Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01507/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01507-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Juanita Hernandez (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income under Title XVI of 

the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were 

submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe.

2

 

1 Andrew M. Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul is substituted for Acting Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill as the defendant in this suit. 

2 The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including 

entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. Nos. 7, 8.) 

JUANITA HERNANDEZ, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL,

1 Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:18-cv-01507-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

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Having considered the briefing and record in this matter, the Court finds the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole 

and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court affirms the agency’s determination to 

deny benefits.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 

on February 19, 2015. AR 242-49.

3

 Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on January 1, 2011, 

due severe depression, anxiety, panic attacks and high blood pressure. AR 242, 323. Plaintiff’s 

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income were denied initially 

and on reconsideration. AR 134-38, 145-49. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

ALJ. ALJ Shiva Bozarth held a hearing on October 10, 2017, and issued an order denying benefits on

January 4, 2018. AR 12-27, 977-1007. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which the 

Appeals Council denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR 1-5. This 

appeal followed.

Hearing Testimony

The ALJ held a hearing on October 10, 2017, in Fresno, California. Plaintiff appeared with her 

attorney, Jonathan Pena. Impartial Vocational Expert (“VE”) Paul Ramirez also appeared. AR 979.

In response to questioning from the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she has a high school 

education. AR 988. She last worked in 2013 as a caregiver through in-home support services for a 

family friend, who was confined to a hospital bed. Plaintiff cleaned, cooked, and provided 

medication. AR 985-87. Plaintiff could not remember any work that she did from 2008-2011 or in 

2014 and 2015. She did recall working as a restaurant hostess in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. AR 

987-88. 

When asked about her physical impairments, Plaintiff testified that she has diabetes. With

medication, her sugar levels are controlled, and the numbers are better. She takes two pills, Metformin 

and Oseni, and checks her blood sugar four times a day. She is trying to follow a diabetic diet. AR 

3 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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988-89. Plaintiff also testified that she has hypertension. She takes medication for it, but has trouble 

remembering to take the pills. Her cousin and her dad call her to make sure she takes her medication. 

AR 989-90. 

When asked about her physical activities, Plaintiff reported that she tries to do her own 

cleaning. She does not have physical problems with sweeping or mopping. She mostly has difficulty 

concentrating. She can use the microwave to cook her meals, but she does not use the stove because 

she cannot concentrate. She burned her arm once when grease splattered on her. Although Plaintiff 

lives alone, her father and her cousin visit her. Her cousin helps with meals and cleaning and her 

father drives her to doctor’s appointments even though she has a driver’s license. She has a dog but 

does not take him for walks. AR 990-93. 

Plaintiff expressed to the ALJ that her problems became significant when her mother passed 

away. Before that, she was able to work. She engages in self-harm behaviors, cutting or burning 

herself. In 2015, she was put on a psychiatric hold for trying to hurt herself by taking pills. AR 994-

95.

In response to questioning by her attorney, Plaintiff testified that her physical problems include 

asthma, which is triggered by her anxiety and the weather. She uses an inhaler about four times a day. 

Her anxiety is triggered when she is around a lot of people, which is why she tries not to go anywhere. 

When she goes to her doctor’s appointments, she gets anxious and cannot concentrate. AR 995-96. 

Plaintiff also testified that she has trouble with her right arm that started in 2014. She cannot 

lift heavy items. She can hold a cup, but she cannot hold a half gallon of milk because it is too heavy, 

and her arm is too weak. She takes pain medication for it, which helps. After taking her medication, 

she would rate her pain as 5 out of 10. AR 996-98.

