Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01770/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01770-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS PENAFIEL-FALCON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06cv1770-LAB (RBB)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

vs. FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

D.H.S. , et al.,

Respondents.

This matter is before the court on the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition of Carlos

Penafiel-Falcon ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se. He seeks an Order for supervised release from

Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") immigration detention or minimal bail pending resolution

of his Ninth Circuit appeal of the DHS Immigration andCustoms Enforcement's ("ICE") determination

he is removable as an aggravated felon. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Peru who has been in the United States since 1983, with

an adjusted status of immigrant since about 1992. Pet. p. 1. On July 29, 2004, he was convicted

following his guilty plea of second degree burglary under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459-460(b). He

acknowledged in his July 29, 2004 Guilty Plea form: the total penalty for his violation of the Penal

Code § 459(b) (burglary) charge was 3 years; by pleading guilty to the "felony charge" he understood

he would be granted a term of 3-years probation and that if he violated his probation, "the court

may send me to the penitentiary for a maximum of 3 years on this case." From the transcript of

the plea hearing, it is clear the court placed him "on three years of supervised probation," a decision

that expressly -- and merely -- "suspended" imposition of his sentence. Traverse Exh. D-10. 

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1

 "(a) As used in this chapter -- ... (43) The term 'aggravated felony' means ... (G) a theft offense ...

or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year ...." 8 U.S.C. § 1101, Definitions.

2

 The IJ also considered Petitioner's October 2003 grand theft conviction. Pet. Exh. B-11, B-12; see

Ret. 2:4-6, Exh. B. "So, it is the Court's assessment that you do have two aggravated felony convictions of

record," and the "charge of deportability is sustained at this time." Pet. Exh. B-12. 

2

THE COURT: I'll accept your plea. Find that it was knowing,

voluntary and intelligent and that a factual basis exists. Hearing no

legal cause, the imposition of sentence is suspended. You're placed

on three years of supervised probation. You are to serve 90 days in the

county jail. You'll receive credit for 22 days. Pay restitution fine of

$200. . . . ¶ Should you violate probation, should you go to state

prison [to serve the suspended sentence]. . . . 

Traverse Exh. D-10, D-11. 

Petitioner provides an Abstract of Judgment dated March 2, 2005 and filed March 5, 2005.

Traverse Exh. F. The "Abstract Of Judgment - Prison Commitment - Determinate" substantiates a

determinate sentence of one year four months was imposed and ordered executed "after revocation of

probation," with Petitioner remanded to the sheriff's custody. Traverse Exh. F-13, F-14. Nevertheless,

he argues "his plea agreement demonstrates that the sentence imposed was ninety (90) days, with three

(3) years probation," challenging the Abstract of Judgment as "wrong" ( Pet. pp. 10-11), warranting

habeas relief while the Ninth Circuit decides his removal appeal. 

In a May 12, 2005 Notice To Appear, the DHS/ICE charged Petitioner with removability

pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA") § 101(a)(43)(G),1 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony based on his July 29, 2004 conviction

for second degree burglary. Ret. Ex. A. He was paroled into DHS custody in May 2005. He provides

excerpts from the transcript of his October 4, 2005 Removal Proceedings, where he was represented

by counsel. The Immigration Judge (" IJ") denied his application for cancellation of removal and

ordered him removed to Peru. Ret. Exh. D. In conducting the hearing, the IJ addressed as a disputed

issue the aggravated felony ground of deportability, entertaining arguments in addition to briefs on that

question. Pet. Exh. B-4. Using the "modified categorical approach" described below, the IJ ruled the

burglary conviction was for an aggravated felony, and sustained that ground of deportability.2 Pet.

Exh. B-11, B-14 ("Well, sir, at this time I'll sustain the aggravated felony charge, deny the application

for cancellation of removal, order you removed from the United States to Peru as charged by the

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Department of Homeland Security"). Petitioner alleges the IJ violated his due process rights by

ordering him removed on the strength of that classification of the burglary conviction. 

