Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03227/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03227-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE M. PASION,

Plaintiff, No. 2:10-cv-3227 GGH P

vs.

JOHN A. HAVILAND, et al., ORDER 

Defendants.

 /

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. He seeks

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is before the undersigned pursuant to both parties’

consent. Docs. 7, 22. Presently pending is the sole defendant in this case, Cappel’s, motion for

summary judgment. The sole claim remaining in this case is that defendant ordered plaintiff’s

retention in Administrative Segregation (Ad. Seg.) in retaliation for plaintiff’s refusal to

withdraw a complaint against other prison officials.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment 

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct.

at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

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On September 14, 2011, and July 12, 2012, the court advised plaintiff of the 1

requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849

F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

The above advice would, however, seem to be unnecessary as the Ninth Circuit

has held that procedural requirements applied to ordinary litigants at summary judgment do not

apply to prisoner pro se litigants. In Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), the

district courts were cautioned to “construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se

inmates and ... avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Id. at 1150. No example or

further definition of “liberal” construction or “too strict” application of rules was given in Ponder

suggesting that any jurist would know inherently when to dispense with the wording of rules. 

Since the application of any rule which results in adverse consequences to the pro se inmate

could always be construed in hindsight as not liberal enough a construction, or too strict an

application, it appears that only the essentials of summary judgment, i.e., declarations or

testimony under oath, and presentation of evidence not grossly at odds with rules of evidence,

need be submitted by the pro se party. 

Undisputed Facts

The following of defendant’s undisputed facts (DUF) are either not disputed by

plaintiff, or following the court’s review of the evidence submitted, have been deemed

undisputed:

During the relevant time, plaintiff was incarcerated at California State Prison

Solano (CSP-Solano). DUF #1. Defendant Cappel was a Facility I Captain at CSP-Solano at the

relevant time. DUF #2. On February 13, 2009, defendant was interviewed by Lt. McGuire

 Plaintiff was reminded of the requirements in light of Woods v. Carey, --- F.3d ----,

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2012 WL 2626912 (9th Cir. July 6, 2012), and given an additional opportunity to file evidentiary

submissions. Plaintiff filed additional submissions (Doc. 46) that the court has considered.

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regarding a staff complaint plaintiff filed against officers Valdez and Freitas. DUF #4. Plaintiff

alleged that Valdez and Freitas used excessive force and pepper spray on him. DUF #5. 

Lieutenant McGuire placed plaintiff in Ad. Seg. on February 13, 2009, pending the investigation

of plaintiff’s allegations. DUF #6, 7.

Part of defendant Cappel’s responsibilities was to review Ad. Seg. placements and

determine whether the inmate should be released or retained pending an Institutional

Classification Committee (ICC) review. DUF #8. On February 17, 2009, defendant Cappel

reviewed the paperwork regarding plaintiff’s placement in Ad. Seg. and interviewed plaintiff

regarding the allegations of staff misconduct. DUF #9. During the interview plaintiff reiterated

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his allegations of staff misconduct. DUF #10. Defendant Cappel asked plaintiff in the course of

the interview if he wished to withdraw the complaint. DUF #14. Defendant Cappel ultimately

decided to retain plaintiff in Ad. Seg. pending ICC review of the allegations of staff misconduct. 

DUF #11. 

On February 19, 2009, two days after defendant Cappel’s retention order, plaintiff

appeared before the ICC for an initial review of the Ad. Seg. placement. DUF #18. Defendant

Cappel was a member of the committee, but not the chairperson. DUF #19. While the other

committee members, along with the inmate, participate in making the decision, the chairperson

has the final decision making authority. DUF #20; Plaintiff’s Supplemental Declaration at 5. 

The committee decided to retain plaintiff in Ad. Seg. pending the completion of the

investigation. DUF #24. Plaintiff was an active participant in the hearing. DUF #25. A

memorandum summarizing the ICC hearing, that was written the same day as the hearing,

indicates that plaintiff agreed with the decision to retain him in Ad. Seg. DUF #25; Declaration

of Cappel, Exh. B. Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal on February 26, 2009, naming defendant

 Plaintiff also discusses the problems he confronted filing his staff complaint and how it 2

was sent to the incorrect processing unit at the prison. However, is it undisputed all of these

events occurred prior to the involvement of defendant Cappel.

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Cappel, Lt. McGuire, and one other, stating that they retaliated against plaintiff and kept him in

Ad. Seg. for filing his prior inmate appeal. DUF #26.

