Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02485/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02485-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ANTHONY DIESSO,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-2485 LKK KJM P

vs.

KNOWLES, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his Solano County conviction for murder,

possession of a weapon by a prisoner, battery by a prisoner, the findings that he had two prior

serious felony convictions and that he had served a prior prison term as well as the resulting

sentence of 135 years to life. 

I. Background

The state Court of Appeal’s thorough factual summary is fairly supported by the

record:

Guilt Phase

During the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecution presented the

following testimony. In June 1998, defendant was a prisoner at

CMF and was housed in the “I” wing in cell 308 with Jeffrey Ford. 

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The I wing houses prisoners with a psychiatric history who have

had problems in the prison system. On June 29, just before 4:00

a.m., Lieutenant Michael Ross found defendant in his cell banging

on the door and saying something Ross could not understand; the

cell was dark and Ross had a hard time seeing inside. He saw what

appeared to be blood on defendant’s forehead. Defendant moved

away from the cell door and Ross saw him grab his cellmate and

toss him off the lower bunk and into the wall, after which Ford fell

on the floor. Defendant said, “Get it out of here.”

Ross testified that when defendant was taken out of the cell, he was

covered in blood and had a “wide-eyed look.” Investigating

officers entered the cell and found that Ford was dead; his body

was lying face down against the wall. There were bloody

handprints all over the walls and trash and other items strewn about

the cell. The autopsy revealed that Ford died from ligature

strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head. 

Later on the same day, June 29, 1998, two other incidents occurred. First,

after defendant was removed from his cell in the early morning he was

placed in a medical examination room, where the correctional officers

decided to change his restraints. In the course of the transfer of the

handcuffs, defendant broke away and hit one of the officers in the face,

knocking him down and knocking another officer into the wall. Both were

briefly rendered unconscious. In the afternoon, two officers from the

Investigative Services Unit went to talk to defendant. They found two

other officers trying to persuade defendant to give up a razor blade he had

in his possession. Instead, defendant took the razor blade, wrapped some

plastic around it, placed it in his mouth, took a drink from a milk carton

and swallowed the razor blade.

Defendant made several statements about these incidents. On July

3, 1998, he told one officer that he was “trippin” and “that was not

him,” but he did not say to which incident he was referring. Also

on July 3, he told another officer that he did not recall what

happened on the day of the murder, but only remembered being

escorted down the hallway from his cell with blood all over him. 

On July 7, a correctional officer overheard defendant talking with

another inmate, Nicholas Mecca. Defendant bragged about

swallowing the razor blade and bragged that he had sent two

officers to the hospital.

In late December 1998, defendant asked to speak to the

Investigative Services Unit and requested an interview with the

District Attorney’s office. In January 1999, he provided a written

confession and verbally confessed, giving details of the murder of

his cellmate Jeffrey Ford.

Several inmates testified about defendant’s behavior both before

and after Ford’s murder. James Deckard had previously been

defendant’s cellmate, and had asked to be moved because

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defendant kept Deckard up all night talking to himself, and

walking around. Deckard thought defendant was not in control of

his faculties. He testified that when defendant was not receiving

his medication, he was uncontrollable. Before the murder

defendant told Deckard that he was planning on killing another

inmate by choking him, and that he intended to put blood and

satanic signs on the wall so that he would be sent to the mental

hospital at Atascadero based on a not guilty by reason of insanity

verdict. Deckard also testified that defendant had a tattoo saying

“NLR” which stood for “Nazi Low Riders,” a person “that doesn’t

like any other race but himself.” However, Deckard did not think

that defendant was affiliated with that group.

