Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01900/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01900-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, 

CDCR #J-48500, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JUDGE ANTHONY BATTAGLIA, et al., 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-01900-MMA-RBM 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

[Doc. No. 4]

DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, currently incarcerated at San Quentin 

State Prison (“SQ”) located in San Quentin, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil action. See Doc. No. 1.1

 Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required to 

                                               

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 The Court takes judicial notice that over the course of the last 18 years, Plaintiff has filed more than 

1,000 separate civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions, primarily in the Northern District of 

California, which is where Alameda County is situated, where he was convicted by jury of first degree 

murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death, and where he is currently incarcerated. See 

People v. Bonilla, 41 Cal. 4th 313 (2007); 

https://pcl.uscourts.gov/pcl/pages/search/results/parties.jsf?sid=f29f4a3f9f17408 e8076c92cfe63a2a0

(last visited Apr. 17, 2019); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (Courts “may take 

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commence a civil action at the time he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion 

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. 

No. 4). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

 A. Standard of Review 

 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face ... additional hurdle[s].” Id. Specifically, in addition to requiring prisoners to “pay 

the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); 

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

                                               

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”) (citation and quotations omitted).

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“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 

 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a 

strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the 

central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or 

failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.”). 

B. Discussion 

 As an initial matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and finds it does 

not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious 

physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g)). 

And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. That is the case here. 

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A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225 

(quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 

United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 

248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Based on the records and court proceedings available on PACER, this Court takes 

judicial notice that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 

incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 

that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) 

(noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the 

dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, 

which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim 

for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without 

prejudice and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted: Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda 

County District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-

0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 1200027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); 

id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” 

(citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 

6:23-7:19.)); see also Bonilla v. Hernandez, No. 3:18-CV-978-JLS-BLM, 2018 WL 

3817864, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2018) (denying Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP as

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Bonilla v. Plourd, No. 3:18-CV-0954-BAS-JLB, 2018 

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WL 3656105, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2018) (same). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 

F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only 

precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it 

while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 

1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”). 

II. Conclusion and Orders 

 For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 4) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

2) DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure 

to pay the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a); 

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: December 2, 2019 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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