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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals T~nth c~rcuit ~· 

DON RENBARGER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

JANICE JOHNSON, TERRY KINNAHON, 

and RICKY DON JOHNSON, by and 

through his mother and next 

friend, JANICE JOHNSON, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

SAM LOCKHART, J.D. RISLEY, WADE 

STOVALL, 

Defendants. 

and 

MICHAEL DAFFIN, and BETTY WEISS, 

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Defendants-Appellees. ) 

DEC 111990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2707 

(D.C. No. Civ 86-392-C) 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma 

William H. Campbell, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Scott D. Cannon of Knight, Wagner, Stuart & Wilkerson, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma and Weldon Stout of Kennedy, Kennedy, Wright & Stout 

Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, and 

BRIMMER,* Chief District Judge. 

BRIMMER, Chief District Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 1 
* The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

This dispute arose over the construction of a public road 

along the border of lands owned by the appellant, Don Renbarger. 

In his complaint, appellant (plaintiff below) alleged various 

violations of his civil rights stemming from the construction of 

the road and his subsequent arrest on a related criminal charge. 

After lengthy proceedings, the trial court directed verdicts for 

all but one of the defendants remaining at trial. Appellant now 

appeals from the entry of the directed verdicts against him and in 

favor of the other defendants, and from evidentiary rulings of the 

court below. We affirm. 

The appellant Renbarger purchased the land in question in 

Sequoyah county, Oklahoma in 1973. At the time of purchase the 

land was burdened by a reservation for a county road down a section 

line which formed one border of the property. The record reflects 

that Renbarger was made aware of the imminent construction of a 

road along this section line at various times prior to the 

incidents which ultimately led to this lawsuit. 

on March 2, 1982 Renbarger observed activity along his 

property line and went to investigate. He found some of the 

defendants and others in the process of bulldozing a road down the 

section line and tearing down the fence that appellant had strung 

down the middle of the proposed road. Among those present was 

defendant Michael Daffin, Sequoyah County Assistant District 

Attorney, who allegedly told Renbarger that he (Daffin) was there 

to enforce the cutting of the road. Renbarger confronted the 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 2 
defendants and after an unsuccessful attempt to stop the 

construction, went to town to seek legal help or advice. 

Unable to engage legal counsel, Renbarger returned to his 

ranch where he confronted defendant Betty Weiss, a neighboring 

landowner whose husband had approached the Sequoyah County 

Commissioners with the idea of opening the reserved county road. 

He attempted to force Mrs. Weiss out of the area by hurling a dirt 

clod at her vehicle. She, of course, retreated. Deputies of the 

Sequoyah County Sheriff's office apparently later approached 

Renbarger at his home regarding the incident involving the dirt 

clod and Mrs. Weiss. No arrest was made. 

The next day, March 3, Renbarger began repairing the fence. 

He began by blasting holes for fence posts with dynamite. He 

subsequently left this chore to his foreman and ex-wife, Janice 

Johnson. As the sheriff and his deputy approached Johnson later 

that morning, she set off a charge, showering them with dirt. The 

officers promptly arrested Johnson, who was later acquitted of 

attempted murder. That evening, law enforcement officials from 

various local, state and federal agencies descended upon the 

Renbarger•s home, where they proceeded to arrest the .appellant, 

Terry. Kinnamon, an employee of Renbarger, and Ricky Don Johnson, 

the minor son of Ms. Johnson. Attempted murder charges were filed 

against Renbarger and were subsequently dropped. The road 

apparently was never finished. 

Suit was filed, dropped, and eventually refiled by Renbarger, 

Janice Johnson, Terry Kinnamon, and Ricky Don Johnson, alleging 

violations of civil rights under 12 u.s.c. § 1343 and 42 u.s.c. § 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 3 
1983. Named defendants in the refiled suit were Sheriff Sam 

Lockhart, Deputies J.D. Risley and Wade Stovall, Daffin and Weiss. 

Eventually, after various settlements and directed verdicts, only 

Renbarger's claim against J.D. Risley, who had allegedly assaulted 

and threatened the appellant upon his arrest on March 3, 1982, went 

to the jury . The jury found for Renbarger and awarded damages of 

$1. 

