Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00281/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00281-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joseph Artiaga,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-00281-TUC-RM (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Joseph Artiaga’s pro se Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (NonDeath Penalty) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 23). Petitioner did not file a Reply. The Petition is 

ripe for adjudication. 

 Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,1

 this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1). 

 1

 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The Arizona Superior Court in Pima County described the relevant background as 

follows: 

 On December 5, 2005, Petitioner Joe Santos Artiaga was indicted on 

three counts: Theft of Means of Transportation by Control, Burglary in the 

Third Degree, and Possession of Burglary Tools. Public defender Richard 

Kingston was appointed to represent Petitioner. In January 2006, Petitioner 

rejected the State’s plea offer, pursuant to which Petitioner would plead 

guilty to Count One, Theft of Means of Transportation by Control, with one 

prior conviction. On February 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to 

Remand to the Grand Jury, which this court granted on March 3, 2006. On 

March 13, 2006, the grand jury returned an indictment identical to the 

December 5, 2005 indictment. Petitioner’s trial commenced on March 14, 

2006. On the second day of trial, the court addressed Petitioner’s Motion 

for Substitution of Counsel, filed by Petitioner two days earlier. This court, 

off the record, made inquiry into the Petitioner’s request; then denied the 

request on the record. On March 16, 2006, the jury found Petitioner guilty 

of Theft of Means of Transportation by Control, Possession of Burglary 

Tools, and Criminal Trespass, the lesser offense of Burglary in Third 

Degree [sic] (Count Two). On April 14, 2006, this Court granted 

Petitioner’s Motion for Rule 11 Mental Health Evaluation filed by 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Mr. Kingston. On April 17, 2006, this Court 

granted Mr. Kingston’s Motion to Withdraw, and appointed Howard Wine 

to represent Petitioner at the Priors Trial and for sentencing. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Sup. Ct., Pima County Ruling In Chambers Re: Rule 32 Pet. for 

Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) 8/10/2010 (Exh. “AA”) at 1. 

 In his Petition for Review (Doc. 24-3) to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner 

described what had occurred when the grand jury reconvened upon remand as follows: 

 The Grand Jury convened on the afternoon of March 13, 2006 at 

2:00 p.m. to make a new presentment of Mr. Artiaga’s case. The Grand 

Jury, at the request of Mr. Ariaga [sic], had previously invited him to be 

present on that date and time to testify at the new presentment. The County 

Attorney’s office was aware of Mr. Artiaga’s contemplated appearance and 

had, in fact, requested a hearing before Judge Lee to discuss security and 

logistics matters involved in his Grand Jury appearance as well as establish 

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the ground rules for inquiring about his prior convictions. (R.O.A. 45[.]) 

 Mr. Artiaga was advised shortly before his scheduled appearance 

before the Grand Jury that the jail had lost or misplaced hid [sic] civilian 

clothing. That clothing had been provided to officials at the Pima County 

Jail several days before the scheduled appearance. (R.O.A. 115, Affidavit 

of Vicci Broom). Counsel advised Mr. Artiaga that his appearance in jail 

clothing could be inflammatory and prejudicial. Counsel also explained the 

situation to Kristen Kelly, the Deputy County Attorney in charge of 

presenting the case to the grand jury. The presentment proceeded without 

the appearance of Mr. Artiaga and the grand jury was advised, “MS. 

KELLY: And if I may just briefly address everybody. Mr. Artiaga and his 

counsel have made the decision to withdraw the request to testify in front of 

the grand jury.” (R.O.A. 115, Grand Jury Transcript, p. 3, lines 15-18.) 

Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Doc. 24-3) at 4–5. 

On July 18, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of eleven and 

one quarter (11.25) years imprisonment for the theft of means of transportation and/or by 

controlling stolen property count and the presumptive term of three and three quarters 

(3.75) years imprisonment for the possession of burglary tools count to run concurrently. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Minute Entry 7/18/2006 (Exh. “K”) 

at 2–3. Petitioner was also sentenced to time served for the criminal trespass count. Id. 

at 3. 

A. Direct Appeal 

 On August 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a Rule 32 Request for Delayed Appeal 

pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, with the trial court. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Rule 32 Request for Delayed Appeal 8/2/2006 (Exh. “L”). On August 

3, 2006, the trial court granted Petitioner’s Rule 32 Request for Delayed Appeal. Answer 

(Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Order 8/3/2006 (Exh. “M”). On August 17, 

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2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Answer (Doc. 23), Not. of Appeal 8/17/2006 

(Exh. “N”). On May 18, 2007, Petitioner filed his Opening Brief. Answer (Doc. 23), 

Appellant’s Opening Br. 5/18/2007 (Exh. “O”). Petitioner presented the issues on appeal 

as follows: 

(1) Whether Artiaga’s rights to be present at his grand jury hearing were 

violated where the jail failed to give him civilian clothes and where the 

state implied Artiaga’s failure to testify was voluntary. Whether the trial 

court abused its discretion when it denied Artiaga’s request to continue the 

trial in order to review the grand jury transcripts for error. 

(2) Whether the trial court should have dismissed the state’s allegations of 

prior convictions under A.R.S. 13-604(P) for untimeliness. 

