Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00263/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00263-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Latroy Timmons, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-263-PHX-JAT (MHB)

ORDER

Petitioner pro se, Latroy Timmons (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 8, 2008. (Dkt. #1.) The matter was

assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns, who issued a Report and

Recommendation on November 26, 2008 (Dkt. #12), recommending that the Court deny and

dismiss with prejudice the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner filed a written

objection to the Report and Recommendation on December 11, 2008. (Dkt. #13.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219,

1126 (D.Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of

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 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in accordance

with Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)(“In

attempting to answer [whether the state court applied Federal law in an objectively

reasonable manner], the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams [v. Taylor], 529 U.S. [362], 412 [(2000)]. While circuit law

may be ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (‘The ...

statutory language makes clear . . . that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established

law to this Court's jurisprudence.’)”).

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factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”). District

courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject

of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

[report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”).

As stated above, Petitioner seeks relief from his state court conviction based on 28

U.S.C. § 2254. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted before the state courts,

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2), this Court must deny the Petition on those claims

unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “When applying these standards, the

federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court . . . .” Robinson v.

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the summary denial of

Petitioner’s petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals renders the trial court’s

decision on Petitioner’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court, subject to this Court’s review. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-03

(1991) (“later unexplained orders upholding [a] judgment [rejecting a federal claim]” raises

a presumption that the reviewing court “looks through” that order to the last reasoned

decision).

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Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied

on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available

in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on several grounds: (1) that

Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective during the acceptance of the plea agreement and

subsequent sentencing; (2) that it was error for the trial court to deny Petitioner’s motion to

withdraw from the plea agreement; and (3) that the trial court’s imposition of an aggravated

sentence was unconstitutional. In this case, because objections were filed, this Court will

review all issues to which an objection was filed de novo.

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny, “[a]n

ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components: A petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To

establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

(2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A deficient performance is one that is

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

In the context of a plea agreement, a defendant may attack the voluntary and intelligent

character of the plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel fell below the level

of competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56

(1985).

In order to show prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Without specifics that cause the court to have such

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doubts, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be denied. See James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that petitioner needs to “identify what evidence counsel

should have presented” to show his innocence). In the context of a plea agreement,

Petitioner, “must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at

59. Further, where a defendant cannot establish prejudice, the court need not reach the

performance prong. Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995).

A. Ineffective Assistance Claim in State Court

As recounted in the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner raised a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel before the state courts in his Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief. (Report & Recommendation, Dkt. #12, pp. 6-7.) Petitioner contended his counsel

(1) failed to effectively explain the consequences of entering into the plea agreement, and (2)

failed to object to the use and introduction of the pre-sentence report during sentencing. The

state court concluded that Petitioner was advised, by both counsel and the trial court, of the

consequences of entering into the plea agreement. (Id. at 7.) Further, the state court found

that Petitioner had waived his right to have a jury determine the existence of aggravating

factors; therefore the trial court’s use of the pre-sentence report to determine aggravating

factors was proper. (Id.) As discussed above, this Court must defer to these conclusions

unless they were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, or were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 71.

B. Advice Regarding Plea Agreement

Petitioner argues that his counsel’s alleged failure to make him “aware of his

constitutional rights” and to inform him of the “nature of the plea,” including his waiver of

the right to have aggravating factors proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, constitutes

ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Petitioner fails to show that he was prejudiced

by his counsel’s alleged failure. The written, signed plea agreement clearly sets forth

Petitioner’s constitutional rights and the nature of his plea, including the waiver of his right

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to have aggravating factors determined by a jury. Further, in response to the trial judge’s

specific inquiries concerning whether he fully understood the nature of the plea and the rights

he was waiving, Petitioner acknowledged that he was aware of and understood his rights, was

willing to waive them and enter his pleas of guilty. (Dkt. #10, Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, Exh. P, Transcript of Change of Plea Proceedings.) Petitioner’s

statements to the trial court that he understood the sentence he was facing and agreed to

waive his right to have a jury determine aggravating factors “carry a strong presumption of

verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (defendant’s statements at plea

hearing “constitute a formidable barrier” at later proceedings). Therefore, absent any

evidence in the record suggesting the guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent,

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance should be denied.

In reviewing the record, the Court cannot find, nor does Petitioner point to, any

evidence to indicate that the guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent. As such, Petitioner

fails to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the

alleged errors of his counsel, and thus cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s alleged deficiencies in performance.

C. Judge’s Use of Pre-Sentence Report

Petitioner also argues that his counsel’s failure to object to the introduction and use

of the pre-sentence report constitutes ineffective assistance. However, there is no state or

federal law prohibiting a trial court from relying on a pre-sentence report. In fact, Rule 26.4

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a pre-sentence report be prepared

in all cases in which the sentence to be imposed is more than one year and the court has

discretion over the penalty to be imposed. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.4. Further, any reliable

information may be considered by the court in determining the propriety of a sentence within

the allotted range. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.7(b); State v. Fagnant, 176 Ariz. 218, 220 (1993);

overruled on other grounds, in State v. Smith, __ Ariz. __, 194 P.3d 399 (2008); see also

State v. Carbajal, 177 Ariz. 461, 463 (App. 1994) (upholding finding of aggravating factors

based on reliance on information provided in pre-sentence report). Therefore, the Court finds

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that had Petitioner’s counsel objected to the introduction and use of the pre-sentence report,

it would have been futile, and would not have changed the changed the result of the

proceeding.

