Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02474/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02474-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL GONZALEZ, et al.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2474-LAB (MDD)

ORDER APPROVING

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY;

AND

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME FOR

SERVICE ON DEFENDANT

KRISTY SUKEL; 

ORDER DISMISSING

DEFENDANT KRISTY SUKEL;

AND

ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF

DEFAULT

[Docket nos. 18, 19.]

vs.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, et al.,

Defendant.

On February 20, the Court issued an order requiring Plaintiffs’ counsel Blake Wilson,

Esq. to substitute in in place of Joseph Sclafani, Esq., who has apparently abandoned his

clients. The same order required Plaintiffs to show cause why their claims against three

Defendants other than JP Morgan Chase Bank should not be dismissed for failure to serve.

After the Court extended the time for these actions to be taken, Mr. Wilson on March

14 filed a motion for substitution of counsel. That motion is GRANTED. Blake Wilson is now

Plaintiffs’ sole counsel of record, and Joseph Sclafani is terminated as their counsel. The

Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect this.

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Plaintiffs also filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to serve Defendant Kristy

Sukel. The motion shows that Plaintiffs served Defendant Schmidt Mortgage Corporation on

October 2, 2012 and Defendant The Helfing Law Firm, PLLC on October 3. No affidavit of

service for Defendant Kristy Sukel is attached, however. Instead, Plaintiffs’ counsel says he

thought serving her employer The Helfing Law Firm would suffice.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), if a defendant is not served within 120 days after the

complaint is filed, the Court must either dismiss the action without prejudice as to that

Defendant, or else order that service be made within a specified time. Under that same

provision, if the plaintiff shows good cause for failure to serve within the time limit, the Court

must extend the time for service.

Because Defendants were served with process before this action was removed from

California state court, California service of process rules were the only ones applicable. In

California, with exceptions not applicable here, individuals are served by delivering copies

of the summons and complaint to them personally, or to someone authorized by law to

accept service on their behalf. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.90. Plaintiffs’ motion shows that

the summons and complaint were never delivered to Kristy Sukel. Substitute service is

possible, but only after personal service has been attempted, see American Exp. Centurion

Bank v. Zara, 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2011), which did not happen here.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), which applied after removal, service could also be

accomplished by following the law of North Carolina, where The Helfing Law Firm is located,

and where Ms. Sukel allegedly lives. Under North Carolina’s rules, an individual can be

served either personally, by service on an agent, by registered or certified mail, by using a

designated delivery service authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2), or by a

combination of personal delivery and U.S. mail. N.C. R. Civ. P.4(j)(1). None of these

procedures was followed here.

Plaintiffs could also have served Ms. Sukel (after removal) using one of the methods

set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2), but they did not do so.

/ / /

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Plaintiffs’ motion expresses the belief that service on The Helfing Law Firm would

have sufficed, if she were employed there. Instead, they discovered she no longer works

there. But the motion and exhibit suggest Plaintiffs served one summons and complaint on

The Helfing Law firm, not two (one set for the firm and one for her). Service on a fellow

Defendant doesn’t suffice under any of these provisions. Likewise, none of these provisions

allow service on an individual by delivering the summons and complaint to that person’s

employer or former employer.

Plaintiffs, citing Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9 Cir. 1997), th

argue the Court ought to to consider the factors mentioned there and to hold their neglect

was excusable. In fact, the Court may — but is not required to — consider factors such as

those set forth in Briones, which is a non-exclusive list. See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038,

1041 (9 Cir. 2007) (noting district courts’ “broad discretion to extend time for service under th

Rule 4(m)” and holding that a district court “may” consider certain enumerated factors). 

Considering the factors mentioned in Briones, and the circumstances as a whole, the

Court finds failure to serve Kristy Sukel was not the result of excusable neglect, and they

have not shown good cause for it. Procedural rules, such as rules for service of process, can

sometimes be difficult to discern or apply. But in this case, the failure to serve was clear. It

wasn’t reasonable for Plaintiffs’ counsel to believe Kristy Sukel had been served.

Furthermore, her absence from this case, like the absence of the other two Defendants

(besides JP Morgan) has been obvious. Finally, even after being put on notice on February

20 of the need to provide proof of service, Plaintiffs have allowed over three weeks to pass,

apparently without making any effort to find or serve her. 

The Court also considers the conduct of Plaintiffs and their counsel, as a whole. See

Washington v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL: 4839944 at *7 (C.D.Cal., Dec. 14, 2009) (quoting

Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 382–83 (7 Cir. 1998)) (evaluating plaintiff’s th

“conduct as a whole in this case” to determine whether he had shown good cause for failure

to timely serve process). The record is replete with examples of their dilatory conduct. Much

of this is attributable to Joseph Sclafani, Plaintiffs’ former attorney whom the Court

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reprimanded on March 4, 2013 (see Docket no. 14). But Blake Wilson, their current counsel,

says he has been representing them since August 30, 2012. (Docket no. 19 at 1:22–23.)

Therefore some of the dilatory conduct occurred on his watch, even if Mr. Sclafani was also

responsible. This conduct included failure to monitor the docket and failure to oppose a

motion to dismiss. This has caused delay and unnecessarily imposed burdens on the Court

and on JP Morgan.

The Court therefore finds Plaintiffs’ failure to serve Kristy Sukel was not excusable.

All claims against here are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and she is DISMISSED AS

A PARTY.

Because it appears Plaintiff has satisfactorily served Defendants Schmidt Mortgage

Corporation and The Helfing Law Firm, PLLC, and they have neither answered nor otherwise

pleaded nor defended within the time permitted, the Clerk is directed to enter a default

against these two Defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 15, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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