Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01956/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01956-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Ronnie O’Neal Brown,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 02-1956 FCD PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Richard E. Early, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff filed this civil rights action in September 2002. 

The court determined that he stated a claim for relief against

Dr. Rhoads and David G. Smith for denying adequate medical care. 

May 11, 2004, the court made an order authorizing defendant

to examine plaintiff or any other prisoner at deposition. 

September 22, 2004, the court made a scheduling order including a

deadline of January 14, 2005, for completing all discovery and

resolving disputes about discovery.

December 29, 2004, defendant duly noticed plaintiff’s 

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deposition at the Attorney General’s office in Sacramento. 

January 14, 2005, defendant moved to dismiss the action for

plaintiff’s failure to attend. February 8, 2005, the court

denied the motion to dismiss and made an order authorizing

defendant again to notice plaintiff’s deposition in Sacramento,

where plaintiff resides or at any other place the parties agreed. 

The court warned that if plaintiff failed to move to change the

venue or failed to appear severe sanctions, probably dismissal of

his action, would result.

March 10, 2005, defendants again moved to dismiss. 

Defendants alleged they had again duly noticed plaintiff’s

deposition in Sacramento on February 23, 2005, and he again

failed to appear. In a June 7, 2005, order the court again

refused to dismiss the action. The court found that plaintiff

had been arrested for violation of his parole one-half hour

before he was to appear to testify, that his failure to appear

was not willful. The court again authorized defendants to notice

plaintiff’s deposition and warned of sanctions for failure to

appear.

June 15, 2005, defendants again noticed plaintiff’s

deposition at a jail near San Bernardino where plaintiff was

confined. Plaintiff then notified defendants in categorical

terms that he would not testify at deposition because the

discovery deadline had passed and defendants had failed to

provide reciprocal discovery. In the interim, defendants also

had learned that plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ March 10

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motion was grossly misleading. Plaintiff had been arrested on

the morning of February 23 but notwithstanding the day before his

parole officer had given plaintiff $200 to travel to Sacramento

for the deposition, within 50 minutes of the time scheduled for

him to appear in Sacramento, plaintiff was in Victorville,

California, 375 miles from Sacramento, where he was arrested for

forgery and writing bad checks.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) permits dismissal of an action

if a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) allows dismissal for failure of the

plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with the federal rules or any

order of court. Dismissal, however, is a harsh penalty and

should only be imposed in extreme circumstances. See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992).

In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to

comply with a court order, or for failure to prosecute, district

courts must weigh five factors: (1) the public interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. 

Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th

Cir. 1987) (failure to comply with court order); Henderson v.

Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to

prosecute). The same five factors are considered whether a

motion is brought under Rule 16(f), Rule 37(b), or Rule 41(b), or

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whether a court is relying on its inherent powers. See Adriana

Intern. Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412, n.4 (9th Cir.

1990) (relying on the Malone factors and stating “that dismissal

sanctions under Rule 37 and a court’s inherent powers are

similar. We, therefore, use cases involving dismissal under Rule

37 and inherent powers interchangeably.”); U.S. for Use and Ben.

of Wiltec Guam, Inc. v. Kahaluu Const. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 600,

603 (9th Cir. 1988) (using the Malone factors to decide a Rule

37(b) motion); Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 (“The standards governing

dismissal for failure to obey a court order are basically the

same under either of these rules [16(f) and 41(b)]”). The Ninth

Circuit has suggested that dismissal is proper when at least four

factors support dismissal or where at least three factors

“strongly” support dismissal. See Hernandez v. City of El Monte,

138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The first two factors weigh in favor of dismissal because

plaintiff’s failure to testify at deposition in violation of the

court’s several orders has both impeded resolution of this case

and prevented the court from adhering to its trial schedule. See

Malone, 833 F.2d at 131. Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation has

made timely resolution of his complaint and adherence to a

reasonable trial schedule impossible.

Dismissal is also warranted under the third factor because

plaintiff’s intransigence has presumptively prejudiced

defendants. See Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423. A dismissal for

lack of prosecution must be supported by a showing of

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unreasonable delay but unreasonable delay creates a presumption

of injury to the defense. Id. Plaintiff’s unresponsiveness has

caused unreasonable delay, prejudicing defendants. See id.

Courts often decide that dismissal is improper under the

fourth factor because strong public policy concerns usually favor

resolution of claims on their merits. Dahl v. City of Huntington

Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). In this case, however,

plaintiff’s refusal to testify, his deception and his willful

violation of the court’s orders frustrate public policy concerns

and make continuing the matter impracticable by completely

interfering with the rightful disposition of the case. Valley

Engineers, Inc., v. Electrical Engineering, 158 F.3d 1051, 1056-

57 (9th Cir. 1998).

Finally, dismissal is appropriate under the fifth factor

because the court has already considered, and employed, less

drastic alternatives. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 132. The

following factors are of particular relevance in determining

whether a district court has considered alternatives to

dismissal: “(1) Did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility

of less drastic sanctions and explain why alternative sanctions

would be inadequate? (2) Did the court implement alternative

methods of sanctioning or curing the malfeasance before ordering

dismissal? (3) Did the court warn the plaintiff of the

possibility of dismissal before actually ordering dismissal?” 

Id. Malone specifically identifies a warning, a fine or the

imposition of costs or attorney fees as appropriate alternative

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sanctions. Id., n.1. 

This court has repeatedly warned plaintiff that he risked

dismissal by failing to comply with the court’s orders. Warning

a plaintiff that failure to obey a court order will result in

dismissal satisfies the requirement the court consider

alternatives. See Buss v. Western Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d

1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985);

Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6

(3d Cir. 1982). Here, imposing lesser sanctions of fines or

attorney fees would be wholly inadequate because plaintiff

proceeds in forma pauperis and would likely be unable to pay any

monetary sanctions the court might impose. Dismissal at this

stage is not premature because plaintiff can hardly be surprised

by a harsh sanction in response to his deception and willful

violation of the court’s several orders. Given plaintiff’s

unwillingness to prosecute, delaying dismissal would mean the

case would sit, inactive, indefinitely. Thus, dismissal is

justified because less drastic sanctions have proved ineffective

and are not feasible. See id.

Each of the five relevant factors weigh in favor of

dismissal. See Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399. Accordingly, I

recommend that plaintiff’s action be dismissed.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and 

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recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 2, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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