Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00535/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00535-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHERYL M. COLDIRON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 07-00535 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Cheryl M. Coldiron moves for summary judgment. 

Defendant Michael J. Astrue in his capacity as Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration opposes the motion and cross-moves

for summary judgment. Having considered all of the papers filed by

the parties, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is the second time that Plaintiff has sought this Court’s

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her

disability claim. On October 7, 2003, the Court issued an order

remanding the case and directing the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

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to reevaluate the evidence. Administrative Record (AR) 717. 

Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s subsequent determination of nondisability.

On June 3, 1999, Plaintiff applied for disability payments

under Title II of the Social Security Act (SSA), alleging

disability beginning on August 25, 1995. AR 109-11. The

application was denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 84-93. 

On October 31, 2001, after a hearing, the ALJ, Cathryn Lazuran

issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 22-31. 

This became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. AR 8-9. Plaintiff

appealed to this Court and on August 11, 2003 the Court issued an

order vacating the ALJ’s decision. The parties stipulated to

remanding the case to Defendant for further administrative

proceedings. AR 717-22. In particular, the parties stipulated

that the ALJ would reevaluate the treating opinion of Wladislaw V.

Ellis, M.D.; the examining source opinions of Steven D. Feinberg,

M.D., and Matthew B. Zwerling, M.D.; the non-examining source

opinion; the lay evidence of Plaintiff’s spouse, Alan Coldiron; and

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC). AR 717.

On June 22, 2005, Cathryn Lazuran, the same ALJ who had made

the 2001 determination of non-disability, again denied Plaintiff’s

disability claim. AR 697-711, 926-83. The ALJ found that

Plaintiff did not qualify for a period of disability under 42

U.S.C. § 416, and was not entitled to Social Security Disability

Insurance Benefits (SSDIB) under 42 U.S.C. § 423, because she could

perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. AR

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710-11. On November 27, 2006, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for further review, determining that the ALJ

had complied sufficiently with the Court’s order. AR 678-81. 

Thus, the ALJ’s decision became Defendant’s final decision. 

Plaintiff then commenced a second civil action, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), which the Court related to Plaintiff’s 2002

action. Pl.’s Compl. 1-2; Related Case Order 1. Plaintiff now

moves for summary judgment. Defendant opposes the motion and

cross-moves for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff’s Personal History

Plaintiff was born on October 6, 1955. She graduated from

college and received a Master of Business Administration (MBA)

degree in 1984. AR 40-43. From 1982 through 1995, Plaintiff

worked as both a software sales person and software sales

supervisor. AR 45-46. On January 13, 1995, at work, Plaintiff

injured her right arm and shoulder when she used them to brace a

falling filing cabinet. AR 702. Plaintiff has not been employed

since August, 1995. AR 932. Plaintiff was originally righthanded, but after her injury she taught herself to write with her

left hand. AR 932. Plaintiff has two children, who were sixteen

and thirteen years old at the time of her February 12, 2001,

administrative hearing. AR 42. In 2001, a Workers’ Compensation

judge gave Plaintiff a permanent disability rating of thirty-three

and one-third percent, based on Dr. Feinberg’s assessment that

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1After a Workers’ Compensation claimant has reached maximum

improvement, or his or her condition has been stable for a

reasonable period of time, the disability is deemed “permanent and

stationary.” Leboeuf v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d

234, 238 (1983). Then, a Workers’ Compensation judge assesses a

claimant’s diminished future earning capacity based on a statutory

formula. Calif. Law of Employee Injuries & Workers’ Comp. § 8.01

(2007). In Plaintiff’s case, the Workers’ Compensation judge found

that her future earning capacity was reduced by one-third, as a

result of her permanent disability.

2

Prior to her injury, Plaintiff received her primary care from

Lydia Mertens, M.D., and she continues to visit Dr. Mertens for bimonthly check-ups and monitoring of her medications. AR 248-49.

3Thoracic outlet syndrome is the general term for a group of

conditions caused by compression of nerves, blood vessels, or both,

at the base of the neck. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 1916 (28th

ed. 2006) (Stedman’s).

4

Brachial plexus nerve blocks involve injection of a local

anesthetic into the major nerve network serving the upper limbs of

the body. Stedman’s at 230, 1513.

4

Plaintiff’s disability was permanent and stationary.1 AR 654, 965-

66. Plaintiff’s date last insured (DLI)--the date on or before

which Plaintiff was required to establish the onset of disability--

was December 31, 2001. AR 933.

II. Plaintiff’s Medical History

Plaintiff’s medical record comprises approximately 300 pages. 

AR 889. The administrative record includes medical reports and

records from at least sixteen physicians, from the years 1995

through 2004. AR 3-7. 

Dr. Ellis was Plaintiff’s primary treating physician2 from

April, 1996 to July, 2000. AR 392-481, 575-94. In April, 1996,

Dr. Ellis diagnosed Plaintiff with thoracic outlet syndrome.3

 AR

479. From April, 1996 through May 8, 2000, Dr. Ellis treated

Plaintiff with brachial plexus nerve blocks,4 administering

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5Dr. Feinberg did treat Plaintiff during the time that she

stopped seeing Dr. Ellis. But, in January, 2002, Plaintiff

recommenced treatment with Dr. Ellis, and in May, 2002, Plaintiff’s

attorney confirmed that Dr. Ellis is Plaintiff’s treating physician

for her impairments. AR 665, 857.

6

Cervical spondylosis is a neck injury, a non-specific,

degenerative lesion of the cervical vertebrae, intervertebral

discs, and surrounding soft tissue. Stedman’s at 1813.

