Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00246/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227(b)(3) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TANEESHA CROOKS, individually

and on behalf of all others similarly

situated; ANTHONY BROWN,

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 17cv246-WQH-MDD

ORDER

v.

RADY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before this Court is the motion to stay proceedings, strike class

allegations, or in the alternative, dismiss the complaint filed by Defendant Rady

Children’s Hospital. (ECF No. 9). 

I. BACKGROUND

On February 8, 2017, Plaintiffs Taneesha Crooks and Anthony Brown initiated

this action by filing a Complaint alleging two causes of action under the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) against Defendant Rady Children’s Hospital: (1)

negligent violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., and (2) knowing and/or

willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (ECF No. 1). 

On March 15, 2017, Defendant moved the Court for an order (1) staying all

proceedings until a decision is rendered by the D.C. Circuit Court in ACA Int’l v. Fed.

Comm’cns Comm’n, et al., No. 15-1221 (D.C. Cir. 2015); (2) striking Plaintiffs’ class

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allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f); or (3) dismissing the Complaint for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). 

(ECF No. 9). On April 10, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition.1

 (ECF No.

12). On April 17, 2017, Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 13). 

II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Brown incurred a debt to Defendant sometime in 2012. (ECF No. 1 at

¶ 10). “On or before April 11, 2016, Defendant, through its agent, Rady Children’s

Specialists, began calling Plaintiff Brown’s cellular telephone ending with ‘3623’. . .

via an ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ (‘ATDS’), while using an ‘artificial or

prerecorded voice’ . . . .” Id. ¶ 11. On or about April 11, 2016, counsel for Plaintiff

Brown “faxed and mailed cease and desist letters to Defendant’s multiple locations”

revoking any prior express consent that may have been given to receive such telephone

calls. Id. ¶ 12. 

On April 18, 2016, Defendant’s agent, Rady Children’s Specialists, confirmed

receipt of the cease and desist correspondence from April 11, 2016 in a fascimile

correspondence to Plaintiff Brown’s counsel. Id. ¶ 15. “[O]n December 23, 2016,

Defendant continued calling Plaintiff Brown’s cellular phone . . . via an [ATDS].” Id.

¶ 16. “When Plaintiff Brown answered Defendant’s phone call on December 23, 2016,

an artificial or prerecorded voice message remind[ed] Plaintiff Brown of the existence

of the alleged debt.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff Brown “never provided Defendant with his

cellular telephone number at the time the alleged debt relating to the calls was incurred”

and “if any prior express consent was ever given, it was expressly revoked by the

correspondence of April 11, 2016.” Id. ¶ 18. 

Prior to October 2016, Plaintiff Crooks incurred a debt to Defendant. Id. ¶ 20. 

“On or about October 14, 2016, . . . Defendant, through its agent, Rady Children’s

1

 Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of various proceedings in other courts in support of their opposition to Defendant’s motion. (ECF No. 12-1). The Court denies this request for judicial notice as unnecessary. See, e.g., Asvesta v.

Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1010 n.12 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying request for judicial notice where judicial notice would be “unnecessary”). 

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Specialists, began calling Plaintiff Crooks’ cellular phone ending with ‘2044’ via an

[ATDS], while using an ‘artificial or prerecorded voice,’ . . . .” Id. ¶ 21. On October

21, 2016, counsel for Plaintiff Crooks “faxed and mailed a cease and desist letter to

Defendant’s multiple locations” revoking any prior express consent that may have been

given to receive such telephone calls. Id. ¶ 23. “[O]n November 4, 2016 Defendant

continued calling Plaintiff Crooks’ cellular phone . . . via an [ATDS] with unsolicited

prerecorded messages.” Id. ¶ 24. 

“[B]oth Plaintiffs suffered an invasion of their legally protected interest in

privacy . . . .” Id. ¶ 26. “Upon information and belief, the telephone equipment used

by Defendant to place the calls at issue has the capacity to dial [a] telephone number 

automatically from a stored list or database without human intervention, using a random

or sequential number generator.” Id. ¶ 27. The calls “were placed to a telephone

number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiffs incur a charge for

incoming calls[.]” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiffs were “personally affected” by the calls because

Plaintiffs were “frustrated and distressed that . . . Defendant interrupted Plaintiffs with

unwanted calls using an ATDS and/or prerecorded voice.” Id. ¶ 31. “Defendant’s calls

forced Plaintiffs and other similarly situated class members to live without the utility

of their cellular phones by occupying their cellular telephone with one or more

unwanted calls, causing a nuisance and lost time.” Id. ¶ 32. 

“Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly

situated (the ‘Class’).” Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiffs define the class as, 

All persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s, not sent for emergency purposes, to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and/or with an artificial or prerecorded message within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 

Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs request injunctive relief and statutory damages. Id. at 12. 

