Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00017/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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Defendants requested oral argument. Upon review of the briefs, the Court has

determined that oral argument is not required to resolve the pending motion and denies the

State Defendants’ request.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Debra L. Harvey; et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Janet Napolitano, Governor; et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-17-TUC-FRZ (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim (Doc. No. 18)1

 filed by

Defendants Governor Janet Napolitano and Secretary of State Janice K. Brewer (hereinafter

“the State Defendants”). For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

the District Court grant the Motion to Dismiss. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2008, Plaintiff Page Maier filed the instant action. (Doc. No.1) In

addition to the State Defendants, Plaintiff also named Defendant Pima County Recorder F.

Ann Rodriguez in her official capacity. Plaintiff moved to consolidate her case with

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Coronado v. Napolitano, CV 07-1089-PHX-SMM and such motion was denied. (See

January 16, 2008 Order (Doc. No.47) entered in Coronado, CV 07-1089-PHX-SMM and

Doc. No. 20 herein).

On January 31, 2008, Defendant Rodriguez filed an Answer. (Doc. No. 11) On

February 7, 2008, the State Defendants were granted an extension to respond. (Doc. No. 17)

On February 20, 2008, the State Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.

18) and Plaintiff filed her Response on March 3, 2008 (Doc. No. 21). 

On March 18, 2008, Plaintiff Maier filed an Amended Complaint which removed

Plaintiff Maier as a named party and substituted Deborah Harvey as the sole Plaintiff. (Doc.

No. 25) Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court that “Plaintiff Harvey stipulates that the

Motion to Dismiss and the response thereto filed by Plaintiff Maier apply in all respects to

Plaintiff Harvey and the Amendment to the Complaint. Plaintiff Harvey further stipulates

that Defendants may include in their reply to the response to the Motion to Dismiss whatever

arguments they may have concerning the Amendment, provided that these comments are

limited to asserting that the Amendment does not change the status of the Motion to

Dismiss....” (Doc. No. 28) Thereafter, on March 20, 2008, the State Defendants filed their

“Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 26).

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), Plaintiff may amend the complaint “once as a matter

of course...before being served with a responsive pleading....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(A). 

The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is not a responsive pleading within the meaning

of Rule 15(a). Breier v. Northern Calif. Bowling Proprietors’ Ass’n., 316 F.2d 787, 789 (9th

Cir. 1963). However, there is no question that Defendant Rodriguez’s Answer is a

responsive pleading. Nonetheless, “if the amendment affects all defendants or one or more

of those that have not responded, then it generally is held that a ‘responsive pleading’ has not

been served for purposes of Rule 15(a) and plaintiff may amend the complaint as of course

with regard to those defendants that have not answered.” Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, Mary Kay Kane, 6 Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 2d § 1481. Any effect the

First Amended Complaint may have upon Defendant Rodriguez is of no moment given that

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Plaintiffs do not specifically identify the offenses of which they stand convicted other

than to say that “[t]hey have been convicted only of drug or other offenses which were not

felonies at common law.” (SAC, p. 15) 

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on June 16, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. No.

31). “The primary effect of the proposed” amendment is to add Catherine M. Beddard as a

named Plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, p. 2) Plaintiffs

Harvey and Beddard unconditionally stipulated, inter alia, “that the proposed Amended

Complaint will not in any way change or alter the substantive claims raised in the original

Complaint...that the claims raised in the proposed Amended Complaint are identical to those

raised in the original Complaint...that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Response

to the Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants’ Reply...are fully and entirely applicable to

Plaintiffs Harvey and Beddard....” (Id. at pp. 3-4) The record reflects that Defendant

Rodriguez did not file an opposition to the proposed amendment. The State Defendants filed

a “Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to Amend” and “re-urge[d] their pending Motion to

Dismiss as to the proposed Amended Complaint....” (Doc. No. 33) On August 27, 2008, the

Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. The Second

Amended Complaint is hereinafter referred to as “SAC”.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging Arizona’s

felon disenfranchisement scheme “for the denial of the vote to Plaintiffs and the consequent

failure to accord them the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” (SAC, p.1) Plaintiffs “seek the right to vote in Arizona under ‘the common

law felony theory’....” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that they “have been convicted of more than one

offense which defendants consider to be felonies, but which were misdemeanors or

nonexistent at common law.”2

 (Id. at p. 14) Plaintiffs allege that they have been denied the

right to vote because of such convictions and because they owe fines and restitution as a

result of their convictions. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]hey have successfully completed

all terms of incarceration, parole, or probation.” (Id. at p.15) Plaintiffs further allege that

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they are residents of Pima County; are of voting age; are citizens of the United States and

Arizona; and they “would otherwise be entitled to vote...” but for the fact of their prior

convictions and the outstanding fines and restitution owed. (Id. at pp. 14-15) 

Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief and expenses, fees and costs

associated with this action. (Id. at pp. 32-33)

The State Defendants have moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ SAC pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. 

