Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05334/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05334-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Property Damage

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BIBEKANAND SATPATHY, dba

AMADORE ENTERTAINMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD.;

COVENANT AVIATION SECURITY, LLC;

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION; CITY AND COUNTY OF

SAN FRANCISCO; THAI AIRWAYS

INTERNATIONAL, LTD. and DOES 1 to 50,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-5334 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Bibekanand Satpathy alleges that certain Defendants

damaged his baggage containing unexposed and undeveloped motion

picture film by subjecting the film to x-ray surveillance. 

Defendant Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (Cathay Pacific) moves for

summary judgment and, in the alternative, for partial summary

judgment on the issues of whether the rights and liabilities of the

parties are governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention, 49

U.S.C. § 40105; whether Plaintiff's claims are barred for failure

to give timely notice; and whether Cathay Pacific is entitled to

limited liability under the terms of the Warsaw Convention. 

Defendant Thai Airways International (Thai Airways) joins the

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1

On February 10, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his

claims against Defendant Transportation Security Administration and

on March 25, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims

against Defendant City and County of San Francisco. Defendant

Covenant Aviation Security, Inc. has not joined in this motion for

summary judgment.

2

motion.1 Collectively, Cathay Pacific and Thai Airways are

referred as Moving Defendants. Mr. Satpathy opposes the motion. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the

Court grants Moving Defendants' motion for summary judgment that

the Warsaw Convention applies to the dispute between these three

parties and that Plaintiff failed to file timely notice. Because

summary judgment is granted on the ground of untimely notice, the

Court does not address the issue of limited liability.

BACKGROUND

1. Evidentiary Objections

Cathay Pacific objects to some of the evidence submitted by

Plaintiff. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections and

has not relied on any inadmissible evidence. To the extent that

the Court relies on any evidence to which Cathay Pacific objects,

such evidence has been found admissible and the objections are

overruled. To the extent that the Court decides the motion without

considering evidence to which Cathay Pacific has objected, its

objections are overruled as moot. 

2. Factual Background

Mr. Satpathy is the principal of Amadore Entertainment, a film

production company. According to Mr. Satpathy, he was contracted

to film a motion picture in India. The film was part of a media

project and was scheduled to be telecast by the Indian government

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and distributed in national and international markets. Mr.

Satpathy attests that the value of this contract was

$12,000,000.00. In preparation for his business venture, Mr.

Satpathy purchased a round-trip ticket from Udaan Travel and was

issued a "Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check." The reverse side of

the ticket provided notice of the limits of liability under the

Warsaw Convention. A notice of the limits of liability was also

listed in a ticket jacket which contained the Passenger Ticket and

Baggage Check. 

On November 1, 2003, Mr. Satpathy checked in at the San

Francisco International Airport (SFO) with eighteen bags weighing

seventy pounds each which, according to Mr. Satpathy, contained

unexposed and undeveloped motion picture film and camera

accessories. The combined weight was 1,260 pounds. Mr. Satpathy

knew that sixteen bags were in excess of the two-bag limit. Cathay

Pacific issued Mr. Satpathy an excess baggage ticket showing that

he was being charged at a rate of $121.00 per bag in excess, for a

total of $1,936.00. Mr. Satpathy also received eighteen bag tags

for each bag that he checked. 

According to Mr. Satpathy, large, bright yellow and orange

tags with large bold black letters were placed on all eighteen bags

indicating "DO NOT X-RAY," and "PACKAGE CONTAINS UNDEVELOPED FILM."

Mr. Satpathy declares that he informed a Cathay Pacific counter

representative that the baggage contained film that was not to be

x-rayed. Mr. Satpathy states that the counter representative and

an unidentified supervisor assured him that the bags would not be

x-rayed. Mr. Satpathy also declares that he reminded the

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representative that on a previous trip in July, 2003, his baggage

containing undeveloped film was taken to another counter for manual

inspection. Mr. Satpathy claims he suggested to the representative

that if such a procedure were again necessary, he was carrying a

film changing tent, which is a portable darkroom.

Mr. Satpathy asserts that he gave the counter representative a

written declaration stating the nature of the checked baggage and

an estimate of the value of the film at $73,000.00. Cathay Pacific

denies that this is possible, claiming that certain procedures are

followed when a passenger declares value for his or her baggage. 

Specifically, a Cathay Pacific manager would have to approve any

declared value, which is limited to $3,000 per passenger regardless

of the number of bags. If approved, the manager would note the bag

tag numbers in the passenger's file, place a "fragile" sticker on

the bags and call down to the baggage room to advise of the

declaration. In addition, according to Cathay Pacific, Mr.

