Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01480/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01480-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Douglas Eric Ross, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Jeffrey Van Winkle, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01480-PHX-NVW (ESW)

ORDER 

 This is a civil rights action brought by pro se prisoner Douglas Eric Ross 

(“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants Akin and 

Contreras’ unopposed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 117), which 

Defendant Burke has joined (Doc. 121). For the following reasons, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 117) and Joinder (Doc. 121) and dismiss this action with 

prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 A. Plaintiff’s Claims 

 Plaintiff is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman (“ASPCEyman”) in Florence, Arizona. On June 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a four-count Complaint 

(Doc. 1) pertaining to an alleged assault committed by former ASPC-Eyman Correctional 

Officer Defendant Burke. Plaintiff also sued Correctional Officers Akin and Contreras 

and Deputy Warden Van Winkle for their alleged conduct in regards to the alleged 

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assault. The Court ordered Defendants Burke, Akin, and Contreras to answer Counts 

One, Two, and Three. (Doc. 22 at 7). The Court dismissed Count Four and Defendant 

Van Winkle. (Id.). 

 In July 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a six-count First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 67) naming Burke, Akin, Contreras, and other prison personnel as 

Defendants. (Docs. 64, 68). After screening the First Amended Complaint pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court found that Count Six stated an Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendant Quintana, who was the nurse in charge at ASPC-Eyman at the 

time of the alleged assault. (Doc. 64 at 8-9; Doc. 68 at 1-2). The Court ordered 

Defendant Burke to answer Count One, Defendant Akin to answer Count Two, 

Defendant Contreras to answer Count Three, and Defendant Quintana to answer Count 

Six. (Doc. 68 at 2). The remaining counts and Defendants were dismissed. Defendants 

Burke, Akin, Contreras, and Quintana have answered the First Amended Complaint. 

(Doc. 69, 78, 85). 

B. Defendant Quintana’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Inmates must exhaust their available administrative remedies before bringing 

Section 1983 lawsuits based on prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). On December 

2, 2015, Defendant Quintana filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to 

Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 98). Defendant Quintana asserted that Plaintiff 

did not filed any grievance appeals relating to the allegations against her and therefore 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id. at 4). 

The Court advised Plaintiff of the requirements for responding to the Motion for 

Summary Judgment. (Docs. 101, 111). Plaintiff, however, did not file a response. On 

January 26, 2016, the Court granted Defendant Quintana’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (Doc. 112). 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Medical Records 

In November 2015, Defendants Akin and Contreras moved for an order 

compelling Plaintiff to sign an authorization for the release of Plaintiff’s medical records. 

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(Doc. 90). Plaintiff did not respond. On December 22, 2015, the Court granted the 

Motion to Compel. (Doc. 109). 

D. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute 

 On March 1, 2016, Defendants Akin and Contreras filed a Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 117), which indicates that Plaintiff has refused to sign an 

authorization releasing his medical records. Defendants Akin and Contreras stated that 

because this case involves “allegations of physical assault, with no available video 

footage to prove or disprove the claims, medical records would be the best evidence by 

which to test Plaintiff’s allegations.” (Id. at 2). Defendants Akin and Contreras asserted 

that they are prejudiced by Plaintiff’s refusal to provide access to Plaintiff’s medical 

records. (Id.). 

 On March 3, 2016, the Court advised Plaintiff of the March 18, 2016 deadline for 

responding to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 117). (Doc. 119). In bold letters, the Court 

informed Plaintiff that pursuant to Rule 7.2(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure 

(“LRCiv”), the “failure of Plaintiff to respond to the Motion to Dismiss may in the 

discretion of the Court be deemed as consent to the granting of that Motion without 

further notice, and judgment may be entered dismissing the complaint and action with 

prejudice as to Defendants Akin and Contreras . . . .” (Id. at 2) (bold omitted). 

 Defendant Burke joined the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 117) on March 11, 2016. 

(Doc. 121). On that same date, the Court affirmed the March 18, 2016 response deadline. 

(Doc. 123). In bold letters, the Court advised Plaintiff that the failure to “respond to the 

Motion to Dismiss may in the discretion of the Court be deemed as consent to the 

granting of that Motion without further notice, and judgment may be entered dismissing 

the complaint and action with prejudice as to all defendants pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i).” 

(Id. at 2) (bold omitted). 

 In addition, the Court required Plaintiff to sign and return the authorization for 

medical records that counsel for Defendants Akin and Contreras previously mailed to 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 122). The Court set a deadline of March 18, 2016 and advised Plaintiff 

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in bold letters that if he “fails to comply with this Order, the Court may dismiss this 

action with prejudice without further notice to Plaintiff.” (Id. at 1-2) (bold omitted). 

