Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01401/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01401-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRANCE SYKES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. RIOS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01401-KES-HBK (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 

OBEY COURT ORDER AND PROSECUTE1

14-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Terrance Sykes, Jr. is a federal inmate proceeding pro se in this civil action. For 

the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the District Court dismiss this action 

without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders and prosecute this action. 

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens vs. Six 

Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff neither paid the filing fee nor 

accompanied his complaint with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See

docket). Accordingly, the same day, the Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff within thirty 

(30) days to either pay the $405.00 filing fee or submit an enclosed IFP application. (Doc. No. 3). 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2023). 

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The Court specifically advised Plaintiff that if he failed to timely respond to the Order or seek an 

extension of time to do so, the undersigned would recommend the Court dismiss this case for his 

failure to comply with a court order and/or prosecute this action.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff filed a 

“motion in equity” seeking exemption from the filing fee requirement and the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”) on the basis that his incarceration is illegitimate. (Doc. No. 4). On 

December 4, 2024, the Court denied the motion but afforded Plaintiff until December 20, 2024 to 

either pay the filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 5). The 

Court again expressly warned Plaintiff that if he failed to either pay the $405.00 filing fee or 

submit a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, the undersigned will recommend the 

District Court dismiss the action as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and comply with 

court orders consistent with Local Rule 110. (Id. at 3 ¶ 4).2 As of the date of these Findings and 

Recommendations, Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing fee nor applied to proceed in forma 

pauperis and the time to do so has expired. (See docket).

APPLICABLE LAW 

A. Plaintiff’s is Required to Pay the Filing Fee

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.00. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only 

if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 

493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The fee is not waived for prisoners, however. If granted leave to proceed IFP, a prisoner 

nevertheless remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), 

regardless of whether his action is dismissed for other reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (2); 

Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

2 On December 20, 2024, the Court again denied Plaintiff’s request to correct his “prisoner” status, taking 

judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Western District of New York conviction and his present incarceration as 

satisfying the statutory definition of “prisoner” as set forth in the PLRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). (Doc. No. 

9). 

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The Court advised Plaintiff that for this case to proceed further, he must pay the $405.00 

filing fee or submit an IFP application within 30 days of receiving the November 15, 2024 Order. 

(See Doc. No. 3). The Court then afforded Plaintiff until December 20, 2024 to pay the filing fee 

or submit an IFP application. (Doc. No. 5). Because Plaintiff has failed to either pay the filing 

fee of $405.00 or submit a IFP application, Plaintiff’s case may be dismissed without prejudice. 

See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that a district court 

“will be free to dismiss the complaint” if the filing fee is not paid or application to proceed in 

forma pauperis is not granted); see also In re Perroton, 958 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(affirming dismissal of pro se litigant’s claim for failure to pay required filing fees). 

B. Failure to Prosecute

Alternatively, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily 

dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules 

or with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 

F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Local Rules, corresponding with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . .

any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . 

. within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent 

power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including 

dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th 

Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey 

a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 

(9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone 

v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with 

a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure 

to prosecute and to comply with local rules).

In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

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cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 

1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal 

without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 

litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California 

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 

overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 

filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 

under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re Approval of the Judicial 

Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 

Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 

recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 

litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 

weighs in favor of dismissal. 

Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale, or witnesses’ 

memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 

factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 

to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 

unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 

1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 

the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 

The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 

disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case 

toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is 

the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 

1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 

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multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 

Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary 

dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court 

order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the 

docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). 

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 

Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. Both the November 15, 2024 and 

December 6, 2024 Orders directing Plaintiff to submit an IFP application or pay the filing fee

expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to timely comply would result in a recommendation of 

dismissal of this action for his failure to prosecute this action and as a sanction under the Court’s 

Local Rules. (See Doc. No. 3 at 1, Doc. No. 5 at 3, ¶ 4). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warnings

that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a dismissal 

without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby addressing 

the fifth factor. 

After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, in the alternative, the 

undersigned recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 

110.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

This action be DISMISSED without prejudice.

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NOTICE

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff’s failure to file objections within the specified time 

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may result in waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: January 6, 2025 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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