Id., Exh. “O” at 1. 

 Petitioner argued that his Fifth Amendment right to testify at his grand jury 

proceeding was violated when the state failed to provide him civilian clothing in which to 

testify, causing Petitioner to decline to appear before the grand jury. Id., Exh. “O” at 5. 

Petitioner further argued that this “constitutional violation was compounded where the 

prosecutor misrepresented the reasons for Artiaga’s failure to appear.” Id. Petitioner 

further argued that the March 13, 2006 indictment did not contain any allegations of 

prior-conviction, although these were contained in the original indictment. Id., Exh. “O” 

at 12. In light of this omission, Petitioner asserted that the state failed to file the priorconviction allegations at least twenty (20) days before trial in violation of Arizona law. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Appellant’s Opening Br. 5/18/2007 (Exh. “O”) at 12. Petitioner 

sought that his sentences that were enhanced by two prior convictions be vacated and the 

matter remanded accordingly. Id.

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 On November 1, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction and sentence.2

 Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. App. Memorandum Decision 

11/1/2007 (Exh. “P”). The court of appeals held that Petitioner’s “conviction after . . . 

trial rendered moot any issue involving the grand jury proceeding.” Answer (Doc. 23), 

Exh. “P” at 2 (citing State v. Just, 138 Ariz. 534, 541–42, 675 P.2d 1353, 1360–61 (Ct. 

App. 1983)). The court further held that “Artiaga d[id] not argue that the denial of the 

continuance affected the trial, but rather that a continuance would have revealed alleged 

errors in the grand jury proceeding . . . [and] is therefore not reviewable on appeal.” Id., 

Exh. “P” at 3. Finally, the court of appeals found that Artiaga argued before the trial 

court that “the state had not timely disclosed an item of evidence” in violation of A.R.S. § 

13-604(P), but on appeal “contends that the state’s allegation that he had historical prior 

convictions for sentence enhancement purposes was untimely under A.R.S. § 13-604(P).” 

Id., Exh. “P” at 3. As such, the court held that Artiaga “failed to preserve this issue 

below and ha[d] forfeited review of this issue absent fundamental error.” Id. The court 

further held that Artiaga did not meet his burden “in a fundamental error analysis.” 

Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. App. Memorandum Decision 11/1/2007 (Exh. “P”) at 4. 

 On January 24, 2008, Petitioner filed his pro se Petition for Review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court. Answer (Doc. 23), Petition for Review 1/24/2008 (Exh. “Q”). 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Petition. See Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. of 

Appeals Mandate 7/16/2008 (Exh. “R”). 

 2

 The Arizona Court of Appeals modified the sentencing minute entry, but affirmed the 

enhanced sentenced as modified. See Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. App. Memorandum Decision 

11/1/2007 (Exh. “P”). 

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B. Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On June 23, 2008, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

Answer (Doc. 23), Not. of PCR 9/23/2008 (Exh. “S”). On December 8, 2008, counsel for 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. See Answer (Doc. 23), Pet. for PCR 

12/8/2008 (Exh. “U”). Pursuant to Montgomery v. Sheldon (I),3

 counsel stated that there 

were no issues to appropriate for Rule 32 relief.4

 Id., Exh. “U” at 10. On February 13, 

2009, Petitioner filed a motion seeking that the December 8, 2008 Petition for PCR be 

stricken and new, advisory counsel be appointed. Answer (Doc. 23), Pet.’s Mot. to Strike 

2/13/2009 (Exh. “W”). The Rule 32 court granted Petitioner’s request and ordered that 

the December 8, 2008 PCR Petition be stricken. Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., 

Pima County, Order 2/17/2009 (Exh. “W”). 

 On July 21, 2009, new counsel for Petitioner filed a Petition for Post Conviction 

Relief. Answer (Doc. 23), Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Y”). Counsel averred that she could not 

 

3 Montgomery v. Sheldon (I), 181 Ariz. 256, 889 P.2d 614 (1995). 

4

 Counsel for Petitioner explained: 

 In Montgomery v. Sheldon (I), supra, the Arizona Supreme Court 

commented that a Defendant should have an opportunity to file a pro se petition if 

counsel does not feel that these are appropriate issues to be raised in a 

supplemental pleading; and, the Court clarified that in Montgomery v. Sheldon 

(II), 182 Ariz. 118, 893 P.2d 1281 (1995). In State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 910 

P.2d 1 (1996), the court reaffirmed and commented: 

If, after conscientiously searching the record for error, appointed 

counsel in a PCR proceeding finds no tenable issue and cannot 

proceed, the defendant is entitled to file a pro se PCR. 

 Accordingly, pursuant to the notice filed by the Defendant, it is requested 

that the Court allow the Defendant to file a pro se Rule 32 petition if he so 

desires. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “U” at 10–11. 

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“find any viable issues to present regarding Petitioner’s allegations of Error.” Id., Exh. 

