Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07190/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 13, 1998 Decided February 2, 1999

No. 97-7190

Billie Davenport, et al.,

Appellants

v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01954)

Barbara Harvey argued the cause for appellants. With

her on the briefs was Arthur L. Fox, II.

Daniel B. Edelman argued the cause for appellee International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO. With him on

the brief was Earl V. Brown, Jr.

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Neal D. Mollen argued the cause for appellee Northwest

Airlines, Inc. With him on the brief was John J. Gallagher.

Edgar N. James and Marta Wagner were on the brief for

appellee Teamsters Local 2000.

Before: Henderson, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs in this case are

individual members of the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, AFL-CIO ("IBT"), and of IBT Local 2000 ("Local

2000") which represents all flight attendants employed by

Northwest Airlines ("Northwest"). The dispute concerns a

temporary labor agreement known as the "Bridge Agreement." Plaintiffs sued the IBT, Local 2000 and Northwest,

contending that the president of Local 2000 lacked authority

to enter into the Bridge Agreement because he failed to

submit it for ratification by the union's membership. The

district court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary

injunction against implementation of the Agreement. We

affirm.

I

The employment relationship between Northwest and its

flight attendants is governed by a collective bargaining agreement entered into on August 1, 1993.1 Section 5.A of the

agreement regulates the number of hours a flight attendant

can be required to fly within a given period of time ("flight

time"), the number of hours a flight attendant can be required to work in a shift ("duty time"), and rest periods. See

Appendix ("App.") 78-80. Specifically, s 5.A.3.b prescribes

what is known as the "8-in-24" rule, which states that a flight

attendant cannot be scheduled for more than 8 hours of flight

time within any 24-hour period unless certain interim rest

conditions are met. Section 5.A.3.d states that attendants

__________

1 By its terms, the 1993 agreement became amendable 60 days

prior to August 2, 1996, and the parties currently are engaged in

negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. Complaint

p 18.

generally cannot be scheduled for more than 30 hours of

flight time in any 7-day period. Section 5.A.4 provides the

additional restriction that duty time may last no more than 12

to 14 hours.

In March 1993, while the collective bargaining agreement

was under negotiation, the Federal Aviation Administration

announced that for the first time it was considering including

flight attendant duty time in its Federal Aviation Regulations

("FARs"). See 58 Fed. Reg. 17,024 (1993). Northwest and

the IBT responded by including the following language in the

final version of section 5.A.3:

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graphs 3.a. through e. below, shall apply to all Flight

Attendants for daily and weekly limitations. Any

changes or modifications in the Federal Air Regulations

shall also be applied to Flight Attendants.

App. 78. The new FARs were published on August 19, 1994

and became effective in early 1996. They regulate duty time

and rest periods for flight attendants by permitting airlines to

assign duty time of 14 to 20 hours, rather than the 12 to 14

hours prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement.

The FARs do not limit flight time, whereas the collective

bargaining agreement limits it to 8 hours in 24 and 30 hours

in 7 days. See 59 Fed. Reg. 42,974 (1994); 14 C.F.R.

s 121.467.

Northwest took the position that in light of the new FARs,

section 5.A.3 of the collective bargaining agreement permitted

it to implement changes in the flight time limits, as well as to

override other limits previously set forth in section 5.A. At a

meeting on October 31, 1994, the then-president of Local

2000, Mary Don Erskine, disagreed. Erskine's successor as

president of Local 2000, Bruce Retrum, took office two

months later, on January 1, 1995. Northwest continued to

press its position and negotiations ensued.

In June 1996, Northwest sent Retrum a proposed letter of

agreement and stated that if the dispute were not resolved

shortly, Northwest would seek arbitration. App. 194.

Northwest's proposal was known as the "Bridge Agreement,"

so-called because it was intended to remain effective only for

a "bridge" period until a permanent agreement was reached

under a new collective bargaining agreement. See supra note

1. Under the Bridge Agreement, Northwest would be allowed to override the 8-in-24 rule when scheduling "higher

value turnarounds" ("HVTs"), flight sequences that begin and

end at a flight attendant's home base and generally do not

involve more than three separate flight segments. In return,

Northwest would pay flight attendants higher, international

flight rates in certain instances involving longer flight and

duty time, and would refrain from implementing other modifications in flight and duty time it believed authorized by the

new FARs.

On July 17, 1996, Retrum responded that he would prefer

to continue negotiations rather than begin arbitration.

