Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02079/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02079-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRON A. PAYNE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FUJIOKA, et al., 

Defendants.

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1:13cv02079 AWI DLB PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF‟S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

(Document 12)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF AN 

EXTENTION OF TIME TO COMPLY WITH 

APRIL 23, 2014, ORDER

Plaintiff Myron A. Payne (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed this action on December 23, 2013.

On April 23, 2014, the Court screened his complaint and ordered him to either amend the 

complaint, or notify the Court of his willingness to proceed only on the cognizable claim. 

Plaintiff requested an extension of time on May 20, 2014, and the Court granted him an 

additional sixty (60) days to comply with the order.

On July 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the screening order. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Reconsideration motions are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. 

Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 

441 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A party seeking reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly 

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convincing nature to induce the court to reverse a prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water 

Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part 

on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). 

This Court reviews a motion to reconsider a Magistrate Judge‟s ruling under the “clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(a). As such, the court may only set aside those portions of a Magistrate Judge‟s order that are 

either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also Grimes v. City and 

County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir.1991) (discovery sanctions are nondispositive pretrial matters that are reviewed for clear error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)). 

A magistrate judge‟s factual findings are “clearly erroneous” when the district court is 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Security Farms v. 

International Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997); Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 

485, 489 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The “„clearly erroneous‟ standard is significantly deferential.” 

Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for 

Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 623, 113 S.Ct. 2264 (1993).

The “contrary to law” standard allows independent, plenary review of purely legal 

determinations by the magistrate judge. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3rd 

Cir.1992); Green, 219 F.R.D. at 489; see also Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, 

case law, or rules of procedure.” Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 254 F.R.D. 553, 

556 (D. Minn. 2008); Rathgaber v. Town of Oyster Bay, 492 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 

2007); Surles v. Air France, 210 F.Supp.2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see Adolph Coors Co. v. 

Wallace, 570 F.Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

“Pretrial orders of a magistrate under § 636(b)(1)(A) . . . are not subject to a de novo 

determination. . . .” Merritt v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 

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1981). “The reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding 

court.” Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241; see Phoenix Engineering & Supply v. Universal Elec., 104 F.3d 

1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1997) (“the clearly erroneous standard allows [for] great deference”). A 

district court is able to overturn a magistrate judge‟s ruling “„only if the district court is left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.‟” Computer Economics, Inc. v. 

Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 980, 983 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Weeks v. Samsung Heavy 

Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, “[m]otions for reconsideration 

are disfavored, however, and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in 

their original briefs.” Hendon v. Baroya, 2012 WL 995757, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 

Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001); Northwest Acceptance Corp. 

v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988)).

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff‟s complaint stated a cognizable 

procedural due process claim against Defendants Fujioka, Gipson and Rodriguez. It further 

determined that Plaintiff could not state a substantive due process claim or a claim under the 

Fifth Amendment. However, the Court permitted Plaintiff to amend his Eighth Amendment 

claim and his Equal Protection claim. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to either amend his 

complaint, or proceed with the cognizable claim. 

In his motion, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge‟s findings are clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law. 

As to his substantive due process claim, Plaintiff alleges that claims about certain types 

of property are not procedural due process claims, but rather are actionable as substantive due 

process issues. Plaintiff is incorrect. While he has stated a procedural due process claim based 

on an authorized, intentional deprivation without pre-deprivation protections, the legal 

requirements of a substantive due process claim are different. Although Plaintiff may not like 

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the fact that a substantive due process claim requires a deprivation that shocks the conscience, 

Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998), the Court is bound by 

applicable law. Plaintiff‟s claims simply do not involve “conscience shocking” government 

action. 

Plaintiff also argues that the Court erred in finding that the Fifth Amendment only applies 

to the federal government. Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). Again, 

however, Plaintiff‟s disagreement with the applicable law does not warrant reconsideration. 

As to Plaintiff‟s Equal Protection claim and Eighth Amendment claim, the Court granted 

him leave to amend these claims and reconsideration appears unnecessary at this juncture. In 

any event, although Plaintiff may feel that deprivation of personal family pictures, religious 

materials, etc. constitutes an extreme deprivation that denies him the minimal civilized measure 

of life‟s necessities, Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations 

omitted), he is incorrect. 

Similarly, the Court explained that Plaintiff did not include any allegations that would 

implicate a violation of equal protection. He does not present any reason in his motion to depart 

from this finding.

ORDER

For these reasons, Plaintiff‟s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Plaintiff is 

GRANTED an extension of time of thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order within 

which to comply with the Court‟s April 23, 2014, order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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