Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-01196/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-01196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

IVAN QUINTEL METCALF, )

)

Plaintiff , )

)

v. ) Case No. 7:14-cv-01196-SLB-JEO

)

CAPTAIN AGEE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Ivan Quintell Metcalf (“plaintiff”), has filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging rights, privileges, or immunities afforded him under the 

Constitution or laws of the United States have been abridged during his 

incarceration. (Doc. 1). The plaintiff names as defendants Commissioner Kim

Thomas (“Thomas”) and Tim Owens, Mike Agee and Gene Mitchell (jointly “the 

Lawrence County defendants”). The plaintiff complains that he was sexually 

assaulted by defendant Tim Owens, a Lawrence County officer, on September 27, 

2013. (Doc.1 at 41

). The plaintiff also complains that on October 8, 2013, he was 

physically assaulted by defendant Owens, resulting in hospitalization. (Id.) As to 

1

All citations to the record are to the document and page numbers assigned by the court’s 

electronic filing system.

 

FILED

 2015 Jul-28 AM 09:45

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-01196-KOB-JEO Document 39 Filed 07/28/15 Page 1 of 39
defendants Thomas, Agee and Mitchell, the plaintiff asserts they denied him “safe 

housing.” (Id.) Due to his injuries from the assaults, the plaintiff seeks 

compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 5). The plaintiff amended his 

complaint to clarify the names of the defendants and that he was claiming his 

rights under the Eighth Amendment and various state statutes were violated.2

 

(Doc. 6). He filed a second amendment to provide affidavits from other inmates in 

support of his allegations. (Doc. 8). Both of the amendments were allowed by the 

court. (Doc. 9).

In accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(2), the complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a 

preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 

(1991). 

I. Procedural History

On October 30, 2014, the court entered an Order for Special Report directing 

that copies of the complaint in this action be forwarded to the named defendants 

2

The state statutes listed by the plaintiff do not create a private cause of action upon 

which the plaintiff is able to seek relief. Ala. Code §§ 14-3-13, 14-3-16 and 14-3-52 are within 

the title setting forth state prison guidelines. Section 14-3-13 is the oath of office for prison 

guards, § 14-3-16 states a prison guard is guilty of a misdemeanor for violation of the chapter, 

and § 14-3-52 was repealed. The remaining Code provision the plaintiff cited, § 14-4-11, allows 

a county commission to appoint a superintendent of public works if the court uses inmate labor 

in county public works projects. As such, any claims the plaintiff brings under these Code 

provisions are due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2

 

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and requesting that they file a special report addressing the factual allegations of 

the plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 10). The defendants were advised that the special 

report could be submitted under oath or accompanied by affidavits and, if 

appropriate, would be considered as a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant 

to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By the same Order, the 

plaintiff was advised that after he received a copy of the special report submitted 

by the defendants he should file counter affidavits if he wished to rebut the matters 

presented by the defendant in the special report. The plaintiff was further advised 

that such affidavits should be filed within twenty days after receiving a copy of the 

defendant’s special report.

On January 9, 2015, defendant Kim Thomas filed a special report with 

affidavits, medical records, and other evidence attached. (Doc. 20). Defendants 

Owens, Agee and Mitchell filed a special report on January 12, 2015, also with 

affidavits and other evidence attached. (Doc. 21). The plaintiff filed a response 

(doc. 22) and was thereafter notified that the court would construe the special 

reports as motions for summary judgment and that he would have an additional 

twenty days to respond to the motion for summary judgment, filing affidavits or 

other material if he so chose. (Doc. 30). The plaintiff was advised of the 

consequences of any default or failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See 

3

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Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985). The Lawrence County 

defendants supplemented their special report with additional evidence on April 23, 

2015. (Doc. 31). To date, the court has received no further response from the 

plaintiff. However, the plaintiff has filed multiple motions seeking discovery 

(docs. 32-35), which the court has ruled on, as well as a motion to compel (doc. 

37) which the court finds to be moot, as explained herein.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Because the special report of the defendants is being considered as a motion 

for summary judgment, the court must determine whether the moving parties, the 

defendants, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment may 

be granted only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In 

making that assessment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences against the 

moving party. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). 

The burden of proof is upon the moving party to establish his prima facie 

entitlement to summary judgment by showing the absence of genuine issues and 

that he is due to prevail as a matter of law. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 

F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Unless the plaintiff, who carries the ultimate 

4

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burden of proving his action, is able to show some evidence with respect to each 

element of his claim, all other issues of fact become immaterial, and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 

1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to 

establish a prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no 

genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of 

proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” [citations omitted]. 

Thus, under such circumstances, the public official is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has failed to carry 

the burden of proof. This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually 

unsupported claims prior to trial. 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532. However, any “specific facts” pled in a pro se 

plaintiff’s sworn complaint must be considered in opposition to summary 

judgment. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986)).

III. Summary Judgment Facts

Applying the above standards to the pleadings before the court, the 

following facts are undisputed or, if disputed, are taken in a light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.

5

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The plaintiff, who is in custody at Bibb Correctional Facility, was 

transferred to the Lawrence County Jail for a court appearance. (Doc. 20-2 at 7). 

