Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00175/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00175-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL EUGENE LONDON,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-03-00175 RRB KJM P 

vs.

A.A. LAMARQUE, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of Yuba

County of: (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm, and (2) being a felon in possession of

ammunition. Petitioner currently is serving a sentence of thirty-years-to-life in the California

Department of Corrections. Petitioner challenges his convictions on jury instructional grounds.

I. Background

Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial. After sentencing, petitioner appealed

his convictions to the California Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts

underlying petitioner’s conviction, which follows, is consistent with this court’s reading of the

record.

/////

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

At approximately 8:45 p.m. on August 6, 1999, Sheriff’s

Lieutenant Alan Long and Reserve Deputy Robert Hess were

dispatched to the Vinboy Trailer Park to arrest defendant on an

outstanding felony arrest warrant. On their way to the trailer park,

the officers were advised defendant’s truck had been seen leaving

the trailer park, heading down Third Avenue. Between 9:00 p.m.

and 9:15 p.m., the officers located the truck on Third Avenue,

recognized the driver as defendant, and parked behind the truck.

The officers got out of their marked patrol car as defendant got out

of his truck, leaving his hands inside the truck. As defendant

appeared to be doing something with his hands inside the truck and

the officers could not see his hands, they drew their guns and

ordered defendant to show his hands. Defendant did not comply. 

The officers repeatedly directed defendant to take his hands out of

the truck, to no avail. Defendant repeatedly asserted he had not

done anything, and the officers then advised him they had a felony

warrant for his arrest.

As the officers moved toward defendant, defendant began to back

away from them and then ran down Third Avenue. Defendant

ignored their demands to “stop.” After a chase, defendant was

apprehended. Deputy Hess conducted a pat-down search and

found 13 live .22-caliber rifle shells in defendant’s pants pocket.

An inventory search of defendant’s truck revealed a handgun, 10

rounds of .22-caliber ammunition, and an empty box for .22-caliber

ammunition. The handgun was in plain sight, on the driver’s side

floorboard about two inches from the door. It was loaded with

seven live .22-caliber rounds and two expended casings. The

ammunition was scattered across the seat.

Defendant testified that he had recently bought the truck and

picked it up that day, between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. When he picked

up the truck, he realized its headlights were not working, so he

took it to his sister’s house on Third Avenue, approximately half a

mile away. On the way to his sister’s house, he hit a speed bump

and the gun came out from underneath the seat. After arriving at

his sister’s, he put the gun behind the seat and then he noticed the

ammunition on the floorboard. To prevent his sister’s children

from picking up the ammunition, defendant put it in his pocket. 

He was going to get rid of the gun, but did not have time to decide

exactly how, and he was probably going to throw the ammunition

in the dumpster.

 

Answer, Ex. A at 2-3. The Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. 

Id. at 8. Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the California Supreme

Court. Answer, Ex. B. Petitioner’s request for review was denied without comment. Id. (last

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

3

page). The sole claim presented in this action was presented to the Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court on direct appeal. 

II. Standards For Granting Habeas Corpus Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).1 Courts are not required to

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Arguments and Analysis

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated petitioner’s right to due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to instruct jurors on the defense of “transitory possession.” 

Pet. at 3. Petitioner asserts the defense was a valid defense supported by his testimony, and

without his requested instruction the jury had no choice but to convict him. Id., Ex. A at 6-14. 

Petitioner’s jury was instructed that in order to find petitioner guilty of being a

felon in possession of a firearm, the jury had to find: (1) the defendant owned, had in his

possession or had under his control a firearm, and (2) the defendant had knowledge of the

presence of the firearm. RT 148:12-16. The jury also was informed:

A violation of Section 12021(a)(1) is justified where all the

following conditions are met: One, the person found the firearm;

two, the person possessed the firearm no longer than was necessary

to deliver or transport the firearm to a law enforcement agency for

that agency’s disposition; three, the firearm was transported or was

being transported to a law enforcement agency and it was so

transported or being transported after the person gave notice to the

law enforcement agency that he was transporting the firearm to that

agency for disposition.

RT 148:17-149:1. Substantially similar instructions were given regarding possession of

ammunition. RT 150:5-21. 

Petitioner requested, without success, that the jurors be instructed as follows:

When an ex-felon comes into possession of a firearm without

knowing that he has a firearm, and he later learns that he has a

firearm, he does not automatically violate PC 12021(a) upon

acquiring knowledge of the firearm. The ex-felon violates the law

only if it is proved that he intentionally retained possession of the

weapon after learning of its presence and did not take reasonable

steps to immediately relinquish possession of it.

/////

/////

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Evidence has been presented that the defendant’s possession of the

firearm and ammunition was only temporary. Such temporary

possession is not unlawful unless the prosecution has proven

beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. The possession was based on defendant’s ownership or right to

exercise control over the firearm and ammunition and

2. The firearm and ammunition were possessed for a purpose other

than disposal, abandonment or concealment.

CT at 121-122 (emphasis in original). On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court should

have provided these instructions to petitioner’s jury. The Court of Appeal addressed this claim

as follows:

This court has rejected the defense of transitory possession of a

firearm by a felon. (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th

1029.) “As a matter of public policy, the Legislature has made it a

crime for convicted felons to possess firearms. (§ 12021, subd.

