Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-00704/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-00704-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROGER CLARK,

NO. CIV. S-98-704 LKK/GGH PS

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

COUNTY OF YUBA, et al

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion to vacate this

court’s December 16, 2002 order and plaintiff’s motion to reopen

the case. The court has reviewed the statements of opposition

filed by defendants. The matter is decided based on the papers and

without oral argument. 

Background 

Plaintiff originally filed suit on April 20, 1998. On June

12, 2002 the magistrate judge assigned to this case recommended

that decedents’ motion for summary judgment be granted. This court

adopted the findings and recommendations on December 16, 2002. The

Case 2:98-cv-00704-LKK -PAN Document 272 Filed 03/09/07 Page 1 of 4
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December 16 order terminated the case. Plaintiff appealed,

contending that he was not timely served with defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. On December 2, 2003, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the judgment of this court. The Ninth Circuit

specifically rejected plaintiff’s argument that the motion for

summary judgment was untimely. On April 26, 2004, the United

States Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition for writ of

certiorari.

On November 16, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside

or vacate the court’s December 16, 2002 order. Plaintiff again

claimed, inter alia, that the motion for summary judgment was

improperly served. The magistrate judge recommended denying the

motion and this court adopted the recommendation. Accordingly, the

motion to set aside or vacate the December 16, 2002 order was

denied. 

In plaintiff’s pending motions, plaintiff asserts that he

believed the case was still open and that the case was closed by

mistake. Plaintiff also argues that defendants failed to properly

serve their motion for summary judgment. 

Analysis

Plaintiff presents no compelling reasons why this case should

be reopened or why this court’s December 16, 2002 order should be

vacated. It is well established that "[u]nder the ‘law of the

case' doctrine a court is generally precluded from reconsidering

an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a

higher court in the identical case." United States v. Alexander,

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106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d

153, 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993)).

These motions mark the second time plaintiff has asked that

the court revisit its prior ruling. To the extent that these

motions may be construed as motions to reconsider, plaintiff has

failed demonstrate any new grounds or reasons for why the court

should grant his motions. 

Local Rule 78-230(k) requires that a party seeking

reconsideration of a district court's order must brief the "new or

different facts or circumstances . . . which . . . were not shown

upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion." Generally speaking, before reconsideration may be granted

there must be a change in the controlling law or facts, the need

to correct a clear error, or the need to prevent manifest

injustice. See United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

Motion to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the

unsuccessful party to "rehash" arguments previously presented. See

Costello v. United States Government, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D.

Cal. 1991). Nor is a motion to reconsider justified on the basis

of new evidence available prior to the court's ruling. See Fay

Corp. v. BAT Holdings One, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Wash.

1987), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1990). These relatively

restrictive standards "reflect[] district courts' concern for

preserving dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency."

Costello, 765 F. Supp. at 1009.

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The Yuba County defendants seek attorneys fees for the 1

work incurred in preparing its response to plaintiff’s motions. The

court finds that an award of attorneys fees is not appropriate in

this situation. However, should plaintiff file yet another motion

for reconsideration the court will entertain defendants’ request

for attorneys fees and/or sanctions.

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Here, plaintiff raises the same arguments he raised before the

magistrate judge and before the Ninth Circuit, namely that the

summary judgment motion was untimely. This issue was conclusively

addressed by the magistrate judge as well as the Ninth Circuit.

Plaintiff also fails to establish that there was change in the

controlling law or facts, the need to correct a clear error, or the

need to prevent manifest injustice. See Alexander, 106 F.3d at

876. Upon review of the record, it is evident that all of

plaintiff’s claims have been fully adjudicated and there is no

reason for the court to revisit its prior order. 

1

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 9, 2007.

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