Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02012/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:881 Forfeiture Property-Drugs

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

2005 Toyota Sequoia,

VIN:5TDZT38AX5S239010, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-2012-PHX-JAT

ORDER

 Pending before this Court is the United States of America’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to

Strike Claim and Answer of Mukhtiar Singh. (Doc. 21) Mukhtiar Singh (“Claimant”) filed

a Claimant’s Opposition to Motion to Strike Claim and Answer. (Doc. 22) The Court now

rules on the Motion.

I. Facts

This case stems from an investigation that the Bakersfield, California division of the

Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) initiated against Parminder Toor (“Toor” or

“criminal defendant”) for drug trafficking. On May 4, 2009, a Confidential Source (“CS”)

alerted the DEA Phoenix Division Office that Toor had asked the CS to transport fifty

kilograms of cocaine from Phoenix, Arizona to Seattle, Washington. The CS’s compensation

for the trip would be $300 per kilogram of cocaine, for a total sum of $15,000.00. The DEA

ultimately located Toor in Bakersfield, California, from where Toor allegedly was directing

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the drug trafficking operation. 

On May 5, 2009, the CS picked up two duffle-type bags of cocaine at a designated

location in Phoenix. Per Toor’s instructions, the CS then drove from Phoenix to Sacramento,

California, to discuss further transport of the cocaine to its final destination in Seattle. Toor

drove to and from this meeting in a 2005 Toyota Sequoia (“defendant vehicle”). The day

following the Sacramento meeting, law enforcement officers arrested Toor at his residence.

Mukhtiar Singh, Claimant, who is also Toor’s father-in-law, and an unidentified relative were

present at the scene of the arrest. 

After locating the defendant vehicle in the garage of Toor’s residence, the arresting

officers inquired as to the ownership of the vehicle. Because Claimant did not speak English,

he enlisted the help of the unidentified relative to function as his translator. Claimant

answered that the vehicle was in his name; however, he also confirmed that Toor was the

primary and actual owner of the defendant vehicle. The law enforcement officers searched

the defendant vehicle and discovered some white crystal substance, which the lab tests later

identified as methamphetamine. Following the arrest, Toor was charged with and is currently

being prosecuted for Distribution and Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and Conspiracy to Distribute and

Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

II. Procedural History

On July 1, 2009, Claimant submitted a claim in the administrative forfeiture action

with the DEA claiming ownership of the vehicle. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Verified

Complaint in rem seeking to forfeit the defendant vehicle seized at the criminal defendant’s

residence. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §

881(a)(4) because the vehicle was used, or was intended for use, to transport, or in any

manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of controlled

substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. In response to Plaintiff’s Verified

Claim, Claimant timely filed a verified claim to the defendant vehicle as the owner of such

property. Thereafter, Claimant filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s claim.

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On January 15, 2010, Plaintiff mailed a set of Special Interrogatories to Claimant to

gather information concerning Claimant’s relationship to the vehicle. After initially failing

to respond, Claimant complied with a Court order and filed responses. In the interrogatory

responses, Claimant re-asserted his ownership claim to the vehicle. Claimant indicated the

following: (1) Claimant obtained a loan, in his own name, to finance the purchase of the

vehicle; (2) Claimant obtained an insurance policy, in his own name, to cover the vehicle;

(3) Claimant asserted his daily use of the vehicle; (4) Claimant explained that he made

several payments toward the insurance policy coverage and as repayment of the loan.

Claimant also admitted that the criminal defendant: (1) was included on the insurance policy;

(2) used the vehicle; and (3) together with his wife, Claimant’s daughter, paid off a large

portion of the loan, as well as; (4) made payments toward the insurance policy on Claimant’s

behalf. Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of Claimant’s responses or the documentation

provided as corresponding proof. Nor did Plaintiff assert a failure on Claimant’s part to fully

answer the questions posed to him in the interrogatories. 

On July 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Claim and Answer of Mukhtiar

Singh. Plaintiff challenges Claimant’s standing to contest the forfeiture action. Despite

ample case law on this issue, Plaintiff inexplicably diverged from the established Article III

standing analysis. 

Plaintiff alleges that Claimant lacks standing due to his failure to meet the definition

of ownership set out as a requirement for the “innocent owners” affirmative defense under

section 983(d) of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), 18 U.S.C. §

983. Plaintiff asserts that because Claimant is allegedly not an “owner” for purposes of an

affirmative defense, Claimant lacks sufficient interest in the vehicle to contest a forfeiture

action. However, Plaintiff failed to explain why such standard should be applied to determine

Article III standing. After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

asserted standard improper and thus inapplicable to the determination of Claimant’s standing.

See United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 820 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (claimant’s failure to

“establish on the merits a property interest entitling [claimant] to relief” does not result in a

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lack of standing to contest the forfeiture action); see also United States v. One Lincoln

Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2003) (held that even “bare legal title” was

sufficient to confer standing).

III. Legal Standard

Any person claiming an interest in the property subject to forfeiture action can contest

such action by filing a claim in the court where the action is pending. Supp. R. Certain Adm.

& Mar. Cl. G(5)(a)(I). In response, the government may move to strike the claim for lack

of standing. Id. at G(8)(c)(i)(B). The government may present the motion to strike as a

motion for summary judgment challenging “whether the claimant can carry the burden of

establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at G(8)(c)(ii)(B). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is mandated

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by “com[ing]

forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create

a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48. However,

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in the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.

