Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07028/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 11, 2009 Decided July 17, 2009

No. 08-7028

JACQUELINE T. ROBINSON-REEDER,

APPELLANT

v.

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 07cv00880)

Christopher Cuneo argued the cause as amicus curiae in

support of appellant. With him on the briefs was Terry L.

Sullivan.

Jacqueline T. Robinson-Reeder, pro se, joined the briefs of

amicus curiae and filed a statement of personal explanations.

Christine N. Kearns argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee. Ellen C. Cohen entered an appearance.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The district court dismissed

plaintiff Jacqueline Robinson-Reeder’s Title VII claims against

her former employer, but permitted her to file an amended

complaint to preserve her claim of defamation. On the same day

she filed the amended complaint, Robinson-Reeder filed a notice

of appeal from the dismissal of her Title VII claims.

Subsequently, she and the defendant filed a joint stipulation

dismissing the defamation claim without prejudice. Because the

district court has not entered a final judgment in this case, and

because no exception applies to the rule that generally limits our

jurisdiction to review of final judgments, we dismiss RobinsonReeder’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I

Robinson-Reeder worked as an Executive Assistant at the

American Council on Education (ACE) for several months in

late 2006. She alleges that her superiors denied her technical

assistance for a computer problem and failed to respond to her

complaints about an insubordinate office assistant. Believing

that a probation notice she received was unjust, RobinsonReeder resigned her position. She subsequently experienced

difficulty obtaining comparable employment.

In May 2007, Robinson-Reeder filed a pro se complaint

against ACE in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia. The court construed her filings to raise five

claims. The first four, brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., were for:

racially discriminatory treatment regarding her request for

technical assistance (Claim I); racially discriminatory treatment

regarding the probation notice (Claim II); retaliation for her

complaints about the office assistant (Claim III); and retaliation

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1

On appeal, Robinson-Reeder disputes the district court’s

characterization of her complaint, contending that she raised only one

Title VII claim (the claim described as Claim II above), along with her

defamation claim (Claim V). As this dispute has no consequence for

our jurisdictional analysis, we adopt the district court’s

characterization for purposes of explication.

for having filed a charge with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (Claim IV). The fifth claim, brought

under the common law of the District of Columbia, alleged that

ACE defamed her by giving negative references to potential

employers (Claim V). Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on

Educ., 532 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2008).1

On January 29, 2008, the court granted ACE’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings as to all four Title VII claims. Id. at

13-17. At the same time, noting that Robinson-Reeder had

failed to cite any independent basis for federal jurisdiction over

her defamation claim, the court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 18-19 (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)). The court stated that it “will dismiss plaintiff’s

defamation claim if an amended complaint asserting that claim

and a proper independent basis for federal jurisdiction is not

filed within 20 days.” Id. at 19; see Robinson-Reeder v. Am.

Council on Educ., No. 07-0880, Order at 1 (D.D.C. Jan. 29,

2008) (same). Later that day, the court clarified that any

amended pleadings would be due by February 19, 2008.

Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., No. 07-0880,

Set/Reset Deadlines Notice (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2008).

Within the time period specified by the court, RobinsonReeder filed an amended complaint that reasserted her

defamation claim and invoked the court’s diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction. See Am. Compl. at 1 (J.A. 74) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 1332). The same day, she filed a notice of appeal

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2

Robinson-Reeder has also submitted a separate statement of

personal explanations.

3

Under the collateral order doctrine, the Court has “interpreted the

term ‘final decision’ in § 1291 to permit jurisdiction over appeals from

from the January 29 order. On February 29, ACE filed in the

district court a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the

ground, among others, that it failed to state a claim for

defamation upon which relief could be granted. RobinsonReeder did not oppose the motion to dismiss, and the district

court did not rule on it. Instead, on March 28, 2008, the parties

(with Robinson-Reeder then represented by counsel) filed a joint

stipulation, stating that “the remaining cause of action in the

within action is dismissed without prejudice.” Stipulation of

Dismissal (J.A. 95).

 Robinson-Reeder, now again proceeding pro se, seeks

review of the district court’s dismissal of Claim II of her initial

complaint. ACE has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for

lack of appellate jurisdiction. This court appointed amicus

curiae to present arguments in favor of Robinson-Reeder’s

position, and she has indicated that she joins the briefs that

amicus filed.2

 Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction,

we do not reach the merits of Robinson-Reeder’s appeal.

