Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01059/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01059-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 05cv1059

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEARCEY JAMES STEWART,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 05cv1059-BTM (CAB)

ORDER:

(1) DECLINING TO ADOPT THE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE; 

(2) GRANTING PETITIONER’S

AMENDED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

AMEND THE PETITION;

(3) DIRECTING THE CLERK OF

COURT TO FILE THE PROPOSED

AMENDED PETITION AS A FIRST

AMENDED PETITION; AND,

(4) ISSUING A SCHEDULING ORDER

ON PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

DISCOVERY

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his San Diego County

Superior Court conviction of two counts of attempted murder, contending that: (1) newly

discovered evidence showing that he was not the driver of the car from which the shots were

fired undermines the prosecution’s case; (2) the state court erred in denying the habeas petition

in which he presented the newly discovered evidence; (3) he is actually innocent; and (4) in light

of the newly discovered evidence there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. (Pet.

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at 6-9.) Respondent has filed an Answer to the Petition accompanied by a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support, contending that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

because: (1) the Petition was filed after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations set forth

in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); (2) the claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus; and (3) the

state court decisions denying Petitioner’s claims were neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Doc. Nos. 12-13.) Petitioner has

filed a Traverse. (Doc. No. 31.)

Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) submitted by

United States Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo which recommends dismissing the

Petition as untimely, or alternately denying the Petition because Petitioner has not established

actual innocence and the remaining claims do not present federal questions. (Doc. No. 37.)

Petitioner has filed Objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 52.) Petitioner has also filed a Motion

for Discovery seeking to compel Respondent to turn over exculpatory materials, and an

Amended Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition in order to adequately plead the federal basis

of his claims. (Doc. Nos. 41, 50.)

The Court has reviewed the R&R, as well as Petitioner’s Objections and Motions,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which provides that: “A judge of the court shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the following reasons, the Court declines to adopt the findings and

conclusions of the Magistrate Judge, grants Petitioner’s Amended Motion for leave to amend,

directs that the proposed amended petition be filed as a First Amended Petition, and issues a

briefing schedule directing a response to the Motion for Discovery.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted on April 12, 1996, after a joint trial, of two counts of attempted

murder as the driver of a car from which his co-defendant Richard Charles Lee was found to

have shot two brothers, Mark and Michael Parish. The appellate court affirmed the convictions

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of both men on December 17, 1998, although it modified Lee’s sentence, and the state supreme

court denied the consolidated petitions for review on March 9, 2000. (Lodgment Nos. 7, 10.)

Lee, however, obtained habeas relief from the trial court on August 31, 2000. (Pet. Ex. E, In re

Lee, No. HC16243 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Aug. 31, 2000).) The order which vacated Lee’s conviction and

ordered a new trial did so in a summary fashion, stating that relief is appropriate because “the

People do not oppose the petition” as they “conceded that there appears to be newly discovered

evidence which is sufficiently credible to cast doubt on the integrity of [Lee’s] convictions.” (Id.

at 1.) Petitioner contends that to this day he does not know exactly what evidence resulted in

the overturning of Lee’s conviction, but believes it was based on a letter dated July 14, 1998,

sent by the District Attorney to Lee’s attorney, which states that the District Attorney had

received third-hand information regarding Lee which was being disclosed to Lee pursuant to

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). (Traverse Ex. A.) In that letter, the District

Attorney informed Lee’s counsel that Darnell Jackson, through his attorney, had approached the

District Attorney with an offer of proof regarding information that Jackson had “about certain

unsolved cases.” (Id.) The letter states that Jackson informed the District Attorney that

Petitioner and Arnold Adkins were the people who shot the Parish brothers, that Jackson had

“described for his attorney the facts of how and where the Parish brothers were shot,” that

Jackson’s “statements were consistent with the police reports with the exception of Adkins being

identified as one of the shooters instead of Lee,” and states that Adkins was recently deceased.

(Id.) The letter reports that Jackson made the following statement:

Jackson stated that Richard Lee was in fact involved in a shooting that same day,

but not the shooting of the Parish brothers. Jackson told his attorney that Richard

Lee met up with Adkins and [Petitioner] at Anthony Riley’s house after the

shooting of the Parish brothers. Jackson stated that Lee came from a car function

at Martin Luther King Park. Jackson reportedly told his attorney that when

Adkins and [Petitioner] told Lee about the Parish brothers shooting, Lee became

excited and wanted to do a shooting also. Jackson stated that the group was aware

of a party in Emerald Hills so they went there to do a shooting. They saw a group

and parked 1/2 block away, Lee walked up to the group and fired several rounds

into the crowd and then fled back to the car. Jackson stated that the person killed

was named “Gee Wiz.” I checked with SDPD homicide detectives and there was

a person with the moniker Gee Wiz killed about one hour after the Parish brothers

shooting.

(Id.) 

