Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01056/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01056-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO CHAIDEZ,

CDC #F-47646,

Civil No. 07-1056 IEG (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILING

TO STATE A CLAIM AND FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST IMMUNE DEFENDANTS

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b); AND

(2) DENYING MOTION TO STAY [Doc.

No. 5] AS MOOT

vs.

ROBERT HERNANDEZ, WARDEN, et al. 

Defendants.

On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff, Roberto Chaidez, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

On June 15, 2007, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte

dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief could

be granted. See June 15, 2007 Order at 7-8. In addition, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file

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a First Amended Complaint. However, before Plaintiff received this Order, he filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. No. 4]. After receiving the Court’s Order, Plaintiff filed

a “Motion to Stay” [Doc. No. 5] which the Court construes as a motion for extension of time to

correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s June 15th Order.

I. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

As the Court informed Plaintiff in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions

of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after

docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must

sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

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duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. Constitutional Claims

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

1. Rule 8

In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, he makes a vague and general allegation that

prison officials kidnaped him and placed him in administrative segregation while holding him

“hostage in a tiny ‘lil’ cage.” (FAC at 6.) Plaintiff alleges a variety of conspiracies and ways

he is being discriminated against but he rarely refers to any specific Defendant. Plaintiff must

set forth more detailed factual allegations regarding the claims against each individual

Defendant. Based on the failure to provide any specific factual allegations, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), which provides

that a complaint “shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the

court’s jurisdiction depends . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a). Rule 8 is designed to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against

them and the grounds on which those claims rest. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

2. Personal Liability & Causation

In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to identify with specificity what any

specific Defendant did to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. A person may be said to

deprive another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, [only] if he does

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an affirmative acts, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].”

Johnson v. Duff, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Causation is, of course, a required element

of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th. Cir. 1999).

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities

of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983

provides for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by

affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required

duties, cause the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights. Johnson, 588 F.2d

at 743.

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to state any constitutional claim against any of

the individual persons he lists in his First Amended Complaint, he must amend his pleading to

allege facts which explain what each of these individuals did, or failed to do, and why he

believes those acts or omissions amounted to a violation of the specific constitutional rights. Id.,

see also Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)(“In order for a person acting under

color of state law to be liable under § 1983, there must be a showing of personal participation

in the alleged rights deprivation.”).

3. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights

In addition, Plaintiff continues to claim that his due process rights were violated when

prison officials failed to properly process his administrative grievances. The Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

 “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant

prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v.

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Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Thus, to state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must

allege: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the

interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913

(9th Cir. 2000). To the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural adequacy of CDC inmate

grievance procedures, his First Amended Complaint fails to state a due process claim. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. This is because the Ninth Circuit has held that

prisoners have no protected property interest in an inmate grievance procedure arising directly

from the Due Process Clause. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding

that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of

entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”); accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.

1994) (1995); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that any named prison

official deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison

grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison

regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if

Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not

expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest how

the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances amounted to a

restraint on his freedom not contemplated by his original sentence or how they resulted in an

“atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are dismissed for

failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.

4. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff also continues to claim that he has been retaliated against for filing

administrative grievances in violation of his First Amendment rights. To the extent Plaintiff

claims Defendants have retaliated against him, he must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1)

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1

 “[A] retaliation claim may assert an injury no more tangible than a chilling effect on First

Amendment rights.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.2001) (emphasis original).

“Without alleging a chilling effect, a retaliation claim without allegation of other harm is not

actionable.” Id. Thus, while many plaintiffs alleging retaliation can show harm by pointing to the

“chilling effect” such acts may have had on the exercise of their First Amendment rights, “harms

entirely independent from a chilling effect can ground retaliation claims.” Rhodes, 380 F.3d at 1131.

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he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights, (2) the alleged retaliatory action

“does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and

discipline,” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), and (3) the

defendants’ actions harmed him.1

 See Rhodes v. Robinson, 380 F.3d 1183, 1131 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“Our cases, in short, are clear that any retribution visited upon a prisoner due to his decision to

engage in protected conduct is sufficient to ground a claim of unlawful First Amendment

retaliation--whether such detriment “chills” the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights

or not.”); see also Resnick, 213 F.3d at 449; Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants’ actions failed to “advance legitimate

penological goals,” Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815-16, that he was harmed as a result of exercising his

First Amendment rights, Rhodes, 380 F.3d at 1131, or has been otherwise ‘chilled’ in relation

to the exercise of his rights. Resnick, 213 F.3d at 449; Hines, 108 F.3d at 269. Therefore, the

Court must also sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims for failing to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). 

5. Eleventh Amendment

Finally, Plaintiff names the State of California and the California Department of

Corrections as Defendants. The State of California and the California Department of Corrections,

as an agency of the State of California, are not “persons” subject to suit and are instead, entitled

to absolute immunity from monetary damages actions under the Eleventh Amendment. See

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996); Pennhurst State School &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); see also Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387,

1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is not a “person” within

the meaning of § 1983). In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must identify a

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“person” who, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the

Constitution or a federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the State of California and the

California Department of Corrections are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).

III. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a

Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded

pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in

the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter

be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-

79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

2. Plaintiff’s “Motion to Stay” [Doc. No. 5] is liberally construed as a motion for

extension of time to file an Amended Complaint and is DENIED as moot;

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint

to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 29, 2007

HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

 Southern District of California

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