“Y” at 4. Accordingly, she sought leave pursuant to Montgomery v. Sheldon (I), for 

Petitioner to file a pro se Rule 32 Petition. Id., Exh. “Y” at 5. On March 31, 2010, 

Petitioner filed his Pro Se Supplement to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. See 

Answer (Doc. 23), Petitioner’s Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”).5

 Petitioner 

asserted the following grounds for relief: 1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 2) the 

trial court erred in not giving Petitioner new counsel on the second day of trial; 3) 

ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel; and 4) ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. Id., Exh. “Z” at 4–25. 

 Petitioner alleged that trial counsel lied to him, disregarded specific instructions, 

“failed to investigate issues [that Petitioner] directed [counsel] to pursue regarding 

[Petitioner’s] serious mental health problems[,]” and failed “to discuss the discovery and 

investigation reports[.]” Id., Exh. “Z” at 4–8. Petitioner further alleged that trial counsel 

did not allow Petitioner to testify before the grand jury, and did not appeal or file a 

special action upon the trial court’s denial of a continuance. Id., Exh. “Z” at 8–10. 

Petitioner alleged that trial counsel “failed to thoroughly explain the plea agreement and 

no hearing was held[.]” Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “Y” at 3. Petitioner also argued that his 

relationship with trial counsel “was completely fractured with irreconcilable conflict.” 

Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “Z” at 10. Petitioner asserted that the trial court “violated the 

Arizona Supreme Court holding in State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505 (1998) as well as State 

 5

 Respondents’ Exhibits “Z” and higher appear in the Court’s docket at Docket Entry 

Nos. 24 and 25 as “Additional Attachments to Main Document.” For citation purposes, 

however, the Court refers to Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 23) with the appropriate exhibit listed. 

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v. Torre, 206 Ariz. 52, 75 P.3d 142 (App.2003)” by failing to “make a full factual 

determination” and by failing to appoint new counsel in light of his “completely fractured 

relationship” with trial counsel. Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “Z” at 13–14. 

 Petitioner alleged that sentencing counsel’s “failure to file a written motion to 

exclude the admission of the State’s Exhibits 6, 7, and 9 used at the prior convictions trial 

as evidence of Joe’s prior felony convictions clearly f[ell] below a standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 18 (citations 

omitted). Petitioner further alleged that if the Rule 32 court found sentencing counsel’s 

performance acceptable, it must find that the trial court “abused its discretion in denying 

the objection stated by [sentencing counsel] to exclude the admission of State’s Exhibits 

6, 7, and 8 at the Prior Convictions Trial[.]” Id., Exh. “Z” at 18. Petitioner also alleges 

that sentencing counsel was ineffective because he “waived the psych evaluation.” Id., 

Exh. “Z” at 21. 

 Petitioner alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing “to obtain the 

necessary court records, investigate, present, and preserve meritorious claims on Joe’s 

direct appeal.” Id., Exh. “Z” at 22. Petitioner alleges that he told appellate counsel about 

the trial court’s alleged failure to make a factual record regarding his motion for new 

counsel that was heard during trial and “demanded she preserve the issue on direct 

appeal.” Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “Z” at 24. Petitioner further asserts that appellate 

counsel’s alleged failure to preserve the claim constituted ineffective assistance. Id. 

Petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance for appellate counsel’s alleged failure to file 

a reply brief and “correct the record” regarding the issue of untimeliness of the State’s 

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allegations of prior convictions. Id., Exh. “Z” at 24–25. 

 On July 28, 2011, the Rule 32 court held an evidentiary hearing. See Answer 

(Doc. 15), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Minute Entry 7/28/2011 (Exh. “W”) & Hr’g 

Tr. 7/28/2011 (Doc. 15-12). 

 On August 10, 2010, the trial court granted “an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s 

claims for 1) Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel/Richard Kingston: Failure to 

investigate and present a mental health defense; and 2) Ineffective Assistance of Priors 

and Sentencing Counsel/Howard Wine: Failure to follow through and submit Petitioner’s 

Rule 11 Mental Health Evaluation to mitigate his sentence[,]” and denied the remainder 

of Petitioner’s PCR petition. See Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, 

Ruling—In Chambers Re: Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 8/10/2010 (Exh. 

“AA”) at 8–9. The trial court recognized that “[t]o establish a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel warranting relief, a defendant must show that counsel’s 

representation fell below objective standards of reasonableness and that counsel’s 

deficient performance was prejudicial.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3 (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 

222 (1985)). 

 With regard to trial counsel’s alleged failures regarding the grand jury proceeding 

were precluded because the issue had been “previously presented and denied in 

Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence and on direct appeal.” Answer 

(Doc. 23), Exh. “AA” at 3. The Rule 32 court further held that even “[a]ssuming, 

arguendo, Mr. Kingston’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

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reasonableness when he failed to file [a] special action before Petitioner’s trial, there was 

no prejudice as the trial court essentially found no violations at the grand jury 

proceeding.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 4. The Rule 32 court also held that because Petitioner 

was sentenced to a term encompassed in the plea agreement, he could not establish 

prejudice. Id., Exh. “AA” at 4. As such, any ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

stemming from an alleged failure to explain the plea offer failed. Id. Similarly, the Rule 

32 court found that Petitioner’s failure to specify what discovery or investigative reports 

trial counsel allegedly failed to share or how Petitioner’s possession of those reports 

would have changed the outcome of this case resulted in Petitioner’s failure to show 

prejudice. Id. As a result, the Rule 32 court denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel in this regard. 

