Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05449/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05449-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 15, 2002 Decided April 2, 2002

No. 00-5449

Willie Jefferson,

Appellant

v.

Department of Justice,

Office of Professional Responsibility,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01489)

Brian G. Friel, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for amicus curiae on the side of appellant. With him on the

briefs were Michael N. Levy.

Willie Jefferson, appearing pro se, was on the brief for

appellant.

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Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. On the brief were Roscoe C. Howard Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence and Meredith Manning,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Henderson, Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Willie Jefferson appeals the grant

of summary judgment to the Justice Department on his

request under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5

U.S.C. s 552(a) (1996 & West Supp. 2001), for "any and all

records created by and/or received by the ... Office of

Professional Responsibility ("OPR") in regards to Assistant

United States Attorney ("AUSA") Jeffrey Scott Downing."

Previously, this court affirmed the grant of summary judgment insofar as Jefferson did not challenge the district court's

segregability determination or the government's reliance on 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(2) ("Exemption 2") and s 552(b)(5) ("Exemption 5") to redact certain material. Order, May 14, 2001.

Thus, the only question now before the court is whether the

government properly relied on s 552(b)(7)(C) ("Exemption

7(C)") in redacting certain other documents that it released to

Jefferson, and in refusing "to confirm or deny the existence of

any additional responsive records," the so-called Glomar response. Id. We hold, on de novo review, that the district

court correctly concluded that OPR compiled the files that it

released to Jefferson for law enforcement purposes, and that

the redacted information in these files falls within Exemption

7(C). However, because OPR was not entitled to make a

Glomar response as to all of its files in the absence of an

evidentiary showing to support that response, we remand the

case to the district court to determine whether OPR had nonlaw enforcement files regarding AUSA Downing as of December 2, 1999, the date of OPR's response to Jefferson's FOIA

request. See Bonner v. Dep't of State, 928 F.2d 1148, 1152

(D.C. Cir. 1991).

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I.

Following his conviction for drug offenses and his sentence

to life imprisonment without parole in the Middle District of

Florida, Jefferson filed several FOIA requests to obtain

records from the OPR. The first FOIA request of August 8,

1995, sought his complete criminal file and was denied under

FOIA Exemption 7(A) because his criminal appeal was pending.

See Jefferson v. Reno, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C.

2000). While his FOIA appeal was pending, but after his

conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal, the government informed the district court on October 1, 1997, that

AUSA Downing, the trial prosecutor, had "purged" the criminal case files. See id. at 2-3. While file reconstruction was

going on pursuant to the district court's order, Jefferson

moved for sanctions against the Justice Department and

AUSA Downing. See id. at 2-3. In March 2000, the district

court referred AUSA Downing to OPR so that it could

"investigate whether he violated the law or engaged in professional misconduct." Id. at 6. After the Justice Department

released additional documents relating to his criminal trial

files, see id. at 5, and the court conducted a limited in camera

review of eleven disputed documents, the district court entered a final judgment on August 27, 2001.

Jefferson's FOIA request at issue in the instant appeal

followed a period of correspondence between Jefferson and

OPR that eventually led to the release of redacted portions of

"certain records pertaining to a complaint filed by" Jefferson

against AUSA Downing, see id. at 5, but not such other files

as OPR may have regarding AUSA Downing. After filing his

first FOIA request on August 8, 1995. Jefferson wrote a

letter to OPR in October 1995, charging AUSA Downing with

prosecutorial misconduct before the Grand Jury and alleging

the deliberate withholding and concealing of exculpatory evidence and the presentation of perjured and manufactured

evidence at his trial. Jefferson further alleged that AUSA

Downing had conspired with a confidential informant to give

false testimony at trial and had violated Fed. R. Crim. P.

48(a). OPR responded that it found no basis on which action

by OPR would be warranted. After Jefferson wrote two

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additional letters, again alleging prosecutorial misconduct,

OPR advised Jefferson that the proper forum for his complaint was the court and that OPR found no allegation upon

which action by OPR would be warranted. Jefferson responded by letter of August 2, 1996, that: "In order for me to

document your office's assistance in this matter would you

please forward to me a copy of the investigative report your

office completed."