The plaintiff alleges that on September 27, 2013, while in Lawrence County Jail, 

he was sexually assaulted by defendant Owens, a Lawrence County Correctional 

Officer. (Doc. 1 at 4). He states that “Tim Owens came inside my cell and made 

me get against the wall and stripped search[ed] me, while I was held against the 

wall officer Tim Owens stuck his index finger and middle fingers inside my anus 

and said ‘How does it feel cunt.’ ”3

 (Id.) Defendant Owens then threw him on the 

bed and said, “If you tell anyone I’ll kill you.”4

 (Id.) According to the plaintiff, 

two other inmates, Jose Martinez and “Curtis W.” were present in D-cell at the 

time of this assault. (Doc. 20-2 at 12). On September 30, 2013, the plaintiff 

notified defendant Agee, who refused to let him file a grievance or send outgoing 

mail. (Id. at 12).

On October 8, 2013, while still housed at Lawrence County Jail, the plaintiff 

was physically assaulted by defendant Owens, causing the plaintiff to be 

hospitalized. (Doc. 1, at 4). According to inmate Bo Nickelson, he and inmate 

3

In some of the plaintiff’s versions of this attack, he alleges that defendant Owens also 

placed his penis in the plaintiff’s anus. (See e.g., doc. 20-2 at 12; doc. 20-6 at 3-4).

4

Defendant Owens denies this incident occurred. (Doc. 21, at 28). 

6

 

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Chris Orr were housed with the plaintiff at the Lawrence County Jail. (Doc. 8 at 

3). He avers that plaintiff asked for his legal mail, to which defendant Owens 

responded by macing the plaintiff. (Id.) The plaintiff turned away and Owens then 

shot the plaintiff in the back with a stun gun. (Id.) After the plaintiff was on the 

floor, Owens kneed him, hit him, and put the stun gun to his back some more. (Id.) 

The plaintiff was removed from the room, then Orr and Nickelson were placed 

back in the same room with the plaintiff and the plaintiff had a seizure. (Id.) 

Approximately 40 minutes later, the plaintiff was taken to the hospital. (Id. When 

the plaintiff returned from the hospital, the plaintiff, Nickelson and Orr were all 

returned to Bibb Correctional Facility.5

 (Id.) 

Inmate Chris Orr’s affidavit is quite similar to Nickelson’s. (Doc. 8 at 4). 

He states that the three inmates were in the multi-purpose room and the plaintiff 

kept asking for his legal mail. (Id.) Defendant Owens came through the door and 

sprayed the plaintiff. (Id.) When the plaintiff turned away, defendant Owens shot 

him in the back with a taser gun. (Id.) In other statements, both Orr and Nickelson 

5

Defendants Agee, Owens and Mitchell filed a special report and affidavits in response to 

the plaintiff’s allegations. Although within that report they label facts as “undisputed” (doc. 21, 

at 5), their version of events and affidavits in support of their version contradict the version of 

events and affidavits submitted by the plaintiff. Because the court cannot reconcile the two 

versions, and because this case is before the court on the defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment, the court has considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

accepting the version set forth by the plaintiff for purposes of this opinion.

7

 

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state that Owens also hit the plaintiff in the head, and that after the plaintiff was 

handcuffed, defendant Owens ran the plaintiff’s head into a walk. (Doc. 20-2 at 

15, 16). Inmate Orr states that the plaintiff then had a seizure, was taken to the 

hospital, and when he returned, the three of them were returned to prison. (Doc. 8 

at 4). 

Upon arrival at Bibb Correctional Facility, defendant Agee provided 

Correctional Officer Goggins with a Use of Force Report for the morning incident 

between the plaintiff and defendant Owens.6

 (Doc. 20-2 at 8, 14, 18). The 

plaintiff informed non-party Goggins that he had been sexually assaulted. (Id. at 

14). Goggins reported the incident to Lieutenant Felicia Ford. (Id. at 14). The 

6

According to the incident report completed by Correctional Officer John Hutton at Bibb 

Correctional Facility, the altercation the morning of October 8, 2013, involving the plaintiff was 

between the plaintiff and an Officer Thompkins. (Doc. 20-2 at 8; doc. 20-9). According to the 

Use of Force report completed by defendant Owens, the plaintiff was told to stop kicking the 

door by an officer Thompson, but only officer Owens entered the room with the plaintiff. (Doc. 

20-2 at 18). According to defendant Owens’ affidavit, Officer Thompson did open the door to 

the multi-purpose room, to tell plaintiff to stop kicking the door. (Doc. 21 at 27).

Because any allegation of an officer Thompkins or Thompson’s involvement directly 

contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations and the two affidavits of witnesses he submitted, the court 

assumes for purposes of this opinion that defendant Owens was the officer involved in the 

morning altercation. The Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) investigator stated that 

he reviewed the surveillance tape of the incident and that in it, Owens is heard to give the 

plaintiff several orders to stop knocking on the door; that deputy Owens entered the room and 

deployed his “OC,” that the plaintiff attempted to strike defendant Owens with a belt and 

defendant Owens then tased the plaintiff, took him to the floor and placed him in handcuffs. 

(Doc. 20-2 at 8-9). According to Officer Hutton’s investigation, as of December 5, 2013, the use 

of force was not justified, although the investigation continued. (Id. at 19).

8

 

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plaintiff was taken for body chart documentation, upon which the plaintiff was 

noted to complain of lower back pain, had a bump on his left thigh and had a bump 

on the right side of his forehead. (Id. at 10). The plaintiff also reported anal pain 

from the September 27 incident and severe thigh pain from the October 8 incident. 

(Id. at 10). 

