Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01751/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01751-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUSTIN ANTONIO ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, Secretary, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 18cv1751-JAH (MSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Justin Antonio Anderson (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. (ECF No. 3.) Petitioner was convicted in the San Diego County Superior Court 

of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon, with a gang 

enhancement, and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. (Id. at 1-2.) He claims

his federal constitutional rights were violated because the evidence is insufficient to prove 

he entered into an agreement to murder or assault anyone (claim one), and because the 

corpus delicti of conspiracy was not established, as he was convicted based solely on his 

own statements of a crime which never occurred (claim two). (Id. at 7-13.) He also alleges 

in claim one he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure 

to move for an acquittal based on insufficient evidence and failure to interview and call as 

defense witnesses eight fellow gang members and co-conspirators. (Id. at 9-56.)

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Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF 

Nos. 8-9.) Respondent argues that habeas relief is not available because the state court 

adjudication of claim one is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law, and claim two is not cognizable on federal habeas

because it rests solely on state law. (ECF No. 8-1 at 12-20.) Respondent contends the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims should not be considered because Petitioner has 

failed to exhaust state court remedies, as the claims have not been presented to the state 

supreme court, only to the state superior court. (EFC No. 8 at 2-3.)

Petitioner has filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 11.) He argues that because the evidence

he entered into an agreement to kill or assault anyone is absent or so weakly circumstantial 

as to amount to pure speculation, the state court adjudication of claims one and two 

involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, which requires 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of that element of his conspiracy conviction. (Id. at 1-

10.) He requests that if the Court finds his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not 

exhausted, this action be stayed and his federal petition be held in abeyance while he returns 

to state court to exhaust state court remedies. (Id. at 10 n.3.) 

The Court recommends denying habeas relief on claims one and two because the 

state court adjudication is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

The Court recommends denying the ineffective assistance of counsel claims irrespective 

of any failure to exhaust state court remedies and without a stay and abeyance on the basis

they are plainly meritless. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a five-count Third Amended Information filed in the San Diego County Superior 

Court on August 5, 2015, Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder and assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 182(a)(1)

(count one), two counts of criminal street gang conspiracy in violation of California Penal 

Code § 182.5 (counts two and four), and two counts of attempted murder in violation of 

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California Penal Code §§ 187(a) and 664 (counts three and five). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s 

Transcript [“CT”] at 478-88.) Nine overt acts were alleged as to count one, consisting of 

telephone conversations recorded from a wiretap of Petitioner’s cell phone, and it was 

alleged he committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association 

with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further and assist the gang 

within the meaning of California Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). (Id.) 

On September 8, 2015, a jury returned a guilty verdict on count one, found the gang 

allegation true, and returned not guilty verdicts on the remaining counts. (CT 843-50.) On 

October 16, 2015, he was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. (CT 851.)

Petitioner appealed, raising claims one and two presented here, but without the 

ineffective assistance of counsel aspects of claim one. (Lodgment No. 3.) The appellate 

court affirmed. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Anderson, No. D069071, slip op. (Cal.App.Ct. 

Feb. 27, 2017).) On March 27, 2017, he filed a petition for review in the state supreme

court raising the same claims, which was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.) 

Petitioner constructively filed a habeas petition in the state superior court on 

January 16, 2018, presenting the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims raised in 

claim one here, as well as claims alleging his trial counsel failed to object to the conspiracy 

jury instructions as misleading and confusing, to file a motion for a new trial, to seek 

recusal of the trial judge, and to object to the introduction of the telephone calls which were 

not alleged as overt acts. (ECF No. 9-25.) That petition was denied on March 26, 2018, 

on the basis that: “Petitioner failed to provide all reasonably available evidence to support 

his allegations of IAC,” he “was improperly utilizing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

as a ‘second appeal’ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at trial,” and “was 

improperly utilizing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a ‘substitute appeal’ for issues 

he could have raised on appeal.” (ECF No. 9-26 at 2.) Petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration with additional documentation which was denied on May 7, 2018, on the 

basis that he did not show a change in the law or facts, and an appeal of the denial of a

habeas petition lies only in the appellate court. (Id. at 3.) 

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II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

San Diego Police Detective Eric Morales testified that he works with the violent 

crimes task force, which includes Police, Probation, Sheriff and FBI officers, along with

investigators from the office of the San Diego District Attorney, who attempt to identify, 

disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprises associated with street gangs. (Lodgment No. 2, 

Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 227-29.) Petitioner, a documented member of the Lincoln Park 

gang, was a subject of surveillance in 2013, which included a wiretap of his cell phone. 

(RT 229-32.) On the evening of April 27, 2013, Detective Morales intercepted a phone 

call from Petitioner to fellow Lincoln Park member Glenn Gray in which Petitioner said 

he was so upset he “could almost cry” because he had spotted a group of Crips gang 

members hanging out “deep” in Lincoln Park territory. (RT 233-39.) Based on additional 

calls monitored over the next couple of hours, including calls by Petitioner trying to obtain 

guns from other Lincoln Park gang members, Detective Morales was concerned something 

was about to happen. (RT 240.) He notified his supervisor, Sergeant Cruz, who said he 

would notify other officers and saturate the area with a police presence. (RT 240-41.)

Vadasto Cruz, a San Diego Police Sergeant with experience in the street gang unit, 

testified that he is a supervisor of the FBI-led violent crimes gang task force whose mission 

is to assist local law enforcement in addressing gang issues. (RT 245-46.) He said there 

are two main African-American gangs in San Diego, the Crips who are associated with the 

color blue and call each other “cuz,” and the Bloods who are associated with the color red 

and call each other “blood.” (RT 378.) Lincoln Park is associated with the Bloods. (RT 

428.) On the evening of April 27, 2013, Sergeant Cruz was notified by Detective Morales

that calls were intercepted indicating Petitioner had observed a large group of Crips in 

Lincoln Park territory and it appeared he and other gang members were gathering firearms 

in order to commit a criminal act. (RT 251.) Sergeant Cruz activated the task force’s 

reactive mechanism, requested a saturation of police presence in the southeastern area of 

San Diego where Lincoln Park gang members congregate, and responded in an unmarked 

police car to the 5200 block of Logan Avenue, where most of Petitioner’s intercepted calls 

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were made. (RT 252-57, 260.) Calls intercepted later that night and early the next morning 

indicated Petitioner had become aware of the law enforcement presence, at which point, 

about 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., Sergeant Cruz became confident no violent acts were going to take 

place and ordered the officers to stand down. (RT 260-61.)

Sergeant Cruz testified that gang members have recently become aware their phones 

may be tapped and have resorted to coded terminology for guns and drugs. (RT 259.) Calls

intercepted from Petitioner’s phone were summarized by Sergeant Cruz and played for the 

jury while he explained the terminology used. In an 8:25 p.m. call from Petitioner to 

Sherbly Gordon, Petitioner asked if he should come to a nightclub and whether the 

nightclub was conducting pat-downs prior to entering, to which Gordon responded he

should not come because there were too many “Babbies” or “Babylon” there, terms used 

to describe police officers. (RT 266-67.) In a 9:22 p.m. call, Petitioner, whose gang 

moniker is “J Hawg,” said he had just gone somewhere with his younger brother, Desmond 

Crisp, a Lincoln Park gang member with the moniker “Lil Hawg,” and they were returning 

to Lincoln Park territory near the 2500 block of Logan Avenue. (RT 265-68, 271-72.) 