 Regarding sentencing counsel, the Rule 32 court found that the State’s “allegation 

of two prior felony convictions was attached to both, the original indictment and the 

second indictment.” Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “AA” at 6. The Rule 32 court went on to 

determine that “[a]ccordingly, there was no basis for Petitioner’s objection under A.R.S. 

§ 13-604(P)[;] [h]owever, Mr. Wine could have objected orally in court (and has done so) 

to the State’s Exhibits 7 and 8 on the ground of untimely disclosure of an item of 

evidence.” Id. Finding that the State’s untimely disclosure did not prejudice Petitioner, 

the Rule 32 court held that sentencing counsel was not ineffective. The Rule 32 court 

also found Petitioner’s Moody claim was without merit, and as such “there was no claim 

for Mr. Wine to preserve.” Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim 

was denied as to this issue. 

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 With regard to appellate counsel, the Rule 32 court held that in light of its findings 

regarding Petitioner’s Moody claim lacking merit, the “decision not to raise this claim on 

appeal was not unreasonable.” Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “AA” at 8. The Rule 32 court 

further found that “Ms. Heveri’s decision not to file a Reply to the State does not 

constitute ineffective assistance.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 8. As such, it denied Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. Id., Exh. “AA” at 8. 

 On June 10, 2011, after evidentiary hearings, the Rule 32 court denied Petitioner’s 

remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., 

Pima County, Under Advisement Ruling—Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

6/10/2011 (Exh. “CC”). Regarding trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and 

present a mental health defense, the Rule 32 court held that “Petitioner failed to meet 

both prongs of the Strickland test in proving this claim.” Id., Exh. “CC” at 3. In light of 

trial counsel’s testimony that “he thought Petitioner was competent and that Petitioner 

never told him that at the time of the offense, he was having difficulty appreciating the 

nature of his acts[,] . . . [the] Court f[ound] that it was reasonable for Mr. Kingston not to 

investigate and present a mental health defense.” Id., Exh. “CC” at 3. With regard to 

sentencing counsel’s alleged failure “to follow through and submit for sentencing 

Petitioner’s Rule 11 mental health evaluation[,]” the Rule 32 court found that: 

Mr. Wine testified that he thought Petitioner was fully competent. In 

addition, Mr. Wine understood that the Court’s plan was to impose the 

lowest sentence possible. Since the results of the mental health evaluation 

would have been used as mitigation evidence, such evidence was not 

necessary given Mr. Wine’s understanding of the Court’s intention. 

Moreover, even if Mr. Wine did not think that the Court planned to impose 

the lowest sentence possible, Mr. Wine testified that he was not sure the 

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would have followed through on the Rule 11 because he was concerned that 

the mental health evaluation could develop aggravating circumstances that 

would be harmful to Petitioner. Given this testimony, the Court finds that it 

was reasonable for Mr. Wine not to follow through and submit for 

sentencing Petitioner’s Rule 11 mental health evaluation. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “CC” at 4. 

 On August 5, 2011, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 23), Pet. for Review 8/5/2011 (Exh. “DD”). Petitioner 

asserted two grounds for relief: 1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

Petitioner’s motion to continue trial in light of Petitioner’s inability to testify before the 

grand jury; and 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his alleged failure to seek 

special action review of the March 13, 2006 grand jury proceedings. Id., Exh. “DD” at 

8–18. On March 2, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 3/2/2012 (Exh. “EE”). The court of 

appeals denied Petitioner’s claim regarding the denial of his motion to continue trial, 

“[f]irst because Artiaga previously challenged on appeal the denial of the motion to 

continue, he is precluded from doing so now pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)[,] . . . [and] 

[s]econd, Artiaga did not raise this issue in his petition below.” Id., Exh. “EE” at 2–3 

(citations omitted). The court of appeals further stated that “[t]o the extent Artiaga 

challenges the trial court’s denial of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 

failing to seek special action relief from the grand jury proceedings held in March 2006, 

we deny relief on that claim as well.” Id., Exh. “EE” at 3. The appellate court 

determined that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice under Strickland. Id., Exh. “EE” 

at 3–4. 

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 On June 6, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Supreme Ct. ME 6/6/2012 (Exh. “FF”); see also Answer (Doc. 

23), Ariz. Ct. App. Mandate 10/15/2012 (Exh. “GG”). 

C. The Instant Habeas Proceeding 

 On April 22, 2013, Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). Petitioner 

claims four (4) grounds for relief. First, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel for counsel’s alleged “failure to explore a mental health defense at the request of 

the defendant[;] . . . [inability] to substantiate that [Petitioner] was in reality being reindicted in December of 2005 over a State dismissal of charges[;] . . . [failure to] allow[] 

the defendant to appear in front of the grand jury[;] . . . [failure to] fil[e] a special action . 

. . to challenge the Grand Jury Proceedings[;] [failure to] accep[t] my request of 

substantial proceeal [sic] reishs [sic] and for not pursuing the issue of the so-called jiggle 

key[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Second, Petitioner alleges Due Process violations in light 

of his street clothing being “lost” prior to his appearance before the Grand Jury. Id. at 7. 

