Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02510/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02510-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David M. Rodriguez , Judy Gonzales

Poggi, Jose Mendoz a, Frank Rivera,

Mario Quezada, and Esther Anaya-Garcia,

on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Maricop a County Community College

District , The Governing Board of the

Maricopa County Community College

District , Rufus Glasper, in his official and

individual capacity, and Phillip Randolph,

in his official and individual capacity, 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 04-2510-PHX-EHC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certificat ion [Dkt. 26],

support ed by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [Dkt. 27]. Defendants filed a

Response opposing class certification. [Dkt. 56]. Plaintiffs filed a Reply. [Dkt. 61].

Background

Plaintiffs are six persons of Latino origin employed by the Defendant Maricopa

County Community College District (District). Plaint iffs are also the putative

representatives of a class consisting of all the Latino employees of the District. The District

maintains an e-mail system, known as a "listserv," for its employees to communicate with

one another. The e-mail system allows an employee to simultaneously send a single e-mail

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message to every emp loyee of the District. According to Plaintiffs, the e-mail system is

primarily for the purpose of communications regarding the educational, research,

administrative, and business activities of the Dist rict. Defendants' policy regarding the use

of t he e-mail system states that Defendants do not monitor the use of the e-mail syst em,

recognizing "that the free exchange of opinions and ideas is essential to academic

freedom." [Dkt. 56, ex. 5, p. 1].

Over a two-week p eriod in October of 2003, Walter Kehowski, a faculty member in

the Mathematics Department of the District's Glendale Community College, sent three emails to every employee of t he District, including the Plaintiffs and the putative class

members. In the e-mails Kehowski expressed his views, detailed below, on topics such as

immigration, multiculturalism, affirmative action and diversity. Kehowski also expressed his

views on his faculty website, which was linked to the District's webpage. 

On October 7, 2003, Kehowski sent an e-mail in response to the announcement of

a cultural event by a Latino student group. The e-mail called the student group "'racist' and

separatist, denounced 'diversity double-talk,' and contained Internet links to offensive

articles, including one discussing a fear that Latinos will 'take over' t he count ry." [Dkt. 27,

p. 4, quoting Dkt. 33, ex. 1].

On October 13, 2003, Kehowski sent a second e-mail, which began "YES! Today's

Columbus Day! It's time to acknowledge and celebrate the superiorit y of Western

Civilization. Enjoy the buffet." [Dkt. 29, ex. 3, p. 2]. The "buffet" referred to in the e-mail,

was the collection of website links and excerpts of articles attached thereto. The collection

of links and excerpts of articles set forth themes similar t o t hose expressed in Kehowski's

e-mail. For instance, one excerpt stated that "America did not become the mightiest nat ion

on earth without distinct values and discrimination. The government was created by

White, Anglo-Saxon (English) Prot estants, with guns in their hands." [Dkt. 29, ex. 3, p. 7].

Kehowski also provided his comment s on the excerpts. For example, in response to the

statement that "the ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, human rights and

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1

 "The term La Raza refers t o M exican Americans and other Latinos." [Dkt. 27, p. 5,

fn. 2].

2

 Defendant s role in the removal of the "Intelligence" page, if any, has not been

presented to the Court at this time.

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cultural freedom... are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas,"

Kehowski comments that "One might add that they're not Latin American ideas either."

[Dkt. 29, ex. 3, p. 2]. 

On October 15, 2003, Kehowski sent a third e-mail, which denounced

"multiculturalism" and "d-d-d-diversity," and proclaimed that "Western Civilization is

superior." [Dkt. 27, p. 5]. The e-mail ended wit h a warning: "Remember, only the victor

writes the history. YES! You think La Raza1

 doesn't already know t hat ?" [Dkt. 33, ex. 3, p.

11 (emphasis in original)].

