Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01709/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01709-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 07cv1709 L (NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID AVILA,

Petitioner,

v.

L.E. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No.07cv1709 L (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 1]

David Avila (Avila or Petitioner), a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner contests his confinement on the

bases that (1) he was denied his fourteenth amendment due process rights because (a) the parole board

denied him parole solely based on unchanging, immutable factors, (b) his committed offense is not

particularly egregious and should not have been used as a primary factor to deny him parole; (c) the

parole board delayed his parole hearing; and (2) his eighth amendment rights were violated because the

delay in his parole hearing unlawfully and systematically prolonged his incarceration.

Respondent filed an answer, arguing that the Court should deny the Petition. Specifically,

Respondent contends that (1) Petitioner has no federally-protected liberty interest in parole; (2) even if

this Court recognizes such an interest, Petitioner received all the process he was due in connection with

that interest, and therefore the state court’s determinations do not contradict clearly established federal

law nor unreasonably apply the facts to the governing federal laws; and (3) Petitioner fails to state a

cognizable claim for habeas relief under the eighth amendment. Petitioner filed a traverse. This Court

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28 1 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are summarized from the probation report [Lodgment

3] that the Parole Board read into the record. Lodgment 5 at 14-22.

2 07cv1709 L (NLS)

has reviewed the Petition, answer, traverse, lodgment and the complete record in this case. After a

thorough review, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED in its entirety.

RELEVANT FACTS.

1

The Underlying Offense.

On the night of February 5, 1986, nineteen-year-old Michael Bergman went to a liquor store in

Fresno, California. He bought a few items and returned to his car. At the car, Avila’s co-defendant,

Arthur Sambrano, said to Bergman: “give me that wallet, you want to live or you want to die?” 

Sambrano grabbed Bergman’s wallet and a struggle ensued. Avila then approached the victim, holding

a black-handled knife. As Avila reached into the car with the knife, Bergman handed over his wallet. 

Avila and Sambrano left, and appeared to be laughing as they went through Bergman’s wallet.

Bergman quickly drove away. He drove to his girlfriend’s house–where he had been visiting

before he drove to the store–and got out of the car. His girlfriend and her friend discovered him lying

face down in the driveway. They noticed he was not breathing and called the police and paramedics. 

Police found a single stab wound on the left side of Bergman’s chest. Bergman had died.

On August 11, 1986 Avila plead guilty to first degree murder. Lodgments 1-3. He received a

sentence of 25 years to life. Id. 

Pre-commitment Factors.

Avila was 22 years old at the time of the murder. His pre-commitment history included several

arrests as a juvenile, but none of those arrests resulted in a conviction. Id. at 39. He did, however,

spend 90 days in juvenile hall. Id. He also spent 30 days in county jail as an adult. Id. at 40. Avila

graduated from high school and worked in construction from the time of his graduation to just before his

commitment offense. Id. at 48. At the time of the offense, Avila had just been laid off from work. Id.

Post-commitment Factors.

Avila stopped using drugs in 1998, the same time he received his last disciplinary report. Id. at

53. Since at least 1998 Avila has participated in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics

Anonymous (NA). Id. at 59. He is also in another self-help program, Life Without a Crutch. Id. He

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attends three classes a week. Id. Avila has received a number of certificates for work, such as in

furniture refinishing and upholstery. Id. at 54; see Pet’n Ex. E (copies of all certification, chronos and

work reports). He is also licensed as a forklift driver. Id. at 73. Avila has participated in the Joint

Venture program. Id. He has saved approximately $13,000 for his parole account. Id. at 55.

The Parole Hearing.

Avila became eligible for parole on July 6, 2004. Lodgment 5 at 1. After a delay of six months,

the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) held his second parole hearing on January 10, 2006 at Calipatria

State Prison. Id.; see id. at 90. Avila was represented by state-appointed counsel. Id. at 1-2. No

District Attorney appeared at that hearing. Id. at 7. 

Avila presented laudatory letters from correctional officers regarding his good behavior and

courteous treatment of staff. Id. at 62-63. He provided several letters from family members who would

like to help him out and bring him back into the family with job offers, financial support and a vehicle. 

