Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00945/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00945-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABRAHAM GALINDO,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-0945 MCE DAD P

vs.

ED FOULK, Executive Director,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a civil detainee currently confined at Napa State Hospital, is

proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On

April 7, 2009, the undersigned ordered respondent to file a response to the petition. On June 24,

2009, respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioner has failed to

properly exhaust his federal habeas claims by first fairly presenting them to the highest state

court. Petitioner has filed an opposition to the motion. Respondent has not filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, in the Glenn County Superior Court, petitioner was found not guilty by

reason of insanity of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Petitioner does not challenge

that underlying criminal conviction in his habeas petition pending before this court. Rather, he

challenges the Glenn County Superior Court’s subsequent decisions, rendered in proceedings

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under California Penal Code § 1026.5(b), extending his commitment pursuant to that judgment

of conviction. (Pet. at 1-2 & Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 1.)

The record before this court establishes as follows. In 2004, the Glenn County

District Attorney petitioned the Superior Court to extend petitioner’s commitment for two years

from August 31, 2004, to August 31, 2006. Following a court trial in February 2005, the

Superior Court extended petitioner’s commitment to August 31, 2006, as requested by the

District Attorney. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District

reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the

decision in In re Howard N., 25 Cal. 4th 117 (2005). After a second court trial in September

2006, the Superior Court found sufficient evidence to sustain the petition and again extended

petitioner’s commitment to August 31, 2006. (Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 1.) 

In March of 2006, the Glenn County District Attorney again petitioned the

Superior Court to extend petitioner’s commitment through August 31, 2008. Following a jury

trial held in September of 2006, petitioner was found to suffer from a mental disease, defect, or

disorder that made it seriously difficult for him to control his dangerous behavior. It was also

found by the jury that he posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others. Based upon those

jury findings, the Superior Court again extended petitioner’s commitment to August 31, 2008. 

(Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 1.) 

On appeal from that determination, petitioner argued that there was insufficient

evidence introduced at both trials to support the finding of his serious difficulty in controlling

dangerous behavior. On December 11, 2007, the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District affirmed petitioner’s ongoing commitment. On January 14, 2008, petitioner

filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. On February 20, 2008, the petition

for review was summarily denied. Petitioner did not file any habeas petitions with the California

Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Lodged Docs. 1 & 5-6.) 

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On April 29, 2008, petitioner commenced this action by filing a federal habeas

petition, asserting the following five claims: (1) a single psychiatric opinion does not constitute

substantial evidence to support the extension of an insanity commitment; (2) the trial court and

the District Attorney erred in relying on evidence of petitioner’s past mental condition as

opposed to his “current mental condition”; (3) experts testified that petitioner needs to take

psychiatric drugs, but those drugs actually induce violent behavior; (4) psychiatry and psychology

are “pseudo sciences” – there is no cure for mental illness; and (5) the experts testifying at his

commitment trials were improperly motivated by financial gain. (Pet. at 4-11.)

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Respondent’s Motion

Respondent has moved to dismiss the pending petition, arguing that petitioner 

failed to exhaust his habeas claims in state court as required. Specifically, respondent notes that

petitioner has raises five claims in his pending federal petition. Respondent concedes that

petitioner presented these same claims in his petition for review filed with the California

Supreme Court. Respondent argues, however, that petitioner failed to raise any of these claims

in his appeal filed with the California Court of Appeal. According to respondent, where, as here,

a petitioner raises his federal habeas claims for relief for the first and only time to the state’s

highest court on discretionary review, he has not fairly presented those claims for purposes of the

exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, respondent concludes that petitioner’s federal habeas

claims are unexhausted and that the pending petition should be dismissed. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 3-4.) 

II. Petitioner’s Opposition

In opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioner argues that he

presented each of his claims to the California Supreme Court, thereby satisfying the exhaustion

requirement. In addition, petitioner argues that if his failure to present those claims to the

California Court of Appeal is an issue, it should be noted that he did not personally choose which

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claims were presented on appeal. Rather, petitioner contends, his appointed counsel made those

decisions and is responsible for any procedural default or errors stemming from that decision. 

(Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

State courts must be given the first opportunity to consider and address a state

prisoner’s habeas corpus claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2005) (citing Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982)); King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Habeas

petitioners have long been required to adjudicate their claims in state court - that is, ‘exhaust’

them - before seeking relief in federal court.”); Farmer v. Baldwin, 497 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

2007) (“This so-called ‘exhaustion requirement’ is intended to afford ‘the state courts a

meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error’ before a federal habeas court may

review a prisoner’s claims.”) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986)). In general,

a federal court will not grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus unless “the

applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement will not be deemed to have been waived unless the

state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 

A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting to the

highest state court all federal claims before presenting the claims to the federal court. See

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). A

federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal

legal theory upon which his claim is based. See Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025 (“Fair presentation

requires that a state’s highest court has ‘a fair opportunity to consider . . . and to correct [the]

asserted constitutional defect.’”); Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2004)

(same) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 276)); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003),

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 Under Pennsylvania law, allocatur review “is not a matter of right, but of sound 1

discretion, and an appeal will be allowed only when there are special and important reasons

therefor.” Castille, 489 U.S. at 347 (quoting Pa. R. App. P. 1114). 

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overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v.

Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Bland v. California Dep’t of Corrs., 20

F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994). 

II. Discussion

If a habeas petitioner presents for the first and only time his federal claims to the

state’s highest court on discretionary review, without more, he fails to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th

Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1146 (2005); see also Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 2008) (“However, Castille does not address the question presented here, as

Castille involved only a state court’s rejection without comment of a new claim in an

extraordinary motion and does not tell us what to do when a court has in fact spoken on the

issue.”). In Castille, the Superior Court in Pennsylvania had affirmed Castille’s conviction on

direct appeal. Castille then unsuccessfully raised his federal claims for the first time in two

“petitions for allocatur” in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Castille next filed a petition for 1

writ of habeas corpus in federal court raising various federal claims, some of which he had raised

only in his allocatur petitions. The district court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust state

court remedies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and

remanded, concluding that Castille’s inclusion of his claims in his allocatur petitions filed with

the state’s highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement. Disagreeing, the United States

Supreme Court held in a unanimous decision that petitioner had not exhausted his federal habeas

claims. The Supreme Court explained that a habeas claim remains unexhausted

where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless

“there are special and important reasons therefor.” Raising the

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claim in such a fashion does not, for the relevant purpose,

constitute “fair presentation.” (internal citations omitted) 

Id. at 348 & 351.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has similarly held that a

habeas petitioner does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement by raising his federal claims for the

first and only time in a petition for discretionary review filed with a state supreme court. See

Casey, 386 F.3d 896. In that case, Casey raised his federal claims for the first and only time in

his petition for review filed with the Washington Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit explained

that Casey’s petition for review was analogous to Castille’s allocatur petitions because the

Washington Supreme Court will grant a petition for review not as a matter of right, but within its

own discretion. The Ninth Circuit determined that there was “no principled or logical distinction

that . . . would set Casey’s case apart from the precedent in Castille” and concluded that

“[b]ecause . . . Casey raised his federal constitutional claims for the first and only time to the

state’s highest court on discretionary review, he did not fairly present them.” 386 F.3d at 917-18.

See also Nichols v. Hartley, 1:08-cv-01017-OWW-BAK-GSA HC, 2009 WL 3153710, at *4

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (recommending dismissal, recognizing “Casey stands for the

proposition that if the filing in the state’s highest court is one for discretionary review, the

petition[er] must have presented all of his federal claims at the lower levels of the state courts.”);

Gurnsey v. California, No. Civ. S-07-1900 MCE KJM P, 2008 WL 4104316 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2,

2008) (recommending dismissal pursuant to Castille and Casey where federal claims were

presented to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review); Hill v. California Bd. of

Prison Hearings, No. C 06-3080 MMC (PR), 2007 WL 2318976, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2007)

(where claim was presented only in a petition for review that was summarily denied by the

California Supreme Court, it was not fairly presented for purposes of the exhaustion

requirement); Reynoso v. Lamarque, No. Civ. S-03-0272 RRB EFB P, 2007 WL 707521, at *7

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (“Because petitioner raised claims 4 and 5 for the first time in a

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 It appears somewhat incongruous to the undersigned that federal claims presented for 2

the first time in state court via a state habeas petition filed directly to the California Supreme

Court are fairly presented and therefore properly exhausted, while the same claims presented for

the first time in a petition for review filed with that court are not. Nonetheless, the decision in

Casey v. Moore is the law of the circuit and this court is bound by it, even if such subtleties may

understandably be lost on many of the pro se petitioners seeking habeas relief in the federal

courts. 

