Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01281/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01281-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Louis Joseph Cassise,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01281-PHX-PGR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES SENIOR 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Louis Joseph Cassise’s (“Petitioner”) Petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) (the “Petition”). Respondents 

have filed a “Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petition for Containing Only Unexhausted 

Claims” (Doc. 19). Petitioner has responded (Doc. 21), and Respondents have replied 

(Doc. 22). With leave of Court, Petitioner filed a “Supplement to Petioner’s [sic] 

Response to Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petition” (Doc. 25). Respondents filed a 

Supplemental Reply (Doc. 26). 

The Petition contains six grounds for relief. The parties agree that none of the six 

grounds have been exhausted in state court. For the reasons set forth herein, it is 

recommended that the Court dismiss the Petition without prejudice. 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND 

On September 17, 2013, Petitioner signed a plea agreement in which Petitioner 

agreed to plead guilty to ten counts of public sexual indecency in violation of Arizona 

law. (Doc. 12-2 at 10-12). The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas and entered 

judgment accordingly. (Id. at 14-17, 19-27). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

consecutive two-year terms of imprisonment on two counts and concurrent terms of 

lifetime probation on the remaining counts. (Id. at 21-23). 

In January 2014, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Id. 

at 29-33). Petitioner’s appointed PCR counsel could not find a colorable claim for PCR 

relief. (Id. at 35-37). Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition, which the trial court denied 

on November 25, 2014. (Id. at 39-63, 92). 

On December 22, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals seeking review of the trial court’s denial of the PCR Petition. (Id. at 94). The 

Petition for Review became fully briefed on February 13, 2015. (Attachment 1). As of 

the date of this Report and Recommendation, the Arizona Court of Appeals has not ruled 

on the Petition for Review.

1

 (Id.).

On July 9, 2015, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 1). 

The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition. (Doc. 6). Respondents requested 

that the Court extend the answer deadline until forty days after the Arizona Court of 

Appeals rules on Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (Doc. 12, 14). The Court denied the 

request. (Doc. 17). In February 2016, Respondents filed the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

19). Petitioner filed a Response (Doc. 21), and Respondents replied on February 17, 

2016 (Doc. 22). In March 2016, the Court granted Petitioner’s request for leave to 

supplement his Response. (Doc. 23, 24). On April 11, 2016, Petitioner filed his 

1 The case number of Petitioner’s appellate case is 1 CA-CR 14-0852 PRPC. Case 

information is available online at http://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/aacc/1ca/1cacase.htm. 

- 2 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Supplement to Petitioner’s Response” (Doc. 25). Respondents filed a Supplemental 

Reply on April 15, 2016 (Doc. 26).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court’s September 15, 2015 Order details Petitioner’s six grounds for habeas 

relief as follows:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the Arizona Court of

Appeals failed to timely rule on his petition for review from

the denial of state post-conviction relief in violation of his 

federal due process rights and his right to a speedy

disposition in violation of the Sixth Amendment. In Ground

Two, he alleges that the trial court abused its discretion

in violation of his federal due process rights by denying his 

state petition for post-conviction relief. In Ground Three,

Petitioner asserts that his conviction for multiple offenses 

violated his Fifth Amendment double jeopardy rights. In

Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that counts 1 and 2 were

aggravated and multiplicitous in violation of his Fifth 

Amendment double jeopardy rights. In Ground Five,

Petitioner asserts that lifetime probation and requiring him

to register as a sex offender violated his federal due process 

and double jeopardy rights. In Ground Six, Petitioner alleges

that his federal due process rights were violated by the 

severity of his sentences, gross misrepresentations, and 

unethical judicial conduct.

(Doc. 6 at 2). Based on the following discussion, the undersigned concludes that the 

Court should dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1). 

A. Younger Abstention Doctrine

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held 

that a federal court generally cannot interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. 

