Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02911/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02911-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP J. SEILER,

Petitioner,

 v.

J. BROWN, Warden, 

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2911 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Phillip Seiler filed a petition in this court for a writ of habeas corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent J. Brown, Warden, to show

cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and a

memorandum of points and authorities in support of it and lodged exhibits with the court. 

Respondent also filed a motion to dismiss, which this court denied. Petitioner filed a

traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, who is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation at California State Prison, San Quentin, pled guilty in 1989 to a charge of

second degree murder with special enhancements, a violation of California Penal Code

sections 187 and 12022.5, for shooting and killing his wife’s lover in 1988. See

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition (“Pet. Mem.”) at 1. The trial

court sentenced him to fifteen years to life, with a two-year enhancement for use of a

firearm. Id. In 2003, he was found suitable for parole and granted parole by the Board of

Prison Terms (“BPT”), a decision the Governor of California reversed. Id. at 2. Petitioner

challenged the validity of the reversal in state habeas petitions, later denied, that he filed

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with the Marin County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the Supreme

Court of California. Petition at 6-7. Petitioner again challenges the validity of the

Governor's decision in the present petition. Pet. Mem. at 3-4. 

Petitioner asserts three claims: (a) the Governor’s reversal violated his plea

agreement; (b) the Governor’s power to review the BPT’s decision violates the ex post

facto clause of the United States and California Constitutions; and (c) the Governor’s

reversal of the BPT’s decision violated his constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole

because it was not based on any evidence. Id. at 5. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). A state court decision is an

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 Petitioner raises two more contentions under this claim, specifically that there is an ex

post facto violation and that his plea may not have been voluntary. See Pet. Mem. at 9, 10-11.

The ex post facto claim is dealt with in the subsequent section of this order. As to the

contention that his plea may not have been voluntary, the court finds that such a contention

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“unreasonable application” of Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of §

2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's

decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” See

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 413. 

A reviewing federal court may not issue the writ “simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-1092 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the

highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned

opinion, in this case the superior court’s denial of petitioner’s state habeas petition. See

Ylst at 801-806; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

On November 8, 1988 “California voters approved Proposition 89, which added

Section 8(b) to Article V of the California Constitution to provide for review [of parole board

decisions] by the governor.” Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1996). 

DISCUSSION

A. The Governor’s Decision Did Not Violate the Plea Agreement

1. Background

Petitioner contends that the Governor’s reversal of the BPT’s decision violates his

plea agreement because it impairs “vested rights acquired under prevailing law existing at

the time he committed his crime...attaching an unanticipated disability to his negotiated

plea and subsequent sentence.” Pet. Mem. at 9.1

 

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goes to the validity of petitioner’s plea, which is not an issue appropriately raised in a petition

attacking the denial of parole. Such a contention would have to be raised in a separate petition

directed toward his conviction. 

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2. Applicable Federal Law

A defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of his plea agreement. 

See Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). When a guilty plea

“rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can

be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” 

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that California contracts, including plea

agreements, are “deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the

reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws.” Davis v. Woodford,

446 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting People v. Gipson (In re Gipson), 117 Cal. App.

4th 1065, 1070 (2004)). 

3. Analysis

Davis controls. The Ninth Circuit has deemed that a California contract, such as

petitioner’s plea agreement, incorporates and contemplates the reserve power of the state

to amend the law, such as when the voters added Article V, section 8(b) to the California

Constitution. Inherent in the agreement is, therefore, a recognition of the state’s power, to

change the final decision-maker from the BPT to the Governor. (Whether the use of this

power is otherwise constitutionally sound is addressed below.) Thus the State cannot be

said to violate a plea agreement when it acts in accordance with a new law that is

necessarily incorporated into the agreement. Moreover, petitioner has advanced no

evidence or argument that either the prosecutor or the trial court made any promises to him

with respect to parole. In other words, there is no evidence that parole was even part of the

plea agreement. Thus the court finds no merit in petitioner’s contention that his plea

agreement was breached. Accordingly, habeas relief is denied on this claim. 

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B. The Governor’s Decision Does Not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause

1. Background

Petitioner contends that at the time he pled guilty the BPT was the “sole entity

authorized to determine when a convicted murder [sic] would be released.” Pet. Mem. at

13. Petitioner contends that the Governor’s “clearly retroactive application of that power

against Petitioner has prolonged his incarceration” and therefore violates the “constitutional

bar against ex post facto application of law.” Id. at 12. The court notes that Article V,

section 8(b) of the California Constitution, which grants the Governor power to review,

modify and reverse decisions of the Board of Prison Terms, was adopted after petitioner

committed his commitment offense. 

