Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01885/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01885-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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~·,,,puBL I SH· 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

SENECA-CAYUGA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, 

an organized Tribe of Indians, as 

Recognized Under and by the Laws 

of the United States, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United S~tes Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY O 31989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

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No. 86-1885 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. ) 

DAVID L. THOMPSON, the duly ) 

elected District Attorney of ) 

Ottawa County, Oklahoma, BOB SILLS,) 

the duly elected Sheriff of Ottawa) 

County, Oklahoma; JON D. DOUTHITT, ) 

Associate District Judge for the ) 

13th Judicial Administrative ) 

District of Oklahoma, ) 

Defendants-Appellants. 

QUAPAW TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, a 

Federally recognized Indian 

JESSE MCKIBBEN, Chairman of 

Tribe of Oklahoma, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. 

DAVID L. THOMPSON, District 

Attorney of Ottawa County, 

MORLAND T. BARTON, Assistant 

District Attorney of Ottawa 

County; BOB SILLS, the duly 

elected Sheriff of Ottawa 

) 

) 

) 

Tribe; ) 

Quapaw) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

County, Oklahoma; JON D. DOUTHITT, 

Judge of the District Court of 

Ottawa County, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

Appellate Case: 86-1885 Document: 01019957849 Date Filed: 05/03/1989 Page: 1 
Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 85-C-639-B) 

David A. Thompson, District Attorney (Thomas H. May, District 

Attorney and Morland T. Barton, Assistant District Attorney, with 

him on the briefs), Miami, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Ben Loring, Hall, Loring & Smith, P.C. of Miami, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma. 

John H. Charloe, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee Quapaw 

Tribe of ·Oklahoma and Jessee McKibben. 

Before SEYMOUR and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and BROWN*, District 

Judge. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1885 Document: 01019957849 Date Filed: 05/03/1989 Page: 2 
The Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma and the Quapaw Tribe of 

Oklahoma are federally recognized Indian tribes that operate 

high-stakes bingo games on trust land. They brought this action 

to enjoin a pending state court suit in which the State of 

Oklahoma sought to enjoin operation of· the bingo games. The 

federal court held that it was not required to abstain; and issued 

a preliminary injunction. We affirm. 

I• 

BACKGROUND 

In 1983, the State of Oklahoma sued the Seneca-Cayuga and 

Quapaw Tribes in separate actions in state court seeking to enjoi~ 

the operation of Tribal bingo games, which violate the gaming laws 

of the state, see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 995.1-18 (1981). 

Shortly thereafter, the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe filed suit in federal 

court and was granted a preliminary injunction restraining state 

officials from enforcing state gaming laws on Indian land. The 

state district court subsequently dismissed the state suits 

against both Tribes for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 

the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe voluntarily dismissed the federal action. 

In July 1985, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed the lower 

state court, holding that the actions were not barred by the 

.Tribes 1 . sovereign .immunity and·f•remanding -for further findings on 

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other-. ~issues. ·. State ex rel. May v. Seneca-:-Cayuga Tribe of 

Oklahoma, 711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985) (Seneca-Cayuga I). 

The Tribes brought the present action seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief against the State of Oklahoma and the state 

trial judge, the Honorable Jon D. Douthitt. The parties entered 

into extensive stipulations of fact, which are set forth briefly 

as follows. The bingo operations at issue are held in buildings 

used exclusively for bingo, and located on land held in trust for 

the Tribes. The players are primarily non-Indians. All or most 

of the games are in violation of state statutes, and no federal or 

state taxes are withheld from the prizes. The bingo games provide 

·employment for Tribal members, and income which is used to fund 

Tribal health and welfare programs. 

The district court denied a motion by the State asking it to 

abstain from exercising its jurisdiction because of the pending 

state action. Based on the stipulations, the court then enjoined 

Judge Douthitt from proceeding with the state court suit between 

the State and the Tribes, and enjoined the State from interfering 

with the operation of the bingo games. 

The State has appealed this preliminary injunction under 28 

u.s.c. § 1292 (a}(l} (1982). Its primary argument for reversal is 

that the district court should have abstained under the doctrine 

of .Younger v. ,Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. In 

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assessing, this contention,. ,we_, must.,,.consider, California. v •. Cabaz_on 

Band of Mission Indians, 107 s.ct. 1083 (1987), issued after the 

district court opinion in thi? case, which addresses the conflict 

between a tribe's right to operate bingo games and a state's right 

to control gambling. 

