a portion of the

April 9, 2012 Order regarding the issue of absolute immunity in connection with the

filing of the civil RICO action. (Docs. 375, 377.) On the same day, Aubuchon filed a

motion for stay pending appeal, which Thomas joined. (Docs. 376, 378.) Aubuchon and

Thomas request a stay of discovery as to the counts pertaining to the civil RICO action

only:

Aubuchon seeks only to stay certain counts as to the narrow issue of the

filing of the RICO lawsuit, not as to any alleged underlying actions which

may simultaneously support those counts. Aubuchon seeks a narrowly

drawn stay order which would prevent discovery on the issue of the filing

of the RICO action. Such stay would apply only to any inquiry surrounding

the preparation, filing, prosecution and dismissal of the RICO action itself. 

Aubuchon does not seek a stay regarding the various investigations/

transactions that are the subject of the RICO suit.

(Doc. 452 at 3.)

II. Legal Standard

Under the collateral order doctrine, a small class of district court decisions are

considered final decisions subject to immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-25 (1985). “[T]he denial of a substantial claim of absolute

immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute

immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil

damages action.” Id. at 525. The question of absolute immunity is separate from the

merits of the underlying action even though a reviewing court must consider the

plaintiff’s factual allegations to resolve the question. Id. at 528-29.

The Supreme Court has expressed the importance of avoiding excessive disruption

of government by “broad-ranging discovery and deposing of numerous persons, including

Case 2:10-cv-02756-NVW Document 466 Filed 06/07/12 Page 3 of 6
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an official’s professional colleagues” before the district court has resolved the threshold

immunity question. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982); see also Mitchell,

472 U.S. at 526. But neither Mitchell nor Harlow addressed whether discovery must be

limited after the district court has decided the threshold immunity question while the

immunity decision is on appeal.

In the Ninth Circuit, the interlocutory appeal of denial of immunity normally

divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial. United States v. Claiborne,

727 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1984); Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992). 

However,

This divestiture of jurisdiction rule is not based on statutory provisions or

the rules of civil or criminal procedure. Instead, it is a judge made rule

originally devised in the context of civil appeals to avoid confusion or waste

of time resulting from having the same issues before two courts at the same

time. Given this purpose, it has been suggested that the rule should not be

employed to defeat its purpose or to induce needless paper shuffling.

Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 850 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also

Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 123 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 1997)

(stay upon interlocutory appeal to assert colorable claim to absolute or qualified immunity

is not based upon any formal division of “jurisdiction” between trial and appellate courts). 

To minimize disruption and delay of trial court proceedings, the Ninth Circuit and

other circuit courts have adopted the rule that if the district court finds that the

defendants’ claim of qualified immunity is frivolous or has been waived, the district court

may certify that the defendants have forfeited their right to pretrial appeal and proceed

with trial. Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105; see Behrens, 516 U.S. at 310-11 (“This practice,

which has been embraced by several Circuits, enables the district court to retain

jurisdiction pending summary disposition of the appeal, and thereby minimizes disruption

of the ongoing proceedings.”). 

Moreover, “[t]he Harlow right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain

claims, not from litigation in general.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996). 

Case 2:10-cv-02756-NVW Document 466 Filed 06/07/12 Page 4 of 6
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Where an immunity defense applies to one claim and not another, the claims are separable

for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. Beier v. Cty. of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058,

1064 (9th Cir. 2004). The fact that defendants will have to endure discovery and trial on

some claims does not defeat the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review the denial of

qualified immunity on other claims. Id.; see Alice L. v. Dusek, 492 F.3d 563, 565 (5th

Cir. 2007) (pending interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity, to the extent

defendant was subject to discovery requests on claims for which she does not or cannot

assert qualified immunity, such discovery requests did not implicate her right to qualified

immunity).

It is concluded, therefore, that when a public official files an interlocutory appeal

from the denial of a non-frivolous claim to absolute immunity, the district court may not

alter the decision on appeal, i.e., the denial of immunity, which is separate from the merits

of the underlying litigation. But the district court may exercise discretion regarding

pretrial discovery, considering the possibility of compromising any immunity protection

the defendants may have and avoiding unnecessary disruption of the ongoing

proceedings. 

III. Analysis

Thomas and Aubuchon’s claim of absolute immunity seeks a sweeping extension

of absolute prosecutorial immunity beyond existing law. But the Court does not find it is

frivolous or has been waived and does not certify that they have forfeited their right to

pretrial appeal. See Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105. However, for reasons previously stated,

Thomas and Aubuchon’s claim of absolute immunity for the civil RICO claim is unlikely

to succeed on the merits. Thus, staying a narrow portion of discovery as requested likely

would require a second round of discovery after the denial of immunity is affirmed on

appeal.

Further, granting Thomas and Aubuchon’s motion to stay discovery would at most

slightly reduce their immediate discovery burden. Their claim of absolute immunity on

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appeal does not permit them to avoid testifying as fact witnesses regarding the civil RICO

claim as it relates to Defendant Arpaio. In their briefs and oral argument, Thomas and

Aubuchon’s attorneys were not able to provide any concrete examples of discovery that

would be stayed. The difficulty in articulating practical boundaries of the requested

discovery stay demonstrates that a stay would not only disrupt ongoing proceedings, but

likely complicate discovery, resulting in additional cost and delay. In contrast, denying

the stay would not substantially increase Thomas and Aubuchon’s discovery burden.

Thomas and Aubuchon seek a narrowly drawn discovery stay that is unnecessary

to preserve the decision on appeal, not likely to provide them any practical benefit, and

likely to cause confusion, disruption, and increased expense of ongoing proceedings. 

Their motion to stay pretrial discovery related to the civil RICO claim will therefore be

denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Lisa Aubuchon and Peter R.

Pestalozzi’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal Pursuant to Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure (Doc. 376), joined by Defendants Andrew and Ann Thomas (Doc.

378), is denied.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2012.

Case 2:10-cv-02756-NVW Document 466 Filed 06/07/12 Page 6 of 6