Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05811/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05811-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATIE JERKOVICH, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FRESNO-MADERA CHAPTER OF )

AMERICAN RED CROSS; AMERICAN )

RED CROSS; and DOES 1-25, ) 

inclusive, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-5811 REC DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT.

(Doc. 25)

On June 13, 2005, the Court heard Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary

judgment. Upon due consideration of the written and oral

arguments of the parties and the record herein, the motion is

GRANTED as set forth below.

I. Factual Background

A. Facts Related to the Chapter & Plaintiff’s Position

In December of 2001, the Fresno-Madera Counties Chapter of

the American Red Cross (the “Chapter”) hired Plaintiff Katie

Jerkovich (“Plaintiff”) as a Public Support Specialist. The

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position was a full time position in which Plaintiff was expected

to work at least 40 hours per week. The Chapter employed

approximately 10 people during the time at issue in this case. 

The Chapter depends almost entirely on charitable donations for

its operating expenses. 

Management of the Chapter changed during the course of

Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff was hired by Gina GreenwoodMeinert, who was then the Chapter’s Executive Director. Ms.

Greenwood-Meinert left the Chapter in September of 2002 and was

replaced by Ed Webb, who was the interim manager from September

2002 to November 2002. Mr. Webb was replaced by Jean Hermanson,

who was the interim manager from November 2002 to May 2003. Ms.

Hermanson was replaced by Carter Taylor, who was the interim

manager from June 2003 to July 2004. In July 2004, the Chapter

hired its current Chief Executive Officer, Ellen Schneider.

In April of 2003, Plaintiff informed the interim manager,

Ms. Hermanson, that Plaintiff would be taking a pregnancy leave

beginning in June 2003. On April 18, 2003, Plaintiff presented

Ms. Hermanson with a memo regarding Plaintiff’s “Maternity Leave

and New Schedule.” In this memo, Plaintiff stated:

Hi Jean,

Please review the following, as this is a tentative

schedule for my upcoming maternity leave and new

schedule. 

At this current time, I am tentatively planning to work

full time up to on or about June 20th, 2003.

I will then be on maternity leave and out of the office

during the months of July 2003 and August 2003...with

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 Ms. Taylor extended the Chapter’s business hours until 5 pm 1

during Plaintiff’s pregnancy leave. Plaintiff requested that her

work schedule be altered to 8-5 on three days and 2-5 on two days,

but Ms. Taylor declined. Such schedule would have amounted to 30

hours per week. 

 This number accounts for a one hour unpaid lunch on 2

Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays.

3

the possibility of being available to work some hours,

after August 15, 2003.

My first full day back to work would then be

tentatively scheduled to start September 3, 2003 with

my new work schedule being the following:

Monday and Wednesday work from 12pm-4pm

Tuesday, Thursday and Friday work from 8am-4pm1

Taylor Decl. Ex. A. (ellipses in original, emphasis added). 

Both Plaintiff and Ms. Hermanson signed and dated the memo.

Plaintiff began her pregnancy leave in mid-June of 2003, a

few days after Ms. Taylor began her role as the Chapter’s interim

manager. Prior to her departure, Plaintiff met with Ms. Taylor

and gave her a copy of the memo. Plaintiff and Ms. Taylor did

not discuss the new schedule at that time. 

B. Facts Related to Meetings Re Plaintiff’s Return to Work

On August 27, 2003, Ms. Taylor met with Plaintiff to discuss

Plaintiff’s return to work. The Chapter’s Accounting / Office

Manager, Dona Burson, was also present at this meeting. After

reviewing the memo that Plaintiff had given her, Ms. Taylor

determined that, under the terms of the memo, Plaintiff would be

working only 29 hours per week. Defs.’ Reply to UMF No. 5; 2

Taylor Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9. The Chapter provided health insurance

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benefits only to full time employees, who are those working 40

hours a week. Ms. Taylor characterized the change in hours as a

shift to part-time status and informed Plaintiff at the meeting

that due to this change Plaintiff would be ineligible for paid

medical benefits. Plaintiff disputes Ms. Taylor’s reading of the

memo as a request for part-time status and denies that she ever

requested such a change. 

Ms. Taylor also informed Plaintiff at the August 27 meeting

that because her benefits would not be paid by the Chapter,

Plaintiff could reimburse the Chapter for the cost of Plaintiff

and her family’s medical insurance. Ms. Taylor also told

Plaintiff, who had brought her baby to the meeting, that the baby

could not come to work with Plaintiff because the Chapter did not

have a child care facility and did not permit other employees to

bring their children to work. Plaintiff disputes that the

Chapter did not allow employees to bring their children to work. 

Also at the August 27, 2003, meeting, Plaintiff was informed

of the creation of a new position within the Chapter, the Chief

Development / Public Relations Officer (“CD/PR Officer”). 

Plaintiff was given a copy of the Chapter’s new organizational

chart, which indicated that Plaintiff, who had previously

reported to the Executive Director, would now report to the CD/PR

Officer, who would then report to the Executive Director. Ms.

Taylor gave Plaintiff a copy of the CD/PR Officer job description

and informed Plaintiff that she could apply for the position. 

Ms. Taylor scheduled a second meeting with Plaintiff for

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Plaintiff disputes Ms. Taylor’s assertion that Ms. Taylor 3

told Plaintiff that the move was due to staffing changes, Pl.’s

Opp’n to UMF No. 16, however in her declaration, Plaintiff states

that Ms. Taylor told Plaintiff that her “office was going to be

moved from a private one to the hallway, to make room for the

person selected for this newly created position . . ..” Jerkovich

Decl. ¶ 17.

On September 15, 2003, Plaintiff received a bill for $2,319 4

to cover her insurance costs from July 1, 2003 to October 31, 2003.

5

September 9 to further discuss her schedule and return from

maternity leave. Before this meeting, Plaintiff submitted a

physician’s certification extending her pregnancy leave until

September 17, 2003. At the meeting, which Ms. Burson also

attended, Ms. Taylor asked Plaintiff to return to work on Monday,

September 22, 2003, rather than on Wednesday, September 17,

because Ms. Taylor was scheduled to be out of town from September

17-19. Ms. Taylor also informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff would

no longer have an enclosed office due to staffing changes. Ms. 3

Taylor informed Plaintiff, who was breast-feeding her child, that

Plaintiff could use a computer room to privately express breast

milk during the day. Ms. Taylor had arranged for a lock to be

put on the computer room door to ensure privacy. Additionally,

Ms. Taylor informed Plaintiff that she would have to bear the

costs of her medical insurance as of July 1, 2003. 

4

At the conclusion of the September 9 meeting, Plaintiff

presented Ms. Taylor with a list of 23 questions regarding the

job duties of the Public Support Specialist and the newly-created

CD/PR Officer position. On September 16, 2003, Ms. Taylor sent a

memo answering the questions to Plaintiff’s home by overnight

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mail. The memo confirmed that Plaintiff would resume work on

September 22, 2003. One of Plaintiff’s questions was whether the

Public Support Specialist had been changed to an hourly nonexempt position with no benefits, and, if so, what was the reason

for the change. Taylor Decl. Ex. E at 1. Ms. Taylor responded

as follows:

5. The Public Support Specialist is an exempt

position. If staffed by a full time Red Cross

employee, the standard benefit package applies. In the

agreement that you signed with Jean Hermanson, Interim

Executive Director, on 4/18/03, you requested a parttime schedule of 29 hours per week. Part-time

employees do not receive medical benefits at the

Fresno-Madera Counties Chapter of the American Red

Cross. You do have the option of receiving medical

coverage providing you reimburse the Chapter for the

monthly medical premium costs.

Taylor Decl. Ex. F at 1-2. Plaintiff also asked what the salary

reduction would be if she were to “accept the ‘Public Support

Specialist’ position as redefined?” Taylor Decl. Ex. E at 1. 

Ms. Taylor replied that the salary for the full time Public

Support Specialist position “is based on a 40 hour work week. If

you choose a part-time position, the salary will be

proportionately decreased to represent the 29 hour work week.”

Taylor Decl. Ex F at 2.

C. Facts Related to Plaintiff’s Return to Work & Subsequent

Communications

Plaintiff reported for work on September 17 in the early

afternoon. After having been at the office for approximately an

hour, Ms. Taylor, who had cancelled her trip, appeared and asked

Plaintiff if she had received the memo responding to Plaintiff’s

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questions. Plaintiff indicated that she had not, and Ms. Taylor

told Plaintiff to return home, review the memo and return to work

on September 22, as requested by Ms. Taylor.

