Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00680/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00680-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SYDNEY STONE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CJ DEROSA, et. al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-680-PGR-CRP

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of

Defendants Lappin and Watts (Individual Capacity Claims). (Doc 25). Defendants Lappin

and Watts argue this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Defendant Lappin is

Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and Defendant Watts is Administrator of

National Inmate Appeals of the Federal BOP. Defendants Lappin and Watts contend they

have insufficient minimum contacts with the forum state of Arizona for the court to assert

personal jurisdiction over them. They further contend Plaintiff’s claims assert supervisory

liability, which is insufficient for claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Responding to Defendants’ Motion

Case 2:07-cv-00680-PGR Document 42 Filed 02/18/09 Page 1 of 10
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1

 This policy was the subject of a previous lawsuit filed by another inmate at FCIPhoenix. See Powell v. Ellis, cv-04-625-PHX-DGC (HCE). In November 2006, relying on

Ashker v. Cal. Dept. Of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917, 922-924 (9th Cir.2003), the District

Court held that prison officials violated the plaintiff’s “First Amendment rights by approving

of and enforcing a policy requiring packages of books obviously coming from bookstores or

publishers to be subjected to additional labeling.” (cv-04-625-PHX-DGC (HCE), Doc 44).

To remedy the violation, the Court entered a permanent injunction enjoining prison officials

from enforcing BOP Program Statement 5800.10, Chapter 3 at 310 to the extent it required

rejecting a package from bookstores or publishers if it lacked “Authorized by Bureau Policy”

or other similar language. (cv-04-625-PHX-DGC (HCE), Doc 47). 

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for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues personal jurisdiction exists because the alleged

injury in this case, the rejection of a book Plaintiff paid Barnes & Noble to send inmate

Libretti, was based on a BOP policy enforced by Defendants. This Court recommends that

the District Judge, after his independent review and analysis, DENY Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. The injury in this case, the rejection of a book with no notice to

Plaintiff, was based on a BOP policy that both Defendant Lappin and Defendant Watts

enforced.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a private citizen who alleges in March 2005 she purchased a book at Barnes

& Noble in Colorado and then paid Barnes & Noble to mail the book to inmate Joseph

Libretti at Federal Correctional Institution-Phoenix (“FCI-Phoenix”). (Doc 1). She further

alleges Barnes & Noble mailed the book to inmate Libretti with a return address identifying

the sender as Barnes & Noble, Glendale, CO. Pursuant to BOP policy, prison officials

rejected the package at the post office and it was returned to Barnes & Noble. Prison

officials did not notify Plaintiff or inmate Libretti that the book was rejected. 

Plaintiff alleges the package was rejected based on BOP Program Statement 5800.10,

Chapter 3 at 310, which requires additional labeling on packages from bookstores sent to

inmates when the package is not pre-approved via form BP-331. The policy requires prison

officials reject such a package unless it is marked “Authorized by Bureau Policy” or similar

language indicating that the contents are authorized by Bureau Policy.1

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Defendants Lappin and Watts filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Individual Capacity

Claims) arguing they lack the requisite minimum contacts with the state of Arizona for

personal jurisdiction to be asserted over them. They contend they are only generally

involved in the “various components of the Bureau of Prisons within the State of Arizona”

and this general involvement “is not enough to satisfy due process concerns” that accompany

questions of personal jurisdiction. (Doc 27). Defendant Lappin states he is the Director of

the Federal BOP and he is located in Washington, D.C. He asserts he has only general

supervisory responsibility over FCI-Phoenix and no control of day to day operations. For

his part, Defendant Watts states he is the National Inmate Appeals Administrator for the

Federal BOP and he has final signatory authority for all administrative remedy responses to

inmate complaints filed at the Central Level with BOP. Both Defendants state they did not

develop the policy at issue in this case. 

The only specific involvement Defendants identify with this lawsuit is Defendant Watts’

rejections of inmate Libretti’s appeals in this matter and Defendant Lappin’s overall control

of BOP policies. Calling this specific involvement “ministerial” in nature, Defendants argue

such involvement “is too random, fortuitous, and attenuated to support exercise of in

personam jurisdiction in this Court.” (Doc 27). Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s alleged

respondeat superior theory of liability is not viable in a Bivens claim.

