Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01529/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01529-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY LEE COBBS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1529 MCE JFM P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction on

charges of street terrorism and first-degree murder for the benefit of a street gang, with use of a

firearm. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for a

“claim-of-right” jury instruction; (2) there is insufficient evidence the shooting was the natural

and probable consequence of an unarmed assault; (3) if the evidence is not insufficient as a

matter of law, the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction to the effect that

the shooting was not a natural and probable consequence of the target act if it was the

independent act of one of the participants; (4) the jury instructions improperly permitted the jury

to consider whether the crime of murder in the abstract is a natural and probable consequence of

the crime of assault in the abstract; (5) the natural and probable consequence doctrine improperly

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1

 This statement of facts is taken from the April 19, 2001 opinion by the California Court

of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-5, appended as Exhibit

A to Respondent’s Answer, filed on February 20, 2003. 

2

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3

 For clarity, we refer to Diane and her daughters by their first names.

2

permits conviction based on ordinary negligence; (6) the natural and probable consequence

doctrine creates an unconstitutional presumption; (7) the trial court erred in admitting expert

testimony on petitioner’s state of mind and guilt of the offenses; (8) the trial court erred in

denying his motion to strike his prior juvenile adjudication; and (9) he was prejudiced by denial

of the right to a continuous preliminary hearing. Upon careful consideration of the record and

the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas

corpus relief be denied.

 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

At trial with codefendant Undrey Darnel Turner, the prosecution

argued [petitioner] was guilty of first degree murder on either of

two theories: felony murder based on attempted robbery, and

murder as the natural and probable consequence of assault and

battery.

The jury convicted [petitioner] of first degree murder in count one

(Pen. Code, § 187),2 without indicating the theory on which it

based its verdict. It also found true allegations the murder was

committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd.

(b) (1)), and [petitioner] was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd.

(a) (1)). The jury found [petitioner] guilty of street terrorism in

count two. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a).) The court sentenced

[petitioner] to an aggregate term of 53 years to life in prison.

* * *

Diane King lived at 330 West Magnolia in Stockton with her five

adult daughters – Shaun, Tachelle, Willette, Carriel, and Shalia –

and their children.3 Kenny Williams, Willette’s fiancé, had been

living with the Kings for approximately two months. Shavonn

Bragg and her daughter were also staying at the home. The Kings

knew [petitioner] because he was Diane’s sister’s nephew, and

dated Bragg’s first cousin. Bragg had seen [petitioner] and

Williams fighting at [petitioner’s] birthday party a few weeks

before.

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[Petitioner] knocked on Diane’s door around 3:00 a.m. on

September 13, 1997. Williams and Bragg were watching

television in the living room. [Petitioner] was drunk, and asked

them to drive him home. While preparing to leave with Bragg,

[petitioner] discovered his gun was missing. He looked for the gun

in the house, then accused Williams of taking it. Williams denied

having the gun, and told [petitioner] to leave. The Kings locked

the door after [petitioner] left. [Petitioner] had a “tantrum” on the

porch, kicked the door, and threw things around. He yelled,

“Somebody got my gun,” and “I’m going to get this house. I’m

going to shoot this house up.” Diane called the police, but

[petitioner] left before they arrived.

Later the same morning, [petitioner] told friends that his gun was

missing. [Petitioner] said “he didn’t know where he left it or what

he did with it because he was drunk.” However, he wanted to talk

to somebody about getting it back. The group of people who

gathered outside Filbert Arms Apartments started teasing

[petitioner] about Williams beating him up at the party. One

commented, “If you go over [to where Williams lives], the person

who has [petitioner’s] gun might blast you all.” [Petitioner] and

Sam Grim pumped up the crowd, saying “Let’s go.”

James “Scratch” Hopkins was sitting in front of the Madison Arms

Apartments, around the corner from the King home. [Petitioner]

approached Hopkins with a group of approximately 10 young men. 

Several, including [petitioner], were later identified by an expert on

criminal street gangs as members of the East Coast Crips.

[Petitioner] asked Hopkins if he knew anything about the missing

gun. Hopkins denied having it. He then retrieved a gun from his

apartment, and told his girlfriend to lock the door. Hopkins saw

Aaron Hargrove, one of the men with [petitioner], take a Mac-11

out of its case, and load it. Eventually, the focus shifted away from

Hopkins.

The group started walking toward the King home with [petitioner]

in the lead. Some stayed on the porch, and others, including

[petitioner] and codefendant Turner, went inside. Williams and

Bragg were in the northeast bedroom watching a football game on

television. Bragg saw [petitioner] walk from the kitchen toward

the bedroom, saying, “Where is my gun?” [Petitioner], Turner,

Hargrove, Grim, and Larry Fullard entered the room as Williams

started to get out of bed. They socked and kicked Williams, who

fell to the floor without swinging back. Williams screamed that he

did not have [petitioner’s] gun. Grim testified he and Turner tried

to stop Hargrove when he walked in and pointed a gun at Williams. 

Hargrove started to leave, then turned and shot Williams in the 

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chest from a distance of two feet. Williams was pronounced dead

shortly after he arrived at the emergency room.

(People v. Ricky Lee Cobbs, slip op. at 3-5.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

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(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

All of the claims contained in the instant petition were raised on direct appeal in

the California Court of Appeal, which issued a reasoned decision on the claims. (Answer, Exs.

A, B.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s claims on petition for

review. (Answer, Ex. B.) Accordingly, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal provides

the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner raises several claims of jury instruction error. After setting forth the

applicable legal principles, the court will analyze these claims in turn below. 

1. Legal Standards

In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to

warrant federal habeas relief, challenged jury instructions “cannot be merely ‘undesirable,

erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process right

guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (1988)

(quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail on such a claim petitioner

must demonstrate “that an erroneous instruction‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 317 (quoting Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d

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299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In making its determination, this

court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the

jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v.

Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). Where the challenge is to a refusal or failure to

give an instruction, the petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy,” because “[a]n omission, or an

incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). See also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616,

624 (9th Cir. 1997). 

2. Instruction on Claim-of-Right

As explained above, one of the prosecution theories was that petitioner was guilty

of first degree felony murder on the basis that the homicide occurred during the commission of

an attempted robbery of the gun. Petitioner’s defense to this theory of the case was that he was

merely trying to reclaim his own property; he had no intent to steal the gun because it belonged to

him. He requested the following jury instruction on “claim of right,” which he argued would

have negated the finding of intent to commit a robbery: 

The defendant’s honest belief, even if mistakenly held, that [he]

[she] had a right or claim to the property taken negates the

felonious intent necessary to convict [him] [her] of [robbery]

[burglary] [or] theft.

The defendant need not show the claim of right was reasonable. 

