Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02191/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER F. POSEY, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2191 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging his conviction in the Marin Superior Court for sale of a controlled

substance (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11352(a)). Petitioner was sentenced to ten years

and fourth months in state prison, with enhancements for prior convictions. Petitioner

appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed the judgment. The state supreme court

granted a petition for review and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on January, 22, 2004. 

See People v. Posey, 32 Cal. 4th 193 (2004). Petitioner filed the instant action on May

27, 2005.

**Original filed 8/18/06**

Case 5:05-cv-02191-JF Document 14 Filed 08/18/06 Page 1 of 7
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28 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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In its Order to Show Cause dated July 29, 2005, this Court found that the petition

alleged a cognizable claim that Petitioner’s federal constitutional right to trial by a jury

drawn from the vicinage of the crime was violated because the jury was selected from a

district in which no part of the crime occurred. Respondent filed an answer addressing

the merits of the petition. Petitioner did not file a traverse. After reviewing the briefs

and the underlying record, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and

will deny the petition.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Supreme Court found the relevant facts to be as follows:

Detective Rudy Yamanoha of the Marin County Sheriff’s Department

received information that a woman known as “Nini,” who apparently was a

resident of San Francisco County, was selling cocaine in the area of Marin or was

selling that substance to Marin residents. (Nini later was identified as Johnneka

Hall, who originally had been Petitioner’s codefendant, but had fled prior to trial.)

Yamanoha, while in Marin, placed a telephone call to Nini, who was in San

Francisco, and left on a paging system a telephone number that apparently had a

415 area code (which encompasses both Marin and San Francisco). Nini called

back Yamanoha and soon agreed to sell him an ounce of cocaine base for $575.

Although he in fact was in Marin, Yamanoha told Nini that he was in Santa Rosa,

in Sonoma County, and asked her to meet him halfway at Vista Point on the

Marin side of the Golden Gate Bridge, but she did not agree. Later that day,

Yamanoha paged Nini again to make arrangements for delivery, this time

apparently leaving a second telephone number with a 415 area code. Nini called

back Yamanoha and had him speak to Petitioner, who persuaded Yamanoha to

buy two ounces of cocaine base for $1,150, and then agreed to delivery at Vista

Point in Marin. A minute or so later, however, Petitioner called Yamanoha at the

second 415 area code telephone number, and changed the point of delivery from

Vista Point in Marin to a location in San Francisco not far from the Golden Gate

Bridge. That evening, Yamanoha went to the location in question and, after some

delay, bought a little less than two ounces of cocaine base from Petitioner for the

full price of $1,150, with Petitioner promising to make up for the shortage on the

next purchase. The transaction was surreptitiously videotaped by law enforcement

officers.

Some days later, Detective Yamanoha, in Marin County, again paged Nini,

who was in San Francisco County, and apparently left a telephone number with a

707 area code (which encompasses Sonoma County, including Santa Rosa)

directed to a cellular telephone. Nini called back Yamanoha and had him speak to

Petitioner. Yamanoha asked to buy two more ounces of cocaine base, and

Petitioner agreed to sell that quantity for $1,150. Although he in fact was in

Marin, Yamanoha told Petitioner that he was in Santa Rosa, and asked Petitioner

to meet him halfway in Marin; Petitioner refused, and proposed the same location

in San Francisco as previously; Yamanoha ended the conversation before

Case 5:05-cv-02191-JF Document 14 Filed 08/18/06 Page 2 of 7
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28 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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resolving the matter, stating that he had an incoming call, and Petitioner said that

he would call back. A minute or so later, Petitioner called Yamanoha, apparently

at the 707 area code telephone number, and Yamanoha agreed to meet him at the

previously identified San Francisco location. That evening, Yamanoha went to the

location in question and purchased two ounces of cocaine base from Petitioner for

$1,150. This transaction too was surreptitiously videotaped by law enforcement

officers.

A few days later, Detective Yamanoha attempted to buy more cocaine base

from Petitioner, but gave up when Petitioner refused to make delivery other than

in San Francisco County. Within a week or two, Petitioner was arrested in San

Francisco.

In its charge, the trial court instructed the jury on the crime of sale of

cocaine base and also on venue, and directed it to determine the question of guilt

or innocence prior to venue. After deliberations, the jury returned verdicts finding

Petitioner guilty of two counts of sale of cocaine base. The jury, however, was

unable to agree on venue. Thereupon, the trial court declared a mistrial on that

issue alone, denying a motion by Petitioner for mistrial on the entire case.

