Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_12-cv-03283/USCOURTS-alnd-1_12-cv-03283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CEDRIC D. BURROUGHS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HONDA MANUFACTURING OF

ALABAMA, LLC,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:08-CV-1239-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This lawsuit arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) against

Honda Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC (“HMA”). The named plaintiffs in this

action are Cedric Burroughs (“Mr. Burroughs”), Eddie Caldwell (“Mr. Caldwell”),

and Angela Blake (“Ms. Blake”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). On April 6, 2009, the

court conditionally permitted Plaintiffs to proceed as a collective action under the

FLSA. (Doc. 67).

Pending before the court is HMA’s Motion To Decertify the Collective Action

and Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiffs’ Claims (the “Motion”) (Doc. 154) filed on September

6, 2011. The parties have filed numerous materials in support of and in opposition

FILED

 2012 Jul-19 PM 01:12

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:08-cv-01239-VEH Document 194 Filed 07/19/12 Page 1 of 12 FILED

 2012 Sep-21 AM 09:51

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:12-cv-03283-VEH Document 1 Filed 09/20/12 Page 1 of 12
to the Motion. (See Docs. 155, 158-164, 166, 172-76, 180-84). 

While this Motion was pending, a similar request for relief was decided in

HMA’s favor by another district judge of this court on March 29, 2012, in the lawsuit

of Briggins v. Honda Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC, et al.(hereinafter “Briggins”),

No. 1:08-CV-1861-KOB, (Doc. 166) (N.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2012). See Briggins, Doc.

166 at 2 (“The court concludes that such collective action trial would be

unmanageable and, more fundamentally, that the plaintiffs in this case are not

‘similarly situated’ to each other for the purpose of establishing liability under the

FLSA.”)). 

On May 2, 2012, the court entered a show cause order in this litigation with

respect to the decertification ruling in Briggins:

The court has studied the Motion and all related materials

preliminarily, including the Briggins opinion and agrees with the

decertification analysis contained therein. While the undersigned is

certainly not bound by Briggins, it is appropriate for this court to

consider adopting the opinion as applicable persuasive authority. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are ORDERED to SHOW CAUSEno later than

May 21, 2012, why the facts material to this lawsuit (as supported with

pinpointed citations to the evidentiary record) are appreciably different

or distinguishable from those at issue in Briggins such that the Briggins

decertification decision should not persuasively apply here.

(Doc. 185 at 2 (emphasis added)).

Pursuant to this show cause order, Plaintiffs filed their response (Doc. 188) on

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May 24, 2012. The court then entered an order requiring HMA to file a reply (Doc.

189), which it did on June 28, 2012. (Doc. 193). Accordingly, the Motion is under

submission and for the reasons explained below is GRANTED. 

II. COLLECTIVE ACTION STANDARDS

Section 206(d) of the FLSA provides:

No employer having employees subject to any provisions of thissection

shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees

are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages

to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which

he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment

for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,

effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar

working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i)a

seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures

earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based

on any other factor other than sex.

29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has endorsed a two-step

approach to determining whether to certify a collective action under Section 216(b):

The first determination is made at the so-called “notice stage.” At the

notice stage, the district court makes a decision-usually based only on

the pleadings and affidavits which have been submitted-whether notice

of the action should be given to potential class members. 

Because the court has minimal evidence, this determination is

made using a fairly lenient standard, and typically resultsin “conditional

certification” of a representative class. If the district court

“conditionally certifies” the class, putative class members are given

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notice and the opportunity to “opt-in.” The action proceeds as a

representative action throughout discovery.

Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995)). “Because the

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court has minimal evidence [during the first stage], this determination is made using

a fairly lenient standard, and typically results in ‘conditional certification’ of a

representative class.” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218.

The second determination is typically precipitated by a motion for

“decertification” by the defendant usually filed after discovery islargely

complete and the matter is ready for trial. At this stage, the court has

much more information on which to base its decision, and makes a

factual determination on the similarly situated question. If the claimants

are similarly situated, the district court allows the representative action

to proceed to trial. If the claimants are not similarly situated, the district

court decertifiesthe class, and the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without

prejudice. The class representatives-i.e. the original plaintiffs-proceed

to trial on their individual claims.

In Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1

1991), the Eleventh Circuit set forth a two-part test for determining whether a

collective action under the FLSA should be conditionally certified. The two judicial

inquiries for the court to make are: (i) whether there are other employees of the

employer who wish to “opt-in;” and (ii) whether these employees are “similarly

situated” with respect to both there job duties and their pay. Dybach, 942 F.2d at

1567-68; see also Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240,

1247-49 (11th Cir. 2003) (detailing differences between collective actions under

FLSA and class actions under Rule 23).

