Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04624/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04624-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WADE ROBERTSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SHIRAZ QADRI, AVENIR RESTAURANT

GROUP, INC. and GREG ST. CLAIRE,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 06-04624 JF

ORDER1 (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

RELIEF

[re: docket no. 20, 27]

Defendants Shiraz Qadri (“Qadri”), Avenir Restaurant Group, Inc. (“Avenir”) and Greg

St. Clarie (“St. Claire”), (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff Wade Roberston

(“Robertson”) opposes the motion. The Court heard oral argument on October 13, 2006. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion with leave to amend.

 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2006, Robertson filed a complaint in this Court against Qadri, the general

**Original filed 10/26/06**

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 36 Filed 10/26/06 Page 1 of 10
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2

 “Respondeat superior liability” does not constitute an independent claim for relief. 

3

 Robertson also seeks damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress with his

claims for false imprisonment, false arrest and assault. 

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

manager of Nola’s Restaurant and Bar (“Nola’s”), seeking declaratory judgment, or in the

alternative, damages for false imprisonment, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress arising out of the incident on April 28, 2006 described below. On August 18, 2006,

Robertson filed an amended complaint against Qadri, Avenir (Nola’s owner), and St. Claire

(Avenir’s owner). Robertson asserts claims arising from two incidents described below, one on

April 28, 2006, and another on August 4, 2006. Regarding the first incident, Robertson seeks

declaratory judgment regarding the “non-occurrence of tortious acts,” and, in the alternative,

damages for false imprisonment, false arrest, and respondeat superior liability.2 Robertson also

seeks damages for assault arising out of the second incident.3 

A. The April 28 Incident

Robertson alleges the following. Qadri is the general manager of Nola’s Resturant and

Bar (“Nola’s”), Avenir owns Nola’s, and St. Claire owns Avenir. On the night of April 27, 2006,

and the morning of April 28, 2006, Robertson was a patron at Nola’s and hosted a party of seven

people. At 12:35am Robertson wished to leave Nola’s immediately and requested his final bill

from Qadri who was behind the bar. At 12:39am Qadri printed Robertson’s bill and presented it

to him. Robertson immediately reported to Qadri a $90 discrepancy in the bill, claiming that he

had already paid a waitress $100 for $10 in drinks and expected the change to be applied to his

final bill. Qadri then stated that he did not believe Robertson and was going to check his story

independently. Qadri also stated that he was taking back Robertson’s credit card and instructed

Robertson that he was to “stay right here . . . right here.” Qadri also stated, “unless you want

trouble . . . I’ve got your card,” and he waved Robertson’s card in the air toward a Nola’s

employee who appeared to be a bouncer standing near the doorway exit. Qadri left the bar area

at approximately 12:43am. Robertson felt compelled to remain in the restaurant as a result of

Qadri’s statements and actions, contrary to his will to leave. 

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

According to an electronic timestamp, a second bill was printed at 12:45am with a new

total reflecting a $90 reduction. However, Qadri did not return to Robertson and deliver the new

bill until 1:00am. Robertson signed the bill and left Nola’s. As Robertson exited he noticed a

police officer in a police vehicle staring continuously at him. Robertson entered his vehicle and

drove away, but was immediately followed and pulled over by the police officer. The police

officer then arrested Robertson for driving under the influence of alcohol. Roberston was

detained by the police in excess of twelve hours.

The police officer filed several police reports alleging facts in support of his

determination that he had probable cause for Robertson’s arrest without a warrant. The first

report, dated April 28, 2006, states that a man identifying himself as Nola’s general manager

flagged down the police officer and expressed concern that a few of his intoxicated patrons might

drive away from the area. He then pointed to a man in a Hawaiian shirt, saying that he had been

drinking heavily in the bar. The police officer saw the man in the Hawaiian shirt standing near a

pickup truck and a few minutes later saw that someone was driving the truck. Shortly thereafter

the officer pulled the truck over and found that the driver was the same Hawaiian-shirted man. A

subsequent police report, dated April 29, 2006, states that the police officer later contacted and

interviewed Qadri. In the interview Qadri confirmed that Robertson was the Hawaiian-shirted

man that he had warned the officer about. Qadri stated that Robertson had been drinking for

several hours in the bar and was “pretty intoxicated” when he paid his bill. The police report

indicates that Qadri tried to call a taxi for Robertson because he knew that Robertson was too

intoxicated to drive safely, which is why Qadri flagged the police officer down.

