Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07104/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2015 Decided October 23, 2015

No. 14-7104

BODE & GRENIER, LLP,

APPELLEE

v.

CARROLL L. KNIGHT, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01323)

Joseph Andrew Ahern argued the cause for appellants. 

With him on the briefs was Ben M. Gonek.

Randell C. Ogg argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee. 

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion filed for the Court by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

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BROWN, Circuit Judge: “Hell hath no fury like a lawyer 

scorned.” Tom Gordon, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Lawyer 

Scorned, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 28, 2015), 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/tom-gordon-hell-hath-no-furylike-a-lawyer-scorned-1422489433. The problem with 

scorning a lawyer is that lawyers tend to sue. So it is here. A 

law firm based in the District of Columbia, Bode & Grenier, 

LLP, provided legal services to three Michigan-based 

companies owned and managed by Carroll Knight

(“appellants”). More than ten years into the relationship, 

appellants stopped paying the bill. The predictable result? 

Litigation. The law firm prevailed in the district court, 

winning a judgment for $70,000 in overdue legal fees—plus

$269,585.19 in legal fees for having to litigate over $70,000 

in legal fees. We affirm the district court. 

I

Appellants offer petroleum fueling products and services, 

ranging from service stations to large-scale petroleum storage. 

Based in Michigan, the appellant companies operate in 

multiple Midwestern states. Bode & Grenier represented 

appellants between 1994 and 2008, advising on taxation, 

gasoline contracts, petroleum futures and various regulatory 

enforcement and litigation matters. Throughout most of the 

relationship, no written agreement governed the terms of legal 

representation or manner of payment. Appellants paid the law 

firm monthly based on oral agreements. 

On November 25, 2005, catastrophe struck. 

Approximately 100,000 gallons of petroleum spilled out of 

holding tanks owned by appellants in Toledo, Ohio. 

Appellants stopped the leak, but were powerless to stop the 

flood of regulatory actions that followed in its wake. A 

month after the spill, Knight called Bode & Grenier’s 

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managing partner, William Bode, to request the firm’s 

services. The firm soon tackled regulatory enforcement

proceedings in Ohio, a lawsuit in federal court in Ohio, and 

counseled the company on other regulatory issues. As before, 

the firm billed appellants monthly. 

According to the complaint, appellants began paying 

their legal fees sporadically between December 2005 and 

January 2007. At some point, they stopped paying. Bode 

issued an ultimatum: unless Knight and his companies agreed 

to pay overdue legal fees, and signed a document setting out 

the terms of prospective relations, the firm would 

immediately withdraw from all pending cases. Knight 

capitulated. On August 7, 2007, the parties executed three 

agreements: a Retention Letter setting out the terms of future 

relations; a Promissory Note (“Note”) obligating appellants to 

pay $300,000 in past-due legal fees; and a Confession of 

Judgment (“Confession”) authorizing the firm to instantly 

secure judgment if appellants failed to satisfy the Note by 

May 1, 2008. 

The first of May came and went without appellants 

satisfying the Note. Wasting no time, the firm entered the 

Confession of Judgment in Michigan state court the next day, 

May 2, 2008. Judgment issued that very day, without a 

hearing or adversarial process, for $302,500 ($300,000 due 

under the Note, plus $2,500 in attorney’s fees). 

Three months later, in July 2008, Bode & Grenier filed 

the instant federal case in the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia seeking $75,105.97 in unpaid legal 

fees owed under the Retention Letter. The complaint brought 

claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, guaranty, 

and a petition to pierce the corporate veil. Appellants

counterclaimed, seeking disgorgement of all legal fees to 

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compensate for alleged disclosures of client confidences in 

the complaint. Discovery closed in February 2009. 

In March 2009, both parties moved for summary 

judgment. Appellants argued the Confession of Judgment 

filed in Michigan barred the federal suit under res judicata 

principles. Bode & Grenier opposed the counterclaim as 

baseless. In September 2011, the district court granted Bode 

& Grenier’s motion for summary judgment on the 

counterclaim, and denied appellants’ motion for summary 

judgment based on res judicata. Bode & Grenier, LLP v. 

Knight, 821 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59 (D.D.C. 2011). 