III. STANDARD

When resolving a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all

allegations of fact set forth in the complaint are taken as true. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d

903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). However, conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). That is, when all the allegations are

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the factual allegations

pled “‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Williams v.

Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., __ U.S. __,

127 S.Ct. at 1965); see also SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88

F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (a claim may be dismissed because it lacks “a cognizable legal

theory” or because it fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim). “Once a claim has

been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp., __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. at 1969.

IV. DISCUSSION

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent

part that:

Section 1. ...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States

according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons

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The right to possess a weapon is not automatically restored. See A.R.S. §13-912(B).

Additionally, “the right to vote of persons convicted of [forging or] counterfeiting election

returns is not automatically restored.” (Motion, p.4 n.3); see also A.R.S. §16-1011(C).

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in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any

election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the

United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers

of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the

male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of

the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,

or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the

proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole

number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

U.S.Const. Amend. XIV, §§ 1, 2 (emphasis added) (hereinafter referred to as “Section 1" or

“Section 2" respectively). 

With regard to voter qualifications, the Arizona constitution provides in pertinent part

that “[n]o person who is adjudicated an incapacitated person shall be qualified to vote at any

election, nor shall any person convicted of treason or felony, be qualified to vote at any

election unless restored to civil rights.” Ariz. Const. art. VII §2 (emphasis added); (see also

Motion, p. 3) (“Since Arizona became a state, its Constitution has limited the right to vote

of convicted felons.”) Additionally, under Arizona statute, “[a] conviction for a felony

suspends...” several civil rights of the person sentenced including “[t]he right to vote”, the

right to serve as a juror, and the right to possess a gun or firearm. A.R.S. § 13-904 (A)(1)-

(5). A felony is “an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in the custody

of the state department of corrections is authorized by any law of this state.” A.R.S. § 13-

105(16); 2008 Ariz.Legis.Serv. ch.150, §1. A person convicted of a single felony

automatically regains most3

 civil rights that were lost or suspended by the conviction if the

person: (1) completes a term of probation or receives an absolute discharge from

imprisonment; and (2) pays any fine or restitution imposed. A.R.S. § 13-912. Persons, such

as Plaintiffs herein, who stand convicted of more than one felony but are not in prison or on

probation or parole are not entitled to automatic restoration but must instead apply to the

superior court wherein they were either sentenced, or discharged at the end of the term of

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In some instances, additional limitations apply to restoration of the right to possess

a weapon. A.R.S. §§ 13-905(C), 13-906(C). Moreover, in some cases restoration of the right

to possess a weapon is unavailable. Id.

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ARS §§ 13-905 and 13-906 were recently amended. See 2008 Ariz.Legis.Serv. ch.

301 §§44, 45. The amendments are not yet effective. However, even if the amendments

were effective, they are not substantive and would not alter the instant discussion or outcome.

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probation, for restoration of any civil rights which were lost or suspended resulting from the

conviction.4

 See A.R.S. §13-905 (regarding persons convicted of two or more felonies and

whose period of probation has been completed); A.R.S. § 13-906 (regarding persons

convicted of two or more felonies and who have received an absolute discharge from

imprisonment);5 see also Ariz.R.Crim.P. 29 et seq (regarding restoration of civil rights for

probationers). Whether to grant an application for restoration is within the discretion of the

superior court judge by whom the person was sentenced or that judge’s successor in office.

A.R.S. § 13-908.

Plaintiffs contend that Arizona’s disenfranchisement of that group of felons who stand

convicted of “non-common law felonies” is not exempted by Section 2, cannot withstand the

strict scrutiny standard of the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1, and thus, such

disenfranchisement is unconstitutional. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he common law felonies

are treason, murder, manslaughter, mayhem, rape, arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, and

sodomy. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 108 n.6 (1943). Drug and many other

offenses which Arizona classifies as felonies are ‘non[-]common law’ felonies...sometimes

called ‘statutory’ felonies, which were misdemeanors or nonexistent at common law.” (SAC,

p. 7; see also Response, pp. 10-11 (citations omitted)).

