Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01380/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01380-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DIANA BERNHARDT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

AND REHABILITATION (HIGH 

DESERT STATE PRISON), 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-01380-KJM-AC 

ORDER 

Diana Bernhardt, the plaintiff, worked for the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (the CDCR) at High Desert State Prison. She alleges her former 

supervisor, Lt. David Griffith, created and presided over a sexually hostile work environment, one 

that forced her into a medical leave of absence in February 2012. She also claims the CDCR 

retaliated against her after she reported Lt. Griffith’s actions. The CDCR has moved for summary 

judgment. The court held a hearing on January 16, 2015. Shelley Bryant appeared for 

Ms. Bernhardt, and Scott Sommerdorf appeared for the CDCR. After evaluating the evidence, 

the parties’ briefs, and the arguments at the hearing, the court GRANTS the motion in part and 

DENIES it in part. 

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I. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The parties dispute the admissibility of several documents. At summary judgment, 

admissibility of evidence depends not on form, but on content. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 

1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The party seeking admission of evidence 

“bears the burden of proof of admissibility.” Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2002). If the opposing party objects to the proposed evidence, the party seeking 

admission must direct the court to “authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on 

attribution, hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the 

evidence in question could be deemed admissible . . . .” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 

376, 385–86 (9th Cir. 2010). A district court may nonetheless exercise its discretion “to be 

somewhat lenient” should a party opposing summary judgment fall short of the “formalities of 

Rule 56.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 

1993). See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (“We do not mean that the nonmoving party must 

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

. . . [Rule 56] permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of 

evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves”); Block, 253 

F.3d at 418–19 (“To survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce 

evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.”). 

To the extent the court cites and relies on evidence here, it overrules any contrary 

objections for purposes of this motion. Three objections, however, warrant particular mention. 

First, Bernhardt relies extensively on a written report on the CDCR’s internal investigation. See 

generally Internal Affairs Investigative Report (Inv. Rep.), Bryant Decl. Ex. D, ECF No. 36-7; 

Pl.’s Opp’n Undisp. Mat. Facts (UMF1), ECF No. 36-2; Def.’s Obj. Undisp. Facts (UMF2), ECF 

No. 38-1. The CDCR opposes this court’s consideration of that report, predominantly because it 

argues the report is inadmissible hearsay. See, e.g., UMF2 no. 81. Hearsay statements are those 

“(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party 

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offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 

801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless federal law or the Federal Rules of Evidence 

provide otherwise. Id. R. 802. Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 803 describe a number of 

exclusions and exceptions to this general rule. 

Here, the internal report was composed outside of this court, and in many instances 

Bernhardt offers the report for evidence of Lt. Griffith’s and the CDCR’s alleged wrongdoing 

documented within it. See, e.g., UMF2 no. 93. It fits the definition of hearsay. Under the 

circumstances of this case and motion, however, consideration of the report is proper. The CDCR 

or its agents created it, and the circumstances of its creation suggest its reliability and accuracy. It 

describes interviews with several witnesses who could testify at trial, and in this way it is 

demonstrative of genuine disputes of material fact. It is offered against the CDCR and may also 

qualify as a record of a regularly conducted activity or a public record. See Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2), 803(6), (8). In sum, because the report may fall within an exclusion or exception to the 

general bar against hearsay statements, because it is indicative of genuine disputes of material 

fact, and because this court has discretion to grant leniency at this stage of the litigation, 

exclusion of the report in total is improper here. Cf., e.g., Hatcher v. Cnty. of Alameda, 

No. 09-1650, 2011 WL 1225790, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011) (denying at summary judgment 

the defendants’ request to exclude as hearsay the contents of an internal investigative report, 

because, among other reasons, the testimony in question could be admitted directly at trial). The 

CDCR may of course later move in limine to exclude specific portions of the report, or object to 

their introduction at trial. 

Second, Bernhardt relies on a letter she wrote to Associate Warden Peery to show 

she was “chastised” for seeking evidence of sexual harassment against other employees and to 

show the CDCR delayed its investigation in retaliation against her. Bryant Decl. Ex. G, ECF 

No. 36-10.1

 The letter, dated May 31, 2012, documents a May 25 telephone conversation 

 1

 Bernhardt has not confirmed the contents of this letter by declaration. The letter was 

introduced, however, as exhibit 20 in Associate Warden Peery’s deposition, and Peery confirmed 

she received, read, and “understood” what Bernhardt had written in the letter. Peery Dep. 81:15–

25. Peery recalled the conversation described in the letter, but not “completely,” although she 

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between Bernhardt and Associate Warden Peery on May 25, 2012. Id. at 2. Bernhardt accuses 

Peery of seeking only to protect Griffith, subjecting her to a “gag order” to prevent her discussion 

of her claims against him, and warning other employees not to speak with her. The CDCR argues 

this letter is inadmissible hearsay. The letter was composed out of court, and in addition 

describes a conversation that occurred out of court. Bernhardt offers it as evidence of the truth of 

its contents, that is, to show the CDCR in fact sought to delay its investigation in retaliation for 

her report. For purposes of this motion, however, and in the appropriate spirit of leniency, 

because Bernhardt may take the stand at trial and offer the same statements she seeks to admit 

here by document, this first layer of hearsay is not fatal. But whether in the letter or on the 

witness stand, Bernhardt’s reports of Peery’s words must eventually qualify under an exclusion or 

exception to the rule against hearsay. Because Peery’s statements were ostensibly offered in her 

capacity as associate warden, at trial they may be properly excluded from the definition of 

hearsay by Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) (“A statement that meets the following 

conditions is not hearsay: . . . The statement is offered against an opposing party and . . . was 

made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while 

it existed . . . .”). The court will consider the letter for purposes of this motion. 