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Petitioner contended in his Traverse that he did not receive a copy of the July 14, 1998

letter until two and one-half years after it was written, and alleged that the failure of the District

Attorney to provide him a copy of the letter, and the continued refusal to divulge the evidence

upon which the reversal of Lee’s conviction is based, is part of a “cover-up” to protect Jackson’s

credibility because he is an important prosecution witness in other cases. (Traverse at 5-12.)

Petitioner contends in his Objections and his Amended Motion to amend that he became aware

of the contents of the letter in January 2003, but did not actually receive a copy of the letter until

after he filed his federal habeas Petition. (Objections at 3; Pet.’s Amended Mot. to Amend at

4.) However, the contents of the letter were described in a state habeas petition filed on

Petitioner’s behalf by his attorney on May 10, 2002. (Lodgment No. 12 at 13.) It was averred

in that petition that Lee’s attorney had conducted an investigation based on the information

contained in the July 14, 1998 letter, and had discovered that Jackson was also an informant in

another case regarding Skyline gang members, that Jackson was in the witness protection

program and unavailable, and that Lee’s attorney had obtained declarations from individuals

from the Skyline area corroborating Jackson’s statement that Adkins had shot the Parish

brothers. (Id. at 13-14.) Those declarations are attached to the Traverse as Exhibits B-D.

In the habeas petition filed in the trial court, Petitioner’s counsel indicated that, based on

the information provided in Lee’s habeas petition, he had conducted his own investigation, and

that “on or about April 20, 2001, I received a letter from Roy Vinson [an uncle of Adkins],

advising me that he had information that petitioner had been wrongly convicted in the shooting

of the Parish brothers in case no. SCD 116366. Mr. Vinson advised me that Darnell Jackson was

the driver of the vehicle from which Arnold Adkins had shot the Parish brothers.” (Id. at 5-6.)

Counsel goes on to state that he was contacted by Arnold Johnson, a cousin of Adkins, on June

10, 2001, and that: “Johnson informed me that at the funeral of Arnold Adkins, Darnell Jackson

admitted to being the driver of the vehicle used in the shooting of the Parish brothers. Mr.

Johnson further informed me that Arnold Adkins had also informed him of that fact in late

1996.” (Id. at 6.) Finally, counsel stated that: “Shortly after obtaining the declaration of Arnold

Johnson, I was informed of a former girlfriend of Darnell Jackson, one Tatianna Daniels who

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1

 Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which provides for constructive filing

of court documents as of the date they are submitted to the prison authorities for mailing to the court.

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court will use the constructive filing

dates throughout this Order.

-5- 05cv1059

had made statements to others that Darnell Jackson had personally confessed to his involvement

in the shooting of the Parish brothers. [¶] I spent many months attempting to get in contact with

‘Tatianna’, known to me only by that name.” (Id.) Attached to the state habeas petitions are

declarations by Vinson, Johnson and Daniels, dated May 6, 2001, July 26, 2001 and May 6,

2002, respectively. (Id. at 19-24.) These are the same declarations relied on by Petitioner in the

instant federal Petition. (Pet. Exs. A-C.) However, as discussed below, only the Daniels

declaration provides direct evidence that Jackson was the driver.

The trial court issued an order to show cause, and the District Attorney responded with

evidence that Vinson, Johnson and Daniels had provided prior inconsistent statements regarding

Jackson’s involvement in the Parish brothers shooting, were all associated with the same gang

to which Petitioner belonged, the Skyline Pirus, and that Vinson and Johnson had been convicted

of multiple felonies and were serving life sentences. (Lodgment No. 14.) The appellate court

denied relief on the basis that “the ‘newly discovered’ evidence presented herein is clearly

insufficient to support a conclusion that points unerringly to Petitioner’s innocence.” (Lodgment

No. 16, In re Stewart, No. HC 17038, slip op. at 3 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Dec. 17, 2002).) The court found

that “the evidence is not credible because of inherent inaccuracies and witness bias. Moreover,

it does not completely undermine the prosecution’s case or point unerringly to Petitioner’s

innocence, and the evidence includes inadmissible hearsay.” (Id.) Petitioner, acting pro se,

constructively filed a habeas petition in the appellate court on January 29, 2003.1

 (Lodgment

No. 17.) That petition was denied on May 23, 2003, in a four-page order in which the appellate

court agreed with the conclusions of the trial judge regarding the reliability of the Vinson,

Johnson and Daniels declarations and the inadmissibility of the hearsay contained therein, and

concluded that: “The declarations at best raise an issue of credibility without providing a

complete defense.” (Lodgment No. 18, In re Stewart, No. D041599, slip op. at 3-4 (Cal.App.Ct.

May 23, 2003.) Petitioner presented the same claims in a pro se habeas petition constructively

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filed in the state supreme court on August 31, 2003, which was denied on August 11, 2004 by

an order which stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” (Lodgment Nos. 19-20.)

