Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00069/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00069-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BETTY GUZMAN, on behalf of

herself and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 11-cv-69-BAS(WVG)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO SET ASIDE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S MARCH

18, 2014 ORDER

[ECF No. 70]

v.

BRIDGEPOINT EDUCATION, INC.,

et al.,

Defendants.

On January 12, 2011, Plaintiff Betty Guzman commenced this putative class

action against Defendants Bridgepoint Education, Inc. (“Bridgepoint”), Ashford

University (“Ashford”), and University of the Rockies, asserting claims for violations

ofCalifornia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, False Advertising Act, and Consumer Legal

Remedies Act, among others. These claims arise from the allegations that Defendants

1

disseminated false and misleading information regarding, among other things, the true

costs of attendance, the transferability of credits, the quality of the education, and the

When Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on August 8, 2012, which is 1

currently the operative complaint, University of the Rockies was not included as a defendant. The

Court will refer to the remaining defendants, Bridgepoint and Ashford, collectively as “Defendants”

for the purposes of this order. 

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prospects of post-graduation employment. Plaintiff now moves for this Court to set

aside the magistrate judge’s March 18, 2014 order. Defendants oppose.

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted

and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge WilliamV. Gallo issued

an order regulating discovery that was expressly limited to class-certification issues

only. (CMC Order 1:19–23.) March 31, 2014 was the deadline for completion of all

class-certification-related discovery. (Id. at 2:17–19.) The court defined “completed”

to mean that “all discovery under Rules 30-36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

must be initiated a sufficient period of time in advance of the cut-off date, so that it

may be completed by the cut-off date, taking into account the timesfor services, notice,

and response as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Id. at 2:20–23

(emphasisin original).) The court added that “[a]ll disputes concerning discovery shall

be brought to the attention of the Magistrate Judge no later than thirty (30) days

following the date upon which the event giving rise to the discovery dispute occurred.” 

(Id. at 2:23–25.) Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules state that “[f]or written discovery, the

event giving rise to the discovery dispute is the date of service of the response.” (Pl.’s

Mot. Ex. 25.)

A. Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories 

On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff served Defendants with her First Set of

Interrogatories. Thereafter, the parties agreed to extend the deadline for Defendants

to respond by 30 days to October 9, 2013. Defendants served responses to the

interrogatories on October 9, 2013. In their response, Defendants objected to

Interrogatory No. 7 on several grounds. 

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On October 29, 2013, Plaintiff sent a meet-and-confer letter addressing certain

perceived deficiencies in the responses. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 6.) In the letter, Plaintiff

requested that Defendants cure the identified deficiencies by November 1, 2013, and

sought to schedule an in-person meet-and-confer conference during the week of

November 4, 2013. (Id.) 

“Mindful of the magistrate judge’s 30-day deadline to raise discovery disputes,

and out of an abundance of caution, [Plaintiff] sought and obtained Defendants’

consent to make a joint motion for extension of time to file a joint statement for

determination of discovery disputes,” which the parties subsequently filed on

November 8, 2013. (Kolesnikov Decl. ¶ 12.) To justify the extension, the parties

stated in their joint motion that “following a mutual extension of time to respond [to

the discovery requests],” the parties “ha[d] been working diligently to resolve the

above-mentioned disputes,” “ha[d] exchanged meet-and-confer letters regarding the

disputes,” and “[were] reviewing the respective lettersregarding the disputes and have

discussed meeting in person very soon in an attempt to resolve the disputes[.]” (ECF

No. 64.)

On November 12, 2013, the magistrate judge denied the parties’ joint motion for

an extension of time. (ECF No. 65.) That order stated the following:

Counsel waited until the date a Joint Statement of Discovery

Disputes was due to file the Joint Motion and have not yet

met and conferred in person regarding the discovery

disputes.

Counsel have essentially treated the granting of the Joint

Motion as a forgone conclusion, the Court’s approval being

a mere formality in the process. However, the Court is not

a mere rubber stamp, and the Court would be justified in

denying the Joint Motion because it wasreceived on the date

the Joint Statement was due.

