Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02678/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02678-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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 As there is a dispute over the identify of Betti’s 1

employer and which entity was acting at any given time, as

discussed below, the court will refer to both Kaiser Foundation

Health Plan and The Permanente Medical Group as “Kaiser” unless

it is necessary to differentiate between the two entities. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGELA M. BETTI, 

Plaintiff,

v.

KAISER PERMANENTE AND KAISER

FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-03-2678 DFL DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (“KFHP”) moves for

summary judgment on plaintiff Angela Betti’s claim that KFHP

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by refusing

to provide her with a reasonable accommodation and that, as a

result, she was constructively terminated from her position.1

I.

Betti was employed at the Kaiser facility in Stockton as a

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psychiatric social worker’s assistant, working towards licensure

as a licensed clinical social worker. (Mot. at 2.) In the

summer of 2002, Betti was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress

disorder (“PTSD”). (Kramer Decl. Ex. 9 at 15.) During the

summer and early fall of 2002, Betti’s supervisor, Allison Kemps,

received reports that Betti was coming in late and having

difficulty completing her paperwork during her scheduled hours. 

(Def.’s SUF ¶ 10.) Betti missed an appointment with a client on

October 15, 2002 and then missed a rescheduled appointment with

the same client on October 28, 2002. (Kemps Decl. ¶ 7.) Betti

also missed work on November 7, 2002, and on several occasions in

December. (Id.) 

A meeting was held between Kemps and Betti on January 14,

2003. (Def.’s SUF ¶ 14.) Betti’s schedule, her tardiness, and

her absences were discussed at the meeting. (Pl.’s Response to

Def.’s SUF ¶ 14.) At this point, Betti was working four ten-hour

shifts each week, starting at 8:30 a.m. on Monday and Wednesday

mornings and 9:30 a.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. (Kemps Decl. ¶

8.) During the meeting, Kemps suggested that Betti switch to

five eight-hour shifts, which would allow her to come in later,

but Betti rejected this suggestion. (Id. ¶ 9.) The meeting

ended with an agreement that Betti would provide a proposed

revised schedule that would allow her to come in later. (Kemps

Decl. ¶ 10; Kramer Decl. Ex. 5 at 59.) However, Kemps did impose

the restriction that Betti had to come in at 8:30 a.m. on

Wednesday morning to be present for the mandatory weekly “Child

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Team” meeting. (Kramer Decl. Ex. 5 at 148, 224.) Furthermore,

Betti informed Kemps that she did not want to give up her Monday

morning assignment at August Elementary School because she

enjoyed the work and felt she could arrive on time on Mondays. 

(Id. at 122, 224-26.) 

On February 4, 2003, another meeting was held, with Kemps,

Betti, and Betti’s union steward and clinical supervisor, Larry

Meade. (Kemps Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 3.) At the meeting, the parties

worked together to modify Betti’s schedule. (Id.) Betti

submitted a new proposed schedule on February 6, 2003, which

pushed back her start time to 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday and Thursday. 

(Kramer Decl. Ex. 5 at 61.) Kemps immediately approved the

schedule, but informed Betti that, for administrative reasons,

the schedule could not be officially implemented until April. 

(Kemps Decl. ¶ 13.) In the meantime, Kemps offered to remove all

of the early morning appointment slots from Betti’s schedule, but

Betti declined this offer. (Id.) 

On Wednesday February 19, 2003, Betti did not arrive at work

on time and missed the 8:30 a.m. meeting. (Id. ¶ 15.) Betti

also missed a client appointment scheduled at 9:45 am. (Id. ¶

16.) Another provider, Adam Pollack, treated the patient after

noticing that Betti had not arrived. (Kramer Decl. Ex. 11 at 31-

22, Def.’s Ex. G at 39-41.) After twice attempting to contact

Betti, Kemps told the receptionist to cancel the remainder of

Betti’s appointments for the day. (Kemps Decl. Ex. 7.) Betti

woke up at 11:00 a.m., immediately called the Kaiser

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receptionist, and was told that Kemps had cancelled the remainder

