Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06366/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNA ARRILLAGA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FREMONT,

Defendant.

Case No.17-cv-06366-JSC 

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

CALCULATION OF DAMAGES

Re: Dkt. No. 29

Plaintiff Donna Arrillaga sued Defendant City of Fremont (“Defendant” or “City”) for 

injunctive relief and damages arising from alleged violations of Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (“Section 504”); and California’s Disabled Persons Act, California 

Civil Code § 54 (“CDPA”).1 (Dkt. No. 1.)2 On August 30, 2018, the Court granted the parties’ 

consent decree settling Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief, (see Dkt. No. 23), and the parties’ 

stipulation requesting that the Court act as finder of fact on the question of the amount of damages 

due under California Civil Code § 54.3, (Dkt. No. 24). Now pending before the Court is 

Plaintiff’s motion for calculation of statutory damages in the amount of $45,000. (Dkt. No. 29.) 

After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, the Court concludes that oral argument is not 

necessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the December 13, 2018 hearing, and

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion. 

//

//

 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 7 & 11.) 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff is disabled and requires “a walker and a 

scooter for mobility” because she is “unable to stand or walk independently.” (Dkt. No. 29-1 at ¶

4.) On 45 separate occasions over a six-month period between November 2016 and May 2017, 

Plaintiff personally encountered structural barriers3to on-street and off-street public parking in the 

historic Niles district of the City. (Id. at ¶ 5-6, 11.) Plaintiff encountered these barriers on a 

twice-weekly basis when attending “knitting and painting groups and when volunteering at the Art 

Gallery in [her] capacity as a member of the Fremont Arts Association.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) The barriers 

caused Plaintiff “difficulty, discomfort, and embarrassment.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

On May 3, 2017, Plaintiff notified the City in writing of the barriers she experienced and 

the difficulties they caused, (id. at ¶ 9), and she filed a government claim with the City seeking 

damages “pursuant to § 910 et seq. of the California Government Code,” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 33). 

Plaintiff’s May 2017 government claim constituted the City’s first notice of the parking issue in 

the Niles district. (Dkt. No. 31-1 at ¶ 8.) 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff sued the City on November 1, 2017, bringing causes of action under Title II of the 

ADA, Section 504, and the CDPA. (Dkt. No. 1.) As previously discussed, the parties resolved 

Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief,

4

(see Dkt. No. 23), and stipulated to both Defendant’s 

liability and Plaintiff’s entitlement to statutory damages under the CDPA, (see Dkt. No. 20 at ¶¶ 3-

4 ). The parties further stipulated to have the Court determine the specific amount of statutory 

damages to which Plaintiff is entitled. 

Plaintiff filed her motion for calculation of damages on November 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 29.) 

The motion is fully briefed, (see Dkt. Nos. 31 & 32), and the Court heard oral argument on 

 

3 The barriers included a lack of “designated on-street parking” and “[i]ncorrectly configured 

designated accessible parking spaces.” (Dkt. No. 29-1 at ¶ 5.) 

4 Pursuant to the parties’ consent decree, “the City’s Public Works department has conducted a 

field visit and survey of the site, has designed the required ramps, parking stalls, curb cuts, and 

pathways, has solicited comment from the Niles Street Association and the Niles Merchants 

association, and has begun construction on the parking stalls.” (Dkt. No. 31-1 at ¶ 9.) 

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December 13, 2018. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks statutory damages under the CDPA in the amount of $45,000. Defendant 

counters that “[a] reasonable damages award is $4,000 because [Plaintiff] had an obligation to 

mitigate her damages” under California Civil Code § 55.56. (Dkt. No. 31 at 2.) The Court does 

not agree that section 55.56’s mitigation provisions apply to claims against public entities. 

However, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to statutory damages in the amount of 

$1,000 for each distinct occasion in which she encountered the barriers at issue, but is instead 

entitled to statutory damages for each distinct barrier to access personally encountered. 