II

The jurisdiction of a court of appeals is generally limited to

appeals from “final decisions” of the district courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291; see Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203

(1999). “In accord with . . . historical understanding,” the

Supreme Court has “repeatedly interpreted § 1291 to mean that

an appeal ordinarily will not lie until after final judgment has

been entered in a case.” Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 203.3 As the

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a small category of orders that do not terminate the litigation,” a

category that “includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve

important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively

unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying

action.” Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1292

permits appeals from a limited set of interlocutory decisions.

Robinson-Reeder’s appeal does not fall under either of these rubrics,

and she does not contend that it does.

Court has explained, “the final judgment rule serves several

salutary purposes:”

It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe

to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon

to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur

in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals

would undermine the independence of the district

judge, as well as the special role that individual plays

in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in

accordance with the sensible policy of avoid[ing] the

obstruction to just claims that would come from

permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of

separate appeals from the various rulings to which a

litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of

judgment. The rule also serves the important purpose

of promoting efficient judicial administration.

Id. at 203-04 (alteration in original) (quoting Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)). “Consistent

with these purposes,” the Court has held that “a decision is not

final, ordinarily, unless it ends the litigation on the merits and

leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Id.

at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Although the amicus brief maintained that the district court

intended its January 29 order to dismiss the entire action, Amicus

Curiae Br. 11, counsel acknowledged at oral argument that the court’s

treatment of the defamation claim makes clear this was not so. Oral

Arg. Recording at 5:10-15.

The finality of a decision in a case involving multiple

claims is governed in part by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b), which specifies that a district court “may direct entry of

a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . .

only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason

for delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). “Otherwise, any order or

other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than

all the claims . . . does not end the action as to any of the claims

. . . and may be revised at any time before the entry of a

judgment adjudicating all the claims . . . .” Id.; see Cambridge

Holdings Group, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 1356, 1359

(D.C. Cir. 2007).

As amicus acknowledged at oral argument, there was no

final judgment from which Robinson-Reeder could have

appealed at the time she filed a notice of appeal in this court on

February 19, 2008. Oral Arg. Recording at 5:10-15.4

 The

district court’s January 29, 2008, order had dismissed her Title

VII claims on the pleadings, but it had not dismissed her

defamation claim. Rather, the court stated that it “will dismiss

plaintiff’s defamation claim if an amended complaint asserting

that claim and a proper independent basis for federal jurisdiction

is not filed within 20 days.” Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d

at 19 (emphases added). The court further suggested that

“diversity of citizenship” could provide such an independent

jurisdictional basis. Id. The court thus made clear that it had

not dismissed Robinson-Reeder’s defamation claim, and that it

would do so only if she failed to file an appropriately amended

complaint. Nor did the district court make the “express[]

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determin[ation] [of] no just reason for delay” authorized by Rule

54(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).

Notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment on the day

she filed her notice of appeal, Robinson-Reeder argues that we

have jurisdiction as a consequence of Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a)(2). Rule 4(a)(2) provides that “[a] notice of

appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order -- but

before the entry of the judgment or order -- is treated as filed on

the date of and after the entry.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2). As

construed by the Supreme Court in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.

Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., this rule “permits a notice of

appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of appeal

from the final judgment only when a district court announces a

decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by

the entry of judgment.” 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991). The key

point for our purposes, however, is that for Rule 4(a)(2) to

apply, “[t]here must at some point prior to consideration of the

appeal actually have been a final appealable judgment of some

sort entered; Rule 4(a)(2) by its terms makes a premature notice

effective ‘on the date of and after the entry [of judgment].’”

Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d

156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting FED.

R. APP. P. 4(a)(2)); see FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 275 (“Under Rule

4(a)(2), a premature notice of appeal does not ripen until

judgment is entered.”).

The next question, then, is whether the district court ever

entered a final judgment in this case. Robinson-Reeder makes

three arguments in support of her contention that it did. First,

she argues that the “dismissal of the remaining defamation claim

became self-actuating when the condition[] for dismissal

occurred.” Amicus Curiae Br. 13. That condition, she

maintains, was the failure to file an amended complaint stating

a proper defamation claim and a proper independent basis for

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jurisdiction. Because the district court never ruled that her claim

and jurisdictional basis were proper, she insists that the court’s

condition for dismissing the complaint was satisfied. Id. at 13-

14.

