Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00488/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00488-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332pr Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARK ALLCHIN and DAVID FOSTER, 

individuals, on behalf of all others 

similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs,

v. 

VOLUME SERVICES, INC. dba 

CENTERPLATE and DOES 1-100, 

inclusive, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

CLASS CERTIFICATION 

[Doc. No. 48] 

 

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiffs Mark Allchin and David Foster (“Plaintiffs”) filed a 

putative class action in the County of Sacramento Superior Court of California against 

Defendant Volume Services, Inc. (“Defendant”). (Doc. No. 1-3.) On April 24, 2015, the 

suit was removed to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California. 

(Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on May 

22, 2015. (Doc. No. 7.) The FAC alleged that Defendant violated various California 

employment laws when it failed to properly compensate employees for their overtime 

work. (See id.) On February 24, 2016, the case was transferred to the Federal District 

Court for the Southern District of California. (Doc. No. 22.) On March 13, 2013, 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 48.) At the parties’ request, the 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 22
2 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court continued the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion until July 31, 2017. (Doc. Nos. 52, 56.) 

Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on July 17, 

2017. (Doc. No. 58.) Plaintiffs filed a reply on July 24, 2017. (Doc. No. 59.) 

BACKGROUND 

Defendant is a hospitality service company providing concessions to various 

venues across the United States and Canada. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 2, ¶ 2.) Defendant 

provides concessions at seven locations in California, including stadiums, golf courses, 

convention centers, and a zoo. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 10.) Defendant employs non-exempt employees 

in nearly 80 different positions. (Id. ¶ 8.) Some of these positions are eligible to receive 

service charges as part of their compensation. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiffs are employees of Defendant. Mark Allchin has been employed by 

Defendant since 1993 and has worked exclusively at the San Diego Convention Center 

and Qualcomm Stadium. (Id. ¶ 14.) David Foster has been employed by Defendant since 

2011 and also worked exclusively at the San Diego Convention Center and Qualcomm 

Stadium. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has failed to properly compensate employees for 

their overtime and improperly provided employees with inaccurate paystubs. (See Doc. 

No. 7 ¶¶ 39, 59.) Plaintiffs filed this case as a purported class action and now seek to 

certify three classes, including one subclass. 

DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

In order to maintain a class action, Plaintiffs bears the burden of showing they have 

satisfied the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), as well as one of the 

prongs of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 

1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A 

party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the 

Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 22
3 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 

338, 351 (2011) (emphasis in original). 

“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by 

and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 348 (quoting 

Califano v. Yamasaki ̧442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). As such, district courts must 

conduct a “rigorous analysis” to ensure each of the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met. 

Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. Determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met 

may require some analysis of the underlying claims. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351 (“class 

determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and 

legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action”). However, district courts should 

limit any analysis of the merits to that necessary for assessing the Rule 23 requirements. 

Id.; Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011). If the court is 

not fully satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met, certification should be 

denied. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 

A. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites 

The party seeking certification bears the burden of showing they satisfy each of the 

four requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 

representation. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. 

Numerosity requires “the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This “requires examination of the specific facts 

of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 446 U.S 318, 330 (1980). “The central 

question is whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently identified and demonstrated the existence 

of the numbers of persons for whom they speak.” Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 

F.R.D. 672, 680-81 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 

Commonality is established where “there are questions of law or fact common to 

the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “All questions of fact and law need not be common 

to satisfy the rule.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 22
4 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs must show, however, that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” 

Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 

(1982)). This means that class members’ claims must depend upon a “common 

contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means 

that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity 

of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. 

Typicality requires that “the claims or defense of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This tests 

“whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on 

conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members 

have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., 

LLC ̧617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named 

representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts, Corp., 976 

F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Finally, the adequacy requirement is met by showing “the representative parties 

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 

This involves two inquiries: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any 

conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their 

counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1020. 

B. Rule 23(b)(3) 

As Plaintiffs seek to certify their classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), they must also 

show “that the questions of law or fact common to class member predominate over any 

questions affecting only individuals members, and that a class action is superior to other 

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3). These two requirements are referred to as “predominance” and “superiority” 

and are intended to allow class certification in cases where “a class action would achieve 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 22
5 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to 

persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other 

desired results.’” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (quoting 

Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). “Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 

criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a),” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 

1426, 1432 (2013), and tests “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 

warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 

591, 594 (1997). 

