Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03028/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed July 17, 2001

No. 00-3028

United States of America

v.

Jose Naranjo,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

93cr00418-01

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On Appellant's Petition for Rehearing

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Before: Sentelle, Henderson, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: After this Court denied Jose Naranjo's ("the

Defendant") appeal from the district court's denial of his

collateral review motion, he moved for rehearing or alternatively to amend his motion to include a new claim. In this

motion, for the first time the Defendant claims that his

sentence should be vacated following the Supreme Court's

decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

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Because both the district court and this Court already have

denied the Defendant's collateral review motion based on the

claims he raised originally, and because he does not offer any

reason sufficient for us to reconsider our earlier denial, we

deny his motion for rehearing. In addition, we deny his

motion to add a new claim based on Apprendi.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1995, the Defendant was convicted for drug conspiracy

in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) and 846. He was

sentenced to life in prison after the district court judge found

that he was responsible for five or more kilograms of cocaine.

On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction and sentence.

See United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1530-35 (D.C.

Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1982 (1998).

In 1999, the Defendant filed a pro se motion for habeas

corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. s 2255, asserting five claims for

relief. The district court denied the Defendant's motion and

subsequently denied his request for a certificate of appealability. The Defendant then petitioned this Court for a certificate of appealability. In August 2000, we denied his petition

and dismissed his appeal. The Defendant then filed a "Motion for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc

and Motion for Leave to Supplement/Amend Motion to Vacate" in light of Apprendi. In this filing, the Defendant

argues for the first time that his sentence should be vacated

under Apprendi. We ordered the Government to respond to

this motion and appointed amicus curiae to file a reply brief

on behalf of the Defendant.

II. ANALYSIS

In his motion, the Defendant seeks to assert issues on

rehearing that were not raised before the district court

originally or before us initially on appeal. Amicus curiae

argues that the Defendant's motion to amend should be

granted (or at least remanded to the district court to consider

granting it) under the "long-odds exception" to the general

rule barring amendments to pleadings on appeal. See DartUSCA Case #00-3028 Document #610264 Filed: 07/17/2001 Page 2 of 4
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mouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 23 (1st Cir.

1989). Under the long-odds exception recognized by the

First Circuit, a court will grant leave to amend if "justice ...

requires further proceedings." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Amicus curiae claims that justice requires permitting

the amendment in this case because, among other reasons:

(1) the Defendant in no way acted in bad faith by not raising

the Apprendi issue earlier; (2) he would have been allowed to

amend his motion in district court under Federal Rule of

Procedure 15(a); and (3) "courts freely grant pro se litigants

leave to amend," Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545,

548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). If the amendment is permitted, amicus

curiae avers that it will relate back to the time of the

Defendant's original s 2255 motion, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(2), and therefore meet s 2255's statute of limitation

requirements, see s 2255 p 6(1).

By raising certain claims "before the court which imposed

the sentence," 28 U.S.C. s 2255 p 1, the Defendant has

waived his statutory right under s 2255 to assert other claims

on appeal as part of his initial motion for collateral review.

Cf. Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 685 (8th Cir.

2001) ("Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a

petitioner for the first time on appeal."). We already have

denied the Defendant's s 2255 motion once, and he has not

articulated why the issues initially raised in that motion

justify rehearing by the panel or by the Court en banc. See

D.C. Cir. R. 35; Fed. R. App. P. 35, 40.

This Court has a well-established rule against allowing

parties to initiate new claims on appeal and has never

adopted the long-odds exception. See Shipbuilders Council

of Am. v. United States, 868 F.2d 452, 456 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

1989). We have, however, cited the First Circuit's decision in

Dartmouth Review to note that our approach to parties'

attempts to amend their pleadings on appeal "need not be

inflexible." Guam v. Am. President Lines, 28 F.3d 142, 151

& n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Still, in that case, as in other cases,

we denied the party's attempt to add a new claim on appeal.

See id. at 151; see also Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am.

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v. Babbitt, 235 F.3d 588, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Shipbuilders

Council, 868 F.2d at 456 n.2.

If we permit the Defendant to raise his Apprendi claim in

his motion for rehearing, we would be allowing him not only

to undermine this well-established rule, but also to end-run

the strict requirements for seeking collateral review under

s 2255. Congress specifically limited prisoners to one collateral review motion as of right. See s 2255 p 8. For this

reason, prisoners are on notice to "choose their issues wisely."

Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed,

the Seventh Circuit has warned prisoners that "the itch to

invoke the latest decision of the Supreme Court can be costly,

because a loss will require [the appellate] court's approval to

launch a later collateral attack if better grounds for relief

become available." Id. The district court already "has denied [the Defendant] relief" on the claims raised in his initial

motion for collateral review. See s 2255 p 5. Allowing him

(or similarly situated prisoners) to add new claims to a motion

that already has been dismissed by the district court (and

dismissed on appeal) would effectively give him two bites at

the same apple and would substantially erode the limits

Congress established on prisoners' ability to seek collateral

review. Accordingly, we deny the Defendant's request to

amend his motion for collateral review.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion for

rehearing and motion to amend his s 2255 motion are denied.

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