2. Applicable Federal Law

Application of the ex post facto clause, according to the Supreme Court, is limited to

criminal legislation that effects an increase in punishment, criminalizes conduct that was

not previously criminal, or requires more proof for conviction of an offense than was

previously required. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990), citing Calder v.

Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798). In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S.

499 (1995), the Court stated that without evidence that the new law substantively changed

the definition of criminal conduct or altered the standards of parole eligibility, it created “only

the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment.” Id. at

514. 

The Ninth Circuit, in Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1996), a case factually

similar to the instant case, rejected the contention that the California Governor’s reversal of

a grant of parole by the BPT violated the ex post facto clause. The appellate panel ruled

that by merely adding a stage of review the law remained “neutral” rather than invidious:

In this case, Johnson is similarly unable to demonstrate that an increase in

his punishment actually occurred, because, like the petitioner in Morales, he had not

been granted parole under the old law. Morales, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1600.

Under the old law, the BPT’s decision would have been subjected to no review.

Johnson’s case is like Dobbert, where the petitioner could only speculate whether

the jury would have imposed a life sentence had it possessed the final power to

decide. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294 & n. 7, 97 S.Ct. at 2299 & n. 7. Here, because the

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BPT’s parole decision is not final until after the expiration of the thirty-day

gubernatorial review period, it cannot be said with certainty that the BPT would have

granted Johnson parole had it possessed the final review authority.

Johnson argues that, unlike the administrative convenience purpose of the

law in Morales, the purpose and effect of the law here is to lengthen prison terms by

making it more difficult for convicted murderers with indeterminate sentences to be

released on parole. However, the law itself is neutral inasmuch as it gives the

governor power to either affirm or reverse a BPT’s granting or denial of parole.

Moreover, the governor must use the same criteria as the BPT. The law, therefore,

simply removes final parole decisionmaking authority from the BPT and places

it in the hands of the governor. We cannot materially distinguish this change in the

law from that at issue in Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. at 590, 21 S.Ct. at 731.

In Mallett, the Court found no ex post facto violation where the new law allowed for

higher court review of intermediate court decisions, even though the petitioner would

have been entitled to a final intermediate court decision at the time of his crime. Id.

at 597, 21 S.Ct. at 733. We therefore conclude that the application of Proposition 89

to authorize the governor’s review of Johnson’s grant of parole did not violate the Ex

Post Facto Clause.

Id. at 967. 

In Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), decided after Johnson, the Supreme Court

addressed an inmate’s as-applied constitutional challenge to “the retroactive application of

a Georgia law permitting the extension of intervals between parole considerations.” Id. at

246. The Court declared that the “standard announced in [California Department of

Corrections v.] Morales [514 U.S. 499 (1995)] requires a more rigorous analysis of the level

of risk created by the change in the law,” rather than mere speculation: “We do not accept

the Court of Appeals’ supposition that the [new law] ‘seems certain’ to result in some

prisoners serving extended periods of incarceration.” Id. at 255. The Supreme Court

stated that the relevant inquiry is that “[w]hen the rule does not by its own terms show a

significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s

practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its

retroactive application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the earlier

rule.” Id. 

The statute at issue in Garner vested the Parole Board with discretion to set an

inmate’s parole reconsideration hearing date and the power to permit expedited parole

reviews if the circumstances warrant. See id. at 254. “These qualifications,” the Court

found, “permit a more careful and accurate exercise of the discretion the Board has had

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from the outset.” Id. at 254. In evaluating whether the Board’s use of its discretion was

constitutionally permissible, the Court criticized the Court of Appeals for not considering the

Board’s internal policy statements which can provide “important instruction as to how the

Board interprets its enabling statute ... and therefore whether, as a matter of fact, the

amendment to the ... [statute] created a significant risk of increased punishment.” Id. at

256. “Absent a demonstration to the contrary, we presume the Board follows its statutory

commands and internal policies in enforcing its obligations.” Id. at 256. 

3. Analysis

Petitioner’s claim fails under Johnson and Garner. Petitioner’s contentions mirror

those rejected in Johnson. Because the Governor’s review is based on the same criteria

and record used by the BPT, the layer of review itself is neutral. Petitioner can only

speculate whether the BPT, had it had the final decision-making power, would have

granted parole. Like the inmate in Johnson, because he had not been granted parole

under the old law, petitioner cannot demonstrate that an increase in punishment occurred. 

