Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01838/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01838-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD HERSHIPS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GROVES AT MANZANITA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-1838 MCE CKD PS

ORDER 

Pending before the court are defendants’ motion for more definite statement, motion to 

strike (Anti-SLAPP, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16), and motion to declare plaintiffs vexatious 

litigants. The motions were submitted on the papers. ECF No. 42. Upon review of the 

documents in support and opposition,1and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS 

AS FOLLOWS:

Defendants move for a more definite statement, contending that plaintiffs’ first amended 

complaint does not meet federal pleading standards and is incomprehensible. This contention is 

well taken.

 

1

 Both defendants and plaintiffs have filed objections to submissions by the opposing side. 

Defendants’ objections (ECF No. 37) are sustained. Plaintiffs’ objections (ECF Nos 45, 46) are 

overruled. In ruling on the pending motions, the court has taken judicial notice only of orders

filed in this court and other courts.

Case 2:15-cv-01838-MCE-CKD Document 54 Filed 04/06/16 Page 1 of 7
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Motions for more definite statement are governed by Rule 12(e). “Rule 12(e) is designed 

to strike at unintelligibility, rather than want of detail.” Woods v. Reno Commodities, Inc., 600 

F.Supp. 574, 580 (D.Nev. 1984); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist., 491 F.Supp. 1364, 

1385 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Rule 12(e) permits a party to move for a more definite statement “[i]f a 

pleading is so vague that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” 

The function of such a motion is thus not to require the pleader to disclose details of the case, 

Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F.Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1979), nor to 

provide the evidentiary material that may properly be obtained by discovery. Famolare, Inc. v. 

Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981). A motion for more definite 

statement should be denied if a pleading meets federal standards by providing a “short and plain 

statement” of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint comprises 120 pages with 176 pages of exhibits. The 

first amended complaint is prolix, unintelligible, does not clearly set forth what claims are 

brought against which defendants, and falls woefully short of articulating any of the elements of 

the alleged causes of action. Defendants’ motion for more definite statement will therefore be 

granted. Plaintiffs will be afforded an opportunity to file a second amended complaint. 

Plaintiffs are advised that in the second amended complaint, the basis for federal 

jurisdiction should be set forth in the first paragraph. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). For 

each cause of action, the defendants against whom the cause of action is brought should be 

specifically identified. 

With respect to any claim for fraud, plaintiffs must set forth specific allegations. Rule 

9(b), which provides a heightened pleading standard, states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party 

must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, 

knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

9(b). These circumstances include the “‘time, place, and specific content of the false 

representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.’” Swartz v. 

KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Edwards v. Marin Park, 

Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 

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1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, 

where, and how’ of the misconduct charged”). “Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances 

constituting the alleged fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular 

misconduct . . . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done 

anything wrong.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124.

 With respect to any claims predicated on violations of state law, plaintiffs must carefully 

adhere to the pleading requirements for stating a cause of action. For instance, plaintiffs in the 

first amended complaint allege financial elder abuse, but they allege no conduct which violates 

California Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.30. Similarly, the first amended complaint 

alleges a cause of action for retaliatory eviction but fails to identify any rights they exercised or 

prohibited acts that would constitute retaliation under California Civil Code § 1942.5. Plaintiffs’ 

claim for malicious prosecution is similarly deficient in that plaintiffs plead no prior action in 

which plaintiffs prevailed. In addition, several of plaintiffs’ causes of action, as presently pled, 

appear to be barred under the anti-SLAPP provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 

425.16.2

In addition, plaintiffs are informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order 

to make plaintiffs’ amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiffs file an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. To foster compliance with the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 that the 

 

2

 Because the court has determined that the pleadings at present must be amended, the motion to 

strike will be denied without prejudice to its renewal after the filing of the second amended 

complaint. Plaintiffs are cautioned, however, that defendants’ arguments with respect to the 

motion to strike appear to be well taken. Any causes of action for senior elder financial abuse, 

retaliatory eviction, violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 and malicious 

prosecution pled in the second amended complaint cannot be predicated on the three-day notice 

and/or the unlawful detainer action instituted against plaintiffs.

