Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00905/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00905-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOTLEY, ET AL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SMITH, ET AL,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-00905

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. No. 49)

Defendants seek reconsideration of the assigned magistrate judge’s order of March 9, 

2016, granting plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw deemed admissions. (Doc. Nos. 35, 45.) For the 

reasons discussed below, the court denies defendants’ request for reconsideration.

I. Background

This matter has a tangled procedural history. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on 

June 14, 2015, and then filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) three days later. (Doc Nos. 1, 

7.) On July 10, 2015, defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss/motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. (Doc. No. 11.) On August 20, 2015, this motion was taken under submission for 

decision by the previously assigned District Judge. However, on February 29, 2016, this case was 

reassigned to the undersigned. Shortly thereafter the motion was reset for hearing because no 

decision had yet been rendered at the time of the reassignment. 

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The court’s delay in issuing a decision on defendants’ motion to dismiss/motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, however, did not stop the matter from proceeding. On July 27, 2015, 

the assigned magistrate judge ordered the parties to submit a joint status report. (Doc. No. 16.) 

The parties complied and filed a Rule 26(f) report on August 14, 2015; however, the report did 

not contain an agreed upon discovery schedule, and a scheduling order was never issued by the 

court. (Doc. No. 22.) Nonetheless, defendants set about pursuing discovery and mailed requests 

for admissions to plaintiffs’ counsel on November 25, 2015. Plaintiffs failed to timely respond—

depositing their responses in the mail on December 29, 2015, a day late—and defendants filed 

notices of deemed admissions on January 27, 2016. (Doc. Nos. 29, 30.) 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a response to defendants’ notice of deemed admissions, 

including an alternative request for relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) and 

36(b). (Doc. No. 31.) The assigned magistrate judge informed plaintiffs it would not act on their 

request for relief because they had failed to properly notice the motion pursuant to Local Rule 

251. (Doc. No. 32.) Instead, on February 7, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw the 

deemed admissions—the motion that is at the center of defendants’ current request. (Doc. No. 

33.) Defendants filed an opposition (Doc. No. 34), to which plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. No. 35), 

and the assigned magistrate judge order the parties to meet and confer and file a timely Joint 

Statement re Discovery Disagreement pursuant to Local Rule 251. (Doc. No. 36.) 

The parties filed their Joint Statement on March 4, 2016. (Doc. No. 42.) Prior to the 

filing of the document and as noted above, the matter was transferred from the Sacramento 

Division of the Eastern District of California to the Fresno Division. (Doc. No. 37.) 

Additionally, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2016. (Doc. No. 38.) 

The motion to dismiss/motion for judgment on the pleadings and the motion for summary 

judgment were all reset for hearing and oral argument was heard by the undersigned on May 3, 

2016. (Doc. No. 56.) 

On March 9, 2016, the assigned magistrate judge granted plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw 

deemed admissions. (Doc. No. 45.) Defendants filed the current request for reconsideration on 

March 23, 2016. (Doc. No. 49.) To date, no discovery and scheduling order has yet to have been 

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issued in this action.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) states non-dispositive pretrial matters may be 

decided by a magistrate judge, subject to reconsideration by the district judge. See also Local 

Rule 303(c). The district judge shall, upon reconsideration, modify or set aside any part of the 

magistrate judge’s order which is “found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Local Rule 

303(f); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Discovery motions are non-dispositive pretrial 

motions within the scope of Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and thus subject to the 

“clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review. Rockwell Intern., Inc. v. Pos-ATraction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983). The magistrate judge’s factual 

determinations are reviewed for clear error, and the magistrate judge’s legal conclusions are 

reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to law. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 

1195, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. CIR, 947 

F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). “[R]eview under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly 

deferential, requiring a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” 

Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (quoting 

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “A magistrate judge’s 

decision is ‘contrary to law’ if it applies an incorrect legal standard, fails to consider an element 

of applicable standard, or fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of 

procedure.” Martin v. Loadholt, No. 1:10-cv-00156-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 3563312, at *1 (E.D. 

Cal. July 18, 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Here, the assigned magistrate judge granted plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw deemed 

admissions on two grounds. First, the magistrate judge held the withdrawal of the admissions 

would promote the presentation of the merits of the action because, contrary to defendants’ 

expressed belief, defendants had failed to show the deemed admissions were identical to facts 

stated in plaintiffs’ complaint, discovery responses, or readily obtainable police reports. (Doc. 

No. 45 at 4.) In the same vein, the magistrate judge noted the existence of a public policy 

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favoring resolution of civil rights cases on their merits. (Id. at 4–5 (citing Hernandez v. City of El 

Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998)). Second, the magistrate judge noted withdrawal of the 

admissions would not inflict any prejudice upon defendants. (Id. at 5.) The magistrate judge 

labeled defendants’ claim of prejudice “manufactured,” noting it was based primarily on the 

impact withdrawal would have on the motion for summary judgment defendants had filed just 

before the parties submitted the Joint Statement regarding the discovery dispute. (Id.) The 

magistrate judge also noted withdrawal would not upset the litigation of the action because “[n]o 

Rule 26 discovery plan ha[d] been established, no deadlines for the completion of discovery ha[d] 

been set and no trial ha[d] been scheduled.” (Id.)

In their request for reconsideration, defendants group the deemed admissions into three 

classes. The first class, according to defendants, consists of deemed admissions consistent with 

facts stated in plaintiffs’ complaint or discovery responses. The second class, per defendants, 

consists of deemed admissions consistent with information contained in readily obtainable police 

reports. The third class consists of deemed admissions dealing with ultimate issues of fact. 

According to defendants, the magistrate judge committed clear error in withdrawing the first two 

classes of deemed admissions because they were consistent with facts pled and information 

already provided by plaintiffs or otherwise contained in police reports. Defendants also argue

withdrawal of all three classes constitutes clear error because the magistrate judge failed to 

conduct a proper equitable balancing. 

The court holds the magistrate judge’s decision to withdraw the first and second class of 

deemed admissions was not clearly erroneous. First, defendants’ allegation that the magistrate 

judge “fail[ed] to review the cited evidence” is incorrect. (Doc. No. 49 at 17.) Indeed, as the 

magistrate judge stated in her order:

. . . [d]efendants have not shown how these deemed admissions are 

consistent with facts pled by Plaintiffs, facts included in Plaintiffs’ 

discovery responses or facts available in police report evidence. 

[Citation omitted.] Absent such a showing, the Court will not parse 

through the cited pleadings, discovery responses or police reports to 

verify their purported consistency with the deemed admissions or to 

make factual determinations. 

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(Doc. No. 45 at 4.) The magistrate judge did not refuse to review evidence; she refused to play 

the role of advocate, a job reserved for defendants’ counsel. Furthermore, a review of the 

evidence proffered by defendants in support of their contention reflects that the requested 

admissions are not identical to the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint or the police reports cited 

by defendants.

1 Under these circumstances the court cannot form a “definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Concrete Pipe and Prods., 508 U.S. at 623. 

The court also finds the magistrate judge’s balancing of equity was not clearly erroneous. 

In support of their argument, defendants cite to Federal Rule of Procedure 36(a) and its 

interpretation by the Ninth Circuit in Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 669 

F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1981). (Doc. No. 49 at 16–17.) While the court does not doubt “[c]allous 

disregard of discovery responsibilities cannot be condoned,” Asea, 669 F.2d at 1246, it does not 

find that plaintiffs’ conduct can be categorized as such. As the magistrate judge noted, no pretrial scheduling order has ever been issued in this case. Absent a scheduling order, it not at all 

fair to say plaintiffs have been shucking their discovery responsibilities. Accordingly, the court 

concludes that the magistrate judge’s order was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

IV. Conclusion

For all the reasons stated above, the court denies defendants’ request for reconsideration 

of the magistrate judge’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw admissions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

1

 For example, in Request for Admission No. 8, defendants ask plaintiffs to “[a]dmit that, based 

on Plaintiff’s statement during their call for service at Plaintiff’s residence, Officer Joseph Smith 

and/or Officer Brian Little obtained and/or issued a short-term emergency protective order 

(“EPO”) against Plaintiff’s estranged husband Paul Motley for the benefit of Pamela Motley.” 

(Doc. No. 49-1 at 7.) In support of the pending motion, defendants cite to a portion of plaintiffs’ 

complaint in which it is alleged: “Officer Smith and Little then went to Paul’s residence and 

served him with an emergency protective order that had been issued . . . .” (Id.) But to serve is 

clearly not necessarily the same as to obtain or to issue. 

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