Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05317/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2004 Decided December 21, 2004

No. 03-5284

Thomas P. Loughlin, et al.

Appellees

v.

United States of America and

American University,

Appellees

Glenbrook Limited Partnership, et al.

Appellants

Consolidated with

03-5286, et al.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00152)

(No. 02cv00294)

(No. 02cv00349)

Mitchell E. Zamoff argued the cause for appellants

Glenbrook Limited Partnership, et al. With him on the briefs

were Sten A. Jensen, Rene E. Browne, Matthew T. Ballenger, J.

Douglas Baldridge, Patrick M. Regan, Richard S. Lewis, and

USCA Case #03-5317 Document #866686 Filed: 12/21/2004 Page 1 of 28
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Victoria S. Nugent. Jonathan E. Halperin and Thanos Basdekis

entered appearances.

Mitchell E. Zamoff, Sten A. Jensen, Rene E. Browne, and

Matthew T. Ballenger were on the brief of appellant The

American University.

S. Michael Scadron, Senior Trial Counsel, U.S. Department

of Justice, argued the cause for appellee United States of America.

With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney

General, Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, Jeffrey S.

Bucholtz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick Glynn,

Director, and David S. Fishback, Assistant Director.

Richard S. Lewis and Victoria S. Nugent were on the brief

for appellee Camille Saum.

Before: EDWARDS and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: The Federal Tort Claims Act

("FTCA") gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions on

claims against the United States (the "Government") for money

damages for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or

death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting within the scope

of his or her employment, under circumstances where the

Government, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant

under the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000). This waiver of

sovereign immunity does not extend to claims against the United

States "based upon an act or omission of an employee of the

Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or

regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the

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failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function." 28

U.S.C. § 2680(a).

This case involves an FTCA action brought by appellants –

American University ("AU"); Glenbrook Limited Partnership,

Lawrence N. Brandt, Inc., Lawrence N. Brandt, and Robert

Brant (collectively "Glenbrook-Brandt"); Thomas P. Loughlin

and Kathi Loughlin, individually and on behalf of their children;

Patricia Gillum; and Camille Saum – for the Government's

alleged negligence in (1) burying dangerous munitions and toxic

chemicals on property leased from AU in the Spring Valley area

of the District of Columbia around the time of World War I, (2)

failing to issue warnings about the buried munitions and

chemicals and the resulting dangerous conditions, and (3) failing

to investigate and remedy the hazards and contamination it

caused. Gillum and Saum initially filed their FTCA and local

law claims in D.C. Superior Court. Their local law actions

claimed that AU was liable to the plaintiffs under District of

Columbia law, because the dangerous munitions and toxic

chemicals on AU's property, and the hazardous conditions

resulting therefrom, caused injuries to neighboring property

owners. AU removed these actions to the District Court under

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)-(c) (2000). The Loughlins filed both their

FTCA action and supplemental local law claims similar to those

filed by Gillum and Saum in District Court. The District Court

invoked its supplemental jurisdiction over all local law claims

against AU under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). 

AU filed a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure to dismiss the local law actions for failure to

state a claim. The District Court denied this motion and wrote

a lengthy opinion suggesting that the Loughlins, Gillum, and

Saum had stated a cause of action against AU under District of

Columbia law. See Loughlin v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 2d

165 (D.D.C. 2002) ("Loughlin I"). The District Court turned to

the FTCA matter after rendering a judgment on the

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supplemental action. The trial court first allowed the parties

jurisdictional discovery limited to the existence of rules,

regulations, or directives that might pertain to the first part of

the discretionary function exception. The District Court then

granted the Government's motion to dismiss with prejudice the

FTCA actions under the discretionary function exception. See

Loughlin v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2003)

("Loughlin II"). Having found that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under the FTCA, the District Court dismissed all

remaining claims without prejudice. Id. at 30. The FTCA

claimants appeal the dismissal of their claims, as well as the

limited scope of the trial court's discovery orders. AU

separately appeals the District Court's denial of its motion to

dismiss the supplemental action against the University. In the

alternative, AU asserts that, if the actions resting on District of

Columbia law are moot, then the District Court's decision on the

non-federal claims should be vacated.

We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the FTCA claims

under the discretionary function exception. Although the trial

court's framework for discovery was misguided, we nonetheless

find that the parties had a full and fair opportunity to determine

the relevant jurisdictional facts and the District Court had an

adequate record upon which to rest its judgment. Finally, we

vacate the District Court's decision denying AU's motion to

dismiss. The District Court had no subject matter jurisdiction

over the FTCA action. Therefore, the trial court had no

supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) to entertain nonfederal claims. Accordingly, because it should not have reached

the merits of the negligence claims under District of Columbia

law, the District Court's views on local law are a nullity and

must be vacated.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 1917, at the invitation of AU, the United States

