Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07347/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07347-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONG LAM, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 06-7347 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Docket No. 19) 

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Long Lam, a prisoner of the State of California currently incarcerated at

the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, filed a habeas corpus petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the Board of Parole Hearings’ (“BPH”) denial

of parole during parole suitability proceedings in 2004. This Court ordered Respondent

to show cause why a writ should not issue. On March 4, 2008, Petitioner filed an

amended petition. Thereafter, the Court ordered Respondent to file an answer. 

Respondent filed an answer, memorandum and exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner

has filed a traverse. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied on the merits.

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, on August 12, 1985, Petitioner pled guilty to one count

of second degree murder with use of a firearm, three counts of assault with a deadly

weapon with use of a firearm, one count of attempted murder with great bodily injury, and

one count of discharge of a firearm in an inhabited dwelling. Petitioner was sentenced to

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seventeen years-to-life in state prison. 

In this habeas action, Petitioner does not challenge his conviction or sentence, but

instead alleges that his due process rights were violated by the denial of parole by the

BPH during a subsequent parole suitability hearings on October 28, 2004. Petitioner

further complains that the terms of his plea agreement were violated by the Board’s

decision to deny him parole. 

At the October 28, 2004 hearing, the BPH relied, in part, upon the following

account of Petitioner’s commitment offenses excerpted from the Probation Officer’s

Report:

On January 15, 1985, the defendant shot Daniel Schwieterman to death. 

He also shot Samuel Quintere in the head, but did not kill him. In the same

incident, the defendant assaulted Joe Alaniz, Louie Madraga and Alex

Varga, with a firearm. Finally, the defendant discharged a firearm at an

occupied motor vehicle, but did not injure anyone. 

The offenses occurred when the defendant drove up to a disco where the

various victims were standing in the street. The defendant had some

trouble parking his vehicle and actually drove up on the curb. One of the

people in the victim-group laughed at the defendant and some remarks

were made about his driving ability. The defendant then became angry and

got out of his car with a handgun. He began shooting in the group of

victims, killing Daniel Schwieterman.

He then got back into his car and drove away. Victim Quintera began

following the defendant in his own car. However, during the chase, the

defendant fired three or four shots at Quintera, wounding him in the head. 

The defendant was then apprehended by an armed security guard and held

until police arrived. Defendant admitted the offense to the police, saying

that he was mad and that he was trying to scare the victims. At the time of

his arrest, the defendant [had a] .14 blood-alcohol level.

Respondent’s Answer, Ex. 3 at 2-3.

The 2004 BPH panel considered Petitioner’s lack of prior criminal history. At the

hearing, Petitioner also discussed his arrest for drunk driving in 1983, for which he

stated he spent a night at the precinct and then was released, but had to participate in AA. 

(Ex. 3 at 20.) The BPH panel also questioned about and considered Petitioner’s social

history, discussing his arrival from Vietnam in July 1978, six years prior to the incident

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in question, his time with the Vietnamese Army and the eighteen months he spent as a

prisoner of war. Petitioner testified that his abuse of alcohol commenced when he “lost

everything” after his escape from a prisoner of war camp, and his immigration to the

United States. (Ex. 2 at 17.) 

Petitioner testified that during his time in prison he has obtained a vocational

certification for machine shop, a GED and a business certificate (Ex. 2 at 22-23). The

panel further discussed Petitioner’s receipt of laudatory chronos for his work as a

receiving and release clerk and for participating in AA and NA. (Id.)

 Petitioner testified that he has a grown daughter living in New York, with whom

he is in contact. (Ex. 2 at 18-19.) Petitioner’s former wife came to the United States

before him, but she remarried someone else. (Ex. 2 at 18.) Petitioner later remarried as

well. (Id.) However, no letters of support from family members were in Petitioner’s

file. (Ex. 2 at 25.) 

The Presiding Commissioner discussed Petitioner’s parole plans. Petitioner is not

an American citizen and has an INS Immigration Hold, however it does not appear that

there was supporting documentation in his file. (Ex. 2 at 28.) Petitioner testified that if

he were paroled, he would request to be paroled to Vietnam. (Id.) Petitioner testified

that if he were, he plans to lives with his aunt and uncle in South Saigon or another uncle

in Saigon. (Ex. 2 at 28-29, 30.) Petitioner’s parole plans if paroled to Vietnam include

working at a restaurant. (Ex. 2 at 30.) If he is not deported, Petitioner plans to live with

his sister in Bishop, Yosemite and to work at her restaurant there, though no letter to the

effect was in Petitioner’s file. (Ex. 2 at 32.)

