Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02529/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02529-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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- 1 - 09cv0441

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRACE L. SANDOVAL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv2529 DMS (POR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILING

TO STATE A CLAIM UPON

WHICH RELIEF CAN BE

GRANTED PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

vs.

MODERN PAINT AND BODY SHOP,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, has submitted a Complaint, Motion and Declaration

Under Penalty of Perjury in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), and a request

for appointment of counsel.

Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States,

except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. §

1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff

is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook,

169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets and finds

it is sufficient to show that she is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this

action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

Case 3:09-cv-02529-DMS-POR Document 4 Filed 12/16/09 Page 1 of 3
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Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)

After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the case “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted” or is “ frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As currently pled, it is

clear that Plaintiff’s complaint: (1) fails to state a cognizable claim; and (2) is frivolous to the extent

it is based on facts which are fantastic and delusional.

First, in her complaint, plaintiff fails to allege any facts establishing a cause of action under 18

U.S.C. § 1962, et seq. Although RICO does not expressly provide a statute oflimitations, the Supreme

Court (by analogy to the Clayton Act) has established a 4-year limitations period for civil RICO

claims. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs. Inc., 483 US 143, 156 (1987). Thus, to the

extent the complaint alleges criminal activity prior to November 10, 2004, Plaintiff’s claims are timebarred. Furthermore, while the standard used to evaluate dismissal of a pro se complaint is liberal,

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976), even a “liberal interpretation . . . may not supply elements

of the claim that were not initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982). “A civil RICO claim requires allegations of the conduct of an enterprise through

a pattern of racketeering activitythat proximatelycaused injury to the plaintiff.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP,

476 F.3d 756, 760-61 (9th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the “elements of a civil RICO claim are as follows:

(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as predicate

acts) (5) causing injury to plaintiff's business or property.” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de

Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005). To establish liability, “one must allege and prove

the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same

‘person’ referred to by a different name.” Id. The non-time barred allegations in the complaint do not

provide a basis for an inference that the alleged criminal activitywas a part of an enterprise, Defendant

was engaged in such an enterprise, or that Plaintiff’s business or property was injured by the

enterprise’s criminal conduct. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed because it failsto state a claim

for a civil RICO violation.

Second, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed as frivolous to the extent it pleads facts which

are fantastic or delusional. “[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. [The] term ‘frivolous,’

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moot.

- 3 - 09cv0441

when applied to the complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful

factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774,

775 (9th Cir. 1996); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). When determining

whether a complaint is frivolous, the court need not accept the factual allegations as true, but must

“pierce the veil of the complaint,” to determine if the allegations are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or

“delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). 

Here, Plaintiff makes fantastical claims against various entities. For example, Plaintiff asserts

that the owner of Modern Paint and Body Shop “is an orphan from Arizona... [who] is joined with

orphans from Arizona in stealing cars.” (Compl. at 1.) She claims “Robert Goodman Senior

demanded to drag [her] at cattle call rodeo to cause wounds on [her] human skin.” (Id. at 3.) She

further alleges and that Mr. Goodman caused injury to her right lung in 1982, a claim she has made

in previous filings with this Court. See Sandoval v. Yavenditti, No. 09cv441 (DMS) (S.D. Cal. 2009).

Plaintiff’s allegations “rise[ ] to the level of irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504

U.S. at 33. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice as frivolous

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I). See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n. 8 (9th 1

Cir.2000) (en banc) (“there is, by definition, no merit to [a frivolous] action and so no reason to grant

leave to amend”); see also Sandoval v. Russo, No. 09cv424 L (WMc), 2009 WL 563889, *2 (S.D.

Cal.) (dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s frivolous civil RICO action); Sandoval v. Vasquez, No.

08cv2104 L (WMc), 2008 WL 4974422, *2 (S.D. Cal.) (same); Sandoval v. Fink, No. 08cv1869 L

(NLS), 2008WL4753744, *3 (S.D. Cal.) (same); Sandoval v. Danko, No. 08cv1853 IEG (BLM), slip.

op. at 3 (S.D. Cal., Oct. 15, 2008) (same).

For the foregoing reasons, theCourtGRANTS plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis,

DISMISSES the case with prejudice, and DENIES plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: December 16, 2009

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-02529-DMS-POR Document 4 Filed 12/16/09 Page 3 of 3