Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-08-11115/USCOURTS-ca5-08-11115-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-11115

KIM Y SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

XEROX CORP,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:06-CV-1213

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:*

In the published opinion, we explain the reasons for our judgment

affirming the trial court’s judgment except for vacating the award of punitive

damages. Here we explain the holding that the evidence was sufficient to

support Smith’s claim of retaliation.

To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that

(1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 24, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 08-11115

Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2003). 1

 413 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2005). 2

 F ED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). 3

 575 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 4

 530 U.S. 133, 150–51, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). Because this case was fully tried 5

to a jury, our focus is not on parsing evidence into a prima facie case and the constituent parts

of the ordinary burden shifting analysis, but rather on whether the evidence supports the

jury’s ultimate finding of retaliatory intent. See Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ.

Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 402 (5th Cir. 2000).

2

adverse employment action. We are concerned only with the third element in 1

this case. Xerox argues that the jury could not have found on the evidence

presented either that Smith’s EEOC complaint was a motivating factor for its

decision to terminate her, or that Xerox would not have terminated Smith even

absent an improper consideration of the EEOC charge. Xerox moved for

judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) at the conclusion of the evidence, but the

district court denied the motion.

We review the denial of a JMOL motion de novo. Bryant v. Compass

Group USA, Inc. A JMOL is warranted when “a party has been fully heard on 2

an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not

have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”3

We consider “all of the evidence from the record, draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party, and may not make credibility determinations

or weigh the evidence.” E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg’l Healthcare Sys. v. Lexington Ins.

Co. We must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury 4

is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.5

Xerox argues that we must limit our inquiry to evidence of events

occurring after Smith filed her EEOC charge in November 2005. We disagree.

Although events following the EEOC complaint may be the most relevant to the

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3

retaliation charge, Smith’s allegations cannot be parsed and considered in a

vacuum. Instead, all the evidence relevant to Smith’s employment and

interaction with Jankowski provides background and context for the later

termination decision and may be considered if the jury could have drawn from

it any inferences supporting its verdict. Viewed in this light, we think the

evidence in toto, even if not overwhelming, was sufficient to support the

retaliation claim.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Smith, the evidence showed that

Smith excelled in her position in 2003. During that year she achieved well over

100% of her plan numbers and was rewarded by Xerox with the President’s Club

award, which goes only to the top eight performing employees in the nation. In

2004, Smith’s performance declined, but she still achieved approximately 90%

of her plan, and Smith’s manager commended her for doing a good job. Then

after Jankowski took over and there were significant changes to Smith’s

territory and the number of agents that she supported, Smith struggled to make

her plan numbers, and she had a difficult relationship with Jankowski. The

evidence suggests that the relationship was strained from the start when Smith

missed a meeting Jankowski scheduled for a Sunday at the beginning of the year

prior to a national kickoff meeting in Virginia. Smith was unable to travel from

Texas to Virginia in time for the meeting, and Smith believed Jankowski

resented her for that.

Smith testified that Jankowski ignored her in conference calls, gave her

no feedback, counseling, or coaching, and failed to openly discuss her

performance expectations beyond the need to simply “make plan.” According to

Smith, this situation persisted before she was placed in the Performance

Improvement Process even though Xerox’s written policies called for an ongoing

dialogue between employees and managers. Smith insisted that she was never

asked for input about performance expectations and was simply told to “make

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4

plan.” Smith’s characterization of Jankowski’s management style was supported

by other evidence showing that Jankowski disliked his employees asking

questions. Other employees testified that Jankowski was results- and processoriented and could be a “hard ass.” One fellow employee, Cindy Fowler, testified

that Jankowski’s style was that he ran the show and he insisted that employees

do things his way, often dismissing the ideas of others. She testified that

Jankowski’s management style was especially “intense” when dealing with

women. She had heard it said of Jankowski that he did not work well with

female employees, and she admitted that she may have also made that

complaint.

One incident showing the relationship between Smith and Jankowski is

particularly telling of an animus by Jankowski. One of Jankowski’s concerns

about Smith’s performance was her handling of the so-called “Low Hanging

Fruit” procedure, which concerned the facilitation of sales to existing customers.

