Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01194/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01194-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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10cv1194

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL RAMIREZ, a minor, by and

through his guardian ad litem, CECILIA

SANTIAGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRI CITY MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 10cv1194 L(NLS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

REMAND [doc. #12]

Plaintiff seeks remand of this action to the Superior Court for the State of California,

County of San Diego based upon defendants’ untimely removal. Defendant Tri City Medical

Center (“TCHD”) opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the case will be remanded.

1. Procedural Background

On March 18, 2009, plaintiff filed his complaint in the state court alleging a cause of

action for medical negligence against TCHD and other defendants. The complaint was amended

several times. The state court granted plaintiff’s motion to file a fifth amended complaint

(“FAC”) at a hearing on April 30, 2010, but rejected certain limited aspects of plaintiff’s

Case 3:10-cv-01194-L-NLS Document 22 Filed 10/25/10 Page 1 of 4
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1 The state court declined to accept plaintiff’s proposed FAC for the following

reasons: the FAC “purports to change the caption of this lawsuit from Santiago to Wosk to

Ramirez v. Salpietra, R.N.;” “alleges that Cecilia Santiago is a plaintiff”; “Paragraphs 43, 63, and

83 refer to ‘both plaintiffs’”; “alleges that defendants’ ‘actions constituted discrimination against

Daniel and his family on the basis of their race and/or national origin.’” (Plaintiff’s Exh. E.) The

state court noted that “[w]ithout correcting these problems, the Fifth Amended Complaint in its

present form will cause confusion for the court staff and the parties.” (Id.)

2 10cv1194

proposed pleading1 and provided until May 14, 2010 for plaintiff to make the revisions. In the

proposed and subsequently filed FAC, plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of race and/or

national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in addition to

state law claims. The federal claim giving rise to the right of removal was alleged for the first

time in the FAC.

Although the proposed FAC containing the federal cause of action was provided to

defendants as an attachment to plaintiff’s motion to amend and leave to file the FAC in

substantially the form presented was granted on April 30, 2010, the FAC was not filed until May

13, 2010. 

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides:

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may

be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become

removable, . . .

Failure to comply with the thirty-day time limitation renders the removal procedurally

defective. “The ‘strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant

always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper,’ and that the court resolves all

ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).

In the present case, the issue is when the thirty-day period for removal commenced. 

Plaintiff contends that defendants’ removal of the action on June 3, 2010 was untimely because

the state court granted his motion for leave to file the FAC, which contained the federal claim,

on April 30, 2010. But defendants argue the removal would have been premature prior to the

actual filing of the FAC, May 13, 2010. 

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The Ninth Circuit has not answered the question of when removal becomes timely. There

are at least three approaches to this question. One provides that the 30-day period for removal

commences with the service of a motion to amend or stipulation permitting amendment. See

Lucente S.P.A. v. Apik Jewelry, Inc., 2007 WL 7209938, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2007)(citing Webster v

Sunnyside Corp., 836 F. Supp. 629, 631 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Harriman v. Liberian Maritime

Corp., 204 F. Supp. 205, 206-207 (D. Mass. 1962). As the Lucente case notes, this approach

allows for removal even though the court may ultimately deny the motion to amend. In such a

case, removal would be premature. Id., *3. 

The majority of courts considering this issue have held that the removal clock begins to

run when the state court grants plaintiff’s motion to amend to state a federal claim. Sullivan v.

Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1998)(“Until the state judge granted the motion to

amend . . .the complaint did not state a federal claim, since the state judge might deny the

motion. . . .); see also Owings v. Deere and Co., 441 F. Supp.2d 1011, 1014 (S.D. Iowa 2006)

(listing cases); Graphic Scanning Corp. v. Yampol, 677 F. Supp. 256, 258 (D.Del. 1988). The

Ninth Circuit has stated: “[W]e don't charge defendants with notice of removability until they've

received a paper that gives them enough information to remove.” Durham v. Lockheed Martin

Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006). As noted above, the state court granted plaintiff’s

motion to amend the complaint on April 30, 2010, but with directions to make some corrections

to the proposed pleading that did not impact the substantive federal claim.

Like a small number of courts, defendants would have the Court require the actual filing

of the FAC in order to start the removal period. See Bezy v. Floyd County Plan Commission,

199 F.R.D. 308, 313 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Desmond v BankAmerica Corp., 120 F.2d 1201 (N.D.

Cal. 2000)(“removal of this case based on the addition of parties or claims, if available at all,

will become available only upon the filing of an amended complaint”). The Court disagrees

with this approach in the particular circumstances of this action. 

At issue is the determination of the date that defendants clearly ascertained that the action

could be removed. With the granting of plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint on April 30,

2010, the FAC clearly became removable. The few minor, non-substantive changes to the

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proposed FAC that the state court wanted to see included in the filed FAC did not alter the fact

defendants knew that the federal claim could and would be asserted against them in the FAC

thus commencing the 30-day removal period. This approach is consistent with the specific

language of the statute that does not require the filing of an amended complaint in order for the

case to become removable: “receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of

an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that

the case is one which is or has become removable” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Requiring defendants

to remove the case once the court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend does not lead to the

situation where removal is premature.

The Court finds that defendants' removal was untimely in this case and is thus

procedurally defective. The removal period began when the state court granted plaintiff’s

motion to amend to state a federal claim in the FAC because it was at that point that defendants

first ascertained that the case was one that had become removable. Although the proposed FAC

had some minor issues that caused the state court to decline to allow the pleading to be

immediately filed, those issues did not impact the notice to defendants that plaintiff was

asserting a federal cause of action that allowed the action to be removed.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion for remand is GRANTED. The Clerk

of the Court is directed to return this case to the Superior Court for the State of California,

County of San Diego, Case No. 37-2009-00085508-CU-MM-CTL. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 25, 2010

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. NITA L. STORMES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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