Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01701/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01701-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 28:1332ri Diversity-Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Joseph Orlosky,

Plaintiff,

v.

William E. Merill, Transformed 

Service Inc., DOES 1 through 50,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01701-BTMWVG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM; AND 

DENYING REQUEST FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

On August 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in addition to a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”) and a Request for Appointment of 

Counsel. For the reasons discussed below, the IFP Motion is granted, the 

Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, and the Request for Appointment of 

Counsel is denied without prejudice.

Discussion

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Upon review of Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of his IFP Motion, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of inability to pay the filing fees 

required to prosecute this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is

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GRANTED.

II. Failure to State a Claim

Although the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed IFP, Plaintiff’s Complaint 

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court is under a continuing 

duty to dismiss an IFP case whenever the Court determines that the action “fails 

to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Here, the Complaint must be dismissed because it does not plead facts that 

demonstrate the existence of an element of a violation of the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”): a pattern of racketeering 

activity. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants violated § 1962 of RICO when 

they “engaged in a racketeering conspiracy to defraud and extort funds from 

plaintiff by engaging in practices and dishonest conduct designed to entrap 

plaintiff, threaten the property of the plaintiff and threaten litigation in Kansas if 

plaintiff did not pay Defendant immediately as demanded.” Specifically, Plaintiff 

alleges that upon receiving Plaintiff’s property for interstate shipping, Defendants’ 

altered and misrepresented the condition of the property, demanded fraudulent 

fees related to shipping the property, and ultimately stole the property. Because 

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are “held to less rigorous standards 

than those drafted by attorneys.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 980 

F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Even so, Plaintiff has not yet succeeded in stating a claim on which relief 

can be granted because his Complaint does not allege a pattern of racketeering 

activity. To state a claim under § 1962 of RICO, a plaintiff must allege the “(1) 

conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity 

(known as ‘predicate acts') (5) causing injury to plaintiff's ‘business or property.’” 

Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th 

Cir. 2005). At a minimum, a “pattern” requires that the predicate acts be “related” 

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and “continuous.” Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). To 

establish that predicate acts are “continuous,” a plaintiff may plead “closed-ended 

continuity” or “open-ended continuity.” Id. at 1526. “Closed-ended continuity 

refers to a closed period of repeated conduct. It is established by showing that 

the predicate acts occurred over a substantial period of time. If closed-ended 

continuity cannot be established, plaintiffs may plead open-ended continuity. 

Open-ended continuity refers to past conduct that by its nature indicates a threat 

of future criminal conduct. It is established by showing either that the predicate 

acts specifically threaten repetition or that they were an ongoing entity's regular 

way of doing business.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants’ predicate acts occurred 

between August 11, 2017 and August 13, 2017. A period of three days does not 

constitute “a substantial period of time,” as required by closed-ended 

continuity.

1+ Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to establish open-ended continuity. As 

currently pleaded, the Complaint only alleges a single isolated activity on the part 

of Defendants. It does not allege that Defendants’ predicate acts threaten 

repetition or that the predicate acts have become Defendants’ regular way of 

doing business.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff will have 45 days from the date of this order to file an amended 

complaint. 

III. Request for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a request for appointment of counsel. 

 

1 The 9th Circuit has observed that while there is no “hard and fast, bright line, 

one-year” rule for the continuity requirement, it will generally not be “satisfied by 

a pattern of activity lasting less than a year” and “a pattern of activity lasting only 

a few months does not reflect the long term conduct to which RICO was intended 

to apply.” See Allwaste, F.3d at 1528.

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There is no right to counsel in civil cases, and district courts may appoint 

counsel only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an 

evaluation of both ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the 

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 

involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed 

together before reaching a decision.” Id.

At this point in time, the Court cannot say there is any likelihood of success 

on the merits. Therefore, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Request 

for Appointment of Counsel.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above: 

1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED;

2) Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff 

will have 45 days from the date of this Order to file an amended 

complaint; and

3) Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED without 

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED:

Dated: September 6, 2017

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