Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02748/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02748-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MINH KIM TRUONG, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant.

 Case No.: 16-CV-02748-H-DHB 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; and 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[Doc. Nos. 12-1, 17-1] 

On November 7, 2016, Plaintiff Minh Kim Truong (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g) requesting judicial review of the Social Security 

Administration Commissioner’s (“Defendant”) final decision denying her disability 

benefits. (Doc. No. 1.) On April 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, 

requesting that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and order the payment 

of benefits, or alternatively, remand the case for further proceedings. (Doc. No. 12.) On 

May 7, 2017, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a response in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, requesting the Court affirm the Commissioner’s final 

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decision. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14.) On May 11, 2017, Defendant filed an amended cross-motion 

for summary judgment and an amended response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 

Nos. 17, 18.) On June 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the cross-motion 

for summary judgment and a reply. (Doc. No. 19.) On June 26, 2017, Defendant filed a 

reply. (Doc. No. 18.) For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and affirms 

the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

BACKGROUND 

On March 22, 2013, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, claiming a 

disability onset date of February 15, 2012. (AR234-40.) The Social Security 

Administration denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on June 10, 2013, and 

again upon reconsideration on January 31, 2014. (AR90-93, 95-99.) On February 27, 

2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (AR101-02.)

On March 30, 2015, an ALJ held a hearing where Plaintiff appeared with counsel 

and testified. (AR40-46.) At the hearing, the ALJ also heard testimony from a medical 

expert and a vocational expert. (AR46-64.) In a decision dated May 11, 2015, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a mood disorder and 

myositis. (AR13, 29.) Despite this finding, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR13-16.) The ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium 

work, but not work involving unprotected heights or dangerous machinery. (AR16.) The 

ALJ also determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing routine and noncomplex 

tasks, but needed to avoid sustained, intense interaction with the public, coworkers, and 

supervisors. (Id.) In light of these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could 

not perform past relevant work. (AR28.) Based on this RFC assessment and Plaintiff’s 

age, education, and work experience, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, specifically the 

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representative occupations of industrial cleaner and kitchen helper. (AR28-29.) Based on 

these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled from February 15, 2012, 

the alleged onset date, through May 11, 2015, the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR29.) 

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. (AR1.) 

Upon requesting review by the Appeals Council, Plaintiff also submitted an opinion letter 

from Dr. Henderson and additional medical records from Kaiser Permanente. (AR1106-

1293.) The Appeals Council included this additional evidence in the record. (AR6.) On 

September 27, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering 

the ALJ’s decision final. (AR1-4.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Legal Standard for Determining Disability 

 “A claimant is disabled under Title II of the Social Security Act if he is unable ‘to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or . . . can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Parra v. Astrue, 

481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). “To determine 

whether a claimant meets this definition, the ALJ conducts a five-step sequential 

evaluation.” Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Ninth Circuit has summarized 

this process as follows: 

The burden of proof is on the claimant as to steps one to four. As to step five, 

the burden shifts to the Commissioner. If a claimant is found to be “disabled” 

or “not disabled” at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider 

subsequent steps. The five steps are: 

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? 

If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant 

is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case 

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. 

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is “not 

disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s 

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impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step two 

and the evaluation proceeds to step three. 

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific 

impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” 

and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s 

impairment neither meets nor equals one of the impairments listed in the 

regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the 

evaluation proceeds to step four. 

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? 

If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability 

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the 

past, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and the 

evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step.[1

] 

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is 

“disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the 

claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner must establish that 

there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that claimant 

can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of 

showing that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national 

economy that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or 

(2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. If the Commissioner 

meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled to 

disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, 

then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 

416.920. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

 

1

 “At step four, the ALJ must consider the functional limitations imposed by the claimant’s 

impairments and determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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II. Standards of Review for Social Security Determinations 

Unsuccessful applicants for social security disability benefits may seek judicial 

review of a Commissioner’s final decision in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is 

limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“An ALJ’s disability determination should be upheld unless it contains legal error or is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 

2014). “‘Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.’” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995)). The district 

court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 

1009. “‘Where the evidence as a whole can support either a grant or a denial, we may not 

substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s.’” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Massachi v. 

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007)). “‘The ALJ is responsible for determining 

credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039). 

