Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00315/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

AEP INDUSTRIES, INC., )

) 

 Plaintiff, )

) 

 v. ) 

) 

 CASE NO. 2:15-CV-315-WKW 

 [WO] 

THIELE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., )

) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff AEP Industries, Inc., (“AEP”) has a plant in Montgomery, 

Alabama, that manufactures flexible plastic packaging products. In 2013, AEP 

wished to purchase plastic bag manufacturing equipment that met certain 

specifications. Defendant Thiele Technologies, Inc. (“Thiele”) agreed to 

manufacture the equipment for AEP. AEP contends that the equipment Thiele 

manufactured did not meet its specifications; that some of the equipment was never 

delivered; and that Thiele committed fraud and breach of warranty by failing to 

manufacture equipment that met Thiele’s express and implied representations, 

promises, and warranties. (Doc. # 1.) 

Before the court are Thiele’s motion to transfer venue and motion to dismiss. 

(Doc. # 11.) Upon consideration of the motions, the court concludes that the 

motion to transfer venue is due to be granted. Therefore, the court will not rule on 

the motion to dismiss. 

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I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

 The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(a)(2). AEP is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 

New Jersey. Thiele is a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business 

in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Among the damages AEP seeks is a refund of 

$1,835,375.10 AEP paid Thiele for manufacturing equipment that AEP contends is 

defective. (Doc. # 1 ¶18.) Thus, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 

Personal jurisdiction is not contested. 

 AEP’s claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud concern a 

contract between AEP and Thiele for the manufacture and delivery of certain 

equipment to AEP’s Montgomery, Alabama plastics manufacturing plant; the 

contract was consummated in Montgomery, Alabama; and Thiele delivered, 

installed, and modified a substantial portion of the equipment at AEP’s 

Montgomery plant, where it remains to this day. Therefore, venue is proper. 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (“A civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in 

which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is 

situated.”); Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. 

Ct. 568, 578 (2013) (“[V]enue is proper so long as the requirements of § 1391(b) 

are met, irrespective of any forum-selection clause.”). 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

 A forum-selection clause “does not render venue in a court ‘wrong’ or 

‘improper’” under the statutes governing venue in federal courts. Atl. Marine, 134 

S. Ct. at 579. However, a valid forum selection clause may be enforced through a 

motion to transfer based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id. at 580-81. 

For cases in which the transferor and transferee forums are both within the federal 

court system, the doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 580. Section 

1404(a) provides: 

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, 

a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 

division where it might have been brought or to any district or 

division to which all parties have consented. 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

 Ordinarily, a court considering a § 1404(a) motion considers a number of 

factors relating to the convenience of the parties and the public interest to decide 

whether, on balance, a transfer would serve “‘the convenience of parties and 

witnesses’” and be “‘in the interest of justice.’” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). Those factors include:  

(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant 

documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the 

convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the 

availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling 

witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum’s 

familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a 

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plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of 

justice, based on the totality of the circumstances. 

Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). 

 However, when the parties have a contract that contains a valid forum 

selection clause, “[t]he calculus changes.” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581. Then, 

“the overarching consideration under § 1404(a) is whether a transfer would 

promote ‘the interest of justice,’” and the court gives the forum selection clause 

“‘controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.’” Id. (quoting Stewart 

Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988)). 

The presence of a valid forum-selection clause requires district courts 

to adjust their usual § 1404(a) analysis in three ways. 

First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the 

party defying the forum-selection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing that transfer to the forum for which the parties 

bargained is unwarranted. . . . 

Second, a court evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to transfer 

based on a forum-selection clause should not consider arguments 

about the parties’ private interests. When parties agree to a forumselection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected 

forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their 

witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation. A court accordingly 

must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the 

preselected forum. . . . 

As a consequence, a district court may consider arguments about 

public-interest factors only. . . . Because those factors will rarely 

defeat a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-selection 

clauses should control except in unusual cases. 