In assessing predominance and superiority, Rule 23(b) provides a non-exclusive 

list of factors for courts to consider, including: 

(A)the class members’ interest in individually controlling the prosecution or 

defense of separate actions; 

(B)the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 

begun by or against class members; 

(C)the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 

claims in the particular forum; and 

(D)the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). 

II. THE PURPORTED CLASSES 

Plaintiffs seek to certify four discrete classes. (Doc. No. 48 at 2-3.) The first class 

(hereinafter the “Overtime Class”) includes “all current and former non-exempt 

employees of Defendant within the State of California who . . . were compensated, at 

least in part, by service charge distributions and who worked overtime hours.” (Id. at 2.) 

The second class (the “Late Pay Subclass”) is a subclass of the Overtime Class and 

includes any member of the Overtime Class who also “did not receive all their full 

overtime wages upon termination or resignation.” (Id.) The third class (the “Inaccurate 

Pay Statement Class”) includes “all current and former non-exempt employees of 

Defendants within the State of California who . . . were not provided with an accurate, 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 22
6 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

itemized pay statement reflecting (1) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay 

period and the corresponding number of hours worked by the employee at each hourly 

rate, or (2) reflecting the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer.” 

Finally, the fourth class (the “UCL Class”) is a derivative class, consisting of all members 

of the other classes. 

The alleged injury to the Overtime Class and the Late Pay Subclass stems from the 

claim that Defendant improperly calculated the amount of overtime pay for employees 

receiving service charge distributions. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant failed to include 

service charges in the calculation of employees’ regular pay rates for purposes of 

determining the proper overtime rate. (See Doc. No. 48-1 at 19.) Thus, as a result of this 

miscalculation, neither class received their entire compensation. 

The alleged injury to the Inaccurate Pay Statement Class stems from misstatements 

in employee’s pay statements. Plaintiffs argue that employees’ pay statements violated 

the California Labor Code because they did not, for example, include all hourly rates or 

the name and address of the employer. 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiffs bear the burden of “affirmatively demonstrat[ing]” they have satisfied all 

of the prerequisites of a class action. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351. Here, Plaintiffs have not 

done so. The record before the court is limited to facts concerning the named plaintiffs, 

and offers almost no details as to other class members. For example, Plaintiffs have 

produced their personal paystubs with alleged miscalculations and misstatements but 

have offered no paystubs from other class members or—even though named plaintiffs 

only worked at two of the seven California locations. Similarly, Plaintiffs have failed to 

address differences between named plaintiffs’ employment and that of other class 

members such as differences in unionization and the impact of collective bargaining 

agreements. With no evidence regarding other class members, the Court is unable to 

assess similarities and differences between named plaintiffs and the classes they seek to 

represent. As such, the Court cannot find that Rule 23’s prerequisites are met and must, 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 22
7 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

thus, deny certification. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161 (requiring a “rigorous analysis”). 

Furthermore, because the discovery deadline has already passed, the Court denies 

certification with prejudice. 

A. Overtime Class and Late Pay Subclass 

Plaintiffs’ proposed Overtime Class includes “all current and former non-exempt 

employees of Defendant within the State of California who . . . were compensated, at 

least in part, by service charge distributions and who worked overtime hours.” (Doc. No. 

48 at 2.) Plaintiffs allege this class shares a common injury stemming from Defendant’s 

failure to properly calculate the amount of class members’ overtime pay by not including 

class members’ compensation from service charges in the calculation of their overtime 

rate. Evidence of this common injury, however, is lacking. As a result, the Court finds 

the Plaintiffs have not affirmatively demonstrated the presence of commonality, 

typicality, or predominance and denies certification of the Overtime Class and its 

subclass. 

1. Commonality 

To demonstrate commonality, Plaintiffs must show that class members have 

suffered the same injury. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349-50. “This does not mean merely that 

they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law” but, rather, that the way 

in which their rights were violated is common to class members. Id. “Their claim must 

depend on a common contention . . . that is capable of classwide resolution.” Id. Here, 

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that class members’ injuries stem from Defendant’s 

conduct that was common to class members. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 22
8 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To show that class members sustained a common injury, Plaintiffs have produced a 

limited number of their personal paystubs. (Doc. No. 48-3, Exhibits 5-11.) These 

include six paystubs for Mark Allchin (“Allchin”) and one paystub for David Foster 

(“Foster”). Of these seven paystubs, only two actually include overtime pay—both 

belonging to Allchin.1

 

Plaintiffs fail to explain how Allchin’s paystubs demonstrate a miscalculation of 

his overtime pay, much less a miscalculation common to the entire class. First, only two 

of Allchin’s seven paystubs actually include overtime compensation. (See Doc. No. 48-3 

at 69, 73.) The first paycheck, dated September 21, 2011, shows that Allchin received 

$26.67 for 1.5 hours of overtime work, or an effective overtime hourly rate of $17.78. 