III. MOTION TO STAY

Defendant requests a stay of this entire matter pending the decision in ACA Int’l

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v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, No. 15-1221 (D.C. Cir. 2015).2 Defendant contends that

a stay is warranted because the D.C. Circuit is considering a challenge to the Federal

Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of certain provisions of the

TCPA which are “directly relevant to the issues of potential liability and damages in

this matter.” (ECF No. 9 at 2). Defendant contends that “[b]ecause ACA International

challenges the FCC’s interpretations of the definition of ATDS, the definition of ‘called

party’ under the TCPA, and the methods to revoke express consent, the issues before

the D.C. Circuit in ACA International will substantially impact the issues of potential

liability and damages in the present matter.” (ECF No. 9-1 at 12). Defendant contends

that any prejudice to Plaintiffs caused by a stay is minimal. Defendant contends that

it will suffer hardship if this action is not stayed due to unnecessary discovery and trial

preparation and that a stay will save judicial resources. Id. at 13–14. 

Plaintiffs contend that they would be “significantly prejudiced” by an unknown

and indefinite delay in conducting discovery. (ECF No. 12 at 19). Plaintiffs assert that

“it is far from guaranteed that a final result in ACA International is imminently

forthcoming.” Id. at 19. Plaintiffs contend that the decision in ACA International is

irrelevant to multiple issues in this action because this case involves prerecorded calls. 

Id. at 21. Plaintiffs contend that this Court is bound by existing Ninth Circuit precedent

and the FCC definition of ATDS under the 2003 and 2008 declaratory rulings. Id. at

22–23. Plaintiffs contend that the D.C. Circuit will likely decide the ATDS issue

favorably to Plaintiffs. Id. at 22. Plaintiffs contend that any burden of producing

discovery on Defendant does not justify a stay. Id. 

“The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court

2

 Courts may take judicial notice of “proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d

244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice (ECF No. 9-2) and takes judicial notice of the following documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201: (1) Joint Brief for Petitioners Document #1600622, ACA Int’l v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Dec. 24, 2016) No. 15-12115, and (2) Court of Appeal Docket No. 15-1211 in matter of ACA Int’l v.

Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n. (ECF Nos. 9-3, 9-4).

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to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for

itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 

A stay “is an exercise of judicial discretion, and the ‘party requesting a stay bears the

burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.’” Ind.

State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S. 960, 961 (2009) (citing Nken v,

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009)). 

A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and

the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it,

pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case. This rule applies whether the separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the

court.

Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979).

In determining whether a stay is appropriate, a district court “must weigh

competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55.

“Among these competing interests are the possible damage which may result from the

granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required

to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or

complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result

from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). 

The TCPA provides,

It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any call (other than . . .with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any

telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service,

or any service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . .

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). ACA International is a consolidation of various petitions

challenging a 2015 FCC Order interpreting various provisions of the TCPA.3

 The

issues before the D.C. Circuit involve (1) the type of equipment that constitutes an

3

 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument in ACA International

on October 16, 2016 but has not issued an opinion. (ECF No. 9-4 at 12).

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ATDS under the TCPA, (2) the definition of a “called party” under the TCPA, and (3)

the methods to revoke express consent. 

Based on the record and at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot

conclude that the outcome of ACA International would have a significant impact on the

litigation in this Court. Regardless of the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision on the

definition of ATDS, the parties will need to conduct discovery to determine the

technology used by Defendant to place the alleged calls, among other issues. Further,

the Complaint alleges that Defendant placed prerecorded calls to Plaintiffs. (ECF No.

1 at ¶¶ 11,21). Defendant may be subject to liability under the TCPA for using an

ATDS or for placing prerecorded calls to Plaintiffs. See Vaccaro v. CVS Pharm., Inc.,

No. 13-CV-174-IEG RBB, 2013 WL 3776927, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2013)

(“Because the provision is written in the disjunctive, plaintiffs can state a claim under

the TCPA by alleging the use of (1) an ‘artificial or prerecorded voice’ or (2) an

ATDS.”). Defendant has not sufficiently identified how the remaining issues before the

D.C. Circuit in ACA International would impact this case. See Ind. State Police

Pension Trust, 556 U.S. at 961 (holding that the party requesting a stay bears the burden

of establishing that it is justified). Further, Defendant’s contention that it will suffer

hardship if the action is not stayed due to unnecessary discovery and trial preparation

does not justify a stay in this case. See Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1112

(9th Cir. 2005) (“[B]eing required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute

a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’ within the meaning of Landis.”). The motion to

stay is denied. 

IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 

A. Legal Standards

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to

move for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has

subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Assoc. of Med. Colls. v. United States, 217

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F.3d 770, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2000). “In a facial attack [on jurisdiction], the challenger

asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to

invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must

contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

legal theory.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). “[A]

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as

true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. 

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). “In sum, for a complaint to survive

a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from

that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

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B. Lack of Standing Pursuant Rule 12(b)(1) 

Defendant contends that the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 9-1 at 27). Defendant contends that the facts

alleged in the Complaint fail to establish an injury-in-fact because Plaintiffs allege only

“a bare procedural violation” that is “divorced from any concrete harm.” Id. at 28–30. 

Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs failed to allege injury specific to each

individual call. Id. at 30. 

Plaintiffs contend that the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish Article

III injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs contend that the Complaint alleges economic loss, invasion

of privacy, annoyance, and wasted time as a result of the calls. (ECF No. 12 at 40). 

Plaintiffs contend receipt of unwanted phone calls constitutes a concrete injury

sufficient to establish standing to bring a TCPA claim. Id. at 41. Plaintiffs contend that

the TCPA establishes a substantive right to be free from certain phone calls without

prior consent. Id. at 42. 

The jurisdiction of federal courts is constitutionally-limited to actual cases or

controversies. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Raines v.

Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). The standing to sue doctrine is “rooted in the

traditional understanding of a case or controversy” and “limits the category of litigants

empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Id.

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing Article III

standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Plaintiff must

establish (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted). In the absence of Article III

standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit. Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998). “To establish injury in fact,

a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’

that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or

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hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A

particularized injury “affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. A

“concrete” injury may be intangible but must actually exist. Id.

In Spokeo Inc.v. Robins, the Supreme Court addressed the concrete injury-in-fact

requirement of Article III standing in the context of an alleged violation of the Federal

Credit Reporting Act. The Court stated, 

Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to

authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. 

Id. at 1549. The Court concluded that a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any

concrete harm” does not satisfy the injury-in-act requirement of Article III. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed standing to bring a TCPA

cause of action in light of the Supreme Court decision in Spokeo. Van Patten v. Vertical

Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017). In Van Patten, the plaintiff brought

a TCPA cause of action arising out of alleged unauthorized telemarketing text messages

he received inviting him to return to his former gym. The plaintiff alleged injuries

including “the aggravation that necessarily accompanies wireless spam” and the fact

that consumers “pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such wireless

spam.” Id. at 1041. The Court of Appeals held that “a violation of the TCPA is a

concrete, de facto injury” and that the plaintiff’s allegations were therefore sufficient

to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. Id. at 1043. The Court of Appeals stated, “The

TCPA establishes the substantive right to be free from certain types of phone calls and

texts absent consumer consent.” Id. 

[T]he telemarketing text messages at issue here, absent consent, present the precise harm and infringe the same privacy interests Congress sought to protect in enacting the TCPA. Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA “need

not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” 

Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 

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In this case, Plaintiffs allege a number of harms resulting from the unsolicited

phone calls from Defendant. Plaintiffs allege “an invasion of their legally protected

interest in privacy.” (ECF No.1 at ¶ 26). Plaintiffs allege the calls “personally

affected” Plaintiffs and caused frustration and distress. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiffs allege “the

calls forced Plaintiffs . . . to live without the utility of their cellular phones by

occupying their cellular telephone with one or more unwanted calls, causing a nuisance

and lost time.” Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that the “calls were placed to a telephone

number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiffs incur a charge for

incoming calls.” Id. ¶ 29. The alleged unsolicited ATDS and prerecorded calls to

Plaintiffs’ cellular telephones “by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the

solitude of” Plaintiffs. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041. The Court concludes that these

factual allegations are sufficient to establish a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact

resulting from Defendant’s alleged calls. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of

standing is denied. 

3. Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 

Defendant contends that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to support an inference of use

of an ATDS. (ECF No. 9-1 at 25). Plaintiffs contend that the Complaint contains

sufficient facts to plausibly allege use of an ATDS. (ECF No. 12 at 35). 

The TCPA provides,

It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any call (other than . . . with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service,

or any service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . .

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). To bring a claim under the TCPA, a plaintiff must show (1) that

defendant made the call (2) to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone

service and (3) the call was made using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice. 

Id. The TCPA defines an ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity . . . to store or

produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator

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[and] to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). Under the TCPA, an ATDS “need

not actually store, produce, or call randomly or sequentially generated telephone

numbers, it need only have the capacity to do it.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,

569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009). “When evaluating the issue of whether equipment

is an ATDS, the statute’s clear language mandates that the focus must be on whether the

equipment has the capacity ‘to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using

a random or sequential number generator.’” Id. 

