Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08230/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08230-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

 Plaintiff David William Perkins seeks judicial review and reversal of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his 

application for Social Security disability benefits. 

I. Background 

 On January 31, 2010, and February 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed applications for Social 

Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and 

Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (AR1

 198-99, 202-08.) Plaintiff alleges that on 

January 22, 2010, he became unable to work due to his disabling condition. (AR 198.) 

On March 11, 2010, the SSA denied Plaintiff’s application (AR 135-42), and on August 

6, 2010, the SSA denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration (AR 144-46). Pursuant to 

Plaintiff’s request (AR 152-53), a hearing was held on January 17, 2012, before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Earl C. Cates, Jr. (AR 44-88). 

 1

 Administrative Record. 

David William Perkins, 

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-13-08230-PCT-SPL

ORDER 

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 Applying the five-step sequential framework,2 on February 1, 2012, the ALJ 

issued a decision ruling that Plaintiff is not disabled and is not entitled to disability 

benefits. (AR 22-35.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since January 22, 2010, his alleged disability onset date. (AR 

24.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

ischemic heart disease, coronary artery disease status post three stents, obesity, and 

tobacco addiction. (Id.) He further found the following impairments were non-severe: 

myopic astigmatism, diabetes, cataract, sleep apnea, orthopedic pain, depression, and 

anxiety. (AR 24-27.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not 

meet or equal one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. (AR 28.) 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity3

(“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to lift twenty-five pounds occasionally 

 2

 To be eligible for Social Security disability benefits, a claimant must show an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 1999). In deciding whether a claimant is disabled and eligible for Social Security disability benefits, an ALJ employs a five-step sequential analysis, determining: 

(1) whether the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted for more than 12 

months; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals one of the listings in the regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity, the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work. 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 

416.920). See also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or 

‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The 

claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four of the sequential process. Id.; Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). At step five, the burden shifts 

to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

3

 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is defined as the most he or she can do 

despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 

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with his left hand; lift twenty-five pounds occasionally with his right hand; lift fifty 

pounds occasionally on an infrequent basis; sit for an hour at one time for a total of six 

out of eight hours in an eight-hour workday; stand for thirty minutes at a time; walk for 

one hundred yards at a time; stand and walk for a total of four hours in an eight hour day; 

and should avoid bending, twisting, and stooping. (AR 28.) Based on Plaintiff’s RFC, 

the ALJ found that he could perform his past work as a customer order clerk, and could 

perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 33-

35.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social 

Security Act. (AR 35.) 

 On July 18, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision, and the decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of the 

SSA. (AR 1-4.) Having exhausted the administrative review process, on September 17, 

2013, Plaintiff sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision by filing a Complaint in this 

Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1.) 

II. Standard of Review 

In reviewing the decision of the ALJ, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision 

unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Orn v. Astrue,

495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; “it 

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence 

that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 

720; Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ is responsible for 

resolving conflicts, ambiguity, and determining credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Where “the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a decision, [the 

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Court] may not substitute its judgment for that of [the ALJ].” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. 

“However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 

630 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court reviews “only the reasons 

provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a 

ground upon which he did not rely.” Id. 

III. Discussion

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and the case be 

remanded for benefits because the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of Plaintiff’s 

treating physicians, and improperly discredited Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 11.) 

In response, Defendant contends that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence and is free of legal error. (Doc. 12.) 

 A. Medical Opinion Evidence 

 “The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 

374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996). In doing so, an ALJ should afford the most weight to the 

treating physician’s opinion, a lesser amount of weight to an examining physician’s 

opinion, and an even lesser amount to a physician who has neither treated nor examined 

the claimant. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 63. Where a treating physician’s opinion is not 

contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” 

reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not be rejected without “specific and 

legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. As with a treating physician, there 

must be clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an 

examining physician, and specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence in the record, for rejecting an examining physician’s contradicted opinion. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The ALJ can “meet this burden by setting out a detailed and 

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 

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thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

 1. Michael Aranda, D.O. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to assign sufficient weight to the 

opinion of his treating physician Michael Aranda, D.O.. Plaintiff reports Dr. Aranda 

began treating him in 2007 for medical conditions of carpal tunnel, back injuries, high 

blood pressure, diabetes, depression, and shoulder injuries. (AR 235.) On January 20, 

2011, Dr. Aranda completed a Multiple Impairment Questionnaire in which he diagnosed 

Plaintiff’s conditions as coronary artery disease, spinal stenosis, and diabetic peripheral 

neuropathy, and listed Plaintiff’s primary symptoms as severe back pain, stiffness, 

decreased sensation, decreased range of motion, extreme fatigue, and leg weakness. (AR 

513-14.) Dr. Aranda opined that Plaintiff can sit, stand, or walk for no more than one 

hour in an eight-hour day; could frequently lift/carry up to 5 pounds, occasionally lift up 

to 20 pounds, and occasionally carry up to 10 pounds; is precluded from performing 

repetitive reaching, handling, fingering, and lifting; and has additional psychological and 

vision limitations. (AR 515-19.) He opined that Plaintiff would be likely to miss work 

more than three days per month due to his impairments. (AR 519.) In a letter dated 

September 26, 2011, Dr. Aranda opined that Plaintiff’s “very complex medical condition 

severely limits his ability to work in any capacity.” (AR 823.) 

