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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unite.! Scates Court of Appeals 

Trnth Ci .. tnit 

JAN 2 4 1990 

l\OBERT L. .HOECKER 

Clerk STEPHEN REID PATTERSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

-vsCITY OF OLATHE, KANSAS, 

a municipal corporation, 

VERNON B. WATSON, CHARLES 

D. GINOW, II, and CONRAD 

R. SALMON, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees.) 

Nos. 88-1047 

and 88-1154 

88-2228 

88-2252 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

No. 84-2389-S 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1 

David R. Morris, Ruth M. Bensen, John E. Shamberg of Shamberg, 

Johnson, Ferguson & Goldman, Olathe, Kansas, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Lawrence L. Ferrer, Mark A. Buchanan of Ferrer & Bunn, Overland 

Park, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees. 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and 

shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth 

Circuit, except for the purposes of establishing the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel. 

10 Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and WINDER, 2 District 

Judge. 

Plaintiff Stephen R. Patterson ("Patterson'') appeals 

the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants, City of Olathe, Kansas, Vernon B. Watson, Charles D. 

Ginow, II, and Conrad R. Salmon ("defendants"). Patterson 

alleged in his complaint that the defendants violated his civil 

rights under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1985 and also alleged pendent 

state claims under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. § 75-6103. 

Patterson seeks recovery for a C5-C6 spinal cord injury that 

resulted in quadriplegia. Patterson specifically argues that the 

defendant officers used excessive force during the time that 

Patterson was in their custody and that such conduct caused his 

injuries. 

The district court granted the defendants' motion for 

summary judgment on plaintiff's sections 1983 and 1985 claims and 

ruled that: "under the facts of the case plaintiff's evidence is 

insufficient for a reasonable jury to find liability under 

sections 1983 and 1985, as a matter of law.'' Memorandum Decision 

2 The Honorable David K. Winder, United States District 

Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 2 
and Order at 16-17. The plaintiff's state law claims under the 

Kansas Tort Claims Act were dismissed without prejudice. 

Plaintiff Patterson appealed the district court's entr y 

of summary judgment on the claims arising under 42 u.s.c. §§ 198 3 

and 1985 and the dismissal of his state law claims without 

prejudice. The defendants cross-appealed arguing that the 

pendent state claims should have been dismissed on their merits. 

The defendants contend that there is insufficient evidence to 

s upport the state law claims and the claims should be dismissed 

with prejudice. 

On appeal there are two issues before this court: 

1. Is there sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find the defendant liable 

under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1985? 

2. Should the district court have retained 

jurisdiction over the pendent state claims; 

or, should the court have dismissed the 

claims with prejudice rather than dismiss the 

claims without prejudice? 

This court concludes that the district court's grant o f 

summary judgment against the plaintiff's section 1983 and 1985 

claims is affirmed. The district court's dismissal of the state 

law claims under the Kansas Tort Claims Act without prejudice is 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 3 
reversed and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. 

Additionally, the request for attorney's fees and costs is 

denied. 

Facts 

The parties have engaged in exhaustive discovery. 

Discovery is complete. All possible evidence was before the 

district court. The record establishes the following facts. 

On Friday, October 8, 1982 Patterson went to Sue's 

Place, a tavern in Olathe, Kansas. Patterson drank beer with his 

friends from 8:00 p.rn. to 12:00 a.rn. During that time, Patterson 

drank five or six beers and had also ingested a Dexatrirn tablet. 

Patterson left the tavern with the intent to go to a 

party at a friend's home and purchased a twelve-pack of beer to 

take with him. As Patterson went to his car he met Torn 

Easterberg, a friend whom he had known since grade school. 

Patterson invited Easterberg to accompany him to the party. 

Easterberg had a plastic gallon jug half full of grain alcohol 

mixed with grape juice. The two began drinking the alcohol-grape 

mixture and left Sue's Place between 12:15 and 12:30 a.rn. 

Patterson drove his 1980 4-wheel drive Toyota pickup truck. 

Patterson and Easterberg continued to drink on the way to the 

party. 

At the corner of Dennis and K-7 highway in Olathe, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 4 
Kansas, Patterson hit at least one street sign and possibly 

three. Patterson and Easterberg continued travelling. Patterson 

pulled his truck onto a side street near Honeysuckle and Sherida n 

in order to investigate possible damage to the truck's 

undercarriage. He left the key in the ignition, the engine 

running and the gearshift in neutral. Patterson got out of the 

truck and walked to the front of the truck to inspect for damage. 

