Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-06040/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-06040-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 160
Nature of Suit: Stockholder's Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

RONALD EARL PLOOF,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-06040-NJV

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DISMISSING ALL

FEDERAL DEFENDANTS

Re: Dkt. No. 17

Ronald Earl Ploof, proceeding pro se, filed this civil action on December 23, 2015. The 

parties who have appeared have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. (Docs. 10, 

18.) Pending before the court is the Motion to Dismiss filed March 23, 2016, by Defendants the 

Internal Revenue Service and John Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. 

(Doc. 17.) For the reasons discussed below, the court grants the Motion to Dismiss and will 

dismiss all federal Defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move to dismiss an action 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On such a motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "To confer subject matter jurisdiction in an action against a sovereign, 

in addition to a waiver of sovereign immunity, there must be statutory authority vesting a district 

court with subject matter jurisdiction." Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 

1016 (9th Cir. 2007). The United States, as a sovereign, may not be sued except in strict 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

accordance with the terms of a specific and explicit waiver of sovereign immunity granted by 

Congress, and the terms of the waiver define the court’s jurisdiction. See United States v. Nordic 

Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (construing Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code); United

States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990) (construing 28 U.S.C. Section 1346(a)(1)). Waivers of 

sovereign immunity “cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed,” and are strictly 

construed in favor of the sovereign. Dunn & Black P.S. v. U.S., 492 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985)). Where the United 

States has not consented to suit, the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 

and dismissal is required. Id. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants the Internal Revenue Service and John Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal 

Revenue Service, move to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject 

matter jurisdiction and asserting a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Complaint fails to assert any 

such waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. Plaintiff merely alleges that “the federal 

court has jurisdiction because it deals with the IRS the Securities and Exchange Commission & 

Congressman Huffman.” Complaint, p. 12. Plaintiff does not cite any statute authorizing this 

court to exercise jurisdiction over any of the claims against the several federal defendants named 

in this action. 

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States,” and 28 U.S.C. § 1340 generally confers jurisdiction for matters arising under the Internal 

Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Title 26”), it is well established that the United States has not waived 

its sovereign immunity to suit based on general jurisdictional statutes. See Hughes v. U.S., 953 F. 

2d 531, 539 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1992) (neither 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340 nor 1343 constitute a waiver of 

sovereign immunity). Rather, the grant of jurisdiction in such statutes is limited to cases in which 

the Government has already consented to suit. See Arford v. United States, 934 F.2d 229, 231 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 7426 and 28 U.S.C. 

Case 1:15-cv-06040-NJV Document 23 Filed 05/24/16 Page 2 of 4
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United States District Court

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§ 2410). In this instance, the United States has not consented to suit.

Where, as here, a federal employee is named as a defendant in his official capacity and a 

judgment necessarily would operate against the Government, the suit is considered to be one 

against the United States, for which there must be a waiver of sovereign immunity allowing the 

suit to be maintained. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737-38 (1947); Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756

F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). Again, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing both jurisdiction 

and a waiver of sovereign immunity in a suit against the United States. In certain circumstances, a 

suit for damages may be maintained against an official of the United States in his individual or 

personal capacity for alleged violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Stonecipher v. 

Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401-403 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of allegations based 

on individual acts by Commissioner Koskinen or other federal employees depriving him of his 

constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court cannot construe this action as a Bivens action against 

the named federal employees in their individual capacities.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of 

showing that the court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the Internal Revenue Service 

and John Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. For the same reasons, the 

court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction over the other named federal defendants: Congressman Jared Huffman, the United 

States Securities and Exchange Commission, Jack Hardy, Roy Sheetz, and Amy Rosenthal. 

Accordingly, this action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as against all 

federal defendants. Because the court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it 

does not reach Defendants' arguments regarding other grounds for dismissal.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Defendants the Internal Revenue Service; John 

Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; Congressman Jared Huffman; the 

United States Securities and Exchange Commission; Jack Hardy; Roy Sheetz, and Amy Rosenthal

are HEREBY DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 24, 2016

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:15-cv-06040-NJV Document 23 Filed 05/24/16 Page 4 of 4