(Doc. No. 48-3 at 69.) This rate is one and a half times the paycheck’s indicated hourly 

rate of $11.85. The paycheck does include an entry for “Gratuity” but Plaintiffs have 

offered no facts establishing this was a service charge that occurred on the same day that 

Allchin worked the 1.5 hours of overtime. Similarly, Allchin’s only other paycheck 

including overtime pay shows him receiving one and a half times his hourly rate. And 

again, Plaintiffs have offered no facts showing that this calculation was incorrect. 

Aside from Allchin’s paychecks, the only other evidence Plaintiffs have offered of 

a miscalculation of overtime pay is a passage of Mr. Winarski’s deposition. (See Doc. 

No. 48-1 at 12.) In this passage, Winarski is asked about two exhibits, “Exhibit 15” and 

“Exhibit 16.” (Doc. No. 48-3, Winarski Deposition ln. 89:17-90:13.) Although the 

preceding portion of the deposition was not included in the record, the premise of the 

question posed to Winarski is that Allchin worked three, three-hour shifts on one day but 

was not paid overtime. (See id. ln. 89:3-8.) Notably, however, the two exhibits Winarski 

was presented with have not been included in the record before the court. And without 

                                                                

1

 Two additional paystubs include entries for CAOTPrem, which stands for California Overtime 

Premium. (Doc. No. 48-3, Winarski Deposition ln. 34:10-11.) Winarski testified that this payment was 

for “when a person works past midnight, their shift goes into midnight, that there is a premium paid. 

(Id. ln. 34:13-15.) Plaintiffs have offered no explanation for whether this premium is legally required 

and, if so, how it was miscalculated. 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 22
9 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

these, it is impossible for the Court to assess the injury. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 

(“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.) 

Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs were able to show that Allchin’s overtime pay was 

miscalculated, they have offered no evidence to show that class members other than 

Allchin were injured in a common manner. Plaintiffs seek to certify a class containing at 

least 2000 individuals. (Doc. No. 48-3, Winarski Declaration ¶ 2.) These class members 

are spread out across numerous venues in California, including stadiums, zoos, golf 

courses, convention centers, and catering company facilities, and are employed in nearly 

80 different positions. (Doc. No. 58-1, Winarski Declaration ¶¶ 2-3, 8.) Notably, 

locations differ as to whether workers are unionized and, if so, as to the terms of the 

separately negotiated collective-bargaining agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Yet despite these 

differences, Plaintiffs offer no evidence of wage miscalculation beyond Allchin’s 

paystubs—let alone a miscalculation common to the class.2

 There are no representative 

paystubs, no representative payment histories, and no additional class member 

declarations. Without more, the Court cannot say that class members’ rights were 

violated in a common manner. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352 (“Without some glue holding the 

alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that 

examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to 

the crucial question.”). 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the testimony of Winarski does not save the class. Winarski 

is Defendant’s Vice President of Human Resources and was deposed as a Person Most 

Knowledgeable. (See Doc. No. 48-3, Exhibit 1.) Winarski testified that Defendant’s 

policy for calculating overtime policy was reduced to writing in September 2012, (Doc. 

No. 48-3, Exhibit 1 ln. 11:14-23), and, although each location calculated overtimes 

separately, they all followed the policy, (Id. ln. 46:10-16). Plaintiffs make much of this 

                                                                

2

 Plaintiffs do offer a paystub belonging to Ken M Aronovsky, but offer no explanation of who his is, 

where he worked, or why the paystub shows a miscalculation. 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 22
10 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

policy, arguing that it supports a finding of commonality. (See Doc. No. 48-1 at 11-12.) 

