Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07041/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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Case No. 18-CV-07041-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

FEDERAL AGENCY OF NEWS LLC, et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FACEBOOK, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-CV-07041-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 25

Plaintiffs Federal Agency of News LLC (“FAN”) and Evgeniy Zubarev (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) bring suit against Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) because Facebook removed

FAN’s Facebook account and page. Before the Court is Facebook’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 

25. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the 

Court GRANTS Facebook’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff FAN is a “corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Russian 

Federation” that “gathers, transmits and supplies domestic and international news reports and 

other publications of public interest.” ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 2, 5. Plaintiff Evgeniy Zubarev 

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is “the sole shareholder and General Director of FAN.” Id. at ¶ 6. Defendant Facebook operates an 

online social media and social networking platform on which users like FAN can disseminate 

content by publishing on the users’ Facebook page “posts and other content for its Facebook 

followers.” Id. at ¶¶ 3-4, 25. Facebook users’ utilization of Facebook is governed by Facebook’s 

Terms of Service that, if violated, may result in the deletion of users’ Facebook accounts and 

pages. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 53, 94.

On or about December 2014, FAN started “a Facebook page through which FAN has 

published its posts and other content for its Facebook followers.” Id. at ¶ 3. After the 2016 United 

States presidential election, “Facebook began to shut down ‘inauthentic’ Facebook accounts that 

allegedly sought to inflame social and political tensions in the United States.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

Facebook allegedly shut down such accounts because the accounts’ activities were “similar or 

connected to that of Russian Facebook accounts during the 2016 United States presidential 

election which were allegedly controlled by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency (‘IRA’).” 

Id. FAN’s Facebook account and page were among those that were shut down. Id. at ¶ 52. FAN’s 

Facebook account and page were shut down on April 3, 2018. Id.

1. FAN’s Role in Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Presidential 

Election

As aforementioned, Facebook shut down Facebook accounts with connections to Russian 

Facebook accounts allegedly controlled by the IRA. Id. at ¶ 10. The IRA was “an agency which 

allegedly employed fake accounts registered on major social networks . . . to promote the Russian 

government’s interests in domestic and foreign policy.” Id. at ¶ 11. Specifically, in a United States 

Intelligence Community report regarding Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, 

the IRA was described as an agency of “professional trolls whose likely financier is a close Putin 

ally with ties to Russian intelligence.” Id. at ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, 

from “the time of FAN’s incorporation and until in or about the middle of 2015, FAN and the IRA 

were located in the same building” in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Id. at ¶ 32.

In addition, FAN’s founder and first “General Director” is Aleksandra Krylova. Id. at ¶ 29. 

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The Special Counsel investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election that 

was headed by Robert Mueller determined that Krylova was employed by the IRA from about 

September 2013 to about November 2014. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 29. However, FAN proclaims that it does 

not know the veracity of the Special Counsel’s finding. Id. at ¶ 29. Nevertheless, on February 16, 

2018, the Special Counsel indicted Krylova, who was accused of participation in the IRA’s 

“interference operations targeting the United States.” Id. at ¶ 34.

Moreover, on October 19, 2018, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Virginia unsealed a criminal complaint. Id. at ¶ 36. The criminal complaint divulged that the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) had uncovered “a Russian interference operation in 

political and electoral systems targeting populations within the Russian Federation, and other 

countries, including the United States” codenamed “Project Lakhta.” Id. In support of the criminal 

complaint, the FBI asserted that Project Lakhta used “inauthentic user names to create fictitious 

Facebook profiles” and “published false and misleading news articles intended to influence the 

U.S. and other elections.” Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43. Notably, the FBI also attested that FAN, as well as the 

IRA, were entities within Project Lakhta. Id. at ¶ 37. Furthermore, the criminal complaint was 

filed against Elena Khusyaynova, who has been FAN’s chief accountant since August 2, 2016. Id.

at ¶ 36, 46. However, FAN maintains that it had no involvement in Project Lakhta or a “direct 

connection” to the IRA. Id. at ¶¶ 40, 51.

2. Facebook’s Role in the United States’ Investigation of Russian Interference in the 

2016 Presidential Election

On September 6, 2017, Facebook’s Chief Security Officer Alex Stamos announced that 

“Facebook found approximately $100,000 in advertisement spending” between June 2015 and 

May 2017 “associated with more than 3,000 advertisements in connection with approximately 470 

allegedly inauthentic Facebook accounts and Pages.” Id. at ¶ 15. Stamos stated that “Facebook 

conducted a sweeping search looking for all ads that might have originated in Russia.” Id. at ¶ 16. 

