Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-08-50960/USCOURTS-ca5-08-50960-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50960

MICHAEL KLEINMAN; SCOTT WADE; JOHN FURLY TRAVIS, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

CITY OF SAN MARCOS

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and PRADO and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:

This appeal concerns whether a junked-vehicle ordinance designed to

eliminate eyesores and promote public order, SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE OF

ORDINANCES § 34.196(a), can be applied to a wrecked Oldsmobile 88 that has

been put to use as a cactus planter, colorfully painted, and adorned with the

words “make love not war.” Appellants contend that the car is an expressive

artwork and that interference with this display violates their rights under the

First Amendment and the Visual Artists Right Act (VARA). 17 U.S.C.

§ 166A(a)(3). The district court rejected both claims, then went further and

ordered the owner to comply with a removal order of the San Marcos municipal

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 10, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

 Judge Haynes concurs in the judgment only. *

2

court. We also reject Appellants’ constitutional and statutory claims but vacate

the district court’s attempt to enforce the municipal court order.*

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Michael Kleinman operates Planet K stores throughout the San

Antonio and Austin areas. Planet K stores are funky establishments that sell

novelty items and gifts. Kleinman has a tradition of celebrating new store

openings with a “car bash,” a charity event at which the public pays for the

privilege of sledgehammering a car to “a smashed wreck.” The wrecks are then

filled with dirt, planted with vegetation, and painted. Placed outside each store,

the “planters” serve as unique advertising devices.

An Oldsmobile 88 car-planter was created upon the opening of a new

Planet K store in San Marcos, Texas. Kleinman arranged to have the smashed

car planted with a variety of native cacti and painted with scenes of life in San

Marcos. Positioned in front of the store, the distinctive planter is visible to

motorists traveling north on Interstate 35. Kleinman did not dictate the content

of the illustrations, but he requested that the phrase “make love not war” be

incorporated into the design. Two local artists, Scott Wade and John Furly

Travis, were commissioned to paint the wreck. At trial, Travis testified that he

had no particular message in mind when he painted the car, “just happiness.”

He intended his images to convey the idea that “you could take a junked vehicle,

junk canvas, and create something beautiful out of it.” Wade sought to

transform “a large gas-guzzling vehicle” into “something that’s more respectful

of the planet and something that nurtures life as opposed to destroys it.” Wade

explained that his intent was to describe American car culture and the link

between gasoline and the war in Iraq. 

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

 A junked vehicle can be brought into compliance if the “vehicle or vehicle part is 1

completely enclosed within a building and is not visible from the street or other private or

public property” or if the “vehicle is completely covered by a heavy duty, contour-fitting cover

so that no part of the vehicle except the tires is exposed to public view and it is the only one

on the property,” SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34.197(a)(1), (a)(4). 

3

On several occasions during and after the conversion of the smashed wreck

into a car-planter, the City of San Marcos ticketed Planet K and various Planet

K employees under an ordinance banning junked vehicles. The ordinance

declares junked vehicles to be a public nuisance and prohibits citizens from

placing or keeping junked vehicles on their property. SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE

OF ORDINANCES §§ 34.194, 34.196(a). The ordinance defines a “junked vehicle”

as follows: 

Junked vehicle means a vehicle that is self propelled, inoperable,

and: 

(1) Does not have lawfully affixed to it both an unexpired license

plate and a valid motor vehicle safety inspection certificate; 

(2) Is wrecked, dismantled, partially dismantled, or discarded; or

(3) Has remained inoperable for more than 45 consecutive days. 

Id. § 34.191.

Kleinman contested the tickets and requested a hearing to determine

whether the car-planter falls within that definition. The San Marcos municipal

court found that it did and ordered the car-planter removed or brought into

compliance by concealment behind a fence or in an enclosure. Kleinman then 1

brought suit for injunctive relief in state court. The City removed the case to

federal district court. Wade and Travis joined the suit to assert their claims

under VARA. 

Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the application

of the junked-car ordinance to the car-planter would not violate the First

Amendment and that Wade and Travis failed to state a statutory claim for relief.

