Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02559/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 1The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAAC ADETAYO GRILLO, M.D.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-2559 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 4, 11]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants California Department of Corrections and State

ofCalifornia'sMotionto Dismiss[Docket No. 4] and Defendant California MedicalBoard's Motion to Dismiss

[Docket No. 11]. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted

to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby

GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants California Department of Corrections and the State of

California [Docket No. 4] and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant California Medical Board

[Docket No. 11].

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.1

Plaintiff Isaac Adetayo Grillo ("Plaintiff" or "Dr. Grillo") is a medical doctor originally from Nigeria,

Africa. Compl. at ¶ 4. Dr. Grillo received his M.D. from Kansas University in 1960 and subsequently

completed his residency at the Jewish Hospital in Kansas City. Id. From 1965 through 1966, Dr. Grillo

trained in thoracic surgery. Id. at ¶ 5. He later moved to California and became one of the first thoracic

surgeons at Highland Hospital, Oakland. Id. Dr. Grillo took and passed, in his first attempt, the General

Surgery Board Exams in 1966 and the Thoracic Surgery Board Exams in 1967. Id. From 1967 to 1968, Dr.

Grillo worked as a physician at the San Leandro Tuberculosis hospital while teaching thoracic surgery to

residents at Highland Hospital. Id. 

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In 1968, Dr. Grillo moved back to Nigeria. Id. at ¶ 6. For approximately twenty years, from 1968

to 1988, he was, successively, a lecturer, professor, and Head of the Department of Surgery at the only

medical school with the University ofIbadan, in Ibadan, Nigeria. Id. During this time, he was the only thoracic

surgeon in Nigeria. Id. He was also on the team that performed the first open heart surgery in Africa. Id. In

1988, Dr. Grillo moved from Nigeria to Saudi Arabia and was appointed professor of surgery at King Saud

Hospital in Abha, Saudi Arabia. Id. 

In 1999, at the age of seventy, Dr. Grillo left Saudi Arabia and returned to the United States. Id. at

¶ 7. Dr. Grillo applied for, and was appointed, the first and only black doctor for the California Department

of Corrections ("CDC") at the Salinas Valley State Prison in Monterey County, California. Id. Dr. Grillo

commenced employment with the CDC in January 2000. Id. 

While employed by the CDC, Dr. Grillo was regularly chastised by the hospital's chieffor prescribing

too many tests. Id. at ¶ 18. Additionally, prison officials frequently expressed their disapproval when Dr. Grillo

would order an x-ray to determine whether a patient had an internal fracture. Id. Prison officials complained

to Dr. Grillo that the tests and referrals he prescribed were costing the CDC "money they could not afford."

Id. Prison officials also told Dr. Grillo that prisoners did not deserve sophisticated medical care. Id. Dr. Grillo

believes that the CDC "targeted" him because of his race and because of his practice of referring patients for

diagnostic tests, MRIs, x-rays, and laboratory tests. Id. at ¶ 19.

On June 27, 2000, prisoner Kenneth Holcomb ("Holcomb") was injured when he was physically

attacked by another prisoner. Id. at ¶ 20. Holcomb was initially examined by prison physician, Dr. Clark.

Id. Dr. Clark did not x-ray Holcomb or perform any tests. Id. Although Holcomb had been given a neck

collar, Dr. Clark removed the collar and sent Holcomb back to his cell in a wheelchair. Id. The next day, on

June 28, 2000, Dr. Grillo learned ofthe incident involving Holcomb. Id. at ¶ 21. Since the MedicalTechnical

Assistant AbelHarrison ("Harrison") refused to bring Holcomb to Dr. Grillo, Dr. Grillo visited Holcomb in his

cell. Id. at ¶ 22. Dr. Grillo brought a neck collar and hard board with him. Id. Although it was not the usual

custom of the prison to videotape examinations, the custody officer videotaped Dr. Grillo's examination of

Holcomb. Id. 

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2Patients with Munchausen syndrome "go from medical provider to medical provider dramatically

presenting very plausibe symptoms and histories and receiving care, up to and including surgery." Id. at ¶ 10,

n. 1. "They fake physical signs of illness and abnormal laboratory findings." Id. 

3

During Dr.Grillo's examinationofHolcomb,Holcomb complained that he could notfeelanything below

his neck, suggesting that he was suffering froma spinalinjury. Id. at ¶ 23. Dr. Grillo also noted that Holcomb

had priapism, a prolonged erection of the penis, which was indicative of a spinal injury. Id. However,

Holcomb's blood pressure and pulse were normal. Id. His oxygen saturationwas also at an acceptable level.

Id. Further, although Holcomb was not able to breath using his lungs, his abdominal breathing was normal.

