Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01140/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01140-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERRILL OXFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

SARA LEE BAKING GROUP, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

CIV F 05-1140 AWI LJO

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Merrill Oxford (“Oxford”) filed suit against his former employer, Defendant

Sara Lee Baking Group, Inc. (“Sara Lee”). Oxford’s complaint was originally filed in state court,

but was removed to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. In his complaint,

Oxford alleges claims for: (1) wrongful termination under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., (“ADEA”), and the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act, California Government Code § 1200 et. seq., (“FEHA”); (2) termination in

violation of public police under California Government Code § 12920; (3) breach of employment

contract; (4) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (5) fraud and deceit; (6) promise

without intent to perform; (7) concealment; and (8) negligent misrepresentation. Sara Lee has

filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. Oxford has filed no opposition or response. 

Because Sara Lee’s motion has shifted the burden to Oxford and Oxford has submitted no

evidence or created any genuine disputed material facts, Sara Lee’s motion will be granted.

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Because Oxford has filed no opposition to the motion for summary judgment, no separate statement of 1

undisputed facts, and no opposition to Sara Lee’s proposed undisputed facts, the factual background comes from

Sara Lee’s Undisputed Material Facts (DUMF) and the evidence submitted in support of the DUMF’s.

2

SUBMITTED UNDISPUTED BACKGROUND1

Oxford is 61 years old and began working for Rainbow Bakery in 1964 as a route delivery

salesman. DUMF No. 1. His immediate supervisor was Route Sales Supervisor Larry Best. Id. 

Best reported to Harold Irby who was the Interim Manager of the Sales Division. Id. Irby

reported to Chris Castro, the General Sales Manager. Id. Prior to Oxford’s early retirement in

July 2003, the company was bought by Earth Grains, which was then bought by Sara Lee. Id. 

The complaint does not contain any allegation that Oxford exhausted the administrative

remedies provided by the FEHA or the EEOC. DUMF No. 2.

In the complaint, Oxford identifies six specific instances that created a hostile work

environment or constituted discrimination based on his age (40 +) and that led to his constructive

discharge. Those instances are: (1) around January 1998, Oxford was falsely accused of sexual

harassment; (2) in March 2002, Oxford was verbally abused by one of his supervisors; (3) in

April 2002, Oxford was falsely accused of sexual harassment; (4) Oxford was publically

humiliated by one of his supervisors; (5) Oxford was compared to other less reputable salesmen;

and (6) Oxford’s delivery truck was taken away and was replaced with a smaller truck that had

not been cleaned and was filthy. Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 13. The incidents referred to in

paragraph 13 of the Complaint were not motivated by plaintiffs age and plaintiff was not

disabled. DUMF No. 10. 

The January 1998 sexual harassment incident involved a complaint by an employee

named Rozalind Taylor. See DUMF No. 3; Ratliff Declaration Exhibit A5. Sara Lee determined

that the alleged harassment did not occur and told Oxford that they “appreciated the great job”

that he was doing for them. Ratliff Declaration Exhibit A3. Any communication between

Oxford, Irby, and Best regarding Rozalind Taylor’s January 1998 accusation of sexual

harassment were isolated, trivial and not motivated by age or disability. DUMF No. 3.

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Also, sometime between 2000 and 2003, Irby told Oxford that Irby said that he and Best may stop by and 2

see Oxford’s wife. See Oxford Deposition at 67:12-21; 102:19-103:9. The insinuation was apparent and offensive

to Oxford. See id. Irby apparently made similar comments to at least one other employee. See id. at 67:22-25.

3

The March 2002 verbal abuse incident involved punching a time card and overtime. See

Oxford Deposition at 80:7-85:14. Specifically, Best told Oxford words to the effect that Oxford

was to stay away from the time clock and that Best would punch Oxford’s card. See id. Oxford

reported the incident to Chris Castro who conducted a meeting on the subject. See id. Best

admitted telling Oxford not to punch his card, and Castro reacted very negatively to Best’s

admission. See id. Castro then discussed Sara Lee’s rules and reiterated that employees were to

punch their own time cards. See id. The March 2002 time clock incident was isolated, trivial

and not motivated by age or disability. DUMF No. 4.

