Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00095/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00095-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Ruben Benito Lopez is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action. He 

asserts the Kern County Sheriff’s Department is liable for excessive use of force and negligence when 

he was placed under arrest on February 6, 2014. Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a 

claim for excessive use of force, he fails to show this Court has jurisdiction over the matter. Therefore, 

the Court recommends that the action be DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. Screening Requirement

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the action is “frivolous, malicious or 

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). The Court must screen the First Amended 

Complaint because an amended complaint supersedes the previously filed complaint. See Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

RUBEN BENITO LOPEZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT.,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00095 - DAD- JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

DISMISSING THE ACTION WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Case 1:16-cv-00095-DAD-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/11/16 Page 1 of 6
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II. Pleading Standards

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the standards for pleading in the federal courts. 

A pleading must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may 

include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Federal Rules 

adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards” than 

pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and 

succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The 

purpose of the complaint is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him, and the grounds 

upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The 

Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Vague 

and conclusory allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation.] A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation.] The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation.] Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of 

the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should 

assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal 

conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. The Court may grant leave to amend a 

complaint to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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III. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff reports that he was arrested on February 6, 2014 for “an assault [with a] deadly 

weapon.” (Doc. 12 at 3) He asserts that officers with Kern County Sheriff’s Department came to his 

residence, and Plaintiff surrendered from his back yard. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, a deputy “called 

it in that they have a suspect in custody [and] that they were escorting [Plaintiff] to a patrol car.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges he did not resist arrest and was placed in handcuffs. (Doc. 12 at 4) He asserts 

that “a patrol car pulled up and Officer Weiss’s K-9 partner got [loose] and attacked.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

asserts he “was put through excrusiating (sic) pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he now has “over nine 

scars on [his] left leg” from the dog bite. (Id.)

IV. Discussion and Analysis

Based upon the above factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the Kern County Sheriff’s 

Department is liable for negligence and using excessive force during the course of his arrest.

A. Excessive Force

Plaintiff seeks to state a claim for excessive force in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(“Section 1983”), which “is a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. 

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Thus, an individual may bring an action for the deprivation of civil 

rights pursuant to Section 1983, which states in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts from 

which it may be inferred (1) he was deprived of a federal right, and (2) a person or entity who 

committed the alleged violation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 

Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). Here, Plaintiff asserts the Kern County 

Sheriff’s Department is liable for the use of excessive force in the course of his arrest. (Doc. 12 at 3) 

The Supreme Court of the United States determined that the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals who have not yet been convicted of a crime “from the use 

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of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 

However, allegations of excessive force during the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment, which prohibits arrests without probable cause or other justification. Id. (“claim[s] that 

law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or 

other ‘seizure’ ... are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ 

standard”); see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (“the use of force to effect an 

arrest is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures”). The Supreme 

Court explained,

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts . . . the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive 

force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are 

“objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without 

regard to their underlying intent or motivation. An officer’s evil intentions will not make 

a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an 

officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (1989) (internal citations omitted). The issue is “whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit instructs 

courts to consider “the totality of the circumstances and . . . whatever specific factors may be 

appropriate in a particular case.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010).

In Graham, the Supreme Court set forth factors to be considered in evaluating whether the force 

used was reasonable, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id., 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 

(1985). In addition, Court may consider “whether officers administered a warning, assuming it was 

practicable.” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 381-82 (2007)). Ultimately, the “reasonableness” of the actions “must be judged from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Significantly, as the Court previously informed Plaintiff, accidental use of force does not 

support a claim for excessive force. (See Doc. 11 at 4) The Supreme Court explained that “liability 

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for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 

U.S. 833, 849 (1998)). “Thus, if an officer’s Taser goes off by accident or if an officer unintentionally 

trips and falls on a detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial detainee cannot prevail on an excessive 

force claim.” Id.; see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903-904 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting 

qualified immunity on an eighth amendment excessive force claim because the plaintiffs failed to 

show the defendants maliciously and sadistically applied force for the purpose of causing harm).

Plaintiff alleges the K-9 “got loses (sic) and attacked.” (Doc. 12 at 4) Previously, he asserted 

that “the K-9 officer accidently released his K-9 dog and it attacked.” (Doc. 1 at 3) Whether the dog 

was “accidently released” or simply got loose, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting the conclusion 

that Kern County Sheriff deputies intentionally—or “maliciously and sadistically”—caused Plaintiff 

harm. See Hudson 503 U.S. at 7. Without such intent, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive 

force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472. Rather, it appears 

Plaintiff’s claims are rooted in negligence and he may seek relief in the state court. 

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Plaintiff’s only remaining cause of action in his First Amended Complaint is for negligence. 

(See Doc. 12 at 3) Because Plaintiff failed to state a constitutional violation of his rights, the Court 

should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman 

Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001).

V. Findings and Recommendations

Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support his claim for excessive force amounting to 

punishment. Because Plaintiff was informed of the legal standards governing his claim and failed to 

allege sufficient facts in his amended pleading, the Court finds further leave to amend would be futile. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction; and

2. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close the matter.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

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Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with 

the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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