Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01356/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01356-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Puente Arizona, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa 

County, Arizona, in his official capacity, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 The Court held a discovery conference call with the parties on January 20, 2016. 

Doc. 370. Defendants raised concerns regarding invocations of the Fifth Amendment 

during the depositions of the two Expungement Plaintiffs, Sara Edith Cervantes Arreola 

and Elia Estrada Fernandez. Because assertions of the Fifth Amendment must be 

addressed on a question-by-question basis, the Court directed the parties to submit a 

matrix which set forth each question, each Fifth Amendment refusal to answer, 

Defendants’ arguments as to why the invocation was improper, and Plaintiffs’ arguments 

as to why the Fifth Amendment was properly invoked. Doc. 373. 

 The parties submitted the matrix on January 29, 2016. Doc. 398. The Court has 

conducted a question-by-question review, and has also read the questions and answers in 

the context of the deposition transcripts which the Court later required the parties to file. 

Docs. 424; 424-1. The Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination was properly invoked by the Expungement Plaintiffs with respect to 

virtually all of the questions. 

Case 2:14-cv-01356-DGC Document 431 Filed 02/19/16 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

A. Legal Standard.

 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth 

Amendment’s protections apply to civil proceedings. Doe v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 

1263 (9th Cir. 2000). In the civil context “the invocation of the privilege is limited to 

those circumstances in which the person invoking the privilege reasonably believes that 

his disclosures could be used in a criminal prosecution, or could lead to other evidence 

that could be used in that manner.” Id. “Therefore, the privilege against selfincrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of prosecution 

and also covers those circumstances where the disclosures would not be directly 

incriminating, but could provide an indirect link to incriminating evidence.” Id. 

(emphasis in original; quotation marks and citation omitted). 

B. Analysis. 

 Virtually all of the questions at issue concern the Expungement Plaintiffs’ use of 

falsified documents to obtain employment. There were many questions about social 

security numbers, including whether certain social security numbers belonged to the 

Expungement Plaintiffs (see Docs. 424 at 56; 424-1 at 18-19, 36-37, 102-03), whether 

they had used these social security numbers to obtain employment (see Docs. 424 at 43-

44, 49, 53; 424-1 at 16-19, 36-37, 96-98, 103-04, 106-08), and how they had initially 

obtained these social security numbers (see Docs. 424 at 36; 424-1 at 102-03). There 

were also a number of questions about tax documents, including whether the 

Expungement Plaintiffs had signed certain forms, such as IRS Form W-4 (see Doc. 424 at 

37-38, 41-43) and Arizona Form A-4 (see id. at 44), whether they had filed tax returns 

(see Docs. 424 at 57; 424-1 at 27), and whether information on certain tax documents 

was accurate (see Doc. 424 at 44). Ms. Cervantes Arreola was asked whether an 

immigration document, a Permanent Resident Card, was hers. See id. at 53-54. Ms. 

Estrada Fernandez was asked about using a false name on her employment paperwork. 

See Doc. 424-1 at 32-33. 

Case 2:14-cv-01356-DGC Document 431 Filed 02/19/16 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Defendants argue that the Fifth Amendment was not properly invoked in response 

to these questions because the Expungement Plaintiffs admit they were previously 

convicted under Arizona identity theft statutes for using false identifications to obtain 

employment, the convictions were based on the Expungement Plaintiffs’ guilty pleas, the 

prosecutions in which the Expungement Plaintiffs pled guilty were based on the very 

documents presented to them in their depositions, three years have now passed without 

any evidence of a federal investigation or federal prosecution based on the same 

documents and information, and the Expungement Plaintiffs therefore have not shown 

any substantial or real threat of prosecution. For several reasons, the Court is not 

persuaded by these arguments. 

 First, although it is true that the Expungement Plaintiffs have admitted that they 

were convicted of violating Arizona identity theft laws, they are not basing their current 

Fifth Amendment assertions on those laws. Instead, they base their invocations of the 

Fifth Amendment on federal statutes prohibiting the making or use of false statements on 

tax documents (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)), fraud or misuse of immigration or other documents 

(18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), (b)), social security fraud (18 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(c)), the making of 

false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)), perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621), and tax evasion (26 

U.S.C. § 7201)). The fact that the Expungement Plaintiffs were previously convicted of 

violating Arizona identity theft laws does not prohibit their prosecution under these 

federal statutes. 

 Second, Defendants assert that prosecution of the Expungement Plaintiffs under 

the federal statutes is highly unlikely given that three years have passed since they 

entered guilty pleas in the state case. Defendants also note that the Expungement 

Plaintiffs identify no instances where similar prosecutions have occurred. All of this may 

be true, but Defendants have not shown that prosecutions based on the above-cited 

federal statutes would be barred by the statute of limitations, double jeopardy, or some 

form of immunity. Thus, there appears to be no legal bar to the prosecution of the 

Expungement Plaintiffs for violating these laws. 