Petitioner’s claim also fails under Garner’s as-applied test. Garner directs this court

to first examine whether the change is facially unconstitutional. As discussed in the

preceding paragraph, because it leaves untouched the standards by which parole eligibility

is determined, the law at issue in the present petition does not violate the ex post facto

clause. 

Next, Garner directs this court to determine whether petitioner has shown that there

is a significant risk that the rule’s practical application will result in increasing the period of

incarceration. Petitioner has not overcome the presumption that the Governor followed the

“statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling [his] obligations.” Garner, 529 U.S. at

256. He has said that the “governor[’s] ... tough on crime political stance ... [has] result[ed]

in the reversal of all but eight (8) out of approximately three hundred and fifty (350) findings

of parole suitability by the Board of Prison Terms.” Pet. Mem. at 8. However startling this

evidence may be, this high reversal rate does not show with specific facts and details that

in petitioner’s case the Governor did not follow the statutory commands and internal

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policies in fulfilling his obligation to review decisions of the BPT. 

For the foregoing reasons, habeas relief for this claim is DENIED. 

C. The Governor's Decision is Supported by Some Evidence

1. Background

Petitioner contends that “[a]bsent a tangible demonstration that he currently poses

an unreasonable risk to public safety the Governor fails to meet the ‘some evidence’

standard.” Pet. Mem. at 17.

2. Applicable Federal Law

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the

record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007)

(applying “some evidence” standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904

(9th Cir. 2002). The evidence underlying the Board’s decision must also have “some

indicia of reliability.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some

evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established federal law in the parole context for

purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-1129 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is met “does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence

in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472

U.S. at 455; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal, and assures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at

457). 

The Governor does not have unfettered discretion, but rather “may only affirm,

modify, or reverse the decision of the parole authority on the basis of the same factors

which the parole authority is required to consider.” California Constitution, Article V, section

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8(b). 

3. Analysis

The Governor, though he noted that petitioner had made significant positive

progress in prison, reversed the parole grant, stating that, “Mr. Seiler would pose an

unreasonable risk to public safety if released at this time.” Pet. Mem., Ex. C at 4. The

stated reasons for the reversal were the gravity of petitioner’s commitment offense, which

demonstrates an “exceptional indifference to human suffering,” petitioner’s “unstable social

history,” which included early drug use, petitioner's misconduct reports, and the opposition

of the district attorney and the police department to petitioner’s release. Pet. Mem., Ex. C

at 3. Petitioner disputes the significance and weight the Governor attached to these

factors, including the number and importance of the misconduct reports. Pet. Mem. at 19,

27. 

a. Commitment Offense

Petitioner contends that the “facts of the crime, in particular, its unplanned,

spontaneous nature, do not support the Governor’s unilateral finding that Petitioner’s

actions demonstrate exceptional indifference to human suffering.” Id. at 22. 

The Governor described the commitment offense thus: “Angry and jealous, Mr.

Seiler flew into a rage when he saw his estranged wife with [the victim] Mr. Horner. He

pursued them and ran his van into their car, thereby endangering their lives. When Mr.

Seiler confronted Mr. Horner, he pointed a 12-gauge shotgun and fired at point blank

range, killing him instantly.” Pet. Mem., Ex. C at 3. 

The Governor may consider the gravity of the commitment offense in assessing an

inmate’s suitability for parole. See Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b). The commitment offense

may be a circumstance indicating unsuitability for parole if the “prisoner committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.” Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 2402(c)(1). In determining this, the Governor may consider whether “the offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering,” and “[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

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offense.” Id. 

Recent Ninth Circuit cases reflect that a critical issue in parole denial cases is the

Board’s use of evidence from the commitment offense and prior offenses. In Biggs v.

Terhune, the court explained that the some evidence standard may be considered in light

of the Board’s decisions over time. See 334 F.3d 910, 916-917 (9th Cir. 2003). The court

reasoned that “[t]he Parole Board's decision is one of ‘equity' and requires a careful

balancing and assessment of the factors considered . . . A continued reliance in the future

on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and

could result in a due process violation.” Id. Although the Biggs court upheld the initial

denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner's

conduct before incarceration, the court cautioned that “[o]ver time, however, should Biggs

continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a

parole date simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious questions

involving his liberty interest.” Id. at 916. 

The court in Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.

2006), however, criticized the decision in Biggs: “Under AEDPA it is not our function to

speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Sass

determined that it is not a due process violation per se if the Board determines parole

suitability based solely on the unchanging factors of the commitment offense and prior

offenses. See id. (prisoner’s commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses

amounted to some evidence to support the Board’s denial of parole). However, Sass does

not dispute the argument in Biggs that, over time, a commitment offense may be less

probative of a prisoner's current threat to the public safety. 