Appellant Renbarger now challenges the trial court's rulings 

which disallowed the introduction of testimony by Gus Gossett, a 

Sequoyah County Commissioner, on the customs and practices of the 

county commissioners when opening a reserved section line road for 

public use. He contends that the procedure actually followed by 

t he commissioners in this · case "failed to meet even the most 

r udimentary requirements of due process and notice . 11 Specifically, 

appellant sought to show that it was customary to inform the 

burdened landowner of the i mpending opening of the road . Appellant 

also challenges as error the directed verdicts in favor of Daffin 

a nd Weiss. 

Appellant cites Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Company, 398 u.s. 144 

(1970), for the proposition that custom which carries with it the 

force of law is relevant to the issue of whether due process 

required that he be informed of the building of the proposed road. 

That case is inapposite. In Adickes, the Court held that if the 

plaintiff could show "the existence of a state enforced custom of 

segregating the races . . • 11 and that the action complained of nwas 

motivated by that state-enforced custom, she will have made out a 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 4 
claim under§ 1983." Id. at 171-73 (footnote omitted). Here, 

appellant attempted to show that the custom of informing burdened 

landowners of the pending construction of county roads rose to such 

a level so as to amount to a denial of due process in the absence 

of that notice. Adickes speaks of custom as the act depriving one 

of constitutional rights. In contrast, appellant speaks of custom 

as the measure of what process is due. 

But, irrespective of appellant's custom argument, 1n the 

absence of an identifiable and protected property interest, he has 

no claim based on alleged deficiencies in procedural due process. 

See, ~~ Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975); Perry v. 

Sindermann, 408 u.s. 593, 599 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 

u.s. 564, 569-70 (1972). Here, appellant had no protecte~ property 

interest in the land along the section line where the defendants 

were constructing the road, appellant took title to his land 

subject to the Cherokee Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 57-241, 32 Stat. 

716 (1902). Section 37 of the Act provides that public roads "may 

be established along section lines without any compensation being 

paid therefor, and all allottees, purchasers, and others shall take 

the title to such lands subject to this provision • • • • 11 Moreover, 

the Oklahoma Constitution recognizes the validity of this 

reservation of lands for public roads along section lines. Okla. 

Const. art. XVI, § 2. In Paschall Properties, Inc. v. Bd. of 

County Comm'rs, 733 P.2d 878 (1987), the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

analyzed the effects of the Cherokee Allotment Agreement on the 

property interests of landowners whose property borders a section 

line. The court stated: 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 5 
[T]he Cherokee Allotment Act negates the argued ability 

to permanently vacate or abandon section line roads. It 

provides that roads may be established along all property 

lines without any compensation being paid for them. It 

is also provided that the original allottees and 

purchasers shall take their title to these lands subject 

to this ability to establish roads. The Act contains no 

time constraints as to when these roads may be 

established and specifies that all subsequent purchasers 

are subject to the provision, having taken their title 

subject to it. 

Paschall, 733 P. 2d at 879 (emphasis in original and added) . 

Appellant thus had no protected property interest in that portion 

of his land encumbered by the reserved road which would entitle him 

to notice of the intended construction. Also, the trial court 

found that appellant did have actual notice of the opening of the 

road. Because the requirements of due process did not attach in 

the absence of a protected property interest, the procedure 

customarily followed by the Sequoyah County Commissioners is 

irrelevant. But even if there was a denial of due process -- which 

this Court has not found -- that process was not denied by any 

named defendant. It was the action of the county commissioners, 

who were not named as defendants, which resulted in the opening of 

the road. 

In short, custom is not the measure of due process, and in any 

event, appellant had no protected property interest but nonetheless 

did have actual notice of the proposed construction of the road. 

This Court will not find error in a ruling excluding evidence 

absent a showing that a substantial right of a party has been 

affected. K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 

1155-56 (lOth cir. 1985). Consequently, since its ruling did not 

affect any rights of the appellant, the trial court did not err in 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 6 
excluding Mr. Gossett's testimony. 

We next turn to appellant's argument that the trial court 

erred in directing verdicts for Daffin, the assistant district 

attorney 1 and Weiss 1 the neighboring landowner. We have said "that 

the trial judge may grant a motion for directed verdict only when 

all the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are so in favor 

of the moving party that reasonable persons could not differ in 

their conclusions." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Palermo, 815 

F.2d 1329, 1335 (lOth Cir. 1987). This is such a case. 

Regarding the appellant's arguments concerning the propriety 

of the order directing verdict in favor of Daffin, appellant argues 

that this issue revolves around Daffin's presence at the road site. 