II. 

YOUNGER ABSTENTION 

Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to 

exercise the jurisdiction granted them by Congress. See Colorado 

River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 

(1976). As courts within a federalist system, however, they are 

on rare occasions permitted or required not to exercise their 

jurisdiction where such inaction is necessary to avoid undue 

interference with states' conduct of their own affairs. See id. 

at 813-18. The Younger doctrine sets forth principles for 

determining when it is appropriate to abstain from interfering 

with ·a state judicial proceeding. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 

("the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin 

pending state proceedings in state courts is not to issue such 

injunctions"). 

Younger abstention requires an ongoing state judicial (or in 

a proper case administrative) proceeding, the presence of an 

~-important state interest, and-~n adequateropportunit~to raise 

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~ .,:federal'"'.claims· in the" .state-proceedings. -See -Middlesex County 

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 

Each of these conditions must be satisfied before Younger 

abstention is warranted. Id. at 432. Younger abstention is not 

discretionary once the above conditions are met, see Colorado 

River, 424 U.S. at 817 n.22, absent extraordinary circumstances 

that render a state court unable to give state litigants a full 

and fair hearing on their federal claims, 1 see Trainor v. 

Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 442 n.7 (1977) (quoting Kugler v. 

Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975)); Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. 

Accordingly, our review is de novo. Accord Fresh Int'l Corp. v. 

Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 & n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1986). 

In this case, there is clearly an ongoing state judicial 

proceeding. Litigation in the state system has already reached 

the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, see Seneca-Cayuga I, 711 P.2d 77, 

and is now on remand in the state trial court. We therefore turn 

to the second Younger requirement, the necessity _that the state 

proceeding implicate an important state interest. In view of our 

conclusion below that this element is lacking, we need not address 

1 The district court found that the Younger conditions were 

met, but declined to abstain on the grounds that extraordinary 

circumstances made abstention improper. On appeal, the parties 

vigorously dispute and defend this conclusion. Because we hold 

that the Younger abstention conditions have not been satisfied, we 

need riot decide whether extraordinary circumstances are present. . -

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~.the~adequacy. of thea;opportunity:"-to raise ·the fede-ral claim- in 

state court. 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court identified two state interests in 

the regulation of high-stakes bingo games: preventing the 

infiltration of organized crime, and protecting the State's 

economy and tax base. Seneca-Cayuga, 711 P.2d at 91. These are 

undoubtedly legitimate state concerns. This case, however, 

concerns activities that are necessarily primarily of federal 

interest. Moreover, the Tribes have a claim to sovereign immunity 

which shields them from suit in state court. We consider each of 

these factors in turn in assessing the magnitude of the state's 

interests at stake in this case. 

A. Primacy of Federal Interest 

The Constitution grants to Congress the power "To regulate 

Commerce ••• with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 

cl. 3. The treaties and other agreements that govern the 

relationship between the Indians and other Americans are part of 

"the supreme Law of the Land." Id. art. VI, cl. 2. It is 

Congress that has set the terms under which modern American 

Indians live, the United States Supreme Court that has shaped the 

interpretation of those terms, and the federal Bureau of Indian 

Affairs that has managed the day-to-day interactions with the 

Tribes •... .Lndeed,.-Oklahoma,-.. like.many other states, was required to 

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disclaim~-ju.r,isdiction. over Indians ·at· statehood •. See Oklahoma 

Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267, 270 (1906); Enabling 

Act Amendment, ch. 2911, 34 Stat. 1286 (1907); see generally 

Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n., 829 F.2d 967, 

976-81 (10th Cir. 1987} (citing§ 1 of the Oklahoma Enabling Act 

and interpreting it as a general reservation of federal and tribal 

jurisdiction over Indians and their lands and property), cert. 

denied, 108 s.ct. 2870 (1988). 2 

2 We held in Indian Country, U.S.A. that Oklahoma's disclaimer 

is one both of.proprietary and of governmental authority. See 

Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 976-81. Neither the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court, nor the State in this litigation, agree with that 

conclusion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held in recent years 

that the Oklahoma disclaimer is one of proprietary, but not of 

governmental, authority. See Currey v. Corporation Comm'n, 617 

P.2d 177, 179-80 (Okla. 1980) (disclaimer is one of proprietary 

interest in Indian lands), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); see 

also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 69 (1961)--

(construing Alaskan disclaimer as proprietary rather than 

governmental); Ahboah v. Housing Auth. of the Kiowa Tribe of 

Indians, 660 P.2d 625, 630 (Okla. 1983) (confirming Currey). We 

are not bound to follow this interpretation, however, as the 

Enabling Acts conferring statehood in Oklahoma are federal 

enactments. 

