Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01080/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

ARCTIC CAT INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL PRODUCTS INC., 

BRP U.S. INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________

2019-1080

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida in No. 0:14-cv-62369-BB, 

Judge Beth Bloom.

______________________

Decided: February 19, 2020

______________________

GREGG LOCASCIO, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

NATHAN S. MAMMEN, JOHN C. O'QUINN, CALVIN ALEXANDER 

SHANK; NICHOLAS STEPHAN BOEBEL, Hansen Reynolds 

LLC, Minneapolis, MN; NIALL ANDREW MACLEOD, AARON 

MYERS, DIANE PETERSON, Kutak Rock LLP, Minneapolis, 

MN. 

 LOUIS W. TOMPROS, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 

Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendants-appellees. 

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2 ARCTIC CAT INC. v. BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL

Also represented by JENNIFER JASMINE JOHN, MICHELLE 

LISZT SANDALS. 

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

Arctic Cat Inc. (“Arctic Cat”) appeals from a judgment 

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida that Arctic Cat is not entitled to recover precomplaint damages from Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (“Bombardier”) due to the failure of Arctic Cat’s 

licensee to mark products in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 

§ 287. Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods., 

334 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1240 (S.D. Fla. 2018). Because we 

agree with the district court that § 287 continues to limit

damages after a patentee or licensee ceases sales of unmarked products, and that willful infringement does not 

establish actual notice under § 287, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Arctic Cat owns U.S. Patents 6,793,545 (“the ’545 patent”) and 6,568,969 (“the ’969 patent”), which are directed 

to thrust steering systems for personal watercraft

(“PWCs”). The ’545 and ’969 patents issued in 2004 and 

2003 respectively, but Arctic Cat had stopped selling PWCs 

before either patent issued. In 2002, Arctic Cat entered 

into a license agreement with Honda for several Arctic Cat 

patents and patent applications, as well as any later patents “that patentably cover Arctic Cat’s Controlled Thrust 

Steering methods, systems, and developments,” which includes the ’545 and ’969 patents. J.A. 256 ¶ GG; see J.A. 

4078. The initial draft of the license agreement included a 

provision requiring Honda, as licensee, to mark all licensed 

products with the applicable patent numbers. However, 

that provision was deleted during negotiations, and the final version of the license agreement expressly stated that 

Honda had no marking obligations.

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ARCTIC CAT INC. v. BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL 3

Thereafter, Honda began making and selling unmarked PWCs, and Arctic Cat made no effort to ensure 

that PWCs sold by Honda were marked. The parties dispute when Honda stopped selling unmarked products under its license with Arctic Cat, but Arctic Cat asserts that 

Honda stopped selling unmarked products no later than 

September 6, 2013, approximately one year before Arctic 

Cat sued Bombardier. Bombardier contends that Honda 

continued to sell PWCs under the Arctic Cat license as late 

as 2018.

On October 16, 2014, Arctic Cat sued Bombardier for 

infringement of various claims of the ’545 and ’969 patents. 

Before trial, Bombardier moved to limit Arctic Cat’s potential damages because of Honda’s sales of unmarked products. The district court held that Bombardier, as 

defendant, bore the burden of proving that Honda’s PWCs 

practiced the asserted claims and, because that proof was 

lacking, denied Bombardier’s motion.

At trial, the jury found Arctic Cat’s patents not invalid, 

awarded Arctic Cat a royalty to begin on October 16, 

2008—six years before Arctic Cat filed suit—and found 

that Bombardier had willfully infringed the asserted 

claims. After post-trial briefing, as relevant here, the district court denied Bombardier’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on marking and willfulness. As to 

marking, the district court held that Bombardier had failed 

to meet its burden of proving that Honda’s PWCs practiced 

the asserted claims. Bombardier appealed to this court. 

See Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 

876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Arctic Cat I”).

