Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02651/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02651-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Because the Petition is not consecutively paginated, the

Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system (“ECF”). 

1 10cv02651 AJB(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, 

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 10cv02651 AJB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS AND ORDER DENYING

EVIDENTIARY HEARING [ECF No.

13]

Petitioner Jose Miguel Rodriguez, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on December 22, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 [ECF

Nos. 1, 5].1 Rodriguez argues that the restitution fine imposed by

the sentencing court violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against excessive fines and deprives the Petitioner of his due

process rights. (See Pet. 6, 12-14, ECF No. 1.) Specifically,

Rodriguez contends that the sentencing court did not consider the

mandatory factors stated in California Penal Code section

1202.4(c), including his future ability to pay, when imposing a

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2 Respondent’s initial motion to dismiss was stricken from

the record on February 17, 2011, because it lacked a hearing date

[ECF Nos. 11-12].

3

 The Court will consider the arguments raised in both the

initial Motion as well as the Supplement.

2 10cv02651 AJB(RBB)

restitution fine that exceeded two hundred dollars. (Id. at 13.) 

On January 6, 2011, this Court issued an Order Sua Sponte

Substituting Respondent [ECF No. 7]. The Clerk of the Court was

ordered to modify the docket to reflect “Matthew Cate, Secretary”

as Respondent in place of “Raul Lopez” and “Edmund G. Brown, Jr.” 

(Order Sua Sponte Substituting Resp. 2, ECF No. 7.) Consequently,

Matthew Cate is the only Respondent. (See id.) 

On February 22, 2011, Respondent Cate filed a Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, along with a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities and a Notice of Lodgments [ECF No. 13].2

Cate argues that the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice

because it is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(d). (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF

No. 13.) 

Respondent filed a request seeking leave to file a supplement

to the Motion to Dismiss, which the Court granted [ECF Nos. 14-15]. 

On March 2, 2011, Respondent filed a Supplement to Motion to

Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 16].3 

There, Respondent contends that the recent Supreme Court decision

in Walker v. Martin, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011), provides

further support for the dismissal of Rodriguez’s Petition. (See

Supplement Mot. Dismiss 1-3, ECF No. 16.) Cate argues that the

Supreme Court found that California’s time limitation for

applications for habeas corpus constitutes an adequate and

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independent state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas relief. 

(Id. at 1-2.) Therefore, Respondent alleges, Rodriguez is also

procedurally barred from bringing this claim. (Id. at 3.)

Petitioner filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 21, 2011, addressing the

arguments raised in the Motion and in Respondent’s Supplement. 

[ECF No. 18]. On March 30, 2011, the Court found the Motion to

Dismiss suitable for resolution on the papers, pursuant to Civil

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) [ECF No. 19]. Respondent Cate did not file a

reply.

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss and attachments, Respondent’s Supplement to Motion to

Dismiss, and Petitioner’s Opposition. For the reasons stated

below, the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2004, a jury found Rodriguez guilty of first

degree murder with the special circumstance that the victim was

murdered for the purpose of preventing her from testifying as a

witness in a criminal proceeding. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Rodriguez, No. D044763, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2005);

see Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) On July 21, 2004, Rodriguez was sentenced

to life in prison, ten years for the special circumstance

allegation and one year for a firearm enhancement; in a separate

case, the state court also revoked his parole. (See Lodgment No.

9, Rodriguez v. Adams, No. S181024 (Cal. filed Mar. 15, 2010)

(petition for writ of habeas corpus attachment at 1826-27). The

superior court imposed a restitution fine of $10,000, pursuant to

California Penal Code sections 2085.5 and 1202.4(b). (Id. at

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1827.) The court ordered Rodriguez to pay $3,926.84 in restitution

directly to the victim’s family through the Victims Compensation

Program, pursuant to California Penal Code section 1202.4(f). 

(Id.) Judgment was entered on July 26, 2004. (Lodgment No. 7,

Rodriguez v. Adams, No. D056703 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Feb. 2, 2010)

(petition for writ of habeas corpus attachment at 288-89). 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction. On October 5,

2005, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District,

Division One, affirmed the conviction. (Pet. 2, 34, ECF No. 1;

Lodgment No. 1, People v. Rodriguez, No. D044763, slip op. at 1,

19.) On November 14, 2005, Rodriguez filed a petition for review

with the California Supreme Court, and on January 18, 2006, the

court summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 2, People v.

