Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02120/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02120-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

E. & J. GALLO WINERY, a 

California corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

PESTMASTER SERVICES, INC., a 

California corporation, JEFFERY 

M. VAN DIEPEN, and UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-02120 WBS KJN 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff E. & J. Gallo Winery (“Gallo”) brought this 

action against Pestmaster Services, Inc. (“Pestmaster”), its 

president and owner, Jeffery Van Diepen (“Van Diepen”), and the 

United States of America (“United States”) alleging violations of 

state tort law after Pestmaster’s application of an herbicide 

destroyed Gallo’s grape vines. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket 

No. 8).) Before the court is the United States’ motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Docket No. 13.) 

I. Background

The United States, through its Bureau of Reclamation 

(“the Bureau”) owns and operates a series of dams and canals in 

the Central Valley Project, among them the Folsom South Canal. 

(FAC ¶¶ 1, 10.) The Bureau contracted with Pestmaster to provide 

weed-abatement services for facilities and properties in the 

Central Valley Project, including Folsom South Canal, in June 

2016. (Id.; see also Decl. of Kara A. Fleming (“Fleming Decl.”) 

¶ 4, Ex. 1 (Docket No. 13-2).) 

Under the contract, Pestmaster was given discretion to 

determine how, when, and what herbicide to apply. (Fleming 

Decl., Ex. 2 at §§ 3.4, 3.8, 3.16.) Pestmaster was required to 

abide by all applicable state and federal laws and submit a Spray 

Management Work Plan before the start of work, including a plan 

to “prevent the unauthorized release of any chemicals . . . 

including clean-up procedures to be undertaken allowing for the 

protection of . . . neighbors/adjoining property owners.” 

(Fleming Decl., Ex. 2 at §§ 3.0, 3.4-3.6, 3.9.) Exercising its 

discretion, Pestmaster decided to use Method®240SL (“Method”) to 

prevent weeds at the Folsom South Canal in December 2016.1 (FAC 

¶¶ 39-40.) 

Method is harmful to grape vines and grapes. (Id. ¶¶ 

2, 17-18.) Its label explicitly warns users that “[a]pplications 

1 Plaintiff correctly claims Method is not on the list of 

preapproved chemicals in the Scope of Work. (Opp. to Mot. 

(“Opp.”) at 6 (Docket No. 19).) However, that list does not 

purport to be exhaustive or exclusive. (Fleming Decl., Ex. 2 at 

§ 3.8 (“Chemicals approved for use on Reclamation Lands include 

the following”).) 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

made where runoff water flows onto agricultural land may injure 

or kill crops such as . . . grapes.” (Id.; see also Decl. of 

David Fallek (“Fallek Decl.”), Ex. A (Docket No. 20).) The

warning also provides users should not apply Method “during 

periods of intense rainfall or where prevailing soils are either 

saturated with water or of a type through which rainfall will not 

readily penetrate.” (Id.; see also Fallek Decl., Ex. A.) 

Despite these warnings, Pestmaster allegedly applied 

Method on the bank of the Folsom South Canal adjacent to Silva 

Ranch, a Gallo grape vineyard, during a period of intense 

rainfall. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 11, 13, 20-21.) The herbicide then washed 

down the bank and into the vineyard, where it was taken up by the 

grapevines. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 23.) It rendered the grapes unusable in 

the 2017, 2018, and 2019 growing seasons, resulting in a total 

loss of more than $200,000. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 25-27, 31.) 

Gallo presented a claim to the Bureau for $209,999.58

plus attorney’s fees on December 13, 2018, pursuant to the 

administrative exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

(Id. ¶ 31.) The Bureau failed to respond to the claim within six 

months.2 (Id.) This suit followed. 

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

allows parties to dismiss claims against them for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). An attack on 

2 The statute provides “[t]he failure of an agency to 

make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is 

filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, 

be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this 

action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

subject matter jurisdiction may be facial or factual. “In a 

facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations 

contained in a compliant are insufficient on their face to invoke 

federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the 

challenger disputes the trust of the allegations that, by 

themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe 

Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where, as here, the defendant has mounted a factual 

attack, the plaintiff must present “affidavits or any other

evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing that the 

court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” Edison 

v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 

Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2009)). The district court may consider the parties’ 

evidence without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for 

summary judgment. Id. (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 

(9th Cir. 2000). Disputed facts must be resolved in favor of the 

plaintiff. Id. 

III. Discussion

“A party may bring an action against the United States 

only to the extent that the government waives its sovereign 

immunity.” Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 

1995). The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 

1346(b), represents “a limited waiver of that sovereign 

immunity,” that makes the United States liable “to the same 

extent as a private party for certain torts of federal employees” 

under “the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 

Edison, 822 F.3d at 518 (internal citations omitted). The FTCA 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and its exceptions must be strictly construed, with all 

ambiguities resolved in favor of the sovereign. United States v. 

Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992). 

The United States cannot be held vicariously liable for 

the negligent acts of its independent contractors. United States 

v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-14 (1976) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

2671) (noting the statute’s definition of federal “employees” 

excludes “any contractor with the United States”). This is 

referred to as the “independent contractor” exception. In its 

complaint, plaintiff does not allege that the United States or 

one of its federal employees is directly liable for the damage to

its grapes; indeed, its allegations are confined to vicarious 

liability alone. (See FAC ¶¶ 41, 46, 54.) Accordingly, 

plaintiff’s claims against the United States fail on their face. 

Nevertheless, “[t]he independent contractor exception . 

