Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00105/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00105-35/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LEE JOHNSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATURAL GAS FUEL SYSTEMS, INC. 

D.B.A. MOMENTUM FUEL 

TECHNOLOGY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00105-SAB

ORDER RE AMENDMENT TO PRETRIAL 

ORDER; PRETRIAL PROCEDURES; 

ALLOWING LIMITED TESTIMONY BY 

VIDEOCONFERENCE AND USE OF 

INDEPENDENT COURT REPORTER FOR 

PREPARATION OF UNOFFICIAL 

TRANSCRIPT

(ECF No. 165) 

A. Trial Briefs

In the amended pretrial order (ECF No. 165), the Court permitted that trial briefs were

optional. However, the Court amends its pretrial order to require that each party file a trial brief 

no later than January 9, 2025. The form and content of the trial brief must comply with Local 

Rule 285. Special attention shall be given in the trial brief to address reasonably anticipated 

disputes concerning the substantive law, jury instructions and/or admissibility of evidence. L.R. 

285(a)(3). The parties need not include in the trial brief any issue that is adequately addressed in 

a motion in limine or in an opposition brief to a motion in limine.

B. Jury Selection 

Plaintiffs William and Joan Johnson; Intervenor Plaintiff Markel; Defendant Momentum; 

Defendant Pape; and Defendant Carleton shall each be afforded twenty-five (25) minutes to voir 

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dire the jury. The time limitation will be strictly enforced. 

In a civil action, each party is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870. 

“Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purposes of 

making challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to 

be exercised separately or jointly.” Id. Section 1870 “prescribes only the number of peremptory 

challenges to which each [p]arty is entitled. It specifically leaves to the trial court's discretion the 

number and manner of exercise of peremptories in cases where there are ‘(s)everal defendants or 

several plaintiffs.’ ” Carr v. Watts, 597 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

1870); compare Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC, No. 23-15702, 2024 WL 4532903, at *5 (9th Cir. 

Oct. 21, 2024)1(finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in treating defendants, 

which were represented by different counsel and subject to different claims requiring different 

defenses, as different parties and granting each party three peremptory challenges); Nehring v. 

Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 401 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing “to equalize the peremptory challenges, i.e.. to give the

[plaintiff] the same number of peremptory challenges” that the defendant and impleaded third 

party were each allowed, ultimately determining an imbalance of three peremptories by the 

plaintiff, three peremptories by defendant, and three peremptories by the impleaded party was 

not an abuse of discretion), with Moore v. S. Afr. Marine Corp., 469 F.2d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 

1972) (finding no error in the district court's requirement that two co-defendants—one which 

filed a third party complaint for indemnity against the other—share the same number of 

peremptory challenges allowed to plaintiff) and Rogers v. De Vries & Co., 236 F. Supp. 110, 111 

(S.D. Tex. 1964) (“Under [28 U.S.C. § 1870] it was within the discretion of the Court to allow 

three peremptory challenges to the Plaintiff and either allow a total of three to both defendants, 

or three to each defendant to be exercised separately or jointly”).

The Court has considered the parties’ respective positions, claims, and crossclaims and 

finds it appropriate to treat Plaintiffs and the Intervenor Plaintiff as a single party, and 

1 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b).

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Momentum, Pape, and Carleton as a single party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870. Due to the number of

plaintiffs and defendants, the Court will increase the number of peremptories per side by three 

challenges. In other words, the two Johnson plaintiffs and the Intervenor Plaintiff are entitled to 

six peremptory challenges to be exercised jointly. The Court finds Defendants, which are each 

subject to the same claims by Plaintiffs and the Intervenor Plaintiff, are also entitled to six 

peremptory challenges. However, because Defendants Momentum, Pape, and Carleton assert 

different crossclaims against each other and each have different defenses to those claims, the 

Court shall divide the six peremptories equally between the Defendants. Thus, the Court will 

designate two peremptory challenges for Momentum, two peremptory challenges for Pape, and 

two peremptory challenges for Carleton. Defendants may exercise their two peremptory 

challenges separately or some or all Defendants may exercise their challenges jointly without 

court intervention. Should any party file objections to the number of peremptory challenges, 

such objections must include an alternate proposal with appropriate legal authority. Any party 

opposing those objections and/or alternative shall have three days to respond. 