An unreasonable belief that [he] [she] had a legal right to take the

property will suffice so long as the claim was made in good faith.

If the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant

acted under a bona-fide belief in a right or claim to the property

you must find that defendant did not form the necessary felonious

intent.

(Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 614.) The trial court declined to give this instruction.

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to give the “claim of right” jury

instruction relieved the prosecution of proving the element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt,

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in violation of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). He also claims that the omission of this jury instruction prevented him from presenting

his defense that he the lacked the intent required for a guilty finding of felony murder. See

United States v. Burt, 410 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[a] defendant is entitled to

instructions relating to a defense theory for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even

though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility”). Finally,

relying on Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1999), petitioner argues that the trial court’s

error in refusing to give the requested jury instruction is reversible per se. 

In its decision denying petitioner’s claim in this regard, the California Court of

Appeal noted the extensive evidence in this case that petitioner was trying to retrieve his own

gun when he went to the King residence and that he “acted with the bona fide, subjective belief

Williams had the gun that belonged to him.” (Opinion at 7.) Based on this evidence, the

appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the “claim-of

right defense.” (Id. at 8.) In reaching this decision, however, the court noted as follows:

It has long been the rule in this state and generally throughout the

country that a bona fide belief, even though mistakenly held, that

one has a right or claim to the property negates felonious intent.

[Citations.] (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1143.) 

However, a claim-of-right defense is limited to “forcible takings

intended to recover specific personal property in which the

defendant in good faith believes he has a bona fide claim of

ownership or title.” (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935,

956.) Its availability is also limited by policy considerations where

the claim to the property is “founded in a ‘notoriously illegal’

transaction.” (Id. at p. 954, fn. 5, citing People v. Hendricks

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [fee for prostitution]; People v. Gates

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1182 [proceeds from a forgery ring]; and

People v. Johnson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 425, 457-458 [payment

for illegal drugs].) “‘[A] trial court is not required to instruct on a

claim-of-right defense unless there is evidence to support an

inference that [the defendant] acted with a subjective belief he or

she had a lawful claim on the property.’” (People v. Barnett, supra,

at p. 1145, emphasis in original.)

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(Id. at 7.) The appellate court also concluded that the trial court’s error was harmless under the

facts of this case. The court reasoned as follows:

Relying on Conde v. Henry, (9th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 734,

[petitioner] says the error in this case is reversible per se because

[petitioner] “could not argue claim of right as a valid legal theory

and was refused a jury instruction on this issue which could have

eliminated a finding of robbery and thus felony murder.” The court

in Conde v. Henry acknowledged the general rule set forth in

Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. 1 [144 L.Ed.2d 35], but

found: “Here, the trial court improperly precluded Conde’s

attorney from making closing argument explaining the defendant’s

theory of the case, it refused to instruct the jury on the defendant’s

theory, and, over the defendant’s objection, it gave jury instructions

that did not require that the jury find every element of the offense. 

Together, these errors deprived the petitioner of effective

assistance of counsel, due process and trial by jury on every

element of the charged crime.” (Conde v. Henry, supra, at p. 741,

emphasis added.) In the case before us, the court allowed defense

counsel to argue [petitioner] lacked the intent to steal, and he did

so. [Petitioner] does not challenge the jury instructions given on

felony murder or intent to steal. We therefore reject as meritless

[petitioner’s] argument this case involves more than simple

instructional error subject to the Chapman analysis.

Based on this record, we conclude the error in refusing to instruct

the jury on the claim-of-right defense was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt, that is, that “the guilty verdict actually rendered

in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” (Sullivan v.

Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [124 L.Ed.2d 182, 189],

emphasis in original; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p.

24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) The jury found true the allegation in

count one that [petitioner] committed murder “for the benefit of, at

the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang” in

violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b) (1), and found

[petitioner] guilty in count two of street terrorism in violation of

section 186.22, subdivision (a). In addition, the court found true

the allegation [petitioner] was convicted as a juvenile of shooting

at an inhabited dwelling in violation of section 246, a prior felony

conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (d), and

section 1170.12, subdivision (b). By virtue of his conviction of an

offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,

subdivision (b), [petitioner] was not permitted to “own, or have in

his . . . possession or under his . . . custody or control any firearm

until the age of 30 years.” (§ 12021, subd. (e).) He was 26 years

old when he committed the current offenses. Thus, [petitioner’s]

claim to the gun was founded in his notoriously illegal activities,

and he was not entitled to invoke the claim-of-right defense. (See

People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 642; People v. Gates, 

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supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1182; and People v. Johnson, supra, 233

Cal.App.3d at pp. 457-458.)

(Id. at 9-11.)

This court accepts the state courts’ conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing

to give petitioner’s requested “claim-of-right” jury instruction. This court also agrees that the

error is subject to harmless error analysis. Conde v. Henry is not a United States Supreme Court

case. Further, Conde was evaluated under the less stringent pre-AEDPA standards. Id., 198 F.3d

at 738 ("AEDPA's restrictions do not apply because the original petition was filed before the

effective date of AEDPA"). As explained above, a federal writ of habeas corpus will issue only

when the state court decision is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). A federal habeas court “can no longer reverse a state court decision merely because that

decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal Constitutional issue.” Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Conde does not dictate the result in

this case. 

In any event, as explained by the state appellate court, the facts in Conde are

distinguishable from the facts of this case. Here, unlike the situation in Conde, petitioner’s

counsel was allowed to argue his defense that petitioner lacked the intent to steal because he

believed he owned the gun. (See Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 1944-47, 1798-99.)

Further, unlike Conde, the jury instructions at petitioner’s trial did not relieve the jury from

finding every element of the offense. Accordingly, Conde is not dispositive and the trial court’s

jury instruction error is subject to harmless error analysis. Neder, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999) (state

court’s error in giving a jury instruction that omitted an element of the offense subject to

harmless error analysis).

In order to grant habeas relief where a state court has determined that a

constitutional error was harmless, a reviewing court must determine: (1) that the state court's

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decision was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court harmless error

precedent, and (2) that the petitioner suffered prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619 (1993) from the constitutional error. Inthavong v. LaMarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir.

2005). Because both of these tests must be satisfied before relief can be granted, a habeas court

may address them in any order. Id. at 1061. 

On collateral review, an error is not "harmless" if it "had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. In determining

whether an error is harmless, the question is “what effect the error had or reasonably may be

taken to have had upon the jury's decision.'" Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1322 (9th

Cir.1994) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., concurring)), overruled on other

grounds by Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir.2003). An error is not

harmless if a reviewing court is "in grave doubt" as to whether the error had "substantial and

injurious effect or influence." O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995)

As explained by the California Court of Appeal, the trial court’s error in refusing a

jury instruction on petitioner’s “claim-of-right” defense could not have had substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the verdict because the defense was not available to petitioner

under California law. Pursuant to California law, a criminal defendant does not have a legitimate

claim of right to personal property if the property belongs to him because of his commission of

illegal acts. See Hendricks, 44 Cal.3d at 642; Gates, 43 Cal.3d at 1182. Petitioner’s jury found

that petitioner committed the murder in furtherance of a criminal street gang. As such,

petitioner’s asserted “right” to the gun was rooted in activities that were notoriously illegal. 

