Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01567/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01567-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis A. Moreno, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-1567-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff’s opening brief (doc. 11), defendant’s response (doc.

14), and plaintiff’s reply (doc. 15). 

I.

This case arises from a denial by the Social Security Administration of plaintiff’s

application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security

Act. Plaintiff alleged a disability beginning February 29, 2008, due to physical and mental

impairments, including major depression with psychotic features. The claim was denied

initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing on November 1, 2010, the administrative

law judge (ALJ) issued a decision denying benefits. The decision became the final decision

of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review.

Plaintiff then filed this action for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

A district court may set aside a denial of benefits “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954

(9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as

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a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Where the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s diabetes, obesity, and depression were “severe”

impairments as defined by the Social Security Act. He also found that plaintiff’s intellectual

functioning was in the borderline range, but that his cognitive impairment was not “severe”

within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff has the residual functional

capacity to perform medium work, except that his mental impairments limit him to unskilled

work. Tr. 31. The ALJ further found that plaintiff is able to perform his past relevant work

as a field worker, restaurant worker, and a landscape worker. Therefore, the ALJ concluded

that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. 

II.

At step two of the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s diabetes,

obesity and depression were “severe” within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to also find that his cognitive impairment was

“severe.” 

An impairment is “severe” if it “significantly limits” an individual’s mental or

physical ability to perform basic work activities. Id. Notwithstanding that the ALJ did not

include borderline intellectual functioning in the list of plaintiff’s “severe” impairments, he

did consider the impairment throughout the sequential analysis and included the effect of the

borderline intellectual functioning in determining the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.

The ALJ acknowledged IQ testing by Dr. Bencomo that revealed a nonverbal IQ of 75. He

also considered plaintiff’s lapses in concentration and memory during Dr. Bencomo’s

examination, and plaintiff’s reports of memory difficulties to treating and examining sources.

Tr. 31, 415, 424-25, 465. Based on the record evidence, the ALJ found that plaintiff had

moderate difficulty in concentration, persistence, and pace. Tr. 31. The ALJ concluded that

plaintiff’s mental impairments limit him to unskilled work. Tr. 31. 

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Therefore, to the extent the ALJ erred in failing to include borderline intellectual

functioning in the list of severe impairments, it had no practical effect and was therefore

harmless. See Pederson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 405 Fed. Appx. 117, 119 (9th

Cir.2010) (holding that a step two determination had no practical effect when the ALJ did

not end the analysis at step two).

III.

A.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to properly weigh medical source opinions.

Specifically, he argues that although the ALJ accorded “significant” weight to certain

limitations assessed by examining physician Dr. Bencomo, he erred in rejecting other

limitations identified by Dr. Bencomo. 

The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Bencomo’s opinion that plaintiff could

remember locations and understand and remember very short, simple instructions, but would

have difficulty understanding detailed and complex instructions. Accordingly, the ALJ

concluded that plaintiff’s mental impairment limits him to unskilled work. Tr. 36, 425. The

ALJ, however, did not accept Dr. Bencomo’s opinion that plaintiff would be unable to work

in coordination with others, including coworkers and supervisors, without being distracted

by them due to paranoid delusional thinking. Tr. 36, 425. The ALJ based this conclusion

on his finding that plaintiff’s symptoms were alleviated with treatment, his treating sources

consistently noted that plaintiff was polite and respectful in interactions, and the record

demonstrated that plaintiff is able to sustain close relationships with family and friends. Tr.

36, 455, 579, 668, 676. 

The ALJ also supported this conclusion based on the opinion by Dr. Gallucci, a

reviewing State agency psychologist. When there is a conflict between the opinions of

medical source experts, an ALJ may disregard the opinion of an examining physician if he

sets forth “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for

doing so.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Although a contrary

opinion by a non-examining medical expert does not alone constitute specific, legitimate

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reasons for rejecting a treating or examining physician’s opinion, it may “constitute

substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record.”

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); SSR 96-6p. 

Dr. Gallucci completed forms indicating that plaintiff had marked limitations in his

ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, and no more than

moderate limitations in the remaining functional abilities. Tr. 427-28. Dr. Gallucci opined

that plaintiff could perform simple work, work in coordination with or proximity to others

without being unduly distracted, respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. Tr. 429. Dr. Gallucci therefore

concluded that plaintiff had all of the abilities required to meet the mental demands of

unskilled work. Tr. 429. 

