Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02479/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mohammed Mostafa Altayar,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Loretta E. Lynch, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-02479-PHX-GMS (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Mohammed Mostafa Altayar has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

(Doc. 4). 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

 An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner released on bond. The Government 

sought to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and invoked the automaticstay provision of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (allowing for up to a 90-day stay while the 

Government pursued its appeal). Petitioner filed this Petition, but then the BIA granted 

the Government a discretionary stay of the IJ order. Petitioner’s first two claims 

regarding the automatic stay are now moot. There is no case or controversy regarding 

Petitioner’s third claim, and all of his claims fail. Therefore, the Court will recommend 

that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice, and that the Motion for 

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Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) be denied. 

II. BACKGROUND

a. Procedural History

 On August 11, 2016, the IJ found the following as true: 

 The above-named respondent is a male, native and 

citizen of Iraq. (Exh. I, Form 1-862 (May 7, 2015).) He was admitted to the United States on or about January 25, 2011 as a Refugee. (Id.) He adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident RE6 on May 24, 2012. (Id.) On March 6, 

2015, he was convicted in the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, for aggravated assault, a class 3 felony, in 

violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“ARS”) sections 13-

1203, 13-1204, 13-3105, 13-701, 13-702, and 13-801. (Id.) 

He was sentenced to forty-eight hours of incarceration in the 

Maricopa County Jail and five years of probation. (Id.) 

 On May 7, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or “the Department”) issued a Notice to 

Appear against the respondent, charging him as subject to removal pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “the Act”) in that 

he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or ten years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 

245(j) after the date of admission, and is convicted of a crime 

for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. (Id.) The filing of the NTA with the Court commenced 

proceedings and vested jurisdiction in this Court. 8 C.F.R. § 

1003.14(a) (2014). 

 The OHS detained the respondent with no bond and the respondent requested for this Court to grant a bond hearing for a custody status redetermination. (Bond Exh. 1, 

Form 1-286; Bond Exh. 2.) The Court held such a hearing on May 19, 2015 and granted the respondent’s request for release on bond in the amount of $5.500. (IJ Order (May 19, 

2015.) The Department appealed and the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or ‘‘the Board”) vacated this 

Court’s decision arid ordered the respondent detained on no bond. (BIA Order (Dec. 3, 2015).) 

 Thereafter, the respondent submitted an unopposed 

motion for a custody redetermination hearing pursuant to Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). (Bond 

Exh. 8.) After considering all of the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the Court grants the respondent’s request for release on bond. Furthermore, the Court finds that a bond of 

$18,000 is appropriate and reasonably calculated to assure the respondent’s presence at future hearings. 

(Doc. 9-1, Ex. R, at 97.) 

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b. Government Appeal

 On July 22, 2016, the Government filed a Notice of Intent to Appeal, also known 

as an “Automatic Stay,” by filing a Form EOIR-43, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2), with the 

Immigration Court. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. T, at 139.) On August 4, 2016, the Government filed 

the appeal of the IJ’s bond decision with the BIA. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. U, at 141.) On 

September 12, 2016, the BIA issued a Briefing Schedule with a transcript and granted 

both parties until October 3, 2016 to submit a brief to the BIA. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. X, at 154.) 

On September 30, 2016, the Government filed its supporting brief with the BIA. (Doc. 9-

1, Ex. Y, at 156.) 

 On November 2, 2016, the BIA, “[a]fter consideration of all information... 

concluded that the stay of the bond order will be granted.” (Doc. 12-1 at 1.) 

c. Federal Habeas Petition 

Before the BIA granted the discretionary stay, Petitioner filed this Petition on July 

22, 2016. (Doc. 1.)1

 

 In his Petition, Petitioner raises the following requests for relief: 

1. Grant a Writ of Habeas Corpus, directed to the 

Respondents requiring them to show cause why Mr. 

Altayar should not be immediately released from custody. 

2. Declare that Mr. Altayar’s continued detention violates 

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. 