Petitioner alleges that counsel advised him that appearance before the Grand Jury in his 

jail uniform would be prejudicial, and the Prosecutor informed the Grand Jury that 

Petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance, resulting in a Due Process violation. 

Id. Third, Petitioner claims that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

because trial was scheduled to begin the day following his re-indictment, and although he 

filed a motion to continue trial, it was denied. Id. at 8. Fourth, Petitioner asserts that 

prosecutorial misconduct occurred in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 

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when the Deputy County Attorney failed to inform the Grand Jury the reason Petitioner 

decided not to appear before it. Id. at 9. On March 24, 2014, Respondents filed their 

Answer (Doc. 23). Petitioner did not file a reply. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. In General

 The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus 

by a person in state custody: 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 

179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal 

habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of 

comity, finality, and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 

2842, 2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 

123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet 

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and highly deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 

L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must 

“presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this 

presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court’s 

determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 

1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is 

unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles 

delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“AEDPA requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . 

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beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786–87) (alterations in original). 

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the 

exhaustion doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged 

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 

1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he 

exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the 

enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 

455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 (internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine 

of comity which “teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its 

jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 

cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting 

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)). 

 Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 

procedure the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has 

been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard 

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v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The fair 

presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the 

presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting 

the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because 

petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to 

“fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the 

exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct 

appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial postconviction process 

available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 

1998)). 

 In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the 

Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 

2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the 

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Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts 

have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for 

the same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 

350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). 

C. Procedural Default 

 “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ 

to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 

650 (1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided 

by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent 

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 

S.Ct. at 2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id.

(citations omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion 

and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been 

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that 

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In 

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim 

applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, 

but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that 

the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See 

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 

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303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if 

the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”) 

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner’s habeas 

petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. 

First, where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief 

based on independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2254. Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no 

power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, 

resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the 

judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the 

federal court “must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently 

available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.6 (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). 

 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

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barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see 

also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) 

(recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same 

standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he 

existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner 

can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to 

comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner 

must show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . 

created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 

477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Without a showing of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the 

procedural default and gain review by the federal courts. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2649. 

 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice 

standard will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary 

to correct ‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 

S.Ct. 1558, 1572–73, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

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exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with 

a colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 

S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. 

Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered 

on the merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862. Further, in order to 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). 

 In Arizona, a petitioner’s claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has 

waived his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). “If an asserted claim is of 

sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently’ waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor 

the Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” 

requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 

446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this 

assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are 

better suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622. 

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III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

 As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s petition is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to 

applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the 

latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Artiaga’s petition. The Court has 

independently reviewed the record and finds that the Petition (Doc. 1) is timely pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

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IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 1. Legal Standards

 For cases which have been fairly presented to the State court, the Supreme Court 

elucidated a two part test for determining whether a defendant could prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to overturn his conviction. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, Petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. “This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, Petitioner 

must show that this performance prejudiced his defense. Id. Prejudice “requires showing 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose 

result is reliable.” Id. Ultimately, whether or not counsel’s performance was effective 

hinges on its reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; see also State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 771 P.2d 1382 (1989) 

(adopting Strickland two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). The Sixth 

Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance is not meant to “improve the quality of 

legal representation,” rather it is to ensure the fairness of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. “Thus, ‘[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 

must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) 

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(quoting Strickland, 466 at 686) (emphasis and alteration in original). 

 “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ . 

. . and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citations omitted). 

Judging counsel’s performance must be made without the influence of hindsight. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. As such, “the defendant must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 

considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 

S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). Without the requisite showing of either “deficient 

performance” or “sufficient prejudice,” Petitioner cannot prevail on his ineffectiveness 

claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. “[T]he question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 

F.3d 884, 899 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S.Ct. at 788) 

(alterations in original). “The challenger’s burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Accordingly, “[w]e apply the doubly deferential 

standard to review the state court’s ‘last reasoned decision.’” Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 

960, 966 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of 

any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in 

2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington, 131 U.S. at 98, 131 S.Ct. at 784. As such, Petitioner 

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also bears the burden of showing that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his 

case in an objectively unreasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99, 122 

S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Additionally, “[a]s a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of 

counsel’s ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson 

v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 

1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an 

ineffective assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner 

to exhaust his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

This is “[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly 

fact-dependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As 

such, “a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below 

can[not] later add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id.

(citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 

788 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on one set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on 

different facts”). 

2. Failure to Explore Mental Health Defense 

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to explore a 

mental health defense at the request of the defendant.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. 

Respondents assert that Petitioner failed to exhaust this claim, because he did not present 

it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Answer (Doc. 23) at 10. The Court agrees with 

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Respondent. 