However, they have identified no error in the policy that would lead to a miscalculation 

of overtime pay. The policy clearly provides for the inclusion of service charge 

compensation in employees’ overtime pay and Winarski testified that whenever 

employee’s received service charges, it was included in the overtime calculations as 

necessary. (Doc. No. 48-3, Exhibit 1 ln. 25:4-13.) Without a connection between the 

company-wide policy and the alleged injury to class members, the policy alone cannot 

support a finding of commonality. As the Supreme Court explained in Dukes, class 

members “claims must depend upon a common contention.” 564 U.S. at 350. Were 

Plaintiffs’ contention that the application of Defendants’ written policy resulted in a 

miscalculation of overtime pay, then certainly this common contention requirement 

would be met. But that does not appear to be Plaintiffs’ contention—or at least they have 

made no showing of how the policy resulted in the class members’ injury. 

The Court notes that this analysis of the commonality prerequisite necessarily 

overlaps with the merits of Plaintiffs’ contentions. However, such overlap is “a familiar 

feature of [class action] litigation” and proper in conducting a “rigorous analysis” of the 

Rule 23 requirements. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351. 

2. Typicality 

Typicality requires that “the claims or defense of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The test of 

typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is 

based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether the other class 

members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts 

Corp. ̧ 976 F.2d 497, 508 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wolin, 617 

F.3d at 1175. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he commonality and typicality 

requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge” but “[b]oth serve as guideposts for 

determining whether . . . class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class 

members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 22
11 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

157 n. 13. Because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of other class members’ injuries, 

they have failed to establish that named plaintiffs are typical. 

As the Court previously explained, Plaintiffs have offered almost no evidence 

showing that named plaintiffs sustained injuries arising from miscalculated overtime pay. 

More importantly, however, with regards to typicality, Plaintiffs have offered no 

evidence of how class members, other than named plaintiffs, were injured. As such, the 

Court is unable to assess “whether other members have the same or similar injury, 

whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and 

whether the other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” 

Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. And without assurances of these similarities, there is no way to 

ensure “class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Falcon, 

457 U.S. at 157 n. 13. 

3. Predominance 

As Plaintiffs seek to certify their class under the third prong of Rule 23(b), they 

must show that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “Rule 23(b)(3)’s 

predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a),” Comcast Corp. v. 

Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013), and tests “whether proposed classes are 

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Products, Inc. 

v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997). Plaintiffs have not met this “more demanding” 

standard. 

Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the commonality requirement because they have 

offered no facts showing that class members were injured through a common course of 

conduct. As such, they necessarily fail to show that those common questions 

predominate over individual ones. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624 (“the predominance 

criterion is far more demanding”). The Court further notes that Plaintiffs have failed to 

show that “questions affecting only individual members” will not engulf the case. 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 22
12 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

One issue that threatens to splinter resolution of Plaintiffs’ overtime claims is the 

different collective bargaining agreements governing pay at Defendant’s various venues. 

In his declaration, Winarski stated that Defendant operates seven facilities in California, 

some of which are unionized and some of which are not. (Doc. No. 58-1 ¶¶ 6, 10.) 

Unionized facilities each have at least one separately negotiated collective-bargaining 

agreements, which addresses overtime pay and service charges. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs 

Allchin and Foster only worked at two of the facilities, the San Diego Convention Center 

(“SDCC”) and Qualcomm Stadium (“Qualcomm”). (Id. ¶ 4.) Both SDCC and 

Qualcomm are unionized, but are governed by separate collective bargaining agreements. 

(Id. ¶ 7.) Whether an employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement can have 

a significant impact on their overtime compensation. See Cal. Lab. Code § 514 (“Section 

510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining 

agreement if [certain conditions are met].”) Yet despite this potentially dispositive issue, 

Plaintiffs have not addressed its impact on class certification. First, Plaintiffs did not 

include Allchin or Foster’s collective bargaining agreements in the record and do not 

address their impact on Section 510 of California’s Labor Code, which forms the basis of 

Plaintiffs overtime claims. (See Doc. No. 7, First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 34-39.) 

Second, even if the SDCC and Qualcomm collective bargaining agreements do not affect 

Plaintiffs’ overtime claims, Plaintiffs have offered no information regarding how other 

class members’ claims are affected by their collective bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs 

do not identify which other facilities are covered by collective bargaining agreements, 

nor what the terms of those agreements might be. And without this information, there is 

no way to know whether common issues will predominate. See Williams v. Boeing Co., 

225 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (finding that grouping hourly employees 

covered by multiple agreements would be unmanageable and declining to certify 

subclasses because plaintiffs did not provide sufficient information regarding the 

agreements’ coverage). Furthermore, as named plaintiffs only include individuals 

covered by collective bargaining agreements, there is a possibility that they will fail to 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 22
13 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fully protect the interests of employees not covered by one. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 

n. 13. 

