Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-01070/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-01070-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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Case No.: 5:10-cv-01070-EJD

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PAGA EMPLOYEES

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MAY MOUA,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 

MACHINES CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:10-cv-01070-EJD 

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PAGA 

EMPLOYEES

Re: Dkt. Nos. 101, 102, 103, 109, 110, 122, 

123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 

135

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff May Moua brings this employment action against Defendants International 

Business Machines Corporation, Joseph Koenig and Venkatasubramiam Iyer (collectively, 

“IBM”) for several violations of the California Labor Code. In one of her causes of action, Moua 

asserts the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), California Labor Code § 2699, on behalf of 

a list of other “aggrieved employees” at IBM, who are otherwise known in this order as the 

“PAGA employees.” 

Presently before the court are 15 separate motions for summary judgment filed by IBM, 

each one addressing an individual PAGA employee. Plaintiff separately opposes the motions. As 

will be explained, IBM is entitled to summary judgment for most, but not all, of the PAGA 

employees. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment should be granted if “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

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The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion 

and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 

or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the issue is one on which the nonmoving party must bear the 

burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out an absence of evidence supporting 

the claim; it does not need to disprove its opponent’s claim. Id. at 325.

If the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party 

to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific materials in the record to show that there is a 

genuinely disputed fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A “genuine issue” 

for trial exists if the non-moving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary 

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

However, the mere suggestion that facts are in controversy, as well as conclusory or speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers, is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. 

(“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”); Thornhill Publ’g Co. 

v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Instead, the non-moving party must come 

forward with admissible evidence to satisfy the burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of 

material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine 

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). “But if the nonmoving party 

produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats 

the motion.” Id.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. PAGA

A PAGA representative action is a type of qui tam action. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los 

Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, (2014). Under PAGA, an “aggrieved employee” may bring a civil 

action against an employer “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former 

employees.” Cal. Lab.Code § 2699(a). “[A]ny provision of [the Labor Code] that provides for a 

civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency . . . 

may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee.” Id. 

PAGA also provides for the recovery of a civil penalty for any Labor Code provisions that do not 

themselves have an associated civil penalty. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f). “The civil penalties 

recovered on behalf of the state under . . . PAGA are distinct from the statutory damages to which 

employees may be entitled in their individual capacities.” Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 381. 

If the employee is successful, 75 percent of the penalties recovered go to the Labor and 

Workforce Development Agency, and the remaining 25 percent go to the aggrieved employees. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i). 

A representative plaintiff proceeding under PAGA must “prove Labor Code violations 

with respect to each and every individual on whose behalf plaintiff seeks to recover civil penalties 

under PAGA.” Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., LLC, No. C 08-05430 SI, 2009 WL 513496, at *4

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009)

B. Moua’s PAGA Cause of Action

According to the Second Amended Complaint, Moua’s PAGA cause of action is based on 

the following:

 Failure to pay earned and unpaid wages at the time of discharge, in violation of 

Labor Code § 201;

 Willful failure to pay discharged employees, in violation of Labor Code § 203;

 Failure to pay timely wages in violation of Labor Code § 204;

 Failure to provide compensating time off in lieu of overtime compensation in 

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violation of Labor Code § 204.3; 

 Labor Code § 210, which designates a civil penalty for violation of Labor Code § 

204;

 Failure to provide itemized wages statements, in violation of Labor Code § 226(a);

 Labor Code § 226(e), which designates a statutory penalty for violation of Labor 

Code § 226; 

 Labor Code § 226.3, which designates a civil penalty for violation of Labor Code § 

226; 

 Labor Code § 226.6, which designates a knowing and intentional violation of Labor 

Code § 226 a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or a term of 

imprisonment not exceeding one year; 

 Failure to provide meal and rest breaks, in violation of Labor Code § 226.7;

 Failure to pay overtime wages, in violation of Labor Code § 510;

 Failure to pay premium wages for failing to provide meal and rest breaks, in 

violation of Labor Code § 512;

 Labor Code § 558, which designates a civil penalty for violation of Labor Code §§ 

510 and 512;

 Failure to maintain records, in violation of Labor Code § 1174;

 Labor Code § 1174.5, which designates a civil penalty for violation of Labor Code 

§ 1174;

 Failure to comply with the maximum hours of work, in violation of Labor Code § 

1198; and

 Failure to provide meal and rest periods in violation of Wage Order No. 4-2001, 

subds. 11, 12. 