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complaint must set forth a short and plain statement of the claims, the second amended complaint 

will be limited to 40 pages.

Defendants also move to have plaintiffs declared vexatious litigants. Defendants seek an 

order requiring plaintiffs to post security before proceeding further in this action. The Ninth 

Circuit has acknowledged the “inherent power of federal courts to regulate the activities of 

abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” 

De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (discussing requirements, pursuant to 

the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), for issuing an order requiring a litigant to seek permission 

from the court prior to filing any future suits); see also Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 

F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). Local Rule 151(b) provides, in pertinent part: “The provisions of 

Title 3A, part 2, of the California Code of Civil Procedure, relating to vexatious litigants, are 

hereby adopted as a procedural rule of this Court on the basis of which the Court may order the 

giving of security, bond, or undertaking, although the power of the court shall not be limited 

thereby.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, Title 3A, part 2, commencing with § 391.3 A vexatious litigant 

 

3 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391 provides:

As used in this title, the following terms have the following meanings:

(a) "Litigation" means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending 

in any state or federal court.

(b) "Vexatious litigant" means a person who does any of the following:

(1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, 

or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that 

have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain 

pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.

(2) After a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly 

relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination 

against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) 

the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or 

concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the 

litigation was finally determined.

(3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious 

motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics 

that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

(4) Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal 

court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, 

transaction, or occurrence.

(c) "Security" means an undertaking to assure payment, to the party for whose benefit the 

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is, inter alia, a person acting pro se who “repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or 

other papers” or “engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause 

unnecessary delay.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391(b)(3). Defendants contend plaintiffs meet this 

standard as well as subsections (b)(1) (five litigations in preceding seven years determined 

adversely to plaintiff) and (b)(4) (previously declared a vexatious litigant).

While many of plaintiffs’ pleadings in this action are unintelligible, a review of the docket 

does not indicate that plaintiffs have repeatedly filed frivolous motions or engaged in other tactics 

intended to cause unnecessary delay. Although defendants may view plaintiffs’ pleadings as 

meritless, at this stage of the litigation, the court does not find imposition of a vexatious litigant 

order under subsection (b)(3) is warranted.

Defendants assert that plaintiff Howard Herships has had at least five litigations 

determined adversely to him and thus should be declared vexatious under subsection (b)(1). 

Defendants contend that plaintiff Herships has had three habeas petitions4determined adversely 

to him, lost a case against the County of Santa Clara, and had a case against the State of

California dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Review of the cases cited by defendants does not 

support defendants’ contention that plaintiff meets the statutory definition. The first habeas case,

filed in the Northern District (No. C 09-4713 MMC (PR)), was dismissed and was determined 

adversely to plaintiff. ECF 21-1, p.4-6. In the second habeas case cited by defendants, however, 

 

undertaking is required to be furnished, of the party's reasonable expenses, including attorney's 

fees and not limited to taxable costs, incurred in or in connection with a litigation instituted, 

caused to be instituted, or maintained or caused to be maintained by a vexatious litigant.

(d) "Plaintiff" means the person who commences, institutes or maintains a litigation or 

causes it to be commenced, instituted or maintained, including an attorney at law acting in propria 

persona.

(e) "Defendant" means a person (including corporation, association, partnership and firm 

or governmental entity) against whom a litigation is brought or maintained or sought to be 

brought or maintained.

4

 Plaintiff contends that a habeas action does not constitute “litigation” within the meaning of the 

vexatious litigant statute, citing In re Bittaker, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1004 (1997). That case appears 

to be inapposite. The issue presented in Bittaker was whether a habeas petition was subject to a 

previously issued vexatious litigant order, not whether a habeas petition was included in the 

statutory definition of “litigation” under subsection (b)(1).