5

injections approximately every two weeks. AR 608-12. Plaintiff

discontinued her treatment with Dr. Ellis after the Workers’

Compensation judge referred her to Dr. Feinberg and asked her to

stop seeing Dr. Ellis. AR 962.

Dr. Feinberg, a certified physical medicine and rehabilitation

specialist, is not Plaintiff’s treating physician,5 but she saw him

on at least three occasions from 2000 to 2001. AR 606-18, 665. At

the request of the Workers’ Compensation judge, Dr. Feinberg

examined Plaintiff on May 8, 2000. AR 606. He diagnosed Plaintiff

with cervical spondylosis6 and chronic right shoulder pain

syndrome. AR 615. Dr. Feinberg examined Plaintiff again in

January, 2001. AR 614. During this examination, Plaintiff

described continued pain in her neck, right upper back, shoulder

and arm and she self-limited her right shoulder abduction to ninety

degrees. AR 614-15. Dr. Feinberg’s examination revealed that

Plaintiff actually had full range of shoulder motion, with full

internal rotation and full extension. AR 615. He noted that

Plaintiff demonstrated diffuse discomfort to palpation and stronger

grip strength on the left than on the right, muscle testing was

otherwise normal, sensation was intact and reflexes were

symmetrical. Id. Dr. Feinberg ruled out psychological factors as

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7The record does not clearly link Dr. Casella’s report to the

psychological examination that the ALJ requested during the

hearing. Plaintiff could not remember the date of the examination

or the name of the psychologist. AR 936. However, the ALJ

6

affecting Plaintiff’s physical condition. Id. He determined that

Plaintiff was precluded from work above the right shoulder level,

forceful or repetitive work with her right upper arm, or any heavy

lifting. AR 616. He also described Plaintiff’s subjective factors

of disability as slight to moderate pain. AR 615.

Dr. Feinberg referred Plaintiff to Peter Edgelow, M.A., P.T.,

a physical therapist and thoracic outlet specialist. AR 613. Mr.

Edgelow treated Plaintiff from July 10, 2000 through February 9,

2001. AR 595, 619-28, 963. On July 10, 2000, he noted, Plaintiff

reported that her migraines had stopped and for the previous two

years she had been fairly stable with the use of medication. AR

624. Plaintiff’s regularly treating physical therapist is Edward

Rosen, P.T. AR 605. Beginning October 4, 1995, Mr. Rosen began

treating Plaintiff on a weekly basis. AR 482-556, 836. Plaintiff

continued physical therapy with Mr. Rosen during the time she was

treated by Mr. Edgelow. AR 600. Mr. Rosen continued treating

Plaintiff until at least January 22, 2003, when he concluded that

Plaintiff was “totally disabled.” AR 835.

Plaintiff underwent a psychological examination as part of her

Workers’ Compensation claim. AR 936-37. Dr. Feinberg referred

Plaintiff to a psychiatrist, Dr. Charles Casella, who examined her

on September 19, 2000. AR 614. According to Dr. Feinberg’s notes,

Dr. Casella found no “gross psychopathology.” Id. The ALJ

requested Dr. Casella’s full report,7 but did not receive it from

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referenced only one existing psychological examination conducted in

relation to Plaintiff’s Workers’ Compensation claim. AR 703.

8

In 1999, Dr. Adornato reviewed three surveillance videotapes

of Plaintiff, dated October 25, 1997, November 12, 1998 and

November 19, 1998. AR 314. Because he did this at the request of

the Division of Workers’ Compensation, this footage was presumably

gathered by that agency in connection with Plaintiff’s Workers’

Compensation claim. In 2000, Dr. Feinberg viewed the November,

1998 videotapes and concluded that they did “not indicate much

other than that [Plaintiff] was able to be out and about during the

day,” and did not show her doing much with her right arm. AR 612.

7

Plaintiff or her attorney. AR 703, 936-37. In a letter dated

December 27, 2004, Plaintiff’s attorney wrote that he had “no

success” obtaining the report from Plaintiff’s psychological

examination, but he believed that Plaintiff qualified as disabled

based on Dr. Feinberg’s “comprehensive report.” AR 905.

On June 17, 2003, Plaintiff began treatment with a marriage

and family therapist, Patricia Britton, M.A., M.F.A. AR 935. Ms.

Britton reported that Plaintiff had “reactive depression,” but did

not note any functional limitations resulting from mental

impairment. AR 903-930. Ms. Britton’s counseling notes indicated

that therapy improved Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain and depression. 

Id. These notes also indicated that Plaintiff began taking courses

toward a teaching credential in late 2004 and expressed a desire to

return to the “world of work.” AR 919-20. 

On January 5, 1998, Bruce T. Adornato, M.D., a neurologist,

examined Plaintiff at the request of the Workers’ Compensation

judge. AR 610. Dr. Adornato disagreed with the diagnosis of

thoracic outlet syndrome and found no “objective findings to

support [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints.” AR 314. Dr.

Adornato also viewed surveillance videotapes of Plaintiff,8 taken

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from October, 1997 through November, 1998, and noted that they “did

not demonstrate any limitation of her spontaneous movement” and

instead showed that Plaintiff had normal use of her right arm in a

variety of conditions. AR 314-17. He concluded that the tapes

confirmed his clinical impression that it was “medically unlikely”

that Plaintiff suffered from “a disability, as she describes.” AR

315. Dr. Adornato also commented that Dr. Ellis’s treatment method

of injecting brachial plexus nerve blocks into Plaintiff’s shoulder

on a regular basis was “well outside the mainstream of medical

care.” AR 319. Dr. Adornato questioned Dr. Ellis’s “placebo

therapy” of relying on Plaintiff’s subjective statements about her

symptoms, without objective clinical evidence for his diagnosis of

thoracic outlet syndrome. AR 320.

