Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01744/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01744-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert I. Grim, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-01744-PHX-NVW 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Robert I. Grim seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied 

him disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security 

Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be 

vacated, and the matter remanded for computation of benefits. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was 42 years old on his disability onset date, has an associate’s degree in 

psychology, and performed skilled work as an automobile mechanic and dental 

laboratory technician. His disability is based primarily on multiple mental impairments, 

including Asperger syndrome and attention deficit disorder. He has a history of hitting 

himself in the head with a hammer and banging his head against a pole. Plaintiff testified 

that he has difficulty concentrating and completing tasks if other people are around. He 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

further testified that he has difficulty interpreting interpersonal communications, which 

often results in misunderstandings and conflicts. He experiences symptoms of depression 

and anxiety, including sleeping too much or too little. He testified that he has suicidal 

thoughts at least every other week, if not more frequently, and he has been hospitalized 

multiple times for attempting suicide. He is classified as Seriously Mentally Ill under the 

Maricopa County mental health care system. 

On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits alleging 

disability beginning December 23, 2010. On March 25, 2013, he appeared with his 

attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. 

On May 24, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 

decision. On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff sought review by this Court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); 

accord Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings 

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). 

III. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at 

step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity and determines whether the claimant is still 

capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, 

where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements 

of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2011, and that he did not engage in 

substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of December 23, 

2010, through his date last insured of December 31, 2011. At step two, the ALJ found 

that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

bipolar disorder, depression, a personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder, Asperger syndrome, asthma, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. At 

step three, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: 

has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(b) except that the claimant can frequently climb ramps, 

stairs and ladders. He can never climb ropes or scaffolds. He should avoid 

concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants, such as odors, fumes, dusts 

and gases. He also should avoid hazardous environments. He is limited to 

work which involves only occasional changes in the work setting, 

occasional interaction with the public and co-workers and occasional 

supervision. 

The ALJ further found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff was capable of 

performing past relevant work as a dental laboratory technician, which is defined as 

skilled, light work in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. The ALJ Erred in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility. 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and, if so with no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the 

rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). “This is not an easy 

requirement to meet: ‘The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required 

in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

To ensure meaningful review, the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony 

from a claimant the ALJ finds not to be credible and explain what evidence undermines 

the testimony. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2014). “General findings are insufficient.” Id. The ALJ must make findings 

“sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002); 

accord Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In making a credibility determination, an ALJ “may not reject a claimant’s 

subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the claimant’s allegations.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 

1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But “an ALJ 

may weigh inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, 

daily activities, and work record, among other factors.” Id. An ALJ may consider 

whether the claimant has adequately explained failure to seek treatment or follow a 

prescribed course of treatment. Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., __ F.3d __, 2015 

WL 4620150, at * 7 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2015). Further, the claimant is not required to 

produce objective medical evidence of the symptom or its severity. Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1014. 

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. Second, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms not entirely credible because (1) the objective medical evidence does not 

support the degree of severity alleged by Plaintiff, (2) he obtained an associate’s degree 

from Arizona State University and was a full-time student at Phoenix College in January 

2011, (3) he failed to appear for numerous appointments, (4) he maintained a long-term 

relationship with a woman that recently ended, and (5) he reported daily activities that are 

not as limited as the ALJ would expect if Plaintiff had the limitations he claims. 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The ALJ did not identify the testimony he found not to be credible and did not 

explain how the evidence undermines Plaintiff’s testimony. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 

1102. The ALJ said Plaintiff testified he has trouble sleeping because of his anxiety, has 

trouble making and keeping friends, gets into conflicts easily, is extremely defensive, 

feels people are conspiring against him, has suicidal thoughts every other week, has had 

multiple suicide attempts, and bangs his head against objects when he gets irritated. The 

ALJ also said, “The claimant has described daily activities which are not limited to the 

extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations,” 

but never identified what “the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations” are that 

are contradicted by Plaintiff’s daily activities. Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 

multiple mental impairments, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s “condition responded well to 

treatment” without identifying what “condition” responded well to treatment. Even if 

general findings were sufficient, which they are not, the ALJ’s reasons for finding 

Plaintiff less than fully credible do not satisfy the clear and convincing standard. 

Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility findings are not “sufficiently specific to permit the 

court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” See 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. 

B. The ALJ Erred in Weighing Medical Source Opinion Evidence. 

1. Legal Standard 

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit 

distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat 

the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and 

(3) non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must give weight to the 

treating physician’s subjective judgments in addition to his clinical findings and 

interpretation of test results. Id. at 832-33. Where a treating physician’s opinion is not 

contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” 

reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not be rejected without “specific and 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 830; Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). “Even if a treating physician’s opinion is 

contradicted, the ALJ may not simply disregard it. The ALJ is required to consider the 

factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) in determining how much weight to 

afford the treating physician’s medical opinion.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2014). 

Further, an examining physician’s opinion generally must be given greater weight 

than that of a non-examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. As with a treating 

physician, there must be clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted 

opinion of an examining physician, and specific and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting an examining physician’s contradicted 

opinion. Id. at 830-31. 

The opinion of a non-examining physician is not itself substantial evidence that 

justifies the rejection of the opinion of either a treating physician or an examining 

physician. Id. at 831. “The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may 

also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent 

clinical findings or other evidence in the record.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 

(9th Cir. 2002). Generally, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 

physician than to the opinions of physicians who do not treat the claimant, and the weight 

afforded a non-examining physician’s opinion depends on the extent to which he 

provides supporting explanations for his opinions. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Factors that an ALJ may consider when evaluating any medical opinion include 

“the amount of relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the quality of the 

explanation provided; the consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole; 

[and] the specialty of the physician providing the opinion.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. In 

deciding weight to give any medical opinion, the ALJ considers not only whether the 

source has a treating or examining relationship with the claimant, but also whether the 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

treatment or examination is related to the alleged disability, the length of the relationship, 

frequency of examination, supporting evidence provided by the source, and medical 

specialization of the source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

2. The ALJ’s Weighing of Medical Source Opinions 

The ALJ said he was unable to assign any significant weight to the opinions of the 

examining physicians Dr. Marc Walter, Dr. Aaron Bowen, and Dr. Mark Wellek, or to 

the opinion of treating psychiatrist Dr. Laura Don regarding Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments. The ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record for rejecting any of these medical opinions. 

The ALJ stated that he was unable to assign the opinion of consultative examiner 

Dr. Marc Walter any significant weight because although Plaintiff’s psychiatric 

impairments are severe, they responded well to treatment, so they do not render Plaintiff 

incapable of working. The ALJ did not say which impairments responded well to 

treatment and did not give a specific reason for rejecting Dr. Walter’s opinion. Dr. 

Walter’s testing of Plaintiff showed he most likely has Asperger syndrome, bipolar 

disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Dr. Walter observed that Plaintiff 

“has very much difficulty with social functioning,” including interpreting nonverbal cues. 

Dr. Walter concluded Plaintiff has several serious mental disorders, each of which would 

markedly interfere with his ability to maintain work. 

The ALJ stated that he was unable to assign the opinion of consultative examiner 

Dr. Aaron Bowen any significant weight because the objective medical evidence 

indicates that Plaintiff’s psychiatric impairments are severe. Dr. Bowen opined that he 

saw no evidence of any of the diagnoses Plaintiff claims to have and that the bestsupported diagnosis is borderline personality disorder. Dr. Bowen noted: 