Facebook then “shared these findings with United States authorities” and provided Congress “with 

information related to the 3,000 advertisements.” Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. 

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On September 21, 2017, Facebook’s cofounder, chairman, and chief executive officer 

Mark Zuckerberg released a video stating that “Facebook is actively working with the U.S. 

government on its ongoing investigations into Russian interference” and that Facebook is 

supplying information to the Special Counsel. Id. at ¶ 19. 

3. The Removal of FAN’s Facebook Account and Page

On April 3, 2018, Facebook shut down FAN’s Facebook account and page. Id. at ¶ 52. In 

an email, Facebook explained that FAN’s Facebook account and page were shut down because 

FAN violated Facebook’s Terms of Service. Id. at ¶ 53. FAN was among the more than 270 

Russian language accounts and pages that Facebook shut down on April 3, 2018. Id. at ¶ 20. On 

the same day, Zuckerberg published a blog post explaining Facebook’s actions. Id. at ¶ 21. 

Zuckerberg wrote that the accounts and pages taken down on April 3, 2018 were removed because 

“they were controlled by the IRA” and not because of “the content they shared.” Id. Specifically, 

Zuckerberg wrote that the IRA “has repeatedly acted deceptively and tried to manipulate people in 

the US, Europe, and Russia,” and since 2016, when the IRA “had set up a network of hundreds of 

fake accounts to spread divisive content and interfere in the US presidential election,” Facebook 

has improved its “techniques to prevent nation states from interfering in foreign elections.” Mark 

Zuckerberg, https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104771321644971 (last visited July 19, 

2019). 

B. Procedural History

On November 20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Facebook. ECF No. 1. On 

April 15, 2019, Facebook filed the instant motion to dismiss. ECF No. 25 (“Mot.”). On May 15, 

2019, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. ECF No. 26 (“Opp.”). On May 29, 2019, Facebook filed a 

reply. ECF No. 27 (“Reply”). On June 12, 2019 and June 19, 2019, Facebook filed two separate 

statements of recent decisions pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d)(2). ECF Nos. 28-29. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

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short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 

noticeable facts, see Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 

beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

B. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 

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leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 

amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 

moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ complaint states the following five causes of action: (1) a Bivens claim for 

violation of the First Amendment; (2) “damages under Title II of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 

and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983”; (3) “damages under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act”; (4) 

breach of contract; and (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Compl. at ¶¶

59-117.

Facebook argues that the Communications Decency Act renders Facebook immune from 

all of Plaintiffs’ federal and state causes of action, except for Plaintiffs’ first cause of action: a 

Bivens claim for violation of the First Amendment. Mot. at 6. Moreover, Facebook argues that 

Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim for violation of the First Amendment fails because Facebook is not a state 

actor, and the First Amendment only applies to state actors or private entities whose actions 

amount to state action. Id. at 9.

The Court finds Facebook’s arguments persuasive. Therefore, below, the Court first 

addresses why Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for “damages under . . . 42 U.S.C. Section 1983” 

fails, then how Facebook is immune from most of Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action pursuant 

to the Communication Decency Act, and finally why Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim for violation of the 

First Amendment fails because Facebook is neither a state actor nor a private actor whose actions 

amount to state action.

A. Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fails

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action requests “damages under . . . 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.” 

Compl. at ¶¶ 79-88. It is unclear how Plaintiffs can allege a § 1983 violation. “To sustain an action 

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under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional 

right.” Balistreri v. Pacifia Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs’ complaint 

does not allege that any party was acting under color of state law. Moreover, this second cause of 

action also alleges a violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, not a violation of a 

constitutional right. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs allege a violation of § 1983 under Plaintiffs’ 

second cause of action, the Court hereby DISMISSES the § 1983 claim with prejudice. 

Amendment would be futile and unduly prejudicial to Facebook. Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532

(“[W]hether to grant leave to amend nevertheless remains within the discretion of the district 

court, which may deny leave to amend due to undue delay, bad faith[,] dilatory motive[,] . . . 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party[,] . . . [and] futility 

of amendment.”). No amount of additional pleading can transform Plaintiffs’ Title II statutory 

claim into a claim for violation of a constitutional right. Moreover, it would be prejudicial to 

require Facebook to continue to litigate a claim that fails as a matter of law.

