Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00164/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00164-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ADRIANO LANDICHO, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

AMERICA’S WHOLESALE LENDER, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-164-JAM-KJN PS 

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Presently pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant JPMorgan 

Chase Bank, N.A. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiffs, who proceed without counsel, initially failed to file 

a written opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion in accordance with Local Rule 

230(c). Nevertheless, in light of plaintiffs’ pro se status and the court’s desire to resolve the 

action on the merits, the court continued the hearing on defendant’s motion and provided 

plaintiffs with an additional opportunity to file an opposition to the motion no later than May 12, 

2016. (ECF No. 21.) The court’s order specifically cautioned that “[f]ailure to file an opposition 

or statement of non-opposition by the new required deadline will result in a recommendation that 

the entire action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” 

 (Id.) However, although the new deadline for filing an opposition has now passed, plaintiffs 

again failed to oppose the motion. For the reasons discussed below, dismissal is warranted at this 

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juncture. 

 Eastern District Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply 

with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of 

any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the Court.” 

Moreover, Eastern District Local Rule 183(a) provides, in part: 

Any individual representing himself or herself without an attorney 

is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, these 

Rules, and all other applicable law. All obligations placed on 

“counsel” by these Rules apply to individuals appearing in propria 

persona. Failure to comply therewith may be ground for dismissal, 

judgment by default, or any other sanction appropriate under these 

Rules. 

See also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the 

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”) (overruled on other grounds). A district 

court may impose sanctions, including involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s case pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), where that plaintiff fails to prosecute his or her case or 

fails to comply with the court’s orders, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the court’s local 

rules. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (recognizing that a court “may act 

sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute”); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts may dismiss an action 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute 

or comply with the rules of civil procedure or the court’s orders); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 

53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground 

for dismissal”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with 

any order of the court”); Thompson v. Housing Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 

1986) (per curiam) (stating that district courts have inherent power to control their dockets and 

may impose sanctions including dismissal or default). 

 A court must weigh five factors in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to 

prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, or failure to comply with a district court’s local 

rules. See, e.g., Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260. Specifically, the court must consider: 

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(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 

the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to 

the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases 

on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. 

Id. at 1260-61; accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002); Ghazali, 46 

F.3d at 53. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[t]hese factors are not a series of 

conditions precedent before the judge can do anything, but a way for a district judge to think 

about what to do.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the first two Ferdik factors strongly support dismissal. Plaintiffs’ repeated failure to 

oppose the pending motion to dismiss strongly suggests that plaintiffs are not interested in 

seriously prosecuting the action, or at least do not take their obligations to the court and other 

parties seriously. Indeed, plaintiffs have not even requested an extension of time on any 

articulated basis, let alone shown good cause for a further extension of time to comply with the 

court’s orders.1 Any further time spent by the court on this case will consume scarce judicial 

resources and take away from other active cases. 

 The third Ferdik factor, prejudice to a defendant, also favors dismissal. Plaintiffs have 

now twice failed to oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss, and at a minimum, defendant has been 

prevented from attempting to resolve this case on the merits by plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay in 

prosecuting this action. 

The fifth Ferdik factor, which considers the availability of less drastic measures, also 

supports dismissal of this action. As noted above, the court has actually pursued remedies that 

are less drastic than dismissal. The court sua sponte granted plaintiffs an additional opportunity 

to oppose the motion to dismiss and warned plaintiffs about the potential consequences for failure 

 

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 Thus far, the court’s orders sent to plaintiffs have not been returned to the court as 

undeliverable. Nevertheless, even if they had been, it is plaintiffs’ duty to keep the court 

informed of their current address, and service of the court’s orders at the address on record was 

effective absent the filing of a notice of change of address. In relevant part, Local Rule 182(f) 

provides: “Each appearing attorney and pro se party is under a continuing duty to notify the Clerk 

and all other parties of any change of address or telephone number of the attorney or the pro se 

party. Absent such notice, service of documents at the prior address of the attorney or pro se 

party shall be fully effective.” 

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to comply with the court’s orders. Additionally, the court finds no suitable alternative to 

recommending dismissal of the action. In light of plaintiffs’ repeated failure to respond to 

defendant’s motion, despite the court’s explicit orders, the court has little confidence that 

plaintiffs would pay monetary sanctions if they were imposed in lieu of dismissal. Based on the 

limited record before the court at this stage of the proceedings, the court also cannot properly 

fashion any issue or evidentiary sanctions. 

The court recognizes the importance of giving due weight to the fourth Ferdik factor, 

which addresses the public policy favoring disposition of cases on the merits. However, the 

fourth Ferdik factor is outweighed by the other Ferdik factors. Indeed, it is plaintiffs’ own failure 

to comply with court orders that precludes a disposition on the merits. 

Therefore, after carefully evaluating and weighing the Ferdik factors, the court concludes 

that dismissal is appropriate. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. The entire action be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

2. The pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) be denied as moot. 

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 

In light of the foregoing recommendations, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. The June 9, 2016 hearing on the motion to dismiss is VACATED. 

2. All pleading, discovery, and motion practice in this action are stayed pending 

resolution of these findings and recommendations. With the exception of objections to the 

findings and recommendations and non-frivolous motions for emergency relief, the court will not 

entertain or respond to further motions or filings until the findings and recommendations are 

resolved. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

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shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED. 

Dated: May 13, 2016 

 

 

 

 

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