Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04028/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04028-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael D. Mott, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 05-4028 PHX SMM (VAM)

)

Dora Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Michael D. Mott ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

raises four grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 3 at pp. 5-

8). Respondent filed an answer opposing the granting of habeas

relief. (Doc. 11).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault and unlawful

flight in Maricopa County Superior Court on April 5, 1985 in CR

140750. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit D; see also Exhibits B and C). 

Petitioner waived his right to counsel in this case and

represented himself at trial with the assistance of advisory

counsel. (Id., Exhibit B). For these convictions, petitioner was

sentenced to a total of 13.5 years in prison. (Id. at Exhibit D). 

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Counsel raised the following issue on appeal:

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Did the trial court deny [petitioner's] right to

counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution when it allowed him to

represent himself?

State v. Mott, 162 Ariz. 452, 454, 784 P.2d 278, 280 (Ariz.Ct.App.

1989). 

Pursuant to petitioner's motion, the state Court of Appeals

permitted him to represent himself, however, petitioner did not

file a supplemental brief. Mott, 162 Ariz. at 454, 784 P.2d at

280. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ordered that his appeal

in this case, CR 140750 be consolidated with his appeal in CR

140943 because "they raised common issues of law and fact," and,

pursuant to a new request from petitioner for appointment of

counsel, re-appointed his former counsel. Id., 162 Ariz. at 455,

784 P.2d at 281. The court also directed that the state file an

answering brief addressing the following issues:

(1) Those issues raised in the opening brief, i.e.,

whether trial counsel denied [petitioner's] right to

counsel by allowing him to represent himself at both

trials;

(2) Whether the trial court erroneously relied on two

Rule 11 psychiatric reports from a prior cause in

vacating his order denying [petitioner's] motion for

self-representation, and the effect on appeal of

absence of those psychiatric reports from the record; 

(3) Whether the trial court erred by allowing

[petitioner] to continue to represent himself at trial

after numerous outbursts in the presence of the jury

that may have prejudiced [petitioner's] ability to

receive a fair trial from an impartial jury.

Mott, 162 Ariz. at 455, 784 P.2d at 281.

On November 7, 1989, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

petitioner's convictions and sentences in both cases, concluding

"[petitioner] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his

right to counsel." Mott, 162 Ariz. at 461, 784 P.2d at 287. 

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Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmance of his convictions and sentences in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (See Doc. 3 at p. 2). 

On March 22, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 3 at p. 2

and Exhibit G). Neither a copy of the Notice or the petition

itself are included in the record. Respondents indicate they have

not included these documents because the Maricopa County Superior

Court "misplaced" them. (See Doc. 11 at p. 3 (Note 3)). 

Nevertheless, the trial court, in denying Rule 32 relief, noted

petitioner filed previous Rule 32 petitions in 1986 and 1994 and

characterized the issues raised by petitioner in his petition as:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) prosecutorial

misconduct, and (3) trial court error in denying his request for

change of counsel. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit G). The Court dismissed

the petition pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) "because these

claims either were or should have been raised in the direct appeal

or the prior Rule 32 proceedings." (Id.). On May 6, 2004, the

trial court denied a motion for reconsideration. (Id. at Exhibit

H).

On June 10, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for review in

the Arizona Court of Appeals. In the petition, petitioner

presented the following issues:

1) The denial of the Notices and Petitions were based on

false information.

2) The Notices and Petitions were denied by only one

(1) judge; yet the motion for reconsideration was

denied by a different judge - why?

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3) The judge who denied the Notices and Petitions has

shown bias and prejudice towards Petitioner throughout

the proceedings.

4) The Motion for Court Records should have been

granted.

(Doc. 11, Exhibit I at pp. 2-3). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition for review

without comment on June 17, 2005. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit J). 

Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(Doc. 3 at p. 2).

On January 9, 2006, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus

petition raising the following grounds:

GROUND I: 6th Amendment

The denial of the Motion to Change appointed trial

attorney violated petitioner's 6th Amendment right to

competent representation by an attorney ...

GROUND II: 6th Amendment

A fair trial is one guarantee of the 6th Amendment. 

When the State uses perjured testimony to obtain

conviction the defendant does not receive a fair trial. 

A denial of fair trial must call for a new trial

without the perjured testimony and to vacate the

conviction and sentence ....

GROUND III: 6th Amendment

Abuse of discretion by a Judge causes problems at

trial. At first, the trial judge denied defendant's

motion to represent himself. It was only after the

prosecutor told the judge it was permissible, that the

judge allowed it. The judge even made reference to his

competence ....

Since the trial judge admitted he didn't know the law

as well as an attorney, there is reason to believe that

errors were made by the judge at all phases of the case

....

GROUND IV: 6th Amendment

Prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the defendant. 

Allowing the knowin [sic] use of perjured testimony is

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just an example. The prosecutor altered subpoenas from

the defendant. That kept alabi [sic] witness from

proving the innocence of the defendant.

When a prosecutor commits misconduct, the fair trial

guarantee of the 6th Amendment is violated ....

(Doc. 3 at pp. 5-8).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that all claims raised in the habeas

petition are barred by the one year statute of limitations

provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Doc. 11 at p. 4). 

Alternatively, respondents assert that petitioner's claims were

not properly exhausted in state court and are now procedurally

defaulted. (Id. at pp. 4-8).

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

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right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed

by April 23, 1997,1

 or they were barred by the statute of

limitations absent a showing the circumstances surrounding the

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filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

The Arizona Court of Appeals entered its decision affirming

petitioner's convictions and sentences on November 7, 1989. See

Mott, 162 Ariz. 452, 784 P.2d 278. Petitioner had 30 days from

the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, or until December 7,

1989, to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme

Court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19(a). Petitioner states he did not

seek such review. (Doc. 3 at p. 2). Because his petition was

finalized prior to the AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996,

petitioner was required to file a federal habeas petition

challenging the convictions and sentences at issue in this case no

later than April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

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The record reveals petitioner had nothing pending between

November 7, 1989, and the filing of his Rule 32 petition on March

22, 2004, a period of nearly 14 years and for nearly 7 years after

the statute of limitations began to run. (See Doc. 3 at p. 2). 

As a result, petitioner's habeas claims are untimely. Although

petitioner did file a Rule 32 petition in 2004, and although such

state post-conviction proceedings may toll the limitations period,

see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), such a proceeding cannot save already

time-barred claims. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th

Cir. 2003) ("we hold that section 2244(d) does not permit

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.").

Petitioner has presented no basis for equitable tolling of

the limitations period and none is apparent from the record. As a

result, the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Because petitioner's claims are clearly time-barred, the Court

need not consider respondents' alternative argument that the

claims are procedurally defaulted.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied on the basis that all claims raised

therein are barred by the statute of limitations. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

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Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation. 

 DATED this 26th day of June, 2006.

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