Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02407/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02407-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405rs Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY ELIZABETH LANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv2407-WQH (NLS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR 

REMAND [ECF Nos. 14, 15]; and 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF No. 17]

Mary Elizabeth Lane (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under the Social Security Act.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Social Security 

Administration’s (“Defendant”) final decision denying her claim for disability insurance 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. ECF No. 1. This case was referred for 

a report and recommendation on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. ECF 

No. 16; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After considering the papers submitted, the 

administrative record, and the applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment and motion to remand be DENIED and that Defendant’s 

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cross motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On February 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Social Security 

Disability Insurance, alleging on disability onset date of May 14, 2012. Administrative 

Record (“AR”) 17. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claim initially on June 13, 2014 

(AR 89-102, 119-123), and on reconsideration on December 19, 2014 (AR 103-118, 125-

128). AR 17. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”), which was held on March 7, 2017. AR 17. Plaintiff was represented by counsel 

at the hearing. Id. Plaintiff, her husband, and vocational expert Nelly Katsell testified at 

the hearing. AR 17.

On May 26, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s request for 

benefits, finding that Plaintiff had not been under a disability within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act from May 14, 2012, through the date of the decision. AR 14-31. 

Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration on July 19, 2017. AR 4. On October 11, 

2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner for judicial review purposes. AR 1-6. 

Plaintiff timely commenced this action in federal court. 

B. Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony

Plaintiff was born on July 5, 1976. AR 29. Plaintiff lives with her husband and 

her son, who was 11 at the time of the hearing. AR 48-49. 

Regarding education, Plaintiff is a high school graduate and also attended trade 

school at San Diego Job Core, where she acquired office skills. AR 44. She previously 

worked as a booking clerk and information assistant for the County of San Diego’s 

Sheriff’s Department from about 2010 to 2012, where she was in charge of data entry, 

mug shots, answering calls, and making reservations. AR 44-45, 50. The job also 

required her to work in the jail. AR 44. In that job, she testified that she would lift and 

carry about 10-20 lbs and was sitting most of the time. AR 45. She stated that she 

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stopped working because she was stressed, having panic attacks, depressed, and getting 

bad headaches. AR 45. She stated that a doctor did not tell her to stop working but she 

did receive state disability. AR 45. When pressed about what was stressful in the job, 

she testified that she was having a lot of problems with supervisors, managing work, and 

had psychiatric issues where she was on stress leave for about half the time she worked. 

AR 50. She clarified that it was the supervisors and other employees/coworkers that 

stressed her out, in particular supervisors who she felt attacked her. AR 50-51. During 

this time, she testified that she was taking medications but that they were not helping her. 

AR 51. Eventually, she was let go from the job. AR 53. She testified that she felt like 

she was doing well there, but let her go because of her personal issues, because she was 

sometimes tardy, and because she was absent a lot due to her stress and depression. AR 

54. She testified that after she was let go, she did not look for another job and she did not 

need the money at the time because her husband was working. AR 54. 

Plaintiff testified that she believes she is unable to work because she is always 

depressed, cries multiple times every day, finds it difficult to concentrate and focus, 

forgets things, has heightened anxiety around people, and finds it difficult to complete 

things in a certain timeframe and at a certain pace. AR 47. She testified to hearing 

voices and seeing shadows. AR 47. She testified that she has taken various medications. 

She was on Prozac for a while, but then it stopped helping. AR 56. She testified that the 

new medication she was on was not helping much either. AR 57. She testified that she 

has also had talk therapy over the years too but it was not helpful either. AR 57. When 

asked to rate her mental pain on a scale of 1 to 10, Plaintiff testified that she is usually a 

at a 6 or 7 on average over the last year. AR 66-67. When she goes to the grocery store 

with her husband, it goes up to an 8 to 9. AR 67. 

Plaintiff describes her average day as starting off by taking her son to school, after 

which she comes home, gets in bed, and takes her meds. AR 48. She gets up to pick him 

up from school, then comes back home and gets back in bed. AR 48. She testified that 

she spends about 95% of her day in bed. AR 48. She testified that her husband does the 

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majority of the house cleaning and preparing the meals. AR 48. She also testified that 

she does not help her son with his homework. AR 49. When at home, she testified that 

she mainly lies in bed and just sleeps. AR 58. She does not watch TV but looks at the 

computer about 15-20 minutes a day. AR 58. She testified that she did not like going to 

the movies, family gatherings, restaurants, the beach, the zoo, or Seaworld. AR 58-59, 

68.

As for physical symptoms, Plaintiff testified that she experiences pain daily in her 

back, knees, feet, ankles, hands, and neck. AR 45. She stated that the pain impedes her 

ability to kneel or sit down and get up fast and to walk long distances. AR 46. She also 

states that she has rheumatoid arthritis in her hands, for which she takes methotrexate and 

Tylenol arthritis. AR 46. She testified that she experienced this pain when she was last 

working for the County, and that medication helped but not entirely. AR 52-53. She 

testified that she can ride in the car for about 30 minutes before experiencing back pain, 

stand for about 30 minutes before experience back and knee pain, walk for about 15 

minutes before having to stop, lift and carry only about five lbs. AR 62-63. Plaintiff 

testified that she would regularly be in pain at a 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 10, where it 

would be less when she was laying in bed. AR 64-65. She testified that she could only 

work if her pain was at a 1 or 2. AR 66. 

C. Plaintiff’s Husband’s Testimony 

Daryl Gardener, Plaintiff’s husband, also provided testimony at her hearing. AR 

70. They have been together for fifteen years, and married for two. AR 71. He testified 

that Plaintiff had difficulty with concentration, where he often have to remind her to pick 

up their son or to bathe. AR 71, 72. He testified that sometimes she gets just stuck in the 

car and is unable to move. AR 73-74. He also testified that she often has panic attacks, 

where she needs to call him to help calm her down. AR 71-72. In addition, he testified 

that she has trouble interacting with others, where she will get upset and end up in a 

confrontation. AR 72. He testified that she does not do well in groups of more than 5 or 

6 people. AR 72. He testified that she spent about 95% of her time in bed. AR 75. He 

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knew her when she had her job with the County and said that she could not cope with the 

employees and supervisors, and would often call him from the bathroom to cry. AR 75. 

