Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00666/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00666-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDIE JARAMILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH BURNES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:23-cv-00666-CDB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS CERTAIN DEFENDANTS 

FOLLOWING SCREENING

14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge

Plaintiff Rudie Jaramillo is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 

it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

//

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II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 

any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 

theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 

B. Linkage and Causation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 

rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

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section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

C. Supervisory Liability

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of 

their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; see e.g., 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff required to 

adduce evidence the named supervisory defendants “themselves acted or failed to act 

unconstitutionally, not merely that subordinate did”), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 

1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is 

no respondeat superior liability under section 1983”).

Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 

‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 

inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Accord 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability may be based on 

inaction in the training and supervision of subordinates).

Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 

implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 

rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 

F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations & quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 

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grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).

To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his 

deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a ... policymaker possessed 

with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 

713 (9th Cir.2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the 

involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Bd.

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff names Sergeant Joseph Burnes and correctional officers Alphonso Garcia, A. 

Rodriguez, M. Barrett, S. Bartolo,1 A. Hernandez, J. Contreras, E. Ruiz, R. Villanueva-Garcia, all 

employed at California State Prison, Corcoran (CSP-Cor) as defendants in this action. (Doc. 1 at 

1-3.) He seeks a declaratory judgment, an “order for the Defs to not harass or assault the Plaintiff 

again,” compensatory and punitive damages, costs of suit and any other relief the Court deems 

just. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff states “[c]ameras should be put up in all areas of Corcoran State Prison 

also.” (Id.) Plaintiff attached documentation related to Log Nos. 19-03132 and 19-053832as 

exhibits to his complaint. (Id. at 9-19.)

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff alleges two constitutional claims: Eighth Amendment excessive force and First 

Amendment retaliation. 

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1 Plaintiff later spells this individual’s surname as “Bartolow.” The Court elects to use Plaintiff’s initial spelling. 

2 Log No. 19-05383 does not appear relevant to the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. It involves different 

correctional officers—Alejo and Loza—and concerns a move from the 4A building to administrative segregation on 

an unidentified date that involved two strip searches, threats, and damage to Plaintiff’ shoe. (See Doc. 1 at 14-15.) 

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Eighth Amendment: Factual Allegations

In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff contends that on April 29, 2019, at about 11 a.m., 

Defendants Ruiz, Contreras, and Garcia came to his cell door to perform a cell search. (Doc. 1 at 

4.) Plaintiff asserts that because he had been attacked by Ruiz and Garcia four days prior, he 

refused to cuff up and “to put himself in [their] custody.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked for a lieutenant or 

captain to respond. (Id.) Sergeant Burnes arrived and directed Plaintiff to cuff up; Plaintiff asked 

why. (Id.) Burnes replied, “You know why.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Burnes’s response referred to 

Plaintiff having given an interview the day before concerning a staff complaint “for the 4-25-19 

incident where 4 C/Os pulled a lanyard triangle trying to hurt” Plaintiff and fracturing his left 

ulna. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that during that interview, “the Def was staring at him saying RAT and 

acting like he was going to hurt him with the other Defs present.” (Id.) 

When Plaintiff asked for “a non bias escort and was denied the Defs left and then came 

back with other Defs,” including Barrett, Hernandez, Bartolo, and Rodriguez. (Doc. 1 at 4.) One 

or more of the officers was carrying a shield used for cell extractions. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 

Defendants entered his cell and attacked him “with no cameras or non bias staff.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

states that when the cell door opened, he “ran out into the dayroom to get a witness to the actions 

of the Defs.” (Id.) Garcia, Barrett, Bartolo, and Hernandez then grabbed him and started hitting 

him with fists; Ruiz used his baton to repeatedly hit Plaintiff in the head. (Id.) Plaintiff states he 

“never chose to hit any of the Defs.” (Id.) When Plaintiff “went to the floor,” those officers piled 

on him, “striking his sides and legs.” (Id) Ruiz jumped on Plaintiff’s back “with his knee and his 

other hitting the floor,” striking Plaintiff on the back of the head, shoulders, and spine with his 

baton. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends Hernandez and Bartolo were holding his arms, “kneeing and punching” 

him in the face. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Rodriguez and Burnes stood by watching, until they “saw the 