Ms. Taylor emailed Plaintiff on September 18, 2003, to

confirm that Plaintiff would report to work on Monday, September

22. Plaintiff responded by email that she did not understand why

she could not come to work on the date for which her doctor

cleared her and that she was still uncertain as to how her

position had changed, including salary and benefits. Ms. Taylor

sent Plaintiff another email on September 20 that included a

memorandum explaining that the salary of a 29 hour a week Public

Support Specialist would be approximately 3/4 the salary of a

full-time Public Support Specialist. The memo also indicated

that “the position remains an exempt position, so you will not

receive overtime pay for any hours worked in excess of 29 hours

per week. Of course, should you wish to work full-time, the

salary will be restored to $30,000.” Taylor Decl. Ex. I. The

memo further indicated that employees working part-time are not

eligible for benefits but those working full time are eligible. 

Plaintiff sent Ms. Taylor another email on September 22,

2003, asserting that all of her questions had not been answered. 

Ms. Taylor sent an email in reply stating that she had answered

Plaintiff’s questions and that if Plaintiff did not appear for

work that day that Ms. Taylor would assume that Plaintiff had

resigned her position as Public Support Specialist.

Plaintiff did not appear for work on September 22. By

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letter dated September 23, 2003, Ms. Taylor informed Plaintiff

that her actions had prompted the Chapter to conclude that

Plaintiff had resigned her position. The letter also indicated

that the Chapter would consider Plaintiff’s application for the

CD/PR Officer position.

D. Facts Related to the CD/PR Position

During her tenure as interim manager, Ms. Taylor determined

that the Chapter was in debt and that its operating expenses were

exceeding its incoming revenue; the Chapter had a deficit of

almost $350,000. To improve the financial condition of the

Chapter, Ms. Taylor obtained a $250,000 loan from the national

organization and developed the new CD/PR Officer position. 

Plaintiff disputes Ms. Taylor’s motivation for creating the new

position.

1. The Job Descriptions

The Public Support Specialist position is focused on

increasing public support for the delivery of disaster relief

services by the Chapter “through increased fund raising,

marketing and public affairs activities.” Taylor Decl. Ex. C. 

The responsibilities and requirements listed on the job

description given to Plaintiff are:

[W]orking with an outside vendor to expand the direct

marketing program; highlighting disaster services in

marketing, volunteer recruitment and fund-raising

activities; serving as the lead public affairs officer

for disaster incidents; organizing special events to

cultivate donors, recruit volunteers and increase

community awareness of the local Chapter; soliciting

corporate and business sponsors for Red Cross events

and activities; coordinating media relations;

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marketing, public speaking and communicating Chapter

activities to the community.

Id. The qualifications are listed as a bachelor’s degree or a

combination of college and work experience and 2-3 years of

experience in a relevant field. Id. Prior fund raising

experience is desired, as is experience working with donors. The

“essential responsibilities” are: 

• Manage direct mail program with out-of-house

vendor

• Monitor donor data base and grow existing donors

• Coordinate the donor acknowledgment process

• Expand the donor base and grow existing donors

• Assist with the organization of donor cultivation,

volunteer recruitment, community awareness and

fund-raising events

• Secure sponsorships for special events and

programs

• Prepare reports as required for local, regional or

national Red Cross purposes

• Identify and take advantage of community events

and opportunities to solicit public support for

the Red Cross, particularly regarding disaster

services

• Serve as chief public affairs officer during

disaster situations

• This position and one other are grant funded

initially. Funding will decrease in increments. 

Consequently, this position, at a minimum, must

generate additional income to fund the two

positions within two years. Additional funds

neede[d] to sustain the positions is estimated to

be $70,000. This estimate could change as

conditions change.

• The duties listed in this job description may be

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modified as a result of future organizational

changes. These duties are not the only duties to

be performed by the employee occupying this

position. The employee will be required to follow

any other job-related duties as requested by the

Executive Director.

Id. 

The CD/PR Officer position is focused on resource

development. The qualifications are listed as a bachelor’s

degree, a minimum of five years of leadership in fund-raising and

public relations, bilingual ability in English and Spanish,

excellent written and verbal communication skills, and a minimum

of three years management experience. The duties are:

Directly responsible for comprehensive resource

development program for American Red Cross. Will

manage and participate in aggressive annual giving

program, including major gifts, personal, foundation,

corporate and in-kind solicitation programs. Develops

and meets goals and objectives for short and long range

fund raising programs. Supervise public information

program to compliment fund-raising activities and

promote agency image throughout community. Interprets

Red Cross policies, programs and services to the

public.

Taylor Decl. Ex. L. The specific functions of the position as

listed on the job description are:

• Responsible for overall administration and management

of the Financial Development / Public Relations

Department.

• Responsible for the hiring, training, supervision,

evaluation and development of employed staff.

• Responsible for the development and management of

the department budget.

• Develops and implements an annual and three year

fund raising plan, approved by the Chapter Board

of Directors, that maintains a sound financial

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position sufficient to meet Chapter, National and

Community needs/requirements.

• Works closely with the Financial Development

Committee and sub-committees to plan and implement

a resource development program based on

cultivation and solicitation of gifts by committee

members and other volunteers.

• Oversees and implements a comprehensive public

relations marketing and communications program.

• Develops an effective publications program to

promote corporate image.

• Conducts business and acts in a manner that

minimizes risk to the Chapter and National and

promotes a safe and healthful work environment.

• Responsible for recruitment, supervision and

development of volunteer staff.

• Perform other duties as required.

Id. 

2. The Application & Selection Process

Ms. Taylor solicited and received applications for the CD/PR

Officer position. Tom Jones, a management consultant, assisted

Ms. Taylor with the interview process. Forty-four applications

were reviewed and several interviews were conducted by Mr. Jones

and Ms. Taylor. The position was offered to Hilda Martinez on

October 20, 2003. 

Ms. Martinez’s qualifications include a Master of Journalism

degree from the University of California at Berkeley and a

Bachelor of Arts degree, cum laude, from Harvard University. 

Taylor Decl. Ex. M. Ms. Martinez had six years of experience in

public relations, had worked as an Associate Producer at NBC

Network News and had experience managing employed staff and

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developing public relations and marketing plans. She is also

fluent in Spanish. Id. Ms. Martinez is of child-bearing age and

has pre-school aged children. Taylor Decl. ¶ 26. 

Plaintiff was interviewed for the position but was not

selected. Plaintiff’s qualifications include a Bachelor of Arts

degree from California State University at Fresno and

approximately two years of experience in public relations and

fund raising. Taylor Decl. Ex. N. Plaintiff is not fluent in

Spanish and has not had any management experience.

D. Facts Relevant to Discriminatory Animus 

It is undisputed that “[d]uring her employment Ms. Jerkovich

never heard any derogatory or negative comments concerning

pregnant women.” Defs.’ UMF No. 28. There is also no evidence

that any employee of the Chapter ever heard such comments. 

According to Plaintiff, in the course of discussing what Ms.

Taylor characterized as Plaintiff’s request for a shift to parttime status at the August 27 meeting, Ms. Taylor suggested to

Plaintiff that Plaintiff possibly “did not wish to return to work 

at Red Cross at all.” Jerkovich Decl. ¶ 10. Ms. Burson

testified that Ms. Taylor mentioned that she hoped Plaintiff

would want to stay home and be a full time mother. Burson Depo.

98:11-18; Burson Decl. ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff also avers that at the September 9 meeting, Ms.

Taylor asked Plaintiff whether she was “really interested in the

Chapter activities” because “it just seems to me that you aren’t

very interested in what’s been going on around here for the last

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two months.” Jerkovich Decl. ¶12. Ms. Burson avers that Ms.

Taylor was “angry with Katie, because she had not called in more

to find out how the Chapter was doing while she was on maternity

leave.” Burson Decl. ¶ 11. Ms. Burson also testified that Ms.

Taylor complained of being “frustrated” over Plaintiff’s being

“too exuberant” and speaking “too loudly” in the office and that

Plaintiff’s dress was “unprofessional.” Burson Depo. 103:17-

104:06.

According to Ms. Burson, Ms. Taylor “did not want Katie to

return from her maternity leave, whether it was on a part-time

basis or a full time basis. She made many comments to me

directly, and in private, to the effect that she hoped that Katie

did not return, and if she insisted on returning part-time, [Ms.

Taylor] would make [Katie’s] life so miserable that [Katie] would

leave.” Burson Decl. ¶ 11. Ms. Burson also asserts that Ms.

