Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00622/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00622-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 “Doc. No.” refers to documents in this Court’s file. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GINA GAIL CELAYA 

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA SCHRIRO, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 01-622-TUC-DCB (BPV)

ORDER

On November 28, 2001, Petitioner, an inmate confined in the Arizona State

Prisons Complex in Perryville, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No.

1.)1

 A Second Amended Petition ("Petition") was filed on September 27, 2007. (Doc.

No. 34.) Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition on March 3, 2008. (Doc. No.

44.) Petitioner filed a Reply on June 16, 2008. (Doc. No. 49.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order DISMISSING Grounds Two and Three, and GRANTING

RELIEF as to Ground One. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court briefly summarized the background and facts of the state court

proceedings as follows:

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During the late night hours of December 21, 1992/early morning

hours of December 22, 1992, Trinidad Lopez, age 51, was shot by Miss

Celaya, then 14 years of age, and he died as a result of injuries sustained

in the shooting. The medical examiner determined that Trinidad Lopez

died of blood loss as a result of a single gunshot wound to his upper right

buttocks area. (RT 9/27/94, ¶. 36-40) 

The State’s theory was that Miss Celaya shot Mr. Lopez during

the course of an armed robbery and carjacking. RT 9/24/94, 146-14.

Gina Celaya’s defense was that she shot Trinidad Lopez in self-defense

during a struggle in which Trinidad Lopez sexually assaulted her. (RT

9/27/94, ¶. 99-109)

On Tuesday evening, December 22, 1992 at approximately 8:00

p.m. the victim’s family made a missing person report to the Tucson

Police Department. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lopez’ vehicle was involved

in an accident in South Tucson. (RT 1/4/93 Juvenile Probable Cause

Hearing, page 21). At that time Baby Laguna, the defendant’s friend,

was driving the vehicle, the defendant was seated in the passenger side

of the vehicle, and in the camper back area were young teenage girls

April Ornelas, Sonya Levya and Gloria Espinosa, all of whom were

friends of Gina Celaya. While the girls were “cruising” in the decedent’s

vehicle, the victim’s daughter and her husband saw the vehicle and gave

chase. Baby Laguna fired shots at the family’s pursuing vehicle.

Subsequently, Ms. Laguna crashed the vehicle. (RT 9/22/94 second day

of jury trial). The girls fled to Rebecca Antone’s house. (RT 9/22/99

page 75). Testimony at trial by Ms. Espinosa, Ms. Leyva, Ms. Ornelas

and Ms. Antone indicated that Gina Celaya told them that she had killed

Trinidad Lopez. The three girls and two of their parents went to the

police station to report the incident and what they had been told.

Efforts to locate Mr. Lopez’ body were unsuccessful.

Subsequently, a transient, Vernon Osborne, discovered Mr. Lopez’ body

in the desert near the Los Reales Landfill on December 24, 1992. Mr.

Osborne flagged down a vehicle, went to a convenience store and

contacted the police.

Ms. Celaya was ultimately arrested for the homicide of Mr. Lopez.

On January 4 and 12, 1993 Judge Collins conducted a Probable Cause

Hearing at the Juvenile Court. The Court on January 4, 1993 appointed

an attorney to represent Baby Laguna. (RT 1/4/93 pages 5-6).

Thereafter, on April 1, 13 and 14, the Court conducted a lengthy

Amenability Hearing. The defendant was ultimately transferred to adult

court to face charges. 

Defendant presented numerous motions which were heard and

resolved by the Court. On September 21 through September 29, 1994 the

defendant was tried before a jury for First Degree Murder and Armed

Robbery. The defendant was convicted of First Degree Murder and

Armed Robbery. Th[e] Court sentenced the defendant to a term of 25

years to life on the First Degree Murder Charge and a consecutive term

of 10.5 years on the Armed Robbery.

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(Answer, Ex. D: M.E. 11/5/99, at 2-3.) 

B. Appeal

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on

direct appeal. (Answer, Ex. A.) The court of appeals addressed Petitioner’s arguments,

rejecting Petitioner’s contentions that (1) the trial court should have allowed

Petitioner’s taped statement’s to be played to the jury; (2) the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct in saying that the defense could have introduced Petitioner’s prior

statements; (3) the trial court improperly limited defense efforts to prove the violent

character of the decedent in support of defendant’s claim of self-defense; (4) the trial

court should have permitted impeachment of a prosecution witness by allowing inquiry

into her activities in inducing another to engage in prostitution; (5) Petitioner’s pretrial

statements were involuntary; and (6) the consecutive sentences in the case violated the

double-jeopardy clause or A.R.S. § 13-116, or that the imposition of the sentences

constituted cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) 

Petitioner appealed that decision to the Arizona Supreme Court, and on

September 18, 1996, that court denied review. (See Answer, at 2; Appendix to

Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(hereafter “Appendix”), Ex. B.) 

 C. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner’s uncontested assertion is that the notice of post conviction relief was

filed on October 7, 1996. (See Second Amended Petition at 3.) Petitioner’s first

petition for post-conviction relief was filed on August 3, 1998. (See Appendix, Ex. C,

at 1.) Petitioner presented the following issues in her petition: (1) Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence were in violation of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions

because two members of the Tucson Police Department committed perjury at her trial;

(2) The testimony of Vernon Osborne at the Rule 32 hearing constitutes newlydiscovered evidence; (3) The recantation of Magdalene “Baby” Laguna constitutes

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newly-discovered evidence; and (4) State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441 (App. 1996)

constitutes a significant change in the law. (Id. at 3-4.) The trial court conducted an

evidentiary hearing and thereafter issued a minute entry on November 5, 1999, denying

relief on all four issues. (Id. at 2) 

On January 10, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona

Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (See

Second Amended Petition, at 3) The court of appeals granted review but denied relief

on October 17, 2000. (Appendix, Ex. D.) No motion for reconsideration or petition

for review from that decision was filed. The Arizona Court of Appeals issued its

mandate on November 30, 2000. (Appendix, Ex. E.) 

D. First Federal Habeas Petition and Amended Petition

Petitioner filed her first petition for post-conviction relief in District Court on

November 28, 2001. (Doc. No. 1.) The petition contained three exhausted claims, and

one unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Id.) The District Court

subsequently dismissed the petition without prejudice, with leave to file an amended

petition deleting the unexhausted claim, and held the federal habeas proceedings in

abeyance until after Petitioner exhausted the unexhausted claim. (Doc. No. 11.)

Petitioner filed the First Amended Petition on January 30, 2002. (Doc. No. 13.) The

Amended Petition was held in abeyance while Petitioner sought exhaustion of her

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in state court. (Doc. No. 15-28.) 

E. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On November 23, 2001, Petitioner filed her second notice of post-conviction

relief in state court. (See Second Amended Petition, Supp. Ex. 8, at 6.) On February

20, 2002, Petitioner filed her second petition for post-conviction relief, raising claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim, in the alternative, of a change in the

law. (Second Amended Petition, Supp. Ex. 1.) 

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On October 24, 2003, the trial court denied the petition with regard to all

assertions of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding the claims precluded. (Id.,

Supp. Ex. 8, at 13.) The trial court addressed each claim nonetheless, and made

extensive findings of fact as to each claim “so that there [would] be no questions as to

this Court’s Findings and Conclusions in the event this issue is raised yet again.” (Id.

at 14.) The trial court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective with regard to all

issues raised. (Id. at 36.) The trial court granted relief with regard to the claim asserted

in the alternative; concluding that there had been a significant change in the law, and

that the court had been influenced by the State’s assertion that there was a presumption

that the Court impose consecutive sentences. (Id. at 38.) Accordingly, the trial court

resentenced Petitioner to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences of life

imprisonment without the possibility of release for 25 years and 10.5 years

imprisonment, for first degree murder and armed robbery, respectively. (Id., Supp. Ex.

8, at 38, and Supp. Ex. 9, at 2-3.)

On October 7, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court

of Appeals, along with a motion to accept the oversized petition for review, asserting

that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that trial counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id., Supp. Ex. 10.11) The court of appeals denied

the motion to accept the oversized petition, and withdrew the petition for review,

returned the petition to counsel, with leave to refile a petition in compliance with Rule

32.9(c)(1), Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Id., Supp. Ex. 12.) A revised petition was submitted on

January 13, 2004. (Id., Supp. Ex. 13.) In a memorandum decision filed August 22,

2006, the court of appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Id., Supp. Ex. 14.) The

court of appeals found the ineffective assistance of counsel claims “indeed precluded

in this second post-conviction proceeding because they could have been but were not

raised in her first Rule 32 proceeding.” (Id., Supp. Ex. 14, at 3.) Although the appellate

court questioned the trial court’s finding that the record supported the finding that

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Petitioner personally waived her claims of ineffective assistance “after being advised

of the necessity to raise them by her appellate and Rule 32 counsel both orally and in

writing”; the appellate court did not reach that question because it rejected Petitioner’s

assertion that waiver of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Arizona law

requires an informed, voluntary personal waiver. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the appellate court’s decision with the

Arizona Supreme Court, urging the supreme court to find that the claims were not

precluded unless they were knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived. (Id., Supp.