This holding, commonly referred to as the “Younger abstention doctrine,” is based on the 

principle of federal-state comity. See id. at 44; Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332, 

336 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The Younger doctrine was borne of the concern that federal court 

injunctions might unduly hamper a state in its prosecution of criminal laws.”). The 

Younger abstention doctrine applies to both trial and direct appeal proceedings. See New 

Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989)

- 3 -

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“For Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary 

system, and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by intervening in mid-process 

would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as sovereign.”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.

v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975) (“[A] necessary concomitant of Younger is that 

a party [wishing to contest in federal court the judgment of a state judicial tribunal] must 

exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court . . . .”); 

Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Our reading 

of [Younger] convinces us that only in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant 

entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the 

jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state 

courts”); Roberts v. Dicarlo, 296 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1184-85 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (dismissing 

federal habeas petition pursuant to Younger abstention doctrine when the petitioner filed 

his federal habeas petition while state court direct appeal was pending). 

Younger abstention is required when the following three factors are met: (i) state 

proceedings are ongoing, (ii) the state proceedings implicate important state interests, and 

(iii) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to pursue federal claims in the 

ongoing state proceeding. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 

457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 

791, 799-801 (9th Cir. 2001). 

If the Younger factors are satisfied, a federal court must not interfere with the 

ongoing state proceeding unless extraordinary circumstances exist, such as a threat of 

irreparable injury that is “both great and immediate.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (“even 

irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is ‘both great and immediate’”) (citation 

omitted). Extraordinary circumstances may also include bad faith or harassment on the 

part of the state. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 437 (holding that Younger 

abstention was required where there “no bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional 

circumstances dictate[d] to the contrary”). The Ninth Circuit has found extraordinary 

circumstances where a defendant is facing retrial and federal intervention is necessary to 

- 4 -

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prevent a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310 

(9th Cir. 1992); Hartley v. Neely, 701 F.2d 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1983). “The Fifth 

Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy . . . ‘is not against being twice 

punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.’” Mannes, 967 F.2d at 1312 (quoting

United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896)). Hence, “full vindication of the right 

necessarily requires intervention before trial . . . .” Id. (citing Hartley, 701 F.2d at 781).

All three Younger factors are satisfied in this case. First, it is undisputed that 

Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceeding is ongoing.

2

 Second, the State of Arizona has an 

important interest in assessing and correcting violations of a defendant’s rights. Finally, 

Petitioner has been afforded an adequate state forum to pursue his federal claims. See 

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (a federal court should assume that 

state procedures will afford an adequate opportunity for consideration of constitutional 

claims “in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary”). A ruling on the merits 

of Petitioner’s habeas claims would have the practical effect of enjoining the state 

proceedings to the extent the Arizona Court of Appeals might address the claims.

Because the three Younger factors have been met, the Court must abstain from 

intervening in the PCR proceeding unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Although the 

Petition for Review was filed in December 2014 and has been ripe for decision since 

February 2015, an ordinary delay in appellate review does not establish extraordinary 

circumstances.3

2 Some courts have held that Younger abstention is not necessary where the pending state proceeding is not a direct appeal, but a state post-conviction proceeding. Al 

Saud v. Ryan, CV-15-0849-PHX-SPL (JFM), 2015 WL 10097522, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 

3, 2015); Smith v. Williams, No. 2:12-cv-00952-MMD-VCF, 2013 WL 1501583, at *2 

(D. Nev. April 13, 2013). However, an of-right PCR proceeding is functionally equivalent to a direct appeal. State v. Ward, 118 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that an of-right PCR proceeding is the “functional equivalent of a direct appeal”); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007) (treating an of- right PCR proceeding as a form of direct review). Accordingly, the Younger abstention 

doctrine applies to Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceeding. 

3 Section II(B)(1) below rejects Petitioner’s argument that the delay constitutes a due process violation.

- 5 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Further, Petitioner is not facing trial on charges that might be barred by the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. Federal intervention is not necessary to prevent the possibility of great 

and immediate irreparable harm. See Mannes, 967 F.2d at 1313 (“Because Mannes faced 

the possibility of irreparable injury if forced to stand trial on murder charges that might be 

barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the district court properly heard her petition.”).

