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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAR 3 0 1990 

MICHAEL G. KIRK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, THE 

FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER co., and THE 

BUDD COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

:ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-3249 

(D.C. No. 88-2342-0) 

(D. Kansas) 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assi~tance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from the order of the district court 

granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellant filed 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3249 Document: 01019966790 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 1 
this products liability action against defendants for injuries 

sustained when a multipiece wheel assembly of a 1969 Chevrolet 

delivery truck explosively separated during servicing on July 3, 

1987. Appel lees moved for summary judgment claiming that 

appellant's action is barred by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303, the 

statute of repose section of the Kansas Products Liability Act. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(a)(l) provides in relevant part: 

[A] product seller shall not be subject to liability in 

a product liability claim if the product seller proves 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm was 

caused after the product's "useful safe life" had 

expired. "Useful safe life" begins at the time of 

delivery of the product and extends for the time during 

which the product would normally be likely to perform or 

be stored in a safe manner .•.. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(b)(l) provides: 

In claims that involve harm caused more than 10 

years after time of delivery, a presumption arises that 

the harm was caused after the useful safe life had 

expired. This presumption may only be rebutted by clear 

and convincing evidence. 

Here, it was uncontroverted that the wheel assembly and its 

component parts were over ten years old at the time appellant's 

injury occurred. In fact, the wheel assembly had been in use for 

approximately eighteen years. Upon appellees' motion, the 

district court concluded that a reasonable jury could not find 

that appellant had successfull y rebutted the statutory presumption 

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Appellate Case: 89-3249 Document: 01019966790 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 2 
by clear and convincing evidence and accordingly held appellant's 

claims to be barred by the statute. 

Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment because there remained a dispute as to a material 

fact, namely the useful safe life of the wheel assembly. 

Appellant's brief at 3. In addition, appellant argues that under 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303, a plaintiff need not satisfy the clear 

and convincing standard of proof in order to survive summary 

judgment. Id. at 7. 

In reviewing a summary judgment order, this court applies the 

same standard employed by the trial court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 

143 (10th Cir. 1988). The moving party carries the burden of 

proving that it is entitled to summary judgment, and the court 

must review the record in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion. Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 

(10th Cir. 1987). 

The inquiry to be performed "is the threshold inquiry of 

determining whether there is the need for a trial--whether 

there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved 

only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved 

in favor of either party.'' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (emphasis added). The trial judge's summary 

judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists is whether 

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Appellate Case: 89-3249 Document: 01019966790 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 3 
the evidence presented is such that a jury applying the applicable 

evidentiary standards could reasonably find for either the 

plaintiff or the defendant. Id. at 255; State of Colorado v. 

Western Paving Constr. Co., 833 F.2d 867, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Here, the appellant would have been required at trial, under Kan. 

Stat. Ann. § 60-3303, to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the wheel assembly at issue had a useful safe life of at 

least 18 years. Accordingly, the trial judge properly performed 

his summary judgment inquiry using the clear and convincing 

standard. 

After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to 

appellant, we hold that the trial court properly granted summary 

judgment in favor of appellees; a reasonable jury could not find 

that appellant successfully rebutted the statutory presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. The evidence indicated that, in 

addition to the wear and tear, rust and corrosion from eighteen 

years of constant use, the side ring was deformed as a result of a 

previous accident. Scott Magnuson, a coworker of appellant, 

testified that the side ring was "uniquely bent'' before 

appellant's accident. However, appellant did not offer any expert 

testimony as to the effects of wear and tear or of the previous 

accident on the wheel assembly's useful safe life. 

Appellant offered only the testimony of a GMC truck dealer 

that the useful life of the wheel assembly "should" outlast the 

l ife of the vehicle. Appellant and appellant's brother-in-law and 

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Appellate Case: 89-3249 Document: 01019966790 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 4 
employer testified that the wheel was in "good condition and a 

serviceable wheel." Finally, Magnuson also testified that the 

wheel, if properly serviced and maintained, "should" last the life 

of the truck. This evidence is simply insufficient, under the 

clear and convincing standard, to rebut the statutory presumption 

that the wheel assembly's useful safe life had expired. 

