Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00534/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00534-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Anthony Dean,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-0534-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on March 13, 2012 (Doc. 1), supplemented by three addendums (Docs. 27, 28 and 

29). On July 11, 2012, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 30). Petitioner filed an 

Amended Traverse on August 21, 2012 (Doc. 69), supplemented by Addendums filed 

August 21, 2012 (Doc. 46) and January 7, 2013 (Doc. 85).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2005, over a period of more than three hours, Petitioner 

repeatedly drove slowly past the victim’s residence, staring at the victim who was doing 

yard work. Eventually, Petitioner fired three shots at the victim, who fled inside and 

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called police. The victim and neighbors provided descriptions of the vehicle and 

Petitioner. Officers discovered bullet holes in the victim’s truck.

Later that same day, Petitioner’s brother, who lived across the street, reported that 

Petitioner had stolen a gun from his home that Petitioner had previously given him. He

reported that that he had previously alerted authorities that he believed his brother had 

been involved in a different drive by shooting in the area, and that he believed Petitioner 

was involved in the shooting at the neighbor’s home. He related that Petitioner was 

angry at his family because they had him committed to a mental health facility in 

California for evaluation. He advised that Petitioner was headed back to California.

Petitioner was arrested two days later in California, in connection with the

investigation of a drive by shooting there. Petitioner admitted to taking the gun, but 

claimed he was the true owner. He admitted to shooting at the neighbor who he believed 

to be having an affair with his brother’s wife, but claimed he believed the gun was 

loaded with blanks. 

The shooting victim identified Petitioner from a photographic line-up. (Exhibit B, 

Presentence Report at 1-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 30, are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit ___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On July 6, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in the Pinal County Superior Court, in 

case number CR200601144, on charges of: (1) drive by shooting; (2) aggravated assault; 

(3) burglary; (4) theft; and (5) criminal damage. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) Counsel was 

appointed and eventually1 moved (with the consent of the State) for a Rule 11 evaluation 

for competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. (Exhibit C, Motion.) 

The parties eventually stipulated that Petitioner was not competent to stand trial, 

and on July 8, 2008, the court ordered Petitioner committed to the Arizona State Hospital 

 

1

In the interim, Petitioner had been prosecuted in California, paroled on March 21, 2007, 

and he absconded from parole in January, 2008. (Exhibit B, Presentence Report at 4.) 

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for restoration of competency. (Exhibit D, M.E. 7/8/2008.) A series of reports were 

submitted from the Arizona State Hospital (Exhibits O, P, and Q). A review hearing was 

conducted on January 30, 2009 (Exhibit E, M.E. 1/30/09), and on February 17, 2009, 

Petitioner was found competent to stand trial. Because the relationship with trial counsel 

had deteriorated, new counsel was appointed (Exhibit F, M.E. 2/17/09).

On August 13, 2009, Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit 

H), wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the drive by shooting and aggravated assault 

charges, in exchange for dismissal of the other charges, and a stipulated mitigated term 

of 7 years on the drive by shooting, and consecutive probation on the aggravated assault. 

Petitioner appeared for sentencing on September 14, 2009, and was sentenced to 

seven years in prison on the drive by shooting and a consecutive five year probation term 

on the aggravated assault. (Exhibit I, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 1; Exhibit N, Docket.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a “Pro Nun Tunc Motion” (Exhibit J), 

moving to correct his sentence on the basis that he was entitled to time served credits for 

time in custody in California with an Arizona hold placed on him. The court denied the 

motion, finding that Petitioner was not entitled to credit for time served until he was in 

the custody of the Pinal County authorities. (Exhibit L, Order 1/26/11.) 

On February 8, 2011, Petitioner filed an “Amended Pro Nun Tunc Motion” 

(Exhibit M), again seeking additional credit for time served. In addition, a series of 

additional motions and “requests” have been filed with the trial court. (Exhibit N, 

Docket.) The motions were denied. (Addendums, Doc. 46, M.E. 2/18/11.) 

/ /

/ /

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 13, 2012 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition raised a variety of allegations concerning his California conviction, but the 

Court found that it asserts a single ground for relief: “that he did not voluntarily enter 

into his plea agreement.” (Order 4/27/12, Doc. 11 at 2.) The Court ordered all other 

grounds for relief dismissed. (Id.) 

Petitioner has supplemented his Petition with: (1) a “Notice of Lodgement,” filed 

June 20, 2012 (Doc. 27), consisting of various exhibits from Petitioner’s California 

prosecution, and the instant prosecution; (2) an “Amendment to the Lodgement of 

Exhibits” (Doc. 28), correcting the number of identified pages in the Notice of 

Lodgement (Doc. 27); and (3) a second “Notice of Lodgement” (Doc. 29), asserting that 

his extradition was contested, and therefore the dismissal of his challenges to the 

California was improper.

Response - On July 11, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc. 

30). Respondents argue that the Petition is barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner’s state remedies on his claim were not properly exhausted and are now 

procedurally defaulted, and the claim is without merit.