Id. Because Holcomb stated that he could not feel anything below his neck, but also stated that he felt cold,

Dr. Grillo suspected that Holcomb had Manchausen syndrome2 and was therefore faking his injuries. Id. 

After his initial examination of Holcomb, Dr. Grillo called Dr. Daniel Thor ("Dr. Thor"), the chief

physician, for a second opinion. Id. at ¶ 24. Dr. Thor arrived approximately forty-five minutes later. Id.

During this time, Dr. Grillo did not have access to Dr. Clark's notes because Dr. Clark's notes were in the

possession of Dr. Thor. Id. While waiting for Dr. Thor, Dr. Grillo decided that he would test whether

Holcomb was malingering. Id. at ¶ 25. Dr. Grillo therefore told Holcomb that he would injectsomething into

his arm that would make his arm move. Id. at ¶ 25. In reality, Dr. Grillo only injected 2 cc of saline solution,

a placebo, into Holcomb's arm. Id. Holcomb's arm moved, further indicating to Dr. Grillo that Holcomb was

malingering. Id. When Dr. Thor arrived, Dr. Grillo received Dr. Clark's notes. Id. at ¶ 26. Dr. Thor reviewed

Dr. Grillo's diagnosis and signed "Agreed" on the charts. Id. 

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Grillo ordered an x-ray of Holcomb's cervical spine. Id. at ¶ 27. The x-ray

revealed that the patient had an anterior dislocation of vertebrae C5/C6, which indicated that Holcomb had

suffered a serious spinal injury. Id. It was determined that Holcomb was irreparably damaged. Id. at ¶ 28.

Dr. Grillo and Dr. Clark were immediately and summarily suspended. Id. at ¶ 29. Dr. Grillo remained

suspended for nearly two years. Id. at ¶ 31. During this time, he engaged in adversarial proceedings with the

CDC relating to the suspension of his employment. Id. Dr. Grillo also filed a charge with the EEOC alleging

race discrimination and wrongful suspension. Id. 

In 2001, the California Medical Board ("CMB") initiated an administrative action against Dr. Grillo.

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Id. at ¶ 33. In the CMB proceedings, Dr. Grillo was accused of giving Holcomb a saline solution for no

apparent reason while at the same time telling the patient that he was giving him a "powerfulmedication to make

him stronger." Id. at ¶ 34, 

On June 7, 2002, Dr. Grillo, on one hand, and the State and the CDC, on the other, entered into a

settlement agreement. Id. at ¶ 32. Dr. Grillo acknowledged in the agreement that it was entered into freely and

voluntarily by and with the advice of counsel. Id. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Dr. Grillo agreed to

release and dismiss all claims against the State and the CDC, including but not limited to claims under the Fair

Employment and Housing Act, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Dr. Grillo also

waived the benefits of California Civil Code § 1542, which provides that "[a] general release does not extend

to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time ofexecuting the release,

which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor." Id.

 Although Dr. Grillo believed that the CMB's action against him would be terminated as a result of the

June 7, 2002 settlement agreement, it was not. Id. at ¶ 33. 

 Dr. Grillo was subsequently required by the CMB to participate in the Physician Assessment and

ClinicalEducation ("PACE") program. Id. at 36. The PACE program is a for-profit program run by defendant

William Norcross, M.D. ("Dr. Norcross") and administered by a private, unaccredited group ofphysicians in

San Diego who are predominately white. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 39. The primary purpose of the program is the

evaluation of physicians with substance abuse problems or mental illness. Id. at ¶ 39. The PACE program

takes place over two days, and is intended to evaluate the physician's skills. Id. at ¶ 37. Among the factors

evaluated in the PACE program are: (1) an assessment of clinical knowledge; (2) a chart review; (3) ethics;

(4) communication; (5) mechanisms ofdisease;(6) interpretation ofmedicalliterature; and (7) an examspecific

to the participant's field. Id. The PACE program also requires a computer test and the performance of a

complete history and physical examination of the physician, including neurocognitive and psychological

screening. Id. The PACE program charges participants $5,000 for the two-day exam and another $4,500

for the second part of the exam. Id. at ¶ 39. No curriculum is provided to the participants and there are no

text books, test materials, or manuals to assist them with preparation for the course. Id. at 38. The PACE

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evaluation is, for the most part, subjective as there are no standards or metrics indicating the physician's

proficiency in medicine. Id. At the end of the program, a participant is rated as "Pass," "Fail," or "More

Training Needed." Id. at ¶ 39. At the time Dr. Grillo participated in the program, it had only been in existence

for a few years and had been never been administered to a large sample of test-takers. Id. at ¶¶ 38-39. 