After rejecting a suggestion by the People that it resolve the question of

venue itself, the trial court empaneled a second jury and conducted a second trial

solely on the issue of venue. Evidence similar to that presented at the first trial

was introduced before the second jury. After the second jury was instructed on

venue by the trial court, and after that jury presented questions to, and received

answers from, the trial court in the course of deliberations, the jury made a finding

that “Venue is in Marin County”. The trial court rendered a judgment of

conviction, sentencing Petitioner to a term of imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment (after modifying it

in part on a point not pertinent here). Noting that (the California Supreme Court)

had left open the issue of the soundness and continuing vitality of the rule that

venue is a question of fact for the jury, the Court of Appeal rejected each of

Petitioner’s contentions relating to venue. First, the Court of Appeal concluded

that the trial court had not erred by receiving from the first jury the verdicts

finding Petitioner guilty of two counts of sale of cocaine base that were

purportedly “incomplete” because that jury was unable to agree on venue, and

that the trial court had not acted in excess of its jurisdiction by thereafter

declaring a mistrial on venue alone, empaneling the second jury, receiving that

jury’s finding that venue was in Marin County, and rendering the ensuing

judgment. Second, the Court of Appeal rejected a claim that the trial court’s

instructions to the second jury on venue were erroneous. Third, the Court of

Appeal concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the second jury’s

finding on venue. Fourth and finally, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court

had not violated Petitioner’s right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution or section 16 of article I of the California Constitution, to trial

by jurors of the vicinage by drawing the first jury (which returned the guilty

verdicts) from Marin County.

Respondent’s Exhibit J (People v. Posey, 32 Cal. 4th 193, 201-203 (2004)).

\\\

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28 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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III. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to a state proceeding only if

the state court’s ruling either “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As it is used in 2254(d), “clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” refers to the

“holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decision as of the time of

the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Thus,

if the Supreme Court has not ruled on the particular legal issue raised by a petitioner in

state court, the state court’s adjudication cannot be “contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law,” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). The court must presume

correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner

rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(e)(1).

B. PETITIONER’S CLAIM

Petitioner alleges that the vicinage guarantee of the Sixth Amendment was 

violated because the jury that convicted him was composed solely of residents of Marin

County, a county in which he alleges no part of the crime occurred. Petitioner further

contends that the Vicinage Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment. However, Petitioner fails to acknowledge, or apply, the

relevant AEDPA standard of review to the instant petition. 

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1 Issued on January 22, 2004. See People v. Posey, 32 Cal. 4th 193, 222 (2004).

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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 The Vicinage Clause guarantees a person accused of a crime “the right to a...jury

of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district

shall have been previously ascertained by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In Stevenson

v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court

decision denying habeas relief sought on Vicinage Clause grounds. The court found that

while the Supreme Court has held that certain provisions of the Sixth Amendment

extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it has not reached the

question of whether the Vicinage Clause applies to the states. Id. at 1071. Accordingly, 

the state court’s decision could not have been “contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established federal law.” Id.

Likewise, this Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show that the state

court’s adjudication of his vicinage rights claim satisfies the AEDPA standard for habeas

relief. In deciding the merits of Petitioner’s vicinage claim, the California Supreme

Court reiterated its holding in Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046, (2001), that 

“the vicinage right embodied in the Sixth Amendment...applies only against the United

States and is not incorporated...against the states.” People v. Posey, 32 Cal. 4th at 222. 

As the United States Supreme Court had not decided whether federal constitutional

vicinage rights extend to the states at the time of the relevant state court decision,1

 nor

has it done so as of the date of this order, the California Supreme Court’s holding cannot

have been “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law,” as those terms are used in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Similarly, Petitioner has failed to

show that the California Supreme Court’s decision was based upon an “unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding,” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

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28 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the petition for

writ of habeas corpus is denied. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: _______________ _______________________ 

 JEREMY FOGEL

 United States District Judge

8/18/06

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28 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following:

Christopher Posey

190 Victoria Street, Apt # 6

San Francisco, CA 94132

Jeremy Friedlander

CA Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Case 5:05-cv-02191-JF Document 14 Filed 08/18/06 Page 7 of 7