Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02025/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert C. Echols,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-02025-PHX-ROS (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES SENIOR 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Robert C. Echols’ (“Petitioner”) Petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have 

filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 21), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 28). The matter 

is deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises seventeen grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The 

undersigned finds that this habeas proceeding is time-barred under the one-year statute of 

limitations set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 

Stat. 1214.1

 It is therefore recommended that the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. It is further recommended that Petitioner’s “Motion to Toll the One Year 

1 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

 

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Time Period for the Entire Time that his State Habeas Corpus is Pending in the Arizona 

Courts” (Doc. 14) be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Convictions and Sentences

In 2008, a jury sitting in the Superior Court of Arizona for Pinal County found 

Petitioner guilty on (i) two counts of Drive By Shooting at a Residence, class two 

dangerous felonies; (ii) five counts of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon or 

Dangerous Instrument, class three dangerous felonies; and (iii) five counts of Aggravated 

Assault with a Deadly Weapon or Dangerous Instrument, class two dangerous crimes 

against children. (Bates Nos. 14, 26).2 On August 14, 2008, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to a total of sixty-eight years in prison. (Bates No. 26). Plaintiff appealed the 

sentences for four of the aggravated assault counts to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Bates Nos. 11-34).

In its July 8, 2009 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Bates Nos. 2-9). Petitioner did not petition the Arizona 

Supreme Court for further review. On September 30, 2009, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals issued its mandate. (Bates No. 64). 

B. Post-Conviction Relief

On March 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Bates Nos. 68-70). The trial court appointed Petitioner counsel, who could not find a 

colorable claim for relief. (Bates Nos. 72-81). Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition on 

December 16, 2010. (Bates Nos. 83-106). On June 27, 2011, the trial court denied the 

PCR Petition. (Bates Nos. 118-21, 123-24).

On February 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals seeking review of the trial court’s denial of the PCR Petition. (Bates Nos. 126-

41). On April 3, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

2 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer (Doc. 21) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page of the record.

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(Bates Nos. 143-48). On July 30, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate, 

which stated that Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review 

and that the time to do so had expired. (Bates No. 150).

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court seeking review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ April 2012 decision. (Bates Nos. 

153-61). On October 20, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Bates No. 

163).

On October 8, 2015, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. The Court 

ordered Respondents to answer the Petition. (Doc. 7). On February 4, 2016, Petitioner 

filed a “Motion to Toll the One Year Time Period for the Entire Time that his State 

Habeas Corpus is Pending in the Arizona Courts” (Doc. 14). The Court ordered 

Respondents to respond to the Motion. (Doc. 15). Respondents’ Limited Answer (Doc. 

21) contains their response to Petitioner’s “Motion to Toll . . .” Petitioner has filed a 

Reply (Doc. 28). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within 

one year of the latest of: 

1. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

2. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

3. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

4. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Statutory tolling is available under AEDPA, 

which provides that the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis 

added); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled 

while the state prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state postconviction remedies are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. ANALYSIS

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on 

July 8, 2009. (Bates Nos. 2-9). Petitioner had thirty days from July 8, 2009 (until August 

7, 2009) to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review of the decision. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not seek such review. Accordingly, Petitioner’s convictions 

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and sentences became final on August 7, 2009, 3 and the one-year statute of limitations 

began running on August 8, 2009. Summers, 481 F.3d at 717; see Gonzalez v. Thaler, 

132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations commences upon the 

expiration of the time for seeking review of petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest 

court); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the 

“anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate 

the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations). Consequently, unless 

statutory or equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas 

petition expired on August 9, 2010,

4 rendering the Petition filed on October 8, 2015

untimely. 

1. Statutory Tolling 

Statutory tolling does not apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly 

filed.” Pace v. DiGuiglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral 

review petition is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance 

with state rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. 

McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing 

requirements in determining whether habeas petitioner’s PCR petition was a “properly 

filed” application that is eligible for tolling). This includes compliance with filing 

deadlines. Hence, an untimely state collateral review petition is not “properly filed.” 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ 

conditions,” and that a state PCR petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it was 

rejected by the state court as untimely).

If the collateral review petition was “properly filed,” then the Court must 

determine the dates it was “pending.” In Arizona, a PCR petition becomes “pending” as 

3 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ delay in issuing its mandate (Bates No. 64) did 

not delay the finality of the convictions. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (2007).

