Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01235/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01235-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Paul Melcher, Cynthia Salcido, and

Jenny Torres, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of San Luis, Arizona, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-1235 PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants City of San Luis, Carlos Bernal, Dolores Concha, Guillermina Fuentes,

Luis Luna, Nieves Riedel, Rosa Varella, Jorge Villacana, and Rosalicia Cordova have filed

a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #104. Plaintiffs Paul Melcher, Cynthia Salcido, and

Jenny Torres have filed a response. Dkt. #114. Defendants have replied. Dkt. #115. The

Court held oral argument on February 29, 2008. Dkt. #119. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.

I. Background.

A. The Parties’ Statements of Fact.

The facts of this case are set forth in Defendants’ statement of facts in support of their

motion for summary judgment (“DSOF”) and Plaintiffs’ statement of facts in opposition to

the motion (“PSOF”). Dkt. ##105, 113. Defendants’ statement contains 112 numbered

paragraphs with citations to the record. Plaintiffs’ statement contains 284 paragraphs with

citations to the record and an additional 51 factual exhibits. Plaintiffs’ statement, however,

does not dispute any of the facts set forth in Defendants’ statement. Under the Court’s Local

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1

 The Court’s task has been made even more difficult by the paucity of factual citations in

Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion. Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(e) requires

that a memorandum of law filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment “include

citations to the specific paragraph in the statement of facts that supports factual assertions

made in the [memorandum].” (Emphasis added.) The introductory section of Plaintiffs’

memorandum contains some citations to the record, but the remainder is largely devoid of

citations. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ statement of facts is not organized to correspond to

arguments made in the memorandum, but instead contains a survey-like recitation of

evidence from various depositions and documents, including many citations to entire

documents without explanation. See PSOF, Dkt.#113, Part III. Where a nonmoving party’s

opposition fails to cite specific materials in the Court’s record, the Court is not required to

search the entire record for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. See

Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pac.

N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988). The same is true when the

nonmoving party’s papers are “extraordinarily difficult to use” due to their size and poor

citation. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Rules, “[e]ach numbered paragraph of the statement of facts set forth in the moving parties’

separate statement of facts shall, unless otherwise ordered, be deemed admitted for purposes

of the motion for summary judgment if not specifically controverted by a correspondingly

numbered paragraph in the opposing parties’ separate statement of facts.” LRCiv 56.1(b).

By failing specifically to controvert the facts asserted in Defendants’ statement, Plaintiffs

have admitted those facts. The Court has nonetheless read both parties’ statements with care

in an effort to identify factual disputes in this case. Where the Court has been unable to

identify a disputed fact by comparison of the parties’ statements, the Court has accepted

Defendants’ factual assertions as true.1

B. The Facts.

San Luis is a small city in southwestern Arizona. Plaintiff Paul Melcher was

employed as Assistant City Administrator, Cynthia Salcido as Deputy City Clerk and

Assistant to the City Administrator, and Jenny Torres as Director of the Economic

Development Department. Plaintiffs’ positions were eliminated when the City Council

adopted Resolution 563 on June 9, 2004. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ elimination of

their positions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants Bernal, Concha, Fuentes, Luna, Riedel, Varella, and Villacana were

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members of the City Council who voted in favor of Resolution 563. Defendant Cordova was

the interim City Administrator. Resolution 563 was prepared and formally proposed by

Defendant Cordova. 

Defendant Cordova had worked as the City’s Human Resources Director prior to

becoming interim City Administrator in 2004. Ms. Cordova has a Bachelor of Science

Degree in Business Administration, a Master’s Degree in Business Administration, and a

graduate certificate in Public Management. DSOF ¶ 6. Ms. Cordova began working on a

new organizational structure for the City in late May of 2004. Id. at ¶ 7. She did so after

speaking with Defendant Fuentes, who was serving as Mayor and as a member of the City

Council. Id. at ¶ 20; PSOF ¶ 92. Defendant Fuentes told Ms. Cordova that she believed

there was a waste of labor and resources in the City. Ms. Fuentes asked Ms. Cordova to use

her human resources skills to better utilize the City’s resources. DSOF ¶ 20; PSOF ¶ 92.

Defendant Fuentes did not specifically talk to Ms. Cordova about eliminating positions.

DSOF ¶ 21. Ms. Cordova also believed that there were wasted labor resources in the City

and that she could implement a more effective organization. Id. at ¶ 22. 

