Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02938/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02938-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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1

 The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 03-2880/2938

___________

William Weaver, *

*

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Michael Bowersox, *

*

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 13, 2004

Filed: February 16, 2006 (Corrected 2/23/06)

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

The State of Missouri appeals the grant of habeas relief to William Weaver.

The district court1

 concluded that the prosecutor’s closing arguments during the

penalty phase of Weaver’s capital murder trial violated the United States Constitution.

Weaver cross-appeals the denial of his claim that the prosecutor made improper

closing arguments during the guilt phase of the trial. We affirm.

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I.

 In separate Missouri state court trials held in 1988, William Weaver and Daryl

Shurn were convicted of the execution-style shooting death of Charles Taylor. Taylor

was an acquaintance of Shurn who was going to testify against Shurn in a drug case.

Shurn hired Weaver to kill Taylor, and Weaver was convicted of doing so. 

During his closing argument in the penalty phase, the prosecutor made a series

of statements relevant to the claims in this matter. In a claim the parties identify as

Claim 2E, the prosecutor made the following statements: 

So, yeah, is there a possibility he's innocent? A possibility. I'm not

going to deny that. But that's not what's required by the law and that's

not what we could live by. If that's required, nobody would ever be

sentenced to die. We wouldn't have a death penalty. And, quite frankly,

if you don't sentence him to die in this case, there's no point in having a

death penalty.

Weaver's trial counsel objected to the statements as improper and misstatements of the

law. The state trial court sustained the objection and issued a curative instruction for

the jury to disregard the statements.

In a claim the parties identify as Claim 2F, the prosecutor made the following

statements:

Then I'll say what I said earlier. If these facts don't justify, don't cry out

for the death penalty, then which facts do? If a cold-blooded hit on

behalf of drug scum isn't enough for the death penalty, then what facts

justify it?

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I know there's a movie, Patton, and in the movie, George Patton was

talking to his troops because the next day they were going to go out in

battle and they were scared as young soldiers. And he's explaining to

them that I know that some of you are going to get killed and some of

you are going to do some killing tomorrow morning. And they all knew

that. And he was going to try to encourage them that sometimes you've

got to kill and sometimes you've got to risk death because it's right. He

said: But tomorrow when you reach over and put your hand in the pile

of goo that a moment before was your best friend's face, you'll know

what to do.

Defense counsel objected to the statements as improper on the grounds that they were

intended to inflame and prejudice the jury. The state trial court overruled the

objection.

Finally, in a claim the parties identify as part of Claim 2M, the prosecutor made

statements that Weaver contends improperly focused the jury on society's general war

on drugs, urged the jury to sentence Weaver to death merely to send a message to

other drug dealers, and caused the jury to ignore its obligation to individualize its

sentencing consideration by focusing on the particular facts involved in his case:

It strikes right at the heart of our system. You've got to look beyond

William Weaver. This isn't personal. This is business. You people

represent the entire community. You represent society. You have to

give a message here. You have to tell the Williams Weavers and the

Daryl Shurns of the world, and you have to be willing to look them right

in the eye when you do it, that there's a point at which we won't allow

you to go. And when you do, prison's too good. It's the death penalty.

Sometimes killing is not only fair and justified; it's right. Sometimes it's

your duty. There are times when you have to kill in this life and it's the

right thing to do. If Charles Taylor had been able to get his gun out that

day, would you have said it was right for him to kill Weaver and Shurn?

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Of course, you would. It would have been self-defense. Well, it was

right to kill then and it's right to kill him now.

. . . .

This case – I guess it's the one that just cries out to you to say protect the

community. The drug dealers, they are taking our streets away from us.

Are we going to take them back? Are we going to let them have the

streets or are we going to fight back? If the drug peddlers are going to

run our community, then all is lost. Then there's no point in having

jurors. The death penalty applies in some cases. It applies in this case.

When it comes time after [defense counsel] talks to you, I'll talk to you

again briefly, and then you've got to go to the jury room and you've just

got to toughen up and do what's right, even though it's going to be tough.

You've got to say this is bigger than William Weaver. It's not personal;

it's business.

. . . .