On October 24, 2005, Petitioner appealed the result to the Board of Immigration Appeals

("BIA"). Ret. Exh. E. On February 7, 2006, the BIA denied his appeal. Ret. Exh. F. The BIA

affirmed the IJ's decision that the second degree burglary conviction was an aggravated felony as

defined in INA § 101(a)(43)G) and found the IJ properly relied on the Abstract of Judgment in

determining Petitioner had admitted and pleaded guilty to all elements in the charging document for

that offense, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Pet. Exh. C; Pet. Exh. F (Petitioner's

Abstract of Judgment records the imprisonment "time imposed" as one year and four months). 

On February 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition For Review and Motion For Stay Of Removal

with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Ret. Exh. G. On February 22, 2006, the ICE sought travel

documents from the Peruvian consulate and notified Petitioner of the post-removal-Order custody

review procedures. Ret. Exhs. H, I. On June 12, 2006, the ICE notified him of its intention to

continue his detention, for failure to demonstrate that he did not pose a flight risk. Ret. Exh. J. On

August 24, 2006, Petitioner filed for habeas relief in the form of an Order from this court granting

supervised release or bail pending the result of his Petition For Review in the Ninth Circuit.

Petitioner relies on his central legal premise: his second degree burglary conviction should not

qualify as an aggravated felony, and therefore it cannot support his detention, because his sentence was

for less than one year. He represents he received 90 days confinement only, even though the Abstract

of Judgment reflects a sentence of one year and four months was imposed after he violated probation.

 The government's Return urges denial of the Petition on grounds: Petitioner extended his own

period of detention by seeking extensions before the BIA and the Ninth Circuit; he is an aggravated

felon, contrary to his arguments, and therefore subject to mandatory detention, citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226,

1231; he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he never sought a bond hearing before

an IJ as required by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1(d) before seeking this habeas relief; and the sixmonth period of post-removal detention considered "presumptively reasonable" does not mean that

every alien not removed after six months' detention must be released. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

"To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no

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 Respondent also contends Petitioner has shown his removal is unlikely in the forseeable future

because he is subject to mandatory detention as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, and the government

may detain aliens for as long as is "reasonably necessary" to effectuate their removal. In these circumstances,

Respondent contends Petitioner's continued ICE custody does not violate the holdings in Zadvydas and Clark.

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 Alternatively, had the court granted the Petition, the government sought imposition of a bond and

authority to prescribe other appropriate conditions of release and terms of supervision. Ret. p. 9.

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 "(a) Classes of deportable aliens. Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the

United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of

the following classes of deportable aliens; . . .(2) Criminal offenses. (A) General crimes. . . .(iii) Aggravated

felony. . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1227.

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significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." Id. at 701; see also Clark, 543

U.S. at 378; Ret. pp. 3-7. "[C]ourts have frequently held that litigation efforts that stymie removal

efforts serve to toll the permissible detention periods set forth in Zadvydas."3 Ret. 7:22-23, pp. 7-8,

citing, inter alia, Lawrence v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 221, 226-27 (1st Cir. 2006). Respondent represents

"the only factor that prevents the government from implementing Petitioner's removal is the stay of

removal granted by the Ninth Circuit."4 Ret. 7:15-16. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Detention Of Aliens Ordered Removed

Detention of aliens who are considered removable by reason of having committed any offense

covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) is mandatory.5 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B); see Ret. Exh. F.

After an alien has been ordered removed, DHS must attempt to effectuate the removal within ninety

days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (defining "removal period"). During the removal period, the alien

must be held in custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). The DHS has discretion to release aliens after the

initial ninety-day removal period, subject to bond and other supervisory conditions. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001)

(observing "[t]he choice . . . is not between imprisonment and the alien 'living at large' . . . [but rather]

is between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be violated"). The

DHS may continue to detain certain classes of aliens, in particular those who have been convicted of

certain criminal offenses. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688-89. The "presumptive period during which the

detention of an alien is reasonably necessary to effectuate his removal is six months." Clark v.

Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Beyond six-months, "an alien may

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be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal

in the reasonably foreseeable future." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; Clark, 543 U.S. at 378; " Pelich v.

INS, 329 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003) (the "burden [is] on the alien to show, after a detention of

six months, that there is good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future") (citation omitted). This Petitioner is under a stay of removal ordered

by the Ninth Circuit at his request while it reviews his appeal filed there.

