Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01526/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01526-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIX M. LOPEZ, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 vs.

MERCED COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:06-cv-01526 OWW DLB 

 (Three Judge Court)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:

PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

This case comes before a three-judge court, under § 5 of the

Voting Rights Act (“VRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (“Section 5”). 

Plaintiffs challenge numerous annexations, detachments,

consolidations and/or formations to cities and special districts

in the County of Merced, California, adopted since November 1,

1972. On November 21, 2006, Circuit Judge Jay S. Bybee and

District Judges Oliver W. Wanger and Anthony W. Ishii, appointed

to the three-judge panel by the Chief Judge of the Circuit

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, heard Plaintiffs’ motion for a

preliminary injunction (Doc. 19), seeking to enjoin the

certification of the November 7, 2006 election results in certain

defendant jurisdictions. 

Due to the proximity of the scheduled city council meetings

at which the November 7, 2006 results were to be certified and

newly-elected municipal officers sworn-in, the Court announced an

oral statement of decision which denied the motion for

preliminary injunction. The parties were invited to submit

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proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (See Docs. 67

& 76.) Having reviewed these, and all the pleadings and

supplementary materials, and having heard oral argument, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated entitlement to

injunctive relief. These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

memorialize our oral decision on November 21, 2006. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and are

registered voters residing in the City of Los Banos in Merced

County, California who allege they are Hispanic, Spanishspeaking, and have been unlawfully denied voting rights, in part

based on their race and language. (Compl. at ¶3.) Defendants

are the County of Merced and numerous governmental units within

the County, including: the Local Area Formation Commission of

Merced County (LAFCO), which is an administrative agency

responsible for reviewing and approving requests to annex or

change the boundaries of governmental units within the County,

see Cal. Gov. Code § 56375; the cities of Atwater, Dos Palos,

Gustine, Livingston, and Los Banos, all of which are

municipalities organized pursuant to California law; and

seventeen water and resource conservation special districts

within Merced County. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated § 5 of the

Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under § 5, a covered state or

political subdivision must secure approval or “preclearance”

before enacting or seeking to administer “any voting

qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,

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or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force

or effect” on the date coverage began. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. A

covered jurisdiction can secure preclearance from either the

United States Attorney General or the United States District

Court for the District of Colombia. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.1. In

either an administrative proceeding before the United States

Attorney General or a judicial proceeding seeking a declaratory

judgment before the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, the covered jurisdiction must demonstrate that the

proposed change affecting voting does not have the purpose and

will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to

vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language

minority group. Id. If the covered jurisdiction cannot meet its

burden, the United States Attorney General will deny preclearance

or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

will not grant a declaratory judgment approving a change

affecting voting. In the absence of either type of preclearance,

the voting change cannot be implemented or enforced in any

election. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10.

Plaintiffs allege that, since November of 1972, Defendants

have adopted, approved and implemented over 200 annexations and

other boundary changes within the County of Merced which

unlawfully impair their voting rights. (Compl. at ¶11.) 

Plaintiffs further allege that no Defendant has obtained either

administrative or judicial preclearance for these changes as

required by § 5, but that they have nonetheless implemented and

continue to implement the changes. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.) 

Plaintiffs contend that these violations of § 5 justify

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preliminary injunctive relief to restrain the Defendants from any

continued implementation of the voting changes unless and until

they are precleared under § 5. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.)

Along with their Complaint, Plaintiffs initially filed, but

did not set for hearing, a motion for temporary restraining order

(“TRO”). (Docs. 1-2, filed Oct. 27, 2006.) The district court

then scheduled a hearing on the TRO for November 3, 2006. (Doc.

9, filed Nov. 2, 2006.) At that hearing, certain facts were

agreed to by the parties, namely that only the Defendant

municipalities of Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine, Livingston, and

Los Banos were to hold elections on November 7, not other

Defendants, and that all of the challenged annexations and

boundary changes in those jurisdictions had been previously

submitted to the Attorney General for expedited review. (Doc. 18

at 3-4; see also Doc. 13-3, Decl. of Christopher E. Skinnell at

¶¶ 5-8.) 

