Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02312/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02312-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP 

address 69.75.46.123,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-2312-MMA-NLS

ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO 

SERVE A THIRD PARTY 

SUBPOENA PRIOR TO A RULE 

26(f) CONFERENCE

[ECF No. 4]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Ex Parte

Motion for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. 

ECF No. 4. No Defendant has been named or served, and so no opposition or reply briefs 

have been filed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.

I. Background

This is one of numerous cases filed by Plaintiff alleging copyright infringement 

against a defendant using the BitTorrent file-sharing system.1 On November 14, 2017, 

 

1 On November 14, 2017, Strike 3 holdings filed eight separate cases against John Does 

in this District: 17cv2302-MMA-JLB; 17cv2312-MMA-NLS; 17cv2313-AJB-JMA; 

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Plaintiff filed this Complaint against “John Doe,” who is allegedly a subscriber of 

Spectrum/Time Warner Cable and assigned Internet Protocol (“IP”) address 69.75.46.123

(“Defendant”). ECF No. 1, ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges Defendant infringed its copyrights by 

using the BitTorrent file distribution network, one of the most common peer-to-peer file 

sharing systems used to distribute data such as digital movie files. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant downloaded, copied, and distributed several of Plaintiff’s 

works without authorization. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 26-27, 31, 35-37, Ex. A to Compl. 

Plaintiff seeks leave to conduct early discovery to learn the identity of the 

subscriber of the IP address from the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) who leased the 

address. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an order permitting it to serve a third party 

subpoena under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 on Time Warner Cable that would 

require it to supply the name and address of its subscriber to Plaintiff. ECF No. 4-1 at 2. 

Plaintiff does not seek the telephone number or email address of the subscriber associated 

with Defendant’s IP address. Id. (“This subpoena will only demand the true name and 

address of the Defendant.”) 

II. Legal Standard

A party is generally not permitted to obtain discovery without a court order before 

the parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(d)(1). However, courts make exceptions to allow limited discovery after a 

complaint is filed to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying information necessary to 

serve the defendant. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. 

Cal. 1999). A party who requests early or expedited discovery must make a showing of 

good cause. See Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275-76 

(N.D. Cal. 2002) (applying “the conventional standard of good cause in evaluating 

Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery”). Good cause exists “where the need for 

 

17cv2315-MMA-AGS; 17cv2316-GPC-KSC; 17cv2317-JAH-BLM; 17cv2318-DMSBLM; and 17cv2319-JAH-BGS.

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expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the 

prejudice to the responding party.” Id. at 276.

“The Ninth Circuit has held that when the defendants’ identities are unknown at 

the time the complaint is filed, courts may grant plaintiffs leave to take early discovery to 

determine the defendants’ identities ‘unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover 

the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.’” 808 

Holdings, LLC v. Collective of December 29, 2011 Sharing Hash, 2012 WL 1648838, *3 

(S.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 

1980)). “A district court’s decision to grant discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is 

a matter of discretion.” Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578 (citing Wells Fargo & Co. v. 

Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977).

To determine whether “good cause” exists to permit expedited discovery to 

identify John Doe defendants, district courts in this Circuit consider whether the plaintiff 

(1) “identif[ies] the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can 

determine that the defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal 

court”; (2) “identif[ies] all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant” to ensure 

that plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify the defendant; and (3) “establish[es] 

to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion 

to dismiss.” Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578-80. Additionally, the plaintiff should 

demonstrate the discovery will likely lead to identifying information that will permit 

service of process. Id. at 580. These factors are considered to ensure the expedited 

discovery procedure “will only be employed cases where the plaintiff has in good faith 

exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and will 

prevent use of this method to harass or intimidate.” Id.

III. Discussion

a. Identification of Missing Party with Sufficient Specificity 

Plaintiff must identify Defendant with enough specificity to enable the Court to 

determine that Defendant is a real person or entity who would be subject to the 

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jurisdiction of this Court. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578. Some district courts in this 

Circuit have determined that “a plaintiff identifies Doe defendants with sufficient 

specificity by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual defendant on 

the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by using ‘geolocation technology’ to 

trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin.” 808 Holdings, 2012 WL 1648838, at 

*4; see Openmind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1-39, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *6, 

(concluding that plaintiff satisfied the first factor by identifying the defendants’ IP 

addresses and by tracing the IP addresses to a point of origin within the State of 

California); see also Pink Lotus Entm’t v. Does 1-46, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, *6 

(same). Others have concluded that merely identifying the IP addresses on the day of the 

alleged infringement satisfies this factor. 808 Holdings, 2012 WL 1648838, at *4 (citing 

cases).

Here, Plaintiff provided the Court with sufficient specificity that it seeks to sue a 

real person subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. In support of its identification of the 

missing party, Plaintiff provides declarations and factual contentions with evidentiary 

support in its complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff provides declarations from Plaintiff’s 

investigator, Tobias Fieser who is IPP International UG’s employee and from a second 

independent forensic investigator, John S. Pasquale.