B. Communications Decency Act

The Court now turns to the Communications Decency Act, which renders Facebook 

immune from all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action, except for Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim for violation of 

the First Amendment. 

Under the Communications Decency Act, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 

service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 

information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). In interpreting § 230, the Ninth Circuit held 

en banc that in “passing section 230 [of the Communications Decency Act], . . . Congress sought 

to immunize the removal of user-generated content . . . .” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 

Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (emphasis added). 

Any “activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties 

seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.” Id. at 1170-71. This immunity extends 

to causes of action under both state and federal law. Id. at 1169 n.24. Moreover, § 230(c)(1)

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“immunizes decisions to delete user profiles.” Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., 444 Fed. App’x 986, 987 

(9th Cir. 2011). However, the Ninth Circuit has not interpreted § 230 to grant immunity for causes 

of action alleging constitutional violations. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1164.

The Communications Decency Act’s grant of immunity applies to a defendant if: “(1) 

Defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the information for which 

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable is information provided by another information content 

provider; and (3) Plaintiff’s claim seeks to hold Defendant liable as the publisher or speaker of that 

information.” Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 

(hereinafter “Sikhs for Justice I”) (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. 

Facebook, Inc., 697 Fed. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter “Sikhs for Justice II”). The Court 

addresses these three prongs in turn.

1. Interactive Computer Service

To satisfy the first prong of the Communications Decency Act’s immunity test, the 

defendant must be an “interactive computer service.” “Interactive computer service” is defined as 

“any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 

access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 

provides access to the Internet . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Facebook is unquestionably an 

interactive computer service, and Plaintiffs do not even attempt to dispute that Facebook is an 

interactive computer service. In addition, according to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Facebook is a “web 

based platform or service” with “2.2 billion monthly users” who utilize the internet to gain access 

to “Facebook account[s], posts, and all content” stored on Facebook’s “platform or service.” 

Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 60-61. Thus, Plaintiffs’ complaint also supports the notion that Facebook is an 

interactive computer service.

This Court has previously found that Facebook is an “interactive computer service” 

because Facebook “provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer service.” 

Sikhs for Justice I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1093. This Court’s decision in Sikhs for Justice I was 

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, which also held that “Facebook is an interactive computer service 

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provider.” Sikhs for Justice II, 697 Fed. App’x at 526. Similarly, in Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 

F. Supp. 2d 785, 801 (N.D. Cal. 2011), this Court found that “Facebook meets the definition of an 

interactive computer service under the [Communications Decency Act].”

Many other courts have also found Facebook to be an interactive computer service. For 

instance, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held: “Facebook qualifies as an 

interactive computer service because it is a service that provides information to multiple users by 

giving them computer access . . . to a computer server, namely the servers that host its social 

networking website.” Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also 

Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Plaintiff does not 

vigorously dispute that Facebook provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 

computer service. As such, the court finds, as others have previously, that Facebook provides an 

interactive computer service.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Thus, Facebook satisfies the first prong of the Communications Decency Act’s immunity

test: that Facebook is an interactive computer service. 

2. Information Provided by Another Information Content Provider

To satisfy the second prong of the Communication Decency Act’s immunity test, the 

information for which Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook liable—FAN’s account, posts, and 

content—must be information provided by an “information content provider” that is not Facebook.

An “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole 

or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any 

other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 

Plaintiffs do not challenge that the information for which Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook 

liable for removing—FAN’s Facebook account, posts, and content—was not provided by 

Facebook, but rather, by FAN. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ complaint is unequivocal that “FAN has 

operated a Facebook page through which FAN has published its posts and other content,” that 

“FAN . . . gathers, transmits, and supplies domestic and international news reports and other 

publications of public interest,” and that “[o]ne of the media that FAN uses to disseminate news, 

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primarily of local interest, throughout the Russian Federation is Facebook.” Compl. at ¶¶ 2-3, 25. 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ own complaint admits that FAN is the source of the information that Facebook 

removed. By contrast, the complaint nowhere alleges that Facebook provided, created, or 

developed any portion or content of FAN’s Facebook account, posts, and content. Therefore, FAN 

is the information content provider in the instant case.

An analogous case is Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., 2016 WL 3648608 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 

2016). The Lancaster plaintiff brought suit against the defendant because the defendant removed 

some of the plaintiff’s videos hosted by the video sharing website YouTube. Id. at *3. However, 

because the removed videos were not created by YouTube, but rather, were the plaintiff’s 

creations or public domain videos, the Lancaster court concluded that the information for which 

the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable was information provided by another information 

content provider (i.e., the Lancaster plaintiff) and not YouTube.