Third, Bernhardt relies on her declaration as evidence of her interactions with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), California Department of Employment 

and Housing (DFEH), and the CDCR in 2012 and 2013. See Bernhardt Decl., ECF No. 36-18. 

Her declaration describes phone calls and letters between her and several others. See id. ¶ 2. The 

CDCR contends these statements are hearsay. See, e.g., UMF2 No. 177. These statements, all 

made out of court, may nonetheless be admitted for any relevant purpose other than their truth. 

The apparent purpose for which Bernhardt has offered the statements of EEOC and CDCR 

 

remembers “asking [Bernhardt] not to call the institution, admonishing her, telling her she could 

not discuss the investigation because that is a confidential process, not supposed to be talking 

about it with other staff. That was the gist of the conversation. That’s what I wrote down.” Id. at 

83. This testimony is sufficient to authenticate the letter for purposes of summary judgment. See 

Las Vegas Sands v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding a letter “could have been 

authenticated by review of [its] contents if [it] appeared sufficiently genuine” even if not attached 

to an authenticating affidavit). 

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representatives is not to show, for example, that the EEOC in fact was waiting for the CDCR’s 

internal investigation, see id. no. 180, but to show the effect of this statement on Ms. Bernhardt, 

that is, to dissuade her from filing a formal charge. Moreover, many of the statements the CDCR 

contends are hearsay may very well also be admissible in the form of its own statements—those 

of Bernhardt’s party opponent—and excluded from the hearsay rule should the letter itself be 

offered at trial. See, e.g., id. no. 184 (“On or about April 8, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter form 

[sic] the OCR stating that it had received Plaintiff's request, the investigation was complete, and 

her warden at HDSP had the results. . . .”). The objection is overruled for purposes of this 

motion, but as noted above, at trial this and any evidence may be admitted only in accordance 

with the Federal Rules of Evidence.

II. BACKGROUND 

The following facts are not disputed for the purpose of this motion unless 

otherwise noted. Bernhardt began working at High Desert State Prison on June 2, 2003. UMF1 

no. 1. Bernhardt alleges Lt. Griffith, her supervisor, began sexually harassing her at work in 

August 2010. Id. nos. 2, 27–51. The internal CDCR report describes interviews the CDCR 

conducted with Bernhardt, her coworkers, and with Lt. Griffith. 2 Lt. Griffith’s reported 

indiscretions include the following: He referred to Bernhardt as “Hot-Ass Dee Dee” from August 

2010 through the fall of 2011. Inv. Rep. at 21, 72. He referred to other women as “Sugar Tits,” 

id. at 78–79, and “the virgin daughter,” id. at 79–80, and called other men and women “fat fuck,” 

id. at 82–83, “pussy,” id. at 84–85, and “pissy pants,” id. at 71. He frequently accused Bernhardt 

and other women of staring at his and other men’s crotches. Id. at 81–82. He once displayed 

scratch marks on his buttocks supposedly sustained in a recent sexual encounter. Id. at 72–73. 

On several occasions in 2010 and 2011, he bragged that if Bernhardt and other women would 

spend one night with him, no other man would satisfy them. Id. at 73–74. In the summer of 

 2

 As described above, the CDCR contends this report is inadmissible hearsay, see, e.g., 

UMF2 no. 94, but does not offer evidence to contradict the report’s contents, and agrees that 

Bernhardt alleges this conduct, see UMF1 no. 27–51. It also relies on these allegations in its 

motion. See Def.’s Mem. P.&A. Mot. Summ. J. 3–4. The court finds the defendants do not 

dispute the facts described here for purposes of this motion. 

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2011, he asked Bernhardt’s coworker if that coworker had ever given her ex-husband a blowjob; 

after she admitted to giving him an “accidental blowjob,” he distributed a video to the office 

depicting a man and woman in circumstances he suggested demonstrated how an accidental 

blowjob could occur. Id. at 74–75. He once also personally demonstrated how he believed an 

accidental blowjob may have occurred after removing his trousers, although not his underwear. 

Id. at 75-76. At some time between November 2011 and January 2012, he grasped the breast of 

Bernhardt’s coworker in her presence. Id. at 77–78. Neither Bernhardt nor her coworkers 

immediately reported this conduct. UMF1 nos. 29, 32, 35, 38, 42, 45, 46, 51. Several sergeants 

who worked in the same department denied knowledge of it, and many coworker-interviewees’ 

accounts differ in the details. See generally Inv. Rep. 

Bernhardt’s healthcare provider put her on stress-based medical leave in February 

2012. UMF1 nos. 3, 53. The last day she reported to work was February 23, 2012. Id. no. 3. 

Some evidence shows she told the CDCR that Lt. Griffith’s harassment brought about her leave 

of absence. Id. nos. 53, 55. On March 3 and 13, 2012, Bernhardt made her first complaints of 

sexual harassment and requested an internal investigation. Id. nos. 20–21. For fear of being 

labeled a “rat,” she had withheld any earlier report. Id. no. 52. Bernhardt says Lt. Griffith 

secured employees’ continuing tenure in his department by threat and intimidation; she recalls his 

words: he would “take them down” if they filed a complaint; the CDCR does not agree. Id.

no. 54. The parties do agree Bernhardt did not allege any retaliation in March 2012. UMF1 

no. 22. 

By the CDCR’s reckoning, the evidence shows it “immediately developed a plan 

of action.” Id. no. 56. On March 13, 2012, it interviewed Bernhardt about her complaint, id. no. 

57, and about a week later, it informed her it had reassigned and admonished Lt. Griffith. Id. nos. 