Further, petitioner was not legally entitled to possess a gun at the time of the crime because of his

prior conviction of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. (Opinion at 10.) Under California law, as

explained by the state appellate court, a claim-of-right defense was not available to petitioner

under these circumstances. (Id. at 10-11.)

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In sum, the trial court’s refusal to give a “claim-of-right” jury instruction did not

eliminate the duty of petitioner’s jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner

harbored the intent to steal, did not result in prejudice to petitioner, and did not violate

petitioner’s right to present a defense. Cf. Burt, 410 F.3d at 1104 (conviction reversed on appeal

where trial court’s failure to instruct on defendant’s theory of defense resulted in prejudice

because, without the instruction, jury was required to find defendant guilty). The decision of the

California Court of Appeal to the same effect is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

3. Doctrine of Natural and Probable Consequences

The other prosecution theory at petitioner’s trial was that Williams’s murder was

the natural and probable consequence of an assault and battery that petitioner aided and abetted. 

Petitioner raises a number of claims challenging his conviction pursuant to this theory of liability. 

The court will evaluate these claims in turn below.

A. Insufficient Evidence that the Shooting was the Natural and Probable

Consequence of an Unarmed Assault

Petitioner first argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the

prosecution’s theory that he was guilty of murder because he aided and abetted an assault on

Williams. Petitioner argues, in essence, that the evidence does not support a finding that he

intended any crime or that he had any reason to know Hargrove had a gun or would use a gun to

shoot Williams. Petitioner states that he went over to the Williams residence simply to look for

his gun or to try and buy it back and that “there was never a plan to commit any crimes or do

anything to Kenny Williams.” (Traverse at consecutive p. 19.) He further explains:

There was no evidence that [petitioner] was aware that Hargrove

would take it upon himself to obtain a gun or any evidence that

[petitioner] knew that Hargrove did so and brought it to the scene. 

To the contrary, the evidence was that the various persons involved

in the physical assault on Williams went unarmed to the King

house, used only their fists and feet resulting only in bruises, and 

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that they tried to verbally and physically prevent Hargrove from

using the weapon once he entered the room with the gun displayed.

(Pet., Ex. A at 24.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There

is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “[T]he dispositive question

under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318). A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus “faces a heavy burden when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due

process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n .13 (9th Cir. 2005). In order

to grant the writ, the habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected an

objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id.

The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier of

fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign the

inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir.1994). The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th

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Cir.1991). “The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. 

It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v.

Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the

substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324

n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. In California, 

An aider and abettor is a person who: (1) acting with knowledge of

the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) with the intent or

purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission

of the offense; (3) by act of advice aids, promotes, encourages, or

instigates the commission of the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984)

35 Cal.3d 547, 561l) A defendant may be held criminally

responsible as an accomplice not only for the crime he intended to

aid and abet (the target crime), but also for any other crime that is

the natural and probable consequence of the target crime. (People

v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) Where the allegations

raise the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the trier of

fact must find two elements in addition to those set forth in the test

for aider and abettor liability: (1) that the perpetrator committed an

offense other than the target crime; and (2) the offense committed

by the perpetrator was a natural and probable consequence of the

target crime that the defendant aided and abetted. (People v.

Prettyman, aupra, at p. 262.) However, if the jury finds a

defendant encouraged a codefendant to commit an assault, but had

no reason to believe the codefendant would use a deadly weapon to

commit the assault, it may not find that the murder was a natural

and probable consequence of the assault. (Id. at p. 267; People v.

Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817, 836-837.) “‘The question of

what constitutes a natural and probable consequence is one of fact

for the jury.’” (People v. Luparello (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 410,

443, citation omitted.)

(Opinion at 11-12.) "The test for an aider and abettor's liability for collateral criminal offenses ...

depends upon all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular defendant's conduct." 

People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 535 (1993). The natural and probable consequences

doctrine uses an objective test. Liability "is measured by whether a reasonable person in the

defendant's position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably

foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted." Id. at 535.

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4

 The appellate court also stated that “Grim and [petitioner] began pumping up the group,

saying “Let’s go.” (Id. at 13.) Petitioner correctly points out that the record actually reflects that

only Grim “pumped up” the group. (RT at 1283-84, 1420.) However, even without evidence

that petitioner “pumped up” the crowd, the Court of Appeal’s ultimate conclusion is not an

unreasonable application of Jackson. 

14

The California Court of Appeal concluded that “a reasonable jury could find

[petitioner] was an instigator and leader in the attack on Williams, and knew Hargrove had a

loaded weapon. Moreover, in reaching a guilty verdict, the jury could elect to disregard as not

credible Grim’s self-serving testimony that he and codefendant Turner tried to stop Hargrove

from using the gun.” (Opinion at 14.) This conclusion is not an unreasonable application of

Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. As recited by the

California Court of Appeal, 

When [petitioner] told his fellow gang members someone had

taken his gun, they began teasing him about the earlier fight with

Williams at [petitioner’s] birthday party. Grim wanted to get the

gun, and was upset [petitioner] was not doing anything. Michael

Rocquemore advised [petitioner], “Hey, you can’t go get a gun

with no gun.”

[Petitioner] first approached Hopkins, and asked if he knew

anything about the gun. Hopkins said he did not. Hopkins saw

Hargrove with a black gun case. Hopkins got a gun from his

apartment. When he returned to the group, he saw Hargrove take a

Mac-11 out of the gun case and load it. Rocquimore and

codefendant Turner were standing nearby, and [petitioner] was

going the other way.

Hopkins told the investigating officer that [petitioner] pointed out

where Williams lived, and led the group in that direction.

[Petitioner], Turner, Grim, and Fullard had forced Williams to the

floor with their blows, when Hargrove pulled out his gun and shot

him. Rocquimore affirmed at trial that if someone “disrespects”

the gang, they are dealt with harshly. Sometimes this involves a

beating. Sometimes it involves being shot, and killed “[i]f it get[s]

that far, . . .”