The October 8, 2013, hospital admission records reflect the plaintiff was 

brought in due to a seizure. (Doc. 20-5 at 21). He was noted to have suffered a 

trauma because he “fell and struck rt. side of head.” (Id. at 21). A hematoma was 

noted on the right side of the plaintiff’s face. (Id. at 22). The plaintiff was 

diagnosed with syncope. (Id. at 22). CT scans were normal, the plaintiff showed 

no signs of a heart attack and had no broken bones. (Id. at 23, 31-33). 

The plaintiff was issued a cane for seven days, from October 10, 2013, 

through October 17, 2013. (Doc. 20-3 at 5; doc. 20-4 at 13). Later medical 

records reflect that the plaintiff retained the cane due to back and leg trauma in 

2013. (Id. at 23, 32). He also made numerous complaints of ongoing back and leg 

pain due to the October 8, 2013, incident. (Id. at 25, 27, 29-30, 33; doc. 20-4 at 1, 

3, 5-6, 8, 10, 14-16; doc. 20-5 at 2-13, 18). X-rays of the plaintiff’s back and hip 

in October and December 2013 and July 2014 were normal. (Doc. 20-4 at 27-30). 

9

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Due to the sexual assault allegations, the plaintiff was referred for mental 

health services. (Doc. 20-5 at 14). The plaintiff was found not to need mental 

health services, but was told he could return as needed. (Id. at 14). An 

investigation into the sexual assault allegations by the Alabama Department of 

Corrections reached a conclusion of “unsubstantiated.” (Doc. 20-6 at 5). The 

investigator noted that the plaintiff took a polygraph on the sexual assault 

allegations and untruthfulness was indicated. (Doc. 20-8). Although the plaintiff 

was not questioned on the use of force incident, the investigator wrote the Sheriff 

of Lawrence County to “urge you to refer the use of force allegation to an agency 

of your choosing so that an impartial investigation is conducted....” (Docs. 20-7, 

20-8).

In addition to his allegations against defendant Owens, the plaintiff asserts 

that defendants Captain Mike Agee and Sheriff Gene Mitchell denied the plaintiff 

safe housing and refused to let the plaintiff file grievance and incident reports 

regarding defendant Owens’ assault of the plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 4). The plaintiff 

further alleges that defendant Kim Thomas also denied the plaintiff safe housing, 

did not let the plaintiff file grievance or incident reports concerning his 

hospitalization, and failed to investigate the plaintiff’s allegations. (Id.) 

10

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Prior to filing this case on June 17, 2014, the plaintiff had filed an action in 

the Circuit Court for Lawrence County against defendants Owens and Agee 

alleging the same facts. (Doc. 20-13). That action, filed October 17, 2013, also 

asserts constitutional violations based on the above facts. By motion to amend 

dated December 11, 2013, the plaintiff added defendant Mitchell and defendant 

Thomas as parties to that action. (Doc. 20-13, at 8-11). The claims in the state 

court action are virtually identical to those before the court here. While that action 

was filed first, to date the defendants in the state court case have not been served. 

The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss that action in January 2015. (Doc. 31-1). 

The unserved defendants filed an objection to that motion (doc. 31-2), and the 

Circuit Court judge denied the motion to dismiss in April 2015. (Doc. 31-1). As 

of today, the defendants have yet to be served in that action. See Case Action 

Summary, Metcalf v. Owens, CV 2013-000019.00, Lawrence County Circuit 

Court.

IV. Discussion

A. Abatement

The defendants assert that, due to the case pending in Lawrence County 

Circuit Court, this court should dismiss the federal action pursuant to § 6-5-440,

Code of Alabama 1975, as amended. That Code provision states that “[n]o 

11

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plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two actions in the courts of this state at the same 

time for the same cause and against the same party.” (Id.) The defendants,

relying on state court decisions, argue that “courts of this state” include federal 

courts within the State of Alabama. (Doc. 20 at 7; doc. 21 at 8).

 The court is of the opinion that while § 6-5-440 may provide a bar to the 

Lawrence County court continuing its action in light of this federal litigation, § 6-

5-440 provides no basis for this court to dismiss this action. The abatement statute 

argument is not for this court to decide. See e.g., Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. 

Skilstaf, Inc., 695 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (for a federal district 

court, Alabama’s abatement statute does not control the decision to retain or 

dispose of the litigation). This court must consider the abatement statute only if it 

creates a procedural bar to any state claims. L.A. Draper & Son v. WheelabratorFrye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 430 (11th Cir. 1984) (in a case based on federal question 

jurisdiction, district court erred when it did not consider Alabama’s abatement 

statute as a procedural bar before dismissing state claims). No such issue presents 

itself in the pleadings here. Therefore, the court finds that the Alabama abatement 

statute, a procedural rule, does not apply to this matter. The defendants’ § 6-5-440 

argument is without merit. See e.g, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 

716 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947) (“Of 

12

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course, where resort is had to a federal court ... because a federal right is claimed, 

the limitations upon the courts of a State do not control a federal court sitting in the 

State.”); Tillman v. Georgia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1314 (S.D.Ga. 2006) (in 

claims arising out of federal law, federal law governs the substance and procedure 

of the action).

B. Abstention

The abstention doctrine announced in Colorado River Water Conservation 

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), “allows a federal court to dismiss a 

case when a concurrent state proceeding provides a more appropriate forum.” 

TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Allowing a dismissal is not the same as requiring a dismissal. “Generally, as 

between state and federal courts, the rule is that the ‘pendency of an action in the 

state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court 

having jurisdiction....’” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (citations omitted). 

Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction 

given them.” Id. Thus, federal courts should abstain to avoid duplicative litigation 

with state courts only in “exceptional” circumstances. Id., at 818. See also 

American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. First State Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 882, 884 (11th 

Cir. 1990) (“A federal court may dismiss an action because of parallel state court 

13

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litigation only under exceptional circumstances. Indeed, only the clearest of 

justifications will warrant dismissal.”). This case does not present an exceptional 

circumstance.

The court must consider six factors in deciding whether to abstain: (1) the 

order in which the courts assumed jurisdiction over property; (2) the relative 

inconvenience of the fora; (3) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained and the 

relative progress of the two actions; (4) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (5) 

whether federal law provides the rule of decision; and (6) whether the state court 

will adequately protect the rights of all parties. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. 

v. First State Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Colorado River, 

424 U.S. at 818 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 

1, 23 (1983)). No single factor is dispositive, and the court “is required to weigh 

the factors with a heavy bias favoring the federal courts’ obligation to exercise the 

jurisdiction that Congress has given them.” Jackson-Platts v. General Elec. 

Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1141 (11th Cir. 2013).

Considering each of the above factors in turn, the court finds the first factor, 

the order in which the courts assumed jurisdiction over property, is inapplicable 

because this is not a proceeding in rem. Where “there is no real property at issue,” 

this factor does not favor abstention. See Maharaj v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 432 

14

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F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2005). As to the second factor, the relative 

inconvenience of the fora, the court must consider the inconvenience of the federal 

forum and focuses “primarily on the physical proximity of the federal forum to the 

evidence and witnesses.” Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 368 

F.3d 1320, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). As the plaintiff is housed in Bibb Correctional 

Facility, in Bibb County, and three of the four named defendants are located in 

Lawrence County, the court finds Lawrence County is more convenient for the 

defendants, but this court is closer to the plaintiff. However, as the plaintiff and 

his witnesses are in state custody, the Lawrence County Circuit Court can obtain 

jurisdiction over the plaintiff for purposes of trial. This factor weighs slightly in 

favor of abstention. 

Under the third factor, the court must consider which forum acquired 

jurisdiction first. Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1142. The court considers not the 

“chronological order in which the parties initiated the concurrent proceedings, but 

the progress of the proceedings and whether the party availing itself of the federal 

forum should have acted earlier.” TranSouth Fin., 149 F.3d at 1295. “This factor, 

as with the other Colorado River factors, is to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible 

manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand. Thus, priority should not be 

measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of 

15

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how much progress has been made.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. This factors 

weighs heavily, indeed almost decisively, in favor of declining to abstain. 

Although filed in October 2013, the state court action has not progressed beyond 

the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint, which the plaintiff attempted to dismiss by 

way of a “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice,” dated January 19, 2015.7

 (Doc. 

31-1). On January 23, 2015, the Lawrence County defendants filed an objection to 

the plaintiff’s motion and a motion to stay the state court proceedings. (Doc. 31-

2). On April 15, 2015, the Circuit Court judge cryptically ruled that 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE filed by 

METCALF IVAN AIS#267734 is hereby DENIED; this matter will 

proceed to adjudication of the issues raised here in.

(Doc. 31-3). 

Through today, the defendants in that action have not been served. Because 

this case is much further developed than the state court litigation, this factor 

weighs heavily in favor of not abstaining. See First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. 

McCollum, 144 F.3d 1362, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The [third] factor, the order 

in which the tribunals obtained and exercised jurisdiction, also weighs against 

7

Under Rule 41(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., the plaintiff certainly could have dismissed the state 

court action without an order from the court. 

16

 

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discretionary dismissal.... [N]o activity had occurred in state court before the filing 

of the federal petition or even before the district court ruled.”).

The fourth Colorado River factor questions the potential for piecemeal 

litigation. “Run of the mill piecemeal litigation will not do: this factor ‘does not 

favor abstention unless the circumstances enveloping those cases will likely lead to 

piecemeal litigation that is abnormally excessive or deleterious.”’ Jackson-Platts, 

727 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1333). The concern with 

piecemeal litigation arises primarily where parallel lawsuits “pose[] a risk of 

inconsistent outcomes not preventable by principles of res judicata and collateral 

estoppel.” Woodford v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene County, Inc., 239 F.3d 

517, 524 (2nd Cir. 2001). Because this court has jurisdiction to resolve the entirety 

of the claims raised in both suits, this factor does not favor abstention. 

The fifth factor requires a determination of whether federal or state law 

governs the action. As the plaintiff brings claims asserting his constitutional rights 

have been violated, questions of federal law, this factor too weighs against 

abstention. 

The sixth and final factor requires this court to consider whether the state 

court will adequately protect the rights of all parties. This factor only weighs in 

favor of abstention when one forum is inadequate to protect a party’s rights. 

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Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1334. Neither of the fora is inadequate. This factor is 

therefore neutral. 

In light of the foregoing, the court finds little in the way of support for 

abstention. Most importantly, although pending first, the state court action has not 

progressed to the point of service on the defendants, no answer has been filed, and 

no dates have been set. In contrast, this federal action is at the point of summary 

judgment. This court declines to abstain, finding the same inappropriate under 

Colorado River and its progeny.8

The court therefore considers each claim, on its merits, against the named 

defendants.

C. Commissioner Kim Thomas

The plaintiff asserts that defendant Thomas failed to provide the plaintiff 

safe housing, failed to allow the plaintiff to pursue a grievance, and failed to 

investigate the plaintiff’s allegations. (Doc. 1 at 4). Construing the plaintiff’s safe 

housing claim as one for violation of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to 

prison conditions that are humane, such claim fails. 