Dr. Grillo participated in the program during two days in May 2004 and a week in September 2004.

Id. at ¶ 44. He paid approximately $9,500 in fees. Id. Based on Dr. Grillo's performance in the PACE

program, Dr. Norcross provided the CMB with a declaration indicating that "Dr. Grillo was slow and cautious,

sacrificing speed for accuracy, although both scores were still within normal limits." Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41. Dr.

Norcross further noted that Dr. Grillo's scores were "consistently low across the board," that "Dr. Grillo did

display an area of strength in anatomic structures and relative strength in pathology and laboratory medicine,"

that "Dr. Grillo employed good judgment in implementing that knowledge," and that "[w]hile everyone agreed

thatDr. Grillo's strength is his pleasant, caring manner, there was genuine concern expressed." Id. at ¶ 42. Dr.

Norcross further observed that Dr. Grillo had indicated that he was not computer literate and that "[c]omputer

literacy is a factor in this examination." Id. 

On October 4, 2004, based on Dr. Norcross' declaration, the CMB suspended Dr. Grillo's license

to practice medicine. Id. at ¶¶ 40, 46. On October 6, 2004, the CMB issued a press release stating the

following: 

The Medical Board has filed an accusation against Grillo alleging unprofessional

conduct through gross negligence and incompetence in that he failed to diagnose a

cervicalspine injury of a prisoner at Soledad prison who had suffered a subluxation

ofC4-C5, resulting in quadraplegia. The board later adopted a stipulated settlement

and disciplinary order, which imposed a public letter of reprimand with a condition

precedent:successful completion ofPhasesI and II ofthe PhysicianAssessment and

Clinical Education (PACE) program at the University of California at San Diego. 

In a September 8, 2004 communication to the board from the Director and

Associate Director of the UCSD Pace Program, the board was fully informed that

serious deficiencies were noted during Grillo's assessment bythe PACE faculty/staff.

The assessment report noted that at a multi-disciplinary staff meeting onSeptember

1, 2004, the director and other participants 'expressed grave reservations about

whether Dr. Grillo should be practicing medicine' and that the 'deficiencies

documented during his two-day Phase-1 PACE Assessment, if applied in the real

world of medical practice, would almost certainly have resulted in patient harm, and

perhaps even death.' The report also stated that Grillo's serious deficiencies of

clinical knowledge and judgment extended beyond the limited scope of the PACE

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3Plaintiff's first cause of action does not actually state a cognizable claim, but merely seeks certain

equitable relief that Plaintiff alleges he would be entitled to if he were to prevail on his other causes of action.

 

4The Court notes thatDr. Norcross has not yet been served with the Complaint and therefore has not

appeared in this action or joined in either of the Motions to Dismiss. 

6

Program's five-day clinical education and that as a result, 'may require additional

training or monitoring either in residency, fellowship, or some other proctored

environment.'

Id. at ¶ 48. 

B. Procedural History.

On June 22, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the State, the CDC, the CMB, and Dr. Norcross

alleging the following causes of action: (1) "injunctive relief" to enforce the June 7, 2002 settlement agreement

and for reinstatement of his job and license3; (2) violations of42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988; (3)

wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (4) "conspiracy to deprive civil rights"; (5) defamation; (6)

infliction of emotional distress; (7) tortious interference with existing and prospective business; and (8) fraud.

On July 12, 2005, the State and the CDC filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 15, 2005, the CMB

filed a Motion to Dismiss.4 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted only if it

appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes of such a motion,

the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded factualallegations

are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. American

Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of

the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997).

The court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory allegations cast in the form

of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); See Miranda

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v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."); Sprewell v. Golden

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.

1988) ("[C]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss forfailure to state

a claim.").

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted unless

the court determines that the allegationofother facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly

cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.

1986). The Court should consider factors such as "the presence or absence ofundue delay, bad faith, dilatory

motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party

and futility ofthe proposed amendment." Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.

1989). Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party is the most important. See Jackson v. Bank of

Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing ZenithRadio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401

U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971)). Leave to amend is properly denied "where the amendment would be futile."

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

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5The particular documents that the CMB seeks judicial notice of are all part of the record in In the

Matter of Accusation Against Isaac A. Grillo, M.D. before the Division ofMedicalQuality MedicalBoard

ofCalifornia and are as follows: (1) the Stipulation and Order re: Interim Order Suspending License Pursuant

to Govt. Code Section 11529; (2) the Supplemental Accusation and Petition to Enforce Decision; and (3) the

Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order. 