The State, in this appeal, goes still further than the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court. The State claims not only that Oklahoma 

has the relevant authority to regulate the Tribes, but also that 

the Tribes are subject without limit to the jurisdiction of 

Oklahoma's courts. In support of this argument, the State recites 

a history of the exercise of Oklahoma jurisdiction over Indians 

previous to and immediately after statehood. See Brief of 

Appellant State of Oklahoma at 13-16. It is clear, however, that 

only federal and tribal courts existed prior to statehood, see 

Seneca-Cayuga I, 711 P.2d at 81 n.16; see also Indian Country, 

U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 977-78 (chronicling gradual expansion of 

jurisdiction of federal courts at expense of tribal courts); Harjo 

v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1121 (D. D.C. 1976) ("general 

absence of an adequate court system" led to establishment of 

federal courts in 1895 to supplement tribal courts), aff'd sub 

nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Both state 

and fede~~l courts_ hav~rejected the State's argument that 

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This is not to say-that states have not exercised authority 

over reservation land, especially over non-Indians on such land. 

Nor is it to say that states have no right to exercise authority 

over activities in Indian Country. See California v. Cabazon Band 

of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1091 (1987) (no~ se rule 

precluding state jurisdiction over tribes and tribal members in 

the absence of express congressional consent); Rice v. Rehner, 463 

U.S. 713 (1983) (state may require liquor license for onreservation sale of liquor for off-premises consumption); Moe v. 

Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state 

may tax on-reservation sale of cigarettes to non-Indians); SenecaCayuga I, 711 P.2d at 85 n.41 (listing federal statutes granting 

state jurisdiction). The presumption and the reality, however, 

are that federal law, federal policy, and federal authority are 

paramount in the conduct of Indian affairs in Indian Country. See 

Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1092 n.18 (presumption against state 

jurisdiction in Indian Country); Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d 

at 9 7 6 ( same) • 

Oklahoma may exercise unlimited jurisdiction in Indian Country, 

see,~, Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 980 n.6 (discussing 

origin and history of unlimited jurisdiction argument and citing 

authorities); Seneca-Cayuga I, 711 P.2d at 88-89 (no evidence that 

State has complied with P.L.-280's requirements for acquiring 

general jurisdiction; state jurisdiction exists only when tests 

are met for preemption and for lack of infringement on tribal 

self-government). 

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- In,.this particular case, .·the Indian bingo games ·:under at ta-ck 

-by the State promote the important congressional policy of 

encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic'development. 3 

Similar games not only have been approved by the Department of the 

Interior and other Cabinet departments, they have been actively 

developed. See Cabazon, 107 s.ct. at 1092-93. The Tribes' bingo 

games thus manifest both congressional and executive policy. In 

contrast, where the Supreme Court has mandated that federal courts 

abstain, the matter being litigated in state court has been a 

"traditional area of state concern," Moore, 442 U.S. at 435, with 

a federal claim asserted to change the state's conduct of its 

affairs. See Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (execution of state 

court judgment); Ohio Civil Rights Corrim'n v. Dayton Christian 

Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986) (sex discrimination); Middlesex, 

457 U.S. 423 (professional conduct of lawyers); Moore, 442 U.S. 

415 (family relations child welfare); Trainor, 431 U.S. 434 (state 

welfare program); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (state 

contempt proceedings); Huffman, 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (local 

nuisances); Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (state criminal 

proceedings). 

3 On October 17, 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act, Pub.L.No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (to be codified 

at 25 u.s.c. §§ 2701-2721). This Act implements Congressional 

policy by providing "a statutory basis for the operation of gaming 

by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic 

development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 

Id. at Sec. 3.(1) (to be codified at 25 u.s.c. § 2702(1)). 