In November 2011, Bode & Grenier amended its 

complaint, adding a claim for attorney’s fees. Appellants 

filed an amended answer in January 2012. That answer, like 

their original answer, admitted Bode & Grenier’s basic 

allegation that the law firm “provided legal services to 

Defendants pursuant to the agreement” between the parties. 

First Amended Complaint ¶ 33; Defendant’s Answer to First 

Amended Complaint ¶ 33. Only one part of the answer was 

new: an affirmative defense attacking the law firm’s fees as 

unreasonable. With a new defense came further discovery, 

opened in March 2012. 

Trial was set for November 13, 2012. In September 

2012, appellants filed a pretrial statement that raised multiple 

defenses not included in their answer, including duress, 

failure of consideration and failure to comply with a condition 

precedent. The latter defense argued the law firm could not 

recover because its legal services were not approved by the 

“Litigation Committee” referred to in the Retention Letter.

1

 1 Various clauses in the Retention Letter refer to the Litigation 

Committee. Without defining the Committee’s composition, the 

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The court struck the added defenses but permitted appellants 

to file a motion requesting leave to amend, which they filed 

on October 11, 2012, barely four weeks before trial. In their 

motion, appellants dropped the defense of duress, but stood 

by the other two. The court denied the motion. Allowing 

leave to amend, the court found, would unduly delay trial, 

requiring a third round of discovery. It would also prejudice 

the plaintiff, forcing them to face newly christened defenses 

not raised over the course of four years of litigation. 

Trial went forward as scheduled on November 13, 2012. 

Bode & Grenier voluntarily dismissed all but the breach of 

contract and attorney’s fee claims, the latter of which the 

parties agreed to handle in post-trial proceedings. Following 

a one-day bench trial, the court found in favor of Bode & 

Grenier on the breach of contract claim, entering judgment for 

$70,000, the amount of unpaid legal fees stipulated by the 

parties. In subsequent proceedings, the court granted the law 

firm’s claim for attorney’s fees, rejecting the contention that 

the fees were either precluded by Michigan Law or limited by 

the Promissory Note. Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 31 F. 

Supp. 3d 111, 113–20 (D.D.C. 2014). Appellants timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. 

II

We must first consider whether the Confession of 

Judgment filed in Michigan state court precluded the current 

suit under res judicata principles. The trial court rejected 

 

Retention Letter notes that the “Firm’s role and scope of work in 

these matters will be determined by the Litigation Committee . . . .” 

J.A. 209. The Committee also “approve[s] the anticipated fees 

incurred for the work to be performed.” Id.

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appellants’ summary judgment motion seeking preclusion. 

We review that decision de novo. See, e.g., Aka v. Wash.

Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “[A] party 

is only entitled to summary judgment if the record, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Id. 

Applying that framework, we affirm the decision. 

 Federal courts extend to state court judgments the same 

preclusive effect those judgments would receive in the 

originating state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (requiring that state 

“judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and 

credit” in other courts as they had “by law or usage in the 

courts of such State . . . from which they are taken”); see also

Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980) 

(plurality opinion) (noting that the requirement to award 

preclusive effect to state court judgments, “if not compelled 

by the Full Faith and Credit Clause [of the Constitution] . . . is 

surely required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738”). Michigan state law 

thus determines the preclusive effect of the Confession, if 

any.

Michigan statute prescribes the procedure for procuring a 

Confession of Judgment. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2906. 

Confessions of Judgment may take effect, “although there is 

no suit then pending between the parties,” upon the filing of 

the Confession, “signed by [a Michigan] attorney,” with the 

local court. Id. § 600.2906. The document containing the 

confession must be “distinct from that containing the bond, 

contract or other evidence of the demand for which such 

judgment was confessed.” Id. § 600.2906(1). The process “is 

purely ex parte.” Gordon v. Heller, 260 N.W. 156, 157

(Mich. 1935). The party against whom judgment is entered 

never appears, having already consented to judgment. 

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Michigan courts have not considered the precise 

question before us: whether a Confession of Judgment 

triggers claim preclusion, known as res judicata in Michigan. 

“The doctrine of res judicata is employed” in Michigan “to 

prevent multiple suits litigating the same cause of action.” 

