Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01990/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:1836(a) Injunction against Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLOBALIZATION PARTNERS, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 19-cv-01990-BAS-LL

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR 

A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND SETTING 

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

[ECF No. 2]

v.

CAROLINE LAYTON,

Defendant.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Globalization Partners, Inc.’s Ex Parte 

Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 2 (“TRO Application”).) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s TRO Application and 

sets a schedule for further briefings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Globalization Partners, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “GP”) filed a complaint 

against Defendant Caroline Layton alleging, among other things, misappropriation 

of trade secrets and breach of contract. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff concurrently filed the 

instant TRO Application and moved to file parts of its application under seal. 

Plaintiff is a corporation that “facilitat[es] foreign employment for domestic 

companies” by placing its clients’ candidates for hire on Plaintiff’s “fully compliant 

local payroll in whatever country the employee lives[.]” (TRO App. at 6.) Plaintiff 

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alleges that it invested substantial “intellectual and creative work” to determine the 

“legal, tax, and [human resources] implications of building a scalable business 

system in the 60+ countries in which its clients expand most frequently, and turning 

that into a legal platform plus software.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that this 

confidential, proprietary information is the reason that it is “years ahead of its 

competitors” and has experienced continued growth in its market. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, a former executive of the company, 

“systematically searched for and downloaded GP’s proprietary pricing information,

customer and prospective customer lists, new hire forms, and analysis and 

strategies,” primarily during the last two days of her employment, and subsequently 

attempted to cover her tracks by altering computer settings and deleting files. (Id. at 

17–18.) Plaintiff alleges that this information forms the “blueprint for recreating 

GP’s business and competing against GP.” (Id. at 5–6.) Plaintiff further claims that 

Defendant “refused to affirm that she would honor” Plaintiff’s policies regarding 

non-disclosure of confidential information and refused to identify her new employer, 

Papaya Global, who Plaintiff contends is a direct competitor. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed the instant application requesting that the Court issue a 

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on the basis that it “will be irreparably harmed 

by Defendant’s use or disclosure of GP’s confidential and proprietary information 

. . . if GP were forced to wait the entire notice period for its Motion to be heard.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendant to return its confidential and 

propriety information, prohibit Defendant from using or disclosing Plaintiff’s 

information, permit Plaintiff to conduct a forensic inspection of Defendant’s 

accounts and devices to determine if its information exists elsewhere, and expedite 

discovery. (Id. at 22.)

Plaintiff’s counsel attests that his office “sent out for personal service on 

Defendant Layton, at her home address, copies of GP’s Complaint, Ex Parte Brief In 

Support of GP’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order, and all supporting 

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papers.” (ECF No. 3, Mot. to Seal, Declaration of Mark A. Romeo (“Romeo Decl.”) 

¶ 3.) Because there is no proof of service or other documentation reflecting that 

service was completed, it is unclear whether Defendant received notice of this 

proceeding. Hence, for purposes of this Order, the Court assumes Defendant was not 

provided notice of the instant application and construes Plaintiff’s application as a 

request to issue the TRO without providing notice to Defendant.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may only issue a TRO without notice to the adverse party if: 

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that 

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and 

the reasons why it should not be required. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The Supreme Court has held, “[e]x parte temporary 

restraining orders are no doubt necessary in certain circumstances, but under federal 

law they should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the 

status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a 

hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 

(1974) (internal citation omitted).

Ex parte TROs “may be appropriate ‘where notice to the adverse party is 

impossible either because the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a 

known party cannot be located in time for a hearing.’” Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. 

v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Am. Can Co. v. 

Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1984)). If notice is possible, “courts have 

recognized ‘a very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because 

notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.’” 

Id. (quoting Am. Can Co., 742 F.2d at 322). One example of such a situation is 

“where an alleged infringer is likely to dispose of the infringing goods before the 

hearing.” Id. To show this, “plaintiffs must show that defendants would have 

disregarded a direct court order and disposed of the goods within the time it would 

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take for a hearing . . . [and] must support such assertions by showing that the adverse 

party has a history of disposing of evidence or violating court orders or that persons 

similar to the adverse party have such a history.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) 

(quoting First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 1993). 

III. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that Plaintiff improperly brought this application for a TRO 

on an ex parte basis. The identity of the adverse party is clear in this case, as are her 

whereabouts. (See Romeo Decl. ¶ 3 (Plaintiff’s counsel stating that his office “sent 

out for personal service” at Defendant’s home address).) Thus, the only remaining 

basis on which this Court can issue a TRO without notice to Defendant is if Plaintiff 

has shown that notice to Defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of 

the action. 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that the notice 

would undermine prosecution of the action. Plaintiff does not directly explain why 

a TRO should be granted before Defendant has an opportunity to respond. See Funes 

Suazo v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-1882-LAB (MSB), 2019 WL 4849188, at *1 (S.D. 

Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) (“Respondents apparently have no notice of the TRO motion, and 

the motion does not explain why a TRO should be granted before they can respond. 

For this reason alone, the motion is subject to denial.”). In fact, as noted previously, 

Plaintiff’s counsel represented in his declaration that his office pursued personal 

service on Defendant before filing the instant application. (Romeo Decl. ¶ 3.) 

Because Plaintiff attempted service of the instant application on Defendant, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiff does not hold the position that providing notice to Defendant 

would be counterproductive to the prosecution of this case because of a risk that 

Defendant would dispose of evidence or violate court orders. This negates any claim 

that notice would frustrate prosecution of Plaintiff’s case. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a TRO

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(ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff is ORDERED to file an executed summons by 5:00 p.m. on 

October 18, 2019 with: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint; (2) Plaintiff’s motion for temporary 

restraining order and attachments; and (3) a copy of this Order. Defendant SHALL

file a response to Plaintiff’s motion on or before October 21, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 16, 2019

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