I. The CDPA Generally 

The CDPA “generally guarantees people with disabilities equal rights of access to public 

places, buildings, facilities and services, as well as common carriers, housing and places of public 

accommodation.” Jankey v. Lee, 55 Cal. 4th 1038, 1044-45 (2012) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Individuals with disabilities or medical conditions have the same 

right as the general public to the full and free use of the streets, 

highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, medical facilities, 

including hospitals, clinics, and physicians' offices, public facilities, 

and other public places. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 54(a). The CDPA provides for monetary damages under Section 54.3, which

states, in part:

Any person or persons, firm or corporation who denies or interferes 

with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified 

in Sections 54 and 54.1 or otherwise interferes with the rights of an 

individual with a disability under Sections 54, 54.1 and 54.2 is liable 

for each offense for the actual damages and any amount as may be 

determined by a jury, or the court sitting without a jury, up to a 

maximum of three times the amount of actual damages but in no 

case less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and attorney's fees as 

may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any 

person denied any of the rights provided in Sections 54, 54.1, 

and 54.2.

Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3 (emphasis added). The parties do not dispute that the City is liable to 

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Plaintiff for damages under section 54.3 of the CDPA.5 (See Dkt. No. 20 at ¶ 3 (noting that “[t]he 

parties agree that the City is liable for, and Plaintiff entitled to damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 

54.3”).) The parties dispute, however, whether Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate her damages 

pursuant to California Civil Code section 55.56, which applies to certain claims brought under the 

CDPA. 

II. Mitigation Provisions Under California Civil Code 55.56

Plaintiff argues that she had no duty to mitigate her damages because section 55.56—by its 

terms—does not apply to claims against public entities. Defendant counters that the mitigation 

provisions of section 55.56 apply to all claims under the CDPA and therefore must be considered 

when determining damages under that statute. The plain language of Section 55.56 and its 

companion sections does not support Defendant’s interpretation. 

In 2009, the California Legislature enacted the Construction-Related Accessibility 

Standards Compliance Act (“CRASCA” or “the Act”), of which the mitigation provisions under 

section 55.56 are part. Cal. Civ. Code § 55.51. The Act states, in part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provisions of this part 

shall apply to any construction-related accessibility claim, as defined 

in this part, including, but not limited to, any claim brought under 

Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55.

Id. The Act defines “construction-related accessibility claim” as “any civil claim in a civil action 

with respect to a place of public accommodation, including, but not limited to, a claim brought 

under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55.” Cal. Civ. Code 55.52(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Act defines 

“place of public accommodation” as having “the same meaning as ‘public accommodation’ as set 

forth in Section 12181(7) of Title 42 of the United States Code [Title III of the ADA] and the 

federal regulations adopted pursuant to that section.” Cal. Civ. Code 55.52(7). Title III of the 

ADA defines “public accommodation[s]” as certain “private entities” whose “operations . . . affect 

 

5 Defendant’s opposition discusses case law in this circuit regarding the CDPA’s application to 

public entities, noting that “[r]ecent unpublished cases have questioned whether the CDPA applies 

to public entities at all.” (See Dkt. No. 31 at 3-4.) Defendant goes on to note, however, that “[p]er 

the stipulation in place in this case[,] . . . the parties have agreed that the CDPA applies to the City 

for purposes of this case.” (Id. at 4.) Thus, this Order focuses only on the amount of damages 

available under § 54.3. 

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commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (prohibiting discrimination on 

the basis of disability by private entities that operate places of public accommodation) (emphasis 

added); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (“Place of public accommodation means a facility operated by a 

private entity whose operations affect commerce.”). The Act is thus clear that it applies only to 

claims involving facilities operated by private entities (i.e., “public accommodations”). 

Section 55.56 of the Act likewise applies only to places of public accommodation. The 

section states, in pertinent part:

(a) Statutory damages under either subdivision (a) of Section 52 or 

subdivision (a) of Section 54.3 may be recovered in a constructionrelated accessibility claim against a place of public accommodation

only if a violation or violations of one or more construction-related 

accessibility standards denied the plaintiff full and equal access to the 

place of public accommodation on a particular occasion.

