Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-03910/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-03910-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BERNARDO MENDIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JOHN M. GARCIA, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 10-cv-03910-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 87, 90, 101 

INTRODUCTION 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Bernardo Mendia’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Leave to 

File a Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Mot. to Am., 

Dkt. No. 101. Defendants John M. Garcia, Ching Chang, and the United States of America 

(collectively, “Defendants”) filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 102), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Dkt. 

No. 103). Before Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to Amend, Defendants sought to dismiss the 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” Dkt. No. 70). See United States and Official-Capacity 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“U.S. MTD”), Dkt. No. 87; Individual Agent Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss (“Agents MTD”), Dkt. No. 90.1

 Plaintiff filed Oppositions to those Motions to 

Dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 97-98. However, the parties did not complete briefing as to the Motions to 

Dismiss, because—with the Court’s permission—Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to file his Third 

Amended Complaint. See Dkt. No. 100. Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal 

authority, and the record in this case, the Court rules as follows. 

 

1

 Plaintiff sues the agents in their official capacities as well as their personal capacities. Second 

Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 70. Accordingly, Defendants have filed two separate motions to dismiss, 

one representing the United States and the agents’ in their official capacity liability (U.S. MTD) 

and another representing the agents in their personal capacity liability (Agents MTD). 

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BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 

 The following factual background is taken from Plaintiff’s SAC. Dkt. No. 70. Plaintiff 

acquired derivative United States citizenship in 1987.2 Id. ¶ 10. On May 9, 2007, Plaintiff was 

arrested and charged with financial crimes, at which time he sought the assistance of a bail 

bondsman to secure his release from pretrial detention. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 26-27. On June 15, 2007, 

Garcia and Chang, agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), interviewed 

Plaintiff, ostensibly selecting him for questioning because he is foreign-born. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 

Plaintiff informed Chang that he was a United States citizen, gave his full social security number, 

and stated he had a United States passport issued in 1997. Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiff proceeded to invoke 

his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, to which Garcia allegedly said something to the effect 

of “Oh! You don’t want to talk?” and “We’ll see if you want to talk when we’re deporting your 

ass!” Id. ¶¶ 42-43, 47. 

 Chang placed an immigration detainer3 on Plaintiff that same day. Id. ¶ 47; see Req. for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. C, Dkt. No. 85. The detainer stated ICE had initiated an 

investigation to determine whether Plaintiff was subject to removal. Id. Plaintiff alleges the 

immigration detainer “dissuaded all bail bondsmen [from] conduct[ing] business with Plaintiff[,]” 

and he was thus unable to obtain a bail bond. SAC ¶¶ 53, 55-57. 

 On January 8, 2008, Garcia issued a second detainer. RJN, Ex. D. This detainer was 

stamped with the words “Drop Hold” and was marked “Please cancel the detainer previously 

placed by this Service on 06-15-2007.” 4 Id. Plaintiff alleges he was not aware the detainer had 

 

2

 Though not stated in the SAC, the First Amended Complaint explains he acquired U.S. 

citizenship from his mother. Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 27. 

3

 An immigration detainer advises a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency “that the 

Department [of Homeland Security (“DHS”)] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of 

that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). The 

detainer requests the agency notify DHS before the alien’s release such that DHS can arrange to 

take custody over the alien. Id. In the proposed Third Amended Complaint (“Prop. TAC,” Dkt. 

No. 101-1), Plaintiff asserts both “Chang and Garcia placed an ICE detainer on Plaintiff[,]” rather 

than only Chang. Prop. TAC ¶ 46. 

4

 In the proposed TAC, Plaintiff alleges that while the document stated “Drop Hold,” it also 

contained checked boxes indicating that ICE initiated an investigation to determine whether 

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been cancelled until July 31, 2009, when the state court released Plaintiff on his own 

recognizance.5 SAC ¶¶ 77, 82, 84. Plaintiff refused to accept release until the court informed him 

no detainer was in place. Id. ¶ 84. 

B. Procedural Background 

Plaintiff submitted an administrative tort claim to DHS on June 9, 2009, which the agency 

denied on March 1, 2010. Id. ¶ 3. On August 31, 2010, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his 

initial Complaint against Garcia and DHS. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff alleged constitutional and tort 

claims arising out of the detainer Garcia placed on him while he was in state custody. Id. ¶¶ 11-

15. Plaintiff, still proceeding pro se, then filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 

11, 2011, in which he (1) added Chang as a defendant; (2) asserted claims under Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for violations of his 

constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and right to bail; and (3) asserted claims 

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse 

of process, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. FAC ¶¶ 77-102. 

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC (Dkt. No. 34), which the Court 

granted on the grounds that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing (Dkt. No. 51). Plaintiff appealed 

the Court’s dismissal of the action (Dkt. No. 52), and on April 8, 2014, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 

holding Plaintiff could show that Defendants caused his injury and thus had standing to sue. See 

Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). 

In the Court’s December 17, 2014 Order to Set Briefing Schedule, the Court granted 

Plaintiff 90 days to obtain new counsel and seek leave to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. 

No. 63. Plaintiff timely sought leave on March 10, 2015 (Dkt. No. 64) and filed his SAC, again 

 

Plaintiff was subject to removal and also that ICE requested Plaintiff’s detention so ICE agents 

could assume custody over him. Prop. TAC ¶ 70. Plaintiff contends this simply “renewed” the 

ICE detainer or otherwise failed to cancel the June 2007 detainer. Id. The Court makes no 

findings as to the effect of the January 8 detainer. For purposes of this Motion to Amend, 

however, the Court takes Plaintiff’s allegations on their face and assumes two detainers were in 

effect. 

5

 Plaintiff does not allege when or how the detainer was in fact cancelled, if the January 8 detainer 

did not do so. 

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proceeding pro se, on April 1, 2015 (Dkt. No. 68). As noted, Defendants then moved to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s SAC. U.S. MTD; Agents MTD. The United States’ Motion addresses Plaintiff’s 

FTCA claims for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as 

Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claims for violations of his Fifth Amendment rights to equal 

protection and substantive due process. See U.S. Mot. The Agents’ Motion addresses Plaintiff’s 

Bivens claims for violations of his Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection and substantive due 

process. See Agents Mot. Plaintiff subsequently obtained counsel (Dkt. No. 93) and filed 

Oppositions to Defendants’ Motions (Dkt. Nos. 96, 98). Thereafter, the parties notified the Court 

Plaintiff intended to seek leave to file a third amended complaint. Dkt. No. 99. The Court 

suspended the deadline for Defendants’ Replies and the hearing pending this Order. Dkt. No. 100. 

In seeking leave to file a third amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks to assert 11 new claims, 

including (1) Federal Tort Act claims against the United States for negligence, negligent infliction 

of emotional distress, and abuse of process; (2) Bivens claims against Chang and Garcia for 

violations of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, Fifth Amendment right to 

equal protection, First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and Eighth Amendment right 

against excessive bail; and (3) claims for equitable relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act 

against all Defendants for violations of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, Fourth 

Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, 

and Eighth Amendment right against excessive bail. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 110-19, 131-54, 160-76, 183-

88, 197-224. Plaintiff also seeks to add a new defendant, ICE Field Office Director Timothy 

Aitken. Id. ¶ 14; Mot. to Am. at 1. All Defendants oppose amendment. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

All Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice to support their Motions to Dismiss, 

asking the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) Exhibit A: court records 

from The People of the State of California v. Bernardo Mendia, Case No. 1-126105-6; (2) Exhibit 

B: court records from the case of The People of California v. Bernardo Mendia, Case No. 162581; 

(3) Exhibit C: Immigration Detainer (stamped “Hold”) dated June 15, 2007; (4) Exhibit D: 

Immigration Detainer (stamped “Drop Hold”) dated January 8, 2008; (5) Exhibit E: Plaintiff’s 

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First Amended FTCA claim to DHS dated August 9, 2009; (6) Exhibit F: October 9, 2009 letter 

and supplemental materials from Plaintiff to DHS counsel in support of his FTCA claim; (7) 

Exhibit G: letter dated March 1, 2010 from DHS to Plaintiff, denying his FTCA claim; (8) Exhibit 

H: March 10, 2010 letter and supplemental materials from Plaintiff to DHS counsel; (9) Exhibit I: 

certification stamp affixed by the Clerk of the Superior Court of California for Alameda County. 

RJN, Exs. A-I, Dkt. Nos. 85-(1-24). 

 Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ request. Dkt. No. 97. It appears, however, that Plaintiff 

does not contest the authenticity of the documents or their relevance, only Defendants’ 

characterization of them. Id. at 1. In the Agent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, they address 

“Facts for Judicial Notice,” in which they summarize many of the documents in their request. 

This, Plaintiff contends, is argument and not appropriate for judicial notice. Id. 

The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either (1) generally known within the 

trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). However, “[a] 

court may not take judicial notice of one party’s opinion of how a matter of public record should 

be interpreted.” United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 974 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 

Rather, the Court may only take judicial notice of the documents themselves. Proper subjects of 

judicial notice court documents already in the public record and documents filed in other courts. 

See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, 

courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson 

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Exhibits A and B as they are public 

court documents. 