On appeal, we affirmed as to willfulness but vacated 

and remanded as to marking. Id. at 1369. Specifically, we 

determined that the district court erred in placing the burden on Bombardier to prove that the Honda PWCs practiced the claimed invention. We held that once an alleged 

infringer identifies products that it believes are unmarked 

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patented articles subject to the notice requirements of 

§ 287, the patentee bears the burden of proving that the 

identified products do not practice the claimed invention. 

Id. at 1368. Accordingly, we vacated the district court’s 

judgment as to marking and remanded to allow Arctic Cat 

an opportunity to establish that the Honda PWCs do not 

fall within the asserted claims.

On remand, Arctic Cat conceded that it could not show 

that the Honda PWCs do not practice the asserted claims,

J.A. 5065 ¶ K; J.A. 589, but nonetheless moved for summary judgment that it is entitled to receive pre-complaint 

damages. First, Arctic Cat argued that the damages limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 287 applies only while a patentee is 

actively making, using, or selling unmarked products. 

Thus, Arctic Cat argued, § 287 did not apply after the time 

that it alleges Honda stopped selling unmarked products, 

and Arctic Cat is therefore entitled to damages during the 

period after the cessation of Honda’s sales but before the 

filing of its suit against Bombardier. More ambitiously, 

Arctic Cat also argued that it is entitled to damages for the 

full six-year period prior to suit allowed under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 286—including for the period during which Honda was 

undisputedly selling unmarked products—because the 

jury’s finding of willful infringement is sufficient to demonstrate actual notice under § 287.

In its own motion for summary judgment, Bombardier 

argued that Honda’s PWCs were unmarked patented articles and Arctic Cat failed to provide constructive or actual 

notice under § 287, and Arctic Cat therefore cannot receive 

any pre-complaint damages. Bombardier argued that noncompliance with § 287 can be cured only by either beginning to mark or providing actual notice to an alleged 

infringer.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of Bombardier, and Arctic Cat appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

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ARCTIC CAT INC. v. BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL 5

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment according to the law of the regional circuit. Kaneka 

Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Grp. Co., 790 F.3d 1298, 

1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The Eleventh Circuit reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. 

Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

In this appeal, we are tasked with interpreting the 

marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287. Statutory interpretation 

is a question of law that we review de novo. Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Glaxo 

Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 395 (Fed. Cir. 

1990)).

I

Section 287(a) provides in pertinent part:

Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or 

selling within the United States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented 

article into the United States, may give notice to 

the public that the same is patented . . . by fixing 

thereon the word “patent” . . . . In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by 

the patentee in any action for infringement, except 

on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in 

which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an 

action for infringement shall constitute such notice.

The notice provisions of § 287 do not apply to patents 

directed to processes or methods. See Wine Ry. Appliance 

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Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 395 (1936). 

Nor do they apply when a patentee never makes or sells a 

patented article. Id. at 398. Thus, a patentee who never 

makes or sells a patented article may recover damages 

even absent notice to an alleged infringer. If, however, a 

patentee makes or sells a patented article and fails to mark 

in accordance with § 287, the patentee cannot collect damages until it either begins providing notice or sues the alleged infringer—the ultimate form of notice—and then 

only for the period after notification or suit has occurred. 

Thus, a patentee who begins selling unmarked products 

can cure noncompliance with the notice requirement—and 

thus begin recovering damages—by beginning to mark its 

products in accordance with the statute. See Am. Med. 

Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir.

1993).

A patentee’s licensees must also comply with § 287. 

See Arctic Cat I, 876 F.3d at 1366 (citing Maxwell v. J. 

Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 198, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). While 

courts may consider whether the patentee made reasonable efforts to ensure third parties’ compliance with the 

marking statute, id., here Arctic Cat’s license agreement 

with Honda expressly states that Honda had no obligation 

to mark. J.A. 4081 ¶ 6.01; J.A. 259 ¶ JJ. Thus, it is does 

not excuse Arctic Cat’s lack of marking that it is Arctic 

Cat’s licensee, rather than Arctic Cat itself, who sold unmarked products.

