Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02961/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02961-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMUNDO QUEZADA, Civil No. 13cv2961-GPC (DHB)

Petitioner, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATI

ON OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE

DENIAL OF FIRST AMENDED

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MARTIN BITER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Gonzalo P. Curiel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Raymundo Quezada (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a California prisoner proceeding

pro se with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 4.) He challenges his San Diego County Superior Court

convictions of two counts of kidnapping during a carjacking, and one count each of

evading an officer with reckless driving, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and

allowing a concealed firearm in a vehicle, along with jury findings that he was

vicariously liable for his co-defendant’s use of a handgun. (First Amended Petition

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[“FAP”] at 1-2.) Petitioner claims here, as he did in state court, that his federal

Constitutional rights were violated because: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support

the kidnapping during a carjacking convictions because there was no evidence the

kidnappings facilitated the carjacking; (2) the jury was not instructed on the lesser

included offense of simple kidnapping; (3) the jury was not instructed that kidnapping

during a carjacking requires that the kidnapping must facilitate the carjacking, and is not

committed if the carjacking is merely incidental to the kidnapping; and (4) the jury was

not given a unanimity instruction regarding the gun possession crimes and gun use

allegations. (FAP 6-9, 34-71, 94-112.1

) 

Respondent has filed an Answer with an attached Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support, and has lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 12-

13.) Respondent contends that habeas relief is unavailable because Claims 2-4 do not

present federal claims, and because the adjudication of all claims by the state court is

neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. (Memorandum of P&A in Support of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 19-40.) 

Petitioner has not filed a Traverse.

For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED.

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

In a five-count Second Amended Information filed in the San Diego County

Superior Court on May 18, 2010, Petitioner and his co-defendants Rafael Ortiz and

Gustavo Martinez were charged with two counts of kidnapping during a carjacking in

violation of California Penal Code section 209.5 (counts one and two), and one count of

evading an officer with reckless driving in violation of California Vehicle Code section

2800.2(a) (count three). (Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 27-30.) Petitioner alone

was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal

1

 Citations to the First Amended Petition and the Answer are to pages assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system. 

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Code section 12021(a)(1) (count four), and one count of allowing a concealed firearm to

be carried in a vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 12025(a)(3) (count five). (Id.) 

The Information contained sentence enhancement allegations that Petitioner and Martinez

personally used a handgun in the commission of counts one and two within the meaning

of Penal Code section 12022.53(b), and that Ortiz was vicariously liable as a principal

for the use of a firearm in the commission of counts one and two within the meaning of

Penal Code section 12022(a)(1).2

 (Id.) 

All three co-defendants were tried together with a single jury. On June 7, 2010,

the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and returned true findings on all sentence

enhancement allegations. (CT 554-61.) On October 8, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced

to life in prison plus four years. (CT 567.) His co-defendants also received life

sentences. (CT 235, 823.)

Petitioner and his co-defendants filed a consolidated appeal, presenting, inter alia,

the same claims presented here. (Lodgment Nos. 3-11.) The appellate court, in a

published opinion, affirmed in all respects. People v. Ortiz, et al., 208 Cal.App.4th 1354

(Cal.Ct.App., Aug. 29, 2012). All three co-defendants thereafter filed a consolidated

petition for review in the state supreme court presenting, inter alia, the claims raised here. 

(Lodgment Nos. 13-15.) The petition was denied by an order which stated in full: “The

petitions for review are denied.” (Lodgment No. 16, People v. Ortiz, No. S205790 (Cal.

Dec. 13, 2012).) 

 III.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Paul Fatta, the owner and manager of the Big Kahuna restaurant located on

Ingraham Street in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego, testified that on Monday,

2

 The Second Amended Information was amended at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief to allege that Petitioner was vicariously liable as a principal for the use of a firearm in the commission of counts one and two within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022(a)(1), rather than that he had personally used a gun within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(b). (CT 549.) 

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February 2, 2009, he looked out the front window of the restaurant and saw a black BMW

with a man driving and a woman passenger pull up to the curb and park. (Lodgment No.

1, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 1224-29.) The woman exited the BMW from the front

passenger door onto the sidewalk in front of the restaurant, as if she intended to enter his

restaurant or Rocky’s restaurant next door. (RT 1227-29.) Fatta then saw three men

walk across the sidewalk and surround the car; the man and woman in the BMW both

looked terrified, and the woman was startled and jumped back when one of the men

spoke to her. (RT 1230.) One of the three men grabbed the woman and pushed her into

the front passenger seat of the BMW and followed her in; a second man pushed the driver

over and got behind the wheel, so there were four people in front; the third man got in the

back seat and they sped away. (RT 1233-36.) Fatta called 911 at 11:39 a.m. and reported

a suspected carjacking; he told the operator that the BMW was traveling south on

Ingraham Street toward Sea World and the entrance to Interstate 8, and described the men

as Hispanic, wearing loose fitting clothing and hooded sweatshirts. (RT 1231, 1236-38,

1274-75.)

Elias Rodriguez, a Tactical Flight Officer with the Air Support Unit of the San

Diego Police Department, testified that he was airborne on duty on February 2, 2009,

about 11:40 a.m., and responded to a call of a possible carjacking. (RT 1250-53.) 

Rodriguez located a vehicle, which matched the description given by the 911 caller, about

two or three minutes later at the intersection of Interstates 5 and 8; the vehicle was being

followed by a police car driven by Officer Howard Spetter. (RT 1254-55.) Rodriguez

testified that he observed the vehicle drive in an evasive manner; it exited Interstate 8 at

the Hotel Circle South exit by cutting across two lanes abruptly, “blew a stop sign,” and

continued westbound on Hotel Circle South at a high rate of speed. (RT 1255.) It passed

numerous vehicles and ran another stop sign as it reentered Interstate 8 eastbound. (Id.) 

The vehicle cut across the traffic lanes, cut off numerous cars, and narrowly missed a

motorcycle, before it stopped on the left shoulder. (RT 1256.) Officer Rodriguez saw

three people exit the vehicle and run across the westbound lanes of Interstate 8; the men

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“amazingly made it across” the four or five traffic lanes. (Id.) A video taken from the

helicopter camera, which included an audio recording of the police radio traffic, was

played for the jury, and the jury was provided with a transcript of the recording, a copy

of which is in the record. (RT 1257-62; CT 164-89.) Rodriguez saw the suspects

removing articles of their clothing as they ran through the parking lot of a Motel 6, and

he lost sight of them when they ran into a parking garage. (RT 1263-66.) 

Howard Spetter, a K-9 Officer with the San Diego Police Department, testified that

he was in uniform driving a marked police car on February 2, 2009; he was parked at

Perez Cove by Sea World off Ingraham Street giving his dog a bathroom break, when he

received a dispatch of a possible carjacking. (RT 1270-74, 1278-79.) A short time later

he observed a gray, four-door BMW with five occupants, which matched the description

given in the dispatch, waiting at a traffic light on Ingraham Street. (RT 1274-77.) 

Officer Spetter followed the BMW, several cars back, without activating his siren or

overhead lights, waiting for confirmation that he was following the suspect car; the BMW

proceeded normally and entered eastbound Interstate 8. (RT 1278-82.) The BMW

continued eastbound on Interstate 8; when it passed the exit ramp for Interstate 5, it began

to drive evasively by changing lanes, slowing down, speeding up, and passing cars

without apparent reason. (RT 1284-86.) At the last possible moment it abruptly took the

Hotel Circle exit and Officer Spetter activated his overhead lights and siren; the BMW

failed to stop for a stop sign at the end of the exit ramp; it proceeded westbound on Hotel

Circle South, accelerating rapidly to over 90 miles an hour, driving in the opposite traffic

lane and passing vehicles illegally, nearly hitting one. (RT 1287-92.) The BMW blew

through another stop sign as it reentered Interstate 8, crossed all lanes of traffic, and

stopped at the center divide. (RT 1292-95.) Just as Officer Spetter approached the car,

three men exited, jumped the concrete divider, ran across the westbound lanes, and

climbed over a fence. (RT 1295-97.) He ordered the remaining male occupant of the

BMW out at gunpoint and handcuffed him; a second officer arrived and took custody of

the female passenger. (RT 1299-1300.) The male passenger was terrified, and he told

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Officer Spetter that the BMW belonged to him, that he had been the victim of a

carjacking, and that there had been guns involved in the carjacking which had been

thrown out of the car while they were on Hotel Circle just before they got back on the

freeway. (RT 1305-07.) A stun gun was found in the back seat of the BMW. (RT 1315.)