The Court may also take judicial notice of Exhibits C and D, as Plaintiff refers to the 

immigration detainers extensively in his SAC and proposed TAC. See United States v. Ritchie, 

342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a document is not attached to a complaint, it may be 

incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the 

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document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.”); Sizemore v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Ret. Plan, 939 

F. Supp. 2d 987, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (taking judicial notice of letters referenced in complaint); 

SAC ¶¶ 48, 77; Prop. TAC ¶¶ 46, 50, 57-58, 70. Given Plaintiff’s reliance on the detainers, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ request as to Exhibits C and D. 

The Court does not consider Exhibits E, F, G, H, and I in this Order and therefore does not 

take judicial notice of them at this time. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a 

matter of course within (1) 21 days after serving the pleading or (2) 21 days after the earlier of 

service of a responsive pleading or service of a Rule 12(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 

Outside of this timeframe, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written 

consent or the court’s leave,” though the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although the rule should be interpreted with ‘extreme liberality,’ leave 

to amend is not to be granted automatically.” Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 

A court considers five factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 

faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 

whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas 

Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Not all of the factors 

merit equal weight. As this circuit and others have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the 

opposing party that carries the greatest weight. Prejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under 

Rule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citation omitted). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [] factors, there 

exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. at 1052 (emphasis 

in original). “Denials of motions for leave to amend have been reversed when lacking a 

contemporaneous specific finding by the district court of prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith 

by the moving party, or futility of amendment.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

186-87 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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DISCUSSION 

A. Bad Faith

Bad faith may be shown when a party seeks to amend late in the litigation process with 

claims which were, or should have been, apparent early. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Plaintiff argues his request is not brought in bad faith because he recently obtained 

counsel, who has helped him draft his proposed TAC and investigate other claims and defendants. 

Mot. to Am. at 6. Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff seeks to amend in bad faith, nor does the 

record before the Court indicate a bad faith purpose for Plaintiff’s desire to amend. As such, the 

Court finds Plaintiff does not seek to amend his pleading in bad faith. 

B. Undue Delay 

“[D]elay alone no matter how lengthy is an insufficient ground for denial of leave to 

amend.” United States v. Webb, 665 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Morongo Band of 

Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). However, undue delay combined 

with other factors may warrant denial of leave to amend. See, e.g., Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387-89 

(holding that prejudice and undue delay are sufficient to deny leave to amend); Morongo Band of 

Mission Indians, 893 F.2d at 1079 (“delay of nearly two years, while not alone enough to support 

denial, is nevertheless relevant”). 

Defendants argue that amendment will further delay this case, which has been pending for 

over five years. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 8. However, much of this delay was the result of 

Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s subsequent successful appeal to the Ninth 

Circuit. Further, it was not until after he filed his SAC that Plaintiff obtained counsel, and 

Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff knew of the theories and legal bases for the amendments 

at the time he filed his prior complaints pro se. See Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1388; Johnson v. 

Serenity Trans., Inc., 2015 WL 4913266, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015) (the undue delay 

“inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff knew of the facts or legal bases for the amendments at 

the time the operative pleading was filed and nevertheless failed to act promptly to add them to the 

pleadings.”). As such, the Court finds Plaintiff’s delay does not weigh against his Motion for 

Leave to Amend. 

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C. Prejudice to the Opposing Party

This factor carries “the greatest weight” in whether to grant leave to amend, as “[p]rejudice 

is the touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (quotation 

omitted). “The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD 

Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. “A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings 

supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint.” 

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sol., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Solomon v. 

North Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998)). However, “[n]either delay 

resulting from the proposed amendment nor the prospect of additional discovery needed by the 

non-moving party in itself constitutes a sufficient showing of prejudice.” Tyco Thermal Controls 

LLC v. Redwood Indus., 2009 WL 4907512, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2009). 

Defendants repeat the same argument to show prejudice as they do for undue delay: that 

amendment will delay litigation. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 8. They contend amendment is 

prejudicial because “[a]s time passes, the memories of witnesses fade, and they may become more 

difficult to locate, which increasingly prejudices Defendants.” Id. However, such generalized 

arguments are insufficient to meet their burden of showing prejudice. See In re Fritz Co. Sec. 

Litig., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding no prejudice because “[w]hile the 

fading of witnesses’ memory over time and the changes to the [defendant] company could perhaps 

prejudice defendants, they fail to show specifically how it would do so”). Moreover, no case 

management deadlines have been established and discovery has not yet commenced, and therefore 

there is no risk Defendants will need to duplicate any prior efforts. Cf. Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 

1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding prejudice where “parties ha[d] engaged in voluminous and 

protracted discovery” prior to amendment and “[t]rial was only two months away, and discovery 

was completed”); Scognamillo v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding prejudice where plaintiffs “sought leave to amend late in litigation, 

approximately twelve weeks before the . . . discovery cutoff” and where the proposed theories 

were “a radical departure” such that “[g]ranting leave to amend at this point would require 

extensive additional discovery on entirely new topics and the redeposition of witnesses[.]”). As 

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such, the Court finds Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing prejudice 

sufficient to warrant denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. 

D. Previous Amendments

Courts have broader discretion in denying motions for leave to amend after leave to amend 

has already been granted. Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 

Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Chodos, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend when the party knew of the factual basis for 

the amendment prior to a previous amendment. Id. Further, a party that contends it learned “new” 

facts to support a claim should not assert a claim that it could have pleaded in previous pleadings. 

Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 2008 WL 913328, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2008) (citing 

Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1003). 

Defendants point out that Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint following each of 

their motions to dismiss, which they argue has resulted in delayed litigation and wasted judicial 

resources. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 6. They contend “Plaintiff should not be allowed to use the 

pleading process as a way to ferret out Defendants’ defenses or attempt to work around them.” Id. 

Defendants further argue Plaintiff’s pro se status should have no bearing since Plaintiff was not 

incarcerated during the litigation and has had “substantial opportunity” to retain counsel. Id. 

Despite Defendants’ argument, “where, as here, a plaintiff files a motion to amend after a 

defendant files a motion to dismiss, courts will still grant the motion to amend absent an 

independent showing by the defendant of at least one of the [other] factors.” Naranjo v. Bank of 

Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 2015 WL 913031, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (collecting cases). Although 

Plaintiff has amended his complaint twice before, he made those amendments without the benefit 

of counsel. Rather, it is in the interests of justice to allow Plaintiff, now with the guidance of his 

new counsel, to have an opportunity to set forth his claims with more precision. Thus, absent a 

finding that another factor weighs in favor of denying leave to amend, and given the policy of 

permitting amendment with “extreme liberality,” the Court finds this factor does not weigh against 

granting leave to amend. 

// 

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E. Futility of Amendment

 “A motion for leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally 

insufficient. However, a proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under 

the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim[.]” Miller v. 

Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The standard to be 

applied is identical to that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Id. To satisfy the 12(b)(6) pleading standard, a plaintiff must plead his claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendants generally assert amendment would be futile because the proposed TAC does 

not “cure the deficiencies” in Plaintiff’s SAC. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 7. In addition, Defendants 

raise four specific arguments as to why amendment is futile: (1) Plaintiff fails to meet the state tort 

requirements under the FTCA; (2) the agents are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Plaintiff lacks 

Article III standing for declaratory relief; and (4) Plaintiff cannot assert claims against Aitken, as 

Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) and the 

relation back requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Opp’n to Mot. 

to Am. at 7-19. Because Defendants assert Plaintiff’s “proposed TAC would be susceptible to the 

same arguments for dismissal posed by Defendants” in their motions to dismiss, the Court 

addresses those motions in this Order as well. Id. at 7. 

1. Proposed FTCA Claims 

“The United States can be sued only to the extent that it waives its sovereign immunity 

from suit.” Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). “The FTCA, enacted 

in 1946, was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits 

in tort.” Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). “The 

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FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity for tort claims arising out of the 

negligent conduct of government employees and agencies in circumstances where the United 

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant under the law of the place where the act 

or omission occurred.” Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the 

FTCA, “federal district courts [have] exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States 

for ‘injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act 

or omission’ of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Levin, 133 S. Ct. 

at 1228 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). State law provides the substantive law governing an 

FTCA claim. Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In assessing the 

United States’ liability under the FTCA, we are required to apply the law of the state in which the 

alleged tort occurred.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (“the United States . . . [is] liable to the claimant 

in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”). 

The United States’ waiver of immunity, however, is limited by the exceptions set forth in 

28 U.S.C. § 2680. One provision, known as the intentional tort exception, “preserves the 

Government’s immunity from suit for ‘[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false 

imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 

misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.’” Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. 

Ct. 1441, 1442 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). There is, however, a “law enforcement 

proviso,” which extends the waiver of sovereign immunity to six intentional torts “covering claims 

that arise out of the wrongful conduct of law enforcement officers.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (immunity lifted “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law 

enforcement officers of the United States Government”). Those six intentional torts are assault, 

battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Id. Section 

2680(h) defines an “investigative or law enforcement officer” as “any officer of the United States 

who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations 

of Federal law.” 

In his proposed TAC, Plaintiff asserts five claims under the FTCA: (1) false arrest/false 

imprisonment, (2) negligence, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) negligent 

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infliction of emotional distress, and (5) abuse of process. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 95-147. Defendants 

argue amendment is futile as to these claims because Plaintiff cannot meet the state tort 

requirements. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 7. 

a. False Arrest/False Imprisonment 

Court One of the proposed TAC alleges “Defendants caused [Plaintiff’s] false 

imprisonment June 15, 2007 to July 31, 2009” through the unlawful immigration detainers. Prop. 

