Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00018/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00018-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

STEPHEN HEINEMANN and SHARILYN

HEINEMANN,

NO. CIV. 07-0018-FCD-DAD

PlaintiffS,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COPPERHILL APARTMENTS; THE

GARABALDI COMPANY; JOHN L.

EVILSIZOR; MARY A. EVILSIZOR;

and KENNETH A. EVILSIZOR; and

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 This matter is before the court on defendants Copperhill

Apartments, John L. Evilsizor, Mary A. Evilsizor, and Kenneth A.

Evilsizor’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1

Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motion. For the reasons set forth

below,2

 defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

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3 The facts herein are based upon the allegations in

plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”),

filed August 31, 2007 [Docket #14]).

2

BACKGROUND3

A. Handicapped Parking Spaces

Plaintiff Stephen Heinemann (“plaintiff” or “Heinemann”) is

physically disabled. (FAC ¶ 2). At a young age, Heinemann had

to have the lower half of his left leg amputated. (Id. ¶ 19). 

He now wears a prosthetic leg to assist him in walking. (Id.) 

In 2001, Heinemann moved into the defendant Copperhill Apartments

(“Copperhill”) in El Dorado Hills, CA. (Id. ¶ 19). Copperhill

is owned and/or operated by defendants John L. Evilsizor, Mary A.

Evilsizor, and Kenneth A. Evilsizor (collectively, “defendants”). 

(Id. ¶¶ 3-6). The Copperhill management was aware of Heinemann’s

disability and that Heinemann traversed the Copperhill property

in a wheelchair on occasion. (Id.) 

Until May or June of 2005, Copperhill provided Heinemann

with a handicapped parking space that was a short, safe distance

from his apartment. (Id.) The parking space was located next to

a railed ramp, and the space was painted with the traditional

markings and colors of a handicapped space. (Id. ¶ 20). The

parking space was also marked “handicapped” by a post at the

front of the space. (Id.) At this point in time, the space

complied with the Americans with Disabilities Act Architectural

Guidelines (“ADAAG”). (Id.)

In May or June of 2005, Copperhill repaved the surface of

the parking lot. (Id.) After repaving the parking lot,

Copperhill management decided not to place the handicapped

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parking spaces in the same position. (Id.) Rather, Copperhill

moved the handicapped parking spaces two-hundred feet away from

where it was previously placed. (Id.) Additionally, the new

location of the handicapped parking spaces is atop a hill

approximately fifty to seventy-five feet above the level surface

where the space was formerly located, and it has a steep angle. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the angle presents a serious danger

to handicapped persons in wheelchairs or those who use prosthetic

limbs, particularly when the pavement is wet. (Id.)

Heinemann requested on several occasions that Copperhill

move the handicapped parking space back to its original position. 

(Id. ¶ 21). Heinemann spoke with a Copperhill manager and was

told that nothing would be done to accommodate him. (Id.) 

Further, Heinemann alleges that he fell while trying to navigate

the hill and that he informed Copperhill of this fall. (Id.) 

Heinemann also informed Copperhill that the placement of the

handicapped spaces was unacceptable and located in a place too

dangerous for handicapped persons. (Id.) 

Copperhill management told Heinemann that they had obtained

El Dorado County’s permission to move the handicapped parking

spaces and that he needed to contact El Dorado County if he

wanted to have it moved. (Id.) Subsequently, Heinemann went to

the Building Department in El Dorado County to inquire about the

process of having the handicapped parking spaces returned to

their original position. (Id. ¶ 22). The Building Department

gave Heinemann a plot map of the Copperhill Apartments that

showed the original location of the handicapped parking spaces,

but did not show the new location. (Id.) The Building

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4 Plaintiffs identify “Marilyn Heinemann” as a new

plaintiff in the FAC, but identify her as “Sharilyn Heinemann” in

the body of the FAC and in the caption of their Opposition to

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. As such, the court will refer to

the new plaintiff as “Sharilyn Heinemann.”

4

Department told Heinemann that there was no evidence that

Copperhill had either requested or been granted permission to

move the spots. (Id.)

Thereafter, Heinemann again confronted Copperhill about the

new location of the handicapped parking spaces. (Id.) Heinemann

was told that Copperhill did not care what El Dorado County said

about the parking spaces and that it would not move the

handicapped parking spaces back to their original position. 

(Id.)

B. Toxic Mold and Water Saturation

Plaintiffs Stephen Heinemann and Sharilyn Heinemann4

(collectively, “plaintiffs”) also allege that the Copperhill

Apartments were designed, built, maintained, and managed in such

a manner that the exterior of the building leaked water into the

walls and floors to the point of saturation. (Id. ¶ 23). As a

result, molds and fungus permeated the walls, flooring, ceilings,

and air ventilation systems. (Id.) Despite plaintiffs’ repeated

complaints, defendants refused to properly cure the defects

within a reasonable time or at all. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 65). Defendants

also assured plaintiffs that personal property damaged by water

intrusion or mold/fungus contamination would be replaced or

cleaned in a manner designed to restore the property to its

original condition. (Id. ¶ 24). Defendants failed to perform 

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remedial measures to restore plaintiffs’ contaminated personal

property. (Id.)

