Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01222/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01222-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fidelity National Financial, )

Inc., et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. CIV 03-1222 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Colin H. Friedman, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion to

compel and motion for sanctions. Mot. (doc. # 119). Plaintiffs

seek an order compelling third party Yariv Elazar to comply with a

subpoena for the production and inspection of documents. Id. at 2-

5. In addition, Plaintiffs seek sanctions in the amount of

$1,170.00, representing attorney's fees incurred in bringing this

motion due to Elazar's refusal to comply with their subpoena. Id.

at 5-6. On December 4, 2006, a response was filed as being on

behalf of Defendants Farid and Anita Kramer Meshkatai and third

Case 2:03-cv-01222-RCB Document 142 Filed 02/07/07 Page 1 of 9
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1

 Because counsel has appeared on his behalf, the Court has

jurisdiction over Elazar. For ease of discussion, the Court shall

hereafter in this Order refer to the party Defendants and Elazar

collectively as "Defendants," except as otherwise indicated.

2

 The Court takes judicial notice of the related cases in the

United States District Court for the Central District of California

as matters of public record having a direct relation to the matters

in this case between the same parties. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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party Yariv Elazar by name.1 Resp. (doc. # 125) at 2, 6. On

December 8, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their reply. Reply (doc. #

126). Having carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court

now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2002, Plaintiffs Fidelity National Financial, Inc.

and Fidelity Express Network, Inc. obtained a judgment for

$8,475,978.00 in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California against Defendants Colin H. Friedman, Hedy

Friedman, Anita Kramer Meshkatai, and Farid Meshkatai. Fid. Nat'l

Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, No. CV 00-06902-GAF-RZ (C.D. Cal. 2002)

(doc. # 235) at 2.2

 On November 14, 2002, Plaintiffs registered

the California judgment by filing a certified copy in this Court. 

(doc. # 1). Post-judgment proceedings in the California action are

currently before the Honorable Gary A. Feess.

On July 6, 2006, Plaintiffs filed another action against the

judgment debtors in the United States District Court for the

Central District of California, alleging RICO violations and

fraudulent conveyances in connection with their evasion of the

underlying judgment. Fid. Nat'l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, No. CV 06-

04271-CAS-JWJ (C.D. Cal. 2006) (doc. # 1). The RICO action is

currently before the Honorable Christina A. Snyder.

Case 2:03-cv-01222-RCB Document 142 Filed 02/07/07 Page 2 of 9
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3

 Plaintiffs have been conducting post-judgment discovery

pursuant to Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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On September 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte

application for an order scheduling expedited discovery concerning

a motion for preliminary injunction filed by them in the RICO

action. Id. (doc. # 63). On October 10, 2006, Judge Snyder issued

an order authorizing a number of expedited depositions and document

production requests related to Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary

injunction. Id. (doc. # 75).

Meanwhile, in September of 2006, during the course of ongoing

investigations3 related to their collection efforts, Plaintiffs

apparently learned that the judgment debtors who are Defendants in

this action had loaned a large sum of money to Yariv Elazar, a

third party residing in Scottsdale, Arizona. Cabanday Decl. (doc.

# 119) at 7 ¶ 4. On October 10, 2006-- the same date as Judge

Snyder's order permitting expedited discovery in the RICO action--

Plaintiffs served Elazar with a subpoena issued by this Court for

documents related to transactions with the judgment debtors. Id. ¶

5; Mot. (doc. # 119), Ex. 1; Resp. (doc. # 125) at 3.

On October 19, 2006, one day before he was to appear, Elazar's

counsel sent Plaintiffs a letter objecting to the subpoena, arguing

that it was untimely and inconsistent with Judge Snyder's order

regarding expedited discovery in the RICO action. Mot. (doc. #

119), Ex. 2 at 2. Counsel also maintained that Elazar could not be

required to appear in California, and that the subpoena would be

unenforceable if costs were not advanced. Id. In an effort to

reach an out-of-court resolution of the matter, Plaintiffs' counsel

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responded to these objections by letter dated October 25, 2006. 