(Opinion at 13-14.)4 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence was

sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that Williams’s murder was the natural and

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probable consequence of an assault that petitioner aided and abetted. Reasonable jurors could

have found that petitioner intended to commit an assault upon Williams when he went to his

residence and that he knew Hargrove carried a gun and could use it on Williams. The fact that

petitioner can construct from the evidence alternative scenarios at odds with the verdict does not

mean that the evidence was insufficient. The appellate court’s ruling that there was sufficient

evidence to support the verdict is not objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Trial Court’s Denial of Requested Jury Instructions

Petitioner’s next claim is that even if the evidence is sufficient to support his

murder conviction on a theory that he aided and abetted an assault, he is still entitled to habeas

corpus relief because the trial court erred in denying his request for special jury instructions. 

Specifically, petitioner argues that the trial court improperly refused to “instruct the jury on the

theory of defense that the shooting was not a natural and probable consequence of the target act if

it was an independent act of one of the participants.” (Pet., Ex. A at 28.) 

The California Court of Appeal fairly explained the background to this claim as

follows:

In this case, [petitioner] proposed the following instructions at

trial:

Defense Instruction No. 1: “Homicide is not, as a matter of law, a

natural and probable consequence of a gang attack.”

Defense Instruction No. 4: “You may not find Mr. Cobbs guilty as

an aider and abettor of homicide unless a reasonable person in the

same position as Mr. Cobbs, and under like circumstances, would

have recognized that homicide was a natural and probable

consequence of the act aided and abetted.”

Defense Instruction No. 5: “Mr. Cobbs may not be found guilty of

aiding and abetting a homicide as a natural and probable

consequence of the target offense if the homicide was a fresh and

independent product of the mind of one of the participants, outside

of, foreign to, the common design.”

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An “Addendum” to CALJIC No. 3.02: “You may not find the

defendant guilty as an aider and abettor unless a reasonable person

under like circumstances would have recognized that the crime

charged was a natural and probable consequence of the act aided

and abetted. In making this determination, you may only consider

those circumstances which the defendant knew at the time that the

act[s], upon which the aiding and abetting allegation is based, were

committed.

“A criminal act is not a natural and probable consequence of the

target offense if the act was a fresh and independent product of the

mind of one of the participants, outside of, or foreign to, the

common design.”

The court denied [petitioner’s] request, reiterating its reluctance to

“monkey[] with CALJIC.” It instructed the jury on aiding and

abetting and accomplice liability in accordance with CALJIC Nos.

3.01 96th ed. 1996), 3.02 (1997 rev.), and 3.14 (6th ed. 1996). 

Specifically, the court informed the jury that “[m]erely assenting to

or aiding or assisting in the commission of a crime without

knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and without

the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the

commission of the crime is not criminal. Thus, a person who

assents to or aids or assists in the commission of a crime without

that knowledge and without that intent or purpose is not an

accomplice in the commission of a crime.”

(Opinion at 15-17.) The appellate court concluded that these jury instructions “fully and fairly

informed the jury of the applicable law.” (Id. at 17.)

Petitioner argues that the trial court was required to give his requested jury

instructions because “sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support instructions on

[petitioner’s] theory of defense, that the shooting was Hargrove’s independent act, and the

negating effect that this may have on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, on which

[petitioner’s] guilt was allegedly based.” (Pet., Ex. A at 30.) This court agrees with the

California Court of Appeal that the jury instructions given at petitioner’s trial, set forth above,

fairly supported petitioner’s defense theory that the shooting was not a natural and probable

consequence of an assault that petitioner aided and abetted because it was an “independent act”

of Hargrove. Under the circumstances presented by this case, petitioner has failed to meet his

“heavy burden” to show that the omission of the requested jury instructions rendered his trial

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5

 The exact jury instruction given at petitioner’s trial states, in relevant part: “In order to

find the defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged in Count 1, you must be satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt that:

“1. The crime of assault or battery was committed;

“2. That the defendant aided and abetted those crimes;

“3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of murder; and

“4. That the crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission

of the crimes of assault or battery.” (CT at 508.)

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fundamentally unfair. Petitioner has also failed to cite a United States Supreme Court case which

holds that the absence of jury instructions informing the jury that the act of a perpetrator cannot

be a natural and probable consequence of a target act if it was “independent” renders a criminal

trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the decision of the state courts with respect to this claim

is not contrary to established Supreme Court precedent and may not be set aside. Petitioner is

not entitled to relief on this claim.

C. Abstract Findings

Petitioner’s next claim is that CALJIC No. 3.02, given at his trial, improperly

permitted the jury to consider whether the crime of murder in the abstract is a natural and

probable consequence of the crime of assault in the abstract, instead of focusing on the specific

facts of this case.5 He argues that this jury instruction

erroneously permitted the jury to make its “natural and probable

consequences” determination based on whether the crime of

murder in the abstract is a natural and probable consequence of the

crime of assault in the abstract. The error was especially

prejudicial because the People’s expert testified and the prosecutor

argued that murder was a purpose of gangs and a foreseeable

consequence of gang assault generally. In contrast, the defense

case rested solely on the specific circumstances of this case. The

court’s error diverted the jury from a full consideration of those

specific facts of this case where the primary acts involved an

unarmed assault which resulted in minor bruising, followed by an

independent act by Hargrove, who alone was armed, unbeknownst

to Cobbs. Cobbs and the others beating up Williams in the

bedroom did not aid and abet the eventual shooting; instead, they

attempted to stop it when the gun was seen, although they were

unsuccessful in preventing Hargrove from shooting. Yet the

court’s instructions, coupled with the gang expert’s testimony and

the absence of defense requested instructions allowed Cobbs to be

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convicted of the abstract crime of gang murder, without

consideration of his personal culpability under the facts of this

case.

(Pet., Ex. B at 20-21.)

The California Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the grounds that the jury

instructions, as a whole, correctly apprised the jurors that they were required to focus on the facts

of this case and not on the crimes of murder and assault in the abstract. The appellate court

reasoned as follows:

The Supreme Court described the scope of the trial court’s duty to

instruct on the natural and probable consequences doctrine in

People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at page 254: “We conclude

that when the prosecutor relies on the ‘natural and probable

consequences’ dostrine, the trial court must identify and describe

the target crimes that the defendant might have assisted or

encouraged. An instruction identifying target crimes will assist the

jury in determining whether the crime charged was a natural and

probable consequence of some other criminal act. And an

instruction describing the target crimes will eliminate the risk that

the jury will engage in uninformed speculation with regard to what

types of conduct are criminal.” (Emphasis in original.)

In the case before us, the court identified the target crimes of

assault and battery in CALJIC No. 3.02, and described them for

the jury in accordance with CALJIC Nos. 9.00 (1998 rev.), 16.140

(6th ed. 1996), and 16.141 (6th ed. 1996). We therefore conclude

the court complied with its instructional obligations under People

v. Prettyman. We also note that “‘”the correctness of jury

instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court,

not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a

particular instruction “‘” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926,

943.) Here, the court instructed the jury to decide the case based

on evidence received in the trial, and not from any other source.

