Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01171/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FIL ~.D 

UniU!d States C.0~~ Appeab Ter,th C1rcu1t 

APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 171992 

------------H.QBERT L. HOECKER 

LEO YOUNGER; VIOLA YOUNGER; JAMES E. 

FARNER; DOROTHY FARNER; JOSEPH P. 

FARNER, JR.; MAJORIE E. FARNER; WILLIAM 

H. FARNER; JACQUELYN FARNER; BETTY A. 

FARNER; DELORES J. FARNER; DONALD P . FARNER; SYLVESTER FARNER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

THE FEDERAL LAND BANK OF WICHITA; ) 

FEDERAL LAND BANK OF SOUTH WEST ) 

COLORADO; JUNIOR A. COLE; RUBY F. COLE; ) 

JOSEPH COLEMAN, ESQ.; ROBERT DAVIG; ) 

MICHAEL V. HOLTZ; RALPH E. MILLER, DAVID) 

LEINSDORF, ESQ.; GUTHERIE-SLATER- ) 

O'CONNER; FARM CREDIT SERVICES OF ) 

MOUNTAIN PLAINS, PCA, formerly known as) 

Ninth District Production Credit ) 

Association of Denver; JOHN EDWARD MAAS,) 

ESQ.; BARROWS & SISUN, P.C., ) 

Defendants, 

and 

SENN, LEWIS, VISCIANO, HOTH & STRAHLE, 

P.C., formerly known as Senn, Lewis, 

Hoth, & Strahle, P.C., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Clerk 

No. 91-1171 

(D.C. No. 90-C- 2270) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1171 Document: 010110243002 Date Filed: 04/17/1992 Page: 1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This case has a lengthy procedural history, only the outlines 

of which are relevant to this appeal. Beginning in 1983, 

plaintiffs were involved in extensive state court litigation which 

ultimately was heard in the Colorado Supreme Court and remanded 

for trial before the parties entered into a settlement agreement 

and stipulated for dismissal with prejudice in September 1990. 

On December 26, 1990, plaintiffs filed a fifty-one page prose 

complaint in federal court naming, among others, the law firm of 

Senn Lewis Visciano Hoth & Strahle, P.C. ("Senn Lewis") which had 

represented them in their writ of certiorari to the Colorado 

Supreme Court. Senn Lewis moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b), and filed a notice of intention to pursue Rule 11 

sanctions. The trial court dismissed the complaint in its 

entirety for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, adding that 

the claims were "frivolous" and failed to state claims upon which 

relief could be granted. Senn Lewis filed a formal motion for 

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Appellate Case: 91-1171 Document: 010110243002 Date Filed: 04/17/1992 Page: 2
attorneys' fees and costs on March 12, which the court denied in a 

separate minute order. Senn Lewis now appeals from the denial of 

fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 1 

Rule 11 provides that 

The signature of (a] ... party constitutes a 

certificate by the signer that ... [the pleading] is 

well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . 

. . and that it is not interposed for any improper 

purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay 

or needless increase in the cost of litigation .•.• If 

a pleading .•• is signed in violation of this rule, 

the court ... shall impose upon the person who signed 

it ... an appropriate sanction, which may include an 

order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 

the reasonable expenses incurred ... , including a 

reasonable attorney's fee. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Our review of the district court's denial of 

such a sanction is limited to determining whether the court abused 

its discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartrnax, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2460-

61 (1990) . 

The district court has wide latitude to determine the 

relevant facts and the appropriate sanction, if any. In so doing, 

"the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the 

special circumstances that often arise in prose situations." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Construing 

plaintiffs' prose complaint broadly, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 

1 Plaintiffs have not responded, either in the district court 

or here . 

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Appellate Case: 91-1171 Document: 010110243002 Date Filed: 04/17/1992 Page: 3
U.S. 519 (1972}, we are unable to say from the record in front of 

us that the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we 

AFFIRM the district court's denial of attorneys' fees. 

The man.date shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-1171 Document: 010110243002 Date Filed: 04/17/1992 Page: 4