On July 1, 1998, Eugene W. Wolf, M.D., an orthopedist,

examined Plaintiff at the request of the Division of Workers’

Compensation and Plaintiff’s employer. AR 610. Dr. Wolf found no

objective evidence of Plaintiff’s disability, but rather an

“exaggeration” and “amplification” of her subjective symptoms. AR

285-311. He opined that Plaintiff’s disability was created by Dr.

Ellis’s treatment methods. AR 310. Dr. Wolf’s report was

discounted in Plaintiff’s 2001 Workers’ Compensation disability

assessment. AR 610.

Dr. Zwerling, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Plaintiff on

several occasions and submitted medical records from December, 1995

through January, 1999. AR 365-80. On July 15, 1999, Dr. Zwerling

wrote a summary report, stating that he believed Plaintiff was

correctly diagnosed with thoracic outlet syndrome, and opining that

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9Plaintiff was involved in a lawsuit against the company that

manufactured the filing cabinet that had caused her alleged injury. 

AR 286, 295. Although it is not explicit in the record, Plaintiff

apparently initiated the lawsuit. AR 668.

9

Plaintiff could work an eight hour day if allowed to alter her

positions frequently, though she would be precluded from lifting

more than ten pounds. AR 366. On February 4, 1999, Dr. Zwerling

posited a strong “psychologic, psychosomatic component” to

Plaintiff’s symptoms that could be remedied with long-term

counseling, but he did not diagnose a mental impairment. AR 367-

68. Dr. Zwerling reviewed Plaintiff’s medical files and disputed

the medical practices of her treating physician, Dr. Ellis, stating

that he disagreed with the value of Dr. Ellis’s treatment protocol

of frequently injecting Plaintiff with nerve-blocking drugs. Id.

On October 25, 1996, David Bradshaw, M.D., a rehabilitation

specialist, examined Plaintiff in regard to a third party matter.9

AR 608. Dr. Bradshaw reported that he had examined Plaintiff prior

to her shoulder injury in January, 1995, for pre-existing

musculoskeletal problems and headaches. AR 229. In his October

25, 1996 report, he indicated that Plaintiff’s lack of improvement

for symptoms that he determined could be remedied with “minimum

treatment” suggested psychiatric variables. AR 229-33. Dr.

Bradshaw did not diagnose a mental impairment. Id.

On March 30, 2004, Thanh Q. Tran, M.D., conducted a physical

examination and neurological evaluation of Plaintiff, at the

request of the SSA. AR 889-95. Dr. Tran found that Plaintiff had

normal ranges of motion except for an inability to raise her right

arm above her head. AR 890. Plaintiff had full motor strength in

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10Because Case Number 02-04903 CW was consolidated with Case

Number 07-00535 CW, the Court reviews the record from the original

claimed onset date of August 25, 1995, through the DLI, December

31, 2001.

10

all extremities except in her right grip, no atrophy and normal

muscle tone. Id. Plaintiff also did “not appear depressed,” was

“alert and oriented,” with “good comprehension and attention,” and

a “good memory.” Id. Dr. Tran diagnosed Plaintiff with right neck

and shoulder pain and weakness in the right hand “with unclear

etiology.” AR 891. He stated that, based on Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints, she would be unable to work because of

constant right shoulder pain. Id. However, Dr. Tran’s objective

findings were that Plaintiff had no limitations in walking,

sitting, standing or posture. Id.

III. Plaintiff’s Second Hearing Before the ALJ

Prior to her second hearing, Plaintiff amended her disability

onset date to January 8, 2001,10 alleging continuing disability due

to degenerative disc disease and nerve damage to her right side. 

AR 701, 783-89. 

On October 26, 2004, Plaintiff, accompanied by her attorney,

Patrick Kelly, appeared before the ALJ at a second hearing and

presented testimony about her daily activities. AR 969-77. 

Plaintiff stated that she was able to dress and groom herself, but

she had retained a housekeeper to do household chores for the past

several years and her husband helped her cook dinner. AR 972-73. 

She shopped for groceries once a week but did not usually carry

bags from the store into the house, and she did some laundry. AR

973-76. Each day, she walked for about an hour and did physical

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11Prozac, also referred to as fluoxetine hydrochloride, and

Elavil, also referred to as amitriptyline, are prescription antidepressants. Physician’s Desk Reference 1801 (61st ed. 2007). 

12Neurontin, also referred to as gabapentin, and OxyContin,

also referred to as oxycodone hydrochloride, are prescription

analgesics, or pain medications. Id. at 2487, 2703.

11

therapy exercises for approximately an hour. AR 974. She took

OxyContin, a prescription pain medication, that she claimed made

her “fuzzy headed.” Id. She also took Prozac, Elavil,11 and

Neurontin.12 AR 965. Plaintiff could drive a maximum of twenty

minutes; when she needed to go further for a doctor’s appointment,

her husband took the day off from work to drive her. AR 975. She

and her family flew to Mexico for a one week vacation every summer. 

Id. She used a computer for e-mail ten to fifteen minutes per day,

paid bills online, and read for a hobby for about one to two hours

per day. AR 975-76.

