Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05263/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05263-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODERICK WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD EARLY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:03-cv-05263-LJO-SMS-PC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

PROCEED WITH FIRST AMENDMENT

FREEDOM OF SPEECH CLAIM AGAINST

DEFENDANTS EARLY, LAMANCO, AND

PASTOR, AND TO DISMISS ALL

REMAINING CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN THIRTY

DAYS

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Roderick Washington (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the original complaint on March 3, 2003.

(Doc. 1.) On March 21, 2003, the court issued a minute order administratively closing the case

pursuant to a pre-filing order which was in effect against plaintiff. (Doc. 6.) The original complaint

was returned to plaintiff. On April 23, 2003, the District Judge issued an order directing the Clerk

to administratively close the case pursuant to the pre-filing order. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiff appealed the

orders closing his case. (Docs. 8, 13.) The appeals were dismissed by the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 19.)

On June 5, 2003, plaintiff filed a motion for the court to vacate the judgment and accept

payment of the filing fee. (Doc. 22.) On July 11, 2003, plaintiff paid the filing fee. (Doc. 23.) On

July 21, 2003, the court granted plaintiff’s motion and re-opened the case. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff

resubmitted the original complaint. (Doc. 1.) 

On December 8, 2004, the court screened the original complaint and dismissed it for failure

to state a claim, with leave to amend. (Doc. 36.) On December 20, 2004, plaintiff filed the first

amended complaint. (Doc. 42.) On March 21, 2006, the court screened the first amended complaint

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and dismissed it for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (Doc. 60.) On May 12, 2006,

plaintiff filed the second amended complaint. (Doc. 63.) 

II. SUMMARY OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”) was filed on May 12, 2006. (Doc. 63.)

Plaintiff names over 75 defendants, all employees of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) who worked at North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”) and Corcoran State

Prison (“CSP”) where plaintiff was incarcerated during the time of the events at issue. Plaintiff

alleges he arrived at NKSP on July 9, 1999, was transferred to CSP in November 1999, was returned

to NKSP on December 2, 2002, and was later transferred back to CSP where he was incarcerated

when he commenced this action on March 3, 2003. 

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights by

defendants based on denial of medical care, retaliation, interference with plaintiff’s prison appeals

and court cases, denial of a proper hearing, racial and religious discrimination, conspiracy by

defendants, misclassification of plaintiff as a mental patient, risk to personal safety, interference with

and loss of property, threats, negligent hiring, denial of right to correspond, and use of force. 

Medical

Plaintiff alleges that the events at issue in the second amended complaint began on July 9,

1999, when he arrived at NKSP on the bus. Plaintiff alleges he was experiencing swollen tonsils and

neck and back problems. He was medically screened and although he complained of symptoms, he

was denied medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges he was then subjected to bio-medical

experimentation when defendant Gary, a lab tech, injected him with a TB substance which caused

him to experience chest, eyes, throat, and tonsilar and stomach problems. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants Makesome and Salvia then ordered him confined to Ad Seg, and for four and a half

months he was denied medical care. Plaintiff alleges he could not hear, eat, touch his head, neck,

or any part of his body. He alleges he could not brace himself against any object, and he was not

given any relief or comfort by defendants. He alleges he suffered from upper respiratory tract

symptoms, infection, conjunctivitis, and stool problems. He alleges he was in severe pain

everywhere on his body and head. He alleges he reported the symptoms, and it was clear he needed

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emergency medical treatment and that his condition would worsen without it. Plaintiff alleges that

after the four and a half months were over, defendants ordered examinations and prescribed

antibiotics and Tylenol for plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that after he was transferred to CSP, he was

again denied medical treatment. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants deliberately falsified documents about his health, so they

could classify him as a mental health patient. Plaintiff alleges that defendants sought to give him

“psychotropic” medications, conspired to medicate him for mental problems, and wrongfully placed

him in a mental health setting. 

Plaintiff alleges that in 2003, once a week for about six weeks, he submitted sick call requests

to defendants Quicho and Wood seeking an appointment with the doctor for problems with his

tonsils, stomach, eye and head, to no avail. When plaintiff asked about the delay in seeing the

doctor, defendants Quincho and Chavas told him to keep resubmitting sick call request slips.

