Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02061/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02061-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIO R. AYALA and MIRNA AYALA,

individually and as Administrators of the

Estate of Julio A. Ayala,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO,

SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, CHIEF MARK

RAFFAELLI, OFFICER MIKE KUCHAC,

OFFICER JANELLE PEREZ, CORPORAL

BRUCE McPHILLIPS, OFFICER DAVID

BERRY, CORPORAL DANNY GIL,

OFFICER MELINDA LOPEZ, CORPORAL

KEN CHETCUTI, SERGEANT RON

CARLINO, CORPORAL DAVE KENNAN,

OFFICER CHRIS DEVAN, OFFICER MATT

McNICHOL, OFFICER ADAM PLANK,

OFFICER ROBBY CHON, and DOES 1 to 50,

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02061 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this civil-rights action, defendants move for summary judgment. Plaintiffs bring

several federal and state-law claims on behalf of their decedent son. Defendants have failed to

eliminate all triable issues of fact in plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments and plaintiffs’ state-law claims for wrongful death, assault and battery,

and negligence against defendants. Defendants have demonstrated that there are no triable

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issues of fact remaining in plaintiffs’ Monell claims and state-law claims for negligence and

negligent hiring, supervision, and training against the City of South San Francisco, Carlino and

Rafaelli. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. 

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Julio R. Ayala and Mirna Ayala were the parents of decedent Julio A. Ayala. 

Defendants Chief of Police Mark Raffaelli, Officer Mike Kuchac, Officer Janelle Perez,

Corporal Bruce McPhillips, Officer David Berry, Corporal Danny Gil, Officer Melinda Lopez,

Corporal Ken Chetcuti, Sergeant Ron Carlino, Corporal Dave Kennan, Officer Chris Devan,

Officer Matt McNichol, Officer Adam Plank, and Officer Robby Chon were South San

Francisco police officers alleged to be involved with decedent’s death. The City of South San

Francisco was also named as a defendant. 

On the evening of April 3, 2005, 26-year-old Julio A. Ayala was in a hotel room in

South San Francisco. The people in the room next door, Veronica Vargas and Pedro Escobar,

placed a 911 call shortly before midnight (Hynes Decl. Exh. A-2, 28:9–21). They had heard

sounds of someone in the next room banging against the walls and kicking the door. They

feared that the person in the next room would break through their door. Vargas placed the call

and relayed this information to the police (id. at Exh. A-1, 13:10–15). Vargas and Escobar

testified in their deposition that they were very afraid at the time, so they made the 911 operator

stay on the line with them (id. at A-2, 30:16–20). Vargas did not actually see Ayala or any of

the events that transpired after the police arrived (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 8, 28:14–20; 38:9–12). 

Escobar also testified that he did not know exactly what was happening in the other room and

that he had not seen anything (id. at Exh. 9, 40:4–7). 

Other than the police officer defendants, there were no other surviving witnesses. 

Officers Mike Kuhac and Janelle Perez were the first to respond, arriving at around 12:20 a.m. 

Primarily from radio dispatch, Kuhac learned that the caller was complaining that someone in

the hotel was screaming and knocking on hotel room doors (id. at Exh. 1, 12:1–4). Perez

testified at her deposition that she had received similar information and did not know if there

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was a felony or other crime in progress (id. at Exh. 2, 39:2–15). Neither officer testified that

they had any prior dealings with or knowledge of decedent (id. at Exh. 1, 12:19–25; Exh. 2.

34:1–11).

When Kuhac and Perez first encountered Ayala, the door to his hotel room was open,

and Ayala was wearing only socks (id. at Exh. 1, 12:16–18). Kuhac stood in the door of the

hotel room, and Ayala approached him. It was at that time that Kuhac first developed the

impression that Ayala was on PCP because he appeared sweaty, aggressive, and agitated (id. at

21:5–22:1). Kuhac also testified that Ayala did not appear to have been the victim of a crime,

did not appear to be injured, did not appear to have committed any crimes against anyone else,

and did not try to punch, kick, or grab Kuhac or Perez (id. at 23:1–20). Kuhac did not ask

Ayala any questions regarding the disturbance (id. at 24:11–15). Kuhac testified that he

determined at that time that he should arrest Ayala for being under the influence or for a “5150”

— being a danger to himself (id. at 25:13–20). 

