Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00515/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00515-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. BREWER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-00515-JD 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 36

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has brought a civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendant correctional officer Brewer retaliated against 

plaintiff for filing a grievance by referring him to mental health services and writing him up for 

torn clothing, and defendant correctional officer Mendenhall violated plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment rights by loudly stating that plaintiff was gay which placed him in danger. Plaintiff 

seeks declaratory, punitive, and compensatory relief. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss 

and a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Factual Background1

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). Motion for Summary 

Judgment (“MSJ”) at 4. Defendants Mendenhall and Brewer were correctional officers at PBSP 

during the relevant time. Id. On November 26, 2011, Mendenhall was delivering mail in 

plaintiff’s section. Decl. Mendenhall ¶ 2. The parties agree that on that date Mendenhall stated to 

plaintiff that he looked “gray”. Id.; Compl. at 6. Mendenhall contends she observed plaintiff’s 

 

1

The following facts, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed.

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hair getting gray and stated, “wow [plaintiff] you are starting show some gray. If you are not 

careful, you are going to start getting old like me. It’s a good thing that me and Miss Clairol [the 

hair coloring product] are best friends.” Id. Mendenhall states that plaintiff asked if she called 

him gay and she responded, “No, I called you gray.” Id. She then observed plaintiff laugh and 

she walked away. Id. Plaintiff states that Mendenhall awkwardly attempted to engage him in 

conversation at this time. Compl. at 5-6.

After this exchange, plaintiff states that Mendenhall returned several hours later for the 

evening inmate count and stated, “You are gay.” Compl. at 6. Mendenhall denies making this 

comment. Plaintiff alleges that a few days later on December 3, 2011, Mendenhall was again 

working in plaintiff’s section and loudly stated, “Yeah your gay! I know you are!” Compl. at 7. 

Plaintiff states that other inmates heard the exchange and he has included an affidavit from another 

inmate. Opposition, Ex. A. Plaintiff alleges that Mendenhall made this comment after he refused 

to provide information regarding an upcoming hunger strike. Compl. at 6-7. Mendenhall denies 

asking plaintiff about a hunger strike or making any comments about his sexuality. Decl. 

Mendenhall ¶ 3.

Plaintiff alleges that other inmates made inappropriate remarks and threatened to harm him 

as a result of Mendenhall’s statements. Opposition at 4. However, there are no allegations that 

plaintiff was ever harmed as a result of this or that plaintiff requested a transfer to a different 

prison, a transfer to a different section of PBSP, or to be placed in protective custody.

On December 4, 2011, Mendenhall conducted a random search of plaintiff’s cell for 

contraband and confiscated state-issued food, paper towels, plastic bags, string, altered ear buds 

and nonprescription medications from the clinic. Decl. Mendenhall ¶ 3. These objects were 

confiscated because they can be used to make weapons or alcohol. Id. ¶ 4. 

On December 5, 2011, plaintiff was upset and approached defendant correctional officer 

Brewer to speak with him about the search of his cell and removal of certain items. Decl. Brewer

¶ 2. Brewer responded that the day before had been his day off and he had no control over what 

cells were searched on his day off. Id. Brewer noted that plaintiff seemed agitated and then 

plaintiff abruptly returned to his cell. Id. Brewer wrote a note to other staff that stated plaintiff 

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was acting paranoid, agitated and irrational. Decl. Brewer ¶ 3. Later the same day, Brewer 

noticed that plaintiff seemed to act in a withdrawn and despondent manner. Id. ¶ 4. On December 

6, 2011, Brewer completed a referral for mental health services regarding plaintiff. Id. When 

Brewer made the mental health referral he was not aware that plaintiff had filed a grievance 

against Mendenhall. Id. ¶ 5.

Several months later, on May 1, 2012, Brewer searched plaintiff’s cell as part of a random 

search. Id. ¶ 7. Brewer discovered multiple pieces of a torn state-issued shirt, which is a violation 

of California Prison Regulations as a destruction of property. Id. Inmates tear up clothing or 

mattresses so they can make string, commonly known as “fish-lines,” to pass contraband between 

cells. Id. ¶ 8. Brewer states that referring plaintiff to mental health services and writing him up 

for the torn shirt were not in retaliation for the grievance against Mendenhall. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff 

argues that Brewer took these actions in retaliation for plaintiff’s protected conduct. 

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. See id. 

A court may grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings 

and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 

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(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). 

For purposes of summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

Retaliation

Legal Standard

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 

1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline).

Retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act and 

inconsistency with previous actions, as well as direct evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). However, mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not 

sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment where no evidence that defendants knew about plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that 

defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior lawsuit). A prisoner must at least 

allege that he suffered harm, since harm that is more than minimal will almost always have a 

chilling effect. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 n.11.

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Analysis

Plaintiff’s first retaliation claim asserts that Brewer referred plaintiff to mental health 

services in retaliation for the filing of a grievance against Mendenhall. Defendants argue that the 

referral to mental health services occurred on December 6, 2011, but plaintiff’s grievance was not 

submitted until December 22, 2011. Decl. Bond, Ex. C. Because Brewer was unaware of the 

grievance which had yet to be filed, his referral could not have been in retaliation. In his 

opposition, plaintiff does not contest that the grievance was filed after the referral to mental health. 

Opposition at 8-9. Plaintiff changes his argument and states that Brewer’s action was in 

retaliation not for the Mendenhall grievance but due to plaintiff filing fifteen other grievances. 

Opposition at 9. While the record does reflect that plaintiff has filed many grievances, plaintiff 

provides no support for his general allegation that the referral was in retaliation for any of these 

grievances. His mere speculation with no support is insufficient. Wood, 753 F.3d at 904. 

Even assuming that plaintiff could link his protected conduct to the referral to mental 

health, he has failed to show that he suffered harm from the referral or that it did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Based on plaintiff’s exhibits, as a result of the referral a 

doctor came to plaintiff’s cell to speak with him. Opposition, Ex. G. Plaintiff refused to speak 

with the doctor, which the doctor indicated was plaintiff’s right and plaintiff only asked him who 

had made the referral. Id. The doctor left but still reviewed plaintiff’s records. He found no 

serious issues and no further action was taken. Id. There does not appear to be any harm here to 

plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that he was at risk of being committed to the psychiatric unit and that if 

other inmates think he is under psychiatric care he is vulnerable to assault. Plaintiff provides no 

support for these allegations, but even if he did suffer harm, it is clear that Brewer’s referral 

reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff was not committed to the psychiatric 

unit by the referral; rather, a doctor attempted to speak with him and then reviewed his prison 

record. A doctor briefly speaking to a prisoner regarding his mental health reasonably advances a 

legitimate correctional goal of monitoring a prisoner’s health.

Plaintiff alleges that the violation report for plaintiff’s torn shirt was in retaliation for 

plaintiff’s December 2011 grievance against Mendenhall. Though, Brewer was only responsible 

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for performing searches on November 8, 2011, December 27, 2011, and March 16, 2012. Id. 

Plaintiff has not met his burden in showing that Brewer issued the May 5, 2012, rules violation 

report in retaliation due to Brewer finding out about the December 2011, grievance. Based on 

plaintiff’s own allegations, Brewer was aware of the grievance during the March 16, 2012, search 

and was perhaps aware of the grievance during the December 27, 2011, search, but did not issue a 

rules violation report on those occasions. 2 This contradicts plaintiff’s argument that the rules 

violation report was only issued after Brewer became aware of the grievance. Plaintiff argues that 

on April 23, 2011, November 8, 2011, December 27, 2011, and March 16, 2012, officers found 

contraband in his cell but did not issue rules violation reports. Opposition at 10, Ex. H. He 

contends that Brewer issued the rules violation report on May 5, 2012, in retaliation for his 

grievance. But plaintiff does not point to any facts showing that the May rules violation report 

was in retaliation for a grievance filed five months earlier. In addition, it is undisputed that the 

May violation report advanced a legitimate correctional goal of confiscating contraband. While 

plaintiff was not disciplined prior to this occasion, the record reflects that he was continually in 

violation of prison rules. Plaintiff’s speculation is insufficient to defeat summary judgment, 

therefore defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted for this claim. 

Deliberate Indifference to Safety

Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, 

prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. 

at 833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to 

protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates 

the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, 

 

2

The exact date that Brewer became aware of the Mendenhall grievance is unknown. The 

grievance against Mendenhall was submitted on December 22, 2011. Decl. Bond, Ex. C. Plaintiff 

states in his opposition that Brewer was aware of the Mendenhall grievance on January 16, 2012. 

Opposition at 11. However, plaintiff is erroneously referencing Brewer’s declaration where he 

states when he was aware of plaintiff’s grievance against him for the mental health referral. Decl. 

Brewer ¶ 6. 

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objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent 

to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040-41.

