Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-01607/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-01607-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Torts to Land

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

TNL/PM

E-FILED on 5/18/05

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JAYNE PALMISANO and RICHARD

PALMISANO

Plaintiffs,

v.

OLIN CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

No. C-03-01607 RMW

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON

PLAINTIFFS' EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

CLAIMS

[Re Docket No. 44]

The Motion of defendants Olin Corporation and Standard Fusee for Partial Summary Judgment on

Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claims, or, in the alternative, to Compel Medical Discovery, was heard on

February 4, 2005. The Rapazzini Graham/Duane Morris plaintiffs oppose the motion. The court has read

the moving and responding papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants defendants' motion for partial summary judgment to the extent that plaintiffs are

precluded from claiming damages for emotional distress caused by any fear or anxiety that they may

experience physical illness or disease (such as thyroid disease or learning disabilities) from exposure to the

allegedly contaminated water. Plaintiffs are not precluded from seeking compensation for emotional

distress resulting from general disruption to their lives, loss of use of their property, annoyance,

Case 5:03-cv-01607-RMW Document 270 Filed 05/18/05 Page 1 of 7
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1 Rapazzini Graham/Duane Morris cases were consolidated under Jane Palmisano v. Olin

Corp. & Standard Fusee, No. 03-01607; Alexander putative class action cases were consolidated under

Mark Daniels v. Olin Corp. & Standard Fusee, No. 03-01211; and Alexander individual cases were

consolidated under Albert Aguilar v. Olin Corp. & Standard Fusee, No. 03-01644. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

TNL/PM 2

inconvenience, and the like caused by having to deal and put up with the allegedly toxic water. The

alternative motion to compel medical discovery is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring numerous claims against Olin and Standard Fusee for dumping hazardous waste,

including potassium perchlorate, at Olin's flare making facility in Morgan Hill, California. Defendants used

the potassium perchlorate as an oxidizer and explosive propellant in rocket fuel and flares. Perchlorate is

known to affect the thyroid gland, and perchlorate exposure has been known to impair neurological

development in infants and fetuses and cause thyroid disorders, tumors, and cancer. The waste from Olin's

flare making facility has created a toxic plume in the groundwater basin in Southern Santa Clara County. 

The plume has migrated to San Martin, affecting an aquifer that supplies groundwater to plaintiffs, who are

residents of the city of San Martin. Upon discovery of the perchlorate contamination in January 2003,

residents were advised by government officials not to use the water for drinking or cooking, and have been

using bottled water, provided at Olin's expense since that time. Olin has publicly accepted responsibility for

the contamination, and by order of the Regional Water Quality Control Board, has been investigating the

scope of the contamination so that a clean-up strategy can be implemented.

Numerous complaints were filed against Olin, and at an October 3, 2003 Case Management

Conference, plaintiffs were divided into three master files.1 This order involves the Rappazini

Graham/Duane Morris plaintiffs, who bring claims for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, nuisance,

trespass, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and CERCLA violations. Plaintiffs seek

general damages for loss of use and enjoyment of property, inconvenience, annoyance, discomfort, mental

suffering and emotional distress, as well as special damages for diminution in property value and CERCLA

response costs.

The Rapazzini/Graham plaintiffs and defendants have each identified two "bellwether" plaintiffs for

purposes of addressing plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs have stated that they are not asserting personal injury

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

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claims. After an unsuccessful mediation, the parties commenced shortened discovery involving the

bellwether plaintiffs. During mini-depositions, bellwether plaintiff Dalla revealed that she has thyroid

disease; bellwether plaintiff Pereira revealed that she was pregnant at the time she learned of the

perchlorate contamination and also revealed that she has thyroid disease; and bellwether plaintiff Smith

testified that she is developing back problems related to lifting bottled water, that her twenty-five year old

daughter is experiencing hot flashes, and that her seven year old son is being evaluated for learning

disabilities. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are not bringing claims that their clients have or will suffer

physical illness or disease as a result of their exposure. However, they do claim that they are entitled to

recover compensation for emotional distress resulting from their worry about the effect of the perchlorate in

their drinking water, particularly those who have preexisting thyroid problems as pechlorate is known to

cause thyroid disruption. 

Defendants contend that recovery for plaintiffs' anxiety over the potential adverse health effects of

plaintiffs' exposure to the allegedly contaminated water is not compensable. Further, defendants allege that

plaintiffs refusal to produce medical records and information precludes plaintiffs from seeking such

recovery. Defendants submit that the individual medical status of each of the bellwether plaintiffs, and the

medical status of the bellwether plaintiffs' family members, should be excluded from the trial. Alternatively,

defendants argue that they are entitled to discovery of plaintiffs' medical records. 

II. ANALYSIS

Emotional distress damages are generally available under tort claims for negligence, trespass, and

nuisance. Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 337 (1960) ("It is settled that, regardless

of whether the occupant of land has sustained physical injury, he may recover damages for the discomfort

and annoyance of himself and the members of his family and for mental suffering . . . when such discomfort

or suffering has been proximately caused by a trespass or a nuisance."). However, recovery for anxiety

resulting from fear of developing some disease from the exposure is not recoverable unless the fear is

corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will

develop the disease in the future due to the toxic exposure. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6

Cal. 4th 965, 988-997 (1993); see Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1074 (1994) ("Potter

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

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demands application of the "more likely than not" threshold to emotional distress claims arising out of

negligent exposure to HIV or AIDS"). In Potter, plaintiffs were residents living near a landfill where

defendant had dumped liquid waste containing semiliquid toxic chemicals over a number of years, despite

agreeing at the outset of its contractual relationship with the owner of the landfill not to do so. The

California Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, fear of cancer (or other serious disease) claims under a

negligent infliction of emotional distress theory and held that: 

in the absence of a present physical injury or illness, damages for fear of

cancer may be recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that (1) as a

result of the defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, the

plaintiff is exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer; and (2) the

plaintiff's fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or

scientific opinion, that it is more likely thannot that the plaintiff willdevelop the

cancer inthe future due to the toxic exposure. Under this rule, a plaintiff must

do more thansimply establishknowledge of a toxic ingestionor exposure and

a significantincreasedrisk of cancer. The plaintiffmustfurthershowthatbased

upon reliable medical or scientific opinion, the plaintiff harbors a serious fear

that the toxic ingestion or exposure was ofsuchmagnitude and proportion as

to likely result in the feared cancer.