C. Labor Code Exemptions

Three statutory exemptions to the protections of the Labor Code are relevant to these 

motions. As a general matter, these provisions are narrowly construed. Ramirez v. Yosemite 

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Water Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 794 (1999) (“Ramirez”). 

i. Administrative Exemption

Labor Code § 515(a) “exempts from overtime compensation ‘executive, administrative, 

and professional employees’ whose primary duties ‘meet the test of exemption,’ who ‘regularly 

exercise[] discretion and independent judgment in performing those duties’ and who earn a 

monthly salary at least twice the state minimum wage for full-time employees.” Harris v. Super. 

Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 170, 178 (2011). Consequently, to be considered “administrative” an employee 

must: “(1) be paid at a certain level, (2) their work must be administrative, (3) their primary duties 

must involve that administrative work, and (4) they must discharge those primary duties by 

regularly exercising independent judgment and discretion.” Id. 

Under the second element:

[W]ork qualifies as ‘administrative’ when it is ‘directly related’ to 

management policies or general business operations. Work qualifies 

as ‘directly related’ if it satisfies two components. First, it must be 

qualitatively administrative. Second, quantitatively, it must be of 

substantial importance to the management or operations of the 

business. Both components must be satisfied before work can be 

considered ‘directly related’ to management policies or general 

business operations in order to meet the test of the exemption.

Id. at 181-82. 

ii. Computer Professional Exemption

Labor Code § 515.5(a) exempts from overtime pay “an employee in the computer software 

field.” According to the applicable wage order, an employee is considered to work in the 

“computer software field” if: (1) the employee is “primarily engaged in work that is intellectual or 

creative and that requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment;” (2) the employee 

is primarily engaged in statutorily-defined duties related to computer system specifications; (3) the 

employee is “highly skilled and is proficient in the theoretical and practical application of highly 

specialized information to computer systems analysis, programming or software engineering,” 

regardless of job title; and (4) the employee has an annual salary of at least $75,000 or an hourly 

rate of pay of at least $36.00. Wage Order No. 4-2001, subd. 1(A)(3)(h). 

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iii. Outside Salesperson Exemption

Labor Code § 1171 specifies that the wage, hour and working conditions provisions of 

California law apply to all individuals “employed in any occupation, trade, or industry, whether 

compensation is measured by time, piece, or otherwise, but shall not include any individual 

employed as an outside salesman . . . .” “An ‘[o]utside salesperson’ is one who customarily and 

regularly works more than half the working time away from the employer’s place of business 

selling tangible or intangible items or obtaining orders or contracts for products, services or use of 

facilities.” Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 26 (2014) (quoting Wage Order No. 4-

2001, subd. 2(M)). 

Determining whether an employee is covered by the outside salesperson exemption 

requires inquiry into the “realistic” requirements of the job. Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th 785, 802 (1999). 

The court must examine “first and foremost, how the employee actually spends his or her time.” 

Id. But the court “should also consider whether the employee’s practice diverges from the 

employer’s realistic expectations, whether there was any concrete expression of employer 

displeasure over an employee’s substandard performance, and whether these expressions were 

themselves realistic given the actual overall requirements of the job.” Id.

D. Application

IBM argues there is no dispute of material fact that the PAGA employees are exempt

employees according to one of the statutory exceptions detailed above.

1

 To prevail on that 

argument, IBM must produce sufficient evidence to show that each PAGA employee is covered by 

a recognized exemption. See Duran, 59 Cal. 4th at 26 (holding that the employer bears the burden 

of proving an exemption under the Labor Code). But since Plaintiff would bear the burden of 

proof at trial to show a violation of the Labor Code, she must “designate specific materials in the 

record to show that there is a genuinely disputed fact” in response to IBM’s that proof of any 

violation is absent. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

 

1

The court rejects Moua’s notice challenge because IBM’s Answer provided fair notice it would 

raise exemptions as an affirmative defense to her claims. 

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In consideration of the authorities stated above, the court rules as follows on separate 

motions for summary judgment:

i. Mariam Samie (Dkt. No. 101)

Mariam Samie worked in sales of an IBM software product known as Optim. Considering 

the duties Samie actually performed and the amount of time she spent away from her employer’s 

business conducting those duties, IBM has satisfied its burden to show, with admissible evidence,

that Samie is subject to the outside salesperson exemption. 