8

Within their special report, the Lawrence County defendants suggest this court stay this 

action if it determines that both abatement and abstention are inappropriate. For the same 

reasons the court finds abstention inappropriate, the court declines to stay this action. Although 

pending for almost two years, the state court action remains dormant. 

18

 

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The plaintiff does not allege any facts which create a genuine issue of 

material fact that defendant Thomas had any awareness of the conditions in 

Lawrence County jail or any control over those conditions. Moreover, defendant 

Thomas, by virtue of his position as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of 

Corrections at the time in question, does not gain liability for other individuals’ 

wrongful actions. Section 1983 contains no provision which allows a supervisor to 

be liable solely for the conduct of others. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 917 

(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

690–92 (1978) and LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 510 U.S. 1164 (1994)). 

In his response to defendant Thomas’ special report, the plaintiff states that 

he “has reviewed applicable case law and has been unable to locate any authority 

imposing a constitutional duty upon Commissioner Thomas.” (Doc. 22, at 7). The 

court views this statement as a tacit admission that defendant Thomas is due to 

have judgment granted in his favor on the plaintiff’s claims. 

D. Lawrence County Defendants

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

To the extent that the plaintiff brings this action against the Lawrence 

County defendants in their official capacities, they are immune from monetary 

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damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, ... treated 

as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). “A 

state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s 

immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, [59] (1996). Alabama has 

not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not 

abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune 

from claims brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe 

Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). Because the Lawrence County 

defendants are state actors entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official 

capacities, any such claims the plaintiff brings are due to be dismissed. 

2. Defendant Tim Owens 

As stated above, the plaintiff alleges defendant Owens physically and 

sexually assaulted him. “Confinement in a prison where terror reigns is cruel and 

unusual punishment. A prisoner has a right to be protected from the constant threat 

of violence and from sexual assault.” Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 

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(5th Cir., 1981) (citations omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Int’l 

Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th 

Cir.1986)).

a. Sexual Assault

The determination of whether a prison official’s sexual abuse of a prisoner 

constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation requires a two-part inquiry. The first 

inquiry is the objective component, which requires a plaintiff show that the 

defendant’s conduct was objectively serious or caused an objectively serious injury 

to the plaintiff. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994); see also Boxer X v. 

Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006). The defendants first argue that the 

plaintiff’s sexual assault claim cannot survive because the plaintiff has alleged no 

actual injury from the assault. (Doc. 21 at 22). Other circuits have held that 

“sexual assaults against inmates by prison guards without lasting physical injury 

may be actionable under the Eighth Amendment as acts which are ‘offensive to 

human dignity.’” Copeland v. Nunan, 250 F.3d 743, 2001 WL 274738, *2 (5th 

Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196-97 

(9th Cir. 2000) (rape of prisoner case)). “[S]evere or repetitive sexual abuse of a 

prisoner by a prison official can violate the Eighth Amendment.” Boxer X, 437 

F.3d at 1111. “‘[S]exual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections officer has no 

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legitimate penalogical purpose, and is simply not part of the penalty that criminal 

offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id. (quoting Boddie v. 

Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2nd Cir. 1997)).

Moreover, the extent of injury suffered is but one factor to be considered in 

determining whether the use of force was wanton or unnecessary. See Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). The United Supreme Court in Wilkins v. Gaddy

clarified that the purpose of Hudson was to “shift the ‘core judicial inquiry’ from 

the extent of the injury to the nature of the force – specifically, whether it was 

nontrivial and ‘was applied ... maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Id., 

559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). The Northern District of 

Florida recently reached a similar conclusion. That court held:

The [Supreme] Court more recently reiterated the core inquiry of 

Hudson, rejecting once again “the notion that ‘significant injury’ is a 

threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim.” Wilkins 

v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010).... “Otherwise, the Eighth 

Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how 

diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of 

injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.... The Court noted that “[a]n inmate 

who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to 

pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good 

fortune to escape without serious injury.” 559 U.S. at 38. 

Notwithstanding, a prisoner’s “relatively modest ... alleged injuries 

will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.” Id. at 40.

....

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There are occasions when § 1997e(e) should not be used to dismiss a 

claim for damages[;] where the jury should be permitted to consider 

the use of force and extent of a prisoner’s injuries. See Harrell v. 

Cnty. of Nassau, 2013 WL 5439137, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) 

(denying summary judgment due to disputed facts, and drawing 

inferences in favor of Plaintiff who was punched in the face while 

restrained on a stretcher with a gunshot wound to his back, that if jury 

believed Plaintiff’s evidence, they could reasonably find the force 

used “shocks the conscience.”); Hart v. Bell, 2011 WL 1584601, at 

*5–6 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2011) (denying summary judgment, 

including § 1997e(e) argument, and finding that, under plaintiff’s

version of the events, “there was no need for the application of any 

force by the defendants and the force that was used against him –

choking him, twisting his wrists, placing handcuffs on him in an 

excessively tight manner, causing him to fall head first to the floor, 

and striking him in the face – was excessive, gratuitous, and malicious 

on the part of the defendants.”). 

Black v. Brunson, 2014 WL 5682653, 4-5 (N.D. Fla. 2014).

Another court to consider the matter reasoned as follows:

[T]he “physical injury” requirement of § 1997e(e) is equated with the 

concept of de minimis injury in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and 

the de minimis injury requirement is satisfied if the physical force 

used was “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” I have no 

difficulty concluding that a sexual assault upon a prisoner by a 

correctional officer who has authority over the prisoner, and the 

responsibility to protect and care for the prisoner, is repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind. 