During the TRO hearing, the parties entered into a

stipulation that elections would be held on November 7, 2006, but

that no Defendant municipality would finalize or certify the

results of its election until either preclearance was obtained

for the voting changes or the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for

preliminary injunction at a hearing to be held subsequently. 

(See Doc. 18 at 3-4.) The Court directed the parties to file

supplemental briefing on the issues identified, and set the

hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction for

November 21, 2006 before the three-judge panel. (See id. at

4-5.) The parties elected not to present testimony at that

hearing on the preliminary injunction. 

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Plaintiffs timely submitted supplemental authorities in

support of their motion, and Defendants filed oppositions.

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the certification of the November 7,

2006 election results by Defendants. Plaintiffs did not seek to

enjoin the casting of ballots by the voters, or other conduct of

the November 7, 2006 elections.

Defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs

(1) lacked standing, and were guilty of (2) laches and 

(3) unclean hands. Defendants also contended the Defendant

cities are not subject to the preclearance requirement of § 5,

and that the balance of hardships favored denial of the

preliminary injunction.

With respect to standing, assuming, arguendo, that the

Defendant Cities are covered jurisdictions under § 5, Defendants

cited Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), for

the proposition that a § 5 suit alleging failure to comply with

the preclearance requirement may only be brought against a city,

by a resident and registered voter of that city. Plaintiffs

rejoined that residency in the County of Merced satisfied the

standing requirement.

Defendants advanced the equitable defenses of laches and

unclean hands, based on Plaintiffs’ knowledge, at least as early

as August 24, 2006, that their claims existed and their failure

to timely notify each entity to provide reasonable opportunity

for obtaining preclearances. Defendants also argued that

Plaintiffs’ delay of two full months to file this action, just

eleven days before the election they sought to enjoin the

certification of, without contacting any of the Defendants to

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provide notice of the alleged violations, coupled with taking no

action to set the matter for a hearing on their injunctive relief

request until six days before the election, caused Defendants

prejudice. 

Plaintiffs argued, relying on Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11, that the filing date was delayed because they

required sufficient time to properly analyze facts and applicable

law and to compile the documentation necessary to their claims

before filing the complaint. They professed no duty to inform

Defendants of the need for preclearance, and that no earlier

hearing on injunctive relief was required because they sought

only to stop certification of election results, not the

elections. 

Relying on United States v. Board of Commissioners of

Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S. 110 (1978), Plaintiffs disputed

Defendants’ contention that Defendants are not subject to the § 5

preclearance requirement. Plaintiffs maintained that, having

alleged a violation of § 5, they were entitled to injunctive

relief as a matter of law, without the necessity of making any

showing under the traditional test for issuance of a preliminary

injunction. To support this position, Plaintiffs cited Lopez v.

Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (“Lopez I”), and United States

v. Louisiana, 952 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. La. 1997) (“Louisiana”).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defendant County of Merced is a “covered political

subdivision” that has been subject to the preclearance

requirements of § 5 since November 1, 1972. See Appendix to 28

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C.F.R. Pt. 51 (listing covered jurisdictions and their respective

dates of coverage).

2. Defendant Local Area Formation Commission (“LAFCO”) of

Merced County is a public administrative agency through which

municipalities and special districts alter boundaries within

Merced County. LAFCO has the authority to review and approve

applications for boundary changes submitted either by registered

voters’ or property owners’ signed petitions or pursuant to a

resolution of the governing board of an affected municipality or

local agency. Cal. Gov’t Code § 56375.

3. LAFCO does not hold elections, nor does LAFCO have any

role in the election certification process.

4. Defendant Cities of Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine,

Livingston, and Los Banos are municipalities organized pursuant

to California law, and are governmental units located within the

geographic and territorial boundaries of Merced County. (Compl.

at ¶6.)