Ms. Cordova met with Defendant Fuentes and the City Attorney to discuss her ideas

regarding restructuring. Id. at ¶ 23. Working with the City Attorney, Ms. Cordova put

together a proposed restructuring of city departments and positions that became Resolution

563. Id. at ¶ 24. The actual language of Resolution 563 was drafted by the City Attorney.

Ms. Cordova placed the Resolution in packets for the City Council’s June 9, 2004

meeting – the first meeting of the newly constituted council. Id. at ¶ 30. Ms. Cordova

included her own written recommendation that the Resolution be passed to “promote the

operation of the City in a more cost efficient manner and . . . achieve a budget savings for

fiscal year 2004/2005.” Id. at ¶ 31. At the meeting, there was no significant discussion of

Resolution 563. The Resolution was passed by a vote of 7-0. Id. at ¶ 32.

Resolution 563 made a number of changes to the San Luis city government. It

eliminated the Economic Development Department and the Parks and Recreation

Department. Id. at ¶ 27. It reorganized the Departments of Administration, Public Works,

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Counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 have been dismissed by the parties. Dkt. ##110, 118. 

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Social Services, and Finance. Id. at ¶ 28. And it eliminated six positions from the

Classification and Salary Plan of the City: Assistant City Administrator, Deputy City Clerk

and Executive Staff Assistant, Parks and Recreation Director, Senior Center Director,

Economic Development Director, and Office Support Specialist for the Department of

Economic Development. Id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiffs occupied three of these six positions. Id. at

¶ 33. 

On June 10, 2004, Ms. Cordova sent a memorandum to each of the Plaintiffs advising

them that their positions had been eliminated and their employment was terminated. Id. at

¶ 37. In response, Plaintiffs sent memoranda dated June 12, 2004 to Ms. Cordova

complaining that their terminations were improper and asking her to review them pursuant

to a Personnel Policy specifically pertaining to Reductions in Force. Id. at ¶ 38. Ms.

Cordova consulted with the City Attorney, who prepared reply letters dated June 18, 2004,

for her signature. Id. at ¶ 39. The letters rejected Plaintiffs’ complaint. Id. at ¶ 40. 

C. The Suit.

The First Amended Complaint alleges that Resolution 563 violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Dkt. #5. Specifically, each of the Plaintiffs contends that the Resolution deprived them of

liberty and property interests without due process of law (Counts 5-6), and Plaintiffs Torres

and Salcido assert that the Resolution constituted retaliation for their exercise of First

Amendment rights (Count 4).2

 Id. Before discussing the evidence submitted in support of

these claims, the Court will review the relevant standards for summary judgment and address

Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to absolute legislative immunity.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary

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judgment. The disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Summary judgment may be entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

III. Absolute Legislative Immunity.

Absolute immunity from suit attaches to all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate

legislative activity. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). “Whether an act is

legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or the intent of the official

performing it.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998). Thus, in determining

whether the individual Defendants are entitled to immunity in this case, the Court must ask

“whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, [Defendants’] actions were

legislative.” Id. at 55. The Court will first address the council-member Defendants, then

Defendant Cordova, then the City. 

A. Immunity of the City Council.

The Court must consider four factors in determining whether Resolution 563 was a

legislative act: (1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the formulation of

policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether

the act is formally legislative in character; and (4) whether the act bears all the hallmarks of

traditional legislation. Kaahumanu v. County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). Applying these factors, the Court concludes that the Resolution was a

legislative act and that the seven Defendants who were council members are entitled to

legislative immunity.

First, Resolution 563 constituted the formulation of city policy, not an act of ad hoc

decisionmaking. The Resolution restructured city government, eliminating two departments

and reorganizing four. The Resolution eliminated six positions and affected the City’s

budget and management structure. The Resolution was initiated by the interim City

Administrator who had concerns about the City’s efficiency and budget, and after the

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Administrator had consulted with the Mayor who had the same concerns. Ms. Cordova’s

conversations with the Mayor did not address the elimination of any positions, and Ms.

Cordova brought her educational and human resources training to bear in recommending the

restructuring. This was the formulation of policy, not an ad hoc decision concerning

Plaintiffs’ jobs.

Second, Resolution 563 was not limited to a few individuals. It eliminated

departments, reorganized other departments, and eliminated more positions than those held

by the three Plaintiffs. In Bogan, the City of Fall River, Massachusetts adopted a similar

measure that froze salaries, eliminated positions, and eliminated a department of which the

plaintiff was the sole employee. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 47. The Supreme Court had “little

trouble concluding” that the act was legislative. Id. at 55. 