The court rejects Moua’s argument that Samie was instead a technical resource and not 

engaged in “selling” IBM’s product. Moua proposes a definition of the word “selling” that is too 

restrictive to be accepted here because the applicable wage order, No. 4-2001, does not define 

“selling,” and “selling” can equally encompass conduct meant “to influence or induce to make a 

purchase.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1129 (11th ed. 2003). In addition, Samie 

unequivocally testified that her efforts were, in fact, directed at securing product sales. Samie’s 

declaration submitted in opposition to the motion does not dispute any facts material to an 

application of the exemption. 

The court also finds Moua’s reliance on Ramirez misplaced. Though the California 

Supreme Court recognized that state law differs from federal law “in that it does not contain any 

provision that reclassifies intrinsically nonexempt nonsales work as exempt based on the fact that 

it is incidental to sales,” there is no evidence that Samie engaged in “nonexempt nonsales work” 

under the court’s interpretation of what constitutes “selling.” 

Because Moua did not submit sufficient counter-evidence to demonstrate a dispute of 

material fact with respect to the application of the outside salesperson exemption to Samie, no 

reasonable jury could find in her favor. IBM’s motion for summary judgment will be granted. 

ii. Patricia Ann Marcus (Dkt. No. 102)

Patricia Ann Marcus is an Opportunity Manager who generally advises customers as to 

their training and educational needs related to software products. IBM argues Marcus satisfies the 

administrative exemption and has produced sufficient evidence on the application of that 

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exemption to satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment. To that end, there is no dispute that 

Marcus’ salary qualifies under the exemption’s first element. 

Under the second element, Marcus’ work is qualitatively “administrative,” in that it is 

directly related to management policies or general business operations. Notably, work falling 

under this definition is not limited to participation in formulating management policies or in the 

operation of the business as a whole, and may include “advisory specialists and consultants of 

various kinds, credit managers, safety directors, claim agents and adjusters, wage-rate analysts, tax 

experts, account executives of advertising agencies, customers’ brokers in stock exchange firms, 

promotion men, and many others.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c); see also Harris, 53 Cal. 4th at 181 

(observing that 29 C.F.R. § 205 “is one of the regulations incorporated in Wage Order 4-2001). 

And “regardless of whether the management policies or general business operations to which their 

work is directly related are those of their employer’s clients or customers or those of their 

employer.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(d). Marcus’ position is particularly comparable to that of an 

account executive supporting the management policies of IBM’s customers. Moua’s argument 

that Marcus is primarily engaged in sales overlooks the details of Marcus’ testimony about her job 

duties and is unpersuasive. 

As to the third element, there is no dispute that Marcus’ primary duties involved work that 

can be classified as qualitatively administrative. 

For the fourth element, “the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the 

comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct and acting or making a decision 

after the various possibilities have been considered.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a). This element also 

“implies that the person has the authority or power to make an independent choice, free from 

immediate direction or supervision with respect to matters of significance.” Id. The element is 

satisfied, for example, by a systems analyst “who develops methods to process . . . accounting, 

inventory, sales and other business information by using electronic computers,” and who 

“determines the exact nature of the data processing problem, and structures the problem in a 

logical manner so that a system to solve the problem and obtain the desired results can be 

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developed.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(c)(7). Marcus’ role in training support is closely akin to that of 

the systems analyst who working independently within minimal managerial oversight. 

Moua did not submit sufficient counter-evidence to demonstrate a dispute of material fact 

with respect to the application of the administrative exemption to Marcus. IBM’s motion for 

summary judgment will therefore be granted.

iii. Madhuri Kancherla (Dkt. No. 103)

Madhuri Kancherla is a Service Delivery Manager supporting PeopleSoft systems for IBM 

customers. PeopleSoft is an application that business use to run processes such as payroll and 

benefits, and Kancherla recommends improvements to customers, plans maintenance and 

improvement projects and resolves problems. Like Marcus, IBM argues Kancherla satisfies the 

administrative exemption and has produced sufficient evidence of its application to satisfy the

initial summary judgment burden. Moreover, since Kancherla’s job duties are similar to that 

Marcus in many respects, the analysis of the administrative exemption is largely the same.

There is no dispute that Kancherla’s salary qualifies under the exemption’s first element. 

