Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-05442/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-05442-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances underlying

the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOANNA J. RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. __________________________________

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CIV NO 06-05442 PVT

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

REMAND AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Re: Docket Nos. 14 and 19)

I. INTRODUCTION

 In this Social Security case, Plaintiff, Joanna J. Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) brings an action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) appealing a final decision by the Commissioner of Social

Security which denied her claims for disability insurance under Title II of the Social Security

Act (42 U.S.C. § 400 et seq.) for the time period beginning in September 2003. Presently before

the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment brought by Plaintiff and Defendant Michael

J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant”).1

 For the reasons

set forth below, the Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Grants

Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand.

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ORDER, page 2

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has the authority to review the Commissioner’s

decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal

standards. Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence is

“more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). When determining whether

substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, the court examines the administrative

record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at

1257. Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, the court must

defer to the decision of the ALJ. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). The trier

of fact, and not the reviewing court, must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence

can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Finally, “[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless.” Burch

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Remand is the appropriate remedy where

additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects. Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716,

719 (9th Cir. 1985). If, however, a rehearing would simply delay payment of benefits, reversal is

appropriate. Id.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

The Social Security Act provides benefits to qualified individuals who are disabled. 42

U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is

expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at

least twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An impairment for purposes of this definition

“results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

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ORDER, page 3

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). 

In addition, a person is disabled only if the impairment is so severe as to preclude not only

performance of his previous work, but also, considering his age, education and work experience,

performance of any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The claimant carries the burden of proving disability. Ukolov v.

Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining

whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended April 9, 1996. First, the Commissioner determines whether

the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” Id. If so, the claimant is not disabled,

and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in such activity, the Commissioner

proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments; if not, the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant has a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to

determine whether the impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1; if so, disability benefits are automatically awarded. Id. If the

impairment is not one presumed to be disabling, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to

determine whether the claimant has sufficient Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform

his past relevant work; if so, the claim is denied. Id. The claimant has the burden of proving

that he or she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant

meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. In step five, the burden

shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant, based upon his age, education, work

experience, and RFC, can perform other substantial gainful work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1987).

To disregard the uncontradicted opinion of a treating physician, an ALJ must provide

clear and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). If a

treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by a non-treating doctor, the treating physician’s

opinion may be rejected only for “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial

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 2 “The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform ‘sedentary’ work activity,

standing and walking up to 2 hours cumulatively and sitting up to 6 hours in an 8 hour workday,

and lifting and carrying up to 10 lbs. consistently. The claimant should only occasionally be

required to twist, stoop, or crouch, and should avoid exposure to temperature and humidity

extremes and such irritants as fumes, odors, cigarettes, and chemicals.” (Tr. 35-36)

ORDER, page 4

evidence in the record. Id. 

Similarly, when a claimant has “produced medical evidence of underlying impairments

consistent with his complaints and there is no affirmative evidence that he is malingering, the

ALJ's reasons for rejecting [the claimant’s] testimony must be clear and convincing.”

Regennitter v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Additionally, the ALJ must articulate specific reasons for rejecting the claimant’s subjective

testimony regarding his pain and limitations. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may not reject a claimant's statements regarding his limitations

merely because they are not supported by objective evidence. Id. at 1147; Bunnell v. Sullivan,

947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.1991). In determining credibility, an ALJ may engage in ordinary

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering claimant's reputation for truthfulness

and inconsistencies in claimant's testimony. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir.

2005).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Findings

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not performed disqualifying work since the

alleged onset of disability (Tr. 35 [finding # 2]). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s one

severe impairment was lupus (Tr. 35 [finding # 3]). At step three, the ALJ determined that the

lupus did not meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment presumed to establish

disability (Tr. 35 [finding # 4]). In the findings on residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ

found that Plaintiff’s statements about pain and limitations were “not totally credible” (Tr. 35

[finding #5]) (emphasis in original); and the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform sedentary

 work with certain restrictions. (Tr. 35-36 [finding #6]).2

 At the fourth step, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff could have performed three of her past jobs (Tr. 36 [findings #7, 8]). 

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ORDER, page 5

Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s RFC determination for the following reasons: 1) it

was based on the ALJ’s improper finding that the lupus did not “equal” listing 14.02 because it

was not supported by substantial evidence; 2) the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of her

treating physician; 3) the ALJ improperly discounted the Plaintiff’s symptom-reporting; 4) the

findings on Plaintiff’s RFC were not supported nor properly reached; and 5) the step four

findings that she could perform in her past jobs were not supported or properly reached.

1. ALJ’s Finding Lupus Not Being “Equal” to 14.02 Supported by

Substantial Evidence

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by finding at step three that listing 14.02 was not

“equaled.” Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence

and improperly disregarded evidence of equivalency. Although Plaintiff’s lupus is considered a

“severe” impairment (Tr. 35 [finding #3]) it does not “meet or medically equal” any of the listed

impairments (Tr. 35 [finding #4]). In order to meet or “equal” the listings, Plaintiff must

establish that the “symptoms, signs and laboratory findings ‘at least equal in severity and

duration’ to the characteristics of a relevant listed impairment.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

1099 (9th Cir. 1999) citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. 