On March 5, 2009, plaintiff appeared before the ICC for a review of his Ad. Seg.

placement. DUF #28. Defendant Cappel was a member of the committee, although not the

chairperson. DUF #29. The committee reviewed the paperwork regarding the investigation that

was now closed. DUF #30. It was noted that plaintiff had maintained his allegation of staff

misconduct but was unable to provide any evidence to support this allegations. DUF #31. The

committee concluded there was no basis for plaintiff’s allegations of staff misconduct and

therefore recommended that plaintiff leave Ad. Seg., and return to general population. DUF #32. 

Plaintiff was released on March 9, 2009. DUF #34.

Disputed Facts

Defendant Cappel states that asking plaintiff if he wished to withdraw his

complaint is a procedural question because sometimes an inmate does withdraw his complaint. 

DUF #14. Defendant Cappel states he retained plaintiff in Ad. Seg., not because he refused to

withdraw his complaint, but due to the nature of the allegations and releasing plaintiff back into

general population would have jeopardized the integrity of the ongoing investigation against the

prison officers. DUF #15. Defendant Cappel states the decision also was to protect plaintiff

from staff as the allegation involved staff members. DUF #16. Defendant Cappel states he made

this decision in light of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3335(a). DUF #17. Plaintiff 3

states he was retained in Ad. Seg. in order to pressure him to withdraw his complaint. 

Opposition to Summary Judgment (Opposition) at 3. 

 The regulation states: When an inmate's presence in an institution's general inmate 3

population presents an immediate threat to the safety of the inmate or others, endangers

institution security or jeopardizes the integrity of an investigation of an alleged serious

misconduct or criminal activity, the inmate shall be immediately removed from general

population and be placed in administrative segregation. Administrative segregation may be

accomplished by confinement in a designated segregation unit or, in an emergency, to any single

cell unit capable of providing secure segregation.

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Defendant Cappel states that plaintiff was in agreement to be retained in Ad. Seg.

during the February 19, 2009, ICC hearing. DUF #25. Plaintiff states in his opposition, “I did

not agree to be retained but rather, I don’t have any other choice but be retained.” Opposition at

5. Plaintiff also believes that he was not released from Ad. Seg. due to the investigation

concluding, rather he was released because he filed a complaint against Cappel and others. 

Opposition at 3.

Analysis

Legal Standard

The Ninth Circuit treats the right to file a prison grievance as a constitutionally

protected First Amendment right. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009), citing

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2005); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 2003). To state a viable claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment in the

prison context, a plaintiff must show five basic elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and

that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269

(quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68). Mere conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not

suffice, a prisoner must “allege specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the

prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in the

protected activity. Pinard v. Clatskunie School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff need not show that “‘his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed,’ but rather that the

adverse action at issue ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First

Amendment activities.’” Brodheim at 1271. Plaintiff also bears the burden of pleading and

proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains. Id.

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This is not to say that a vexatious grievance filer can never be punished. 

Vexatious litigants may be the subject of court discipline, and the undersigned would find it

incongruous that while the courts can punish vexatious filings, prison officials may not. Indeed,

the right to petition for grievances is not absolutely protected; such a right has no greater

protection than speech in general. Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 1997). In

the prison context, one’s free speech rights are more constricted from what they would be on the

outside. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987). Again, plaintiff

must show that the actions or omissions constituting the “retaliation” served no legitimate

penological goal.

Discussion

It is undisputed that plaintiff was already in Ad. Seg. prior to defendant’s

involvement in this case. It is also undisputed that defendant retained plaintiff in Ad. Seg. on

February 17, 2009, for two days, until an ICC hearing on February 19, 2009, continued the Ad.

Seg. placement. It is also undisputed than another ICC hearing on March 5, 2009, decided to

release plaintiff, and he was actually released on March 9, 2009. It is undisputed that while

defendant was on the ICC that retained plaintiff on February 19, 2009, defendant was not the

chairperson, who has the final decision making authority.

What is in dispute is if defendant had a legitimate correctional goal in keeping

plaintiff in Ad. Seg. for two days until the ICC hearing, or if defendant retained plaintiff in Ad.

Seg. for refusing to withdraw his complaint against other prison officials. For the reasons that

follow, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.

It is undisputed that California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3335(a) provides

for an inmate to be retained in Ad. Seg. during the pendency of an investigation and the court

finds this regulation serves a legitimate penological interest. See Wright v. Director of

Corrections, 2011 WL 6729677, *4 (S.D. Cal., December 21, 2011). However, this regulation

cannot simply serve as a shield to justify retaliation by prison officials.

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Plaintiff argues he would have been perfectly safe in general population and there

was no justification for Ad. Seg., other than to force him to withdraw his complaint. Plaintiff

notes that the underlying conduct of this claim occurred in July 2008, and he remained in general

population while his inmate grievance was processed. Plaintiff states he was perfectly safe for

the eight months in general population until placed in Ad. Seg. in February 2009. It appears the

grievance was improperly processed as there was confusion whether it was a staff misconduct

complaint or a complaint for improper medical care resulting from the pepper spray and improper

treatment. The court notes the bulk of plaintiff’s federal complaint contained allegations of

excessive force, use of pepper spray and improper medical care against other dismissed

defendants.

