Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03153/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03153-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D ca·~ U •ted States court o_f APP .., TENTH CIRCUIT 01 Tenth Circult 

JOSIE BUTLER, as Administrator of 

the Estate of FRANK BUTLER, 

deceased; JOSIE A. BUTLER; GREG ) 

BUTLER; JOSEPH BUTLER; ANGELA SMALL) 

BUTLER; FRANKIE LYNN BUTLER, ) 

individually, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 

a Utah Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

OCT 041995, 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-3153 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-4067R) 

William J. Pauzauskie, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Douglas F. Martin, of Porter, Fairchild, Wachter & Haney, Topeka, 

Kansas (Ronald W. Fairchild, of Porter, Fairchild, Wachter & 

Haney, Topeka, Kansas, with him on the brief) for DefendantAppellee. 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT* and McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit 

Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This case is before us on appeal from a decision of the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas granting 

Defendant Union Pacific Railroad's (the "Railroad") motion to 

* Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3153 Document: 01019280218 Date Filed: 10/04/1995 Page: 1 
dismiss the Butlers' personal injury complaint pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b) (6). Federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of 

citizenship, and we must determine whether the Kansas Supreme 

Court would apply the common law "Fireman's Rule" to preclude recovery under Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-232 & 66-234.1 Because we 

conclude that the Kansas Supreme Court would apply the "Fireman's 

Rule" in this case, we affirm the decision of the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Frank Butler was a fire fighter for Marshall County, Kansas. 

He died in the process of fighting a fire alongside the Railroad's 

tracks west of Marysville, Kansas, and his family brought this 

personal injury action against the Railroad pursuant to Kan. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 66-232 & 66-234, providing for statutory liability of 

railroads for fire and negligence respectively. The Railroad 

filed a motion to dismiss based on the common law "Fireman's Rule" 

that a fire fighter cannot recover for injuries caused by the fire 

that initially required his or her presence as a fire fighter. 

The district court granted the Railroad's motion dismissing the 

Butlers' complaint, and the Butlers appealed. 

1 As a preliminary matter, we must also address the Butlers' 

Rule 28(j) Motion to Supplement the Record filed after oral arguments. Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) provides for citation of supplemental authority "[w]hen pertinent and significant authorities 

come to the attention of a party after the party's brief has been 

filed, or after oral argument but before decision." The rule 

further provides that a party shall "without argument" state the 

reasons for the supplemental citations. 

The Butlers' Rule 28(j) motion cites no supplemental authorities not cited earlier in the briefs, but instead attempts to 

reargue those issues raised earlier in briefs and oral argument. 

This constitutes an abuse of Rule 28(j), and we deny the Butlers' 

motion to supplement the record. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

We review an order of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b) (6) de novo. Industrial Constructors Corp. v. United States 

Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 967 (lOth Cir. 1994). In a 

diversity case, we review the district court's determination of 

state law de novo, basing our conclusion upon the result that we 

believe the state courts would reach. Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 

F.3d 1470, 1476 (lOth Cir. 1993) (citing Salve Regina College v. 

Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)). 

The single narrow issue before us is whether the common law 

"Fireman's Rule" applies to claims brought under Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§§ 66-232 & 66-234. These statutes were adopted by the Kansas 

legislature in the late 1800's in an effort to hold the railroads 

accountable for damages caused by their operation. In 1870, the 

legislature passed section 66-234 relating to the standard of care 

required of railroads in negligence actions. Before the enactment 

of this statute, Kansas common law required proof of gross negligence in order to hold a railroad liable for damages. U.P.R.W. 

Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 167, 186 (1869). With the enactment of 

section 66-234, the legislature changed the common law rule so 

that railroads were liable for any act of negligence. This change 

in the standard required in order to establish liability--from 

gross negligence to simple negligence--appears to have been the 

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only change intended by the legislature. See St. Joseph & D. C. 

R. Co. v. Grover, 11 Kan. 302, 306-07 (1873). 

In 1885, the legislature passed section 66-232 relating to 

the liability of railroads for damages by fire. The statute provides that a plaintiff may establish a cause of action against a 

railroad for damages arising out of a fire by simply establishing 

that the fire was caused by the operation of the railroad. Kan. 

Stat. Ann. § 66-232. The statute goes on to state, parenthetically, that such proof of causation and damages shall be prima 

facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad. Id. 

Lastly, the statute provides that any contributory negligence of 

the plaintiff shall be considered in awarding damages. Id. 

The statute's purpose was 11 to secure the utmost care on the 

part of railroad companies to prevent the escape of fire from 

their moving trains, .. and to serve somewhat as a police regulation 

to enforce such care on the part of the railroad companies. 

Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1899) 

(citing multiple Kansas Supreme Court cases) . The need for the 

statute was based upon the peculiar danger of fire from the 

operation of railroad trains. Id. at 101. The locomotives 

passing by at great rates of speed would often scatter fire along 

the track. Id. While modern railroads are undoubtedly less 

likely to 11 SCatter fire along the track 11 than the coal burners of 

the 1800's, this statute still applies to their operation in 

Kansas today. 

Kansas first adopted the common law 11 Fireman's Rule 11 in 1985 

in Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 694 P.2d 433 (Kan. 1985). 