Id. at 74-77; see Pet’n Ex. G (letters of support). The psychological report about Avila reported that he

appears to be making a successful transition from a gang-oriented lifestyle to a more responsible

lifestyle. Id. at 64-65. It also noted that “significant risk factors would include relapse into substance

abuse, association with criminal elements or being threatened due to his dropout status. He appears to

have good support with his family and AA. He appears to be motivated to succeed to help himself, his

wife and his children.” Id. at 85.

After deliberations, the Board found Avila was “not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.” Id. at 82. 

The Board relied on these factors: the offense was committed in an especially cruel and violent

manner–an unarmed man stabbed and killed for his wallet; the motive was trivial in comparison to the

actual offense; Avila was under the influence of drugs and alcohol and does not remember much of the

crime period, so that he may not have much insight into his responsibility for the crime; he had an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct and failed to profit from society’s previous attempts to correct his

criminality; Avila had a record of two 128 chronos (the last one in 1998 for having contraband) and 16

serious 115 disciplinary reports (70% were violent in nature; the last one was in 1998 for mutual

combat); the psychiatric report was not totally supportive; Avila had a placement score of 117 due to his

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prior disciplinary problems that he must lower; and Avila’s positive progress is only relatively recent. 

Id. at 84-87.

On the plus side, the Board noted that Avila does have a viable residence outside of his last

county of legal residence, acceptable employment plans and marketable skills. Id. at 85-86. They

commended his vocational pursuits, commitment to AA and NA and lack of disciplinary reports in the

previous eight years. Id. at 87. The Board recommended that Avila remain discipline-free, upgrade

vocationally and educationally if possible and keep participating in self-help programs. Id. at 89. 

Parole was denied for two years from the January 2006 hearing. Id. at 90, 92.

The State Court Decisions.

On November 26, 2006 Avila filed a habeas petition with the Fresno superior court. Lodgment

6. That court denied his petition, finding that the Board’s decision to deny parole was supported by

some evidence. Lodgment 7 at 3. The court stated:

Here, the court finds that there was at least some evidence that releasing

petitioner could pose an unreasonable risk to society or a threat to public

safety, because of the violent nature of the original offense and

petitioner’s multiple disciplinary reports since becoming incarcerated,

many of which were of a violent nature. Indeed, petitioner admits to

stabbing another inmate on one occasion. (Transcript at 53). Petitioner

also admits that he did not stop using drugs until 1998, and that his last

disciplinary report was in 1998. (Ibid.)

Id.

Avila filed another habeas petition with the court of appeal. Lodgment 8. That court summarily

denied the petition on April 3, 2007. Lodgment 9. He then filed a petition for review with the

California supreme court. Lodgment 10. The state supreme court denied the petition without comment

on June 26, 2007. Lodgment 11.

LEGAL STANDARD

AEDPA Governs this Petition.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this Petition. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-337 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court will not grant habeas

relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was (1)

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on an

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). “Clearly established federal law,” for purposes of § 2254(d), means

“the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders

its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003).

Decisions that Contradict or Unreasonably Apply Federal Law.

A federal habeas court may grant relief where the state court (1) decides a case “contrary to”

federal law by applying a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases; or (2)

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal court may also grant habeas relief where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application” of federal law, such as where the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies those

decisions to the facts at issue. Id.

The state court decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief the

state court’s application of “clearly established federal law” must be “objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “Objectively unreasonable” differs from “clear error” in

that a federal court cannot grant habeas relief only because it believes that the state court erroneously or

incorrectly applied “clearly established federal law;” the application must be objectively unreasonable. 

Id. at 75-76 (internal citation omitted).

Decisions Based on an Unreasonable Determination of the Facts.

Section 2254(e)(1) provides: “[a] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asks that this Court modify the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings of January

10, 2006. He requests these changes be made: (1) that the committed offense not be deemed “more

violent or aggravated than the minimum to sustain his conviction” or “particularly egregious” to justify

denial of parole; (2) the Board not continue to rely on “unchanging factors” to deny Petitioner parole;

(3) order the Board to subtract the time his parole hearing was involuntarily delayed without notice from

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the two years he has to wait for his next parole hearing, or, subtract the time he was delayed from parole

itself; and (4) order the Board to convene a fair and impartial hearing and set a parole date, or, release

Petitioner on parole and credit his parole with the number of days during which he was imprisoned

beyond the parole date. Pet’n Attachment pp.1-2.

