Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02814/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02814-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRELL DESHON LEMONS,

CDCR #P-83680,

Plaintiff,

vs.

A. CAMARILLO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-DHB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

VALENZUELA'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Terrell Deshon Lemons (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at Ironwood State Prison in Blythe, 

California, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), is proceeding with a Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(ECF No. 60).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I. Procedural History

On January 24, 2017, Defendant Valenzuela1filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (ECF No. 142). On February 13, 2017, the Court notified 

Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v. 

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 

1998) (en banc), and set a briefing schedule (ECF No. 148). Plaintiff was given until June 

9, 2017, to notify the Court that he did not oppose Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion or file 

an Opposition. (Id. at 2.) 

That date has long since passed and Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition or any 

notification relating to the Motion currently before the Court. The Court has determined 

no oral argument is required, and took Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment under submission for resolution on the papers pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR

7.1.d.

Having carefully considered the record as submitted, the Court now GRANTS

Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. Factual Background

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

On August 15, 2012, while housed at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”), Plaintiff’s cell 

was searched “during a massive search of Facility C-2 Building.” (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff 

and his cellmate were returning to their cell at approximately 3:30 p.m. and realized that a 

radio was missing that was not documented in the cell search. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff and 

his cellmate “called upon Sgt. Cortez and 3rd Watch Building Officer Liss to verify that 

Plaintiff’s radio was indeed missing.” (Id. at 5.) 

The next day, on August 16, 2012, Plaintiff approached Correctional Officer 

Camarillo and showed him that the radio had not been documented as confiscated during 

 

1

 This Motion is brought by Defendant Valenzuela only. The remaining Defendants are not currently 

moving for summary judgment and remain in this action.

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the cell search. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Camarillo responded by denying that Plaintiff’s name 

or identification was on the radio. (Id.) Plaintiff “immediately produced valid 

documentation” that showed “Sgt. D. Pollard had recently compensated Plaintiff with that 

exact radio.” (Id.) However, Defendant Camarillo “insisted ‘he was not giving [Plaintiff’s] 

radio back.’” (Id.)

Plaintiff then “walked about 10 feet” and spoke to an unidentified Sergeant who 

“advised [Plaintiff] to 602 (appeal).” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff returned to his cell to begin 

writing the appeal and later that day a radio was “placed in front of Plaintiff’s cell” by 

another inmate. (Id.) 

On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff was exiting the “chowhall” when Camarillo decided 

to search Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he complied with the search but the pat down 

search became “aggressive.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Camarillo “why are you grabbing me 

like that?” (Id. at 5.) While receiving no response from Camarillo Plaintiff claims he “felt 

a shot of pain from his testicles to the gut of his stomach.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was 

unable to remain in the “spread eagle” position due to the pain but Camarillo told him to 

“put your [expletive] hands in the air and squeezed his grasp harder.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff 

“bucked in an attempt to free himself” but he was “taken to the ground immediately by 

Defendant Camarillo from the front and Defendants J. Butcher and D. Zamora from 

behind.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was “subdued and restrained on the ground” by Butcher and Zamora while 

“Camarillo continued to punch Plaintiff upon the face and while applying a choke-hold.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that “after allowing this to go on for some time,” Butcher “pulled 

and/or waved” Camarillo off Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Following this incident, Camarillo allegedly told his supervisors that he “felt ‘contraband’ on Plaintiff and Plaintiff resisted.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff claims that no 

contraband was ever found on him. (Id.) He further claims that Defendants Greenwood, 

Valenzuela and Pollard “all accepted as true” that Plaintiff had contraband despite no 

evidence of any contraband. (Id. at 8.) 