On September 15, 1998, Jefferson filed another complaint

with OPR, captioned "RE: 'Request for the initiation of

criminal charges against [AUSA] Downing,' " alleging violations of Title 18 of the United States Code for obstruction of

justice and deprivation of constitutional rights, as well as a

privacy claim under Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations for giving unauthorized access to his criminal file for the

purpose of destroying those records. OPR responded that it

found no basis for any action based on Jefferson's allegations.

Jefferson, responding to OPR's statement that it would further review the matter if he could supply more details,

submitted two declarations and repeated his allegations that

his criminal trial records were "improperly accessed and

destroyed" by AUSA Downing. OPR advised Jefferson on

May 3, 1999, that it found no allegation of misconduct on

which OPR action would be warranted.

Jefferson filed the FOIA request at issue on August 3,

1999, prior to the time the district court referred AUSA

Downing for an investigation by OPR. This time Jefferson

sought "copies of any and all records created and/or received

by ... [OPR] ... in regards to" AUSA Downing, and "an

index of any files maintained by OPR in regards to" AUSA

Downing. The OPR responded by letter of December 2,

1999, that "[i]t is the policy of this Office when responding to

FOIA requests from third-party individuals to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records concerning Department

of Justice employees," absent their consent or "an overriding

public interest," citing FOIA Exemption 7(C). Nevertheless,

OPR stated that it had identified 28 documents responsive to

Jefferson's request "pertaining to a complaint filed by you,"

and released eleven in their entirety and seventeen in part.

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OPR withheld the remaining information pursuant to FOIA

Exemptions 2, 5, and 7(C).

Following denial of his administrative appeal, Jefferson

filed suit challenging OPR's FOIA determination. The government moved for summary judgment and submitted a

declaration by Dale K. Hall, an OPR employee and FOIA

specialist, stating that "[a]ll records relating to OPR's investigations are compiled for law enforcement purposes and,

therefore, are deemed to be law enforcement files" within

Exemption 7(C). In addition, Hall stated that "all nonexempt information contained in the 17 [redacted] documents

was reasonably segregated for release" to Jefferson, and that

pursuant to Exemption 7(C), "OPR [w]ould neither confirm

nor deny any other records that may or may not exist" on

AUSA Downing. The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that

because OPR's investigation related to allegations of criminal

misconduct, the records were prepared for law enforcement

purposes within the meaning of Exemption 7(C). The court

also ruled that Jefferson had failed to show that OPR was

engaged in illegal activity, thereby confirming the appropriateness of the redactions in the released materials. The

court rejected Jefferson's challenge to OPR's claim that all

segregable portions of the records had been disclosed. Of

particular significance, the district court further ruled that

OPR's Glomar response refusing to confirm or deny whether

it possessed any other files on AUSA Downing was proper

because such records would not shed light on the agency's

conduct and Jefferson "seeks information in law enforcement

files related to an individual who has not waived his rights to

privacy with respect to any such records."

II.

On appeal, Jefferson, assisted by amicus, contends that the

district court erred as a matter of law in allowing the

government to make a Glomar response with respect to any

other files that OPR may possess on AUSA Downing. Because OPR conducts both law enforcement and non-law enUSCA Case #00-5449 Document #668948 Filed: 04/02/2002 Page 5 of 17
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forcement activities, and Jefferson's FOIA request asked for

"all records" relating to AUSA Downing and not simply those

compiled for law enforcement purposes, Jefferson maintains

that OPR had to identify the records at issue and establish

with particularity that they were compiled for law enforcement purposes. Alternatively, Jefferson contends that even if

OPR could properly issue a Glomar response under Exemption 7(C) in some circumstances, there was no evidence

showing that all of OPR's files relating to AUSA Downing

were compiled for law enforcement purposes. Jefferson also

contends that the district court erred in failing both to review

whether the 17 redacted documents were compiled for law

enforcement purposes, and to determine the segregability of

the non-law enforcement documents. Finally, Jefferson contends that the district court erred in finding that AUSA

Downing's privacy interest outweighed the public interest in

disclosure of the records even if they were compiled for law

enforcement purposes.

Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.

Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court

must "determine, from inspection of the agency affidavits

submitted, whether the agency's explanation was full and

specific enough to afford the FOIA requester a meaningful

opportunity to contest, and the district court an adequate

foundation to review, the soundness of the withholding."

King v. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217-18 (D.C. Cir.

1987).

Under FOIA Exemption 7(C), the requirement that "each

agency shall make available to the public information" does

not apply to matters that are:

records or information compiled for law enforcement

purposes, but only to the extent that the production of

such law enforcement records or information ... (C)

could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C). In assessing whether records are

compiled for law enforcement purposes, this circuit has long

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stances the requested files were compiled, see Weisberg v.

United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir.

1973), and "whether the files sought relate to anything that

can fairly be characterized as an enforcement proceeding."

Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

In Rural Housing Alliance v. Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d

73 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court identified two types of investigatory files that government agencies compile: (1) files in

connection with government oversight of the performance of

duties by its employees, and (2) files in connection with

investigations that focus directly on specific alleged illegal

acts which could result in civil or criminal sanctions. Id. at

81. Again, the court emphasized that the purpose of the

investigatory files "is the critical factor." Id. at 82. Thus, if

the investigation is for a possible violation of law, then the

inquiry is for law enforcement purposes, as distinct from

customary surveillance of the performance of duties by government employees. Id. Then, in Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d

408 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court set forth a two-part test

whereby the government can show that its records are law

enforcement records: the investigatory activity that gave rise

to the documents is "related to the enforcement of federal

laws," and there is a rational nexus between the investigation

at issue and the agency's law enforcement duties. Id. at 420,

421. The court again distinguished the need "to establish

that the agency acted within its principal function of law

enforcement, rather than merely engaging in a general monitoring of private individuals' activities." Id. at 420.

The court applied these principles in Kimberlin v. Dep't of

Justice, 139 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In that case, the

requester asked for "all papers, documents and things pertaining to the OPR investigation" of another AUSA. Id. at

947. Applying the distinction between law enforcement records and internal agency investigations set forth in Rural

Housing, 498 F.2d at 81, the court stated that "[m]aterial

compiled in the course of ... internal agency monitoring does

not come within Exemption 7(C) even though it 'might reveal

evidence that later could give rise to a law enforcement

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investigation.' " Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 947. Concluding,

however, that "the OPR investigation here at issue was

conducted in response to and focused upon a specific, potentially illegal release of information by a particular, identified

official," id. at 947, the court held that the information in the

OPR files was compiled for law enforcement purposes. Id.

Consistent with the plain language of his FOIA request of

August 3, 1999, Jefferson states in his pro se brief that he

sought any and all records maintained by OPR pertaining to

AUSA Downing "after OPR continued to refuse to investigate

AUSA Downing in light of the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that an investigation of AUSA Downing was warranted." As the Justice Department sees it, Jefferson is concerned with OPR's failure to conduct an investigation based

on allegations that could lead to civil or criminal sanctions,

and is not seeking records maintained in the course of general

oversight of government employees. See Appellee's Br. at 14.

If so, then it would appear that the district court properly

ruled that the OPR files requested by Jefferson satisfied

Exemption 7(C)'s threshold requirement. However, Jefferson points out in his pro se brief that his request extends to

records that OPR maintains as "an internal affairs unit acting

as [an] employer simply supervising its employees."