Robertson alleges that he hired a private investigator to meet and confer with Qadri

regarding the events alleged above. Qadri declined either to admit or to deny if the events

described in the police report in fact occurred. 

B. The August 4 Incident

Robertson alleges via affidavits attached to his amended complaint that the following

incident occurred on the evening of August 4, 2006. Robertson delivered legal work to his client

Timothy Gray (“Gray”) at Gray’s office which is located adjacent to Nola’s. A number of Gray’s

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

colleagues and social acquaintances arrived in Gray’s office, and food was delivered (from

Nola’s) for the group. At 8:45pm Gray responded to a violently loud knock at the door and

stepped outside of the office, closing the door behind him while his guests, including Robertson,

waited inside. The people outside included Qadri, St. Claire and another man, allegedly a chef

and part-owner of Nola’s. Robertson heard yelling on the other side of the closed door including

the phrases, “Is Wade Robertson in there? . . . Did you know that prick is suing us? . . . I want

you to get him out of there now! . . . And you tell him that I’m going to come after him with

everything I’ve got!” Robertson became seriously concerned for his physical safety and feared

that the people outside the door were either going to come into the office and physically hurt him,

or that they were waiting for him to step out so they could physically hurt him. One of Gray’s

other guests went outside to assist Gray and the two later returned. Gray instructed everyone to

leave the premises but asked them to wait for him for safety reasons. Gray left to settle the

catering bill for the food that had been delivered to his office. Upon his return Gray informed the

group that they had all been “banned” from Nola’s. The group then left Gray’s office without

incident. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the

Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the

complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections,

66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be

ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996).

On a motion to dismiss, the Court’s review is limited to the face of the complaint and

matters judicially noticeable. North Star International v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 720

F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983); MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.

1986); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F.Supp. 1393, 1395 (C.D. Cal. 1995). However, under the

“incorporation by reference” doctrine, the Court also may consider documents which are

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4

 Defendants request judicial notice of the court file, including police reports, relating to

the criminal case currently pending against Robertson. Robertson references the police reports

extensively in his amended complaint, but opposes judicial notice of these documents on the

basis that Defendants have not properly authenticated them. Robertson also asserts that police

reports are not judicially noticeable pursuant to Ninth Circuit and California Supreme Court

authority. However a court may take judicial notice of the existence (as distinctly separate from

the truth) of a document filed in another court to establish the fact of such litigation and related

filings. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, when a court takes judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may

do so not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is

not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity). The Court therefore grants the request for

judicial notice as to the fact of the existence of a pending criminal case against Robertson. On

October 6, 2006, Robertson filed a motion for administrative relief to strike Defendant’s request

for judicial notice because their papers violate Civil Local Rule 3-17. The motion is denied

because Defendants have offered to file a stipulation and proposed order regarding the redaction

of Robertson’s personal information on file. 

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

referenced extensively in the complaint and which are accepted by all parties as authentic, which

are not physically attached to the complaint. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,

183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim for Declaratory Relief

Robertson seeks a declaratory judgment that Qadri did not make statements to the police

as alleged in the police report referenced in Robertson’s amended complaint. Defendants assert

that declaratory relief is inappropriate because there is no justiciable or actual controversy that

requires clarification of legal issues and because there is a pending criminal case against

Robertson in the Santa Clara Superior Court.4

Declaratory relief is appropriate (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in

clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief

from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Eureka Fed. Sav.

& Loan Ass'n v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 873 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting

Bilbrey by Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir.1984)). The purpose of declaratory

relief is to enable parties to adjudicate their disputes before either suffers great damage. See

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

Societe de Conditionnement v. Hunter Eng. Co., Inc., 655 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding

that declaratory relief advances to present a litigable controversy which otherwise might only be

tried in the future). 

 In 1971 the Supreme Court articulated a national policy forbidding federal courts from

staying or enjoining pending state proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). The

Ninth Circuit has since explained that the Younger abstention doctrine precludes federal

injunctive relief and declaratory relief in the context of pending state criminal matters. 

Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 1992). Practicality and administrative

considerations also generally counsel against the exercise of federal declaratory relief jurisdiction

in cases that involve only state law questions and are brought during the pendency of related state

court proceedings. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 103 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1996)

overruled on other grounds by Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir.

1998). 

In light of the pending criminal case against Robertson in state court, the Court declines

to exercise declaratory relief jurisdiction over Robertson’s claim. The Court therefore will grant

Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Robertson’s claim for declaratory relief.

