Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02121/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARLAND JONES,

CDCR #F-47928,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SGT. CANEDA; 

SGT. ESTAUCIO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02121-CAB-MDD

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff, Garland Jones, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff claims two RJD correctional sergeants have “harassed” him, “diminished 

[his] ability to file legal documents,” denied him access to the legal library, “disrupted 

[his] program,” and attempted to “undermine” his “legal actions.” Id. at 2‒4. He has not 

prepaid the full civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a 

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2).

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face an additional hurdle.” Id.

In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in 

“monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege 

to proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner:

. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also 

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) 

(under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may 

entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the 

PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in 

federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a 

strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the 

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central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or 

failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When ... presented with 

multiple claims within a single action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only 

when the case as a whole is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. 

Pulido, 928 F.3d. 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-

52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 

that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of 

filing.”).

B. Discussion

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds it contains no “plausible 

allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as 

described above, Plaintiff seeks to sue two RJD officials based on claims that they have 

all interfered with his ability to file and gather documentation he claims relevant to 

unspecified complaints and other “legal matters.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2‒4. These 

claims fail to plausibly meet § 1915(g)’s exception for imminent danger. See Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1055-56 (plaintiff must allege to face a real, proximate and/or ongoing danger 

at the time of filing); Prophet v. Clark, No. CV 1-08-00982-FJM, 2009 WL 1765197, at 

*1 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2009) (finding prisoner’s access to the courts, interference with 

legal mail, and retaliation claims insufficient to satisfy § 1915(g) exception in cases of 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury”).

And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

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some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. That is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings available on 

PACER, the Court finds that Plaintiff Garland Jones, identified as CDCR Inmate #F47928, while incarcerated, has had four prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that 

they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 

They are: 

(1) Jones v. Tolson, et al., Civil Case No. 1:15-cv-01037-JDP (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 14, 2015) (Order dismissing civil action for failing to state a 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2)) (ECF No. 17) (strike one);

(2) Jones v. Tiscornia, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-00544-GPC-PCL

(S.D. Cal. July 30, 2018) (Order dismissing second amended complaint 

for failing to state a claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

(ECF No. 11) (strike two); 

(3) Jones v. Mailroom Officials at CSATF, et al., Civil Case No. 1:17-

cv-00281-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018) (Findings and 

Recommendations [“F&R”] to dismiss second amended complaint for 

failure/inability to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) (ECF No. 22); (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019 Order 

adopting F&R) (ECF No. 24) (strike three); and

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(4) Jones v. Cal. Corr. Healthcare Servs., et al., Civil Case No. 2:17-

cv-00738-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal. March 21, 2019) (Order & F&R to 

dismiss second amended complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2)) (ECF No. 30); (April 26, 2019 Order 

adopting F&R and dismissing second amended complaint without leave 

to amend) (ECF No. 32) (strike four).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated at least three

“strikes” as defined by § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent 

all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of 

abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed 

IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).1

II. Conclusion and Orders

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

(2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to 

prepay the $400 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

 

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In fact, Plaintiff has been denied leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in 

this Court on six previous occasions. See Jones v. Blahnik, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

3:18-cv-02262-GPC-BLM (ECF No. 11); Jones v. Elizaldie, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-

cv-02734-JLS-MDD (ECF No. 4); Jones v. Elizaldie, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:19-

cv-00296-BAS-AGS (ECF No. 4); Jones v. Campos, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:19-

cv-01340-LAB (JLB) (ECF No. 4), and Jones v. Elizalde, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

3:19-cv-01521-CAB-JLB (ECF No. 4).

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(4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2020

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