Dr. Gallucci’s opinion is consistent with other evidence in the record including

treating sources who consistently noted that plaintiff was always polite, respectful and

cooperative in their interactions. Tr. 648, 650, 676. Moreover, even Dr. Bencomo found that

plaintiff has adequate social interaction skills and can interact appropriately with the general

public. Tr. 36, 425. Like other medical sources, Dr. Bencomo reported that plaintiff’s

behavior during interactions was socially appropriate. Tr. 425.

Finally, Dr. Bencomo’s opinion was based in large part on plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of disabling limitations. Therefore the reliability of that opinion is inextricably

intertwined with plaintiff’s credibility. The ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not fully

credible, Tr. 34, also calls into question the reliability of Dr. Bencomo’s assessments. See

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (“Because the present record supports the ALJ in discounting

[claimant’s] credibility, . . . he was free to disregard [an examining physician’s] opinion,

which was premised on [claimant’s] subjective complaints.”). 

These reasons are sufficiently specific and legitimate to support the ALJ’s decision

to discount portions of Dr. Bencomo’s opinion.

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B.

The ALJ also rejected the opinion of psychiatric physician’s assistant Harmston who

found that plaintiff had several “moderately severe” and one “severe” mental functional

limitations. Tr. 706-07. First, the ALJ rejected Harmston’s opinion that plaintiff has a severe

restriction in his ability to respond appropriately to others because it is inconsistent with

treating sources who reported that plaintiff is always polite, respectful, and cooperative. Tr.

35. Moreover, these conclusions were inconsistent with Mr. Harmston’s own treatment

records which demonstrated that plaintiff’s condition improved with treatment. Tr. 675. 

We conclude that the ALJ gave sufficiently specific and legitimate reasons for

discounting the opinions of physician’s assistant Harmston.

IV.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in discounting his subjective complaints of

disabling symptoms. When evaluating the credibility of subjective complaints, the ALJ must

first consider whether there is an underlying medical impairment that could reasonably be

expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms. If an underlying impairment is

shown, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s

testimony about the severity of the symptoms by giving “specific, clear and convincing

reasons for the rejection.” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably

be expected to cause only some of plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. The ALJ supported this

conclusion by noting that both treating sources, and the plaintiff himself, reported that his

medications were working and that he was feeling better. Tr. 33. An impairment that can

reasonably be alleviated by treatment cannot serve as a basis for a finding of disability.

Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The ALJ observed that plaintiff had a long history of mental health treatment with

counseling and medication that were “generally successful” in controlling his symptoms of

depression and anxiety. Tr. 35. In June 2008, plaintiff reported that he was doing better and

his mental status exam revealed euthymic (normal) mood and appropriate affect. Tr. 457.

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In July 2008, plaintiff’s counselor reported that he was doing well and could be discharged

from counseling. Tr. 639. In February 2010, plaintiff stated he was “getting along,”and his

medications worked well without side effects. Tr. 675. Plaintiff’s treating physician’s

assistant, Mr. Harmston, reported that plaintiff’s mood was euthymic and his affect

appropriate. Tr. 676. Plaintiff reported in May 2010 that his medications were working and

that he was feeling better. Tr. 33. In September 2010, treating sources noted that plaintiff’s

medications were working well and that plaintiff exhibited normal behavior, an appropriate

affect, relaxed mood and good concentration. Tr. 33. The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s

treatment has been generally successful in controlling his symptoms is supported by

significant evidence in the record. 

The ALJ also found that plaintiff’s daily activities were not fully consistent with his

complaints of disabling limitations. Plaintiff is able to spend time with his father and

extended family, take frequent walks, help with housecleaning, and actively look for work.

The ALJ reasonably found that the job search indicates that plaintiff’s own perceptions of

his ability to work are at odds with the limitations he otherwise reported. 

All of these reasons are sufficiently clear and convincing to support the ALJ’s

conclusion that plaintiff’s subjective complaints are not fully credible. 

V.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff is not 

disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED

AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying disability benefits.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2013.

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