Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07126/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 21, 2013 Decided July 12, 2013

Unsealed August 7, 2013

No. 11-7126

LEOLA SMITH,

APPELLANT

v.

CATHY L. LANIER, CHIEF, METROPOLITAN POLICE 

DEPARTMENT - IN HER PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, ET 

AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-00808)

James R. Klimaski argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were John P. Racin and Lynn I. Miller.

James C. McKay Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor 

General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General. 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 1 of 8
Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: After the Metropolitan Police 

Department searched Leola Smith’s house and found no 

illegal drugs, she sued the Chief of Police and others, alleging 

that an MPD officer lied in the affidavit used to procure the 

search warrant. The district court, finding that Smith failed to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the affidavit’s 

veracity, granted summary judgment to defendants. We 

affirm. 

I.

On July 13, 2007, MPD Officer Thomas Ellingsworth 

submitted an affidavit to a D.C. Superior Court Judge seeking 

a warrant to search appellant Leola Smith’s property at 1812 

9th Street NW, Washington, D.C. In the affidavit, 

Ellingsworth stated that an MPD confidential informant 

(“CI”) had carried out a controlled drug buy at Smith’s 

property. According to Ellingsworth, a CI contacted him 

“[w]ithin the past seventy-two hours . . . in reference to illegal 

drug activity occurring within the premises known as 1812 

9th Street NW, Washington D.C.” The CI advised 

Ellingsworth that “individuals are selling crack cocaine from 

within the residence.” Ellingsworth then “provided the CI 

with Metropolitan Police Department funds and dropped [the 

CI] off” near Smith’s property. “Once inside the building the 

CI advised that [the CI] knocked on the house door and an 

unknown subject answered.” The CI advised the individual of 

the CI’s “intention to purchase a quantity of cocaine,” entered 

the house, and “handed that individual the MPD funds in 

exchange for crack cocaine.” After leaving the premises, the 

CI “handed the M.P.D. officer a piece of white paper which 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 2 of 8
contained a loose white rock like substance, a portion of 

which field tested positive for cocaine base.” 

Based on Ellingsworth’s affidavit, the Superior Court 

Judge approved the warrant application, and on July 14 

Ellingsworth and other MPD officers conducted a search of 

Smith’s residence. The search yielded no illegal drugs. 

Smith, along with Dion Franklin, another person living at 

the property, then filed suit in the United States District Court 

against Chief of Police Cathy Lanier, the District of 

Columbia, and several MPD officers, alleging, among other 

things, that the search violated their Fourth Amendment 

rights. Specifically, they alleged that Ellingsworth lied when 

he stated in his affidavit that a CI had carried out a controlled 

drug buy at the property. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88–94.

Defendants subsequently moved for a protective order to 

limit discovery regarding the CI, invoking the “informer’s 

privilege,” which permits the government “to withhold from 

disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of 

violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that 

law.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). 

Finding the informer’s privilege applicable and concluding 

that no exception was warranted, the district court granted 

defendants’ motion for a protective order. 

At some point during discovery, Smith’s lawyer learned 

that the MPD was unable to locate the file for the CI who 

allegedly participated in the controlled buy. Apparently as a 

result, the district court ordered defense counsel to “submit an 

ex parte affidavit attesting to counsel’s efforts to meet with 

the confidential informant, the results of such a meeting,” and 

“the substance of what [counsel] has learned, if anything, 

from the confidential informant” about the events related to 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 3 of 8
the controlled drug buy. The district court also directed 

counsel to file a public affidavit “attesting to the scope and 

results of the search made for relevant documents, including 

but not limited to: the originals of documents already 

produced; any documents or records reflecting or relating to 

the controlled buy and any drugs allegedly bought by the 

confidential informant.” 

Pursuant to this order, counsel filed sealed and ex parte

declarations by three MPD officers, including Inspector Brian 

Bray. At a status conference the next day, the district court 

informed Smith’s counsel of the ex parte declarations and 

explained that Inspector Bray “showed me the file that is 

approximately five, six inches thick regarding the C.I. in this 

case. This file covers many years. And it is my information 

and I have every reason to believe it is correct that this is an 

active C.I.” The district court added, however, that “I think 

it’s fair to say that . . . the documents that this investigator has 

reviewed do not relate specifically to” the date of the 

controlled drug buy. According to the district court, Inspector 

Bray had “personally searched the file and has nothing to 

produce regarding this particular transaction”; the file “has 

not a piece of paper based on his search” related to the date of 

the controlled drug buy. 

Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, 

and the district court granted the motion in part and denied it 

in part. Smith v. Lanier, 779 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2011). 