Taylor was “at odds with Katie, because Katie insisted on not

returning part-time.” Burson Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff argues that

Ms. Taylor did not want Plaintiff to return to the office because

Ms. Taylor “most likely believed Ms. Jerkovich would be too busy

with her child . . ..” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 15, 2004 in the

Superior Court of Fresno County. Defendants removed the case to

federal court asserting jurisdiction based on 36 U.S.C. § 300105. 

Section 300105(a)(5) grants original jurisdiction in any case in

which the American Red Cross or its units are parties. See

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 Government Code section 12945, which governs pregnancy- 5

related claims, was amended after Plaintiff filed her complaint.

Defendants construe some of Plaintiff’s claims as though alleged

under the statute as amended. Plaintiff pointed out that she is

not alleging that the Chapter failed to accommodate her as required

under the amended statute; Defendants’ argument regarding that

issue is irrelevant and has been omitted.

14

American Red Cross v. S.G and A.E, 505 U.S. 247, 248, 112 S. Ct.

2465, 120 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1992). 

Plaintiff’s complaint states four causes of action. Claims

one through three allege violations of California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Govt. Code § 12940 et

seq.. In claim one Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to

reinstate her to her prior position and that Plaintiff was

constructively terminated in violation of section 12945(b). In 5

claim two Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against

and demoted because of her pregnancy and constructively

terminated in violation of section 12945(a). In claim three

Plaintiff alleges that she was both discriminated and retaliated

against by the Chapter’s failing to hire her for the CD/PR

Officer position. In claim four Plaintiff alleges a common law

claim for termination in violation of public policy.

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

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affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)). 

Materiality is determined by the substantive law governing a

claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all inferences drawn

from it must be construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91

L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to defeat summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809

F.2d at 630. 

The nonmoving party “may not rely on the mere allegations in

the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment,” but must

set forth by affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party may not simply state

that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence at trial; it

must produce at least some “significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank

v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569,88 S.

Ct. 1575 (1968)). “Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual

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data will not create a triable issue of fact.” Marks v. United

States, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978).

The question for the Court is not whether the “evidence

unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

evidence presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). This requires

more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position;” there must be “evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. 

“If the facts make a claim implausible, the nonmovant must

present more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be

necessary in order to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Id.

IV. Discussion

A. Resolution of Certain Factual Disputes

Plaintiff’s claims involve some of the same disputed facts. 

To avoid redundancy, these disputes will be addressed separately

rather than within the discussion of the individual claims. 

1. Construction of the Memo

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “requested that her ‘new

work schedule’ be part-time upon her return” from pregnancy leave

and that “Ms. Jerkovich and Ms. Hermanson agreed in writing that

Ms. Jerkovich would work these reduced hours upon her return from

pregnancy leave.” Defs.’ UMF Nos. 5-6. Defendants argue that

the change in Plaintiff’s status from a full time employee who

was eligible to receive paid medical benefits to a part-time

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employee who was not so eligible was the result of Plaintiff’s

request. Defendants assert that Ms. Taylor properly and

permissibly interpreted the language of the memo to mean that

Plaintiff would begin working 29 hours per week upon her return

from pregnancy leave. Such a schedule is not full time under Red

Cross standards, so it was proper for Ms. Taylor to characterize

the change as one to part-time employment. 

Plaintiff argues in response she never requested working

part-time and that the memo represented a “flexible” full-time

schedule that would permit Plaintiff to work reduced hours in the

office. Pl.’s Opp’n to UMF Nos. 5-7; Jerkovich Decl. ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff avers that the memo “documented the substance” of her

conversation with Ms. Hermanson and reflects Plaintiff’s “inoffice availability” upon her return from maternity leave. 

Jerkovich Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff asserts that her “customary

additional work hours were at night, early mornings, weekends

(i.e., breakfast club presentations), and would significantly

exceed a forty hour work week.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that this memo represents her “inoffice” schedule is unsupported by the plain language of the

memo. The memo, as mentioned, was signed by both Ms. Hermanson

and Plaintiff. It indicates that Plaintiff’s “new work schedule”

upon her return from pregnancy leave would be that Plaintiff

would “work” from 12-4 on Mondays and Wednesdays and from 8-4 on

Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. Although the memo represents

the “substance” of Plaintiff’s conversation with Ms. Hermanson

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 Ms. Taylor testified that the Chapter did not have anyone 6

working from home. Taylor Depo. 129:12-13.

 Absent from either parties’ evidence is any testimony from 7

Ms. Hermanson, although she is listed as a potential witness for

Defendants on the parties’ joint pretrial statement. Doc. 43 at

12. 

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yet it does nothing except set forth “work” hours. It does not

distinguish between “in-office work hours” and “out of office

work hours” or explain how or when Plaintiff was to work out of

the office. It uses the unambiguous term “work.” 

Plaintiff’s contention that she had arranged to work some

hours from home is also unsupported by any external evidence,

such as Red Cross policy allowing employees to work from home or 6

a definitive statement from Plaintiff that there was an agreement

between Ms. Hermanson and Plaintiff that Plaintiff would work

from home certain hours. Plaintiff testified that she

“understood [the memo] to be my in-office hours, and I believe

Jean Hermanson understood it as such as well.” Jerkovich Depo. 7

103:6-8 (emphasis added). Plaintiff also testified that “there

wasn’t a discussion about the hours I would keep, because I kept

hours outside the office all the time.” Id. at 103:22-24. 

Plaintiff’s self-serving testimony regarding the intent of

the memo is without evidentiary support. It is insufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact. See Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating

that courts may refuse to find genuine issue of fact “where the

only evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated and self-serving

testimony’”). 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff requested

a “new work schedule” upon her return from pregnancy leave that

was a part-time schedule of 29 hours per week is documented in

the memo and is undisputed. The memo indicates that it was

intended to set forth Plaintiff’s “new work schedule;” there is

no evidence indicating that the intent of the memo was to set

forth an “in-office” or “flexible” schedule. 

2. Plaintiff’s Intent Regarding the Memo 

While the intent of the memo can be garnered from its face,

it does appear that Plaintiff neither realized nor intended that

the 29 hours per week schedule set forth in the memo would result

in a change in her employment status. Pl.’s Opp’n to UMF Nos. 7-

8. Plaintiff’s intent regarding the memo, however, is not

material to the issues in this case because there is no evidence

that this intent was ever communicated to Ms. Hermanson, Ms.

Burson, Ms. Taylor or anyone else who might have knowledge of the

arrangement. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not clearly

indicate to Ms. Taylor at either the August 27 or September 9

meeting that she wanted to return full time. Jerkovich Depo.

130:14-20; 143:18-22. 

Plaintiff attempts to contradict her own testimony with the

declaration of Ms. Burson, the Chapter’s Accounting Officer who

was also present at the meetings. Ms. Burson avers that,

contrary to Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff told Ms. Taylor at

both meetings that Plaintiff was planning on returning to work

full time. Burson Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10. However, Ms. Burson testified

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in her deposition that she did not recall everything that was

discussed at the meetings and only recalled a discussion of

Plaintiff’s duties. Burson Depo. 47:8-9; 48:4-5. By “duties,”

Ms. Burson was referring to what Plaintiff “would be responsible

for, and what she had done before.” Id. at 47:18-19. Ms. Burson

acknowledged that she was “more interested in watching

[Plaintiff’s] baby” at the August 27 meeting. Burson Depo.

47:14-15. 

“As a general rule, an affidavit submitted in response to a

motion for summary judgment which contradicts earlier sworn

testimony without explanation of the difference does not

automatically create a genuine issue of fact.” Scamihorn v. Gen.

Truck Drivers, Local 952, 282 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th

Cir. 1991)); see also Schwarzer, Tashima, Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac.

Guide: Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial 14:166 at 14-60 (The Rutter

Group 2004) (“A party cannot create an issue of fact by a

declaration contradicting his or her own deposition or other

sworn testimony”). Ms. Burson’s declaration does not explain her

refreshed recollection of what took place at the meetings. Even

considering Ms. Burson’s assertion, it does not negate

Plaintiff’s own testimony that she did not specifically mention

full time versus part-time status. Thus while Plaintiff’s

assertion that she did not intend the 29 hour per week schedule

proposed in the memo to effect a change in her job status will be

be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, any dispute

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as to this issue does not create an issue of material fact. 

