Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01336/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01336-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333in Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Phillip Kaplan,

Plaintiff,

v.

State of California, et al.; City of San 

Diego CA, et al.; San Diego Police 

Department; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-1336-AJB-KSC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Doc. No. 34)

After having his van impounded for failing to register it in accordance with 

California’s vehicle code, Kaplan brought this lawsuit against the impounding officers, the 

San Diego Police Department (SDPD), and the City of San Diego. However, because the 

officers enjoy qualified immunity, and because Kaplan fails to state a claim for 

constitutional violations against the SDPD or the City, the Court GRANTS defendants’ 

dismissal motion. (Doc. No. 34.) Finding any amendment to Kaplan’s lawsuit to be futile, 

the Court DISMISSES his complaint with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Kaplan’s SAC, which is similarly styled to his first two complaints in its use of 

boilerplate language, alleges claims arising under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and violations of his 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 33 at 2.) Defendants distill 

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Kaplan’s SAC down to eight claims, with which the Court agrees. (Doc. No. 34 at 2.) Those 

include claims against Officers Miller, Dunagan, and Lowry under: (1) the Fourteenth 

Amendment, (Doc. No. 33 at 35–36); (2) under the Fourth Amendment for an unlawful 

search and seizure, (Id. at 36–38); (3) under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s 

substantive due process clause, (Id. at 38–39); (4) a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, (Id. at 39–42); (5) a claim for abuse of process, (Id. at 42); (6) a claim 

against the City of San Diego for failure to train, (Id. at 43); (7) unconstitutional custom or 

policy, (Id. at 44–45); and (8) declaratory relief, (Id. at 45–47). 

The basis for Kaplan’s claim was defendants’ seizure of Kaplan’s van in 2016, which 

he lives in. (Id. at 5.) Kaplan alleges he was in California for 45 days when the officers 

stopped him because he did not have a license plate on his van. (Id. at 6.) When Kaplan 

asked if the officers wanted to check for weapons, the officers searched Kaplan. (Id.) They 

then asked for the van’s registration, however, Kaplan did not have any because he had 

been traveling throughout the country and did not register or title his van in California. (Id.) 

The officers then impounded the van. (Id. at 7.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s

complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss

a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack of cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient

facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal.,

88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). However, a complaint will survive a

motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this

determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual

allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 

(9th Cir. 2007). Notwithstanding this deference, a reviewing court need not accept legal

conclusions as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for

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a court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Assoc. 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.

Pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers” because pro se litigants are more prone to making errors in pleading than 

litigants represented by counsel. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations 

omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that federal courts should liberally construe 

the “‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (quoting Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)). Nonetheless, Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short plain statement of 

“the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Even if some claims may not—

on their face—be subject to dismissal under Rule12(b), a court still has discretion to 

dismiss those that fail to comply with the requirement that they be simple, concise, and 

direct. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants again argue that Kaplan’s SAC should be dismissed for four reasons: 

(1) Kaplan’s collateral attack is improper and he failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies; (2) Kaplan’s complaint—despite amendment—falls short of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8 standards; (3) Kaplan fails to state any claim for relief; and (4) the 

officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Officers Miller, Dunagan, and Lowry are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

For brevity’s sake, the Court begins its analysis with qualified immunity. “In 

determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we consider (1) whether 

there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly 

established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.” C.V. by & through Willegas v. 

City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 

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1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Supreme Court has often stressed the importance of 

deciding qualified immunity “at the earliest possible stage in litigation” in order to preserve 

the doctrine’s status as a true “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Additionally, “courts are now empowered to 

address the two prongs in whichever order would expedite resolution of the case.” Morales 

v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2017).

Without getting into the merits of Kaplan’s constitutional claims, even assuming he 

can state a claim, Kaplan cannot overcome qualified immunity because he cannot show the 

officers violated a clearly established right. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in 

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Quiroz v. 

Short, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Here, Kaplan does not—and cannot—

show that the officers’ actions violated a clearly established right. The officers approached 

Kaplan and inquired about his registration status. When he informed them his van was 

indeed unregistered, the officers impounded the van pursuant to California Vehicle Code 

§ 22651(o)(1)(A). Impounding his van in this manner does not violate a clearly established 

right, and neither does being reasonably questioned by law enforcement officers. 

Moreover, Defendants state that even if Kaplan’s arguments that the Vehicle Code does 

not apply to him because he was merely a guest in California were valid, it would not have 

been clearly established at the time of the officers’ actions, and thus qualified immunity 

would still attach. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 17.) 

Thus, the Court finds that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity against 

Kaplan’s claims and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all claims against officers Miller, 

Dunagan, and Lowry.

B. Kaplan’s IIED and Abuse of Process Claims

Defendants argue that Kaplan’s IIED and abuse of process claims should be 

dismissed because Kaplan failed to allege compliance with the California Government 

Claims Act (CGA). California Government Code § 915(a) sets forth the procedure for 

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claims presentation to a local public entity, which includes Defendants the City of San 

Diego and the San Diego Police Department. The section provides:

a) A claim, any amendment thereto, or an application to the public entity for 

leave to present a late claim shall be presented to a local public entity by either 

of the following means:

(1) Delivering it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof.

