Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03473/USCOURTS-ca7-19-03473-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 30, 2020

Decided February 6, 2020

Before

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3473

ROBERT A. HAAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAVID M. NOORDELOOS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 19 C 7300

Sharon Johnson Coleman,

Judge.

O R D E R

This case comes before us on appellant Robert Haas’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis on appeal. Below, we explain why we find it necessary to summarily vacate 

the district court’s dismissal of Haas’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(a) for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Because we vacate 

the district court’s judgment, we necessarily certify that this appeal is taken in good 

faith, grant Haas’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, and waive the 

appellate filing fee. 

Turning to the merits of the district court’s dismissal order, we conclude that the 

district court erred in holding that Haas cannot state a federal claim on the grounds that 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 19-3473 Document: 9 Filed: 02/06/2020 Pages: 2
No. 19-3473 Page 2

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), “does 

not provide a vehicle to litigate First Amendment claims.” Haas argues that this is not 

so, citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But cf. Loumiet v. United 

States, No. 18-5020, 2020 WL 424919, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 2020) (finding no Bivens

remedy for First Amendment violation where FIRREA provided detailed administrative 

remedy for alleged wrongs). In this circuit, at least, the question is unsettled. See Smadi 

v. True, 783 F. App'x 633 (7th Cir. 2019) (remanding so that district court can develop 

full record with recruited counsel on whether Bivens-style damages remedy is available 

for alleged violations of prisoner’s First Amendment rights after Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. 

Ct. 1843 (2017)). 

Next, to the extent the district court implied that Haas’s claims are barred by 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), we conclude that such a holding is 

premature. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007) makes clear that an anticipatory 

Heck bar is not a valid ground for dismissal. Because this case was resolved by the 

district court at such an early stage, it is difficult to assess precisely what legal theories 

the pro se plaintiff intends to pursue. To the extent he wishes to collaterally attack his 

pending criminal prosecution, the appropriate action here is “to stay the civil action 

until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Id. (citing Heck, 512 

U.S. at 487–488, n. 8).

On remand, the district court should evaluate at an appropriate time what claims 

Haas intends to pursue and whether they implicate or are ancillary to his pending 

criminal case. This may also require consideration at some point of the issues of 

potential claim and issue preclusion, but we are unable to sort those out at this stage. 

Once the claims are clarified, the civil defendants in this case should be served, and the 

district court should consider the possibility of a stay pursuant to Wallace. 

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, 

WAIVE the appellate filing fee, VACATE the dismissal of Haas’s complaint, and 

REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Case: 19-3473 Document: 9 Filed: 02/06/2020 Pages: 2