Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01449/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01449-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL A. TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. CASTILLO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:23-cv-001449-NODJ-BAM (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS 

(ECF No. 18)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Paul A. Turner (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff 

complaint, and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is 

currently before this Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility

(“SATF”). Plaintiff alleges that the events in the complaint occurred at Kern Valley State Prison

(“KVSP”). Plaintiff names Correctional Officer David Castillo as the sole defendant.

In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges a due process violation and an Eighth Amendment violation. 

Plaintiff was housed at KVSP, A-yard on June 8, 2022. Plaintiff was conducting his assigned

duties as a laundry worker on A yard. Plaintiff collected and distributed laundry to prisoners and 

other housing units on facility A. At about 8:10 am on June 8, Plaintiff and another co-worker 

were returning to their job site location on the patio of facility A. Upon entering the patio, 

Defendant Castillo ordered Plaintiff and the coworker to submit to a pat down. The coworker 

was ordered to go to work. Plaintiff was ordered to go sit down on the floor and was ordered to be 

“stripped out naked visual of patio camera and D. Castillo body camera also my co-workers and 

my boss was visual of me getting stripped out naked.” (ECF No. 18 p. 5.) Plaintiff voiced his 

objections of his rights being violated and the lack of privacy. After being searched on the patio, 

Plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to the program office where Defendant Castillo stripped 

Plaintiff out naked again so that Plaintiff could spread his butt cheek for Defendant Castillo. 

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal to see the patio camera and body camera. Plaintiff was 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

found guilty on 5/6/23 for drugs. Based on June 8, 2022 incident, there was no mention of drugs 

being found on Plaintiff. Plaintiff was sent back to Plaintiff’s cell on facility A. Under Title 15, 

any incident that is serious, video is supposed to be saved and shown to Plaintiff for an RVR. 

Plaintiff was denied video evidence. The video will show that Castillo stripped Plaintiff out 

naked out doors on the patio.

In claim 2, Plaintiff alleges a failure to protect his safety and security and fabrication of 

evidence, abuse of power, and retaliation. After the above incident, Defendant Castillo 

influenced other officers to not call Plaintiff to work from June 9, 2022 to August 9, 2022. 

Plaintiff was not permitted to go to his work assignment. On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff was 

permitted to collect laundry on A yard. Plaintiff picked up the laundry cart in front of A Yard 

building 2. On the way to the patio, Defendant Castillo was waiting for Plaintiff where Castillo 

patted Plaintiff down. He asked Plaintiff if Plaintiff had anything in the cart. Plaintiff said it was 

dirty laundry and Plaintiff’s Muslim oil. Plaintiff was then handcuffed and placed in a holding

cell where Plaintiff was stripped naked and was told that the Muslim oil tested positive for meth. 

Plaintiff was ordered to go back to his cell on A yard. After this Defendant Castillo told 

Plaintiff’s coworkers that Plaintiff had said that “it” was Plaintiff’s co-workers’ drugs, because 

Castillo wanted Plaintiff to get hurt by Plaintiff’s peers. On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff was 

unassigned from laundry. Castillo has showed his abuse of power and how he can violate 

Plaintiff’s rights and have inmates hate Plaintiff. Castillo, during the incidents, threatened to get 

Plaintiff fired and get Plaintiff off of A yard, which happened. He got charges filed against 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff “observed c/o Castillo telling my coworkers that as long as I was assigned to 

laundry he would frequently search them.” Plaintiff took this as a means of intimidation to get 

Plaintiff off the yard.

As remedies, Plaintiff wants the courts to investigate Defendant Castillo, Plaintiff wants 

him fired and wants compensation of $50,000.

III. Discussion

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969.

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but is not a clear statement. Plaintiff's complaint relies 

on generalized and conclusory allegations and lacks specific factual allegations about what 

happened. Most of Plaintiff's allegations are vague and conclusory statements that do not contain 

enough factual details to permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference that any named 

Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. General assertions 

regarding who knew what about Plaintiff are not sufficient, and Plaintiff may not merely state that 

actions happened without providing any factual allegations in support of his claims. 

B. Fourth Amendment – Strip Searches

“The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 558 (1979). Courts regularly recognize the importance and difficulty of keeping detention 

facilities free from drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Id. at 559; see also Way v. Cty. of 

Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2006). However, courts also recognize the “frightening 

and humiliating invasion” occasioned by a strip search “even when conducted with all due 

courtesy.” Way, 445 F.3d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted); Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. 

Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011). Although some visual body cavity searches 

of prisoners may be reasonable, others can “be excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to 

any legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 322 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“[I]ncarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.”). There is no precise definition 

to assess reasonableness, and each case “requires a balancing of the need for the particular search 

against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The prisoner 

“bears the burden of showing that [prison] officials intentionally used exaggerated or excessive 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

means to enforce security.” Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333) (finding visual body cavity search conducted in full view of other 

inmates and intended to detect illicit drugs was reasonably related to a legitimate penological 

interest).

Plaintiff alleges that he was strip searched, but routine strip searches have been held 

constitutional. See generally Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d at 333. However, Plaintiff alleges 

that the first strip search was done in a manner to invade his privacy by recording the search on 

Defendant's body worn camera and/or on the patio camera. “The [Supreme] Court [has] obviously 

recognized that not all strip search procedures will be reasonable; some could be excessive, 

vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d 

at 332.

As to the first strip search on the patio, liberally construing the allegations in the 

complaint, Plaintiff states a Fourth Amendment violation for conducting the first strip search with 

an activated body camera and patio camera.1

C. False Accusation 

Plaintiff appears to allege that he received a false disciplinary report. Although not 

entirely clear, it appears Plaintiff is alleging that he was falsely accused of possession of 

controlled substances.

Inmates do not have any due process right to be free from false disciplinary charges. See

Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (inmates have “no constitutionally 

guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the 

deprivation of a protected liberty interest,” provided that they are “not . . . deprived of a protected 

liberty interest without due process of law.”); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir.

1989) (“Sprouse’s claims based on the falsity of the charges and the impropriety of Babcock’s 

involvement in the grievance procedure, standing alone, do not state constitutional claims.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim that any defendant wrote a false disciplinary charge or misclassified 

1 This screening order recognizes a cognizable claim only for the strip search in which the body camera was activated

and/or the patio camera activated. Where the strip search was conducted without the cameras being activated (i.e., in 

the program office), the Court does not find a cognizable claim.

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

a disciplinary charge fails to state a cognizable claim.

The creation of false evidence, standing alone, is not actionable under § 1983. See 

Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987) (independent right to accurate prison 

record has not been recognized); Johnson v. Felker, No. 1:12–cv–02719 GEB KJN (PC), 2013 

WL 6243280, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Prisoners have no constitutionally guaranteed right 

to be free from false accusations of misconduct, so the mere falsification of a report does not give 

rise to a claim under section 1983.”) (citations omitted). Moreover, “plaintiff cannot state a 

cognizable Eighth Amendment violation based on an allegation that defendant[ ] issued a false 

rule violation against plaintiff.” Jones v. Prater, No. 2:10-cv-01381 JAM KJN P, 2012 WL 

1979225, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 2012); see also Youngs v. Barretto, No. 2:16-cv-0276 JAM AC 

P, 2018 WL 2198707, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2019) (noting that issuance of false rules violation 

report does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was prosecuted for the false charges. See 

Theodoropoulos v. Cty. of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:19-cv-00417-JGB-KES, 2020 WL 5239859, 

at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 17, 2020) (“[F]abrication of evidence is not a constitutional violation unless 

the fabricated evidence played a material role in the plaintiff's prosecution.”).

D. Fourteenth Amendment – Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff may be attempting to allege that he was denied due process at his RVR hearing

because the video evidence was not available. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from 

being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 

(1974). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff 

must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty 

interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 

U.S. 460, 466 (1983).

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. 539, 556 (1974). With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural 

requirements that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may 

prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and 

reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, 

when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the 

issues presented are legally complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71. In addition “[s]ome evidence” 

must support the decision of the hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 

(1985). The standard is not particularly stringent and the relevant inquiry is whether “there is any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached . . . .” Id. at 455–56 (emphasis 

added).

Plaintiff alleges that video evidence was not permitted or shown at his RVR hearing, and 

it may have been deleted. Plaintiff does not have a due process right to present audio or video 

recordings during a disciplinary hearing, as long at the Wolff factors are satisfied. As alleged, the 

complaint does not set forth sufficient information to determine whether Plaintiff states a due 

process claim. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency.