E. Plaintiff’s Allegation that He Did Not Receive the Motion to Dismiss 

 On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed two documents asserting that he did not receive 

a copy of the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 117). (Docs. 124, 125). Plaintiff states that “all I 

have is a ‘Court Order’ indicating a deadline to respond, but do not know what the 

defendants filed as my failure to prosecute & what other arguments that may have been 

presented in support of this Motion.” (Doc. 124 at 2). The Court observed that the 

Certificate of Service attached to the Motion to Dismiss did not reflect Plaintiff’s updated 

address as notified in a document that Plaintiff filed in January 2015. (Doc. 48). The 

Court ordered Defendants Akin and Contreras to mail the Motion to Dismiss to Plaintiff 

at the updated address. (Doc. 127 at 2). The Court required Plaintiff to respond to the 

Motion to Dismiss no later than fourteen days from the date of service. (Id.). 

Defendants Akin and Contreras filed a Notice of Service stating that on March 29, 2016, 

they mailed Plaintiff the Motion to Dismiss in compliance with the Court’s March 11, 

2016 Order (Doc. 127). (Doc. 128). Plaintiff did not respond by the April 15, 2016 

deadline.1

 On May 6, 2016, counsel for Defendants Akin and Contreras informed the Court 

that Plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s order to sign an authorization releasing 

Plaintiff’s medical records. (Doc. 130). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 As Plaintiff has been warned, the Court may deem Plaintiff’s failure to respond to 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 117) and Joinder (Doc. 

121) as Plaintiff’s consent to the granting of the Motion. See LRCiv 7.2(i); Ghazali v. 

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). Prior to granting the Motion, however, the 

Court must weigh five factors: (i) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

 

1

 Fourteen days from March 29, 2016 is April 12, 2016. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6(d), three days are added to the response deadline. 

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litigation, (ii) the Court’s need to manage its docket, (iii) the risk of prejudice to the 

defendants, (iv) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and (v) the 

availability of less drastic sanctions. See Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (citing Henderson v. 

Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). All five factors weigh in favor of 

dismissal. 

A. Factors One and Two: Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution of 

Litigation and the Court’s Need to Manage its Docket 

 “[T]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 

dismissal.” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). This 

case has been pending for nearly two years. Plaintiff has been given ample time to 

respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, but has failed to do so. Plaintiff has caused 

this case to stall by disobeying the Court’s order to sign a medical release. Plaintiff’s 

conduct has adversely affected the Court and public’s interest in judicial efficiency and 

the prompt resolution of cases. Further, the Court’s interest in controlling its docket 

supports the dismissal of this action that Plaintiff has effectively abandoned. See Ferdik 

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the “district courts’ power 

to manage their dockets without being subject to the endless vexatious noncompliance of 

litigants . . . .”). For these reasons, factors one and two weigh in favor of dismissing this 

case. 

B. Factor Three: The Risk of Prejudice to Defendants 

 “To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish that plaintiff's actions impaired 

defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision 

of the case.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Malone v. 

United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff alleges that he 

has sustained physical injuries arising from Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff’s refusal to 

allow Defendants to obtain Plaintiff’s medical records prevents the full and fair litigation 

of this case. The risk of prejudice to Defendants is great if this case is not dismissed for 

Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and obey the Court’s orders. 

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C. Factor Four: Public Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on their Merits

Although public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, Plaintiff's 

refusal to release his medical records defeats this goal. In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 

433 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiffs’ total refusal to provide discovery obstructed 

resolution of their claims on the merits). Plaintiff’s conduct in this case overcomes the 

public policy that typically weighs against dismissal. 

D. Factor Five: The Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions 

The Court has already pursued remedies that are less drastic than dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s suit. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 131-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (before dismissing a case 

as a sanction, a district court must first consider the impact of the sanction and the 

adequacy of less drastic sanctions). Plaintiff was explicitly warned on multiple occasions 

that the Court may dismiss this action if Plaintiff fails to respond to the Motion to 

Dismiss and release his medical records. See Estrada v. Speno & Cohen, 244 F.3d 1050, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a court’s warning to a party that the failure to obey a 

court order will result in dismissal can meet the requirement that the court considered 

alternatives). Despite the Court’s warnings, Plaintiff has chosen to disregard the Motion 

to Dismiss and the Court’s order that Plaintiff sign an authorization releasing his medial 

records. Because Plaintiff is indigent, imposing a monetary sanction in lieu of dismissal 

would be a futile act. The Court concludes that dismissal is warranted. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Because the five factors discussed above weigh in Defendants’ favor, the Court 

will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 117) and Joinder (Doc. 121). Plaintiff 

has disregarded the Court’s orders and has effectively abandoned this case. Under these 

circumstances, a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 133 

(upholding dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with court order). Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 

Prosecute (Doc. 117) and Defendant Burke’s Joinder (Doc. 121). 

/ / / 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in 

favor of Defendants, dismiss this action with prejudice, and terminate the case. 

 Dated this 19th day of May, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge 

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