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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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I, j 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOYCE DIXON, Individually and as 

Administratrix of the Estate of 

WESLEY DIXON, deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

THE CITY OF LAWTON, OKLAHOMA; 

OFFICER DAN BORDERS; OFFICER 

SAM HELTON AND LIEUTENANT BILL 

ADAMSON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

1-:tLV:D . U<1it~.:d S~-.t~1f (;p~t! ~£ App(!ab 

Tenth C1r~ut 

MAR -. 8 ·tQ§fJ 

ROBERT L. t-IOECKER. 

Clerk 

No. 86-2447 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CIV-84-2241-T) 

Michael A. Williams (Daria Aguirre with him on the brief), Sherman 

& Howard, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Richard L. Denney (Lydia JoAnn Barrett with him on the brief), 

Denney Law Firm, Norman, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before TACHA, GARTH* and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Senior United Circuit Judge 

for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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Plaintiff-appellant administratrix brought this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 u.s.c. SS 1983 and 1985(3) against 

defendants-appellees City of Lawton and three police officers 

seeking redress for the shooting death of her son, Wesley Raynard 

Dixon (Dixon). After a six-day trial, the jury on specific 

interrogatories found in favor of each individual defendant and 

the city on the S 1983 claim, and in favor of the individual 

defendants on the S 1985(3) claim. The district court entered 

judgment on the jury verdict in favor of all defendants. 

Plaintiff now appeals arguing that 1) the district court's jury 

instruction concerning S 1985(3) was erroneous because it 

instructed that S 1983 liability was a condition precedent to 

liability under S 1985(3), and 2) the district court's admission 

of psychotherapist-patient communications was erroneous because of 

evolving federal common law privilege. While we do not agree with 

the second point, we agree with the first point. Nevertheless, we 

affirm the judgment because our review of the record convinces us 

that plaintiff's theory of the case was encompassed completely 

under S 1983. Accordingly, the error was harmless. 

This tragic Sunday morning incident began after plaintiff's 

decedent Wesley Dixon spotted a neighbor and friend, Rhonda Perry, 

in a parked car with her boyfriend, Rodney Harris (Harris). 

According to one account, Dixon slapped Rhonda Perry while she was 

seated in the car because Dixon suspected her of cheating on his 

best friend, Bobby Dale. The conflict escalated. Harris jumped 

out the car and a fistfight broke out between Harris and Dixon. A 

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neighborhood crowd gathered and several people separated Harris 

and Dixon for a short time. The fight resumed with Harris as the 

aggressor, however, and the two were separated again. 

After the fight was broken up the second time, a close friend 

and neighbor of the Dixon family, Dorothy Jackson, asked Dixon 

what was wrong. He indicated that he was all right. She then 

asked him about his belt buckle, which displayed the name "Dick." 

Without responding verbally to her question, Dixon undressed while 

outside. Dorothy Jackson's son-in-law, Virgil Maddox, then got a 

blanket, covered the naked Dixon and tried to calm and restrain 

him. Dixon was moved to the Maddox porch (across the street from 

the Dixon home) where Dixon twice asked his nephew, Stacey Sutton, 

to bring him a gun. Sutton refused. Dixon then was taken home by 

Maddox and Broderick Jackson, son of Dorothy Jackson. 

Once home, Dixon talked with Maddox and Broderick Jackson. 

The two no longer restrained him. Broderick Jackson testified: 

You know he's (Dixon) talking about God, said God is 

tired of all these people, you know, sleeping 

with ••• other men's wives, and things like that, God 

is tired of all the sin. He said .•. God sent him on 

a mission--God sent him on a mission of some sort. 

Rec. vol. III at 469. Dixon then became agitated, went to the 

back of his home and returned with a gun. Maddox wrestled the gun 

away from Dixon and gave it to Stacey Sutton, who put it in a coat 

closet. 