5. Defendants Ballico Community Services District, Central

California Irrigation District, Delhi County Water District, East

Merced Resource Conservation District, Franklin County Water

District, Hilmar County Water District, Le Grand Community

Services District, Los Banos Resource Conservation District,

Merquin County Water District, Midway Community Services

District, Planada Community Services District, Santa Nella County

Water District, Snelling Community Services District, South Dos

Palos County Water District, Turlock Irrigation District, Volta

Community Services District, and Winton Water and Sanitary

District, are special districts organized pursuant to California

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law, and are governmental units located within the geographic and

territorial boundaries of Merced County. (Id.)

6. Among all Defendants named in this suit, only the

Cities of Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine, Livingston and Los Banos

held elections on November 7, 2006. (Doc. 13, Jones Decl. at

¶12; Doc. 13, Skinnell Decl. at ¶10.) The County of Merced did

not hold any elections for county officers or ballot measures on

that date, nor did LAFCO or any of the other special district

Defendants hold elections on November 7, 2006. Id. 

7. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Plaintiffs,

therefore, stipulated that preliminary injunctive relief against

the County, LAFCO and the special districts’ was unnecessary, and

limited their motion accordingly.

8. Plaintiffs Felix M. Lopez and Elizabeth Ruiz are

Hispanic, Spanish-speaking residents of the County of Merced and

of the City of Los Banos, not any other city named as a

defendant.

9. No other named Plaintiff is a resident of the cities of

Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine, or Livingston. 

10. Plaintiffs knew no later than August 24, 2006 that the

cities’ challenged annexations, detachments, consolidations

and/or formations had not received § 5 preclearances. (See Doc.

2, Avila Decl., Ex. 2.)

11. Plaintiffs filed suit October 27, 2006, approximately

11 days before the November 7, 2006 election. (Doc. 2.) 

12. Plaintiffs limited their request for injunctive relief

to an injunction restraining Defendants from finalizing or

certifying the results of the elections, not from conducting

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elections. (Doc. 19 at 13.) 

13. Plaintiffs did not request a hearing on their request

for TRO before or at the time the complaint was filed. 

14. Before filing their complaint, Plaintiffs did not

notify any Defendant of Defendants’ alleged non-compliance with

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and did not give any Defendant the

opportunity to cure any alleged VRA violation before filing suit.

15. There was at least 60 days delay by Plaintiffs in

filing their lawsuit from their alleged first knowledge, on

August 24, 2006, of the claimed violations. 

16. Plaintiffs assert they had a large number of complex

factual and legal issues to research and document which delayed

filing of the complaint. 

17. Plaintiffs’ counsel is highly informed and experienced

in VRA litigation, and the legal issues presented were well known

to him prior to filing this case.

18. As of the date of the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for

preliminary injunction on November 21, 2006, none of the

Defendant municipalities had secured preclearance for any of the

annexations and other boundary changes at issue. However, all

such Defendants had submitted preclearance requests. 

19. The County of Merced requested on behalf of all the

cities that the Department of Justice expedite review of the

annexations pursuant to regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 51.34, and on

November 2, 2006, was assured by the responsible Department of

Justice personnel that the Department would use its best efforts

to complete review of the annexations by November 17, 2006. 

(Doc. 13, Skinnell Decl. at ¶¶ 5 & 9.)

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20. The County did not inform the cities that preclearance

requests had been filed for the cities, whose first knowledge of

those preclearance requests or the necessity for them was the

filing of this suit.

21. Under California Law, the elections official must

certify the results of that election to the governing body (in

this case, the municipalities) by no later than the fourth Friday

after the election. Cal. Elec. Code § 10262. The governing body

must then meet no later than the fourth Friday after the election

to declare the results of the election and install the newly

elected officials. Cal. Elec. Code § 10263. During oral

argument, several defendant cities stated that their governing

bodies were meeting that same night to declare results. 

