Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01347/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01347-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYOCERA CORP., a Japan

corporation; and KYOCERA

WIRELESS CORP., a Delaware

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 04-CV-1347 H

(CAB)

ORDER GRANTING

COUNTERDEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON

COUNTERCLAIMANTS’

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

CLAIM

vs.

HECMMA INC., a Texas corporation;

EMPRESAS HECMMA S.A. de R.L.

de C.V., a Mexican corporation; and

HECTOR FIERRO, an individual,

Defendants. ______________________________

HECMMA INC., and HECTOR

FIERRO, 

 

Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third

Party Plaintiffs,

 vs.

KYOCERA CORP. and KYOCERA

WIRELESS CORP.,

 

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

and JOHN CHIER,

 Third Party Defendant.

Case 3:04-cv-01347-H-CAB Document 184 Filed 09/14/06 Page 1 of 6
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On August 23, 2006, this Court granted in part and denied in part

Counterdefendants Kyocera Corporation and Kyocera Wireless Corporation’s

(collectively “Counterdefendants’”) motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No.175.)

In that order, the Court granted summary judgment as to all claims against Kyocera

Corporation. Accordingly, counterclaims only remain pending against Kyocera

Wireless Corporation (“KWC”). Also in that order, the Court granted

Counterdefendants’ request to submit additional briefing on their motion for summary

judgment as to Counterclaimants Hecmma, Inc. (“Hecmma”) and Hector Fierro’s

(collectively “Counterclaimants”) promissory estoppel claim.

Counterdefendants filed their supplemental brief on September 5, 2006. (Doc.

No. 179.) Counterclaimants have not filed a response. For the reasons stated below,

the Court GRANTS Counterdefendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the

promissory estoppel claim.

Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing

an absence of a genuine issue of material fact on issues where the non-moving party

will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the party

resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is not

sufficient.” Id. at 252.

/ / / / 

Case 3:04-cv-01347-H-CAB Document 184 Filed 09/14/06 Page 2 of 6
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides guidance where the nonmoving

party does not respond, indicating that summary judgment may only be entered “if

appropriate”:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided

in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response,

by affidavits or as otherwise provided by this rule, must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the

adverse party.

As the Supreme Court outlined in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61

(1970), the burden on the party opposing summary judgment only arises if the motion

is properly “supported” as required by Rule 56(c). Thus, unless the moving party has

met its initial burden of production under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is not

“appropriate” under Rule 56(e). If the moving party does not meet this burden,

“‘summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is

presented.’” Id. at 160 (quoting advisory committee notes to the 1963 amendments to

Rule 56). Therefore, even where the nonmoving party fails to respond, a court must

still find that no material issues of fact remain for trial and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law before granting summary judgment. Otherwise,

summary judgment is not appropriate. See, e.g., Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681

(2d Cir. 2001); Livernois v. Med. Disposables, Inc., 837 F.2d 1018, 1022 (11th Cir.

1988).

Finally, if the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element

of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted).

Case 3:04-cv-01347-H-CAB Document 184 Filed 09/14/06 Page 3 of 6
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B. Analysis

Counterclaimants base their promissory estoppel claim on KWC’s alleged

promises to pay in the purchase orders it submitted to Counterclaimants. (First

Amended Countercomplaint ¶ 33.) According to Counterclaimants, Hecmma

reasonably relied on the promises to pay for the goods by purchasing materials and

making components, and it suffered damages when the purchase orders were not paid.

(Id.; Decl. Hector Fierro ¶ 5.) Further, Counterclaimants’ responses to interrogatories

confirm that the promises to pay underlying the promissory estoppel claim are those

contained in the purchase orders. (Decl. Jill Houlahan, Ex. A, 2-3.)

Counterdefendants argue that promissory estoppel is inapplicable here, however,

because Hecmma’s performance under the purchase orders was requested at the time

the orders were submitted. Thus, because the only promises were in the purchase

orders, the promises were bargained for and supported by consideration, and promissory

estoppel does not apply.

The elements for a promissory estoppel cause of action are: (1) a clear promise;

(2) reliance; (3) substantial detriment; and (4) damages “measured to the extent of the

obligation and not performed.” Toscano v. Greene Music, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 732, 737

(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Under California law, “a promise which the promisor should

reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third

person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be

avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles

County Metro. Transp. Auth., 1 P.3d 63, 66 (Cal. 2000). 

Promissory estoppel, however, “is inapplicable where the promisee’s

performance was requested by the promisor at the time the promise was made.” Healy

v. Brewster, 380 P.2d 817, 822 (Cal. 1963); Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe, 158

Cal. Rptr. 178, 183-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 30 Cal. Jur. 3d § 23 Estoppel and Waiver

(2006). “In other words, where the promisee’s reliance is bargained for, the law of

consideration applies; and it is only where the reliance was unbargained for that there

Case 3:04-cv-01347-H-CAB Document 184 Filed 09/14/06 Page 4 of 6
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is room for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Healy, 380 P.2d at 822;

see also 30 Cal. Jur. 3d § 23 Estoppel and Waiver (2006). The doctrine employs

equitable principles to supply the necessary consideration to satisfy the requirement that

consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced. See

Kajima/Ray Wilson, 1 P.3d at 66; see also CalFarms, Inc. v. Krusiewicz, 31 Cal. Rptr.

3d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).

Counterclaimants’ promissory estoppel claim is based on KWC’s alleged

promises in purchase orders submitted to Hecmma. (First Amended Countercomplaint

¶ 33.) Thus, the alleged promises to pay are all connected to requests from KWC for

Hecmma to provide certain products. Because all of the promises to pay were in

exchange for Hecmma’s performance under the purchase orders, Hecmma’s reliance

in purchasing materials and manufacturing components was requested by KWC at the

time it submitted the purchase orders, and thus, it amounts to consideration. See, e.g.,

Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation District, 449 P.2d 462, 468 (Cal. 1969) (promissory

estoppel inapplicable where promisee’s performance was requested at the time of the

promisor’s promise, as law of consideration applies). Therefore, because the promises

were not gratuitous, but were given in exchange for Hecmma’s performance on the

purchase orders, the promises were supported by consideration and Counterclaimant’s

claim for promissory estoppel must fail. See id. at 468-69 (finding that defendants’

specific promises to plaintiff that he would be granted salary increases each year were

part of bargain under which plaintiff entered into employment with defendant, and thus,

could not form the basis of a claim for promissory estoppel); Walker v. KFC Corp., 728

F.2d 1215, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 1984) (where performance by plaintiffs was bargained for,

plaintiffs could not maintain an action for promissory estoppel under California law);

see also Arsape S.A. v. JDS Uniphase Corp., 2005 WL 2989296 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3,

2005) (where only evidence of clear and ambiguous promises between the parties was

in written, bargained for purchase agreements, summary judgment entered on

promissory estoppel claim).

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Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to

Counterclaimants’ promissory estoppel claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 14, 2006

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

Jill S. Houlahan, Esq.

Chapin Wheeler, LLP

600 West Broadway, Suite 700

San Diego, CA 92101 

Leon Schydlower, Esq.

Law Offices of Leon Schydlower

210 N. Campbell Street

El Paso, TX 79901 

Case 3:04-cv-01347-H-CAB Document 184 Filed 09/14/06 Page 6 of 6