The State Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because “Section 2

permits states to take away the rights of all felons to vote” and, therefore, does not

distinguish between common law felonies and non-common law felonies. (Motion, pp. 6-7)

(emphasis in original) citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 32 (1974)). 

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The U.S. Supreme Court “has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected

right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citations omitted). However, the Court has

also recognized that “[t]his equal right to vote...is not absolute; the States have the power to

impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where a challenged statute has granted the

right to vote to some citizens but has denied the franchise to others, the U.S. Supreme Court

has examined “whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest”,

Id. at 337 (citations omitted), i.e., “the State must show a substantial and compelling reason

for imposing...” the limitation at issue. Id. at 335. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has

declined to apply strict scrutiny analysis to a state statute excluding felons from the vote.

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding California’s felon disenfranchisement

scheme). In so holding, the Richardson Court determined that 

the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in [Section]

2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in the case

of the other restrictions on the franchise which were invalidated in the cases

on which respondents rely. We hold that the understanding of those who

adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of

[Section] 2 and in the historical judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s

applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance

in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations on the franchise

which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause by this Court.

Id. at 54 (emphasis added). The Court further pointed out 

we may rest on the demonstrably sound proposition that [Section] 1, in dealing

with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form

of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic

sanction of reduced representation which [Section] 2 imposed for other forms

of disenfranchisement...[Section] 2 is as much a part of the Amendment as any

of the other sections and how it became a part of the Amendment is less

important than what it says and what it means.

Id. at 55 (emphasis added).

 Plaintiffs contend the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, including

that cited by the Richardson Court, supports the conclusion that the reference to “other

crime” in Section 2 referred only to common law felonies.

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The Richardson Court observed that “[t]he legislative history bearing on the meaning

of the relevant language of [Section] 2 is scant indeed....” Id. at 44. The Court noted that

“the framers of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were primarily concerned with the effect of

reduced representation upon the States, rather than with the two forms of disenfranchisement

which were exempted from that consequence by the language with which we are concerned

here.” Id. Further, “the language ‘except for participation in rebellion or other crime’ was

never altered....” Id. at 45. After review of what little legislative history there is, the Court

concluded that the phrase “was intended by Congress to mean what it says.” Id. at 44; see

also Id. at 45 (“What little comment there was on the phrase in question here supports a plain

reading of it.”) 

When addressing the same issue Plaintiffs raise herein, this District Court likewise

examined the Richardson decision and other cases in reaching the conclusion that “[a] plain

reading of [Section] 2 admits of no distinction between common law and non-common law

felonies. Thus, the language of [Section] 2 means what it says–persons convicted of crimes

may be excluded from the franchise.” Coronado v. Napolitano, 2008 WL 191987, *8. 

(D.Ariz. Jan. 22, 2008) (granting motion to dismiss because, inter alia, “the phrase ‘other

crime’ is not limited to felonies at common law.”) This Court agrees. A plain reading of

Section 2 suggests no distinction between common law felonies and non-common law

felonies. Id.

Further, as pointed out in Coronado, “‘[w]here the language is plain and admits of no

more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to

aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.’” Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.

470, 485 (1917) and citing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). Consequently,

“Plaintiffs’ argument finds no support in either a plain reading of [Section] 2 or principles

of statutory interpretation.” Id.

Even if further consideration is given to Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning legislative

history, such arguments do not alter the conclusion that Section 2 encompasses both common

law and non-common law felonies. Plaintiffs cite reconstruction-era legislation enacted

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Richardson explains that “[i]n March 1867, before any state was readmitted,

Congress passed ‘An act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States,’

the so-called Reconstruction Act...” which established “the conditions on which the former

Confederate States would be readmitted to representation in Congress.” Richardson, 418

U.S. at 49

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“Nine other former Confederate states were subsequently readmitted upon condition

that they would never deprive persons of the right to vote ‘except as a punishment for such

crimes as are now felonies at common law.’” (Response, p.8 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S.

at 52)).

