Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02037/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EPARMA MAU,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07CV2037

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, MICHAEL MUKASEY,

ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBIN BAKER,

DIRECTOR OF SAN DIEGO FIELD

OFFICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, JOHN A.

GARZON, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE,

Respondents.

Presently before the Court is Petitioner Eparama Mau’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner seeks release pending the outcome of his challenge to his

deportation order which is currently under review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. For the

following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition and orders Respondents to provide

Petitioner with a bail hearing. 

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Fiji. He entered the United States in March 2001 as a nonimmigrant B-2 visitor for pleasure with authorization to remain in the United States until September

14, 2001. He subsequently remained in the United States beyond this date without authorization. 

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On March 16, 2004, while on probation for a previous conviction for driving under the

influence, Petitioner was convicted of violating California Vehicle Code § 23153(b) for Driving Under

the Influence with Bodily Injury and was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment. On September 16,

2004, Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner,

charging him with deportability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), which provides for the

deportation of an alien who violates his non-immigrant status. 

Petitioner was transferred to the custody of the Respondents on October 5, 2004 and held in

custody pending removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). On December 15, 2004, a removal hearing was held. Petitioner

admitted each of the allegations filed against him. The IJ found Petitioner removable based on the

admissions. The IJ heard testimony from the Petitioner regarding his fear of being returned to Fiji

based on past instances of abuse at the hands of Fijian officials which the IJ concluded was credible.

However, the IJ denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding under the Immigration

Act and the Convention Against Torture based on Petitioner’s DUI conviction. The IJ further denied

deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture based on a finding that Petitioner had not

established it more likely than not that he would be tortured by a public official if returned to Fiji.

Petitioner timely appealed the decision of the IJ to the BIA. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling on April

28, 2005. 

Petitioner then filed a timely petition for review pro se with the Ninth Circuit on May 12, 2005.

The same day, Petitioner moved for a stay of deportation pending appeal; Respondents filed a notice

of non-opposition to the stay on July 8, 2005. Following two extensions of time, Petitioner’s opening

brief was filed late on November 17, 2005, but was accepted by the Court. Respondents were ordered

to file their brief by January 26, 2006. On January 20, 2006, the Respondents sought a two-week

extension of time to file their brief. Petitioner filed an opposition to the extension on February 7,

2006. Respondent’s brief was filed on February 9, 2006. After a 14-day extension, Petitioner filed

his reply brief on March 9, 2006. No action has since taken place in the case.

//

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Procedural Background

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2241 on October

19, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) The Court granted Petitioner’s accompanying motions to proceed in forma

pauperis and for appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 6, 9.) Respondents filed their return to the

Petition on December 28, 2007. (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner filed a traverse on January 18, 2008. (Doc.

No. 16). 

JURISDICTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alien detainees can properly challenge the extent of the Attorney

General’s authority to detain a removable alien under the statutes authorizing detention. Zadvydas

v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-89 (2001); see also Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003).

Where, as here, an administrative order of removal is not final, “habeas corpus jurisdiction remains

in the district court.” Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (describing how a removal order becomes final). 

DISCUSSION

1. Respondents’ Authority to Detain Petitioner

The parties do not dispute that Petitioner’s detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), aliens may be “detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

from the United States.” Unlike section 1226(c) of the same statute, which makes detention

mandatory where the alien is inadmissible or deportable based on the commission of certain offenses,

detention under section 1226(a) is discretionary; the Attorney General may release the alien on bond

or conditional parol. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). 

i. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) Authorizes Petitioner’s Continued Detention

Petitioner argues the length of his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) has surpassed the length

authorized by the statute. In support, Petitioner relies on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decisions in Tijani

v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) and Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)..

In Tijani, the Court of Appeals reviewed the by then 32 month detention of an alien subject

to detention under the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Like Petitioner, the alien

in that case was awaiting the outcome of his appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth

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Circuit observed it was “constitutionally doubtful that Congress may authorize imprisonment of this

duration for lawfully admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.” 430 F.3d at 1242.

