Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00567/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00567-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ANTONIO AUDELO,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. JEFFREY BEARD and KAMALA 

D. HARRIS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-00567-H-PCL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court now is Petitioner ERIC ANTIONIO AUDELO, proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis, petitioning for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) The petition was 

originally filed on March 12, 2014; however, the case was dismissed without prejudice 

because the filing fee was not paid. (See Docs. 2, 3.) On July 10, 2018, the appropriate 

information regarding Petitioner’s prisoner trust fund statement was filed. (Doc. 7.) The 

case was thereafter reopened. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of his motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court granted accordingly. (Docs. 9, 10.) Now 

properly before the Court, the petition claims habeas relief is warranted based on 

Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsels rendering ineffective assistance at their respective 

stages of the matter, violating Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Id.) 

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The Honorable William Q. Hayes referred the matter to the undersigned Judge for 

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil 

Rule 72.1(c)(1)(d). After a thorough review of the petition, answer, state court record, 

and state court decisions, the Court recommends DENYING relief.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 

550 (1981) (holding in part that findings of historical fact, including inferences properly 

drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). As 

Petitioner has not objected to any of the facts presented in the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion, the Court accepts the Court of Appeal’s recitation, laid out in full as 

follows:

On November 18, 2009, [Petitioner], his mother and grandmother 

were moving out of their rented home because their lease expired. The 

owner of the home, Jose Rocha, [FN. We refer to Jose Rocha and his son, 

Manuel Rocha, by their first names individually, and as “the Rochas”

collectively.] and his son-in-law, Hector Ramirez, visited the home to see 

how long it would be until they were finished moving. Jose also asked 

[Petitioner] when he would be able to move an inoperable car parked on the 

property. The car belonged to [Petitioner]’s older brother who died in 1991 

as a teenager in a shooting in which [Petitioner] was also shot. Jose 

explained he received notices from the city to move the car or he would 

incur fines. Jose told [Petitioner] that he (Jose) would move the car and 

[Petitioner] became angry.

Ramirez approached [Petitioner] to calm the confrontation and 

[Petitioner] threatened to fight him. Jose called Manuel to come to the home; 

Jose and Ramirez then sat in a car parked in the street. [Petitioner] got his 

semi-automatic handgun and placed it in its box in the front seat of his car. 

[Petitioner], his grandmother and his mother continued moving items out of 

the house when Manuel arrived.

After Manuel arrived, the Rochas and Ramirez approached 

[Petitioner], who was standing by his car. As they approached, [Petitioner] 

grabbed the handgun from the box in the front seat of his car and hid it 

behind his back. [Petitioner] told the Rochas he would move the car but 

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added it did not matter because Jose was going to lose the house, 

presumably to foreclosure. Manuel told [Petitioner] the home was none of 

his business and told him to take his things and “go out.”

[Petitioner] pulled the gun out from behind his back and pointed it at 

Manuel stating, “Come on. What are you going to do about it? Let’s go.”

When Jose assured [Petitioner] they were not trying to insult him, 

[Petitioner] pointed the gun toward Jose and said, “You too, asshole!”

Although the gun was loaded when he pointed it at the Rochas, [Petitioner] 

did not load a bullet into the chamber or put his finger on the trigger. 

[Petitioner]’s mother tried to calm him. Manuel retreated to the car and 

called the police, and [Petitioner], Jose and Ramirez continued to argue.

[Petitioner] was arrested without incident and taken into custody. 

While in custody, he admitted he was under the influence of 

methamphetamine and later explained he struggled with addiction since his 

honorable discharge from the Army in 2008. He was charged with two 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon for pointing the semi-automatic 

handgun at each of the Rochas, with enhancements for personal use of a

firearm for each assault charge, and one count of being under the influence 

of a controlled substance. A jury convicted him of all counts and found true 

that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the two assault 

counts. At sentencing, the court imposed the upper terms for one assault and 

for the attached enhancement, simply stating [Petitioner]’s criminal history 

supported the upper terms. When 14 years old, [Petitioner] was convicted of 

possessing a switchblade, resisting arrest, and twice taking a vehicle without 

the owner’s consent. At 17, he was convicted of attempted premeditated 

murder, malicious discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and being 

personally and principally armed with a firearm. At 23, he was convicted of 

driving under the influence and causing an injury. At 25 he was again

convicted of driving under the influence, and convicted twice of being under 

the influence of a controlled substance. Finally, at the age of 34, he was 

convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia one month before he committed 

the assault on the Rochas while under the influence of methamphetamine.