Likewise, here, the complaint reveals that FAN’s Facebook account, posts, and content 

were created and disseminated by FAN, not Facebook. Thus, Facebook satisfies the second prong 

of the Communications Decency Act’s immunity test: that the information for which the Plaintiffs 

seek to hold Facebook liable was information solely provided by FAN, the information content 

provider in the instant case.

3. Treatment as Publisher

The third and final prong of the Communication Decency Act’s immunity test requires that 

Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook liable as a publisher or speaker of Plaintiffs’ content. 

“[P]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from 

publication third-party content.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)

(emphasis added). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Facebook’s decision to remove FAN’s account, 

postings, and content. Note that here, the Court does not broach Count I, Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim 

for violation of the First Amendment, because as discussed above, the Communications Decency 

Act does not immunize a defendant from constitutional claims. However, the Court discusses how 

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Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action are predicated on Facebook’s decision to remove FAN’s 

account, postings, and content. 

For instance, Count II of Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks damages under Title II of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 because “Facebook willfully, intentionally, purposefully, knowingly, 

recklessly, and/or negligently deprived FAN and its members . . . of Facebook’s internet-based 

social networking service.” Compl. at ¶ 84. Count III of Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks damages under 

the California Unruh Civil Rights Act because “Facebook has denied access to Facebook internet 

connections and the Facebook ‘community’ based on Russian nationality and/or Russian 

ethnicity.” Id. at ¶ 91. Count IV of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges breach of contract because 

“Facebook breached the contract[, the Facebook Terms of Service,] by removing FAN’s Facebook 

account and blocking FAN’s content.” Id. at ¶ 98. Count V of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because “Facebook breached its 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings [sic] by blocking FAN’s access to Facebook users 

and FAN subscribers.” Id. at ¶ 106. 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Facebook’s decision not to publish FAN’s content.

The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “immaterial whether [the] decision comes in the form of 

deciding what to publish in the first place or what to remove among the published material.” 

Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 n.8. In other words, “removing content is something publishers do, and 

to impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a 

publisher.” Id. at 1103 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held en banc that “activity 

that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post

online is perforce immune under section 230” of the Communications Decency Act.

Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1163. Thus, because Plaintiffs’ second through fifth claims are 

predicated on Facebook’s decision to remove content, Ninth Circuit law under Barnes

unambiguously establishes that Plaintiffs’ claims treat Facebook as a publisher. Therefore, 

Facebook satisfies the third and final prong of the Communications Decency Act’s immunity test: 

that Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook liable as a publisher or speaker of Plaintiffs’ content.

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Plaintiffs argue that the Communications Decency Act does not immunize Facebook 

because the instant case “does not concern obscenity or any other form of unprotected speech; it 

concerns political speech that strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.” Opp. at 16. It is telling 

that Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority for this argument. Immunity under the Communications 

Decency Act does not contain a political speech exception. The statutory text provides that no 

“provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 

any information provided by another information content provider. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) 

(emphasis added). No distinction is made between political speech and non-political speech. 

Numerous courts have held that the Communications Decency Act immunizes a website’s 

removal of political speech. For instance, this Court has held that under the Communications 

Decency Act, Facebook was immune from liability for blocking access to the plaintiff’s Facebook 

page through which the plaintiff had “organized a number of political and human rights advocacy 

campaigns.” Sikhs for Justice I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1090, 1094-96. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this 

Court’s order in Sikhs for Justice I. See Sikhs for Justice II, 697 Fed. App’x at 526; see also Ebeid 

v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 WL 2059662, at *1-*3 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019) (holding that the 

Communications Decency Act immunized Facebook for “restricting what plaintiff can post on the 

Facebook platform” by removing the plaintiff’s posts “calling for the recall of John Casson, the 

then-British Ambassador to Egypt”).

Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that granting Facebook immunity in the instant case is counter 

to the congressional intent behind the Communications Decency Act. Opp. at 18-19. Plaintiffs’ 

argument misses the mark. The Ninth Circuit has held: “Both parties make a lot of sound and fury 

on the congressional intent of the immunity under section 230, but such noise ultimately signifies 

nothing. It is the language of the statute that defines and enacts the concerns and aims of 

Congress; a particular concern does not rewrite the language.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105 (emphasis 

added). As explained above, Ninth Circuit case law interpreting the language of the 

Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), has held that “activity that can be boiled 

down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce 

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immune under section 230.” Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71.