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

MICHAEL G. KIRK, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 

THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER 

COMPANY and THE BUDD COMPANY, 

Defendants. 

FILED 

U.S:_ DISTRICT COURT 

D, ... _r_, .... ___ _ ',) ' ' • ! : '- ,., .' ,. ,,AS • •. • • • !_ ~-i ,., J--\ 

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) CIVIL ACTION 

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) NO. 88-2342-0 

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) _________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Plaintiff, filed this products liability action against 

defendants General Motors Corporation (GMC), The Firestone Tire and 

Rubber Company (Firestone) and The Budd Company (Budd) for injuries 

suffered when a multipiece wheel assembly explosively separated 

during servicing. The components of the wheel assembly are a 20 X 

6.5 RH5" side ring and disc manufactured by Firestone and a disc 

manufactured by Budd, which the plaintiff claims were both assembled 

and installed in a Chevrolet truck manufactured by GMC. Plaintiff 

alleged claims in strict liability, negligence and breach of implied 

warranty of fitness against all three defendants. 

Appellate Case: 89-3249 Document: 01019966790 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 6 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

Defendants jointly move for summary judgment claiming that 

plaintiff's action is barred by K.S.A. 60-3303, the statute of 

repose section of the Kansas Products Liability Act. Because this 

motion is dispositive of this action, none of the other motions 

argued by defendants will be considered. Further, the court finds 

oral argument on these motions would not be helpful and accordingly 

denies defendants' request for such argument. 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, we must 

examine all evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing 

party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 824 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 

1988). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, he 

must show, through pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, that there is 

no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the 

moving party does not bear the burden of proof, he must show "that 

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's 

case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). This 

burden is met when the moving party identifies those portions of 

the record demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets his requirement, the burden 

shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The trial judge then 

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AO 72A 

(Rev. 8182) 

determines whether a trial is needed - "whether, in other words, 

there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved 

only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in 

favor of either party." Id. at 2520. 

The pertinent facts are: On July 3, 1987, the truck was 

brought into the shop where plaintiff was employed as service 

manager. One of plaintiff's coworkers, John Coleman, began to 

replace the four rear tires. Finding both inside wheels rusted to 

the hub, Coleman unsuccessfully attempted to loosen the wheel by 

pounding on the rim with a small duck bill hammer. He then 

retrieved a larger hammer and while he was pounding on the tire with 

this hammer, the wheel assembly explosively separated causing the 

jacks to dislodge pinning Coleman under the truck. Shortly 

thereafter, plaintiff reused the wheel assembly which had been 

involved in the Coleman accident and mounted a tire on it. As he 

was rolling it out to the truck, he was injured when the assembly 

separated for the second time. 

K.S.A. 60-3303 (a)(l) of the Kansas Products Liability 

Act, K.S.A. 60-3303 et.seq., provides: 

[A] product seller shall not be subject to 

liability in a product liability claim if the 

product seller proves by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the harm was caused after the 

product's "useful safe life" had expired. 

"Useful safe life" begins at the time of 

delivery of the product and extends for the time 

during which the product would normally be 

likely to perform or be stored in a safe manner. 

For the purposes of this section, "time of 

delivery" means the time of delivery of a 

product to its first purchaser or lessee who was 

not engaged in the business of either selling 

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A072A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

such products or using them as component parts 

of another product to be sold. 

Examples of evidence that is especially 

probative in determining whether a product's 

useful safe life had expired include: 

(A) The amount of wear and tear to which the 

product had been subject; 

(B) the effect of deterioration from natural causes, and 

from climate and other conditions under which the product 

was used or stored; 

(C) the normal practices of the user, similar 

users and the product seller with respect to the 

circumstances, frequency and purposes of the 

product's use, and with respect to repairs, 

renewals and replacements; 

(D) any representations, instructions or warnings made by 

the product seller concerning proper maintenance, storage 

and use of the product or the expected useful safe life 

of the product; and 

(E) any modification or alteration of the 

product by a user or third party. 