Ex. 15, at 7) The supreme court denied review on June 5, 2007. (Id., Supp Ex. 16.) 

F. Second Amended Federal Habeas Petition

On September 26, 2007, the District Court, noting that the appellate court had

issued the mandate on August 2, 2007, lifted the stay and returned this case to the

Court’s active docket. (Doc. No. 33.) The Court further granted Petitioner’s motion

to amend the petition and ordered the Clerk of Court to file the lodged Second

Amended Petition. (Id.) The amended petition had the effect of reinserting the newly

exhausted claim, which directly related back to the original petition, and deleting the

moot claim regarding concurrent sentences. (Id.) 

The Second Amended Petition along with Supplemental Exhibits 1 through 21

was filed by the Clerk of Court on September 27, 2007. (Doc. No. 34-38.)

Respondents filed an Answer with Exhibits A through J attached on March 3, 2008.

(Doc. No. 44.) A Reply with Exhibits A through N was filed by Petitioner on June 16,

2008 (Doc. No. 49.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed her petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

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B. Statute of Limitations

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ

of habeas corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). 

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before a federal court may review a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a petitioner

must exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in state court every

claim raised in his federal habeas petition. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731

(1991); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal

habeas action must exhaust his federal claims in the state courts “by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process” before he may submit those

claims in a federal habeas petition); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to give the state the “opportunity

to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to

provide a state with this necessary opportunity, “the prisoner must fairly present his claim

in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and

legal theories on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982);

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th

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Cir. 2001). In state court, the petitioner must describe not only the operative facts but also

the asserted constitutional principle, for if “state courts are to be given the opportunity to

correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (“If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.”). A

petitioner does not ordinarily “fairly present” a federal claim to a state court if that court

must read beyond a petition, brief, or similar papers to find material that will alert it to the

presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32-33 (rejecting contention that petition

fairly presented federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim because “ineffective” is a

term of art in Oregon that refers only to federal law claims, since petitioner failed to

demonstrate that state law uses “ineffective assistance” as referring only to federal law

rather than a similar state law claim); Harless, 459 U.S. at 6 (holding that mere

presentation of facts necessary to support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim

similar to federal claim, is insufficient; petitioner must fairly present the substance of the

federal claim); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim

in state court only on state grounds); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999)

(holding that petitioner failed to “fairly present” federal claim to state courts where he

failed to identify the federal legal basis for his claim). 

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is not

necessary for purposes of federal exhaustion. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v. Sandon,

161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are exhausted by

review by the court of appeals); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Swoopes for assertion that in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death

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penalty, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the distinction between

exhaustion and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default rule.

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal

claim applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal

claim, but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is

clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Thus,

in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to exhaust a federal claim in

state court may cause a procedural default. A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer

“available” to him. A federal claim that is defaulted in state court

pursuant to an adequate and independent procedural bar may not be

considered in federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and

prejudice for the default, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice would result if the federal court refused to consider the claim. 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In other words, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from

federal review in either of two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in

federal court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be

defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, the

claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present

the claim in a necessary state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now

find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1. This is often referred to as

“technical” exhaustion, because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state

court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court

unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state

court, or demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Id. at 750;

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Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). If a claim has never been fairly

presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may determine whether state

remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1989); Teague

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

Cause is defined as a “legitimate excuse for the default,” and prejudice is defined

as “actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)

(a showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that “some objective factor external

to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule”).

Prejudice need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d

at 1123 n.10. To bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient

proof of his actual innocence,” Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir.

2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), which can be shown when “a

petitioner ‘presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence

in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of

nonharmless constitutional error.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

316 (1995)).

D. Standard of Review: Merits

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for

habeas relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution

of state and federal criminal sentences.’ “ Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 475

(2007) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA's “

‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands that

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state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt .” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party's

claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other

non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply

a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim

under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal

law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly

established” federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the

petitioner's state court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient

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legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower

federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 127

S.Ct. at 654; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while

only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive”

in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law

unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of §

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it

confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the

Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to

analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill

state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court cases] to the

facts of the prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974.

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule

from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular ... case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court]

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For

a federal court to find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent

“unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court's

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decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the

state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) ( Miller-El II). A state court decision

“based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state

court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the

“burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-474; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240. However,

it is only the state court's factual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject to

§ 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42 (“The clear

and convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains

only to state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”).

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its

rationale. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan,

313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir.

2000). In those circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to

assess whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling

federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is

reviewed independently, a federal court nevertheless defers to the state court's ultimate

decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes,

336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state court did not decide the merits of a properly raised

claim will the claim be reviewed de novo, because in that circumstance “there is no

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2 Although not essential to this determination, or the timeliness

calculations, Respondents have miscalculated the time period for timely

filing even assuming that the clock starts the date that the court of

appeals denied relief, October 17, 2000. The limitations period expires

a year after the judgment becomes final, not a year and a day, as stated

in Respondents Answer (Doc. No. 44 at 5.) See Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus the filing deadline would be

October 17, 2001, not October 18, 2001, as asserted by Respondents.

 

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state court decision on [the] issue to which to accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at

1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v.

Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

Respondents submit that the Petition exceeded the 1-year statute of limitations

and there is no statutory or equitable basis for tolling the limitations period. (See

Answer, at 5-8.) 

Respondents assert that Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on

October 17, 2000, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief from the trial

court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Respondents further assert that the statute of

limitations began to run the next day, and therefore, to be timely under the AEDPA,

Petitioner would have had to file the present petition by October 18, 2001.2

 Under

Respondents calculation, Petitioner’s federal petition, filed on November 28, 2001, is

untimely, absent statutory or equitable tolling, by 41 days.

Petitioner responds that the correct date to begin calculating the AEDPA

limitations period is the date that the court of appeals issued its mandate, November 30,

2000. Thus, to be timely under this calculation, Petitioner would have had to file the

present petition by November 30, 2001. Accordingly, Petitioner’s original petition,

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filed on November 28, 2001, is timely even without regard to statutory or equitable

tolling of the limitations period. 

1. Date on which conviction and sentence became final.

Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 17, 1996, 90 days after her

direct appeal was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on September 18, 1996, when

the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme

Court expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d

894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). 

2. Statutory Tolling

The limitations period was tolled immediately, however, by the pendency of

Petitioner’s petition for post conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The notice

of post-conviction relief had been filed in the trial court on October 7, 1996, prior to the

conclusion of direct review. There was no gap between the conclusion of direct review,

and Petitioner’s properly filed application for state post-conviction review. Thus, the

issue is not when direct review became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A), rather, this Court

must determine how long Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief was “pending”

for purposes of tolling the limitations period pursuant to § 2244(d)(2). 

Until an application for state post-conviction relief has achieved final resolution

through the State’s post-conviction procedure it remains “pending.” See Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002); See also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069,

1077 (9th Cir. 2007). In Carey, the Supreme Court interpreted the word "pending" and

explained that, "until the application [for post-conviction or other collateral review] has

achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures, by definition,

it remains 'pending.' " Carey, 536 U.S, 214 at 220. To do so, the Court looked to the

definition of "pending" as "in continuance" or "not yet decided." Id. at 219 (quoting

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1669 (1993)). 

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Respondents assert that the thirty days following the denial of Petitioner’s

petition for review to the court of appeals, the time during which Petitioner could have,

but did not, seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court, is not tolled, because there is

no longer any action “pending” in the state courts. Respondents cite Bunney v.

Mitchell, 241 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (Bunney I) in support of this argument. 

In Bunney I, the Ninth Circuit held that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the statute of

limitations for the 90-day period following the denial of a state-court petition because

a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court is not State post-conviction

review or other State collateral review. Id. at 1156. Although the Ninth Circuit did

note, as Respondents assert, that Congress did not include anything comparable to the

phrase found in § 2244(d)(1) “or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” in

the subsection that applies to state post-conviction petitions, the Ninth Circuit explicitly

limited this holding to the period of time during which Petitioner could have sought

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court

has since confirmed that a petition is not pending while a Petitioner is seeking further

federal review of an application for state court relief. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.

327 (2007) (emphasis added). 

The opinion in Bunney I, however, was withdrawn when the Ninth Circuit

expressed its uncertainty over when a summary denial of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus before the California Supreme Court becomes final. The court noted that there

were two plausible ways to read the rules at issue in that case: Rule 24(a), in which a

decision of any kind becomes final 30 days after filing and Rule 27(a), in which the

California Supreme Court may grant a rehearing after its own decision in any cause,

respectively. The Ninth Circuit noted that Rule 24(a) could be read by itself and

literally, resulting in a decision of any kind becoming final 30 days after filing.

