Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01676/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01676-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEROME FOSSELMAN,

CDCR #H-66012,

Civil No. 07-1676 IEG (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[Doc. No. 18];

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF

TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS [Doc. No. 20]; 

AND

(3) VACATING HEARING DATE

AND SUBMITTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

COMPLAINT PURSUANT 

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

FOR DECISION WITHOUT 

ORAL ARGUMENT PURSUANT 

TO S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1.d.1

vs.

JAMES TILTON, Secretary, Cal. Dept. of

Corrections and Rehabilitation; 

VICTOR M. ALMAGER, Warden;

CANDIE COOK, Medical Appeals

Coordinator; Dr. CUMMINGS, Dentist, 

Defendants.

Jerome Fosselman (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison

in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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1

 While this case was automatically referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge William

McCurine, Jr. pursuant to S.D.CAL. CIVLR 72.3, Plaintiff has not consented to magistrate judge

jurisdiction. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1] at 19. However, the Court finds that a Report and

Recommendation regarding Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is not necessary. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

72.3.e (noting that when a party fails to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c)(1), the assigned magistrate judge shall “conduct all necessary hearings and submit proposed

findings of facts and recommendations for the disposition of all motions excepted from the magistrate

judge’s jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), unless the district judge orders otherwise.” (emphasis

added)).

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On March 17, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 16]. That Motion was set for hearing before this Court on

May 5, 2008.1

 Plaintiff has since filed both a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No.

18], as well as a Motion for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. No. 20]. 

I.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because his “intellectual functioning is in the

borderline range, and although he is not mentally retarded, his cognitive skills are generally

deficient.” See Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 18] at 3. Plaintiff claims to have limited access to the law

library, and while he has been helped by fellow inmates in the past, “[w]ithout the honorable

court’s intervention ... he will be left on his own.” Id.

“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353

(9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363

(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation omitted).

Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.”

Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v.

$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.”

 See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113

F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance

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requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an

evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,

1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance of

counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). However, so long as a pro

se litigant, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate his claims against the relative

complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the appointment

of counsel do not exist. Id. (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when

district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have

fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert testimony.”). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint involves relatively straightforward Eighth

Amendment claims related to his dental care and demonstrates his ability to articulate the facts

supporting his claims. Therefore, neither the interests of justice nor exceptional circumstances

warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.

1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel must be denied.

II.

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

Plaintiff’s also requests an extension of time in which to file an Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss because he is a pro se litigant with a learning deficiency who is “only allowed

law library access for two hours a week” and “[f]our hours with an established court deadline.”

See Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 20] at 2. 

This is Plaintiff’s first request for an extension of time, and his request is timely.

Moreover, because the Court has found no exceptional circumstances support appointment of

counsel in this matter, he is still proceeding in pro se. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (court has a “duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose

their right to a hearing on the merits of their claim due to ... technical procedural requirements.”).

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Thus, the Court finds good cause to grant Plaintiff’s request. “‘Strict time limits ... ought not to

be insisted upon’ where restraints resulting from a pro se prisoner plaintiff’s incarceration

prevent timely compliance with court deadlines.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1987) (citing Tarantino v. Eggers, 380 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1967); see also Bennett v.

King, 205 F.3d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s dismissal of prisoner’s

amended pro se complaint as untimely where mere 30-day delay was result of prison-wide

lockdown). 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

1) DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 18]; and

2) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 20]. Plaintiff shall have until Monday, June 9, 2008,

to file his Opposition, and Defendants shall have until Monday, June 16, 2008, to file a Reply.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that the date of Monday, May 5, 2008, previously

set for hearing of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 16], is hereby VACATED.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) shall

be considered submitted as of Monday June 23, 2008, and the Court shall enter a decision on

the papers at that time without holding any oral argument. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1.d.1. 

DATED: April 10, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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