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Plaintiff was escorted to the Program Office where he “immediately told” Defendant 

Pollard that Camarillo had used excessive force and that it was “in reprisal for Plaintiff’s 

complaint about his radio the week prior.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims he told Valenzuela 

and Greenwood about the excessive force by Camarillo as well. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 

Greenwood “declined to accept and/or investigate Plaintiff’s version of the events.” (Id.

at 9.) Greenwood allegedly told Plaintiff that “you are a liar, you assaulted my officer . . . 

and if it’s the last thing [Greenwood] does, [Greenwood] is going to make sure that Plaintiff 

would be transferred to Pelican Bay, so that Plaintiff would never see his family again.” 

(Id.)

A few hours later, Plaintiff was again brought to the Program Office where he would 

be transferred to Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). (Id. at 8.) However, Plaintiff 

claims he realized that his “radio was not on the inventory list/receipt and immediately 

brought it to Sgt. Pollard’s attention.” (Id.) Pollard sent Defendant Ramirez to locate 

Plaintiff’s radio and bring it to Plaintiff. (Id.) When the radio was located, Pollard “signed 

‘602’ on the inventory sheet to show she placed the radio in Plaintiff’s property upon 

departure.” (Id.) However, on September 21, 2012, Plaintiff received his “allowable 

property” while housed in Ad-Seg but there was no radio contained in the property. (Id.) 

Plaintiff appealed the issue and was again “granted a Super III G.E. radio.” (Id.) 

On October 28, 2012, while still housed in Ad-Seg, Plaintiff was permitted to receive 

“non-contact (behind the glass) visits” with his wife. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff claims that his 

wife was “ordered to a closed room by a Sgt. or Lt. Ramirez and subjected to being 

searched in further reprisal and [to] discourage Plaintiff’s wife from visiting.” (Id.)

On April 3, 2014, Plaintiff “brought this (threat) and other situations where Plaintiff 

experienced other reprisal/retaliation” to former Warden Miller’s attention. (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims she “assured Plaintiff that this would not occur” while in the presence of 

Greenwood. (Id.) The next day, on April 4, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an “Inmate Request 

CDCR 22” form to Miller regarding the threat by Greenwood which was received by Miller 

on April 14, 2014, and forwarded to Defendant Galeana, a correctional counselor. (Id. at 

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10.) Galeana then passed Plaintiff’s complaint to Defendant Angulo, also a correctional 

counselor. (Id.)

On April 21, 2014, Angulo called Plaintiff into his office “to reiterate/reassure 

Plaintiff that he would indeed by referred by ICC to be transferred to a Level III prison, 

not a Level IV prison (Pelican Bay State Prison) as previously threatened” by Greenwood. 

(Id.) Four days later, Angulo “retracted this reassurance” on the grounds that there had 

been a “miscalculation in points.” (Id.) However, Galeana called Plaintiff into his office 

to inform him that he was “taking Plaintiff back to ICC for Level III transfer” because he 

had contacted the “Head Office in Sacramento” to review his calculations for accuracy. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff was later called back again to Galeana’s office between May 16, 2014, and 

May 22, 2014, and was told that “some guy in CSR, at Centinela, have a stick up his ass 

because nobody aggravated your offense to make you a high-risk, high security Level IV 

inmate.” (Id.) Previously in August of 2010, Plaintiff claims Valenzuela found Plaintiff 

“not guilty” of mutual combat with another inmate but “approximately 2 years later, and 

coincidentally in August of 2012, Plaintiff was re-issued the same rule violation report 

(RVR) 115 and found ‘guilty’ for fighting.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges there was no other 

documentation of this finding other than Valenzuela’s entry in a log book. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims this was done to make him eligible for a Level IV placement. (Id.)

On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison, a Level IV 

prison, by himself in a van. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that this was intentional so that his “radio 

would be confiscated once again, this time without compensation.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

he was subjected to further acts of retaliation while housed at Pelican Bay. (Id. at 11-12.) 

On August 23, 2012, following the alleged incident with Camarillo, Plaintiff claims 

Defendant Villalobos-Valenzuela “was on notice and notified of the incident” but waited 

an “hour and 30 minutes after the excruciating pain” to examine Plaintiff.” (Id. at 15.) 

