Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00695/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00695-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Action for Interplea

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1 Under the E-Government Act of 2002, this is a written opinion and therefore is

available electronically. However, it has been entered only to decide the motion or matter

addressed herein and is not intended for official publication or to serve as precedent.

2 The Complaint named several other defendants, including James W. May, Irene

N. Trotter, John L. House and Shirley House, and also listed the two parcels as in rem

defendants. None of these defendants have submitted Rule 56 motions or briefs. Trotter was

dismissed from this litigation via Order (doc. 83) dated May 5, 2006, with the consent of all

parties. The Houses, who are proceeding pro se, remain defendants of record, and it is

apparently undisputed that they own an undivided one-half interest in the 10-foot strip. The

Houses have elected not to be heard on summary judgment, despite being afforded an ample

opportunity to do so. Defendant James May, also proceeding pro se, has submitted filings

through Lisa May in which he disclaims any legal interest in the real property at issue herein. It

appears that plaintiff seeks no relief as to the Houses and James May.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LISA CLEWIS MAY, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 04-0695-WS-B

 )

A PARCEL OF LAND, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This quiet title action is before the Court on the parties’ dueling motions for summary

judgment, to-wit: defendant United States of America’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 77)

and plaintiff Lisa Clewis May’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 88). The motions,

which concern substantially similar factual and legal issues, have been briefed and are ripe for

disposition at this time.1

I. Procedural History.

Plaintiff Lisa Clewis May filed this action in Baldwin County Circuit Court in September

2004 against several in personam defendants, including the United States of America, seeking to

quiet title in two related parcels of real property, one of which is merely a 10-foot strip.2

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 1 of 21
3 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record,

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 

2004); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005). This standard

will be followed with respect to each of the cross-motions for summary judgment. Fortunately,

there is virtually no dispute between the parties as to any material facts. This is so

notwithstanding plaintiff’s nine single-spaced pages in her opposition brief (doc. 81) objecting to

36 of the 38 findings of fact proffered by the Government. Plaintiff does not appear to contest

the veracity of any of these facts. Instead, she simply challenges their legal relevance by stating

that such facts do not prove that James May owned a cognizable interest in the property under

Alabama law, that he fraudulently transferred the property to avoid his income tax liabilities, or

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Together, these parcels comprise Lisa May’s current homestead and residence in Magnolia

Springs, Alabama. The Complaint alleges that plaintiff holds title to the residence, but that the

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) wrongfully issued a federal tax lien on that property in June

2004 based on a federal income tax indebtedness that she does not have. On that basis, the

Complaint seeks a declaration that the federal tax lien is not valid, and that Lisa May holds the

entire and undivided fee simple interest in the residence, subject only to a mortgage held by

Irene Trotter, public rights of way, the Houses’ one-half interest in the 10-foot strip, and any

other rights that others may have to the bed, shores, and waters of the Magnolia River. 

On November 1, 2004, the Government removed this action to this District Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1444. Following a discovery period, the Government and Lisa May filed

cross-motions for summary judgment. The critical legal issue raised by those motions is whether

the federal tax lien pertaining to the tax indebtedness of Lisa May’s husband, James May, can

properly attach to residential property to which Lisa May holds sole and exclusive title. The

Government maintains that the tax lien reaches the property because Lisa May is her husband’s

nominee, or alternatively because James May fraudulently transferred the property in an attempt

to shield it from the IRS’s collection efforts. By contrast, Lisa May’s position is that James May

holds no legal interest in the property that is cognizable under Alabama law, and that the tax lien

is therefore improper and invalid, irrespective of federal nominee principles. Lisa May further

contends that the Government’s fraudulent transfer argument is time-barred and also fails on the

merits.

II. Relevant Facts.3

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that the Government’s fraudulent transfer contention is timely. Only rarely does plaintiff

contend that a fact recited by the Government is not, in fact, true and correct. In general, far

from disagreeing with the Government as to what happened, plaintiff merely quarrels with the

legal significance of those events. Moreover, plaintiff’s suggestion that the Government has

failed to comply with Local Rule 7.2(a)’s requirement that proposed findings of fact be

“appropriately referenced to the supporting document or documents filed in the action” is

baseless, as the Government has carefully documented each fact which it recites by reference to

appropriate record citations and exhibits. There is no widespread LR 7.2(a) violation here, even

though plaintiff ascribes same to nearly every one of the Government’s proposed findings of

fact. That said, plaintiff has contravened Local Rule 5.1(a), which requires that filings be

double-spaced, by submitting nine pages of single-spaced objections in the body of her

memorandum of law.

4 The parties’ summary judgment filings are rendered somewhat confusing by the

lack of any markings identifying their exhibits by number, even as the parties use numbers in

their briefs to reference such exhibits. This omission can create ambiguities in the record as to

which number corresponds to which exhibit, and renders it difficult to discern which exhibit a

litigant (or this Court) is citing. To alleviate such confusion in the future, counsel should take

care to label each exhibit with an appropriate sticker or other marking before filing it.

5 James May testified that his financial position was “fine” in 1989 and that there

were no creditors at that time “who were not paid or who were hounding” him, with the possible

exception of the IRS. (James May Dep., at 35.) Other record evidence confirms that the IRS

was in fact an exception to this statement, as the IRS had assessed tax liabilities against him of

$15,166.23 on May 30, 1988. (U.S. Exh. 5.)

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A. History and Chain of Title for the Property.

