Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03557/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03557-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH SINGLETON,

Petitioner,

 v.

JAMES E. TILTON, Acting Secretary,

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation; DEE ADAMS, Warden,

Corcoran State Prison,

Respondents. /

No. C 05-03557 WHA

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Kenneth Singleton petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

Contrary to petitioner, his confession was not coerced and his sentencing did not violate due

process. The petition fails to state valid grounds upon which a federal court can provide relief. 

It is therefore DENIED.

STATEMENT

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm enhancement following a

jury trial in Alameda County Superior Court. Petitioner fatally shot the victim about two hours

after participating in a fist fight with him. Petitioner was seventeen when he committed the

crime, but several months elapsed before he was arrested. He was eighteen when arrested (Pet.

at 2–4). Petitioner was placed in an interview room at ten on the morning of his arrest. The

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interviewers entered the room at around noon and read petitioner his Miranda rights, at which

time he invoked his right to counsel. The interviewers started to leave the room, but stopped

when petitioner told them that he wanted to talk. This first interview lasted less than twenty

minutes. Petitioner was then interviewed on-and-off throughout the day without further readvisement of his rights. He took naps, was given food and drink, and was given a coat when

he said he was cold. At one point, petitioner asked to speak to his mother. He was allowed to

call her, but the conversation was secretly taped and monitored by detectives without notice to

petitioner. He told his mother that the police “were cool.” Soon after completing the call,

petitioner gave a taped confession at ten on the evening of his arrest (Pet., App. A at 1–5).

After being examined by mental health experts, petitioner was found mentally

incompetent to stand trial. That was in August 2000. In April 2002, he was found competent. 

In an evidentiary hearing, the judge ruled that the confession could not be used in the

prosecution’s case-in-chief because it was taken in violation of petitioner’s right to counsel. It

held, however, that the statement could be used for impeachment because it was not coerced

(Exh. 6-A at 184–88). Petitioner testified and was impeached with his taped confession. He

was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. The court

imposed the statutory mandatory sentence of fifty-years to life.

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. That appeal contained the two claims

that are asserted in the instant action. Petitioner argued that his confession should have been

deemed coerced, and should not have been used for impeachment. He asserted that its use

prejudiced his defense. He also argued that his sentence was so disproportionate as to constitute

cruel and unusual punishment. The state court of appeal affirmed. It found that the confession

was voluntarily given despite a violation of petitioner’s Miranda rights. It found the sentence to

have been proportional to the crime despite petitioner’s background (Pet., App. A at 1–5). A

petition for rehearing in the court of appeal, as well as a timely petition for review by the

California Supreme Court, were denied without statement (Pet., App. B, C). Petitioner filed the

instant petition in September 2005. In December, the respondents were ordered to show cause

why the writ should not issue.

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ANALYSIS

Persons in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment may be provided habeas relief by

a federal court if they are held in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United

States. A petitioner must establish that, for any claim adjudicated on the merits, either (1) the

state-court decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the United

States Supreme Court, (2) involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (3) was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. 2254.

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it fails to apply the correct

Supreme Court authority to a question of law or if it applies such authority incorrectly to a case

involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those in the controlling decision. A state

court’s decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it applies the

governing Supreme Court rule in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405, 409–10 (2000). The Ninth Circuit has held that, in AEDPA cases,

determinations of factual issues by a state court must be presumed correct unless they are the

result of an “unreasonable determination.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir.

2004). This presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

2254(e)(1).

Petitioner argues that his conviction should be overturned because his confession was

coerced and should not have been used for impeachment. Petitioner also argues that his

sentence should be invalidated because the sentence is disproportionate to his crime.

1. USE OF PETITIONER’S CONFESSION FOR IMPEACHMENT.

Petitioner argues that the use of his taped confession for impeachment violated his Fifth

and Sixth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to counsel. The trial court found

that the confession was admissible for impeachment because petitioner’s right to silence was

waived voluntarily, but not knowingly and intelligently. Petitioner argues that the waiver was

not voluntary. The parties address the issue of coercion for both the Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights together. This order will likewise.

