Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00407/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00407-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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10cv407

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN A. RUBIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH

PLAN, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 10cv407-L(RBB)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to Prosecute and/or to Obey

Court’s May 24, 2010 Order (“Motion”). Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The Motion came

on for a hearing on January 31, 2011 at 10:30 a.m. Only Seth L. Neulight, Esq., counsel for

Defendant, appeared at the hearing. For the reasons which follow, Defendant’s Motion is

GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or, Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement is DENIED as

moot. 

This employment termination action was initially filed in State court and removed to this

court based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, because Plaintiff

alleged a claim under Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2606 et seq. Plaintiff’s state

law claims were removed based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367. 

/ / / / /

Case 3:10-cv-00407-L-RBB Document 17 Filed 01/31/11 Page 1 of 6
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After removal, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) or in the alternative for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Plaintiff did not file

an opposition, and the motion was submitted on May 3, 2010 as unopposed. On May 4, 2010

Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition, which stated in its entirety:

Plaintiff will not be filing opposition to Defendant's motion, per se; in light of

Defendant's arguments, Plaintiff will instead be preparing and filing an amended

pleading in advance of the scheduled hearing date.

On May 10, 2010 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On May 12, 2010 the court

issued an order to show cause. Because the amended complaint was untimely under Rule

15(a)(1)(B), the court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the amended complaint should not be

stricken. Defendant was ordered to inform the court whether it opposed the filing of the

untimely amended complaint and whether the amended complaint mooted the pending motion to

dismiss. 

In response to the order to show cause, Plaintiff retroactively requested an extension of

time to file the amended complaint. Defendant filed a response stating the amended complaint

did not address the issues raised in the pending motion and should be stricken as untimely.

On May 24, 2010 the court issued an order rejecting the amended complaint because it

did not address the issues raised in the pending motion. However, the parties were ordered to

meet and confer within 7 days regarding the remaining defects in the amended complaint, and

Plaintiff was given until June 14, 2011 to file either an opposition to Defendant's motion to

dismiss or an amended complaint which addressed the issues raised by the motion.

Plaintiff filed neither an opposition nor an amended complaint. On May 25, 2010

Defendant's counsel Seth Neulight e-mailed Plaintiff's counsel Deb Pedersdotter to schedule a

meeting and conference pursuant to the May 24, 2010 order, however, she did not immediately

respond. (Decl. of Seth L. Neulight at 1 & Ex. A.) On May 27 Mr. Neulight received an e-mail

from Ms. Pedersdotter proposing May 31. (Id. at 1 & Ex. B.) Mr. Neulight could not meet on

that day, and tried to reschedule the meeting, but did not receive a response prior to the May 31,

2010 deadline. (Id. at 1-2 & Ex. B.) The parties therefore did not meet and confer as ordered.

/ / / / /

Case 3:10-cv-00407-L-RBB Document 17 Filed 01/31/11 Page 2 of 6
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The parties did not communicate again until June 14, 2010, the due date for Plaintiff’s

amended complaint or opposition brief, when Ms. Pedersdotter contacted Mr. Neulight to let him

know that Plaintiff intended to file an amended complaint that day or the next. (Id. at 2.) 

However, Plaintiff did not file anything. On July 23, 2010 Mr. Neulight called Ms. Pedersdotter

to inquire whether Plaintiff intended to proceed with the case. She told him she would speak

with Plaintiff and let Mr. Neulight know, but she did not again contact Mr. Neulight. (Id.) Mr.

Neulight called Plaintiff's counsel again in mid-August, and was informed that the delay in filing

was due to her health issues and involvement in an auto accident; however, she indicated she

would file papers shortly. (Id.) As of August 30, 2010, Plaintiff had not filed anything. Mr.

Neulight e-mailed Ms. Pedersdotter to inquire about the status and informed her of Defendant's

intent to file a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. (Id. at 2-3 & Ex. C.) Plaintiff's counsel

did not respond. (Id. at 3.) On October 13, 2010 Mr. Neulight called her again to inquire as to

Plaintiff's intent to prosecute. She informed him that Plaintiff intended to prosecute the case,

but, beyond stating that Defendant would receive "something" by October 20, she could not be

more specific. (Id.) Plaintiff did not file or otherwise provide Defendant with anything by that

date. Plaintiff did not comply with the May 24, 2010 order because he did not file an amended

complaint or an opposition by the June 14, 2010 due date. To date, he has not filed either

document.