By this time, the Lawton police department had been called by 

neighbors. On the report that there was a naked man with a gun, 

defendant-appellee Officer Borders (Borders) was dispatched to the 

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scene and arrived first. Defendants-appellees Lieutenant Adamson 

(Adamson) and Officer Helton arrived thereafter. An unidentified 

neighbor ran out of the Dixon home yelling: "He's got a gun." On 

this information, an understanding was reached between Officer 

Borders and Broderick Jackson, who had come outside, whereby 

Jackson would attempt to persuade Dixon to come out of his home 

without the gun. While the officers waited outside, Broderick 

Jackson went inside the Dixon home. Jackson testified that Dixon 

initially indicated that he would comply with the police request, 

but that he needed some clothes from his coat closet. Dixon 

proceeded to the closet and dived for his gun. Rec. vol. III at 

472. Maddox then attempted to take the gun away from Dixon a 

second time. 

By this time, the officers were at the front door of the 

home. Betty Sutton Womack, Dixon's sister, declined to let the 

officers inside. Adamson and Borders heard a physical struggle in 

progress and pushed Betty Sutton Womack aside. They saw Maddox 

attempting to restrain Dixon, who had an Armalite AR-18 

semi-automatic gas operated rifle1 with an ammunition clip in it. 

The ejector port was open, which indicated that the bolt of the 

rifle had been cocked. Adamson grabbed the barrel end of the 

rifle and Borders the stock end. Although Dixon was in a 

crouched position with Maddox attempting to restrain him, Dixon 

would not let go of the rifle after being told to do so by 

Adamson. Unable to obtain control of the rifle and having lost 

1 The officers thought the rifle was an M-16. 

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his night stick in the struggle, Borders struck Dixon twice on the 

side of his head with his .357 magnum service revolver while 

Lieutentant Adamson tried to control the barrel end of Dixon's 

rifle. At this point, Maddox left. According to the officers, 

Dixon fired two shots which hit the floor. Borders testified that 

he thought .Adamson had been shot and that he would be next. With 

his left hand, Borders pushed Dixon to the right and fired five 

times. In the process, Borders shot himself in the left thumb. 

Again, according to the officers, Dixon continued to fire the 

rifle. 

Dixon probably lost consciousness within minutes and may have 

lived thirty minutes before expiring. Dixon's autopsy revealed 

the presence in his bodily fluids of phencyclidine, commonly known 

as PCP, a potent hallucinogen with pronounced behavioral toxicity. 

Rec. vol. Vat 901. This drug has an unpredictable dose-response 

relationship and produces bizarre and frequently violent behavior 

in the user. Id. at 901-04. Seven expended cartridges, six of 

which were positively identified as being fired from Dixon's AR-18 

rifle, were recovered, although defendants' firearms expert could 

not state with certainty when the cartridges were fired and 

plaintiff's witnesses testified that they heard only five or six 

shots fired. Some traces of nitrite and lead were found on the 

carpet where the incident occurred, and defendants' firearm expert 

testified that this was consistent with the firing of a .223 

caliber cartridge bullet (used in Dixon's AR-18 rifle) because the 

bullet frequently disintegrates upon impact. On direct 

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examination, defendants' firearms expert did not think that the 

nitrite and lead traces were from any of the rounds fired from 

Borders' .357 service revolver because the floor would have been a 

secondary target, but on cross examination the expert admitted 

that he could not say with certainty from which firearm came the 

traces. 

The trial focused on fourth and fourteenth amendment claims. 

Plaintiff claimed that Dixon was deprived of life and liberty 

without due process of law by the defendants, specifically that 

the individual defendants accomplished an unlawful seizure of 

Dixon marked by excessive force. Plaintiff also claimed that the 

individual defendants conspired to cover up this excessive use of 

force by giving false testimony and tampering with evidence at the 

scene. According to the plaintiff, the City of Lawton had a 

custom or policy of excessive force, brought about in part by a 

failure to screen, train and supervise its officers. Defendants' 

disputed these claims and contended that throughout the entire 

incident they were unable to obtain control of Dixon's AR-18 rifle 

and that deadly force was necessary and appropriate in order to 

preserve lives endangered by Dixon. 