Moreover, in the recent Irons decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the continuing

vitality of Biggs. See Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2006). However, the court

found that relief for Irons was precluded by Sass. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that all of

the cases in which it previously held that denying parole based solely on the commitment

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offense comported with due process were ones in which the prisoner had not yet served

the minimum years required by the sentence. Id. at 665. Also, noting that the parole board

in Sass and Irons appeared to give little or no weight to evidence of the prisoner's

rehabilitation, the Ninth Circuit stressed its hope that “the Board will come to recognize that

in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate's commitment offense,

regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given

the liberty interest in parole that flows from relevant California statutes.” Id. (citing Biggs,

334 F.3d at 917). Even so, the Ninth Circuit has not set a standard as to when a complete

reliance on unchanging circumstances would amount to a due process violation. 

The court, having reviewed the record, finds that there was some evidence in the

record to support the Governor’s decision based on the commitment offense. There is no

evidence that petitioner’s wife or Mr. Horner encouraged or deliberately caused petitioner’s

rage. Petitioner shot Mr. Horner even though he had time to consider his actions when he

pursued the pair in his vehicle. From this, the court finds that there was some evidence to

support the conclusion that the manner in which the offense was carried out with an

exceptionally callous disregard for human life. 

Even though petitioner asserts that the Governor ignored the fact that the Board did

carefully consider the commitment offense, this is irrelevant to the constitutional issue. 

Even though the Governor must review the same evidence as the Board, Section 8(b)

allows him to arrive at a different decision than the BPT. This same explanation applies to

petitioner’s contention that the unplanned nature of the crime does not indicate an

exceptional indifference to human life. Section 8(b) allows the Governor to arrive at his

own decision based on the record. 

b. Unstable Social History and Other Parole Suitability Factors

The Governor also relied on petitioner's unstable social history as a factor for

unsuitability. Specifically, the Governor mentioned his use of marijuana starting at age

fourteen – using it twice a month until the commitment offense – his dropping out of high

school, and his trouble making friends owing to frequent changes of residences in his

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youth. Pet. Mem., Ex. C at 3. The Governor also listed petitioner’s seven misconduct

reports, including two “serious reports” in 1991, and the opposition of the Sacramento

District Attorney and the Sacramento City Police Department to his release, citing

petitioner’s “lack of compassion and regard for the law.” Pet. Mem., Ex. at 3. 

Petitioner contends that the Governor’s finding that he has an unstable social history

“is without foundation.” Pet. Mem. at 24. Petitioner asserts that he has maintained contact

with his family and has received letters from former employers offering jobs to petitioner

after his release. Id. Furthermore, petitioner contends that he participated in Narcotics

Anonymous while in prison with favorable results. Id. at 25. Petitioner disputes the

significance and weight the Governor attached to these factors, including the number and

importance of the misconduct reports. Id. at 27. He also contends that the Governor’s

reliance on the opinions of the police department and district attorney does not “comport to

statutorily defined determinations set forth” in the California Penal Code. See id. at 28. 

An unstable social history is listed as a circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability. 

Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15, 2402(c)(3). In addition, circumstances which taken alone that do

not clearly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a

finding of unsuitability: “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be

considered in determining suitability for parole.” Id. at section 2402(b).

The court, having reviewed the record, finds that there was some evidence in the

record to support the Governor’s decision. While the major events of heavy drug use and

inadequate socialization are long past events and while at some point they may cease to

be entitled to much weight, they provide, at this point, some evidence supporting the

Governor’s reversal and the state court’s decision not to overturn the reversal. Though

petitioner disputes the significance and number of the misconduct reports, the court finds

that even in the absence of such reports, there was sufficient evidence to support the

Governor’s reversal of parole.

Petitioner’s contention that the Governor’s use of the opinions of the district attorney

and police department is also without merit because under section 2402(b) of Title 15 of the

Case 4:04-cv-02911-PJH Document 14 Filed 08/30/07 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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California Code of Regulations the parole decision-maker shall consider all relevant and

reliable information available in determining suitability for parole. Information from the

prosecutors and the arresting and investigating officers, persons who have familiarity with

petitioner’s criminal acts, qualifies as relevant and reliable information. 

For the foregoing reasons, habeas relief is DENIED on this claim. 

CONCLUSION

The court concludes that the state court’s adjudication did not result in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court. The court also concludes that its adjudication

did not result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Therefore, for the foregoing

reasons, the court DENIES the petition. 

The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: August 30, 2007

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

 United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.04\SEILER911.RUL

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