Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00406/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00406-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WITKIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARIANA LOTERSZTAIN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-0406 TLN KJN P

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, with a civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Lin’s motion for summary judgment or, in the 

alternative, partial summary judgment, is before the court. As discussed below, defendant Lin’s 

motion should be granted.

II. Allegations/Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Mariana Lotersztain, Dr. Wayne Scott, Dr. Neil Largoza, Martin

Kuersten, Dr. J. Lin, and S. Gates were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs by intentionally refusing to treat or properly treat plaintiff’s broken finger, resulting in the

permanent disfigurement of his finger, as well as permanent loss of range of motion. Plaintiff

also alleges that defendant Lotersztain refused to treat plaintiff’s injuries in retaliation for

plaintiff’s pending civil rights litigation against her. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Additionally, plaintiff 

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raises various state law claims against defendants Dr. Mariana Lotersztain, Dr. Wayne Scott, Dr. 

Neil Largoza, Martin Kuersten, Dr. Lin,1 and S. Gates. 

III. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).2

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c).) “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory 

Committee Notes to 2010 Amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

1

 Dr. T. Lin was erroneously sued as Dr. J. Lin. (ECF No. 55-1 at 5.)

2

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was revised and rearranged effective December 10, 2010. 

However, as stated in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2010 Amendments to Rule 56, “[t]he 

standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged.”

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Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

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demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By notice issued November 22, 2021 (ECF No. 55), plaintiff was advised of the 

requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. 

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. Facts

At all times relevant herein, plaintiff Michael Witkin was a state prisoner.

On December 23, 2017, while participating in a flag football game at the prison, plaintiff 

fractured the fourth finger on his right hand.

Plaintiff reported to the prison’s Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”) for treatment.

On December 26, 2017, plaintiff received an x-ray of the finger, which showed a 

comminuted intraarticular fracture of the fourth proximal phalanx. The x-ray also revealed mild 

degenerative changes. 

An offsite orthopedic referral was ordered.

On January 9, 2018, 17 days after the injury, plaintiff had a consultation with defendant 

Dr. Lin.

Dr. Lin is a licensed physician and hand surgeon in private practice. Dr. Lin has no 

affiliation with the department of corrections and is not employed by any governmental entity.

Dr. Lin has no knowledge as to how his patients from correctional facilities are referred or 

what the process is for them to retain a referral.

Plaintiff had one visit with Dr. Lin, on January 9, 2018.

At the January 9, 2018 visit, Dr. Lin took off plaintiff’s plaster splint and examined 

plaintiff’s finger.

The examination of the finger revealed that the finger was swollen, without any rotational 

deformity.

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Dr. Lin also reviewed plaintiff’s x-rays during the January 9, 2018 visit.

Dr. Lin’s impression was a right ring finger proximal phalanx/PIP joint intra-articular 

fracture, with slight displacement. The fracture was 17 days old at the time Dr. Lin saw plaintiff.

Plaintiff met with Dr. Lin, expecting to proceed with the surgical option, closed reduction 

and external fixation (“CREF”). Plaintiff was informed of the surgery and the risks. Dr. Lin did 

not recommend the CREF procedure. 

Dr. Lin applied an Oval-8 splint. Plaintiff was advised to stay in the splint for another 

week and after that he could start gradual range of motion exercises. He was instructed not to 

expose the fracture site to excessive stress for two months.

Plaintiff was directed to return to see Dr. Lin if needed.

On January 17, 2018, plaintiff was seen by a prison nurse for a muscle strain experience 

during a workout. At this visit, plaintiff was concerned that his finger may not heal right and so 

asked to see his primary care physician, Dr. Mo.

On March 15, 2018, plaintiff had an appointment with Dr. Mo. Plaintiff thereafter wanted 

to return to see Dr. Lin but contends that this request was denied.

Approximately 60 days after his visit with Dr. Lin, plaintiff resumed his normal workout 

routine and returned to sports.

