Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08106/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Briceno Reina, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-08106 PCT NVW (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

May 2, 2013. Petitioner filed an amended petition on or about

July 17, 2013. See Doc. 5. Respondents filed a Limited Answer

to First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)

(Doc. 12) on November 15, 2013. Petitioner filed a reply (Doc.

13) to the answer to his petition on November 25, 2013. 

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned September 29, 2006,

charged Petitioner with one count of molestation of a child.

Answer, Exh. A. The indictment alleged that, on September 18,

2006, in Mohave County, Arizona, Petitioner engaged in “sexual

contact” with a person under the age of fifteen. Id., Exh. A.

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During Petitioner’s two-day trial, a witness testified

that she saw Petitioner in a room at his home with the victim.

Id., Exh. C at 97, 107. The witness testified, inter alia, that

the victim was lying on her back, that Petitioner was holding

the victim’s ankles, that Petitioner’s trousers were down around

his knees, and that his erect penis was exposed. Id., Exh. C

at 97–98, 110–11, 114, 122. Both the four-year-old victim and

Petitioner testified at Petitioner’s trial. Id., Exh. C at 123-

29; Exh. D at 70-98. 

On June 28, 2007, the jury found Petitioner guilty on

one count of molestation of a child. Id., Exh. H at 2 & Exh. F.

On July 25, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to a mitigated term

of twelve years imprisonment; the sentence was mitigated because

of Petitioner’s lack of prior convictions, his age (Petitioner

was then 74 years old), his family support, and his cooperation

during the prosecution. Id., Exh. J at 8–9 & Exh. I.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. In his direct appeal Petitioner

asserted: 

1. The state trial court denied Petitioner his right to

a fair trial and due process of law by improperly denying a

“Consciousness of Innocence; Absence of Flight” jury instruction

because a police officer testified that Petitioner remained at

the alleged scene of the crime until police arrived.

2. The state trial court denied Petitioner his right to

a fair trial and due process of law by improperly denying a

“Consciousness of Innocence; Voluntary Consent to Search” jury

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instruction because a police officer and Petitioner testified

that he voluntarily consented to a search of his home, the

alleged crime scene.

3. The state trial court denied Petitioner his right to

a fair trial and due process of law by improperly denying a

“Failure to Investigate” jury instruction when the evidence

presented at trial showed the police photographed every room in

Petitioner’s home except for the alleged crime scene.

4. The state trial court denied Petitioner his right to

a fair trial and due process of law by improperly denying a

“Prosecution Bound by Defendant’s Statement Unless Contrary

Evidence Presented” jury instruction because the state failed to

present sufficient evidence disproving Petitioner’s statements.

5. The state trial court denied Petitioner his right to

a fair trial and due process of law by improperly denying a

motion for a directed verdict because the only evidence of guilt

presented by the state were the inconsistent statements of an

eyewitness who allegedly saw acts committed in a very dark room

and the testimony of the four-year old victim, who had, at some

point after the incident, told her mother that nothing had

happened. Id., Exh. L & Exh. M.

In a memorandum decision entered November 20, 2008, the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in Petitioner’s direct

appeal, denying each of Petitioner’s claims and affirming

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. N.

On August 7, 2007, thirteen days after Petitioner filed

his notice of appeal, Petitioner filed a pro per notice of

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post-conviction relief, which alleged: “[n]o child witness

expert was called to testify at trial,” and “defendant is

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id., Exh. O. The

state trial court acknowledged receipt of the notice and

ultimately appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his

post-conviction relief proceedings. Id., Exh. P & Exh. Q.

On February 18, 2008, while his direct appeal was

pending, the state trial court granted Petitioner’s postconviction counsel’s request to “toll” his post-conviction

proceedings until thirty days after the Arizona Court of Appeals

issued a decision in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. R & Exh. S.

 The Court of Appeals issued its mandate in

Petitioner’s direct appeal on January 29, 2009. Id., Exh. N.

Petitioner did not file a post-conviction petition within the

next thirty days. On October 21, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro

per petition for state post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and also requested

appointment of counsel. Id., Exh. T. The state trial court

allowed Petitioner to proceed with his Rule 32 action, finding

that his failure to file a timely petition was “not due to the

fault of the defendant.” Id., Exh. U. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his post-conviction proceedings. On

September 8, 2011, counsel notified the Superior Court that

counsel they could find no colorable issue to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. Y. On August 29, 2012,

Petitioner filed a document captioned as a “verified petition

for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum” in the state trial

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court. Id., Exh. AA. The trial court rejected the petition on

September 11, 2012, stating: 

The Court has received from the Defendant a

Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

ad Subjiciendum filed August 29, 2012. The

Defendant’s petition is not a Petition for

Post Conviction Relief. The current petition

is a rambling generalized missive alleging,

among many other things, that the Arizona

legislature has no constitutional right to

create the statutes under which the Defendant

was convicted, and that this court has no

jurisdiction to enforce these

unconstitutional laws. The Defendant’s motion

is frivolous and incorrect. IT IS ORDERED

denying Defendant’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum. 