Third, when a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its 

contractual obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) 

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transfer of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-oflaw rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect publicinterest considerations. 

Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581-82 (citations omitted). 

B. The Parties’ Contract Contains a Valid Forum Selection Clause. 

1. Governing Law

 Because the applicable standard of review turns on whether the parties have 

a “valid forum-selection clause,” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581, the court must first 

determine whether the parties’ contract in this case contains such a clause. This 

determination turns on whether the contract includes Paragraph 11 of Thiele’s 

November 25, 2013 proposal labeled “Governing Law and Venue For Legal 

Actions.” (Doc. # 12-1 at 28 ¶ 11.) 

Paragraph 11 contains not only a forum selection clause, but also a choiceof-law provision, which provides that “the contract . . . shall be interpreted and 

construed in accordance with the laws of the state where [Thiele] manufactures the 

products.” (Doc. # 12-1 at 27 ¶ 11.) It is undisputed that Thiele manufactured the 

equipment in Green Bay, Wisconsin, Fergus Falls, Minnesota, and Reedley, 

California.1

 (Doc. # 12-1 at 4 ¶¶ 14-16.) However, neither the choice-of-law nor 

the forum selection provisions apply if the parties’ contract does not include them. 

                                                             1

AEP argues that the machinery was also manufactured in Alabama because, after Thiele 

shipped the first line of equipment to AEP, Thiele representatives went to Montgomery to make 

numerous changes to the equipment in an attempt to meet AEP’s specifications. For the reasons 

stated in Section III.C., the court concludes that Thiele did not manufacture the equipment in 

Alabama. 

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Therefore, to determine whether Paragraph 11 exists in the contract that the parties 

formed in Alabama, the court must apply Alabama law.2

 See St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co. v. ERA Oxford Realty Co. Greystone, LLC, 572 F.3d 893, 895 n.1 

(11th Cir. 2009) (“Because this is a diversity case concerning an Alabama 

insurance contract, we apply Alabama substantive law. A federal court sitting in 

diversity, as in this case, must apply the choice of law principles of the state in 

which it sits. In determining which state’s law applies in a contract dispute, 

Alabama follows the principle of lex loci contractus, applying the law of the state 

                                                             2

 In support of its motion to transfer venue, Thiele cites law from including Alabama, as 

well as from some jurisdictions that are not controlling, such as Florida. AEP mainly relies on 

Alabama law. Thus, the parties do not object to applying Alabama law to the contract formation 

issues here. In any event, the applicable Alabama law primarily consists of Alabama’s statutes 

adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, which, as its name implies, and for practical reasons, is 

generally uniform throughout the states that have adopted it. More importantly, however, 

“[a]pplying the choice-of-law clause to resolve the contract formation issue would presume the 

applicability of a provision before its adoption by the parties has been established.” Schnabel v. 

Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Trans–Tec Asia v. M/V Harmony 

Container, 518 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e cannot rely on the choice of law 

provision until we have decided, as a matter of law, that such a provision was a valid contractual 

term and was legitimately incorporated into the parties’ contract.”); DeNicola v. Cunard Line 

Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding, in an admiralty case, that “[g]iving effect to [the 

choice of law] provision for the purpose of determining whether it and the other [contractual] 

conditions should be given effect obviously would be putting the barge before the tug.”); 

Williams v. Gen. Elec., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1181 n.5 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (“[A] court cannot 

sensibly apply a contractual choice-of-law provision before the court determines that the parties 

have a valid contract.”). But see P & S Bus. Machines, Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 

807 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The validity of a forum selection clause is determined under the usual 

rules governing the enforcement of contracts in general. . . . Consideration of whether to enforce 

a forum selection clause in a diversity jurisdiction case is governed by federal law.”). In this 

case, unlike in P&S, the applicability of the forum selection clause is a question of the existence

of a forum selection clause (i.e., whether the parties formed a contract that includes the clause), 

not a question of the enforceability of a valid forum selection clause that is indisputably in the 

parties contract. 

