Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01669/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01669-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06cv1669-BTM (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD TERRY,

Petitioner,

v.

R.K. WONG, Acting Warden; BILL

LOCKYER, Attorney General of

the State of California,

Respondents.

 

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Case No. 06cv1669-BTM (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[DOC. NO. 12]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California.

On August 11, 2006, Petitioner Reginald Terry, a state prisoner

appearing pro se, filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus currently

before the Court. Doc. No. 1. Petitioner challenges his multiple

robbery convictions, as well as his forty-one year, eight month prison

sentence. Id.

This Court has considered the Petition (Pet.), Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss (Resp’t Mem.), and all supporting documents submitted by the

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parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. Doc. No. 12.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion in People v. Terry, No. D037185 (Cal. Ct. App. May 15, 2002).

Lodgment 3. This Court presumes the state court’s factual determinations to be correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

340 (2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from

such facts are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

Between November 1999 and January 2000, Terry robbed two

motels, a gas station and a bank. He had previously stayed

at the motels and was recognized by the clerks/victims. His

fingerprints matched prints found at the scene of the gas

station robbery. He confessed to the bank robbery. He was

also convicted of twice robbing a bookstore.

James Worley and Rod Baltau testified that on January 9,

2000, while Worley was ringing up a purchase by Baltau in a

bookstore, Terry pointed a gun at Baltau and threatened him.

Terry took money from Worley and fled. Worley identified

Terry from a black and white photograph and in court. Baltau

also identified Terry as the robber.

Terry testified he is a career criminal but he only robs

banks. He admitted committing only a bank robbery.

See Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Lodgment 3 at 2.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The District Attorney of San Diego County filed an information

charging Petitioner with eight counts of second degree robbery in

violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) § 211 in connection

with the above-described robberies. Appellant’s Opening Brief, Lodgment

1 at 1. With regard to Counts Six through Eight, the information

alleged that Petitioner personally used a firearm within the meaning of

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Penal Code § 12022.53(b). Id. at 1-2; Lodgment 3 at 1.

On June 2, 2000, a jury returned a guilty verdict on six counts of

robbery in violation of Penal Code § 211, three while personally using

a firearm. Order of the California Court of Appeal, Lodgment 3 at 1;

see also Lodgment 1 at 2 (jury acquitted Petitioner of Counts 1 and 2).

In a bifurcated proceeding, Petitioner admitted that he had served four

prior prison terms and had one prior serious felony conviction and one

prior strike conviction. Order of the California Court of Appeal,

Lodgment 3 at 1-2. On December 4, 2000, the trial court imposed a

sentence of forty-one years and eight months, specifically,

the 10-year upper term for one count of robbery with a prior

strike conviction, enhanced 10 years for personal firearm

use, and five years for the prior serious felony conviction,

with consecutive terms of two years on five convictions of

robbery with a prior strike conviction (double one-third the

middle term), two enhanced by three years four months for

personal firearm use (one-third the middle term).

See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 3; see also Order of the California

Court of Appeal at 2. The trial court struck the prior prison term

enhancements. Id.

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. Appellant’s Opening Brief, Lodgment

1. On appeal, Petitioner alleged that there was insufficient evidence

to support his convictions for the robberies of the F Street Bookstore

(Counts Six and Seven), and as such, his convictions on those counts,

together with the accompanying sentencing enhancements, should be

reversed. Id. at 11-18. On May 15, 2002, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s convictions in an unpublished opinion.

Order of the California Court of Appeal, Lodgment 3.

Based on a review of the record presented to this Court, it appears

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1

 In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner left blank the sections requesting

information regarding further direct review. See Pet. at 2-3. In his initial state

habeas petition, however, Petitioner indicated that he sought such review as early as

July 24, 2002, but the “petition for review [was] mailed but not received by c[our]t.”

Lodgment 8 at 3-5; see also id. at Exs. D (attaching July 8, 2002 correspondence from

Petitioner’s appellate counsel providing guidance regarding how and when to file a

petition for direct review in the California Supreme Court) and E (attaching prison

legal mail log, which indicates that Petitioner sent legal mail to the California

Supreme Court on July 24, 2002). Petitioner’s subsequent state habeas petitions

reiterate these representations. See Lodgment 4 at 5 (indicating Petitioner sought

direct review in the California Supreme Court as of July 24, 2002 but petition was not

received by court); Lodgment 6 at 5 (indicating direct review was sought and was then

“pending”). Moreover, in response to Petitioner’s May 29, 2003 inquiry regarding the

status of his petition for direct review, the clerk confirmed that per the California

Supreme Court’s docket, no petition for review was ever filed. See Lodgment 8 at Ex.

