Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02396/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441al Removal- Airline Crash

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F~LED 

OCT 05 2016 

CI ERK u.s. DISTRICT COURT 

Qou'r-H-ERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

By~DEPUTY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES BAGLEY, CASE NO. 15cv2396-WQH-WVG 

Plaintiff, ORDER 

v. 

PAUL TEIRSTEIN; DOES 1 through 

100, inclusive, 

Defendant. 

14 HAYES, Judge: 

15 The matter before the Court is the motion to remand (ECF No. 18) filed by 

16 PlaintiffJames Bagley. 

17 I. Background 

18 On September 15,2015, Plaintiff James Bagley initiated this action by filing a 

19 Complaint in San Diego County Superior Court, Case Number 37-2015-00031 OOO-CU20 PO-NC, alleging claims for personal injury, property damage, and loss of income 

21 arising from an airplane crash. (ECF No. 1-2 at 4). The Complaint alleges a 

22 negligence cause of action and asserts that Defendant Paul Teirstein was piloting a 

23 "tow glider" and caused the "tow plane to be unable to disengage the glider ... and 

24 caus[ed] the [tow plane] to fly straight into the ground." (ECF No. 1-2 at 7). The 

25 Complaint alleges 

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27 

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Defendant Paul Teirstein as pilot in command of a tow glider failed to 

maintain directional control so as to cause it to turn violently causing the 

tow plane to be unable to diseng~e the glider and violently raising the 

tail ofthe tow plane causing it to tTy straight into the ground. Defendant 

Paul Teirstein was not competent nor suffIciently current or capable to fly 

the glider in accordance WIth Federal Aviation regulations. 

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1 Id. 

2 On October 22, 2015, Defendant filed a notice ofremoval under 28 U.S.C. § 

3 1331, based on Plaintiffs allegation that Defendant failed to comply with Federal 

4 Aviation Regulations ("FAR"). (ECF No.1 at 3). Defendant contends that removal 

5 is properly based on "federal question" jurisdiction. Id. at 7. 

6 On November 3,2016, Defendant filed an answer. (ECF No.2). 

7 On July 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. (ECF No. 18). On August 

8 8, 2016, Defendant filed an opposition. (ECF No. 20). On August 12, 2016, Plaintiff 

9 filed a reply. (ECF No. 21). 

10 II. Discussion 

11 Plaintiff contends that the complaint asserts claims under state law and that this 

12 Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 18-1 at 1,4). Plaintiff contends that 

13 the allegation that Defendant violated the FARis not the "central allegation of 

14 negligence" against Defendant. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that the Federal Aviation 

15 Act ("FAA") does not create a federal cause of action for personal injury suits and does 

16 not provide grounds for removal based on federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 6. 

17 Plaintiff contends that complete preemption does not provide a proper grounds for 

18 removal in this case because "[ c Jomplete preemption giving rise to removal has been 

19 found only in narrow areas .... " Id. at 7. Plaintiff contends that Congress has not 

20 expressed any intent that federal aviation regulations completely preempt ordinary state 

21 law personal injury claims. Id. 

22 Defendant contends that federal subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied because 

23 Plaintiff s complaint raises a federal issue. (ECF No. 20 at 3). Defendant contends that 

24 Plaintiffs claim is "wholly dependent upon compliance with federal regulations." 

25 (ECF No. 20 at 9). Defendant contends thatthe reference to the FAR regulations in the 

26 Complaint raises the issue of pilot qualifications, which are completely preempted by 

27 federal law. Id. at 4. Defendant alleges that the Court may "assert subject matter 

28 jurisdiction over other claims" through supplemental jurisdiction, "even if ... the Court 

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1 lacks federal-question jurisdiction over any portion of the complaint." Id. at 10. 

2 A. Legal Standards 

3 "Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an action filed in state court 

4 to federal court if the federal court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over 

5 the action." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 

6 2009). Absent diversity of citizenship, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction 

7 "when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded 

8 complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citation omitted); 

9 see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The well-pleaded complaint rule "makes the plaintiff the 

10 master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on 

11 state law." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Federal jurisdiction must exist at the time the 

12 complaint is filed and at the time removal is effected. Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. 