The warning letter that Jankowski issued to Smith specifically pointed out his

concern. Smith presented testimony from Steven Webster, a sales manager for

one of the Xerox agents, who said that Smith did what she was supposed to do

with respect to low hanging fruit. Bonnie Dooley, another Xerox agent that

Smith supported, testified that Smith’s level of support was “very good” and that

she put a lot of effort into the low hanging fruit procedure. But more important,

in response to Jankowski’s criticism about her handling of low hanging fruit,

Smith sent an e-mail to some of her co-workers asking for their help and

information on how they handled the procedure. After Jankowski found out

about Smith’s request, he sent an e-mail message to those employees but

apparently copied Smith by mistake. Jankowski then used a procedure to

electronically re-call the e-mail so that it could not be viewed by the recipients.

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 The full message was never produced during discovery, and Xerox reported during

6

this litigation that Jankowski’s laptop computer that was used to send the message had

apparently been lost. The jury was certainly entitled to consider this evidence when

evaluating the credibility of Xerox and its witnesses.

 For example, Xerox policies call for documentation of an employee’s unsatisfactory 7

performance before the first warning letter is issued and the employee is placed in the

disciplinary process. Smith’s personnel file contains no such documentation.

5

However, Smith was able to capture part of the message, which supports a

conclusion that Jankowski instructed the other employees not to assist Smith.6

Against this backdrop, we turn to the letters Jankowski issued Smith

placing her on a 90-day warning period and then on a 60-day probationary

period. Both letters informing Smith of these actions were detailed in their

descriptions of Smith’s deficiencies, including her failure to meet her plan

numbers. There was significant dispute at trial as to whether the letters

accurately stated any deficiencies other than Smith’s falling below her plan

numbers, or whether Jankowski provided the level of support and assistance he

promised to give to help Smith improve. What was not disputed, however, was

that Xerox’s policies generally state that counseling and coaching of employees

should occur prior to the issuance of formal warning letters, yet Xerox offered no

documentation supporting Jankowski’s claim that he did counsel Smith before

placing her on probation. Joe Villa agreed that Xerox policies for the

disciplinary process contemplate a great deal of additional documentation prior

to issuance of a letter placing an employee in the Performance Improvement

Process, but that such additional documentation was absent in Smith’s case.7

Smith filed her EEOC complaint alleging discrimination on November 17,

2005. She immediately notified Jankowski about the complaint that same day.

Smith’s personnel file, which was produced and paginated by Xerox as part of

this litigation, shows a fax cover sheet dated November 29, 2005, immediately

preceding the written request for Smith’s termination. Smith argues that this

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 The documents bear bates stamp numbers 949 and 953. Both bear the November 29, 8

2005 date, and both have a box checked “Scan for retention.” The check marks on the two

documents are not the same. Further, in the comments section of both there is a handwritten

message reading, “PIP EE = 80611Y.” However, the word “PIP” is different. In Bates number

949, the word is written as “PiP” with a lower case “i,” while in Bates number 953 the word

appears as “PIP,” with an upper case “I.” 

 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (stating that “it is the function of the jury 9

as the traditional finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh competing evidence and

inferences”), overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331

(5th Cir. 1997); see also Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding

that memorandum notifying employee of demotion and containing contradictory dates as to

6

document shows Xerox began the termination process only days after the EEOC

charge. Xerox argues that there are two identical copies of the November 29,

2005 fax cover sheet in Smith’s file. It contends that the copy preceding the

termination request was simply an additional copy that was placed out of order

in the file. It also contends that the termination request shows that it was made

in January 2006 after Smith’s probation ended.