Further, even when the ALJ commits legal error, a reviewing court will uphold the 

decision where that error is harmless. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099; see also Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have long recognized that harmless error 

principles apply in the Social Security Act context.”). “[A]n ALJ’s error is harmless where 

it is ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1115. “‘[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party 

attacking the agency’s determination.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 

396, 409 (2009)). 

/// 

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III. Analysis 

 In denying Plaintiff’s disability application, the ALJ’s analysis proceeded through 

each of the five steps. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in a 

substantially gainful activity since her application date of February 15, 2012. (AR13.) At 

step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was suffering from the following severe impairments: 

a mood disorder and myotisis. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s 

impairments, independently or in combination, met one of the listed impairments in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) Next, in order to complete step four, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC allowed her to perform medium work, with the 

exception of work involving unprotected heights or dangerous machinery. (AR16.) The 

ALJ also determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing routine and noncomplex 

tasks, but must avoid sustained, intense interaction with the public, coworkers, and 

supervisors. (Id.) 

 In so finding, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Plaintiff alleged that 

her disability arose from four sources: fibromyalgia, neuropathy, depression, and poor 

coordination. (See generally AR40-46.) Plaintiff claimed these conditions resulted in 

debilitating pain that prevented her from engaging in many basic activities, including any 

work-related activities. (Id.) 

 The ALJ determined that none of Plaintiff’s conditions justified her inability to work 

any job. The ALJ dismissed Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia claim because Dr. Lorber, an 

impartial, nonexamining, medical expert, found the diagnosis of fibromyalgia was not 

supported. (AR25.) Similarly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not suffer from 

neuralgia2

 because Dr. Lorber testified that her migraines and various alleged pains were 

not supported by any findings from physical exams. (Id.) As for Plaintiff’s depression, 

 

2

 Trigeminal neuralgia is a chronic pain condition that affects the trigeminal nerve, which carries 

sensation from the face to the brain. Trigeminal neuralgia, Mayo Clinic, 

http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/trigeminal-neuralgia/basics/definition/con-20043802 

(last accessed Jul. 6, 2017). 

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the ALJ did not dismiss it entirely, but found that it only moderately limited her social 

functioning and concentration. (AR26.) The ALJ concluded at step four that Plaintiff was 

unable to perform her past employment. (AR 28.) At step five, however, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff was not disabled, pursuant to Medical Vocational Rule 203.19. (AR29.) 

 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the ALJ erred in 

determining Plaintiff had a medium RFC. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 23.) Additionally, Plaintiff 

claims that the ALJ, in his analysis at step five, failed to consider Plaintiff’s alleged 

inability to communicate in English. (Id. at 11-12.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

decision is incorrect in light of the additional evidence Plaintiff presented to the Appeals 

Council. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees and grants summary judgment for 

Defendant. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining Medium RFC 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ incorrectly found that Plaintiff had the capacity to 

perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(c). (Doc. No. 12-1 at 23-24.) 

Plaintiff contends the RFC determination was erroneous because (1) substantial evidence 

does not support the ALJ’s conclusion, (2) the ALJ assigned insufficient weight to treating 

physicians, and (3) the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for finding Plaintiff only 

partially credible. (See id.) 

 An individual’s RFC is his or her ability to do sustained work activities despite 

limitations from any impairments. 42 U.S.C. § 404.1545(a). The RFC assessment 

considers any symptoms related to a claimant’s impairment(s), such as pain, that may limit 

what the claimant can do in a work setting. Id. In establishing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ 

must assess all relevant evidence in the record, and consider all of the claimant’s 

impairments, including those categorized as non-severe. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3),(e). While 

non-severe impairments alone may not limit an individual’s ability to work, they may be 

critical to the outcome of a claim when considered with other limitations. SSR 96-8p. 

 The ALJ must evaluate all medical opinions it receives in determining the claimant’s 

RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). A medical opinion is “a statement from a medical source 

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about what [claimants] can still do despite [their] impairments.” Id. § 404.1527(a)(1). 

