Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00861/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-00861-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY INSURANCE 

AUTHORITY,

Plaintiff,

v.

GALLAGHER BENEFIT SERVICES,

INC.

Defendants.

Case No. 1:17-cv-00861-EPG

ORDER:

1. GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT 

GBS’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 

REGARDING THE DELIBERATIVE 

PROCESS PRIVILEGE;

2. GRANTING GBS’S MOTION IN 

LIMINE NO. 3 SEEKING EXCLUSION 

OF EVIDENCE OF RESTITUTION OR 

DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES NOT 

DISCLOSED IN SJVIA’S RULE 26(A)(1) 

DISCLOSURES;

3. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART GBS’S MOTION IN LIMINE 

NO. 4 SEEKING EXCLUSION OF 

TESTIMONY REGARDING 

UNDISCLOSED EXPERT DAMAGES 

OPINIONS

4. GRANTING GBS’S MOTION IN 

LIMINE NO. 5 SEEKING EXCLUSION 

OF ADVERSE TESTIMONY FROM 

DEFENDANT’S WITNESSES BEYOND 

RULE 45 GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS

(ECF Nos. 84)

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This order addresses Motions in limine two through five filed by Defendant Gallagher 

Benefit Services, Inc. (GBS) on January 17, 2020. (ECF Nos. 84) The Court held a hearing on 

the motions on February 3, 2020. (ECF No. 121.) The Court rules as follows.

I. GBS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2, SEEKING EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY 

WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SJVIA’S PRIOR ASSERTION OF DELIBERATIVE 

PROCESS PRIVILEGE

GBS’s motion in limine No. 2 asks the Court to prelude SJVIA from eliciting any 

testimony within the scope of SJVIA’s assertions of deliberative process privilege. (ECF No. 84, 

at p. 17). GBS claims that SJVIA made a strategic decision during discovery to assert the

deliberative process privilege to shield and withhold all information about any aspect of the 

SJVIA Board’s decision-making process that was not actually discussed during Board meetings. 

SJVIA responds by arguing that “(1) the privilege was only asserted to questions 

regarding Mr. Wander Poel’s personal, subjective thoughts, motives or understanding not, as 

GBS asserts, questions related to SJVIA; and (2) the privilege was only asserted in the form of an 

admonition.” (ECF No. 94, at p. 9). 

The parties agree with the legal proposition that a party may not introduce evidence at trial 

that they withheld as privileged during discovery, i.e. that a privilege cannot be used as both a 

sword and a shield. See Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broadcasting of 

Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although courts have recognized that 

reliance on advice of counsel may be probative of non-willfulness, the district court was within its 

discretion in precluding Feltner from relying on advice of counsel in this case. The privilege 

which protects attorney-client communications may not be used both as a sword and a shield.”) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

During the deposition of SJVIA Board Member and County of Tulare Supervisor Peter 

Vander Poel, counsel SJVIA blocked questions based on the deliberative process privilege, for 

example during the following questioning:

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Q: Well, were you trying to—were you trying to represent Tulare or the 

SJVIA when you were on the board?

[Counsel for SJVIA]: Well, I’m going to object as to the extent, again, that the 

question calls for you to disclose undisclosed subjective considerations as part of 

any kind of legislative process. I’m going to caution you that that is—it falls 

within the deliberative process privilege, is inadmissible, and should not be 

disclosed. To the extent that there’s been any kind of subjective intent while you 

were on the board that has been made public, you can disclose that or testify to 

that. But to the extent that it is subjective and not disclosed, it falls within the 

privilege and should not be disclosed. Okay?

A: Thank you.

(ECF No. 87-18, at p. 5).

Q: Did staff explain to you that this was a concern because it created a cash 

flow problem:

[counsel for SJVIA]: Again, I want to—I want to counsel you that the deliberative 

process privilege also applies to staff. So to the extent these were undisclosed 

discussions that took place, which then were relied upon by you in making 

decisions as a board member, that is inadmissible and nondiscoverable and should 

not be disclosed. Okay?

A: Okay.

(ECF No. 87-18, at p. 15)

Q: At some point in time, did you make a decision that you would try to use 

the premium charges to other counties to offset losses associated with the County 

of Fresno and the County of Tulare?