(a)(1).) The purpose of this law is to protect public welfare by

precluding the possession of guns by those who are more likely to

use them for improper purposes. [Citation.] Due to the potential

for death or great bodily injury from the improper use of firearms,

public policy generally abhors even momentary possession of guns

by convicted felons who, the legislature has found, are more likely

to misuse them. Criminalizing the transitory possession of

firearms by convicted felons in circumstances that do not satisfy

the elements of self-defense, defense of others, or legal necessity is

not likely to result in ‘manifest injustice to admittedly innocent

individuals.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1037-1038; see also People v.

Frazier (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1312, [no instruction on

transitory possession required where defendant possessed drugs for

several hours].) Pepper is well-reasoned and correctly decided,

and remains good law.

We note that the California Supreme Court has recognized, in the

context of narcotics cases, that the “‘momentary possession’

defense serves the salutory purpose and sound public policy of

encouraging disposal and discouraging retention of dangerous

items such as controlled substances and firearms.” (People v.

Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191 (Martin), citing People v.

Hurtado (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814.) However, the Supreme

Court has never applied this defense to a case of a felon in

possession of a firearm. 

Nonetheless, even if we assume that the defense of transitory

possession is available to a defendant alleged to be a felon in

possession of a firearm or ammunition, such a defense would not

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

be available to this defendant. “[T]he defense of transitory

possession devised in [People v.] Mijares [(1971) 6 Cal.3d 415]

applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband

for the purpose of disposal.” (Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1191,

emphasis added.) The defense arose in a very specific factual

context, one “involving a fleeting, de minimis possession and a

reflexive act of abandonment.” (Martin, supra, at p. 1188, quoting

People v. Sullivan (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1446, 1452.) In carving

out this defense, the Supreme Court “repeatedly focused on the

fleeting and transitory nature of [the] possession.” (Martin, supra,

at p. 1191.)

The possession in this case was neither fleeting nor momentary. 

Defendant picked up the truck between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. 

He drove approximately one-half mile to his sister’s house. In the

course of that journey, he discovered the gun and ammunition. 

Almost two hours later, between 9:00 p.m. and 9:15 p.m., the gun

and ammunition remained in defendant’s possession.

When the officers arrived at defendant’s sister’s house, defendant

did not immediately advise them that the gun was in the truck. 

Defendant repeatedly refused to comply with the officers’

commands and resisted arrest. Then he fled the scene. After a

chase, defendant was arrested. He did not inform the officers

about the gun or ammunition. After a pat-down search revealed

the ammunition, he still did not advise the officers there was a gun

in the truck.

There is no indication in this record that defendant “made any

attempt, or took any physical action, to dispose of the [gun and

ammunition], much less enlist the assistance of the officers in

doing so. Indeed, there is nothing in the record from which to infer

that defendant would have voluntarily relinquished possession of

the [gun and ammunition] were it not for the search[es] conducted

incident to his arrest. . . .” (Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1193.) 

On this record, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on

momentary possession for the purpose of disposal. (See ibid.)

Furthermore, in Martin, the Supreme Court expressly limited the

application of the Mijares transitory possession defense. The

“expansion of the momentary possession defense to lengthier

possession incidental to the defendant’s intent to dispose of

controlled substances effectively rewrites the statutory

requirements of unlawful possession by introducing a new element

of specific intent to retain.”’” (Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1191

. . . [internal quotation omitted]).

/////

///// 

/////

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

The instructions requested by defendant in this case suffered

precisely this infirmity. Both of the instructions would have

introduced the element of “‘specific intent to retain.’ We are not

authorized to so revise the Legislature’s description of a criminal

offense.” (People v. Hurtado, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 814.) 

We find the trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s requested

instructions. 

 

Answer, Ex. A at 5-8.

Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that the California Court of

Appeal decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court of Appeal indicated

that California law did not provide for the defense suggested by petitioner and this court may not

reexamine state-court determinations of state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68 (1991). Petitioner identifies no clearly established federal law requiring that petitioner be

allowed to present his “transitory possession” defense if such a defense is not recognized by

California law. 

Even if petitioner had met his burden, a violation of due process occurs if the

failure to give a requested jury instruction deprives the defendant of a fair trial. See Dunckhurst

v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The California Court of Appeal noted that even if

the “transitory possession” defense was available under California law, the evidence presented at

trial was not consistent with “fleeting” or “momentary” possession of the gun and thus did not

warrant the giving of the instruction requested by petitioner. In this respect, the Court of

Appeal’s decision is not based on an unreasonable factual determination of what constitutes

“fleeting” or “momentary.” Moreover, the trial court’s giving of the instruction as to when a

violation of the state’s felon in possession statute is justified provided the jury with an alternative

to conviction.

Accordingly, petitioner’s claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1).

/////

///// 

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s application

for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 27, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

lond0175.157

Case 2:03-cv-00175-RRB -KJM Document 10 Filed 01/27/06 Page 9 of 9