Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01810/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1810

___________

Barbara Rodgers, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

City of Des Moines; Ronald Wakeham, *

*

Appellees. * 

___________

 Submitted: November 14, 2005

 Filed: January 25, 2006 

___________

Before ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Barbara Rodgers (Rodgers) brought this action against the City of Des Moines

(City) and Des Moines Fire Chief Ronald Wakeham (Chief Wakeham) under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code

Chapter 216; and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 2601-2654, claiming sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and hostile

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The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

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work environment. The district court1

 granted the City and Chief Wakeham summary

judgment on all of Rodgers’s claims. Rodgers appeals only the district court’s entry

of summary judgment on her claim under the FMLA. For the reasons set forth below,

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1976, Rodgers began working in the City’s fire department as a police

information typist. Over time, Rodgers became an administrative analyst.

Rodgers requires periodic medical treatment and absences from work due to

fibromyalgia, diabetes, hypertension, and hypothyroidism. In May 2000, the City

granted Rodgers intermittent FMLA leave. On June 1, 2000, Assistant Fire Chief

Doug Rubin (Assistant Chief Rubin) completed Rodgers’s annual performance

evaluation, rating Rodgers’s “observance of working hours” as “improvement

required.” Assistant Chief Rubin explained Rodgers’s “[s]ick leave taken over the

past 12 months well exceeds City average, thereby reducing [Rodgers]’s availability

to support staff during normal working hours.” Assistant Chief Rubin also noted there

was “[n]o abuse suspected.” 

On March 19, 2001, Chief Wakeham issued a memo to Rodgers entitled “New

Policies.” The memo clarified and modified Rodgers’s job duties, including

(1) prohibiting Rodgers from making purchases in excess of $100 without Chief

Wakeham’s “direct written permission,” (2) requiring Rodgers to provide monthly

invoice status reports to Chief Wakeham, (3) requiring Rodgers to submit all travel

and training requests to Chief Wakeham for review and approval, (4) requiring

Rodgers to provide a “written petty cash reconciliation report” to Chief Wakeham

“prior to submittal to Finance,” (5) setting a particular time for Rodgers to take her

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lunch, and (6) requiring Rodgers to keep her files “in a neat and orderly manner,

properly labeled and easily identified,” so in the event Rodgers was absent, Chief

Wakeham would “be able to find files and locate pertinent information regarding

invoices, budgeting, contracts, etc.” 

In April 2001, Rodgers took medical leave for four weeks due to fibromyalgia.

When Rodgers returned to work, Chief Wakeham removed the petty cash management

responsibility from Rodgers’s duties. 

On January 8, 2002, Chief Wakeham gave Rodgers a letter summarizing

Rodgers’s attendance record for the year 2001. Rodgers was absent for all or part of

115 work days out of the year’s 249 work days. Chief Wakeham noted Rodgers

(1) took FMLA leave on 75 occasions, totaling 356.25 hours, which time was

“protected under the current federal law”; (2) missed work on 40 occasions, totaling

223.25 hours, which absences “were not typically scheduled absences with advance

notification”; and (3) was eligible for an additional 145.75 hours of FMLA leave.

Chief Wakeham advised Rodgers “to take whatever steps are necessary to demonstrate

significant and sustained improvement in attendance.” 

Rodgers applied for future FMLA leave on January 17, 2002. The next day, the

City denied Rodgers’s request, because (1) Rodgers altered some language on the

application form “in a manner that may restrict the City from obtaining necessary

medical information regarding [Rodgers’s] illness,” and (2) Rodgers’s “request for

leave time is too vague in nature.” The City noted “[t]he physician’s statement cites

periodic necessary medical follow up, however it fails to give . . . enough information

to be able to determine what kind of work schedule may be contemplated as a result.”

The City directed Rodgers “to submit a more specific declaration from [Rodgers’s]

physician regarding necessary absences for periodic medical follow up,” and to

“resubmit [Rodgers’s] request on the proper form without making any alterations

whatsoever.” 

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On February 1, 2002, Rodgers submitted another application for FMLA leave

based on “Intermittent-Chronic Conditions.” On February 7, the City denied

Rodgers’s application, citing “the vagueness of the stated period of [Rodgers’s]

anticipated leave.” The City directed Rodgers to “provide specific periods of time for

[Rodgers’s] absences.” 