Oxford was never accused of sexual harassment in April 2002. See DUMF No. 5; Ratliff

Declaration Exhibit A-1 at p. 136:6-11.

The public humiliation referenced in the fourth subsection of Paragraph 13 in the

complaint appears to deal with three incidents. The first occurred between 2000 and 2003 where

Harold Irby drove behind Oxford, blinked and honked at Oxford to stop the delivery truck, and

Oxford pulled to the side and got out of his truck. See Oxford Deposition at 92:19-93:9, 98:8-16. 

Irby then yelled and screamed at Oxord in public, “Liberty School called. Why haven’t you been

there? , , , I have a meeting with someone. Why the hell haven’t you been by there?” Id. The

second incident occurred between 2002 and 2003 at a sales meeting involving Sara Lee’s

delivery drivers. See id. at 95:3-96:25, 97:6-21. A supervisor was talking and Oxford was

asking the supervisor a question. See id. Irby then yelled from his office 15 feet away, “Oxford,

shut your fucking mouth. No one can hear [the supervisor] talk.” See id. The third incident

occurred between 1998 and 2003 at a “sales room checking in.” See id. at 98:23-99:25. In front

of other employees, Irby stuck up two fingers and said, “Oxford, I found two out of code bread in

Food 4 Less today.” Id. The public humiliation or embarrassment experienced by Oxford from

these incidents were isolated, trivial, and not motivated by age or disability. DUMF No. 6. 2

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The alleged comparison between Oxford with less reputable salesmen occurred at Cost

Less Groceries shortly before Oxford’s retirement in 2003. See Oxford Deposition at 43:16-

45:20; Defendant’s Motion at 10:18-19. Irby was present at the grocery store and found bread

that had been placed by the wrong signs. See id. Irby warned that the grocery manager could get

in trouble, and then proceeded to place bread on the racks himself. See id. Oxford saw that Irby

placed bread under the wrong sign and reiterated Irby’s own warning back to Irby. See id. In

front of the grocery manager, Irby then described Oxford as being delivery driver Kurtz. See id. 

Kurtz was apparently known as the worst delivery driver and had a very poor reputation with that

grocery manager. See id. The comparison with the less reputable salesman was isolated, trivial,

and not motivated by age or disability. DUMF No. 7. 

The older delivery truck incident occurred sometime between 1998 and 2003. See

Oxford Deposition at 48:3-49:25. Oxford had cleaned his truck and showed Irby the results. See

id. Irby criticized Oxford’s parking of the truck and did not comment on the cleanliness of the

vehicle. See id. Several days later, Oxford was assigned an older truck that had not been cleaned

and had dirt inside, dirt on the outside, and spilled soda on the dashboard. See id. The

replacement delivery truck incident was isolated, trivial, and not motivated by age or disability. 

See DUMF No. 8. 

No one at Sara Lee did anything to prevent Oxford from performing his duties or to

reduce his earnings, hours or benefits, and Oxford always had the same job functions. DUMF

No. 11. No one lied or misrepresented anything to Oxford. Id. Oxford was not disciplined

during the times alleged in the complaint. Id. The terms and conditions of Oxford’s employment

were not affected by the alleged conduct of Irby or Best. Id. Other than the 1998 claim of

harassment by Ms. Taylor, no one else complained about Oxford’s conduct at Sara Lee. Id. No

one at Sara Lee tried to prevent Oxford from receiving the benefits he was entitled to after he

retired. DUMF No. 12. Other than the March 2002 time clock incident, Oxford is not aware of

anything done by Sara Lee which amounted to a violation of the contract. DUMF No. 13. 

Oxford had neither problems with nor criticisms of, the Sales Manager, Chris Castro, and

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Oxford believed that Castro was an honest person. DUMF No. 14. Whenever Oxford reported a

problem, Castro would meet with Oxford and try to resolve Oxford’s concerns. Id. Prior to

Oxford’s retirement, Castro asked Oxford not to retire. DUMF No. 15. 

No discovery has been conducted by Oxford and no experts have been designated. 

DUMF No. 16.

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v.