In a 9:39 p.m. call from Petitioner to Aaron Harvey, a Lincoln Park gang member 

with the moniker “Lil Struck,” Petitioner is heard laughing and telling Harvey he wants to 

do something that night like go to a bar rather than “sit up at Grammie’s all night.” (CT 

528-30.) In a 9:52 p.m. call by Petitioner to Glenn Gray, a Lincoln Park gang member, he 

told Gray he has just seen “rippers” (changed from “crippers” because Lincoln Park gang 

members avoid using “c” when possible as it is associated with the Crips), meaning 

members of the Crips gang, in Lincoln Park territory where Gray has seen them before,

that the Crips were “deep,” meaning a significantly large number of them, and that it made 

him want to cry the same way Gray had wanted to cry on that previous occasion. (RT 269-

70, 379, 383-85; CT 537-38.) In a 9:58 p.m. call to Aaron Harvey, a Lincoln Park gang 

member, Petitioner said “you need to calm me down.” (RT 268-69, 272; CT 542.) 

Petitioner called Gray again at 10:30 p.m. and said: “I’m trying to go do that right now,”

and: “Do you want some of my folks to come get you?”, to which Gray declined. (RT 272-

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73; CT 544.) Petitioner called Bobby Towers, a Lincoln Park gang member, at 10:36 p.m., 

and asked “where Beef at.” (RT 273; CT 548.) 

In the first charged overt act, Petitioner called Darryl Charles, a Lincoln Park gang 

member with the moniker “Beef” or “Tiny Beef,” at 10:40 p.m., and asked if he can borrow 

“that.” (RT 273-74.) In the second overt act, during the same call, Charles appeared to 

immediately understand what Petitioner referred to, said he does not have it, and told

Petitioner he would have to call either “Kal” or “Brim” to obtain the item. (RT 274.) “Kal” 

refers to Deon Winters and “Brim” to Alonzo Harvey, both Lincoln Park gang members. 

(RT 275.) Petitioner went on to tell Charles that “if I get it you may not want it back,” to 

which Charles replied: “It’s going to be like that,” and Petitioner said “just know it’s going 

to be briv if you get it back.” (RT 274-75.) The term “briv” refers to drama, or that 

something bad was going to happen. (RT 275.) Petitioner then called Deon Winters and 

Alonzo Harvey, but both calls went unanswered. (RT 275-76.) 

The third overt act, a phone call at 10:44 p.m., Petitioner called Deon Winters and 

asked: “Hey, where’s bro’s shit at?”, which at first Winters did not seem to understand, but 

once Petitioner explains that the “bro” he was referring to is Darryl Charles by using “BF” 

and “TB” as shortened versions of Charles’ monikers Beef and Tiny Beef, Winters realized

what Petitioner was asking for and directed him were to find it in a shed “in my pack.” 

(RT 275-77; CT 553.) It was at that point Detective Morales called Sergeant Cruz and 

reported he was concerned something might be about to happen. (RT 277.) In the fourth 

overt act, Petitioner called Deon Winters at 10:55 p.m., asked if he knew “where Brim be 

putting the other one at,” to which Winters responded no. (RT 354; CT 555.) 

In the fifth overt act, Petitioner called Winters again at 11:03 p.m., and Sergeant 

Cruz said it sounded as if Petitioner told Winters he found the gun in the shed where 

Winters said it was, but was looking for another one, asked Winters if he knew where 

Aaron Harvey might have hidden a second gun, and Winters directed Petitioner where to 

look. (RT 355-57; CT 556-58.) That call was interrupted at 11:06 p.m. by a call (the sixth 

overt act) from Jawaun Jones, a Lincoln Park gang member with the moniker “Briv” or “J 

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Briv,” during which Petitioner asked if he can borrow “that,” to which Jones replied

“Peanut” has it. (RT 355-58.) Sergeant Cruz testified it sounded as though Jones initially 

thought Petitioner was asking for money during that call, to which Petitioner replied “no, 

I don’t want that. I don’t need that,” and Jones immediately said: “Peanut got that.” (RT 

355-56; CT 562.) In the seventh overt act, a phone call between Petitioner and Deon 

Winters at 11:09 p.m., Petitioner told Winters: “I’m tryna bust a move somewhere, 

somewhere else right now,” and that he found the gun where Winters said it would be but 

was looking for a second gun. (RT 397-98; CT 565.) The eighth overt act is a phone call 

at 11:38 p.m. from Petitioner to Lincoln Park gang member Alonzo Harvey in which 

Petitioner asked “where you put that at?”, to which, according to Sergeant Cruz, Harvey 

replied with instructions on where Petitioner should look in the shed for a second gun. (RT 

400; CT 571.) In that call Harvey asked Petitioner “what you got goin on?”, and he replied

“you already know I’m up here with some-, something freaky.” (CT 571.) The ninth and 

final overt act is a 12:46 a.m. call from Stanley King, a Lincoln Park gang member, to 

Deon Winters using Petitioner’s phone, in which King said he is stuck at Grammie’s house 

due to the police being “everywhere.” (RT 404-05; CT 581.) Sergeant Cruz testified that 

voices are heard in the background while Petitioner is making his calls, and it is clear those

voices are from people with Petitioner. (RT 270-71; 354-55.) 

At about 11:40 or 11:50 p.m., Petitioner’s green Saturn was observed parked in the 

5200 block of Logan Avenue. (RT 366, 408.) At that point Petitioner began making calls 

discussing the use of a police scanner, asking a female to drive around the neighborhood 

to see if she would be stopped by police, which she was, and indicating he and the people 

he was with were not able to move due to the police presence, saying “we can’t even 

fucking get the hell away from here,” “we can’t hop, skip and jump and not get in nothing,”

and “as soon as we get the first chance to bop, we outta here.” (RT 366-67, 400-11; CT 

584-97.) Petitioner called Deon Winters the next morning at 10:02 a.m., told him the police 

did not leave the area until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., and said “we was gonna leave and go 

somewhere else” but did not do so because of the police. (CT 598-600.) 

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A phone call was intercepted at 10:05 a.m. the next morning to Petitioner’s phone 

from Deandre Towers, a Lincoln Park gang member in state prison illegally using a cell 

phone, discussing gang activity unrelated to the prior evening, which the prosecutor used 

as background to show Petitioner was an active gang member and that Christopher 

Anderson, one of his two younger brothers, was in custody that night, and therefore when 

Petitioner referred to being with his younger brother that night he must have been referring 

to Desmond Crisp. (RT 410-28.) The calls were played for the jury and transcripts are in 

the record. (RT 369-429; CT 516-626.) The parties stipulated that Stanley King, Aaron 

Harvey, Glenn Gray, Bobby Towers, Deandre Towers, Darryl Charles, Alonzo Harvey, 

Deon Winters, Jawaun Jones, Desmond Crisp and Byresse Taylor were all active Lincoln 

Park gang members in 2013, and that Lincoln Park is a criminal street gang within the 

meaning of California law.1 (RT 1360-61.)

Tabitha Harmon testified that Petitioner is the father of her child and a Lincoln Park 

gang member, and they have known each other over seven years and are currently in a 

relationship. (RT 445-46, 452.) On the evening of April 27, 2013, she was at a house on 

Logan Avenue with Petitioner, Aaron Harvey and Grammie, and was asked to drive to the 

store for drinks and cigarettes. (RT 447-50.) She did not recall if it was Petitioner who 

asked her to drive to the store or if she reported back about specific locations of police 

vehicles. (RT 451-53.) She was pulled over by the police for no reason but not given a 

ticket, and said there was a police car on every street that night. (RT 453-54.)

Chris Tiller testified that he lived across the street from a house at 5403 Grape Street 

in April 2013, which could be seen from Euclid Avenue, and the house hosted parties once 

or twice a month attended by 50 to 75 people each time, mostly African-Americans who 

often used gang slang such as calling each other “cuz.” (RT 459-64.) A gang detective 

said Euclid Avenue and 54th Street are both major north-south thoroughfares in Lincoln 

 

1

 Other than Bobby Towers, Deandre Towers and Alonzo Harvey, all of those men were 

initially charged in this matter, and Crisp, Charles, Gray and King entered guilty pleas and 

were sentenced to prison terms prior to Petitioner’s trial. (CT 1-16, 729.)