Army leased grounds from the University and gave its Corps of

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Engineers ("Corps") exclusive control over the property. Later

that year, the Bureau of Mines established the American

University Experiment Station ("AUES") in order to consolidate

its chemical weapons research. When AUES was transferred

from civilian control to the War Department's newly formed Gas

Service, it became central to the Gas Service's Research

Division, which used the experiment station to develop,

manufacture, and test myriad chemical weapons. In order to

simulate battlefield conditions, gas weapons were tested in

trenches, bunkers, and pits created on the property. Loughlin II,

286 F. Supp. 2d at 3-4. 

Shortly after the war's end, AUES was disbanded and the

Army transferred personnel and equipment to other bases. It is

undisputed, however, that some munitions and chemical warfare

materials remained buried in Spring Valley, either as a result of

weapons testing or deliberate burial. Id. at 4. In March 1920,

the Army signed an agreement pledging to restore the buildings

and grounds to the condition they were in when the Government

took control of the property. This agreement appears to have

been superceded, however, by a subsequent agreement, dated

June 21, 1920, in which the University agreed to release the

Government from its obligation to restore the property in

exchange for the transfer of title to certain buildings erected by

the Army. Id. The Army nevertheless performed some salvage

and restoration work before leaving AUES; some contaminated

structures were burned and others were boarded up and

surrounded with fencing. Id. at 4 n.4.

In 1986, when AU embarked on plans to build a new

athletic facility, the University discovered a 1921 article in The

American University Courier, which reported that the Army had

buried munitions on or near the University campus during

World War I. The University notified the Army, which

conducted document reviews and scoured the site with metal

detectors, but did not uncover conclusive evidence of any buried

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munitions. Id. at 4. In 1990, American University sold property

to Glenbrook-Brandt, which planned to construct two houses, at

what is today 4825 and 4835 Glenbrook Road. In the course of

these construction projects, workers uncovered old laboratory

equipment and possible chemical contaminants. They also

experienced severe physical reactions to the site that required

emergency hospital care. Id. at 5. Glenbrook-Brandt informed

the University, which retained an industrial hygiene consulting

firm to investigate. The firm identified a herbicide, Silvex, in

the soil, which it explained could irritate the senses, but was not

a hazardous substance. Id. 

Around this time, workers excavating land approximately

one mile from the Glenbrook-Brandt property discovered an

underground munitions bunker. That project's developer

contacted the Army, which commenced investigations that

lasted until 1995 and unearthed live and spent munitions and

chemical warfare-related materials from the World War I era.

These events gave rise to separate litigation against the United

States by the owner/developer of that property. Id. at 5 & n.6

(citing W.C. & A.N. Miller Cos. v. United States, 963 F. Supp.

1231 (D.D.C. 1997)). 

In January 1994, the Army, now immersed in a

comprehensive investigation to locate buried weapons, sought

and received permission from Glenbrook-Brandt to access its

properties and sample the soil. Id. at 5. In February 1994,

Thomas and Kathi Loughlin tendered a purchase offer to buy the

property at 4825 Glenbrook Road. Glenbrook-Brandt disclosed

to the Loughlins the recent developments, and the Loughlins

hired an independent testing organization to sample the soil and

evaluate potential environmental hazards. This independent

firm found no contamination from hazardous substances. Id. at

5-6. On March 21, 1994, the Loughlins contracted to purchase

4825 Glenbrook Road. 

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Meanwhile, on March 9, 1994, the Corps collected soil

samples from the Glenbrook-Brandt properties. Soil and

groundwater samples were also collected from other "points of

interest" throughout the area. In June 1995, the Defense

Department issued its final Record of Decision, which

concluded that no further action was necessary with respect to

the removal operation in Spring Valley. At this time, the Army

had removed from the area 141 pieces of ordnance, 43 of which

were suspected of being chemical weapons. Id. at 5.

The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") also

conducted soil sampling at 4825 Glenbrook Road during this

time. EPA collected seven samples on March 11, 1994, one of

which revealed heightened levels of arsenic. Id. at 6. Both the

Loughlins and Glenbrook-Brandt allege that they lacked

knowledge of this abnormal result until it was disclosed to them

by the Corps in early February 1999. Id. Indeed, in January

1995, the Corps issued a letter to the Loughlins and other Spring

Valley residents, which stated that the soil samples had not

revealed chemical agents or explosives and that no hazard to

human health or to the environment existed as a result of the

Army's activities at AUES. Id.

In June 1996, however, workers at the site of the AU

President's residence at 4835 Glenbrook Road, next door to the

Loughlins' home, suffered reactions to odors and fumes that

burned their eyes. These workers unearthed laboratory

glassware and broken bottles filled with chemicals. The

University hired Apex Environmental, Inc., which conducted

soil samples that confirmed the existence of a contaminated area

approximately 12 feet in diameter and up to two feet deep; the

contamination included arsenic. Id. These events led the

District of Columbia to conduct its own investigation, which

also found elevated levels of arsenic and other toxic substances.

Id. 

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In February 1998, the Corps conducted a geophysical

survey of the Korean Ambassador's residence at 4801 Glenbrook

Road, which also abuts 4825 Glenbrook Road, and found two

potential burial pits. The Corps informed Spring Valley

residents that it would investigate whether additional chemical

warfare-related materials existed at 4801 Glenbrook Road. A 75

millimeter projectile was discovered buried six inches deep in

the Ambassador's property in February 1999. Id. at 6-7.