Concerning § 1985(3), the trial court instructed in pertinent 

part that: "You need consider the question of defendants' 

liability under the plaintiff's additional claim brought under 

Section 1985 only if you first find that a defendant is liable 

under Section 1983." Rec. vol. VII at 1403. Plaintiff's trial 

counsel properly objected: 

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We object to the instruction that indicated you 

could only consider the 1985 action if a finding as to a 

1983 violation--unless a finding to a 1983 violation was 

made out. We don't believe that to be the law. We 

believe the law is that they are separate and distinct 

causes of action, neither are they dependent on the 

other. 

Id. at 1424-25. On appeal, plaintiff claims that the instruction 

confused the-jury and precluded jury consideration of rights 

protected by the thirteenth amendment. 

We review a challenged jury instruction, not in isolation, 

but as part of the entire charge and in the context of the entire 

trial. United States v. Park, 421 u.s. 658, 674-75 (1975}; ~ 

v. Naughten, 414 u.s. 141, 146-47 (1973). We must be satisfied 

that the jury instructions as a whole were "not misleading and 

contained an adequate statement of the law to guide the jury's 

determination." Park, 421 u.s. at 675. 

As an initial matter, we note that our review of the trial 

court's instructions to the jury has not been enhanced by the 

state of this record. First, the district court docket sheet 

indicates that the hard copy of the district court's instructions, 

furnished to the jury for guidance, rec. vol. VII at 

1422-23, did not remain filed and entered on the docket. 2 

Accordingly, it is not part of the record on appeal. Moreover, we 

lack a recorded account of the genesis of these instructions. 

During trial, the judge indicated that he would meet with counsel 

2 The district court docket sheet contains the following 

notation with all but the last word been crossed out: 

Q8 i!e 88 ~ INS'I'RQC'I'IQNS -* ~ ('I'AOIR~oon) w£. error. 

If initially filed and docketed in regular course, the 

instructions should not have been removed. 

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in his library to settle instructions. See, ~' rec. vols. III 

at 499, VI at 1314. These meetings do not appear to have been of 

record; therefore, we lack a transcript. Finally, the comment of 

plaintiff's trial counsel concerning the court's methodology of 

settling instructions causes us some concern: 

Plaintiff's Counsel: Of course, we want to be sure the 

record is clear we are renewing our requested 

instructions, and I think the Court, through your law 

assistant, has taken that into consideration, but I'm 

not sure it's on the record anywhere. 

Rec. vol. VII at 1429. We discuss these points in hopes of 

simplifying the task of adequate appellate review. 

A copy of the numbered instructions filed of record 

facilitates our review so we may better understand references to 

the instructions by the court and the parties. Frequently the 

district court will prepare and file sua sponte a copy of the 

court's instructions to the jury. If the court has prepared such 

a copy, but has not filed it, counsel should consider requesting 

that it be filed. We recognize that instruction conferences held 

in open court in civil cases need not be recorded if the parties 

agree and the judge approves, 28 u.s.c. § 753(b), and that 

instructions sometimes are discussed in chambers prior to making a 

record. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 789 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978). However, we think that in 

those cases where disagreement about the instructions is 

anticipated, the better practice is to put instruction conferences 

on the record, even though these conferences precede final 

objections upon the instructions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. 

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Finally, we have noted that it is the judge's sole responsibility 

to resolve issues concerning the instructions and that reliance 

upon law clerks for this function is improper. United States v. 

Sloan, 811 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

Turning to the merits of the § 1985(3) instruction, the 

district court's instruction is erroneous as a matter of law. 