Petitioner alleges in claim one of his federal Petition that the state courts erred in denying

his state habeas petitions because the new evidence shows that his conviction was based on the

unreliable and perjured eyewitness identification testimony of the Parish brothers, that he was

therefore convicted in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that habeas relief is available

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because the state court adjudication of his claims was contrary to

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). (Pet. at 6-6e.) He contends in claim two that

the state courts erred in determining that the Vinson, Johnson and Daniels declarations were not

credible without conducting an evidentiary hearing, but identifies no basis for a violation of his

federal rights other than indicating that development of the record in this regard, and in particular

exposing Jackson as lying about his participation in the shooting in order to maintain his good

standing with the District Attorney, goes to the heart of his actual innocence claim. (Pet. at 7-

7e.) Petitioner alleges in claim three that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he

stands convicted, and that the newly discovered evidence, which consists not only of the Vinson,

Johnson and Daniels declarations showing Jackson was the driver, but also a statement by

William Allen impeaching Kevin Brown which was not turned over by the prosecutor,

demonstrates that he was convicted in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to due process. (Pet. at 8-8d.) Finally, Petitioner alleges in claim four that, in light of the newly

discovered evidence, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and the denial of

his state habeas petition was therefore contrary to clearly established United States Supreme

Court authority. (Pet. at 9-9c.)

Respondent contends the Petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that

the claims do not present federal questions. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of Answer at 11-19.) Respondent argues that the state court adjudication of the claims could not

be contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

because the United States Supreme Court has never established a rule requiring states to provide

an evidentiary hearing or a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. (Id. at 19-25.)

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Petitioner replies in his Traverse that the prosecution committed Brady error and suborned

perjury by not disclosing to Petitioner the information which was given to Lee’s attorney, which

the prosecution apparently became aware of while Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, and

argues that any potential untimeliness here was caused by the state preventing him from

interviewing Jackson or failing to disclose Jackson’s statements. (Traverse at 1-5.) Petitioner

also argues that his claims do in fact present federal questions. (Id. at 5-22.) 

The Magistrate Judge found that the latest the one-year statute of limitations began to run

was when Petitioner became aware of the newly discovered evidence, either when Lee was

granted habeas relief on August 31, 2000, or at the latest when Petitioner’s counsel was

contacted by Vinson on April 20, 2001 and told that Jackson was the driver, and that the instant

Petition, constructively filed on May 15, 2005, was untimely. (R&R at 8-14.) The Magistrate

Judge found that statutory tolling was unavailable for the time Petitioner was pursuing one

complete round of state post-conviction collateral review from May 14, 2002 until August 11,

2004, because the one-year limitations period had already expired prior to commencement of the

state habeas proceedings. (R&R at 9-12.) The Magistrate Judge also found that equitable tolling

was not available because any impediment to the filing of the state habeas petition ended when

Petitioner became aware of the newly discovered evidence as late as April 20, 2001, and that

Petitioner had not made a sufficient showing of actual innocence so as to avoid operation of the

statute of limitations. (R&R at 12-14.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge found, in the alternative,

that Petitioner’s claims did not present federal questions, with the possible exception of his

actual innocence claim, but that Petitioner had failed to establish that he is actually innocent, and

had in any case failed to establish that the adjudication of any of his claims by the state courts

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (R&R at 14-19.) 

Petitioner objects to the findings of the Magistrate Judge regarding the commencement

of the statute of limitations, objects to the finding that he has failed to state a federal claim, and

objects to the standard applied to his actual innocence claim. (Objections at 1-11.) He also

seeks leave to amend his Petition to clearly state the federal basis for his claims (Pet.’s Amended

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Mot. to Amend at 1-9), and seeks discovery of any exculpatory evidence in Respondent’s

possession. (Pet.’s Mot. for Discovery [Doc. No. 41] at 1-8.) 

II. Statute of Limitations

The one-year statute of limitations begins to run at the latest of- 

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). 

With respect to section 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 7,

1999, the last day he could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court following the March 9, 1999 denial by the state supreme court of his petition for

review. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2002). With respect to section

2244(d)(1)(B), Petitioner contends an impediment was created by the state because it engaged

in a “cover-up” by refusing to inform him of the information provided by Jackson upon which

Lee’s conviction was vacated, and by making Jackson unavailable by keeping him in the witness

protection program. (Traverse at 3-4.) The Magistrate Judge found that the information

provided to Lee’s counsel did not exonerate Petitioner and therefore did not have to be provided

to Petitioner’s counsel, that in any case Petitioner was likely to have been aware of the

information contained in the letter no later than August 31, 2000, the date Lee was granted

habeas relief, and that measuring two and one-half years from the date of the letter, July 14,

1998, the “cover-up” had ended by December 2000. (R&R at 9-10.) The Court declines to

adopt these findings. 

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When the R&R was issued, the record was unclear as to exactly when Petitioner became

aware of the information contained in the July 14, 1998 letter. A review of the state habeas

petition shows that Petitioner’s habeas counsel was aware of the information in the letter by at

least April 20, 2001, by which time he had conducted an investigation based on the information

provided by Lee’s counsel and had received a letter from Vinson stating that Jackson was the

driver of the vehicle from which the Parish brothers were shot. (Lodgment No. 12 at 5.) The

Magistrate Judge assumed that the two and one-half year “cover-up” alleged by Petitioner ran

from July 14, 1998 until December 2000. (R&R at 9-10.) Petitioner now contends that the

“cover-up” began in September 2000 and ended in January 2003 when he first became aware

of the contents of the letter, and that it constitutes a state-created impediment to presenting his

claims. (Objections at 3.) Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the appellate court in

January 2003 which contains a photocopy of the description of the letter which was presented

by his counsel in the habeas petition filed in the trial court. (Lodgment No. 17 at 22.) 