Alternatively, the two rules could be read together and construed as not encompassing

a summary denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because a summary denial

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3 Conversely, section 2244(d)(1)(A), by virtue of inclusion of the words

“by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review” makes it clear that finality is to be determined by

reference to a uniform federal rule. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d 1069,1074

(2007) (citing Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 531 (2003)).

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would not encompass the determination of a “cause.” Thus, the specific interpretations

of the state rules at issue were directly determinative to the Ninth Circuit’s

determination to withdraw its opinion in Bunney I. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit

requested that the Supreme Court of California accept certification and resolve the

question. Bunney v. Mitchell, 249 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001) (Bunney II). The

California Supreme Court declined, and the Ninth Circuit resolved the issue by relying

on its own interpretation of Rule 24(a) and state decisions in determining that the denial

of the petitioner’s state-court habeas petition was not final for 30 days, and found the

federal petition in that case timely. Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001).

 The facts in Bunney are distinguishable from the facts of this case, however, as they

rely on a different set of state procedural rules. Thus, contrary to Respondent’s

assertion, the holding in Bunney is inapplicable to this case, except to the extent it

reinforces the conclusion that a federal court should look to the rules of the state to

determine when a state decision on a petition is “final” to determine when the petition

is still pending under § 2244(d)(2).3

 Although the Ninth Circuit has addressed finality

issues similar to the one before this Court, it has not decided the issue in a case where

it has been fully argued and considered in a factual and procedural posture equivalent

to the present case. 

In Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2001), the issue was whether

the petitioner's judgment became final at the time the Washington Court of Appeals

denied his motion to modify the commissioner's ruling, or upon issuance of the

mandate. Id. at 896. The petitioner argued that the one-year limitations period did not

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begin to run until the mandate had issued. Id. at 897. Relying on Washington

procedural rules, the Ninth Circuit held that the Washington appellate court's denial of

Wixom's motion to modify the judgment, and not the mandate, concluded review. Id.

at 897-98. Washington state procedural rules provided that a "decision terminating

review" by the Washington appellate court "unconditionally conclude[d] direct review."

Id. at 898. The denial of a motion to modify the judgment was a "decision terminating

review" under Washington law. Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit determined that

because the decision, and not the mandate, concluded direct review under Washington

law, the decision commenced the one-year limitations period imposed by the AEDPA.

Id.

Wixom is clearly distinguishable from this case, as, in Arizona, there is no

equivalent to the Washington Rules that formed the basis for the Wixom decision.

There is no similar Arizona rule stating when an appellate case ends. 

In another distinguishable case, the Ninth Circuit court in Hemmerle was faced

with the dilemma of determining when, under § 2244(d)(2), a petition for postconviction relief was finally “determined”and the petitioner’s state post-conviction

proceedings became final. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007).

The petitioner proffered an argument that a letter issued after the Supreme Court’s

denial of review from the clerk of the court of appeals, notably not a mandate, but

instead a letter which facilitated the performance of a ministerial function of returning

the record to the trial court pursuant to Rule 32.9(h) was (1) a mandate, and (2) the date

on which the proceedings became final. Id. at 1077. The Ninth Circuit rejected the

arguments, noting that Rule 32.9(h) states that “[w]hen the matter is determined, the

clerk of the appellate court shall return the record to the appropriate trial court for

retention according to law” and thus, the letter was not a mandate, rather, something

that occurs “when the matter is determined’ and that “the matter was determined by the

Arizona Supreme Court on [the date] when it denied review” because there was

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4 Under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[i]f there has been no

motion for reconsideration and no petition for review filed, the clerk of

the Court of Appeals shall issue the mandate at the expiration of the

time for the filing of such motion or petition." Ariz. R. Crim. P.

31.23(a)(l).

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“nothing left for it do” and thus “nothing remained ‘pending’ for purposes of §

2244(d)(2).” Id. at 1077. This case is factually distinct from Hemmerle. Unlike the

so-called “mandate” in Hemmerle, the mandate issued in the present case was a

mandate issued commanding the trial court that such proceedings be had in the case as

required to comply with the memorandum decision of the court of appeals. (Answer,

Ex. F.) The Ninth Circuit in Hemmerle did not have an actual mandate before it,

specifically finding that the letter referred to by petitioner as a “mandate” was “not

equivalent to the issuance of the mandate.” Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1077. The Ninth

Circuit in Hemmerle specifically acknowledged that there was no requirement that the

appeals court wait a certain amount of time before sending the record back, that the

ministerial function was to be performed, pursuant to Rule 32.9(h) only after the

“matter is determined.” Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hemmerle, that the

matter was “determined” by the Arizona Supreme Court on the date it denied review

did not settle the issue which is squarely before this Court: Under Arizona law, does a

petition for post-conviction relief remain pending, for purposes of statutory tolling

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), until the date the appellate court issues its decision, or

the date the court issues its mandate? 

Under Arizona law, appellate review in a criminal case is not final until the

mandate has issued.4

 Arizona courts have expressly stated that a judgment is not final

until the mandate has issued. "The decision of the appellate court does not become final

until the order (or mandate) is filed." State v. Ward, 120 Ariz. 413, 415 (1978); see also

Borrow v. El Dorado Lodge, Inc., 75 Ariz. 218, 220 (1953) (stating appellate court's

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judgment becomes effective on "the date of the issuance of the mandate"); State v.

Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. 158, 159 n.2 (App. 2001) ("A conviction becomes final upon the

issuance of the mandate affirming the conviction on direct appeal and the expiration of

the time for seeking certiorari in the United States Supreme Court."); State v. Dalglish,

183 Ariz. 188, 190 (App. 1995) ("We conclude that Petitioner's case was final on ... the

date the Arizona Supreme court issued its mandate."); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432,

432-444 (App. 1995) ("It is true that, in cases where there is an appeal pending, the

final deadline [to file for post-conviction relief] will be unknown until the appeal is

resolved and the mandate has issued."); Owen v. Shores, 537 P.2d 978,981 (Ariz. App.

1975) ("There was still the necessity for issuance of the Court's mandate, and for the

trial court to take the necessary action to enforce the mandate...."); State v. Febles, 210

Ariz. 589, 592 (App. 2005)(Conviction became final on date the court issued the

mandate after time for further review expired.).

Thus, looking to Arizona law, as the previously discussed cases direct this Court

to do, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.23(a) provides that, "[i]f there has been

no motion for reconsideration and no petition for review filed, the clerk of the Court of

Appeals shall issue the mandate at the expiration of the time for filing such motion or

petition." Thus, Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition was pending, as the Supreme Court has

defined that term in Carey, until it reached final resolution upon issuance of the court

of appeals mandate on November 30, 2000. Accordingly, the Petition, filed on

November 28, 2001, is timely. 

3. Equitable Tolling

Alternatively, Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling under these

circumstances. 

Respondents note that the Supreme Court has not decided whether equitable

tolling applies under the AEDPA, citing Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085

(2007) and Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005), and do not concede that

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it does. (Answer, at 7.) The Ninth Circuit has held that 2244(d) allows for equitable

tolling. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008). A petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations if he can show: " '(1) that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way' and prevented timely filing." Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007)

(citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). "Equitable tolling is typically

granted when litigants are unable to file timely petitions as a result of external

circumstances beyond their direct control." Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055. "Equitable tolling

is typically denied in cases where a litigant's own mistake clearly contributed to his

predicament." Id.

Respondents argue that the correct standard to determine the presence of an

“extraordinary circumstance” can be found in Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th

Cir. 2002) (Extraordinary circumstances are those circumstances “beyond a prisoner’s

control [which] make it impossible to file a petition on time.”)(citations omitted). The

Ninth Circuit in Harris noted that since the Supreme Court had decided Pace, the Ninth

Circuit had not yet settled on a standard of application. Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055 (citing

for comparison Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.2006) and Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir.2006). The court noted that the only case to

address the issue noted the possibility that Pace had “lowered the bar somewhat”

compared with the previous standard. Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055, citing

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (2005)). Harris did not

decide whether a substantive difference existed between the two standards because the

Ninth Circuit granted equitable tolling based on the petitioner’s reliance in good faith

on then-binding circuit precedent in making a tactical decision to delay filing a federal

habeas decision, even though Harris could have filed a timely habeas petition. Harris,

515 F.3d at 1055. 

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a. Diligence

Petitioner argues that she diligently pursued her rights, expeditiously exhausting

state remedies, and procuring funding for counsel to pursue federal remedies. (Reply,

at 13.) After present counsel was retained, counsel avows that he diligently located and

obtained records from several different attorneys, reviewed extensive volumes of

records, viewed evidence located both in court and at the police department, and

independently investigated and prepared the necessary briefs for filing the habeas

corpus petition in this in this case. (Reply, at 13, Exhibits to Reply, Ex. B.) 

