Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01710/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01710-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VALENTINE E. UNDERWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

F. GONZALEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:11-cv-1710-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF NO. 20)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) 

On March 30, 2015, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim, but gave leave to amend. (ECF No. 19.) His first amended complaint is before the 

Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

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relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s allegations are essentially unchanged from those contained in his initial 

complaint. 

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Plaintiff is incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, but complains of acts that 

occurred at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”). He names the following 

Defendants in their individual capacities: (1) Warden F. Gonzalez, (2) Associate Warden 

M. Carrasco, (3) Investigative Services Unit Captain J. Gutierrez, (4) I.G.I. Lieutenant J. 

Gentry, (5) I.G.I. Sergeant L. Machado, (6) I.G.I. Correctional Officer Sigston, and (7) 

I.G.I. Correctional Officer T. Turmezi. 

Plaintiff was validated as a member of the Black Guerilla Family (“BGF”) gang on 

December 16, 2008. He alleges the validation was in retaliation for the exercise of his 

First Amendment rights and also violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 

rights. He further alleged that his law books and religious books were denied in 

retaliation, and in violation of his Due Process rights. 

He seeks the removal of harmful documents pertaining to validation from his 

central file, money damages, and all necessary changes to correct the violations of his 

rights.

Plaintiff provides a lengthy list of facts, occurring over more than a two year 

period, that he believes support his claims. He also provides approximately 200 pages of 

exhibits in support of his complaint. Although the relevance of some of these facts and 

exhibits is difficult to ascertain, Plaintiff’s allegations are nonetheless detailed below. 

On November 21, 2006, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with correctional 

officers at Kern Valley State Prison. He was assessed a Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) 

term and transferred to the SHU at CCI.

In March and May 2007, Plaintiff appeared before an Institutional Classification 

Committee (“ICC”) chaired by Defendant Gonzalez. On both occasions, Counselor 

Torres (not a defendant) noted that Plaintiff’s SHU term was short, and discussed 

placing Plaintiff in the Behavior Modified Unit (“BMU”). On both occasions, Defendant 

Gonzalez stated Plaintiff’s SHU term was correct and that Plaintiff was not “BMU 

qualified.” During the May 2007 ICC, Gonzalez asked Plaintiff if he would like to stay on 

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the CCI general population yard at the conclusion of his SHU term because Plaintiff’s 

wife lived nearby. Plaintiff agreed.

On May 21, 2007 Plaintiff’s SHU term concluded. Plaintiff received notice he was 

being placed in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”) pending available bed 

space in the general population yard.

On June 5, 2007, Plaintiff appeared before an unscheduled ICC chaired by 

Defendant Carrasco. 

On June 20, 2007, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Gonzalez regarding his ASU housing 

and asked that he be moved to general population and issued his property.

On June 28, 2007, Defendant Carrasco responded, stating that there was no 

available bed space in the general population.

On July 5, 2007, Plaintiff was moved to the general population and issued his 

property.

On July 6, 2007, Plaintiff appeared before a Unit Classification Committee 

(“UCC”), where he was handcuffed, taken to the BMU, and denied all property.

On July 10, 2007, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Gonzalez asking to be removed from 

the BMU. He reminded Gonzalez that he previously determined Plaintiff was not BMU 

qualified.

On July 11, 2007, Plaintiff submitted an administrative appeal contesting his BMU 

placement. His appeal was returned to him and was not processed. 

On July 17, 2007, Plaintiff received a response from Defendant Carrasco

regarding his July 10, 2007 letter. Carrasco stated that Plaintiff’s request to be removed 

from BMU was denied based on Plaintiff being found guilty of a Rules Violation Report 

(RVR) for the November 21, 2006 altercation with a correctional officer. Although Plaintiff 

contested the RVR, it was not overturned.

On July 27, 2007, Plaintiff was escorted to “R&R” to receive his BMU-allowable

property. Defendant Robinson denied Plaintiff his law books. Robinson also slammed 

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down a draft of Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint concerning excessive force at KVSP.

Three other correctional officers were present.

On July 29, 2007, Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal regarding the denial of his law 

books. 