Another inmate, Ray Ochoa, had been housed with defendant on

previous occasions before Ford was killed. Ochoa testified that

defendant had mood changes, talked to himself and walked around

aimlessly. On one occasion defendant told Ochoa he was dressing

like a girl in order to make himself appear mentally ill. He also

told Ochoa how to swallow razor blades, how to go on a hunger

strike, how to overdose on medication and how to otherwise fake

symptoms of mental illness. Defendant said he was going to kill

an inmate called Stephanie by strangling him and that he would go

to the mental hospital afterwards because he was going to put

things on the wall with blood and act crazy. Ochoa testified that on

the night of the killing, defendant was trying to get the officers’s

attention and the officer did not respond to him. Ochoa saw

defendant come out of his cell the night of the murder, and he

testified that defendant seemed “out of it.”

A third inmate, Nicholas Mecca, was housed in the Administrative

Segregation wing of CMF when defendant was housed there after

June 29. Mecca testified that defendant told him he had killed a

“punk,” meaning a homosexual. He asked Mecca to testify that he

(defendant) was “having psych problems” and was crazy. He told

Mecca that the killing did not have anything to do with

psychological problems and that he never had a psychotic break,

but he wanted Mecca to help him make it seem that was what had

happened. Mecca testified that a few days before the killing,

defendant told him he was going to kill a punk with a razor blade

he had received from another inmate. At some point in time

defendant told Mecca that “he was gonna do it” in order to become

a Nazi Low Rider.

During the guilt phase, the defense called two mental health

experts. Dr. Dean Clair, a psychologist, reviewed records but was

unable to meet with defendant because he refused to submit to an

interview. In May 1997, Dr. Clair had interviewed defendant for a

prior offense and had concluded at that time that defendant was not

psychotic. Based on his past contact with defendant and on the

files he reviewed for the current offense, Dr. Clair’s opinion was

that as of the date of the current offense defendant was psychotic as

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a result of an organic mental disorder. Dr. Clair’s opinion was

based in part on defendant’s history of seizure disorder with

blackouts, resulting from childhood brain trauma.

Dr. Herb McGrew, the second mental health expert called by the

defense, was appointed by the court to evaluate the defendant. Dr.

McGrew, a psychiatrist, had evaluated defendant once for a prior

offense and twice for the current offense. The first time he

evaluated defendant, in 1997, Dr. McGrew found him incompetent

to stand trial, and defendant was sent to Atascadero. As to the

current offense, Dr. McGrew’s opinion was that defendant “was

extremely and extraordinarily disturbed” and likely psychotic at the

time of the murder. However, Dr. McGrew also testified that he

felt that defendant was manipulative, and he questioned whether

defendant was giving accurate information.

Defense counsel argued that at the time of the murder defendant

was suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered him

incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit murder. The

jury found defendant guilty on all counts. At the reading of the

verdicts defendant made a verbal outburst and pushed over counsel

table, and was removed from the courtroom.

Sanity Phase

The parties stipulated that the jury could consider all of the guilt

phase evidence during the sanity phase. At the sanity phase the

same doctors returned to the stand. Dr. Clair testified that in his

opinion defendant was legally insane at the time of the murder. He

based his opinion in part on the fact that defendant suffered from a

convulsive disorder, and people with such disorders often have

uncontrollably violent episodes in which they lose the ability to

distinguish right from wrong. Moreover, defendant had a history

of instability and violent acting out and might not have been taking

his medication. The fact that defendant killed his cellmate “under

circumstances where it would be inescapable that he would be

charged with that” suggested an inability to link behavior and

consequences. He found defendant’s behavior in general to be

totally irrational. He also noted that in the period leading up to the

crime, defendant had been telling others that voices were

tormenting him. From the fact that defendant acted coherently

both before and after the murder, Dr. Clair concluded that

defendant is “transiently psychotic.” He opined that all indications

were that defendant was not in control of himself at the time of the

murder.

Dr. McGrew also testified that defendant was legally insane at the

time of the murder. He believed that at the time of these offenses

defendant was not capable of making any rational decision about

whether killing Ford was right or wrong. The prosecutor suggested

the murder was rational because it was gang-related. Dr. McGrew

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could only guess that defendant did not commit the murder for

gang-related reasons, but because he was out of control.

