Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03097/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03097-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KELLY CLAYTON, o/b/o M.M.M., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:18-cv-3097 AC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”), denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on behalf 

of her child under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f.1

 

For the reasons that follow, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 

grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

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1

 SSI is paid to financially needy disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a); Washington State Dept. 

of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 375 (2003) 

(“Title XVI of the Act, § 1381 et seq., is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) scheme of 

benefits for aged, blind, or disabled individuals, including children, whose income and assets fall 

below specified levels . . .”). 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits on her child’s behalf on December 4, 2014. 

Administrative Record (“AR”) 84, 224.2 Plaintiff alleged the child’s disability onset date was 

August 1, 2014. AR 58, 224. The applications were disapproved initially, (AR 58, 143-46), and 

on reconsideration, (AR 58, 153-57). On June 2, 2017, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Judith 

A. Kopec presided over hearings on plaintiff’s challenge to the disapprovals. AR 58, 79-116 

(hearing transcript). Plaintiff and her child were present and testified at the hearing. AR 58, 79. 

The minor was represented by attorney representative Harvey Stack. Id. Michael Lace, a 

medical expert, also testified at the hearing. Id. 

 On October 27, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding the child “not 

disabled” under Section 1614(a)(3)(C) of Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

AR 58-74 (decision), 75-78 (exhibits). On September 25, 2018, the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-6 (decision). 

 Plaintiff filed this action on November 29, 2019. ECF No. 1; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 

1383c(3). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. ECF Nos. 7, 8. The 

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record filed by the 

Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 18 (plaintiff’s summary judgment motion), 23 

(Commissioner’s summary judgment motion), 24 (plaintiff’s response). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff’s child was born in 2008 and was a minor child when plaintiff filed her 

application on the child’s behalf. AR 58, 224. Plaintiff alleges disability beginning August 1, 

2014 based on a combination of impairments including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 

(ADHD), bipolar disorder, behavioral disorder, and learning disorder. AR 251-57. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is 

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” 

 

2

 The AR is electronically filed at ECF Nos. 11-3 to 11-9 (AR 1 to AR 386). 

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Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the 

Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . ..’” Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a 

preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2012). “It means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While 

inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from 

the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted). 

Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court 

nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 

846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The 

court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the 

ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on 

evidence that the ALJ did not discuss”). 

 The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 

which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 

ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 

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2006) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

IV. RELEVANT LAW 

 Supplemental Security Income is available for every eligible individual who is “disabled.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1381a; Department of HHS v. Chater, 163 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.1998) (“The 

Social Security Act directs the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to provide 

benefits to all individuals who meet the eligibility criteria”). An individual under the age of 18, 

such as plaintiff’s child here, is “disabled” if he meets two criteria, set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(C)(i): 

First, he must have an impairment that results in marked and severe 

functional limitations. He satisfies this criterion if his impairment 

matches one of those described in the Listing [Listing of 

Impairments, 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpart. P, App. 1]. Second, the 

impairment must have lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months 

Merrill ex rel. Merrill v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.2000); see also, 20 CFR § 416.906 

(“Basic definition of disability for children”). “The claimant bears the burden of establishing a 

prima facie case of disability.” Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Drouin 

v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir.1992)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996); Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir.1996). 

 The Commissioner has established a three-step sequential evaluation process for the ALJ 

to follow when considering the disability application of a minor claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.924(a); see, e.g., Rose v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5476513, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (applying the 

three-step sequential evaluation process in a child disability case); Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. 

Astrue, 536 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (same); Smith ex rel. Enge v. Massanari, 139 

F.Supp.2d 1128, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same). The Commissioner developed this evaluation 

process after the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 

Pub.L. No. 104–193, § 211, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), altered the statutory definition of childhood 

disability and the standard for determining whether a child is eligible for disability benefits. See 

Howard ex rel. Wolff, 341 F.3d at 1013 (citing legislative history indicating that the change in the 

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law was designed so that only needy children with severe disabilities will be eligible for SSI); 

Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1065, 1067–68 (9th Cir.1997) (recognizing the more stringent 

standard for finding a child disabled imposed by the 1996 legislation). The following summarizes 

the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 

Id., § 416.924(a), (c). 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the claimant 

is not disabled. 

Id., § 416.924(a), (d). 

 Step Three encompasses two analytical steps. First, it must be determined whether the 

claimant’s impairment meets or medically equals a Listing. Second, the impairment must also 

satisfy all of the criteria of the Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(d). The mere diagnosis of an 

impairment in the Listing is insufficient, without more, to sustain a finding of disability. Young 

v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir.1990); Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th 

Cir.1985). If the claimant does not meet or medically equal a Listing, he may still be considered 

disabled if an impairment results in limitations that “functionally equal the listings.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(a). 

In determining whether the severe impairment functionally equals the listings, the ALJ 

must assess the claimant’s functioning in six “domains.” The “domains” are broad areas of 

functioning that are “intended to capture all of what a child can and cannot do.” Id., § 

416.924a(b)(1). The six domains are: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and 

completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating 

objects; (5) caring himself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). 

To “functionally equal” the listings, the impairment must result in “marked” limitations in two 

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domains or an “extreme” limitation in one domain. Id., § 416.926a(a), (d). In making this 

assessment, the ALJ looks at “how appropriately, effectively, and independently” the claimant 

preforms his activities “compared to the performance of other children [the claimant’s] age who 

do not have impairments.” Id., § 416.926a(b). 

A minor has a “marked” limitation in a domain if his impairment “interferes seriously” 

with his “ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.926a(e)(2)(i). The regulations also provide that “marked” limitations means a limitation that 

is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme.” Id. A minor has an “extreme” limitation in a 

domain if his impairment “interferes very seriously” with his “ability to independently initiate, 

sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). The regulations also provide that 

an “extreme” limitation also means a limitation that is “more than marked.” Id. However, 

“extreme” limitation does not mean a “total lack or loss of ability to function.” Id. 