Generally, the ALJ gives more weight to opinions from treating 

sources. Id. § 404.1527(c)(1), (c)(2). Unless the treating source’s opinion is well supported 

“by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is not 

inconsistent with other evidence in the record, the ALJ cannot give it controlling 

weight. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). In cases where a treating source was not given controlling 

weight, non-treating, non-examining physicians may provide substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ's findings. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. In determining how much weight 

to give medical opinions of non-treating physicians, the ALJ considers: (1) the extent of 

the medical examination; (2) how much the opinion is supported and explained by evidence 

in the record; (3) how consistent the medical opinion is with the record as a whole; (4) 

whether the opinion comes from a specialist; and (5) other factors that support or contradict 

the medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(1)-(6). The ALJ must incorporate 

evidence from prior state agency medical consultants as appropriate and give weight 

according to the standards stated above. Id. § 404.1513a(b)(1)3

 With these requirements in mind, the ALJ’s RFC finding of a medium work 

limitation was properly based on substantial evidence in the record and free from legal 

error. Thus, the Court affirms. 

1. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Determination 

 “An ALJ’s disability determination should be upheld unless it contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th 

Cir. 2014). “‘Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.’” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995)). The ALJ has 

 

3

 State agency medical consultants are considered to be “highly qualified and experts in Social 

Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1) 

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a responsibility “to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve 

ambiguities in the record.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). As such, the ALJ’s decision must be 

upheld where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Andrews 

53 F.3d at 1039. In regard to both Plaintiff’s physical and mental conditions, the ALJ 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

i. Physical Conditions 

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial 

evidence in light of her various physical ailments. Plaintiff claims the ALJ overlooked her 

left finger deformity, which originates from a workplace accident in a Vietnamese 

sugarcane factory prior to 1979, and causes her too much pain to work. (AR41-43; see 

also Doc. No. 12-1 at 13-15.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly 

disregarded her alleged neuralgia and fibromyalgia. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the 

ALJ’s RFC determination was not erroneous given that the decision to discount the severity 

of Plaintiff’s physical conditions was supported by substantial evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d 

at 1039 (“Substantial evidence . . . is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”) 

In finding Plaintiff capable of engaging in medium-level work, the ALJ relied 

heavily on the testimony of Dr. Lorber, a non-treating medical expert. (AR25.) With 

regard to Plaintiff’s finger, Dr. Lorber testified that claimant had good dexterity in her left 

hand and that nothing in the record indicated a worsening of Plaintiff’s index finger. (See 

AR25, 51.) In developing his opinion, Dr. Lorber relied on evidence that Plaintiff was able 

to assemble small parts for many years after her finger injury, and testified that the medical 

records indicated that her condition had not worsened. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Lorber 

pointed out that Plaintiff stopped working at her job because of pelvic pain rather than 

issues with her left index finger. (AR27.) Although Plaintiff’s treating physicians provided 

some evidence supporting a disability finding, Dr. Lorber cited numerous instances in the 

record that show Plaintiff’s left index finger did not produce a severe disability. (AR24; 

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see also AR903, 918, 1103 (indicating that the pain in Plaintiff’s left index finger was 

neither caused by fibromyalgia nor related to Plaintiff’s prior injury).) Dr. Lorber’s 

testimony, in conjunction with the evidence he cited, constituted substantial evidence to 

disregard Plaintiff’s left index finger impairment. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial 

evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other 

evidence in the record.”); Tonepetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 

that the opinion of a non-examining medical expert may constitute substantial evidence 

when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record); Andrews, 53 F.3d at 

1041 (“reports of the nonexamining advisor need not be discounted and may serve as 

substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record”). 

 Similarly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination despite 

Plaintiff’s complaints of neuralgia. In analyzing Plaintiff’s alleged neuralgia impairment, 

the ALJ began by noting that although Plaintiff reported severe headaches and body pain, 

multiple physical examinations showed normal musculoskeletal and neurological findings 

that support minimal limitations. (AR17.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that a May 3, 2012 

exam at Kaiser revealed that she was in no acute distress, had normal neck range of motion, 

intact cranial nerves II-XII, normal coordination, no HEENT abnormalities, and normal 

motor strength. (AR18 (citing AR384-89).) Findings from a CT scan of Plaintiff’s head 

during this examination at Kaiser showed no evidence of intracranial abnormalities that 

would cause severe headaches. (AR832-33.) To corroborate this, the ALJ cited a July 27, 

2012 diagnosis finding no evidence of aneurysm, arteriovenous malformation, venous 

angioma, multiple sclerosis plaques in the brain stem, atrophy, or swelling, which 

demonstrated that there was no definite cause for Plaintiff’s alleged trigeminal neuralgia. 

(AR19 (citing AR835-837).) Despite diagnoses of neuralgia from other doctors, the ALJ 

gave controlling weight to Dr. Lorber’s testimony in referencing these tests. (See AR23.) 

The ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Lorber’s testimony, which is corroborated by the record, 

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amounts to substantial evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff did not suffer from a 

severe neuralgia impairment. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 

 Lastly, the ALJ’s RFC determination was proper despite Plaintiff’s claim of 

fibromyalgia because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff did 

not meet the diagnostic requirements for fibromyalgia. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. On July 

25, 2012, the Social Security Administration issued a Policy Interpretation Ruling 

providing guidance on how to determine if a person has a medically determinable 

impairment of fibromyalgia. SSR 12-2p, 77 Fed. Reg. 43640 (July 25, 2012). This ruling 

established the criteria for a finding of fibromyalgia: an applicant must have: (1) a history 

of widespread pain; (2) at least eleven positive trigger points on physical examination, or 

repeated manifestations of at least six fibromyalgia symptoms; and (3) evidence that other 

disorders that could cause the symptoms were excluded. Id. 

 The ALJ gave controlling weight to Dr. Lorber’s testimony that Plaintiff did not 

conclusively suffer from fibromyalgia. (AR24.) None of the various diagnoses of 

fibromyalgia, as Dr. Lorber pointed out, were supported by a finding of eleven or more 

positive trigger point sites. (AR23.) Dr. Lorber pointed to a lack of support in the evidence 

to invalidate a finding of fibromyalgia, which amounts to a specific and legitimate reason 

for discrediting the findings of other physicians. Dominguez v. Colvin, 927 F. Supp. 2d 

846, 860 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he ALJ reasonably concluded that that diagnosis was not 

‘well documented’ because ‘no physician indicated number of tender trigger points to 

confirm the diagnosis.’”). Additionally, the ALJ noted that in two separate exams for 

chronic pain due to fibromyalgia on March 25 and June 24, 2014, Plaintiff had intact cranial 

nerves II-XII, normal muscle bulk, intact sensation and symmetrical reflexes in all four 

extremities, normal gait, and was alert and in no acute distress. (AR18 (citing AR902-23).) 

The ALJ noted that a more recent exam on March 31, 2015 corroborates these findings 

given that Plaintiff was in no acute distress, and had intact cranial nerves II-XII with full 

visual fields and facial sensation. (AR19 (citing AR1103-04.) Therefore, the ALJ was 

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permitted to rely on Dr. Lorber’s opinion because it was supported by these objective 

medical findings, and thus amounts to substantial evidence. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 

ii. Mental Conditions 

 The ALJ did not err in his RFC determination, even though the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment of mood disorder, because it is supported by 

substantial evidence. In the RFC analysis, the ALJ noted that Dr. Engelhorn, a state 

consultative examiner found Plaintiff to have generally normal cognitive findings, except 

that Plaintiff had a somewhat depressed mood. (AR20 (citing AR620-23).) Additionally, 

an August 30, 2014 exam by Dr. Henderson revealed Plaintiff had an impaired memory, 

depressed mood, poor energy, poor concentration and attention, and limited judgment. 

(AR21 (citing AR932-33).) The ALJ properly incorporated these findings in the RFC 

analysis, and determined that Plaintiff suffers from a severe impairment of a Mood 

Disorder which precludes sustained interaction with the public, coworkers, and 

supervisors, but does not prevent her from undertaking all jobs. Fry v. Astrue, No. EDCV 

09-1933 AJW, 2010 WL 2948826, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (holding that the ALJ 

properly incorporated the opinions of physicians in determining that Plaintiff had a severe 

impairment of mood disorder); Price v. Astrue, No. ED CV 09-01118-VBK, 2010 WL 

480985, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) (finding that the ALJ considered varied psychiatric 

evidence, and thus made a proper determination that Plaintiff had a severe impairment of 

mood disorder); (see also AR27.). 

 Substantial evidence in the record, which the ALJ cited, supports a finding that 

Plaintiff’s severe mental impairment would not preclude Plaintiff from a medium RFC. 

(See AR21, 26.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that findings in Mental Status examinations 

(MSE) were generally unremarkable and within normal limits. (AR20.) For example, on 

May 9, 2012, Plaintiff denied being depressed and an examination showed she had normal 

mood and affect. (AR375-76).) Additionally, the ALJ cited to both MSEs and physical 

examinations, dated April 20, 2012 through December 5, 2014, showing numerous reports 

of intact cognitive functioning and a normal mood. (AR21 (citing AR334-55, 1029-78).) 