Adair v. State, 680 N.W. 2d 386, 396 (Mich. 2004). 

Subsequent actions are barred “when (1) the prior action was 

decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same 

parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in the second case 

was, or could have been, resolved in the first.” Id. The party 

invoking res judicata bears the burden to prove it applies. 

Baraga Cnty. v. State Tax Comm’n, 645 N.W. 2d 13, 16

(Mich. 2002). 

Under either of Michigan’s “two alternative tests for 

determining when res judicata will bar a claim in a second 

lawsuit because the claim could have, with the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, been brought in the first action,” Begin 

v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 773 N.W. 2d 271, 283 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2009), overruled on other grounds by Admire v. Auto-Owners 

Ins. Co., 831 N.W. 2d 849 (Mich. 2013), preclusion through a 

Confession of Judgment is unlikely. First, the “‘same 

evidence’ test looks to ‘whether the same facts or evidence 

are essential to the maintenance of the two actions.’” Id.

(quoting Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 N.W. 

2d 829, 834 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)). Claim preclusion blocks 

a second action “between the same parties when the evidence 

or essential facts are identical.” Id. (quoting Dart v. Dart, 597 

N.W. 2d 82, 88 (Mich. 1999)).

The second test casts a wider net by examining the 

relevant transactions of events. “Whether a factual grouping 

constitutes a transaction for purposes of res judicata is to be 

determined pragmatically, by considering whether the facts 

are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether 

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they form a convenient trial unit . . . .” Adair, 680 N.W. 2d at 

398; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2)

(1982) (“RESTATEMENT”) (substantially the same). 

Transaction-based preclusion “is justified only when the 

parties have ample procedural means for fully developing the 

entire transaction in the one action going to the merits to

which the plaintiff is ordinarily confined.” RESTATEMENT § 

24 cmt. a. 

Here, the Confession of Judgment entered in Michigan

state court had no preclusive effect. The Promissory Note 

underlying the Confession was carefully drawn, and Michigan 

Supreme Court precedent indicates that a Confession is a 

judgment without expectation it will be joined with other 

claims. See Gordon, 260 N.W. at 157.

The Confession rested on a narrowly tailored Promissory 

Note obligating appellants to pay $300,000 in overdue legal 

fees. In the event of default, the Confession allowed the law

firm to receive near-instantaneous judgment on the Note. 

And that is precisely what happened: appellants defaulted, 

and the firm executed the Confession in Michigan without a 

hearing or adversarial process. Appellants appeared only 

constructively. Judgment issued as a purely ministerial act: 

no judge reviewed the substance of the dispute—the 

underlying evidence that proved appellants had failed to pay 

their bills. Under Michigan law, the court simply enforced 

the clear language of the Confession and Note. 

We have no difficulty concluding the present suit need 

not have been brought earlier. Neither of the alternative tests 

Michigan employs to determine whether a subsequent action 

could have been brought in a prior case supports preclusion. 

First, the Confession and the present action rely on different 

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evidence: the former on a Note for past debts, the latter on 

prospective fees owed under the Retention Letter. 

The same transaction test asks whether the suits share a 

“single group of operative facts” and “form a convenient trial 

unit.” Adair, 680 N.W. 2d at 397–98. Here, the answer is no. 

Michigan’s Supreme Court makes clear that Confessions of 

Judgment are entered “purely ex parte,” which implies they 

are entered without being joined to other claims. Gordon, 260 

N.W. at 157. As the trial judge found, the mechanical process 

of entering a Confession hardly “lend[s] itself well to adding 

additional claims based upon the underlying debt.” Bode & 

Grenier, LLP, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 63.

Michigan courts handle Confessions based on clear 

statutory command: as long as the parties present the 

appropriate paperwork and signatures, judgment issues 

immediately. Almost nothing about that process resembles an 

ordinary claim, which must be handled in the course of 

adversarial litigation, and ultimately examined by a judge or 

jury. These differences call to mind the Restatement’s 

warning that the same transaction test applies only “when the 

parties have ample procedural means for fully developing the 

entire transaction” in the first action. See RESTATEMENT § 24 

cmt. a. Requiring litigants to pile on every other available 

claim when filing a Confession would transform the entire 

process, hoisting the parties into adversarial litigation when 

they only meant to settle one part of their dispute. See id. § 

26(1)(a) (noting that preclusion should be unavailable when 

“the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that the plaintiff 

may split his claim, or the defendant has acquiesced therein”). 