Shortly thereafter, Corporal Bruce McPhillips and Officer David Berry arrived. Kuhac

contemplated using pepper spray on Ayala. McPhillips counseled against doing so. Because of

the close quarters in the hotel room, the officers too could have been affected (id. at

26:21–27:7). McPhillips and Berry testified in their depositions that they agreed with Kuhac’s

assessment that Ayala was on PCP (Hynes Decl. Exh. F, 39:13–24, Exh. G, 24:17–19). 

 Ayala was not responding to the officers’ commands, so they formulated a plan to bring

him into custody. The discussions occurred in front of Ayala and he did not appear to

comprehend what was happening (id. at 46:14–24). Eventually, the officers decided that Kuhac

would grab Ayala’s right arm and Berry would grab his left arm, and they would pull him into

the hallway where the officers would attempt to put Ayala in handcuffs (id. at Exh. G, 30:1–8;

Exh. F, 47:11–18). Ayala’s arms slipped though their grasp because he was sweating and

wearing no clothes. The officers then attempted to tackle Ayala to the ground. Kuhac testified

that he estimated that within three to five minutes of taking him to the ground, Ayala was

handcuffed with his hands above his head (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 2, 40:11–17). The officers

were not able to cuff Ayala’s hands behind his back. Ayala could still pull his arms beneath

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him and plant his hands on the ground to lift up his torso (Hynes Decl. Exh. F, 64:20–65:4). 

Ayala was face down and the officers applied pressure to parts of his body to prevent him from

moving. Berry was positioned near Ayala’s head, and admits to hitting him three or four times

in the face, as well as grabbing a fistful of Ayala’s hair (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 3, 28:7–22). 

Corporal Danny Gil and Officer Melinda Lopez arrived together in response to the

dispatch call (id. at Exh. 5, 47:5–25). Shortly after he arrived, Gil heard McPhillips call for

Code 3 cover, meaning that all available units should respond to the location with their

emergency equipment (id. at 50:4–14). While the officers were holding him, Ayala attempted

to kick his legs and Perez applied pressure to try to prevent him from moving (Hynes Decl. Exh.

F 68:2–7). Ayala was growling and muttering in a mix of English and Spanish while the

officers held him down (id. at Exh. G, 48:24–49:2). Gil suggested that the officers should place

Ayala in a body wrap. The other officers agreed. Gil then put out a call on the radio requesting

that the officer who had the wrap should bring it to the hotel (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 5, 69:3–12). 

A “body wrap” consisted of a shoulder harness, a binding for the ankles, and a blanket with

straps that encircled and restrained the legs (Hynes Decl. Exh. E, 38:12–40:12). The harness

and the ankle straps attached to loops on the blanket using carabiners which helped prevent

captives from moving. Before asking that the wrap be brought, Gil did not ask if a crime had

taken place, and his view of Ayala was obscured by the officers applying pressure to subdue

him (id. at 54:3–55:4, 70:12–16). Gil also punched Ayala at least one time with a closed fist

(id. at 71:12–23). 

After that, Officers Chris Devan and Adam Plank, Corporals Ken Chetcuti and Dave

Kennan, and Sergeant Ron Carlino were the next to arrive. Carlino had the body wrap. At the

time, the officers were switching off applying pressure and distraction blows in an attempt to

subdue Ayala. From deposition testimony, it appears that anywhere from four to six officers

were holding Ayala down at any given time. Carlino testified that Ayala did not appear to

respond or react consciously to any of the officers’ orders or efforts to subdue him (id. at Exh.

H. 108:18–25). 

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Then, Corporal Schwartz and Officer Matt McNichol arrived. Some of the officers

began administering more “distraction blows” using their hands and knees (id. at Exh. I,

56:7–23; Exh. J, 124:15–18, 125:12–14). Ayala still did not respond or cooperate, though none

of the officers testified that he ever attempted to hit or kick them, and Ayala never attempted to

take any officer’s weapons.

The officers then formulated a plan to use the carotid hold on Ayala (Hynes Decl. Exh. J

172:10–23). Carlino testified that the decision was made by himself, Kennan, Kuhac, Gil, and

McPhillips (id. at Exh. H, 88:3–23). McNichol testified at deposition that he was uncertain who

actually made the decision, although he recalled hearing the discussions (id. at Exh. K,

64:5–15). Gil testified that he thought Carlino had formulated the plan. The officers intended

to apply the carotid hold, undo Ayala’s handcuffs and reposition them to place his hands behind

his back, and then place Ayala in the body wrap (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 5 81:19–82:24). The

officers had called for paramedics to be downstairs in the hotel earlier (Hynes Decl. Exh. H,

146:17–147:1). 