American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755

F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985). Where summary judgment requires the court to apply law to

undisputed facts, it is a mixed question of law and fact. See Sousa v.Unilab Corp. Class II (NonExempt) Members Group Benefit Plan, 252 F. Supp.2d 1046, 1049 (E.D. Cal. 2002). Where the

case turns on a mixed question of law and fact and the only dispute relates to the legal

significance of the undisputed facts, the controversy for trial collapses into a question of law that

is appropriate for disposition on summary judgment. See Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d

1519, 1523 (9th Cir. 1994); Sousa, 252 F.Supp.2d at 1049.

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

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nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving party has

no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden

of persuasion.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th

Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets it initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d

at 1103; Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1982); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles,

607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986);

Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Assn, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir.

2002). A “genuine issue of material fact” arises when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Thrifty Oil,

322 F.3d at 1046. 

In attempting to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank,

391 U.S. at 289; Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2001). However,

the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is

sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; Hopper v. City

of Pasco, 248 F.3d 1067, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for

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trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 650 F.2d 129, 132 (9th

Cir. 1982).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. See Rule

56(c); Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1079-80. The court has the discretion in appropriate circumstances

to consider materials that are not properly brought to its attention, but the court is not required to

examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact where the

evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references. See Southern Cal. Gas

Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified

Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587; Stegall v. Citadel Broad, Inc., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328

F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092-93 (E.D. Cal. 2004); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d

993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply

because a litigant claims that one exist or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del

Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Bryant v. Adventist

Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). If the nonmoving party

fails to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is

entitled to summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103.

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 DEFENDANT’S MOTION

1. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – Wrongful or Constructive Discharge Under the 

 ADEA and FEHA

Prior to filing suit under either the ADEA or FEHA, a plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies and file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) for claims under the ADEA or file a complaint with the Department of

Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) for claims under FEHA. See Legnani v. Alitalia Linee

Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001); Sanchez v. Pacific Powder Co., 147

F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998); Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir.

1990); Morgan v. Regents of the University of California, 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 (2000); Balloon

v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1120 (1995). Defendants have raised the issue of

Oxford’s compliance with the ADEA and FEHA exhaustion of administrative remedies

requirements. See Ratliff Declaration at ¶ 2. However, Oxford has not responded and there is no

indication that he filed claims with the EEOC or DFEH. Because Oxford has not shown that he

exhausted administrative remedies, summary judgment on this cause of action is granted.

2. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - Constructive Discharge In Violation of Public 

 Policy

Oxford relies on California Government Code § 12920 and alleges that he was harassed,

discriminated and retaliated against by Sara Lee on the basis of age, and that Sara Lee failed to

take action to prevent the harassment. Sara Lee argues that this cause of action, although not

labeled as such, is one for constructive discharge in violation of public policy because the

complaint focuses on the allegedly forced retirement or “discharge” of Oxford in July 2003. 

Given the lack of opposition, the Court accepts Sara Lee’s interpretation of the cause of action. 

“Constructive discharge occurs only when the employer coerces the employee’s

resignation, either by creating working conditions that are intolerable under an objective

standard, or by failing to remedy objectively intolerable working conditions that actually are

known to the employer.” Mullins v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 15 Cal. 4th 731, 737 (1997). 

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The conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary

and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and

reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or

her employer. The proper focus is on whether the resignation was coerced, not

whether it was simply one rational option for the employee. An employee may

not be unreasonably sensitive to his [or her] working environment . . . . Every job

has its frustrations, challenges, and disappointments; these inhere in the nature of

work. An employee is protected from . . . unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess

of those faced by his [or her] co-workers. He [or she] is not, however, guaranteed

a working environment free of stress. 

 Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1246-47 (1994). Thus, reductions in pay, or

criticisms of work performance, as well as single, isolated and trivial acts of misconduct, or

demotions are generally insufficient to support a claim for constructive discharge. See id.;

Casenas v. Fujisawa USA, Inc., 58 Cal.App.4th 101, 1116-17 (1997); Cloud v. Casey, 76

Cal.App.4th 895, 902-03 (1999); Gibson v. Aro Corp., 32 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1636-37 (1995). 