Assuming an impediment was created by the failure of the District Attorney to share the

information contained in the July 14, 1998 letter with Petitioner or his counsel, any such

impediment was lifted sometime before April 20, 2001, when counsel was contacted by Vinson.

Even to the extent Petitioner contends there was an impediment to filing his state habeas petition

until May 6, 2002, when he was finally able to secure the Daniels declaration, which appears to

be the first time he possessed direct admissible evidence that Jackson was the driver, the

calculation of the statute of limitations would not change for the reasons discussed immediately

below. Petitioner’s contentions that he only became aware of the existence of the letter in

January 2003, and did not secure a copy of the letter until after he filed his federal habeas

Petition, also does not change the calculation for the reasons discussed below.

28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply here. With respect to section 2244(d)(1)(D), the

statute of limitations begins to run on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” The

Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of his claims no later

than December 2000, based on Petitioner’s contention that he did not become aware of the July

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14, 1998 letter for two and one-half years, and that the information provided by Vinson, Johnson

and Daniels was merely derivative of the information provided in the July 14, 1998 letter. (R&R

at 10.) The Court declines to adopt this finding because the information contained in the July

14, 1998 letter does not indicate that Jackson was the driver, and therefore the information

contained in the Vinson, Johnson and Daniels declarations is not derivative of the information

provided by Jackson. Rather, the record indicates that Petitioner’s counsel conducted an

independent investigation after being informed at an unstated time by Lee’s counsel of the

results of an investigation conducted by Lee’s counsel, and that Petitioner’s counsel became

aware of information implicating Jackson as the driver at least by April 20, 2001, when counsel

states he received a letter from Vinson in which Vinson said that Jackson was the driver.

(Lodgment No. 12 at 5.) Although expansion of the record might indicate that Petitioner or his

counsel became aware of the information contained in the July 14, 1998 letter even earlier, an

earlier date would not benefit Petitioner. As discussed below, setting this date at January 2003

when Petitioner contends he first learned of the contents of the letter does not change the

outcome.

A difficulty arises in determining when Petitioner or his counsel became aware of the

factual predicate of the claim, however, because although Petitioner’s counsel indicated that

Vinson told him in a letter that Jackson was the driver of the vehicle, the declaration ultimately

submitted by Vinson does not contain such direct evidence. (Id. at 19-20.) In fact, neither the

Vinson declaration, dated May 6, 2001, nor the Johnson declaration, dated July 26, 2001,

provide direct evidence that Jackson was the driver. (See id. at 19-22.) It is only with the

Daniels declaration, dated May 6, 2002, that Petitioner was in possession of direct admissible

evidence that Jackson was the driver. (Id. at 24-25.) Thus, there are two possible dates upon

which Petitioner could be found to be aware of the factual predicate of his claim that the

prosecution withheld evidence regarding Jackson, the April 20, 2001 date that counsel received

a letter from Vinson, or the May 6, 2002 date when counsel obtained the Daniels declaration.

The ultimate determination of timeliness does not rest on which of these dates is used to start the

statute of limitations, and does not change if the date is set at January 2003, the date Petitioner

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contends he became aware of the contents of the July 14, 1998 letter. The Court rejects

Petitioner’s implied contention that he did not become aware of the factual predicate of his

claim, or that an impediment to presenting his claim was not lifted, until he actually received a

copy of the letter after initiating his federal habeas proceedings. By his own admission he was

aware of the contents of the letter and in possession of the Daniels declaration in January 2003.

In sum, the one-year statute of limitations began to run either on April 20, 2001, May 6,

2002, or January 2003, and the instant Petition, filed on May 15, 2005, is untimely unless

Petitioner is entitled to tolling of the limitations period. Petitioner’s attorney filed the first state

habeas petition in the superior court on May 14, 2002, which was denied on December 17, 2002.

(Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) Petitioner, acting pro per, constructively filed a habeas petition based

on the same evidence in the appellate court on January 29, 2003. (Lodgment No. 17.) That

petition was denied on May 23, 2003, for essentially the same reasons given by the trial court.

(Lodgment No. 18, In re Stewart, No. D041599, slip op. at 3-4 (Cal.App.Ct. May 23, 2003.)

Petitioner presented those same claims in a pro se habeas petition constructively filed in the state

supreme court on August 31, 2003, which was denied on August 11, 2004 by an order which

stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” (Lodgment Nos. 19-20.) 