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- - --;e:The · Supreme Court ,has· indicated -that. state;dnterests are not 

of great weight in circumstances like those before us. This is 

not a case involving off-reservation activities, see· Mescalero 

Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), or non-reservation 

Indians, see Organized Village of Kake, 369 U.S. 60. Nor is it a 

case governed by non-exclusive treaty language, see Puyallup 

Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Department, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), or 

one in which the on-reservation activities result ~erely from 

"marketing an exemption" to state law, see Washington v. . -- Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 

134 (1980); cf. Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 1094 (Indian bingo 

"generat[es] value on the reservations through activities in which 

[Tribes] have a substantial interest"); Indian Country, U.S.A., 

829 F.2d at 986 (Indian bingo does not fall within "marketing an 

exemption" caselaw). Rather, the State seeks here to assert the 

authority to regulate activities established by Indians under 

tribal ordinances and operating in Indian Country. 4 The 

regulation is aimed at the conduct of the games themselves, not 

the conduct of the non-Indian customers of the Tribes' games. In 

such cases, the Supreme Court has specifically held that federal 

interests outweigh both of the state interests identified by the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Cabazon, 107 S.Ct. at 1094-95 (state 

4 Whether the land in question is Indian Country was an issue 

in the state litigation •. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the 

land is Indian Country, see Seneca-Cayuga I, 711 P.2d at 82, and 

the parties have stipulated to that effect. Stipulations, II, #4; 

III, #1. 

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( · ·. ,:;concer.n, over1•;organized crime ~insuff'ici-ent··:to., escape: .. preemption in 

Indian bingo case); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 

u.s~ 136 (1980) (state revenue interest insufficient to support 

state tax of on-reservation activities that cost state nothing). 

Similarly, we have recently held that Oklahoma's interest in 

preventing organized crime5 and protecting its revenue base ·are 

insufficient to escape preemption of its gambling laws as applied 

to bingo games on other tribal lands. See Indian Country, U.S.A., 

829 F.2d at 982, 987. 

Furthermore, the threshhold question whether the State has 

authority to regulate Indian bingo is a matter of federal law. 

See Colville, 447 u.s; at 154 (''tribal sovereignty is dependent 

on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the 

States"). State regulatory authority over Indian bingo in Indian 

Country depends on a determination either that federal law has not 

preempted state authority, or that state regulation would not 

infringe on tribal self-government. See Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. at 

1091-92; Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation 

v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 147 (1984); White 

Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142; Mescalero Apache Tribe, 

411 U.S. at 148; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 

5 The State's interest in preventing organized crime has also 

been undermined by passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 

see supra note 3~ one purpose of which is to shield Indian gaming 

from organized crime and other corrupting influences. It is 

apparent from this Act that the federal government intends to _ regulate this matter. 

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- ,_,-A·lthough:. t-he Oklahoma·- Supreme,-Cou-rt -has articulated _a new basis 

for state authority over activities in Indian Country on state law 

grounds, see Seneca-Cayuga I, 711 P.2d at 88, that court also 

recognized that the question of whether ''residual" jurisdiction 

exists may not be reached until the federal issues have been 

resolved. See id. 

The question of jurisdiction, in the sense of the State's 

authority to regulate, is central to the State's case because· the 

Tribes concede in this federal litigation that if State laws 

apply, the Tribes' games do not comply with them. Stipulations, 

I, #4. State courts are, of course, competent to decide such 

jurisdictional questions, but the fact that this central issue is 

not one of state law indicates that the importance of the State's 

interest in the state litigation is minimal. Where, as in this 

case, a state court is asked to decide issues of federal law in an 

area in which federal interests predominate, the State's interest 

in the litigation is in our view not important enough to warrant 

Younger abstention. Nor would resolution of these issues in state 

court prevent conflict between the interests of the Tribes, 

protected by federal law, and the interests of the State. That 

conflict is inevitable. Because abstention would not mitigate 

this conflict, the proper forum to resolve it is federal court. 

Cf. United States v. Composite Bd. of Medical Examiners, 656 F.2d 

131, 136 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding alternatively that purpose of 

Younger abstention is .. to avoid conflict between state and federal 

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-··-=( .. - .-_-_,;gove·rnmen.ts r when~ conf.,.lict- unavoidable;,· proper"· forum is federalcourt). 

B. Sovereign Immunity 

The relative insignificance of Oklahoma's interest in this 

case is further demonstrated by the lack of jurisdiction in the 

state court to hear the suit against the Tribes. As the analysis 

set out below demonstrates, the Tribes' sovereign immunity shields 

them from such suits. Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional 

question, see Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 172; United States v. 

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 us. 506, 512 (1940); 

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California St. Bd. of Equalization, 757 

F.2d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 

9 (1987); Ramey Constr. Co., 673 F.2d at 318, and the state suit 

against the Tribes is barred where, as here, the Tribes have 

refused to waive their sovereign immunity. 