In order to satisfy the listings found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, an

individual must have “significant, documented, constitutional symptoms and signs of severe

fatigue, fever, malaise and weight loss.” Also, a moderate level of severity is required involving

one of the following systems: (1) joint involvement, (2) muscle involvement, (3) ocular

involvement, (4) respiratory involvement, (5) cardiovascular involvement, (6) digestive

involvement, (7) renal involvement, (8) hematologic involvement, (9) skin involvement, (10)

neurological involvement, or (11) mental involvement. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,

Listing 14.02B (2006). Plaintiff’s lupus did not equal any of the listings in section 14.02. 

Medical expert David A. West, M.D. testified that “[Plaintiff] has a mild involvement - - trivial

mild involvement of nearly a half of different organ systems [listed]. Maybe a moderate

involvement of the joints, but not for sure” (Tr. 533). Additionally, Dr. West did not believe that

Plaintiff met the weight loss requirement and also noted that her alleged fever was not

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 3 There appears to be an inaccurate report by the ALJ on the board specialist’s findings

regarding the Plaintiff’s migraines. In fact, Dr. West testifies that her migraines were treated

“terribly aggressively” (Tr. 533). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, however, “[a] decision of the

ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th

Cir. 2005). In light of Plaintiff’s failure to meet the threshold requirements of section 14.02B,

the ALJ’s error in misreporting Plaintiff’s treatment for migraines is harmless. The ALJ’s

decision should not be reversed for this inaccuracy. 

ORDER, page 6

documented (Tr. 533). 

According to the standard set out in Tackett, Plaintiff’s above symptoms did not match

the severity required in the listings. Additionally, the fact that Plaintiff did not suffer weight loss

and the fact that Dr. West also noted that Plaintiff’s alleged fever was not documented speaks to

Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the threshold requirements of section 14.02B. Plaintiff argued that

her level of severity was “very close” to meeting the requirements of the listings. Plaintiff even

states in her motion that “[t]his statement was positive evidence of the impairment having

equaled the listing, but the ALJ did not even acknowledge that evidence of equaling.” A

symptom being “very close” is not equivalent to one that “equals” a listing. Plaintiff failed to

establish sufficient findings through her symptoms to “equal” any listing in 14.02B. 

2. ALJ Properly Rejected Opinion of Plaintiff’s Treating Physician

Plaintiff claims the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of her treating physician,

Thomas Bush, M.D. The opinion of Dr. Bush was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. West, the

consultative examiner. Dr. Bush opined that Plaintiff would miss approximately four days of

work per month (Tr. 433) and that her symptoms would often interfere with attention and

concentration (Tr. 430). In contrast, Dr. West opined that the Plaintiff “has only ‘mild’ joint

involvement, ‘mild’ venous insufficiency, and ‘mild’ Raynaud’s and ITP, her migraines have

received no aggressive treatment, and her depression has received no durational treatment at all,

her lupus would not meet or equal in severity the provisions of 14.02(b).”3

 (Tr. 32) (emphasis in

original). 

Because the treating physician was contradicted by the examining physician, Dr. West,

the ALJ was only required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-831 (9th Cir. 1996). An ALJ may reject a treating opinion

which is conclusory and unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical findings.

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ORDER, page 7

Batson v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.

2004) citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).

The ALJ specifically found that Dr. Bush’s opinion should be rejected because treatment

notes made after the Plaintiff’s onset date showed that her symptoms had resolved overall and

her lupus was stable (Tr. 33). Plaintiff argues the ALJ erroneously based his conclusion on a

single occasion where the joint pain was unremarkable. This, however, was not the case. 

Rather, the ALJ’s conclusion was based on the fact that on April 30, 2004, Plaintiff’s joints and

lower extremities were “‘unremarkable,’ and her thrombocytopenia, ‘resolved’” (Tr. 33) as well

as the finding in treatment notes from September 20, 2004 that her lupus, APS and Raynaud’s

were all found stable. Dr. Bush opined that the Plaintiff would be able to perform “sedentary”

jobs, “lifting and carrying up to 10 lbs. occasionally, sitting for 1 hour at a time, up to 6 hours

standing and walking cumulatively for 2 hours in an 8 hour workday no more than occasionally

twisting, stooping, and crouching and with reasonable preclusion from environmental irritants”

(Tr. 33). Dr. Bush opined that the onset date of these limitations was approximately April 2004. 

Furthermore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet the durational requirement for

disability since Dr. Bush reported that her symptoms had been “resolved” before a “durational

period considerably less than 12 months” (Tr. 33). Dr. Bush also reported that she would be

“capable of low stress jobs” (Tr. 430). Plaintiff’s own treating physician did not entirely

preclude employment and therefore, she should not be considered disabled for the purposes of

employment. Dr. Bush does report that Plaintiff’s symptoms would cause her to miss about four

workdays per month, however, the ALJ rejected this report based on the treatment notes from

April 30, 2004 and September 20, 2004, which contradicted Dr. Bush’s opinion by reporting that

Plaintiff’s joints and lower extremities were “unremarkable,” her thrombocytopenia “resolved”

and her lupus, APS and Raynaud’s were “stable” (Tr. 33). 