 In rejecting his opinion, the ALJ found the “the objective findings in the record do 

not confirm the impairments or limitations alleged by Dr. Aranda.” (AR 32.) The ALJ 

cited that while Dr. Aranda diagnosed Plaintiff with diabetic peripheral neuropathy, the 

record did not confirm his diagnosis and instead, indicated the contrary. In 2010, a nerve 

conduction study reported Plaintiff’s upper extremities as normal, and Plaintiff was 

reported to have “excellent sensation of the hands and feet with no evidence of diabetic 

neuropathy.” (AR 32, 379, 555, 788.) In 2011, Plaintiff specifically reported no 

symptoms of diabetic neuropathy. (AR 32, 705.) 

 The Court finds that the ALJ provided “specific and legitimate” reasons for 

rejecting Dr. Aranda’s opinion, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence 

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in the record.4 The ALJ permissibly rejected the opinion on the basis that it was 

inconsistent with the medical evidence, and he cited the relevant portions of the record 

that supported his reasoning. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff argues that the 

negative EMG “is not particularly relevant” because Dr. Aranda found Plaintiff’s 

“limitations were related primarily to his back and heart problems.” (Doc. 11 at 16.) This 

argument is unavailing however, because it does not detract from the finding that Dr. 

Aranda rendered an opinion that was unsupported by his own findings and was contrary 

to the medical evidence – the very basis upon which the ALJ relied in rejecting the 

opinion. Instead, Plaintiff’s argument only highlights that Dr. Aranda opined that Plaintiff 

was severely limited by a condition that Plaintiff did not largely receive treatment for. 

Therefore, the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the opinion of Dr. Aranda does not 

constitute legal err. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

 2. Shields Stutts, M.D.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to assign sufficient weight to the 

opinion of his treatment physician Baldwin Shields Stutts, M.D.. Plaintiff reports that Dr. 

Stutts began treating him in 2010. On March 6, 2011, Dr. Stutts completed a Cardiac 

Impairment Questionnaire in which he diagnosed Plaintiff with coronary artery disease, 

NYHA Class III, 24 diabetes mellitus, dysmetabolic syndrome X, mixed hyperlipidemia, 

and essential hypertension, and listed Plaintiff’s primary symptoms as “exertional 

dyspnea/pressure.” (AR 522.) He opined that Plaintiff can sit for two hours in an eighthour day, stand or walk for no more than one hour in an eight hour day, and occasionally 

lift/carry up to 20 pounds. (AR 522-27.) He further opined that Plaintiff would miss 

work more than three days per month due to his impairments. (AR 525-26.) 

 The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Stutts on the basis that his findings were 

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 Because Dr. Aranda’s findings are contradicted in the record by examining physicians Robert Barker, M.D. and Stephen C. Gill, Ph.D., the ALJ must only provide “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record for 

rejecting his opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. 

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inconsistent with his treatment records. “In contrast to the persistent limitations alleged 

by Dr. Stutts,” the ALJ cited that his treatment notes indicated that Plaintiff reported no 

fatigue, chest discomfort, shortness of breath, or palpitations. (AR 32. 705-707.) Dr. 

Stutts also opined in the questionnaire that Plaintiff’s prognosis “is reasonably good.” 

(AR 32, 522.) Further, the ALJ found that while he “does have a treating relationship” 

with Plaintiff, “the record reveals that actual treatment visits have been relatively 

infrequent” having seen Plaintiff only once every six months. (AR 32.) 

 The Court finds that the ALJ offered specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

the opinion of Dr. Stutts, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.5

 The ALJ did not err in discrediting Dr. Stutts’ opinion on the basis that it 

conflicted with earlier assessments. As here, “[a] conflict between treatment notes and a 

treating provider’s opinions may constitute an adequate reason to discredit the opinions 

of a treating physician or another treating provider.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 

1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111-12). Nor did he err in relying on 

the infrequency of treatment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“If a treating source’s 

opinion is not given controlling weight, the weight that it will be given is determined by 

length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination... and other factors.”). 