Before the carotid restraint was applied, Perez secured the body wrap’s ankle straps

around Ayala’s ankles (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. E, 101:2–16). Kennan applied the hold while

straddling Ayala’s back (Hynes Decl. Exh. M, 84:24–85:4). Regarding the manuever’s

application, Kennan testified (id. at Exh. J, 211:1–10, Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 6, 230:1–231:3):

Q. How long did you apply the carotid?

A. I remember when I first started the application, Mr Ayala

was turning his head too much and I released it. I didn’t

completely released [sic] it. I just lessened the pressure. 

But once I thought he had — he stopped fighting enough

for me to get it back in position — I remember I had to do

that a couple of times. Two or three times. I don’t

remember exactly how many times. But as far as the

actual application, I can’t remember. I don’t know

exactly . . . .

Q. Did you stop the carotid because you believed the carotid

had gone into effect?

A. I stopped it because — I did not know if it had taken

effect. But we were at the point where he was relaxed

enough to be handcuffed, and that was enough for me. 

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Q. And how did you know he was relaxed enough to be

handcuffed? Is that based on you feeling or based on what

someone was telling you? . . .

A. Based on him being handcuffed and my [extension] cord

[connecting Kennan’s radio to a microphone] being stuck

between his handcuffs. 

Q. Did you feel him relaxing as he was being handcuffed?

A. I don’t remember the exact point where he — where he

was handcuffed. 

Q. While he was being handcuffed, were you still in position

of the carotid? Was your arm still aligned with the chin or

just below his chin around his neck?

A. I don’t remember. I do remember focusing on my radio.

Q. Were you still applying pressure when he was being

handcuffed? 

A. I don’t know. 

Carlino and McPhillips testified that they were monitoring Kennan’s application of the hold

while it occurred (Hynes Decl. Exh. H, 101:22–102:11, Exh. F, 20:3–16). The testimony is

unclear on how long the carotid was applied. Kennan was uncertain of how long he applied the

carotid hold, although he did testify that the entire process of handcuffing Ayala took less than

five minutes (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 6, 232:20–233:8). Carlino testified that he thought that

Kennan had applied the carotid hold for around ten seconds (id. at Exh. 11, 96:8–13). Kennan

gave no signal to the other officers to denote when he had finished administering the carotid

hold (id. at 96:19–24). 

Lopez then secured Ayala into the body wrap (id. at Exh. 4, 114:4–115:22). While he

was being placed in the body wrap, some of the officers thought they heard sounds like snoring

or agonal breathing coming from Ayala. After Lopez had finished securing the top part of the

wrap, she then checked Ayala for a pulse (id. at 119:8–14). None of the officers could find a

pulse, and the paramedics were unable to revive him. 

An autopsy was performed on Ayala by Dr. Thomas Rogers. He testified that he noted

petechial hemmorrhages, fluidity of blood, cerebral swelling, pulmonary congestion, edema,

and visceral organ congestion which he believed to be consistent with asphyxia (Sarmiento

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Decl. Exh. 7, 23:7–27:23). Dr. Rogers also found a fracture of Ayala’s left superior horn of his

thyroid cartilage and a fracture of one of his right ribs (id. at 35:6–13, 41:7–13). Dr. Roger’s

autopsy report listed the cause of death by a blunt injury to the neck associated with physical

exertion and cocaine intoxication (id. at Exh. 4).

As the highest ranking officer present, Carlino was the supervisor during the incident

(id. at Exh. 11, 23:1–8). Carlino testified that he considered use of the carotid restraint to be

something less than deadly force (id. at 28:3–19). In his deposition, he identified tracheal injury

and risk associated with certain types of people as risks involved in the use of the carotid

restraint (id. at 34:5–25). Carlino was unfamiliar with risks associated with using the carotid

restraint on people under the influence of stimulants or using the restraint in conjunction with

the body wrap. 

In his deposition, Kennan did not recall any training he had received in the police

academy regarding the use of the carotid hold (id. at Exh. 6, 33:13–20). He also did not recall

receiving training regarding the carotid hold before the incident (id. at 38:2–10). Kennan also

testified that he was trained in the mechanics of applying the carotid restraint but not when it

was an appropriate technique to subdue a suspect (id. at 43:12–25). He was unaware of risks

associated with asphyxiation and injuries to subjects who turn their heads while the carotid is

being administered (id. at 99:4–22). 