6Plaintiff attaches the following documents to his Opposition: (1) a July 1, 2005 article from the

SacramentoBee; (2) a June 24, 2005 article fromthe Daily Journal; and (3) the Notice of Hearing in In the

Matter of Supplemental Accusation and Petition to Enforce Decision Against Isaac A. Grillo, M.D.

before the Division of Medical Quality Medical Board of California. 

8

ANALYSIS

A. Requests for Judicial Notice.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that both the CMB and Plaintiff have asked the Court to

consider materials outside ofthe pleadings in this matter. Specifically, Defendant CMB has requested that the

Court take judicial notice of certain documents on the grounds that the documents are part ofthe public record

ofthe underlying administrative proceeding involving Plaintiff and the CMB.5 Plaintiff, on the other hand, merely

attaches certain documents to his Opposition, but makes no clear request for judicial notice.6 Plaintiff does,

however, oppose the CMB's request forjudicialnotice on the grounds that the documents the CMB seeks to

submit are: (1) beyond the scope of the Complaint; (2) subject to dispute; and (3) not relevant. 

"Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.

1990). However, Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides an exception to this general rule. See Fed. R. Evid.

201. Under Rule 201, a court may take judicial notice of "matters of public record" as long as the facts are

not "subject to reasonable dispute." See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citations omitted). 

Court filings and orders are the type of documents that are properly noticed under Rule 201. Notice

can be taken, however, "only for the limited purpose of recognizing the 'judicial act' that the order [or filing]

represents on the subject matter of the litigation." United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th

Cir.1994) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.

1992)); see also General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1082, n. 6

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7

In light ofthe authoritiessetforth above, Plaintiff's argument that the documentsfromthe administrative

proceedings are ofquestionable authenticity and subject to dispute is without merit. Further, Plaintiff's argument

is completely undermined by the fact that Plaintiff also seeks to have the Court consider a document that is part

ofthe same administrative record. Additionally, since this Court make take judicial notice of certain documents

pursuant to Rule 201 without convertingaRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismissinto a motion forsummary judgment,

Plaintiff's request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is inappropriate and is therefore denied. 

8Although Plaintiff does not clearly identify the statutory basis for his fourth cause of action, it also

appears to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

9

(7th Cir. 1997) ("We agree that courts generally cannot take notice of findings of fact from other proceedings

for the truth [of the matter] asserted therein because these findings are disputable and usually are disputed.");

San Luis v. Badgley, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (a court "may take judicial notice of a

document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the litigation, but rather to establish

the fact of such litigation and related filings."). 

Applying this standard, the Court finds that it may take judicial notice of the documents the CMB has

submitted, but only of the existence and legal effect of the documents. Because it appears that the CMB is

requesting judicial notice of these documents for that limited purpose, and because it appears that the

documents are in fact relevant to the instant action, the CMB's request forjudicial notice is GRANTED.7 For

the same reasons, the Notic e of Hearing in In the Matter of Supplemental Accusation and Petition to

Enforce Decision Against Isaac A. Grillo, M.D. before the Division of Medical Quality Medical Board of

California – which Plaintiff has submitted to the Court – is judicially noticed as well. With respect to the two

articles that Plaintiff seeks to have the Court consider, however, the Court finds that these documents are

irrelevant. Further, because it appears that Plaintiff is inappropriately requesting that the Court take judicial

notice ofthe documents forthe truth of certain facts asserted therein, judicialnotice is not proper. Accordingly,

these documents have not been considered by the Court and the Court hereby strikes these documents from

the record. 

B. Motions to Dismiss.

1. Plaintiff's Federal Claims and the Eleventh Amendment.

In its Motion to Dismiss, the CMB argues that Plaintiff's federal claims, asserted in his second cause

of action8 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 (the "Civil Rights Act"), must be dismissed

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9The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The

United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the Eleventh Amendment also prohibits suits against

a State, or its agencies and departments, by its own citizens without the State's consent. Welch v. Texas Dept.

of Highways & Public Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 472 and 478-495 (1987).

10

because the CMB is not a "person" subject to liability under the CivilRights Act and the Eleventh Amendment9

bars Plaintiff from pursuing a federal claim under the Civil Rights Act against the CMB or other state

defendants. The State of California and the CDC also move to dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims on the grounds

that Plaintiff's second and fourth causes of action do not setforth any basis for liability against either the State

or the CDC. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen ofthe United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought

against a judicialofficer for an act or omissiontaken in suchofficer'sjudicialcapacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of

Congress applicable exclusively to the District ofColumbia shall be considered to be

a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1985 establishes liability for any person who, with at least one other person, "conspire[s] . .

. forthe purpose ofdepriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class ofpersons ofthe equalprotection

of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or forthe purpose of preventing or hindering

the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or

Territory the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Further, under section 1986:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done,

and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having

power to prevent or aid in preventing the commissionofthe same, neglects or refuses

so to do, ifsuchwrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his

legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such

person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.