Plaintiff alleges he submitted request slips and grievances, but defendants Rhodes, Quicho, Wood,

Chavas, Giovanno and Henscel destroyed them.

Plaintiff alleges that after his return to CSP, defendants ignored medical orders from the Los

Angeles County Sheriff concerning pneumonia and H. pylori suffered by plaintiff. 

Plaintiff alleges he continues to have medical problems. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from

extreme bladder, stomach, back, chest, eye, head and neck problems and severe pain, as a result of

defendants' failure to provide adequate medical treatment. 

Personal Safety

Plaintiff alleges that defendants placed him in an extremely cold strip cell without food,

clothing, heat, showers, a mattress or blanket, or yard time for 3-4 days, causing him to suffer

physical injury and emotional distress. 

Use of Force

Plaintiff alleges that on December 30, 2002, he was removed from cell 115 and placed in a

holding cell by defendants Cambridge, Chambers, Westpaul, Sands, McDaniel and Gaskins. He

alleges that without warning they punched, pushed, and kicked plaintiff while he was handcuffed.

///

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Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Gaskin, Chambers, and Westpaul struck him in the back of the

leg and pushed him into a cage, causing a laceration to his forehead. 

Plaintiff alleges he was assaulted, sexually abused, and pepper sprayed He also alleges that

defendants intentionally and wantonly struck, kicked, stomped, punched and administered mace to

him. 

Adverse Prison Conditions

Plaintiff makes a variety of allegations against defendants concerning conditions of his

confinement. For example, plaintiff alleges that defendants confiscated or destroyed his mail,

withheld his property, destroyed his books, delayed his correspondence, denied him access to the law

library, refused to assist him with paperwork, destroyed his appeals, withheld his newspapers,

created false and misleading documents about his health, trashed his legal property, sexually abused

him, took away his job, stole or switched his clothing, and failed to reimburse him for misplaced

funds. 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 30, 2002 and January 10, 2003, defendants McDaniel,

Stevens, Cambridge, Westpaul, Uddie, Hicks, Lopez and Early placed him naked in an extremely

cold strip cell for several days for complaining about medical treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that

defendants deprived him of food, clothing, a mattress, yard time, and showers for 3-4 days. He also

alleges he was handcuffed, hogtied, and placed in restraints for 24 hours. 

Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that after he filed administrative grievances, he experienced discrimination,

property loss, and mail tampering by defendants Tauberman, Day, Truin, Hoyt, Guthrie, and Pastor,

because he had complained. He alleges that defendant Biggs confiscated and destroyed one of his

appeals. Plaintiff alleges that after he filed court cases and grievances concerning staff misconduct,

defendants Early, Coleman, Taxdahl, Flores, Lopez and Lomanco withheld his grievances, berated

him for allegations he made in his grievances, subjected him to property loss and transfer, and denied

him access to the courts. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ retaliation caused the district courts of

California to "shut the door on plaintiff for failure to pay filing fees." Plaintiff also alleges he was

transferred to CSP out of retaliation. 

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Plaintiff also alleges that defendants tampered with his mail, harassed him, created false

write-ups, and denied him access to the law library, yard, showers, food, and funds because he filed

filing grievances, small claims actions, and federal and state actions. Plaintiff also alleges that

defendants exposed plaintiff and his family to substantial risk of injury and death out of retaliation.

Interference with Court Cases

 Plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with his efforts to file and maintain his court

cases by confiscating, destroying and misplacing funds, legal property and books, and by interfering

with his mail. Plaintiff alleges that defendants denied him judicial review of the legality of his

confinement and conviction by trashing legal mail, withholding and trashing his appeals, and

refusing to reimburse him for funds misplaced in 1999. Plaintiff alleges that his confinement in the

SHU denied him of the right to appeal ineffective counsel. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions

caused the district courts of California to "shut the door on plaintiff for failure to pay filing fees."

He alleges he was denied access to the law library to make copies, get court forms, and study

case law for his habeas case. He alleges that some of his cases were dismissed because he could not

file responses. Plaintiff alleges that defendants do not help Ad Seg inmates with photocopies, legal

assistance, or preparing court forms. 

Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated against because he is a black Muslim and because he

protested his mistreatment. He alleges that blacks are more often placed in the SHU at CSP. He

alleges defendants discriminated against when they placed him in solitary confinement, interfered

with his medical treatment, and denied him access to the courts. Plaintiff alleges that he was also

discriminated against for filing grievances about loss of his property against defendants Westpaul

and Chamber. 

As an example of discrimination, plaintiff alleges that on December 25, 2002, he held his

food port open complaining about property, medical, and mail issues and afterward, on

December 29, 2002, he was placed in a cell with no lights and an inoperative toilet. He alleges that

also, on December 30, 2002, his legal mail was trashed and torn by defendant Oddies. 

///

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Plaintiff also alleges he was the only African American forced to submit to a strip cell search

and walk out of the cell naked in front of inmates in Ad Seg, even though he had broken no rules.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants confined him in prison and the SHU because he is

Muslim and because he provided legal assistance to other prisoners. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

intentionally discriminated against him by placing him in solitary confinement, mishandling funds,

and restricting his right to file appeals. 

No Proper Hearing

Plaintiff alleges that on January 4, 2003, he was served with disciplinary charges for delaying

a peace officer. Plaintiff alleges he requested that the hearing officer call as witnesses the inmates

who were housed in a cell across from him in Ad Seg. Plaintiff alleges that he also asked that

defendants Gaskin, Sands, Cambridge, Chambers and Westpaul be called as witnesses. Plaintiff

alleges that his disciplinary hearing was held by an unknown defendant who did not allow witnesses

to attend. Plaintiff alleges that after the hearing, he received a retaliatory transfer to CSP without

warning. 

Correspondence with Sister

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Early, Lamanco, and Pastor cut off his correspondence with

his sister, Lisa A. Smith, with whom he had corresponded for over 10 years, because plaintiff wrote

about prison conditions. Plaintiff alleges that on January23, 2003, after she had written complaining

of retaliation, she received a letter from defendant Early allowing the correspondence to resume.

Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to cover up their misconduct by creating false and

misleading documents about plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Coleman, Taxhdal,

Flores, Steeler, Castillo, Bravo, Fleske and Buckely conspired with various other defendants to

conceal the true facts and events surrounding their unconscionably violent intentional behavior.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Nyguen, Masseburg, Schultz, Rhodes, Markoff, Oliver, Ayson,

Makesome, Markoff, Rean and Keith conspired to place plaintiff in mental health facilities, force

medication on him, and conceal the fact that he was unlawfully injected with a virus. 

///

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Supervisors and Policies

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Early, Lopez, Flores, Taxdahl, Lamanco, Stevens, Graham

and Truerse authorized and ratified outrageous conduct and wrongful acts by certain other

defendants. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Lamanco, Early, McDaniel, Massburger, Nyguen,

Hammon, and others allowed defendants Early and Lamanco to hogtie plaintiff, knowing such

conduct would be harmful.

Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated because of the policies, practices and customs of

defendants who acted in supervisorial positions. He alleges there were policies for use of force, strip

cell policies, confiscation of property policies, denial of legal mail policies, punishment and

intimidation policies, discrimination policies, hiring and personnel policies, and policies to cover up

wrongful incidents. Plaintiff alleges his mistreatment, discrimination, and retaliation were

foreseeable results of policies, practices, and customs which were known to be deficient but

condoned by officials, supervisory personnel, and policy makers at NKSP. 

Grievance Process

Plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with the grievance process at the prison. He

alleges that he submitted prison appeals describing problems from July 1999 to 2001, and from

December 2, 2003 to January 17, 2003, placing defendants on notice of violations concerning

handling of mail, but defendants Coleman, Fleske, Tachdal,, Robinson, Lopez, Lomonco, and Early

confiscated and destroyed the appeals. Plaintiff also alleges defendants placed him on Appeal

Restriction status at NKSP and he was not allowed to file prison appeals. 

Personal property

Plaintiff alleges defendants withheld his mail and newspapers. He alleges his job was taken

away, and defendants forced him to mail his clothing home, then stole or switched his

clothing. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants failed to reimburse him for funds misplaced in 1999.