4 August 7, 2010 was a Saturday. Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C), the deadline to file a federal habeas 

petition is extended to Monday, August 9, 2010 as that is the next day that is not a 

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 

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soon as the notice of PCR is filed. Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 

1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona postconviction rules 

demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.”). It remains 

“pending” until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction 

procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). This includes “[t]he time 

between (1) a lower state court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a 

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state 

law.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 191.

Here, the one-year statute of limitations began running on August 8, 2009. The 

limitations “clock” continued to run uninterrupted until March 17, 2010—the date 

Petitioner filed his PCR Notice. (Bates Nos. 68-70); see Isley, 383 F.3d at 1055-56 

(stating that in Arizona, a state post-conviction proceeding is commenced when the 

petitioner files the notice in accordance with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)); see Nino v. 

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not 

tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the 

first collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that 

interval.”). The length of time between August 8, 2009 and March 17, 2010 is 221 days. 

After subtracting 221 days from the one-year (365 day) limitations period, 144 days 

remained on the limitations “clock” in which to file a federal habeas petition. 

On September 29, 2011, the trial court denied the PCR Petition. (Bates Nos. 118-

21, 123-24). The trial court extended the deadline for filing a Petition for Review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals to February 10, 2012. (Attachment 1). On February 1, 2012, 

Petitioner filed the Petition for Review. (Bates Nos. 126-41). On April 3, 2012, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Bates Nos. 143-48). The 

deadline for petitioning the Arizona Supreme Court for review of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision was May 3, 2012. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Even though Petitioner 

did not file a Petition for Review by the May 3, 2012 deadline, Respondents state that 

statutory tolling applies to the thirty-day period in which Petitioner could have sought 

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further review. Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned will use May 4, 

2012 as the date AEDPA’s limitations period recommenced.5

 As there were 144 days 

remaining on the limitations “clock,” Petitioner had until September 24, 2012 to file his 

federal habeas petition.

Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do 

not “restart” the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). On June 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a 

Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court seeking review of the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ April 2012 decision. (Bates Nos. 153-61). Because the limitations period 

had expired in September 2012, the Petition for Review had no statutory tolling effect. 

(Bates No. 163).

2. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply

The standard for equitable tolling of the one-year habeas limitations period is a 

very high bar, and is reserved for rare cases. Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075 

(9th Cir. 2014); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

5 A number of circuits have held that statutory tolling applies during the period of time in which a habeas petitioner could have sought further review of a state court’s 

denial of post-conviction relief. Postconviction Remedies § 25:23 n. 5 (June 2015). 

However, these holdings are arguably inconsistent with Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 

(2002), Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), and Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 

(2006). Those “decisions indicate that if a state petition is untimely, none of the time before (as well as during) the state court’s consideration of the post-conviction review 

petition is statutorily tolled.” Postconviction Remedies § 25:23 n. 5 (June 2015). It is not clear under Ninth Circuit case law whether statutory tolling applies to the period of time in which a defendant may seek further review of a PCR petition if the 

review is not actually sought. See Gold v. Hennessy, CR 04-1252-PHX-JAT, at *4 (D. 

Ariz. 2006) (“[A]n appeal that is never filed cannot be considered timely; Petitioner cannot reap the benefit of AEDPA’s tolling mechanism without actually filing her 

petition for review of the PCR denial.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2005), as amended 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Pace, if a state court denies a 

petition as untimely, none of the time before or during the court's consideration of that 

petition is statutorily tolled.”); Gildon v. Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2004)

(rejecting a habeas petitioner’s argument that statutory tolling applied during the period in time in which he could have filed a petition for certiorari review in the U.S. Supreme 

Court regarding state court’s denial of post-conviction relief; stating that “[b]ecause 

[petitioner] never filed a petition for certiorari review in the Supreme Court, his potential certiorari petition was never ‘properly filed.’”) (quoting Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233 F.3d 

490, 492 (7th Cir. 2000).

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exceptions swallow the rule.’”) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 

(7th Cir. 2000). It is a petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted. 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our 

precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate.”). 

As previously discussed, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that: 

(i) he or she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently and (ii) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his or her way. A petitioner must also show that the 

“extraordinary circumstances” were the “but-for and proximate cause of his [or her] 

untimeliness.” Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); see also 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In his Reply (Doc. 28 at 3-6), Petitioner asserts that AEDPA’s limitations period 

was statutorily tolled through October 20, 2014—the date the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied his Petition for Review. The preceding section explains why Petitioner’s assertion 

is incorrect. A petitioner’s miscalculation of when the limitations period expired does not 

constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner's lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”); Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never 

accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged 

inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for promptness.”); see also Alexander v. 

