Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02248/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02248-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE, individually, and RICHARD 

ROE on behalf of Minor A, Minor B, and 

Minor C,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BUTTE COUNTY PROBATION 

DEPARTMENT; ROXANNE LARA; 

DAWN HOROWITZ-PERSON,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-02248-TLN-DMC

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs John Doe (“Doe”) and Richard Roe’s

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint. (ECF No. 65.) 

Defendant Dawn Horwitz-Person1(“Horwitz-Person”) opposes the motion. (ECF No. 66.) 

Defendant Butte County Probation Department (“Butte County”) and Roxanne Lara (“Lara” or 

collectively “County Defendants”) separately oppose the motion. (ECF No. 67.) Plaintiffs filed a 

reply. (ECF No. 70.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint. Also pending before the Court are County Defendants’ 

1 Defendant refers to herself as “Dawn Horwitz-Person” in her opposition. (ECF No. 66.) 

Although the operative Complaint (ECF No. 1) and the summons (ECF No. 3) refer to her as

“Dawn Horowitz-Person,” the Court will refer to this individual by the name used in her moving 

papers: “Dawn Horwitz-Person.” 

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Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) and Defendant Horwitz-Person’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 

35), which are DENIED as moot.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Doe was charged and convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to five 

years in state prison. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) Doe served his prison sentence and was released from 

custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (Id. at 3.) 

CDCR determined Doe was not a high-risk offender and released Doe into a Post-Release 

Community Supervision (“PRCS”) program, rather than parole. (Id.) Doe owns a home and has 

family ties in Butte County and was released as a PRCS participant under the supervision of Butte 

County Probation Department (“BCPD”). (Id.) The CDCR issued a “Release Program Study” to 

BCPD which documented the terms of agreement for Doe’s release. (Id.) Doe reported to BCPD 

for PRCS supervision and was given a new list of conditions and restrictions beyond those 

outlined in the Release Program Study. (Id.) 

On November 9, 2020, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the supplemental conditions and 

restrictions imposed by BCPD violated U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiffs’ rights under the United 

States Constitution, and the California Constitution. (ECF No. 1.) On January 11, 2021, County 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 34.) On January 11, 2021, Defendant HorwitzPerson also filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 35.) On December 10, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the 

instant motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. (ECF No. 65.) On December 29, 2021, 

Defendant Horwitz-Person filed an opposition. (ECF No. 66.) On December 30, 2021, County 

Defendants filed an opposition. (ECF No. 67.) On January 4, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF 

No. 70.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15 governs amended and supplemental 

pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Rule 15(d) provides: “On motion and reasonable notice, the court 

may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, 

2 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from ECF No. 1.

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occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(d); see also Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 15(d) 

provides a mechanism for parties to file additional causes of action based on facts that didn’t exist 

when the original complaint was filed”) (citing Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 

374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)).

“Rule 15(d) is intended to give district courts broad discretion in allowing supplemental 

pleadings.” Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988). “In deciding whether to permit a 

supplemental pleading, a court’s focus is on judicial efficiency.” Yates v. Auto City 76, 299 

F.R.D. 611, 613 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Planned Parenthood of S. Az. v. Neely (Neely), 130 F.3d 

400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997)). The use of supplemental pleadings is “favored” because it enables a 

court to award complete relief in one action “to avoid the cost, delay and waste of separate 

actions which must be separately tried and prosecuted.” Keith, 858 F.2d at 473 (citing New 

Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28–29 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 367 U.S. 963 

(1964); Yates, 299 F.R.D. at 613 (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has stated that new 

claims, new parties, and events occurring after the original action are all properly permitted under 

Rule 15(d). Keith, 858 F.2d at 475 (citing Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 

377 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1964)). Moreover, even though supplemental proceedings are “favored,” 

they “cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct, and new cause of action.” Neely, 130 F.3d 

at 402 (citations omitted). Rather, matters newly alleged in a supplemental complaint must have 

“some relation to the claims set forth in the original pleading.” Keith, 858 F.2d at 474. “[T]he 

fact that a supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its 

allowance, but only a factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of discretion . . . [.]” Id.