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Dr. Henderson, who began treating Plaintiff once a month on February 1, 2013, (see 

AR880), did not find that Plaintiff had any serious mental impairment until his January 5, 

2015 diagnosis, (AR934). Moreover, Dr. Engelhorn noted that Plaintiff’s daily activities 

and lack of hospitalization demonstrates that Plaintiff does not suffer from severe mental 

impairments. (AR621.) As such, substantial evidence in the record indicates that the ALJ’s 

RFC evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not erroneous. Thomas, 278 F.3d 

at 957 

In sum, the ALJ relied on sufficient evidence to support a Medium RFC finding 

regarding Plaintiff’s left index finger, neuralgia, fibromyalgia, and mental impairment. 

This evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, and the ALJ’s RFC 

determination must therefore be affirmed. Andrews 53 F.3d at 1039. 

2. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s RFC determination was erroneous because the ALJ 

improperly discredited the opinions of treating physicians in favor of nonexamining 

medical expert, Dr. Lorber’s evaluation. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 13-18.) Whether an ALJ 

properly discredited a treating physician’s opinion is a question of law. Salvador v. 

Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); Meschino v. Apfel, 1998 WL 513969, *7 (N.D. 

Cal. 1998). The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among three types of physicians: “(1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the 

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant 

(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as 

amended (Apr. 9, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining treating, examining, and 

nonexamining sources). Generally, the opinions of treating physicians are given more 

weight than the opinions of examining physicians, which are in turn given more weight 

than the opinions of nonexamining physicians. See Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 

F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003). Treating physicians’ opinion, in particular, are given 

“special weight” and the ALJ must justify a decision to disregard them. Embrey v. Bowen, 

849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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If a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may 

only disregard the opinion if he justifies that decision with “clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 

(9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a treating physician’s opinion 

is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may still only disregard it by providing 

“‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. 

(quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). “The ALJ may meet his 

burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 

881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, an “ALJ may discredit treating 

physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole, 

or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1195 (9th Cir. 2004). 

i. Physical Conditions 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discredited various treating physicians’ 

opinions regarding her physical ailments. (Doc. 12-1 at 18.) Specifically, the ALJ gave 

minimal weight, if any, to the opinions of Drs. Geanacou, Sidrick, Cohen, Amand, and 

Grisolia. In doing so, the ALJ discounted the alleged severity of Plaintiff’s finger pain and 

fibromyalgia. 

In analyzing Plaintiff’s left index finger deformity, the ALJ did not err in discrediting 

the opinions of Drs. Sidrick and Grisolia because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate 

reasons, which are supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Sidrick did not make a diagnosis 

of chronic pain, but described that Plaintiff had a decreased range of motion in her left 

index finger. (AR894-95, 899-900.) In turn, on March 31, 2015, Dr. Grisolia found that 

Plaintiff suffered from a chronic pain in her left index finger that developed within the last 

two years of the date. (AR1103.) The ALJ disregarded these opinions because “few 

detailed findings [in the physicians’ reports] support significant limitations,” and Dr. 

Lorber testified that Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment in her left index finger. 

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(AR18.) Dr. Lorber cited evidence that Plaintiff was able to assemble small parts for many 

years after her finger injury, and testified that the medical records indicated that her 

condition had not truly worsened since the injury. (AR25, 51.) In addition, the ALJ pointed 

to numerous instances in the record that show Plaintiff’s left index finger did not produce 

a severe disability. (AR24; see also AR903, 918, 1103 (indicating that the pain in 

Plaintiff’s left index finger was neither caused by fibromyalgia nor related to Plaintiff’s 

prior injury).) This amounts to specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions 

of Dr. Sidrick and Grisolia. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

 With regard to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, the ALJ disregarded the conclusory opinions 

of treating and examining physicians Drs. Geanacou, Cohen, Sidrick, and Grisolia because 

their diagnoses were not supported by the medical evidence. (AR27.) Plaintiff was first 

diagnosed with fibromyalgia, absent an explanation of criteria, on June 7, 2012 by one of 

her treating physicians, Dr. Geanacou. (AR1209.) On March 4, 2013, Dr. Cohen, a 

rheumatologist, similarly diagnosed Plaintiff with fibromyalgia, and identified tenderness 

in several trigger point areas, but did not document the exact number of positive trigger 

points. (AR1199.) In a diagnosis on December 13, 2013, Dr. Sidrick, another treating 

physician, wrote that Plaintiff was unable to work due to fibromyalgia, but did not 

document any positive trigger points. In a July 26, 2014 letter, Dr. Sidrick described 

Plaintiff as having symptoms consistent with fibromyalgia, including chronic pain and 

depression. (AR918.) Dr. Grisolia, a neurologist, affirmed Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia 

diagnosis on June 24, 2014, but did not support this finding with a trigger point assessment. 

