Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02529/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02529-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ROBLES,

Petitioner,

 vs.

J. SOLIS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 04-2529 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") decision of May

2, 2003 finding him not suitable for parole. 

Per order filed on October 22, 2004, the court found that the petition

appeared to state a cognizable due process claim under § 2254, when liberally

construed, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer to the order to show cause

and petitioner filed a traverse. Respondent later filed a supplemental answer, and

petitioner filed a supplemental traverse.

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BACKGROUND

On October 24, 1990, petitioner was convicted of attempted murder in the

Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles

and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of seven years to life. 

Petitioner was found not suitable for parole the first four times he

appeared before the BPT. On May 2, 2003, petitioner appeared before the BPT

for the fifth time. The BPT again found him not suitable for parole. 

Petitioner challenged the BPT's May 2, 2003 decision in the state superior,

appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California denied his

final state habeas petition on June 9, 2004, the instant federal petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the

claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

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Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Legal Claims

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's May 2, 2003

decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

hearing for one year, on the ground that the decision does not comport with due

process. Petitioner claims that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious" and

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not supported by the evidence. He argues that the BPT's continued reliance on

his committing offense and other unchanging factors violates due process.

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the parole scheme set forth in section 3041

and accompanying regulations “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 

It matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with

15-to-life sentence implicated prisoner’s liberty interest).

Respondent argues that the Ninth Circuit's holdings in McQuillon and

Biggs no longer control because the Supreme Court of California since held in In

re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), that the language of section 3041 is not

mandatory and, therefore, California inmates cannot have a liberty interest in

early release on parole that is protected by federal due process. Unfortunately for

respondent, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected their no-liberty-interest argument

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and made clear that "California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in

parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005)." Sass v. California Bd.

of Prison Terms, No. 05-16455, slip op. 10563, 10566 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2006). 

It also held that the "some evidence" standard identified in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445 (1985), is clearly established federal law in the parole context for

AEDPA purposes. Id. at 10572-73. 

Due process requires that "some evidence" support the parole board's

decision not to release the prisoner. Id. (holding that Hill, which required “some

evidence” to support revocation of inmate's good-time credits, applies to

decisions to deny parole reviewed in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at

915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d at 904 (same); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). The "some evidence"

standard is minimally stringent: The "Due Process Clause does not require courts

to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact." Hill,

472 U.S. at 456 (emphasis added). The relevant question for the court is

"whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the [BPT]." Id. at 455-56. The court "cannot reweigh the evidence;"

it only looks "to see if 'some evidence' supports the BPT's decision." Powell v.

Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994).

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek, 833 F.3d at 1390. Relevant in this inquiry is whether

the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence

to, the board. See Pedro v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.

1987); see also Morales v. California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005

(9th Cir. 1994) (court may consider whether a prisoner's allegations of any

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violations by the board are of a "minor" nature, whether they are supported in

fact, whether the prisoner had an opportunity to participate, and whether he took

full advantage of that opportunity), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995).

In sum, if the parole board's determination of parole unsuitability is to

satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability,

to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, the record shows that on May 2, 2003, petitioner appeared with

counsel before a BPT panel for a subsequent parole consideration hearing. It was

petitioner's fifth appearance before the BPT. The presiding commissioner

explained that in assessing suitability for parole the panel would consider

petitioner's commitment offense, prior criminal and social history, and his

programming and behavior since commitment, including progress since

petitioner's last hearing, any new psychiatric reports and any other information

that may have a bearing on parole suitability. Accord Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(b) (setting out factors to be considered in determining suitability for

parole). The commissioner also explained that the panel had reviewed

petitioner’s central file and prior transcripts, that it would afford petitioner an

opportunity to make corrections to the record, and that petitioner would be given

an opportunity to make a final statement regarding parole suitability. 

The panel then discussed with petitioner the evidence relevant to each of

the factors to be considered in determining his suitability for parole, and provided

him with ample opportunity to be heard on every issue. The panel also heard

final statements from a deputy district attorney and petitioner’s attorney.

The panel recessed to deliberate and, after the hearing resumed, found that

petitioner was “not suitable for parole" and "would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison at this time.” May 2, 2003 Hr’g Tr. at

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51 (Resp’t Ex B). The panel explained that it had considered all relevant

evidence and concluded that the factors suggesting unsuitability outweighed

those suggesting suitability. 

The panel found that the commitment offense was carried out in a "cruel

and callous manner with a disregard for human suffering." Id. at 52. Petitioner

and his fellow gang members brutally attacked a rival gang member in a public

park and restaurant. They hit and kicked the victim repeatedly, petitioner kicking

him at least twice, before one of petitioner's fellow gang members shot the victim

twice in the back, causing him serious injuries. The panel also found that

petitioner has an unstable social history and prior "criminality," including a street

gang lifestyle that resulted in multiple juvenile arrests for offenses such as

spraying graffitti, possession of a knife in school and stealing a car. Id. at 52-53. 

He was on probation at the time of the commitment offense. Id. at 53. 

The panel found that although petitioner has "done well while

incarcerated," he recently had been cited for a 115 administrative violation for

disobeying a direct order. Id. On December 25, 2001, during a visit from a

friend, petitioner was ordered to refrain from physical contact. He nonetheless

hugged the friend and was charged with a disobeying a direct order. 

The panel commended petitioner for getting his parole plans in "good

order," acquiring his GED, doing "some work with college courses" and taking

part in "self-help" groups. Id. at 53, 54. However, it made clear that in its

judgment "these positive aspects of your behavior do not outweigh the factors –

the factors of unsuitability." Id. at 54. The panel encouraged petitioner to stay on

the right track: "[I]f you stay on that track, if you refrain from getting 115s, there

may be a parole date in the future." Id.

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The state courts denied petitioner's request for state habeas relief from the

BPT's determination that he was not suitable for parole.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because the state courts'

rejection of his federal claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 USC § 2254(d). The BPT’s May 2,

2003 decision to deny petitioner parole after his fifth parole consideration hearing

is supported by some evidence in the record and that evidence bears some indicia

of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole

based on gravity of offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916

(upholding denial of parole based solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior

to imprisonment); Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on

criminal history, cruel nature of offense, and need for further psychiatric

treatment). Petitioner’s disagreement with the BPT’s assessment of the evidence

does not compel a different result. Our inquiry here is simply "whether there is

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

[BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). There is – the attempted

murder offense was cruel and callous; petitioner has a prior criminal history that

includes several arrests for gang-related criminal activity; and petitioner suffered

a recent prison disciplinary violation. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) &

(d) (listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and

circumstances tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh

the evidence." Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner claims that the BPT's continued reliance on his committing

offense and prior criminal history violates his due process rights. But even if

petitioner's 2001 prison disciplinary violation did not in of itself constitute "some

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evidence," the Ninth Circuit recently made clear that evidence of a prisoner's

"prior offenses and the gravity of his convicted offense[]" may "constitute some

evidence to support the [BPT's] decision." Sass, slip op. at 10573. It simply

cannot be said that in "making a judgment call based on evidence of preconviction recidivism and the nature of the conviction offense," the BPT acted

"arbitrarily." Id. 

 The court is satisfied that the BPT gave petitioner individualized

consideration and that there is “some evidence” in the record to support the

panel's decision to deny petitioner parole after the May 2, 2003 subsequent

hearing. It simply cannot be said that the state courts' rejection of petitioner’s

challenge to the BPT’s May 2, 2003 decision was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or that

it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); Sass, slip op. at 10573-74. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief. 

 CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 11, 2006 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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