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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 5, 2002 Decided February 4, 2003

No. 02-5037

ROLE MODELS AMERICA, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,

AND RODERICK R. PAIGE, SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv01595)

P. David Richardson argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Joseph C. Port Jr.

Joel Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellees. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard Jr.,

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 1 of 10
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U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and TATEL,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: This case involves a challenge to the

Secretary of Defense’s decision to convey a closed military

base to a state-created development corporation. Because

the procedures by which the Secretary reached this decision

violated applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, we

reverse the district court’s contrary conclusion and remand

with instructions to enjoin the conveyance.

I.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990

(DBCRA), 104 Stat. 1808 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.

§ 2687 note), establishes a mechanism for the ‘‘timely closure

and realignment of military installations inside the United

States.’’ Id. § 2901(b) (for ease of reference, all citations to

the DBCRA are to the Act as it appears in note following 10

U.S.C. § 2687). The Act requires the Secretary of Defense

to determine, within six months of a decision to close a

military base, whether other federal departments or agencies

can use the property. Id. § 2905(b)(5)(A). If none can, the

Secretary must ‘‘publish in the Federal Register and in a

newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the

vicinity of the installation,’’ id. § 2905(b)(7)(B)(i)(IV), an announcement that ‘‘surplus’’ property exists, id.

§ 2905(b)(7)(B)(i)(II). Thirty days thereafter, the Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA), an entity ‘‘established by State

or local government and recognized by the Secretary of

Defense,’’ 24 C.F.R. § 586.5; 32 C.F.R. § 176.5, must ‘‘[p]ublish, TTT in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation, the time period during

which the LRA will receive notices of interest from TTT

representatives of the homeless[ ] and other interested parUSCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 2 of 10
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ties,’’ 24 C.F.R. § 586.20(c)(1); 32 C.F.R. § 176.20(c)(1). Notices of interest ‘‘shall describe the need of the [applicant] for

the buildings or property,’’ DBCRA § 2905(b)(7)(C)(i), and

must include, at a minimum, ‘‘a description of the planned

use,’’ 24 C.F.R. § 586.20(c)(2)(ii)-(2)(iii); 32 C.F.R.

§ 176.20(c)(2)(ii)-(2)(iii). ‘‘Other interested parties’’ means

‘‘any parties eligible for the conveyance of property TTT under

TTT the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of

1949 [(FPASA), 40 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.],’’ DBCRA

§ 2905(b)(7)(P)—a statute designed to provide ‘‘an economical

and efficient system for TTT [d]isposing of surplus [federal]

property,’’ 40 U.S.C. § 101(3). Non-profit educational institutions, if recommended by the Secretary of Education, are

among the groups eligible for FPASA conveyances. Id.

§ 550(c).

After the LRA publishes the required notice, the process

bifurcates: Notices of interest submitted by representatives

of the homeless and those submitted by FPASA-eligible

‘‘other interested parties’’ are considered on separate, parallel

tracks. On the homeless-assistance track, the LRA begins by

considering both homeless submissions and potential commercial uses in order to formulate a comprehensive redevelopment plan for the surplus property. DBCRA § 2905(b)(7)(F).

The LRA then submits its plan to the Secretary of Housing

and Urban Development, who in turn determines whether the

LRA has ‘‘balance[d]’’ commercial and homeless needs ‘‘in an

appropriate manner.’’ Id. § 2905(b)(7)(H)(i)(III). Meanwhile, on the other track, the Secretary of Defense evaluates

any notices of interest submitted by FPASA-eligible parties.

Id. § 2905(b)(7)(K)(v). This process occurs before the LRA

submits its plan to the HUD secretary. Id. If the Secretary

of Defense determines that an ‘‘other interested’’ applicant

meets the eligibility standards established by the FPASA and

associated regulations, the Secretary effects a ‘‘public benefit

conveyance’’ of the requested property to that party. Id.

After completion of the two parallel processes — that is, after

the Secretary of Defense has conducted the public benefit

conveyance screenings and the HUD Secretary has approved

the LRA’s plan — the Secretary of Defense ‘‘shall dispose’’ of

the remaining base property, giving ‘‘substantial deference’’

USCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 3 of 10
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to the LRA’s redevelopment plan. Id. § 2905(b)(7)(K)(i),

(K)(iii).