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Park territory. (RT 1213.) Marquis Anderson testified that he held a party on April 27, 

2013, at his house on Grape Street near 54th Street, with about 100 people. (RT 471-72.) 

Many of the guests were Crips, and some of the people living at the house were Crips. (RT 

473-77.) The party was in full swing at 9:00 p.m. and over by midnight. (RT 477.) 

Don Holmes, an investigator with the office of the San Diego District Attorney, 

testified that he reviewed the location records of Petitioner’s cell phone between 8:10 p.m. 

on April 27, 2013, to 1:43 a.m. on April 28, 2013. (RT 485-86.) Petitioner’s phone used 

a cell tower near Logan Avenue from 8:10 to 9:05 p.m., indicating it was stationary at that 

time, but moved 1.5 miles to the west at 9:10 p.m. before returning to the original tower 

from 9:15 to 9:26 p.m. (RT 498-503.) The phone began moving north at 9:28 p.m., and 

was using a cell tower near 54th Street from 9:32 to 9:44 p.m., moving south and east. (RT 

504-07.) It continued south from 9:52 to 9:57 p.m., and by 10:08 p.m. it was back near 

Logan Avenue where it remained stationary until the next day. (RT 508-60.) The 9:44 p.m. 

call is consistent with traveling on 54th Street, and the 9:52 p.m. call is consistent with 

traveling south on 54th Street toward Euclid Avenue. (RT 561-62.)

Other than the testimony of gang experts, the remainder of the prosecution’s case

involved the four counts on which Petitioner was acquitted, which included participation 

in two drive-by shootings, one on July 28, 2013, and one on August 4, 2013. On July 18, 

2013, a gold 2000 Toyota Camry was stolen, and when it was recovered it had two bullet 

holes and the windows had been shot out. (RT 582-84.) Alberto Castellanos testified that 

he stole the Camry on July 18, 2013, and drove it five days before selling it for five hundred 

dollars to a teenager named Chris. (RT 590-95.)

A city bus driver testified that on July 28, 2013, at about 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., he was 

stopped at the corner of Market and 32nd Streets when a car with two African-American 

males in a gold Camry pulled up next to the bus; the driver was wearing latex gloves and 

the other man was crouching down in the back seat with a green bandana over his face. 

(RT 663-72.) The car made a right turn in front of the bus and proceeded down 32nd Street;

the security videotape from the bus showed a green car following a gold Camry with the

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first three characters of the license plate matching the stolen Camry. (RT 673-77; 872-73.) 

Several eyewitnesses testified that gunshots were fired near the corner of Market and 32nd 

Streets, and a brown or gold car which drove by just before the shots were fired sped away 

immediately afterwards with an African-American male holding the steering wheel with 

one hand and a handgun out the window with the other, and with an African-American 

male in the back seat. (RT 621-33, 645-47, 689-762.) Evidence collected at the scene

included .40 caliber and .380 caliber shell casings on the ground, a bullet in a nearby house, 

and bullet holes in two parked cars and a child’s play structure. (RT 780-819.) The green 

Saturn seen on the surveillance video from the bus was later found parked in front of the 

house where Petitioner lived with his mother, and was registered to Petitioner’s mother, 

who identified it as belonging to her. (RT 1023-36.) 

Don Holmes testified that Petitioner’s cell phone, from about 3:58 p.m. to 4:16 p.m. 

on July 28, 2013, was connected to a cell tower near 505 32nd Street, and began moving 

away from that area about 4:24 p.m. (RT 821-39.) John Cisneros, a San Diego Police 

Officer, responded to the shooting at 505 32nd Street which took place about 4:15 p.m. on

July 28, 2013, in West Coast Crips territory. (RT 860-62.) In his experience, solo driveby shootings are uncommon, and typically involve a hot car which is stolen and a cold car 

which does not raise flags with the police. (RT 864, 879.) Shots are fired from the hot car,

which is then abandoned, with the trailing cold car used for escape. (RT 864-65.) 

The police were dispatched to 5211 Kalmia Street on a shots fired call at 5:58 p.m. 

on August 4, 2013. (RT 902-05.) Orlandous Jackett testified that on August 4, 2013, he 

owned a Camaro painted bright sparkly blue with gold rims and “Bitch Rollin’” painted on 

the side. (RT 913-15.) There were five bullet holes in his car, but he did not remember 

how they got there and did not remember telling a detective at the hospital that night that 

he was driving on 52nd Street when two African-American males with their faces covered 

drove toward him and fired at him five times. (RT 917-19.) Police officers who were 

responding to a shots fired call at 5:58 p.m. on August 4, 2013, on Kalmia Street, were 

diverted to where the victim, Orlandous Jackett, was bleeding from gunshot wounds and 

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going in and out of consciousness, and where a bright blue Camaro with five bullet holes 

was parked at an odd angle nearby. (RT 928-37.)

Guillermo Trejo testified that about 5:30 p.m. on August 4, 2013, he heard gunshots 

and saw two cars, a brown or gold sedan and a blue Camaro, and said the shots came from 

one car to the other. (RT 952-55.) When interviewed by police that night he said he saw 

someone standing outside a gold Camry with his face covered firing at the blue Camaro, 

and the man in the Camaro firing back and hitting the back window of the Camry. (RT 

965-66.) About 5:45 p.m. that evening two African-American males were seen running 

from the gold Camry, which had been shot up. (RT 969-73, 976-81.) 

Vladimir Nazarov, a San Diego Police Officer, testified that on August 4, 2013, he 

interviewed gunshot victim Orlandous Jackett, who said he was driving home and was 

stopped at a stop sign when the passenger of a car coming in the opposite direction got out 

and fired five or six shots at him. (RT 989-94.) A gang detective testified that Jackett is a

documented member of the Neighborhood Crips, his distinctive blue car was readily 

identifiable to people in the area as a car driven by a Neighborhood Crip, and driving a 

bright blue car in rival gang territory is a sign of disrespect. (RT 1000-11, 1216.) Don 

Holmes was recalled and testified that on August 4, 2013, Petitioner’s phone used cell 

towers in the general area of the shooting when it occurred. (RT 1177-90.) 

Three WIN 9 millimeter Luger and three .40 caliber bullet casings were found at the 

scene of the August 4, 2013 shooting, and three WIN 9 millimeter Luger casings were 

found inside the Camry. (RT 1041-55, 1066-69.) Petitioner’s fingerprints were not found 

in the Camry. (RT 1095-1104.) Desmond Crisp was a major contributor to DNA found in 

the interior of the Camry, and DNA from Orlandous Jackett was found in the blood stain 

in the Camaro. (RT 1111-16.)

Officer Cisneros was recalled to testify that Byreese Taylor, a Lincoln Park gang 

member, was shot at but not hit while walking home from work on August 27, 2013. (RT 

1154.) He called Petitioner to tell him about it and a recording of the call was played for 

the jury in which Taylor said it is time for a retaliatory shooting, to which Petitioner replied: 

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“It’s been that time,” and “I’ve been tryin’ to get my car so I could do my part.” (RT 1154-

65; CT 625.) The .40 caliber casings recovered at the two drive-by shootings were fired 

from the same gun, and the bullets collected from the Camry and Camaro were fired from 

the same nine millimeter gun. (RT 1360.) The People rested. (RT 1363.)

Dwayne Harvey testified that he grew up in Southeast San Diego, was aware of gang 

activity in the area, and allowed neighborhood children to play in the backyard of his 

mother-in-law’s house at 5221 Logan Avenue. (RT 1477-81.) He did not believe his sons 

and Petitioner are gang members, but is aware they are documented as gang members by 

the police, and said he never saw his sons or Petitioner with a gun. (RT 1483-96.) 

