Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07001/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MICHAEL GOODWIN, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

• 

FILED 

United State,~· Cc·Jrt ol Appeals 

'1'.-,., i·I-; ~ii·l'l! it 

JAN 161991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 90-7001 

) 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Department ) 

of Corrections, R. MICHAEL ) 

CODY, GARY MAYNARD, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D,C. No. 89-468-C) 

Michael Goodwin, Prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Steven Spears 

Kerr, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

Appellate Case: 90-7001 Document: 010110016254 Date Filed: 01/16/1991 Page: 1 
• 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Michael Goodwin is currently serving a twelve-year 

sentence in Oklahoma state penitentiary for repeated drug offenses. In September of 1989, Goodwin filed this habeas petition 

in federal district court, alleging that the Oklahoma Prison 

Overcrowding Emergency Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, §§ 570-576 

(West Supp. 1991), which authorizes the state to limit prison 

overcrowding by dispensing emergency time credits to certain 

classes of inmates, violated his constitutional rights. 

Specifically, he argued that the statute denied him equal 

protection of the laws sine~ it arbitrarily and capriciously 

prohibited the awarding of credits to violent offenders, those 

classified as higher than "medium security", and repeat offenders 

like himself. 

The district court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, 

Seay, J., did not reach the merits of this argument; rather, it 

dismissed Goodwin's petition for failure to exhaust state remedies 

as required by 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Goodwin appeals the dismissal, 

arguing that it would have been futile for him to pursue state 

remedies in light of the adverse ruling by the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals in Kinnard v. State of Oklahoma, No. H-89-768 

(Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 1989) (order denying petition for state 

habeas corpus). We agree with Goodwin that exhaustion of state 

remedies is not required where the state's highest court has 

recently decided the precise legal issue that petitioner seeks to 

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raise on his federal habeas petition. In such a case, resort to 

state judicial remedies would be futile. We therefore conclude 

that the district court erred in dismissing the petition, and we 

remand for further proceedings. 1 

According to 28 u.s.c. § 2254(b), a federal court may not 

entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless "it appears 

that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances 

rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 

prisoner." In interpreting this provision, many circuits have 

come to recognize that "a petitioner may be excused from 

exhausting state remedies if the highest state court has recently 

addressed the issue raised in the petition and resolved it 

adversely to the petitioner. II Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 

236 (9th Cir. 1981). For example, in Robinson v. Berman, 594 F.2d 

1, 3 (1st Cir. 1979), the First Circuit recognized a limited 

exception to the exhaustion requirement when the question raised 

by petitioner -- the constitutional vagueness of a statutory 

provision -- had recently been decided by the highest state court. 

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that a habeas petitioner was 

not required to exhaust state remedies where the Missouri Supreme 

Court rejected the same issue of law raised by another state 

prisoner. Hawkins v. Higgins, 898 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1990). 

According to that court, 

1 We grant petitioner's request for a certificate of probable 

cause and in forma pauperis status. 

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[t]he petitioner in Harness [the previous case] raised 

the same issue of law as does Hawkins. The Missouri 

courts held against that petitioner. The underlying 

facts are nearly identical. Any state challenge would 

be futile and a waste of judicial resources. 

Id. at 1367.2 

Like the circuits above, the Tenth Circuit has also 

acknowledged an exception to the exhaustion doctrine. 

Specifically, we refer to the case of Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 

214, 216 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 916 (1970), in 

which the court allowed petitioners to bypass state judicial 

remedies and file habeas petitions directly in federal court. In 

that case, a number of prisoners had challenged the state's 

failure to provide counsel during parole revocation hearings. One 

of those prisoners took the· issue through the state courts and 

received an adverse ruling from the Utah Supreme Court. Later, 

other prisoners filed petitions for habeas corpus relief directly 

in federal court without first exhausting state remedies. We held 

that because the issue decided in the earlier state action was 

2 See also Harris v. Duckworth, 909 F.2d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 

1990) (exhaustion not required where Indiana Supreme Court had 

made it "exceedingly clear that there was no constitutionally 

protected due process right to judicial review of the evidence 

presented to prison disciplinary boards"); Piercy v. Black, 801 

F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 1986) (recourse to Nebraska courts 

not required where, under almost identical facts, Nebraska Supreme 

Court rejected the claims of a similarly situated individual); 

Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, 1101-02 (D. Nev. 1986) 

(petitioner excused from exhausting state remedies where state's 

Supreme Court had recently addressed issue against petitioner's 

position), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Bronson v. McKay, 870 

F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1989); Mattern v. Sumner, 637 F. Supp. 527, 

527-28 (D. Nev. 1986) (habeas petitioner excused from exhaustion 

requirement since Nevada Supreme Court had decided issues against 

petitioner's position in another case presenting identical 

issues). See generally L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies,§ 66 

at 279-281 (1981 & Supp. 1990). 

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identical to the one presented in the federal habeas actions,· 

state relief was effectively foreclosed and hence no further 

exhaustion of state remedies was necessary. 

We believe that the facts in Alverez are similar to those at 

issue here. Goodwin's habeas claim is based on the very 

constitutional arguments that were rejected by the Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals in Kinnard. In that case, the Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals the highest criminal court in the state --

affirmed the state district court's conclusion that "the exclusion 

of inmates who are classified above medium security or who are 

violent or repeat offenders is patently reasonable .•• and is 

incapable of being viewed as capriciously arbitrary." Kinnard v. 

State of Oklahoma, No. C-89·-1184 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, J.989) 

(order denying petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition). 

Because petitioner's claims here are identical to those raised in 

Kinnard -- in fact, Goodwin's petition follows Kinnard's petition 

almost word for word -- and because there has been no "intervening 

United States Supreme Court decision on point or any other 

indication that the state court intends to depart from its prior 

decision," Sweet, 640 F.2d at 236, we conclude that Goodwin was 

effectively foreclosed from relief in the state court. We 

therefore hold that it was unnecessary for Goodwin to exhaust 

state remedies. 

Of course, this opinion in no way undermines the exhaustion 

doctrine as it applies to habeas corpus review. We recognize the 

important interests served by the exhaustion doctrine and merely 

hold that exhaustion of state remedies is not necessary where, as 

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here, the state's highest court has explicitly and recently 

addressed the precise issue advanced by the petitioner. Were 

petitioner's claims factually or otherwise distinguishable in any 

meaningful way from those in Kinnard, exhaustion of state remedies 

certainly would be a prerequisite for federal habeas review. 

However, since Goodwin and Kinnard were similarly situated and 

raised the same legal claim, we find that exhaustion of state 

remedies would serve no real purpose. To hold otherwise would 

"only create an unnecesary impediment to the prompt determination 

of individuals' rights." Sweet, 640 F.2d at 236. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

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