Plaintiff’s spouse, Alan B. Coldiron, was not at the hearing,

but on June 18, 1999, he submitted an assessment of Plaintiff’s

daily activities and in July, 2002, he submitted an observational

statement. AR 144-49, 667-71. Mr. Coldiron opined that

Plaintiff’s daily activities were affected by her impairments: she

took at least four pain medications daily, and would need to take

these medications for the rest of her life. AR 667-71. He

reported that Plaintiff read, went to movies, took daily walks, ran

errands, and took care of their children before school. AR 144,

147. Plaintiff was “moody” two to three days a week, but managed

her mood with medication. AR 147. Mr. Coldiron indicated that Dr.

Wolff only examined Plaintiff for twelve minutes and his report was

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thrown out by a Workers’ Compensation judge as biased. AR 667. 

Mr. Coldiron also indicated that only one of the Workers’

Compensation surveillance videotapes of Plaintiff that were

interpreted by Dr. Adornato was admitted into evidence at the

Workers’ Compensation hearing, and some of the women depicted in

that tape were not Plaintiff. AR 668.

Stephen P. Davis testified as an impartial vocational expert

(VE). AR 977-82. The ALJ’s first hypothetical question to the VE

asked:

assume a person [of Plaintiff’s age, education and past

relevant experience] can lift twenty pounds occasionally

and less than ten pounds frequently. Can stand, walk and

sit without limit. Can occasionally climb, stoop and

reach with the right dominant arm. And has no limitation

regarding use of the left arm. Is limited regarding

pushing and pulling to twenty pounds occasionally and

should not crawl. . . . Would there be . . . jobs the

person could do?

AR 979-80. Mr. Davis testified that this hypothetical person could

not perform the “light duty” requirements of Plaintiff’s former

job, but could do some “sedentary” work. AR 979-80. The VE listed

three jobs this hypothetical person could perform: credit

authorizer, with 186,000 jobs existing nationally and 5,400 in

California; collections clerk, with 247,200 jobs nationally and

19,000 in California; and telemarketer, with 989,700 jobs

nationally and 16,600 in California. AR 980. The second

hypothetical included further limitations, such that the person

would only be able to lift ten pounds occasionally and would need

the option to sit or stand. AR 980. The VE responded that this

hypothetical person would also be able to do the three jobs that he

had previously identified. Id.

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13In order to make a SSDIB determination under Title II, the

ALJ must apply a sequential five-step evaluation process to the

disability claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520: (1) is the

claimant engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) if not,

does the claimant have a severe impairment, or combination of

impairments; (3) if so, are the impairments listed in, or as severe

as those listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, do the impairments

preclude the claimant from performing past relevant work; and 

13

Board-certified neurologist and clinical neurophysiologist

Roger Bertoldi, M.D., testified as an impartial medical expert at

the 2004 hearing. AR 933-61. Dr. Bertoldi testified that the

medical evidence indicated that Plaintiff had degenerative disc

disease of the cervical spine, right arm strain and headaches, but

that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of

any listed impairment. AR 938, 946. Dr. Bertoldi testified that

there were no conflicts in the medical record, except for the

opinions of Dr. Ellis. AR 937. Dr. Bertoldi saw a conflict

between Dr. Ellis’s treatment methods and standard procedures used

in the medical community. Id. Dr. Bertoldi stated that Dr.

Ellis’s frequent injections of nerve blocks into Plaintiff’s

shoulder was not a conventional treatment and that his credentials

were suspect, given his treatment methods. AR 949-50. Dr.

Bertoldi explained that Dr. Ellis represented himself as a

neuropsychiatrist, but that psychiatrists do not administer nerve

blocks. Id. Dr. Bertoldi was reluctant to characterize

Plaintiff’s chronic pain as malingering, instead opining that it

might be attention seeking behavior. AR 952.

IV. The ALJ’s Disability Determination

In her 2005 decision, the ALJ conducted the five-step

evaluation process13 outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and found

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(5) if so, is other work precluded? 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(g).

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that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the SSA on or

prior to her DLI on December 31, 2001. AR 701. At step one of the

five-part analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not worked

since the alleged disability onset date. AR 710. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc

disease of the cervical spine, right arm strain, and headaches were

severe within the meaning of the Regulations. Id. As a component

of the step two analysis, the ALJ examined the record and found no

medically verifiable evidence that Plaintiff suffered from a severe

mental impairment on or prior to December, 2001. AR 703. The ALJ

analyzed the treatment notes from Ms. Britton, Plaintiff’s

therapist from 2003 to 2004, and found no reference to mental

impairment prior to December, 2001. Id. The ALJ also noted that

Dr. Zwerling posited a strong “psychologic, psychosomatic

component” to Plaintiff’s symptoms, but that he did not clinically

diagnose a mental impairment. Id. The ALJ discussed Dr.

Bradshaw’s suggestion of psychiatric variables contributing to

Plaintiff’s impairment, but found that Dr. Bradshaw’s suggestion

was not a clinical diagnosis. Id.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments, 

either singly or in combination, were not severe enough to meet or

medically equal any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the

Regulations. AR 710. In order to make this determination, the ALJ

relied on the testimony of the impartial medical expert, Dr.

Bertoldi. AR 703.

