Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-05644/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-05644-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY IMPERIAL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

INSPECTOR RAMSEY, Does 1 to 10,

Defendants. /

No. 08-05644 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH

PREJUDICE

Defendant San Francisco Police Inspector James T. Ramsey moves

to dismiss Plaintiff Anthony Imperial’s Second Amended Complaint

(2AC) on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Plaintiff has filed a response in which he

states that he is not filing an opposition because he has amended

his complaint in compliance with the Court’s June 5, 2009 Order

Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss his First Amended Complaint

(1AC), in which the sole named Defendant was the City and County of

San Francisco (San Francisco). Having read Plaintiff’s 2AC and the

papers submitted by Defendant, the Court grants Defendant’s motion

to dismiss and dismisses Plaintiff’s 2AC with prejudice. The

hearing scheduled for July 15, 2010 is vacated.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

With minor exceptions, the allegations in Plaintiff’s 2AC are

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the same as those in his 1AC. In his 2AC, Plaintiff sues Inspector

Ramsey instead of San Francisco, the defendant named in his . In

his 2AC, Plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff "does

business" as NextArts in the Hunter's Point area of San Francisco. 

Plaintiff reported to San Francisco officials irregularities in

contracts awarded to businesses in the Hunter's Point area and

several of the Hunter's Point businesses requested police

assistance in quieting Plaintiff. As a result of his whistleblowing, Plaintiff became "the target of police harassment." 

Inspector Ramsey and other unnamed police officers aided local

businesses "in an effort to end Plaintiff's business career." 

Inspector Ramsey and other unnamed officers supplied "incorrect and

improper information regarding Plaintiff" to Sam Singer and

Associates (Singer), allowing Singer to obtain a restraining order

against Plaintiff. Inspector Ramsey and other unnamed officers

also "supplied Singer with information regarding a past conviction

of Plaintiff that was sealed by the court and was unrelated to any

alleged present behavior by Plaintiff." Inspector Ramsey harassed

Plaintiff despite his knowledge that Plaintiff is disabled. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff attempts to state claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Inspector Ramsey for violations of

his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment, and "other applicable State of California and Federal

laws, including but not limited to the California Civil Code

Sections 51 and 51.7."

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2008, Plaintiff filed his original complaint

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against San Francisco. On January 21, 2009, San Francisco filed a

motion to dismiss. On February 25, 2009, Plaintiff filed his 1AC.

The Court denied San Francisco's motion to dismiss the original

complaint as moot. On March 9, 2009, San Francisco filed a motion

to dismiss the 1AC. On June 5, 2009, the Court issued its Order

Granting the Motion to Dismiss. 

The Equal Protection claim was dismissed on the ground that

Plaintiff had failed to allege that he was a member of a protected

class or that San Francisco had discriminated against him because

of his membership in a protected class. The claim was dismissed

without leave to amend because San Francisco had made this same

argument in its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint,

so that Plaintiff had an opportunity to correct this deficiency and

had failed to do so in his 1AC. 

The Due Process claim was dismissed on the ground that

Plaintiff "had failed to allege that municipal actors' conduct

amounted to a deprivation of his entire business, or, if so, how." 

The Court also dismissed on the ground that Plaintiff had not

alleged the type of process to which he believed he was due. This

claim was dismissed with leave to amend for Plaintiff to correct

these deficiencies.

The Court dismissed Plaintiff's unspecified state law claims

on the ground that any state claim that depended upon the

administrative claims that Plaintiff had filed against San

Francisco to satisfy the exhaustion requirement was time-barred. 

The Court granted leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege specific

state law claims that had been exhausted and were not time-barred.

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LEGAL STANDARD

 A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). In considering

whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court

will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan,

792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this principle is

inapplicable to legal conclusions or “naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claims

A. Equal Protection Claim

In its June 5, 2010 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's

Equal Protection claim without leave to amend. Therefore,

Plaintiff may not re-allege this claim in his 2AC. Furthermore, in

his 2AC, Plaintiff has not remedied the deficiencies that the Court

noted in the June 5, 2010 Order. Therefore, the Equal Protection

claim is again dismissed with prejudice.

B. Due Process Claim

In his 2AC, Plaintiff has added no new allegations regarding

his Due Process claim. He merely repeats the allegation that

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Inspector Ramsey "aided local businesses . . . in harassing

Plaintiff in an effort to end Plaintiff's business career . . ." by

assisting Singer in obtaining a restraining order against

Plaintiff. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects

individuals against governmental deprivations of "life, liberty or

property" without due process of law. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795

(9th Cir. 1995). To state a claim under the Due Process Clause a

plaintiff must allege that the government has deprived him of life,

liberty or property, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33

(1976), and that the government deprived him of these

constitutionally-protected interests without due process of law. 

Id. "The assets of a business (including its good will)

unquestionably are property, and any state taking of those assets

is unquestionably a 'deprivation' under the Fourteenth Amendment." 

College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense

Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999). 

As in his 1AC, Plaintiff does not clearly allege that

Inspector Ramsey's actions amounted to a taking of his business,

and, if so, how. Furthermore, he again fails to allege the type of

process which he believes was due. Therefore this claim is

dismissed. Because Plaintiff had an opportunity to remedy these

deficiencies, but failed to do so, this claim is dismissed with

prejudice.

II. State Claims

In his 2AC, Plaintiff complied with the Court's instruction to

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specify the state causes of action he was asserting by indicating

that Inspector Ramsey violated California Civil Code §§ 51 and

51.7. However, other than this change, Plaintiff adds no new

allegations regarding his state claims.

California law requires that a plaintiff suing a public entity

must first present a claim to that public entity. Cal. Gov't Code

§ 945.4. If the relief is denied, the plaintiff may file a lawsuit

within six months of that denial. Cal. Gov't Code § 945.6(a)(1). 

This rule also applies to claims against public employees acting

within the scope of their employment. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App.

3d 871, 873 n.1 (1973) (citing California Government Code §§ 950.2

and 945.4); C.A. Magistretti Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 27

Cal. App. 3d 270, 274-75 (1972). A plaintiff must allege in his

complaint that he has complied with the claim presentment statute

in order to state a cause of action against a public employee. Id.

at 275; Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 350,

355 (1977).

In the June 5, 2010 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's

state claims, partly because he failed to file his complaint within

six months of the denial of his administrative claim. The Court

granted leave to amend to allege only state claims that were

exhausted and were not time-barred. In his 2AC, Plaintiff does not

allege that he filed an administrative claim against Inspector

Ramsey for violations of California Code § 51 and 51.7, nor that

these claims are timely filed. For this reason, Plaintiff's claims

under §§ 51 and 51.7 must be dismissed. See Castenada v. City of

Napa, Cal., 1996 WL 241818, *6 (N.D. Cal.) (claims under § 51.7

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must be exhausted pursuant to California Government Code § 945.4);

K.S. v. Fremont Unified Schl. Dist., 2007 W.L. 4287522, *4 (N.D.

Cal.) (Unruh Act causes of action are subject to Tort Claims Act

presentment requirements) (citing Gates v. Sup. Ct., 32 Cal. App.

4th 481, 508 (1995)).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice because he had

the opportunity to remedy the deficiencies noted above, but failed

to do so. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

Defendants shall recover their costs from Plaintiff.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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