In April 1985, James May and his then-spouse, Kathryn May (who is not a party here),

purchased certain real property (the “Property”) in Magnolia Springs, Alabama, as joint tenants

with rights of survivorship. (U.S. Exh. 1.)4

 James May and Kathryn May used the Property as

their residence. (U.S. Exh. 2, at # 3.) In February 1989, James May transferred his interest in

the Property to Kathryn May via Assumption Warranty Deed, in exchange for $10.00 and other

good and valuable consideration. (U.S. Exhs. 12 and 2, at #1.)5 James and Kathryn May

continued to live on the Property after that transfer took place. (U.S. Exh. 2, at #3.)

In 1991, James and Kathryn May divorced. The Judgment of Divorce entered by the

Baldwin County Circuit Court in June 1991 provided, in pertinent part, that Kathryn May “shall

convey to all of her right, title and interest in and to the marital home which is currently in the

name of [Kathryn May] only.” (U.S. Exh. 4, at ¶ 7.) A careful reading shows that the quoted

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 3 of 21
6 James May was in dire financial straits at the time of his 1991 divorce. As he

wrote several years later, “At the time of the divorce what little liquid assets I had had been spent

paying Katie’s medical bills, rent, support, and buying her furniture and other things to set her up

in her new apartment. By the time of the divorce I didn’t have any money left and had

considerable outstanding liabilities.” (U.S. Exh. 14, at 1-2.) He further wrote, “My income at

the time of the divorce was not sufficient for me to pay all of Katie’s bills and all of my bills.” 

(Id. at 2-3.) Similarly, as of May 1994, James May represented that his current financial

demands “far outstrip my present income.” (Id. at 3.)

7 The payment obligation was James May’s, not Lisa May’s. (U.S. Exh. 2, at #6.) 

Lisa May paid nothing for the Property. The evidence before the Court is that James May paid

the $9,000 in full to Kathryn May for the Property. (Id. at #6, #10.)

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language suffered from a typographical error, inasmuch as it failed to identify the person to

whom Kathryn May was to convey her right, title and interest to the Property. Nonetheless,

James May avers that Kathryn May had agreed that he should receive the Property as part of the

divorce property settlement, but that this document “omitted [his] name when it came to the

provision about who was to get the Property.” (James May Aff., ¶ 6.) He also admits that “[i]t is

true that technically [he] got the house” in the divorce. (U.S. Exh. 14, at 2.)6

 Thus, despite the

ambiguity in the divorce decree, it is undisputed that Kathryn May and James May agreed that

he would receive the Property pursuant to their divorce in 1991. In the meantime, James May

proposed marriage to Lisa May, and they married soon after. (James May Aff., ¶ 7.) James May

asserts that he gave Lisa May the Property as a “wedding gift,” with no further elaboration as to

his reasons or intent. (Id., ¶ 9; U.S. Exh. 3, at #1, #7; Lisa May Aff., ¶ 4.) Rather than having

Kathryn May deed the Property to him and then deeding the Property to Lisa May, James May

felt that it was more efficient to have Kathryn May deed the Property directly to Lisa May. 

(James May Aff., ¶ 10.) This is exactly what happened. On August 12, 1991, as part of the

property settlement on divorce, Kathryn May transferred the Property to Lisa May, in exchange

for a $9,000 payment by James May to Kathryn May. (Id.; U.S. Exh. 2, at #2.)7 This figure

represents approximately half of the equity that Kathryn and James May had accumulated in the

Property prior to the divorce. (U.S. Exh. 11, at 7, 12.) At any rate, title passed directly from

Kathryn May to Lisa May, without ever formally including James May, as Kathryn May

executed an Assumption Warranty Deed for the Property in favor of Lisa May in August 1991. 

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 4 of 21
8 James May represents that, as of the date of the transfer to Lisa May, he “was

solvent and able to pay [his] debts as they accrued.” (U.S. Exh. 2, at #8.) Given that the transfer

occurred in August 1991, just two months after entry of the Judgment of Divorce, it is difficult to

reconcile James May’s statement in his affidavit that he was able to pay his debts as they accrued

at the time of the transfer with his earlier statement that he “didn’t have any money left and had

considerable outstanding liabilities” at the time of the divorce. Likewise, it is problematic that

James May offered representations of solvency in his affidavit, after responding, “I do not

remember,” when asked in interrogatories about his assets and liabilities as of 1991. (Id. at #4.) 

These discrepancies cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

9 The Government points to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court’s findings during James

May’s 1994 bankruptcy proceedings that there was no evidence of consideration for the transfer

to Lisa May, and “there was a pattern of James May’s putting assets in his spouse’s name or of

he and his spouse at the time of putting assets in his spouse’s name.” (U.S. Exh. 11, at 12.) But

the parties offer no indication as to the factual basis of that “pattern,” so there is no evidence in

the record from which a factfinder in this case could find such a pattern.

10 In that regard, it bears noting that James May is listed (along with Lisa May) as a

mortgagor for the Property in conjunction with a mortgage executed in September 1999. (U.S.

Exh. 8.) If, in fact, James May has no interest in the Property, then it is difficult to comprehend

how he could be classified as a mortgagor with respect to that Property, given that he would have

no interest to mortgage. Additionally, correspondence in the record establishes that James May

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(James May Aff., ¶ 12; Plaintiff’s Exh. 2.)8

James May continued to live at the Property after Kathryn May transferred it to Lisa

May, apparently with no interruption in his residence.9 It is undisputed that James May has

continuously resided at the Property from 1985 through the present, and that he currently lives

there with Lisa May and their two children. (U.S. Exh. 2, at #3a; U.S. Exh. 3, at #2a.) There is

no allegation or suggestion that James May has not enjoyed or does not continue to enjoy

unfettered access to the rights and benefits of home ownership through his residence at the

Property, or that any limitation has been placed on him in that respect. Furthermore, although

the Property is titled in Lisa May’s name, the record reflects that James May pays all or

substantially all of the day-to-day expenses incident to home ownership. James May has

personally paid the property taxes on the Property every year, purportedly at the request of and

“on behalf of Lisa Clewis May.” (U.S. Exh. 2, at #3b; U.S. Exh. 3, at #2b.) James May has

personally made all mortgage payments on the Property since 1985, first on behalf of Kathryn

May and later on behalf of Lisa May. (Id. at #3c.)10 He has taken deductions on his personal

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 5 of 21
was involved, in a hands-on manner, in discussions with the mortgagee concerning a proposed

refinance of the Property in 2003 and 2004. (U.S. Exh. 9 & 10.)