With respect to the claim that Ellingsworth lied in his 

affidavit regarding the controlled drug buy, the district court 

found that plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Id. at 

86. According to the court, plaintiffs had “submitted no 

affirmative evidence that Ellingsworth concocted a fake 

informant”; instead, “the only ‘evidence’ plaintiffs have 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 4 of 8
introduced to support this claim is based on speculation and 

innuendo.” Id. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument

that “the absence of police records relating to the informant 

creates a genuine question as to whether the informant ever 

existed,” explaining that plaintiffs “provided no case law 

suggesting that missing police records alone are sufficient to 

transform the existence of a CI into a genuine question of 

fact.” Id. In addition, the court noted that “[a]lthough 

defendants concede that the working file and unit file relating 

to the CI are missing,” they had “produced documentation 

showing that a CI performed a controlled drug buy at the 

Property,” including documents demonstrating “that a white 

rock substance was obtained by the CI as a result of the 

controlled buy.” Id. at 86 n.5. 

Although the district court found that plaintiffs had 

“failed to place any material fact as to the informant’s 

existence into dispute,” it explained that it had “[n]evertheless 

. . . reviewed the affidavits submitted by defendants ex parte

and the (ample) documentation of the controlled buy, and has 

conducted an in camera hearing to make sure the informant 

indeed existed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Having considered all this evidence,” the court concluded 

that “plaintiffs’ unsupported allegations do not create an issue 

of material fact.” Id.

The district court also granted summary judgment to 

defendants on the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims, with the 

exception of Franklin’s unreasonable search claim and both 

plaintiffs’ intentional tortious destruction of property claims, 

which proceeded to trial. Id. at 90, 93. During the trial, the 

district court granted defendants’ oral motion to dismiss the 

destruction of property claims. The trial proceeded on 

Franklin’s unreasonable search claim, and the jury returned a 

verdict in his favor. 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 5 of 8
Smith alone now appeals, challenging only the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on her claim that 

Ellingsworth lied in his affidavit regarding the controlled drug 

buy. “We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo and may affirm only if, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to [Smith] and giving 

[her] the benefit of all permissible inferences, we conclude 

that no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in [her] favor.” 

Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

II.

Smith first argues that the district court improperly relied 

on ex parte, in camera evidence to grant summary judgment 

in favor of defendants. In support, she invokes “ ‘the firmly 

held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a 

case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.’ ” 

Appellant’s Br. 18 (quoting Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 

1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). For their part, defendants argue

that we need not determine whether the district court properly 

relied on ex parte evidence because summary judgment would 

have been appropriate even without taking the ex parte

evidence into account. Given that our review is de novo and 

that “we can affirm a district court judgment on any basis 

supported by the record,” Carney v. American University, 151 

F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we begin with that 

question.

Smith contends that the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment was inappropriate because the MPD’s inability to 

find records documenting the CI’s participation in the alleged 

drug buy creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Ellingsworth lied in his affidavit about the occurrence of the 

buy. But even if the absence of these documents gives rise to 

an inference in Smith’s favor, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(7);

Stevenson v. Linens of the Week, 688 F.2d 93, 98–99 (D.C. 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 6 of 8
Cir. 1982) (explaining “the principle that the absence of an 

entry in a business record is probative of the non-occurrence 

of the event in question”), this inference is insufficient to 

survive summary judgment because other record evidence—

not including the ex parte affidavits—demonstrates that a 

controlled drug buy did in fact take place at Smith’s 

residence. Specifically, the record contains a photocopy of a 

heat seal bag used to contain contraband that states that

Ellingsworth seized “white paper containing white rock” on 

July 11, 2007 from “1812 9th St. NW,” Smith’s address. By 

corroborating Ellingsworth’s claim that drugs were in fact 

recovered from Smith’s property within seventy-two hours of 

July 13, 2007, this record negates any inference arising from 

the missing CI documents.

Instead of attacking the evidentiary force of the heat seal 

bag, Smith points to discrepancies in dates in other MPD 

documents in the record. One of these records—a drug 

property report with an affixed index card—states that “white 

piece of paper containing white” [sic] was “recovered in the 

Northwest section of DC” on July 11, 2007 but also indicates 

the evidence being “received by” an Officer Castor on July 

10. Another document—a page from the MPD Property Log 

Book—records Ellingsworth’s recovery of “white paper 

containing white rock” on July 7. According to Smith, these

discrepancies render the two documents unreliable. But even 

assuming this is true, Smith offers no real response to the key 

piece of evidence in the record—the heat seal bag—which 

lists July 11 as the relevant date and accurately records 

Smith’s address. She suggests that the record could have been 

“changed [or] recreated without any difficulty,” Oral Arg. 

Rec. 5:54–5:58, but we have made clear that a “bare 

allegation” of fabrication “does not suffice to create a genuine 

issue as to the authenticity of [a] document.” Ostrzenski v. 

Columbia Hospital for Women Foundation, Inc., 158 F.3d 

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 7 of 8
1289, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Thus, given the heat seal bag’s 

corroboration of the occurrence of a drug buy at Smith’s 

property, and given Smith’s failure to proffer evidence 

undermining the evidentiary force of this record, Smith’s 

reliance on inconsistencies among other police records is 

insufficient to identify a material issue of disputed fact.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

 So ordered.

USCA Case #11-7126 Document #1450357 Filed: 08/07/2013 Page 8 of 8