This case involves the application of the DBCRA’s disposition procedures to Fort Ritchie, a U.S. Army base located in

the Catoctin mountains of western Maryland. Fort Ritchie’s

history as a military installation began in 1926 when Maryland purchased the property — previously a resort for

wealthy Mid–Atlantic urbanites — to create a national guard

training site, naming it for then-Governor Albert C. Ritchie.

Military District of Washington, Fact Sheet: Fort Ritchie

Background, at http://www.mdw.army.mil/fs-i12.htm (Dec. 11,

2002). During World War II, the Army used Fort Ritchie for

counterintelligence training, including staging mock Nazi rallies in a specially built faux Bavarian village. See Steve

Vogel, In Western Md., Fort Ritchie Leaving Military for

Civilian Life, WASH. POST, July 17, 1998, at C1. The Army

even brought German and Japanese prisoners-of-war to the

base to provide trainees with authentic interrogation experience. Id. During the 1950s, the Army used the fort as a

support base for nearby Site R, a top-secret command structure known as the ‘‘underground Pentagon.’’ Id. Beginning

in the 1970s, Fort Ritchie became a high-tech military communications center. Id. By the mid–1990s, however, the fort

had outlived its usefulness, and the Secretary of Defense and

the President slated it for closure during the 1995 base

closure round. See Notice of Recommended Base Closures

and Realignments, 60 Fed. Reg. 11414, 11436 (Mar. 1, 1995)

(Secretary of Defense recommending closure of the base);

President’s Message to Congress Transmitting Recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, H.R. DOC. NO. 104–96, at 1 (1995) (President accepting

recommendation).

On May 10 and May 15, 1996, the Department of Defense,

acting pursuant to its duties under the Act, published notices

in the Federal Register and a local newspaper. See Notice of

Availability of Surplus Land and Buildings in Accordance

with Public Law 103–421 Located at Fort Ritchie Military

Reservation, Cascade, MD, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,445–05 (May 10,

USCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 4 of 10
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1996); THE HERALD–MAIL, May 15, 1996, at C8. Also on May

10, the Fort Ritchie LRA (later renamed PenMar Development Corporation) published two notices, virtually identical to

each other, entitled ‘‘Homeless Assistance Outreach Initiative.’’ These notices announced:

The Fort Ritchie Local Redevelopment Authority TTT

will receive Notices of Interest from representatives of

agencies that seek to serve the needs of our community’s

homeless population, (Washington County, Maryland and

Franklin County, Pennsylvania), until 4:30 p.m., August

9, 1996TTTT

Notices of Interest must include at least the following: a

description of the proposed homeless assistance program,

including the specific proposed reuse of property or

facilities, such as supportive services, job and skills training, employment programs, emergency shelters, traditional or permanent housing, food and clothing banks,

treatment facilities or other activities that meet homeless

needs as assessment of the need for the program; a

description of the extent to which the program is or will

be coordinated with other homeless assistance programs

in the community; information about the physical requirements necessary to implement the program, including a description of the buildings and property that are

necessary in order to carry out the program; a description of the financial plan, the organization and the organizational capacity of the representative to carry out the

program; and an assessment of the time required in

order to commence carrying out the proposed program.

Joint Appendix (J.A.) 71 (reprinting LRA–1 Public Notice,

Homeless Assistance Outreach Initiative, Fort Ritchie, Cascade, MD, THE HERALD–MAIL, May 10, 1996 (page number

omitted in J.A.)); LRA–1 Public Notice, Homeless Assistance

Outreach Initiative, Fort Ritchie, Cascade, MD, THE RECORD

HERALD, May 10, 1996, at 10B. As of December 1997, when

PenMar submitted its redevelopment plan to HUD, the Secretary of Defense had conducted no public benefit conveyance

screenings. HUD approved the plan, and then, in August

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1998, the Secretary of Defense published a ‘‘Record of Decision’’ (ROD) in the Federal Register accepting the plan. See

Notice of Record of Decision on the Final Environmental

Impact Statement (FEIS) on the Disposal and Reuse of the

U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Ritchie, Washington County, Maryland, 63 Fed. Reg. 43383 (August 13, 1998). Under the Act,

publication of the ROD obligated the Secretary of Defense to

dispose of the property in accordance with the LRA’s plan.

