Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-00930/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-00930-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

HEATH ALLRED,

Plaintiff;

vs.

THE CITY OF CARBON HILL,

ALABAMA, a municipal

corporation, and JAMES

RICHARDSON,

Defendants.

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6:13-cv-00930-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court are Defendants City ofCarbon Hill’s and James Richardson’s

motions to dismiss PlaintiffHeath Allred’s first amended complaintfor failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 13, 14.)

The issues have been fully briefed by the parties and are ripe for decision. For the

reasons discussed below, the motions are due to be denied.

I. Background1

In a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true a plaintiff’s factual allegations and 1 

construe them in his favor as the non-moving party. Chepstow, Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th

Cir. 2004). 

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FILED

 2013 Oct-07 PM 04:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 6:13-cv-00930-LSC Document 22 Filed 10/07/13 Page 1 of 25
Plaintiff Heath Allred (“Allred”) was hired as the police chief of Defendant

City of Carbon Hill (“Carbon Hill”) on August 19, 2010. Carbon Hill did not specify

the length of his employment when it hired him. Allred completed his probationary

period without incident in February 2011. After completing his probationary period,

Allred was told that Carbon Hill’s Personnel Rules and Regulations (“Personnel

Rules”) governed his employment. The Personnel Rules require notice and a hearing

for suspensions over three days, demotions, and dismissals. 

In 2012, Allred’s relationship with Defendant James Richardson

(“Richardson”), the mayor of Carbon Hill, began to sour. Allred’s wife, Jacque

Roberson Allred, announced in early 2012 that she was challenging Richardson in

Carbon Hill’s mayoral race. Allred received a call in February 2012 from Ken Guin

(“Guin”), Richardson’s personal attorney. Guin allegedly told Allred that his job

would suffer if he did not stop his wife from running for mayor. Allred continued to

support his wife’s candidacy but did not participate in campaign activity or support

his wife’s candidacy while in uniform or while performing his job duties.

During the race, Richardson accused Allred of failing drug tests. Allred

repudiated this allegation by passing three drug screens. However, Richardson

continued to accuse Allred of drug use, absence from work, and neglect of his job

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duties. Richardson would also disparage Allred while visiting the dispatch area of the

Carbon Hill Police Department. Richardson ultimately prevailed over Jacque

Roberson Allred in a close run-off election on October 6, 2012. Jacque Roberson

Allred later filed suit to contest the election. 

On November 5, 2012, Richardson met privately with Allred before the Carbon

Hill city council meeting. Richardson informed Allred that his employment was

terminated and that Carbon Hill would be selecting a new police chief. Richardson

told Allred that he should have known his termination was coming because of his

wife’s candidacy for mayor and his support for her. After the private meeting, the city

council appointed a new police chief along with other positions. Allred’s attorney

asked when Allred should report for duty as a regular employee of the Carbon Hill

Police Department. The council then went into executive session, and the city

attorney told Allred’s counsel after the executive session that Allred was no longer

employed by Carbon Hill.

Allred has since filed suit against both Carbon Hill and Richardson, pursuing

various state and federal law claims based on the end of his employment with Carbon

Hill. Carbon Hill and Richardson have now moved to dismiss all of these claims.

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II. Standard of Review

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading must also contain a “demand for the

relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”

“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for

a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678-679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Instead, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations

omitted). Iqbal establishes a two-step process for evaluating a complaint. First, the

Court must “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” Id. Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed, but they “must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-1965 (2007).

In reviewing thecomplaint, the Court must “draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The Court must consider

the “face of the complaint and attachments thereto” to determine whether the

Plaintiff states a claim for relief. Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cnty.,

Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1253 n.13 (11th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff need not plead each element

of the cause of action but must plead “enough information regarding the material

elements of a cause of action to support recovery under some viable legal theory.”Am.

Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, Fla., 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th

Cir. 2011 (internal quotations omitted). 

III. Analysis

Allred alleges federal law claims against Richardson and Carbon Hill under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) for violations of his constitutional rights of freedom of

association and procedural due process. He also alleges a state law violation of due

process based on wrongful termination under Ala. Code § 11-43-230. The Court will

examine each claim in turn.

