Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02634/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02634-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA PFITZER also known as No. 2:09-cv-02634-MCE-GGH

PAMELA EBERT,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BENEFICIAL CALIFORNIA, INC.;

and Does 1-10 inclusive, and

MANN BRACKEN, LLP,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Pamela Pfitzer (“Plaintiff”) seeks monetary relief

from Defendants for alleged violations of the federal Truth in

Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and the federal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

Presently before the Court is a Motion by Beneficial

California, Inc. (“Defendant”) to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is

granted.1

Case 2:09-cv-02634-MCE-AC Document 25 Filed 03/19/10 Page 1 of 7
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 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 2

allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint unless

otherwise specified.

2

BACKGROUND2

On August 21, 2006, Defendant Beneficial mailed to Plaintiff

a pre-screened credit line offer of $8,000.00 with an initial

check of $7,000.00. Plaintiff entered into a contract with

Defendant and by 2008, the balance due on the credit line

including fees and interest was $9,551.53. 

On October 8, 2008, Defendant, through its debt collector

Mann Bracken, LLP, (“Mann Bracken”) began attempting to collect

the debt from Plaintiff via mail and phone calls. According to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,

Plaintiff learned from employees of Mann Bracken that in the

event of default, it was possible for Defendant to record any

judgment obtained against Plaintiff against her property.

Plaintiff now alleges that Defendant failed to provide

required disclosures to Plaintiff prior to the consummation of

the transaction, in violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant failed to provide such disclosures clearly and

conspicuously in writing as mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a),

Defendant failed to properly identify property subject to a

security interest as mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9), and

Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff that in the event of a

default, Defendant would record a judgment against any property

owned by Plaintiff. 

Case 2:09-cv-02634-MCE-AC Document 25 Filed 03/19/10 Page 2 of 7
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3

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's

obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to

relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 555

(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain

something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

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Case 2:09-cv-02634-MCE-AC Document 25 Filed 03/19/10 Page 3 of 7
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4

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

The purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of

credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more

readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the

uninformed use of credit...” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide mandatory

disclosures as required under TILA. Defendant argues that

Plaintiff's claim for TILA violations is time-barred because

civil penalties under TILA are subject to a one-year statute of

limitations.

Specifically the statute of limitations for damages under

TILA, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), states that, “Any action

under this section may be brought in any United States district

court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within

one year from the date of occurrence of the violation.” 

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5

The “date of occurrence” is the date the transaction is

consummated. See Walker v. Washington Mutual Bank FA, 63 F.

App'x. 316, 317 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff has failed to allege the actual date she entered

the contract with Defendant, leaving the Court to only speculate

as to the applicable period of limitations. Nonetheless,

Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss acknowledges

expiration of the statutory period (Pl.’s Opp’n pg. 3) and seeks

to save her claim by arguing that equitable tolling should apply

to suspend the statute of limitations. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the doctrine of equitable

tolling may, in appropriate circumstances, suspend the

limitations period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable

opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures that form the

basis of the TILA action.” King v. State of California, 784 F.2d

910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). In determining justifiable application

of the equitable tolling doctrine, a court “focuses on excusable

delay by the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 414

(9th Cir. 2002). 

“Excusable delay” is defined as whether a reasonable

plaintiff would not have known of the existence for a possible

claim within the limitations period. Lukovsky v. City & County

of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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6

To establish excusable delay, the plaintiff must show “fraudulent

conduct by the defendant resulting in concealment of the

operative facts, failure of the plaintiff to discover the

operative facts that are the basis of its cause of action within

the limitations period, and due diligence by the plaintiff until

discovery of those facts.” Federal Election Com'n v. Williams,

104 F.3d 237, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, the only explanation that Plaintiff provides to invoke

this equitable protection is that “critical terms were not

disclosed” to her, and “therefore she could not have reasonably

discovered these provisions [regarding her debt].” However

Plaintiff has not plead any level of due diligence on her own

part to seek out the necessary disclosures within the prescribed

statutory period. The touchstone of the “excusable delay”

inquiry is that the plaintiff sought to discover operative facts

but was actively prevented from doing so by Defendant. If

Plaintiff is going to seek equitable treatment from this Court,

she must invest the requisite effort necessary to justify

suspending the statute of limitations. 

Equitable tolling will not be applied, and thus the statute

of limitations period has expired. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s TILA claim is granted.

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7

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(Docket No. 20) is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later than

twenty (20) days after the date this Memorandum and Order is

filed electronically. If no amended complaint is filed within

said twenty (20)-day period, without further notice, Plaintiff’s

claims will be dismissed without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-02634-MCE-AC Document 25 Filed 03/19/10 Page 7 of 7