Petitioner’s mother testified that she owned a green Saturn and a green Lexus and allowed

all her children to drive them. (RT 1524, 1527.) Petitioner has 46 Facebook friends who 

are gang members, and he posted a picture of himself at the graveside of one of four Lincoln 

Park members known to have been shot and killed in the last few years. (RT 1608-14.)

Reginald Washington testified that he is a former Skyline Eastside gang member 

who served a prison term for a gang shooting and currently works with Project Aware, 

which he created in prison, helping young men avoid gang involvement. (RT 1623-42.) 

He said it was not plausible for a gang member to hang on to a car used in a shooting. (RT 

1651-52.) He opined that Petitioner’s reference to “that” in his phone calls likely means 

obtaining a weapon for protection or to commit a crime. (RT 1649.) He said that only one 

of the ten criteria used by police to document gang members involves violence or criminal 

activity, and it is possible to be documented and not a gang member. (RT 1647-48, 1661-

62.) The parties stipulated that Orlandous Jackett had gunshot residue on his person, and 

that ten San Diego Police officers would testify they conducted traffic stops of Petitioner

in 2012-13, four times while he was driving a green Lexus and six times while he was in a 

green Saturn, and during several stops he admitted he was a member of the Lincoln Park 

gang. (RT 1697-1700.) The defense rested.

The prosecution provided rebuttal evidence that the house at 5221 Logan Avenue is 

owned by Kyle Winters’ mother and is a hangout for Lincoln Park gang members, that

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Kyle Winters is the father of Deon Winters, and both are Lincoln Park gang members. (RT 

754, 1539, 1704-05.) The prosecutor represented outside the presence of the jury that Kyle 

Winters’ mother is called “Grammie” and her house is referred to as “Grammie’s house.” 

(RT 754, 1539.) Police responded to the house on March 26, 2009, based on a complaint 

that a woman’s daughter was being held there against her will, entered the house and found 

the girl, as well as cocaine, rifles and gang paraphernalia, and arrested Alonzo Harvey and 

Deon Winters. (RT 1706-10.)

After deliberating a day and a half, the jury found Petitioner guilty on count one, 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon based on the 

events of April 27, 2013. (CT 479, 838-44.) They returned a true finding on the allegation 

that he committed count one for the benefit of, at the direction or, or in association with a 

criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal 

conduct by gang members. (CT 843-44.) The jury found him not guilty of criminal street 

gang conspiracy and attempted murder for the July 28, 2013 shooting as charged in counts 

two and three, and not guilty of criminal street gang conspiracy and attempted murder for 

the August 4, 2013 shooting as charged in counts four and five. (CT 480-88, 845-50.) He

was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in state prison. (CT 851.)

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution were violated because there is insufficient evidence from which 

a jury could reasonably infer he entered into an agreement with anyone to kill or assault 

rival gang members (claim one), and because the elements of conspiracy were established 

only by his own statements in violation of California’s corpus delicti rule (claim two). 

(ECF No. 3 at 7-13.) In claim one, he alleges a violation of his federal constitutional right 

to the effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to seek acquittal on 

the basis of insufficient evidence, and failure to interview and call as defense witnesses 

Stanley King, Desmond Crisp, Jawaun Jones, Glenn Gray, Alonzo Harvey, Deon Winters, 

Darryl Charles and Aaron Harvey. (Id. at 9.)

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Respondent answers that the state court adjudication of claim one is neither contrary 

to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law which 

requires that every element of an offense to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because 

sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to draw a reasonable inference Petitioner 

entered an agreement with one or more of his fellow gang members to conduct a drive-by 

shooting at the Crips’ party. (ECF No. 8-1 at 12-17.) Respondent contends claim two does 

not present a claim cognizable on federal habeas because it relies only on state law, and 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims are unexhausted and cursory. (Id. at 17-20.)

Petitioner replies that because the evidence that he entered into an agreement to kill 

or assault someone is nonexistent, or so weakly circumstantial as to amount to speculation, 

the state court adjudication of claims one and two involves an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law. (ECF No. 11 at 1-10.) He requests that if the Court finds 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not exhausted, this action be stayed and his 

federal petition held in abeyance while he exhausts state court remedies. (Id. at 10 n.3.) 

 A. Standard of Review

In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the

merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Satisfying § 2254(d) is a threshold requirement, and even if it is 

satisfied, or does not apply, a petitioner must still show a federal constitutional violation 

occurred in order to obtain relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v. 

Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

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indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state 

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases 

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only 

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there 

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 

427 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In order to satisfy 

§ 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must show that the factual findings upon which the state court’s 

adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Claim One

Petitioner alleges in claim one that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 

was violated because there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. (ECF No. 3 

at 7-9.) He argues there was no evidence he entered into an agreement with anyone to

murder or assault anyone, and in fact the opposite occurred, as everyone he allegedly 

attempted to enlist to join him in a drive-by shooting at the Crips’ party refused to become 

involved, and although circumstantial evidence can establish the agreement element of 

conspiracy, there comes a point where, like here, the evidence is so slight it amounts to

mere speculation. (Id. at 9-10; ECF No. 11 at 1-10.) 

Respondent answers that the state court denial, on the basis that sufficient evidence 

was presented to allow the jury to draw a reasonable inference Petitioner entered into an 

agreement with one of his fellow gang members to do a drive-by shooting at the Crips’

party, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. (ECF No. 37-1 at 11-12.) 

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in his petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) That petition was denied with an order which stated: “The petition for 

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review is denied.” (Lodgment No. 7.) The same claim was presented to the state appellate 

court on direct appeal and denied in a written opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 5.)

There is a presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991). 

The Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the last reasoned 

state court opinion addressing the claim, the appellate court opinion, which states:

Anderson argues there is no evidence to show he entered into an 

agreement with another person to commit first degree murder. He states a 

reasonable inference may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, 

speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work, but must be 

drawn from the evidence. Anderson contends the People’s argument is based 

on pure speculation.

The People assert circumstantial evidence clearly shows Anderson 

agreed with fellow gang members to shoot Crip gang members. The People 

argue the fact Anderson was looking for two guns shows he had agreed with 

at least one other person to attack the Crip gang members.

Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“Pursuant to section 182, subdivision (a)(1), the crime of conspiracy, a 

crime distinct from its target offense, occurs when two or more persons have 

the specific intent to agree to commit ‘any crime’ (italics added), as well as 

the specific intent to commit the elements of the target crime and one or more 

of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. The act 

of one conspirator is the act of all. Each is responsible for everything done by 

his coconspirators, including those things that follow as the probable and 

natural consequence of the execution of the conspiracy.” (People v. Zacarias

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 652, 657 (Zacarias).)

“Conspiracy is an inchoate crime. It does not require the commission 

of the target offense. Because it is an inchoate crime, conspiracy fixes the 

point of legal intervention at the time of the agreement to commit a crime.” 

(Zacarias, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 657.)

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 

aforethought. (§ 187.) “A killing with express malice formed willfully, 

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deliberately, and with premeditation constitutes first degree murder.” (People 

v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) “Generally, the intent to unlawfully 

kill constitutes malice.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153.) 

“Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is 

manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow 

creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when 

the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant 

heart.” (§ 188.) “(A)ny murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging 

a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the 

vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree.” (People 

v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 601; § 189.) 

Assault is “‘any wrongful act committed by means of physical force 

against the person of another.’” (People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 

101, 108.)

“In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that 

a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. (Citation.) The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment 

the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the 

evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053 (Kraft).) The 

conclusions of the trier of fact can be supported by circumstantial evidence as 

well as by direct evidence. (In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 

996.)