“An actual or constructive discharge in violation of fundamental public policy gives rise to a tort

action in favor of the terminated employee,” and “to sustain a claim of wrongful discharge in

violation of fundamental public policy, [the plaintiff] must prove that his dismissal violated a

policy that is (1) fundamental, (2) beneficial for the public, and (3) embodied in a statute or

constitutional provision.” Turner, 7 Cal.4th at 1252, 1256; see also Colores v. Board of Trustees,

105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1306-07 (2003). The public policy against age discrimination in FEHA

may support a common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 

Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 880, 897 (1997).

As applied in this case, the evidence presented fails to show such an objectively egregious

work environment that a reasonable person in Oxford’s position would feel compelled to quit. 

The evidence at most shows isolated, intermittent criticisms of Oxford’s work performance by a

manager. Cf. Turner, 7 Cal.4th at 1246-47; Casenas, 58 Cal.App.4th at 1116-17; Gibson, 32

Cal.App.4th 1628, 1636-37. The 1998 sexual harassment claim was resolved in Oxford’s favor,

there was no 2002 allegation of sexual harassment, it appears that Oxford’s use of the small,

“dirty” delivery truck was an isolated occurrence, and the approximately four instances of public

humiliation (comparison with Kurtz, Liberty School delivery, asking a question, and the out of

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Oxford’s complaint contains a numbering error. There are a total of eight causes of action pled, but there 3

is no third cause of action.

10

code bread) all deal with criticisms of Oxford’s job performance and appear to have spanned a

five year period. Moreover, there is no evidence that any of the criticisms or events identified in

the complaint occurred because of, or on the basis of, Oxford’s age. None of the criticisms

reference age and Oxford himself testified that he did not believe that harassment was due to age. 

See Oxford Deposition at 131:24-132:17. Because the evidence presented does not indicate

improper conduct motivated by Oxford’s age, and because the evidence presented does not show

sufficiently extraordinary or egregious conditions that could support a finding of constructive

discharge, summary judgment on this claim is granted.

3. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Breach of Contract3

Oxford alleges in his complaint that there existed an implied in fact contract between

himself and Sara Lee. This implied contract allegedly included the following terms: (1) Oxford

would be treated fairly, equitably, impartially, without harassment or discrimination or

retaliation, and in compliance with Sara Lee’s policies and procedures; (2) Sara Lee would base

all employment decisions so as to further the principles of equal employment opportunity,

including equal treatment based on age; (3) all personnel actions would be administered without

regard to age; (4) Sara Lee would provide a work environment free of age and disability

harassment; (5) Sara Lee would provide a work environment free of age discrimination; (6)

Oxford could work in an environment free of harassment and discrimination based on age; (7)

Sara Lee would promptly and thoroughly investigate all charges of discrimination and

harassment; (8) Sara Lee would take effective action to prevent harassment and discrimination;

(9) Oxford could continue his employment indefinitely as long as he performed satisfactorily;

(10) as long as Oxford performed satisfactorily, his employment would not end and his job duties

would not be reassigned except for good cause; (11) Sara Lee would not evaluate Oxford’s work

in an arbitrary or capricious manner (12) Sara Lee would not take actions to prevent Oxford from

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Although Oxford appears to have testified that the March 2002 time clock incident may have violated his 4

contract (not all of the pages supporting DUMF No. 13 have been provided), Oxford has presented no evidence that

the March 2002 clock incident actually constitutes a breach of contract. There is no evidence that Oxford lost pay,

that Oxford was prevented further from punching his own time card after the meeting with Castro, or that shows how

many (if any) days Oxford was unable to punch his own time card. In fact, the incident appears to have been

properly resolved internally through the meeting with Castro, which apparently occurred within two days of Castro

receiving the complaint. See Ratliff Declaration Exhibit A4. The isolated March 2002 time clock incident, which

was successfully resolved internally, does not appear to constitute a breach of contract. 

11

performing his duties; and (13) if Oxford was involuntarily terminated, Sara Lee would not

unreasonably attempt to prevent Oxford from receiving benefits. See Complaint at ¶ 28.