Mot. (doc. # 119), Ex. 3. Plaintiffs' counsel then sent a second

letter on November 6, 2006, advising Elazar's counsel that Elazar's

continued noncompliance would result in the filing of a motion to

compel. Mot. (doc. # 119), Ex. 4 at 1-2. As promised, Plaintiffs

filed this motion (doc. # 119) on November 15, 2006.

Subsequently, at a status conference on November 27, 2006,

Judge Snyder indicated that she would confer with Judge Feess

regarding the possibility of appointing a master to oversee

discovery in the RICO action and the original action. Supplement

to Defs.' Resp. (doc. # 131), Ex. E at 21:17-23.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Elazar's compliance with

their subpoena for the production and inspection of documents

related to transactions with the judgment debtors. Mot. (doc. #

119) at 3-5. Plaintiffs maintain that their request for discovery

from this third party is appropriate under Rule 69(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. In addition, Plaintiffs

seek monetary sanctions for attorney's fees related to the research

and drafting of this motion to compel, arguing that Elazar's

noncompliance with the subpoena has been unjustified. Id. at 5-6.

A. Motion to Compel

Defendants object to the subpoena served on Elazar on three

grounds. First, they contend that the discovery sought is improper

under Rule 69(a). Resp. (doc. # 125) at 5. Second, they believe

that it violates Judge Snyder's order regarding expedited discovery

in the RICO action. Id. at 4-5. Finally, they argue that the

discovery sought would violate an order by Judge Snyder regarding

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the coordination of discovery in the related cases. Id. at 3-4.

1. Propriety of Request Under Rule 69(a)

Defendant's first argument is without merit. Rule 69(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unambiguously provides that a

judgment creditor "may obtain discovery from any person, including

the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules or in

the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the

district court is held." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) (emphasis added). 

Nevertheless, Defendants contend that "Rule 69(a) generally does

not contemplate discovery to non-parties in aid of execution of

judgment." Resp. (doc. # 125) at 5. Interestingly enough, the

case on which Defendants rely for this erroneous proposition

contradicts their position. See Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten

Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("'In aid of the

judgment or execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain

discovery from any person . . . .'") (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

69(a)). Moreover, as recognized by the Magnaleasing court, the

purpose of post-judgment discovery under Rule 69(a) is to discover

"concealed or fraudulently transferred assets." Id. In this

instance, Plaintiffs have made a strong showing that the documents

sought from Elazar are both relevant and necessary in light of

their discovery of a substantial loan from the judgment debtors to

Elazar. See Cabanday Decl. (doc. # 119) at 7 ¶ 4; Mot. (doc. #

119), Ex. 1 at 3. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs'

use of Rule 69(a) to seek discovery from Elazar is proper.

2. Judge Snyder's Order in the RICO Action

On October 10, 2006, Judge Snyder issued an order authorizing

a number of expedited depositions and document production requests

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related to a motion for preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiffs

in the RICO action. Fid. Nat'l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, No. CV 06-

04271-CAS-JWJ (C.D. Cal. 2006) (doc. # 75). In response to the

present motion to compel, Defendants insinuate that the subpoena

here at issue is nothing more than a ruse by Plaintiffs intended to

circumvent Judge Snyder's order, which they believe "severely

limit[s] discovery in the RICO action." Resp. (doc. # 125) at 4.

The Court does not share Defendants' suspicions. The order to

which Defendants refer simply provides for expedited discovery

concerning Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in the

RICO action, which has already been argued and granted. See Fid.

Nat'l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, No. CV 06-04271-CAS-JWJ (C.D. Cal.

2006) (doc. ## 79, 152) (minutes of order to show cause re

preliminary injunction hearing; order granting motion for

preliminary injunction). Dealing only with discovery concerning

Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, Judge Snyder's order

neither imposes any "severe limit[s] on discovery" in the RICO

action nor, more importantly, does it appear that Judge Snyder

intended to seek to bind this Court.

