Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00613/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00613-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CLARK, No. 2:15-CV-0613-JAM-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BENNETT FEINBERG, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Feinberg; (2) Lewis; (3) Fong;

and (4) Sahota. Plaintiff states that he broke his finger in December 2013 but was denied

medical care. According to plaintiff, he was seen by defendant Feinberg, apparently a prison

doctor, on May 5, 2014, for “severe pain, throbbing in the index finger area.” Plaintiff informed

defendant Feinberg that his finger had never been set correctly. Plaintiff claims that defendant

Sahota reviewed his prison grievance regarding his finger but “denied the medical request for

help.” Plaintiff also states that defendant Sahota denied surgery. Next, plaintiff claims that

defendant Fong reviewed his grievances and also denied medical care. Specifically, plaintiff

claims that “no relief was provided for the constant pain after the interview was conduct[ed] by

Lawrence C. Fong on 7/3/2014.” Finally, plaintiff claims that he “sought medical relief” from

defendant Lewis by way of a prison grievance but that defendant Lewis also denied care. 

Attached to plaintiff’s complaint are the defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s

various grievances. In responses dated May 13, 2014, by defendant Sahota and July 3, 2014, by

defendant Lewis, plaintiff was informed as follows:

In the First Level Appeal, received on 4/14/2014, you indicated that you

are requesting to be provided with the medical care that a specialist

recommended. Records show that this was a joint replacement in your

finger. You are requesting an investigation in why you were not provided

medical care for the pain of your fractured finger. 

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During your interview with Dr. Feinberg, your medical history was

reviewed. It is noted that orthopedic surgery of the 5th finger was

recommended by an orthopedic surgeon on 1/24/14. The request for

services was denied by the Institutional Utilization Management

Committee (IUMC) on 2/6/14. The IUMC recommended to provide

continuous care and to consider buddy taping to the adjacent finger. 

Records show that due to the deformity of your finger, taping caused more

pain than not. Dr. Feinberg resubmitted a Request for surgery on 5/5/14

for a right 5th PIP joint replacement. Your case was discussed in length

by the IUMC. The pros and cons of surgery were discussed. The clinical

finding of the IUMC was to deny the surgery. It was felt that any

recommendation at this stage may not return full function of the finger. 

The IUMC recommended accommodations to minimize situations causing

discomfort. Your request for surgery is denied. 

II. DISCUSSION

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

/ / /

/ / /

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is his contention that he should have been

provided surgery. At best, plaintiff’s allegations indicate a difference of medical opinion and not

deliberate indifference. To the contrary, plaintiff’s allegations as well as documents attached to

the complaint clearly show that plaintiff was, in fact, provided medical treatment. Plaintiff’s

disagreement with the course of that treatment does not give rise to a claim under § 1983. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed

for failure to state a claim. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 23, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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