A patentee who makes or sells patented articles can 

satisfy the notice requirement of § 287 either by providing 

constructive notice—i.e., marking its products—or by 

providing actual notice to an alleged infringer. Gart v. 

Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “Actual notice requires the affirmative communication of a 

specific charge of infringement by a specific accused product or device.” Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings 

Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

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This case presents a discontinuous situation in which 

unmarked products were sold, such that Arctic Cat could 

not receive damages before providing notice, but the sales 

of unmarked products allegedly stopped for a period of time 

prior to the filing of Arctic Cat’s complaint. Thus, the issue 

presented is whether the cessation of sales of unmarked 

products excuses noncompliance with the notice requirement of § 287 such that a patentee may recover damages 

for the period after sales of unmarked products ceased but 

before the filing of a suit for infringement. We hold that it 

does not.

Arctic Cat argues that, because § 287 is written in the 

present tense, the statute by its terms only applies while a 

patentee is “making, offering for sale, or selling” its products. Thus, according to Arctic Cat, the statute limits damages only during periods when the patentee is actually 

making, offering for sale, or selling the patented article. 

Bombardier responds that, to begin recovering damages after sales of unmarked products have begun, § 287 requires 

that a patentee either begin marking its products or provide actual notice to an alleged infringer; cessation of sales 

of unmarked products is not enough. We agree with Bombardier.

We begin with the language of the statute. Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001). While § 287 describes 

the conduct of the patentee in the present tense, the consequence of a failure to mark is not so temporally limited. 

Section 287 provides that “in the event of failure so to 

mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in 

any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to 

infringe thereafter” (emphasis added). The statute thus 

prohibits a patentee from receiving any damages in a subsequent action for infringement after a failure to mark, rather than merely a reduced amount of damages in 

proportion to the amount of time the patentee was actually 

practicing the asserted patent.

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Arctic Cat’s obligation to mark arose when its licensee 

began selling patented articles. The cessation of sales of 

unmarked products certainly did not fulfill Arctic Cat’s notice obligations under § 287, nor did it remove the notice 

requirement imposed by the statute. The notice requirement to which a patentee is subjected cannot be switched 

on and off as the patentee or licensee starts and stops making or selling its product. After all, even after a patentee 

ceases sales of unmarked products, nothing precludes the 

patentee from resuming sales or authorizing a licensee to 

do so. In the meantime, unmarked products remain on the 

market, incorrectly indicating to the public that there is no 

patent, while no corrective action has been taken by the 

patentee. Confusion and uncertainty may result. Thus, 

once a patentee begins making or selling a patented article, 

the notice requirement attaches, and the obligation imposed by § 287 is discharged only by providing actual or 

constructive notice.

This reading of § 287 comports with the purpose of the 

marking statute. The policy of § 287 is to encourage marking, not merely to discourage the sale of unmarked products. We have explained that the notification requirement 

of § 287 “serves three related purposes: (1) helping to avoid 

innocent infringement; (2) encouraging patentees to give 

public notice that the article is patented; and (3) aiding the 

public to identify whether an article is patented.” Arctic 

Cat I, 876 F.3d at 1366 (citing Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Requiring a patentee who has sold unmarked products to provide 

notice in order to begin recovering damages advances these 

objectives by informing the public and possible infringers 

that the article is patented. Arctic Cat’s proposed interpretation, on the other hand, would undermine these objectives. In Arctic Cat’s view, § 287 should be read to allow a 

patentee to mislead others that they are free to make and 

sell an article that is actually patented, but nonetheless 

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allow the patentee to recover damages without undertaking any corrective action. We reject this view.