Rodriguez, No. SD2004DA1094 (Cal. filed Nov. 14, 2005) (petition

for review at 1); Lodgment No. 3, People v. Rodriguez, No.

SD2004DA1094, order at 1 (Cal. Jan. 18, 2006) (en banc).) 

Rodriguez did not file a petition for certiorari with the United

States Supreme Court. (See Pet. 3, ECF No. 1.) 

Nearly four years later, on November 2, 2009, Rodriguez filed

a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego Superior

Court, which was denied on December 22, 2009. (Lodgment No. 5,

Rodriguez v. Adams, No. HC19765 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 2,

2009) (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1); Lodgment No. 6, In

re Rodriguez, No. HC19765, order denying petition at 1-2 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2009).) Next, Rodriguez filed a habeas

petition in the California Court of Appeal, and it was denied on

February 25, 2010. (Lodgment No. 7, Rodriguez v. Adams, No.

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D056703 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1); Lodgment No. 8,

In re Rodriguez, No. D056703, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25,

2010).) On March 15, 2010, he filed a petition for habeas relief

in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on October 13,

2010. (Lodgment No. 9, Rodriguez v. Adams, No. S181024 (petition

for writ of habeas corpus at 1); Lodgment No. 10, In re Rodriguez,

No. S181024, order denying petition at 1, (Cal. Oct. 13, 2010)

(citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 959

P.2d 311 (1998)).) On December 22, 2010, Rodriguez filed his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court [ECF No. 1]. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rodriguez is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 because he filed his Petition after

April 24, 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A §

2254(a). In other words, a petitioner must allege the state court

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violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhald

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

 A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding federal courts have no authority to review a state’s

application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief

only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgement

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(d).

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The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to

adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

matters under section 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision

is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). 

A federal court is therefore not required to review the state

court decision de novo, but may proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis in original

deleted). Section 2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the

Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” (Id.) 

“[A] state court decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus

review, for example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuitbased law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only

when the state court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221,

1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208

(7th Cir. 1996); see Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th

Cir. 1996)).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgement of a State court, a determination of a 

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factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing ev

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

Rodriguez’s claim is that the sentencing court erred in

imposing an excessive restitution fine that he has “little chance

of paying.” (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) He argues that the fine violates

his due process rights and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against excessive fines, and also constitutes an erroneous

application of the sentencing guidelines. (Id. at 6, 13-14.) The

Petitioner maintains the sentencing court did not describe what

information it relied on when ordering the fine. (Id. at 12.) 

Instead, the court merely stated it had reviewed the Probation

Officer’s Report which contained insufficient information for the

court to conclude that Rodriguez would be able to pay the

restitution. (Id. at 12-13.) 

Petitioner submits that the Probation Officer’s Report shows

that Rodriguez “reported no assets or future income.” (Id. at 13.) 

Rodriguez further explains:

 At sentencing, petitioner could not have known that

the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (C.D.C.R.) made few or no paying jobs

available to the majority of the inmate population,

therefore the fines are based on the erroneous assumption

that petitioner would be able to pay the fines out of his

prison earnings while incarcerated. 

(Id.) Petitioner asserts that since he was incarcerated on July

21, 2004, he has not been assigned a prison job and has only paid

$533.35 of the $3,926.84 restitution fine. (Id.) This amount was

paid with money he received from family members. (Id.) As a

result, Rodriguez maintains, “[The] [s]entencing court abused its

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discretion when it impose[d] the restitution fines without

considering petitioner’s future ability to pay as require[d] by

penal code § 1202.4(c).” (Id.) The Petitioner believes that his

future earning capacity in prison is limited, and because he has

been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, there is

no evidence demonstrating that he would be capable of paying the

imposed fined. (Id.) 

Rodriguez additionally argues that as a result of the state

court’s failure to consider the mandatory factors, the fine

constitutes an unauthorized sentence and is correctable whenever it

is brought to the Court’s attention. (Id. at 14.)

Imposition of unauthorized sentence is [an] act which is

in excess of [the] court’s jurisdiction and may be [the]

subject of later review even after affirmance of [a]

judgment on direct appeal; [an] unauthorized sentence is

not subject to harmless error, nor does it ripen into [a]

sentence authorized by law with [the] passage of time. 