State liberty interests

Plaintiff alleges that defendants have deprived him of state-created liberty interests by (1)

failing to notify plaintiff by way of memorandum, (2) retaliating against him, (3) depriving him of

clothing as punishment, and sexual molestation, (4) failing to provide personal safety, (5) destroying,

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confiscating and trashing property, (6) denying him procedural due process, (7) tampering with mail,

and losing funds, books, and mail, (8) failing to provide medical treatment, and (10) discriminating

against him. Plaintiff also alleges that under California Civil Code § 51.7 and 52.2(b), defendants

acted and conspired to beat, terrorize and intimidate him because of his race, color, and/or national

origin. 

Negligent Hiring

Plaintiff alleges that defendants negligently failed to assign, supervise, or control officers,

fostering a code of silence. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Lomanco, Earl, Grannis, Garibay,

Woodford, and the CDC negligently employed, retained, supervised, and trained certain correctional

officers, medical personnel and doctors, resulting in injury to plaintiff. 

Defamation

Plaintiff alleges defendants defamed him by characterizing him as crazy, harming his

reputation and health. 

Injuries & Relief

Plaintiff alleges he suffered grave bodily and emotional injuries, loss of property, and

incurred medical expenses. He alleges he has permanent scarring on his heart, chest, liver, stomach,

and eyes. As relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive

relief, attorney fees and costs, and trial by jury.

III. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

///

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person ‘does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500

F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he

‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the

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Plaintiff is well aware of Rule 8(a) but continues to file voluminous documents. He has filed sixty eight 1

civil cases in this district and has attempted to file many others. At least three of the filed cases were dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(2) as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Therefore, under the three strikes provision of § 1915(g), plaintiff is not allowed to bring a civil action without

prepayment of the filing fee unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Plaintiff is also subject to a pre-filing review order at this court. The instant action was dismissed on April 23, 2003

(Doc. 12.); however, the court reinstated the action on July 21, 2003 after plaintiff paid the filing fee. (Doc. 24.) 

Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.2002). 2

Thus, even if plaintiff has since exhausted, the claims based on events occurring after the date the original complaint

was filed would be dismissed as the exhaustion did not occur prior to filing suit. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201.

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actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id.

(quoting Johnson 588 F.2d at 743-44). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that

show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

A. Rule 8(a)

The court has informed plaintiff more than once that in filing a complaint, he needs to

comply with Rule 8(a) which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing plaintiff is

entitled to relief. Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need

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only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Rule 8(a) does not

require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon at trial, but only a

statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is extremely difficult to read, consisting of forty five

(45) handwritten pages with two hundred twenty eight (228) separate paragraphs. Plaintiff names

over seventy five (75) defendants and discusses fourteen (14) claims for relief. Although plaintiff

provides headings for each of his fourteen claims for relief, underneath each claim he incorporates

all of the preceding paragraphs by reference. The time frame of these incidents appears to span from

1999 to late 2003, well after the initiation of this action. Due to the manner in which plaintiff has 2

organized his second amended complaint, the court could not easily determine which facts go with

which claims and/or defendants. In fact, at first reading, it appeared to the court that plaintiff’s

allegations were insufficient to put any of the defendants on notice of his claims for relief. 

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B. Eighth Amendment Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that defendants ignored his requests for medical care, sought to medicate him

for mental problems, used him for bio-medical experimentation, and ignored medical orders from

the Los Angeles County Sheriff concerning pneumonia and H. pylori suffered by plaintiff.

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves

an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a deliberately

indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s

civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.”

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.

Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th

Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds,

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence

is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis

or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242

(9th Cir. 1989). 

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Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle, 429

U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical treatment, the

prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, overruled on

other grounds, WMX Techs, 104 F.3d at 1136; Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766

F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Although neither a physician’s negligence nor a prisoner’s disagreement with a particular

course of treatment states a claim for deliberate indifference, a prison medical staff’s acts or

omissions will constitute deliberate indifference if staff members knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Prison officials are deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “interfere with treatment once

prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The Ninth Circuit has found deliberate indifference where

prison officials “deliberately ignore the express orders of a prisoner’s prior physician for reasons

unrelated to the medical needs of the prisoner.” Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.