For the second and third elements, Kancherla testified she spends 45% of her time making 

proactive efforts to recommend systems improvements for IBM’s customers, which is 

indisputably administrative work. Kancherla also testified she spends 30% of her time planning 

complex maintenance projects, which the court finds satisfies the definition of work directly 

related to management policies or general business operations in light of Kancherla’s description 

of these duties. See 29 C.F.R § 541.205(a) (“The administrative operations of the business include 

the work performed by so-called white-collar employees engaged in ‘servicing’ a business as, for 

example, advising the management, planning, negotiating, representing the company, purchasing, 

promoting sales, and business research and control.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7) 

(describing as exempt employees “concerned with the planning, scheduling, and coordination of 

activities which are required to develop systems for processing data to obtain solutions to complex 

business, scientific, or engineering problems of his employer or his employer’s customers”); see 

also 28 C.F.R. § 541.205(d). Kancherla, therefore, satisfies the qualitative and quantitative 

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requirements for administrative work. Moua’s contention that Kancherla is actually involved in 

production work does not account for all of the aspects of Kancherla’s job.

On the fourth element, Kancherla’s testimony reveals that, while the universe of choices 

she may utilize in response to work ticket or in creating a customer patch is limited by the 

resources available to her, she nonetheless exercises significant independent discretion and 

judgment when creating a unique solution from that universe of resources. In that way, 

Kancherla’s job duties are distinct from an employee “who merely applies his knowledge 

following prescribed procedures or determining which procedure to follow” (29 U.S.C. § 

541.206(c)(1)), such as the employee described in the out-of-circuit district court opinion cited by 

Moua (Hunter v. Sprint Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2006)). 

As with Marcus, IBM is entitled to summary judgment as to Kancherla because Moua did 

not submit sufficient counter-evidence to demonstrate a dispute of material fact with respect to the 

application of the administrative exemption.

iv. James Fabia, Thach Nguyen, Vijay Peduru and Mohammad Rizwan (Dkt. 

Nos. 109, 123, 126, 133)

James Fabia and Mohammad Rizwan are PeopleSoft administrators. Thach Nguyen and 

Vijay Peduru are also members of the PeopleSoft team at IBM. In relevant part, the record shows 

that these employees’ job duties correspond in many ways to those of Kancherla. Therefore, the 

court adopts the same analysis and finds that Fabia, Nguyen and Rizwan are subject to the 

administrative exemption despite Moua’s arguments to the contrary. Because there is no dispute 

of material fact, no jury could find in Moua’s favor. IBM’s summary judgment motions as to 

Fabia, Nguyen, Peduru and Rizwan will be granted. 

v. Bryan Barker (Dkt. No. 110)

Bryan Barker was employed at IBM as a delivery project executive. In this position, 

Barker was responsible for ensuring that IBM met its contractual commitments, testifying that he 

“manage[d] everything once the contract was signed.” He spent 50% to 80% of his time resolving 

PeopleSoft outages for IBM customers, and would ensure there was a plan to remedy the problem. 

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Barker testified he spent 20% of time on analyzing recurrent problems and recommending system 

improvements. He also represented IBM during customer interactions. IBM argues Barker

satisfies the administrative exemption and has produced sufficient evidence of its application to 

satisfy the initial summary judgment burden. 

There is no dispute that Barker’s salary qualifies under the exemption’s first element. On

the second and third elements, Barker’s job duties were “administrative” since they satisfy both

the quantitative and the qualitative requirements no matter how Moua parses the particular tasks. 

See 29 C.F.R § 541.205(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7); see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.205(d). 

That parsing does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. 

For the fourth element, the record shows that Barker exercised discretion and independent 

judgment in a manner that satisfies the definition provided by 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a). Much like 

Marcus, Barker’s job duties track those of the systems analyst example described in the regulation. 

See 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(c)(7). 

IBM is entitled to summary judgment as to Barker because Moua did not submit sufficient 

counter-evidence to demonstrate a dispute of material fact.

vi. Aravind Murthy (Dkt. No. 122)

Aravind Murthy has worked at IBM since 2005, first as a database administrator until the 

first quarter of 2009, and then as a service delivery manager. Generally, Murthy ensures the 

functionality of Oracle systems for IBM clients. In the manager role, Murthy spends 40% of his 

time analyzing customer systems and recommending changes, 25% of his time designing systems 

modifications, 15% of his time on business research and 20% of his time coordinating overseas 

teams. As an administrator, Murthy spent 40% of his time on systems analysis, 25% of this time 

preparing and delivering recommendations to client systems, and 30% of his time executing 

changes, attending internal meetings and resolving system problems. IBM argues that Murthy

satisfies the administrative exemption and the computer professional exemption and has produced 

sufficient evidence of its application to satisfy the initial summary judgment.