However, instead of deciding the constitutional issue, the court interpreted the authority conferred by

§ 1226(c) as applying only to “expedited” removal of criminal aliens. Id. That authority, the court

held, had been exceeded by the two years and eight months of process which had already passed while

Tijani remained confined. The court ordered release of Tijani unless he was provided with a bail

hearing and found unsuitable for release under factors associated with flight risk or danger to the

community. Id. 

Petitioner also draws support from the Ninth Circuit’s post-Tijani decision in Nadarajah v.

Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). In that case, the Ninth Circuit observed that the general

immigration detention statutes do not authorize the Attorney General to incarcerate detainees for an

indefinite period. The Court held detention pursuant to general detention statutes must be “for a

reasonable period, and only if there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Id. at 1079 (emphasis added). Once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is

no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must

respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Id. at 1079-80 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

701). 

Applying the law to the facts, the court concluded the writ of habeas corpus should issue

because the length of the detention in the case, over 60 months, was unreasonable when compared to

the six-month period identified as presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v.

Davis, a case in which the Supreme Court interpreted a different detention statute. Further, the court

observed that Nadarajah had established that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future based in part on his past success in proceedings before both the IJ and

the BIA. In both venues, he received a determination that he was entitled to relief from removal. 

Respondents argue Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on these cases because: (1)

Tijani and Nadarajah only apply to mandatory detention pending prolonged administrative removal;

(2) Petitioner’s detention is voluntary; or because (3) Petitioner’s removal is reasonably foreseeable.

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a. Are the Tijani and Nadarajah Precedents Applicable?

As an initial matter, Respondents argue the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Tijani and Nadarajah

do not apply to the case at hand because those decisions apply only to mandatory detention under

section 1226(c) pending prolonged administrative removal proceedings whereas Petitioner is held

pursuant to section 1226(a), under which detention is discretionary.

The Court disagrees and finds Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the authorization contained

in the related mandatory detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), is applicable to the current

controversy. Respondents cite no evidence based on either the text or the legislative history of these

provisions which would lead to the conclusion that section 1226(a) authorizes detention beyond that

authorized by section 1226(c). The Tijani court characterized the authority conferred by section

1226(c) as the period of time necessary for the “expedited removal” of aliens. See Tijani, 430 F.3d

at 1242. This Court finds detention authority under section 1226(a) is similarly limited. Further, the

Court finds the Nadarajah court’s conclusion that “the general immigration detention statutes do not

authorize . . . indefinite [incarceration]” equally applicable in characterizing both sections 1226(a) and

1226(c). Like section 1226(c), the Court finds detention under section 1226(a) is only authorized for

a “reasonable period” and only if there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future” Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1079-80.

b. Is Petitioner’s Detention Voluntary?

Respondents next argue Petitioner may not seek habeas relief because his detention is

voluntary since he sought and was granted a stay of the removal order. In support, they cite a recent

unpublished opinion in which the Ninth Circuit rejected an alien’s habeas petition by reasoning that

the appellant’s requested stay of removal pending appeal of his final removal order amounted to

voluntary detention. See Cruz-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 221 F.App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).

Respondents note a stay of the removal order is not essential to preserve Petitioner’s ability to

challenge the decision of the BIA. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.

2003) (“IIRIRA . . . allows aliens to continue their cases from abroad.”).

Petitioner calls Respondents’ theory of voluntary detention absurd, arguing it is based on a

false choice between detention and removal when release on supervision is a readily available option.

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Respondents contend Petitioner has engaged in a bad faith refusal to complete necessary travel

documents. The Court finds this issue to be a red herring. It is Petitioner’s pending petition for

review of his removal order and the related stay that prevents his immediate removal—not the lack

of travel documents.

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Petitioner further notes that aside from the unpublished opinion in Cruz-Ortiz, there is no legal

authority in support of Respondents’ theory.