He testified that his opinion was that she could not work full-time because of her mental 

capacity, where she is required to be around any other person, because her attention span 

is limited to 10 minutes, she cannot concentrate, and gets frustrated and anxious. AR 80. 

He also testified that she does not do housework and when she does, she often needs help, 

such as taking laundry to the laundromat. AR 77-78. He testified that he has never heard 

her talk about suicide. AR 80. He also testified that her mental issues have gotten worse 

over the years. AR 81. 

D. Documentary Medical Evidence

Plaintiff’s medical records include treatment for physical ailments but the Court 

will limit the overview here to her mental health treatment as Plaintiff does not challenge 

the ALJ’s treatment of the physical impairments in this case. See ECF No. 14-1 at 7. 

i. Treatment in 2011-2012

The earliest mention of depression in Plaintiff’s medical records before the Court 

was on February 14, 2011, where she was seen at Kaiser Permanente on an unrelated 

physical issue. AR 873. Treatment notes stated that she has a history of depression, was 

previously on Prozac, but she stopped taking it. It was noted that it was “presently 

controlled per the patient” and that she did not want medication at that time. 

Subsequently, on March 23, 2011, Plaintiff screened positive for depression at a 

Vista Mobile Health Van event. AR 914. She requested prescriptions for Prozac and 

Ambien via email. AR 922. She wrote that her anxiety and depression were getting 

worse and she was having problems sleeping and focusing. Id. She reported feeling 

drained and not wanting to be around people, crying a lot, and feeling very agitated. Id. 

She was prescribed Prozac after speaking to a Kaiser nurse on the phone and told to 

follow up. AR 928. 

On May 10, 2011, she was seen by Dr. Nguyen Phuong Tran, who noted that 

Plaintiff complained her anxiety and depression were getting worse and that she had a 

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“supervisor at work that [was] causing most of her stress.” AR 948. She reported having 

problems sleeping, but no suicidal thought or plan. Id. She was noted to be alert, 

oriented to person, place and time, and in no distress. Id. She was given 2 weeks off 

work. AR 949. 

Dr. Tran saw Plaintiff again on June 6, 2011, where she reported slight 

improvement with Prozac. AR 980. He noted that “patient has anxiety d[ue] to work 

environment and relationship with her supervisor. Id. He increased her Prozac dosage. 

AR 981. 

On October 17, 2011, she was seen in the Psychiatry department by Laura Daniels, 

MFT. AR 1119. The chief complaint was listed as “depression: work and family 

related.” AR 1128. Onset was noted to be 1996, but that it was recurrent and worsening 

for the last five months. Id. Specifically, as to the recent onset, treatment notes stated 

that it was “specific to work related stressors,” and Plaintiff had stated that “she feels 

singled out a lot by her supervisor, with reprimands for small things other employees are 

not reprimanded for.” Id. Plaintiff also reported that she was currently looking for 

another job within the county and had not taken any action with her employer otherwise 

regarding her situation. Id. Dr. Daniels assessed her with severe depression. AR 1129. 

Suicidal ideation was present but mild, and Plaintiff did not report any suicidal plan or 

intent. Id. She was noted to have good attire, grooming, and hygiene, but poor eye 

contact and negativistic behavior. AR 1131. Mood was anxious and depressed with a 

congruent affect. Her thought process was coherent and relevant and she was oriented to 

person, place, time, situation, with memory intact to immediate, recent, and remote recall, 

and alert and clear. Id. Her judgment and impulse were unimpaired and insight and 

reliability average. Id. Dr. Daniels provided a treatment plan with short term goals and 

noted that that Plaintiff was motivated to comply. AR 1132. 

On November 2, 2011, a disability evaluation was performed by Susan Stewart, 

LCSW. AR 1222. It was noted that Plaintiff suffers from major depressive disorder, 

dysthymia, moderate bipolar disorder. AR 1222. Her GAF score was assessed to be 60-

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51, with moderate symptoms and moderate difficulty in social and occupational 

functioning. AR 1222. She was assessed with significant impairment in the following: 

daily responsibilities, sleeping, communication, participation in activities, management of 

conflicts, memory, decision-making, irritability, anxiety, and depression. AR 1223. She 

was assessed with moderate difficulties in eating, hygiene, concentration, and 

organization and mild difficulties in thoughts of harming self. AR 1223. She was 

assessed with no difficulties in following through with assignments and thoughts of 

harming others. AR 1223. The assessment also discussed her work issues with her 

feeling that her supervisor was picking on her and singling her out with constant criticism 

and attempting to force her to quit. AR 1223. Plaintiff reported that she was looking for 

other positions in the county. AR 1223. 

Plaintiff’s next appointment was November 15, 2011 with Dr. Scott Richards, who 

performed a psychiatric initial screening assessment. AR 1261. He reported Plaintiff 

presenting as alert and oriented with no focal deficits, appropriate eye contact, wellkempt, normal speech but slow psychomotor movements, depressed mood, and intact 

memory, judgment, and linear thoughts. AR 1264. She denied any suicidal or homicidal

ideation. Id. 

Plaintiff continued with more regular visits through early 2012. She was seen on 

December 2, 2011 by psychiatric social worker Bharanthy Thridandam. AR 1318. 

Plaintiff complained about sleep issues and reported being “depressed all the time” and 

suffering from crying spells. Id. At the time of the appointment, Plaintiff had been given 

time off work from October 17, 2011 though December 15, 2011. Id. She was seen 

again a week later on December 8, 2011, where she stated that the therapy was helping 

but she still did not feel like she could go back to work. AR 1343. On December 15, 

2011, she reported getting more irritable and snappier, and still being depressed all the 

time. AR 1367. She did report starting to play in the backyard with her son, decluttering 

and organizing the house, and getting out of bed to do things and keep moving. Id. 

