Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-06214/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-06214-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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Case No.: 19-cv-06214-EJD

ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR MOOTNESS INTO MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING SUR-REPLY

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONTPELIER ONE LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-06214-EJD 

ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR MOOTNESS INTO 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING SURREPLY

Re: Dkt. No. 21

Plaintiff Scott Johnson sues Defendant Montpelier One LLC, the owner of the real 

property at 2380 Montpelier Drive, San Jose, California, alleging various barriers to accessibility 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California state law. Presently before the 

Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1). Defendant argues that the ADA claims are moot, that Johnson lacks Article III standing 

to seek injunctive relief, and that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over the state law claims. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the 

Court finds that Defendant’s motion to dismiss on mootness grounds must be converted to a 

motion for summary judgment. Because Defendant attached additional evidence to its Reply 

brief, the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file a Sur-Reply. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following allegations derive from the Complaint, Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”), which 

generally must be construed as true on a motion to dismiss. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 

1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Case No.: 19-cv-06214-EJD

ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR MOOTNESS INTO MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING SUR-REPLY

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Plaintiff is a quadriplegic. Compl. ¶ 1. As a consequence, he cannot walk, he uses a 

wheelchair for mobility, and he drives a “specially equipped van.” Id. Plaintiff also has

“significant manual dexterity impairments.” Id. 

Defendant Montpelier One LLC owned the real property located at or about 2380 

Montpelier Drive in San Jose, California in January and April 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff 

attempted to visit a chiropractor’s office located at 2380 Montpelier Drive (“the Chiropractor”) on 

two occasions, once in January 2019 and once in April 2019. Id. ¶ 9. During those two visits, 

Plaintiff personally encountered various barriers to accessibility. Id. ¶ 17. Specifically, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant (1) “fail[s] to provide accessible parking,” (2) “fail[s] to provide accessible 

door hardware at the Chiropractor,” (3) “fail[s] to provide accessible paths of travel leading into 

the Chiropractor.” Id. ¶ 12-16. 

On September 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action. Dkt. No. 1. The operative 

Complaint contains two counts: (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a), see Compl. ¶¶ 24-34; (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 51-53, see Compl. ¶¶ 35-39. Defendant Montpelier One LLC answered the 

Complaint on November 8, 2019. Dkt. No. 10. 

II. DISCUSSION

That brings us to the present motion. Defendant attests that, following receipt of the 

Complaint, it voluntarily remedied the three barriers identified therein with the help of a Certified 

Access Specialist (“CASp”), Steve Moncur. See Mot. at 3; Dkt. No. 21-3 (“Nguyen Decl.”). 

Defendant says that the parties then conducted a joint site inspection (as required by General 

Order 56) on February 4, 2020. Dkt. No. 27 (“Reply”) at 4. Defendant specifically avers that

“Plaintiff’s counsel was accompanied by its expert Tim Wegman and Defendant was accompanied 

by its expert Steve Moncur, CASp.” Id. According to Defendant, the joint site inspection 

confirmed that Defendant had voluntarily remedied the three barriers identified in the Complaint. 

Mot. at 3, 6. 

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ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR MOOTNESS INTO MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING SUR-REPLY

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Accordingly, on March 25, 2020, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 21. 

Defendant argues that the ADA claim (Count 1) must be dismissed as moot or, in the alternative, 

because Plaintiff has insufficiently pleaded his standing to seek injunctive relief. See Dkt. No. 21-

1 (“Mot.”) at 6-7. In the event this Court dismisses Count 1, Defendant asks this Court to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim (Count 2), which is a California state law 

claim. 

Because a private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief under the ADA, a defendant’s 

voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s 

ADA claim. Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Johnson 

v. Gallup & Whalen Santa Maria, No. 17-CV-01191-SI, 2018 WL 2183254, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 

11, 2018) (“There can be no effective relief here, where defendants have already removed the 

architectural barriers that plaintiff identified in the complaint.”). That is because a plaintiff only 

has Article III standing for injunctive relief if he can “demonstrate a sufficient likelihood that he 

will again be wronged in a similar way. That is, he must establish a real and immediate threat of 

repeated injury.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

threat of future injury dissipates if the barriers to accessibility have been remediated—particularly 

where remediation required structural changes that are not reasonably likely to be undone. See

Johnson v. Holden, No. 5:18-CV-01624-EJD, 2020 WL 1288404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2020); 

Ramirez v. Golden Creme Donuts, No. C 12-05656 LB, 2013 WL 6056660, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

15, 2013); see generally Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 

167, 190 (2000) (“[A] defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the 

formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not 

reasonably be expected to recur.”). 

In this case, Defendant argues that its voluntary remediation of the three barriers at issue—

all structural—has mooted Plaintiff’s ADA claim. The Court agrees that if Defendant could 

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establish the fact of its remediation, Plaintiff’s ADA claim would be moot. The Court is satisfied 

that Defendant’s alleged changes would not be mere “temporary fixes.” Sanchez v. Wendys No. 

7421, No. 819CV00111JLSDFM, 2019 WL 6603177, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019). If the

parking, the door hardware, and the paths of travel leading into the Chiropractor have indeed been 

made ADA-compliant, the complained-of accessibility barriers would be highly unlikely to recur. 