(Id. at 13-14.) Finally, the Petitioner appears to seek an

evidentiary hearing assessing his financial status and ability to

pay the restitution. (Id.) 

Respondent Cate moves to dismiss the Petition on two grounds,

neither of which addresses the merits of Rodriguez’s excessive fine

claim. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-8, ECF No. 13;

Supplement Mot. Dismiss 1-3, ECF No. 16.) First, Respondent argues

that the Petition is barred by the statute of limitations set forth

in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d). (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5,

ECF No. 13.) Cate contends that AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations commenced on April 19, 2006, but Rodriguez did not file

his federal Petition until December 22, 2010. (Id. at 6.) Because

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Rodriguez is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the

Petition should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 5-8.)

Second, Cate asserts the Petitioner is procedurally barred

from bringing the excessive fine claim. (Supplement Mot. Dismiss

1-2, ECF No. 16.) The claim Rodriguez raises in this Petition is

among those included in the state habeas corpus petition he filed

with the California Supreme Court on March 15, 2010, which was

denied as untimely. (Id.) In Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at

1120, the Supreme Court recently clarified that California’s

timeliness requirement qualifies as an independent state ground

adequate to bar habeas corpus relief. (Id.) For this additional

reason, Cate argues that the claim Rodriguez raises in this

Petition is procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed with

prejudice. (Id. at 2-3.) 

In his Opposition, Rodriguez appears to argue that his

Petition should not be barred by the one-year statute of

limitations because the state court’s imposition of excessive

restitution fines constitutes an illegal sentence, which can be

challenged at any time. (See Opp’n 7, ECF No. 18.) Petitioner

asserts that the California timeliness rule should not procedurally

bar his claim because at the time Rodriguez filed his federal

Petition, the Ninth Circuit did not recognize California’s

timeliness rule as an adequate state ground to bar habeas relief. 

(Id. at 5.) Moreover, because two lower courts denied his state

habeas petition on the merits without mentioning the time bar, the

rule has been inconsistently applied and is therefore not an

adequate state ground. (Id. at 6.) Even if the bar is adequate

and independent, Rodriguez explains that he can establish cause and

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prejudice, which saves his claim from being procedurally defaulted. 

(Id. at 6.) 

Even if Rodriguez’s claim is not procedurally barred, an

excessive fines claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review

because it is unrelated to Petitioner’s state custody. Bailey v.

Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2010). A district court cannot

hear a habeas claim that challenges a restitution fine imposed by a

state court because an action under § 2254 can only attack the

denial of a constitutional right causing the petitioner to be “in

custody” or to have a longer sentence. Id. (“[Section] 2254(a)

does not confer jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s in-custody

challenge to a restitution order imposed as part of a criminal

sentence.”); see United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 400 (9th

Cir. 2002) (finding that challenging a restitution fine is not a

cognizable basis for habeas corpus relief because it does not

challenge the validity or duration of confinement); United States

v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). In any

event, Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition for other reasons.

A. The One-Year Statute of Limitations

Cate maintains that Rodriguez’s Petition is barred by the oneyear statute of limitations set forth in § 2244(d). (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 13.) The Respondent asserts

Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 18, 2006, the end of

the ninety-day period following his conviction, which is the

expiration of time he had to petition for certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court. (Id. at 5-6.) The statute of limitations

typically commences the day the judgment becomes final, which was

April 18, 2006. (Id. at 6.) Because Rodriguez waited almost five

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years to file his federal Petition, until December 22, 2010, Cate

argues that the Petition is both facially and legally untimely. 

(Id.) Rodriguez does not directly address this argument. (See

generally Opp’n 1-8, ECF No. 18.) He does, however, appear to

argue that his restitution award “constitutes an illegal sentence

and jurisdictional error,” which is correctable at any time. (Id.

at 7; see also Pet. 14, ECF No. 1.)

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions

is set forth in AEDPA. As amended, § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1). 

Here, on October 5, 2005, the appellate court affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Rodriguez, No. D044763, slip op. at 1, 19.) Rodriguez then

petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and the court

denied the petition on January 18, 2006. (Lodgment No. 3, People

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v. Rodriguez, No. SD2004DA1094, order.) Rodriguez did not file a

petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court. 