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Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218.2

Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating a “reasonable basis” for their

contention that collective action status is appropriate. Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79

F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Haynes v. Singer Co., Inc., 696 F.2d 884,

887 (11th Cir. 1983)). Also, “[t]he decision to create an opt-in class under § 216(b),

like the decision on class certification under Rule 23, remains soundly within the

discretion of the district court.” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219.

The Supreme Court has identified the main benefits of a collective action under

§ 216(b):

A collective action allows . . . plaintiffs the advantage of lower

individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The

judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of

common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged . . .

activity.

Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486, 107 L.

Ed. 2d 480 (1989). Separate from determining the similarly situated issue, other

district courts have “balance[d] these putative benefits against any prejudice to the

defendant and any judicial inefficiencies that may result from allowing plaintiffs to

Although Hipp involved a collective action brought under the Age 2

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that

the analysis set forth in that case applies with equal force to FLSA collective actions.

Cameron-Grant , 347 F.3d at 1243 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003).

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proceed collectively.” Bayles v. American Medical Response of Colorado, Inc., 950

F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (D. Colo. 1996); see id. (“Further, regardless of the potential

benefits, plaintiffs still must meet their burden of showing that they are similarly

situated.”).

III. ANALYSIS

Based upon the substantially similar nature of the material FLSA facts in

Briggins with those at issue here, the court adopts the decertification decision in

Briggins as persuasive authority and concludes, in its discretion, that Plaintiffs have

not carried their second stage similarly situated burden and that, additionally, upon

balancing the competing interests, collective adjudication of this dispute is no longer

appropriate. In particular, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ response to the show cause

order does not establish any appreciable factual distinctions between the Briggins

record and this one, such that the decertification analysis utilized in Briggins should

somehow be disregarded or discounted by this court. 

Instead, the court agrees with Briggins that the material differences among the

various positions, zones, and departmentsthat this FLSA lawsuit presents “will make

it impractical to ‘resolve any significant issues on a class wide basis’” and that “[t]his

impracticality becomes evenmore apparent when considering the individual defenses

that the defendant can assert in this case.” (Doc. 166 at 31). 

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Additionally, the court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ record-keeping

arguments as grounds for opposing theMotion. The Supreme Court’s burden-shifting

decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90

L. Ed. 1515 (1946), overturned on other grounds by statute as recognized in

McKenna v. Champion Int’l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Congress

passed the Portal Act to overturn the effect of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,

328 U.S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515 (1946), in which the Supreme Court

held that certain preliminary and incidental activities not previously considered part

of a compensable workday were subject to FLSA’s minimum-wage and overtime

provisions.”), does not suggest, much less bind, this court to find that a “reasonable

basis” for continuing the collective action status of this lawsuit exists. 

Critically, Anderson simply is not a decertification decision, but instead arises

out of the context of potential FLSA liability when an employer’s records evidencing

the hours worked by and compensation paid to its employees are lacking:

When the employer has kept proper and accurate records the

employee may easily discharge his burden by securing the production of

those records. But where the employer’s records are inaccurate or

inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes a more

difficult problem arises. The solution, however, is not to penalize the

employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable

to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would

place a premium on an employer’s failure to keep proper records in

conformity with his statutory duty; it would allow the employer to keep

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the benefits of an employee’s labors without paying due compensation

as contemplated by the Fair Labor Standards Act. In such a situation we

hold that an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has

in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and

if he producessufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that

work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then

shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise

amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the

reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee’s

evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, the court may

then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only

approximate.

Anderson, 382 U.S. at 687-88, 66 S. Ct. at 1192 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’

reliance upon other FLSA record-keeping opinionsto counter HMA’s decertification

efforts is similarly misplaced. 

In sum, thislawsuit contains a myriad of individualized inquiries coupled with

a dearth of proof on commonality, e.g., an HMA plan, policy, or practice that is

uniformly applied and well-suited for collective treatment. Consequently, akin to

Briggins, this court discretionarily discontinues this case’s conditional collective

course.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED, and the collective action previously

permitted to proceed conditionally is HEREBY DECERTIFIED. Relatedly and

consistent with guidance from Hipp as well as the FLSA decertification procedures

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followed by this court in Collins v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. (hereinafter “Collins”),

No. 7:04-CV-0553-VEH, (Doc. 240) (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2006), all the claims of the

opt-in plaintiffs are HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the right

of each opt-in plaintiff to pay the required filing fee and initiate his or her own

separate action against HMA no later than August 20, 2012. Collins, (Doc. 240 at 1-

2). If any dismissed opt-in plaintiff fails to file his or her own lawsuit and pay the

required filing fee on or before August 20, 2012, then such person will forego the

opportunity to pursue any FLSA claims against HMA that form the basis of this

litigation. (Id. at 2). 

