Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02154/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02154-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD KIMBRO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIRANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 12-cv-2154 MCE KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

(ECF No. 85.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the following 

reasons, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in 

part.

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)). 

“Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

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1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on July 30, 2014, (ECF No. 22-2), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Legal Standard for Qualified Immunity

In analyzing a claim of qualified immunity, a court must examine (1) whether the facts as 

alleged, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, show that the defendant’s conduct violated a 

constitutional right, and (2) if a constitutional right was violated, whether, “in light of the specific 

context of the case,” the constitutional right was so clearly established that a reasonable official 

would understand that what he or she was doing violated that right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201–02 (2001). If no constitutional right was violated, the inquiry ends and the defendant 

prevails. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

To meet the “clearly established” requirement, “[t]he contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This requires defining the right 

allegedly violated in a “particularized” sense that is “relevant” to the actual facts alleged. Id.

“Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, 

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Brosseau v. 

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

Courts are not required to address the two inquiries in any particular order. Rather, courts 

may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 

hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).

Plaintiff’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the original complaint as to the following claims: 1) 

defendant Physician’s Assistant Miranda allowed plaintiff’s medication to expire; 2) on 

September 18, 2008, defendant Licensed Vocational Nurse Clark denied plaintiff his medication; 

3) on December 23, 2008, defendants Correctional Officers McBride and Kelly made plaintiff go 

outside in his underwear and shower shoes when there was snow on the ground; 4) on December 

23, 2008, defendants Correctional Officers Leon and Morris transported plaintiff outside in his 

underwear and shower shoes after taking over his transport from defendants McBride and Kelly; 

5) on December 23, 2008, defendant Correctional Sergeant Hougland applied leg irons so tightly 

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on plaintiff that plaintiff’s legs bled; 6) on December 23, 2008, defendants Correctional Officers 

Leon and Morris used excessive force causing plaintiff to suffer back injuries. 

The undersigned describes plaintiff’s claims herein. 

Claims Against Defendant Miranda

Plaintiff alleges that in 2006, he was diagnosed with kidney stones while housed at Salinas 

Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff was later transferred to Mule Creek 

State Prison (“MCSP”). (Id.) While at MCSP, plaintiff was sent to a urologist who 

recommended surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff was sent to High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) before he 

could receive surgery. (Id.)

In June 2008, plaintiff was having severe problems with his kidneys. (Id.) On June 16, 

2008, plaintiff was sent to see former defendant LaJeunesse, a urologist located in Reno, Nevada. 

(Id.) Defendant LaJeunesse told plaintiff that he would receive surgery on his right kidney first 

and that stents would be implanted during the surgery. (Id.) Defendant LaJeunesse told plaintiff 

that it was important to remove the stents to prevent infection. (Id.) 

The first surgery occurred on July 9, 2008, as planned. (Id.) On July 18, 2008, plaintiff 

was seen for follow-up. (Id. at 5.) At that time, plaintiff was having problems with the stents and 

was told that he would have the second surgery within one month and the stents would be 

removed at that time. (Id.)

Plaintiff was not returned to defendant LaJeunesse for the second surgery on August 18, 

2008, as planned. (Id.) Plaintiff’s medications, which had been prescribed following the first 

surgery, began to expire. (Id.) Plaintiff became ill and had large amounts of blood in his urine. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that from August 18, 2008, until September 9, 2008, Nurse Ling referred 

plaintiff to defendant Miranda on an emergency basis because of pain and because plaintiff had 

not been returned to Reno for his second surgery. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered an 

infection because defendant Miranda allowed his medications to expire. (Id.) 

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Claims Against Defendant Clark

On September 17, 2008, plaintiff returned to Reno for his second surgery. (Id. at 6.) On 

September 17, 2008, plaintiff returned to HDSP after his surgery. (Id.) When plaintiff went to 

the pill line on the morning of September 18, 2008, to receive his medication, defendant Clark 

allegedly denied plaintiff all of his medications. (Id.) Defendant Clark told plaintiff that after he 

left the prison on September 17, 2008, all of his medications were thrown out. (Id.) Plaintiff did 

not receive his medication for six days and suffered severe pain. (Id.) 

Claims Against Defendants McBride and Kelly

Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2008, defendants McBride and Kelly came to his 

cell door. (Id. at 10.) They told plaintiff to cuff up. (Id.) They told plaintiff that he was being 

taken to see the sergeant. (Id.) Plaintiff cuffed up in his underwear and shower shoes. (Id.) 

Defendants took plaintiff outside even though he was wearing only his underwear and shower 

shoes. (Id.) Snow was on the ground. (Id.) 

Claims Against Defendant Hougland

Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2008, defendant Hougland placed leg irons on his 

lower legs. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that the leg irons were so tight that they cut into his legs 

and caused bleeding. (Id.)

Claims Against Defendants Leone and Morris

Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2008, defendants McBride and Kelly handed him 

off to defendants Leone and Morris for transport to the sergeant. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 

defendants Leone and Morris made him walk outside even though he was only wearing his 

underwear and shoes. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Leone and Morris forced 

plaintiff to the ground, injuring his back. (Id.)

Dismissed Claims

The claims that defendant Miranda failed to return plaintiff to Reno for his second surgery 

in September 2008 and that defendant Clark denied plaintiff access to medical care and 

medication on September 9, 2008, were dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure to administratively 

exhaust these claims. (ECF No. 65.) 

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Plaintiff’s claims alleging that defendants McBride and Kelly used excessive force and 

that defendant Clark failed to give plaintiff medication on December 23, 2008, were dismissed 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state claims upon which relief 

may be granted. (ECF No. 81.) All claims against defendant LaJeuenesse have been dismissed. 

(Id.) 

Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendant Miranda

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Miranda failed to provide him with adequate medical care 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In particular, plaintiff alleges that between August 18, 

2008, and September 9, 2008, defendant Miranda allowed his prescription for antibiotics to 

expire, causing plaintiff to suffer an infection. Plaintiff also alleges that during that time, 

defendant Miranda allowed his prescriptions for pain medication to expire. 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006 ) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two part test for 

deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by 

demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury 

or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need 

was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2012).

Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and 

fails to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 

2010). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi 

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from 

which he could make an inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must 

make the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

Defendants argue that defendant Miranda did not act with deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. In support of this argument, defendants rely on the declaration 

of defendant Miranda and the exhibits attached to his declaration. (ECF No. 85-3.) In his 

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declaration, defendant Miranda states, in relevant part,

4. Kimbro has a history of kidney stones for which he underwent 

treatment in 2008.