58–60. On March 28, 2013, Griffith received a notice of adverse action. Beckler Decl., Ex. E, at 

1, ECF No. 33-5. His pay would be reduced by ten percent for two years, effective May 1, 2013. 

Id. Griffith retired before the penalty took effect. UMF1 no. 63; Griffith Dep. 126:20–127:17, 

ECF No. 36-4. The CDCR also offered Bernhardt a new position in the accounting office, but 

she refused. UMF1 nos. 61–62. 

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Bernhardt argues that other evidence shows how the CDCR dragged its feet. Id. 

no 56. After Lt. Griffith was reassigned, on March 24, 2012, Bernhardt and a coworker sent the 

CDCR a memo expressing their fear that Lt. Griffith would violently retaliate against them. Inv. 

Rep. at 9. Deposition testimony suggests the prison did not address this memo. See UMF1 no. 

56; Spoon Dep. 82:7–83:11, ECF No. 36-12; Foulk Dep. 46:6–48:12, ECF No. 36-13. A letter 

Bernhardt received in April 2012 informed her the CDCR would not investigate her allegations 

because they were under administrative review. Bryant Decl. Ex. E, ECF No. 36-8. On May 25, 

2012, by Bernhardt’s account, an associate warden chastised her for asking others about Griffith’s 

harassment, UMF1 no. 56; UMF2 no. 86, then dismissed her feelings and ignored her complaints, 

id. no. 87. She argues the CDCR delayed its investigatory interviews for about seven months and 

withheld information for a year. UMF1 no. 56; see Inv. Rep. (dated February 8, 2013). The 

parties agree Bernhardt has remained absent from work since April 2012 due to a back injury 

unrelated to her claims stemming from Lt. Griffith’s actions. Id. no. 72. 

On May 29, 2012, the CDCR notified Bernhardt by letter an investigation would 

begin. Suppl. Bernhardt Decl. Ex. Y, at 17, ECF No. 41. In August 2012 she first took her case 

outside the CDCR and filed a pre-complaint questionnaire with the federal Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). EEOC Intake Questionnaire 4, ECF No. 36-19. She alleged 

sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and a hostile work environment, but not retaliation. Id. at 

2. She requested the EEOC look into the discrimination and confirmed she wanted to file a 

charge against the CDCR, acknowledging that her name and claims may be disclosed. Id. at 4. 

The parties agree the EEOC did not forward the intake questionnaire to the California Department 

of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). In September 2012 she contacted the EEOC again 

and learned it required more information about the CDCR’s internal investigation. Bernhardt 

Decl. ¶¶ 2b, 2c, ECF No. 36-18. Bernhardt contacted the EEOC again in October, November and 

December of 2012, and in January and March of 2013. Id. ¶¶ 2d–2l. 

In April 2013, Bernhardt received notice the CDCR’s internal investigation was 

complete. Id. ¶ 2m; UMF1 no. 23. She requested its conclusions. Bernhardt Decl. ¶ 2m, ECF 

No. 36-18. The CDCR later informed her it had sustained nine of her seventeen allegations, id.

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¶ 2n, and she forwarded this information to the EEOC. Id. In June 2013, the EEOC told her it 

had not finished its investigation, id. ¶¶ 2q, so she filed a charge of discrimination on July 2, 

2013, id. ¶¶ 2q, 2s, and requested a right to sue letter, id. ¶ 2u, which she received on November 

13, 2013, id. ¶ 2w. On June 21, 2013, she also filed a complaint of discrimination with the DFEH 

and received a right-to-sue letter the same day. Id. ¶ 2r. Before June 12, 2013, Bernhardt was 

acting without representation. Bernhardt Decl. ¶ 3. 

The original judicial complaint in this case was filed on July 11, 2013. Compl., 

ECF No. 2. The First Amended Complaint, filed August 15, 2013, remains the operative 

pleading. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 8. Bernhardt alleges two statutory causes of action. First, 

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), she alleges sexual 

harassment, sex discrimination, and the CDCR’s retaliation after she made her report. First Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 14–16. Second, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), 

California Government Code § 12940, she alleges the same claims: sexual harassment, sex 

discrimination, and retaliation. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–22. 

The CDCR moved for summary judgment on December 16, 2014. ECF No. 33. It 

advances three arguments: first, that Bernhardt did not timely exhaust her administrative remedies 

as to her Title VII and FEHA claims of discrimination and a hostile work environment; second, 

that it is entitled to an affirmative defense against both the Title VII and the FEHA discrimination 

claims because its policy against sexual harassment was effective and reasonable and Bernhardt 

did not take advantage of the CDCR’s anti-harassment apparatus; and third, that Bernhardt has 

put forward insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title 

VII or the FEHA. 

After reviewing the applicable legal standard, the court evaluates each of the 

CDCR’s arguments in the context of both Title VII and the FEHA. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

trial court in receipt of a motion for summary judgment performs a “threshold inquiry” to decide 

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“whether there is the need for a trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 

(1986).3 The judge does not make findings of fact, but decides more fundamentally whether 

“there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. Only “genuine issue[s] of 

material fact” matter; only “disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48. 

The party who moves for summary judgment, here the CDCR, bears the initial 

burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

Rule 56 does not require the CDCR to negate Bernhardt’s claims with evidence. Id. Rather the 

CDCR must show “there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 

325. If it meets this burden, Bernhardt must then respond and show the case is in fact proper for 

trial, that is, she must “establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1986). Both parties must “cit[e] to 

particular parts of materials in the record . . . ; or show[] that the materials cited do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 

(“[The nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt 

as to the material facts.”). Unsupported assertions are insufficient: the purpose of summary 

judgment is “‘to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof.’” Id. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e) advisory committee note on 1963 amendments). Finally, because the CDCR has moved for 

summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most 

favorable to Bernhardt. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 

(9th Cir. 2008). 

