Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02032/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02032-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE C. ELEBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-2032 DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 

5). This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B).

For the reasons stated herein, the court shall grant plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis. In addition, the court shall dismiss the complaint with leave to amend.

I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). (See ECF No. 5). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be 

granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

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accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of 

twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court each time the 

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2).

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp.

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 

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most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

III. PLEADING STANDARD

A. Generally

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source 

of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 

plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 

while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

B. Linkage Requirement

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (stating vicarious liability is inapplicable in 

Section 1983 suits). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious 

liability in Section 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has 

violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named defendant 

with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. 

Id. at 676.

Liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under Section 1983 only if the 

supervisor: (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or directed the 

violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Taylor, 880 F.2d at

1045. A sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation permits supervisorial liability. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (citing Thompkins v. Bell, 828 F.2d 298, 303-304 (5th Cir. 1987)). Defendants cannot 

be held liable for being generally deficient in their supervisory duties.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff, an inmate housed at the Deuel Vocational Institution (“DVI”) at the time of the 

incidents in question (see ECF No. 1 at 8), alleges that his First, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated by defendants J. Beard, J. Price, J. Lewis, C.M. Heck, M. 

Contreras and C. Stottenberg1. Plaintiff states that after his primary care physician had 

determined that he suffered from a testicular condition called “large bilateral hydroceles,” 

treatment for the ailment was intentionally delayed. (See id. at 1-3, 8-10). He asserts that the 

delay in receiving and/or the denial of access to medical care in October 2015 was due to a 

“system” created in October 2015 by the “CRC Norco Medical Department.” (See id. at 10).

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 Plaintiff states that at the time the instant complaint was filed, defendant J. Beard was the 

Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; that defendant J. Price 

was the Warden at DVI; that defendant J. Lewis was the Deputy Director of Policy and Risk 

Management Services at DVI; that defendant C.M. Heck was a Health Program Specialist II at 

DVI, and that defendants M. Contreras and C. Stottenberg were Health Care Appeals 

Coordinators at DVI. (See ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 8-9).

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Construing the complaint liberally (see Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 421), plaintiff contends that 

this system, perpetuated by defendants, constituted deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, which caused him additional injury and 

left him in “extreme pain, on-going [sic] to November 15, 2016.” (See generally ECF No. 1 at

18, 23) (brackets added). Plaintiff further asserts that this led to a need for medical attention. 

(See id. at 23).

Plaintiff also appears to argue that defendants deprived him of his due process rights as 

well as his right to meaningful access to courts under the First Amendment when they prevented 

him from filing grievances related to his medical treatment, in violation of state regulations 

regarding the processing of administrative appeals. (See ECF No. 1 at 15-16). He argues that 

defendants “[had] a duty to process [his] appeal to the first level[,] but [they] continually decided 

to ‘screen out’ or refuse to answer his appeal for specific ‘erroneous’ reasons . . . .” (Id. at 16) 

(brackets added) (parentheses omitted). He generally alleges that defendants’ actions were 

retaliatory in nature. (See id. at 15-16).

Ultimately, plaintiff contends that defendants’ actions and/or inaction effectively made the 

administrative appeals system unavailable to him. For this reason, plaintiff argues, it was futile 

for him to exhaust at the third level of review. (See ECF No. 1 at 19). Plaintiff further argues 

that because defendants had the opportunity to review his appeals but refused to do so in violation 

of his constitutional rights, they will not be prejudiced should the court consider this action. (See

generally id. at 19-20).

B. Relief Requested

Plaintiff seeks the following relief from the court: (1) a declaration that defendants’ acts 

and omissions violated his constitutional rights; (2) preliminary and permanent injunction 

directing defendants to refrain from engaging in retaliatory action against him for exercising his 

First Amendment rights; (3) a protective order; (4) compensatory damages in the amount of 

$1,000,000.00 from each defendant both jointly and severally; (5) punitive damages in the 

amount of $1,000,000.00 from each defendant; (6) costs of the suit, and (7) any additional relief 

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the court deems just, proper and equitable. (See ECF No. 1 at 20-22). Plaintiff would also like to 

have a jury trial. (See id. at 21).

V. DISCUSSION

At the core of plaintiff’s complaint are two claims: (1) denial of access to courts in 

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) deliberate indifference to serious 

medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As currently presented, neither states a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.

A. Access to Courts Claim

1. Administrative Appeals 

Plaintiff’s claim that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when 

defendants actively chose not to review and/or cancelled his administrative appeals (see ECF no. 