Third, Resolution 563 was a formal council resolution, drafted by the City Attorney,

proposed by the interim City Administrator, presented at a public meeting, moved and

seconded by members of the Council, and approved by a unanimous vote.

Finally, Resolution 563 bore the hallmarks of traditional legislation. It was formally

adopted as a legislative act by the City Council. It concerned organization and structure of

departments and reduction of the City’s budget. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “the

decision to eliminate a position for budgetary reasons is clearly legislative.” Bechard v.

Rappold, 287 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiffs’ arguments that Resolution 563 was not a legislative act focus almost

entirely on Defendants’ motives and political alliances. Plaintiffs note Defendant Concha’s

statement that a department was eliminated to get rid of Plaintiff Torres’ position and Ms.

Riedell’s control of the council and her desire to eliminate Ms. Salcido’s job. Plaintiffs also

argue that there were not legitimate budgetary reasons for the Resolution. These arguments

focus on Defendants’ motives and intentions, an inquiry not permitted under Bogan. 

The Court accordingly concludes that the seven Defendants who were members of the

City Council – Bernal, Concha, Fuentes, Luna, Riedel, Varella, and Villacana – are entitled

to legislative immunity. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 49-55. 

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B. Immunity of Defendant Cordova.

“[O]fficials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when

they perform legislative functions.” Id. at 55. An individual’s actions are legislative in

nature when they are “integral steps in the legislative process.” Id. Ms. Cordova clearly

played an integral role in the creation and passage of Resolution 563. She decided how to

structure the Resolution, worked with the City Attorney to create it, and presented the

Resolution to the City Council with her recommendation as interim City Administrator that

the Resolution be adopted. DSOF ¶¶ 20-24, 31. Ms. Cordova is entitled to legislative

immunity for her role in the Resolution’s passage.

C. Immunity of the City.

The Court cannot agree with Defendants’ argument that the City is entitled to

legislative immunity. Supreme Court decisions “make it quite clear that, unlike various

government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit – either absolute or

qualified – under § 1983.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); see also Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,

445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“holding that municipalities have no immunity from damages

liability flowing from their constitutional violations[.]”). Defendants argue that this Court

should follow Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir. 1992), and hold the City immune,

but the majority opinion in Hollyday provides virtually no analysis to support its holding.

Id. at 1443. The concurrence, by contrast, provides a thoughtful explanation of why

legislative immunity is not enjoyed by government entities. Id. at 1444-45. The Court will

not rely on Hollyday and disregard established Supreme Court statements in this area. 

D. Effect of a Finding of Legislative Immunity.

Plaintiffs have sued the City Council members and Ms. Cordova in their individual

and official capacities. Legislative immunity shields these Defendants from liability only in

their individual capacities. See Board of County Com'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v.

Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677 n.1 (1996) (“[legislative] immunity from suit under § 1983

extends to public servants only in their individual capacities[.]” (emphasis in original)).

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Thus, the Council members and Ms. Cordova may still be sued in their official capacities.

 “A suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit

against the governmental entity itself.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th

Cir.1991); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978) (“officialcapacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity

of which an officer is an agent[.]”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 & 167 n. 14

(“[t]here is no longer a need to bring official capacity actions against local government

officials [because] under Monell, . . . local government units can be sued directly).

Generally, a municipality may be sued for constitutional torts committed by its officials

according to an official policy, practice, or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. In

particular, “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where . . . a deliberate choice to follow

a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality); see City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (plurality) (“[O]nly those municipal officials who have ‘final

policymaking authority’ may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.”).

The City’s liability, therefore, turns on the actions of those who officially considered and

passed Resolution 563. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 647 (“the fate of the City[‘s liability under

§ 1983] hinges on [a public official’s] official capacity liability.”). The Court accordingly

will consider whether the actions of the individual Defendants give rise to City liability for

the First Amendment and due process violations alleged in the complaint.

IV. First Amendment Claims of Torres and Salcido (Count 4).

To establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation under § 1983, Plaintiffs must

show that (1) they engaged in expressive conduct that addressed a matter of public concern;

(2) Defendants, as government officials, took an adverse action against them; and

(3) Plaintiffs’ expressive conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse

action. Alpha Energy Savers v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

If Plaintiffs meet this burden, Defendants can escape liability under Mt. Healthy City Sch.