Schiro, 213 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the petitioner] made an 

incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the limitations period. This does 

not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting equitable tolling.”). As 

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances made it 

impossible for him to timely file his federal petition, equitable tolling is unavailable.

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3. The Statute of Limitations Expired on September 24, 2012, 

Meaning Petitioner Untimely Filed the Federal Habeas Action

To summarize the preceding sections, AEDPA’s statute of limitations commenced 

on August 8, 2009. The limitations period was statutorily tolled while Petitioner’s PCR 

Petition was pending in state court (from March 17, 2010 through May 4, 2012). 

Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Applying statutory 

tolling, Petitioner had until September 24, 2012 to seek federal habeas review. 

Accordingly, the Petition (Doc. 1) filed on October 8, 2015 is untimely. 

B. The Petition’s Untimeliness is Not Excused by the Actual Innocence 

Gateway/Miscarriage of Justice Exception

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway”

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 

340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th 

Cir.2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “‘must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.’” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual 

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 

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2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

In his Reply (Doc. 28 at 9), Petitioner states that “the state habeas corpus that 

Petitioner submitted in August of 2015 . . . reurged the ‘sufficiency of evidence’ issues, 

as well as, an actual innocence claim.”6

 To the extent Petitioner argues that the 

miscarriage of justice exception should be applied if the Court finds that the Petition is 

time-barred, Petitioner does not proffer any new evidence to support actual innocence. 

Petitioner’s conclusory statement is insufficient to establish a Schlup gateway claim. See 

Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (“we have denied access to the 

Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of innocence was merely cumulative or 

speculative or was insufficient to overcome otherwise convincing proof of guilt”). 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass 

through the Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this proceeding.

C. Petitioner’s “Motion to Toll the One Year Time Period for the Entire 

Time that his State Habeas Corpus is Pending in the Arizona Courts” 

(Doc. 14)

On February 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion stating that:

In August 2015, Petitioner realized in his pro-se capacity he 

could still file a state habeas corpus pursuant to Arizona 

Rules of Court. At that time Petitioner did file a state habeas 

corpus to exhaust all state remedies. Petitioner, therefore, 

asks this court to toll the one year time limitation under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

(Doc. 14). In his Reply (Doc. 28 at 9), Petitioner clarifies that he is requesting that the 

Petition “be stayed, and the 1-year statute of limitations be tolled in consideration of the 

Petitioners [sic] ‘state habeas’ being at issue presently.” In light of the undersigned’s 

conclusion that the Petition (Doc. 1) is time-barred, it is recommended that the Court 

deny the Motion (Doc. 14) as moot. 

6 The trial court’s docket does not reflect that Petitioner filed any documents in the trial court in August 2015. (Attachment 2). The undersigned observes that Petitioner did not indicate in the October 2015 Petition (Doc. 1 at 3-5) that he filed a “state habeas

corpus” in August 2015. Even if Petitioner did file a “state habeas corpus” in August 2015, the Petition would remain time-barred as AEDPA’s limitations period expired in 2012. See Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482; Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss with prejudice the Petition (Doc. 1) on the basis that it is time-barred. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s “Motion to Toll the One 

Year Time Period for the Entire Time that his State Habeas Corpus is Pending in the 

Arizona Courts” (Doc. 14) be denied as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Amended 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 10th day of June, 2016. 

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ATTACHMENT 1

Case 2:15-cv-02025-ROS Document 29 Filed 06/13/16 Page 12 of 22
Filed on 1/6/2012 2:39:35 PM 

Page 1 of 2

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

PINAL COUNTY, STATE OF ARIZONA

 

Date: 01/06/2012 

 

Judge: JDG PRO TEM ROBERT C BROWN,

By Judicial Administrative Assistant: Lucy Luedke 

 

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ROBERT ECHOLS, 

 Defendant(s).

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

S1100CR200701774 

NOTICE/ORDER 

The ordered transcript having been filed; 

IT IS ORDERED extending the time for the filing of a Petition for Review to February 10, 

2012. 

The Petitioner’s current address is Robert Echols, ADC #233445, ASPC Lewis, Stiner 

Unit, P.O. Box 3100, Buckeye, AZ 85326. 

Mailed/distributed copy: 1/6/2012 

ROBERT ECHOLS, ADC #233445 

ASPC LEWIS, STINER UNIT 

PO BOX 3100 

BUCKEYE AZ 85326 

LYNN HAMILTON 

Office Distribution: 

COUNTY ATTORNEY/K PIERCE 

VICTIMS ASSISTANCE

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JUDGE/ BROWN 

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ATTACHMENT 2

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