Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02911/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02911-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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14cv2911 BEN (NLS) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAVON LAMAR TORBERT, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

WILLIAM D. GORE, Sheriff of San 

Diego Sheriff Department; DEPUTY 

DAILLY, Sheriff of San Diego Sheriff 

Department; DEPUTY McMAHON, 

Sheriff of San Diego Sheriff Department; 

DEPUTY Y.G. GEBREBIORGIS, Sheriff 

of San Diego Sheriff Department; 

SERGEANT ESTRADA, Sheriff of San 

Diego Sheriff Department; COUNTY OF 

SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1-50, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14cv2911 BEN (NLS) 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[Dkt. Not. 66]; and 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT 

WITNESS [Dkt. No. 68]. 

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Plaintiff Javon Lamar Tobert (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action on December 9, 2014. He alleges excessive 

force, cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference claims arising from an 

alleged incident where one of the defendants slammed a metal door on Plaintiff’s left 

arm. 

Plaintiff asks this court, for a second time, to appoint him counsel from the court’s 

pro bono panel. He argues that appointment of counsel is appropriate here because (1) 

this case is complex and presents scientific issues outside Torbert’s scope of 

understanding, and he has only an eighth grade education; (2) Torbert is mentally 

impaired, suffering from serious mental health issues that include severe borderline 

personality disorder, self-inflicting behavior, disassociation, and mood swings for which 

he takes psychotropic medications; (3) he will require the help of experts to prove his 

claims; and (4) he is indigent and does not have the resources to investigate crucial facts, 

as he will no longer have the help of jailhouse lawyers due to prison transfers. 

I. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

A. Legal Standard. 

The Constitution provides no absolute right to the appointment of counsel in any 

civil proceeding. Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In pro se and in forma pauperis proceedings, district courts do not have the authority “to 

make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 

U.S. 296, 310 (1989). But they do have the discretion to request that an attorney 

represent an indigent civil litigant upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. Of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2004). 

A finding of exceptional circumstances “requires an evaluation of both the 

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims 

pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th 

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Cir. 1983). Neither of the Wilborn factors are dispositive, and they must be viewed 

together before the district court reaches its decision. Id. 

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits. 

 A plaintiff that provides no evidence of his likelihood of success at trial fails to 

satisfy the first factor of the Wilborn test. Bailey v. Lawford, 835 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D. 

Cal. 1993). Here, there is very little before the court regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s 

case, other than the assertions in the complaint. As a result, it is difficult at this time to 

determine the likelihood that Plaintiff will succeed on the merits. Therefore, Plaintiff 

fails to satisfy the first Wilborn factor. 

C. Plaintiff’s Ability to Articulate His Claims. 

Where a pro se civil rights plaintiff shows he has a good grasp of basic litigation 

procedure and has been able to articulate his claims adequately, he does not demonstrate 

the exceptional circumstances required for the appointment of counsel. See Palmer v. 

Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). As another court in this district noted, there is 

“no doubt [that] most pro se litigants find it difficult to articulate their claims and would 

be better served with the assistance of counsel.” Garcia v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections & 

Rehab., 2013 WL 485756, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013). But it is for this reason that 

federal courts employ procedures that protect a pro se litigant’s rights. See Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In pro se civil rights cases, a court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, where a pro se plaintiff 

can articulate his claims in light of their relative complexity, there are no exceptional 

circumstances to justify appointment of counsel. Garcia, 2013 WL 485756, at *1, citing 

Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. 

 The purported complexity of this case and Plaintiff’s limited knowledge of the law 

have not prevented him from articulating his claims. This court has reviewed Plaintiff’s 

complaint and other pleadings and finds that the issues he raises are not particularly 

complex. The court understands Plaintiff’s claims and the relief sought. Plaintiff has 

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also demonstrated that he has a good grasp on basic litigation procedure, as evidenced by 

the pleadings and submissions he has filed with this court. 

 While Plaintiff argues that he is on several psychiatric medications and in 

treatment, he makes no allegations regarding the impact of his mental illnesses on his 

ability to present his case. As for his other argument that he lacks funds and needs 

counsel to work with experts to help frame his claims, such an issue is common to most 

prisoners, and does not amount to exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying appointment of counsel 

where plaintiff complained that he had limited access to law library and lacked a legal 

education). The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently put on his case thus far in light 

of the complexity of the legal issues involved. 

Viewing the Wilborn factors together, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of 

success on the merits of his case or that he cannot articulate his claims and litigate this 

action pro se. Therefore, Plaintiff has not established the exceptional circumstances 

required for the appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(1). 

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS 

Torbert asks this court to appoint an expert witness to help the trier of fact 

understand the evidence and determine the facts at issue regarding his excessive force, 

medical neglect and emotional distress claims. He also says that Defendants have a 

medical expert so any medical evidence will be biased toward the Defendants. 

A. Legal Standard. 

 An expert witness may testify to help the trier of fact determine the evidence or a 

fact at issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702. A court has full discretion to appoint an expert witness 

either by its own motion or by a party’s motion. Fed. R. Evid. 706(a); McKinney v. 

Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1510-11 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by 

Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991). Appointment of an expert witness may 

generally be appropriate when “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue....” Levi v. Dir. 

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of Corr., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18795, *2 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (citation omitted). 

 The in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, does not waive the 

requirement of the payment of fees or expenses for witnesses in a § 1983 prisoner civil 

rights action. Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993). “Reasonably construed, 

[Rule 706] does not contemplate the appointment of, and compensation for, an expert to 

aid one of the parties.” Trimble v. City of Phoenix Police Dept., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

13061, *6 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citation omitted). 

B. Appointment of an Expert. 

 In his request to appoint an expert, Torbert argues that an expert’s testimony is 

needed regarding medical and psychiatric issues to rebut Defendants’ medical expert. He 

also explains this case contains complex medical and psychiatric issues, and a jury will 

need an unbiased expert’s help to understand those issue. 

Here, it is unclear whether defendant Dr. Joshua has been appointed to serve as an 

expert in this case. Thus it is premature for the court to know whether any further expert 

testimony will be helpful. It is also unclear whether Torbert has the means to retain and 

compensate an expert. 

Further, to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference, 

Torbert must show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1983). Deliberate indifference 

has a subjective component because it requires the court to “consider the seriousness of 

the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” 

Levi, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 3 (citation omitted). In the context of such a claim, “the 

question of whether the prison officials displayed deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff's] 

serious medical needs [does] not demand that the jury consider probing, complex 

questions concerning medical diagnosis and judgment.” Id. Courts have declined to 

appoint an expert under such circumstances. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff's request for 

appointment of a medical expert witness is DENIED. 

/ / / 

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III. ORDER 

 The court DENIES without prejudice Torbert’s motion for appointment of 

counsel and his motion for appointment of an expert witness. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 8, 2016 

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