Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02125/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02125-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Terry Miel, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Maricopa County Sheriff, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-2125-PHX-RCB (MHB) 

 O R D E R 

On October 18, 2013, Plaintiff Terry Miel, who is confined in the Federal 

Correctional Institution Phoenix, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a December 27, 

2013 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint 

because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an 

amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On January 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. In an April 9, 

2014 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had 

failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended 

complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On April 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The 

Court will order Defendant Arpaio to answer the insufficient food allegations in Count 

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One of the Second Amended Complaint and will dismiss the remaining claims and 

Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: 

Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio; Maricopa County Jail Captain John Doe; 

Maricopa County Jail Physician John Doe #2; and Maricopa County Jail Dentist John 

Doe #3. Plaintiff seeks damages. 

 Plaintiff asserts three claims for alleged unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement and denial of medical care while he was incarcerated in the “Maricopa 

County Jail”1

 from September 25, 2013 to January 24, 2014. 

 Plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of Count One: During the time he 

was incarcerated in the Maricopa County Jail, Plaintiff did not receive enough food, 

causing him to lose over 70 pounds. Plaintiff suffered severe weight loss which caused 

him a great deal of physical pain and health complications that he is currently addressing 

at a medical facility. Plaintiff was told that “the amount of food and its type is [] under 

the policies, procedures and control of Defendant Arpaio.” 

 Plaintiff also alleges in Count One that he was forced to live with two other 

inmates “without any hygiene items, no showers for long periods of time,” and on lock 

down “for months at a time with no meaningful exercise.” Plaintiff was told that “the 

rules, policies and procedures for putting 3 men in a 2 man cell (overcrowding) has also 

been approved under the command of Defendant Arpaio and the Captain of the jail, 

Defendant John Doe,” and that both Arpaio and John Doe made the decisions regarding 

lock downs, showers, and hygiene. Plaintiff states that he suffered “emotional trauma” 

for which he takes medication and he is being treated by a psychologist. 

 

1

 The Court notes that at the time Plaintiff filed his original Complaint, he was confined in the Maricopa County Towers Jail and he named the Towers Jail as a 

Defendant in that Complaint. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the 

alleged violations occurred at the Towers Jail. The Court presumes Plaintiff is still referring to Towers Jail in his Second Amended Complaint. 

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 Plaintiff alleges the following facts in Count Two: Defendants Arpaio and Captain 

John Doe #1 “set up the policies and procedures and control the food and medical care 

given at the Maricopa County Jail.” Plaintiff was not given enough food as a pre-trial 

detainee between September 25, 2013 and January 24, 2014, causing him to lose over 70 

pounds and resulting in “severe physical injury.” Plaintiff requested help “from the 

medical staff,” but Defendant John Doe #2 “denied help.” Plaintiff notified Defendants 

Arpaio and John Doe but “still did not receive medical help for these issues.” 

 Plaintiff alleges the following facts in Count Three: On or about November 15, 

2013, Plaintiff bit into a piece of food that contained a foreign object that broke his lower 

denture. Plaintiff notified Defendant John Doe #3, and “after not being treated for [his] 

issues,” he notified Defendants Arpaio, John Doe, and John Doe #2, but “was not given 

treatment for this dental issue.” None of the Defendants “responded to Plaintiff’s 

requests for help, nor looked into the matter.” Eating without a lower denture “was so 

painful that most [of] the time [Plaintiff] couldn’t b[ear] to eat what little food [he] was 

given.” Plaintiff suffered “painful mouth injuries, bleeding gums, cuts to [his] gums, 

severe weight loss and physical pain from lack of food.” 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Conditions of Confinement 

 A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises 

from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than from the Eighth 

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Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 535 n.16 (1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied, requiring proof that 

the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 

1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). To 

state a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. First, the 

alleged constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious”; the 

official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 (citations omitted). Second, the prison official must have a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to 

inmate health or safety. Id. (citations omitted). In defining “deliberate indifference” in 

this context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must 

allege that a defendant’s acts or omissions have deprived the inmate of “the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities” and that the defendant acted with deliberate 

indifference to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 

1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see Estate of Ford v. Ramirez–

Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether conditions of confinement rise 

to the level of a constitutional violation may depend, in part, on the duration of an 

inmate’s exposure to those conditions. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)). “The circumstances, 

nature, and duration of a deprivation of [ ] necessities must be considered in determining 

whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

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 Allegations of overcrowding, without more, do not state a claim under the Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 

1982). A plaintiff may, however, state a cognizable claim where he or she alleges that 

overcrowding results in some unconstitutional condition. See, e.g., Akao v. Shimoda, 832 

F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court’s dismissal of claim that 

overcrowding caused increased stress, tension and communicable disease among inmate 

population); see also Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming 

that an Eighth Amendment violation may occur as a result of overcrowded prison 

conditions causing increased violence, tension and psychiatric problems). 

 With respect to meals, “[t]he Eighth [and Fourteenth] Amendment[s] require[] 

only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or 

aesthetically pleasing.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation 

omitted); see Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128 (applying Eighth Amendment standard to a pretrial 

detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding his conditions of confinement). 

“The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, 

while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.” LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 

1456 (citations omitted). An inmate may, however, state a claim where he alleges that he 

is served meals with insufficient calories for long periods of time. Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim to require an answer from 

Defendant Arpaio with respect to the food he was served and the weight loss he allegedly 

suffered while he was incarcerated in a Maricopa County jail. However, Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim regarding the other alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. It is 

unclear whether Plaintiff was actually one of three inmates housed in a cell designed for 

two inmates, and, if so, for how long, and the effects of the alleged overcrowding. He 

also fails to state when he was on lockdown, for how long, and for how long he was 

denied the ability to exercise. He also fails to state when he was denied the ability to 

shower or when he was denied hygiene items. Thus, the Court will not require an answer 

to those allegations and those allegations are dismissed. 

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B. Counts Two and Three 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

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without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of medical care in Counts Two and Three. 

In Count Two, Plaintiff makes the vague allegation that “after requesting help from the 

medical staff, John Doe #2, I was denied help.” He then alleges that “after notifying both 

Defendants Joseph M. Arpaio and Captain John Doe[,] I still did not receive medical help 

for these issues[.]” Plaintiff fails to state when he requested help from any of these 

Defendants, how he made his requests for help, or what their responses were. 

 Similarly, in Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that he “after notifying John Doe #3 

the dentist of the Maricopa County Jail, and after not being treated for my issues[,] I 

further notified Defendants Joseph Arpaio, Captain John Doe, Medical Doctor John Doe 

#2[.] I was not given treatment for this dental issue.” Again, Plaintiff fails to state when 

he requested help, how, or what response(s) he received to support that Defendants were 

aware that Plaintiff had a serious medical need and failed to respond to that need. 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-

21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

 Accordingly, Counts Two and Three will be dismissed without prejudice. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for lack of adequate food against Defendant 

Arpaio and Defendant Arpaio will be required to answer the allegations regarding the 

lack of food and Plaintiff’s alleged injuries in Count One. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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V. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Counts Two and Three and the allegations in Count One unrelated to 

Plaintiff’s food claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (2) Defendants John Doe, John Doe #2 and John Doe #3 are dismissed without 

prejudice. 

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 (3) Defendant Arpaio must answer the food-related allegations in Count One. 

 (4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 10), this Order, and both summons and request for 

waiver forms for Defendant Arpaio. 

 (5) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Second Amended Complaint on a Defendant 

within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this 

Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Second 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Second Amended 

Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

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form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Second Amended Complaint, or 

this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (9) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Second 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (10) Defendant Arpaio must answer the insufficient food allegations in Count 

One of the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion 

within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. 

 (11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 DATED this 1st day of July, 2014. 

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