Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00475/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00475-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL MARQUEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

DAVID RUNNELS,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 06-0475 MMC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket No. 4)

On January 25, 2006, petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After

reviewing the petition, the Court ordered respondent to file an answer showing cause why the

petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s cognizable claims, or alternatively to file

a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Rule 4"). Respondent chose the latter

course, and has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. Although given an

opportunity to do so, petitioner has not filed an opposition to respondent’s motion.

BACKGROUND

On April 16, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to a term of 12 years in state prison,

following his guilty plea in Santa Cruz County Superior Court to four counts of assault with a

deadly weapon. He did not file a direct appeal. On June 1, 2001, he filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in Santa Cruz County Superior Court, which petition was denied on July 6,

Case 3:06-cv-00475-MMC Document 5 Filed 01/11/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In rare instances, not presented by the instant petition, the limitations period may run from a

date later than the date on which the judgment became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 

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2001. He did not seek review of that denial, nor did he file an original habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal. On November 22, 2004, he filed a habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court, which petition was denied on October 12, 2005. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") became law

on April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Under AEDPA, petitions filed by prisoners

challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year from

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1

 

Where, as here, a petitioner does not seek direct review in the state court of appeals or

the state supreme court, the limitation period will begin running the day after the date on

which the time to seek such review expires, see Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th

Cir. 2002), which, in California, is 60 days after the entry of judgment, see Cal. Rule of

Court 31(a). In the instant case, judgment was entered on April 16, 2001, and thus the time

for seeking direct review in the California Supreme Court expired on June 15, 2001. As a

result, the limitation period commenced on June 16, 2001, and expired on July 16, 2002. As

noted, the petition was filed in federal court on January 25, 2006, approximately three and a

half years later. Consequently, absent tolling, the instant petition is untimely. 

The one-year limitation period is tolled for the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In the instant case, petitioner 

filed his first state habeas petition on June 1, 2001, in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court,

and it was denied on July 6, 2001. Although that petition was filed June 16, 2001, prior to

the commencement of the limitation period, it was still pending when the limitation period

began, and, consequently, it served to toll the limitation period until July 6, 2001, the date it

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For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner does not assert he is entitled to equitable tolling, and no ground for such tolling is

apparent from the papers filed herein.

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was denied. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding state habeas

petition filed before AEDPA's statute of limitations begins tolls limitation period). Petitioner

filed his next, and only other, state habeas petition more than three years later, on

November 22, 2004, in the California Supreme Court. As the one-year statute of limitations

already had expired on July 6, 2002, over two years earlier, said state habeas petition did not

toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended

before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482 (same). 

Although, in some circumstances, tolling is available during the interstitial period

between state habeas petitions, see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002), such tolling is

not available here. The Supreme Court has limited such tolling to instances in which the

petitioner filed the successive state habeas petition “within what California would consider a

reasonable time.” Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2006). In Chavis, the Supreme

Court found a six-month delay between the denial of a habeas petition in the California Court

of Appeal and the filing of a new habeas petition in the California Supreme Court to be

unreasonable and, consequently, held tolling was not available during that period. Id. at 853. 

Consistent therewith, the Ninth Circuit has denied “gap tolling” during periods of ten, fifteen

and eighteen months between California habeas petitions. Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1163,

1167 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to tolling during a period of

delay constituting more than three years.2

In sum, the instant petition was filed more than three years after the AEDPA statute of

limitations had expired. Although the limitation period was tolled briefly during the

pendency of petitioner’s first state habeas petition, such tolling was not of sufficient length to

render the instant petition timely. Accordingly, the petition will be dismissed.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED and

the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. 

This order terminates Docket No. 4.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 11, 2007 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00475-MMC Document 5 Filed 01/11/07 Page 4 of 4