1. Analysis

As this Court has recently observed, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tijani to grant habeas relief

to the petitioning alien—as that alien was concurrently seeking Ninth Circuit review of his removal

order—conveys an implicit rejection of the argument advanced by Respondents that an alien’s

detention becomes “voluntary” by virtue of that alien’s filing of a petition for review. See Judulang

v. Chertoff, -- F.Supp.2d ----, 2008 WL 410684, *3 (S.D. Cal. February 12, 2008) (Gonzalez, CJ.).

The Court reiterates its agreement with those other district courts which have included time detained

pending judicial review in assessing the reasonableness of a prolonged detention. See, e.g., Mustanich

v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2819732, *8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) (“After reviewing the relevant case law,

and particularly Tijani, the Court concludes that it can and must consider periods of detention which

accrue pending judicial review in determining whether removal proceedings and detention pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) are expeditious and reasonable.”); Martinez v. Gonzalez, 504 F.Supp.2d 887,

897 (C.D.Cal.2007) (rejecting argument time detained during judicial appeals does not count toward

the reasonableness of a lengthy detention).

While the Court is sensitive to the possibility that a removable alien may engage in dilatory

tactics in order to compel a determination that his detention was unreasonably long, Respondents have

set forth no argument that Petitioner’s appeal is frivolous.1 Respondents acknowledge that, as part of

Petitioner’s application for relief under the Convention against Torture, Petitioner presented credible

evidence that his treatment by the police in Fiji constituted torture. (See Respondent’s Return, pg. 5.;

see also Ex. G, Order of the IJ.) In addition, the substantial period for which Petitioner’s petition for

review has been pending is some evidence that the claims therein are not frivolous. 

//

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c. Is Petitioner’s Removal Reasonably Foreseeable?

While raising no argument that the length of Petitioner’s detention thus far is “reasonable”

under Nadarajah, Respondents argue that because judicial review of Petitioner’s petition for review

has a finite duration, Petitioner cannot establish that there is no significant likelihood of removal in

the reasonably foreseeable future. 

1. Analysis

Respondents have detained Petitioner for nearly 40 months. The majority of this time, the past

24 months, has accrued during proceedings before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This

Court cannot determine when the Court of Appeals might adjudicate Petitioner’s petition for review

and even if the Court of Appeals were to adjudicate the Petition, it is not clear that the order of the

BIA would be affirmed as opposed to reversed and remanded. As the Supreme Court has observed,

a court should consider that “as the period of . . . confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably

foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Here, Petitioner

has been in Respondents’ custody for over 3 years. Under the circumstances, the Court concludes

Petitioner has demonstrated no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Cf. Mustanich v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2819732 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2007). Respondents have failed

to adequately rebut this showing.

d. Conclusion

The Court concludes Petitioner’s removal proceedings have not been “expeditious”and further

finds that Petitioner’s detention exceeds the “reasonable period” authorized by the statute. See Tijani,

430 F.3d at 1242 (authority conferred by § 1226(c) applies to expedited removal); Nadarajah, 443 F.3d

at 1079-80 (“[D]etention must be for a reasonable period . . . .”). Because Respondents have not

rebutted Petitioner’s contention that his release is not reasonably foreseeable, Petitioner is entitled to

habeas relief. See Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1079-80 (detention authorized under general detention

statutes only if there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”).

//

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2. Remedy

Petitioner requests he be released from custody under the conditions of supervision set forth

in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), or, in the alternative, given a release hearing to evaluate his eligibility for

supervision under appropriate conditions.

The Ninth Circuit in Tijani remanded the case to the district court: 

with directions to grant the writ unless the government within 60 days of this order

provides a hearing to Tijani before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant

him bail unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a danger

to the community.

430 F.3d at 1242. In Mustanich, Judge Hayes also found it appropriate to grant the petitioner a bail

hearing before an Immigration Judge within ten days. 2007 WL 2819732 at *8. A bail hearing will

give respondents an opportunity to assess whether petitioner’s continued detention is justified. 

CONCLUSION

The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Respondents

are ORDERED to provide petitioner a hearing within thirty days of this order before an Immigration

Judge with the power to grant him bail unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or will

be a danger to the community. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 11, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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