A. § 1983 Freedom of Association Claims

A right of free association is implicit in the First Amendment. Roberts v. U.S.

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Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984). There are two types of

protected association— association involving “intimate human relationships” and

association to engage “in those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at

617-618, 104 S. Ct. at 3249. These two forms are now called “intimate association”

and “expressive association.” McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1562-1563 (11th Cir.

1994). “At a minimum, the right of intimate association encompasses the personal

relationships that attend the creation and sustenance of a family—marriage,

childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with one’s

relatives.” Id. at 1563. Expressive association, on the other hand, relates to protected

rights such as “speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the

exercise of religion.” Id.

“For a public employee to establish that an employment action has infringed

a constitutional right the employee also must demonstrate that he or she has suffered

some sort of adverse employment action for exercising the right.”Id. This can include

“not only discharges, but also demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and

reprimands.” Id.Allred raises § 1983 claims against both Carbon Hill and Richardson

on theories of both expressive and intimate association.

i. Freedom of Association Claims Against Carbon Hill

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To recover against a municipality, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [his or her]

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy

that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the

policy or custom caused the violation.” Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634

F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011). Allred has pleaded a plausible claim of municipal

liability.

First, Allred has pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible constitutional

violation of his rights of expressive and intimate association. He pleaded that he was

hired in August 2010 and that Carbon Hill did not establish a fixed term in office for

his service. Allred pleaded that in November 2012 Richardson informed him before

a city council meeting that he was terminated because Allred’s wife ran against

Richardson for mayor and Allred supported his wife’s campaign for mayor. After

Richardson informed him that he was terminated, the Carbon Hill city council

appointed a new police chief, and after an executive session, Allred was told that he

was no longer employed by Carbon Hill. 

Carbon Hill contends that Allred’s term expired when the mayor was reelected, and thus he was not actually terminated. This argument may be appropriately

raised at the summary judgmentstage. However, the pleaded facts suggest that Allred

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suffered some form of adverse employment action. Even if Allred were not literally

“terminated,” the pleaded facts suggest that Carbon Hill either refused to hire him

on an unconstitutional basis or that he was subjected to some type of adverse

treatment when he was suddenly told that he was being replaced. He has pleaded facts

to suggest that the action occurred due to his marriage to his wife and his expressive

association with her political campaign. Thus, Allred can survive a motion to dismiss

on these claims.

Allred has also pleaded sufficient facts to suggest the existence of the second

and third elements to establish municipal liability. Municipalities are not vicariously

liable for § 1983 violations by city employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of the

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036. Instead, a municipality is

subject to § 1983 liability when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional

implements or executes a policy statement,ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690, 98 S. Ct. at 2035-2036.

“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §

1983.” Id. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-2038. 

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A plaintiff can establish a municipal custom by identifying “the existence of a

widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal

policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the

force of law.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S. Ct. 915, 926

(1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168, 90 S. Ct. 1598,

1613-1614 (1970)). Such a practice is “deemed authorized by thepolicymakingofficials

because they must have known about it but failed to stop it.” Brown v. City of Ft.

Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, Allred has not pleaded any

facts to suggest that Carbon Hill has a longstanding custom of violating the expressive

rights of its employees. Thus, the Court must determine whether Allred has pleaded

sufficient facts to suggest that a municipal policy exists. 

“[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal

policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 480, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1298 (1986). For the municipality to be liable in such

a case, the decisionmaker must possess “final authority to establish municipal policy

with respect to the action ordered.” Id. at 481, 106 S. Ct. at 1299. To determine

whether an official is a final policymaker, the Court must consult state law. Id. at 483,

106 S. Ct. at 1300. An official lacks final policymaking authority when his “decisions

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are subject to meaningful administrative review.” Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116

F.3d 1396, 1401 (11th Cir. 1997). However, the Court’s current task on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion “is not to determine who, in fact, wields final policymaking authority but only

to consider whether plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to withstand the city’s motion

to dismiss.” Brown, 923 F.2d at 1480.

Allred alleges that Richardson told him that he was terminated before the

Carbon Hill city council meeting. The city council then appointed a new police chief

and, after a meeting in executive session, determined that Allred was no longer

employed by Carbon Hill.