Mr. Fieser is an employee in the litigation support department of IPP International 

UG (“IPP”). IPP provides forensic investigation services to copyright owners. ECF No. 

4-2, ¶ 4.) Mr. Fieser testifies that IPP monitors the BitTorrent file distribution network to

find IP addresses that are used to distribute Plaintiff’s copyrighted works without 

authorization. Id., ¶ 5. He attests he reviewed IPP’s forensic activity logs and 

determined its servers connected to an electronic device using IP address 69.75.46.123

and that the IPP software determined that IP address was distributing digital content 

including “pieces of Strike 3’s copyrighted movies listed on Exhibit A to Strike 3’s 

Complaint. [¶] Each piece was recorded in a PCAP, which stands for ‘packet capture’ 

and is a forensically sound interface for recording network traffic.” Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. He 

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further attests that IPP’s software “verified that reassembling the pieces using a 

specialized BitTorrent client results in a fully playable digital movie.” Id. at ¶ 9. Mr. 

Fieser testifies that a digital file can be identified by a “Crytographic Hash Value” and 

that IPP software “determined the files being distributed by Defendant’s IP address have 

a unique identifier of the Crytographic Hash outlined on Exhibit A.” Id. at ¶ 10. Finally, 

Mr. Fieser testifies that “IP address 69.75.46.123 is associated with significant long term 

BitTorrent use.” Id. at ¶ 12. 

Mr. Pasquale is a project manager for 7 River Systems, a cyber security firm, and 

specializes in system and network administration and project management. ECF No. 4-2 

at ¶¶ 3-4. Mr. Pasquale was retained to analyze the data collected by IPP. Id. at ¶ 6. He 

received a PCAP and used a program called Wireshark to view the contents and confirm

the accuracy of the date and time of a single transaction associated with the IP address in 

question. Id. at ¶ 9. Mr. Pasquale also attests that in his experience, Time Warner Cable 

is the only entity that can correlate the IP address to its subscriber. Id. at ¶ 10. 

The factual contentions in Plaintiff’s Complaint trace the allegedly offending IP 

address to this District. Plaintiff states that it “used IP address geolocation technology by 

Maxmind Ind. (“Maxmind”), an industry-leading provider of IP address intelligence and 

online fraud detection tools, to determine that Defendant’s IP address traced to a physical 

address in this district.” ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 9. Based on Exhibit A to the Complaint, the 

dates of the alleged infringement occurred recently, between May–September, 2017. The 

Court is therefore satisfied that any geolocation trace occurring between the dates of 

alleged infringement and the date of the filing of the Complaint that traces the Defendant 

to this District is likely to be accurate.

Based on this evidence and information, the Court finds Plaintiff satisfied the 

“sufficient specificity” threshold. Plaintiff provides the Court with information about the 

allegedly infringing activity at a particular IP address, including the dates and times of 

particular infringing activity. ECF No. 1-2 (Ex. A. to the Complaint). Plaintiff also 

states in its Complaint that it narrowed the activity to a specific IP address, and that it 

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used geolocation technology to trace the identified IP address to within this District. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiff provided a sufficient showing that it seeks to 

sue a real person subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Likewise, if Plaintiff obtains the 

identifying information from the ISP for the subscriber assigned the IP address at issue, 

the information sought in the subpoena would likely enable Plaintiff to serve the 

Defendant.

b. Previous Attempts to Locate Defendants

Second, Plaintiff must describe all previous steps taken to locate the Defendant to 

ensure that Plaintiff made a good faith effort to identify the Defendant. Here, Plaintiff 

states that it diligently attempted to locate Defendant by searching for Defendant’s IP 

address using online search engines. ECF No. 4-1 at 8. Plaintiff also states it engaged in 

diligent research to attempt to identify Defendant using other means, and also extensively 

discussed this issue with its computer investigators and cyber security consultants. Id. 

Plaintiff states that despite its diligent efforts, it is unable to identify any means of 

obtaining the identity of the Defendant other than through subpoenaing the information 

from the ISP. Id.; see also ECF No. 4-3 at ¶ 10 (“Based on my experience in similar 

cases, Defendant’s ISP Time Warner Cable is the only entity that can correlate the IP 

address to the subscriber...”). In light of this information, the Court finds Plaintiff made 

a good faith effort to identify and locate the Defendant.

c. Whether Plaintiff Can Withstand a Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must make a prima facie case of copyright 

infringement. A plaintiff must show: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) that 

Defendant violated the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. 

Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiff alleges it is the owner of the copyrights-in-suit. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35. 

Plaintiff also submits the declarations of Greg Lansksy and Susan B. Stalzer. Mr. Lansky 

is a member of General Media Systems, the parent company that owns Strike 3. Mr. 

Lansky testifies that “Strike 3 owns the intellectual property to the Blacked, Tushy, and 

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Vixen adult brands, including the copyrights to each of the motion pictures distributed 

through Blacked, Tushy and Vixen and the trademarks to each of the brand names and 

logos.” ECF No. 4-2 at ¶ 3. Ms. Stalzer is an employee of Strike 3 Holdings attests IPP 

provided her with the files correlating to the hashes identified in Exhibit A to the 

Complaint. ECF No 4-2 at ¶ 8. She compared the files IPP provided side by side to 

Strike 3’s works and attests that the works are identical, strikingly similar or substantially 

similar to Strike 3’s original copyrighted works. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff also alleges that 

Defendant used BitTorrent to copy and distribute the elements of the original works 

covered by the copyrights-in-suit without authorization. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 36-37. 

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show it can withstand a motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction and withstand a motion for improper venue because 

Defendant’s IP address was traced to a location in this District. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-10. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged a prima facie showing of 

copyright infringement that would likely withstand a motion to dismiss.

d. Additional Considerations

Notwithstanding the above conclusions, the Court notes the growing concerns 

about “copyright trolls,” which are “roughly defined as plaintiffs who are ‘more focused 

on the business of litigation than on selling a product or service or licensing their 

[copyrights] to third parties to sell a product or service.’” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, * 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (quoting Matthew Sag, 

Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1105, 1108 (2015)). As one 

district court recently noted, the “danger of copyright trolls is particularly acute in the 

context of pornography.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35534 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016). “In these cases, ‘there is a risk not only of public 

embarrassment for the misidentified defendant, but also that the innocent defendant may 

be coerced into an unjust settlement with the plaintiff to prevent the dissemination of 

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publicity surrounding unfounded allegations.’” Id. (quoting Media Prods., Inc. v. Doe, 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84111, at *4 (S.D.N.Y June 18, 2012).2 

This Court likewise “shares the growing concern about unscrupulous tactics used 

by certain plaintiffs, especially in the adult film industry, to shake down the owners of IP 

addresses” to exact quick and quiet settlements from possibly innocent defendants who 

pay out only to avoid potential embarrassment. Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-5, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77469, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012). Here, Plaintiff does little to 

alleviate the Court’s concern; to the contrary, the declarations submitted extol the 

rampant nature of piracy in this industry but offer nothing regarding prudence in 

proceeding with claims. Plaintiff does invite the Court to issue a protective order 

establishing procedural safeguards, and the Court will do so. See e.g., Malibu Media v. 

Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 79595, *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2014) (imposing conditions 

and citing cases that do the same); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 35534, *17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016).

///

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///

 

2 This is particularly so because “[t]he fact that a copyrighted work was illegally 

downloaded from a certain IP address does not necessarily mean that the owner of that IP 

address was the infringer. Indeed, the true infringer could just as easily be a third party 

who had access to the internet connection, such as a son or daughter, houseguest, 

neighbor, or customer of a business offering internet connection.” Malibu Media, LLC v. 

Doe, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (quoting Patrick 

Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-6, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77486 *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) 

(internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, it is not clear to this Court how Plaintiff could 

discover this information without first identifying the subscriber to the IP address and 

making appropriate inquiries. Dead Season LLC v. Doe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101993, 

*16 (D. Ariz. July 19, 2013) (concluding the same).

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IV. Conclusion

For good cause shown, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for leave to 

serve a subpoena prior to a Rule 26(f) conference. It is ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff shall attach a copy of this Order to any subpoena.

2. Plaintiff may serve the ISP with a Rule 45 subpoena commanding the ISP to 

provide Plaintiff with only the true name and address of the Defendant to 

whom the ISP assigned an IP address as set forth on Exhibit A to the 

Complaint. The ISP is not to release the Defendant’s telephone number or 

email address. 

3. Within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the subpoena, the ISP 

shall notify the subscriber that his or her identity has been subpoenaed by 

Plaintiff. The ISP must also provide a copy of this Order along with the 

required notice to the subscriber whose identity is sought pursuant to this 

Order.

4. The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30) 

calendar days from the date of such notice to challenge the disclosure of his 

or her name and contact information by filing an appropriate pleading with 

this Court contesting the subpoena. A subscriber who moves to quash or 

modify the subpoena may proceed anonymously as “John Doe,” and shall 

remain anonymous until the Court orders that the identifying information 

can be released. 

5. If the ISP wishes to move to quash the subpoena, it shall do so before the 

return date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena must allow for 

at least forty-five (45) days from service to production. If a motion to quash 

or other challenge is brought, the ISP shall preserve the information sought 

by Plaintiff in the subpoena pending resolution of such motion or challenge.

6. Plaintiff may only use the information disclosed in response to a Rule 45 

subpoena served on the ISP for the purpose of protecting and enforcing 

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Plaintiff’s rights as set forth in its Complaint. If the Defendant wishes to

proceed anonymously, Plaintiff may not release any identifying information 

without a court order allowing the release of the information. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 7, 2017

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