D. Conclusion

Petitioner fails to establish that the state court decision that Petitioner failed to raise

a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that the decision was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the Court will deny habeas

relief based on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

II. DENIAL OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE PLEA AGREEMENT

A state court’s decision on a motion to withdraw from a plea does not present a

federal constitutional issue. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding that the Montana state courts’ application of the state’s “good cause” standard to

withdraw from a plea does not raise an issue of federal due process). Further, merely

asserting a due process violation will not convert a state law issue into a federal issue in the

habeas context. See id. at 1389 (state law issues are not cognizable as a federal habeas

claim). Thus, on this state law issue (i.e., the standard for withdrawing from a plea), the

Court defers to the state court’s conclusion.

Further, even if this Court had the authority to consider this claim on the merits, the

state court correctly applied state law. Rule 17.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides that a court may allow withdrawal from a guilty plea when necessary to avoid a

manifest injustice. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.5. The burden of proof is on the defendant to

establish that withdrawal from the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See State

v. Romers, 159 Ariz. 271, 274 (App. 1988). The Court notes however, that a motion to

withdraw from a plea is left to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Gibbs, 6

Ariz.App. 600, 601-02 (1967). 

Petitioner premised his right to withdraw on his claim of “actual innocence,” and the

alleged failure of the court and his counsel to advise him of his right to a jury determination

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2

 Petitioner also argues that to the extent that he waived his right to have aggravating

factors determined by a jury, that such a waiver is unconstitutional. However, in Blakely, the

Supreme Court held that a defendant may waive his right to have a jury, as opposed to a

judge, determine the existence of aggravating factors. Specifically, the Court stated:

Justice Breyer argues that Apprendi works to the detriment of

criminal defendants who plead guilty by depriving them of the

opportunity to argue sentencing factors to a judge. But nothing

prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When

a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial

sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates

to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004).

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of the facts used to aggravate his sentence. Petitioner fails to carry his burden of establishing

a manifest injustice; he merely asserts that he is innocent. Petitioner points to no objective

evidence of his innocence other than his desire to challenge the physical evidence against

him. However, “[a] defendant is not entitled to withdraw from his plea merely because he

discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality

of the State’s case . . . .” State v. Fowler, 137 Ariz. 381, 383 (App. 1983). Further, as

discussed above, there is no evidence that Petitioner was not fully aware of the rights that he

was waiving by entering into the plea agreement. Accordingly, this Court defers to the state

court’s correct decision that Petitioner had not met the state’s manifest injustice standard to

withdraw from his plea.

III. IMPOSITION OF AN AGGRAVATED SENTENCE

Petitioner argues that the imposition of an aggravated sentence is not proper because

the determination of the existence of any aggravating circumstances was not presented to a

jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2

 Petitioner also raised this claim in his Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief. The state court found that Petitioner had waived his right to have

a jury determine the existence of aggravating circumstances when determining whether to

impose an aggravated sentence. (Dkt. #1-2, p. 29.) As discussed above, this Court must

defer to this conclusion unless it was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

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clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71.

In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that any fact (besides the finding of a prior

conviction) that increases the range of punishment beyond the statutory maximum that would

be authorized by the jury’s verdict alone must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (applying “the rule we expressed in Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000): ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the presumptive statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”).

In Arizona, the presumptive sentence is generally considered the statutory maximum.

See State v. Price, 217 Ariz. 182, ¶ 8 (2007) (“[t]he statutory maximum for Apprendi

purposes . . . is the presumptive sentence established” by statute). However,

If there is one Apprendi-compliant aggravating factor, ‘a

defendant is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the

maximum punishment available under section 13-702.’ Once

such a factor is properly found-by the jury, based on a

defendant’s admission, or, for a prior conviction, by the court or

jury-‘the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find

and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a

sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.’

Id. at 185, ¶ 15 (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court noted that Petitioner had four prior felony convictions. Therefore,

the trial court was permitted to consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a

sentence up to the maximum prescribed in the statute. Moreover, Petitioner waived his

Apprendi/Blakely rights and consented to judicial factfinding with regard to the existence of

aggravating factors in his plea agreement. As such, the Court cannot find that the state’s

imposition of an aggravated sentence was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, or that the decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court’s

imposition of an aggravated sentence was proper.

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CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner fails to establish that the state court’s denial of his

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections to the Report and

Recommendation are OVERRULED. (Dkt. #13.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED accepting and adopting the Report and

Recommendation in its entirety as discussed in this Order. (Dkt. #12.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Dkt. #1.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2009.

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