Northwest agreed to postpone arbitration, and negotiations

continued for the next several months without resolution. An

arbitration date was set for January 29, 1997.

In late January 1997, just before the arbitration was scheduled to begin, Retrum held two conference calls to discuss the

situation with base representatives and executive board members of Local 2000. Retrum said that he had reviewed the

Bridge Agreement with the lawyers for Local 2000, who had

advised him that the Local "could not hope to win an arbitration" on the matter. Id. at 39. Retrum took a vote of the

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er to arbitrate the issue, accept the Bridge Agreement, or do

nothing. The majority voted to accept the proposal. Id. at

40.

Some Local 2000 representatives, however, objected to

adopting the Agreement without ratification by the membership. During one of the conference calls, Retrum explained

that since the Agreement "was a grievance settlement and

not an amendment to the contract," ratification was unnecessary. Id. at 476. Thereafter, Retrum consulted with the IBT

Legal Department regarding membership ratification, and

was specifically advised that ratification was unnecessary.

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Id. at 477. Retrum signed the Bridge Agreement on February 11, 1997.

On March 11, 1997, five union members, two of whom are

plaintiffs in this case, wrote to the then-General President of

the IBT, Ron Carey, expressing their view that Retrum had

no authority to enter into the Bridge Agreement without

membership ratification. They asked Carey to review the

matter and determine whether ratification was required. Id.

at 363-64. On March 21, 1997, Carey wrote to Retrum.

Carey stated that he had "completed [his] review of the flight

duty time issue and the terms of the settlement signed by

Local 2000." He recommended that the Local "immediately

communicate the terms of the settlement to the membership,"

"encourage membership input regarding aspects of the settlement which they believe adversely impacts them," and then

"use this member information to determine its bargaining

proposal or position" in ongoing negotiations with Northwest

for a new collective bargaining agreement. He did not,

however, suggest that ratification was required. Id. at 62-63.

On August 8, 1997, the IBT wrote to Northwest. "Without

taking a position as to whether the bridge agreement is

subject to [the ratification] requirement," the IBT wrote,

"there is a colorable issue as to the agreement's validity

absent ratification." Id. at 10. The IBT advised Northwest

that it would submit the matter to the membership for an

advisory vote, and specifically reserved the right to arbitrate

the issue. Id. at 10-11. Northwest responded on August 12,

1997 that, pursuant to the Bridge Agreement, it would implement HVTs in September and October 1997. Id. at 189.

On August 26, 1997, the plaintiffs sued to prevent implementation of the Agreement and moved for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction. The complaint,

which named the IBT, Local 2000, and Northwest as defendants, alleged three causes of action. Plaintiffs contended

that by going ahead with the Bridge Agreement without

membership ratification, Local 2000 and the IBT had: (1)

violated plaintiffs' equal voting rights under section 101(a)(1)

of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

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("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. s 411(a)(1);2 (2) breached plaintiffs'

ratification rights under the IBT constitution in violation of

section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. s 185;3 and (3) breached their duty of

fair representation. App. 1-9. The complaint did not assert

a cause of action against Northwest, although it did allege

that Northwest "knew and understood that a supplemental

agreement or agreement to modify or amend a collective

bargaining agreement was required to be ratified by the

affected membership before it may be implemented," and that

Northwest could not "lawfully implement the Bridge Agreement with knowledge that it was not ratified in accordance

with the IBT constitution." Id. at 5, 7.

On October 3, 1997, the district court denied the motion for

a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs could not

establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Treating the

counts leveled against the union defendants as if they also

had been leveled against Northwest, the court held that the

two statutory causes of action could not lie against Northwest. See Davenport v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 981

F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1997). LMRDA s 101, the court

held, governs only the rights of union members against

unions. LMRA s 301, it said, does not apply to employers

__________

2 LMRDA s 101(a)(1) provides:

Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights

and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor

organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of

such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in

such organization's constitution and bylaws.

3 LMRA s 301(a) provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between

any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district

court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,

without respect to the amount in controversy or without

regard to the citizenship of the parties.

like Northwest, who are subject to the Railway Labor Act

("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. ss 151-188. The district court further

held that because Northwest had not bargained in bad faith,

and had not knowingly implemented an unratified agreement

that was an obvious alteration of the terms of the collective

bargaining agreement, the duty of fair representation could

not give rise to a valid cause of action against Northwest.