4. Summary

Facebook satisfies all three prongs of the test to establish whether the Communications 

Decency Act immunizes Facebook from non-constitutional federal and state causes of action. 

Plaintiffs’ non-constitutional causes of action are: the second cause of action for damages under 

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the third cause of action for damages under the California 

Unruh Civil Rights Act; the fourth cause of action for breach of contract; and the fifth cause of 

action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As none of these causes of 

action are asserted as a constitutional claim, the Communications Decency Act immunizes 

Facebook from liability for all these causes of action. Therefore, the Court need not reach the 

merits of these causes of action.

Thus, because of Facebook’s immunity under the Communications Decency Act, the Court 

hereby DISMISSES: the second cause of action for damages under Title II of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964; the third cause of action for damages under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; the 

fourth cause of action for breach of contract; and the fifth cause of action for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

Even though the Court is skeptical that Plaintiffs can state a claim, the Court grants leave 

to amend out of an abundance of caution. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532.

C. Bivens Claim for Violation of the First Amendment

Plaintiffs’ sole remaining claim is their first cause of action: a Bivens claim for violation of 

the First Amendment. However, it is axiomatic that the “constitutional guarantee of free speech is 

a guarantee only against abridgement by government, federal or state.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 

U.S. 507, 513 (1976). Thus, it is “undisputed that the First Amendment of the United States 

Constitution only applies to government actors; it does not apply to private corporations or 

persons.” Redden v. The Women’s Ctr. of San Joaquin Cty., 2006 WL 132088, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 17, 2008) (citing Manson v. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., 200 F.3d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 

2000)).

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Indeed, courts have previously rejected attempts to apply the First Amendment to 

Facebook, a “corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,” Compl. 

at ¶ 7. For instance, the Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google, Inc. court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First 

Amendment claim because “Facebook and Twitter . . . are private businesses that do not become 

‘state actors’ based solely on the provision of their social media networks to the public.” 368 F. 

Supp. 3d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2019); see also, e.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 2010 WL 4269304, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against Facebook for violation of the 

First Amendment because Facebook is not a state actor); Shulman v. Facebook.com, 2017 WL 

5129885, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017) (rejecting the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against 

Facebook because Facebook is not a state actor, and noting that “efforts to apply the First 

Amendment to Facebook . . . have consistently failed”). Here, Plaintiffs make no allegations that 

the federal government or a state government had any involvement in Facebook’s removal of 

FAN’s profile, page, and content. Thus, Facebook’s deletion of FAN’s profile, page, and content 

is private conduct that does not constitute governmental action. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to state a 

Bivens claim against Facebook for violation of the First Amendment.

However, Plaintiffs maintain that Facebook’s deletion of FAN’s profile, page, and content 

is actionable under the First Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that first, Facebook 

constitutes a “public forum,” and second, that Facebook’s actions amount to state action. Opp. at 

9, 12. Neither argument is persuasive. The Court addresses Plaintiffs’ two arguments in turn.

1. Facebook is Not a Public Forum

Plaintiffs argue, without support from any authority, that a “public forum denotes a place, 

whether it be a physical place or a location in cyber space that is open to the public for purposes of 

expression.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs believe that Facebook is a public forum because Facebook 

“operates a freely available public forum, open to any and all people who are at least 13 years old, 

with internet access and a valid e-mail address.” Id.

Facebook argues that Plaintiffs’ arguments are incorrect because case law has rejected the 

notion that private companies such as Facebook are public fora. Mot. at 11. Furthermore, 

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Facebook asserts that in order for a private entity to operate as a public forum, the entity must 

have engaged in a function that is both traditionally and exclusively governmental. Id. The Court 

finds Facebook’s arguments more compelling, and addresses each of Facebook’s arguments in 

turn.

a. Case Law Establishes that Private Internet Companies are not Public Fora

Courts have rejected the notion that private corporations providing services via the internet

are public fora for purposes of the First Amendment. For instance, in Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 

this Court rejected the notion that “private social media corporations . . . are state actors that must 

regulate the content of their websites according to the strictures of the First Amendment” under 

public forum analysis. 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (emphasis in original). 