5. On July 7, 2008, Kimbro was prescribed morphine 15 mg for 30 

days “till kidney stones addressed surgically, then OFF morphine.” 

(Ex. A.)

6. On July 22, Kimbro’s morphine prescription was increased to 30 

mg (as indicated by the checkbox ordering morphine 15 mg stopped 

and then handwritten prescription for MS04 30 mg at the bottom of 

the page), and Kimbro was given a new thirty-day supply. (Ex. B.) 

Unless renewed or changed, the morphine prescription would 

expire on August 21, 2008.

7. Kimbro’s medical records show that he submitted a Health Care 

Services Request Form (CDC 7362) on August 14, 2008, in which 

he complained that his second kidney stone surgery was overdue 

and that his medication runs out on August 21, 2008. (Ex. C.) It is 

not clear to which medication Kimbro is referring. Kimbro further 

specifies his morphine runs out on August 29, 2008, and that his 

“other pain medication expires as well.” Kimbro’s request was 

received by the triage registered nurse (RN) on August 18, 2008. 

(Id.)

8. Kimbro’s medical records show that he submitted a Health Care 

Services Request Form (CDC 7362) on August 19, 2008, in which 

he complained that he “must see a doctor, pill line worker Clark 

says all my medication has been discarded because I left the prison 

for 1 day for surgery. I have no medication and just had them 

refilled before my surgery.” (Ex. D.) The request form does not 

indicate that it was received by the triage RN. (Id.)

9. Kimbro’s medical records show that he submitted a Health Care 

Request Services Form (CDC 7362) on August 22, 2008, in which 

he complained as follows: “need to see doctor – saw nurse line 

about meds to no avail. Have not had second surgery for kidney 

stones. Still have stints inside. Pain meds ran out...very much pain 

with new rash on body.” (Ex. E.) This request was received on 

August 27, 2008, by the triage registered nurse (RN), who noted on 

August 28, 2008 that “PA Miranda will renew his Tramadol.” (Id.) 

The RN further noted that Kimbro was to be scheduled to see the 

medical doctor on 9/3/08. (Id.)

10. Kimbro’s medical records show that he submitted a Health 

Care Services Request Form (CDC 7362) on August 25, 2008, in 

which he complained that he is “very ill. Stints in kidney have 

caused more bleeding – pain. Meds have not been refilled. Rash 

on his back by kidneys. No word on second surgery. Weak feel 

bad all day.” (Ex. F.) This request was received by the triage RN 

on August 27, 2008.

11. Kimbro’s medical records show that he submitted a Health 

Care Services Request Form (CDC 7362) on September 4, 2008, in 

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which he complained: “I have not had my medication for pain done 

yet. I have severe pain. Please I need to be seen. Still no word on 

surgeries. Can’t sleep have hard time walking to chow kidney 

stones worse than ever.” (Ex. G.) This request was received by the 

triage RN on September 5, 2008. (Id.) RN Goulding completed the 

bottom portion of the form on September 9, 2008, indicating that 

“Tramadol order waiting on non-formulary. [Morphine] Order 

expired. PA Miranda renewed Ibuprofen 600 mg [orally as needed] 

for pain. MD apt to be scheduled for medication evaluation (patient 

to be seen MD today [9/9] 1330.)” (Id.)

12. Providers do not need to see patients before their medication 

expires. Unless changed or renewed, the expiration date concludes 

the original intended treatment, which does not continue 

indefinitely. If the inmate wants his medication re-filled or 

renewed, he must submit a Health Care Services Request Form 

(CDC 7362), which is processed by the triage nurse. The triage 

nurse is then responsible for printing the inmate’s medication 

reconciliation form, highlighting the medication that is being 

requested by the inmate, and placing the form in the medical 

provider’s box. Once I receive the highlighted medication 

reconciliation form in my inbox, I will check the inmate’s chart and 

determine whether or not to refill or renew the medication.

13. Kimbro’s medication administration records (MARS) reveal 

that during the month of August 2008, Kimbro had valid 

prescriptions for Flomax, Gabapentin, Morphine, Tramadol and the 

following “keep on person” medications: fiber tabs, 

Phenazopyridine (pyridium), Simvastatin, and Urocit-K. (Ex. H.)

14. Flomax is used to treat difficult urination. Gabapentin, 

Morphine, and Tramadol are pain medications. Phenazopyridine 

(pyridium) is used to treat urinary tract pain. Simvastatin is used to 

treat high cholesterol. Urocit-K (or potassium citrate) is used to 

treat kidney stones. 

15. The only medications which had an expiration date between 

August 18, 2008, and September 9, 2008, were Morphine (August 

21, 2008), Phenazopyridine (August 21, 2008) and Tramadol 

(August 29, 2008).

16. On August 28, 2008, I refilled Kimbro’s Tramadol prescription 

for three months. (Ex. I.) I bridged this order, meaning that I 

renewed the prescription without a face-to-face visit with the 

patient.

17. On August 30, 2008, I refilled Kimbro’s Morphine prescription 

for three months. (Ex. J.) I bridged this order, meaning that I 

renewed the prescription without a face-to-face visit with the 

patient.

18. On August 30, 2008, I stopped Kimbro’s Phenazopyridine 

prescription. (Id.) I stopped this medication, which is used to treat 

urinary tract pain, because it is not intended for long term use. The 

medication reconciliation form indicated that a last dispense date of 

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July 22, 2008, and an expiration date of August 21, 2008, meaning 

Kimbro had already been taking it for a month. (Ex. J.) I would 

not typically prescribe Phenazopyridine for more than three days. 

19. On September 9, 2008, I treated inmate Kimbro and 

documented the visit on an Interdisciplinary Progress Note (CDC 

Form 7230). (Ex. K.) I documented that Kimbro was here for a 

follow-up visit on kidney stones. (Id.)

20. September 9, 2008, was my first face-to-face visit with Kimbro 

concerning the issue of his medications expiring following his June 

2008 kidney surgery. I am not responsible for scheduling medical 

appointments. If an inmate requests to be seen by a medical doctor, 

he must submit a Health Care Services Request Form (CDC 7362), 

which is processed by the triage nurse and forwarded to the office 

technician who is responsible for determining the next available 

date for an appointment.