13 Ass'n of Am. , 300 F.3d 1129,1131 (9th Cir. 2002). 

14 A party can challenge removal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

15 through a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. There is a "strong presumption against 

16 removal" such that the removing party "always has the burden of establishing that 

17 removal is proper." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). "The 

18 removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires 

19 resolution in favor of remand." Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244. 

20 B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 

21 "Federal courts may exercise federal-question jurisdiction over an action in two 

22 situations. First and most commonly, a federal court may exercise federal-question 

23 jurisdiction if a federal right or immunity is an element, and an essential one, of the 

24 plaintiff s cause of action." Provincial Gov 't ofMarinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

25 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). "Second, a federal court may 

26 have such jurisdiction if a state-law claim 'necessarily raise[ s] a stated federal issue, 

27 actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without 

28 disturbing any congressionally-approved balance of federal and state judicial 

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1 responsibilities. '" ld. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng 'g & 

2 Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)). "Such a federal issue must be 'a substantial one, 

3 indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent 

4 in a federal forum. '" ld. at 1086-87 (citation omitted). The "mere presence of a federal 

5 issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal question 

6 jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). 

7 In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court considered "whether the incorporation of a 

8 federal standard in a state-law private action, when Congress has intended that there 

9 not be a federal private action for violations ofthat federal standard" confers federal 

10 jurisdiction. ld. at 805. The plaintiffs brought state common law tort claims against 

11 a drug manufacturer and distributor. The plaintiffs alleged that ingestion of a particular 

12 drug during pregnancy resulted in birth defects. The drug company petitioned for 

13 removal from state court to federal court based on the plaintiffs allegation in their 

14 complaint that the drug was "misbranded in violation of the Federal Food Drug and 

15 Cosmetic Act." ld. at 805-06. The Court held that federal jurisdiction was improper 

16 in part because no private, federal cause of action existed. Id. at 817. The Court stated 

17 that, "[g]iven the significance of the assumed congressional determination to preclude 

18 federal private remedies, the presence of the federal issue as an element ofthe state tort 

19 is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional 

20 purposes and the federal system." ld. at 814. 

21 In Grable, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split that followed the Merrell 

22 Dow decision and held that the presence of a federal cause of action is not dispositive 

23 of federal-question jurisdiction. Grable, 545 U.S. at 318. The plaintiff in Grable 

24 brought a state quiet title action following the Internal Revenue Service's seizure of 

25 plaintiffs property due to a tax delinquency and subsequent sale of the property to its 

26 current owner. ld. at 310-11. The plaintiff alleged that the current owner's title was 

27 invalid "because the IRS had failed to notify [the plaintiff] of its seizure of the property 

28 in the exact manner required by [26 U.S.C. § 6335]." ld. at 311. The Court held that 

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1 removal was proper, despite the absence of a federal cause of action. The Court 

2 determined that the meaning of the federal statute was an essential element of the quiet 

3 title claim that was "actually in dispute," and "appear[ ed] to be the only legal or factual 

4 issue contested in the case." Id. at 315. The Court stated that "Merrell Dow should be 

5 read in its entirety as treating the absence of a federal private right of action as 

6 evidence relevantto, but not dispositive of [ Congressional intent]." Id. The Court held 

7 that a federal issue embedded in a state law claim confers federal jurisdiction when the 

8 "state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 

9 substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 

10 congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Id. at 

11 314. 

12 In this case, Plaintiff does not have a private federal remedy, because Congress 

13 did not include a federal cause of action for personal injury suits in the FAA. See 

14 Martin ex reI. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806,808 (9th Cir. 

15 2009) ("The FAA doesn't create a federal cause of action for personal injury suits."). 

