Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00535/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00535-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAMONT SHEPARD, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

COHEN, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:11-cv-00535-LJO-GSA-PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

BE DENIED, AND DEFENDANTS’ 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART

(ECF Nos. 60, 67.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

TWENTY DAYS

I. BACKGROUND

Lamont Shepard (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on March 30, 2011. (ECF No. 1.) This action now proceeds on the 

Second Amended Complaint filed on May 19, 2014, against defendants Dr. Cohen, Sergeant J. 

Lopez, Correctional Officer (C/O) Z. Dean, C/O J. Campbell, and V. Vera-Brown (Nurse)

1

on 

 

1

Plaintiff identifies Vera-Brown as an LVN, but Vera-Brown identifies herself as an RN.

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Plaintiff's due process claim, and against defendants Dr. Cohen, Sergeant J. Lopez, C/O Z. 

Dean, and C/O J. Campbell on Plaintiff's excessive force claim.2 (ECF No. 41.) 

On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 60.)

On December 8, 2014, Defendants Campbell, Dean, Lopez, and Vera-Brown (“Defendants”) 

filed an opposition to the motion, and a cross-motion for summary judgment.

3

 (ECF No. 67.)

On June 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the cross-motion. (ECF No. 81.) 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary 

judgment are now before the court. Local Rule 230(l). For the reasons that follow, the court 

recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied, and Defendants’ cross-motion be granted in part

and denied in part.

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AT ISSUE4

Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR), currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California. 

The events giving rise to the claims at issue in this action allegedly occurred at Corcoran State 

Prison (CSP) in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff alleges as 

follows.

On December 13, 2008, Plaintiff was escorted over to the Acute Care Hospital at CSP 

because Plaintiff did not want to talk to custody staff or medical staff because he was being 

charged with threatening a peace officer and referred for possible prosecution.

Dr. Cohen ordered defendants Sgt. Lopez, C/O Dean, and C/O Campbell to hold 

Plaintiff down, then ordered Nurse Vera-Brown to give Plaintiff 10 mg. of the medication 

 

2

Service of process is pending for defendant Dr. Cohen.

3 On February 25, 2015, the court served Plaintiff with the requisite notice of the requirements 

for opposing the cross-motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998).

4

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is verified and his allegations constitute evidence 

where they are based on his personal knowledge of facts admissible in evidence. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 

922-23 (9th Cir. 2004). The summarization of Plaintiff’s claims in this section should not be viewed by the parties 

as a ruling that the allegations are admissible. The court will address, to the extent necessary, the admissibility of 

Plaintiff’s evidence in the sections which follow.

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Haldol. Plaintiff could have “locked up and/or died” due to Defendant’s over-usage of 

medicine. (Second Amd. Cmp. (“2ACP”), ECF No. 41 at 3 ¶IV.) Defendant Sgt. Lopez 

grabbed Plaintiff’s right arm, forcing him face down on the gurney, placing his weight on 

Plaintiff to hold him still. C/O Campbell grabbed Plaintiff’s left arm and twisted it as he too 

forced Plaintiff down on the gurney, placing his weigh on Plaintiff to keep him there. 

Defendant Z. Dean grabbed Plaintiff’s head and held it down, placing his weight on it. With 

Plaintiff held in this position, Dr. Cohen ordered Nurse Vera-Brown to administer the 

medication into Plaintiff’s right arm. 

After the injection, Plaintiff was released from Defendants’ grip and placed in a holding 

cell where his heart started beating irregularly. Plaintiff informed defendant C/O Lopez that his 

heart was beating irregularly, and C/O Lopez informed Dr. Cohen of the problem. Plaintiff was 

then taken out of the holding cage and placed on a gurney, where an EKG examination was 

performed. The EKG exam showed some abnormality, but Plaintiff was returned to the 

holding cell without being treated for the heart problem. Dr. Cohen told Plaintiff that he lost 

consciousness because he overdosed on drugs or medication. This statement was untrue; Dr. 