Davenport, 981 F. Supp. at 8-9 & n.2.

Subsequently, the members of Local 2000 elected plaintiffs

Billie Davenport and Danny Campbell as the two principal

officers of Local 2000, with Davenport replacing Retrum as

president. On December 18, 1997, the Local held a referendum on the Bridge Agreement and the members rejected it

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decisively. Thereafter, the IBT demanded that Northwest

rescind the Agreement. When Northwest refused, the IBT

filed a cross-claim against Northwest pursuant to the RLA,

seeking an injunction requiring Northwest to cease applying

the Bridge Agreement and to restore and maintain the status

quo.

II

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion

for a preliminary injunction. Although the IBT and Local

2000 remain nominal defendants-appellees, they now support

the position of the plaintiffs.

A court considering a plaintiff's request for a preliminary

injunction must examine whether: (1) there is a substantial

likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) plaintiff will

be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; (3) an

injunction will substantially injure the other party; and (4)

the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. See

Serono Lab. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir.

1998). These factors interrelate on a sliding scale and must

be balanced against each other. Id. at 1318. We review the

district court's weighing of the preliminary injunction factors

for abuse of discretion, while reviewing its underlying legal

conclusions de novo and its underlying factual findings for

clear error. Id.

III

The district court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to

succeed on the merits because they could not establish a

cause of action against Northwest. Plaintiffs do not appeal

the court's rejection of their claim under LMRDA s 101, see

Pl. Br. at 14 n.6, but do dispute the court's conclusions with

respect to the duty of fair representation and LMRA s 301.

They also raise a number of additional, miscellaneous arguments.

A

The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. ss 151-188, governs

labor relations in the railroad and airline industries. Section

2 of the RLA grants to employees the right to organize and

bargain collectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and requires employers under the Act to bargain

exclusively with the representatives so chosen. 45 U.S.C.

s 152. Based on that section and other considerations, the

Supreme Court has inferred a duty of fair representation

owed by unions to their members. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n,

Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 74-76 (1991); Steele v. Louisville

& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199-203 (1944).4

A union "breaches its duty of fair representation if its

actions are either 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.' "

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Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 67 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386

U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). A union's actions are arbitrary, the

Supreme Court has held, "only if, in light of the factual and

__________

4 The duty of fair representation also applies to unions certified

under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), based on

NLRA provisions comparable to section 2 of the RLA. See Vaca v.

Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345

U.S. 330, 336-37 (1953). Cases describing the scope of the duty

freely cite precedents under both statutes. See, e.g., Marquez v.

Screen Actors Guild, 119 S. Ct. 292, 300 (1998) (citing Air Line

Pilots, 499 U.S. at 67); Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 67 (citing Vaca,

386 U.S. at 190); Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 337 (citing Steele, 323

U.S. at 198-99).

legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's

behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as

to be irrational." Id. at 67 (internal quotation and citation

omitted); see Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 119 S. Ct. 292,

300 (1998). "The duty of fair representation does not itself

require ratification votes," although "the discriminatory denial of the right to ratify [an agreement with the employer]

may be inconsistent with a union's obligation." American

Postal Workers Union, Local 6885 v. American Postal Workers Union ("Postal Workers"), 665 F.2d 1096, 1105 n.20 (D.C.

Cir. 1981).

Under certain circumstances, where a union has breached

its duty of fair representation an employer may also be

implicated in the union's breach. See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397

U.S. 25, 29 (1970); Postal Workers, 665 F.2d at 1109-10;

Steffens v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 797

F.2d 442, 445 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1986). In Postal Workers, we

recognized that "an employer may sometimes be joined in a

suit involving duty of fair representation claims against a

union." 665 F.2d at 1109. We noted that "[i]n all such cases,

however, the employer somehow acted improperly and infringed the rights of the individual aggrieved employees."

Id. We further observed that in such cases, "the court[s]

required that the employer have actual notice of, or might

reasonably be charged with notice of, the union's breach of

duty to its members." Id.

The parties dispute the proper standard for determining

whether an employer can be implicated in a union's breach of

duty. Northwest focuses on the language in Postal Workers

which requires that "the employer somehow acted improperly." Id. Citing cases from several circuits, Northwest contends that a plaintiff must "prove employer misconduct which

amounts to collusion in the union's breach," Northwest Br. at

20, and not simply "knowledge" of the breach. See, e.g.,

Dement v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 845

F.2d 451, 464 n.21 (4th Cir. 1988); United Indep. Flight

Officers v. United Airlines, 756 F.2d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir.