“The legal standard for granting or denying a motion to supplement under Rule 15(d) is 

the same as the standard for granting or denying a motion under Rule 15(a).” Yates, 299 F.R.D. 

at 614 (citing Athena Feminine Techs., Inc. v. Wilkes, No. C 10-4868 SBA, 2013 WL 450147, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013)) (internal quotations omitted). Courts commonly apply the five 

Foman factors to Rule 15(d) motions: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive on the part 

of the movant; (3) repeated failure of previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing 

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party; and (5) futility of the amendment. Lyon v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 308 F.R.D. 203, 

214 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); Natural Resources 

Defense Council v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-cv-01207-LGO GSA, 2016 WL 8678051 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 22, 2016). Among these five factors, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 

party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent prejudice or a ‘strong showing’ of any other Foman factor, there is 

a presumption in favor of granting leave to supplement.” Lyon, 308 F.R.D. at 214 (citing 

Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052)). Supplementation should be permitted where doing 

so would serve Rule 15(d)’s goal of judicial efficiency, and a court should assess whether an 

entire controversy can be settled in one action. See Neely, 130 F.3d at 402.

III. ANALYSIS

County Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint improperly 

concerns events which predate the original Complaint and therefore fails to comply with Rule 

15(d). (ECF No. 67 at 7.) Additionally, County Defendants oppose the granting of leave to file a

supplemental complaint based on two Foman factors: (1) undue prejudice to the opposing party; 

and (2) futility of amendment. (Id. at 2, 6.) County Defendants and Horwitz-Person both argue 

Plaintiffs’ instant motion would obstruct judicial efficiency. (ECF No. 66 at 2; ECF No. 67 at 2.)

First, the Court will determine whether Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint properly 

complies with Rule 15(d). Second, the Court will turn to an analysis of the applicable Foman 

factors to determine whether amendment is permissible under Rule 15(d). Finally, the Court will 

evaluate the question of judicial efficiency. 

A. Compliance with Rule 15(d)

Defendant Horwitz-Person argues Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint contains 

new, separate, and distinct causes of action which should be the subject of a separate action. 

(ECF No. 66 at 2.) County Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint 

concerns events which predate the original Complaint, and “are not the proper subject of a 

supplemental complaint.” (ECF No. 67 at 7.) In reply, Plaintiffs argue the supplemental claims 

are sufficiently related to the original Complaint and are properly based on events occurring after 

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the original Complaint was filed. (ECF No. 70 at 3.) 

A supplemental pleading is used to allege relevant facts occurring after the original 

pleading was filed. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(“Rule 15(d) permits the filing of a supplemental pleading which introduces a cause of action not 

alleged in the original complaint and not in existence when the original complaint was filed.”);

see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 10–04038 JSW, 2011 WL 672802, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb.18, 2011) (treating a Rule 15(a) motion to amend as a Rule 15(d) motion to supplement

where plaintiff seeks to allege facts occurring after the original pleading was filed). “While some 

relationship must exist between the newly alleged matters and the subject of the original action, 

they need not all arise out of the same transaction.” Keith, 858 F.2d at 474. “While the matters 

stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the claim set forth in the original 

pleading, the fact that the supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should 

not be a bar to its allowance, but only a factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of its 

discretion, along with such factors as possible prejudice or laches.” Id. (citing 3 J. Moore, 

Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.16[3] (1985)). “Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events happening after suit, and it 

follows, of course, that persons participating in these new events may be added if necessary.” Id.

at 475 (quoting Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 226–27 

(1964). 

Here, there is clearly a relationship among the claims in the supplemental complaint and 

the claims in the original action. Plaintiffs’ original Complaint was principally concerned with 

the legality and constitutionality of additional PRCS conditions imposed by BCPD. (See ECF 

No. 1.) The proposed supplemental complaint alleges additional causes of action related to the 

PRCS program but are premised on events which occurred after the filing of the original 

Complaint. (ECF No. 70 at 3–4.) The new causes of action are sufficiently related to the claims 

in the original Complaint and are properly included in a supplemental complaint to promote the 

economical and speedy disposition of the controversy. See Keith, 858 F.2d at 473; see also 

William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th 

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Cir.1982) (“The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute 

between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the initial 

pleadings are filed.”)

County Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ supplemental complaint improperly includes equal 

protection claims and a “Taxpayer Suit for Wasted Funds” claim, which simply provide 

additional legal theories to attack Plaintiffs’ PRCS conditions. (ECF No. 67 at 7.) In reply, 

Plaintiffs contend the equal protection claims arose “from the specific events and new therapy 

requirements that were demanded of Doe in the spring of 2021, well after the original 

Complaint’s filing.” (ECF No. 70 at 4.) Additionally, Plaintiffs contend the “Taxpayer Suit for 

Wasted Funds” claim only arose after Butte County Probation Supervising Officer Candice Carr 

filed a declaration on January 21, 2021 (ECF No. 39), where Plaintiffs learned BCPD personnel 

considered its actions to be “standard” practice. (Id. at 4.) The Court finds the supplemental 

claims arose from events occurring after the filing of the original Complaint and they are 

therefore the proper subject of a motion to supplement under Rule 15(d). 

