Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_93-cv-00306/USCOURTS-caed-2_93-cv-00306-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY JUNIOR WEBSTER,

NO. CIV. S-93-306 LKK/DAD DP

Petitioner,

v. O R D E R

JILL L. BROWN, Warden of the

California State Prison at

San Quentin, et al,

Respondents.

 /

Pending before the court is a motion for reconsideration of

the magistrate judge’s order granting an evidentiary hearing on

three of petitioner’s claims. These claims include petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim that California

failed to properly narrow the pool of death-eligible cases, and the

claim that petitioner was denied meaningful appellate review. As

explained below, the motion is denied.

In non-dispositive matters, “[t]he district court must defer

to the magistrate judge’s orders unless they are clearly erroneous

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 Furthermore, in Keeney, the Supreme Court addressed the 1

situations in which an evidentiary hearing was mandatory but did

not change the law with respect to when an evidentiary hearing

would be permissible. 504 U.S. at 23 (“[D]istrict courts . . .

still possess the discretion, which has not been removed by today’s

opinion, to hold hearings even where they are not mandatory”)

(O’Connor, J., dissenting).

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or contrary to law.” Grimes v. San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240

(9th Cir. 1991). Only if the district court is left “with the firm

and definition conviction” that the orders were mistaken should it

set them aside. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333

U.S. 364, 395 (1948). This is a particularly high standard given

the broad judicial discretion afforded with respect to holding

evidentiary hearings. See Pagan v. Keane, 984 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.

1993) (“In every case he has the power, constrained only by his

sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the applicant's

constitutional claim.”) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,

318 (1963)).

First, respondent argues that petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel, as supported by current declarations, is

unexhausted and that an evidentiary hearing is therefore

inappropriate. The court disagrees. First, this is not a case

where the petitioner negligently failed to develop the facts

supporting a claim at a state court evidentiary hearing. Cf.

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 540 U.S. 1 (1992). Rather, the petitioner 1

here actually sought -- but was denied -- the opportunity to

develop the facts at a state court hearing. Second, only claims

must be exhausted, not evidence or exhibits. See Austin v.

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Swenson, 522 F.2d 168, 170 (8th Cir. 1975) (“Exhaustion does not

require that all of the evidence shall have been submitted.”);

Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192, 1197 (1st Cir. 1972). Here,

petitioner is merely offering support for the factual allegations

underlying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim made in

state court.

Next, respondent argues that the hearing on petitioner’s claim

that California’s death penalty scheme fails to meaningfully narrow

those eligible for the death penalty is pointless, because the

claims has already been rejected by the Ninth Circuit.

Respondent’s position is that the claim is purely a question of

law. The court disagrees. Petitioner is not mounting a facial

attack on California’s death penalty scheme; rather, he is merely

arguing that its enforcement is unconstitutional. See People v.

Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 826 (Ill. 2002) (McMorrow, J., concurring)

(“the question of whether the constitutional requirement of

narrowing has occurred is a factual one”). Accordingly, an

evidentiary hearing is not inappropriate.

Finally, respondent maintains that an evidentiary hearing on

the denial of meaningful appellate review is an abuse of

discretion, because petitioner has not come forward with a basis

for the claim. To the contrary, petitioner has indicated that when

petitioner’s death penalty appeal was pending, three justices on

the California Supreme Court were ousted in a judicial retention

election. Petitioner further alleges that his “appeal was heard

by the new court, suitably reformulated to reflect a specific

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political agenda to affirm death sentences.” Opp’n to Mot. at 7.

While not passing on the merits of the claim, the court finds that

it was not an abuse of discretion (much less a clearly erroneous

abuse of discretion) for the magistrate judge to err on the side

of caution and permit petitioner to present evidence in support of

his claim at a hearing.

The motion for reconsideration is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2007.

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