Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00310/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00310-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANTONIO ORLANDER JERIDO, )

#169480, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10cv310-SRW

)

KEN HARMON; ANN DAVIS; )

CAPTAIN WHITE; LT. BLAND; )

OFFICER GREEN; )

SGT. SMITHERMAN; SGT. SMITH; )

OFFICER SCARBROUGH; )

OFFICER PENALTIN, )

1

and OFFICER FOX, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Antonio Orlander Jerido [“Jerido”], a former inmate

of the Chilton County Jail, in Clanton, Alabama, who is now housed at the Donaldson

Correctional Facility in Bessemer, Alabama, claims that officials at the Chilton County Jail

violated his constitutional rights by opening his incoming documents from the court and the

Alabama Internal Affairs Department outside his presence, byrefusing to allow Jerido to seal

outgoing documents to the court and his lawyer before placing them in the prison mail

In their response to the complaint, the defendant advises the correct spelling of his 1

name is Pennington. However, for purposes of this Memorandum, the court will refer to the

defendant as identified by the plaintiff. 

Case 2:10-cv-00310-SRW Document 77 Filed 07/03/13 Page 1 of 18
system, and by treating him differently from another inmate whose legal mail was opened in

the inmate’s presence. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3-6; Pl.’s Mtn. to Add Defs. - Doc. No. 2

4 at 1-2; Pl.’s Special Report - Doc. No. 7 at 2. The defendants are identified as Warden

Ken Harmon, Assistant Warden Ann Davis, Captain George White, Lt. Jennifer Bland,

Officer Jo Green, Officer Ryan Fox, Officer Kathy Penaltin, Officer William Scarbrough,

Officer Mike Smith, and Sergeant Allen Smitherman. Defs.’ Resp. - Doc. No. 39. Jerido

seeks damages and injunctive relief. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 4; Pl.’s Special Report- Doc.

No. 7 at 2, 5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1, the parties have

consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and

ordering the entry of final judgment.

The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report, second

supplemental special report, and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing Jerido’s claims

for relief. Doc. No. 39, Doc. No. 63, and Doc. No. 66. In these documents, the defendants

deny Jerido’s allegations that they violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, the

defendants assert that the complaint is due to be dismissed because Jerido failed to exhaust

an administrative remedy available to him at the Chilton County Jail with respect to the

This Memorandum is limited to those issues presented by the plaintiff in the 2

complaint and the allowed amendments, see Doc. No. 1, Doc. No. 4, and Doc. No. 7, as any

other claims are not properly before the court. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d

1312, 1315 (11 Cir. 2004) (“At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for th

plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.

15 (a). A plaintiff may not amend . . . [his] complaint through argument in a brief [or

response] opposing summary judgment.”). 

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claims presented in this cause of action. The defendants base their exhaustion defense on the

plaintiff’s failure to lodge a grievance with the jail before filing the claim presently pending

before this court. 

 Pursuant to the orders entered in this case and governing case law, the court deems

it appropriate to treat the defendants’ reports as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

August 11, 2010 - Doc. No. 42; Order of Sept. 24, 2010 - Doc No. 67; Bryant v. Rich, 530

F.3d 1368, 1375 (11 Cir. 2008) (Although an exhaustion defense “is not ordinarily the th

proper subject for a summary judgment[,]” the defense is appropriate for summary judgment

when the evidence demonstrates administrative remedies “are absolutely time barred or

otherwise clearly infeasible.”). Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion and the evidentiary materials filed

in support thereof, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

with respect to the exhaustion defense is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. th

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

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dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).3

The partymoving for summaryjudgment “always bears the initial responsibilityofinforming

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record,

including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating

there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to

present evidence in support ofsome element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden

of proof. Id. at 322-24. 

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; th

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact [by citing to materials in the record

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for 3

presenting and deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory

Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summaryjudgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summaryjudgment determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant

summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance

remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally

applicable to the current rule. 

