Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01126/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN CRUZ ODED,

ICE #A–044-556-767,

Civil

No.

14cv1126 BAS (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(Doc. 2); AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

vs.

W. DAY;

Defendant.

Martin Cruz Oded (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the Otay Detention Center

located in San Diego, California, has filed a civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff has not prepaid

the filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. 2). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to

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prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full

amount offiling feesin civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation

Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the

PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused

of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law

or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A “civil detainee” on the other hand, is not a “prisoner”

within the meaning of the PLRA. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir 2005);

Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 886 (holding that INS detainee not also facing criminal charges

is not a “prisoner” under § 1915).

Because it appears Plaintiff is currently an immigration detainee, and is not a

“prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) when he filed this action, the filing fee

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not apply to this case. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1122. 

Therefore, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets, just as it would for any

other non-prisoner litigant seeking IFP status, and finds it is sufficient to show that he

is unable to pay the fees or postsecurities required to maintain this action. See S.D.CAL.

CIVLR 3.2(d). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2).

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP issubject to sua sponte dismissal

to the extent it contains claims which are “frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, orseek monetary relief froma defendant immune fromsuch

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

(per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited

to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

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(“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the

language of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 

It is not clear whether Plaintiff is an immigration detainee or whether he is also

facing criminal charges. Regardless, Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights

were violated when Defendant refused to provide him with a dinner meal on one

occasion. See Compl. at 2. If Plaintiff is not a prisoner, the Eighth Amendment does not

apply. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a “pretrial detainees’ rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth

Amendment,” and therefore, “the same standards apply.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, however, Plaintiff must allege

facts sufficient to show that the conditions of his confinement subjected him to

“unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991). The Eighth

Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and conditions imposed may be

“restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 349. Adequate food is a basic

human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). However, prison food need not be “tasty or aesthetically pleasing,” and

it need only be “adequate to maintain health.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456

(9th Cir. 1993); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Although the NinthCircuit has never decided what exact quantity of prisoner food

is necessary to pass constitutional muster, other courts have established guidelines. See,

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e.g., Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding two meals a day

sufficient if nutritionally and calorically adequate); see also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442

F.2d 178, 186, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding diets of 2,800 to 3,300 calories per day

constitutionally adequate); Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir. 1982)

(finding one meal a day for 15 days, where the meal contained 2,000-2,500 calories and

was sufficient to maintain health, constitutionally adequate). It is clear, however, that

even the complete denial of single meals on a few occasions is insufficient to support a

claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See e.g., Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352

(5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]hat Palmer may have missed one meal ... does not rise to the level

of a cognizable constitutional injury”); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir.

1998) (“Missing a mere one out of every nine meals is hardly more than that missed by

many working citizens over the same period.”); Wilkins v. Roper, 843 F. Supp. 1327,

1328 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (denial of one meal does not give rise to constitutional violation). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because he has failed to allege facts

which show that he was denied sufficient food or nutrition necessary to maintain his

health. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)

(when considering Eight Amendment challengesto the conditions of confinement, court

should consider amount oftime the prisoner wassubject to the allegedly unconstitutional

condition). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s entire action must be dismissed for failing to state a claim. The

Court will permit Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. 2)

is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

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from the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures

all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint

will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

3. The Clerk of Court shall mail a court approved civil rights form to Plaintiff.

DATED: June 6, 2014

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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