(AR902.) Finally, on October 30, 2014, Dr. Geanacou referred Plaintiff for chiropractic 

treatment to alleviate her fibromyalgia symptoms. (AR928.) 

 The ALJ did not err in disregarding the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and examining 

physicians. Treating physician opinions are properly discredited if they are “conclusory, 

brief, and unsupported by the record.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. Here, none of the 

diagnoses of fibromyalgia are supported by the record because, as Dr. Lorber pointed out, 

they did not satisfy the SSDI’s diagnostic criteria of eleven or more positive trigger point 

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sites. See SSR 12-2p, 77 Fed. Reg. 43640 (July 25, 2012); (AR23.) Indeed, only Dr. 

Cohen’s diagnosis on March 4, 2013 identified any trigger points, which still lacked a 

sufficient number to support a finding of fibromyalgia because he only noted eight. 

(AR1199.) These findings of fibromyalgia were also contradicted by a March 25, 2014 

examination performed by Dr. Grisolia, who found her to have a normal gait and intact 

neurological functions. (AR902-903.) The ALJ was permitted to reject the conclusory 

diagnoses of fibromyalgia because they were inconsistent with Social Security’s diagnostic 

criteria for fibromyalgia, and the evidence in the record. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 

1195 (“ALJ may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief, and 

unsupported by the record as a whole . . . or by objective medical findings.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, 

the more weight we will give to that opinion.”), 416.927(c)(4) (same). 

ii. Mental Conditions 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Dr. Henderson and 

Dr. Lessner with regards to Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (See Doc. No. 12-1 at 19.) On 

July 11, 2014, Dr. Lessner, an examining physician, diagnosed Plaintiff with major 

depression with psychotic features, posttraumatic stress disorder, and paranoid personality 

disorder. (AR916-17.) Additionally, Dr. Lessner scored Plaintiff with a GAF of 30-40, 

indicating major mental impairment, and precluding Plaintiff from making decisions, 

concentrating, or working in any job environment. (See id.) On January 5, 2015, Dr. 

Henderson, a treating physician, similarly diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression and 

post-traumatic stress disorder. (AR934.) In this diagnosis, Dr. Henderson described that 

Plaintiff cannot comprehend or follow instructions, perform simple and repetitive tasks, or 

make decisions on her own. (Id.) Notwithstanding these findings, the ALJ gave most 

weight to the opinion of Dr. Engelhorn, a state examiner, who diagnosed Plaintiff only with 

mood disorder. (See AR26.) 

The ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Lessner’s and Dr. Henderson’s opinions, as 

he gave “specific and legitimate reasons” which are supported by “substantial evidence.” 

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Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The ALJ cited the findings of several examining and treating

physicians, including Drs. Geanacou and Cohen, which contradicted a finding of severe 

mental impairment. (See AR21.) These physical exams generally indicated that Plaintiff 

had a normal mood, and oppose a finding of a disabling mental impairment. (See generally 

AR1029-78). Furthermore, Plaintiff testified she was capable of activities, such as grocery 

shopping and going to church, that are impossible for someone with the severe mental 

impairments from which Plaintiff allegedly suffers. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an ALJ permissibly relied on 

testimony regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities in rejecting a physician’s opinion that 

Plaintiff was capable of carrying such activities out due to mental impairments); (see also 

AR21 (citing AR621).). This amounts to specific and legitimate reasons and offers proper 

grounds for rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s physicians. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

Additionally, the ALJ “may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is based to a 

large extent on a claimant's self-reports that have been properly discounted as 

incredible.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). As the ALJ points out, Dr. Lessner’s and Dr. 