Plaintiffs argue that the collective bargaining agreements are irrelevant because 

“Defendants make no evidentiary showing of any applicable collective bargaining 

agreement, a showing upon which any § 514 analysis necessarily turns.” However, this 

gets the burden backwards. “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively 

demonstrate his compliance with [Rule 23].” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. And this requires 

“evidentiary proof.” Comcast Corp., 133 S.Ct. at 1432. Plaintiffs have not provided such 

proof. Plaintiffs have not identified which of Defendant’s facilities are covered by 

collective bargaining agreements nor whether those agreements affect overtime 

compensation. In sum, Plaintiffs’ evidence does not establish that differences amongst 

the class members’ collective bargaining agreement are predominated by common 

questions. See Boeing Co., 225 F.R.D. at 637. 

B. Inaccurate Pay Statement Class 

Plaintiffs’ proposed Inaccurate Pay Statement Class includes “all current and 

former non-exempt employees of Defendants within the State of California who . . . were 

not provided with an accurate, itemized pay statement reflecting (1) all applicable hourly 

rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked by 

the employee at each hourly rate, or (2) reflecting the name and address of the legal entity 

that is the employer.” (Doc. No. 48 at 2.) This class will allege that Defendant violated 

California Labor Code § 226 by providing employees with inaccurate pay statements. 

However, because Plaintiffs have not offered facts demonstrating that common questions 

predominate, the Court cannot certify the class. See Sali v. Universal Health Servs. of 

Ranch Springs, Inc., 2015 WL 12656937, *9 (June 3, 2015 C.D. Cal.) (denying 

certification of wage statement class premised on the fact that defendants used a doingbusiness-as name on their paystubs because injury was “not amenable to common 

systems of proof”). 

/// 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 22
14 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Predmoniance 

To establish the requisite element of predominance, Plaintiffs must show that 

“questions of law or fact common to class member predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This inquiry subsumes 

Rule 23(a)’s commonality analysis and is “even more demanding.” Comcast Corp. v. 

Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). Based on the evidence before the Court, 

Plaintiffs’ analysis of § 226 involves various individualized issues that are not amendable 

to a class action under Rule 23(b)(3). 

To prove a violation of § 226, Plaintiffs must show “(1) a violation of the statute; 

(2) the violation was knowing and intentional; and (3) an injury resulted from the 

violation.” Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F.Supp.3d 781, 810 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Each 

of these elements is necessary, and a failure of proof is fatal. E.g., Elliot v. Spherion Pac. 

Work, LLC, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that plaintiff could not 

recover under § 226 because she did not suffer injury resulting from defendant’s “use of a 

slightly-truncated name”). Determining whether class members were injured by 

Defendant’s alleged violations will require an individualized analysis at odds with the 

principles of a class action. Sali, 2015 WL 12656937, *9 (“The Court agrees that 

demonstrating that each class member was damaged by the claimed inaccuracy in the 

wage statement is a critical individualized issue in determining liability that is not 

amenable to common systems of proof.”); see also Delgado v. New Albertson’s, Inc., 

2009 WL 10670628, *10 (Dec. 15, 2009 C.D. Cal.) (“Finding injury for each class 

member would be a particularly daunting task and would require an individualized 

determination for each class member.”). Similarly, based on the evidence before the 

Court, the Court cannot say that assessing whether alleged violations were knowing and 

intentional is subject to common proof. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 22
15 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

i. Injury 

To establish a violation of California Labor Code § 226, an employee must 

establish they suffered an injury resulting from the employer’s inaccurate pay stub. Cal. 

Lab. Code. § 226 (“An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional 

failure by an employer . . . is entitled to recover . . . .”); Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, 

LLC, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that plaintiff could not 

recover under § 226 because she did not suffer injury resulting from defendant’s “use of a 

slightly-truncated name”). The injury threshold is not high, see Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, 

Inc., 181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1306 (2010) (“a very modest showing will suffice”), but a 

failure to show injury is fatal. Where plaintiffs seek to certify a class-wide claim under 

§ 226, they must show that a finding of injury is “amenable to common systems of 

proof.” Sali, 2015 WL 12656937 at * 9. If not, the class fails. Id.; see also Dukes, 564 

U.S. at 350 (“That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is 

capable of classwide resolution”). Various courts have denied class certification on the 

grounds that determination of injury requires individualized analysis. Sali, 2015 WL 

12656937, *9 (“The Court agrees that demonstrating that each class member was 

damaged by the claimed inaccuracy in the wage statement is a critical individualized 

issue in determining liability that is not amenable to common systems of proof.”); see 

also Delgado, 2009 WL 10670628, *10 (Dec. 15, 2009 C.D. Cal.) (“Finding injury for 

each class member would be a particularly daunting task and would require an 

individualized determination for each class member.”). The Court finds this case is no 

different. 