Alabama law allows the mayor to remove any officer not elected by the people

for “good cause” and appoint a new officer. Ala. Code § 11-43-81. If the officer was

elected by the city council or appointed with its consent, the mayor must tell the

council his reasons for dismissing the officer at the next council meeting. Id. The

council must then approve the act of removal. Id. Carbon Hill contends that this

establishes that the final policymaker in this case is the city council.

At this stage ofthe litigation, it is inappropriate without the process of discovery

to determine whether the review process of the mayor’s decision constitutes a

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meaningful administrative review. The Court can decide this issue appropriately on 2

summary judgment. However, even if the Court accepts that the council was the final

policymaker, Allred still states a plausible claim for relief against Carbon Hill.Alabama

law requires the mayor to provide the council with his reasons for removal. Id.

Richardson told Allred before the council meeting that he was terminating him

because Allred’s wife ran against him for mayor and Allred had supported her

candidacy. The city council later met in executive session, presumably to discuss

Allred’s employment with Carbon Hill. At this stage in the pleadings, the Court can

infer that Richardson provided the same reasons he gave Allred to the city council,

and the city council approved Richardson’s decision anyway. The Court can infer

from the pleadings that Richardson told the city council to remove Allred and appoint

a new police chief because Allred had supported his wife’s campaign for mayor, and

the council obliged. Through discovery, the parties can determine both whether the

city council was the final policymaker and, if so, whether the city council acted

In small Alabama cities like Carbon Hill, the mayor has discretion to vote as a member of 2 

the city council on any issue and must vote when there is a tie. Ala. Code § 11-43-2. Richardson

acknowledges that he is, at least at times, a voting member of the Carbon Hill city council by

attempting to invoke his legislative immunity. (Doc. 14 at 17.) “What our precedents mean by

meaningful administrative review is plainly review by a municipal official’s superiors.” Carter v. City

of Melbourne, Fla., — F.3d ----, 2013 WL 5305341, at *4 (11th Cir. September 23, 2013). It is possible

that Richardson’s participation and potential votes in such a session would mean that the city council

review process was not “meaningful administrative review” and Richardson may be a final

policymaker. 

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improperly. At the 12(b)(6) stage, however, Allred has stated a plausible claim that

Carbon Hill denied his constitutional right to freedom of association.

Thus, the motion to dismiss the freedom of association claims against Carbon

Hill is due to be denied.

ii. Freedom of Association Claims Against Richardson

The Court reads Allred’s complaint to allege that Richardson also violated his

rights to freedom of association. Allred does not clearly state whether he is suing

Richardson in his individual capacity or his official capacity, but “plaintiffs are not

required to designate with specific words in the pleadings that they are bringing a

claim against defendants in their individual or official capacities, or both.” Young

Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, Fla., 529 F.3d 1027, 1047 (11th Cir. 2008). The

Court must look at various factors to determine the type of claim, including “the

nature of plaintiff’s claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the

nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, particularly claims of

qualified immunity which serve as an indicator that the defendant had actual

knowledge of the potential for individual liability.” Id. In his freedom of association

claim, Allred requests punitivedamages against Richardson, and punitive damages are

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only available when an official is sued in his individual capacity. See City of Newport 3

v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762 (1981) (determining that

municipalities are immune from punitive damages claims), and Colvin v. McDougall,

62 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that sheriff acting in his official capacity

could not be subject to punitive damages). Richardson also raises qualified immunity,

which suggests his awareness that he is being sued in his individual capacity. 

As noted in part III(A)(i), supra, the Court cannot determine based solely on the

pleadings who is the actual final policymaker in this action. Richardson may actually

be the final policymaker. However, a city official may be individually liable even if he

is not a final policymaker if he is an “official decisionmaker.” Quinn v. Monroe Cnty.,

330 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003). “[A]n official or formal decisionmaker may

often be identified by a rule, e.g., an employee handbook or organizational chart, or in

the case of public entity employers, by examining the statutory authority of the official

alleged to have made the decision.” Id. at 1328.

Alabama law gives the mayor authority to terminate a city employee appointed

or elected by the city council immediately and even appoint a temporary replacement.