16 The lack of a federal cause of action under the FAA is evidence that Congress did not 

17 intend to provide federal-question jurisdiction through the FAR and FAA. Merrell 

18 Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 ("We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation ofa federal 

19 statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that 

20 there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a 

21 claim 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. "'). In this 

22 case, allowing Defendant to remove Plaintiffs state law tort claim to this Court 

23 because of a reference to the FAR would disturb the "congressionally approved balance 

24 of federal and state responsibilities" that the Legislature indicated by declining to 

25 provide a cause of action under the FAA. Grable, 545 U.S. at 318. 

26 The Complaint alleges in part that Defendant "was not competent nor 

27 sufficiently current or capable to fly the glider in accordance with Federal Aviation 

28 regulations." (ECF No. 1-2 at 7). However, to confer federal-question jurisdiction 

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lover state law tort claims, the claims must involve a substantial and contested federal 

2 issue "indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be 

3 inherent in a federal forum." Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. The "mere presence" of the 

4 FAR in Plaintiff s state law cause of action for negligence does not necessarily raise 

5 a substantial federal issue. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 804. In this case, the FAR are not 

6 a central issue to the Defendant's alleged negligence. There is no indication of a 

7 disputed federal issue. In Grable, where removal was proper despite the fact that no 

8 federal cause of action existed, the meaning of a federal statute was both disputed and 

9 determinative ofthe case. In this case, the parties may dispute the applicability of the 

10 FAR, but neither Plaintiff nor Defendant contend that there is a dispute over the 

11 meaning of the FAR.1 

12 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs claims do not involve a substantial federal 

13 issue and federal question jurisdiction does not provide grounds for removal. See 

14 Brown v. City & Cty a/Honolulu, No. CV 14-00354 HG-KSC, 2015 WL 1564961, at 

15 *2-3 (D. Haw. Apr. 7, 2015). 

16 C. Preemption 

17 i. Complete Preemption 

18 The jurisdictional doctrine of complete preemption may also provide grounds for 

19 removal of a claim to federal court. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 

20 (1987). Complete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule that 

21 exists where, "[t]he Supreme Court has concluded that the preemptive force of some 

22 statutes is so strong that they 'completely preempt' an area of state law." Balcorta v. 

23 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F .3d 1102, 11 07 (9th Cir. 2000)( citing Metro. 

24 Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 65). When the complete preemption doctrine applies, "any 

25 claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, 

26 a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. 

27 

28 1 In fact, Plaintiff states that "rDefendant] is correct that federal law will likely supply the standard of care." (ECF No. 18-1 at 5). 

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( 

1 Of Cal v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 

2 (1983)). Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine distinct from ordinary 

3 preemption and is limited in application. Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 

4 1179, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2002); Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & 

5 Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the Supreme Court 

6 has only recognized three instances of complete preemption). Complete preemption 

7 is a "doctrine applicable to removal jurisdiction only" and "is not a doctrine of 

8 defensive preemption." Retail Prop. Trust, 768 F.3d at 948. "[C]omplete preemption 

9 occurs only when Congress intends not merely to preempt a certain amount of state 

10 law, but also intends to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from state to federal 

11 court." Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183. 

12 In this case, Plaintiffs state law negligence claims are not subject to complete 

13 preemption as a result of Plaintiffs reference to the FAR in the Complaint. Courts 

14 have concluded that Congress did not intend the FAA to preempt all state law claims. 

15 See Gilstrap, 709 F.3d at 1004 ("[W]e have in several instances held that state-law 

16 personal-injury claims are not displaced by the FAA."). In Martin ex reI. Heckman, the 

17 court held that Congress did not intend the FAA to "exclude all state law personal 

18 injury suits from the area of air travel" and stated that "[t]he FAA doesn't create a 

19 federal cause of action for personal injury suits." 555 F.3d at 808. "[T]he complete 

20 preemption doctrine applies only to 'claim[s] which come within the scope of [a 

21 federal] cause of action.'" Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) 

22 (citation omitted); see also Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1245 ("Our holding is 

23 buttressed by the Supreme Court's explanation that a federal statute must provide the 

24 'exclusive cause of action' for complete preemption to apply .... "). 