of her schedule. (Kramer Decl. Ex. 5 at 93.) Betti then

contacted Kemps, who told her not to come into work for the

remainder of the day and directed her to obtain a note from her

physician explaining her tardiness. (Id. at 93-94.) Betti

returned to work the next day with the requested note. (Kemps

Decl. ¶ 18

Kemps convened another meeting with Betti and Meade on

February 25, 2003, at which Kemps announced her intent to proceed

with a “corrective action plan” (“CAP”) because of Betti’s “gross

misconduct” in failing to call or appear for work on February 19,

2003. (Id. ¶ 19, Ex. 9.) Meade protested that this discipline

was excessive and, after some arguing back and forth, Betti and

Meade left the meeting. (Id.) 

Kemps presented Betti with the CAP at a March 6, 2003

meeting, where Meade was also present. (Id. ¶ 20.) The CAP

provided, among other things, that Betti would arrive on time “in

all circumstances.” (Id. Ex. 10.) Betti refused to sign the CAP

and indicated that she intended to file a union grievance to

protest the discipline. (Id. Exs. 10-11.) 

On March 26, 2003, Betti arrived at work at least 30 minutes

late, missing the weekly Wednesday meeting. (Kramer Decl. Ex. 6

at 166-67.) The following day, Betti was at least 20 minutes

late, arriving at 10:50 or 11:00 a.m., when her modified schedule

required her to arrive at 10:30 a.m.. (Id. at 167-68.) Kemps

then notified Betti in writing that there would be further

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26 Dr. Jurkowski recommended the transfer based upon his 2

opinion that Kemps exacerbated or triggered Betti’s PTSD

symptoms. (Def.’s Ex. E at 48-49.) 

5

disciplinary proceedings. (Kemps Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. 12.) On March

31, 2003, Betti went on medical leave. (Def.’s SUF ¶ 30.) 

Starting in July 2003, Betti’s counsel and counsel for The

Permanente Medical Group (“TPMG”), Susan Spurlack, began to

correspond about Betti’s return to work. (Supplemental Alden

Decl. Ex. D.) On August 21, 2003, Betti’s psychiatrist, Dr.

Jurkowski, indicated that Betti could return to work if two

conditions were met: (1) if she were given an afternoon schedule

for six months to a year; and (2) if she were transferred to a

different clinic. (Kemps Decl. Ex. 13.) 2

Counsel for Kaiser responded to these requests for

accommodation by letter on October 6, 2003. (Supplemental Kramer

Decl. Ex. 13.) Counsel stated that an afternoon schedule could

be accommodated, with the exception of the Wednesday morning

meeting. (Id.) The letter indicated that, despite Betti’s

argument to the contrary, attendance at the Wednesday meeting had

not been waived for other staff members. (Id.) However, the

letter invited Betti to submit any “other facts” she believed

were relevant to the Wednesday meeting. (Id.) 

Counsel also responded that the second request, for a

transfer to a different facility, was not required under state or

federal law. (Id.) She also indicated that Betti could apply

for a transfer, but that there were currently no openings Betti

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was qualified to fill. (Id.)

Between October 6, 2003 and November 20, 2003, counsel for

both parties apparently had conversations regarding Betti’s

transfer, and Kaiser agreed to assist in forwarding Betti’s

“application for transfer to either the South Sacramento or

Modesto Kaiser facilities.” (Id. Ex. 14.) However, counsel for

Kaiser indicated that Betti would not be placed at the top of the

list for a transfer. (Id.) In a letter dated November 22, 2003,

Betti’s counsel objected to this position and argued that Betti

was entitled to expedited consideration because the transfer was

a necessary accommodation. (Id.) Betti’s counsel reiterated

this argument in correspondence on December 3, 2003 and December

4, 2003. (Id. Exs. 15, 16.)

On January 5, 2004, counsel for Kaiser informed Betti’s

counsel that it had run a search for vacant positions at its

Manteca, Modesto, South Sacramento, and Sacramento facilities,

and found no current vacant positions for a psychiatric social

worker without licensure. (Supplemental Alden Decl. Ex. C.) The

letter also indicated that Kaiser had no obligation to transfer

Betti to an open clinical social worker position, which requires

licensure. (Id.) However, Kaiser indicated that it was willing

to explore positions in locations other than those indicated or

other job classifications for which Betti might be qualified. 