The court sentenced [Petitioner] to prison for the upper term of nine 

years [FN. The trial court has the discretion to sentence a defendant 

convicted of assault with a semi-automatic firearm to state prison for three, 

six, or nine years.] for one assault count, the upper term of 10 years [FN. 

The trial court has the discretion to impose a consecutive sentence for the 

personal use of a firearm enhancement for three, four, or 10 years in state 

prison.] for the attached personal use of a firearm enhancement, two years 

for the second assault count, and one year for being under the influence of 

methamphetamine, which the court deemed satisfied by credit for time 

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served. [FN [Petitioner] challenges only the court’s imposition of the upper 

term for the first count of assault with a deadly weapon and the upper term 

for personal use of a firearm enhancement on count one.] In total, the court 

sentenced [Petitioner] to 22 years four months in prison. The court 

previously granted [Petitioner]’s motion to dismiss his prior strike 

conviction allegation for the attempted premeditated murder conviction, and 

[Petitioner] is eligible for formal probation. It suspended execution of the 

sentence and ordered 10 years of formal probation, cautioning [petitioner] 

not to violate probation because the prison sentence was severe.

[Petitioner] violated probation two months after sentencing when he 

admitted he used methamphetamine. At the probation revocation hearing, his 

probation officer reported [Petitioner] also had post-traumatic stress disorder 

as a result of his military service, refused to utilize available mental health 

services, and was a danger to himself and others. The court revoked 

probation and imposed the suspended 22-year, four-month sentence.

(Lodgment 6 at 2-5.)

Petitioner’s probation was revoked on October 11, 2011. (Lodgment 2 at 371.) 

Following the revocation, Petitioner began pursuing a direct appeal. Subsequent to his 

opening brief and the respondent’s brief, Petitioner filed his reply brief on September 12, 

2012.1(Lodgments 3, 4, 5.) Petitioner’s direct appeal was based solely upon the trial 

court’s alleged error in using the same aggravating factor to sentence Petitioner to the 

upper limits on one count of assault and the related enhancement. (See Lodgment 3.) The 

Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the issue had not been preserved as trial 

counsel had not objected to the dual use of the aggravating factor at sentencing. 

(Lodgment 6.) The Court of Appeal also determined whether the claim had any merit 

despite the procedural default. The Court of Appeal found the trial court was within its 

“discretion to use [Petitioner’s] criminal history to impose the upper terms on one assault 

count and on the enhancement.” (Id. at 6-7.)

 

1 Only Petitioner’s reply brief is file stamped. Plaintiff’s opening brief is neither file stamped nor signed 

by counsel, so the Court cannot determine when it was filed. (Lodgment 3.) Respondent’s reply brief is 

similarly not file stamped; however, it is signed and dated August 9, 2012. (Lodgment 4 at 10.) 

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Following this denial at the Court of Appeal, Petitioner did not pursue his direct 

appeal any further. Instead, Petitioner began pursuing habeas relief. Petitioner filed his 

first petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 3, 2013 in the Superior Court of 

California. (Lodgment 7.) This petition was based on the alleged error in sentencing as 

well as ineffective assistance of Petitioner’s attorneys at trial and on direct appeal. (Id.) 

The Superior Court rejected the petition, finding there had been no sentencing error and 

that Petitioner had introduced “no facts to indicate that [his] trial attorney made any 

unprofessional errors or that any decisions were not the result of an informed choice 

among tactical alternatives.” (Lodgment 8 at 3.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition in the Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 9.) In this 

petition, Petitioner abandoned the sentencing claim, and instead brought only ineffective 

assistance of counsel arguments with regard to both his trial and appellate counsel. (See

generally id.) The Court of Appeal denied the petition for the same reason the Superior 

Court did: Petitioner failed to provide facts to substantiate his claims. (See Lodgment 10.) 