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1985); Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 797-

98 (8th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiffs, by contrast, fasten on the "actual notice" language of Postal Workers, and argue that an employer's

"knowledge" of a union's breach is a sufficient predicate.

They contend that the union breached its duty of fair representation when it signed the Bridge Agreement without ratification by the membership, knowing that ratification was

required. And they further assert that Northwest implicated

itself in the union's breach by signing the Agreement with

knowledge both that ratification was required and that the

union had knowingly dispensed with it. In support, they cite,

inter alia, Goclowski v. Penn Central Transportation Co., in

which the Third Circuit indicated that a cause of action could

be made out against both a union and an employer if plaintiffs

"establish that the Union had no authority to enter into [an]

agreement and that the employer was aware of this contractual disability." 571 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir. 1978). But see id.

at 761 n.18 ("On the facts of the instant case, the Railroad's

collusion with the Union, if proved, would amount to an

undermining of the basic collective bargaining agreements.")

(emphasis added). See also Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 945

F.2d 889, 896 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[f]ailure to ratify

under circumstances where an employer is aware both of the

ratification requirement and of the failure to comply with it

may invalidate an employer's claims under the unratified

agreement," but noting that "crucial to our analysis" is that

"non-ratification was coupled here with a deliberate policy of

secrecy").

We need not resolve this legal dispute in order to decide

this case, because the plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of

success on the merits even under the standard they propose.5

Plaintiffs do not contend that an employer's (or union's) mere

mistake about whether ratification was required is enough to

__________

5 For the same reason, we need not decide whether the union

itself breached its duty, a necessary prerequisite for concluding that

the employer was implicated in such a breach. See Postal Workers,

665 F.2d at 1108.

create liability. See Postal Workers, 665 F.2d at 1101 (noting

that interpretations of union constitutions by unions, "if reasonable and in good faith, are not to be disturbed by the

courts"). They concede that the requirement of ratification

must at least be "objectively clear" at the time. See Oral

Arg. Tr. at 60-62. Indeed, plaintiffs do not disagree with the

district court's characterization of their own leading case,

Goclowski, as one in which " 'the employer ... knowingly

implemented an unratified agreement that was an obvious

alteration of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.' " Pl. Br. at 37 (quoting Davenport, 981 F.Supp. at 9

n.2 ). They simply disagree with the court's determination

that this case does not share those facts. But we review such

a factual finding only to determine whether it is clearly

erroneous, and we cannot so characterize the district court's

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finding here.

Plaintiffs accurately note that the IBT constitution provides

that "amendments" to collective bargaining agreements must

be ratified by the membership. Article XII, section 2(b).

And plaintiffs' contention that the Bridge Agreement constituted such an amendment is not an unreasonable one. But

the contrary view, that the Bridge Agreement did not alter

the terms of the collective bargaining agreement but merely

settled a dispute over their interpretation, is also not unreasonable, let alone irrational. See Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at

67 (holding that a union breaches its duty of fair representation only where its behavior is "so far outside a wide range of

reasonableness as to be irrational") (internal quotation and

citation omitted).

The collective bargaining agreement provided that "[a]ny

changes or modifications in the Federal Air Regulations shall

also be applied to Flight Attendants." Section 5.A.3. Based

on this provision, Northwest contended that the new FARs

superseded the duty time and rest period limitations found

elsewhere in the collective bargaining agreement. Retrum,

the Local's president, was advised by the Local's legal counsel

that the union "could not hope to win an arbitration" if it

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disputed Northwest on this issue. App. 39. He was also

advised by IBT counsel that:

Letters of understanding that either interpret and/or

assist in the application of existing contract language or

provide language which memorializes the parties' understanding of a subject by filling in gaps in the contract

generally do not require ratification. These types of

letters do not change the terms of the contract but

merely interpret and apply the contract that was ratified

by the membership.

Id. at 26. And the week before Retrum signed the Bridge

Agreement, he was "specifically advised" by IBT counsel that

ratification of the Agreement was unnecessary. Id. at 479.

