Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03927/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03927-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACK HINSHAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE VESSEL M/V AURORA, and AL BOURAQ

AVIATION, INC., a Delaware

Corporation,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-3927 CW

ORDER DENYING THE

GESVI LAW FIRM'S

REQUEST FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiff Jack Hinshaw's former counsel, the Gesvi Law Firm

(Gesvi), requests this Court to determine the value of its

attorneys' lien for twenty percent of Plaintiff's settlement

(Docket No. 197). Plaintiff opposes the award of any attorneys'

fees for Gesvi. The matter was decided on the papers. Having

considered the papers filed by Plaintiff and Gesvi, the Court

denies Gesvi's request for attorneys' fees.

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2005, Plaintiff signed an attorney-client

retainer agreement with Gesvi. The agreement provides that

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United States District Court

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Plaintiff will pay Gesvi the "sum of 40 (forty) percent of the

gross recovery should a lawsuit be filed to commence litigation

proceedings." It explains, "Although Attorney's right to

reimbursement for expenses or costs advanced under this agreement

is not contingent upon a successful outcome, fees are subject to

recovery as follows: 'NO RECOVERY - NO FEES'". 

Gesvi is located in Southern California. Sid M. Sharif, an

attorney at Gesvi, states that he and Plaintiff understood that, if

the vessel at issue was moved to San Francisco, Mr. Sharif would

find local counsel to make court appearances. Plaintiff, however,

states that it was Mr. Sharif's "unilateral decision" to find

someone to stand in for him in San Francisco.

On September 28, 2005, Plaintiff initiated this action. 

Mr. Sharif was the only attorney listed on the complaint, which

noted that the Vessel M/V Aurora (the Vessel) was located in the

City and County of San Francisco and that this Court had

jurisdiction over it. In January, 2006, Timothy R. Lord, an

attorney in San Francisco, became Mr. Sharif's co-counsel in this

case. Plaintiff was displeased with Mr. Lord's performance at a

mediation. The relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Lord broke

down and, on May 12, 2006, Mr. Lord filed a notice disassociating

himself as Plaintiff's counsel. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Lord

withdrew because Plaintiff sent Mr. Sharif a letter complaining

about Mr. Lord and Mr. Sharif then sent that letter to Mr. Lord.

Shortly thereafter, Gesvi filed a motion for an order

permitting it and Mr. Sharif to withdraw as Plaintiff's counsel. 

In support of the motion, Mr. Sharif stated:

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While I am unable to disclose the contents of my

communications with my client because of the attorney-client

privilege, there has been, in my opinion, a breakdown in the

relationship between myself and Mr. Hinshaw, and particularly

between the client and my associate counsel in San Francisco,

Mr. Lord. I am unable to represent Mr. Hinshaw without

assistance from counsel located in the San Francisco area near

the Courthouse. Mr. Lord has already filed a notice of

disassociation in this case, although it was done without my

consent or that of the client. There also exists a

substantial disagreement between Mr. Hinshaw and me, regarding

how the case should be prosecuted, and Mr. Hinshaw has

reflected his dissatisfaction with the representation of both

counsels. Mr. Hinshaw has also demanded that I expand the

scope of my original representation without compensation,

i.e., relating to a potential claim for sales commissions

entailed in second amended complaint [sic] promising a bonus

only.

(Docket No. 70).

On July 6, 2006, after Plaintiff consented to substitute

himself in pro per in place of counsel, the Court granted Gesvi's

and Mr. Lord's motions to withdraw. Mr. Sharif states that, even

after the withdrawal, he twice helped Plaintiff draft some

pleadings and that Plaintiff agreed to pay him $250.00 an hour,

half of what Mr. Sharif normally charges on an hourly basis. Mr.

Sharif states that Plaintiff has never paid him. In Plaintiff's

reply, he states that there was no discussion of fees for these

legal services and that Mr. Sharif provided him with no invoice. 

Without providing further explanation, Plaintiff states that the

work Mr. Sharif did after his withdrawal as counsel "was for his

benefit as much as mine."

On March 21, 2007, Gesvi filed a notice of lien for attorneys'

fees. The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's pro se motion

to reject or to quash the lien. Because Plaintiff had not yet

recovered damages, the Court did not address whether Gesvi's

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withdrawal was justified or whether services provided by the firm

were intended to and did benefit Plaintiff.

