Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04720/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04720-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cherie Harbaugh,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Pacific Capital Enterprises LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-04720-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Cherie Harbaugh’s (“Plaintiff”) Application 

for Entry of Default Judgment against Defendants Pacific Capital Enterprises, LLC, 

(“Pacific”), Superior Diamond Management, LLC, and Michael Barry Eckerman and 

Tonya Eckerman (“Defendants”). (Doc. 19). The Court now rules on the application.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual allegations here are rather few. According to Plaintiff, she worked as an 

inside salesperson for Pacific from May 2018 to September 2019. (Doc. 1 at 4). Superior 

Diamond Management, LLC was Pacific’s manager and Michael Eckerman was its CEO. 

(Id. at 3). Plaintiff generally alleges that while she worked for Pacific, Defendants did not 

pay her “her earned wages including her earned overtime pay and minimum wage.” (Id. at 

4). She also states that Defendants “failed to make, keep, and preserve records of the hours 

[she] actually worked.” (Id. at 5). 

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on July 15, 2019 bringing claims under the 

Federal Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), Arizona’s wage statute, and common-law 

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claims for breach of contract, violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, and unjust enrichment. (Doc. 1 at 2). No Defendant answered and the Clerk of the 

Court entered default on January 8, 2020. (Doc. 17). No Defendant has moved to set aside 

the default. Plaintiff now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55 for 

entry of default judgment.

II. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Once the clerk has entered default, a court may, but is not required to, grant default 

judgment under Rule 55(b) on amounts that are not for a sum certain. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 

616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). In considering whether to enter default 

judgment, a court may consider the following factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s 

substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money 

at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material 

facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on 

the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). When considering these factors, 

Defendants are deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, but 

do not admit allegations related to damages or those that do no more than “parrot” the

elements of a claim. DirecTV v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007); Geddes v. 

United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).

A. The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim and the Sufficiency of the 

Complaint

“The second and third Eitel factors address the substantive merits of the claim and 

the sufficiency of the complaint and are often analyzed together.” Joe Hand Promotions, 

Inc. v. Garcia Pacheco, No. 18-cv-1973-BAS-KSC, 2019 WL 2232957, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

May 23, 2019). These two factors may favor entering default judgment when, considering 

the complaint and subsequently submitted affidavits, a plaintiff shows a plausible claim for 

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relief. Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); see also J & J Sports 

Prods., Inc. v. Molina, No. CV15-0380 PHX DGC, 2015 WL 4396476, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 

17, 2015) (considering affidavits attached to the motion for default judgment). In her 

application for entry of default judgment, Plaintiff only seeks relief under the FLSA and 

Arizona’s wage statute. Thus, the Court will analyze those claims only.

The FLSA seeks both to “compensate those who labored in excess of the statutory 

maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of extra work and to spread employment 

through inducing employers to shorten hours because of the pressure of extra cost.” Bay 

Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460 (1948). To accomplish these goals, the 

FLSA prevents covered employers from forcing their employees to labor “for a workweek 

longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for [her] employment 

in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 

regular rate at which [she] is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207. An employer who violates this 

statutory imperative “shall be liable to the employee . . . affected in the amount of [her]

unpaid overtime compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated 

damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 

(1945) (explaining that the liquidated damages provision recognizes “failure to pay the 

statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard 

of living ‘necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers’ and to the 

free flow of commerce, that double payment must be made in the event of delay in order 

to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being”) (footnote 

omitted). In a similar fashion, Arizona law provides that “if an employer . . . fails to pay 

wages due any employee, the employee may recover in a civil action against an employer 

or former employer an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.” A.R.S § 23-

355(A).

The pleading standards for FLSA claims are governed by Landers v. Qualtiy

Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014). There, after canvassing the law of the First, 

Second, and Third Circuits, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that—although 

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detailed facts and an approximation of hours is not necessary—a Plaintiff must identify a 

given workweek “that she worked more than forty hours in . . . without being compensated 

for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week.” Id. at 644–45. In other words, 

without more, a plaintiff who alleges she regularly worked over forty hours a week without 

overtime compensation does not satisfy Rule 8(a)’s requirement of a “short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 642; see also 

Ratcliffe v. Apex Sys., LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01688-WQH-MDD, 2019 WL 5963759, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019) (collecting cases dismissing FLSA claims for failure to identify 

a specific workweek).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations suffer from the same deficiencies identified in Landers. 

She simply alleges that she “routinely” worked over forty hours in a workweek, in addition 

to weekends, seemingly without any compensation. (Doc. 1 at 4). “[A]bsent from the[se] 

allegations . . . , however, [is] any detail regarding a given workweek when [she] worked 

in excess of forty hours and was not paid overtime for that given workweek and/or was not 

paid minimum wages.” Landers, 771 F.3d at 646. The complaint fails to supply “sufficient

detail about the length and frequency of [her] unpaid work to support a reasonable inference 

that [she] worked more than forty hours in a given week.” Id. (quoting Nakahata v. New 

York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013)). As was true there, 

Plaintiff’s general allegation raises only the possibility of undercompensation in violation 

of the FLSA, which falls short of what Rule 8(a) requires. Id.

