Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-01786/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-01786-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VISA U.S.A. INC., a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff and Counterdefendant,

 v.

FIRST DATA CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation; FIRST DATA RESOURCES,

INC., a Delaware corporation; and FIRST

DATA MERCHANT SERVICES

CORPORATION, a Florida corporation,

Defendants and

Counterclaimants.

 /

No. C 02-01786 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE RULING

AND QUESTIONS ON FIRST

DATA’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON AUGUST 5, 2005 AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ papers and, thus, does not wish to hear the parties

reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to rely on authorities not cited

in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing counsel of these authorities

reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at the hearing. If the parties

submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the citations to the authorities

only, without argument or additional briefing. See N.D. Civil Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties

will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance on such authority.

The Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART First Data’s

motion for partial summary judgment of Visa’s trademark claims. The Court tentatively finds

Case 3:02-cv-01786-JSW Document 920 Filed 08/04/05 Page 1 of 2
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that Visa, U.S.A. lacks standing under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, but may have standing to sue under 15

U.S.C. § 1525(a).

The parties will each have 15 minutes to address the following questions:

(1) In the few instances in which an exclusive licensee is afforded standing to sue under

Section 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, not only does the operative license agreement confer an

exclusive license, but the agreement also grants the exclusive licensee a property interest

in the trademark or rights that amount to those of an assignee. See, e.g., Ultrapure

Systems, Inc. v. Ham-let Group, 921 F. Supp. 659, 665-66 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see also

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 33 cmt. d (1995) (licensees are precluded

from maintaining an action under Section 32 unless the transaction can be characterized

as an assignment). The record is undisputed that Visa International did not confer an

exclusive license to Visa, U.S.A. and never granted a property interest or rights that

amounted to those of an assignee. Neither the contract, nor the alleged oral

modification, nor the later confirmation in writing confers either an exclusive license or

property rights to Visa, U.S.A. How does Visa, U.S.A. contend that it has standing

under Section 32 as an exclusive licensee with ownership interests, or an assignee, of the

mark?

(2) The license agreement between Visa International and Visa, U.S.A. explicitly provides

that Visa International “shall have the sole right to engage in infringement or unfair

competition proceedings involving the Mark.” (See License Agreement, Schur

Declaration, Exh. N, ¶ 6.) 

(a) Even if the permission to sue in this particular matter was a valid

modification of the parties’ agreement, in order to qualify as a legal

representative, does Visa, U.S.A. have to demonstrate that it has a duty to

sue in all disputes involving the trademark? 

(b) Does the October 22 letter embody an agreement that Visa International

would give up any rights to this particular lawsuit in exchange for Visa,

U.S.A.’s promise to indemnify it? Can that constitute an agreement to

designate Visa, U.S.A. as its legal representative?

(3) How does First Data respond to the reasoning in Nakajima All Co. v. SL Ventures,

Corp., 2001 WL 641415, *2 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2001), in which the district court

determined that plaintiff had standing to sue under Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),

because although the license agreement explicitly prohibited the right to sue, plaintiff

was able to demonstrate that it had received express permission to do so? Why is this

reasoning insufficient to distinguish the present matter from the holding in Finance

Investment Co. (Bermuda) v. Geberit AG, 165 F.3d 526, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998)?

(4) Is the oral modification of the 1977 license agreement valid because it has been fully

performed? 

(5) Do the parties wish to address any additional issues?

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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