B. Exhaustion Of Remedies

As a threshold matter, Respondent represents Petitioner sought no bond hearing before an IJ,

and has therefore not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the type of conditional

release he seeks here, warranting denial of the Petition. Ret. 5:11-6:3; see Ret. Exh. A, p. 4. 

District courts are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider petitions

for habeas corpus. That section does not specifically require petitioners

to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus.

However, we require, as a prudential matter, that petitioners exhaust

available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief

under section 2241. 

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by FernandezVargas v. Gonzales, -- U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 2422 (U.S. Jun. 22, 2006). 

 Petitioner's Traverse does not address the exhaustion requirement nor refute Respondents'

argument the court must deny the Petition on that ground. See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998

(9th Cir. 2004) ("lower courts are . . . not free to address the underlying merits without first

determining the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied or properly waived"). Although Petitioner

appears not to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to release on bond pending

review Respondent represents is an option available to him, warranting dismissal of the Petition on

that ground alone, even were the court to reach his contention his prior burglary conviction was

erroneously characterized as a felony, that argument is without merit and his detention is not unlawful.

C. Petitioner's Detention Is Not Unlawful

1. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Release Or Bail

Primarily on the strength of his sentencing argument, Petitioner contends he has been denied

due process because the DHS has allegedly failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence he is

removable, purportedly entitling him to immediate release. He alleges his incarceration is

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28 6 U.S. v. Rivera -Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001), superseded on other grounds by U.S.S.G. §

2L1.2, cmt n.4 (2002), as noted in U.S. v. Navaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2007).

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unconstitutional as a deprivation of his liberty while he is "forced to wait and appeal to the federal

courts for relief." Pet. pp.6-7. He represents he has not yet entered his 90-day removal period under

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) because the Ninth Circuit has stayed his removal pending the outcome of his

Petition For Review, a stay he himself requested. He suggests he meets the criteria for setting bail

while awaiting a final decision regarding removal, citing, inter alia, Tam v. INS, 14 F.Supp.2d 1184

(E.D.Cal. 1998). However, "[b]ail pending a decision in a habeas case is reserved for extraordinary

cases involving special circumstances or a high probability of success." Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318

(9th Cir. 1989); see also Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3rd Cir. 1992) (bail is appropriate

in such instances "only when the Petitioner has raised a substantial constitutional claim upon which

he has a high probability of success, and also when extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist

which make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective") (citation omitted). 

Petitioner insists the ICE will not be able to prove his 2004 second degree burglary was an

aggravated felony qualifying him as removable on the basis of that conviction. For the reasons

discussed below, the court finds that argument is meritless, and he has thus not "raised a substantial

constitutional claim upon which he has a high probability of success," nor any "exceptional

circumstances," defeating his bail or bond argument, even if he had administratively exhausted his

request for conditional release while he awaits the Ninth Circuit's determination of his removability.

2. Petitioner's Prior Burglary Conviction Must Be Construed As A Felony

Petitioner does not dispute that if his second degree burglary conviction qualifies as an

aggravated felony, he has not made a case for habeas relief. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), an

"aggravated felony" includes a burglary offense carrying a term of imprisonment of at least one year.

"[T]he term 'burglary' as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), has

a uniform definition independent of the labels used by state codes . . . --

the unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or

structure, with intent to commit a crime." Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128,

1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting definition of burglary from Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-99 [...] (1990)). In assessing whether

a person's conviction satisfies this generic definition, we do not

examine the particulars of the burglary committed. [U.S. v.] RiveraSanchez, 247 F.3d at 907.[6

]. Rather, we " 'look only to the fact of

conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.' " Id. at 907-

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 "Where, however, the state statute reaches both conduct that would constitute a burglary under

Taylor/Ye, and conduct that would not, we may look beyond the statutory language to 'documentation or

judicially noticeable facts that clearly establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement

purposes" . . . .[I]f the statute and the judicially noticeable facts would allow the defendant to be convicted of

an offense other than that defined as a qualifying offense by the guidelines, then the conviction does not qualify

as a predicate offense." Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 851, quoting Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d at 908. The

language of Petitioner's guilty plea accords with the Taylor/Ye generic definition of "burglary."