And I'm going to beg you for the entire community and for society not

to spare his life. I'm going to beg you for the right message instead of

the wrong message. The right message is life? For an execution? That's

the right message? That's the message you want to send to the drug

dealers, the dope peddlers and the hit men they hire to do their dirty

deeds: Life in prison is what you get when we catch you and convict

you. Life in prison? That's the message you want to send to the scum of

the world? That when we catch you and we're convinced you're guilty,

we're going to give you life in prison? That's not the right message.

. . . .

The message has to be death for these types of people. That's the only

message they are going to understand.

The one thing you've got to get into your head, this is far more important

than William Weaver. This case goes far beyond William Weaver. This

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touches all the dope peddlers and the murderers in the world. That's the

message you have to send. It doesn't just pertain to William Weaver. It

pertains to all of us, the community. They are our streets, our

neighborhoods, our family. The message is death, not life. And you've

just got to geer [sic] yourself to that.

. . . .

You've got to think beyond William Weaver. As I told you earlier, this

is our worst nightmare. This is society's worst nightmare. If they could

kill witnesses and we don't execute them in exchange, then there's no

deterrence. Then the whole system fails and then chaos reigns and our

streets are never safe. The dope peddlers reign and people like William

Weaver do.

. . . . 

It's bigger than William Weaver. And you've got to have the guts to do

it. I'm the Prosecuting Attorney in this county, the top law enforcement

officer in the county. I decide in which cases we ask for the death

penalty and in which cases we don't.

Weaver's counsel objected to the last statement regarding the prosecutor being the top

law enforcement officer in the county who chooses the cases in which to pursue the

death penalty. The trial court sustained the objection to that statement, and instructed

the jury to disregard it.

The jury sentenced Weaver to death for his role in the offense.

After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Weaver filed a petition in

federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which, after amendment by counsel,

raised twenty-two separate claims for relief. The district court granted relief on the

first of those claims that Weaver's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when

the prosecutor exercised two peremptory strikes against black venirepersons during

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jury selection. The State of Missouri appealed. This court reversed and remanded

with instructions to address the remaining twenty-one issues raised in Weaver's

petition. Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001).

On remand, the district court again granted relief, this time on three claims

related to improper closing arguments the prosecutor made during the penalty phase

of Weaver's trial. The district court vacated the death sentence, and ordered that

Weaver either be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole or be

given a new penalty-phase trial. The district court denied relief on all other claims,

but granted a certificate of appealability on two claims related to closing arguments

the prosecutor made during the guilt phase of Weaver's trial.

II.

We first briefly address the cross-appeal. In claims the parties identify as 2B

and 2C, Weaver contends the prosecutor made six statements during the guilt-phase

closing argument and rebuttal which improperly referred to the prosecutor's personal

beliefs or threatened the jury. A discussion of the actual statements is not necessary

because the district court determined the claims had been procedurally defaulted. As

a consequence, Weaver has to show "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental

miscarriage of justice" to have the claims reviewed. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 750 (1991) ("[F]ederal habeas review of [a procedurally defaulted claim]

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice."). 

The district court determined Weaver failed to show cause and prejudice or

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice arising from the failure to consider

the claims. In an abundance of caution, the district court addressed the merits of the

claims and determined the statements did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as

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to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477

U.S. 168, 181 (1986).

On appeal, Weaver does not address the procedural default issue. He does not

argue there was cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice

occurred. By failing to address the procedural default issue, he has abandoned his

cross-appeal. See, e.g., Etheridge v. United States, 241 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 2001)

("Claims not argued in the briefs are deemed abandoned on appeal."). We therefore

decline to review the merits of Weaver's cross-appeal.

III.

We next turn to the issue of whether Weaver’s claims are subject to the

strictures placed on our review by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Weaver argues the Missouri Supreme Court did not address the

“war on drugs” claims set out in Claim 2M. Our review of the Missouri Supreme

Court decision leads to the conclusion that although the war on drugs claims were not

specifically discussed, the Missouri Supreme Court did address the claims in a

conclusory fashion that is sufficent to bring the case under AEDPA.