22. Defendants presented evidence that enjoining

certification of the November 7, 2006 votes in Defendant cities

would materially harm the cities and their voters. 

i. According to the affidavit of Dos Palos’ City

Clerk, the City of Dos Palos “is in crisis.” (See Doc. 39, Decl.

of Alice Thompson, City Clerk of the City of Dos Palos, at ¶7.) 

Prior to the election, Dos Palos’ City Council was operating with

two vacancies on its City Council, and its senior management was

in disarray. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-5 (“The City of Dos Palos currently

has an interim City Manager. The Police Chief is on

administrative leave, and the Sergeant of the Police Department

position is vacant.”).) Because of the unsettled state of

affairs in the Police Department, the Merced County Sheriff’s

Department was temporarily providing police services to the City,

which was an arrangement opposed by many citizens in Dos Palos. 

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(Id. at ¶6.) In addition, the Dos Palos City Clerk stated that

at the first meeting of the newly-elected council, set for

November 21, 2006, the new City Council and Mayor were scheduled

to address fundamental governance issues, along with the

expansion of City water and sewer plants. (Id. at ¶6.) Under

the California Government Code, new council members were to take

the oath of office on November 21, 2006. 

ii. Similarly, Defendant City of Los Banos provided

evidence of significant harm to the City and its voters if the

election results were not timely certified. (See generally Doc.

38, Decl. of Lucille Mallonee, City Clerk of the City of Los

Banos.) For example, the incumbent Mayor and two incumbent

councilmembers were all due to leave office upon qualification of

their successors. If the seating of the new officials were

delayed, and the retiring members were unwilling to continue to

serve during the pendency of this action, “the City would have

only two members of its governing body [lacking a quorum to

conduct business]. Under California law, a majority of the

council may not be appointed, and a special election would have

to be held.” (Id. at ¶6.) 

iii. The Los Banos City Clerk asserted that the City

of Los Banos’ newly-elected Mayor and Council were due to

consider a proposed annexation. (Id. at ¶7.) The sitting Mayor

and Council deemed it appropriate to put off decision on the

annexation so that the new Mayor and Council could consider the

issue because “the election results have generally been regarded

in the City of Los Banos as calling for a significant change in

city policy with respect to annexations and growth.” (Id. at

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¶8.)

23. The electorates of the Defendant municipalities had the

justified expectation that their local votes cast in the November

7, 2006, elections would be counted. Preventing the seating of

the newly elected local decisionmakers in the cities of Dos Palos

and Los Banos would have frustrated the will of the voters in

those jurisdictions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The VRA contains a citizen-suit provision and a strong

policy supporting enforcement of the Act to protect voters

against infringement of their right to vote. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1973a(b). Enforcement power is not solely vested in the

Attorney General of the United States; citizens may bring suit to

enforce the act. 

2. The grounds for injunctive relief are those

traditionally recognized by the United States Supreme Court and

the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001); Associated Gen.

Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity,

950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs must show either

a combination of probable success on the merits and the chance of

irreparable harm, or that serious questions on the merits are

raised and the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

Associated Gen. Contractors, 950 F.2d at 1410. 

3. The limited jurisdictional scope of the Court’s review

under the VRA precludes consideration of the “merits” (i.e.,

whether the underlying boundary changes violate the VRA or

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whether voting rights of minorities are or are not being

adversely affected). See United States v. Louisiana, 952 F.

Supp. 1151, 1159-60 & n.9 (W.D. La. 1997) (refusing to analyze

the probable success on the merits prong of the traditional

preliminary injunctive relief standard, but acknowledging that

the balance of the harms is relevant as is the question of

whether a voting change is covered by § 5). 

4. Nevertheless, the Court may examine the extent to which

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on those merits issues which are

within its jurisdiction, namely issues of standing and coverage

of the Defendant Cities by § 5 of the VRA. It is also undisputed

that the Court must examine the balance of the hardships. For

example, in Merced v. Koch, 574 F. Supp. 498, 499-500 & n.2

(S.D.N.Y. 1983), which considered a motion for preliminary

injunction in a § 5 challenge, the district court indicated that

the relevant inquiries were: (a) whether plaintiffs had

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the

allegation that § 5 applied to the election; and (b) whether the

balance of hardships weighed in favor of the issuance of an

injunction.