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where the contract was formed. We are being asked to interpret an Alabama 

insurance policy; therefore, Alabama substantive law applies.” (citation omitted)). 

2. Thiele’s Offer

On November 25, 2013, Thiele sent AEP a proposal to manufacture plasticbag-making equipment. (Doc. # 12-1 at 7.) Thiele designated the proposal as 

number 13-10-56279 R3. (Doc. # 12-1 at 7.) Thiele’s proposal included detailed 

terms, such as specifications and prices for the various components of the 

equipment to be manufactured, a statement that the offer would be valid for thirty 

days, a proposed shipping date, and other terms and conditions of sale such as 

warranties and provisions governing testing materials, shipment, and contract 

cancellation. (Doc. # 12-1 at 7-27.) The proposal expressly indicated that it was 

intended to serve as the parties’ contract. (See, e.g., Doc. # 12-1 at 27 ¶ 11 

(provision in the “Terms and Conditions” section of the proposal discussing “the 

contract between Seller and Purchaser, including these Terms and Conditions of 

Sale”).) 

 The parties agree that Thiele’s proposal constituted an offer. (See, e.g., Doc. 

# 16 at 9-10, 16-17 (AEP’s brief in opposition to the motion to transfer, 

characterizing AEP’s purchase order as an “acceptance” that contained terms and 

conditions different from, or in addition to, those in Thiele’s proposal/“offer”).) 

See Ala. Code § 7-2-206(1)(a) (“Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 

language or circumstances: . . . An offer to make a contract shall be construed as 

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inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the 

circumstances.”); see generally Bergquist Co. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236, 

1248-49 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (collecting cases from numerous jurisdictions to explain 

that, under the UCC, “[t]he general rule is price quotations are not offers, but rather 

are mere invitations to enter into negotiations or to submit offers . . . . However, if 

detailed enough, a price quotation can amount to an offer which can be accepted. 

But to do so, the offer[or] must intend that the contract exist upon acceptance of 

the offer; that is, it must reasonably appear from the price quotation that assent to 

that quotation is all that is needed to ripen the offer into a contract. Whether this 

price quotation is an offer is a question of fact that depends upon the parties’ acts, 

their expressed intent, and the circumstances surrounding each transaction.” 

(citations omitted)). 

Thiele’s offer contained the following relevant provisions: 

1. Applicability: Seller’s sale of products and services is expressly 

conditioned upon the terms and conditions contained herein. All 

quotations, offers to sell, proposals, acknowledgments and 

acceptances of orders by Seller are subject to these Terms and 

Conditions of Sale, and acceptance by Purchaser is expressly limited 

to them. Any conflicting terms and conditions set forth in any 

purchase order or similar communication submitted to Seller by 

Purchaser are objected to, and are deemed proposals for addition to 

the contract of sale, and do not become part of the contract of sale 

between Seller and Purchaser unless expressly and separately agreed 

to in writing by Seller. Authorization by Purchaser, whether written or 

oral, for Seller to supply the products and services will constitute 

acceptance of these Terms and Conditions of Sale. 

. . . .

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11. Governing Law And Venue For Legal Actions: The contract 

between Seller and Purchaser, including these Terms and Conditions 

of Sale, shall be interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws 

of the state where Seller manufactures the products. The exclusive 

jurisdiction for any legal proceedings involving the contract between 

Seller and Purchaser, including these Terms and Conditions of Sale, 

shall be the state or federal courts located in the county or judicial 

district where Seller manufactures the products. Purchaser expressly 

consents to the jurisdiction and venue of such courts. 

(Doc. # 12-1 at 26-27.) 

2. AEP’s Acceptance

 On December 3, 2013, AEP sent Thiele a purchase order for “QUOTE # 3-

10-56279 R3.” (Doc. # 16-1 at 33.) AEP’s purchase order contained the following 

relevant provision: 

2. VARIATIONS: No variations in the delivery schedule, price, 

quantity, specifications, or other provisions of this order will be 

effective unless agreed to in writing and signed by the purchasing 

agent or other authorized representative of [AEP]. 

