Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01953/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01953-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID DONNELL, No. 2:01-cv-1953-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SNOWSHOE SPRINGS ASSOCIATION

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This case involves a dispute between Plaintiff David Donnell

(hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a homeowner, and Defendant Snowshoe

Springs Association (hereinafter “Defendant”), a homeowners

association whose jurisdiction includes the area where

Plaintiff’s property is located. Plaintiff commenced this suit

on October 22, 2001, asserting various state and federal causes

of action. All but one of Plaintiff’s claims have been dismissed

pursuant to several terminating motions brought by Defendant. 

Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim involves an alleged violation of

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), a provision of the Fair Housing

Amendments Act (“FHAA”). 

Case 2:01-cv-01953-MCE-KJM Document 172 Filed 04/03/06 Page 1 of 8
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Local Rule 78-230(e) allows a party opposing a motion to 1

bring a countermotion and have that countermotion heard

concurrently with the underlying motion so long as the

countermotion is related to the same subject matter as the

original motion. 

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

The case is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to

Substitute Party. The Court was informed on October 3, 2005,

that Plaintiff had died on or around September 6, 2005. 

Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks permission to substitute

Plaintiff’s personal representative, Ms. Sharon K. Lewis, as the

real party in interest. Defendant opposes the substitution and

has brought a related Countermotion to Dismiss. Because

Defendant’s Countermotion involves the same general subject

matter as Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute, the Court will rule

on both motions simultaneously, pursuant to Local Rule 78-

230(e).1

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Substitute is granted. Defendants Countermotion to Dismiss is

denied.2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the owner of a residence in Dorrington,

California. Defendant is a residential homeowners’ association

providing water and other services to its members, which includes

Plaintiff. In 1995, Plaintiff’s payments to Defendant for water

service fell into arrears. 

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3

Plaintiff alleges that his inability to timely make these

payments was related to physical disabilities including epilepsy,

dyslexia, pancreatitis, hemorrhaging, and various other

conditions. According to Plaintiff, Defendant then “undertook a

scheme to deprive [him] of his housing despite [Defendant’s]

knowledge that he was physically disabled and would be left with

no housing if [Defendant] succeeded.” (First Amended Complaint,

¶ 16). 

More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

disconnected his water service, caused the District Attorney to

file criminal charges against him for reconnecting it, and

ultimately pursued foreclosure proceedings despite knowledge that

it had no legal right or authority to do so. Plaintiff claims

that he suffered additional injury when Defendant refused to

agree to a monthly payment plan as a way to allow Plaintiff to

catch up on his arrearages and avoid foreclosure. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant’s refusal to agree to said payment plan

constitutes a violation of section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the FHAA. 

That section requires landlords and other individuals to make

reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or

services, when such accommodations are necessary to afford

disabled persons equal opportunity with respect to the use and

enjoyment of a dwelling place.

The present action is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s

Motion to Substitute Party. As a result of Plaintiff’s recent

death, Plaintiff’s counsel asks the Court to substitute the

Administrator of Plaintiff’s Estate, Ms. Sharon K. Lewis, as the

new real party in interest. 

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Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a “Rule” 3

are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4

Defendant opposes the substitution, alleging that Plaintiff’s

motion is defective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a).3

Specifically, Defendant contends that “[a]bsent proof that

Plaintiff’s counsel represents ‘the successors or representatives

of the deceased party,’ Plaintiff’s counsel does not have the

authority to make a motion to substitute.” (Opp. at 3:7-9

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)).

ANALYSIS

When a party dies while litigation is pending, the

successors or representatives of the deceased party may move to

substitute a new party in place of the deceased. Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 25(a). However, a lawyer who represents a party

before that party’s death is not a “representative” within the

meaning of Rule 25 and, consequently, cannot continue an action

on behalf of the decedent unless asked to do so by a

representative of the estate. 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal

Practice and procedure § 1955, at 545 (2d ed. 1986); Coverdale v.

Apfel, No. 98-CV2531-DLC, 1999 WL 33945646, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June

22, 1999).

Here, Defendant contends that “[t]here is no evidence that

[Plaintiff’s] administratrix retained Plaintiff’s counsel to

continue this action or that there is any formal attorney-client

relationship between Plaintiff’s counsel and the administratrix.” 

(Opp. at 3:10-12).

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5

Unfortunately for Defendant, the record indicates precisely

the opposite. Indeed, in papers filed with this Court, Ms.

