Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00402/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00402-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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November 14, 2003, the court served on plaintiff notice the required

by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele

United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Andre Ramon Craver,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 03-0402 GEB PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Sacramento County, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoThis action is proceeding on plaintiff’s March 3, 2003,

complaint in which he claims: (1) Since September 3, 2002 Dr.

Baradhursingh denied plaintiff treatment for headaches, numbness

in his hands and feet, stiffness in his neck and back and pain in

his knee; (2) In January 2003 Dr. Baradhursingh revoked

permission for plaintiff to use a cane and special shoes; and (3)

T. Smith denied plaintiff pain medication. Defendants move for

summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes.1

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26 v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

2

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits, 

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The

moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

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issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The

opponent’s affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative

that a jury reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the

opponent. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged is implausible,

stronger evidence than otherwise required must be presented to

defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that

“supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is

competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that the opponent need

not produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial

in order to avoid summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 

Rather, the questions are (1) whether the evidence could be

submitted in admissible form and (2) “if reduced to admissible

evidence” would it be sufficient to carry the party’s burden at

trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032

(9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing party’s reliance upon

her diary upon the ground it was hearsay was overruled because

the party could testify to all the relevant portions from

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personal knowledge or read it into evidence as recorded

recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion to

strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

The following facts are undisputed: At all times relevant

to this action, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the

Sacramento County Jail; defendant Baradhursingh was a physician

at the Sacramento County Jail and defendant Smith was the nurse

supervisor responsible for investigating and responding to

medical grievances. 

In October 2001 plaintiff was diagnosed with torn left

quadriceps but surgery was deferred in favor of physical therapy. 

July 28, 2002, Dr. Hambly authorized plaintiff’s use of a

cane for the length of his stay. August 26, 2002, medical staff

renewed this authorization and authorized him to have shoes

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(without laces) provided by his family for the length of his

stay. 

September 3, 2002, plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs

and hit his head. Plaintiff complained of a headache, numbness

in his hands, feet and legs, and pain in his left knee and left

ankle. Jail medical staff examined plaintiff and a doctor not

named as a defendant referred plaintiff for outside evaluation,

including a CAT scan of plaintiff’s head. Plaintiff had no

fractures and the CAT scan was normal. September 4, 2002,

defendant Baradhursingh found plaintiff was “ambulatory” despite

some swelling of the left knee and left ankle. Plaintiff had

good range of motion in his shoulders and neck.

September 13, 2002, Dr. Hambly saw plaintiff for left knee

and ankle pain, reviewed plaintiff’s chart, prescribed Vicodin

and Celebrex and referred plaintiff for outside evaluation.

January 28, 2003, plaintiff requested defendant

Baradhursingh prescribe a cane. Defendant Baradhursingh denied

the request after examining plaintiff and reviewing plaintiff’s

medical history. 

 Dr. Hambly, not defendant Baradhursingh, revoked

plaintiff’s authorization for shoes provided by his family. 

November 17, 2002, plaintiff experienced numbness in his

fingers and toes, sharp pain radiating down his spine to the rest

of his body, his right shoulder felt as though it was dislocated,

and his neck and back were stiff. He awoke at night in pain

despite taking Vicodin twice daily. November 18, 2002, medical

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staff examined plaintiff, reviewed back exercises previously

prescribed and discussed the importance of strengthening his back

muscles.

November 19, 2002, plaintiff requested he be housed on the

medical floor after release from disciplinary confinement because

climbing stairs hurt his knees.

November 22, 2002, defendant Baradhursingh explained to

plaintiff that sedentary habits would cause muscle atrophy.

Plaintiff did not receive his prescribed medication at least

five times between November 30, 2002, and January 6, 2003. 

December 3, 2002, no one responded to plaintiff’s request for

medical attention when he awoke at night with a headache and pain

shooting down his spine, followed by numbness. Plaintiff filed

grievances about these incidents. 

Defendant Smith did not directly supervise staff responsible

for dispensing medicine. She responded to plaintiff’s written

grievances but she never administered medicine to plaintiff,

examined plaintiff or in any other way provided direct medical

care to plaintiff while he was at the jail.

January 5, 2003, medical staff ordered x-rays of plaintiff’s

knees for comparison with earlier films to rule out the

possibility of internal damage.

January 21, 2003, defendant Baradhursingh prescribed

Celebrex. January 26, 2003, medical staff substituted Tylenol #3

for Vicodin. Staff refused to issue a cane to plaintiff because

he had been caught “cheeking” Vicodin at least three times, had

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admitted using a cane as a weapon and did not need a cane. They

referred plaintiff for an orthopedic evaluation, with the caveat

that he was not to be given a cane because of security issues. 

Any ambulatory assistance was to be remedied by a wheelchair and

housing accommodations. January 28, 2003, defendant Bahadursignh

found plaintiff was ambulatory.

Because petitioner was a pretrial detainee, the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected him from conditions

amounting to punishment and his rights were violated if defendant

subjected him to an “arbitrary or purposeless” condition, viz.,

one not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 539 (1979). 

The standard for determining whether plaintiff’s due process

rights were violated is the same as it would be under the Eighth

Amendment. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Therefore, to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must adduce

evidence of “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), viz., evidence defendants knew

of and disregarded a risk of injury or harm that “is not one that

today’s society chooses to tolerate.” See Helling v. McKinney,

509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994).

Defendant Baradhursingh contends there is no genuine issue

of whether he was deliberately indifferent. 

The undisputed facts and plaintiff’s evidence show several

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physicians responded to plaintiff’s complaints after the

September 3, 2002, fall and so defendant Baradhursingh was not

solely responsible for plaintiff’s care. Defendant Baradhursingh

prescribed medication and recommended plaintiff do exercises

prescribed in physical therapy. Defendant Baradhursingh denied

the request after examining plaintiff and reviewing plaintiff’s

medical history. Defendant Baradhursingh determined plaintiff

was sufficiently ambulatory so as not to require a wheelchair and

plaintiff adduces no evidence to the contrary. 

Defendant Baradhursingh did not revoke plaintiff’s

authorization for special shoes. 

Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence defendant

Baradhursingh knew of but disregarded plaintiff’s headaches, pain

or numbness or that he revoked authorization for plaintiff to use

special shoes. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute about

whether defendant Baradhursingh was deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Defendant Smith asserts that since she was a supervisor she

cannot be liable under § 1983. Plaintiff asserts defendant Smith

failed adequately to respond to plaintiff’s complaints that he

was not receiving his medication. 

A person is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if

he commits or directs an act or omission that violates a

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989). “Supervisory liability exists even without overt

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personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory

officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself

is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force

of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642,

646 (9th Cir.1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

To hold a supervisor liable for the unconstitutional acts of

his subordinates, there must be a “causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc). This connection may be established by showing

the supervisor personally participated in or directed the

violation, Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989),

implemented a policy so deficient as to be the moving force of

the violation, Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989),

or by omitting to perform an act he was legally required to do,

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978), such as

failing to take adequate steps to address a violation of which he

knew or should have known, see, Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930,

937 & fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendant Smith supervised responses to grievances and she

responded to many of plaintiff’s complaints. She was not

responsible for administering medication to plaintiff and there

is no evidence she was responsible for disciplining other nurses

or ensuring other nurses followed protocol.

There is no genuine dispute that defendant Smith was

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

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For these reasons, defendants’ November 29, 2004, motion for

summary judgment should be granted and judgment should be entered

in defendants’ favor.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 17, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

crav0402.f&r msj(1)

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