The Court also rejects Defendants' suggestion that the close

timing of the subpoena and Judge Snyder's discovery order is

somehow indicative of Plaintiffs' improper motive. Given the

revelation in September of 2006 of a substantial loan transaction

between the judgment debtors and Elazar, see Cabanday Decl. (doc. #

119) at 7 ¶ 4, the Court perceives nothing sinister about

Plaintiffs' motives in subpoenaing Elazar in October of 2006 for

the production and inspection of documents related to that

transaction. Indeed, Defendants cast greater doubt on their own

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motives through their silence on the issue of the alleged loan

transaction, and their hollow assertions that the documents sought

from Elazar are irrelevant. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain post-judgment discovery from Elazar

in the action pending before this Court are proper, and are not

affected by any order entered by Judge Snyder in the RICO action.

3. Judge Snyder's Order Regarding Coordination of Discovery

In a similar vein, Defendants paint Plaintiffs' present

efforts at obtaining discovery in this action as a veiled attempt

at circumventing Judge Snyder's plan to coordinate discovery in the

RICO action and original action. Resp. (doc. # 125) at 3-4. At a

status conference on November 27, 2006, Judge Snyder indicated that

she would confer with Judge Feess regarding the possibility of

appointing a master to oversee discovery in those two cases. 

Supplement to Defs.' Resp. (doc. # 131), Ex. E at 21:17-23. 

Because the present action arises out of Plaintiffs' registration

of the California judgment in this Court, Defendants believe that

"Judge Snyder's statements affects [sic] this case." Resp. (doc. #

125) at 4. Defendants cite no legal authority for this erroneous

proposition.

This Court has not been contacted by any other court regarding

the possibility of coordinating discovery in all three actions, and

is consequently unaware of how the other courts wish to proceed. 

More importantly, the parties have not petitioned or demonstrated

to this Court the need for coordinating discovery with the other

courts. Therefore, it would be premature to delay discovery on the

speculation that a master may be appointed with authority to

oversee discovery in this case. Post-judgment discovery will

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continue to proceed in this case as it has since its inception with

the full cooperation of all parties.

Plaintiffs motion to compel will be granted. The parties

should arrange for Elazar to produce the requested documents at a

reasonable time and place in Arizona. See Mot. (doc. # 119), Ex.

3. Alternatively, if the parties agree, they may arrange for

Elazar's production of the requested documents at the California

offices of Plaintiffs' counsel at Plaintiffs' expense.

B. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiffs seek $1,170.00 in attorney's fees for researching

and drafting this motion to compel. Mot. (doc. # 119) at 5-6. The

request is supported by the declaration of Thomas H. Case,

reflecting 5 hours of research and drafting at an hourly rate of

$235.00. Case Decl. (doc. # 119) at 9 ¶ 2. Although Defendants

have had notice of Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, the motion is

essentially unopposed-- save for the unmeritorious objections to

the subpoena discussed above. Resp. (doc. # 125) at 1-6. Under

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i), the Court may deem a party's

lack of opposition-- or untimely opposition-- as consent to the

granting of a motion, and may grant the motion summarily if it is

facially meritorious. LRCiv 7.2(i); Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc.,

983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court finds that

Plaintiffs' request for fees is facially meritorious.

A subpoena duces tecum is itself a court order, noncompliance

with which may warrant contempt sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

45(e). The Court finds that counsel's hourly rate of $235.00 for 5

hours of research and drafting are reasonable measures of the fees

incurred by Plaintiffs in bringing this motion. See Case Decl.

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(doc. # 119) at 9 ¶ 2. More importantly, as explained above,

Defendants' underlying objections to the subpoena served on Elazar

border on frivolous. Defendants have not raised any other grounds

in their response to suggest that an award of fees would be

unwarranted under the circumstances. Plaintiffs' motion for

sanctions will therefore be granted, ordering Elazar to pay

monetary sanctions of $1,170.00 to Plaintiffs for attorney's fees

incurred in bringing this motion to compel.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to compel (doc. # 119)

is GRANTED. Yariv Elazar shall produce the requested documents as

described in the foregoing order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions is

(doc. # 119) GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing Yariv Elazar to pay monetary

sanctions in the amount of $1,170.00 to Plaintiffs for attorney's

fees incurred in bringing this motion to compel. 

DATED this 6th day of February, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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