///// 

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 Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010; however, it is appropriate to rely on 

cases decided before the amendment took effect, as “[t]he standard for granting summary 

judgment remains unchanged.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Notes of Advisory Comm. on 2010 

amendments. 

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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION: HARASSMENT CLAIMS 

Both Title VII and the FEHA require plaintiffs exhaust their administrative 

remedies before launching judicial complaints of workplace harassment or hostile work 

environments. Wilson-Combs v. Cal. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114–15 

(E.D. Cal. 2008). Each statute constructs a different regime, although the justification for this 

administrative hurdle is the same: the statutes empower an administrative agency to dispose of 

employment discrimination claims first, ideally to foster compliance by conciliation and 

persuasion. Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A. Title VII 

Title VII plaintiffs must file timely charges with the EEOC or an equivalent state 

agency. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Feb. 20, 

2002). The DFEH is such an agency. Dornell v. City of San Mateo, 19 F. Supp. 3d 900, 905 

(N.D. Cal. 2013). When a state agency may grant appropriate relief, and the complainant first 

files a charge with that state agency, Title VII requires a claimant file an administrative charge 

with the EEOC “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice 

occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also E.E.O.C. v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 

585 (9th Cir. 2000) (summarizing the statute). If a complainant has filed a charge with the state 

agency, the charge is not deemed to have been filed with the EEOC, however, until either 

(a) sixty days elapse, or (b) the state investigation is closed, whichever occurs first. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(c); Dinuba, 222 F.3d at 585. This rule grants the state agency a 60-day window of 

exclusivity to evaluate the charge. Dinuba, 222 F.3d at 585. A worksharing agreement between 

the EEOC and the DFEH further complicates this picture. Under that agreement, the filing of a 

charge with one agency is considered a constructive filing with the other, and each organization is 

the other’s agent for this purpose. Id. “In practical terms, therefore, a charge filed with a state 

agency within 240 days of the unlawful employment practice will be guaranteed timely filing 

with the EEOC.” Id. In summary, if Bernhardt filed a charge with the DFEH within 240 days of 

the last alleged unlawful act of discrimination, it was timely for purposes of Title VII. 

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Furthermore, if Bernhardt filed a charge with either the EEOC or the DFEH, the charge will be 

deemed jointly filed if it falls within those agencies’ worksharing agreements. 

Title VII does not define “charge,” but requires charges “shall be in writing under 

oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission 

requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The applicable procedural regulations require a charge 

include the complainant’s name, contact information, the name and address of the target 

employer, a description of the claim, the number of affected persons, and information whether 

state proceedings have already commenced. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a).4 Satisfaction of these 

default requirements is necessary but not sufficient to make out a “charge.” See Federal Exp. 

Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (interpreting the regulations in the context of the 

Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). To be a “charge,” the 

filing must also be reasonably understood to embody a request for the agency to “activate its 

machinery” on the complainant’s behalf. Id. at 402. 

Here, the parties agree Bernhardt filed a formal DFEH charge on June 21, 2013, 

and a formal EEOC charge on July 2, 2013. UMF1 nos. 24, 25. June and July 2013 are nearly 

five hundred days beyond February 2012, Bernhardt’s last day of work. Both formal complaints 

 4

 The full text of this regulation reads as follows: 

Each charge should contain the following: (1) The full name, address and 

telephone number of the person making the charge except as provided in 

§ 1601.7; (2) The full name and address of the person against whom the 

charge is made, if known (hereinafter referred to as the respondent); (3) A 

clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, 

constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices: See § 1601.15(b); 

(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the respondent 

employer or the approximate number of members of the respondent labor 

organization, as the case may be; and (5) A statement disclosing whether 

proceedings involving the alleged unlawful employment practice have been 

commenced before a State or local agency charged with the enforcement of 

fair employment practice laws and, if so, the date of such commencement 

and the name of the agency. 

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a). The regulation also provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of 

paragraph (a) of this section, a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the 

person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to 

describe generally the action or practices complained of.” Id. § 1601.12(b). 

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are therefore too late. Bernhardt can only have filed a timely charge if another filing satisfies the 

definition of “charge” and was timely. Bernhardt argues the EEOC Intake Questionnaire she 

signed on August 25, 2012, fits the bill. See EEOC Intake Questionnaire 4, ECF No. 36-19. In 

her questionnaire, Bernhardt provided her name and contact information, the name and contact 

information for High Desert State Prison, named Lt. Griffith as her harasser, and noted her 

attachment of an “intake package, letter and memos,” noting “witness information is included in 

the EEO pk.” Id. at 1–2. In a supplemental declaration, Bernhardt says she also attached internal 

EEO complaint material to her questionnaire. Suppl. Bernhardt Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 41. 

Bernhardt also checked a box next to the following statement: 

I want to file a charge of discrimination, and I authorize the EEOC 

to look into the discrimination I described above. I understand 

that the EEOC must give the employer, union or employment 

agency that I accuse of discrimination information about the 

charge, including my name. I also understand that the EEOC can 

only accept charges of job discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, genetic information, or 

retaliation for opposing discrimination. 

EEOC Intake Questionnaire 4, ECF No. 36-19 (emphasis in original). The intake questionnaire 

reads, in fine print on the last page, “Consistent with 29 CFR 1601.12(b) and 29 CFR 1626.8(c), 

this questionnaire may serve as a charge if it meets the elements of a charge.”5

 Id. Bernhardt has 

also described her multiple contacts with the EEOC’s employees, her effort to pursue an 

investigation of discrimination, and her desire to obtain a right-to-sue letter. See Bernhardt Decl. 

¶ 2, ECF No. 36-18. 