The defense called Dr. Stephen Estner, a board certified

psychiatrist, appointed by the court. Based on his examination of

defendant and his review of the records Dr. Estner concluded that

at the time of the murder defendant met the criteria for legal

insanity in that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong. Dr.

Estner also testified that people with mental illness can fluctuate to

the point where they are lucid before and after a crime but insane at

the time the crime is committed.

Michael Pappa, a captain with the Department of Corrections,

testified for the prosecution about defendant’s arraignment hearing,

during which appellant lunged at his attorney and “head-butted”

him, and then spit on the bailiff. The court had defendant removed

from the public courtroom and held in a secure cell adjacent to the

courtroom, where the court questioned defendant, who did not

respond to the court’s questions. A week later, the court again

attempted to arraign defendant, who once again refused to speak. 

When the court explained it could not accept defendant’s not guilty

by reason of insanity plea unless defendant personally entered the

plea, defendant responded to the court’s questions and entered his

plea.

Officer Fermin Rubio testified to an incident in 1997 where

defendant stabbed another inmate 17 times because the inmate had

called defendant “a snitch.” Rubio testified that the inmate had the

reputation as an “effeminate homosexual.” He also testified to an

in-court incident in April 1999, where defendant lunged at and

attempted to assault his attorney.

Answer, Ex. A (Court of Appeal opinion) at 3-8.

II. Standards Under The AEDPA

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 1

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA”). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 1

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

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objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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26 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970). 2

 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) 3

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III. Petitioner’s Request To Represent Himself

A. Background

During the course of pretrial proceedings, petitioner filed several Marsden2

motions to relieve his series of appointed lawyers and several Faretta motions seeking to 3

represent himself. CT 45-50, 55-60, 64-69 (Marsden motions); CT 75-79, 82-85, 89-93 (Faretta

motions). The court gave petitioner a written advisement, which petitioner filled out and filed

with the court. In it petitioner acknowledges his understanding of his legal rights, the advantages

of having a lawyer, the disadvantages of self-representation, and the nature of the charges and the

possible consequences. CT 105-109 (Faretta advisement and waiver). At the hearing on

February 28, 2000, the court reviewed these topics with petitioner, who affirmed his

understanding of the problems attendant upon self-representation. 2/28/00 RT 4-9. The court

warned petitioner that “if you represent yourself and then you engage in the acting-out behavior

which unfortunately you have done time and time again, that you’d be removed from the

courtroom, and there’s not going to be anybody here to represent you.” 2/28/00 RT at 5. Later,

the court asked petitioner “what can you tell me to cause me to believe you when you tell me you

are not going to act out in the future?” Petitioner said:

Well, just my word and the fact that I’ve – I have acted

inappropriately in your courtroom, but at the same time, I realize it

hasn’t done any good for me. If anything, it’s made things worse,

and I’m not planning on trying to make anything worse than they

already are.

2/28/00 RT 9. The prosecutor objected “primarily based on his disruptiveness.” Id. Defense

counsel also urged the court not to grant the motion because of “the complicated nature of this

case, there’s also an NGI defense . . . .” 2/28/00 RT 10. Petitioner interjected that his “behavior

in court and what takes place in prison is two separate different things.” Id. at 11. The court

mused that it “want[ed] to make sure that we give Mr. Diesso all his constitutional rights and not

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just the one that talks about representing himself. I want to make sure that he has a fair and

impartial shot at this whole situation.” Id. at 12. Once again, petitioner interjected:

If the Court feels uncomfortable with me being in here, if I were to

represent myself, I can always be placed in the holding tank, and I

can hear just as very clearly as if I was standing here. And the

bailiff can run the papers back and forth, because they’ve done that

on other cases where there was disruptions in other courtrooms

where the person that went pro per. So I feel that if that is the

issue, I can – I have no problem being placed in there or being put

on the electric belt or whatever makes the Court happy.

Id. at 12-13. The court then ruled:

As I say, you know, we are trying to balance your constitutional

rights to represent yourself and trying to balance whether or not

this is the best thing for you and whether or not it’s something that

the Court should allow. 