Moreover, federal intervention is not appropriate because Petitioner’s claims are not 

exhausted. See id. at 1312 (discussing petitioner’s exhaustion of state remedies regarding 

claim that retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and stating that “[s]ince Mannes 

exhausted state remedies on her double jeopardy claim, the district court had jurisdiction 

to hear her petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254”); Hartley, 701 F.2d at 781 (“[W]e are 

convinced that a petitioner in state custody can only be assured freedom from double 

jeopardy by giving him access to habeas review prior to a second trial. We therefore hold 

that pretrial habeas corpus review is appropriate in those cases where, as here, all other 

state remedies were exhausted.”).

In sum, the record does not show that Petitioner will suffer great and immediate 

irreparable harm if the Court abstains from interfering with the PCR proceeding. Nor 

does the record show any other extraordinary circumstance that may justify such 

interference, such as bad faith or harassment on the part of the state. Middlesex County 

Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 437. The undersigned concludes that the Younger abstention 

requires that the Petition (Doc. 1) be dismissed.4

 World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. 

4 The Younger abstention doctrine still would apply even if the Arizona Court of 

Appeals decided the Petition for Review prior to the Court’s ruling on this Report and Recommendation. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “the critical question is not whether the state proceedings are still ‘ongoing,’ but whether ‘the state proceedings were underway before initiation of the federal proceedings.’” Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 

1337, 1341 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir.1986) (focusing on the time that the federal action was initiated and ignoring that the state court proceeding was subsequently 

remanded)); Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994) (“To 

decide whether there was a pending state judicial proceeding within Younger, we focus 

on the status of the state court proceeding at the time of the district court's decision rather 

than on its current status on appeal.”).

- 6 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 1987) (“When a case falls within the 

proscription of Younger, a district court must dismiss the federal action.”). The next 

section explains that dismissal of the Petition (Doc. 1) is also required by the exhaustionof-remedies doctrine.

B. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

It has been settled for over a century that a “state prisoner must normally exhaust

available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal

courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct.

734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”); 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Similar to the Younger abstention doctrine, the exhaustion 

requirement is rooted in the principle of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. 

If an appeal or collateral-review proceeding is pending in state court, a petitioner 

has not exhausted his state remedies until the completion of those proceedings. See 

Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983). Except for cases involving a life 

sentence or the death penalty, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for 

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.” 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

“Once a district court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted 

claims, it need not inquire further as to the petitioner’s intentions. Instead, it may simply 

dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Although a federal court may excuse the exhaustion requirement in 

certain limited circumstances, none of those circumstances exist in this case.5

5 Petitioner incorrectly asserts that Menna v. NY, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) holds that a 

federal court may excuse the exhaustion requirement in cases alleging violations of the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. (Doc. 21 at 4; Doc. 25 at 3-4). Menna holds that a defendant 

- 7 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Petitioner’s Failure to Exhaust is Not Excusable Under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(B). The Arizona Court of Appeals’ Delay Does Not 

Violate Petitioner’s Due Process Rights.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B), a federal court may issue a writ of habeas 

corpus despite a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies if “there is an absence 

of available State corrective process” or “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” In Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-

31 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit held that “since excessive delay in obtaining an 

appeal may constitute a due process violation, a prisoner need not fully exhaust his state 

remedies if the root of his complaint is his inability to do so.” “[I]t would be meaningless 

to insist that petitioner exhaust his state remedies when the essence of his due process 

claim arises directly out of his inability to do so.” Id. at 530 (quoting Wheeler v. Kelly, 

639 F.Supp. 1374, 1378 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)). 

Again, it is undisputed that the Petition for Review is pending before the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ delay in ruling on 

his Petition for Review violates his due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 7). There is “no 

talismanic number of years or months” constituting unacceptable delay. Coe, 922 F.2d at 

531. To determine when delay becomes excessive and thus a due process violation, four 

factors apply: “the [l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of 

his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 

(1972)). These are commonly known as the “Barker factors.” Each factor is analyzed 

below. However, none of the factors are “a necessary or sufficient condition” to the 

finding of a due process violation. Coe, 922 F.2d at 532 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 

533). “Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other 

circumstances as may be relevant.” Id.

does not waive a double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty. Id. at 62.