The questionnaire does not include any language to show it was signed under oath 

or affirmation; however, this omission is not fatal. See Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 

106, 112–13 (2002) (rejecting the argument that a charge is not a charge until the filer satisfies 

 5

 The full text of 29 C.F.R § 1601.12(b) is reproduced in footnote 4 above. Section 

1626.8(c) reads as follows: “A charge may be amended to clarify or amplify allegations made 

therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful 

employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will 

relate back to the date the charge was first received. A charge that has been so amended shall not 

again be referred to the appropriate State agency.” 

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Title VII’s oath or affirmation requirement). In all other respects the intake questionnaire fits the 

definition of a charge: it is in writing, satisfies the minimal regulatory requirements, and a 

reasonable factfinder could conclude Bernhardt intended the EEOC to swing into action on her 

behalf. Other district courts have held similarly. For example, in Leftwich v. Gallaudet Univ., the 

plaintiff alleged race and disability discrimination. 878 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 2012). His 

intake questionnaire generally described discriminatory acts, including “‘racial slurs, verbal 

harassment’ by [a supervisor] as well as ‘suspen[sion] for 5 days for insubordination.’” Id. at 91. 

He checked a box on the intake questionnaire to verify he “want[ed] to file a charge of 

discrimination” and “authorize[d] the EEOC to look into the discrimination” described in the 

questionnaire. Id. These statements were sufficient to deem the questionnaire a charge. Id. See 

also Enoch v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 11-3551, 2012 WL 2371049, at *7 (D. Md. June 22, 

2012) (holding similarly). 

Bernhardt submitted her intake questionnaire on August 26, 2012. Bernhardt 

Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 41. As described above, if the questionnaire is also a “charge” within 

the meaning of that agreement, it was constructively filed with both agencies when the EEOC 

received it. The date 240 days before August 26, 2012 fell on December 30, 2011, while 

Bernhardt was still working in the same unit as Griffith, and Bernhardt reported Griffith’s 

harassment continued into 2012. See Inv. Rep. 23–24.6 

No party has adequately addressed the EEOC-DFEH worksharing agreement and 

whether the EEOC intake questionnaire falls within its scope. Neither has the CDCR put forward 

any argument to establish the temporal bounds of the alleged unlawful harassment; it only 

assumes for purposes of argument that Lt. Griffith could not have harassed Bernhardt any later 

than February 23, 2012, the last day she worked before taking her leave. Because the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to Bernhardt, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88, and 

 

6

 This conclusion infers Bernhardt’s filing of a constructive DFEH complaint from the EEOC 

intake questionnaire, essentially reversing the process described in Dinuba, see 222 F.3d at 585, 

and disregarding whether the DFEH was aware of the EEOC intake questionnaire, which the 

parties agree was not forwarded. Nevertheless, as the court concludes below, Bernhardt’s judicial 

complaint would have been timely even based solely on her formal charges. 

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because the CDCR bears the initial burden to demonstrate the lack of “evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, summary judgment may not be granted for 

failure to exhaust Title VII administrative remedies. 

Even if Bernhardt’s case depended solely on her formal charges, the court still 

would not grant summary judgment. Although Title VII’s procedural requirements, including its 

time limits, are strictly enforced, Villalvaso v. Odwalla, Inc., No. 10-02369, 2011 WL 1585604, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011), they are not jurisdictional requirements, and are subject to 

waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 

(1982). The doctrine is meant to avoid injustice in the face of good-faith error. Villalvaso, 2011 

WL 1585604, at *4. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that no formula can dictate its 

applicability, but has distilled four factors to use in determining whether equitable tolling is 

available to a discrimination plaintiff: (1) the plaintiff’s diligent pursuit of a claim; (2) the 

administrative agency’s provision of misinformation or misleading statements; (3) the plaintiff’s 

reliance on the misinformation or misrepresentation; and (4) the plaintiff’s lack of representation 

at the time. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying factors 

in a FEHA case); Valentine v. California Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, No. 10-8717, 2012 WL 386682, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (applying factors in a Title VII case). 

Viewing the evidence relevant to tolling in the light most favorable to 

Ms. Bernhardt, her affidavits describe how she contacted the EEOC many times during the year 

after she left High Desert State Prison, seeking an administrative charge and investigation. A 

reasonable factfinder could conclude this evidence shows the EEOC discouraged her from filing a 

formal charge while the CDCR investigated her complaint, or that it advised her not to file a 

formal charge, or that she got no clear answer. Bernhardt may be found to have misplaced her 

reliance on the EEOC’s representations, or lack thereof. The parties do not dispute she had no 

lawyer at the time. Title VII’s provisions on administrative exhaustion, and the case law 

interpreting these provisions, present a formidable barrier to understanding for the untrained, 

pro se complainant. The record before the court does not demonstrate conclusively that 

Bernhardt is not eligible for equitable tolling, if she needs tolling to have satisfied exhaustion. 

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The court denies summary judgment on Bernhardt’s Title VII discrimination and hostile work 

environment claims. 

B. FEHA 

An employee seeking relief for discrimination or a hostile work environment under 

the FEHA must file a verified complaint with the DFEH within one year of the last alleged 

unlawful practice. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b), (d). If the DFEH does not institute a civil action 

within 150 days, or if it elects not to bring an action, the complainant employee may seek judicial 

relief. Id. § 12965(b); Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 83 (1990). As noted above, the CDCR omits 

discussion of the EEOC/DFEH worksharing agreement and the effect of Bernhardt’s EEOC 

intake questionnaire. CDCR’s evidence and argument only tangentially address the date the 

alleged unlawful harassment ceased. Even if CDCR had carried its burden to show Bernhardt 

filed a qualifying complaint on the date she filed her DFEH complaint, June 21, 2013, and no 

earlier, summary judgment is nonetheless improper. Even though June 21, 2013, is more than 

one year after Lt. Griffith’s alleged harassment and the end of Bernhardt’s employment, UMF1 

no. 24, the evidence suggests the FEHA limitations period would be equitably tolled to permit 

Bernhardt’s filing on June 21, 2013, as discussed below. 

A federal district court may entertain arguments for equitable relief in the face of 

the FEHA’s statute of limitations. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 900 (9th Cir. 

2001); MacDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 102 (2008). The doctrine 

of equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to pursue non-judicial remedies without forfeiting recourse 

to the courts, should those non-judicial remedies prove deficient. Williams v. Gyrus ACMI, LP, 

No. 14-00805, 2014 WL 4771667, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (citing Addison v. State of 

Cal., 21 Cal. 3d 313 (1978)). The California Supreme Court has held that equitable tolling 

applies when a defendant has timely notice of a complaint, is not prejudiced by tolling, and the 

plaintiff acted in good faith. MacDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102. The MacDonald court expressly 

endorsed the expansion of this test articulated in Downs v. Department of Water & Power, 58 Cal. 

App. 4th 1093, 1100 (1997), and Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924–26 

(1983). The first requirement, notice to the defendant, “essentially means that the first claim must 

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have been filed within the statutory period.” Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 924. This requirement 

works to alert the defendant of the need to investigate the facts forming the basis of the judicial 

complaint. Id. The second requirement, lack of prejudice to the defendant, “essentially translates 

to a requirement that the facts of the two claims be identical or at least so similar that the 

defendant’s investigation of the first claim will put [it] in a position to fairly defend the second.” 

Id. at 925. The third requirement, the plaintiff’s good faith and reasonable conduct, is less clearly 

defined, but the plaintiff should file the judicial complaint “a short time after tolling end[s].” Id.

at 926 (citing Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 319 (1978)). 

Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to Bernhardt, the evidence supports 

giving her the benefit of equitable tolling. To the first MacDonald requirement, the “first claim” 

is Bernhardt’s request to investigate Lt. Griffith in March 2012, well within one year of the 

alleged harassment in mid-to-late-2011 and early 2012. See generally Internal Affairs 

Investigative Report, Bryant Decl. Ex. D, ECF No. 36-7; UMF2 (describing the CDCR’s 

objections to that Report). To the second MacDonald requirement, Bernhardt’s March 2012 

complaints to CDCR and her formal FEHA complaint each allege Lt. Griffith’s sexual 

harassment of her and her coworkers over the same period of time. They are essentially identical 

in this respect.7 Finally, the evidence also satisfies the third MacDonald requirement, Bernhardt’s 

diligence. Her affidavits describe her efforts throughout 2012 and 2013 to advance her case, even 

when she had no legal representation. This evidence is admissible and cognizable in this context. 

Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 902. The CDCR’s attack on Bernhardt’s diligence is more appropriately 

addressed in the context of its affirmative defenses, discussed below. 

The CDCR has not satisfied its initial burden to show an absence of genuinely 

disputed material facts surrounding the question of administrative exhaustion of plaintiff’s FEHA 

claims of discrimination and a hostile work environment. The court denies summary judgment on 

this claim. 

 7

 Bernhardt’s retaliation claims, alleged only in her “second” DFEH complaint, are 

dissimilar to her sexual harassment claims. The court addresses her retaliation claims separately 

below. 

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V. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 

A. Title VII: Reasonable Care 

 1. Doctrine; Legal Standards 

When an employee’s supervisor creates a hostile work environment, for example 

by sexual harassment, the employer is vicariously liable for the harassment. Burlington 

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 

775, 807 (1998). The defendant employer has no defense to this liability if the harassment 

“culminates in a tangible employment action.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 

808 (1998). The term “tangible employment action” does not appear in the statute, but rather is a 

judicial creation. The U.S. Supreme Court describes tangible employment actions as “the means 

by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates”; 

“official act[s] of the enterprise”; “company act[s]”; usually those “documented in official 

company records” and “subject to review by higher level supervisors.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. 

To invoke such an action the supervisor obtains “the imprimatur of the enterprise.” Id. “A 

tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.” Id.

If the employer does not take a “tangible employment action,” it may assert a 

defense, subject to proof by a preponderance of evidence: first that it “exercised reasonable care 

to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior”; and second “that the plaintiff 

employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 

provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 

(1998). The employer’s proof of reasonable care can include evidence of its policy against sexual 

harassment; its proof of the employee’s unreasonable failure can include that he or she did not file 

an internal complaint. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 807. 

The Supreme Court has extended the reasonable-care affirmative defense to 

constructive discharges. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004). An 

employee is constructively discharged if working conditions were so objectively intolerable as to 

compel her resignation. Id. at 141. The Court’s articulation of the defense in a constructive 

discharge case is essentially the same as set forth above: “An employer may defend against such a 

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claim by showing both (1) that it had installed a readily accessible and effective policy for 

reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably 

failed to avail herself of that employer-provided preventive or remedial apparatus.” Id. at 134. 

The affirmative defense “will not be available to the employer, however, if the plaintiff quits in 

reasonable response to an employer-sanctioned adverse action officially changing her 

employment status or situation, for example, a humiliating demotion, extreme cut in pay, or 

transfer to a position in which she would face unbearable working conditions.” Id. 

2. Analysis 

Here, the CDCR took no tangible employment action and did not subject 

Bernhardt to working conditions so intolerable that she was forced to resign. The parties agree 

Bernhardt remains a CDCR employee and her continued absence is due to an unrelated injury. 

