Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05259/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05259-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDO KUBA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 1-A AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, an

agency of the California Department of Food

and Agriculture’s Division of Fairs and

Expositions; DALY CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, a governmental agency; and

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-05259 WHA

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF

LEAVE TO AMEND AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this action, plaintiff Alfredo Kuba alleges that defendants 1-A Agricultural

Association and Daly City Police Department violated his civil rights. Plaintiff now moves for

leave to file a second amended complaint. This order finds that plaintiff was diligent in seeking

this amendment and that defendants will not be prejudiced by this amendment. Plaintiff’s

motion is, therefore, GRANTED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Kuba is an animal-rights activist. Defendant 1-A District Agricultural

Association operates the Cow Palace, a performance facility owned by the State of California. 

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United States District Court

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The Cow Palace holds various events including rodeos and circuses. Defendant Daly City

Police Department provides security during events at the Cow Palace. 

Plaintiff demonstrates and has demonstrated at the Cow Palace whenever the circus or

the rodeo is there. Plaintiff’s demonstrations consist of holding signs, handing out leaflets, and

discussing his views with pedestrians. In addition, plaintiff places signs on his van. 

The Cow Palace has a “First Amendment Expression Policy” which was originally

adopted by 1-A’s board of directors in 1998 and updated in 2002 and in 2004 (Evans Decl.

Exh. 5). In an earlier action, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the policy. In that

earlier action, the judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In a published

opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The Ninth Circuit ruled that “[t]he First Amendment Expression Policy enforced by the

Association at the Cow Palace during the rodeo and the circus is unconstitutional on its face” 

Id. at 863.

 In response to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, 1-A’s board passed an amendment to its

policy on October 27, 2004 (Evans Decl. Exh. 5). The amendment was intended to

“supplement” not “replace” the existing guidelines. The amendment provided that “[t]he three

established free expression zones may be utilized by protesters but protesters will not be

restricted to these zones.” Still, “[a]ny activities of protesters outside the free expression zones

cannot take place in a way which impeded pedestrians or vehicles.” The amendment modified

the specific restrictions to “leafletting and one-on-one discussions.” Further, the amendment

added the restriction that “no signs shall be held during activities within the parking lots but

shall be restricted to the First Amendment zones.” 1-A’s board also added its views on

advertising in the Cow Palace parking lot:

However, in addition to this general commercial parking use,

certain areas of the parking lot, and on rare occasions the entire

parking lot, is rented by a promoter and, more commonly,

sections of the preferred lot or the entire lot are rented by a

promoter or vendor, for purposes consistent with the mission of

the Association. Allowing unpaid speech in such areas would

interfere with and conflict with the purpose of the facility, which

is specified in provisions of the Food and Agricultural Code. It

would also interfere with generation of revenue.

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The amendment did not alter or address the prohibition on “signs, banners, lettering, or

communicative pictures” displayed on vehicles contained in Section III(5)(J) of the original

policy. The amendment also did not remove subject-matter relevance as grounds for giving

preference to certain on-site demonstrations and exhibitors.

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the current action on December 20, 2005. In March

2006, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction so that he could demonstrate at the Grand

National Rodeo at the Cow Palace. The parties stipulated to a resolution with respect to the

Grand National Rodeo, which stipulation was approved on March 23. 

On April 24, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. In his first amended complaint,

plaintiff listed five claims for relief in his current complaint: (1) violation of his exercise of free

speech protected by the First Amendment of the United State Constitution brought pursuant to

42 U.S.C. 1983, (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United State Constitution brought pursuant to Section 1983, (3) violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause brought pursuant to Section 1983, (4) violation of Article 1,

Sections 2(a) and 3(a) of the California Constitution brought pursuant to Section 1983, and (5)

violation of Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. Plaintiff requested declaratory

and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and civil penalties under

California Civil Code Section 52(b)(1).

In May, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to mediate their disputes. One of the

sticking points, apparently, is that plaintiff sought resolution of what he alleged to be contentbased favoritism of certain speakers the Cow Palace. Defendants apparently contended that this

issue was outside of the scope of plaintiff’s amended complaint.

Plaintiff thus now seeks leave to file a second amended complaint. The proposed

second amended complaint states the same five causes of action as the prior iteration, but

proposes to add allegations specifically that “Defendant 1-A Agricultural Association has an

unconstitutional policy that provides different rights for speakers depending on the subject

matter of their message” (Evans Decl. Exh. 1). 1-A Agricultural opposes the motion. Daly City

Police Department did not file any opposition.

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ANALYSIS

Leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when justice so requires under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). This standard is a liberal one. Rule 15(a), however,

does not apply when a district court has established a deadline for amended pleadings under

Rule 16(b). See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Once a scheduling order has been entered, the liberal policy favoring amendments no longer

applies. Subsequent amendments are not allowed without a request to first modify the

scheduling order. Id. at 608–09. At that point, any modification must be based on a showing of

good cause.

Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the

diligence of the party seeking the amendment. . . . Although the

existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the

modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the

focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking

modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Id. at 609 (citation omitted).

Under the case management order in effect in this case, “[l]eave to add any new parties

or pleading amendments must be sought by March 25, 2006” (Case Management Order)

(emphasis in original).

This order finds, however, that plaintiff has been diligent, and that allowing further

amendment is otherwise proper. Plaintiff moved (prior to the cutoff for amendments) for

temporary injunctive relief. When the parties resolved that motion for an injunction, it appeared

that the parties would be able to strike a suitable fix to all of their disputes in this action. After

mediation ultimately fell through, however, it became clear that the parties had different ideas

of the issues at stake. Plaintiff moved promptly thereafter to amend his complaint, so as to

clarify the issues.

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment adds no new factual allegations and no new causes of

action. 1-A Agricultural’s argument that the amendment would create onerous further

discovery obligations is specious. Indeed, apparently no depositions have yet been taken. The

depositions will thus merely be expanded when they do take place. Nor does this case seem to

be document-intensive litigation. Any documents relevant to the proposed amended complaint

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seemingly would also have been relevant to the first amended complaint. In any event, the nonexpert discovery deadline is not until September 29, 2006. No other deadlines in the case

management order are effected by plaintiff’s proposed amendment.

1-A Agricultural also contends that plaintiff lacks standing to assert new allegations

about improper content-based restrictions. This argument lacks merit. Traditional standing

requirements are relaxed in the First Amendment context:

At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech . . . the

transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected

expression is deemed to justify allowing ‘attacks on overly broad

statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack

demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a

statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.

Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999) (citation

omitted); see also Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947,

956 (1984).

In this action, we need not even stretch traditional standing principles to conclude that

Kuba may challenge the content-based restrictions in the Cow Palace’s speech policy. Kuba

alleges that his speech was restricted on the basis of the content of the speech — his protests

against animal cruelty. Plaintiff’s complaint thus asserts his own rights, not merely those of

third parties. He allegedly is and has been threatened with arrest for seeking to speak about

animal cruelty, purportedly in a differential fashion from those who speak about topics more

palatable to the rodeos and circuses taking place at the Cow Palace. Plaintiff has standing to

pursue his claims as amended. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. Finding

no further argument necessary, hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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