One employee responded to Kehowski's e-mails. Kehowski replied to that employee,

saying "if the White Man will not defend his culture, will even eagerly participate in its

dest ruct ion (that's what you've just witnessed with Columbus Day), then Hispanics (for

example) sense that they can replace his culture with their own language and culture." [Dkt.

29, ex. 4 (parenthetical statements in original)].

The e-mails included articles and statements written by Samuel P. Huntington, a

Harvard p rofessor and author, and Arthur Schlesinger, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winning

author. [Dkt. 29, ex. 3, p. 2]. The e-mails included a link to Kehowski's faculty website,

which proclaimed that "The only immigration reform imperat ive is preservation of White

majority." [Dkt. 29, ex. 5, p. 1]. The website also included links to articles similar to those

cont ained in the e-mails. At some time after October of 2003, the links to articles were

moved to a separate "Int elligence" page on Kehowski's faculty website. In early 2005, the

"Intelligence" page was removed from Kehowski's faculty website.2

District employees complained to the administration of the District and its

Governing Board (also named as a Defendant), sending letters and e-mails to Defendant

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Rufus Glasper, the District's Chancellor, and Defendant Phillip Randolph, the President of

Glendale Community College. Plaintiffs allege that the District did not limit Kehowski's

communications through e-mail or the website, and did not take any action against

Kehowski personally. 

On October 16, 2003, Defendant Randolph sent an e-mail to the emp loy ees of

Glendale Community College, advising t hat "the openness of [the District's e-mail] system

also allows individuals to express opinions on almost any subject" and that "I want

everyone... to know that personally and administratively, I support the District's values and

philosophy about diversity." [Dkt. 56, ex. 3]. 

On October 23, 2003, Defendant Glasper issued a press release regarding Kehowski's

communications. The press release states that Kehowski's "message is not aligned with

the vision of our district." The bulk of t he press release highlights the District's

commitment to academic freedom, which dictates that taking action against Kehowski

"could seriously undermine our ability to promot e true academic freedom." [Dkt. 56, ex. 4].

This press release received public mention in the November 15, 2003 edition of the Arizona

Republic newspaper. [Dkt. 63, ex. 5].

On November 7, 2003, Defendant Randolph held a meeting with approximately 40

Latino employees of Glendale Community College. On December 9, 2003, the District's

Governing Board held a public meet ing regarding Kehowski's communications. Speakers,

including Latino employees, students, and members of the community, voiced their

concerns regarding Kehowski's communications. 

Plaintiffs allege that the District's decision to allow Kehowski's communications

without reprimanding him or taking other action has emboldened others to make similar

communications. On February 12, 2004, David Dudley, a math professor at the District's

Phoenix College sent every Phoenix College employee an e-mail with the subject: "'New

Hiring Procedures for Phoenix College.'" The message itself stated: "'1. Are you Hispanic?

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If yes, Congrat ulat ions you've got the job. Oh by the way, what is your name and what job

do you want?'" [Dkt. 27, pp. 9-10].

Plaintiffs filed charges of racial and national origin discrimination wit h the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On April 28, 2004, the EEOC issued identical

Det erminations to Plaintiffs, finding "reasonable cause to believe that [the District] violated

Title VII by harassing Charging Party and a class of employees, because of their national

origin, race, religion, and sex." [Dkt s. 33, ex. 5; 36, ex. 1; 37; ex. 1; 38, ex. 1; 39, ex. 1]. The

parties unsuccessfully tried informal conciliation. On August 18, 2004, the EEOC issued

identical right to sue letters to Plaintiffs. [Dkts. 31, ex. 1; 33, ex. 6; 36, ex. 2; 37, ex. 2; 38, ex.

2; 39, ex. 2]. 

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court on November 12, 2004. [Dkt. 1]. The

Complaint alleges a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,

popularly known as Tit le VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and violation of

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants'

conduct is unlawful and an injunction "preventing district employees from disseminating

racially disparaging material through its website and email system." [Dkt . 1, p. 8]. Plaintiffs

ask the Court to order Defendants to establish policies t o effectuate the terms of the

injunction. Plaintiffs further seek damages resulting from Defendants' conduct. Plaintiffs

seek to prosecute those claims, and pursue the relief described above, on behalf of a class

comprising the Latino employees of the District. 

Legal Standard

The Court has discretion to certify a class, but must exercise its discretion wit hin the

framework of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186

(9th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of class certification), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir.

2001). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), there are "four p rerequisites for class action

litigation, which are: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of

represent at ion." Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming class

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certification in case alleging a racially-based hostile work environment). "In addition to

meeting the four conjunctive requirements of 23(a), a class action must also qualify under

one of the three subdivisions of 23(b)". Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 163, 94

S.Ct. 2140, 2145 (1974) (class certification proper under Rule 23(c)(2), but dist rict court

instruct ed t o dismiss the case because the representative plaintiff refused to pay for notice

to the class members). The proponent of class certification "bears the burden of

demonstrating that she has met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least

one of the requirements of Rule 23(b)." Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.

Discussion

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs sought certificat ion "of a class of all past, present, and

future Latino employees of [the Maricopa County Community College District] who have

been, continue t o be, or in the future may be subjected to a hostile work environment on

account of their race, color, and/or national origin." [Dkt. 1, p. 5]. In their Motion for Class

Certification, Plaintiffs have changed t he description of the putative class. Plaintiffs seek

certification of a class defined as "all persons of Latino origin emp loy ed by [the Maricopa

County Community College District] at any time between October 7, 2003 and the present,

during which the official [Maricopa County Communit y College District] webpage included

a link to a website maintained by Walter Kehowski t hat addressed issues of race, ethnicity,

race relations, immigration, and/or similar matters unrelated to the subjects he t eaches."

[Dkt. 27, p. 1]. 

A. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

1. Numerosity

Plaintiffs must establish that the p utative class "is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). In det ermining whether joinder is

impracticable, courts look to such factors as t he geographical distribution of the members

of the proposed class, Carr v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 414 F.Supp. 1292, 1304 (N.D.

Cal. 1976) (numerosity not established where proposed class was alleged to have 100

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members, all but two of whom lived in the Northern District of California) (citing DeMarco

v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968)), and the number of members in the proposed

class, Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333, fn. 9 (7th Cir. 1969)

(40 members of class sufficient "where the individual members of the class are widely

scattered"); State of Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 20-21 (C.D. Cal.

1969) (350 class members insufficient where many of the members had previously joined

or intervened in related cases); Winkler v. DTE, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 235, 239 (D. Ariz. 2001)

("reasonable estimate" of 266 class members sufficient).

Here, Plaintiffs seek certification of a class comprising all Latino employees of the

District from October 7, 2003 unt il t he present. Plaintiffs allege that the District employed

703 Latinos in October of 2003, when Kehowski sent his e-mails. As of April 1, 2005, the

District is alleged to employ 730 Latinos. The class of Latinos exposed to Kehowski's emails and websit e is potentially larger than 730, due to departures and hires occurring from

October of 2003 until the present. Because they are all employed by the Dist rict, the

geographical distribution of the putative class members is likely limit ed. Given that there

are potent ially more than 730 members of the proposed class, joinder would be "inefficient

and costly," and therefore impracticable. See Winkler, 205 F.R.D. at 239 (impracticable to

join 266 proposed class members all of whom were assumed to reside near Scottsdale,

Arizona).

Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' description of t he class, arguing that the class

should only include "individuals who claim to have read all of Professor Kehowski's emails, his entire web page, and any links." This class cannot meet the numerosity

requirement because Plaintiffs "have identified fewer than a handful" of members. [Dkt. 56,

p. 6]. Because this argument focuses on whet her t he alleged hostile work environment is

individual or common to all Latino employees, it is better addressed in determining

commonality.