There is no question that Petitioner acted diligently in this matter. 

b. Extraordinary Circumstances

As discussed above, federal courts are to look to state law in order to determine

whether a state petition for post-conviction relief is still “pending” for purposes of

tolling under § 2244(d)(2). Neither case in effect at the time Petitioner filed her petition

for post conviction relief in state court, Bunney and Wixom, addressed the use of the

date of the issuance of an appellate court mandate under Arizona law. 

The cases cited by Petitioner establish conclusively that, under Arizona law, a

petition for post-conviction relief is pending in Arizona state courts until the date the

reviewing court issues its mandate. See Barrow, 75 Ariz. at 220; Lindus v. Northern

Insurance Company of New York, 103 Ariz. 160, 162 (1968) (en banc) ("Where the

interests of justice outweigh the interest in bringing litigation to an end the court should

recall the mandate."); Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. at 159 n.2; Dalglish, 183 Ariz. at 190;

Jones, 182 Ariz. at 432-444; and Owen, 537 P.2d at 981. 

This was not a miscalculation of the deadline, or negligence on behalf of

counsel, or simple inexcusable oversight. (See Reply, Exhibit B.) Counsel’s

calculation demonstrates good-faith reliance on existing precedent and constitutes

“extraordinary circumstances” under Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054. Accordingly, Petitioner

having demonstrated diligence and extraordinary circumstances, the Magistrate Judge

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finds that the time between the court of appeals decision on October 17, 2000, and the

issuance of the mandate on November 30, 2000, is equitably tolled, and thus, the

Petition is timely. 

B. Ground One

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s exclusion of vital defense witnesses who

would have testified to the decedent’s prior acts of violence toward women and

especially prostitutes, under circumstances similar to those in the present case, was

contrary to clearly established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court

and denied Gina Celaya’s rights to due process, a fair trial and to present a defense,

violating the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, with

substantial and injurious effect. (Petition, at 5.) 

1. Precluded testimony

Petitioner asserts that testimony from the following three witnesses was

erroneously precluded by the trial court, and that this issue was raised throughout the

Arizona appellate system. 

a. Jacquelin Carranza

Jacquelin (“Jackie”) Carranza (aka Christie Dolan) was interviewed by the

defense and the police prior to Petitioner’s trial. (Appendix, Ex. H, I.) Ms. Carranza,

a prostitute, recognized a photograph of the victim on television as a “date” of hers.

(Appendix, Ex. H, at 3.) She had known the victim since 1988, but had most recently

seen him in December, 1992. (Id.) Ms. Carranza stated that the first time she was with

the victim, he drove her to an area “far out by the airport,” and “down a dirt road ...like

a dump,” abused her verbally and physically, and “scared the hell” out of her.

(Appendix, Ex. H., at 4, 8.) Ms. Carranza remembered that, during her most recent

encounter with the victim, he was wearing a baseball cap, and driving a small light blue

or gray pickup truck. (Appendix, Ex. I, at 15.) Ms. Carranza also stated that the victim

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had told her about his work and his family - that he was married with two grown

children, and worked in construction or the mines. (Id. at 23-26.) 

b. Teresa Larrivas

Teresa Larrivas, a former prostitute, recognized the victim’s photograph from

the news and was interviewed by the Tucson Police Department prior to Petitioner’s

trial. (Appendix, Ex. J.) Ms. Larrivas recalled encountering the victim approximately

six years before the interview. (Id. at 5.) Ms. Larrivas said that the victim was

Hispanic, with short hair and a mustache, and kind of heavy, drove a blue truck, with

a camper on it, and always used to wear a baseball cap. (Id. at 8, 12.) Ms. Larrivas was

certain of her identification, stating “I know it was him.” (Id. at 13.) Ms. Larrivas

remembered being picked up by the victim and being driven out of South Tucson to a

place that was “just all desert.” (Id. at 10, 14.) The victim informed Ms. Larrivas that

he would not be paying her, and told her to get off the truck. (Id. at 15-17.) The victim

grabbed Ms. Larrivas and took her to the back of the camper and raped her while she

pleaded with him and struggled and told him “no.” (Id. at 17-18.) 

c. Francis Czybora

Ms. Czybora, who had been a bartender at Ralph's Tavern, came forward after

the trial had started and testified during a proffer. Ms. Czybora testified out of the

presence of the jury that she had known the victim for 15-18 years, as a daily customer

at Ralph’s Tavern. (Appendix, Ex. K, RT 9/27/94, 210-211). Ms. Czybora knew him

as a man who “liked to fight and he was very abusive to the other patrons” in the bar.

(Id. at 214.) Ms. Czybora knew that prostitutes that went with him “come back beat up”

and personally witnessed the victim slam a girl against the wall when she wouldn’t go

with him. (Id. at 215.) Ms. Czybora knew of several prostitutes from her work at the

bar, and was told that the victim “liked to use his fist on them.” (Id. at 217.) She told

of one occasion in which the victim was “after” a 14 year-old girl who was waiting for

her mother in the tavern. (Id. at 223.) Ms. Czybora testified that when she warned him

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5 ROA refers to the Clerk’s Record in the matter of State v.

Celaya, CR-41554. The State electronically filed the ROA in

this Court’s Document Numbers 52 and 53, and, because the

ROA does not appear to be consecutively Bates stamped

throughout, the Court will refer to this Court’s docket number,

part numbers and page numbers for reference to these

documents.

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of the trouble he could get into with a 14 year-old he said, “Well, if they bleed, they can

get stuck.” (Id.) 

2. Trial Court’s rulings

a. Jackie Carranza

The State moved to preclude any evidence of alleged violent tendencies of the

victim and that he allegedly frequented prostitutes, specifically the testimony of Jackie

Dolan-Carranza and Victor Manuel. ("ROA", Doc. No. 52, Part 3, at 4.)5

 The defense

argued that this information was relevant to self-defense under Ariz.R. Evid. 404(b) as

to Trinidad Lopez's identity, and his state of mind, his intent, and his common plan and

scheme to force sex with women he picked up on the streets, including Gina Celaya,

after driving them to a secluded desert area near the dump. (Id., Part 3, at 40-45; RT

5/10/94, 26-27.) The trial court granted the State’s Motion to Preclude Witnesses

Jackie Carranza and Victor Manuel. (Id., Part 9, at 4.) The trial court found Ms.

Carranza’s testimony was too speculative, and any prejudicial effect would have

outweighed any probative value. (Id., Part 9, at 38; Part 48, R.T. 6/10/94, at 2-3, 8.) 

 The trial court made the same finding as to Victor Manuel. (Id., Part 9, at 38.) 

b. Teresa Larrivas

The trial court initially ruled that Ms. Larrivas' testimony was relevant and

admissible, (ROA, Part 9, at 37; R.T. 6/10/94, at), but reversed its ruling on

admissibility just two days before trial and precluded the testimony on the grounds that

Gina Celaya did not know of the acts before the shooting. (ROA, Part 15, at 1.) The

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trial court granted the State’s motion to preclude testimony of Teresa Larrivas, after

reviewing the statements provided by Ms. Larrivas, and found that “where self-defense

is asserted, as here, then the defendant charged with homicide may be permitted to

introduce evidence of specific acts of violence by a deceased only when those acts were

personally observed by the defendant or made known to him (her) prior to the

homicide.” (Id., Part 15, at 1-2.) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The trial

court also held that Ms. Larrivas would not be testifying as to any general character

traits of the victim, nor that the unassociated incident eight years ago constituted a

“habit”. (Id.) 

c. Francis Czybora

The court precluded Ms. Czybora’s testimony because it was unsure she was

talking about the same person and because the information was from about 7 or 8 years

before Mr. Lopez’ death. (RT 9/27/94 at 233-34.) 

3. Appeal

This Court reviews the Arizona Court of Appeals opinion as the last reasoned

state court opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04 (1991). The Arizona Court of Appeals

ruled that the trial court properly excluded the testimony of Ms. Carranza and Ms.

Larrivas under Rules 404(a)(2) and 405; that character could only be proved by

reputation or opinion evidence, and that the trial court did not err by excluding evidence

of these two instances of violent behavior. (Answer, Ex. A, at 4.) Further, the court

was unpersuaded by the argument that the evidence was not character evidence but

proof of a common scheme or plan to assault prostitutes. (Id.) The court of appeals

also found the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 403 by excluding

Ms. Czybora’s testimony, offered mid-trial, because the reputation was temporally

remote, and the probative value of the evidence was marginal, and would require an

expenditure of time to rebut the evidence. (Id.) The court of appeals denied a motion

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to reconsider, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review. (Appendix,

Ex. B.) 

4. Analysis

Respondents argue that review by this Court is limited to a determination of

whether the admission or exclusion of the evidence in question rendered the trial so

fundamentally unfair so as to violate the defendant’s due process rights, and that this

Court has no authority to review error in the trial court’s application of Arizona Statutes

and the Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Answer, p. 13.) 

