Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05005/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided January 19, 1997

No. 97-5005

PATRICK J. MAHONEY, REVEREND;

THE CHRISTIAN DEFENSE COALITION,

APPELLANTS 

v.

BRUCE BABBITT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,

APPELLEES 

-

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02827)

-

On Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal

from the Denial of Preliminary Injunction

-

James M. Henderson, Sr., Colby M. May, and Jay Alan Sekulow were on the emergency motion for

injuction pending appeal from the denial of preliminary injunction, for appellants.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, and Marina Utgoff Braswell,

Assistant United States Attorneys were on the opposition to the emergency motion for injunction

pending appeal from the denial of preliminary injunction, for appellees.

Before WILLIAMS, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: This matter came before us pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure on appellants' motion for an emergency injunction pending their appealfrom

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the denial of a preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior and the National Park

Service (collectively "NPS" or "the government"). Appellants sought, originally by demonstration

permit and later by invoking an exception to the regulations requiring the permit, to demonstrate

along the route of the Inaugural Parade in opposition to the policies of President Clinton. By order

filed January 19, 1997, we allowed a portion of the reliefsought in the emergency motion for reasons

more fully set out below.

I.

Appellants, the Reverend Patrick J. Mahoney and other members of the Christian Defense

Coalition ("CDC"), desired to conduct on the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue during President

Clinton's second Inaugural Parade, a demonstration protesting against the Clinton Administration's

policies toward abortion, particularly his veto of a bill banning partial birth abortions. In pursuit of

that goal, appellants filed an application with NPS, under whose jurisdiction the relevant areas fall,

for demonstration permits for three areas, including the section of Pennsylvania Avenue at issue in

the present appeal. NPS regulations specify that "[a]ll demonstration applications ... are deemed

granted ... unless denied within 24 hours of receipt." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3) (1996). The NPS did

not deny appellants' application and therefore the permit was deemed granted. However, the same

section of the regulations further specifies that "where a permit has been granted, or is deemed to

have been granted pursuant to this subsection, the Field Director may revoke that permit pursuant

to [36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(6)]." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3). The revocation provision incorporates the

grounds on which the application originally could have been denied under § 7.96(g)(4)(iii). That

subsection provides, inter alia, that an application can be denied where "[a] fully executed prior

application for the same time and place has been received," and the permit issued or to be issued in

response to that application will authorize activities which do not "reasonably permit multiple

occupancy" of the area covered by the permit. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A). In the instant case,

the NPS had previously received applications from itself for the use of the same areas and from the

Armed ForcesInauguralCommittee. NPS granted permits based on those two applications and also

granted a permit to the Presidential Inaugural Committee, which filed after the appellants an

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1

"Demonstrations" of twenty-five or fewer persons do not require permits under applicable

regulations. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2)(i). 

application for a special event covering the same space. Although NPS granted all three of the other

applications, it revoked the application of CDC by letter of December 16, 1996, over the signature

of Richard Merryman, the Chief of the Division of Park Programs.

The Merryman letter, as well as an earlier oral warning by NPS counsel Randall Myers,

further advised Mahoney, and CDC, that if individual members of CDC or small groups of members

followed through on an announced intention to picket in "space[s] assigned to the Presidential

InauguralCommittee," those members would be engaged in illegal conduct which "would subject you

and your group to potential arrest and fine."

Mahoney and CDC filed the present action in the district court on December 23, 1996,

seeking a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against enforcement

of the oral and written threats of the defendants to arrest appellants if they displayed signs critical of

President Clinton's veto of a bill banning partial birth abortions or of his abortion policies generally

on the sidewalks adjacent to the route of the Inaugural Parade along Pennsylvania Avenue. By

opinion of January 16, 1997, the district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, even though

persons displaying bannerssupportive ofthe President were not to be arrested. CDC appealed to us,

and by emergencymotion pursuant to FED.R. APP. P. 8, sought relieffromthe denial of a preliminary

injunction by way of an injunction pending appeal. As the Inaugural Parade was scheduled for

January 20, we considered the motion on an emergency basis and, on January 19, we ordered that

the motion be granted in part, to the extent that we ordered that the appellees be "enjoined from

arresting or interfering with" individual plaintiffs or groups of twenty-five or fewer1such individuals

displaying signs critical of the President or his policies except under circumstancesin which the same

arrests or interference would occur as to "individuals displaying signs not critical of the President or

his policies." We further noted in the order that "[a]n opinion more fully explaining the basis" for our

ruling would follow. We set that explanation out below.

II.

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As the amicus American Civil Liberties Union reminded us in the first sentence of its

argument, "It is a bedrock principle of First Amendment law that in administering a public forum, the

government may not permit speech that expresses one viewpoint while prohibiting speech that

expresses the opposite viewpoint." Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 4. As

the Supreme Court once stated, "[A government] has no ... authority to license one side of a debate

to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." R.A.V. v. City

of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992). Even the more so, the government has no authority to license

one side to fight freestyle, while forbidding the other to fight at all. Appellants contend that that is

what the government has done to them, and appellants are correct.

It is well established law that "content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum

... must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)

(emphasis in original). This requires the regulating government "to show that the regulation is

necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id.