The concern the Court obviously has is the fact that, in this Court’s

opinion, the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. We

have a situation where even in the CDC, which is a very highly

controlled environment and much safer for everybody than this

courtroom, you have not conducted yourself according to the rules.

While in my court on several occasions, you’ve acted out and

attempted to assault your attorney. You’ve been violent. I’ve had

to remove you from the courtroom and place you in the holding

cell next to my courtroom, and you acted out so much there, if

memory serves correctly, we had to remove you from this floor, so

we could conduct further hearings in your case.

You have acted out in such a way that I don’t find your statement

that you will not act out in the future to be credible. I find based

upon my personal observations of you that you engage in

purposeful behavior when you believe it somehow is going to

benefit you. And it’s this Court’s opinion that your acting out has

been entirely based upon your own specific intent to disrupt this

court and to build error into the record.

To allow you to represent yourself would be, in this Court’s

opinion, a huge mistake. It’s obvious that you are not competent to

represent yourself. If you take the records in these proceedings

since they began in its entirety, they clearly demonstrate that you

are not competent to represent yourself. I’m satisfied clearly that

you are mentally competent and that you’ve been fully informed of

your right to counsel. But I’m not satisfied that you really

understand what I’ve told you and what the consequences of your

contemplated act to represent yourself are.

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I specifically find that you have not intelligently and voluntarily

waived your right to counsel, and to allow the defendant to attempt

to represent himself would be a farce and a sham. So the motion is

denied.

Id. at 13-14. Petitioner raised the issue on appeal from his conviction. The Court of Appeal

rejected his claim:

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in basing its denial of

the motion on the finding that his waiver was not knowing and

intelligent. Faretta holds that a defendant has the right under the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to waive counsel and represent

himself or herself.

The record is clear that the trial court believed that defendant

would disrupt the court proceedings, and found that to allow him to

represent himself “would be a farce and a sham.” Defendant

asserts that the basis of the trial’s [sic] court’s ruling was that the

defendant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent. The court

made its finding in the context of its grave concern that the

defendant would continue to disrupt the proceedings.

This basis alone would suffice to support the trial court’s

conclusion that defendant could not represent himself, and a ruling

will be upheld if it was correct on any basis.

A defendant who chooses self-representation must be able and

willing to abide by procedural rules and courtroom protocol. “The

right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of

the courtroom,” and self-representation may be terminated when a

defendant engages in “serious and obstructionist misconduct.” The

California Supreme Court has held that the trial court may deny a

motion for self-representation if it has a reasonable basis for

believing that self-representation will create a disruption. “Thus, a

trial court must undertake the task of deciding whether a defendant

is and will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient,

disrespectful or obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to

preclude the exercise of the right to self-representation.” The trial

court’s decision to terminate a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the Welch

court held the same deference should be applied “when it comes to

deciding whether a defendant’s motion for self-representation

should be granted in the first instance.”

Our review of the record reveals numerous pretrial proceedings at

which defendant was seriously disruptive. On one occasion he

refused to leave his prison cell to appear for a readiness

conference, and the court was forced to continue the conference. 

In addition to the incidents cited by the trial court in its ruling on

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 The May 6, 1999 transcript immediately follows that of the proceedings on April 13, 4

1999. 

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the Faretta motion, the defendant had physically lunged at his

attorney and “head-butted” him, spit on the bailiff, used foul

language, and refused to speak when addressed directly by the

court. “We are also aware that the extent of a defendant’s

disruptive behavior may not be fully evident from the cold record,

and that one reason for according deference to the trial court is that

it is in the best position to judge defendant’s demeanor. Thus

while no single one of the above incidents may have been

sufficient by itself to warrant a denial of the right of selfrepresentation, taken together they amount to a reasonable basis for

the trial court’s conclusion that defendant could or would not

conform his conduct to the rules of procedure and courtroom

protocol, and that his self-representation would be unacceptably

disruptive.” There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

denial of the Faretta motion here.

Answer, Ex. A at 20-22. 

Both courts’ observations of petitioner’s behavior is borne out by this court’s

review of the record. The following incidents occurred before the court denied petitioner’s

Faretta requests:

• On April 12, 1999, the transcript reports that “the defendant makes

physical contact with Mr. Moe [his lawyer at that time] and is restrained.” 

Before petitioner was removed from the holding cell, he said, “I’ll tell you

right now, fool. This ain’t going down, mother fucker. It ain’t going

down, punk.” He then yelled from the holding cell, “Hey, your ass is

mine, Moe. Put that on the record.” 4/12/99 RT 5.

• On May 6, 1999, after an evaluation of petitioner’s competence to stand

trial, petitioner interrupted the proceeding, prompting the court to ask, “Do

we have any duct tape, gentlemen? Do you have something to gag him,

because I’m not going to put up with this.” 5/6/99 RT 10. Later in the 4

same hearing, a Marsden hearing, the court described petitioner’s

demeanor in this fashion: “He comes out of my holding cell acting like an

animal. He hears me say to the correctional officer, “Do you have any

duct tape. . . .” and he immediately stops. There’s nothing wrong with this

gentleman. This is all feigned. . . . and if he thinks that he’s going to

manipulate the legal system, it’s not going to happen.” Id. at 11. As the

hearing continues, the court reporter noted petitioner “burping” and

“making noises.” Id. at 12, 13. This prompted the court to direct

petitioner to be put in the holding cell. Id. at 13. 

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• The minutes for petitioner’s arraignment on August 19, 1999 note,

“Defendant became verbally + physically assaultive, he was removed from

the courtroom + placed into a holding cell adjacent to the courtroom.” CT

15. During the sanity phase of the trial, correctional officer Pappa

described what had occurred: “I observed Mr. Diesso lunge toward his

attorney, Mr. Oldwin, and head-butt him on the left side of his face. And

after that, he was grabbed by the correctional staff and carried out of the

courtroom. And just prior to being carried out of the courtroom, he turned

and spat on the bailiff.” RT 486. 

B. Analysis

In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth

Amendment right to represent himself at trial after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to

counsel and a trial court lacks discretion to deny a request so long as it is knowing, voluntary,

and timely. 422 U.S. at 835.

In this case, petitioner argues that the trial court did not properly apply the Faretta

standards, for it found he was mentally competent to represent himself yet also found that he had

not validly waived his right to counsel. The Court of Appeal found that the denial was based not

on an invalid waiver, but on the potential for disruption if petitioner represented himself.

In Hirschfield v. Payne, 420 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2005), the petitioner had made two

motions to represent himself. The first had been denied as made for the purpose of delay, while

the second was denied because the petitioner was unfamiliar with legal procedures. Id. at 927-

28. The Ninth Circuit found the first denial proper, but the second was not. It recognized that

had the second judge been aware of the prior ruling, he could have denied the second motion “on

the separate ground that it was intended to cause delay.” Id. at 928. However, the court

recognized it could not deny habeas relief on the basis of “a hypothetical justification not actually

relied on by the trial court.” Id. It refused to “ posit[] an alternative reason for the state court’s

decision . . .where the record reveals the state court did not base its decision on that alternative

reason.” Id. at 929; see also Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.

denied sub nom. Mitchell v. Van Lynn, 541 U.S. 1037 (2004) (refusing to uphold Faretta denial

on grounds of timeliness when state court had used lack of competence; court would not “invent

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an alternative rationale for the state court’s decision which requires application of an entirely

different and unrelated legal principle” and then uphold the decision based on the alternative

rationale).

This case is not like Hirschfield and Van Lynn. Although the trial court said

petitioner had not validly waived his right to counsel, the Court of Appeal found that denial of

the Faretta motion was made “in the context” of the potential for disruption and found the denial

proper on that basis. The trial court did more that “initially express concern” about the potential

for disruption; the focus of its explanation was on the earlier disruptions and the predictive value

of those episodes. Accordingly, unlike Hirschfield and Van Lynn, this court need not “invent an

alternative rationale for the state court’s decision” and may analyze the denial in the context of

petitioner’s disruptive behavior. 

The Faretta court observed:

 We are told that many criminal defendants representing themselves

may use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of their trials. But

the right of self-representation has been recognized from our

beginnings by federal law and by most of the States, and no such

result has thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial judge may

terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately

engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. See Illinois v.

Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353. . . .

The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity

of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . .

Faretta, at 834 n.46. Moreover, as the Court has observed, the “government’s interest in ensuring

the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his

own lawyer.” Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). The Fourth Circuit has

explained:

A trial court must be permitted to distinguish between a

manipulative effort to present particular arguments and a sincere

desire to dispense with the benefits of counsel.

United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000). 

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In this case, the court did not terminate petitioner’s right to represent himself, but

rather denied his request based on the potential for disruption of the proceedings. This is not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1989), the court granted the

defendants’ requests to represent themselves in a federal mail fraud prosecution, but thereafter

denied their repeated requests to be transported to a warehouse to inspect and categorize boxes of

documents they claimed were relevant to their defense. At a status hearing a week before trial,

defendants renewed their request. In response, the judge terminated their pro se status, finding

that they had refused to prepare for trial and so were incapable of representing themselves. Id. at

672. The Ninth Circuit reversed:

Pretrial activity is relevant only if it affords a strong indication that

the defendants will disrupt the proceedings in the courtroom. The

Supreme Court never suggested that the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation could be terminated for failure to prepare properly

for trial. Rather, it stated that [t]he right of self-representation is

not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.

Id. at 674 (internal quotations omitted). 

In United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1998), the court

terminated the defendant’s pro se status before trial after he repeatedly refused to answer the

court’s questions, challenged the court’s jurisdiction, and demanded a bill of particulars. He

challenged this ruling on appeal. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction:

[W]hen a defendant’s obstreperous behavior is so disruptive that

the trial cannot move forward, it is within the trial judge’s

discretion to require the defendant to be represented by counsel.

Id. at 1079. The court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Flewitt, but noted:

In Flewitt, the defendants’ conduct merely affected the defendants’

chance of prevailing at trial; it did not prevent the trial from

proceeding. In contrast, Brock’s steadfast refusal to answer the

court’s questions made it extremely difficult for the court to

resolve threshold issues, such as whether the defendant would be

represented by counsel. Brock did not simply refuse to prepare for

trial, he refused to cooperate, even minimally, with the court. 

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Furthermore, Brock’s obstructionist conduct persisted even after

several contempt citations. It was, therefore, reasonable for the

trial court to conclude that Brock’s behavior strongly indicated that

he would continue to be disruptive at trial.

Id. at 1080-81 (footnote omitted). 

As Brock and Flewitt recognize, when pretrial behavior strongly indicates that a

defendant will be disruptive at trial, a court is justified in revoking that defendant’s pro se status

before trial. Nothing in these cases, or in Faretta itself, suggests that a trial judge must first

permit a defendant to proceed pro se before relying on the predictive power of his prior behavior

to determine that the pro se defendant would disrupt the trial.

In Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 126

S.Ct. 139 (2005), the Ninth Circuit considered the interaction between state and federal rulings

concerning the timeliness of a Faretta request. It noted:

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is Supreme Court precedent existing at the

time of the state court’s decision. Supreme Court precedent

includes not only bright-line rules it establishes but also the legal

principles and standards flowing from them.

Id. at 1060. The court noted that Supreme Court guidance on “the permissible timing of a Faretta

request is scarce,” and concluded:

Because the Supreme Court has not clearly established when a

Faretta request is untimely, other courts are free to do so as long as

their standards comport with the Supreme Court’s holding that a

request “weeks before trial” is timely.

Id. at 1061. 

This case is similar, in that Supreme Court precedent on the question of when a

disruptive defendant’s request to represent himself may be revoked or denied is scarce. The

California Supreme Court has concluded that “the same rule” concerning the termination of the

right of self-representation of an obstructionist defendant 

/////

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applies to the denial of a motion for self-representation in the first

instance when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion

gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his selfrepresentation will create disruption.

People v. Welch, 20 Cal.4th 701, 735 (1999). The Court of Appeal relied on Welch in reaching

its decision in this case. Answer, Ex. A at 21.

The Welch court’s holding comports with Faretta and with Brock and Flewitt’s

recognition of the predictive value of pretrial behavior. The Court of Appeal’s determination

therefore is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the “principles and standards”

flowing from Faretta. Moreover, the court did not make an unreasonable factual determination

by relying on petitioner’s earlier disruptions as establishing the “strong indication” that he would

use his pro se status to continue his obstructionist behavior. The record shows his disruptions

were serious and continued even after he was removed from the courtroom. There was no

federal constitutional error.

IV. Jury Instruction On Mental State

In California, “all murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . lying in wait” or is

“willful, deliberate, and premeditated” is first degree murder. Cal. Pen. Code § 189. In this case,

the prosecutor proceeded on these two theories in pursuing the first degree murder charge against

petitioner. See RT 336-338. 

Petitioner argues that CALJIC No. 3.32, the jury instruction on mental state, failed

to inform the jury it could consider evidence of petitioner’s mental illness in determining the

mental state of lying in wait and did not make it clear to the jurors that evidence of petitioner’s

mental illness need only raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the required mental states. 

The trial court instructed the jury:

You have received evidence regarding a mental disease, mental

defect or mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the

commission of the crime charged, namely, murder in Count 1 or

lesser crimes thereto, namely, murder in the second degree and

voluntary manslaughter. You should consider this evidence solely

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 The 8.25 instruction as given read: 5

Murder which is immediately preceded by lying in wait is murder

of the first degree. The term lying in wait is defined as a waiting

and watching for an opportune time to act, together with a

concealment by ambush or by some other secret design to take the

other person by surprise, even though the victim is aware of the

murderer’s presence. The lying in wait need not continue for any

particular period of time, provided that its duration is such as to

show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.

RT 382; CT 389. 

17

for the purpose of determining whether the defendant actually

formed the specific intent, premeditated, deliberated or harbored

malice aforethought, which are elements of the crime charged in

Count 1, namely murder.

RT 385. The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s challenge:

Lying in wait is one form of deliberate and premeditated murder. 

A showing of lying in wait obviates the necessity of separately

proving premeditation and deliberation. In other words, lying in

wait is the functional equivalent of proof of a premeditated,

deliberate intent to kill.

The jury was first instructed with CALJIC No. 8.25, which was

given without modification. It defined the state of mind for lying

in wait as “equivalent to premeditation and deliberation.” . . . The 5

jury was then instructed with CALJIC No. 3.32, as modified by the

court. CALJIC No. 3.32 instructed the jury that it could consider

defendant’s mental state in determining whether he premeditated or

deliberated. The jury also received the standard instruction that as

to the murder charge, “there must exist a union or joint operation

of act or conduct and a certain mental state in the mind of the

perpetrator. Unless this mental state exists the crime to which it

relates is not committed.” Together, these instructions advised the

jury that defendant’s mental disorder was relevant to its

consideration of whether he had the required mental state for

murder; because lying in wait is equivalent to premeditation,

CALJIC No. 3.32 necessarily included it in the mental states as to

which defendant’s mental disorder could be considered.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defendant further faults the instruction on the basis that it failed to

make clear that the evidence of mental defect “need only be

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capable of raising a reasonable doubt about the existence of the

required mental states,” thereby depriving defendant of his

constitutional right to require that every element of his crime be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. The jury was

instructed that the prosecution’s burden was to prove the case

beyond a reasonable doubt and, specifically, that each piece of

prosecution evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Defense counsel argued reasonable doubt in his closing, including

a specific argument that the jury must be convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite intent for the

crimes. The burden was clear.

Here the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that

the jury understood the charge as the defendant asserts. (People v.

Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 496, 525, quoting Estelle v. McGuire (1991)

502 U.S. 62, 72-73 & fn. 4.) We conclude there is no reasonable

likelihood that the jury understood it could not apply the evidence

of mental disorder to the lying in wait instruction, or understood

the instruction to abrogate the prosecution’s burden of proof.

Answer, Ex. A at 17-20 (internal quotations and most citations omitted). 

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction

cannot be merely “undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned, but must violate some

due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,

146 (1973). Moreover, “not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction

rises to the level of a due process violation.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). 

An ambiguous jury instruction creates constitutional error if “there is a reasonable likelihood that

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of

constitutionally relevant evidence,” or otherwise “in a way that violates the Constitution.” Boyde

v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (instruction on mitigating evidence in a capital case);

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (adopting Boyde test for other challenges to

ambiguous jury instructions). In making this determination, a single instruction “may not be

judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Boyde,

494 U.S. at 378. 

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/////

A. Mental State Evidence And Lying In Wait

In California, evidence of a defendant’s mental illness, defect or disorder is

admissible “on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific intent,

premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is

charged.” Cal. Pen. Code § 28(a). Petitioner presented such evidence in the guilt phase and the

jury was instructed to consider it “solely” when evaluating whether he “actually formed the

specific intent, premeditated, deliberated or harbored malice aforethought.” RT 385. Petitioner

argues the use of the word “solely” and the failure to list lying in wait as one of the mental states

covered by the instruction prevented the jury from considering the evidence of petitioner’s

mental state when evaluating whether he was guilty of first degree murder on a theory of lying in

wait.

As the Court of Appeal noted and the jury in this case was instructed, proof of

lying in wait “acts as the functional equivalent of proof of premeditation, deliberation and intent

to kill.” See People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal.3d 589, 614 (1988). An equivalent is something “having

equal or corresponding import, meaning, or significance: chiefly of words and expressions,” or

“that is virtually the same thing; identical in effect; tantamount.” Oxford English Dictionary

Online at <http://dictionary.oed.com> (accessed 8/21/06). Accordingly, the jury was told to

consider the evidence of petitioner’s mental illness solely in connection with its determination

whether petitioner possessed the necessary mental states of premeditation and deliberation and

was told that lying in wait was “of equal meaning” and “virtually the same thing” as

premeditation. Given the equivalence of the terms, the use of the word “solely” in CALJIC No.

3.32 did not prevent the jury from considering the evidence of petitioner’s mental illness in

connection with the theory of lying in wait. The Court of Appeal’s decision did not unreasonably

apply clearly established federal law.

/////

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B. Raising A Reasonable Doubt

Petitioner argues that the instruction failed to inform the jury that his evidence of

mental illness could be the basis of a different verdict if it merely raised a reasonable doubt about

whether the prosecution had met its burden and that this deprived him of his right to hold the

prosecution to its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The “clearly established federal law” against which this claim must be measured

is In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which recognized that the due process clause requires

“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” of every element necessary to a finding of guilt. A jury

instruction that, in context, fails to give effect to that requirement violates a defendant’s

constitutional rights. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). However, as with

most claims of jury instructional error, this claim must be evaluated in the context of the

instructions as a whole. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378. 

Here, the jury was instructed that 

each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances

necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond

a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to

establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference

necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until

the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether

his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not

guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of

proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

In the crime charged in Count 1. . . there must exist a union or joint

operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind

of the perpetrator. Unless this specific intent exists, the crime to

which it relates is not committed.

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In the crime charged in Count 1. . . there must exist a union or joint

operation of act or conduct and a certain mental state in the mind

of the perpetrator. Unless this mental state exists, the crime to

which it relates is not committed.

RT 369, 378, 379; CT 362, 381, 382, 383. These instructions informed the jury of the

prosecution’s burden in general and on the issues of intent and mental state. The Court of

Appeal did not apply federal law in an unreasonable fashion in rejecting this claim of error. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 22, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

2/dies2485.157

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