Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01265/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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United Sta~ Cwn Q{ Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UIIITBD STATES COURT OF .APPEALS MAR i 7 1991 

FOR THE TDITII CIRCUIT 

REYNALDO B. BARELA, JR. , 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FRANK MUNIZ, U.S. POSTAL 

SERVICE, Denver, Colorado, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1265 

(D.C. No. 88-M-875) 

(D. Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGIIBlff* 

Before LOGAR, lfOORB, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1265 Document: 010110031434 Date Filed: 03/27/1991 Page: 1 
Mr. Barela appeals from the district court's dismissal of his 

claim that he was improperly discharged from the Postal Service. 

He contends his discharge violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 

his union's collective bargaining agreement, and the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978. The district court dismissed Mr. Barela's 

case based upon his failure to file timely appeals and upon its 

finding that the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply. We 

affirm. 

Mr. Barela received notice of proposed removal from his 

position as a mail handler on January 30, 1985. The notice stated 

that he was being removed for verbally threatening a postal 

supervisor and for failure to follow official instructions. This 

same notice stated Mr. Barela could respond within ten days to the 

accusations of insubordination by writing to a labor relations 

representative. Mr. Barela filed a response, but after the 

required filing date. 

Notice of his termination was mailed on February 28, 1985, 

along with notice of the filing deadlines for appeals for the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) (within twenty days) and the 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor, beginning the EEO 

complaint procedure (within thirty days). The February 28, 1985 

notice also outlined the future deadlines for the various stages 

of appeal under EEO, MSPB, and Postal Service procedures. On 

March 26, 1985, Mr. Barela was given a "Notice of Final Interview 

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Appellate Case: 90-1265 Document: 010110031434 Date Filed: 03/27/1991 Page: 2 
with EEO Counselor" advising him of his right to pursue further 

EEO action by filing a formal complaint within fifteen days. The 

record shows Mr. Barela failed to meet each of these filing 

deadlines. Certified letter receipts and affidavits in the record 

show that these notices were delivered to Mr. Barela's address. 

On July 3, 1985, Mr. Barela was notified of the rejection of 

his discrimination complaint filed with the Postal Service because 

it was filed forty days too late. This notice informed him of his 

right to appeal within twenty days. It also stated, "In lieu of 

an appeal to the Commission, you may file a civil action in an 

appropriate U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the 

[July 3, 1985] decision." (emphasis in original). Mr. Barela did 

appeal this decision to the Commission in a timely manner, but it 

affirmed the rejection due to Mr. Barela's failure to adequately 

justify his late filing. He did not file suit in federal district 

court until June 9, 1988, nearly three years after receiving 

notice that he must file within thirty days. 

Mr. Barela finally filed his MSPB appeal on July 13, 1987. 

This appeal was dismissed due to untimely filing on September 8, 

1987, after he was given two opportunities to explain his late 

filing. The MSPB stated that this initial decision would become 

final if not appealed by October 13, 1987. The record shows that 

Mr. Barela's petition for review was denied on December 16, 1987. 

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On this same date he was given notice of his right to appeal to 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 

thirty days. Certified letter receipts and affidavits reproduced 

in the record show delivery of these notices to either Mr. Barela 

or his attorney of record in the MSPB appeals. 

Mr. Barela filed suit in the United States District Court for 

the District of Colorado on June 9, 1988, setting forth the same 

three claims argued in this appeal. The district court ruled: 

(1) the claim of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 

u.s.c. 794(a), is barred because Mr. Barela filed this action 

after the thirty-day deadline set out in 42 u.s.c. 

2000(e)-2016(c); (2) the claim concerning breach of the collective 

bargaining agreement fails because the complaint was not wellpleaded and because the six-month statute of limitations for 

filing had run; and (3) the filing date for review of the MSPB's 

decision concerning violation of the Civil Service Reform Act had 

passed, barring further action on this claim as well. The 

district court then held that the doctrine of equitable tolling 

did not excuse Mr. Barela's untimely filings and entered judgment 

for the defendant on all claims. 

Because all of the relevant filings were untimely under the 

applicable statutes, the only remaining issue in this case is 

whether equitable tolling excuses Mr. Barela. He presents two 

reasons why the doctrine should apply in his case. First, he 

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argues that his failure to file a formal complaint of 

discrimination within the fifteen-day limitation set out in 29 

u.s.c. S 214(a)(l)(ii) was caused by his EEO counselor's 

misleading statements, and that he was misled by other officials 

into missing various deadlines. Second, he claims that certain 

physical and psychological limitations led to the delays in filing 

EEO and MSPB administrative appeals as well as his failure to file 

suit in federal court within the required time. 