United States Supreme Court Rule 13 provides that a petition

for certiorari must be filed within ninety days of the entry of an

order denying discretionary review by the state supreme court. See

S. Ct. R. 13. When a habeas petitioner seeks direct review by the

state’s highest court but does not file a petition with the United

States Supreme Court, the judgment becomes final when the

prisoner’s time to petition the Supreme Court expires. Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Rodriguez’s judgment became final for the purposes of AEDPA on

April 18, 2006, ninety days after the California Supreme Court

denied his petition for review. See id.; see also S. Ct. R. 13. 

Pursuant to § 2244(d), the statute of limitations for federal

habeas corpus began to run on April 19, 2006, the day after the

judgment became final. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see Corjasso

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the

one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA begins to run the day

after the conviction becomes final). The statute of limitations

period would have expired on April 18, 2007. See Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a)) (“In computing any amount of time prescribed or

allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event,

or default from which the designated period of time runs shall not

be included.”) Rodriguez filed his federal Petition nearly three

and one-half years later, on December 22, 2010 [ECF No. 1]. 

Therefore, unless he is entitled to a later start date or to

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sufficient statutory or equitable tolling, this action is barred by

AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Rodriguez argues that he can bring an illegal sentence claim

at any time. (See Opp’n 7-8, ECF No. 18; see also Pet. 13-14, ECF

No. 1.) Insofar as Rodriguez makes this assertion to oppose Cate’s

statute of limitations defense, Rodriguez cites no case law to

support his argument. Nevertheless, the law is to the contrary. 

Courts routinely apply AEDPA’s statute of limitations to claims

that a petitioner was given an illegal sentence. See Murphy v.

Idaho, Case No. CV 07-230-C-MHW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52279, at

*3-10 (D. Idaho July 7, 2008); Pena v. Slaughter, No. CV 05-138-

BLG-RWA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48739, at *9 (D. Mont. May 12,

2006); see also United States v. Fiorillo, No. CR-94-427-JLQ, 2006

U. S. Dist. LEXIS 71332, at *7, 29-32 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006)

(applying statute of limitations to § 2255 petition). AEDPA

governs the statute of limitations inquiry.

1. Later Start Date

Preemptively, Respondent argues that Rodriguez is not entitled

to a later start date for the running of the statute of

limitations. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6-7, ECF No.

13.) Cate submits that the statute began to run on April 19, 2006,

and it expired one year later on April 18, 2007. (Id.); see 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also id. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 

Rodriguez does not address this argument in his Opposition. (See

Opp’n 1-8, ECF No. 18.) 

The one-year period of limitations runs from the latest of (1)

the date the judgment became final, (2) the date the impediment to

filing the application was removed, if the applicant was prevented

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from filing the state action, (3) the date the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court if the right

was newly recognized, or (4) the date the factual predicate of the

claim could have been discovered through due diligence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Under subsection (A), the start date for the one-year

limitations period in Rodriguez’s case was April 19, 2006, which is

the day after the judgment became final. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see

S. Ct. R. 13; see also Corjasso, 278 F.3d at 877; Bowen, 188 F.3d

at 1158-59. A later start date would be appropriate if one of the

other subsections of the limitations statute, subsection (B), (C),

or (D), applies to his circumstances. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Because there is no justification for a later

start date, the limitations period began to run on April 19, 2006. 

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

2. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is tolled during

periods in which a petitioner is properly seeking collateral review

of a pending state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) states,

“The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period

of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2);

see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). “[A]n

application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance

are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing

filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (explaining that

typical filing requirements include all relevant time limits). 

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“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that

[is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Pace,

544 U.S. at 414 (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226

(2002)); see also Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir.

2009).

The interval between the disposition of one state petition and

the filing of another may be tolled under “interval tolling.” 

Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. “[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations is

tolled for ‘all of the time during which a state prisoner is

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to

exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular postconviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th

Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. The statute of

limitations is tolled from the time a petitioner’s first state

habeas petition is filed until state collateral review is

concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state collateral

challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling of the limitation period. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 7, ECF No. 13.) Cate notes that statutory tolling applies to

petitioners while they are seeking collateral relief, but Rodriguez

did not file his first state habeas petition until November 2,

2009. (Id.) Because this date is years after the expiration of

the one-year statute of limitations on April 18, 2007, Respondent

argues, there is no tolling effect. (Id. (citing Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)).) The Petitioner

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does not address this argument in his Opposition. (See Opp’n 1-8,

ECF No. 18.) 