1992) (reversing summary judgment where prison officials forced prisoner to endure a plane flight

that resulted in ear injury, in direct contravention of a treating physician’s previous orders); Ortiz v.

City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curium) (reversing summary judgment

where medical staff knew that pretrial detainee had head injury, but prescribed contraindicated

medications, disregarding evidence of complications to which they had been specifically alerted by

private treating physician); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding cognizable claim

for deliberate indifference where warden refused to authorize prisoner’s receipt of medicine that had

been previously prescribed by a physician); Cf. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062(where surgery

recommended by prisoner’s prior physician was severely delayed, court was unable hold doctors

liable because prison administrators, not the doctors, were responsible for scheduling treatment).

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts against any individual defendant demonstrating the

defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff's health or safety regarding his

medical care. He also failed to show that a delay in his medical care resulted in further injury. 

///

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Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim for Eighth Amendment denial of

adequate medical care under § 1983 against any of the defendants. 

C. Eighth Amendment Right to Personal Safety

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights to personal safety when they placed him

in an extremely cold strip cell without food, clothing, heat, showers, a mattress or blanket, or yard

time for 3-4 days, causing him to suffer physical injury and emotional distress. 

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse.

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1250-51; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To establish a violation of this duty,

the inmate must establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

serious harm to the inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The deliberate indifference standard

involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective

terms, “sufficiently serious . . .” Id. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). Second, the prison

official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. Prison

officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. Id. at 1250;

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison

officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates’s safety.

Id. at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Id. (citing Wilson,

501 U.S. at 298). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts against any individual defendant demonstrating the

defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety. Moreover, plaintiff fails to show

any connection or link between the actions of any named defendant and the deprivation alleged to

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have been suffered by plaintiff. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim for

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s personal safety under § 1983 against any

of the defendants. 

D. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that defendants used force against him.

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain orrestore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at

9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s

chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,

1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of

a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9-10.

Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that defendants’ used wanton and unnecessary force

against him that was not part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Therefore, the

court finds that plaintiff’s claim for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment must be dismissed.

E. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff makes a variety of allegations against defendants for conduct resulting in adverse

conditions of his confinement. 

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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at

347. Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide

prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint,

801 F.2d at 1107; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128

(9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may

be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if

he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting

evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit

unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official

is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id.

at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations

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are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

“The Eighth Amendment guarantees adequate heating.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1091.

“Inadequate ventilation and air flow violates the Eighth Amendment if it undermines the health of

inmates and the sanitation of the penitentiary.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090 (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Also, the denial of adequate clothing may, under certain circumstances, rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that any defendant knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to plaintiff’s health or safety. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a

cognizable claim for conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment against any of the

defendants.

 F. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against him for filing prison grievances and court

cases.

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An

allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is

sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing that any named defendant performed a

specific act because of plaintiff’s protected conduct. Moreover plaintiff has not alleged facts

demonstrating that his First Amendment rights were chilled as a result of defendants’ conduct. In

fact, after the alleged retaliation, plaintiff continued to file grievances and proceeded to file the

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instant action. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual

was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. Therefore,

the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against any of the defendants for

violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 because of retaliation. 

G. Denial of Access to Courts

Plaintiff claims that defendants interfered with his efforts to file and maintain his court cases,

causing cases to be dismissed and causing the district courts of California to "shut the door on

plaintiff for failure to pay filing fees.” 

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate

wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions.

Id. at 354. The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances or to litigate

effectively once in court. Id. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration

or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from

the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). To prevail on his claim, plaintiff

must show that he suffered an actual injury by being shut out of court. Id. at 415; Lewis, 518 at 351.

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Id. at 351. Law libraries

and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id. Because

inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate

cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance

program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate claiming interference with or

denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id.

With regard to plaintiff’s allegations of denial of legal assistance, he fails to state a claim that

defendants violated any of his constitutional rights. With regard to plaintiff’s allegations of

interference with his court cases, plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that any named defendant

performed an act which violated his right to bring to court a direct criminal appeal, habeas petition,

or civil rights action. Plaintiff’s statement that defendants caused the district courts of California to

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"shut the door” on him is conclusory. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that

show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren, 152

F.3d at 1194. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for denial of

access to the courts under § 1983 against any of the defendants.