11 Such gifts are considerable, in light of James May’s representation in discovery

that his annual adjusted gross income from 1991 through 2004 ranged from roughly $80,000 to

roughly $134,000. (U.S. Exh. 2, at #7.)

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income tax returns for those mortgage payments, as he and Lisa May file their tax returns

separately. (James May Dep., at 70-77.) The utility and telephone bills for the Property are in

James May’s name, and he personally pays all such bills, purportedly on behalf of and at the

request of Lisa May. (U.S. Exh. 2, at #3d; U.S. Exhs. 6 & 7; U.S. Exh. 3, at #2d.) Thus, despite

the fact that she holds title to the Property, Lisa May does not now make, and has never made,

payments for mortgage, property tax or utilities for the Property at which she, James May and

their children reside.

In 1999, significant renovations were done to the Property. Lisa May asserts, “I paid

around $180,000 for renovations in 1999.” (U.S. Exh. 3, at #2e.) James May similarly states,

“Mrs. May paid for those renovations.” (U.S. Exh. 2, at #3e.) A closer look, however, exposes

the fallacy of this characterization. Lisa May may have nominally paid for the renovations, but

the funds did not originate with her. On the contrary, it is undisputed that she paid for the

renovations using (a) borrowed money from mortgage refinancings, on which mortgage

payments were made 100% by James May; and (b) “about $100,000” in monetary gifts from

James May. (U.S. Exh. 2, at #3e; U.S. Exh. 3, at #2e.)11 In the face of uncontroverted evidence

that James May was the source of and responsible for every penny used to renovate the Property,

the Court will not indulge the fiction that Lisa May personally paid for that work.

With respect to both the 1989 and 1991 transfers of the Property, James May insists that

he had no intention of evading his debt liabilities to the IRS or to anyone else; rather, he

attributes those decisions to unspecified personal issues relating to his marriage, and not to

considerations about debts and creditors. (James May Aff., ¶¶ 13-14.) In this respect, he

maintains that the proof is in the pudding, inasmuch as he has fully repaid all of his tax debts

from 1989 and 1991. (Id.) He specifically asserts that “[t]here was no intent to defraud any

creditor, including the revenue service[,] by titling the property to her.” (U.S. Exh. 2, at #8.)

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 6 of 21
12 The gross amount of this liability may be broken down by year as follows: (a)

$3,232.44 for the 1984 tax year; (b) $15,166.23 for the 1987 tax year; (c) $11,017.75 for the

1988 tax year; (d) $4,624.10 for the 1989 tax year; and (e) $13,871.47 for the 1990 tax year. 

(Id.) These amounts were assessed by the IRS at different times, dating back as far as May 1988.

13 A 1994 letter from James May’s then-counsel relating to his bankruptcy

proceedings stipulated that at the time of the divorce James and Kathryn May’s joint debts

included income tax liability of $47,911.99 plus interest. (U.S. Exh. 13.) The joint nature of this

indebtedness is underscored by the Judgment of Divorce, which assigns responsibility to James

May for paying “all federal and state income taxes which have accrued during the marriage

including, but not necessarily limited to, federal income taxes due for the years 1983, 1987, 1988

and 1990.” (U.S. Exh. 4, at ¶ 2.)

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B. James May’s Tax Troubles.

Against the backdrop of the history of the Property, we must project a separate

chronology of James May’s dealings with the Internal Revenue Service. There has been no

suggestion that Lisa May personally has accrued any back tax liability that might give rise to a

tax lien. That said, it is undisputed that at various times dating back to the 1980s, James May

has owed back taxes to the United States Treasury. A federal tax lien issued by the IRS in

March 1992 reflected that “James W and Kay M May” (presumably referring to Kathryn May)

jointly owed back taxes totaling $47,911.99 plus accrued interest. (U.S. Exh. 5.)12 Thus, the

record is crystal clear that James May had significant unpaid tax liabilities as of February 1989

(when he transferred the Property to Kathryn May) and as of August 1991 (when he caused

Kathryn May to transfer title to the Property to Lisa May).13 It is equally clear, however, that the

tax liabilities referenced in the 1992 lien are not those animating the current dispute. Rather,

James May has since paid in full all tax liabilities that he owed as of February 1989 and August

1991, and that none of those amounts remain outstanding today. (James May Aff., ¶¶ 13, 14.) 

The record does not reflect, however, the precise timing of when he paid the indebtedness set

forth in the 1992 tax lien.

In the wake of the 1992 lien, James May continued to experience chronic difficulties with

his income taxes. In October 2003, the IRS issued a tax lien against him individually in the

amount of $89,457.87, consisting of 1040 liability for the 1999 tax year in the amount of

$34,271.19 and civil penalties from the tax years 1999, 2000 and 2001 totaling $55,186.68. 

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 7 of 21
14 Notices of Federal Tax Liens were duly recorded in the Baldwin County Probate

Court for these liens in October 2003 and April 2004, respectively.