On November 2, 2009, approximately two and one-half years

beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations under §

2244(d), Rodriguez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 5, Rodriguez v. Adams,

No. HC19765 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1). He

litigated his state petition through the California courts, and the

state supreme court denied his petition for habeas relief as

untimely on October 13, 2010. (Lodgment No. 9, Rodriguez v. Adams,

No. S181024 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1); Lodgment No.

10, In re Rodriguez, No. S181024, order denying petition for writ

of habeas corpus at 1 (citing In re Robbins).)

 A subsequently filed petition for state collateral relief

cannot revive an expired statute of limitations. Pace, 544 U.S. at

417; see also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001);

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). The statute

of limitations for the Petitioner was not tolled for the period

between April 19, 2006, the date the limitations period commenced,

and November 2, 2009, the date his first state habeas petition was

filed. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. Because the limitations period

had already expired by November 2, 2009, statutory tolling does not

save Rodriguez’s federal Petition. 

3. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate

when “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make

it impossible’” to file a timely petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d

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1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319

F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] litigant seeking equitable

tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at

418 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.

327, 335 (2007); Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 548 F.3d 871, 878-79

(9th Cir. 2008); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,

1026 (9th Cir. 2005).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of

external forces, not the result of the petitioner’s lack of

diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a ‘factspecific inquiry.’” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye v.

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Cate argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is

entitled to equitable tolling. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 7-8, ECF No. 13.) Respondent claims that Rodriguez is unable to

show that he had been pursuing his rights diligently but some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. (See id.) Cate

insists that Petitioner offers no explanation for his delay. (Id.

at 8.) Without an explanation, Respondent explains, the only

justification for the delay is lack of diligence, which precludes

equitable tolling. (Id.)

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Rodriguez does not address this argument. (See Opp’n 1-8, ECF

No. 18.) He only responds to Respondent’s claim that the Petition

should be dismissed because it is procedurally defaulted. In the

absence of extraordinary circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control,

there is no basis to equitably toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

Because Rodriguez is not entitled to a later start date,

statutory tolling, or equitable tolling, the district court should

GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition as barred by

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.

B. Procedural Default Under California Law

Respondent Cate sought leave to supplement the Motion to

Dismiss in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Walker, __

U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1120. (Ex Parte Appl. File Supplement Mot.

Dismiss 1, ECF No. 14.) The Court granted the request, and

Respondent filed a Supplement to Motion to Dismiss, in which he

argues that Rodriguez’s excessive fines claim is procedurally

defaulted. (Order Granting Ex Parte Appl. File Supplement Mot. 1,

ECF No. 15; Supplement Mot. Dismiss 2-3, ECF No. 16.) 

“A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a

state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state

law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate

to support the judgment.’” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. __, __, 130

S. Ct. 612, 614 (2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729 (1991)). A habeas petitioner who has failed to comply with a

state’s procedural requirements for presenting federal claims has

deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address the claims. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b); Engle v.

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Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28 (1982)). “In order to constitute

adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of

procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s

purported default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.

1994) (citing Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). 

The respondent has the burden of pleading an adequate and

independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense in a habeas

case. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The burden of proof shifts to the petitioner to place that defense

in issue; the burden then shifts back to the respondent to prove

the bar is applicable. See id. at 586. “Accordingly, absent

showings of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be

unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address a

prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’” Walker, __

U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1127 (citations omitted) (alteration in

original).

Respondent argues that Rodriguez’s Petition should be

dismissed because the claim is procedurally defaulted. (Supplement 

Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 16.) Respondent relies on a recent Supreme

Court case holding that California’s timeliness requirement

constitutes an independent state ground adequate to bar federal

habeas corpus relief. (Id. (citing Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.

Ct. at 1124, 1131).) On March 15, 2010, Rodriguez filed a state

habeas petition with the California Supreme Court, and one of the

three claims raised was the same excessive fine claim Rodriguez

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advances in this federal habeas Petition. (Id. (citing Pet. 6, ECF

No. 1; Lodgment No. 9, Rodriguez v. Adams, No. S181024 (petition

for writ of habeas corpus at 1). The state supreme court denied

the petition as untimely on October 13, 2010, citing In re Robbins. 

