Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_06-cv-00015/USCOURTS-ared-1_06-cv-00015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

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1

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101, et seq.

IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

SHERRY YOUNG, as Parent of

Zachary Young, a minor PLAINTIFF

v. 1:06CV00015-WRW

TWIN RIVERS SCHOOL DISTRICT,

VINCE SAYORS, CALVIN PICKETT,

MIKE BISSENBACH, ALAN ZIEGER, 

CAROLYN URENO, SHAWN ROSS, and

JIM RUTLEDGE, in their Official Capacities

as Board Members; and BRUCE EVANS, in his

Official and Individual Capacities DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants after her son Zachary was paddled at school.

Plaintiff argues that her son was deprived of due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under

the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”).1 Defendants have moved for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 13) and Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 16). Defendants motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff Sherry Young is the mother of Zachary Young who was a seventh grade student at

Williford Junior High School in the Twin Rivers School District on April 16, 2004, at the time of

the paddling. Defendant Evans was the Superintendent of the school district and administered the

punishment. 

After violating school policy, Zachary had the option of taking a three day suspension from

school or be given three “licks.” At the request of his mother, Zachary opted for the licks so that

Case 1:06-cv-00015-BRW Document 17 Filed 10/27/06 Page 1 of 5
2

Doc. No. 14, ps. 7-10. 

3

Doc. No. 1, p. 2. 

4

Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987); Fed R. Civ. P. 56. 

5

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

6

Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1979).

7

Id. at 728.

he would not get behind in his classes. Ms. Young was present when Zachary received his

punishment, but was not allowed in the room. Anthony Burkhammer, a school employee, served

as a witness to the paddling. According to both Defendant Evans and Mr. Burkhammer, the first lick

was given with normal force, “not at all excessive,” and the second and third licks were much

lighter.2

 In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Zachary was “unable to sit down, use the bathroom,

or ambulate without difficulty for several days . . . .”3

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so

that the dispute may be decided on purely legal grounds.4 The Supreme Court has established

guidelines to assist trial courts in determining whether this standard has been met:

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the

need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.5

 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment is an 

extreme remedy that should only be granted when the movant has established a right to the judgment

beyond controversy.6 Nevertheless, summary judgment promotes judicial economy by preventing

trial when no genuine issue of fact remains.7

 I must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

Case 1:06-cv-00015-BRW Document 17 Filed 10/27/06 Page 2 of 5
8

Id. at 727-28.

9

Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338, 1339 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting City of Mt.

Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)). 

10Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

11Sylvester v. Fogley, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (W.D. Ark. 2005).

12Golden ex rel. Balch v. Anders, 324 F.3d 650, 652-653 (8th Cir. 2003); S.S. by &

through Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir.2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 532 U.S.

904. 

party opposing the motion.8 The Eighth Circuit has also set out the burden of the parties in

connection with a summary judgment motion:

[T]he burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to demonstrate,

i.e.,“[to point] out to the District Court,” that the record does not disclose a genuine

dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the

record does not contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which

bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged, and, if the record

in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is

then the respondent’s burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts,

showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry

that burden, summary judgment should be granted.9

Only disputes over facts that may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.10

III. Analysis

As an initial matter, ACRA does not apply to this case because there is no allegation that

either Plaintiff is a part of a protected class. Nevertheless, the burdens of proof for claims brought

under § 1983 and ACRA are identical;11 therefore, even if Plaintiff’s ACRA could be sustained, the

§ 1983 claims would be considered as including the ACRA claims. 

For government conduct to amount to a violation of substantive due-process, a plaintiff must

show that the conduct shocks the conscience.12 The government action must be more than merely

Case 1:06-cv-00015-BRW Document 17 Filed 10/27/06 Page 3 of 5
13Id.; Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir.1998) (en banc). 

14Id. (citing Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir. 2002)).

15Daniels v. Lutz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044-45 (E.D. Ark. 2005).

16Id. at 1044-45 (citing Wise v. Pea Ridge School Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir.

1988)).

17Wise, at 565. 

18Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-112. 

arbitrary or capricious.13 “Substantive due process ‘is concerned with violations of personal rights

. . . so severe . . . so disproportionate to the need presented, and . . . so inspired by malice or sadism

rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse

of official power literally shocking to the conscience.’”14

 In corporal punishment actions, the Eighth Circuit has developed a four factor test to

determine whether the action shocks the conscience.15 The factors are: “(1) the need for the

application of corporal punishment; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of

punishment administered; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; and (4) whether the punishment was

administered in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.”16 Applying this test, the Wise court concluded that, “[m]inor discomfort

and hurt feelings do not make a federal case.”17

In view of the Eighth Circuit standards, Defendants’ conduct does not shock the conscience.

Zachary was punished for fighting at school. Three licks is not disproportionate to the school’s

need to discourage fighting. In addition, when given the choice, Plaintiff decided that Zachary

should receive a paddling rather than a three-day suspension. Defendants administered the

punishment at the behest of Plaintiff, acting within school policy and under Arkansas law.18 Plaintiff

Case 1:06-cv-00015-BRW Document 17 Filed 10/27/06 Page 4 of 5
19See Wise, supra (held that two licks with paddle did not violate due process).

20Doc. No. 16, p. 11, Police Incidence Report “Mrs. Young feels like it will leave a bruise

. . . .”

has not submitted evidence that Defendants acted maliciously19 or that Zachary suffered an injury

from the paddling.20 For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of October, 2006.

 /s/Wm. R. Wilson, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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