In their declarations, Plaintiffs state that they were confused by their paystubs. For 

example, David Foster declared that he “did not have an understanding of what amount 

of the service charge would be included in [his] check” and “was also never able to 

understand from looking at my pay check stubs how Centerplate determined how much 

service charge I was owed or for what shifts I was being paid service charges.” (Doc. 

No. 48-5, Foster Declaration ¶ 5.) Similarly, Mark Allchin declared that he “never had 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 22
16 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an understanding of hat amount of the service charge would be included in [his] check” 

and “was also never able to understand from looking at my pay check stubs how 

Centerplate determined how much service charge I was owed of for what shifts I was 

being paid service charge.” (Doc. No. 48-4, Allchin Declaration ¶ 3.) Some courts have 

held that employee confusion is sufficient to show an injury. See e.g., Delgado, 2009 

WL 10670628, *3 (citing Elliot, 572 F.Supp.2d at 1181.) However, even if Foster and 

Allchin’s confusion is enough to establish injury to them personally, Plaintiffs offer no 

evidence that such confusion is uniform throughout the proposed class. Indeed, Plaintiffs 

offer no evidence of what other class members thought whatsoever. The only classmember evidence of understanding was provided by Defendant through a declaration of 

Wendy Marquez, who stated “[w]e get paystubs that show all of our hours worked” and 

also claimed she “never noticed any discrepancy between the amount I worked and the 

time I was pad.” (Doc. No. 58-11 at 11, Declaration of Wendy Marquez ¶ 11.) Ms. 

Marquez made no mention of being confused by her paystubs. (Id.) Thus, were the 

Court to rely on Plaintiffs’ confusion as the basis for their injury, there is no evidence this 

was uniform throughout the class and assessing injury would require individualized 

inquiries, not of the type contemplated by Rule 23 class actions. See Delgado, 2009 WL 

10670628, *10 (Dec. 15, 2009 C.D. Cal.) (“Finding injury for each class member would 

be a particularly daunting task and would require an individualized determination for 

each class member.”). 

Plaintiffs also argue they have met certain statutory requirements by which they 

are “deemed injured.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 226(2)(B). These provisions provide that: 

(B) An employee is deemed to suffer injury for purposes of this subdivision 

if the employer fails to provide accurate and complete information as 

required by any one or more of the items (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision 

(a) and the employee cannot promptly and easily determine from the wage 

statement along one or more of the following: 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 22
17 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(i) The amount of the gross wages or net wages paid to the employee during 

the pay period or any of the other information required to be provided on the 

itemized wage statement pursuant to items (2) to (4), inclusive, (6), and (9) 

of subdivision (a). 

(ii) Which deductions the employer made from gross wages to determine the 

net wages paid to the employee during the pay period. Nothing in this 

subdivision alters the ability of the employer to aggregade deductions 

consistent with the requirements of item (4) of subdivision (a). 

(iii) The name and address of the employer and, if the employer is a farm 

labor contractor, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1682, the name and 

address of the legal entity that secured the services of the employer during 

the pay period. 

(iv) The name of the employee and only the last four digits of his or her 

social security number or an employee identification number other than a 

social security number.” 

Cal. Lab. Code § 226(e)(2)(B). Plaintiffs have not established a class-wide injury under 

any of these prongs. 

Plaintiffs argue that class members were injured because Defendant’s “pay 

statements do not reflect all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the 

corresponding number of hours worked by the employee at each hourly rate.” Doc. No. 