Plaintiff contests Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing both Defendants

enforced the unconstitutional policy which required additional labeling of packages from

booksellers or publishers. Plaintiff notes Defendant Lappin, as the Director of BOP, is

responsible for BOP policies and their enforcement, which includes enforcement of the

policy at issue in this case. Plaintiff further notes, Defendant Watts, as Administrator of

National Inmate Appeals, has ultimate authority to grant or deny inmate appeals. In this

case, Defendant Watts denied any remedy for rejecting the package. He determined the

package was properly rejected because it did not have the additional labeling required by the

BOP policy at issue. 

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Plaintiff further argues she does not allege liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

 Rather, Plaintiff contends Defendants are directly responsible because they “had the power

to stop the enforcement of [the] policy” and instead “continued enforcement of that policy

or at least turned a blind eye to its enforcement.”

ANALYSIS

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention

is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see also Triton

Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1995). Rule 56(e) compels the

non-moving party to “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rely

merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,

288-89 (1968). However, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a

party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which the party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

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When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the

non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted. Id. at 249-50.

The issue in the pending Motion for Summary Judgment is whether this Court has

personal jurisdiction over Defendants Lappin and Watts. A federal district court may only

exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court

of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(k)(1)(A). In addition, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the

defendant’s due process right. Due process requires that defendants have certain minimum

contacts with the forum state. Intl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant can be general or

specific. If a defendant’s contacts with the state are substantial or continuous and systematic,

general jurisdiction can be asserted even if the cause of action in not related to the substantial

activities. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396

(9th Cir.1986). 

In the Ninth Circuit, courts apply a three-prong test to determine the due process limits of

specific jurisdiction.

(1)The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with

the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege

of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of

its laws[;] (2) [t]he claim must be one which arises out of or results from the

defendant’s forum-related activities [; and] (3) [e]xercise of jurisdiction must be

reasonable. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.

1995) (citations omitted). All of these requirements must be met for jurisdiction over

the defendant to comply with due process. Id. 

“Purposeful availment requires that the defendant engage in some form of affirmative

conduct allowing or promoting the transaction of business within the forum state.”

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Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other

grounds, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991). This requirement

ensures that a defendant “will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of

random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party

or third person.” Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183,

85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Doe v. Am. Natl. Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (9th Cir.1997). In Am. Natl. Red

Cross, a tort case arising from the contraction of AIDS following a blood transfusion, the

plaintiff sued the American Red Cross, the University of Arizona, various doctors, several

blood banks, and the Director of the Federal Drug Administration’s Division of Blood and

Blood Products (“FDA administrator”). Id. at 1050. Plaintiff argued all these defendants

contributed to her husband contracting AIDS from a blood transfusion he received at an

Arizona hospital. Specific to the FDA administrator, the plaintiff argued the administrator

“failed to properly ensure a blood supply free from the AIDS virus.” Id. at 1050. The FDA

administrator contended the Arizona courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him and the

Ninth Circuit agreed. The Court held the FDA administrator had not engaged in affirmative

conduct allowing or promoting the transaction of business in Arizona because he did not

direct his activities at Arizona and did not control distribution of blood products. Id. at 1051.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found Plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of the FDA

administrator’s alleged activities. Id. at 1051.

Personal jurisdiction can also be found where (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed

at the forum state (3) cause harm, the brunt of which the defendant knows is likely to be

suffered in the forum state. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB (9th Cir.1993) (citing

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). In Calder, the Supreme Court held that California

had personal jurisdiction over two Florida reporters in a libel action arising out of their

intentional publication of a story drawn from California sources where the brunt of the harm,

in terms of emotional distress and damage to the plaintiff’s professional reputation, was in

California. 465 U.S. at 788-89. The Court reasoned that the defendants expressly aimed

their actions at California and knew their article would have a potentially devastating impact

on the plaintiff in California. Id. at 789-90.

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In the pending Motion for Summary Judgment before this Court, Defendants argue that

it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish personal jurisdiction, Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050,

1056 (9th Cir.2007), and that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants Lappin and Watts are

residents of Arizona or have meaningful contacts with the State. Furthermore, they contend

Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary minimum contacts with the State to satisfy due

process. 

Defendants Lappin and Watts argue they have only general responsibility over FCIPhoenix, directing various components of the BOP in Arizona. They contend such general

responsibility is insufficient to satisfy due process. While Defendants Lappin and Watts

admit specific involvement in that Defendant Watts rejected the administrative appeals in this

case and Defendant Lappin had overall responsibility for the policy at issue, they maintain

such involvement was too random, fortuitous, and attenuated to support personal jurisdiction.

This Court disagrees. 

