Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03932/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03932-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1, 2005,

and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code

§ 5075(a).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER FLORES,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-3932 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket no. 14)

Petitioner Javier Flores, a state prisoner incarcerated at the

California Training Facility at Soledad, filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. 

Petitioner has filed an opposition, and Respondent has filed a

reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the

motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

In 1982, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. He

was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life in state prison.

On February 20, 2003, Petitioner appeared before the

California Board of Parole Hearings (Board)1 for his tenth parole

suitability hearing. The Board found that Petitioner was suitable

for parole. On July 18, 2003, former Governor Davis reversed

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Petitioner's grant of parole. On June 2, 2004, Petitioner sought

habeas relief from the California Supreme Court challenging former

Governor Davis's reversal of his parole grant, and his petition was

denied on June 20, 2005. 

 Petitioner signed his federal petition on August 14, 2005. 

However, it was not file stamped by the Clerk of Court until

September 28, 2005. A pro se federal habeas petition is deemed

filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for

mailing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir.

2001), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a federal or state habeas petition is

deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison

authorities for filing, rather than the date it is received by the

courts). However, Petitioner fails to make a claim or showing that

the date he signed the petition was the date of delivery to prison

officials for mail. Such a claim is especially important here

because forty-five days elapsed between the date the petition was

signed and the date it was filed. The Court assumes that

Petitioner did not give his petition to prison officials for

mailing on August 14, 2005 in light of his equitable tolling

argument requesting the Court to toll the statute of limitations

for the thirty-six days the prison law library was closed during

August and September, 2005. (Opp'n at 4-5.) Therefore, the Court

will deem his petition filed as of September 23, 2005, three court

days before the date of filing.

On January 19, 2006, the Court issued an order directing

Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent filed this motion.

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DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed a statute of

limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state

prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital

state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the

latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after

the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking

direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created

by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action

prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases

on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The one-year statute of limitations also applies to habeas

petitions that challenge administrative decisions. The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals held in Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061

(9th Cir. 2004), that section 2244's one-year time limit applies to

all habeas petitions filed by persons in custody pursuant to a

state court judgment. In cases challenging administrative

decisions, the limitations period is determined by section

2244(d)(1)(D), which states that the limitations period begins to

run on "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence." Id. at 1066 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)). 

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For an administrative decision, such as those by the Board, this

typically means the day following notice to the petitioner of the

decision. Id.; see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th

Cir. 2003). In this case, the 2003 decision by former Governor

Davis reversing Petitioner's grant of parole was faxed to

Petitioner on July 21, 2003. (Resp't Ex. 2.) The limitations

period began to run on July 22, 2003. Accordingly, Petitioner had

until July 22, 2004 to file the present petition. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Therefore, his petition filed on September 23, 2005,

more than one year after the limitations period had expired, is

untimely absent tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

The petition may nonetheless be timely if the limitations

period was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a substantial

period of time. AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled

under § 2244(d)(2) for the "'time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

[with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim] is pending.'" 

Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)). In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223

(2002), the Supreme Court held that the limitations period is also

tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and

the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. In

California, where prisoners generally use the State's "'original

writ' system," this means that the limitations period remains

tolled during the intervals between a state court's disposition of

an original state habeas petition and the filing of a further

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 In California, the supreme court, intermediate courts of

appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas corpus

jurisdiction. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir.

1999). Although a superior court order denying habeas corpus relief

is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus

petition in the court of appeal. Id. If the court of appeal denies

relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court

by way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original

habeas petition in the supreme court. Id. at 1006 n.3.

3

 The Court notes that in 2002, the Ninth Circuit held that

tolling under § 2244(d)(2) ended thirty days after the California

Supreme Court's denial of the final habeas petition was filed because

that was when the denial became "final" under former California Rule

of Court 24. Allen v. Lewis, 295 F.3d 1046, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

banc) (reaffirming Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.