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 "Though Taylor addressed the sufficiency of convictions resulting from a jury conviction, it is wellaccepted that the same analysis applies when the defendant has pleaded guilty." Velasco-Medina, 305 at 851

n.6, citing U.S. v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1997).

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08 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 [...]. In cases where the state

statute accords with the Taylor/Ye definition of burglary, the mere fact

of conviction under that statute justifies treating the burglary as an

aggravated felony and imposing a sentencing enhancement.[7]

U.S. v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 851 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court defined "burglary" as it is to be applied in the

sentence enhancement statute, adopting a "contemporary meaning" and opining "Congress meant by

'burglary' the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States."8

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. The analytical approach is categorical: 

The Courts of Appeal uniformly have held that [the sentence

enhancement statute] mandates a formal categorical approach, looking

only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the

particular facts underlying those convictions. . . . Although the exact

formulations vary, the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary

contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other

structure, with intent to commit a crime.

Id. at 600 (emphasis added).

"We conclude that a person has been convicted of burglary . . . if he is convicted of any crime,

regardless of its exact definition or label, having [those] basic elements . . . ." Id. at 599, 602 ("We

therefore hold that an offense constitutes 'burglary' for purposes of a § 924(e) sentence enhancement

if either its statutory definition substantially corresponds to 'generic' burglary, or the charging paper"

and other documentation factually show the establishment of "all elements of generic burglary in order

to convict the defendant"). The definition for sentence enhancement purposes articulated in Taylor

has been adopted for analysis of predicate offenses in the immigration context as well. Ye v. INS, 214

F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (as "burglary" is undefined in the INA, the BIA applies the generic

definition of "burglary" found in Taylor, i.e., (1) an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining

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in, (2) a building or structure, with (3) intent to commit a crime), citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598; see

Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002). 

CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 provides, in pertinent part: "Every person who enters any house,

room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, or other building . . . with intent to commit grand

or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." The Ninth Circuit has held that section "is far too

sweeping to satisfy the Taylor definition of generic burglary." U.S. v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165, 1169,

1170 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding it permissible to consider charging papers and signed plea

agreements to confirm whether the burglary at issues qualifies as an aggravated felony). California's

definition of burglary is broader than Taylor's generic definition because the offender need not have

made an "unlawful" entry but rather may be punished for any entry into the designated locations with

intent to commit larceny or any felony. Id. Thus, the California statute can be violated in ways that

qualify as aggravated felonies and in ways that do not, requiring a "modified categorical approach" to

the determination. Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189 ("Under the modified categorical approach, we conduct

a limited examination of documents in the record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to

conclude that a defendant was convicted of the elements of the generically defined crime even though

his or her statute was facially over-inclusive") (citations omitted). The analysis is guided by two

considerations: "avoiding an inquiry into the underlying facts of the defendant's prior conviction, and

relying on documentation that clearly establishes a conviction based on all of the generic elements of

the underlying offense." Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 851, 852-53, citing Franklin, 235 F.3d at 1170.

"Where the prior conviction was based on a guilty plea, the sentencing court's review is limited

'to those documents made or used in adjudicating guilt' such as 'the terms of the charging document,

the terms of a plea agreement or [the] transcript of [the] colloquy between the judge and defendant in

which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial

record of this information.' " U.S. v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting U.S.

v. Martinez-Martinez, 468 F.3d 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2006). This court considers Petitioner's

conviction and sentencing record presented to determine "whether other documentation clearly

establishes that [Petitioner's] underlying burglary conviction involved the requisite elements of generic

burglary." Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 851, 852 (holding a guilty plea to a charge of unlawfully

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 He argues: "On July 29, 2004, Petitioner received three years probation and a suspension of the

imposition of sentence with 90 days in Orange County Jail [for his conviction on guilty plea of second degree

burglary]. He did not receive 16 months for the conviction. Any subsequent time received must include the

basis for the time, as well as the date ordered, etc. The NTA [Notice To Appear] issued by the government on

May 5, 2005 charging him with an Order of Removal pursuant to INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (conviction

of an aggravated felony as defined in INA section 101(a)(43)(G)] fails to properly state the offense and time

received for the offense." Traverse 10:8-11, 7:1-16.