3. The Public Support Specialist Position as Identical

to the CD/PR Officer Position

a) Intention Behind the Creation of the Position

Ms. Taylor testified that she “created the CD/PR Officer

position with the goal of hiring someone who would be capable of

developing successful fund development and marketing plans and

supporting strategies to immediately improve the financial

condition of the Chapter.” Defs.’ UMF No. 31. As mentioned, the

Chapter was significantly in debt and Ms. Taylor had obtained a

loan from the national organization. 

Plaintiff disputes Ms. Taylor’s motivation as follows: “Ms.

Taylor in fact did not hire somebody with fund raising

experience, and little public relations experience, which

suggests that improving the financial condition was not her goal. 

She intended to hire somebody to do what Ms. Jerkovich has been

doing all along.” Pl.’s Opp’n to UMF No. 31. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff presents no evidence to

support her suggestion that Ms. Martinez has “little public

relations experience.” To the contrary, her resume indicates

that Ms. Martinez has been a Public Relations Associate, a Public

Relations Consultant and an Account Supervisor. Taylor Decl. Ex.

M. All three positions involved public relations for a total of

six years of experience in the field. Plaintiff is correct that,

according to her resume, none of Ms. Martinez’s prior positions

involved fund raising. The lack of specific experience does not,

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without more, create a genuine issue of fact as to Ms. Taylor’s

motivation. 

Plaintiff supports her dispute as to Ms. Taylor’s goal in

creating the CD/PR Position with the testimony of Ms. Burson. 

Q. Was it your understanding that the chief financial

development public relations officer position was

created to improve the financial condition of the

chapter?

A. I believe that that’s probably what Carter [Taylor]

intended, even though we had an individual that was

doing the job or had been doing the job already. I saw

no need to create another position, but I will take it

one step further. If that’s what she had in mind, why

did she hire somebody that had absolutely no fundraising experience, nor PR experience, other than

working for a campaign or for an ad agency. If that

was her purpose, then why did she hire the individual

she hired, that’s my opinion.

Burson Depo. 152:8-25; 153:1-3 (emphasis added). This testimony

is not evidence that Ms. Taylor had an ulterior motive in

creating the position. Putting aside for a moment that Ms.

Burson acknowledges that Ms. Taylor “probably . . . intended” to

improve the Chapter’s financial condition by creating the CD/PR

Officer position, Ms. Burson’s further offering regarding Ms.

Taylor’s reason is, as she acknowledges, her opinion and a

rhetorical question, not fact. Defendants properly object to

this evidence as conclusory and lacking in factual foundation. 

Moreover, nothing on the record indicates that Ms. Burson was in

a position to determine the Chapter’s hiring needs or that she

was involved in developing strategy to relieve the Chapter of its

debts; Ms. Burson testified that she did not have any role in the

creation of the job description for the “chief financial officer

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[CD/PR Officer] position.” Burson Depo. 129:24-25, 130:1. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ assertion that Ms. Taylor’s goal in

creating the CD/PR Officer position was to improve the Chapter’s

financial situation is undisputed.

b) Duties

A component common to all of Plaintiff’s claims is that the

Public Support Specialist position and the CD/PR Officer position

are the same. Plaintiff argues that prior to her pregnancy leave

she had been performing all of the functions of the CD/PR Officer

position, that the new position stripped Plaintiff of her

responsibilities and that Plaintiff was demoted because the CD/PR

Officer was to supervise the Public Support Specialist. 

Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material

fact because the two positions are dissimilar. Defendants are

correct that, according to the two job descriptions, the

positions are different. The CD/PR Officer appears to be a highlevel management position focused on strategic planning, longterm goals, and overseeing development. In contrast, the Public

Support Specialist appears to be a non-managerial role that is

more of a hands-on position focused on the actual implementation

and running of programs. Additionally, while the upper

management level CD/PR Officer position requires a college

degree, the lower level Public Support Specialist may be hired

with either a college degree or equivalent experience. 

That the job descriptions indicate some similarity of duties

between the Public Support Specialist position and the CD/PR

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Officer position does not create a genuine issue of material

fact. Similarity is to be expected of two positions within the

same department; there is sufficient differentiation in the job

descriptions for the burden to shift to Plaintiff to demonstrate

a genuine issue of fact as to this issue.

Plaintiff argues that the fact that Ms. Martinez “took over

all the duties and responsibilities Katie Jerkovich had

previously been doing” after Ms. Martinez was hired is evidence

that the new position was meant to replace Plaintiff’s position. 

Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) No. 6. Defendants

acknowledge that initially Ms. Martinez handled Plaintiff’s

duties as well as her own, but point out that a person was hired

to replace Plaintiff in the Public Support Specialist position in

February of 2004. Taylor Depo. 236:25-238:14. That one member

of a department temporarily carried the weight of another does

not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the similarity

of the positions.

Plaintiff also argues that her job duties had expanded and

she was “often referred to as ‘Public Relations/Marketing

Director.’” Plaintiff supports the latter assertion with a

performance review given of her by Ed Webb, who was the interim

director for a few months in 2002. Pl.’s Opp’n to UMF No. 4. He

listed Plaintiff’s title as “Public Relations/Marketing Director”

on the review. Jerkovich Decl. Ex. C. In his declaration, Mr.

Webb avers that the title was a “misstatement” and that he had no

intention of changing Plaintiff’s job title or position. Webb

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 Even if the duties were not within the Public Support 8

Specialist job description, the description specifies that the

duties listed “may be modified as a result of future organizational

changes. These duties are not the only duties to be performed by

the employee occupying this position. The employee will be

required to follow any other job-related duties as requested by the

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Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s assertion is unsupported by the record;

it is undisputed that the Chapter hired Plaintiff as a “Public

Support Specialist” and that Plaintiff’s job title did not

change. Defs.’ Reply to UMF No. 4.

Plaintiff supports the former assertion - that her duties

had expanded - with a memo Plaintiff prepared for Ms. Taylor

prior to the start of her pregnancy leave and with the

performance review given by Mr. Webb, the substance of which came

from a document supplied by Plaintiff. Jerkovich Depo. 90:1424. 

To summarize, Plaintiff’s self reporting of her duties and

accomplishments includes the following: “schedule, plan and

organize all fund raising events,” including five events in 2002

and four events in 2003; securing sponsorships for events;

“manage and maintain the Direct Mail Program,” including cost

cutting; sending out letters to 150 area companies as part of the

“Major Gift Campaign;” upgrading and maintaining the in-house

donor database; acting as a media relations spokesperson;

speaking to community organizations; and improving public

awareness of Chapter activities and services. Jerkovich Decl.

Ex. C; Taylor Decl. Ex. B. 

These duties are within the purview of the Public Support

Specialist job description. The description, quoted supra, 8

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26 Executive Director.” Taylor Decl. Ex. C.

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includes managing the direct mail program, organizing and

assisting with fund raising events, and soliciting public support

for the Red Cross, as well as requiring that funds be generated

to maintain the position. In contrast, the CD/PR Officer is

responsible for a number of things that Plaintiff has presented

no evidence that she did including, inter alia, hiring, training,

supervising and evaluating employed staff; development and

management of the department budget; and the development and

implementation of a three-year fund raising plan. 

Plaintiff also cites the testimony of Ms. Burson in support

of her position. Ms. Burson testified that it was “apparent” to

her that Ms. Taylor had a “different agenda” regarding the

creation of the CD/PR Officer position. This “agenda” was

“hiring somebody to do what Katie had been doing all along, and

not utilizing her at all.” Burson Depo. 111:2-6. 

Defendants properly object to this testimony as Ms. Burson’s

unsupported opinion and a conclusory allegation, which will not

carry Plaintiff’s burden. See Marks, supra, 578 F.2d at 263. Ms.

Burson impression does not recount anything Ms. Taylor did or

said that indicated that she did not intend to utilize Plaintiff

in the Chapter. 

Accordingly, Defendants have shown by admissible evidence

that the CD/PR Officer position and the Public Support Specialist

position were separate and distinct positions. The two positions

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Section 7291.9(c)(A) provides that an employee can be 9

reinstated to a comparable position if the employer made the change

“for legitimate business reasons unrelated to the employee taking

a pregnancy disability leave.” 2 Cal. Code Regs. 7291.9(c)(A).

27

are within the same department and share the overall goals of

promoting the Chapter through marketing and improving its

financial situation, but their individual duties and

responsibilities, as set forth in the job descriptions, are

different. Plaintiff has failed to present admissible evidence

from which a trier of fact could find to the contrary. It is

thus undisputed that the Public Support Specialist position

differed from the CD/PR Position and that the position Plaintiff

occupied prior to her pregnancy leave was the former. 