The Missouri Supreme Court addressed the appellant’s claims about the

prosecutor’s emphasis on his position as the elected prosecutor in Section IV.A. of the

opinion and a claim the prosecutor accused defense counsel of suborning perjury in

closing argument in Section IV.B. Those claims were discussed in considerable detail

by the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then went on to discuss the

arguments raised in Weaver's "Other Argument Section" of his state post-conviction

application in section IV.C., under the heading: “Other Improper Arguments.” The

Court stated in that section:

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Lastly, Weaver puts forth a collection of allegedly improper arguments

made by the state during the punishment phase, including the complaint

that the prosecutor argued matters outside the evidence that lacked

evidentiary support. The prosecutor argued that had Weaver not run out

of bullets he would have shot the arresting officer. He argued that if a

prosecution witness had been out jogging a short while after the crime

Weaver would have also shot that witness. Finally, he argued that the

death penalty would be a deterrent. Our review of the penalty phase

arguments discloses that these arguments are reasonable. The fact that

the crime had been planned for the purpose of killing a witness and for

the purpose of advancing what was apparently a very violent drug

enterprise, permits an inference that the defendant had a high propensity

for violent conduct in the future. The claim that the trial court abused its

discretion in permitting the argument is without merit. The point is

denied.

Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 514 (Mo. 1995). 

Our court’s en banc decision in Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir.

2004) held that “the ‘summary nature’ of the discussion of the federal constitutional

question does not preclude application of the AEDPA standard.” The opinion goes

on to cite to James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999). In James, our

court stated that “[t]he summary nature of the Missouri Court of Appeals opinion does

not affect [our decision to apply the AEDPA] standard.” Id. at 869.

The Seventh Circuit ruled in Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2005)

that: 

AEDPA’s requirement that a petitioner’s claim be adjudicated on the

merits by a state court is not an entitlement to a well-articulated or even

a correct decision by a state court. In fact, several circuits have held that

a state court need not offer any reasons and summarily dispose of a

petitioner’s claim and that summary disposition would be an

adjudication on the merits. (emphasis in original)

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 The Missouri Supreme Court’s summary disposition of Section IV.C. claims

is an adjudication on the merits. We understand the concurrence’s argument that the

Missouri Supreme Court discussed, in a cursory fashion, some of the specific claims

set out in Section IV.C., but did not specifically address the war on drugs claim.

However, a decision by a state supreme court that disposes of a claim, even in a

conclusory fashion, is sufficient. In this case, the Missouri Supreme Court

recognized a number of claims relating to allegedly improper closing arguments and

summarily denied those claims. The discussion in Section IV.C., of the Missouri

Supreme Court decision, read in context with the discussions in Sections IV.A. and

IV.B. is sufficient under our court’s interpretation of AEDPA.

IV.

Under AEDPA, a court should only grant relief if “a decision [is] contrary to,

or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “a

decision [is] based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362 (2000). 

The State argues that the United States Supreme Court has not addressed

improper penalty-phase closing arguments by a prosecutor. However, we have

previously found that argument unpersuasive. Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d

969, 974 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that “it is apparent that there are Supreme Court

decisions on penalty phase closing arguments” and “[t]here are also Supreme Court

decisions on guilt phase closing arguments that are relevant”).

A prosecutor’s argument violates due process if it “infect[s] the trial with

unfairness.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. To determine if a prosecutor’s statement

infected Weaver’s trial with unfairness, the court must:

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(1) Measure the type of prejudice that arose from the argument; (2)

examine what defense counsel did in his [or her] argument to minimize

prejudice; (3) review jury instructions to see if the jury was properly

instructed; and (4) determine if there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different, taking into

account all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1363 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Newlon v. Armontrout,

885 F.2d 1328, 1337 n.10 (8th Cir. 1989)). The court should only grant habeas corpus

relief it the state’s “closing argument was so inflammatory and so outrageous that any

reasonable trial judge would have sua sponte declared a mistrial.” James v. Bowersox,

187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999). Without applying AEDPA, we vacated two

sentences, including that of Shurn, the man who hired Weaver to kill Taylor, when the

prosecutor in Weaver’s trial made similar improper arguments in the penalty phase.

Newlon, 885 F.2d at 1329; Shurn v. Delo, 177 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 1999).

The prosecutor in this case made various penalty phase statements listed in

detail in Section I. These statements can be categorized into several types: (1) an

analogy that the role of a juror is like that of a soldier who must do his or her duty and

have the courage to kill; (2) statements by the prosecutor about his personal belief in

the death penalty; (3) statements that executing Weaver was necessary to sustain a

societal effort as part of the “war on drugs”; (4) assertions that the prosecutor had a

special position of authority and decided whether to seek the death penalty; and (5)

arguments that were designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury (culminating in a

statement that the jury should “kill [Weaver] now”).

