Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01893/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01893-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANNE HUNTSBERRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JULIE ANN SHIELDS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01893-DMR 

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO 

DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IFP 

APPLICATION AND DISMISS 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7

Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP 

Application”). [Docket Nos. 1, 2.] Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. 

[Docket No. 6.] The court requested additional information regarding the IFP Application, which 

Plaintiff provided. [Docket No. 7.] Plaintiff has declined the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. [Docket No. 5.] Therefore, the undersigned requests that this matter 

be reassigned to a District Judge, and issues this Report and Recommendation with the 

recommendation that the IFP application be granted, and that the Amended Complaint be 

dismissed with leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

In order to understand and fairly construe Plaintiff’s allegations, for purposes of this 

Report and Recommendation, the court reviews the information in both the Complaint and the 

Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff brings this action against Julie Ann Shields, Vickie L. Mickle, and James

Thompson (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff owned real property at 3201 Partridge Avenue

in Oakland, CA. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that at some unspecified time notaries public

Shields and Mickle participated in the fraudulent transfer of Plaintiff’s real property through some 

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form of forgery. Compl. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that Thompson “caused financial identity theft,”

but provides no additional information about him. Am. Compl. at 1-2. 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff raises seven claims for relief. Plaintiff asserts the following 

six claims pursuant to criminal statutes: (1) financial identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); 

(2) deprivation of rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242; (3) wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343; (4) illegal 

transfer of real property by forged deed under 18 U.S.C. § 495; (5) laundering of monetary 

instruments under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); and (6) engaging in monetary transactions derived from 

specified unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Am. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff also asserts a 

claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

For the reasons stated below, the court recommends that the Amended Complaint be 

dismissed with prejudice with respect to the claims brought under criminal statutes. However, the 

court recommends that Plaintiff otherwise be granted leave to amend. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. IFP Application

A court may authorize a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without 

prepayment of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable 

to pay such fees or provide such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Having evaluated Plaintiff’s 

financial affidavit, the court believes that Plaintiff has satisfied the economic eligibility 

requirement of 28 U.S.C. section 1915(a) and recommends granting the IFP Application. 

B. Review of Complaint 

In reviewing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts may dismiss a case sua 

sponte if the party applying for in forma pauperis status files a frivolous action, fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To make the determination under 28 U.S.C. section 

1915(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether there is an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted 

wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 

1984). Courts have the authority to dismiss complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual 

allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1228. A court can also dismiss a 

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complaint where it is based solely on conclusory statements, naked assertions without any factual 

basis, or allegations that are not plausible on their face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 

(2009); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than 

those drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), a complaint, or 

portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to set forth “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

554 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] district court should not dismiss a pro se 

complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 

complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quotations omitted). 

The court now reviews Plaintiff’s claims for relief.

i. Claims Regarding Criminal Allegations

Six of Plaintiff’s claims arise under criminal statutes. Plaintiff seeks relief for financial 

identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); deprivation of rights, 18 U.S.C. § 242; wire fraud, 18 

U.S.C. § 1343; illegal transfer of real property by forged deed, 18 U.S.C. § 495; laundering of 

monetary instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); and engaging in monetary transactions derived 

from specified unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

Generally, private citizens do not have standing to initiate a federal criminal 

prosecution. See, e.g., Robertson v. U.S. ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 278 (2010) (“Our 

entire criminal justice system is premised on the notion that a criminal prosecution pits the 

government against the governed, not one private citizen against another.”) (per curiam); see also

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially 

cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).

None of the criminal statutes cited by Plaintiff appear to provide a basis for civil liability. 

See, e.g., Agnew v. Compton, 239 F.2d 226, 230 (9th Cir. 1956) (no civil liability pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242), overruled on other grounds, Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29–30 (9th 

Cir.1962); McDonald v. Lee, No. 15-CV-1256-KJM-KJN, 2015 WL 4758012, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

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Aug. 11, 2015) (no private standing to prosecute claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1343); Ardalan v. 

McHugh, No. 13-CV-01138-LHK, 2013 WL 6212710, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (plaintiff 

lacked standing to bring claims under various criminal statutes). 

As a private citizen, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring suit under the criminal 

statutes that she has identified. Accordingly, the court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims be 

dismissed without leave to amend to the extent they are based on criminal statutes.

However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “committed knownly [sic] and [i]ntentional 

harm to plainitff [sic] by unlawful acts 18 U.S.C. 242 and [w]ire fraud 18 U.S.C. [s]ection 1343.” 

Am. Compl. at 2. Broadly construed, it is possible that Plaintiff is attempting to allege tortious 

conduct. The court therefore recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend to the extent 

that she is attempting to assert a state tort claim, such as fraud. 

ii. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under section 1983, a complaint “must both (1) allege the deprivation of a 

right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim fails to satisfy either prong. First, Plaintiff does not allege 

how her constitutional or federal rights were violated, nor does she identify each Defendant’s role 

in the violation.

As to the second prong, Plaintiff does not allege that the actions were committed by “a 

person acting under color of state law.” Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1067. Shields and Mickle are 

notaries public. California law provides that the “Secretary of State may appoint and commission 

notaries public in such number as the Secretary of State deems necessary for the public 

convenience.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 8200. Persuasive authority suggests that notaries public are not 

state actors, as they merely hold a commission. See, e.g., Bush v. Pharis, No. 1:13-CV-00452, 

2013 WL 5961107, at *6 (W.D. La. June 3, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

CIV.A. 13-0452, 2013 WL 5961110 (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2013) (dismissing section 1983 claim 

against notary public because he was not a state actor); see also Worthington v. Rose Palmer, Esq., 

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No. 3:15CV410, 2015 WL 7571822, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2015), appeal dismissed (Feb. 29, 

2016) (notary public is a commission holder with ministerial powers, not a state actor). 

Plaintiff names Thompson as a defendant, but does not explain who he is or his 

involvement in the facts underlying this suit.1 Thus, Plaintiff has not provided enough information 

for the court to determine whether Thompson is a state actor. 

Plaintiff has not identified a defendant acting under color of state law who has violated a 

right guaranteed to Plaintiff by the federal Constitutional or a federal statute. However, because it 

is not clear that amendment would be futile, the court recommends that Plaintiff’s section 1983 

claim be dismissed with leave to amend. 

III. PRIOR STATE LAWSUIT

According to Plaintiff, the present action raises claims that have been filed in other 

lawsuits. IFP App. ¶ 10. Specifically, Plaintiff identifies two cases brought in the Superior Court 

of California, Alameda County: Case Nos. RG09489160 and RG08364892. Id. It is not possible 

to determine whether the claims or issues raised in this case have been adjudicated in the state 

court proceedings. 

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Plaintiff submits: “The plainitff [sic] Dianne Huntsberry alleges [t]hat additional Defendant have 

been named as James Thompson [t]o the complaint as a party to plainitff [sic] pleadings that 

caused the [f]inancial identity theft alleged in this amended complaint pursuant [t]o 18 U.S.C. 

Section 1028 ( a ) ( 7 ) [sic].” Am. Compl. at 1-2. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court recommends that Plaintiff’s IFP application be 

granted and that her complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to the claims arising under criminal 

statutes. Plaintiff should otherwise be granted leave to amend, as she may be able to plead 

sufficient facts to support civil claims for the alleged wrongful conduct. 

The Clerk is directed to reassign this case to a District Judge.

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Dated: June 24, 2016

______________________________________

DONNA M. RYU

United States Magistrate Judge

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