It is a fundamental principle of Indian law that Indian 

tribes are sovereign entities. As dependent sovereigns, they 

retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and 

their territory," United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 

(1975), although they do not have the full powers of sovereign 

nations. It has long been settled law that retained tribal 

sovereign immunity is co-extensive with that of the United States. 

See United States Fidelity-& Guaranty Co., 309 U.S~at 512; Ramey 

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_cons tr .... co., 67 3 F. 2d .. at 319:-:2-0. Neither, a~ federal nor a state 

court has jurisdiction over a suit against a tribe absent either 

''an effective waiver or consent" by the tribe, 6 Puyallup Tribe, 

433 U.S. at 172; see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 

F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980) (en bane), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 

(1982), or an "unequivocal expression of contrary legislative 

intent" to waive sovereign immunity, Santa Clara Pueblo v. 

Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978). 7 While tribal sovereign 

6 But see Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 

623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981), 

in which this Court found federal jurisdiction to hear a suit 

against a tribe after the state and tribal courts had refused to 

hear it. Dry Creek Lodge was based on highly unusual 

circumstances. See White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307, 

1312 (10th Cir. 1984) (case "based on what the court regarded as 

absolute necessity"); Ramey Constr. Co., 673 F.2d at 319 n.4 (Dry 

Creek Lodge concerned with "particularly egregious allegations of 

personal restraint and deprivation of personal rights"). 

Plaintiffs had gone to considerable expense in reliance upon the 

word of the supervisor of a reservation, and had then been cut off 

by Indian neighbors not only from the opportunity to recover their 

expenses but also from access to the only road off their land. 

This Court concluded that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 

49 (1978), was not meant to bar federal jurisdiction where 

plaintiffs' rights had been egregiously violated and tribal 

remedies were wrongfully denied to plaintiffs. See Dry Creek 

Lodge, 623 F.2d at 685. Later cases in this Court suggest that 

Dry Creek Lodge is to be narrowly construed. See White, 728 F.2d 

1307; Ramey Constr. Co., 673 F.2d 315. 

7 Current federal policy is to strengthen tribal sovereignty. 

See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 u.s.c. §§ 461-479 (1982 

&Supp. IV 1986); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 

324, 334-35 (1983); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62-64. The 

infringement on tribal self-government analysis adopted in SenecaCayuga I, 711 P.2d at 83-84, 89-92 (sovereign immunity has given 

way to a preemption/infringement on tribal self-government test), 

has never been applied by a federal court to sovereign immunity 

questions. It is unlikely to be so applied, because suits against 

a tribe absent tribal consent infringe on the exercise of selfgovernment. Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59-60 (providing 

federal forum to enforce Indian Ci v.il Rights Act inter fer es with 

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''( •. ':cc:- immuni,ty: is- not;absolute,,,.,waivers of.·:rsove·reign ·immunity-are 

strictly construed. See Ramey Const. Co., 673 F.2d at 320. 

The Tribes have vigorously argued the issue of sovereign 

· immunity at every stage of this litigation. The State does not 

contend that the Quapaw Tribe has in any way given its consent to 

suit against it, nor does it argue that Congress has abrogated the 

Tribes' sovereign immunity. 8 It does raise for the first time in 

this appeal the argument that the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe has waived 

its immunity to suit by including a "sue and be sued" clause in 

its corporation charter. 9 The State distinguishes contrary 

tribal autonomy and self-government). 

8 The State's brief asserts that there are no barriers to state 

assertion of jurisdiction over the Tribes on the ground that the 

State has had jurisdiction over them since statehood on the basis 

of ''prior existing jurisdiction." Brief· of Appellant State of 

Oklahoma at 13-16; see also Seneca-Cayuga I, 711 P.2d at 88-90 

(discussing ''residual" state jurisdiction). Whether or not_ this 

theory is tenable as a matter of federal law, it addresses only 

the question of authority to regulate the Tribes, not the question 

of tribal amenability to suit. To understand it in the latter 

sense would be to give state courts jurisdiction when federal 

courts lack it, a result completely contrary to the history of 

federal primacy in the area of Indian law and policy. 