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3

This is not true of all Defendants. Plaintiff Torres has presented no evidence that

Defendants Cordova, Fuentes, Varella, or Villacana knew of the 2001 statement. This is an

independent basis for summary judgment in favor of the City and these Defendants in their

official capacities on Torres’ claim. See Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265

F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff Torres asserts that Defendant Concha knew of the

2001 statement (PSOF ¶ 57), but the cited portions of the record do not support this assertion.

Ms. Concha testified during her deposition that she did not remember whether Plaintiff

Torres spoke at the 2001 meeting. Ex. 113, Att. 2, at 42:9-12. Plaintiffs’ counsel presented

Ms. Concha with minutes of the meeting during her deposition, and Ms. Concha confirmed

from the minutes that Ms. Torres had in fact spoken in favor of Mr. Ruiz at the meeting (see

id. at 43:16-19), but Ms. Concha never testified that she remembered this fact when she voted

in favor of Resolution 563 three years later. Plaintiffs point to a statement in Defendant

Concha’s deposition where she appears to admit that Ms. Torres’ position was eliminated in

order to replace her with another person (Dkt. #113, Att. 2 at 158:16-59:9), but this

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Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1997), by showing that they would have taken the

same action in the absence of Plaintiffs’ expressive conduct. Id. at 287.

A. Claim of Plaintiff Torres.

Alex Ruiz is a controversial figure in the politics of San Luis, having been in and out

of city government on a number of occasions. Mr. Ruiz apparently is a political opponent

of some of the Defendants. Plaintiff Torres spoke in favor of Mr. Ruiz at a City Council

meeting in 2001, and contends that Resolution 563 was passed three years later in retaliation

for that speech. Plaintiff Torres also contends that the Resolution was passed because

Defendants dislike her mother, who is also their political opponent, and therefore interfered

with her First Amendment right to associate with her mother.

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff Torres satisfies the first element of a First

Amendment claim – that she engaged in expressive conduct addressed to a matter of public

concern. Nor do Defendants contest the second element – that Resolution 563 constituted

an adverse action against Ms. Torres. Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff Torres has

failed to present sufficient evidence on the third element – that her 2001 statement in favor

of Mr. Ruiz was a substantial or motivating factor in the passage of Resolution 563. 

Plaintiff Torres has presented evidence that some Defendants knew of her 2001

statement in support of Mr. Ruiz.3

 Even if the Court assumes that all Defendants knew of

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deposition excerpt does not say that the action was taken as the result of Ms. Torres’

statement in 2001 or any other First Amendment activity. 

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the 2001 statement, however, this fact alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment

on Torres’ First Amendment claim. Plaintiffs asserting First Amendment claims under §

1983 must show causation – that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor

in the adverse employment action. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “plaintiffs are

required . . . to provide more than ‘mere evidence’ that the defendants were aware of

[plaintiff’s] expressive conduct” to meet this burden. Alpha Energy Savers, 381 F.3d at 929

(citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs argue that causation is shown by Defendants’ participation in efforts to

recall Ms. Torres’ mother from the City Council in 2001 and 2003. The fact that some

Defendants were political opponents of Ms. Torres’ mother and sought to have her recalled

on two occasions says nothing specific, however, about whether the 2001 statement by

Plaintiff Torres was a substantial or motivating factor in the passage of Resolution 563 in

2004. Although Plaintiffs assert that the recall efforts against Ms. Torres’ mother were based

in part on the mother’s support of Mr. Ruiz, Plaintiffs must do more. They must connect the

passage of Resolution 563 to the specific First Amendment activity in question – Plaintiff

Torres’ statement at the 2001 council meeting – and Defendants recall efforts with respect

to Ms. Torres’ mother simply do not address that event. See Karam v. City of Burbank, 352

F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (there must be a nexus between the exercise of First

Amendment rights and the alleged retaliatory action to survive summary judgment on a

§ 1983 claim).

Plaintiffs also assert that the fact that Resolution 563 was passed at the first meeting

after Defendants all were elected to the City Council supports an inference that it was passed

in retaliation for Ms. Torres’ 2001 statement. The Court does not agree. Three years is too

long to make a causal connection on the basis of timing. See Clark County Sch. Dist. V.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (period of 20 months “suggests, by itself, no causality

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4

Even if the Court found that Plaintiff Torres had raised a question of fact as to whether her

2001 statement was a substantial and motivating factor, the Court would grant summary

judgment because Defendants have established a Mt. Healthy defense. As footnote 3

demonstrates, Plaintiff failed to present evidence that a majority of the council members

knew of her 2001 statement. Given this failure, the Court must conclude that a majority of

the council voted without regard to her 2001 statement and would have passed Resolution

563 even if the statement had never been made. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.