3. Enjoin the Respondents from invoking the automatic stay provision of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) where the 

alien has prevailed in the merits of his removal 

proceedings and the immigration court has made an 

individualized determination that the alien is not a 

flight risk and does not pose a danger to society. 

4. Award to Mr. Altayar and his counsel reasonable costs 

and attorney’s fees. 

 

 

1

 Petitioner also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on August 29, 2016 (Doc. 4.) and an Application for Entry of Default on October 26, 2016 (Doc. 8). 

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 On September 30, 2016, District Judge G. Murray Snow directed Respondents to 

answer the Petition and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and referred the matter to this 

Court. (Doc. 6.) On October 26, 2016, the Government filed an Answer. (Doc. 9.) On 

October 31, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 11.) On November 15, 2016, the Court 

conducted an oral argument. On November 22, 2016, the parties submitted additional 

briefing regarding the 90-day limit of the automatic stay. (Docs. 16, 17.) 

d. Statutes 

 After a custody or bond determination by an Immigration Judge, an “appeal from 

the determination by an Immigration Judge may be taken to the Board of Immigration 

Appeals pursuant to § 1003.38.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f). The government may file for a 

“discretionary stay” or an “automatic stay in certain cases” of a custody order. § 

1003.19(i). Here, the Government invoked the automatic stay provision, which reads: 

(2) Automatic stay in certain cases. In any case in which DHS has determined that an alien should not be released or has set 

a bond of $10,000 or more, any order of the immigration judge authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be 

stayed upon DHS’s filing of a notice of intent to appeal the custody redetermination (Form EOIR–43) with the 

immigration court within one business day of the order, and, except as otherwise provided in 8 CFR 1003.6(c), shall 

remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the Board. The decision whether or not to file Form EOIR–43 is 

subject to the discretion of the Secretary. 

§ 1003.19(i)(2). 

 To preserve an automatic stay, the Government must file, with the notice of 

appeal, a certification by a senior legal official that the official has approved the filing of 

the notice of appeal and that the motion has evidentiary support, and the legal arguments 

are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument. § 1003.6(c). Further, “[t]he 

Board will track the progress of each custody appeal which is subject to an automatic stay 

in order to avoid unnecessary delays.” § 1003.6(c)(3). And, “[i]f the Board has not acted 

on the custody appeal, the automatic stay shall lapse 90 days after the filing of the notice 

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of appeal.” § 1003.(c)(4) (emphasis added).2

III. THE PETITION

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

 The Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a detainee who is “in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3). As Petitioner is currently detained within this Court’s jurisdiction and asserts 

that his continued detention violates due process, this Court has jurisdiction over his 

claims. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Spencer v. Lemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). 

a. Counts One and Two are moot. 

 In Count One, Petitioner argues the “automatic stay violates Mr. Altayar’s 

substantive due process right to liberty because the regulation permits unilateral 

government detention without justification that would outweigh Mr. Altayar’s 

constitutionally protected interest in freedom from government restraint.” (Doc. 1 at 12) 

(emphasis added). In Count Two, Petitioner argues his “continued detention violates his 

procedural due process rights because the automatic stay allows the Government to 

infringe upon his fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical custody with a 

process that is not narrowly tailored to serve a state interest that is neither compelling nor 

substantially justified.” (Doc. 1 at 13)(emphasis added). 

 Petitioner’s first two claims are moot. The automatic stay is no longer in effect 

because the BIA granted a discretionary stay of the IJ’s bond order. Petitioner’s first two 

claims are predicated on his detention pursuant to the “automatic stay” of 8 C.F.R. § 

1003.19(i)(2). Because Petitioner is no longer being held pursuant to the automatic stay, 

 

2

 If “the automatic stay period expires,” then “the alien’s release shall be 

automatically stayed for five business days” pending the Attorney General’s consideration of the case. § 1003.6(d). This provision is not relevant here because the BIA acted on the Government’s appeal and continued the stay at the Board’s discretion. 

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his first two claims are moot. See Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 

1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002) (“When a controversy no longer exists, the case is moot.”). 