The district court also ordered all three plaintiffs sua sponte to comply with the

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

 Texas Transportation Code declares a junked vehicle visible from a public place to be 2

a public nuisance and its maintenance to be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed

$200. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 683.071, 072-073 (2007). In addition, municipalities may adopt

procedures to remove junked vehicles. Id. § 683.074. Any municipal procedures cannot apply

to a junked vehicle (1) that is completely enclosed in a building in a lawful manner and is not

visible from the street or other public or private property; or (2) that is lawfully stored in

connection with the business of a vehicle dealer or junkyard, or is an antique or special

interest vehicle, provided that the vehicle is orderly maintained, not a health hazard, and

screened from the public view. Id. § 683.077. 

4

municipal court order and bring the car-planter into compliance with the City

Code within thirty days. This appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court’s factual findings after a bench trial for

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Water Craft Mgmt. LLC v. Mercury

Marine, 457 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006). Clear error exists:

if (1) the findings are without substantial evidence to support them,

(2) the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, and

(3) although there is evidence, which if credible would be

substantial, the force and effect of the testimony, considered as a

whole, convinces the court that the findings are so against the

preponderance of credible testimony that they do not reflect or

represent the truth and right of the case. 

Id. Reversal for clear error is warranted only if the court has a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Amendment

Appellants’ principal contention is simple: “visual art” is fully protected

by the First Amendment. Consequently, neither the city ordinance nor the state

statute standing behind the ordinance may impose a “content-based regulation” 2

prohibiting the car-planter’s public display. In the alternative, Appellants, while

acknowledging that the car-planter is a “junked vehicle,” assert that the

ordinance fails to satisfy intermediate scrutiny as applied to their creation.

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

 The City, of course, rejects a characterization of the planter as protected by the First 3

Amendment.

5

That this cactus planter, a three-dimensional advertisement for a novelty

shop, could be considered a constitutionally-protected expression speaks more

to the law’s vagueness than to the capability or intention of the artists. In fact,

the City stipulated that “the vehicle/planter is an object which contains and

projects some level of artistic expression after it was painted by Plaintiffs Wade

and Travis and altered to allow it to grow plant-life.” But this category is not 3

so unbounded. The Supreme Court, in the course of applying the First

Amendment to an expressive act (a Saint Patrick’s Day parade), stated

unanimously:

As some of these examples [of non-speech protected expression]

show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of

constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying

a “particularized message,” would never reach the unquestionably

shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schönberg, or

Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.

557, 569, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 (1995) (citation omitted). Hurley refers solely to

great works of art. Neither in Hurley nor in any later case has the Court

elaborated on the extent of First Amendment protection for visual non-speech

objects or artworks.

Seizing on Hurley’s statement, the Second Circuit declared, in a case

concerning New York City’s street vendor regulations, that artworks including

paintings, photographs, prints, and sculptures are “always” communicative and

therefore entitled to “full First Amendment protection.” Bery v. City of New

York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996). Despite this broad language, the Bery

court held only that the ordinance’s application to vendors of those works did not

stand up to intermediate scrutiny. Id. Further, the court reasoned that, because

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

Bery has been criticized or limited by other lower court opinions as well. See, e.g. 4

White v. City of Sparks, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (D. Nev. 2004)(declining to follow the Bery

holding because it would be out of step with

the First Amendment’s fundamental purpose — to protect expression.”);

Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 294 n.11 (noting that

the difficulty with Bery is that it is “at once too broad and too narrow in their

scope of protection. Conceivably, not every item of painting, photograph, print

or sculpture that may be offered for sale on City sidewalks by any vendor is

necessarily so expressive as to categorically merit First Amendment protection,

but at the same time some objects outside those four categories may also be

sufficiently expressive. 

State v. Chepilko, 965 A.2d 190, 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)(agreeing with criticism

of Bery’s holding that any business activity that involves the taking and sale of photographs

automatically qualifies for First Amendment protection and concluding that such business

activity is entitled to First Amendment protection only if it serves predominantly expressive

purposes).

6

the crafts of the jeweler, the potter, and the silversmith are only sometimes

“expressive,” the constitutional protection afforded those categories of works

must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. 