Based on this advice, Retrum concluded that the union constitution "did not have to be ratified because [it] did not create

new contract terms but only resolved a dispute over interpretation of the existing contract." Id. at 312; see id. at 477-78.6

While the IBT now contends that ratification was required,

that is a position it arrived at quite late.7 Even after the

signing of the Agreement, the IBT's Legal Department twice

reaffirmed that "no ratification vote was necessary in the

opinion of the IBT because the Bridge Agreement was a

grievance settlement and not an amendment to the collective

bargaining agreement." Id. at 479; see id. at 481. When the

plaintiffs put the question directly to the IBT's then-General

__________

6 Although the Bridge Agreement used the words "amend" and

"modify" in its text, Retrum explained that the Agreement used

"this terminology not because it is an amendment or supplemental

agreement, but because the underlying language" of the existing

collective bargaining agreement itself used it. App. 477. As Retrum pointed out, s 5.A.3.b provided that "[a]ny changes or modifications" in the FARs "shall also be applied to Flight Attendants."

See id.; see also id. at 78. Retrum also pointed out that side-letters

typically used by the union and Northwest to resolve disputes over

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (discussed in

the text below) were sometimes labeled "contract amendments."

Id. at 306-07.

7 The IBT took this position in its answer to the plaintiffs'

amended complaint, filed on September 24, 1997. App. 513, p 14.

President, Ron Carey, he did not suggest that ratification was

required. Instead, he merely noted in a letter that

[w]hen the [new] FARs became effective Northwest advised Local 2000 that it believed the terms of the collective bargaining agreement permitted it to implement

changes to the daily and weekly limitations.... The

Company argued that it could apply the new FARs to

Teamster members and ignore the better contract language because of language ... which provides that "any

changes or modifications in the Federal Air Regulations

shall also be applied to flight attendants."

Id. at 62. Even after individual union members threatened to

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sue over the failure to ratify, the IBT's Associate General

Counsel told Northwest only that "there is a colorable issue

as to the agreement's validity absent ratification"--while

expressly declining to "conced[e] the correctness of the complaining members' legal position." Id. at 10. Indeed, in their

amended complaint, plaintiffs charged that "[t]he IBT has not

repudiated the Bridge Agreement and by its actions it has

ratified the Agreement." Id. at 464-65, p 14.8

Of course, none of this establishes as a matter of law that

Northwest's bargaining position was correct or that ratification was unnecessary to settle the dispute. But it does

support the district court's conclusion that, unlike Goclowski,

this was not a case where "the employer ... knowingly

implemented an unratified agreement that was an obvious

alteration of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." Davenport, 981 F. Supp. at 9 n.2; cf. Goclowski, 571

__________

8 Even on appeal, the IBT concedes that "[t]he IBT constitution

does not require that settlements of grievances arising under a

CBA [collective bargaining agreement] be submitted for membership ratification." IBT Br. at 7 (emphasis omitted). It also concedes that the Bridge Agreement "grew out of ... a dispute

between [Northwest] and Local 2000 over the proper interpretation

of the underlying" collective bargaining agreement. Id. It contends, however, that the Agreement "did not resolve" that dispute

and instead "effected a series of amendments to the underlying

CBA." Id.

F.2d at 760 ("Plaintiffs have set forth far more than a mere

disagreement with Union officials over the meaning of the

Union's constitution."). The fact that the IBT itself described

plaintiffs' position as no more than "colorable" seriously undermines its current contention that the employer should

have assessed that position as "obviously" correct. Indeed,

given the conclusion of the Local's president that ratification

was unnecessary, it would have been problematic for Northwest to have refused to implement the agreement without

ratification. See Moreau v. James River-Otis, Inc., 767 F.2d

6, 10 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Management should neither be allowed

nor required to scrutinize internal union policies and practices

too closely, and, indeed, it may commit an unfair labor

practice if it delves too deeply into the union's affairs.");

Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund

v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098, 1113 & n.19 (6th Cir. 1986); cf.

Teamsters Local Union No. 251 and McLaughlin & Moran,

Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 30, 32 (1990) ("[A]n employer may not

lawfully refuse to sign a contract on the basis that the union's

ratification procedures were not in accordance with the requirements of its constitution and bylaws.").