B. Applicable Foman Factors

Courts commonly apply the following five Foman factors to Rule 15(d) motions: (1) 

undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant; (3) repeated failure of 

previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) futility of the 

amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. County Defendants oppose the granting of a supplemental 

complaint based on two of the five Foman factors: undue prejudice to the opposing party and 

futility of amendment. (ECF No. 67 at 2, 6.) The Court will analyze both applicable Foman 

factors. 

i. Undue Prejudice

County Defendants argue that granting leave to supplement the pleadings would be 

prejudicial because motions to dismiss on the original Complaint have been fully briefed and are 

actively pending. (ECF No. 67 at 2.) Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint “raises several 

similar legal issues” and would necessitate “a second motion [to dismiss] largely duplicative of 

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the pending motion [to dismiss].” (Id. at 3.) In reply, Plaintiffs contend Defendants fail to meet 

their burden to show prejudice. (ECF No. 70 at 6.) 

As with a motion to amend under Rule 15(a), prejudice to the opposing party is a valid 

consideration when determining whether to allow supplemental pleadings under Rule 15(d). See 

Eminence, 316 F.3d at 1052. “Prejudice may be established in a variety of ways, such as where a 

motion to amend is made after the cutoff date for such motions, or when discovery has already 

closed or is about to close.” Lyon, 308 F.R.D. at 214 (citing Zivkovic v. Southern Cal. Edison 

Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Solomon v. North Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 

151 F.3d 1132, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district 

court’s grant of leave to supplement even when it would require reopening discovery, as “most of 

the information on the added claim would be available in [defendant’s] own files” and “little 

additional discovery would be needed.” Lyon, 308 F.R.D. at 215 (quoting LaSalvia v. United 

Dairymen of Ariz., 804 F.2d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The party opposing leave to amend 

bears the burden of showing prejudice.” U.S. v. Somnia, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 3d 947, 958 (E.D. 

Cal. 2018) (quoting Serpa v. SBC Telecomms., 318 F. Supp. 2d 865, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2004)); DCD 

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987).

County Defendants fail to meet their burden to show prejudice. County Defendants argue 

they would be prejudiced if the motion is granted because they would be forced to file a “second 

motion [to dismiss] largely duplicative of the pending motion [to dismiss],” forcing them to 

challenge the same claims twice. (ECF No. 67 at 3.) The Court disagrees. The Court 

acknowledges County Defendants will need to renew their motion to dismiss in response to the 

supplemental allegations, however this does not amount to cognizable prejudice. Typically, “a 

court evaluates prejudice in terms of, e.g., whether discovery cut-offs have passed, how close trial 

is, and so forth.” Yates, 299 F.R.D. at 614. Here, discovery has not started, answers have not 

been filed, and Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show the type of prejudice that is 

usually cognizable by courts. See Id. This factor favors granting Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to 

file a supplemental complaint.

//

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ii. Futility

County Defendants argue the claims raised in the proposed supplemental complaint will 

be mooted by a favorable decision on the pending motion to dismiss, and therefore County 

Defendants imply the proposed supplemental complaint is futile. (ECF No. 67 at 6.) In reply, 

Plaintiffs contend County Defendants have failed to identify anything facially futile about the 

proposed supplemental complaint. (Id.) 

“A proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the 

amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller v. RykoffSexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988), implied overruling recog. on other grounds 

by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also U.S. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 

995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de 

novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988). Denial of such motions on futility 

grounds is “rare.” Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

“Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended 

pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

County Defendants hypothesize that if the Court rules in their favor on the pending motion 

to dismiss, then the claims in Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint would be mooted and 

therefore futile. (ECF No. 67 at 6.) However, the Court has not ruled on the pending motion to 

dismiss, thus County Defendants’ hypothesis is unavailing. A speculative ruling that the Court 

has never made cannot be a proper basis to deny Plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental 

complaint. This factor favors granting Plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint. 

C. Judicial Efficiency

Defendant Horwitz-Person and County Defendants both argue that granting the instant 

motion would obstruct judicial efficiency but disagree on the nature of the obstruction. (ECF No. 

