Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01665/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01665-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK M. ROZENSKI,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1665 GEB GGH P

vs.

R.A. CASTRO, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.SC. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2001 conviction for residential

burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459), assault with a deadly weapon and inflicting great bodily injury

upon Diane Fox (Cal. Penal Code §§ 245, 12022.7(a)), assault with a deadly weapon on Philip

Harney (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)), and violation of a protective order by an act of violence

with a prior conviction within seven years for violating a protective order (Cal. Penal Code §

166(c)(4)). Petitioner is serving a sentence of 8 years.

This action is proceeding on the amended petition filed November 4, 2004. 

Petitioner raises the following claims: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) Brady violation; 3) 

\\\\\

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insufficient evidence; and 4) jury instruction error. After carefully considering the record, the

court recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA “worked

substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential standards of

review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal

defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

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state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

III. Factual Background

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal contains a factual summary. After

independently reviewing the record, the court finds this summary to be accurate and adopts it

below.

Defendant and Diane Fox had a six or seven month romantic relationship, which 

ended in March 2000. On November 2, 2000, Fox obtained a domestic violence 

protective order against defendant. On December 27, 2000, Fox obtained another 

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protective order against defendant.

On January 9, 2001, Fox and a male friend, Phil Harney, went to a lounge where 

Fox consumed three glasses of wine and Harney consumed three or four drinks. 

After having dinner at a nearby restaurant, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., they took

a taxi back to her home and went to bed.

Later, Fox got up to get some water and saw defendant in her family room. He 

told her he had come to fix a bicycle tire. Fox ran to Harney, who got up and told 

defendant to leave. After Fox and Harney went back to bed, Fox was awakened 

by defendant hitting Harney in the head with an object that looked like a bat. 

Harney was bleeding heavily from broken dentures and facial injuries. Harney 

went to a neighbor’s house and called a taxi.

Fox watched Harney leave from her front step. As she walked back into her 

house, someone grabbed her by her hair and threw her to the ground, resulting in a

bump on her head. She then felt something warm on her neck. Fox was attacked 

again. When Fox arose, she saw defendant in the dining room, drinking beer. 

Defendant gave Fox some beer and admitted he hit Harney, but claimed he did not

hurt her. Fox was frightened and threw pots and pans at defendant until he left.

Fox was intoxicated and did not realize her neck had been cut until deputy sheriffs

of Sacramento County arrived. Fox had a beer in her hand, and Deputy Nicholas 

Smolich described Fox as under the influence and hysterical. Deputy Smolich 

found a bloody kitchen knife on the dining room floor.

Fox received 28 stitches on her neck and injuries to her lip, face, and head. Fox 

told the deputy she believed her throat had been cut during the fight with 

defendant.

After Fox arrived home from the hospital the next day, she was asleep on the

couch when defendant awakened her between 10:00 a.m. and noon. Defendant 

apologized, but said he had not attacked her. Fox believed she hyperventilated 

and passed out. After Sheriff’s deputies arrived again, defendant hopped the 

fence.

After the deputies left, defendant returned to Fox’s patio area. Fox again 

screamed for help, and defendant fled once again. [Footnote]

[Footnote: Fox did not have a telephone. She yelled “9-1-1” so that the 

neighbors would hear her and call.]

Fox told defendant’s friend, Mark Henry, several days later that she did not see 

defendant cut her throat and that defendant might have been set up by a jealous 

drug dealer. 

Defendant was interviewed the next day by Detective Clifford Lunetta. After 

being confronted with eyewitness statements, defendant admitted he was angry at 

Harney because he believed Harney had beaten up Fox. Defendant admitted he 

went to the house and hit Harney a number of times, but denied touching Fox. 

Defendant denied using any object to hit Harney.

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No defense evidence was presented.

Respondent’s August 2, 2005, Lodged Document No. 5, pp. 2-4.

IV. Discussion

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, a petitioner must show

that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To this end, the petitioner must

identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. The federal court must then determine

whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professional competent assistance. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “We strongly presume that

counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised 

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland at 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In extraordinary cases, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated

based on a fundamental fairness standard. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391-93, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1512-13 (2000), (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).

The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the importance of giving deference

to trial counsel’s decisions, especially in the AEDPA context:

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In Strickland we said that “[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential” and that “every effort

[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, even when a court is

presented with an ineffective-assistance claim not subject to §

2254(d)(1) deference, a [petitioner] must overcome the

“presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Ibid. (quoting Michel

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

For [petitioner] to succeed, however, he must do more than show

that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were

being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it

is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its

independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland 

incorrectly. See Williams, supra, at 411, 65 S. Ct. 363. Rather, he

must show that the [ ]Court of Appeals applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699, 122 S. Ct. 1843,1852 (2002).