The Justice Department regulations provide, in relevant

part, that OPR "shall ... [r]eceive and review any information or allegation concerning conduct by a Department employee that may be in violation of law, regulations or orders,

or of applicable standards of conduct...." 28 C.F.R.

s 0.39a(a) (2001). In addition, OPR is required to:

Refer any matter that appears to warrant examination in

the following manner:

(1) If the matter appears to involve a violation of law, to

the head of the investigative agency having jurisdiction

to investigate such violations;

(2) If the matter appears not to involve a violation of law,

to the head of the office, division, bureau or board to

which the employee is assigned, or to the head of its

internal inspection unit....

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Id. s 0.39a(d). Among the information that OPR may receive

are "[r]eports containing the findings of any investigation

undertaken upon matters [that appear not to involve a violation of law] ... and the administrative sanction to be imposed, if any sanction is warranted." Id. s 0.39a(e). Consistent with the distinction drawn in Pratt, 673 F.2d at 419-21,

and Rural Housing, 498 F.2d at 81, the regulations contemplate that OPR may secure reports, as distinct from compiling them, that arise as a result of internal agency monitoring

and review allegations of non-law violations by Department

attorneys for internal disciplinary purposes. OPR's internal

guidelines reflect a similar distinction, providing that "OPR

reviews allegations of attorney misconduct involving violations

of any standard imposed by law, applicable rules or professional conduct, or Departmental policy." www.usdoj.gov/opr/index.html (last visited March 27, 2002). Thus, as

in Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 947, and Beck, 997 F.2d at 1492, we

decline to hold as a matter of law that all OPR records are

necessarily law enforcement records.

Because the Department had the burden, under the twopart test of Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420-21; see also United States

Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991), to establish as

a threshold matter that its records are law enforcement

records, the district court had to determine whether all of

OPR's records relating to AUSA Downing were law enforcement records before turning to a consideration of whether the

public interest in disclosure of any law enforcement records

was outweighed by AUSA Downing's privacy interests. See 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C). The district court relied on Hall's

declaration that "[a]ll records relating to OPR's investigations

are compiled for law enforcement purposes, and, therefore,

are deemed to be law enforcement files." That may well be

true, for this court has recognized that Exemption 7(C)

"covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds

of laws," including those involving "adjudicative proceedings."

Rural Housing, 498 F.2d at 81 n.46. Depending on the

purpose of the investigation, records obtained by OPR regarding ethical violations by AUSA Downing of the Attorney

General's Code of Conduct, see 28 C.F.R. s 77.1-5; 28 U.S.C.

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s 530B, may be investigatory law enforcement files under

Rural Housing, 498 F.2d at 82. Cf. Griva v. Davidson, 637

A.2d 830, 846-47 (D.C. 1994); Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.2d

683, 686 (D.C. 1988). But as the case giving rise to "the

Glomar response" itself makes clear, the Department cannot

rely on a bare assertion to justify invocation of an exemption

from disclosure, see Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1014-15

& n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1976), especially when, as here, the regulations contemplate that OPR will receive as well as generate

reports that may constitute investigatory records compiled

"in connection with government oversight of the performance

of duties by its employees." Rural Housing, 498 F.2d at 81;

id. at 82 n.48. Had OPR received reports or allegations

regarding non-law violations by AUSA Downing, it is entirely

possible that OPR took no action beyond receipt; on the

record before the district court, however, the court could not

determine whether such records exist. Although the Department submitted a Vaughn index in response to Jefferson's

first FOIA request, it did not provide the district court with a

similar description of all of OPR's files regarding AUSA

Downing in response to Jefferson's FOIA request of August

3, 1999. Nor does the record indicate that the district court

conducted an in-camera inspection of OPR's files regarding

AUSA Downing. Under the circumstances, OPR failed to

meet its burden to produce evidence whereby the district

court would be in a position to make the required threshold

evidentiary determination. See King, 830 F.2d at 217-18.

Because Jefferson's August 3, 1999 FOIA request is considerably broader than the FOIA request in Kimberlin, 139 F.3d

at 947, we agree with amicus that a remand is required. The

Department's regulations describe OPR as a mixed function

agency with responsibilities that embrace not only investigations of violations of law and breaches of professional standards that may result in civil liability, see, e.g., Griva v.

Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 846-47 (D.C. 1994); Avianca, Inc. v.

Corriea, 705 F.Supp. 666, 678-79 (D.D.C. 1989), but breaches

of internal Department guidelines that may lead to disciplinary proceedings, see Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 90 (D.C. Cir.

1984), as a result of the receipt of reports of investigations by

other entities of such non-law violations. Hence, a Glomar

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response was inappropriate in the absence of an evidentiary

record produced by OPR to support a finding that all OPR

records regarding AUSA Downing are law enforcement records. Unlike cases on which the government relies, such as

Dunkelberger v. FBI, 906 F.2d 779, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1990),

where the law enforcement purpose of the agency's documents was conceded, or Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 947-48, where

the FOIA request was directed only to OPR's investigation,

Jefferson's FOIA request seeks all records that OPR may

have regarding AUSA Downing. His position that not all

OPR records are necessarily law enforcement records appears to be supported by the Justice Department's regulations.

On remand, therefore, the Department, to meet its burden

to claim exemption from the obligation to disclose the requested records, must provide a Vaughn index, or in-camera

inspection, or other evidence that would enable the district

court to determine whether all OPR records relating to

AUSA Downing are law enforcement records under Exemption 7(C). If the court finds there are non-law enforcement

records in OPR, they must be released unless Exemption 2 or

5 applies; the government's invocation on appeal of Exemption 6 comes too late. See Maydak v. United States Dep't of

Justice, 218 F.3d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On the other

hand, if the district court finds on remand that all of OPR's

records regarding AUSA Downing are law enforcement records, we hold, consistent with the Order of May 14, 2001, that

Jefferson's challenge to the district court's weighing of the

public and private interests under Exemption 7(C) fails.

The district court balanced the privacy interests in the

manner instructed by, and with a result virtually compelled

by, Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 948. Other binding precedent in

this circuit is to the same effect. See, e.g., Nation Magazine

v. U.S. Customs Service, 71 F.3d 885, 894 & n.8 (D.C. 1995);

Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493, 1494; Rural Housing, 498 F.2d at 82.

Even assuming, as the court did in Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at

149, "that the balance of interests relating to the disclosure of

material in an OPR file will not so often tip toward withholding that a categorical rule against disclosure is appropriate,"

Jefferson fails to show that access to OPR's law enforcement

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files on AUSA Downing "is necessary in order to confirm or

refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in

illegal activity." Safecard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d

1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991). A news clipping submitted by

Jefferson stating that OPR is inundated with federal prisoner

complaints and agrees with a judge's criticism of an attorney

only about half of the time does not, as the district court

correctly found, suffice to raise a claim of illegal agency

activity; the clipping reports quantity and does not suggest a

predilection to ignore such complaints. Nothing in the district court's referral of AUSA Downing to OPR for the file

destruction mandated a finding of agency misconduct.

Amicus' reliance on Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.

1984), is misplaced. Although in Stern the court acknowledged the public interest in knowing that a government

investigation was comprehensive or that disciplinary measures were adequate, id. at 92, the court nevertheless declined to release the names of lower level employees, recognizing that, unlike Exemption 6, the balance is not tilted

emphatically in favor of disclosure under Exemption 7(C).

Id. at 91-92. In Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493, moreover, the court

indicated the limits of Stern: not only did Stern involve a

well-publicized scandal that the FBI had conducted widespread, illegal surveillance of political activists through surreptitious entries and wiretappings and then covered up its

activities, the disclosure ordered by the court was limited to

the name of a high-level FBI official who knowingly participated in the cover-up. Stern, 737 F.2d at 86, 93. AUSA

Downing is not a high official in the United States Attorney's

Office, see Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 949, and the public's

knowledge of AUSA Downing with regard to his prosecution

of Jefferson is hardly comparable to the scandal in Stern or

even to the public's knowledge of the OPR investigation in

Kimberlin. Yet in Kimberlin, which involved a politically

charged investigation of a sitting Vice President, the court

held that the AUSA's privacy interests outweighed the public

interest in releasing the contents of the OPR investigation of

the AUSA, notwithstanding the AUSA's own public disclosure

of the existence of the investigation. Cf. United States Dep't

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of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,