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Prior to steps four and five of the analysis, the ALJ weighed

the medical and other evidence in the record to assess Plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (RFC). AR 704. The ALJ looked at

several sources to make the RFC determination, including: the

medical information from Dr. Ellis, Plaintiff’s regular treating

physician; the reports of Drs. Feinberg and Tran; and observational

statements from Plaintiff’s spouse, Mr. Coldiron. Id. The ALJ

also looked at Plaintiff’s testimony, explaining that she gave

little weight to these statements, because she found Plaintiff’s

testimony “not entirely credible” in light of the treatment record

and Plaintiff’s daily activities. AR 704. The ALJ also indicated

evidence in the record that detracted from Plaintiff’s credibility,

including statements from examining physicians, Dr. Adornato and

Dr. Wolf. AR 705. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the

RFC to lift ten pounds occasionally; stand and walk two hours out

of an eight hour day; sit for six hours out of an eight hour day;

and occasionally climb, stoop and reach with her right arm. AR

704-708. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no limitations with the

left arm. Id.

At step four of the disability analysis, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff was precluded from working in her past relevant

occupation of software sales person. AR 710. The ALJ based this

finding on the RFC assessment and the testimony of the VE, Mr.

Davis. AR 708.

At step five, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of

performing sedentary work existing in significant numbers within

the national economy. AR 710-711. Here, the ALJ utilized the

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Medical-Vocational guidelines, as well as the VE’s testimony, to

determine that there were thousands of jobs in the national economy

that Plaintiff could perform. AR 709. Consequently, the ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the SSA. AR 710-711.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ’s

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, a court reviews the record as a whole, not

just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the Commissioner’s decision simply by isolating a specific

quantum of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498,

501 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, a court must weigh the evidence that

supports the Commissioner’s conclusions and that which does not. 

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be affirmed even

when there is evidence on the other side. Hall v. Sec’y of Health,

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Educ., & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979). The ALJ’s

decision should also be affirmed when the evidence is susceptible

to more than one rational interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler, 753

F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by substantial

evidence, the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact shall be

conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the SSDIB section of SSA, disability is defined as an

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will be determined to be

disabled only if his or her physical or mental impairment is so

severe that he or she “is not only unable to do his [or her]

previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ erred in her step two

finding that Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment was not severe;

(2) the ALJ did not comply with this Court’s remand order in making

the 2005 determination; (3) the ALJ erred in her step five finding

that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform other work; and (4) the

ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s allegation that she

experienced side-effects from prescription medication and

misconstrued Plaintiff’s self-reported daily activities.

I. The ALJ Did Not Err in the Step Two Determination

Plaintiff argues that at the second step of the five-step

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sequential inquiry, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s

conclusion that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment.

At step two of the disability determination, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment

or combination of impairments that “significantly limits [his or

her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities include:

“[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple

instructions,” and “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision,

co-workers and usual work situations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).

A person claiming disability bears the initial burden of

establishing his or her disability. Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). One claiming

disability must furnish medical and other evidence of its

existence. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Subjective statements about

pain or disability must be backed up by “[o]bjective medical

evidence of pain or other symptoms established by medically

acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(5)(A). Further, symptoms alone “are not enough to

establish that there is a physical or mental impairment.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1528. The impairment “must be shown by medically

acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques.” Id. Moreover,

“[i]mpairments that can be controlled effectively with medication

are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility” for

disability benefits. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d

1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Here, the ALJ ruled in Plaintiff’s favor at step two, finding

that her combination of impairments was “severe.” AR 703. The ALJ

was only required to consider impairments alleged by Plaintiff or

about which evidence had been received. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528. 

The ALJ looked at the medical evidence in the administrative

record, finding that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments

from degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, right arm

strain, and headaches. Id. It remained Plaintiff’s responsibility

to establish that she also had a severe mental impairment during

the time period for which she claimed disability. See Tidwell v.

Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998) (“At all times, the burden

is on the claimant to establish her entitlement to disability

insurance benefits.”). However, Plaintiff failed to provide

evidence of medically determinable functional limitations caused by

a mental impairment.

The ALJ properly examined the evidence that would support

Plaintiff’s claim of depression and inability to concentrate,

stemming from severe mental impairment, and found that Plaintiff’s

claim was not supported by objective medical evidence. The ALJ

examined Plaintiff’s medical records and noted that Dr. Feinberg,

in his January, 2001 medical report, specifically ruled out

psychological factors as affecting Plaintiff’s physical condition. 

AR 703. The ALJ also referred to Dr. Feinberg’s notation, in

September, 2000, that an examining psychiatrist, Dr. Casella,

diagnosed Plaintiff with “no gross psychopathology.” AR 703. The

ALJ explained that, although Dr. Zwerling opined in a 1999 report

that Plaintiff’s symptoms had a psychosomatic component, the

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physician had not offered this statement as a clinical diagnosis,

but merely a personal opinion. AR 368, 703. Lastly, the ALJ

looked at a 1996 medical report from Dr. Bradshaw, who neither

diagnosed nor purported to diagnose a mental impairment, but

instead opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms were indicative of

psychiatric variables. AR 233, 703. The ALJ properly determined

that none of these statements rose to the level of a medically

acceptable clinical diagnosis of mental impairment.

The ALJ also looked for evidence that Plaintiff suffered from

functional limitations caused by mental impairment, and found none. 

The ALJ referred to Dr. Tran’s finding that Plaintiff had good

comprehension, attention and memory. AR 707. She also referred to

Ms. Britton’s counseling notes, which indicated that Plaintiff’s

condition was improving with the use of medication, and that

Plaintiff did not report any problems with concentration or

persistence. AR 706. The ALJ also noted that Ms. Britton’s

report, created in 2004, was based on a treatment period that began

in 2003, nearly two years after Plaintiff’s DLI. AR 903-25. 

For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ properly found that

Plaintiff’s self-reported mental impairment was not supported by

objective medical evidence in the record.