There is no dispute that Murthy’s salary qualifies under the exemption’s first element. On 

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the second and third elements, Murthy’s job duties in both positions were “administrative” since 

they satisfy both the quantitative and the qualitative requirements. See 29 C.F.R § 541.205(a); see 

also 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7); see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.205(d). For the fourth element, the 

record shows that Murthy exercised discretion and independent judgment in a manner that satisfies 

the definition provided by 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a). Moua has not successfully demonstrated a 

material dispute of fact for any of the exemption’s elements. IBM is entitled to summary 

judgment as to Murthy.

vii. Rickey Moore and Sendhil Jayaraman (Dkt. Nos. 124, 134)

Rickey Moore and Sendhil Jayaraman are database administrators. Moore managed 

PeopleSoft databases for IBM clients, and spent 50% of his time improving the speed and 

efficiency of database functions. Moore also spent 20% of his time on database disaster recovery. 

Similarly, Sendhil Jayaraman spent the majority of his time coordinating and performing work to 

manage, maintain, and improve Oracle systems for IBM customers. 

IBM argues that both Moore and Jayaraman are subject to the administrative exemption. 

However, Moua has successfully shown that application of the exemption presents materially 

disputed facts that preclude summary judgment to IBM. Importantly, the record does not show 

that either Moore or Jayaraman directly engaged with IBM’s customers, in notable contrast to the 

other employees discussed in this order. Instead, Moore and Jayaraman manage customer 

databases internally. Thus, it cannot be determined as a matter of fact on this record that Moore 

and Jayaraman spend the majority of their time with the “planning, scheduling and coordination of 

activities which are required to develop systems for processing data to obtain solutions to complex 

business, scientific, or engineering problems” of their employer or their employer’s customers. 29 

C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7). Furthermore, a reasonable jury could analogize the work of Moore and 

Jayaraman to that of a non-exempt clerical employee, even though they exercise some measure of 

discretion or judgment as to the matter in which they perform their tasks. 29 C.F.R. § 

541.205(c)(2). As such, whether Moore and Jayaraman are engaged in work that is either 

qualitatively or quantitatively administrative is a triable issue of fact. The issue of whether Moore 

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and Jayaraman exercise the requisite degree of discretion and independent judgment for the fourth 

element of the exemption is also a topic on which there exists a material dispute of fact. 

However, IBM is correct that claims under Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and 203 cannot be 

asserted as a matter of law as to Jayaraman because he is a current employee. Thus, IBM’s motion 

addressing Moore will be denied. The motion addressing Jayaraman will be granted in part and 

denied in part. 

viii. Reddiah Prathipati (Dkt. No. 127)

Reddiah Prathipati has worked as a Siebel team lead since 2008. Siebel is a system used 

by corporations to track and analyze information regarding sales and marketing activities, 

customers and customer purchases, and communications with clients. Prathipati leads a teach of 

U.S.-based and India-based systems administrators, acts as a liaison between IBM and customers, 

evaluates team members, manage responses to service disruptions, serves as the compliance head 

for IBM’s Oracle line of business, and develops system architectures for prospective clients. 

IBM has produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Prathipati satisfies the 

administrative exemption. There is no dispute that his salary satisfies the first element. The 

record also supports a finding that Prathipati’s job duties are qualitatively and quantitatively 

administrative. See 29 C.F.R § 541.205(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7); see also 28 C.F.R. 

§ 541.205(d). Moua’s argument to the contrary, which is notably short on citations to evidence in 

the record, does not persuade the court that a jury could find in her favor on these issues. 

Therefore, there is no dispute of material fact on the second and third elements of the 

administrative exemption. 

There is also no genuine dispute of material fact as to the fourth element because Prathipati 

plainly exercises a significant degree of discretion and independent judgment in his position. 

Though Moua argues otherwise, the evidence cited in support of her argument does not show this 

element is materially disputed. IBM’s motion will be granted as to Prathipati. 

ix. Deepak Sharma (Dkt. No. 128)

Deepak Sharma is an IT Consultant to IBM’s customers and has a mix of job duties 

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ranging from engagement manager, in which he acts as the single point of interface between IBM 

and a client, to project manager, in which he leads teams and manages the technical aspects of a 

project for a client, to IT architect. 