42 U.S.C. § 1986. Section 1988 provides for the recovery of attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

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Here, the sole basis for the purported § 1983 claim alleged in Plaintiff's second cause of action is

Plaintiff's contention that the CMB deprived him of his right to due process by failing to grant him the right to

a hearing or the right to cross-examine witnesses prior to suspending his license. Compl. at ¶ 59. While

Plaintiff alleges that the CDC also participated in this alleged violation of Plaintiff's substantive due process

rights, the underlying factual allegations make clear that the hearing Plaintiff is referring to was conducted by

the CMB, a separate entity and defendant, and not the CDC. With respect to the § 1985 claim, Plaintiff also

alleges that each of the defendants "conspired to violate [his] rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed . .

. by the Constitution." Id. at ¶ 60. However, Plaintiff does not provide any facts in support of this alleged

conspiracy claim. With respect to Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for "conspiracy to deprive civil rights,"

Plaintiff vaguely allegesthat "[u]known employees of the CDC have conspired with each other and with others

to deprive Dr. Grillo of his right to due process, including a right to notice, a meaningful opportunity for a

hearing, confrontation and cross-examination." Id. at ¶ 69. Plaintiff further alleges that "[b]ecause the [PACE]

test was subjective, and because Dr. Norcross had a serious conflict of interest, and because there are no

standards for the PACE program, the actions of the department of corrections also violate Dr. Grillo's

substantive due process rights." Id. The fourth cause of action does not appear to allege any claims against

the CMB. 

Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court agrees with the State and the CDC that the second and

fourth causes of action, as currently plead, do not appear to clearly state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,

1985, or 1986 against the State or the CDC. The allegations are entirely vague and conclusory and, although

Plaintiff repeatedly refers to an alleged deprivation of his right to a "hearing, confrontation and crossexamination," those allegations quite clearly concern the administrative proceeding before the CMB, not the

CDC. More importantly, however, as the CMB correctly argues, it is well-established that states, state

agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacity are not "persons" within the meaning of the

federal Civil Rights Act and may not be subjected to suit under the statute. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Bennet v. California, 406 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1969). Indeed, in Will, the

United States Supreme Courtstated that:"Section 1983 provides a federalforum to remedymany deprivations

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of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for

alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its

immunity, . . . or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment

to override that immunity." Will, 491 U.S. at 66. The Supreme Court then expressly held that "Congress, in

passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the

federal-state balance." Id. Suits against a state or state agency brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 are also

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fincher v. State of Fla. Dept. of Labor and Employment Sec.,

798 F.2d 1371, 1371 (11th Cir. 1986).

Here, it is clear that the CMB is a state agency within the California Department ofConsumer Affairs

that is responsible for the quality of medical practice of physicians within the State of California and has

licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary authority to carry out its actions. The CDC is also clearly an agency of

the state. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2001, et seq.; Cal. Gov. Code § 900.6 ("State" includes any

department, divisions,bureau, board, commission, or agency ofthe State."). Plaintiff's argument to the contrary

is directly underminedbythe relevant Ninth Circuit authorities. See Forster v. County of SantaBarbara, 896

F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The California Board of Medical Quality Assurance is an agency of the

state of California."); Bennett, 406 F.2d at 39 ("state agencies such as the . . . California Department of

Corrections, which are but arms ofthe state government, are not 'persons' within the meaning ofthe CivilRights

Act."). Accordingly, the CMB, the CDC, and the State are all entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Further, since none of these defendants can be held liable on the merits of Plaintiff's Civil Rights Act claim,

attorney's fees under section 1988 are unavailable. Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 115 (llth Cir. 1989). The

fact that Plaintiff believes that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar other statutory causes of action that are

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1042 U.S.C. § 3789d(c) provides that "No person in any State shall on the ground of race, color,

religion, nationalorigin, or sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under or denied employment in connection with any programs or activity funded in whole or in

part with funds made available under this chapter."

1142 U.S.C. § 2000d provides that "No person in the United States shall, on the ground ofrace, color,

or nationalorigin, be excluded fromparticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

1242 U.S.C. § 1997 is the Prison Litigation Reform Act and, as Plaintiffis not a prisoner, it is not clear

how this statute is even applicable. 

13The CMB also argues that Plaintiff's federal claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff knowingly

waived his right to a hearing and therefore cannotstate a due process claim against the CMB. See CMB Reply

at Ex. B at pp. 0011-0013. In support of this argument, the CMB offers documents from the public record

in the administrative proceeding underlying the instant action demonstrating that the CMB properly followed

the proceduressetforthinCalifornia Government Code § 11529 governing the suspension of a medicallicense.

