Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01221/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 11 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adam Alcantar, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 14-1221-PHX-NVW (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Adam Alcantar, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexEyman, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer (Doc. 11), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc.

13).

BACKGROUND1

In its April 30, 2010 Memorandum Decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals found the

following facts:

[Petitioner] victimized his niece, C., three times during 1989 or 1990, when

she was between seven and eight years old. One incident occurred when she

was playing hide-and-seek with [Petitioner] at his residence. When [Petitioner]

found C. hiding in a bedroom, he put her on the bed and held her down as he

rubbed his crotch against hers and tried to unzip his pants. After C. screamed,

another child came out of hiding in a nearby closet, and [Petitioner] let C. go.

Another incident occurred when [Petitioner] was playing with C. and other

children in the living room, picking them up by their legs and arms, and

spinning them in circles to get them dizzy. When it was C.’s turn, [Petitioner]

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put two fingers inside her underwear and placed one finger inside her vagina.

He dropped her onto a nearby couch when she started kicking him. The third

incident took place at a family birthday party. There, [Petitioner] tried to put

his fingers under C.’s swimming suit and touched her vaginal area while

giving her a piggyback ride in a swimming pool.

[Petitioner]’s daughter, A., and her cousin, D., were both in kindergarten when

[Petitioner] began abusing them in 1990 or 1991. When A. and D. were

playing at home one day jumping on a bed, [Petitioner] told them to show him

their “private areas,” which they did. They also followed [Petitioner]’s

instructions to touch themselves and each other. [Petitioner] then led A. out of

the bedroom so he could be alone with D. After telling D. to partially undress,

[Petitioner] performed oral sex on her, took off his pants, stroked his penis,

and tried to penetrate her vagina with it. He stopped when he saw his wife and

other family members coming home, and he immediately put D. in a closet and

told her to get dressed.

When [Petitioner] and his wife separated, A. lived with [Petitioner] at his

parents’ house. Just before her eighth or ninth birthday, [Petitioner] came into

the bedroom where A. was lying down. He lay down next to her, held down

her arms, and began masturbating, touching her leg with his penis. [Petitioner]

then repositioned A. onto her back, removed her underwear, held her arms

down again, and forced her legs open. He tried inserting his penis into her

vagina and slightly penetrated her several times, repeatedly instructing her,

“Tell me you like it.” [Petitioner] then tried to have anal sex with her, saying

several times, “I’m almost there.” After performing oral sex on A. and trying

to enter her vagina from behind, [Petitioner] said he was “almost done,” and

he ejaculated onto A.’s back.

[Petitioner] abused A. again a “couple [of] months” later when she was living

with him at his girlfriend’s house. One day when A. was showering,

[Petitioner] came into the bathroom naked and got into the shower with her.

He put soap on his penis and put his penis in her vagina several times, telling

her he was “cleaning [her] out.” When [Petitioner]’s girlfriend came home, he

told A. to “[g]et the hell out” of the shower, and A. ran out of the bathroom,

crying.

(Exh. F at ¶¶ 3-7.)

A grand jury charged Petitioner with indecent exposure, two counts of child

molestation, three counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, and four counts of sexual

abuse of a minor. (Exh. A.) The State alleged that all the charges, except indecent exposure,

were dangerous crimes against children, and that Petitioner had three prior convictions.

(Exhs. A, B.) A jury convicted him as charged, and the trial court imposed a combination of

consecutive and concurrent sentences totaling 144 years. (Exhs. C, F at ¶ 1.)

In his opening brief on direct appeal, Petitioner argued that pre-indictment delay

violated his federal right to due process. (Exh. E at ¶¶ 39-55.) He also argued that the trial

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court erred in denying his motion to preclude the State’s expert from testifying about

common characteristics of victims of childhood sex crimes, and in permitting a witness to

testify about Petitioner’s attempt to commit a sex crime against her. (Id. at ¶¶ 56-65, ¶¶ 66-

75.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Exh.

