Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02930/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02930-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

In re: STEVEN A. & HOPE M.

FIELDS,

Debtors,

____________________________/

HOPE M. FIELDS,

NO. CIV. S-09-2930 FCD

Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RETAILERS CREDIT ASSOCIATION,

Appellee.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on pro se appellant Hope M.

Fields’ (“Fields” or “appellant”) appeal of the bankruptcy

court’s entry of judgment against her, following trial on

September 10, 2009. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 158(a), appellant

elected appeal to this court. 

The court has reviewed the parties’ briefs and the

underlying record and by this order, issues its decision

AFFIRMING the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the Sacramento

Superior Court properly determined Fields incurred the subject

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because the court finds that oral argument will not be

of material assistance, it orders this matter submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The court also notes that

appellant expressly waived oral argument. (See Docket #7).

2 On June 2, 2010, this court granted appellee’s “Motion

to Augment the Record on Appeal,” finding that appellant’s

appendix did not include all pertinent documents. On August 13,

2010, appellant filed a request for Judicial Notice, which the

court construes as an objection to certain items in the Augmented

Record and Appellee’s Appendix. The court denies appellant’s

objections as moot. The objections relate to material that is

not relevant to the legal determinations in this appeal.

2

debt from Jack’s House of Music after her bankruptcy procedings,

and under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Fields could not

relitigate the issue.1 Appellant also moves for reversal of the

bankruptcy court’s judgment on the ground that the proceedings

before the bankruptcy court violated her due process rights. 

This court finds that appellant was given sufficient due process

in the bankruptcy court.

BACKGROUND

In 1981, appellant filed her first petition for bankruptcy

protection in the Eastern District of California; however, in

1982 that filing was dismissed. (Appellee’s Appendix [“A.A.”],

filed May 17, 2010, at 186, 187 [Fields Depo., 23:17-20, 24:17-

18]).2

 Appellant filed a second bankruptcy petition in this

court in June 1982. (A.A. 188 [Fields Depo., 25: 10-14]). The

second bankruptcy was filed as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but it

ultimately was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (A.A. 188-89

[Fields Depo., 25:24-26]). Those proceedings concluded in 1984. 

(Appellant Br. pp. 3-4.) 

The litigation that lead to this appeal centers on a debt

owed by appellant to Jack’s House of Music for a musical

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 March 6, 1989; November 16, 1989; and July 18, 1991. 

Appellee also claims that during the March 6, 1989 and the July

18, 1991 telephone conversations, appellant indicated that she

would start sending money to satisfy the debt. (A.A. 52, 53);

(A.A. 48 [Espinda Testimony, ¶ 9, 13]).

3

instrument appellant rented for her daughter. (Appellant Br. p.

3 ¶ 1). The debt was not listed in either of appellant’s

bankruptcy petitions. (A.A. 188, 189 [Fields Depo., 25:1-9,

26:4-16]). There is also no evidence in the record that Jack’s

House of Music was informed of either of appellant’s bankruptcy

filings. (A.A. 190-191 [Fields Depo., 29:21-30:15]).

In 1988, appellee Retailers Credit Association (“appellee”

or “RCA”) began its attempts to collect the debt, in the amount

of $200.00, owed by appellant to Jack’s House of Music. (A.A.

51-52);(A.A. 48 [Espinda Testimony, ¶ 6]). Appellee states that

on three occasions3 it contacted appellant regarding the debt to

Jack’s House of Music, and appellant did not mention in the

telephone conversations that the debt had been discharged in

bankruptcy. (A.A. 52-53);(A.A. 48 [Espinda Testimony,¶ 9, 11,

12]). Appellant asserts, to the contrary, that she received

telephone calls from appellee starting in 1984, and that she

informed the caller during each conversation that the debt had

been discharged. (Appen. Tab J pp. 34-35 ¶ 8). 

In 1990, appellee sued Fields. (A.A. 48 [Espinda Testimony,

¶ 12]). On August 28, 1991, a default judgment was entered

against appellant in the amount of $374.13. (A.A. 106). 

Appellant asserts she was never served with RCA’s complaint, and

only discovered the judgment in 1998 when she attempted to obtain

credit and was informed that appellee had a lien against her. 

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(Appellant Br. p. 5 ¶ 10, 12). 

Thereafter, appellant filed a motion in the Sacramento

County Superior Court, dated March 25, 2001, to vacate the

default judgment against her, claiming that the judgment was for

a debt that had been discharged in her bankruptcy. (A.A. 107). 

As alleged in appellant’s 1990 complaint, on August 10, 1988,

Fields entered into a contract with Jack’s House of Music wherein

appellant agreed to pay Jack’s House of Music $200.00 for the

lease of a musical instrument. (Appellant Br. p. 5 ¶ 12). In

her motion to vacate the default judgment appellant claimed she

never signed a contract with Jack’s House of Music, in 1988 or at

any other time. (Appen. Tab K p. 43 ¶ 5). The superior court

denied appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment, finding that

“the debt was incurred after bankruptcy and is unaffected by it.” 

(A.A. 121). Appellant moved for reconsideration and also

appealed the superior court’s decision. (A.A. 121-148). The

court of appeal affirmed the superior court’s order. (A.A. 149).