(Doc. # 16-1 at 36 ¶ 2 (emphasis added).) 

 AEP’s purchase order did not contain a provision regarding forum selection 

in the event of a dispute involving the contract. (Doc. # 16-1 at 36.) 

 Ala. Code 1975 § 7-2-207(a) provides: 

A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 

confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 

acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from 

those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 

conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. 

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AEP does not argue that the purchase order failed to operate as an 

acceptance on grounds that the purchase order expressly made acceptance 

conditional on Thiele’s assent to AEP’s terms. Instead, AEP argues that its 

purchase order operated as an acceptance that contained terms in addition to, or 

different from, Thiele’s offer. (See Doc. # 16 at 17.) However, AEP does not 

point to any term in its acceptance that is “in addition to or different from” Thiele’s 

forum selection clause. As AEP points out, its purchase order acceptance did state 

that “[n]o variations in the . . . provisions of this order [would] be effective,” but 

AEP does not explain which provision of its purchase order, if any, would be 

“varied” by the forum selection clause in Thiele’s earlier proposal.3

 Accordingly, 

with respect to forum selection, it does not appear that the acceptance contains 

                                                             3

 AEP’s purchase order did contain the following provision: 

12. MISCELLANEOUS: This purchase order, as the same may be amended or 

modified in writing, supersedes all prior understandings, transactions and 

communications, or writings with respect to the matters referred to herein. When 

[Thiele] has not expressly accepted this order, Thiele, by commencing work 

hereunder, shall be deemed to have agreed to all the provisions hereof. 

(Doc. # 16-1 at 36 ¶ 12.) 

 AEP does not argue that Paragraph 12 of its purchase order is applicable to the court’s 

consideration of the motion to transfer. In fact, AEP does not mention Paragraph 12. 

Accordingly, for purposes of the motion to transfer, the court will ignore Paragraph 12. Fils v. 

City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts cannot concoct or 

resurrect arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties.”); Polk v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 

No. 11–0725–WS–B, 2012 WL 1640708, *3 (S.D. Ala. May 8, 2012) (“It is well-established that 

courts cannot make a party’s arguments for it or ‘fill in the blanks’ on that party’s behalf.”). Cf. 

Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that federal courts 

“have a limited and neutral role in the adversarial process, and are wary of becoming advocates 

who comb the record of previously available evidence and make a party’s case for it”). 

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additional or different terms from the offer. Instead, the offer contains a forum 

selection clause, and the acceptance says nothing at all about the selection of a 

forum. Therefore, the parties’ contract contains a forum selection clause. 

Alternatively, to the extent that AEP’s purchase order could be deemed an 

acceptance containing terms that are different from or in addition to Thiele’s offer, 

the forum selection clause is nevertheless part of the parties’ contract. Alabama’s 

Uniform Commercial Code states: 

The additional terms [in the acceptance] are to be construed as 

proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms 

become part of the contract unless: (a) The offer expressly limits 

acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) They materially alter it; or (c) 

Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given 

within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 

Ala. Code § 7-2-207(2). 

To the extent that AEP’s acceptance conflicts with the forum clause in 

Thiele’s offer by virtue of omitting a forum selection clause, the terms of AEP’s 

acceptance are “different from,” not “in addition to” Thiele’s offer. If read 

literally, § 7-2-207(2) applies only to additional terms, not different ones. Some 

states approach § 7-2-207(2) literally; others view § 7-2-207(2) as applying to both 

different and additional terms. See generally 24 Causes of Action 575 § 24 

(describing different jurisdictions’ approaches to § 7-2-207(2)). Neither party cites 

a controlling Alabama case definitively setting forth Alabama’s approach to the 

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issue.4 However, AEP contends that § 7-2-207(2) applies.5 (Doc. # 16 at 17.) 