On December 19, 2011, she started to see therapist Lynn Gary. AR 1379. She was 

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reported as being still very depressed. AR 1379. The treatment notes stated that “[s]tress 

and unfairness by her supervisor has led her to fear losing her job.” Id. She discussed 

her family situation and history and how she did not have much support. Id. Impairment 

was noted to be great and symptoms to be severe. AR 1380. She denied any suicidal or 

homicidal ideation or plan, primarily because of her son. Id. She was noted to be 

compliant with her treatment plan most of the time. AR 1379. She was put off work 

through January 10, 2012. AR 1395. She saw Lynn Gary again on January 12, 2012, 

where she was noted to be “somewhat better, in that she made direct eye contact and 

smiled” upon greeting. AR 1423. She also reported that she did several activities with 

her son. AR 1424. She was given another week off work and stated that she still 

experienced high anxiety about returning to work. Id. She continues to have crying 

spells and not wanting to get out of bed. Id. She was seen again on February 13, 2012, 

where she reported feeling a lot better but still not at a level where she felt she could 

return to work. AR 1524. She reported being somewhat fragile but making an effort to 

engage with her son. Id. She was noted to have good progress toward the goals of the 

treatment plan, and her overall impairment and severity of symptoms were now 

moderate. Id. Dr. Gray had a conversation with Plaintiff on February 23, 2012 to discuss 

needing to develop a plan to go back to work and educated Plaintiff about the fear of 

returning to work when it had been too long. AR 1560. She saw Plaintiff again on 

February 27, 2012, where she noted that Plaintiff was doing much better, but still 

depressed and worries about returning to work. AR 1567. She was noted to have some 

dissociative moments and was still somewhat fragile. Id. She was noted also to still be 

very nervous about how her coworkers and supervisor would treat her upon return to 

work. Id. That was the last appointment with Dr. Gray in Plaintiff’s records before a 

hiatus in treatment. 

During the time she saw Dr. Gray, she also met several times with a psychiatrist, 

Dr. Etta Lindenfeld. The first visit was on January 17, 2012, where she presented as neat, 

clean, but with poor eye contact, and body tremors when she spoke of traumas. AR 1467. 

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She was noted to be extremely sad and cried intermittently. Id. She had passive suicidal 

ideation, with paranoid symptoms, but not auditory or visual hallucinations. AR 1468. 

She presented as oriented, with memory and judgment intact. Id. She was assessed to 

not meet the criteria for inpatient psychiatric care. Id. Dr. Lindenfeld adjusted Plaintiff’s 

medications. Id. She saw Dr. Lindenfeld again on January 24, 2012 but had not been 

able to buy her medications due to money so was given more time to try her new 

medications. AR 1504. She saw Dr. Lindenfeld once more on March 5, 2012, where she 

reported some adverse effects and symptoms from her medications. AR 1577. She was 

noted to exhibit anxious anticipation of returning to work and that she had applied for 

other positions. AR 1577. Dr. Lindenfeld adjusted Plaintiff’s medications again based 

on her complaints. AR 1578.

ii. Treatment after 2014

Plaintiff medical records do not show any mental health treatment after early 2012 

until early 2014. On February 18, 2014, she restarted treatment with Dr. Lindenfeld and 

explained that she lost her mental health insurance coverage when she lost her job but 

recently obtained coverage again through her then boyfriend (now husband). AR 2251. 

During the visit, she was noted to be not working, which was “emotionally better for 

her.” Id. She reported still not being well, crying, isolated, fearful of people and being 

angry in public situations, and experiencing auditory hallucinations where she heard her 

name being called. Id. She was noted to be neat and clean, but with poor eye contact. 

Id. Her mood was extremely sad, and had a congruent affect where she was blunted and 

withdrawn. Id. She was oriented and had intact memory and judgment. Id. 

Dr. Lindenfeld adjusted Plaintiff’s medications after the visit. AR 2252. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff began more regular appointments with Dr. Lindenfeld. On 

April 18, 2014, Plaintiff reported hearing auditory hallucinations telling her she was fat

and undeserving, particularly when she was alone at home. AR 2290. She reported 

being unable to go to the store with her fiancé unless she took Ativan. Id. Her mood was 

noted to be somewhat better on Celexa. Id. Her mental status exam was the same as 

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noted on her previous visit. Id. Dr. Lindenfeld adjusted Plaintiff’s medications due to 

issues with a weight gain side effect. Id. On June 23, 2014, Plaintiff was noted to be 

feeling very low and worthless, being unable to get out of bed, and experiencing passive 

suicidal ideation. AR 2319. She had stopped taking Risperdal due to weight gain and 

feeling more depressed. Id. She reported feeling withdrawn, isolated, irritable, 

unmotivated, and guilty. Id. She saw her family socially about once a month. Id. Her 

paranoia remained, where she reported feeling like someone was following her even 

though she knew it was not true. Id. Dr. Lindenfeld again adjusted her medication, to 

have her taper off Celexa and start Effexor for her depression and start Abilify for her 

paranoia. AR 2320. Plaintiff missed a series of her next appointments (AR 2333, 2592, 

2597, 2603, 2624), and saw Dr. Lindenfeld again on October 17, 2014. At that 

appointment, she continued to complain about high irritability, anger, and throwing 

things and hitting the wall. AR 2466. She reported experiencing auditory hallucinations 

of a command nature to crash her car or overdose on pills but will not because of her son. 

Id. She reported still being isolated and not wanting to go out. She reported taking less 

Effexor than prescribed because it made her feel angry and never took Abilify because of 

fears it would make her worse. Id. She reported feeling stress over her upcoming 

wedding and often argued with her fiancé. Id. Dr. Lindenfeld again adjusted her 

medications. AR 2467. 