II. The ALJ Complied with the Court’s Remand Order

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s determination was

procedurally improper because the ALJ failed to comply with this

Court’s remand order by not procuring, at step two of the

disability determination, a consultive evaluation of Plaintiff’s

mental status to determine its severity. 

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Because disability hearings are not adversarial in nature, the

ALJ has a special duty in social security cases fully and fairly to

develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a

claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v.

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). An ALJ may order a

consultive evaluation where the record is ambiguous or devoid of

evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a. The ALJ’s duty to develop the

record is of less importance when a claimant is represented by an

attorney. Ludwig v. Halter, 5 Fed. Appx. 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ can fulfill his or her obligation by making a reasonable

attempt to obtain medical evidence from the claimant’s treating

sources. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B). But the ALJ has “broad

latitude” in determining whether to order a consultive evaluation. 

Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s

duty to investigate does not extend to a duty to generate evidence

of a disability that is not clearly indicated on the record. 

Turner v. Califano, 563 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1977); Nisenbaum v.

Callahan, 1999 WL 92650 (N.D. Cal.). 

The relevant portion of this Court’s remand order reads: “If

necessary/warranted, the ALJ will obtain medical expert and

supplemental vocational expert evidence.” AR 717. The Appeals

Council provided further instructions to the ALJ to obtain

additional evidence about Plaintiff’s mental impairment, including

a “consultive mental status examination with psychological

testing,” but only “if warranted and available.” AR 721. 

The Court’s remand order did not compel Defendant to generate

an additional medical report. It merely stated that, if necessary

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or warranted, the ALJ would obtain an evaluation of Plaintiff’s

mental status. Plaintiff misconstrues this language. Further, the

Appeals Council’s instructions were in accord with the remand

order.

The ALJ supplemented the record by obtaining further

information from Plaintiff, both prior to and at the hearing and

considered these additional medical records and reports in her 2005

determination. The ALJ discussed the updated records from

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Ellis; a March 30, 2004

Neurological Consultive Examination by Dr. Tran; treatment records

from Plaintiff’s marriage and family therapist, Ms. Britton; and

reports from Dr. Feinberg, who examined Plaintiff in both 2000 and

2001. AR 703. Dr. Feinberg’s treatment notes explained that an

evaluating psychologist, Dr. Charles Casella, examined Plaintiff on

September 19, 2000, and ruled out mental impairment. AR 614, 703. 

The ALJ requested an existing psychological evaluation, conducted

in connection with Plaintiff’s Workers’ Compensation claim, but

Plaintiff’s attorney never submitted the report. AR 936-937. The

ALJ made reasonable attempts to obtain the report. The ALJ

complied with the Court’s remand order, which instructed the ALJ to

“obtain medical expert and supplemental vocational expert

evidence,” as necessary, by utilizing both a vocational expert and

a medical expert during the October, 2004 hearing. AR 717.

Plaintiff did not claim a mental disability on either of her

applications for disability; on June 3, 1999, she claimed thoracic

outlet syndrome and chronic pain, and on November 15, 2002, she

claimed degenerative disc disease and nerve damage. AR 122, 786. 

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Also, both Plaintiff and her attorney failed to submit valid

evidence in support of a possible mental impairment component to

her disability claim. AR 724, 936-937. 

It was not the ALJ’s duty to generate additional evidence of

mental impairment where the record did not establish a medical

basis for this claim during the relevant time period, and where a

psychological evaluation reportedly found no mental impairment. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ complied with the remand

order.

III. The ALJ Did Not Err in the Step Five Determination

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s step five finding, that

Plaintiff was capable of performing work that exists in the

national and local economy, was not supported by substantial

evidence. Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ erred by

misconstruing reports that included limitations that would preclude

Plaintiff from performing two of the three occupations cited by the

ALJ in her step-five analysis. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the

ALJ did not sufficiently explain the weight she assigned to the

reports of Dr. Tran and Dr. Feinberg. Plaintiff’s third contention

is that the testimony of the VE conflicted with the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (DOT).

In step five, the ALJ must demonstrate “that other work exists

in significant numbers in the national economy” that the claimant

can do, given his or her RFC, age, education and past work

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). A claimant’s RFC is the most he or she

“can still do despite his [or her] limitations,” or the claimant’s

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maximum ability to perform sustained work in an ordinary work

setting on a regular and continuing basis, eight hours a day for

five days a week. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ weighs all

of the relevant medical and other evidence to make the RFC

determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Then, the ALJ compares

the claimant’s RFC and the nature of the impairments to a table of

medical vocational guidelines to determine the claimant’s ability

to perform any gainful work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(g); Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.

1989). “When [the vocational guidelines] do not adequately take

into account claimant’s abilities and limitations, [they] are to be

used only as a framework, and a vocational expert must be

consulted” to determine whether substantial gainful work exists for

the claimant. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir.

2002). Hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to the VE must set

out all of the claimant’s limitations and restrictions. Light v.

Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997). The

assumptions in the hypothetical must be supported by the record. 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988).

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Her RFC Determination

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that

Plaintiff retained the RFC occasionally to reach with her right arm

was not consistent with the evidence cited in her decision,

specifically the medical reports from Drs. Feinberg and Tran. The

ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to lift ten pounds

occasionally; stand and walk two hours out of an eight hour day;

sit for six hours out of an eight hour day; and occasionally climb,

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stoop and reach with her right arm. AR 708. The ALJ explained

that her RFC assessment was based on Dr. Feinberg’s opinion that

Plaintiff could not perform work with her right arm above shoulder

level or repetitively reach with the right arm, and should avoid

heavy lifting; Dr. Tran’s finding that Plaintiff could only

occasionally climb, stoop and reach above her head with her right

arm; and Dr. Zwerling’s assessment that Plaintiff would require an

option to sit or stand. Id. 

The ALJ based her assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC on substantial

evidence in the record. In his January, 2001 report, Dr. Feinberg

noted that Plaintiff could not perform work above shoulder level

with her right arm, and would be precluded from forceful or

repetitive work or heavy lifting with that arm. AR 616. He

explained that, although using her right arm caused her discomfort,

Plaintiff actually had a full range of motion. Id. at 615. Dr.

Tran found that Plaintiff could lift twenty pounds occasionally and

less than ten pounds frequently; only occasionally climb, stoop or

reach above her head; and never crawl. AR 889-93. Dr. Zwerling

determined that Plaintiff was not impaired in terms of standing,

sitting or walking, but that she would need frequent alterations of

position, and could not lift or carry more than ten pounds at a

time. AR 366. At Plaintiff’s 2004 hearing, the medical expert

testified that these opinions were consistent with the medical

record. AR 937. Thus, the ALJ’s determination that the reports

from Drs. Feinberg and Tran supported a conclusion that Plaintiff

could occasionally reach with her right arm was both reasonable and

consistent with the record.

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B. The ALJ Properly Assigned and Explained the Weight She

Applied to the Evidence

Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently

explain the weight that she assigned to the reports of Drs.

Feinberg and Tran. Although Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s

reliance on these reports or the weight assigned to other evidence,

she contends that the ALJ used obscure language in assigning

weight. 

Because of Plaintiff’s amended onset date, the ALJ explained

that she gave greater weight to the more recent opinions. AR 708. 

The ALJ gave primary weight to the opinion of Dr. Feinberg, who

examined Plaintiff at least twice between 2000 and 2001. AR 707. 

The ALJ found that Dr. Feinberg’s 2001 medical assessment was

consistent with the medical record as a whole. The ALJ also

assigned some weight to the opinion of Dr. Tran, who provided the

most recent assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC, and found that it was

consistent with Dr. Feinberg’s assessment. AR 708. Lastly, the

ALJ took into account the statement of Dr. Bertoldi, the medical

expert who testified at the hearing, that he agreed with the

limitations set forth by Dr. Tran. AR 947-49.

Along with reports from Dr. Feinberg and Dr. Tran, the ALJ

also discussed and assigned weight to other evidence in the record. 

The ALJ explained that she gave little weight to Dr. Zwerling’s

opinion, that Plaintiff had no sitting, standing or walking

impairment, because he saw Plaintiff only on a few occasions before

February, 1999. AR 705-06. However, the ALJ factored Dr.

Zwerling’s assessment that Plaintiff required an option to sit or

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stand into the RFC assessment. The ALJ also considered Dr. Ellis’s

opinion that Plaintiff was precluded from work activity, but found

that it was neither reliable nor credible in light of the numerous

examining physicians who had disagreed with his diagnosis and

treatment methods. AR 706-07. The ALJ also considered the opinion

of Mr. Rosen, Plaintiff’s treating physical therapist, that

Plaintiff was precluded from work activity. AR 707. However, the

ALJ explained that because Mr. Rosen was neither an acceptable

medical source nor a vocational expert, his opinion was not given

weight. Id.

Accordingly, the ALJ provided clear, specific and legitimate

reasons for the weight she assigned to each opinion, specifically

those of Drs. Feinberg and Tran.

C. The ALJ Properly Relied on the VE’s Testimony in Making

the Step Five Non-Disability Determination

Plaintiff’s third assertion is that the ALJ’s step five

determination was flawed because the ALJ’s hypothetical questions

to the VE did not include a limitation on reaching, and that the

VE’s resulting testimony conflicted with the occupations listed in

the DOT. 

In her decision, the ALJ explained that she utilized the

testimony of the VE, within the framework of the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, to determine that there were sedentary jobs existing in

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

still perform, given her age, education, professional skills and

RFC. AR 709. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of

“sedentary work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567, which

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“involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a time and

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files,

ledgers, and small tools.” AR 709; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). The

ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff had no limitation in using her

left arm, but she had some functional limitation in her right arm

and would require an option to sit or stand. AR 708.

The ALJ posed hypothetical questions to the VE that accounted

for all of Plaintiff’s functional limitations. The ALJ drew

directly from the medical evidence in formulating her questions,

specifically Dr. Feinberg’s assessment that Plaintiff was precluded

from work above shoulder level with the right arm, should avoid

heavy lifting and could not perform repetitive functions with the

right arm; and Dr. Tran’s opinion that Plaintiff could only

occasionally reach in all directions, including overhead. The

ALJ’s second question depicted a person who would only occasionally

be able to lift ten pounds or reach with the right arm. AR 979-80. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. The ALJ’s

hypothetical questions to the VE appropriately accounted for

Plaintiff’s limitation on the use of her right arm, as well as

other limitations.

Plaintiff contends that the VE’s answer to the ALJ’s

hypothetical questions included two occupations, collections clerk

and credit authorizer, that require “frequent” reaching. First,

Plaintiff argues that the VE contradicted the DOT regarding the

“occasional” reaching requirement of the collections clerk

occupation. However, according to the DOT, the collections clerk

occupation requires only occasional reaching one-third of the time. 

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DOT (2001) (241.357-010 Collection Clerk).