15 In their affidavits, both James May and Lisa May express in virtually identical

language their belief that they “are the victims of a vendetta on the part of the Government

because [they] refused to move out of the house and live somewhere else.” (Lisa May Aff., ¶ 9;

James May Aff., ¶ 17.) Of course, statements of speculation or personal belief are generally not

proper and are not considered on summary judgment. See, e.g., Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d

1275, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2002) (“an affidavit stating only that the affiant ‘believes’ a certain fact

exists is insufficient to defeat summary judgment by creating a genuine issue of fact about the

existence of that certain fact”); see also Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742

(11th Cir. 1996) ("For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the

record."); Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 995 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that statements that are

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(U.S. Exh. 16.) In March 2004, the IRS issued another lien against James May in the amount of

$73,946.93, based on unpaid tax liabilities arising from his 1995 income taxes ($1,000) and 1998

income taxes ($72,946.93). (Id.)

14 Neither the October 2003 lien nor the March 2004 lien

referenced any tax liabilities of Lisa May, or recited her as the taxpayer against whom the liens

were entered. As such, the 2003 and 2004 liens apply specifically and exclusively to the tax

liabilities of James May. These federal tax obligations, which accrued between 1995 and 2001,

were based on separate IRS assessments in November 1996, December 1999, March 2003, and

April 2003. The record reflects that James May and his law firm are and have been making

monthly payments (of unspecified amounts) to service these debts, with the intention of paying

them off as expeditiously as possible. (James May Aff., ¶ 15.)

Simply stated, the narrow question presented in this action is whether the tax liens of

October 2003 and March 2004 attach to the Property, even though title is held exclusively by

Lisa May and not by James May. On June 10, 2004, the IRS forced the issue by issuing a Notice

of Federal Tax Lien (the “Nominee Lien”) against “Lisa Clewis May, Nominee of James W

May” for the entire $163,404.80 sum of both outstanding tax liens previously issued against

James May for the tax years 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. (Plaintiff Exh. 5.) The Nominee

Lien provides, “This lien attaches to that certain real property as record [sic] with the Baldwin

County Judge of Probate in Real Property Bk. 452 Page 1557,” referring to the Property. (Id.) 

Thus, the Nominee Lien seeks to attach the Property to satisfy the unpaid tax liabilities of James

May, notwithstanding that the Property is titled solely to Lisa May.15 Four months after the

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 8 of 21
conclusory or based on conjecture do not satisfy Rule 56(e)). For that reason, the Court lends no

weight to speculative statements concerning what Lisa and James May believe the Government’s

motivations for the Nominee Lien might have been.

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issuance of the Nominee Lien, Lisa May filed this lawsuit in an attempt to defeat that lien.

III. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only

for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon

Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

The applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of cross-motions for

summary judgment. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d

1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[c]ross-motions for

summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment

unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely

disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see

also Wermager v. Cormorant Tp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983) (“the filing of cross

motions on summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there is no dispute as to a

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 9 of 21
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material fact, or have the effect of submitting the cause to a plenary determination on the

merits”). However, it is also true that cross-motions may be probative of the absence of a factual

dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the dispositive legal theories

and material facts. Oakley, 744 F.2d at 1555-56. This is just such a case.

IV. Analysis.

The Government proffers two theories under which it contends the Nominee Lien

attaches to the Property, despite the fact that the Property is titled to Lisa May and not James

May. First, the Government would rely on the nominee doctrine, a common-law theory pursuant

to which federal tax liens attach to a taxpayer’s property that is titled to the taxpayer’s nominee. 

Second, the Government maintains that James May fraudulently transferred the Property,

initially to Kathryn May and then to Lisa May, with the actual intent of hindering, delaying or

defrauding the IRS’s efforts to collect the back income taxes and penalties that he owed.

A. The Government’s Nominee Theory.

The Tax Code provides as follows: “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or

refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States

upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” 26

U.S.C. § 6321; see also United States v. Towne, 406 F. Supp.2d 928, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“A

federal tax lien attaches to all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, that

belong to a taxpayer.”). The statutory language “is broad and reveals on its face that Congress

meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have.” United States v. National

Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 86 L.Ed.2d 565 (1985). “The lien arises

in favor of the government at the time an assessment of the unpaid taxes is made against the

delinquent taxpayer.” Horton Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 986 F.2d 286, 290 (8th Cir. 1993). 

At issue in this case, of course, is the Government’s utilization of this tax lien procedure

against the Property, title to which is held by Lisa May. The rub that precipitated this litigation

is that § 6321 plainly applies only to property and rights to property belonging to the delinquent

taxpayer. Simply put, then, the key question is whether James May has a property right or

ownership interest in the Property. If so, then the Nominee Lien is valid and proper. If not, then

it is not (unless the underlying transfer was fraudulent under Alabama law, which is a separate

and analytically distinct question).

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16 See also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350-51, 97 S.Ct.

619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (explaining that petitioner’s assets may properly be regarded as

taxpayer’s property for purposes of federal tax lien if petitioner is taxpayer’s alter ego); Macklin

v. United States, 300 F.3d 814, 818 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In the case of a nominee lien, the IRS

proceeds against an alter ego or nominee of a delinquent taxpayer for the purposes of satisfying

the taxpayer’s obligations.”) (citations omitted); F.P.P. Enterprises v. United States, 830 F.2d

114, 118 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Property held in the name of an entity which is the alter ego of a

taxpayer may be levied on to satisfy the tax liabilities of the taxpayer.”); United States v. Dawes,

344 F. Supp.2d 715, 721 (D. Kan. 2004) (“even when legal title may be held by others, a

taxpayer may be found to be an equitable owner”); Sumpter v. United States, 302 F. Supp.2d

707, 720 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“where property is placed in the name of another as the taxpayer’s

alter ego or nominee, the lien attaches to the property ... [such that] the United States can enforce

a taxpayer’s liability for taxes against property held for him by his nominee or alter ego”).