F. In any event, neither copies of a petition for direct review by the California

Supreme Court nor a ruling related thereto were submitted to this Court.

2

 In determining the filing date of his petitions, Petitioner is entitled to the

benefit of the “mailbox rule,” which is the date the petitions were presented to prison

authorities for mailing to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)

(holding that petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed at the time [he]

deliver[s] it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk”); Huizar v.

Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the application of Houston’s

mailbox rule to federal habeas filings); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199,

1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing same with regard to state habeas petitions). Here,

Petitioner’s initial state habeas petition bears a handwritten signature, verification,

and typewritten date of September 24, 2004. Lodgment 8 at 6, 10. Accordingly, this

Court will construe Petitioner’s original state habeas petition as filed as of

September 24, 2004. Id.

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that Petitioner did not pursue further direct review.1 Pet. at 2.

Instead, on September 24, 2004,2 Petitioner filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, No. S128155, Lodgment 8. In support of his request for

state habeas relief, Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed

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reversible error by failing (1) to instruct the jury regarding

appropriate eyewitness identification procedures, and (2) to respond to

the jury’s request for clarification after deliberations had begun. Id.

at 5-9. Petitioner also alleged that he suffered from “grave mental

illness” of varying degrees (ranging from “major depressive disorder,

recurrent with severe psychotic features,” “polysubstance dependency,”

and “anti-social personality disorder”), that he actively participated

in the prison mental health care system at the Correctional Clinical

Case Management System (“CCCMS”) level of care, and that his condition

rendered him incapable of understanding his legal remedies and

“transacting court business.” Id. at 3-4. In light of his alleged

mental condition, Petitioner argued that he was entitled to tolling.

Id.

Next, on October 11, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Superior Court. Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, No. HC17966, Lodgment 4. In this petition, however,

Petitioner argued that the trial court improperly imposed an upper term

maximum sentence without a jury determination as to aggravating factors

in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 3-4 (citing Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989)). The California Superior Court denied the petition in its

entirety on February 23, 2005. Order Denying Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, Lodgment 5. Petitioner then sought collateral review in

the California Court of Appeal on April 11, 2005, raising the same

Blakley claim he presented to the lower court. Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, No. D046242, Lodgment 6. The California Court of Appeal

denied the petition on May 20, 2005. Order of the California Court of

Appeal, Lodgment 7 at 2 (underlining that “Blakely is not a watershed

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3

 Again, Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Houston’s mailbox rule to

determine the filing date of his federal habeas petition. See supra text accompanying

note 2.

4

 Although both R.K. Wong and Bill Lockyer were named as respondents, the

Government moved to dismiss only on behalf of Respondent Wong.

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rule of criminal procedure that must be applied retroactively to final

cases” such as Petitioner’s).

On August 17, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition filed nearly one year before, citing In re

Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (Cal. 1953). Docket (Register of Actions),

Lodgment 9 (recording denial of habeas petition).

On August 11, 2006,3 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1. In his

federal habeas petition, Petitioner resurrects only the claims he

asserted in his habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court,

namely, that the trial court’s failures to instruct the jury with regard

to eyewitness identification and to respond to the jury’s duringdeliberations request for clarification were improper. Id. at 6-7. In

addition, Petitioner asserts that he “is currently under a level of care

that requires close psychiatric monitoring and treatment” and that he

takes “potent psychotropic drugs.” Id. at 8, 14.

Respondent moved to dismiss on February 22, 2007, arguing that the

instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).4 Resp’t Mem. at 3-5. In support, Respondent

contends that the applicable limitations period expired before

Petitioner first sought collateral review in state court and long before

he filed his federal habeas petition. Id. at 4. Respondent also

contends that Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of equitable

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tolling on the basis of any alleged mental illness. Id. at 5.

Respondent maintains that Petitioner’s condition is “being properly

treated” and has not been shown to have had any impact on his ability

to pursue federal habeas relief in a timely manner. Id. According to

Respondent, Petitioner’s lengthy delays in filing his habeas petitions

demonstrate a lack of diligence, and as a result, no such tolling is

warranted. Id. For all these reasons, Respondent requests that the

petition be dismissed in its entirety. Id. at 6.

Petitioner has not opposed or otherwise responded to Respondent’s

motion.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006).

