Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01859/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01859-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10-CV-1859 - IEG (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 7]

vs.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Jose Luis Lopez, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint against Defendant Bank

of America, N.A., alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, common law fraud, breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

violation of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

(“RESPA”). (Doc. No. 1.) Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by Defendant

Bank of America, N.A. (Doc. No. 7.) For the reasons described herein, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint is primarily a general attack upon the lending practices of

Defendant and other lenders over the past ten years. Plaintiff refers specifically to Defendant,

Bank of America, N.A., once, on the first page of his Complaint. See generally Compl. Plaintiff

alleges he “entered into a consumer contract for the refinance of a primary residence located at 920

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Caleb Court San Diego CA 92514.” See Compl. at 1. Loan documents indicate that on November

8, 2006, Plaintiff executed two mortgage loans from lender MortgageIT in the amounts of

$380,000 and $95,000. See Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exs. A-D. 

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 7, 2010, along with a request for a temporary

restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3-4.) On September 13,

2010, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 6.)

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on September 29, 2010. (Doc. No. 7.) When Plaintiff did not

oppose the motion by October 25, 2010, Defendant filed a reply notifying the Court of Plaintiff’s

failure to oppose the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 8.) On November 2, 2010, the Court vacated

the hearing scheduled for November 8, 2010 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and took the

matter under submission. (Doc. No. 9.) The same day, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to

Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 11.)

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2009). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in

the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The

court must accept all factual allegations pled in the complaint as true, and must construe them and

draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty

Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

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 Plaintiff’s negligence claim is entirely derivative of his allegation that Defendant failed to 1

make required disclosures under TILA, RESPA, and HOEPA at the time of the originating loan

transaction. Plaintiff also asserts a claim for negligence per se. Negligence per se is the “presumption

of negligence arising out of a violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation . . .” Cal. Serv. Station &

Auto Repair Ass’n v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1171 n.5 and 1178 (Cal. Ct. App.

1998). In California, negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, not an independent cause of action.

 See id.; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1285-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s negligence per se allegation fails along with his negligence claim.

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action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). A court need not accept “legal

conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to

assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have

violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,

Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

II. Analysis

A. Causes of Action that Derive from the Original Loan Transaction

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Bank of America, N.A. was the originating lender

(or participated in any way in the loan transaction) or that Bank of America, N.A. assumed liability

for claims arising from the loan transaction. Defendant has submitted documents indicating it was

not the originating lender. See Def.’s RJN, Exs. A-D. Because Defendant had no involvement in

the origination of the loans, any claims by Plaintiff that arise from the originating loan transaction

must fail. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s first,

second, fifth and seventh causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, violation of the 1

Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

(“RESPA”)). The remainder of Plaintiffs causes of action are at least plausibly related to conduct

that took place subsequent to that transaction.

B. Fraud

In his third cause of action, Plaintiff seeks damages for common law fraud. Defendant

maintains that this cause of action fails because it is time barred and because Plaintiff has not

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 The Court does not need to decide whether this cause of action is time barred because it 2

determines that Plaintiff’s claim lacks merit. Moreover, in arguing that this cause of action is time

barred, Defendant assumes Plaintiff’s allegations are directed exclusively at the originating loan

transaction. As discussed above, for purposes of this order, the Court assumes Plaintiff’s allegations

are directed at subsequent events.

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alleged facts with the specificity required for a fraud claim. See Def.’s Mot. at 7-9. 2

To recover for common law fraud under California law, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1)

misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of its falsity, (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5)

resulting damages. Lazar v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (Cal. 1996). Moreover, Rule 9(b) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires allegations of fraud to be state with particularity. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”). In the Ninth Circuit, this rule has been interpreted

as requiring the plaintiff to allege “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct

charged. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)). “[A] plaintiff must set forth more than the

neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or

misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Decker v.

GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994)). Specifically, a complaint “must adequately

specify the statements it claims were false or misleading, give particulars as to the respect in which

plaintiff contends the statements were fraudulent, state when and where the statements were made,

and identify those responsible for the statements.” In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 42

F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any allegations specifically directed to

Defendant, let alone allegations regarding the names of individuals with whom he spoke, when and

where such discussions to place, or the content of such discussions. Thus, Plaintiff fails to satisfy

the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), and the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s fraud claim.

C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In his fourth cause of action, Plaintiff seeks damages for breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. Defendant maintains that this cause of action fails because Plaintiff

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28 For the reasons stated in n.2 above, the Court does not need to decide whether this cause of 3

action is time barred.

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has not alleged facts constituting a claim and, more specifically, because Defendant does not have

a special relationship with Plaintiff with fiduciary characteristics. See Def.’s Mot. at 9-10.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract and “is aimed

at making effective the agreement’s promises.” Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 23

Cal.4th 390, 400 (Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Broadly stated,

that covenant requires that neither party do anything which will deprive the other of the benefits of

the agreement.” Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11 Cal.4th 85, 91 (Cal. 1995) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the implied covenant “does not extend beyond

the terms of the contract at issue.” Poway Royal Mobilehome Owners Ass’n v. City of Poway, 149

Cal. App.4th 1460, 1477 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). 

In this case, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant was a party to the

originating loan transaction. Plaintiff fails to identify any contractual obligations owed by

Defendant, let alone how Defendant violated such obligations. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations

fall far short of specific facts sufficient to “raise [his] right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as

a factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s allegations fail

to state a viable claim, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s fourth cause

of action.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Last, in his sixth cause of action, Plaintiff seeks damages for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Defendant maintains this cause of action is time barred and that Plaintiff has

not alleged facts supporting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Def.’s 3

Mot. at 14-16.

The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or

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extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

defendant's outrageous conduct. Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co., 100 Cal. App.4th 736,

744-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). To support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, “[i]t

is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the

plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware. Christensen v.

Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (Cal. 1991).

In this case, even if Defendant were deemed to have engaged in intentional and outrageous

conduct, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any allegations indicating that Defendant directed

its conduct to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts sufficient to “raise [his] right to

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s

allegations fall short, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s sixth cause of

action.

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CONCLUSION

Loss of one’s home is clearly a serious injury. Kerr v. American Home Mortg. Servicing,

Inc., 2010 WL 3154551 (S.D.Cal. 2010). Nonetheless, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint do

not state a viable claim on any of the causes of actions Plaintiff has asserted. Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

each of Plaintiff’s claims.

If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, he should do so within 21 days of the

filing of this order. The amended complaint should only make the revisions discussed above,

should be a complete document without reference to any prior pleading, and should not add any

new causes of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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