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discretionary appeal to the California Supreme Court, he has failed to exhaust those claims for 

purposes of the federal habeas corpus statute.”).

2

As noted above, in this case, petitioner asserts five claims for relief in his federal

habeas petition pending before the court. He raised these same five claims in his petition for

review filed with the California Supreme Court on January 14, 2008, following the California

Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the judgment. (Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. 1.) In California,

however, granting a petition for review of a lower court decision is discretionary. See California

Rules of Court, Rule 8.500(b) & (c). In this regard, Rule 8.500(b) of the California Rules of

Court enumerates the limited circumstances under which the California Supreme Court may

choose to exercise its discretionary power of review, as follows:

The Supreme Court may order review of a Court of Appeal

decision:

(1) When necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an

important question of law;

(2) When the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction;

(3) When the Court of Appeal decision lacked the concurrence of

sufficient qualified justices; or

(4) For the purpose of transferring the matter to the Court of

Appeal for such proceedings as the Supreme Court may order.

In this way, a petition for review directed to the California Supreme Court is

analogous to the allocatur petition filed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as in Castille and

the petition for review filed with the Washington Supreme Court in Casey. Pursuant to the

decisions in Castille and Casey, if petitioner raised his five federal habeas claims for the first and

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only time in his January 14, 2008, petition for review to the California Supreme Court, he has

failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 

After carefully reviewing counsel’s opening and reply briefs filed on behalf of

petitioner on appeal to the California Court of Appeal, petitioner’s pro se petition for review

submitted to the California Supreme Court, and his pending pro se federal habeas petition, the

court finds that petitioner has failed to exhaust his second, third, fourth, and fifth federal habeas

claims for relief. However, contrary to respondent’s contention, the undersigned concludes that

petitioner has properly exhausted his first claim for federal habeas relief. 

As respondent acknowledges, in petitioner’s direct appeal of right to the state

appellate court, petitioner argued that there was no substantial evidence introduced at the

proceedings below to support the extension of his commitment. This first claim of petitioner’s

pending federal petition, is virtually identical to the first claim of his petition for review filed

with the California Supreme Court in which he similarly argued that there was no substantial

evidence before the trial court to support a finding that he has difficulty controlling dangerous

behavior. In fact, petitioner on this point has lifted entire passages from his opening brief to the

California Court of Appeal and repeated them here in support of his federal claim of entitlement

to habeas relief. Petitioner has presented essentially the same argument, that there was

insufficient evidence presented at the September 2006 proceeding before the Glenn County

Superior Court to support the extension of his confinement, to the California Court of Appeal,

the California Supreme Court and to this court. The state courts, including the California

Supreme Court, were given an adequate opportunity to address petitioner’s first claim for habeas

relief. Accordingly, petitioner has satisfied the fair presentation requirement with regard to this

claim. (Resp’t’s Lodged Docs. 2, 5 & Pet. at 4-6.) 

If these findings and recommendations are adopted, petitioner’s federal petition

pending before this court is then a “mixed” petition, containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. A federal court cannot grant habeas relief based on a mixed petition. However, recent

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developments in the law leads the court to conclude that respondent’s motion to dismiss should

not be granted at this time. Instead, petitioner should be given the opportunity to inform the

court as to how he wishes to proceed in this case after considering the three options set forth

below. See Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1015-17 (9th Cir. 2005).