While plaintiff may have been safe in general population prior to the correct

processing of the complaint, it is undisputed that defendant had no involvement in any of these

actions and only became involved in February 2009, after plaintiff was initially placed in Ad.

Seg., by a separate party. Also, the investigation into staff misconduct did not begin until

February 2009. There are no allegations that defendant was even aware when the underlying

incident occurred. Nor does plaintiff set forth any statements that he told defendant or even the

ICC that he had been safe in general population for the eight prior months.

Nor does the fact that defendant asked plaintiff if he wished to withdraw his

complaint, sufficient to demonstrate retaliation. Plaintiff states that defendant questioned

plaintiff aggressively regarding the underlying facts of excessive force, but with regard to

withdrawing his complaint, plaintiff only states that defendant asked if he wished to withdraw it. 

Opposition at 3. Clearly, it was necessary for Cappel to understand whether the investigation

was to go forward or not, i.e., if there were to be no investigation, retention in Ad. Seg would

have been unnecessary. How else does Cappel find out what plaintiff desires, but to ask him?4

 Plaintiff’s position is analogous to that of a defendant who claims: in failing to plead 4

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which he might have straightaway served some “easier”

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Plaintiff supports his argument by pointing out that defendant had the ability to

release him from Ad. Seg., but because defendant chose not to, this proves retaliation. Plaintiff

has failed to support his arguments with any evidence, simply his beliefs. Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (conclusory allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment). 

Plaintiff reiterated his beliefs many times in the course of his deposition answers.

Question: And you’re saying that Cappel specifically asked you: Are you going - -

what did he specifically ask you regarding withdrawing your complaint?

Answer: Well, he asked me, you want to withdraw your complaint? I say no. 

See, if I withdraw my complaint, I believe he’s going to release me in the hole,

you know. 

Deposition, Exhibit to Tomlins Declaration (Deposition) at 35 (emphasis added).

Question: And you have no evidence or facts that [Cappel] conspired with

Lieutenant Maguire, do you?

Answer: Obviously, it’s - - like I said, he got the authority to release me, but he

didn’t, so obviously they are conspiring.

Deposition at 47 (emphasis added).

That defendant had the ability to release plaintiff, and did not, does not prove

retaliation. As noted above, plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of

legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at

1271. While plaintiff’s prior time in general population is noteworthy, plaintiff provides no other

arguments that can overcome summary judgment. While California Code of Regulations, Title

15, § 3335(a) cannot serve as a complete defense under the guise of placing an inmate in Ad.

Seg. for his own protection, the undisputed evidence in this case supports defendant’s contention

that plaintiff was placed in Ad. Seg., in the normal course of an investigation for his own safety,

a legitimate correctional goal. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that plaintiff was promptly

time in federal prison, he was retained in county jail in detention status for several more months

pending trial as “retaliation” for failure to accept the plea agreement. No– retention in the less

favorable conditions of the county jail followed as a matter of course from the defendant’s

determination not to plead guilty. 

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released from Ad. Seg., back into general population twenty days later, once the investigation

concluded. In that time there were two separate ICC hearings that apprised plaintiff of the

situation and the status of the investigation. Declaration of Cappel, Exh. B, C. Plaintiff has

failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate retaliation in defendant’s decision to retain

plaintiff in Ad. Seg. for two days until the ICC hearing.

Plaintiff also argues that he was retained in Ad. Seg. for filing a complaint and

then refusing to withdraw it. Plaintiff then argues the only reason he was released from Ad. Seg.

was not that the investigation ended as defendant argues, but because plaintiff filed another

complaint naming defendant and others. Had plaintiff been again retained in Ad. Seg. after filing

another complaint, that could perhaps show a pattern that does not support a legitimate

correctional goal. That plaintiff was released a week after filing the next complaint, tends to

discredit plaintiff’s argument of being placed in Ad. Seg. for submitting complaints. In fact, it

supports defendant’s argument that plaintiff was placed in Ad. Seg. for his own protection and to

insure the integrity of the investigation. Once the investigation was complete and despite more

complaints from plaintiff, he was not placed back in Ad. Seg. Based on all this evidence,

defendant has shown that plaintiff’s retention in Ad. Seg. was not in retaliation for refusing to

withdraw his complaint, rather it served a legitimate correctional goal during the short time

period of the investigation. 

5

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 36) be granted and this case closed.

DATED: August 22, 2012

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH: AB - pass3227.sj

 As the court has not found a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity argument 5

will not be addressed.

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