B. Claim One - Refusal to Reinstate / FEHA Violation

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendants

violated Plaintiff’s right to pregnancy leave by refusing to

reinstate her within the time required by law. Section 12945(a)

provides, in pertinent part, that:

[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . (a)

For an employer to refuse to allow a female employee

disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions to take leave . . . and thereafter return to

work as set forth in the commission’s regulations.

Cal. Govt. Code § 12945(a). Plaintiff also alleges that the

changes made by Defendants amounted to a constructive discharge. 

The regulations provide that a person taking pregnancy leave

must be returned to the same or comparable position. Plaintiff 9

argues that the change in hours, salary and benefits as well as

the hiring of the CD/PR Officer altered her former position such

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that she was not reinstated to her pre-pregnancy leave position. 

1. Refusal to Reinstate to the Same or Comparable

Position

a) Did Defendants Refuse to Reinstate Plaintiff

Based on the Change in Hours, Salary & Benefits?

As discussed, the memo bearing Plaintiff’s signature

represents a 29-hour work week. Also as mentioned, Red Cross

policy provides paid benefits to those employees working full

time, which is defined as 40 hours per week. Taylor Decl. ¶ 9,

Ex. D1. The change in Plaintiff’s eligibility for paid benefits

and the change in salary were dictated by the change in

Plaintiff’s schedule. Neither change was unreasonable; both were

the direct result of Plaintiff’s own request. That Plaintiff did

not realize the ramifications of her “new work schedule” is

irrelevant to the issue of whether she was properly reinstated. 

Even if it were assumed that the change in hours, salary and

benefits did alter Plaintiff’s position, it remains undisputed

that Ms. Taylor communicated to Plaintiff in the September 20,

2003 email message that Plaintiff could return to work full time

and receive both the full salary and the paid medical benefits to

which only full time Red Cross employees were entitled. 

Plaintiff argues that this offer “was not a bona fide offer made

with the intention of full reinstatement” because the email

concludes with the statement that the Chapter looked forward to

Plaintiff’s return “on Monday, September 22, 2003 with the

schedule you requested prior to your maternity leave.” Pl.’s

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 The timeliness of Plaintiff’s reinstatement will be 10

discussed infra. 

 The memo specified that the new schedule would become 11

effective on Plaintiff’s return to work, not before her leave. To

that end, it appears that the Chapter’s request that Plaintiff pay

for her health benefits during her leave was inappropriate. Any

changes to Plaintiff’s work status were not effective until her

return. There is, however, no allegation that Plaintiff actually

paid the $2,319.

29

Opp’n at 8. Plaintiff argues that “[c]learly, the message [Ms.

Taylor] intends to deliver is that if Ms. Jerkovich insists on

returning, it will be part-time only.” Id. 

There is no evidence offered by Plaintiff from which a trier

of fact could reasonably conclude that the offer by Ms. Taylor

was not “bona fide.” That Ms. Taylor referenced the schedule

that Plaintiff herself had proposed prior to her leave does not,

without more, indicate that the offer was invalid. The offer is

fatal to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants refused to

reinstate her. Plaintiff has cited no case law stating that the

reinstatement must be made at any particular time prior to the

employee’s return to work. Here, prior to Plaintiff’s scheduled

return to work on September 22, Defendants assured her of her 10

right to return to her former position with full salary and

benefits. This is sufficient. 

The requested change in hours was reasonably construed as a

request for a change to less than full time status. The

accompanying changes in compensation and benefits did not alter

Plaintiff’s position from what it had been prior to her leave.11

Even if such alteration had occurred, it is undisputed that

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Plaintiff was offered reinstatement to her former hours, salary

and benefits.

b) Did Defendants Refuse to Reinstate Plaintiff

Based on the Change in Duties?

Plaintiff argues that the Public Support Specialist position

was so altered by the development of the CD/PR Officer position

that it ceased to be the position she had prior to her pregnancy

leave. Plaintiff also alleges that because the CD/PR Officer was

to be Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, Plaintiff was demoted. 

As discussed, under the terms of the job descriptions it is

apparent that the two positions were not the same. Also as

discussed, Plaintiff has presented no evidence from which a trier

of fact could reasonably determine that improving the Chapter’s

financial condition was not Ms. Taylor’s goal in creating the

CD/PR Officer position. Additionally, the Public Support

Specialist position was not eliminated by the creation of the

CD/PR Officer; the Chapter hired a replacement for Plaintiff a

couple of months after hiring the CD/PR Officer. 

Even if the hiring of the CD/PR Officer altered Plaintiff’s

position, California law provides that an employer may reinstate

an employee to a comparable position if the change is made for

“legitimate business reasons unrelated to the employee taking a

pregnancy disability leave.” 2 Cal. Code Regs. 7291.9(c)(A). 

Here, as discussed supra, it is undisputed that the Chapter was

having financial trouble and there is evidence that Ms. Taylor

intended to improve the Chapter’s financial situation by creating

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the CD/PR Officer position. More importantly, there is no

evidence that the development of the CD/PR Officer position was

related to Plaintiff’s taking her pregnancy leave. That

Plaintiff may have had to report to the new position does not

necessarily mean that she was demoted, so long as her position

was comparable. 

The Public Support Position is not identical to the CD/PR

Officer position. This is evidenced by the job descriptions and

the fact that both positions were subsequently filled by the

Chapter. Plaintiff has presented no evidence on which a trier of

fact could reasonably find that the CD/PR Officer position

stripped Plaintiff of her duties or supporting her argument that

“Ms. Taylor’s repeated statements that Ms. Jerkovich would be

able to return to her former position were empty statements that

Ms. Jerkovich knew would not be realized upon her return from

maternity leave.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. Even if the new position

did alter the Public Support Specialist position, there is no

evidence that the redefined Public Support Specialist position

was not comparable to the original or that the alteration was not 

done for the legitimate business reason of improving the

Chapter’s financial state.

Defendants have presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate

no triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants

offered to reinstate Plaintiff to the same or comparable position

upon her return from maternity leave. Plaintiff has not carried

her burden of demonstrating a triable issue as to the

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17 partly because she had not received Ms. Taylor’s request in

writing. Jerkovich Depo. 143:4-9. Plaintiff returned to work in

the early afternoon, id. at 171:21-24, consistent with her

Wednesday schedule of working from 12-4. The Federal Express

package from Ms. Taylor, which contained the request in writing,

was received at Plaintiff’s home at 10:23 am on September 17th,

before Plaintiff was scheduled to arrive at work. Taylor Decl. Ex.

F. 

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interpretation of the memo or as to the differences between the

two positions in her department. Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment as to this aspect of Plaintiff’s claim for

failure to reinstate.

c) Did Defendants Refuse to Reinstate Plaintiff

Within Two Business Days?

Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated the statute

because Defendants failed to reinstate Plaintiff to her position

within two business days. The applicable regulation provides

that an employer must reinstate an employee “within two business

days, where feasible, after the employee notifies the employer of

her readiness to return, to the same, or, where applicable, a

comparable position . . ..” 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 7291.9(b)(2). 

Plaintiff’s doctor cleared her for return to work on

Wednesday, September 17, 2003. It is undisputed that at the

September 9 meeting, Ms. Taylor requested Plaintiff return on

Monday, September 22, 2003, three business days later. Defs.’ 12

UMF No. 15. Ms. Taylor was scheduled to be out of town from

September 17-19 “for a banquet and meeting with the Red Cross’

State Council.” Taylor Decl. ¶ 11. Ms. Taylor avers that she

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requested Plaintiff start on September 22 because she wanted to

be present when Plaintiff returned. Defendants assert that it

was thus not feasible for Plaintiff to return to work until

September 22. Ms. Burson acknowledged that, because Plaintiff’s

office had been moved around, it would have been helpful for Ms.

Taylor to be present when Plaintiff returned so that Ms. Taylor

could give Plaintiff an “orientation” as to where Plaintiff’s

files were and what changes had been made during Plaintiff’s

pregnancy leave. Burson Depo. 63:25-64:04. Ms. Burson also

testified, however, that in her opinion it was not necessary for

Ms. Taylor to be present because Plaintiff was familiar with her

own job. Burson Depo. 62:11-13. Ms. Burson characterized Ms.

Taylor’s request as “totally out of line.” Id. at 62:8.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Ms. Taylor was scheduled to

be out of town on September 17-19. Pl.’s Reply to UMF No. 15. 