The conclusion that a ratification requirement was not

"obvious" is further supported by a history in which Northwest and Local 2000 had settled numerous contract interpretation disputes via side-letter agreements signed by the Local

2000 president without ratification by the membership. As

Retrum explained, these letters "typically resolve[d] some

dispute between Local 2000 or its predecessors and NorthUSCA Case #97-7190 Document #413381 Filed: 02/02/1999 Page 12 of 21
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west Airlines concerning the proper interpretation or application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement," and had never

been challenged as not binding because they had not been

ratified. App. 306-07. While these letter agreements were

not as far-reaching as the Bridge Agreement, many did

interpret substantive collective bargaining agreement provisions. This established practice of settling disputes without

ratification undermines plaintiffs' contention that Northwest

should have known Retrum lacked authority to enter into a

binding agreement without ratification. See Central States,

799 F.2d at 1114 ("[T]he union's entry into and compliance

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with [two] prior letter agreements constituted representations

by the union to the employer that union officials were authorized to enter into side letter agreements ... without ratification."); cf. NLRB v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local No. 8, 465 F.2d 974, 975 n.1 (9th Cir. 1972)

("When a union representative indicates that he has authority

to enter into a binding agreement without membership ratification, and there is an established history of entering into

bargaining agreements without such ratification, the [u]nion

cannot later contend that ratification is necessary.").

Finally, plaintiffs argue that Northwest knew or should

have known that ratification of the Bridge Agreement was

required because the union had insisted on a ratification vote

when Northwest made an earlier attempt to implement higher value turnarounds in 1992. The circumstances in 1992,

however, were considerably different. Like the 1993 collective bargaining agreement, the agreement in effect in 1992

set flight and duty time restrictions. But unlike the 1993

agreement, the earlier collective bargaining agreement did

not provide that "[a]ny changes or modifications in the FARs

shall be applied to Flight Attendants." Accordingly, in 1992

it was clear that Northwest could implement HVTs only by

amending the collective bargaining agreement. Under the

1993 agreement, by contrast, Northwest could reasonably

argue that under the new FARs it had authority to implement HVTs without amending the agreement.

In sum, even assuming that an employer can be implicated

in a union's breach of the duty of fair representation merely

by implementing an agreement with knowledge of that

breach, we cannot find clearly erroneous the district court's

conclusion that Northwest had no such knowledge. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs are not

likely to succeed on the merits of this claim against the

airline.

B

Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's rejection of their

claim under LMRA s 301, 29 U.S.C. s 185(a). See supra

note 3. That section provides both jurisdiction and a cause of

action for suits alleging a violation of a contract between an

employer and a labor organization, or between labor organizations. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.

448, 456 (1957); see also Local 14 Nursing Home Pension

Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 590 (1993); Franchise Tax

Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23

(1983). Plaintiffs contend that s 301 subjects Northwest to

"accountability for knowingly benefitting from [the] union's

violation of members' ratification rights." Pl. Br. at 41.

As the district court pointed out, however, LMRA s 301

does not apply to this case. The LMRA applies only to

"contracts between an employer and a labor organization

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as

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defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. s 185 (emphasis added). "Employer" is

defined in the chapter to exclude "any person subject to the

Railway Labor Act," id. s 152(2), and "employee" is defined

to exclude "any individual employed by an employer subject

to the Railway Labor Act," id. s 152(3).9 As a "common

carrier by air," Northwest is subject to the RLA. 45 U.S.C.

s 181. Accordingly, as the district court held, a cause of

action does not lie against Northwest under section 301. See

Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 70 v. Western Pac. R.R.,

809 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1987); Steffens, 797 F.2d at 445

n.2; United Indep. Flight Officers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1283;

Fechtelkotter v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 693 F.2d 899,

902-03 (9th Cir. 1982); Raus, 663 F.2d at 794; Brotherhood

of Locomotive Firemen v. United Transp. Union, 471 F.2d 8,

9 (6th Cir. 1972).10

__________

9 29 U.S.C. s 152 itself provides definitions only for use in

subchapter II of Chapter 7, Title 29 of the United States Code.

LMRA s 301, 29 U.S.C. s 185, is in subchapter IV. 29 U.S.C.

s 142(3), however, provides that "employer," "employee" and "labor

organization" "shall have the same meaning" when used throughout

Chapter 7 "as when used in subchapter II."

10 Nor are we persuaded by plaintiffs' contention that Wooddell

v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71, 502

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C

Neither plaintiffs' original complaint, nor their amended

complaint, expressly stated any cause of action against Northwest. Nonetheless, the district court liberally construed the

complaint to assert the same causes of action against Northwest as it asserted against the Local and the IBT. We have

accepted that characterization for purposes of this appeal, and

have reached the same conclusions as the district court

regarding the validity of those claims.