Although Landers did not address the pleading standards for comparable state-law 

wage claims, courts have found it “instructive as to the pleading standard applicable to

such claims.” Avalos v. Amazon.com LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00567-DAD-BAM, 2018 WL 

3917970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (collecting cases); see also Solie v. Health 

Care@Home LLC, No. CV-19-05399-PHX-JJT, 2020 WL 1821257, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Apr. 

10, 2020) (applying Landers to Arizona’s minimum wage statute). Thus, for the same 

reasons, Plaintiff’s claim for withheld regular wages is also inadequately pleaded. Again, 

Plaintiff fails to identify any specific week during which Defendants failed to compensate 

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her. Instead, she general alleges only that she “was not paid all her earned wages by” 

Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 6). Under Landers, such an allegation does not rise above the level 

of a mere possibility without the support of further underlying facts.

Accordingly, because of the serious deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court 

must conclude that these two factors weigh against entry of default judgment here.

B. Sum of Money

Under this factor, “the Court considers the amount of money at stake in relation to 

the seriousness of [Defendants’] conduct.” Bankers Ins. Co. v. Old W. Bonding Co., LLC, 

No. CV11-1804 PHX DGC, 2012 WL 2912912, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2012). Because 

Plaintiff seeks an award of monetary damages, she must prove up her damages with 

evidence. PepsiCo Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

Although Plaintiff seeks a statutory damages award for her overtime pay, which 

generally supports entry of default judgment, Elektra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 

F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005), the majority of the damages she seeks stems from her 

request for treble damages in the amount of $55,461.81 for wrongly withheld regular pay. 

(Doc. 19-1 at 3). The award of treble damages for withheld wages is discretionary even 

when a defendant defaults. Neis v. Heinsohn/Phoenix, Inc., 628 P.2d 979, 984 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1981). Generally, the propriety of a treble-damages award turns on the employer’s 

bad faith. See Calisi v. United Fin. Servs., LLC, 302 P.3d 628, 635 ¶ 29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2013). 

Plaintiff’s only supporting evidence for both her federal and state-law claims is her 

counsel’s affidavit. (Doc. 19-1). She does not even proffer her own sworn statement 

attesting to the number of hours she worked and what portion of those hours she went 

without regular or overtime compensation. More fundamentally, the statement of her 

lawyer is not evidence on which a damages award can be based. Ammini Innovation Corp. 

v. KTY Intern. Mktg., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that evidence 

must usually be admissible to prove up damages). Thus, this affidavit is insufficient to 

show entitlement to any damages.

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The absence of any evidence supporting a damages award creates a defect that tips 

this factor against entry of default. Without any evidence of bad faith, the Court is unable 

to conclude that a treble damages award is appropriate. As a result, the Court also cannot 

conclude that the requested damages award is reasonable in relation to the seriousness of 

Defendants’ conduct. Accordingly, this factor weighs against entry of default judgment.

C. Remaining Eitel Factors

On balance, the remaining Eitel factors do not weigh strongly either for or against 

entry of default judgment. First, the policy in favor of merits decisions almost always 

weighs against entry of default judgment but it is not dispositive where, as here, the failure 

to answer “makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo Inc., 

238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Second, absent a default judgment, Plaintiff will likely be 

prejudiced by Defendants’ failure to participate in this litigation. HPSC, Inc. v. Porter, No. 

CV-08-0084-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 942288, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2008). Third, it is 

unclear what the possibility of disputed facts is. Although the Court found the complaint 

to fall well-below the plausibility standard, it is also true that Defendants were served, 

(Doc. 12), and have not come forward to dispute Plaintiff’s allegations. Fourth, and finally, 

it is similarly unlikely that Defendants default resulted from excusable neglect given the 

fact that they were served.

Accordingly, because the Court finds that three Eitel factors weigh heavily against 

default judgment, and the remaining factors do not point strongly either way, the Court will 

not enter default judgment at this time. To be clear, much of why those factors weigh 

against entering default judgment could be ameliorated by an affidavit from Plaintiff 

herself that addresses the deficiencies identified herein. For example, an affidavit might be 

able to identify a given work week that Plaintiff worked more than forty hours in without 

overtime. An affidavit might also be able to provide detail about how frequently her 

employer withheld wages, which could also support a treble damages award. Absent such 

evidence, however, the totality of the Eitel factors weigh against entering default judgment.

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Cherie Harbaugh’s Application for Default 

Judgment (Doc. 19) is DENIED without prejudice. Within fourteen days of the date of this 

order, Plaintiff shall either amend her complaint (and re-serve Defendants) or file another 

motion for entry of default judgment, along with accompanying affidavit(s), that cures the 

deficiencies identified herein

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 

20) is DENIED as premature. Any future motion for fees must be procedurally complaint 

with LRCiv. 54.2. Requests for taxable costs are to be filed with the Clerk of the Court. 

LRCiv. 54.1(a).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that fictional defendants John and Jane Does I – IV, 

Corporations I – V, and XYZ Partnerships I – V are DISMISSED.1

Dated this 1st day of June, 2020.

 

1 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1969); 

Molnar v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 684, 686–87 (9th Cir. 1956).

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