The exact nature of the fax transmittal form is unclear because of several

inconsistencies on the face of the document and in the record. Xerox is correct

that the first page of the termination form is stamped as received on January 4,

2006. The form is dated as signed by Villa on that date and by Jankowski on

January 3, 2006. The bottom of the last page of the form contains fax

transmittal information showing a fax date of January 4, 2006. This transmittal

information is missing from the bottom of the first page of the form, however,

leaving one to wonder how or when the first page was transmitted. Xerox is

incorrect that the two fax cover sheets that are dated on November 29, 2005, are

identical, as a close inspection reveals otherwise. We are unable to conclude 8

whether the November 29, 2005 fax cover sheet transmitted the termination

request. We are able to say, however, that the two cover sheets were written at

different times with the same date, and the exhibit confusion is left for the jury

to resolve. See Boeing Co. v. Shipman.9

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whether it was sent within probationary period or outside probationary period contributed to

fact issue as to whether employee suffered an adverse employment action, and therefore

summary judgment was improper).

 Part of the mileage was for Smith’s travel to a customer and part was for travel to 10

a company sponsored conference. Charlene Fischer, the Regional Sales Manager for the

Central Region, testified that travel to a customer’s location could be reimburseable.

7

Within a matter of only weeks from Smith’s EEOC charge, Jankowski

issued a letter of concern to Smith for allegedly making false claims on two

expense reports. Smith claimed reimbursement for a car wash of a company

vehicle, even though the receipt turned out to be for her personal vehicle, and

she claimed reimbursement for mileage driven for company purposes even

though she had also taken a vacation day for that date. The evidence, again

viewed in the light most favorable to Smith, was that this letter could support

a charge of expense account fraud, a serious accusation that could be reported

to corporate security. As it turned out, Smith had a reasonable explanation for

the claimed expenses. The car wash was apparently a simple mistake, and the

mileage request was arguably compensable. However, rather than seek 10

Smith’s explanation for the expenses, Jankowski issued the letter of concern

chastising Smith for her actions.

Most damaging to Xerox with respect to this letter was the testimony of

Joe Villa, the human resources manager. Villa testified that before Jankowski

issued such a letter of concern he should have spoken to Smith to obtain her

explanation and he should have sought the participation of the human resources

department. Villa agreed on direct examination that Jankowski did not do so.

Smith also presented Villa’s deposition testimony about the letter of concern, in

which he agreed that if Jankwoski issued the letter without speaking to Smith

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 Villa testified on cross-examination by Xerox’s counsel that he made a mistake in his 11

deposition insofar as he now recalled—at trial—that Jankwoski did discuss the letter of

concern with him before sending it to Smith. He also testified that he now remembered—at

trial—that Jankowski said he had already discussed the matter with Smith. The jury

obviously was not required to believe such self-serving testimony.

See Bryant, 413 F.3d at 476. 12

Id.

13

 548 U.S. 53, 69, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415–16 (2006) (describing totality of circumstances 14

test for determining whether actions are retaliatory in a Title VII case, and noting that

“[c]ontext matters”).

8

it would look like Jankowski was lashing out or retaliating against Smith. 

Villa’s testimony was tantamount to an admission of retaliation. 

11

Xerox argues that the letter of concern is irrelevant because Smith did not

claim in her EEOC complaint that it was an adverse employment action. It also

contends that the letter is similar to a memorandum that we found insufficient

to show pretext in Bryant. We disagree. In Bryant a memorandum merely 12

memorialized past transgressions by the employee, and we concluded that there

simply was no evidence linking the memorandum or the past transgressions

with the employee’s termination. Here, the letter of concern, sent without prior 13

discussion with Smith, involved new allegations of wrongdoing, one of which

Smith conceded to be a simple mistake over receipts (the carwash) and the other

of which was arguably not error by Smith (the miles). In light of Villa’s

testimony, the jury was not required to accept that this letter was just a simple

memorialization of inaccuracies in an expense report. Following so closely on

the heels of Smith’s EEOC complaint, the letter was certainly probative of

Jankwoski’s attitude toward Smith and provided further context for Jankowski’s

decision to seek Smith’s termination. Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White.

14

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 532 U.S. 268, 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001). 15

Id. at 272, 121 S. Ct. at 1511.

16

 33 F.3d 498, 508 (5th Cir. 1994). 17

Id.