Carbon Hill moved for dismissal of any punitive damages claims that Allred raised against 3 

Richardson in his official capacity. The Court reads Allred’s complaint to only seek punitive

damages on his § 1983 claims against Richardson in his individual capacity, not in his official

capacity. 

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Ala. Code § 11-43-81. Even though the mayor’s decision may be ultimately subject to

review by the council, Allred has pleaded that Richardson told him he was terminated.

Richardson told him that he was firing him based on his marriage and his support for

his wife’s political campaign. Thus, Allred has alleged sufficient facts to state a

plausible claim ofindividual liability as to Richardson based on expressive and intimate

association.

Richardson, however, has attempted to invoke qualified immunity protection

in this case. Qualified immunity shields government officials engaged in discretionary

tasks from liability unless they violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). An official must be acting within his

discretionary authority to be eligible for qualified immunity. Holloman ex rel. Holloman

v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263-1264 (11th Cir. 2004). 

If the official was acting within his discretionary authority, the Court must

consider whether a plaintiff has alleged facts to infer the violation of a constitutional

right and must also consider whether the right was clearly established at the time of

the misconduct. Pearson v.Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-816 (2009)

(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001)). Following Pearson, the

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Court should use its discretion to determine the proper order of the two prongs of

qualified immunity analysis. Id. at 236, 129 S. Ct. at 818. “A motion to dismiss a

complainton qualified immunity grounds will be granted ifthe complaintfails to allege

the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Richardson never clearly asserts that he was acting in his discretionary

authority. He contends instead that he did not terminate Allred’s employment, the

decision to appoint a new police chief was a decision of the city council, and

Richardson was not a policy maker in this case. For the reasons noted above, the Court

has already rejected these arguments at the motion to dismiss stage. They do not serve

as a basis for establishing Richardson’s discretionary authority. 

Even ifRichardson sufficiently asserted that he was acting within his discretion,

Allred has asserted plausible claims that violate clearly established constitutional law.

As established in Part III(A), supra, there is clearly established law in both the

Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit on the rights of expressive and intimate

association. It is also clearly established in the Eleventh Circuit that a state official

violatesthose rights by subjecting that individual to adverse employment action. Thus,

the constitutional rights at issue are clearly established. Allred has pleaded a plausible

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claim thatRichardson’s actionsdeprived him ofthese underlying constitutional rights,

as discussed above. The Court will revisit the issue of qualified immunity if

Richardson invokes it at the summary judgment stage, but qualified immunity is not

due to be granted at this time. 

Finally, insofar as Richardson has invoked legislative immunity on this federal

claim, it is inapplicable to him at this stage of the litigation. Local legislators are

entitled to absolute immunity for legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S.

44, 49, 118 S. Ct. 966, 970 (1998). However, Allred’s claims are based on

Richardson’s decision to terminate Allred and Richardson’s decision to get the city

council to appoint a new police chief, not Richardson’s legislative capacity.

Moreover, even if Allred’s claims involve Richardson’s conduct as a member of the

city council in its executive session, Richardson is not protected by legislative

immunity. Employment decisions are generally cast as administrative decisions, and

legislative immunity does not apply. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1306 (11th Cir.

2009). Individual decisions to replace employees are also administrative, not

legislative, decisions. Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 406 (11th Cir. 1995).

Richardson has not provided any facts that, based on the “nature of the act,”

would suggest that any votes relating to Allred or the appointment of the new police

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chief were legislative, not administrative. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55, 118 S. Ct. at 973.

Legislative acts in the employment context involve circumstances where lawmakers

terminate an official’s position based on budgetary or other broad public policy

concerns. See Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1306 (noting that commissioners’ decision to abolish

a position in its budget was a legislative act). Instead, the alleged facts suggest that the

decisions to terminate Allred and appoint a new police chief were based solely on

Allred’s individual circumstances and were not “discretionary, policymaking

decision[s] implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city

provides to its constituents.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56, 118 S. Ct. at 973. 

The motion to dismiss Allred’s claim against Richardson for violating his rights

of expressive and intimate association is due to be denied.