(Id.) Kaiser again reiterated, on January 13, 2004, that it had

searched for vacant positions, that no vacant positions were

currently available, and that it was willing to look at other

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positions and locations. (Id., Ex. B.) Kaiser also indicated

that it would notify Betti if a position became available. (Id.) 

Betti’s first amended complaint, naming KFHP as a defendant,

was filed on January 21, 2004 and raises two claims: (1) that

KFHP failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for Betti’s

disability in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq;

and (2) that KFHP refused to provide a reasonable accommodation

for Betti’s disability in violation of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12900 et

seq. Defendant KFHP moves for summary judgment on both claims. 

II.

KFHP argues that summary judgment is appropriate for three 

reasons: (1) Betti could not perform the essential functions of

her job, with or without modifications; (2) KFHP provided

reasonable accommodations to Betti; and (3) KFHP was not Betti’s

employer. (Mot. at 2.) 

The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against

qualified individuals with disabilities and requires employers to

make “reasonable” accommodations for the known physical or mental

limitations of such individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. A qualified

individual with a disability is one who “with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of

the employment.” Id. § 12111. To prevail in a suit asserting

prohibited discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that

she has a disability; (2) that she is capable of performing the

essential functions of her position; and (3) that she was denied

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a reasonable accommodation. Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d

1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). The same test is applied to FEHA

claims. Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 235, 66

Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1997); Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d

1128, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).

 A. Essential Function

KFHP argues, and Betti concurs, that regular and predictable

attendance is an essential job function of a psychiatric social

worker’s assistant. (Mot. at 10; Def.’s Ex. D. at 139, 161,

441.) However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Betti can perform this essential job function. At the

time she left on medical leave, Betti’s modified schedule had not

yet been fully implemented. Betti’s clinical supervisor, Meade,

has expressed an opinion that Betti could have performed the

essential functions of her position, including, presumably,

arriving on time, with the requested accommodations. (Meade

Decl. ¶ 8.) Additionaly, Betti argues that, at her current

position, she has adhered to a schedule like the one she

requested from Kaiser. (Opp’n at 6-8.) Finally, Kaiser’s

willingness to accept Betti back in August 2003 with an afternoon

schedule undercuts its argument that Betti could not perform the

essential functions of her position. Because there is a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Betti could arrive on time

under a reasonably modified schedule, summary judgment is DENIED

on this basis.

\\\

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B. Reasonable Accommodation

In an ADA case, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing 

the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would permit her

to perform the essential functions of her position. U.S. Airways

v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (2002). Upon such

a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the

accommodation is unreasonable on the facts presented. Id. at

402. Reassignment to a vacant position is identified by the ADA

and its implementing regulations as a reasonable accommodation. 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App. (2005). While an

employer need not create a new position for a disabled employee

or promote an employee who is not otherwise qualified for the

vacant position, the employer must consider the employee for

vacant positions. See, e.g., Buckingham v. United States, 998

F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding, under the Rehabilitation Act,

that a request for a transfer to the same job at a different

location is not per se unreasonable); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,

228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that reassignment is

a reasonable accommodation and that, in the absence of an undue

hardship, a disabled employee should be given the priority for

reassignment over non-disabled applicants), rev’d on other

grounds, U.S. Air, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401, 122 S.Ct.

1516 (2002); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir.

1996) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment

and holding that the ADA required United Airlines to consider

transferring the plaintiff to a position outside her department);

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Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d 247 (6th Cir.

2000) (discussing the obligation to transfer an employee, but

ultimately holding that the plaintiff had not met his burden of

requesting a transfer, as required by company policy); Smith v.

Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that

an employer has an obligation to reassign a disabled employee to

a vacant position, not merely consider the employee alongside

other applicants). The ADA also imposes a continuing obligation

on the employer to engage, in good faith, in an interactive

process with a disabled applicant to attempt to identify and

implement a reasonable accommodation. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at

1137-38. 

Although Kaiser adopted the erroneous position that it was

not required to give Betti priority in applying for a vacant

position, it did, nonetheless, engage in the interactive process

and attempt to reasonably accommodate Betti. In October and

again in January, Kaiser communicated that it had searched for

job openings and that there were no vacant positions in the job

classification Betti occupied and in the job locations Betti

desired. (Supplemental Kramer Decl. Ex. 13; Supplemental Alden

Decl. Exs. B, C.) Kaiser indicated a willingness to search other

locations and job classifications, if Betti so desired. (Id.) 

Kaiser was not required, as Betti’s counsel requested in her

December 3, 2003 correspondence, to convert an open clinical

position to a psychiatric social worker assistant position. 

In arguing that Kaiser could have reasonably accommodated

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26 Although Betti’s declaration appears to include three 3

separate listings, the second and third listing are for the same

position (Job Number RH.0300026). (Betti Decl. Ex. 3.)

11

her request for a transfer, Betti points to deposition testimony

indicating that other employees have been transferred and to two

job listings from Kaiser’s external job search. (Opp’n at 11.) 3

However, the deposition testimony does not rebut Kaiser’s

evidence that, at the time Betti sought to transfer, there were

no vacant positions available. 

Nor do the job listings assist Betti. The first listing is

for a clinical social worker position, a vacancy for which Betti

was not qualified. (Betti Decl. Ex. 3.) Although Betti was

qualified to fill the second position, for a psychiatric social

worker assistant, this position was located in Richmond. (Id.)

The correspondence between Betti’s counsel and Kaiser indicates

that Betti expressed a desire to transfer to South Sacramento or

Modesto. (Supplemental Kramer Decl. Ex. 14.) It appears that

Kaiser voluntarily expanded its search to the Sacramento and

Manteca locations. (Supplemental Alden Decl. Ex. C.) There is

nothing in the record indicating that Betti had a desire, in late

2002 or early 2003, to transfer to the Richmond facility, or that

she communicated such a desire to Kaiser. Once a disabled

employee has requested the accommodation of a transfer, “both

parties have an obligation” to proceed with a “reasonably

interactive process” to identify an appropriate alternative

position. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1171-72. If Betti would have

accepted a position in Richmond, she had an obligation to inform

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Kaiser of this fact as part of the interactive process. 

Kaiser fulfilled its obligations under the ADA by searching

for an open position for Betti at the locations she requested,

offering to broaden its search, and promising to inform Betti if

a position became available. Kaiser cannot be held liable merely

because its search for a reasonable accommodation proved

fruitless. Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 27 (1st

Cir. 2001). Kaiser has met its burden of showing that, on the

particular facts of this case, the requested transfer was not a

reasonable accommodation. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED

on this basis. 

C. The Identity of Betti’s Employer

KFHP alleges, alternatively, that summary judgment should be

granted because it is not Betti’s employee. In support of this

position, it offers a declaration that TPMG is a separate legal

entity and that TPMG, not KFHP, was Betti’s employer. (Alden

Decl. ¶¶ 1-11.) Additionally, it provides documents produced in

discovery by Betti, all of which list TPMG as Betti’s employer. 

Supplemental McNamara Decl. Ex I.) Betti’s evidence on this

point does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact. At

most, Betti’s documentation is consistent with employment by

either KFHP or TPMG. (Betti Decl. Ex. 1.) While Betti

apparently labored under the mistaken belief that her employer

was Kaiser Permanente, an entity that does not actually exist,

this does not affect the legal status of TPMG as her employer. 

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 Betti requested permission to amend her complaint to name 4

TPMG. (Opp’n at 12-13.) Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, leave to amend

should be freely granted whenever justice so requires. However,

leave to amend may be denied where the amendment would be futile. 

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the

court finds, as a matter of law, that Betti was not denied a

reasonable accommodation, amendment would be futile. Therefore,

the motion to amend is DENIED. 

13

Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED on this basis as well. 

4

III.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/25/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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