Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00713/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARLUK KHAN MAYWEATHERS, Civil No. 05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Doc. # 57]

v.

R. Q. HICKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is brought by Plaintiff Karluk Khan Mayweathers (“Plaintiff” or “Mayweathers”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third

Amended Complaint (“TAC”). Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion. For the reasons that follow, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

II. FACTS

The TAC alleges the following. Plaintiff was at different times incarcerated at Calipatria, Solano

and Tehachapi State Prisons. Plaintiff lists a number of dates on which Defendants violated his civil

rights: February 18, 2005; January 1, 2001; November 23, 1990; and November 3, 1986. (TAC, p. 1). 

A specific description of the offensive act is provided only for the February 18, 2005 claim. 

On February 18, 2005, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”). 

Plaintiff was apparently celled with a cellmate of the same race. Plaintiff asked to be randomly celled

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1Plaintiff’s opposition also asserts that while in administrative segregation, he was denied pen

and paper and was prevented from using the law library. The TAC does not contain these allegations,

and they will not be considered. 

2

In addition, the TAC briefly refers to a “violation of APA” without providing any details or even

the full name of the law violated. (TAC, p. 3). In the event “APA” stands for the Administrative

Procedure Act, the TAC does not even attempt to state a claim under the Act. 

05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

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with a cellmate of another race. (TAC, p. 3). Defendants R. Bennett, Hunt, and Trujillo, acting under

the supervision of Defendants Ryan and Ochoa, refused Plaintiff’s request. Id. Plaintiff was then placed

in administrative segregation for a week. Id. While in administrative segregation, Plaintiff was denied

his religious diet trays required by his orthodox Muslim faith. Id.1 

Plaintiff’s TAC alleges violations of his equal protection rights and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.2 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion ‘can be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim.’” Holley v. Crank, 400 F.3d 667, 674

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 576 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Civil rights complaints are construed liberally. See Holley, 400 F.3d at 674. Moreover, courts

“have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d

1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). 

“However, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of

the claim that were not initially pled. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal citation omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s 1986, 1999, and 2001 Claims are Barred as Untimely

Plaintiff’s 1986, 1990, and 2001 claims fail as barred by the statute of limitations. Section 1983

does not contain a statue of limitations. Section § 1983 claims are characterized as tort actions for the

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recovery of damages for personal injuries. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Therefore

“a State’s personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.” Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (citation omitted). As of January 1, 2003, the California statute of

limitations period for personal injuries is two years. Cal. C.C.P. § 335.1; Andonagui v. May Dept. Stores

Co., 128 Cal.App.4th 435, 440 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2005). Prior to that, the statutory period was one year. 

Cal. C.C.P. § 340. 

“Federal law determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to

run for a § 1983 action. Specifically, in [§ 1983 actions], the claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or

has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d

800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Therefore Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued at the time

of the events, in 1986, 1990 and 2001, and the statutory period was to run out in 1987, 1991 and 2002,

respectively. 

Plaintiff does not benefit from tolling. When not inconsistent with federal law, courts apply the

law of the forum state regarding tolling. Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted). Under California law, the tolling period is two years maximum:

If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335),

is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under

the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life, the time of that disability is not a part

of the time limited for the commencement of the action, not to exceed two years. 

Cal. C. C. P. § 352.1(a). Therefore Plaintiff’s claims were tolled until 1988, 1992 and 2003,

respectively. The present action was filed in 2005, past the expiration of the tolling period. 

Finally, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the limitations period is not extended by the alleged

consequences of the violations. Plaintiff argues that although the underlying events happened years ago,

they have resulted in disciplinary reports which “to this day are being cited and used adversely” at his

Parole Board hearings. (Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, p. 7). 

Plaintiff seems to rely on the collateral consequences doctrine. Under the doctrine, a habeas

corpus petition does not automatically become moot upon petitioner’s release from custody if collateral

consequences of the underlying conviction still exist. See White v. White, 925 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Supreme Court, however, has held that the presumption of collateral consequences does not apply to

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3Defendants also note, as part of their argument for dismissing the CDC based on Eleventh

Amendment protection, that state officials are not immune from suit for injunctive relief in their

individual capacities. No reference to specific state official Defendants is made. Because the CDC is an

entity and cannot be sued in its individual capacity, it is immune from all claims, including those for 

damages and injunctive relief. Therefore all claims against the CDC should be dismissed. 