(Id. (emphasis in original).)

On November 15, 2013, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s meet-and-confer

letter. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 8.) The parties subsequently agreed to continue to meet and

confer in order to resolve their disagreements. (Young Decl. ¶ 4.) On November 22,

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2013, counsel for the parties met in person to discuss the issues raised in the October

29, 2013 letter. (Id. ¶ 5; Kolesnikov Decl. ¶ 17.) During the conference, the parties

agreed to review certain responses and determinewhether supplementing the responses

was necessary. (Young Decl. ¶ 5; Kolesnikov Decl. ¶ 17.)

Defendants served supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s interrogatories on

February 3, 2014. (Pl.’s Mot. Es. 20–23.) However, Defendants maintain that they

“did not supplement their response to Interrogatory No. 7.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 3:15–17.) 

Interrogatory No. 7 requests that Defendants “[i]dentify all enrollment advisors at

BRIDGEPOINT or ASHFORD who were disciplined, demoted, or otherwise received

negative performance reviews during the Relevant Period because of the number of

students they enrolled.” (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 2.)

B. Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production

On November 22, 2013, Plaintiff served Defendants with her First Set of

Requests for Production (“RFPs”). On December 23, 2013, Defendants served

responses to the RFPs. Defendants objected to RFP No. 11 and RFP No. 16. (Pl.’s

Mot. Exs. 14–15.) RFP No. 11 requests “[a]ll DOCUMENTS CONCERNING the

discipline, demotion, or termination of any of BRIDGEPOINT’s enrollment advisors

during the RELEVANT PERIOD, including, but not limited to, the names of those

individuals, the dates when they were disciplined, demoted, or terminated, and the

reasons for the discipline, demotion, or termination”; RFP No. 16 requests “[a]ll

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING all complaints fromstudents and graduates during the

RELEVANT PERIOD received by BRIDGEPOINT.” (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 12.)

On January 23, 2014, Plaintiff sent a meet-and-confer letter to Defendants

requesting that Defendants cure certain perceived deficiencies in Defendants’

responses. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 18.) Plaintiff also sought to schedule an in-person meetand-confer conference for February 3, 2014. (Kolesnikov Decl. ¶ 25.) 

//

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On January 27, 2014, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s letter, and maintained

their objections as previously stated. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 19.) At Plaintiff’s request, the

parties met and conferred in person on February 3, 2014, where Defendants reiterated

their objections. (Young Decl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Defendants initially produced documents in

response to Plaintiff’s RFPs on February 24, 2014. (Id. ¶ 11.)

Despite the meet-and-confer efforts, the parties were unable to resolve the

discovery disputes without court intervention. As a result, Plaintiff submitted to the

magistrate judge a Joint Statement for Determination of Discovery Disputes,2

specifically requesting an order compelling further responses to Interrogatory No. 7

and RFP Nos. 11 and 16. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 24.) 

Plaintiff also preemptively addressed the timeliness of the Joint Statement in the

Joint Statement, providing two reasons under Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules. (Pl.’s

Mot. Ex. 24.) The entirety of that explanation is as follows:

Ms. Guzman believes that the current Joint Statement is

timely under the Chambers Rules for two reasons. First, this

Joint Statement concerns deficiencies in Defendants’

supplemental responses to Interrogatories, which were

served on February 3, 2014. Second, Ms. Guzman has at all

times proceeded diligently with attempting to conduct a

thorough meet-and-confer before filing any motion to

compel. To that effect, Ms. Guzman sent Defendants an

eleven-page meet-and-confer letter on October 29, 2013,

which is within 30 days of Ashford’s service of its initial

discovery responses. However, only on November 15, 2013

did Defendants respond to that letter. Counsel promptly met

and conferred in person on November 22, 2013. Thereafter,

it took Defendants another two months to serve

supplemental responses. Nonetheless, the meet-and-confer

process was able to narrow the disagreement between the

parties to only three discovery responses discussed in this

Joint Statement. Accordingly, Ms. Guzman urges the Court

to reach the merits of the underlying discovery disputes.

