Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-05232/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-05232-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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28 1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WHITNEY ET. AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WURTZ ET. AL.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: C 04-05232 PVT

ORDER GRANTING CROSSDEFENDANTS UNITED AIR LINES INC.

AND SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

WURTZ ET. AL., )

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Cross-Claimants, )

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v. )

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SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., UNITED ) 

AIR LINES INC., )

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Cross-Defendants. )

___________________________________ )

On April 4, 2006, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull for

hearing on Cross-Defendants Southwest Airlines Co. and United Air Lines Inc.’s Motion to

Dismiss.1 Based on the briefs and arguments presented,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Cross-Defendants United Air Lines Inc. and Southwest

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ORDER, page 2

Airlines Co.’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as discussed below. 

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an employment dispute between Veriscape Inc. and certain

employees. The First Amended Complaint is premised upon the alleged wrongful termination of

employees by Defendants Veriscape Inc. and Chief Executive Officer of Veriscape Inc., Charles

Wurtz. Plaintiff Whitney alleges that he was employed as a “Corporate Sales Officer” by Veriscape

Inc.. Plaintiff Whitney also alleges that he “has a physical disability” “as a result of a broken neck.” 

Plaintiff Whitney was promised certain accommodations in light of his disability. Plaintiff Whitney

alleges that Defendants failed to consider his disability. Some of these failures included requiring

Plaintiff Whitney to travel to Toronto, New Orleans, Anaheim and Phoenix. Defendants Veriscape’s

and Wurtz’s alleged failure to take all reasonable steps to accommodate Plaintiff Whitney’s

disability underpins the first cause of action- for damages pursuant to California Government Code §

12940. 

The instant cross-claim ensued from the wrongful termination action. Defendants/CrossClaimants are seeking indemnification for Whitney’s claim against them. Cross-Claimants state that

any liability that they may be found to have due to Plaintiffs’ allegations are secondary to that of the

United and Southwest. Cross-Claimants assert that United and Southwest are liable under equitable

indemnity because Plaintiff Whitney was “in an area where he had to negotiate aisles, and did not

have free access to bathrooms, or if such bathrooms were not equipped to accommodate passengers

with disabilities, the primary liability is with such airlines and they are required to indemnify crossclaimants.” As a result of his inability to negotiate aisles, Plaintiff Whitney soiled his diapers.

Cross-Defendants Southwest and United argue that Plaintiff Whitney does not, and cannot in

good faith, allege that any conduct by United or Southwest caused him any damages. CrossDefendants United and Southwest argue that they cannot be liable to Plaintiff Whitney for damages

pursuant to California Government Code § 12940, and that Wurtz’s cross claim fails as a matter of

law.

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ORDER, page 3

II. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must accept all material allegations in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barron v.

Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir.1994). Matters outside the pleadings are not usually

appropriately considered on a motion to dismiss. Cassettari v. County of Nevada, 824 F.2d 735, 737

(9th Cir. 1987). 

A cause of action will be dismissed only where there is either “a lack of a cognizable legal

theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) will not be granted unless it appears that plaintiff can prove no set of

facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). It is only

under extraordinary circumstances that dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6). United States v.

City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981).

Leave to amend must be freely granted when justice requires. Fed. Rules Civ. Pro. 15(a). 

Factors relevant to whether leave to amend should be granted include any undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, any repeated failures to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, any undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance

of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Absent

any such factors, where a plaintiff shows that the underlying facts may be a proper basis for relief,

he should be given an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. Ibid. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. CROSS CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE INDEMNITY

Cross-Defendants United and Southwest state that there is no allegation by Plaintiff Whitney

that Cross-Defendants owed Plaintiff a tort duty to offer negotiable aisles and certain accessability

and accommodation. Plaintiff Whitney alleges that Defendants/Cross-Claimants failed to consider

his disability when they required Plaintiff to travel by air. Plaintiff Whitney’s complaint only

mentions Cross-Defendants United and Southwest while describing how Defendants/CrossCase 5:04-cv-05232-PVT Document 125 Filed 04/04/06 Page 3 of 7
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ORDER, page 4

Claimants violated California Government Code § 12940 by allegedly failing to accommodate

Plaintiff Whitney. United and Southwest state that they are not liable and cannot be liable to

Plaintiff Whitney under any tort theory, and therefore they cannot be liable to Cross-Claimants for

equitable indemnity. 

Cross-Claimants argue that the Cross-Defendants are liable because they owed a duty to offer

negotiable aisles and certain accessability and accommodation to Plaintiff Whitney and have

allegedly breached that duty. However, Cross-Claimants do not cite any law attributing any tort

liability to the Cross-Defendants United and Southwest. In order for the Cross-Defendants to be

liable under equitable indemnity, they must first be liable to Plaintiff Whitney. Cross-Claimants

argue that “as public air carriers, cross-defendants also owe to Whitney a duty under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, and other legislation.” 

The availability of equitable indemnity depends upon the potential indemnitor’s liability to

the plaintiff, not to the defendant. Federal Agricultural Corp. v. It’s A Jungle Out There, 2005 WL

3325051. In It’s a Jungle Out There, this Court recently explained:

The party from whom equitable indemnity is sought need not have

owed a duty to the party seeking indemnity. ‘What is important,’

however ‘is the relationship of the tortfeasors to the plaintiff and the

interrelated nature of the harm done.’ Accordingly, California courts

have required the party seeking equitable indemnity to demonstrate

that the proposed indemnitor would be liable as a tortfeasor to the

underlying plaintiff. Generally, the basis for tort liability against the

proposed indemnitor is a duty owed to the underlying plaintiff. It’s a

Jungle Out There, 2005 WL 3325051 at 32 (citations omitted).