Plaintiffs contend that the hazardous living condition

existed at the time they took possession of the rented property

and during their tenancy. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 64). Plaintiffs further

allege a litany of damages to their health as a result of the

mold and/or fungus within their apartment. (Id. ¶ 70). 

Plaintiffs also allege that the rental value of the property was

diminished and that they are entitled to money damages for the

rent they paid. (Id. ¶ 69).

C. The Litigation

On January 2, 2007, plaintiff Stephen Heinemann filed a

complaint in this action, alleging violations of state and

federal law. The complaint was dismissed by the court for

failure to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a). On August 31, 2007, plaintiffs filed their First

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff Stephen Heinemann brings claims

against all defendants for violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), violations of the Unruh Civil Rights

Act (the “Unruh Act”), violations of California Civil Code § 54,

violations of California Health and Safety Code § 19955,

violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200,

and negligence, arising out of the new placement of the

handicapped parking spaces. Both plaintiffs bring claims against

all defendants for breach of the implied warranty of

habitability, fraudulent concealment, and negligent 

misrepresentation, arising out of the presence of toxic mold and

water saturation in their apartment. 

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6

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

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506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

A. Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

Plaintiff Stephen Heinemann contends that defendants engaged

in unfair and unlawful discrimination against him under the ADA

by failing to “ensure proper barrier-free access for safe, full

and equal use and enjoyment of the defendants’ business

establishments.” (FAC ¶ 25). Specifically, plaintiff’s ADA

claim is based upon defendants’ placement of the handicapped

parking spaces after the parking lot was repaved in 2005. 

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s ADA claim should be dismissed

because he fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) and

because he has not alleged facts demonstrating unequal access.

In order to succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination based

upon an architectural barrier, plaintiff must demonstrate “(1)

the existing facility at the defendants’ place of business

presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA, and

(2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Wilson v.

Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1067 (E.D. Cal.

2006). A defendant’s non-compliance with standards set forth in

the Americans with Disabilities Act Architectural Guidelines for

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Building and Facilities (“ADAAG”) can demonstrate a prima facie

barrier. Id. A defendant may rebut this prima facie showing “by

demonstrating that, despite the non-conformance with the

guidelines, the alleged barrier is not actually hindering equal

access by the plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges that the new location of the handicapped

parking spaces does not comply with ADAAG standards. 

Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the grade of the hill from

the parking spaces to the building was greater than 1:50 and

“well beyond what is acceptable for an ‘accessible’ route” under

section 4.3.7 and 4.3.8 of the ADAAG. (FAC ¶ 28). Plaintiff

also asserts that he had extreme difficulty walking up and down

the hill and that, on one occasion, he fell. (Id.) Plaintiff

contends that this alleged barrier existed on defendants’

property from May or June of 2005. (FAC ¶ 20). These

allegations give defendant fair notice of the nature of

plaintiff’s claim as well as the grounds upon which the claim

rests. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3.

Moreover, plaintiff also alleges that the new placement of

the handicapped parking spaces hindered equal access. Viewing

plaintiffs allegations as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences therefrom, plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges

that the grade of the hill from the spaces to the building

disproportionately affected access by disabled individuals to

defendants’ business. As such, plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged that defendants deprived him of equal access in violation

of the ADA. 

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9

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Arising Out of the Location of

the Handicapped Parking Spaces

1. Unruh Civil Rights Act

Plaintiff Stephen Heinemann brings claims under California’s

Unruh Act against all defendants based upon the placement of the

handicapped parking spaces after defendants repaved the parking

lot. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim under the Unruh Act

should be dismissed because plaintiff fails to allege that

Copperhill engaged in intentional discrimination. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that where a defendant violates

the ADA, damages can be awarded under the Unruh Act regardless of

whether a plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination. 

Lentini v. California Center for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 846-47

(9th Cir. 2004). In 2006, however, a California intermediate

appellate court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of

California law in Lentini and held that the Unruh Act required

proof of intentional discrimination. Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal.

App. 4th 223. 252-57 (2006). Subsequently, at least one federal

court has followed Lentini and disregarded Gunther. Wilson v.

Haria & Gogri Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135-41 (E.D. Cal.

2007). Other federal district courts have noted the unsettled

nature of this issue. See e.g., Pinnock v. Safino Designs, Inc.,

No. 06CV1707L, 2007 WL 2462107 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2007); Pinnock

v. Solana Beach Do It Yourself Dog Wash, Inc., No. 06CV1816, 2007

WL 1989635 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2007); Wilson v. PFS, LLC, 493 F.

Supp. 2d 1122, 1125-26 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff must plead

intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act, under the liberal

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notice pleading standards applicable in federal court, plaintiff

has satisfied this burden. Plaintiff specifically alleges that

defendants’ conduct was done intentionally. (FAC ¶ 34). In

support of this assertion, plaintiff alleges that he informed

defendants that the new location of the handicapped parking

spaces was unacceptable and dangerous to him as a disabled

individual. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants lied to

him by stating that El Dorado County had given them permission to

move the spaces. Plaintiff also alleges that when he confronted

defendants with information obtained from El Dorado County, he

was told that the parking spaces would not be moved. As such,

assuming plaintiff must meet the more inclusive burden of

pleading intentional conduct, plaintiff’s allegations

sufficiently assert that defendants intentionally discriminated

against him.

2. Plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims

 Plaintiff Stephen Heinemann’s remaining state law claims also

arise out of the placement of the handicapped parking spaces. 

Defendants generally contend that plaintiff’s third, fifth, and

sixth claims should be dismissed on the grounds that plaintiff

does not adequately allege facts sufficient to place them on

notice of the claims against them and the factual basis for the

claims. However, as set forth above, plaintiff alleges that

defendants denied plaintiff equal access while he lived in the

Copperhill apartments through the placement of the handicapped

parking spaces at the top of a hill that was dangerous to

disabled individuals, particularly when it was wet. These

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief under the

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applicable liberal notice pleading standard set forth in Rule

8(a).

Defendants specifically contend that plaintiff’s negligence

claim should be dismissed because plaintiff’s allegations fail to

identify how defendants failed to conform to the applicable

Uniform Building Codes and fail to identify which Uniform

Building Codes are applicable. Contrary to defendants’

assertions, plaintiff alleges that defendants illegally moved the

handicapped parking spaces from the location that El Dorado

County approved on May 12, 1989. (FAC ¶ 45). Plaintiff alleges

that the new location of the parking spaces violated the ADA,

California Government Code § 4450, California Health and Safety

Code § 19955, California Civil Code §§ 52 et seq.. (Id. ¶¶ 44-

45). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants’ conduct in moving

the handicapped parking spaces without approval by the county

violates numerous building codes. (Id. ¶ 47). While the

allegations are broad in nature, they adequately provide

defendants with notice of the nature of and the factual basis for

plaintiff’s claims against them. 

C. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Arising Out of the Presence of 

Toxic Mold and Water Saturation

Plaintiffs Stephen Heinemann and Sharilyn Heinemann bring

claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability,

fraudulent concealment, and negligent misrepresentation based

upon the alleged presence of toxic mold and water saturation in

the apartment they inhabited that was owned by defendants. 

Defendants assert that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction as to Ms. Heinemann and, in the alternative, that

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the claims should be dismissed due to insufficient specificity in

the first amended complaint. 

1. Jurisdiction

This court has original jurisdiction over this action

because it involves a question of federal law, namely the ADA. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367, district courts have

supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to

the claims supplying original jurisdiction that they form part of

the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis

added). Claims are part of the same case or controversy if they

arise from a “common nucleus of operative fact” and are such that

the plaintiff would ordinarily expect them to be tried in the

same proceeding. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715 (1966). Further, § 1367(a) provides that “[s]uch

supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the

joinder or intervention of additional parties.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a); see Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical,

Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, “[section] 1367(a)

permits the adjudication of a claim by a pendent party that

neither arises under federal law nor is supported by diversity of

citizenship.” Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 931. 

Plaintiff Stephen Heinemann’s residence in an apartment

owned and/or operated by defendants is the basis for his claims

under federal and state law relating to both the location of the

handicapped parking spaces and the presence of toxic mold. 

Because there is a common nucleus of operative facts as to all

claims arising out of plaintiff’s relationship with defendants,

the court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff Stephen

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Heinemann’s state law claims. Plaintiff Sharilyn Heinemann

shared the same residence that allegedly contained toxic mold. 

As such, both plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same conduct by

the same defendants and caused similar harm; therefore, the

factual and legal issues will be nearly, if not completely,

identical. Therefore, pursuant to § 1367(a), the court has

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff Sharilyn Heinemann’s

state law claims. 

2. Sufficiency of the Allegations

Defendants assert in the alternative that plaintiffs’ state

law claims arising out of the presence of toxic mold should be

dismissed because plaintiffs fail to include sufficient factual

allegations, such as the relationship between the plaintiffs, to

give defendants notice of the claims against them. 

Plaintiffs allege that plaintiffs entered into a rental

agreement with defendants, plaintiffs paid rent each month to

defendants while they occupied the apartment, and that defendants

allowed “water intrusions to exist” within their apartment. (FAC

¶¶ 1; 62-63). A fair reading of the complaint reveals that

plaintiffs shared residence in the apartment owned by defendants. 

Plaintiffs allege that at the time they took possession and/or

during the time of their tenancy, they were subjected to

defective and dangerous conditions due to the presence of toxic

mold and water saturation. (FAC ¶ 64). Plaintiffs also allege

that they repeatedly informed defendants of these defective and

dangerous conditions, but that defendants failed and refused to

repair the conditions. (FAC ¶ 65). As such, plaintiffs have

alleged who they are, what the conduct at issue was, when the

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conduct occurred, and how they were damaged by the conduct. 

Therefore, plaintiffs’ allegations have adequately provides

defendants with notice of the nature of and the factual basis for

the claims against them. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 30, 2007.

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