To the extent the one-year statute of limitations began to run on April 20, 2001, Petitioner

is not entitled to statutory tolling because the first state habeas petition was filed more than one

year later, on May 14, 2002. To the extent Petitioner did not become aware of the factual

predicate of his claims until he secured the Daniels declaration on May 6, 2002, and the statute

of limitations began to run the next day, see Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001), only seven days ran before tolling began when he filed his first state habeas petition on

May 14, 2002. Assuming he would be entitled to statutory tolling from May 14, 2002, when he

initiated state habeas proceedings, until August 11, 2004, when the state supreme court denied

his final petition, Petitioner had 358 days remaining as of August 11, 2004. He filed the instant

Petition 277 days later, on May 15, 2005, the date he handed it to prison officials for mailing to

the Court (Pet. at 11), and under that scenario the Petition is timely. Even assuming that the

statute of limitations began to run when Petitioner became aware of the existence of the letter

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2

 At page 304 of the Swain opinion, the state supreme court states: “We are entitled to and we

do require of a convicted defendant that he allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have

a final judgment overturned and that he fully disclose his reasons for delaying in the presentation of

those facts. This procedural requirement does not place upon an indigent prisoner who seeks to raise

questions of the denial of fundamental rights in propria persona any burden of complying with

technicalities; it simply demands of him a measure of frankness in disclosing his factual situation.”

Swain, 34 Cal.2d at 304.

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in January 2003, at a time when the statute of limitations was being statutorily tolled, he would

have 365 days remaining if statutory tolling ended on August 11, 2004, and the Petition would

be timely under that scenario.

However, the statute of limitations is only statutorily tolled while a “properly filed” state

habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time between the denial of a petition in a

lower California court and the filing of a subsequent petition in the next higher state court does

not toll the statute of limitations (i.e., an application for post-conviction relief is not “pending”

during the interstitial periods while one is pursuing a full round of state collateral review) if the

petition is untimely. Id. at 223-26. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Court held

that statutory tolling is not available for the period a petition is under consideration (i.e., an

application for post-conviction relief is not “properly filed”) if it is untimely. Id. at 413-14. In

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court held that in the absence of a clear indication

by the state supreme court that a petition is untimely, the federal court “must itself examine the

delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.”

Id. at 198. 

The appellate court denied relief on May 23, 2003, and Petitioner filed his subsequent

habeas petition in the state supreme court on August 31, 2003, a delay of 100-days. In the state

petition form where Petitioner is required to explain any delay in raising the claims within the

meaning of In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949),2

 he wrote: “The investigation regarding

newly discovered evidence was not complete until May of 2002.” (Lodgment No. 19 at 48.)

The state supreme court denied the petition with an order which stated: “Petition for writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.” (Lodgment No. 20.) Lacking an indication regarding timeliness,

this Court must examine the delay “and determine what the state courts would have held in

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respect to timeliness.” Chavis, 546 U.S. at 198. Petitioner’s explanation for the delay is an

unacceptable excuse under Swain because he was aware of the factual basis for the claim in May

2002, over a year before he filed the state supreme court habeas petition. Additionally, there is

no indication that Petitioner was conducting an ongoing investigation, as a comparison of the

appellate court habeas petition and the state supreme court habeas petition reveals that Petitioner

presented the same claims in both petitions and did not support the state supreme court petition

with any evidence which was not presented to the state appellate court. (Compare Lodgment

No. 17 with Lodgment No. 19.) Thus, the more than three-month delay here was completely

unjustified under state law. Swain, 34 Cal.2d at 304; In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 805 (1998)

(holding that a habeas claim “that is substantially delayed will nevertheless be considered on the

merits if the petitioner can demonstrate ‘good cause’ for the delay.”); In re Gallego, 18 Cal.4th

825, 838 n.13 (1998) (stating that a petitioner may establish good cause for delay under Robbins

if he “was conducting a bona fide ongoing investigation (based upon known or triggering facts)

into another claim or claims and withheld the completed claim to avoid the piecemeal

presentation of claims.”) Because Petitioner provided no basis for a finding of good cause nor

any other excuse justifying the 100-day delay, the delay was “unreasonable” within the meaning

of California law, and the state supreme court habeas petition was neither “properly filed” nor

“pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Chavis, 546 U.S. at 199-200

(stating that in determining whether a filing delay was “reasonable” under California law, federal

courts must “keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely filings in California (as

elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that California law in this

respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other States” which provide time periods of

30 to 60 days between filings) (emphasis in original); see e.g., Culver v. Director of Corrections,

450 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal 2006) (finding unexplained and unjustified delays of

71 and 97 days unreasonable under California law). As a result, statutory tolling is unavailable

anytime after May 23, 2003. At that time, Petitioner had either 358 days remaining on the

statute of limitations or 365 days, depending on whether the trigger date is May 6, 2002 or

January 2003. The instant Petition was filed on May 15, 2005, nearly two years later, and nearly

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a year after the statute of limitations expired. Accordingly, statutory tolling does not aid

Petitioner.

The statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the

Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002).

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary circumstances” he has identified

were the proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part.