The “‘airlines... are largely not even covered by Title III of the ADA.’” Access Now, Inc. v.

Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004), citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) which

defines the “specified public transportation” covered by Title III as “transportation by bus, rail, or

any other conveyance (other than by aircraft);” see also, Love v. Delta Air Lines, 179 F. Supp. 2d

1313, 1316 (M.D.Ala.2001) (“aircraft are expressly excepted from the statutory definition of 

‘specified public transportation’ and ‘it is clear that Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under the ADA

because aircraft are not covered under Title III of the ADA’”), rev’d on other grounds, 310 F. 3d

1347 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Cross-claimants assertion that Cross-Defendants owed a duty under Title III of the ADA is an

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28 2 Plaintiff Whitney’s First Cause of Action in the First Amended Complaint is premised

on California Government Code § 12940.

ORDER, page 5

incorrect legal proposition. The ADA does not apply to airlines in the transportation context. Access

Now, Inc., supra, 385 F.3d at 1332. Cross-Defendants cannot be liable to Plaintiff Whitney under

the ADA. Thus, dismissal with prejudice of Cross-Defendants equitable indemnity claim pursuant to

Title III of the ADA is warranted. See Foman v. Davis, supra, 371 U.S. at 182. 

B. EQUITABLE INDEMNITY NOT AVAILABLE PURSUANT TO CAL. GOV. CODE § 12940

Southwest and United argue that California Government Code § 129402 has no application 

to either Cross-Defendant. Section 12940 states, in relevant part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a

bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon

applicable security regulations established by the United States or the

State of California:

(a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color,

national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,

medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation of

any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to

select the person for a training program leading to employment, or to

bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training

program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person

in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a).

It has not been alleged that Cross-Defendants are Plaintiff Whitney’s ‘employer.’ Southwest

and United further argue that the statute imposes liability only on employers who discriminate. “The

FEHA, however, prohibits only ‘an employer’ from engaging in improper discrimination. (§ 12940,

subd. (a).)” Vernon v. State, 116 Cal. App. 4th 114, 123 (2004), quoting Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th

640, 644 (1988).

Defendants/Cross-Claimants state that United and Southwest are liable to Plaintiff Whitney

pursuant to California Government Code § 12940. Cross-Claimants argue that the essence of the

allegations in the First Cause of Action are that Whitney soiled his diapers due to his inability to

negotiate the airplane aisles and obtain access to lavatories. Cross-Claimants further assert that had it

not been for this inability, there would have been no issue of failure to accommodate Whitney’s

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3 The remaining causes of action are either employment related or do not involve CrossDefendants: 2. Violation of the California Labor Code 3. Wrongful Termination in Violation of

Public Policy 4. Constructive Wrongful Termination 5. Fraud in Inducement to Sign an

Agreement 6. Misrepresentation 7. Breach of Contract 8. Violation of the Covenant of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing 9. Breach of a Promissory Note and a Promise to Pay Expenses 10. 

Imposition and Foreclosure of Equitable Lien 11. Alter Ego Liability 12. Common Counts 

ORDER, page 6

physical disabilities by forcing him to travel by air. Cross-Claimants then state that since Plaintiff’s

allegations of violation of § 12940 sound in tort, a cross-complaint for indemnity against CrossDefendant is proper.

This court disagrees. In order to be liable under § 12940 there must be an employment

relationship. No such relationship has been alleged against Cross-Defendants. Cross-Claimants have

misinterpreted what is required for Cross-Defendants to be liable for equitable indemnity. The issue

is not whether Plaintiff Whitney’s claim against Cross-Claimants was tort based, but whether United

or Southwest could owe a tort duty to Whitney under Gov. Code § 12940(a). See It’s a Jungle Out

There, WL 3325051 at 32. In the absence of an employment agreement, Cross-Defendants cannot

owe a tort duty to Plaintiff Whitney under § 12940. Even when accepting all the material allegations

in the cross complaint as true, and construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, Cross-Claimants have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. F.R.C.P.

12(b)(6); Barron v. Reich, supra, 13 F. 3d at 1374. Due to the futility of amendment, this cross-claim

is dismissed without leave to amend. See Foman v. Davis, supra, 371 U.S. at 182. 

C. DISMISSAL OF THE REMAINING CROSS-CLAIMS(2-12) IS WARRANTED

Cross-Claimants assert that Cross-Defendants are liable through equitable indemnity as to the

remaining causes of action in the First Amended Complaint. Each of the remaining causes of actions

are employment related or unrelated to Cross-Defendants.3 Cross-Defendants Southwest and United

have not been alleged to be Plaintiffs’ employer nor are they alleged to be involved in any of

Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action against Defendants. Cross-Claimants have alleged no set of

facts sufficient to state claims against Cross-Defendants for the remaining causes of actions, thus

dismissal with prejudice of those claims is warranted. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 

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ORDER, page 7

IV. CONCLUSION

Cross-Claimants have not sufficiently plead equitable indemnity against Cross-Defendants. 

Cross-Claimants have not plead facts sufficient to state a claim as to causes of action 1-12. CrossDefendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is GRANTED for the aforementioned reasons.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/4/2006

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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