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contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Amendment that permitted disenfranchisement: “‘for

participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law...” (Response, p.7 (quoting “the

Reconstruction Act” of Mar. 2. 1867, 14 Stat. 428 at §56

)); and “‘for such crimes as are now

felonies at common law....’” (Id. at p. 8 (quoting the Readmission Act for Arkansas of June

22, 1868, 15 Stat. 71)(emphasis omitted)).7

 Because Congress was concerned that the

readmitted states would misuse felon disenfranchisement laws to discriminate against

African-Americans, Congress added additional language to the enabling acts specifying that

the laws under which citizens were convicted resulting in disenfranchisement must be

“equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State.” Richardson, 418 U.S. at 51-52; (see

also Response, p.9; Reply, pp.6-7). 

The Coronado court found that the above-referenced reconstruction-era legislation

actually undermined the position that the “other crime” language of Section 2 was meant to

apply to common law felonies only:

First, it demonstrates that where Congress intended to specify common law

felonies, it so stated. Second, the acts cited by Plaintiffs dealt with the

readmission of former Confederate states, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment

applies to all states in the Union. Thus the varying language need not be

“harmonized” as Plaintiffs contend because the different provisions address

different subjects...Assuming that [Section] 2 and the Reconstruction and

Readmission Acts address the same subject, a plain reading of [Section] 2

“gives effect to both” provisions, as is the duty of the courts. Morton v.

Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).

Coronado, 2008 WL 191987 at *8.

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 The Coronado court’s reasoning is sound and equally applicable to Plaintiffs herein.

Plaintiffs had the benefit of the Coronado decision when responding to the State Defendants’

Motion. None of the arguments advanced by Plaintiffs compel this Court to reach a different

conclusion than that reached in Coronado. 

The State Defendants also point out that the Richardson Court in upholding

California’s felon disenfranchisement scheme did not distinguish between the types of

felonies of which the respondents to that case stood convicted. Yet, one of the respondents

had been convicted of felony drug possession which Plaintiffs herein characterize as a noncommon law felony. (Motion, p.7 (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 32 n.9)). Instead, the

Court noted without further comment the crimes of which the respondents were convicted

and went on to hold that Section 2 affirmatively sanctioned “the exclusion of felons from the

vote...” and applied that holding to all respondents before the Court. Richardson, 418 U.S.

at 54. The holding in Richardson “prompted another district court to note, in considering a

distinction between common law and non-common law felonies, ‘the Supreme Court,

however, apparently gave no import to this distinction, and this court shall do the same.’”

Coronado, 2008 WL 191987at * 8 (quoting Perry v. Beamer, 933 F.Supp. 556, 559-60

(E.D.Va. 1996) (granting motion to dismiss), aff’d 99 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1996)). Moreover,

“‘as the common law developed, the meaning of the word ‘felony’ changed.’ Meritt v. Jones,

533 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ark. 1976).” Coronado, 2008 WL 191987 at *8; (see also Reply, p.7)

(“The logical extension of Plaintiff’s [sic] argument is that, as criminal sophistication and

methods have changed and states have enacted laws to combat them, e.g., various types of

cyber-crime...states would be powerless to disenfranchise those convicted of such felonies

if they weren’t [sic] on the short list of common law felonies when [Section] 2 was adopted

by Congress and ratified by the states.”) 

Plaintiffs also advance broad policy arguments, such as upholding disenfranchisement

for non-common law felonies “would eviscerate constitutional protections of the right to

vote” (Response, p. 3) as well as permit disenfranchisement for “petty or minor offenses such

as traffic violations or jay walking.” (Id. at p. 10) Yet, Plaintiffs have cited no support for

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The Alabama statute provided “for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of,

among other offenses, ‘any crime...involving moral turpitude.” Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223 &

n.**. The complainants had been convicted of the misdemeanor of presenting a worthless

check, which the state maintained was a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. at 224.

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their contention that upholding Arizona’s disenfranchisement of felons convicted of noncommon law felonies equates to disenfranchisement for “petty or minor offenses such as

traffic violations or jay walking” (Id. at p. 10), nor do they claim they are disenfranchised for

committing such offenses. Instead, the Arizona scheme applies only to felony convictions.

See e.g. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-452 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. den. 389

U.S. 1048 (1968), (dismissing challenge to New York’s felon disenfranchisement statute as

meritless and observing that “...it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide

that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the

laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further

violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases.”) Moreover, the Arizona scheme

provides for restoration of such rights. Compare Richardson, 418 U.S. at 24 (Section 2

affirmatively sanctioned disenfranchisement scheme that permanently disenfranchised

felons).

