Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01553/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01553-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lon Roger Coleman, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-1553 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 On November 28, 2007, in Maricopa Superior Court, Petitioner pled guilty to the 

crimes of theft and forgery. He was sentenced on December 21, 2007. Doc. 19 at 2. 

After various state court proceedings, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus on July 19, 2012. Doc. 1. This Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge James 

F. Metcalf, who issued his Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) on February 20, 2013. 

Doc. 19. Judge Metcalf recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 

denied with prejudice because it was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and was procedurally barred. Doc. 19 at 20, 21. Pursuant 

to Rule 72(b)(2), Petitioner has filed written objections to the R&R. Doc. 20. Having 

reviewed Petitioner’s objections, the Court will accept Judge Metcalf’s R&R. 

I. Legal Standard. 

 A party may file specific, written objections to an R&R within fourteen days after 

being served with a copy of the R&R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. 

' 636(b)(1). The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to 

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which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1). 

II. Analysis. 

 Petitioner does not specifically object to the Magistrate’s timeline showing that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely under the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, or to 

the Magistrate’s finding that his claims are procedurally barred. Rather, Petitioner makes 

objections relating to his lack of legal resources and his mental illness. Doc. 20 passim. 

Although not explicitly stated, Petitioner essentially objects to the Magistrate’s finding 

that equitable tolling does not apply in his case.1

 A paragraph from Petitioner’s 

objections neatly summarizes his points: 

[Petitioner,] having been denied the assistance of knowledgeable 

representation, must rely on unreliable paralegals for consultation, is 

provided a resource library containing fewer reference materials than what 

a pre-law student routinely possesses and continually is confronted by 

personnel ignorant of and complacent to the special needs necessitated by 

his psychological issues. 

Doc. 20 at 3. Petitioner emphasizes that he was ignorant of the statute of limitations, and 

that the “mental illness and the cruel/unusual institutional response to it have prolonged 

the ignorance and that is the real reason for his delay.” Id. at 5. 

Equitable tolling of the AEDPA “is available in our circuit, but only when 

‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a 

petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness.’” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Spitsyn v. 

 

1

 Arguably, Petitioner’s objections also relate to whether he has shown sufficient 

“cause and prejudice” to overcome the procedural bar on his habeas petition. See

Doc. 19 at 17. However, because this Court adopts the R&R’s finding that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely and that equitable tolling should not apply, the Court need not address whether Petitioner has shown sufficient cause and prejudice to lift the procedural bar. 

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Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)). To qualify for equitable tolling, Petitioner 

must also show that he diligently pursued his rights. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 

(9th Cir. 2009). This Court will review de novo Petitioner’s arguments that his lack of 

legal resources and his mental illness should trigger equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations. 

 A. Legal Knowledge & Resources. 

 Petitioner emphasizes that he was ignorant of the procedural requirements for 

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Doc. 20 at 3–4. Petitioner also points out 

the repeated delays in state court proceedings, which further obscured the deadline for his 

habeas petition. Id. at 6, 7. However, ignorance of the statute of limitations and a lack of 

legal sophistication are not an “extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, absent an 

affirmative misstatement of law by a court, delays in court proceedings do not rise to the 

level of an extraordinary circumstance. See, e.g., Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 788–89 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Plier v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004)) (finding that equitable tolling 

does not apply when courts do not warn pro se litigants about deadlines, unless court 

affirmatively misleads parties). 

Petitioner also argues that the legal resources available to him, including the 

prison law library and paralegal assistance, were inadequate. See Doc. 20 at 3. This 

circuit has found that a lack of access to legal resources may be an extraordinary 

circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 

1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that unavailability of a copy of the AEDPA 

in a prison law library could be grounds for equitable tolling). However, in cases where 

courts have found that an extraordinary circumstance might exist, the petitioner always 

pointed to specific materials to which he did not have access. See, e.g., Roy v. Lampert, 

465 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to AEDPA materials and 

Oregon law books may be an extraordinary circumstance); Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 

1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to Spanish language legal materials or 

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assistance could entitle habeas petitioner to equitable tolling). In this case, Petitioner has 

failed to point to specific materials that he was lacking. Rather, his complaints about his 

legal resources are highly generalized, and he does not show how his lack of legal 

resources prevented him from filing a habeas petition while the statute of limitations was 

running. 