The Presiding Board Member noted that there was a confidential letter from the

victim’s mother in the file that would be considered. (Ex. 2 at 25.) Two letters from the

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the Los Angeles District Attorney’s

Office opposed to Petitioner’s parole were also in Petitioner’s file. (Ex. 2 at 33-34.) 

The Board also considered Petitioner’s disciplinary history while incarcerated,

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including 2 disciplinary findings, one of which was for possession of contraband (food)

and the other for a verbal confrontation. (Ex. 2 at 22.) The panel also considered a

report from Petitioner’s correctional counselor which stated that Petitioner was believed

to pose a low degree of threat to the public if released. (Ex. 2 at 26.) The panel further

considered a 2004 psychological report from Dr. S. Stack stated that Petitioner would

have a violence potential that would be no more than that of an average citizen, yet

stated that alcohol was a risk factor as a precursor to violence. (Ex. 2 at 27.)

Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Anthony J. Sousa expressed the District

Attorney’s Office’s opposition to parole, noting that Petitioner’s recognition of his

actions are a dramatic departure from past parole hearings where Petitioner claimed he

suffered from a flashback from his wartime experiences, so he clearly still lacks insight

about himself and the crimes he committed. (Ex. 2 at 37-38.) He argues that

Petitioner’s acknowledgment of his crimes did not include an accurate response

regarding the number of people he wounded. (Ex. 2 at 39.) Sousa states that Petitioner’s

insufficient remorse does not support Petitioner’s release from prison. (Ex. 2 at 40.)

The father of murdered victim Daniel Schwieterman also attended the parole

hearing and testified that he has never been offered a personal apology from Petitioner,

despite being available and attending all of Petitioner’s parole hearings. (Ex. 2 at 48-49.)

After a recess to consider the evidence, the BPH found that Petitioner was “not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat

to public safety if released from prison.” (Ex. 2 at 52.) This determination was based on

the especially violent and brutal manner of Petitioner’s commitment offense including

the attack on 5 people, demonstrated a callous disregard for human life. (Ex. 2 at 53.) 

The Presiding Commissioner noted that Petitioner has realistic parole plans but no

supporting documentation. (Id.) The Board commended Petitioner for his behavior in

prison and his academic achievements but noted that Petitioner had not sufficiently

participated in self help programs. (Ex. 2 at 53-54.) The Board found that Petitioner

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needed to participate in additional self-help in order to face, discuss, understand, and

cope with stress in a non-destructive manner. (Ex. 2 at 54.) In a separate decision, the

Board denied parole for two years. (Ex. 2 at 56.) 

Petitioner challenged the 2004 Board’s decision in Los Angeles County Superior

Court, which denied his claims in a reasoned opinion on August 15, 2005. (Answer Ex.

7.) The California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District and the California

Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petitions on October 4, 2005 and

September 13, 2006, respectively. (Answer Ex. 9 & 11.) Petitioner filed a federal

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 20, 2006. The case was transferred to the

Northern District of California on November 29, 2006.

On January 11, 2007, Petitioner was again denied parole by the BPH at a

subsequent hearing. On April 9, 2007, Petitioner filed another petition in Los Angeles

County Superior Court challenging the denial of parole on the basis of breach of

contract. That petition was denied by the California Court of Appeal on May 4, 2007. 

Petitioner appealed that decision to the California Supreme Court on August 17, 2007. 

That petition was denied on February 20, 2008. Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition on March 4, 2008.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that the BPH violated his due process rights by denying him

parole without factual support for a finding of unsuitability; relying on the static factors

of his crime alone; failing to comply with California Penal Code section 3041 and

breaching the contract of his plea agreement. Petitioner also raises claims regarding the

legality of his guilty plea and plea agreement.

Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state

prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

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challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this Court may entertain a petition for habeas

relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any claim on

the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal habeas relief

will not be granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether the

state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003).