Plaintiff argues that reinstatement on September 17 was

“completely feasible” because Ms. Taylor “miraculously

reappeared” on the 17th. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. Ms. Taylor stated in

her declaration that her out of town trip was cancelled at the

last minute because she had to “attend a meeting of the Chapter’s

Board of Directors and handle other pressing chapter business.” 

Taylor Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. 

Although neither party cites any case law regarding the

proper interpretation of the word “feasible” as used in the

statute, Defendants have offered admissible evidence that it was

not feasible in the administrative sense for Plaintiff to be

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reinstated within two business days. Ms. Taylor, Plaintiff’s

supervisor, wanted to be present when Plaintiff returned from

pregnancy leave so that she could orient Plaintiff to the changes

in the office. Plaintiff has offered no evidence supporting her

position that Ms. Taylor’s schedule was not as she claimed;

sarcastic characterizations are insufficient. Plaintiff has not

carried her burden with respect to this issue and Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment as to this aspect of Plaintiff’s

claim for failure to reinstate.

2. Constructive Discharge

Plaintiff argues in the alternative that Defendants violated

FEHA by constructively discharging her from her position. The

California Supreme Court set forth the applicable standard for a

constructive discharge claim in Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7

Cal. 4th 1238 (1994). The court stated that “[c]onstructive

discharge occurs when the employer’s conduct effectively forces

an employee to resign.” Id. at 1244-45. The court explained: 

In order to establish a constructive discharge, an

employee must plead and prove, by the usual

preponderance of the evidence standard, that the

employer either intentionally created or knowingly

permitted working conditions that were so intolerable

or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation

that a reasonable employer would realize that a

reasonable person in the employee’s position would be

compelled to resign.

Id. at 1251. The court emphasized that this standard is an

objective one; Plaintiff must demonstrate that “a reasonable

person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or

conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative

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except to quit.” Id. at 1248 (quotations omitted). Although

usually a question of fact, “in some situations a court may

conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable employee would not

have felt compelled to resign” and summary judgment is proper. 

Kovatch v. Cal. Casualty Management Co., Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th

1256, 1267 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Aguilar v. Atl.

Richfield Co., 25 Cal. 4th 826, 854 n.19 (2001).

a) Plaintiff Has Standing

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s constructive termination

claim “is pure speculation” because Plaintiff did not return to

work. Defs.’ Reply at 4. To the extent that this could be

construed as an argument that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert

a claim, it is incorrect. If a threatened injury is “certainly

impending” it may constitute an injury in fact sufficient to

establish standing. 15 Moore’s Federal Practice §101.40[7][a]

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (citing McConnell v. Federal Election

Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003)). 

The injury here was, if not actualized during the short time

Plaintiff did return to the office, “certainly impending.” 

b) The Allegedly Intolerable Conditions

To be deemed intolerable an adverse working condition

generally must be unusually “aggravated” or amount to a

“continuous pattern.” Cloud v. Casey, 76 Cal. App. 4th 895, 902-

03 (1999). “The determination of whether a person was

constructively discharged depends on the working conditions that

person encounters.” Kovatch, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1268 (citing

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Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1244-47). A plaintiff must show that she

was “personally exposed to the conduct, even if the conduct was

not directed at [her].” Id. “Incidents of offensive behavior”

happening outside the presence of the plaintiff or of which the

plaintiff was unaware until after her termination are disregarded

in evaluating the conditions, although they may be relevant to

the issue of animus. Id. 

Bearing this standard in mind, the “intolerable conditions”

as alleged by Plaintiff and refuted by Defendants are set forth

below. 

1) Fact Number 1: Change in Status, Benefits

& Salary

It is undisputed that if Plaintiff were to return to her

position full time her salary would be unchanged. The proposed

reduction in salary was to reflect Plaintiff’s “new work

schedule” as set forth in the memo she and Ms. Hermanson signed. 

As discussed, there is no evidence supporting the proposition

that the memo reflected a “flexible” schedule and merely set

forth Plaintiff’s in-office availability; the memo speaks for

itself. It is reasonable for an employer to prorate a salary to

reflect the hours to be worked. Additionally, Red Cross policy

provides that only full time employees, defined as those working

40 hours a week, are eligible for paid benefits; Plaintiff does

not argue to the contrary. 

The change in hours, which was requested by Plaintiff, does

not constitute an intolerable working condition. The

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 It does not appear from the record that Plaintiff attempted 13

to bring her child to work and was refused; it is questionable

whether this was a condition Plaintiff actually encountered.

However, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the instruction was a

condition, it was encountered.

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corresponding changes in benefits and salary were the result of

the proposed change in Plaintiff’s working hours. These changes

do not constitute intolerable conditions. See Lee v. Bank of

America, 27 Cal. App. 4th 197 (1994) (finding no constructive

discharge in case of salary reduction and change to position of

less responsibility). 

2) Fact Number 2: Plaintiff’s Not Being Able

to Bring Her Baby to Work

The second condition is that Plaintiff was told by Ms.

Taylor at the August 27, 2003, meeting that she could not bring

her baby to work with her. Defs.’ UMF No. 10. It is 13

undisputed that the Chapter did not have a child care facility. 

Defendants assert that it is also undisputed that the Chapter

“did not permit employees to bring children to work with them.” 

Id. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not have an agreement

with either Ms. Hermanson or Ms. Taylor that she would be allowed

to bring her baby to work with her. Jerkovich Depo. 136:02-07.

Plaintiff also admits that no Chapter employees brought their

infant or toddler aged children to work. Jerkovich Depo. 134:05-

06. Plaintiff nonetheless argues that employees were allowed to

bring their children to work with them. Plaintiff asserts that

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 Although not a basis for this decision, it is noteworthy 14

that Plaintiff’s proposed work schedule provided that she would not

work on Monday and Wednesday mornings so that she could care for

her child while her spouse taught photography classes. Jerkovich

Decl. ¶ 7. This undermines the assertion that Plaintiff intended

to bring her baby with her to work.

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unspecified employees brought their children to work to help with

volunteer projects, Jerkovich Depo. 133:17-18, and Ms. Burson

recalls “a couple of instances where the director of health and

safety had his two children in his office for several hours.” 

Burson Depo. 54:19-21. 

Neither Plaintiff’s nor Ms. Burson’s assertions refute Ms.

Taylor’s assertion that the Chapter did not, as a general rule,

permit employees to bring their children to work. That a

director brought his children in on a couple of occasions does

not establish that Chapter management allowed children to be

brought to work on a regular basis. Not allowing infants in a

workplace without a childcare facility is not an intolerable

condition.14

3) Fact Number 3: Changed Office Location 

At the September 9 meeting, Plaintiff was informed that she

“would no longer be working in the private office [she] had used,

but would instead be working at a desk in the hallway and [her]

former office would be occupied by the person selected in the

newly created job position.” Jerkovich Decl. ¶12. Ms. Burson’s

testimony indicates that the reason behind the move was so that

Ms. Taylor could “keep an eye” on Plaintiff. Burson Depo.

101:13-15. Even if that was the motivation behind the move,

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Ms. Taylor testified that the Public Support Specialist was 15

moved into the hallway until a storage room could be converted into

an office. In January 2004 the office was complete and the new

Public Support Specialist moved into it in February. Taylor Depo.

160:7-16. There is no evidence, however, that the temporary nature

of the situation was communicated to Plaintiff. 

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Plaintiff has presented no case law suggesting that moving an

employee’s work location either to more closely supervise the

employee or to accommodate staffing changes is an intolerable

condition. Moving an employee’s work location is not a condition

that would make a reasonable employee feel that they had no

alternative other than to quit.15

4) Fact Number 4: Use of Computer Room for

Lactation

The other condition was that Plaintiff would have to use a

computer room to express her breast milk during the day as she no

longer had a private office. Ms. Taylor had a lock installed on

the door of the room to guarantee Plaintiff’s privacy. Taylor

Depo. 161:18-22. Plaintiff asserts that it was “a tiny room,

filled with computer equipment and was far from sanitary.” 

Jerkovich Decl. ¶ 17. This assertion is conclusory. There is no

indication that Plaintiff inspected the room upon her return to

the office and found it unsuitable. Additionally, there is no

evidence that Plaintiff actually encountered this condition, i.e.

attempted to use the room, and it would be proper for this

condition to not be considered. See Kovatch, 65 Cal. App. 4th at

1268. Plaintiff was provided a secure and private place for her

lactation needs; even if less than ideal, this accommodation

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would not prompt a reasonable employee to believe that her only

option was to quit.