There are several differences between § 1983 3 and § 1985(3) 4 and 

it was error to precondition consideration of plaintiff's 

§ 1985(3) claim upon a finding of § 1983 liability. Although 

3 

4 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory 

or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) provides in pertinent part: 

If two or more persons in any State or Territory 

conspire .•. for the purpose of depriving, either 

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons 

of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 

privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the 

purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted 

authorities of any State or Territory from giving or 

securing to all persons within such State or Territory 

the equal protection of the laws; ... in any case of 

conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more 

persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act 

in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby 

another is injured in his person or property, or 

deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege 

of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured 

or deprived may have an action for the recovery of 

damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, 

against any one or more of the conspirators. 

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neither § 1983 nor § 1985(3) create any substantive rights, a 

§ 1983 claim generally describes a substantive violation of a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws, whereas a § 1985(3) 

claim generally describes a conspiracy of two or more persons for 

the purpose of depriving of another of equal protection of the 

laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws. 

Section 1985(3) requires proof of a conspiracy, while § 1983 does 

not. Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 

1430 n.l4 (8th Cir. 1986); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 

1205, 1255 n.64 (7th Cir. 1984). Section 1983 requires that a 

defendant have acted under color of state law, while § 1985(3) 

does not. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971). 

Finally, § 1985(3) requires proof that a conspirator's action was 

motivated by a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus; 

there is no such requirement under § 1983. Griffin, 403 u.s. at 

102; Cassettari v. Nevada County, 824 F.2d 735, 739-40 (9th Cir. 

1987). Thus, section 1985(3) provides for redress of injuries 

which result from private conspiracies driven by "some racial or 

otherwise class-based discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 u.s. 

at 102; Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156, 158 (lOth Cir. 1980). 

A § 1985(3) private conspiracy motivated by racial concerns "must 

aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by 

the law to all." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 

Plaintiff points out that one of the sources of congressional 

power to enact§ 1985(3), a statute which reaches private 

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conspiracies, was the thirteenth amendment.5 See Griffin, 403 

u.s. at 104-07. The thirteenth amendment empowers Congress "to 

determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the 

authority to translate that determination into effective 

legislation." Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 

Section 1985(3) assists in accomplishing that end by providing a 

remedy. Applying the thirteenth amendment and§ 1985(3), we have 

held that a racially motivated conspiracy to interfere with a 

minority person's right to public accommodations is actionable. 

Fisher, 624 F.2d at 159. 

According to plaintiff, the difficulty with the district 

court's § 1985(3) instruction is that it renders thirteenth 

amendment rights vindicated under § 1985(3) "virtually impotent" 

and subordinate to fourteenth amendment rights vindicated under 

S 1983. Appellant's Brief at 11. This argument is flawed in two 

respects. First, § 1983 and § 1985(3) do not create independent 

substantive rights; they are procedural statutes which provide a 

remedy for deprivation of existing rights. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & 

Loan v. Novotny, 442 u.s. 366, 372, 376 (1979) (interpreting 

§ 1985(3)); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 u.s. 600, 

5 u.s. Canst. am. XIII provides: 

§ l. Slavery prohibited. 

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 

punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 

duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 

any place subject to their jurisdiction. 

§ 2. Power to enforce amendment. 

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 

appropriate legislation. 

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617-188 (1979) (interpreting S 1983); Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 

150, 154 (lOth Cir. 1980). Second, the complaint never mentioned 

the thirteenth amendment as a basis of liability, see rec. vol. I, 

doc. 2 at 2 (paragraph in complaint listing specific 

constitutional provisions implicated), and our review of the 

record convinces us that the plaintiff's claims proven at trial 

were grounded in the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 

We note that the district judge struggled with whether to 

grant a directed verdict on plaintiff's S 1985(3) conspiracy claim 

and wanted the record to reflect his "serious misgivings" about 

it. Rec. vol. IV at 644, 1328-29. These misgivings were well 

placed because testimony and physical evidence concerning alleged 

racial incidents which were central to plaintiff's § 1985(3) 

claim, see rec. vol. V at 791, repeatedly were ruled inadmissible. 

