Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-02437/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-02437-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LOTU T. OSOTONU, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DANIEL P. LICHAU, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 17-cv-02437-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 35 

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a former detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. His claims arise from an arrest in the city of American Canyon. Plaintiff alleges 

that the defendant police officer unlawfully detained, searched and arrested him and used 

excessive force. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment stating this action 

is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and, in the alternative, that 

plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law and that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff is no longer in the custody of the county jail, has failed to update the court with 

his address, and has failed to file an opposition. Regardless, the court has looked to the 

merits of the motion, and for the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Summary Judgment Standard 

 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show 

that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may 

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

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reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence 

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When 

the moving party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond 

the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough 

evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id. The court 

must regard as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other 

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 

1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 

952 F.2d 1551, 1559 (9th Cir. 1991). 

B. Heck v. Humphrey 

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction 

or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 

by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. 

C. Fourth Amendment Standard 

The Fourth Amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 

Const. amend. IV; Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995). The 

ultimate test of reasonableness requires the court to balance the governmental interest 

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that justifies the intrusion and the level of intrusion into the privacy of the individual. 

Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1496 (9th Cir. 1996). State 

law is irrelevant in this calculus. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (no 4th 

Amendment violation where arrest was based on probable cause but state law called for 

issuance of a citation rather than arrest). 

In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, one “must demonstrate 

that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his 

expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has 'a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 

either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that 

are recognized and permitted by society.'" Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) 

(Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978))). 

The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported by probable cause. 

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 

692, 700 (1981) (an arrest is unlawful unless there is probable cause to support it). A 

claim of unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure if the allegation is that 

the arrest was without probable cause or other justification. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 

U.S. 547, 555-58 (1967); Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014, n.1. (9th 

Cir. 2015) (absence of probable cause is essential element of § 1983 false arrest claim). 

Officers may rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to defend themselves against a 

constitutional tort action for false arrest. Lingo v. City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (finding officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff when they smelled 

marijuana coming from her home even where the original search was unlawful). 

 An allegation of the use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in 

effectuating an arrest states a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rutherford v. City 

of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Graham 

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Excessive force claims that arise in the context of an 

arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment 

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reasonableness standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95. 

D. Facts 

The following facts are undisputed except where indicated otherwise:1

On the evening of March 3, 2017, defendant Deputy Lichau was assigned to patrol the 

city of American Canyon. Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”), Lichau Decl. ¶ 2. 

Defendant was in full uniform driving a marked police car. Id. Defendant observed 

plaintiff and another individual seated in a parked car (“the parked car” with the driver’s 

door open, inside the parking lot of a Safeway). Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendant parked the police 

car and approached the parked car on foot when he noticed that the steering column of 

the parked car was dismantled and exposed wires were showing. Id. ¶ 3. Based on 

defendant’s training and experience he suspected the car was stolen. Id. Defendant 

also detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from the car and noticed that plaintiff’s 

eyes were bloodshot and watery. Id. Based on defendant’s training and experience, this 

is an objective sign of intoxication. Id. Defendant also noticed that the passenger 

window was broken, which furthered his suspicion that the car was stolen. Id. 

Defendant spoke with plaintiff and the passenger and asked for plaintiff’s driver’s 

license. Video 1 (Docket No. 36) at 00:16-00:31; RJN at 139. 2 Plaintiff stated his driver’s 

license was suspended following an accident. Id.; RJN at 139-40. Defendant asked who 

the car belonged to. Plaintiff stated that he “sort of bought it,” while the passenger stated, 

“sort of but not for sure.” Id. at 00:50-01:00; RJN at 140. Defendant asked if plaintiff had 

insurance; plaintiff denied that he had any. Id. at 03:58-04:04; RJN at 143. Plaintiff also 

admitted he had recently been arrested for driving under the influence. Id. at 04:55-

05:39; RJN at 144. Plaintiff also admitted to smoking marijuana approximately five hours 

before driving. Id. at 05:39-06:40; RJN at 145. Police dispatch confirmed that plaintiff’s 

 

1 The court has also viewed video footage of the arrest from defendant’s body camera 

and reviewed the transcript of the video. Docket No. 36; Request for Judicial Notice 

(“RJN”) Ex. 1 at 139-48. 