On March 4, 2002, Rodgers sent an e-mail message to Chief Wakeham stating,

“If you could provide specific questions to address your concerns, I can forward them

to my physician and have him respond.” On March 19, 2002, Rodgers wrote another

e-mail message to Chief Wakeham advising she had not received a response to her

March 4 e-mail message and requesting a response. 

On March 25, Chief Wakeham gave a letter to Rodgers stating that in light of

Rodgers’s vague leave request, her doctor visits would be handled like any other

doctor appointment:

Your medical provider states that periodic follow-up visits may be

necessary for medical treatment; no specific schedule is outlined. It

seems that traditional city leave policies will work well for such

appointments. While it is desirable that medical appointments be

scheduled at a time which will least interrupt business operations, I am

willing to work with you in scheduling your time around reasonable

advanced requests for leave to attend to such periodic visits.

The letter also restated the City’s interest in a specific leave request:

There is a need for predictability to the timing or extent of the leave. An

open-ended grant of time off does not permit the department to have the

necessary predictability of available staff to accomplish the necessary

work.

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The letter further stated, “If you are able to provide a firm framework of treatment

schedules and anticipated absences associated with the treatment regimen, I can once

again review your request.” 

On June 3, 2002, Rodgers submitted a third application for future intermittent

FMLA leave. In response, the City arranged for a second medical opinion to review

the medical necessity of Rodgers’s requested leave.

Dr. John D. Kuhnlein (Dr. Kuhnlein) evaluated Rodgers on August 9, 2002, for

the purpose of giving a second opinion and concluded, in relevant part, as follows:

I believe she has met the criteria for the Family Medical Leave Act

benefits. The fibromyalgia is unpredictable with regard to the timing of

her flares. She cannot predict the timing of the flares of her

hypothyroidism. She may need time away from the work place on an

unpredictable basis to deal with her medical problems.

On September 13, 2002, after receiving Dr. Kuhnlein’s report, the City approved

Rodgers’s request for future intermittent FMLA leave. 

Six months later, in March 2003, due to a City-wide reduction in workforce to

achieve a balanced City budget, the City eliminated Rodgers’s administrative analyst

position in the fire department and transferred her to a newly created position in the

public works department. Rodgers retained her same pay and benefits. 

On August 7, 2003, Rodgers sued the City. Although the City never denied

Rodgers any leave time she requested for illness or doctor appointments, Rodgers

believes the City made her “feel [she] should not have taken that time off.” 

Public Works Director William Stowe (Director Stowe), on November 1, 2004,

encouraged Rodgers to improve her attendance at work. On December 3, the City

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held a pre-disciplinary hearing regarding Rodgers’s absences from work. On

December 7, Director Stowe issued Rodgers a written reminder regarding Rodgers’s

frequent absences from work, which, in Director Stowe’s opinion, precluded Rodgers

from meeting an essential function of her job. 

Rodgers took approximately one month of FMLA leave, because of her

fibromyalgia, beginning in December 2004. Rodgers returned to work on January 18,

2005. On January 24, 2005, Director Stowe temporarily assigned Rodgers to the

public works department’s call center. The City stated Rodgers’s wages and benefits

would not be reduced, and Rodgers may return to her administrative analyst duties

when her intermittent FMLA leave ends.

On March 1, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on

all of Rodgers’s claims. Rodgers appeals the district court’s judgment on her FMLA

claim, arguing the district court (1) ignored facts supporting Rodgers’s claim, (2) erred

in holding emotional distress damages are not available under the FMLA, (3) abused

its discretion in not awarding equitable relief, and (4) erred in not considering

Rodgers’s allegations the City continued to violate the FMLA after Rodgers filed her

complaint. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s entry of summary judgment. Shanklin v.

Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Anderson,

275 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2002)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Shanklin, 397 F.3d at 602 (quotation omitted). The nonmoving

party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the [nonmoving] party’s

pleading, but the [nonmoving] party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided

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in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56], must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

A. District Court’s Statement of Facts

Rodgers argues the district court “completely failed to mention numerous facts

that supported [Rodgers]’s claims,” and “[q]uite frankly, the entire tone of the court’s

recitation of facts sounds like it was written by defense counsel.” After listing twentyone ignored facts, Rodgers’s entire argument supporting the inclusion of these facts

is as follows:

These are not immaterial or tangentially relevant facts. These are

facts which directly demonstrate the ongoing and serious nature of

Defendants’ FMLA violations and which prove Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff

met her burden to raise these facts and provided ample support in the

record for them.

The court’s failure even to mention these facts speaks volumes

about the court’s failure to consider them.