05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

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the revocation of parole. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Further, “the presumption of

collateral consequences does not apply to prison disciplinary proceedings.” Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d

477, 480 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has distinguished between “substantial civil penalties” that result from a

criminal conviction, such as the inability to engage in certain businesses, to serve as an official of

a labor union, to vote in state elections, and to serve as a juror, and “non-statutory consequences”

that “result from a finding that an individual has violated parole,” such as the effect on

employment prospects or the sentence imposed in future criminal proceedings. The latter

consequences are “discretionary decisions” that “are not governed by the mere presence or

absence of a recorded violation,” but “are more directly influenced by[ ] the underlying conduct

that formed the basis for the parole violation.” ... Because the decision whether to grant parole is

left to “the judgment of the” Board of Prison Terms, Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402, the

likelihood of delayed or denied parole is a type of nonstatutory consequence dependent on

discretionary decisions that is insufficient to apply the presumption of collateral consequences. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Therefore the alleged use of disciplinary reports does not remove the timeliness bar for Plaintiff’s

1986, 1990 and 2001 claims. Because the untimeliness cannot be cured by an amendment, these claims

should be dismissed with prejudice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Defendant California Department of Corrections Is Immune 

Defendant California Department of Corrections (“the CDC”) should be dismissed as immune

from suit. The Eleventh Amendment precludes suits “in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.” Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). Agencies of the state are also

immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court. Dittman v.

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a state agency,

the CDC is immune from suit. Because claims against the CDC are legally insufficient and cannot be

saved by an amendment, they should be dismissed with prejudice. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688.3 

C. Lack of Personal Involvement by Defendants Hickman, Woodford, and Giurbino

Defendants Hickman, Woodford and Giurbino should be dismissed because there are no

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allegations of their personal participation in the violation. “[A] plaintiff in a section 1983 action must

show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state law;

and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.” 

Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 1989). Hickman is the former, and Woodford is the

current Director of the CDC. Giurbino is the former Warden of Centinela. There are no allegations that

these Defendants personally committed any violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. 

A supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

“participated in or directed the violations,” “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” or

“implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is

‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focused on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633

(9th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Hickman are very general and based solely on Hickman’s status “as

a high-level supervisory official.” (TAC, p. 2). As mentioned above, “[v]ague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.” Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. The TAC contains no allegations against Wood or Giurbino

specifically. Plaintiff’s opposition only notes that the prison policies are a “reflection of the officers in

charge.” (Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, p. 25). Because Plaintiff does not plead facts indicating

that these three Defendants directed the violations, were aware of the violations and failed to prevent

them, or instituted a policy promoting the violations, claims against them should be dismissed. 

Further, the undersigned recommends that the claims be dismissed with prejudice. Dismissal

with prejudice is appropriate where a plaintiff repeatedly fails to cure pleading deficiencies. See

Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993). This is Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. 

Previous Court Orders informed Plaintiff that respondeat superior liability does not exist in § 1983

actions. (See, e.g., Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint, doc. # 19, p. 13; Order Dismissing

Second Amended Complaint, doc. # 36, p. 15). Although the previous pleadings named other

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4Plaintiff’s SAC also states, “[Defendants] violated Plaintiff’s free exercise right to either be

randomly celled with another prison[er] without any race-based animus or to be celled with someone

from another race.” (SAC, p. 3). Although Plaintiff uses the phrase “free exercise” which is typically

applied in the context related to religious beliefs, this phrase appears to be the wrong choice of legal

terms for his equal protection claim. In the event Plaintiff was in fact referring to an equal protection

claim based on religious discrimination, his allegations are too vague to state a claim. 

05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

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supervisory defendants, the legal deficiency is the same, and dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

 D. Equal Protection Claim Is Properly Alleged

Plaintiff properly alleged an equal protection claim based on the February 18, 2005 incident.4

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all

persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473

U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected

class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999). 

Where defendants consider race as a factor in assigning cellmates, the policy is suspect on its face and

the plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent or impact. See Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973-74

(9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff alleges that on February 18, 2005, Defendants R. Bennett, Hunt, and Trujillo, acting

under the supervision of Defendants Ryan and Ochoa, based on Plaintiff’s race denied his request to be

either randomly celled with another inmate or be assigned a cellmate of a different race. (TAC, p. 3). 

Plaintiff also alleged that the prison has a policy of racial segregation of inmates, apparently for interests

related to security. Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such

a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. See id. at 514. “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

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28 5Equal protection is the only claim Defendants seek dismissed based on qualified immunity. 

05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

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prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear

on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” Jackson

v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Further, civil rights complaints are construed liberally. See Holley, 400 F.3d at 674. Moreover,

courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d

1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). 

Therefore although Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because he did not

specify what each Defendant did or demonstrate discriminatory intent, Plaintiff satisfied the pleading

requirements. Mayweathers provided Defendants’ names and described the essence of the alleged

wrongdoing. He is not required to plead with more specificity. 

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants, however, are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s equal protection claim.

5

The defense of qualified immunity shields a § 1983 defendant from trial when the defendant

“‘reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted,’ even if the

[defendant’s] conduct was constitutionally deficient.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir.