6 Cal. 4th at 997 (1993). In establishing this standard, the court noted that its "discussion is equally

relevant to emotional distress engendered by fear that other types of serious physical illness or injury may

result from toxic exposure." Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 980. The court recognized that although its holding "may

foreclose compensation to many persons with genuine and objectively reasonable fears," public policy

concerns justify the result. Id. at 993. Those concerns include the tremendous societal cost of allowing a

potentially unrestricted number of plaintiffs claiming fear of disease from toxic exposure and the need to

have a sufficiently definite threshold for recovery to permit consistent application from case to case. Id. at

991-993.

Plaintiffs claim they are not seeking damages that Potter precludes. First, they say that they are not

pursuing claims for any damages based on fear of future disease; rather they are seeking recovery for the

worry about "rocket fuel in their drinking water," particularly since two of them have existing thyroid

conditions. Plaintiffs do not claim the thyroid conditions were caused by the contaminated water or will

more likely than not be aggravated in the future as a result of any exposure. The court does not find

plaintiffs' distinction from Potter meaningful. To allow recovery for anxiety about one's future health without

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

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proof of the liklihood of contracting any particular disease would be inconsistent with the public policy

concerns set forth in Potter.

Second, plaintiffs claim footnote 10 on page 986 of Potter "explicitly stated that its holding, and the

'fear of cancer' standard articulated by the court, was not applicable to trespass and nuisance claims, and

specifically was not applicable to emotional distress claims arising out of trespass and nuisance." P's

Memo, p. 16:18-20. The court disagrees. All footnote 10 says is that in the law of nuisance and trespass

(as in the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress) emotional distress without physical injury is

compensable. Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 986, n.10. Potter applies to all tort claims in which recovery is sought

for emotional distress. Plaintiffs do not articulate—and the court does not perceive—any logical reason

why Potter's holding should apply only to negligence claims. The fact that trespass and nuisance causes of

action protect property rights reinforces the conclusion that Potter did not exempt such claims from its

holding. If recovery for unsubstantiated medical fears were still compensable after Potter, surely it would

not be through claims that seek, respectively, to redress "invasions of the interest in the exclusive possession

of land" and "discomfort and annoyance while using land." Rest. (Second) Torts § 821D, coms. b, d. 

The Potter court articulates a somewhat lower standard for claims involving intentional infliction of

emotional distress but still requires that to be compensable the distress must be "based upon medically or

scientifically corroborated knowledge that the defendant's conduct has significantly increased the plaintiff's

risk of cancer and that the plaintiff's actual risk of the threatened cancer is significant." Id. at 981 (citations

omitted). 

Plaintiffs do not claim that the likelihood of their acquiring a disease or illness from the alleged toxic

exposure has been significantly increased or that they already suffer some illness or disease caused by the

exposure.

Plaintiffs have also steadfastly objected to putting their medical conditions in issue. The court finds

that if plaintiffs were to be allowed to claim damages for emotional distress caused by health anxieties, the

defendants would have the right to explore plaintiffs' medical conditions and plaintiffs' knowledge of their

susceptibility to disease or illness and what triggers their alleged distress. The position that plaintiffs have

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

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taken on medical discovery precludes them from now seeking compensation for worry about health risks,

particularly the plaintiffs who apparently say they were worried because of existing medical conditions.

III. ORDER

The court hereby orders:

1. Plaintiffs are precluded from claiming damages for emotional distress caused by any fear or

anxiety that they have experienced or will experience physical illness or disease (such as thyroid disease or

learning disabilities) from exposure to the allegedly contaminated water; 

2. Plaintiffs are precluded from testifying or offering evidence as to their medical conditions or 

their family's condition, unless the condition has relevance to some issue other than fear of contracting or

aggravating some disease or illness;

3. Plaintiffs are not precluded from seeking compensation for emotional distress resulting from

general disruption to their lives, loss of use of their property, annoyance, inconvenience, and the like caused

by having to deal and put up with the allegedly toxic water; and 

4. The alternative motion to compel medical discovery is denied as moot.

DATED: 5/18/05 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C-03-01607 RMW

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Colin L. Pearce clpearce@duanemorris.com

M. Elizabeth Graham meg@RapazziniGraham.com

Richard Matthew Franco rmfranco@duanemorris.com

Mark P. Rapazzini mpr@rapazzinigraham.com

Timothy W. Moppin twmoppin@duanemorris.com

Matthew K. Kliszewski mkkliszewski@duanemorris.com 

Randall C. Creech Rcreech@sjlegal.com

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Adam Edward Miller Adam.miller@husch.com

Carol A. Rutter carol.rutter@husch.com

Earl L. Hagstrom earl.hagstrom@sdma.com

Keith M. Casto keith.casto@sdma.com 

Gary A. Sloboda gary.sloboda@sdma.com 

Randall C. Creech Rcreech@sjlegal.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered for

e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 5/18/05 DOH 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:03-cv-01607-RMW Document 270 Filed 05/18/05 Page 7 of 7