TAC ¶¶ 95-109. 

The Court applies California law to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. See Tekle v. 

United States, 511 F.3d 839, 853 (9th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases where courts applied California 

law to FTCA claim for false imprisonment). Under California law, false imprisonment requires 

the “(1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, (3) for 

an appreciable period of time, however brief.” Bocanegra v. Jakubowski, 241 Cal. App. 4th 848, 

855 (2015) (internal quotations omitted); see also Watts v. Cty. of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 

(9th Cir. 2001) (“Under California law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are not 

separate torts, as false arrest is ‘but one way of committing a false imprisonment.’” (quoting 

Asgari v. City of L.A., 15 Cal. 4th 744, 847 n.3 (1997)). 

As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit has held that “Mendia lacks standing to seek 

damages for any period of pre-trial detention he suffered after the state court granted him release 

on his own recognizance.” Mendia, 768 F.3d at 1013 n.1. It explained that although 

“[a]pproximately six months after lodging the detainer against Mendia, the ICE agents cancelled it 

. . . . [i]n the interim, on an unspecified date, the state court removed the bail condition and granted 

Mendia release on his own recognizance.” Id. at 1011. Plaintiff, “believ[ing] the immigration 

detainer was still in place, . . . refused to accept release, even though he no longer needed the 

assistance of a bail bondsman to get out.” Id. “Given that he chose to remain in state custody 

rather than accept release, . . . . [t]he loss of liberty he experienced after being granted release on 

his own recognizance is thus a self-inflicted injury.” Id. at 1013 n.1. Plaintiff’s SAC and 

proposed TAC do not provide any further details about this event, and the Court makes no 

findings at this time regarding the period for which Plaintiff may recover. Nevertheless, while the 

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Ninth Circuit has held Plaintiff cannot seek damages for the entire time he was in state custody, he 

may still potentially recover for the time between the date Chang issued the June 16, 2007 

immigration detainer and the date the state court released Plaintiff on his own recognizance. 

Turning to Defendants’ futility argument, they argue Plaintiff cannot state a claim for false 

imprisonment because his “arrest and subsequent pretrial detention . . . were executed pursuant to 

lawful privilege by local police in accordance with [a] valid warrant and court order by the 

Superior Court of California in Contra Costa County.” U.S. MTD at 10. However, as Defendants 

themselves note, “Plaintiff does not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest by police or his pretrial 

custody” for financial crimes. Id.; see Prop. TAC ¶ 21-22. Rather, Plaintiff contests the validity 

of the immigration detainer Defendants placed on him and argues they compelled him to remain in 

pretrial detention when he otherwise would not have had to do so. Prop. TAC ¶ 105; see Martinez 

v. City of L.A., 141 F.3d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Under California law, a claim for false 

imprisonment grounded upon prolonged detention may arise if a person is ‘deprived of his liberty 

after his jail term ends.’” (quoting Sullivan v. Cty. of L.A., 12 Cal. 3d 710, 715 (1974)). Plaintiff 

alleges bail bondsmen refused to do business with him due to the detainers, and thus Plaintiff was 

unable to post bail. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 52-55. He further alleges the detainer prevented him from 

engaging in plea negotiations as “[b]eing branded an alien by ICE could be grounds for probation 

to be denied” or from petitioning the state court for a bail reduction or a grant of release on his 

own recognizance. Id. ¶¶ 58, 60. As such, Defendants have not shown Plaintiff is unable to state 

a claim for false imprisonment. 

 b. Negligence 

Count Two of the Proposed TAC asserts a claim of negligence under the FTCA. Prop. 

TAC ¶¶ 110-19. Defendants do not raise a specific object to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, but as 

noted above, have generally asserted that “Plaintiff fails to meet the state tort requirements under 

the FTCA.” Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 7. 

Under the FTCA, a plaintiff may sue the United States for injuries caused by the 

negligence of federal employees. Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the United States is the sole party which may be sued 

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for personal injuries arising out of the negligence of its employees.”). “In order to establish 

negligence under California law, a plaintiff must establish four required elements: (1) duty; (2) 

breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Martinez v. Pac. Bell, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 1564 (1990)). 

Plaintiff alleges ICE officials have a duty to act with reasonable care and to not subject 

individuals to (1) personal injury; (2) “discriminatory treatment on the basis of actual or perceived 

race, ethnicity, and/or national origin;” and (3) “deprivations of liberty without due process.” 

Prop. TAC ¶¶ 111-14. He further asserts ICE officials have a duty “to adequately train and 

supervise their subordinates and to establish and enforce policies and practices that prevent the 

occurrence of unconstitutional and tortious actions by their subordinates.” Id. ¶ 115. But here 

Plaintiff asserts Defendants were negligent by wrongfully placing ICE detainers on him and by 

failing to (1) properly cancel the first ICE detainer; (2) take appropriate measures to ensure that it 

did not appear that the first ICE detainer was still in place; (3) take appropriate measures to ensure 

that it did not appear that another ICE detainer was put in place; and (4) inform Plaintiff when 

Garcia dropped the detainer. Id. ¶ 116. Given these allegations, Defendants have not shown 

Plaintiff is unable to state a claim for negligence. 

 c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Count Three seeks to assert a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Prop. 

TAC ¶¶ 120-30. Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to show “outrageous” behavior or intent to 

cause emotional distress as his allegations are merely conclusory. U.S. MTD at 14; see Prop. 

TAC ¶¶ 120-30. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not 

excluded as a matter of law from FTCA by § 2680(h).” Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 

1172 (9th Cir. 1990), amended, 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990). In making this determination, the 

Sheehan court noted “‘[t]here is no justification for this Court [or any court] to read exemptions 

into the [Federal Tort Claims] Act beyond those provided by Congress.’” (quoting Rayonier Inc. v. 

United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) (alterations in the original)). Accordingly, to state a 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law, a plaintiff must show 

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“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 

defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quotations omitted). “The California Supreme Court has set a ‘high bar’ for what can constitute 

severe distress.” Wong v. Tai Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376 (2010). “Severe emotional 

distress means emotional distress of such substantial . . . or enduring quality that no reasonable 

[person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 

Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004 (1993) (quotations omitted). Conduct is “outrageous” if it is “so 

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Christensen v. 

Super. Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). 

During the interrogation, Plaintiff alleges Chang and Garcia engaged in a “staring contest” 

with him when he refused to speak, and Garcia subsequently made a statement to the effect of 

“We’ll see if you want to talk when we’re deporting your ass!” Prop. TAC ¶¶ 44-45. Upon 

learning of the detainer, Plaintiff “first experienced anger that shifted to chagrin, then fright, 

followed by worry, and finally grief and depression.” Id. ¶ 125. This has “lasted over two years 

from June 16, 2007 to July 31, 2009, and continues to this day” and has also resulted in a 

gastrointestinal disorder. Id. Plaintiff alleges his “emotional distress was the natural 

consequence” of Chang’s and Garcia’s actions and that they intended to cause such distress. Id. ¶¶ 

124, 129. Plaintiff’s allegations about the agents’ threat of deportation combined with Plaintiff’s 

imprisonment under the detainer state plausible facts to support an intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim. As such, Defendants have not shown that amendment would be futile. 

 d. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Count Four asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Prop. TAC 

¶¶ 131-41. “A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the 

tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and 

damages apply.” Wong, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 1377. Negligent infliction of emotional distress 

claims are instead treated as a type of negligence claim. Karimi v. GMAC Mortg., 2011 WL 

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3360017, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) (citing Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 

790, 818 (2006)). As Plaintiff brings a separate claim for negligence, it would be redundant to 

allow him to also bring a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, leave 

to add a separate claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress would be futile. 

e. Abuse of Process 

Count Five asserts a claim of abuse of process under the FTCA. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 142-47. 

Under California law, abuse of process requires proof that the “‘the defendant (1) contemplated an 

ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not 

proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.’” Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 

1011 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended Aug. 19, 2011 (quoting Booker v. Rountree, 155 Cal. App. 4th 

1366, 1371 (2007)). 

Plaintiff alleges Chang and Garcia “intentionally placed ICE detainers on Plaintiff to 

retaliate against him for asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and/or 

from engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment.” Prop. TAC ¶ 144. As this is a 

newly added claim, Defendants do not address it in their Motions to Dismiss, see U.S. MTD; 

Agents MTD, and their only argument is again a blanket assertion that “Plaintiff fails to meet the 

state tort requirements under the FTCA.” Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 7. However, “under wellestablished California law, the tort of abuse of process ‘requires misuse of a judicial process.’” 

Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(emphasis in original) (quoting Stolz v. Wong Commc’ns Ltd. P’ship, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1811, 1822 

(1994)). In other words, “[i]t is a process that is ‘pursuant to authority of [a] court.’” Estate of 

Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1037 (alterations in the original) (quoting Meadows v. Bakersfield Sav. & 

Loan Ass’n, 250 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753 (1967)). 

Plaintiff relies on the issuance of the immigration detainer as the basis for his claim; but he 

has not identified any judicial process Defendants allegedly abused. Without more, he has failed 

to allege a cognizable abuse of process claim. See United States v. Juarez-Velasquez, 763 F.3d 

430, 435 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing immigration detainer as “simply an administrative 

mechanism”); Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1037 (“Misuse of an administrative proceeding—even 

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one that is quasi-judicial—does not support a claim for abuse of process.”). As such, the Court 

cannot grant Plaintiff leave to add this claim as it would be futile. 

