Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00942/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00942-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

LEE WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUSSELL COUNTY BOARD OF 

EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

) 

)

)

)

CASE NO. 3:15-CV-942-WKW

[WO] 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Plaintiff’s pro se Motion for Leave to File Amended 

Complaint, Motion to Stay Magistrate Recommendation and Memorandum of Law 

in Support. (Doc. # 47.) The court will construe this document as a motion for leave 

to file an amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e); 

see also Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(requiring that “pro se filings” be “liberally construe[d]”).

The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that courts should refrain from 

dismissing pro se complaints for failure to state a claim where a redrafted pleading 

could plausibly cure the complaint’s deficiencies. “Where a more carefully drafted 

complaint might state a claim, a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance 

to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” 

Case 3:15-cv-00942-WKW-WC Document 48 Filed 09/22/16 Page 1 of 5
2

Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part, Wagner v. 

Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).1 This 

rule admits of only two exceptions: “(1) where the plaintiff has indicated that she 

does not wish to amend her complaint; and (2) where a more carefully drafted 

complaint could not state a claim and is, therefore, futile.” Carter v. HSBC Mortg. 

Servs., Inc., 622 F. App’x 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Plaintiff has given no indication that he does not wish to amend his complaint. 

Rather, the motion before the court today shows just the opposite. (Doc. # 47.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s failure to file the motion until after the Magistrate Judge issued 

his recommendation (Doc. # 46) does not warrant a denial of leave to amend. Cf. 

Bank, 928 F.2d at 1112 (requiring that leave be granted “where the plaintiff does not 

seek leave until after the district court renders final judgment . . . and even where the 

plaintiff never seeks leave to amend in the district court, but instead appeals the 

district court’s dismissal”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to amend may only be denied if amendment would be futile. Carter, 622 F. 

App’x at 786; see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Under the Bank standard, futility of amendment is a high bar. “Leave to 

amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly 

																																																												 1 Although Wagner overruled the Bank standard as applied to plaintiffs represented by 

counsel, the court explicitly declined to extend its ruling to pro se litigants. 314 F.3d at 542 n.1 

(“We decide and intimate nothing about a party proceeding pro se.”).

Case 3:15-cv-00942-WKW-WC Document 48 Filed 09/22/16 Page 2 of 5
3

dismissed.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). Where “the 

issue of futility . . . is close,” the court must “err on the side of generosity to the” pro 

se plaintiff. O’Halloran v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 350 F.3d 1197, 1206 

(11th Cir. 2003); see Bettencourt v. Owens, 542 F. App’x 730, 735–36 (11th Cir. 

2013) (“In deciding whether a more carefully drafted pro se complaint might state a 

claim, i.e., whether an amendment would be futile, we have placed a heavy thumb 

on the scale in favor of answering that question in the affirmative.”). Thus, futility 

of amendment only justifies denial of leave to amend where “a more carefully 

drafted complaint could [not] conceivably state a valid claim,” O’Halloran, 350 F.3d 

at 1206, or where it is “scarcely possible” that the pro se plaintiff’s amended 

complaint would state a legally cognizable claim, Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045, 

1049 (11th Cir. 2003).

In light of this forgiving standard of review, Plaintiff must get his second bite 

at the apple. To be sure, Plaintiff’s complaint is rife with pleading deficiencies. (See 

Doc. # 46 at 8–29 (pointing out the complaint’s various flaws).) But the majority of 

Plaintiff’s claims are at least colorable, albeit insufficiently pleaded. For example, 

take Plaintiff’s claim of “Retaliation,” which the Magistrate Judge construed as 

“alleg[ing] causes of action for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (Docs. # 1 ¶ 21; 46 at 13.) 

As written, the complaint fails to allege the elements of the respective causes of 

Case 3:15-cv-00942-WKW-WC Document 48 Filed 09/22/16 Page 3 of 5
4

action, and therefore failsto state a claim. (See Doc. # 46 at 13–18.) But, conversely, 

nothing in the complaint shows that a valid claim could not “conceivably” be stated. 

O’Halloran, 350 F.3d at 1206. It very well may be that Plaintiff “participated in an 

activity protected by Title VII,” “suffered an adverse employment action,” and can 

show “a causal connection between participation in the protected activity and the 

adverse action.” Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 

2001) (setting out the elements of a cause of action for Title VII retaliation). 

Looking at the face of the complaint, we simply do not know. And even if the 

complaint toes the line of “scarce[ ] possib[ility],” Silvia, 351 F.3d at 1049, we must 

“err on the side of generosity” and grant Plaintiff leave to amend. O’Halloran, 350 

F.3d at 1206.

In sum, the flaws in Plaintiff’s complaint are largely factual, rather than legal, 

in nature. (See generally Doc. # 1.) Given the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate that “pro 

se filings” are to be “liberally construe[d],” Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1215, and 

the “heavy thumb on the scale in favor of” granting leave to amend rather than 

dismissing with prejudice, Bettencourt, 542 F. App’x at 736, it cannot be said that 

leave to amend should be denied as futile. Thus, because Plaintiff has actively 

sought to amend his complaint, neither exception to the Banks rule applies here. See 

Carter, 622 F. App’x at 786. Plaintiff therefore must be given a chance to cure his 

complaint’s deficiencies. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for 

Case 3:15-cv-00942-WKW-WC Document 48 Filed 09/22/16 Page 4 of 5
5

leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. # 47) is GRANTED. It is further 

ORDERED as follows:

1. On or before October 7, 2016, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint 

that complies with the Middle District of Alabama’s Local Rule 15.1. See M.D. Ala. 

LR 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, document or other papers, whether filed 

as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must, except by leave of court, 

reproduce the entire pleading, document or other papers as amended, and may not 

incorporate any prior pleading, document or other papers by reference.”);

2. The pending motions to dismiss (Docs. # 9, 11, 12, 15, 18) are DENIED 

as moot; and 

3. The recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. # 46) is moot.

DONE this 22nd day of September, 2016. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:15-cv-00942-WKW-WC Document 48 Filed 09/22/16 Page 5 of 5