21. During the September 9, 2008 visit, I noted that Kimbro stated 

that he had right back pain from stones. I noted that Kimbro further 

stated that he had a right renal stent placed on June 9, 2008, and 

that he was scheduled with urology for left kidney stent placement, 

yet he complained he was experiencing painful urination and red 

(dark) tinted urine since he had his stent placed. I noted that 

Kimbro complained of chronic low back pain secondary to 

degenerative disc disease and requested a refill of his morphine 

prescription (30 mg twice daily), stating that he ran out 16 days 

ago. I noted that Kimbro said that he had not received Tramadol 

(50 mg) either. Finally, I noted that Kimbro said he had dull, 

constant low back pain that is 8/10 on scale. (Id.)

22. During the September 9, 2008 visit, I noted that I prescribed 

him Tylenol with codeine for 10 days and pyridium for 10 days. 

Tylenol with codeine is used to treat pain. Pryidium is used to treat 

urinary tract pain. I further noted that for his chronic low back 

pain, I would not refill morphine. However, I noted that the nonformulary request form was filled out to activate Tramadol 50 mg 

for 90 days. Finally I noted to continue Gabapentin 800 mg.

23. Tramadol is a non-formulary medication, meaning that it is not 

routinely stocked in the pharmacy. Requests for non-formulary 

medications must be submitted for approval by the Chief Physician 

and Surgeon or Chief Medical officers.

24. At all times between August 18, 2008 and September 9, 2008, 

plaintiff had a valid prescription for pain medications, including 

Tramadol, Gabapentin and Ibuprofen.

25. At no time did I intentionally allow Kimbro’s medications to 

expire. Rather, once Kimbro’s complaints that his medications 

were expiring came to my attention, I evaluated the need to renew 

the particular medication. Specifically, I bridged orders renewing 

his Tramadol and Morphine prescriptions on August 28, 2008 And 

August 30, 2008 respectively.

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(ECF No. 85-3 at 1-5.)

Alleged Failure to Provide Pain Medication

The undersigned first considers plaintiff’s claim that defendant Miranda allowed his pain 

medication to expire between August 18, 2008, and September 9, 2008. The following facts

appear undisputed. In August 2008, plaintiff had prescriptions for Gabapentin, Tramadol, 

Morphine and Phenazopyridine for pain. The only medications with expiration dates between 

August 18, 2008, and September 9, 2008, were morphine (August 21, 2008), Phenazopyridine 

(August 21, 2008) and Tramadol (August 29, 2008). On September 5, 2008, defendant Miranda 

reinstated plaintiff’s Ibuprofen prescription to treat pain as needed. 

The undersigned next considers which of the pain medications were prescribed to treat 

plaintiff’s pain associated with his kidneys, as this is the pain on which the instant claim is based. 

In his unverified opposition, plaintiff discusses the types of pain his pain medication was 

prescribed to treat. (ECF No. 89.) Plaintiff alleges that the Gabapentin was prescribed to treat 

nerve damage and was not prescribed to treat the pain associated with his kidneys. (Id. at 89.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Tramadol was prescribed to treat pain associated with arthritis and 

degenerative disc disease. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that narcotics were prescribed to treat the pain 

associated with his kidneys. (Id.)

In Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit indicated that 

where a party opposing summary judgment has personal knowledge of the unsworn, inadmissible 

material submitted, such that a party could present the content of the material in admissible form 

at a trial, the court could consider the material in the summary judgment analysis. 

Because plaintiff is not a medical professional, the undersigned finds that he does not have 

sufficient personal knowledge regarding the types of pain his pain medication was prescribed to 

treat. Therefore, the undersigned does not consider plaintiff’s unsworn statements in his 

opposition regarding the types of pain his medication was prescribed to treat. 

Defendants do not address the issue of what types of pain the pain medication was 

prescribed to treat. However, the record is clear that plaintiff was prescribed morphine and 

Phenazopyridine to treat the pain associated with his kidneys. With respect to Tramadol, the 

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triage nurse who reviewed plaintiff’s August 22, 2008 Health Care Request form wrote that 

plaintiff complained of pain from his kidney surgery and wanted his Tramadol renewed. (ECF 

No. 85-3 at 15.) The triage nurse further wrote that she spoke with defendant Miranda and he 

would renew plaintiff’s Tramadol prescription. (Id.) From this record, the undersigned 

reasonably infers that Tramadol was prescribed to treat plaintiff’s kidney pain. The record also 

indicates that plaintiff was prescribed Ibuprofen, as needed for pain associated with his kidneys. 

Defendants do not identify the type of pain Gabapentin was prescribed to treat. However, 

medical records submitted by defendants indicate that plaintiff was prescribed Gabapentin as 

early as April 23, 2008, i.e., several months before his kidney surgery. (Id. at 1.) The fact that 

plaintiff suffered great pain in late August and early September 2008, as reflected by the Health 

Care Request forms he filled out, despite receiving Gabapentin, suggests that this medication was 

not prescribed to treat plaintiff’s pain related to his kidney problems. Based on this unexplained 

record, the undersigned cannot find that Gabapentin was prescribed to treat pain related to 

plaintiff’s kidney problems. 

The undersigned next considers plaintiff’s claim that defendant Miranda allowed his 

prescriptions for the pain medications prescribed to treat the pain associated with his kidney

problems, i.e. morphine, Phenazopyridine and Tramadol, to expire between August 18, 2008, and 

September 9, 2008. Defendant Miranda argues that he did not act with deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs because he refilled plaintiff’s prescriptions for morphine and 

Tramadol, and plaintiff had access to Ibuprofen. 

It is clear that on August 30, 2008, defendant Miranda stopped plaintiff’s Phenazopyridine 

prescription because it was not intended for long term use. This prescription expired on August 

21, 2008.

While defendant Miranda states that on August 30, 2008, he refilled plaintiff’s morphine 

prescription for three months, the record does not entirely support this claim. Defendant has 

provided a “Medication Reconciliation Form” indicating that on August 30, 2008, he refilled 

plaintiff’s prescription for morphine 30 mg for kidney pain. (ECF No. 85-3 at 26.) This form 

also indicates that plaintiff had another prescription for morphine for 15 mg, which defendant also 

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ordered refilled on August 30, 2008. (Id.) However, in his declaration, defendant states that on 

September 9, 2008, he did not refill plaintiff’s morphine prescription for chronic back pain. It is 

possible that the 15 mg morphine prescription was for back pain. However, it seems unlikely that 

an inmate would have two separate morphine prescriptions. Without further explanation, the 

undersigned finds that defendant’s failure to refill plaintiff’s morphine prescription on September 

9, 2008, contradicts his claim that on August 30, 2008, he refilled plaintiff’s morphine 

prescription for 3 months. 

The record also indicates that plaintiff failed to receive morphine after August 21, 2008. 