2. Proposed Bivens Claims 

Plaintiff’s SAC alleges two Bivens claims against Chang and Garcia for violations of his 

Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection and substantive due process. SAC ¶¶ 118-50. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed TAC seeks to add four more Bivens claims against Chang and Garcia for 

violations of his First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment rights as a result of the allegedly improper 

detainer. CITE. Chang and Garcia argue these claims are futile because (1) there is no Bivens

remedy in the immigration context, and (2) Chang and Garcia are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Agents MTD at 11-34; see Opp’n to TAC Mot. at 7 (re-raising qualified immunity argument and 

arguing Court should decide issue at earliest instance). 

The Bivens case was the first time the Supreme Court “recognized . . . an implied private 

action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional 

rights.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 91). In 

doing so, the Supreme Court established that “federal courts have the inherent authority to award 

damages against federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional 

rights.” W. Ctr. For Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted). A plaintiff who asserts a Bivens claim therefore “seeks to hold federal officers 

individually liable for constitutional violations.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 

2011); see Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal 

officers from committing constitutional violations.”). A“Bivens action can be maintained against a 

defendant in his or her individual capacity only, and not in his or her official capacity.” DalyMurphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). “This is because a Bivens suit against a 

defendant in his or her official capacity would merely be another way of pleading an action against 

the United States, which would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Consejo de 

Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). 

a. Availability of Bivens Remedy

Chang and Garcia make three arguments against Plaintiff’s Bivens claims: (1) the 

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Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., precludes a Bivens remedy; (2) 

Congress’ and the Executive Branch’s plenary powers over immigration matters warrants 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Bivens claims; and (3) Plaintiff’s status as a fugitive should preclude him 

from seeking a remedy in this Court. Agents MTD at 16-26; Opp’n to TAC Mot. at 7 (“[T]he 

special factors’ defense against Bivens claims receives the same consideration in the context of the 

proposed TAC.”). 

The Supreme Court disfavors implied causes of action like Bivens and therefore limits their 

availability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. A Bivens remedy “has to represent a judgment about the best 

way to implement a constitutional guarantee.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 

Damages are not “an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate 

a protected interest.” Id. In the 44 years since Bivens, the Court “ha[s] recognized two more 

nonstatutory damages remedies, the first for employment discrimination in violation of the Due 

Process Clause, . . . and the second for an Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials[.]” Id.

at 549-50 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see Davis v. Passman, 422 U.S. 228, 245-48 (1979) 

(implying a damages action under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to hold that a former 

congressional employee could seek damages against her employer for a claim of gender 

discrimination); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980) (implying another Bivens in 

allowing a prisoner’s estate to pursue damages against federal prison officials for violations of the 

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights). Carlson marks the last time the Supreme Court extended 

Bivens. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 622 (2012) (“Since Carlson, the Court has had to 

decide in several different instances whether to imply a Bivens action. And in each instance it has 

decided against the existence of such an action.”). Rather, “[t]he [Supreme] Court has . . . 

‘recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to 

legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.” Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 981 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004)). As a result, the 

Supreme Court “ha[s] consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new 

category of defendants.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68; see Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 622-23 

(summarizing cases where Court declined to extend Bivens). 

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The context in which a plaintiff asserts a Bivens action is key; the Supreme Court “ha[s] 

responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.” 

Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988). When faced with a Bivens claim, the Ninth 

Circuit “construe[d] the word ‘context’ as it is commonly used in law: to reflect a potentially 

recurring scenario that has similar legal and factual components.” Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 981 

(internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has implied a Bivens action only “to provide an 

otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted 

unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative 

remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct.” Malesko, 534 U.S. 

at 70. “Where such circumstances are not present, [the Court] ha[s] consistently rejected 

invitations to extend Bivens[.]” Id. In particular, “the Court has emphasized that ‘[s]o long as the 

plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed 

judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.’” Libas Ltd. v. Carillo, 329 F.3d 1128, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2003) (alterations in the original) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69). 

“[T]he decision whether to recognize a Bivens remedy may require two steps.” Wilkie, 551 

U.S. at 550. The Ninth Circuit first asks “whether there is ‘any alternative, existing process for 

protecting the plaintiff[’s] interests. If there is such an alternative remedy, [the] inquiry stops. If 

there is not, [courts] proceed to the next step and ask whether there nevertheless are factors 

counseling hesitation before devising such an implied right of action.” Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 982 

(quotations and marks omitted). In other words, even absent an alternative remedy, courts should 

not extend Bivens if there are “any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new 

kind of federal litigation.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (quotations omitted). With that test, the Court 

considers whether Bivens provides a remedy for Plaintiff’s claims for (1) First Amendment 

retaliation, (2) Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure, (3) Fifth Amendment equal protection, 

self-incrimination, and due process, and (4) Eighth Amendment excessive bail. 

(i) Existence of Alternative Remedies 

The Supreme Court has refused to extend Bivens “[w]hen the design of a Government 

program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for 

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constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration[.]” Schweiker, 487 U.S. 

at 423. Defendants argue there are two alternate remedies that preclude a Bivens remedy: the 

remedial measures set forth in the INA and federal habeas relief. 

Defendants urge the Court to follow the holding of Mirmehdi, where the Ninth Circuit 

declined to extend Bivens to constitutional violations stemming from deportation proceedings, in 

part due to the comprehensive remedial scheme of the INA. Agents MTD at 19-20. The 

Mirmehdi plaintiffs were Iranian citizens who were arrested for immigration violations and 

detained for approximately four years during immigration proceedings. 689 F.3d at 979-80. 

Having challenged their detention “on direct appeal of their detention, during the merits 

proceeding related to their asylum applications, and in a federal petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus[,]” the plaintiffs subsequently sued a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and an 

Immigration and Naturalization agent, asserting claims of wrongful detention under Bivens. Id. at 

979. The court concluded that “deportation proceedings constitute the relevant environment of 

fact and law in which to decide whether to recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit first held that the existing remedial system in the INA and the 

availability of habeas relief precluded the availability of a Bivens remedy, as the plaintiffs could 

and did use those schemes to challenge their detention. Id. The court next found two factors that 

“counsel[ed] hesitation” before extending Bivens. Id. First, the INA presented a “complex[] and 

comprehensive[] . . . existing remedial system[.]” Id. Second, “immigration issues ‘have the 

natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the nation,’ which further 

‘counsels hesitation’ in extending Bivens.” Id. (quoting Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d 

Cir. 2009) (en banc)). Thus, “given the extensive remedial procedures available to and invoked by 

them and the unique foreign policy considerations implicated in the immigration context[,]” the 

Ninth Circuit declined to extend Bivens to allow illegal immigrants to sue federal agents for 

wrongful detention pending deportation proceedings. Id. at 983. 

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention that “[a]lthough it did not deal with 

detainers per se, the holding in Mirmehdi should apply with full force” to this case. Agents MTD 

at 19. Several factors distinguish Mirmehdi from this case. First, the Ninth Circuit identified 

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deportation proceedings as the context in which it considered the availability of a Bivens remedy 

and limited its holding to that context. Id. at 981, 983 (“[W]e decline to extend Bivens to allow 

the [plaintiffs] to sue federal agents for wrongful detention pending deportation[.]”). Plaintiff, 

however, seeks to sue Chang and Garcia for constitutional violations arising out of an immigration 

detainer—deportation proceedings against Plaintiff never commenced and no order of removal 

was ever issued. This case therefore presents a different context than the one considered in 

Mirmehdi. Second, Plaintiff’s citizenship further differentiates the case. The Mirmehdi court 

specifically addressed “whether an alien not lawfully in the United States may sue for monetary 

damages claiming constitutionally invalid detention.” 689 F.3d at 978. Whether a citizen may 

bring a Bivens claim requires a different analysis. Id. at 981 n.3 (“[W]e must consider whether an 

immigrant may bring a Bivens claim to vindicate certain constitutional rights separately from 

whether a citizen may bring such a Bivens claim.”). Plaintiff alleges he is a U.S. citizen, not an 

alien, and there are no indications that Plaintiff resided in the country illegally. See SAC ¶ 10 

(asserting Plaintiff acquired derivative U.S. citizenship); Prop. TAC ¶ 1 (same); see also 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(3) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”). 

Plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship makes this case more similar to Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. 

Supp. 2d 1256 (M.D. Ga. 2012), where the court found the INA did not preclude a Bivens remedy. 

The Lyttle plaintiff asserted Bivens claims for violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 

against ICE agents who allegedly detained and deported the plaintiff to Mexico despite knowing 

the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen. Id. at 1269-74. While Lyttle did not concern the issuance of an 

immigration detainer, the court’s analysis of whether the INA provided adequate remedies for 

citizens so as to foreclose a Bivens remedy is applicable to this situation. Id. at 1276. The Lyttle

court found “[t]he remedy under the INA [was] not constitutionally adequate for citizens” because 

it failed to “provide ‘meaningful safeguards or remedies’ for a U.S. citizen like [the plaintiff].” Id.

at 1276 (quoting Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425). Noting the INA provided some “procedural 

protections for citizens who may be wrongly identified as deportable aliens,” the court 

nevertheless determined those protections were “constitutionally inadequate” to redress a citizen’s 

constitutional violations. Id. at 1277 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (authorizing courts of appeal to 

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review a petitioner’s claim of nationality upon final order of removal)). The court “conclude[d] 

that the INA does not provide any meaningful remedy and review procedure for . . . a U.S. citizen” 

and thus did not prevent the court from crafting a Bivens remedy. Id. at 1278. 

