Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eldon M. Schurz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend judgment. (Dkt. 157.) The

motion is brought in response to the Court’s Order denying Petitioner’s amended habeas

corpus petition. (Dkts. 154, 155.) Petitioner requests reconsideration of the Court’s ruling

regarding one claim. 

Rule 59

A motion to alter or amend judgement under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure is essentially a motion for reconsideration. Rule 59(e) offers an “extraordinary

remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial

resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). The

Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a motion brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) should only

be granted in “highly unusual circumstances.” Id.; see also 389 Orange Street Partners v.

Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). Reconsideration is appropriate only if the court

is presented with newly discovered evidence, if there is an intervening change in controlling

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law, or if the court committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS,

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration is not a forum for the

moving party to make new arguments not raised in its original briefs, Northwest Acceptance

Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-926 (9th Cir. 1988), nor is it the time to

ask the court to “rethink what it has already thought through,” United States v. Rezzonico,

32 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quotation omitted).

Claim Four

Petitioner contends that this Court’s denial of Claim Four was in clear error and

manifestly unjust. (Dkt. 157 at 2.) Claim Four alleges that pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470

U.S. 68 (1985), the state courts unreasonably erred in denying Petitioner the appointment of

a mental health professional in order to investigate insanity as a possible defense at trial.

(Id.) For the most part, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration presents the same arguments

that this Court has already rejected. (See Dkt. 154 at 8-18.) 

Based on State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981), Petitioner contends

that Ake required the appointment of a mental health expert prior to trial to allow him to

attempt to establish lack of premeditation due to the possibility of a character trait for

impulsivity. (Dkt. 157 at 3.) 

In Ake, the Supreme Court held that the state trial court erred in denying the defendant

the appointment of a mental health expert to support his defense of insanity. Ake’s need for

expert assistance was based on the following record:

[I]t is clear that Ake’s mental state at the time of the offense was a substantial

factor in his defense, and that the trial court was on notice of that fact when the

request for a court-appointed psychiatrist was made. For one, Ake’s sole

defense was that of insanity. Second, Ake’s behavior at arraignment, just four

months after the offense, was so bizarre as to prompt the trial judge, sua

sponte, to have him examined for competency. Third, a state psychiatrist

shortly thereafter found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial, and suggested

that he be committed. Fourth, when he was found to be competent six weeks

later, it was only on the condition that he be sedated with large doses of

Thorazine three times a day, during trial. Fifth, the psychiatrists who

examined Ake for competency described to the trial court the severity of Ake’s

mental illness less than six months after the offense in question, and suggested

that this mental illness might have begun many years earlier.

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1 After the trial court denied Petitioner’s Rule 11 motion, Petitioner did not

pursue the issue of his mental condition as a defense at trial. Instead, the defense theory was

that Petitioner’s co-defendant committed the murder.

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Ake, 470 U.S. at 86. Insanity was Ake’s sole defense at trial. Therefore, when the trial court

denied the appointment of a mental health expert, Ake had no expert testifying that he was

insane at the time of the murders. Ake, 470 U.S. at 72. 

In the present case, Petitioner moved the trial court for a Rule 11 competency

evaluation and noticed to the court a possible defense of insanity. (See Dkt. 154 at 9-11.)

The trial court authorized a mental health professional to examine Petitioner to evaluate his

competency and to determine if he needed additional mental health testing in light of his

notice of a possible insanity defense. (Id.) The trial court received a report from Dr. Jack

Potts finding Petitioner competent to stand trial and competent at the time of the murder.

(Id.) On this record, the trial court denied Petitioner’s request for further psychiatric

assistance.1

 (Id. at 11.) 

After reviewing the entire record, including Dr. Potts’s report, the Arizona Supreme

Court found that the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion because “[t]here is

nothing in [Dr. Potts’s] report to indicate that there was any real question regarding

[Petitioner’s] sanity at the time of the offenses.” Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 54, 859 P.2d at 164.

(Id.) This Court reviewed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to the

AEDPA and concluded:

The supreme court’s treatment of this claim is not unreasonable. Petitioner did

not meet the threshold standard required by Ake for the appointment of a

mental health expert because he failed to demonstrate that his sanity or mental

capacity at the time of the crime was likely to be a significant factor in his guilt

phase defense. Dr. Potts’s report does not suggest that Petitioner’s sanity at

the time of the offenses would likely be a significant factor at trial. Rather, Dr.

Potts found Petitioner competent to stand trial and able to assist in his defense.

(Id. at 12-13.)

This conclusion was not in error. Ake has not been extended outside the context of

an insanity defense. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (refusing to indicate

that Ake extends to other requests for experts); see also Williams v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 1030,

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1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ake does not require a mental health expert be appointed whenever a

defendant is contemplating an insanity defense; rather, defendant must make a threshold

showing that the appointment is reasonably necessary); State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 859

P.2d 131 (1993) (same). Because the United States Supreme Court has not expanded the

holding in Ake to require the guilt-stage appointment of a mental health expert where the

defendant is not offering an insanity defense, the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court

denying this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004) (AEDPA would “be undermined if

habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to

existing law”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000) (habeas relief cannot be granted

if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle

advanced by a petitioner). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim Four.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Dkt.

157.)

DATED this 23rd day of October, 2007.

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