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199,

1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling (under

AEDPA) is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner had at least implied knowledge of the factual basis of his claims as early as

May 2002, when his attorney filed the first state habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 19 at 48.)

Even assuming equitable tolling was available until January 2003 when Petitioner filed his pro

se habeas petition in the appellate court, which is when he contends he first became aware of the

contents of the letter, and the statute of limitations did not began to run until statutory tolling

ended on May 23, 2003, the Petition is untimely under the calculations discussed immediately

above. Petitioner’s contention that equitable tolling is available due to: (1) the continued refusal

of the prosecutor to turn over the statement made by Jackson; (2) the refusal to make Jackson

available; (3) the refusal to disclose the file regarding Jackson’s cooperation on this and other

cases; and/or (4) because he did not actually receive a copy of the July 14, 1998 letter until after

he initiated his federal habeas proceedings, is unavailing. Although Petitioner alleges that if he

were given access to this material he might be able to establish that Jackson was the driver based

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on more credible evidence than the Vinson, Johnson and Daniels declarations, or might be able

to finally prove that the prosecution has withheld exculpatory evidence, the lack of access to this

material was not the proximate cause of his delay in filing the state supreme court habeas

petition. Accordingly, equitable tolling does not render the Petition timely.

The Magistrate Judge also concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to avoid operation of

the statute of limitations based on his claim of actual innocence because he had not met the

standard set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). (R&R at 12-14.) The Magistrate

Judge found that Petitioner had not demonstrated that the new evidence makes it more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

because the declarations of Vinson, Johnson and Daniels are not credible for the reasons set forth

by the state courts, and because the evidence presented by Jackson which led to the overturning

of Lee’s conviction does not prove that Petitioner is innocent, but in fact confirms Petitioner’s

guilt. (R&R at 12-14.) The Court declines to adopt these findings and will consider the issue

in the first instance.

In Schlup, a capital case, the petitioner claimed he was actually innocent of the murder

for which he was convicted, and that his conviction was obtained as a result of the withholding

of evidence by the prosecution in violation of Brady, and in violation of his right to the effective

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 307. The Court noted that because the petitioner had failed to establish cause and prejudice

sufficient to overcome a procedural default, he would be able to “obtain review of his

constitutional claims only if he falls within the ‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Id. at 314-15, quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,

494 (1991). The Schlup Court noted that because the claim for relief at issue “depends critically

on the validity of his Strickland and Brady claims, Schlup’s claim of innocence is thus ‘not itself

a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have

his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315,

quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (recognizing that the “body of our habeas

jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim,

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but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred

constitutional claim considered on the merits.”) The Supreme Court has therefore made clear

that an assertion of actual innocence is not itself a constitutional claim, but a gateway available

to have otherwise barred claims considered on the merits. Id.; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S.

518, 539 (2006) (noting that the case at hand involved a “federal habeas petition seeking

consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence.”)

“In order to pass through Schlup’s gateway, and have an otherwise barred constitutional

claim heard on the merits, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, including

evidence not introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-76 (9th

Cir. 2003), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In applying this standard, “A petitioner need not

show that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was convicted of committing; instead, he must

show that ‘“a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Majoy, 296 F.3d at

776, quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), quoting Schlup,

513 U.S. at 316. 

In Majoy, the petitioner was convicted of non-capital murder and conspiracy to commit

murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. There, as here, the federal habeas petition was

found by the district court to be barred by the statute of limitations after rejecting petitioner’s

contentions that a state-created impediment extended the deadline, that he did not discover the

factual basis for his claims until a time which would render his petition timely, and that equitable

tolling was available. Majoy, 296 F.3d at 772. Evidence was presented at Majoy’s trial in the

form of statements made to the police by an accomplice who was “unavailable” at trial due to

his refusal to testify, and in the form of the preliminary hearing testimony of the accomplice,

which “furnished the foundation for Majoy’s conviction.” Id. at 773. That evidence had been

called into question after trial when the accomplice wrote letters to the trial court stating that he

had falsely implicated Majoy due to police prompting and coercion. Id. The Ninth Circuit held

that if a fact-finder could conclude that the claims of the accomplice were credible, then, in light

of other evidence negating Majoy’s culpability, “the Schlup gateway would seem to open,” and

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petitioner “might fall within the narrow class of cases implicating a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Id. at 776. The Court went on to state that: “If he does, the question to be answered

is whether surviving the rigors of this gateway has the consequence of overriding AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitation, a legal question not yet decided by this Circuit or the Supreme Court.

If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then his otherwise-barred claims must be

heard on the merits.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court in Majoy remanded to the district court

with instructions to develop the record with respect to the “gateway” claim, and determine

whether the claim was factually meritorious, prior to consideration of whether the claim was

jurisdictionally barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 776-78.