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In asserting that James May has an ownership interest in the Property, the Government

argues that Lisa May is his nominee and that the Property is therefore subject to James May’s tax

liens. It is beyond cavil that “[p]roperty of the nominee or alter ego of a taxpayer is subject to

the collection of the taxpayer’s tax liability.” Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888

F.2d 725, 728 (11th Cir. 1989).16 “A court presented with a nominee or alter ego claim attempts

to discern whether a taxpayer has engaged in a sort of legal fiction, for federal tax purposes, by

placing legal title to property in the hands of another person or entity while, in actuality,

retaining all or some of the benefits of being the true owner.” Sumpter v. United States, 302 F.

Supp.2d 707, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The nominee theory is designed “to determine whether

property should be construed as belonging to the taxpayer if he/she treated and viewed the

property as his/her own, in spite of the legal machinations employed to distinguish legal title to

the property.” Baum Hydraulics Corp. v. United States, 280 F. Supp.2d 910, 916 (D. Neb. 2003)

(citation omitted). Under this doctrine that has emerged in federal jurisprudence, the

Government would have the Court apply a patchwork of factors from other jurisdictions in order

to ascertain whether Lisa May holds the Property as the nominee of James May.

B. Whether Alabama Law Recognizes a Property Interest.

Plaintiff responds that the Government’s analysis is fatally flawed because it glosses over

the threshold requirement that James May must have a cognizable interest in the Property under

Alabama law before his federal tax lien can attach to it. This requirement is a correct statement

of law. Indeed, “[t]he federal tax lien statute itself creates no property rights but merely attaches

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 11 of 21
17 See also National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722 (“[I]n application of a

federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the

taxpayer had in the property.”); Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 2005) (“A

federal tax lien does not arise or attach to property in which a person has no interest under state

law.”); Towne, 406 F. Supp.2d at 932 (“A federal tax lien, however, does not attach to property

in which a taxpayer has no interest under state law.”). 

18 In support of this proposition, plaintiff points to Cooper v. Cooper, 266 So.2d 871

(Ala. 1972), wherein the Alabama Supreme Court observed that “[p]rima facie, the status of real

property is precisely as indicated by the muniment of title.” Id. at 878.

-12-

consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.” United States v. Craft, 535

U.S. 274, 278, 122 S.Ct. 1414, 152 L.Ed.2d 437 (2002).17 Thus, courts “look initially to state

law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach,

then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as

‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Id. If

the individual rights that, in certain combinations, may constitute property are a “bundle of

sticks,” then “[s]tate law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those

sticks qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal

law.” Id. at 278-79; see also United States v. Murray, 217 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2000) (while state

law determines what interest a taxpayer possesses in property, “federal law determines whether

that state-law-created interest constitutes ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ under the federal lien

statute”). Lisa May opposes the Government’s Rule 56 motion on the nominee theory, and seeks

summary judgment on that theory herself, on the ground that James May lacked any interest in

the Property under Alabama law.

To buttress her point, plaintiff claims that James May cannot own an interest in the

Property because she “is the title holder and Alabama bases ownership on title.” (Plaintiff’s

Proposed Findings and Conclusions, at ¶ 32.)18 This generality vastly oversimplifies Alabama

property law. More importantly, Lisa May overlooks a critically significant strand of Alabama

case law recognizing that one spouse may possess a lingering cognizable interest in a property

even after deeding it to the other spouse as a purported gift. While Alabama law “may presume

that the property is given to a wife when the title is placed in her name, this is only a rebuttable

presumption.” Taylor v. Peoples Fertilizer Co., 117 So.2d 180, 188 (Ala. 1960). Such a

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 12 of 21
19 This line of authority undercuts plaintiff’s strident assertion that the Government

is asking this Court “to judicially create a law which allows a federal agency to confiscate

private Alabama residential real property, depriving Alabama citizens of their hearth and home,

where no state statute or case law exists on the point.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief (doc. 81), at

16.) The requisite on-point caselaw plainly exists.

-13-

presumption may be rebutted by a showing of the parties’ real intent, in which case Alabama law

finds a continuing property interest on behalf of the husband. The Taylor court deemed the

presumption rebutted where the plaintiff had purchased property while heavily in debt and had

placed such property in his wife’s name to prevent creditors from levying on it. Based on these

facts, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding the muniment of title in the

wife’s favor, the property belonged to the plaintiff and was therefore subject to his debts. Id.

Taylor is hardly unique in Alabama jurisprudence. See also McLain v. McLain, 409 So.2d 852,

854 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court concluded that

property given by husband purportedly as a gift to wife remained marital property, where the

parties continued to use it as their joint abode and where the husband’s purpose in effecting the

transfer was to effect a marital reconciliation); Cox v. Cox, 395 So.2d 1027, 1029-30

(Ala.Civ.App. 1981) (husband retained a one-half interest in house after transferring title to wife,

where purpose of transfer was to preclude former wife from obtaining lien on it and parties’ real

intent was to hold title jointly); see generally Snow v. State, 60 So.2d 346, 348-49 (Ala. 1952)

(finding that even though sister held record title to property and transfer was not made for

purposes of tax evasion, her brother was taxpayer responsible for property because he exercised

right of control over property, received its benefits, and sister was holding title as mere

accommodation to insulate property from potential lawsuits against brother).

These cases demonstrate that Alabama law does, in fact, recognize that an individual may

retain a property interest in land that has been deeded to his spouse or other close family

member, where the parties’ real intent is for the individual to remain a beneficial owner of such

property.19 Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is mistaken.