When asked about her hospitalizations, Plaintiff testified that she hears voices. The medication 

from her psychiatrist helped in the beginning, but it is no longer helping. The voices became louder 

about two months prior to the hearing. Prior to that, she would hear things every night. Some of the 

voices were command voices telling her to hurt herself. AR 998-99. Plaintiff also has problems 

sleeping. She averages two to five hours of sleep a night. This causes concentration issues during the 

day and she sees things, like shadows. She has issues with fatigue and decreased energy, and she cat 

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naps during the day. AR 999-1000. Plaintiff also reiterated that she has problems being around a lot 

of people. She may isolate and gets paranoid. She does individual therapy, not group therapy. AR 

1000. She does not watch TV and does not read. AR 1001. 

Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ elicited testimony from VE Paul Ramirez. The ALJ 

asked the VE hypothetical questions. For all of the hypotheticals, the ALJ asked the VE to assume an 

individual with the same age, education and work experience as Plaintiff. For the first hypothetical, 

the ALJ asked the VE to assume an individual who cannot be exposed to more than concentrated 

levels of chemicals, dusts or other respiratory irritants, cannot work at unprotected heights or around 

fast moving machinery, cannot operate a motor vehicle, and is limited to simple and routine tasks, 

occasional interactions with coworkers, supervisors and the general public. The VE testified that there 

would be work in the national economy for such an individual, such as laborer of stores, hand packer, 

and cleaner, housekeeper. AR 1002-03.

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume the same individual from 

hypothetical number one with the additional limitation that the individual would require a reminder 

once per hour to stay on task. The VE testified that there would be no jobs for such an individual. AR 

1003.

For the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume the same individual from 

hypothetical number one with the additional limitation that this individual would need two 

unscheduled absences from work per month. The VE testified that there would be no jobs available 

for such an individual. AR 1003. 

Following questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE to assume a hypothetical 

individual limited to a range of light work, with the right upper extremity would be limited to 

occasional overhead reaching and frequent reaching in all other directions, occasional ramps, stairs 

and stooping, but never ropes, ladders or scaffolds, limited to simple, routine tasks, and would have 

difficulty relating and interacting with coworkers, supervisors and the general public and would be off 

tasks 15 percent of the time in those categories. The VE testified that there would be no work for this 

individual. AR 1004. 

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For the final hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume the individual in hypothetical 

number one with an additional limitation to the light exertional level. The VE testified that there 

would be jobs available at the light exertional level, such as office helper, cannery worker, and sorter, 

agricultural. AR 1004-05. 

Medical Record

The relevant medical record was reviewed by the Court, and will be referenced below as 

necessary to this Court’s decision.

The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 15-27. Specifically, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2011, her 

alleged onset date. AR 18. The ALJ identified asthma, obesity, depressive disorder, generalized 

anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder as severe impairments. AR 18-19. The ALJ 

determined that the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed 

impairments. AR 19. Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work. She could lift and carry 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, 

and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She could not be exposed to more than concentrated levels 

of chemicals, dusts, or other respiratory irritants. She also could not work at unprotected heights, with 

fast moving machinery, or operate a motor vehicle. She was limited to simple, routine tasks and 

occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public. AR 20-26. With this RFC, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy, such as office assistant, cannery worker and sorter agricultural. AR 26-27. The ALJ 

therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 27. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 

1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 

considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 

evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, 

and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 

her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 

1990).

DISCUSSION4

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to incorporate into the RFC the mental 

limitations identified by the consultative examiner, Dr. Soad Khalifa; (2) improperly discounting the 

opinion of third-party witness Jael Enos; and (3) improperly evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective 

4 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including arguments, 

points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific argument or brief is not to 

be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

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complaints regarding her mental impairments and the impact of Plaintiff’s right ankle impairment on 

her RFC. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining Plaintiff’s Mental RFC

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by assigning great weight to the opinion of the 

consultative psychiatric examiner, Dr. Soad Khalifa, but failing to incorporate all of the limitations 

identified by Dr. Khalifa into Plaintiff’s mental RFC. 