Category (1) is factually unique, but contains statements similar in nature to

impermissible statements made in other cases. When a prosecutor tells a jury that they

have a duty to kill and, as in this case, uses a graphic story from a movie to support

that duty, the statement should be taken as “calculated to remove reason and

responsibility from the sentencing process.” Newlon, 885 F.2d at 1338. Soldiers have

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no choice but to kill. Soldiers follow orders when they kill. The responsibility for a

particular death lies, therefore, with a commanding officer or the declaration of war

itself, and not with a soldier's individual conscience. Furthermore, wartime killing is

not a deliberative process, not a considered choice. 

Describing jurors as soldiers with a duty eviscerates the concept of discretion

afforded to a jury as required by the Eighth Amendment. See Zant v. Stephens, 462

U.S. 862, 879 (1983). Not only was the main thrust of the prosecutor’s argument

diametrically opposed to the requirement that capital sentencing be at the jury’s

discretion, it also "diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death

sentence, in violation of the Eighth Amendment under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472

U.S. 320, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (1985)." Antwine, 54 F.3d at 1361. 

Categories (2), (4), and (5) are improperly inflammatory under several existing

United States Supreme Court precedents. Statements about the prosecutor’s personal

belief in the death penalty are inappropriate and contrary to a reasoned opinion by the

jury. Miller v. Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1995). A prosecutor should

not emphasize his or her position of authority in making death penalty determinations

because it may encourage the jury to defer to the prosecutor’s judgment. Newlon, 885

F.2d at 1335-37. Further, arguments against a rational decision by the jury, and

specifically those that implore the jury to kill the defendant immediately, are contrary

to a fair proceeding. Id. at 1336-37; see also Shurn, 177 F.3d at 667-69 (Wollman, J.,

concurring). 

Category (3) is also factually distinct, but similar to arguments that are

improper under existing law. The controlling Supreme Court precedent is well-settled

and longstanding: the Eighth Amendment requires capital sentencing to be an

individualized decision-making process. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S.

373, 381 (1999) ("In order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional

muster, it must perform a narrowing function with respect to the class of persons

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eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentencing decisions

rest upon an individualized inquiry."); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 274-75

(1998) (referring to "the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing

in capital cases"); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 7 (1994) ("States must ensure

that 'capital sentencing decisions rest on [an] individualized inquiry,' under which the

'character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular

offense' are considered.") (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303 (1987));

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) ("We have held that a capital

sentence is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed without

an individualized determination that that punishment is 'appropriate[.]'") (citing

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)); Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 ("What

is important [from a constitutional standpoint] at the selection stage is an

individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the

circumstances of the crime.").

The argument that a signal must be sent from one case to affect other cases puts

a improper burden on the defendant because it prevents an individual determination

of the appropriateness of capital punishment. Sublett v. Dormire, 217 F.3d 598, 600-

01 (8th Cir. 2000). Further, invoking a jury’s general fear of crime to encourage the

application of the death penalty in a particular case is unfairly inflammatory.

Copeland, 232 F.3d at 972-73. Using the conscience of the community as a guiding

principle for punishment puts too significant of a burden on a single defendant.

United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1992). 

There is little doubt that the prosecutor’s statements are such that we would

certainly grant relief without applying AEDPA. However, case law that applies the

AEDPA bar makes it a closer decision. The question for us is whether the state court

made an unreasonable interpretation of federal law as required by AEDPA. The

finding by our court in Copeland is illustrative on this point. In Copeland, applying

AEDPA, we found that the prosecutor’s arguments in the penalty phase risked

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creating a mob mentality by preying on the jury’s fear of crime. Copeland, 232 F.3d

at 975. Further, the court found that, “it was unreasonable, in light of Supreme Court

precedent, to conclude that the argument did not result in a deprivation of due

process.” The statements in this case are more egregious and systemic than those in

Copeland. 

The conclusion by the Missouri Supreme Court that “the penalty phase

arguments . . . [were] reasonable” is unreasonable under existing United States

Supreme Court precedents. It is unclear which precedents the Missouri Supreme

Court applied. Regardless, there can be no interpretation of the inflammatory remarks

by the prosecutor that is reasonable under the various applicable United States

Supreme Court precedents. As a result, AEDPA does not bar relief in the present

matter.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result.