Reply And Other Filings – Petitioner proceeded to make a series of filings 

(Docs. 27, 28, 29, and 31). On July 19, 2012, Petitioner filed his original Travers (Doc. 

32). He then continued to make a number of other filings (Docs. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 

40, and 41.) The Court found a number of the filings to be attempts at serial 

amendments to the Traverse, and struck them. Petitioner was advised that the matter 

would be resolved on the basis of: Petition (Doc. 1); “Notice of Lodgement” (Doc. 27); 

“Notice of Errata” (Doc. 28); “Notice of Lodgement” (Doc. 29); Response (Doc. 30); 

and the original Traverse (Doc. 32). Petitioner was, however, given leave to file a 

motion to amend his traverse. The Court observed that under the applicable rules, “No 

provision is made for serial amendments or supplements.” (Order 8/7/12, Doc. 42 at 2.) 

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Petitioner was cautioned: “No further amendments to the Petition or Traverse will be 

permitted in the absence of a showing of exceptional circumstances and excusable 

neglect.” (Id. at 3.) 

Petitioner eventually filed a motion (Doc. 44) to file his amended traverse, which 

was granted (Doc. 68). Petitioner’s Amended Traverse (Doc. 69) was filed October 11, 

2012, together with the original Attachments (Doc. 46) to the proposed traverse. The 

Court noted (Doc. 84) that page 5 had been omitted from the Amended Traverse, and on 

January 7, 2013, Petitioner filed the omitted page (Doc. 85).

Petitioner has proceeded to file a flurry of other documents, including various 

Declarations (Docs. 54, 55, 63, 65, 76, 77, 79), Additional Attachments (Docs. 56, 60), 

and various Notices (Docs. 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 and

86).2 These additional documents are not motions, and in light of the warnings provided 

to Petitioner, are not considered in connection with the Petition.

Petitioner’s Amended Traverse (Doc. 69) argues that various prior rulings of this 

Court have been incorrect or improper, and/or ignored until Petitioner mailed copies to 

Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner especially 

complains about the Court’s dismissal of various claims, and the refusal to allow him to 

conduct discovery. (Doc. 68 at 1-4, 12-14.) Petitioner argues that to dismiss his claims 

as procedurally defaulted “would result in a major fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

because he has been harmed by the denial of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 4.) 

Petitioner attacks his extradition, his purported factual discrepancies in the police reports 

and presentence report, the sufficiency of the indictment, the failure of counsel to file a 

 

2

These filings are largely irrelevant to the issues addressed herein. See e.g. Doc. 54 

(disputing alleged aggravating circumstances), 55 (chronicling and opposing competency 

proceedings at trial), 56 (additional trial records), 60 (same), 61 (terrorists at 

Guantanamo Bay), 62 (complaint about limited response), 63 (demand for relief on 

dismissed habeas petition), 64 (complaint about Dick Cheney), 65(loss of habeas rights 

after September 11, 2001), 66 (loss of law library), 67 (economy and budget), 70 

(sanctions), 72 (attack on Libya), 73 (resignation of Petraeus), 74 (political issues), 75 

(relationship between Petitioner’s cases), 76 (suggestions to Congress), 77 (obligation to 

uphold the Constitution), 78 (Respondents’ failure to answer), 79 (sexual harassment), 

80 (Court’s failings), 81 (“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”), 82 (“Florida/Oil/Bush”), 83 

(Respondents’ failure to answer), and 86 (discussing budget deficits). 

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motion to dismiss in 2007, and the impropriety of the process finding him incompetent 

and restoring him to competence. (Id. at 6-9.) Petitioner argues his plea was involuntary 

because he accepted it only to be freed from the competency restoration process. (Id. at 

9.) He asserts that he filed motions with the trial court to correct his sentence on 

February 18, 2011, March 22, 2011, and August 25, 2011, and dropped the matter in a 

motion filed December 30, 2011. (Id.) Petitioner argues he was kidnapped and tortured 

when he was extradited to Arizona. (Id at 10.) Petitioner argues that his Petition was 

timely, and that equitable tolling should be granted because the AEDPA statute of 

limitations was an unconstitutional response to terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 

resulting in an improper suspension of habeas. (Id.at 10-12.) Finally, Plaintiff argues 

that he has been off medication since arriving at the Arizona Department of Corrections 

in 2009, and yet has remained competent. (Id. at 15.)

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Finality - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins 

to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or 

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the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).3 

For Arizona pleading defendants, their opportunity for direct review is an Arizona 

Rule 32 of-right post conviction relief proceeding. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 

(9th Cir. 2007). “Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is 

a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. 

