Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08199/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08199-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KM 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lon Roger Coleman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 12-8199-PCT-DGC (JFM) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Lon Roger Coleman, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Tucson, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a November 27, 2012 

Order, the Court denied the Application to Proceed with leave to re-file. Plaintiff filed a 

new, deficient Application to Proceed which the Court also denied with leave to re-file. 

On May 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a third Application to Proceed (Doc. 14). The Court will 

order Defendants Schiff, Gordanier, Puckett, and Blackard to answer Counts Two, Six, 

and Eight of the Complaint, and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants 

without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s third Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). The statutory fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the 

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previous month’s income each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 

agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

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342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Complaint 

 Plaintiff raises eight claims for relief in the Complaint and names the following 

Defendants: Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) Director Charles L. Ryan; 

Senior Adult Probation Officer Michael Holland; Warden Sullivan; Assistant Deputy 

Warden Palosaari; Lieutenant Gordanier; Security Staff Sergeant Morrish; Security Staff 

Captain Schitter; Mental Health Supervisor L. Schiff; Medical Health Services 

Administrator J. A. Clenney; Unknown MTC Employee in Charge of Inmate Movement; 

Security Staff Officer Puckett; Unknown Grievance Coordinator; Security Staff Officer 

Krakenbuhl; Warden Ryder; and Security Staff Officer Blackard. Plaintiff seeks 

injunctive relief and money damages. 

IV. Discussion

A. Count One 

 In Count One, Plaintiff claims his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated when Defendant Holland submitted a report to a trial court judge which was 

“factually inaccurate and grossly distorted, [and] omitted and/or fabricated facts which 

were relied upon for sentencing consideration in a case for which [Plaintiff] was a 

Defendant.” Plaintiff claims that as a result of the inaccurate report, the trial judge was 

denied the opportunity to consider exculpatory evidence and mitigating circumstances 

during sentencing and Plaintiff has suffered psychological harm in prison. 

 A prisoner’s claim for damages cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a 

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction 

or sentence,” unless the prisoner demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has 

previously been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Plaintiff’s claim that the trial judge failed to consider 

exculpatory evidence and mitigating circumstances during sentencing implies the 

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invalidity of Plaintiff’s sentence, and his claim is therefore barred by Heck. The Court 

will dismiss Count One for failure to state a claim. 

B. Count Two 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and 

rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleges that on 

April 3, 2012, Defendant Gordanier directed Plaintiff to go outside while security staff 

conducted a quarterly search of his dorm. Plaintiff informed Defendant Gordanier that 

going outside caused Plaintiff to suffer panic attacks, blackouts, vertigo, personality 

alterations, migraines, and/or nausea due to Plaintiff’s mental illness. Plaintiff also 

explained that he had not been outside of the building in seven months and that during 

previous quarterly searches staff accommodated his disability without a problem. 

Defendant Gordanier told Plaintiff that he had discussed Plaintiff’s situation with 

Defendant Schiff and had been told by Defendant Schiff that Plaintiff’s mental illness did 

not prevent Plaintiff from going outdoors. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Gordanier refused to review Plaintiff’s medical 

documentation, handcuffed Plaintiff, and had Plaintiff physically taken out of the 

building and across the yard to disciplinary housing. Plaintiff claims that he blacked out 

at the door and later awoke on the floor of CDU cell. Defendants Gordanier and Morrish 

then issued two disciplinary tickets to Plaintiff for “disobedience” with respect to 

Plaintiff’s failure to leave the building and “obstructing and delaying staff performance of 

duties” with respect to Plaintiff passing out. 

 Plaintiff further claims that he sent written complaints to Defendants Sullivan and 

Palosaari, who failed to intervene on his behalf. Finally, Plaintiff claims Defendant 

Schitter conducted Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and refused to consider witness 

accounts of Plaintiff’s disability. 