Plaintiff look at them then they took turns kicking” Plaintiff in the face, causing a gash to his 

eyebrow, bruising, and swelling. (Id.) Plaintiff also had “a split/gash” on his head from Ruiz’s 

baton. (Id.) He asserts Garcia and Barrett hit and kneed his legs, “unnecessarily holding [his] 

prone legs.” (Id.) Burnes finally ordered the officers to place cuffs and leg irons on Plaintiff. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff denies striking any Defendant “even though they were attacking him while his left arm 

was in a full arm splint” from the earlier incident. (Id.) When the cuffs could not be applied due to 

the splint, “they attempted to rip and twist it off as shown in the pictures of the incident.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff states he was escorted to the rotunda and directed to sit in a chair. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

Plaintiff could not sit down due to the leg irons and the “chair backwards;” he told Defendants 

that, but they responded by pulling him to the floor. (Id.) Hernandez and Bartolo punched and 

kneed Plaintiff a few times, then picked him up. (Id.) Plaintiff then “chose to just sit down 

regularly on the now forward chair.” (Id.) Burnes then radioed for a “GRV and medical.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Burnes then “tried to humiliate” him by asking, “how does it feel to get 

battered?” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Burnes then punched him twice, saying “You ain’t shit.” (Id.) 

Ruiz yelled, “’Don’t talk to my Sgt. like that,” and tackled Plaintiff to the ground. (Id.) Ruiz 

punched Plaintiff and Burnes “ordered one of the Defs to ‘break that fucking wrist.’” (Id.) 

Plaintiff states it was very painful because they “used the cuffs as leverage.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

contends two “psychtechs” then came into the area and Burnes “yelled [hysterically] ‘Get out, get 

out, get out if it doesn’t concern you!’” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts the “psychtechs got scared and ran 

back out” and Burnes ordered the officers to pick Plaintiff up and sit him down. (Id. at 6.) 

Plaintiff states he “chose to go along with the Defs to get it over with.” (Id.)

When medical arrived, different psychiatric technicians observed Plaintiff and he believes 

“they came with the GRV.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff needed medical treatment and was placed on a 

gurney. (Id.) While on the gurney, Plaintiff states Burnes “tried again to humiliate” him by 

“taunting him with random comments of gang affiliations, baffling the responders and medical.” 

(Id.) Burnes “kept it up” once outside the building. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Bartolo and Hernandez 

watched and escorted Plaintiff for medical treatment. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that after he was “done with medical a video staff complaint was

done ... with Sgt. Green,” before Plaintiff was returned to his cell. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff 

contends that during the entire incident, Defendant Villanueva-Garcia was in the tower, “doing as 

the Def. Sgt. Burnes ordered, [e]ven though he did not get a chance to hit and beat the plaintiff.” 

(Id.) 

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Plaintiff contends the Defendants’ actions were “done with malice and forethought” and 

they should be held accountable. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff alleges he suffered lacerations to his 

head, bruising on his face, back, and left arm, and significant swelling. (Id. at 4.) He further 

alleges his “broken ulna and splint” were “reinjured.” (Id.) 

Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Legal Standards

“[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on prisoners constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328

(1986) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). As courts have succinctly observed, 

“[p]ersons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment.” Gordon v. Faber, 800 F. Supp. 

797, 800 (N.D. Iowa) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977)) (citation 

omitted). “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal 

offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation 

marks & citation omitted).

A correctional officer engages in excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause if he (1) uses excessive and unnecessary force under all the circumstances, 

and (2) “harms an inmate for the very purpose of causing harm,” and not “as part of a good-faith 

effort to maintain security.” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 2018). In other 

words, “whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force ..., the core 

judicial inquiry is ... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7

(1992). In making this determination, courts may consider “the need for application of force, the 

relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by 

the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 

at 7. Courts may also consider the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id. However, the 

absence of serious injury is not determinative. Id.

Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Analysis

Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff plausibly alleges Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claims against Defendants Barrett, Bartolo, Burnes, Garcia, Hernandez, 

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Rodriguez, and Ruiz. As to those individuals, Plaintiff alleges they sought to remove him from 

his cell and to assault him in retaliation for Plaintiff filing an earlier staff complaint. Barrett, 

Bartolo, Burnes, Garcia, Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Ruiz kicked Plaintiff or beat him with their 

fists, knees, or a baton while Plaintiff was restrained and allegedly compliant. 

However, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable claim concerning Defendants Contreras and 

Villanueva-Garcia. Despite naming J. Contreras as a defendant in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

no facts whatsoever concerning Contreras. Moreover, the only facts alleged as to VillanuevaGarcia involve his or her position in the “tower” and the assertion that Villanueva-Garcia 

followed Burnes’s orders. There are no facts to indicate Villanueva-Garcia was involved in 

physically assaulting Plaintiff, and, in fact, Plaintiff states Villanueva-Garcia “did not get a 

chance to hit and beat” him. Hence, Villanueva-Garcia did not use excessive force against 

Plaintiff. 

First Amendment: Factual Allegations

Plaintiff contends that the named Defendants retaliated against him by using excessive 

force because he participated in a “staff complaint video interview” the day prior. (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

He alleges “the Defs and other C/Os stared threateningly” at him during the interview, “mouthing 

the word RAT and pounding their hands into each other while walking by, laughing at the time.” 

(Id.) As a result of the April 25, 2019, incident that was the subject of the staff complaint, 

Plaintiff suffered physical injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was charged with battery on a 

peace officer. (Id.) He asserts the Defendants attempted to “stop hi[m] continuing his grievance 

and potential suit.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that incidents involving the Defendants “happen 

repeatedly and day after the interview ... Defs showed their intentions to the plaintiff during the 

interview and on the day of the beating told him” that Plaintiff knew why his cell was being 

searched and why he was being asked to cuff up. (Id.) Plaintiff identifies his injury as those 

physical injuries he suffered on April 29, 2019. (Id.) 

First Amendment Retaliation Legal Standards

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and retaliation against 

prisoners for exercising this right is a constitutional violation. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

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566 (9th Cir. 2005). A claim for First Amendment retaliation in the prison context requires: (1) 

that a state actor took some adverse action against the plaintiff (2) because of (3) the plaintiff’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) “the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Id. at 567-

68. To prove the second element, retaliatory motive, plaintiff must show that his protected 

activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s challenged conduct. 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff must provide direct or 

circumstantial evidence of defendant’s alleged retaliatory motive; mere speculation is not 

sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2011); accord Wood v. Yordy, 

753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition to demonstrating defendant’s knowledge of 

plaintiff’s protected conduct, circumstantial evidence of motive may include: (1) proximity in 

time between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliation; (2) defendant’s expressed 

opposition to the protected conduct; and (3) other evidence showing that defendant’s reasons for 

the challenged action were false or pretextual. McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882.

First Amendment Retaliation Analysis

Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff plausibly alleges First Amendment retaliation 

claims against Defendants Barrett, Bartolo, Burnes, Garcia, Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Ruiz. 

Plaintiff alleges they assaulted him on April 29, 2019, in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a 

staff complaint on April 25, 2019. Plaintiff alleges the actions by Barrett, Bartolo, Burnes, Garcia, 

Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Ruiz on April 29, 2019, were taken to prevent Plaintiff from 

“continuing his [earlier] grievance” and from filing suit. Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ motive for 

retaliating against him is demonstrated by Burnes’s comment to Plaintiff that he knew why his 

cell was being searched and by the others using the word “rat” while they observed the interview 

that followed the April 29, 2019, incident. 

Nevertheless, as above, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable claim concerning Defendants 

Contreras and Villanueva-Garcia. Again, despite naming J. Contreras as a defendant in the 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever concerning Contreras. Additionally, the only facts 

alleged as to Villanueva-Garcia involve his or her position in the “tower” and the assertion that 

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Villanueva-Garcia followed Burnes’s orders. Because Villanueva-Garcia was not involved in the 

excessive force incident, and because there are no facts asserted to indicate Villanueva-Garcia 

was present at or observed the interview and/or called Plaintiff a “rat,” Plaintiff fails to state a 

retaliation claim against Villanueva-Garcia. 

C. Screening Summary

In summary, the Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Eighth Amendment excessive 

force and First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Barrett, Bartolo, Burnes, 

Garcia, Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Ruiz. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege those same 

claims against Defendants Contreras and Villanueva-Garcia. Hence, the Court will recommend 

that this action proceed only on Plaintiff’s cognizable claims, and that Defendants Contreras and 

Villanueva-Garcia be dismissed from this action.

IV. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign a district judge to this action. 

For the reasons given above, this Court RECOMMENDS:

1. That this action PROCEED only on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force 

and First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Barrett, Bartolo, Burnes, 

Garcia, Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Ruiz; and

2. That Defendants J. Contreras and R. Villanueva-Garcia be DISMISSED from this 

action. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without 

leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the 

Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the 

exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise 

reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be 

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disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time 

may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 

(9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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