A: All right. Again, I’m going to make the same objection/admonition. When 

he says “decision,” I’m distinguishing between nondisclosed evidence and facts 

which you may have relied upon in making a decision versus something that has 

been disclosed publicly with regards to your actions on the board. 

(ECF No. 87-18, at p. 27)

SJVIA’s argument that these objections were only asserted in the form of an admonition is 

not persuasive. The witness repeatedly followed his counsel’s advice. See, e.g., ECF No. 87-18, 

at p. 22 (“I would say it’s because of that admonition. . . . I would lean on the admonition.”); ECF 

No. 87-18, at p. 29 (“I’m going to rely on the admonition.”); ECF No. 87-18, at p. 32 (“And I’m 

going to rely on the admonition.”). At no time did either the witness or his counsel waive the 

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objection.

SJVIA has argued that this scope is very limited because “the Ralph M. Brown Act [] 

requires that, with exceptions that do not apply here, all of a public entity’s business be conducted 

in open session.” (ECF No. 94, at p. 13, citing Cal. Govt. Code §§ 54950, et seq.). That Act 

provides in part “In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public 

commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the 

conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and 

that their deliberations be conducted openly.” CA Gov. Code, § 54950. While the Court 

appreciates this legal requirement, it appears inconsistent with counsel’s repeated admonitions to 

assert the privilege “to the extent these were undisclosed discussions that took place, which then 

were relied upon by you in making decisions as a board member.”

Thus, the Court grants GBS’s motion insofar as it requests that SJVIA be precluded from 

eliciting any testimony within the scope of its assertion of the privilege. Based on SJVIA’s 

objections on the record, the scope includes “undisclosed discussions that took place, which then 

were relied upon by [a decision-maker] in making decisions as a board member.” It does not 

include anything that was “disclosed publicly with regards to your actions on the board.” 

Additionally, the Court will grant GBS’s motion insofar as it requests that “the Court bar all 

SJVIA staff and Board members from testifying to issues over which SJVIA previously claimed 

deliberative process privilege,” with specific questions to be addressed at trial.1

GBS also asks that SJVIA be precluded from presenting any testimony “from any Board 

members about whether the Board would have adopted higher rates or reserves had Gallagher 

recommended them.” (ECF No. 84, at p. 17). GBS’s motion does not cite to any case law 

supporting this request. Nor does it cite any specific assertion of the privilege at deposition 

regarding such subject matter. Instead it argues as a matter of fairness that SJVIA should be 

precluded from testifying over what it would have done because it has blocked some discovery 

regarding its past decisions. 

 

1 To the extent GBS believes that subject matter being elicited at trial was blocked during discovery, it may raise that 

objection during trial.

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Without any specific legal precedent, the Court declines to make such a ruling. Again, 

SJVIA did allow some testimony regarding its decision-making to the extent it was publicly 

disclosed. It is highly relevant for the jury to hear from Board Members what they would have 

done in certain hypothetical circumstances, subject to the jury evaluating their credibility with the 

benefit of direct and cross-examination. Although, again, no SJVIA witness can support such an 

answer by describing what was discussed in closed session or was a previously undisclosed 

subjective opinion, consistent with the Court’s ruling above.

II. GBS’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3, SEEKING EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 

OF RESTITUTION OR DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES NOT DISCLOSED IN 

SJVIA’S RULE 26(A)(1) DISCLOSURES

GBS’s motion in limine No. 3 seeks exclusion of evidence of restitution or disgorgement

damages on the ground that they were not disclosed in SJVIA’s Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures. (ECF 

No. 84, at p. 18). 

SJVIA concedes that disgorgement of fees paid to Gallagher was not included in its Rule 

26 disclosures but argues it should be allowed to seek disgorgement damages from the jury 

because any failure was substantially justified or harmless. SJVIA primarily relies on the fact 

that its complaint seeks “the amount of professional fees paid by SJVIA to GBS” in its prayer for 

relief. (ECF No. 94, at p. 15). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(iii) requires each party, “without awaiting a 

discovery request, [to] provide to the other parties . . . a computation of each category of damages 

claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and copying as 

under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from 

disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and 

extent of injuries suffered.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(iii). Rule 37(c)((1) states that “If a party 

fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or c, the party is not 

allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a 

trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

SJVIA’s complaint states in its prayer for relief that SJVIA is seeking, among other 

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damages: “An award of restitution in the amount of the professional fees paid by SJVIA to GBS.” 