48-1 at 14.) Recently in Apodaca v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 675 Fed.Appx. 663 (9th 

Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s hourly rate could be “promptly and 

easily determine[d] from the wage statement alone” by “dividing the amount paid by the 

hours worked.” Id. at 665. Because employer’s paystub included an amount paid and the 

number of hours worked, the Court found they had satisfied the hourly rates requirement 

of § 226(a). Id. As such, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 

certification for claims based on § 226. Id. The Apodaca holding is directly on point 

here. Defendant’s paystubs include the number of hours worked and the total amount of 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of 22
18 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

compensation for those hours. (E.g., Doc. No. 48-4, Allchin Declaration ¶ 3 (“The pay 

check stub includes an “Overtime Rate” of $8.10 per hour, and a payment totaling $6.08 

for 0.5 hours of overtime.”)) Thus, at a minimum, an employee could promptly and 

easily determine their applicable hourly rate by “dividing the amount paid by the hours 

worked.” Apodaca, 675 Fed.Appx. at 665; see Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor Transport, 

879 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1142 (E.D. Cal.) (“if a claimant injury is based merely upon the 

plaintiff having to perform ‘simple math’ with the information already in his possession, 

then there is no cognizable injury.”) 

Plaintiffs also argue that class members were injured because class members’ 

paystubs included an inaccurate employer name and address. (Doc. No. 48-1 at 11.) The 

Court first notes that there is no evidence in the record that the address appearing on 

Plaintiffs’ paystubs is inaccurate. In his deposition, Winarski testified that the address on 

Allchin’s September 21, 2011 paystub was the headquarters of Volume Services, Inc. at 

the time. (Doc. No. 48-3, Winarski Deposition ln. 21:5-8; 20-25.) And Plaintiffs have 

offered no other evidence that Defendant’s address was incorrect. As such, Plaintiffs 

cannot argue injury arising from an inaccurate address. 

Address aside, Plaintiffs’ argue class members’ paystubs are inaccurate because 

Defendant used its doing-business-as (“dba”) name of Centerplate Inc., rather than the 

name Volume Service, Inc. (Doc. No. 48-3 at 14.) California Labor Code § 226 is silent 

as to whether a dba name is sufficient. Id. (only requiring “name and address of the legal 

entity”). However, courts addressing the question have refused to find a per se violation 

when companies deviate from using their full legal name. E.g., Elliot v. Spherion Pac. 

Work, LLC, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding no violation of § 226 

where defendant truncated its name on the wage statements); Delgado, 2009 WL 

10670628, *4 (finding no violation of § 226 where defendant included the name 

“Albertson’s, a SUPERVALU Company” when Albertson’s was its dba name); York v. 

Starbucks Corp., 2009 WL 8617536, *8 (Dec. 3, 2009 C.D. Cal.) (finding no violation of 

§ 226 where defendant used its dba name “Starbucks Coffee Company”, rather than its 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of 22
19 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

corporate name). When interpreting California’s labor statutes, “words are to be given 

their plain and commonsense meaning.” Apodaca, 675 Fed.Appx. at 665 (quoting 

Murphy, 40 Cal.4th at 1103). And as the Court in Elliot noted, § 226 does not require 

“an employer to state its ‘complete’ or ‘registered’ name” but “only requires the 

employer state its ‘name and address.’” 572 F.Supp.2d at 1180. In light of federal court 

decisions, and in the absence of California state court cases on point, the Court cannot 

find a per se injury based on Defendants’ use of “Centerplate, Inc.” as its name. This was 

the name used throughout its operations in California and was accompanied by the 

correct address. And to the extent that Plaintiffs can allege some specific injury resulting 

from this aspect of the paystub, they have offered no evidence of a class-wide uniformity. 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s pay statements are inaccurate because 

employee’s compensation stemming from services charges is not included in the hourly 

rates. (Doc. No. 48-1 at 14.) Plaintiffs, however, do not cite any legal support for their 

claim that “applicable hourly rates” should include the service charges and the Court 

cannot find any. And in any event, Plaintiffs have not established that showing an 

employee’s service charges were not included in their hourly rate is amenable to class 

proof. Winarski testified that how service charges were included in rates differed from 

location to location. (Doc. No. 58-10; Winarski Deposition ln. 22:20-23:3, 24:6-17.) 

