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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2339

___________

Yeng Thao; Peter Yang; Michelle *

Yang, as co-trustees for the heirs and *

next of kin of Ki Yang, deceased, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

City of St. Paul, a municipal *

corporation; St. Paul Police *

Department, a public entity; William *

Finney, an individual; John M. *

Harrington, an individual; Michael *

Tharalson, an individual; Shannon Sills, *

an individual; Patrick Kellerman, an *

individual; John Does 1-5, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2007

 Filed: April 2, 2007

___________

Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

A St. Paul police officer shot and killed Ki Yang (“Mr. Yang”), a paranoid

schizophrenic, in his home after Mr. Yang’s family requested assistance from 911 and

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The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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a threatening incident ensued. Appellants, co-trustees for the estate of Mr. Yang

(“Plaintiffs”), filed a lawsuit against the City of St. Paul, the St. Paul Police

Department, and certain police officers (collectively, “Defendants”) under Section

1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the

Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, subd. 1. The

district court1

 granted summary judgment to the Defendants on all claims and

Plaintiffs appeal only the district court’s decision as to the ADA, the Rehabilitation

Act, and the MHRA (collectively, the “Acts”). For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

I. Background

Mr. Yang was a paranoid schizophrenic. He apparently suffered from delusions

and had previously been committed to and received treatment from mental health

facilities. Although the district court concluded that Mr. Yang was not disabled

within the meaning of the ADA, we assume for the purposes of this appeal that he

qualifies as a disabled individual under the Acts and do not recount the disputed

characterizations of his illness here. 

On September 27, 2002, Peter Yang, Mr. Yang’s son, called 911 because his

father had barricaded himself in – and his family members out of – their shared home

with shoelaces and coat hangers. Mr. Yang had refused his family entry into the home

for three days because he believed they were trying to poison him. His family sought

an ambulance to take Mr. Yang to the hospital “in order to prevent any disaster.” In

addition, some of the family members needed to access personal property in the house.

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Peter Yang explained to the 911 dispatcher that Mr. Yang had a long history of

mental illness. The dispatcher sent an ambulance to the home and also contacted the

police department to request assistance with “an emotionally disturbed person.” The

dispatcher reported to police: “He locked his family outside, has a history of

threatening to kill his family. He hallucinates, thinks someone is after him, trying to

poison him. He has no weapons, except kitchen utensils, has a history of psychiatric

problems. Medics are en route.” 

Two police officers, Shannon Sills and Mike Tharalson, arrived on the scene.

Because the family warned the officers that Mr. Yang did not like police, the officers

remained out of sight while other members of the family attempted to plead with Mr.

Yang through a window. In the meantime, the officers instructed the medics to leave

and contacted the shift patrol supervisor, Sergeant Pat Kellerman, for assistance.

Kellerman arrived shortly thereafter. 

The police officers determined that Mr. Yang was not an imminent threat to

himself or others. Thus, they treated the circumstance as a domestic situation in which

a party had been excluded from his home by a person whom the officers had been told

had committed assault in the past. The officers convinced the family to forcibly

access the home (and showed them how) and offered to accompany them to retrieve

their belongings. Certain family members, who were still pleading with Mr. Yang

through the window, reported to the others that Mr. Yang had retrieved a gun and was

threatening his family. Those accessing the house assured the others that the gun

merely was a BB-gun. 

Once inside the house, Mr. Yang’s wife asked Tharalson to take her husband

to the hospital. He refused, explaining that Mr. Yang had not threatened anyone.

Tharalson proceeded farther into the house and Mr. Yang appeared carrying a

traditional Hmong dot zuo – a weapon that looked like a garden sickle – and a BBgun. Mr. Yang shouted for the group to leave and Tharalson ordered Mr. Yang to

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The record contains varying descriptions of whether Mr. Yang walked or ran

at Tharalson. Compare Appellee’s Appendix (“AA”) at 82-85 (deposition of Chang

Yang) with AA at 110 (statements of Chang Yang). See also AA at 27-28 (deposition

of Officer Tharalson). 