 1. Eighth Amendment and ADA Claims 

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference claim against Defendants Gordanier and Schiff with respect to his 

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allegations that these Defendants ignored a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff when they 

required him to move outdoors. Plaintiff has also adequately stated an ADA claim 

against these Defendants based on his allegation that Defendants failed to accommodate 

his mental illness. 

 2. Grievances 

 The mere denial of a grievance does not give rise to the inference of active 

unconstitutional behavior. Where a defendant=s only involvement in the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative grievances, the failure to 

intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to remedy alleged unconstitutional behavior does not 

amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 

199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

against Defendants Sullivan and Palosaari in Count Two. 

 3. Disciplinary Action 

To the extent Plaintiff claims he was denied due process during disciplinary 

hearings, he has failed to state a claim. In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must 

first decide whether Plaintiff was entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was 

denied any constitutionally required procedural safeguard. Liberty interests which entitle 

an inmate to due process are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while 

not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by 

the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 

 To determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections afforded 

by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions imposed and 

ask whether they “‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state 

might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). “Atypicality” requires not merely an 

empirical comparison, but turns on the importance of the right taken away from the 

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prisoner. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997). To determine 

whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look to prisoner’s 

conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the sanction will 

affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 Plaintiff was not entitled to any due process procedural protections because 

placement in disciplinary segregation is not an atypical and significant hardship. See

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 487 (30 days’ disciplinary segregation is not atypical and 

significant); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3rd Cir. 2002) (seven months of 

disciplinary confinement “does not, on its own, violate a protected liberty interest”); 

Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) (two and one-half years’ administrative 

segregation is not atypical and significant); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 

1985) (prison authorities may change a prisoner’s “place of confinement even though the 

degree of confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one 

institution than in another” without violating a prisoner’s due process rights); Lucero v. 

Russell, 741 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1984) (administrative transfer to maximum security 

without a hearing does not infringe on any protected liberty interest). Plaintiff has 

therefore failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim with respect to his 

disciplinary proceedings. 

C. Count Three 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated by Defendant Clenney. Plaintiff states that he filed a Health Needs 

Request asking for a medical mattress and pillow to alleviate pain Plaintiff experienced 

from a spinal injury. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Clenney responded by insisting that 

Plaintiff visit the clinic at his facility to be evaluated by the doctor on staff. Plaintiff 

asserts that this was neither possible, due to his mental illness and inability to go outside, 

or necessary. 

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 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter 

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

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indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that Defendant Clenney was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; Plaintiff’s facts show only 

that Defendant Clenney required Plaintiff to be evaluated by a doctor before issuing the 

medical mattress. This is not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment medical claim. 

The Court will dismiss Count Three for failure to state a claim. 

D. Count Four 

 Plaintiff claims in Count Four that Defendants Puckett, Blackard, and Krakenbuhl 

processed Plaintiff’s possessions after Plaintiff was transferred to disciplinary 

segregation. Plaintiff claims that several non-contraband items were lost or destroyed. 

 Where the negligent conduct of a prison official causes the loss of a prisoner’s 

property, the loss does not amount to a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 329, 331-332 (1986) (overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 

U.S. 527 (1981), “to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state official 

may ‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.”). “[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of 

an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property.” Daniels, 474 

U.S. at 328 (emphasis in original). Therefore, where a prisoner alleges that prison 

officials lost or misplaced his property, or otherwise claims that an official’s negligent act 

caused his property loss, he fails to state a claim. The Court will dismiss Count Four for 

failure to state a claim. 

E. Count Five 

 In Count Five, Plaintiff claims his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

access-to-the-court rights were violated when he did not receive mail from the Court 

because of his inability to leave his building to pick up his mail. Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants Schiff and Sullivan were aware of Plaintiff’s mental illness, but instructed the 

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mail room clerk not to deliver Plaintiff’s mail to Plaintiff in his cell. Plaintiff claims that 

withholding of his mail “affected [his] handling of a habeas petition for which a rul[ing] 

was sent on 9/7/11 and not given to [Plaintiff] until 1/17/12.” 