5. Lopez I, which Plaintiffs cite for the proposition that

they are entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of law without

the need to make any showing under the traditional test for

issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Court notes that

equitable principles are relevant. See Lopez I, 519 U.S. at 21-

22 (suggesting that preliminary injunctive relief might be

appropriate in an “extreme circumstance” where “there are

equitable principles that justify allowing the election to

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proceed.”) (emphasis added).

6. Here, in examining the likelihood of success on the

merits, the district court must first address two questions: 

(a) whether Plaintiffs have standing even though they reside in

only one of the five allegedly covered cities, and (b) whether

the cities are jurisdictions covered by § 5. 

7. As to standing, both named Plaintiffs reside in Los

Banos, one of the five cities against which injunctive relief is

sought. Plaintiffs maintain that their residence within a

covered jurisdiction (Merced County) provides them with standing

to challenge elections throughout that covered jurisdiction,

without regard to residence in the subunit holding the

election(s) being challenged. 

8. No Ninth Circuit case is directly on point. However, a

series of reapportionment cases brought under the VRA in the

Second, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh circuits are instructive. 

a. First, in Fairly v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th

Cir. 1974), plaintiffs, African-American residents of Forrest

County, Mississippi, challenged a plan to reapportion voting

districts for the election of the five-member Forrest County

Board of Supervisors. Plaintiffs alleged that the plan would

have resulted in underrepresentation of electors residing in some

but not all of the five districts. The Fifth Circuit first

concluded that “sufficient damage through underrepresentation to

obtain standing will be inflicted if population equality among

voting units is not present.” Id. at 603. However, the “injury

results only to those persons domiciled in the under-represented

voting districts.” Id. Accordingly, because the class

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representatives failed to allege that they were domiciled in the

voting district they were challenging, or that they were

underrepresented, they could not properly represent a “sub-class

of electors of which they may not be members.” Id. at 604. 

b. Similarly, League of Women Voters of Nassau County

v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155 (2d Cir.

1984), applied Fairly to a challenge to reapportionment that

would have affected voting for Nassau County’s Board of

Supervisors. Id. at 156. The Second Circuit held that some of

the plaintiffs, who resided in overrepresented municipalities

within Nassau County lacked standing, while two other plaintiffs,

who resided in underrepresented political subdivisions had

standing to sue. See also Wright v. Dougherty County, 358 F.3d

1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005)(per curiam) (applying Fairly in a

similar case to find that “injury results only to those domiciled

in the under-represented voting districts”); Minority Police

Officers Ass’n of South Bend v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197,

202 (7th Cir. 1983) (same). 

9. All these cases concern county-wide electoral policies. 

These cases stand directly for the proposition that, where it is

alleged that a county-wide policy results in underrepresentation

of electors residing within certain county sub-units, only

individuals residing within underrepresented districts have

standing to challenge the county-wide policy and the county-wide

election, because only those residing in underrepresented

districts will be injured by the election. These cases do not

directly address whether an individual residing in one

municipality within a covered county has standing to challenge a

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municipal election in a separate municipality (i.e., one in which

the plaintiff is not a resident) within the same covered county. 

However, these cases all stand for the proposition that

plaintiffs must be injured by a challenged policy or election to

have standing, and injury is established by domicile in the

underrepresented district. 

10. Plaintiffs assert that any resident of the covered

jurisdiction has standing to challenge the apportionment of

voting districts in any subunit of the covered jurisdiction

regardless of whether or not they reside in that subunit. This

approach to standing would mean that if the State of California

were a covered jurisdiction, a resident of Los Angeles would have

standing to challenge non-preclearance of a voting district in

San Francisco. This does not satisfy the required element of

injury in fact, as there can be no infringement of a plaintiff’s

right to vote in an election in which he or she is not eligible

to vote.