In August 2008, appellant filed two adversary proceedings

against appellee. (Appellee Br. p. 8). In the actions,

appellant requested a declaration that the judgment of the

superior court was void and also sought damages in the amount of

$1,000 per year for every year the judgment remained pending

against her. (Appellee Br. p. 8). The adversary proceedings

were consolidated, and the trial of the consolidated action took

place on September 10, 2009 in the bankruptcy court. (A.A. 1-

13). Prior to trial, the parties submitted direct testimony and

documentary evidence to the court, pursuant to Bankruptcy Local

Rule 9017-1. (Appellee Br. p. 9; A.A. 14-41). On September 10,

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

2009, appellant was given the opportunity to present evidence and

was questioned by the court. (Id.). Ultimately, the court

ruled in favor of appellee, stating its findings of fact and

conclusions of law on the record. (A.A. 1-13, 12: 8-10). The

court found that appellant did not establish that the debt to

Jack’s House of Music was incurred prior to her bankruptcy

filings, nor did she establish that the debt was listed in her

bankruptcy schedules or that Jack’s House of Music had any

knowledge of her bankruptcies. (A.A. 4:3-8, 6:1-8:2, 10:8-11:7). 

Further, the court ruled that regardless of appellant’s factual

showing, her claim failed as a matter of law because the superior

court had already determined that the underlying debt was

incurred after her bankruptcies and the doctrine of collateral

estoppel precluded relitigation of that issue. (A.A 4:9-14, 6:1-

7:6, 11:10-18).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 A district court’s standard of review over a bankruptcy

court’s decision is identical to the standard used by circuit

courts reviewing district court decisions. See In re Baroff, 105

F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, the bankruptcy court’s

factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and its

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8013; In re Southern Cal. Plastics, Inc., 165 F.3d 1243, 1245

(9th Cir. 1999). 

ANALYSIS

While appellant raises a multitude of issues in her briefs,

the only issues properly raised in this appeal are appellant’s

claims that: (1) the bankruptcy court erred in finding the debt

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

to Jack’s House of Music was not discharged by her bankruptcies;

and (2) that her due process rights were violated by the trial in

the bankruptcy court.

Regarding the first issue, the superior and bankruptcy

courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear dischargeability

actions. In re Watson, 192 B.R. 739, 746 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.

1996)(stating that “state courts and bankruptcy courts have

concurrent jurisdiction over all proceedings ‘arising under title

11 or in or related to cases under title 11.’”); see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1334(b) (2005). The doctrine of collateral estoppel, however,

precludes the relitigation of an issue when: “(1) the issue is

identical to that which was decided in a former proceeding; (2)

the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3)

the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding; (4)

the decision was final and on the merits; and (5) the party

against whom the preclusion is sought is the same as, or in

privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” In re Watson,

192 B.R. at 746.

In this case, in 2001, appellant filed her motion to vacate

the default judgment, arguing the underlying debt to Jack’s House

of Music had been discharged by her prior bankruptcy. The

superior court determined that the debt was not discharged in

bankruptcy. Fields’ instant adversary complaints raise the same

issue of dischargeability of the debt–-appellant continues to

claim that the debt to Jack’s House of Music was discharged in

her bankruptcy proceedings. That issue was fully litigated and

decided by the superior court, and the court’s decision was

affirmed on appeal. The fact that the bankruptcy court has

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether the debt to Jack’s

House of Music was discharged in appellant’s bankruptcy does not

preclude application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Pursuant to that doctrine, the bankruptcy court properly

determined that appellant’s adversary actions were precluded by

the superior court’s decision as a matter of law.

Appellant presents a number of cases to argue that she is

not bound by the superior court’s judgment; however, the cases

are inapposite to these facts. Plaintiff relies on cases

involving automatic stays under 11 U.S.C. § 362, which has no

applicability here, or cases where jurisdiction lay exclusively

in federal court to determine the particular issue. As

previously noted, here, there is concurrent jurisdiction over

appellant’s dischargeability complaint. Appellant chose to

litigate the issue in state court and she is bound by the

findings in that action. Principles of collateral estoppel

preclude relitigation of the same issue in the bankruptcy court.

Because the court finds the bankruptcy court’s legal

conclusion regarding application of the doctrine of collateral

estoppel proper, it need not reach the alleged factual errors

appellant raises as a basis for reversal of the bankruptcy

court’s judgment.

Regarding the second issue raised by this appeal, the Due

Process Clause requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing,

appropriate to the nature of the case, before a person is

deprived of life, liberty, or property. Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Notice is

required because “the right to be heard has little reality or

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Appellant also objects to the bankruptcy court’s

findings of fact and conclusions of law, citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a). However, under the rule, it is sufficient for findings of

fact and conclusions of law to be stated orally on the record

following the close of evidence. The bankruptcy court complied

with Rule 52(a), orally stating its findings on the record. 

8

worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can

choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or

contest.” Id. at 314. The due process requirement of a hearing,

does not, however, mean that in every civil case there must be a

hearing on the merits. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.

371, 378 (1971). It is well recognized that the opportunity to

be heard is one which must be granted “at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner.” E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,

552 (1965).

In this case, appellant broadly claims that her due process

rights to be notified and heard were violated. However, her

contentions are more specifically directed at the length of her

hearing, and as to a claim that she was prevented from presenting

evidence relevant thereto. Pursuant to Local Rule 9017-1, the

parties presented all direct testimony and all documentary

evidence to the court in advance of trial. On September 10, 2009

appellant was given an opportunity to present additional evidence

and was questioned by the bankruptcy court. Appellant thus

received notice of the trial, she attended the trial, and, in

addition to the evidence offered pursuant to Local Rule 9017-1,

she gave testimony. Accordingly, appellant was given an

opportunity to be heard and to present evidence relevant to her

claims, and therefore, the court cannot find a violation of her

due process rights by the bankruptcy court.4

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court’s judgment

is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 24, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-02930-FCD Document 22 Filed 08/24/10 Page 9 of 9