(Id. (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphases in original).) Defendants disputed

Plaintiff’s position that the need for an extension of time was a product of Defendants’

delay: 

The Joint Statement includes Plaintiff’s request to compel discovery. Consequently, the 2

parties also refer to the Joint Statement as a motion to compel. For the purposes of this order, the two

terms will be used interchangeably. 

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Defendants served interrogatory responses on October 9,

2013. Nearly three weeks later, on October 29, Plaintiff set

a meet and confer letter. Then, on the afternoon of

November 8—the very day this Court’s 30-day discovery

dispute deadline was set to expire, Plaintiff hurriedly asked

Defendants to agree to an extension of time to submit a

discovery dispute to this Court and consent to a joint motion

being filed, which, as a courtesy, Defendants did.

(Id. (footnote omitted.) Defendants also argued that Plaintiff’s request was untimely

because their responses to Interrogatory No. 7 and RFP Nos. 11 and 16 have remained

unchanged since they were originally served, respectively, on October 9, 2013, and

December 23, 2013: they contend that their February 3, 2014 supplemental responses

did not supplement their response to Interrogatory No. 7, and their January 27, 2014

letter did not clarify their response to RFP Nos. 11 and 16. (Id.) 

C. Magistrate Judge’s March 18, 2014 Order

On March 18, 2014, the magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel as

untimely. (ECF No. 69.) With respect to Interrogatory No. 7, the magistrate judge

explained:

In accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

33(b)(2) and 36(a)(3), Ashford and Bridgepoint each had

until September 4, 2013, to provide their responses to

Plaintiffs discovery requests. When they did not respond on

time, the 30-day clock to resolve those disputes began to run. 

Ashford’s untimely responses 30 days later on October 9,

2013, did not reset the clock, but even assuming that it did,

Plaintiff had until November 12, 2013, to bring the matter to

the Court’s attention. Defendant’s Supplemental Responses

served on February 3, 2014 also did not reset the clock as

Plaintiff contends. To follow Plaintiff’s logic, the 30-day

clock would never begin to run aslong asthe opposing party

continued to amend or supplement earlier responses. The

filing by the parties of their Joint Motion For Extension on

November 8, 2013, by itself, was insufficient to toll the

clock.

It appearsto the Court that the Response to Interrogatory No.

7 is the only interrogatory at issue in the Joint Statement. 

The Response to Interrogatory No. 7 was served on October

9, 2013. The response was never changed or supplemented. 

Any motion to compel a supplemental response to

Interrogatory No. 7 was due on November 12, 2013. Since

the Joint Statement was not received by the Court until

March 4, 2014, the motion to compel further response to

Interrogatory No. 7 is untimely.

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(March 18, 2014 Order 4:11–5:10 (footnote omitted).) Addressing RFP Nos. 11 and

16, the magistrate judge explained:

It appears to the Court that the Responses to Requests for

Production of Documents Nos. 11 and 16 are at issue. The

Response to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 11

and 16 was served on December 23, 2013. Any joint

statement containing a motion to compel further responses

to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 11 and 16

was due on January 23, 2014. Since the Joint Statement was

received by the Court on March 4, 2014, the motion to

compel further responses to Requests for Production of

Documents Nos. 11 and 16 is untimely.

(Id. at 6:9–22.) The magistrate judge’s order ended by stating that “[n]either party, but

particularly Plaintiff, has explained, let alone justified, the extraordinary delay in

bringing these disputes to the Court’s attention. Without good cause having been

demonstrated, there is no reason to grant the parties’ requests.” (Id. at 8:7–11.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this motion to set aside the magistrate judge’s March

18, 2014 order under Rule 72(a). Defendants oppose.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge

within fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The

magistrate judge’s order will be upheld unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to

factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive

pretrial discovery matters. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378

(S.D. Cal. 2000); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 697 (S.D. Ga. 1996)

(reviewing magistrate judge’s order addressing attorney-client issues in discovery for

clear error). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe &

Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

//

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On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review

of purely legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“the phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates

plenary review as to matters of law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D.