On December 9, 2014, Plaintiff began to see Dr. Yona Choung. AR 2528. 

Plaintiff reported still feeling depressed, experiencing sadness and crying, feeling 

worthless, and not wanting to be touched. Id. She reported feeling a decrease in her 

energy level and motivation, wanting to stay in bed, paranoia about others staring at and 

following her, and auditory and visual hallucinations. Id. She was noted to be 

noncompliant with her medications because she sometimes felt scared to take them due to 

secondary side effects. Id. Her mental health exam revealed that she maintained 

appropriate eye contact, normal gait, posture, behavior and motor activity, down mood 

and affect, normal speech, coherent and logical thought, alert and oriented to person, 

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place and situation, and fair insight and judgment. AR 2529. She was put on Prozac, 

Seroquel, and Ativan. AR 2530-31. After a couple of more cancelled appointments (AR 

2540, 2250), she also began to see therapist Donna Gray on January 21, 2015. 

Treatments notes stated that she was very withdrawn, extremely soft spoken, did not have 

normal eye contact, and was very tense during the session. AR 2556. She stated that she 

did not feel like she could work, and was fired from her County job, which she felt was 

“too stressful.” Id. She spends almost all of her time at home, and sometimes thinks that 

people are watching or talking about her, but reported that she can usually talk herself out 

of feeling threatened. Id. Her overall impairment was noted to be great and severity of 

symptoms to be severe. Id. On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff saw Dr. Choung again. She 

reported being unsure if the Prozac was helping. AR 2564. She reported flashbacks to 

previous abuse, more vivid nightmares, continued paranoia when outside of someone 

following her, continued sadness and crying, and feeling worthless. Id. Her mental 

health status was similar to her previous visit. AR 2566. Dr. Choung adjusted her 

medications slightly. AR 2567. She saw Drs. Choung and Gray a couple of more times, 

with the latest appointment on March 30, 2015. AR 2576, 2581, 2586. 

In 2016, Plaintiff began to see Dr. Melanie Leadley. AR 2669. On March 1, 2016, 

treatment notes indicated that her previous medications were not working and Plaintiff 

continued to feel depressed, more emotional, with lower thoughts. AR 2673. She was 

reported to not be experiencing any auditory or visual hallucinations or paranoia. Id. She 

reported feeling more agitated and more sensitive, with lower energy. Id. Her mental 

status exam reported her as well groomed, in no acute distress, and cooperative. AR 

2676. She had fair rapport with intermittent eye contact, regular and normal speech, flat 

affect congruent with mood, linear, logical and goal oriented thought process, passive 

suicidal ideation without plan or intent, good judgment, fair insight, and low impulsivity. 

AR 2676-77. Dr. Leadley noted that her symptoms did not warrant a high level of care 

and outpatient care was still appropriate. AR 2677. Dr. Leadley told Plaintiff to stop her 

previous medication Latuda and start Geodon. Id. Plaintiff saw Dr. Leadley again on 

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April 7, 2016 and May 20, 2016, but no treatment notes appeared in the record. AR 

2683, 2688. At her June 21, 2016 appointment, Plaintiff reported that she stopped taking 

Geodon weeks ago. AR 2694. She reported still feeling paranoid and needing to take 

Lorazepam in order to leave the house. Id. She also reported hearing someone call her 

name and seeing shadows. Id. She also reported feeling on edge and anxious all the 

time, and felt that nothing helps her symptoms. Id. Her mental health exam was mostly 

same as previous visit, but mood was noted to be dysthymic. AR 2696-97. Dr. Leadley 

adjusted Plaintiff’s medications again, and noted that her symptoms seemed more 

consistent with PTSD and not a separate psychotic process. AR 2697-98. Plaintiff saw 

Dr. Leadley again on August 2, 2016, where she reported no real difference with new 

drugs apart from sleeping better. AR 2711. She reported being more irritable and 

emotional and tearful. Id. She still expressed concerns about people following her and 

did not go out much, but could if she had to. Id. Her mental health exam was again 

similar, but without suicidal ideation. AR 2714. The last treatment notes in Plaintiff’s 

record with Dr. Leadley was on January 17, 2017, where she reported feeling “really 

down.” AR 2734. She reported experiencing panic attacks at night and waking up 

sobbing. Id. She was noted to be rarely taking the prescribed lorazepam. Id. She 

experienced a recent flare-up of her rheumatoid arthritis, which had affected her mood. 

Id. She did not report any psychotic symptoms at that appointment. Id. Her mental 

status exam reported her being in no acute distress, cooperative, mild psychomotor 

retardation, good rapport, intermittent eye contact, regular and normal speech, largely flat 

mood but tearful at end of appointment, linear, logical and goal oriented thought process, 

good judgment, fair insight, and low impulsivity. AR 2737. Dr. Leadley again adjusted 

her medications. AR 2738. 

iii. Camellia Clark 

On May 27, 2014, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Clark for the Department of 

Social Services, Disability Evaluation division. AR 463. Plaintiff arrived at the 

appointment on time and drove herself. AR 463. During her examination, she was 

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observed to be adequately dressed and groomed. AR 464. She appeared able to take care 

of herself and all chores necessary to live independently and take care of her son. AR 

464. She reported not handling her own money though. AR 464. Her posture, gait and 

psychomotor activity were normal, and her speech was normal but slow. AR 464. She 

exhibited detached and flat mannerisms and maintained poor eye contract. AR 464. She 

was oriented to month, date, and year but not the city she was in. AR 464. She was able 

to spell her name backwards but was not able to complete a test where she was asked to 

count down by threes. AR 464. She was able to recall details from her history and recall 

two out of three items after five minutes, and maintained concentration during her

examination. AR 464. He judgment and insight were observed to be intact. AR 464. 

Her affect was observed to be completely flat. AR 464. She reported suicidal ideation in 

the past, but nothing in the present. AR 464. Though she reported hallucinations in the 

past, she was observed to be logical and goal oriented in the evaluation. AR 464. 