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including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed

-- show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. [] Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive the defendants’ properlysupported motions for summaryjudgment, Jerido is required

to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting

his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is

merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing

party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact]

could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11 Cir. 1990) th

(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are

likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice

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to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . . , in the absence of [admissible]

supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment”); Harris v. Ostrout,

65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate th

“produced nothing, beyond his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the

defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“[M]ere verification th

of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary

judgment. . . .”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by

requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and

on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. th

1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to

require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is

appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the th

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

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Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only th

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude

entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11 Cir. 2003) th

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the

evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to

admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving

for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary

materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material

fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001) th

(To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving partymust produce evidence

such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

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pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th

Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard

of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Jerido fails to

demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. 

Matsushita, supra. 

III. DISCUSSION

On January 27, 2010, Jerido was transferred from the Elmore County Jail to the

Chilton County Jail to await criminal proceedings. He was transferred back to Elmore

County Jail in July 2010. Harmon Aff. at 1-2, Defs.’ Resp. - Doc. No. 39-2 at 1-2. The

evidentiary materials submitted by the parties establish that Jerido did not file a grievance

with jail personnel challenging the handling of his incoming or outgoing mail before filing

his original complaint in this suit in April 2010. Id. at 2. The defendants therefore maintain

that this case is subject to dismissal because Jerido failed to exhaust the administrative

remedy provided at the Chilton County Jail prior to filing this complaint as required by the

Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act compels exhaustion of available administrative

remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a § 1983 complaint. 

Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

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prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted.” “Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate must

exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative

remedies.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available

administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the

exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325

(11 Cir. 1998); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81. Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion th

requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93 (emphasis added). “Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural

rules [as a precondition to filing suit in federal court] because no adjudicative system can

function effectivelywithout imposing some orderlystructure on the courts ofits proceedings.

. . . Construing § 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion . . . fits with the general scheme of

the PLRA, whereas [a contrary] interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal

court once administrative remedies are no longer available] would turn that provision into

a largely useless appendage.” Id. at 90-91, 93. The Court reasoned that because proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary an inmate cannot “satisfy the Prison

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Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement . . . by filing an untimely or otherwise

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal[,]” or by effectively bypassing the

administrative process simply bywaiting until the grievance procedure is no longer available

to her. Id. at 83-84; Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11 Cir. 2005) (inmate who th

files an untimely grievance or simply spurns the administrative process until it is no longer

available fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA). “The only facts pertinent

to determining whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement are those

that existed when he filed his original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th

Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (inmate’s “attempt to amend or supplement his original complaint

did not change the important historical fact: his administrative remedies were unexhausted

when he filed his original complaint. Therefore, he cannot cure the exhaustion defect”).

 The record in this case establishes that the Chilton County Jail provides a grievance

procedure for inmate complaints. Defs.’ Resp. - Doc. No. 39-12 at 17-18. The relevant

portion of the grievance procedure reads as follows:

It is the policy of the Chilton County Corrections Facility that grievances may

be initiated by any inmate, at any time, for mistreatment or abuse by jail

personnel or other inmates without fear of retribution. . . .

The inmate will file his grievance in writing on the Inmate Grievance Form. 

The grievance will be given to a corrections officer who will attempt to resolve

it. If he/she cannot resolve the grievance, it will be forwarded to the shift

supervisor. If the shift supervisor cannot resolve the issue, the grievance will

be forwarded to the Lieutenant. 

Every effort will be made to resolve a grievance, verbally or in writing, within

five (5) working days from the date the original grievance is received. A

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written record of the grievance resolution will be forwarded to the inmate

within fifteen (15) days from the original grievance date, and a copy will be

placed in the inmate’s file. 

Grievances of an emergency nature will be dealt with on a more expedient

time frame according to the nature of the situation. 

The inmate filing the grievance must allow the appropriate time for the

grievance to be answered. Multiple grievances for the same complaint will not

be accepted. No block-wide grievances will be accepted. 

Id. Defendants presented one grievance that Jerido submitted to prison officials on June 2,

2010. In it he complained, 

Mymail fromthe courts have been opened without me present since the month

of Feb. until now. Your officers here continue to state that my mail from the

court is “not legal.” I’ve talked to several of them and I still can’t get

anywhere cause they say that this is coming from you “Warden” and “Assit

Warden Davis.” And it seems that you want [sic] answer my other request. 

Can you please stop opening my mail without me being present from the court

and other government officials.

Defs.’ Resp. - Doc. No. 39-11 at 1. Defendant Warden Harmon disposed of the grievance

stating, “Talked w/ inmate Jerido about legal mail, and advised him that court document[]s

are not legal mail.” Id. Defendants submitted other “Inmate Request Forms” that Jerido

submitted to jail personnel, but none of them are grievances and none of them concern his

incoming or outgoing mail. Id. at 2-19. 

The court entered orders allowing Jerido the opportunity to respond to the arguments

made by the defendants in their special reports. Doc. No. 42, Doc. No. 50, Doc. No. 51, Doc.

No. 54, Doc. No. 62, Doc. No. 67, and Doc. No. 70. In his responses to the orders and in his

response to the defendants’ supplemental report, Jerido presents argument and evidentiary

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materials, including the June 2, 2010, grievance. Pl.’s Resp. - Doc. No. 25, Doc. No. 46-1

at 2; Doc. No. 53, Doc. No. 61, and Doc. No. 68. However, Jerido has submitted no evidence

that at any time prior to filing this civil action in April 2010, he submitted a grievance with

jail personnel challenging the reading of mail from the court or governmental officials

outside his presence. Rather, all of the evidence before the court demonstrates that Jerido

failed to file a grievance regarding this matter before he filed suit in this case. He also has

submitted no evidence demonstrating that he ever filed a grievance regarding the refusal of

prison officials to allow him to seal outgoing mail to the court or his attorney before placing

it in the prison mail system, or regarding an alleged decision to discriminate against him. 

Although Jerido argues that his comment, “you want [sic] answer my other request”

demonstrates that he “was complaining about prison conditions,” the comment is too vague

and speculative to put Warden Harmon, who did not respond to it, on notice about all the

additional matters Jerido raises in this lawsuit. Pl.’s Resp. - Doc. No. 46 at 5. The court

therefore concludes that the claims presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87-94. 

It is undisputed that Jerido failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available to him

which is a precondition to proceeding in this court on his claim. Specifically, Jerido did not

file a grievance with respect to the claims presented in this cause of action as allowed by the

grievance procedure in effect at the Chilton County Jail before filing this case. Jerido is no

longer at the Chilton County Jail; thus, the administrative remedy provided by the defendants

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for the instant claim is no longer available to Jerido. Under these circumstances, dismissal

with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1375 n.11; Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157;

Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5 Cir. 1995) (“Without the prospect of a dismissal with th

prejudice, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative

grievance or by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative

remedies and gaining access to a federal forum without exhausting administrative

remedies.”); Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2 Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted) (inmate’s nd

“federal lawsuits . . . properly dismissed with prejudice” where previously available

administrative remedies had become unavailable). 

B. Mootness and Qualified Immunity

Even if the court were to reach the merits of plaintiff’s complaint contained in his only

grievance -- that is, that officials read incoming mail from the court outside his presence --

4

summary judgment would be due to be granted to defendants. First, plaintiff Jerido is no

longer at Chilton County Jail, so his request for equitable relief is moot. See Adler v. Duval

County School Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11 Cir. 1997). “Equitable relief is a prospective th

remedy, intended to prevent future injuries.” Id. For that reason, “[w]hen the threat of future

harm dissipates, the plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief become moot because the plaintiff

Plaintiff also states in his grievance, “you want [sic] answer my other request,” but 4

his reference is too vague to encompass all of his other claims in this suit, and the documents

in the summary judgment record do not clarify the reference. Defs.’ Response - Doc. No. 46-

1 at 2. 

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no longer needs protection from future injury.” Id.; see also Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d

1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“[A]n inmate’s claim for injunctive and

declaratory relief in a § 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has

been transferred.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no indication that Jerido,

who is now at the Donaldson Correctional Facility, will be returned to the Chilton County

Jail. “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a pending case or controversy

regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present injury or real and

immediate threat of repeated injury.” Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11 Cir. 1985). th

Absent in this case is any showing of a “continuing, present injury or real and immediate

threat of repeated injury” to Jerido. See id. (finding that a transfer of the plaintiff back to the

jail if he was again incarcerated at a minimum security facility and charged with a

disciplinary infraction was too speculative to satisfy the required injury element). Mootness

is jurisdictional, and dismissal of the equitable claims is required when an action is moot, as

a decision in a moot action would be an impermissible advisory opinion. Al Najjar v.

Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11 Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Consequently, plaintiff’s th

equitable claims, if they were exhausted, are due to be dismissed. 

Second, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages. Qualified

immunity offers complete protection from civil damages for government officials sued in

their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

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U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11 Cir. 2002) (same). Qualified immunity is not merely a

th

defense against liability but rather immunity from suit. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231-32 (2009) (citation omitted). To receive qualified immunity, the public official must

first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the

allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11 Cir. 2002). th

There is no dispute that the defendants were acting within the course and scope of their

discretionary authority when the incidents complained of occurred. Plaintiff Jerido must,

therefore, allege facts that, when read in a light most favorable to him, show that defendants

are not entitled to qualified immunity. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11 Cir. th

2003). 

In order to satisfy his burden, a Plaintiff must show two things: (1) that Defendants

committed a constitutional violation and (2) that the constitutional right Defendants violated

was “clearly established.” Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11 Cir. 2004). th

Courts now have discretion to determine the order in which the two prongs of Plaintiff's

burden of proof are analyzed. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (Courts “should be permitted to

exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case hand.”). 

“Thus, the qualified immunity standard is broad enough to cover some mistaken judgment,

and it shields from liability all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violated

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the law.” See Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1167 (11 Cir. 2009) (citations and th

quotation marks omitted). 

At the time defendants acted, it was not clearly established that Jerido had a

constitutional right to have his incoming mail from the court opened in his presence. In fact,

several months after defendants acted, the undersigned issued a Recommendation that public

court documents not be considered “legal mail” that must be opened in an inmate’s presence

because they are nonprivileged public records. See Richards v. Sutton, 2009 WL 2914518,

at *6 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2009) (“It is doubtful that the mail in question can be considered

‘legal mail,’ but was, rather, merely a copy of a document filed in this civil action and which

is a matter of public record. Such mail is not in any way privileged, and a jailer's opening

of it is not a constitutional violation.”). Interference with legal mail violates an inmate’s

right of access to the courts. See Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2008);

Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465, 1468 (11th Cir. 1991). An access-to-courts claim,

however, requires “actual injury regarding prospective or existing litigation,” such as

“missing filing deadlines or being prevented from presenting claims” while “in the pursuit

of specific types of nonfrivolous cases: direct or collateral attacks on sentences and

challenges to conditions of confinement.” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 &

n.10 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1332–33. Jerido has

alleged no such injury, and he has not alleged he received non-public records from the court,

consequently if his access to the courts claim were properly exhausted, summary judgment

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would be due to be granted to defendants. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. 

An inmate also “has a First Amendment free speech right to communicate with his

attorneys by mail, separate and apart from his constitutional right to access to the courts.” 

Id. at 1334; see also id. at 1334 n.34 (limiting discussion to attorney-client mail and not

“legal mail in general”). Unlike an access-to-the court claim, a free speech claim does not

require an actual injury. Id. at 1334. This First Amendment free speech right is, of course,

subject to the limitations attendant to an inmate’s status as a prisoner and the legitimate

penological interests of jail administrators. Id. at 1333. Jerido’s grievance did not relate to

mail to or from his attorneys, and it was not clearly established when defendants acted that

Jerido had a free speech right to have his incoming public documents from the court opened

in his presence. Consequently, if Jerido’s free speech claim were properly exhausted,

summary judgment would be due to be granted to defendants. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED to the extent the

defendants seek dismissal of this case due to the plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust an

administrative remedy previously available to him at the Chilton County Jail.

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the provisions of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust an administrative remedy provided to

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him during his confinement in the Chilton County Jail as this remedy is no longer available

to him with respect to the claims presented in the this cause of action. 

3. No costs are taxed herein. 

A separate Final Judgment will accompany this memorandum opinion.

DONE, this 3rd day of July, 2013.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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Case 2:10-cv-00310-SRW Document 77 Filed 07/03/13 Page 18 of 18