2005). Qualified immunity is tested under a two-prong analysis established by the United States

Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). First, a court must determine whether the facts

alleged, resolving all disputes of fact in favor of the party asserting the injury, show that the officers

conduct violated a constitutional right. See id. at 201. If the conduct violated a constitutional right, the

court must determine whether the violated right was “clearly established.” See id. “Even if the violated

right is clearly established, the Saucier Court recognized that it may be difficult for a police officer to

determine how to apply the relevant legal doctrine to the particular circumstances he or she faces. The

Saucier Court therefore held that if the officer makes a mistake in applying the relevant legal doctrine,

he or she is not precluded from claiming qualified immunity so long as the mistake is reasonable.” 

Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 411 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). The rule of

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6For instance, “it has not been clearly established that [] race-based differentiation is

unconstitutional in the context of a prison-wide lockdown instituted in response to gang-or race-based

violence.” Walker, 370 F.3d at 978. 

05-CV-713 WQH (CAB)

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qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Saucier 533 U.S. at 202. 

As stated above, Plaintiff properly alleged an equal protection claim based on the February 18,

2005 incident. Therefore the first prong of the Saucier test is satisfied. Plaintiff does not show,

however, that racial segregation for security reasons is clearly unconstitutional. A right is clearly

established if the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (internal citation omitted). 

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the right is clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[R]acial segregation, which is unconstitutional outside prisons, is unconstitutional within 

 (1972) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted). The second prong of the Saucier test, however,

“operates at a high level of specificity.” Walker, 370 F.3d at 977-978. “It is insufficient that the broad

principle underlying a right is well-established. ‘The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). If the law did not put the

official on notice “that his conduct would be clearly unlawful,” the official is entitled to qualified

immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Defendants argue that they could have reasonably believed that racially segregating prison cells

for security reasons did not violate the Constitution.6 The incident took place on February 18, 2005. At

the time, the Ninth Circuit held that a prison racial segregation policy only had to be “reasonably related

to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Johnson v.

California, 321 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 

On February 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499

(2005). Johnson held that all racial classifications were subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 509. Therefore

at the time Plaintiff’s equal protection claim arose, Defendants were not on notice that racial segregation

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related to safety reasons clearly violated inmates’ equal protection rights. Moreover, even Johnson did

not hold that racial segregation motivated by security considerations was unconstitutional. See id. at 515

(“We do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. We hold only that

strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review....”). Therefore the contours of the right remain

undefined. Consequently, Defendants are shielded by qualified immunity on the equal protection claim.

The Court notes that qualified immunity “means only that defendants ‘need not respond in

damages. It does not mean that they cannot be enjoined from future violations of [plaintiff’s] rights.’” 

Walker, 370 F.3d at 978. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction against Defendants “assigning cell-partners to

him based on race.” (TAC, p. 7). 

The claim for injunctive relief remains. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must ordinarily

demonstrate “a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). Plaintiff alleged a policy of racial segregation in housing. 

(TAC, p. 3). At this stage of litigation, the equal protection claim for injunctive relief appears viable. 

Because qualified immunity applies, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim for damages is not legally

cognizable. Therefore the equal protection claim for damages should be dismissed with prejudice. 

F. Plaintiff Fails to Allege a RLUIPA Claim

Plaintiff’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) claim

should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff repeatedly failed to cure the pleading deficiencies.

Under RLUIPA, 

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in

or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results

from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that Defendants substantially

burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir.

2005). “In order to reach the level of a constitutional violation, the interference with one’s practice of

religion “must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a

tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.

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1997). 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to cure the pleading deficiencies of his RLUIPA claim

once again. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his religious diet trays for a week. The same allegations

were made in his First and Second Amended Complaints. Upon a thorough analysis, the Court

repeatedly found that Plaintiff did not allege a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion. (See

Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint, doc. # 19, pp. 8-13; Order Dismissing Second Amended

Complaint, doc. # 36, pp. 10-16). Because the allegations remain the same, the claim fails again. 

This conclusion is also supported by the law of the case doctrine. “Under the ‘law of the case’

doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court,

or a higher court, in the same case.” Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citations omitted). For the law of the case doctrine to apply, “the issue in question must have been

‘decided explicitly or by necessary implication in [the] previous disposition.’ ” United States v. Lummi

Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff made the same RLUIPA violation

allegations in a consecutive series of pleadings, this Court recommends dismissal of the claim in

accordance with the previous decisions. Because the failure to cure the defects in pleadings has been

repeated, the claim should be dismissed with prejudice. See Neubronner, 6 F.3d at 672. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The

following claims should be dismissed with prejudice: Plaintiff’s 1986, 1999, and 2001 claims; all claims

against the California Department of Corrections; all claims against Defendants Hickman, Woodford,

and Giurbino; RLUIPA claim; and the equal protection claim for damages. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 26, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

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served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 26, 2006

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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