Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02177/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02177-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2177

___________

John R. Beckman, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

KGP Telecommunications, Inc., * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2005

Filed: April 20, 2005 

___________

Before MELLOY, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

John R. Beckman began working for KGP Telecommunications, Inc. in 1997

when he was fifty-four years old. Beckman first worked as an outside sales

representative, and later as national sales manager for one of KGP’s divisions. In

2001, KGP suffered a financial downturn resulting in a 50% reduction of its

workforce. Between August 2001 and February 2002, KGP implemented three

workforce reductions, engaged in two organizational restructurings, and enforced a

hiring and wage freeze. During this timeframe, Beckman’s position was merged with

another. Beckman was not selected for the consolidated position, so he returned to

outside sales at a reduced salary. KGP chose its director of business development,

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*

The Honorable Joan Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota. 

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fifty-year-old John Grubb, to fill the consolidated position. Grubb became

Beckman’s supervisor. In February 2002, Beckman was laid off as part of KGP’s

third reduction in force. 

Beckman then brought this lawsuit against KGP alleging age discrimination.

The district court*

 granted summary judgment to KGP, finding Beckman failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, KGP had a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Beckman’s employment, and Beckman

failed to show KGP’s nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him was a pretext for

age discrimination. 

On appeal, Beckman argues the district court committed error in granting

summary judgment. Under the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), Beckman had to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. See Chambers v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Inc. Co., 351

F.3d 848, 855-56 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating elements of prima facie ADEA case

involving reduction in force). The burden then shifted to KGP to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Beckman’s termination. Id. at 855. After

KGP satisfied its burden of production, Beckman was required to show KGP’s stated

reason–a reduction in force– was a pretext for age discrimination. Id. 

Here, Beckman failed to present sufficient evidence that age discrimination was

the true reason for his termination. Beckman was in the same age group when he was

hired and fired, he was not replaced by anyone younger, he was not a superior

candidate for the consolidated position, the employees allegedly given preferential

treatment were in the same age group as Beckman, and the KGP workforce got older,

rather than younger, during the reductions in force. 

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Beckman asserts comments allegedly made by Grubb and the owner’s husband

show he was fired because of age discrimination. When Beckman met with Grubb

in September 2001 to discuss his sales job, Grubb remarked, “I guess I need to get

you some accounts, or you’ll be down the road, old man.” The next month, the

owner’s husband called Beckman on the telephone to discuss his job change and

asked, “Hey old man, you haven’t gone and slit your wrists or anything, have you?”

Beckman later asked Grubb why his salary was cut, and Grubb responded, “I’m not

going to listen to some old f***er ask questions about everything I am trying to do,”

and “We could have hired . . . two younger people, more aggressive people for what

we are paying you.” The comments by Grubb and the owner’s husband do not raise

an inference of age discrimination because Beckman did not present any evidence

that either man made the decisions that negatively affected him. Remarks about age

may establish pretext under some circumstances, but not when the remarks are made

by someone other than a decisionmaker. Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 925 (8th

Cir. 2004). Although Grubb and the strategic planning committee had recommended

that Beckman be included in the first two reductions in force, the ultimate

decisionmakers, Trevor and Timothy Putrah, had rejected the recommendations.

During the third round of layoffs, the Putrahs decided to lay off Beckman. Even if

Grubb’s remarks are viewed as evidence of his motive to discharge persons based on

age, the remarks do not support an inference that the Putrahs’ decision to terminate

Grubb was motivated by his age. Id. 

Beckman contends that rather than the familiar McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting analysis, the district court should have applied Desert Palace v. Costa, 123

S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2003), which holds a plaintiff may be entitled to a mixed-motive

jury instruction without presenting direct evidence of discrimination if he shows

discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision.

Assuming without deciding that Costa applies to ADEA claims, the district court

properly granted summary judgment to KGP because Beckman presented insufficient

evidence to support a finding that his age was a “motivating factor” in his

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termination. See Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 615 (8th

Cir. 2003). 

We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to KGP.

______________________________

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