K.S.A. 60-3303 (b) (1) provides: 

In claims that involve harm caused more than ten 

years after time of delivery, a presumption 

arises that the harm was caused after the useful 

safe life had expired. This presumption may 

only be rebutted by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

We note that K.S.A. 60-3303 (b) (1) creates a presumption 

that all products have a useful safe life of ten years. Therefore, 

a claimant is precluded from assessing liability against a product 

seller1 unless he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

K.S.A. 60-3302 (a) defines "product seller" as "any person or 

entity that is engaged in the business of selling products, whether 

the sale is for resale, or for use or consumption," including "a 

manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer of the relevant 

product." K.S.A. 60-3303(b) provides that the term "manufacturer" 

includes a product seller who "designs, produces, makes, fabricates, 

constructs or remanufactures the relevant product or component part 

of a product before its sale to a user or consumer." 

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A072A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

the products useful safe life extended beyond the presumption. See 

Chamberlain v. Schmutz Manufacturing Company, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 

588, 590 ( 1982) It is undisputed that if the above statute of 

repose applies, it will bar plaintiff's claims against all three 

defendants. 

Initially, plaintiff erroneously contends that the clear 

and convincing standard of proof demanded by K.S.A. 60-3303 should 

not be applied at the summary judgment stage of this litigation. He 

asserts that he should only be required to rebut the statutory tenyear useful safe life presumption by a preponderance of the 

evidence. It is, however, well established that the inquiry 

involved in ruling on a motion for summary judgment "necessarily 

implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would 

apply at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. 

at 252. The question becomes whether a jury could reasonably find 

either that the plaintiff proved his case clear and convincing 

evidence or that he did not. Id. at 254. "To be clear and 

convincing, evidence should be clear in the sense that it is 

certain, plain to the understanding, unambiguous, and convincing in 

the sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to make it 

believable." City of Haven v. Gregg, 244 Kan. 117, 119, 766 P.2d 

143 (1988). 

Here, it is uncontroverted that the wheel assembly and its 

component parts were over ten years old at the time plaintiff's 

injury occurred, thereby invoking the statutory presumption that the 

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A072A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

useful safe life of the product had expired. 2 Defendants have 

buttressed this presumption with expert evidence establishing that 

the product had been subject to excessive wear and tear, as well as 

deterioration for natural causes and that it had been significantly 

altered as a result of the Coleman accident. 

James M. Holden, a consulting engineer, testified in his 

deposition that the causes of the plaintiff's accident were (1) rust 

and corrosion; (2) imprudent reassembly of the wheel after 

Coleman's accident; and ( 3) improper assembly of the wheel by 

plaintiff. Holden further testified that the components of the 

wheel assembly were so badly worn and rusted that they were not 

within their original design specifications. He also testified the 

force of the initial separation deformed and altered the side ring. 

(Holden deposition, exhibit C). James M. Schultz, the Budd company 

expert, testified that there was excessive corrosion in the latch 

hook area of the rim base, significant wear and tear on the hook of 

the rim base, and excessive corrosion on the hook area of the side 

ring. Schultz concluded that this wear and tear and corrosion 

altered the wheel assembly from its original design specifications 

prior to the Coleman accident. (Schultz deposition, exhibit E). 

Robert E. Lee, Firestone's expert, stated that the assembly 

2 The rim base, side ring and disc components of the wheel 

assembly were manufactured and assembled into a GMC Chevrolet C-50 

truck in 1969. The truck was purchased by a softdrink bottling 

company, and owned and operated as a delivery truck from 1969 until 

1987. For purposes of this motion, the parties stipulate that the 

wheel assembly was in continuous use until the date of plaintiff's 

injury. 

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AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

separated due to the combination of wear on the parts, the corrosion 

in the retention hook area on the rim base and possibly a lack of 

full assembly. (Lee deposition, exhibit F). 

Turning now to plaintiff's evidence, we note the absence 

of expert testimony relating to the effects of wear and tear and of 

the Coleman accident on the wheel assembly. 3 While there is no 

fixed rule that requires expert testimony, where the specific topic 

involved requires special expertise, only the testimony of a person 

with such expertise will be received. See Randolph v. 

