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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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I 

FI LED 

United States Cotirt of Appeal& 

T1>nth Cir.-:i.·it 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OCT l O 1990 

&OBERT L. .HOECKER 

Clerk 

ARTHUR R. FACTEAU, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

ROBERT J. TANSY, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

No. 89-2304 

(D.C. No. 89-660 SC) 

(D.N.M.) 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Arthur R. Facteau appeals the district court's dismissal and 

transfer of his petition for habeas corpus based on procedural 

defects in a prison disciplinary hearing and ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Facteau contends that: (1) the consent 

decree in Duran v. Anaya, No. 77-721 (D.N.M.), does not authorize 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6062 Document: 010110059549 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 1 
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referral of habeas motions; and (2) the district court erred in 

finding no ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

We disagree with Facteau's contention that the district court 

could not refer his claims to the special master authorized to 

hear certain prisoner complaints about disciplinary hearings at 

the Central New Mexico Correctional Facility. Facteau has cited 

no authority for the proposition that habeas petitions must be 

treated differently from section 1983 actions, for which it is 

undisputed that reference is proper, see Facteau Y...!.. Sullivan, 843 

F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1988), and we see no reason for drawing such 

a distinction. The claims asserted by Facteau in his petition are 

similar in nature and kind to those referred to the special 

master. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err 

in referring the matter to the special master first, and 

dismissing the claim without prejudice. 

We also disagree with· Facteau's assertion that the district 

court erred in considering his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. It is axiomatic that there is no constitutional right to 

counsel in state habeas proceedings challenging prison 

disciplinary proceedings. Whitley Y...!.. Murray, 823 F.2d 55 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1034 (1987). Where there is no 

constitutional right to counsel, ineffective assistance of counsel 

where counsel was had can raise no constitutional question. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in 

dismissing Facteau's ineffective assistance of counsel claims with 

prejudice. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6062 Document: 010110059549 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 2 
• t 

• 

We GRANT the certificate of probable cause and AFFIRM the 

judgment of the district court. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6062 Document: 010110059549 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 3 
.. FI LED 

U!lited States Cou.rc of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

LOU ANNA MUNKRES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LARRY J. SLAYTON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

) 

THE CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, DAVID ) 

HERBERT, MARY JO PALMER, DAVID HATTER, ) 

J. GUY HENSON, STEPHEN E. REEL, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

OCT 1 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6062 

(D.C. No. 86-1421-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Before TACHA, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON,** District Judge. 

**Honorable Alan 

District Court 

designation. 

B. Johnson, District Judge, United States 

for the District of Wyoming, sitting by 

Lou Anna Munkres appeals entry of summary judgment against 

her on her § 1983 action. Ms. Munkres had claimed that her 

constitutional due process rights were violated by City Manager 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6062 Document: 010110059549 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 4 
• 

Larry J. Slayton in association with her termination as an 

employee of the City of Midwest City, Oklahoma (the city). The 

trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mr. Slayton under 

the holding of Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 859 F.2d 142, 146 

(10th Cir. 1988). We affirm. 

On appeal, we review the granting of a motion for 

summary judgment de nova, and apply the same standard as 

the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate 

only when there are no genuine issues of fact, and one 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, 

the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable 

to the appellant, as the norunoving party. 

Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1990)(citations 

omitted). 

The parties agree on the pertinent facts of the case. 

Ms. Munkres was terminated by Mr. Slayton "for the good of the 

service" without pretermination notification or hearing. 

Mr. Slayton relied on the city's charter, which provides that 

removal or termination of officers or employees of the city may be 

based on "the good of the service. 111 Ms. Munkres counters that 

1 Art. III,§ 3 of the city's Charter provides 

pertinent part: 

The city manager shall be chief executive officer and 

head of the administrative branch of the goverrunent. . . . He shall: 

(1) Appoint, and when necessary for the good of 

the service, remove all heads of administrative 

departments and other administrative officers and 

employees of the city except as otherwise provided 

in this charter and except as he or the council by 

ordinance may authorize the head of a department, 

an officer or an agency to appoint and remove 

subordinates in each department, office or agency, 

subject to such merit system regulations as the 

council may ordain. 

in 

(continued on next page) 

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.. 

the personnel practices manual of the city's merit system provides 

that removal or termination must be based on "just cause." The 

distinction is material because Oklahoma law provides that there 

is no federal constitutional impediment to summary termination for 

the good of the service, while ordinances or employment contracts 

requiring termination for just cause grant the employee a property 

right, triggering pretermination due process requirements. 

v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196, 200 (Okla. 1980). 

Ms. Munkres looks to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 13-109 

(1978 & Supp. 1990), which provides that municipal legislation 

concerning purely municipal matters overrides conflicting 

provisions of state statute. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

has held that while a city council ordinance is enforceable as 

municipal legislation, a city council's resolution is not 

considered to be municipal "legislation." Umholtz v. City of 

Tulsa, 565 P.2d 15, 21 (Okla. 1977). In the case before us today, 

it is undisputed that the city's merit system and personnel 

practices manual were formally adopted by resolution rather than 

ordinance, although Ms. Munkres attempts to bootleg these 

(continued from previous page) 

(emphasis added). 

Art. VII,§ 43 of the city's Charter provides: 

Appointments and promotions in the service of the 

city shall be made solely on the basis of merit and 

fitness, and removals and demotions shall be made solely 

for the good of the service. Better to achieve these 

ends, the council shall establish, within six (6) months 

after adoption of this Charter, a merit system and 

provide for its proper organization and functioning and 

for proper personnel administration. 

(emphasis added). 

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documents into the charter under its statement enabling the city 

council to establish such system by ordinance, Art. III,§ 3. 

Under Umholtz, the resolutions adoping the merit system and 

personnel practices manual do not override the language of the 

pertinent Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 10-120 

(1978 & Supp. 1990): 

Appointments and promotions in the service of a 

statutory council-manager city shall be made solely on 

the basis of merit and fitness; and removals, demotions, 

suspensions, and layoffs shall be made solely for the 

good of the service. The council J2y ordinance may 

establish a merit system and provide for its 

organization and functioning, and provide for personnel 

administration and regulation of personnel matters. 

(emphasis added). 

In addition, because, the merit system and personnel 

practices manual were not adopted by ordinance, the charter, 

approving termination "for the good of the service," controls the 

provisions of both the merit system and the personnel practices 

manual. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that 

Ms. Munkres does not have an enforceable right to the 

pretermination procedures which she demands. 

Likewise, we reject Ms. Munkres' assertion that the city is 

estopped from denying enforceability of the just cause provision 

of the merit system and the personnel practices manual. First, 

Ms. Munkres has shown no evidence of detrimental reliance on the 

just cause provision. See Burdick v. Independence School 

District, 702 P.2d 48, 55 (Okla. 1955). Second, Oklahoma law 

permits a municipality to be estopped from specified conduct only 

if such estoppel furthers a broader public policy than the conduct 

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itself. Id. In this case, public policy is clearly set forth in 

the city's charter, Art. III,§ 3 and Art. IV,§ 3, and the 

estoppel proposed by Ms. Munkres would thwart the very terms of 

that properly established public statement of policy. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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