On October 6, 2007, Plaintiff was released from BMU to the general population.

On November 21, 2007, Plaintiff received the second level response denying his 

602 regarding his law books. Also on November 21, 2007, a confidential memorandum

was produced that eventually was relied on in Plaintiff’s gang validation.

In November or December of 2007, Plaintiff went to R&R to pick up an order of 

Islamic oils. Defendants Sigston and Robinson were present. Defendant Sigston issued 

Plaintiff’s supplies. Plaintiff was missing one of his oils. When he asked about the oil he 

was told, “You got what your getting.” Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal but received no 

response. Thereafter, Defendant Sigston became an Institutional Gang Investigator. 

On March 4, 2008, Defendant Sigston searched Plaintiff’s cell and took his 

property.

On March 10, 2008, Plaintiff’s property was returned and was comingled with his 

cellmate’s property. Plaintiff’s property had a notice stating, “Gang training materials 

confiscated.” Some of Plaintiff’s legal paperwork had been highlighted in yellow marker. 

On or about March 10, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a 602 administrative appeal 

regarding his property.

On April 5, 2008, Plaintiff’s institution was placed on lockdown.

On April 30, 2008, Plaintiff’s cell was searched and his religious books were 

confiscated. His excessive force civil rights complaint was spread out on his bed.

On June 23, 2008, Plaintiff filed his excessive force civil rights complaint, 

Underwood v. Knowles, Case No. 1:08-cv-00986.

On June 24, 2008, Plaintiff wrote the Prison Law Office requesting assistance in 

getting medical care.

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On June 25, 2008, Plaintiff wrote the Department of Justice requesting assistance 

in getting medical care.

On June 29, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal regarding his religious books 

being confiscated and then lost. Plaintiff contends that this appeal was granted at the 

First Level, but then denied by Defendant Carrasco on improper and falsified grounds at 

the second level.1

On July 28, 2008, Plaintiff received a response from the Prison Law Office.

On August 7, 2008, Plaintiff’s cell was searched, his legal papers were taken, and 

a list of Defendants in his excessive force case was taken from his cell.

On or about August 10, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal regarding his 

missing legal papers. The appeal was returned for Plaintiff to seek an informal response.

On August 13, 2008, Plaintiff sent a copy of one of his medical 602s to the Prison 

Law Office. 

On August 25, 2008, Plaintiff resubmitted his 602 regarding missing legal papers. 

Plaintiff complained to Correctional Officer Erwin (not a defendant), and was told, “Leave 

it alone, your already on thin ice.”

On or about August 25, 2008, Defendant Machado interviewed Plaintiff regarding 

his March 10, 2008 appeal regarding the alleged confiscation of gang material and 

comingling of Plaintiff’s and his cell mate’s property. Machado informed Plaintiff that the 

gang material was a picture of a man in chains in front of a map of Africa. Defendant 

Machado told Plaintiff he would respond to the appeal within a week, but never 

 

1

These contentions are somewhat contradicted by Plaintiff’s exhibits. The exhibits reflect that Plaintiff 

submitted a CDCR Form 22 to Defendant Foster, alleging that Defendant Foster agreed to settle Plaintiff’s 

grievance by getting him hygiene supplies, but that no such supplies were provided. Defendant Foster 

responded by stating that he had not agreed to anything, but would see what he could do. (ECF No. 20 at 

196.) Plaintiff’s appeal of this issue was granted at the first level, to the extent Plaintiff was offered a 

replacement Qu’ran and dictionary. (ECF No. 20 at 121.) Plaintiff found the replacement items to be 

unsatisfactory and appealed to the second level, requesting hygiene items instead. (ECF No. 20 at 123.) 

The second level appeal was denied on the ground Plaintiff had accepted the replacement books. (ECF 

No. 20 at 126.) The appeal also was denied at the Director’s Level. There, the reviewer noted that Plaintiff 

apparently had refused the replacement books, but could nevertheless renew his request for such 

replacements. Other compensation was denied. (ECF No. 20 at 119.) 

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responded. Plaintiff made several attempts to contact Defendants Machado, Gentry and 

Gutierrez to obtain a response, but was unsuccessful. Plaintiff resubmitted the 

grievance several times, but it was denied.