Cal. Civ. Code 55.56(a) (emphasis added). It follows that the mitigation provisions found under 

sections 55.56(h)-(i) apply only to public accommodation claims, as well.6 

Here, there is no dispute that Defendant is a public, not a private entity. There is likewise 

no dispute that public entities are covered by Title II of the ADA, and not by Title III. See

Daubert v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist., 760 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Title II regulates state 

and local governments operating public services or programs.”); see also Barden v. City of 

Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “anything a public entity does” is 

covered under the scope of Title II) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the 

Act applies only to claims involving public accommodations (i.e., facilities operated by private 

entities), it follows that the mitigation provisions under the Act do not apply to the instant claim 

against Defendant. 

Defendant’s reliance on Beauchamp v. City of Long Beach, 730 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2013) is 

unavailing. In Beauchamp, as here, the plaintiff sued a municipality under the CDPA alleging that 

 

6 As applicable here, where a plaintiff alleges that she “personally encountered [a] violation on a 

particular occasion,” the relevant mitigation provision states that “[t]his section does not alter the 

applicable law for the awarding of injunctive or other equitable relief for a violation or violations 

of one or more construction-related accessibility standards, nor alter any legal obligation of a party 

to mitigate damages.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(h). 

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certain barriers he “encountered on the City’s streets and sidewalks denied him full and equal 

access to such public facilities.” Id. at 988. The district court found that the plaintiff “had 

encountered barriers that denied him access on 440 distinct occasions,” but awarded the plaintiff 

$17,000 in statutory damages based on the number of barriers he encountered, not the number of 

occasions he encountered them. Id. The plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit certified a 

question to the California Supreme Court seeking its “determination as to the proper construction 

of ‘offense’ for purposes of section 54.3, and specifically, whether multiple incidents of denials of 

access due to encounters with the same barrier can constitute a single ‘offense.’” Id. at 989. 

In explaining its request, the Beauchamp court recognized in dicta that “section 54.3 must 

be interpreted in light of section 55.56 of the California Civil Code, which limited the damages 

available under section 54.3 for certain types of claims.” 730 F.3d at 989-90 (emphasis added). 

The Beauchamp court did not hold that section 55.56’s mitigation provisions applied to CDPA 

claims against public entities, but instead, looked to section 55.56 for guidance on the following 

question, which it certified to the California Supreme Court: 

Section 54.3(a) of the California Civil Code provides that a person 

who violates the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), Cal. 

Civ.Code §§ 54, 54.1, is liable for actual damages for “each offense . 

. . but in no case less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).” Does 

the phrase “each offense” refer to each occasion when a plaintiff 

encounters a barrier that denies the plaintiff full and equal access to a 

public facility, or should a trial court construe “each offense” more 

narrowly, particularly in situations where a plaintiff repeatedly 

encounters the same barrier? If the phrase “each offense” is not 

susceptible to a narrower construction, under what circumstances 

would the penalty scheme in section 54.3 violate the due process 

clause of the state constitution?

Beauchamp, 730 F.3d at 987-88. The parties ultimately settled before the California Supreme 

Court could answer that question. See 752 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The parties have indicated 

that they reached a settlement following the California Supreme Court’s acceptance of the 

certified question.”). Because the Beauchamp court did not specifically address whether the 

mitigation provisions under section 55.56 apply to CDPA claims against public entities, the 

court’s analysis in Beauchamp does not support Defendant’s argument. Further, the plain terms of 

CRASCA suggest that section 55.56 does not apply to claims against public entities. Defendant’s 

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argument that Plaintiff’s 45 separate visits to the Niles district constitute impermissible “stacking” 

of damages is similarly unavailing, because it relies on section 55.56’s mitigation provisions and 

cites cases involving private, not public entities. (See Dkt. No. 31 at 6-7.) 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff was under no duty to mitigate her damages 

under the CDPA because claims against public entities are not covered under section 55.56. 