Respondents are correct in their assertion that a state prisoner is not entitled to

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 unless she is held in custody in violation of the

Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Eagle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);

28 U.S.C. § 2254. “Clearly established federal law holds that ‘federal habeas corpus

relief does not lie for errors of state law,” Lewis v. Jeffery, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990),

and that ‘it is not in the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions,’ Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)).”

See also Mammal v. Van de Camp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). A state trial

court’s admission of evidence under state evidentiary law will form the basis for federal

habeas relief only where the evidentiary ruling “so fatally infected the proceedings as

to render them fundamentally unfair” in violation of the petitioner’s due process rights.

Mammal, 926 F.2d at 919. This means that a state prisoner challenging the correctness

of state evidentiary rulings has alleged no deprivation of federal rights. Gutierrez v.

Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Eagle, 456 U.S. at 118-19.)

Petitioner, however, asserts that the citation to state evidentiary law is necessary

because it is well established that a person exercising the right to present witnesses in

her own defense “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence

designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and

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innocence.” (Reply, at 23)(Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973);

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth

Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity

to present a complete defense.’ ” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (internal citations omitted)

(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). A defendant’s right to

present a defense stems both from the right to due process provided by the Fourteenth

Amendment, see Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, and from the right “to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” provided by the Sixth Amendment, see

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (explaining that the right to compulsory

process would be meaningless if the defendant lacked the right to use the witnesses

whose presence he compelled). 

That right, however, is limited. “In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is

required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence

designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and

innocence.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. “[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad

latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal

trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they

are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ”

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483

U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). Although the Supreme Court has indicated its approval of “wellestablished rules of evidence [that] permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its

probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury,” see Holmes v. South Carolina,

547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006), “[i]n these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly

affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, [evidentiary rules] may not be

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applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. As

the Ninth Circuit has explained, “the presence or absence of a state law violation is

largely beside the point,” the issue is whether the state proceedings satisfy due process.

Mammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20. 

The United States Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions that

violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,

352 (1990). The Supreme Court has “found the exclusion of evidence to be

unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a

weighty interest of the accused.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. On habeas review, the

question is whether the court’s refusal to admit the evidence rendered Petitioner’s trial

fundamentally unfair. Jones v. Schriro, 2008 WL 444619 (2008) (citing Chambers, 410

U.S. at 302-303). Petitioner argued to the court of appeals that the “trial court’s rulings

precluding evidence offered in support of Gina Celaya’s self-defense and crime

prevention defense violated her constitutional right to a fair trial, compulsory process,

and her right to present a defense to the first-degree murder[] charges she faced” and

cited relevant Supreme Court case law. Reply, Ex. G, at 3031, 39, 42. The court of

appeals, however, did not address Petitioner’s constitutional claim. Answer, Ex. B.

Accordingly, the claim is reviewed de novo, because in this circumstance “there is no

state court decision on [the] issue to which to accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at

1167; see also Menendez, 422 F.3d at 1025-26; and Nulph, 333 F.3d at 1056-57.

Petitioner’s defense was summarized in her response to the State’s motion to

preclude impermissible character evidence:

1) [Petitioner] was walking on South Sixth Avenue; 2) the decedent

stopped and offered to give her a ride; 3) due to the area of town she was

in, the fact it was late at night, she agreed to take a ride; 4) the decedent

did not take Gina home as promised, but took her to a wildcat dump in

the desert; 5) the decedent asserted that Gina was a prostitute, and upon

learning she was not, still insisted on culminating a sex act; 6) the

decedent frightened Gina, put her in fear of serious physical injury and

fear for her life; 7) Gina fired a gun, not knowing where she had hit the

man, and only learned later that he died. 

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The prosecution’s theory of the case was similarly summarized:

a) Gina was walking down Sixth Avenue and passed herself off as

a prostitute, and thereby got a ride from the decedent - or - Gina was

walking down South Sixth Avenue and was kindly given a ride by the

decedent; b) after Gina entered the vehicle she lured the decedent to the

wildcat dump in the desert with promise of a sex act - or - she forced the

decedent to go to the wildcat dump at the end of a gun; c) upon reaching

the wildcat dump Gina shot and killed the decedent so as to take his

vehicle (a so-called truck jacking). 

Petitioner argued the trial court’s preclusion of testimony by the three witnesses

deprived the jury of background information about Mr. Lopez - that on two prior

occasions the victim drove women he picked up as prostitutes to an isolated desert

location where he forcibly sexually attacked them, and that he had a reputation for

violence among prostitutes - that might have corroborated Gina Celaya’s account of the

events immediately preceding the shooting which was critical to her self-defense claim.

(Doc. No. 49, Ex. G - Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 32.) Petitioner asserted in her

appellate brief that the testimony would have corroborated many aspects of her account

of the events leading up to the shooting, especially since there were no eyewitnesses to

the confrontation in the desert, including: 1) that the victim voluntarily offered her a

ride; 2) that through his own initiative, he drove to the isolated desert setting where he

was found; 3) that he did so with the intent to engage in sexual relations with her; and

4) that he was sexually assaultive and abusive with her when they arrived. (Doc. No.

49, Ex. G, at 36-38.) 

The State argued that evidence of this nature would only have been admissible

if Petitioner had known of the decedent’s reputation for violence. (ROA, Doc. No. 52,

Part 3, at 7-9.) Despite the Petitioner’s repeated assertions that the evidence was not

being introduced as character evidence under 404(a) and 405, the evidentiary criteria

for the introduction of character evidence became the central focus of the State’s

argument, and the State court’s decision to reverse its earlier finding that Ms. Larrivas’

testimony was relevant and admissible, and later to affirm that decision. Little

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consideration was given to Petitioner’s argument that the evidence was presented under

404(b) outside of the appellate court’s cursory dismissal of this argument. 

Respondents assert that the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the victim’s

character did not undermine the fundamental fairness of Petitioner’s trial because

“nothing in the record suggests that Petitioner knew about those alleged past acts, and

Petitioner does not contend otherwise.” (Answer, at 14.) As Petitioner asserted in her

appellate brief, she was not attempting to have specific acts evidence admitted to prove

that the victim acted in conformity therewith, she was attempting, under Rule 404(b)

to have other act evidence admitted to prove what was perhaps referred to inartfully, as

the victims “modus operandi” or as evidence of the victim’s design, plan and intent.

Under Rule 404(b), while specific act evidence is not admissible to prove the character

of a person to show action in conformity with that character, it may be admissible for

other purposes “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent ...” The list of reasons is

not exclusive. State v. Jeffery, 135 Ariz. 404, 417 (1983). 

While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that a trial was conducted in

a procedurally fair manner, and it is possible to have a fair trial even when state

standards are violated, the Ninth Circuit recognizes the converse view - that state

procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that do not comport with

fundamental fairness. Mammal, 926 F.2d at 919. 

The state courts erred by failing to fully consider the admission of specific act

evidence under Rule 404(b) (the testimony of Ms. Larrivas and Ms. Carranza) for the

purpose of corroborating Petitioner’s version of events, and to show the victim’s motive

and intent to sexually assault Petitioner in order to ensure a fundamentally fair trial.

The State opened the door to such evidence by attacking Petitioner’s credibility and by

arguing that Petitioner was a family man who was not intending to sexually assault

Petitioner, but was merely giving her a ride home.

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The State Courts did not identify or apply clearly established Supreme Court law

guaranteeing the right to present a defense. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302;

Washington, 388 U.S. at 19; Crane, 476 U.S. at 683. The State Courts relied instead

on the mechanistic application of evidentiary rules to find that the trial court properly

excluded the witnesses. 

“Even relevant and reliable evidence can be excluded when the state interest is

strong,” and then “only the exclusion of critical, reliable and highly probative evidence

will violate due process.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983).

As the state interest weakens, less significant evidence is protected. In light of this

record, Respondents have identified no state interests that would compel this Court to

exclude the evidence at issue. 

The trial court’s concerns, that it would take time to rebut the evidence and that

the evidence was temporally remote, and the appellate court’s concern with the

reliability of Ms. Czybora’s identification, are minor, particularly since the jury heard

evidence that the decedent was a decent “grand-fatherly person” and that the prior bad

acts of Petitioner were presented through the testimony of Magdalena Laguna and

Jessica Vega. Principles of basic fairness and due process require that Petitioner be

allowed to present evidence that would corroborate her key theory of the defense, that

the decedent had attacked Petitioner before she pulled the gun in self defense. It is in

cases like this that a “collateral issue, such as credibility, may be important and yet

nonetheless must sometimes be subordinated to the need of the factfinder to hear

relevant evidence.” Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 v. 778, 788 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.

concurring). 