On May 9, 2015, Dr. Khalifa completed a consultative psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff 

complained of depression, anxiety, low motivation, isolative behavior, excessive sleeping and anger 

issues. She also described limited social activities. AR 391-92. She was able to take care of her 

personal hygiene. With regard to her daily activities, Plaintiff reported that she sits at home, sleeps and 

sometimes watches television. AR 392. 

On mental status examination, Plaintiff was cooperative with good eye contact, alert and 

oriented in all spheres. Dr. Khalifa determined that it “was clear ... that she was exaggerating her 

symptoms” and “that with memory testing she was pretending that she could not remember and gave 

approximate answers.” AR 393. As to her cognitive skills, her attention and concentration were 

impaired, and she had difficulty spelling her last name backward. Her memory also was impaired, but 

Dr. Khalifa observed that Plaintiff was exaggerating and “it seemed that she was pretending that she 

does not remember.” AR 393. Her judgment and insight were good, but her abstract thinking and 

fund of knowledge were poor. AR 393. Dr. Khalifa diagnosed Plaintiff with persistent depressive 

disorder, along with hypertension, back pain and arm pain. Dr. Khalifa opined that “[a]ccording to the 

claimant, she is unable to maintain attention and concentration to carry out simple job instructions.” 

AR 393. She would have difficulty relating and interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the 

general public because of her anger issues and poor social skills, depression and anxiety symptoms. 

She was unable to carry out an extensive variety of technical and/or complex instructions. She also 

had some restrictions on her activities, based on statements that she had back pain and arm pain, and 

low motivation, not performing any chores or activities. Dr. Khalifa further opined that because 

Plaintiff was unable to do math, she should not be handling her own funds. AR 393-94. 

///

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In evaluating Dr. Khalifa’s opinion, the ALJ reasoned as follows:

As for the opinion evidence, Consultative examiner, Dr. Khalifa, opined the claimant 

was unable to maintain attention and concentration to carry out simple job instructions, 

and would have difficulty relating and interacting with coworkers, supervisors and the 

general public. She was unable to carry out an extensive variety of technical and/or 

complex instructions (Exhibit B4F, pp. 5-6). I give great weight to Dr. Khalifa’s opinion 

because it is consistent with and supported by the record. The claimant testified that she 

had great difficulty concentrating (Hearing Transcript), it took her nearly two days to 

complete her Adult Function Report (Exhibit B5E), and she needed reminders to take her 

medication (Hearing Transcript). The claimant was diagnosed with anxiety (Exhibit 

6BF, p. 43), isolated herself to her apartment (Exhibit B4F, p. 3), and got paranoid and 

anxious around people (Hearing Transcript). Accordingly, I give great weight to this 

opinion.

AR 24.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by assigning “great weight” to Dr. Khalifa’s opinion, but 

omitting from the RFC, without comment, Dr. Khalifa’s assessment that Plaintiff was unable to 

maintain concentration and attention to carry out simple instructions. 

An RFC “is the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] limitations” and it is “based on all 

the relevant evidence in [one’s] case record,” rather than a single medical opinion or piece of 

evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). While it is true that an ALJ is “not qualified to interpret raw 

medical data in functional terms,” Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008), the 

ALJ is not precluded from making an RFC finding that differs from assessments contained in medical 

source statements. Indeed, “the RFC need not precisely reflect a physician’s specific assessments.” 

Holcomb v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-cv-02268-KJM-CKD, 2019 WL 4745268, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 30, 2019) (citing Turner v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

As the Ninth Circuit has expressed, “[i]t is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the 

claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 

1049 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A review of the record indicates no apparent conflict between Dr. Khalifa’s opinion and the 

RFC limitation to simple, routine tasks. In relevant part, Dr. Khalifa’s report states, “According to the 

claimant, she is unable to maintain attention and concentration to carry out simple job instructions.” 