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2. Commonality

Plaintiffs must establish that there are "questions of law or fact common to the

class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This is a minimal st andard: "all that is required is a common

issue of law or fact." Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 904 (9th Cir. 1975). The Court in

Blackie found a common issue of law in determining the standard of care applicable to the

defendant corporation, its officers and its independent auditor. Id. at 905. The Court also

found common issues of fact involving the "alleged inventory overvaluation," even

though the alleged overvaluat ion would have affected the class members differently

depending on when they bought stock. Id. at 904.

Defendant s argue that commonality does not exist in this case "because there are

enormous differences even as to the Kehowski material which employees throughout the

Dist rict saw." [Dkt. 56, p. 4]. The differences in the materials viewed by the employ ees, so

Defendants argue, is relevant in proving a racially hostile environment, which requires

inquiry into the subjective percept ions of t he victim. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) ("if the victim does not subjectively perceive the

environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the

victim's employment, and there is no T it le VII violation"); see also Vasquez v. County of

Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (to prevail on hostile work environment claim

a plaintiff must prove (1) subjection to conduct of a racial nat ure; (2) "that the conduct was

unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficient ly severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of t he plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment").

Therefore, Defendants conclude that commonality is lacking unless one "assume[s] that

every Latino in the District chose to read all of t his material or that a large number of Latino

employees were offended by what they read,... to the point that the terms and conditions

of their employment were affected." [Dkt. 56, p. 6]. 

In deciding whether to certify a class, a court may not look at the merits of the case.

Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78, 94 S. Ct. at 2152-53 (court could not shift notice cost to the

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defendants based on its finding that the class was "more than likely" to prevail). The Court

should, however, consider evidence concerning the nat ure of Plaintiffs' claims in

determining "whether the matters in controversy herein are p rimarily individual in character

or are susceptible to proof in a class action." Polich v. Burlington Nort hern, 116 F.R.D. 258,

261 (D. Mont. 1987) (no commonalit y because there would be a "wide variance of proof"

in establishing each class members' damages from the defendants' fraud). 

In discrimination cases generally, a court may examine the extent of the defendant 's

alleged discriminatory conduct in determining whether commonality exists. Staton, 327 F.3d

at 954 (in affirming class certificat ion, not ing evidence presented in class counsels'

interviews, salary documents, and company-wide e-mail). T he Ninth Circuit has "held, in

a civil rights suit, that commonality is satisfied where t he lawsuit challenges a system-wide

p ract ice or policy that affects all of the putative class members." Armstrong v. Davis, 275

F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (commonalit y met notwithstanding "a wide variation in the

nature of the particular class members' disabilities"). Commonality may be established by

a uniform pattern of conduct by defendant. LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332 (9th Cir.

1985) (uniform pattern of INS conduct established commonality among residents of migrant

farm dwellings, even though the residents were affected differently by the conduct). 

In discrimination cases alleging a hostile work environment, neither the Ninth Circuit

nor any of the courts of appeals have directly addressed what affect the individual element

of a hostile work environment claim should have in determining commonality. See Melissa

Hart, Litigation Narratives: Why Jenson v. Eveleth Didn't Change Sexual Harassment Law,

But Still Has a Story Worth Telling, 18 Berkeley Women's L.J. 282, 295 (2003) (reviewing

Clara Bingham and Laura Leedy Gansler, Class Action: The Story of Lois Jenson and the

Landmark Case that Changed Sexual Harassment Law (2002) ("The appropriateness of

sexual harassment class action treatment has yet to reach the Supreme Court, and indeed

has received essentially no attention in the courts of appeals."). Without comment ing on

how the individual element of a hostile work environment claim affects commonality, the

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Ninth Circuit has allowed cases involving claims of hostile work environment to proceed

as class actions. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 946, 953-59 (commonality existed where Plaintiffs

complained "of a complex of discriminatory practices that includes compensation, training,

and work environment in addition to promotions"); and see Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d

405, 408 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court certified class action in case alleging a gender-based

hostile work environment after Plaintiffs "deleted their class claims respecting hiring,

promotions, and training"). 

District courts have specifically this addressed this question and found

commonality among the members of a putat ive class claiming a hostile work environment

based on offensive communications. See, e.g., Newsome v. Up-t o-Date Laundry, Inc., 219

F.R.D. 356 (D. Md. 2004) (finding commonality based on racially-hostile speech directed

at class members); Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding commonality

where "Individual Defendants made either the same or substantially similar offensive

comments in each of the seminars attended by members of the proposed class").

In Newsome, the Court looked at whether the work environment was hostile towards

the class as a whole. 219 F.R.D. at 362. In that case, the plaintiffs sought t o cert ify a class

consisting of "All African Americans employed by defendant" in certain departments over

a specified period of time. Id., at 360. The plaintiffs alleged that "the defendants directed

racially hostile speech at class members," thereby creating a hostile work environment. Id.

at 362. The Court certified the class, finding that commonality existed because "[h]ostile

work environment claims require plaintiffs t o demonstrate that the landscape of the total

work environment was hostile towards the class." Ibid. The Court found that the plaintiffs

did not need to demonstrate that every class member heard the racial slur at issue because

"[e]vidence of the subject ive experiences of each class member is not necessary to support

class-wide liability; there must only be evidence that some class members experienced

objectively severe and pervasive conduct. Ibid, (citing EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor M fg. of

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America, Inc, 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1074 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (using a totality of the circumstances

test in determining whether a class was subject to a hostile work environment). 

Likewise in Markham, the Court focused on the defendants' conduct in finding

commonality among the members of the class. 171 F.R.D. at 221-22. There, the plaintiffs

sought cert ification of a class of all female police officers who attended training seminars

conducted by the defendants over a specified p eriod time. The plaintiffs alleged that the

five individual defendants made sexually harassing and offensive comments during those

seminars, resulting in a work environment hostile to the female officers. Id. at 218.

Defendants argued that commonality could not exist among the female officers because

"what each class member saw or heard at any given seminar differs." Id. at 222. The Court

rejected this argument finding that "the proper inquiry is an object ive one that asks what

the Individual Defendants said and did at each seminar, not what each member of the

plaintiff class heard and saw." Ibid. The Court found commonality because the defendants

"made either the same or substantially similar offensive comments in each of the seminars

attended by members of the proposed class." Ibid. 

The Court finds the approach applied in Newsome and Markham persuasive. Those

cases direct a court, in determining commonality, to focus on the defendants' conduct and

whether that conduct was directed against the class as a whole. The virtue of the approach

taken from those cases is that it allows courts to adjudicate as class actions claims of

discrimination based on harassing conduct directed at the class as a whole. Otherwise an

anomaly would result: the defendants would create a hostile work environment for t he

class as a whole, but a court would be barred from hearing a consequent hostile work

environment claim on behalf of the class as a whole. In short, the class would be harmed

as a whole, but forced to seek relief as individuals. This approach is in accordance wit h the

United States Supreme Court's comment that "civil rights cases against part ies charged

with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples" of "class actions for

declaratory or injunctive relief." Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S. Ct.

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2231, 2245 (1997) (deny ing class certification where uncommon questions predominated

among class of victims of asbestos exposure). 

This approach is refined by examining cases where courts have found no

commonality exist ed among the members of a class alleging hostile work environment

claims. The reason commonly given for a lack of commonality is that the evidence

presented in those cases fails to establish that the class as a whole was subject to a hostile

work environment based on a uniform policy or practice of the defendants. See Stubbs v.