First, petitioner may elect to seek a stay and abeyance order to allow him to return

to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. The Ninth Circuit recently analyzed the two

procedures available to habeas petitioners who wish to proceed with exhausted and unexhausted

claims for relief. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the Ninth Circuit

explained “the Kelly procedure,” which it had originally outlined in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d

1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the three-step Kelly procedure, 

(1) the petitioner amends his petition to delete any unexhausted

claims, (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully

exhausted petition, allowing petitioner the opportunity to proceed

to state court to exhaust the deleted claims, and (3) petitioner later

amends his petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to

the original petition. 

King, 564 F.3d at 1135. A petitioner who elects to proceed under the Kelly procedure will be

able to amend his petition with his newly exhausted claims if they are timely. If a petitioner’s

newly-exhausted claims are untimely, he will only be able to amend his petition to include them

if they share a “common core of operative facts” with the claims in his original petition. In this

regard, the Kelly procedure, unlike the alternative procedure discussed below, is a riskier one for

a habeas petitioner because it does not protect a petitioner’s unexhausted claims from expiring

during a stay. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41; see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-75

(2001) (unlike the filing of a state habeas petition, the filing of a federal habeas petition does not

toll the statute of limitations).

As the Ninth Circuit explained in King, the United States Supreme Court has

authorized an alternative procedure which it outlined in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277

(2005). Under the Rhines procedure, the petitioner need not amend his petition to delete

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unexhausted claims. Instead, the petitioner may proceed on a “mixed petition,” and his

unexhausted claims remain pending in federal court while he returns to state court to exhaust

them. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140; Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Rhines

concluded that a district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner time to

return to state court to present unexhausted claims.”). A petitioner who elects to proceed under

the Rhines procedure can, in many instances, avoid an issue with respect to the timeliness of his

federal petition. See King, 564 F.3d at 1140. However, the United States Supreme Court

cautioned that a “stay and abeyance [under the Rhines procedure] should be available only in

limited circumstances,” and “district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s

trip to state court and back.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. The Supreme Court explained that

district courts should not grant a stay if the petitioner has engaged in abusive litigation tactics or

intentional delay or if the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. Id. at 278. In addition,

federal proceedings may not be stayed indefinitely and reasonable time limits must be imposed

on a petitioner’s return to state court to exhaust additional claims. Id. at 277-78. Here, if

petitioner chooses to pursue this option (i.e., a stay and abeyance order), the court will issue a

separate order granting him thirty days leave to file a motion for a stay and abeyance under the

Kelly or Rhines procedure.

Second, petitioner may elect to abandon the unexhausted claims set forth in his

petition before this court without seeking a stay and abeyance order and proceed solely on his one

exhausted claim. Petitioner is advised that, if he chooses this option, a subsequent petition

challenging the same commitment proceedings may be barred as second or successive. If

petitioner chooses this option, the court will issue a separate order granting him thirty days leave

to amend his petition so as to include his first and only exhausted claim. 

Finally, petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss this action and complete

exhaustion of his unexhausted claims and then file a new federal petition presenting all of his

exhausted claims. Petitioner is advised, however, that if he chooses this option, any future

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federal petition for writ of habeas corpus may very well be time barred. The habeas corpus

statute imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in

federal court. In most cases, the one year period will start to run on the date on which the state

court judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for

seeking direct review, although the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

In sum, the court will recommend that respondent’s motion to dismiss be denied

at this time. The court will also recommend that petitioner be granted thirty days leave to notify

the court by declaration as to how he wishes to proceed in this case. If the assigned district judge

adopts these findings and recommendations and petitioner elects to pursue this action by filing a

declaration, petitioner is advised that his declaration need not be lengthy. Petitioner only need

state whether he wishes to pursue the first, second, or third option described above. Then, upon

review of petitioner’s declaration, the undersigned will issue an order granting petitioner thirty

days leave to either: (1) file a motion for stay and abeyance pursuant to the Kelly or Rhines

procedure; (2) file an amended petition containing only his exhausted claims; or (3) file a motion

for dismissal.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s June 24, 2009 motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 11) be denied; and

2. Petitioner be granted thirty days leave to file a declaration notifying the court

as to how he wishes to proceed in this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 16, 2010.

DAD:9

gali0945.157

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