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at all”). Even if some inference could be drawn from the fact that Defendants adopted

Resolution 563 at their first full council meeting, that inference is rendered implausible by

other facts in the record. Defendant Bernal, one of the council members who voted in favor

of the Resolution and supposedly in league with the other Defendants, also spoke in favor

of Mr. Ruiz at the 2001 council meeting. DSOF ¶92. So did Maria Luz Hoyas, the woman

who supposedly was hired to fill Ms. Torres’ position after she was terminated. Id. at ¶¶90-

91. Moreover, Plaintiff Melcher admitted that he read articles in 2003 or 2004 in which Ms.

Fuentes stated that Ms. Torres’ position should be eliminated for financial reasons, not

because of her support of Mr. Ruiz. Id. at ¶¶42, 45. Given these facts and the three-year

hiatus between Ms. Torres’ single statement at the council meeting and the passage of

Resolution 563, Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that the statement was a substantial or motivating factor for passage of the

Resolution. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff Torres’ First

Amendment claim.4

The Court must also enter summary judgment on Plaintiff Torres’ associational rights

claim. Plaintiff Torres claims that Defendants eliminated her position in retaliation for her

mother’s political conduct and that this action interfered with her First Amendment right to

associate with her mother. Under Ms. Torres’ own authority, however, an interference with

associational rights is actionable only if it is “direct and substantial” or “significant.”

Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 228 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff Torres has presented no evidence that the passage of Resolution 563 directly,

substantially, or significantly interfered with her association with her mother. 

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B. Claim of Plaintiff Salcido.

Plaintiff Salcido claims that Resolution 563 was adopted in retaliation for her having

served as the named plaintiff in a 2003 lawsuit that prevented Defendant Riedel from running

for Mayor of San Luis. As with the claim of Plaintiff Torres, Defendants do not contend that

Plaintiff Salcido has failed to meet the first or second prongs of a § 1983 First Amendment

claim. They instead contend that Plaintiff Salcido has failed to present evidence to establish

a triable question of fact on the third element – that her role as a named plaintiff in the 2003

lawsuit was a substantial or motivating factor in the passage of Resolution 563. Defendants

also argue that the Resolution would have passed even in the absence of Plaintiff Salcido’s

exercise of her First Amendment rights. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. In order to

address these arguments, the Court will consider Salcido’s evidence against each Defendant.

1. Rosalicia Cordova.

Ms. Cordova knew that Plaintiff Salcido had been the named plaintiff in a lawsuit

challenging Defendant Riedel’s candidacy for mayor (PSOF ¶ 116), but Plaintiffs have

presented no evidence that Ms. Cordova took this fact into account when proposing

Resolution 563. Plaintiffs argue that the connection can be inferred from the timing of Ms.

Cordova’s actions – that Resolution 563 was approved at the first City Council meeting after

Defendant Riedel and her alleged supporters were elected to the City Council. As with the

claim of Plaintiff Torres, however, this fact alone does not create a triable question of fact

with respect to Ms. Cordova. 

As noted above, the evidence concerning Ms. Cordova’s preparation of Resolution

563 is that she believed the City could be more efficient in its use of its labor resources.

There is no evidence to suggest that Defendant Cordova cared about the lawsuit against

Defendant Riedel. There is no evidence that the lawsuit had any effect upon Defendant

Cordova. There is no evidence that Defendant Cordova took adverse actions directed at Ms.

Salcido when Ms. Cordova was in charge of the human resources department. And

approximately 12 months elapsed between Salcido’s involvement in the lawsuit and the

passage of Resolution 563. Given these facts, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Salcido has

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Throughout this section IV, the Court explains why the individual defendants are entitled

to summary judgment in their official capacities and why the City, therefore, is also entitled

to summary judgment. The Court does not address Defendants in their individual capacities

because they are entitled to legislative immunity. The Court notes, however, that the

discussion in this section would apply equally to the individual Defendants’ personal

liability. Thus, for those Defendants where Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient

evidence, summary judgment would be warranted even if they were not entitled to legislative

immunity. 