(ECF No. 1-1, at p. 25). 

However, its Rule 26 initial disclosures do not refer to restitution, disgorgement, or other 

professional fees. SJVIA’s initial disclosures dated August 3, 2017 state in relevant part “This 

negligent conduct fell below the standard of care and breached the contract resulting in damages 

that exceed $28,000,000. But for Gallagher’s breaches and professional negligence, SJVIA 

would currently have an approximate $8,000,000 surplus instead of a $20,000,000 deficit.” (ECF 

No. 87-29, at p. 7). SJVIA’s supplement to its initial disclosures included the statement 

“Attached as Exhibit A is a detailed breakdown of Plaintiff’s damages in the amount of 

$28,249,265.” (ECF No. 87-30, at p. 3). The attached spreadsheet does not list any restitution, 

disgorgement, or professional fees. (ECF No. 87-30, at p. 5).

SJVIA claims that the failure to disclose was harmless because “the full amount of fees 

the SJVIA paid” is known. SJVIA asserts that amount is $2,911,744.25. GBS argues, however, 

that such a disclosure is insufficient because “[t]he amount of fees and how they should be 

apportioned between obligations Gallagher adequately performed and obligations Gallagher 

allegedly breached have not been the subject of any discovery or expert analysis.” (ECF No. 84, 

at p. 22). SJVIA counters that “under applicable California law, it would be GBS’ burden—not 

the SJVIA’s—to provide evidence of any amount of set-off GBS could possibly be entitled to 

(though the SJVIA would dispute such a claim) because GBS contends that it performed some of 

its services competently.” (ECF No. 94, at p. 16).

Also relevant to this issue is the substantial discussion made about SJVIA’s initial 

disclosures regarding damages as part of the motions for summary judgment. GBS moved for 

summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff’s only theory of damages was legally improper. In 

response, SJVIA claimed, in part, that it could also seek additional theories of damages, including 

recovery of fees, even though those theories had not been in SJVIA’s rule 26 disclosures. The 

following discussion took place on the record:

The Court: Ms. Strickroth [Plaintiff’s counsel], let me ask, we didn’t 

cover these alternative theories. Are you or are you trying to reserve the right to 

do either the loan amount/liquidity or the fees, and why do you get to do that? Or 

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are you rising and falling on this argument as the damages argument that you 

made?

Ms. Strickroth: We are reserving the right to recover the loan amount, 

which is part and parcel to the damages that we’ve calculated. It’s subsumed in it. 

We are reserving the right to recover the fees that Gallagher collected, which they 

know exactly how much fees they’ve collected.

The Court: What do you do with the fact—was it in—I have your 

disclosure. Is it in the disclosure?

Ms. Strickroth: No, it was not.

The Court: So are you going to amend the disclosure?

Ms. Strickroth: We can amend the disclosure, number one, and I don’t think 

that, it is my argument, that Gallagher is prejudiced in any way. They know 

exactly how much they received in fees. It’s not a calculation that is foreign or 

hidden from them in any way.

(ECF No. 87-22, at p. 10).

Despite this discussion, SJVIA did not amend its initial disclosures to add these categories 

of damages. Moreover, SJVIA’s pretrial statement does not include any of these categories in its 

statement of damages. ECF No. 68, at p. 16 (“The SJVIA seeks damages from GBS in the 

amount required to restore the SJVIA to the financial position it would have been in but for 

GBS’s breaches and negligence.”). Notably neither party has submitted a jury instruction on the 

proper measure for disgorgement of fees or restitution. 

