Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01687/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01687-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON MURILLO,

CDCR # P-43503, Civil No. 11-1687 BEN (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 3];

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF No. 4]; 

AND

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILING TO STATE

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

AND FOR LACK OF PROPER

VENUE

vs.

IAN PARKINSON; COUNTY OF SAN

LUIS OBISPO; ULLOA; MAYES; ADAMS;

MANPAL; RUSHING; P. FLOURNEY; T.

GOFF; VILLAROMAN; DENNIS MORRIS;

CHARLES MARSH; JOHN DOES 1-5,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“RJD”), California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 3], and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel

[ECF No. 4].

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493

F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 3] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further

orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil

action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however,

unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district

courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be

exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the

‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se

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in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon,

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice because, for the reasons set forth

below, neither the interests of justice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of

counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at

1017.

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

A. Venue

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has combined claims that arose in the County of San Luis

Obispo with claims that have arisen from events while housed at RJD in San Diego County.

These claims appear to be separate and distinct with no indication why Plaintiff filed them in the

same action. Venue may be raised by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet filed

a responsive pleading and the time for doing so has not run. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486,

1488 (9th Cir. 1986). “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of

citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district

where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in

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which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district

in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise

be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488; Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a district

in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in

the interests of justice, transfer such case to any district in or division in which it could have

been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Parkinson, County of San Luis Obispo, Ulloa,

Mayes, Adams, Manpal and Rushing arose in San Luis Obispo County, California, which is

within the jurisdictional confines of the Central District of California, Western Division. See

28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2) (“The Central District [of California] comprises 3 divisions.... (2) The

Western Division comprises the counties of Los Angeles, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara and

Ventura.”). The claims against these Defendants are not alleged to have arisen in the Southern

District. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(d) (“The Southern District [of California] comprises the counties

of Imperial and San Diego.”). 

Therefore, venue as to the claims against Defendants Parkinson, County of San Luis

Obispo, Ulloa, Mayes, Adams, Manpal and Rushing are properly brought in the Central District

of California, Western Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2), but not in the Southern

District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488. Accordingly, the

Court dismisses the claims against Defendants Parkinson, County of San Luis Obispo, Ulloa,

Mayes, Adams, Manpal and Rushing, without prejudice, for lack of proper venue. If Plaintiff

wishes to purse claims against these individual Defendants he should file a separate action in the

Central District of California, Western Division.

B. Illegal search claims

The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are far from clear, but he appears to allege that

Defendant Flourney, a nurse at RJD, violated his constitutional rights by conducting “illegal

body cavity searches.” (Compl. at 17-18.) The Fourth Amendment applies to a jail or prison’s

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policy of strip searches of inmates. See Bull v. City of San Francisco, et al., 595 F.3d 964, 974-

75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). When determining whether Plaintiff has stated a Fourth

Amendment claim for an unreasonable search, the Court looks to whether the strip search was

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 89 (1987). “The reasonableness of a search is determined by reference to its context.” Bull,

595 F.3d at 971 (citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Plaintiff alleges no specific facts with regard to these visual body cavity searches.

Plaintiff appears to object to the visual body cavity searches on the grounds that Defendant

Flourney is a nurse and not a correctional officer. (See Compl. at 18.) Such a claim does not

rise to the level of finding that the visual searches were “excessive, vindictive, harassing or

unrelated to any legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder, 860 F.3d at 332. Thus, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation arising

from visual body cavity searches.

C. Due Process and Heck

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s due process claims must be dismissed because they are

premature under the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Constitutional claims involving a prison’s disciplinary or administrative decisions to revoke

good-time credits are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

and 1915A(b)(1) since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever the claim for

damages depends on a determination that a disciplinary judgment is invalid or the sentence

currently being served is unconstitutionally long. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44

(1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he lost good time credits as a result of Defendants fabricating

charges against him resulting in a disciplinary conviction. (See Compl. at 18.) In order to state

a claim for damages under section 1983 based on these allegations under Heck and Edwards,

however, Plaintiff must allege facts in his Complaint sufficient to show that Defendants’

decision to remove his credits has already been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or

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called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff has failed

to do so; therefore, he must sufficiently amend his Complaint to provide such a showing before

any cause of action for damages accrues under the Civil Rights Act. Id.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Even if Plaintiff were able to overcome the Heck bar, he has failed to state a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim. “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison

regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections.

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations

omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of disciplinary hearing which show “the type of atypical, significant deprivation

[that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty

interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus discretionary nature of

the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and whether they

amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by

prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence was

lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

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Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants from San Luis Obispo are

dismissed without leave to amend in this action but also without prejudice to pursue in a separate

action filed in the Central District, Western Division.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 3]

is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 4] is DENIED.

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

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ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Defendants Parkinson, County of San Luis Obispo, Ulloa, Mayes, Adams, Manpal

and Rushing are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate these Defendants from the docket.

6. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b).

7. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed

in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, this action

shall remain dismissed without further Order by the Court.

8. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a Court approved § 1983 form to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 11, 2011

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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