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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2009 Decided November 10, 2009

No. 08-7040

GLENN KERSEY,

APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:96-cv-02639-RWR)

Eric L. Siegel argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Neil L. Henrichsen.

Bruce P. Heppen, Deputy General Counsel, Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Carol B. O'Keeffe,

General Counsel, Mark F. Sullivan, Deputy General Counsel,

Gerard J. Stief, Senior Associate General Counsel, and David J.

Shaffer, Associate General Counsel. Sonia A. Bacchus and

Robert J. Kniaz, Counsel, entered appearances. 

Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Glenn Kersey, an employee of

the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA), alleges that WMATA’s refusal to promote him was

the consequence of discrimination and retaliation, in violation of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.

WMATA contends that its refusal was the consequence of a

binding settlement agreement that had been in place between the

parties since 1990. The district court granted summary

judgment for WMATA, and we affirm.

I

WMATA hired Kersey as a bus operator in 1979. In 1980,

Kersey got into a fight with bus passengers, suffered injuries to

his neck and back, and took a leave paid for by workers’

compensation. Kersey was still on leave four years later when

WMATA terminated him for failing to report two arrests. After

Kersey’s union (Local 922 of the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters) filed a grievance on his behalf, WMATA reinstated

him. In 1988, while still on leave, Kersey got into a fight with

a WMATA employee on WMATA property and was again

arrested. Charged with assault and carrying a deadly weapon,

he was subsequently acquitted by a jury. On February 2, 1989,

WMATA once again terminated Kersey, referencing his medical

disqualification from operating a bus (based on his neck and

back injuries), his record of violent physical confrontations, and

his failure to report arrests. See WMATA Personnel Action

Report (Feb. 2, 1989) (WMATA Supp. App. 115); WMATA

Mem. (Jan. 31, 1989) (WMATA Supp. App. 116-17).

Kersey filed a grievance against this second termination.

On April 23, 1990, Kersey, the union, and WMATA Assistant

General Manager LeRoy Bailey signed an agreement that by its

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terms constituted a “full and final settlement of this grievance.”

1990 Settlement Agreement (WMATA Supp. App. 118). Under

that agreement, Kersey was reinstated “to a position of cleanershifter with the understanding that he will only be permitted to

clean buses and under no circumstance will he be permitted to

operate an authority vehicle.” Id. A subsequent memorandum

of understanding, which Kersey also signed, reiterated that he

“will not be permitted to operate an Authority vehicle (revenue

and non-revenue) under any circumstances.” 1990 Mem. of

Understanding (May 25, 1990) (Supp. App. to Appellant’s Br.,

Ex. B). 

Soon after signing these agreements, and notwithstanding

their provisions, Kersey began attempting to apply for positions

that required operating WMATA vehicles. In the summer of

1990, WMATA refused to allow Kersey to take a promotional

test for such a position, informing him that the 1990 Settlement

Agreement precluded him from obtaining the position. See 2d

Am. Compl. ¶ 41. From 1990 through the fall of 1995, Kersey

repeatedly made requests -- which WMATA repeatedly denied

-- for positions that required driving. See id. ¶¶ 41, 43, 47, 59.

During this period, WMATA also repeatedly denied Kersey

promotions into positions -- including the position of mechanic

-- that required driving, citing the no-driving provision of the

1990 Agreement. See Appellant’s Br. 6 (stating that WMATA

asserted the “1990 ‘no-driving’ restriction as the basis for

reject[ing]” Kersey’s promotion applications in 1993 and 1995);

Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s 1st Interrogatories 19-21 (WMATA

Supp. App. 195-97).

Beginning in 1991, Kersey filed a series of complaints with

WMATA, his union, and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC), charging unfairness, disability

discrimination, and retaliation by both WMATA and the union

in regard to his failure to secure promotions. Beginning in 1992,

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WMATA supervisors had intermittent discussions with the

union about modifying the 1990 Settlement Agreement to permit

Kersey to apply for positions that required driving, but that did

not require driving passengers. 1992 Draft Agreement

(WMATA Supp. App. 121); 1994 Draft Mem. of Understanding

(WMATA Supp. App. 130). In October and November 1995,

WMATA permitted Kersey to take tests for mechanic positions

that required driving, but it ultimately denied him promotion to

those positions -- again citing the no-driving provision. See 2d

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-60; Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s 1st

Interrogatories 19.

On November 22, 1996, Kersey sued WMATA in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia, contending (as

refined on this appeal) that WMATA’s 1993 and 1995 refusals

to promote him to positions requiring driving constituted

retaliation and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In 2008, the district court granted

summary judgment in favor of WMATA, finding that the

refusals were the “‘delayed, but inevitable consequence’ of the

express terms of [the 1990] contract.” Kersey v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 533 F. Supp. 2d 181, 191 (D.D.C. 2008)

(quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980)).