11. Consequently, the two named Plaintiffs, Mr. Lopez and

Ms. Ruiz, who allege they are residents of the City of Los Banos,

only have standing to challenge the municipal elections within

Los Banos. They do not have standing to challenge changes to the

voting districts of the other defendant cities and, consequently,

cannot obtain injunctive relief against those jurisdictions.

12. As to whether Los Banos is covered under § 5,

Defendants argue that it is not subject to the requirements of

the VRA. The Voting Rights Act mandates preclearance of any

changes to voting districts for covered states or political

subunits. The State of California is not a covered jurisdiction,

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but the County of Merced is a covered “political subdivision”

under § 5 of the VRA. Defendants argue that Los Banos is a

political subunit of the State of California and not the County

of Merced. (See, e.g., Doc. 29, County of Merced’s Opposition to

Application for Preliminary Injunction, filed Nov. 17, 2006; Doc.

34, City of Atwater Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunctive Relief, filed Nov. 17, 2006.) They argue,

therefore, that Los Banos is not subject to the preclearance

requirements of § 5. This court assumes arguendo–solely for

purposes of Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion–that

Plaintiffs made a colorable argument under Sheffield, 435 U.S.

110, that Defendant Los Banos is subject to § 5 preclearance

obligations.

13. Turning to equitable considerations, we find that

Defendants have not demonstrated by a preponderance of the

evidence that the doctrine of laches, alone, should bar

Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. To establish

laches, Defendants must show that (1) Plaintiffs delayed

inexcusably in the assertion of a known right and (2) that

Defendants have been prejudiced as a result of that delay. See

O’Donnell v. Vencor, Inc., 465 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

14. Plaintiffs excuse their delay in filing by claiming

that they had a large number of historical, factual issues

concerning boundary changes to research and present in the

complaint. However, Plaintiffs presented no evidence of when

their investigation began or what research was performed, except

for a reference to August 2006.

15. Plaintiffs offered no explanation for why the inquiry

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and research did not commence until August 2006 when the alleged

violations go back thirty-four years. Absent this explanation,

questions arise about the necessity to present the court with an

eleventh-hour, last minute, “urgent” request that has farreaching consequences to the voting processes in the Defendant

Cities. 

16. The lateness of the filing of Plaintiffs’ complaint is

troubling, but without a fully developed record, Plaintiffs’

assertion that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 dictated the

extra time needed for factual and legal investigation is a

colorable contention of excuse for delay. Absent a more complete

record, we do not find that Plaintiffs’ claim is bared by laches.

17. The doctrine of “unclean hands” is also inapplicable to

Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. The doctrine “closes

the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with

inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he

seeks relief.” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304

F.3d 829, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Precision Instr. Mfg. Co.

v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). 

Plaintiffs’ hands are not “unclean” because of their failure to

notify the Defendant jurisdictions of their non-compliance with

the VRA before filing the instant suit. No authority is

presented that Plaintiffs had a legal pre-suit filing duty to

disclose non-compliance to Defendants. It is the responsibility

of the individual governmental entities to know the law and to

follow it.

18. Finally, we turn to the balance of hardships. There is

no dispute that the balance of the hardships must be analyzed in

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deciding whether to issue injunctive relief.

19. We find that the balance of hardships tips in favor of

the Defendants. 

20. The municipal voters of Los Banos had justified

expectations that their votes would be counted in important and

highly disputed local elections. We, like other courts faced with

similar situations, are reluctant to set aside the results or

prevent certification of an election. See, e.g., Lopez v. Hale,

797 F. Supp. 547, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1992)(three-judge § 5 court)

(“Here, the primary, once conducted ... created expectation

interests that cannot lightly be discounted. The overriding

purpose of the Act is to facilitate citizens’ right to

participate in the electoral process. While the Act permits that

process to be interrupted where requirements such as preclearance

have not been met, we do not enthusiastically consider setting

aside an election that has occurred....”); United States v. City

of Houston, 800 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D. Tex. 1992)(three-judge §

5 court) (“When elections have been held even under a voting

scheme that does not technically comply with section 5 the people

have chosen their representatives. Neither the Justice

Department nor this court should lightly overturn the peoples’

choices.”); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.

