Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_05-cv-03015/USCOURTS-arwd-3_05-cv-03015-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been

substituted for Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

We note that counsel has failed to file a brief in support of his motion. Local rule 2

7.2(a) requires that all motions not specifically itemized as an exception in subsection (d)

therein "shall be accompanied by a brief consisting of a concise statement of relevant facts

and applicable law." Counsel is advised that failure to file said brief with future motions will

result in the denial of his motion for attorney fees. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

CALLIE CASTEEL PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-3015

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Callie Casteel, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

October 5, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$2165.11 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 16.85 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $125.00 and $58.61 in expenses. (Doc. # 13). The defendant has filed a response, 2

expressing no objections to this award. (Doc. # 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

Case 3:05-cv-03015-JLH Document 15 Filed 02/16/07 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

2

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

The Commissioner filed a response expressing no objection to the award of a reasonable

attorney's fee under the EAJA, the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees

or the number of hours expended by plaintiff's counsel. (Doc. # 14). The court construes this lack

of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's decision to

deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

Case 3:05-cv-03015-JLH Document 15 Filed 02/16/07 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

3

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

Case 3:05-cv-03015-JLH Document 15 Filed 02/16/07 Page 3 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

4

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory

rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special

factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the

discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson

v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased

when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly

attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has not attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit and has

not presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's

counsel is entitled to an hourly rate of $125.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Counsel requests reimbursement for .30 hours for serving the defendants. However, the

court finds that these tasks could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc.

v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been

Case 3:05-cv-03015-JLH Document 15 Filed 02/16/07 Page 4 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

5

completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are not

compensable under the EAJA. Therefore, .30 attorney hours must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

Counsel has also requested .15 for the preparation of affidavits of service, .15 for

reviewing the order adopting the report and recommendation remanding the case pursuant to

sentence 5, .15 hour for reviewing the order referring the case to the magistrate, and .15 hour for

reviewing the order adopting the report and recommendation remanding the case pursuant to

sentence four. This court concludes that it should not have taken an attorney experienced in

handling social security cases this amount of time to perform this task. Bowman v. Secretary of

H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Therefore we are deducting .20 hour from the total

number of compensable hours sought. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $58.61 in expenses incurred with regard to the

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $58.61 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 16.35 (16.85-.50)attorney hours, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, and $58.61 in expenses, for

a total attorney's fee award of $2102.36. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out

of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

Case 3:05-cv-03015-JLH Document 15 Filed 02/16/07 Page 5 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

6

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 16th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-03015-JLH Document 15 Filed 02/16/07 Page 6 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>