Substantial Evidence Supports Anderson’s Conviction for Conspiracy to 

Commit Murder and Assault with a Deadly Weapon

Anderson acknowledges the record shows he was upset at having seen 

rival gang members at the Grape Street party. He also concedes he tried to 

locate two guns, which constitute overt acts. Anderson asserts there is no 

evidence that would allow the jury to reasonably infer he ever entered into an 

agreement with another person to kill rival gang members. He argues he may 

have been trying to locate two guns before approaching any fellow gang 

members to kill rival gang members. We are not persuaded by this argument.

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we examine the 

entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment. (Kraft, supra, 23 

Cal.4th at p. 1053.) We therefore must reject Anderson’s hypothetical 

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scenario. The record supports the reasonable inference Anderson entered into 

an agreement with other gang members to shoot rival gang members before 

attempting to locate two guns.

Police officers listening to Anderson’s telephone calls testified there 

were voices in the background on Anderson’s side discussing the large 

number of Crips at the party. This indicates the persons who were with 

Anderson also reacted to the presence of the Crips. In his first telephone call 

after seeing the Crips, Anderson reminded Gray how he had felt when he saw 

the Crips at the Grape Street house on another occasion. Approximately 10 

minutes later, Gray asked Anderson “what’s brackin?” [Footnote: Bloods 

substitute the letter “b” for the letter “c.” Gray was asking Anderson “What’s 

cracking””] Anderson replied, “Tryna go do that,” and offered to send “my 

folks” to “come get you.” These remarks permits the reasonable inference 

Anderson had formed the intent to shoot Crips and his “folks” were willing to 

assist him by picking up Gray to help in the attack.

Anderson telephoned Lincoln Park gang members in an effort to locate 

guns. Anderson told a gang member he might not want the gun back because 

Anderson intended to use it for some drama. A homicide detective testified 

there was a history of retaliatory incidents between the Bloods and the Crips 

and a shooting could result from a happenstance meeting for no reason.

Anderson told a gang member he needed a gun because “blood a nigga, 

nigga is trying to go do something real quick.” Anderson told another gang 

member some people were not answering their phones and he was trying to 

“bust a move somewhere, somewhere else right now.” He told Gray he was 

“trying to bust a move away from here.” Anderson continued to look for guns. 

After he located one gun, he continued to look for a second gun. The trier of 

fact could reasonably infer there was a second person involved in Anderson’s 

plan to attack the Crips. The record shows that Anderson stopped looking for 

a second gun after a gang member told him where his gun was. Anderson 

then contacted unidentified persons several times to ascertain the location and 

strength of the police presence. Anderson told a gang member “as soon as we 

get the first chance to bop, we outa here.” In view of the evidence showing 

he had obtained two guns, Anderson’s use of the term “we” indicates he did 

not intend to act alone.

The substantial evidence standard of review is the same in cases in 

which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. (People v. 

Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296.) We do not reweigh the evidence but 

review whether the reasonable inferences that could be derived from such 

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evidence support the conclusions of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) Here, the record shows that other people with 

Anderson saw the Crips at the Grape Street house, Anderson made concerted 

efforts to locate two guns, he used the plural pronoun “we” in describing the 

plan to leave at the first opportunity, Anderson was an active member in the 

Lincoln Park gang and had ongoing contact with other gang members. In 

addition, the record shows the Bloods and Crips in southeast San Diego had a 

history, and current practice, of gang retaliation and drive-by shootings. We 

conclude there is substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably 

conclude that Anderson entered into an agreement with other persons to shoot 

the Crips who were at the birthday party at the Grape Street house.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Anderson, No. D069071, slip op. at 7-12.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 

That clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief, “if it is 

found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have 

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324

(1979). The standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) require an additional layer of deference in 

applying the Jackson standard, and this Court “must ask whether the decision of the 

California Court of Appeal reflected an ‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson and Winship

to the facts of this case.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme 

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” not as a means of error correction. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 103 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.5). 

“A conviction for conspiracy [under California law] requires proof of four elements:

(1) an agreement between two or more people, (2) who have the specific intent to agree or 

conspire to commit an offense, (3) the specific intent to commit that offense, and (4) an 

overt act committed by one or more of the parties to the agreement for the purpose of 

carrying out the object of the conspiracy.” People v. Vu, 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1024 

(2006). The trial evidence showed that: (1) Petitioner and his brother Desmond Crisp, both 

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Lincoln Park gang members, drove past a party attended by numerous Crips in Lincoln 

Park territory, which upset Petitioner so much he wanted to cry; (2) he then called fellow 

gang member Gray, told him there were numerous Crips in their territory which made him 

want to cry the same way a previous similar event at the same spot had made Gray want to 

cry, and asked if he wanted to come out; (3) Petitioner then called fellow gang members 

Charles, Winters, Jones and Harvey who helped him acquire a gun and assisted him in 

attempting to locate another, and Petitioner told Harvey and Winters he was trying to do 

something; (4) voices of people with Petitioner are heard in the background during those 

calls, including correcting him regarding the number of Crips at the party; (5) it is 

uncommon for drive-by shootings by gang members to be conducted alone, and they 

usually involve a driver and a shooter in one car and a driver of a second escape car; (6) the 

Crips and Lincoln Park gangs have a history of opportunistic retaliatory shootings;

(7) Petitioner agreed with a fellow gang member that it is past time for a retaliatory gang 

shooting; (8) he enlisted the help of a female friend to drive around the neighborhood that 

night to determine if the increased police presence meant he could not leave the 

neighborhood without being pulled over by the police; (9) during that evening he said “we 

can’t even fucking get the hell away from here,” “we can’t hop, skip and jump and not get 

in nothing,” and “as soon as we get the first chance to bop, we outta here,”; and (10) the 

next morning he said “we was gonna leave and go somewhere else,” but were prevented 

from doing so by the police presence in his neighborhood that night. The jury could draw 

a reasonable inference from the evidence that Petitioner expressly or tacitly reached an 

agreement with one or more of his fellow gang members to conduct a drive-by shooting at 

the Crips party with the specific intent to assault the partygoers with a firearm and attempt 

to murder them, and the only reason they did not do so was because Petitioner confirmed 

with the help of a friend they could not leave the neighborhood without being stopped by 

the police. 

Petitioner argues that the agreement element of conspiracy was not proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence anyone agreed to come out that night 

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and go with him on a shooting. (ECF No. 3 at 8-9.) “To prove an agreement, it is not 

necessary to establish the parties met and expressly agreed; rather, ‘a criminal conspiracy 

may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence that the parties positively or tacitly 

came to a mutual understanding to accomplish the act and unlawful design.’” Vu, 143 

Cal.App.4th at 1025 (quoting People v. Brown, 272 Cal.App.2d 623, 628 (1969)). 

“Because there rarely is direct evidence of a defendant’s intent, ‘(s)uch intent must usually 

be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’” 

Id. (quoting People v. Chinchilla, 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690 (1997)). 

Petitioner argues the evidence shows he had difficulty enlisting anyone to do 

anything that evening, and the only person he mentioned Crips to on any of the phone calls, 

Gray, declined the invitation to have “some of my folks to come get you.” (CT 543.) He 

points out he asked Charles at 10:40 p.m. if he was going to come hang out, and Charles 

said “fuck that.” (CT 548.) But Charles told Petitioner he was in bed, and it is unclear 

whether Charles knew what was happening at that point, as it is only after Charles declined

to go out that Petitioner asked to borrow a gun. (Id.) Petitioner made several unanswered 

calls from 10:44 to 11:38 p.m., looking for a second gun and complaining no one was 

answering his calls, and argues he never explicitly asked anyone to come with him 

anywhere. He points out that Detective Morales and Sergeant Cruz both testified that 

during the intercepted calls they never heard him say what he planned to do with the gun,

or heard him enter an agreement to do something with the gun. (ECF No. 3 at 11.) Thus, 

he argues, even if fellow gang members were assisting him in obtaining guns, the

circumstantial evidence that he entered into an agreement with one of them to join him in 

a drive-by shooting at the party relies on pure speculation that an agreement was formed 

with one of the persons heard in the background while he was making the calls. 