Additionally, the introduction of the testimony of the three witnesses was not

presented in a vacuum. Although the preclusion of three other witnesses is not at issue

in this habeas, the facts presented by the pretrial proceedings are relevant to the trial

court's decision to preclude the witnesses at issue, and only bolster the relevance and

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reliability of the proffered testimony. The defense apparently interviewed two sisters,

Lois Garcia and Pauline Nassewtewa. They claimed to have known Mr. Lopez from the

Hideout bar and told of his violent and abusive acts toward women. (ROA, Part 48, RT

6/10/94, at 11-12.) The trial court noted its intention to preclude these witnesses for the

same reasons the court was applying as to Ms. Carranza, (id. at 12), but the record

seems to indicate that the defense was ultimately unable to produce them for timely

interviews or trial, despite a subpoena that is in the record. (ROA, Part 46, RT 6/3/94

at 17; Part 9, at 61-62.)

Similarly, the defense found and interviewed a former prostitute named Tracy

Stewart. She stated that Mr. Lopez took her out to a desert area near a dump and had

sex with her. Her complaints were that he was too cheap, and took too long to complete

the sex act. The transcript of her interview is contained in the Appendix to the original

Memorandum filed on November 28, 2001 as Exhibit F. Again, however, the record

contains hints that the defense was having trouble locating her before trial (ROA, Part

48, RT 6/10/94 at 14) and she was ultimately not called as a defense witness despite the

lack of a formal ruling on the state's motion to preclude her.

A third witness in this category was Victor Manuel. He gave the defense a

statement in which he said that Mr. Lopez had aggressively tried to "pick him up" for

a "ride home" as he was walking on South Sixth Avenue at night. (Appendix, Ex. G.)

Mr. Manuel stated that he declined the offer but Mr. Lopez kept circling back until Mr.

Manuel had to hide behind a trash can near a restaurant. (Id., at 4.) The trial court

ultimately precluded testimony from Mr. Manuel because he failed to appear for an

interview by the State. (RT 6/3/94 at 16.) The defense did not appeal any of the court's

rulings regarding Lois Garcia, Pauline Nassewtewa, Jackie Stewart or Victor Manuel.

The testimony of the precluded witnesses at issue in this habeas was both

consistent with the testimony of each of the other two witnesses, and, additionally,

consistent with the testimony of these four additional witnesses. The exclusion of this

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relevant and vital testimony was fundamentally unfair, particularly as the strength of

testimony is balanced against the State’s very minor interests in excluding the

testimony. 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether

the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)

(holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the

error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

Evaluating the excluded testimony in the context of the entire record, the Court

finds that its exclusion had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict in

Petitioner’s case. The specific facts Petitioner provided to Detective Thompson about

the victim’s conduct immediately after the shooting were strikingly similar in many

respects to the proffered evidence, which Petitioner did not know about when she made

the statements, and would have corroborated her version of events. There was no other

witness to the shooting, and the State contested the credibility of the Petitioner’s

statements, suggesting the accusation of a sexual assault was made up in response to the

detective’s suggestion. The effect of precluding these witnesses was especially potent

in light of the presentation of Petitioner’s own prior bad acts through the witness

Magdalena “Baby” Laguna, and Jessica Vega. The trial court described the evidence

against Petitioner as “overwhelming,” consisting of Petitioner’s own friends and

acquaintances testifying that Petitioner herself told them that she killed the victim in

order to steal his truck. The trial court summarized the trial testimony as follows:

Sonya Georgina Leyva (Age 18 on date of trial) - testified that she

overheard Gina and Baby Laguna talking about Gina killing a guy. She

overheard them say that Gina stole the decedent’s truck. (9/22/4 Trial

Transcript, p.49). Gina asked her if she wanted to go to California with

them in the truck. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p.35).

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April Ornelas (age 15 on date of trial) - Gina told her she shot the man

at Valencia, near the airport; Gina shot the man in order to get his car;

(9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶ 78-80). She observed Gina with a gun the

day after the shooting loading the gun and handing it to Baby Laguna

who fired at pursuers. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p.74).

Rebecca Antone - (Age 15 on date of trial) - Gina’s good friend. Gina

called her numbers of times the day after the murder to tell her “she had

a truck” and to invite Rebecca to go “cruising around” town with Gina in

the truck. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p.92-92). Gina told Rebecca that she

had stolen the truck. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p.95). Gina specifically

told Rebecca that she shot the owner of the truck on Valencia by the

airport. This conversation occurred in Rebecca Antone’s room in the

presence of the other girls. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p.96). She testified

that she saw Gina carrying a gun that day in a blue pouch (9/24/94 Trial

Transcript, p.98).

Gloria Espinosa - (age 16 on date of trial) - Gina and Baby pull up in the

truck next to Gloria and April while they’re walking. Gina invites them

to go cruising in the truck. They were planning on going to California.

(9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶. 113-114). She saw Gina with the gun.

(9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶. 117-119). She testified as follows:

“Well, when we got to Rebecca’s house and we had

crashed, April had asked Gina where she got the truck

from, and Gina told her that she killed Trinidad and got the

truck from him.” (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p.119 Lines 6-

9). Gina said she killed the man because she wanted the

truck. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p. 120). 

Baby Laguna - (age 16 on date of trial) - She testified that she

and Gina had previously stolen a car and gone to California. (9/24/94

Trial Transcript, ¶. 253-254). Just prior to the murder, she testified that

Gina came to her home with a gun, asked Baby to help her unstick the

gun, and asked Baby to go with her because she wanted to get a car.

(9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶. 255-259). Baby told Gina she was sick and

could not go with Gina. Baby’s mother told Gina to leave. (9/24/94

Trial Transcript, p.259). The next day, Gina showed up at Baby’s house

with the truck. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, p. 262). When she asked Gina

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6 Transcripts of the trial in its entirety were not submitted to this

Court with the ROA. This characterization of trial testimony is

obtained from the trial court’s minute entry denying Petitioner’s

First Rule 32 Petition. (Doc. No. 37, Ex. 8.). Having failed to

submit complete transcripts along with their supporting

memorandum, either party may file objections to this Court’s

factual summarization of the testimony, along with supporting

documentation, to be included in the objection or response filed

to this Report and Recommendation. 

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whose truck it was, Gina told her she shot some guy. (9/24/94 Trial

Transcript, p. 264). She testified that Gina told her that she pretended

that she was a prostitute and the guy picked her up and they went over by

the desert. She testified that they were outside in the desert when she

shot the man. She testified that Gina drove by the area where she had

shot the man to show Baby. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶. 267-271). Gina

told Baby that she got nineteen dollars from the man. She said the man

begged her not to kill him. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶. 271-273). They

were planning to drive the truck to California or Bisbee. (9/24/94 Trial

Transcript, ¶. 19-20). While the above mentioned girls and Gina were at

Rebecca’s house, Gina tole the three girls and Baby “that she had shot

some man, and that they had better not say nothing.” She told them the

man she shot was the owner of the truck. She saw Gina with the handgun

in the blue bank bag. (9/24/94 Trial Transcript, ¶. 26-28). 

...

... With regard to her cross-examination of Baby Laguna, [defense

counsel] impeached Ms. Laguna with regard to her immunity, the fact

that she had committed numbers of crimes for which she was not being

prosecuted, that she had imagined and made up her testimony in order to

avoid getting into trouble, and impeached her with numerous prior

inconsistent statements. 

Exhibits to Second Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. 8, Minute Entry, October 24, 2003, p. 16-17.)6

Without the testimony of the three witnesses, there was very little reason for the

jury to believe Petitioner’s version of events. The testimony of those witnesses would

have drastically altered the juries perception of what happened the night Mr. Lopez was

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shot. There is no question that Petitioner admitted she shot the victim and took his

truck. If Petitioner had presented testimony that corroborated her version of events,

there is a strong chance the jury may have chosen to believe that while what happened

before and after the events which occurred in the desert may have been an exercise in

extremely poor judgment as well as a complete disregard for human life by Petitioner,

that Petitioner’s friends were lying, or Petitioner was lying when she told her friends

how she obtained the truck. 

The State Court’s denial of relief for the violations of Due Process, Compulsory

Process, the right to present evidence and the right to a fair trial rendered Petitioner’s

trial fundamentally unfair and was contrary to clearly established law and had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court grant relief as

to Ground One of the Petition. 

C. Ground Two

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s refusal to admit Petitioner’s tape recorded

statement after the State used it to impeach her was contrary to clearly established

federal law and violated her constitutional right to due process of law, fair trial, and to

present a defense, as she was entitled to introduce this evidence under Ariz. R.Evid.

106. 

1. Relevant facts

The relevant facts are taken from Petitioner’s memorandum, and are essentially

uncontested: 

Tucson Police Detective Thomson interrogated Gina Celaya following her arrest

at 4 a.m. on the morning of the day after the shooting. He obtained two brief taperecorded statements. (RT 9/14/94 at 5-41; State's Exhibits 163 and 164 copies of which

are included as Exhibits L (24 pages) and M (5 pages) in the Appendix to the original

Memorandum filed on November 28, 2001.) Gina Celaya was unaccompanied by an

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adult or an attorney when she gave those statements. (ROA, Part 54, RT 9/14/94 at 14.)