For example, in bringing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding an alleged 

failure to investigate, the Court of Appeal noted Petitioner “has not provided us with 

evidence that trial counsel in fact never engaged in such investigations . . . .” (Id. at 1.)

To fully exhaust his state remedies, Petitioner filed his final state petition in the 

Supreme Court of California on December 9, 2013.2(Lodgment 11.) Therein, Petitioner 

framed his arguments as a response to the Court of Appeal’s decision. (See id. at 6.) 

Petitioner first argued his trial counsel’s failure to present his PTSD was due to a failure 

 

2 The Court notes that in his current petition filed with this Court, Petitioner includes an attachment 

which is a handwritten petition for habeas corpus, different from that filed with the Court here. (Doc. 1 

at 23-25.) Petitioner claims he attempted to file this with the Supreme Court of California, but it is 

unclear why it was never filed. This new petition is only cosmetically different from both the current 

petition and that which was actually filed with the Supreme Court. (Id. at 19.) Within this petition, 

Petitioner fully lays out the same claims. (See generally id. at 23-35.) The Court will read Petitioner’s 

arguments contained therein and address any additional arguments presented concurrently with the 

present petition before the Court.

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to investigate, which was so fundamentally ineffective that no further facts were

necessary. (Id. at 7.) Secondly, Petitioner argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for 

two reasons: raising a forfeited claim and failing to raise ineffective assistance based on 

trial counsel’s failure to preserve the now forfeited claim. (Id.) According to Petitioner, 

this was clearly sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance. (Id.) The Supreme Court 

disagreed, and summarily denied the petition on February 19, 2014. (Lodgment 12.) 

Petitioner now brings the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims before this 

Court in his Petition filed on March 12, 2014. (Doc. 1.) After a dismissal without 

prejudice, and a denial of a formal inquiry, the Court now turns to the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims. (See Docs. 2, 13, 14.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of state court only on the ground he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. §2254(a). Federal habeas courts may not “reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). “[A] state court’s 

interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged 

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 

74, 76 (2005); see Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a 

violation of state law standing alone is not cognizable in federal court on habeas”).

This FAP is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on 

the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d); Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal 

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court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; 

rather, the court applies an extraordinary deferential review, inquiring only whether the 

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 

1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877(9th Cir. 2004). Because Petitioner’s 

arguments involve only questions of law, this Court reviews the petition under the 

“contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Hines v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

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[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of §2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

Where the state court did not reach the merits of a claim because of the imposition 

of a state procedural bar, “there is no state court decision. . . . to which to accord 

deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Thus, this court must review those claims de novo. 

Id. However, AEDPA “does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision 

can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, 100 (2011). “Rather, [as the Supreme Court has] explained, ‘[w]hen a federal claim 

has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.’” Johnson v. Williams, 133 

S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 99).

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner is now before the Court arguing he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel from both his trial and appellate counsels. According to Petitioner, his trial 

counsel was ineffective for four reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to investigate Petitioner’s 

PTSD, (2) trial counsel failed to present expert testimony regarding Petitioner’s PTSD, 

(3) trial counsel failed to present imperfect self defense as a defense, and (4) trial counsel 

failed to research the effects of PTSD on Petitioner’s case and the law of self defense and 

defense of others. (Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Petitioner argues his appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel 

raised a forfeited claim regarding Petitioner’s sentencing. (Doc. 1 at 5-7.) Specifically, 

Petitioner alleges this was a shortcoming on his appellate counsel’s part because appellate 

counsel “raise[d] a forfeited claim . . . , and the[n] cite[d] a case that tells one that the 

very claim raised required Trial Counsel to object during sentencing.” (Id. at 5.) Trial 

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counsel had not raised any such objection, as required. Petitioner argues by this action, 

appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. 

