Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02684/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Konstantin Malofeev, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Unknown Party, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-02684-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff Konstantin Malofeev’s Motion for Default Judgment. 

(Doc. 52.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 On December 14, 2014, Malofeev, a Russian citizen, filed suit against 

GoDaddy.com, LLC, and several unknown parties alleging defamation and false light. 

(Doc. 1.) On March 13, 2015, Malofeev filed a second amended complaint, which 

included a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and named Alexei Sorokin, Sarkis 

Grigoryan, and Mikhail Kovalenko as Defendants (the “Individual Defendants”). (Doc. 

11.) 

 Malofeev alleges that the Individual Defendants run several websites: 

www.malofeev.com, www.malofeev.biz, www.malofeev.info, www.malofeev.co, and 

www.kandidatmalofeev.com. (Id., ¶¶ 4-6.) Using these websites, which are hosted by 

GoDaddy.com, the Individual Defendants allegedly published false information about 

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Malofeev; namely, that he is involved in criminal activities, such as fraud or money 

laundering, and that he was criminally investigated in Russia. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 13-15.) 

Malofeev asserts these websites contain defamatory subject matter and cast him in a false 

light, for which he seeks $50,000,000 in damages and transfer of the websites to his 

name. 

 The Individual Defendants were served with the complaint via email, (Doc. 26), 

and the Clerk entered default against them on October 20, 2015, (Doc. 51). Malofeev 

now moves for default judgment against the Individual Defendants and an order 

transferring the rights to the websites to him. (Doc. 52.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 “Entry of default judgment . . . is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Aldabe 

v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Once default has been entered by the 

Clerk, the Court may enter default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b). See Eitel v. McCool, 

782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts may consider several factors in determining 

whether to enter default judgment, including (1) the possibility of prejudice to the 

plaintiff, (2) merits of the claims, (3) sufficiency of the complaint, (4) amount of money 

at stake, (5) possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable 

neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil procedure 

favoring decisions on the merits. Id. at 1471-72. All allegations in the complaint are 

taken as true, and the plaintiff “is required to prove all damages sought in the complaint.” 

Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 

ANALYSIS

 Malofeev’s motion does not analyze the merits of his case and he makes no 

attempt to examine the Eitel factors. Instead, the two-page motion merely recites the 

procedural history of the case and requests that the Court enter default judgment 

transferring the five websites to him. (Doc. 52 at 1-2.) Notwithstanding the deficient 

motion, the Court declines to enter default judgment for several reasons. 

 First, the Court likely lacks personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants. 

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Malofeev alleges that he is a Russian citizen. The complaint does not list his address or 

state whether he currently resides in the United States. He seeks default judgment against 

three Individual Defendants, all of whom are alleged to have Russian addresses, and all 

of whom were served via email. (Doc. 11, ¶¶ 4-6.) Although he argues that each 

Individual Defendant consented to jurisdiction in this forum via GoDaddy.com’s terms of 

service, he fails to provide any allegations relating to those terms. Most importantly, the 

terms of service are binding between the Individual Defendants and GoDaddy.com; not 

between the Individual Defendants and Malofeev. 

 Furthermore, Malofeev does not allege that any harm occurred to him in this 

jurisdiction or that the Individual Defendants targeted the forum with their allegedly 

defamatory websites. Malofeev does not allege that the Individual Defendants have any 

contacts with the forum. Simply put, the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

the Individual Defendants in this case would violate due process. See Brink v. First 

Credit Res., 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 858 (D. Ariz. 1999) (“[T]he Due Process Clause requires 

that nonresident defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.”) (emphasis in original). 

 Second, even assuming the truth of the factual allegations, the second amended 

complaint fails to state a claim. Malofeev brings three claims: (1) defamation, (2) false 

light, and (3) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125. In order to establish defamation, the plaintiff 

must prove: (1) defendant made a false statement regarding plaintiff, (2) the statement 

was defamatory, (3) the statement was published to a third party, (4) defendant made the 

statement with actual malice, and (5) damages. See Morris v. Warner, 770 P.2d 359, 366 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). Actual malice is required because Malofeev alleges that he is a 

public figure, (Doc. 11, ¶ 13), and requires “proof that the defamatory statement was 

made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 

or not.” Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Malofeev does not identify a single defamatory statement in his complaint. 

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Nor does he specify which statements appeared on which website. There are no factual 

allegations demonstrating that the statements are false, or that Defendants harbored ill 

will toward Malofeev. The claim is insufficiently pled. 

 With respect to false light, “a public figure may bring a false light claim for 

statements that relate to his private life and presents his private life in a false light.” 

Ultimate Creations, Inc. v. McMahon, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (D. Ariz. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Malofeev does not identify any allegedly 

false statements, the Court is unable to conclude whether the statements relate to 

Malofeev’s private life or his life as an alleged public figure. As such, this claim fails. 

 Section 43 of the Lanham Act, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125, “is a broad federal 

unfair competition provision which protects unregistered trademarks.” Van Praagh v. 

Gratton, 993 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). “An unregistered mark . . . can be protected under the Lanham Act 

if it would qualify for registration as a trademark.” Lopez v. Gap, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 

400, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). “To qualify for trademark registration, a mark must be either 

(1) inherently distinctive, where its intrinsic nature serves to identify its particular source; 

or (2) distinctive by virtue of having acquired a secondary meaning in the minds of 

consumers.” Van Praagh, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). 

 Malofeev alleges his “name is distinctive as he is highly involved . . . in his local 

community.” (Doc. 11, ¶ 38.) But the extent to which Malofeev is known in his 

community is irrelevant. Trademark law protects names and symbols used in connection 

with goods or services. Malofeev does not allege that his name is tied to a specific 

product or service. Nor does he allege that his name is a registered trademark, or that he 

has sought to register it. This claim fails as a matter of law. 

 Last, the Court finds no prejudice to Malofeev. He has failed to identify any 

concrete harm suffered from the allegedly false information listed on the websites.1

 As 

 

1

 An internet search conducted by the Court on January 13, 2016 revealed that all 

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such, the Court finds Malofeev will not suffer harm in the absence of default judgment. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, (Doc. 52), is 

DENIED. Within 7 days of the date of entry of this Order, Plaintiff shall show cause 

why the case should not be dismissed. Failure to respond will result in termination of the 

case without further order of the Court. 

 Dated this 19th day of January, 2016. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge

 of the websites have been taken down or are in the process of being cancelled. None of 

the content on any of the sites was able to be viewed. 

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