See Cal. Gov. Code § 11529 (setting forth procedures that must be met in order for the administrative law

judge to issue an interim order suspending license and providing for subsequent notice and hearing); see also

Cal. Gov. Code § 11505 (providing for hearing); see also CMB Reply at Ex B at pp. 0018-0024. While

Plaintiff's counselargues in Plaintiff's Opposition briefthat the writtenwaiver ofthe hearing mustbe disregarded

because Plaintiff's counsel"question[s] . . . under what circumstances [Plaintiff signed the document] and with

what promises he was induced to sign any document," Plaintiff's Complaint does not set forth any facts in

support of this newly created argument that Plaintiff did not knowingly waive his right to a hearing before the

CMB or that he was somehow fraudulently induced into relinquishing his rights. To the extent that Plaintiff's

Complaint discusses fraud, it concerns an entirely different settlement agreement with the CDC.

Notwithstanding this point, the Court need not resolve this dispute since the fact remains that Plaintiff's Civil

Rights Act claims against the State, the CDC, and the CMB are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

13

not actually plead or asserted in his Complaint – such as 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)10, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d11, 42

U.S.C. § 199712 – is entirely irrelevant and does not alter this conclusion. Plaintiff's federal causes of action

against the State, the CMB, and the CDC, as currently plead, are undisputedly barred by sovereign immunity

and Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 are therefore DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.13 Moreover, while Plaintiff has specifically sought leave to amend his Complaint, the

allegations he seeks to assert appear to be limited to claims that may only be brought against an employer.

Accordingly, since Plaintiff has not identified any cognizable federalclaims against the CMB that are not barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, the CMB is DISMISSED from this lawsuit WITH PREJUDICE. 

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14Although the third cause of action for wrongful termination is asserted against "all defendants," the

Complaintmakes clear thatCMB was not Plaintiff's employer, and there are no facts in the Complaintsufficient

to establish liability against the CMB under this legal theory. Accordingly, on this basis alone, with respect to

the CMB, the wrongfulterminationclaim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Similarly, the Complaint states

that the eighth cause of action for fraud is asserted against "all defendants," but the underlying allegations quite

plainly only concern the State and the CDC. Further, Plaintiff has not identified any relevant facts that would

indicate that he could amend his complaint to state a claim against the CMB for fraud. Accordingly, this claim

against the CMB is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Finally, Plaintiff's defamation claim, asserted in his fifth

cause of action, and the tortious interference claim, asserted in his seventh cause of action, appear to be

asserted only against the CMB. Indeed, Plaintiff confirms this fact in his Opposition by arguing that "Plaintiff's

defamation case did not accrue when the defamatory statements were posted to the CMB website. They

accrued when Plaintifflearned ofit barely days priorto the filing ofthe complaint." See Opp. at 7. Plaintiff also

argues that his interference claim has to do with the "rejection of the Plaintiff's employment in Kansas in

May/June 2005," which, according to the allegations in the Complaint, is connected to the CMB's actions

against Plaintiff. Given the position Plaintiff has taken in his Opposition, the Court concludes that he has failed

to state a claim against the CDC orthe State for either the defamation claim or the tortious interference claim.

14

2. Plaintiff's State Law Causes of Action.

With regard to Plaintiff's remaining state law causes of action, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims

must be dismissed because Plaintiff has not complied – and cannot comply – with the California Tort Claims

Act. Defendants also note that several of the state law causes of action fail on the merits. In his Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges the following state law causes of action: (a) wrongful termination, (b) defamation, (c) infliction

of emotional distress, (d) tortious interference with existing and prospective business, and (e) fraud.14 

a. California Tort Claims Act.

Under California Government Code § 911.2, "[a] claim relating to a cause of action for death or for

injury to person or to personal property . . . shall be presented [to the public entity]. . . not later than six months

after the accrualofthe cause of action." Id. Additionally, California Government Code § 945.4 provides that

"no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim

is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has

been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board[ .]" Cal. Gov. Code

§ 945.4. Finally, section 945.6 provides that, "any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for

which a claim is required to be presented . . . must be commenced, ifwritten notice is givenin accordance with

section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail."

Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6. "[T]he combined effect of sections 911.2 and 945.6 is that a claim for a personal

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injury action against a public entity must be presented within six months of the injury; and if the claim is denied,

suit must be filed within six months of the date of denial." Schmidt v. Southern California Rapid Transit

Dist., 14 Cal. App. 4th 23, 25-26 (1993). 

