Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01412/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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28 1 Respondents urge that the only proper Respondent named in this

matter is Mr. Schomig, who was Petitioner’s immediate custodian at the

time the petition was filed. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GEORGE SONDAH, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-01412 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., JANET ) 

NAPOLITANO, KATRINA KANE, )

JAMES SCHOMIG, )

 ) 

Respondents. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Mr. George Sondah (“Petitioner”), who is represented by

counsel in this matter, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on July 6, 2009. At that

time Petitioner was detained by Respondents1 in Eloy, Arizona.

Petitioner also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and

a motion to consolidate this case with Docket No. 2:09 CV 1410.

Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Response”) (Doc. 17) on August 27, 2009. In

total, four motions to consolidate were filed. On September 2,

2010, the motions to consolidate were denied in Docket No. 2:09

CV 1410. On September 28, 2010, Respondents were ordered to

file additional pleading. Respondents filed a response to the

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2 Petitioner came to the attention of ICE when he was arrested for

petty theft and detained in Martinez, California, by local authorities.

Response, Exh. 2. When detained by immigration officials, Petitioner told

the officials he had a pending application to obtain the status of a lawful

permanent resident. Id., Exh. 2. 

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Court’s order, inter alia urging that the petition is moot. See

Doc. 43. Petitioner filed a Response to Order and Supplemental

Pleadings on October 22, 2010. See Doc. 44. 

I. Background

Petitioner is a native of Liberia, who entered the

United States as a refugee from Ghana. See Response (Doc. 17),

Exh. 1 & Exh. 2. On March 29, 2001, Petitioner was admitted to

the United States as a refugee, pursuant to section 7 of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”). See id., Exh. 1 &

Exh. 2. 

On December 6, 2002, Petitioner was convicted by the

State of California on one charge of petty theft. Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of three years probation pursuant to

this conviction. Id., Exh. 2. On May 12, 2008, Petitioner was

convicted by the State of California on once count of petty

theft with a prior conviction. See id., Exh. 2. Petitioner was

sentenced to serve 270 days in jail followed by a term of two

years probation. Id., Exh. 2.

On April 8, 2009, the government issued a Notice to

Appear, charging Petitioner was removable from the United States

because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral

turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal

misconduct, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Id.,

Exh. 3. Petitioner was taken into custody on that date2 and held

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without bond because the government concluded he was subject to

mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). A bond

determination was conducted by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on

May 1, 2009, who determined Petitioner could not be released on

bond. Id., Exh. 5.

Petitioner reserved an appeal of this decision and was

represented by counsel in his appeal. Id., Exh. 5. The Board

of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of

the decision of the IJ on June 19, 2009. Id., Exh. 7.

On July 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a Form I-485, i.e.,

an application to adjust his status to that of a lawful

permanent resident, and a Form I-602, seeking a waiver of

grounds of inadmissibility. Id., Exh. 8. Petitioner had an

interview with Citizenship and Immigration Services on July 24,

2009. Id., Exh. 9.

The habeas petition asserts:

It has long been the policy of the Arizona

Field Office of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)

to authorize the detention of individuals

admitted to the United States as refugees who

have not acquired permanent resident status

within one year. These “unadjusted refugees”

are commonly held for approximately four to

six months while their applications for

permanent residence are being adjudicated.

During this time, they are not charged with

any civil or criminal offense and are not

placed in removal proceedings. They are not

eligible to apply for bond in front of a

neutral magistrate. Petitioner argues that

this policy and practice of detaining

unadjusted refugees violates substantive and

procedural due process and is contradictory

to the Immigration and Nationality Act.

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3 Respondent maintained Petitioner’s detention did not violate

any constitutional right or federal statute. Respondent asserted

Petitioner’s detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a), while a

determination regarding his admissibility was pending, was legally

similar to an alien’s detention during removal proceedings, i.e., it

was not “indefinite” detention because Petitioner’s detention would

end when a final order of removal was entered or when Petitioner’s

removal proceedings resulted in a change of his status to that of a

legal resident.

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Respondent asserted in his initial response to the

petition that the petition must be denied because, at that time,

Petitioner was being legitimately detained as a refugee “who has

not adjusted his status and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(c).”

Response at 2. Respondent further asserted in the initial

response that he was required to detain Petitioner “for

inspection and examination” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1159, as a

refugee who had not adjusted his legal status after one year.

Id. Respondent argued Petitioner’s detention was not

unconstitutional because it was not indefinite, as his status

was not permanent, i.e., “a decision regarding his admission

[would] be issued and served shortly.... ” Id. at 4.3

In response to the Court’s order requiring

supplementation of the record, Respondent states:

On July 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a Form

I-485 seeking to adjust his status to that of

a lawful permanent resident. The U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”)

denied Petitioner’s application on August 31,

2009, due to Petitioner’s criminal history.