Analysis

Petitioner raised this claim in his habeas corpus petition filed in the California

Supreme Court. Respondent’s Lodged Document No. 6. The California Supreme Court denied

the petition without comment or citation. Id. Because the only state court decision reviewing

this claim is unexplained, the court will independently review the record to determine whether

the denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence

that Diane Fox was taking Paxil, a psychotropic drug, and had engaged in prior acts of selfmutilation, witnessed by her two former roommates, Mr. Grenz and Zachary Smith. Petitioner

also alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay and jury instructions, and

for advising petitioner not to use his witnesses.

The court granted the prosecution’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that

Diane Fox was taking psychotropic medication and had engaged in previous acts of selfCase 2:03-cv-01665-GEB-GGH Document 49 Filed 02/16/06 Page 6 of 15
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 On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in refusing him to present 1

evidence of Fox’s drinking habits, her use of psychotropic medication and her prior acts of

cutting herself. The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim. Respondent’s Lodged

Document No. 5, pp. 4-9. 

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mutilation. RT at 23-24. Therefore, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to introduce evidence

regarding these matters.

1

Respondent has also provided the declaration of petitioner’s counsel in which he

describes the investigation of petitioner’s case:

3. That as part of my defense and representation of Petitioner Frank Rozenski, a 

private investigator, James Wagoner, was hired to conduct an investigation into 

the matter, which included interviewing Mr. Rozenski, the victims in the case and 

all potential exculpatory witnesses whose names were provided by Mr. Rozenski 

or whose names were set forth in the discovery provided to the defense.

4. That Mr. Wagoner initially interviewed Mr. Rozenski on March 30, 2001, at 

the Sacramento County Main Jail to determine his version of the facts and 

thereafter interviewed the victims and witnesses provided by Mr. Rozenski. Mr. 

Wagoner personally interviewed both victims Phil Harney and Diane Fox and 

obtained statements from each of them. Mr. Wagoner subsequently interviewed 

Mr. Rozenski several times after the initial interview at the main jail to obtain 

further information, including an interview which took place on April 14, 2001.

5. Mr. Wagoner interviewed other potential exculpatory witnesses provided by 

Mr. Rozenski, including Mark Henry, Mary Peterson, Leon Beers, the owner of 

the Time-Out Tavern, Sherry Kalkins, and Scott Grenz. A twenty two page 

statement was taken from Mr. Harvey by Mr. Wagoner and subsequently 

transcribed. Attempts were made to locate other witnesses, some of whom were 

either homeless or transient, without success. Every effort was made to find any 

and all witnesses who might have relevant or pertinent information. Many 

witnesses had no relevant information, could not remember certain facts, repeated 

hearsay statements which could not be verified or were in admissible or gave 

information which was potentially harmful to Mr. Rozenski’s defense, including 

information regarding Mr. Rozenski’s violent tendencies.

6. For example, one of the witnesses mentioned in Mr. Rozenski’s petition for 

habeas corpus as an exculpatory witness, Scott Grenz, was personally interviewed 

by Mr. Wagoner on July 9, 2001. He told Mr. Wagoner that Mr. Rozenski has 

attacked him on at least two previous occasions and that he had filed charges 

against Mr. Rozenski in 2000. He further stated that he lost seven weeks of work 

because of injuries inflicted by Mr. Rozenski. Although Mr. Grenz also stated 

that he had seen Ms. Fox cut herself on the cheek with a steak knife, it was 

determined that Mr. Grenz’s statement that Mr. Rosenski had physically attacked 

him on two separate occasions and caused him to lose seven weeks of work was 

so damaging that it would have negated any testimony regarding Ms. Fox’s

conduct.

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7. Mr. Wagoner attempted to locate find [sic] another possible exculpatory 

witness mentioned in Mr. Rozenski’s petition for habeas corpus, Zachary Smith. 

Mr. Rosenski did not have an address or telephone number for Mr. Smith. Mr. 

Wagoner attempted to locate Mr. Smith without success and finally, attempted to 

contact Mr. Smith through one of his mutual friends, Joseph McCoy. On July 9, 

2001, Mr. Wagoner spoke to Mr. McCoy’s mother. She stated that Mr. McCoy 

was homeless and rarely stayed in contact with her. She further stated that 

because of his drinking problem, he was no longer permitted to stay at the 

Salvation Army, Loaves and Fishes or any other local shelters. Mrs. McCoy was 

given Mr. Wagoner’s telephone number and asked to call him if her son contacted

her. Mr. Wagoner never heard back from Mrs. McCoy.

