Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00490/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 11:101 Bankruptcy

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MELANIE HUGHES, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

CLAYEO C. ARNOLD and CLAYEO C. 

ARNOLD, PROFESSIONAL LAW 

CORPORATION, 

 Appellees. 

 

______________________________/

No. 2:08-00490 JAM 

Order Denying Motion for Stay 

Pending Appeal

 The matter is before the Court on a bankruptcy appeal. 

Melanie Hughes (“Appellant”) has filed a motion for a stay 

pending appeal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment order. 

Clayeo C. Arnold and Clayeo C. Arnold, Professional Law 

Corporation (“Appellees”) oppose the motion. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion.1

 

1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 78-230(h). 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On or about March 14, 2005, Appellant filed a petition for 

relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby 

commencing the underlying bankruptcy case.2 On June 14, 2005, 

Appellees filed a complaint to determine dischargeability of 

debts and for denial of discharge, thereby commencing an 

adversary action requesting that certain debts owed to Appellees 

be adjudicated as non-dischargeable, including a state court 

judgment awarding attorney’s fees and costs (“attorney’s fees” 

award) to Appellees following a jury verdict in their favor in a 

sexual harassment action brought by Appellant.3 

On May 22, 2007, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. On August 24, 2007, Appellees’ summary 

judgment motion was granted to the extent it sought a 

determination that the attorney’s fee award was nondischargeable (“Partial Summary Judgment Order”). On September 

4, 2007, Appellant filed a notice of appeal of the Partial 

Summary Judgment Order and a statement of election to have the 

2

 The material facts relevant to this motion are taken from 

the record below. 

3

 Appellees’ first two causes of action in their complaint 

seek a determination that the attorney’s fee award is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as a willful and 

malicious injury. Appellees’ third and fourth causes of action 

seek to deny Appellant’s discharge, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 

727(a), for failure to keep adequate records and for concealing 

property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 

2

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appeal heard by the district court. The district court 

subsequently granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal on 

the ground that the Partial Summary Judgment Order was not a 

final judgment because it adjudicated fewer than all the claims 

in the adversary proceeding. 

In the meantime, on October 3, 2007, Appellees filed two 

motions in the adversary proceeding: (1) a motion seeking a 

determination of the amount owed by Appellant on the nondischargeable attorney’s fee award; and (2) a motion for relief 

from the automatic stay. On February 19, 2008, the bankruptcy 

court issued an order determining that the amount owed on the 

attorney’s fee award to be $122,702.37 (“Order Determining 

Amounts”). On March 3, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered an 

order certifying the Partial Summary Judgment Order as a final 

order, as supplemented by the Order Determining the Amounts 

pursuant to Rule 54(b). Upon entry of the final appealable 

judgment, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay 

precluding execution on the non-dischargeable attorney’s fee 

award. Appellant then filed a notice of appeal. On March 24, 

2008, the bankruptcy court denied Appellant’s motion to stay 

proceedings pending appeal. Appellant now seeks an order from 

this Court staying the proceedings pending appeal of the 

bankruptcy court’s Partial Summary Judgment Order. 

/// 

3

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II. OPINION 

“The standard for evaluating stays pending appeal is 

similar to that employed by district courts in deciding whether 

to grant a preliminary injunction.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 

1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). “An appellant seeking a 

discretionary stay pending appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8005 

must prove: (1) appellant is likely to succeed on the merits of 

the appeal; (2) appellant will suffer irreparable injury; (3) no 

substantial harm will come to appellee; and (4) the stay will do 

no harm to the public interest.” In re Irwin, 338 B.R. 839, 843 

(E.D. Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party 

moving for a stay has the burden on each of these elements.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The movant’s failure to 

establish even one of the elements dooms the motion. Id.

“A motion for a stay of the judgment, order, or decree of a 

bankruptcy judge . . . must ordinarily be presented to the 

bankruptcy judge in the first instance.” Fed. R. Bankr.P 8005. 

“When a bankruptcy court has ruled on the issue of a stay of its 

order pending appeal, the district court, sitting as an 

appellate court, reviews that decision for abuse of discretion.” 

In re Irwin, 338 B.R. at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted); 

Matter of Universal Life Church, Inc., 191 B.R. 433, 444 (E.D. 

Cal. 1995). Discretion is only abused when the judicial action 

is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; or put another way, 

4

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discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take 

the view adopted by the trial court. In re Irwin, 338 B.R. at 

844. It is well-established that “on appeal to the district 

court from bankruptcy court, issues of law are reviewed de novo 

while the district court is constrained to accept the bankruptcy 

court’s findings of facts unless they are clearly erroneous.” 

Id.

 In the present case, the Court finds that Appellant has 

failed to sustain her burden to establish that a stay pending 

appeal is warranted. Specifically, Appellant did not offer any 

facts demonstrating that she will suffer irreparable harm absent 

a stay. While Appellant maintains that she would suffer 

irreparable harm if Appellees begin to collect on their debt, 

she provides no support for this assertion. As such, the Court 

finds that Appellant has failed to establish that she will 

suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not issued at this time.4 

Accordingly, Appellant’s motion to stay pending appeal is 

DENIED. 

/// 

 

4

 Because Appellant had failed to demonstrate irreparable 

harm, the Court need not reach the remaining elements a movant 

must prove in order to warrant a stay pending appeal. 

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III. ORDER 

 For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES 

Appellant’s motion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 21, 2008 

 

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