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the

decision of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). If the

state court only considered state law, the federal court must ask whether state law, as

explained by the state court, is “contrary to” clearly established governing federal law. 

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See, e.g., Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Small,

282 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002) (state court applied correct controlling authority

when it relied on state court case that quoted Supreme Court for proposition squarely in

accord with controlling authority). If the state court, relying on state law, correctly

identified the governing federal legal rules, the federal court must ask whether the state

court applied them unreasonably to the facts. See Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1232.

Legal Claims and Analysis

1. Factual Support for Parole Denial

Petitioner claims that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendments

were violated by BPH’s denial of parole without a “factual record to support the

findings.” Petitioner also claims that the Board improperly applied the “some evidence”

standard in determining whether Petitioner should be found suitable for parole. 

Respondent claims the “some evidence” standard is improper.

A. Background

Due process requires that “some evidence” support the parole board’s decision

finding the prisoner unsuitable for parole. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461

F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the “some evidence” standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985),

applies to parole decisions in a section 2254 habeas petition); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d

910, 15 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002)

(same). The “some evidence” standard is minimally stringent and ensures that “the

record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the parole board] were without

support or otherwise arbitrary. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining whether this

requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455

(quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128).

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

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supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons v.

Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, in California, the court must

look to California law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner

unsuitable for parole. Id.

 The recent California Supreme Court case of In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181

(2008), clarified what California law requires the parole board to find in order to deny

parole: the Board must find only that the prisoner is a current threat to public safety, not

that some of the specific factors in the regulations have or have not been established. Id.

at 1212. This means that the “some evidence” test is whether there is “some evidence”

that the prisoner is a threat, not whether there is “some evidence” to support particular

secondary findings of the parole board, for instance that the prisoner needs more time for

rehabilitation. Id.; see Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (when assessing whether a state parole

board’s suitability determination was supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis

is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole suitability determinations in

the relevant state).

The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition,

finding that establish that there is “‘some evidence’ to support the Board’s finding that

the petitioner is unsuitable for parole.” (Answer Ex. 7.) The court relied on the

“especially violent and brutal” nature of the offense, that Petitioner had not sufficiently

participated in self-help programs, noting that Petitioner failed to adequately explain the

lack of precipitation for his actions.

Because the Superior Court is the highest state court to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned opinion, this Court looks to its decision to decide

whether it was contrary to, or involving an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.7.

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B. Analysis

The decision of the Los Angeles County Superior Court found that the record

contained “some evidence” to support the BPH conclusion that Petitioner was unsuitable

for parole. (Answer Ex. 7.) The decision found that there was “some evidence” to

support for the BPH’s finding that the crime was especially violent or brutal because it

involved multiple victims and that Petitioner could benefit from additional self-help

programming to gain insight and address “outstanding anger related issues.” Id. at 2. 

The Superior Court found support for the BPH’s decision that Petitioner would pose an

unreasonable public safety threat. Id. at 3. 

The BPH had some evidence to support its findings that Petitioner needed further

programming “in order to face, discuss, understand, and cope with stress in a

nondestructive manner. ” (Answer Ex. 2 at 54.) Specifically, while Petitioner had

committed himself to AA and NA, the BPH relied on his failure to complete any anger

management programs. Petitioner’s testimony showed that he lacked adequate insight

into his criminal behavior as his testimony reflected that he could not recall the number

of victims he shot and an adequate understanding for why he had committed an attack on

five victims. In rendering a decision, a Deputy BPH Commissioner relied on this failure

of understanding, stating that the inconsistencies from his testimony “causes me to

conclude that you’ve either put the commitment offense out of your mind and behind

you, which is not an appropriate move to make, or you’re simply glossing over it, which

is also not appropriate.” Id. at 57.

The facts on which the BPH relied provide some evidence to support the finding

of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. The findings regarding the callousness of his

crimes, as well as his lack of insight constitute some evidence which “rationally

indicate[s] that [he] will present an unreasonable public safety risk if released from

prison.” In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573, 595 (2005). It was not irrational for the

BPH to conclude that a prisoner who cannot provide adequate insight into his own

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behavior continues to pose an unreasonable risk to society, despite his other prison

behavioral and educational gains. 