544, 572 (1969) (declining to set aside elections held under

unprecleared voting; because it was debatable that defendants

were covered by § 5, there had been “no deliberate defiance”). 

Although all these cases concern elections already held, here the

timing of the suit and request for injunctive relief six days

before the election and shortly before the required state law

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election certification dates interferes with voters’ expectations

and the orderly conduct of public elections.

21. An injunction against certification of election results

would work significant hardship on Los Banos, effectively

depriving the city’s voters of their elections. Under California

law, the election results must be certified within time periods

that cannot here be satisfied if an injunction issues. Absent

certification, existing councilmembers would continue to hold

their seats until a new election. Such disenfranchisement under

all the circumstances of this case is inequitable, particularly

in light of the inability of the City to form a quorum and

conduct business absent the seating of new members of its

governing body.

22. Denying preliminary injunctive relief does not

disadvantage Plaintiffs. The primary goal of injunctive relief

in a § 5 challenge “must be to ensure that the covered

jurisdiction submits its election plan to the appropriate federal

authorities for preclearance as expeditiously as possible.” 

Lopez I, 519 U.S. at 10. That goal has already been

substantially met in this case. Plaintiffs’ interests are

protected because the Defendant jurisdictions have submitted for

preclearance by the United States Attorney General every

annexation or other boundary change that is at issue. 

23. In Lopez I, the United States Supreme Court suggested

that an injunction might not be appropriate where “extreme

circumstances” exist. Although the Supreme Court did not define

“extreme circumstances,” it suggested that such a circumstance

may be present when “a seat’s unprecleared status is not drawn to

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the attention of the [covered jurisdiction] until the eve of the

election and there are equitable principles that justify allowing

the election to proceed.” Lopez I, 519 U.S. at 21-22 (citing

Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1991)). 

24. In both Lopez I and Clark, no such “extreme

circumstance” existed because the defendant jurisdictions were

aware of their potential preclearance violations months if not

years before the lawsuits. Here, although the County of Merced

submitted the preclearance requests for the cities, no city

official was notified of such submissions before this lawsuit was

filed. Los Banos was not aware of potential preclearance

litigation and only learned of the litigation by the faxed

notices of the lawsuit after October 27, 2006, less than ten days

before (i.e. on the eve of the election). Plaintiffs’ delay in

seeking to give notice of its request for an ex parte TRO is

unjustified, because it further compressed the time for the

defendants’ responses, even if the restraint sought was not

against holding the elections, but rather certification of

election results. 

25. At the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that

he intentionally waited to set any hearing on the TRO request.

Plaintiffs “only sought to enjoin certification of the election

results.” This further delayed notice to Defendants. 

26. This case is also distinguishable from Louisiana, 952

F. Supp. 1151, where the defendants had known for several years

that their annexations were subject to the preclearance

requirements of § 5 and did nothing.

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27. The combination of Plaintiffs’ unexplained delays; the

submission by Defendants for § 5 review of all relevant

preclearance requests to the Department of Justice; the urgent

nature of local issues in the elections; and the justified

expectations of Los Banos’s electorate, all converge to amount to

“extreme circumstance” discussed in Lopez I, 519 U.S. at 21, and

warrants denying the preliminary injunction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

TO THE EXTENT ANY FINDING OF FACT MAY BE INTERPRETED AS A

CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ANY CONCLUSION OF LAW MAY BE INTERPRETED AS

A FINDING OF FACT, IT IS SO INTENDED.

SO ORDERED

DATED: January 26, 2007. 

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

 /s/ Jay S. Bybee 

 JAY S. BYBEE

United States Circuit Judge

 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

 ANTHONY W. ISHII

United States District Judge

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