DISCUSSION

A. Respondent Lockyer Should Be Dismissed As An Improper

Respondent 

As an initial matter, the petition names R.K. Wong and Bill Lockyer

as Respondents. Pet. at 1. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

provides that the state officer having custody of a habeas petitioner

shall be named as respondent. Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The

structure of the California penal system places prisoners in the custody

of both the Director of Corrections and the warden of the California

prison where the petitioner is incarcerated. See Ortiz-Sandoval v.

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Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the warden of a

California prison and the Director of Corrections for California have

the power to produce the prisoner,” and emphasizing that the Advisory

Committee Notes accompanying the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases contemplate directors as possible respondents). Thus Wong, identified as

acting warden of the prison where Petitioner is currently incarcerated,

is a proper respondent, whereas Lockyer, the Attorney General of the

State of California, is not.

The Attorney General failed to move to dismiss Repsondent Lockyer

as an improper party. Instead, the Attorney General opted to move to

dismiss on behalf of Respondent Wong only. Resp’t Mem. at 3-6. Because

this Court finds that Lockyer was improperly named as a respondent, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent Lockyer be dismissed as an improper

party.

B. The AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), effective April 24, 1996, imposes a one-year statute of

limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state

prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West Supp. 2006). Section 2244(d)’s

one-year limitations period applies to all habeas petitions filed by

persons in “custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Id. §

2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroacCase 3:06-cv-01669-BTM-BLM Document 13 Filed 05/07/07 Page 8 of 21
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tively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).

Only section 2244(d)(1)(A) applies in this case. As noted above,

Petitioner failed to file an opposition to Respondents’ motion, and

therefore has made no explicit argument that any other provision of

section 2244(d)(1) applies. Moreover, even construing the instant

petition liberally, this Court can identify neither suggestion nor

evidence that Petitioner’s claims would be more properly evaluated under

any other subsection. See Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2005) (instructing that courts must “construe pro se habeas filings

liberally”). Accordingly, subsection 2244(d)(1)(A) governs Petitioner’s

habeas claims.

Again, subsection 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the one-year

limitations period begins to run on the date on which the habeas

petitioner’s conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

While section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides no definition of “final by the

conclusion of direct review,” the Supreme Court has explained that

“final” means “a case in which a judgment of conviction has been

rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a

petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally

denied.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (citing

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982)). Where, as

here, no petition for review was filed in the California Supreme Court

following direct review in the state appellate court, the conviction

becomes final forty (40) days after the California Court of Appeal filed

its opinion. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2002)

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5

 In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Supreme Court further instructed

that the time an application for state post-conviction review is “pending” includes the

interval between the lower state court’s adverse decision and the prisoner’s filing of

a notice of appeal in the higher state court, provided that the filing of that notice

is timely under state law. See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-23; see also Evans v. Chavis,

546 U.S. 189, 126 S.Ct. 846, 852-53 (2006) (reiterating Saffold, and clarifying that

absent guidance from state courts, federal courts must independently examine the delay

in each case and determine what the state courts would have held with respect to

timeliness).

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(citing Cal. Rules of Court, rules 24(a), 28(b), 45(a); Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 12a).

In this case, the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s

direct appeal on May 15, 2002. Lodgment 3. Petitioner’s conviction

therefore became final on June 24, 2002, or upon the expiration of the

allotted forty-day period in which Petitioner could have sought direct

review in the California Supreme Court. See Smith, 297 F.3d at 813.

Thus, the statute of limitations period commenced on June 25, 2002, and

expired one year later on June 24, 2003. Petitioner, however, delayed

filing his federal petition until August 11, 2006, more than three years

after the limitations period had expired. Consequently, absent tolling,

the instant petition is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling

1. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review . . . is pending.”5 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2);

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of

limitations is not tolled, however, “from the time a final decision is

issued on direct state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral

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6

 The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed the question whether equitable

tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005) (assuming without deciding that equitable tolling applies to

the AEDPA’s limitations period).

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challenge is filed.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Similarly, the limitations period is not tolled after state post-conviction proceedings are

final and before federal habeas proceedings are initiated. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

As set forth above, Petitioner first sought state collateral review

in the California Supreme Court on September 24, 2004. Lodgment 8.

