Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00638/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00638-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN PEASE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv638-WQH-BLM

ORDER

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, and SAN

DIEGO CITY CLERK ELIZABETH

MALAND, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining

Order (“Application for Temporary Restraining Order”), filed by Plaintiff Bryan Pease. 

(ECF No. 3).

I. Background

On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and

Declaratory Relief to Remedy Violation of Civil Rights (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1), the

Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3), and a Proof of Service and

declaration stating that the Summons and the Application for Temporary Restraining

Order were served on Defendants City of San Diego (“City”) and San Diego City Clerk

Elizabeth Maland (“Maland”) (ECF Nos. 3-2, 4).

Plaintiff asserts that he “is a serious contender for interim appointment to the San

Diego City Council District 2 seat that was made vacant by the recent special mayoral

election.” (ECF No. 3 at 2). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant San Diego City Clerk

Elizabeth Maland “is refusing to process the application papers of [Plaintiff] to be

considered for the appointment, based on alleged failure to meet the technical terms of

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the durational residency requirement” of San Diego Municipal Code (“SDMC”) 27.0119,

which provides that “[n]o individual is eligible to run for or hold the office of a

Councilmember ... either by election or appointment, unless ... that individual was a

registered voter of the district at least thirty calendar days prior to the date nomination

papers were filed by the candidate ... or at least thirty calendar days prior to the date of

filing an application for appointment to an elective office....” Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff

contends: 

The decision by city staff was based on [Plaintiff]’s most recent registration in District 2 having taken place on February 19, 2014, which was less than 30 days prior to the March 17, 2014 filing deadline for nomination papers. However, [Plaintiff] also lived in District 2 from 2004-2007 and was a

registered voter in the district during that entire time period. Thus,

[Plaintiff] ‘was a registered voter of the district at least thirty calendar days prior to the date nomination papers were filed.’

Unlike Government Code section 25041, dealing with election eligibility for county boards, SDMC 27.0119 does not state that registration must have been for thirty days ‘immediately’ prior to filing papers. Because seven years is a longer period than thirty days, [Plaintiff] easily meets the requirement of SDMC 27.0119 that he ‘was a registered voter of the district at least thirty calendar days prior to the date nomination papers were filed.’

Id. at 4 (quoting SDMC 27.0119(b)(2)). Plaintiff contends that “First Amendment rights

to free speech and petitioning are at stake, and ... residency requirements are evaluated

under strict scrutiny.” Id. Plaintiff contends that he “has complied with the exact

requirements of the ordinance to the letter and should not be denied an opportunity to

present his case to the City Council for why he would be a good choice for this

appointment.” Id. Plaintiff “requests a temporary restraining order preventing

Respondents from refusing to accept Petitioner’s application to be considered by the City

Council for the interim District 2 seat by reason of Petitioner allegedly failing to meet the

thirty day durational residency requirement.” Id. at 5-6.

The Petition alleges two causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell

v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for

violation of Plaintiff’s “First Amendment rights to petition his government and to seek

appointment to the District 2 seat.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 21). The Petition requests declaratory

and injunctive relief and attorney fees. The Petition alleges that “[t]he City Council will

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hold a hearing on April 14-15 [during] which candidates for the position will be

considered. [Plaintiff] therefore requires emergency declaratory relief and a temporary

restraining order to allow his application to be considered.” Id. at 6.

In support of the Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiff submits

his own affidavit which states that, on March 17, 2014, Plaintiff attempted to submit a

completed application for appointment to Council District 2, but “City staff refused to

process my application due to my most recent voter registration in District 2 having been

on February 19, 2014.” (Pease Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 3-1). Plaintiff states that he has “been

a registered voter in District 2 for over three years, which was seven years prior to

applying for this appointment. [Plainitff] lived at 230 Ivy Street, Apartment 2 and was

registered to vote there from 2004 to approximately 2007.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff states that

he has “only one residence, which is [his] home in Ocean Beach [in District 2], and [he

has] lived there for over a year.” Id. ¶ 6.