8. Impeachment information regarding Diane Fox was also investigated and 

sought. Some of the information was the subject of several defense motions in 

limine and ultimately was excluded by the magistrate.

9. All the information discovered by Mr. Wagoner was discussed with Mr. 

Rozenski and all decisions made to not call certain witnesses were tactical 

decisions made in conjunction with Mr. Rozenski’s full understanding and 

agreement.

Respondent’s Lodged Document No. 7. 

Other than Grenz and Smith, petitioner identifies no other witnesses he claims

counsel should have called. Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner’s conclusory claim that

counsel improperly advised him not to call his witnesses should be denied. James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 26 (9 Cir. 1994)(“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of th

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”) In addition, petitioner does not identify the hearsay

he claims counsel failed to object to. Nor does petitioner identify the jury instructions he claims

counsel should have objected to. These conclusory claims should be denied. Id.

After independently reviewing the record, the court finds that the denial of

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim by the California Supreme Court was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim

should be denied.

B. Brady Violation

Petitioner raised this claim in his habeas corpus petition filed in the California

Supreme Court. Respondent’s Lodged Document No. 6. The California Supreme Court denied

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the petition without comment or citation. Id. Because the only state court decision reviewing

this claim is unexplained, the court will independently review the record to determine whether

the denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to disclose that Diane Fox was

taking Paxil, was an alcoholic, had suffered two convictions for spousal abuse and had numerous

arrests for drunk in public. Petitioner also alleges that Phil Harney was not interviewed until

three days after the incident, and that the testimony of both Harney and Fox was incredible and

therefore, inadmissible.

The prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused

can violate the accused’s due process right to a fair trial. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83

S.Ct. 1194 (1963). A successful Brady claim requires demonstrating that evidence 1) “favorable

to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or it is impeaching,” 2) was suppressed by the

state (either willfully or not), and 3) is “material,” by way of a “reasonable probability” that the

disclosure would have produced a different result at trial. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-

82, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999).

Petitioner’s claims that Phil Harney was not interviewed until three days after the

incident and that the testimony of Harney and Fox was inadmissible because it was incredible do

not state Brady claims. Rather, these allegations are so vague and conclusory that the court finds

that they state no colorable claim for habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9 Cir. 1994). th

As discussed above, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to exclude

evidence that Diane Fox was taking psychotropic medication, i.e. Paxil. RT at 15, 23. The

prosecution could not have suppressed this evidence as it was a basis of a motion in limine. In

other words, petitioner’s counsel was aware of this evidence. 

The trial court also granted the prosecution’s motion to exclude evidence

regarding Diane Fox’s drinking history. RT at 23. The prosecution could not have suppressed

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evidence regarding Diane Fox’s drinking history as it was a basis of a motion in limine. In other

words, petitioner’s counsel was aware of this evidence. 

Finally, petitioner argues that the prosecution suppressed evidence that Diane Fox

had been convicted of spousal abuse and arrested for being drunk in public on several occasions. 

Although Fox’s alleged arrests for being drunk in public were not mentioned by the parties or the

court during the discussion of the prosecutions’ motion in limine, it is clear that the court’s ruling

that no evidence would be permitted regarding Fox’s drinking history would have included these

arrests. In any event, it is unlikely that evidence of these arrests would have produced a different

result at trial. During counsel’s cross-examination of Fox, she testified that she was intoxicated

at the time of the incident. RT at 112. In addition, Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff Smolich

testified that when he arrived on the scene, Fox appeared to be “somewhat” under the influence. 

RT at 123. Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff Trevino testified that when he arrived on the

scene, Fox appeared to be intoxicated. RT at 208. 

Because a fair amount of evidence was presented that Fox was intoxicated on the

night of the incident, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have

been different had evidence been presented that Fox had been arrested for drunk in public on

several occasions. The jury was presented with sufficient by which to gauge the effect of alcohol

on Fox’s ability to perceive the events on the night of the incident. 

Finally, petitioner argues that the prosecutor withheld evidence that Fox had once

been convicted of spousal abuse. As described in the summary of facts above, the evidence that

petitioner assaulted both Harney and Fox was strong. Had the jury been presented with this

evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been

different. 

After independently reviewing the record, the court finds that the denial of this

claim by the California Supreme Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

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C. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner raised this claim in his habeas corpus petition filed in the California

Supreme Court. Respondent’s Lodged Document No. 6. The California Supreme Court denied

the petition without comment or citation. Id. Because the only state court decision reviewing

this claim is unexplained, the court will independently review the record to determine whether

the denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner identifies grounds three as involving a claim of “false accusations,

hearsay, lack of evidence.” Amended Petition, p. 6. Petitioner describes the supporting facts of

this claim as follows:

Changing their stories at least twice, lying about what happened that night. No 

prints on the knife, no other weapon, was produced in Mr. Harney’s case. He also

did not identify me in court. Mr. Harney was not interviewed until 3 days later 

and has no medical report to prove his dentures were broken or how. I was not at 

the scene of the crime when Ms. Fox was cut. Donald Dennis her roommate can 

confirm this fact at a deposition or evidentiary hearing.