Moreover, “[w]e credit jurors with intelligence and common sense

[citation] and do not assume that these virtues will abandon them

when presented with a court’s instructions.” (People v. 

Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 594.) Thus, after hearing the

specific charges against [petitioner], listening to the detailed

testimony regarding the events of September 13, 1997, in a lengthy

trial, and receiving the court’s instructions, the jury understood it

was required to determine whether Williams’s murder was the 

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natural and probable consequence of the assault and battery

actually planned and inflicted on the victim.

(Opinion at 18-19.)

This court concludes that the giving of CALJIC No. 3.02 at petitioner’s trial did

not result in a due process violation. Petitioner’s jury was specifically instructed that it should

base its decision on the evidence received in the trial and not from any other source. (CT at 476.) 

There is no evidence that the jurors misunderstood this instruction or refused to follow it, or that

they decided the case based on abstract principles as opposed to the facts of this case. See Penry

v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001) (“[w]e generally presume that jurors follow their

instructions”). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

D. Conviction on a Negligence Standard

Petitioner’s next claim is that CALJIC No. 3.02, which sets forth the “natural and

probable consequences doctrine,” improperly permits a criminal conviction based on ordinary

negligence, in violation of state and federal due process standards, because “the aider and abettor

need not share the perpetrator’s mental state or even intend that the crime be committed so long

as the perpetrator’s commission of the crime was reasonably foreseeable.” (Pet., Ex. A at 40-41.) 

Citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) and Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957),

petitioner argues that “both the California and United States Supreme Courts have consistently

disapproved on the imposition of criminal liability based upon a “strict liability” construction of

a statute which would permit culpability despite a defendant’s ignorance of facts which make an

act punishable.” (Id. at 42.) Petitioner also argues that “the federal constitutional right to fair

trial by jury is implicated when the jury is allowed to impose criminal liability without finding all

necessary elements of the charge.” (Id. at 43.) In state court, petitioner relied on People v.

Smith, 57 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1474, 1488, wherein the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District held that “an abbreviated version of former CALJIC No. 900 (1994 rev.),

which did not distinguish between the “natural and probable consequence” of an act and “intent,”

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6

 In Hicks v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court held that state laws

guaranteeing a defendant procedural rights at sentencing may create liberty interests protected

against arbitrary deprivation by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 447 U.S.

at 343, 346. The court found a due process violation where a state appellate court re-imposed the

defendant's original 40-year sentence, even though the sentence was premised upon a state statute

that had been declared unconstitutional after defendant’s original sentence was imposed and,

without which, the sentence would have been ten years. In Lambert v. California, the United

States Supreme Court held that an ordinance that made it a criminal offense for a convicted felon

to remain in the city of Los Angeles for five days without registering with the Chief of Police

was violative of due process when applied to a person who had no actual knowledge of the duty

to register. 355 U.S. at 225. Both Hicks and Lambert are factually distinguishable from this case

20

erroneously directed the jury to impose a negligence standard to the assault element of assault

with a deadly weapon.” (Opinion at 19-20.)

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments in this regard with

the following language:

As we explained, the court complied with the obligations for

instructing on aider and abettor liability and the natural and

probable consequences doctrine as described in People v.

Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at page 254. Under CALJIC No. 3.02

the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

aided and abetted the crime of assault and battery. The court had

already defined aiding and abetting in accordance with CALJIC

No. 3.01 as follows: “A person aids and abets the commission or

attempted commission of a crime when he or she, [¶] (1) with

knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and [¶] (2)

with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or

facilitating the commission of the offense, by act or advice, aids,

promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” 

(Emphasis added.) We therefore conclude the instructions in this

case properly differentiated between the [petitioner’s] intent in

performing an act to aid and abet the target crime, and the natural

and probable consequences of the target crime.

(Opinion at 20.)

The California Court of Appeal's decision in this regard is not "objectively

unreasonable," Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003), because there is no Supreme Court

precedent on point. No United States Supreme Court case holds that California’s “natural and

probable consequences doctrine,” as set forth in CALJIC 3.02, improperly permits conviction on

a negligence standard.6 On habeas review, with regard to jury instructions, a reviewing court

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and do not provide support for petitioner’s arguments. 

7

 This court also notes that the facts of this case do not give rise to a finding of

negligence. Accordingly, the court need not decide whether the “natural and probable

consequences” doctrine would have application to a case involving mere negligence. See United

States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).

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must not "engage in a technical parsing of [their] language, ... but instead approach the

instructions in the same way that the jury would--with a commonsense understanding of the

instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial." Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,

368 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). As described by the California Court of Appeal, a

review of the instructions as a whole reflects that petitioner’s jury was instructed that to be guilty

as an aider and abettor, he must specifically intend to commit, encourage, or facilitate the

commission of the target offense. In addition, the jury was correctly instructed on the meaning of

the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine. The jury instructions do not eliminate the

need to find intent, do not expressly allow conviction upon proof of mere negligence, and do not

carry that implication when read as a whole. Upon independent review, this court concludes that

use of CALJIC No. 3.02 did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, this

claim should be denied.7

E. Unconstitutional Irrebuttable Presumption

Petitioner’s next claim is that application of the “natural and probable

consequences” doctrine to his case violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

because it created an unconstitutional presumption which relieved the prosecution of its burden

to prove the element of intent (malice) beyond a reasonable doubt and allowed the jury to convict

him based on a mere negligence standard. He explains his claim as follows:

The “natural and probable consequences” doctrine acts as a

presumption of the element of malice for murder. It defines an

objective standard of culpability – the doctrine is based on what a

reasonable person would foresee as “probable and natural

consequences” – and then it uses that standard to conclusively

impute a higher degree of criminal culpability to a person who may

not in fact have foreseen, let alone intended or deliberated on, such

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8

 Petitioner’s jury received the following instruction:

One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or

crimes is not only guilty of that crime or those crimes, but is also

guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a

natural and probable consequence of the crime or crimes originally

aided and abetted.

If you find that the original crime that was planned was simple

Battery, in order to find the defendant guilty of the crimes of

assault with a deadly weapon or a means likely to produce great

bodily harm you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. The crime or crimes of battery was committed;

2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;

3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of

battery; and

4. The crime of assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to

produce great bodily harm was a natural and probable consequence

fo the commission of the crime of battery.

If you find that the original plan was to commit an assault with a

deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily harm,

then this instruction is not applicable.

(CT at 219.)

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consequences. Thus, in a prosecution for murder, the “natural and

probable consequences” doctrine operates as an irrebuttable

presumption that a non-killer has malice, even though such a state

of mind would not be presumed and would have to be proven in

order to convict the actual killer.

