Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06066/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06066-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

SHARON R. BALL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-6066

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Sharon R. Ball, appealed to this Court from the denial of her applications

for social security disability benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (Doc. #1). On August 30, 2005, the undersigned remanded this matter to the

Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. #9 & 10). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Shannon Muse Carroll, filed an Application For Attorney’s Fees

Under The Equal Access to Justice Act, (hereinafter the "EAJA"), on October 16, 2005 (Doc.

#11 & 12). The Commissioner responded on October 21, 2005 (Doc. #13). This matter is

now ready for consideration.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits

was substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of

benefits was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner, however, objects

to counsel’s application for attorney’s fees based upon counsel’s failure to keep

contemporaneous time records. In the alternative, the Commissioner objects to counsel’s

application based upon counsel’s practice of billing in quarter-hour increments. The

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Commissioner argues that the time records submitted by plaintiff’s counsel are inconsistent

with the docket report such that counsel failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the time

claimed was reasonable or reasonably spent on the litigation for which fees are sought.

(Doc. #13, pp. 1-3). A copy of the Docket Report is attached to Defendant’s Response

(Doc. #13, Attachment #1). The Defendant’s response goes on to point to specific dates on

the Docket Report which establish counsel’s time records were not created

contemporaneously with any of the relevant pleadings. Thus, she respectfully objects to

plaintiff’s application and requests that the undersigned deny counsel’s application for for

attorney fees (Doc. #13, p. 1). The defendant argues that the application for fees should be

denied, however, she alternatively argues that the number of hours for which compensation

is sought she be reduced due to excessive billing (Doc. #13, pp. 3-5). 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA can be appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002),

citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the

necessary standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out

of a claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for

his or her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees

under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

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prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe

firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v.

Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,

361 (8th Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,

even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d

456, 459 (8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties

requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation;

the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services;

the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved.

Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).

The statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2

412(d)(2)(A). However, the EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an

itemized statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other

expenses were computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal

fee-shifting statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with

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"contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description

of the subject matter of the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may

reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Counsel’s EAJA pleadings were filed of record on October 16, 2005 (Doc. #11-12).

The Commissioner filed her very detailed response on October 21, 2005 (Doc. #13).

Despite ample time to do so, Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to: reply to the Commissioner’s

objections; file an amended itemization of her time records; or, offer any explanation of the

deficiencies within her time records. 

The deficiencies are numerous and continue throughout counsel’s itemization.

Counsel’s itemization is contained within the text of her affidavit wherein she asserts that her

time spent on the case was recorded contemporaneously with the work which was performed.

Counsel submits that she prepared and filed the complaint in this case on June 12, 2004

(Doc. #11, Attachment #1, p. 2). However, the docket sheet reflects that the complaint was

actually filed on May 26, 2004, more than two weeks before the drafting is reflected in the

itemization (Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2). Counsel reports that she reviewed the order of

reference on July 22, 2004 (Doc. #11, Attachment #1, p. 2). Yet, the docket sheet reflects

that the order of reference was filed, more than a month earlier, on June 10, 2004 (Doc. #13,

attachment #1, p. 2). Counsel’s itemization indicates that she reviewed the transcript and

answer on August 20, 2004 (Doc. #11, Attachment #1, p. 2). The transcript and answer

were actually filed of record on July 15, 2004 (Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2). 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s appeal brief was due to be filed on August 14, 2004, and was

timely filed on August 12, 2004 (Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2). However, counsel’s

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itemization indicates that on September 15, 2004, she prepared a motion for extension of

time and had a telephone conference regarding same with the United States Attorney’s Office

(Doc. #11, Attachment #1, p. 2). Additionally, counsel’s itemization reflects that she

reviewed the order of extension of time within which to file her brief on September 27, 2004

(Doc. #11, Attachment #1, p. 2). While the docket sheet reflects that Plaintiff’s brief was

timely filed, the docket sheet does not reflect any such motion for extension of time or order

granting same being filed in this case (Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2). Despite the Plaintiff’s

brief being filed on August 12, 2004, Counsel’s itemization alleges that she prepared the

brief on October 8, 2004, nearly two months after the brief was filed. (Doc. #11, attachment

#2, p. 2; Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2). 

Likewise, Defendant’s appeal brief was filed of record on September 13, 2004, yet

Counsel asserts that she reviewed the defendant’s brief and considered filing a responsive

brief on November 22, 2004 (Doc. #11, attachment #2, p. 3; Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2).

The undersigned filed the memorandum opinion and judgment in this case on August 30,

2005 (Doc. #9 & 10). Yet, Counsel alleges that she reviewed these documents on January

14, 2005, more than 8 months prior to the date they were filed by the Court (Doc. #11,

attachment #2, p. 3; Doc. #13, attachment #1, p. 2). Lastly, counsel asserts that she devoted

2 hours of her time to preparation of EAJA pleadings on January 16, 2005, while said

pleadings were not filed until October 16, 2005 (Doc. #11, attachment #2, p. 3; Doc. #13,

attachment #1, p. 2). 

A thorough review of counsel’s itemization reveals that counsel’s itemization was not

maintained or created contemporaneously with any action taken on behalf of Plaintiff in this

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case. Therefore, the undersigned finds the Commissioner’s argument has merit. Thus,

plaintiff’s counsel’s application for EAJA fees (Doc. #11 & 12) must be denied in its

entirety. 

Accordingly, we find that counsel is not entitled to compensation for an attorney's fee

award under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that at such time as is appropriate, plaintiff’s counsel may

seek a reasonable fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2006.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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