A review of the equitable tolling cases reveals that courts 

have required either the employer or the government agent to "lull 

the plaintiff into inaction" or to "actually mislead" or "actually 

deceive" the plaintiff. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 

861 F.2d 1475, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 

54 (1989); Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 

347 (10th Cir. 1982); Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 

652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1981); Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency 

Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838-39 (10th Cir. 1979). Specifically, this 

court in Cottrell noted: "The notice from the EEOC advised 

plaintiff in unambiguous terms that his right to sue would be lost 

if not exercised within ninety days, and in light of this 

unqualified warning we cannot give force to plaintiff's assertion 

that he was "lulled" by the notice." 590 F.2d at 839. Indeed, 

Cottrell implies that even misleading statements can be cured by a 

subsequent unambiguous statement of the filing deadline. 

This court has established a more lenient standard for 

allowing equitable tolling in cases involving pro se plaintiffs. 

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, 

See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 1984); 

Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt. Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 

(10th Cir. 1983). Yet, in both of these cases the employer or 

government agent provided inaccurate information in writing to the 

plaintiff concerning the filing deadlines. In neither of these 

cases did the plaintiff receive notice that he or she must file 

within the deadline or waive all further appeals. Compare 

Cottrell, 590 F.2d at 839. The evidence in these two cases 

satisfied the "active deception" test established in the earlier 

equitable tolling cases. 

The present case is distinguishable from Martinez and 

Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro on the facts. Here, Mr. Barela was given 

written notice of his right to appeal each administrative ruling 

and was clearly apprised of the filing deadlines. Mr. Barela does 

claim that he was misled by the EEO counselor about certain filing 

dates, but this claim does not concern the issues involved in the 

present appeal. 

Because it is the plaintiff's burden to establish reasons for 

equitable tolling under Byers v. Follmer Trucking Co., 763 F.2d 

599, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1985), and Taylor v. General Tel. Co. of the 

Southwest, 759 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 1985), and because he has 

failed to establish that the notices themselves were misleading or 

to specify exactly how he was misled concerning the filing 

deadlines relevant to his claims before this court, he has failed 

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" 

to meet his burden. In addition, Mr. Barela has missed nearly 

every deadline presented by the Postal Service, the MSPB, and this 

court, demonstrating a clear lack of diligence in pursuing his 

case. In Martinez and Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro the plaintiffs 

missed deadlines by only a few days and were able to show they 

were diligently pursuing their appeals. Here, Mr. Barela filed 

his suit in federal court nearly three years after the filing 

deadline. He also missed at least three other administrative 

deadlines. 

Mr. Barela also asserts that his mental condition from 1985 

through 1988 prevented him from meeting the filing deadlines. 

While the record shows that he has been treated for mental 

instability, Mr. Barela fails to demonstrate the requisite degree 

of mental incapacity to invoke equitable tolling. The court in 

Speiser v. United States Department of Health and Human Servs., 

670 F. Supp. 380 (D. D.C. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 

1987), held that 

[T]he universally applied standard for determining when 

a person is mentally unsound for purposes of tolling 

civil statute [sic] of limitation is: "[The] disability 

is of such a nature as to show [plaintiff] is unable 

to ... comprehend his legal rights or liabilities." 

Further, impaired judgment alone is not enough to toll 

the statute of limitations. 

Id. at 384 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also 

Bassett v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1244, 1247-48 (S.D. 

Ohio 1984). The court in Dumas v. Agency for Child Dev. - New 

York City Head Start, 569 F. Supp. 831, 833-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 

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• 

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held that under New York law a plaintiff must show insanity to 

invoke equitable tolling. 

While he may have been somewhat distraught or depressed 

during the period of 1985 through 1988, Mr. Barela has failed to 

present evidence that he was insane or was incapable of 

comprehending his legal rights during the periods at issue here. 

Throughout the period in question, Mr. Barela demonstrated a clear 

understanding of his rights. He filed various appeals and 

petitioned for writs of review, albeit usually after the filing 

deadlines; arranged for an attorney to pursue his MSPB appeals; 

and filed a detailed prose brief in this appeal. The district 

court did not err in finding Mr. Barela has not demonstrated the 

requisite mental incapacity to invoke the doctrine of equitable 

tolling. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Hoore 

Circuit Judge 

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