Of the other employees examined in this order, Sharma’s job duties most closely resemble 

those of Prathipati in several aspects. And like Prathipati, IBM has produced sufficient evidence 

to demonstrate that Sharma satisfies the administrative exemption. There is no dispute that his 

salary satisfies the first element. The record also supports a finding that Sharma’s job duties are 

qualitatively and quantitatively administrative. There is also no genuine dispute of material fact as 

to the fourth element because Sharma exercises discretion and independent judgment in his 

position. IBM’s motion will be granted as to Sharma. 

x. Alan J. Polini (Dkt. No. 130)

Alan J. Polini was a SAP Systems Analyst for the time period relevant to this action. He 

primarily worked on projects to customize SAP to meet the needs of IBM’s customers. He would 

meet the customer to gather information and determine specifications, would create a 

recommendation, wrote scripts to automate processes, and performed tests. 

IBM argues there is no dispute of material fact that Polini is subject to the computer 

professional exemption. The court agrees. The record shows that Polini’s work in creating 

customized SAP processes for IBM’s customers, choosing from an array of different 

functionalities and other possible options, shows that he was primarily engaged in creative work 

related to computer system specifications. Also, no reasonable jury could find that Polini is not 

highly skilled and proficient in computer systems analysis and programming. In addition, there is 

no dispute that Polini’s salary meets the requisite standard. 

Because Plaintiff did not produce adequate evidence to show a materially disputed fact on 

application of the computer processional exemption to Polini, IBM’s motion for summary 

judgment will be granted. 

xi. Gaurav Rana (Dkt. No. 131)

Gaurav Rana worked as an Opportunity Manager between December, 2007, and August, 

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2010. Importantly, however, Rana testified that he did not work overtime hours in this position 

and was not denied meal and rest breaks. The e-mails produced by Moua, which she claim show 

that Rana worked overtime hours, do not create a material dispute of fact because they do not 

reveal anything more than Rana sent an email at one particular time on one particular day. Even 

drawing all inferences in Moua’s favor, the e-mails are simply not substantial enough to overcome 

Rana’s testimony. For this position, what remains is any claim under Labor Code §§ 1174 and 

1174.5, on which the court cannot grant summary judgment in light of the record. 

Rana now works as a Program Manager. In that position, he manages IBM’s eLearning 

Portfolio, which provides training support programs to IBM’s customers. There is no material 

dispute in the record that his work constitutes “servicing,” as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(b). 

Nor is there any material dispute that Rana exercises significant discretion and independent 

judgment in the Program Manager position. Since Moua does not challenge the other elements of 

the administrative exemption, IBM’s motion will be granted as to Rana’s work as a Program 

Manager. 

xii. Christopher Larosa (Dkt. No. 135)

Christopher Larosa worked as an Accelerated Value Leader from December 1, 2008, 

through August 31, 2010. In that position, Larosa was responsible for managing and delivering 

the Lotus-branded services to IBM customers. He assessed customer needs, recommended 

upgrades, assessed the propriety of system changes, managed installations and upgrade projects, 

and made recommendations based on the unique needs to particular customers. Between 

September 1, 2010, and March 28, 2012, Larosa worked as a Services Sales Specialist, which 

related to contracts through which IBM provides technical support to customers. Similar to his 

prior position, Larosa assessed customer needs and developed tailored recommendations for the 

delivery of services.

IBM has produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Larosa satisfies the 

administrative exemption for both of his positions. There is no dispute that his salary satisfies the 

first element, and the record supports a finding that Larosa’s job duties are qualitatively and 

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quantitatively administrative. See 29 C.F.R § 541.205(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7); see 

also 28 C.F.R. § 541.205(d). The second and third elements are therefore satisfied. 

As to the fourth element, the record shows that Larosa exercised discretion and

independent judgment in both of his position by communicating with customers, understanding 

their needs, and creating unique solutions. In response to this evidence, Moua did not produce 

evidence to show that application of the administrative exemption to Larosa was subject to a 

material dispute of fact. IBM’s motion will be granted as to Larosa. 

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing:

1. The motions for summary judgment at Dkt. Nos. 101, 102, 103, 109, 110, 122, 123, 

126, 127, 128, 130, 133 and 135 are GRANTED;

2. The motions for summary judgment at Dkt. Nos. 131 and 134 are GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART; and 

3. The motion for summary judgment at Dkt. No. 124 is DENIED. 

Additional pending motions will be addressed through separate order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2017

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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