5) Fact Number 5: Change in Plaintiff’s

Position / Altering Chain of Command

Plaintiff asserts that it was “clear” to her that the CD/PR

Officer would have “virtually all of the duties, responsibilities

and functions that [Plaintiff] previously had.” Jerkovich Decl.

¶ 17. Plaintiff further asserts that if she were to return to

work, “whether part-time or full-time, I would merely be an

assistant, which is work that could be easily performed by our

non-paid interns and volunteers . . . I could not return to this

work environment.” Id. 

The CD/PR Officer position was vacant when Plaintiff went to

work on September 17 for approximately an hour. As Plaintiff did

not return to work for any appreciable amount of time, it is

unlikely that Plaintiff sufficiently encountered the condition of

having her job duties changed and having to work within the new

office organizational structure for it to constitute an

intolerable condition under Kovatch. Assuming, arguendo, that

Plaintiff did encounter this condition, the two positions, as

discussed, are separate and distinct, although not without their

similarities. Additionally, there is no evidence to support

Plaintiff’s contention that she was demoted. Moreover, even if

the altered work environment were considered a demotion and / or

a condition, California courts have held that a demotion, even if

accompanied with a reduction in pay and responsibility, is not by

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itself an intolerable condition. See Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1247.

Plaintiff cites no case in which conditions such as the ones

she encountered were deemed intolerable. In contrast, the Ninth

Circuit found no constructive discharge in King v. AC&R

Advertising, 65 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 1995), in which the plaintiff

sued when his employment was changed to be “at will,” his salary

was reduced from $235,000 to $175,000 and his bonus structure was

changed. The court found the plaintiff’s resignation

“unreasonable as a matter of law” because the plaintiff failed to

show that the conditions were “so unusually adverse that a

reasonable employee in [his] position would have felt compelled

to resign.” Id. at 769. Further, the California Supreme Court

has acknowledged that “[e]very job has its frustrations,

challenges, and disappointments; these inhere in the nature of

work. An employee is protected from . . . unreasonably harsh

conditions, in excess of those faced by his [or her] co-workers. 

He [or she] is not, however, guaranteed a working environment

free of stress.” Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1247. 

Here, Plaintiff’s resignation, even assuming she encountered

all the alleged conditions, was unreasonable as a matter of law. 

No reasonable employee would believe that a change in duties and 

organizational structure, an office relocation, a no-child policy

and a change in salary/benefits commensurate with an employee’s

own proposed work schedule would be intolerable. Although these

changes may have been disappointing or annoying to Plaintiff,

they were not “unusually adverse” or “unreasonably harsh.” 

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c) Nexus With Plaintiff’s Protected Status

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Ms. Taylor’s

actions were based on Plaintiff’s pregnancy. Constructive

termination requires a nexus between the termination and the

employee’s protected status or activity. Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at

1258-59; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174-76

(1980). Assuming, arguendo, that the facts regarding

discriminatory animus are sufficient, without any intolerable

conditions there can be no constructive discharge and this

portion of claim three need not be discussed further.

Defendants’ request for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

claims that Defendants failed to reinstate her and that she was

constructively discharged is hereby GRANTED. 

B. Claim Two - Discrimination

Plaintiff’s second claim is for general discrimination based

on her pregnancy. Prior to the 2004 amendment, Government Code

section 12945 provided that it was unlawful for an employer

discriminate against an employee due to pregnancy, childbirth, or

a related medical condition “in compensation or in terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.” Plaintiff asserts that

after the amendment, which deleted this language, employment

discrimination based on pregnancy was subsumed within the general

provision of section 12940. Section 12940 makes it unlawful for

an employer to discriminate based on, inter alia, physical

disability or medical condition. Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(a).

Neither party makes a legal argument or presents any case

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 The joint pretrial statement filed by the parties states 16

that Plaintiff is proceeding under the following three legal

theories: failure to reinstate, constructive discharge and a FEHA

violation for failure to promote. See Doc. 43 at 8. 

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law regarding this issue. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that “based

on the facts previously stated, that Ms. Taylor intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff because of her pregnancy and

made conditions so intolerable that she was unable to return to

work.” Defendants, in turn, argue that Plaintiff has not

addressed her second claim and that, because it is based on the

same facts as the first, summary judgment is appropriate.

It is apparent from Plaintiff’s description of claim two -

that Ms. Taylor “made conditions so intolerable that [Plaintiff]

was unable to return to work” - that claim two is alleges a

constructive discharge claim. Claim two is redundant of the

constructive discharge component of claim one; summary judgment

is hereby GRANTED in favor of Defendants as to claim two.16

C. Claim Three - Retaliation

Plaintiff’s third claim is for pregnancy discrimination

under FEHA based on her not being selected for the CD/PR Officer

position. Plaintiff argues that “Ms. Taylor was angry with Ms.

Jerkovich for not accepting part time employment, and granted Ms.

Jerkovich an interview for the new position with no real

intention of hiring her.” Pl’s Opp’n at 12.

1. Legal Standard

Plaintiff does not challenge the legal standard as set forth

by Defendants, which is for discriminatory failure to promote

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 The discrimination standard is more appropriate here as a 17

claim for retaliation under FEHA section 12940(h) requires that a

plaintiff be retaliated against for opposing an employer’s unlawful

practices, filing a complaint or otherwise reporting a FEHA

violation. Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(h). There is no allegation

here that Plaintiff filed a complaint or reported a FEHA violation.

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rather than retaliation. To state a claim for discrimination, 17

Plaintiff will have to demonstrate that Defendants discharged or

took adverse employment action against Plaintiff based on her

pregnancy or childbirth related condition. Cal. Govt. Code §

12940. California courts apply a three-stage burden-shifting

test in interpreting FEHA employment discrimination claims. Guz

v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000) (discussing

the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas test). At trial, the

initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. Id. This generally consists of showing

that the plaintiff 1) was a member of a protected class, 2) was

qualified for the position sought, 3) suffered an adverse

employment action, such as denial of a job, and 4) “some other

circumstances suggests discriminatory motive.” Id. at 355. The

court explained that: 

[Plaintiff] must at least show “actions taken by the

employer from which one can infer, if such actions

remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not

that such actions were ‘based on a [prohibited]

discriminatory criterion . . ..’”

Id. Similarly, this Court, in Phipps v. Gary Drilling Co., 722

F. Supp. 615, 619 (E.D. Cal. 1989), stated that “the prima facie

case must be supported by evidence that gives rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination.” The failure of a

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plaintiff to produce “specific facts” that establish a prima

facie case renders summary judgment appropriate. Id. 

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case there is a

presumption of discrimination. Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355. The

burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the

action was “taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”

Id. at 355-56. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the

plaintiff must offer evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory

or pretextual motive. Id. at 356.

The California Supreme Court noted in Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at

356-57, that California appellate courts have used varying

approaches to this test at the summary judgment stage, where the

initial burden is on the moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

The Guz court did not decide the issue, but it appears that

summary judgment may be appropriate if Defendants 1) demonstrate

an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s prima facie case

and Plaintiff does not present evidence supporting it; or 2)

present a legitimate non-discriminatory motive for their actions

and Plaintiff fails to produce affirmative evidence supporting a

rational inference of intentional discrimination. Muzquiz v.

City of Emeryville, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1106, 1116-17 (2000).

2. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

a) Protected Status, Qualifications & Adverse

Employment Action

Plaintiff, as a pregnant woman or a woman disabled by

pregnancy, is a member of a protected class as defined by FEHA. 

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Plaintiff was also subject to an adverse employment action in

that she was not chosen for the CD/PR Officer Position. These

elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie will be assumed for purposes

of this motion.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima

facie case for discrimination based on failure to promote because

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she was qualified for the CD/PR

Officer position and reasonably expected to receive the

promotion. The preferred qualifications were a minimum of five

years of leadership experience in fund raising and public

relations, a minimum of three years of management experience,

excellent written and verbal communication skills, and bilingual

ability in English and Spanish. Ms. Taylor acknowledged that she

considered these to be “preferences to the extent that the

Chapter might not find a candidate possessing every stated

qualification.” Taylor Decl. ¶ 22. Defendants also argue that

Plaintiff has no evidence showing any improper discriminatory

animus by Ms. Taylor based on Plaintiff’s protected status. As

discussed, Ms. Taylor’s intent behind creating the position was

to remedy the Chapter’s poor economic condition. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not bilingual and lacked

both the five years of leadership experience and the three years

of management experience. Plaintiff argues in response that

bilingual ability was not necessary to the job because “Ms.