DBCRA § 2905(b)(7)(K)(iii).

Appellant Role Models America, Inc., a non-profit educational institution, seeks to convert surplus military bases

into military-style preparatory academies for at-risk secondary-school dropouts. To support this effort, Congress appropriated $10 million in start-up funding to ‘‘establish an

academy that consists of a residential center located on the

site of a military installation closed or realigned pursuant to a

law providing for closures and realignments of such installations.’’ 29 U.S.C. § 2914(g)(2); H.R. REP NO. 105–825, at

1257 (1998) (encouraging Department of Labor to make funds

available to Role Models). Interested in using Fort Ritchie

as a school, Role Models approached PenMar in December

1996 about a public benefit conveyance screening. PenMar

replied that ‘‘it was not the appropriate screening time.’’

Alexander Decl. ¶ 13. Later, PenMar told Role Models that

‘‘the screening process for the educational conveyance provisions was not required at Fort Ritchie.’’ Id.

Claiming that it was entitled to a public benefit conveyance

screening regarding the Fort Ritchie property, Role Models

filed suit in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia against the Secretaries of the Army and of

Education, requesting a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction prohibiting the conveyance of Fort

Ritchie to PenMar until the Government conducted a proper

screening. The district court denied injunctive relief, finding

that Role Models failed to satisfy any of the requirements for

a preliminary injunction. Role Models Am., Inc. v. White,

193 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002). Role Models appeals,

seeking interlocutory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section

1292(a)(1).

USCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 6 of 10
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II.

As a threshold matter, the Government argues that its

action is not ‘‘final’’ within the meaning of section 704 of the

Administrative Procedure Act because the Secretary of Defense has yet to convey Fort Ritchie to PenMar. See 5

U.S.C. § 704. The standards for determining finality of

agency action are well-established. To be final, an action

need not be ‘‘the last administrative [action] contemplated by

the statutory scheme.’’ Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 590 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Rather, the

question is whether the agency has ‘‘impose[d] an obligation,

denie[d] a right, or fixe[d] some legal relationshipTTTT’’ Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 177

F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Applying this standard, we have no doubt that the Government’s action is final. By publishing the ROD, the Defense

Department obligated itself to convey the property to PenMar. See DBCRA § 2905(b)(7)(K)(iii). Base closure cases

that have found a lack of final agency action, e.g., Dalton v.

Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994), do not require a contrary result

since such cases addressed the Secretary of Defense’s nonbinding base closure recommendations to the President. In

any event, the Government’s action in this case would be final

and reviewable even if the ultimate disposition of Fort Ritchie

remained an open question since, according to the Government, potential public benefit conveyees such as Role Models

had only until August 9, 1996, the deadline set in the May 10

newspaper notices, to apply for a conveyance. Role Models’

disqualification from seeking a public benefit conveyance after

that date constitutes ‘‘deni[al] [of] a right’’ for purposes of

APA review.

Turning to the merits, the Government argues that the two

identical May 10 notices fulfilled the LRA’s obligation to

notify ‘‘representatives of the homeless[ ] and other interested

parties’’ of the deadline for submitting notices of interest. 24

C.F.R. § 586.20(c)(1); 32 C.F.R. § 176.20(c)(1). We disagree.

We cannot imagine how Role Models, an organization devoted

USCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 7 of 10
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to establishing schools for at-risk minors, could possibly have

interpreted a notice entitled ‘‘Homeless Assistance Outreach

Initiative’’ as an invitation to apply for the Fort Ritchie

property. Even if Role Models discounted the title, the

notice’s very first sentence informs readers that the LRA

would ‘‘receive Notices of Interest from representatives of

agencies that seek to serve the needs of our community’s

homeless population.’’ Reinforcing the message that the

LRA’s exclusive interest was in proposals to help the homeless, the notice goes on to describe elements of a suitable

submission: ‘‘[proposals for] emergency shelters, TTT food

and clothing banks, treatment facilities or other activities that

meet homeless needs, TTT [and] a description of the extent to

which the program is or will be coordinated with other

homeless assistance programs in the communityTTTT’’ None

of these requirements could relate to a proposal from Role

Models to operate a school for at-risk students. The two

notices thus failed to fulfill the requirement that the LRA

‘‘shall [p]ublish’’ the time period in which it will receive

notices from ‘‘representatives of the homeless[ ] and other

interested parties.’’ 24 C.F.R. § 586.20(c)(1) (emphasis added); 32 C.F.R. § 176.20(c)(1) (emphasis added).