489 U.S. 749, 773-74 (1989).

Finally, amicus' contention that the district court erred in

upholding OPR's redactions of the documents that it disclosed

under Exemption 7(C), because the court had no basis on

which to determine whether the redacted material was compiled for law enforcement purposes, is meritless. Cf. Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 947. The documents that were released by

OPR "pertain[ed] to a complaint" of illegal activity by Jefferson against AUSA Downing. Jefferson's written complaints

involved allegations of criminal wrongdoing by AUSA Downing. Jefferson did not challenge the district court's segregability determination, nor OPR's redactions pursuant to FOIA

Exemptions 2 and 5. By amicus' own admission, OPR only

withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(C) the names and identifying information of Justice Department employees and third

parties, in order to protect their privacy. See Amicus Br. at

25. Hence, amicus, at most, presents speculative or vague

assertions that redacted information was improperly withheld. See Carter, 830 F.2d at 392.

Accordingly, we remand the case for the district court to

determine, upon evidence the government shall present, that

any additional records sought by Jefferson's August 3, 1999,

FOIA request are law enforcement records properly withheld

under Exemption 7(C); we otherwise affirm the grant of

summary judgment.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I believe all of the

files of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) in the

Department of Justice relating to the investigation of an

individual are "compiled for law enforcement purposes" within the meaning of exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C). OPR therefore properly

refused to confirm or deny the existence of other investigations of Assistant United States Attorney Downing.

Exemption 7(C) shields law enforcement files from disclosure when release of the records would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(C).

So-called "Glomar" responses, named after the ship involved

in Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1976), are

permissible answers to FOIA requests if the agency's acknowledgment that it has investigatory files about an individual would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the individual's privacy. If Jefferson sought law enforcement files, our

decision in Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489 (D.C. Cir.

1993), justified OPR's Glomar response, a point about which

we all agree.

We may also agree that "[i]nternal agency investigations

... in which an agency, acting as the employer, simply

supervises its own employees" are not law enforcement investigations. Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

But ever since its founding by Attorney General Levi in 1975,

OPR has lacked general supervisory authority over DOJ

attorneys. Its task has always been much narrower. OPR is

a reactive agency within the Justice Department, receiving

complaints and investigating "allegations of professional misconduct by Department of Justice attorneys that pertain to

the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate or

provide legal advice." Office of Professional Responsibility,

Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Report 1, http: //www.usdoj.gov/opr/99AR-Final.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).

By regulation, OPR is charged with the duty of investigating the conduct of Justice Department attorneys "that may be

in violation of law, regulations or orders, or of applicable

standards of conduct or may constitute mismanagement,

gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and

specific danger to public health or safety." 28 C.F.R.

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s 0.39a(a) (2002). Recognizing the potential overlap with the

investigative authority of the Justice Department's Office of

the Inspector General, which "conducts and supervises audits,

inspections and investigations relating to the programs and

operations of the Department," 28 C.F.R. s 0.29a(a) (2002),

the Attorney General has circumscribed OPR's authority.

OPR "shall have jurisdiction to investigate allegations of

misconduct by Department attorneys that relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate or provide legal

advice." Jurisdiction for Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct by Department of Justice Employees, Order No.

1931-94 (Nov. 8, 1994). The Inspector General has exclusive

authority to investigate any other allegations.

When OPR receives a complaint, it conducts a preliminary

inquiry. 28 C.F.R. s 0.39a(c) (2002). When OPR determines

that the matter warrants further investigation, OPR refers it

for investigation:

(1) If the matter appears to involve a violation of law, to

the head of the investigative agency having jurisdiction

to investigate such violations;

(2) If the matter appears not to involve a violation of law,

to the head of the office, division, bureau or board to

which the employee is assigned, or to the head of its

internal inspection unit;

28 C.F.R. s 0.39a(d)(1) & (2) (2002).

Two points about the quoted subsections need stressing.