McDonald's Corporation, 224 F.R.D. 668, 675-76 (D. Kan. 2004) (no commonality on hostile

work environment claim because the alleged discrimination was based on "decentralized,

individualized decision-making," involved "different environment s and conditions" and

involved "different pay scales, positions, and locality p ay differences"); Elkins v. American

Showa, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 414, 423-425 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (no commonality because the

evidence offered failed t o show "that the plant-wide environment was hostile" and "fail[ed]

to show a common pattern"); Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 159 (D. Kan. 1996) (no

commonality where discrimination claims focused "upon the individual actions taken by

different individual supervisors, and not a uniform policy or practice"). In determining

commonality among a class seeking to bring a hostile work environment claim, a court

should examine whether the alleged discrimination was directed against the class as a

whole or against individual members of t he class and whether the discrimination was

pursuant to a policy or uniform practice of the defendants.

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to find discrimination against the

putative class as a whole based on a uniform policy or practice of the Defendants, thereby

establishing common questions of law and fact among the members of the putative class.

See Stubbs, 224 F.R.D. at 675 (commonality not satisfied by bare allegations of a pattern

and practice of discrimination). 

Plaintiffs allege that Kehowski sent out three e-mails to every employee of t he

District, including the Lat ino employees. Those e-mails contained Kehowski's pejorative

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remarks against minorities in general and Latinos in particular. The e-mails also contained

excerpts of articles and links to articles expressing similar views. Plaintiffs further allege

that Kehowski's website, linked to the District's website, carried materials expressing

Kehowski's hostility towards Latinos. Kehowski's missives were not sent to only some

members of the putative class, nor was his website available only to a few. One Latino

employee received an e-mail directed specifically to that employee, but that e-mail was a

reply to the response the employee had sent to Kehowski regarding his district -wide emails and the rep ly set forth the same themes expressed in the District-wide e-mails.

Kehowski's views were published to all members of the putative class on the e-mail

communication system and website used by all the District's employ ees. T he uniformity

of distribution distinguishes this case from cases such as Zapat a, 167 F.R.D. at 159, where

the claims of discrimination were based on conduct by different individual supervisors

against different members of the class. T hose facts are common to all the members of the

putative class. See Markham, 171 F.R.D. at 222 (commonality where the defendant s made

same or substantially similar remarks to all members of class).

Defendants' response to Kehowski's communications and the complaints they

engendered is also alleged to be based on Defendant s' p olicy. Defendants have expressed

their disdain for Kehowski's views, but have not limited Kehowski's communications

t hrough e-mail or the website, and have not taken any action against Kehowski personally ,

taking the position that their e-mail system is open for employees to express their views

"on almost any subject." [Dkt. 56, ex. 3]. Defendants maintain that these actions are

required by their policies regarding the use of the e-mail system and the District's website.

Defendants' response regarding Kehowski's communications has been directed to

the putative class as a whole. On Oct ober 16, 2003, Defendant Randolph sent an e-mail to

the employees of Glendale Communit y College, advising that "the openness of [the

District's e-mail] system also allows individuals t o express opinions on almost any subject"

and that "I want every one... to know that personally and administratively, I support the

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District's values and philosophy about diversity." [Dkt. 56, ex. 3]. Defendant Glasper's

press release on October 23, 2003, which described the op enness of the employee

communications system, was for general distribution and garnered attention in the Arizona

Republic newspaper. On November 7, 2003, Defendant Randolph held a meeting with

approximately 40 Latino employ ees of Glendale Community College. On December 9, 2003,

the District's Governing Board held a p ublic meeting regarding Kehowski's

communications.

Given the class-wide distribution of Kehowski's communications and the uniformand public- response Defendants had to t hose communications, the Defendants are wrong

in arguing that the work environment of each member of the putative class must be

determined individually. Kehowski's communications are arguably offensive on t heir face;

a Latino employee would not need t o read the entirety of those communications to feel

under attack. Further, Kehowski's views received the attention of the entire District, and

the public, evidenced by the meetings, district wide e-mails, press releases and media

coverage.