AR 393 (emphasis added). The inability to carry out simple job instructions was therefore Plaintiff’s 

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own opinion of her functioning. In contrast, Dr. Khalifa opined that Plaintiff “would have difficulty 

relating and interacting with coworkers, supervisors and the general public because of her anger issues 

and poor social skills, depression and anxiety symptoms” and was “unable to carry out an extensive 

variety of technical and/or complex instructions because of [these] reasons.” AR 393-94. Dr. 

Khalifa’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to carry out an extensive variety of technical or complex 

instructions is not inconsistent with Plaintiff’s RFC for simple, routine tasks. 

Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC determination at step-four that Plaintiff could perform simple, 

routine tasks was supported by the opinions of the state agency consultants and the consultative 

examiner, Dr. Robin Rhodes Campbell. The state agency physicians, Drs. R. Warren and D. 

Funkenstein both determined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in the ability to carry out very 

short and simple instructions. AR 74, 109. They also concluded that she had the ability to understand 

and remember simple instructions and had the ability to attend and concentrate for periods of two 

hours as required in the workplace. AR 75, 110. Similarly, on December 3, 2016, following a 

consultative evaluation on December 3, 2016, Dr. Robin Rhodes Campbell opined that Plaintiff would 

have “no impairment in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short, simple instructions.” AR 

402. The ALJ gave “partial weight” to these opinions, explaining that she assigned “great weight to 

the limitations regarding simple instructions ..., but less weight to the remainder of the opinions, 

because they are not supported by the record.” AR 25. The opinions of non-treating or nonexamining physicians may serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with 

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957

(9th Cir. 2002). Here, the opinions of the state agency physicians and Dr. Campbell were consistent 

with the independent clinical findings on examination that Plaintiff had no deficits in attention, her 

concentration was adequate for conversation and time-limited assessment tasks, she was alert and 

oriented to person, place, time and situation, presented with no obvious cognitive delays, and her 

insight and judgment were reasonable. AR 400.

The Court therefore finds that the ALJ did not err in establishing Plaintiff’s mental RFC and 

limiting her to simple, routine tasks. 

///

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B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating the Third-Party Testimony of Jael Enos

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the third-party testimony of her friend, 

Jael Enos. Ms. Enos completed a Third-Party Function report on March 16, 2015. She reported that 

she sees Plaintiff daily and helps with activities, such as washing her hair, cleaning, and doctor’s 

visits. She also reported that Plaintiff needs reminders to take medications. She rarely goes outside 

and does not drive because she becomes overly anxious. She cannot pay her bills, count change, 

handle a savings account or use a checkbook/money orders. Her impairments affect her ability to lift, 

squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit, kneel, climb stairs and see. They also affect her memory, 

understanding, task completion, concentration, following instructions, using hands, and getting along 

with others. AR 279-87. The ALJ assigned “some weight” to Ms. Enos’ statements because her 

personal relationship with Plaintiff prevented her from being considered a “disinterested third party

witness,” she was not medically trained to make exacting observations regarding Plaintiff’s 

impairments, and the statements did not evidence greater limitations than those indicated by the ALJ. 

AR 26.

An ALJ must take into account competent lay witness testimony. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]n order to discount 

competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ ‘must give reasons that are germane to each witness.’” 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (citation omitted). An ALJ is not required to discuss every witness’ 

testimony on an individualized, witness-by-witness basis. Id. Rather, “if the ALJ gives germane 

reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when 

rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” Id.

Plaintiff’s personal relationship with Ms. Enos is not a valid reason to discount her 

observations. Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that “[t]he fact that a lay witness is a family member cannot 

be a ground for rejecting his or her testimony. To the contrary, testimony from lay witnesses who see 

the claimant every day is of particular value.”). Further, Ms. Enos’ lack of medical training is not a 

valid reason to discount her testimony. Lay witnesses are not required to have medical training and 

their testimony need not be backed by any particular expertise. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (“Lay 

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testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects the claimant’s ability to work is 

competent evidence that the ALJ must take into account.”). Nevertheless, because the third-party 

statement of Ms. Enos was of the same general nature as Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s 

valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s statements, discussed in detail below, apply equally to Ms. 