The question before this Court is not whether BPH properly weighed the evidence

before it; the question is whether there was “some evidence” to support the BPH’s denial

of parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. It is not up to this Court to “reweigh the evidence.” 

Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). Because the BPH’s denial of parole

was supported by some evidence, the Los Angeles County Superior Court decision

upholding the BPH’s parole denial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Therefore, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

2. Reliance on Crime Alone

Petitioner claims that the Board’s violated his due process by denying his parole

solely based on the facts of his crime alone. Petitioner claims the Board ignored his

many achievements while in prison. Respondent argues that Petitioner fails to state a

claim.

A. Background

California law clearly provides that “the nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone,

can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole.” In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616,

682 (2002). However, “the denial of parole may be predicated on a prisoner’s

commitment offense only where the Board can ‘point to factors beyond the minimum

elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed’ that demonstrate the inmate

will, at the time of the suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released.” Irons,

505 F.3d at 852 (citing In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1071 (2005)). The

circumstances must show that “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner[.]” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). But

overall, the “circumstances of the crime reliably established by evidence in the record”

must “rationally indicate that the offender will present an unreasonable public safety risk

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if released from prison” to justify a denial of parole on the basis of the commitment

offense. Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 595.

While “the parole board’s sole supportable reliance on the gravity of the offense

and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified,”

over time, “should [a prisoner] continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and

evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of

[his] offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty

interest in parole.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003). “A continued

reliance . . . on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior

to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system

and could result in a due process violation.” Id. at 917.

B. Analysis

This Court finds Petitioner's arguments unpersuasive. The Board's decision here

relied not only on the circumstances of petitioner's commitment offense but also on his

failure to sufficiently participate in self-help and his lack of insight into his commitment

offense and behavior. Under the relevant standard, these factors constitute “some

evidence” in support of the Board's decision that petitioner was not yet suitable for

release on parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

3. California Penal Code section 3401

Petitioner claims the BPH failed to consider Petitioner’s suitability for parole in a

manner required by California Penal Code section 3041. The Los Angeles County

Superior Court rejected this claim, finding that the Board did not rely on static factors

alone.

A. Background

Section 3041(a) requires the Board to meet with each inmate one year before the

expiration of his minimum sentence and normally set a release date in a manner that will

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provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to their

threat to the public, as well as comply with applicable sentencing rules. Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(a). However, subsection (b) of this section requires that the Board set a release

date “unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Id. at

§ 3041(b) (emphasis added). 

To determine whether an inmate is a current threat to society, the Board must in

turn “identify and weigh . . . [pre and post-conviction] factors relevant to predicting

whether the inmate will able to live in society without committing additional antisocial

acts.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1205-1206 (2008). Additionally, title 15,

section 2402, of the California Code of Regulations states that “all relevant, reliable

information available to the panel shall be considered in determining” a prisoner’s

suitability for parole. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402. Furthermore, “circumstances

which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a

pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.” Id. BPH considers an expansive list

of factors including: the prisoner’s social history, the commitment offense and prior

criminal history, his behavior before, during and after the crime and “any other

information which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release.” See Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). The regulations specifically include as factors tending to support

unsuitability for parole: whether the commitment offense was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner; a prisoner’s previous record of violence; an unstable

social history; psychological factors; and institutional behavior. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2402(c). The regulations specifically include as factors tending to support suitability

for parole: no juvenile record; stable social history; signs of remorse; stress-related

motivation for the crime; lack of criminal history; age; understanding and plans for the

future; and institutional behavior. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d). 

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The key is how those factors interrelate and whether those factors provide “some

evidence” the prisoner is currently dangerous to the public. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.

4th at 1212; see also Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 2008) (it is not

“that a particular factor or factors indicating unsuitability exist but that a prisoner's

release will unreasonably endanger public safety.”). Accordingly, the inquiry is whether

“some evidence indicates a parolee's release unreasonably endangers public safety.” Id.

As long as the evidence underlying the Board's decision has “some indicia of reliability,”

parole has not been arbitrarily denied. See Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389,

1390 (9th Cir. 1987). As the California courts have continually noted, the Board’s

discretion in parole release matters is very broad. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1204.

Thus, the penal code, corresponding regulations, and California law clearly establish that

the fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety and an assessment of a

prisoner's current dangerousness. See id. at 1205-06.