A prisoner need not wait until he is actually assaulted to state a claim and obtain 

preventative relief. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845; see also Gonzalez v. CDCR, 739 F.3d 1226,

1235 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding standing to bring 8th Amendment challenge to prison’s gang 

debriefing process, even though prisoner had not yet debriefed, where he alleged risk of retaliation 

from other gang members). If the court finds the Eighth Amendment’s objective and subjective 

requirements satisfied, it may grant appropriate relief. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845-46. But cf. 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (requiring physical injury in order to bring claim for mental or emotional 

injury).

Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other 

grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). This is so even if the verbal 

harassment is racially motivated. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(federal court cannot order guards to refrain from using racial slurs to harass prisoners). However, 

in some circumstances, a prison official may create a serious risk of irreparable harm, and thus 

violate the Eighth Amendment, by giving other inmates reason to believe that a particular inmate 

is gay. Radillo v. Lunes, 2008 WL 4209824, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008); see also Valandingham 

v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.1989) (deliberately spreading rumor that prisoner is 

snitch may state claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in state custody). 

However, “speculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to 

a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm.” Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App’x. 670, 671 (9th 

Cir. 2007).

Analysis

For purposes of this motion for summary judgment, the Court assumes that on one 

occasion Mendenhall referred to plaintiff’s gray hair and on two occasions stated that he was gay 

so other inmates could hear. See Leslie, 198 F.3d at 1158. The issue then is whether two 

references to plaintiff’s sexuality violated the Eighth Amendment.

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It is undisputed that plaintiff was not harmed and never requested protective custody or to 

be transferred as a result of Mendenhall’s statements. Plaintiff alleges that other inmates made 

disparaging remarks about harming him. But allegations of verbal harassment and abuse by 

guards fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While in some instances 

deliberately spreading a rumor about a prisoner may state a claim for violating the right to be 

protected from violence, the facts of this case do not reach that threshold. Summary judgment is 

proper for defendants because there is no dispute as to any material fact and they are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.

In Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, the facts involved defendants calling the 

prisoner a “snitch”, and the prisoner was assaulted on two separate occasions. Valandingham v. 

Moen, 963 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1992). In Radillo v. Lunes, 2008 WL 4209824, the prisoner was a 

member of the Mexican Mafia prison gang and there were undisputed facts that the Mexican 

Mafia does not tolerate homosexual behavior. Id. at *2. While the plaintiff in Radillo was not 

assaulted, the defendant spread rumors that he was gay and there was evidence that the defendant 

knew the rumors would be dangerous for plaintiff and that plaintiff would be continually exposed 

to Mexican Mafia members. Id. 

The plaintiffs in the above two cases demonstrated more than “speculative and generalized 

fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners . . . . ” Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App’x. at 671. In 

this case, plaintiff merely presents conclusory allegations that he was in danger but does not 

provide any evidence in support of the allegations. Nor did plaintiff attempt to be moved to a 

different prison or even a different part of the facility. Defendants have met their burden, but 

plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in showing there is a genuine issue for trial regarding the 

Eighth Amendment.3

 

3

In Williams v. Paramo, No. 13-56004, slip op. 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2015), the plaintiff was a 

transgender prisoner who alleged that defendants started rumors she was a convicted sex offender

and prison officials added an “R” suffix to her prison record, which denotes a history of sex 

offenses. She also alleged that members of the Two-Five prison gang threatened her and that 

defendants ignored her requests for help. The Ninth Circuit found that based on these facts, 

plaintiff had demonstrated imminent danger pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) to proceed in forma 

pauperis. Id. The facts of the instant case do not rise to the level reached in Williams.

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While the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner need not wait to be assaulted before 

obtaining relief, see Farmer at 845, the Court was describing injunctive relief and a request to 

remedy a dangerous condition. Id. In this case plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief to be 

moved or placed in protective custody; rather, he seeks money damages due to the possibility of 

an assault that has not occurred. Compl. at 3. Plaintiff has not suffered any physical injury, yet 

seeks punitive and compensatory relief, presumably for emotional injuries. However, “[n]o 

Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional 

facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 

physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).4 For all these reasons, summary judgment is granted 

regarding the Eighth Amendment claim.5 

II. CONCLUSION

1. The motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 36) is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

 

4

To the extent plaintiff seeks declaratory relief or nominal or punitive damages that would not be 

foreclosed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), summary judgment is still granted for defendants because the 

speculative fear of assault does not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm as 

described above.

5 Because the Court has granted summary judgment and not found a constitutional violation, the 

motion to dismiss and qualified immunity argument will not be addressed.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. BREWER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-00515-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on 3/23/2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing 

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle 

located in the Clerk's office.

Jose Luis Martinez ID: E-51644

Pelican Bay State Prison

P O Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532 

Dated: 3/23/2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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