The alleged injury in this case derives from a BOP policy that both Defendants Lappin

and Watts are charged with enforcing. Plaintiff has provided evidence showing the book

she sent to inmate Libretti via Barnes & Noble was rejected pursuant to a BOP policy

contained in Program Statement 5800.10, Section 310. Viewed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence demonstrates that the alleged injury in this case was

the result of deliberate enforcement at FCI-Phoenix of the BOP policy requiring

additional labeling. 

Given that a BOP policy is a critical issue in this case, Defendant Lappin’s position as

Director of the BOP is sufficient conduct and connection with Arizona that he should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court here, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), thus satisfying the requirements of due process.

Defendant Lappin’s position as Director gives him overall authority over the BOP and its

policies. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4041and 4042(a)(1) (“the [BOP] . . . shall have charge of the

management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions”); 28 C.F.R.

§§ 0.95 (a) (“The Director of the [BOP] shall direct all activities of the [BOP] including:

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. . .[m]anagement and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions”) and

0.96(o) (“The Director of the [BOP] is authorized to exercise or perform any of the authority,

functions, or duties conferred or imposed upon the Attorney General ... , including the taking

of final action in the following-described matters:. . . . [p]romulgating rules governing the

control and management of Federal penal and correctional institutions. . . .”) 

Personal jurisdiction over Defendant Watts is also appropriate. Defendant Watts, as the

appeals administrator, denied Plaintiff’s appeal based on the policy of Program Statement

5800.10. Defendant Watts argues his denial of the appeal was a ministerial act, which was

too random, fortuitous, and attenuated to support personal jurisdiction. (Doc. #48 at 4.) The

Court disagrees that denial of an inmate’s administrative request is a ministerial act, which

is defined as an activity that is “absolute, fixed, and certain and in the performance of which

there is no discretion.” The Law Dictionary, (Amy B. Brann, ed., Anderson Publishing Co.,

7th ed. 1997). Because Watts’ denial was the result of the policy, it is a significant contact

and sufficient to be the basis of personal jurisdiction. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.

Defendants cite three cases to support their position that this Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over them. Defendants’ reliance on these cases is misplaced as all three are

distinguishable from the pending case. In Doe v. Am. Natl. Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, the

FDA administrator who was sued when Plaintiff’s husband contracted AIDS from a blood

transfusion in an Arizona hospital, did not control or enforce a policy that led to Plaintiff’s

injury. Plaintiff attempted to sue the FDA administrator based on the administrator’s general

involvement in blood products. There was no specific action that connected the FDA

administrator to Plaintiff’s injury. In the case before this Court, Defendants Lappin and

Watts are both directly connected to Plaintiff’s alleged injury because it resulted from their

enforcement of specific national BOP policy. 

Defendants’ reliance on the other two cases is misplaced as well because the injuries in

those cases occurred as a result of prison officials at a prison facility failing to take action.

See Smith v. United States, 2007 WL 2155651, at *5 (July 26, 2007) (Plaintiff alleged

exposure to asbestos, no allegation of a BOP policy that resulted in exposure to asbestos);

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See also Mansoori v. Lappin, 2005 WL 2387599 (D.Kan.2005) (Plaintiff alleged exposure

to tobacco smoke in a non-smoking facility. Plaintiff alleged prison officials at the facility

were not enforcing BOP policy). The alleged injuries did not occur because an official was

enforcing BOP policy.

Finally, although Defendants are correct that there is no respondeat superior liability

under § 1983, and, therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who

allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability, Monell v. New

York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978), direct personal

participation is not the only predicate for § 1983 or Bivens liability. Anyone who “causes”

any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir.1978), (citing Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.1976)).

“The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional

injury.” Id. at 744, citing Beverly v. Morris, 470 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1972). 

Here, Plaintiff is asserting that his harm is the result of the enforcement of a BOP policy.

By implementing a policy and allowing it to continue to be enforced, a supervisor sets in

motion a series of acts by others which he should reasonably know would cause others to

inflict the constitutional deprivation. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th

Cir.2007) (inmate sex-offenders sufficiently stated claims against supervisory officials where

they alleged that the officials created policies and procedures that violated their constitutional

rights and that defendants were wilfully blind to the constitutional violations committed by

subordinates).

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after

its independent review, DENY Defendants’ Motion of Summary Judgment (Individual

Capacity Claims). (Doc 25).

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may file and serve written objections within 10

days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. If objections are filed,

the parties should direct them to the District Court by using the following case number: CV07-680-PHX-PGR.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to

all parties.

DATED this 18th day of February, 2009.

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