V. The Parties’ Positions

Defendant Dr. Lin

Defendant Lin contends that the undisputed facts and evidence demonstrate that the care 

and treatment provided by Dr. Lin complied with the standard of care. Dr. Lin examined 

plaintiff’s finger and the x-ray images; plaintiff sustained a comminuted and intra-articular 

fracture of the fourth proximal phalanx, with degenerative changes. Considering Dr. Lin’s exam 

findings, the x-ray report, and the history of the injury, Dr. Lin determined that surgery was 

unlikely to provide a better result than splinting, and such determination was consistent with the 

standard of care. Dr. Burgar, defendant’s expert, confirmed that such treatment complied with 

the standard of care, and surgery on plaintiff’s finger could have resulted in a worse outcome for 

plaintiff; thus, splinting the finger was the preferred course of treatment. (ECF No. 55-1 at 8-9.) 

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Dr. Lin argues that the evidence shows that Dr. Lin appropriately informed plaintiff of the option 

of surgery or splinting, and that plaintiff chose splinting. Indeed, plaintiff explained his decision 

to proceed with splinting was based on Dr. Lin’s opinion that surgery was not more likely to 

provide a better result. (Pl.’s Dep. at 84-85.) Dr. Lin gave plaintiff instructions for follow-up if 

needed, but no further contact was received. While plaintiff is unhappy with the results, the 

“described finger deformation, loss of function, and improper healing was more likely than not a 

result of the fracture and not Dr. Lin’s medical care,” as opined by expert Dr. Burgar. 

In addition, Dr. Lin did not refuse or fail to provide care to plaintiff. Rather, Dr. Lin 

evaluated plaintiff’s finger and provided splinting to plaintiff’s finger based on his medical 

judgment. Plaintiff adduced no evidence demonstrating that at the time Dr. Lin recommended 

splinting that such recommendation subjected plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm or, if it 

did, that Dr. Lin knew that it did. Further, if it subsequently became clear that splinting would 

not provide an ideal outcome, Dr. Lin was never advised that plaintiff required follow-up.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff contends that defendant Lin fails to resolve two pivotal disputed questions of 

material fact. First, plaintiff argues that defendant Lin’s January 9, 2018 notes (ECF No. 55-2 at 

103), show that plaintiff chose the CREF option, and that medical records show plaintiff selected 

the CREF treatment option (ECF No. 90-3 at 73). Plaintiff points to Dr. Scott’s interrogatory 

response that, based upon information and belief, plaintiff “chose the closed reduction and 

external fixation (‘CREF’) treatment option, and an oval splint was prescribed.” (ECF No. 89-3 

at 23.) Plaintiff argues that because the court must take as true plaintiff’s evidence that he chose 

the CREF treatment option, Dr. Burgar’s opinion sheds no light on the propriety of defendant 

Lin’s actions and medical judgment,” leaving unanswered whether Dr. Lin met the standard of 

care or was deliberately indifferent. (ECF No. 90 at 2.) 

Second, plaintiff argues that Dr. Lin earlier took the position that he complied with the 

standard of care when he recommended that plaintiff have surgery to repair the finger. (ECF No. 

90 at 3, citing ECF No. 76 at 15-16.) Plaintiff claims Dr. Lin’s current position is that at the time 

of treatment, Dr. Lin determined that “surgery was not more likely to provide a better result than 

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splinting was correct, and consistent with the standard of care.” (ECF No. 90 at 3, quoting Burgar 

Decl. ¶ 4.) Finally, plaintiff argues that the court should give no weight to Burgar’s opinion 

because it was not based on the true facts, and rests on assumptions not supported by the 

evidence. (ECF No. 90 at 3-4) (citing Stephens v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 935 F.3d 852, 856 (9th 

Cir. 2019); see also Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 787 (9th Cir. 2019).) 

Defendant’s Reply

Defendant counters that plaintiff fails to address the key issues pertinent to the motion and 

fails to present material evidence or any legitimate basis to deny summary judgment. First, 

plaintiff failed to offer expert testimony concerning the standard of care or causation or damages. 

Plaintiff’s effort to evade the required expert testimony by challenging the foundation for Dr. 

Burgar’s opinion is unavailing. Dr. Burgar’s expert opinion is based on the totality of the record, 

including the admissions and statements plaintiff made in his deposition, and is entitled to full 

weight. Second, plaintiff adduced no evidence demonstrating that when defendant Dr. Lin 

recommended splinting that such recommendation subjected plaintiff to a substantial risk of 

serious harm or, if it did, that Lin knew it did. Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr. Lin examined 

plaintiff’s finger and the x-rays, and in his deposition, plaintiff admitted that Dr. Lin told plaintiff 

about surgical options, explained the risks, but made the reasoned recommendation for the 

splinting. 