According to defendant, on September 9, 2008, plaintiff told him that he had run out of morphine 

16 days earlier. The medication administration record reflecting when plaintiff received 

morphine indicates that plaintiff did not receive morphine 30 mg. after August 21, 2008. (ECF 

No. 85-3 at 21.) Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff did not receive morphine after August 

21, 2008. 

It is possible that defendant refilled plaintiff’s morphine prescription but was not 

responsible for plaintiff’s failure to receive morphine. However, without further explanation of 

the confusing record, the undersigned cannot find that defendant Miranda refilled plaintiff’s 

morphine prescription on August 30, 2008. 

With respect to Tramadol, it is undisputed that defendant Miranda refilled plaintiff’s 

Tramadol prescription on August 28, 2008. This prescription was set to expire on August 29, 

2008. However, according to defendant Miranda, Tramadol is a non-formulary medication, 

meaning that it is not routinely stocked in the pharmacy. Requests for non-formulary medications 

must also be submitted for approval by the Chief Physician and Surgeon or Chief Medical 

Executive. Therefore, defendant Miranda should have known that plaintiff would not 

immediately receive Tramadol following his refill of the prescription. When plaintiff saw 

defendant Miranda on September 9, 2008, plaintiff had still not received any Tramadol. 

With respect to Ibuprofen, the medical records attached to defendant Miranda’s 

declaration indicate that as of August 28, 2008, plaintiff’s prescription for Ibuprofen was 

“inactive.” (ECF No. 85-3 at 24.) The Health Care Services Request form dated September 5, 

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2008, states that defendant Miranda stated that he renewed plaintiff’s Ibuprofen prescription. 

(ECF No. 85-3 at 19.) 

In summary, taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record 

demonstrates that plaintiff received no medication for the pain associated with his kidney 

problems between August 29, 2008, and September 5, 2008. Beginning on September 5, 2008, 

defendant Miranda renewed plaintiff’s Ibuprofen prescription. Ibuprofen was the only pain 

medication plaintiff received for the pain associated with his kidneys from September 5, 2008, to 

September 9, 2008. 

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned cannot find that defendant Miranda did not act 

with deliberate indifference with respect to plaintiff’s need for pain medication. Based on the 

facts of this case, to find that defendant did not act with deliberate indifference, the undersigned 

would have to find that defendant prescribed a readily available medication adequate to treat 

plaintiff’s kidney pain during the at-issue time period. Defendant has not met his burden of 

demonstrating that he did so. Instead, the record shows that when defendant Miranda refilled 

plaintiff Tramadol prescription on August 28, 2008, he should have known that plaintiff would 

have to wait to receive Tramadol, as it was non-formulary. With respect to morphine, based on 

the confusing record, the undersigned cannot find that defendant refilled this prescription on 

August 30, 2008. Instead, the record shows that plaintiff received no morphine after August 21, 

2008. While plaintiff had access to Ibuprofen starting on September 5, 2008, plaintiff was not 

receiving any other medication for his kidney pain. Defendant does not claim, and provides no 

evidence supporting a claim, that Ibuprofen was adequate to treat plaintiff’s kidney pain. 

Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity test, the undersigned finds that a 

reasonable physician’s assistant would have known that allowing plaintiff to go without any pain 

medication for his kidney pain, other than Ibuprofen, would violate plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

right to adequate medical care. For these reasons, defendant Miranda is not entitled to qualified 

immunity and should be denied summary judgment as to this claim.

////

////

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Antibiotics

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Miranda allowed his prescription for antibiotics to expire 

between August 18, 2008, and September 9, 2008, which caused him to develop an infection in 

his kidney. Defendants’ summary judgment does not directly address this issue.

However, from the record it appears that plaintiff was not prescribed antibiotics between 

August 18, 2008, and September 9, 2008. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim that defendant Miranda 

allowed his prescription for antibiotics to expire during this time is not supported by the record. 

Accordingly, defendant Miranda should be granted summary judgment as to this claim.

Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendant Clark

Plaintiff alleges that on September 18, 2008, defendant Clark denied him all of his pain 

medications when he went to the pill line. This claim is not limited to the pain medication 

plaintiff was prescribed for his kidney problems. In particular, plaintiff alleges that on September 

18, 2008, defendant Clark told plaintiff that after he left the prison for his second kidney surgery 

on September 17, 2008, all of his medications were thrown out. Plaintiff alleges that he did not 

receive his medication for six days and suffered severe pain. 

Defendants argue that defendant Clark did not act with deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. In support of this argument, defendants refer to defendant 

Clark’s declaration and the exhibits attached. In her declaration defendant Clark states, in 

relevant part,

2. From April 2007 to August 2011, I was employed at HDSP as a 

Licensed Vocational Nurse (LVN).

3. During September 2008, I was assigned to B yard second watch 

(6:00 a.m. to 2 p.m.), and on occasion, I worked overtime on third 

watch (2 p.m. to 10 p.m.)

4. B yard was typically staffed with three LVNs and two RNs who 

were together responsible for preparing for and conducting 

medication line, a process by which inmates line up to receive their 

medications. Medication line is conducted twice a day – once in 

the morning and once in the evening. If the yard was on lock-down 

or modified program for any reason, medications would be 

distributed to the inmate’s cell, rather than having the inmates line 

up at a designated area to receive their medication.

5. As an LVN, my duties included administering medications to 

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inmates, ordering medications, processing medication prescriptions 

as they are received from the pharmacy, conducting laboratory 

draws, and gathering data to assist the registered nurses.

6. I have access to an inmate’s prison medical file via the 

electronic Unit Health Record (eUHR) system. In preparation for 

this declaration, I have reviewed the records of inmate Kimbro (V77359) contained in his medical file as well as records provided to 

me by the Office of the Attorney General.

7. When an inmate is given his medication, the RN or LVN I 

responsible for documenting it on a Medication Administration 

Record (MAR) form. The MAR lists valid medication 

prescriptions, the date the prescription was filled, the expiration 

date, and the prescribing doctor. Once an inmate is administered a 

particular medication, the nurse initials in the box under the date 

that the medication was given.

8. Kimbro’s September 2008 MAR reveals that during the month 

of September 2008, Kimbro had valid prescriptions for Tylenol 

with codeine; Sulfamethoxazole (an antibiotic); Tramadol; 

Gabapentin; Flomax; and the following medications to keep on 

person medications: fiber tabs, Simvastatin (for high cholesterol), 

and Urocit-K. (Exs. L-Q.)