Id., Exh. BB. 

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals.

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated

because he “was never charged with violating a law of ‘the State

of Arizona’ and thus never committed a crime,” and that he was

convicted of violating a law which was unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner also asserts that his Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated because he

has been imprisoned since 2006 and “he was never properly or

legal[l]y convicted.” In his amended petition Petitioner also

asserts he has not taken a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. Petitioner also alleges that, in a state action for

post-conviction relief, he asserted that he was not properly

charged with a crime and that he was never properly charged with

a crime by an indictment or information.

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

-6-

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s federal habeas

claims are procedurally barred.

II Analysis

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state courts by

failing to present them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

procedurally correct manner.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

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Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

For purposes of exhausting state remedies, a

claim for relief in habeas corpus must

include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a

statement of the facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. The federal claim is

fairly presented if raised in the petition

itself, an accompanying brief, or another

similar document filed with that court.

Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir. 2013)(internal

citations and quotations omitted).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

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any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-

93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S.

Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

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F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal;

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Petitioner never properly presented any claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals in a state action for post-conviction relief.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar). The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals recently confirmed this conclusion in Hurles v. Ryan,

706 F.3d 1021, 2013 WL 219222 at &6 (9th Cir. 2013), concluding

“Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for

denying relief.” See also Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101

(9th Cir. 2012).

“Federal habeas courts reviewing the

constitutionality of a state prisoner’s

conviction and sentence are guided by rules

designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect

necessary to preserve the integrity of legal

proceedings within our system of federalism.”

Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct.

1309, 1316[](2012). One such rule is the

doctrine of procedural default, according to

which a federal court is barred from hearing

the claims of a state prisoner in a habeas

corpus proceeding when the decision of the

last state court to which the prisoner

presented his federal claims rested on an

“independent and adequate state ground.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546, [](1991). However, federal courts

are to “presume that there is no independent

and adequate state ground for a state court

decision when the decision ‘fairly appears to

rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law, and when the

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adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face

of the opinion.’” Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546

(quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, [](1983)). A state

court may overcome the above presumption

simply by stating “clearly and expressly that

its decision is based on bona fide separate,

adequate, and independent grounds.” Id. at

733, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Long, 463 U.S.

at 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted).

 A state court judgment rests on an

independent and adequate state procedural

ground when the “state court decline[s] to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because

the prisoner ... failed to meet a state

procedural requirement.” Id. at 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546 (emphasis added).

 “For a state procedural rule to be

‘independent,’ the state law ground for

decision must not be ‘interwoven with the

federal law.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Long, 463

U.S. at 1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, and citing

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct.

1038,[](1989) (applying Long to federal

habeas cases)). “A state law ground is so

interwoven if ‘the state has made application

of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent

ruling on federal law [such as] the

determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’”

Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,

75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, [](1985)) (alteration in

original). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct. 2578, [](2002) (per

curiam) (noting that, although the rule at

issue there “does not require a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits, if the

state court’s decision rested primarily on a

ruling on the merits nevertheless, its

decision would not be independent of federal

law”). A review of pertinent Supreme Court

case law illustrates that a state court

ruling, even on a state procedural issue,

that necessarily or actually depends on an

antecedent ruling on the merits of a federal

claim is interwoven with federal law and

therefore not independent.

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Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 450 (2012).

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

A petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause to

excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Alleged

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not establish

cause for the failure to properly exhaust a habeas claim in the

state courts unless the specific Sixth Amendment claim providing

the basis for cause was itself properly exhausted. See Edwards

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money,

391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004). “Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence is not cause, but attorney error rising to the

level of an independent constitutional violation (in the form of

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ineffective assistance of counsel) does constitute cause.”

Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2012).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

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Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Habeas petitioners are “entitled to an evidentiary

hearing only if they allege [] facts that, if proved, would

entitle them to relief and if they did not receive a full and

fair evidentiary hearing in the state court.” Swan v. Peterson,

6 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993). “[I]f the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas

relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct.

1933, 1040 (2007).

In reply to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts he is challenging the jurisdiction of state

laws enacted in violation of Arizona statutes and the Arizona

Constitution and in violation of Petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights. Petitioner also asks the Court to order

Respondents to address the merits of his claims for habeas

relief.

Petitioner did not exhaust his federal habeas claims by

fairly presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his

direct appeal, or in his state action for post-conviction

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relief. Petitioner has not established cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his federal habeas

claims. Petitioner does not assert his factual innocence or

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent

consideration of his federal habeas claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal habeas

claims by not fairly presenting them to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not

established cause for nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of his claims, nor has Petitioner established a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent substantive

review of the merits of the claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Briceno Reina’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

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to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 26th day of November, 2013.

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