H. Equal Protection/Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his race

and religion, because of his activities as a Muslim and jailhouse lawyer, because he complained

about his mistreatment, and because he filed prison grievances. 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection

claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff establishes an equal protection claim by

showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of the plaintiff's membership

in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.2001). Under

this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendants’ actions were a result of

the plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d

1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish

an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972);

Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004); SeaRiver Mar. Fin.

Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim under

this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the

plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. If an equal

protection claim is based upon the defendant’s selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a

plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement is based upon an "impermissible motive." Squaw

Valley, 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1995).

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Plaintiff fails to allege anyfacts showing that defendants intentionally treated him differently

as a result of his race or religion. Plaintiff also fails to allege facts showing that defendants

intentionally treated him differently, under the circumstances, than prisoners who were not AfricanAmerican, Muslim, jailhouse lawyers, complaining, or filing grievances. Also, plaintiff has not

shown that defendants’ conduct toward him was irrational. Moreover, plaintiff fails to show any

connection or link between the actions or omissions of any named defendant and the deprivation

alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a

cognizable claim for violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 

I. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that defendants transferred him to CSP without a proper hearing.

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id.;

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the existence of a liberty interest

created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Such interests are limited to freedom from restraint which

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484. Prison inmates do not have a constitutional right to be incarcerated at a

particular correctional facility or to be transferred from one facility to another. 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). Nor do prisoners have a liberty interest in prison

transfers. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence of a liberty interest entitling him to

procedural due process. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

based on a violation of the Due Process Clause.

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J. First Amendment

In the second amended complaint at page 21, paragraphs 82 and 83, plaintiff alleges that

defendants prohibited him from corresponding with his sister because he wrote to her about prison

conditions.

In resolving challenges to restrictions on prisoners' speech freedoms, their rights must be

balanced against the interests of the state in the confinement of prisoners in order to deter crime and

in the operation of the prison system. O’Connell v. Southworth,422 F.Supp. 182 (D.R.I. 1976). “[A]

prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a

prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus challenges to

prison restrictions that are asserted to prohibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms

of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner

has been committed in accordance with due process of law.” Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 790

(9th Cir. 1982) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).

“Censorship of prisoners' mail, therefore, may be justified where the regulation or practice in

question furthers one of these important or substantial governmental interests and is unrelated to the

suppression of expression.” Id at 791. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)). But

the limitation must be no greater than necessary to protect the governmental interest involved. Id.

The court finds that plaintiff states a cognizable claim for relief under the First Amendment

for violation of his rights to freedom ofspeech under § 1983 against defendants Early, Lamanco, and

Pastor. The parties are here advised that the First Amendment claim found cognizable is limited to

plaintiff’s allegations in the second amended complaint at page 21, paragraphs 82 and 83.

K. Conspiracy

Plaintiff claims that defendants conspired to conceal facts about their misconduct, misstate

plaintiff’s health record, place him in mental health facilities, medicate him, and conceal the fact that

he was unlawfully injected with a virus.

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or meeting

of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.

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1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d

1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121,

1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact

details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’”

Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

Plaintiff does not provide any factual information showing that any defendant had an

agreement with another defendant to act in a way that would violate plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983.

L. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff alleges that defendants in supervisorial positions authorized and ratified wrongful

acts by other defendants. He also alleges that defendants were responsible for policies, practices and

customs at the prison which caused violation of his rights.

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts that

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be

alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507

U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendants personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them;

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or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen, 885 F.2d

at 646. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim for supervisory liability of

defendants.

M. Violations of Grievance Process

Plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with the grievance process at the prison,

confiscated and destroyed appeals, and denied him the right to file appeals.

There is no constitutional right to an inmate appeals process. The Ninth Circuit has held that

prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640

(9th Cir. 1988). The non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement, an

administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Id.

See also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.

1991); Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (”[A prison] grievance procedure is

a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not

give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the

fourteenth amendment”). Id.; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions

in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983

action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Defendants’ actions in responding to plaintiff’s appeal, alone, cannot give rise to any claims

for relief under section 1983. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the

defendants upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 for improperly responding to his

appeals.