In addition, the Ebeid court rejected the argument that Facebook is a public forum. 2019 WL 

2059662, at *6. Moreover, in Buza v. Yahoo!, Inc., the court held that the plaintiff’s assertion that 

“Yahoo!’s services should be seen as a ‘public forum’ in which the guarantees of the First 

Amendment apply is not tenable under federal law. As a private actor, Yahoo! has every right to 

control the content of material on its servers, and appearing on websites that it hosts.” 2011 WL 

5041174, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011). Furthermore, in Langdon v. Google, Inc., the court held 

that “Plaintiff’s analogy of [Google and other] Defendants’ private networks to shopping centers 

and [plaintiff’s] position that since they are open to the public they become public forums is not 

supported by case law.” 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 632 (D. Del. 2007).

At bottom, the United States Supreme Court has held that property does not “lose its 

private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.” 

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972). Thus, simply because Facebook has many users 

that create or share content, it does not mean that Facebook, a private social media company by 

Plaintiffs’ own admission in the complaint, becomes a public forum.

Plaintiffs rely on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and its progeny for the notion 

that a “private enterprise [that] exercised semi-official municipal functions as a delegate of the 

state would be subject to the public fora analysis of the First Amendment.” Opp. at 9. However, 

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Marsh is distinguishable. In Marsh, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution of a 

person distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a private company-owned town violated 

the First Amendment. 326 U.S. at 508-09. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that 

although the company-owned town was privately owned, the town was essentially a public 

municipality subject to the First Amendment because the town exercised the powers of a public 

municipality. Id. at 503-04, 509. However, the United States Supreme Court subsequently cabined 

the holding in Marsh to the situation where a private enterprise assumes “all of the attributes of a 

state-created municipality” such that the private enterprise “was performing the full spectrum of 

municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State.” Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569. Plaintiffs do 

not allege that Facebook assumes all of the attributes of a state-created municipality or that 

Facebook was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the 

state. Thus, Marsh does not support Plaintiffs’ argument. 

In sum, Facebook is not a public forum under Ninth Circuit law.

b. For a Private Entity to Operate as a Public Forum, the Entity Must Engage in a 

Function that is Both Traditionally and Exclusively Governmental 

The Court now turns to Plaintiffs’ argument that Facebook operates as a public forum by 

engaging in functions that are traditionally and exclusively governmental. Whether a private entity 

operates as a public forum is only relevant to the “public function test,” one of four tests the 

United States Supreme Court has articulated “for determining whether a private [party’s] actions 

amount to state action.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 

Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that because an entity “performs an 

exclusively and traditionally public function within a public forum, we focus only upon the public 

function test”). Here, the Court finds that Facebook did not engage in functions that are 

traditionally and exclusively functions of the state. Examples of functions that are traditionally the 

exclusive prerogative of the state include “hol[ding public] elections”, “govern[ing] a town,” or 

“serv[ing] as an international peacekeeping force.” Brunette v. Humane Society of Ventura Cty., 

294 F.3d 1205, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002). There are no allegations that Facebook holds public 

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elections, governs a town, or serves as an international peacekeeping force. 

This Court has previously held that “private entities who creat[e] their own . . . social 

media website and make decisions about whether and how to regulate content that has been 

uploaded on that website” have not engaged in “public functions that were traditionally

exclusively reserved to the State.” Prager, 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Similarly, the Ebeid court held that “Facebook’s regulation of speech on its platform” is 

not a function exclusively reserved for the state, thus Facebook was not a public forum. 2019 WL 

2059662, at *6. Moreover, the Harris v. Kern Cty. Sheriffs court held that Facebook does not 

satisfy the public function test because Facebook “had [not], “in essence, become the 

government.” 2019 WL 1777976, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2019). Furthermore, the Cyber 

Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc. court held that AOL, “one of many private online companies 

which allow its members access to the Internet . . . where they can exchange information with the 

general public,” did not satisfy the public function test. 948 F. Supp. 436, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

Numerous other courts have also declined to treat similar private social media 

corporations, as well as online service providers, as state actors. See, e.g., Howard v. Am. Online, 

Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that AOL should be deemed a state 

actor because it is a “quasi-public utility” that “involves a public trust”); Kinderstart.com LLC v. 