B. § 1983 Procedural Due Process Claim

To make out a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show: “‘(1) a

deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2)state action;

and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.’” Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658

F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th

Cir. 2003)). “Generally, a public employee has a property interest in continued

employment if state law or local ordinance in any way limits the power of the

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appointing body to dismiss an employee.” Ross v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 173 F.3d 1305,

1307 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Allred pursues procedural

due process claims against both Carbon Hill and Richardson.4

As with the freedom of association claims, Allred must plead factual matter

suggesting a Carbon Hill policy or custom in order to sustain a procedural due process

claim. Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1125 (11th

Cir. 1992). For the reasons discussed in Part III(A)(I), supra, Allred has pleaded

factual information to plausibly suggest that the actions of Richardson or the Carbon

Hill city council constitute actions taken by an official policymaker. Thus, ifAllred has

pleaded plausible facts to suggest a violation of his procedural due process rights,

Carbon Hill may be held liable.

Allred pleaded the prima facie case. First, he claimed that he had a continued

interest in his employment. Allred pleaded that the city council hired him in August

2010 without setting a term of employment as required by statute. Ala. Code § 11-43-

As discussed in Part III(A)(ii), supra, the Court must determinewhether claims are asserted 4 

against a city official in his individual capacity, his official capacity, or both. Allred pleaded that

“Defendant James Richardson acted on behalf of Defendant City of Carbon Hill, Alabama, in

terminating the Plaintiff’s employment without affording him procedural due process.” (Doc. 10 at

29 ¶ 161). He also seeks punitive damages on this claimagainst Richardson in his individual capacity.

Richardson raised qualified immunity. Thus, based on these circumstances, the Court reads the

complaint to attempt to state a claim against Richardson in his individual capacity as well as against

Carbon Hill. 

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46 (“The council shall fix by ordinance the terms of service, not to exceed the term

of the mayor, of all the officers appointed or elected whose terms are not prescribed

by law.”) He contends that Carbon Hill gave him a continued interest in his

employment by assuring him that the Personnel Rules, which require a hearing in the

event of termination, suspension, or demotion, govern his employment. He also

claims a continued interest in his employment on the basis of Ala. Code § 11-43-230,

which entitles a police chief to a pre-termination hearing. Although both Carbon Hill

and Richardson now claim that his term “expired” and he was not entitled to a

hearing based on either the personnel rules or Alabama statute, this is an issue to be

resolved on summary judgment. 

Allred pleaded that both Richardson and Carbon Hill deprived him of that

liberty interest by immediately removing him from his position and appointing a new

police chief without any hearing. Richardson told him that he was terminated, and the

city attorney informed Allred after an executive session that he was no longer

employed by the city. Thus, he has also pleaded that Richardson personally deprived

him of his procedural due process rights by telling him that he was fired without any

advance notice or hearing. Allred satisfied the prima facie elements.

However, Carbon Hill and Richardson contend that even ifAllred’s rights were

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violated, the Alabama state courts provide an adequate state remedy in the form of

common law certiorari. Generally, both intentional and negligent deprivations of

property rights do not constitute a procedural due process violation if an individual

can pursue a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. Hudson v.Palmer, 468U.S. 517, 533,

104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544, 101 S. Ct. 1908,

1917 (1981). However, both of these cases involved the destruction of prisoners’

personal property by prison officers. In that context, the Court reasoned that “when

deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of

a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply ‘impracticable’ since the state

cannot know when such deprivations will occur.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S. Ct.

at 3203.

The Court has applied different reasoning in the context of employment

termination actions. There, a “root requirement” of Due Process is that “‘an

individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant

property interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct.

1487, 1493 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786

(1971) (emphasis in original)). “This principle requires ‘some kind of a hearing’ prior

to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest

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in his employment.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-570, 92 S.

Ct. 2701, 2705 (1972)). The Court reasoned that denial of a person’s livelihood is a

significant deprivation, and any terminated worker faces burdens finding employment

elsewhere while questions surround the circumstances of his or her termination. Id.

at 543, 105 S. Ct. at 1494. In Loudermill, the plaintiff actually pursued several layers

of administrative review, but not state court remedies, before pursuing a claim in

federal court. Id. at 535-536, 105 S. Ct. at 1490. The Court found that the plaintiff still

stated a claim for relief based on the lack of an initial pre-termination hearing. Id. at

547-548, 105 S. Ct. 1496. 