N. Interference with Personal Property

Plaintiff alleges that defendants stole, withheld, or otherwise interfered with his personal

property. 

With respect to plaintiff’s property allegation, in order to constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and

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unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The confiscation of personal

property, however, does not give rise to a claim for relief for violation of the Eighth Amendment,

regardless of the value of the property to the inmate. Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegation is

insufficient to give rise to a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 

O. Threats

Plaintiff alleges that defendants threatened and harassed him. However, verbal harassment

or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and threats do not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, any claims

of mere verbal threats or harassment must be dismissed.

P. State Liberty Interests

Plaintiff sets forth numerous allegations that defendants have deprived him of state-created

liberty interests. As in many of the assertions plaintiff has made above, plaintiff does not provide

any factual information regarding his allegations. Similarly, plaintiff fails to link any of the named

defendants to any act or omission that resulted in the alleged deprivation. Accordingly, none of the

assertions made regarding state liberty interests are sufficient to give rise to a cognizable claim for

relief for purposes of section 1983.

Q. California Common Law Battery

Plaintiff alleges that defendants intentionally and wantonly struck, kicked, stomped, punched

and administered mace to plaintiff. 

Under California law, “[a]n assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to

commit a violent injury on the person of another” and “[a] battery is any willful and unlawful

use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code § 240, 242 (West 1999); 5

B. E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 346 (9th ed. 1988). 

Plaintiff has alleged no specific facts showing that defendants used force or violence against

him unlawfully. Moreover, plaintiff has not linked any of the named defendants to any act or

omission that resulted in a violation of his rights. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff's claim for

battery must be dismissed.

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R. Negligent Hiring

Plaintiff alleges that some of the defendants acting in supervisory positions negligently

employed, retained, supervised, and trained certain correctional officers, medical personnel and

doctors, causing plaintiff to suffer injuries. 

"California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person

for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee." Doe v. Capital Cities, 50

Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). "[T]he cornerstone of a negligent hiring theory is the

risk that the employee will act in a certain way and the employee does act that way." Id. at 1055.

Plaintiff has alleged no specific facts showing that any of the defendants "knew or should

have known that hiring" the "certain correctional officers, medical personnel, and doctors" "created

a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materialized." Id. at 1054. Accordingly, the court

finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under a negligent hiring theory.

S. Defamation

Plaintiff alleges that some of the defendants defamed him by falsely and publicly

characterizing him as crazy, injuring his reputation and health. 

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation.” Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal.App.4th

13, 27, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 752, 764 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Under California

law, “[t]he tort of defamation involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d)

unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damages.” Taus v.

Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 720, 151 P.3d 1185, 1209 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Reputation alone does not implicate any “liberty” or “property” interests sufficient to invoke the

procedural protection of the due process clause, and something more than simple defamation by a

state official must be involved to establish a claim under § 1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701

(1976). 

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts in support of his allegations showing that defendants

used defamatory language and published it to someone other than the plaintiff who would understand

it to be defamatory. Plaintiff also fails to provide factual information about the nature of the injuries

to his reputation and health that resulted from the defamation. Moreover, plaintiff has not linked any

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named defendant with an affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

rights. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for defamation.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations give rise to a cognizable claim for relief under

section 1983 against defendants Early, Lamanco, and Pastor, for violation of plaintiff’s rights to

freedom of speech under the First Amendment. This First Amendment claim is limited to plaintiff’s

allegations in the second amended complaint at page 21, paragraphs 82 and 83.

The court also finds that plaintiff’s allegations do not give rise to any other claims for relief.

Moreover, in light of the fact that the court has previously provided plaintiff with two opportunities

to amend the complaint, the court finds that plaintiff is unable to cure the deficiencies in the

complaint and should not be granted further leave to amend.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed only against defendants Early, Lamanco, and Pastor, on

plaintiff’s First Amendment freedom of speech claim, entirely found in the second

amended complaint at page 21, paragraphs 82 and 83; and that this First Amendment

claim is the only claim found cognizable by the court;

2. All other defendants in the second amended complaint be dismissed for plaintiff’s

failure to state any claims against them upon which relief may be granted; and

3. All other claims in the second amended complaint be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

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Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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