III. Amount of Damages

Plaintiff seeks $45,000 in statutory damages under section 54.3—$1,000 for each distinct 

occasion in which she encountered the barriers at issue. Defendant “does not dispute the factual 

account provided in Plaintiff’s Declaration that she visited the Niles parking facilities 45 times in a 

six-month span representing visits [that] averaged twice per week.” (Dkt. No. 31 at 2.) All of the 

encounters occurred before Plaintiff notified the City of the barriers. (Dkt. No. 29-1 at ¶ 11.) 

Thus, the issue before the Court is the same question the Beauchamp court certified to the 

California Supreme Court; specifically, can a plaintiff recover statutory damages under section 

54.3 for each occasion in which she personally encountered the barrier in question, or should the 

Court “construe ‘each offense’ more narrowly, particularly in situations where a plaintiff 

repeatedly encounters the same barrier?” See Beauchamp, 730 F.3d at 987-88. 

Although the Beauchamp court did not answer that question, the analysis the court 

provided in explaining its request is helpful. The court noted, in pertinent part:

In sum, we read California cases to suggest that where a statute allows 

for the imposition of ever-mounting penalties, a trial court should first 

consider whether the statute is susceptible to a narrowing construction 

in a particular case. Cf. People v. Toomey, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1, 22, 

203 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1984) (explaining that where a statute “fails to 

specify what constitutes a single violation,” the courts should 

“determine appropriate penalties on a case-by-case basis”). 

Furthermore, if a statute is not susceptible to a narrowing 

construction, it appears the trial court should consider whether the 

application of the penalty provision is constitutionally excessive as 

applied under the due process clause of the state and federal 

constitutions. Hale [v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388 (1978)]. 

Id. at 991. Further, the court noted:

Because section 54.3 does not directly define “each offense,” it may 

be susceptible to a narrowing construction. A trial court would not be 

compelled to construe that phrase to mean each separate encounter 

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with a barrier, particularly where a California court has stated that 

“[n]ot every denial of ‘full and equal access’ under section 54.1 . . . 

gives rise to a cause of action for damages under section 

54.3.” Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc., 155 Cal. App. 4th 

254, 265, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 838 (2007). Given that section 

54.3 imposes mandatory, ever-mounting penalties, the cases 

reviewed above suggest that California courts may have the discretion 

to construe section 54.3 narrowly in an appropriate case. For instance, 

a trial court could plausibly define “each offense” to mean each 

barrier personally encountered by the plaintiff, rather than each 

occasion when the plaintiff encountered that barrier. Cf. Jayhill 

Corp., 9 Cal. 3d at 289, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d 1400. 

Given that the mitigation provisions under section 55.56 do not apply to claims against a 

public entity, a plaintiff could conceivably visit the non-CDPA compliant public facilities of a 

municipality multiple times in a single day for a period of several months, encountering the same 

barriers to access and racking up “mandatory, ever-mounting penalties,” before bringing such 

barriers to the municipality’s attention. Such a result could not have been the reasonable intent of 

the California Legislature. Thus, the Court finds that section 54.3 is susceptible to a narrowing 

construction when applied to public entities and will construe “each offense” under section 54.3 to 

mean each barrier personally encountered by Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff did not encounter any 

barriers after she notified the City of the problems, the Court need not and does not decide 

whether any barriers encountered after notifying a public entity of the barriers could constitute a 

separate offense.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to the following damages under 

section 54.3:

(1) $1,000 for the lack of accessible on-street parking adjacent to 

the Niles Art Gallery

(2) $1,000 for the “excessive slopes and cross slopes in the space 

and access aisle” near the “two designated accessible parking 

spaces in the public parking lot on the left side of the Niles 

Town Plaza”

(3) $1,000 for the “unregulated and non-signalized cross walk”

(4) $1,000 for the inaccessible sidewalk near the on-street stall 

parking in front of the Gallery

(See Dkt. No. 29-1 at ¶¶ 13-14.) 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff is entitled to $4,000 in statutory damages under 

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section 54.3. The Court sets a further case management conference for January 31, 2019 at 1:30 

p.m., in the event the parties do not reach an agreement regarding Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and 

costs or do not stipulate to a briefing schedule for same. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2018

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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