Thiele contends that, if § 7-2-207(2) applies, it favors Thiele because, in making its 

offer, Thiele specifically objected to the incorporation of different or additional 

terms. (Doc. # 17 at 6-7.) 

Thiele is correct. Under § 7-2-207(2)(c), different or additional terms in the 

acceptance do not become part of the parties’ agreement if the offeror has given 

notification of objection to the additional terms. Thiele’s offer expressly stated 

that 

[a]ny conflicting terms and conditions set forth in any purchase order 

or similar communication submitted to Seller by Purchaser are 

objected to, and are deemed proposals for addition to the contract of 

sale, and do not become part of the contract of sale between Seller and 

Purchaser unless expressly and separately agreed to in writing by 

Seller. 

(Doc. # 12-1 ¶ 1.) 

Alternatively, as AEP itself points out, an acceptance negating a forum 

selection clause would be a material alteration to the terms of the offer and, 

therefore, would not become part of the parties’ contract. (See Doc. # 16 at 18 

                                                             4

 The cases cited by AEP are distinguishable. The holding of Electrical Box & Enclosure, 

Inc. v. Comeq, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1250 (Ala. 2003) did not turn on the application of § 7-2-207(2) 

because both parties’ forms incorporated the contested arbitration clause by reference. Similarly, 

in Kennedy Elec. Co., v. Moore-Handly, Inc., the offeror’s terms were attached to the acceptance. 

5

 Because both parties appeal to § 7-2-207(2), neither party can be prejudiced by its 

application, and the court will assume, without deciding, that Alabama would apply § 7-2-207(2) 

in cases where, as here, the acceptance proposes terms that are different from the offer rather 

than merely additional to the offer. The court notes that applying § 7-2-207(2) to different as 

well as additional terms is consistent with Official Comment 3 to § 7-2-207(2), which states that 

“[w]hether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends upon 

the provisions of subsection (2).” 

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(citing Duro Textiles, LLC v. Sunbelt Corp., 12 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224 (D. Mass. 

2014).)6

Accordingly, even if AEP’s purchase order could be construed as containing 

“different” terms providing for no forum selection clause, those different terms are 

excluded from becoming part of the parties’ agreement by virtue of § 7-2-

207(2)(c). Therefore, to the extent that the provisions of AEP’s purchase order are 

different from the forum selection clause in Thiele’s proposal, the provisions of 

AEP’s purchase order are not part of the parties’ contract, and the provisions of the 

Thiele’s offer govern. 

C. Under the Forum Selection Clause, the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of Alabama is Not an Appropriate Venue. 

The forum selection clause provides that exclusive jurisdiction for any legal 

proceedings involving the contract will lie in “the state or federal courts located in 

the county or the judicial district” where the equipment was manufactured. In this 

case, it is undisputed that the equipment was manufactured in Green Bay, 

Wisconsin, Fergus Falls, Minnesota, and Reedley, California. (Doc. # 12-1 at 4 ¶¶ 

14-16.) AEP argues that the equipment was also manufactured in Alabama 

because, after Thiele manufactured some of the equipment and shipped it to 

                                                             6

 AEP cites Duro Textiles for the proposition that the forum selection clause in Thiele’s 

offer is “knocked out” because it conflicts with AEP’s acceptance. However, Duro Textiles does 

not support AEP’s position. AEP also cites Ala. Code 1975 § 7-2-207(3) for the proposition that 

conflicting terms in the parties’ forms cancel each other out. Section 7-2-207(3) is inapposite. It 

applies in cases when “[c]onduct by both parties . . . recognizes the existence of a contract . . . 

although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.” Ala. Code 1975 § 7-2-

207(3). Neither party argues that this is such a case. 