Plaintiff further alleges Villalobos-Valenzuela “failed to report any and all marks, bruises 

and/or scratches upon Plaintiff’s body.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff claims that in the days 

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following the incident, he “started to notice his vision getting blurry in his right eye, the 

eye Defendant Camarillo was punching, while being restrained.” (Id.) Plaintiff did not 

immediately assume it was serious but it later “flared up and [Plaintiff] had to be rushed to 

CTC 2-4 weeks later.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims to continue to suffer from “negative reactions 

to bright lights and blurriness.” (Id.) 

B. Defendant’s Claims

Defendant Valenzuela, a Correctional Lieutenant, was employed at Centinela State 

Prison (“CEN”) until October of 2013. (See Def.’s Valenzuela’s Decl., ECF No. 142-4, ¶ 

1.) As a Lieutenant, Valenzuela’s job responsibilities included “overseeing and 

supervising the general activities and the day-to-day operations of the facility.” (Id. ¶ 2.) 

In addition, Valenzuela was responsible for “ensuring that staff met all security standards,” 

as well as serving as a “senior hearing officer” who conducts disciplinary hearings and 

appeal reviews. (Id.) This also included being “responsible for collecting and preparing 

documents in response to use of force incidents.” (Id.) 

On August 23, 2012, the date of the incident with Defendant Camarillo, Valenzuela 

was in the program office when he heard “the yard alarm and the institutional radio report 

an incident” in the dining hall. (Id. ¶ 3.) Valenzuela arrived at the scene and “saw that 

Sergeant Pollard was already handling the incident and that inmate Lemons had been 

restrained.” (Id.) Valenzuela claims that prior to this incident he was “not aware of any 

purported risk that Officer Camarillo posed to Plaintiff” and that Plaintiff had never 

expressed any concerns to him about Defendant Camarillo. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Sergeant Pollard collected reports from each of the individual officers involved in 

the incident, completed a “CDCR 837 Crime/Incident Report, Part C,” and provided this 

report to Valenzuela. (Id. ¶ 5.) It was Valenzuela’s duty to collect the report from Pollard 

and conduct his own review of the incident. (Id.) Valenzuela was responsible for 

reviewing the individual reports, preparing a “summary of the events as described by the 

officers,” and assemble an “Initial Incident Report package.” (Id.) 

On August 23, 2012, Pollard provided Valenzuela with reports from “the officers 

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who participated in or witnessed the incident between Officer Camarillo and inmate 

Lemons.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Following a review of these reports, Valenzuela “prepared a summary 

of the incident, as had been reported by staff.” (Id. ¶ 8.) An administrative disciplinary 

hearing “on the Rules Violation Report concerning the August 23, 2012 incident” was 

conducted on May 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 9.) Criminal Charges were also brought against Plaintiff 

in state court for battery on a peace officer. (See Jeffrey Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 142-3, Pl’s 

Depo. 102:18-24.) Plaintiff was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six years. (Id.) At 

his trial, Plaintiff was represented by counsel and called several fellow inmates as 

witnesses. (Id. at 102:18 - 103:18.)

On May 24, 2012, an administrative hearing was held at CEN regarding the Rules 

Violation Report and Plaintiff was found “guilty of the charges and assessed 150 days 

forfeiture of behavioral credits and sentenced to a 12 month term in administrative 

segregation.” (Valenzuela Decl., Ex. D., ECF No. 142-4, Rules Violation Report dated 

May 2, 2014.)

III. Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Valenzuela seeks summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff 

waived his Eighth Amendment claims against Valenzuela; (2) Plaintiff cannot establish an 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim or a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; 

(3) his Eighth Amendment claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (4) 

Valenzuela cannot be sued in his official capacity for monetary damages; and (5) 

Valenzuela is entitled to qualified immunity. (See Def’s. Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. 

for Summ. J., ECF No. 142-1, at 512-22 (hereafter “Def’s. P&As”).)

A. Standard of Review

Rule 56(a) provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying 

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those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then 

shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine 

issue for trial. Id. at 324.