9. Kimbro’s September 2008 MARs indicate that on the morning 

of September 18, 2008, Kimbro was administered Tylenol with 

codeine, Sulfamethoxazole, Tramadol, Gabapentin, and Flomax. 

(Exs. L-O,) I was not the nurse who administered Kimbro’s 

medications on September 18, 2008, as the initials which appear 

under that date are not mine. (Id.)

10. Kimbro’s September 2008 MARS indicate that on the evening 

of September 18, 2008, Kimbro did not receive any medications. 

(Id.) Kimbro did not receive any medications on September 19, 

2008. (Id.)

11. There are many reasons why an inmate might not receive his 

medications on a particular day. For example, it is possible that the 

inmate refused his medications or was out of the institution for a 

medical appointment. I do not know why Kimbro did not receive 

his medication on the evening of September 18, 2008, or on 

September 19, 2008.

12. On September 19, 2008, I authored a new MAR for a seven day 

supply of Tylenol with codeine. (Ex. P.) The record indicates that 

the order was filled on September 19, 2008, and that I administered 

Tylenol with codeine to Kimbro on the morning of September 19, 

2008 and another nurse (LVN Hamilton) administered it to him on 

the evening of September 19, 2008. (Id.)

13. Kimbro did not receive Tylenol with codeine on September 20, 

2008. (Id.) I do not know why Kimbro did not receive his Tylenol 

with codeine on that day. 

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14. Kimbro continued to receive Tylenol with codeine on 

September 21, 2008, to September 24, 2008. (Exs. P-Q.) I was not 

the nurse who administered him the Tylenol with codeine on those 

dates, as the initials that appear in the boxes under those dates are 

not mine.

15. Kimbro’s September 2008 MARs indicate that his Tramadol 

prescription was discontinued sometime after September 18, 2008. 

(Ex. L.) A nurse wrote at the bottom of the MAR that “[inmate] 

went [out to medical] no new orders written for this med.” (Id.) I 

was not the nurse who wrote “DC’D” or the note that Kimbro went 

out to medical.

16. At no time, from September 18, 2008 to September 23, 2008, 

did I intentionally or unintentionally deny Kimbro his medications.

17. As an LVN, I did not have the authority to cancel or 

discontinue an inmate’s medical prescriptions. However, if an 

inmate leaves the prison for more than 72 hours, his medications 

are returned to the pharmacy.

(ECF No. 85-4 at 1-3.)

The undersigned herein summarizes the information in the MAR documents attached to 

defendant Clark’s declaration with respect to plaintiff’s receipt of pain medication, i.e., Tramadol, 

Tylenol with codeine, and Gabapentin. The record demonstrates that between September 18, 

2008, and September 24, 2008, plaintiff received Tramadol on the morning of September 18, 

2008. (Id. at 6.) The MAR states that plaintiff’s Tramadol was discontinued and that plaintiff 

went out for a medical appointment with no new orders written for Tramadol. (Id.) 

Tylenol with codeine was prescribed twice a day for plaintiff. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff received 

Tylenol with codeine on the morning of September 18, 2008, twice on September 19, 2008, twice 

on September 21, 2008, and on the morning of September 22, 2008. (Id. at 7, 13, 15.) 

Plaintiff received Gabapentin on the morning of September 18, 2008. (Id. at 11.) The 

undersigned cannot find any indication in the records that plaintiff received Gabapentin at any 

other time between September 18, 2008, and September 24, 2008.

In summary, the only pain medication plaintiff received after September 18, 2008, was 

Tylenol with codeine. On September 19, 2008, defendant Clark prepared a new “MAR” for a 

seven day supply of Tylenol with codeine. 

////

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Attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s opposition is a typewritten note by Licensed Clinical 

Social Worker (“LCSW”) Boretz dated September 19, 2008. (ECF No 89 at 23.) LCSW Bortez 

writes, 

Follow-up, Individual Contact: SUBJECTIVE – Mr. Kimbro was 

assessed earlier today as he reported suicidal ideation apparently in 

desperation to receive post-surgery medical attention. Mr. Kimbro 

reports continued physical pain and concern for his regular 

prescribed medical medications which appear to have been 

discontinued when he left the institution for his surgery and which 

have not been renewed. At Mr. Kimbro’s request, I took his 

concerns to D-Yard nursing staff and hand delivered his request for 

medical attention. I spoke with RN Daniels and LVN Clark both of 

whom suggested I simply put Kimbro’s request for medical contact 

in the pile of all those retrieved from B-yard inmates for that day. I 

explained that it appears his daily medications had not been 

renewed when he arrived back from surgery and both RN Daniels 

and LVN Clark appeared familiar with Mr. Kimbro. Mr. Kimbro 

continues to deny impulses for self harm and stated, “I hope I don’t 

have to go man down again to get my meds.

(Id.)

A prisoner need only receive adequate treatment, not his chosen treatment. Herrera v. 

Beregovskays, 2013 WL 6572585 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2013), citing Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 

123 (2d Cir. 2011). A failure to provide a prisoner with stronger pain medication is not 

indifference where no medical provider recommended treatment from that provided, or acted with 

a culpable state of mind. Id., citing Hill, 657 F.3d at 123; Rush v. Fischer, 923 F.Supp.2d 545, 

554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (prison nurse’s refusal to provide narcotic medication to manage pain not 

indifference where ibuprofen was provided and facility doctor also refused to provide narcotic 

medication).

The record in the instant case is distinguishable from the cases cited above. In the instant 

case, plaintiff had prescriptions for three pain medications. The note from LCSW Boretz 

indicates that on September 19, 2008, he told defendant Clark that it appeared that plaintiff’s 

medications had not been renewed when he returned to the prison following surgery. Therefore, 

on September 19, 2008, defendant Clark had knowledge that plaintiff was not receiving any of his 

medications. While it appears likely that defendant Clark wrote plaintiff’s new prescription for 

Tylenol with codeine on that date, it is unclear why she did not issue new prescriptions for 

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plaintiff’s other medication or take additional steps to see that plaintiff received his medications. 

Defendants do not argue, and the record does not suggest, that this is a case where 

defendant Clark determined that plaintiff required only Tylenol with codeine for pain, after 

consulting with a medical doctor. 

Without additional information regarding why defendant Clark did not take further steps 

to ensure that plaintiff received all of his medications after the matter was brought to her attention 

by LCSW Boretz, the undersigned cannot find that she did not act with deliberate indifference. 

Without additional information regarding how and why defendant Clark responded to LCSW 

Boretz, the undersigned cannot evaluate the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. For 

these reasons, defendant Clark should be denied summary judgment.

Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendants McBride and Kelly

Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2008, defendants McBride and Kelly made him 

walk outside wearing only his underwear and shower shoes.

Defendants McBride and Kelly argue that they did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. In support of this argument, defendants first refer to the declaration of defendant 

Hougland which explains why plaintiff defendants McBride and Kelly took plaintiff outside. 

Defendant Hougland states, in relevant part,

3. At approximately 7:45 p.m. on December 23, 2008, while 

conducting my duties as Program Sergeant in Facility B, Licensed 

Vocational Nurse (LVN) Clark contacted me and told me that 

inmate Kimbro (V-77359) had threatened her.

4. LVN Clark told me that because Kimbro had not turned on his 

cell light, she did not issue him his medication.

5. LVN Clark told me that Kimbro then yelled out of his cell at 

LVN Clark and said, “You better hope I don’t get my hands on 

you.”

6. Due to this threat, I directed Officers McBride and Kelly to 

escort inmate Kimbro to the Facility B Program Office.

(ECF No. 85-7 at 1-2.) 

The declarations of defendants McBride and Kelly describe what happened during the 

escort ordered by defendant Hougland. As indicated above, the only remaining claim against 

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defendants McBride and Kelly is that they made plaintiff walk outside, in the winter, in his 

underwear and shower shoes. Plaintiff’s claim alleging excessive force against these defendants 

has been dismissed. 

In his declaration, defendant Kelly states, in relevant part, 

3. [On] December 23, 2008, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Officer 

McBride and I entered Facility B Building 4 (B4) to escort Kimbro 

to the program office to be counseled and reported threats toward 

medical staff. The program office is located in another building 

across the yard from Building 4, where Kimbro was housed. The 

distance from B4 to the program office is approximately 100 yards.

4. Inmate Kimbro became very belligerent and stated, “I didn’t say 

shit to that bitch.”

5. Officer McBride and I exited Building 4 and, due to inmate 

Kimbro’s resistive behavior, placed Kimbro against the outer wall 

of the building. Kimbro put his right foot against the wall and 

kicked away from the wall forcing his body towards Officer 

McBride and me.

6. Officer McBride and I simultaneously spun to the left and, 

utilizing our momentum, forced Kimbro to the ground. Kimbro 

landed face down on his stomach with Officer McBride to 

Kimbro’s left side, while I was kneeling down on Kimbro’s right 

side.

7. I held Kimbro’s right hand and wrist using my left hand and had 

my right hand on Kimbro’s right shoulder. Officer McBride held 

Kimbro’s left wrist using his right hand and had his left hand 

between Kimbro’s shoulder blades. At no time did I place my 

elbow or knee on Kimbro’s back.

8. Responding staff arrived, and at Sergeant Hougland’s direction, 

Office Maydole applied leg restraints on Kimbro.

9. Officers Leone and Morris relieved Officer McBride and me, so 

that they could continue to escort Kimbro to the program office.

10. After I was relieved, I went to the restroom to wash my hands 

and did not see Officers Leone and Morris’ further escort of 

Kimbro.

11. I do not recall whether there was snow on the ground outside. 

At no time did I shove Kimbro’s face in the ground.

12. I do not recall what inmate Kimbro was wearing, but it was my 

normal practice to allow an inmate to get dressed before taking him 

out of his cell. However, if any inmate is being resistive and/or 

non-compliant, it may be necessary to get the inmate out of the cell 

in order to gain compliance. Under such circumstances, getting the 

inmate out of the cell and into restraints would take priority over 

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allowing the inmate to get fully dressed.

(ECF No. 85-5 at 1-2.)

Defendant McBride’s declaration is similar to that of defendant Kelly’s declaration. (ECF 

No. 85-6.) However, defendant McBride states that, “I do not recall what Kimbro was wearing, 

but due to the reported threats, it was necessary to quickly remove him from his cell in order to 

gain compliance.” (Id. at 3.)

Plaintiff does not dispute defendants’ claim that the distance he was made to walk outside 

was 100 yards.

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from “inhumane methods of punishment” and 

“conditions of confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (as 

amended). To state a claim that a defendant has violated the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must 

“objectively show that he was deprived of something sufficiently serious” and “make a subjective 

showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or 

safety.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to the first prong, a deprivation is sufficiently serious when a prison official’s “act or 

omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). As to the second prong, the defendants must have had a “sufficiently 

culpable state of mind,” that is, “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–35 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is undisputed that defendants made plaintiff walk 100 yards outside in December 

wearing his underwear and shower shoes. Whether there was snow on the ground, and the 

amount, is disputed. The amount of time plaintiff was outside is unclear due to the conflicts 

plaintiff had with defendants McBride and Kelly, and, as will be later discussed, defendants 

Leone and Morris. However, plaintiff does not allege any prolonged discomfort or adverse 

consequence stemming from his exposure to the cold. For this reason, the undersigned 

recommends that defendants McBride and Kelly be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

See Swenson v. Cnty. of Kootenai, 2014 WL 585726, at *16 (D. Idaho Feb.14, 2014) (finding 

plaintiff’s allegations that she walked through three inches of snow in sandals insufficient to state 

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Eighth Amendment claim in part because she alleged “no adverse result from her brief exposure 

to cold weather”), accepted by 2014 WL 1247801 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2014); Tyler v. Watson, 

2009 WL 4110304, at *1, *3 (W.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2009) (granting summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim involving five-minute-long strip search outside in “freezing 

thirty-degree temperature” because “he did not suffer any objectively serious injury”); Taylor v. 

Gomez, 1998 WL 34256-91 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (requiring inmate to walk a half-mile to 

breakfast in rain and cold wearing blue jeans and blue shirt did not state a colorable Eighth 

Amendment claim).

1

Because the undersigned finds that defendants McBride and Kelly did not violate 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, there is no need to address the second prong of the qualified 

immunity analysis. 

Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendant Hougland

Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2008, defendant Hougland placed leg irons on his 

lower legs. Plaintiff alleges that the leg irons were so tight that they cut into his legs and caused 

bleeding. Defendants move for summary judgment as to this claim on grounds that defendant 

Hougland did not apply the leg irons to plaintiff. Defendants further argue that there is no 

evidence that defendant Hougland ordered the leg irons to be applied too tightly. 

In support of this argument, defendants refer to the declaration of defendant Hougland 

who states, in relevant part,

6. Due to this threat, I directed Officers McBride and Kelly to 

escort inmate Kimbro to the Facility B Program Office.