Those facts also present common questions of law. In deciding the merit s of this

case, the fact-finder will have to determine whether Kehowski's communications and the

Defendants' responses thereto created a host ile work environment for the Latino

emp loyees of the District. As alleged, that determination will focus on the offensiveness

of Kehowski's communications and the propriety of the Defendants' response and the

Dist rict 's p olicy regarding emp loy ee communicat ions. Because Kehowski's

communications are allegedly offensive to the entire class and were directed to the entire

class, the fact-finder should consider their offensiveness to the putat ive class as a whole.

See Newsome, 219 F.R.D. at 362 (finding that racial slur was objectively offensive and

directed at class members). The fact-finder will also have to determine whether the District's

policy, which arguably prevented Defendants from silencing or reprimanding Kehowski,

was required by Kehowski's right to freedom of expression, as Defendants have argued.

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3

 Citing Falcon, Defendants merge their arguments concerning commonality and

typicality. [Dkt . 56, pp. 7-10]. Having addressed Defendants' arguments in its discussion

of commonality, the Court need not address them again in discussing typicality.

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3. Typicality

Plaintiffs must establish that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Typicality is

satisfied if the claims of the representative parties "are reasonably coextensive with those

of the absent class members." Staton, 327 F.3d at 957 (quotation omitted). "The

commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge." Gen. Tel. Co. of the

Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, n. 13, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2371, n. 13 (1982).3

 Here, the claims of the Plaintiffs are "reasonably coextensive with," if not identical

to, those of the p ut ative class members. Plaintiffs and the class members received the same

communications from Kehowski. They argue those communications are pat ent ly offensive

to the Plaintiffs and the class members. Defendants' resp onse t o Kehowski's

communications is alleged to be uniform and based on the District's policy. 

Should the case reach the stage of determining monetary damages, the amount of

the monetary damages suffered by the Plaintiffs may differ from that suffered by the class

members. A potential variance does not render Plaintiffs' claims less t han coextensive with

those of the putative class members. The Complaint does not include a p ray er for

reinstatement, front-pay, back-pay, or any other type of damages or equitable relief

available under Title VII, which could require a determination unique to each member of the

putative class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g)(1). The damages requested in the Complaint for

"emotional distress, humiliation, and anguish" are not based on facts unique to each

member of the class, but are based on Defendants' actions affecting t he members of the

class as a whole. 

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4. Adequacy of Representation

The Plaintiffs, as representative parties, must be able to "fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This standard requires (1) that

t he representative parties have coextensive interests with the class members and (2) t hat

the represent at ive parties and their counsel will vigorously prosecute the case. Staton, 327

F.3d at 957-59. As discussed above, the Plaintiffs in this case have claims coextensive with

those of the putative class members and there is nothing in the record to indicate that their

interests in p ursuing those claims are not coextensive with the interests of the class

members.

The representative parties and their counsel appear willing to vigorously p rosecute

t his case. The Plaintiffs all pursued their claims against Defendants to the EEOC. T hey

have all sat for their depositions [Dkt. 56, attachments] and produced declarations in

support of the instant Motion to Certify [Dkts. 31, 33, 36-39].

Counsel for the representative parties have been active in conducting depositions

and taking discovery. Counsel have experience litigating class action and civil rights cases.

Lead counsel for the class would be Thomas A. Saenz of the Mexican American

Legal Defense and Educational Fund [MALDEF], which was created to safeguard the civil

rights of Latinos and has more than 30 years experience in litigating class action cases,

including those brought for violations of civil rights in the context of emp loy ment. Thomas

Saenz oversees MALDEF's complex employment litigation and references six such cases

in which he has served as class counsel. MALDEF has a budget of approximately $6

million, indicating it has the resources to vigorously p rosecute this case on behalf of the

class. [Dkt. 28]. MALDEF has staff attorneys who will assist in this case, so far five have

notified the Court of their ap p earance in this case. Also representing the class would be

David F. Gomez and Michael J. Petit ti, Jr. of Gomez & Petitti, PC, who have experience with

employment cases, particularly in the Arizona state courts.

