Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04211/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04211-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRA RAMIREZ, an individual,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC.,

and DOES 1-5, inclusive,

Defendant. /

No. C 14-04211 WHA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, plaintiff moves to voluntarily dismiss her

complaint without prejudice on the basis that she wishes to add new parties that would destroy

complete diversity. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Sandra Ramirez worked as a leasing agent for defendant AvalonBay

Communities, Inc. In August 2014, Ramirez commenced this action in state court against

AvalonBay. The action was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,

because plaintiff is a citizen of California, and defendant is incorporated in Maryland and has its

principal place of business in Virginia.

The operative scheduling order herein set the deadline to seek leave to join additional

parties as January 30, 2015. Discovery has closed and the deadline for filing a motion for

summary judgment is August 13. Ramirez filed this motion on June 4, seeking voluntary

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For the Northern District of California

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dismissal without prejudice because she wished to join two new defendants, James Speltz and

Grace Naylor (Ramirez’s supervisors at AvalonBay), to assert claims based what she claimed

were newly-discovered facts. Ramirez was concerned that if she sought leave to join Speltz and

Naylor past the deadline, such motion might be denied, after which point the statute of

limitations on her claims against them would have run. On the other hand, Ramirez noted that if

she was permitted to join Speltz and Naylor, the action would be remanded to state court, as

they, like herself, were California residents, so complete diversity would be destroyed. 

On June 5, Ramirez commenced an action against Speltz and Naylor in state court. 

Ramirez asserted that Speltz had harassed her based on her sexual orientation and her disability

in the form of fabricated customer-service complaints and that Naylor disregarded her

complaints about Speltz and ultimately recommended Ramirez’s termination (Def.’s Request for

Judicial Notice, Exh. 1).

Ramirez now moves to voluntarily dismiss her complaint without prejudice under Rule

41(a)(2). AvalonBay opposes this motion. This order follows full briefing and oral argument.

ANALYSIS

Rule 41(a)(2) provides that after the opposing party files an answer or motion for

summary judgment, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on

terms that the court considers proper.” A motion for voluntary dismissal should be denied if it is

based on impermissible forum-shopping, which may be shown if the plaintiff’s justification for

the motion is baseless. Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 792 F.2d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.

1986). AvalonBay argues that Ramirez’s justification for her motion is based on false premises

and that it would be prejudiced if Ramirez is allowed to dismiss this action, only to join all

parties herein in the state-court action against Speltz and Naylor.

Ramirez claims her motion is justified because new facts arose that led her to seek to add

new parties after the court’s deadline, and has already filed claims against Speltz and Naylor in

state court. This argument fails. Ramirez argues that it was not until she reviewed Speltz’s

allegedly fabricated customer-service complaints, produced in discovery, that Speltz had

discussed with her that she discovered that Naylor may have approved of and participated in

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Speltz’s conduct (Pl.’s Reply at 2–3). Ramirez cannot, however, overcome the fact that she filed

a complaint against Speltz with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing about the same

alleged harassment and noted her belief that Naylor had disregarded her complaints (Def.’s

Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 2). It is simply implausible that nearly a year into this

litigation Ramirez would have only now realized that she had a claim against Speltz and Naylor,

and Ramirez cannot be permitted to use a belated state court proceeding to circumvent the

deadline for joining new parties or to avoid the federal forum. 

“A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless

a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches,

263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). AvalonBay argues that it would be prejudiced if Ramirez’s

motion were to be granted. For example, AvalonBay argues that it could face greater liability if

it is joined in the state-court action, as it could be held “vicariously liable” for Speltz’s and

Naylor’s conduct. Further, Ramirez’s extensive delay in pursuing her claims against Speltz and

Naylor has caused AvalonBay to incur expenses that would be futile if it were brought back into

state court. Specifically, AvalonBay has incurred fees for time spent preparing its removal

petition, attending the case management conference, preparing its initial disclosures, and filing a

Rule 26(f) report. Additionally, AvalonBay could be forced to make duplicate expenditures in

state court, if, for example, it is required to participate in alternative dispute resolution even

though it has already participated in mediation herein, and may need to attend a new deposition

of Ramirez conducted by Speltz and Naylor. 

Ramirez’s only argument that AvalonBay has not been prejudiced is that because

AvalonBay’s defense counsel will likely also defend Speltz and Naylor, certain discovery

materials. That argument is insufficient to overcome the prejudice that AvalonBay has

established and the lack of good cause for Ramirez’s motion.

Lastly, Ramirez argues that this is an “exceptional” circumstance that justifies the

exercise of Colorado River abstention. In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–19 (1976), the Supreme Court found that in light of the “virtually

unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” a federal

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court should only dismiss a matter on the basis of a parallel proceeding in state court based on

the “clearest of justifications.” Colorado River and subsequent decisions lay out the following

factors, that, although not exclusive, are relevant to whether it is appropriate to stay proceedings: 

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the inconvenience of the

federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums

obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the

merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal

litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the state court proceedings will

resolve all issues before the federal court. Railroad Street & Co Inc. v. Transport Insurance Co.,

656 F.3d 966, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2011). The factors are applied “with the balance heavily

weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury

Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).

Factors 4 and 7 heavily favor the exercise of jurisdiction, as this case precedes the

parallel state court proceeding, and to grant Ramirez’s motion would plainly encourage plaintiffs

to belatedly file separate claims against non-necessary parties in a different forum as an escape

hatch from a federal forum. Ramirez argues that state court is more convenient as both she and

her counsel are located 25 miles outside of San Francisco, but that is not so inconvenient to sway

the Court.

It is true that factors 3, 5, 6, and 8 do favor abstention, because Ramirez’s claims are

based on state law, and she would be able to join the defendants herein in that case. Factor 1

does not apply as there is no property involved in this case.

Nevertheless, this order finds that this Ramirez’s dilemma resulting from her own lack of

diligence is not an exceptional circumstance warranting abstention under Colorado River.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Ramirez’s motion to voluntarily dismiss her complaint is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2015. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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