General Order U-01 addresses the use of the carotid restraint by the South San Francisco

Police Department (id. at Exh. 2). It states that “carotid restraints are to be employed only in

those situations that require the immobilization of a combative and dangerous subject” and that

“the carotid hold shall only be utilized by those officers who have been properly trained to do

so.” 

***

This action was filed on March 17, 2006. The complaint alleged three claims under

federal law. Plaintiffs claimed that the officers used excessive force on decedent in violation of

the Fourth Amendment, and that doing so violated plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

They also alleged a pattern or practice of the use of excessive force against Latinos,

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African-Americans, and other minorities in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Their final federal

claim alleged that the City, Chief of Police Rafaelli, and Sergeant Carlino were liable for Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment violations for a failure to train and supervise the other officers

properly. The complaint also alleged state-law claims for wrongful death, a survival action, and

negligence against all defendants, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against

Rafaelli and the City of South San Francisco. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was granted in part and denied in part on

August 28, 2006. The order held that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged constitutional

violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of minorities in general. Plaintiffs

could, however, maintain an action on behalf of decedent for all of their asserted claims. This

motion for summary judgment was filed on June 6, 2007, and a hearing was held on July 12,

2007. Trial in this action is set to begin on September 17, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of

production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy

Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a genuine

issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

1. DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENCE.

Defendants make several objections to evidence plaintiffs presented in opposition to

their motion to summary judgment. First, defendants object to the deposition testimony of Dr.

Rogers as expert testimony that lacks foundation to the extent that he opines on the ultimate

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cause and manner of death. On summary judgment, a testimony by an expert witness must be

both admissible at trial and must set forth specific facts that show that there are trial issues of

fact. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591–92 (1993); FRCP 56(e). Under Rule

56(e), the expert must back up his or her opinion using specific facts. To the extent that Dr.

Rogers opines on the ultimate cause of death and his opinion thereon, plaintiffs have not made a

sufficient showing to qualify him as an expert witness. Neither side disputes, however, that

Rogers performed the autopsy on Ayala. Observations he made during the autopsy are

admissible to extent that he is not rendering an opinion on the ultimate cause of Ayala’s death. 

Defendants’ motion to strike expert testimony is GRANTED as to Rogers’ statements on Ayala’s

cause of death. 

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs have misrepresented Dr. Rogers’ deposition

testimony. In the autopsy report, Dr. Rogers listed the cause of death as “blunt injury to the

neck associated with physical exertion and acute cocaine intoxication” (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 7,

Dep. Exh. 4). It also listed anatomical diagnoses of asphyxia and blunt injuries. In his

deposition, Dr. Rogers noted that he observed certain conditions that he believed consistent

with asphyxia. Defendants also argue that Rogers’ testimony contradicts itself, but Rogers

never actually testified that asphyxia was the cause of Ayala’s death. He testified only that his

observations were consistent with asphyxia, or asphyxial death. Defendants’ objection is

DENIED. 

In any event, defendants do not address the issue of the cause of Ayala’s death in their

motion except to object to plaintiffs’ evidence. Defendants’ argument primarily rests on their

assertion that the force used was reasonable in these circumstances. In fact, neither side points

to evidence regarding the cause of Ayala’s death to eliminate or create a triable issue of fact. 

That ultimate issue simply does not affect the outcome of this order, nor is it addressed by

parties in their briefs. 

Second, defendants object to the declaration of Roger Clark, plaintiffs purported expert

on police practices. Specifically, they argue that Clark gave opinions on medical issues that are

outside of his expertise because he was not qualified as a medical expert. Clark’s declaration

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qualifies him as an expert only on police practices and issues. Defendants’ motion to strike

testimony is GRANTED as to the portions of Clark’s declaration in which he gives opinions

regarding the progression of asphyxiation and how it develops. 

Defendants also object to Clark’s assertion that “the majority of positional or restraint

asphyxia incidents have occurred after physical exertion and struggle” (Sarmiento Decl. Exh. 10

¶ 34). Clark never identifies what restraint incidents to which he refers in coming to this

conclusion. This statement also will be stricken from his declaration. 

2. EXCESSIVE FORCE.

Plaintiffs’ first claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and alleges that the officers used

excessive force in detaining Ayala. First, defendants argue that under the circumstances, the

officers’ actions were reasonable. Second, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity because the rights allegedly violated were not clearly established. 