Henderson’s opinions, while based on clinical tests such as the Bender Gestalt test, were 

largely based on Plaintiff’s reported symptoms. (See AR26.) Given that Plaintiff had been 

determined to be partially incredible, the ALJ rightfully discounted these examinations and 

their conclusions.4

 See Brawner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 

(9th Cir. 1988). As such, the ALJ properly rejected the physicians’ findings of severe 

mental disability, and gave controlling weight to Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion, which is 

reflected in Plaintiff’s RFC assessment. (AR27.) 

In sum, the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia, left index finger pain, and mental impairment. The ALJ thoroughly explored 

 

4

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the medical record, stated his interpretations, and made findings supported by substantial 

evidence. Heckler, 722 F.2d at 502. 

3. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by partially rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding her subjective pain and the intensity of her symptoms. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 21-23.) 

Defendant asserts that the ALJ supported his decision to discount Plaintiff’s testimony with 

substantial evidence. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 16-18.) After reviewing the record and the ALJ’s 

reasoning, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in determining Plaintiff to be only 

partially credible given that Plaintiff’s daily activities involved the “performance of 

physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 

1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

the intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Molina, 674 F.3d 

at 1112. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective 

medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Second, if the claimant has produced that evidence, and the 

ALJ has not determined that the claimant is malingering, the ALJ must provide ‘specific, 

clear and convincing reasons for’ rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity 

of the claimant’s symptoms.” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th 

Cir.1996)). 

 “With respect to daily activities, [the Ninth Circuit] has held that if a claimant ‘is 

able to spend a substantial part of [her] day engaged in pursuits involving the performance 

of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting, a specific finding as to this fact 

may be sufficient to discredit a claimant’s allegations.’” Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049; see 

also Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding 

that an ALJ properly determined that the claimant’s “ability to fix meals, do laundry, work 

in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child served as evidence of [the 

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claimant]’s ability to work”); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 

2008) (finding that the ALJ properly supported his adverse credibility determination by 

pointing to evidence in the record showing that the claimant “ha[d] normal activities of 

daily living, including cooking, house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in 

managing finances”). Here, as in Vertigan, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony was 

not entirely credible because it was inconsistent with her daily activities. (AR21-22.) 

Specifically, the ALJ noted that, after the alleged onset date, Plaintiff reported that she had 

been using a treadmill every day and often practiced yoga and Tai Chi. (AR21 (citing 

AR822).) Plaintiff also reported that she could prepare simple meals, use a computer, go 

to church once a weak, and go grocery shopping. (AR21 (citing AR621).) These daily 

activities involve the “performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work 

setting” and, thus, the ALJ properly relied on Plaintiff’s reported daily activities in finding 

her testimony not entirely credible. Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049. 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff’s Language Abilities at Step Five 

In her reply brief, Plaintiff contends for the first time that the ALJ erred at step five 

by failing to consider her limited English language skills. (Doc. No. 19 at 9.) The ALJ 

found that Plaintiff “is able to communicate in English” and did not include language 

limitations in any of his hypothetical questions to the Vocational Expert (“VE”). (AR28; 

see AR58-64.) Plaintiff argues this was erroneous because the ALJ’s finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence and, thus, the VE should have been questioned regarding 

the impact of Plaintiff’s language limitations. The Court disagrees. The ALJ’s finding is 

supported by substantial evidence, in particular that Plaintiff previously worked for 18 

years in a job requiring DOT Level 2 reading skills, and, thus, the ALJ’s examination of 

the VE was not improper. 

 The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff is able to communicate in English is supported by 

substantial evidence. Plaintiff worked for 18 years as an electronics assembler—a job that 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) says requires, at minimum, a level two 

language development. See DOT No. 726.684-018. This language development level 

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indicates an employee can “[w]rite compound and complex sentences,” “[s]peak clearly 

and distinctly,” and has a “[p]assive vocabulary of 5,000-6,000 words.” Additionally, in a 

July 11, 2014 psychological evaluation, Doctor Henderson stated that Plaintiff “appeared 

to understand much of the English dialogue.” (AR907.) As such, there is substantial 

evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could communicate in English. See 

Palomares, 887 F. Supp 2d. at 921–22 (“Because the language requirement for Mr. 

Palomares' previous occupation is the lowest level in the DOT, the Court assumes that the 

ability to communicate in English . . . is consistent with the level one language requirements 

and the language ability found by the ALJ). 