(2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body 

at its principal office.

West’s Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 915 (2014). After the public entity rejects the claim, a 

plaintiff has six months to file a lawsuit before it becomes barred as a matter of law. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 342, 945.6(a).

While Kaplan failed to allege compliance with the GCA in his SAC, he did file a 

supplemental document alleging “he filed a timely claim complying with the required 

Government Claims Act to the Defendants and ‘complied with applicable claims statutes’ 

within the time limitation.” (Doc. No. 37 at 2.) However, these conclusory allegations fail 

to establish when he presented the claim to any public entity, which entities he submitted 

claims to, and when the entities rejected such claims allowing this lawsuit to be timely.

Moreover, Kaplan fails to allege any facts establishing an abuse of process claim. 

Under California law, a plaintiff brining an abuse of process claim must show the defendant 

“(1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the judicial process, and (2) committed ‘a

willful act in the use of th[at] process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.’” 

Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir.

2008) (quoting Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Wiess & Karma, Inc., 

42 Cal. 3d 1157, 1159 (1986)). An abuse of process claim “requires misuse of a judicial 

process.” Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Stolz v. Wong Comm’cs Ltd. P’ship, 

25 Cal. App. 4th 1811, 1822 (1994)). As Defendants note, Kaplan has not shown any facts 

that the officers impounded his van as a part of a litigation tactic or otherwise abused any 

judicial process. Thus, that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Finally, turning to the merits of Kaplan’s IIED claim, Kaplan fails to allege facts 

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showing the officers engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct . . . with the intention of 

causing . . . emotional distress.” Christensen v. Sup. Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (Cal. 1991) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The conduct “must be so extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. Approaching 

Kaplan and impounding his van because he failed to produce valid registration does not 

near exceeding the bounds of tolerated conduct in a civilized society. Thus, the Court also 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this claim.

C. Kaplan’s Failure to Train and Custom/Policy Claims Against the City 

Fail

First, Kaplan alleges the City failed to “instruct the officers on policy regarding the 

‘summary tax seizure’ of section CVC 22651(o)(1)(A) and the applicability of the section.” 

(Doc. No. 33 at 43 (italics in original).) Kaplan continues, “[t]he municipality failed to 

instruct the officers of the applicability of section 22651(o)(1)(a) in that it does not apply 

to out of state, nonresidents, or the officer knew or should have known, or was indifferent 

to the misapplication of the code.” (Id.) However, Kaplan is incorrect that California’s 

vehicle code does not apply to out of state residents. The Court previously held that 

“Plaintiff is subject to local authority—including the vehicle code. . . .” (Doc. No. 28 at 6.) 

The Vehicle Code itself only states that officers “may remove a vehicle located within the 

territorial limits in which the officer or employee may act, under the following 

circumstances,” but includes no residency requirement. Thus, any argument that the City 

failed to train officers predicated on this assertion must fail. Accordingly, the Court 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Kaplan’s failure to train claim against the City. 

Next, Kaplan alleges the City and the San Diego Police Department has a custom or 

policy of “harass[ing] homeless persons including but not limited to the homeless class 

living in their vehicles.” (Doc. No. 33 at 44.) Kaplan points to an article referencing another 

case before this Court regarding homeless persons living in their recreational vehicles. (Id.) 

Kaplan alleges Defendants have a “police policy to harass persons living in their vehicles” 

which “goes to a pattern of harassment by the City of San Diego.” (Id. at 45.) However, 

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here, Kaplan only pleads a single incident—his own. “A plaintiff cannot prove the 

existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely on the occurrence of a single 

incident of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.” Davis v. City of 

Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989); see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 

471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality opinion). Moreover, as noted by Defendants, the 

rest of Kaplan’s allegations are conclusory and fail to state a claim. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 21.) 

For example, Kaplan alleges “[t]he seizure of vehicle without registration is a common 

practice that is so widespread and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the 

force of law even though it is not authorized by written law or express policy.” 

(Doc. No. 33 at 45.) While the Court must liberally construe pro se pleadings such as 

Kaplan’s FAC, the Court does not have to take legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. Accordingly, the Court DIMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Kaplan’s custom or 

policy claim against the City and SDPD.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). However, under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to grant 

leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant leave 

to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Here, Kaplan has filed three complaints and was already given an opportunity 

to amend. (Doc. Nos. 1, 4, 33.) However, the Court finds any further amendment would be 

futile as Kaplan’s core set of facts simply fails to state a federal claim. Accordingly, the 

Court DECLINES granting leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds the dismissal of Officers Millar, Dunagan, and Lowry is necessary 

because they are entitled to qualified immunity for their interactions with Kaplan in 

engaging with him, searching his van, and impounding it. The Court also dismisses the 

IIED and abuse of process claims because Kaplan’s FAC fails to state a claim for relief for 

both. Finally, Kaplan cannot allege a failure to train argument or an unlawful custom or 

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policy claim against the City of San Diego or the San Diego Police Department. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.

(Doc. No. 34.) Plaintiff’s SAC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court Clerk is 

instructed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2019

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