The Court must accept the state court’s finding that circumstantial evidence by itself 

is sufficient under state law to establish Petitioner entered into an agreement with one or 

more of his fellow gang members to go on a drive-by shooting at the Crips’ party. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16 (holding that federal habeas courts must analyze Jackson

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claims “with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as 

defined by state law.”); Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (Federal 

habeas courts “are bound by a state court’s construction of its own penal statutes.”); Estelle 

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court 

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”) The Court must respect 

the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary 

conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming the jury resolved 

all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

The jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that the people who helped

Petitioner locate firearms that evening, and the people who were with him while he was 

locating firearms, knew he was going to use them in a drive-by shooting at the Crips’ party. 

In addition to Petitioner’s numerous references to “we” that night, Sergeant Cruz testified 

that it is clear that the people whose voices are heard in the background while Petitioner

was making those calls are with Petitioner. (RT 270-71.) When Petitioner initially called 

Gray and told him about the Crips gathered at the party, voices in the background with 

Petitioner are heard correcting him, saying “way more than that” after Petitioner describes 

the number of Crips, after which Petitioner reemphasizes that there are a large number of 

Crips at the party. (RT 269-70, 383-84.) The voices of people with Petitioner can also be 

heard in his call to Winters asking where the other gun could be found. (RT 354.) Thus, 

Petitioner was with other people when describing how many Crips were at the party and 

how upset he was about seeing a large gathering of Crips on Lincoln Park territory, as well 

as when he acquired one gun and was looking for a second one. He said “we” when asking 

to borrow a gun, when referring to when he was going to leave after acquiring the firearms, 

and the next morning when stating he did not leave the neighborhood due to the police 

presence. In light of that evidence, in particular his repeated use of “we,” as well as 

evidence that Petitioner believed the time was right for a retaliatory shooting, that it is 

unusual for drive-by shootings by gang members to be conducted alone, that Petitioner was 

looking for another gun after having acquired one, that the Crips and Lincoln Park gangs 

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have a history of opportunistic retaliatory shootings, and Petitioner’s enlistment of a friend 

to test to see if the police presence would prevent him from leaving the neighborhood 

without being pulled over, a reasonable inference could be drawn that Petitioner explicitly 

or tacitly entered into an agreement with one or more of the people he was with, or one or 

more of the people who were assisting him to locate firearms, to attempt to assault and 

murder people by conducting a drive-by shooting at the Crips party. See Vu, 143 

Cal.App.4th at 1025 (“[A] criminal conspiracy may be shown by direct or circumstantial 

evidence that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to accomplish 

the act and unlawful design.”); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16 (holding that federal habeas 

courts must analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to the substantive elements of 

the criminal offense as defined by state law.”).

Even if Petitioner is correct that a reasonable inference could be drawn from the 

evidence that he failed to find someone to go with him on a drive-by shooting, that alone 

is not sufficient to demonstrate it was unreasonable for the state court to conclude the jury 

could have drawn an inference that he entered such an agreement. See Cavazos v. Smith, 

565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (holding that Jackson “unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court 

‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume –

even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any 

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’”) (quoting 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012) (“The jury in 

this case was convinced, and the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was 

so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”).

Accordingly, in light of the additional layer of deference this Court must give in 

applying the Jackson standard, as well as the Supreme Court’s admonition that federal 

habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 

justice systems,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.5), it is clear 

that the state court state court adjudication does not reflect “an ‘unreasonable application 

of’ Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case.” Juan H, 408 F.3d at 1274. In addition, 

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there is no basis to find that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication 

of this claim rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. The Court 

therefore recommends that habeas relief be denied as to claim one.

C. Claim Two

Petitioner alleges in claim two that the prosecution did not prove the elements of 

conspiracy independent of his own statements in violation of the California’s corpus delicti

rule. (ECF No. 3 at 10-13.) Respondent answers that this claim is not cognizable on federal 

habeas as it presents only a question of state law. (ECF No. 8-1 at 17-20.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review,

which was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning, and to the appellate court,

which denied it in a written opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 5-7.) The last reasoned state court 

opinion addressing the claim is the appellate court opinion, which states:

Anderson contends the People did not present any evidence of 

conspiracy other than his own statements. He argues this violates the corpus 

delicti rule, which requires the prosecutor to make a prima facie showing he 

entered into an agreement with another person to commit first degree murder 

by evidence other than defendant’s own statements, and requires reversal.

The People contend the purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to assure 

that a defendant has not confessed to a crime that was not committed. The 

People argue the corpus delicti rule has little application to this case because 

Anderson’s statements were not a confession but instead were part of the 

crime of conspiracy. Conspiracy requires both an agreement and overt acts in 

furtherance of the agreement. The People assert the record contains enough 

evidence, independent of Anderson’s statements, to show the conspiracy.

Additional Factual Background

At the People’s request, without objection, the trial court instructed the 

jury:

“The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based 

on his out-of-court statements alone. You may rely on the 

defendant’s out-of-court statements to convict him only if you 

first conclude that other evidence shows that the charged crime 

was committed.

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“That other evidence may be slight and need only be 

enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was 

committed.[”]

“The requirement of other evidence cannot be proved by 

statements made before or after a crime, but can be proved by 

statements made during the crime.[”]

“This requirement of other evidence does not apply to 

proving the identity of the person who committed the crime. If 

other evidence shows that the charged crime was committed, the 

identity of the person who committed it may be proved by the 

defendant’s statements alone.[”]

“You may not convict the defendant unless the People 

have proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (CALCRIM 

No. 359.)

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“To convict an accused of a criminal offense, the prosecution must 

prove that (1) a crime actually occurred, and (2) the accused was the 

perpetrator. Though no statute or constitutional principle requires it, 

California, like most American jurisdictions, has historically adhered to the 

rule that the first of these components-the corpus delicti or body of the crimecannot be proved by exclusive reliance on the defendant’s extrajudicial 

statements.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1164–1165 

(Alvarez).) “On appeal, a defendant may make a direct claim that there was 

insufficient evidence, aside from his statements, of the corpus delicti.” (Id. at 

p. 1165.)

“In California, it has traditionally been held, the prosecution cannot 

satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial statements, 

confessions, or admissions of the defendant. (Citations.) . . . (¶) This rule is 

intended to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested 

words alone, of a crime that never happened.” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 

pp. 1168–1169.) “(A)s historically applied, the rule requires corroboration of 

the defendant’s extrajudicial utterances insofar as they indicate a crime was 

committed, and forces the People to supply, as part of their burden of proof in 

every criminal prosecution, some evidence of the corpus delicti aside from, or 

in addition to, such statements. (Id. at p. 1178.)

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“Expert opinion testimony may support the corpus delicti when two 

conditions are met. First, the opinion must be ‘(r)elated to a subject that is 

sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would 

assist the trier of fact.’ (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) Second, the opinion 

must be based on ‘matter . . . perceived by or personally known to the witness 

. . . that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion 

upon the subject to which (the expert’s) testimony relates. . . .’ (Evid. Code, 

§ 801,subd. (b).) Although the expert cannot directly opine that the defendant 

is ‘guilty’ to support the corpus delicti (citation), the expert may testify as to 

various ‘“ultimate issues’” including facts necessary to establish the corpus 

delicti of a charge.” (People v. Powers–Monachello (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 

400, 412.)

“The independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond 

a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal 

conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible. (Citations.) 