Also on August 25, 2008, Plaintiff received a response from the Prison Law Office 

regarding his medical issues.

On August 28, 2008, Defendant Foster discussed with Plaintiff compensation for 

the religious books that had been confiscated during a cell search. Foster stated that he 

would get items to compensate Plaintiff and would be right back. Foster later told Plaintiff 

he was told by a Lieutenant not to compensate Plaintiff.2

Later that day, Correctional Officer Hutton (not a defendant) told Plaintiff the 

lieutenant wanted to speak to him. Plaintiff was handcuffed, escorted outside, and told 

by Defendants Turmezi and Sigston that he was being placed in ASU. They stated, “We 

got what we want today Underwood, you’ll get what you want tomorrow.”

On August 29, 2008, Plaintiff was transferred to Bakersfield for a biopsy. This was 

the care Plaintiff had requested in his letters to the Prison Law Office and Department of 

Justice.

On September 1, 2008 Plaintiff wrote the Prison Law Office requesting 

information regarding retaliation and the gang validation process.

On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff was given three source items being used against 

him in the gang validation process, three confidential memoranda, and a CDCR 128B 

chrono.

On September 3, 2008, Plaintiff received a Prison Focus Magazine titled “Black 

August We Will Never Forget,” in the mail.

On September 4, 2008, Plaintiff appeared before an ICC chaired by Defendant 

Carrasco. Plaintiff complained of retaliation. He requested a response from Defendant 

Machado to his 602 regarding the alleged gang materials. Plaintiff asked Carrasco to 

 

2

See n.1, supra.

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instruct Plaintiff to forward a response to his appeal. Defendant Carrasco stated, “she 

has more important things to do.”

Also on September 4, 2008, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Turmezi. 

Plaintiff explained that he had never been a member or associate of a gang. Turmezi 

showed Plaintiff a green sheet of Black August material allegedly found in Plaintiff’s 

property. Plaintiff explained his Black August material was on white paper. Turmezi 

would not allow Plaintiff to see the material, stating it was confidential. Turmezi stated 

that all Black August material is BGF material. Plaintiff mentioned the magazine titled, 

“Black August We Will Never Forget” being given to inmates in the mail. Turmezi and 

five or six other officers started laughing. 

Also on September 4, 2008, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Gonzalez about not being 

issued his legal property.

On September 6, 2008, Plaintiff wrote Prison Focus Magazine regarding the use 

of Black August material to validate Plaintiff as a BGF member.

On September 8, 2008, Plaintiff re-submitted an appeal regarding the confiscation 

of alleged gang material and comingling of his property with his cell mate’s property. The 

appeal was not processed. 

On September 8, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a 602 regarding his ASU placement.

On September 10, 2008, Plaintiff received a response from Defendant Carrasco 

to his September 4, 2008 letter. Carrasco stated Plaintiff received his property on 

September 9, 2008. 

Plaintiff received his property on September 11, 2008.

On September 12, 2008, Plaintiff received a letter from the Prison Law Office

notifying him that they wrote the Attorney General regarding Plaintiff’s medical needs.

On September 15, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal requesting a polygraph 

regarding his alleged gang affiliation. His appeal was not processed.

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On September 20, 2008, Plaintiff appeared before an ICC. He argued that the 

gang validation process was retaliatory. Defendant Carrasco refused to assist Plaintiff in 

getting a response to his 602 regarding the confiscation of alleged gang material from 

his cell and comingling of his property with his cell mate’s property.

On October 6, 2008, Plaintiff received a letter from the Prison Law Office

regarding his medical care.

On October 9, 2008, Plaintiff received a response from Prison Focus Magazine.

On October 15, 2008, Plaintiff resubmitted a 602 appeal regarding his property 

being co-mingled with his cell mate’s when the alleged gang material was found. His 

appeal was denied processing.

On October 27, 2008, Plaintiff received a response to his 602 requesting a 

polygraph.

