Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01533/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01533-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL GIBSON,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK,

Respondent.

 /

1:07-cv-01533 DLB HC

ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING

PETITIONER’S MOTION TO STAY

PROCEEDINGS

[Docs. 16, 21]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

 BACKGROUND

On January 12, 2007, Petitioner was convicted of second degree burglary and petty theft

with priors. Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate state prison term of two years. (Lodged

Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction.

Petitioner filed three pro se state post-conviction collateral petitions in the California state

courts including one petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodged

Doc. No. 2.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 27, 2007, in

the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The petition was

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transferred to this Court on October 11, 2007, and filed on October 22, 2007. 

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on January 22, 2008, arguing that the

petition should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. (Court Doc. 16.) Petitioner filed an

opposition on January 30, 2008. (Court Doc. 18.) 

On February 7, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the proceedings. (Court Doc. 21.)

Respondent filed an opposition on February 19, 2008. (Court Doc. 25.)

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

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with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

th

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

 In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

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if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition, Petitioner raises the following four claims: (1) Petty theif [sic] are

not the same as burglary of the First or Second Degree which were charged the definitions are not

the same”; (2) Burglarys are crimes of violence and petty theifs [sic] are crimes of moral

turpitude”; (3) Restitution was never discussed in plea agreement of the sum $5,000 dollars [sic]

or any amount no victim no property damage”; and (4) eneffective [sic] assistance of counsel.” 

Petitioner did not directly appeal his conviction and only filed one petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. In that petition, Petitioner presented the

following single claim: “How can a petty theif [sic] be an Burglary when a definition of a

burglary is a ‘inhabited dwelling’ a grocery store is not an ‘inhabited dwelling’ where no one

lives a ‘residence’” [sic]. (Lodged Doc. No. 2.) 

As Respondent submits, this claim can be construed as raising both claim one and two of

the instant federal petition. Therefore, this filing served to exhaust only claims one and two of

the instant petition. Claims three and four are not raised in the petition submitted to the

California Supreme Court, and therefore are not exhausted. Consequently, the instant petition

contains unexhausted claims and is subjected to dismissal; however, the Court must first give

Petitioner the opportunity to amend the petition to delete the unexhausted claims. Jefferson v.

Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9 Cir. 2005). th

As previously noted, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the instant proceeding pending

exhaustion on February 7, 2008. (Court Doc. 21.) Respondent filed an opposition on February

19, 2008. (Court Doc. 25.) 

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the United States Supreme Court determined

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that district courts have limited discretion to stay mixed petitions and to give petitioners an

opportunity to return to state court to exhaust. The Supreme Court noted that, while the

procedure should be “available only in limited circumstances,” it “likely would be an abuse of

discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had

good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and

there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.”

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

In his motion to stay, Petitioner has not presented good cause as to why he filed the

instant federal petition with unexhausted claims. Petitioner filed a petition in the California

Supreme Court on August 8, 2007, and included only one claim. The petition was denied on

September 12, 2007, with citations to In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 (1947), and In re Dixon, 41

Cal.2d 756 (1953). Petitioner simply does not explain why he did not include claims three and

four of the instant petition to the California Supreme Court, nor has Petitioner shown any attempt

to exhaust these claims when the instant petition was filed. Accordingly, Petitioner has not

demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant a stay under Rhines, and the motion shall be denied.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant proceeding is DENIED; 

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Petitioner may, at his

option, move to with the unexhausted claims and proceed with only the exhausted

claims. Guizar v. Estelle, 843 f.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988); and, th

3. Petitioner is advised that if he fails to withdraw the unexhausted claims within the

thirty (30) day time frame, the entire petition will be dismissed, without prejudice. 

This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after

exhausting available state remedies. However, this does not mean that Petitioner

will not be subject to the one year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). Although the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request

for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not

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toll for the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 531

U.S. 991 (2001). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 25, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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