(Id.) Because the court dismissed that petition as untimely,

Respondent argues, Walker instructs that the claim Rodriguez has

raised in this federal Petition is procedurally defaulted and

subject to dismissal. (Supplement Mot. Dismiss 2-3, ECF No. 16.)

Petitioner counters that when he first started the habeas

corpus process, the rule in the Ninth Circuit was that California’s

time bar was not independent and adequate. (Opp’n 5-6, ECF No.

18.) Rodriguez argues that the timeliness rule has been

inconsistently applied and therefore was not firmly established and

regularly followed. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner further claims that

even if the California time bar is an independent and adequate

state ground, his claim may still be reviewed in federal court

because he can establish the cause and prejudice exception to the

procedural default rule. (Id. at 6-8.) 

1. Independence

A state procedural rule is independent when the “state law

basis for the decision [is] not . . . interwoven with federal law.” 

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote

omitted); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). A state

law basis is interwoven with federal law when “‘the state has made

application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on

federal law [such as] the determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’” Park v. California, 202

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F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.

68, 75 (1985)). 

In 1998, the California Supreme Court made it clear that

California’s timeliness rule was independent of federal law. See

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-83; see also Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d

1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by

Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1131. Accordingly, when the

California State Supreme Court summarily denied Rodriguez’s

petition in 2010, citing In re Robbins, it did so on an independent

procedural ground.

2. Adequacy 

“To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural ground, a state rule

must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Walker, __

U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1127-28 (quoting Kindler, 558 U.S. at __,

130 S. Ct. at 612) (footnote omitted); see Hanson v. Mahoney, 433

F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2006). Prior to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Walker, the California timeliness rule, although

independent, was not an adequate state ground to bar federal habeas

relief. Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1208. In light of Walker, the law

is clear that California’s time bar is both adequate and

independent.

Walker is instructive. There, the petitioner filed a federal

habeas corpus petition that was dismissed for failure to exhaust

state court remedies. Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1126. 

The petitioner then filed a state habeas petition in March 2002,

but because he gave no reason for his failure to assert the claims

until nearly five years after his conviction became final, the

California Supreme Court denied the petition in September 2002,

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citing In re Robbins as one of the cases justifying the denial. 

Id. When the petitioner returned to federal court to pursue his

amended federal petition in light of his exhaustion, the district

court dismissed the claims on procedural default grounds. Id. at

1126-27. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the

case; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the

“adequacy” of California’s time bar and held that it was an

adequate and independent state ground sufficient to bar federal

habeas relief. Id. at 1127. 

Petitioner argues that Walker was decided after his state

petition was denied by the California Supreme Court and at a time

when the Ninth Circuit’s rule was that the In re Robbins time bar

was not adequate. (Opp’n 5-6, ECF No. 18.) The Supreme Court held

that the timeliness requirement set forth in In re Robbins is both

an adequate and independent state law ground to support a

procedural default. See Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1124,

1130-31. Since then, the Ninth Circuit has applied Walker to

pending cases and held that “denial of habeas relief by the

California Supreme Court on the ground that the application for

relief was filed untimely was an independent and adequate state

procedural ground requiring denial of a subsequent habeas petition

in federal court . . . .” Alvarez v. Wong, No. 09-15547, 2011 U.S.

App. LEXIS 6976, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2011); see Haynes v.

Haviland, No. 08-17755, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11607, at *1-2 (9th

Cir. June 7, 2011) (same); see also Martinez v. McGrath, No. CIV S02-0159 KJM GGH P, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar.

9, 2011)(applying Walker).

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Rodriguez’s conviction became final in April 2006, but he did

not file his state habeas petition in superior court until November

2009; the petition was not filed with the California Supreme Court

until March 2010, and it was denied in October 2010 with a citation

to In re Robbins. The California courts signal that a habeas

petition is untimely by citing the controlling cases, such as In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993)

and In re Robbins. See Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1124. 

The three leading decisions outlining California’s time bar are In

re Robbins, In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 959 P.2d 290, 77 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 132 (1998), and In re Clark. See Walker, __ U.S. at __,

131 S. Ct. at 1125. “Those decisions instruct habeas petitioners

to ‘alleg[e] with specificity’ the absence of substantial delay,

good cause for delay, or eligibility for one of four exceptions to

the time bar.” Id. at 1128 (citations omitted). 