This is the last event that Patterson remembers on October 9, 

1982 until he woke up in the Kansas University Medical Center in 

Kansas City, Kansas. 

At 1:37 a.m., on October 9, the Olathe Police 

Department was informed that a pickup truck was stuck in the mud 

in a field near Cedar and Normandy Streets, a mile and a half 

from where Patterson initially stopped his vehicle. Officer 

Charles D. Ginow responded to the call and found Easterberg 

passed out behind the wheel. Ginow removed Easterberg from the 

truck and arrested him for driving under the influence. 

Easterberg was taken to a holding cell at the Olathe Police 

Department. The vehicle was towed away. 

At 3:42 a.m., on October 9, Darlene Schechter, a 

newspaper delivery person, went to the Olathe Police Department 

and reported that an intoxicated person was lying in a yard at 

the corner of Honeysuckle and Sheridan Streets. Officers Ginow, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 5 
Conrad R. Salmon and Sergeant Vernon B. Watson responded to the 

9-1 dispatch--meaning "intoxicated person." 

The police officers arrived and found Patterson lying 

on his left side and stomach. Patterson could only communicate 

to a limited degree. The officers observed that he could move 

portions of his upper body, including his head, neck, shoulders 

and arms. There were no external indications of injury except a 

scrape on Patterson's back. The officers asked Patterson if he 

had been injured and he responded: "no." The officers noted 

that there was a tire track in the grass where Patterson lay. 

The officers concluded that Patterson had not been struck by a 

vehicle. 

The officers picked Patterson up, placed him in the 

patrol car and transported him to the Olathe Police Department. 

They put Patterson in a holding cell. The police tried to 

contact his wife, but could not because she was out of town. 

Ultimately, they called Patterson's employer Karl Nordstrom and 

requested that he take responsibility for Patterson. Nordstrom 

arrived at 6:00 a.m. on October 9. Nordstrom and the officers 

then attempted to move Patterson. He did not respond. 

At 6:24 a.m. on October 9, the police contacted the 

Johnson County emergency dispatcher for medical assistance. The 

reserve personnel arrived and determined that Patterson's 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 6 
condition was serious and requested a Med-Act unit to respond. A 

Med-Act unit arrived. The personnel determined Patterson's vital 

signs, conferred with the Olathe Community Hospital emergency 

room physician and started an I.V. in Patterson's arm. 

The Med-Act personnel found a large hematoma behind 

Patterson's left mastoid process and some dried blood around his 

mouth. The crew transported Patterson to the Kansas University 

Medical Center. Dr. Robert Mathews diagnosed his condition as a 

fracture dislocation of the C5-C6 vertebrae. Dr. Mathews was 

unable to determine the cause of Patterson's injuries. 

I. 

This court must review de novo the district court's 

grant of a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). See Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 

141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment shall be rendered i f 

the evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Maughan v. 

SW Servicing. Inc., 758 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985); Luckett v. 

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1980). 

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 7 
supported motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986). Summary . judgment must 

be rendered against the party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of 

proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 3 22-

23 (1986). 

To determine if sufficient evidence exists "the 

inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts [in the 

admissible record] ... must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the [nonmoving] party." Matsushita Elec. Industrial 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting 

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see 

also Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(setting forth the summary judgment standard). If a nonmoving 

party makes some showing on a material issue, we must consider 

the applicable standard of proof to determine whether the showing 

is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party on that issue. Should the nonmoving party not 

make a sufficient showing on any essential element of his case, 

all other facts are rendered immaterial, and summary judgment i s 

appropriate. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. Patterson 

must establish the existence of each element essential to his 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 8 
case under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. 3 The United States 

Supreme Court sets forth the elements of a 1983 claim as 

follows: 

[T]he initial inquiry must focus on whether 

the two essential elements to a§ 1983 action 

are present: (1) whether the conduct 

complained of was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law; and (2) 

whether this conduct deprived a person of 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-332 (1986). 

"A police officer's use of excessive force is 

actionable under§ 1983 as a constitutional violation." Lusby v. 

T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984) 

(citing Garrick v. City of Denver, 632 F.2d 969, 972 (10th Cir. 