This argument simply misreads the district court’s January

29 order. In that order, the court indicated that it would dismiss

Robinson-Reeder’s defamation claim if she failed to file “an

amended complaint asserting that claim and a proper

independent basis for federal jurisdiction” within the specified

time period. Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (emphasis

added). She did file such a complaint, however, asserting both

defamation and diversity of citizenship -- the independent

jurisdictional basis the court itself had suggested. See id. Of

course, if the district court had determined that these assertions

were improper, dismissal would have followed. But there is no

ground for reading the court’s order as suggesting that an

amended complaint would be dismissed in the absence of such

a determination.

Second, Robinson-Reeder argues that, following the parties’

stipulation to dismissal of the defamation claim without

prejudice, the district court dismissed not just that claim but the

entire action. And she points out that, in Ciralsky v. CIA, we

held that a district court’s dismissal of an entire action is a final

appealable judgment, whether or not the dismissal was with

prejudice. 355 F.3d 661, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Ciralsky is not

relevant here, however, because the district court did not dismiss

Robinson-Reeder’s action. The parties themselves did not

indicate that they wanted the action dismissed, stipulating only

“that the remaining cause of action in the within action is

dismissed without prejudice.” Stipulation of Dismissal (J.A. 95)

(emphasis added). More important, the court did not dismiss

anything at all. Although the clerk of the court evidently

marked the electronic docket “terminated” on March 31, 2008,

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5

See, e.g., Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., Inc., 212 F.3d 1076,

1080 (8th Cir. 2000); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc.,

190 F.3d 775, 776-77 (7th Cir. 1999); State Treasurer v. Barry, 168

F.3d 8, 15 (11th Cir. 1999); Chappelle v. Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84

F.3d 652, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1996); Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031, 1034 (6th Cir.

1993); Cheng v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 311

(9th Cir. 1989).

6

See Doe v United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir.

2008) (collecting cases); JTC Petroleum Co., 190 F.3d at 776 (same);

see also, e.g., LNC Invs. LLC v. Republic Nicaragua, 396 F.3d 342,

346 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding as a general rule that voluntary dismissal

of a remaining claim without prejudice does not satisfy § 1291’s

finality requirement, but recognizing an exception where such a claim

there is no indication that the court itself ever issued a

terminating order. Cf. Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 712

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Had the court intended to dismiss the action,

it would have done more than just remove the case from its

active calendar; it might, for example, have designated the 2002

order as ‘final and appealable,’ as did the Ciralsky district court

. . . .”). Indeed, well after the date of “termination,” RobinsonReeder filed -- and the court resolved -- several more motions.

See Civil Docket for Case #: 1:07-cv-00880-JDB (J.A. 6-7).

Third, Robinson-Reeder argues that, even if the district

court did not dismiss the entire action, the voluntary dismissal

of the only remaining (defamation) claim was sufficient to

permit appeal of those (Title VII) claims that the court did

adjudicate. There is little doubt that this would be so had the

remaining claim been dismissed with prejudice.5

 But the

circuits, and even cases within individual circuits, are divided

over whether voluntary dismissal without prejudice of

unresolved claims can suffice to make a district court’s

judgment final -- and, if so, under what circumstances.6 In

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is “‘effectively barred’ because the statute of limitations on that claim

ha[s] lapsed”).

addition, while some courts hold that voluntary dismissal of

unresolved claims without prejudice permits review of

adjudicated claims if the district court approves the dismissal

and enters judgment, see, e.g., James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc.,

283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (also requiring that “the

record reveal[] no evidence of intent to manipulate . . . appellate

jurisdiction”), others hold that even entry of a court order is

insufficient to permit review in such circumstances, see, e.g.,

Rabbi Jacob Joseph Sch. v. Province of Mendoza, 425 F.3d 207,

210-11 (2d Cir. 2005).

To date, this court has nibbled around the edges of this

issue. In Ciralsky, we held that, although “courts often regard

the dismissal without prejudice of a complaint as not final, and

thus not appealable,” the (involuntary) dismissal of an action by

a court -- “whether with or without prejudice -- is final and

appealable.” 355 F.3d at 666 (internal quotation mark omitted).