See, ~, rec. vol. IV at 624-34, vol. V at 796-99. These 

rulings have not been challenged on appeal. Applying the directed 

verdict standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) after considering the 

admissible evidence (which does not include inflammatory rhetoric 

by plaintiff's trial counsel), and recognizing that a scintilla of 

evidence on the S 1985(3) claim was insufficient to withstand 

defendants' motions for a directed verdict, see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986), the defendants 

were entitled to a directed verdict on the § 1985(3) claim because 

of a lack of evidence tending to show a racially based, 

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the defendants' actions. 

See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 

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Regarding a conspiracy claim, we think that plaintiff 

recognized the problems with the § 1985(3) claim. After plaintiff 

rested, the court asked plaintiff to explain how the evidence was 

sufficient to withstand the defendants' directed verdict motions 

on the § 1985(3) claim. Rec. vol. IV at 638. In response, 

plaintiff's trial counsel correctly stated: "I believe we have a 

[§] 1983 conspiracy." Id. He then moved to conform the pleadings 

to the proof without objection. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(b). We agree with plaintiff that the evidence was sufficient 

to withstand a directed verdict on § 1983 conspiracy claim. 6 

6 By a § 1983 conspiracy claim, we mean a conspiracy to violate 

a right protected by § 1983; in other words, a conspiracy to 

deprive a plaintiff of a constitutional or federally protected 

right under color of state law. Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 

425 (11th Cir. 1988); see,~' Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 795 

F.2d 612, 628 (7th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy to retaliate against a 

person for exercise of first and fourteenth amendment rights 

remediable under § 1983); Cameo Convalescent Center v. Senn, 738 

F.2d 836, 840-43 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 F.2d 1106 

(1985) (conspiracy to prosecute meritless claims and deny hearing 

on appeal remediable under§ 1983). 

A § 1983 conspiracy claim may arise when a private actor 

conspires with state actor to deprive a person of a constitutional 

right under color of state law. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 

24, 29 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 u.s. 144, 149-152 

(1970). The conspiracy provides the requisite color of state law 

under § 1983. 

A § 1983 conspiracy claim also may arise when a plaintiff 

does not wish to rely exclusively on § 1985(3) with its 

requirement of class-based, discriminatory animus. For example, a 

plaintiff might be unable to prove a racially motivated 

conspiracy, but could prove a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff 

of civil rights under color of state law. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 

849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1988); Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 

332, 338 (5th Cir. 1987); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer 

Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1430 n.14 (8th Cir. 1986). 

Provided that there is an underlying constitutional 

deprivation, the conspiracy claim allows for imputed liability; a 

plaintiff may be able to impose liability on one defendant for the 

actions of another performed in the course of the conspiracy. 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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However, no instruction was tendered to the court on this theory, 

no objection was made to the court's instructions as inadequate on 

this theory, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, and this issue has not been 

raised or briefed by plaintiff's appellate counsel. Thus, this 

case differs from Cameo Convalescent Center v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 

840-43 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985), where 

the district court's failure to give a requested jury instruction 

on conspiracy under § 1983 resulted in reversible error. 

Apart from having waived the issue,7 any error in failing to 

submit a § 1983 conspiracy theory to the jury was harmless, given 

the jury's apparent conclusion that none of these defendants 

violated Dixon's constitutional rights through the use of 

excessive force. What remains of plaintiff's claims thereafter is 

insufficient to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim; for in addition 

to proving an agreement, plaintiff was required to prove an actual 

deprivation of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws," 42 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (lst Cir. 1980); 

Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir. 1983). 

7 Along the same lines of waiver, we note that plaintiff's 

appellate counsel has not raised the issue of the trial court's 

instructing on qualified immunity over the objection of both 

plaintiff and defendants. See rec. vol. VII at 1400-01 

(instruction on qualified immunity); id. at 1424, 1427 

(objections). Although plaintiff's docketing statement indicates 

a general intention to appeal jury instructions, any issue 

concerning this particular instruction was not briefed, see Fed. 