In December 1998, the Corps also began further

investigation of the Loughlins' property "'to confirm the absence

of buried munitions, remnants thereof, and associated material.'"

Id. at 7 (quoting United States' Stat. of Material Facts Not in

Dispute ¶ 70). On June 9, 1999, the Corps collected 22 soil

samples. All but four of the samples contained elevated levels

of arsenic. Id. Based on the June 1999 samples, the Corps

concluded that there was an "'unacceptable hazard'" from arsenic

on the properties at 4801 and 4825 Glenbrook Road. Id. The

Corps informed the Loughlins, who were forced to permanently

evacuate their home. Since 1996, Army investigations in Spring

Valley unearthed 667 pieces of ordnance, including chemical

munitions and bottles of chemicals. These events spawned

several lawsuits. Id. 

This case presents FTCA claims brought by appellants

against the Government. The Loughlins, Gillum, and Saum also

brought negligence claims against AU, id.; Loughlin I, 209 F.

Supp. 2d at 167, which brought cross-claims against the

Government under the FTCA, see Br. of AU, Loughlins,

Glenbrook-Brandt, Saum, and Gillum ("FTCA Appellants' Br.")

ii-iii. The Gillum and Saum actions were initially filed in

Superior Court and then removed to federal court under 28

U.S.C. § 1441(b)-(c). The Loughlins filed both their FTCA

action and their supplemental local law claims in District Court.

The District Court exercised its supplemental jurisdiction over

the local law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. On March 13,

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2002, AU moved to dismiss the local law claims pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). On June 3, 2002, the District Court denied AU's

motion to dismiss, finding that AU owed a legal duty under the

applicable District of Columbia law. See Loughlin I, 209 F.

Supp. 2d at 167. 

On September 20, 2002, the Government filed a motion to

dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment against all

FTCA claimants (appellants) under the discretionary function

exception. See United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, Civil Docket for Case No. 1:02-cv-00294-ESH,

reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 20, 28. Appellants argued

that the motion was premature, because jurisdictional discovery

was necessary. The District Court permitted jurisdictional

discovery limited to the existence of mandatory directives

relevant to the first part of the discretionary function exception.

See Loughlin II, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 7. The District Court

subsequently granted the Government's motion to dismiss under

the discretionary function exception, dismissing all claims

against the United States with prejudice, and all remaining

claims, including those against AU, without prejudice. See id.

at 30. 

Appellants appeal the dismissal of their case under the

discretionary function exception and the court's restrictions on

jurisdictional discovery. See FTCA Appellants' Br. 10-41. AU

separately appeals the District Court's denial of its motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), seeking reversal on the merits with

respect to Saum if we find jurisdiction under the FTCA, or

vacatur if we affirm the applicability of the discretionary

function exception. See Appellant AU's ("AU") Br. 9-11. Prior

to oral argument, we ordered, sua sponte, that counsel be

prepared to address the jurisdictional basis for this court to

exercise appellate review and the effect that a determination that

diversity jurisdiction exists for the case between Saum and

American University would have on AU's request for vacatur.

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See Loughlin v. United States, No. 03-5284, Order (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 15, 2004) ("Order of 10/15/04").

II. ANALYSIS

The FTCA vests the district courts with jurisdiction over

civil damages claims against the United States 

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government . . . if a private person[]

would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law

of the place where the act or omission occurred. 

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). This waiver of sovereign immunity is

limited in part by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which insulates the

Government from suits regarding

[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee

of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of

a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or

regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal

agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not

the discretion involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The second clause of § 2680(a) "marks the

boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability

upon the United States and its desire to protect certain

governmental activities from exposure to suit by private

individuals." United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea

Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984).

A. The Discretionary Function Exception

The discretionary function exception is a barrier to subject

matter jurisdiction. See Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C.

Cir. 1995). A district court thus has no authority to address the

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merits of claims allegedly arising under the FTCA in cases in

which the plaintiff is unable to overcome this jurisdictional

barrier. Because federal jurisdiction determinations are purely

legal, we review de novo the District Court's judgment on the

applicability of the discretionary function exception. See

Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1146 (2004) (dismissal pursuant to FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) reviewed de novo); Cope, 45 F.3d at 450

(rulings on application of the discretionary function exception

reviewed de novo). A complaint may be dismissed on

jurisdictional grounds only if "it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957).

The Supreme Court has established a two-step test to

determine whether a governmental act or omission falls within

the ambit of the discretionary function exception. See Cope, 45

F.3d at 448 (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315

(1991)). These two prongs track the language of § 2680(a). The

first asks whether a "'federal statute, regulation, or policy

specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to

follow. . . .'" Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 (quoting Berkovitz v.

United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). If such a binding

directive exists, then "the employee has no rightful option but to

adhere to the directive." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. Failure to

abide by such directives opens the United States to suit under

the FTCA. 