7. A short time later, I walked out of the Program Office and 

looked across the yard to Building 4, where I saw who I 

subsequently learned was inmate Kimbro and Officers McBride and 

Kelly on the ground in front of Building 4, to the right of the door.

 

1

 Defendants also argue that there is no evidence that they had a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind. Defendants argue that due to the reported threat made by plaintiff, it was necessary to 

quickly get plaintiff out of his cell in order to gain compliance. Defendants argue that getting 

plaintiff out of his cell and into restraints took priority over allowing plaintiff to get fully dressed. 

In his verified complaint, plaintiff denies making threats against defendant Clark. (ECF No. 1 at 

10.) Therefore, whether plaintiff made the threat against defendant Clark is disputed. 

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8. I radioed Central Control and notified them of the Code 1 on B 

Yard. I then responded to their location. 

9. When I arrived, Officer McBride was kneeling on inmate 

Kimbro’s left side with his right hand on Kimbro’s upper back and 

left hand holding somewhere on Kimbro’s left arm.

10. Officer Kelly was leaning down on inmate Kimbro’s right side 

with his left hand holding Kimbro’s right wrist. I could not see 

where Officer Kelly’s right hand was.

11. I then ordered Officer Maydole to apply leg restraints on 

inmate Kimbro. I observed Officer Maydone apply the leg 

restraints on Kimbro. I did not personally apply the leg restraints 

on Kimbro.

12. Once the leg restraints were applied, Officer Leone relieved 

Officer Kelly, and Officer Morris relieved Officer McBride.

13. Officers Leone and Morris supported inmate Kimbro’s arm 

while Kimbro stood up. Once Kimbro was standing, Officers 

Leone and Morris began escorting him across the yard to the 

Program Office.

14. As Officers Leone and Morris escorted inmate Kimbro across 

the yard, I stood behind. Officer Leone was escorting from 

Kimbro’s right side, and Officer Morris was escorting from 

Kimbro’s left side.

15. When the escort was about 200 feet from Building 4, inmate 

Kimbro began to twist his upper body and arms and attempted to 

pull away from Officers Leone and Morris.

16. I heard someone yell for Kimbro to get down, and then I saw 

Officers Leone and Morris use their body weight to force Kimbro 

face down on the ground.

17. I radioed Central Control and advised them of a Code 1.

18. Officer Norman later told me that while trying to restrain 

inmate Kimbro’s legs, Kimbro kicked him on his right shin. 

Officer Norman had a hold of inmate Kimbro’s lower legs with his 

hands.

19. I instructed Officers Bennett and Pasillas to relieve Officers 

Leone and Morris. Officers Bennet and Pasillas supported 

Kimbro’s upper arms to stand him up and escorted him to the 

Facility B Program Office.

20. Once inside the Program Office, inmate Kimbro was secured in 

Holding Cell # 1.

21. At about 9:00 p.m., Investigate Services Unit Officers, Wheeler 

and Rodriguez arrived to the Program Office to interview inmate 

Kimbro. Once Officers Wheeler and Rodriguez completed their 

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interview with Kimbro, they informed me that Kimbro had invoked 

his Miranda rights.

22. Due to the injuries on Kimbro’s face, a use of force interview 

was required. However, because Kimbro had invoked his Miranda 

rights, the decision was made not to question him.

23. Officer Pasillas operated the camera during this interview. I 

started the interview at about 11:00 p.m. and videotaped Kimbro’s 

injuries to his face, knees, right ankle, back and right shoulder. 

24. At about 11:02 p.m., we finished recording. I collected the 

video tape from Officer Pasillas, and the video tape was retained 

with the incident package.

(ECF No. 85-7 at 2-3.)

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Hougland placed leg irons on his lower 

legs that were applied so tightly that they caused his legs to bleed. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) In his 

opposition, plaintiff states,

Defendant Hougland claims he’s not responsible for leg irons being 

too tight as he only ordered them but did not put them on. Sgt. 

Hougland ordered plaintiff to be transported across the yard in leg 

irons when only wearing shower shoes and underwear with a lot of 

snow on the ground even though plaintiff was A.D.A. mobility 

impaired and had medical issues he was aware of. It has been 

shown plaintiff began to bleed from his ankles due to tight leg 

irons. That he could not walk and tripped several times. 

(ECF No. 89 at 18.) 

In his opposition, plaintiff appears to abandon his claim that defendant Hougland 

personally put on the leg irons. Instead, plaintiff now claims that defendant Hougland ordered 

that the leg irons be put on plaintiff and knew that they had been applied too tightly because his 

ankles were bleeding. Plaintiff does not appear to claim that defendant Hougland ordered the leg 

irons to be applied too tightly. 

While defendant Hougland may not have personally applied the leg irons, a prison 

official’s failure to intervene can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. See Robins v. 

Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (failure to intervene and protect can violate a 

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights). However, plaintiff did not present this theory of liability in 

his complaint. Defendants’ summary judgment motion did not address this new claim raised in 

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the opposition. A plaintiff may not raise a new theory of liability for the first time in his 

opposition to a summary judgment motion without amending his complaint. See Coleman v. 

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2000). For this reason, the undersigned does 

not address this claim. 

Because plaintiff has abandoned the claim he raised against defendant Hougland in the 

complaint, defendant Hougland should be granted summary judgment.

Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendants Leone and Morris

Plaintiff raises two claims against defendants Leone and Morris. First, plaintiff alleges 

that on December 23, 2008, defendants Leone and Morris made him walk outside even though he 

was only wearing his underwear and shower shoes, i.e., the same claim he raised against 

defendants McBride and Kelly. Second, plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2008, defendants 

Leone and Morris used excessive force against him when they forced him to the ground, injuring 

his back.

Exposure to the Elements

It is undisputed that defendants Leone and Morris took over the escort of plaintiff from 

defendants McBride and Kelly. Plaintiff also does not dispute that he was transported 100 yards 

in the inclement weather. For the reasons the undersigned found that defendants McBride and 

Kelly should be granted summary judgment as to this claim, the undersigned recommends that 

summary judgment be granted to defendants Leone and Morris. 

Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Leone and Morris used excessive force against him during 

the transport when they forced him to the ground, injuring his back. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison 

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The inquiry as to whether a prison official’s use of force constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 6–7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).

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“The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is ... contextual and responsive 

to contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). A prison official’s use of force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm 

violates the contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). 

However, “[n]ot ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of 

action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Factors that can be considered 

are “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of 

force that was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Marquez v. 

Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir.2003).