Subsequently, the Second Circuit grappled with Bery’s implication when

vendors of T-shirts and ballcaps decorated with “graffiti art” sought an

exemption from the same New York City ordinance. Mastrovincenzo v. City of

New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006). The court narrowed Bery’s broad dictum:

“To say that the First Amendment protects the sale or dissemination of all

objects ranging from ‘totem poles’ to television sets does not take us far in trying

to articulate or understand a jurisprudence of ordered liberty; indeed, it would

entirely drain the First Amendment of meaning.” Id. at 92 (citation omitted). 4

The court recast Bery’s distinction between fine art and decorative arts in terms

that enforcement officers and vendors in the “real world” can understand and

apply “without recourse to principles of aesthetics.” Id. at 95. Mastrovincenzo

ultimately decided that the “expressive” elements of the clothing merited some

First Amendment protection, but that the city ordinance was narrowly tailored

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

 We need not reach the City’s contention that, if viewed as some form of protected 5

speech, the car-planter represents commercial speech entitled to a lesser level of constitutional

protection.

7

and left ample alternative avenues of communication, thereby satisfying

intermediate scrutiny.

We share the Mastrovincenzo court’s skepticism that the heavy machinery

of the First Amendment is to be deployed in every case involving visual nonspeech expression. Protected expression takes many forms, but Hurley’s

reference to works of fine art did not sweep so broadly as to require a judicially

crafted hierarchy of artistic expression. By analyzing the artist-vendors’ rights

under intermediate scrutiny, the Bery court effectively conceded as much.

Fortunately, we need go no further than that in the instant case.

Irrespective of the intentions of its creators or Planet K’s owner, the car-planter

is a utilitarian device, an advertisement, and ultimately a “junked vehicle.”

These qualities objectively dominate any expressive component of its exterior

painting. Appellants concede that the car falls within the definition of the San 5

Marcos ordinance. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit, confronted before Hurley with

a wrecked auto that was displayed streetside to remind the public how the

owner’s son had been killed, had no difficulty finding that the auto’s removal

under a junked-vehicle ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny. Davis v.

Norman, 555 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1977). When the “expressive” component of an

object, considered objectively in light of its function and utility, is at best

secondary, the public display of the object is conduct subject to reasonable state

regulation. We therefore pretermit “recourse to principles of aesthetics.”

In an abundance of caution, however, because the City concedes that the

car-planter has some protected expressive content, we apply the intermediate

scrutiny test articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien,

391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1973), which balances the individual’s right to

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

8

speak with the government’s power to regulate. O’Brien rests on the principle

that when “speech” and “non-speech” elements are united in a course of conduct,

a valid governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify

incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 376, 88 S. Ct. at

1678-79. Under O’Brien, a regulation is constitutional if it is within the

constitutional power of the government; it furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest; the government interest is unrelated to the suppression

of free expression; and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment

freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id.

at 376, 88 S. Ct. at 1679. The junked-vehicle ordinance passes muster under the

O’Brien test.

First, regulation of junked vehicles is within the City’s traditional

municipal police powers. Second, important governmental interests justify the

ordinance, the purpose of which is to protect the community’s health and safety

from the problems created by abandoned vehicles left in public view. A junked

vehicle is a public nuisance:

A junked vehicle that is located in a place where it is visible from a

public place or public right-of-way is detrimental to the safety and

welfare of the general public, tends to reduce the value of private

property, invites vandalism, creates fire hazards and constitutes an

attractive nuisance creating a hazard to the health and safety of

minors and is detrimental to the economic welfare of the city by

producing urban blight adverse to the maintenance and continuing

development of the City and is a public nuisance. 

SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34.196(a). Junked vehicles are an

attractive nuisance to children. Rodents, pests, and weeds thrive in and around

them. Testimony showed that the City pursued more than 1,300 junked vehicle

cases in the two years prior to trial. These facts, found by the district court, fully

support the City’s interests in regulating junked vehicles. The ordinance also

tends to reduce urban blight, vandalism, and the depressing effect of junked

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

9

vehicles on property values. Appellants’ insistence that the car-planter has been

rendered safe is immaterial to the constitutionality of the ordinance. The City’s

right to regulate junked vehicles, not the individual status of each vehicle, is the

concern of First Amendment inquiry. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers

Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430, 110 S. Ct. 768, 779 (1990). 