Here, Petitioner relies on the declarations of Vinson, Johnson and Daniels to support his

actual innocence contention. He also contends that if he could obtain access to Jackson and/or

the District Attorney’s file regarding Jackson’s cooperation in this and other cases, he might

discover evidence proving that Jackson was the driver of the car, might be able to refute the

unsupported contention that Jackson said that Petitioner was the driver, and might be able to

bolster his claim that the Parish brothers were pressured to falsely identify Lee and Petitioner,

and that the District Attorney is involved in a cover up. Petitioner’s burden at the threshold of

the Schlup gateway is to demonstrate that it is “more likely than not, in light of the new

evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bell, 547 U.S.

at 538; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329; Majoy, 296 F.3d at 778. In making that determination, this

Court “must consider all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without

regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that would

govern at trial.” Bell, 547 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The July 14, 1998 letter reported the substance of Jackson’s statement, namely, that

Jackson said that when Petitioner and Adkins told Lee about the Parish brothers shooting, Lee

became excited and the group left to conduct another shooting in which Lee killed a man.

(Traverse Ex. A.) Although the letter states that Jackson’s attorney said that “Jackson related

to him that [Petitioner] and Arnold Adkins (not Richard Lee) were actually the people who shot

the Parish brothers,” the actual statement by Jackson, as reported in the letter, merely states that

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Petitioner and Adkins “told Lee about the Parish brothers shooting.” (Id.) Petitioner argues that

this is third-hand information which, aside from the fact that Jackson’s statement does not

directly implicate Petitioner as the driver, lacks an adequate basis as to how Jackson acquired

knowledge that Petitioner was the driver, and that the circumstances of the District Attorney

relying on such evidence to take the extreme measure of overturning a jury verdict and vacating

Lee’s conviction shows that the District Attorney: (a) knows that the Parish brothers committed

perjury at Petitioner’s trial when they identified Lee and Petitioner as the perpetrators; (b) knows

that Jackson’s intimate knowledge of the shooting came from Jackson’s participation in that

crime; (c) is willing to go to any length to protect Jackson’s credibility because he is the chief

prosecution witness in other cases; and (d) conceded habeas relief to Lee in order to avoid an

evidentiary hearing where this information would be revealed. (Traverse at 9-12.) 

Petitioner attempts through his Motion for Discovery to obtain information which he

contends might establish that Jackson never provided evidence that Petitioner admitted to being

the driver, that Jackson lied to his attorney in order to entice the District Attorney to place him

in the witness protection program and/or to avoid punishment for being the driver of the car

during the shooting of the Parish brothers, and that the District Attorney is aware of these alleged

facts as well as improprieties surrounding the investigation of the shooting but continues to cover

them up to protect Jackson. (Pet.’s Mot. for Discovery at 2-8.) If Petitioner can obtain credible

evidence that Jackson was the driver of the car, he may be able to fit through the Schlup

gateway. The Court finds that it is appropriate to reserve ruling on this issue until after ruling

on Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery. See Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776-78. The Court takes no

position at this time as to the merits of Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery, that is, whether

Petitioner is entitled to the discovery sought, whether in camera review of the materials is

necessary, or whether such discovery is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) for example, but

merely finds that a response would be useful in addressing the motion. 

In sum, the instant Petition was filed after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations

and is subject to dismissal on that basis, with the caveat that the Ninth Circuit has left open the

possibility that Petitioner may avoid dismissal if he can pass through the Schlup gateway. The

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Court will reserve ruling on that issue until after ruling on the Motion for Discovery.

III. Motion for Leave to Amend

Petitioner has filed an Amended Motion for Leave to Amend his Petition in response to

the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he had failed to state a federal claim, and in particular that

he made only vague references to the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in connection

to his claim involving failure of the prosecutor to turn over the statements of William Allen.

(Doc. No. 50.) Petitioner attaches a proposed amended petition presenting the following claims:

(1) a claim alleging a violation of Brady and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)

(holding that the prosecutor has a duty to disclose to the defense before trial all promises,

inducements or threats made to a witness to gain cooperation in the investigation or prosecution),

based on the failure of the prosecution to disclose that they knew, prior to prosecution witness

Kevin Brown’s testimony that Petitioner had confessed, that William Allen had made a

statement impeaching Brown; (2) a prosecutorial misconduct claim based on the same

allegations as claim one; (3) a Brady/Giglio claim based on the failure of the prosecution to turn

over information implicating Jackson as the driver; and (4) an actual innocence claim. (Pet.’s

Amended Mot. to Amend [Doc. No. 50] Ex. A.) 

With respect to claims one and two in the proposed amended petition, Petitioner contends,

as he did in the appellate court on direct appeal, that the prosecution’s case essentially turned on

a statement Petitioner made to Kevin Brown that purported to be a confession that Petitioner had

killed one of Brown’s “home-boys.” (Lodgment No. 3 at 1-2.) Brown stated that when he saw

Petitioner speaking to William Allen after football practice at Grossmont College, Petitioner

stopped talking to Allen and called Brown over to him, and that Petitioner made the statement

to Brown while Allen was standing about 20 feet away. (Id.) Petitioner contends now, as he did

on appeal, that the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to disclose that a prosecution investigator

interviewed Allen and that Allen stated that he was not at Grossmont College talking with

Petitioner at any time relevant to when the alleged confession was made. (Id. at 2-4.) The

appellate court denied the claim on the basis that, assuming the information should have been

turned over to the defense: “Given the overwhelming direct evidence against Stewart, it is not

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reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different if Allen, Stewart’s

friend and a former member of the same gang, had testified that he had never seen Stewart at

Grossmont College.” (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Lee, et al., No. D026580, slip op. at 14.)