I agree Weaver's claims warrant habeas relief even if AEDPA's strict standard

of review applies. I write separately because I do not believe AEDPA applies.

When a claim raised in state court proceedings is ignored by the state courts

"we apply a pre-AEDPA standard of review." Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744,

756 n.8 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 967-68 (8th Cir.

2003)); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) ("In this case, our review

is not circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither

of the state courts below reached this prong of the Strickland analysis."); Canaan v.

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2

Specifically, the prosecutor argued:

The death penalty deters. I'm convinced of that. People can argue for a

thousand years whether it does or not, but I'm convinced it does. It

doesn't deter passion killings. It doesn't deter crazed people who kill.

But it deters business killings like this.

I set forth the specifics of this argument for the purpose of showing Weaver's

"deterrent" claim was distinct from his "war-on-drugs" claim in state court.

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McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) ("When a state court is silent with respect

to a habeas corpus petitioner's claim, that claim has not been 'adjudicated on the

merits' for purposes of § 2254(d) [and] a federal court cannot apply the deferential

standard provided by § 2254(d)."); Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.

2003) ("Where, as here, the state court did not assess the merits of a claim properly

raised in a habeas petition, the deference due under AEDPA does not apply."). 

A careful side-by side examination of the claims Weaver made in state court

and the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion addressing those claims convinces me the

latter ignored what Weaver referred to then as his "War On Drugs" argument, and

what the Court refers to now as categories (3) and (5) of Weaver's claim, that is, the

"War On Drugs" argument as well as the statements designed to appeal to the

emotions of the jury.

Before the Missouri Supreme Court, Weaver made six separate arguments in

a section entitled "Other Improper Arguments." The six separate arguments were as

follows: 1) the prosecutor's statement that if Weaver had not run out of bullets, he

would have shot a police officer; 2) the prosecutor's statement that if Weaver had not

run out of bullets, he would have shot witness Jean Hanson; 3) the prosecutor's

discussion of the death penalty as a deterrent to homicide in violation of a pre-trial

motion in limine;2

 4) the prosecutor's opinion there were crimes other than first degree

murder for which a sentence of life without parole would be appropriate; 5) the

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prosecutor's claim he could have presented victim impact evidence through the

victim's wife, relatives, and friends; and 6) the "War On Drugs" argument, which

identified and challenged the specific portions of the sentencing transcript containing

the prosecutor's statements that have been referred to as Claim 2M in the proceedings

before our court.

The Missouri Supreme Court's opinion discusses only the first three of the six

arguments advanced by Weaver:

Lastly, Weaver puts forth a collection of allegedly improper arguments

made by the state during the punishment phase, including the complaint

that the prosecutor argued matters outside the evidence that lacked

evidentiary support. The prosecutor argued that [1] had Weaver not run

out of bullets he would have shot the arresting officer. [2] He argued that

if a prosecution witness had been out jogging a short while after the

crime Weaver would have also shot that witness. [3] Finally, he argued

that the death penalty would be a deterrent. Our review of the penalty

phase arguments discloses that these arguments are reasonable. The fact

that the crime had been planned for the purpose of killing a witness and

for the purpose of advancing what was apparently a very violent drug

enterprise, permits an inference that the defendant had a high propensity

for violent conduct in the future. The claim that the trial court abused its

discretion in permitting the argument is without merit. The point is

denied.

State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 514 (Mo. 1995).

In determining whether a claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the

purpose of applying AEDPA's strict standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

"[w]e must simply look at what a state court has said, case by case, and determine

whether the federal constitutional claim was considered and rejected by that court."

Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004). While I acknowledge the

"summary nature of a state court's decision does not affect the applicable standard of

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review," Closs v. Weber, 238 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing James v.

Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999)), I submit a distinction must be drawn

between summarily disposing of a claim and wholly ignoring it. 

Significantly, when I look at what the state court said in this case, it is clear the

state court discusses and analyzes only three of the six arguments advanced by

Weaver in his "Other Improper Arguments" section. Most notably, the state court

identified the third of Weaver's six arguments as his final argument, and nowhere

discusses or analyzes Weaver's last three arguments, including his "War On Drugs"

claim. I do not know what else to glean from what the state court said other than to

conclude it ignored Weaver's most compelling constitutional claim.