At first Gina denied knowledge of the shooting but after the detective asked her whether

the man had tried to harm her, and told her that this was her chance to say so, she

admitted that she had shot him after he attempted to sexually assault her. (Appendix,

Ex. L at 1-10.)

Before trial, the State obtained an order prohibiting the defense from introducing

the taped statements, which it characterized as self-serving hearsay. The State

stipulated that it would not introduce evidence of Gina Celaya's statements during its

case-in-chief. Although the prosecution did not introduce Gina Celaya's statements to

Detective Thomson in its case-in-chief, during cross-examination the prosecutor

extensively used portions of the taped statements to impeach Gina's direct testimony.

(ROA, Part 63, RT 9/27/94 at 169-189.) The usage of the taped statements was

wide-ranging and covered many topics including the following: the actions Miss Celaya

took when she reached the desert (id. at 169-171); whether she told Detective Thomson

that she shot the man because he laughed at her (id. at 172); whether she took the safety

off the gun before shooting (id at 171); whether Trinidad Lopez was coming at her

when she shot him (id. at 173); whether Detective Thomson was the first person she

told that Trinidad Lopez had tried to hurt her (id. at 175, 179); whether Miss Celaya

denied taking the truck during the initial portion of the statement (id. at 180); what she

told Detective Thomson about who owned the gun (id. at 185); whether Detective

Thomson told her that Baby said the man thought she was a prostitute (id. at 189); and

whether it was Gina's or the detective's decision to talk off-tape. (id. at 189) These

questions covered the crucial area of the events preceding and during the shooting. The

prosecutor's questions were culled from every portion of Miss Celaya's tape-recorded

statements.

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The cross-examination use of the tapes covered the issue of the origin of the selfdefense claim and whether Detective Thomson planted the idea of self-defense in Gina's

mind which she then fabricated.

Q. Okay. Now, when Detective Thomson said to you on Page

10 of your statement -- you want to make sure that you

remember what your answer was now -- Detective

Thomson said -- asking you if you killed him in

self-defense, and later on do you remember what you told

him at that point?

A. Yeah.

Q. What did you tell him?

A. I told him what he tried to do.

Q. No, that's not true. Read what it says there, your very first

answer.

A. Where I said I didn't kill nobody?

Q. You told him you didn't kill nobody?

A. Yeah.

Q. Later on in the court: "Judge, I shot him because he tried

to hurt me." I am giving you that opportunity right now.

What did you say? "Did this man hurt you." And what did

you say?

A. Yeah.

Q. Right. And that's the first time that you ever mention to

anyone that this man tried to hurt you in any way?

A. That's the first time, yes.

Id., RT 9/27/94, 183-184.

On redirect examination, defense counsel read a brief portion of one of Gina’s

answers during the interrogation into evidence, and elicited Gina’s testimony that she

had told Detective Thomson about the details of what had occurred in the desert and on

the drive out. (Id., RT 9/27/94 at 190-195). Then, near the close of the defense case,

the defense moved to play portions of the tape-recorded statements for the jury in order

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7 Again, this portion of the trial transcript is missing from the

ROA. This characterization of trial testimony is obtained from

Petitioner’s Second Amended Memorandum of Points and

Authorities to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No.

31.). Objections to this characterization of the record due to

failure to submit trial transcripts may be raised in objections to

this Report and Recommendation. 

- 40 -

to place Gina's statements in context following the impeachment that occurred during

cross-examination. (RT 9/28/94, 35.)7

 Defense counsel argued:

What happened in cross-examination after Ms. Celaya testified, the State

asked her a whole series of questions taken from one page and another

page, and attempted to impeach her, without the jury able to hear the

context in which they were played. And I think that in the interest of

fairness, I should be allowed to play a portion of the tape.

Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).

The prosecution objected on hearsay grounds to playing the tape. The trial court

denied without explanation the motion to play the tape of pages 10-24 of Ms. Celaya's

initial statement and ruled that the portion of the second statement would not be

admitted because the witness had been "adequately rehabilitated." (RT 9/28/94, 39-40.)

During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued, over defense objection,

that defense counsel could have put in the evidence of the statements if she had wanted

the jury to hear them. (RT 9/28/94,160.) The prosecutor argued to the jury that Miss

Celaya could have testified about "everything else" she said, or that the defense could

have called Detective Thomson to introduce the statements. (RT 9/28/94, 160.) The

court overruled defense objections. Id. The prosecutor argued to the jury that she was

"not obligated to put on the defendant's lies." Id.

2. Appeal

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to not allow defense

counsel to play sections of defendant’s taped statements to the jury. (Appendix, Ex. B.)

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The appellate court found Rule 106 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence inapplicable in

that context. Rule 106 provides:

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced

by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of

any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in

fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.

The Court of Appeals found that, by its terms, the rule applies only when proof

is made through introduction of a statement, and not through impeachment through

prior inconsistent statements. (Appendix, Ex. B., at 2-3.) In the context of

impeachment, the court found that the risk of misleading the trier is avoided by the

ability of the witness to correct misperceptions by present testimony, rather than past

hearsay; and that this was in fact what defense counsel did on redirect. (Id., at 3.) 

The appellate court found that, as to Petitioner’s second argument, that the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct in saying that the defense could have introduced

defendant’s prior statements, the state was responding, improperly, to defense counsel’s

arguments that the jury could infer from the failure of the state to introduce defendant’s

pretrial statements that they were adverse to the state. The appellate court found that

the state’s improper response to the improper arguments was harmless because it “at

best neutralized an impermissible inference sought to be exploited by the defense.”

(Id.) 

3. Analysis

This court will not review the court of appeals' determination that the rule of

completeness was inapplicable in this situation, since that is a question of Arizona

evidence law. Instead, this court must again determine if the evidentiary ruling resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. The

relevant Supreme Court precedents are those discussed above. An evidentiary ruling

would be unconstitutional if it "so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due

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process of law." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75. Moreover, such rules do not abridge an

accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not "arbitrary" or

"disproportionate to the purposes [the rule is] designed to serve." United States v.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).

The Arizona Court of Appeals considered the application and purpose of the rule

and explained:

The rule exists to prevent misleading the trier by introducing only a

portion of a statement when other parts of the statement indicate that the

portion sought to be introduced distorts the meaning intended. By its

terms it applies only when proof is made through introduction of a

statement. It ought not apply to impeachment through prior inconsistent

statements. The risk of misleading the trier is avoided by the ability of

the witness to explain her prior statements, why she made them, and what

she meant. Distortion, in short, is prevented by the opportunity to correct

misperceptions by present testimony rather than past hearsay. ... “In

fairness” therefore, the consistencies need not be considered

contemporaneously with the inconsistencies. 

(Appendix, Ex. B.)

Petitioner asserts that, during rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor “made

matters even worse,” misleading the jury by arguing that defense counsel could have

put in the evidence of the statements if she had wanted the jury to hear them. The court

overruled defense objections. The appellate court considered the argument that the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct, while initially plausible, ultimately unavailing

because of the context in which the statement was made. (Id.) 

Although the Petitioner cites several Supreme Court cases in her Petition, it

cannot be said, under the AEDPA, that there is "clearly established" Supreme Court

precedent addressing the issue before this Court. This Court has found no case wherein

the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the “rule of completeness” nor has

the Supreme Court extended the protections of the Due Process Clause, the Compulsory

Process Clause or the Confrontation clause to a trial court’s exclusion of a defendant’s

otherwise inadmissible statement to rehabilitate a defendant after impeachment. 

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In an analogous case however, the Supreme Court held that “an essential

component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. Crane v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 683, 690 (1986). In Crane, the Supreme Court found that the Kentucky courts

erred in foreclosing petitioner's efforts to introduce testimony about the environment

in which the police secured his confession. Id. at 691. The Court opined that evidence

about the manner in which a confession was obtained is often highly relevant to its

reliability and credibility and that such evidence was especially relevant in the rather

peculiar circumstances of this case, in which the Petitioner sought to paint a picture of

a young, uneducated boy who was kept against his will in a small, windowless room for

a protracted period of time until he confessed to every unsolved crime in the county,

including the one for which he stood convicted. Id. The Court reversed the conviction,

holding that the introduction of evidence of the physical circumstances that yielded the

confession was “all but indispensable to any chance of its succeeding” especially since

neither the state court nor the respondents had advanced any rational justification for

the wholesale exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory evidence. Id. 

Although this Court cannot extend the specific legal principal announced in

Crane to the facts of this case, this Court finds that the circumstances of the trial court’s

mechanistic application of Rule 106 to exclude Petitioner’s statements, presented out

of context by the State, although damaging to Petitioner’s case, would not, for reasons

cited by the appellate court, rise to the level of the Brecht “substantial and injurious”

standard. See 507 U.S. at 637. 