Dr. Clark found no limitations in the following areas: (1) ability to sustain an 

ordinary routine without sustained supervision; (2) ability to complete simple tasks; and 

(3) ability to avoid normal hazards. AR 465. She found moderate limitations in the 

following areas: (1) ability to socially interact with others; and (2) able to understand 

instructions. AR 465. Finally, Dr. Clark found marked limitations in the following areas: 

(1) ability to complete detailed tasks; (2) ability to complete complex tasks; and (3) 

ability to concentrate for at least two-hour increments at a time, in order to maintain a 

regular work schedule. AR 465. 

iv. Gregory Nicholson

On November 25, 2014, Plaintiff was also evaluated by another psychiatrist, Greg 

Nicholson. AR 533. Plaintiff arrived on time and was driven by her son’s father. AR 

533. During the evaluation, she reported hearing auditory hallucinations, calling her 

name or telling her to harm herself. AR 534. She also reported paranoia, irritability, 

depressed mood, insomnia, decreased appetite and energy, trouble concentrating, and 

decreased interested in activities. AR 534. She reported that she stopped working at her 

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detention center job because of stress. AR 535. As for daily activities, she reported that 

she does not cook meals, does not do laundry, and does not drive because of “road rage.” 

AR 535. However, she can dress herself, bath, and maintain hygiene. AR 535. She also 

reported being able to handle bills and cash, and go out on her own. AR 535. 

During the examination, Dr. Nicholson reported that Plaintiff was neatly groomed 

and made good eye and interpersonal contact with him. AR 535. He found her 

cooperative and genuine during the interview. AR 535. Her thought process was 

coherent and organized, and was able to follow the conversation. AR 535. She 

confirmed experiencing hallucinations and paranoia, but did not experience any during 

the interview. AR 536. Her mood was noted to be depressed and affect dysphoric. AR 

536. Plaintiff’s speech was normal and articulated, she was alert and oriented to time, 

place, person and purpose, and appeared of normal intelligence. AR 536. She was able 

to complete a test where she was asked to count down by threes, and could do a simple 

math problem. AR 536. 

Dr. Nicholson diagnosed Plaintiff with psychotic disorder, anxiety disorder, and 

depressive disorder and assigned her a GAF of 50. AR 537. For prognosis, he stated that 

he expected that her condition would improve in the next twelve months with treatment. 

AR 537. He concluded that she is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple 

one or two step instructions and is able to follow detailed and complex instructions. AR 

538. He found mild limitations at all the following areas: (1) Plaintiff’s ability to relate 

and interact with coworkers and the public; (2) her ability to maintain concentration and 

attention, persistence, and pace; (3) her ability to accept instructions from supervisors; (4) 

her ability to maintain a regular attendance in the workplace and perform work activities 

on a consistent basis; and (5) her ability to perform work activities without special or 

additional supervision. AR 538. He also concluded that she can handle funds. AR 538. 

E. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Nellie Katzel testified at the hearing. AR 81. She 

characterized Plaintiff’s vocational background as a prisoner-classification interviewer, 

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with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) of 7 and listed as sedentary position. AR 

82. Plaintiff stated that she did not to have a degree or criminal justice course to qualify 

for that job, but received on the job training. AR 82. 

The ALJ posed this first hypothetical to the VE, asking whether there would be any 

jobs that could fit the following restrictions: sedentary; unskilled, meaning low 

production-level job, no working with general public or crowds of coworkers, occasional 

verbal contact with supervisors and coworkers, and ability to deal with only occasional 

changes in a routine work setting; low concentration, meaning alert and attentive but only 

to unskilled routine work tasks; low memory, meaning requiring only the ability to 

understand, remember, and carry out simple work instructions and ability to remember 

and use good judgment in only making simple work related directions; lift 10 pounds 

occasionally; list and carry only 5 pounds occasionally; standing for 15 minutes or 

walking for 15 minutes, for total of 2 hours in a 8-hour work day; sit 30 minutes for total 

of 6 hours where she would sit for 30 minutes, then stand briefly and repeat the pattern; 

no more than occasional stooping, bending, twisting, or squatting; no work on floor, 

including no kneeling, crawling, and crouching; no climbing or descending a full flight of 

stairs; no over lifting or reach with either extremity; no more than frequent reaching, 

handling, and fingering. AR 82-84. Against this hypothetical, the VE testified that there 

would be three jobs that would fit the requirements: (1) addresser, 209.587-010, with 

national number of 175,000; (2) polisher of eyeglass frames, 713.684-038, with national 

number of 120,000; and (3) cutter and paster, 249.587-014, with national number of 

235,000. AR 84. The VE testified that these numbers were eroded in light of the 

sit/stand option. AR 85. 

The ALJ presented the VE with another hypothetical, adding in the additional 

constraint that, instead of occasional verbal contact with supervisors and coworkers, it 

would be rare contact. AR 85. The VE testified that she would not be able to perform 

these three jobs with this additional limitation, and that she would not be employable. 

AR 85. As to these three jobs, the ALJ also asked whether below average performance to 

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15-20% below average and excessive absenteeism to 3 or 4 full days a month would 

preclude employment, and the VE said that it would. AR 87. The ALJ then asked the 

VE whether she might be able to work as a caretaker of a property or house-sitter while 

someone is gone. AR 86. The VE testified that house-sitter would be a possibility. AR 

86. 

II. THE ALJ DECISION

A. The Sequential Process

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must 

show that he or she cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected 

to last at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3). The Social Security 

regulations establish a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether an applicant 

is disabled under this standard. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Batson v. Comm’r 

of the Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the applicant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(b). If not, then at step two the 

ALJ must determine whether the applicant suffers from a severe impairment or a 

combination of impairments. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c). If the impairment is 

severe, at step three the ALJ must determine whether the applicant’s impairment or 

combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment contained under 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d). If the 

applicant’s impairment meets or equals a listing, he or she must be found disabled. Id.