As the Court notes, the Eighth Amendment requires capital sentencing to be an

individualized decision-making process. See ante at 12. Not once, not twice, not

thrice, but seven times the prosecutor urged the jury to ignore the individual offender,

William Weaver. Instead of focusing the jurors' attention upon Weaver's character

and record, and the particular circumstances of Weaver's offense, the prosecutor

instead advised the jury "[t]he one thing you've got to get into your head, this is far

more important than William Weaver. This case goes far beyond William Weaver."

 He told the jury "drug dealers . . . are taking our streets away from us." He advised

the jury to "send a message" to "all dope peddlers and murderers in the world [for the

sake of] all of us, the community. They are our streets, our neighborhoods, our

family." He said drug dealers were "society's worst nightmare. If they could kill

witnesses and we don't execute them in exchange, then there's not deterrence. Then

the whole system fails and then chaos reigns and our streets are never safe. The dope

peddlers reign."

These statements, as well as the other improper statements discussed by the

Court, clearly violated Weaver's constitutional rights. I have no trouble concluding

such to be the case when reviewing the district court's decision de novo or when

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applying the more demanding standard of review under AEDPA. I therefore concur

in affirming the judgment of the district court.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with Judge Melloy that all of Weaver's claims are subject to review

under the AEDPA standard and concur in Part III of his opinion. But because I do not

think that the Court correctly applies that standard to Weaver's claims of prosecutorial

misconduct, I respectfully dissent. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as amended by

AEDPA, we must accept a state court's decision on the merits of a claim later raised

in federal habeas proceedings unless that decision "was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States." The Court today, purporting to apply the

AEDPA standard, holds that habeas relief must be granted to Weaver on his sentence.

The Court notes that several of Weaver's claims are "factually unique" or

"factually distinct," presumably when compared to habeas claims adjudicated by the

Supreme Court to date. ante at 10, 11. These factual distinctions alone raise red flags.

I propose that it is less likely that a state court's decision will be contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when there are no Supreme

Court cases on all fours. Moreover, the law that the Court cites today as on point is

found in opinions from this Circuit, not in opinions from the Supreme Court. "[A]s

the statutory language makes clear, . . . § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to [the Supreme] Court's jurisprudence." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000).

The Supreme Court cases to which the Court does refer in its opinion stand for

general propositions: "[a] prosecutor's argument violates due process if it 'infect[s] the

trial with unfairness,'" ante at 9 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986)); the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury not be precluded from exercising

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its discretion, ante at 11 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (noting the

requirement in capital cases for an "individualized determination" of those defendants

who should receive the ultimate penalty "on the basis of the character of the individual

and the circumstances of the crime")); and there is a need for "an individualized

decision-making process" so that a death sentence will pass constitutional muster, ante

at 11 (citing Supreme Court cases at 11–12). None of the Supreme Court cases cited

in the Court's opinion touches on the distinct claims of prosecutorial misconduct on

which the writ was granted.

In these circumstances, I cannot agree that the Missouri Supreme Court's

decision on the issue of the prosecutor's penalty-phase argument is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court. Were it not for the AEDPA standard of review, I might agree with

the result reached by the Court today. Indeed, the outcome was different—where we

did not apply the AEDPA standard—in our § 2254 review of Weaver's co-defendant's

death sentence on grounds of improper prosecutorial closing argument in the penalty

phase. Shurn v. Delo, 177 F.3d 662, 665–67 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1010

(1999); see also Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming preAEDPA grant of the writ on grounds of improper prosecutorial argument), cert.

denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990). But under AEDPA, we are not empowered to grant the

writ even though we may believe that the state court got it wrong. A state-court

decision is not necessarily unreasonable because the federal habeas courts deem it to

be incorrect. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411. "A federal court may not overrule

a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent

from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12,

17 (2003) (expounding the "contrary to" standard). The only issue for the federal

courts in this case is whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Because of the apparent

inconclusive state of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the alleged constitutional

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violation in this case (the Court cites no apposite Supreme Court cases), I would hold

that the state court's decision was neither contrary to nor an objectively unreasonable

application of federal law and would reverse the judgment of the District Court.

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