C. Application of Nominee Theory to the Property.

In light of the foregoing, then, the critical inquiry becomes whether the presumption of a

gift can be rebutted here by evidence of the parties’ “real intent.” There is no direct evidence of

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 13 of 21
20 At most, plaintiff offers a conclusory statement that James May “wanted to make

a wedding gift of the Property.” (James May Aff., ¶ 9.) Similarly, Lisa May attests in

conclusory fashion that the Property “was a wedding gift from Jim.” (Lisa May Aff., ¶ 4.) This

testimony sheds no light on the “real intent” of the parties, as required by Alabama law, but

simply confirms the unremarkable and unilluminating fact that the parties now label the

transaction a “gift.” Likewise, James May’s statement that, following the “gift,” he has “always

regarded the Property as Lisa’s” (James May Aff., ¶ 12) is too vague, too ambiguous, and too

obscure to be reasonably classified as an expression that he intended to relinquish all of his

beneficial rights and interests in the Property. And even if it could be so construed, plaintiff has

never articulated that argument to this Court. In any event, that statement leaves unanswered

whether James May intended to continue, or whether he has continued, to exercise dominion and

control over the Property, to reap its benefits and to chart its course after the transfer occurred. 

Therefore, the Court must dig deeper on summary judgment. Given the Government’s extensive

arguments that James May retained an ownership interest in the Property, plaintiff was squarely

on notice that the Mays’ intentions as to James May’s interest in the Property were at issue on

summary judgment. Yet she remained silent on this point, proffering neither direct evidence nor

argument that James May’s real intent was that he would have no say in, rights to, responsibility

for, or beneficial ownership interest of any kind in the Property after he deeded it to Lisa May,

much less that he intended for Lisa May to be free to do whatever she wanted with the Property

without input, interference or restrictions from him. In the absence of such evidence, the Court

must turn to circumstantial evidence to assess the parties’ intentions.

21 The parties concur that “no state or federal court in Alabama has definitively set

forth the factors to be considered in determining whether an individual holds property as the

nominee of another.” (U.S. Opposition Brief (doc. 91), at 9; Plaintiff Reply Brief (doc. 92), at

2.)

-14-

“real intent,” in terms of whether it was intended that James May would remain a beneficial

owner of the Property notwithstanding his putative “gift” to Lisa May.20 Therefore, the Court

must turn to circumstantial evidence to assess their intent. How is such evidence to be

evaluated? Alabama case law is not well developed, consisting only of shadowy guidance that

the parties’ real intent is “reflected in the conditions and circumstances attending the

transaction.” Cone v. Cone, 331 So.2d 656, 658 (Ala. 1976) (citation omitted).21

Fortunately, the questions of whether a taxpayer had the “real intent” to gift property to

his spouse and, alternatively, whether the parties intended that the taxpayer would remain a

beneficial owner of such property under Alabama law are substantively indistinguishable from

the question of whether the taxpayer’s spouse is his nominee under federal law. Compare Cody

v. United States, 348 F. Supp.2d 682 (E.D. Va. 2004) (explaining that nominee analysis is

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 14 of 21
22 It would be erroneous to focus on the label applied to the doctrine by Alabama

courts, as opposed to its substance. Plaintiff does just that, arguing “that Alabama does not

recognize nominee liens at all.” (Plaintiff’s Principal Brief, at 3.) There is, indeed, no Alabama

decisional authority that explicates a “nominee doctrine” as such. But federal appellate courts

have deemed state law to bear on the nominee question even when the state courts have called it

something else. See, e.g., Spotts, 429 F.3d at 253 (opining that “Kentucky law does have law

that provides guidance on nominee theory, though it discusses the theory using the term

‘constructive trust’”); Scoville v. United States, 250 F.3d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 2001) (looking to

Missouri law of fraudulent conveyance for purposes of evaluating state standards for nominee

liability); see generally United States v. Stinson, 386 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1218 (W.D. Okla. 2005)

(looking at Oklahoma fraudulent conveyance principles in evaluating nominee argument). For

that reason, the undersigned will accord no talismanic significance to the magic words “nominee

doctrine,” nor will it infer from their absence that Alabama authorities fail to recognize a theory

akin to that which federal courts have labeled “nominee doctrine.”

-15-

“aimed at ferreting out the true ownership of the property”) with McLain, 409 So.2d at 853-54

(examining whether parties really intended for property to be a gift, and relying on temporal

proximity of transfer to parties’ divorce, as well as fact that parties continued using property as

joint home after it was deeded to wife). The Alabama “real intent” issue in the spousal gift

context is thus a variant of the nominee doctrine prescribed in other jurisdictions, even though it

is known by a different appellation in this state.22 

Federal courts confronting nominee issues have routinely used the law of other

jurisdictions to flesh out amorphous or ill-defined state standards for determining nominee

status. See Cody, 348 F. Supp.2d at 694 (“federal courts sitting in states whose law of nominee

ownership is similarly undeveloped have typically looked to nominee ownership criteria

employed in other federal tax collection cases”); Baum Hydraulics, 280 F. Supp.2d at 916 (being

unable to locate clear definition or application of nominee theory in Nebraska, court consults

case law from other jurisdictions); LiButti v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 71, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)

(where no reported New Jersey cases address factors relevant to nominee theory, court applies

factors used by other federal courts considering such theory); Towe Antique Ford Foundation v.