Because Confessions rest on mutual agreement, they will 

often involve straightforward obligations, such as the payment 

of a precise sum. Rigidly applying res judicata in this context 

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may deter parties from agreeing to Confessions in the first 

place, an outcome counter to Michigan’s general preference 

for the private settlement of disputes. See Galperin v. Dep’t 

of Revenue of Mich., 42 N.W. 2d 823, 825–26 (Mich. 1950) 

(“The [Michigan Supreme] Court has often held that the 

settlement of disputed matters and the compromise of 

doubtful claims is favored by law. Efforts toward amicable 

settlement of disputed claims to avoid litigation meet with 

judicial approval.”). 

Accordingly, we hold that the Confession did not bar the 

current suit under principles of res judicata. 

III

A

Appellants next challenge the denial of a motion to 

amend their answer. Days before trial, appellants sought to 

add two affirmative defenses—failure of a condition 

precedent and failure of consideration—and remove their 

earlier admission that the law firm provided legal services 

pursuant to the “agreement.” Each of the new defenses took 

aim at a clause in the Retention Letter calling for a “Litigation 

Committee” (of unspecified membership) to approve legal 

services and fees. The trial court denied the amendment, 

finding the request was unduly delayed and would have 

prejudiced the plaintiff. 

We review the denial under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 

(D.C. Cir. 1996). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

permit parties to amend their pleadings “once as a matter of 

course” within certain time periods. FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(1)(A). Otherwise, amendment requires “the opposing 

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party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Id. § 15(a)(2). 

Courts must “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. 

“Although the grant or denial of leave to amend is committed 

to a district court’s discretion, it is an abuse of discretion to 

deny leave to amend unless there is sufficient reason, such as 

‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . . repeated failure 

to cure deficiencies by [previous] amendments . . . [or] futility 

of amendment.’” Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Foman 

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the belated addition of new defenses that would have required 

additional discovery. The issues appellants sought to 

interject—centering on the role of the Litigation Committee—

threatened to fundamentally reshape the landscape of the 

litigation. Neither of two prior answers raised those issues. 

Instead, both answers admitted the law firm provided legal 

services pursuant to the parties’ agreement. Two rounds of 

discovery focused, quite appropriately, on issues raised in the 

original and amended complaints and answers. Accordingly, 

the district court concluded the amendment would have likely

required additional discovery. Bode & Grenier, LLP v. 

Knight, No. 08-1323, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2012). 

The request simply came too late. The motion to amend 

arrived four years after litigation began, one year after 

summary judgment motions were decided, eight months after 

filing an amended answer and only days before trial. That is 

the very picture of undue delay. Cf. Elkins v. District of 

Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding undue 

delay when a motion to amend arrived “five years after the 

initial complaint and after discovery had closed”); 

Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 

F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding undue delay on a 

motion to amend filed seven years after litigation began, when 

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discovery had closed and the court had decided summary 

judgment motions); Doe v. McMillan, 566 F.2d 713, 720 

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirming a denial to amend a pleading 

thirty-eight months after the filing of the complaint). Had the 

motion been granted, discovery would have been reopened, 

the scheduling order replaced and the trial date reset. 

Appellants suggest they gave fair notice of the Litigation 

Committee defense in deposition questions posed years before 

they filed the motion to amend. That argument fails. If 

anything, it proves only that the defenses they sought to raise 

were “based on facts known prior to the completion of 

discovery.” Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987). Appellants had no reason to wait years before 

addressing those defenses in their answer. Indeed, moving to 

amend on the eve of trial bears the hallmarks of 

gamesmanship, defeating the orderly character of litigation 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to foster. As this 

court has emphasized, “Strategic or merely lazy 

circumventions of a legal process grounded in a sound policy 

have the effect of eroding the regularized, rational character 

of litigation to the detriment of practitioners and clients 

alike.” Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 

F.3d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying amendment. 