Additionally, Dr. Weiss’ psychological testing contradicted Dr. Bush’s concentration

limitations. Dr. Weiss found that Plaintiff was able to “understand, remember and carry out

simple, detailed and complex instructions without special or additional supervision. [Plaintiff]

was able to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for the duration of the evaluation” (Tr.

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ORDER, page 8

240). Also, Dr. Madireddi, a board certified orthopedist, stated that she believed Plaintiff could

work in a light-work capacity (Tr. 229). In light of the foregoing medical opinions, the ALJ

properly gave Dr. Bush’s opinion minimal weight based on the specific, legitimate reasons given

by Dr. West, Dr. Weiss, Dr. Madireddi as well as Dr. Bush’s own treatment notes.

3. ALJ Did Not Provide Clear and Convincing Reasons to Reject Claimant’s 

Subjective Pain Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s reports of her symptoms. 

Plaintiff testified (Tr. 498-518, 520-528) that she suffered from pain, fatigue, migraines,

numbness, depression (Tr. 524-525), medication side-effects (Tr. 511-512) and activity

limitations (Tr. 517). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made a limited acknowledgment of Plaintiff’s

testimonial statements (Tr. 33-34) and that the acknowledgment made did not indicate “clear and

convincing” reasons for the ALJ’s rejection of her subjective pain testimony. The ALJ found

that Plaintiff’s testimony was “not totally credible” (Tr. 35) but made no further specifications as

to the reasons for this conclusion aside from pointing back to the acknowledgments made in the

body of the decision (Tr. 35 [finding #5]). The ALJ compared Plaintiff’s testimony to the

“record as a whole” (Tr. 34) and in this manner, found Plaintiff’s contentions to be “less than

fully credible” (Tr. 34). 

The ALJ is permitted to use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” such as

considering Plaintiff’s reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies in her testimony. Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ, however, must specify the testimony that

is not credible and the evidence that undermines it. General findings are insufficient. Id. In

Burch, the ALJ articulated daily living activities, objective medical findings, and lack of

consistent treatment as reasons for denying benefits. In this case, the ALJ arrived at a

conclusory opinion after generally comparing the Plaintiff’s complaints to the entire record. The

ALJ’s two-sentence, cursory explanation of why Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony should be

disregarded does not amount to “clear and convincing” reasoning. 

4. ALJ Properly Found Capacity for Sedentary Work

The ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff could perform at least sedentary work. This

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ORDER, page 9

is supported by the findings of Dr. Madireddi, Dr. Weiss and also, the testimony of Dr. West (Tr.

228-229, 238-240, 534). Additionally, Dr. Bush had indicated that the limitations he set forth in

his opinion only applied as of April 2004 and by the end of this same month, these limitations as

he noted, appeared to have been “resolved” (Tr. 33). Dr. Bush also noted in his RFC report that

the Plaintiff could tolerate “low stress jobs” (Tr. 430). 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider her mental impairments because she

had not properly pursued any treatment. Plaintiff argues that according to Nguyen v. Chater, 100

F.3d 1462, this kind of reasoning “is to be disfavored because of the high incidence of untreated

mental impairments” (Plaintiff’s Motion, p. 16). This is an incorrect interpretation of Nguyen,

which actually states that “the fact that claimant may be one of millions of people who did not

seek treatment for a mental disorder until late in the day is not a substantial basis.” Id. In

Nguyen, the claimant did in fact seek treatment, but just did so later than he should have. In

contrast, in this case, Plaintiff did not pursue any treatment whatsoever. As stated in Social

Security Ruling 96-7p, an individual’s statements may be less credible when the level or

frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints. There must be medical signs

and laboratory findings of the physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be

expected to produce the symptoms. Due to Plaintiff’s failure to seek proper mental treatment, it

was proper for the ALJ to determine that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were “non-severe.” (Tr.

30). 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider the limiting side-effects of her

medication. Plaintiff argues that the side-effects of her medication would limit her functioning

on a job and should have been considered. On the RFC questionnaire, Dr. Bush reported that

Coumadin would have side-effects that could affect Plaintiff’s functioning at work, but did not

specify any way that the side-effects of Coumadin could limit Plaintiff’s functioning. 

Accordingly, there was no evidence for the ALJ to consider.

5. Findings as to Plaintiff’s Ability to Perform Past Work

If Plaintiff is able to perform her past work, then she is not disabled. According to the

RFC report by Dr. Bush, Plaintiff is limited to occasional twisting, stooping and crouching (Tr.

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ORDER, page 10

432). Among the past jobs that Plaintiff has had in the last fifteen years is that of engineering

technician and administrative assistant, both of which are office desk jobs. Neither of these jobs

required more than occasional twisting, stooping and crouching. Plaintiff has not shown that any

of the restricted movements were required in either of the past jobs mentioned above. Therefore,

the ALJ properly found Plaintiff has the capacity to perform sedentary work such as the type she

performed in her past work. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the Foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

2) Plaintiff’s motion for remand is granted for further clarification by the ALJ on his

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony; and 

3) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Dated: August 23, 2007

____________________________

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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