I. Due Process Claims.

A. Petitioner’s Liberty Interest in Release on Parole.

Clearly established federal law provides that Petitioner may demonstrate a procedural due

process violation by showing (1) a federally-protected life, liberty or property interest exists and has

been subject to interference by the state; and (2) the procedures attendant upon the deprivation of that

interest were constitutionally insufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S 454, 460

(1989). The Supreme Court found the expectancy of release provided in a Nebraska parole statute “is

entitled to some measure of constitutional protection,” but because the language and structure of the

statute was unique, “whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided

on a case-by-case basis.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12

(1979); see Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-378 (1987) (holding that mandatory language in

Montana parole statute created a presumption that parole will be granted which gave rise to a protected

liberty interest). A parole board satisfies due process in a state parole hearing where the state parole

procedures afford (1) an opportunity to be heard; and (2) a statement of reasons for denying the parole. 

Id. at 16.

Mandatory language in the California parole statute, Cal. Penal Code § 3041, “gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir.

2002). This liberty interest is “created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of

the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003). Even though the California Supreme

Court has held that § 3041's language does not establish a mandatory duty to set a release date for

indeterminate life inmates, In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061 (2005), California prisoners maintain a

liberty interest in release on parole. Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.

2006).

/ / /

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2 A panel in the Ninth Circuit recently found in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 546 (9th Cir.

2008) that California prisoners have a protected liberty interest in release on parole, that due process is

violated unless there is “some evidence” in the record to support the decision or the decision is “otherwise

arbitrary,” and that the continued reliance on static factors to deny parole violated due process. The court

found that under the unique circumstances of this case the state could not continue to rely on the static

factors of petitioner's commitment offense because, due to the passage of 25 years, as well as his

rehabilitation, education and conduct while in prison, the commitment offense alone could not demonstrate

that his release would pose an imminent danger to public safety. These holdings, however, are no longer

supported by precedent in the Ninth Circuit because the Ninth Circuit granted en banc review for Hayward. Hayward v. Marshall, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10538 (9th Cir. 2008).

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1. The “Some Evidence” Standard.

Due process requires that “some evidence” exist in the record to support the parole board’s

decision. Id. at 1128. The relevant inquiry is whether “any evidence in the record . . . could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. (quoting Superintendent of the Mass. Corr. Inst. v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-456 (1985)). The evidence the parole board relies on “must have sufficient

indicia of reliability,” and “continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, [such as] the

circumstances of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915-917.2

2.. Whether the “Some Evidence” Standard is Clearly Established Federal Law.

The Ninth Circuit has reiterated that the Greenholtz, Allen and Hill standards are clearly

established federal law for AEDPA purposes applicable to parole hearings such as the one at issue here. 

Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007), rehearing denied, 506 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Respondent argues that Petitioner has no federally-protected liberty interest in parole (Answer ¶¶ 12-

13), but that even if he does, only the “opportunity to be heard” and the “statement of reasons for the

denial” requirements constitute clearly established federal law applicable to state parole proceedings. 

Mem. Ps&As, p.10, ll.7-11. Respondent acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit has already decided these

issues in Sass and Irons, but contends that intervening United States Supreme Court authority has

effectively overruled those cases. Mem. Ps&As, pp.12-14. Specifically, Respondent argues that Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649 (2006) and Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1933

(2007), impliedly overruled the Ninth Circuit’s extension of the “some evidence” rule of Hill from the

prison disciplinary context to the parole hearing context.

In Musladin, several members of a murder victim’s family sat in the front row of the spectator

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section at trial wearing buttons with a photograph of the victim. 127 S.Ct. at 651. The Ninth Circuit

applied two Supreme Court decisions that set forth the test to determine whether state-sponsored

practices are so inherently prejudicial that they must be justified by an essential state policy or interest,

and found that the state court violated clearly established federal law. Id. at 652. The Supreme Court

found that the Ninth Circuit erred by finding that the Supreme Court had never addressed a claim that 

private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. 

Id. at 654.