The affirmative defense described in Ellerth and Faragher is therefore available to the CDCR, 

and the parties’ dispute focuses on that defense: (1) whether the CDCR’s efforts to prevent and 

eliminate sexual harassment were reasonable and effective and (2) whether Bernhardt acted 

unreasonably when she did not report Lt. Griffith’s conduct earlier. 

First, the CDCR must show it exercised reasonable care both to prevent sexual 

harassment and to address it once discovered. See Hardage v. CBS Broad., Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e construe[] this standard to require both preventive and remedial 

measures.”), amended on denial of reh’g, 433 F.3d 672 and 436 F.3d 1050 (2005). On the first 

question, prevention, the evidence shows the CDCR’s policies expressly forbid sexual 

harassment, and Bernhardt acknowledges her participation in a long list of anti-harassment 

training sessions. UMF1 nos. 4–19. On the second point, remediation, the evidence before the 

court creates a triable issue of fact. Bernhardt cites evidence a reasonable jury could conclude 

shows the CDCR unreasonably delayed its investigation, upbraided her for seeking evidence, did 

not effectively punish Lt. Griffith, or withheld reprimand of coworkers, who she says covered up 

or withheld evidence of Lt. Griffith’s harassment. A reasonable jury could also credit evidence 

that the CDCR immediately reassigned and reprimanded Lt. Griffith. The equally plausible 

outcomes defeat summary judgment. 

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Whether Bernhardt unreasonably ignored the CDCR’s preventative and remedial 

apparatus is a knottier question. As described above, the alleged harassment began in August 

2010, but Bernhardt did not make a report until March 2012. She completed an EEOC intake 

questionnaire in August 2012, and filed formal charges with the DFEH and EEOC in June and 

July 2013. In Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., the Ninth Circuit found in somewhat similar 

circumstances that the employee had unreasonably delayed reporting harassment. 339 F.3d 1158, 

1178–79 (9th Cir. 2003). In that case the plaintiff had not sought relief during a year of sexual 

harassment, until two years after the first incident. Id. She explained her inaction grew out of 

discomfort with the employer’s reporting system, which arose from bad experiences during 

previous discrimination complaints. Id.; see also Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863 

(9th Cir. 1999) (finding the employer had successfully asserted an affirmative defense under 

Faragher, supra, by showing the plaintiff employee “knew about [its] policy prohibiting sexual 

harassment and had received several copies of it” and “knew whom to contact if she was being 

subjected to sexual harassment,” but waited two years to complain, after which the defendant’s 

actions were “swift and certain”). Although similar to this case in terms of their chronologies, 

Holly D. and Montero are distinguishable. A reasonable jury could find Bernhardt’s years-long 

hesitation reasonable in the face of the prison’s hierarchy, the threats allegedly made by 

Lt. Griffith, a male-dominated workplace, pressure not to “rat out” other employees, and the 

CDCR’s allowing Griffith to retire before his pay was docked as a penalty for his behavior. The 

court denies summary judgment on the reasonable care defense. 

B. FEHA: Avoidable Consequence 

The California Supreme Court interprets the FEHA to impose strict liability on 

employers whose employee-supervisors sexually harass subordinates. State Dep’t of Health 

Servs. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 1026, 1034 (2003). Nevertheless, the common-law doctrine 

of avoidable consequences — a doctrine generally applicable whenever an injured person may 

have avoided injury by reasonable effort or expenditure — fits within FEHA’s statutory scheme. 

Id. at 1043. After all, an employer cannot be expected to stamp out sexual harassment in its ranks 

without having reason to suspect any harassment in the first place. Id. at 1049. If an employee 

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shows the employer is liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment, the employer may not avoid 

liability, but it may reduce or eliminate any damages owed by pleading and proving three points: 

(1) it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct the sexual harassment; (2) the employee 

unreasonably failed to use preventive and corrective measures provided; and (3) reasonable use of 

those procedures would have prevented some of the harm suffered. Id. at 1044. The standard of 

reasonableness “‘is not as high as the standard required in other areas of law.’” Id. at 1045 

(quoting Green v. Smith, 261 Cal. App. 2d 392, 396 (1968)). 

At the same time, however, the FEHA must be construed to protect employees. Id.

at 1040 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12993). The California Supreme Court has suggested 

temperance in application of the avoidable consequences doctrine. For example, an employee 

may fear reprisals for reporting sexual harassment. Id. at 1045. “[N]atural feelings of 

embarrassment, humiliation, and shame” may reasonably delay a report. Id. Or the employer 

may not have “consistently and firmly” enforced its policy. Id. The question of the plaintiff’s 

reasonableness is usually one for the finder of fact to resolve. Id. Here, a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Bernhardt’s complaints, though delayed, measured up to an appropriately lowered 

bar. She proposes as justifications her fear of violent reprisal from Lt. Griffith, fear of becoming 

a “rat,” and the pressures and disincentives created by a male-dominated environment and the 

hierarchical reporting structure within High Desert State Prison. Or a jury could dismiss these 

concerns and find a reasonable employee would have sounded the alarm much sooner given the 

outrageous and obnoxious nature of Griffith’s conduct. Because both conclusions are possible, 

summary judgment cannot be granted on the avoidable consequences defense to the FEHA claim. 

VI. RETALIATION 

A. Title VII 

Title VII also requires Bernhardt to exhaust her administrative remedies before 

bringing her retaliation claims. Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003), as 

amended (Jan. 2, 2004). The jurisdictional scope of a Title VII claim is only as wide as the scope 

of the EEOC charge and investigation. Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 

2001). In other words, the court may not consider allegations absent from the EEOC charge and 

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investigation unless those omitted charges could “‘reasonably be expected to grow out of’” the 

wrongs originally alleged. B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100 (quoting EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 

891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis omitted). The court may not consider new allegations unless 

they are “‘like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.’” Id. 

