Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01507/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01507-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

In re: 

MICHELLE MARIE BALETTI CASE NO. CIV. S-06-1507 WBS

 CIV. S-06-1801-WBS

Debtor, (Bankruptcy Court No. 05-

27329-C7)

-----------------------------

(Adversary Proceeding No. 05-

PREM DHAWAN, 2302)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

A. LEWIS CHANDLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

-----------------------------

 ----oo0oo----

Currently before the court is Appellant A. Lewis

Chandler’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s order of

October 26, 2006, dismissing Chandler’s appeal from several

orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court denying summary

judgment and denying his request for a jury trial because the

court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Case 2:06-cv-01507-WBS Document 42 Filed 01/04/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

///

The court will consider Chandler’s motion under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b) because it seeks relief from a previous order. 

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly

in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial

resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d

877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Rule 60(b) “provides for

reconsideration only upon a showing of (1) mistake, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4)

a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6)

‘extraordinary circumstances’ which would justify relief.” Id.

Under Rule 60(b), reconsideration is generally only appropriate

where the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in

controlling law. See United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134

F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 

Under Local Rule 78-230(k)(3), motions for

reconsideration must also set forth “what new or different facts

or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were

not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for

the motion.” In addition, the moving party bears the burden of

showing the necessary grounds for granting relief. See Cassidy

v. Tenorio, 856 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988). The court must

take the moving party’s factual allegations as true. Id. Mere

legal conclusions, general denials, or simple assertions that the

movant has a meritorious defense are insufficient to justify

upsetting the underlying judgment. Id.

Case 2:06-cv-01507-WBS Document 42 Filed 01/04/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

///

Jurisdiction over an appeal from an order of a

bankruptcy court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 158. That section

vests the district courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals “from

final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . and with leave of the

court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees.” 28 U.S.C.

§§ 158(a) & (c). Thus, only “final” rulings may be appealed as a

matter of right; a party seeking to appeal any other order must

seek leave of the court. In re Frontier Props., Inc. v. Elliot,

979 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Chandler argues that the court committed clear error in

ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the

Bankruptcy Court had in fact entered a final judgment. Chandler

relies on In re Rains, 482 F.3d 893, 901 (9th Cir. 2005). In

Rains, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court, acting in

its appellate capacity, had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from

an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court approving a

settlement agreement. Id. at 901 (“Whatever prematurity existed

in Rains’s appeal from the order approving the settlement

agreement was cured by the subsequent entry of a final

judgment.”). In its previous order, because it was not made

clear that Chandler’s appeal of final judgment was also before

this court, the court did not consider the effect of that appeal

upon the court’s jurisdiction. The court accordingly erred in

dismissing the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

1. Appeal of Jury Demand Denial

 Chandler appealed the bankruptcy court’s denial of his

demand for a jury trial. An appellant may appeal from certain

Case 2:06-cv-01507-WBS Document 42 Filed 01/04/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

kinds of interlocutory orders after the entry of final judgment. 

Am. Ironworks & Erectors Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d

892, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party may appeal interlocutory

orders after entry of final judgment because those orders merge

into that final judgment.”); Munoz v. Small Business

Administration, 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that

“an appeal from the final judgment draws in question all earlier

non-final orders and all rulings which produced the judgment”). 

Because the matter was heard and decided ultimately by the court

without a jury, the denial of Chandler’s request for jury trial

led ultimately to the judgment. The court therefore erred in

finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal from

that denial. Accordingly, Chandler’s motion for reconsideration

will be granted with regard to his appeal from the order of the

Bankruptcy Court denying his demand for jury trial. 

2. Appeal of Summary Judgment Denials

Chandler also appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s two

denials of his summary judgment motions. The court did not

commit a clear error in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to

hear the appeal from those orders. 

Rains held that “even if the order approving the

settlement agreement were interlocutory, we are not necessarily

deprived of jurisdiction because ‘subsequent events can validate

a prematurely filed appeal.’” Rains, 428 F.3d at 901 (quoting

Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389.) The subsequent

events in Rains included appeals from court orders enforcing the

settlement agreement. Id. at 898-99. Specifically, the Rains

bankruptcy court granted an ex parte application for entry of

Case 2:06-cv-01507-WBS Document 42 Filed 01/04/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. An

appeal of the Rains bankruptcy court’s judgment thus naturally

drew into question the interlocutory order approving the

settlement agreement. Cf. Munoz, 644 F.2d at 1364. 

An appeal of a denial of summary judgment is materially

different. An order denying summary judgment does not ordinarily

become appealable after a trial on the merits. Allahar v.

Zahora, 59 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Once a trial has been

completed and all the facts presented, it is almost always

immaterial whether or not summary judgment should have been

granted at an earlier point in the proceedings.”); see also

Haberman v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th

Cir. 2006) (“The denial of summary judgment based on factual

disputes is not properly reviewable on an appeal from a final

judgment entered after trial.”). The proper redress for a denial

of a summary judgment based on a factual dispute “would not be

through appeal but subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of

law . . . and appellate review of those motions if they were

denied.” Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993). 

Further, the question of the propriety of considering

Chandler’s summary judgment motions is jurisdictional. E.E.O.C.

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 354 n.55 (7th Cir. 1988)

(whether to make an exception to the normal rule that an order

denying summary judgment is not appealable goes to the

jurisdiction over a particular appeal.) The court does not have

jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of summary

judgment motions based on factual disputes even after final

Case 2:06-cv-01507-WBS Document 42 Filed 01/04/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

judgment has been entered. An appellant may contest the final

judgment and all non-final orders which produced the final

judgment. Munoz, 644 F.2d at 1364. Because Chandler was

afforded an opportunity to contest the facts at a hearing

subsequent to the Bankruptcy Court’s denials of his summary

judgment motions for the reason that material facts remained,

those denials were immaterial to the Bankruptcy Court’s final

judgment. Accordingly, the court will deny Chandler’s motion for

reconsideration of that part of this court’s previous order

dismissing his appeal from the bankruptcy court’s orders denying

his motions for summary judgment. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) appellant Chandler’s motion for reconsideration be,

and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART, as to the jury trial

denial; and DENIED IN PART, as to the denial of the motions for

summary judgment;

(2) the court’s October 26, 2006, order is VACATED IN

PART, insofar as the court dismissed the appeal of the jury

demand denial for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant is given fifteen days to file an Opening

Brief consistent with this order. Appellee’s Opening Brief shall

be due fifteen days after service of appellant’s Opening Brief. 

DATED: January 2, 2007

Case 2:06-cv-01507-WBS Document 42 Filed 01/04/07 Page 6 of 6