B. Analysis

Here, Petitioner was not constitutionally deprived of his liberty interest in parole

because there was “some evidence” to support the Board's decision denying him parole

after over twenty years in prison and six parole hearings. Petitioner has not established

that the BPH decision violated his rights. For the reasons stated above in Section 3,

Petitioner is denied relief on this claim.

4. Untimeliness of Remaining Claims

Petitioner’s remaining claims, 4 through 6 in the amended petition, challenge

aspects of his plea agreement and the denial of parole as violating its terms. Respondent

argues that these claims are time-barred.

A. Legal Standard

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which

became law on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

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Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must

be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment became

final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review;

(B) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the

petitioner’s direct review became final. In this case, judgment was rendered on August

12, 1985, and Petitioner did not file an appeal. Pursuant to Rule 30.1 (amended and

renumbered 8.308) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty (60) days in

which to file a notice of appeal. Because Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal, his

direct review concluded on October 12, 1985, when the sixty-day period for filing a

notice of appeal expired. Thus, under § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner would ordinarily have

had one year, or until October 12, 1986, in which to file his federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.2001). 

In most cases, the one year limitations period will start on the date on which the

judgment becomes final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passes for

seeking direct review, but the limitations period may start on a later date. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The statute of limitations applies to the entire “application” when

the starting date is completion of direct review under § 2244(d)(1)(A), but when the

starting date is determined under any of the other subsections, §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D), the

statute of limitations is applied on a claim-by-claim basis. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 416 n.6 (2005) (“[Section] 2244(d)(1) provides that a ‘1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.’ (Emphasis added.) 

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The subsection then provides one means of calculating the limitation with regard to the

‘application’ as a whole, § 2244(d)(1)(A) (date of final judgment), but three others that

require claim-by-claim consideration, § 2244(d)(1)(B) (governmental interference); §

2244(d)(1)(C) (new right made retroactive); § 2244(d)(1)(D) (new factual predicate).”).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year limitation period starts on the date on which

“the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” The time begins “‘when the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes

their legal significance.’” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)) (remanding case to district

court for further factual findings concerning determination of when, with exercise of due

diligence, petitioner could have discovered facts to support prejudice prong of IAC

claim). Section 2244(d)(1)(D) accordingly allows the limitation period to start running

at a later date “when the facts on which a federal habeas claim is based would not have

been discovered by a duly diligent petitioner.” Ybanez v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 645, 646

(5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Petitioner initially filed his claim in the state courts in

2007, long after the limitations period had run with regard to any challenge to the initial

plea and long after Petitioner would have been aware of the facts supporting his breach

of contract claim with regard to the failure to grant parole. Thus, absent any applicable

tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner has the

burden of showing facts entitling him to statutory and to equitable tolling. Smith v.

Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065

(9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to either tolling provision. 

B. Analysis

Petitioner's direct appeal became final in 1985 and he first became eligible for

parole in 1995. Petitioner has had multiple parole hearings in which he was denied

parole before the 2004 hearing. Yet it wasn’t until April 9, 2007, that Petitioner filed a

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petition in the state courts seeking relief on the ground that the plea agreement had been

violated and that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. On May 4, 2007, the

California Court of Appeal denied relief, finding that petitioner failed to show prejudice

from the error.

Under AEDPA, the statute of limitations for a claim regarding the circumstances

of Petitioner’s plea is long past expired, as Petitioner filed his federal petition on March

4, 2008, more than twenty three years after the conclusion of his direct review.

Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. Petitioner’s claims regarding the breach of contract with

regard to the denial of parole, governed by § 2244(d)(1)(D), are also untimely. 

Petitioner was initially eligible for parole in 1995 but failed to bring his first state court

petition regarding the breach of contract until April 9, 2007, after multiple parole

hearings. Thus, even if the limitations period is governed by § 2244(d)(1)(D), the

petition is still untimely.

Because Petitioner’s claims 4 through 6 in the petition are denied as untimely,

Petitioner’s motion seeking judicial notice (docket no. 19) is DENIED as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 14, 2010 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONG LAM,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BEN CURRY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-07347 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on January 14, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Long Lam

D12629

CTF Central

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: January 14, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:06-cv-07347-JSW Document 23 Filed 01/14/10 Page 17 of 17