Before that court ruled on this pending petition, however, Petitioner

filed a different habeas petition in the California Superior Court on

October 11, 2004. Lodgment 4. The California Superior Court denied

that petition on February 23, 2005. Lodgment 5. Petitioner then

pursued and was denied state habeas relief in the California Court of

Appeal. Lodgment 6-7. Finally, the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s initial petition for habeas review on August 17, 2005.

Lodgment 9. Accordingly, if the time period between September 24, 2004

and August 17, 2005 fell within the AEDPA’s limitations period, it would

be tolled. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, however, the statute

of limitations commenced on June 25, 2002 and expired on June 24, 2003,

long before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition. As such,

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Accordingly, unless

Petitioner establishes an entitlement to equitable tolling, the instant

petition is untimely.

2. Petitioner Fails to Show Equitable Tolling Is Warranted

In the Ninth Circuit, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

is subject to equitable tolling.6 See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970

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7

 As summarized above, Petitioner referenced his alleged mental illness in his

initial state habeas petition, arguing that his condition prevented him from pursuing

habeas relief in that court in a timely manner and therefore he was entitled to

tolling. See Lodgment 8 at 3-4.

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(9th Cir. 2006). While equitable tolling is “unavailable in most

cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), it is

appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates two specific

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S.

at 418. “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

the AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Petitioners face such a high bar in order to effectuate the “AEDPA’s

statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in

order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale

claims.” Guillory v. Rose, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226). As a result, when assessing a habeas

petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable tolling, courts must conduct

a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146,

1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Petitioner did not oppose Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and

therefore has not formally addressed Respondent’s arguments with regard

to equitable tolling. In the instant habeas petition, however,

Petitioner explains that he is serving his sentence in the Enhanced

Outpatient Program (“EOP”), that he “is currently under a level of care

that requires close psychiatric monitoring and treatment,” and that he

has been prescribed “potent psychotropic drugs.”7 Pet. at 8, 14. In

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8

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) provides

[w]henever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a

general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the

representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person.

An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative

may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a

guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented

in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection

of the infant or incompetent person.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).

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support of these representations, Petitioner attaches prison mental

health treatment plan records dated between November 2, 2005 and April

20, 2006, which describe the nature and extent of Petitioner’s symptoms

of depression and anxiety and confirm that he has been prescribed

medication for same. See Pet. at Ex. A. Petitioner also cites Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)8 and several Ninth Circuit cases touching

on competency issues. Pet. at 14 (citing Allen, 408 F.3d at 1152-54)

(reversing dismissal for failure to prosecute and remanding for

competency hearing where habeas petitioner presented sufficient evidence

of incompetence, namely, two declarations attesting to petitioner’s

mental illness and inability to understand court orders and letter from

prison psychiatrist stating petitioner was under psychiatrist’s care,

was diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and was

taking two psychotropic medications); Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119,

1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (in a non-habeas civil case, reasoning that where

“a substantial question exists regarding the mental competence of a

party proceeding pro se,” the preferred procedure is for courts to

conduct a hearing to determine competence and if necessary, appoint a

guardian ad litem)). Finally, Petitioner indicates that he is

unfamiliar with habeas proceedings and that his federal habeas petition

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9

 Petitioner also represents that he will require the assistance of appointed

counsel after his “inmate legal assistant” (the inmate who Petitioner asserts prepared

the instant petition) is transferred from the EOP. Pet. at 8.

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was prepared by another inmate.9 Id. at 8.

Respondent contends that equitable tolling is unwarranted in this

case. Resp’t Mem. at 5. Claiming that Petitioner is receiving proper

treatment for his alleged mental illness, Respondent argues that

Petitioner has not established that his alleged condition has prevented

him from pursuing federal habeas relief in a timely manner. Id. In

Respondent’s view, the lengthy delays between Petitioner’s state and

federal habeas filings demonstrate nothing more that Petitioner’s lack

of diligence. Id. Accordingly, Respondent insists that equitable

tolling is inappropriate. Id.