Sharon K. Lewis, the Administrator of Plaintiff’s estate, states

that “[Plaintiff’s counsel] are authorized to act as my attorneys

in my capacity as Administrator of the Estate of [Plaintiff] in

order to represent the interest of the Estate in the within [sic]

action.” (Lewis Decl. ¶ 4). Defendant’s argument is therefore

without merit. Because Plaintiff’s personal representative

followed proper procedure in notifying the Court of her intention

to continue the present action, Defendant’s argument must fail. 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute will be granted.

In addition to opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute,

Defendant has also filed a Countermotion to Dismiss. Defendant

contends that dismissal is warranted on two separate grounds. 

First, Defendant argues that, without an effective substitution

of parties, there is no longer a proper Plaintiff to litigate the

present dispute. (Opp. at 4-5). Defendant claims prejudice in

having to prepare for trial “without a proper Plaintiff, and

without any indication that the administratrix is actually

interested in continuing to pursue this case.” (Id. at 4). The

Court, however, has already addressed those issues with respect

to Plaintiff’s substitution motion as discussed above. Because

Plaintiff properly moved to substitute parties, Defendant’s first

theory for dismissal is no longer cogent. 

Defendant’s second theory for dismissal is predicated on

California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.34, a statute that

precludes the recovery of pain and suffering damages upon the

death of a Plaintiff. 

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Federal courts hearing section 1983 claims are further 4

limited in that the applicable state law can only be applied to

the extent that it is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and

laws of the United States” 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Venerable, the

District Court found that Cal. Code Civ. P. § 377.34 was not

inconsistent with federal law; however, the Court acknowledged

that other courts had come to a contrary conclusion. Venerable

at 1132-1133. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue. 

Id. at 1131, n.4. Consequently, the question of whether Cal.

Code of Civ. P. § 377.34 is inconsistent with federal law is

(continued...)

6

See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 377.34 (stating that “[i]n an action . .

. by a decedent’s . . . successor in interest on the decedent’s

cause of action, the damages recoverable . . . do not include

damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement”). Defendant

contends that this California statute is applicable to federal

question cases and, consequently, asks the court to “dismiss all

causes of action where the damages are based on Plaintiff’s pain

and suffering.” (Opp. at 5). 

Defendant offers a single federal case in support of its

proposition. (See Opp. at 5:6-8 (citing Venerable v. City of

Sacramento, 185 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1131-33 (E.D. Cal. 2002), for

contention that California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.34 is

applicable to federal question cases). In Venerable, the

District Court invoked California Code of Civil Procedure §

377.34 in dismissing a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Unlike Venerable, however, the instant case does not contain a

section 1983 claim; rather, the case involves a single claim

arising under section 3604 of the FHAA. The distinction is

significant because in section 1983 actions, courts are permitted

by statute to look to state law in answering damages questions

when federal law is silent on a particular issue. 

4

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(...continued) 4

nowhere near as settled as Defendant’s brief would seem to

suggest.

7

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Venerable at 1131. Thus, federal courts

considering section 1983 claims are allowed to incorporate state

law with respect to certain damages issues only because section

1988 specifically authorizes them to do so. 

Here, Defendant does not contend that section 1988 applies

to claims brought under the FHAA. Such a position would run

counter to the legislative history surrounding section 1988. See

42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(a)(2003)(Historical and Statutory

Notes)(indicating to which federal causes of action section

1988(a) applies. Reference to 42 U.S.C. § 3604 is conspicuously

absent). Moreover, even assuming section 1988 applied to FHAA

claims, Defendant has failed to address whether the FHAA is

silent on the survivability of pain and suffering damages. As

discussed previously, under section 1988 courts can turn to state

law only when federal law is silent on a particular issue of

damages. 

Notwithstanding the inapplicability of section 1988,

Defendant might still be entitled to relief if Defendant could

point to a similar statute that governs FHAA claims. 

Unfortunately, Defendant has identified no such statute, and the

court is unable to find one. Consequently, the Court finds

California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 inapplicable to

the instant case. 

///

///

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As indicated above, in bringing this Countermotion 5

Defendant asks the Court to “dismiss all causes of action where

the damages are based on the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering.” 

(Opp. at 5 (emphasis added)). However, as it stands now, this

case involves only a single cause of action pursuant to which

Plaintiff seeks a number of different remedies. It would be

procedurally improper for this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s only

cause of action simply because one of the remedies sought by

Plaintiff is not recoverable. 

8

Defendant’s Countermotion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for pain

and suffering damages is therefore denied. 

5

 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute is

GRANTED. Defendants Countermotion to Dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 31, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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