Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00018/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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JDDL

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Johnny Deon Tarvin, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-0018-PHX-DGC (JRI)

ORDER

Pet it ioner, who is confined in the Bachman Unit of the Arizona State Prison Complex

in Buckeye, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The $5.00 filling fee has been paid. The Court will order Petitioner t o show

cause in thirty days why his action should not be dismissed pursuant t o Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

A. Procedural Background.

In t he M aricopa County Superior Court, Matter No. CR2000-009169, Petitioner pled

guilty to aggravated assault. He was sentenced t o a t erm of nine years. The sentence of

imprisonment included a finding that Petitioner had one prior felony conviction. Petitioner

did not appeal his sentence. He requested post-conviction relief. By order filed August

30, 2004, the Maricopa County Superior Court denied his request. Petitioner’s appeal

therefrom was later denied by the Arizona Court of Ap peals. He did not seek review in the

Arizona Supreme Court.

In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. First, he contends

that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was sentenced to an aggravated

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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004).

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term wit hout a jury finding or a waiver of his claim under Apprendi/Blakely.

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 Petitioner

further alleges that his sentence had not become final because he filed his one and only

Rule 32 Petition after the Blakely decision, thus, the st at e court unlawfully denied his

Petition. Second, Petitioner claims that the fundamental error as set fort h in t he p revious

ground ent it led him t o automatic direct review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, but review

was denied in violat ion of his due process rights. Third, Petitioner re-asserts that his Sixth

Amendment and due process rights were violated when the state court refused t o review

his Rule 32 petition.

B. Summary Dismissal Standard.

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, promptly after the

filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the

petition to det ermine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any

exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the dist rict court ." Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily

dismissed. Id.; see also Obremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418 (9t h Cir. 1990) (affirming district

court’s summary dismissal as a mat t er of law, but relying upon Rule 4 instead of Rule

12(b)(6)).

Rule 4 shows that “Congress envisioned dist rict courts taking an active role in

summarily disposing of facially defective habeas petitions.” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d

1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). Under Rule 4, courts may sua sponte raise issues that are

ident ifiable from the face of the petition, including issues such as procedural default, Boyd,

147 F.3d at 1127-28, and the one-year limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Herbst v.

Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). “It would waste scarce judicial resources for the

district court to cause the facially defective petition to be served on the State and to

entertain the State’s ensuing motion to dismiss.” Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1128.

This summary dismissal power is not without limits. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1128. A court

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must give a p et itioner notice and an opportunity to respond to the argument for dismissal.

Id.; accord Herbst, 260 F.3d at 1043. When the petitioner is pro se, the court must make

clear the issue and the consequences for failing to respond. Boy d, 147 F.3d at 1128. An

order to show cause and an opportunity to respond is one permissible method. Id.

Because Petitioner’s application is facially defective, the Court will require Petitioner to

show cause why his action should not be dismissed. 

C. Analysis.

Petitioner contends that his aggravated sent ence violated Apprendi/Blakely. In

Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a jury finding bey ond a reasonable doubt is

required for any “fact” that increases the penalty other than the fact of a prior conviction.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-90. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), t he Supreme

Court applied Apprendi and held that the State of Washington’s sentencing guidelines

impermissibly allowed enhancement of a defendant’s sentence based on a judicial finding

of deliberate cruelty. 

Recently, in Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit Court

of Ap p eals held that because the petitioner’s direct appeal was not pending at the time t hat

Blakely had been decided, t he holding in Blakely could not be applied retroactively. Thus,

the court of appeals rejected the petitioner’s claim that his sent ence violated the Sixth

Amendment as construed under Apprendi. 

The Blakely decision issued on June 24, 2004. At t hat t ime, Petitioner had no direct

appeal pending. More than likely , he had waived it as part of his guilty plea. For guilty

pleas, Arizona provides an “of-right” avenue of review in a post-conviction proceeding

under Rule 32.1 of t he Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure that is considered to be the

equivalent of a direct appeal. See State v. Smith, 910 P.2d 1, 3 (Ariz. 1996); Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz. R. Crim. P. Assuming that the of-right Rule 32 proceeding is considered to be the

equivalent of a direct appeal such t hat Blakely might be applicable, Petitioner failed to file

a timely notice of his of-right proceeding. He was convicted on October 2, 2000, and he

was required to file within ninety days. See Rule 32.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P. His notice was

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filed on August 19, 2004, and denied as untimely on August 30, 2004. See State v. Tarvin,

Matter No. CR2000-009169 (Maricopa Cty Sup. Ct.) (Sep t . 1, 2004 Minute Entry). The

Maricopa County Superior Court expressly found that Petitioner’s conviction became final

when the time for filing his of-right proceeding had elapsed. Id. Because Petitioner’s

conviction was final prior to the issuance of Blakely on June 24, 2004, that decision cannot

be applied retroactively. Further, Arizona law only mandates an automatic direct review

of capital cases in the state supreme court, therefore, t here is no support for Petitioner's

claim that an alleged error in sentencing is automatically subject to a direct review by the

courts.

Even assuming that retroactivity did not preclude consideration of Petitioner’s

claim, aggravation of his sentence based upon a prior conviction is constitutionally

permissible. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a jury finding beyond a reasonable

doubt is required for any “ fact” that increases the penalty other than the fact of a prior

conviction. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-90 (emphasis added). See also Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239-47 (1998) (no due p rocess violation in treating recidivism

as a sentencing factor instead of an element of a crime for purposes of enhancing a

sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)). Petitioner does not describe exactly how his sentence

was aggravated, but it appears that the only basis used by the sentencing court was his

prior felony conviction. Consequently, under Apprendi and its progeny, Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment and due process rights were not violated. 

C. Show Cause.

In light of the foregoing, none of Petitioner’s grounds for relief are sufficient to

warrant an answer from Respondents. Petitioner is hereby ordered to show cause why his

action should not be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing §

2254 Cases as plainly without merit . He will be permitted thirty days in which to respond.

D. Address Changes.

In the notice of assignment issued in this action (Doc. #2), Pet itioner was advised

he must file a notice of change of address if his address changes. Petitioner is again

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reminded that at all times during the pendency of this action, Petitioner shall immediately

advise the Court of any change of address and it s effective date. Such notice shall be

cap t ioned “ NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” Petitioner shall serve a copy of the

Notice of Change of Address on all opposing parties. The notice shall contain only

informat ion p ertaining to the change of address and its effective date, and shall not include

a motion for other relief. Failure to timely file a notice of change of address may result in

the dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant t o Rule 41(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

E. Warning of Possible Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41.

Petitioner should take note that if he fails to timely comply wit h every provision of

this Order, this action will be dismissed without furt her not ice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comp ly

with any order of the Court). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That Petitioner shall have 30 days from the date this Order is filed to show

cause why his action should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

§ 2254 Actions; and

(2) That if Petitioner fails to file a Response within 30 days of the dat e t his Order

is filed, the Petition shall be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Actions and the Clerk of Court shall enter a judgment of dismissal

accordingly, without further notice to Petitioner.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2006.

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