A sexual assault on an inmate by a guard – regardless of 

the gender of the guard or of the prisoner – is deeply 

“offensive to human dignity.” “Being violently assaulted 

in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal 

offenders pay for their offenses against society.’ ”

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Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting, 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 

811 (1994).

Solliday v. Spence, 2009 WL 559526, * 11-12 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (footnote omitted).

Other courts similarly have found intrusive sexual conduct combined with 

allegations of pain sufficient to satisfy the “injury” requirement. See e.g., Smith v. 

Cochran, 338 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (rape); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 

193, 197 (7th Cir. 1977) (sexual assault). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff for purposes of 

this motion, the court finds that defendant Owens’ conduct as alleged by the 

plaintiff in regard to the sexual assault was objectively serious, sufficient to satisfy 

the first prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis.

The second inquiry is the subjective component, “which requires the prison 

official have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Boxer X, 437 F.3d at 1111, or 

to act with deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, health, or safety, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 836. If no 

legitimate law enforcement purpose or penalogical purpose can be inferred from 

the officer’s conduct, the conduct itself can be sufficient evidence of a culpable 

mind. See gen., Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1281-1281 (11th Cir. 2005); 

Hammond v. Gordon County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (N.D. Ga. 2002). See 

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also Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Giron v. Corr. 

Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating sexual actions served 

no valid objective, in such cases, the conduct itself constitutes sufficient evidence 

that force was used “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 

harm.”).

 The Lawrence County defendants argue that because the plaintiff does not 

allege that Owens intended to sexually assault him, this claim fails. (Doc. 21 at 

22). However, under the facts alleged by the plaintiff, the conduct described could 

only be intentional. Those facts leave no room for the possibility that the described 

assault was accidental. The cases relied on by the defendants do not require a 

different conclusion. In each of the cases defendants cite (see doc. 21 at 21-22), 

the allegation of sexual abuse concerned fondling, not rape.9

 Because no 

legitimate purpose was served by Owens’ sexual assault of the plaintiff, the 

subjective component of the Eighth Amendment analysis is satisfied. See Wood, 

692 F.3d at 1050-51 (“[A]t its core, the Eighth Amendment protects ‘the basic 

concept of human dignity’ and forbids conduct that is ‘so totally without 

9

The court is mindful that defendant Owens denies the sexual assault incident ever 

occurred. Because such contradiction creates a genuine issue of material fact, its resolution is 

properly left to the trier of fact.

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penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.’”) 

(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976)).

b. Excessive Force

To establish a claim for excessive force, the plaintiff must show that (1) the 

defendant acted with a malicious and sadistic purpose to inflict harm and (2) that a 

more than de minimis injury resulted. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 

(11th Cir. 2002). This court must decide “whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 

7). Although the extent of any injury alone is not dispositive of an excessive force 

case, it is “one factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly 

have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).

Whether the use of force is excessive, and thus violates the inmate’s right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment, depends on whether the jailer’s act 

“shocks the conscience.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 

2007). Force “applied ... maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 

causing harm,” is within the “shocks the conscience” realm. Id. To evaluate 

whether actions shock the conscience, the court must consider the following 

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factors: (1) the need for force; (2) the relationship between that need and the 

amount of force used; and (3) the extent of the resulting injury. Whitley, 475 U.S. 

at 321. Additionally, the court considers (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of 

staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible official on the basis 

of facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a 

forceful response.” Id. These factors must be viewed with “a wide range of 

deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security.” Bennett v. 

Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990).

Once again taking the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, this claim against defendant Owens’ survives summary judgment.10 

Considering the above factors, the court finds “[t]he need for the use of force [was] 

10The Lawrence County defendants assert that defendant Owens’ version of events is 

confirmed by the video of the October 8, 2013, altercation. However, that video has not been 

made an exhibit in support of these defendants’ submissions. Even if it had, the defendants 

allege that the video shows that the plaintiff “flipped off” the observation camera and placed his 

belt over his shoulder while pacing the room. (Doc. 21, at 18). When defendant Owens entered 

the room, “plaintiff did not submit, but continued to have his belt on his shoulder.” (Id.). The 

defendants continue that

After Officer Owens deployed the pepper spray, the plaintiff lunged at him with 

the belt. After Officer Owens deployed the taser, the plaintiff continued to refuse 

to comply or submit to hand cuffs, necessitating knee strikes.

(Id.). Whether pepper spraying, tasing (by some accounts more than twice) and multiple knee 

strikes were “excessive” under these circumstances is a question for a trier of fact. Additionally, 

nothing in the defendants’ account of the altercation necessarily contradicts the affidavits of 

Nickelson and Orr that defendant Owens ran the plaintiff’s head into a wall after the plaintiff was 

handcuffed.

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established by the undisputed evidence that [the inmate] created a disturbance.” 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1533. However, turning to the second factor, the court is of 

the opinion that the amount of force used was far beyond that which was needed. 

According to the affidavits of the two inmates in the cell with the plaintiff, 

defendant Owens sprayed chemical spray in the plaintiff’s face because he was 

demanding his mail and banging on the door. When the plaintiff turned away from 

Owens, Owens tased the plaintiff in the back. Once the plaintiff was on the 

ground, Owens repeatedly kicked the plaintiff. Finally, according to the other 

inmates affidavits, Owens purposefully slammed the plaintiff’s head into a wall. 