A. Reasonableness of Officers’ Actions.

“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests

at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). Determining whether the force used was reasonable “requires careful attention to the

facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Ibid. “The

reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . .” Id. at 396–97. “In

some cases . . . the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect may be

a factor to consider.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 349 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Turning to the first factor, governmental interests, defendants present evidence that the

officers thought that they had probable cause to arrest Ayala either for being under the influence

or for being a danger to himself. Plaintiffs point out that defendants admitted repeatedly that

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there was no indication that Ayala had committed any other felonies or misdemeanors, that any

other crimes were in progress, or that Ayala had been injured. The substance of the 911 call

from Vargas and Escobar was that Ayala had been banging on the walls and doors of his own

and other hotel rooms. From the deposition testimony, none of the officers had prior dealings

with Ayala, and on arrival different officers had varying amounts of information regarding the

events. 

The most important of the three factors set out in Graham is “whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officer[s]or others.” 490 U.S. at 396. Defendants

present their own testimony that Ayala was growling and screaming at the officers and resisting

their attempts to subdue him. When they arrived, at least some of the officers testified that they

believed that Ayala was high on PCP. None of the defendants, however, ever testified that

Ayala tried to hit them, kick them, or grab their weapons. Additionally, there were a total of

thirteen officers on the scene by the time Kennan applied the carotid hold. When the carotid

restraint was applied, Ayala’s hands were cuffed in front of him and his ankles were already

bound by the body wrap’s ankle strap. Defendants did testify, however, that Ayala was face

down and could still push himself up with his arms. A reasonable jury could still conclude that

the officers had Ayala largely under control and that Ayala did not pose an immediate danger to

the officers and the public. 

Turning to the third factor in Graham, defendants present evidence that Ayala was

resisting arrest. The officers testified that they discussed their plans to subdue Ayala in front of

him. Ayala was completely unresponsive and unaware of what they were doing. He did not

react to the officers’ commands. Cutting against this is the fact that none of the officers ever

testified that Ayala attempted to harm them. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ayala could have

escaped, particularly once his hands were handcuffed and his ankles were restrained. 

Defendants attempt to argue that near the beginning of the exchange with Ayala, they believed

that he could run into the hallway or jump out the window. This seems logical at that time, but

once his hands were handcuffed and several officers were holding him down, the possibility of

escape and meaningful resistance seemed much more remote. 

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Finally, turning to the availability of other methods, defendants argue that plaintiffs have

identified no other methods that could have been used against Ayala. Defendants argue that

distraction blows and handcuffs had not worked, so they made a decision to apply the carotid

hold and use the body wrap. Here, plaintiffs argue that the carotid hold constitutes deadly force

that was not warranted in these circumstances. In Nava v. City of Dublin, 121 F.3d 453 (9th

Cir. 1997), a district court’s grant of a permanent injunction against the California Highway

Patrol’s use of the carotid hold except where the use of deadly force was justified was

overturned because the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit did not

disturb the trial court’s finding that the carotid hold constituted deadly force. Accordingly,

parties disagree on whether the carotid hold constitutes deadly force. Defendants also have not

established that all of the steps that they took during the incident, taken together, were

necessary under the circumstances. 

Defendants assert that plaintiff cannot assert this claim against defendants McNichol,

Plank, Perez, Chon, Chetcuti, and McPhillips. These officers only had limited contact with

Ayala during the incident, so defendants assert that they cannot be held liable because they did

not contribute to the injury. This argument carries little weight because the incident likely

could not have played out in the same way without them. Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs these officers contributed to the overall plan to restrain Ayala, that

eventually ended in his death.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could

still conclude that the officers used excessive and deadly force under the Graham factors. 

Accordingly, defendants have not eliminated all triable issues of fact as to whether their actions

were reasonable. 

B. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The

threshold question in deciding whether officials are entitled to qualified immunity is whether,

taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, the facts show that the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a

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violation is established, then the court must ask whether the law forming the basis of the

violation was clearly established. Ibid. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 208. “If the law did not put the

officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified

immunity is appropriate.” Id. at 202. Finally, the officers are still entitled to summary

judgment if they had a reasonable, though mistaken, view of either the law or the facts. Id. at

1213. 

As mentioned above, this order has already established that when viewed in the light

most favorable to the Ayalas, the facts could establish that the officers violated Julio A. Ayala’s

Fourth Amendment rights. 

The right to be free from excessive force is well-established, so now this order turns to a

more specific inquiry of whether it would be clearly established that the degree of force at issue

here would violate a suspect’s rights. Plaintiffs point to a decision, Drummond v. City of

Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003), in which officers attempted to take a man into

custody for evaluation who was in an agitated state due to mental illness. The officers placed

weight on Drummond’s neck and back and bound his ankles with a hobble restraint. As a

result, Drummond suffered cardiopulmonary arrest. Id. at 1054–55. The Ninth Circuit held that

officers would have been on notice that these actions violated the suspects’ rights. Id. at 1061. 