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“Waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and

intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which

depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,

including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” Edwards v. Arizona, 451

U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (citation omitted). Statements that are involuntary are inadmissible for

any purpose. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397–398 (1978). Statements that are voluntary,

but made without a proper waiver, are admissible for impeachment. Harris v. New York, 401

U.S. 222, 224 (1971).

In evaluating voluntariness, courts do not look to the state of mind of an accused who

waives his rights, but look for improper coercion by the state. Therefore, “[c]oercive police

activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’. . . .” 

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). The question of voluntariness is whether the

defendant’s will was overborne at the time he made the waiver. See Haynes v. Washington, 373

U.S. 503, 513 (1963). When evaluating voluntariness, courts must look to the totality of the

circumstances. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991).

After the accused invokes his right to counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation

until counsel has been made available, unless the accused initiates further communication with

the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. Further communication is initiated when the accused

evinces a “willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” 

Oregon v. Bradshaw, 426 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983).

There is no dispute as to whether petitioner initiated further communication. Petitioner

admits that, as the interrogators were preparing to leave after the right to counsel was invoked,

he said, “Hey, hold up. I am going to talk to you guys” (Pet. 7). The only issue concerns

voluntary waiver. Petitioner argues that his waiver was not voluntary because: (1) further

questioning by the interrogators was a deliberate violation of Miranda; (2) petitioner’s age,

education, background, experience and circumstances contributed to the involuntary nature of

his confession; and (3) petitioner was badgered and cajoled into waiving his rights. Petitioner

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argues that it was prejudicial error to have allowed the confession to be used for impeachment

because it was not made voluntarily.

Adjudicating the coercion issue must take many factors into account. This order will

examine each factor in turn and conclude that the state court’s determination was not contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, established federal law. Factual determinations were not

unreasonably made. Petitioner’s arguments fail.

A. Deliberate Violation of Miranda.

Petitioner claims that the police deliberately violated Miranda in continuing questioning

after petitioner invoked his right to counsel. It is undisputed that petitioner’s confession was

taken in violation of Miranda, but petitioner believes the issue of deliberate violation is relevant

because the Ninth Circuit in Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 1999), in

holding that a confession was involuntary, found it significant that the police were intentionally

violating Miranda to elicit statements that could be used for impeachment. Petitioner argues

that this order should review the claim independently, without using the “unreasonable

application” AEDPA standard, because the state court of appeal failed to adjudicate the claim

on the merits.

Petitioner is incorrect in saying that the state court of appeal failed to adjudicate the

claim on the merits. The court distinguished a cited decision from petitioner’s case on the

ground that the distinguished decision involved intentional conduct by detectives. By

distinguishing petitioner’s case on the issue of intentional conduct, the state court rejected

petitioner’s intentional conduct claim on the merits. This order, therefore, must apply the

stricter AEDPA standard.

In Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002), a post-AEDPA habeas

decision, the petitioner was held to have initiated further communication by asking, “What

happened?” Answers to the interrogator’s questions following that initiation were deemed

properly admitted.

In the instant case, the interrogating officer testified that his failure to re-advise

petitioner of his rights, after petitioner invoked his right to counsel and before further

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questioning and the confession, was due to his understanding that the first advisement was

sufficient. The officer testified that he believed petitioner had waived his right to counsel by

initiating further communication (Exh. 6-A at 102–03). Petitioner did initiate further

communication. Petitioner’s statement, “I am going to talk to you guys,” was surely more

inviting of further conversation than the initiation in Pollard. It was therefore reasonable under

federal law for the state court to conclude that the failure to re-advise was unintentional.

B. Petitioner’s Background.

Petitioner argues that the state court of appeal did not take into account relevant facts

regarding petitioner’s vulnerability to coercion when it evaluated the totality of the

circumstances. Petitioner says specifically that his dependence on his mother and his mental

state were not taken into account in determining that his statements were voluntary. This is not

true.