Satpathy would have been charged a supplemental sum and issued a

miscellaneous charges order (MCO). The MCO would state the

declared value, the contents of the baggage and the supplemental

sum. The MCO would also be placed in Mr. Satpathy's flight file. 

According to Cathay Pacific Airport Service Manager J. Russ Forston

who reviewed Mr. Satpathy's flight file, there was no evidence of

any declared value or supplemental sum. Forston Dec. ¶ 9. 

On November 1, 2003, Mr. Satpathy traveled on Cathay Pacific

from San Francisco to Bangkok with a stop in Hong Kong. Then, he

traveled from Bangkok to Kolkata, India on Thai Airways, arriving

on November 4, 2003. At that time, Mr. Satpathy received all

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eighteen bags but was not aware of any damage to the film. He

proceeded with his movie-shooting schedule. Mr. Satpathy declares

that when the first round of filming was completed, he and the

motion picture crew took the film to be developed in a motion

picture film processing laboratory where he learned that the film

was ruined as a result of x-ray damage. Mr. Satpathy returned to

the United States in December, 2003, and he declares that he then

sought a second opinion on the damaged film. Mr. Satpathy asserts

that RGB laboratory in Southern California confirmed the damage to

the film in late December, 2003. Thereafter, Mr. Satpathy retained

counsel, who provided written notice of the damaged film to Cathay

Pacific and Thai Airways on January 5, 2004. 

On August 23, 2004, Mr. Satpathy filed suit in State court

alleging the following State law causes of action: (1) negligence;

(2) breach of contract; and (3) fraud/negligent misrepresentation. 

On December 16, 2004, Thai Airways removed the complaint to this

Court. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987). Material facts which would preclude entry of summary

judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may

affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify

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which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving

party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a

material fact on such issues, nor must the moving party support its

motion with evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.;

see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990);

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the moving party shows an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific

evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

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2 October 12, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934)

reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 40105.

7

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicability of the Warsaw Convention

Moving Defendants assert that all rights and liabilities of

the parties to this action are governed exclusively by the Warsaw

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to

International Transportation by Air2 (Warsaw Convention). Although

Plaintiff does not concede that the Warsaw Convention applies to

his claims against Moving Defendants, he fails to argue that it

does not.

The Warsaw Convention prescribes uniform rules governing the

international air transportation of passengers, baggage and cargo. 

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,

247 (1984). The United States ratified the Warsaw Convention in

1934. Id. at 246. The treaty was amended by the Montreal Protocol

4, which became effective in the United States in 1999. Perri v.

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).

The purpose of the Warsaw Convention is "to create a uniform body

of law governing the rights and responsibilities of passengers and

air carriers in international air transportation. It was intended

to protect the 'international air transportation industry[, which]

was in its beginning stages' at the time the Convention was

drafted." Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934, 937

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(9th Cir. 2001). As a treaty of the United States, the Warsaw

Convention supersedes State law, even when the State claim is not

cognizable under the Warsaw Convention. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.

2; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76

(1999). 

The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international

transportation" defined in part as:

any transportation in which, according to the contract

made by the parties, the place of departure and the place

of destination, whether or not there be a break in the

carriage or a transshipment, are situated either within

the territories of two High Contracting Parties or within

the territory of a single High Contracting Party . . .

Warsaw Convention, ch. 1, art. 1, (2). 

Here, Mr. Satpathy traveled from San Francisco to Hong Kong,

Bangkok and Kolkata, India. The places of departure and

destination were situated within the territories of High

Contracting Parties, namely, the United States and India,

respectively. Thus, Mr. Satpathy's travel constituted

international transportation as defined by the Warsaw Convention. 

Therefore, the Warsaw Convention governs the rights and liabilities

of Mr. Satpathy, Cathay Pacific Airways and Thai International

Airways. Consequently, the Warsaw Convention preempts Mr.

Satpathy's State law claims against Cathay Pacific and Thai

International. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 162, 169-75; Carey v. United

Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001). 

II. Timely Notice Under the Warsaw Convention

Cathay Pacific argues that Mr. Satpathy's claims are barred

for failure to give timely written notice as required by the Warsaw

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Convention. Mr. Satpathy responds that, given the inconspicuous

nature of the damage to the film, he acted reasonably upon

discovery of the damage and thus satisfied the notice requirements.

The Warsaw Convention provides, in pertinent part:

2. In case of damage, the person entitled to delivery

must complain to the carrier forthwith after the

discovery of the damage, and, at the latest, within seven

days from the date of receipt in the case of baggage. . .