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Montgomery, Alabama, engineers and other personnel from Thiele came to 

Alabama over the course of five months to overhaul the machinery and rewrite 

software in an attempt to make the equipment meet AEP’s specifications. (Doc. # 

16-1 at 5 ¶¶ 16, 18. Thiele contends that its work on the equipment constituted 

“installing” the equipment rather than “manufacturing” it. The only definition the 

parties provide to establish the meaning of “manufacturing” and “installation” is 

the following: 

“Manufacture” is defined as the process of making wares by hand or 

by machinery especially when carried on systematically with division 

of labor, whereas “install” means to make (a machine, a service, etc.) 

ready to be used in a certain place. 

(Doc. # 12 at 10 (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 648, 757 (11th 

ed. 2012); Doc. # 16 at 14.) 

 Because both parties agree on this definition and provide no other, the court 

concludes that the parties agree that the term “manufacture” is unambigious and 

that this definition conveys their intent as to the meaning of the term. Therefore, 

the court will use the parties’ definition. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 

London v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 142 So. 3d 436, 454 (Ala. 2013) (holding that contracts 

“must be construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and that, if the terms of 

the contract are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction”); 

see also Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 746 (Ala. 2000) 

(“‘[A]s with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.’” (quoting 

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15 

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 

(1985)); Loerch v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of Birmingham, 624 So. 2d 552, 553 

(Ala. 1993) (holding that “the intention of the parties controls in construing a 

written contract,” and that, where the contract terms are unambiguous, the parties’ 

intent is derived from the ordinary meaning of the terms of the contract itself). 

 AEP argues that, after some of the machinery was “installed” in 

Montgomery, it failed to work as promised. (Doc. # 16 at 11-12.) Therefore, 

according to AEP, over a period of more than five months, Thiele engineers and 

personnel came to Montgomery, Alabama, where they “added,” “designed,” 

“installed,” “modified,” “redesigned,” “removed,” and “replaced” numerous parts 

of the equipment. (Doc. # 16 at 13-14.) AEP also alleges that Thiele sent 

computer programmers to Montgomery to “rewrite and redesign the software to 

correct, add, and delete aspects of the program.” (Doc. # 16 at 14.) Thiele does 

not, however, allege that any of the altered parts or software programs were 

“ma[de] . . . by hand or by machinery especially . . . systematically with division 

of labor.” (Doc. # 12 at 10; Doc. # 16.) Thiele also does not provide any evidence 

that the overhauling of the equipment as a whole involved “making” the equipment 

“by hand or by machinery especially when carried on systematically with division 

of labor.” (Doc. # 12 at 10; Doc. # 16.) Accordingly, it does not appear from this 

record that any of the alterations to the equipment that occurred in Alabama 

involved “manufacturing” as defined by the parties. Rather, the modifications 

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Thiele performed in Montgomery were more in the nature of “installation,” which, 

in contrast to manufacturing, the parties define as “mak[ing]” the equipment and its 

component parts “ready to be used in a certain place.” (Doc. # 12 at 10; Doc. # 

16.) 

 Therefore, the forum selection clause does not allow venue to lie in the 

United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. 

D. The Case Will Be Transferred to the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Wisconsin 

 Pursuant to the forum selection clause, this case may be transferred to a 

United States District Court in any of three venues: the Sixth Division of the 

District of Minnesota; the Fresno Division of the Eastern District of California; and 

the Green Bay Division of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Thiele seeks a 

transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

AEP does not argue that either of the other two district courts would be more 

convenient. Further, AEP does not argue that this is an unusual case in which 

public interest factors weigh against transfer to the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581-82 (“[A]s the party defying the forum-selection 

clause, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for 

which the parties bargained is unwarranted. . . . [When parties have agreed to a 

forum-selection clause,] a district court may consider arguments about publicinterest factors only. . . . Because those factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion, 

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the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual 

cases.”). 

Accordingly, this case will be transferred to the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Green Bay Division. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, Thiele’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. # 11) is GRANTED, 

and this action is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin, Green Bay Division. 

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to take the necessary steps to 

effectuate the terms of this order. 

 DONE this 29th day of March, 2016. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:15-cv-00315-WKW-CSC Document 18 Filed 03/29/16 Page 17 of 17