Cohen made the statement to justify his wrongdoing. 

Plaintiff was admitted to the Acute Care Hospital as a crisis patient for the next two 

days. Plaintiff alleges there was no penological justification for Defendants’ actions.

The court found that Plaintiff stated cognizable claims against defendants Cohen, 

Lopez, Dean, Campbell, and Vera-Brown for violation of Plaintiff’s rights to due process, and 

against defendants Cohen, Lopez, Dean, and Campbell for use of excessive force in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 11.)

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks 

omitted); Washington Mutual Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s 

position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to 

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particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, 

declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence 

or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence 

to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 

other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

In resolving cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider each party=s 

evidence. Johnson v. Poway Unified School Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 

denied, 132 S.Ct. 1807. Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary 

judgment, he must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other 

than for him. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for summary judgment, they 

need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff=s case. In re Oracle Corp. 

Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984 

(quotation marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 

precludes entry of judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo 

Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 

132 S.Ct. 1566 (2012). 

IV. EXCESSIVE FORCE

A. Legal Standard

What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . .” Hudson 

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim 

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation 

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marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always 

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth 

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis 

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 

cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical 

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” 

Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in 

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and 

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the 

responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant 

to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id.

B. Defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell

Defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell argue that they did not use excessive force 

against Plaintiff, because they did not use any force against Plaintiff. Defendants’ evidence 

consists of their declarations.

“It is my understanding that Plaintiff alleges that I forcefully held him 

down while Dr. Cohen gave him an injection. I have never forcefully 

held down any inmate to receive an injection. Thus, this allegation is 

false. I did not use force against Plaintiff on December 13, 2008. 

Further, the procedure for involuntarily medicating inmates who are 

uncooperative is to place them in a five-point restraint system, and I have 

never done that for Plaintiff.”

(Decl. of Z. Dean, ECF No. 67-2 ¶9.)

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“It is my understanding that Plaintiff alleges that I forcefully held him 

down while Dr. Cohen gave him an injection. I have never forcefully 

held down any inmate to receive an injection. Thus, this allegation is 

false. I did not twist Plaintiff’s arm and force him face down on the 

gurney. I did not use force against Plaintiff on December 13, 2008. 

Further, the procedure for involuntarily medicating inmates who are 

uncooperative is to place them in a five-point restraint system, and I have 

never done that for Plaintiff.”

(Decl. of J. Campbell, ECF No. 67-3 ¶9.)

“It is my understanding that Plaintiff alleges that I forcefully held him 

down while Dr. Cohen gave him an injection. I have never forcefully 

held down any inmate to receive an injection. Thus, this allegation is 

false. I did not use force against Plaintiff on December 13, 2008. 

Further, the procedure for involuntarily medicating inmates who are 

uncooperative is to place them in a five-point restraint system, and I have 

never done that for Plaintiff.”

(Decl. of J. Lopez, ECF No. 67-5 ¶9.)

Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff’s evidence in support of his motion consists of the allegations in his verified 

Second Amended Complaint, (2ACP, ECF No. 41 at 3 ¶IV), and exhibits including two 

Incident Reports on CDCR form 837-C by prison officials reporting their accounts of the 

events on December 13, 2008 before Plaintiff was escorted to the Acute Care Hospital, (Pltf’s 

Motion, ECF No. 60 at 16 (Exh. A.) and 17-18 (Exh. B.)), and a copy of Plaintiff’s form 602-

HC inmate appeal submitted on December 14, 2008 complaining that Dr. Cohen violated 

Plaintiff’s rights to be free of excessive force and forced medication5(ECF No. 60 at 22-27 

(Exh. C.)) 