3. Every complaint must be made in writing upon the

document of carriage or by separate notice in writing

dispatched within the times aforesaid.

4. Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, no

action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of

fraud on his part.

Warsaw Convention, ch. 3, art. 26, (2)-(4).

These requirements serve "to facilitate prompt notice of

carriers' exposure to liability from damage claims . . . sparing

potential defendants of the burden of having to defend themselves

against 'stale' claims brought long after the wrong alleged." 

Hitachi Data Sys. v. United Parcel Serv., 76 F.3d 276, 279 (9th

Cir. 1996); see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).

It is undisputed that Mr. Satpathy received his baggage on

November 4, 2003, and first provided written notice to Moving

Defendants on January 5, 2004. Moving Defendants contend that this

fact is sufficient to bar Mr. Satpathy's claim for failure to

provide timely notice given the express terms of the Warsaw

Convention. Furthermore, citing Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United

States, 170 F. Supp. 422, 426 (Ct. Cl. 1959), Moving Defendants

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argue that, because the Warsaw Convention is an international

agreement, "an American court does not have the right to interpret

it as freely as it might interpret an American statute or

contract." Plaintiff cites no authority for his argument that,

considering the inconspicuous nature of the damage to the film,

enforcing the seven-day notice provision "would be a gross

distortion of the intent of the Warsaw Convention." Opp. at 5. 

Plaintiff argues that he acted reasonably under the circumstances

because, upon verification of the damage, he satisfied the notice

requirement.

On the other hand, Moving Defendants present no authority for

the proposition that the seven-day notice requirement may not be

enlarged when the damage cannot be discovered within that time

period. In Stud v. Trans International Airlines, 727 F.2d 880, 883

(9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there is an

argument that the notice period could be enlarged under such

circumstances, but did not have to decide the question because the

shipper in that case knew of the destruction within the required

time-frame. However, Stud is applicable nevertheless. In Stud,

the plaintiff transported a horse which was in good health upon

arrival at the destination airport. Id. at 881. Shortly

thereafter, the horse became visibly ill and died ten days later. 

An autopsy done the next day concluded that the horse died of

pneumonia brought on by the stress of travel. Id. A final autopsy

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3

 In Stud, the plaintiff had fourteen days, under an earlier

version of the Warsaw Convention, to give notice because "goods"

had been damaged. Where, as here, there is alleged damage to

baggage, a claimant has seven days to provide written notice under

the terms of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Montreal

Protocol No. 4. 

11

dated more than two months later concluded that the temperature

fluctuations in the aircraft probably caused the horse's fatal

illness. Id. The plaintiff provided written notice of its claim

four days after the final autopsy. Id. The plaintiff argued that

notice was timely because he did not know that he could hold the

defendant airline liable until he received the final autopsy

report. Id. at 883. The Ninth Circuit stated:

Stud's notice of complaint was not timely. Even if we

assume for the sake of argument that the fourteen-day

period may be enlarged when damage to or destruction of

goods could not, in the exercise of due diligence, be

discovered within that period, it should not be enlarged

here. Within fourteen days of receipt, a diligent

shipper would have known-and Stud in fact knew-of both

the damage to and the destruction of Super Clint. The

Convention did not require Stud to prove to a certainty

at the time of giving notice that Transamerica had caused

Super Clint's death. There was no need to wait for a

final autopsy report before giving notice of complaint.

Id.3

Likewise, Mr. Satpathy knew of the damage to his film

immediately after he used it for the first round of filming in

India and developed it in a motion picture film processing

laboratory where he found the film completely ruined by x-ray

damage. However, Mr. Satpathy provides no evidence that he gave

written notice to Moving Defendants within seven days of

discovering the damage. Rather, he waited until he returned to the

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United States, obtained a second opinion on the cause of the damage

to the film, and hired counsel who then provided notice. Id. at ¶¶

14, 15. Stud instructs that Mr. Satpathy should have provided

notice to Moving Defendants within seven days of his discovery of

the damage to the film because the Convention does not require a

claimant to prove to a certainty, at the time of giving notice,

that the airline had caused the damage.

Accordingly, even assuming that the Warsaw Convention could be

construed to allow the enlargement of the notice period when damage

to or destruction of goods could not, in the exercise of due

diligence, be discovered within that period, it should not be

enlarged here because Mr. Satpathy should have given notice of the

damage to his film immediately after the film was developed in

India when he first discovered the damage, not weeks later after he

returned to the United States, obtained another examination and

hired counsel. Therefore, Moving Defendants' motion for summary

judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/19/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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