 Petitioner raised this claim in his pro se PCR Petition. Answer (Doc. 23), Pet.’s 

Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”) at 4–8. The Rule 32 court held an evidentiary 

hearing regarding trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and present a mental health 

defense. See Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Ruling—In Chambers 

Re: Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 8/10/2010 (Exh. “AA”) at 8–9; Answer 

(Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR-2005-4798, Hr’g Tr. 4/27/2011 

(Exh. “II”); Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR-2005-

4798-001, Hr’g Tr. 5/23/2011 (Exh. “JJ”); Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima 

County, Case No. CR-2005-4798, Hr’g Tr. 6/6/2011 (Exh. “KK”). On June 10, 2011, 

after the evidentiary hearings, the Rule 32 court denied this portion of Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

 Petitioner did not re-urge this issue in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 23), Pet. for Review 8/5/2011 (Exh. “DD”). As such, the 

claim is unexhausted and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 

32.2(a)(3), 32.4; see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 

L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in 

each appropriate state court”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 

640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas 

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petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited 

from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a 

result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 

(1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal 

habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not 

met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not 

merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause 

“for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to 

address the merits of his claims.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel based on an alleged failure to explore a mental health defense 

cannot stand. 

3. Re-indictment 

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for “not being able to 

substantiate that [Petitioner] was in reality being re-indicted in December of 2005 over a 

State dismissal of charges[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Respondents assert that Petitioner 

failed to exhaust this claim, because he did not present it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Answer (Doc. 23) at 10. The Court agrees that this claim is unexhausted. 

 Petitioner did not raise this claim in either his direct appeal or PCR petitions. See

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Answer (Doc. 23), Appellant’s Opening Br. 5/18/2007 (Exh. “O”); Answer (Doc. 23), 

Pet.’s Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”). As such, the claim is unexhausted and 

would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a)(3), 32.4; see also 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state 

court”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) 

(“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless 

the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either 

cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 

(9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his 

claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

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claims.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on an 

alleged failure “to substantiate that [Petitioner] was in reality being re-indicted in 

December of 2005 over a State dismissal of charges” cannot stand. See Petition (Doc. 1) 

at 6. 

4. Appearance Before the Grand Jury 

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for “not allowing defendant 

to appear in front of the grand jury at the Grand Jury [sic] request and also at 

[Petitioner’s] request.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Respondent asserts that Petitioner failed to 

exhaust this claim, because he did not present it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Answer (Doc. 23) at 10. The Court finds this claim exhausted. 

 Petitioner initially raised this claim in his direct appeal. Answer (Doc. 23), 

Appellant’s Opening Br. 5/18/2007 (Exh. “O”) at 1–11. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

held that Petitioner’s “conviction after . . . trial rendered moot any issue involving the 

grand jury proceeding.” Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “P” at 2 (citing State v. Just, 138 Ariz. 

534, 541–42, 675 P.2d 1353, 1360–61 (Ct. App. 1983)). The court further held that 

“Artiaga d[id] not argue that the denial of the continuance affected the trial, but rather 

that a continuance would have revealed alleged errors in the grand jury proceeding . . . 

[and] is therefore not reviewable on appeal.” Id., Exh. “P” at 3. Petitioner sought review 

of this decision with the Arizona Supreme Court. See Answer (Doc. 23), Petition for 

Review 1/24/2008 (Exh. “Q”). The Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition. See

Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals Mandate 7/16/2008 (Exh. “R”). 

 Petitioner again raised this issue in his PCR Petition. Answer (Doc. 23), Pet.’s 

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Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”) at 8–10. The Rule 32 court found the issue 

precluded, because it had been “previously presented and denied in Petitioner’s Motion to 

Vacate Judgment and Sentence and on direct appeal.” Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior 

Ct., Pima County, Ruling—In Chambers Re: Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

8/10/2010 (Exh. “AA”) at 3. The Rule 32 court further recognized that “the trial court 

found that there was no legal basis in Petitioner’s motion, while the Court of Appeals 

found that the issue was moot unless raised prior to trial.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. 

 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, in the context of a Rule 

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 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, violation, that although an error: 

had the theoretical potential to affect the grand jury’s determination 

whether to indict [a] particular defendant[] for the offenses with which [he] 

w[as] charged. . . . [T]he petit jury’s subsequent guilty verdict means not 

only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant[] w[as] 

guilty as charged, but also that [he] [is] in fact guilty as charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury’s verdict, then, any error in 

the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S.Ct. 938, 941–42, 90 L.Ed.2d 50 

(1986). In the habeas context, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly held that 

“any constitutional error in the grand jury proceedings is harmless because [defendant] 

was ultimately convicted of the offenses charged.” Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70, 106 S.Ct. at 941–42) (defendant 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of false evidence to the grand jury). 

As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, the “reversal of a conviction 

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the Grand Jury is in session and during deliberations and voting. 

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after a trial free from reversible error cannot restore to the defendant whatever benefit 

might have accrued to him from a trial on an indictment returned [free from error.]” 

Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 71, 106 S.Ct. at 942. 

 Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Arizona courts did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. “It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess 

counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence[;] . . . [however,] [b]ecause of 

the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance[.]” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Even assuming that trial counsel’s actions were unreasonable, 

Petitioner is unable to demonstrate prejudice as a result of any constitutional error before 

the grand jury, because any such error was rendered harmless when he was found guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70, 106 S.Ct. at 941–42; 

Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d at 1042. Accordingly, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim regarding an alleged failure to allow Petitioner to testify before the Grand 

Jury is without merit. 