A habeas petitioner’s alleged mental incompetency may warrant

equitable tolling or require further development of the record because

mental incompetency is an extraordinary circumstance beyond a prisoner’s

control. See Allen, 408 F.3d at 1152-54 (finding substantial,

uncontradicted evidence of incompetence warranting a hearing where

inmate claimed to be incompetent, submitted sworn declarations from

himself and another inmate, and provided a letter from his prison

psychiatrist); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003)

(expansion of record required where petitioner with history of mental

illness and possible incompetence provided medical records and stated

in a sworn pleading that he was incompetent in the years in which his

petitions should have been filed); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), abrogated on other

grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (noting that “[w]hen

a putative habeas petitioner’s mental incompetency is at issue, and the

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10 While psychiatrists considered Petitioner’s mood to be within normal limits

as of November 2, 2005, they described him as having a “depressed” mood on January 26,

2006. Pet. at Ex. A.

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record discloses a genuine basis for concern, it is appropriate to toll

the AEDPA’s time bar until a reasonable period after the district court

makes a competency determination”). However, a showing of mental

illness alone will not toll the limitations period; mental illness tolls

the limitations period only where the prisoner’s alleged mental illness

somehow made filing a timely habeas petition impossible. See Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (equitable tolling will only

be granted if “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time”) (citation omitted);

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner must

show that extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness); see also Johnson v. Evans, No. S-05-2460, 2007 WL 178014, at *4

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2007) (explaining that “mental illness will toll a

limitation period ‘only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer

from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights

and acting upon them’”) (citation omitted). Again, the petitioner bears

the burden of showing an entitlement to equitable tolling. See Miranda,

292 F.3d at 1065.

The medical records attached to Petitioner’s sworn federal habeas

petition document three mental health assessments conducted between

November 2, 2005 and April 20, 2006. See Pet. at Ex. A (attaching

mental health treatment plans dated November 2, 2005, January 26, 2006,

and April 20, 2006). During this period, prison psychiatrists described

Petitioner’s appearance, behavior, speech, sleep, affect, cognition,

sensorium, insight, judgment, and attitude as within normal limits,10

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11 Moreover, staff noted that Petitioner occasionally refused or discontinued

his medications, was sometimes tearful, agitated, or easily stressed, and on one

occasion, had thoughts of suicide. Lodgment 8 at Ex. G.

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and noted that Petitioner denied any hallucinations, delusions,

suicidality, or “violence risk.” Id. Notwithstanding these observations, psychiatrists consistently identified Petitioner’s problems

and/or symptoms as depression, anxiety, and panic attacks, and concluded

that Petitioner suffered from mood disorder not otherwise specified

(“NOS”). Id. To address Petitioner’s symptoms, psychiatrists

prescribed unspecified “psych” medications, recommended yard activity,

and encouraged Petitioner’s participation in therapy groups. Id.

Also before this Court are EOP records attached to Petitioner’s

sworn habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. See

Lodgment 8 at Ex. G (attaching mental health progress notes dated from

May 10, 2002 through July 30, 2002). These records detail Petitioner’s

mental state immediately prior to the date on which Petitioner’s

conviction was upheld on appeal to approximately one month into the

AEDPA’s limitations period. Id. During this two and one-half month

period, staff summarized Petitioner’s thought processes as ranging from

slowed, “impaired insight,” and “poor judgment” to concrete and goal

directed, his mood as ranging from “okay,” depressed, and dysphoric to

“all right” and “much better,” his affect as ranging from incongruent

to appropriate for content and broad or smiling, and his behavior as

consistently cooperative and open.11 Id. Staff also noted that

Petitioner regularly attended therapy groups, worked as a porter, and

was a member of the prison baseball team. Id. By mid-to-late July

2002, staff assessments generally described Petitioner as in “good

spirits” and smiling, and underlined his ability to recognize that

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12 Further, the records attached to the instant petition do little to support

a claim for equitable tolling because they summarize Petitioner’s mental health and

treatment related thereto between November 2, 2005 and April 20, 2006, i.e., long after

the AEDPA limitations period expired.

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“dwelling on past violence & prob[lem]s agitated him.” Id. Over the

course of this entire period, however, staff regularly assessed

Petitioner as having major depressive disorder (recurrent, severe with

psychotic features), incongruent mood, polysubstance dependence, and a

Global Assessment of Functioning score of 45. Id. Staff also

consistently recommended that Petitioner continue to receive the same

level of mental health treatment. Id.

Based on its review of the records submitted, this Court is not

persuaded that Petitioner’s alleged mental condition warrants either

equitable tolling or further inquiry regarding Petitioner’s competency.