1981)). Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375 

(10th Cir. 1985) and Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453 (10th 

Cir. 1987) set forth factors for an excessive force claim. The 

excessive degree of force is determined by "the relationship 

between the amount of force used and the need presented, the 

3 Section 1985 requires that there be some racial or other 

class-based discrimination. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 

U.S. 88 (1971). Such facts do not exist in this case. 

Patterson's arguments are based solely on section 1983. 

Consequently, it is evident that there is no basis for 

Patterson's claim under section 1985. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 9 
extent of the injury inflicted and the motives of the state 

officer." Id. at 1458. 

In support of his excessive force claim, Patterson 

argues that he was intoxicated, therefore, no degree of force was 

justified. He is now a quadriplegic and further argues that no 

motive justifies the use of force that would inflict such injury . 

To further support his 1983 claim, Patterson presented the 

following circumstantial evidence. Patterson was intoxicated 

during the time he was in defendants' custody. Patterson never 

resisted defendants' custody or control. The defendant officers 

concluded at the time that they found Patterson that he was not 

injured. Patterson also claims that expert testimony establishes 

that he did not have a spinal cord injury when he was arrested. 

Patterson's spinal cord injury was caused by a blow delivered 

with great force. A night stick, flashlight, or boot, all of 

which were in the officers' possession, could have caused 

Patterson's injury. Patterson also argues that the Olathe Police 

Department did not conduct an internal investigation in spite o f 

the fact Patterson's spinal cord injury was discovered while he 

was in their custody. Patterson speculates that there was a 

cover-up and that the suspicious nature of his injuries warranted 

further investigation into the defendant officers' conduct. 

Patterson's arguments invite considerable sympathy but 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 10 
are unpersuasive. There is simply insufficient evidence in this 

voluminous record that would enable the trier of fact to 

conclude, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that one or 

more of the defendants used excessive force or committed any 

other violation of§ 1983 as against Patterson, or that such 

violation caused his spinal cord injuries. The record suggests 

that there are a number of possible causes for Patterson's 

injuries. 

The defendants presented considerable evidence claiming 

that Patterson's injuries were caused when he came in contact 

with the shackle plate under his own pickup truck as the truck 

passed over him. They argue that the injury resulted from the 

force pushing down on the spinal column from above and behind the 

head. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants a t 

26-27. This possible cause of his injuries was unrelated to the 

defendants' conduct. In fact, the district court found that 

there was "convincing proof" that Patterson had been run over b y 

his own truck. See Memorandum Decision and Order at 8. This 

court does not reach that question, however, and simply states 

that the evidence in this voluminous record is such that the 

trier of fact could not find by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the defendants used excessive force or caused Patterson's 

injuries. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 11 
There is also an indication in the plaintiff's briefs 

that his§ 1983 claim against the defendants is based on the 

grounds that they failed to provide adequate medical care to 

Patterson. In order to prove such a claim, it is necessary that 

Patterson show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference 

to his medical needs and that such deliberate indifference caused 

the injuries. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

Here again, the evidence does not support such a claim. 

Plaintiff attempts to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa 

loquitur because of the absolute lack of affirmative or direct 

evidence supporting his theory. Res ipsa loquitur, however, 

cannot appropriately apply to Patterson's section 1983 claim. 

Allegations of gross negligence or intentional misconduct are 

necessary to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 

U.S. 344 (1986). Negligence is an insufficient basis of 

liability under section 1983. Kansas state common law is clear 

that: "[R)es ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked to establish gross 

negligence or willful misconduct." Rupe v. Smith, 181 Kan. 60 6 , 

616, 313 P.2d 293, 301 (1957). See also Lee v. Consolidated 

Edison Co. of New York, 95 Misc.2d 120, 407 N.Y.S.2d 777, 783 

(N.Y. Civ. ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Misc.2d 304, 413 

N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1978) ("[t]he authorities are uniform 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 12 
in holding that gross negligence cannot be proven by application 

of the res ipsa loguitur doctrine." (citations omitted)). 

The plaintiff is left with nothing more than 

speculation. A party may not "rely on mere speculation or 

conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a 

motion for summary judgment." Knight v. United States Fire Ins. 

Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986). Therefore, the district 

court's decision to grant summary judgment on plaintiff's 42 

u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims in favor of the defendants is 

AFFIRMED. 

II. 

On appeal, this court must consider whether the 

district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise 

pendent jurisdiction over Patterson's state law claims. See 

Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). 

