Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02649/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02649-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Carmine Micolo, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

County of Pinal, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-02649-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 On December 31, 2014, Plaintiff Michael Carmine Micolo filed an amended 

complaint asserting that Defendants used excessive force in his May 17, 2014 arrest, in 

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 10. On March 13, 2015, the 

Court dismissed all claims against the Pinal County Sherriff’s Department, and all of 

Plaintiff’s state law claims. Doc. 24. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the 

remaining claims. Doc. 48. The motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 49, 53) and no 

party has requested oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant 

the motion. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to assert any claims he may have 

based on Defendants’ conduct after the arrest.1

I. Background. 

Plaintiff was arrested on May 17, 2014, on charges of criminal trespass, 

 

1

 Plaintiff attempted to file an amended response on January 27, 2016. Doc. 52. An amendment of this type is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules of Practice, and Plaintiff did not obtain leave of court to file such an 

amendment. In addition, the amendment was untimely. See Doc. 47 (requiring Plaintiff to file his response by January 15, 2016). 

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aggravated assault of a police officer, and resisting arrest. Doc. 10, ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges 

that he was suffering from delirium and acute renal failure at the time of the arrest, and 

that the arresting officer, Sergeant Stacy Sherwood of the Pinal County Sherriff’s 

Department, punched, pushed, and tased him during the arrest. Id., ¶¶ 13, 18. Plaintiff 

alleges that he was placed in an ambulance after the arrest, where his hands were cuffed 

and his ankles shackled. Id., ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that the officers subsequently 

tightened his cuffs, causing him injury. Id.

On August 28, 2014, the Pinal County Attorney filed a criminal complaint 

charging Plaintiff with criminal trespass, aggravated assault of a police officer, and 

resisting arrest. Doc. 48-1 at 2.2

 On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one 

count of resisting arrest. Id. at 18. On December 1, 2015, the Pinal County Superior 

Court sentenced Plaintiff to two days in Pinal County Jail and eighteen months of 

supervised probation. Id. at 23. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Sherwood used excessive force during the arrest and 

seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Doc. 10. Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Pinal County under Monell 

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging that Sherwood’s conduct 

was undertaken pursuant to official policy. The Court stayed the action pending 

resolution of the criminal case against Plaintiff. Docs. 1, 38. The Court lifted the stay on 

December 16, 2015, approximately two weeks after Plaintiff’s sentencing (Doc. 47), and 

Defendants moved dismiss (Doc. 48). 

II. Legal Standard. 

A successful 12(b)(6) motion must show either that the complaint lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its theory. Balistreri 

 

2

 The Court takes judicial notice of the criminal complaint, plea order, and sentencing order supplied by Defendants. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); Lee v. City of 

L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may take judicial notice of public records on Rule 12(b)(6) motion). 

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v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 

cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss as long as it contains “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when “the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556). 

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court takes the plaintiff’s well-pleaded 

factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions couched as 

factual allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth and are not sufficient to 

defeat a 12(b)(6) motion. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Pro se litigants are subject to the same pleading requirements as everyone else. 

Calugay v. GMAC Mortgage, No. CV-09-1947-PHX-LOA, 2009 WL 3872356, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. Nov. 18, 2009) (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986). But 

courts have an obligation “to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). If a pro se 

complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must grant 

leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

III. Analysis. 

 A. Excessive Force During Arrest. 

 Plaintiff’s principal claim is that Defendants violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 

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Amendments by using excessive force against him during his arrest. Doc. 10, ¶ 18. He 

seeks damages for this alleged constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants assert that this claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that an individual who has been convicted of a 

state-law crime cannot obtain relief under § 1983 that “would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction” unless the conviction has been invalidated in a separate 

proceeding. 512 U.S. at 487. The rationale for this rule is that federal law provides a 

different avenue for challenging a state-law conviction: a habeas corpus action under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Heck prevents an individual seeking to challenge his state-law conviction 

from sidestepping the exhaustion and other procedural prerequisites set forth in § 2254. 

 Although Heck involved a malicious prosecution claim, the Court made clear that 

its holding would also apply to certain excessive force claims. See 512 U.S. 477 at n.6. 

Specifically, Heck prohibits an individual from bringing an excessive force claim if he 

has been convicted of resisting lawful arrest in connection with the same incident. Id. 

Heck applies in these cases because an excessive force claim, if proven, negates an 

element of the offense of resisting lawful arrest – namely, the lawfulness of the arrest. Id. 