Plaintiffs also argue that “the enforcement of felon disenfranchisement laws has

resulted in racial disparities at the ballot box...” (Id. at p. 16) which compel “re-examination”

and reconsideration of “felon disenfranchisement laws under the [E]qual [P]rotection

[C]lause...due to our changing and evolving society.” (Id. at p.15) The State Defendants

aptly counter Plaintiffs’ argument by pointing out that “[r]acial discrimination claims can and

have been made based on facts presented in specific cases concerning the enactment and

enforcement of felon disenfranchisement provisions.” (Reply, p.8 (citing Hunter v.

Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)) In Hunter, the Supreme Court upheld an equal protection

challenge to Alabama’s disenfranchisement statute8

 based on the finding that the statute was

“motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section

continues to this day to have that effect.” Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 The Court declined to

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consider whether the statute “would be valid if enacted today without any impermissible

motivation.” Id. The Hunter Court further stated that “Section 2 was not designed to permit

the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of...[the Alabama

disenfranchisement statute] which otherwise violates [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez, ... suggests the contrary.”

Id. 

Moreover, although the Richardson Court itself rejected the challenge to the facial

validity of the California scheme at issue, the Court remanded for further proceedings with

regard to the “respondents’ alternative contention that there was such a total lack of

uniformity in county election officials’ enforcement of the challenged state laws as to work

a separate denial of equal protection...” because the state court had not previously addressed

such contention. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56. 

Plaintiffs herein argue that non-common law felonies are exempted from Section 2.

Unlike cases such as Hunter and Richardson, Plaintiffs do not assert that the Arizona scheme

at issue was racially motivated or that it is enforced in a non-uniform manner so as to result

in “a separate denial of equal protection...” Id.; (See also Reply, p.9). 

“The early exclusion of felons from the franchise by many states could well have

rested on Locke’s concept...that by entering into society every ...[person] ‘authorizes the

society, ... the legislature thereof to make laws for him as the public good of society shall

require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due.’ A

...[person] who breaks the laws ...[that person] has authorized ...[that person’s] agent to make

for his [or her] own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right

to participate in further administering the compact.” Green, 380 F.2d at 451& n.7 (quoting

John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (An Essay Concerning the True Original,

Extent and End of Civil Government) at §89). Juxtaposed against this long-standing and

time-honored social contract are concerns raised by Plaintiffs and characterized by

Defendants as “negative societal impacts” caused by felon disenfranchisement. (Reply, p.

9; see also Response, pp. 13-15); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55 (summarizing “contentions that

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these notions are outmoded, and the more modern view is that it is essential to the process

of rehabilitating the ex[-]felon that he be returned to his role in society as a fully participating

citizen when he has completed the serving of his term.”) Like the Richardson Court, this

Court recognizes that such arguments are more appropriately “addressed to the legislative

forum which may properly weigh and balance them against those advanced in support of

[Arizona’s] present constitutional [and statutory] provisions.” Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the term “other crime” as used in Section 2 of the

Fourteenth Amendment makes no distinction between “common law” and “non-common

law” felonies. Therefore, Plaintiffs, who allegedly stand convicted of “non-common law”

felonies are not exempt from application of Section 2's affirmative sanction of felon

disenfranchisement and their claims alleging otherwise must fail. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the

Arizona scheme disenfranchising “non-common law” felons rises and falls on the success

of their argument that Section 2 encompasses only common law felonies. Therefore, their

challenge to the state scheme necessarily fails as well. 

The Court’s conclusions also dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant

Rodriguez. Defendant Rodriguez, Pima County Recorder, is responsible pursuant to Arizona

statute for the registration of voters in Pima County and for canceling the registration of

persons convicted of a felony. A.R.S. §§ 16-163, 16-165, 16-166, 16-168 ; see also 2008

Ariz.Legis.Serv. ch.273 §§4, 5, 8 (reflecting 2008 amendments to A.R.S. §§16-163, 16-166,

16-168). “As Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that the felon disenfranchisement statutes abridge

or deny their right to vote, Plaintiffs also fail to state a claim against Defendant[]

Rodriguez...for acting pursuant to [her] statutory directive.” Coronado, 2008 WL 191987

at *9.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

grant the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.18) and dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as

to all named Defendants without prejudice.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 08-17-TUC-FRZ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 28th day of August, 2008.

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