- 8 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

i. Barker Factors

a. Length of Delay

The Petition for Review was filed on December 22, 2014 and was fully briefed on 

February 13, 2015. In Coe, the Ninth Circuit found a four-year delay to be 

“alarming,” but it has also observed that a two-year delay is not “extreme.” Coe, 922 

F.2d at 531; Hamilton v. Calderon, 134 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2008). The undersigned 

finds that the delay in the disposition of the Petition for Review is not unusual or 

unacceptable. The first factor weighs against Petitioner.

6

b. Reason for the Delay

Although extreme or unusual delays in state court can justify immediate federal 

review, the delay must be attributable to the state rather than to the petitioner. 

Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1998). The undersigned 

observes that Petitioner did not request any filing extensions in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals and filed two motions to accelerate the court’s review. (Attachment 1). The 

undersigned cannot find that the delayed resolution of the Petition for Review is 

attributable to Petitioner. Instead, it appears that the delay is due to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ caseload. “[D]elays by the court are attributable to the state.” Coe, 922 F.2d at 

531 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531) (“the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances 

[as negligence or overcrowded courts] must rest with the government rather than with the 

defendant”). The second factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

6 In Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is 

presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” In the speedy trial context, “courts have generally found delays approaching one year to be ‘presumptively prejudicial.’” United States v. Beamon, 992 

F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1993). Without deciding whether the length of the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, the undersigned has analyzed the remaining three Barker factors.

- 9 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

c. Petitioner’s Assertion of his Rights

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ docket reflects that in April and May 2015, 

Petitioner inquired about the status of the Petition for Review. (Attachment 1). On May 

13, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Accelerated Disposition of Petition for Review. 

The court denied the Motion. On May 28, 2015, Petitioner filed a second Motion for 

Accelerated Disposition of Petition for Review. After the court denied the Motion, 

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The record reflects that Petitioner has diligently 

pursued relief in state court. The third factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

d. Prejudice to Petitioner

Three factors apply when determining prejudice: (i) oppressive incarceration 

pending appeal; (ii) a petitioner’s anxiety and concern awaiting the outcome of the 

appeal; and (iii) impairment of the petitioner’s grounds for appeal or of the viability of 

his defense in the event of retrial. Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. Regarding the first factor, 

Petitioner’s “incarceration would be unjustified and thus oppressive were the appellate 

court to find [his] conviction improper. If it affirms the conviction, however, the 

incarceration will have been reasonable.” Id. (citing United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 

1370, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Regarding the second factor, Petitioner has not shown that he has experienced any

more anxiety and concern “than any other prisoner awaiting the outcome of an appeal.” 

Id. (quoting Antoine, 906 F.2d at 1382-83). 

Finally, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement. This case does not 

present a concern that the delay in the resolution of the PCR proceeding “will make it 

more difficult for [P]etitioner to refresh the memory of witnesses or locate new 

exculpatory evidence.” Id. The undersigned does not find prejudice. The final Barker 

factor thus weighs against Petitioner.

ii. Analysis

Although two of the Barker factors weigh in favor of Petitioner and two weigh 

against Petitioner, the Barker “factors have no talismanic qualities.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 

- 10 -

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

533. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has been diligent in asserting his rights in state 

court and the delay in resolving his Petition for Review is attributable to the state. 

However, the delay is not overly long and Petitioner is not suffering any cognizable 

prejudice. After considering the Barker factors and the totality of the circumstances, the 

undersigned does not find that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ delay in deciding the 

Petition for Review constitutes a due process violation. 

Based on the foregoing discussion, the circumstances of this case do not support 

excusing the exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). There is not an 

absence of state corrective procedures. The delay in the resolution of the of-right PCR 

proceeding is not so extreme or unusual so as to render the state corrective process 

ineffective. See, e.g., Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995) (delay of 

fifteen years, within “no end in sight”); Coe, 922 F.2d at 531 (discussing due process 

violation from delay of more than three years in appellate proceeding); Hamilton, 134 

F.3d at 939 (less than two year period during which petitioner’s sentence was under 

review by the California Supreme Court did not constitute extreme delay warranting 

federal intervention before entry of final judgment). 