VI. Legal Standards

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires plaintiff 

to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 

(2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations 

marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc)).

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By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the objective 

requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994). Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of 

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond 

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, “the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “If a [prison 

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not then the [official] has not violated the 

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cty of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 

1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016). 

“Typically, a difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner -- or between 

medical professionals -- concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to 

deliberate indifference.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations, 

quotations and brackets omitted). “But that is true only if the dueling opinions are medically 

acceptable under the circumstances.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (citation omitted). To determine 

whether the treatment was medically acceptable, courts must consider “the record, the judgments 

of prison medical officials, and the views of prudent professionals in the field. . . .” Id. 

“Accepted standards of care and practice within the medical community are highly relevant in 

determining what care is medically acceptable and unacceptable.” Id. 

In order to recover damages against a prison official for deliberate indifference, an inmate 

must prove that the indifference “was the actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of the 

inmates’ eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Delay in medical treatment generally only 

constitutes deliberate indifference if it causes further harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-61 

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(“[When] a claim alleges ‘mere delay of surgery,’ a prisoner can make ‘no claim for deliberate 

medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.’”) (citation omitted).

VII. Discussion

Plaintiff’s Injured Finger

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff’s injured finger constitutes a serious medical need, 

thus meeting the objective element. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Alleged Change in Position

Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Lin changed position, earlier contending that he complied 

with the standard of care by recommending plaintiff have surgery to repair the finger, is not 

supported by the record. Plaintiff cites to a copy of Dr. Lin’s requests for admissions propounded 

to plaintiff. (ECF No. 76 at 15-16.)3

 But plaintiff fails to demonstrate how such discovery 

requests constitute a change in position.

Dr. Burgar’s Opinion

Plaintiff’s effort to challenge the foundation of Dr. Burgar’s expert opinion is unavailing. 

As was explained in the June 23, 2022 order denying plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Burgar’s 

expert testimony, Dr. Burgar has specialized knowledge as an orthopedic specialist, is board 

certified in orthopedic surgery and hand surgery, was fellowship-trained in hand and 

microsurgery, and has over 17+ years of surgical experience. (ECF No. 72 at 7, citing 55-2 at 

123.) Dr. Burgar’s medical training and experience provides her the knowledge to opine whether 

Dr. Lin’s care and treatment were within the community standard of care. Dr. Burgar reviewed 

plaintiff’s medical records from DVI and Dr. Lin’s practice, plaintiff’s complaint and deposition, 

as well as Dr. Lin’s declaration, and after such review used her medical judgment to form her 

opinion on Dr. Lin’s treatment of plaintiff on January 9, 2018. Plaintiff’s objection as to the 

foundation for Dr. Burgar’s opinion is overruled. 

3

 Plaintiff refers to this alleged change in position in disputing defendant’s claim that he was not 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs (ECF No. 90-1 at 3, citing ECF No. 76 

at 16.) The request for admission reads: “Admit that Dr. Lin recommended that you have 

surgery to repair your finger.” (ECF No. 76 at 16.) Asking such a question is not the same as Dr. 

Lin claiming that he recommended plaintiff have surgery.

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The CREF Procedure

Plaintiff claims he chose the CREF procedure, relying on two medical records. (ECF No. 

55-2 at 103, 90-3 at 73.) Such reliance is unavailing for several reasons. 

First, as a layperson, plaintiff is not qualified to offer an interpretation of his medical 

records. See Fed. Rule of Evidence 701. An expert witness is required to interpret these medical 

records. See Fed. Rule of Evid. 702. 

Second, as argued by defendant, plaintiff testified that despite seeing Dr. Lin and 

expecting to proceed with the surgical option, plaintiff was informed of the surgical option, the 

risks, and agreed to the splinting. Plaintiff testified that at the time of the appointment, plaintiff 

essentially deferred to Dr. Lin’s expertise (Pl.’s Dep. at 84-85 (ECF No. 55-2 at 64-65) (“I 

thought I’m seeing an expert and I’m going to be going with whatever he recommended.”) Even 

plaintiff’s declaration states that “because defendant Lin explained that surgery was no longer a 

viable option, [plaintiff] allowed [Lin] to proceed with immobilizing [the injured] finger with a 

splint.” (ECF No. 90-2 at 4.) Whether or not plaintiff thought he chose the CREF procedure, it is 

undisputed that Dr. Lin did not recommend that plaintiff receive the CREF procedure. 

Third, even if plaintiff chose the CREF option over Dr. Lin’s recommended splinting

procedure, Dr. Burgar opined that Dr. Lin’s choice in splinting the finger rather than performing 

the CREF procedure was within the standard of care. Plaintiff provided no expert medical 

opinion to the contrary.

Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not return to see Dr. Lin, who treated plaintiff on 

only one occasion. 

No Evidence of Deliberate Indifference

Further, plaintiff provided no additional facts or evidence demonstrating that Dr. Lin’s 

actions in splinting the finger constituted deliberate indifference in treating plaintiff’s injured 

finger. At the time of the appointment, it is undisputed that Dr. Lin did not believe the CREF 

procedure “would, more likely than not, provide a better outcome than splinting.” (ECF No. 55-2 

at 75.) Expert witness Dr. Burgar mirrored Dr. Lin’s conclusion, and further found that surgery 

“could have resulted in a worse outcome.” (ECF No. 55-2 at 120.) Plaintiff adduced no expert 

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medical opinion to the contrary.

Plaintiff adduced no facts or evidence demonstrating that when Dr. Lin splinted plaintiff’s 

finger, such action subjected plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm or, if it did, that Dr. Lin 

knew it did. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr. Lin examined plaintiff’s 

finger and the x-rays, and in his deposition, plaintiff admitted that Dr. Lin told plaintiff about 

surgical options, explained the risks, but made the reasoned recommendation for the splinting. 

Absent evidence not presented here, the undersigned cannot find that defendant Dr. Lin was 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs on January 9, 2018.

VIII. State Law Claims

Regarding plaintiff’s state law claims for medical malpractice (professional negligence) 

and negligent infliction of emotional distress, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to provide 

expert testimony demonstrating that defendant Lin’s medical treatment fell outside the standard 

of care. Defendant Lin presented the declaration of medical expert Dr. Burgar who opined that 

Dr. Lin’s care complied with the medical standard of care. Plaintiff failed to provide any expert 

testimony contrary to that provided by Dr. Burgar. 

In his opposition, plaintiff did not address the merits of his state law claims or offer an 

expert medical opinion as to the standard of care. Plaintiff simply argues that the court should 

assign no weight to Dr. Burgar’s opinion because it “fails to address the factual scenario in this 

case.” (ECF No. 90 at 4.)

In reply, defendant reiterates that California law requires that plaintiff offer expert 

testimony concerning the standard of care, causation and damages. (ECF No. 92.) 

Because the standard of care can only be established through expert testimony, 

Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1988), and plaintiff failed to offer such expert 

testimony, defendant Dr. Lin is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s state law claims. 

Absent such expert opinion, the court need not reach plaintiff’s arguments or issues raised in his 

opposition. Nevertheless, plaintiff’s contention that he does not need an expert because Dr. 

Burgar does not have sufficient foundation for her opinion is not well-taken. First, plaintiff is 

required to present expert testimony to demonstrate defendant Lin’s medical care fell below the 

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community standard of care. Hutchinson, 838 F.2d 390. Second, as argued by defendant, Dr. 

Burgar’s expert opinion is based on a sufficient foundation because Dr. Burgar reviewed the 

record in this case, including plaintiff’s medical records, and admissions and statements made in 

his deposition. Finally, plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Burgar’s opinion was denied on June 23, 

2022, finding that “[t]he record amply demonstrates that Dr. Burgar’s opinion is reliable based on 

her training, knowledge and over seventeen years of specialized experience in orthopedic surgery 

and hand surgery.” (ECF No. 72 at 9, citing Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 

2010).

Therefore, defendant Dr. Lin is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s state law 

claims.

IX. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Dr. Lin’s motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 55) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 14, 2023

/witk0406.msj.Lin

Case 2:19-cv-00406-DJC-CSK Document 93 Filed 03/14/23 Page 12 of 12