First, the regulations treat violations of "law" as violations of

statutory law and violations of regulations, standards of conduct and so forth as something else. But for FOIA purposes,

"law"--as in "compiled for law enforcement purposes"--includes violations of regulations and standards of conduct and

court orders and so forth. All of these sources are also law,

although they are not legislation.* This is why "[i]nvestiga-

__________

* When a government attorney is found to have engaged in

intentional misconduct, OPR notifies the state bar association which

has licensed that attorney. See General Accounting Office, Follow-up Information on the Operations of the Department of

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tions which focus directly on specific alleged illegal acts,

illegal acts of particular identified officials, acts which could, if

proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions" are investigations

for law enforcement purposes within the meaning of exemption 7(C). Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of

Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81 & n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

Second, after the employee's office conducts an investigation of his alleged non-statutory violation pursuant to

s 0.39a(d)(2), it must file the investigative report with OPR,

together with a description of the sanction imposed. It is the

possibility that OPR possesses such a (d)(2) report relating to

Assistant United States Attorney Downing that leads my

colleagues to the conclusion that OPR may possess non-law

enforcement files outside exemption 7(C)'s protection. This

strikes me as doubly mistaken.

It wrongly assumes that any (d)(2) investigation by the

head of the department would be unrelated to a law violation,

an assumption that rests on a misreading of the regulations.

And it also wrongly assumes that OPR receives the report for

other than law enforcement purposes. What other purposes

might these be? Surely not as an "employer simply supervising its employees." Maj. op. at 8. To repeat, OPR is not a

supervising agency within the Justice Department; and it

does not have general oversight responsibility. Instead OPR

receives the report of the (d)(2) investigation so that it may

decide whether to pursue its law enforcement functions further. "When warranted, OPR conducts full investigations of

such allegations, and reports its findings and conclusions to

the Attorney General and other appropriate Departmental

officials." http: //www.usdoj.gov/opr/index.html. That OPR

might close the file at this stage, or earlier, does not mean

that the records it compiles are for other than law enforcement purposes. Not every complaint will be credible. Not

every investigation will conclude that the target engaged in

__________

Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility 2 (2001). The

ethical rules for lawyers contain enforceable standards and violations carry civil if not criminal sanctions. Also, attorneys who

violate court rules can be sanctioned for contempt of court.

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misconduct. And as with any agency conducting law enforcement investigations, not every piece of information in OPR's

file will constitute evidence of illegal activity. In the course

of investigating someone for committing a crime, the FBI for

instance might have its agents conduct investigations into the

individual's friends and associates, his lifestyle, his spending

habits and so forth. None of these inquiries will necessarily

reveal criminal activity, but there can be no doubt that the

records thus compiled are for law enforcement purposes

within exemption 7(C). For these reasons, I would credit the

affidavit of the government attorney that "[a]ll records relating to OPR's investigations are compiled for law enforcement

purposes and, therefore, are deemed to be law enforcement

files." Declaration of Dale K. Hall, at 2. My colleagues label

the sworn statement a "bare assertion," maj. op. at 10, which

has nothing to do with what should concern us--namely,

whether it is true. I am convinced that it is. The majority

offers no good reason for disbelieving it.

One should not be misled by the majority's statement that

our court has "decline[d] to hold as a matter of law that all

OPR records are necessarily law enforcement records." Maj.

op. at 9. The most to be said of the cases cited for this

proposition--Kimberlin v. Dep't of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 947

(D.C. Cir. 1998), and Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489,

1492 (D.C. Cir. 1993)--is that the court had no occasion to

discuss, or to reach, the issue. This is the first case to do so,

and I believe the result it reaches is mistaken.

Because OPR conducts law enforcement investigations, and

has no other function within the Department of Justice, its

records come within exemption 7(C) and a remand is unwarranted. I therefore dissent.

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