B. Claims for Damages

 Alternatively, Robertson asserts tort claims for false imprisonment false arrest, and

assault. Robertson includes intentional infliction of emotional distress in each of these claims.

(1) False Imprisonment and False Arrest

Robertson’s claim for false imprisonment alleges that Defendants confined him at the bar

for seventeen minutes by means of threatening comments and actions and by withholding his

property while Qadri contacted the police and identified Robertson. Robertson’s claim for false

arrest alleges that Qadri conducted a de facto citizen’s arrest by confining Robertson at the bar

until Qadri could transfer custody of Robertson to the police after making false accusations. 

Defendants assert that the conduct and statements attributed to them that give rise to

Robertson’s false imprisonment and false arrest claims are absolutely privileged by Cal. Civ.

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

Code § 47(b). Defendants also assert that false imprisonment and false arrest do not constitute

separate claims for relief. Robertson contends that § 47(b) immunity applies only to

communications, not conduct. Robertson further contends that two separate claims are proper

because there are significant pleading differences between false imprisonment and false arrest. 

As formulated by the California Supreme Court, the tort of false imprisonment consists of

the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an

appreciable length of time, however short. Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994). 

False arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts in that false arrest is but one way of

committing a false imprisonment. Collins v. San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673 (1975). 

Cal Civ. Code § 47(b) states that a privileged publication or broadcast is one made in any

(1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized

by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law. When a

citizen contacts law enforcement personnel to report suspected criminal activity and to instigate

law enforcement personnel to respond, the communication enjoys an unqualified privilege under

section 47(b). Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 364 (2004). However, this

privilege protects only publications and communications and therefore a threshold issue in

determining the applicability of the privilege is whether the defendant’s conduct was

communicative or noncommunicative. Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal. 3d 202, 211 (1990). The

distinction between communicative and noncommunicative conduct hinges on the gravamen of

the action. Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1058 (2006). The key in determining whether

the privilege applies is whether the injury allegedly resulted from an act that was communicative

in its essential nature. Id. 

As currently pled, Robertson’s alleged injury in both his claims hinges essentially and

entirely on Qadri’s alleged communications to the police officer. The § 47(b) privilege therefore

applies to Defendants’ alleged conduct. As indicated by the Court at oral argument, Robertson

must separate Defendants’ privileged communications from any alleged non-privileged conduct. 

(2) Assault

Defendants also contend that Robertson has failed to establish a claim for relief for

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

assault. In order to state a cause of action for assault a plaintiff must establish (1) that defendant

intended to cause harmful or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of such contact,

and (2) that plaintiff was put in imminent apprehension of such contact. Brooks v. U.S., 29 F.

Supp. 2d 613, 617 (N.D.Cal. 1998) aff’d, 162 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2004). Assault is a tort of

specific intent and a plaintiff must prove that defendant intended to place plaintiff in a reasonable

apprehension of harmful or offensive contact. Id. The crime of assault requires the present

ability to commit a violent injury on another person. Cal. Pen. Code § 240. In civil actions for

assault, the courts have applied the definition of criminal assault and relied on criminal cases in

rendering their decisions. See McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App. 2d 249 (1946). However, the

tort of assault is not defined by statute, and thus the court is afforded the opportunity to extend

the concept of the tort beyond the limits placed on the corresponding crime by its statutory

definition. Lowry v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 63 Cal. App. 2d 1 (1944). 

When Defendants were allegedly shouting outside Gray’s office, Robertson was inside

and behind a closed door. The alleged facts would not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of

harmful or offensive contact. Robertson therefore has not adequately pled a claim for relief for

the tort of assault.

(3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Robertson claims intentional infliction of emotional distress within his claims for false

imprisonment, false arrest and assault. Defendants assert that Robertson has not properly pled

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Alternatively, Defendants assert that their alleged

conduct is privileged and did not rise to the level necessary for liability. 

In order to state a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a

plaintiff must show (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4)

actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection

Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n. 7 (1987). Only conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a

decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress

is actionable. Id.

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

Robertson’s assertions regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress are

scattered among other claims for relief. The Court therefore cannot presently perceive a

cognizable claim for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

III. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED with leave to amend. Any second amended complaint must be filed on or before

November 15, 2006; the motion for administrative relief is DENIED. 

DATED: _________________

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

10/25/06

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Patrick C. Kerwin & Leslie Mark Gammill

Kerwin & Kerwin, LLP

968 Woodside Rd.

P.O. Box 610148

Redwood City, CA 94061

Wade Robertson

P.O. Box 20185

Stanford, CA 94309

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