 Certainly there is some evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s claim that she 

has limited English skills. For example, at her hearing in front of the ALJ, Plaintiff testified 

that she could speak “very little” English and required an interpreter. (AR37-40.) 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s disability application states that she cannot speak, read, or understand 

English, but she can write more than her name in English. (AR255.) Also, various medical 

records indicate that Plaintiff sometimes used interpreters, including her daughter, for overthe-phone and in-person consolations with various physicians. (See AR342, 363, 392, 402, 

456, 619, 637, 672, 932, 1088, 1102, 1115, 1145, 1291.) This conflicting evidence, 

however, does not obviate the fact that Plaintiff was successfully employed for 18 years in 

a job that required her to be able to communicate in English. Because the record is subject 

to more than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion. 

Andrews 53 F.3d at 1039. 

 As the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was able to communicate in English was 

supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err by omitting any literacy limitation 

from the hypotheticals he posed to the VE. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the ALJ did not err in asking hypothetical questions to the VE 

that did not consider some of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations because they were not 

supported by substantial evidence). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on both Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2001) and Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 

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2000) is misplaced. In Pinto, the ALJ found that the SSDI applicant spoke “very little 

English” but then failed to “address the impact of [the applicant’s] illiteracy on her ability 

to find and perform a similar job.” 249 F.3d at 847. As such, the Ninth Circuit remanded 

the case, holding that “in order for an ALJ to rely on a job description in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles that fails to comport with a claimant’s noted limitations, an ALJ must 

definitively explain this deviation.” That holding is inapplicable here because the ALJ 

found the Plaintiff could communicate in English—indeed she had held a job of equivalent 

or higher language skills for 18 years. Similarly, Silveira is inapplicable because, there, 

the ALJ “made no express finding that Silveira was literate in English” and the Ninth 

Circuit remanded for the ALJ to determine whether Silveira was literate. 204 F.3d at 1261-

62. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could communicate in English. This finding is 

supported by substantial evidence and, thus, there was no error in the examination of the 

VE. Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1164-65; see also Landeros v. Astrue, No. CV 11-7156-JPR, 

2012 WL 2700384, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that 

“apparent conflicts” existed between VE's testimony and DOT in part because plaintiff's 

counsel failed to question VE about any such conflicts). 

C. New Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded substantial portions of the 

record and the Appeals Council erred in refusing to give weight to the supplemental 

evidence that was submitted after the ALJ hearing. The Ninth Circuit has held that 

evidence evaluated in a decision by the Appeals Council “becomes part of the 

administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing the 

Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.” The district court may remand 

the case to the ALJ to reconsider the decision in light of the additional evidence. Taylor v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d, 1228, 1233. However, “under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), remand is warranted” only if Plaintiff can show the additional evidence is material. 

Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2001). Evidence is material if it bears 

“directly and substantially on the matter in dispute” and there is a reasonable possibility 

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that it would have changed the outcome of the administrative hearing. Mayes v. Massanari, 

276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff did not meet her burden. 

The additional evidence that Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council concerned 

Plaintiff’s medical condition from a few months before the ALJ’s May 11, 2015 decision 

to almost a year after the decision. (AR1112-1293.) Although the new evidence shows 

that Plaintiff was diagnosed with arthritis in her left index finger on June 6, 2015, 

(AR1125), her testimony regarding her daily activities, including using a computer, 

contradict a finding of severe pain in her finger. Additionally her activities involving daily 

exercises in yoga and Tai Chi contradict any new medical evidence of finding of severe, 

debilitating pain in her cervical spine. (See AR1112.) Accordingly, the new evidence does 

not provide a dispositive confirmation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain in her 

finger and her spine, given that the weight of the new record still contradicts her testimony. 

Cook v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-CV-00061-FVS, 2017 WL 1479430, at *5 (E.D. 

Wash. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Moreover, even considering this ‘new evidence,’ the ALJ's finding 

that the Plaintiff's subjective complaints are not credible because the overall medical 

evidence does not support Plaintiff's alleged limitations, is still supported by substantial 

evidence, for all the reasons discussed herein.”) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 

679 (9th Cir. 2005)). There is no reasonable possibility that the ALJ would have found 

Plaintiff disabled, even with due consideration given to the additional evidence. Mayes, 

276 F.3d at 462. As such, the new evidence is not material and this case need not be 

remanded to the ALJ. Id. 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision was 

supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Therefore, the 

ALJ’s disability determination must be upheld. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009. 

Accordingly the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, grants the 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and affirms the Commissioner’s final 

decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2017 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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