 The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from actively 

interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring 

petitions or complaints to federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to 

ligate them effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354. The right “guarantees no 

particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability–the capability of bringing 

contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” 

Id. at 356. 

 As a matter of standing, for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that 

he suffered an “actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation. Id. at 349. To 

show actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate 

that the defendants’ conduct frustrated or impeded him from bringing to court a 

nonfrivolous claim that he wished to present. Id. at 352-53. 

 “[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal 

claim.” Id. at 354. The right of access to the courts “does not guarantee inmates the 

wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything 

from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. The nonfrivolous 

claim must be a direct or collateral attack on the inmate’s sentence or a challenge to the 

conditions of his confinement. Id. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply 

one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and 

incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant Schiff or Sullivan actively interfered 

with his right to prepare or file legal documents. Plaintiff’s habeas case was dismissed 

without prejudice as premature on September 7, 2011. This ruling was issued because 

Plaintiff had not exhausted state court remedies; Plaintiff habeas petition was not 

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dismissed as result of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order or inability to file 

documents with this court. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count Five for failure to 

state a claim. 

F. Count Six 

 Plaintiff alleges in Count Six that his First Amendment right to free exercise of 

religion was violated when Defendants Puckett and Blackard confiscated Plaintiff’s 

rosary. Plaintiff claims that the rosary was issued to him by the ADOC Chaplaincy and 

was not contraband. Plaintiff claims the confiscation of his rosary violated his right to 

exercise his religion and that he lost the therapeutic value of the rosary. Liberally 

construed, Plaintiff has adequately stated a First Amendment claim against Defendants 

Puckett and Blackard and the Court will require these Defendants to answer Count Six. 

 Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Ryan and Sullivan promulgated policies 

resulting in the confiscation of Plaintiff’s rosary and were negligent in supervising their 

employees. To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered 

a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative 

link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362, 371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and 

therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 

F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 

 Plaintiff has failed to describe the policies implemented by Defendants Ryan and 

Sullivan that resulted in the confiscation of his rosary; rather Plaintiff’s facts indicate that 

Defendants Puckett and Blackard acted contrary to policy by confiscating a noncontraband religious item. Further, Defendants Ryan and Sullivan are not liable based 

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solely on their position as supervisors of Defendants Puckett and Blackard. Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim in Count Six against Defendants Ryan and Sullivan. 

G. Count Seven 

 In Count Seven, Plaintiff claims his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated when Defendant Unknown MTC Employee retaliated against him. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Unknown MTC Employee directed Plaintiff to move from 

CDU to a regular dorm even though Defendant was aware “that doing so would provoke 

a recurrence of the events of 4/3/2012, resulting in the issuance of more disciplinary 

tickets,” and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that he 

declined to move and Defendant MTC Employee retaliated by issuing two disciplinary 

tickets to Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s failure to move. 

 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant Unknown MTC Employee retaliated 

against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights or that the disciplinary tickets 

were issued without legitimate penological justification. Plaintiff’s facts indicate that 

Defendant directed Plaintiff to move, Plaintiff refused, and Defendant issued the 

disciplinary tickets in response to Plaintiff’s refusal, not in response to Plaintiff’s exercise 

of his First Amendment rights. 

 To the extent that Plaintiff also claims Defendants Sullivan, Ryder, and Unknown 

Grievance Coordinator have failed to respond grievances, he has failed to state a claim. 

See Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (defendants did not commit constitutional violations when 

they denied administrative grievances, failed to intervene on plaintiff’s behalf, and failed 

to remedy allegedly unconstitutional behavior). Plaintiff’s allegations that he has been 

subjected multiple housing transfers, solitary confinement, and confined in unsanitary 

conditions also fail to state a claim because Plaintiff has not linked these allegations to 

any of the named Defendants. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377 (to state a valid claim 

under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific injury as a result of 

specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the injury and the 

conduct of that defendants). 

