Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01389/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01389-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Albert Brogdon, Jr. )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV-11-01389-PHX-RCB(MEA)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

City of Phoenix Police )

Department; Officer Mylen )

Lubker; Officer Eric )

Boardman, )

)

 Defendants. )

____________________________)

Pending before the court is plaintiff pro se George

Albert Brogdon, Jr.’s third Motion for Appointment of

Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (Doc. 60). 

Despite three attempts, still, plaintiff has not made the

predicate showing of “exceptional circumstances” which the

Ninth Circuit requires to warrant appointment of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Agyeman v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)) 

(District courts have discretion pursuant to section 

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1915(e)(1) to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants

“‘only in exceptional circumstances.’”). Accordingly, as

discussed below, the court denies plaintiff's motion for

appointment of counsel.

Background

 Plaintiff’s current motion, although not identical, is

substantially similar to his prior two motions, which were

denied. As before, the plaintiff declares that: (1) he is

“unable to afford counsel[;]” (2) he has been “granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis[;]” and (3) his “imprisonment

will greatly limit his ability to litigate.” Compare Mot.

(Doc. 60) at 1, ¶¶ 1-2 with Mot. (Doc. 37) at 1, ¶¶ 1-2 and

Mot. (Doc. 23) at 1, ¶¶ 1-2. Also as before, plaintiff

states that “counsel would better enable [him] to present

evidence and cross-examine witnesses[]” at trial. Compare

id. at 1, ¶ 3 with Mot. (Doc. 37) at 1, ¶ 3 and Mot. (Doc.

23) at 2, ¶ 3. In contrast to his earlier motions, however,

this time, rather than simply anticipating trial, as the

plaintiff indicates, the case is trial ready. Indeed, the

parties have been ordered, among other things, to lodge a

Proposed Joint Pretrial Order shortly. See Ord. (Doc. 59).

Continuing to oppose plaintiff’s motion, the defendants

argue, as they did previously, that he has not shown the

requisite “exceptional circumstances” for appointment of

counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The court

agrees.

Discussion

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action such as this, “[t]here is no

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constitutional right to appointed counsel[.]” Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation

omitted), partially overruled en banc on other grounds, 154

F.3d 952, 954 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Hedges v.

Resolution Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994)

(“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil

proceedings.”) Therefore, federal courts do not have the

authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” 

Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310,

109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989). By the same token

though, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a “court may

request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford

counsel.” Such a request is predicated upon a showing of

exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103.

A finding of exceptional circumstances “requires at least

an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on

the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to

articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the

legal issues involved.’” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon,

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). “‘Neither of these

factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together

before reaching a decision.’” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wilborn, 789 F.2d at

1331). In the end, the burden remains upon the plaintiff to

establish exceptional circumstances. See Thornton v.

Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3910446, at *5 (S.D.Cal.2010)

(denying section 1915(e)(1) motion for appointment of counsel

where plaintiff “failed to demonstrate either a likelihood of

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success on the merits or an inability to represent himself

(beyond the ordinary burdens encountered by prisoners

representing themselves pro se) [ ]”). Plaintiff Brogdon has

not met this burden. 

Plaintiff does not offer (nor has he previously) any

argument whatsoever as to his likelihood of success on the

merits. Likewise, plaintiff Brogdon has not shown “that

because of the complexity of the claims he [has been] unable

to articulate his positions.” See Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Indeed, the record demonstrates just the opposite. Remaining

for trial is a straightforward “Fourth Amendment claim . . .

alleging that [defendants] Boardman and Lubker lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Plaintiff.” Ord.

(Doc. 57) at 13:1-2, ¶ 4. This case is not factually or

legally complex. Nor does it involve a large number of

parties or issues. 

What is more, as the record reflects, the plaintiff has

shown an ability to more than adequately articulate his

position. Plaintiff “has been able to articulate his claims

. . . , as the Court found that [his] complaint contained

allegations sufficient to survive the [statutorily mandated]

sua sponte screening” process. See Miller v. LaMontagne,

2012 WL 1666735, at *2 (S.D.Cal.2012). Additionally, during

the two year pendency of this lawsuit, plaintiff has filed

numerous motions with some success. Indeed, he partially

withstood defendants’ motion to dismiss, as well as their

summary judgment motion. Thus, plaintiff has shown that he

is capable of navigating the legal process.

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Even if, as plaintiff claims, his confinement “will

greatly limit his ability to litigate[,]” Mot. (Doc. 60) at

1, that asserted limitation does not establish complexity of

the issues or otherwise show exceptional circumstances. 

Finally, although, as plaintiff states, an attorney “would

better enable plaintiff to present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses[,]” id., that is not a sufficient basis for finding

exceptional circumstances. See Thornton, 2010 WL 3910446, at

*5 (citing Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525) (“factual disputes and

anticipated cross-examination of witnesses do not indicate a

presence of complex legal issues warranting a finding of

exceptional circumstances”).

For all of these reasons, on this record the court finds

that the “exceptional circumstances” necessary for

appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) are

absent. Accordingly, the court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s

Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 60).

DATED this 19th day of June, 2011.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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