B

Affirming the denial resolves two related issues. First, 

appellants claim the district court improperly concluded the 

Litigation Committee’s approval did not constitute a 

condition precedent. We cannot decide this question because 

the trial judge declined to rule on it. Before trial, appellants

offered a short motion seeking judgment as a matter of law. 

That motion argued appellants should prevail because the 

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Litigation Committee constituted a condition precedent, 

which the plaintiffs had failed to plead appropriately. The 

court found that motion “plainly premature” and “decline[d] 

to address it.” J.A. 341 n.2. During trial, the court again 

declined to resolve the issue. See J.A. 494 (“I have made no 

ruling regarding condition precedent . . . because I have no 

occasion to make such a ruling. And that is because the 

defendants admitted [in each of two answers filed] that the 

plaintiff provided legal services pursuant to the agreement.”). 

“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court 

does not consider an issue not passed on below.” Singleton v. 

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). That rule applies here. 

“The issue before us is the denial of the leave to amend and 

not the merits of [the] new theory” appellants attempt to raise. 

Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). 

Second, appellants’ opening brief intimates the district 

court erred by granting a motion in limine precluding mention 

of the Litigation Committee defense. But appellants’ papers 

stop at suggestion: the issue is nowhere explained. Their

opening brief lists the motion in limine in the rulings under 

review section, but does not explain how the judge erred in 

granting the motion. “Simply listing the issues on review 

without briefing them does not preserve them.” Terry v. 

Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Democratic 

Cent. Comm. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 485 F.2d 

786, 790 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding waiver where 

appellant provided “no argument whatever in support” of 

certain issues). As the issue is waived, we do not address it. 

IV

After trial, the district court awarded the plaintiff

$269,585.19 in attorney’s fees under a fee-shifting clause in 

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the Retention Letter. See Bode & Grenier, LLP, 31 F. Supp. 

3d at 123. The court interpreted the Retention Letter, which 

has no choice-of-law clause, in light of D.C. law, refusing to 

incorporate a provision in the Promissory Note requiring the 

application of Michigan law. 

We confront two issues on appeal. First, appellants 

suggest the district court erred in failing to incorporate the 

Promissory Note’s choice-of-law and attorney’s fee clauses. 

According to appellants, the court should have applied 

Michigan law to the Retention Letter and limited the recovery 

of attorney’s fees to fifteen percent of the debt. Second, 

appellants contend that, under Michigan law, Bode & Grenier 

cannot recover fees incurred while representing itself, which 

the law firm did during much of the proceedings in district 

court. 

We review questions involving contract interpretation 

and choice-of-law de novo. Essex Ins. Co. v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 

511 F.3d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Chicago Ins. Co. v. 

Paulson & Nace, PLLC, 783 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Because both of appellants’ arguments lack merit, we affirm 

the district court. 

A

The Retention Letter did not incorporate the Promissory 

Note’s choice-of-law and attorney’s fee clauses. 

“Interpretation of a contract, like statutory and treaty 

interpretation, must begin with the plain meaning of the 

language.” Am. Fed. Gov. Employees, Local 2924 v. FLRA, 

470 F.3d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Here, the inquiry begins 

and ends with the text. This suit rests on the Retention Letter, 

which contains no choice-of-law clause. Bode & Grenier 

seeks to recover under the Retention Letter’s fee-shifting 

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clause, which makes appellants “responsible for [the 

plaintiff’s] costs of collecting any fees due and owing, 

including reasonable attorney fees and expenses . . . .” J.A. 

210. The Retention Letter makes only brief mention of the 

separate Promissory Note signed the same day: 

Notwithstanding the above . . . this firm is owed the 

amount of $446,566 for legal services previously 

rendered in this matter. You have agreed to execute a 

Promissory Note in the amount of $300,000, payable in 

nine months, as a partial payment against that amount, 

and also to pay $20,000 per month for the next eight 

months as further partial payments of fees owed.

Id. 

“It is a general rule” of contract interpretation “that 

reference . . . to extraneous writings renders them part of the 

agreement for indicated purposes” only. Md.-Nat’l Capital 

Park & Planning Comm’n v. Lynn, 514 F.2d 829, 833 (D.C. 

Cir. 1975). For that reason, a subcontract referencing the 

terms of the prime contract only “insofar as they apply” and 

“insofar as they relate . . . to the work undertaken herein” did 

not incorporate the prime contract’s dispute clause. Wash.