F.)

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, reasserting

counsel’s claims from his direct appeal. (Exh. G at 2-10.) Within these arguments, Petitioner

included additional claims of ineffective assistance of appellate and trial counsel, judicial

bias, and prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at 5, 6, 8.) He also argued that the trial court erred

in failing to stop the State from prosecuting a multiplicitous indictment, dismissing one of

the charges, upholding prior evidentiary rulings, imposing appropriate disclosure sanctions,

and preventing prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at 10-12.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review without comment. (Exh. H.)

Petitioner filed a timely PCR notice, and the trial court appointed appellate counsel

to represent him. (Exhs. J, K.) The trial court granted appellate counsel’s motion to appoint

new counsel for Petitioner. (Exhs. L, M.) Appointed counsel notified the court that he had

interviewed Petitioner twice, reviewed suggestions from him, and interviewed trial counsel.

(Exh. N.) Counsel also stated that after his review of “the Superior Court file,

correspondence from [Petitioner], six volumes of trial transcripts, appellate briefs, and the

appellate decision,” he “determined there are no colorable claims which he can raise on

[Petitioner’s] behalf.” (Id.) The trial court granted counsel’s request to allow Petitioner

additional time in which to file a pro se Rule 32 petition. (Exhs. N, O.) More than 2 weeks

after the deadline, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR notice based on his failure to file

a timely petition. (Exh. P.)

The trial court granted Petitioner’s subsequent motion to set aside the dismissal, and

allowed him additional time in which to file a pro se PCR petition. (Exhs. Q, R.) Although

Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition was not filed until a month past that deadline, the trial court

accepted it. (Exhs. S, T.) Petitioner argued that his sentences did not comport with Arizona

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sentencing statutes in numerous respects and alleged instances of “flagrant, pervasive and

escalating prosecutorial misconduct.” (Exh. S, attachment A at 3-13.) He also asserted

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that trial, appellate, and Rule 32 counsel were

ineffective in failing to properly respond to and/or raise the alleged sentencing errors and

instances of prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at 1-3.)

The trial court found Petitioner’s sentencing claims precluded, increased his

presentence incarceration credit, and concluded counsel had not been ineffective in failing

to raise the sentencing challenges. (Exh. U at 2.) Similarly, the court found prosecutorial

misconduct claims precluded and “unsupported by the record.” (Id.) Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration was denied. (Exh. V.)

In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner reasserted some

of the claims raised in his PCR petition. (Exh. W.) The appellate court granted the petition

for review, but adopted the trial court’s ruling, and denied relief. (Exh. X.) Petitioner did not

seek further review. (Exh. Y.)

In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. In his first

ground, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to

grant his motion to dismiss based on pre-indictment delay. In his second ground, Petitioner

alleges that improper and prejudicial expert testimony was presented at his trial, violating his

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In his third ground, Petitioner alleges

that other acts for which Petitioner had previously been convicted were improperly presented

to the jury. In his fourth ground, Petitioner alleges that his attorney provided constitutionally

defective assistance.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Grounds Two and Three fail to state a

basis for federal habeas relief; and Grounds One and Four fail on the merits. As such,

Respondents request that the Court deny and dismiss Petitioner’s habeas petition with

prejudice.

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A. Non-Cognizable Claims

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that “his convictions and sentences were secured

through the use of improper, prejudicial expert testimony” in violation of the Federal Rules

of Evidence and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In Ground Three,

Petitioner argues that “the jury was improperly and prejudicially influenced by immaterial,

irrelevant, inadmissible testimony of [a previous victim of Petitioner] regarding other sexual

acts which were prosecuted by the State.”

The Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law grounds.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see

Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (“[M]ere error of state law, one that does

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas.”);

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law.”). And, a petitioner may not “transform a state law issue into a federal one

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 119-21 (1982) (“While they attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional

terms, we believe that this claim does no more than suggest that the instructions at

respondents’ trials may have violated state law.”).

