Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-07003/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-07003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACK DAVIDSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security.

Defendant.

No. C 19-07003 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this action seeking judicial review of an agency decision denying plaintiff’s claim for 

Social Security disability benefits, defendant moves to dismiss. Because plaintiff’s complaint is

untimely, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

In March 2016, plaintiff Jack Davidson went to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

to file for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The SSA denied 

plaintiff’s claims, so plaintiff requested a hearing. After the hearing, an administrative law judge 

found that plaintiff did not quality as “disabled” under Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff requested review of the decision from SSA’s 

Appeals Council, which denied the request for review. On August 8, 2019, the SSA sent 

plaintiff a letter explaining that his request for review had been denied and that if he wanted to 

file a civil action challenging the decision, he had 60 days to do so. It also explained that the 60 

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United States District Court

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days would begin upon plaintiff’s receipt of the letter, presumed to be five days after August 8. 

Plaintiff’s counsel apparently received the letter on August 16, which would have made the due 

date October 15. The letter made clear that if plaintiff needed additional time, he could request it 

in writing from the SSA but that such a request would only be granted for “good reason” (Dkt. 

No. 12-1 at 8, 18, 23–24, 27).

On October 24, nine days after the due date, plaintiff’s counsel requested a 30-day 

extension from the SSA. In the request, counsel briefly explained that on August 15, one day 

before his office received the SSA’s decision, “[t]he legal assistant charged with the 

responsibility to calendar all due dates” left the firm. Apparently, “the person who assumed this 

responsibility was not aware of the Appeals Counc[i]l decision” until after the deadline had 

passed. Counsel’s letter did not include any other details. The SSA denied plaintiffs’ request for 

an extension (id. at 27–28). 

On October 25, plaintiff filed a complaint, seeking review of the SSA’s conclusions. The

complaint included no details explaining the delay in filing. In fact, it doesn’t mention a delay of 

any sort (Dkt. No. 1). Defendant Andrew Saul, sued in his capacity as Commissioner of Social 

Security, now moves to dismiss the complaint as untimely. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

ANALYSIS

Defendant’s motion to dismiss argues that plaintiff failed to timely file this complaint. 

Sections 405(g) and (h) of Title 42 of the United States Code govern judicial review of Social 

Security claims. The statute provides that civil actions seeking review must be “commenced 

within sixty days after the mailing to [claimant] of notice of such decision or within such further 

time as the Commissioner may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While the 60-day timeline “is not 

jurisdictional,” it “constitutes a statute of limitations.” Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469 

(1986). Counsel’s receipt on August 16 meant the due date to file an action was October 15. 

Plaintiff filed on October 25, thus making his complaint untimely.

While 60 days remains the applicable statute of limitations, courts may extend the period 

under the doctrine of equitable tolling if “the equities in favor of tolling the limitations period are 

so great that deference to the agency’s judgment is inappropriate.” Id. at 480 (citation and 

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United States District Court

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quotation marks omitted). Our court of appeals has held that equitable tolling “is a very high 

bar, and is reserved for rare cases.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 

2014). The doctrine only applies “in two generally distinct kinds of situations. In the first, the 

plaintiffs were prevented from asserting their claims by some kind of wrongful conduct on the 

part of the defendant. In the second, extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control 

made it impossible to file the claims on time.” Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 931 F.2d 

590, 595 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Nothing in the record indicates any wrongful conduct by the SSA. Thus, if equitable 

tolling applies, it applies because extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for plaintiff or 

his counsel to file a claim or request a deadline within the 60-day period. This question is 

“highly fact-dependent.” Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff, 

however, has provided little in the way of facts.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains no discussion of the circumstances that led to the late filing. 

It does not even mention that plaintiff missed the SSA’s initial deadline or that it neglected to ask 

for an extension until nine days after deadline had passed (Dkt. No. 1). Counsel then submitted a 

copy of the letter to the SSA, requesting an extension. This one-page letter, submitted without 

any explanation, mentioned only that “[t]he legal assistant charged with the responsibility to 

calendar all due dates had left our employ” on August 15, one day before it had received the 

Appeals Council decision and 61 days before the filing deadline. Thus, “the calendaring was not 

noted, and the person who assumed this responsibility was not aware of the Appeals Counc[i]l 

decision” (Dkt. No. 2). In other words, the letter requesting an extension attributed the tardiness 

to a clerical error in counsel’s office.

Our court of appeals has held that counsel’s “negligence in general do[es] not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.” Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 

1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). This does not categorically render equitable estoppel inapplicable in 

all cases of clerical error. For a small office, a shift in personnel combined with illness could be 

extraordinary. Here, however, plaintiff has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances. 

Apart from these two sentences in the letter to the SSA, plaintiff has made no attempt to justify 

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the delay. The record bears no discussion of the size of counsel’s office, the procedure for 

calendaring due dates, or why it took more than 60 days for the office to recognize the oversight. 

The complaint remains silent on this matter, and indeed, plaintiff has not submitted anything to 

oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss. Thus, there is little basis to conclude that plaintiff or his 

counsel faced extraordinary circumstances. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

This motion is based on the operative complaint. Plaintiff is invited to move for leave to 

amend his complaint by APRIL 14, 2020, AT NOON. Plaintiff must plead his best case. His

motion should affirmatively demonstrate how the proposed amended complaint corrects the 

deficiencies identified in this order, as well as any other deficiencies raised in defendant’s

motion but not addressed herein. The motion should be accompanied by a redlined copy of the 

amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2020

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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