Ohio 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010 update). “Thus, [the district court] must

exercise its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal

conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to law if it fails

to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United States

v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff presents three arguments is support of her position that the magistrate

judge’s March 18, 2014 order is clearly erroneous and contrary to law: (1) the motion

to compel wastimely because Plaintiff brought the discovery disputesto the magistrate

judge’s attention within 30 days after exhausting the meet-and-confer process; (2)

Plaintiff demonstrated good cause to extend her deadline to file the motion to compel;

and (3) the magistrate judge’s order conflicts with Foman’s policy of favoring

decisions on the merits. The Court will address each argument below.

A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

In arguing that her motion to compel was timely, Plaintiff disagrees with the

magistrate judge’s findings asto when the 30-day discovery dispute clock commenced. 

Plaintiff argues that the November 12, 2013 deadline for any motion to compel a

supplemental response to InterrogatoryNo. 7 and the January 23, 2014 deadline for any

motion to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 11 and 16 are incorrect, and the

correct deadline is March 4, 2014, 30 days after February 3, 2014 “when the parties’

meet-and-confer efforts reached an impasse.” (Pl.’s Mot. 12:14–19.)

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Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules and the September 23, 2013 Case Management

Conference (“CMC”) Order explicitly require “[a]ll disputes concerning discovery [to]

be brought to the attention of the Magistrate Judge no later than thirty (30) days

following the date upon which the event giving rise to the discovery dispute occurred.” 

(CMC Order 2:23–25; see also Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 25.) Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules

clearly define “the event giving rise to the discovery dispute” for written discovery as

“the date of the service of the response.” (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 25.) The rules do not define

the event giving rise to the discovery dispute as when the parties’ meet-and-confer

efforts reach an impasse. (See id.)

Defendants served their response to the interrogatories on October 9, 2013, and

they served their responses to the RFPs on December 23, 2013. As the magistrate

judge noted, only Defendants’ initial responses addressed Interrogatory No. 7 and RFP

Nos. 11 and 16; Defendants’ following responses did not alter the nature of their

objection or the dispute at all from their initial responses. Consequently, the date when

the parties’ meet-and-confer effortsreached an impasse is not relevant to the magistrate

judge’s calculation of the due dates based on the language of Judge Gallo’s Chambers

Rules. Applying the aforementioned rules as they are written to the circumstances of 3

this case, Plaintiff’s deadline to file a Joint Statement for the interrogatories was

November 12, 2013 and for the RFPs was January 23, 2014,which the parties failed

4

to meet.

The Court cannot conclude that the magistrate judge made any mistake in

calculating the applicable deadlines. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 623. The Court

also cannot identify any failure or misapplication of relevant statutes, case law, or rules

of procedure by the magistrate judge. See Cathcart, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2. In fact,

Insofar as Plaintiff argues that Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules are invalid—namely, that there 3

is a meet-and-confer policy that somehow overrides Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules—Plaintiff fails

to demonstrate that that issue is proper for this Court to consider at this time under Rule 72(a).

The magistrate judge noted that November 12, 2013 is the first business day after Veteran’s 4

Day, a federal court holiday. (March 18, 2014 Order 2:18–24 n.2.)

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the magistrate judge followed the applicable rules to a tee. Therefore, the magistrate

judge’s calculations of the applicable deadlines and his finding that the Joint Statement

was untimely are neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

B. Good Cause for an Extension of Time

Plaintiff also argues that good cause existed to extend the deadlines for

completing discovery and moving for class certification. The magistrate judge

unilaterally considered that “allow[ing] [Plaintiff’s]requested discoverywould require

an extension of time for fact discovery to be completed, which in turn, would require

extending the date by which the critical Motion for Class Certification must be filed.” 

(March 18, 2014 Order 7:7–15.) The court continued, stating that it was “unwilling to

extend any dates set in the Case Management Conference Order.” (Id.) 