See also, Murillo-Flores v. Mukasey, No. CV08-0943-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 310143, at *4 

(D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2009) (“Because Petitioner is no longer detained under the automatic 

stay, this Court may no longer grant any relief as to [the automatic stay and procedural 

due process claims], and they must be dismissed as moot.”); El-Dessouki v. Cangemi, No. 

06-3536(DSD/JSM), 2006 WL 2727191, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 2006) (because the 

BIA issued a discretionary stay, “this § 2241 petition is moot to the extent petitioner 

challenges his detention pursuant to § 1003.19(i)(2).”).3

b. Count Three 

 Petitioner argues “the Government’s pattern and practice of violating the rights of 

individuals similarly situated as Mr. Altayar creates the probability of irreparable injury 

to those aliens who have prevailed on the merits in their removal proceedings and yet 

remain detained indefinitely at the whim of the Government.” (Doc. 1 at 13.) Petitioner 

incorporates his due process arguments into Count Three. (Id.) “It is well established that 

the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). “Freedom from imprisonment—from 

government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of 

the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 

(2001). 

i. Advisory opinion 

 Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to resolving actual “Cases” 

and “Controversies,” rather than rendering advisory opinions. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 

Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (quoting U.S. Const. art. 

III, § 2). Here, Petitioner is requesting the Court find that the use of the automatic stay 

violates “the rights of individuals similarly situated as Mr. Altayar....” (Doc. 1 at 13.) 

 

3

 Even if Petitioner’s claims were not moot, they would fail for the reasons outlined in Section III(b)(ii),(iii). 

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Petitioner is requesting the Court determine that others not before the Court will be 

harmed. But the Court is not permitted to rule regarding “the probability of irreparable 

injury to those aliens” who may be affected by the automatic-stay provision when 

Petitioner is the only party in this case. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United 

States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (“[A] federal court has no authority to give opinions upon 

moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which 

cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”) (citation and quotations omitted); 

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (holding that “a federal court has neither 

the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights 

of litigants in the case before them”). The Court finds there is no longer a case or 

controversy regarding Count Three. 

ii. An automatic-stay does not violate due process. 

 Assuming the Court rules on the merits of this argument, then the automatic stay 

does not violate due process because it permits the Government an opportunity to appeal 

an IJ bond decision before the detainee is released. The Supreme Court has expressed a 

“longstanding view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens 

during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 

526. “As we said more than a century ago, deportation proceedings ‘would be vain if 

those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character.’” 

Id. at 523 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)). Here, a stay of 

some length is afforded precisely because it allows the Government an opportunity to 

appeal before a detainee might flee. El-Dessouki, 2006 WL 2727191, at *3 (“a finite 

period of detention to allow the BIA an opportunity to review the immigration judge’s 

bond redetermination is a narrowly tailored procedure that serves the government’s 

interest in preventing flight of aliens likely to be ordered removable and in protecting the 

community”). 

 Petitioner’s argument that the automatic stay “denied Mr. Altayar’s right to liberty 

while the appeal of the IJ’s bond determination is proceeding” (Doc. 1 at 6) misses the 

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point. Although Petitioner is detained pending appeal to the BIA, the question is whether 

permitting an automatic stay violates due process. Petitioner and others have a right to 

appeal an adverse custody decision to the BIA. See 8 CFR §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). 

Similarly, the Government may appeal and adverse bond decision. An automatic stay of 

limited duration allows the Government to pursue its appeal before the subject might post 

bond and flee. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 528 (“detention necessarily serves the purpose of 

preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal 

proceedings”). 