. . has no bearing on the United States’ FTCA liability for its 

own acts or omissions.” Edison, 822 F.3d at 518 (emphasis 

original). If the United States exercised control over 

Pestmaster such that Pestmaster cannot be said to be 

“independent,” the United States could be found liable for 

Pestmaster’s actions. See Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814. Such a 

relationship requires “substantial supervision over the day-today operations of the contractor.” Autery v. United States, 424 

F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Letnes v. United States, 

820 F.2d 1517, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Here, it does not appear that the United States 

exercised the degree of substantial control necessary for 

Pestmaster or its employees to be considered employees of the

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

government. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[c]ontractual 

provisions directing detailed performance generally do not 

abrogate the contractor exception.” Id. at 957. While the Scope 

of Work provides Pestmaster must submit a Spray Management Work 

Plan before the start of work, Pestmaster retains ultimate 

discretion about when to spray, what to spray, and how to spray. 

(Fleming Decl., Ex. 2 at §§ 3.4-3.6, 3.8, 3.16.) While the 

contract and the Scope of Work establish a broad, general 

compliance framework, there is no showing that the United States 

controled the day-to-day operations of Pestmaster. See Letnes, 

820 F.2d at 1519 (holding “detailed regulations and inspections 

are [not] evidence of an employee relationship.”) Accordingly, 

the United States cannot be held liable for Pestmater’s actions. 

Finally, Gallo argues California law imposes three 

separate duties of care on the United States for which it may be 

held directly liable: (1) as a “pesticide user”; (2) as a 

landowner; and (3) under the peculiar risk doctrine, which makes 

landowners liable for the actions of an independent contractor 

when the work involves a “special risk” of harm. (Opp. to Mot. 

(“Opp.”) at 11-13 (Docket No. 19).) “Even where an employer has 

delegated some responsibilities to an independent contractor, the 

employer may still be held separately and directly liable for its 

own negligence.” Edison, 822 F.3d at 518 (citing Logue v. United 

States, 412 U.S. 521, 532-33 (1973)). “Only upon a finding that 

the government delegated its entire duty of care may the court 

dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction under the FTCA’s

independent contractor exception.” Id. 

As for the first claimed duty, California Food & 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Agriculture Code § 12972 states that pesticides must be applied 

in “such a manner as to prevent substantial drift to nontarget 

areas.” Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 12972. But this duty could 

only be breached by Pestmaster, because only Pestmaster employees 

applied the herbicides. (FAC ¶¶ 3-4.) For the reasons stated 

above, Pestmaster employees cannot be considered government 

employees, and the United States cannot be held liable for their 

actions. 

The second claimed duty is the United States’ duty as a 

landowner. (Opp. at 11-12.) Under California Civil Code Section 

1714, “[e]veryone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned 

to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the 

management of his or her property or person, except so far as the 

latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the 

injury upon himself or herself.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a). 

Plaintiff relies on a misreading of the Ninth Circuit’s 

interpretation of California law in Edison v. United States, 822 

F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2016), to suggest that the United States may 

be held directly liable as a landowner in this case. (Opp. at 

12.) In Edison, a group of prisoners sought to hold the United 

States directly liable for failing to take actions in response to 

a coccidioidomycosis epidemic in a federal prison, claiming 

breaches of duty “outside the scope of [the United States’]

relationship” with the independent contractors responsible for 

the prison’s daily operations. 822 F.3d at 518. Here, however,

the alleged breaches are attributable to Pestmaster’s actions 

alone. Accordingly, these claims are precluded by the FTCA

because the United States cannot be held vicariously liable for 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Pestmaster’s breach.3 

With regard to the third claimed duty under the

peculiar risk doctrine, a “peculiar risk” is a risk particular to

“the work to be done, arising either from the nature or the 

location of the work and against which a reasonable person would 

recognize the necessity of taking special precautions.” Privette 

v. Superior Court, 5 Cal 4th 689, 692 (1993) (internal quotations 

omitted). California’s peculiar risk doctrine is “an exception 

to the general rule that [the government] is not liable for torts 

committed by an independent contractor.” Myers v. United States, 

652 F.3d 1021, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Yanez v. United 

States, 63 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1995)). The United States can 

be found directly liable for its own negligence when “it fails to 

ensure that an independent contractor takes adequate safety 

precautions” when the work to be performed involves “special 

dangers.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Pestmaster does not cite any California authority to 

support its contention that spraying herbicides involves a 

“special danger” or is an inherently dangerous activity that 

would trigger application of the peculiar risk doctrine. (Opp. 

at 13.) While plaintiff cites cases from other jurisdictions, 

3 In a footnote in its motion to dismiss, the United 

States cautioned that “any claim that the United States was 

negligent in delegating weed abatement to Pestmaster or in 

training or supervising these independent contractors would be 

barred by the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception.” (Mot. at 

6 n.2.) This prompted a response from the plaintiff, arguing the 

discretionary-function exception does not apply. (Opp. at 15-

19.) The United States agrees. (Reply at 5 (Docket No. 21).) 

Accordingly, the court does not express any opinion as to the 

applicability of the discretionary-function exception to this 

case. 

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

most are over sixty years old and are of minimally persuasive 

value. (Id.) Accordingly, plaintiff’s peculiar risk theory 

fails because the application of pesticides has not been 

recognized as a “special danger” under California law. Because 

the FTCA’s independent contractor exception applies, this court 

cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 

claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant United States’ 

motion to dismiss (Docket No. 13) be, and the same thereby is, 

GRANTED.

Dated: March 24, 2020

Case 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN Document 26 Filed 03/25/20 Page 9 of 9