Upon reviewing the Joint Statement, the Court is unable to identify a formal

request to extend the deadlines for completing discovery and moving for class

certification. (See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 24.) Rather, Plaintiff presented two reasons why she

believed that the Joint Statement was timely: “First, this Joint Statement concerns

deficiencies in Defendants’ supplemental responses to Interrogatories, which were

served on February 3, 2014”; and “[s]econd, Ms. Guzman has at all times proceeded

diligently with attempting to conduct a thorough meet-and-confer before filing any

motion to compel.” (Id.) After presenting her two reasons, Plaintiff “urge[d] the Court

to reach the merits of the underlying discovery disputes.” (Id.) Neither party requested

an extension of the deadlines for completing discovery and moving for class

certification. (See id.) Thus, this ground for setting aside the March 18, 2014 order is

likely outside the scope of this motion.

However, even if this Court considersthe merits of whether Plaintiff established

good cause, the Court nonetheless concludes that Plaintiff failed to establish good

cause for an extension of time. Foremost, given that the parties did not formally make

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such request for an extension of time, it is difficult to understand how they—but

especially Plaintiff—could have justified such a request with good cause. 

Even if the Court considers Plaintiff’s apparent argument that her diligence

justified finding good cause to extend the deadline for completing discovery and

moving for class certification, her explanation still does not address the magistrate

judge’s finding, which this Court agrees with, that the initial response to Interrogatory

No. 7 was never changed or supplemented. Similarly, Plaintiff also failsto address the

fact that Defendants’ response to RFP Nos. 11 and 16 also remained unchanged since

the original response. It is an important fact that Defendants’ responses remained

unchanged throughout the discovery process, particularly in light of Judge Gallo’s

Chambers Rules that defines “the event giving rise to the discovery dispute” for written

discovery as “the date of the service of the response.” (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 25.) Defendants’

initial responses that remained unchanged are the “events” that gave rise to the

discovery disputes.

Lastly, to determinewhether themagistrate judge acted properly in not extending

the discovery and class-certification-motion deadlines, this Court must consider only

what the parties presented to the magistrate judge at the time the request was made. 

With respect to diligence, the following is the entirety of Plaintiff’s explanation from

the Joint Statement:

Ms. Guzman has at all times proceeded diligently with

attempting to conduct a thorough meet-and-confer before

filing any motion to compel. To that effect, Ms. Guzman

sent Defendants an eleven-page meet-and-confer letter on

October 29, 2013, which is within 30 days of Ashford’s

service of its initial discovery responses. However, only on

November 15, 2013 did Defendants respond to that letter. 

Counsel promptly met and conferred in person on November

22, 2013. Thereafter, it took Defendants another two months

to serve supplemental responses. Nonetheless, the meet-andconfer process was able to narrow the disagreement between

the parties to only three discovery disputes. Accordingly,

Ms. Guzman urges the Court to reach the merits of the

underlying discovery disputes.

(Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 24 (emphases in original) (footnote omitted).) 

//

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In response, Defendants challenged Plaintiff’s contention that she proceeded

diligently. Defendants emphasized that Plaintiff did not send their meet-and-confer

letter until nearly three weeks after they served their interrogatory responses. (Pl.’s

Mot. Ex. 24.) Furthermore, on November 8, 2013—the day the magistrate judge’s 30-

day discovery-dispute deadline was set to expire—“Plaintiff hurriedly asked

Defendants to agree to an extension of time to submit a discovery dispute . . . and

consent to a joint motion being filed, which, as a courtesy, Defendants did.” (Id.) 

Defendants further emphasized to themagistrate judge that their supplemental response

to the interrogatories and clarification letter addressing the RFPs did not alter in any

way the objections regarding Interrogatory No. 7 and RFP Nos. 11 and 16.

From these facts, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge that “[n]either

party, but particularly Plaintiff, has explained, let alone justified, the extraordinary

delay in bringing these disputes to the Court’s attention.” (See March 18, 2014 Order

8:7–11.) It is evident that there were delays in the parties’ responses, but no

explanation of what prompted those delays was presented to the magistrate judge. 