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally used one of two approaches to

determine whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that the calls were made by an

ATDS to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Maier v. J.C. Penney Corp., No.

13CV0163-IEG DHB, 2013 WL 3006415, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2013). Under the

first approach, courts “allow for minimal allegations regarding use of an ATDS in

recognition of the fact that the type of equipment used by the defendant to place the

‘call’ is within the sole possession of the defendant at the pleading stage, and will

therefore only come to light once discovery has been undertaken.” Id. Under the

second approach a “plaintiff must go beyond simply using statutory language alleging

the defendant’s use of an ATDS and must include factual allegations about the ‘call’

within the complaint allowing for a reasonable inference that an ATDS was used.” Id.

In this case, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Brown answered a phone call

from Defendant on December 23, 2016 and “an artificial or prerecorded voice message”

reminded him of an alleged debt to Defendant. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 17). Similarly, the

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Crooks answered a call on or about October 19, 2016,

in which a “prerecorded message played with no live human on the line.” Id ¶ 22. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant made the “unwanted autodialed calls using a

prerecorded voice” to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones and provide the number used to make

the calls. Id. ¶¶ 19, 24. Further, Plaintiffs allege, “Upon information and belief, the

telephone equipment used by Defendant to place the calls at issue has the capacity to

dial telephone number[s] automatically from a stored list or database without human

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intervention, using a random or sequential number generator.” Id. ¶ 27. Construed in

the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the factual allegations of

the Complaint are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Defendant used an

ATDS in making the alleged calls to Plaintiffs. See also Maier, 2013 WL 3006415, at

*3 (stating that “generic content of a message, a description of a robotic sounding voice,

or a lack of human response” are “indirect factual allegations supporting a reasonable

inference of use of an ATDS”). Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is denied. 

VI. MOTION TO STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS

Defendant moves the Court for an order striking class allegations pursuant to

Rule 12(f) because the Complaint demonstrates that the class action cannot be

maintained on the facts alleged. (ECF No. 9-1 at 16). Defendant contends that this case

is unsuitable for class treatment because the issue of consent will need to be analyzed

on an individual basis for each putative class member. Id. at 19. Defendant contends

that the proposed class is not precisely and adequately defined and therefore lacks

commonality and ascertainability. Id. at 20–23. Defendant contends that the allegations

of the Complaint are insufficient to establish that the purported class representatives

have claims typical of the purported class members. Id. at 24. Defendant contends that

the Complaint alleges an impermissible “fail-safe class” which is not ascertainable

because class members are not capable of identification prior to final judgment. Id. at

25. 

Plaintiffs contend that the class allegations are not spurious and the Rule 23

requirements were properly pled. (ECF No. 12 at 28). Plaintiff contends that the class

definition is properly pled and that the complaint adequately alleges ascertainability. 

Id. at 30. Plaintiffs contend that the Complaint does not allege an impermissible failsafe class. Id. at 31. Plaintiffs contend that this motion is premature and that Plaintiffs

are not required to satisfy Rule 23(a) and (b) prior to class certification. Id. at 33. 

However, Plaintiffs further contend that the issues of commonality, typicality, and

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adequacy have been properly pled. Id. at 33–34. 

 A court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function

of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise

from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Fantasy,

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted), rev’d on other

grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). Courts disfavor motions to

strike class allegations because issues related to class allegations are generally more

appropriately resolved on a motion for class certification. See Lyons v. Coxcom, Inc.,

718 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235 –36 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Thorpe v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 534 F.

Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2008). “Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike

lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Cal. Dep’t. of Toxic Substances

Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Fantasy,

Inc., 984 F.2d at 1528). “In exercising its discretion, the court views the pleadings in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . and resolves any doubt as to the

relevance of the challenged allegations or sufficiency of a defense in defendant’s favor.”

 Id.

The Court concludes that Defendant’s motion to strike class allegations is

premature at this stage of the proceedings. The class issues raised by Defendant are

more appropriately considered at the class certification proceedings. See Lyons, 718 F.

Supp. 2d at 1236 (noting that courts rarely grant motions to dismiss class allegations

before discovery has commenced); In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage and Hour Litig.,

505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 615–16 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“In the absence of any discovery or

specific arguments related to class certification, the Court is not prepared to rule on the

propriety of the class allegations and explicitly reserves such a ruling . . . . [P]laintiffs

should at least be given the opportunity to make the case for certification based on

appropriate discovery . . . .”). Defendant’s motion to strike class allegations is denied.

VII. CONCLUSION 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to stay, motion to strike class

allegations, and motion to dismiss the Complaint filed by Defendant Rady Children’s

Hospital is DENIED. (ECF No. 9). 

DATED: October 10, 2017

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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