E. Retaliation

It is unclear what Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is, and Plaintiff may be alleging a 

claim for retaliation. Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to 

speech or to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 

F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 

1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable 

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 

408 F.3d 559, 567– 68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th 

Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

Adverse action taken against a prisoner “need not be an independent constitutional 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

violation. The mere threat of harm can be an adverse action.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 

(internal citations omitted). A causal connection between the adverse action and the protected 

conduct can be alleged by an allegation of a chronology of events from which retaliation can be 

inferred. Id. The filing of grievances and the pursuit of civil rights litigation against prison 

officials are both protected activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68. The plaintiff must allege 

either a chilling effect on future First Amendment activities, or that he suffered some other harm 

that is “more than minimal.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. A plaintiff successfully pleads that the 

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal by alleging, in addition to a 

retaliatory motive, that the defendant’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” or that they were 

“unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution.” Id.

Plaintiff has failed to allege the facts for each of the elements of a claim for retaliation

against any defendant. Plaintiff does not allege any protected conduct he engaged in. Plaintiff also 

fails to allege that any conduct chilled Plaintiff's First Amendment rights or that it did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this 

deficiency.

F. Prison Regulations

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to bring any claims solely based on a defendant’s 

violation of prison rules and policies, he may not do so, as alleged violations of prison rules and 

policies do not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of 

action for the deprivation of federally protected rights. “To the extent that the violation of a state 

law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by 

the federal Constitution, [s]ection 1983 offers no redress.” Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 

1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th 

Cir. 1996)); see Davis v. Kissinger, No. CIV S–04–0878-GEB-DAD-P, 2009 WL 256574, *12 n. 

4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009). Nor is there any liability under § 1983 for violating prison policy. 

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the violation of any prison 

regulation, rule or policy does not amount to a cognizable claim under federal law, nor does it 

amount to any independent cause of action under section 1983.

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

G. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect

It is unclear if Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for failure to protect. Prison 

officials “are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 

inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). A prisoner may state a Section 1983 

claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials where the officials acted with 

deliberate indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury to him. Labatad v. Corrections 

Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). However, prison officials are liable under 

the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference 

occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 

harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.825, 834, 841 (1994). The official is not liable under the 

Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, at 837.

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant because Plaintiff fails to allege 

any factual support that Defendant was aware that Plaintiff was at risk of serious harm and failed 

to take reasonable action. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege that any harm resulted to Plaintiff 

because of Defendant’s conduct. An assertion that Plaintiff may have been in fear of attack does 

not subject Defendant to liability for failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has 

not identified any compensable injury to himself. Damages are not available to prisoners asserting 

only mental or emotional injuries. Gonzales v. Harmon, No. 1:21-CV-00796 BAM PC, 2021 WL 

5179261, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV00796 NONE BAM PC, 2021 WL 5852720 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021). 

Here, Plaintiff's allegations do not state, but imply, that he experienced fear, intimidation, 

and threats of violence as a result of these incidents, but does not allege that he sustained physical 

injury; nor can such personal physical injury to Plaintiff plausibly be inferred from the alleged 

facts. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim.

///

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

H. Housing

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim for his removal from A yard, he fails to 

state a claim.

In general, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not give rise to federal 

constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (It is well 

settled that prisoners have no constitutional right to placement in any particular prison, to any 

particular security classification, or to any particular housing assignment.); accord King v. Lemos, 

No. 1:20-CV-01837-NONE-BAM (PC), 2021 WL 2038187, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2021).

I. Prison Employment

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under either the Fourteenth Amendment or 

Eighth Amendment for loss of his prison job.

There is no constitutional right to a prison job. “[T]he Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not create a property or liberty interest in prison employment[.]’ ” 

Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 

596 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam); and citing Baumann v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 754 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir.1985)); see also Rainer v. Chapman, 513 Fed.Appx. 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 

that the district court properly dismissed the California prisoner-plaintiff's “due process claims 

based on his removal from his work assignment and transfer from the facility where his job was 

located because these allegations did not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty or 

property interest.”) A prison job is not a basic human need and the loss thereof does not give rise 

to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Barno v. Ryan, 399 F. App'x 272, 273 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(unpublished opinion); accord Schessler v. Kostecky, No. 1:23-CV-01012 BAM PC, 2023 WL 

8437599, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2023).

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 

Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a 

cognizable claim against Defendant David Castillo for a Fourth Amendment violation for 

conducting the first strip search with an activated body camera and/or patio camera. However, 

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state any other cognizable claims for relief. Despite 

being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure 

the identified deficiencies and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed January 25, 2024, (ECF 

No. 18), against Defendants David Castillo for a Fourth Amendment violation for 

conducting the first strip search with an activated body camera and/or patio camera; and

2. All other claims be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which relief 

may be granted.

* * *

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-01449-KES-BAM Document 19 Filed 02/14/24 Page 11 of 11