In American Medical Systems, 6 F.3d at 1537, we interpreted § 287 to allow a patentee who had sold unmarked 

products to begin recovering damages after the patentee 

began marking. Otherwise, a patentee who has sold unmarked products would have no incentive to begin marking, contrary to the objective of the statute. Here, where 

Honda merely stopped selling unmarked products but Arctic Cat otherwise took no action to remedy prior noncompliance or to provide notice that the articles were actually 

patented, Arctic Cat never complied with the notice requirement of § 287 and thus cannot recover damages for 

any period prior to the filing of its complaint.

II

Arctic Cat also argues that, regardless of its failure to 

mark, it should nevertheless recover the maximum amount 

of pre-suit damages allowed by 35 U.S.C. § 286 because the 

jury’s finding that Bombardier willfully infringed the asserted claims should be sufficient to establish actual notice 

under § 287. Arctic Cat acknowledges, as it must, that this 

argument is foreclosed by our precedent. In Amsted Indus.

Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co. we held that the determination whether a patentee provided actual notice under 

§ 287 “must focus on the action of the patentee, not the 

knowledge or understanding of the infringer,” and that “[i]t 

is irrelevant . . . whether the defendant knew of the patent 

or knew of his own infringement.” 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994) (citing Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 6 F.3d at 1537 n.18)). 

Accordingly, we reject Arctic Cat’s argument.

Aside from our inability to reverse the decision of an 

earlier panel, see Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 

F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988), we reiterate the conclusion

that willfulness, as an indication that an infringer knew of 

a patent and of its infringement, does not serve as actual 

notice as contemplated by § 287. While willfulness turns 

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on the knowledge of an infringer, § 287 is directed to the 

conduct of the patentee. The marking statute imposes notice obligations on the patentee, and only the patentee is 

capable of discharging those obligations. It is not directed 

to the infringer and does not contemplate mere knowledge 

of the infringer as sufficient to discharge the notice requirements placed on the patentee.

Arctic Cat bases its argument for reversing Amsted on 

a supposed typographical error in that opinion in a quotation from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunlap v. 

Schofield, 152 U.S. 244 (1894). Where the Supreme Court 

stated that notice “is an affirmative fact,” id. at 248, our 

opinion in Amsted quoted Dunlap as characterizing notice 

as “an affirmative act,” 24 F.3d at 187. Arctic Cat argues 

that this discrepancy undermines the reasoning in Amsted

and that, properly understood, Dunlap stands for the proposition that notice is a fact that can be proved by knowledge 

of the infringer. But the alleged mistranscription in Amsted is inconsequential to our analysis of Dunlap because

the relevant fact is the act of the patentee. The full context 

of Dunlap confirms this understanding:

The clear meaning of this section is that the patentee or his assignee, if he makes or sells the article patented, cannot recover damages against 

infringers of the patent, unless he has given notice 

of his right, either to the whole public, by marking 

his article ‘Patented,’ or to the particular defendants, by informing them of his patent, and of their 

infringement of it.

One of these things—marking the articles, or notice to the infringers—is made by the statute a prerequisite to the patentee’s right to recover damages 

against them. Each is an affirmative fact, and is 

something to be done by him.

152 U.S. at 248. Thus, the fact is the act of marking or 

providing notice, and both are “something to be done by” 

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ARCTIC CAT INC. v. BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL 11

the patentee. Knowledge by the infringer is not enough. 

Actual notice under § 287 requires performance by the patentee.

Finally, we note that other decisions of this court predating Amsted similarly interpreted actual notice under 

§ 287 to require action by the patentee. See Am. Med. Sys., 

6 F.3d at 1537 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The notice of infringement must therefore come from the patentee, not the infringer.”); Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 

1066 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[The patentee] failed to carry its 

burden of convincing the jury that it had performed affirmative acts in compliance with § 287.”).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Arctic Cat’s remaining arguments 

but find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, for the reasons 

above, we affirm the district court’s denial of pre-complaint 

damages to Arctic Cat.

AFFIRMED

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