Third, the junked-vehicle ordinance is not intended to regulate “speech”

at all but is a content-neutral health and safety ordinance. Appellants argue

that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance is motivated by disagreement with

the content of the car-planter’s “message” and thus should be subject to the strict

scrutiny reserved for content-based speech regulations. The district court made

no finding of an impermissible motivation, nor is such a finding compelled by the

record.

Fourth, the ordinance is reasonably tailored to achieve the City’s

legitimate interests with only incidental restriction on protected expression. The

ordinance authorizes junked vehicles to remain on private property if enclosed

from public view. SAN MARCOS,TEX.,CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34.197(a)(1). Appellants

contend that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored because it permits an

exception for dealerships and junkyards. The underlying state statute, however,

prohibits the City from adopting any procedures as to vehicles “stored or parked

in a lawful manner on private property in connection with the business of a

licensed vehicle dealer or junkyard.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 683.077. Thus, the

City has an overarching legal basis for exempting dealerships and junkyards

from its junked vehicle statute. Indeed, the exemption for businesses that deal

with junked vehicles reinforces rather than discredits the content-neutrality of

the junked vehicle ordinance. Both the City and the State sensibly distinguish

individual conduct from commercial conduct, which creates different hazards

and requires different regulations. In addition, the ordinance is limited to

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

10

regulating the medium and location of the car-planter, and in so doing it reduces

the blight and attractive nuisance problems caused by vehicular wrecks.

Appellants also argue that the enclosure requirement leaves them without

any adequate alternative means of expression. See Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989). But as the district

court noted, enclosing the car-planter does not cut off public access because it

leaves Planet K free to display the car-planter behind a fence, indoors, or in a

garage enclosure. Kleinman could still advertise and invite the public to view

the car-planter. He could, pursuant to local law, erect a sign or display a poster

of the car-planter visible to the public. Because the ordinance affords ample

alternative means for Appellants to express their messages, this court will not

second-guess the scope of the ordinance nor impose Appellants’ preferred display

mode on the City. Id. at 800, 109 S. Ct. at 2758.

B. VARA

Appellants Travis and Wade also raise claims under the VARA. The

VARA provides the author of a work of visual art with the right: 

(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other

modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her

honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or

modification of that work is a violation of that right, and

(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and

any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a

violation of that right. 

17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). The district court denied relief under VARA, finding that

the junked-vehicle ordinance does not require the destruction of a junked

vehicle, merely its screening from general public view.

The preliminary statutory issue, however, is whether the car-planter

qualifies as a “work of visual art” under the VARA. The statute excludes “any

merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, packaging

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/10/2010
No. 08-50960

11

material or container” from protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The district court found

that the car-planters are closely associated with Planet K, are part of the store’s

corporate image and culture, and are a distinctive symbol of the Planet K

business. These findings, which are not clearly erroneous, indicate that the carplanters are “promotional” material and thus outside of the VARA’s protection.

See Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 2003). For this reason as well

as that of the district court, we affirm the conclusion that Appellants Travis and

Wade failed to state a claim for relief under VARA.

C. Order for Compliance

The district court ordered that “Plaintiffs shall comply with the Order of

the San Marcos Municipal Court” and “bring the car planter into compliance

with City Code.” Appellants assert this order was in error since the City never

requested any affirmative relief. Further, Wade and Travis were not parties to

the municipal court’s order and cannot be ordered to “comply.” We agree.

Although the City contends that the order is actually in Kleinman’s favor—by

giving him thirty days to comply before any City enforcement action—the

district court lacked jurisdiction to grant this relief. This portion of the district

court’s order must be vacated.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment on the merits

but vacate the portion of the district court’s judgment that orders Appellants to

comply with the municipal court order. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.

 Case: 08-50960 Document: 00511024986 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/10/2010