To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party is “required to present 

significant, probative evidence tending to support h[is] allegations,” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted), and must point to some evidence in 

the record that demonstrates “a genuine issue of material fact [which], with all reasonable 

inferences made in the plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the 

plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). The opposing party cannot rest solely 

on conclusory allegations of fact or law. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 

1986). 

B. Eighth Amendment Claim

1. Waiver of claims

Valenzuela moves for summary judgment of the Eighth Amendment claim brought 

against him on the ground that Plaintiff waived this claim during his deposition. (See Def’s. 

P&As at 12.) While it does appear in Plaintiff’s deposition that he intends to bring only 

due process claims against Valenzuela, his SAC is verified and remains the operative 

pleading containing an Eighth Amendment claim against Valenzuela. (See SAC at 6-12, 

27.) Therefore, the Court will not enter summary judgment as to this claim on the ground 

that Plaintiff waived these claims. However, the Court will consider summary judgment 

on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute as to any material fact.

2. Failure to Protect Claim

Plaintiff alleges in his SAC that Valenzuela failed to “take disciplinary or other 

actions to cure the known pattern of physical ‘verbal abuse of inmates by Defendant 

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Camarillo” which “constituted ‘deliberate indifference’ to the Plaintiff and other 

prisoners[’] safety.” (SAC at 18.) 

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must “take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); 

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) 

(“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the 

Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his 

safety and general well-being.”). “Protecting the safety of prisoners and staff involves 

difficult choices and evades easy solutions.” Berg, 794 F.2d at 460.

Thus, to show that a prisoner has been subject to cruel and unusual punishment by 

an officer’s failure to protect him, he must point to evidence in the record which shows that 

the alleged deprivation was objectively “sufficiently serious,” i.e., that the conditions he 

faced posed a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). Second, because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates 

the Eighth Amendment,” evidence must exist to show the defendant acted with a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal 

quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 8. 

In a failure to protect case, “that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to 

inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials display a deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s well-being when they know of and consciously disregard an 

excessive risk of harm to that inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 837. “[T]he official must 

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Thus, “deliberate 

indifference” entails something more than mere negligence, but may be satisfied with proof 

of something less than acts or omissions “for the very purpose of causing harm,” or that a 

particular official “acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an 

inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “Whether a prison official had the requisite 

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knowledge of a substantial risk” may be inferred if the prisoner produces evidence 

sufficient to show that the risk was “obvious.” Id.

As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges in his SAC that Valenzuela, and other prison 

officials, were aware that Defendant Camarillo was both verbally and physically abusive 

to inmates. (See SAC at 18.) Plaintiff offers no other factual allegations to support his 

claim. In his Declaration, Valenzuela states “[p]rior to the August 23, 2012 incident, 

inmate Lemons had never communicated to me any safety concerns he had in regard to 

Officer Camarillo, or any of the other involved officers.” (Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 4.) 

Valenzuela also declares that he “was not aware of any purported risk that Officer 

Camarillo posed to Plaintiff.” (Id.) In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he did not have 

“any idea” that he was going to have a confrontation with Camarillo on August 23, 2012,

and “the whole thing came as a big surprise” to him. (Jeffery Decl., Ex. A at 118:19-25.) 

Plaintiff offers no specific factual allegations in his SAC or his deposition testimony that 

Valenzuela knew, or should have known, that Camarillo was a danger to Plaintiff. 

When the moving party meets its initial obligation demonstrating that no genuine 

issue exists, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of 

material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). Plaintiff provides no factual evidence, exhibits or admissible affidavits to 

defeat Defendant’s showing that he did not fail to protect him from harm in violation of his 

Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly Defendant’s Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims is GRANTED.

C. Due Process Claim

In his SAC, Plaintiff alleges that on August 23, 2012, “Defendants Capt. 