Plaintiffs' appellate briefs offer three additional lines of

argument. But not only do those arguments fail to state a

cause of action against Northwest, they fail to articulate a

cause of action against any party.

First, plaintiffs point to 28 U.S.C. s 1337 as a statute that

subjects Northwest to accountability for benefitting from the

union's asserted violation of its members' ratification rights.

Pl. Br. at 41. Section 1337, however, merely grants district

courts "jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising

under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."

28 U.S.C. s 1337(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have identified no Act of Congress--other than those discussed above--

under which such a cause of action might arise.

__________

U.S. 93 (1991), overrules this line of authority. Wooddell did not

address the application of section 301 to actions involving employers

and employees subject to the RLA. Rather, Wooddell merely held,

in a case in which all of the parties were subject to the LMRA, that

a union constitution is a "contract between labor organizations" and

hence covered by section 301. See id. at 98-100. Here, although

plaintiffs' claim does involve such a contract, one of the parties--

Local 2000--is not a "labor organization" within the meaning of

section 301 because its members are employed by an employer

subject to the RLA. See 29 U.S.C. ss 152(2), (3), (5); Brotherhood

of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 376-

77 (1969); Fechtelkotter, 693 F.2d at 902-03; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 471 F.2d at 9; Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 58

F.R.D. 566, 568-69 (S.D. W.Va. 1973).

Second, plaintiffs contend that Northwest may be joined in

their action against the Local and the IBT under Rule 19 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the

"joinder of persons needed for just adjudication." Northwest

is a necessary party, plaintiffs contend, because its presence

is necessary for the court to set aside the Bridge Agreement.

But while Rule 19 provides for joinder of necessary parties, it

does not create a cause of action against them. See Vieux

Carre Property Owners, Residents & Assocs., Inc. v. Brown,

875 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is implicit in Rule 19(a)

itself that before a party will be joined ... as a defendant the

plaintiff must have a cause of action against it."); cf. 4 James

W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice s 19.04[1][a] (3d ed.

1998) ("[Rule 19] governs only the procedural propriety of

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tion or venue of the federal court."). It is not enough that

plaintiffs "need" an injunction against Northwest in order to

obtain full relief. They must also have a right to such an

injunction, and Rule 19 cannot provide such a right. See 28

U.S.C. s 2072(b) ("[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]

shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.");

Postal Workers, 665 F.2d at 1110 (holding that plaintiffs may

not use Rule 19 to join employer in action against union

unless plaintiffs show employer "to have been implicated in

the union's breach of duty to its members").11

Finally, the plaintiffs' briefs discuss at length the contention that President Retrum lacked both actual and apparent

authority to sign the Bridge Agreement without membership

ratification. That discussion, however, floats free of a tether

__________

11 Plaintiffs rely primarily on Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,

503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974), which they contend permitted a

plaintiff to join an international union in her civil rights action

against sex-segregated locals, even though the international had "no

part in the wrongdoing." Pl. Br. at 31. Far from having "no part

in the wrongdoing," however, we held that the international had

"maintained" the sex-segregated locals. Id. at 184. Moreover, the

plaintiff in Evans, unlike the plaintiffs in the present case, had a

cause of action (under 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-2(c)) against the party she

sought to join under Rule 19. See id. at 184-86.

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to any specified cause of action against Northwest. It may be

that plaintiffs intend that discussion to bolster their breach of

duty argument. As noted above, however, even on plaintiffs'

own theory they must establish not merely that Retrum

lacked authority (actual or apparent) to sign the Agreement,

but that it was "objectively clear" or "obvious" to Northwest

that he did. It may also be that plaintiffs intend their

actual/apparent authority discussion to support their LMRA

s 301 claim. But even if Retrum lacked authority to sign the

Bridge Agreement, that would not alter the fact that section

301 is inapplicable to employers and labor organizations subject to the RLA.

The plaintiffs may also intend their argument that Retrum

lacked actual or apparent authority to itself constitute some

kind of cause of action against Northwest. If that is what

they intend, however, they have failed to allege anything

remotely resembling such a claim in either their initial or

amended complaints. See App. 1-9, 461-69. It is far too late

in the day to do so now. See Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 315

(D.C. Cir. 1991). Accordingly we find nothing in plaintiffs'

discussion of Retrum's authority to upset the district court's

conclusion that plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits

against Northwest.