He was irritable during the interview and kept making snide comments 

about the questions and smirking as he responded. He was very vague and 

evasive with his answers. He was very theatrical and kept sighing, 

exaggerating everything that came out of his mouth, and talking about how 

he can’t do anything. . . . Overall, he is not a credible source. 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Dr. Bowen also commented that during the Mini Mental Status Exam, “the claimant put 

forth very little effort and kept sighing and moaning—frankly, this is the one of the worst 

efforts I have seen.” Yet, all of Plaintiff’s responses on the Mini Mental Status Exam 

appear to be correct, and sighing may have been a sincere, but inappropriate, reaction to 

the extremely simple questions and tasks, such as repeating three words. Dr. Bowen also 

commented: “He was clearly exaggerating and this writer has no doubt that he is just 

throwing out a list of conditions without really knowing what he is saying (he doesn’t 

have learning disabilities, dyslexia, Asperger’s, ADHD, bipolar, depression, anxiety, or 

any of the other diagnoses he says he has).” Dr. Bowen’s interaction with Plaintiff 

illustrates Plaintiff’s difficulty with interpersonal communications and how negatively 

others react to it. 

The ALJ stated that he was unable to assign the opinion of consultative examiner 

Dr. Mark Wellek any significant weight because Dr. Wellek saw Plaintiff only one time, 

and Dr. Wellek’s statement that Plaintiff’s condition did not respond well to Prozac, 

carbamazepine, and trazodone was contradicted by three treatment notes (two on the 

same day, one of which was for three minutes). But the treatment notes make no 

reference to medications; they merely state that Plaintiff said he was “doing better” and 

was “much less depressed than he was.” Dr. Wellek found that Plaintiff exhibited the 

classic signs and symptoms of Autism Spectrum Disorder and suggested medications 

more likely to be effective for the anxiety and agitation of autism and for depression. 

The ALJ did not acknowledge the difference between autism and depression. 

The ALJ stated that he was unable to assign either of the opinions of treating 

psychiatrist Dr. Laura Don any significant weight because the objective medical evidence 

does not support these opinions. The ALJ identified two examples of contradictions 

between Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living and Dr. Don’s opinion. First, in July 

2011 Dr. Don opined that Plaintiff has “marked difficulty leaving the house or allowing 

people into his home due to panic and paranoid delusions.” In September 2011 Plaintiff 

reported that he goes outside daily, but he also reported that he spends as little time as 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

possible in stores because people scare him, he does not go places on a regular basis, he 

mostly keeps to himself, and he avoids people as much as possible. In March 2013 

Plaintiff testified that in 2012 he flew to San Diego to visit his mother for four or five 

days. Second, in March 2013 Dr. Don opined that Plaintiff “suffers from moderate to 

moderately severe fatigue as a result of his medications,” but Plaintiff “did not similarly 

report significant fatigue while undergoing treatment.” However, in March 2013 Plaintiff 

testified that medications interfere with his sleep patterns, sometimes preventing him 

from falling asleep at night, which results in him sleeping during the day. Even if Dr. 

Don incorrectly identified fatigue as a side effect of Plaintiff’s medications (and sedation 

as a side effect of Seroquel), the ALJ did not give any reason to reject Dr. Don’s opinions 

that Plaintiff has severe impairments in his ability to relate to other people, respond 

appropriately to supervision and customary work pressures, and perform complex or 

varied tasks and has moderately severe impairments in his ability to understand, carry 

out, and remember instructions and to respond appropriately to co-workers. 

Instead, the ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions of two psychologists 

employed by the State Disability Determination Services who neither treated nor 

examined Plaintiff, but concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled based on reviewing 

records. Both reviewing psychologists gave great weight to medical opinions from 2008 

(at least two years before the alleged onset date), from Dr. Ottney regarding physical (not 

mental) impairments, and from Dr. Bowen, whose opinion the ALJ rejected. They 

rejected Dr. Don’s July 2011 opinion because it relied heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective 

report of symptoms and limitations. The ALJ provided only the following conclusory 

explanation for giving the reviewing opinions significant weight: 

Although those physicians were non-examining, and therefore their 

opinions do not as a general matter deserve as much weight as those of 

examining or treating physicians, those opinions do deserve significant 

weight, particularly in a case like this in which there exist a number of 

other reasons to reach similar conclusions (as explained throughout this 

decision). 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

However, the other reasons to reach similar conclusions are not “explained throughout 

this decision.” Moreover, the ALJ erred by giving significant weight to the opinions of 

non-treating or non-examining psychologists without showing they were consistent with 

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. 