On December 10, 2010 Defendant filed the instant Motion under Rule 41(b). Plaintiff did

not file a response. By failing to file either an opposition or a notice of non-opposition, Plaintiff

violated Civil Local Rule 7.1, which required a filing no later than January 14, 2011. Civ. Loc.

Rule 7.1(e)&(f).

On January 24, 2011 the court issued a notice of hearing on Defendant's Motion, which

ordered counsel to appear, and ordered Plaintiff's counsel to serve the notice on Plaintiff, so that

he may attend, if he so desired. Plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with the order, because she

did not file the affidavit and did not appear at the hearing.

In its Motion, Defendant argues that this case should be dismissed under Rule 41(b)

because Plaintiff has failed to prosecute his claims and because he has failed to comply with the

Case 3:10-cv-00407-L-RBB Document 17 Filed 01/31/11 Page 3 of 6
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May 24, 2010 order. Rule 41(b) provides in pertinent part: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or

to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any

claim against it.” To determine whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or failure to

comply with a court order, the court must weigh five factors: 

(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need

to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the

availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits.

Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal with prejudice for failure to 

timely file amended petition). 

"The public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal." 

Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Given Plaintiff's failure to take any

steps to prosecute this action since May 2010, the first factor favors dismissal. See Pagtalunan,

291 F.3d at 642 ("failure to pursue the case for almost four months").

With respect to the second factor, Plaintiff's untimely and unsuccessful filing of an

amended complaint, request for additional time, and subsequent failure to prosecute have

consumed some of the court's time that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket. 

See id. "It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine

noncompliance of litigants such as [Plaintiff]." Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of

dismissal." Id.

To make an adequate showing on the third factor, "a defendant must establish that

plaintiff's actions impaired defendant's ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with

the rightful decision of the case. . . . [P]endency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in and

of itself to warrant dismissal. Limited delays and the prejudice to a defendant from the pendency

of a lawsuit are realities of the system that have to be accepted, provided the prejudice is not

compounded by unreasonable delays." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

However, the law presumes prejudice if the delay is unreasonable." In re Phenylpropanolamine

("PPA") Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir.2006). "Unnecessary delay

inherently increases the risk that witnesses' memories will fade and evidence will become stale."

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Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. "The presumption may be rebutted and if there is a showing that

no actual prejudice occurred, that fact should be considered when determining whether the

district court exercised sound discretion. A plaintiff may proffer an excuse for delay that, if

anything but frivolous, shifts the burden of production to the defendant to show at least some

actual prejudice." Id. at 1228 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Although Ms. Pedersdotter informed Mr. Neulight that delay had been caused by her

medical issues and an auto accident, this explanation does not cover the entire period of the

delay. Ms. Pedersdotter informed Mr. Neulight on June 14, 2010 that she would file an amended

complaint on that day or the following day. (Seth L. Neulight Decl. at 2.) Therefore, the

explanation, which was provided to Defendant in mid-August (id.), covers only the time after

the June 14, 2010 due date had already passed. The explanation given to Defendant therefore

does not explain why Plaintiff failed to timely file. Furthermore, Plaintiff had the opportunity to

file a response to Defendant’s Motion and appear at the hearing to provide an explanation to the

court, but did not do so. Because Plaintiff's failure to timely file is unexplained, the presumption

of prejudice remains unrebutted. The third factor therefore favors dismissal. See Pagtalunan,

291 F.3d at 643. 

With respect to the fourth factor, consideration of less drastic sanctions than dismissal

must occur after Plaintiff had violated an order. Although on May 24, 2010 the court extended

the time for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint or an opposition to Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, Defendant at least twice warned Plaintiff's counsel that it would seek dismissal for

failure to prosecute and comply with orders (Seth L. Neulight Decl. Ex. C & D), and although

this court's Civil Local Rules provide for dismissal after six months of inactivity, Civ. L. R.

41.1(a), the court has not considered less drastic sanctions in response to Plaintiff's failure to

comply with the May 24, 2010 order. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 992; Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at

463. The fourth factor therefore weighs against dismissal.

Last, "[p]ublic policy favors disposition of cases on the merits." Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at

463. This generally counsels against dismissal. See PPA Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228. 

Nevertheless, "a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party's failure to comply with

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deadlines . . . cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits. [Therefore] this factor lends

little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits

but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction." Id. (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). The last factor therefore does not counsel against dismissal.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to

Prosecute and/or to Obey Court’s May 24, 2010 Order is GRANTED. See Pagtalunan, 291

F.3d at 463. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or, Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement is DENIED as

moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2011

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. RUBEN B. BROOKS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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