R. App. P. 28(a), and we deem it abandoned. Collins v. City of 

San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1988); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 

742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

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u.s.c. § 1983. Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 845 (1st Cir. 

1988); Villanueva v. Mcinnis, 723 F.2d 414, 418-19 (5th Cir. 

1984). Thus, we join those courts which have recognized that to 

recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead 

and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of 

rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be 

insufficient. Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742-43 

(1st Cir. 1980); ~also Kaplan v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 

794 F.2d 1059v 1065 (5th Cir. 1986); Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 

1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1985); Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1395 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 1038 (1984); Hampton v. 

Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 622-23 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part on 

other grounds, 446 u.s. 754 1980). This is because the essence of 

a § 1983 claim is the deprivation of the right rather than the 

conspiracy., Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 

n.2 (7th Cir. 1975). 

Finally, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in 

admitting certain information contained in Dixon's medical records 

from a community mental health center. Approximately one month 

before the incident in question, Dixon had sought treatment as an 

inpatient, but left within 24 hours. Defendants offered the 

information in response to plaintiff's evidence tending to show 

that Dixon did not use drugs and did not have psychological 

problems. See rec. vol. VI at 1099-1100. The medical records 

contain Dixon's response to a question concerning whether he used 

any "street drugs." Dixon answered affirmatively, indicated the 

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type as "everything but heroin," and indicated that the frequency 

of use was "occasionally." Addendum to Appellant's Brief, defo 

ex. 15. The medical records also contain a screening report from 

triage, taken by a staff member of the mental health center, which 

discusses Dixon's admitted propensity to engage in violent 

behavior to gain attention, including an incident in which he 

threatened to shoot his wife and himself. Id. The district court 

determined that the information contained in the medical records 

was relevant and probative, rec. vol. VI at 1288, vol. VII at 

1323, and the issue before us is whether these records are 

privileged. 

Whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in this 

circuit pursuant to federal common law as interpreted "in the 

light of reason and experience," Fed. R. Evid. 501, remains 

undecided. United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 830-31 (1986) 

(per curiam). We note that such a privilege has been recognized 

in the Sixth Circuit, In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 464 u.s. 983 (1983), and adopted by statute in 

Oklahoma. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, S 2503 (West 1980). The 

psychotherapist-patient privilege has been rejected by other 

circuits. United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1542 (1989); United States v. 

Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 u.s. 853 

(1976). Once again, however, we need not decide whether to 

recognize a federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege 

in this circuit. See Crews, 781 F.2d at 831. Assuming, without 

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deciding, that such a privilege does exist, we would look to 

Supreme Court Model Rule and hold that the privilege does not 

apply in these circumstances. 

Model Rule 504, proposed by the Judicial Conference Advisory 

Committee on Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court but not 

enacted by Congress, would have created a psychotherapist-patient 

privilege. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1972). Although a personal 

representative of a deceased patient may claim the privilege, 

there are exceptions. Model Rule 504 provided in pertinent part: 

(d) Exceptions. 

111 Condition an element of claim or defense. There 

is no privilege under this rule as to communications 

relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional 

condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he 

relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or 

defense, or, after the patient's death, in any 

proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition 

as an element of his claim or defense. 

Id. at 241. The Advisory Committee Note explained the rationale 

for the rule: "By injecting his condition into litigation, the 

patient must be said to waive the privilege, in fairness and to 

avoid abuses. Similar considerations prevail after the patient's 

death." Id. at 244; see also 2 D. Louisell & c. Mueller, Federal 

EvidenceS 216 at 858 (1985) (discussing waiver or privilege). 