Given this history, the Court will GRANT GBS’s motion to the extent it will preclude 

Plaintiff from seeking an award of disgorgement of fees it paid to GBS. Such a result follows 

from Rules 26 and 37. It is undisputed that this category of damages was not included in 

Plaintiff’s initial disclosures. The failure is not substantially justified or harmless. Plaintiff could 

have included this category of damages in its initial disclosures, yet chose not to. Indeed, 

Plaintiff chose not to amend its initial disclosures even when this issue became apparent in 

connection with the motion for summary judgment, and notwithstanding the Court’s direct 

question whether Plaintiff would amend its disclosures to add this category. Moreover, it is not 

harmless. Although the parties disagree on who bears the burden of proving what portion of fees 

could be claimed, they each claim that some allocation may need to be done. Even under 

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SJVIA’s understanding of the law, GBS lost its opportunity to prepare a calculation and 

associated evidence or expert testimony as to the amount of fees at issue by the claims in this 

case. Finally, there are no jury instructions to consider on this legal issue and it is not ready to be 

tried. 

III. GBS’ MIL NO. 4 SEEKING EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY REGARDING 

UNDISCLOSED EXPERT DAMAGES OPINIONS

GBS’s motion in limine number 4 seeks to prelude SJVIA’s expert witness, Mr. Bednar, 

from testifying to three matters discussed in the declaration he filed in support of SJVIA’s 

opposition to GBS’s summary judgment motion. Specifically:

• The opinion that a higher increase to non-founders helped the SJVIA when 

compared to applying the 17% blended rate increase that GBS proposed.

• Had GBS set the rates appropriately, the increase would have been within the 

range of normal.

• Had GBS set the rates correctly, the SJVIA would have collected enough premium 

from the departing entities during the plan year to cover each entity’s incurred but 

not reported IBNR claims.

GBS claims that these opinions were not timely disclosed by Mr. Bednar’s expert report, 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). (ECF No. 84, at p. 23).

SJVIA agrees that Mr. Bednar will not testify as to the first opinion. (ECF No. 94, at p. 

18 (“The SJVIA does not intend to offer at trial the complained-of statement from paragraph 15 

of Bednar’s declaration and is willing to agree that it will not elicit testimony from Bednar at trial 

to the effect that had the SJVIA adopted the 17% blended rate increase in 2016 that GBS 

recommended, the SJVIA would have suffered additional damage.”).

SJVIA argues that the other two opinions were adequately disclosed by Mr. Bednar’s 

expert report.

Regarding the opinion that “Had GBS set the rates appropriately, the increase would have 

been within the range of normal,” SJVIA points to the following statement in Mr. Bednar’s timely 

disclosed Rule 26 expert report: “SJVIA’s rates would have been competitive in the marketplace 

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and would have remained attractive to new groups.” (ECF No. 81-8, at p. 13.) The Court finds 

that this disclosure is substantially similar to the opinion at issue. The Court will therefore deny 

GBS’s motion to the extent it seeks to preclude Mr. Bednar from offering the opinion that that 

“Had GBS set the rates appropriately, the increase would have been within the range of normal.”

Regarding the opinion that “Had GBS set the rates correctly, the SJVIA would have 

collected enough premium from the departing entities during the plan year to cover each entity’s 

incurred but not reported IBNR claims,” SJVIA pointed to the chart at the end of his report that 

calculates revised premium from departing entities and corresponding IBNR claims. (ECF No. 

81-8, at p. 46). Counsel for GBS countered that the chart demonstrates that SJVIA did not collect 

sufficient premiums, noting certain negative numbers on the chart. The Court concludes that the 

basis for Mr. Bednar’s opinion on this subject was adequately disclosed to allow GBS to 

understand the basis for this claim and challenge it through cross-examination. The Court will 

therefore deny GBS’s motion to the extent it seeks to preclude Mr. Bednar from offering the 

opinion that “Had GBS set the rates correctly, the SJVIA would have collected enough premium 

from the departing entities during the plan year to cover each entity’s incurred but not reported 

IBNR claims.”2

IV. GBS’S MOTION IN LIMINE NUMBER 5 SEEKING EXCLUSION OF 

ADVERSE TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT’S WITNESSES BEYOND 

RULE 45 GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS

GBS’s motion in limine number 5 asks the Court to rule that a subpoena by SJVIA for Mr. 

Volk and Mr. Toole fall outside the Court’s subpoena power, and cannot be commanded to testify 

adversely in SJVIA’s case-in-chief. 