IV

In light of our affirmance of the district court's conclusion

that the plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits, it

would take a very strong showing with respect to the other

preliminary injunction factors to turn the tide in plaintiffs'

favor. See Murrow Furniture Galleries v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., 899 F.2d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs

have not made such a showing.

Although they do not press a public interest argument on

appeal,12 plaintiffs do contend that they will suffer irreparable

__________

12 Plaintiffs initially contended before the district court that

there were "health and safety reasons" for granting a temporary

injury in the absence of an injunction. Their principal contention is that the HVTs increase the flight time required of

flight attendants in a given duty period, while at the same

time eliminating attendants' per diem pay and hotel allowances because overnight stays are no longer required on such

trips. Northwest replies that the attendants serving on such

flights are those who affirmatively seek them because the

turnarounds permit completion of a month's work in fewer

work days. This dispute is not important, however, because

the injury plaintiffs urge is in any event not irreparable. If

plaintiffs ultimately succeed on the merits, this kind of injury

can be remedied with money damages. See Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) ("[T]he temporary loss of

income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury.").

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Plaintiffs also contend that implementation of the Bridge

Agreement has caused the union irreparable injury by depriving it of a valuable bargaining chip in its current negotiations

for a new collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 1.

Any such injury, however, is mitigated by the Bridge Agreement's express provision that the Agreement remains in

effect only "for the duration of the current negotiations," and

"that the terms of this Agreement shall operate without

prejudice to either parties' [sic] position in any subsequent

negotiation or arbitration." App. 67. Indeed, in reviewing

the issue, the IBT General President found this to be the

"most significant element of the settlement." Id. at 63.

Moreover, if there were any such injury, it would have

reciprocal application to Northwest: whatever bargaining

advantage the union would lose to Northwest in the absence

of an injunction, Northwest would lose to the union in the

presence of one. See Serono Lab., 158 F.3d at 1326.13

__________

restraining order. They ultimately conceded, however, that this

contention was "not supported on this record." App. 452-53.

13 Plaintiffs also contend that the deprivation of their right of

ratification itself constitutes irreparable injury, even apart from the

collateral consequences discussed above. But this contention is

inextricably linked to the merits: plaintiffs suffer such an injury

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In sum, because plaintiffs have demonstrated neither likelihood of success on the merits nor irreparable injury, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion for a preliminary injunction.

V

Finally, the IBT suggests as an alternative disposition that

we vacate the district court's order and remand the case for

consideration of its cross-claim for an injunction restoring the

status quo prior to the Bridge Agreement.

Under the Railway Labor Act, an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions representing its

employees has exclusive jurisdiction over "minor disputes,"

defined as those arising "out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application" of existing collective bargaining

agreements.14 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor

Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989) (quoting 45

U.S.C. s 153 First (i)); see also id. at 304 n.4 (noting airline

industry provision of 45 U.S.C. s 184); International Ass'n

of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 687-89

(1963). In the case of so-called "major disputes," however,

the district courts have jurisdiction to enjoin violations of

the status quo pending the completion of required bargaining and mediation procedures. Consolidated Rail Corp., 491

U.S. at 302-03; see 45 U.S.C. ss 152 Seventh, 155, 156.

"Major disputes" are defined as those relating to "the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them.

They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is

sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue

is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy." Consolidated Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 302 (quoting

Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945)).

__________

only if they in fact have such a right, a proposition they have not

established.

14 Suits for breach of the duty of fair representation are an

exception. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S.

324, 328-29 (1969); Raus, 663 F.2d at 794.

The IBT contends that the present case concerns a "major

dispute," and that it is entitled to an injunction requiring

Northwest to cease applying the Bridge Agreement pending

completion of the required procedures. To establish that

contention, the IBT must show that the dispute is not "arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collectivebargaining agreement." Id. at 307; see Air Line Pilots Ass'n

v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Whatever the merits of the IBT's position, it does not provide

grounds for vacating the district court order currently before

this court. The claim advanced by the IBT is different from

those raised by plaintiffs. Because it was not filed until after

the district court issued its order and after the plaintiffs filed

their notice of appeal, the court did not--and did not have an

opportunity to--rule on the merits of the IBT's claim. On

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remand, the parties will have a chance to present their

arguments concerning this issue, and the court will have an

opportunity to render a decision.

VI

The denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction

is affirmed and the case is remanded to the district court.

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