Case 2:14-cv-01356-DGC Document 431 Filed 02/19/16 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Third, Defendants note that the various documents presented during the 

depositions were the same documents at issue in the Expungement Plaintiffs’ violation of 

Arizona identity theft laws. But Defendants have not shown where the Expungement 

Plaintiffs admitted the facts asked about in their depositions. The parties have provided 

the Court with the transcript of Ms. Cervantes Arreola’s guilty plea in state court, and the 

plea colloquy contains nothing more than a simple admission of guilt. See Doc. 398-1 at 

10 (admitting that “on or about July 8, 2010 and within Maricopa County, Ms. Cervantes 

possessed or used personal identifying information of another person, including a 

fictitious person, with the intent to obtain employment”). It did not address any of the 

documents presented during Ms. Cervantes Arreola’s deposition, and did not include her 

admission to any of the facts about which she was asked in the deposition. Thus, even 

though the documents may have been at issue in the state court prosecutions, Defendants 

cannot show that the Expungement Plaintiffs previously made admissions with respect to 

those specific documents. Answers to the questions posited by the Defendants would 

therefore be new admissions. 

 Fourth, the Court is not persuaded that it can overrule the Expungement Plaintiffs’ 

Fifth Amendment assertions merely because prosecution under the relevant federal 

statutes appears unlikely. It is true that the law on this subject is somewhat ambiguous, 

providing helpful quotations for both sides. The Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth 

Amendment applies only when a person is faced with “substantial and ‘real,’ and not 

merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.” Marchetti v. United States, 390 

U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (citations omitted). It is also true, however, that courts have 

emphasized, as quoted above, that the “privilege against self-incrimination does not 

depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of prosecution.” Glanzer, 232 F.3d 

at 1263 (citing United Liquor Co. v. Gard (In Re Seper), 705 F.2d 1499, 1501 (9th Cir. 

1983)). 

 The Court finds helpful guidance in the Supreme Court’s seminal decision of 

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). The high court made clear that the 

Case 2:14-cv-01356-DGC Document 431 Filed 02/19/16 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

privilege against self-incrimination “not only extends to answers that would in 

themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces 

those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the 

claimant for a federal crime.” Id. at 486 (citation omitted). The court clarified that “this 

protection must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to 

apprehend danger from a direct answer.” Id. (citation omitted). The court also stated that 

“[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, 

in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an 

explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious 

disclosure could result.” Id. at 486-87. 

 The Court has reviewed each of the federal statutes cited by the Expungement 

Plaintiffs and concludes that the questions asked by Defendants would assist a prosecutor 

in proving some element of the crimes set forth in those statutes. They would, as 

Hoffman notes, “furnish a link in the chain of evidence” needed to prosecute the 

Expungement Plaintiffs for a federal crime. And when the Court considers the questions 

in the setting in which they were asked, as Hoffman directs, the Court concludes that the 

Expungement Plaintiffs have reasonable cause to apprehend danger from answering the 

questions. The Expungement Plaintiffs admit they are undocumented immigrants. They 

have previously admitted to violating state identity theft statutes. Their responses to 

questions posed by Defendants could provide evidence upon which a federal prosecutor 

might rely in prosecuting them for various federal crimes. Defendants have identified no 

legal impediment to such a prosecution. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that 

the Expungement Plaintiffs have reasonable cause to apprehend danger from the 

questions posed by Defendants. 

 True, three years have passed since the Expungement Plaintiffs admitted to state 

identity theft. Also true, the Expungement Plaintiffs have not cited examples of similar 

prosecutions. But the Court can find no case holding that the Fifth Amendment was 

improperly invoked merely because the person asserting the privilege was unable to 

Case 2:14-cv-01356-DGC Document 431 Filed 02/19/16 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

prove an imminent threat of prosecution. Clearly, the possibility of prosecution exists 

here, and answers to the questions could provide evidence for such a prosecution. This is 

sufficient to sustain the Expungement Plaintiffs’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment. See

Glanzer, 232 F.3d at 1263; see also United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473, 478 (10th Cir. 

1983) (“Once the court determines that the answers requested would tend to incriminate 

the witness, it should not attempt to speculate whether the witness will in fact be 

prosecuted.”) (collecting cases); United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 

1984) (same). 

C. Conclusion.

 The Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment was properly invoked with respect 

to questions 1-3, 5-9, 11, and 14-17 in the Cervantes Arreola deposition. These numbers 

correspond to numbers in the parties’ matrix. See Doc. 398. The Court finds that 

questions 4, 10, 12-13, and 18 were ultimately answered by Ms. Cervantes Arreola and 

therefore present no Fifth Amendment issue. The Fifth Amendment was also properly 

invoked in response to questions 2-9 and 11-21 in the Estrada Fernandez deposition. 

Questions 1 and 10 were ultimately answered by Ms. Estrada Fernandez and therefore do 

not present a Fifth Amendment issue. 

 Because each of the questions either invoked a proper Fifth Amendment objection 

or was ultimately answered, the Court concludes that no basis exists for Defendants to 

conduct further depositions of the Expungement Plaintiffs on the matters addressed in 

this order. 

 Dated this 19th day of February, 2016. 

Case 2:14-cv-01356-DGC Document 431 Filed 02/19/16 Page 6 of 6