On March 28, 2014, Defendants filed an opposition to the Application for

Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 8). Defendants contend that the City “has

consistently applied its residency requirements to all potential candidates for elective

office since they were adopted.” Id. at 5. Defendants contend:

[Plaintiff]’s strained interpretation is not supported by the ordinary meaning of the language of the SDMC, it runs counter to the Council’s intent for

enacting the requirements, and would produce absurd results, such as

allowing for the appointment and/or election of candidates who did not live

in the district that they seek to represent. [Plaintiff] has not, and cannot, establish the four requirements needed for a [temporary restraining order] to issue, and, therefore, his application must be denied.

Id. at 5-6.

Defendants submit Maland’s declaration and numerous exhibits. Maland states

that, pursuant to the SDMC, the deadline for filing the required application forms for

appointment to fill the Council District 2 vacancy was March 17, 2014, by 5:00 p.m. 

(Maland Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 8-1). Maland states that, on March 17, 2014, at 4:16 p.m.,

Plaintiff “came into [Maland’s] office ... to file his application to be considered for

appointment to fill the Council District 2 vacancy.” Id. ¶ 6. Maland states that Plaintiff

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“had registered to vote at his current address on-line on February 19, 2014, which meant

that, as of March 17, 2014, he had only been a resident and registered voter at his current

address for twenty-six (26) days.” Id. ¶ 8. Maland states that “[s]ince [Plaintiff] did not

meet the City’s minimum residency requirements set forth in the SDMC, [Maland]

informed him that [Maland] would be unable to accept his application papers.” Id. ¶ 10. 

Maland states that “[t]he residency requirement was uniformly and consistently applied

to all potential candidates, including [Plaintiff], for the current Council District 2

vacancy,” and “the residency requirements contained in SDMC section 27.0119 have

been uniformly and consistently applied in the same manner they were towards potential

applicants for the current Council District 2 vacancy for every election and/or

appointment that has taken place since [Maland] joined the Office of the City Clerk” in

2000. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Maland states that a “total of nineteen (19) have been confirmed as

being qualified to be considered for the current Council District 2 vacancy appointment.” 

Id. ¶ 17.

Defendants submit a memorandum from the San Diego City Attorney dated

September 30, 1976, which summarized an earlier report from the City Attorney and

stated:

[B]ecause of the effect of the case of Johnson v. Hamilton, 15 Cal. 3d 461

(1975) the residency requirements for elective office found in Section 7 of

the [City] Charter were no longer valid. We suggested the adoption of an ordinance to add a section to the Municipal Code providing for the maximum residency requirements permissible under the court ruling. Without the ordinance, the only requirement applicable is that an elective

officer be a resident of the City or Council district at the time the officer

takes office. We suggested that the Municipal Code be amended to include a longer residency period, that is, a candidate or appointee shall have been a resident of the City or district 30 days prior to the time of filing an application for nomination or appointment.

(ECF No. 8-3 at 8). Defendants submit the SDMC provision passed after the case of

Johnson v. Hamilton, which states:

No individual is eligible to run for or hold the office of a Councilmember,

other than the Mayor, either by election or appointment, unless:

(1) that individual is, at the time of assuming such office, a resident and voter of the district from which nomination or

appointment is sought, and

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(2) that individual was a registered voter of the district at least

thirty calendar days prior to the date nomination papers were filed by the candidate pursuant to the nomination and write-in

procedures in this article or at least thirty calendar days prior to the date of filing an application for appointment to an elective office pursuant to Section 27.0804 of this article.

SDMC § 27.0119(b), ECF No. 8-5 at 27. Defendants submit portions of the City Charter

and the SDMC sections dealing with the procedure for filling vacancies in elective offices

by appointment, SDMC §§ 27.0801-27.0809, and the procedures for being nominated to

be on the ballot for an election to a municipal office, SDMC §§ 27.0201-27.0222. (ECF

No. 8-5).

On March 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the Application for

Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff states that he “has learned that the

City Council hearing to fill the vacant District 2 seat will now be on April 7 rather than

April 14 as previously thought.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff attaches a declaration from Floyd

Morrow, who was a deputy San Diego City Attorney in the 1960’s, who was elected to

the San Diego City Council in 1965, and who is “the longest serving member of the San

Diego City Council in history, having served for over 12 years on the Council.” (Morrow

Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 9-1). Morrow asserts that the intention of the City Council in passing

the ordinance at issue was not “to limit our own ability to appoint members to fill vacant

seats on the City Council to only individuals who had been registered to vote in the

district for the thirty days immediately prior to submitting nomination papers.” Id. ¶ 4.

On April 2, 2014, Defendants filed objections to Morrow’s declaration. (ECF No.

10). In deciding the pending motion, the Court does not consider Morrow’s declaration. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ objections to Morrow’s declaration are denied as moot.

II. Discussion

When the nonmovant has received notice, as here, the standard for issuing a

temporary restraining order is the same as that for issuing a preliminary injunction. See

Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not

be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

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Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation omitted). The party seeking

preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of showing “that he is likely to succeed on

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “Serious questions going to the merits

and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of

a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of

irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

The interpretation of municipal ordinances and charters “is governed by rules of

statutory construction.” Canfield v. Sullivan, 774 F.2d 1466, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1985)

(citation omitted). Federal courts apply state rules of statutory construction when

interpreting municipal laws. See id.; see also McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882

F.2d 384, 387-88 (9th Cir. 1989). When California courts interpret a statutory provision:

[O]ur paramount task is to ascertain the intent of those who enacted it. To

determine that intent, we look first to the language of the [statutory] text, giving the words their ordinary meaning. If the language is clear, there is no need for construction. If the language is ambiguous, however, we

consider extrinsic evidence of the enacting body’s intent.

Thompson v. Dep’t of Corr., 25 Cal. 4th 117, 122 (2001) (citations omitted). After

review of the submissions of the parties and applying the applicable rules of statutory

construction, the Court does not conclude that Plaintiff has established that “section

27.0119 by its clear terms does not require voter registration in the district for 30 days

‘immediately’ prior to applying for appointment to the City Council seat for that district,

but just registration for at least 30 days at some point prior to the application being

made.” (Compl. at 6, ECF No. 1). However, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s interpretation

of the statute is sufficiently plausible to raise “serious questions going to the merits” of

his claims. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135.

Plaintiff contends that he will be irreparably harmed if the Court does not grant the

Application for Temporary Restraining Order because he will be denied “his First

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Amendment rights to free speech and petitioning,” by being “denied an opportunity to

present his case to the City Council for why he would be a good choice for this

appointment.” (ECF No. 3 at 4). Defendants contend that Plaintiff will not suffer

irreparable harm because it “is highly unlikely that [Plaintiff], whose eligibility would be

clouded by this pending litigation at the time a decision must be made [by the City

Council to fill the vacant District 2 seat], would be considered a viable candidate by the

Council.” (ECF No. 8 at 16-17). After considering the submissions of the parties, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary injunctive relief.

Plaintiff contends that “[t]here is no harm to the City in the requested relief being

granted, because if the City Council does not want to appoint [Plaintiff] to the position,

there is nothing requiring it to do so.” (ECF No. 3 at 5). Plaintiff contends that “granting

a [temporary restraining order] would allow the democratic process to play out, which is

also in the public interest.” ECF No. 9 at 12; see also ECF No. 1 at 2 (“‘The vigor of a

democracy depends upon the continued infusion into the stream of public debate of the

views and proposals of the many.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Hamilton, 15 Cal. 3d 461, 471

(1975)). Defendants contend that “[t]o have the City’s residency requirements applied

differently to [Plaintiff] than to all other individuals that applied to be considered for the

District 2 vacancy would not be equitable or in the public interest,” and Plaintiff’s

“lawsuit is simply a desperate attempt to cure his own failure to timely register [to vote]

at his current address.” (ECF No. 8 at 16). After considering the submissions of the

parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the balance of equities tips

sharply in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application for Temporary Restraining Order

is GRANTED. (ECF No. 3). From the date of this Order until otherwise ordered by this

Court, Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego City Clerk Elizabeth Maland are

restrained from refusing to accept Plaintiff Bryan Pease’s application to be considered

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by the City Council for the interim District 2 seat by reason of Plaintiff allegedly failing

to meet the thirty-day durational residency requirement. No later than April 16, 2014, the

parties shall file a status report.

DATED: April 4, 2014

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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