The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability. Roberts v. 

Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (“In general, you have to 

prove to us that you are blind or disabled”); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. This burden requires a 

showing that the minor has an impairment listed in the regulations, and that he has met the 

duration requirement. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a), 416.924(d)(2). 

V. THE ALJ’s DECISION 

 The ALJ made the following findings: 

1. The claimant was born [in June of 2008]. Therefore, he was a 

school-age child on November 14, 2014,3

 the date application was 

filed, and is currently a school-age child (20 CFR 416.926a(g)(2)). 

2. [Step 1] The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since November 14, 2014, the application date (20 CFR 

416.971 et seq.). 

3. [Step 2] The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

disruptive behavior disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder combined (hereinafter “ADHD”). (20 CFR 416.924(c)). 

 

3

 This date of November 14, 2014 is inconsistent with the record concerning the date plaintiff 

filed the initial application. A copy of the application appears in the record and is dated 

December 4, 2014. AR 224. The ALJ also indicated at the hearing, without objection from the 

parties, that the application date is December 4, 2014. AR 84. 

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4. [Step 3] The claimant does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 416.924, 416.925 and 416.926). 

5. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that functionally equals the severity of the listings (20 

CFR 416.924(d) and 416.926(a). 

6. The claimant has not been disabled, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, since November 14, 2014, the date the application was 

filed (20 CFR 416.924(a)). 

AR 58-74. 

 As noted, the ALJ concluded that the minor was “not disabled” under Section 

1614(a)(3)(A) of Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). AR 74. 

VI. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that the minor’s mental impairments did not meet or 

functionally equal a listed impairment. ECF No. 18 at 12.4

 In reaching her conclusion in this 

regard, the ALJ assessed the evidence as to each of the six pertinent domains. She found that the 

minor had no limitations in the areas of moving about and manipulating objects; caring for 

himself; or health and physical well-being; and had less than marked limitations in the areas of 

acquiring and using information; attending and completing tasks; and interacting and relating 

with others. AR 69-73. Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence establishes the minor’s marked 

limitations in the domains of (1) acquiring and using information, and (2) attending and 

completing tasks. ECF No. 18 at 14.5 As the Commissioner notes, ECF No. 23 at 5, plaintiff 

does not allege that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, the only issue 

before the court is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that the minor had 

less than marked limitations in (1) attending and completing tasks and (2) interacting and relating 

 

4

 Citations to documents in the court record use the page numbers imposed by the Electronic 

Case Filing system, rather than the document’s internal pagination. 

5

 Findings of marked limitation in two domains would render the minor disabled within the 

meaning of the statute. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a) (“[Y]our impairment(s) must be of listinglevel severity; i.e., it must result in ‘marked’ limitations in two domains of functioning or an 

‘extreme’ limitation in one domain, as explained in this section.”). Plaintiff does not challenge 

the ALJ’s finding of no limitation in acquiring and using information. 

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with others. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. 

The ALJ relied on the opinion testimony of impartial medical expert Michal A. Lace, 

Ph.D., to which she gave “great weight.” AR 68.6 After reviewing the evidence, Dr. Lace 

testified at the hearing that the minor’s disruptive behavior disorder and ADHD, combined, were 

severe, but that he had less than marked limitations in attending and completing tasks and 

interacting and relating with others. AR 88-91. The ALJ determined that Dr. Lace had supported 

these findings with evidence from the record, and that his findings were consistent overall with 

the record. AR 68-71, 88-91. 

The opinions of a nonexamining, testifying medical advisor such as Dr. Lace “may serve 

as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent 

with it.” Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. Here, the ALJ found that Dr. Lace’s opinion was consistent 

with evidence that the minor exhibited symptoms of ADHD and a mood disorder, but that he 

improved with treatment and that medication, counseling, and family support managed his 

impairments. AR 69. It is well established that impairments which can be controlled effectively 

with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits. 

Warre v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). Having independently reviewed the 

medical record, the undersigned agrees with the ALJ that Dr. Lace’s opinion was supported by 

and consistent with the record. 

The ALJ’s conclusion that the minor had less than marked limitations in the disputed 

domains was based on the finding that medication and treatment generally controlled and 

improved his various behavioral symptoms. AR 70-71. Because Dr. Lace’s opinion constitutes 

substantial evidence supporting that finding, the ALJ’s conclusion may not be disturbed on 

judicial review. See Howard ex rel. Wolff, 341 F.3d at 1011. 

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 The ALJ also considered the opinions of four other doctors, two of whom examined the minor 

at the request of the Agency and two of whom reviewed evidence. Although their findings 

varied, none of these experts opined that the minor had marked limitations in two domains. Each 

of these opinions was given partial weight by the ALJ. See AR 65-67. Plaintiff raises no issues 

related to these opinions. 

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Plaintiff acknowledges that school records show some progress and improvement with 

medication and treatment, but nonetheless contends that the minor’s “limitations in the domains 

of attending and completing tasks and interacting and relating with others are still at the marked 

level.” ECF No. 18 at 11-12; see also ECF No. 24 at 2. It is true that the record, including 

teacher questionnaires and other lay witness evidence as well as medical and psychological 

records, demonstrates serious impairments. However, even if the record may be fairly construed 

to support plaintiff’s contention, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954; Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. 

Here plaintiff has argued for an alternative interpretation of the evidence, but has not 

identified any legal error. Because the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by a medical opinion that 

constitutes “substantial evidence,” the decision must be upheld. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18), is DENIED; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23), is 

GRANTED; and 

 3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for defendant, and close this case. 

 SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 12, 2020 

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