Merely claiming “diligence” to justify or explain delays isinadequate. To the contrary,

the reasonable presumption isthat parties proceeding diligently would respond quickly

and file their requests with the court in a timely manner. Plaintiff attempts to argue

circumstances now that were not presented to the magistrate judge, such as the “yearend holidays” and “counsel’s prearranged travel plans,” but those additional facts are

outside the scope ofthisreview precisely because these newly presented circumstances

were not presented to the magistrate judge. Courts are not omniscient. They can only

assess the circumstances based on what the parties present. The parties here,

particularly Plaintiff, failed to explain their delays and support their request for an

extension of time with good cause.

//

//

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In sum, the Court finds that a challenge to the magistrate judge’s refusal to

extend deadlines for completing discovery and moving for class certification are not

proper for consideration here. But alternatively, the Court nonetheless finds that any

request for an extension of the relevant deadlines, insofar as they were properly made,

were not supported by good cause. Therefore, the magistrate judge’s refusal to extend

the relevant deadlines was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

C. Applicability of Foman

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge’s March 18, 2014 order

conflicts with the policy in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), favoring decisions

on the merits. In Foman, the Supreme Court stated that

It is too late in the day entirely contrary to the spirit of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits

to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities. “The

Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of

skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the

outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of

pleading isto facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” The

Rules themselves provide that they are to be construed “to

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action.”

Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

48 (1957)). However, that was in the context of the First Circuit holding that a defect

in a notice of appeal rendered it ineffective to review the district court’s judgment

dismissing the complaint. Id. at 180. The defect in the notice of appeal was that it

“failed to specify that the appeal was being taken from that judgment as well from the

orders denying the [certain] motions.” Id. at 180-81. Foman does not address

timeliness of meeting filing deadlines or disputes during discovery. 

Plaintiff also cites Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986), as legal

authority in the Ninth Circuit that is consistent with Foman. But that is not entirely

accurate. Though the Ninth Circuit does state in Eitel that there is a “strong policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits,” that

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policy was merely one factor out of seven that courts were instructed to consider in

exercising discretion to enter default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Contrary

to Plaintiff’s assertion, Eitelstrongly suggeststhat the policy favoring decisions on the

merits is not an overriding policy that trumps all or even most others, but rather one

that courts should consider in its exercise of discretion in entering judgment. See id.

Like Foman, Eitel does not address timeless of meeting filing deadlines or disputes

during discovery. Instead, both Foman and Eitel discussed the consideration ofissuing

decisions on the merits when faced with the possibility of entering judgment against

a party. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82; Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (“Our starting

point isthe general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Casesshould

be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.”).

The Ninth Circuit took a more measured approach in balancing the policy

favoring disposition on the merits against the need for compliance with deadlines and

discovery obligations in In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability

Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006). The court recognized that the “public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits counsels against dismissal.” In re

Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1228. However, it continued, explaining:

At the same time, a case that is stalled or unreasonably

delayed by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines and

discovery obligations cannot move forward to resolution on

the merits. Thus, we have also recognized that this factor

“lends little support” to a party whose responsibility it is to

move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose

conduct impedes progress in that direction.

Id. (citing, among others, In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (giving

weight to the plaintiff’s failure to specify why it isimportant that his action be resolved

on their merits); Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991)

(observing that it is the responsibility of the moving party to move toward disposition

on the merits)). The Ninth Circuit has also warned:

//

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In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the

federal and state systems routinely set schedules and

establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and

resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if

the deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the best

way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. Parties

must understand that they will pay a price for failure to

comply strictly with scheduling and other orders, and that

failure to do so may properly support severe sanctions and

exclusions of evidence.

Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005).

Upon reviewing the relevant legal authority, this Court rejects Plaintiff’s

suggestion that the public policy favoring disposition on the merits overrides the policy

promoting parties to comply with deadlines and discovery obligations. Furthermore,

insofar as the public policy favoring disposition on the merits applies to the

circumstances in this case, the Court finds that the magistrate judge’s March 18, 2014

order does not conflict with Foman. Therefore, the magistrate judge’s March 18, 2014

order was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the

magistrate judge’s March 18, 2014 order because the order was neither clearly

erroneous nor contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

Consequently, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s request to compel further

responses to Interrogatory No. 7 and RFPs Nos. 11 and 16. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2014

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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