Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01151/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01151-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

R. QUACKENBUSH,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-1151-OWW DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 9)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed

February 5, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff alleges that after he was processed at the Wasco Reception center, he became a

“victim” of the legal system. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the court system because

of the deficiencies in the law library and the system for outgoing legal mail. Plaintiff alleges that the

described conditions were the primary reason for the denial of his original appeal. 

Plaintiff also contends he was subject to “inhumanitarian” conditions at the Reception

Center. Plaintiff contends he was he did not have a mattress for “days”; he was required to wait in

a shower until a cell became available; and he did not have items mandated by the regulations. 

Plaintiff is seeking money damages. Plaintiff names the Director of the California Department of

Corrections (“CDC”), the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), the

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People of the State of California, and the Governor of the State of California as defendants. 

1. Claims Against the CDCR and the People of the State of California

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an

unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

1991)(citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996);

Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v.

State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural

Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brook,

951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)(concluding that Nevada

Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v.

Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). The CDCR is a state

agency and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims

as against the CDCR are barred. 

Plaintiff also names the People of the State of California as a defendant. States are not

persons for purposes of §1983. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69

(1997); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To the extent that

plaintiff’s allegations are against the State of California, plaintiff’s claim is barred under the

Eleventh Amendment.

2. Claims Against Defendants Director of CDC and Governor

a. Official Capacity Suits

Plaintiff names the Director of CDC and the Governor of the State of California as

defendants. The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official

capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9 Cir. 1997); Eaglesmith th

v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9 Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9 Cir. 1992). th th

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on defendants in their official

capacity, he may not do so. 

///

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b. Personal Capacity Suits

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their

personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997); Pena v. Gardner, 976 th

F.2d 469, 472 (9 Cir. 1992). “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a th

government official for actions [the official] takes under color of state law. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1988). Where plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, such

as in the instant action, this “necessarily implies” a personal-capacity suit because an officialcapacity suit would be barred. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968,

973 n.16 (9 Cir. 1994); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 th

(9 Cir. 1994); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9 Cir. 1991). th th

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie case

of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that supervisory defendants either:

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional

violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)(internal citations omitted); Taylor

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some

facts must be alleged to support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that defendants personally participated in

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black

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at 646. For this reason, plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against either of the named

defendants. 

Because plaintiff has failed to state cognizable claims for relief against the only two named

defendants, the complaint must be dismissed. The court will supply plaintiff with the requisite legal

standards that appear to apply to his claims and will permit plaintiff the opportunity to file an

amended complaint, in the event that plaintiff believes in good faith he has a cognizable claim.

3. Denial of Access to the Court System

While the federal system is one of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim for relief under section 1983. 

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration

or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from

the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). For backward-looking claims such

as that at issue here, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying

claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as

recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, No. 04-36021, 2007

WL 446593, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007).

The first element requires that plaintiff show he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out

of court. Harbury 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 2007 WL 446593, at *3. The

second element requires that plaintiff show defendant Chapparro proximately caused the alleged

violation of plaintiff’s rights, “[t]he touchstone . . . [for which] is foreseeability.” Id. Finally, the

third element requires that plaintiff show he has no other remedy than the relief available via this suit

for denial of access to the courts. Id. at *6.

4. Conditions of Confinement

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

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452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials

may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting

evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence

on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s

conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

///

///

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5. Rule 8(a)

The court has screened plaintiff’s complaint and found that it does not state any claims for

relief under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended

complaint. In addition, plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need

only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Rule 8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon

at trial, but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. 

In drafting his amended complaint, plaintiff is warned that the amended complaint must

comply with Rule 8(a). Plaintiff should clearly and briefly set forth the facts in support of each claim

and should supply the facts necessary to link the alleged violation of his constitutional right to acts

or omissions of the named defendants. However, plaintiff should not argue and should not set forth

a lengthy description of immaterial facts.

 C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

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supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 5, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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