A. Governing Law

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (U.S. 2000) (stating it is beyond 

question that Strickland is the “clearly established” law governing ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Jones v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). There, the United States Supreme 

Court establish a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To 

establish that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a challenger must show: 

(1) his trial counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) trial counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense. Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 694). A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient 

before examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged 

deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove 

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail.

To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors 

so serious . . . that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The 

relevant inquiry is not, however, what counsel could have done, but rather whether the 

decisions made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 

(9th Cir. 1998). In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered 

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained 

that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th 

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Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from 

counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, 

and the standard of review of highly deferential.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,

381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every 

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

It is well settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of counsel] 

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (a 

petitioner “making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of 

counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 

judgment”); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 933 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

where petitioner failed “to indicate how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure . . .” to 

conduct cross-examination on a specific issue); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 

(9th Cir. 1987) (defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel for failure to 

call out-of-state witnesses absent indication of what witnesses would have testified to or 

how their testimony would have changed the outcome of proceeding.); Cranford v. 

Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 453, 457 (D. Nev. 1987) (“Aside from the bald allegation that his 

attorney should have raised this claim but did not, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

how his attorney’s performance fell below the reasonable level of professional 

competence required by Strickland”).

It is well-established that a defendant has the ultimate authority to make 

fundamental decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his 

or her own behalf, or take an appeal. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977)

(Burger, C.J. concurring). However:

[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests, . . . the indigent defendant has 

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a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous 

points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 

judgment, decides not to present those points.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise would “seriously 

undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s 

professional evaluation.” Id. The professional judgment and evaluation every defendant is 

entitled to is an examination of the record, research of the law, and the marshaling of 

arguments on behalf of the defendant. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state court’s 

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell, 535 U.S. at 689-699. In order to 

merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that the state 

court’s ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); West v. Schriro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90802

(D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007).

The Ninth Circuit has held that a convicted defendant has no Sixth Amendment 

rights on appeal because appellate review is not required of states. “If, however, the State 

elects to furnish an avenue for appeal, its procedures must comport with the Due Process 

and Equal Protections Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Trial Counsel

Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective in four ways: (1) failing to discover 

and investigate Petitioner’s PTSD, (2) failing to present Petitioner’s PTSD to the jury 

through expert testimony, (3) failing to present imperfect self-defense based on PTSD, 

and (4) failing to investigate and present self-defense as it relates to PTSD. (Doc. 1 at 9.)

Respondent argues all of Petitioner’s claims to this extent are conclusory and should be 

rejected as such. (Doc. 18-1 at 13.) Given these allegations’ conclusory nature, 

Respondent contends the Court of Appeal was correct and could not have been 

unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s claim. (Id.)

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Petitioner’s arguments here can be simplified into two basic categories: 

Petitioner’s PTSD and self-defense. In order to best assess Petitioner’s arguments, the 

Court will rearrange his arguments under these headings. The Court will first determine 

whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to discover, investigate, and present 

Petitioner’s PTSD. Second, the Court will determine whether trial counsel was 

ineffective in his presentation of self-defense.

1. Petitioner’s PTSD Diagnosis

Petitioner first argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to discover his 

PTSD diagnosis, investigate the effect of this diagnosis on Petitioner’s case, and present 

the diagnosis to the jury through expert testimony. Petitioner contends had trial counsel 

discovered his PTSD before the trial an alternate defense could have been presented 

wherein Petitioner, affected by his PTSD, was prompted to commit the assaults as a result 

of feeling threatened and falling back on his military training to deal with the perceived 

threats. However, Petitioner’s argument in this regard falls short for the following 

reasons.

Petitioner argues that because he has “no evidence” of trial counsel’s “due 

diligence” performed before the trial, trial counsel must not have performed any 

investigation which would have allegedly led to the discovery of Petitioner’s PTSD. 

(Doc. 1 at 30.) However, a lack of evidence is not the same as affirmative evidence. To 

show ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must overcome a “strong presumption”

that trial counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Here, it is 

unclear whether Petitioner lacks any evidence of trial counsel’s investigation because 

trial counsel truly performed no investigation. Regardless, under the presumption, 

Petitioner must affirmatively show trial counsel did not conduct such an investigation. 