In Murray v. Gilmore, we held that a district court order

granting summary judgment on some claims but dismissing the

remaining claim “without prejudice subject to reconsideration”

was not a dismissal of the action and was not final and

appealable. 406 F.3d at 712-13. And in Outlaw v. Airtech Air

Conditioning & Heating, Inc., we held that a court order,

dismissing a plaintiff’s “remaining claims without prejudice in

an effort to cure the lack of an appealable order” with respect to

the adjudicated claims, represented a final appealable judgment.

412 F.3d at 158; see id. at 162.

Today, we continue to do no more than nibble because we

can resolve the question of our appellate jurisdiction without

taking a bigger bite. In this case, there was no court order

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7

Nor has Robinson-Reeder suggested that the voluntary dismissal

of her defamation claim was effectively “final because [she] could not

refile it due to a lapsed statute of limitations” or any other analogous

constraint. Murray, 406 F.3d at 712; see Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 666

n.1; LNC Invs. LLC, 396 F.3d at 346.

dismissing the remaining claim;7 rather, dismissal was

accomplished by stipulation of the parties alone pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). CompareFED.R.CIV.

P. 41(a)(1) (providing for dismissal “without a court order by

filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties”), with

id. 41(a)(2) (providing for dismissal “by court order”). As noted

above, Rule 54(b) states: “[T]he court may direct entry of a

final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . .

only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason

for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however

designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . does

not end the action as to any of the claims . . . and may be revised

at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the

claims . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Here, the district court

adjudicated fewer than all the claims: it dismissed only the Title

VII claims, and never ruled on the amended defamation claim.

All we have is the parties’ stipulation, which cannot substitute

for a court order under the Rule. Moreover, the court never

determined -- “expressly” or otherwise -- that there was “no just

reason for delay.” Id. Accordingly, it remains the case that the

dismissal of the Title VII claims “does not end the action as to

any of the claims,” id., and hence is not an appealable “final

decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cf. Blackman v. District of

Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 174-75 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(holding that orders that “do not dispose of all the claims of all

of the parties” are nonfinal and nonappealable in the absence of

an express determination that there is no just reason for delay).

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Were we to permit the parties’ dismissal without prejudice

to generate an appealable judgment, we would effectively

transfer to the litigants the “dispatcher” function that Rule 54(b)

vests in the district court. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey,

351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956) (explaining that under Rule 54(b), “the

District Court is used as a ‘dispatcher’ . . . to determine, in the

first instance, the appropriate time when each ‘final decision’

upon ‘one or more but [fewer] than all’ of the claims in a

multiple claims action is ready for appeal”). There would then

be nothing to prevent two parties who have received a decision

on only one of several claims, but who would like the views of

the appellate court on the decided claim before proceeding to

trial on the remaining claims, from obtaining review simply by

dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice. At least in

the absence of a statute-of-limitations or comparable problem,

see supra notes 6 & 7, those voluntarily dismissed claims could

thereafter be reinstated and the litigation recommenced. Not

only would this weaken the policy against “piecemeal appeals”

in general, but it would also “undermine the independence of the

district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in

our judicial system.” Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 203 (quoting

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374).

Robinson-Reeder worries that, “[i]f the dismissal without

prejudice of [her] defamation claim [is found to preclude] the

finality of the decision below, she will never have a chance to

appeal the ruling on her finally dismissed Title VII claim.”

Amicus Curiae Br. 22. But that conclusion simply does not

follow, as there are several steps Robinson-Reeder can take,

which, if successful, will clearly create a final appealable

judgment. She can: (1) obtain a Rule 54(b) determination from

the district court; (2) secure dismissal of her defamation claim

with prejudice; or (3) move that the district court adjudicate her

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8

The third option is complicated, but not eliminated, by the fact

that Robinson-Reeder has also filed her defamation claim as part of a

free-standing lawsuit in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia.

defamation claim and then enter final judgment.8 Whether there

are other steps as well is a question we need not decide today,

but there is no cause for concern that Robinson-Reeder will be

denied an opportunity to appeal once the district court enters a

final judgment in her case.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack

of appellate jurisdiction.

So ordered.

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