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That rule provides that a fire fighter cannot maintain an action 

for negligence against the party who caused the risk that necessitated the fire fighter's presence in the first place. Id. at 

436. The court held that: 

it is a public policy of the State of Kansas that a fire 

fighter cannot recover for injuries caused by the very wrong 

that initially required his presence in an official capacity 

and subjected the fire fighter to harm; that public policy 

precludes recovery against an individual whose negligence 

created a need for the presence of the fire fighter at the 

scene in his professional capacity. 

Id. at 438. Thus, the Fireman's Rule "precludes recovery against 

an individual whose negligence created the very need for the 

presence of the fire fighter," id. (emphasis added), and it draws 

no distinction between common law negligence and statutory negligence. Thus, if the statutes at issue merely codify negligence 

claims against the railroad, it appears that the Fireman's Rule 

would preclude recovery. On the other hand, if the statutes ereate a different kind of liability, then the Fireman's Rule might 

not be applicable. 

Based on the language of the statute and its interpretation 

in St. Joseph, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 66-234 clearly provides only for 

a statutory negligence claim. St. Joseph, 11 Kan. at 306-07. 

However, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 66-232 is somewhat less clear. That 

statute provides, in essence, that a plaintiff need only prove 

causation and damages in order to prove a prima facie case of 

negligence. Thus, at its core, section 66-232 is also a negligence statute, which merely provides for a reduced burden of proof 

to establish a prima facie case. It does not eliminate negligence 

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as the basis of the claim. See Matthews, 174 U.S. at 103 (contrasting the Kansas statute, "making the fact of fire prima facie 

evidence of negligence," with a similar Missouri statute, "prescribing an absolute liability"). 

The Butlers argue that the "Fireman's Rule" does not apply to 

section 66-232 because the rule is limited to negligence claims 

and the statute is somehow different from a negligence claim. If 

the statute provided for strict or absolute liability--as does the 

Missouri statute discussed in Matthews--then we would have a more 

difficult question. However, the interpretation of section 66-232 

by the Kansas Supreme Court clearly indicates that the statute 

provides only for a special burden shifting scheme, but does not 

alter the nature of the cause of action as one based on negligence. 

The statute does not attempt to make the railroads liable in 

the absence of negligence (i.e., strictly or absolutely liable), 

but simply shifts the burden of proof to the company when the 

plaintiff proves the fire was caused by the operation of the 

railroad and proves damages. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Merrill, 19 P. 

793, 795 (Kan. 1888). Proof of causation results in a presumption 

that the railroad was negligent; however, the railroad may yet 

rebut the presumption, prove that it was not negligent, and 

thereby avoid liability. Id. at 794-95. Thus, we agree with the 

Railroad that section 66-232 is no more than a burden shifting 

statute and does not alter the nature of the claim from one based 

on negligence. Because sections 66-232 & 234 simply provide for 

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negligence claims, we believe the "Fireman's Rule" is applicable 

to both of them. 

The Butlers further argue, however, that the Kansas legislature clearly intended to provide for causes of action in all cases 

of injuries resulting from fires caused by a railroad. Thus, they 

contend that the common law "Fireman's Rule" does not apply to 

their statutory claim, or, if it does, the statute prevails. The 

Butlers argue that when a statute and common law conflict, the 

statute controls. See Board of County Comm'rs of Neosho County v. 

Central Air Conditioning Co., Inc., 683 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Kan. 

1984). However, this argument appears to logically depend on a 

statutory enactment that occurs subsequent to the common law rule 

in conflict. See id. at 1286 (holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature 

was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the 

public interest). In any event, we do not see the Fireman's Rule 

as conflicting with section 66-232 and 66-234, but rather as articulating a special rule for a special circumstance that was not 

specifically addressed by the legislation. 

The Butlers also urge us to reverse the district court's decision based upon a 1968 decision by the United States District 

Court for the District of Kansas addressing this issue. In Daily 

v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 298 F. Supp. 911 (D. Kan. 1968), the 

district court held that a law enforcement officer injured while 

fighting fires under the direction of the county could maintain an 

action under section 66-232. Id. at 915. In so holding, the 

district court stated that a public policy defense based on the 

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... 

logic of the "Fireman's Rule"2 would yield to the legislative 

policy expressed in section 66-232. Id. at 914. This argument 

suffers, however, from a number of flaws. 

First, the district court in Daily was attempting to guess 

how the Kansas courts might interpret the "Fireman's Rule" before 

the Kansas Supreme Court had expressed its rationale for adopting 

it. Second, the passage cited by the Butlers is dicta. The district court had earlier stated that the plaintiff was a law enforcement officer--not a fire fighter--and was therefore not subject to the exemption applied to fire fighters engaged in fighting 

fires as professionals. Id. at 913. Third, we believe this dicta 

offered by the district court was simply wrong, and we are not 

bound to follow it. The "Fireman's Rule" is the Kansas Supreme 

Court's interpretation of negligence actions--including statutory 

ones--involving fire fighters in the performance of their duties. 

As such, we must follow it. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-232 & 66-234 simply provide for negligence actions against railroads. As such, they are subject to 

the "Fireman's Rule" adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court for all 

negligence actions. We therefore AFFIRM the decision of the district court. 

2 The Kansas Supreme Court did not actually adopt the rule until 1985, when it decided Calvert. 

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