1 at 10-17) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for several reasons. First,

actions taken when reviewing administrative appeals cannot serve as the basis for liability on a 

Section 1983 claim. See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

Second, to the extent plaintiff asserts that his First Amendment right to access to courts 

and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process were violated when defendants Heck, Lewis, 

Contreras and Stottenberg rejected his administrative appeals, which in turn, affects his ability to 

proceed in this court (see generally ECF No. 1 at 15-16), this argument fails. This is because 

plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in an error-free appeals process. See Ramirez 

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating inmates lack separate constitutional 

entitlement to specific prison grievance procedure); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1988).

Furthermore, plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to have defendants apply certain 

state regulatory exceptions to his administrative appeals process or to apply them in a particular 

way, either. Thus, plaintiff’s largely redundant additional assertion that the standard 

administrative appeals rules should not have been applied to his case because he discovered 

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additional information about his condition after the statutory period during which he should have 

filed his treatment-related administrative appeals (see generally ECF No. 1 at 10)2fails as well.

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff is arguing that defendants improperly applied certain 

state statutory regulations to his administrative appeals or that they improperly rejected his 

appeals (see ECF No. 1 at 10-20), a state’s violation of its own laws does not create a cognizable 

federal claim. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) 

(stating no Section 1983 liability for violation prison policy). Moreover, a litigant may not 

transform a state law issue into a federal one by asserting a violation of due process. See

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996).

In sum, plaintiff’s access to courts arguments are incorrect, and they fail to state claims 

upon which relief may be granted.

2. Retaliation

Plaintiff also makes a cursory, factually unsupported allegation that defendants retaliated

against him because he filed grievances. (See ECF No. 1 at 15-16). However, plaintiff has failed 

to meet the threshold requirements of a Section 1983 action and related federal case law, namely, 

those of identifying specific defendants, of linking each of them to specific acts or inaction, and 

of identifying the specific resulting harm he experienced. See generally 42 U.S.C. 1983; see also

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934; see also Ortez, 88 F.3d at 809. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff 

intended to raise a separate retaliation a claim in this action, this argument – as currently written –

fails.

For these reasons, plaintiff’s access to courts and due process claims, as presented, are not 

cognizable. Plaintiff will, however, be given the opportunity to amend them in an amended 

complaint should he choose to do so.

B. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is also not cognizable. At the core of this claim is 

2

 This is a liberal construction of what is a very convoluted argument on plaintiff’s part. If this is 

not what plaintiff intended to argue, he must clarify what he meant to assert in any amended 

complaint he may file.

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that plaintiff was not properly and/or timely treated for his testicular condition. (See generally

ECF No. 1 at 10, 18) (stating system created in October 2015 kept plaintiff in chronic pain until 

November 15, 2016). Once again, however, in direct contravention of Section 1983 threshold 

requirements, plaintiff fails to identify which specific defendants failed to treat him for his 

condition and/or pain and when. (See generally id.). On the contrary, based upon the stated 

occupations of each of the defendants (see id. at 1-2, 8-9), none of them are medical professionals 

who plaintiff states failed to properly treat his condition and/or its resulting pain during the 

periods in question. (See generally id.). Consequently, on the face of the complaint, none of the 

named defendants would have been responsible for treating plaintiff’s medical conditions. 

Further, none of them could have been responsible for any chronic pain and/or deterioration in 

health plaintiff experienced due to lack of treatment.

Additionally, to the extent that plaintiff intends to impute deliberate indifference liability 

to the named defendants as supervisors (see ECF No. 1 at 8-9), as stated earlier, government 

officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat 

superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Rather, for any of the claims against the named defendants who 

are supervisors to be cognizable, plaintiff must attribute some affirmative act or omission to each 

one of them that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. See id. at 676.

Given these findings, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference is not 

cognizable. Plaintiff will, however, be given the opportunity to amend this claim as well.

VI. OPTIONAL LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is being given the opportunity to amend the complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file 

an amended complaint, it will take the place of the original complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa

Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012) (amended complaint supersedes original). Any amended 

complaint should observe the following:

An amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson 

v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another's act or omits to perform an act he is 

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legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). An amended complaint must also 

contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff may not 

change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 

605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it is complete in itself without 

reference to any earlier filed complaint. See L.R. 220 (E.D. Cal. 2009). This is because an 

amended complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is 

filed, the earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (“The amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being 

treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 

F.3d 896 (2012).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith;

3. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend, and

4. Within thirty days of the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a first 

amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint within the time allotted may result in 

the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and/or failure to obey a court order. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also L.R. 110.

Dated: April 13, 2020

DLB:13

DB/ORDERS/ORDERS.PRISONER.CIVIL RIGHTS/eleb2032.scrn.revd

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