Plaintiff argues that defendant Cohen ordered defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell to 

use excessive force against him. Plaintiff declares in the Second Amended Complaint

(“2ACP”):

“Dr. Cohen ordered defendants Sgt. Lopez, C/O Dean, and C/O 

Campbell to hold Plaintiff down, then ordered LVN Vera-Brown to give 

Plaintiff 10 mg. of the medication Haldol. . . . Defendant Sgt. Lopez 

grabbed Plaintiff’s right arm, forcing him face down on the gurney, 

placing his weight on Plaintiff to hold him still. C/O Campbell grabbed 

Plaintiff’s left arm and twisted it as he too forced Plaintiff down on the 

 

5

Plaintiff states that the appeal “listed all staff members and their involvement.” (Motion, ECF 

No. 60 at 10.) However, Dr. Cohen is the only defendant named in the appeal, and the appeal does not address 

Plaintiff’s allegations against any of the other defendants. (ECF. No. 60 at 22-27 Exh. C.))

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gurney, placing his weigh on Plaintiff to keep him there. Defendant Z. 

Dean grabbed Plaintiff’s head and held it down, placing his weight on it. 

With Plaintiff held in this position, Dr. Cohen ordered LVN Vera-Brown 

to administer the medication into Plaintiff’s right arm. After the 

injection, Plaintiff was released from Defendants’ grip and placed in a 

holding cell, . .” 

(2ACP, ECF No. 41 at 3 ¶IV.)

 The Incident Reports submitted by Plaintiff do not refer to any incident of excessive 

force. (ECF No. 60 at 16 (Exh. A.) and 17-18 (Exh. B.))

Discussion 

Defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell declare that they did not hold Plaintiff down to 

receive an injection, while Plaintiff declares that they held him down, placing their weight on 

him to keep him still while the injection was administered. There is no other evidence before 

the court supporting any of the parties’ declarations. This factual dispute over whether 

defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell used any force against Plaintiff is material to Plaintiff=s 

Eighth Amendment claim and therefore, neither Plaintiff nor defendants Lopez, Dean, and 

Campbell are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of excessive force.

C. Defendant Vera-Brown

Plaintiff is not proceeding against defendant Vera-Brown on the excessive force claim

in this case. Therefore, there is no issue before the court whether defendant Vera-Brown used 

excessive force against Plaintiff. 

V. INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION – DUE PROCESS CLAIM

A. Legal Standard

The decision to forcibly medicate an inmate implicates both substantive and procedural 

due process. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990). Inmates have “a significant 

liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” U.S. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir.

2012) (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22). However, the liberty interest “must be ‘defined in 

the context of an inmate’s confinement.’” Id. at 745 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 222). Prison 

officials have an obligation to provide prisoners with medical treatment and have a duty to take 

reasonable measures to ensure an inmate’s safety. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225. The proper 

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standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s 

constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.” Loughner, 672 F.3d at 745 (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

There are three factors that are “particularly relevant in the contest of involuntary 

medication: (1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the 

legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) a court must consider the impact 

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and 

on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (3) the absence of ready alternatives is 

evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id. (internal punctuation and citations 

omitted). The Due Process Clause permits treatment of an inmate’s serious mental illness by 

administering antipsychotic drugs against the inmate’s will, “if the inmate is dangerous to 

himself or others, and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Id. at 746. Due 

process is satisfied if the inmate is provided with “notice, the right to be present at an adversary 

hearing, and the right to be present and cross examine witnesses.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 235; 

accord Kulas v. Valdez, 159 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell

Defendants Campbell, Lopez, and Dean argue that they are not liable for forcefully 

medicating Plaintiff because they were not involved in the evaluation and decision to medicate 

Plaintiff. Defendants Campbell, Lopez, and Dean each make the same, identical declaration, as 

follows:

“Plaintiff was escorted to the Acute Care Hospital on December 13,

2008. There, Plaintiff was evaluated and treated by Dr. Cohen. . . It is 

my understanding that Plaintiff claims he was medicated unnecessarily 

and against his will. I did not medicate Plaintiff. I did not order Plaintiff 

to be medicated. I had no authority or control over the decision to 

medicate Plaintiff. I am not a doctor or medical professional. I do not 

make medical decisions or orders regarding the medical care of inmates. 