If the impairment does not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ must determine the 

applicant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 

416.920(e). Then, the ALJ must determine at step four whether the applicant retains the 

residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 

416.920(f). If the applicant cannot perform past relevant work, at step five the ALJ must 

consider whether the applicant can perform any other work that exists in the national 

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economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). 

The applicant carries the burden to prove eligibility from steps one through four 

but the burden at step five is on the agency. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Applicants not disqualified at step five are eligible for disability benefits. Id.

B. Substance of the ALJ’s Decision

At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since May 12, 2012, the alleged onset date. AR 19. 

At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s major depressive disorder, anxiety, 

post-traumatic stress disorder, and chronic lumbar and cervical spine sprain/strain 

constituted severe impairments. Id. In addition, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s 

rheumatoid arthritis was not a medically determinable impairment. Id. 

At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that would meet or medically equal the severity of any listed 

impairments. AR 20-21. The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s physical impairments exhibited 

the requisite nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis, nor 

did Plaintiff’s back disorder result in the inability to ambulate. AR 20. As to Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments, the ALJ considered Paragraph B criteria and found that Plaintiff did 

not exhibit the requisite one extreme or two marked limitations. AR 20. Specifically, the 

ALJ found only: mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information; 

moderate limitation in interacting with others; marked limitation in concentrating, 

persisting, or maintaining pace; mild limitation in adapting or managing herself. AR 20-

21. In addition, the ALJ considered Paragraph C criteria and found that Plaintiff did not 

have only marginal adjustment. AR 21. 

The ALJ next established that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to 

perform the full range of unskilled sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), 

except that such work could not require:

• Lifting more than 10 pounds at a time on more than occasional basis; 

• Lifting and carrying articles weighing more than 5 pounds, on more than 

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occasional basis;

• Standing or walking more than 15 minutes at one time and no more than 2 

total hours in an 8-hour workday; 

• Sitting more than 30 minutes at a time, and no more than 6 total hours in an 

8-hour work day; 

• More than occasional stooping, bending, twisting, or squatting; 

• Working on the floor; 

• Ascending or descending full flights of stairs; 

• Overhead lifting or overhead reaching with either extremity; 

• More than frequent reaching, handling, fingering; 

• Working in other than low stress environment – low production level, not 

working with general public or crowds of coworkers, only “occasional” 

verbal contact with supervisors and coworkers; 

• Working at no more than a low concentration level, which means the ability 

to be alert and attentive to only routine unskilled work tasks; 

• Working at no more than a low memory level – ability to understand, 

remember, and carry out only “simple” instructions and ability to remember 

and use good judgment in making only “simple” work decisions. 

AR 22. 

With these limitations, at step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform 

any of her past relevant work. AR 29. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was only 

35 years old and considered a younger individual and has at least a high school education 

and the ability to communicate in English. Id. Thus, the ALJ found that given her 

background, there were significant jobs in the economy that she could perform, including 

several specifically enumerated by the vocational expert. Id. The ALJ concluded 

Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act from May 14, 

2012, the alleged disability onset date, through May 26, 2017, the date of the decision. 

AR 30-31. 

III. Legal Standard of Review 

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision 

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must 

affirm the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and applies the correct legal standards. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. “Substantial evidence 

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means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation and 

citation omitted). It is a “highly deferential” standard of review. Valentine v. Astrue, 574 

F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, 

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Vasquez v. 

Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If 

the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the agency’s 

decision must be upheld. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. It is not the Court’s role to 

reinterpret or re-evaluate the evidence, even if a re-evaluation may reasonably result in a 

favorable outcome for the plaintiff. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

IV. DISCUSSION

On the face of Plaintiff’s motion, she states that she is making two separate 

arguments: (1) that the ALJ’s opinion is not entitled to the deference of the substantial 

evidence test; and (2) that the ALJ committed an error of law by failing to properly 

consider the evidence of record. ECF No. 14-1 at 10. While Plaintiff attempts to present 

her argument as two separate inquiries, it appears those arguments essentially conflate 

into one—whether the ALJ committed some error of law in evaluating the medical 

opinions. See also ECF No. 21 at 2. Plaintiff appears to argue that if the ALJ did commit 

legal error, then the opinion cannot be afforded the deference of the substantial evidence 

test. Therefore, the Court will first address whether the ALJ committed any legal error 

with regard to treatment of the medical opinions of record. 

In the ALJ’s opinion, he first reviewed the testimony provided by Plaintiff and her 

husband. AR 23-24. Then, after concluding that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably have expected to produce her symptoms, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

[her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 

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in the record” and that Plaintiff was not “as limited as she alleges.”1 AR 24. 

After setting out this ultimate conclusion, the ALJ spends the next pages of the 

decision summarizing the medical evidence of record. He discusses her mental health 

treatment records. AR 24-25. Plaintiff does not appear to object to any of this discussion 

specifically. 

The ALJ then discusses the consultative medical examinations conducted by Drs. 

Clark and Nicholson. Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Clark, specifically 

her finding that Plaintiff had a “marked” limitation in her ability to concentrate for at 

least two-hour increments at a time, in order to maintain a regular work schedule. ECF 

No. 14-1 at 14-15. The ALJ found that this opinion by Dr. Clark was not be supported 

and specifically, inconsistent with her other determinations that Plaintiff was able to spell 

her name forward and backward, she was not easily distracted, her judgment and insight 

were intact, and her thought process was logical and goal oriented. AR 26. Plaintiff 

argues that this is a “cherry picked” assessment of Dr. Clark’s opinion and that it is 

inconsistent that the ALJ’s own finding under Paragraph B criteria that Plaintiff had a 

“marked” limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. ECF No. 14-1 at 

15; AR 20-21. 