The Government argues that the Secretary’s May 10 and

May 15 notices, which unquestionably fulfilled the requirements of DBCRA section 2905(b)(7)(B)(i)(IV), performed double-duty by also fulfilling the requirements of 24 C.F.R.

section 586.20(c)(1) and 32 C.F.R. section 176.20(c)(1). Again,

we disagree. The two notices announcing the surplus property’s availability failed to fulfill the entirely different requirements that the regulations impose on the LRA — to inform

‘‘representatives of the homeless[ ] and other interested parties’’ of the deadline for submitting notices of interest. Even

if Role Models had been so fluent in DBCRA arcana as to

realize that the surplus property announcement obligated the

LRA to collect notices of interest soon thereafter, it still

would not have known of the August 9 deadline. Contrary to

the implication of the Government’s argument, we think it

quite reasonable to assume that two distinct notice requirements obligating different parties to impart different informaUSCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 8 of 10
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tion are not redundant. Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498

U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (‘‘[A] court should ‘give effect, if possible,

to every clause and word of a statute.’ ’’) (citation omitted).

At oral argument, Government counsel insisted that the

regulations do not require the LRA to notify ‘‘other interested parties’’ despite language directing that the LRA ‘‘shall’’

inform ‘‘representatives of the homeless[ ] and other interested parties’’ of the deadline. 24 C.F.R. § 586.20(c)(1) (emphasis added); 32 C.F.R. § 176.20(c)(1) (emphasis added). Urging us to chalk this plain language up to ‘‘less than careful

draftsmanship,’’ counsel argued that a literal reading is incompatible with a subsequent regulation providing that ‘‘[i]n

addition [to the formal notice requirement], the LRA has the

option to conduct an informal solicitation of notices of interest from [potential public benefit conveyees].’’ 24 C.F.R.

§ 586.20(c)(1)(i) (emphasis added); 32 C.F.R.§ 176.20(c)(1)(i)

(emphasis added). Even were this argument not untimely,

Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 7 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (‘‘[O]ral

argument on appeal is not the proper time to advance new

arguments or legal theoriesTTTT’’), we would flatly reject it.

One provision requires that the LRA formally notify ‘‘representatives of the homeless[ ] and other interested parties’’;

the other permits the LRA to ‘‘informal[ly]’’ notify the latter

group. Given the well-recognized flaws inherent in constructive notice, see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (‘‘It would be idle to pretend that

publication alone TTT is a reliable means of [notification]’’

since ‘‘[c]hance alone brings to the attention of even a local

resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back

pages of a newspaper.’’), it seems neither strange nor redundant to provide for informal notice as a complement to a

scheme of formal notice through publication.

In sum, none of the Government’s arguments rebuts the

fact that potential public benefit conveyees such as Role

Models failed to receive the notice mandated by regulation.

Nor, in view of the Act’s overall structure, can we dismiss this

as a merely technical violation. The Secretary of Defense’s

obligations to (1) conduct public benefit conveyance screenings and (2) accept only HUD-approved LRA redevelopment

USCA Case #02-5037 Document #729958 Filed: 02/04/2003 Page 9 of 10
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proposals, taken together, guarantee that the Government

will consider all proposals submitted by public interest

groups. These procedural guarantees — checking the LRA’s

institutional inclination to develop surplus property commercially — mean nothing if public interest groups do not know

of their right to submit proposals in the first place.

Role Models’ experience perfectly illustrates the need for

proper notice. The LRA’s procedural errors prevented Role

Models from triggering a public benefit conveyance screening, thereby depriving it of a valuable right under the Act.

Attempting to turn this error into a defense, the Government

argues that because ‘‘the LRA received no [timely] notice of

interest from [potential public benefit conveyees], TTT there

was no public benefit screening notice of interests to consider.’’ Appellees’ Br. at 16. This makes no sense. Although

the Government is certainly correct that it could not have

screened notices of interest that it never received, here it

received none precisely because the LRA failed to give proper notice.

The district court’s order is reversed and this matter

remanded with instructions to enter a permanent injunction

against conveyance of the Fort Ritchie property until the

Government remedies the procedural errors described above.

So ordered.

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