Google, Inc., 2007 WL 831806, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“[T]he emanation of third-party 

speech from a search engine [does not] somehow transform[] that privately-owned entity into a 

public forum.”); Nyabwa v. Facebook, 2018 WL 585467, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2018) 

(“Because the First Amendment governs only governmental restrictions on speech, Nyabwa has 

not stated a cause of action against Facebook.”); Shulman v. Facebook.com, 2017 WL 5129885, at

*4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claims against Facebook for failure to 

sufficiently allege that Facebook is a state actor); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 

631-32 (D. Del. 2007) (finding that Google is a private entity that is ”not subject to constitutional 

free speech guarantees” and asserting that the United States Supreme Court “has routinely rejected 

the assumption that people who want to express their views in a private facility, such as a 

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shopping center, have a constitutional right to do so”).

Thus, by operating its social media website, Facebook has not engaged in any functions 

exclusively reserved for the government. Therefore, Facebook does not operate as a public forum, 

so Facebook’s actions do not amount to state action under the public function test.

2. Facebook’s Actions Do Not Amount to State Action

Plaintiffs assert that Facebook’s actions satisfy the joint action test, which is one of the 

four tests the United States Supreme Court has articulated in discerning whether a private party’s 

actions amount to state action subject to the Constitution. Opp. at 12-13. However, Facebook 

responds by asserting that there are no factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint that would 

support a finding that Facebook satisfies the joint action test. Mot. at 13. Facebook has the better 

argument.

The joint action test asks “whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert 

in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1140 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “This requirement can be satisfied either by proving the existence of a 

conspiracy or by showing that the private party was a willful participant in joint action with the 

State or its agents.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, joint action exists when 

the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that 

it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Id. Notably, merely 

“supplying information [to the state] alone does not amount to conspiracy or joint action.” Deeths 

v. Lucile Slater Packard Children’s Hosp. at Stanford, 2013 WL 6185175, at *10-*11 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 26, 2013); see also Lockhead v. Weinstein, 24 Fed. App’x 805, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 

mere furnishing of information to police officers does not constitute joint action . . . .”); Butler v. 

Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (“[W]e decline 

to hold that the mere act of furnishing information to law enforcement officers constitutes joint 

(activity) with state officials . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schaffer v. Salt Lake City 

Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have consistently held that furnishing 

information to law enforcement officers, without more, does not constitute joint action.”); 

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Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); 

Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 399 (6th Cir. 2009) (same). The Court first discusses 

whether Facebook was a willful participant in joint action with the government, and then turns to 

whether Facebook and the government conspired together.

a. Facebook was not a Willful Participant in Joint Action with the Government

As discussed above, the joint action test can be satisfied if the private party was a “willful 

participant in joint action with the State.” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1140. The only allegations that 

Plaintiffs can muster in support of their joint action theory are: 

• that Facebook searched for advertisements that “might have originated in Russia,” and 

“shared these findings with United States authorities,” Compl. at ¶ 16;

• that “Facebook would provide the United States Congress with information,” Id. at ¶ 17

• that Facebook would “do its part ‘to make sure investigators have the information they 

need,’” Id. at ¶ 18;

• that Facebook was “actively working with the U.S. government” and “providing 

information” to the Special Counsel, Id. at ¶ 19; and

• that Facebook acted “at the behest of the government of the United States,” Id. at ¶ 66.

These allegations reveal that Facebook allegedly supplied the government with information that 

might relate to the government’s investigation into Russian interference with the 2016 presidential 

election. However, the case law is unequivocal that “supplying information [to the state] alone 

does not amount to conspiracy or joint action.” Deeths, 2013 WL 6185175, at *10-*11. Indeed, 

the complaint does not even allege that the government was aware that Facebook removed FAN’s 

account and page. Moreover, the allegation that Facebook acted “at the behest of the government” 

is entirely conclusory and fails to meet the pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. A 

“bare allegation of . . . joint action will not overcome a motion to dismiss.” Dietrich v. John 

Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court finds Deeths instructive. In Deeths, the plaintiff sued, inter alia, Dr. John 

Stirling for Dr. Stirling’s role in Kern County Child Protective Services’ social workers’ 

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investigation into suspected child abuse by the plaintiff and removal of the plaintiff’s child from 

the plaintiff’s care. 2013 WL 6185175, at *10. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Dr. Stirling, a

private actor, had extensive contact with Kern County social workers on numerous occasions and 

provided allegedly false information about the health and wellbeing of the plaintiff’s child to the 

Kern County social workers. Id. at *3. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that Dr. Stirling actually 

recommended to Kern County social workers that the plaintiff’s child be removed from the 

plaintiff’s care and that the plaintiff’s child was removed from Plaintiff’s care as a result of Dr. 