In the absence of such specific directives and where the

"challenged conduct involves an element of judgment," id., the

second step determines whether the challenged discretionary act

or omission is "of the nature and quality that Congress intended

to shield from tort liability." Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[b]ecause the purpose of

the exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of

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legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,

economic, and political policy through the medium of an action

in tort, . . . the exception protects only governmental actions and

decisions based on considerations of public policy." Gaubert,

499 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

"What matters is not what the decisionmaker was thinking, but

[rather] the type of decision being challenged . . . ." Cope, 45

F.3d at 449. 

Appellants principally contend that the Government failed

to warn them of the buried munitions and toxic chemicals and of

the soil contamination that these materials purportedly created.

They argue that the District Court erred when it concluded that

these claims are covered by the discretionary function exception.

See FTCA Appellants' Br. 12-34. 

Appellants first submit that the Government's decision not

to warn of the buried material violated binding directives. See

FTCA Appellants' Br. 23-34. If mandatory directives so

constrained the Government's discretion, the discretionary

function exception would not protect a failure to warn. We

agree with the District Court, however, that appellants have

failed to cite any regulations or policies that prescribed a

nondiscretionary duty to warn. We therefore affirm the District

Court's ruling on prong one of the discretionary function test for

the reasons enunciated by the District Court in its exhaustive

opinion. See Loughlin II, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 9-19. 

Although appellants point to myriad documents from the

World War I era, they fail to identify a specific and binding

directive that (1) addressed AUES or research facilities in

general, and (2) proscribed the burial of munitions or required

that such burials be marked. As the District Court explained,

appellants point to a 1919 shipping order that addressed AUES

but did not discuss buried munitions, and a Gas Warfare

Bulletin that proscribed burial in most cases and required

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markings where burial was permitted, but gives no indication

that it applied to activities at AUES. See id. at 9-14.

Appellants also fail to identify specific and binding

directives that pertain to their negligence claims for the post1986 time period, i.e., after the Government had begun to

investigate the potential existence of submerged chemical

warfare materials and the risk of contamination. See id. at 14-

19. We reject, moreover, appellants' suggestion that the

Government had adopted an unwritten or de facto policy to

inform the community during this time period. As the District

Court concluded: 

While . . . documents do suggest that the Army wished to

communicate information to the public about the progress

of its investigation, it reads far too much into them to argue

that they demonstrate an official, irrevocable commitment

to alert the public to every development in the search for

buried munitions, or to every potential danger that was

discovered. 

Id. at 29. Thus, appellants have failed to identify relevant

binding directives or policies, the violation of which would

bring this case outside of § 2680(a). 

We turn, then, to the second prong of the discretionary

function exception. Appellants argue that the Government's

failure to warn of the buried munitions and of the resulting

contamination was not a decision susceptible to public policy

considerations. See FTCA Appellants' Br. 12-23. First,

appellants seem to urge that the Government's decision to bury

the munitions without disclosing their burial during World War I

or its immediate aftermath is not the type of decision susceptible

to public policy considerations. This argument is untenable.

The decision whether to warn of these burials in the immediate

aftermath of the War was "fraught with . . . public policy

considerations,"Cope, 45 F.3d at 449 (internal quotation marks

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omitted). As the District Court observed, it required balancing

"competing concerns of secrecy and safety, national security and

public health." Loughlin II, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 23. Indeed, at

oral argument, appellants' counsel conceded that national

security concerns are greater when the decision whether to warn

is contemporaneous with the war effort. See Recording of Oral

Argument at 3:17-:28. 

Appellants contend, however, that because the

Government's duty to warn was ongoing, concerns that were

salient in wartime cannot determine the nature of the

Government's decision not to warn over the subsequent 80 years.

See FTCA Appellants' Br. 22; Recording of Oral Argument at

2:30-:49. The argument is without merit. Appellants' position

assumes that the Government was required consistently and

regularly to revisit its initial decision not to warn and re-balance

the relevant factors. A judicially constructed requirement to

rethink particular decisions not to warn on a regular basis for

over 80 years would constitute precisely the "judicial secondguessing" that the discretionary function exception was intended

to displace. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks

omitted). It would insert the courts into prioritization and

resource allocation decisions that implicate serious political,

social, and economic considerations. Instead, in order for us to

consider whether the decision not to warn was susceptible to

public policy considerations in subsequent years, appellants

must identify circumstances in which the Government itself

would have revisited the decision not to warn. 

Appellants point to two such events. The first is a finding

by EPA that one of seven soil samples collected in 1994 from

the 4825 Glenbrook Road property revealed heightened levels

of arsenic. See FTCA Appellants' Br. 22. Appellants allege that

they were not informed of this result until 1999. Second,

appellants allege that they were not informed of a 1993 Draft

Field Sampling Plan, which identified as "points of interest" two

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munitions pits adjacent to the 4825 Glenbrook property. See id.;

see also Engineering-Science, Inc., 1 Field Sampling Plan for

Hazardous and Toxic Waste, Spring Valley Project,

Washington, D.C. (on behalf of the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers), 6/30/93 ("Draft Field Sampling Plan"), J.A. 2857,

2878. Appellants submit that the Government's knowledge of

specific hazards (the abnormal soil sample and the points of

interest in the Draft Field Sampling Plan) renders the decision

whether to warn void of public policy considerations. See

FTCA Appellants' Br. 22.

