Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL OSTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SOLANO; SOLANO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 

and DOES 1 through 50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-1264-JAM-AC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants County of Solano (“the County”) and Solano 

County Sheriff’s Department (“SCSD”) (collectively “Defendants”) 

filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #39) Plaintiff Michael Oster’s

(“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. #38).1 For 

the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as a Deputy Sheriff with SCSD until 

he resigned in 2010 after years of alleged harassment, 

 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for July 15, 2015.

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retaliatory and invasive investigations, surveillance, and 

unwarranted intrusions into his and his family’s lives by his 

superiors. SAC ¶¶ 2, 11, 14-15, 17-19, 25. Plaintiff alleges

that this occurred pursuant to a policy of Defendants wherein 

officers were allowed to harass, retaliate against, demote, and 

even terminate certain disfavored SCSD employees “who make 

internal and public complaints about the SCSD’s nefarious inner 

workings.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 20-21, 24. The SAC alleges these 

actions constitute retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in 

protected free speech in violation of his First Amendment rights. 

Id. ¶¶ 23-25. 

Plaintiff’s original complaint (Doc. #2) was dismissed with 

leave to amend (Doc. #12). Plaintiff then filed a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #13), alleging two causes of action

against the County, SCSD and Does 1-50: (1) a Monell claim 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§1983”) and (2) a First Amendment 

retaliation claim pursuant to §1983. Defendants again moved to 

dismiss (Doc. #14) for failure to state a claim. The Court 

again granted the motion (Doc. #22). The Court concluded the 

FAC failed to allege sufficient facts for a claim under Monell 

v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 

658 (1978) and failed to adequately allege the speech underlying 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was “a matter of legitimate 

public concern.” The Court denied both claims without leave to 

amend. Plaintiff appealed (Doc. #24) the Court’s ruling.

The Ninth Circuit held that the Court properly dismissed 

Plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability under Monell and found 

the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend 

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the claim. Ninth Circuit Memorandum (Doc. #34) at pp. 1-2. The 

Ninth Circuit concluded Plaintiff “failed to allege any facts 

that would plausibly support his claim of ‘an unofficial yet 

distinct departmental policy’ allowing supervising officers to 

act unlawfully.” Id. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the 

Court did abuse its discretion in declining to grant Plaintiff 

leave to amend his First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. at 

p. 2. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff could possibly 

cure the deficiencies in the FAC by attaching letters supporting 

his First Amendment retaliation cause of action and remanded the 

matter back to this Court. Id. 

The Court accordingly granted Plaintiff leave to amend his 

First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff filed the SAC 

alleging a sole cause of action for First Amendment Retaliation 

pursuant to §1983 against the County, SCSD and Does 1-50, 

attaching various letters that Plaintiff contends constituted 

the protected speech underlying his claim.

II. OPINION

A. Named Defendants

Defendants contend the County should be dismissed because 

the Ninth Circuit upheld this Court’s order dismissing 

Plaintiff’s Monell claim without leave to amend. MTD at p. 5. 

The Court first notes that the Solano County Sherriff’s 

Department is not a properly named defendant for Plaintiff’s 

§1983 claims; the Court will consider the County as the sole 

named defendant. See Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. 

Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding the county was a proper 

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defendant but that suing an agency of the county was improper); 

Dasovich v. Contra Costa Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 14-CV-00258-

MEJ, 2014 WL 3368038, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

It is well established that a municipal defendant cannot be 

held liable pursuant to §1983 under a respondeat superior 

theory. See Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232–

33 (9th Cir. 2011). In addition, as stated above, the Ninth 

Circuit explicitly held that Plaintiff “failed to allege any 

facts that would plausibly support his claim of ‘an unofficial 

yet distinct departmental policy’ allowing supervising officers 

to act unlawfully.” Ninth Circuit Memo at pp. 1-2 (quoting the 

FAC). Despite this ruling, the SAC repeats this allegation 

verbatim. SAC ¶ 20. In fact, although Plaintiff did not 

include the Monell claim as a formal cause of action, the SAC 

consistently mentions the alleged, unlawful conduct was carried 

out pursuant to a policy or custom of Defendants. The issue of 

Monell liability has already been adjudicated by this Court and 

affirmed on appeal in Defendants’ favor. As there is no other 

basis for liability plausibly alleged regarding the County, the 

Court dismisses the County from this action. 

B. Doe Defendants

The only remaining Defendants are Does 1-50. In their 

Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contend the letters provided by 

Plaintiff indicate Plaintiff knows the persons involved in the 

alleged conduct, chose not to name them in the SAC, and, 

therefore, should not be allowed to proceed against DOE 

Defendants. MTD at pp. 5-6. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations because 

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Plaintiff cannot possibly meet the requirements for relating the 

claims against currently unnamed individuals back to the 

original complaint under either Federal or California law. 

In his Opposition, Plaintiff completely fails to address 

this issue regarding the Doe Defendants. Plaintiff also has not

requested any additional time or discovery to ascertain the 

identities of the Doe Defendants, effectively conceding the 

issue. Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to properly 

substitute the individuals responsible for the alleged conduct 

for the Doe Defendants but has failed to do so. He is, 

therefore, pursuing a First Amendment retaliation claim against 

no one and the claim against the Doe Defendants must be

dismissed. The Court need not address Defendants’ other 

arguments in support of their motion to dismiss, including 

whether the letters attached to the SAC plausibly relate to a 

matter of public concern. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2015

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