* * *

The instructions here had the effect forbidden by the Constitution

because they permitted [petitioner] to be convicted of murder

without any finding that he in fact intended the death of the victim

or even that he was aware that such killing was contemplated by

Hargrove or that Hargrove had a gun. 

(Pet., Ex. A at 43-44.)8

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The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim on direct appeal, stating as

follows:

In People v. Francisco (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1189, the

defendant raised a similar argument. The court affirmed

defendant’s murder conviction. Citing People v. Cooper (1991) 53

Cal.3d 1158, 1162, at footnote 3, it noted that the Supreme Court

“has continued to emphasize the ongoing validity of the theory of

aiding and abetting liability for any reasonably foreseeable offense

committed by the person aided and abetted.” (Francisco, supra, at

p. 1189.) The court explained that “aiding and abetting is one

means under which derivative liability for the commission of a

criminal offense is imposed. It is not a separate criminal offense.

[Citation.] As an aider and abettor, it is the intention to further the

acts of another which creates criminal liability.” (Id. at p. 1190.) 

A similar theory of derivative liability forms the basis of the

felony-murder rule, long accepted in this state. (citation omitted.)

(Opinion at 21-22.)

The state appellate court’s interpretation and analysis of the “natural and probable

consequences” doctrine, a state court construct, may not be challenged in this federal habeas

corpus action. State courts are “the ultimate expositors of state law,” and this court is “bound by

the state's construction except when it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to

evade the consideration of a federal issue.” Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 862 (1994) (quoting

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (construing state court judgment)). See also

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (construing state statute); Melugin

v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) (construing state criminal statute). There is no

evidence of subterfuge here. 

It is true that a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by

the Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact

so infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due

process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d

1107 (9th Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v.

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas

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corpus petition, however, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of

justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a due process violation. As explained by the

state appellate court, the record reflects that petitioner and approximately ten other men went to

the King home with the intention of confronting Williams about petitioner’s missing gun. 

Petitioner had previously threatened to “shoot this house up” and had caused such a disturbance

that the residents locked him out of the house and called the police. Hargrove was carrying a

loaded gun. Petitioner and several other men, including Hargrove, entered the King residence

and confronted Williams, socking and kicking him. During this altercation, Hargrove shot and

killed Williams. A prosecution expert witness testified that petitioner and his co-defendants

were gang members, that the killing of Williams was a gang related activity involving retaliation

and intimidation, and that acts of gang retaliation could become lethal. (RT at 941-43, 956-59,

962-64, 968.) Witness Michael Rocquimore affirmed that if someone “disrespects” the gang,

they could be shot and/or killed. Under these circumstances, petitioner’s conviction of murder

on the theory that it was the natural and probable consequence of an assault he aided and abetted

does not constitute a complete miscarriage of justice. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the jury instruction on “natural and

probable consequences” created an impermissible mandatory presumption of intent. Federal due

process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory presumptions to relieve the

prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314; see

also Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510. In general, “[a] mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it

must infer the presumed fact if . . . certain predicate facts” are proved. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. 

The due process clause is implicated where the presumed fact is an element of the prosecution’s

case, because in that situation proof of predicate facts will either remove the presumed element

from the State’s case altogether or will shift the burden of persuasion on the presumed element to

the defendant. Id. at 317. In either case, such a presumption operates to relieve the State from its

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9

 Although Leary involved analysis of a statutory presumption, “[t]he reasoning of the

statutory inference cases is applicable to analysis of common-law inferences.” Barnes v. United

States, 412 U.S. 837, 844 n.8 (1973).

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constitutional obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime

charged. Id. at 313; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

On the other hand, a permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier

of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof of the basic fact. County Court of Ulster Cty. v. 

Allen, 442 U.S. 149, 157 (1979). In order for such a presumption to pass constitutional muster, it 

must be said with substantial assurance that “the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow

from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36

(1968).9 Similarly, there must be a “rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate

fact presumed” -- a connection grounded in “common experience.” Tot v. United States, 319

U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). However, notwithstanding the label ultimately placed on an

evidentiary presumption, the ultimate test of its constitutionality remains constant: “[t]he device

must not undermine the fact finder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the

State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ulster Cty., 442 U.S. at 156 (citing

In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). 

The jury instruction given at petitioner’s trial on “natural and probable

consequences” did not instruct the jury that it must find a certain mental state if the specified

factors were proven. Rather, the thrust of the instruction was that the jury could not render a

guilty verdict unless the specified factors were established. In that sense, it did not involve a

presumption at all, either mandatory or permissive. Even assuming the jury instruction involved

a presumption, the instruction merely allows, but does not require, the jurors to make a guilty

finding if they found the underlying factors true. It did not instruct the jurors to infer intent or

any other element of the crime charged against petitioner. Accordingly, the instruction did not

employ an impermissible mandatory presumption. This court also notes that petitioner’s jury

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was instructed that a defendant could not be found guilty unless the prosecution proved him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (CT at 499, 505.) Accordingly, the instructions at petitioner’s

trial, considered together, did not permit a rational juror to believe that intent could be found

without proof by the prosecution of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 

For all of the reasons explained above, the opinion of the California Court of

Appeal rejecting petitioner’s claim that the natural and probable consequences doctrine creates an

improper presumption is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor is it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts of this case. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief.

4. Expert Testimony

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings admitting expert

testimony on petitioner’s state of mind and guilt of the offenses violated his rights to due process

and a fair trial. The California Court of Appeal explained the nature of petitioner’s claim in this

regard, and the court’s ruling thereon, as follows:

Evidence Code section 801 provides: “If a witness is testifying as

an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such

an opinion as is:

“(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common

experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of

fact; and

“(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill,

experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally

known to the witness or made known to him at or before the

hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably

may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the

subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is

precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his

opinion.”

Accordingly, expert testimony is admissible if it relates to a subject

beyond the jurors’ common experience even though it

encompasses the ultimate issue in the case. (People v. Olguin

(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1371; Evid. Code, § 805; see People

v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 45.) Thus, where a gang

enhancement is alleged, expert testimony is admissible on the

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culture, habits, and psychology of gangs, because those subjects are

“sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an

expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a);

People v. Olguin, supra, at p. 1370.) Expert testimony that a

defendant is a gang member also falls in this category. (citations

omitted.) However, “[e]xpert opinion is not admissible if it

consists of inferences and conclusions which can be drawn as

easily and intelligently by the trier of fact as by the witness.” 

(People v. Torres, supra, at p. 45 [the jury was competent to

determine whether robberies had been committed].) Under

different circumstances, expert testimony may be required to show

actions by certain individuals were for the benefit of a criminal

street gang. (People v. Valdez, supra, at pp. 508-509 [expert

testimony needed to explain how members of diverse gangs could

have been acting for the benefit of a street gang]; People v. Gamez,

supra, at p. 965 [expert testimony needed to explain relationship

between two gangs whose members were present at the shooting,

and the continuing criminality of one of those gangs].) The trial

court has wide discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony, and

appellate courts will not overturn its rulings on appeal absent an

abuse of discretion. (citation omitted.)