9 Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 

u.s.c. § 476, 477 (1982), authorize tribes to organize and adopt a 

constitution and a corporate charter. The corporate charters · usually include a "sue and be sued" clause to enable the tribes to 

engage in commercial activity as corporations without losing their 

sovereign immunity as tribes. This court has held that the 

presence of such a clause in a tribal corporate charter does not 

waive the tribe's immunity as a tribe. See Ramey Constr. Co., 673 

F.2d at 320; see also Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of 

Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521 (C.D. Utah 1981), aff'd and remanded, 

671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982). See also Gold v. Confederated 

Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, 478 F. Supp. 190, 

196 (D. Or. -1979); Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. 

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·>:• . caselaw,- on the .-g-round«·:that: special-. c,i-rcumstances attended the 

drawing- up of constitutions and pharters by Oklahoma Indian 

tribes. 10 It is far too late for the State to raise this issue. 

It is bound by its stipulation below that "the State Court 

litigation is without the consent of the [Seneca-Cayuga] Tribe." 

Stipulations, III, #13. 

The state courts thus lack jurisdiction to hear the State's 

case against the Tribes. The.federal nature of the law and of the 

issues to be decided, combined with this lack of state 

jurisdiction, reduce the State's interest in this litigation to 

the vanishing point. Cf. Champion Int'l Co. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 

1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1984) (state has "no cognizable state 

interest in enforcing [state] laws preempted by federal law"); 

Baggett v. Department of Professional Regulation, 717 F.2d 521, 

524 (11th Cir. 1983) (no abstention where federal preemption 

readily apparent and state tribunal therefore acting beyond its 

lawful authority). The absence of a vital state interest, an 

Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978), aff'd., 642 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1981); 

Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977); but see Martinez 

v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691(1962) 

(construing "sue and be sued" clause as rendering tribe amenable 

to suit in Colorado state court under Colorado constitution); cf. 

Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 

1970) (tribe/corporation distinction not raised). 

10 Section 473 of the Indian Reorganization Act provides that 

sections 476 and 477 do not apply to the Seneca tribe of Oklahoma. 

The Seneca-Cayuga Tribe organized instead under section 503 of the 

Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25 u.s.c. §§ 501-510 (1982). We 

express no opinion as to the effect of this distinction. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1885 Document: 01019957849 Date Filed: 05/03/1989 Page: 17 
·· :essential ·prer.equ-isi te· of Younger· abstention, se·e Mi·ddle·sex, 4 57 

U.S. at 432,-makes abstention unwarranted. 

III. 

THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

The grant of a preliminary injunction is within the sound 

discretion of the district court. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 

F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). A preiiminary injunction may issue 

when the movant has shown that four conditions are met: 1) there 

is a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits; 2) 

he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; 3) 

the threatened injury to him outweighs whatever damage the 

proposed injury may cause the opposing party; and 4) the 

injunction, if 1ssued, would not be contrary to the public 

interest. See id. Where the movant has met the last three of 

these conditions, this circuit has adopted the Second Circuit's 

definition of substantial likelihood, see Continental Oil Co. v. 

Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781-82 (10th Cir. 1964), under 

which plaintiffs need only show.a fair ground for litigation. 

Lundgrin, 619 F.2d at 63. 

The State does not deny that the conditions for a preliminary 

injunction were satisfied below, and the record contains 

, __ sufficient. evidence. to, support the_ issuance of the injunction .. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1885 Document: 01019957849 Date Filed: 05/03/1989 Page: 18 
... :· ·.,,,.Plaintif.f s not~,on,ly "have a f a:i,r·., g-round,-,for- litigation, but are 

likely to prevail on the merits in light of Cabazon, 107 S. Ct. 

1083, and our decision in Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d 967. 

Without the preliminary injunction, the Tribes would face the 

prospect of significant interference with their self-government. 

They would lose income used to support social services for which 

federal funds have been reduced or are non-existent, and lose jobs 

employing Indians who face a rate of unemployment ranging from 

thirty-five percent (the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe} to close to fifty 

percent (the Quapaw Tribe). Stipulations II, #6-8; III, #4-7. 

The Tribes would also be forced to expend time and effort on 

litigation in a court that does not have jurisdiction over them, 

and risk inconsistent binding judgments from state and federal 

courts. The State, on the other hand, has no significant interest 

in enjoining the operation of the bingo games, under Cabazon and 

our reasoning in this opinion. Finally, the injunction promotes 

the paramount federal policy that Indians develop independent 

sources of income and strong self-government. 

The judgment of the district court refusing to abstain and 

granting a preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. 

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