Appellants' arguments on these two points fail for the

reasons provided by the District Court:

In deciding whether this information [on the abnormal soil

sample result] should be made public, the agency would

have had to weigh several factors, including the reliability

of the test, the significance of one unusual result, the

possibility of unnecessarily alarming Spring Valley

residents should the danger have ultimately proved

unfounded, and whether further testing should be done

before this data was revealed. Conducting this delicate

balance is a matter that calls for discretion of the sort that

the FTCA shields from judicial second-guessing. . . .

Similarly, with respect to the pits, while there were two

shell pits . . . identified in a Draft Field Sampling Plan

prepared by the Corps in 1993 . . . , no information existed

at the time that the pits actually contained munitions. . . .

[T]he existence of munitions pits–which were constructed

to test, not bury, explosives–does not necessarily indicate

the presence of buried contaminants. Certainly, the Plan

which claimants suggest was withheld from them does not

indicate that weapons or other toxic materials were actually

in the ground. As such, the Army's decision whether to

announce this limited information, with its highly

speculative relationship to actual risk, is subject to the same

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policy considerations that attended upon EPA's decisions

whether to go public with its soil test results.

Loughlin II, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 28-29 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The District Court's judgment is

consistent with this court's decision in Wells v. United States,

851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988), where we held that the

discretionary function exception barred claims that EPA

negligently failed to inform residents neighboring three lead

smelters of potential risks and to provide a timely remedy for the

hazards. See id. at 1472. Wells concluded that EPA's decision

to engage in further study to determine the appropriate lead

testing level was based on public policy considerations,

including the socio-political and economic implications of

recognizing an action level in one situation that could not be

consistently applied. See id. at 1473, 1477. 

Appellants contend, however, that Cope v. Scott, not Wells,

controls this case. In Cope, we held that prong two of the

discretionary function exception did not extend to the

Government's decision not to post a warning sign on a particular

strip of road. See Cope, 45 F.3d at 451. We rejected the

Government's purported public policy concern of aesthetics,

given the numerous signs on the same stretch of road. See id. at

452. Appellants submit that just as Cope held that the decision

whether to post warning signs in suitable locations was not

susceptible to public policy considerations once other warning

signs were placed on the same strip of road, the Government's

decision in 1999 to warn Spring Valley residents of

contamination reveals that public policy considerations did not

determine the Government's earlier decisions not to issue such

warnings. Thus, appellants argue, the only remaining questions

are what the Government knew and when, which turn on

negligence law, not public policy. See Recording of Oral

Argument at 13:25-:52. This argument cannot carry the day for

appellants. 

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The geography gap in Cope (warning sign at one location

but not at another) is not analogous to the time gap here

(warning issued in 1999 but not earlier). In Cope, the presence

of no less than 23 signs on the same strip of road was probative

of the nature of the decision to place an additional warning sign,

because it demonstrated that the Government was not concerned

with preserving a pristine view on the particular stretch of road.

See Cope, 45 F.3d at 452 ("[T]he Park Service has chosen to

manage the road in a manner more amenable to commuting

through nature than communing with it."). In contrast, the

Government's decision to warn Spring Valley residents of

contamination in 1999 sheds no light on whether the prior

decision not to warn was "'susceptible to policy judgment' and

involve[d] an exercise of 'political, social, [or] economic

judgment.'" Cope, 45 F.3d at 448 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at

325; Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820) (second alteration in

original). That a Government agent in 1999 made a different

decision is irrelevant. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d

1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987) ("However erroneous or misguided

[the government's] deliberations may seem today, it is not the

place of the judicial branch [through the FTCA] to now question

them."). The passage of time gave the Government more

information to digest, an opportunity to re-weigh the political,

social, and economic considerations, and occasion to make a

new policy judgment. The earlier judgment was no less a matter

of policy because the later judgment was arguably better

informed.

In other words, the nature of the decision whether to warn

in 1999 was different from the nature of the decision whether to

warn prior to 1999 because of intervening discoveries that

rendered the risk to public health substantially less speculative.

The burial pit on the property of the Korean Ambassador, which

abuts the Loughlins' property, was not discovered until 1998-

1999. When this pit was finally located, it was found to contain

submerged munitions. Loughlin II, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 28 n.27.

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In addition, 18 of 22 soil samples taken in June 1999 revealed

elevated levels of arsenic. Id. at 7. Thus, the warnings that were

issued in 1999 followed the discovery of a new burial pit and

extensive new soil sampling results. They do not shed light on

the nature of the earlier decisions not to warn. 

B. The Discovery Orders

Before leaving the FTCA appeal, we turn to appellants'

challenge to the District Court's discovery orders. Appellants

submit that the District Court abused its discretion by limiting

discovery to the existence of binding directives under prong one

of the discretionary function exception. See FTCA Appellants'

Br. 34-40. We review the District Court's discovery rulings for

abuse of discretion. See Macharia, 334 F.3d at 64. Although

the District Court's partition between "prong-one discovery" and

"prong-two discovery" is misguided, we find no basis for

reversal. 