Charles Lara, a San Diego Police Officer, testified that he was on patrol in uniform

in the Hotel Circle area when he heard the dispatch of a suspected carjacking. (RT 1384-

86.) He arrived at the Motel 6 and heard rustling sounds from the area of the San Diego

River next to the parking lot. (RT 1386-92.) He saw three men walking northbound in

the river through waist-deep to nipple-deep water, and identified them in court as

Petitioner and his co-defendants Martinez and Ortiz; the parties stipulated that Petitioner,

Martinez and Ortiz were the three men who were in the BMW, ran across the freeway,

and were arrested coming out of the river. (RT 1360, 1393-94, 2249-51.) By the time

the three men reached the parking lot numerous officers were on the scene; the three men

were taken into custody and shown to the man and woman from the BMW at a curbside

lineup. (RT 1395-1404.) Two baseball caps, a jacket with a one-hundred dollar bill in

the pocket, and a pair of gloves, were recovered near the fence between the Motel 6

parking lot and the San Diego River. (RT 1804-12, 1884-1902.) A loaded 9-millimeter

Glock handgun, an unloaded 9-millimeter Beretta handgun, several 9-millimeter bullets,

and a damaged 9-millimeter Beretta ammunition clip, were recovered from the roadside

along Hotel Circle South. (RT 1907-37.)

Silvia Arellano testified that on February 2, 2009, she lived in Chula Vista, just

south of San Diego; she was a licensed attorney in Mexico and worked at her family’s

construction company in Tijuana as head of the legal department. (RT 1409-13.) She

crossed the border every Monday through Friday to go to work using a Sentri Pass, which

expedited the crossing for her as a United States citizen. (RT 1413.) She did not go to

work on Monday, February 2, 2009, because it was a Mexican holiday. (RT 1414.) She

was living with her boyfriend Joshua Castrillon at that time; she was twenty-nine and he

was thirty-two; they had known each other since they were teenagers and had been living

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together since 2006. (RT 1414-17.) She said Castrillon never had any money, which

caused them to quarrel, and her wealthy parents did not like him. (RT 1417-24, 1430.) 

At that time Arellano owned two BMWs, a 2004 525 and a 2007 530, both registered to

her; she drove the 2004, and Castrillon drove the 2007 and considered it his car, although

she made the payments. (RT 1420-22.) She said Castrillon was part owner of a

restaurant from 2006 to 2008; he sold his interest in the restaurant in 2008, and borrowed

$15,000 from Arellano’s mother to purchase a lunch truck, although she had never seen

the truck. (RT 1417-20, 1423-26, 1538.) They stopped living together as a result of the

February 2, 2009, incident, when she first learned that Castrillon was a drug dealer. (RT

1427-31.)

Arellano testified that on February 2, 2009, she and Castrillon drove from their

home in Chula Vista to the Pacific Beach area to have breakfast at Rocky’s restaurant on

Ingraham Street; they left about 10:30 a.m., and Castrillon drove them in the gray 2007

BMW. (RT 1420-21, 1432-35.) Castrillon pulled up in front of the Big Kahuna

restaurant on Ingraham Street next to Rocky’s and parked. (RT 1437-38.) As Arellano

exited the BMW, a large SUV with tinted windows pulled in front of them, and three men

came out and surrounded them. (RT 1441-44.) Two of the men closed her door,

preventing her from exiting, and got into the back seat; they were wearing hooded

sweatshirts with the hoods up even though it was a warm day, and she could see they

were wearing gloves and had their hands in their pockets. (RT 1445-46.) The third man

had a gun in his hand and opened the driver’s door; he pushed Castrillon over, got behind

the wheel, and made Castrillon get into the back seat with the other two men. (RT 1447-

49.) As they drove down Ingraham Street toward Sea World, someone in the back seat

asked Arellano to get her cell phone from her purse to make sure she did not call anyone. 

(RT 1451-54.) She could not find her cell phone in her purse but she gave them her iPad, which was on top of her purse, and they threw it out the window. (RT 1454.) 

Because they had told her to do as she was told, and she was afraid her cell phone might

ring, she continued looking for her cell phone, but she could not find it quickly and

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passed her purse to the back seat after she felt a sting on her shoulder and heard the

clicking sound of a stun gun. (RT 1455-58.) She later identified the stun gun as the one

found by the police in the back seat of the BMW, and said that a one-hundred dollar bill

was missing from her purse. (RT 1461-63.) 

Arellano said she saw a police car in the side view mirror following them as they

drove down Ingraham Street to the freeway. (RT 1463-64.) She said Castrillon was very

scared and asked the men what this was about. (RT 1466-68.) They entered the freeway

with the police car following them without its lights or siren activated, and one of the

men in the back seat was talking on a cell phone. (RT 1468-71.) The driver veered

across the lanes and took the Hotel Circle exit very fast, which caused the police car to

activate its lights and siren; the driver told Arellano to put her window down and he threw

his gun out the passenger-side window. (RT 1471-77.) They were going about 90 miles

an hour on Hotel Circle, passing cars and moving from one side of the street to the other,

and then reentered the freeway. (RT 1477-79.) They drove across the lanes to the middle

divider and stopped; the three men jumped out with the BMW still in gear and it rolled

forward until Arellano put the transmission in park. (RT 1419-81.) The three men ran

across the westbound lanes of the freeway toward the hotels, and she and Castrillon were

detained and questioned. (RT 1481-86.) 

In court, Arellano identified Petitioner as the man who was sitting directly behind

her with the stun gun; she identified co-defendant Martinez as the man who was driving;

and she identified co-defendant Ortiz as the man seated in the middle of the back seat

next to Petitioner. (RT 1486-88.) At the curbside lineup she identified Petitioner as the

man with the stun gun, but identified Ortiz as the man sitting directly behind her, and

identified Martinez as the driver. (RT 1662-67.) At the preliminary hearing she said that

Ortiz was directly behind her and used the stun gun on her, and Petitioner was seated in

the middle of the back seat next to Ortiz. (RT 1522-24.) She said that Castrillon moved

out of her house later that day after telling her that the incident was related to a problem

of his; she never asked him the nature of the problem because she did not want to know

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or become involved. (RT 1496-97.) 

A Motel 6 maintenance man saw three men run through the motel’s parking lot

chased by the police, and pointed out where two of the men had thrown their caps. (RT

1940-42.) The parties stipulated that:

Joshua Castrillon was a drug dealer. He had suffered a previous conviction for transportation and sale of marijuana in 1993. [¶] Sometime in November of 2008, Mr. Castrillon was involved in the organizing of a shipment of 600 pounds of marijuana from Mexico into San Diego.

His partners in that venture were, among others, Arturo Galarza, A.K.A. Art, A.K.A. Chapo; Daniel Cital Jasso, A.K.A. Paisa, A.K.A. Negro;

and Jose Alberto Ochoa, A.K.A. Junior.

Mr. Castrillon had met Arturo Galarza at the Palomar Card Club on

El Cajon Boulevard in San Diego in early 2008, and Mr. Galarza then introduced him, meaning Mr. Castrillon, to Daniel Jasso.

Daniel Jasso was known to Joshua Castrillon to be affiliated with

Teo, who is Teodoro Garcia Simental, a former lieutenant of a Mexican

drug cartel.

All parties further stipulate that the expected shipment of marijuana never arrived in San Diego. As a result, pursuant to the rules of the drug trade, Mr. Castrillon, as the broker of the deal, was primarily responsible for its value, approximately $70,000 to $100,000. Mr. Castrillon knew that his

partners, Galarza and Jasso, were also being pressured to come up with that money. Mr. Castrillon was fearful of what may happen to him if he did not come up with the money. [¶] Though Mr. Castrillon had some property in

Mexico that he had been trying to sell as of February 2, 2009, he had not

been able to raise any money and had not made any payments towards the $70,000 to $100,000 that he owed for the missing marijuana. 

All parties further stipulate that on February 24, 2009, and then on February 26, 2009, respectively, Arturo Galarza and Daniel Jasso were

arrested and charged as additional suspects in the alleged kidnapping of Joshua Castrillon and Silvia Arellano on February 2, 2009.

All parties further stipulate that Joshua Castrillon continued to traffic

in illegal narcotics after February 2, 2009. On July 31, 2009, he was pulled over in the city of San Diego as part of an on-going narcotics investigation and found to have approximately one kilo of cocaine hidden in his vehicle. When arrested, Joshua Castrillon admitted that he knew persons in the

Tijuana drug trade; that he possessed the cocaine for sale; and that he

intended to sell the cocaine for profit.

(RT 1987-88.)