As an initial matter, this Court acknowledges that the mental health

records submitted show a history of depression, anxiety, and related

treatment. See Lodgment 8 at Ex. G. However, the records do not

support a finding, or even a legitimate concern, that Petitioner’s

mental illness rendered him legally incompetent. Id. The records also

do not demonstrate that mental illness or any other disability prevented

Petitioner from filing a habeas petition before the limitations period

(June 25, 2002-June 24, 2003) expired.12 See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034;

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. Instead, the records confirm that on July 24,

2002—thirty days into the AEDPA limitations period—Petitioner attempted

to seek review of his conviction in the California Supreme Court. See

Lodgment 8 at 3 (Petitioner explaining that he attempted to seek review

in the California Supreme Court on July 24, 2002); id. at Ex. E (prison

legal mail log confirming correspondence forwarded to California Supreme

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13 The records from Petitioner’s direct appeal do not contain any indication that

there was a concern regarding Petitioner’s competence during the trial and pre-trial

proceedings. See Lodgments 1-3.

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Court on that date). The records further confirm that Petitioner

monitored the status of his filings throughout the limitations period

by sending periodic correspondence to his appellate counsel and seeking

assistance from his “jailhouse lawyer” when many months had passed

without a court ruling. See Lodgment 8 at 3 (Petitioner explaining that

he “waited approximately eleven months for a response” to his petition

for review in the California Supreme Court and alerted his jailhouse

lawyer to the delay at that time); id. at Exs. B-F (attaching letter

responses from appellate counsel and the clerk of court and prison legal

mail logs confirming correspondence sent by Petitioner to various

courts, all dated during the relevant period). Finally, the records

confirm that despite his condition immediately prior to and approximately one month into the AEDPA’s limitations period (May 10, 2002-July

30, 2002), Petitioner was able to maintain employment as a porter,

voiced an increased understanding about how to cope with environmental

stressors, and regularly participated in therapy groups. Lodgment 8 at

Ex. G. Given this record, this Court finds that the fact that

Petitioner suffered from and was treated for mental illness at the

beginning of and more than two years after the expiration of the

limitations period is not sufficient to show that he was mentally

incompetent or that mental illness rendered him unable to pursue his

legal rights over the course of the entire limitations period.13 See

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799; see also Johnson,

2007 WL 178014, at *4 (explaining that “mental illness will toll a

limitation period ‘only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer

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from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights

and acting upon them’”) (citation omitted).

Moreover, even assuming Petitioner’s condition in mid-2002

prevented him from pursuing federal habeas relief in a timely manner,

equitable tolling for the period supported by the medical record

evidence would not render the instant petition timely. In particular,

the records documenting treatment received before and during the

limitations period, dated May 10, 2002 through July 30, 2002, potentially would support equitable tolling for a mere thirty-six days of

that period (June 25, 2002-July 30, 2002). Here, Petitioner delayed

filing his federal habeas petition until August 11, 2006. As such, even

if this Court were to provide equitable tolling for those thirty-six

days, the instant petition is still untimely.

In sum, Petitioner sets forth no evidence showing that mental

illness or other disability prevented him from filing a federal habeas

petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at

799; see also Johnson, 2007 WL 178014, at *4. While Petitioner submits

mental health records exhibiting a history of mental illness and related

treatment, he fails to explain how his mental illness rendered him

incapable of timely filing. Id. Moreover, Petitioner has provided

limited record evidence of mental health treatment during the relevant

period, and has provided neither declarations nor affidavits signed by

treating psychiatrists that might support a claim that his mental

illness prevented him from filing in a timely manner. Compare Allen,

408 F.3d at 1152-53 (evidence of incompetence included letter from

prison psychiatrist stating petitioner was under psychiatrist’s care,

was diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and was

taking two psychotropic medications). As such, this Court has

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14 Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner attempts to argue that his

unfamiliarity with habeas proceedings justifies equitable tolling, the argument is

without merit. Pet. at 8. It is well settled that a habeas petitioner’s status as an

inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and lack of legal assistance do not constitute cause

to excuse an untimely filing. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005)

(“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an

excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for promptness.”);

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a “pro se

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling”); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th

Cir. 2000) (noting that “ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

prisoner, generally does not excuse prompt filing”).

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thoroughly reviewed the mental health records submitted and finds that

they fail to compel the conclusion that equitable tolling should be

applied and to raise a substantial question regarding Petitioner’s

competency. Accordingly, this Court finds that equitable tolling is not

warranted in this case.14

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the instant

petition was filed well after the statute of limitations expired, and

that there exists no basis for tolling. As a result, this Court finds

that the claims presented in the instant petition are barred by the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and therefore RECOMMENDS that

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. Doc. No. 12.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss; and (3) dismissing

this action in its entirety with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 29, 2007, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

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all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than June 19,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

Dated: May 7, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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