Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00007/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00007-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Andrew Bradford Tree,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-00007-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

On March 30, 2020, Magistrate Judge Maria S. Aguilera issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) in which she recommended the Court deny Petitioner Andrew 

Bradford Tree’s pro se pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff filed his objection to the R&R (Doc. 19) 

and Defendant filed a response (Doc. 20). Upon review, the Court adopts the magistrate 

judge’s R&R and denies the Petition.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW: MAGISTRATE’S R&R

The standard of review of a magistrate judge’s R&R is dependent upon whether or 

not a party objects: where there is no objection to a magistrate’s factual and legal 

determinations, the district court need not review the decision “under a de novo or any 

other standard.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). However, when a party 

objects, the district court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 

disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or 

modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the 

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magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). Moreover, “while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de 

novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, 

sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.” Thomas, 

474 U.S. at 154. 

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

Petitioner does not object to the magistrate’s statement of facts. As such, the Court 

adopts the magistrate judge’s recitation of facts, and merely summarizes as necessary to 

address Petitioner’s objections. 

III. PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS

Petitioner argues that the magistrate judge erroneously: (1) concluded that 

Petitioner’s grounds one and two were procedurally defaulted; (2) determined that his 

untimely arraignment and grand jury indictment were permissible; and (3) decided that 

Petitioner had failed to demonstrate defense counsel’s bias. (Doc. 19.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s Complaint raises three grounds for relief. First, Petitioner alleges that 

his rights were violated when his arraignment was held over 72 hours after arrest. (Doc. 

1 at 6.) Second, he argues he was indicted by a grand jury outside of his presence and that 

this ex parte determination of probable cause constituted structural error and deprived the 

state court of jurisdiction. (Id. at 7.) Finally, Petitioner claims that his counsel was 

ineffective because counsel suffered from a conflict of interest at every stage of his 

proceedings. (Id. at 8.) 

Petitioner asserts that in contrast to the magistrate judge’s conclusions, his first 

two claims were not procedurally defaulted because he is permitted to raise jurisdictional 

issues at any time. (Doc. 19 at 2.) The Court agrees that subject matter jurisdiction may 

be raised at any time, but this is not what Petitioner is doing, grounds one and two raise

due process claims. Due process claims can be procedurally defaulted. See Henry v. 

Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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The state court determined that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred; this 

decision was based on adequate and independent state grounds and is not reviewable in 

habeas. See e.g., Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). Even so, a district 

court may consider a procedurally defaulted claim if Petitioner can show cause and 

prejudice, or that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” is likely to occur absent relief. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). As explained below, Petitioner has not 

met this burden.

Petitioner alleged that appellate counsel did not challenge the arraignment or

indictment proceedings at trial or on appeal because counsel had a conflict of interest.

(Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner’s Complaint alleges that appellate counsel’s conflict was 

because appellate counsel “work[ed] out of the same office as trial counsel,” (id.), and

that state prosecutors and public defenders are paid from the same coffer, (Doc. 15 at 65).

In the R&R, the magistrate judge correctly noted that Petitioner had not shown any actual 

bias and therefore his claim had no merit. (Doc. 18 at 6-7 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 

U.S. 162, 171 (2002)).) Petitioner’s general allegation that appellate counsel was biased 

because of a shared workspace and public salary is insufficient. The Court will not 

presume that all court appointed attorneys must have a conflict of interest without any 

further facts in support. Therefore, Petitioner’s barren claim that counsel was biased does 

not present cause for his procedural default of his first two grounds. Moreover, as 

explained infra, Petitioner’s claims are non-meritorious; he has therefore not 

demonstrated prejudice or that a fundamental injustice has occurred. The Court finds that 

Petitioner’s due process claims are procedurally defaulted without excuse.

Next, Petitioner seems to argue that the magistrate judge incorrectly determined 

that his untimely arraignment and grand jury indictment were permissible. (Doc. 19 at 3.) 

The magistrate judge explained that Petitioner’s arraignment was delayed because he had 

been shot in the hip and was not released from the hospital for ten days. (Doc. 18 at 4.) 

This was a “necessary delay” allowed for by state statute. (Id. (citing State v. Brown, 310 

P.3d 29, 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).) Moreover, the magistrate judge stated that neither 

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state nor federal law mandates preliminary hearings in lieu of an indictment, and that the 

state court was permitted to proceed with either. (Id. at 5.) Furthermore, she also

indicated that the state court maintains jurisdiction once an indictment is issued and 

therefore the trial court was never divested of jurisdiction. (Id. at 5-6.) The magistrate 

judge noted that these decisions did not constitute structural error, in fact, they were not 

errors at all. (Id. at 6.)

Medical treatment may justify a delayed arraignment beyond the statutorily 

mandated 24 hours from arrest. Brown, 310 P.3d at 35. The magistrate judge was correct 

that no due process violation occurred; Petitioner’s arraignment was postponed due to his 

injury requiring hospitalization. 

In addition, a constitutional right to be charged by indictment by grand jury has 

never been extended to the states, and states may proceed by indictment or information.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972). While a charge made through an 

information requires a preliminary hearing under Arizona law, indictment has no such 

requirement. See Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 30. Moreover, even if there is error in the grand 

jury proceedings, when a defendant is found guilty by a jury of peers, any error is 

harmless. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1986). Here, state 

prosecutors were not required to ask for a waiver before indicting Petitioner, see State v. 

Sisneros, 670 P.2d 721, 723 (Ariz. 1983), and after indictment the state court retained

jurisdiction over the matter, see Ariz. Const. Art. VI, § 14(4). Finally, Petitioner’s 

incongruous argument that he was denied due process because there was no probable 

cause determination is unpersuasive since a grand jury indictment requires a such a

determination. See A.R.S. § 21-413.

The Court agrees with the magistrate judge, Petitioner’s first two grounds are

procedurally defaulted without excuse and fail to require relief habeas and his third 

ground is meritless.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Maria S. Aguilera’s Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. 

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(Doc. 18.)

2. Petitioner Andrew Bradford Tree’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. (Doc. 1.)

3. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court will 

not issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable persons could not 

“debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been 

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

4. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case file in this 

matter. 

Dated this 5th day of May, 2020.

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