A valid tort claim must state the date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction

which gave rise to the claim, a generaldescription ofthe injury or damage incurred, and the name or names of

the public employeeswho caused such injury or damage. Cal. Gov. Code § 910(c)-(e). Pursuant to California

Government Code § 915(b), claims against the State must be presented to the State Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board. Cal. Gov. Code § 915. 

Section 950.2 ofthe California Government Code provides in pertinent part, "a cause of action against

a public employee or former public employee from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a

public employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity for such injury is barred[.]"Cal. Gov.

Code § 950.2. "Proper filing of a claim against the public entity is a condition precedent to action against the

employees." Moyer v. Hook, 10 Cal. App. 3d 491, 492 (1970). If a civil complaint does not affirmatively

allege compliance with the claim presentation requirements, or allege facts showing the applicability of a

recognized exception or excuse for noncompliance, itmustbe dismissed. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th

1234, 1242 (2003); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). In

fact, the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that compliance with California's Tort Claims Act is a substantive

element of any cause of action against the State. See U.S. v.California, 655 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1980).

Here, it is beyond dispute that Plaintiff has not complied with the above-noted requirements. Indeed,

the Complaint does not contain any factualallegations sufficient to show that Plaintiff submitted a written claim

to the State Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. For this reason alone, the state law claims

in the Complaint are DISMISSED. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1242. Further, Plaintiff's argument

that he is excused from compliance with the California Tort Claims Actmerely because his claim "arose under

the watchful eyes of the State" is completely without merit. As the CDC notes in its Reply brief, California

courts have long held that actual knowledge by the public entity of the facts and circumstances regarding a

potential claim does not excuse the plaintiff's failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act. See City

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15Plaintiff does vaguely assert that the State and the CDC should be "estopped" from relying on the

California Tort Claims Act presumably due to the fact that the CDC entered into a settlement agreement with

Plaintiff on June 7, 2002 whereby Plaintiff agreed to release any and all claims against the CDC. However,

Plaintiff's argument depends entirely upon his misguided belief that the CDC is somehow responsible for the

CMB's actions. As set forth below, this argument is foreclosed by Hogen v. Valley Hospital, 147 Cal.App.3d

119, 125 (holding that the California Medical Board is a separate entity that is empowered and directed to

conduct an independent investigation of all complaints from the public prior to the filing of an accusation

pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 2220 and California Government Code §§ 11500-

11528). Significantly, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege – because it cannot – that the CDC "promised," as

part of the agreement, that the CMB would cease its investigation and proceedings against Plaintiff. More

importably, however, Plaintiff's argumentstill does not explain why he failed to comply with the California Tort

16

of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974); Department of Water & Power v. Superior

Court, 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1296-97 (2000). As stated by the California Supreme Court in City of San

Jose:

It is not the purpose of the claims statutes to prevent surprise. Rather, the purpose

of these statutes is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to

adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense

oflitigation. . . . It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of

the public entity's actualknowledge ofthe circumstancessurroundingthe claim. Such

knowledge - standing alone - constitutes neithersubstantialcompliance nor basis for

estoppel. 

City of San Jose, 12 Cal.3d at 455. Additionally, Plaintiff cannot rely on the substantial compliance doctrine

because the doctrine "has application only when there is a defect in form but the statutory requirements have

been met." Nguyen v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center, 8 Cal.App.4th 729, 732-33

(1992). 

Effectively conceding that he has not met the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff

includes in his Opposition a "motion for leave to file a late claim with the Government." The State and the

CDC, however, argue that Plaintiff cannot possibly amend his Complaint to demonstrate compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act because "it is clear that plaintiff is not entitled to any late-claim relief." See CDC

Reply at 4. Pursuant to California Government Code § 911.4(b), an application for a late-claim must be

"presented to the public entity . . . within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the

cause of action." Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4(b). Here, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that he is not entitled

to late-claim relief on his wrongful termination claim, his infliction of emotional distress claim, or his fraud

claim,15 but argues instead that he has notmissed the initial deadline for his defamation claim and his tortious

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Claims Act. Even if the CDC were legally responsible for the CMB's actions, which it is not, then Plaintiff had

notice of the "breach" of the settlement agreement as early as June 2002, when the settlement agreement

became effective and the CMB administrative proceedings were not terminated. 

17

interference claim because these claims are "connected with the [CMB's October 4, 2004] publication and the

rejection ofthe Plaintiff's employment in Kansas in May/June 2005." Even if Plaintiff were correct on this point

however, which this Court does not so find, his argument does not prevent dismissal of his state law claims

against the CDC because – even assuming that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for these

causes of action – the facts alleged in the Complaint only pertain to the CMB, not the CDC or the State. Since

Plaintiff cannotstate a federal claim against the CMB, the question of whether he can pursue state law claims

against the CMB is irrelevant. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff's state law claims are hereby dismissed for failure

to comply with the California Tort Claims Act. Since the facts alleged in the Complaint demonstrate that

Plaintiffis not entitled to late-claim relief, particularly giventhe fact that his claims against the CDC first accrued

roughly three to four years ago – Plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

 b. Plaintiff's Claims for Fraud and Defamation.