Without such evidence Petitioner’s claim alleging a failure to investigate does not have 

merit. Carillo-Valenzuela v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40531, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 

May 13, 2009).

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Next, Petitioner argues introducing the perceived threat would have played a key 

role in an alternate defense. What Petitioner fails to note is trial counsel in fact explored 

and presented this during trial. In examining the Rochas, Ramirez, and Petitioner, trial 

counsel elicited testimony of the circumstances surrounding the incident – primarily that 

there was little light illuminating the area of the incident. (See Lodgment 2 at 158, 168, 

246.) Additionally, in his closing, trial counsel explicitly laid out the perceived 

threatening circumstances, including the men’s tempers running high, the dark, the 

Rochas and Ramirez retreating to a vehicle when Manuel arrived, the three men 

approaching Petitioner together from the darkness, and Manuel raising his hands at 

Petitioner. (Id. at 313.) 

According to Petitioner, this presentation by trial counsel was ineffective. The 

Court disagrees. Trial counsel introduced testimony describing the evening’s events and 

the surrounding conditions. The Court notes trial counsel did not mention the perceived 

threat until his closing and Petitioner’s military training was only addressed on crossexamination. However, trial counsel bundled all of the evidence related to this theory and 

introduced throughout the trial, and presented the perceived threat and Petitioner’s 

referring to his military training during closing arguments. The jury therefore was 

directly presented with, and could infer any missing components of, the argument 

Petitioner believes would have prevailed. The jury knew of Petitioner’s military training 

and could assess whether it found the perception of a threat reasonable. The jury clearly 

found the theory not credible. Regardless of the arguably disjointed presentation, trial 

counsel did present evidence of Petitioner’s perception of and response to a threat 

adequately at trial. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim to this extent lacks merit.

Furthermore, while trial counsel did not address Petitioner’s PTSD during the trial, 

he did introduce Petitioner’s medical records regarding the PTSD in a mitigation 

statement submitted for sentencing purposes. (Lodgment 1 at 84-110.) This was 

appropriate because California law does not recognize PTSD to negate any intent 

required to commit a crime, but rather is only relevant to sentencing. See United States v. 

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Rice, 458 Fed.Appx. 652, 653 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding PTSD is relevant to sentencing 

even when it is not relevant to guilt). Given this, trial counsel was not ineffective for not 

presenting Petitioner’s PTSD diagnosis to the jury. Because Petitioner’s PTSD was

irrelevant to Petitioner’s actual trial, trial counsel could not have been ineffective by 

declining to introduce expert testimony describing Petitioner’s PTSD diagnosis. Trial 

counsel was correct in delaying the introduction of the PTSD diagnosis until the 

sentencing phase. 

Because trial counsel adequately presented the main components of Petitioner’s 

alternate defense and refrained from prematurely introducing evidence which would have 

been irrelevant at the time, trial counsel was not ineffective. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim 

to this extent must fail.

2. Self Defense

Petitioner next argues his trial counsel was ineffective for neglecting to argue selfdefense, or in the alternative, imperfect self-defense. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Trial counsel’s theory 

presented to the jury was that because the gun Petitioner wielded was not actually capable 

of firing a bullet without some additional manipulation, there could not have been an

assault. (Lodgment 2 at 250.) Petitioner was charged with two counts of violating 

California Penal Code section 245, subsection (b): assault upon another with a semiautomatic firearm. (Lodgment 1 at 1.) To convict a person of this crime, “the defendant 

must have done an act with a semiautomatic firearm that by its nature would directly and 

probably result in the application of force to another person.” (Id. at 309.) Trial counsel’s 

strategy was to show that without further action by Petitioner, simply pointing the gun 

would not “directly and probably result in the application of force” because some 

additional manipulation was necessary. (Id. at 309-310.) Trial counsel would attack the 

prima facie case by showing the act was too attenuated with an actual “application of 

force to another.” (Id.)