Upon review of the record in this case, the Magistrate Judge finds that the ruling

was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

as announced by the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court deny relief as to Ground Two of the Petition.

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D. Ground Three

Petitioner raises nine claims of ineffective assistance of trail counsel pursuant

to the sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). Respondents assert that these claims are barred from federal habeas review

because the state court found them precluded under state law. 

1. Relevant facts

On February 20, 2002, Petitioner filed her second petition for post-conviction

relief, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim, in the

alternative, of a change in the law. (Second Amended Petition, Supp. Ex. 1.) On

October 24, 2003, the trial court denied the petition with regard to all assertions of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding the claims precluded. (Id., Supp. Ex. 8,

at 13.) 

2. Appeal

In a memorandum decision filed August 22, 2006, the court of appeals granted

review, but denied relief. (Id., Supp. Ex. 14.) The court of appeals held that “the

decision by [Petitioner’s] first Rule 32 counsel not to assert any claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel in that proceeding constituted a waiver of those claims in

subsequent proceedings and that [Petitioner’s] personal knowledge and informed

consent were not necessary to effect the waiver.” (Id.) The appellate court explicitly

found that the acts and omissions by trial counsel that Petitioner was raising as an IAC

claim did not involve or affect any such basic or personal rights which the Constitution

guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial that would require a

knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the appellate court's decision with the

Arizona Supreme Court, urging the supreme court to find that the claims were not

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precluded unless they were knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived. (Id., Supp.

Ex. 15, at 7) The supreme court denied review on June 5, 2007. (Id., Supp Ex. 16.) 

3. Analysis

If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner attempted

to raise the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both "independent" and

"adequate"--review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801 ("When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching

the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal

court.") (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87- 88 (1977) and Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)). A state procedural default rule is "independent" if it

does not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith,

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). A state procedural default rule is "adequate" if it is "strictly

or regularly followed." Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting

Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-53 (1982))

Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural bar, but goes on to alternatively

address the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still barred from federal review. See

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989) ("[A] state court need not fear reaching

the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the

adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a

state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the state

court also relies on federal law.... In this way, a state court may reach a federal question

without sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.") (citations omitted);

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A state court's application of

a procedural rule is not undermined where, as here, the state court simultaneously

rejects the merits of the claim.") (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n. 10).

Petitioner asserts that the IAC claim is not procedurally barred in this Court

because the preclusion rule was unclear at the time it was supposedly broken. (Petition,

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at 31.) Petitioner asserts that the relevant time frame for consideration is the period

when first-PCR counsel supposedly “broke” the rule - somewhere between November

of 1994 and August of 1998. 

The rule of preclusion by waiver for ineffective assistance of counsel claims not

raised in previous Rule 32 proceedings existed both prior to and during the relevant

time period at issue. In State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 786 P.2d 948 (1990), in a second

post-conviction relief proceeding, the defendant raised, for the first time, ineffective

assistance of counsel at trial. Id. at 99-100. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the

issue was waived and the defendant was precluded from raising it. Id. at 100; see also

State v. Pac, 175 Ariz. 189, 190-91, 854 P.2d 1175, 1176-77 (App.1993) (finding issues

waived because they could have been raised in a prior post-conviction relief proceeding

or on direct appeal). In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court referred to this as “the usual

rule[] of preclusion.” Krone v. Hotham 181 Ariz. 364, 366 (1995). 

Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes an

independent state law ground, see Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860, and the Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly determined that Arizona regularly and consistently applies its preclusion

rules such that they are an adequate bar to federal review of a claim. See Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir.1998) (finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed

and adequate); Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir.1997) (same). 

Petitioner asserts that, had the rule been clear, the United States Supreme Court

would not have had to certify a question to the Arizona Supreme Court asking how the

rule worked, as it did in Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157 (2001). The certified question

posed to the Arizona Supreme Court, however, asked how the rule worked at the time

the state court had ruled on respondent’s claim - in 1995 - three years before the

relevant date in this case. See Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157 (2001). 

Petitioner concludes by stating that the comment to Rule 32.2(a), as it was

updated in 1996, “told practitioners (both judges and lawyers) that if trial errors were

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‘egregious’ enough they would not be precluded in successive PCR proceedings. The

resultant confusion interfered with a fair opportunity to seek relief on such claims in

state court.” See Petition, p. 36. This conclusion errs in both law and fact.

First, the comment to Rule 32.2 updated in 1996 reads in relevant part:

“[t]he pre-1992 version of Rule 32.2(a)(3) indicated that a defendant

must “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently” not raise an issue at trial,

on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding before the issue was

precluded. [citation omitted] While that is the correct standard of waiver

for some constitutional rights, it is not the correct standard for other trial

errors. Accordingly, some issues not raised at trial, on appeal, or in a

previous collateral proceeding may be deemed waived without

considering the defendant’s personal knowledge, unless such knowledge

is specifically required to waive the constitutional right involved. If an

asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must

show that the defendant “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently”

waived the claim. For most claims of trial error, the state may simply

show that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a

previous collateral proceeding, and that would be sufficient to show that

the defendant has waived the claim.

This comment to the Rule put attorneys on notice, even prior to Smith, that the

“knowing, voluntary and intelligent” standard of waiver was not the correct standard

for all trial errors. A review of State law as cited above indicates that courts had been

applying a preclusion by waiver through a failure to raise the claim in a prior petition

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and there is no reason to believe

that this rule or comment did anything more than reinforce the notion that if you failed

to raise an issue that was not “of sufficient constitutional magnitude” then the issue

would be deemed waived without consideration of the defendant’s personal knowledge.

Factually, it is not accurate to say that any “resultant confusion” caused by the

commentary interfered with Petitioner’s opportunity to seek relief on such claims in

state court. Petitioner’s counsel who represented her in her first PCR testified that she

chose not to raise issues of ineffectiveness because of their limited success

(Supplemental Ex. 7, at 135) and/or because she did not spot any of the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims raised in the second PCR. (Supplemental Ex. 7, at 137-

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139). Petitioner’s counsel discussed with Petitioner that she would not be raising any

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but acknowledged that had counsel been aware

of the facts that were developed at the second PCR hearing, she would have filed a Rule

32. (Ex. 7, at 138-140.) 

Finally, Petitioner urges this Court to consider that Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(c)

required the appointment of counsel for a first IAC claim in a second PCR case until

the rule was changed in the year 2000. The rule stated:

Upon the filing of a timely notice in a capital case, or the first notice in

a non-capital case, or the second or subsequent notice in a non-capital

case, which, for the first time, raises a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the presiding judge shall appoint counsel for the defendant

within 15 days if requested . . .

It does not necessarily follow from the pre-2000 version of Rule 32.4 that Arizona law

contemplated that IAC claims involving egregious trial error could be raised in a second

PCR case. A second or subsequent notice invoking ineffective assistance of counsel

may, or may not have been raising claims of trial error, for instance, the second PCR

may raise IAC claims as to appellate counsel or as an exception to the preclusionary

rule which would allow a notice of post conviction relief of right or notice of appeal

outside of the limitations period to be filed under Rule 32.2(b).

The court in Smith recognized what was required of a defendant, at the time

Petitioner filed her claim, to avoid preclusion of a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel: she must show a constitutional right is implicated, one that can only be waived

by a defendant personally. 202 Ariz. 446. The court noted some of the relatively few

rights that can be so characterized. Id., citing State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 22

(1998) (waiver of right to counsel); State v. Butrick, 113 Ariz. 563, 566 (1976) (waiver

of right to jury trial); State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333, ¶ 17 (App.1999) (right to

twelve-person jury); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (

"Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has

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been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal

defendant in order to preserve a fair trial."); cf. State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 215, 689

P.2d 153, 158 (1984) (although "certain basic decisions have come to belong to an

accused," such as "[t]he ultimate decisions on whether to plead guilty, whether to waive

jury trial, and whether to testify," "the power to decide questions of trial strategy and

tactics," including what witnesses to call at trial, "rests with counsel"). An alleged

violation of the general due process right of every defendant to a fair trial, without

more, does not save such claim from preclusion.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that the State court’s preclusionary

ruling is an independent and adequate procedural bar. Because the procedural bar is

adequate and independent, federal review of this claim is foreclosed unless Petitioner

can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The

Magistrate Judge finds no cause to excuse the procedural default. There was no

objective factor external to the defense which impeded Petitioner's efforts to comply

with the State's procedural rule, Petitioner merely failed to raise the issues in her first

Rule 32. Federal review of this claim is barred.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court DISMISS claims Two and Three

of Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

This Court further recommends that the District Court GRANT Petitioner’s

request for relief as to Ground One, and remand this case to the state court for a new

trial. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 01-0622-TUC-DCB.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2009.

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