5. Special Action After Grand Jury 

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for “not filing a special 

action request on the defendant [sic] behalf to challenge the Grand Jury proceedings.” 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Respondents assert that Petitioner exhausted this claim. Answer 

(Doc. 23) at 10. The Court finds this claim exhausted. 

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 Petitioner initially raised this issue in his PCR Petition. Answer (Doc. 23), Pet.’s 

Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”) at 8–10. The Rule 32 court held that 

“Petitioner’s claim on this ground fails since he has not established either prong of the 

Strickland test.” Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Ruling—In 

Chambers Re: Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 8/10/2010 (Exh. “AA”) at 3. 

The Rule 32 court further recognized that even “[a]ssuming, arguendo, Mr. Kingston’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when he failed to file [a] 

special action before Petitioner’s trial, there was no prejudice as the trial court essentially 

found no violations at the grand jury proceeding.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. 

 Petitioner again raised this issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Answer (Doc. 

23), Petition for Review 8/5/2011 (Exh. “DD”) at 16–18. The court of appeals stated that 

“[t]o the extent Artiaga challenges the trial court’s denial of his claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel for failing to seek special action relief from the grand jury 

proceedings held in March 2006, we deny relief on that claim as well.” Answer (Doc. 

23), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals, Mem. Decision 3/2/2012 (Exh. “EE”) at 3. After properly 

stating the Strickland test, the court of appeals held that the Rule 32 court “correctly 

found that, even if trial counsel’s performance had been substandard, ‘there was no 

prejudice as the trial court essentially found no violations at the grand jury proceeding.’” 

Id., Exh. “EE” at 3. 

 As discussed in Section IV.A.4., supra, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate 

prejudice as a result of any constitutional error before the grand jury, because any such 

error was rendered harmless when he was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 

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See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70, 106 S.Ct. at 941–42; Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d at 

1042. As such, the Court finds that the Arizona courts did not unreasonably apply clearly 

established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in light of the evidence 

presented. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding an alleged 

failure to file a special action following the Grand Jury proceeding is without merit. 

6. Substantial Procedural Rights 

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for “not accepting my 

request of substantial [procedural rights.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Respondents do not 

address this claim. See Answer (Doc. 23). The Court finds this claim to be unexhausted. 

 Petitioner did not raise this claim in either his direct appeal or PCR petitions. 7 See

Answer (Doc. 23), Appellant’s Opening Br. 5/18/2007 (Exh. “O”); Answer (Doc. 23), 

Pet.’s Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”). As such, the claim is unexhausted and 

would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a)(3), 32.4; see also 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state 

court”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) 

(“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

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acknowledging this claim. It is certain, however, that nothing resembling this claim arose in 

either Petitioner’s direct appeal or PCR petition. 

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procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless 

the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either 

cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 

(9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his 

claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

claims.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on an 

alleged failure to accept Petitioner’s request of substantial procedural rights is without 

merit. 

7. Jiggle Key 

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for “not pursuing the issue 

of the so-called jiggle key[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Respondents assert that Petitioner 

failed to exhaust this claim. Answer (Doc. 23) at 10. The Court agrees that this claim is 

unexhausted. 

 Petitioner did not raise this claim in either his direct appeal or PCR petitions. See

Answer (Doc. 23), Appellant’s Opening Br. 5/18/2007 (Exh. “O”); Answer (Doc. 23), 

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Pet.’s Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”). Petitioner referenced an issue regarding 

testimony about the key before the Grand Jury in his Rule 32 petition for review to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, and attached exhibits regarding the key thereto. Answer (Doc. 

23), Petition for Review 8/5/2011 (Exh. “DD”) at 17–18 & Appendix. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals noted “that Artiaga has attached exhibits that apparently were not 

presented to the court below, to support a theory he likewise did not present to the court 

below.” Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals, Mem. Decision 3/2/2012 (Exh. “EE”) at 

3–4. Accordingly, the court of appeals “decline[d] to consider them.” Id., Exh. “EE” at 4 

(citing State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ct. App. 1980)). 

 The Court finds that this claim is unexhausted and would now be precluded. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a)(3), 32.4; see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 

S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the 

prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is 

procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a 

habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

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Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds 

Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on an alleged failure to 

“pursue the issue of the so-called jiggle key” cannot stand. See Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. 

B. Ground Two: Due Process Violation Regarding Grand Jury 

Petitioner asserts that just prior to his appearance before the Grand Jury, his street 

clothes were lost. Petition (Doc. 1) at 7. Petitioner further stated that “Defense Counsel 

alerted the Prosecutor of this delema [sic] but instead of informing the Grand Jury all of 

what had happen [sic]. The Prosecutor took it upon herself to inform the Grand Jury that 

the Defendant had voluntarily withdrew [sic] to appear and give testimony[.]” Id. As an 

initial matter, Respondents assert that Petitioner has failed to assert a cognizable federal 

claim reviewable on habeas. Answer (Doc. 23) at 11. Respondents additionally argue 

that any alleged error is harmless. Id.

