Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05112/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05112-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Medical Malpractice

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1

Defendant has filed a certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2679(d). Therefore, the United States is the only proper

Defendant in this action and is substituted in by operation of

statute. 

2

Plaintiff recently filed an application to file a motion

for reconsideration of the minute order from the March 6, 2008

hearing, including the Court's ruling on this motion. The Court

has reviewed the application and the supporting declaration and

finds that it does not provide grounds to permit the filing of a

motion for reconsideration. See Civil Local Rule 7-9. 

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's application (Docket No.

28). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN MITCHELL,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DR. HAROLD NEMETZ, OPEN DOOR

COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER, and U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVICES, 

 Defendants.

__________________________________/

No. C 07-5112 CW

ORDER GRANTING FEDERAL

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS

Defendant the United States1

 moves to dismiss the complaint. 

Plaintiff Stephen Mitchell opposes the motion. The motion was heard

on March 6, 2008. As stated at the hearing, the Court GRANTS the

motion.2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that on October 18, 2002, he went to the Open

Door Community Health Center in Crescent City, California to seek

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treatment for a painful tooth. Open Door Community Health Center is

a federally deemed health center under the Federally Supported Health

Centers Assistance Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 233 (g)-(n). Plaintiff

alleges Dr. Harold Nemetz examined and diagnosed him with a vertical

fracture to tooth #2. Plaintiff claims that he signed a consent form

for the removal of tooth #2, but Dr. Nemetz, working for Open Door,

extracted the wrong tooth. 

Plaintiff alleges that “within a short period of time, [he] was

experiencing extensive pain in the same area and confronted Dr.

Nemetz as to whether or not he extracted the wrong tooth.” Complaint

¶ 7. Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Nemetz denied extracting the

wrong tooth. According to Plaintiff, “[s]ubsequent visits to two

dental offices could not confirm that a wrong tooth had been

extracted due to lack of dental records” but that “[b]oth Dentists

confirmed that the #2 tooth was still in place and was vertically

fractured.” Id. 

Plaintiff claims "damages for loss of a non-damaged tooth, the

costs for removal of the non-damaged tooth, additional dental

procedures to insert two (2) posts and a bridge for corrective

purposes, pain and suffering." Id. at ¶ 17.

On January 22, 2007, Plaintiff submitted a claim for damage to

the Department of Health and Human Services based on Dr. Nemetz’s

actions. Id. at 12 and Ex. A. After his administrative claim was

denied, Plaintiff filed this complaint on October 4, 2007. 

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the

sufficiency of the pleadings to establish federal jurisdiction, or

allege an actual lack of jurisdiction which exists despite the formal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Thornhill Publishing Co., Inc. v.

General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979);

Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). The

Court may consider matters outside the pleadings, but must accept as

true all material allegations of the complaint and construe the

complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.

The United States, "as sovereign, 'is immune from suit save as

it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued

in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the

suit.'" United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). The exclusive

statute under which the federal government may be sued for personal

injuries is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the

sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed

by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. 

See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1994). The act covers

damages actions "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury

or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" by such

employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 

In United States v. Kubrick, the Supreme Court noted that

compliance with the statute of limitations is a condition of the

government's waiver under the FTCA. 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979). 

Therefore, failure to file a timely FTCA claim is a jurisdictional

defect. Zavala v. United States, 876 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1989)

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(citing Landreth v. United States, 850 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989)).

The FTCA provides, 

A tort claim against the United States shall be forever

barred unless it is presented in writing to the

appropriate Federal agency within two years after such

claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months

after the date of mailing, by certified or registered

mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency

to which it was presented.

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are

time-barred because the administrative complaint was filed more than

two years after the claim accrued. 

"In a medical malpractice case under the FTCA, a claim accrues

when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable

diligence should have discovered, the injury and its cause." 

Landreth, 850 F.2d at 533. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim

accrued at the latest on September 14, 2004, citing a letter

requesting medical records from Plaintiff's counsel to a dentist

named Dr. Row. That letter states that Plaintiff informed counsel

"that the purpose of his visit to Dr. Nimitz [sic] was to [have] a

fractured tooth removed. He informs us that the wrong tooth was

removed in error at that visit." Peters Decl., Ex. B. The letter

goes on to state, "It is our understanding that a fractured tooth was

removed surgically in your office. Also, that additional dental work

has been diagnosed which may require three separate procedures." Id.

 This letter establishes that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of

the alleged injury by September 14, 2004. Therefore, the latest date

on which he could have filed a timely claim was September 14, 2006. 

Plaintiff did not file a claim with the Department of Health and

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Human Services until January 22, 2007.

Plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations should be

tolled because Dr. Nemetz fraudulently concealed his negligent act is

unavailing. To toll the statute of limitations on a theory of

fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff “must plead facts showing that

[the defendant] affirmatively misled it, and that [the plaintiff] had

neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to

its claim despite its diligence in trying to uncover those facts.” 

Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 858 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claim

more than two years before he filed his claim. 

 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is

GRANTED (Docket No. 15). Because amendment would be futile, the

dismissal is with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor

of Defendant and close the file. Each party shall bear its own

costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

4/2/08

Dated: 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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