Similarly, in Landrigan, the defendant refused to allow defense counsel to present mitigating

evidence at a sentencing hearing. 127 S.Ct. 1933. In ruling on a habeas petition, the district court

concluded that the defendant could not establish prejudice based on his counsel’s failure to investigate

further possible mitigating evidence. Id. at 1941. The Ninth Circuit found the district court’s refusal to

hold an evidentiary hearing in this circumstance to be an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent. Id. at 1942. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing, because the Supreme Court had never

addressed the situation where a criminal defendant interferes with his own counsel’s efforts to present

mitigating evidence to a sentencing court. Id.

Irons, which affirms Sass, was announced over seven months after Musladin and two months

after Landrigan. Respondent argues “the precedential value of Irons is questionable because it did not

address Musladin.” Mem. Ps&As, p.13, ll.22-23. For this Court to find that Musladin or Landrigan

effectively overruled Irons or Sass, “the relevant court of last resort must have undercut the theory or

reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” 

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).

In Musladin, the Supreme Court noted that there was a split in the circuits regarding whether the

cases the Ninth Circuit relied on applied to spectator conduct. 127 S.Ct. at 654, and the three concurring

justices would have found that clearly established federal law applied to the spectator conduct at issue. 

Id. at 655-658. Likewise, the Landrigan decision was 5-4, with the four dissenting justices willing to

apply the test the Ninth Circuit relied on as clearly established federal law. Thus, reasonable jurists

disagree with respect to application of the term “clearly established federal law” when determining

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whether existing Supreme Court precedent–which is not directly on point–qualifies as clearly

established federal law in a given context.

The Ninth Circuit extended Hill from the prison disciplinary context to the prison parole context,

“because both directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. That holding is

not undercut by Musladin or Landrigan for at least two reasons. First, those cases interpret the phrase

“clearly established federal law” under the same standard as the Ninth Circuit in Sass, and reasonable

jurists can disagree with the application of that standard in any given context, including the one at issue

here. Second, the Supreme Court in Hill in fact applied the “some evidence” standard to hearings held

in custodial settings that affect the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. Thus, the

holdings of Musladin and Landrigan are not “clearly irreconcilable” with Sass and Irons. Gammie, 335

F.3d at 900. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS REJECTING Respondent’s contention that

Petitioner does not have a federally-protected liberty interest in parole, or that the “some evidence”

standard of Hill does not apply.

B. Whether “Some Evidence” Supports the Board’s Decision.

Petitioner argues that the Board’s decision to deny him parole relied solely on unchanging

factors, such as the nature of the offense, Petitioner’s non-violent prior convictions and his prison

misbehavior over a six year period. Pet’n at 13. He argues their decision is not supported by “some

evidence.” Pet’n at 12. He says that by not setting a parole date, the Board has arbitrarily commuted his

sentence to life without the possibility of parole. Pet’n at 19. Respondent argues that the Board’s

decision passes the “some evidence” test because the decision was not based solely on outdated,

immutable factors.

Here, the Board relied on some static factors, such as the cruel and violent manner of the offense,

the motive, the lack of insight regarding the offense due to substance abuse, and Petitioner’s prior

criminal conduct. But the Board also relied on a number of non-static factors, namely, his prison

disciplinary history, the psychiatric report and the more recent nature of his positive progress. They

suggested that Petitioner remain discipline-free to improve his discipline record, continue to attend selfhelp programs and take advantage of educational and vocational opportunities, where available. Under

the “some evidence” test, the Board’s decision need only be supported by “a modicum of evidence.” 

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3Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions may be cited starting with decisions issued in 2007. See Ninth

Cir. Rule 36-3. Although still not binding precedent, unpublished decisions have persuasive value and

indicate how the Ninth Circuit applies binding authority.

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Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. A court need not examine the entire record, independently assess the credibility

of witnesses or weigh the evidence. Id. The only relevant question is whether any evidence supports

the Board’s decision. Id. at 455-456. This Court finds that some evidence, in the form of both static and

non-static, developing factors, supports the Board’s decision, so that the state court decisions were

neither contrary to nor unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Board relied solely on immutable factors to justify its denial of

parole, which it cannot do under Biggs, 334 F.3d 910. It is unclear whether clearly established federal

law provides that a due process violation can arise from the continued use of static factors as suggested

in Biggs. The Ninth Circuit has stated, in an unpublished case,3 that 

There is no “clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” that limits the number of times a parole board

may deny parole to a murderer based on the brutality and viciousness of

the commitment offense. (fn 5.) The dicta in Ninth Circuit cases like

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-917 (9th Cir. 2003), are not holdings

of the Supreme Court . . .