25 The Court finds that the complete preemption doctrine is inapplicable and does 

26 not provide grounds for removal. See Webb v. Desert Bermuda Dev. Co., 518 F. App'x 

27 521,522 (9th Cir. 2013). 

28 ii. Ordinary Preemption 

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. " 

1 In contrast to the jurisdictional doctrine of complete preemption, ordinary 

2 preemption operates as a federal defense. Retail Prop. Trust, 768 F.3d at 948; see also 

3 Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1107 n.7. Ordinary preemption exists in three forms: express, 

4 field, and conflict.2 Retail Prop. Trust, 768 F.3d at 948. Express preemption exists 

5 where Congressional intent is explicitly stated in the statutory language. Cipollone v. 

6 Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). Conflict preemption occurs where state 

7 law "actually conflicts with federal law." Id. State law is preempted through fielq 

8 preemption "if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make a 

9 reasonable inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. '" Id. 

10 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Dela Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153)(citations 

11 omitted). 

12 Complete preemption and ordinary preemption are two distinct doctrines that 

13 occur in separate procedural contexts. Retail Prop. Trust, 768 F.3d at 948. Only 

14 complete preemption is applicable to removal jurisdiction. See id. Complete 

15 preemption can confer federal jurisdiction and provide grounds for removal; ordinary 

16 preemption is insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. See id.; Moore-Thomas, 553 

17 F.3d at 1244; Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 11 07 n.7. It is well-settled that a defendant cannot 

18 establish federal subject matter jurisdiction by raising a defense such as preemption. 

19 Beneficial Nat. Bankv. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1,6 (2003) ("Thus, a defense that relies on 

20 ... the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute ... will not provide a basis for removal.") 

21 (citations omitted); Newberry v. Pac. Racing Ass 'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 

22 1988) ("Ordinarily, a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense, 

23 including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the complaint 

24 and both parties concede that it is the only question truly at issue."). 

25 In this case, removal based on preemption is only proper if the FAA and FAR 

26 

2 "It is true that the defense of field preemption and the doctrine of complete 27 preemption both rest on the breadtl)., in some crude sense, of a federal statute's 

preemptive force. The two types or preemption, are, however, better considered 

28 aistinct." Retail Pro12. Trust, 768 F.3d at 94g (quoting Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 

424 F.3d 267,273 n:7 (2d Clr. 2005)). 

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1 completely preempt Plaintiffs claims because ordinary preemption cannot provide 

2 grounds for removal. Defendant contends that two Ninth Circuit decisions, Ventress 

3 v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2014), and Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 

4 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007), hold that the FAA preempts all state law claims in the field 

5 of aviation safety regarding pilot qualifications. (ECF No. 20 at 7-8). However, these 

6 cases both address the defensive preemptive effect of the FAA and FAR; neither case 

7 addresses complete preemption as grounds for removal jurisdiction. The defendants 

8 in Montalvo and Ventress did not rely on complete preemption to establish federal 

9 subject matter jurisdiction and remove their actions to federal court. See Montalvo, 508 

10 F.3d at 469-70; Ventress, 747 F.3d at 720. In Montalvo, the parties were properly 

11 removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and preemption was raised in 

12 a motion to dismiss. 508 F.3d at 469-470. In Ventress, the plaintiffs initially brought 

13 suit in federal court and the defendants raised preemption as a defense in a motion for 

14 judgment on the pleadings and later motion for reconsideration. Ventress, 747 F.3d at 

15 720; Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2007). While the court in both 

16 Montalvo and Ventress held that the FAA does have a preemptive effect in certain areas 

17 due to pervasive regulations, this analysis occurred in the context of field preemption, 

18 which cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction. Ventress, 474 F.3d at 720-23; 

19 Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 470. Ordinary preemption cannot confer federal subject matter 

20 jurisdiction and provide grounds for removal. 

21 III. Conclusion 

22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (ECFNo. 18) is 

23 GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this action is remanded to San Diego 

24 Country Superior Court, where it was originally filed and assigned case number 37-

25 

26 DATED:-.~~~-= __ _ 

27 

28 United States District Judge 

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