[Petitioner] argues the court erred in admitting over defense

objection expert testimony that [petitioner] had the required mental

state, and legally and factually aided and abetted commission of the

assault and battery. He complains the expert usurped the jury’s

responsibility to determine intent, and whether [petitioner’s]

actions made him an aider and abettor. We conclude that to the

extent the court abused its discretion in admitting the expert

testimony, [petitioner] was not prejudiced. 

The parties’ briefs summarize in detail the hearing on [petitioner’s]

in limine motions to exclude or limit testimony of prosecution

expert Officer Michael Townes, and Townes’s subsequent trial

testimony. Defense argued unsuccessfully that anticipated expert

testimony describing three motives for gang crime – reputation,

retaliation, and profit – was inadmissible because it dealt with

[petitioner’s] state of mind. At trial, Townes added intimidation to

his list of three motives for gang crime. He explained the need to

maintain respect, stating that a gang member is viewed as a weak

link if he allows disrespect to go unanswered. Townes also

described the type of intimidation a gang would commonly use. 

We conclude Townes’s testimony on the motives of gang crime

was properly admitted to describe gang culture and psychology. 

(People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1370.)

Defense counsel also objected in limine to anticipated testimony

that murder was a natural and probable consequence of gang

retaliation, and the court limited the language the expert could use. 

At trial, the prosecutor asked: “Now, Officer Townes, based upon

your training the experience and your participation in the

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investigation of this case regarding the interviewing of witnesses,

the speaking with the investigating officers and other members of

law enforcement, and your review of the court documents, did you

reach an opinion whether or not the death of Kenny Williams was,

in fact, gang-related activity?” Townes answered over objection,

“It’s my opinion that the incident I’m sitting up here testifying to,

was definitely a gang-related incident.” He then recounted the

facts of the case, including some facts not yet before the court. 

Again, we conclude expert testimony was required in this case to

explain how [petitioner’s] earlier confrontation with Williams, and

subsequent loss of his gun, led [petitioner] and his fellow gang

members to the King home on September 13, 1997. The testimony

also related to the central motives behind gang crimes. Such

matters were beyond the common experience of the typical juror. 

(citation omitted.)

[Petitioner] also asserts the court abused its discretion in permitting

Townes to give his definition of aiding and abetting on crossexamination and redirect. However, before allowing Townes to

testify on his understanding of “aid” and “abet,” the court made

clear it would provide the jury with the legal definition of those

terms. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion.

Only one aspect of the expert testimony is problematical under the

principles we have described. In the following exchange, defense

counsel objected to Townes’s description of how various gang

members assisted in the commission of the crime:

“[PROSECUTOR]: Q. Officer Townes, how did the people who

did not pull the trigger killing Kenny Williams, how did they aid

and abet in the commission of the crime?

“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: Again. That’s a legal conclusion. 

I will object.

“.......................................................................................................

“THE COURT: Well, he’s qualified as an expert. These are areas

that an expert can testify to. I will overrule the objection.

“[PROSECUTOR]: Q. How do people who did not pull the trigger

encourage the commission of that crime?

“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: That assumed a fact not in

evidence, and that calls – it’s clearly inappropriate, I object.

“THE COURT: Well, again, based on the facts as he’s related

them, I will permit the answer.

/////

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10 In support of its conclusion that sufficient evidence supported the guilty verdict, the

state appellate court referred to its previous summary of the evidence, set forth in these findings

and recommendations on pg. 14.

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“THE WITNESS: It’s my opinion that they aided and abetted by

intimidation and also by driving at least two individuals out of the

area.

“[PROSECUTOR]: Q. And by beating Mr. Williams, did they

incapacitate him and put him in a vulnerable position whereby he

was more vulnerable to be shot?

“A. Based on [the] circumstances, correct.

“Q. By beating him did they prevent him from fleeing the

shooting?

“A. By the mere fact of the numbers, yes.

“A. Did they assist in evidence not being recovered such as the

gun?

“A. Yes.”

We do not believe the manner of intimidation, escape, or

concealment of evidence involved here was beyond the jurors’

common experience. The jury was competent to determine from

the evidence and the court’s instructions whether [petitioner] aided

and abetted the assault on Williams. (People v. Torres, supra, 33

Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Accordingly, it was improper for the court

to admit expert testimony on that issue. However, we conclude

[petitioner] was not prejudiced by the court’s abuse of discretion. 

Properly admitted evidence supported the guilty verdict based on

aider and abettor liability.

(Opinion at 22-27.)10

An evidentiary ruling, based on state law, may not be set aside in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding unless it “render[ed] the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process.” Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Whelchel

v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th

Cir. 1993). Due process violations warranting federal interference are found "only where

criminal trials in state courts are conducted in such a manner as amounts to a disregard of that

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11 In the traverse, petitioner claims, for the first time, that prosecution expert Officer

Townes violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he testified that

petitioner, who had “exercised his Miranda rights,” admitted during custodial interrogation that

he was a gang member. (Traverse at consecutive p. 22.) To the extent petitioner is attempting to

belatedly raise a claim in this manner, it should be denied on the grounds that it is impermissibly

vague and conclusory, appears to be unexhausted, and may not be raised in the traverse. See

Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”)); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d

504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for

relief); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we review only

issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). 

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fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. . . ." Pike v. Dickson, 323 F.2d 856,

860 (9th Cir. 1963). 

The decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s claim of

evidentiary ruling error is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of these federal due

process standards. After a review of the record in this case, including the jury instructions, this

court concludes that the admission of Towne’s testimony, described above, did not render

petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim.11

5. Motion To Strike Petitioner’s Prior Juvenile Adjudication

The record reflects that petitioner’s sentence was enhanced due to a prior juvenile 

conviction, to which he pled guilty. (CT at 667-73.) Prior to sentencing, petitioner filed a

motion to strike this prior conviction. (Id. at 659.) In a declaration attached to the motion to

strike, petitioner declared that: (1) at the change of plea hearing, he did not specifically admit to

committing the crime for which he was convicted; (2) he was not “fully advised, informed, nor

did I understand my Constitutional rights . . . nor was I fully advised and informed of the

consequences;” (3) he did not expressly waive or understand his constitutional rights; and (4) he

would not have entered an admission to the charge if he had been fully advised of his

constitutional rights and the consequences of an admission. (Id. at 666-67.) The trial court

denied the motion to strike. (RT at 2017.) 