Enos’ similar statements. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 (“given that the lay witness testimony described 

the same limitations as Molina’s own testimony, ... the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Molina’s testimony 

apply with equal force to the lay testimony”); Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

694 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In light of our conclusion that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting [claimant’s] own subjective complaints, and because [layperson’s] testimony was similar to 

such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting her testimony.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit reversible error in her evaluation of the lay 

witness testimony. 

C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ “failed to set forth any reason for discounting Plaintiff’s 

alleged mental and physical limitations.” (Doc. No. 16 at 15.)

In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must engage in a 

two-step analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the claimant must produce objective medical 

evidence of her impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptom 

or pain alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. If the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no 

evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her 

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. at 1015. 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms regarding her mental impairments, but rejected her statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms. AR 22. Although there 

was evidence suggestive of malingering relative to her mental impairments, which is discussed below, 

the ALJ nonetheless provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

testimony. 

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First, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s statements based on the objective medical evidence. AR 

22. Although lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting 

testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 

2005). The ALJ summarized the medical record relative to Plaintiff’s mental impairments and

highlighted evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff exaggerated her symptoms. AR 24. Specifically, the 

ALJ cited Dr. Khalifa’s findings on mental status examination that Plaintiff “exaggerated her

symptoms.” AR 24. Indeed, Dr. Khalifa repeatedly noted in the evaluation report that Plaintiff was 

exaggerating. AR 393 (“I noticed that she was exaggerating her symptoms.”), (“It was clear to me that 

she was exaggerating her symptoms.”), (“she was exaggerating”). Additionally, during testing, Dr. 

Khalifa found that not only was Plaintiff exaggerating, but she also was pretending that she could not 

remember. AR 393 (“I saw that with memory testing she was pretending that she could not remember

and she gave approximate answers.”), (“it seemed that she was pretending that she does not 

remember”). The ALJ also identified Dr. Campbell’s report indicating that Plaintiff’s test results were 

invalid. AR 24. In her report, Dr. Campbell commented that Dr. Khalifa’s evaluation showed “some 

evidence of exaggeration and malingering.” AR 398. On mental status examination, Dr. Campbell 

also found “evidence of exaggeration and dissimulation.” AR 399. As to Plaintiff’s cognitive testing, 

Dr. Campbell advised caution, stating as follows:

These test results should be interpreted very cautiously given the claimant’s effort, which 

was poor. When presented with any type of memory task, she said without hesitation 

that she would be unable to do them. Her answers were approximate. She presented 

herself as being unable to tell the difference between shapes or colors. She presented 

herself as being unable to add single digit numbers. It is unlikely that the claimant has 

deficits as severe as these test scores would suggest.

AR 400. Plaintiff’s tests results indicated that she was functioning intellectually in the “Extremely 

Low range” and she scored “very poorly” on the measure of memory. AR 401. Dr. Campbell opined 

that these results were not likely to be an accurate estimation of Plaintiff’s overall functioning because 

they were “not consistent with her history nor her current level of functioning.” AR 401. Dr. 

Campbell concluded that the test results were “considered to be invalid.” AR 401. The objective 

findings of Drs. Khalifa and Campbell that Plaintiff exaggerated her symptoms, pretended not to 

remember during memory testing, and exhibited poor effort on testing are a sufficient basis for 

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discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her functional limitations. The ALJ could reasonably 

conclude that Plaintiff’s limitations were not as extensive as alleged. 

Second, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her mental limitations based on 

evidence that her condition improved with treatment and she was stable on her medications. AR 23. 

Impairments that can be effectively controlled with medication are not disabling for purposes of 

determining eligibility for disability benefits. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 

1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Petersen v. Berryhill, 737 Fed. App’x 329, 332 (9th 

Cir. June 19, 2018) (citing Warre and finding ALJ properly relied on evidence that the claimant’s pain 

and symptoms were controlled with medication and treatment). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental 

status improved, and by June 2017, she denied suicidal ideation, she was exercising, and her mood had 

improved. AR 23. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s medications helped stabilize her. AR 23, 25. 

According to treatment records, in June 2017, Plaintiff was continuing with exercise, noted to be 

improved with medications, denied suicidal ideations and her medications were stable. AR 406-07.

With regard to her physical impairments, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “wholly failed to 

evaluate the limitations resulting from her right ankle cyst” and failed to offer clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting her subjective complaints resulting from this impairment. (Doc. 15 at 15, 17). 

However, Plaintiff has waived the issue of her ankle cyst as a disabling impairment by raising it for 

the first time before this Court. See Harshaw v. Colvin, 616 Fed.App’x 316 (9th Cir. 2015). Although 

the medical records include some evidence regarding this condition, such evidence is not sufficient to 

have put the ALJ and the Appeals Council on notice that Plaintiff specifically claimed that she was 

impaired by this condition. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that “at least when claimants are 

represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order

to preserve them on appeal.” Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Plaintiff did not allege that she was impaired by her ankle cyst and she identified no 

limitations associated with her ankle during the administrative proceedings despite being represented 

by counsel. In applying for disability, Plaintiff claimed she was disabled from severe depression, 

anxiety, panic attacks and high blood pressure. AR 323. Her Adult Function Report identified only 

depression, anxiety, arthritis in her legs, back pain, high blood pressure and trouble with her bladder. 

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AR 289. A hearing brief prepared by Plaintiff’s counsel on September 20, 2017, which was submitted 

to the ALJ, alleged that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: depression, 

posttraumatic stress disorder, diabetes, asthma and chronic pain syndrome. AR 352. The briefing 

made no mention of Plaintiff’s ankle cyst or any associated limitations. AR 352-54. At the hearing, 

neither Plaintiff nor her counsel mentioned her ankle cyst or any associated limitations. 

Even if not waived, the ALJ has implicitly rejected Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling 

limitations from her ankle cyst. Plaintiff claims that she complained of pain with weight bearing, 

tenderness, and pain with motion of the ankle from March 2015 through June 2017. (Doc. No. 15 at 

16.) As demonstrated by the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her physical limitations, 

including an inability to walk, were discounted as inconsistent with her activities. AR 22, 23. An ALJ 

can properly discount a claimant’s subjective complaints when the daily activities demonstrate an 

inconsistency between what the claimant can do and the degree that disability is alleged. Molina, 674 

F.3d at 1112–1113. Here, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff was able to exercise. AR 23. This 

consideration included Plaintiff’s own report in May 2017 that she was exercising and had lost 15 

pounds. AR 22, 402. From this record, it was not unreasonable to conclude that Plaintiff’s ability to 

exercise undermined her claims of pain with walking or weight-bearing.

Further, the ALJ considered the objective evidence as undermining her claims regarding an 

inability to walk and postural limitations. AR 23. The objective evidence may be considered when 

evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. In this case, the ALJ 

expressly considered record evidence that Plaintiff’s lower extremities demonstrated normal ranges of 

motion and her gait was within normal limits. AR 23. According to the record, on examination in 

2015, Plaintiff’s ankle range of motion was within normal limits on both the right and left and her gait 

was normal despite Plaintiff’s claim that she could not walk at all because of pain. AR 387. This 

evidence also undermines any allegations concerning ankle range of motion and weight bearing 

difficulties. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints is free of reversible error. Even if one of the reasons provided could be found inadequate, 

there are sufficient other reasons provided to support the assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective 

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complaints. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. Moreover, even if the ALJ 

explained her reasoning with “less than ideal clarity,” the Court must uphold it where the ALJ’s “path 

may reasonably be discerned.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Andrew M. Saul, 

Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Juanita Hernandez. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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