C. Bifurcation

During October 2024 status conferences, it appeared to the Court that the parties agreed 

the action was essentially an admitted liability case and the only issues remaining were 

Plaintiffs’ damages and Defendants’ apportionment of fault. It was the Court’s understanding 

that the parties agreed liability would be stipulated and that the trial would be bifurcated into two 

phases: one phase for Plaintiffs’ damages and a second phase for apportionment of fault amongst 

Defendants. On November 21, 2024, the Court ordered that the parties file a joint statement 

confirming the parties’ agreement to bifurcate the trial and the division of phases. (ECF No. 

196.)

On November 27, 2024, the parties filed a joint statement regarding bifurcation

representing that the parties agreed that the trial should be bifurcated. (ECF No. 199.) However, 

the parties proffered the division of phases should be as follows: (1) Damages, then (2) “Liability 

and Apportionment Issues.” (Id. at 2.) As discussed at the December 4, 2024 hearing, the Court 

is concerned with the effectiveness of a bifurcated trial where liability appears to now be at issue. 

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Instead, the Court finds that a bifurcated trial performed in the phases proposed by the parties 

would confuse the jury, necessarily require cumulative evidence be presented, and extend rather 

than streamline the trial. Without objection at the December 4, 2024 hearing, the Court informed 

the parties that the trial would not be bifurcated. Trial shall proceed in a single phase and all 

aspects of the case, including liability, damages, crossclaims, and allocation of fault, will be 

presented and decided in one continuous proceeding. 

As proposed by the parties at the December 4, 2024 hearing, the presentation of the 

evidence in the single-phased trial shall be as follows: Plaintiffs William and Joan Johnson and 

Intervenor Plaintiff Markel shall present their cases-in-chief; Defendant Momentum will present 

its defense and case-in-chief for its crossclaims against Carleton; Defendant Pape will present its 

defense and case-in-chief for its crossclaims against Carleton and Momentum; then Defendant 

Carleton will present its defense case-in-chief for its crossclaims against Momentum and Pape. 

Any party may reserve to make their opening argument until their case-in-chief is presented. 

D. Court Reporter

A shortage of court resources prevents the Court from making available a court reporter 

to provide real-time transcripts. The proceedings will be recorded via the Court’s electronic 

recording system (ECRO), and the parties will have the opportunity to order official daily

transcripts. 

At the December 4, 2024 hearing, the parties raised the possibility of privately retaining a

court reporter. The Court has reconsidered the parties’ inquiry and shall allow the parties to 

retain a court reporter to assist with expeditious transcription services given the Court’s inability 

to provide real-time transcripts. However, the court reporter would not be preparing the official 

transcript. No citation shall be made to the court reporter’s unofficial transcript either in this trial

or in future proceedings. The parties may not stipulate to a private court reporter’s transcript 

serving as the official transcript. Additionally, the court reporter must be physically present at 

trial. The parties would be responsible for any privately retained court reporter’s compliance 

with this Court’s order and expectations regarding trial conduct and decorum. Should the parties 

proceed with contracting a court reporter to provide an unofficial and non-citable transcript, the 

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parties shall provide the court reporter’s contact information no later than January 6, 2025 to 

allow pretrial coordination with the Court’s ECRO/relief courtroom deputy as to procedures that 

are expected in the courtroom. The parties are advised that the Court may, for any reason, deem 

the use of the privately retained court reporter discontinued.

E. Witnesses Testifying Remotely

At the December 4, 2024 hearing, Plaintiffs indicated a desire to call a limited number of 

first responders and medical providers to testify by videoconference. Plaintiffs represent that 

such witnesses may live in or around Los Angeles. Provided all parties stipulate in writing to 

testimony through the use of remote technology, the Court finds good cause to allow certain first 

responders and medical providers to appear by videoconference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (“For 

good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit 

testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.”); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 43(a) advisory committee's note to 1996 amendment (“Good cause and compelling 

circumstances may be established with relative ease if all parties agree that testimony should be 

presented by transmission.”); see also Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-cv-02797-TLN-CKD, 2019 WL 

1243719, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2019) (“[C]ourts have nonetheless found that geographical 

distance [combined with other factors] may indeed provide good cause and compelling 

circumstances to justify the witness's appearance by video.”). The parties are expected to agree 

to the logistics of presenting exhibits to witnesses and shall be prepared to present tangible 

exhibits to the jury during remote witness testimony. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any objections to any of the provisions of this order 

shall be filed and served within seven (7) days of the date of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 9, 2024 

STANLEY A. BOONE

United States Magistrate Judge

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