Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01764/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01764-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The Court sua sponte substitutes the current Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation as Respondent in this matter. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996)

(stating that the respondent in § 2254 proceedings may be the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO DIVISION

ZENTORY T. BEAN, Civil No. 1:07-1764 MJL (NLS)

Petitioner,

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO ALTER OR

AMEND JUDGMENT; and

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,1

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 17, 2009, this Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Petitioner

Zentory T. Bean’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Order

dated June 17, 2009, Bean v. Tilton, 1:07cv1764 MJL (NLS) [doc. no. 15].) The Court granted habeas

relief based on Bean’s claim that his Sixth Amendment rights, as defined by Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004) and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), were violated when he was

sentenced to the upper term of imprisonment on his Penal Code section 12022.5(a) conviction for

personally using a firearm in the commission of a felony and found the constitutional error was not

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harmless. (See Order at 12-14.) Respondent subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), arguing that the Order granting habeas relief was based on a clear error

of law. (See Mot. to Alter or Amend Judgment [doc. no. 17].) For the reasons discussed below, the

Court GRANTS the motion and DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus in its entirety.

II. ANALYSIS

Bean pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and illegal possession of a firearm, and admitted

an allegation that he personally used a firearm. At sentencing, the court found one mitigating

circumstance, Bean’s early admission of guilt, and one aggravating circumstance, that the offense

involved planning. (Lodgment No. 4 at 2-3.) Concluding the mitigating circumstances outweighed the

aggravating circumstances, the court sentenced Bean to the mitigated term for the voluntary

manslaughter and the illegal possession of a firearm. (Id.) The court sentenced Bean under California’s

Determinate Sentencing law (DSL) to the aggravated term of six years in prison on the gun enhancement

charge but did not state any reason for this choice. (Id.) 

 The gun enhancement Bean admitted, California Penal Code section 12022.5(a), states that a

sentence of five, six or ten years’ imprisonment must be imposed for a violation of the section. (Cal.

Penal Code § 12022.5(a). Pursuant to the version of California Penal Code section 1170.1(d) in effect

at the time of Bean’s sentencing, “[i]f an enhancement is punishable by one of three terms, the court

shall impose the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. . . .” (Cal.

Penal Code § 1170.1(d).) California Rules of Court, Rule 4.421 sets forth the aggravating factors that

a court may consider in deciding whether to impose an aggravated term. Rule 4.421(a)(8) states that

an aggravating factor is “[t]he manner in which the crime was carried out indicates planning . . . .”

Cal.R.Ct. 4.421(a)(8). In his guilty plea, Bean did not admit any facts which established the crime

involved planning.

In its Order granting habeas relief, the Court began with the proposition that the Supreme Court

held in Cunningham that California’s DSL violated defendants’ jury trial rights safeguarded by the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments because it permitted “a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory

maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the

defendant.” Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 275. The Cunningham court held that the “statutory maximum”

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is the middle term. Id. at 288-89. The DSL under which Bean was sentenced was precisely the scheme

invalidated by the Supreme Court in Cunningham and the reason why constitutional error occurred.

Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288-89. 

The Court then concluded that the error was not harmless because it was in “‘grave doubt’ that

the state judge could have or would have given Bean the aggravated sentence of ten years on the gun

enhancement charge solely based on Bean’s prior convictions or that such a sentence could have been

justified under state law.” (Order at 14.) It is this portion of the Court’s analysis with which

Respondent takes issue. (Mot. at 2-3.) Specifically, Respondent argues that the Court used the wrong

standard to decide whether the error was harmless because under Butler v. Curry, “the relevant question

is not what the trial court would have done, but what it legally could have done.” Butler, 528 F.3d 624,

648 (9th Cir. 2008). As the Butler court explained:

After one aggravating factor was validly found, the trial court legally could have

imposed the upper term. That the judge might not have done so in the absence of an

additional

factor does not implicate the Sixth Amendment, as that consideration concerns only the

imposition of a sentence within an authorized statutory range.

Id. at 648-49. 

Under Butler, any Cunningham error is harmless if at least one aggravating factor under

California law was admitted to by the defendant or was found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Butler, 528 F.3d at 643. As Respondent correctly argues in his motion, in Bean’s case, it is irrelevant

whether the Court is in “grave doubt” as to whether the state trial court would have sentenced Bean to

the aggravated term. The only question is whether the state court could have done so. The Court must

answer that question in the affirmative. Rule 4.421(b) states the following applicable circumstances in

aggravation:

(b) Factors relating to the defendant

(1) The defendant had engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious

danger to society;

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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(2) The defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions

in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing

seriousness;

. . . . Cal.R.Ct. 4.421(b)(1), (2).

Bean’s admission that he committed manslaughter and used a gun establishes both of these valid,

aggravating factors in a manner consistent with Cunningham and the Sixth Amendment. See Butler, 528

F.3d at 648-49. Manslaughter is unequivocally “violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to

society.” In addition, Bean’s prior conviction for battery and his current convictions for manslaughter

and use of a gun establish that his convictions are “of increasing seriousness.” See People v. Clark, 12

Cal. App. 4th 663, 666 (1992) (“The offense for which a defendant is being sentenced may be

considered in determining that his or her convictions are of increasing seriousness.”)

Accordingly, the Court agrees that granting Bean’s petition was based on clear error because at

least one appropriate aggravating factor was established in a manner consistent with the Sixth

Amendment. Butler, 528 F.3d at 643; Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288-89.

III. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to alter or amend the

judgment. The petition is DENIED in its entirety for the reasons stated above and in the Court’s

previous Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 11, 2010

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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