We reject Rodgers’s challenge to the district court’s statement of facts for

several reasons. First, Rodgers’s challenge to the district court’s factual findings is

underdeveloped. Rodgers fails to direct us to specific record locations supporting her

challenge. Without some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record

searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party’s arguments. Cf. United

States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Rodgers also fails

to explain how these allegedly omitted facts establish a material question of fact, or

how any of these various facts might prove the City or Chief Wakeham violated the

FMLA. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (party

opposing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial”) (quotation and citation omitted). 

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Second, even if Rodgers did adequately develop her challenge to the district

court’s recitation of the facts, the district court did include several of the allegedly

omitted facts in the court’s recitation of the facts. Third, some of Rodgers’s alleged

facts are irrelevant, some inaccurately characterize the record, and some improperly

advance legal conclusions. Finally, none of Rodgers’s facts were material to the

district court’s stated bases for granting summary judgment. Rodgers failed to meet

the requirement of Rule 56(e) to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Accordingly, we find the district court accurately and

sufficiently recited the evidence of record, did not omit material facts, and did not

improperly weigh the evidence.

B. Emotional Distress Damages 

Rodgers contends the district court erred in holding emotional distress damages

are not recoverable under the FMLA. Rodgers relies on our decision in Duty v.

Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 496 (8th Cir. 2002), in which we affirmed a

verdict awarding compensatory damages under the FMLA, including damages for

“mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries.” However, the

reference to emotional distress damages in Duty is probably mistaken and not sound

law in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada Department of Human

Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 739-40 (2003). The Court in Hibbs explained, “the

cause of action under the FMLA is a restricted one: The damages recoverable are

strictly defined and measured by actual monetary losses.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Our sister circuits who have addressed this issue have held emotional distress

damages are not recoverable under the FMLA. These courts have reasoned that

because the FMLA specifically lists the types of damages for which an employer may

be liable and the list includes only the actual monetary losses of the employee, the

FMLA does not permit recovery for emotional distress damages. See Montgomery

v. Maryland., 72 F. App’x 17, 19-20 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished);

Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 2001); Graham

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v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999); cf. Nero v. Indus.

Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 930 (5th Cir. 1999) (not permitting consequential

damages). 

The FMLA and its accompanying regulations do not expressly provide for

emotional distress damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 825.400(c).

The FMLA only permits recovery for “wages, salary, employment benefits, or other

compensation denied or lost,” and when such benefits are not denied or lost, an

eligible employee may recover “any actual monetary losses sustained . . . as a direct

result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II). We thus conclude emotional distress damages are not

available under the FMLA, and affirm the district court’s denial of emotional distress

damages. 

C. Equitable Relief

Rodgers argues the district court abused its discretion in refusing to award

equitable relief. Specifically, Rodgers contends the City interfered with her right to

take FMLA leave by discouraging her from taking leave, including delaying the

approval of her leave, disciplining her for taking leave, and stripping her of her job

duties for taking leave. We review a district court’s denial of equitable relief for an

abuse of discretion. Midwest Oilseeds, Inc. v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 387 F.3d

705, 715 (8th Cir. 2004). 

“Among other prohibitions, [the] FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering

with an employee’s exercise of her FMLA rights.” Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester

Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 2001). The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any

employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,

any right provided.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). An employer who interferes with an

employee’s FMLA leave “shall be liable to any eligible employee affected” for

compensatory damages and “for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including

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employment, reinstatement, and promotion.” Id. § 2617(a)(1). The FMLA, however,

“provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.”

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002). “The remedy is

tailored to the harm suffered.” Id.

The City took no adverse employment action against Rodgers, and the

undisputed evidence shows Rodgers actually received her requested FMLA leave.

Because Rodgers suffered no prejudice, the FMLA provides no equitable relief, and

the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment on this

claim. 

D. Unpled Allegations

Finally, Rodgers contends the district court erred in failing to consider her

allegation the City continued to violate the FMLA after Rodgers filed her complaint.

Rodgers’s complaint alleged the City violated the FMLA in 2002, and Rodgers never

sought leave to amend her complaint to allege the City violated the FMLA in 2004

and 2005. Accordingly, the district court properly refused to consider unpled

allegations. See N. States Power Co. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 358 F.3d 1050, 1057

(8th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile we recognize that the pleading requirements under the

Federal Rules are relatively permissive, they do not entitle parties to manufacture

claims, which were not pled, late into the litigation for the purpose of avoiding

summary judgment.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion or commit any

error of law.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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