There is no requirement of independent evidence ‘of every physical act 

constituting an element of an offense,’ so long as there is some slight or prima 

facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency. (Citation.) In 

every case, once the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, 

the defendant’s extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full 

value to strengthen the case on all issues.” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 

1171.) 

Our review is de novo. (See Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1181-

1182.)

There is Independent Evidence to Establish the Corpus Delicti of 

Conspiracy

The People rely on cases holding that extrajudicial statements that are 

themselves a part of the conduct of the crime, are not subject to the corpus 

delicti rule. (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394, abrogated on 

another point by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1185–1187.) While 

statements made during a crime may be considered, the corpus deliciti rule 

nevertheless requires corroboration of the defendant’s extrajudicial utterances 

insofar as those statements indicate a crime was committed. (Alvarez, supra, 

27 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) Therefore, the People must show some evidence of 

the corpus delicti aside from, or in addition to, such statements. (Ibid.)

There is sufficient corroboration in the record to ensure that Anderson 

was not falsely convicted, by his words alone, of a crime that never happened. 

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(Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1168–1169.) The evidence shows there 

were a large number of Crip gang members gathered at a party in southeast 

San Diego. Cell phone tower data indicates that Anderson passed through that 

area of town. His companions commented on the large number of gang 

members at the party, indicating they and Anderson noted the Crips’ presence. 

Other gang members described the locations where Anderson might find guns. 

Cell phone data showed that Anderson moved from one location to another 

when informed where the guns were hidden. A gang member reported to 

Anderson that one of the guns he was looking for was in Mira Mesa. Another 

person used Anderson’s cell phone to describe his inability to leave their 

location because of the heavy police presence. In addition, expert witnesses 

testified about gang practices, including the many retaliatory drive-by 

shootings that recently had occurred in the area between rival gangs. 

Therefore, as a matter of law, the record contains the requisite prima facie 

showing, independent of defendant’s extrajudicial statements, to satisfy the 

corpus delicti rule. (Alvarez, at p. 1182.)

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Anderson, No. D069071, slip op. at 12-16.)

Although Respondent contends this claim does not present a federal question 

because it alleges only an error of state law, “[t]he issue for us, always, is whether the state 

proceedings satisfied due process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is largely 

beside the point.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While 

adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally 

fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are 

violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that 

do not comport with fundamental fairness.”). Respondent recognizes that a federal due 

process violation can arise from a state law ruling that is arbitrary or capricious. (ECF No. 

8-1 at 20 (citing Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992) (holding that a state court’s 

application of state law does not rise to the level of a federal due process violation unless 

it was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process violation)).

The state court correctly observed that evidence other than Petitioner’s statements

was presented to establish the crime of conspiracy, including: (1) cell phone tracking data,

which indicated Petitioner drove past a house where a resident testified a large gathering 

of Crips were at a party and a neighbor testified the house often hosted parties with 

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attendees identifiable as Crips; (2) gang expert testimony which indicated the Crips’ party

was in Lincoln Park territory, that Petitioner is an active Lincoln Park member, that Lincoln 

Park and Crips conduct opportunistic retaliatory shootings at each other when they see each 

other in each other’s territory, that at least four Lincoln Park members had been shot and 

killed in the last few years, and that a Lincoln Park member had recently been shot at and 

told Petitioner the time was right to retaliate; and (3) statements by Petitioner’s friends and 

fellow gang members, which indicated they assisted him in locating firearms after a large 

gathering of Crips were seen in their territory, and in determining whether it was possible 

to leave the neighborhood that night without being stopped by the police. As discussed 

above in claim one, the jury was able to draw a reasonable inference Petitioner entered into 

an agreement with fellow gang members to carry out a drive-by shooting of the Crips party, 

which was thwarted only by police intervention. The state court determination that he was 

not convicted solely on the basis of his own statements of a crime that never happened is 

well supported by the record and is not arbitrary and capricious. See Oxborrow v. 

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a federal habeas court must 

defer to the state court’s construction of its own law unless it is “untenable or amounts to 

a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation.”).

The Court finds that the state appellate court’s adjudication of claim two is neither 

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 

nor based on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends habeas relief be denied as to claim two.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

In the body of claim one, Petitioner argues that because there is insufficient evidence 

to support his conspiracy conviction, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 

for an acquittal on that basis, and was deficient in failing to interview and call as witnesses 

for the defense Desmond Crisp, Jawaun Jones, Glenn Gray, Alonzo Harvey, Deon Winters, 

Darryl Charles, Stanley King and Aaron Harvey. (ECF No. 3 at 8-9.) Petitioner presented 

these claims to the superior court in a habeas petition along with allegations that his trial 

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counsel failed to object to the conspiracy jury instructions as misleading and confusing, 

file a motion for a new trial, seek recusal of the trial judge, and object to the introduction 

of irrelevant telephone calls. (ECF No. 9-25.) There is no indication he ever presented the 

claims to any other state court. 

Respondent argues the claims are cursory and Petitioner’s failure to present them to 

the state supreme court prevents this Court from granting relief. (ECF No. 8 at 2-3; ECF 

No. 8-1 at 17.) Petitioner replies that to the extent he has not exhausted state court 

remedies, he requests a stay and abeyance to do so. (ECF No. 11 at 10 n.3.) 

Although the claims have not been presented to the state supreme court, “[a]n 

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); see also Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding “that a federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it 

is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.”).

Because the ineffective assistance of counsel claims are plainly meritless, the Court 

recommends denying habeas relief irrespective of the failure to present them to the state 

supreme court and without a stay and abeyance. Id.; see also Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 

714, 720-22 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that stay and abeyance is unavailable where the 

unexhausted claims are plainly meritless).

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel was deficient in failing to move for an acquittal 

based on insufficient evidence of conspiracy, and relies on the same arguments in claim 

one in which he contends there is insufficient evidence of an agreement to commit assault 

or murder. (ECF No. 3 at 8-9.) Immediately after the People rested their case in chief, 

defense counsel made a motion for acquittal as to all counts other than count one, which 

was denied. (CT 830; RT 1444-57.) Because the motion was denied as to the counts on 

which Petitioner was ultimately acquitted, it appears unlikely the trial judge would have 

granted the motion as to the count on which Petitioner was ultimately convicted. In any 

case, as discussed above, there is sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. 

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Accordingly, a motion for acquittal would have been futile, and “the failure to take a futile 

action can never be deficient performance.” Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 

1996).

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to subpoena, interview and call as defense 

witnesses Desmond Crisp and Stanley King, who he refers to as his indicted coconspirators, as well as Jawaun Jones, Glenn Gray, Alonzo Harvey, Aaron Harvey, Darryl 

Charles and Deon Winters, who he refers to as his unindicted co-conspirators. (ECF No. 

3 at 5.) In support of his state habeas petition, he presented affidavits from Gray, King, 

Jones and Crisp, stating that they were willing to testify at Petitioner’s trial but were not 

contacted by the defense. (ECF No. 9-25 at 22-31.) Gray states that he would have testified 

that during their telephone calls on the night of April 27, 2013, Petitioner never asked him 

to commit a crime, Gray never encouraged Petitioner to commit a crime, and they did not 

conspire to commit murder or assault anyone. (Id. at 22.) King states that while he was 

hanging out in front of Grammies with Petitioner that night Petitioner never mentioned 

anything about seeing rival gang members, never mentioned Crips or how deep they were,

never talked about retaliation, assault or murder, and King did not conspire with him to 

commit assault or murder. (Id. at 24.) Jones states that during their telephone call that 

night Petitioner did not express anger or hostility, never mentioned trying to commit 

murder, assault or any other crime, and Jones did not conspire with him to commit any 

crime. (Id. at 27.) Crisp states that when Petitioner took him to his girlfriend’s house that 

night Petitioner was not mad or angry, they never discussed committing any crime, and the 

two of them did not conspire to commit a crime. (Id. at 30.) 

