Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02288/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02288-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, JR.,

Inmate Booking No. 13719099

Civil

No.

13cv2288 LAB (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE

DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND AS

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; BLAIR

SOPER; SAN DIEGO PROBATION;

PUBLIC DEFENDERS, 

Defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff, David B. Turner, Jr., currently housed at the

Vista Detention Facility, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF

Doc. No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis(“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF Doc. No. 3.) On November 12, 2013, this Court

granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for

failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF Doc. No. 4.) Plaintiff

was granted forty five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct

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the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) That time frame has

long since passed but the Court permitted Plaintiff to file an untimely First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) on July 2, 2014. (ECF Doc. No. 6.) 

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under

these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or

any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks

damagesfromdefendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9thCir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua

sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. 

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now

mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own

motion to dismiss before effecting service ofthe Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that failsto state a claim.”);see

also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A).

/ / /

/ / /

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“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting

that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

In addition, the Court’s duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important

in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Once again, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Blair Soper, the Deputy

Public Defender appointed to represent Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings. However,

a person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising

power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer

is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-

18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys

appointed to represent a criminal defendant during trial, do not generally act under color

of state law because representing a client “is essentially a private function ... for which

state office and authority are not needed.” Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States

v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when publicly appointed

counsel are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients, investigating possible

defenses, presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not act under color

of state law for section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53

(1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that public defender was not a state actor subject to

suit under § 1983 because, so long as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a

client, “his function,” no matter how ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the

interests of the state or county.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Soper must be dismissed for

failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

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Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

the alleged ineffectiveness assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack

on the validity of his underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction has already been

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has

fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”)

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). Heck holds that

“in order to recover damagesfor allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim

challenging the legality of a conviction orsentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:

when a state prisoner seeks damagesin a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction orsentence has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action

should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new

action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims againstSoper “necessarily

imply the invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration. Heck,

512 U.S. at 487. Were Plaintiff to succeed in showing that Defendant Soper rendered

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ineffective assistance of counsel, an award of damages would “necessarily imply the

invalidity” of his conviction. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984) (to succeed on ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s

errors the result of the trial would have been different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956,

958-59 (9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel is a conditional writ

granting petitioner’s release unless state retries him or allows him to pursue an appeal

with the assistance of counsel within a reasonable time). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings in a criminal case, and

because he has not alleged that his conviction has already been invalidated, a section

1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. 

Plaintiff also names as Defendants the County of San Diego, the City of San Diego

Police Department and “San Diego County Jail Prison Officials.” (FAC at 2.) An

agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper defendant under § 1983. 

Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Rather, the

county or city itself is the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality cannot be held

liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot

be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983

for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the constitutional deprivation was

caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 690; Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct.

1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate

indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force

behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835

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(9th Cir. 1996); see Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.

Ct. at 1388; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state

a § 1983 claim against the City or County of San Diego, Plaintiff must allege facts

showing that his injury was caused by individual officers whose conduct conformed to

an official city policy, custom or practice. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

Here, Plaintiff appears to allege that these Defendants were conspiring with the

Deputy Public Defender appointed to defend him to violate his constitutional rights and

engaged in a “malicious prosecution.” (See FAC at 5-6.) A complaint is frivolous

“where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989). Based on these allegations, Court finds the claims in Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint to be frivolous because they lack even “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact,” and appear “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

325, 328. 

Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim against the

City or County of San Diego because he has failed to allege any plausible facts that any

individual police officer’s conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or

practice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that FED.R.CIV.P. 8

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,”

and that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). 

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for

all the reasons set forth above.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Moreover, because the Court finds amendment

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of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile at this time, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is

not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson

v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since

plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claimcontaining an arguable basis in law, this action

should be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing

Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

2. Further, this Court CERTIFIES that any IFP appeal from this Order would

not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977)

(indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be

frivolous).

3. The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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