Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03630/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03630-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOVITA M. BISHOP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-03630-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT’S

RULE 56(d) REQUEST

Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 40

Plaintiff Great American Assurance Company filed this civil action against Jovita M. 

Bishop and David Bishop d.b.a. Bishop’s Care Home seeking a determination that it has no duty 

to defend the Bishops in a state court negligence and wrongful death proceeding.

1

 Prior to the 

Initial Case Management Conference and immediately following the parties Rule 26(f) meeting, 

Plaintiff filed the now pending motion for partial summary judgment arguing that it is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law that it owes no duty to defend Jovita Bishop in the underlying action.2 

(Dkt. No. 21.) A flurry of motions followed, including Defendant’s Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(d) motion which seeks a continuance of the motion for partial summary judgment to 

allow Defendant to conduct discovery. (Dkt. Nos. 26, 27, 30.) At the Initial Case Management 

Conference, the Court ordered the parties to brief: (1) whether Plaintiff was entitled to summary 

judgment on the question of whether Plaintiff is precluded from relying on its reservation of rights 

based on waiver or estoppel, and (2) whether, under Rule 56(d), Defendant is entitled to additional 

discovery before adjudication of Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. Having 

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 6, 10 & 17.)

2

The motion for partial summary judgment is only directed at Defendant Jovita Bishop who is the 

only defendant in the underlying suit. (Dkt. No. 21 at n.1.)

Case 3:18-cv-03630-JSC Document 45 Filed 11/02/18 Page 1 of 4
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considered the parties’ briefs, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see L.R. 7-

1(b), VACATES the November 8, 2018 hearing, and GRANTS Defendant’s motion for a 

continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

DISCUSSION

At the Initial Case Management Conference, Plaintiff represented that its motion for partial 

summary judgment on the reservation of rights issue was based on a solely legal question; namely, 

whether Plaintiff’s reservation of rights preserved its ability to invoke the criminal acts exclusion 

in the underlying policy or whether the doctrines of waiver and estoppel precluded Plaintiff from 

doing so. Upon review of the parties’ briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court determines 

that this question presents a mixed question of law and fact. The Court can determine as a legal 

matter whether the reservation of rights is subject to a claim of waiver or estoppel—it is. See 

Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 30 -35 (1995), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 

26, 1995) (noting that waiver and estoppel are defenses to a denial of coverage and reservation of 

rights). However, at this early stage in the proceedings the Court cannot determine as a matter of 

law whether waiver or estoppel apply. These defenses are, at least in part, factual questions. That 

is, waiver exists where “a party intentionally relinquishes a right or when that party’s acts are so 

inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has 

been relinquished.” Id. at 33-34. Notably, in Waller, the California Supreme Court found that 

waiver did not exist because

[t]he present facts do not show that T.I.E.’s denial letter indicated an 

intention on the part of the insurer to relinquish additional reasons for denial 

of a duty to defend. Nor have plaintiffs shown that T.I.E.’s actions following 

its defense denial were inconsistent with its intent to enforce the terms of the 

policy. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not shown that T.I.E.’s denial of a 

defense induced a reasonable belief in plaintiffs that T.I.E. intended to waive 

additional policy defenses.

Id. at 34 (emphasis added). Facts, intention, action or inaction, and inducement of a reasonable 

belief are all factual issues that the Court cannot decide as a matter of law at this early stage in the 

proceedings. 

Likewise, estoppel requires a showing that the “insurer’s conduct caused either (1) a 

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United States District Court

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reasonable belief that insurer was providing coverage or (2) any detrimental reliance on such 

conduct, both of which are essential to an estoppel claim.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Jioras, 

24 Cal. App. 4th 1619, 1627–28 (1994) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 

Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees’ Ret. Sys., 24 Cal. App. 5th 537, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2018), review denied (Sept. 19, 2018) (“the existence of an estoppel is generally a factual 

question.”).

Defendant contends that because she is not precluded as a matter of law from asserting 

waiver or estoppel as defenses to Plaintiff’s reservation of rights, she is entitled under Rule 56(d)

to obtain discovery regarding whether Plaintiff waived the criminal acts exclusion as a ground to 

deny coverage. Rule 56(d) permits denial or continuance of a motion for summary judgment, “[i]f 

a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 

essential to justify its opposition.” A party requesting a Rule 56(d) continuance bears the burden 

of setting forth specific facts she hopes to elicit from further discovery and demonstrating that the 

facts sought not only exist but are also essential to oppose summary judgment. Family Home & 

Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Defendant seeks the depositions of Plaintiff’s claims and underwriting 

representatives to obtain testimony regarding verbal and written communications between Ms. 

Bishop and the claims representatives to establish:

1. that the policy issued to Defendant is illusory and unenforceable on grounds of 

public policy;

2. that the parties had communications about their subjective beliefs about the 

scope and nature of coverage that bear on the reasonableness of Defendant’s

expectations of coverage; 

3. that Great American misrepresented the coverage afforded to Defendant; 

4. that Defendant asked Great American a number of questions about coverage on 

a number of occasions between 2007 and 2015, and was not given complete 

information in response, such that the responses constituted misrepresentations; 

5. that Great American asserted inconsistent coverage positions, by asserting that 

the Criminal Acts exclusion barred coverage under the Professional Liability 

coverage, but Great American did not assert the Criminal Acts exclusion as a 

defense to the Abuse Liability coverage when it offered to pay, on 

Defendant’s behalf, the remainder of the $100,000 Abuse limits to the 

Giordano’s in settlement. 

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(Dkt. No. 40-1 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff insists that this is not sufficiently specific and that Defendant has 

not shown what facts she could obtain through discovery which would defeat summary judgment. 

The Court disagrees. 

Defendant has specifically identified the discovery she seeks and why this discovery is 

relevant to her defenses of waiver and estoppel. Moreover, Defendant has not had the opportunity 

to obtain this discovery through no fault of her own and “[w]here [] a summary judgment motion 

is filed so early in the litigation, before a party has had any realistic opportunity to pursue 

discovery relating to its theory of the case, district courts should grant any Rule 56[d] motion 

fairly freely.” Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck 

Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the expediency that drove Plaintiff to file 

this motion so early—the November 5, 2018 trial date in the underlying civil action—no longer 

exists as that trial has been continued until March 2019. The Court thus concludes that Defendant 

has established good cause for a continuance of the pending motion for partial summary judgment 

sufficient to allow her time to obtain discovery necessary to oppose that motion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Rule 56(d) motion for a continuance is 

GRANTED. The parties shall complete the additional discovery by December 21, 2018. 

Defendant shall file her supplemental opposition brief by January 10, 2019 and Plaintiff shall file 

a supplemental reply brief by January 24, 2019. The Court will hear the continued motion for 

summary judgment on February 7, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 40.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2018

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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