Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-01050/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-01050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

STANLEY G. DENHOF, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:15-cv-01050-RDP-HGD

)

CHARLES B. COVELLO, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This is an action by Plaintiff, Stanley G. Denhof, a Michigan prisoner, against Charles B.

Covello, a private attorney in Grand Rapids, Michigan. At a time when Plaintiff was living in

Florence, Alabama, he was arrested and extradited to Michigan. While in Michigan, Plaintiff and

Defendant Covello “entered into an attorney-client relationship for an abuse-neglect case.” (Doc.

1 at 4). That particular case was dismissed on August 22, 2008, at which time Plaintiff asked that

Covello turn over his entire case file to a private investigator. Id.

1 Plaintiff presumed that Covello

had complied, until three years later when his sister found a letter from Covello in Plaintiff’s county

jail personal property in which Covello stated he was withholding three documents.2Id. Plaintiff

alleges that Covello continues to maintain his entire file, including the three documents at issue, and

states in vague and conclusory fashion that “[h]ad these reports been given when first requested [he]

1

It is evident that at some point Plaintiff was convicted of a crime in Michigan, where he is

presently incarcerated in the Muskegon Correctional Facility in Muskegon, Michigan. 

2

In subsequent correspondence to Plaintiff, Covello advised that he would be sending the

three documents, which consisted of medical and psychological reports of third parties, back “to the

agencies of origin” because of medical privacy concerns. (Doc. 1 at 4 and 9). 

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FILED

 2015 Jul-28 PM 01:18

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:15-cv-01050-RDP-HGD Document 5 Filed 07/28/15 Page 1 of 5
would not have had to endure the past 7 years in prison.” Id. He now seeks compensatory damages

“in whatever amount he may be entitled,” together with interest, costs, and attorney fees, and an

order requiring that “the three reports in question” be provided to him. Id. 

Based upon the complaint, it appears Defendant is a private actor and that there is no federal

claim asserted. However, Plaintiff contends that this court has jurisdiction of his claim because of

the diversity between the parties and because his damages exceed $75,000.3

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Although he is presently incarcerated in Michigan, he contends he “has every intention of returning

to Alabama once he is released from prison.” (Doc. 1 at 4).4 First, it is doubtful Plaintiff’s

complaint satisfies the requirements of proving the threshold monetary amount in controversy to

invoke diversity jurisdiction. Second, and in any event, the court need not address the amount in

controversy issue because there is nothing in the complaint which indicates Defendant has sufficient

ties with the State of Alabama for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. 

The determination of whether the court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant is normally determined by a two-step process. The first inquiry is “whether the exercise

3 Plaintiff does nothingmore than make the bare assertion that his claim for damages exceeds

$75,000. In that regard, it important to note that there is no presumption in favor of federal court

jurisdiction, and a party cannot merely “confer jurisdiction upon the federal court.” Fitzgerald v.

Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985). It therefore seems clear that Plaintiff

has a burden of establishing jurisdiction, which would include making a showing that the amount

in controversy meets or exceeds the required amount in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Allah El v. Avesta

Homes, LLC, 520 Fed.Appx. 806, 809 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The party filing suit in federal court bears

the burden of establishing facts supporting jurisdiction”), citing Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London

v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010). 

4 Case law supports Plaintiff’s contention that he may consider Alabama as his domicile. See

Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A prisoner

does not acquire a new domicile in the place of his imprisonment, but retains the domicile he had

prior to incarceration”) (citation omitted). 

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of jurisdiction is appropriate under the forum state’s long arm statute.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol,

488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626

(11th Cir. 1966)). The second inquiry is “whether exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would

violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the defendant

have minimum contacts with the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The Eleventh Circuit has

held that “the two inquiries merge, because Alabama’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of

personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible.” Id. (citing Ala. R. Civ. P.

4.2(b) and Sieber v. Campbell, 810 So.2d 641, 644 (Ala. 2001)). Accordingly, for federal courts

located in Alabama, “our jurisdictional analysis collapses into a single determination of whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process.” Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l

Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009).

Again, in order to subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction, due process requires that

Defendant “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Avocent Huntsville, 552

F.3d at 1329. In that regard, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that ‘it is essential in each

case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” 

Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Although Avocent involved a business’

contact with the forum state, the legal axiom applies equally to individuals. The Supreme Court has

recognized that “[d]ue process does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in

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personam against an individual . . . with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” Walden

v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). Furthermore,

“the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum . . . . [instead] it is the

defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis

for its jurisdiction over him.” Id. Accordingly, “[d]ue process requires that a defendant be haled into

court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random,

fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the

State.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 

Applying these principles to Plaintiff’s complaint, it is clear that Defendant has insufficient

contacts (if any) with the State of Alabama for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him

in this matter. There is nothing in the complaint to indicate Defendant has had any contact with

Alabama, either directly or indirectly, other than his representation of Plaintiff (who claims to be an

Alabama resident) in Michigan courts.5 Under these circumstances, it would offend traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice for this court to exercise jurisdiction over Attorney

Covello in this action. 

The court is aware of the case law which allows for transfer of venue, in lieu of dismissal,

in the case where a particular court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Sinochem Int’l

Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369

5

In part II of the complaint form, Plaintiff states: “I was living in Florence when I was

incarcerated, which activated the attorney client relationship.” (Doc. 1 at 1). This vague and

conclusory statement does not show that Covello has had sufficient minimum contacts with 

Alabama for this court to assert personal jurisdiction over him. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the

attorney-client relationship he had with Defendant began after his extradition, and it is clear that the

relationship involved Defendant representing Plaintiff in Michigan. 

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U.S. 463, 466 (1962). However, in this instance, the court takes judicial notice of the proceedings

in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Case No. 1:15-cv-578, in

which the court there found as frivolous, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the plaintiff’s

attempt to transfer litigation involving these same facts from the Michigan state court to the federal

court. Because there is little reason to believe this case, if transferred to the federal court in

Michigan, would receive more favorable treatment than its predecessor, the court declines to exercise

that option. 

Accordingly, the court finds that this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice for

failure of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. A separate order will be entered accordingly. 

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 2),

motion for appointment of counsel (doc. 3), and motion to amend complaint (doc. 4) are due to be

denied without prejudice as moot. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve a copy of the Memorandum of Opinion and Order of

Dismissal upon Plaintiff. 

DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2015.

___________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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