I.R.S., Dep’t of Treasury, U.S., 791 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont. 1992) (applying legal

authorities from other states, where Montana courts had not set forth relevant factors in

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 15 of 21
23 The justification for considering precedents from other jurisdictions in evaluating

whether Lisa May is the nominee of James May is rendered even more compelling by Shades

Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1989). In Shades Ridge, a case

originating in Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit declared that, in comparing federal and state law on

whether a party is a nominee or alter ego for tax liability purposes, “the standards are so similar

that the distinction is of little moment.” Id. at 728; see also Scoville, 250 F.3d at 1202 (citing

Shades Ridge for proposition that federal and state laws apply same basic notion in determining

whether someone acts as a nominee); Cody, 348 F. Supp.2d at 694 (similar). Plaintiff argues that

Shades Ridge is distinguishable because it involved a “notorious gambler,” such that it is “no ...

wonder” that fraudulent intent was found. (Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief (doc. 81), at 16;

Plaintiff’s Suggested Findings of Fact, ¶ 35.) This contention misses the point. Shades Ridge is

germane to this analysis for the legal principles it enunciates, not for the manner in which it

applies those principles to specific facts. That the facts here may substantially diverge from

those in Shades Ridge in no way detracts from the utility of Shades Ridge in setting forth the

Eleventh Circuit framework for this type of analysis.

-16-

determining whether business entity is individual’s nominee).23 This Court will do the same by

examining nominee factors from other jurisdictions to evaluate the parties’ “real intent” vis a vis

ownership of the “gift” Property under Alabama law. To be clear, the Court is not using federal

law to create new property rights under Alabama law, but is instead (like the above-cited cases)

using federal law to supply standards for evaluating property rights already recognized under

Alabama law.

The relevant factors for the nominee query are accurately delineated in Cody v. United

States, 348 F. Supp.2d 682 (E.D. Va. 2004), as follows: “(1) whether the taxpayer expended

personal funds for the property; (2) whether inadequate or no consideration was paid by the

alleged nominee; (3) whether the property was placed in the alleged nominee's name in

anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability; (4) whether the taxpayer enjoys the benefits of, retains

possession of, and exercises dominion and control over the property; (5) whether a close family

relationship exists between the taxpayer and the alleged nominee; (6) whether conveyances

between the taxpayer and alleged nominee were recorded; and (7) whether the alleged nominee

interferes with the taxpayer's use of the property.” Id. at 694-95; see also Sumpter, 302 F.

Supp.2d at 721 (summarizing relevant considerations as being whether inadequate or no

consideration was paid, whether property was transferred in anticipation of liability, whether

close relationship between parties exists, whether conveyance was recorded, whether transferor

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 16 of 21
24 The Court also bears in mind the Sixth Circuit’s admonition that the nominee

factors may be “less probative” in cases of married couples, in terms of “distinguishing tax

shams from legitimate titling decisions between spouses.” Spotts, 429 F.3d at 253 n.2. 

Plaintiff’s problem is that she proffers no evidence that it was a “legitimate titling decision[]

between spouses,” other than James and Lisa May’s mere naked characterization of it as a “gift.” 

Had plaintiff wished to argue that this was a legitimate titling decision, then it was incumbent on

her to present evidence to support that proposition (i.e., to explain the reasons animating that

decision or to show that she and her husband have treated the Property in a manner consistent

with its nominal titling status during the intervening 15 years). This she has not done.

25 Plaintiff’s briefs do not address these factors, but simply dismiss them out of hand

as inapplicable because of her belief that Alabama law can confer no property right to James

May. This argument having been rejected, and plaintiff having offered no fallback position, this

Court does not have the benefit of plaintiff’s analysis or application of the nominee factors.

-17-

retained possession, and whether transferor continued to enjoy benefits of property). At all

times, the critical issue is whether the taxpayer has active or substantial control over the

property. See Shades Ridge, 888 F.2d at 728; Scoville v. United States, 250 F.3d 1198, 1202 (8th

Cir. 2001) (basic notion for determining whether nominee exists turns on who has active or

substantial control); In re Richards, 231 B.R. 571, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (overriding consideration

is whether taxpayer exercised active or substantial control over property); Baum Hydraulics, 280

F. Supp.2d at 916-17 (similar). That said, however, courts must not apply these factors rigidly or

mechanically. See Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 253 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (cautioning that

“rigid adherence to these factors may not be appropriate in every case”); Richards, 231 B.R. at

579 (similar).24

Considering the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the

pertinent factors militate heavily in favor of a finding that Lisa May is the nominee of James

May as to the Property.25 First, it is undisputed that James May expended personal funds for the

Property, inasmuch as he has ultimately paid every penny for mortgages, utilities and

renovations since at least 1991. By contrast, Lisa May has expended no such funds, save for

applying a $100,000 gift (from James May) and a mortgage loan (which James May is repaying)

for home renovations. Second, Lisa May has at no time paid any consideration to anyone for the

Property. Third, the record establishes that James May has continued to enjoy the full

complement of incidences of dominion, ownership and control over the Property at all relevant

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 17 of 21
26 Plaintiff derides the Government’s arguments on this point as “pure speculation

made by a party who has never spent any time at the May home.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief

(doc. 81), at 9.) However, plaintiff neither challenges the veracity of the underlying statement

nor submits record evidence tending to show that it is incorrect.

-18-

times. He has resided at the Property continuously since 1985. He has been actively involved in

dealings with the Property’s mortgage lenders. He has appeared on mortgage documents as a

mortgagor for the Property. He has paid all utilities and taxes on the Property. He has

bankrolled extensive renovations of the Property. Fourth, James May and Lisa May are husband

and wife, which obviously constitutes a close family relationship. Fifth, there is not a shred of

evidence that Lisa May has at any time interfered with or curtailed in any respect James May’s

use of the property.26 Sixth, James May failed to record Kathryn May’s conveyance of the

Property back to him at the time of their 1991 divorce, but instead directed that she deed the

Property directly to Lisa May, even as he acknowledged “that technically [he] got the house.” 

(U.S. Exh. 14, at 2.) That James May “got the house” from Kathryn May but structured the

conveyance in such a manner to leave his name off the title is a factor that supports an inference

that Lisa May is James May’s nominee.