Petitioner does not present cognizable federal claims in Grounds Two or Three.

Although Petitioner attempts to “transform a state law issue into a federal one,” as he argued

in his opening brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner is challenging the

admissibility of evidence under state evidentiary rules, arguing that the State’s expert

testimony was not admissible under Rule 702, Arizona Rules of Evidence, and that the

previous victim’s testimony was not admissible under Rule 404(c), Arizona Rules of

Evidence. (Exh. E at ¶¶ 62-65, 67-75.)

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Grounds Two and Three be denied and

dismissed as said claims are non-cognizable for purposes of federal habeas review.

B. Merits

Pursuant to the AEDPA2

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his due process rights

by denying his motion to dismiss based on pre-indictment delay.

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Although statutes of limitations are the primary protection against overly stale

criminal charges, the “Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against

oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977). The Supreme Court

has held that a due process violation is established when the delay of the indictment violates

those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political

institutions, and which define the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Id. at 790

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Establishing a denial of due process through pre-indictment delay requires: (1) proof

of actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay; and (2) a showing that the delay, when

balanced against the reason for the delay, offends those “‘fundamental conceptions of justice

which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.’” United States v. Sherlock, 962

F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790). Generally, “to

prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process,

even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” Lovasco,

431 U .S. at 796. However, delay for tactical reasons, to harass the defendant, or in reckless

disregard of facts indicating that a defendant’s ability to defend himself is at a discernable

risk implicates due process. See id. at 795 (no due-process violation after 18-month

investigative delay and some prejudice); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25

(1971) (no due process violation after 38-month delay, without culpable intent, and no actual

prejudice); see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) (defendant must

prove that delay “was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him,” in addition to

actual prejudice).

The proof of prejudice must be definite and not merely speculative. See United States

v. Talbot, 51 F.3d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1993). If a defendant fails to demonstrate actual prejudice, the inquiry ends. See United

States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Court finds that the appellate court’s decision was not contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. In denying this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona

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Court of Appeals found that Petitioner had failed to establish either that the state had charged

him when it did in order to gain a tactical advantage or to harass him, or any resulting

prejudice. (Exh. F at ¶¶ 8-13.) Specifically, the appellate court found:

[Petitioner] committed these sexual offenses between 1989 and 1994. They

came to light in March 2002, when then-seventeen-year-old A. revealed to her

mother that [Petitioner] had raped her when she had lived in Arizona. After

learning [Petitioner] had also abused A.’s cousins, C. and D., A.’s mother drove from her

home in Texas to report the offenses to authorities in Arizona that same month.

In the ensuing investigation, which took place over several years, detectives

with the Casa Grande Police Department recorded interviews and collected

other tangible evidence against [Petitioner]. The trial court summarized the

subsequent developments as follows:

[I]n 2005, believing the prosecutor’s office had

“declined”charging, the second assigned investigator authorized

destruction of certain items that had been gathered in the

investigation; these items included cassette recordings of

interviews with victims and potential witnesses, letters between

one victim and the Defendant and certain photographs; copies

of the letters and photographs were made and retained with the

police reports and have been made available to the Defendant;

summaries of the recorded conversations are available in and

contained within the investigator’s reports; . . . the destruction

of the evidence, while inadvertent and negligent, was not the

result of “bad faith” behavior by law enforcement.

[Petitioner] has not provided a transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on his

motion to dismiss. We therefore presume the missing portions of the record

support the trial court’s findings. See State v. Geeslin, 223 Ariz. 553, ¶ 5, 225

P.3d 1129, 1130 (2010).