This was in part because the locations various collective bargaining agreements could 

affect the calculations. (Id.) In light of these location-by-location differences, any 

analysis of whether Defendant’s pay statements were inaccurate necessarily includes an 

individualized analysis.3

 And Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to the contrary. The

                                                                

3

 It is possible that a common proof could be established on a location-by-location basis using 

subclasses. However, Plaintiffs offer insufficient evidence to support the certification of subclasses 

based on location—and, in any event, only have representatives from two of the seven locations. See 

Boeing Co., 225 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (declining to certify subclasses because plaintiffs 

did not provide sufficient information regarding the agreements’ coverage) ; see also Upper Deck Co., 

183 F.R.D. at 680-81 (party seeking certification must have “sufficiently identified and demonstrated the 

existence of the numbers of persons for whom they speak.”). 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of 22
20 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

only evidence of paystubs before the Court belong to Allchin and Foster. As the Court 

previously explained, Plaintiffs have failed to provide facts showing these paystubs are 

inaccurate as to the inclusion of service charges in overtime pay—and much less that they 

establish some class-wide injury. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with other district courts finding that a 

showing of class-wide injury would require individualized analysis inconsistent with 

Rule 23. See Sali, 2015 WL 12656937, *9 (“demonstrating that each class member was 

damaged by the claimed inaccuracy in the wage statement is a critical individualized 

issue in determining liability that is not amendable to common systems of proof”); 

Delgado, 2009 WL 10670628, *10 (Dec. 15, 2009 C.D. Cal.) (“Finding injury for each 

class member would be a particularly daunting task and would require an individualized 

determination for each class member.”). 

ii. Knowing and Intentional Acts 

Plaintiffs have also failed to show that proving that the alleged inaccurate 

statements were made knowingly and intentionally by Defendant is subject to common 

proof. To prove a violation of § 226, Plaintiffs must show that any violations were made 

knowingly and intentionally. Achal, 114 F.Supp.3d at 810. Section 226 defines 

“knowing and intentional” as follows: 

(3) For purposes of this subdivision, a “knowing and intentional failure” 

does not include an isolated and unintentional payroll error due to a clerical 

or inadvertent mistake. In reviewing for compliance with this section, the 

factfinder may consider as a relevant factor whether the employer, prior to 

an alleged violation, has adopted and is in compliance with a set of policies, 

procedures, and practices that fully comply with this section.”

Cal. Lab. Code § 226(e)(3). Because class members’ paystubs are the product of 

multiple policies, procedures, and practices that differ from location to location—almost 

none of which have been addressed by Plaintiffs—the Court finds that common questions 

do not predominate this inquiry. 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of 22
21 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Winarski testified that employees’ paystubs are a result of multiple policies, 

procedures, and practices that differ from location to location. For example, Winarski 

testified that the calculation of service charges, their amount and distribution, differed 

from location to location and were heavily impacted by the various collective bargaining 

agreements. (Doc. No. 48-3, Winarski Deposition ln. 31:19-32:6.) Furthermore, payroll 

is not handled centrally by Defendant at its headquarters but, rather, each location 

prepares their own payroll internally. (Id. ln. 44:11-23.) Notably, overtime rates were 

calculated separately by individuals at each location, based on the location-specific 

constraints. (Id. ln. 56:8-12.) These site-specific differences complicate any common 

proof of whether misstatements were knowing and intentional. For example, to the 

extent Plaintiffs seek to show that Defendant improperly reported a class members’ 

overtime compensation, Plaintiffs will need to identify the location where the rate was 

calculated, who made the calculation, what polices and collective bargaining agreements 

were in place, and then make a factual showing that whoever made the calculation, or 

established the policy mandating the calculation, acted in way to knowingly and 

intentionally misstate it. This is not the type of common proof contemplated by Rule 23. 

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-24.4

 

C. UCL Class 

Because the Court denies certification of the Overtime Class, the Late Pay 

Subclass, and the Inaccurate Pay Statement Class, the Court also denies certification of 

the derivative UCL Class. Plaintiffs’ § Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 claims are all 

derivative of overtime and inaccurate pay statements claims. As Plaintiffs have failed to 

show class certification is proper for the other classes, they similarly fail to support the 

UCL Class. 

                                                                

4

 As previously noted, this type of proof might be susceptible to common proof via subclass, but 

Plaintiffs have not provided evidence to support a certification of subclasses based on location. See 

Boeing Co., 225 F.R.D. at 637; see also Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. at 680-81 (party seeking 

certification must have “sufficiently identified and demonstrated the existence of the numbers of persons 

for whom they speak”). 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of 22
22 

3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification. Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to show that they have met 

the requirements for a class action under Rule 23. Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling 

order, the parties were to complete discovery by January 12, 2017. (Doc. No. 37.) As 

this date has already passed, the record is fully complete. As such, the Court denies the 

motion for class certification. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 4, 2017 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

Case 3:16-cv-00488-H-KSC Document 63 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of 22