The court concluded that Kersey had filed his suit too late under

the applicable statute of limitations, and that, alternatively, he

had failed to rebut WMATA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory

explanation for its actions. See id. at 198. Because the court’s

alternative ground is sufficient to decide the case, it is our focus

here.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. See Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir.

2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no

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1

See Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1, 15

n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that disability discrimination claims

under the Rehabilitation Act are “subject to the McDonnell Douglas

framework”); Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(applying “Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework

to retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act”).

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(2); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

247-48 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is not “genuine”

unless “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. 

The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise

qualified individual with a disability” may be discriminated

against by a federal agency “solely by reason of her or his

disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act states that “[t]he

standards used to determine whether this section has been

violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination

under this section shall be the standards applied under

[provisions of] the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA].” Id.

§ 794(d). The ADA, in turn, bars discrimination against a

“qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . .

conditions[] and privileges of employment,” including

“advancement,” id. § 12112(a), and bars retaliation against an

individual for making a charge under or opposing any practice

made unlawful by that Act, see id. § 12203(a); Smith v. District

of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Where, as here, a claim of discrimination or retaliation is

based upon circumstantial evidence, we analyze the claim under

the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).1

 Under that

framework, “the plaintiff must [first] establish a prima facie case

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2

The district court was correct in holding that in a case like this,

in which the defendant proffers a nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory

rationale, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff actually

made out the elements of a prima facie case. See Kersey, 533 F. Supp.

2d at 197 n.14. As we explained in Morgan v. Federal Home Loan

Mortgage Co.:

[O]nce a defendant has proffered . . . a nondiscriminatory

[and nonretaliatory] explanation, it has “done everything

that would be required of [it] if the plaintiff had properly

made out a prima facie case.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). At that

point, “whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer

relevant,” and the only question is “whether ‘the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’” Id. at 715

(quoting [Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.] Burdine, 450 U.S.

[248,] 253 [(1981)]).

328 F.3d 647, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see Brady v. Office of Sergeant

at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

of discrimination” or retaliation. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). Once the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant

to produce evidence of “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or

nonretaliatory] reason” for its actions. Id. If the defendant

satisfies that burden, “the McDonnell Douglas framework --

with its presumptions and burdens -- disappear[s], and the sole

remaining issue [is] discrimination [or retaliation] vel non.” Id.

at 142-43 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Thereafter, “to survive summary judgment the plaintiff must

show that a reasonable jury could conclude from all of the

evidence that the adverse employment decision was made for a

discriminatory [or retaliatory] reason.” Lathram, 336 F.3d at

1088.2

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3

The parties disagree as to whether the relevant limitations period

for claims under the Rehabilitation Act is three or four years.

Compare Appellant’s Br. 11 (three years for discrimination claims and

four years for retaliation claims), with Appellee’s Br. 38-40 (three

years for both). We need not resolve this dispute, as Kersey did not

file the instant suit until six years after signing the 1990 Settlement

Agreement. Although Kersey’s initial brief contested whether that

agreement “was a final employment decision capable of triggering the

statute of limitations,” Appellant’s Br. 9, the agreement’s express

terms make clear that it was, see 1990 Settlement Agreement (stating

that the agreement constitutes a “full and final settlement of this

grievance”). At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the

1990 Settlement Agreement was final and instead rested his case on

the claim (discussed below) that WMATA rescinded that agreement

in 1995. See Oral Argument Recording at 7:02-:25.

In this case, WMATA has come forward with a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for refusing to

promote Kersey to positions that required driving: to wit, the

provision of the 1990 Settlement Agreement stating that “under

no circumstance will [Kersey] be permitted to operate an

authority vehicle.” 1990 Settlement Agreement; see 1990 Mem.

of Understanding (providing that Kersey “will not be permitted

to operate an Authority vehicle (revenue and non-revenue) under

any circumstances”). There is no dispute that the statute of

limitations has long run on challenging the 1990 Settlement

Agreement as itself having been motivated by disability

discrimination or retaliation.3

 And given the emphatic nature of

the bar against driving contained in that agreement, no

reasonable jury could infer discriminatory or retaliatory intent

from WMATA’s reliance on it to deny Kersey a promotion. Cf.

Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001)

(holding that “proceeding along lines previously contemplated”

after an employee files an EEOC complaint “is no evidence

whatever of [the] causality” required to prove retaliation).

Indeed, Kersey concedes that, if the 1990 Settlement Agreement

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remained in force, he has no viable claim. See Oral Argument

Recording at 7:00-:30.

But Kersey does not concede that the 1990 Settlement

Agreement remained in force. Rather, he contends that

WMATA’s reliance on the agreement is pretext because

WMATA subsequently rescinded the agreement’s no-driving

restriction. Oral Argument Recording at 8:01-10. And as we

have held, proof that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory

reason is mere pretext may well be enough to create a genuine

issue of material fact, and hence to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.

Citing a section of Williston on Contracts relating to

waiver, Kersey contends that a party may unilaterally rescind (or

waive) a written contractual provision either by “express

declaration” or by “a clear, unequivocal and decisive act.”