On October 29, 2008, Plaintiff was taken for an MRI and spoke with Defendant 

Foster during transport. He asked why his inmate request slip stated, “Lieutenant said no 

to compensating me,” yet the appeal log stated Plaintiff was compensated. Foster 

stated, “Oh well.” Plaintiff stated, “I’ll address this with the Courts.” Foster responded, 

“that’s your problem now Underwood, ever since you got that typewriter, you’ve been 

suing everyone. That’s why your where you are now.”

On November 2, 2008, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Gutierrez and requested an 

interview to explain the importance of having Defendant Machado respond to his 602 

regarding the search of his property and requesting that Defendant Machado be 

instructed to forward a response. Defendant Guiterrez responded that Defendant 

Machado was no longer assigned as an IGI and, in any event, denied receiving Plaintiff’s 

602. Defendant Gutierrez advised Plaintiff to forward the 602 to his office so it could be 

assigned to appropriate staff. Plaintiff did so, but received no response. He then 

submitted a “citizen’s complaint” on this issue, but it was denied processing.

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On November 3, 2008, Plaintiff forwarded his 602 request for a polygraph to the 

Appeal Branch.

On November 17, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a request to Defendant Gentry to 

instruct Defendant Machado to respond to Plaintiff’s 602.

Also on November 17, 2008, Plaintiff received a response from the appeals 

coordinator regarding his request for a polygraph. 

On November 20, 2008, Plaintiff received a response from Defendant Gentry

informing him that Defendant Machado was no longer assigned as an IGI.

On December 16, 2008, the Office of Correctional Safety validated Plaintiff as an 

associate of the BGF with an active/inactive review eligibility date of March 14, 2014.

Plaintiff received notice of the validation on December 29, 2008.

On January 5, 2009, Plaintiff resubmitted his citizen’s complaint against 

Defendant Machado to the appeals coordinator.

On January 22, 2009, Plaintiff appeared before an ICC chaired by Defendant 

Carrasco. Plaintiff asked about his claims of retaliation and Carrasco stated, “When are 

you going to realize you have nothing coming before me.” She informed Plaintiff that he 

had been validated and asked if he wanted to debrief. Plaintiff stated he could not 

debrief because he was not a gang member or associate. Carrasco stated that Plaintiff 

would be housed with other validated gang members. Plaintiff refused to be celled with a 

gang member. Carrasco stated that he would be getting a cellmate. Plaintiff stated that 

doing so would lead to “a situation.” Carrasco again stated he would have a cell mate. 

Plaintiff stated there would be a “crime scene” in the cell. Carrasco then stated Plaintiff 

would be placed in a single cell and would receive a RVR for threatening to harm an 

inmate. Plaintiff was assessed an indeterminate SHU term based on the gang validation.

On January 25, 2009, Plaintiff resubmitted his 602 regarding ASU placement. 

On January 28, 2009, Plaintiff received a copy of the RVR for threatening a 

prospective cell mate.

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On January 30, 2009, Plaintiff was interviewed by Correctional Officer Huebner 

(not a defendant) in relation to the RVR. Plaintiff gave Huebner the name of his former 

cellmates and a list of questions to ask them. 

On January 31, 2009, Defendant Huebner informed Plaintiff that Defendant 

Gonzalez had denied the questions Plaintiff wanted asked ask irrelevant.

On February 2, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal contesting the validation 

process.

On February 4, 2009, Plaintiff received copies of the RVR for threatening to harm 

a cellmate.

On February 9, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a 602 on being denied the right to have 

witnesses interviewed. 

Plaintiff eventually was found guilty of threatening to harm an inmate and given a 

4 month SHU term.

In January 2010, Plaintiff filed in the California Superior Court a habeas corpus 

petition challenging his gang validation. His petition and subsequent appeals were 

denied.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). “A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes 

the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). 