The Court does not find that the ALJ committed any legal error in rejecting this 

one finding by Dr. Clark. Plaintiff’s argument does not identify any statute or legal rule 

that the ALJ wrongly applied or violated—rather, the argument is more akin to a simple 

disagreement with the ALJ’s conclusion. Here, the ALJ gave specific reasons for why he 

rejected this one opinion—because it was not consistent with Dr. Clark’s other 

observations, particularly that Plaintiff was not easily distracted, had intact judgment and 

insight, and logical and goal oriented thought process. AR 26. These observations are 

 

1

In her opening brief, Plaintiff objects to this statement as “internally contradictory given the extreme 

findings that [the ALJ] made regarding plaintiff’s exertional and nonexertional limitations.” ECF No. 

14-1 at 13-14. The Court disagrees that this statement is “internally contradictory” simply because the 

ALJ did assess Plaintiff with some severe limitations in his RFC determination. The ALJ could still 

have reasonably assessed Plaintiff with severe limitations without accepting all her testimony. 

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rationally related to Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate and the Court cannot conclude that 

the ALJ’s conclusion was unreasonable. The Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision, 

even if the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Molina, 

674 F.3d at 1111. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not explain why the ALJ’s rejection of this finding 

necessary conflicts with the ALJ’s other conclusion under Paragraph B criteria that 

Plaintiff had a “marked” limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. The 

regulation explains that:

This area of mental functioning refers to the abilities to focus attention on 

work activities and stay on task at a sustained rate. Examples include: 

Initiating and performing a task that you understand and know how to do; 

working at an appropriate and consistent pace; completing tasks in a timely 

manner; ignoring or avoiding distractions while working; changing activities 

or work settings without being disruptive; working close to or with others 

without interrupting or distracting them; sustaining an ordinary routine and 

regular attendance at work; and working a full day without needing more 

than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day. These 

examples illustrate the nature of this area of mental functioning. 

20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00E.3.2 The same regulations define “marked” 

as when “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a 

sustained basis is seriously limited.” Id., 12.00F.2.d. As there is no specific reference to 

any time period, the ALJ could plausibly find a “marked” limitation under this Paragraph 

B criteria and still find that Plaintiff could concentrate for two hours at a time. The ALJ 

did include several limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace in his final RFC, 

including, that Plaintiff could only work “at no more than a low concentration level, 

which means the ability to be alert and attentive to only routine unskilled work tasks” and 

 

2 This citation is to the Mental Health Impairment Listings as it existed on May 26, 2017, the date of the 

ALJ’s decision. These rules were modified effective January 17, 2017 and specified that “[w]hen the 

final rules become effective, we will apply them to new applications filed on or after the effective date 

of the rules, and to claims that are pending on or after the effective date.” Revised Medical Criteria for 

Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 FR 66138-01. 

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could only work “at no more than a low memory level – ability to understand, remember, 

and carry out only ‘simple’ instructions and ability to remember and use good judgment 

in making only ‘simple’ work decisions.” AR 22. 

Plaintiff seems to suggest in her brief that had the ALJ accepted Dr. Clark’s 

finding of the “marked” limitation on her ability to concentrate for two-hour increments 

at a time, that the ALJ “must find plaintiff to be disabled.” ECF No. 14-1 at 14. 

However, Plaintiff fails to explain why this must be so. In a footnote, Plaintiff states that 

“‘marked’ is the severity required to ‘meet the listing,’” without any citation. Id. at 14 

n.4. If this is why Plaintiff believes the ALJ must find Plaintiff disabled had he adapted 

the two hour concentration finding by Dr. Clark, it appears unfounded. The “meet the 

listing” language suggests that Plaintiff might be referring to Paragraph B criteria. 

However, in order to meet Paragraph B, a claimant must be found to have “marked” 

limitations in two areas, not one. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00A.2.b (“To 

satisfy the paragraph B criteria, your mental disorder must result in ‘extreme’ limitation 

of one, or ‘marked’ limitation of two, of the four areas of mental functioning.”). 

Moreover, the ALJ did already find that Plaintiff had “marked” limitation in the area of 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. The issue was that he did not find a 

marked or extreme limitation in the other areas.

3

 Thus, it is unclear how adapting Dr. 

Clark’s opinion as to this one finding related to concentration would have forced the ALJ 

to find Plaintiff disabled. 

Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ gave no reason to disregard opinions of 

her treating physicians that consistently documented that she is unable to work. ECF No. 

14-1 at 15. Without Plaintiff providing citation to support this argument, the Court 

assumes that she is referring to her providers at Kaiser Permanente that put her on offwork status towards the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012. See supra Section D.i. As 

Defendant correctly points out, the determination about whether a claimant is “unable to 

 

3 The other areas are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with 

others; and (3) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00E.1-3. 

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work” is the ultimate decision of the ALJ and “[a] statement by a medical source that [a 

claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the ALJ] will determine 

that [the claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Moreover, there was 

sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ to reject these determinations by the medical 

sources. During the course of treatment, it was clear that the unable to work status was 

temporary. The treatment notes continually indicated that the reason for Plaintiff’s stress

and anxiety and being off work was due to issues with her supervisor and coworkers. See 

AR 980 (noting work environment and relationship with supervisor); AR 1128 (noting 

that Plaintiff felt singled out by supervisor and reprimanded); AR 1222 (noting being 

picked on by supervisor, constant criticism, belief they are trying to get her to quit); AR 

1263 (noting work conflict); AR 1379 (noting stress and unfairness at job). Plaintiff 

noted during this period of treatment that she was looking for other work. See AR 1128 

(noting Plaintiff stated that she was currently looking for another job within the county); 

AR 1222 (noting same). Part of Plaintiff’s treatment plan included attending Back to 

Work classes, which Plaintiff completed. See AR 1132; 1381; 1424 . Plaintiff and her 

therapist also proactively discussed how to get her on track to go back to work. See AR 

1560; 1567 (discussing medications that may help Plaintiff transition back to work). 