Petitioner raised this issue on direct review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Answer (Doc. 23), Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “O”) 4–11. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals held that Artiaga “d[id] not argue that any error in the grand jury proceeding 

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affected the subsequent trial[,] [and] [t]herefore, his conviction after that trial rendered 

moot any issue involving the grand jury proceeding.” Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. of 

Appeals, Mem. Decision 11/1/2007 (Exh. “P”) at 2 (citing State v. Just, 138 Ariz. 534, 

541–42, 675 P.2d 1353, 1360–61 (Ct. App. 1983)). Upon review of additional state court 

precedent, the appellate court further recognized that “an indictment may be challenged 

only through interlocutory proceedings.” Id., Exh. “P” at 3 (citing Maretick v. Jarrett, 

204 Ariz. 194, 62 P.3d 120 (2003)). 

The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “indictment by a 

grand jury is not part of the due process of law guaranteed to state criminal defendants by 

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n. 25, 92 S.Ct. 

2646, 2660 n. 25, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 

S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884)). Moreover, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief 

based on independent and adequate state law grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 728, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554, 115 L.Ed.2d 650 (1991). The appellate court 

denied Petitioner’s claim as moot. Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “P” at 2. This state 

procedural bar to review now prohibits this Court from review because the “state law 

determination [] is sufficient to support the judgment, [and] resolution of any independent 

federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be 

advisory.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 2254. 

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

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103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). 

C. Ground Three: Due Process Violation Regarding Denial of Continuance

 Petitioner asserts that his trial began twenty-four (24) hours after the second 

indictment issued. Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As such, Petitioner argues that he had 

insufficient time to review the findings of the Grand Jury and that his counsel did not 

have sufficient time to prepare for trial. Id. Petitioner further argues that the original trial 

judge had another trial starting on the same day, so Petitioner’s trial was reassigned to 

another judge who should have been given additional time to review the case. Id. 

Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner raised this claim in state court; however, they 

assert that it is unreviewable in habeas. Answer (Doc. 23) at 11–12. 

In his brief for direct review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner asserted 

that “the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant counsel’s request to continue 

the trial so that he could review the grand jury transcripts and file another motion for 

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remand.” Answer (Doc. 23), Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “O”) 8–9. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals held that Artiaga “d[id] not argue that the denial of the continuance 

affected the trial, but rather that a continuance would have revealed alleged errors in the 

grand jury proceeding.” Answer (Doc. 23), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals, Mem. Decision 

11/1/2007 (Exh. “P”) at 3. The appellate court further recognized that “the issue[, 

therefore,] was ‘relevant only to the grand jury proceedings . . . [and] had no effect on the 

subsequent trial.” Id., Exh. “P” at 3 (citing State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 575, 627 P.2d 

721, 726 (Ct. App. 1981)) (second alteration in original). As such, the appellate court 

held that the issue was “not reviewable on appeal.” Id., Exh. “P” at 3 (citations omitted). 

Petitioner did not assert any part of this claim in his PCR petition. See Answer (Doc. 23), 

Pet.’s Pro Se Suppl. to Pet. for PCR (Exh. “Z”). 

 Prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a habeas petitioner must present all 

claims first to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 

71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner 

must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his petition. Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because 

petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). 

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 Here, Petitioner only relied on state law in presenting his claim regarding the 

denial of a continuance to the state court. See Answer (Doc. 23), Exh. “O” at 8–9. The 

fair presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to 

the presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or 

expecting the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. 

See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098. 

As such, it cannot be said that he fairly presented the claim to the state courts and 

therefore it is unexhausted. 

 Moreover, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief based on independent and 

adequate state law grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728, 111 S.Ct. 

2546, 2554, 115 L.Ed.2d 650 (1991). This state procedural bar to review now prohibits 

this Court from review because the “state law determination [] is sufficient to support the 

judgment, [and] resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not 

affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 

S.Ct. at 2254. 

 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

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“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). 

D. Ground Four: Prosecutorial Misconduct

 Petitioner asserts that “by failing to inform the Grand Jury of the Defendant [sic] 

willingness to apper [sic] before them[,] [t]he County Attorney has ineffected [sic] the 

control of the outcome of the Grand Jury Proceedings thierby [sic] overiding [sic] the 

Grand Jury role of being imparcial [sic] and also depriving the Defendant due process of 

law[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. Respondents assert that this is the first time Petitioner has 

raised this claim. Answer (Doc. 23) at 12. 

 A review of the record indicates that Petitioner did not raise this claim to the state 

court. As discussed in Section IV.C., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must present all claims first to the state court. Because Petitioner did 

not fairly present this claim to the state courts, it is unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a)(3), 32.4; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1, 

111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless 

the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

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claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either 

cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 

(9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his 

claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

claims.”). As such, Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct cannot stand. 

E. Conclusion

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas claims are 

without merit, and the Petition (Doc. 1) shall be denied. 

V. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1); 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District 

Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-13-

0281-TUC-RM. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court 

shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 29th day of July, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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