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entering a drug store with the intent to commit larceny satisfies Taylor's definition of burglary). If so,

the conviction is construed as one for an aggravated felony offense. 

A guilty plea "conclusively proves the factual allegations contained in the indictment." U.S.

v. Williams, 47 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see U.S. v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472,

1476, 1477-78 ("Even if we agreed with Bonat that the district court only relied on the charging

document, we would affirm because the Judgment on Plea of Guilty shows that Bonat did in fact pled

guilty to second degree burglary as charged in the Information, and the Information included all the

elements of generic burglary"). The charging papers and the Abstract of Judgment are properly

considered and together may furnish sufficient proof a defendant was convicted of all the elements of

a generic burglary, even if the Abstract of Judgment alone may not be sufficient in itself. See VelascoMedina, 305 F.3d at 851-52. Not only are those documents before the court in this case through

Petitioner's own exhibits, but the Abstract of Judgment alone is sufficient to defeat this Petitioner's

contentions he was not sentenced for a felony, despite his protestations to the contrary.9

In particular, the Petition Exhibit E is a transcript of Petitioner's July 29, 2004 change of plea

hearing. In pertinent part, the transcript substantiates Petitioner understood by pleading guilty, he

could be sentenced up to three years in state prison. The guilty plea was accepted, and the court

"suspended imposition of sentence," placing him on three years of supervised probation and ordering

him to serve 90 days in the county jail, with certain other conditions. Pet. Exh. E-24. Petitioner

appears to confuse the time he was ordered to serve in county jail at the time he was placed on

probation with the duration of his sentence. The court actually concluded: "Should you violate

probation, should you go to state prison, in the event that should occur, upon release from prison,

you would be on parole for three years subject to being reincarcerated up to one year for any

violation of parole, making the total time that you might be on parole and reincarceration four

years." Pet. Exh. E-25 (emphasis added). Petitioner completely ignores his March 2, 2005 Abstract

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 The Robinson issue was whether a California conviction for battery of a police officer, a wobbler,

was a "crime of violence" within the Sentencing Guidelines. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287. The district court

suspended imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on three years probation, subject to serving the first

nine months in jail. Id. at 292. The Ninth Circuit addressed the question whether the sentence rendered the

conviction a felony or a misdemeanor, recognizing the conviction could become a misdemeanor at sentencing

if the court "impos[es] a punishment other than imprisonment in state prison," or if the court grants probation

10

ofJudgment substantiating a determinate sentence of one year four months was ordered executed "after

revocation of probation" when he was remanded to the sheriff's custody. Traverse Exh. F-14. 

The court arrives at the same result on the dispositive issue whether Petitioner's prior

conviction under CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 was a felony or a misdemeanor by examining the question

on purely legal grounds. He concedes burglary of a structure such as his offense "may be an

aggravated felony when one year or more is imposed." Traverse 10:24-25, citing INA § 101(a)(43)(G).

He attempts to distinguish his crime from a burglary qualifying for aggravated felony characterization

in the immigration context not only based on his sentence argument but also by parsing CAL. PENAL

CODE §§ 459, 460 and arguing for fine definitional distinctions. See Traverse pp. 10- 14. He contends

on those bases "he is not subject to removal per INA § 101(a)(43)(G)," and should therefore be

immediately released from custody. Traverse 15:3-14. The court rejects his arguments. 

Burglary under California law may be either in the first degree, punishable by imprisonment

in the state prison for two, four, or six years, or in the second degree, punishable by imprisonment in

the county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 461. Burglary is

thus a "wobbler" offense, i.e., one that can be either a felony or a misdemeanor depending on the

sentence. "When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in state prison

or by fine and imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following

circumstances: (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in the state

prison . . . (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at

that time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the

court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (emphasis added).

In all other circumstances (including Petitioner's), the crime is a felony.