The court further concludes, consistent with its decertification order in Fox v.

Tyson Foods, Inc. (hereinafter Fox), No. 4:99-CV-1612-VEH, (Doc. 602) (N.D. Ala.

Nov. 15, 2006), that there are variations among Plaintiffs’ work assignments and

claims such that collective adjudication of themis also inappropriate. Fox, (Doc. 602

at 1). For example, while Mr. Burroughs has worked as a production employee for

the same shift in the same zone of Assembly Frame within Building 1 or Line 1 for

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his entire career at HMA (Doc. 155 at 45; Doc. 56 ¶ 11; Doc. 163-6 at 7 at 18-19;

Building 1 or Line 1 has produced the Honda Odyssey and occasionally the

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Ridgeline. (Doc. 161-1 (Linda Bailey Decl.) ¶ 3).

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Doc. 62-5 ¶ 4), according to the complaint, Ms. Blake’s employment as a production 4

worker has been primarily in Building 2 or Line 2. (Doc. 56 ¶ 12). As the 5

Administration Division Manager for HMA explains although the Vehicle Quality,

Engine Assembly, and Production Materials Control departments have a single

department manager, each HMA production line is “separately managed and

organized . . . .” (Doc. 161-1 ¶ 5). 

Additionally, while like Mr. Burroughs, Mr. Caldwell has been in Building 1

(Doc. 56 ¶ 13; Doc. 62-6 ¶ 4), he has worked in two different zones within Assembly

Frame and has testified differently than Mr. Burroughs about HMA’s practices and

procedures with respect to management of the workload within these zones. (See,

e.g., Doc. 155 at 45-46 (contrasting Mr. Burroughs’ working through lunch

allegations with no similar allegations made by Mr. Caldwell); id. (contrasting Mr. 6

Burroughs’s 10-12 minute pre-shift allegations with those of Mr. Caldwell, whose

The court has been unable to locate any declaration or deposition testimony

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from Ms. Blake that has been filed into the record. (See Docs. 158, 173, 173-1, 173-

2). Ms. Blake’s “Consent to Join Suit As Party Plaintiff” is part of the record, but this

document does not identify the HMA department(s) and/or zone(s) in which she has

worked. (Doc. 56 at 17).

Building 2 or Line 2 has produced the Pilot and periodically, the Odyssey and

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Accord. (Doc. 161-1 ¶ 3).

 (See also Doc. 163-6 at 20 at 70-72; id. at 72 (“If you’re on a process make

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sure that process is completed before you leave it [for lunch].”)).

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deposition testimony indicated that the time spent on pre-shift efforts depends upon

the specific process being performed and also revealed that his personal restrictions

prevented him from performing several processes)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims

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are subject to individualized determinations and are properly adjudicated in separate

lawsuits.

The clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to sever the causes of Mr. Caldwell and

Ms. Blake from this lawsuit, which will remain pending for Mr. Burroughs. Fox,

(Doc. 602 at 2). The clerk is to electronically copy the second amended complaint

(Doc. 56) and the answer (Doc. 59) filed in 1:08-CV-1239-VEH to the docket of the

severed cases. Fox, (Doc. 602 at 2). Each severed plaintiff is to pay the filing fee for

his or her severed case before August 20, 2012. Id. If any severed plaintiff fails to

pay the filing fee as provided above, the said case will be dismissed with prejudice.

Id.

The clerk isfurther DIRECTED to assign the severed casesto the undersigned

judge but to withhold drawing a case assignment card for the undersigned judge for

such cases until the court can meet as a whole and decide the appropriate allocation

(See also Doc. 163-6 at 15-16 at 53-54 (estimating time spent by Mr. 7

Burroughs doing pre-shift work); Doc. 163-9 at 28 at 102 (Mr. Caldwell’s agreeing

that “what needs to be done to start the process depends on the process”); id. at 12 at

41 (Mr. Caldwell’s indicating that there are 10-15 processes in rear suspension that

he does not perform due to his restrictions)). 

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of case assignment credit. Fox, (Doc. 602 at 2). The litigation of Plaintiffs’ severed

claims will proceed in conformance with the most recentscheduling order (Doc. 115)

entered in this case on November 30, 2010, as further modified on May 6, 2011, by

the court’s CM/ECF margin entry. Finally, the severed cases shall be consolidated

for discovery purposes under 1:08-CV-1239-VEH, and all motions and other

documents are to be filed in that litigation. Fox, (Doc. 602 at 2). 

DONE and ORDERED this the 19th day of July, 2012.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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