3

Likewise, the Rehabilitation Act provides that no “qualified individual with a

disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The

MHRA prohibits discrimination “in the access to, admission to, full utilization of or

benefit from any public service because of . . . disability.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.12,

subd. 1. The parties recognize that the analysis required by the ADA applies equally

to all claims under the Acts. See Gorman, 152 F.3d at 912; Roberts By & Through

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drop his gun. Armed with his weapons, Mr. Yang either ran or walked2

 toward and

then lunged at Tharalson who, in response and in his defense, shot Mr. Yang

repeatedly and fatally.

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Defendants and the district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs appeal only the

district court’s decision as to the Acts. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are

no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. We review the district court’s grant of

summary judgment under the Acts de novo. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909

(8th Cir. 1998).

II. Discussion

The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, . . . be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42

U.S.C. § 12132.3

 Plaintiffs argue that inadequate police training and policies with

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Rodenberg-Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., 86 F.3d 844, 846 n.2 (8th Cir.

1996).

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respect to mentally disabled individuals made an otherwise safe situation dangerous,

which led to Mr. Yang’s death, in violation of the Acts. 

This court recently declined to extend the ADA to encompass failure to train

liability in similar circumstances. See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523,

527 (8th Cir. 2007) (“It was not the City’s failure to train its officers, but [the

deceased’s] apparent attempt to run over the officers that precipitated the shooting.”);

see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II [of the ADA]

does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other

similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities,

prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human

life.”). But see Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp.2d 232 (M.D. Pa. 2003)

(relying on the statutory history and remedial nature of the ADA to permit plaintiff to

state claim under the ADA for failure to train police and modify police practices to

accommodate for mentally ill subjects of involuntary commitment warrants). 

The parties acknowledge that the City of St. Paul provided its police officers

with some ADA training. Plaintiffs, however, dispute the adequacy of that training

for responding to incidents concerning the mentally disabled. Without deciding the

adequacy of the officers’ training, or whether a municipality can be liable under the

ADA for a “failure to train,” we conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

that more “adequate” training to accommodate the mentally ill would have required

a different response. 

All parties concede that at the time the police arrived on the scene that day, Mr.

Yang posed no apparent threat to himself or his family. By all accounts, Mr. Yang

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sought to be left alone. His family members, out of concern for Mr. Yang and a desire

to enter their home to retrieve their belongings, sought entry into the home. 

The family indicated to police that Mr. Yang did not possess any dangerous

weapons and no one believed that he possessed a weapon; no one understood that

entry into the home would have resulted in a life-threatening situation. Both Michelle

and Peter Yang stated that Mr. Yang had not threatened himself or others that day. 

Chang Yang explained that he had no reason to believe that his father possessed a

weapon or that he would use a weapon against his family or the police. Zua Yang

similarly answered in her deposition that she would never have expected Mr. Yang to

have entered the room with a BB gun and a “garden sickle.”

Plaintiffs have not shown that, even with more “adequate” training on

responding to situations concerning mentally disabled individuals, the police would

have ignored requests from the family to enter the home in light of the circumstances

presented. Plaintiffs offered the testimony of one expert, Lou Reiter, a former police

officer, who explained that adequate training under the ADA would have prompted

police to contact mental health professionals or Mr. Yang on the telephone, but not to

assist the family in forcibly entering into the home. The testimony of Plaintiffs’

expert, however, presupposes that the police were given any indication that Mr. Yang

presented a threat to himself or others. Reiter conceded in deposition testimony that,

absent some wrongful act by Mr. Yang (like a threat of violence), the officers did not

have a right to go inside the house and detain Mr. Yang. 

The police officers faced two competing interests at the scene: Mr. Yang’s and

his family’s. Minn. Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 2 provides that an officer may take a

person into custody if the officer has reason to believe the person is mentally ill and

in danger of injuring himself or others if not immediately detained. Even when

viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the police had

no authority to disturb Mr. Yang, as he presented no threat to himself or his family at

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that time. Nonetheless, the family sought entry into the home either to retrieve their

belongings or because they were concerned for Mr. Yang – or both. The police’s

assistance to that end did not create a dangerous situation; unbeknownst to all, the

situation was dangerous from the outset because Mr. Yang turned out to possess a

dangerous weapon. The police might have responded differently if they had known

Mr. Yang possessed a dangerous weapon, but no reasonable jury could find based

upon the facts presented by Plaintiffs that the police would have responded differently

had they received other training under the ADA.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court. 

______________________________

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