As to the third Whitley factor, the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, the 

plaintiff suffered a seizure, was hospitalized, has walked with a cane and had 

ongoing back and thigh pain since this incident with Owens. The fourth and fifth 

factors also weigh in the plaintiff’s favor. The extent of the threat to the safety of 

staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible official on the basis 

of facts known to them, was minimal from the facts before the court. Similarly, as 

to the fifth factor, no effort was made to temper the severity of a forceful response 

by defendant Owens. When jailers continue to use substantial force against a 

prisoner who has clearly stopped resisting – whether because he has decided to 

become compliant, he has been subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated – that use 

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of force is excessive. See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(giving special weight to the fact that the jailers “continued [to] use ... force in a 

manner that was severe enough to render [the plaintiff], at the very least, 

unconscious after [he] had surrendered”), abrogated on other grounds, Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, – U.S. –, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015); Skrtich v. Thorton, 280 F.3d 

1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[G]overnment officials may not use gratuitous force 

against a prisoner who has been already subdued or, as in this case, 

incapacitated.”). Here, the two inmates who witnesses the altercation both stated 

that Owens used his taser while the plaintiff was facing away from him, then 

gratuitously hit him once the plaintiff was on the ground. Under the facts alleged 

in the complaint, Owens used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very 

purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21. 

c. Qualified Immunity

Having found a constitutional violation of the plaintiff’s rights, the court 

must now consider whether the defense of qualified immunity assists defendant 

Owens. Qualified immunity shields public officials in their individual capacities 

from some lawsuits against them arising from torts committed while they are 

performing a discretionary duty. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1329 

(11th Cir. 2007). No one disputes that Owens’ interactions with the plaintiff 

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occurred while defendant Owens was engaged in discretionary duties. To 

overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show a constitutional 

or statutory violation of a right that was clearly established at the time. Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 

(1982).

Other courts have clearly stated that where a guard himself is responsible for 

the rape and sexual abuse of inmates, qualified immunity offers no shield. See 

Chapman v. Willis, 2013 WL 2322947, *8 (W.D. Va. 2013) (citing Schwenk, 204 

F.3d at 1197; Turner v. Huibregtse, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152-53 (W.D. Wis. 

2006) (denying qualified immunity to guards who allegedly touched inmate’s 

buttocks and fondled his penis).

As to the excessive force claim, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “there is 

no room for qualified immunity” in Eighth Amendment excessive force cases 

because they require a subjective element that is “so extreme” that “every 

conceivable set of circumstances in which this constitutional violation occurs is 

clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 

F.3d at 1321-22. Thus, a qualified immunity defense is not available when a 

plaintiff properly pleads the use of excessive force. Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 

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1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall 

v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). 

3. Defendants Captain Agee and Sheriff Mitchell

Plaintiff asserts that defendants Agee and Mitchell denied him “security in 

safe housing” (doc. 1, at 4), which the court takes as a failure to protect claim 

arising under the Eighth Amendment. He further alleges that they “denied plaintiff 

of grievance and incident reports where the plaintiff was hospitalized for the 

alleged attacks.” (Id.) Finally, in his response to the defendants’ special report, 

the plaintiff asserts:

Creating the Notoriously known and called by Jailers D-cell Torture 

Chamber and Staffing it with several known rogue officers created 

unsafe housing and to run it like a Nazi Concentration Camp was 

deliberate indifference.

Defendants Mitchell and Agee specifically developed and designed Dcell specifically for Heinous Crime inmates and assigned rogue 

officers for the purpose of inflicting punishment.

(Doc. 22, at 3-4). 

“Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983 on the basis of 

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 

1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The plaintiff does not allege any 

facts beyond his “rogue officer” theory, which is insufficient to create a genuine 

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issue of material fact concerning Mitchell and Agee’s liability for Owens’ actions. 

Section 1983 contains no provision which allows a supervisor to be liable solely 

for the conduct of others. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d at 917 (citations omitted).

“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual 

capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Harrison v. 

Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The plaintiff 

either must show defendants Mitchell and Agee directly participated in the 

unconstitutional conduct or that some causal connection exists between Mitchell 

and Agee and the alleged deprivation. See id. (citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 

1352, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a causal connection is shown by a 

history of widespread abuse which puts the supervisor on notice; a supervisor’s 

custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or when 

facts support an inference that the supervisor directed his subordinates to act 

unlawfully or knew they would act unlawfully and failed to stop them)). The 

plaintiff has not pleaded any facts which would establish a causal connection 

between defendants Mitchell and Agee and the acts which caused him harm.11

11For instance, the plaintiff does not allege that defendants Mitchell and Agee knew of a 

prior conflict between the plaintiff and Owens, does not allege that Owens had physically or 

sexually assaulted other inmates, and does not allege that his injuries were the result of Mitchell 

or Agee’s customs or policies. Even assuming the plaintiff is correct in his theory that D-Cell is 

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Nor has the plaintiff alleged such facts as to create liability for defendants 

Mitchell and Agee based on their own actions concerning any alleged deprivation 

of rights. The Supreme Court has developed a two-part analysis governing Eighth 

Amendment challenges to prison conditions. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 

1289 (11th Cir. 2004). First, under the “objective component,” a prisoner must 

prove that the condition he complains of is “harmful enough” to violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. The challenged condition must be 

“extreme.” Id. at 9. The second part of the two-part analysis is the “subjective 

component”: That the defendant prison officials “acted with a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind” with regard to the condition at issue. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 

(alterations and citation omitted).