Although the plaintiff apparently put Dixon's mental 

condition at issue by claiming emotional distress and seeking 

damages for "mental pain and suffering of the decedent prior to 

his death," rec. vol. I at 10, 13 (complaint), plaintiff argues 

that "claims of emotional distress or suffering should not be the 

basis for unlimited exposure of Dixon's previous mental health 

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II II 

condition." Appellant's Brief at 22 (citing In re Lifschutz, 467 

P.2d 557, 571-72 (Cal. 1970)) •. We hardly think that the 

disclosure of these pyschotherapist-patient communications 

constituted "unlimited exposure of Dixon's previous mental 

condition." These communications arise from Dixo·n' s one-day stay 

at a mental health center approximately one month before the 

incident in question. Thus, the communications at issue are 

brief, recent and directly related to issues necessarily injected 

into this lawsuit by the plaintiff. 

Even if we viewed the subject matter of Dixon's 

communications to the psychotherapist as pertaining, not to an 

element of plaintiff's claim, but as pertaining only to the 

defense of this action, we would reach the same result. "After 

the patient's death, the privilege does not apply 'in any 

proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an 

element of his claim or defense' so that little scope remains for 

the personal representative's right to claim the 

privilege •.•• " 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 

Evidence ,I 504[07] at 504-35 (emphasis in original), but see id. 

at 504-35 n.l5 (criticizing model rule which would allow 

disclosure of psychotherapist patient communications at the behest 

of adverse party after death of patient). We find the approach of 

the model rule to be a reasonable accommodation of the competing 

interests inherent in such privilege and in accordance with the 

above would find the privilege not applicable to the 

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II II 

communications in this case. Accordinly, the admission of 

defendants' exhibit 15 was not error on the ground of privilege. 

AFFIRMED. 

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II I 

Dixon, Joyce v. The City of Lawton, Oklahoma, No. 86-2447 

GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

Although I concur in almost all of the majority's 

opinion and in its judgment, I write separately because I do not 

agree with two significant statements that appear in the majority 

opinion, albeit as dicta. 

On page 13, the majority opinion characterizes as 

"correct" a statement by plaintiff's counsel that "I believe we 

have a [§] 1983 conspiracy." Further, on the same page, it 

concludes that "(w]e agree with plaintiff that the evidence was 

sufficient to withstand a directed verdict on §1983 conspiracy 

claim." Thus, the majority finds a conspiracy to violate Dixon's 

constitutional rights protected by § 1983. But such a conspiracy 

was never pleaded. It also finds evidence of such a conspiracy 

in the record -- evidence that was never adduced. Nor was any 

such claim or evidence even mentioned at oral argument. 

Indeed, as ·even the majority opinion itself recognizes 

(at page 14 and fn. 7), the issue of whether there was a conspiracy to violate §1983 was never raised on this appeal. The only 

issues raised before us, as the majority opinion accurately 

recounts (at page 2), were: the district court's error in its· 

§1985(3) instruction, and the admission of psychotherapistpatient communications. The court has appropriately and 

correctly addressed and analyzed both of those claims. And, in 

the absence of extraordinary circumstances, none of which appear 

here, we are foreclosed from entertaining issues not presented to 

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•' 

II I 

us as issues on appeal. Adams-Arapoe Joint School District No. 

28-J v. Continental Insurance. 891 F.2d 772, 776 (lOth Cir. 

1989) ("an issue not included in either the docketing statement 

or the statement of issues in the party's initial brief is waived 

on appeal"). See also, Braley v. Campbell. 832 F.2d 1504, 1508 

(lOth Cir. 1987) (en bane); Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 Fo2d 1237, 

1244 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

Moreover, my reading of the record and of the majority 

opinion (at 2-6), which graphically recites the relevant facts 

giving rise to this action (in particular, the circumstances of 

the police department responding to an emergency call) discloses 

no evidence of any such conspiracy --even if one had been pleaded 

and raised as an issue on this appeal. Thus, even though the 

majority correctly rules in the defendants' ,favor on this issue, 

I cannot subscribe to that portion of its opinion which declares 

that the plaintiff stated a conspiracy to violate Dixon's consti-' 

tutional rights under §1983 and offered evidence to that effect. 

In all other respects, I join the majority. 

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