Appellant’s Br. 12 (quoting RICHARD A. LORD, 13 WILLISTON

ON CONTRACTS § 39:28 (4th ed. 2000)); see Appellant’s Reply

Br. 3-4. In fact, the Williston treatise’s description of the rule

is a bit more fulsome: “[I]n the absence of an express

declaration manifesting the intent not to claim the right allegedly

waived, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of

the party who is claimed to have waived its rights, so consistent

with an intention to waive that no other reasonable explanation

is possible.” WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:28; see Lacek v.

Wash. Hosp. Ctr. Corp., 978 A.2d 1194, 1200 (D.C. 2009)

(stating that “a waiver must be clear and unambiguous”). The

record in this case does not contain such an “express

declaration” or “clear, unequivocal and decisive act.”

Kersey first asks us to find evidence of rescission in a

proposal that WMATA Assistant General Manager Bailey made

to Kersey’s union in August 1992. Under that proposal, Kersey

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would have been allowed “to advance to” a vacant steam cleaner

position, which required the ability to operate a WMATA

vehicle. 1992 Draft Agreement. Although Kersey contends that

a reasonable jury could infer from this proposal that WMATA

rescinded the no-driving provision, we do not see how. Bailey’s

proposal was by its own terms merely a “DRAFT” that would

not “become[] effective [until] acceptance by Local 922.” Id.

There is no evidence “that the union ever accepted this

proposal,” and WMATA continued to enforce the 1990 nodriving provision thereafter. Kersey, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 187; see

id. at 197 (noting that “the record establishes conclusively that

WMATA repeatedly enforced the 1990 contract’s driving

prohibition from the time the contract was made through the last

event about which Kersey complains in this suit”). Under these

circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude that WMATA

made “an express declaration” waiving the provision, or that it

“clear[ly], unequivocal[ly], and decisive[ly]” acted in a way “so

consistent with an intention to waive that no other reasonable

explanation is possible.” WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:28.

The record also contains another draft agreement with the

union, dated December 7, 1994. See 1994 Draft Mem. of

Understanding. That 1994 Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) would have permitted Kersey to operate WMATA

vehicles as required for maintenance positions. Id. Like the

1992 Draft Agreement, however, “the record does not establish

that the union ever accepted this MOU.” Kersey, 533 F. Supp.

2d at 188. 

Kersey argues, second, that “WMATA unilaterally

rescinded the 1990 Settlement Agreement by permitting [him]

to test for positions that required driving.” Appellant’s Reply

Br. 3. Specifically, Kersey contends that, in 1993 and 1995,

WMATA permitted him to take examinations for mechanic

positions that required some driving. See id. at 19. Union

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representative Eddie Kornegay testified that, although

WMATA’s initial interpretation of the 1990 Settlement

Agreement’s no-driving provision had been that the agreement

also barred Kersey from applying or testing for positions

requiring driving, WMATA later “overturned” that

interpretation and let Kersey “apply for and take exams for

mechanical jobs.” Kornegay Dep. 87 (WMATA Supp. App.

164). And in an internal 1996 communication, WMATA

confirmed that, although Kersey “was initially denied the right

to take the requisite exams due to the settlement agreement,”

later “there was a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ made that reversed

this.” WMATA Mem. (July 22, 1996) (Supp. App. to

Appellant’s Br., Ex. B). Kersey argues that a reasonable jury

could conclude that, by permitting him to take promotion tests,

WMATA acted in a way that was consistent with an intention to

rescind the no-driving provision.

But whether or not permitting testing was consistent with

rescission, no reasonable jury could conclude that WMATA had

“clear[ly], unequivocal[ly], and decisive[ly]” acted in a way “so

consistent with an intention to waive that no other reasonable

explanation is possible.” WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:28

(emphasis added). As WMATA explained, once it began

discussing with the union the possibility of altering the 1990

Settlement Agreement, WMATA had reason to allow Kersey to

test. See Appellee’s Br. 24. Testing, unlike driving, was not

expressly barred by the 1990 Agreement. See 1990 Settlement

Agreement. And if WMATA, Kersey, and the union had

eventually been able to agree to alter that agreement, then

Kersey’s test results could have positioned him to secure

subsequent promotions. As the district court held, “there is an

obvious ‘other reasonable explanation’ for WMATA's

inconsistent act, namely, that WMATA was willing to let

Kersey take the promotional tests in anticipation of a

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modification of the 1990 contract, a modification that never

materialized.” Kersey, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 196.

We therefore find no genuine issue as to whether the 1990

Settlement Agreement remained in force. As a consequence,

there is no evidentiary support for Kersey’s claim that

WMATA’s reliance on the agreement was mere pretext. And in

the absence of any other basis upon which a reasonable jury

could find that the denials of promotion were the result of

discrimination or retaliation, there is no basis for overturning the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

WMATA.

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

Affirmed.

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