Second, Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s

testimony regarding the occupation of credit authorizer. The DOT

indicates that this occupation may require frequent reaching onethird to two-thirds of the time. DOT (249.367-022 Credit

Authorizer). However, as Defendant points out, this does not mean

frequent reaching with both arms. The purpose underlying the use

of a VE is to assess variables that are not encompassed by the DOT. 

Barring an erroneous assessment of the occupation, determining

whether this particular occupation requires reaching with one or

both extremities is presumably the province of the VE. Also, even

excluding this one occupation, the remaining two occupations,

telemarketer and collections clerk, account for 1,236,900 jobs in

the national economy and 18,500 jobs in the local economy, which is

sufficient to establish the availability of a “significant number”

of jobs which Plaintiff can perform, given her limitations. See

Barker v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 882 F.2d 1474, 1479 (9th

Cir. 1989) (finding that 1,266 local jobs constituted “significant

numbers”); AR 980. 

For the reasons described above, the Court finds that the

ALJ’s step five determination, that Plaintiff was capable of

performing work that existed in the national economy, was properly

supported by substantial medical evidence and the VE’s testimony.

IV. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Alleged Medication

Side Effects and Self-Reported Activity Limitations

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misconstrued Plaintiff’s selfreported activities of daily living and failed to consider the side

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effects from her medication in determining that she could perform

sedentary work. Both of these contentions are related to the ALJ’s

assessment that Plaintiff was not credible and that her statements

were inconsistent with the other evidence in the record. AR 705.

An individual’s symptoms will be determined to diminish his or

her capacity for basic work activities to the extent that the

symptoms are reasonably consistent with the medical and other

evidence, including the individual’s daily activities, type and

effects of any pain medication, and treatment and other measures

used to relieve pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a),(c)(3). When

assessing a claimant’s subjective statements about symptoms and

their functional effects, the “ALJ must make a finding as to the

credibility of the claimant’s statements.” Robbins v. Social Sec.

Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). A claimant’s subjective

statement regarding a symptom must be supported by objective

medical evidence, generated by medically acceptable techniques, of

an underlying impairment, “which could reasonably be expected to

produce the . . . symptoms alleged.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A);

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Conversely, an ALJ may not disregard a claimant’s subjective

testimony about excess pain, “solely on the ground that it is not

fully corroborated by objective medical findings.” Cotton, 799

F.2d at 1407; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is

malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the

claimant’s testimony must be ‘clear and convincing.’” Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Swenson v.

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Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). This means that “the

ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id.

In Plaintiff’s case, the ALJ identified several specific

instances in which Plaintiff’s testimony was undermined by other

evidence in the record. The ALJ cited evidence to illustrate that

Plaintiff’s claims of frequent debilitating headaches were not

consistent with her medical record. AR 704. In 2000, Plaintiff

told evaluating physical therapist Peter Edgelow that, a year after

her injury, her headaches had stopped and she had been relatively

stable for the previous two years with the use of medication. AR

624. In 1997, Plaintiff reported that she was doing much better

than the year prior. AR 255. Plaintiff’s claim of complete

disability was also inconsistent with her testimony that she was

found only thirty-three and one-third percent disabled by Workers’

Compensation. AR 965-66. Lastly, Dr. Adornato, who physically

examined Plaintiff and viewed surveillance videotapes, noted

inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s presentation on examination and

her daily functioning on the videotape. AR 314. For the foregoing

reasons, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for

disputing Plaintiff’s credibility.

The ALJ also provided a reasonable rationale for finding that

Plaintiff’s specific claim of “fuzzy headedness” was not entirely

credible in light of her self-reported daily activities and the

medical record. AR 704. The ALJ cited Plaintiff’s testimony that

she engaged in a wide range of daily activities that included

walking an hour each day, grocery shopping once a week,

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vacationing, watching movies, doing some laundry, and using the

computer for ten to fifteen minutes a day. AR 704. Plaintiff’s

spouse, Mr. Coldiron, reported that Plaintiff walked, shopped, took

care of financial matters, did some light cooking, read, and drove

their children places. AR 144, 705. As discussed above, the ALJ

noted that Plaintiff’s medical records contained no evidence of

functional limitations caused by mental impairment. AR 703. Thus,

the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for giving little

weight to Plaintiff’s subjective complaint of “fuzzy headedness.”

Plaintiff cites Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.

1989), for the proposition that a person need not be “utterly

incapacitated” to be found disabled. But, where a plaintiff

claiming disability is able to spend a substantial part of his or

her day performing physical functions that are transferable to a

work setting, an ALJ may properly discredit his or her allegations

of complete inability to work. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Further, if despite her

claims of pain, a plaintiff “is able to perform household chores

and other activities that involve many of the same physical tasks

as a particular type of job, it would not be farfetched for an ALJ

to conclude that [his or her] pain does not prevent [him or her]

from working.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. 

Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misconstrued her

lifestyle as “active,” the ALJ provided convincing reasons for

determining that Plaintiff could perform sedentary activities. AR

705. The ALJ cited Plaintiff’s direct testimony and Mr. Coldiron’s

statements about Plaintiff’s lifestyle, as well the medical record

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describing Plaintiff’s specific functional limitations. AR 704-05. 

The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living

could be sufficiently applied to sedentary work activity was both

reasonable and consistent with the record.

Because the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for

finding that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy, Defendant did not err.

CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ properly applied the five-step analysis to

conclude that Plaintiff was not disabled, and for the more specific

reasons outlined above, Defendant did not commit reversible error. 

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not

disabled within the meaning of the SSA was supported by substantial

evidence in the record and was based upon proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk

shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file. Each party

shall bear his or her own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/28/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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