Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04056/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04056-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GTE MOBILNET OF CALIFORNIA LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP, dba VERIZON WIRELESS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-04056 SI

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY

By letter briefs, the parties seek resolution of a discovery dispute regarding defendant City of

San Francisco’s interrogatories and requests for production of documents and things. Defendant seeks

an order from the court requiring plaintiff GTE Mobilenet/Verizon to fully respond to its discovery

request. The disputed requests seek the following information: (1) Verizon’s total gross revenue for

services provided to customers with billing addresses in the City and County of San Francisco; (2) the

number of Verizon customers with billing addresses in the City and County of San Francisco; and (3)

the number of telephone calls made or received by customers through Verizon’s personal wireless

services facilities located in the City and County. Plaintiff argues that the requested materials are not

relevant to its remaining claims, which allege violation of § 253 of the Telecommunications Act. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court is not persuaded that the discovery sought is not relevant, and

therefore GRANTS the City’s motion to compel.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff GTE Mobilnet of California Limited Partnership, dba Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) is

Case 3:05-cv-04056-SI Document 63 Filed 10/03/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a company licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to build and operate wireless cellular

transmission stations to serve Northern California. In an effort to improve its coverage in the City of

San Francisco, Verizon sought a permit from the City to install wireless equipment on public rights-ofway throughout the City. This equipment, antennas measuring approximately two feet by two feet and

small utility boxes, would be installed on existing telephone and utility poles.

On April 14, 2005, Verizon Wireless, through its agent NextG Networks, submitted to the City

an application for a utility conditions permit (“UCP”). The City denied its UCP request. Instead, the

City informed Verizon that it needed to obtain a major encroachment permit (“MEPO”) for every

wireless box that it wanted to install in San Francisco. On October 7, 2005, Verizon filed this action,

claiming that San Francisco’s actions and laws violated the federal Telecommunications Act, the

California Public Utilities Code, and San Francisco’s own administrative regulations. Most of the

claims in the original complaint have not survived to this stage of the litigation. The instant dispute

relates to Verizon’s Second Claim, which alleges violations of § 253 of the Telecommunications Act

of 1996.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) provides that parties may obtain discovery regarding any

matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the claim or defense of any party involved in the pending

action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Furthermore, the information sought need not be admissible at trial

as long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. A “

relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other

matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,

437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1978).

DISCUSSION

Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 precludes states and municipalities from

passing laws that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity" from providing

telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). This preemption is not absolute. Section 253 also

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For the Northern District of California

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includes two "safe harbor" clauses, one of which allows state and local government "to manage the

public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers,

on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis." 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).

In City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit

established that a plaintiff may prove a violation of § 253(a) by showing that the challenged state or

local law has had an actual impact on the provision of telecommunications services, or that the law “may

have the effect of prohibiting services.” (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has since reiterated this

holding, stating that to prove a § 253 violation, a plaintiff is not “required to make an actual showing”

of telecommunications services that it is effectively prohibited from providing. Qwest Communications

Inc. City of Berkeley, 433 F. 3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 385 F.3d

1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

The City argues that the discovery it seeks is relevant to the issue of whether the City’s laws

have had an actual impact on Verizon’s ability to provide telecommunications services in violation of

§ 253. Verizon contends it plans on making only a facial challenge to the local laws, under the Ninth

Circuit’s interpretation of § 253 discussed above, and therefore its past or current ability to provide

services in San Francisco is irrelevant. Verizon states: “To establish a violation of § 253, Verizon

Wireless intends to show in its motion for summary judgment that the City’s Major Encroachment

Permit Ordinance (the “MEPO”) is too burdensome on its face to survive scrutiny under the Ninth

Circuit test. Verizon Wireless does not need to show its current degree of market entry or any actual

impact in terms of number of customers, dollars or calls, existing or lost.” Verizon’s Letter Br. 3.

The Court does not disagree that a purely facial challenge, devoid of any evidence of actual

negative impact on telecommunications providers, may suffice to establish a violation of § 253 under

current Ninth Circuit law. And it may well be that Verizon plans on bringing only a facial challenge

in its upcoming motion for summary judgment. However, Verizon’s objections to the requested

discovery will be overruled for two reasons. 

In the first place, Verizon’s complaint alleges that “[t]he City’s arbitrary and unreasonable

requirements, procedures, actions and decisions violate § 253 of the Act, in that they prohibit or have

the effect of prohibiting [Verizon’s] ability to provide telecommunications services within the City and

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For the Northern District of California

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have been imposed in an unfair and discriminatory manner.” (Complaint ¶ 42 (emphasis added); see

also ¶ 43.) Despite Verizon’s current plans to only mount a facial challenge to the City’s actions and

ordinances, nothing in Verizon’s remaining claims against the City limits Verizon’s ability to bring an

“as applied” challenge; those claims encompass both theories of § 253(a) violation. The information

sought by the City is clearly relevant to such claims. 

Secondly, the information sought may also be relevant to a facial challenge to the ordinance.

Whether the City’s actions “may have” the effect of prohibiting services must certainly be a relative

inquiry, depending on a comparison of the cost and other burdens of obtaining the required permits as

against the rewards provided by participating in the City’s telecommunications market. The information

sought will illuminate this balance.

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’

request to compel discovery (Docket No. 55).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2006 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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