Defendants argue that they did not use excessive force against plaintiff. In support of this 

argument, defendants rely on the declarations of defendants Hougland, Leone and Morris. The 

declaration of defendant Hougland describing the circumstances leading to the incident involving 

defendants Leone and Morris is set forth above. Defendant Hougland states that he witnessed 

plaintiff begin to thrust his upper body and arms and attempt to pull away from defendants Leone 

and Morris as they escorted plaintiff. (ECF No. 85-7 at 2.) Defendant Hougland heard someone 

yell for plaintiff to get down, and he then saw defendants Leone and Morris use their body weight 

to force plaintiff to the ground. (Id. at 3.)

In his declaration, defendant Leone states, in relevant part, 

7. I then relieved Officer Kelly and took control of Kimbro’s right 

side by placing my right hand on Kimbro’s left arm and my left 

hand on Kimbro’s upper back. Officer Morris relieved Officer 

McBride by using his right hand to take hold of Kimbro’s left arm.

8. Officer Morris and I then helped Kimbro to his feet and began to 

escort Kimbro across the yard to the Facility B Program Office.

9. Approximately halfway across the yard, Kimbro began to turn 

from side to side and pull away from the escort.

10. I immediately told Kimbro to get down as Officer Morris and I 

used our body weight to force Kimbro to the ground.

11. Once on the ground, Kimbro began to kick his legs back and 

forth. I maintained control of Kimbro’s upper body with my left 

hand on Kimbro’s upper back and my right hand on Kimbro’s head. 

Officer Morris had control of Kimbro’s left side, and Officer 

Norman took control of Kimbro’s legs. At no time did I place my 

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elbrow or knee on Kimbro’s back or shove his face into the ground.

12. Officer Bennett then relieved me and took control of Kimbro’s 

right side. Officer Pasillas relieved Officer Morris and took control 

of Kimbro’s right side. 

13. Officers Bennett and Pasillas then helped Kimbro to his feet 

and escorted him to the Facility B Program Office.

(ECF No. 85-8 at 2.)

In his declaration, defendant Morris states, in relevant part,

4. When I arrived at the location of the incident, I saw an inmate 

who was later identified as Kimbro (V-77359) lying face down on 

the ground and restrained in handcuffs in front of the Building 4 

yard door.

5. Officer Kelly was squatting on Kimbro’s right side, and Officer 

McBride was squatting on Kimbro’s left side. Officers Kelly and 

McBride appeared to be applying downward pressure using their 

hands on Kimbro’s shoulders.

6. Sergeant Hougland then ordered Officer Leone and me to relieve 

Officers McBride and Kelly. I relieved Officer McBride by taking 

control of Kimbro’s left arm with my right hand, and Officer Leone 

relieved Officer Kelly.

7. Officer Leone and I then helped Kimbro to his feet and began to 

escort Kimbro across the exercise yard to the Facility B Program 

office.

8. Officer Norman followed behind to provide coverage of the 

escort.

9. On our escort to the Program Office, Kimbro began to turn his 

body towards Officer Leone and turned his shoulders from side to 

side to pull away from our escort. Officer Leone and I yelled “get 

down,” and used our physical strength and body weight to force 

Kimbro to the ground.

10. While on the ground, I saw Kimbro kick Officer Norman with 

his right foot. Officer Norman yelled, “Quit kicking,” and with 

both his hands on Kimbro’s ankles applied downward pressure to 

stop Kimbro from kicking him.

11. With my left hand on Kimbro’s right shoulder, and my right 

hand on Kimbro’s right hand, I applied downward pressure and 

waited for responding staff to arrive. At no time did I place my 

elbow or knee on Kimbro’s back or shove his face into the ground.

12. When responding staff arrived, Officer Pasillas relieved me, 

while Officer Bennett relieved Officer Leone. 

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(ECF No. 85-9 at 2.)

In the verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that during the escort, he tripped several times 

with Officer Leon and Morris. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he could not walk 

because the leg irons were applied so tightly. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not resisting, he 

just could not walk. (Id.) 

In his unverified opposition, plaintiff states, in relevant part,

It has been shown that plaintiff began to bleed from his ankles due 

to tight leg irons. That he could walk and tripped several times. 

Officers Leone and Morris threw plaintiff to the ground again 

claiming resistance because of leg irons and plaintiff tripping, At 

no time was plaintiff ever written up for or given a hearing for or 

found guilty of that resisting. Officers and Leone did place extreme 

pressure on plaintiff’s back causing him to thrash around due to 

extreme pain. It is true that plaintiff had mobility impaired issues 

due to his back. 

(ECF No. 89 at 18.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations in his unverified opposition are very similar to those made in his 

complaint. Because plaintiff has personal knowledge of the alleged events, the undersigned 

considers his description of the incident contained in his opposition. Fraser v. Goodale, supra.

Despite the number of declarations submitted by defendants, the issue of whether plaintiff 

resisted defendants Leone and Morris is a materially disputed fact. Plaintiff alleges that he did 

not resist defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he could not walk and fell because the leg irons were 

applied so tightly. In contrast, defendants claim that plaintiff turned from side to side, actively 

resisting the escort. 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff did not resist defendants. 

If plaintiff had trouble walking due to the tight leg irons and repeatedly fell, defendants’ use of 

force may not have been justified. 

Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the undersigned finds that 

a reasonable officer would know that forcing an inmate to the ground who was having difficulty 

walking due to the application of leg irons, then applying force to restrain him, would violate the 

inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, defendants Leone and Morris should not be 

granted summary judgment as to this claim.

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In the summary judgment motion, defendants further argue that they are entitled to 

summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff suffered no injuries and the force they used was de 

minimis. The dispositive inquiry for an excessive force claim is not what degree of injury the 

inmate suffered, but whether the degree of force used by defendants was applied “maliciously and 

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” or “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6. While the absence of serious injury is relevant 

to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it does not end it. Id. at 7. According to plaintiff, he had 

difficulty walking due to the leg irons and repeatedly fell. Plaintiff alleges that defendants threw 

him to the ground, even though he was not resisting, and put extreme pressure on his back. These 

facts, if proven, demonstrate that defendants used greater than de minimis force with the intent to 

harm plaintiff and not for disciplinary purposes, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ summary judgment 

motion (ECF No. 85) be granted as to the following claims: 1) defendant Miranda allowed 

plaintiff’s antibiotic prescription to expire; 2) defendants McBride, Kelly, Leone and Morris 

violated the Eighth Amendment by exposing plaintiff to the elements; defendants’ motion should 

be denied in all other respects. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 24, 2015

Kim2154.sj

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