Because the prong-two inquiry looks to the type of decision

whether to warn, irrespective of considerations that factored into

the actual decision, see Cope, 45 F.3d at 449, it may often be the

case that discovery is unnecessary to determine whether prong

two of the discretionary function exception extends to any

particular act or omission. There are situations, however, where

the factual predicate is critical to an accurate analysis of the

nature of the decision made. In Cope, for example, we rejected

the Government's purported policy justification because we

considered it in light of the factual context: The government's

alleged aesthetic considerations were undermined by the

presence of multiple signs on the same stretch of road. See

Cope, 45 F.3d at 452.

The District Court therefore erred in suggesting that our

"[c]ircuit law permits discovery as to prong 1 only." Tr. of

Status Conference of 12/16/02, J.A. 1728, 1796. Ignatiev v.

United States, 238 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2001), on which the

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District Court relied, see Tr. of Mots. Hearing of 1/13/03, J.A.

1826, 1834, is not on point. In Ignatiev, FTCA claimants

alleged that the Secret Service "likely had internal objectives or

policies that created the requisite mandatory obligation" to take

certain safety precautions, which the claimants alleged had not

been taken. 238 F.3d at 466. We held that the lower court erred

in not permitting discovery on the existence of such directives,

noting that "the only discovery necessary to establish

jurisdiction pertains . . . to the existence vel non of internal

governmental policies . . . ." Id. at 467. Circumscribing

discovery in this way was consistent with the Ignatiev

appellants' claim. Even in Ignatiev, however, we recognized

that where "facts [are] necessary to establish jurisdiction,"

plaintiffs must be afforded the "opportunity for discovery of

[such] facts . . . prior to" the granting of a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

Jurisdictional discovery on the data that was available when

a particular decision was made may be especially salient in the

failure-to-warn context, where the speculativeness of the risk

affects the nature of the decision not to disclose. Indeed, the

District Court relied on such facts when it concluded that the

discretionary function exception applies to appellants' failure-towarn claim. See Loughlin II, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 28 ("[W]hile

there were two shell pits . . . identified in a Draft Field Sampling

Plan prepared by the Corps in 1993 . . . , no information existed

at the time that the pits actually contained munitions."). When

such facts are probative of the nature of the decision itself,

jurisdictional discovery may be illuminating. No bright line rule

confines discovery to prong one of the discretionary function

exception. The suggestion, moreover, that one can neatly

partition "prong-one discovery" from "prong-two discovery" is

misleading. Evidence that sheds light on the type of decision

made is not necessarily distinct from evidence on binding

directives that would be responsive to prong one. The search for

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binding directives may – and here, did – uncover important facts

pertaining to the nature of the decisions at issue. 

Although the District Court misconstrued our case law on

jurisdictional discovery, the discovery orders nonetheless

afforded the parties a full and fair opportunity to pursue relevant

information, which, in turn, allowed the District Court to make

a just finding on the speculativeness of the risk. This occurred

because, as it turned out in this case, the so-called prong-one

discovery reasonably embraced the available data on potential

hazards. The 1993 Draft Field Sampling Plan identified pits

and trenches as "potential burial areas," and presented "sampling

activities [to] be used to evaluate the possible presence of

chemical agents or chemical agent-related contamination and

explosives or explosive-related contamination." Draft Field

Sampling Plan at J.A. 2901. The Draft Field Sampling Plan

itself, therefore, undermines the suggestion that the Government

had specific knowledge of buried munitions or contamination in

the area. A Final Remedial Investigation Evaluation Report

explains that the location of "point of interest 24," the munitions

pit that was eventually discovered on the Korean Ambassador's

property, was revised when aerial and supporting photographs

were reevaluated as a result of a 1997 evaluation of the earlier

remedial investigation. See U.S. Army Engineering and Support

Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers & Parsons Engineering

Science, Inc., Final Remedial Investigation Evaluation Report,

Operation Safe Removal Formerly Used Defense Site,

Washington, D.C., 1/8/98, J.A. 1972, 2078. Thus, the

documents cited by appellants reveal an involved investigation

and Government actors struggling to define the scope of the

potential hazard. 

To the extent that appellants seek additional discovery

relevant to the prong-two inquiry, they have failed to

particularize their requests. In their briefs and when pressed at

oral argument, appellants consistently failed to articulate

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precisely what information, pertaining to the nature of the

decision whether to warn, they had been denied. See Recording

of Oral Argument at 32:17-34:59. Given the sprawling record

already compiled in this case and appellants' failure to

particularize additional discovery requests, we conclude that the

District Court's discovery orders reasonably provided the trial

court and this court with the necessary facts to evaluate the

nature of the challenged decisions.

C. Disposition of the District Court Opinion Denying

American University's Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6).

The only remaining question is whether the District Court's

decision addressing the local law claims can survive the court's

subsequent determination that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the federal claims. We hold that it cannot. 