2001)). However, the rationale of Allen only applies to denials the

California Supreme Court filed before January 1, 2003. On January 1,

2003, the California Supreme Court made clear that its orders denying

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus within its original jurisdiction

are final on filing. Cal. Rule of Court 8.532(b)(2)(C). Accordingly,

the denial of Petitioner's state habeas petition within the California

Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was final on the date of its

filing, July 20, 2005.

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original state habeas petition in a higher court, provided the

prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the higher

court. See id. at 220-25.2 

Accordingly, the one-year limitations period which began

running against Petitioner on July 22, 2003 was tolled by the

filing of his state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court

on June 2, 2004, which is a period of 317 days. The statute

resumed running on July 20, 2005,3 the date of the California

Supreme Court denial, and ran until September 23, 2005, the date

Petitioner's federal habeas petition was deemed filed, which is

sixty-five additional days. Therefore, a total of 382 days (317

days plus 65 days) had elapsed before Petitioner filed the present

petition in federal court on September 23, 2005. Therefore, his

petition is untimely because it was filed seventeen days (382 days

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minus 365 days) after the limitations period expired. Accordingly,

statutory tolling does not alone overcome the time bar to

Petitioner's federal petition.

II. Equitable Tolling 

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled

because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a

jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United States District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly),

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Equitable tolling is

unavailable in most cases, because it is applied only if

"extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). "When external forces, rather than a

petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may

be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). The petitioner must show that "the 'extraordinary

circumstances' were the cause of his untimeliness." Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The

petitioner bears the burden of showing that this "extraordinary

exclusion" should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1065 (9th Cir. 2002). The threshold to meet the burden for

equitable tolling under AEDPA is a high one. Id. at 1066. 

Petitioner claims that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because of his attorney's delay in filing his state habeas

petition. Petitioner states, "Petitioner does not here accuse Mr.

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Defilippis of egregious negligence, as he does not know the reasons

it took him 317 days to file the California Supreme Court petition,

but would like the court to consider this as a circumstance that

was beyond his control." (Opp'n at 4.)

Petitioner presents no grounds which establish that he is

entitled to equitable tolling on this basis because he fails to

provide specific facts establishing that he diligently pursued his

claims and that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control

prevented him from filing a timely petition. He does not state

when he requested assistance from his attorney or when the attorney

agreed to assist him. There is nothing in the record that shows

that Petitioner contacted his attorney during the 317-day time

period to inquire about the status of his petition. Petitioner

admits that he "does not know" why it took his attorney 317 days to

file his state habeas petition. (Id.) Petitioner concedes that he

is not accusing his attorney of "egregious negligence." (Id.) 

Even assuming the attorney was negligent, Petitioner's argument

fails because attorney negligence does not warrant equitable

tolling of the limitations period. See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d

1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that attorney negligence such

as an attorney's miscalculation of the limitations period does not

warrant equitable tolling). Accordingly, the Court finds

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on this basis.

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to a total of

forty-four days of equitable tolling due to lack of access to the

prison law library. Again, Petitioner fails to state sufficient

facts to justify equitable tolling on this basis. He claims that

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.05\Flores3932.grantMTD.frm 8

the prison was on lockdown status for eight days from July 13, 2005

through July 28, 2005 and that the law library was closed for

thirty-six days during August and September, 2005. However, he

fails to state specific facts establishing a connection between his

lack of access to the prison law library and his inability to file

a timely federal petition. Petitioner's federal petition consists

of an attachment, which is identical to the state habeas petition

prepared by his attorney except that it is directed to "United

States District Court Northern District of California." (Pet.

Attach. at 1-54; Resp't Ex. 3 at 1-54.) Therefore, Petitioner's

allegations do not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance"

meriting equitable tolling. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1289. 

Accordingly, the limitations period will not be equitably

tolled, and the petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss

(docket no. 14) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate

all remaining motions, enter judgment and close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket no. 14.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/14/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.05\Flores3932.grantMTD.frm 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLORES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03932 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on March 14, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Denise Alayne Yates

Office of the Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Javier Flores C44235

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: March 14, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-03932-CW Document 18 Filed 03/14/08 Page 9 of 9