Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02440/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 09cv2440

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE GUADARRAMA,

CDCR #P-54739,

Civil No. 09-2440 JM (WVG)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

[Doc. No. 2] 

AND 

DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL 

FILING FEES MANDATED 

BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary; 

LARRY SMALL, Warden; 

DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”) and

proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims

the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), CAL

Warden Small and other unidentified CDCR and CAL officials have violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process by imprisoning him beyond his earliest possible release date.

(Compl. at 2-3, 8, 13.) 

In addition, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. 

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access

to the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or

operate as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-82 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

2 09cv2440

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil

litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the

privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (Under the PLRA,

“[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP

status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers,

128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which

were dismissed ‘on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.”

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. Thus, once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is

prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other action IFP in federal court unless he is

under “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);. Cervantes, 493 F.3d

at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of

filing.”).1

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28 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1123 (noting constitutionality of § 1915(g), but recognizing that “serious

constitutional concerns would arise if § 1915(g) were applied to preclude those prisoners who had filed

actions who were not ‘frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim’ from proceeding IFP.”). 

3 09cv2440

While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and

other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a

strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).’” Id. at 1121 (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Andrews further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight

or importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

II.

APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has ascertained that it makes

no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’

at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Therefore,

Plaintiff may be barred from proceeding IFP in this action if he has on three prior occasions had

civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failing to state a claim. See 28

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4 09cv2440

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Jorge Guadarrama, CDCR Inmate #P54739, has had three prior prisoner civil actions dismissed in the Southern District of California

on grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. They are:

1) Guadarrama v. State of California, et al., Civil Case No. 08-0078 MMA (AJB),

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) to Dismiss

Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

[Doc. No. 44]); (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009 Order Adopting R&R [Doc. No. 49]);

and (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2009 Order of USCA Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for

Voluntary Dismissal of Appeal, No. 09-56601 [Doc. No. 58]) (strike one);

2) Guadarrama v. Tilton, et al., Civil Case No. 08-1158 MMA (CAB) (S.D. Cal.

Nov. 5, 2008 Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint for failing to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)) [Doc. No. 12]); (S.D.

Cal. May 22, 2008 Order of Dismissal [Doc. No. 25]); (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2009

Mandate of USCA dismissing appeal No. 09-55467 [Doc. No. 27], cert. denied

U.S. Supreme Court No. 09-5874 (Oct. 28, 2009) (strike two); and

3) Guadarrama v. Cate, et al., Civil Case No. 08-2286 BTM (CAB) (S.D. Cal. Feb.

11, 2009 Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)(1) [Doc. No. 6]); (S.D. Cal.

July 17, 2009 Order re Entry of Judgment [Doc. No. 14]); Order of USCA

Dismissing Appeal, No. 09-55447 [Doc. No. 16]) (strike three).

/ / / 

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5 09cv2440

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes”

pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he is under imminent

danger of serious physical injury, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this

action. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying

IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt

permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 2], and DISMISSES this action

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) for failing to prepay the $350 filing fee.

Plaintiff may no longer proceed IFP in any federal district or appellate court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) while he is incarcerated unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Further, this Court CERTIFIES that any IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken

“in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is

permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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