SJVIA indicates that it intends to call adversely in its case in chief the following 

witnesses:

• Mr. Volk, an Area Vice President and Consulting Actuary at GBS.

• Mr. Toole, GBS’s designated expert and Senior Managing Director at FTI 

 

2 To the extent Mr. Bednar seeks to testify to other opinions outside of his expert report, not addressed in this 

opinion, GBS may raise that objection at trial. 

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Consulting, Inc.

GBS represents that neither witness reside, work in, or regularly transact business in 

California. Mr. Volk is based out of FTI’s Boca Raton, Florida office. Mr. Toole is based out of 

FTI’s Winston-Salem, North Carolina office.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the reach of subpoenas for trials. Specifically, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1) provides: 

(1) For a Trial, Hearing, or Deposition. A subpoena may command a person to attend a 

trial, hearing, or deposition only as follows: 

a. within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly 

transacts business in person; or

b. within the state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts 

business in person, if the person

i. is a party or a party’s officer; or

ii. is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1).

Based on the facts represented by GBS, neither Mr. Volk nor Mr. Toole are within the 

subpoena power. SJVIA does not contend otherwise. The Court will grant GBS’s motion to the 

extent it seeks confirmation that a subpoena by SJVIA for Mr. Volk and Mr. Toole fall outside 

the Court’s subpoena power, and that Mr. Volk and Mr. Toole cannot be commanded to testify 

adversely in SJVIA’s case-in-chief. 

As a consequence of this ruling, SJVIA may use Mr. Volk and Mr. Toole’s deposition 

testimony at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32 (a)(4) (“A party may use for any purpose the deposition of a 

witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds . . . that the witness is more than 100 miles from 

the place of hearing or trial . . . .”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. GBS’s Motion in Limine 2 seeking exclusion of testimony within the scope of 

SJVIA’s proper assertion of deliberative process privilege, (ECF No. 84, at p. 13), is 

GRANTED IN PART:

• SJVIA is precluded from eliciting any testimony from any SJVIA Board Member 

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regarding any “undisclosed discussions that took place, which then were relied 

upon by [a decision-maker] in making decisions as a board member.” It does not 

include anything that was “disclosed publicly with regards to your actions on the 

board.” 

• Additionally, the Court will bar all SJVIA staff and Board members from 

testifying to issues over which SJVIA previously claimed deliberative process 

privilege, with specific questions to be addressed at trial. 

• GBS’s motion is denied insofar as it seeking a ruling that SJVIA be precluded 

from presenting any testimony “from any Board members about whether the Board 

would have adopted higher rates or reserves had Gallagher recommended them.” 

2. GBS’s Motion in Limine No. 3 seeking exclusion of evidence of restitution or 

disgorgement damages not disclosed in SJVIA’s Rule 26(A)(1) Disclosures (ECF No. 

84, at p. 18) is GRANTED.

• Plaintiff SJVIA is precluded from seeking an award of disgorgement of fees it paid 

to GBS. 

3. GBS’s Motion in Limine No. 4 seeking exclusion of testimony regarding undisclosed 

expert damages opinions (ECF No. 84, at p. 23) is GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART.

• Mr. Bednar is precluded from testifying to the opinion that a higher increase to 

non-founders helped the SJVIA when compared to applying the 17% blended rate 

increase that GBS proposed.

• Mr. Bednar may testify to the opinion that had GBS set the rates appropriately, the 

increase would have been within the range of normal.

• Mr. Bednar may testify to the opinion that had GBS set the rates correctly, the 

SJVIA would have collected enough premium from the departing entities during 

the plan year to cover each entity’s incurred but not reported (IBNR) claims.

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4. GBS’s Motion in Limine No. 5 seeking exclusion of adverse testimony from 

Defendant’s witnesses beyond Rule 45 geographical limits (ECF No. 84, at p. 28) is 

GRANTED.

• The Court holds that Mr. Volk and Mr. Toole fall outside the Court’s subpoena 

power and cannot be commanded to testify adversely in SJVIA’s case-in-chief.

• SJVIA may use Mr. Volk and Mr. Toole’s deposition for any purpose in its casein-chief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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