2004). The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are

to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. But, if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may

be granted. Id. at 249-50. 

IV. Discussion

Claimant’s constitutional standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed prior to

considering the merits of the parties’ claims. United States v. Real Property Located at 5208

Lost Franciscos Way, Los Angeles, CA, 385 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004); United States

v. $148,840.00 in United States Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008). The

government should not have to meet its burden of proof if the claimant fails to demonstrate

that he or she has the requisite “facially colorable interest,” deprivation of which would harm

such claimant. United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 79

(2d Cir. 2002); see also Real Property Located at 5208, 385 F.3d at 1191. The burden of

proof to demonstrate sufficient interest varies depending on the stage of the case, and the

claimant must continue to support his or her standing throughout the various stages of the

case. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also United States

v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 2010 WL 2594304, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2010). 

At the pleading stage, a claimant’s burden of proof “is not a heavy one.” United

States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, Beverly Hills, CA, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140

(9th Cir. 2008). By merely asserting an ownership interest, a claimant can either bring a

motion to dismiss or defeat such motion. Id.; United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency,

16 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded on other grounds as stated in United States

v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). At the summary

judgment stage, a claimant has a heightened burden of proof. $133,420.00, 2010 WL

2594304, at *6 (“something more than a mere allegation is necessary to support standing at

the summary judgment and trial stages”). A court may grant the government’s motion for

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summary judgment if a claimant fails to establish standing by a preponderance of the

evidence. Supp. R. Certain Adm. & Mar. Cl. G(8)(c)(ii)(B). A claimant does not have to

“definitively prove the existence of that interest,” but must supplement his or her assertion

of the interest with corroborating evidence. $148,840.00, 521 F.3d at 1273. The type of

requisite evidence is tied to the type of interest that the claimant chooses to assert. Id. at

1274. 

In the case of ownership interest, a claimant must assert to be an owner of the

defendant property and provide “some evidence” to substantiate his or her claim. United

States v. U.S. Currency, $81,000.00, 189 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). This evidence may

consist of “showing actual possession, control, title, or financial stake.” Real Property

Located at 5208, 385 F.3d at 1191. To determine ownership interest, the Court must look

to “the law of the state in which the interest arose.” Id.; see Hooper, 229 F.3d at 820. 

 The government may challenge the assertion of ownership, the validity of the

corroborating evidence, or the existence of such evidence. In one case, the government

successfully challenged the claimant’s assertion of ownership where the claimant asserted

ownership and subsequently hid behind the 5th Amendment shield when asked to explain his

relationship to the defendant property. $133,420.00, 2010 WL 2594304; cf. $148,840.00,

521 F.3d at 1277 (under similar facts the court held that because the government did not

move to strike the claimant’s assertion of ownership such claim became part of the record).

When the court used its discretion to strike the claimant’s assertion of ownership, the

claimant was left with nothing more than a “[m]ere unexplained possession,” which is

insufficient to establish standing. $133,420.00, 2010 WL 2594304, at *7. 

In another case, the government contested the validity of the claimants’ title, asserting

that the fraudulent transfer of title to the claimants controverted the claimants’ evidence of

ownership. Real Property Located at 5208, 385 F.3d at 1191. Because the claimants failed

to respond to the government’s accusations, the court properly accepted the government’s

challenge to the validity of the claimants’ ownership interest, thereby defeating claimants’

standing to contest the forfeiture action. Id. at 1192. Accordingly, short of the government’s

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unopposed or valid challenge to a claimant’s assertion of ownership or corroborating

ownership evidence, or both, the claimant should be permitted to contest a forfeiture action.

In this case, Plaintiff has presented its motion to strike as a motion for summary

judgment; however, Plaintiff has not met that standard. Although the Court finds no material

issue of fact in dispute, Plaintiff has failed to prove that Claimant lacks Article III standing

to contest the forfeiture. Claimant has continuously asserted ownership of the vehicle. When

the law enforcement officers raided the criminal defendant’s residence, an officer inquired

as to whom the vehicle belonged. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 41.) Claimant, who was present at the time

of the raid, responded that “the vehicle was in his name.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 43.) Upon further

prompting, Claimant affirmatively answered the officer’s question of whether “the defendant

vehicle was actually Toor’s.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 44.) Claimant further admitted that criminal

defendant was “the primary driver and made most of the payments” on the defendant vehicle.

(Doc. 1 at ¶ 43.) These statements are consistent with the Claimant’s responses to Plaintiff’s

interrogatories. Claimant’s assertion that the vehicle “was in his name” together with

Plaintiff’s explicit concession that Claimant has “legal title” and is the “titled owner of the

vehicle” support Claimant’s standing as an owner of the vehicle. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 43; Doc. 21

at 10-11.) 

Both California and Arizona statutes equate legal title with ownership of a motor

vehicle. See A.R.S. 28-101(40)(a) (West 2010); Cal. Veh. Code § 460 (West 2010). The

fact of legal title is uncontested. The Court therefore accepts Claimant’s legal title to the

vehicle as an uncontroverted fact. Consequently, Claimant has ownership interest to

establish standing. The Court’s ruling on standing in no way reflects an opinion regarding

Claimant’s ability to prevail on an innocent owner defense. 

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

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IT IS ORDERED that the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Claim and

Answer of Mukhtiar Singh (Doc. 21).

DATED this 25th day of October, 2010.

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