As a matter of California law, conviction of a wobbler is presumptively "regarded as a felony

for every purpose until judgment."10 United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir. 1992),

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and at the same time "declares the offense to be a misdemeanor." Id. at 293, citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§

17(b)(1),(3). The reviewing court upheld Robinson's prior conviction as a felony those statutory requirements

were not met. Id. at 293;see also Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2003) ("a suspended

sentence on a wobbler is treated as a felony for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines when there is no

subsequent action by the state court to designate the offense as a misdemeanor"). 

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citing People v. Banks, 53 Cal.2d 370, 387, 375-76 (1959) ("by pleading guilty [to a wobbler offense]

the defendant acquired the status -- not then final, and conditionally subject to expungement but

nevertheless existing -- of a person convicted of a felony"). A sentence of probation is not a

"judgment" as a matter of California law. See People v. Howard, 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092 (1997)

("Probation is neither 'punishment' . . . nor a criminal "judgment" . . . . Instead, courts deem probation

an act of clemency in lieu of punishment. . . and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in nature");

People v. Smith, 195 Cal.App.2d 735, 737 (1961) ("the order placing a defendant on probation is not

a judgment and sentence") (citation omitted); see also United States v. Qualls, 172 F.3d 1136, 1137

(9th Cir. 1999) (initial probation was not a "judgment imposing punishment other than imprisonment

in the state prison") (citation omitted). In this case, the court suspended the imposition of Petitioner's

sentence in pronouncing the sentence, and in such circumstances, "no judgment is then pending against

the probationer, who is subject only to the terms and conditions of the probation." Howard, 16 Cal.4th

at 1087. In consideration of those circumstances, this Petitioner's conviction would have retained its

presumptive status as a felony, even if the Abstract of his Judgment did not conclusively establish the

felony nature of the crime. See, e.g., Banks, 53 Cal.2d at 372 (wobbler conviction regarded as felony

where imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation, even where

probation was completed without violation ); People v. Esparza, 253 Cal.App.2d 362, 364-65 (1967)

("It is settled that where the offense is alternatively a felony or a misdemeanor (depending upon the

sentence), and the court suspends the pronouncement of judgment or imposition of sentence and grants

probation, the offense is regarded as a felony for all purposes until judgment or sentence and if no

judgment is pronounced it remains a felony "). 

Under this authority, this Petitioner at all times since his guilty plea "stood convicted of a

felony for all purpose." Id. at 365. The sentencing court in Petitioner's case neither "declare[d] the

offense to be a misdemeanor at the time of granting probation" nor did it do so "on application of the

defendant or the probation officer thereafter." People v. Wood, 62 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 (1998)

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("Imposition of a prison term, whether or not suspended, rendered the offense a felony"). Any rule of

construction that a reduction from felony to misdemeanor can occur automatically is precluded by the

statutory discretion lodged with the trial court. See People v. Alvarez, 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 (1997);

Coffey v. Superior Court, 129 Cal.App.4th 809, 820 (2005) (felony status of wobbler "remains until

the charge is in fact reduced to a misdemeanor"). 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In summary, this Petitioner expressly acknowledged he was pleading guilty on July 29, 2004

to a "felony charge," and he understood "the court may send me to the penitentiary for a maximum of

three years" based on the facts he admitted and his guilty plea. Travers Exh. C. The requirements of

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17(b)(1) and (3) were not met, so his wobbler conviction for burglary must be

construed as a felony, even before Judgment was entered imposing a determinate prison sentence

exceeding one year following revocation of his probation. Petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas relief pending the Ninth Circuit's ruling on the appeal of his removal

Order. He appears not to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the conditional

release requested. His continued detention is the result of his own legal challenges to the immigration

proceedings and request for stay of removal associated with his appeal. This court is not persuaded

of his likelihood for success on the merits of his appeal, nor does it find he has demonstrated any

illegality or unconstitutionality in his detention during the interim. There is a significant likelihood

of his removal in the foreseeable future in consideration of the length of time his appeal has already

been pending. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. §

2241 Petition For Release Pending Resolution Of Petition For Review is DENIED. The Clerk of

Court shall dismiss this action in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 6, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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