Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03942/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD B. DYE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03942-DMR 

REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT; 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

GRANTING APPLICATION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Richard B. Dye filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). Plaintiff filed a declination to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). [Docket No. 8.] Therefore, the court issues this Report and Recommendation and 

reassigns this case to a district judge for final disposition, with the recommendation that the IFP 

application be granted and that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

I. DISCUSSION

A court may allow a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment of 

fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay such 

fees or provide such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Having evaluated Plaintiff’s financial 

affidavit, the court finds that he has satisfied the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a) and recommends that the application to proceed IFP be granted. 

The court’s grant of Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, however, does not mean that he 

may continue to prosecute his complaint. A court is under a continuing duty to dismiss a case

filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous 

or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the 

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court dismisses a case pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same 

complaint by paying the filing fee. This is because the court’s section 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is 

not on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Denton v. 

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). To make the determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 

courts assess whether there is an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however 

inartfully pleaded.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). 

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action for claims arising out of the May 2003 revocation of his medical 

license. He makes the following allegations in his complaint: the Medical Board of California 

(“Board”) issued Plaintiff a medical license in 1996. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff 

was an obstetrician/ gynecologist practicing in Half Moon Bay, California. Compl. ¶ 5. In July 

2001, Plaintiff was acquitted in San Mateo Superior Court of criminal charges based on multiple

patients’ allegations that he had performed “inappropriate examinations.” Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff 

alleges his “acquittal was based on trial testimony of all four patients impeaching their own 

allegations,” as well as unrebutted testimony by prosecution and defense experts that “[P]laintiff’s 

examinations were appropriate, did not depart from standards of care or practice, and did not 

constitute sexual misconduct, unprofessional conduct, or sexual abuse.” Id. 

In March 2002, after Plaintiff’s acquittal, the Board brought an “Accusation” against 

Plaintiff, seeking to revoke his medical license “based on the same patients, allegations, and 

related issues” in his criminal trial. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 23. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Ruth Astle 

conducted Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing in August 2002. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 25. Plaintiff alleges that the 

criminal trial record was “incorporated by reference” in the Board hearing, and that Astle noted 

she was aware of Plaintiff’s acquittal. Id. Following the hearing, Astle submitted a Proposed 

Decision recommending that the Board revoke Plaintiff’s medical license. Plaintiff alleges that 

Astle excluded all of Plaintiff’s exculpatory evidence, including expert testimony, simply

relabeling the Board’s allegations as “Findings.” Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27; see also id. at ¶¶ 28-35. The 

Board accepted her recommendation and revoked his medical license effective May 5, 2003. Id. at 

¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges he filed timely appeals of the Board’s decision, all of which were denied. He 

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retired involuntarily in 2006. Id at ¶ 9.

Plaintiff alleges that in or around 2014, he discovered the “similar case” of physician Dr. 

Robert Sinaiko, whose medical license was revoked by the Board in 1998 after ALJ Astle 

recommended revocation but excluded all exculpatory evidence. Id. at ¶ 10. He alleges that 

Astle’s acts “in falsely submitting two Proposed Decisions recommending revocation of both Dr. 

Sinaiko’s license and [P]laintiff’s license while excluding and concealing all their exculpatory 

evidence, demonstrates a pattern of behavior of callous indifferent to the evidence, and reckless 

disregard for the judicial process,” which constitutes “a Fraud upon the Court by corruption of the 

judicial machinery that deprived Dr. Sinaiko and [P]laintiff of their fundamental 6th Amendment 

rights to a fair trial and fundamental 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendment rights to due process and 

property interest protections,” which caused the “unlawful revocation of their licenses.” Id. at ¶ 

11. 