California courts were regularly applying the time bar long

before Rodriguez should have raised his excessive fines claim with

the California courts. At the time Rodriguez filed his first

habeas petition in 2009 and the California Supreme Court denied a

subsequent petition in 2010, the timeliness rule had been

consistently applied by state courts. See Martinez, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 23664, at *9, 9 n.4 (construing Walker as finding the

timeliness bar an adequate and independent state ground since

2002). 

As discussed previously, the petitioner in Walker filed a

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court in March 2002, and

it was denied in September 2002. Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct.

at 1126. The Supreme Court examined California’s time bar in 2002

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and proximate years and concluded that as of that time, the rule

was consistently applied. Id., __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1131;

see also Martinez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, at *11 (finding no

change in the time bar from 2002 to 2004). The timeliness rule was

therefore both independent and adequate at the time of Petitioner’s

default.

Rodriguez additionally alleges that two of the California

lower courts reached the merits of his claim without mentioning the

timeliness rule, and it was not until his claim reached the

California Supreme Court that the timeliness bar was invoked. 

(Opp’n 6, ECF No. 18.) This does not prevent the application of an

adequate and independent state bar. 

A rule can be “firmly established” and “regularly followed”

even if the proper exercise of discretion may allow consideration

of a federal claim in some cases but not others. Walker, __ U.S.

at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1128 (citing Kindler, 558 U.S. at __, 130 S.

Ct. at 612). California’s timeliness rule, although discretionary,

undoubtedly satisfies the “firmly established” requirement. Id.

“Each year, the California Supreme Court summarily denies hundreds

of habeas petitions by citing Clark and Robbins.” Id. The

procedural rule is adequate even though some state courts may have

opted to bypass the timeliness assessment and dismiss a petition on

the merits. Id., __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1129. 

Further, a discretionary state rule is not automatically

disregarded due to inconsistencies in the rule’s application. Id.

(footnote omitted); see also Kindler, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. at 618

(holding that a discretionary state rule can serve as an adequate

ground to bar federal habeas review if it is firmly established and

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regularly followed). In fact, “[d]iscretion enables a court to

home in on case-specific considerations and to avoid the harsh

results that sometimes attend consistent application of an

unyielding rule.” Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1130. 

Rodriguez does not argue, and the record does not suggest, that the

California Supreme Court exercised its discretion in an

unpredictable or unjust manner. See Walker, id.

Petitioner’s excessive fines claim is procedurally barred,

notwithstanding the fact that his claim was originally denied on

the merits by two state courts. See Johnson v. Cullen, No. 3-98-

cv-4043-SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58296, at *3-4, 10 (N.D. Cal.

June 1, 2011) (relying on Walker when ruling that California’s

timeliness requirement was adequate as applied to a state habeas

petition denied by the California Supreme Court in 2001); see also

Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1126, 1131 (stating that the

time bar is adequate as applied to a petition denied in 2002);

Martinez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, at *11 (applying Walker to a

habeas petition that was denied by the California Supreme Court in

2006 to conclude the claim was procedurally barred). Accordingly,

Rodriguez is procedurally barred from raising the excessive fine

claim in federal court because the timeliness rule is an adequate

and independent state doctrine. 

3. Cause and Prejudice

A habeas petitioner who has failed to comply with a state rule

must establish cause and prejudice in order to obtain habeas relief

under federal law. Review of a petitioner’s claim is precluded

unless he “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

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demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50

(citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)); see also High

v. Ignacio, 408 F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005). “[C]ause for a

procedural default on appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some

external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising

the claim.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 492; see McCleskey v. Zant, 499

U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (discussing cause under abuse of writ

doctrine); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. 

Rodriguez argues that even if his excessive fine claim is

procedurally barred, it should still be reviewed by the Court

because he can demonstrate cause and prejudice. (Opp’n 6, ECF No.

18.) He maintains, “The timeliness bar should not [be] applied to

petition[er] since the claim is regarding the imposition of an

unauthorized Government code section 13967 fine[], which

constitutes an illegal sentence and jurisdictional error, which can

be brought to the Court’s attention at any time.” (Id. at 7.) 

Rodriguez submits that if the sentencing court had considered his

ability to pay a restitution fine that exceeded the statutory

minimum, and if the court reviewed Petitioner’s probation report in

which he disclosed that he had no assets, the judge “could have”

determined that Rodriguez would be unable to pay the fine. (Id.) 