Amended Petition, p. 6.

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus

relief is available if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found “the essential

elements of the crime” proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Under Jackson, the court reviews the entire record when the

sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on habeas. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.

11 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483

U.S. 1 (1987). It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.

Ct. at 2789. “The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt. It is whether rational jurors could have reached the same conclusion that these jurors

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reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991).

If the trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in

its review will assign the inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465,

469 (9th Cir. 1994). The fact that petitioner can construct from the evidence alternative scenarios

at odds with the verdict does not mean that the evidence was insufficient, i.e., that no reasonable

trier of fact could have found the conviction scenario beyond a reasonable doubt.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

conviction, we search the record to determine “whether a

reasonable jury, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, could have found the defendants

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the

crime charged.” United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1476 

(9th Cir.1986). The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence

excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the jury could

reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Fleishman, 684

F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct.

464, 74 L. Ed.2d 614 (1982); United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d

1337, 1343 (9th Cir.1981), overruled on other grounds, United

States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). 

United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991)

(emphasis added).

Superimposed on these already stringent insufficiency standards is the AEDPA

requirement that even if a federal court were to initially find on its own that no reasonable jury

should have arrived at its conclusion, the federal court must also determine that the state

appellate court not have affirmed the verdict under the Jackson standard in the absence of an

unreasonable determination. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

because Fox and Harney were not credible witnesses because they changed their stories. In

reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim, the court does not resolve credibility issues. 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (stating that under Jackson resolving

credibility issues is generally beyond the scope of appellate review).

Petitioner also argues there was insufficient evidence because no fingerprints were

found on the knife. Identification Technician McGinnis testified that the handle of the knife was

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textured. RT at 229. McGinnis testified that textured items are not conducive to finding latent

fingerprints on. RT at 229. Despite the lack of fingerprint evidence, the circumstantial evidence

was sufficient on which to find petitioner guilty of assaulting Fox. While Fox testified that she

did not see the person who grabbed her hair, threw her to the ground and cut her (RT at 48), she

testified that right after this incident she saw petitioner sitting on a chair in her dining room. RT

at 50-51. Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could find that petitioner was the person

who assaulted Fox.

Petitioner also argues that Harney did not identify petitioner in court. While this

is true, petitioner told the police that he went to Fox’s house and assaulted Harney. RT at 189. 

Based on this admission, Harney’s inability to identify petitioner in court was not material.

Petitioner also argues that no medical report was presented to prove that Harney’s

dentures were broken. Harney himself testified regarding the injuries he suffered. The

prosecution was not required to introduce medical reports to prove the extent of Harney’s

injuries. 

Finally, petitioner argues that he was not at the crime scene when Fox was cut and

that Donald Dennis could confirm this. As discussed above, Fox’s testimony was sufficient

evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that petitioner assaulted her. In resolving an

insufficiency of evidence claim, the court looks only at the evidence presented to the jury.

After independently reviewing the record, the court finds that the denial of this

claim by the California Supreme Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

In his traverse, petitioner raises additional arguments in the section of the traverse

addressing his insufficiency of evidence claim. Although it is unclear whether these arguments

are exhausted, the court may consider them because they are without merit. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2).

\\\\\

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Petitioner argues that prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. “[A]

conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must

be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the

judgment of the jury.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82

(1985). 

Petitioner argues that the prosecution presented false testimony that Fox received

her injuries on the same night that Harney received his. For example, petitioner claims that a

deputy sheriff falsely testified that the injuries occurred on the same night. Other than his own

conclusory assertion, nothing in the record suggests that the evidence presented by the

prosecution that Fox and Harney received their injuries on the same night was false. Fox herself

testified that she and Harney received their injuries on the same night, and petitioner does not

question her testimony. The testimony of the deputy sheriffs who responded to the scene was

consistent with the testimony of Fox regarding the incident. Petitioner’s claim that the

prosecution presented false testimony is unsupported and should be denied. 

D. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner contends that instructing the jury with CALJIC 17.41.1 (jurors should

advise the court if other jurors are ignoring the jury instructions or otherwise deciding the case

based on improper bases) unconstitutionally deprived petitioner of due process. The precise

issue was decided adversely to petitioner in Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004). No

more need be discussed. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 2/16/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

roz1665.157

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