2 The court takes judicial notice of these public records. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

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driver’s license was suspended. Lichau Decl. ¶ 5. 

Defendant asked plaintiff to get out of the vehicle and whether plaintiff had any 

weapons on him. Video 1 06:45-07:07; RJN at 146. Plaintiff stated, “I have something of 

hers [the passenger]”. Id.; RJN at RJN at 146. Defendant patted down plaintiff and felt a 

hard metal object in plaintiff’s left breast pocket. Lichau Decl. ¶ 5. Defendant asked what 

it was, and plaintiff stated it was his “twenty-two.” Id.; RJN at 146. Defendant retrieved a 

loaded .25 caliber firearm from plaintiff and then handcuffed plaintiff. Lichau Decl. at ¶¶ 

5-6. Defendant also recovered hydrocodone pills, methamphetamine and additional 

ammunition for the firearm. Id. At no point in the interaction did plaintiff complain of 

severe pain in his wrists or that the handcuffs were too tight. 

Plaintiff was charged for possessing the gun and the drugs. RJN, Ex. 1 at 192-96. 

Plaintiff later pled no contest to illegally possessing the gun and drugs. Id. at 41-44. He 

was sentenced to prison for six years. Id. at 4. 

E. Analysis 

Heck 

Plaintiff pled no contest to possessing the gun and the drugs stemming from his 

search and arrest. This civil rights action calls into question the validity of the search and 

arrest. Because the conviction has not been reversed or invalidated, plaintiff cannot 

proceed. This action is barred by Heck. 

Fourth Amendment 

Even if this action was not barred by Heck, a review of the merits shows that 

defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Defendant has presented an abundance of 

evidence demonstrating that the search and arrest were supported by probable cause. 

Plaintiff has not opposed the motion or presented any arguments in response to it. 

Defendant observed plaintiff in a parked car with the door open and with wires hanging 

out of a damaged steering column and a broken window. Plaintiff and his passenger had 

no proof of ownership and admitted that they were not sure if they owned the car. 

Plaintiff also admitted he had a suspended license, no proof of insurance, and that he 

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had been smoking marijuana before driving. Suspecting that the car was stolen, 

defendant acted reasonably in patting down plaintiff and handcuffing him after feeling and 

then finding the gun. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate there is a genuine issue for trial 

with respect to the search and arrest. 

Furthermore, a review of the video of the arrest does not show any incidents of 

excessive force or plaintiff in obvious distress due to tight handcuffs that would set forth a 

constitutional claim. While plaintiff presented allegations of excessive force in his verified 

complaint, he has not addressed the video footage that was presented with the motion for 

summary judgment and which contradicts his claim. “When opposing parties tell two 

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for 

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 

380-83 (2007) (police officer entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity 

in light of video evidence capturing plaintiff’s reckless driving in attempting to evade 

capture which utterly discredits plaintiff’s claim that there was little or no actual threat to 

innocent bystanders). For all these reasons defendant is entitled to summary judgment 

on the merits. 

Qualified Immunity 

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability 

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Defendants can 

have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law requires in 

any given situation. Id. at 205. A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must 

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right 

and whether such right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a 

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reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the two-part 

test that required determining a deprivation first and then deciding whether such right was 

clearly established, as required by Saucier). The court may exercise its discretion in 

deciding which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each 

case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

The court has not found a constitutional violation, and, even if there was a 

violation, defendant would be entitled to qualified immunity. It would not be clear to a 

reasonable police officer that searching and arresting the plaintiff based on the evidence 

described above would violate the law. Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 

35) is GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 13, 2019 

 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

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