Defendants argue that this case is not sufficiently analogous to the facts alleged here

because Ayala was resisting arrest and was not handcuffed behind his back. Still, defendants do

not deny that Ayala was unarmed, and never attempted to hit, kick, or take any weapons from

the officers, and that the officers applied the carotid hold and a body wrap to subdue him even

after his ankles were restrained. Furthermore, the use of the carotid hold except where the

suspect poses an immediate threat has been criticized in case law as noted above. The South

San Francisco police department additionally had a policy that it was only to be used on

dangerous suspects. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Their

motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

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3. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Plaintiffs’ next claim is for interference with their rights to familial relationships under

the Fourteenth Amendment. They argue that defendants’ actions deprived them of their

substantive due process rights to the companionship and society of their son Julio. 

In their briefs, plaintiffs point out that on these facts, there was a seizure that implicated

decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights. Based on this, plaintiffs contend that this claim should

be analyzed under the same standard as the excessive force claim because there is an

amendment that explicitly covers the rights at issue. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,

272 n.7 (1997). Plaintiffs also point out that where the deliberate use of excessive force in a

seizure resulted in death, the decedent’s survivors can litigate the reasonableness of the search. 

See, e.g. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Broward v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593

(1989). “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously

asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). Plaintiffs have already

asserted their son’s excessive force claim on his behalf. Thus, the only avenue left is for

plaintiffs to assert their own Fourteenth Amendment rights, so this claim is judged under

substantive due process standards. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it can properly be

characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Lewis v. County

of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). The Supreme Court has “spoken of the cognizable

level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.” Id. at 846. It is clear

that mere negligence or liability grounded in tort does not meet the standard for a substantive

due process violation. Id. at 849. The Lewis decision involved the high-speed pursuit of a

suspect on a motorcycle, which ended in a police officer hitting and killing the suspect with a

car. In determining that the police officer’s actions did not “shock the conscience,” the

Supreme Court analogized high-speed car chases to tense, rapidly evolving situations such as

prison riots. The decision then determined that officer liability should be judged on a higher

standard than deliberate indifference and should turn on “whether force was applied in a good

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose

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of causing harm . . . .” Id. at 852–53. By contrast, the deliberate indifference standard is

appropriately used in custodial situations where defendants have more time to make decisions

about their actions. 

Defendants then urge that this case is analogous to Lewis because they were attempting

to take Ayala into custody and he was resisting them. The standard to be applied depends at

least in part on whether actual deliberation was practical under the circumstances. See

Moreland v. City of Las Vegas, 159 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1998). On these facts, however, it is

not clear that the analogy to the car chase in Lewis holds up. It is undisputed that Ayala was

resisting at the time Kennan applied the carotid hold, but his hands were cuffed in the front, his

ankles were restrained, and there were thirteen police officers present. In their briefs,

defendants maintain that this was a rapidly evolving situation, but in their deposition testimony,

the officers stated that they had talked out a plan to restrain Ayala and administer the carotid

hold. This undercuts their current argument that their decisions were made in haste. 

Furthermore, the entire incident lasted well over twenty minutes. Still, this situation is not like

the rights of a suspect in custody where deliberate indifference standards would apply. 

Accordingly, conduct here that would shock the conscience would be something less than a

deliberate purpose of causing harm. 

Defendants cite a number of cases that applied Lewis’ purpose of causing harm standard. 

In Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 159 F.3d 365, 372–73 (9th Cir.

1998), a police officer shooting the wrong man in a gunfight outside a bar did not constitute a

substantive due process violation under the purpose to commit harm standard. Another similar

case applying the purpose to commit harm standard was Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 798

(7th Cir. 1998), where parents of a shooting victim could not prevail on a substantive due

process claim against officers who accidentally shot their daughter during a hostage situation. 

Both of these decisions described extremely dangerous situations where the suspects were

armed and the officers and the public were in danger. As with Lewis, they are not analogous to

these facts. 

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Under these facts, a reasonable jury could find that defendants’ conduct shocked the

conscience. Ayala was resisting, but he was unarmed and at no time did he attempt to kick, hit,

or take a weapon from any of the multitude of officers. Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could still find that defendants’ conduct violated the

Ayalas’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly,

defendants motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

4. SUPERVISORY AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY.

Municipalities and local governments can be sued directly for violations of

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 where government officials were acting pursuant to

an official policy or recognized custom. Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv. of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). The plaintiff must identify the policy or custom which caused the violation. 