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Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 

(9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff alleges that his gang validation violated his First and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. Evaluation of a prisoner's due process challenge to gang validation 

requires determination of the “prison official [who] was the critical decisionmaker.” See

Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Castro v. Terhune, 237 

F. App’x 153, 155 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). Generally, “[i]n the case of 

administrative segregation founded upon positive gang validation, the official charged 

with deciding whether to transfer or retain an inmate in administrative segregation is the 

IGI. Thus, prior to validation as a gang member, [plaintiff is] entitled to an ‘informal 

nonadversary hearing’ with an IGI.” Stewart v. Alameida, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1165 

(N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990); and 

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[I]t is clear that the critical 

decisionmaker in the process is . . . the IGI.”)). Here, that individual is Defendant 

Turmezi. Indeed, Defendant Turmezi appears to be the only named defendant 

sufficiently linked to Plaintiff’s gang validation to possibly state a claim. Accordingly, he is 

the only defendant against whom Plaintiff’s due process challenge may potentially

proceed.

As discussed in further detail below, Plaintiff has failed to link any of the named 

Defendants to his retaliation claim. 

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Plaintiff was given leave to amend for the purpose of curing this deficiency and 

failed to do so. Further leave to amend would be futile and should be denied.

B. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without 

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a 

cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish 

the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may 

arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 

460, 466 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty 

interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of segregation. See id.

at 466-68. Liberty interests created by state law are limited to freedom from restraint 

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 

Assuming that confinement in the SHU for an indeterminate period implicates a 

liberty interest, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005) (finding a liberty 

interest in avoiding indefinite confinement in Ohio's “Supermax” facility), Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that he was denied any of the procedural due process protections he is 

guaranteed under federal law. Assignment to the SHU is an administrative measure 

rather than a disciplinary measure and is “essentially a matter of administrative 

discretion.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Munoz v. 

Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997)). To satisfy due process, the 

administrative segregation process must include an informal non-adversary hearing 

within a reasonable time after being segregated, notice of the charges or the reasons 

segregation is being considered, and an opportunity for the inmate to present his views. 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir.1986), overruled on other grounds 

by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 481 (1995). 

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The administrative determination also must meet the “some evidence” standard of 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287-88. Because 

the standard for “some evidence” is not high, a court need only decide whether there is 

any evidence at all that could support the prison officials' administrative decisions. Id. at 

1287-88. A reviewing court does not “examine the entire record, independently assess 

witness credibility, or reweigh the evidence.” Id. at 1287. However, the evidence 

supporting the administrative determination must bear “some indicia of reliability.” Cato 

v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). California regulations 

requiring three source items for gang validation do not dictate the outcome of the federal 

due process analysis. A single piece of evidence that has sufficient indicia of reliability 

can be sufficient to meet the “some evidence” standard. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288.

Plaintiff does not argue that he lacked notice of the charges or an opportunity to 

be heard. Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint and the attached exhibits reflect that he was 

aware of his potential gang validation and the evidence that would be used against him 

for some time prior to the validation. He was interviewed and provided written statements 

regarding the materials used to validate him, and appeared before an ICC to review the 

validation decision. 

However, Plaintiff argues that the evidence relied on for validation does not meet 

the “some evidence” standard. Plaintiff was validated as a gang member based on three 

independent source items: (1) a confidential memorandum in which an informant 

identified Plaintiff as “a BGF member actively recruiting other prospects into the prison 

gang”; (2) Plaintiff’s address book containing the names and CDCR numbers of a BGF 

member and BGF associate; and (3) two photocopied documents allegedly used as BGF 

training materials, entitled “History is a Weapon! Black August Resistance,” and “Black 

August Commemoration: The Revolutionary Class Perspective.” 

As stated in the Court’s prior screening order, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts 

to call into question the reliability of the confidential informant memorandum for the 

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purposes of his screening his complaint. When statements from confidential informants

are used to validate inmates as gang members, the record must contain “some factual 

information from which the committee can reasonably conclude that the information was 

reliable.” Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). “Reliability may be 

established by: (1) the oath of the investigating officer appearing before the committee 

as to the truth of his report that contains confidential information, (2) corroborating 

testimony, (3) a statement on the record by the chairman of the committee that he had 

firsthand knowledge of sources of information and considered them reliable based on 

the informant's past record, or (4) an in camera review of the documentation from which 

credibility was assessed.” Id. at 186-87. Here, the Confidential Information Disclosure 

Form provided to Plaintiff contains Defendant Turmezi’s unsworn statement that the 

information is reliable because it was (1) independently corroborated by other

confidential sources, (2) incriminating to the confidential informant, and (3) corroborated 

by non-confidential sources. Although information sufficient to establish reliability may 

have been presented to the Committee, the only evidence apparently in Plaintiff’s 

possession – Defendant Turmezi’s unsworn statements – is insufficient. 

However, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to call into question the reliability 

of the Black August materials. He alleges only that the materials did not belong to him. 

Although his complaint contains numerous allegations that his property was comingled 

with his cell mate’s (and the Court previously found these allegation sufficient to 

undermine the reliability of these materials), he now states that the Black August 

materials were not his cell mate’s, but instead belonged to someone else or were 

fabricated entirely. Alternatively, he argues that he does not remember possessing the 

items and was not aware the materials were gang related. Generalized speculation that 

the items were fabricated or misattributed to Plaintiff is insufficient to state a claim. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level). Additionally, the Court will not assess Plaintiff’s credibility or 

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reweigh the evidence to determine whether the items properly reflect on Plaintiff’s gang 

association. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287. The court is satisfied that the materials constitute 

“some evidence” having sufficient indicia of reliability to support the validation under the 

applicable standards. Plaintiff’s challenges to this source item fail to state a claim.

Plaintiff also has not alleged sufficient facts to call into question whether his 

address book containing the names and CDCR numbers of a validated BGF member 

and BGF associate constitutes “some evidence” of his gang affiliation. Plaintiff concedes 

that his address book contained this information; he argues only that he was not aware 

of the other inmates’ affiliation with the BGF. However, the Court need not, and indeed 

cannot, assess Plaintiff’s credibility or reweigh the evidence. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287.

Plaintiff’s possession of the other inmates’ information is “some evidence” of his gang 

association, even though the information could support competing inferences. See

Castro, 712 F.3d at 1315 (signing birthday card to validated gang member sufficient to 

constitute “some evidence”); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (probation report noting that 

inmate’s co-defendant was validated as a gang member meets the “some evidence” 

standard); Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (evidence may qualify as “some evidence” even if it does 

not “logically preclude[] any conclusion but the one reached”).

Under federal law, only one source item is required to meet the “some 

evidence” standard and thereby to satisfy due process. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288. 

Because the facts alleged by Plaintiff demonstrate that there was “some evidence” to 

support his gang validation, his allegations fail to state a claim.

Plaintiff previously was advised of these deficiencies and failed to cure them.

Indeed, his first amended complaint contains nearly identical allegations, and nearly 

identical deficiencies, as his original complaint. Accordingly, further leave to amend 

would be futile and should be denied.

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C. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that his placement in BMU and his gang validation were in 

retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights. 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second element focuses on causation and motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a 

“‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quoting 

Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it can 

be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on 

circumstantial evidence. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289 (finding that a prisoner established a 

triable issue of fact regarding prison officials’ retaliatory motives by raising issues of 

suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th 

Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be 

considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”).

In terms of the third prerequisite, filing a grievance is a protected action under the 

First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined 

plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 

192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to determine whether an 

official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

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Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 

F.3d at 1300).

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively allege that “‘the prison 

authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 

778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff alleges he was placed in the BMU on July 6, 2007. His allegation that the 

placement was retaliatory appears to be predicated entirely on his view that the 

placement was unjustified. He does not allege he engaged in any protected conduct 

prior to his BMU placement. Accordingly, he has failed to show that any protected 

conduct was a substantial or motivating factor behind his BMU placement. This 

allegation therefore fails to state a claim.

Plaintiff next argues that his gang validation was retaliatory. The first protected 

conduct discussed in Plaintiff’s complaint is his July 29, 2007 appeal involving Defendant 

Robinson’s denial of his law books. However, none of Plaintiff’s lengthy allegations 

indicate that Defendant Robinson participated in any way in Plaintiff’s gang validation.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts to link Defendant Robinson to any adverse action.3

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim against Defendant Robinson. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77 (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that each defendant 

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights). 