On September 4, 2009, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed Petitioner

in removal proceedings through the issuance,

service and filing of a Notice to Appear

(“NTA”). That NTA was amended on three

occasions, most recently on October 21, 2009.

Petitioner Sondah accepted a final order of

removal to Liberia on April 15, 2010, and

waived his right to appeal that order. In his

removal order, the Immigration Judge denied

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Petitioner’s application to adjust status and

to waive the grounds of inadmissibility. (See

id.) On June 28, 2010, Petitioner Sondah was

released on an order of supervision. (See

Exhibit 6 - Order of Supervision.) Petitioner

is not currently in custody.

Doc. 43 at 2.

Petitioner does not dispute that he is now under a

final order of removal nor does he dispute that he is not now in

custody.

“The case or controversy requirement of Article III

admonishes federal courts to avoid premature adjudication and to

abstain from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.”

U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1208 (10th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A

court must dismiss a case as moot if at any point it becomes

certain either that “‘the allegedly wrongful behavior could not

reasonably be expected to recur,’” Friends of the Earth Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Assoc. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct.

693, 708 (2000) (citation omitted), or that there is no

effective relief remaining for the court to provide. See

Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S. Ct. 2066, 2067

(1996).

The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to

consider a habeas claim that is moot. See, e.g., Dittman v.

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). Because

Petitioner is no longer detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159,

any opinion issued at this time by this Court regarding that

statute would be purely advisory in nature.

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Petitioner’s case is rendered moot by his release from

custody. See Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir.

2007) (discussing and collecting cases wherein a petitioner’s

release from detention or parole or their removal rendered a

habeas petition moot); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.

2006) (finding habeas petition was not moot where petitioner’s

supervised release left open possibility of court’s issuance of

effectual relief). Because Petitioner is no longer in custody,

the Court may not reach the merits of his argument regarding the

constitutionality of his initial detention. Petitioner no

longer has a personal stake in the outcome of his argument.

Because Petitioner no longer has a personal stake in the relief

sought, i.e., a declaration that 8 U.S.C. § 1159 is

unconstitutional, his habeas petition is moot. See Rodriguez v.

Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2010). Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998).

The habeas petition seeks injunctive relief, i.e.,

Petitioner’s release from custody. Injunctive relief may no

longer be granted because Petitioner is no longer detained and,

accordingly, his release would not be effected by a decision

finding the challenged statute unconstitutional. Additionally,

Petitioner seeks declaratory relief. A claim for declaratory

relief will not save a petition from mootness unless the

declaration affects the individual filing the petition. Ferry

v. Gonzalez, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006). Any opinion

issued in this matter that the challenged statute is

unconstitutional would be an advisory opinion. The Court should

not issue such an opinion “because a declaratory judgment on

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that question would have no meaningful effect” on DHS’ or ICE’

future conduct towards Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner contends that the petition is not moot and

the Court should exercise jurisdiction and find the statute

unconstitutional, citing the maxim that the case or controversy

requirement of Article III is satisfied if the challenged

constitutional violation is capable of repetition yet evades

review. Petitioner argues his case presents a situation that is

capable of repetition yet evading review, an exception to the

mootness doctrine which “applies only in exceptional

circumstances.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17, 118 S. Ct. at 988

(quotations omitted). This exception will rescue a moot

controversy only if: “(1) the challenged action is in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party will be subject to the same action

again.” Id. (quotations omitted). See also Weinstein v.

Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 350 (1975).

The second prong of the capable-of-repetition exception

requires a “reasonable expectation” or a “demonstrated

probability” that “the same controversy will recur involving the

same complaining party.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102

S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982). Although other detainees will

undoubtedly face this same issue in the future, there is no

reasonable expectation, and certainly no demonstrated

probability, that Petitioner will be subject to the same action

again.

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4 It is not clear if the “voluntary cessation” doctrine applies to

section 2241 habeas cases. Compare Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773,

775-76 (9th Cir. 1991), with Sherman v. United States Parole Comm’n, 502

F.3d 869, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting cases in which the merits of a

challenge to pretrial detention were not mooted when the petitioner was no

longer detained prior to trial). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has

concluded:

We will not dismiss a petition as moot if “(1) secondary or

‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary

injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet

evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly

illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it

is a properly certified class action suit.” 

Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (2002).

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Neither is the narrow exception to the mootness

doctrine of voluntary cessation applicable.4 This exception

“traces to the principle that a party should not be able to

evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily

altering questionable behavior.” City News & Novelty, Inc. v.

City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1, 121 S. Ct. 743, 747

n.1 (2001). However, this case is not analogous to the

situation where “[respondents] seek to evade sanction by

predictable protestations of repentance and reform.” Id. There

is no suggestion that the decision allowing for Petitioner to be

detained pursuant to section 1226(c) was the result of an

attempt by the government to evade review of 8 U.S.C. § 1159.

Accordingly, the exception of voluntary cessation inapplicable.

See Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (2002).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sondah’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

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appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

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has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 10th day of November, 2010.

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