“The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was

the ‘moving force’ behind the conduct alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal

link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of County

Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original). 

A. Municipal Liability.

“[I]nadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where

the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Assuming

plaintiff has shown that the training received by employees was inadequate, the question then

becomes whether inadequate training can be justifiably called municipal policy. Id. at 389–90. 

To show failure to train, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he was deprived of a constitutional

right; (2) the City had a training policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of the persons with whom its police officers are likely to come into contact;

and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the City properly trained those

officers.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007). 

“Evidence of the failure to train a single officer is insufficient to establish a municipality’s

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deliberate policy” because it does not show that the municipality made a deliberate or conscious

choice. Id. at 484–85. 

Plaintiffs assert that they can establish municipal liability for failure to train on the bases

of (1) failure to instruct the officers regarding the proper circumstances in which to use the

carotid hold and (2) failure to instruct regarding the dangers of positional asphyxia associated

with use of the carotid hold. In support of the first theory, plaintiffs present Kennan’s own

deposition in which he stated that he did not recall the last time when he received training in the

use of the carotid hold. Plaintiffs also present evidence that the city of South San Francisco had

a written policy, General Order U-01, which limited use of the carotid hold only to combative

and dangerous suspects. Defendants designated Detective Neary as the person most

knowledgeable about the practices and training of South San Francisco police officers. He

testified that officers were free to use the carotid restraint at their discretion based on the

training they received at the police academy, and nothing more. Plaintiffs also point out that

Detective Neary believed that positional asphyxia was a theory, and that the police department

did not train its officers about the risks associated with it in using the carotid hold. Plaintiffs

then present the declaration of Roger Clark, their expert in police practices, who declares that

failure to train regarding positional asphyxia constitutes deliberate indifference to the rights of

detainees. 

Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence that the failure to train was part of a

pattern or practice. At most, they have merely shown that Kennan lacked training in using the

carotid hold. As to Detective Neary’s testimony, it only says that officers could use their

discretion in using the carotid hold; it does not indicate some sort of widespread pattern of a

failure to train the officers. Plaintiffs can point to no similar incidents involving the use of the

carotid hold. Similarly, with positional asphyxia, plaintiffs have found no other incidents

related to the alleged failure to train. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,

defendants have shown that there are no remaining triable issues of fact as to whether there was

a pattern or practice that was the moving force behind Ayala’s injuries. Accordingly,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

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B. Supervisory Liability.

Plaintiffs claim that the City of South San Francisco, Chief of Police Rafaelli, and

Sergeant Carlino should be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability. Supervisory

liability may be imposed for a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in training,

supervising, or controlling subordinates, acquiescence in the constitutional violations that for

the basis of the complaint, or conduct showing a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

others. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). The harm must also be

attributable to an official policy or custom. Id. at 645. For instance, a police chief could be

held liable in his supervisory capacity where he had ignored three prior excessive force

complaints against the officer whose conduct was at issue. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 485. 

Plaintiffs first argue that Carlino should be held liable because he was directly

responsible for all officers on the scene. This theory is better-suited to direct liability; Carlino

was present during the incident and participated in the events. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the excessive force and substantive due process claims have already been denied. 

Holding him liable on a supervisory liability theory would be duplicative, and plaintiffs have

not established that this use of force was part of a custom or practice.

Plaintiffs next argue that Rafaelli and the city of South San Francisco should be held

liable on a ratification theory for failing to investigate the incident and failing to discipline those

involved. Defendants present evidence, which plaintiffs do not refute, that there was an

investigation by the San Mateo County District Attorney. All officers participated in the

investigation, and the findings of pathologists and criminologists were reviewed. The results

were ultimately turned over to the Ayalas. Plaintiffs argue that Rafaelli went to the scene of the

incident shortly after it happened and failed to interview the officers or conduct an

investigation. They also present evidence that Rafaelli did not retrain or discipline any of the

officers because of the incident. Plaintiffs, however, never deposed Rafaelli. Plaintiffs have

not carried their burden to establish that these actions were part of a practice or policy made by

Rafaelli or the city. Even assuming that Rafaelli’s actions were inadequate, plaintiffs have not

established that his actions were part of city policy, custom, or procedure. Accordingly, even

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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, they have not shown that there are

triable issues of fact remaining as to supervisory liability. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on this claim is GRANTED. 