The State and the CDC alternatively argue that Plaintiff's fraud claim is barred by California

Government Code § 818.8, which provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by

misrepresentation by an employee of the public entity, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or

intentional." Cal. Gov. Code § 818.8. Plaintiff utterly fails to provide any opposition to this argument. The

Court has already concluded that Plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to

comply with the California Tort Claim's Act. However, the Court finds it important to note that California

Government Code § 818.8 does in fact preclude Plaintiff from asserting a fraud claim against the State or the

CDC based on either negligent or intentional misrepresentations of its employees. 

Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to argue that the CDC is liable for defamation for

allegedly reporting him to the CMB, such claims are barred by California Civil Code § 47, commonly referred

to as the "litigationprivilege." Indeed, the California Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged in Hogen that

communications to the CMB relating to an administrative proceeding are absolutely privileged. See Hogen,

147 Cal.App.3d 119, 122-23. A claim against the CDC for malicious prosecution is also foreclosed by

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Hogen, particularly in this instance, where Plaintiff's Complaint clearly states that the CMB initiated its action

against Plaintiffsolely based on its own investigation and, specifically, based on a declaration provided byDr.

Norcross, who is not employed by, in control of, or otherwise affiliated with the CDC. Hogen, 147

Cal.App.3d at 125. Accordingly, these claims against the State and the CDC fail on their merits. 

Given Plaintiff's failure to provide any meaningful opposition to these arguments, and given the

persuasiveness of the State and the CDC's arguments, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the fraud

and defamation claims on these additional grounds as well. 

C. Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend.

While Plaintiff has specifically requested leave to amend his Complaint, with respect to the CMB,

Plaintiff has not identified any facts that:(1) would be consistent with the current Complaint and (2) would cure

the deficiencies identified in this memorandum. Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401. Accordingly, the

Court concludes that further leave to amend would be futile, and hereby DISMISSES the claims against the

CMB WITH PREJUDICE. With respect to the claims against the State and the CDC, the Court notes that

it has serious concerns regarding Plaintiff's ability to state a claim against these entities in light of the fact that

Plaintiff admits in his current Complaint that he signed a settlement agreement in June 2002 in which he

knowingly and voluntarily released all known and unknown claims against the State and the CDC. Although

Plaintiff has suggested to the Court that the settlement agreement may not have been a valid and enforceable

agreement, the Court is not able to make this determination on the instant Motions to Dismiss. Accordingly,

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend, but is expressly warned that leave to amend is conditioned on his ability to

plead facts consistent with the current Complaint that are sufficient to show that he has not knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to assert claims against the State and the CDC. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant California Medical Board's Motion to Dismiss

[Docket No. 11] is GRANTED. All of Plaintiff's claims against the California Medical Board are hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendants State of California and California Department of

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16All parties are also reminded that, since Dr. Norcross has not yet been served with the Complaint,

the current Complaint is still operable with respect to Dr. Norcross unless and until Plaintiff elects to file an

amended complaint. 

19

Corrections' Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 4] is GRANTED. Plaintiff's federal causes of action under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's state law claims are

also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that

addresses the deficiencies identified in the Court's Order no later than thirty (30) days ofthe date ofthis Order.

However, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint against the State ofCalifornia and the California Department

of Corrections only if Plaintiff can allege, in good faith, facts sufficient to show that: (1) he has a cognizable

federalcause of action against the State and the California Department ofCorrections that is not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment; and (2) he has not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to assert the claims against

the State and the California Department of Corrections. The Court reminds Plaintiff that, if he wishes to file

an amended complaint that asserts state law causes of action against the State or the California Department of

Corrections that have not been dismissed with prejudice by the Court, he must set forth specific factual

allegations sufficient to show either that: (1) he complied with the claim presentation requirements of the

California Tort Claims Act, or (2) he did not comply with the claim presentation requirements of the California

Tort Claims Act, but can demonstrate the existence of an applicable and recognized exception or excuse for

noncompliance. Plaintiff is also be reminded that, if he chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended

complaint will supercede the instant Complaint.16 Therefore, the amended complaint must be self-contained

and cannot refer to, or incorporate by reference, any part of his prior complaint. Failure to amend the

Complaint in compliance with this Order shall be construed by the Court as evidence that further leave to

amend would be futile. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 9-21-05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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