While Plaintiff generally argues Dr. Stutts “provided specific medical findings to support 

his opinions” and “those findings are consistent with the underlying treatment records” 

(Doc. 11 at 18), Dr. Stutts only indicated in the questionnaire that his conclusions were 

“[b]ased upon impression when conversing with patient” (AR 526). See Bray v. Comm'r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The ALJ need not accept the 

opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”) (citation and alteration 

omitted). The Court therefore finds that the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Stutts’ 

medical opinion. 

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 Because Dr. Stutts’ findings are contradicted in the record by the examining physicians, the ALJ must only provide “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting his opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. 

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 B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding Plaintiff’s symptom testimony not 

credible. (Doc. 11 at 20.) To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 

subjective pain or symptoms is credible, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. See 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). “First, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged.’” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 

(9th Cir. 1991)). “Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of 

malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] 

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. 

(quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). The claimant “need not show that [his] impairment 

could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; [he] 

need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. 

(quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282). 

 Plaintiff “alleges persistent limitations dating from a heart attack in January 2010,” 

and that he suffers from fatigue, breathing difficulties, upper and lower back pain, pain in 

his wrists and hands, depression, as well as other conditions. (AR 29, 56-69.) Plaintiff 

testified that he can lift 25 pounds, sit for up to an hour at a time, stand for 30 minutes, 

and walk 100-150 yards at a time. (AR 56-57.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” 

however Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 

of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the... residual 

functional capacity assessment.” (AR 30.) 

 The ALJ discredited the severity of Plaintiff’s pain allegations on four grounds. 

First, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. (AR 30.) While Plaintiff testified that 

he experiences difficulty and pain when grasping and holding onto things, such as a cane, 

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the ALJ cited that he was able to drive both the family vehicle and ride his motorcycle 

several times per month. (AR 29, 30, 57, 67-68.) Similarly, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff 

testified that he has limited strength and can only carry 25 pounds, yet “rides a Harley 88 

cubic and 1350 CCs [which] has to be fairly heavy to keep upright.”(AR 31.) Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ erred in relying on his daily activities to assess his credibility because 

those activities have no apparent bearing on his ability to perform in the workplace. The 

ALJ did not err in failing to discuss whether Plaintiff’s activities were transferable to the 

workplace because his reasoning did not rely on Plaintiff’s functional ability to perform 

them. Rather, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s activities because they contradicted his other 

testimony, which diminished his credibility as a whole. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 639 

(discussing that there are “two grounds for using daily activities to form the basis of an 

adverse credibility determination...” i.e., (1) daily activities contradict other testimony, or 

(2) daily activities involve skills transferrable to the workplace). Therefore, the ALJ did 

not commit error in relying on Plaintiff’s daily activities to discount his symptom 

testimony. 

 Second, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s symptom allegations because he found it 

inconsistent with the treatment notes. The ALJ cited numerous records in which 

Plaintiff’s conditions were reported to have improved or were well-controlled with 

treatment. (AR 25-26, 29-31.) See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(finding substantial evidence supported credibility finding where ALJ found claimant 

responded well to treatment); Warre v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not 

disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”). Third, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s infrequent medical visits undermined the credibility of his pain 

symptoms. The ALJ cited that since January 2010, the record reveals relatively infrequent 

trips to the doctor, and he reported that he has follow-up visits and testing only about 

every four to six months. (AR 30-31.) See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (evidence of 

minimal, conservative treatment is sufficient to discount the severity of symptom 

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allegations) (citing Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007)). The ALJ also 

did not err in relying on these reasons to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. 

 Lastly, in his credibility determination the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s failure to 

follow treatment, citing Plaintiff’s failure to follow medical advice to discontinue 

smoking. (AR 31.) In assessing credibility, “the ALJ may properly rely on ‘unexplained 

or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Smolen, 

80 F.3d at 1284)). Citing Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2000), Plaintiff 

argues that smoking is an addictive habit and a failure to quit is an unreliable basis on 

which the ALJ could rest his credibility determination. Here, “[i]t is certainly possible 

that [Plaintiff] was so addicted to cigarettes that [he] continued smoking even in the face 

of debilitating shortness of breath... Even so, the ALJ presented [] other independent 

bases for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, and each finds ample support in the record. 

Thus, the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s continued smoking, even if erroneous, amounts to 

harmless error.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

finding Plaintiff’s testimony not credible, and therefore did not err in discrediting the 

severity of his subjective complaints. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Valentine v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). 

IV. Conclusion 

 In sum, the Court has considered the record as a whole, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. The Court 

concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from 

reversible error. Accordingly, 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this 

action. 

 Dated this 19th day of December, 2014.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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