5. STATE-LAW CLAIMS.

Plaintiffs also bring four state-law claims against defendants. Defendants move for

summary judgment arguing that plaintiffs have failed to show triable issues of fact and that

these claims are barred by immunities afforded by the California’s Government Tort Liability

Act. 

A. Wrongful Death and Survival Action.

Plaintiffs bring claims for wrongful death under California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 377.60 and for a survival action under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.34. The sum

of defendants’ argument in support of its motion as to these claims is that the officers’ use of

force was reasonable, so these claims should fail. The use of reasonable force under California

law is judged under similar standards to those used for federal constitutional claims. See, e.g.,

Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 334, 349 (1996). This order has already

determined that defendants have not presented evidence that would entitle them to a directed

verdict at trial on the issue of whether their actions were reasonable. Accordingly, defendants’

motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ wrongful death and survival claims is DENIED.

B. Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Training.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants City of South San Francisco, Rafaelli, and Carlino are

liable for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. Plaintiffs also allege a claim for

negligence against all defendants. Under California Government Code § 820.2, “[e]xcept as

otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his

act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested

in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” “Immunity is reserved for those basic policy

decisions which have been expressly committed to coordinate branches of government, and as

to which judicial interference would thus be ‘unseemly’ . . . . On the other hand . . . there is no

basis for immunizing lower-level, or ministerial decisions that merely implement a basic policy

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already formulated.” Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981 (1995) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Police chiefs have power to promulgate rules and policies that are binding

on a city. Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 244 (1979). Decisions to retain and

discipline employees are generally considered discretionary acts. See, e.g., Caldwell, 10 Cal.

4th at 984; Kemmerer v. Fresno County, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1439 (1988). 

Here, plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and negligent hiring, supervision and training

asserted against the city, Rafaelli, and Carlino, are all predicated on decisions made regarding

hiring and retaining employees. Also, plaintiffs attack the decision not to discipline any of the

officers in connection with the incident. These decisions fall under the rubric of discretionary

acts for which government officials have discretionary immunity. Plaintiffs have also identified

no specific policy or failure to train to form the basis of their claims. Accordingly, defendants’

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the claims for negligence and negligent hiring,

supervision and training against the city, Rafaelli, and Carlino in his official capacity. 

Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence against the remaining defendants survive as defendants

merely repeat their arguments is that the use of force was reasonable. As detailed above, there

are triable issues of fact remaining as to whether that was the case. Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligence claim is DENIED with respect to all other

defendants. 

C. Assault and Battery.

To prevail on a claim for battery against a police officer, the plaintiff must establish that

the officer used excessive force against him or her. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th

1269, 1273 (1998). California law uses the same standard of reasonableness as is used under

the Fourth Amendment. See Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999). As

described above, on these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that the amount of force the

officers used was not reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, summary judgment on

this claim is not appropriate, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to the

claim for battery. 

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D. Immunity Under California’s Government Tort Liability Act. 

Finally, defendants contend that they have immunity for all of plaintiffs’ state-law

claims. Two code sections govern the scope of public officers’ liability for common-law torts

under California law. First, California Government Code § 815.2(a) provides:

A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of

his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this

section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee

or his personal representative.

Second, California Government Code § 820(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by

statute . . . a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same

extent as a private person.” Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal has explained that this

statutory framework establishes two principles:

(1) unless they are granted specific statutory immunity, a public

entity and its employees are liable in tort for the same causes of

action that could be brought against a private person; and

(2) absent a statute specifically imposing liability, a public entity

and its employees are not liable for causes of action in tort that

could not be pursued against a private party.

Lueter v. California, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1300 (2002). Furthermore, “California law denies

immunity to police officers who use excessive force in arresting a suspect.” Robinson v. Solano

County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 

“Direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them

to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care . . . .” Munoz v. City of Union City,

120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1112 (2004). Plaintiffs have identified statutes and duties that they

claim the defendants’ breached, including assault and battery, wrongful death, and negligence. 

Accordingly, defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs have pointed to no duty simply fail. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to plaintiffs’ state-law claims. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

DENIED as to plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 based on the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments and plaintiff’s state-law claims for wrongful death, assault and battery, and

negligence. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983 for

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supervisory and municipal liability and plaintiffs’ state-law claims for negligence and negligent

hiring, training, and supervision against the City of South San Francisco, Carlino, and Rafaelli. 

No claims remain against Rafaelli and the City of South San Francisco, thus they are

DISMISSED from this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2007. ______________________________________ WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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