Collectramatic. Inc .• 590 F.2d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 1979), (citing 

Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., Vol. II, §§ 555, 556; 

Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. VII, §2090). 

Wigmore on 

Plaintiff has appended numerous depositions and affidavits 

to his response: 4 (I) Jay Beard, a GMC truck dealer, states that 

the useful safe life of the wheel assembly "should" outlast the life 

of the vehicle and that there was no warning from the manufacturer 

3 Plaintiff has attached to his response portions of the 

depositions of Lee, Firestone's expert, and Schultz, Budd's expert. 

These excerpts provide no support for plaintiff's contention that 

the useful safe life of the wheel assembly had not expired at the 

time of the accident. 

4 Plaintiff has also attached numerous exhibits consisting of 

unidentified and unauthenticated copies of documents which the court 

may not properly consider when ruling upon this motion, since they 

would not be admissible at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Fed. R. 

Evid. 901. GMC has moved to strike exhibits 1 through 7 and 

exhibits 17 through 20, contending that plaintiff has laid no 

foundation for their use as evidence of a material fact in issue. 

Given the fact that proper authentication of these documents would 

not have influenced our ruling in this matter and considering our 

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the motion to 

strike is denied as moot. 

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that the wheel assembly had a limited useful safe life. (Beard 

affidavit, exhibit 12}; (2) Scott Magnuson, a coworker of 

plaintiff states that the side ring was uniquely bent, but despite 

wear and tear was "good." He also states that, if properly 

maintained and serviced the wheel "should" last more than ten years. 

(Magnuson deposition, exhibit 16}; (3} Plaintiff testified that 

the wheel was "old and rusty," but that he noticed no other problem 

with the wheel. (Kirk deposition, exhibit 23); (4) Plaintiff as 

well as plaintiff's brother-in law and employer state that the wheel 

was "in good condition and a serviceable wheel" before the 

accident. 5 (Kirk affidavit, exhibit 13; Glasgow affidavit, exhibit 

14} . 

Plaintiff also claims that the ten-year useful safe life 

period should not be applied, citing K.S.A. 60-3303(b) (2) (A} which 

provides that the useful safe life period of a product shall be 

extended where a product seller has warranted the product for a 

period exceeding ten years. This claim, however, fails since 

plaintiff has provided no evidence of an express warranty by any of 

the defendants. Plaintiff's contentions pursuant to K. S .A. 60-

3303(b} (2) (B} (providing that the repose period is inapplicable in 

5 GMC has moved this court to disregard and Budd has moved to 

strike portions of these affidavits on the basis that they 

contradict prior deposition testimony of these witnesses and attempt 

to create a sham issue of fact. See Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 

1237 (10th Cir. 1986}. Although we acknowledge that certain 

contradictions do exist, based on the factors enumerated in Franks, 

we are unconvinced that these affidavits attempt to create sham 

issues. Thus, we will deny the motion to disregard and motion to 

strike. 

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. .. 

A072A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

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cases of intentional misrepresentation or fraud) and K. S .A. 60-

3303 (b) (2) (D) (providing that the repose period in inapplicable 

where the injury-causing aspect of the product was not discoverable 

by a reasonably prudent person) are equally without merit, since 

plaintiff has failed to present evidence either of fraud or that he 

could not have discovered the injury-causing aspect of the product. 8 

Examining plaintiff's meager evidence in the light most 

favorable to him, yet applying the heightened evidentiary standard 

required by K. S .A. 60-3303, we conclude that a reasonable jury could 

not find that plaintiff has successfully rebutted the statutory 

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Hence, plaintiff's 

claims are barred by K.S.A. 60-3303. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants I motions for 

summary judgment are granted. 

Dated this 3( ,tY day of August, 1989, at Kansas City, 

Kansas. 

O'CONNOR, Chief Judge 

8 Again, we are hampered in our evaluation of plaintiff's 

evidence by his attachment of unauthenticated documents. However, 

it appears clear from the depositions of plaintiff's employer that 

a manufacturer's manual was kept at plaintiff's place of employment 

and that plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with the dangers inherent 

in the multipiece wheel assembly. 

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