Stirling’s recommendation. Id. at *4, *10. Thus, even though Kern County social workers relied 

on Dr. Stirling’s information and recommendation to remove the plaintiff’s child from the 

plaintiff’s care, the Deeths court found no joint action between Dr. Stirling and the government. 

Id. at *10.

By contrast, in the instant case, Plaintiffs argue that Facebook, a private actor, was a 

willful participant in joint action with the government because Facebook provided the government 

with information for the government’s investigation of Russian interference with the 2016 

presidential election. Opp. at 12-15. Plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit. The Deeths court found that

there was no joint action even though a state actor relied upon a private actor’s information and 

recommendation to remove the plaintiff’s child from the plaintiff’s care. Id. at *4, *10. In the 

instant case, Plaintiffs only allege that Facebook provided the government with information.

Compl. at ¶¶ 16-19. Thus, under Deeths, Facebook was not a willful participant in joint action 

with the government.

In addition, Plaintiffs’ claims of joint action between Facebook and the government fail for 

another equally dispositive reason. The Ninth Circuit has held that for there to be joint action, 

there must be “‘state actions’ directed by or jointly conceived, facilitated, or performed by the 

[government actor].” Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1213. Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim for violation of the First 

Amendment is predicated on the alleged violation of “FAN’s First Amendment rights by deleting 

the contents of FAN’s Facebook Page and blocking FAN’s access to its Facebook account.” 

Compl. at ¶ 75. However, the only interactions between Facebook and the government alleged in 

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the complaint pertain to how Facebook provided information to the government for the 

government’s Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election investigation. See, e.g., Id.

at ¶ 17 (“Facebook would provide the United States Congress with information . . . .”). Plaintiffs 

do not allege that the government played any role in shutting down FAN’s Facebook page or 

blocking FAN’s access to its Facebook account. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to allege any state action 

“directly by or jointly conceived, facilitated, or performed by the” government that relates to the 

deletion of FAN’s Facebook page or restriction on FAN’s access to its Facebook account.

Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1213. Consequently, there is no joint action here because there is no 

indication that the government directly or jointly conceived, facilitated, or performed a role in 

Facebook’s decision to shut down FAN’s Facebook page or the decision to prevent FAN from 

accessing its Facebook account.

In sum, the Court finds that there was no joint action because Facebook was not a willful 

participant in joint action with the government, and the government did not directly or jointly 

conceive, facilitate, or perform any action relating to Facebook’s deletion of FAN’s Facebook 

page or restriction of FAN’s access to its Facebook account.

b. Facebook did not Conspire with the Government

As discussed above, the joint action test can also be satisfied by proving a conspiracy 

between the government and the private party. Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1140. To prove a conspiracy 

“between private parties and the government,” there must be “an agreement or ‘meeting of the 

minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). None of 

Plaintiffs’ allegations support the theory that there was either an agreement or a meeting of the 

minds between Facebook and the government to violate Plaintiffs’ rights. 

Thus, there was no joint action because Plaintiffs fail to allege the existence of an 

agreement or a meeting of the minds between Facebook and the government.

c. Summary

In sum, Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim for violation of the First Amendment fails because the 

First Amendment applies only to federal and state governmental actors with very few exceptions.

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Plaintiffs assert that under the joint action test, one such exception, the First Amendment applies 

to private actor Facebook’s decision to delete FAN’s Facebook page and prevent access to FAN’s 

Facebook account. However, as discussed above, the joint action test has not been satisfied here 

because Facebook was not a willful participant in joint action with the government, and Facebook 

did not conspire with the government to violate any constitutional rights. 

Thus, the Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ first cause of action: a Bivens claim for 

violation of the First Amendment. Because granting Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend 

the complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Defendant, and 

Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith, the Court grants leave to amend. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 

F.3d at 532.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the following causes of action without 

prejudice: (1) a Bivens claim for violation of the First Amendment; (2) “damages under Title II of 

the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964”; (3) “damages under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act”; 

(4) breach of contract; and (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Compl. at 

¶¶ 59-117.

The Court DISMISSES with prejudice part of Plaintiffs’ second cause of action, a claim 

for damages under § 1983.

Should Plaintiffs elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiffs shall do so within 30 days. Failure to file an amended complaint within 30 days

or failure to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order or in Defendant’s briefing will result in

dismissal with prejudice of the claims dismissed in this Order. Plaintiffs may not add new causes 

of actions or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2019

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______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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