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not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the lawsuit was a

substantial or motivating factor in Ms. Cordova’s decision to propose Resolution 563. The

Court also concludes that the evidence shows Ms. Cordova would have taken the action

regardless of Plaintiff Salcido’s involvement in the lawsuit, establishing a causation defense.

Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. Ms. Cordova is entitled to summary judgment in her official

capacity on the First Amendment claims of Plaintiff Torres and Salcido.5

2. Carlos Bernal.

Defendant Bernal testified that he supported Resolution 563 because he understood

the City was in a financial crisis and that the restructuring of the Resolution was being done

to save city funds. PSOF ¶ 9. Indeed, Plaintiff Melcher had read articles or flyers in advance

of the passage of Resolution 563 in which Defendant Bernal specifically stated that

Melcher’s and Torres’ positions should be eliminated for financial reasons. DSOF ¶¶ 42, 45.

 Plaintiffs present evidence, however, that Defendant Bernal not only was aware of

Plaintiff Salcido’s lawsuit, but was critical of it. PSOF ¶ 35. Plaintiffs also note that all

seven members of the City Council were in the same political group, that Resolution 563 was

passed at the first City Council meeting where all seven participated, and that there was

virtually no conversation before the City Council passed the Resolution. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 31.

When all of this evidence is taken together, particularly Defendants Bernal’s criticism of

Plaintiff Salcido’s lawsuit, the Court finds it sufficient to raise a question of fact as to

whether the lawsuit was a substantial or motivating factor in Defendant Bernal’s vote for the

Resolution. See Alpha Energy Savers, 381 F.3d at 929 (causation can be inferred from the

fact that defendant expressed opposition to the protected First Amendment action).

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For the reasons explained below, however, the Court concludes that Defendant Bernal

is entitled to summary judgment in his official capacity because he and the other Defendants

have established a Mt. Healthy defense. As will be shown, a majority of the City Council

would have voted in favor of Resolution 563 regardless of Plaintiff Salcido’s participation

in the lawsuit. Plaintiff Salcido therefore cannot show that the lawsuit was the reason for her

injury. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.

3. Dolores Concha.

Defendant Concha testified that she voted in favor of Resolution 563 because it was

in the best interests of the City. DSOF ¶ 106. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Ms.

Concha was aware of Plaintiff Salcido’s lawsuit (PSOF ¶ 54), but Plaintiffs have failed to

present sufficient additional evidence of causation. Unlike Defendant Bernal, Plaintiffs have

not presented evidence that Defendant Concha was critical of the lawsuit. Although

Defendants contend that the timing of Resolution 563 can provide the necessary causation,

the Court does not agree. Approximately one year passed between Salcido’s legal action and

the adoption of Resolution 563. And as already noted, Resolution 563 was not targeted at

Plaintiff Salcido. It involved a broad restructuring of City government and the elimination

of six positions. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to conclude that Salcido’s lawsuit was a substantial or motivating factor

in Concha’s vote for Resolution 563. Defendant Concha is entitled to summary judgement

in her official capacity on the First Amendment claim of Plaintiff Salcido.

4. Guillermina Fuentes.

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendant Fuentes was aware of Salcido’s

lawsuit. PSOF ¶ 144. Plaintiffs claim to have satisfied the requirement of causation by

asserting that Defendant Fuentes said on several occasions that she would eliminate Plaintiff

Salcido’s position. The evidence presented by the parties, however, does not support

Plaintiff’s claim that Fuentes was motivated by the lawsuit. 

Plaintiff Salcido’s lawsuit was filed on July 16, 2003. PSOF Att. 33. Defendant

Fuentes’ statements about firing Salcido were made before this date and thus could not have

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been in retaliation for the lawsuit. For example, Plaintiff Salcido testified that she became

insecure about her job in the Spring of 2003 after hearing that Defendant Fuentes intended

to eliminate her position. DSOF ¶58, Ex. 3 at 129. The Yuma newspaper reported on April

14, 2003 – more than three months before the lawsuit – that Defendant Fuentes intended to

eliminate the positions of Plaintiffs Melcher and Salcido. PSOF Att. 32. The newspaper

suggested that the positions would be eliminated as unnecessary to city government. Id.

Plaintiff Melcher likewise testified that Defendant Fuentes’ reason for wanting to eliminate

his and Salcido’s positions was that she considered them to be unnecessary. PSOF ¶54, Ex.