Thus, while Defendants refer to several provisions of the INA which they contend contain 

procedures to challenge ICE detention and removal, Agents MTD at 20 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 

1229, 1229a, 1229b, 2241), those sections apply specifically to “aliens,” which the INA defines as 

“any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101. Given Plaintiff’s 

U.S. citizenship, those INA provisions are inapplicable here and do not provide a means of relief. 

Finally, although the INA contemplates the possibility of the removal of a U.S. citizen, 

those remedial measures are inapplicable to Plaintiff’s situation. Section 1252(b)(5) provides that 

following a final order of removal, “[i]f the petitioner claims to be a national of the United States 

and the court of appeals finds from the pleadings and affidavits that no genuine issue of material 

fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall decide the nationality claim.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5). Because there was no final order of removal, Plaintiff could not have availed 

himself of this procedure, and such protection is therefore inadequate to address his injuries. As 

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and no order of removal was issued for him, the Court finds the INA 

does not provide a remedy to address the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.6 

The Court next considers whether Plaintiff can remedy his injuries through federal habeas 

relief. Defendants further argue that “ICE detention . . . may also be challenged through habeas 

where appropriate.” Agents MTD at 18. But Plaintiff contends habeas relief was unavailable in 

his case because he was never “in custody” for purposes of a habeas petition. Opp’n to Agents 

MTD at 8, Dkt. No. 96. 

“Habeas corpus proceedings are available only for claims that a person ‘is in custody in 

 

6

 In their Statement of Supplemental Authority, Defendants bring to the Court’s attention De La 

Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2015). Dkt. No. 92. In De La Paz, the Fifth Circuit declined to 

imply a Bivens remedy for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of an allegedly illegal stop 

and arrest of two undocumented immigrants due to the INA’s comprehensive remedial system and 

because Bivens would not provide meaningful compensation. Id. at 376-79. However, De La Paz

is inapposite for the same reason as Mirmehdi—the plaintiffs in De La Paz were illegal aliens. 

See 786 F.3d at 370-71. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s citizenship status is a critical 

distinguishing factor. 

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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Dickerson v. United States, 

530 U.S. 428, 439 n.3 (2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254). The Ninth Circuit, however, has held 

that an immigration detainer does not render a person in custody for purposes of habeas relief. See 

Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 303 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We now agree with the circuits which have 

expressed the opinion that the bare [INS] detainer letter alone does not sufficiently place an alien 

in INS custody to make habeas corpus available.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in Campos v. I.N.S., 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “individuals are ‘in 

custody’ for purposes of [habeas corpus] if they are ‘subject to a final order of deportation.’” 

Veltmann-Barragan v. Holder, 717 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). As noted 

earlier, Plaintiff was never “subject to a final order of deportation” and thus was never in custody. 

See id. Because Plaintiff was not “in custody,” he could not have sought a writ of habeas corpus. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds there are no alternate remedies to protect 

Plaintiff’s interests so as to prevent the Court from implying a Bivens remedy. The Court next 

considers whether special factors counsel against in doing so. 

 (ii) Special Factors 

First, Chang and Garcia argue Congress’ and the Executive Branch’s plenary powers over 

immigration matters constitute a special factor that precludes the availability of a Bivens remedy. 

Agents MTD at 22-23. When the defendants in Lyttle asserted a similar argument, the court 

acknowledged this “general observation” but nevertheless rejected the contention because 

fail[ed] to make the distinction between the use of the immigration 

process to regulate the admission and removal of aliens, a legitimate 

exercise of the power of the political branch of government, and the 

use of that process to detain and remove citizens, an unauthorized 

exercise of political branch power unless additional constitutional 

protections are provided to safeguard against the wrongful removal 

of a citizen from his own country. 

867 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (emphasis in original). The Court agrees with Lyttle that the issuance of 

an immigration detainer on a U.S. citizen is not a proper exercise of congressional power. 

Second, Defendants argue the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine” prevents Plaintiff from 

asserting his Bivens claims. Agents MTD at 23-26. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is a 

“discretionary sanction courts can impose to prevent appellate review for escapees from the 

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criminal justice system.” Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotations omitted). “Courts have regularly applied this doctrine to dismiss both criminal appeals 

and related civil proceedings instituted by fugitives.” Cordell v. Tilton, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 

1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that fugitive 

disentitlement is a severe sanction that courts should not lightly impose.” Mastro v. Rigby, 764 

F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). In doing so, use of the doctrine is generally 

limited “to challenges to detentions, where a [person’s] status as a fugitive from confinement 

clearly undercuts his challenge to his confinement.” Id. 

To apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine here would be inconsistent with that position, 

as such a severe sanction is not warranted here. Moreover, courts also require a nexus between the 

criminal conviction and the civil matter before applying the doctrine. See Willis v. Mullins, 2009 

WL 1657451, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2009) (“[A] sufficient nexus is required in order to apply 

the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.”). There is no such connection in this case. Defendants argue 

there are outstanding warrants for Plaintiff’s arrest, and his status as a fugitive is predicated on the 

criminal charges for which he was in pretrial detention when the events at issue in this case 

occurred. Agents MTD at 23, 25; see RJN, Ex. B at 1 (clerk’s docket and minutes revoking 

Plaintiff’s probation and issuing bench warrant, dated July 25, 2014). Although Plaintiff was 

initially in pretrial detention because of those criminal charges, the immigration detainer on which 

this lawsuit is based was unrelated to those charges, and those charges have no bearing on this 

matter. As such, the Court does not find a connection between Plaintiff’s criminal matters and the 

instant lawsuit to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 

b. Qualified Immunity 

Having established the availability of Bivens, the Court considers Defendants’ argument 

that Chang and Garcia are entitled to qualified immunity. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 7; Agents 

MTD at 26-28. “[T]he qualified immunity analysis is identical under either [section 1983 or 

Bivens] cause[s] of action.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Thus, “[e]ven in 

circumstances in which a Bivens remedy is generally available, an action under Bivens will be 

defeated if the defendant is immune from suit.” Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 807 (2010); see

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F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Federal officials may raise a 

defense of qualified immunity to a Bivens action.”). 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the 

official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the 

challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (citing Ashcroft v. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)). It “is both a defense to liability and a limited entitlement not 

to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672 (internal quotation 

omitted). Qualified immunity purports “to strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold 

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” 

Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). An official is entitled to qualified immunity “unless a plaintiff pleads 

facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right 

was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “[C]ourts have discretion to decide 

which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Id. 

To determine “whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the 

conduct—the critical question is whether the contours of the right were ‘sufficiently clear’ that 

every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” 

Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442 (quoting al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083; some internal marks omitted). “The 

plaintiff bears the burden to show that the contours of the right were clearly established.” 

Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). While there need not be 

“a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. Courts do not “define clearly established 

law at a high level of generality.” Id. at 2084. Instead, “[t]he inquiry . . . must be undertaken in 

the light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Sjurset v. Button, 

__ F.3d __ , 2015 WL 7873404, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2015) (internal quotations omitted; 

alterations in the original). “The subjective beliefs of the actual officer are, of course, irrelevant.” 

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Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). 

(i) First Amendment Claim 

Count Nine of Plaintiff’s Proposed TAC alleges Chang and Garcia retaliated against him 

by placing a detainer on him after he “asserted his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by 

asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination through acts and speech.” Prop. 

TAC ¶¶ 168-76. Plaintiff alleges Chang and Garcia otherwise lacked probable cause to issue the 

detainer because they had “no grounds . . . to believe that Plaintiff was an alien.” Id. ¶ 48. He 

asserts that when the questioning began, he informed Chang and Garcia that he was a United 

States citizen with a United States passport issued in 1997, gave them his social security number, 

and stated that his mother was a United States citizen as well. Id. ¶ 39. In addition, Plaintiff also 

had a California state identification card under the name “Bernardo Mendia” and contends “Chang 

and Garcia, as agents of the federal government, had access to the California Department of Motor 

Vehicles . . . and should have known that Plaintiff was in fact a United States citizen.” Id. ¶ 33. 

Plaintiff thus appears to claim that by lodging the detainer, the agents violated his right not to 

speak as they had “no grounds . . . to believe that Plaintiff was an alien.” Id. ¶ 48. 

“[T]he First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising 

the decision of both what to say and what not to say.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. 

Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988); see Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 

Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1997) (“[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free 

speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide what not to say[.]” (quotations and 

citation omitted)). Additionally, “[o]fficial reprisal for protected speech offends the Constitution 

[because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right[.]” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 

250, 256 (2006) (quotations omitted, alterations in original). As Plaintiff’s refusal to speak falls 

within the scope of the First Amendment, he has alleged the existence of a constitutional violation. 

The next step is to determine “whether the right was clearly established, . . . [by] applying 

an objective but fact-specific inquiry.” Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712 (citation and quotations omitted). 