Although Petitioner presented these contentions in the original Petition, it was unclear

whether this was a separate Brady claim or simply argument in support of his actual innocence

claim. (See Pet. at 8a-8b.) Petitioner requests leave to amend in order to clarify that he is

presenting federal claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct and Brady/Giglio violations, and

not, as he contends the Magistrate Judge found, merely a vague reference to due process. (Pet.’s

Amended Mot. to Amend at 1-2, citing R&R at 16.) 

Petitioner is correct that because the factual basis of this claim was presented in the

original Petition, although perhaps not clearly as a separate Brady/Giglio claim, the claim relates

back to the original Petition for purposes of the statute of limitations. See Mayle v. Felix, 545

U.S. 644, 664 (2005) (holding that relation back requires that the claims be “tied to a common

core of operative facts.”) However, as set forth above, the Court has already found that the

original Petition is untimely and is reserving ruling on whether Petitioner can avoid the operation

of the statute of limitations by fitting through the Schlup gateway. As such, whether claims one

and two in the proposed amended petition relates back to the original Petition has no effect on

the calculation of the statute of limitations.

Thus, Petitioner is in essence seeking to recast and clarify the claims and allegations

presented in the original Petition in order to ensure they are presented as federal claims, and to

ensure that the Court treats his “actual innocence claim” as an assertion that he is entitled to have

his otherwise barred claims heard on their merits. Under a liberal construction of the proposed

amended petition, Petitioner seeks to present prosecutorial misconduct and Brady/Giglio claims

based on the failure of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory information regarding Allen

(claims one and two) and Jackson (claim three), and argues that his claims should be considered

on their merits notwithstanding the failure to present them within the statute of limitations

because he can fit through the Schlup gateway (claim three). Leave to amend after an Answer

has been filed, as here, “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).

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There appears to be no prejudice to Respondent to permit the filing of the proposed amended

petition as the claims in the amended petition merely recast those claims presented in the original

Petition and do not present any new factual allegations. Moreover, the Court will only reach the

merits of the claims if Petitioner fits through the Schlup gateway. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Motion to Amend. The Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to file a copy of the proposed amended petition as an original First

Amended Petition in his action. Because the First Amended Petition will become the operative

pleading in this action upon filing, the Court declines to adopt the findings and conclusions of

the Magistrate Judge regarding the merits of the claims presented in the original Petition.

IV. Motion for Discovery

Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Discovery seeking an order directing Respondent

to turn over any exculpatory evidence in its possession, including but not limited to Jackson’s

file regarding his cooperation with the prosecution in this and other cases, and a report written

by Investigating Officer Wade at the request of the District Attorney summarizing the effect of

Jackson’s statement on Wade’s investigation into the shooting and accounting for the wrongful

conviction of Lee. (Doc. No. 41.) In addition to Petitioner’s contentions regarding the “cover

up” surrounding Jackson, he also contends that Wade is related to the Parish brothers and

pressured them to falsely identify Petitioner and Lee as the perpetrators. (Traverse at 14-15.)

Petitioner contends this information will assist him in presenting his Brady/Giglio claims, in

challenging the credibility of the victims’ eyewitness testimony, and in establishing his factual

innocence by demonstrating that Jackson was the driver of the car. (Pet.’s Motion for Discovery

at 2-8.) As set forth above, the Court finds that resolution of this Motion is appropriate before

determining whether Petitioner can satisfy the Schlup standard. Thus, the Court will direct

Respondent to file a response to Petitioner’s Motion. 

V. Briefing Schedule

Respondent shall file a response to Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery within forty-five

(45) days of the date this Order is filed. Petitioner may file a Reply to the response to his Motion

for Discovery within thirty (30) days of being served with copies of the responses filed by

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Respondent. The briefing shall be directed to the undersigned District Judge, who will rule on

the Motion for Discovery. Respondent is not required to file an Answer to the First Amended

Petition at this time. After the Court has addressed the discovery issues and has determined

whether Petitioner can fit through the Schlup gateway, it will direct further briefing if necessary.

VI. Conclusion and Order

The Court DECLINES TO ADOPT the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate

Judge as presented in the R&R (Doc. No. 37), GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Motion for

Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 50), DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to file a copy of the proposed

amended petition (Doc. No. 50, Ex. A) as an original First Amended Petition which will become

the operative pleading in this action, and ISSUES a briefing schedule regarding Petitioner’s

Motion for Discovery (Doc. No. 41) requiring Respondent to file a response to the Motion

within forty-five (45) days of the date this Order is filed, and providing that Petitioner may file

a Reply within thirty (30) days of being served with Respondent’s brief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 30, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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