Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50140/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50140

Summary Calendar

ARDELL NELSON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PARDONS AND PAROLE CHAIRMAN; NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN,

DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:08-CV-505

Before BENAVIDES, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ardell Nelson, Jr., Texas prisoner # 482188, appeals the 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissal as frivolous of his civil rights suit and moves for

appointment of counsel. Nelson argues that (1) procedures employed by the

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (the Parole Board) violated his due process

rights; (2) his ex post facto rights were violated by the retroactive application of

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 4, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

 Case: 09-50140 Document: 0051994908 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/04/2010
No. 09-50140

2

parole law; and (3) the Parole Board miscalculated the date on which he is to be

released to mandatory supervision. Our review is for an abuse of discretion. See

Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).

Nelson’s due process challenge to the procedures employed by the Parole

Board is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding because Texas inmates

do not have a liberty interest in parole. See Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73-74

(5th Cir. 1995). The dismissal of this claim as frivolous was therefore not an

abuse of discretion. See Siglar, 112. F.3d at 193. Nelson’s ex post facto claim is

similarly frivolous, as he has not shown that the retroactive application of the

complained of parole procedures will result in a longer period of incarceration

than those procedures in effect on the date he committed the offense. See Garner

v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000); Allison, 66 F.3d at 74-75.

Finally, Nelson’s claim that his mandatory supervised release date has

been incorrectly computed is not cognizable in a § 1983 action because it

challenges the duration of his confinement and, if granted, would entitle him to

accelerated release. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000); see

also Allison, 66 F.3d at 73. It should therefore be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition.

Nelson’s appeal is without arguable merit and is dismissed as frivolous.

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Nelson is informed that the district court’s dismissal and

the dismissal of this appeal count as two strikes under § 1915(g). See Adepegba

v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Nelson is cautioned that, if he

accumulates three strikes, he will not be able to proceed in forma pauperis in

any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility

unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED; MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED. 

 Case: 09-50140 Document: 0051994908 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/04/2010