Metro. Area Transit Auth. ex rel. Noralco Corp. v. Norair 

Eng'g Corp., 553 F.2d 233, 234–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Such

nuanced language was “insufficiently specific to incorporate”

the dispute clause “by reference.” Id. at 235; see also 

Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Const. Co., 429 F.2d 764, 775 (D.C. 

Cir. 1970). A different situation exists where contractual 

language clearly exhibits an intent to incorporate another 

document. See, e.g., Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Davis/Gilford, 

967 F. Supp. 2d 72, 80 (D.D.C. 2013). For instance, language 

stating that another document is “hereby referred to and made 

a part hereof” may support total incorporation. Id. at 75, 80;

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see also Vicki Bagley Realty, Inc. v. Laufer, 482 A.2d 359, 

366 (D.C. 1984) (finding a sales contract and a lease 

incorporated where both documents specifically “referred to 

the lease as an attachment or addendum to the sales 

contract”). 

In this case, the Retention Letter did not incorporate the 

Promissory Note’s choice-of-law and attorney’s fees 

provisions. The Retention Letter does not refer to the 

Promissory Note as an attachment. Nor does it incorporate 

the Promissory Note “insofar as it applies” like the contract at 

issue in Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 

See 553 F.2d at 234–36. Indeed, the sole mention of the 

Promissory Note comes at the close of the Retention Letter, 

“prefaced by the phrase ‘[n]otwithstanding the above.’” Bode 

& Grenier, LLP, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 118. As the district court 

concluded, the Retention Letter referenced the Promissory 

Note “for the limited purpose of explaining the payment 

schedule for ‘legal services previously rendered’ and amounts 

already owed . . . .” Id. That outcome leaves the Retention 

Letter without a choice-of-law clause. It also requires reading 

the attorney’s fees clause without reference to the Promissory 

Note’s language limiting such fees to “fifteen (15) percent of 

the principal sum of this Note.” J.A. 212. That fees-cap 

applies only to the Promissory Note, not the Retention Letter. 

Appellants suggest the documents must be construed 

together because they were signed simultaneously and 

concern similar subjects. Appellant Br. 26–27. It is true that, 

“Where two or more written agreements are 

contemporaneously executed as part of one complete package, 

they should be construed together and should be construed as 

consistent with each other, even if not all the agreements are 

signed by the same parties.” Trans-Bay Eng’rs & Builders, 

Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Trans-Bay

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held that three documents—a Construction Contract, a 

Building Loan Agreement and a Regulatory Agreement—

were incorporated because they “were part of a package for a 

single project.” Id. A different scenario exists here. As the 

district court found, “although the documents were executed 

on the same day, they address separate fees—fees already 

owed and fees to be incurred.” Bode & Grenier, LLP, 31 F. 

Supp. 3d at 118. 

Considering the Note and the Retention Letter together 

does not change our conclusion. The Promissory Note 

carefully limits its reach to its four corners. “This note shall 

be governed by” Michigan law, reads the choice-of-law 

clause. J.A. 213 (emphasis added). “Any dispute, claim, or 

cause of action arising out of or in connection with this note

shall be brought in a court sitting in the State of Michigan 

without exception.” Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, the 

attorney’s fee provision applies only “[i]n the event of default 

in the payment of this Note, and if suit is brought hereon”; in 

that case, recovery of fees is capped at “fifteen (15) percent of 

the principal sum of this Note.” Id. (emphasis added). “Note”

clearly refers to the Promissory Note—not the separate 

Retention Letter. Such carefully drafted clauses confirm the 

parties knew how to choose the applicable law and cap 

attorney’s fees when they saw fit. They chose not to do so in

the Retention Letter. Thus, even if we were to read the 

documents together, the choice-of-law and attorney’s fee 

clauses would not migrate to the Retention Letter. 

Appellants also ask us to look beyond contractual 

language and consider correspondence between the parties. 

This we cannot do. Under both Michigan and D.C. law, 

courts may only resort to extrinsic evidence in interpreting a 

contract when the language admits of no clear interpretation. 

See Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W. 2d 453, 464 (Mich. Ct. 