“Post-deprivation remedies do not provide due process if pre-deprivation

remedies are practicable.” Fetner v. City of Roanoke, 813 F.2d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir.

1987).An individual “states a valid procedural due process claim when he alleges that

the defendants failed to give him written notice or a hearing before firing him.” Id.

In the employment context, the Court must consider whether a pre-termination

hearing was made available to an employee as a threshold inquiry of due process. See

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In McKinney, the

Eleventh Circuit essentially developed a two-prong analysis of procedural due process

violations in employmenttermination actions. First, the Court must establish that the

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individual had the basic pre-termination hearing required by Loudermill. Id. Second,

if the initial hearing was held and the individual argues instead that the hearing was in

some way procedurally defective, the Court must consider whether the state has made

available adequate means to remedy the deprivation. Id. at 1563. For example, if a

plaintiff contends that a state board is biased in sanctioning an employee, “only the

state’s refusal to provide a means to correct any error resulting from the bias would

engender a procedural due process violation.” Id.

Here, the Court need not reach the issue of whether common law certiorari is

an appropriate post-deprivation remedy because Allred has pleaded facts to suggest

that he was denied any pre-termination hearing. He pleaded that he was told by

Richardson that he was fired, and the city attorney corroborated this statement after

the city council met in executive session. Neither Richardson nor the city council

provided Allred with any opportunity to defend himself. He was told by Carbon Hill’s

mayor on the spot that he was fired, and no hearingwas ever held. Even though Allred

did not pursue a common law writ of certiorari, he can still proceed with a procedural

due process claim based on Carbon Hill’s total denial of an initial pre-termination

hearing.

Finally, the Court must consider whether Richardson is entitled to qualified

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immunity or legislative immunity. The test for these immunities is set forth in part

III(A)(ii), supra. Assuming that Richardson acted within his discretion, there is still

a plausible claim based on the pleadings that he violated clearly established law in the

Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit. A terminated public employee is entitled to a

basic hearing to satisfy due process, and the pleaded facts suggest that Richardson

summarily terminated Allred without giving him either notice of the termination or

an opportunity to respond. Moreover, Allred has pleaded claims against Richardson

based on his executive acts as mayor. However, even if he pleaded claims against

Richardson based on votes of the Carbon Hill city council, he is not entitled to

legislative immunity for the reasons provided in part III(A)(ii), supra. 

Thus, the motion to dismiss the procedural due process claim is due to be

denied.

C. State Law Wrongful Termination Claim

Allred also sues Carbon Hill on a state law theory ofwrongful termination. Ala. 5

Code § 11-43-230 provides that “[e]very municipality shall provide a predisciplinary

hearing prior to the suspension or termination of its law enforcement officers.” A

Allred’s amended complaint only seeks damages against Carbon Hill, and his factual 5 

allegations in this count involve Carbon Hill’s failure to provide the pre-disciplinary hearing as

applied by law. Thus, this count only states a claim as to Carbon Hill. 

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“law enforcement officer” is defined to include “a permanent and regular employee

with law enforcement duties, including police chiefs and deputy police chiefs.” Ala.

Code § 11-43-231. This definition does not include “any person who is serving a

probationary period of employment, or any person whose term of office has expired.”

Id.

Allred pleaded that he was hired in August 2010 and terminated by Richardson

in November 2012. He contends that the city council never established a term limit

for his employment, and as such he was terminated when Richardson informed him

that he was fired and that the city council would be appointing a new police chief.

After a meeting in executive session, Carbon Hill’s city attorney confirmed that Allred

was terminated. Based on these facts, Allred has pleaded a plausible claim that he was

terminated in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The defendant may

argue on summary judgment that Allred’s term in office expired and that he was not

actually terminated. However, the parties are entitled to discovery to determine the

facts surrounding Allred’s hiring and his ultimate removal from office.

Thus, the motion to dismiss the state law claim against Carbon Hill is due to be

denied.

IV. Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, both Carbon Hill’s and Richardson’s motions to

dismiss (Docs. 13, 14) are due to be denied. All claims will proceed at this time.

A separate order will be entered.

Done this 7th day of October 2013.

 

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

174256

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