DISCUSSION

The Notice of Lien for Attorneys' Fees provides that Gesvi

claims a lien in the amount of forty percent of "the gross

settlement as per retainer agreement." In Mr. Sharif's October 17,

2007 declaration, he states that Gesvi seeks to enforce the lien

for twenty percent of the settlement amount, which he claims

represents half of his attorneys' fees. However, in Mr. Sharif's

November 16, 2007 declaration, he has reinstated his original

request for forty percent of the settlement. Plaintiff argues that

Gesvi is not entitled to any fees, including recovery in quantum

meruit.

An attorney who voluntarily withdraws from a case without good

cause forfeits recovery for services performed. Estate of Falco v.

Decker, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1014 (1987). However, if the

attorney has "justifiable cause" for withdrawing, recovery for

services in quantum meruit is allowed. Id. Justifiable cause for

withdrawal can exist where an attorney becomes incapable of

performing the agreed upon services. Cazares v. Saenz, 208 Cal.

App. 3d 279, 285 (1989) ("Where a contract contemplates the

personal services of a party, performance is excused when that

party dies or becomes otherwise incapable of performing."). 

Withdrawing from a case due to personality clashes, however, "is

not necessarily a justifiable reason for purposes of awarding

fees." Falco, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1014. 

As explained in Rus, Miliband & Smith v. Conkle & Olesten:

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To allow an attorney under a contingency fee agreement to

withdraw without compulsion and still seek fees from any

future recovery is to shift the time, effort and risk of

obtaining the recovery . . . from the attorney, who

agreed to bear those particular costs in the first place,

to the client . . . . It is a very tough row which a

contingency fee attorney originally agrees to hoe. Thus

it is unassailably unfair to allow him or her to escape

that labor absent the most compelling of permissive

reasons -- reasons that, as Falco indicated, must pass

heightened scrutiny.

113 Cal. App. 4th 656, 675–76 (2003).

Mr. Sharif claims that he withdrew for several reasons. 

First, Mr. Sharif states that he was unable to continue

representing Plaintiff without local co-counsel because he could

not travel from his office in Southern California to San Francisco

due to a medical condition. Mr. Sharif further states that he

could not find a replacement for the local co-counsel who withdrew

because he could not find another attorney who was willing to take

the case on a contingent-fee basis. Given Mr. Sharif's existing

medical condition, the risk that he might not have been able to

represent Plaintiff if he could not find local co-counsel was

foreseeable. Mr. Sharif has not presented a compelling reason to

shift this risk to Plaintiff.

Mr. Sharif also provides several examples of Plaintiff's

conduct that he claims made it unreasonably difficult for him to

proceed with the litigation. For example, Mr. Sharif states that

Plaintiff rejected his advice to accept a settlement offer of

$175,000. However, a client's refusal to accept a settlement

cannot in itself constitute cause for withdrawal. Falco, 188 Cal.

App. 3d at 1018. 

Mr. Sharif also states that, against his advice, Plaintiff

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caused a mediation to fail by revealing the identity of the seller

of the Vessel to the buyer. Mr. Sharif claims that, once the

mediation broke down, he had to expand the scope of his

representation by filing a new motion and two amended complaints. 

Mr. Sharif states that Plaintiff would not sign a new retainer

agreement commensurate with this expanded scope of representation.

Even if Mr. Sharif expanded the scope of his representation without

a new retainer agreement, the crucial element in determining

whether he should receive attorneys' fees "is the existence of a

justifiable reason for withdrawing, not the quantity of time

expended." Falco, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1014.

Although Mr. Sharif's examples are indicative of a personality

clash between himself and Plaintiff, they do not sufficiently

establish that he was incapable of representing Plaintiff. See

Cazares, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 285.

The cases that Mr. Sharif cites are inapposite. In Moore v.

Fellner, 50 Cal. 2d 330, 338 (1958) and Mardirossian & Associates,

Inc. v. Ersoff, 153 Cal. App. 4th 257, 262 (2007), the plaintiff

attorneys were awarded fees after being terminated by their

respective clients. Here, the attorney, Mr. Sharif, permissively

withdrew from representation.

Mr. Sharif has sufficiently justified his permissive

withdrawal from the case. However, "[t]he law governing an

attorney's right or duty to merely withdraw from a case—and be done

with it for good—is a different question than an attorney's right

to withdraw and then later recover." Rus, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 673

(internal quotations omitted). Because Mr. Sharif permissively

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withdrew from the case, the Court must evaluate his reasons for

doing so with heightened scrutiny. Rus, 113 Cal. App. 4th at

675–76. When viewed in this light, Mr. Sharif's reasons for

withdrawing are not compelling enough to justify an award of

attorneys's fees. Accordingly, Gesvi's request for attorneys' fees

is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Gesvi's request

for attorneys' fees (Docket No. 197).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/6/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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