While trial counsel did not explicitly argue self-defense, or imperfect self-defense, 

as an affirmative defense during trial, in his closing argument, trial counsel did address 

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the aspects of self-defense and how they applied to the case at hand. (See Lodgment 2 at 

312-313.) To prove a prima facie case for assault against Petitioner, the prosecution had 

to show, among other things, “the application of force was not in self-defense.” (Id. at 

312.) Given this, trial counsel addressed whether Petitioner’s brandishing the gun was in 

fact in self-defense or not. Trial counsel explored this alternate theory in his closing, 

pointing to the tempers of the men involved and the darkness of the evening as 

justifications for Petitioner’s belief the situation was dangerous. (Id. at 312-313.)

Additionally, the jury was instructed comprehensively on the law of self-defense. 

(Id. at 291-93.) Based on the receipt of this instruction, the jury was informed and aware 

of this defense when rendering its final verdict. See Perrault v. Virga, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 47171, *35 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 2014). The jury, therefore, could have found 

Petitioner had been merely defending himself when he committed the assaults. 

Regardless, then, of whether or not trial counsel’s presentation of self-defense was 

actually deficient, there was no prejudice against Petitioner as a result of trial counsel’s 

actions, because the jury had the appropriate information when entering deliberations.

Lastly, trial counsel’s strategy in this case, as discussed above, was that because 

the gun Petitioner had used in the crime was not readily able to fire a bullet without 

further manipulation, Petitioner could not have assaulted the Rocha men. In furthering 

this argument, trial counsel was negating the prima facie case rather than presenting an 

affirmative defense. Presenting self-defense, on the other hand, would be presenting an 

affirmative defense, where Petitioner would be admitting he had committed the assaults, 

but was justified in doing so. Clearly, claiming self-defense conflicts with trial counsel’s 

chosen strategy of attacking the prima facie case. 

An attorney’s strategic decisions “made after thorough investigation of law and 

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690. In this case, Petitioner chose to plead not guilty, which he had “the ultimate 

authority” to do. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). However, because Petitioner 

chose to plead not guilty, trial counsel would have been arguing directly against that plea 

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by presenting self-defense or imperfect self-defense as an affirmative defense. Thus, by 

neglecting to explicitly argue self-defense, or imperfect self-defense, trial counsel 

represented Petitioner zealously and adhered to Petitioner’s plea. 

Based on this totality of circumstances surrounding the theory of self-defense in 

Petitioner’s case, the Court finds Petitioner has not shown his trial counsel was 

ineffective. Regardless of whether trial counsel was deficient or not in his presentation

the affirmative defense of self-defense, trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. 

Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s presentation of this defense was “so 

egregious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, . . . .” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

Instead, the record is clear that trial counsel presented the perceived threat the evening of 

the incident, Petitioner’s military training which “took over” in responding to the 

perceived threat, that the force used did not exceed that which was necessary to end the 

perceived threat, and Petitioner’s cooperation with law enforcement following the 

incident. After presenting this evidence, the jury was in fact instructed on the law of selfdefense as an affirmative defense, in addition to self-defense as an element of the prima 

facie case for assault. Thus, while trial counsel may not have made self-defense an 

overarching theme of the case, trial counsel did present self-defense reasonably at trial. 

Petitioner therefore has not proven he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

from trial counsel, either through the alleged failure to investigate and present evidence 

of Petitioner’s PTSD or through trial counsel’s presentation of self-defense. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s claim to this extent fails and must be DENIED.

C. Appellate Counsel

Petitioner next argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his 

appellate counsel when appellate counsel raised a sentencing issue on appeal.3 There, 

 

3 Respondent addressed an argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel; however, the Court does not see Petitioner’s claim to this extent. 

Nevertheless, even if Petitioner had made this claim, given the Court’s determination that trial counsel 

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Petitioner’s appellate counsel argued the trial court had erred by “using the same factor to 

impose the high term on the assault count and the maximum term on the enhancement.”

(Lodgment 3 at 10.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument because the issue was 

considered forfeited given trial counsel did not object to the dual use of Petitioner’s prior 

criminal history at the time of sentencing. (Lodgment 6 at 6.) Petitioner argues now that 

his appellate counsel was ineffective for raising a forfeited claim on direct appeal. (Doc.1 

at 5-6.) Respondent contends the Court of Appeal, in the last reasoned decision rendered 

on this issue, was correct in finding Petitioner failed to satisfy either Strickland prong in 

presenting this claim. (Doc. 18-1 at 13.)