James Brown, a San Diego Police Detective, testified that at the time of the

incident the crime of kidnapping for ransom involving drug cartels had increased in San

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Diego over the previous few years. (RT 1996.) When Detective Brown heard over the

police radio that a car had been carjacked with passengers and then abandoned when the

perpetrators ran, he suspected a carjacking with a kidnapping element. (RT 2001.) He

and his partner responded to the Motel 6 parking lot, took control of the scene, supervised

the collection of evidence, and observed the curbside lineup of the three suspects, who

he identified in court as Petitioner and his co-defendants Martinez and Ortiz. (RT 2004-

08.) None of the defendants’ DNA or fingerprints were found on the guns recovered

from the side of the road along Hotel Circle South. (RT 2023-24.) Detective Brown

interviewed Castrillon and Arellano at the time of the incident, but neither of them gave

him any leads on the reasons for the kidnapping; three days later, when confronted with

evidence of his criminality, Castrillon told Detective Brown about his drug debt;

Castrillon was an available witness but neither side called him at trial. (RT 2026-30.) 

Detective Brown said Castrillon led him to Galarza’s house; the SUV used during the

kidnapping and carjacking was parked outside, and police records indicated that there had

been a traffic contact with Arturo Galarza while he was driving that vehicle. (RT 2124-

29.) Detective Brown arrested Galarza and charged him with kidnapping during a

carjacking as the driver of the SUV; his house was searched and one firearm, two pounds

of marijuana, and one pound of cocaine were seized. (RT 2031-34, 2339-41.) Daniel

Jasso was also arrested for kidnapping during a carjacking; a search of his house revealed

three firearms and five pounds of marijuana. (RT 2156-57, 2347, 2352.) Galarza and

Jasso both pled guilty prior to trial to simple kidnapping, and were each sentenced to

thirteen years in prison. (RT 3431.) The People rested. (RT 2301.) 

The defense made a motion for acquittal on the two kidnapping during a carjacking

counts, arguing, as Petitioner does here in Claim 1, that there was insufficient evidence

the defendants had the specific intent to commit the kidnapping in order to facilitate the

carjacking, because their sole intent in approaching the BMW was to kidnap its

occupants, who just happened to be in a car. (RT 2709-11.) The trial judge denied the

motion, finding sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the kidnapping

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was done with the specific intent to aid the defendants’ escape by preventing the

occupants from calling the police or sounding an alarm, thereby facilitating the

carjacking. (RT 2711-12.) 

The defense called San Diego District Attorney Investigator Joseph Winney, who

testified that he found “pay-owe slips” on the day of the incident in the center console of

the BMW under Castrillon’s wallet, and was suspicious of how Castrillon could own a

newer model BMW and two cell phones from the income of a food truck. (RT 2304-10.) 

Winney said Castrillon lied to him about his source of income, and that both Castrillon

and Silvia Arellano declined Winney’s offer of protective custody. (RT 2309-11.)

John McGill, a San Diego Police Department Narcotics Detective, testified

regarding the details of the arrests of Jasso and Galarza and the searches of their houses,

and opined that Galarza’s house was a “stash pad” for narcotics. (RT 2337-49.) Michael

Messina, a criminal defense attorney who represented Petitioner at the preliminary

hearing but was relieved due to medical issues, testified that Silvia Arellano did not break

down and cry during her preliminary hearing testimony as she had done during her trial

testimony. (RT 2352-56.) 

Juan Gomez, a San Diego Police Officer, testified that on July 31, 2009, he and his

partner pulled Castrillon over for speeding as he was driving a newer model BMW which

he said was registered to his girlfriend. (RT 2358-61.) They found 2.3 pounds of cocaine

in his vehicle. (RT 2364.) Michael Rubio, a San Diego Police Detective, testified that

he impounded the evidence collected during Castrillon’s July 31, 2009 arrest, which

included a kilogram of cocaine, $521 in United States currency, and a cell phone. (RT

2379-80.) John Tangredi, a detective with the Narcotics Section of the San Diego Police

Department, testified that Castrillon’s BMW was under surveillance just before it was

stopped on July 31, 2009, and was coming from the Palomar Card Club on El Cajon

Boulevard. (RT 2383-87.) Robert Newquest, a San Diego Police Detective, testified that

Castrillon admitted that the cocaine found in his vehicle on July 31, 2009, was his and

that he possessed it for sale. (RT 2391.) 

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Karen Gold, an investigator with the Alternate Public Defender’s Officer, testified

that there were numerous telephone calls each day between Castrillon, Jasso and Galarza

from December 1, 2008 to January 27, 2009, which abruptly stopped from January 27,

2009, to February 5, 2009, at which point they began again. (RT 2396-2410.) Marco

Mercado, an investigator with the Cross-Border Violence Group of the San Diego Police

Department, testified that he met with Castrillon and Arellano regarding the events of

February 2, 2009, “to make sure that victims of the crime are protected and maintained

safe throughout the course of the judicial proceedings.” (RT 2413-14.) Mercado testified

that Castrillon called him on July 31, 2009, during the traffic stop, informed Mercado that

he had been stopped for speeding and the police were having trouble with his Mexican

driver’s license, and asked him to speak to the traffic officer who had pulled him over. 

(RT 2414.) Mercado spoke to the officer and asked the officer not to deport Castrillon,

who was in the United States illegally, because Castrillon was a witness in the carjacking

and kidnapping case, and it is difficult to locate witnesses in Mexico. (RT 2415.) 

Mercado at that time did not know about the drugs in Castrillon’s car, and Castrillon

called Mercado back a few minutes later and told him: “I have some shit in the car. And

if I don’t deliver it in 30 minutes, they’re going to cut off my head and kill my family.” 

(RT 2439.) Castrillon told Mercado that he was afraid to be booked into San Diego

County jail because he might encounter the people who were responsible for the

kidnapping and carjacking, so Mercado put together a “keep-separate order” to protect

him. (RT 2416.) Mercado picked Castrillon and Arellano up at their home on the day

of the preliminary hearing, took them to court, and drove them back home afterward; he

said Arellano was scared and upset that day. (RT 2427-29.) Detective Brown was

recalled and testified that Arellano did not break down crying during the preliminary

hearing as she had during her trial testimony, and that she was more composed at the

preliminary hearing than during trial. (RT 2432.) The defense rested and there was no

rebuttal. (RT 2441.)

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Petitioner’s trial counsel argued to the jury in closing that the kidnapping and

carjacking was a ruse by Castrillon and Arellano, perhaps to extort money from

Arellano’s wealthy parents, or, alternately, it was a consensual drive to a location where

Castrillon could give his partners the missing drugs or money, which was misinterpreted

as a carjacking by the owner of the Big Kahuna restaurant, who never saw any guns, and

in fact Arellano was the only person who testified that a gun was involved. (RT 3012-

24.) Counsel argued that Castrillon dealt drugs before and after the incident, and that

Arellano had lied when she said she did not know he was a drug dealer before the

incident because she must have known he had been arrested in 1993 for felony drug

dealing, and could have seen the pay-owe slips he kept in the BMW she owned. (Id.) 

Counsel argued it was reasonable to find that Arellano was involved with Castrillon’s

drug dealing because she gave Castrillon, an undocumented Mexican drug dealer, a place

to live in the United States, a car registered in her name equipped with an expedited

border crossing Sentri card, and arranged a $15,000 loan from her mother for a lunch

wagon which she never saw and probably did not exist, money which was probably used

to buy drugs for sale. (Id.) 

The jury deliberated for about one full day and found all three defendants guilty

of two counts of kidnapping during a carjacking and one count of evading a police officer

with reckless driving; they found Petitioner guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon

and of being an occupant of a vehicle who allowed a concealed firearm to be in the

vehicle. (CT 810-13.) The jury returned true findings on the sentence enhancement

allegations that Martinez was personally armed with a handgun during the commission

of the kidnapping during a carjacking counts, and that Petitioner and Oritz, although not

personally armed with a firearm, were principals in the kidnapping during a carjacking

counts and were vicariously liable for possession of a firearm. (Id.) Petitioner and Ortiz

were sentenced to life in prison plus four years; Martinez was sentenced to life in prison

plus ten years. (RT 3431-36.)

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IV.

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

(1) Petitioner’s federal Constitutional right to due process was violated because

there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict of kidnapping during a

carjacking because there was insufficient evidence the kidnapping was done with the

specific intent to facilitate the carjacking. (FAP at 6, 52-71, 94-99.) 

(2) Petitioner’s federal Constitutional right to due process was violated by the

failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple

kidnapping. (FAP at 7, 34-52.)