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4

 Defendants argue that a case may only be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2) if the

claims for monetary damages are incidental to the litigation. In support of this proposition,

Defendants cite Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2001) and Probe

v. State Teachers' Retirement System, 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986). Expressly referring

to those cases, the Ninth Circuit stated that "our use of the word 'incidental' was int ended

to mean 'secondary' to injunctive relief." Molski, 318 F.3d 950, n. 14.

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B. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) 

A case may be maintained as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) if "the

party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the

class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief

with respect to the class as a whole." A case involving a claim for monetary damages may

be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) if "the claim for monetary damages [is]

secondary to the primary claim for injunctive or declaratory relief." M olski v. Gleich, 318

F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2003).4 In Molski, the claim for injunctive relief was primary and that

for monetary damages was secondary because the defendants allegedly "acted in a manner

generally applicable to the class" and "injunct ive relief appeared to be the primary goal in

the litigation." 318 F.3d at 950. "[C]ivil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful,

class-based discrimination are prime examples" of cases maintainable as class actions

under Rule 23(b)(2). Amchem Prods, 521 U.S. at 614, 117 S. Ct. at 2245. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "acted in a manner generally applicable to the

class." Kehowski directed his communications to every member of the putative class. Some

class members may have read different portions of Kehowski's communications and had

different reactions to them. Nevertheless, Defendants' response was a uniform position

stressing their disdain for Kehowski's positions and citing t heir policy, which prevented

them from silencing Kehowski.

The primary goal of this litigation appears to be injunct ive and declaratory relief.

Plaintiffs emphasiz e t hat t he work environment is hostile to Latinos and seek relief from the

"hateful, racist messages that altered their work environment." [Dkt . 61, p. 8]. In their

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Complaint, Plaint iffs allege that those messages are "abusive and threatening," creating

"a racially charged employment atmosphere." [Dkt. 1, p. 4]. Despite complaints and an

EEOC determination, Defendants allegedly "failed to take ap propriate action and the hostile

work environment continued." [Dkt. 1, p. 5]. Plaintiffs propose to cure the hostile work

environment by altering Defendant s' policies concerning e-mail and website usage, and

ordering Defendants to enforce the policies.

One of t he primary questions in this case is subject to resolution by a declaration.

Defendants' policies concerning communication among its employees raise questions

concerning the interplay of anti-discrimination law and protections for free expression.

Defendants argue that their p olicy p revent ing them from limiting Kehowski's

communicat ions, and racially-based communications generally, is required by academic

freedom and the right to freedom of expression.

 Damages are secondary to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. As

previously discussed, Plaintiffs do not seek reinst at ement, front-pay, back-pay, or any of

the other types of damages often available in a hostile work environment case. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g)(1). Nor do those types of damages appear appropriate in a case where

no employee is alleged to have been terminated or denied a promotion based on the hostile

work environment. The damages requested in the Complaint are for "emotional distress,

humiliation, and anguish" based on the Defendants' actions affecting the members of the

class as a whole. In any event, the issue of monetary damages could be determined

individually, if the course of this case reveals that it is an issue properly so determined. See

Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (class certification is subject to amendment or alteration). 

Accordingly,

IT IS O RDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification [Dkt. 26] is

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is certified as a class action on behalf of

all persons of Latino origin employed by the Maricopa County Community College District

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at any time bet ween Oct ober 7, 2003 and the present, during which the official Maricopa

County Community College District webpage included a link to a website maintained by

Walter Kehowski that addressed issues of race, ethnicity, race relations, immigration,

and/or similar matters unrelated to the subjects he teaches.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et

seq. and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 as set forth in the Class Complaint [Dkt. 1] are certified

as class claims. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thomas A. Saenz of the Mexican American Legal

Defense and Educational Fund and David F. Gomez and Michael J. Petitti, Jr. of Gomez &

Petitti P.C. are appointed as class counsel. 

DATED this 12th day of January, 2006.

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