Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00333/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MOHAMMED ALI KALHOURI, ) 

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v ) Civil Action No. 2:10cv333-TMH

) (WO) 

J.A. KELLER, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.)

I. BACKGROUND

The petitioner, Mohammed Ali Kalhouri (“Kalhouri”), is currently incarcerated at the

Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama, serving a 52-month sentence, imposed in

2009 by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, upon his

conviction for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and money

laungering. In his petition, Kalhouri claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has

failed to properly consider the mandated statutory criteria in determining the duration of his

placement in a residential reentry center (“RRC”) for the final portion of his federal sentence,

in violation of the Second Chance Act.

In compliance with this court’s orders, the respondent has filed an answer in which

he argues that (1) Kalhouri’s habeas petition is not ripe for court review, because at the time

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Kalhouri filed his petition, he was not close enough to the end of his sentence to qualify for

consideration for placement in an RRC under the Second Chance Act and the BOP had made

no determination regarding his RRC placement; and (2) even if Kalhouri were eligible for

consideration for placement in an RRC at the time he filed his petition, he has not exhausted

administrative remedies with respect to his claims. (Doc. No. 9.) In response, Kalhouri has

filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 12.)

II. DISCUSSION

By his petition, Kalhouri seeks to have the BOP consider him for placement in an

RRC for the final portion of his sentence, for the maximum amount of time allowed, pursuant

to the authority of the Second Chance Act of 2007. (Doc. No. 1 at p. 18.) More specifically,

he requests that this court issue an order directing the BOP “in good faith to consider

Petitioner on an individualized basis using the five factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)

plus take into account the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (c)(6)(C) granting him the maximum

amount of time in the RRC to provide the ‘greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into

the community.’” (Id.)

The Second Chance Act amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(a) and 3624(c). Pursuant to the

Second Chance Act, the BOP staff is required to review inmates for RRC placement 17-19

months before their projected release date, and inmates are to be individually considered

using the five factors listed in § 3621(b). When he filed his petition, on April 15, 2010,

Kalhouri’s projected release date was December 20, 2011, assuming he receives all good

conduct time available. At the time of filing, then, Kalhouri was not close enough to the end

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of his sentence to qualify under the Second Chance Act for consideration for placement in

an RRC for a portion of the remainder of his sentence. There is no indication in the

pleadings before this court that an assessment regarding Kalhouri’s placement in an RRC,

or the duration of that placement, has been made. Ripeness becomes an issue when a case

is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all. See Pac. Gas & Elec.

Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-201 (1983);

Dames & Kalhouri v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981). Under the circumstances, Kalhouri’s

case is not ripe for review.

Moreover, even if the BOP makes a determination regarding Kalhouri’s RRC

placement, Kalhouri must his exhaust his administrative remedies if he wishes to challenge

that determination. The pleadings before this court reflect that Kalhouri has not attempted

to pursue relief via the BOP’s administrative remedies. Kalhouri maintains that exhaustion

should be excused because it would be futile to pursue the BOP’s administrative remedies.

(Doc. No. 1 at pp. 14-15.) In support, he notes that BOP Director Harley Lappin believes

that prisoners placed in an RRC for longer than six months “tend to do worse rather than

better.” (Id.)

It is well settled in this circuit that a federal prisoner who requests habeas corpus relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must first exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief

from this court. See Skinner v. Wiley, 335 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11 Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. th

United States, 959 F.2d 211 (11 Cir. 1992). The BOP has established regulations that set th

forth the procedures that a prisoner must follow before seeking relief from a district court.

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See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 et seq.; United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11 Cir.

th

1990). These regulations govern formal review of inmate complaints relating to any aspect

of their imprisonment and specify the procedures that inmates must pursue before attempting

to seek relief in federal court. United States v. Herrera, 931 F.2d 761, 764 (11 Cir. 1991). th

If, and only if, an inmate has pursued his administrative remedies may he seek relief in

federal court. Id. “An inmate has not fully exhausted his administrative remedies until he

has appealed through all three levels [of the BOP's administrative remedies].” Irwin v. Hawk,

40 F.3d 347, 349 n.2 (11 Cir. 1994). th

Kalhouri has not exhausted the three-level administrative remedy process, set forth

at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.15, with regard to his claims concerning his eligibility for placement

in an RRC. Therefore, he has not satisfied the requirement that he exhaust his available

administrative remedies before seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court. Moreover,

Kalhouri has failed to establish that it would be futile to pursue the BOP’s administrative

remedies. Despite BOP Director Lappin’s alleged personal opinion, the BOP’s regulations,

amended after passage of the Second Chance Act, provide for placement in an RRC for up

to 12 months. Relying on the Second Chance Act and 28 C.F.R. § 570.21, the Eleventh

Circuit has determined that an inmate “may immediately seek [ ] individual determination

[for placement in an RRC up to 12 months] under the administrative procedures currently

available to him.” Woodward v. Grayer, Case No. 08-12851, *7 (11 Cir. Dec. 23, 2008). th

Accordingly, as the BOP is required by statute and its own regulations to consider Kalhouri

for placement in an RRC for up to 12 months, Kalhouri has failed to demonstrate that it

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would be futile to exhaust the BOP’s available administrative remedies. See Hayes v.

Grayer, Case No. 1:09cv896-RWS 2009 WL 1473929 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2009). 

Kalhouri also complains that he will be delayed in vindicating his rights if he complies

with the BOP’s administrative remedies program and that the time required to exhaust

administrative remedies could deprive him of the full 12 months he alleges he is entitled to

serve in an RRC. However, there are deadlines incorporated into the administrative remedies

program that prevent the BOP from unreasonably delaying consideration of a request for

review and any appeal therefrom. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 542.18 (setting forth BOP response

times at various levels of review). Kalhouri has not established extraordinary circumstances

justifying waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Therefore, in addition to this action not

being ripe for court review, dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is also

warranted.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED without prejudice because

this case is not ripe for review and because of Kalhouri’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies in accordance with the procedures established by the BOP.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before July 21, 2010. A party must specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation

to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be

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considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal

factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. th

Boyington Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

th

661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc). th

Done this 7 day of July, 2010. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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