(3) Petitioner’s federal Constitutional right to due process was violated because

the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the offense of kidnapping during a carjacking

requires that the purpose of the kidnapping must be to facilitate the carjacking, and that

the offense is not committed if the carjacking is incidental to the kidnapping. (FAP at 8.)

(4) Petitioner’s federal Constitutional right to due process was violated because

the trial court failed to give the jury a unanimity instruction regarding the gun possession

crimes and gun use allegations. (FAP at 9.)

V.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons the Court finds that the adjudication of Petitioner’s

claims by the state court is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. The Court also finds that any errors with respect to Claims 2 and 3 are

harmless. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS the First Amended Petition be

DENIED.

A. Standard of Review.

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,

provides, with respect to claims which were adjudicated on their merits in the state court,

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that in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner must first demonstrate that the

state court adjudication of the claims: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if the petitioner can

satisfy § 2254(d), or show that it does not apply, he still must show a federal

constitutional violation occurred. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v.

Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Petitioner must also demonstrate

that any constitutional error is not harmless, unless it is of the type included on the

Supreme Court’s “short, purposely limited roster of structural errors.” Gautt v. Lewis,

489 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306

(1991) (recognizing that “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”)

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000). A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from

this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 407. Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is

available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given

set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v.

Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

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clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application

must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Clearly established federal law “refers

to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions

as of time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. To satisfy

§ 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state

court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts,

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at

103. The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is

because it was meant to be . . . [as it] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where

there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court decision

conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Id. at 102-03 (“Section 2254(d) reflects the view

that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

B. Claim 1

Petitioner contends in Claim 1 that his federal Constitutional right to due process

was violated because there was insufficient evidence to establish the kidnapping was

done in order to facilitate the carjacking as required for the offense of kidnapping during

a carjacking. (FAP at 6, 52-71.) He argues that the evidence showed that kidnapping

Castrillon and Arellano was the criminal objective, and the BMW was merely the vehicle

used to transport them. He argues the carjacking was therefore merely incidental to the

kidnapping, and the kidnapping was not committed in order to facilitate a carjacking as

required by California law. (Id. at 53-54.) 

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Respondent answers that the appellate court correctly and reasonably applied

controlling principles of federal law to find that sufficient evidence was presented for the

jury to find that the defendants kidnapped the victims with the intent of facilitating the

carjacking because the jury could have found the defendants kidnapped the victims for

the dual purpose of taking the valuable late-model BMW to keep or sell as partial

payment of the drug debt, and taking the victims and holding them for ransom to satisfy

Castrillon’s drug debt, particularly Arellano who was wealthy and had wealthy parents. 

(Ans. Mem. at 25-26.) 

Petitioner presented Claim 1 to the state supreme court in a petition for review of

the appellate court opinion affirming his convictions. (Lodgment Nos. 14-15.) The state

supreme court summarily denied the petition without citation of authority or a statement

of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 16.) Petitioner presented the same claim to the state

appellate court. (Lodgment Nos. 3-4.) That court denied the claim on its merits. 

(Lodgment No. 12.)

In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Court adopted a presumption

which gives no effect to unexplained state court orders but “looks through” them to the

last reasoned state court decision. The Court will look through the silent denial of Claim

1 by the state supreme court to the appellate court opinion, which stated:

Defendants contend there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions of counts 1 and 2. They argue there was no evidence showing they kidnapped Castrillon and Arellano to facilitate the carjacking.

A

When an appellant challenges a criminal conviction based on a claim

of insufficiency of the evidence, “the reviewing court’s task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine

whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the

testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (Citation.) Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a

conviction.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)

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The substantial evidence standard of review involves two steps. “First, one must resolve all explicit conflicts in the evidence in favor of the

respondent and presume in favor of the judgment all reasonable inferences. 

(Citation.) Second, one must determine whether the evidence thus

marshaled is substantial. While it is commonly stated that our ‘power’

begins and ends with a determination that there is substantial evidence

(citation), this does not mean we must blindly seize any evidence in support of the respondent in order to affirm the judgment. . . . (Citation.) ‘(I)f the word “substantial” (is to mean) anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word

cannot be deemed synonymous with “any” evidence. It must be reasonable

. . . , credible, and of solid value. . . .’ (Citation.) The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the

respondent based on the whole record.” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1632–1633, fns. omitted.) “(T)he power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to

whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or

uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more

inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court

believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874 (Bowers ).)

B

Section 209.5 defines the offense of kidnapping during a carjacking:

“(a) Any person, who, during the commission of a carjacking

and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person who is not a principal in the commission of the carjacking shall be punished by

imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.

“(b) This section shall only apply if the movement of the

victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of

the carjacking, the victim is moved a substantial distance from

the vicinity of the carjacking, and the movement of the victim

increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that

necessarily present in the crime of carjacking itself. . . .” (Italics added.)

The trial court instructed on counts 1 and 2 (kidnapping during a carjacking) with CALCRIM No. 1204 as follows:

“The defendants are charged in Counts 1 and 2 with

kidnapping during a carjacking. To prove the defendant is

guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

“(One,) (t)he defendant committed a carjacking;

“Two, during the carjacking, the defendant took, held, (or)

detained another person by using force or by instilling

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reasonable fear;

“Three, the defendant moved the other person or made that person move a substantial distance from the vicinity of the

carjacking;

“Four, the defendant moved or caused the other person to move with the intent to facilitate the carjacking or to help himself escape or to prevent the other person from sounding an

alarm;

“Five, the person moved was not one of the carjackers;

“(S)ix, the other person did not consent to the movement;

“And, . . . seven, the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe the other person consented to the moving. (¶) . . . (¶)

“To decide whether the defendant committed carjacking, please refer to separate instructions I will now give you on that crime.

“As used here, substantial distance means more than slight or trivial distance. The movement must have been more than

merely brief and incidental to the commission of the

carjacking. The movement must have substantially increased the risk of physical or psychological harm to the person

beyond that necessarily present in carjacking.

“In deciding whether the movement was sufficient, consider all

the circumstances related to the movement. . . .” (Italics added.)

The court also instructed on the offense of carjacking with CALCRIM No. 1650 as follows:

“To prove a carjacking, the People must prove that:

“One, the defendant took a motor vehicle that was not his own;

“Two, the vehicle was taken from the immediate presence of

the person who possessed the vehicle or was its passenger;

“Three, the vehicle was taken against the person’s will;

“Four, the (defendant) used force or fear to take the vehicle or

to prevent that person from resisting;

“And five, when the defendant used force or fear to take the

vehicle, he intended to deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently.

“The defendant’s intent to take the vehicle must have been

formed before or during the time he used force or fear. If the

defendant did not form this required intent until after using the force or fear, then he did not commit carjacking. A person

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takes something when he or she gains possession of it and

moves it some distance. The distance moved may be short. . . .”

The intent that the kidnapping facilitate the carjacking must be present when the original asportation began. (Cf. People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 198 (“the rule that a (kidnapping) in which a robbery occurs does not constitute (kidnapping) for the purpose of robbery (under § 209) unless the specific intention to rob is present at the time of the original asportation.”).) “Intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and usually must be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense.” 

(People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 420; see also People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 558–559.)

C

We conclude there is substantial evidence to support Defendants’ convictions of counts 1 and 2. The jury could reasonably infer from all the evidence that Defendants kidnapped Castrillon and Arellano to facilitate the

carjacking. (§ 209.5; CALCRIM No. 1204.) Undisputed evidence showed that Defendants quickly jumped out of the Lincoln Navigator, pushed Castrillon and Arellano back into the BMW, and drove the BMW away with Castrillon and Arellano held captive inside.

Defendants do not dispute there is substantial evidence to support findings that they committed both the kidnapping and carjacking offenses,

but argue there is insufficient evidence to support a finding they kidnapped Castrillon and Arellano to facilitate the carjacking. However, we conclude the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances that Defendants

kidnapped Castrillon and Arellano for the dual purposes of taking the victims (Castrillon and Arellano) and taking the BMW. Because Castrillon owed a large drug debt (i.e., $70,000 to $100,000) to Jasso and Galarza, the jury could reasonably infer Defendants took the 2007 530i BMW with the

intent to hold or sell it as partial payment of that drug debt. Although, as Defendants argue, there was no evidence presented by the People regarding the current market value of the BMW, the jurors could rely on their common knowledge that late-model BMW’s have a substantial market value.