The parties stipulated that each of the eight individuals Petitioner claims his trial 

counsel should have called to testify were members of the Lincoln Park street gang at the 

time of the events, and that the Lincoln Park street gang meets California’s legal criteria of 

a criminal street gang. (RT 1360-61.) In addition, other than Alonzo Harvey, they were 

all initially charged in this case along with Petitioner, and Crisp, Charles, Gray and King 

entered guilty pleas prior to Petitioner’s trial. (CT 1-16; 729.) 

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In order to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner 

must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, which “requires showing that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). He must also show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, which 

requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair 

trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. For prejudice, there need only be a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent the error. Id.

at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Id. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. 

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). 

As to the performance prong, Petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that it 

was a strategic choice by defense counsel to forgo calling as witnesses Petitioner’s fellow 

gang members and co-conspirators. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“There are countless 

ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense 

attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”). In determining whether 

a strategic choice is reasonable, the Court must consider whether the decision was based 

on a reasonable investigation. Id. at 690-91 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.”). A decision not to investigate “must be directly assessed for reasonableness 

in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” 

Id. at 691; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A lawyer who fails to 

adequately investigate, and to introduce into evidence, records that demonstrate his client’s 

factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt as to that question to undermine confidence 

in the verdict, renders deficient performance.”).

The affidavits of Gray, King, Jones and Crisp are clearly insufficient to undermine 

confidence in the verdict. Their personal opinions as to whether their recorded telephone 

conversations established the elements of conspiracy are legally incompetent and selfCase 3:18-cv-01751-JAH-MSB Document 13 Filed 03/19/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of

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serving, as all four were charged in this case, and Gray, King and Crisp entered guilty pleas. 

Petitioner has not indicated what testimony Alonzo Harvey, Aaron Harvey, Darryl Charles 

and Deon Winters would provide, but assuming it is in the same vein as Gray, King, Jones 

and Crisp, they all would have been subject to cross-examination regarding their gang 

activities. Petitioner’s brother Crisp represented a particular danger to the defense. He

was charged along with Petitioner in count one, his DNA was found in the stolen Camry 

used in both drive-by shootings, he pled guilty to criminal gang conspiracy involving a 

May 28, 2013 shooting at an occupied structure which was not mentioned at trial, and 

evidence was presented that his brother Christopher, who is also Petitioner’s brother, may 

have purchased the stolen Camry from the man who stole it. King, Charles and Gray also 

entered guilty pleas prior to Petitioner’s trial, and were apparently serving prison terms for 

those offenses at the time of trial. (CT 729.) The decision by defense counsel not to call 

witnesses who had little or no helpful testimony and were capable of providing potentially 

damaging evidence, in particular regarding the counts on which they had been charged and 

on which Petitioner was ultimately acquitted, was clearly within the “wide latitude counsel 

must have in making tactical decisions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Furthermore, even assuming that decision was based on an incomplete investigation

because the witnesses were not interviewed by the defense prior to trial, and assuming these 

witnesses would have agreed to testify, Petitioner has not established he was prejudiced by 

the failure to call them at his trial. Their proffered testimony primarily concerns the context 

of Petitioner’s intercepted telephone calls, recordings of which were played in court for the 

jury. Their testimony that Petitioner was not angry during those calls or while he was 

hanging out that night, and did not explicitly mention murder, assault with a firearm, Crips 

or retaliation, would not have materially assisted the defense because the prosecution did 

not rely on an explicit agreement. Rather, the prosecution presented testimony by Sergeant 

Cruz that gang members use coded words and phrases to communicate on gang matters, 

and that there is a history of retaliatory gang shootings between the Crips and Bloods. In 

light of that, and particularly in light of the obvious bias in Petitioner’s favor of his brother 

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and fellow gang members, several of whom were initially charged on the same counts as 

Petitioner, it is not reasonably probable that the result would have been different had they 

testified they did not reach an agreement with Petitioner that night to murder the Crips who 

were attending a party in their territory or assault them with a firearm. Petitioner has not 

shown “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” as a result of his 

trial counsel’s failure to call those witnesses to testify. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends denying habeas relief irrespective of Petitioner’s 

failure to present these claims to the state supreme court because they do not present 

colorable claims for relief.2 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-24.

Petitioner raised four other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his state 

habeas petition, and it is unclear whether he includes them in his request for stay and 

abeyance and wishes to present them here after exhaustion. However, because they too are 

plainly meritless, the Court recommends they be denied for the same reasons as the other

ineffective assistance claims irrespective of exhaustion and without a stay and abeyance. 

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to object to the jury instructions regarding 

conspiracy on the basis they were confusing, misleading or inadequate. (ECF No. 3 at 5.) 

 

2

 To the extent these claims “present a colorable federal claim” so as to preclude 

application of 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(2), the Court would alternately find it would be futile 

for Petitioner to now present his ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the state 

supreme court, and therefore the claim is considered to be exhausted. See Cassett, 406 

F.3d at 621 n.5 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)) (“A habeas 

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical 

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”); 

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the district court correctly 

concluded that Phillip’s claims were nonetheless exhausted because a return to state court 

would be futile.”). It appears it would be futile for Petitioner to present his claim for the 

first time to the state supreme court nearly two years after that court denied his petition for 

review, as it would be met with a state timeliness bar. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 

312-21 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule requiring that a petitioner must 

seek relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time the petitioner or counsel 

knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of the claim 

and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied).

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However, neither here (id.), nor in the state court (ECF No. 9-25 at 7-8), does he identify 

any defect in the instructions or any basis for an objection. As such, the claim fails as 

conclusory. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (denying habeas relief on 

the basis that “presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to 

summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly 

incredible.”); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that conclusory 

allegations are insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to file a motion for a new trial. (ECF No. 3 

at 5.) There are no allegations supporting this claim in the First Amended Petition (id.), 

and in the state habeas petition he based this claim on the same argument he set forth as to 

why counsel was deficient in failing to seek an acquittal, that there was insufficient

evidence of conspiracy. (ECF No. 9-25 at 13.) This claim fails for the same reason his 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for acquittal fails.

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel should have sought to recuse the trial judge. (ECF 

No. 3 at 5.) In his state habeas petition he contended the trial judge should not have

presided over his two preliminary hearings and his trial because a judge should not hear 

the evidence more than once, and that he felt the trial judge “already had his mind made up 

and he was biased. As well as he was favorable to the prosecution and not fair to trial 

counsel.” (ECF No. 9-25 at 14.) This claim fails as conclusory. See Withrow v. Larkin, 

421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (holding that to succeed on a judicial bias claim, a petitioner must 

“overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.”); 

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In the absence of any evidence 

of some extrajudicial source of bias or partiality, neither adverse rulings nor impatient 

remarks are generally sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial integrity.”).

Finally, Petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

introduction of the phone calls which were not charged as overt acts. (ECF No. 3 at 5.) 

The only one he identified in his state habeas petition is the August 27, 2013 call between 

himself and Taylor, where Taylor said he had been shot at but not hit and the time was right 

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for a retaliatory shooting, to which Petitioner replied that the time was past due. (ECF No. 

9-25 at 15.) He argues that it should have been objected to on the basis it is irrelevant and 

prejudicial because Taylor was not shot or hurt. (Id.) The call was clearly relevant and 

admissible, and any objection would have been futile. Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445 (“[T]he 

failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance.”).

The Court recommends denying habeas relief as to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims irrespective of his failure to present them to the state supreme court and 

without a stay and abeyance because they fail to present colorable claims for relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-24; Dixon, 847 F.3d at 720-22.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and 

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the First Amended Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 22, 2019, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than May 10, 2019. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2019

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