Plaintiff also argues that this same grievance gives rise to an inference of suspect 

timing because his second level appeal was denied on November 21, 2007, the same 

date of the alleged confidential informant memorandum against him. However, Plaintiff 

 

3

To the extent Plaintiff may wish to allege that Defendant Robinson denied his due process rights and 

retaliated against him for preparing a civil rights complaint by denying his law books, that claim is not 

properly joined in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may be joined in one action as 

defendants if . . . any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences . . . .”). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue such a claim, he must do so in a separate suit. The same 

holds true for Plaintiff’s claim that his religious books were confiscated by unidentified individuals in 

retaliation for preparing a civil rights complaint and in violation of his due process rights. 

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has not alleged which defendants, if any, participated in producing the confidential 

informant memorandum. Nor has he alleged facts to indicate that any defendants 

involved with the memorandum were aware of Plaintiff’s July 29, 2007 grievance. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated insufficient facts to allege that the confidential informant 

memorandum was produced in retaliation for his July 29, 2007 grievance.

Additionally, this grievance is temporally distant from the assembly of Plaintiff’s 

gang validation package and his subsequent gang validation, having been submitted 

more than two years earlier. Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim based on this 

grievance.

Sometime in November or December of 2007 Plaintiff submitted an appeal 

regarding missing religious oils. The religious oils had been distributed by Defendants 

Sigston and Robinson. Again, however, Plaintiff has not alleged facts linking Defendants 

Robinson or Sigston to his gang validation. Nor has he alleged that any defendants 

participating in the validation were aware of this grievance.

Defendant may wish to allege that Defendant Sigston’s March 4, 2008 search of 

Plaintiff’s cell was in retaliation for the appeal regarding Plaintiff’s religious oils. This cell 

search allegedly resulted in the co-mingling of Plaintiff’s property with his cellmate’s 

property. The cellmate’s property allegedly was used in Plaintiff’s gang validation.

However, the cell search occurred approximately three months after Plaintiff filed his 

602. Standing alone, this three month delay is not sufficient to raise an inference of 

retaliatory intent.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed appeals on December 17, 2007 (medical appeal), March 

10, 2008 (regarding the March 4, 2008 cell search), April 3, 2008 (denial of law library 

access), June 29, 2009 (confiscation of religious books), August 10, 2008 (missing legal 

papers), and August 25, 2008 (missing legal papers). He also filed a civil rights 

complaint concerning unrelated issues on June 23, 2008 (and suggests that Defendant 

Robinson and other unnamed correctional officers were aware of the draft complaint as 

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early as July 27, 2007). Again, however, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to indicate that 

any of the Defendants involved in Plaintiff’s gang validation were aware of these 

grievances. Nor has he alleged facts to suggest that his gang validation was motivated 

by these grievances. Although some of the grievances were submitted shortly before 

Plaintiff received information regarding his gang validation and was interviewed by 

Defendant Turmezi, Plaintiff’s lengthy history of filing grievances during his entire 

incarceration at CCI undermines any inference of suspect timing. Lastly, because 

Plaintiff’s gang validation is supported by some evidence, Plaintiff cannot allege that the 

validation was unrelated to any legitimate penological goal. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants must be held liable for the allegedly retaliatory 

gang validation because he repeatedly claimed that the validation was retaliatory and 

that the materials seized from his cell were not his. This is not sufficient to state a claim. 

As stated above, Plaintiff must allege facts to show that the named Defendants took 

adverse action against him because of his protected conduct, that the action would chill 

a person of ordinary firmness, and that the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. His assertion that he told 

Defendants that the validation was retaliatory does not establish that it was retaliatory.

Plaintiff previously was advised on this standard and the requirements for 

correcting deficiencies in his original complaint. Nevertheless, his first amended 

complaint contains nearly identical factual allegations as his original complaint. Plaintiff’s 

failure to cure noted deficiencies is reasonably construed as reflecting his inability to do 

so. Further leave to amend would be futile and should be denied.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. He previously

was advised of pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct them. He 

failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and should be 

denied. 

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The undersigned recommends that the action be dismissed with prejudice, that 

dismissal count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of the 

Court terminate any and all pending motions and close the case. 

The findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendation, the 

parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to another party’s objections by filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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