However, the issue of Daffin's liability was narrowed at the 

pretrial conference to whether 11Daffin, acting outside the scope 

of his duties as a District Attorney for Sequoyah County, 

improperly advised the County Commissioners ... ", not whether he 

should be held liable based on his actions at the construction 

site. "Ordinarily, issues .•. not preserved in the final pretrial 

order are considered to have been eliminated from an action. 11 Ra th 

Packing co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1308 (1975), aff'd Jones v. 

Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). 

Appellant alleged that Daffin violated his rights by 

improperly advising the county commissioners regarding the legality 

of opening a public road on the section line forming the border of 

appellant 1 s property, and this advice was outside the scope of 

Daffin's duties as an assistant district attorney. Appellant now 

argues that the district court erred directing verdict for Daffin. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 7 
The facts show otherwise. 

First, the trial court found no evidence that Daffin even 

advised the county commissioners regarding the road. Moreover, if 

he had advised them that the road could be built, that advice would 

have been absolutely correct, because the appellant took title to 

the land subject to the reservation for the road. 

Second, appellant asserted that by giving the commissioners 

advice regarding the road, Daffin was acting outside the scope of 

his authority. To the contrary, Oklahoma statutes provide: 

The District Attorney, or his Assistant shall give 

opinion and advice to the board of county commissioners 

... when requested by such officers and boards, upon all 

matters in which any of the counties of his district are 

interested, or relating to the duties of such boards or 

officers in which the state or counties may have an 

interest. 

Okla . Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §215.5 (West 1988). There is no evidence 

in the record, nor has this Court been shown any authority, to the 

effect that Daffin would have been doing anything other than 

performing his statutory duty had he advised the commissioners 

regarding the opening of the road. 

Appellant takes issue with the trial court's reliance on 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 409 (1976), and Benavidez v. Gunnell, 

722 F.2d 615 (lOth Cir. 1983), to support the directed verdict in 

favor of Daffin. These cases discuss prosecutorial immunity and 

good faith, and are of little help to this Court in determining 

whether the trial court's directed verdict ruling was proper. our 

concern is whether "all the inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence are so in favor of [Daffin] that reasonable persons could 

not differ in their conclusions." Palermo , 815 F.2d at 1335. In 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 8 
this instance, they are. Because there was no evidence to support 

appellant 1 s allegations that Daffin advised the commissioners, 

properly or improperly , the trial court was correct in ordering the 

directed verdict in favor of Daffin. 

Even assuming, arguendo, that the issue of Daffin's behavior 

at the construction site was preserved and tried by appellant, the 

trial court's ruling in favor of Daffin must still be affirmed. 

As previously stated, no protected rights of appellant were 

infringed and no injury was suffered. In the absence of a 

constitutionally protected right, Daffin's actions could not have 

violated due process. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70. 

This conclusion leads us to the disposition of the final issue 

on appeal--the propriety of the directed verdict in favor of Weiss. 

Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling that, because t here 

was no showing that Weiss acted under color of state law, she could 

not be subjected to suit under § 1983. To be liable for civil 

rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one must have acted 

"under color of state law. n West v. Atkins, 487 u.s. 42, 48 

(1988). This does not mean that private persons are immune from 

suit under § 1983. "To act 'under color' of law does not require 

that the accused be an officer of the state. It is enough that he 

is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its 

agents. " United States v. Price, 383 u.s. 787, 794 (1966). 

However, "[t]o constitute state action, 'the deprivation [of the 

plaintiff 1 s federally protected rights) must be caused by the 

exercise of some right or privilege created by the state ... or by 

a person for whom the state is responsible .... ' 11 West, 487 u.s. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2707 Document: 01019656406 Date Filed: 12/11/1990 Page: 9 
at 49-50 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 u.s. 922, 937 

(1982)). 

Whether Weiss was exercising "some right or privilege 11 

conferred upon her by the state, or was 11 a person for whom the 

state is responsible 11 , is of no significance if there v1as no 

deprivation of a protected right. We have already held that the 

opening of the road did not deprive appellant of any 

constitutionally protected right. The trial court properly found, 

a fortiori, that since "the county officials did not deprive the 

plaintiff Renbarger of any property without due process of law, the 

defendant Weiss cannot have acted in joint participation with them 

to deprive the plaintiff Renbarger of property without due process 

of law. 11 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

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