As for the final nominee factor, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

Property was placed in Lisa May’s name in anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability. The

Government’s evidence is that the IRS had assessed tens of thousands of dollars of back tax

liability against James May before he orchestrated the transfer of the Property to Lisa May in

1991. This evidence raises a reasonable inference that James May placed the Property in Lisa

May’s name in anticipation of his own tax liabilities. However, James May avers that he did not

transfer the Property to Lisa May “with the intention of to [sic] avoid paying taxes or to avoid

any other debt,” but that “the deed to Lisa was about her and [his] marriage.” (James May Aff.,

¶ 13.) If believed, that evidence would support a conclusion that James May did not transfer the

Property in anticipation of lawsuits or other liability. For purposes of the Government’s Rule 56

Motion, plaintiff’s evidence is credited and all reasonable inferences are drawn in her favor. 

Therefore, the Court assumes, without finding, that James May did not transfer the Property to

Lisa May with the intention of avoiding his IRS liabilities or other debts.

Stepping back from the trees to scrutinize the forest, the Court is reminded that, far from

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 18 of 21
27 Perhaps plaintiff possesses evidence that might establish these considerations. 

But she has placed no such evidence in the record, and has done nothing to rebut the

Government’s showing that James May remains the true, beneficial owner of the Property. The

Court must decide matters before it based on the facts that the parties have actually placed in the

record, without regard to facts that might have been (but were not) presented.

-19-

a mechanical checklist of factors, the “ultimate inquiry” in any nominee analysis is whether the

taxpayer or the purported nominee is “the true beneficial owner of the property.” Spotts, 429

F.3d at 253 n.2. Based on the facts and circumstances presented in the record, the only

reasonable inference that may be drawn is that James May remains to this day a true beneficial

owner of the Property. Although he titled the Property in the name of his wife, James May

received no consideration for that transfer. He has continuously resided at the Property since

1985, with unfettered enjoyment of the benefits of home ownership. During that time, James

May has also continuously borne the burdens of home ownership for the Property. His name is

on the mortgage as a mortgagor, and the utilities are exclusively in his name. Subsequent to the

1991 transfer, James May has paid every penny of every mortgage, property tax and utility

payment that has been made for the Property, with no contributions from Lisa May whatsoever. 

When the Property was substantially renovated in 1999, James May alone footed the bill. 

Additionally, it is quite clear that James May is and remains actively involved in major decisions

concerning the Property, as the record includes several instances in which he negotiated or

otherwise communicated with lenders and no instances in which Lisa May did so. By contrast,

plaintiff has not proffered a shred of evidence that Lisa May’s role with respect to the Property

extends beyond living in it with James May and nominally holding title to it. There is no

evidence that she either receives or pays the bills. There is no evidence that she is active in

dealing with lenders and other service providers concerning the Property. There is no evidence

that she makes any decisions about the Property, or that she has taken or could take any

significant action with respect to the Property without James May’s approval or acquiescence.27

Considering all of the foregoing, the Court finds no genuine issues of fact as to James

May’s ownership interest in the Property under Alabama law. On the evidence submitted, the

Government has conclusively rebutted the Alabama presumption that James May gave the

Property to Lisa May as a gift. In particular, the Government has presented uncontroverted

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 19 of 21
28 In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to reach the Government’s

alternative argument that James May fraudulently transferred the Property to Kathryn May in

1989 and again fraudulently transferred the Property to Lisa May in 1991, in violation of the

Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“AUFTA”), Ala. Code §§ 8-9A-1, et seq.

-20-

evidence that the parties’ real intent (borne out by 15 years of experience following the

purported “gift”) was for James May to retain the incidences of ownership and control, and to

retain a beneficial ownership interest in the Property. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that

might raise a reasonable inference to the contrary. Viewing the record in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, the undersigned determines that James May has held and presently holds

an interest in the Property which is cognizable under Alabama law, in accordance with the

Taylor, McLain, Cox, Cone and Snow lines of precedent. Having ascertained that James May

possesses the requisite property interest under Alabama law, the question then becomes “whether

the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ within the

compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. This question is quite

straightforward. Section 6321 of the Tax Code “reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach

every interest in property that a taxpayer might have.” National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at

720. Moreover, it is plain (and plaintiff offers no evidence or argument to dispute) that James

May’s state-law interest in the Property falls squarely within the parameters of the federal

nominee doctrine, such that his interest in the Property is unquestionably reachable via federal

tax lien, irrespective of the fact that the Property is titled to Lisa May. Accordingly, it is the

finding of this Court, as a matter of law, that Lisa May holds title to the Property as James May’s

nominee, and that the IRS tax liens against James May attach to the Property.28

V. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 77) is granted on the

ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact that (a) James May holds

an interest in the Property under Alabama law; (b) that state-recognized interest

qualifies as a right to property under federal tax lien legislation; and (c) plaintiff

holds title to the Property as the nominee of James May, such that the tax liens

against James May properly attach to the Property.

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 20 of 21
-21-

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 88) is denied for the same

reasons.

3. Plaintiff’s claims against the United States are dismissed with prejudice, and

plaintiff shall take nothing from the United States by her Complaint.

4. Because of this ruling, plaintiff’s only remaining causes of action are in rem

claims against defendant A Parcel of Land, and in personam claims against

defendants John L. House, Shirley House and James W. May. Plaintiff is to

notify the Court in writing, on or before September 19, 2006, whether she

intends to proceed to trial against those remaining defendants and, if so, what the

triable issues might be and what the federal subject-matter jurisdictional basis of

those triable issues might be.

DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of September, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00695-WS-B Document 93 Filed 09/06/06 Page 21 of 21