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 

32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 

days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a 

Petition for Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

In addition, it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244, “direct review" includes the period within which a petition for a writ of 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court is pending or could be sought. See 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). However, certiorari review with the 

U.S. Supreme Court may only be sought following a decision or denial of discretionary 

review by the state court of last resort, i.e. the Arizona Supreme Court. Flynt vs. Ohio, 

451 U.S. 619 (1981). Accordingly, the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the U.S. 

Supreme Court cannot be considered in determining when Petitioner's judgment became 

final when review by the state court of last resort was not sought. Eisermann vs. 

Penarosa, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Hawaii 1999). See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (certiorari 

jurisdiction limited to highest available state court); Sup. Ct. Rule 13 (timeliness from 

decision of highest state court). See also Foreman v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 

2004) ("If a criminal defendant has pursued his direct appeal through the highest state 

court, then this period includes the 90 days for filing a petition for certiorari to the 

Supreme Court. If not, then it includes the time for seeking further state-court direct 

review.")

 

3

The statute provides for later commencement of the one year when the facts supporting 

the claim are newly discovered or there has been a retroactive change in the law. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The undersigned finds nothing in the record to suggest either of 

these might apply.

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Here, Petitioner was sentenced on September 14, 2009. (Exhibit I, Senence.) 

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal or a PCR petition of right. Indeed, the first 

post-conviction filing he made was his “Pro Nun Tunc Motion” (Exhibit J), filed January 

11, 2011, long after the expiration of the time for an “of right” PCR petition. 

Accordingly, excluding any time for certiorari review, Petitioner’s conviction became 

final 90 days after his sentence, or after December 14, 2009, when his time to file an “of 

right” PCR petition expired. 

Further, having not sought direct review of his conviction, and having not sought 

review by the Arizona appellate courts, Petitioner had no right seek certiorari review by 

the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction was final and his one year limitations period 

began running on December 15, 2009.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Such tolling only results from 

state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005).

Here, Petitioner had no state application pending during the time his one year was 

running, e.g. December 15, 2009 through December 14, 2010. Indeed, his first state 

court application following his sentence was his January 11, 2011 motion to correct his 

sentence. (Exhibit J, Motion; Exhibit N, Docket.) Once the habeas statute has run, a 

subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one 

year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling, and his one year 

expired on December 14, 2010.

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4. Timeliness of Petition

Here Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on March 12, 2012. Under the prison 

mailbox rule, filings are deemed “filed” at the time they are delivered to prison officials 

for mailing. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003). Because it does 

not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes that the prison mailbox rule applies 

and that Petitioner delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing on the date he 

signed the Petition, March 11, 2012. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) At that time, 

Petitioner’s one year had been expired for almost 15 months.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition is untimely.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

Here, Petitioner makes no argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

The undersigned takes note of the fact that, despite his protestations to the 

contrary, Petitioner suffers substantially from mental illness. His mental illness is well 

documented in the competency proceedings at trial, and has even been evident in his 

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filings in this action. For example, Petitioner’s arguments have, with some frequency, 

little to do with what even most pro se prisoner litigants would consider to be relevant 

issues. They also reflect patterns of repetition and hyperbole that is common in the 

filings of those suffering from mental illness.

At the same time, Petitioner has demonstrated that he is well capable of

instigating and maintaining litigation. Petitioner filed a series of motions in the state 

court in early 2011. At least those provided to this Court are well reasoned and 

articulated, although not effective. (See Exhibits J and M.) Although these were filed 

after his one year had expired, it was only shortly after. Petitioner had been adjudicated 

by the state court as competent in February, 2009, and apparently continued competent 

through sentencing In September 2009. Although this was three months prior to the time 

his one year habeas limitations period began running, it provides an implication that 

Petitioner remained sufficiently mentally capable that he could have filed during his one 

year limitations period the same Petition he eventually filed in March 2012.

Petitioner argues in his Amended Traverse that he has not received his medication 

since arriving in prison. (Doc. 69 at 15.) Presumably this refers to psychotropic 

medication. Petitioner maintains that despite the lack of medication, he has remained 

competent. (Id.) In light of his medical history, it seems likely to the undersigned that 

being taken off his medication (assuming such occurred) would have caused Petitioner’s 

mental condition to deteriorate to some degree. Again, however, Petitioner’s filings in 

the State court and this action suggest that despite the deterioration, Petitioner remained 

capable of pursuing review of his incarceration during the relevant time, from December 

15, 2009 through December 14, 2010.

6. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the statute of limitations is subject to an 

exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

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7. Summary

Petitioner’s conviction became final on conclusion of direct review on December 

14, 2009, on the expiration of his time to file an “of right” PCR proceeding. The 

limitations period began running thereafter and expired one year later, on December 14, 

2010. Petitioner’s state proceedings after its expiration do not revive the expired period. 

Nor do his assertions of equitable tolling show any circumstance existing during the 

limitations period that would have precluded a timely filing, thereby justifying equitable 

tolling.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents argue procedural default, and that the Petition is without merit. 

Because the undersigned finds the Petition plainly barred by the statute of limitations, 

these defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

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Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed March 13, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

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V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: January 11, 2013

12-0534r RR 12 12 13 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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