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, that inference by the jurors was not mere speculation, but was instead reasonably based on common knowledge regarding the value of late-model BMW’s. Furthermore, assuming arguendo one of the purposes, if not the primary purpose, of the kidnappings

was to kidnap and hold Castrillon and Arellano (e.g., for ransom that would be credited toward Castrillon’s drug debt), that other purpose does not

disprove that another purpose of the kidnappings was to facilitate the

carjacking. Defendants do not cite any cases holding, nor are we persuaded, that the sole, or primary, intent of a section 209.5 offense must be to

facilitate a carjacking. Rather, based on the plain language of section 209.5, we believe that offense requires there be an intent that the kidnapping facilitate a carjacking, even if there are other concurrent intents for the

kidnapping. To the extent Defendants cite evidence or inferences that

would have supported a contrary finding regarding their intent in committing the kidnappings (e.g., that their sole criminal purpose was to

kidnap Castrillon and Arellano to pay the drug debt, the carjacking was merely incidental to the kidnapping, or vice versa), they misconstrue and/or misapply the substantial evidence standard of review. [FN3] (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11; People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d

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at p. 578; People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181; Kuhn v.

Department of General Services, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1632–1633; Bowers, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at pp. 873–874.)

FN3. The fact the prosecutor argued in closing that the

evidence showed Defendants intended to kidnap Castrillon and Arellano to pay for his drug debt did not preclude the jury

from reasonably inferring one of Defendants’ intents for the

kidnappings was to facilitate the carjacking.

People v. Ortiz, et al., 208 Cal.App.4th at 1362-66.

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to federal

habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Federal habeas courts must analyze Jackson

claims “with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as

defined by state law.” Id. at 324 n.16; see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76

(2005) (holding that “a state court’s interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus.”) The Court must “apply the standards of Jackson with an

additional layer of deference” when AEDPA applies, and can only grant relief if the state

court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274

(9th Cir. 2005). The Court must ask whether the appellate court’s decision “reflected an

unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case.” Id. at 1275.

Petitioner contends he did not intend to carjack the BMW, but merely intended to

kidnap the victims. In the First Amended Petition he states:

The defendant did not move or caused the other person to move with the intent to facilitate the carjacking. The intent was to kidnap Joshua

Arellano [sic] due to a bad drug deal gone wrong. Defendant was hired from an outside source to kidnap Joshua Arellano [sic]. Before this incident defendant did not know Joshua Arellano [sic], Daniel Jasso or Arturo Galarza. Defendant had never been in contact with any of the three above mentioned until that day. 

(FAP at 8.)

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Despite Petitioner’s present disclosure that his subjective intent was merely to

kidnap the victims, the evidence presented at trial allowed the jury to draw a reasonable

inference that he also intended to facilitate the carjacking by kidnapping the victims. As

the state court found, by taking the victims in their BMW rather than leaving them on the

sidewalk to call the police, Petitioner prevented them from raising an alarm. That finding

is supported by Arellano’s testimony that someone in the back seat, where Petitioner was

seated, immediately demanded her cell phone to ensure she did not call anyone. Had

Petitioner left the victims on the sidewalk, they could have gone into the restaurant and

called the police. In fact, the evidence supports a finding that kidnapping the victims

might have ensured a successful carjacking but for the fortuitous observation by the

owner of the Big Kahuna restaurant and his 911 call, which he placed mere seconds

before the victims could have run into the restaurant and asked him to place the call had

they not been kidnapped. Evidence that they did not know the police had been notified

by the restaurant owner included Officer Spetter’s testimony that they were calmly

waiting at a traffic light a few blocks away a few minutes later. Had kidnapping been

their only intent, the defendants could have placed the victims in the SUV rather than

forcing them back into the BMW. As the SUV pulled up immediately after the BMW

stopped, it had presumably followed them from their home, and the victims could have

been kidnapped there. Petitioner is correct that there was sufficient evidence the victims

were kidnapped as a result of Castrillon’s admitted drug debt to a dangerous Mexican

drug cartel, particularly Detective Brown’s testimony that kidnapping for ransom by drug

cartels was popular at that time, but that does not mean there was insufficient evidence

that the defendants also intended to carjack the BMW as partial payment for the debt and

to facilitate the carjacking by kidnapping the victims to prevent them from calling the

police. See People v. Perez, 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860-61 (2000) (“[I]f there is substantial

evidence that appellant intended the kidnapping to effect an escape or prevent an alarm

from being sounded, his conviction for kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking

must stand.”)

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The Court must analyze Petitioner’s claim by explicit reference to state law, in

particular the appellate court’s finding that the elements of the offense of kidnapping for

the purpose of carjacking are satisfied if there is sufficient evidence of intent to facilitate

the carjacking by kidnapping the victims. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Bradshaw, 546

U.S. at 76. The state appellate court correctly found sufficient evidence existed to show

that kidnapping the victims facilitated the carjacking by preventing the victims from

raising an alarm. The fact that the jury could draw other reasonable inferences regarding

the defendants’ intent does not mean the jury could not draw the reasonable inference

identified by the state appellate court. 

Considering the additional layer of deference a federal habeas court is required

under AEDPA to give over and above the deference required by Jackson, this Court

cannot say that the appellate court’s opinion involved an objectively unreasonable

application of Jackson and Winship. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275; Coleman v. Johnson, 566

U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012) (“The jury in this case was convinced, and the

only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below

the threshold of bare rationality.”); see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (“If this standard

is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be . . . [as it] preserves authority to

issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that

the state court decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents. . . . and reflects the view

that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”) Thus, addressing

the claim with explicit reference to state law as interpreted by the appellate court, and

resolving any conflicts regarding whether the jury made the proper findings in favor of

the verdict, as this Court must, it is clear that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to

support the convictions. Applying the doubly deferential standard of review necessitated

by AEDPA, the Court finds that the state court adjudication of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, Jackson or Winship, and was

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1706-07;

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Richter, 562 U.S. 102-03; Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76; MillerEl, 537 U.S. at 340; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Juan H.,

408 F.3d at 1275. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that habeas relief be DENIED

as to Claim 1.

C. Claim 2

Petitioner contends in Claim 2 that his federal Constitutional right to due process

was violated by the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that simple kidnapping is

a lesser included offense of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking. (FAP at 7, 34-52.) 

Petitioner argues that although the trial court instructed the jury that carjacking and

felony false imprisonment were lesser included offenses of kidnapping for the purpose

of carjacking, the trial judge erroneously ruled that simple kidnapping is not a lesser

included offense. (Id. at 34.) 

Respondent answers that this is not a cognizable federal habeas claim because it

relies solely on an interpretation of state law. (Ans. Mem. at 27.) Respondent also argues

that the United States Supreme Court has never found that a failure to instruct on a lesser

included offense in a non-capital case violates the federal Constitution, and therefore

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the denial of this claim by the state court was contrary

to clearly established federal law. (Id.) Finally, Respondent argues that the claim fails

on the merits because a lesser included offense instruction is only appropriate where the

evidence warrants one, and the state appellate court here correctly found there was

insufficient evidence the defendants were guilty of simple kidnapping. (Id. at 27-32.)

The Court will look through the silent denial of Claim 2 by the state supreme court

to the state appellate court’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. The appellate court stated:

Defendants contend the trial court erred by not instructing on simple kidnapping as a lesser included offense (LIO) of kidnapping during a carjacking.

A

As discussed above, the trial court instructed with CALCRIM No.

1204 on the section 209.5 offense of kidnapping during a carjacking as

charged in counts 1 and 2. It also instructed on the LIO’s of carjacking and

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felony false imprisonment. [FN4] The court refused Defendants’ request for an instruction on simple kidnapping as an LIO of kidnapping during a carjacking. The jury found Defendants guilty of both counts of kidnapping during a carjacking (counts 1 and 2).

FN4. The trial court instructed on felony false imprisonment with CALCRIM No. 1240 as follows: “False imprisonment by

violence or menace is a lesser included offense of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. To prove the

defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: 

(¶) The defendant intentionally and unlawfully confined or detained someone or caused that person to be restrained or confined or detained by violence or menace; and the defendant

made the other person stay or go somewhere against that

person’s will. . . .”

B

“The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present and there is evidence that would justify a conviction of such a lesser offense.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827.) An instruction on an LIO is not required when there is no evidence to support a finding that the LIO was committed. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 (Breverman).) Alternatively stated, “a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support.” (Id. at p. 162.) “(A) trial court is not required to instruct the jury as to all lesser included offenses, only those that ‘find substantial support in the evidence.’” (People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 700 (Medina).) In determining whether a trial court erred

in not giving a simple kidnapping LIO instruction, we consider whether

there was substantial evidence to support a verdict on that LIO. (Ibid.;

Breverman, at p. 162.) “It is error . . . to instruct on a lesser included

offense when a defendant, if guilty at all, could only be guilty of the greater offense, i.e., when the evidence, even construed most favorably to the defendant, would not support a finding of guilt of the lesser included offense but would support a finding of guilt of the offense charged.” (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 795–796 (Stewart ).)

“Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if . . . the statutory elements of the greater offense . . . include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117.)

In a noncapital case, the Watson standard of prejudice applies when considering a trial court’s error in failing to instruct on an LIO supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836;

Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178.) We reverse only if, after examining the entire record, we conclude it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not

occurred. (Watson, at p. 836; Stewart, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.)

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C

We conclude the trial court did not err by not instructing on simple kidnapping as an LIO of kidnapping during a carjacking. “Generally, to

prove the crime of (simple) kidnapping, the prosecution must prove three

elements: (1) a person was unlawfully moved by the use of physical force

or fear; (2) the movement was without the person’s consent; and (3) the movement of the person was for a substantial distance. (§ 207, subd. (a).)” (People v. Jones (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 455, 462, fn. omitted.) Those elements appear to be included within the elements of kidnapping during a carjacking. (§ 209.5; CALCRIM No. 1204.) Assuming arguendo simple

kidnapping meets the elements test and is therefore an LIO of kidnapping during a carjacking, we nevertheless conclude the trial court did not err by failing to instruct on simple kidnapping because there is insufficient

evidence in the record to support a verdict finding Defendants guilty of simple kidnapping rather than kidnapping during a carjacking. (Medina,

supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 700; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162; Stewart,

supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 795–796.)

The undisputed evidence shows that as Castrillon and Arellano were

beginning to step out of the BMW, Defendants quickly jumped out of the Lincoln Navigator, pushed Castrillon and Arellano back into the BMW, and

drove away with them inside. There can be no doubt the kidnappings

occurred during a carjacking. The kidnappings did not occur before the carjacking, but rather were simultaneous with and during the carjacking. Furthermore, there was an absence of substantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that the kidnappings were not done to facilitate the carjacking. Rather, as discussed above, there is substantial, if not

overwhelming, evidence to support a reasonable inference that Defendants

kidnapped Castrillon and Arellano to facilitate the carjacking.

Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, it cannot be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Defendants’ sole purpose in kidnapping Castrillon

and Arellano was to hold them for ransom to pay the drug debt and that facilitation of the carjacking was not one of their purposes. Defendants took

both the victims and their car at the same time. Therefore, it could only be

reasonably inferred that if Defendants were guilty of any offense involving the carjacking, it was kidnapping during a carjacking and not simple

kidnapping (i.e., without a purpose of facilitating the carjacking). (Cf.

Medina, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 700 (“In this case, there was no substantial evidence that the offense committed was less than that charged. As the Court of Appeal majority concluded: ‘If the jury found that (defendant) intended to kidnap the Perez family, it must have also found that he intended

to carjack, as he was running from the police and jumped into the van and attempted to start it, knowing the Perez family was inside. . . . There was

no evidence he intended only one of those offenses (i.e., carjacking or kidnapping) and not the other, or, under the facts, he would have committed

only one.’”).) Because there is insufficient evidence to support a verdict finding Defendants guilty of only simple kidnapping, the trial court did not err by not instructing on simple kidnapping as an LIO of kidnapping during a carjacking.

D

Assuming arguendo the trial court erred by failing to instruct on simple kidnapping as an LIO of kidnapping during a carjacking, we

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nevertheless would conclude that error was harmless under the Watson

standard of prejudice. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Stewart, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.) Based on our review of the entire record, it appears highly unlikely the jury would have convicted Defendants of simple kidnapping instead of the greater offense of kidnapping during a carjacking. The jury was instructed on, and rejected, the LIO’s of carjacking and false imprisonment and instead convicted Defendants of the greater offense of kidnapping

during a carjacking. Because the jury rejected those LIO’s, we believe it is highly unlikely, given the egregious factual circumstances in this case, the

jury would have found Defendants guilty of simple kidnapping rather than the greater offense of kidnapping during a carjacking. It is not reasonably probable Defendants would have obtained a more favorable outcome had

the trial court instructed on simple kidnapping as an LIO of kidnapping during a carjacking. Therefore, any error in failing to instruct on simple kidnapping was not prejudicial. (Breverman, at p. 178; Watson, at p. 836; Stewart, at p. 796.)

People v. Ortiz, et al., 208 Cal.App.4th at 1366-69.

“[T]he failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in a noncapital case does not present a federal constitutional question.” Windham v. Merkle, 163

F.3d 1092, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th

Cir. 1984) (“Failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser offense fails to present a federal

constitutional question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus

proceeding.”), quoting James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976). Nevertheless,

the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the refusal by a court to instruct a jury on lesser

included offenses, when those offenses are consistent with defendant’s theory of the case,

may constitute a cognizable habeas claim” under clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent. Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis

added); Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1240 (“This general statement may not apply to every habeas

corpus review, because the criminal defendant is also entitled to adequate instruction on

his or her theory of defense.”); Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-1101 (9th Cir.

2002) (finding federal due process violation in a post-AEDPA habeas case where a

request for instruction on the only theory of defense was denied.); United States v. Fejes,

232 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the

jury on his theory of defense provided it is supported by law and has some foundation in

the evidence.”)

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Petitioner has not demonstrated that an instruction on the lesser included offense

of simple kidnapping was necessary to his theory of defense. Petitioner’s defense was

that there was no kidnapping or carjacking, as the defendants were merely escorting

Castrillon and Arellano to complete the drug deal, and/or that the kidnapping and

carjacking were a ruse, as Castrillon, and perhaps Arellano, were complicit in a plot to

extort money from Arellano’s wealthy parents under the guise of a kidnapping. Petitioner

instead argues that simple kidnapping would be a fair verdict, as he did in his post-trial

motion to reduce the two kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking counts to simple

kidnapping. (RT 2709-12, 3415-19.) At sentencing, the defense indicated they had been

willing before trial to plead guilty to simple kidnapping, and would have done so but for

the prosecution’s refusal to negotiate. (RT 3421.) The trial judge stated that the crime

was conducted in an unprofessional manner, and even indicated that: “I don’t want to be

flip about this, but, you know, Larry, Curly and Moe came to mind when they were doing

this particular operation because of its lack of professionalism. They were terrible.” (RT

3426.) The trial judge also noted that if the defendants had simply taken Castrillon away

in the SUV, or had kidnapped him from his house, rather than take him and Arellano

away in the BMW, they would have been facing eight years in prison on each count

rather than a life sentence. (RT 3434.) Although Petitioner argues it is unfair that

Galarza and Jasso were allowed to plead guilty prior to trial to simple kidnapping and

receive sentences of only thirteen years, those men did not carjack the victims at

gunpoint, as did Petitioner and his co-defendants. In any case, in imposing a life

sentence, the trial judge considered sentence parity with the 13-year sentences given to

Galarza and Jasso, “the shot-callers” as he referred to them, and took into consideration

the prosecution’s refusal to negotiate a plea, but chose a life sentence rather than

probation (the only other sentencing option available), due to the terrifying experience

for the innocent victim Arellano and the people on the freeway, opining that it was “an

absolute miracle” no one was killed or injured. (RT 3430-34.) 

/ / /

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Thus, although Petitioner has shown that a conviction on simple kidnapping was

a desirable outcome for him, and one he probably would have chosen before trial had he

been given the option, he has not shown that the failure to instruct the jury on simple

kidnapping as a lesser included offense of kidnapping for the purpose of a carjacking

prevented him from presenting a defense, and has not shown that such an instruction was

supported by state law or the evidence. As the appellate court noted, the evidence

overwhelmingly supported the jury’s finding that the kidnapping was done to facilitate

the carjacking did not support a simple kidnapping charge. The defendants could have

taken the victims in the SUV, or kidnapped them at their home, if kidnapping had been

their only purpose, rather than carjacking them by forcing them back into their car at

gunpoint and driving them away in the late-model BMW, the value of which represented

a significant portion of Castrillon’s drug debt. That determination was neither contrary

to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law providing

for instruction on lesser included offenses which are necessary to the theory of defense

and have some foundation in the law and evidence. Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1240; Bradley,

315 F.3d at 1098-1101. Neither is it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1706-07; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

Moreover, the Court finds that any error is harmless because the failure to instruct

on the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping could not have had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The Brecht standard “protects the State’s sovereign interest

in punishing offenders and its good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights . . . while

insuring that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus is available to those whom

society has grievously wronged.” Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145 (1998)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Under this standard, an error is

harmless unless the ‘record review leaves the conscientious judge in grave doubt about

the likely effect of an error . . . (i.e.,) that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly

balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.’” 

