Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01504/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01504-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Steven Rosales (“Counsel”), attorney for Plaintiff Cheryl Champion (“Plaintiff”), seeks an 

award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 25.) Plaintiff has not opposed the 

motion, and the Commissioner “has no objection to the fee request.” (Doc. 26 at 1.) For the following 

reasons, the motion for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff and Counsel entered into a contingent fee agreement on July 20, 2011, which provided 

Plaintiff would pay twenty-five percent of any awarded past due benefits. (Doc. 25- 1.) On August 10, 

2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of the administrative decision denying her Social Security 

benefits. (Doc. 1.) The Court determined the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record, and issued an order remanding the matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) on October 30, 2012. (Doc. 21.) 

Following the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff (Doc. 22), the parties filed stipulation for 

CHERYL L. CHAMPION, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:11-cv-01504 - JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART COUNSEL’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

Case 1:11-cv-01504-JLT Document 29 Filed 02/18/14 Page 1 of 4
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an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 23.) Pursuant 

to the terms of the stipulation, the Court awarded $3,850.00 to Plaintiff. (Doc. 24.) 

On June 19, 2013, an administrative law judge issued a fully favorable decision for Plaintiff, 

finding she was disabled under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 25-2 at 1-3.) Following this decision, 

the Social Security Administration determined Plaintiff was “entitled to monthly disability benefits 

from Social Security beginning June 2007,” which and would receive a check “for $52,154.15, which 

is the money [Plaintiff was] due through May 2013.” (Doc. 25-3 at 1.) 

Although the Social Security Administration calculated $52,154.15 in benefits, the Court noted 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of attorney fees based upon an award of $74,934 in retroactive 

benefits. (Doc. 27.) Accordingly the parties were directed to file briefs addressing the discrepancy in 

the amounts calculated. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a response on December 16, 2013, explaining: “In 

calculating the total of the retroactive benefit, Counsel for plaintiff added the monthly amounts listed 

in the Notice of Award for the retroactive period of June 2007 through May 2013.” (Doc. 28 at 2.) 

The Commissioner did not file a response.

II. Attorney Fees under § 406(b)

An attorney may seek an award of attorney fees for representation of a Social Security

claimant who is awarded benefits:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, et 

seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 

allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 

25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by 

reason of such judgment. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) 

controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement 

is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. Id. at 807.

III. Discussion and Analysis

District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” 

Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review 

contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 

Case 1:11-cv-01504-JLT Document 29 Filed 02/18/14 Page 2 of 4
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particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of 

the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should 

consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or 

excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.” 

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

In this case, Plaintiff willingly entered into the contingent fee agreement in which she agreed to 

pay “25% of the backpay awarded.” (Doc. 25-1 at 1, emphasis omitted.) Counsel accepted the risk of 

loss in the representation, and he and his paralegal spent 22.4 hours on the case. (Doc. 28 at 3.) 

Counsel provided a record of the time spent on the matter, which demonstrates the amount of time was 

reasonable. (Doc. 25, Exh. 4).

As a result of Counsel’s work to remand the action to an administrative law judge, Plaintiff 

ultimately received an award of benefits in the amount of $52,154.15. However, given the backpay 

period, counsel appears to correctly calculate the retroactive amounts due to be $74,934 and it appears 

the award of the lower amount is either a net award or a typographical error.

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 (See Doc. 25-3.) Under 

the terms of the contract between Plaintiff and Counsel, the calculation of attorney fees would be based 

upon the amount of backpay awarded. (Doc. 25-1 at 1.) Consequently, Counsel is entitled to an award 

of twenty-five percent of the amount awarded, or twenty-five percent of $74,934, which totals 

$18,733.50. This amount appears reasonable in light of the results achieved. Because $3,850.00 was 

paid under the EAJA, the net cost to Plaintiff is $14,883.50. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Counsel’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) (Doc. 25) is

GRANTED;

2. The Commissioner is DIRECTED to pay the amount of $18,733.50 directly to 

Counsel; and

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The Court is confident counsel will take steps to correct this error for Plaintiff.

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3. Counsel is DIRECTED to refund $3,850.00 to Plaintiff Cheryl Champion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:11-cv-01504-JLT Document 29 Filed 02/18/14 Page 4 of 4