Lower courts have provided additional guidance on when a conviction for 

resisting arrest will bar an excessive force claim. In some states, an individual can be 

convicted of resisting arrest even if the arrest was not lawful. In these states, a conviction 

for resisting arrest is no bar to an excessive force claim. See Simpson v. City of Pickens, 

887 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 

1997). In states where the lawfulness of the arrest is an element of the crime of resisting 

arrest, a valid conviction will bar an excessive force claim. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 

394 F.3d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

 Arizona is one of the latter states. “A defendant can only be convicted of resisting 

arrest in Arizona if the officer’s conduct was ‘lawful’ when effecting the arrest; an 

officer’s conduct was not ‘lawful’ if he used excessive force.” Mitchell v. Demski, No. 

CV06-0969-PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 2023471, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 11, 2007); see 

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Dominguez v. Shaw, No. CV 10-01173-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4543901 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 

2011); Hall v. City of Tempe, No. CIV. 12-2094-PHX-PGR, 2013 WL 4079199 (D. Ariz. 

Aug. 13, 2013). Thus, an individual who has been convicted of resisting arrest in 

Arizona cannot bring an excessive force claim arising out of that arrest unless his 

conviction has been overturned or invalidated in a separate proceeding. 

 Plaintiff has been convicted of resisting arrest in Arizona. Doc. 48-1 at 18. 

Plaintiff does not contend that this conviction has been overturned. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim fails as a matter of law. Heck, 512 U.S. 477.3

 

B. Excessive Force After Arrest. 

 Plaintiff’s complaint could be construed as asserting a second excessive force 

claim relating to the arresting officers’ conduct after the arrest. Under the heading 

“statement of facts,” Plaintiff’s complaint states the following: 

During transport to the hospital the Plaintiff was hand cuffed 

and had ankle shackles place on him. In which both were tied 

together. In Plaintiff’s statement he was told by a fellow officer that was with Plaintiff in an ambulance that he needed 

to be restrained again. Handcuffs were tighten. Which caused injuries to the Plaintiff. 

Doc. 10, ¶ 15 (quoted verbatim). 

 Plaintiff’s conviction for resisting arrest does not preclude an excessive force 

claim based on post-arrest actions of the officers. See City of Hemet, 394 F.3d at 693. 

But Plaintiff must still plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570). The amended complaint falls far short of that requirement. A successful 

excessive force claim must show that the officers’ use of force was objectively 

unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. Graham v. 

 

3

 Plaintiff notes that his conviction is the result of a plea bargain, not a jury verdict (Doc. 49 at 7), but that is a distinction without a difference. Plaintiff’s guilty plea constitutes an admission to every element of the crime of resisting arrest, including the lawfulness of the arrest. The admission is therefore sufficient to preclude Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. See City of Hemet, 394 F.3d at 697 (criminal defendant’s entry of guilty plea to crime of resisting arrest would bar a subsequent excessive force claim). 

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Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “Whether a particular use of force was ‘objectively 

reasonable’ depends on several factors, including the severity of the crime that prompted 

the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and whether the 

suspect was resisting arrest.” Tatum v. City & Cty. of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

 Plaintiff has not alleged facts that give rise to the reasonable inference that 

Defendants’ use of force after his arrest was excessive. Although he states that an officer 

injured him by tightening his handcuffs, he does not elaborate on the extent of these 

injuries. Nor does he offer anything to rebut the inference that the officer’s conduct 

might have been necessary to protect Plaintiff from injuring himself or others. Plaintiff 

does not allege that he complained about the tightness of the handcuffs or that the officer 

was otherwise made aware that the handcuffs were too tight. Because Plaintiff has not 

alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the officers’ use of force 

after the arrest was objectively unreasonable, Plaintiff has not stated a viable excessive 

force claim. Because it may be possible for Plaintiff to cure these deficiencies by 

pleading additional facts, the Court will grant leave to amend this claim. 

 C. Monell Claim. 

 Plaintiff cannot prevail on a Monell claim against Pinal County without first 

proving that his constitutional rights were violated. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival 

Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because there is no constitutional violation, 

there can be no municipal liability.”). Because Plaintiff’s excessive force claims have 

been dismissed, his Monell claim must also be dismissed. This claim will be dismissed 

with leave to amend because it may be possible for Plaintiff to cure this deficiency by 

pleading additional facts. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 48) is granted. 

2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by March 11, 2016. This 

complaint may assert any claims Plaintiff may have based on Defendants’ 

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conduct after the arrest. But Plaintiff may not assert an excessive force 

claim based on conduct occurring during the arrest unless he shows that his 

conviction has been overturned or invalidated. If Plaintiff fails to file an 

amended complaint by March 11, 2016, the Clerk is directed to terminate 

this matter without further order of the Court. 

3. The Rule 16 Case Management Conference currently set for 

March 18, 2016 at 3:30 PM is vacated and will be reset if Plaintiff files an 

amended complaint. 

Dated this 16th day of February, 2016. 

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