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Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting O’Neal v. McAninch,

513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995) and citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)

(“[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without

stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially

swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not

affected.”)

As the appellate court found, the jury was instructed that carjacking and felony

false imprisonment were lesser included offenses of kidnapping during a carjacking, and

the jury still convicted on the greater offense. In addition, there was overwhelming

evidence that the defendants kidnapped the victims for the purpose of a carjacking. 

Despite Petitioner’s subjective belief that kidnapping in response to Castrillon’s drug debt

was their only intention, and that the carjacking was merely incidental, the appellate court

correctly observed that there was substantial evidence that carjacking was also a primary

intent of the defendants because the value of the late-model BMW would have gone a

long way toward satisfying Castrillon’s drug debt, and because the defendants did not

need to take the BMW if they only wanted to kidnap the victims for ransom. Given that

evidence, along with the rejection of the other lesser included offenses, and the fact that

sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to draw a reasonable inference that the

kidnapping facilitated the carjacking by preventing the victims from calling the police,

the Court is not in grave doubt the jury would have found the defendants guilty of simple

kidnapping had they been instructed that simple kidnapping is a lesser included offense

of kidnapping during a carjacking. O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 435; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. 

The Court finds that the appellate court’s adjudication of Claim 2 is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court also finds that

any error is harmless. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that habeas relief be

DENIED as to Claim 2.

/ / /

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D. Claim 3

Petitioner contends in Claim 3 that his federal Constitutional rights to due process

and a fair trial were violated because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the

offense of kidnapping during a carjacking requires that the purpose of the kidnapping was

to facilitate a carjacking, and the offense is not committed if the carjacking is merely

incidental to the kidnapping. (Pet. at 8.) Petitioner states that he was hired to kidnap

Castrillon “due to a bad drug deal gone wrong,” and he had no intent to carjack the

victims. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas because it

relies only on an interpretation of state law. (Ans. Mem. at 32.) Respondent also

contends that to the extent it presents a federal claim, clearly established federal law

provides that a federal due process violation can only be shown if there is a reasonable

likelihood the instructions violated the federal Constitution, such as relieving the jury of

finding an element of the offense or altering the burden of proof. (Id. at 32-35.) 

Respondent argues that the denial of the claim by the state appellate court, on the basis

that the jury was adequately instructed on the elements of the offense, and the clarifying

instruction was not an accurate statement of California law, is neither contrary to, nor

involves an unreasonable application of, that clearly established federal law. (Id.)

The Court will look through the silent denial of Claim 3 by the state supreme court

to the state appellate court’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. The appellate court stated:

Defendants contend the trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 1204 on counts 1 and 2. They argue the court should have instructed the offense of kidnapping during a carjacking requires that the

purpose of the kidnapping was to facilitate a carjacking and, in addition, that the offense is not committed if the carjacking is merely incidental to the kidnapping.

We conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1204 on the offense of kidnapping during a carjacking. As quoted above, the jury was instructed one of the elements of that offense

was that “(t)he defendant moved or caused the other person to move with the intent to facilitate the carjacking. . . .” (Italics added.) That instruction adequately instructed the jury of the requirement that the kidnapping be done to facilitate the carjacking. (§ 209.5.) Defendants do not cite any case holding, nor are we persuaded, section 209.5 requires that the sole or primary purpose of the kidnapping be to facilitate the carjacking. Rather,

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it is sufficient if at least one of the intents or purposes of the kidnapping is to facilitate the carjacking.

Likewise, Defendants do not cite any case holding, and we are not persuaded, the trial court must instruct sua sponte that a section 209.5

offense is not committed if the carjacking is merely incidental to the

kidnapping. Rather, the trial court’s instruction with CALCRIM No. 1204

clearly sets forth all the elements of a section 209.5 offense, including the

requirement that the kidnapping be done to facilitate the carjacking. To the extent Defendants assert the court should also have instructed the carjacking must be more than incidental to the kidnapping, we are not persuaded that instruction would be an accurate statement of the law. In any event, that instruction was not required to be given sua sponte and, because Defendants did not request such a clarifying or amplifying modification of CALCRIM No. 1204, they waived any purported instructional error. (People v. Mace (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 875, 882; People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1026; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574.)

We also reject Defendants’ assertion that the prosecutor’s closing argument “invited the jury to convict (them) solely on the basis of a kidnapping simultaneously with a carjacking, without regard for the purpose of the kidnapping. . . .” The trial court instructed the jury: “You must follow the law as I explain it to you (e.g., CALCRIM No. 1204), even if you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” Absent

affirmative evidence showing otherwise, we presume the jury followed the court’s instructions. Therefore, to the extent the prosecutor may have misstated or inaccurately described applicable law, we conclude the jury ignored any such erroneous statements by the prosecutor and instead

followed the trial court’s instructions (e.g., CALCRIM No. 1204). Likewise,

we reject Defendants’ assertion that the jury was misled by the title of CALCRIM No. 1204 (i.e., “1204. KIDNAPPING: DURING

CARJACKING”). Absent affirmative evidence showing otherwise, we conclude the jury followed the substance of CALCRIM No. 1204’s

provisions and not its title, which presumably is truncated for purposes of

convenience.

People v. Ortiz, et al., 208 Cal.App.4th at 1369-70.

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because federal habeas

relief is not available for an alleged error in the application or interpretation of state law. 

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas review, a federal

court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States.”) However, “[t]he issue for us, always, is whether the state

proceedings satisfied due process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is

largely beside the point.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir.

1991). 

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In order to show a federal due process violation arising from a failure to instruct,

Petitioner must demonstrate that the failure to give the instruction “so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). In addition, “[i]t is well established that

the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the

context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72,

quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

Petitioner has not shown that a federal due process violation resulted from the

failure to instruct the jury that in order to establish kidnapping during a carjacking the

carjacking must be more than incidental to the kidnapping. As the appellate court noted,

the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offense of kidnapping during a

carjacking, and the further instruction may not have been a proper expression of

California law. In any case, as discussed above in Claims 1 and 2, there was, as the

appellate court put it, “substantial if not overwhelming evidence” that the defendants

kidnapped the victims in order to facilitate the carjacking. The defendants had the choice

of taking the victims with them in the SUV, or perhaps kidnapping them at their home,

but decided to force them back into the BMW at gunpoint and use that car for the

kidnapping, thereby carjacking the victims in the process. There was evidence presented,

in the form of Detective Brown’s testimony, that kidnapping for ransom by drug cartels

was on the rise at the time of this offense. Petitioner argues that such evidence supports

his position that kidnapping for the purpose of ransom due to the drug debt was their

primary criminal intent, and that it is merely supposition that the late-model BMW could

have been carjacked because it had a value sufficient to satisfy a significant portion of the

driver’s drug debt. Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to

find that the kidnapping was not incidental to the carjacking because it facilitated the

carjacking by preventing the victims from sounding an alarm. Thus, Petitioner has not

shown that the failure to give the instruction (informing the jury that the carjacking must

be more than incidental to the kidnapping), which may not have been an accurate

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statement of California law, “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. The

Court finds that the state court rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and did not involve an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1706-07; Richter, 562

U.S. at 102-03; Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76; Miller-El, 537

U.S. at 340; McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

Furthermore, any possible error is clearly harmless. As set forth above, the jury

was properly instructed on the elements of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking, and

even if they had been further instructed that the carjacking must be more than incidental

to the kidnapping, there was overwhelming evidence that the carjacking was more than

incidental. The jury could have reasonably determined that the kidnappers wanted

possession of the BMW to satisfy the drug debt, and by taking the victims with them they

prevented them from calling the police, thereby facilitating the carjacking. Given that

evidence, and the evidence that the defendants could have kidnapped the victims at their

home or taken them away in the SUV, there is no indication in the record the jury would

have found Petitioner not guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking if they had

been instructed in the manner now asserted by Petitioner. Thus, the alleged instructional

error here could not have had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

The Court finds that the appellate court’s adjudication of Claim 3 is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court also finds that

any error is harmless. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that habeas relief be

DENIED as to Claim 3.

E. Claim 4

Petitioner contends in his final claim that his federal Constitutional right to due

process was denied by the failure of the trial court to give a unanimity instruction

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regarding the firearm possession counts and firearm use allegations. (Pet. at 9.) He

argues that the prosecutor attempted to prove that Petitioner either actually or

constructively possessed a stun gun, which under California law is considered a firearm,

or a handgun, or constructively possessed a handgun used by a co-defendant, and the jury

may have returned guilty verdicts without agreeing unanimously on a specific act or

theory of possession. (Id.)