The District Court considered claims against AU pursuant

to its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section

1367(a) provides:

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The District Court exercised supplemental

jurisdiction over the local law claims against AU based on its

original jurisdiction over the FTCA claims against the

Government. On March 13, 2002, AU moved to dismiss the

local law claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The District Court

denied AU's motion to dismiss, because it found that AU owed

a legal duty under the applicable District of Columbia laws. See

Loughlin I, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 167-69. AU seeks vacatur of the

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22

court's decision, because the District Court had no authority to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction and render a decision against

AU in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in the FTCA

action. AU also fears that litigants will attempt to invoke the

opinion in other proceedings. AU's concern is well founded.

The opinion has been cited as authoritative by other plaintiffs

suing AU in Superior Court. See Pls.'s Opp'n to Def. The

American University's Mot. to Dismiss, Jach v. Am. Univ., No.

03-CA-004659 (D.C. Super. Ct.), filed 9/4/03, reprinted in

Appellee Saum's Br. Add. 61, 84 ("All three of these arguments

[against a legal duty owed by AU to Spring Valley residents]

have already been rejected by the federal court in denying AU's

motion to dismiss the Spring Valley personal injury cases in the

case of Loughlin v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C.

2002) (applying D.C. law)."). 

Appellee Saum contests AU's standing to seek vacatur. See

10/17/04 Letter filed by Appellee Saum, in response to Order of

10/15/04 ("Letter from Saum of 10/17/04"). Saum confuses

standing with mootness, however. Although Article III's caseor-controversy requirement undergirds both our standing and

mootness jurisprudence, the two justiciability doctrines differ in

criticalrespects. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). As the Court has

noted, its "repeated statements that the doctrine of mootness can

be described as 'the doctrine of standing set in a time frame'"

may have created an impression of greater overlap than actually

exists between the two doctrines. Id. at 189-91 (internal

citations omitted). In fact, 

[s]tanding doctrine functions to ensure, among other things,

that the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to

those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake. In

contrast, by the time mootness is an issue, the case has been

brought and litigated, often (as here) for years. 

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Id. at 191. In other words, "[m]ootness doctrine encompasses

the circumstances that destroy the justiciability of a suit

previously suitable for determination." 13A CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533 (2d ed. 1984). 

The issue here is not whether AU lacked standing; indeed,

AU was the defendant who removed cases involving local law

claims to federal court, so its standing was never an issue.

Rather, the issues here are whether the local law claims against

AU, which rested solely on the District Court's supplemental

jurisdiction, were rendered moot due to the court's determination

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the FTCA case,

and, if so, whether the District Court's decision addressing the

merits of the non-federal claims must be vacated.

Saum contends that AU has no "standing to appeal,"

because the non-federal claims are no longer before the District

Court. Letter from Saum of 10/17/04. In furtherance of this

argument, Saum suggests that the District Court's opinion on the

merits should not be disturbed, because it was issued against AU

before the court decided that it had no supplemental jurisdiction.

See Appellee Saum's Br. 4-5. According to Saum, this

confluence of circumstances bars AU from seeking vacatur of

the District Court's decision on appeal. See id. These

contentions are meritless in light of the Supreme Court's

decision in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.

43 (1997). 

The action in Arizonans for Official English was mooted

just after the district court had rendered a judgment in plaintiff's

favor, but before the court of appeals had heard the appeal. The

Ninth Circuit declined to find the case moot and upheld the

judgment for the plaintiff. Before the Supreme Court, plaintiffrespondent urged that "the District Court judgment should not

be upset because it was entered before the mooting event

occurred and was not properly appealed." Id. at 72. While

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expressing "grave doubts" over whether the named petitioners

had standing to pursue appellate review, id. at 66, the Supreme

Court nonetheless entertained the appeal, held that the case was

moot, and concluded that "vacatur down the line" was required,

id. at 75. In reaching this result, the Court stressed that:

"[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to

satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of

the lower courts in a cause under review . . . . And if the

record discloses that the lower court was without

jurisdiction this court will notice the defect . . . . [When the

lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have

jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the

purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in

entertaining the suit."

Id. at 73 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475

U.S. 534 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)) (alterations in original). 

Saum appears to submit that the District Court in this case

had subject matter jurisdiction over the local law negligence

claims at the time when it ruled on AU's motion to dismiss,

irrespective of whether it ultimately lacked such jurisdiction.

See Appellee Saum's Br. 4-5. There is no merit to this

contention. As we held in Tuck v. Pan American Health

Organization, 668 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981), subject matter

jurisdiction "is, of necessity, the first issue for an Article III

court," for "[t]he federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,

and they lack the power to presume the existence of jurisdiction

in order to dispose of a case on any other grounds." Id. at 549.

In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court's

finding that AU owed Spring Valley residents a legal duty

constitutes little more than an impermissible advisory opinion.

Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101

(1998) ("Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than

a hypothetical judgment – which comes to the same thing as an

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advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the

beginning."). 

In addition, as Arizonans for Official English indicates, an

appellate court may act sua sponte to vacate a trial court

decision if it determines that the lower court lacked jurisdiction

due to mootness. This is precisely what happened in Flynt v.

Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), where

the District Court dismissed plaintiff's action as moot, but

offered an opinion on the merits. On appeal, we affirmed the

dismissal of the case on grounds of mootness and sua sponte

vacated the District Court's opinion. The decision in Flynt holds

that the district court, while purporting to dismiss the case

for lack of jurisdiction, improperly considered and offered

judgments on the underlying merits of the dispute. . . .

Where a controversy has become moot, it is the duty of

the appellate court to clear the path for future relitigation of

the issues raised. Accordingly, while we affirm the

dismissal of this particular complaint on the ground that it

is moot, we vacate the opinion of the district court.

Id. at 135-36 (citing United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36,

40 (1950)). This holding is on point here. As in Flynt, the

District Court in this case had no jurisdiction to render a

judgment on the merits of the matters before it. Therefore, the

decision of the District Court must be vacated to "clear[] the

path for future relitigation by eliminating a judgment [AU] was

stopped from opposing on direct review." Arizonans for Official

English, 520 U.S. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

"utilize[] vacatur 'to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because

of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences,'"

irrespective of whether such consequences are imminent or

"remote." Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. FCC, 129 F.3d

625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at

41). 

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In this case, had the District Court properly considered the

FTCA action before addressing the claims that rested solely on

supplemental jurisdiction, it would have been clear beyond the

slightest doubt that Saum had neither subject matter jurisdiction

nor standing to seek a federal court ruling on the merits of her

local law claims against AU. Saum's suit against AU would

have been dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction with

no decision from the District Court on the merits. Saum surely

cannot avoid vacatur merely because the District Court

considered the FTCA and local law actions in the wrong order.

Finally, having foregone the opportunity to cross-appeal on

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Saum now argues for the

first time that the District Court in fact had jurisdiction over the

claims against AU under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (diversity

of citizenship). See Appellee Saum's Br. 6. This claim comes

too late and barren of the requirements necessary to establish

diversity jurisdiction. 

In her brief to this court, Saum acknowledges that "[n]either

of the parties presented diversity as the basis for jurisdiction in

the district court. Indeed, the University, as the removing

defendant, was precluded from asserting diversity in support of

its removal notice under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)." Appellee Saum's

Br. 6 n.2. Saum adds that she "was not required to amend her

complaint after the removal and set forth basis for federal court

jurisdiction." Id. This argument misses the point. AU's

removal rested in part on an assumption that the District Court

had supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims under

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). When it became clear that the court lacked

supplemental jurisdiction, Saum had no grounds upon which to

pursue her claims against AU unless she amended her complaint

to establish diversity jurisdiction. She never did this. 

"Because federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is

a presumption against the existence of diversity jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the party seeking the exercise of diversity

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jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading the citizenship of each

and every party to the action." Naartex Consulting Corp. v.

Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal citations

omitted). Saum has never pleaded the facts necessary to

establish diversity. In a supplemental submission to this court,

Saum does nothing to meet her burden. Rather, relying on

District of Columbia ex rel. American Combustion, Inc. v.

Transamerica Insurance Co., 797 F.2d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir.

1986), Saum merely argues that diversity jurisdiction may be

found and exercised in the court of appeals where the facts

establishing such jurisdiction appear in the record. See Letter

from Saum of 10/17/04. Saum misconstrues Transamerica. 

In Transamerica, we stated that "a party who has not

proved, or even alleged, that diversity exists [may] amend his

pleadings even as late as on appeal," particularly when the

amendment is uncontested. Id. at 1044 (discussing 28 U.S.C. §

1653 (1982) ("Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be

amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.")). Unlike

the appellee in Transamerica, Saum has not moved to amend

her complaint to aver diversity jurisdiction. And she has

presented no rationale that would warrant a departure from this

requirement. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Marsh, 846 F.2d 782, 785 n.4

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Nor has Saum cross-appealed on

the jurisdictional issue. Diversity jurisdiction must be pleaded

by the party claiming it. Jurisdictional pleading must not be

reduced to a mere afterthought years after the commencement of

the action. The court cannot act without jurisdiction and it is the

complaining party's burden to plead it. The question whether

diversity exists here has not been conceded by AU, and it has

not been properly presented by Saum. 

There is a further problem with Saum's position. Even if we

were to find diversity jurisdiction, there would be no appropriate

redress. The District Court dismissed Saum's action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, and Saum has never appealed that

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judgment. Any decision by this court finding diversity would be

merely advisory. We therefore decline Saum's belated invitation

to determine whether there is an adequate basis for diversity

jurisdiction. 

In sum, the District Court had no subject matter jurisdiction

over the FTCA action. The court had no supplemental

jurisdiction under § 1367(a) to entertain any of the non-federal

claims. Accordingly, we hold that, because it should not have

reached the merits of the negligence claims under District of

Columbia law, the District Court's decision against AU on local

law claims is a nullity and must be vacated.

III. CONCLUSION

The District Court's dismissal of appellants' FTCA claims

under the discretionary function exception is hereby affirmed.

The District Court's decision in Loughlin v. United States, 209

F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002), which purports to address the

local law claims, is hereby vacated.

So ordered.

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