C. The ALJ Erred in Determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional 

Capacity. 

A residual functional capacity finding involves a detailed assessment of how a 

claimant’s medical impairments affect his ability to work. In determining a claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, the ALJ “must consider all relevant evidence in the record, 

including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and ‘the effects of all symptoms, 

including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.’” 

Robbins v. SSA, 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ must consider the combined 

effect of multiple conditions, including those that are not severe. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1545(a)(2). A plaintiff’s illnesses “must be considered in combination and must 

not be fragmentized in evaluating their effects.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 829 (9th 

Cir. 1995). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments that include, among other 

things, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and Asperger syndrome. He rejected all of 

the medical opinions that supported finding any severe impairment, so it is impossible to 

know what evidence he used to support his severe impairment findings. However, in his 

step three analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in social 

functioning and moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. 

In his residual functional capacity assessment, the ALJ included limitations related to 

social functioning and did not include any limitation related to concentration, persistence, 

or pace. This error was not harmless because if the ALJ had included a limitation related 

to concentration, persistence, or pace in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, 

the expert would have testified that Plaintiff was not capable of performing his past 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

relevant work as a dental laboratory technician, which is defined as skilled, light work in 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 

D. The ALJ Erred by Failing to Make Factual Findings to Support the 

Conclusion that Plaintiff Can Perform Past Relevant Work. 

At step four, the claimant has the burden of showing she can no longer perform 

her past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ 

may conclude the claimant can perform past relevant work by finding he is able to 

perform the actual functional demands and duties of a particular past relevant job or he is 

able to perform the functional demands and duties of the occupation as generally required 

by employers throughout the national economy. Id. at 845. Thus, at step four, the 

claimant has the burden to prove he cannot perform her prior relevant work either as 

actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy. Carmickle v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Although the burden of proof rests with the claimant at step four, the ALJ must 

make specific factual findings regarding the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the 

physical and mental demands of the past relevant work, and the relation of the residual 

functional capacity to the past work. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. The ALJ is required to 

make explicit findings regarding a claimant’s past relevant work either as generally 

performed or as actually performed, but is not required to make findings about both. Id.

at 845. The ALJ may assess a claimant’s past relevant work as actually performed by 

considering a properly completed vocational expert’s report and/or the claimant’s own 

testimony. Id. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles usually is the best source for how a 

job is generally performed. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. 

The ALJ did not make explicit factual findings regarding the physical and mental 

demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant work either as actually performed or as generally 

performed. He said only that he relied on the vocational expert, who opined that an 

individual with Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity would be capable of performing 

his past work as a dental laboratory technician. 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

E. Remand 

If the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence or suffers from legal 

error, the district court has discretion to reverse and remand either for an award of 

benefits or for further administrative proceedings. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 

(9th Cir. 1996); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). “Remand for 

further proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful.” 

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). “Conversely, where the record 

has been developed fully and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award of benefits.” Id. (citing 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292). To remand for immediate award of benefits, the Court must 

find: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant 

testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited 

evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled on remand. 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Here, the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 

would serve no useful purpose. The ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and for rejecting the medical 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. In addition, he failed to consider all of 

Plaintiff’s severe impairments in his residual functional capacity assessment and failed to 

make factual findings regard the physical and mental demands of Plaintiff’s past relevant 

work. 

It is unnecessary to remand for further administrative proceedings for a step five 

determination of whether Plaintiff was capable of performing any other work. The ALJ 

posed a second hypothetical to the vocational expert that included mental functional 

limitations consistent with the improperly discredited evidence, i.e., Plaintiff’s testimony 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and the medical opinions of the treating and examining psychiatrists. The vocational 

expert opined that under the second hypothetical there would not be any work that 

Plaintiff could perform. Therefore, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited 

as true, the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security is vacated and this case is remanded for computation and award of 

benefits. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall terminate this case. 

Dated this 4th day of September, 2015. 

Case 2:14-cv-01744-NVW Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 14 of 14