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App. 2004) (“But when the language of a document is clear 

and unambiguous, interpretation is limited to the actual words 

used, and parol evidence is inadmissible to prove a different 

intent.”) (omitting citations); In re Bailey, 883 A.2d 106, 118 

(D.C. 2005) (substantially the same). In this case, the parties’ 

written agreements speak for themselves, and do not support 

incorporation. 

B

The second issue before us asks whether Michigan or 

D.C. law applies to the Retention Letter. If Michigan law 

applies, we must determine whether Michigan permits selfrepresented law firms to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to 

contract. The district court applied D.C. law and rejected the 

argument that Michigan law precluded recovery. We affirm.

Because the Retention Letter neither contains nor 

incorporates a choice-of-law clause, we must determine which 

jurisdiction’s substantive laws to apply. “In a diversity case” 

like this one, the “court follows the choice-of-law rules of the 

jurisdiction in which it sits.” Stephen A. Goldberg Co. v. 

Remsen Partners, Ltd., 170 F.3d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

“[I]n the absence of an effective choice of law by the 

parties,” the District of Columbia employs “‘a constructive 

blending’ of the ‘governmental interest analysis’ and the 

‘most significant relationship test,’ the latter as expressed in 

the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 188 (1988).” 

Id. at 193–94 (quoting Hercules & Co., Ltd. v. Shama Rest.

Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 n.18 (D.C. 1989)). The analysis 

centers on five factors: “[1] the place of contracting, [2] the 

place of negotiation of the contract, [3] the place of 

performance, [4] the location of the subject matter of the 

contract, and [5] the domicil, . . . place of incorporation and 

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place of business of the parties.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 188(2)(a)–(e) (1988). For service 

contracts, “the Restatement assigns presumptive weight to the 

place where the services are to be rendered.” Stephen A. 

Goldberg Co., 170 F.3d at 194; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 196 (applying “the local law of the 

state where the contract requires that the services, or a major 

portion of the services, be rendered, unless, with respect to the 

particular issue, some other state has a more significant 

relationship”). If the scales of interest come out even, D.C.

generally employs its own law. See Kaiser-Georgetown 

Cmty. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509 n.10 

(D.C. 1985). 

Here, the factors weigh in favor of applying D.C. law, not 

Michigan law. The first two factors—the place of contracting 

and place of negotiation—are inconclusive. Mr. Knight 

negotiated from Michigan, and Bode & Grenier from D.C. 

Likewise, the fifth factor—domicil—weighs evenly on both 

ends. 

In a dispute over a service contract, no factor matters 

more than the place of performance. Nearly all of the legal 

services at issue were performed in D.C. by attorneys licensed 

to practice in D.C. See Appellee Br. 28–30. While the 

representation required occasional travel outside D.C. (mainly 

to Ohio), we find no evidence suggesting the firm’s attorneys 

routinely practiced in Michigan. The firm managed the 

representation from its sole office, located in D.C. The fourth 

factor—the location of the subject matter of the contract—

supports applying D.C. law for the same reasons. This 

contract called for legal services managed and performed in 

D.C.

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Though the Restatement factors lead us to apply D.C. 

law, we must pause to independently consider “which 

jurisdiction has the greatest interest in the subject.” Stephen 

A. Goldberg Co., 170 F.3d at 194. Michigan had relatively 

little connection to the services at issue. Though Knight’s 

companies call Michigan home, the legal services here 

concerned an oil spill in Ohio that triggered various 

regulatory and legal actions. None of the relevant legal 

services were performed in Michigan. That reality strongly 

supports the application of D.C. law. 

Because we hold that D.C. law applies to the Retention

Letter, we need not decide whether Michigan law bars the 

plaintiff from recovering legal fees incurred while 

representing itself. Michigan law simply does not apply. 

As the trial court concluded, the plain language of the 

Retention Letter permits the recovery of the “costs of 

collecting any fees due and owing, including reasonable 

attorney fees and expenses . . . .” J.A. 210; see Bode & 

Grenier, LLP, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 119–20. The Retention 

Letter nowhere precludes Bode & Grenier from recovering 

fees incurred while representing itself. That is enough to 

resolve the matter. 

V

For the foregoing reasons the district court is

Affirmed. 

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