(internalquotation and citations omitted). Appellants contend that the government in the present case

fellfarshort ofthisstandard when it first revoked appellants' demonstration permit. Appellants argue

that the asserted inconsistency of their use of the sidewalk area with that of the prior and subsequent

permittees is a pretext and further that the previous applications did not comply with the regulations

and should not have been considered in any event. For example, while the regulations require a "fully

executed prior application" as a basis for the denial provisions of 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(4)(iii)(A),

NPS's application to itself that was used in the ouster of appellants was incomplete in that it was

undated, did not state the maximum number of participants asrequired by the regulation, and did not

state whether equipment would be installed in the area under permit. Furthermore, while the

regulations permit a duration of no more than seven days, the NPS application to itself covered the

period from November 1, 1996, to April 1, 1997, and presumably would oust appellants from that

entire time frame. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(iv)(A)-(B). Appellants argued that their ouster from

the sidewalk area under cover of that less than perfect application was a contrived cover for

viewpoint-based discrimination, and that they should have been permitted to participate as a

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"reasonably permitt[ed] multiple occupancy" of the area covered by the permits, just as the Armed

Forces Inaugural Committee, which filed its application after the NPS but before the appellants, and

the Presidential Inaugural Committee, which filed its application after all other applications in the

case.

Because of the time constraints of the emergency basis upon which we have entertained this

case, and because ofthe lessthan fully developed record resulting fromthe same basis, we have found

it neither necessary nor possible to explore this part of appellants' claim. It may be, unless

considerations of mootness have intervened, that a later panel at a later date will entertain these

arguments; but for now, we simply note their existence and proceed to the further alleged deprivation

of First Amendment rights, which we did find it both possible and necessary to remedy on an

emergency basis.

III.

The complaint of appellants is that the government wrongfully restricted their First

Amendment activities on the basis ofthe content and viewpoint oftheirspeech when it informed them

that any of their number engaging in picketing protesting the Clinton veto of the bill banning partial

birth abortions or of his policies more generally would be arrested. Both at the administrative

application stage, and in the district court, as well as before us, appellants pointed to 36 C.F.R. §

7.96(g)(2)(i), which specifies that "[d]emonstrations involving 25 persons or fewer may be held

without a permit," provided that certain conditions not pertinent to the current controversy are met.

Relying on that provision, Mahoney, on behalf of all appellants, stated to representatives of NPS on

December 11 that if NPS denied appellants' application, they intended to demonstrate in small groups

along the Pennsylvania Avenue parade route. Division Chief Merryman, in a writing dated December

16, 1996, declared, "Engaging in this conduct would be illegal and would subject you and your group

to potential arrest and fine." Merryman cited no authority for the proposition that such small group

demonstrations would be illegal. Finding none, and suspecting that the government's threat violated

their First Amendment rights, appellants filed the present action before the district court.

In its complaint to the district court, CDC alleged and the government did not deny that NPS

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counsel Randall Myers advised Mahoney that if a CDC member, even alone, displayed on the public

sidewalk of Pennsylvania Avenue a sign depicting a late term abortion, he "would be subject to arrest

and fine for demonstrating without a permit if he did so alone or with others." The complaint further

alleged, and the government still did not deny, that Myers had admitted that if instead of carrying

graphic posters of late term abortions or signs containing criticisms of the President, Mahoney were

to carry signs offering congratulations or best wishes to the President, he would not be subject to

arrest for demonstrating without a permit. Finding it difficult to believe that the government was in

fact attempting to defend such a blatant discrimination between viewpoints, we called upon the

government for a response. The government in fact tacitly admitted that it had engaged in precisely

the discrimination alleged by appellants and did not retreat from its position on appeal, but instead

attempted to justify it.

The government argues, and the district court concluded, that its viewpoint-based

discrimination is justified under Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of

Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995). As the government's brief put it, "last year a unanimous Supreme

Court rejected the contention that a parade organizer may be compelled to include another

demonstratorin its event." (Citing Hurley.) The government correctly describes the Hurley decision,

but the Hurley decision has little to do with the present case. There are two distinctions between

Hurley and this controversy which are so critical as to make the cases not remotely parallel. In the

first place, the organizer of the parade in Hurley was a private group exercising its own First

Amendment rights. In the present case, NPS is the government. As the Supreme Court recognized

in Hurley, "[T]he guarantees of free speech and equal protection guard only against encroachment

by the government and erect no shield against merely private conduct." Id. at 2344 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). The demonstrators' claim in Hurley thus depended upon an

argument that the Massachusetts Public Accommodation Law covered participation in parades, a

claim rejected by the Court on constitutional grounds. Appellants in the present case need no such

bootstrapping. Here, their desired First Amendment conduct is barred directly by the government,

not by a private party asserting its own First Amendment rights.

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We do not mean to suggest that even the government has an obligation to provide a place for

all viewpoints in its parade. For example, if the Department of Defense or some other agency of the

government were conducting a parade in celebration of the returning veterans of an American war,

few would suppose that opponents of the war could successfully demand the right to sponsor units

therein. See DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency forInt'l Development, 887 F.2d 275, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(government support of one First Amendment protected activity does not compel government

subsidization of another). The would-be demonstrators in the present case are situated as the

anti-war demonstrators in the hypothetical.

While NPS might colorably assert that even the government has a right to bar others from

events of its particular sponsorship, there is still a second critical distinction between Hurley and

appellants' case. As the government tacitly admits, the Supreme Court's holding in Hurley was that

the organizers of a parade could not be compelled to include other demonstratorsin their event. The

protesting demonstrators in Hurley sought to compel the private organizers to allow their

participation in the parade. