Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03113/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

UDited States Court of Appe&b 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 6 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

VIRGIL F. RYDER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

0. C. JENKINS, Warden; UNITED STATES 

PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Nos. 94-3113 

& 

94-3188 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-3223) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Virgil F. Ryder, Pro se. 

Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, D. Brad Bailey, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for RespondentsAppellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-3113 Document: 01019290340 Date Filed: 01/26/1995 Page: 1 
Petitioner, a federal prisoner, filed a petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the 

actions of the United States Parole Commission (Commission) . The 

district court denied the petition, and petitioner app~aled. This 

court abated the appeal pending the district court's disposition 

of petitioner's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. 

After the district court denied the 59(e) motion, petitioner filed 

a new notice of appeal. Our jurisdiction over these appeals,l 

which have now been consolidated, arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 

and 2253. 

In 1968, petitioner was sentenced to twenty years' 

imprisonment for bank robbery. He was paroled in 1972. While on 

parole, petitioner was convicted of a state crime. He was 

incarcerated in state prison from 1978 to 1991. In 1981, while 

petitioner was in state prison, the Commission officially revoked 

petitioner's federal parole and ordered a parole violator term to 

commence upon petitioner's release from state custody. In 1991, 

petitioner was paroled from state prison and returned to federal 

custody to serve his parole violator sentence. He received a 

parole hearing in 1991, after which two hearing examiners 

recommended that petitioner be released in May 1992. That 

recommendation was not followed, however, by the Commission, which 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-3113 Document: 01019290340 Date Filed: 01/26/1995 Page: 2 
ordered petitioner's parole violator term to continue to the 

expiration of his sentence. 

Complaining about the Commission's decision, petitioner has 

filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus--this one, and a 

previous one filed in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri. In -his previous petition, 

petitioner argued that (1) the hearing panel's recommendation was 

improperly referred for review to the Commission; (2) the 

Commission abused its discretion in setting petitioner's parole 

violator term; (3) the Commission lacked jurisdiction over 

petitioner; (4) the Commission improperly relied on aggravating 

factors to continue petitioner's custody beyond that recommended 

by the guidelines; (5) the Commission failed to credit the time 

petitioner served in state custody, as allegedly required by 

28 C.F.R. §§ 2.21(c), 2.47(e) (1), and 2.52; (6) the Commission 

erroneously refused 

petitioner spent on 

custody; and (7) 

to credit earned good-time credits, the time 

parole, and the time he spent in state 

the parole violator sentence violated the 

separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition against double 

jeopardy, and denied petitioner a fair and public trial. The 

district court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the 

petition, disposing of each argument on the merits. The Eighth 

Circuit affirmed. 

Armed with more elaborate arguments, petitioner filed this 

petition in the United States District Court for the District of 

Kansas. Essentially, he argues that his parole violator sentence 

should have commenced with the revocation of his parole in 1981 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-3113 Document: 01019290340 Date Filed: 01/26/1995 Page: 3 
and should have run concurrently with his state sentence. He 

claims that 18 U.S.C § 4210(b) (2) (repealed 1986), which allowed 

the Commission to determine whether the parole violator sentence 

should run consecutively or concurrently to the sentence imposed 

for a new offense, is ambiguous and its implementation must be 

governed by legislative history. Citing House Conference Report 

No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 351, 364, petitioner argues that Congress intended 

the federal sentence to be reinstated immediately after parole 

revocation and served concurrently with a subsequent sentence. 

Because this intent is not reflected in the Commission's 

regulations, particularly in 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c) (2), petitioner 

argues that the Commission has abused its discretion in 

promulgating the regulations. As a result, petitioner allegedly 

has been denied concurrent service of his federal and state 

sentences, contrary to the expressed intent of Congress. 

The petition, in respondents' view, also renews a claim 

petitioner raised in his prior petition--that the Commission 

abused its discretion when it refused to follow the hearing 

panel's recommendation to release petitioner in May 1992. 

Respondents asked the district court to dismiss that claim as 

successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). All other claims, they 

urged, should be dismissed on the merits.2 

2 Curiously, respondents did not argue that petitioner's other 

claims should be dismissed as abusively "assert[ing] new grounds 

unjustifiably omitted from a prior petition." Watkins v. 

Champion, 39 F.3d 273, 275 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-3113 Document: 01019290340 Date Filed: 01/26/1995 Page: 4 
In response, petitioner denied raising any of his present 

arguments in his previous habeas petition. Petitioner's Traverse, 

R. I, doc. 13 at 2. His new arguments, he claimed, are, 

therefore, not barred by § 2244(a). See Sanders v. United 

States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963) ("[Section] 2244 is addressed only to 

the problem of successive applications based on grounds previously 

heard and decided."). He explained that the new arguments are 

based on the intent of Congress, as expressed in the legislative 

history, and on certain passages of 28 C.F.R. Part Two. 

The district court did not rule on respondents' successive 

petition argument. 

history argument. 

regulations do not 

Nor did it consider petitioner's legislative 

Instead, the court decided that the parole 

violate the parole statute and that the 

Commission's actions in this case did not violate the statute. 

On appeal, petitioner complains that the district court 

failed to consider his legislative history argument and his 

argument that, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Part Two, his detainer 

warrant was automatically executed after he served eighteen months 

in state prison. Respondents, on the other hand, urge this court 

to reach their successive petition argument. Further, they claim 

that petitioner's legislative history argument is meritless. 

This court has, in the past, reached the merits of a habeas 

petition that the district court, instead of dismissing as an 

abuse of the writ, chose to dismiss on the merits. See Coleman v. 

Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217, 1228-29 (lOth Cir~), cert. denied, 497 u.s. 

1053 (1990). But see Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1310 

(11th Cir. 1994) (stating in light of Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-3113 Document: 01019290340 Date Filed: 01/26/1995 Page: 5 
2514, 2518 (1992), federal courts must resist temptation "to skip 

over an abuse of the writ issue and deny a claim on the merits"), 

petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 30, 1994) (No. 94-7104). In 

this case, however, the district court failed to consider 

petitioner's central argument regarding legislative history. We 

deem it appropriate to remand this case for consideration of 

respondents' successive petition argument and, if necessary, for 

full consideration of petitioner's claims. The court should also 

determine whether petitioner's claims constitute an abuse of the 

writ, should respondents choose to raise that defense on remand. 

See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 u.s. 467, 493-96 (1991) (explaining 

abuse of the writ doctrine) .3 Accordingly, we REVERSE the 

district court's judgment and REMAND for further proceedings. 

3 Abusive claims are new claims not raised in a previous 

petition. SawYer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992). 

Successive claims "raise grounds identical to grounds heard and 

decided on the merits in a previous petition." Id. 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-3113 Document: 01019290340 Date Filed: 01/26/1995 Page: 6