Burson denies that Spanish fluency was necessary for the

position, which is supported by the fact that Ms. Jerkovich had

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been performing the job successfully for a year and a half.” 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. In addition to being circular, this reasoning

is based on testimony that lacks foundation. As mentioned, Ms.

Burson was not the Chapter’s executive director and was not

involved in the development of the new position. There is no

evidence indicating that Ms. Burson had the knowledge or

experience to determine what the qualifications for the CD/PR

Officer position should be. In contrast, Ms. Taylor averred that

the reason she wanted a person with bilingual ability was to

better address the needs of the large Spanish-speaking population

in the Fresno area. Taylor Decl. ¶ 23. 

Plaintiff also argues that she was qualified for the CD/PR

Officer position because it was identical to the Public Support

Specialist position she had previously been performing. As

discussed, the positions are different; the CD/PR Officer is a

management position concerned with development and long term

strategy while the Public Support Specialist position is a handson position not focused on development. 

It appears that Plaintiff may have been qualified for the

position in that she was familiar with the organization and

Plaintiff, unlike Ms. Martinez, had some fund raising experience.

Plaintiff did, however, lack management experience and is not

bilingual. The inquiry here is not whether Plaintiff was a

better choice than Ms. Martinez, but whether Plaintiff was

qualified. It will be assumed for purposes of this motion that

Plaintiff was qualified for the position. 

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b) Discriminatory Animus

Where Plaintiff’s prima facie case fails is in the area of 

discriminatory motive. There is no evidence that Ms. Taylor’s

actions were related to Plaintiff’s pregnancy. It is undisputed

that Plaintiff never heard any derogatory comments regarding

pregnant women during the course of her employment with the

Chapter. Defs.’ UMF No. 28.

Plaintiff argues that “Ms. Jerkovich was not considered for

the position because Ms. Taylor was angry with Ms. Jerkovich over

the dispute that arose between them over her return from

maternity leave.” Pl.’s Reply to UMF No. 35 (emphasis added). 

This assertion is unrelated to Plaintiff’s protected status;

Plaintiff does not argue that she was not promoted because she

was pregnant, took pregnancy leave or had a child. Ms. Taylor’s

motivation, as characterized by Plaintiff, was anger over the

disagreement regarding the memo, and there is no evidence that

the dispute regarding the memo was related to Plaintiff’s

protected status. To the extent Plaintiff relies on Ms. Burson’s

testimony to support her contention that Ms. Taylor was “angry”

with Plaintiff, there is no factual foundation for Ms. Burson’s

opinion. She was not privy to any of the email communications

between Ms. Taylor and Plaintiff such that she could assess Ms.

Taylor’s attitude regarding the communications. 

There is also no evidence that the Chapter generally was

biased against pregnant employees, employees who take pregnancy

leave or employees with children. Ms. Martinez herself is a

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mother with young children. Similarly, nothing in the record

indicates such bias on the part of Ms. Taylor. The two instances

that might even be considered in the inquiry are that Ms. Taylor

hoped that Plaintiff would want to be a full time mother, which

does not indicate a bias based on pregnancy, especially given

that the person chosen for the position had children, and that

Plaintiff did not express interest in the Chapter’s affairs while

she was on pregnancy leave. This last assertion, while perhaps

inappropriate as Plaintiff was not required to work while on

pregnancy leave, does lead to a rational inference of intentional

discrimination and does not, without more, carry Plaintiff’s

burden in defeating summary judgment.

That Ms. Taylor’s comments do not indicate discriminatory

animus is evident when the facts of this case are compared with

cases in which pregnancy discrimination was found. In Carr v.

Barnabey’s Hotel Corp., 23 Cal. App. 4th 14, 20 (1994), for

example, there was evidence that the manager stated to the

plaintiff, a pregnant woman, that the hotel’s kitchen “was no

place for a pregnant woman to be.” The manager also “told other

employees that pregnant women should not be working in the hotel

or restaurant business, and that ‘it didn’t look good’ to have a

pregnant woman at the front desk where [the plaintiff] worked.” 

Id. Here, there are no comparable instances indicating that any

of the actions taken by the Chapter were motivated by Plaintiff’s

having been pregnant or taken pregnancy leave.

Although Plaintiff may have been qualified for the CD/PR

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Officer position, there is no evidence of discriminatory motive

supporting the assertion that Plaintiff was not selected based on

her protected status. Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie

case of failure to promote.

b) Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Motive

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could establish a prima

facie case, summary judgment may still be appropriate if

Defendants show a legitimate nondiscriminatory motive for not

hiring Plaintiff. Plaintiff may then avoid summary judgment only

by demonstrating by specific and substantial evidence that the

nondiscriminatory motive was pretext for discrimination. 

Defendants assert that Ms. Martinez was selected because her

qualifications were superior to Plaintiff’s. Tom Jones, the

management consultant who sat in on the interviews, found that

Ms. Martinez was better suited for the job based on her

“education, her experience, her demeanor during the interview,

her eagerness, [were] just different than any other person.”

Jones Depo. 32:17-19. Mr. Jones concluded that Ms. Martinez was

well suited for the CD/PR Officer position based on “her

experience in the bay area, the companies she worked for, the

things she did.” Id. at 33:22-23. He stated that Ms. Martinez’s

superiority as a candidate “wasn’t so much fund raising, it was

her involvement with community people outside the organization

she worked for, community relations.” Id. at 34:1-3. 

Comparing the resumes of Ms. Martinez and Plaintiff yields

the following distinctions. As to education, Ms. Martinez

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graduated with her bachelor’s from Harvard with honors and has a

master’s degree from University of California Berkeley; Plaintiff

graduated with her bachelor’s from Cal State Fresno with no

distinction. As to experience, Ms. Martinez has two years of

management experience; Plaintiff has none (the preference was for

3 years). Ms. Martinez has at least four years of experience in

what could be considered a “leadership position” versus

Plaintiff’s two years. Ms. Martinez is bilingual; Plaintiff is

not. The only qualification Ms. Martinez was lacking was fund

raising, in which Plaintiff had approximately two years of

experience. Nevertheless, Ms. Martinez did have experience with

large budgets. On the whole, Ms. Martinez’s resume quite closely

matched the qualifications preferred by the Chapter. 

Given Mr. Jones’ recommendation and Ms. Martinez’s resume,

Defendants have demonstrated a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for hiring Ms. Martinez over Plaintiff. 

c) Pretext

As Defendants had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

not hiring Plaintiff, that another candidate more closely met the

preferred qualifications, Plaintiff can avoid summary judgment

only by producing affirmative evidence supporting a rational

inference of intentional discrimination. Muzquiz, 79 Cal. App.

4th 1116-17. As discussed with respect to Plaintiff’s prima

facie case, there is no such evidence. 

Accordingly, even if Plaintiff were qualified for the

position, Defendants had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

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for hiring Ms. Martinez and there is no evidence that the

proffered nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Defendants’

request for summary judgment is GRANTED as to claim three.

D. Claim Four - Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff’s fourth claim for termination in violation of

public policy is based on the same facts as Plaintiff’s other

claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim

for constructive termination based on a statute and therefore,

under Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1256-57, Plaintiff cannot state a

common law claim for termination in violation of public policy. 

California law supports a claim for pregnancy discrimination

outside the confines of FEHA. In Badih v. Myers, 36 Cal. App.

4th 1289, 1296 (1995), the California Court of Appeal held that

“pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under

article I, section 8 of the California Constitution” in finding

that an employer to whom FEHA was not applicable could still be

liable for wrongful termination based on pregnancy.

Plaintiff, however, does not address the fourth claim in her

opposition. Failure to oppose a claim on a motion for summary

judgment may constitute a waiver of that claim. See Coufal

Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v.

Benicia Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (E.D.

Cal. 2002). Additionally, as mentioned, supra n.16, the parties

set forth three legal theories in their joint pretrial statement,

and a theory arising under the California Constitution was not

among them. Finally, even if Plaintiff were attempting to state

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a claim for termination in violation of public policy rather than

statutory policy, this claim is redundant of the constructive

termination claim on which Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment. Defendants’ request for summary judgment is GRANTED as

to claim four. 

E. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that if summary judgment is not granted as

to all of Plaintiff’s claims, then summary adjudication is

appropriate as to the issue of punitive damages. As summary

judgment is appropriate in this case, the issue of damages need

not be addressed. 

V. Conclusion

Defendants sufficiently carried their burden as the moving

party on a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has failed to

produce “significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint.” T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. 

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment be entered in favor of

Defendants. The clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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