(quoting Green v. L.A. Cty. Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Appropriate factors to consider in this context include “the alleged basis of the discrimination, 

dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in 

the charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Id.

Here, the parties do not dispute that Bernhardt’s internal CDCR complaints and 

her EEOC intake questionnaire omitted any claim of retaliation. UMF1 no. 22; Intake 

Questionnaire, Bryant Decl. Ex. P, at 2, ECF No. 36-19 (showing, for example, that Bernhardt did 

not check the box for “retaliation” and only described “sexual harassment” and a “hostile work 

environment”). The EEOC charge likewise includes no “x” in the box next to “retaliation.” Id. 

Neither her intake questionnaire nor her formal EEOC charge names any person other than 

Griffith. Her intake questionnaire and charge allege discrimination before she took a leave of 

absence, but retaliation could only have occurred afterwards. 

Nevertheless, Bernhardt’s EEOC charge describes her fear of Lt. Griffith’s 

retaliation against her, although not directly from the CDCR. See Charge of Discrimination, 

Bryant Decl. Ex. T, ECF No. 36-23 (“In or about March 2012, I filed a complaint with [the 

CDCR’s] Equal Employment Opportunity office, resulting in Mr. Griffith’s removal from the job 

site. However, I believe potential retaliation from Mr. Griffith, and that matters could become 

much worse.”). An employer may be vicariously liable if it “fail[s] to prevent and promptly 

correct retaliation alleged to have been committed by a supervisor.” Reiber v. City of Pullman, 

No. 11-0129, 2013 WL 3984442, at *20 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2013) (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 

765). See also Muraj v. UPS Freight Servs., No. 04-6563, 2006 WL 2528538, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 

Aug. 31, 2006) (collecting authorities). Bernhardt does not make this argument, and the parties’ 

briefing and arguments at hearing did not address it. Bernhardt does argue the investigation of 

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her claims, including that she feared “matters could get much worse,” would necessarily uncover 

Griffith’s retaliation. Opp’n 19–20. 

Assuming Bernhardt’s retaliation claim had been timely, the facts before the court 

would not allow that claim to go forward. A plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation must 

establish (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the 

employee to an adverse action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the 

employer’s action. E.g., Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2006). “[A]n adverse employment action is one that materially affects the compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). A delayed investigation, 

or even interference with an investigation, is generally not an adverse employment action. See, 

e.g., Lewis v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 11-442, 2013 WL 5852659, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2013) 

(delay); Keeley v. Small, 391 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37-38 (D.D.C. 2005) (interference). See also Ray v. 

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s definition of 

adverse employment action as similar to that of the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, among others); 

Quantz v. Edwards, No. 04-5737, 2006 WL 1277093, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2006) (“[The 

plaintiff] failed to provide any evidence from which a jury could conclude . . . that the decision to 

delay [an] internal investigation would be reasonably likely to deter other employees from 

running for office.), aff'd in relevant part, 264 F. App’x 625 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) 

(“[N]either the investigation nor its delay constituted an adverse employment action . . . .”). 

Bernhardt cannot salvage her retaliation claim by citing the alleged inaction of 

several sergeants who worked in the same office with her and Griffith. See Opp’n 19, ECF No. 

36. She raised this theory of liability for the first time in opposition to this motion and has 

presented the court with no legal authority, binding or otherwise, to support her position. Neither 

can she proceed on a vicarious-liability theory of Griffith’s personal retaliation against her; she 

has not alleged or made any effort to prove he actually retaliated after she reported his behavior. 

Summary judgment must be granted. 

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B. FEHA 

California law likewise prevents a plaintiff from alleging claims in her judicial 

complaint that were absent from her administrative charge. Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 897 (“The 

scope of the written administrative charge defines the permissible scope of the subsequent civil 

action.”) (citing Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1121 (1989)). The FEHA 

mirrors federal law on this point. See, e.g., Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 26 Cal. 

App. 4th 846, 859 (1994) (adopting the federal standard). 

Unlike Bernhardt’s EEOC complaints, her DFEH complaint includes an express 

allegation of retaliation. See Bryant Decl. Ex. S, at 1, ECF No. 36-22. Nevertheless, she has not 

provided sufficient evidence to survive the CDCR’s motion. California law requires a plaintiff 

alleging retaliation in violation of the FEHA show “(1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ 

(2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link 

existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, 

Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). Whether an employer’s action was retaliatory and forbidden 

by the FEHA depends on application of the “materiality” test, that is, did the action “materially 

affect the terms and conditions of employment”? Id. at 1036. Not only “ultimate employment 

actions” qualify; a wide spectrum of actions may fit the bill if “reasonably likely to adversely and 

materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in his or her 

career.” Id. at 1053–54. The law prohibits an employer both from striking with “one swift 

blow,” and by serial, cumulative, “subtle, yet damaging, injuries.” Id. at 1055. 

Here, the CDCR has shown the terms of Bernhardt’s employment have not 

changed since she reported Griffith’s conduct and took medical leave, and that although its 

investigation was protracted, it undertook relatively swift remedial action, not retaliation. The 

CDCR reassigned Griffith and offered Bernhardt a new job. Griffith has now left the CDCR. 

Bernhardt remains out of work due to an unrelated injury, not because there is a danger of future 

harassment. Summary judgment will be granted on this claim. 

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VII. CONCLUSION 

The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Bernhardt’s Title VII and 

FEHA claims for harassment and a hostile work environment, including in light of the available 

affirmative defenses. The motion is GRANTED as to her claims for retaliation under the same 

statutes. This order disposes of ECF No. 33. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 29, 2015. 

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