“[T]he right in question is not the general right to be free from retaliation for one’s speech[,]” 

however, but rather one that is “particularized . . . so that the contours of the right are clear to a 

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reasonable official.” Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094 (quotations omitted) (determining the “right in 

question” to be the “specific right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by 

probable cause.”). The question therefore is whether a reasonable official in 2007 would have 

realized that he or she could not issue an immigration detainer without probable cause on the basis 

of Plaintiff refusing to speak or asserting his Fifth Amendment right to be silent. 

In 2007, it was clearly established that agents were required to have probable cause in 

order to issue an immigration detainer. First, “[t]he government has conceded for years that a 

detainer must be supported by probable cause.” Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st 

Cir. 2015). The First Circuit, citing Cervantez v. Whitfield, 776 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985), further 

explained that ICE’s predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, once “stipulated 

that a detainer ‘may only be authorized . . . when the officer has determined that there is probable 

cause[.]’” Id. (quoting Cervantez, 776 F.2d at 660) (alterations in the original). 

Second, the probable cause requirement to issue an immigration detainer is also reflected 

in immigration statutes. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), immigration officers may make a 

warrantless arrest of “any alien in the United States, if [the officer] has reason to believe that the 

alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to 

escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Similarly, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (c)(2)(i) 

provides that “[a]n arrest shall be made only when the designated immigration officer has reason 

to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense against the United States or is an 

alien illegally in the United States.” The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he phrase ‘has reason to 

believe’ has been equated with the constitutional requirement of probable cause.” Tejeda-Mata v. 

I.N.S., 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th 

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975); Au Yi Lau v. I.N.S., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 

1971)); see also United States v. Cuevas, 16 F. App’x 781, 782 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although [the 

alien] was eventually detained, it was after the INS agent had probable cause to do so under 8 

U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) & (2).”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it was clearly established in 2007 that Chang and Garcia 

needed to have probable cause to believe Plaintiff was an alien before they could issue an 

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immigration detainer. To that end, a reasonable officer in Chang or Garcia’s position and 

confronted with the same circumstances would not have determined probable cause existed for the 

detainer, at least not without making further inquiry. As such, the Court finds Chang and Garcia 

are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and leave to amend 

would not be futile. 

 (ii) Fourth Amendment 

Count Six asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 

seizure. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 148-54. Plaintiff alleges “Chang [and] Garcia . . . caused immigration 

detainers to issue against Plaintiff, which [] caused a deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty[,]”7 and that 

they did not have probable cause to issue the detainer. Id. ¶ 151. Plaintiff further asserts that at 

the time these events occurred, it was clearly established that lodging an immigration detainer 

against a United States citizen was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. ¶ 153. 

The Fourth Amendment protests persons against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. It “applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve 

only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 

878 (1975). “It is well established that an arrest [or detention] without probable cause violates the 

Fourth Amendment[.]” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966) (noting “the 

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction 

between informal detention without cause and formal arrest without cause”). “[W]hile a detainer 

is distinct from an arrest, it nevertheless results in the detention of an individual.” Morales, 793 

F.3d at 217 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.7). 

Faced with a similar situation, the First Circuit in Morales denied an ICE agent qualified 

immunity on a Fourth Amendment claim. The Morales plaintiff was a naturalized United States 

citizen who was imprisoned in 2009 pursuant to an immigration detainer to allow ICE agents to 

 

7

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cannot allege that the ICE detainer directly caused his confinement.” Mendia, 768 F.3d at 1012. 

Nevertheless, while the immigration detainer did not directly cause any unreasonable seizure, it 

may have done so indirectly—namely, by rendering Plaintiff unable to secure a bail bond. See id. 

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investigate her immigration status. Id. at 211. The plaintiff subsequently alleged violations of her 

Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights against the ICE agent who issued the detainer and the agent’s 

supervisors. Id. The First Circuit held that “[i]t was . . . clearly established well before [the 

plaintiff] was detained in 2009 that immigration stops and arrests were subject to the same Fourth 

Amendment requirements that apply to other stops and arrests—reasonable suspicion for a brief 

stop, and probable cause for any further arrest and detention.” Id. at 215. Although the First 

Circuit’s holding concerned conduct that occurred in 2009—two years after the events in this 

case—the court relied on precedent establishing the right long before 2007. In so holding, the 

First Circuit relied in part on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Id. In

Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court considered when a “roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an 

area near the border and question its occupants[.]” 422 U.S. at 876. The Court held that while 

officers need only “have a reasonable suspicion to justify” stopping an individual to make 

inquiries about that person’s “citizenship and immigration status, . . . any further detention or 

search must be based on consent or probable cause.” Id. at 881-82. Thus, as discussed above, it 

was clearly established in 2007 that officials were required to have probable cause in order to issue 

an immigration detainer and it was clearly established that any seizure or detention based on 

citizenship or immigration status likewise required probable cause. 

Plaintiff’s proposed TAC sets forth enough facts to raise a proper claim that ICE officer in 

the same circumstances and with the same knowledge as Chang and Garcia could not have 

reasonably believed probable cause existed to place a detainer on Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges facts 

to show Chang and Garcia would have been aware of the fact that he was a United States citizen. 

See Prop. TAC ¶ 39 (“As soon as the questioning of Plaintiff began, Plaintiff stated in English that 

he was a United States citizen; he gave CHANG and GARCIA his full social security number; he 

informed CHANG and GARCIA that he had a United States passport last issued to him in June of 

1997 in San Francisco California; and that his mother was also a United States citizen.”). Despite 

Plaintiff’s assertions, Chang and Garcia placed an immigration detainer on him, allegedly with “no 

grounds . . . to believe that Plaintiff was an alien.” Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. While ICE never assumed 

custody of Plaintiff, Plaintiff contends the detainer forced him to remain in pretrial detention, as it 

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rendered him unable to secure a bail bond, to seek a reduction in bail or a release on his own 

recognizance, or to engage in plea negotiations. Id. ¶¶ 50, 52-53, 55, 58, 60. As such, the Court 

finds Chang and Garcia are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

claim, and leave to amend would not be futile. 

 (iii) Fifth Amendment Equal Protection 

Count Seven asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right to equal protection. 

Prop. TAC ¶¶ 155-59. Plaintiff alleges Chang and Garcia selected him for questioning due to his 

foreign birth and/or because his name and appearance indicates he is of Mexican descent. Id. ¶ 27. 

He further claims that “[b]y issuing detainers against Plaintiff solely on the basis of his race, 

ethnicity, and/or national origin—including his place of birth and name—Defendants Garcia [and] 

Chang . . . targeted Plaintiff illegally” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 156. 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within 

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Amendment is 

“essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 474 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The Fifth Amendment, which 

applies to the federal government, does not explicitly contain a similar provision. See U.S. Const. 

amend. V. Nevertheless, “[t]he liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 

contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.” 

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). Thus, a damages remedy under Bivens is 

available to address violations of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due 

Process Clause. Davis, 442 U.S. at 248. 

As noted above, it is unnecessary that there be a prior, on-point case with similar facts and 

circumstances in order to show that a right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

violation, and “[t]his is especially true in equal protection cases because the non-discrimination 

principle is so clear.” Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2010). “The 

constitutional right to be free from such invidious discrimination is so well established and so 

essential to the preservation of our constitutional order that all public officials must be charged 

with knowledge of it.” Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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According to Plaintiff, Chang and Garcia’s sole grounds for interrogating him and issuing 

the detainer were his race or foreign birth. Prop. TAC ¶ 27. If true, using race or national origin 

as the only reasons to deprive Plaintiff of his liberty violates his constitutional rights. See 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886 (“Even if [officers] saw enough to think that the [vehicle’s] 

occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that 

they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who were illegally in 

the country.”); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Race or color 

alone is not a sufficient basis for making an investigatory stop.”); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. 

Supp. 2d 19, 35 (D.R.I. 2014) (ICE investigation of plaintiff with her “nation of birth as a sole 

permissible basis for her loss of liberty does not pass constitutional muster.”), aff’d in part, 

dismissed in part on jurisdictional grounds, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015). 

Moreover, as noted earlier, immigration detainers require probable cause, and Plaintiff 

provided Chang and Garcia with his social security number and informed them that he had a 

United States passport as evidence of his citizenship before they issued the detainer. Prop. TAC 

¶ 39. As such, the Court finds that a reasonable officer in Chang’s and Garcia’s positions would 

have known that using Plaintiff’s race as the sole basis for his interrogation and the detainer 

violates the principles of equal protection. Accordingly, the Court finds Chang and Garcia are not 

entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment equal protection claim, and leave 

to amend would therefore not be futile. 

(iv) Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 

 Count Nine alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right against SelfIncrimination. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 168-76. During the interrogation, “Plaintiff stated to Chang and 

Garcia words to the effect that he was going to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain 

silent.” Id. ¶ 41. He affirmed his decision to remain silent with “a stern horizontal shake of his 

head” after Garcia said something to the effect of “Oh! You don’t want to talk?” Id. ¶¶ 42-43. 

Plaintiff accuses Chang and Garcia of issuing the immigration detainer in order to retaliate against 

Plaintiff for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. ¶ 162. 

The Fifth Amendment ensures that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 

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case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. A person cannot be penalized for 

invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege during a police custodial interrogation. Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). “Statements compelled by police interrogations of course 

may not be used against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a 

violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) 

(internal citations omitted). 