The state court of appeal noted that petitioner’s request to speak to his mother was

honored. It also dedicated a paragraph of its statement of the facts to petitioner’s phone call to

his mother. The state court of appeal made mention of petitioner’s mental history and the time

during which he was found incompetent to stand trial (Pet., App. A at 6–7, 9, 12). The record

shows that determinations as to petitioner’s background were reasonably made. The state court

considered all of the factors that defendant asked to be considered.

C. Badgering and Cajoling.

Petitioner argues that he was badgered and cajoled into answering questions. As

discussed above, petitioner initiated further communication during his first interview with

police. There is no assertion or evidence in the record that petitioner was badgered or cajoled

before he said, “I am going to talk to you guys,” in the first fifteen minutes of questioning. It

was reasonable for the court of appeal to conclude that petitioner was not improperly badgered

or cajoled into initiating further conversation as nothing happened in the short time between the

officers getting ready to leave and petitioner’s invitation to further communication. As stated

earlier, petitioner was held for two hours before the first interview. Other interviews occurred

throughout the day as police went out to investigate petitioner’s statements. He was in the

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interview room for a total of twelve hours during which he took naps, was given food, drink,

and a coat to keep warm.

There is no assertion or evidence in the record that petitioner later reasserted his right to

silence or to counsel. To the contrary, there is testimony indicating that petitioner repeatedly

asked to talk to the officers (Exh. 6-A at 97). Petitioner claims that a minor’s repeated requests

to speak to his mother indicated a desire to invoke the right to remain silent. Petitioner does not

cite to, and this Court cannot find, federal law supporting such a conclusion. Petitioner,

furthermore, was not a minor at the time of the interrogation (Pet. 20).

Petitioner also claims that he was tricked by detectives because his mother advised him

that he would not need a lawyer if he were tried as a juvenile (Exh. 7 at 2). Petitioner argues

that this was tantamount to the detectives giving advice to waive the right to counsel because

they were aware of the substance of the conversation and did not comment on the mother’s

advice. The Supreme Court has held that the protections against coercion offered by the

Constitution apply only to proscribe government activity. Without government coercion, it is

irrelevant what other factors went into petitioner’s decision. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479

U.S. 157, 164–65 (1986). Petitioner furthermore mis-characterizes the substance of the phone

conversation. Petitioner’s mother only gave conditional advice: “[B]ut we gotta find out what’s

gonna happen. If they try you as a juvenile, you ain’t gonna need no lawyer, See [sic]” (Exh. 7

at 2) (emphasis added). Petitioner does not allege that he believed he would be tried as a

juvenile. It was therefore reasonable under federal law for the state court of appeal to conclude

that detectives did not badger or cajole petitioner into waiving his rights.

Despite petitioner’s protestation to the contrary, the state court of appeal did take notice

of the above factors when it independently reviewed the trial court’s application of the totality

of the circumstances test as to voluntariness. The court examined the distinction between

intentional and unintentional police conduct. It examined the evidence of petitioner’s

background including his age, education and mental health. It examined the evidence of the

interrogator’s behavior (Pet., App. A at 8–9). The court applied the correct law and determined

that petitioner was not coerced. Its determination cannot be said to be “unreasonable” given

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that none of the factors show coercion. Petitioner has not shown that the court’s decision as to

any of the above factors was an unreasonable application of law or determination of fact. 

2. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SENTENCE.

Petitioner next argues that the state court of appeal unreasonably applied federal law

when it determined that his sentence was constitutionally proportionate to his crime. Petitioner

argued before the state court that he was denied due process at sentencing because the trial court

did not appreciate that it could reduce a mandatory statutory sentence of fifty-years to life for

being disproportionate.

The trial court sympathized with petitioner and wished that a lighter sentence could be

imposed, but said it could not do so because the sentence was mandated by statute (Pet., App. A

at 13). Trial counsel did not suggest any way in which the trial court could reduce the sentence. 

The state court of appeal determined that the trial court had a mistaken understanding of its

sentencing power because the sentence could have been reduced if the trial court found it

constitutionally disproportionate. The state court of appeal evaluated the merits of the

disproportionality issue on its own, making remand unnecessary. It found the sentence

constitutionally proportionate. Petitioner argues that the court’s proportionality analysis was

flawed and that its failure to remand was a deprivation of due process. Petitioner also argues

that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at sentencing.

A. The State Court of Appeal’s Proportionality Analysis.

Petitioner challenges the sentence as disproportionate as applied. He admits that the

sentence is not facially disproportionate for the crime of murder. Petitioner says that he was

seventeen at the time of the offense, mentally ill and not fully culpable because of self-defense

and provocation. A federal habeas court cannot re-examine state-court determinations on statelaw questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). Petitioner’s appeal to state-law

authorities must therefore be disregarded.

A criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been

convicted. Solem v. Helm, 436 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). “The Eighth Amendment does not

require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme

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sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,

23 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The

sentencing court is not required to consider mitigating factors if there is a statutory mandatory

penalty. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994–95.

The decisions petitioner raises to show that age is a relevant factor all relate to the

application of the death penalty to minors. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56

(2005); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.

815, 819 (1988). But, the Supreme Court has “drawn the line of required individualized

sentencing at capital cases.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995–96. The death penalty was not at issue

in petitioner’s sentencing so there was no requirement to consider mitigating factors. Minors

can be sentenced to life imprisonment. In Harris, a pre-AEDPA Ninth Circuit decision, the

court said that there was no inference of disproportionality when a mandatory life sentence was

applied to a 15-year-old murderer. Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 582 (1996). Although Harris

is pre-AEDPA, it’s holding shows that there is no clearly established federal law making life

sentences disproportionate for minors.

Petitioner also says his background, mental status at the time of sentencing, and the

circumstances of the crime show that the sentence was disproportionate. Like petitioner’s age,

these are also mitigating factors. In accordance with the rule in Harmelin, the state courts were

not required to consider them.

The decision of the state court of appeal is consistent with federal law. The sentence, as

applied, is not grossly disproportional.

B. Failure to Remand.

Petitioner argues that it was a denial of due process for the state court of appeal to

decide on the issue of sentence proportionality instead of leaving the determination to the trial

court. Petitioner says that additional evidence not on the record could have been collected on

remand, but does not say what that evidence would have been. Petitioner also argues that the

trial judge, having interacted with petitioner on a daily basis, would have been better positioned

to consider his background in a sentencing decision.

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Petitioner is correct that a trial judge is in a better position to consider a variety of

factors in a sentencing decision. As petitioner also repeats multiple times, the trial judge

expressed his strong regret when imposing the mandatory sentence. As determined in the above

section, however, the consideration of mitigating factors is not required by federal law in the

context of mandatory sentences (except those involving the death penalty). Significantly, no

federal authority requiring remand by the court of appeal is cited, much less Supreme Court

authority.

However unfortunate petitioner’s circumstances were, the mitigating factors offered

were irrelevant to the proportionality analysis. The state court of appeal was able to make a

determination on sentence proportionality based on the record. No federal authority having this

procedure has been cited.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failure to Raise Cruel and

Unusual Punishment Argument.

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of

sentence proportionality. The claim was never raised in state proceedings. The only ineffective

assistance of counsel claim raised in state court related to jury instructions.

A petitioner who presents an ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot “later add

unrelated alleged instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to his claim.” Moormann v. Shriro, 426

F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). The claim made now was not related to the jury instruction

claim made earlier. It was not fairly presented before the state courts. It is therefore

unexhausted and procedurally barred from consideration by the federal courts.

A district court may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits if it is perfectly clear that

the application does not raise even a colorable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(2); See Cassett

v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2005). In alleging ineffective assistance of counsel,

the petitioner must show that counsel was deficient and that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

The federal claim is denied for two reasons. First, the state court of appeal agreed to

address the issue of cruel and unusual punishment on the merits even though trial counsel did

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not raise it. Petitioner was therefore not prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim at

sentencing. Second, this order has already concluded that, under federal law, the sentence was

not disproportionate. Petitioner would therefore have reached the same outcome had the issue

been raised at sentencing. There is no colorable federal claim. The claim is denied on the

merits.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not shown that he is in custody in violation of federal law. The petition is

therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2006. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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