Greenwood, Lt. Valenzuela, and Sgt. Pollard failed to follow the ‘excessive force 

procedure/protocol: secure a video interview or secure video facing chowhall.” (SAC at 

13.) 

The Due Process Clause prohibits states from “depriving any person of life, liberty, 

or property, without the due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The procedural 

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guarantees of due process apply only when a constitutionally-protected liberty or property 

interest is at stake. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). In order to 

invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must first establish the existence 

of a liberty interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472 (1995). In Sandin, the Supreme Court “refocused the test for determining the 

existence of a liberty interest away from the wording of prison regulations and toward an 

examination of the hardship caused by the prison’s challenged action relative to the ‘basic 

conditions’ of life as a prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 

2002) (noting that Sandin abandons the mandatory/permissive language analysis courts 

traditionally looked to when determining whether a state prison regulation created a liberty 

interest which required due process protection). 

Thus, “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence 

of a protected, state-created liberty interest is avoiding restrictive conditions of 

confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of 

those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” 

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts relating to his 

disciplinary conviction that constitute a liberty interest. Therefore, the Court will presume 

that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a liberty interest. When a liberty interest has been 

implicated as the result of a disciplinary charge, the Fourteenth Amendment requires prison 

officials to provide the prisoner with: (1) written notice of the charges at least 24-hours 

before the hearing; (2) the opportunity to appear in person at the hearing, to call witnesses, 

and to present rebuttal evidence; and (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the 

evidence relied on for their decision and the reasons for the action taken by the committee. 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; Neal, 131 F.3d at 830; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 952 (“Although 

prisoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary action and conduct of prison officials, the 

protections against arbitrary action ‘are the procedural due process requirements as set 

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forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.’”). 

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he received written notice or that he was 

deprived of the right to call witnesses. Instead, Plaintiff argues that he was denied access 

to evidence to rebut the charges. The only allegation that Plaintiff clearly sets forth as to 

Defendant Valenzuela is his alleged failure to videotape an interview with Plaintiff 

following the August 23, 2012 incident. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff maintains 

that Valenzuela did not follow protocol and as a result, he could not rebut Defendants 

assertion that Plaintiff failed to report the alleged excessive force by Camarillo. (Jeffery 

Decl., Ex. A at 22, 119:20-120:22.) Plaintiff further maintains that Valenzuela denied his 

due process rights by failing to investigate his claims that Camarillo used excessive force 

against him. (See id. at 23, 121:4-13.)

Even if Plaintiff believes that Valenzuela’s investigation was inadequate, that 

argument alone is insufficient to support a due process claims against Valenzuela. See 

Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“[W]e can find no 

instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a 

civil rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right involved.”) 

Defendant argues that the disciplinary hearing came after Plaintiff’s criminal trial at 

which time he had counsel and witnesses that testified on his behalf. (See Def.’s Ps & As 

at 20.) Moreover, it is not at all clear how the lack of a videotaped interview with Plaintiff 

would have made any difference in the outcome of Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. As 

Defendant also notes, Plaintiff was able to tell his version of the events that occurred on 

August 23, 2012 as he testified at both his criminal trial and his disciplinary hearing. (Id.) 

Plaintiff provides no evidence, nor does he point to any evidence in the record, to rebut 

Defendant’s showing that he was provided with the procedural protections guaranteed by 

Wolff. 

For all these reasons, Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment based 

on due process violations is GRANTED.

/ / /

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D. Eleventh Amendment

Defendant also seeks summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff seeks money 

damages against him based on actions taken in his “official” capacity. The Eleventh 

Amendment bars a prisoner’s § 1983 claims against state actors sued in their official 

capacities, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Consequently, 

the Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Eleventh 

Amendment grounds.

E. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the 

Court has found no triable issue of fact exists to show Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were 

violated by Defendant Valenzuela, it need not reach any issues regarding qualified 

immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would 

have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further 

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 

841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified 

immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of 

a constitutional right at all.”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 142-4) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 as to all of 

Plaintiff’s claims against him.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2017

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