I am not involved in authorizing or approving medical care or the 

administration of medication by doctors or medical staff. I am typically 

not aware of the specific medical orders or procedures for each inmate. 

Instead, my duty is only to ensure the safety and security of medical staff 

and the facility when inmates are being treated. In this case, I had no 

reason to believe that any of the medical procedures or the 

administration of medication to Plaintiff on December 13, 2008 was 

wrong, harmful, or illegal. I did not view Plaintiff’s medical file at the 

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time of treatment. Neither Dr. Cohen nor any of the medical staff 

consulted me or sought my opinion as to the nature and type of treatment 

that Plaintiff would receive. I knew Dr. Cohen to be a medical doctor 

employed at CDCR to provide medical care and medication to inmates. 

I was not aware, nor was it my duty to be aware, of whether specific 

medical procedures were followed for the administration of medication 

to Plaintiff. My duty was to protect the safety and security of the prison, 

staff, and inmates by supervising inmates and correctional officers.”

(Decl. of Z. Dean, ECF No. 67-2 ¶¶8, 10-12; Decl. of J. Campbell, ECF No. 67-3 ¶¶8, 10-12; 

Decl. of J. Lopez, ECF No. 67-5 ¶¶8, 10-12.)

Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff provides no evidence that defendants Lopez, Dean, or Campbell were involved 

in his evaluation or the decision to administer the injection to Plaintiff.

6

 The Incident Reports 

submitted by Plaintiff do not address Plaintiff’s injection or the decision to medicate him. 

(ECF No. 60 at 16 (Exh. A.) and 17-18 (Exh. B.))

Discussion 

The determination of whether Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated rests on how

and why the decision was made to medicate Plaintiff. See Loughner, 672 F.3d at 746 (“[u]nder 

Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of 

overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness”); Kulas, 159 F.3d at

455–56 (forced medication can only be justified by a determination by a neutral fact-finder that 

the antipsychotic drugs are medically appropriate and that the circumstances justify their 

application). Plaintiff has not provided evidence that any person except Dr. Cohen evaluated 

Plaintiff, made the decision to inject Plaintiff, and issued the medication order. Therefore, 

defendants Lopez, Dean, and Campbell are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 

Plaintiff’s claim against them for violation of due process. 

C. Defendant Vera-Brown

Defendant Vera-Brown argues that she is not liable for forcing medication on Plaintiff 

because she was not at work when the order came in to inject Plaintiff, she has no recollection 

 

6 Plaintiff=s opposition to Defendants’ cross-motion is not verified and therefore has no evidentiary 

value. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2006).

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of injecting Plaintiff, and the order was signed by another nurse. Her evidence consists of her 

declaration and supporting exhibits.

“I am a Registered Nurse employed by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) since 2007. In December 2008, 

I worked at Corcoran State Hospital as a Registered Nurse. I am aware 

that Plaintiff Lamont Shepard alleges that I injected him with medication 

against his will at Corcoran State Prison on December 13, 2008. 

According to the prison’s medical records, which are attached as Exhibit 

B, Dr. Cohen was in charge of Shepard’s treatment on December 13, 

2008. Dr. Cohen gave an order to administer 10mg of Haldol to 

Shepard. I did not give the order. A copy of the Physician’s Orders 

showing Dr. Cohen’s order is included as part of Exhibit B. Plaintiff 

alleges that I injected him with medication on December 13, 2008. I do 

not have independent recollection of this, and the medical record does 

not show this. In fact, a review of the medical records shows that I 

probably did not give the injection. The Physician’s Orders show that 

Dr. Cohen ordered the shot at 0940 hours. But I did not begin my shift 

until 1000. Further, the records show that the order was noted by 

another nurse – not me. Thus, the medical records show that I was not 

the person who injected Plaintiff. Regardless, Dr. Cohen ordered the 

injection. I knew Dr. Cohen to be properly licensed and employed 

physician. I have never knowingly followed a medical order or given an 

injection that I believed was illegal, improper, or harmful. Thus, if I did 

give the injection, I would have been simply following an apparently 

lawful doctor’s order by administering an injection of Haldol to 

Shepard.”