16 at 147-48. Defendant Luna testified that she heard Fuentes say on a number of occasions

that Salcido’s position should be eliminated, but Luna’s deposition transcript makes clear that

these statements were made before the April 14, 2003 newspaper article and well before the

lawsuit. PSOF Att. 11 at 132-33. 

The evidence presented by the parties thus shows that Defendant Fuentes had publicly

stated her intention to eliminate Salcido’s position before Salcido ever engaged in the

protected activity of filing the lawsuit against Riedel, and that Fuentes intended to do so

because she considered the position unnecessary. The evidence does not support Plaintiff

Salcido’s claim that she Fuentes voted for Resolution 563 because of the lawsuit.

 5. Luiz Luna.

The record indicates that Defendant Luna knew of Plaintiff Salcido’s lawsuit.

Dkt. #113, Att. 10 at130:23-131:1. As with Defendant Concha, however, Plaintiffs have not

presented sufficient evidence to link the lawsuit to Defendant Luna’s vote for Resolution

563. Plaintiffs’ statement of facts asserts that Defendant Luna had a good working

relationship with Salcido and voted in favor of Resolution 563 because he took directions

from the interim City Administrator, Ms. Cordova. PSOF ¶¶ 200, 202. Defendant Luna is

entitled to summary judgment in his official capacity. 

6. Nieves Riedel.

Defendant Riedel testified that she voted in favor of Resolution 563 because Ms.

Cordova stated that it was necessary for financial reasons. PSOF ¶ 227. She further stated

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that she viewed the Resolution as being in the best interests of the City. DSOF ¶ 110. 

Defendant Riedel clearly knew of Defendant Salcido’s lawsuit against her. The fact

that the lawsuit was directed at Defendant Riedel and prevented her from running for mayor

is sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether the lawsuit was a substantial or

motivating factor in her subsequent vote in favor of Resolution 563. As explained below,

however, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the lawsuit was a substantial or motivating

factor for a majority of the City Council, and Defendant Riedel is therefore entitled to

summary judgment in her official capacity under Mt. Healthy.

7. Rosa Varella.

Defendant Varella testified that she voted in favor of Resolution 563 because it was

recommended by Ms. Cordova. PSOF ¶ 263. She believed that Ms. Cordova knew more

about City finances than she did. DSOF ¶ 107. Although Ms. Varella was aware of the

lawsuit (PSOF ¶ 272), Plaintiff Salcido has failed to present sufficient additional evidence

of causation. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Varella criticized the lawsuit as did

Defendant Bernal or that she was the target of the lawsuit as was Defendant Riedel. Rather,

as with Defendants Cordova, Concha, Fuentes, and Luna, the record does not contain

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the lawsuit was a substantial or

motivating factor for Varella’s vote. Defendant Varella is therefore entitled to summary

judgment in her official capacity. 

8. Jorge Villacana.

Defendant Villacana testified that he voted in favor of the Resolution because it was

recommended by Ms. Cordova. DSOF ¶ 109. Mr. Villacana testified that he did not recall

Plaintiff Salcido’s lawsuit, a fact Plaintiff does not controvert. PSOF ¶ 282. Defendant

Villacana therefore is entitled to summary judgment in his official capacity. Keyser, 265

F.3d at 751. 

9. Mt. Healthy Defense.

As the above discussion makes clear, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence for

a reasonable jury to find that the lawsuit of Ms. Salcido was a substantial or motivating factor

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only with respect to Defendants Bernal and Riedel. This leaves five members of the City

Council who did not act on the basis of Salcido’s protected conduct. Because this majority

of the City Council would have approved Resolution 563 regardless of whether Ms. Salcido

brought her lawsuit against Defendant Riedel, Defendants have established their right to the

Mt. Healthy defense. See Coogan v. Smyers, 134 F.3d 479, 485 (2nd Cir. 1998) (“if a

majority of defendants prove that their individual vote against the plaintiff would have been

the same irrespective of the plaintiff’s protected conduct, then the defendants as a group

cannot be held liable, and no individual defendant, even one whose proof falls short, can be

so held because causation is absent”). 

C. City’s First Amendment Liability.

As noted above, the City’s liability turns on the actions of those who officially

considered and passed Resolution 563. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 647 (“the fate of the City[‘s

liability under § 1983] hinges on [a public official’s] official capacity liability.”). Because

Plaintiffs have failed to establish the liability of the individual Defendants in their official

capacities for violation of the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs Torres and Salcido, the

Plaintiffs have failed to established the City’s liability as well. Stated differently, because

Plaintiffs’ protected activities have not been shown to be a substantial or motivating factor

for a majority of the City’s policymakers, they have not been shown to be a substantial or

motivating factor for the City. The Court will enter summary judgment in favor of the City

on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.

V. Due Process – Liberty (Count 6).

Plaintiffs claim that Resolution 563 deprived them of liberty interests without due

process of law. The Supreme Court has held, however, that an individual who suffers loss

at the hands of a governmental entity may assert a liberty-interest claim only when the

government makes a “charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and

association in the community.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). As the

Ninth Circuit has explained, “a charge which infringes one’s liberty can be characterized as

an accusation or label given the individual by his employer which belittles his worth and

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dignity as an individual and, as a consequence, is likely to have severe repercussions outside

of professional life.” Stretten v. Wadsworth Veteran’s Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 366 (9th Cir.

1976) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants made accusations against them

that had severe repercussions outside their professional lives. Defendants therefore are

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See Kelley v. City of Mesa, 873 F.Supp. 320,

331-32 (D.Ariz. 1994) (plaintiff who lost employment with City cannot make a libertyinterest claim).

VI. Due Process – Property (Count 6).

Plaintiffs assert that their property interests in their jobs were eliminated without due

process of law. Specifically, the First Amended Complaint asserts that Plaintiffs were

terminated “without any pre or post termination appeal.” Dkt. #5, ¶ 41. Plaintiffs’ response

to Defendants’ motion likewise argues that Defendants wrongfully denied them “pretermination hearings” or “full-blown administrative hearing[s] and judicial review posttermination.” Dkt. #114 at 12. 

Although due process normally requires some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation

of a significant property interest, “[w]hen the action complained of is legislative in nature,

due process is satisfied when the legislative body performs its responsibilities in the normal

manner prescribed by law.” Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994)

(quotation and citations omitted). In seeking to define when a particular government action

is legislative, the Ninth Circuit focuses on the character of the action, rather than its label.

Id. 

As discussed in part III of this order, the City Council’s adoption of Resolution 563

was a legislative act. The resolution reorganized four departments, eliminated two

departments, and eliminated six job classifications. It was proposed by the interim City

Administrator and followed normal legislative procedures, including the usual legislative

formalities. It was adopted by unanimous vote at a public meeting of the City Council. The

Resolution was not an administrative action focused solely on the three Plaintiffs. Because

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Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted at oral argument that the City failed to follow its own procedures

for a reduction in force by failing to prepare a plan for implementation of the reduction. But

Plaintiffs do not complain about the lack of a plan in their First Amendment Complaint,

which instead asserts that Plaintiffs lost their jobs “without any pre or post termination

appeal.” Dkt. #5, ¶ 41. Even if Plaintiffs’ complaint had included a lack-of-plan claim,

Plaintiffs have provided no authority for the proposition that a city-policy right to a

reduction-in-force plan constitutes a due process right cognizable as a constitutional

violation. The only due process case cited by Plaintiffs in their response to the motion for

summary judgment – Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) – holds

“that all the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond,

coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute.”

Id. at 547-48. This authority certainly does not support Plaintiffs’ suggestion that they have

a due process right to a reduction-in-force plan. One might argue that such a right arose as

a matter of contract based on the City’s policies, but Plaintiffs have asserted no such claim

in this case.

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the action was legislative, Plaintiffs’ claim that they were wrongfully denied pre- and posttermination hearings lacks merit. Id.; see Dawson v. Milwaukee Hos. Auth., 930 F.2d 1283,

1286 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[for] a legislative rather than adjudicative decision . . . the due process

clause does not require individual hearings before a government makes decisions that affect

the interests of persons in the aggregate.”) (citations omitted); Bakalich v. Vill. of Bellwood,

No. 03-C-1784, 2006 WL 1444893, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2006).6

VII. Conclusion.

Counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 of the First Amended Complaint have been dismissed by the

parties. The individual Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity and therefore are

insulated from § 1983 liability, in their individual capacities, with respect to the remaining

counts. The Court has not found sufficient evidence that the individual Defendants

committed a constitutional violation in their official capacities with respect to Counts 4, 5,

and 6. Accordingly, the City may not be held liable for the official-capacity actions of the

individual Defendants. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 646.

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #104) is granted. 

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this matter.

DATED this 11th day of March, 2008.

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