 Although negligence does not suffice to satisfy this standard, Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991), a prisoner need not show that the prison official 

acted with “the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm [would] 

result,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. In defining the deliberate indifference standard, 

the Farmer Court stated, “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the 

Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement 

staffed by rogue officers, the plaintiff’s serious injuries from the altercation on October 8, 2013, 

did not occur in D-Cell. 

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unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Id. at 837. The plaintiff here neither argues that defendants Mitchell 

and Agee met this standard, nor does he alleged facts which would allow the court 

to reach such a conclusion.

As to the plaintiff’s claim that defendants Mitchell and/or Agee failed to 

allow him to file a grievance, or took no action upon the plaintiff’s allegations, the 

plaintiff has pleaded this in a variety of ways. In his complaint, the plaintiff 

alleges that defendants Agee and Mitchell “denied plaintiff of grievance and 

incident reports where the plaintiff was hospitalized....” (Doc. 1 at 4). In a 

document he entitled “Order for Special Report,” the plaintiff asserts the 

defendants failed to adequately respond to his complaints and grievances. (Doc. 

13 at 1). In his response to the defendants’ special reports, the plaintiff alleges that 

after the sexual assault by Owens, he “managed to inform Captain Agee who took 

no action to stop the abuse.” (Doc. 22 at 9). In a statement given on October 8, 

2013, upon his return to Bibb Correctional Facility, the plaintiff asserted that “I 

notified Captain Agee on about Sept. 30, 2013. Captain Agee said ‘if you have a 

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complaint write a letter if I do not get it than the hell with it,’ he refused to let me 

file a grievance on the incident or send outgoing mail out.” (Doc. 20-2, at 12). 

Viewing each of these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 

and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, the court finds the plaintiff’s 

ability to pursue a grievance over the incidents in question was not thwarted. 

Although he asserts defendant Agee would not let him file a grievance, the plaintiff 

was able to state his allegations and have them thoroughly investigated upon his 

return to Bibb Correctional Facility. Additionally, the plaintiff cites to no 

requirement that a county jail actually have grievance procedures in place. 

Moreover, the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants did not let him file a 

grievance fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim under § 1983. A state 

inmate has no constitutionally protected interest in access to a grievance procedure. 

See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011). While the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust “such administrative remedies 

as are available,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), nowhere does it mandate that 

administrative procedures for exhaustion must exist in a county jail. In other 

words, the failure to allow the plaintiff to file grievances while in Lawrence 

County Jail only prevents the defendants from now raising exhaustion of the same 

as a defense. The plaintiff certainly has not been thwarted in his ability to pursue 

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his claims in court. The court finds the defendants are due judgment in their favor 

on this claim. 

E. The Pending Motion

After the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for the production of medical 

records from Lawrence County (doc. 32), the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Compel 

and Compel Request for Interrogatories and Additional Discovery and Requested 

Production of Additional Documents Pursuant to Fed. R. Civil P. 56.” (Doc. 37). 

Within that pleading, the plaintiff requests the court compel the defendants to 

produce the medical records from Lawrence County. That portion of the motion is 

moot, as such relief was already provided to the plaintiff. (Doc. 36). The plaintiff 

also seeks to compel the defendants to answer his previously filed interrogatories. 

(Docs. 33-35). As the court has already denied the plaintiff’s motions to propound 

those very interrogatories (doc. 36), that portion of the current motion is moot as 

well. 

V. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the magistrate judge 

RECOMMENDS:

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1. That defendant Kim Thomas’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 20) be 

GRANTED and the claims against defendant Thomas be DISMISSED with 

prejudice. 

2. That defendants Agee, Owens and Mitchell’s motion for summary 

judgment (doc. 21) as to the plaintiff’s claims against defendants Agee and 

Mitchell be GRANTED and these claims be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

3. That defendants Agee, Owens and Mitchell’s motion for summary 

judgment (doc. 21) as to the plaintiff’s claims against defendant Owens in his 

official capacity be GRANTED and these claims be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

4. That defendants Agee, Owens and Mitchell’s motion for summary 

judgment (doc. 21) as to the plaintiff’s claims against defendant Owens in his 

individual capacity be DENIED.

5. That the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Ala. Code §§ 14-3-13, 14-3-16, 14-

3-52, and 14-4-11 be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. 

6. That the plaintiff’s motion to compel (doc. 37) is MOOT. 

VI. Notice of Right to Object

Any party who objects to this report and recommendation must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date on which it is entered, file specific written objections 

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with the clerk of this court. Any objections to the failure of the magistrate 

judge to address any contention raised in the petition also must be included. 

Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings of the 

magistrate judge, except for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. 

Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 

715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). 

To challenge the findings of the magistrate judge, a party must file with the 

clerk of the court written objections which shall specifically identify the portions 

of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the 

specific basis for objection. Any objections to the failure of the magistrate judge to 

address any contention raised in the complaint must also be included. Objections 

not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a 

district judge. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to 

make new allegations or present additional evidence. Furthermore, it is not 

necessary for a party to repeat legal arguments in objections. A copy of the 

objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.

On receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a 

United States District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions 

of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made 

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and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district judge, however, need 

conduct a hearing only in his discretion or if required by law, and may consider the 

record developed before the magistrate judge, making his own determination on 

the basis of that record. The district judge may also receive further evidence, recall 

witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 

Objections not meeting the foregoing specificity requirement will not be 

considered by a district judge.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation directly to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made 

only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this report and recommendation

on the plaintiff and counsel for the defendants.

DONE, this 28th day of July, 2015.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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