Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00072/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00072-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP 

address 70.95.164.134, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 19cv72-AJB-LL 

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 

APPLICATION TO EXPEDITE 

DISCOVERY 

[ECF No. 5] 

 

 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s January 30, 2019 “Ex Parte Application for 

Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference.” ECF No. 5. 

Because the Defendant has not been identified, no opposition or reply briefs have been 

filed. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion and all supporting documents, the Court 

DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff alleges it “is the owner of original, award-winning adult motion pictures 

featured on its subscription-based websites.” ECF No. 5-1 at 6. On January 10, 2019, 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against John Doe, a subscriber assigned IP address 

70.95.164.134, alleging copyright infringement. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 1-2. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant infringed fifty-four of Plaintiff’s movies over the 

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BitTorrent protocol. Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff alleges that it “hired an investigator, IPP International U.G., to monitor and 

detect the infringement of Strike 3’s content.” ECF No. 5-1 at 6. Plaintiff further alleges: 

(1) “IPP discovered that Defendant’s IP address was illegally distributing numerous motion 

pictures owned and copyrighted by Strike 3”; and (2) “Strike 3’s independent forensic 

expert, Philip Pasquale reviewed the evidence captured by IPP” and confirmed 

“Defendant’s IP address was involved in an infringing transaction at the exact date and 

time reported by IPP.” Id. 

Plaintiff argues “this IP address is assigned to Defendant by his or her Internet 

Service Provider (“ISP”)” and that the ISP is the “only party that has the information 

necessary to identify Defendant by correlating the IP address with John Doe’s identity[.]” 

Id. Plaintiff therefore seeks an order permitting it to serve a third-party subpoena, pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, on Spectrum requiring Spectrum to supply the name 

and address of its subscriber to Plaintiff. Id. at 7 (“This subpoena will only demand the 

true name and address of Defendant.”). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A party may not seek discovery from any source before the Rule 26(f) conference 

unless that party first obtains a stipulation or court order permitting early discovery. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). 

Generally, a “good cause” standard applies in determining whether to permit early 

discovery. See Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. 

Cal. 2002). Good cause exists “where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration 

of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Id. 

District courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a three-factor test for determining whether good 

cause exists to allow for expedited discovery to identify certain defendants. Columbia Ins. 

Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999). “First, the plaintiff 

should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can 

determine that the defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court.” 

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Id. at 578. Second, the plaintiff must describe “all previous steps taken to locate the elusive 

defendant” to ensure that plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify the defendant. 

Id. at 579. Third, “plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit 

against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Identification of Missing Party with Sufficient Specificity 

Plaintiff has the burden to identify Defendant with enough specificity to establish 

that Defendant is a real person or entity subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Columbia Ins. 

Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. 

Some District Courts in the Ninth Circuit have determined that “[a] plaintiff 

identifies Doe defendants with sufficient specificity by providing the unique IP addresses 

assigned to an individual defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by 

using ‘geolocation technology’ to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of 

origin.” 808 Holdings, LLC v. Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing Hash 

E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29C D63C23C91, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62980, at 

*10-11 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (citing OpenMind Sols., Inc. v. Does 1-39, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Pink Lotus Entm't, LLC v. Does 

1-46, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2011)). 

Other Courts have concluded that identifying the IP addresses on the day of the 

alleged infringement satisfies this factor. 808 Holdings, Ltd. Liab. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 62980, at *10-11 (citing McGip, LLC v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85363, at *4-

5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2011); First Time Videos LLC v. Does, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

42376, at *5 (N.D. Cal. April 14, 2011)). 

Here, Plaintiff failed to identify Defendant with sufficient specificity to enable the 

Court to determine Defendant is subject to its jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserts it employed 

Maxmind’s geolocation technology “to trace Defendant’s IP address to a geographic area 

within this Court’s personal jurisdiction.” ECF No. 5-1 at 12. Plaintiff argues the Court 

“has accepted Maxmind’s findings for the purpose of allowing expedited discovery” and 

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that “federal law enforcement relies on Maxmind for its cyber investigations.” Id. at 13. 

However, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant’s IP address was traced to a 

geographic area within this Court’s personal jurisdiction is not supported by any evidence 

that would indicate: (1) who used the geolocation technology; (2) the dates of use; and (3) 

how it is probative of the physical location of the subscriber. The Court cannot rely on 

Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions regarding the use and accuracy of the geolocation 

technology Plaintiff contends to have applied. See Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 2018 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25353, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018) (“[A]llegations are not 

evidence[.]”). See also Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213868, at 

*6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2018). 

 Plaintiff also does not address when the geolocation was performed. In cases where 

it is unclear whether the subject IP address is “dynamic” or “static,” such as here, it matters 

when Plaintiff's geolocation efforts were performed. In the context of dynamic IP 

addresses, “a person using [a particular IP] address one month may not have been the same 

person using it the next.” State v. Shields, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1453, at *18 (Super. 

Ct. June 7, 2007). It is likely that the user of IP address 70.95.164.134 is a residential user 

and that the IP address assigned by Spectrum is dynamic. Thus, if Plaintiff's geolocation 

efforts were performed close in time to the offending downloads, they may be probative of 

the physical location of the subject IP subscriber. If not, the geolocation of the subject IP 

address may be irrelevant. Plaintiff failed to provide information regarding when the 

geolocation occurred or that the IP address is static. 

Given these deficiencies, on January 31, 2019, the Court ordered Plaintiff to 

supplement its application with: (1) “evidence that Plaintiff’s geolocation services vendor 

determined IP address 70.95.164.134” was “located in the Southern District of California”; 

and to (2) “provide the date on which Plaintiff’s geolocation services vendor made this 

determination” by February 8. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff failed to do so. See Docket. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidentiary support to show that 

Defendant’s IP address likely resolves to a physical address located in this District. For 

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these reasons, the instant Application fails. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s “Ex Parte Application for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 

26(f) Conference.” 

Dated: February 11, 2019 

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