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In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to strike his prior juvenile adjudication. He contends that his guilty plea was involuntary

and uninformed. Specifically, he argues that “he never admitted his guilt and did not personally

waive his constitutional rights. Instead, the colloquy of the plea showed only an understanding of

what would occur in the future.” (Pet., Ex. B at 27.) 

This court notes the following colloquy, which occurred during the change of plea

hearing:

THE COURT: Right. All right. Ricky, as I understand it, you’re

going to admit that on the 27th of August of this year, you did

commit a felony violation of Section 246 of the California Penal

Code, shooting at an inhabited building or motor vehicle? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(CT at 670-71.) (emphasis added.) After this exchange, the trial court advised petitioner that

“when” he admitted the charges, he would be giving up certain constitutional rights. (Id. at 671.) 

Petitioner affirmed that he understood the rights he was giving up. (Id.) At the end of the

hearing, the court accepted petitioner’s plea. (Id. at 672-73.) Petitioner’s claim appears to hinge

on the fact that the trial court’s phraseology indicated that petitioner would be admitting guilt and

waiving his rights at some point in the future. He argues that the record must show he

voluntarily pled guilty and waived his rights using the present tense.

Petitioner’s challenge to his prior conviction is barred by Lackawanna v. Coss,

532 U.S. 394 (2001). In Lackawanna the Supreme Court held that where, as here, a petitioner's

state court conviction was later used to enhance a criminal sentence, "the defendant generally

may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the

prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." 532 U.S. at 403-04. See also Gill v. Ayer,

342 F.3d 911, 919 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003). There are two exceptions to this general rule: (1) petitions

that challenge an enhanced sentence on the basis that the prior conviction used to enhance the

sentence was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as set forth in

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Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and (2) situations where a habeas petition directed

at an enhanced sentence may effectively be the first and only forum available for review of the

prior conviction. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404-05. The record reflects that petitioner was

represented by counsel in connection with his prior guilty plea. Further, petitioner raised this

challenge to his prior conviction in state court. Accordingly, neither exception to the general rule

applies and petitioner is precluded from collaterally attacking his prior conviction through a §

2254 petition. See id. at 406. 

Petitioner’s claim in this regard also fails even when considered on the merits. A

guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,

747-48 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). "The voluntariness of [a

petitioner's] guilty plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances

surrounding it." Brady, 397 F.2d at 749. In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), the

Supreme Court addressed the presumption of verity to be given the plea proceeding record when

the plea is subsequently challenged in a collateral proceeding. While noting that the defendant's

representations at the time of his guilty plea are not "invariably insurmountable" when

challenging the voluntariness of his plea, the Court stated that, nonetheless, the defendant's

representations, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, "constitute a

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings” and that “[s]olemn declarations in

open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Id. at 74. See also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459

U.S. 422, 437 (1983) (plea presumed valid in habeas proceeding when pleading defendant was

represented by counsel); Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court held that the record must

affirmatively show that a criminal defendant's guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary. 395 U.S. at

242-43. In that case, the judge taking the plea asked no questions of petitioner concerning his

guilty plea and petitioner did not address the court. The Supreme Court concluded the record

must reflect that a petitioner pleading guilty understands, and is voluntarily waiving, his rights to

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the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers

and that the court would not presume waiver from a silent record. Id. In Brady the court, citing

Boykin, upheld a guilty plea as voluntary and intelligent even though the defendant had not been

specifically advised of the three rights discussed in Boykin. The court in Brady clarified the

holding of Boykin by stating, “the new element added in Boykin was the requirement that the

record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea

understandingly and voluntarily.” 397 U.S. at 747-48 n.4. Thus, specific articulation of the

Boykin rights “is not the sine qua non of a valid guilty plea.” Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761,

763 (9th Cir. 1974). Rather, if the record demonstrates that a guilty plea is knowing and

voluntary, “no particular ritual or showing on the record is required.” United States v.

McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s challenge to his prior

conviction with the following reasoning:

The transcript of the juvenile hearing shows [petitioner] personally

waived the constitutional rights described by the court, when he

acknowledged he understood “those rights are given up.” With

respect to [petitioner’s] admission to count two of the petition,

counsel explained at the outset that his client was “prepared to

make an admission to Count 2.” The court asked [petitioner]

directly, “Ricky, as I understand it, you’re going to admit that on

the 27th of August of this year, you did commit a felony violation

of Section 246 of the California Penal Code shooting at an

inhabited building or motor vehicle?” [Petitioner] replied, “Yes.” 

Counsel joined in [petitioner’s] waiver of rights, and consented to

the admission. Although the language used by the court might

suggest, in other circumstances, that the admission would come at

a later point in the hearing, it is clear from the context that

everyone, including [petitioner], understood what had transpired.

(Opinion at 28.)

The record of petitioner’s plea taken in connection with his juvenile conviction is

part of the record before this court. (CT at 670-73.) After a review of that transcript, the

undersigned finds that petitioner intended to and did plead guilty at the hearing to the charge of

shooting at an inhabited building or motor vehicle and that his plea was voluntarily made, with

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12 That code section provides, in relevant part:

The preliminary examination shall be completed at one session or

the complaint shall be dismissed, unless the magistrate, for good

cause shown by affidavit, postpones it. The postponement shall not

be for more than 10 court days, unless either of the following

occur:

(1) The defendant personally waives his or her right to a

continuous preliminary examination.

(2) The prosecution establishes good cause for a postponement

beyond the 10- court-day period. If the magistrate postpones the

preliminary examination beyond the 10-court-day period, and the

defendant is in custody, the defendant shall be released pursuant to

subdivision (b) of Section 859b.

(b) The preliminary examination shall not be postponed beyond 60

days from the date the motion to postpone the examination is

granted, unless by consent or on motion of the defendant.

(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the magistrate from

interrupting the preliminary examination to conduct brief court

matters so long as a substantial majority of the court's time is

devoted to the preliminary examination.

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knowledge of the consequences thereof. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

6. Denial of the Right to a Continuous Preliminary Hearing 

In his final claim, petitioner argues that he was improperly denied the right to a

“continuous preliminary hearing” pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 861.12 The state appellate court

denied this claim on state law grounds, essentially finding that petitioner was not prejudiced by

the failure of the trial court to conclude his preliminary hearing within a ten day period. (Opinion

at 28-30.) 

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085;

Gutierrez, 695 F.2d at 1197. It is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application

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13 In the traverse, petitioner raises another unexhausted claim that the trial court violated

double jeopardy principles when it relied on his juvenile conviction to double his sentence under

California’s Three Strikes Law. To the extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly raise a claim

in this manner, it should be denied. Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507; Greenwood, 28 F.3d at 977. 

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of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also, Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir.

1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Petitioner’s claim in this

regard is grounded in California law and is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus

proceeding. For this reason, the claim should be denied.13

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 1, 2006.

008:cobbs1529.hc

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