Plaintiff asserts violations of his own constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 12-15. He sues the Board; Ron Joseph, former Executive Director of the Medical 

Board of California, individually and in his official capacity; Kimberly Kirchmeyer, current 

Executive Director of the Medical Board of California, individually and in her official capacity; 

and ALJ Astle, individually and in her official capacity. Plaintiff brings four claims for relief: 1) 

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, based upon Astle’s “fraud upon the court,” denial of a fair trial, and unlawful 

deprivation of property; 2) violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon the Board’s revocation of Plaintiff’s 

medical license; 3) violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon Joseph’s negligently hiring of Astle and assigning 

and/or approving the assignment of Astle to conduct Board disciplinary hearings against Plaintiff; 

and 4) violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon Kirchmeyer’s formulation of or assistance with formulating policies 

that permit the Board to “continue its acquiesce[nce] in the continuing violation” of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights that resulted in the 2003 revocation of his medical license. See Compl. ¶¶ 65-

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68. Plaintiff asserts that he does not seek to vacate the Board’s decision to revoke his license. 

Compl. at ¶ 17.

B. Analysis

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. 

Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). The appropriate period is that of the forum state’s 

statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 

2004). In the event the state has “multiple statutes of limitations, ‘courts considering § 1983 

claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.’” Silva v. Crain, 

169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989)). In 

California, effective January 1, 2003, the general residual statute of limitations for personal injury 

actions is the two-year period set forth in California Civil Procedure Code section 335.1 and is the 

applicable statute in Section 1983 actions. See Maldonado, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55. A Section 

1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the 

basis of the action.” Id. at 955 (quotation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims are clearly time-barred. Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 9, 

2016, complaining of Astle’s actions in 2002 and the Board’s 2003 decision to revoke his medical 

license. Plaintiff does not allege that he was unaware of Astle’s failure to include the exculpatory 

evidence from his criminal trial in her recommendation; to the contrary, he alleges that his appeals 

of the Board’s revocation of his medical licenses were based upon her “withholding the 

exculpatory evidence.” See Compl. ¶ 37. Therefore, any claims based on those actions are long 

expired under the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s claims one through four, all of which 

are based upon Astle’s actions and the Board’s revocation of his license, are untimely and should 

be dismissed with prejudice on that basis. 

Plaintiff makes vague and contradictory allegations regarding a “fraud upon the court.” On 

the one hand, he does not seek to vacate the Board’s decision to revoke his license due to a fraud 

upon the court. See Compl. at ¶ 17. However, elsewhere in his complaint, Plaintiff appears to 

take a different position, describing “the question to be decided” in his case as “whether by 

effectively excluding the expert testimony and omitting all of his other exculpatory evidence, ALJ 

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Astle gave him a fair hearing.” Id. at ¶ 49. He also alleges that “[t]here is no statute of limitations 

for asserting Fraud upon the Court.” Id. at ¶ 16. Therefore, liberally construing the complaint in 

light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff appears to assert that Astle’s recommendation that his 

license be revoked constituted a “fraud upon the court.” See Compl. ¶ 65b. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(d) permits a court to “entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 

judgment, order, or proceeding” and to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(d)(1), (3).

To the extent Plaintiff pleads such a claim, he essentially challenges the Board’s 

acceptance of Astle’s recommendation that his license be revoked. The Board’s decision was 

subsequently affirmed on appeal. See Dye v. Superior Court, No. A114307, 2006 WL 2006337, at 

*1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 19, 2006) (dismissing appeal of judgment denying Plaintiff’s petition for

writ of administrative mandamus seeking to vacate an order revoking his medical license)1. His 

“fraud upon the court” claim is therefore barred under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which bars 

federal district courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. See Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (recognizing that the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 

district court review and rejection of those judgments”). Rooker–Feldman’s bar applies even 

when a challenge to a state court decision implicates federally protected rights. Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (“[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking 

what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court 

based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”). 

The court therefore recommends that the district court dismiss any claim for fraud upon the court

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

 

1

The court in Dye describes the trial court’s judgment as follows: “The judgment incorporates a 

statement of decision and sets forth express findings that the Medical Board proceeded in a 

manner prescribed by law, that Dye was afforded a fair trial, that the Board’s decision was 

supported by its findings and that its findings were supported by evidence in the administrative 

record.” 2006 WL 2006337, at *1.

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II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that Plaintiff’s IFP application be granted 

and Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to reassign this case 

to a district judge.

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2016

______________________________________

DONNA M. RYU

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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