Respondent answers that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas, but that

even if it is, a unanimity instruction was not necessary because clearly established federal

law provides that a jury is not required to reach a unanimous decision with regard to

which overt act or admission satisfies the actus reus requirement for the charged offense. 

(Ans. Mem. at 35.) Respondent argues that because Petitioner was charged with

possession of a firearm by a felon and allowing a concealed firearm to be in a vehicle,

and the sentence enhancement findings alleged he either possessed or constructively

possessed a firearm during the continuous course of criminal conduct, it was not

necessary for the jury to agree whether he had actual or constructive possession. (Id. at

39.) Thus, Respondent argues that the denial of the claim by the appellate court is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

(Id. at 35-40.) 

The Court will look through the silent denial of Claim 3 by the state supreme court

to the state appellate court’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. The appellate court stated:

Quezada contends his convictions on counts 4 and 5 and his firearm

enhancements for counts 1 and 2 must be reversed because the trial court

did not give a unanimity instruction regarding the possible multiple acts of his firearm possession.

A

In a criminal case, a defendant has the constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo).) Furthermore, “the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime.” (Russo, at p. 1132.) “Therefore, cases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.

(Citations.) (¶) This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is

intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even

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though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant

committed.’” (Ibid.)

However, “where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty.” (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “It is settled that as long as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

is guilty of (a crime) as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide unanimously by which theory he is guilty.” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918.) Russo discussed examples of when there are multiple, discrete crimes requiring a unanimity instruction and when there is only one discrete crime based on multiple theories not requiring a unanimity instruction. (Russo, at pp. 1132–1133.) “(T)ypical examples include the rule that, to convict a defendant of first degree murder, the jury must unanimously agree on guilt of a specific murder but need not agree on a theory of premeditation or felony murder (citation), and the rule that the jury need not agree on whether the defendant was guilty as the direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor as long as it agreed on a specific crime [citation].” (Id. at p. 1133.) Furthermore, “(n)ot only is there no unanimity requirement as to the theory of guilt, the individual jurors themselves need not choose among the theories, so long as each is convinced of guilt. Sometimes, . . .

the jury simply cannot decide beyond a reasonable doubt exactly who did what. There may be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the direct

perpetrator, and a similar doubt that he was the aider and abettor, but no

such doubt that he was one or the other.” (Santamaria, at p. 919, italics added.)

B

The jury found Quezada guilty of count 4, possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and count 5, carrying a firearm in a vehicle (§ 12025, subd. (a)(3)). It also found true the allegations that in committing counts 1 and 2 Quezada, while not personally armed, was vicariously liable for possession of a firearm (§12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court did not give a unanimity instruction regarding the specific acts constituting counts 4 and 5 and the firearm enhancements to counts 1 and 2.

C

Quezada asserts the trial court erred by not instructing sua sponte that the jurors must unanimously agree on the specific acts constituting counts

4 and 5 and the firearm allegations related to counts 1 and 2. He argues that because the evidence was conflicting regarding his actual or constructive

possession of a firearm, there were multiple discrete acts or crimes that could have constituted those counts and allegations. Furthermore, because the prosecutor did not expressly elect as to the specific act or crime constituting the charged offense or allegation and inform the jurors of their

need to unanimously agree on a specific act or crime, he argues the trial court was required to instruct sua sponte on that unanimity requirement.

Without discussing in detail the evidence at trial, we generally agree with Quezada that there is evidence from which jurors could have reasonably inferred he either: (1) actually possessed a gun; (2) actually possessed a taser; (3) constructively possessed Martinez’s gun; or (4)

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constructively possessed Ortiz’s taser. [FN10] However, as the People argue, those separate “acts” did not constitute multiple discrete crimes or firearm allegations, but rather multiple “theories” of a single discrete crime or allegation. (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–1133; People v. Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 918–919.) If the jurors unanimously agreed beyond a reasonable doubt that Quezada actually possessed a gun or taser or constructively possessed a gun or taser, that agreement was constitutionally adequate for his convictions of the disputed counts and allegations. The jurors were not required to unanimously agree on the particular act or acts he did in committing each of those single discrete crimes and allegations. The jurors may not have unanimously agreed as to exactly what Quezada did (e.g., whether he actually or constructively possessed a firearm). But such unanimous agreement is not required for a conviction or true finding. Like the example of uncertainty regarding whether a defendant was the direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, it is

sufficient if the jurors unanimously agreed that Quezada did one or the other (actual or constructive possession of a gun or taser), either of which would constitute the single discrete crime or allegation (e.g., count 4, count 5, count 1 firearm allegation, and count 2 firearm allegation). (Russo, at pp. 1132–1133; Santamaria, at pp. 918–919.) During the continuous course of

conduct involved in this case, the jury unanimously found Quezada guilty of the single discrete crimes charged in counts 4 and 5 and found true the firearm allegations related to counts 1 and 2. The jurors were not required to unanimously agree on the particular theory regarding his acts constituting those single discrete crimes or allegations. (Cf. Russo, at p. 1135; Santamaria, at p. 920.) The trial court did not err by not giving a unanimity instruction. [FN11] People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, cited by Quezada, is inapposite to this case and does not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion.

FN10. For purposes of this opinion, we assume arguendo, as Quezada asserts, that a taser is a firearm within the meaning of the statutes involved herein. (See People v. Heffner (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 643, 652–653.)

FN11. We further note the prosecutor was not required to

elect one of those theories as constituting the single discrete

crime or allegation and inform the jurors they must

unanimously agree on that particular theory. Nevertheless, the

prosecutor apparently attempted to elect among those theories by arguing in closing that Quezada was vicariously liable for

Martinez’s possession of a firearm.

People v. Ortiz, et al., 208 Cal.App.4th at 1374-77.

It is clearly established that a state criminal defendant does not have a federal

constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406

(1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972). Petitioner is therefore not

entitled to federal habeas relief even if the jury did not reach a unanimous decision as to

whether he possessed or constructively possessed a handgun or a stun gun. Richter, 562

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U.S. at 102-03; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76.

However, as previously stated, Petitioner may still show a federal due process

violation if he can demonstrate that the failure to give the instruction “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72,

quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. The appellate court found that a unanimity instruction

was not necessary because the four discrete possibilities of possession (actual possession

of a stun gun, actual possession of a handgun, constructive possession of a stun gun, and

constructive possession of a handgun), were not separate criminal offenses, but merely

different theories of how Petitioner committed the two gun possession crimes and the two

firearm use enhancements. The jury was instructed immediately before closing

arguments that they were required to reach unanimous verdicts on each count and that

each special finding must be unanimous. (RT 2759-60.) That was also the last

instruction they received before beginning deliberations. (RT 3044-45.) 

There was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that Petitioner was armed,

either actually or constructively, with a stun gun or handgun throughout the entire course

of the crime. Arellano testified that she heard the sound of a stun gun and felt a sting in

her shoulder when she was slow in finding and turning over her cell phone. A stun gun

was found in the back seat of the BMW, and she identified Petitioner in court and at the

curbside lineup as the person sitting directly behind her in possession of a stun gun. 

There was admittedly some confusion on her part as to whether Petitioner or Ortiz was

armed with the stun gun, as she had reversed their order in the back seat when testifying

at the preliminary hearing where she said that Ortiz had used the stun gun on her. As a

result, the prosecutor amended the Second Amended Information to change the firearm

use enhancement from alleging Petitioner was actually armed to constructively armed. 

However, Arellano testified that Martinez, the driver, had a handgun in his hand when

he first entered the BMW through the driver’s door, and that he ordered Castrillon into

the back seat at gunpoint. She also testified that Martinez ordered her to open her

window just before he threw a handgun out her window, and handguns were found on the

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side of the road where Castrillon and Arellano said they had been thrown out of the

BMW during the chase. In light of that evidence, and because neither state nor federal

law requires the jurors to unanimously agree as to whether Petitioner actually or

constructively possessed a firearm or a stun gun in order to convict him of the two

firearm possession counts and return true findings on the two firearm use enhancements,

the failure to instruct the jury that they had to be unanimous in that regard could not have

“so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” McGuire,

502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of Claim 4 did not

involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Richter, 562 U.S.

at 102-03; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; McGuire, 502 U.S.

at 72; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and

(2) directing that judgement be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 21, 2015 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than June 4, 2015. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 21, 2015

DAVID H. BARTICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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