At sentencing, the trial court recognized Petitioner had an extensive criminal 

history, which included an attempted murder conviction where Petitioner had engaged in 

a car chase and fired a weapon at an occupied vehicle when he was a minor. (Lodgment 2 

at 4-5.) This criminal history led the trial court to sentence Petitioner to the upper term on 

the first assault charge and the upper term on the enhancement thereon. (Id. at 352.) The 

trial court began sentencing Petitioner on July 7, 2011; however, in order to give 

probation services adequate time to devise the requested comprehensive probation plan, 

the trial court did not impose the final sentence until August 12, 2011. (Id. at 343, 365.) 

Petitioner’s final sentence was 22 years and four months, but the trial court stayed the 

execution of the sentence and placed Petitioner on formal probation for 10 years. (Id. at 

367-68.) Less than two months later, on October 11, 2011, Petitioner’s probation was 

revoked because Petitioner admitted to using methamphetamine. (Id. at 375.) Petitioner 

was thereafter taken into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. (Id.) 

While a failure to raise untenable issues on appeal does not fall below the 

Strickland standard, here Petitioner argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for

raising an unmeritorious issue. Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir. 

 

was not ineffective, the argument would be meritless. The Court will therefore not further address any

claim to this extent.

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1991) (“Petitioner was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not to raise issues 

that had no merit.”); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There 

is no requirement that an attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”) Specifically, 

Petitioner points out his appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel 

“raise[d] a forfeited claim on behalf of the Petitioner, and the[n] cite[d] a case that tells 

one that the very claim raised required Trial Counsel to object during sentencing.” (Doc. 

1 at 6.)

Illustrating Petitioner’s allegation, in Appellant’s Opening Brief, (Lodgment 3),

appellate counsel cited to People v. Osband, 13 Cal.4th 622, 728-29 (Cal. 1996), to 

support the claim that the trial court erred in finding one sole aggravating factor 

warranted the upper term on both the assault and the enhancement. (Lodgment 6 at 12.) 

Only three paragraphs preceding the passage appellate counsel cited, however, the 

Osband court states that while “Defendant raised no claims of error at trial, . . . , because 

the proceedings predate People v. Scott, (1994) 9 Cal. 4th 331, [(requiring objections at 

sentencing to preserve issues on appeal)]” the court considered the sentencing issues on 

appeal. People v. Osband, 13 Cal. 4th at 728. Thus, Petitioner argues based on this 

passage being so close in proximity to that which appellate counsel cited, appellate 

counsel should have been aware of the preservation requirements. This awareness 

combined with appellate counsel’s failure to address trial counsel’s lack of objection, 

according to Petitioner, means appellate counsel filed a “frivolous” claim on Petitioner’s 

behalf.

While Petitioner argues this claim brought by his appellate counsel was ultimately 

frivolous, (See Doc. 1 at 6), the Court of Appeal did not treat the issue as frivolous. 

Instead, the issue was addressed in a reasoned opinion, including an analysis on the 

merits, despite the issue’s procedural bar. (See Lodgment 6 at 10-13.) Because the Court 

of Appeal clearly did not find the argument raised by appellate counsel to be frivolous, 

Petitioner’s claim to this extent must fail. See Foster v. Garcia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

84721, *69-70 (E.D. Cal. November 20, 2006) (where the court found appellate counsel 

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was not ineffective for raising what petitioner argued were frivolous claims because the 

claims were not treated as frivolous by the state court). 

Because Petitioner has not shown his appellate counsel acted deficiently, nor that 

Petitioner was unfairly prejudiced by such deficient actions, Petitioner has failed to prove 

his claim that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel from appellate 

counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim to this extent is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable William Q. 

Hayes, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1) and Local 

Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and 

(2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties 

on or before June 6, 2018. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on or before

June 13, 2018. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specific 

time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Ylst, 951 F.2d at 1157 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 21, 2018

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