Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07731/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07731-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CASEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SANTA ROSA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:18-cv-07731-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 

COUNTY OF SONOMA AND GREG 

SCHMIDT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 39

On July 24, 2019, Defendants Greg Schmidt and the County of Sonoma filed a motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint.

On September 5, 2019, the Court held a hearing, and, after careful consideration of the 

parties’ arguments and the applicable legal authority, for the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 1, 2018, Plaintiff Robert Casey was detained and arrested in Santa Rosa, 

California. (Third Am. Compl., “TAC,” Dkt No. 37 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that he was searching 

for his runaway dog with the help of a stranger along a trail when Defendant officers from the 

Santa Rosa Police Department and Defendant Sonoma County Probation Officer Greg Schmidt 

responded. (TAC ¶ 16.) Defendant Schmidt held Plaintiff at gun point, despite the fact that the 

officers did not have a reasonable belief that Casey was in the process of, had committed, or 

intended to commit a crime. (TAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was put into a chokehold by Schmidt after 

complying with officers to get on the ground and put his hands up. (TAC ¶ 19.) Schmidt choked 

Plaintiff until he was unconscious. Id. As a result, Plaintiff sustained severe bruising, a 

concussion and lacerations, as well as emotional distress. (TAC ¶ 24.) Schmidt’s described his 

Case 4:18-cv-07731-KAW Document 47 Filed 09/12/19 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

sworn statement that the use of the chokehold as a technique was consistent with his training and 

appropriate to administer in these circumstances. (TAC ¶ 30.) As a result of this incident, Plaintiff 

was charged with resisting arrest. (TAC ¶ 3.)

On December 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. On June 20, 2019, the Court 

granted in part and denied in part the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended 

complaint and granted leave to amend the Monell claim. (6/20/19 Order, Dkt. No. 34.) On July 

10, 2019 Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint alleging a state law claim of false imprisonment

and a malicious prosecution claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Schmidt, as well as a 

Monell claim alleging municipal liability, pursuant to § 1983, against the County of Sonoma.

On July 24, 2019, Defendants Schmidt and the County of Sonoma filed a motion to 

dismiss. (Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 39.) On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Pl.’s 

Opp’n, Dkt. No. 43.) On August 14, 2019, Defendants filed a reply. (Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 44.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In considering such a motion, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or 

there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” 

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

Case 4:18-cv-07731-KAW Document 47 Filed 09/12/19 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” and “conclusory statements” are 

inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(5), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on 

the failure to properly effect service of the summons and the complaint pursuant to Rule 4.

Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend is made “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by 

the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

The County Defendants move to dismiss the third, fourth, and eighth causes of action.

(Defs.’ Mot. at 2.)

A. Plaintiff remains barred from alleging false imprisonment claim against the 

County.

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is for false imprisonment. (TAC ¶¶ 61-63.) In the prior

order, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act prior to

filing this lawsuit and must first “be relieved from his failure to timely file a claim under Section 

945.4 before his state law claims against the County Defendants may proceed.” (6/20/19 Order at 

7.) Plaintiff concedes that naming the County Defendants in the eighth cause of action was 

inadvertent and that the cause of action is subject to dismissal. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.)

Accordingly, the eighth cause of action is dismissed without prejudice at to the County 

Defendants.

Case 4:18-cv-07731-KAW Document 47 Filed 09/12/19 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

B. Monell claim

Defendants move to dismiss the Monell claim against the County on the grounds that 

Plaintiff still does not plead sufficient facts to state a claim. (Defs.’ Mot. at 6.) A municipality or 

governmental entity cannot be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat 

superior. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, in 

order to hold a municipality liable for a municipal employee’s conduct under Monell, a plaintiff 

must show that (1) that the plaintiff “possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was 

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 

438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only where a municipality’s failure to 

train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its 

inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is 

actionable under § 1983.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 

Defendants argue that the third amended complaint continues to rely on unrelated and 

unsubstantiated prior lawsuits against the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office to allege a pattern and 

practice. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) Indeed, Plaintiff continues to list cases that the Court previously 

found insufficient to support a Monell claim. (6/20/19 Order at 7-8.)

Notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges that Schmidt’s sworn statement 

regarding the incident described the chokehold as “a technique consistent with his training and 

appropriate to apply in these circumstances....” (TAC ¶ 30.) Defendants, however, argue that this 

is insufficient, because the allegations relate to the underlying incident rather than “any actual 

policy or custom in the Sonoma County Probation Department involving application of a carotid 

hold beyond the occurrence of the subject incident.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) The Court disagrees. 

Generally, “[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to 

impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an 

existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal 

policymaker.” City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985). While “a single incident 

Case 4:18-cv-07731-KAW Document 47 Filed 09/12/19 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

is ultimately insufficient to establish liability, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by stating 

a plausible Monell claim based on failure to train, so long as the allegations apply to all 

individuals that are trained using the policy at issue.” Anakin v. Contra Costa Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 

16-CV-00161-MEJ, 2016 WL 2893257, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2016) (citing Dasovich v. 

Contra Costa Cty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 14-CV-00258-MEJ, 2014 WL 4652118, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 17, 2014)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the chokehold is being used by County law 

enforcement, and is part of their training, despite being banned by other law enforcement agencies 

due to the dangers in applying the technique. (TAC ¶¶ 30-38.) The allegation that the use of the 

technique is not limited to Schmidt is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and permit Plaintiff 

the opportunity to obtain evidence through the discovery process to support his allegations.

Accordingly, the third amended complaint states sufficient facts to allege a plausible 

Monell claim, and the motion to dismiss the third cause of action is denied.

C. Malicious Prosecution Claim

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is for malicious prosecution. (TAC ¶¶ 40-42.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant officers, including Schmidt, “intentionally 

submitted false information to prosecute Plaintiff on criminal resisting charges.” (TAC ¶ 41.)

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff “must show that the defendants 

prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of 

denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” Awabdy v. City of 

Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 

1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that he fails to allege sufficient facts to show 

that the prosecution was initiated with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of 

denying him a specific constitutional right. (Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that 

the defendants “submitted false sworn statements that fabricated Plaintiff’s actions of resistance in 

complete contradiction of the video evidence in order to have him prosecuted.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) 

Further, he argues that the malice is “evidenced by their decision not to collect exonerating 

evidence from the eyewitness in the form of a cell phone video.” Id.

Case 4:18-cv-07731-KAW Document 47 Filed 09/12/19 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Additionally, Defendants argue that the criminal case against Plaintiff’s remains pending, 

such that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirement that the prior proceeding was favorably 

terminated. (Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) Indeed, in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the 

plaintiff must also establish that the prior proceeding terminated in his favor. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 

1068. Here, Plaintiff concedes that his case is still pending, and asks that, to the extent that the 

charges are still pending, that the claim be dismissed without prejudice. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8.)

In reply, Defendants informed the Court that a preliminary hearing was scheduled for 

August 26, 2019. (Defs.’ Reply at 8.) “[A] decision ... to hold a defendant to answer after a 

preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause.” 

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). At the hearing, Plaintiff 

confirmed that the preliminary hearing was continued to October 1, 2019, such that his criminal 

proceeding remains pending.

Accordingly, the fourth cause of action is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may seek 

leave to amend to allege a malicious prosecution claim should the criminal proceeding be 

terminated in his favor.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the motion to dismiss the Monell claim is denied. The fourth 

cause of action for malicious prosecution is dismissed without prejudice as to all defendants, 

because the criminal charges are still pending. Plaintiff may seek leave to amend to include a 

claim for malicious prosecution should the criminal case terminate in his favor. The eighth cause 

of action against the County Defendants is again dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may seek 

leave to amend the eight cause of action to add the County Defendants should his petition for 

relief from the claim filing requirements be granted.

The County Defendants shall file an answer within 21 days of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2019 __________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:18-cv-07731-KAW Document 47 Filed 09/12/19 Page 6 of 6