Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00162/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00162-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERMAN MILLER INC. RETIREMENT

INCOME PLAN, No. 2:07-cv-00162-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RAQUEL S. MAGALLON, also

known as RAQUEL S. MORA, 

an individual and ANA C.

GOMEZ, also known as ANA

MAGALLON, an individual,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendant Raquel Magallon (“Raquel”) claims to be the spouse

of the decedent, Juan Magallon (“Decedent”). As such, Raquel

received payments from the Benefit Plan that the decedent had

through his employer, Herman Miller, Inc. (“HMI”). Defendant Ana

Gomez (“Ana”) later asserted that she was the surviving spouse. 

As a consequence, HMI filed an immediate interpleader action and

was discharged on July 2, 2008. 

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This Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter

under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 in it concerns the Employment Retirement

Income Security Act. The Court must now decide who is entitled

to the Herman Miller retirement benefits at issue.

BACKGROUND

Decedent was an employee of HMI. During Magallon’s

employment, HMI had a plan which afforded retirement benefits

coverage to certain eligible employees, including the decedent

(“Benefit Plan”). On April 11, 2000, Decedent executed a

Beneficiary Designation naming Raquel S. Magallon, identified

therein as the decedent’s spouse, as the beneficiary. At the

June 24, 2010 OSC hearing, Raquel furnished a Mexican Civil

Registration document indicating that she and the decedent were

officially wed on December 30, 1996. Decedent passed on

January 27, 2005. Raquel was identified as the decedent’s

surviving spouse on the Certificate of Death. Payments in the

amount of $122.47 were made to Raquel pursuant to the decedent’s

Beneficiary Designation and her status as the surviving spouse. 

Ana C. Gomez later alleged that she, not Raquel, is entitled

to the full amount of the Benefit Plan. Defendant Gomez produced

a Record of Church Marriage indicating that she and the Decedent

were married on July 24, 1976 (Exh. C to Compl.). Additionally,

Gomez provided an Amended Certificate of Death naming Ana Corina

Gomez as the decedent’s surviving spouse (Exh. D).

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Due to the conflicting claims, and HMI’s uncertainty as to

which defendant is entitled to be paid the Benefit Plan, it

suspended payment to Raquel on August 1, 2006 and filed the

instant interpleader action. HMI was discharged on July 2, 2008

leaving the Court to decide the entitlement issue. 

Attorney Merlyn Hernandez filed an Answer and a cross-claim

against Raquel on behalf of Ana on April 6, 2010. At the May 13,

2010 hearing, which was continued, Raquel appeared with a nonattorney to assist with translation. To date, no formal

appearance has been made on Raquel’s behalf despite an April 29,

2010 letter from California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation

asking that she be afforded additional time to locate

representation. At the time of the most recent June 24, 2010

hearing, Raquel indicated that she had not retained an attorney

and did not state she had any intention of doing so. 

STANDARD

California statutes explicitly declare a bigamous

relationship void from its inception. Cal. Family Code § 2201(a)

(2009). The legislature defined such a relationship as the

“subsequent marriage contracted by a person during the life of a

former husband or wife of the person, with a person other than

the former husband or wife.” Id. 

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The statute further establishes that the subsequent marriage

is illegal and void from the beginning, unless: (1) the former

marriage has been dissolved or adjudged a nullity before the date

of the subsequent marriage; (2) the former husband or wife (i) is

absent, and not known to the person to be living for the period

of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent

marriage, or (ii) is generally reputed or believed by the person

to be dead at the time of the subsequent marriage was contracted. 

Id. 

In its analysis of Section 2201, the Court of Appeals, in In

re Marriage of Tejada, 179 Cal. App. 4th 973 (6th Dist. 2009),

held that bigamy renders the subsequent marriage either void or

voidable, depending on the circumstances. As the Tejada court

noted, one may never legally remarry “prior to dissolution of his

or her existing marriage.” Id. at 980 (citing In re Marriage of

Campbell, 136 Cal. App. 4th 502 (2006)). Moreover, if proceeding

with a marriage under a scenario expounded in subsection (ii)

above, the spouse entering a subsequent marriage must have a good

faith belief in the prior spouse’s death. See, e.g., People v.

Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 802-03 (1956). If this is the case, then

the subsequent marriage is deemed valid until its nullity is

adjudged according to statute. See Cal. Family Code §§ 2201,

2010. California statutory law further establishes that a

marriage is a contractual relationship which may only be

terminated in three ways: (1) the death of one of the parties;

(2) a judgment of dissolution of marriage; and (3) a judgment of

nullity. Cal. Family Code § 301. 

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The California legislature has also declared that “a

marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid by the

laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is

valid in [California].” Cal. Family Code § 308(a). The

California Attorney General offered analysis on this particulary

statutory provision, stating that “[w]here applicants for a

marriage license are already validly married in another state or

in a foreign country, it is neither necessary nor proper for the

county clerk to issue a marriage license to enable the parties to

remarry.” 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 86 (1944). 

ANALYSIS

Under the legal standard articulated above, Raquel’s claim

to the Benefit Plan cannot prevail because the evidence currently

before the Court indicates that her marriage to the decedent was

void from its inception and a violation of California’s bigamy

statutes. Decedent’s marriage to Ana is still in effect because

there has been no showing that there has been a judgment of

dissolution of marriage or a judgment of nullity according to

California Family Code § 301. Case law reaffirms the explicit

statutory language in concluding that one may never legally marry

prior to dissolution of his or her existing marriage. In re

Marriage of Tejada, supra. Although certain exceptions exist if

the remarrying spouse believes that his or her prior spouse has

died, in this case we have absolutely no evidence that was the

case. 

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Consequently the Court determines that given the evidence

before it, Ana is entitled to the Herman Miller retirement

benefits at issue.

The only recourse that Raquel has at this point is to

furnish documentation showing that Juan Magallon’s first marriage

to Defendant Ana Gomez was dissolved or annulled prior to the

date Juan married Raquel. Cal. Family Code § 2201(a).

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the Court finds that the available

evidence shows that Ana is entitled to the Herman Miller benefits

in question. The Court will stay its Order for a period of

thirty (30) days, however, in order to give Raquel a final

opportunity to produce documentation indicating that Juan

Magallon’s 1976 marriage to Ana had in fact been dissolved or

annulled before Juan married Raquel in 1996. If no such evidence

is presented, the Court will issue judgment in favor of Ana Gomez

once said thirty (30) day period expires, without further notice

from the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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