2. This Case Does Not Involve Exceptional Circumstances of Peculiar 

Urgency that Justify Dispensing with the Exhaustion Requirement

The exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement may be excused “in rare cases 

where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.” Hendricks v. 

Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 672 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 182

(1907) (a federal court may “sometimes appropriately interfere by habeas corpus in 

advance of final action by the authorities of the State,” but such cases are “exceptional” 

and of “great urgency”). Exceptional circumstances have been found in cases that 

“involved interferences by the state authorities with the operations of departments of the 

general government” or “concerned the delicate relations of that government with a 

foreign nation.” United States ex. rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 19 (1925); see also 

Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (affirming federal court’s issuance of writ of 

habeas corpus that discharged U.S. deputy marshal from state custody on a homicide 

- 11 -

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

charge where the homicide was committed while the deputy marshal was performing his 

duty to protect Justice Field); Thomas v. Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890) (federal court 

properly issued writ of habeas corpus discharging a petitioner from state custody on a 

perjury charge for testimony given in a contested federal congressional election case); 

Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (affirming issuance of writ of 

habeas corpus discharging a member of the crew of a foreign merchant vessel from state 

custody because the arrest was contrary to the provisions of an international treaty). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found “peculiar urgency” in Hendricks v. 

Zenon, 993 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1993). After holding that a state court denied a habeas 

petitioner’s right to counsel on direct appeal, the Court ordered the state to grant the 

petitioner a new appeal. The Court recognized that by ordering the new appeal, it had 

“unexhausted” the remainder of the petitioner’s federal Constitutional claims. However, 

the Court dispensed with the exhaustion requirement. The Court stated that, “were we to 

give the State a second bite at the apple, no doubt we would see Hendricks’s federal 

Constitutional claims again years hence in a second petition should he lose on his 

appeal.” Id. at 672. The Court further stated that “[b]ecause the State’s failure to afford 

counsel to Hendricks on appeal is the cause of the situation, it could not be heard to 

object to this procedure.” Id. In addition, the Court noted that the interests of federalstate comity had been served because the state had the first opportunity to examine the 

petitioner’s federal claims as contemplated by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b). Id.

Petitioner cites Hendricks to support his claim of urgency. (Doc. 21 at 3; Doc. 25 

at 4). Hendricks is distinguishable from this case as the Court’s dismissal of the Petition 

would not give the state a “second bite at the apple.” To the contrary, the state has not 

had the first opportunity to examine Petitioner’s constitutional claims.

To also support his contention that urgent circumstances exist, Petitioner asserts

that the consecutive sentences on two of the counts and concurrent terms of lifetime 

probation on the remaining counts “constitute double jeopardy violations (both current 

and future) that cause wrongful restraint upon Petitioner’s liberty.” (Doc. 21 at 7). 

- 12 -

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner argues that his consecutive two-year sentences on counts 1 and 2 violates the 

Double Jeopardy Clause, and because he has served two years in prison, “there is an 

urgency to grant the appropriate relief . . . .” (Id. at 7-8). Yet every federal habeas 

petition properly filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleges that an individual is in state 

custody in violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (federal court shall entertain a 

habeas petition “only on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). Petitioner has failed to show that 

this is a rare case involving exceptional circumstances that warrant interference by this 

Court in a matter pending in state court. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Dismissal of the Petition is warranted under both the Younger abstention doctrine 

and the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine. Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Respondents’ “Motion to Dismiss 

Habeas Petition for Containing Only Unexhausted Claims” (Doc. 19). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be dismissed 

without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and the undersigned finds that jurists of reason would 

not find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural ruling.7

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

7 “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [Certificate of Appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

- 13 -

 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 13 of 17
1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. Failure to file 

timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey,

481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 8th day of June, 2016. 

- 14 - 

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 14 of 17
ATTACHMENT 1

Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 15 of 17
Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 16 of 17
Case 2:15-cv-01281-PGR Document 27 Filed 06/08/16 Page 17 of 17