As Plaintiff points out, however, Defendant relies upon extrinsic evidence from Steve 

Moncur, CASp, in order to establish that the barriers no longer exist. See Dkt. No. 26 (“Opp.”) at 

1-3. That is, Defendant brings a factual attack on this Court’s jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s ADA 

claims. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (“Federal courts lack 

jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases 

or controversies.”); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)

(distinguishing between factual and facial attacks on jurisdiction). 

As a general matter, “[i]n resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may 

review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. “However, when the jurisdictional 

issue and the merits are ‘intertwined,’ or when the jurisdictional question is dependent on the 

resolution of factual issues going to the merits, the district court must apply the summary 

judgment standard in deciding the motion to dismiss.” Miller v. Lifestyle Creations, Inc., 993 F.2d 

883 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

“The question of jurisdiction and the merits of an action are intertwined where a statute provides 

the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive 

claim for relief.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In this case, the question of whether 

there are violations of the ADA at the Chiropractor is determinative of both subject matter 

jurisdiction and the substantive claim for relief. The Court will therefore treat the motion to 

dismiss for mootness as a motion for summary judgment.

1

 Accord Johnson v. Barrita, No. C 18-

1 This Court has done so in several prior cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mantena LLC, No. 5:19-CVCase 5:19-cv-06214-EJD Document 28 Filed 06/17/20 Page 4 of 6
Case No.: 19-cv-06214-EJD

ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR MOOTNESS INTO MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING SUR-REPLY

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06205 WHA, 2019 WL 931769, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019). 

Applying the summary judgment standard, Defendant must demonstrate that no genuine 

dispute of material fact exists that the relevant accessibility barriers do not currently exist. See 

Miller, 993 F.2d at 883. In support of its contention to that effect, Defendant attached a 

declaration by Steve Moncur to its Motion. See Dkt. No. 21-2 (“First Moncur Decl.”). Plaintiff 

responds that this declaration is insufficient to establish that the barriers have been remediated. 

Opp. at 4-5. 

As this Court recently explained, a conclusory declaration “stat[ing] that all ADA 

violations have remedied, but . . . provid[ing] no exhibits or other evidence to support these 

statements” is insufficient to support summary judgment on mootness grounds. Johnson v. 

Mantena LLC, No. 5:19-CV-06468-EJD, 2020 WL 1531355, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020); see 

also Kalani v. Starbucks Corp., 81 F. Supp. 3d 876, 882–83 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. 

Kalani v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 698 F. App’x 883 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Conclusory opinions that the 

‘facility is free of non-compliant issues,’ or that particular features, e.g., the accessible parking or 

point of sale, ‘comply with all applicable access requirements,’” are “an insufficient basis on

which to grant summary judgment.”). The declaration must “provide factual support” in order to 

support a finding that the property has come into compliance with the applicable ADA standards. 

Kalani, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 882 (offering the following example of a properly supported opinion: 

“the pick-up counter . . . as modified now provides a length of 36 inches and a height of 34 inches, 

as such it complies with access regulations.”). Such factual support is required whether or not the 

declarant is a CASp-certified expert. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, pursuant to the principles just recited, Mr. Moncur’s 

initial declaration is too conclusory to support a finding that Defendant is now in compliance with 

the ADA. See First Moncur Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. However, after Plaintiff raised this objection in his 

06468-EJD, 2020 WL 1531355, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020); Johnson v. 1082 El Camino 

Real, L.P, No. 5:17-CV-01391-EJD, 2018 WL 1091267, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2018). 

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ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR MOOTNESS INTO MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING SUR-REPLY

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Opposition, Defendant attached a detailed supplemental declaration from Mr. Moncur to its Reply. 

See Dkt. No. 27-1 (“Supp. Moncur Decl.”). In this declaration, Mr. Moncur describes the 

particular features of each barrier that he examined, the measurements he took and how he took 

them, and the applicable ADA and California state law standards he applied. See id. Mr. Moncur 

also attached to his declaration photographs of each of the three relevant areas. Dkt. Nos. 27-2, 

27-3, 27-4. With this additional factual detail and support, the Court believes that Mr. Moncur’s 

supplemental declaration would be sufficient to meet Defendant’s summary judgment burden. 

But of course, the supplemental declaration was not included with Defendant’s opening 

brief, as it should have been. “[W]here new evidence is presented in a reply to a motion for 

summary judgment, the district court should not consider the new evidence without giving the 

non-movant an opportunity to respond.” Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff shall have the opportunity to respond to the evidence Defendant submitted 

with its Reply by filing a sur-reply. 

In that sur-reply, Plaintiff may also request deferral of the Court’s consideration pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Opp. at 3 n.1. If Plaintiff chooses to do so, it should 

address why it has a need to “conduct an expert-led site inspection,” id., if (as Defendant has 

asserted) the parties have already conducted a joint site inspection with their respective experts. 

Any sur-reply must be filed by June 24, 2020 and may be no longer than 15 pages. To 

accommodate this additional briefing, the motion hearing currently scheduled for June 25, 2020 is 

hereby CONTINUED to July 2, 2020. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 17, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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