The Petitioner contends the violation was prejudicial and had a

“likely effect upon the outcome of the sentence (restitution

fines).” (Id.) He argues that an illegal sentence can be

corrected whenever brought to the court’s attention. (Id. at 8.)

To establish cause for the procedural default, Rodriguez must

show that there was an external impediment that prevented him from

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raising the claim sooner. Murray, 477 U.S. at 492; see McCleskey,

499 U.S. at 493. Petitioner, however, provides no information

explaining the cause for the three and one-half-year delay between

the date his judgment became final and the date he filed his first

state court habeas corpus petition. (See Opp’n 1-9, ECF No. 18;

see also Pet. 12-14, ECF No. 1.) For this reason alone, Rodriguez

is unable to demonstrate that the cause and prejudice exception to

procedural default applies to his claim. 

Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that dismissing his claim

would constitute a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” because if

the sentencing court had considered the factors, it could have

found Rodriguez would not be able to pay. (Opp’n 7, ECF No. 18.) 

This argument is not compelling.

As of July 21, 2004, the date Rodriguez was sentenced,

California Penal Code section 1202.4 instructed courts to impose a

separate and additional restitution fine in every case where a

person is convicted of a crime, unless the court finds “compelling

and extraordinary” reasons not to. Cal. Pen. Code § 1202.4(b)

(2004) (current version at Cal. Pen. Code § 1202.4(b) (2011)). A

defendant’s inability to pay cannot be deemed a compelling and

extraordinary reason to not impose restitution. Cal. Pen. Code §

1202.4(c) (2004). For felonies, the restitution fine cannot be

less than two hundred dollars and cannot be more than ten thousand

dollars; the exact amount is to be set at the court’s discretion. 

Id. § 1202.4(b)(1). 

When setting the fine, courts should consider relevant

factors, such as the seriousness of the offense, the defendant’s

ability to pay, and any persons’ losses as the result of the crime,

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among others. Id. § 1202.4(d). The statute provides, “Express

findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of

the fine shall not be required.” Id. Moreover, “[o]nly gross

disproportionality will raise an Eighth Amendment excessive fines

concern.” Heatley v. Tilton, No. 08cv0580-L(WMc), 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 29142, at *45 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2009) (citing United States

v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334-35 (1998)). Under these

standards, the Petitioner cannot establish prejudice.

Notably, the Supreme Court has reserved the miscarriage of

justice exception for the “extraordinary case” where the petitioner

can show that the constitutional error probably resulted in the

conviction of one who was actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Here, Rodriguez’s claim is that the

$3,926.84 portion of his restitution constitutes an excessive fine

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Pet. 13, ECF No. 1.) The

allegation that procedurally barring his claim would result in the

miscarriage of justice is implausible, at best. Petitioner has not

satisfied the requirements to show the cause and prejudice

exception should apply. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Walker, the

California timeliness rule constitutes an independent state ground

adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court, and Rodriguez’s

Petition should be dismissed. See Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.

Ct. at 1124, 1131. Further, the cause and prejudice exception to

procedural default is inapplicable to Petitioner’s circumstances. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss on this ground should be GRANTED.

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C. Evidentiary Hearing

In his Petition, Rodriguez briefly states that an evidentiary

hearing “would be useful” to assess his present financial status

and ability to pay the restitution fine. (Pet. 1, 14, ECF No. 1.) 

The Petitioner does not present any facts that would warrant an

evidentiary hearing. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670

(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the petitioner must demonstrate he

failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in state court);

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (requiring the

petitioner to establish that one of the six factors applies to his

case). Accordingly, Rodriguez’s request for an evidentiary hearing

is DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Rodriguez did not file his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus within AEDPA’s one-year statute

of limitations. The Petitioner is not entitled to a later start

date or tolling. Additionally, Rodriguez is procedurally barred

from brining his excessive fine claim, and he has not established

that the cause and prejudice exception applies to his

circumstances. Moreover, Rodriguez’s contention that an excessive

fine has been imposed on him is not a claim that is subject to

habeas corpus relief. For all of these reasons, Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED. Any request by Petitioner for

an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\RODRIGUEZ2651\R&R re MTDv2.wpd 31 10cv02651 AJB(RBB)

before August 12, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before August 26, 2011. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: July 18, 2011 

 RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Battaglia

All parties of record

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