Pendent jurisdiction may exist whenever there is a 

federal claim before a court with valid federal subject matter 

jurisdiction and the state and federal claims "derive from a 

common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). In the instant case, the 

federal and state law claims do arise from a common nucleus of 

operative fact. Ordinarily, those claims would be tried in one 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 13 
judicial proceeding. See id. at 725. 

The district court's decision to exercise pendent 

jurisdiction over a state law claim if the federal claims are 

dismissed is discretionary. See Transok Pipeline Co., 565 F.2d 

at 1155. The court must weigh considerations of judicial 

economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. See Gibbs, 383 

U.S. at 726. 

The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction 

over Patterson's state law claims under the Kansas Tort Claims 

Act because they lacked sufficient merit for the court to retain 

jurisdiction absent the federal constitutional claims. The 

court, therefore, dismissed appellant's pendent claims without 

prejudice. The district court suggested that the state law 

claims might be heard in state court much sooner than in federal 

court. Moreover, the district court preferred to defer to state 

courts the interpretation of state law and the Kansas Tort Claims 

Act. See Memorandum Decision and Order at 16-17. 

It is true that "[n]eedless decisions of state law 

should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote 

justice between the parties .... " Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. In 

this case, however, "[i]t would be a shocking waste of time and 

money now to require this case to be relitigated in the state 

court." Transok Pipeline Co., 565 F.2d at 1155. The district 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 14 
court abused its discretion and· should have retained jurisdiction 

over the pendent state claims. This result is warranted in the 

interests of judicial economy, convenience and fairness because 

Patterson's state law claims must be dismissed on their merits. 

Defendants' liability under Kansas state law is 

predicated on the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101, et seq. 

which abrogates sovereign immunity subject to several exemptions . 

K.S.A. § 75-6103 states: 

(a) Subject to the limitations of this act, 

each governmental entity shall be liable for 

damages caused by the negligent or wrongful 

act or omission of any of its employees while 

acting within the scope of their employment 

under circumstances where the governmental 

entity, if a private person, would be liable 

under the laws of this state. 

Id. See also Fudge v. City of Kansas City. 239 Kan. 369, 720 

P.2d 1093 (1986) (setting forth the necessary elements of 

government liability under section 75-6103). 

The City of Olathe is liable for the acts of the 

defendant officers only "if a private person, would be liable 

under the laws" of the state of Kansas. See K.S.A. § 75-6103( a ) ; 

Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 675 P.2d 57 (1984). Under common 

law negligence principles applicable to a private person, conduct 

is actionable if a duty exists, there is a breach of that duty 

a nd the breach causes injury. See id. at 61. In order to avoid 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 15 
summary judgment Patterson must make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of each element of his state law claims. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Patterson has not made a sufficient showing, however, 

to establish the causation element of a negligence claim. 

Patterson's injuries could have been the result of a number of 

possible causes, at least one of which was unrelated to the 

defendants' conduct. Moreover, based on our review of the 

massive accumulation of evidence adduced during the discovery 

process, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury 

could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendants' actions caused Patterson's injuries. Consequently, 

submission of plaintiff's state law claims to the jury would do 

nothing more than allow them to speculate as to the possible 

cause of Patterson's injuries. See Knight v. United States Fire 

Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986). 

As a matter of law, Patterson's evidence is 

insufficient for a reasonable jury to find liability against the 

City of Olathe or the other individual defendants under the 

Kansas Tort Claims Act or any other tort theory. Consequently, 

it is unnecessary to address defendants' argument that they are 

immune from liability under the discretionary function exception 

and the good Samaritan provisions. See K.S.A. §§ 75-6104(d) and 

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Appellate Case: 88-1047 Document: 01019961237 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 16 
65-2891. Patterson's state law claims are hereby dismissed on 

their merits. 

III. 

Attorney's fees and costs may be awarded to the 

prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Such an award is not 

warranted in this case. This case does not rise to the level 

required by Christianburg and its progeny. See Christianburg 

Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Patterson's claims 

were not "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" and the 

plaintiff has not acted in bad faith. Id. at 422. Therefore, 

attorney's fees and costs also are not warranted under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11. 

Conclusion 

The district court's grant of summary judgment against 

the plaintiff's sections 1983 and 1985 claims is affirmed. The 

district court's dismissal of the state law claims under the 

Kansas Tort Claims Act without prejudice is REVERSED and the 

claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The request for 

attorney's fees and costs is denied. 

Entered for the court 

David IC. Winder 

District Judge 

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