66 at 2; ECF No. 67 at 2.) Defendant Horwitz-Person argues Plaintiffs’ motion introduces 

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separate, new, and distinct causes of action that “should be the subject of a separate action.”

(ECF No. 66 at 2.) County Defendants take the opposite position, arguing the proposed 

supplemental complaint raises similar legal issues to the original Complaint, and it would be more 

judicially efficient if the Court were to decide on the pending motions to dismiss before allowing 

supplemental briefing. (ECF No. 67 at 3.) In reply, Plaintiffs contend the proposed supplemental 

complaint is a “discrete and logical extension of the original claims in this case.” (ECF No. 70 at 

4.) Plaintiffs further contend that supplementation serves the interest of judicial economy here 

because “the entire controversy between the parties could be settled in one action . . . .” (Id.) 

(citing Flores v. City of Tulare, No. 10-CV-00394-AWI-BAM, 2011 WL 5240428, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 1, 2011)).

The Court finds that on balance, judicial efficiency would best be served by allowing 

supplementation, rather than forcing Plaintiffs to file a separate action, as suggested by Defendant 

Horwitz-Person. “In deciding whether to permit a supplemental pleading, a court’s focus is on 

judicial efficiency.” See Yates, 299 F.R.D. at 613. The Court agrees with County Defendants 

that it would be inefficient to permit a two-part operative complaint3and multiple pending 

motions to dismiss. The Court requests Plaintiffs file an amended complaint (“First Amended 

Complaint”) that integrates the operative Complaint and the proposed supplemental complaint. 

Defendant Horwitz-Person can renew her motion to dismiss to respond to the First Amended 

Complaint with minimal burden because the proposed supplemental complaint contains no new 

allegations against her. (ECF No. 66 at 2–3.) County Defendants can amend their motion to 

dismiss with minimal burden because the legal theories in the original motion to dismiss can be 

applied to the allegations in the supplemental complaint. In fact, County Defendants argue the 

proposed supplemental complaint raises claims that are so similar to the claims in the original 

Complaint that they “may be rendered moot if the Court rules in the County Defendants’ favor on 

some or all of those issues [in the pending motion to dismiss].” (ECF No. 67 at 4.) The Court 

3 Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint is drafted as a supplement, expanding upon 

the Complaint and unable to stand alone. (See ECF No. 65-1.) 

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finds that County Defendants will be minimally burdened by renewing their motion to dismiss to 

respond to such “similar” claims alleged in Plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental complaint. The 

resulting integrated First Amended Complaint, and responsive motions to dismiss, would satisfy 

the judicial efficiency goal of Rule 15(d). Yates, 299 F.R.D. at 613. This factor favors granting 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. 

The Court finds that allowing Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that integrates the 

proposed supplemental complaint4, will enable it to award complete relief in one action and avoid 

waste associated with separate actions. Neely, 130 F.3d at 402; Keith, 858 F.2d at 473; Yates, 299 

F.R.D. at 613.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File 

a Supplemental Complaint. (ECF No. 65.) The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to file a First

Amended Complaint, combining the original Complaint with the proposed supplemental 

complaint. (ECF No. 65-1.) Plaintiffs may file their First Amended Complaint not later than 

fourteen (14) days from the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file an answer to 

the First Amended Complaint not later than thirty (30) days after the electronic filing date of the 

First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint will supersede the original Complaint. 

(ECF No. 1.) County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) and Defendant HorwitzPerson’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35), are DENIED as moot.

//

4

In reply, Plaintiffs disclose the existence of “two additional tort law claims — for false 

imprisonment and negligence — that are not yet ripe under the California Tort Claim Act . . . 

therefore if the Court orders a First Amended Complaint be filed, these two additional claims 

could be incorporated and there would be no further anticipated amendments from Plaintiffs.” 

(ECF No. 70 at 8.) Defendants have not had an opportunity to oppose the additional tort law 

claims and they were not included in the proposed supplemental complaint. (See ECF No. 65-1.) 

The Court cannot grant a motion on a new argument or new evidence presented for the first time 

in a reply brief. See, e.g., Serpa v. SBC Telecommunications, Inc., No. C 03-4223 MHP, 2004 

WL 2002444, *5 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004); In re Lal, No. C 01-1507 VRW, 2002 WL 449661 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2002); United States v. Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1085 (S.D. Cal. 

2001). If Plaintiffs wish to amend further, Plaintiffs may file a motion which this Court will 

entertain at that time.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 8, 2022

Troy L. Nunley

United States District Judge

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