Culverson v. Davison, 237 Fed. Appx. 174, 175 (9th Cir. 2007). Even assuming a due process violation

could result from reliance on only static factors, that did not happen here. As explained above, the

Board relied on both static and non-static factors to justify its denial of parole.

This Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s due process claim based on application of the

“some evidence” test be DENIED.

C. Federal Courts and State Standards of Judicial Review.

Petitioner argues that California’s parole statutes and regulations grant him a liberty interest in

parole, and that only if the committed offense is especially egregious, can the crime be used to primarily

justify denial of parole. Pet’n at 25. Petitioner says the circumstances of the stabbing were not

exceptional or particularly egregious, and cites to the District Attorney’s letter submitted to the parole

board for Petitioner’s 2003 hearing: 

There is no evidence to show that the defendant (Avila) planned or

intended to kill the victum other than the fact the stabbing was inflicted at

the chest, head area, of victim. There is no evidence to show that the

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defendant was even aware of the serious nature of the injury he inflicted

other than the blood he would have observed on his knife and clothing.

Pet’n at 27-28. Respondent argues that federal courts are not bound by state procedural protections to

determine whether a federal constitutional violation has occurred.

The Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument here. First, states can impose more

restrictive protections that those provided by the federal Constitution. California v. Greenwood, 486

U.S. 35, 43 (1988). As explained above, the state courts’ decisions affirming the Board’s decision are

not contrary to nor unreasonable applications of federal law. Second, if there really has been a violation

of state law, clearly established federal law provides that federal habeas relief is not available merely for

an alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 62, 67-68

(1991). Third, even if the state cases that Petitioner relies on did hold that a parole board could only

primarily rely on an especially egregious commitment offense to justify denial of parole, those cases are

inapposite because the Board here relied on several factors other than the commitment offense. There is

no indication that the Board relied primarily on the factors of Petitioner’s offense to justify the denial of

parole.

This Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s due process claim based on application of state

law be DENIED.

D. Eighth Amendment Claim.

Petitioner argues that the six-month delay in conducting his second parole hearing violated his

eighth amendment rights because the delay has increased his time of confinement and will not count

toward parole release. Pet’n at 36-37. Respondent argues Petitioner has not alleged a cognizable claim

for habeas relief under the eighth amendment.

Petitioner presented his eighth amendment claim to the superior court, appellate court and state

supreme court. No court addressed the claim. Where no lower state court opinion addresses a claim

properly presented to the state courts and denied by the state’s highest court without a statement of

reasoning–as here–a federal habeas court reviewing such a claim must independently review the record

to determine whether the state supreme court clearly erred in applying controlling federal law when it

denied the claim without reason. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

The eighth amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments. It “contains a ‘narrow

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proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20

(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-997,(1991)). It forbids sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id. at 21. Successful challenges to non-capital sentences,

however, are “exceedingly rare.” Id. The relevant inquiry is whether Petitioner’s sentence resulted in

“one of ‘the rare cases in which a . . . comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed

leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’” U.S. v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004).

Petitioner does not allege a cognizable habeas claim under the eighth amendment because he

does not challenge the length of his sentence in proportion to his offense. While he says he was bettersuited for parole six months prior, he offers no reason to show that a shorter period of time in prison

would have worked to his advantage. Further, while the Board supports his current efforts at reform,

they say that Petitioner needs to spend more time in prison while continuing with this good behavior. 

Finally, even if the Court construes Petitioner’s argument as a challenge to the disportionality of his

sentence, a term of 25 years to life for first degree murder does not appear to be a disproportionate

sentence. See Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (finding a sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for

two counts of petty theft for stealing videotapes valued at less than $200 under California’s Three

Strikes Law was not a rare and grossly disproportionate sentence).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts’ determinations were contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that they were based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Even though this Court recommends rejecting Respondent’s argument that

Petitioner does not have a federally-protected liberty interest in parole, it RECOMMENDS that the

Petition be DENIED in its entirety because the Board’s decision is supported by some evidence and

Petitioner’s eighth amendment claim is not cognizable for habeas relief.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 29, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

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“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than August 8, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: July 7, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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