Sara Lee moves for summary judgment on the basis that there is no evidence that any of

these implied conditions were ever breached. Sara Lee is correct. During the relevant time

period as alleged in the complaint, 1998 to 2003, the evidence indicates that Oxford’s pay,

benefits, and vacation were not decreased, his hours worked and the overall conditions and terms

of employment did not change, he maintained the same position, he maintained the same job

functions and no one prevented him from doing his job, no one lied or misrepresented anything

to Oxford during his employment, Oxford was never written up regarding any incidents

involving Irby or Best, there is no evidence that Oxford was disciplined, Oxford was asked not to

retire, and no one prevented Oxford from obtaining benefits. See DUMF Nos. 11-15. Further, 4

as discussed above, there is no evidence that any harassment based on age occurred, and Oxford

was not constructively discharged. At the summary judgment stage, where the moving party has

met its initial burden, the opposing party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its

pleadings, but instead is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits,

and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that a dispute exists. Willis,

244 F.3d at 682. Because Oxford has not presented evidence that indicates a breach of an

implied contract, summary judgment on this claim is granted. 

5. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair 

 Dealing

The complaint relies on the implied employment contract discussed in the Fourth Cause

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of Action as the basis for this claim. See Complaint at ¶ 36. Sara Lee moves for summary

judgment on the basis that there was no breach of a contract and that there is no evidence that the

conduct relied upon was a breach or ever even occurred. 

Sara Lee is correct. Assuming that there was an implied employment contract, there is no

evidence that Sara Lee breached the terms of that contract. Because there is no breach of the

implied employment contract, there is no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

See MDTV Med. News, Inc. v. Weinstock, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8806, *14-*15 (N.D. Cal.

2007); Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Ca1.4th 317, 349-50 (2000); Flait v. North Am. Watch Corp.,

3 Cal.App.4th 467, 481 (1992); Los Angeles Equestrian Center, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 17

Cal.App.4th 432, 447 (1993); cf. Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1344

(2000) (requiring a new trial where jury findings of breach of good faith covenant but no breach

of employment contract were inconsistent). Summary judgment on this claim is granted.

6. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Fraud & Deceit/Intentional Misrepresentation

The complaint alleges that Sara Lee fraudulently represented that it would: (1) provide

Oxford, as a disabled employee over 40, with an environment free of discrimination; (2)

effectively address and remedy any of Oxford’s employment complaints and concerns in a

prompt manner and that he would feel comfortable raising concerns or complaints to

management; (3) judge Oxford solely based on merit and work performance; and (4) provide

Oxford with secure employment as long as he performed his duties. See Complaint at ¶ 41.

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a)

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity

(or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e)

resulting damage.” Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (1996). As in the previous

causes of action, Oxford has presented no evidence supporting this claim, and the evidence

presented does not indicate that any misrepresentations occurred. See DUMF No. 11. The

evidence does not show a hostile work environment or discrimination based on age, does not

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show that Oxford’s complaints were ignored, does not show that Oxford could not bring

concerns to management, does not show that Oxford was improperly evaluated, and does not

show that his employment was insecure. See DUMF Nos. 11, 14-15. Because Oxford has

provided no evidence of misrepresentations, summary judgment on this claim is granted.

7. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Promise Without Intent to Perform

The allegations for this cause of action rely on the four “misrepresentations” outlined in

the Sixth Cause of Action. See Complaint at ¶ 49 (expressly relying on the representations

“outlined in Paragraph 41”). The complaint alleges in part that these promises were made to

induce Oxford into accepting Sara Lee’s offer of employment when in fact Sara Lee had no

intention of performing these promises.

A fraudulent deceit may be “a promise, made without intention of performing it.” Cal.

Civ. Code § 1710(4). Through Civil Code § 1710(4), “certain broken promises of future conduct

may be actionable.” Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158 (1991). 

“To maintain an action for deceit based on a false promise, one must specifically allege and

prove, among other things, that the promisor did not intend to perform at the time he or she made

the promise and that it was intended to deceive or induce the promisee to do or not do a

particular thing.” Building Permit Consultants, Inc. v. Mazur, 122 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1414

(2004); Tarmann, 2 Cal.App.4th at 159. “The mere failure to perform a promise made in good

faith does not constitute fraud.” Building Permit, 122 Cal.App.4th at 1414. 