18

9

Relying on Clark County School District v. Breeden, Xerox argues that 15

we can draw no inference of causation between Smith’s EEOC complaint and her

subsequent termination because Smith had been placed on probation months

before the termination and it was not required to cancel or freeze disciplinary

proceedings. In Clark County, the plaintiff was transferred to a new position

only one month after filing a lawsuit, and her retaliation claim relied solely on

this temporal proximity. The evidence showed, however, that plaintiff’s transfer

was contemplated by the manager before he knew about the suit. The Supreme

Court held that employers “need not suspend previously planned transfers upon

discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines

previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence

whatever of causality.” Under Clark County, Xerox is correct that it need not 16

have ceased its disciplinary procedures upon learning of Smith’s EEOC

complaint. But Smith’s placement in the disciplinary process prior to her EEOC

complaint, while certainly relevant, is not the only consideration. If it were, we

could easily conclude from this circumstance alone that Smith’s retaliation claim

fails. However, the existence of a causal link between protected activity and an

adverse employment action is a “highly fact specific” and difficult question.

Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp. We have previously said that indicia of 17

causation may be seen in factors such as: (1) the employee’s past disciplinary

record, (2) whether the employer followed its typical policy and procedures in

terminating the employee, and (3) the temporal proximity between the

employee’s conduct and termination. Smith, unlike the plaintiff in Clark 18

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 970 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff who was fired two months after EEOC 19

complaint was dismissed proved retaliation not only from timing of termination but also by

showing she had no disciplinary history over nine-year employment, incidents for which she

was fired arose only after EEOC complaint had been filed, and supervisor had made

disparaging comments about her EEOC complaint).

 201 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2000)

20

10

County, has not presented evidence only of temporal proximity. Smith was a

long-tenured employee with no disciplinary history prior to 2005 who was

subjected not only to termination shortly following the EEOC complaint but also

to suspicious new charges of wrongdoing for arguably minor incidents following

that complaint. Cf. Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc.

19

We think the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that

Jankowski’s animus toward Smith boiled over due to the filing of the EEOC

complaint, which provided a motivating factor for the termination. In sum,

Jankowski failed to follow Xerox policies as far as documentation prior to placing

Smith in the disciplinary process; the termination process itself was set in

motion by the transmittal of the termination request within days of the EEOC

charge even though Smith was supposed to be on probation for 60 days; a

subsequent letter of concern followed closely after the EEOC charge and leveled

new and potentially serious accusations for incidents that were arguably minor

and easily explained; and Villa admitted that the letter of concern was

suspicious and indicative of retaliatory motivation.

The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to reject Xerox’s affirmative

defense and find that Xerox would not have made the same termination decision

absent an improper consideration of Smith’s EEOC complaint. It is important

to remember that Xerox bore the burden of proving this defense and was

required to present objective proof that it would have made the same decision.

See Garcia v. City of Houston. An employer does not meet its burden of 20

demonstrating its affirmative defense merely by showing that its employment

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Id.

21

 When questioned by Smith’s counsel, Villa merely testified that he asked Jankowski 22

about the possibility of a job reassignment, but Jankowski said he was “pretty sure” nothing

was available. We do not think such fleeting testimony would compel a jury to conclude that

Xerox would have terminated Smith even without considering the EEOC charge. Villa

admitted there was no documentation that options beside termination were considered and

that Xerox never mentioned any other option to Smith. This is not to say that an employer

must always consider lesser actions prior to termination. We hold only that under the

circumstances of this case, and where the testimony shows that the employer ordinarily would

have considered termination as a last resort, the jury was not required to believe that Xerox

would have terminated Smith even without regard for the EEOC complaint.

11

decision would have been justified; instead, it must show that its legitimate

reason alone would have resulted in the same decision. The jury was not 21

required to believe that, absent the EEOC complaint, Xerox would have

terminated a 22-year employee with no prior disciplinary problems and who was

recently among the top eight performing employees in the country, when Villa

testified that a job reassignment would ordinarily be considered for an employee

with such a track record and that termination would be an option of last resort.22

We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Smith’s claim

of retaliation.

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