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 The Court will dismiss the retaliation, grievance, and conditions of confinement 

claims in Count Seven. 

 However, Plaintiff’s allegations adequately state an Eighth Amendment claim for 

deliberate indifference against Defendant MTC Employee. Although Plaintiff has 

alleged his claim with enough specificity to require an answer, the Court will not direct 

that service be made on the Defendant Unknown MTC Employee at this time. The use of 

anonymous appellations to identify defendants is not favored, and as a practical matter, it 

is in most instances impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a summons and 

complaint upon an unidentified defendant. If Plaintiff later discovers the identity of 

Defendant Unknown MTC Employee, Plaintiff should amend his Complaint to name 

him. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (where identity of 

alleged defendants will not be known prior to filing of complaint, plaintiff should be 

given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is 

clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be 

dismissed on other grounds (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 

1980))). Plaintiff may amend his Complaint “once as a matter of course at any time 

before a responsive pleading is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). After any Defendant has 

filed an answer or other responsive pleading, however, Plaintiff must file a motion 

requesting leave to amend and submit a proposed amended complaint. 

F. Count Eight

 In Count Eight, Plaintiff claims his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 

rights under the ADA were violated when Defendant Schiff refused to authorize porter 

assistance for Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that, because of his mental illness, he needs the 

assistance of a porter to bring him meals. Plaintiff claims that because Defendant Schiff 

refused to authorize the assistance of a porter for Plaintiff, the porter is only able to bring 

Plaintiff meals on an “unofficial” basis and, therefore, Plaintiff does not reliably receive 

food. Liberally construed, these allegations adequately state an Eighth Amendment claim 

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and claim under the ADA. The Court will require Defendant Schiff to answer Count 

Eight. 

 To the extent that Plaintiff claims Defendants Sullivan, Palosaari, Clenney, and 

Unknown Grievance Coordinator failed to adequately respond to his grievances, he fails 

to state a claim. See Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300. 

V. Motions 

 A. Motion to Appoint Counsel 

 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel with the Complaint. There is no 

constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). In proceedings in 

forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to 

afford one. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A determination with respect to 

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issue involved. Id. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Having considered both elements, it does not appear at this time that exceptional 

circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case. 

Plaintiff is in no different position than many pro se prisoner litigants. Thus, the Court 

will deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. 

B. Motion to Reconsider Denial of TRO 

 On May 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Non-Compliance, Motion for TRO 

Reconsideration, Motion for Assignment of Counsel.” Plaintiff asks that the Court 

appoint counsel and that the Court reconsider its denial of a Temporary Restraining 

Order. The Court will deny the request for appointment of counsel for the reasons stated 

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above. Further, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s original request for a Temporary 

Restraining Order, the April 17, 2013 denial of that request, and Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration. The Court finds no basis for reconsideration of the denial of a 

Temporary Restraining Order and will deny the Motion. 

VI. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

/ / / 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 14) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial 

filing fee. 

 (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 4) is denied. 

 (4) Plaintiff’s “Notice of Non-Compliance, Motion for TRO Reconsideration, 

Motion for Assignment of Counsel” (Doc. 13) is denied. 

(5) Counts One, Three, Four, and Five; the grievance and disciplinary portions 

of Count Two; and the retaliation, grievance, and conditions of confinement portions of 

Count Seven are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (6) Defendants Ryan, Holland, Sullivan, Palosaari, Morrish, Schitter, Clenney, 

Unknown Grievance Coordinator, Krakenbuhl, and Ryder are dismissed without 

prejudice. 

 (7) Defendants Schiff, Gordanier, Puckett, and Blackard must answer Counts 

Two, Six, and Eight. 

 (8) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for 

Defendants Schiff, Gordanier, Puckett, and Blackard. 

 (9) Plaintiff must complete1

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (10) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the 

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If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central 

Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works 

there. 

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filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (11) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (12) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (13) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 

the Plaintiff.

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 (14) Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by 

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (15) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (16) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 11th day of September, 2013. 

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