As in the previous claims, there is no indication that Sara Lee broke any promises. The

evidence does not indicate constructive discharge, does not indicate age discrimination, does not

indicate improper evaluation of Oxford, does not indicate a hostility to complaints by Oxford,

and does not indicate insecure employment. See DUMF Nos. 11, 14-15. In other words, to the

extent that Sara Lee made the alleged promises to Oxford, those promises were performed for

years by Sara Lee. Because there is no evidence of a broken promise, nor conduct that could

support an inference of a lack of intent to perform a promise, summary judgment is granted. 

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Paragraph 42 alleges that Sara Lee’s actual conduct was contrary to the 4 identified promises of Paragraph 5

41. See Complaint at ¶ 42.

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8. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Concealment 

The allegations for this cause of action rely on conduct that was allegedly contrary to the

four identified representations outlined in the Sixth Cause of Action. See Complaint at ¶ 58

(expressly relying on the representations “set forth in Paragraph 41” and the facts “set forth in

Paragraph 42” ). The complaint alleges in part that the true facts regarding working conditions at 5

Sarah Lee were concealed and that the concealment was intended to induce Oxford to accept

Sara Lee’s offer of employment. 

Fraudulent concealment is “the suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it,

or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of

that fact.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1710(3); Williams v. Wraxall, 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 132 (1995). 

“The elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on a concealment are: (1) the defendant

must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty

to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or

suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been

unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or

suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff

must have sustained damage.” Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 665-66

(1996); Williams, 33 Cal.App.4th at 132.

Here, again like the claims before it, there is insufficient evidence to suggest concealment

or suppression of a fact or the intent to conceal. The evidence presented indicates years of

employment with Sarah Lee, no age discrimination, the ability of Oxford to voice his complaints,

no constructive discharge, and a request by management that he not retire. Stated differently, no

evidence has been presented that indicates fraudulent conduct by Sara Lee. Accordingly,

summary judgment on this claim is granted.

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9. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Negligent Misrepresentation

The allegations for this cause of action are based upon the four misrepresentations

outlined in the Sixth Cause of Action. See Complaint at ¶ 67 (expressly relying on the

representations “outlined in Paragraph 41”). The complaint alleges in part that these

representations were made without any reasonable ground for believing them to be true and were

made to induce Oxford into accepting Sara Lee’s offer of employment.

Negligent misrepresentation encompasses “[t]he assertion, as a fact, of that which is not

true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true,” Cal. Civ. Code § 1710(2), 

or “[t]he positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making

it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1572(2); Oakland

Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1184 (2006). The

elements of negligent misrepresentation are: “(1) a false statement of a material fact that the

defendant honestly believes to be true, but made without reasonable grounds for such belief, (2)

made with the intent to induce reliance, (3) reasonable reliance on the statement, and (4)

damages.” Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Insurance, Inc., 124 Cal.App.4th 116, 129 (2004).

Here, there were no lies or misrepresentations made to Oxford. See DUMF No. 11. 

Oxford has presented no evidence to show that he was discriminated upon based on age, that he

could not make complaints, that he was improperly evaluated, or that he was constructively

discharged. Because Oxford has presented no evidence of misrepresentations, either negligent or

intentional, summary judgment on this claim is granted.

CONCLUSION

Sara Lee has moved for summary judgment on all of Oxford’s causes of action. Sara Lee

has supported its motion with evidence, but Oxford has filed no reply or opposition of any kind. 

In fact, Sara Lee’s evidence shows that Oxford has not conducted discovery in this case. Sara

Lee’s motion is supported by sufficient evidence to shift the burden to Oxford to produce

contrary evidence. It is not enough for Oxford to rely on his complaint at this point, and the

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failure to produce contrary evidence results in judgment for Sara Lee. Sara Lee’s evidence and

arguments indicate that Oxford: did not exhaust his administrative remedies, was not

discriminated against on the basis of age, was not constructively discharged, was not discharged

in violation of public policy, did not have an implied employment contract breached, did not

suffer a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and was not the victim of

intentional fraud (either deceit or promise without intent to perform), concealment, or negligent

misrepresentation. Because no contrary evidence or opposition of any kind has been presented,

summary judgment in favor of Sarah Lee on all causes of action is appropriate.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and

2. The clerk is ordered to enter judgment in this case in favor of Defendant and against

Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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