Thus, it would be reasonable for the ALJ to understand the off work restriction as limited 

to Plaintiff’s position at that time, without taking into account any RFC limitations like 

the ALJ is obligated to under the framework. 

In her reply, Plaintiff additionally argues that the two hour limitation found by Dr. 

Clark is also supported by her daily activities and that the ALJ should not have 

discounted her testimony. ECF No. 21 at 5. For example, Plaintiff points to testimony 

by Plaintiff and her husband that in her typical day, Plaintiff gets up only to take and pick 

up her son from school but otherwise spends the rest of her time, estimated 95%, in bed. 

Id. Plaintiff additionally testified that she had trouble completing tasks at a certain time, 

focusing on specific things, concentrating, and feeling pressured to perform at a certain 

pace. See AR 47. A claimant’s subjective symptoms are a proper consideration in a 

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disability evaluation, but those statements alone cannot be decisive on a disability claim. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). In 

deciding whether to credit a claimant’s testimony about subjective symptoms or 

limitations, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. Under 

the first step, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other symptoms. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. If this step is satisfied, and there is no affirmative evidence that 

the claimant is malingering, then the ALJ must determine the credibility of the claimant’s 

subjective complaints and “evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] symptoms” to 

determine whether and how these symptoms limit a claimant’s ability to work. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). The ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity 

of symptoms as long as he gives clear, specific, and convincing reasons for doing so. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson, 395 F.3d at 1195. In 

weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider the following factors: 1) 

reputation for being honest; 2) inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony; 3) 

inconsistencies in the claimant’s conduct; 4) daily living activities; 5) work record; and 6) 

physician’s testimony concerning the symptoms alleged. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 

789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s limitations were not as 

severe as she alleged at step two, and spends several paragraphs reviewing her medical 

record to explain why. AR 24-27. In her review of the medical record, the ALJ pointed 

to observations by Plaintiff’s treating physicians about her depression and anxiety, her 

treatment, and her progress. AR 24-25. During these sessions, Plaintiff did often report 

crying, feeling low and unmotivated, but was often observed to have normal speech, 

normal thought process, and normal speech. Indeed, even Dr. Clark, whose opinion 

Plaintiff appears to argue the ALJ should have adopted in whole, noted that Plaintiff was 

capable of many daily activities, including caring for her personal hygiene, live 

independently, drive occasionally, and care for her child. AR 26. Further consultative 

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examinations reported similar findings. AR 26-27. All these records support the ALJ’s 

determination that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about what she was capable of 

handling on a day to day basis were not as severe as she alleged. Further, while Plaintiff 

did testify about her problems concentrating, she testified as such generally without any 

specific reference to how long she felt she could concentrate for and the ALJ’s RFC 

reflects several limitations addressing concentration issues already, including limiting her 

to low stress, low concentration levels, unskilled work, low memory tasks, and simple 

instructions and decisions. AR 22. 

Also in her brief, Plaintiff discusses the hypotheticals presented to the VE by the 

ALJ. ECF No. 14-1 at 16. In particular, noting that if the hypothetical RFC was 

modified to include either of the following additional restrictions, Plaintiff would be 

found to be unable to work: (1) modified contact with supervisors and coworkers from 

“occasional” to “rare;” and (2) well below average performance (15-20% below average) 

and excessive abseentism (3 to 4 8-hour shifts each month). Id. Plaintiff then states that 

“[s]uch findings would be consistent” with Plaintiff and her husband’s testimony and the 

medical evidence of record. Id. To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ 

should have included either or both of these additional restrictions in his RFC, the Court 

finds that the ALJ’s decision not to do so was reasonable and well supported. The ALJ 

makes clear in his order that he believed Plaintiff stopped working primarily because of 

her work environment, namely her adverse interactions with her supervisor and 

coworkers, rather than her actual inability to perform the work. As discussed above, this 

is supported in Plaintiff’s medical record, where her providers repeatedly discuss this 

specific issue and where Plaintiff talks about looking for another job. Plaintiff also gave 

testimony that she was feeling very stressed at her job and found it difficult to manage the 

work. AR 50. When asked by the ALJ what was causing that stress, Plaintiff stated that 

“[i]t was mainly the supervisors and people” and she felt her supervisors were 

“attacking” her. AR 51. When asked how she felt like she was performing at the job, 

Plaintiff answered that she felt like she was doing an average job. AR 53. However, she 

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felt like she was let go because of being absent a lot, due to her stress and depression. 

AR 54. When asked if she had enough money in her household that she did not need to 

find a job at that time, Plaintiff answered “[y]es, my husband works.” AR 54. Given this 

background, it was a rational conclusion for the ALJ to draw that Plaintiff’s issues with 

her last job were primarily due to that specific work environment. Why a claimant may 

have stopped working is a valid consideration. See Cullen v. Colvin, No. 6:15-CV00517-SI, 2016 WL 706232, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2016) (citing Bruton v. Massanari, 

268 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 2001)) (upholding ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff stopped 

working for reasons other than disability because it was a rational interpretation of the 

evidence); see also Skelton v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-CV-00115-AA, 2017 WL 1752955, at 

*3 (D. Or. May 2, 2017); Brown v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-06061-KLS, 2014 WL 3891352, 

at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2014). Thus, the ALJ could reasonably have concluded that 

the issues Plaintiff testified she had interacting with her supervisors and coworkers and 

absence due to stress could be eliminated with a much lower stress job with a different 

work environment as identified in the RFC, and therefore, the RFC did not have to reflect 

these additional restrictions. 

In summary, the Court finds that the ALJ decision was well supported in the 

medical record and testimony. The ALJ did not misapply any legal standards or rules in 

his decision, and for the reasons stated above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

RFC determination and ruling. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s benefits is supported by 

substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment be DENIED and that Defendant’s cross motion for summary 

judgment be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties on or before February 11, 2020. 

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The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any 

response to the objections shall be filed and served on or before February 18, 2020. The 

parties are advised that any failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the court’s order. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2020

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