Petitioner does emphasize that he received erroneous advice from paralegals 

(Doc. 20 at 2, 7; Doc. 18 at 6), but this circuit has previously found that an attorney’s 

erroneous advice in calculating the AEDPA limitations period does not constitute an 

extraordinary circumstance. See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). 

This reasoning applies with even greater force to the advice of a paralegal. Petitioner 

also cites instances where he had to struggle with the Arizona Department of Corrections 

for access to the law library and for appropriate legal forms. See Doc. 18 at 14–18. But 

the fact that Petitioner was able to file a lengthy and well-researched state court petition 

(Doc. 14-1, Exhibit P) while the limitations period was running strongly indicates that he 

had access to the necessary legal materials. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 

lack of access to legal resources in this case does not merit equitable tolling. 

 B. Mental Illness. 

Mental illness may be an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling, 

when that illness prevents the petitioner from timely filing his habeas petition. Laws, 351 

F.3d at 923. Petitioner argues that his “mental illness and the cruel/unusual institutional 

response to it have prolonged [his] ignorance and that is the real reason for his delay.” 

Doc. 20 at 5. Petitioner describes various mental ailments from which he suffers: 

agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), catatonia, dissociative identity 

disorder, hallucinations, and depression. Doc. 20 passim. In the record, there is one 

letter from a Licensed Professional Counselor showing that Petitioner suffered from 

PTSD and dissociation between the years 2001 and 2005. Doc. 18 at 22. Finally, 

Petitioner claims that he was suffering “debilitating agoraphobia and severe clinical 

depression” in 2010, the year in which the limitations period was running. Doc. 20 at 6. 

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 Although mental illness may in some cases warrant an evidentiary hearing to 

determine the scope of the illness, Laws, 351 F.3d at 923–24, a district court is not 

obligated to hold such a hearing where “the record is amply developed, and where it 

indicates that the petitioner's mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the 

untimely filing of his habeas petition[.]” Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th 

Cir. 2010). In this case, there is a well-developed record of Petitioner’s actions during 

the limitations period. This Court adopts as correct the R&R’s reasoning on this issue: 

In the face of Petitioner’s limited allegations, the Court has before it a 

record of an able, persistent, albeit dilatory, litigator. During the running of 

the habeas limitations period, Petitioner managed to file his Motion for 

Extension of Time to File Petition for Review (Exhibit P). On December 

17, 2009, less than a month prior to its commencement, he managed to file 

his Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit N), and by February 25, 2011, within 

seven weeks of its expiration, he filed his untimely Petition for Review 

(Exhibit R). All of this indicates that Petitioner’s mental condition did not 

preclude him from litigating. 

Doc. 19 at 12. The ability to file petitions during the limitations period is evidence that 

Petitioner’s mental illness did not prevent him from filing a habeas petition. See Roberts, 

627 F.3d at 773; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because 

[petitioner] was capable of preparing and filing state court petitions [during the 

limitations period], it appears that he was capable of preparing and filing a [federal] 

petition during the time in between those dates.”), modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d 

1165 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Laws, 351 F.3d at 923 (“Of course, a petitioner’s statement 

[of mental illness], even if sworn, need not convince a court that equitable tolling is 

justified should countervailing evidence be introduced.”).2

 Therefore, this Court finds 

that Petitioner’s mental illnesses do not warrant equitable tolling. 

 

 

2 Laws is also distinguishable from the present case because the petitioner in Laws

did not file other petitions while his limitations period was running, and there was no other evidence of the petitioner’s mental competency during that limitations period. See 

351 F.3d at 924. 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf’s Report & Recommendation (Doc. 19) 

is accepted.

2. Petitioner Lon Roger Coleman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) is denied.

3. A certificate of appealability is denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required by 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

Dated this 1st day of April, 2013. 

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