There is no dispute that in 2007, a person had a right to remain silent during a custodial 

interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. Rather, the key inquiry is whether Plaintiff alleges a 

constitutional violation. As a threshold matter, there is a question of whether Chang’s and 

Garcia’s attempts to question Plaintiff amounted to a custodial interrogation. The privilege 

against self-incrimination “does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial 

interrogation for which it was designed.” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 552 (1980). A 

custodial interrogation refers to “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 

way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Generally, courts have found there is a custodial interrogation 

when a reasonable person does not believe he is free to leave. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 

327 (1969) (finding petitioner was in custody and not free to leave when law enforcement officers 

questioned him in his bedroom in the early morning); United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 

1085-88 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding custodial interrogation where appellant reasonably believed he 

was not free to leave where eight law enforcement officers entered appellant’s home, and 

appellant was escorted to a back storage room with guarded door and isolated from others). 

Plaintiff was already in custody when Chang and Garcia sought to question him. See Prop. 

TAC ¶ 21. Under such circumstances, the determination of whether a custodial interrogation took 

place requires the consideration of four factors: 

the language used to summon the individual, the physical 

surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which he is 

confronted with evidence of his guilt, and the additional pressure 

exerted to detain him must be considered to determine whether a 

reasonable person would believe there had been a restriction of his 

freedom over and above that in his normal prisoner setting. 

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Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Interrogation by non-prison employees regarding an unrelated offense can amount to an 

additional restriction on a prisoner’s freedom. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 at 4-5 

(1968). Such is the case here—Chang and Garcia are ICE agents, not jail employees, and they 

sought to question Plaintiff while he was in custody on a matter unrelated to his pending state 

criminal charges. This weighs in favor of finding custodial interrogation. See United States v. 

Serna-Vargas, 1998 WL 10361, at *1, 133 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (“[T]he fact 

that an INS agent entered the prison to question [the defendant] about an unrelated charge would 

likely satisfy the ‘additional restrictions’ test of Cervantes.”). 

 However, the existence of any additional restrictions is only one factor; there are no facts 

that otherwise indicate a custodial interrogation. For instance, Plaintiff does not state where the 

questioning took place, if it was in his cell or some other location in the jail. There are also no 

facts showing how Plaintiff was brought in for questioning; Plaintiff merely alleges he “was 

approached by Chang, and then Garcia[.]” Prop. TAC ¶ 30. Although Plaintiff alleges that 

individuals who refused to be questioned would be threatened with prosecution for resisting or 

delaying an officer or would be punished in some other fashion, id. ¶ 35, Plaintiff does not allege 

that he himself received such threats. 

As it stands, Plaintiff does not allege a custodial interrogation, and he therefore cannot 

allege a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Cervantes, 589 

F.2d at 427-29 (no custodial interrogation where deputy questioned prisoner after routine search 

yielded contraband and interrogation took place in prison library while prisoner was being moved 

to different cell); Barron v. Cate, 2013 WL 978681, at *3-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (finding no 

custodial interrogation where defendant questioned prisoner under normal prison conditions). 

Accordingly, leave to amend would be futile as to this claim. 

(v) Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process 

Count Ten asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment substantive due process 

rights. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 177-82. Plaintiff alleges Chang and Garcia violated his right to substantive 

due process by depriving him of “a citizenship right that can be seen as a quasi-property right” and 

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of his liberty by preventing him from securing a bail bond or by petitioning the state court for 

pretrial release, which forced him to remain in pretrial detention. Id. ¶ 179. Plaintiff further 

accuses Chang and Garcia of “impeding his right to be free from federal government intrusions on 

this [sic] state court proceedings[.]” Id. 

Fifth Amendment “substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in 

conduct that shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered 

liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quotations and citations omitted). 

However, “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 

protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more 

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Cty. 

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (alterations in original) (quoting Albright v. 

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality op.)); see United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 

n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, . . . the 

claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the 

rubric of substantive due process.”). As such, to the extent Plaintiff’s detention claims falls under 

the purview the Fourth or Eighth Amendments or other provisions of the Fifth Amendment, 

Plaintiff cannot rely on substantive due process as a means of redress. 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his deprivation of liberty and his pretrial detention are 

governed by the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment encompasses his claim concerning 

his speech rights. The Eighth Amendment covers his assertions of excessive bail. Plaintiff cannot 

therefore rely on Fifth Amendment substantive due process to pursue those claims. In addition, 

Plaintiff does not show how an immigration detainer deprives Plaintiff of his citizenship in ways 

other than restricting his liberty or how the detainer in fact affected his state court proceedings. 

There are no allegations, for instance, that the state court was aware of the detainer until July 31, 

2009, the date the state court released Plaintiff on his own recognizance, such that the detainer 

interfered with those proceedings. See Prop. TAC ¶ 78. As Plaintiff fails to show Chang and 

Garcia violated his constitutional rights, qualified immunity bars this claim. Accordingly, the 

Court finds leave to amend would be futile as to Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment substantive due 

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process claim. 

(vi) Eighth Amendment 

Count Eleven alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right against excessive 

bail. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 183-88. Plaintiff alleges the immigration detainer Chang and Garcia issued 

rendered him unable to obtain bail and caused his detention in violation of his right to be free from 

excessive bail. Id. ¶ 185. 

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required” for pretrial 

release. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “[T]he Excessive Bail Clause prevents the imposition of bail 

conditions that are excessive in light of the valid interests the state seeks to protect by offering 

bail.” Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Salerno, 

481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)). In order to prevail on an excessive bail claim, a plaintiff must show 

that the bail conditions are excessive for the purpose of achieving “the valid state interests for 

which bail is intended to serve for a particular individual.” Id. A plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that the law enforcement official was the actual and proximate cause of the excessive bail by 

deliberately or recklessly making misrepresentations to the court. Id. at 663-64. 

Plaintiff does not contest the amount of his bail, and there are no allegations the state court 

enhanced his bail for invalid purposes or otherwise set an amount that was excessive in light of the 

valid purpose it sought to serve. See id. at 661. Plaintiff instead alleges bail was 

unconstitutionally excessive because he could not obtain a bail bond on account of the 

immigration detainer. However, “[t]he mere fact that [a plaintiff] may not have been able to pay 

the bail does not make it excessive.” White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968). 

Moreover, it does not appear the detainer affected the amount of Plaintiff’s bail itself. The state 

court set Plaintiff’s bail before Chang and Garcia issued the immigration detainer. See Prop. TAC 

¶ 25. As a result, the detainer could not have influenced the state court’s determination of bail, 

and there are no facts to suggest that either Chang or Garcia had any influence on the state court. 

There is also no indication the state court increased Plaintiff’s bail after Chang and Garcia placed 

the detainer on him. 

As such, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first inquiry of the qualified immunity analysis—that 

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Chang and Garcia violated his constitutional right. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. Accordingly, 

the Court finds Chang and Garcia are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim, and leave to amend would be futile. 

 3. Proposed Declaratory Relief Claims 

The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) provides that “any court of the United States . . . 

may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration . . . 

. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be 

reviewable as such.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The DJA purports to provide a “remedy to one who is 

uncertain of his rights and who desires an early adjudication thereof without having to wait until 

his adversary should decide to bring suit, and to act at his peril in the interim.” McGraw-Edison 

Co. v. Preformed Line Prods. Co., 362 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1966). 

“Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on 

federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of 

litigants.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). In other words, a plaintiff does 

not have an absolute right to declaratory relief, and “the decision to grant declaratory relief should 

always be made with reference to the public interest.” United States v. State of Wash., 759 F.2d 

1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). Courts should deny such relief “when it will neither serve a useful 

purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and 

afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s Proposed TAC asserts six claims under the DJA against all Defendants. He 

seeks declarations that Defendants (1) failed to adequately investigate Plaintiff’s citizenship; (2) 

detained Plaintiff without providing adequate notice or opportunity to respond; (3) detained and 

interrogated Plaintiff without reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was subject to removal or 

detention; and (4) violated Plaintiff’s rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth 

Amendments. Prop. TAC ¶¶ 189-224. 

Defendants argue Plaintiff does not have standing to assert his claims under the DJA,8

 and 

 

8

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plaintiff has standing to seek damages does not ensure that the plaintiff can also seek injunctive or 

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they refer to their arguments concerning the same in their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC. 

Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 7; see U.S. MTD at 3-7. In that Motion, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed 

to show (1) the likelihood of a similar future injury as a result of alleged ICE policies and 

procedures and (2) the redressability of such injury. U.S. MTD at 3. 

The Court first notes the alleged constitutional violations occurred in 2007 and 2008, and 

Plaintiff does not allege these violations are ongoing. The declaratory relief sought is thus 

retrospective, not prospective, in nature. See Rodriguez v. Tilton, 2015 WL 3507126, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. June 3, 2015) (finding plaintiff sought retrospective declaratory relief where court could not 

“discern any allegations of ongoing violations in the complaint”). When a plaintiff seeks 

retrospective declaratory relief, courts have declined to award such relief where “the issuance of a 

declaratory judgment . . . would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or 

restitution by the federal court[.]” Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985); see Nat’l Audubon 

Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 848 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 

312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e consider declaratory relief retrospective to the extent that it is 

intertwined with a claim for monetary damages that requires us to declare whether a past 

constitutional violation occurred. In such a situation, however, declaratory relief is superfluous in 

light of the damages claim.” (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Rasmussen, 

298 F.3d 1198, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002))). Plaintiff’s Bivens claims assert the same 

constitutional violations as his declaratory relief claims. See Prop. TAC ¶¶ 148-88. As such, 

declaratory relief is superfluous and those claims would be futile. 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks prospective relief, he fails to show the likelihood of a future 

injury. When addressing claims under the DJA, the Ninth Circuit “ha[s] long held that the district 

court must first inquire whether there is an actual case or controversy within its jurisdiction.” 

Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]he phrase ‘case of 

actual controversy’ in the Act refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable 

 

declaratory relief.” Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended

Aug. 15, 2001. 

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under Article III.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). In order to 

invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff to 

show 

(1) [he] has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 

action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) 

(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-56 (1992)). “These elements of standing must 

be supported in the same way as any other matter for which a plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 

i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 

Gest v. Bradbury, 443 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “A suit 

brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a ‘case or controversy,’ and an Article III 

federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.” Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 

386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff asserts that he currently “remains on probation and thus has continuing interaction 

with law enforcement.” Prop. TAC ¶ 92. As a result, he “continues to fear that ICE will again 

improperly place a detainer on him.” Id. To that end, Plaintiff “would like to travel to Mexico 

and Germany to visit family,” but he fears traveling internationally “due to fears that ICE will 

prevent him from returning to the United States at a port of entry[.]” Id. ¶ 93. Plaintiff provides 

examples of this occurring to other individuals and alleges that between “yea[r]s 2008 and 2012, 

ICE improperly placed ICE detainers on over 800 United States citizens.” Id. ¶¶ 90-91, 93. 

“In the particular context of . . . declaratory relief, a plaintiff must show that he has 

suffered or is threatened with a concrete and particularized legal harm . . . coupled with a 

sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” Canatella v. State of Cal., 

304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff fails to show a 

sufficient likelihood that ICE officials will place another detainer on him. Although Plaintiff 

articulates his fear of being subject to another immigration detainer, he does not explain why or 

how this is likely to occur again. In comparison, the court in Morales v. Chadbourne, found the 

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plaintiff had standing to sue for injunctive relief where the plaintiff alleged “[s]he [was] an 

American citizen who federal authorities ha[d] twice inappropriately detained on a detainer 

alleging immigration violations” and where “ICE officials told her that this could happen to her 

again.” 996 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38. Plaintiff makes no such allegations here; rather, his fears are 

merely speculative on these allegations. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that his status as a probationer requires him to encounter law 

enforcement is insufficient to establish a “real and immediate injury or threat of future injury that 

is caused by defendants[.]” Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (emphasis in original); see, e.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983) (“[I]t is no 

more than conjecture to suggest that in every . . . encounter between the police and a citizen, the 

police will act unconstitutionally and inflict injury without provocation or legal excuse. And it is 

surely no more than speculation to assert either that [the plaintiff] himself will again be involved 

in one of those unfortunate instances, or that he will be arrested in the future[.]”). Plaintiff’s fears, 

as alleged, are merely “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotations omitted). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that 

[t]he reasonableness of [the plaintiff’s] fear is dependent upon the 

likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. It is 

the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the 

standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions. The 

emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient 

basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future 

injury by the defendant. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8. 

Plaintiff offers no facts suggesting it is likely that ICE officials will issue another 

immigration detainer on him. For instance, there are no allegations ICE officials have continued 

to question his immigration status, have sought additional detainers on him, or even had any 

contact with him at all since his release from custody in 2009. To the extent Plaintiff fears ICE 

officials could issue another detainer on him in the event he is jailed again, courts “are . . . unable 

to conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by general assertions or 

inferences that in the course of their activities [plaintiffs] will be prosecuted for violating valid 

criminal laws.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974). Courts instead “assume that 

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[plaintiffs] will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as 

well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by [the defendants].” Id. 

Finally, while Plaintiff provides several examples of ICE officials allegedly placing 

improper immigration on other United States citizens to show that his “fear was not conjectural or 

hypothetical[,]” Prop. TAC ¶¶ 66, 90-91, this ignores the fact that “the injury also must be direct 

and personal to the particular plaintiff.” Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & 

Cty. of S.F., 624 F.3d 1043, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff does not explain how his examples are 

directly related to him or otherwise suggest an injury personal to Plaintiff. See Friends of the 

Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 181 (2000) (“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, 

however, is not injury to [others] but injury to the plaintiff.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds leave to amend would be futile as to Plaintiff’s declaratory 

relief claims. 

4. Timothy Aitken 

Plaintiff’s Proposed TAC adds Field Office Director Aitken as a defendant in his 

individual and official capacities. Prop. TAC ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges Aitken was responsible for 

formulating, implementing, approving, and/or allowing policies and/or customs applicable to 

ICE’s enforcement activities in northern California, including the (1) investigation of detainees in 

the custody of northern California authorities; (2) issuance of immigration detainers with respect 

to such persons; (3) acquisition of custody of such persons; and (4) subsequent detention and 

treatment of such persons. Id. Plaintiff also alleges Aitken had the “power and authority to 

change policies or customs” and was also responsible for (1) ensuring that ICE’s policies, 

customs, practices, and activities—including the issuance of ICE detainer requests—comported 

with the U.S. Constitution and applicable federal law and regulations; and (2) “training and 

supervising his staff[.]” Id. 

Defendants point out, however, that it is unclear which claims Plaintiff alleges against 

Aitken. Opp’n to Mot. to Am. at 16. The only claims alleged against Aitken appear to be those 

seeking declaratory relief, which are asserted against “all Defendants.” Otherwise, the proposed 

TAC alleges FTCA claims against only the United States and Bivens claims against only Chang 

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and Garcia. 

As only the United States may be properly named as a defendant in an FTCA action, 

Aitken cannot be a defendant as to those claims. See Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”). The 

proposed TAC also does not assert any Bivens claims against Aitken. Plaintiff acknowledges 

Aitken’s absence, but he explains he “believes that discovery will provide a firm basis for 

asserting Bivens claims against Aitken, and in the meantime is proceeding carefully and 

diligently.” Reply to Mot. to Am. at 11; Dkt. No. 103. Plaintiff’s belief does not negate the fact 

that the Proposed TAC, as it stands, lacks facts demonstrating Aitken personally violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff does not, for instance, set forth facts to show Aitken took part in the decision to 

issue the immigration detainer or had any role whatsoever in Plaintiff’s interrogation. See Chavez 

v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (no qualified immunity for supervisor who 

directly participated in alleged constitutional violations where conduct “would be a clear Fourth 

Amendment violation to a reasonable officer”); Blandino v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 

Officers, 2011 WL 588342, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff 

did not allege any facts showing supervisor caused or proximately caused violation of plaintiff’s 

civil rights). Nor does Plaintiff allege Aitken ordered Chang and Garcia to violate Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights or even knew of their conduct. See OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 

1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Nobody would argue . . . that a supervisor who orders subordinates to 

violate constitutional rights escapes liability under Iqbal. As we held in Starr, even a supervisor’s 

knowledge and acquiescence will suffice for liability in some circumstances.”). Although Plaintiff 

asserts Aitken was “responsible for formulating, implementing, approving, and/or allowing 

policies and/or customs applicable to ICE’s immigration enforcement activities in northern 

California, including ICE’s investigation of detainees in the custody of northern Californian 

authorities [and] its issuance of immigration detainers[,]” he does not describe any specific policy 

that would lead to unconstitutional conduct. Prop. TAC ¶ 14; see Righetti v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & 

Rehab., 2013 WL 1707957, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (“No policy or practice liability may 

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be found against a defendant where ‘there is no allegation of a specific policy implemented by [a 

defendant] or a specific event or events instigated by [a defendant] that led to [the] purportedly 

unconstitutional [conduct].’” (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(alterations and emphases in original))). 

Plaintiff also cannot hold Aitken responsible as Chang and Garcia’s supervisor in a Bivens

action. The Supreme Court has made it clear that in a Bivens action, “[g]overnment officials may 

not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of 

respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (2009). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable 

to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through 

the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id.; see OSU Student All., 

699 F.3d at 1071 (“Iqbal makes crystal clear that constitutional tort claims against supervisory 

defendants turn on the requirements of the particular claim—and, more specifically, on the state of 

mind required by the particular claim—not on a generally applicable concept of supervisory 

liability.”). 

In sum, Plaintiff must have specific allegations against Aitken to state a claim against him. 

As the proposed TAC currently stands, it does not contain any facts to state a claim against Aitken 

in either his individual or official capacities and leave to amend would be futile. 

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds leave to amend appropriate as to some 

claims, but futile as to other claims as Plaintiff currently pleads them in his Proposed TAC. 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows: 

1. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to his FTCA intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, false imprisonment, and negligence claims; 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to his FTCA claims for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress and abuse of process; 

3. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to his First and Fourth Amendment Bivens

claims, as well as to his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim; 

4. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to his Fifth Amendment substantive due process 

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28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

and self-incrimination claims, as well as his Eighth Amendment Bivens claim; 

5. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to his Declaratory Judgment Act claims; and 

6. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to adding Timothy S. Aitken as a defendant. 

As this Order also addresses the arguments raised in Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. 

Nos. 87, 90), those motions are hereby terminated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 26, 2016

______________________________________ 

MARIA-ELENA JAMES 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:10-cv-03910-MEJ Document 107 Filed 02/26/16 Page 43 of 43