(Decl. of Vera-Brown, ECF No. 67-4 ¶¶2-6.) Defendant Vera-Brown’s Exhibit B consists of 

two pages.7 The first page is a record of Physician’s Orders for Lamont Sheppard, with a

notation signed by “Cohen, MD” and another unidentified signature, that on December 13, 

2008, “Meds: Haldol 10mg IM x 1 dose now” was ordered. (ECF No. 67-4 at 4.) The second 

page is a record of Interdisciplinary Progress Notes on CDCR form 7230 MH, dated and signed 

by “Cohen, MD” on 12/13/08 at 0950, reporting Lamont Sheppard’s behavior and medical 

history upon his arrival at the ER. (ECF No. 67-4 at 5.)

Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff claims in the Second Amended Complaint that Nurse Vera-Brown was the 

nurse who injected him. 

“Dr. Cohen ordered defendants Sgt. Lopez, C/O Dean, and C/O 

Campbell to hold Plaintiff down, then ordered LVN Vera-Brown to give 

Plaintiff 10 mg. of the medication Haldol. . . . With Plaintiff held 

 

7 The court has no record of an Exhibit A submitted with defendant Vera-Brown’s declaration.

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[down], Dr. Cohen ordered LVN Vera-Brown to administer the 

medication into Plaintiff’s right arm. After the injection, Plaintiff was 

released from Defendants’ grip and placed in a holding cell, where his 

heart started beating irregularly.”

(2ACP, ECF No. 41 at 3-4 ¶ IV.) The Incident Reports submitted by Plaintiff do not address 

Plaintiff’s injection or the decision to medicate him. (ECF No. 60 at 16 (Exh. A.) and 17-18 

(Exh. B.))

Discussion 

Defendant Vera-Brown has provided evidence that she was not the nurse who injected 

Plaintiff and that she would not have made the decision to forcefully medicate Plaintiff. Even 

taking as true Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Vera-Brown was the nurse in attendance who 

injected him, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that she proceeded with the injection because Dr. 

Cohen gave her an order to inject 10 mg. of the medication Haldol into Plaintiff’s right arm. 

(Id.) Plaintiff provides no evidence that anyone besides Dr. Cohen was involved in the 

decision to forcefully medicate Plaintiff. Thus, defendant Vera-Brown is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s due process claim against her.

D. Defendant Dr. Cohen

Plaintiff brings his motion against defendant Dr. Cohen for forced medication. To date, 

defendant Cohen has not been served with process or appeared in this action. Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s motion against defendant Cohen is premature and shall not be considered by the 

court at this juncture.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff has not established beyond 

controversy every essential element of any of his claims and therefore is not entitled to 

summary judgment, and that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial as to whether 

defendants Dean, Campbell, and Lopez used excessive force against Plaintiff. The court also 

finds that defendant Vera-Brown has established there is no triable issue of fact as to any of the 

claims against her, and therefore she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also 

finds that defendants Dean, Campbell, and Lopez have established there is no triable issue of

///

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fact as to whether they forcefully medicated Plaintiff, and therefore they are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s due process claim.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed on October 4, 2014, be 

DENIED;

2. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, filed on December 8, 2014,

be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

3. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of 

defendant Vera-Brown on all of Plaintiff’s claims against her; 

4. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of 

defendants Dean, Campbell, and Lopez on Plaintiff’s due process claim;

5. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED as to defendants 

Dean, Campbell, and Lopez on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim; and

6. This case now proceed against defendant Cohen for violation of Plaintiff’s rights 

to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and against defendants Cohen, Dean, 

Campbell, and Lopez for use of excessive force against Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within twenty 

(20) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 

written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to 

Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be 

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

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failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 2, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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