 In Petitioner’s supplemental briefing, he urges that “it is the process, not 

necessarily the specific amount of time, which violates substantive and procedural due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Doc. 16 at 1.) According to Petitioner, the 

automatic stay turns “the custody redetermination hearing before the IJ into a 

meaningless formality” because the Government can unilaterally continue Petitioner’s 

detention. (Id. at 2.) The Court does not agree that an appeal to the BIA renders the IJ 

decision a meaningless formality. Petitioner agrees that the “regulations under 8 C.F.R. § 

1003.38 provide for a constitutionally permissive appellate process in compliance with 

due process, which provides both parties in bond proceedings with an avenue to appeal 

the Immigration Judge’s custody and bond decision.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) The automatic stay 

also does not turn the IJ decision into a meaningless formality because it affords the BIA 

time to consider an appeal. The purpose of the automatic stay is to “avoid the necessity of 

having to decide whether to order a stay on extremely short notice with only the most 

summary presentation of the issues.” Review of Custody Determinations, 71 FR 57873-

01, 2006 WL 2811410. 

 The Court concludes that any petitioner would have difficulty attacking an 

automatic stay that lasted only one day, and the Government could not justify an 

automatic stay of one year. Thus, the Court next addresses whether a stay of up to 90 

days violates due process. 

 

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iii. The length of the automatic stay does not violate due process. 

 An automatic stay of up to 90 days does not violate due process because it is 

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling Government interest. The Court first finds there 

is no procedural due process violation from § 1003.19(i)(2). An alien’s right to 

procedural due process is violated “only if [1] the proceeding was ‘so fundamentally 

unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case,’” and [2] the 

alien proves that “the alleged violation prejudiced his or her interests.” Mendez–Garcia v. 

Lynch, 840 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Here, Petitioner was permitted to 

contest the stay by filing a brief to the BIA by October 3, 2016. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. X, at 

154.)4

 Petitioner does not argue that his current detention has prejudiced his interests 

regarding his removal or the merits of the IJ bond decision. See also Vargas–Hernandez 

v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where an alien is given a full and 

fair opportunity ... to present testimony and other evidence in support of the application, 

he or she has been provided with due process.”). 

 The Court also finds there is no substantive due process violation. Laws that 

infringe a “fundamental” right protected by the Due Process Clause are constitutional 

only if “the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno, 

507 U.S. at 302 (1993). Substantive due process protections apply to resident aliens. See, 

e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of aliens 

within the jurisdiction of the United States ... [t]he Fifth Amendment as well as the 

Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, 

liberty, or property without due process of law.”) (citations omitted). 

 An automatic stay of up to 90 days does not violate due process because it remains 

in effect until the BIA has an opportunity to review the appeal. In the context of postremoval detention, the Court in Zadvydas wrote that “we think it practically necessary to 

recognize some presumptively reasonable period of detention....” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 

 

4

 The Notice from the BIA to both parties states: “Opposing party is granted until 10/3/2016 to submit a brief to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The brief must be received at the Board on or before this date.” 

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701. The Court determined that “an argument can be made for confining any presumption 

to 90 days” but set a limit of 180 days before a detainee in removal proceedings would be 

entitled to a bond hearing. Id. In the absence of other authority (and Petitioner presents 

none), Petitioner has not established that an automatic stay of up to 90 days in this appeal 

provision violates due process. 

 Petitioner’s reliance on Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 

2004) is misplaced. The ruling in Zavala was predicated upon an indefinite, mandatory 

stay. But the regulation was amended in 2006 to permit an automatic stay of up to only 

90 days.5

 See Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1032 (E.D. Wis.), aff’d sub 

nom. Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that Zavala relied on “the 

previous regulation under which the duration of the automatic stay was indefinite” 

whereas the “current regulation provides that the automatic stay will lapse 90 days after 

the filing of the notice of appeal.”). 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Counts 

One and Two are moot. The Court further finds that there is no case or controversy 

regarding Claim Three. Ground Three also fails to establish a violation of due process. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 Petitioner’s claims in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) mirror those 

presented here. During oral argument on November 15, 2016, Petitioner agreed. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Preliminary 

 

5

 “[T]his rule clarifies the basis on which DHS may invoke the automatic stay provision, and limits the duration of the automatic stay.” Review of Custody Determinations, 71 FR 57873-01, 2006 WL 2811410. “[T]he final rule provides that the automatic stay will lapse 90 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.” Id. 

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Injunction (Doc. 4) be DENIED.

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 23rd day of November, 2016. 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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