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the court simply denied plaintiff permission to file. ECF 21-1, p. 7-8. This case does not appear 

to meet the statutory definition of “adversely determined.” See Fink v.Shemtov, 180 Cal. App. 

4th 1160, 1172-1173 (2010). The third habeas case was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. A 

voluntary dismissal is prima facie proof that the litigation was determined adversely to plaintiff. 

See Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento, 38 Cal. App. 4th 775, 779-780 (1995). Plaintiff makes 

no showing regarding the nature of the voluntary dismissal. Assuming arguendo that habeas 

petitions are included in the definition of litigation under subsection (b)(1), only two of the 

habeas cases cited by defendants count against plaintiff. The remaining civil actions cited by 

defendants include an action in which a motion to dismiss was granted. ECF No. 21-1 at p. 11-

14. This case clearly fulfills the statutory definition. The second case relied on by defendants in 

support of their motion is an action in which the federal court action was dismissed under 

Younger abstention. ECF No. 21-1 at p.16; Herships v. State of California, 2:14-cv-0089 KJM 

CKD PS, ECF No. 6. Because the case was not dismissed on the merits but under an abstention 

doctrine, the court declines to construe said dismissal as a case “determined adversely” to 

plaintiff. In sum, defendants show at most three litigations determined adversely to plaintiff in 

the prior seven years. Thus, entry of a vexatious litigant order under subsection (b)(1) is not 

warranted.

Defendants also contend that plaintiff Howard Herships has been declared a vexatious 

litigant in state court and should be declared a vexatious litigant in this court as well. Having 

considered the basis of the state court’s determination and upon review of the pleadings in the 

federal action, the court declines to find defendant Herships vexatious under this standard. The 

basis of the state court action was a landlord-tenant action which is unrelated to the instant action. 

ECF No. 21-1, Exh. D.5 Subsection (b)(4) is therefore inapplicable.

/////

 

5

 Defendants submit a copy of a vexatious litigant list from state court indicating that plaintiff 

Herships was declared a vexatious litigant by the San Francisco Superior Court on November 25, 

2003. The appellate court affirmed the vexatious litigant order on March 11, 2005. ECF No. 21-

1, Exh. D.

 

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Finally, defendants point out only one other action that has been brought by plaintiff 

Karen Fletcher, a landlord/tenant action venued in state court, which was dismissed with 

prejudice. Defense counsel contends the prior state court action filed by Karen Fletcher 

demonstrates her association with plaintiff Howard Herships and asserts such an association is 

sufficient reason to find plaintiff Fletcher vexatious as well. One action does not a vexatious 

litigant make. There is simply no basis at this time to find plaintiff Karen Fletcher vexatious. 

Accordingly, the court declines to enter an order requiring the posting of security.6

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for more definite statement (ECF No. 19) is granted; no later than 

May 6, 2016, plaintiffs are granted leave to file a second amended complaint, limited to 40 pages, 

exclusive of exhibits, that complies with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the docket 

number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; plaintiffs must file 

an original and two copies of the second amended complaint; failure to file a second amended 

complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be 

dismissed.

2. The motion to strike (ECF No. 20) is denied without prejudice. 

3. Defendants’ motion to declare plaintiffs vexatious litigants (ECF No 21) is denied. 

Dated: April 6, 2016

4 herships.vex.mds.slapp.2

 

6

 Defendants also assert that plaintiffs have sent over 100 emails to defense counsel which have 

been taunting in nature, threatening State Bar disciplinary action and using profanity in referring 

to defense counsel. Plaintiffs are advised that the court will not tolerate such conduct. Although 

plaintiffs’ conduct does not meet the standards for imposition of a vexatious litigant order at this 

juncture, plaintiffs are cautioned that they are subject to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (A 

person “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 

required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees 

reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”). See Wages v. Internal Revenue Service, 915 

F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (pro se plaintiff subject to section 1927 sanctions).

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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