Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00057/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00057-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONI0 PARM0 MORALES,

Petitioner,

v.

THOMAS L. CAREY,

Respondent.

 /

1: 05-CV-0057 AWI WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 19, 2003, following a jury trial in Kern County Superior Court, Petitioner was

convicted of one count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code § 10851(a)), one count

of receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code § 496d), and one count of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon (§ 12021(a)(1)). Additionally, it was alleged that Petitioner has a prior strike (§§

667(c)-(1) & 1170.12(a) - (e)) and a prior prison term (§§ 667.5(b) & 1170,12(a) -(e)), as to all

counts. On March 20, 2003, the court sentenced Petitioner to serve a prison term of eight years and

four months. The court stayed the sentence for count 2 (§ 654) and stayed all but sixteen months of

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the sentence for count 3 until successful completion of count 1.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his conviction. On March 19, 2004, the Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment, with modification. A one-year prior prison term enhancement was stricken. 

The sentence in count 3 was corrected to impose a four-year term.

On July 15, 2004, the Kern County Superior Court amended the abstract of judgment in

accordance with the Court of Appeal’s opinion. The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

petition for review on June 9, 2004. Petitioner did not file a habeas corpus petition in any state

court.

Petitioner filed the present petition on January 13, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County

Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

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pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

When the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this court "looks

through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the

last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 &

n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through"

presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter

without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding th

federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection

of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under §

2254(d)(1)). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

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28 Claims two and three of Petitioner’s petition were resolved in his favor by the Court of Appeal. Thus, the court 1

finds that these claims are not properly before this court and present no basis for relief.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

In claim one of his petition, Petitioner contends that judgment as to counts 1 and 2 must be

reversed due to a lack of sufficient evidence that Petitioner intended to deprive the owner of

possession or had knowledge the vehicle was stolen. Respondent disputes this contention. 1

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a

federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Sufficiency

claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324 n. 16. 

In addressing this contention, the Court of Appeal found as follows:

Defendant argues that the two theft counts must be reversed because there is insufficient

proof that he knew the vehicle was stolen. We disagree. Essentially, “[w]hat this argument

overlooks is that it is beyond the province of this court to reweigh the evidence.” [Citation.]

On appeal, we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier

reasonably could deduce from the evidence. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 557, 576.) 

“‘[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts as found, a

reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court or

jury.’” [Citation.] In this case, the surround circumstances amply support an inference that

defendant knew the car was stolen. First, Contreras testified that defendant picked her up in

the car within two hours from the time it was stolen. “Mere possession of a stolen car under

suspicious circumstances is sufficient to sustain a conviction of unlawful taking.” [Citation.]

Second, defendant never offered an innocent explanation for his acquisition of the vehicle. 

“Where recently stolen property is found in the conscious possession of a defendant who,

upon being questioned by the police . . . remains silent under circumstances indicating

consciousness of guilt, an inference of guilt is permissible. [Citation.] 

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The court agrees with Respondent that the Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to the

Supreme Court precedent as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia. While the Court of Appeal did not cite

Jackson in evaluating Petitioner’s claim, it did cite People v. Johnson, in which the California

Supreme Court explained the standard for sufficiency of evidence claims as being the same as that in

Jackson. People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d at 578. Further, as Respondent argues, the Court of

Appeal’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Jackson. Petitioner’s possession of the car

was circumstantial evidence that Petitioner was driving and had received a stolen vehicle. Petitioner

did not provide an innocent explanation for his possession of the vehicle. Finally, the removal of the

car stereo was additional circumstantial evidence supporting theft rather than an innocent

explanation.

In light of the above, the court finds that Petitioner has not carried his burden of

demonstrating that the Court of Appeal’s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the court concludes that habeas corpus relief is not warranted.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner may seek to appeal from the judgment of the court in this case. Petitioner cannot

proceed on such an appeal absent a certificate of appealability. The controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. §

2253, provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge,

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not

be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises

out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or

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issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

In the present case, the court finds no denial of a constitutional right. Given the deferencial

standard found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), reasonable jurists would not disagree

over whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will be denied.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) This petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED;

3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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