Ultimately, the trial court found the four-year period from the initial report to

law enforcement officials until the indictment was the result of personnel

changes, locating and interviewing potential witnesses and victims, and

“follow up investigation” conducted into “late 2006.” The court found “the

delay [wa]s not the result of intentional or ‘bad faith’ behavior on the part of

law enforcement or prosecution.” Because the record supports the court’s

finding that state officials did not delay prosecution to gain a tactical

advantage or to harass [Petitioner], the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion to dismiss. And, having failed to establish the first step in

the two-step test, [Petitioner] has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief

on appeal. See [State v.] Lacy, 187 Ariz. [340,] 346, 929 P.2d [1288,] 1294

[(1996] (claim based on pre-indictment delay fails “[a]bsent proof of an

intentional delay for strategic or harassment purposes”).

In his appellate briefs, [Petitioner] emphasizes the prejudicial impact of the

pre-indictment delay, particularly the destruction of the audio recordings. Yet

prejudice caused by pre-indictment delay is a necessary but insufficient ground

for dismissal. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. [Petitioner] suggests that, because he

suffered prejudice from the destruction of the evidence, state officials must

have destroyed it for that reason. But the trial court, having observed the

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witnesses below and having served as the trier of fact in this matter, was in the

best position to assess the officials’ motives and credibility, and we

consequently defer to the court’s findings. See State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250,

¶ 10, 165 P.3d 228, 230 (App. 2007).

(Exh. F at ¶¶ 9-12.) The appellate court also noted that the trial court eliminated any

possibility of prejudice by granting Petitioner’s request that the jury be instructed pursuant

to State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964). (Id. at ¶ 13.) The trial court instructed

the jurors that, if they found the State had “lost, destroyed, or failed to preserve evidence

whose contents or quality [were] important to the issues in this case,” they should weigh the

State’s explanation for the unavailability of the evidence; if they found the explanation

inadequate, they could infer the evidence was against the State’s interest and may have

created a reasonable doubt about Petitioner’s guilt. (Exh. F at ¶ 13.)

Because the court of appeals’ determination that Petitioner had failed to establish

either bad faith or resulting prejudice are amply supported in the record, and because the

court’s ultimate conclusion that no constitutional due-process violation had occurred was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, Petitioner is not entitled

to habeas relief on this ground. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192

(defendant must prove that delay “was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him”);

Marion, 404 U.S. at 323 (“potential prejudice” is insufficient).

2. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in

failing to address five specific sentencing issues. Petitioner also asserts that trial and

appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to address five instances of prosecutorial

misconduct.

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The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A court

need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether

prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14. “If it is

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easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697).

In reviewing a state court’s resolution of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

the Court considers whether the state court applied Strickland unreasonably:

For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], ...

he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’stest if his

claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1),

it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he

must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause,

a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, it

is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts

of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted).

Regarding the sentencing issues, other than granting Petitioner additional presentence

incarceration credit, the trial court found that the remainder of Petitioner’s sentencing

challenges were “without merit,” and therefore found that counsel was not ineffective for

failing to assert them. (Exh. U at 2.) Then, in review of these claims, the Arizona Court of

Appeals stated that “because the [trial court’s] ruling is correct with respect to the claims the

court expressly identified and resolved, and [Petitioner] has not persuaded us otherwise, we

adopt that ruling.” (Exh. X at ¶ 3.)

Petitioner does not explain how the state courts violated Strickland or applied

Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Thus, the Court

finds that the state court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law.

As to the prosecutorial misconduct issues, the court of appeals, in its ruling denying

relief on Petitioner’s petition for review, stated that Petitioner “seems to argue the [trial]

court did not address his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with his claim of

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[ineffective assistance of counsel].” (Exh. X at ¶ 4.) The appellate court found that Petitioner

had not been prejudiced because, as the trial court had found, the record did not support any

claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

Again, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of explaining how these rulings

violated Strickland or applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively

unreasonable manner. As such, the Court finds that the state court’s decision was not

contrary to clearly established federal law.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Grounds Two and Three fail to state a basis for federal habeas

relief; and Grounds One and Four fail on the merits, the Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and because the dismissal of the

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

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Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2015.

Case 2:14-cv-01221-NVW Document 14 Filed 05/01/15 Page 13 of 13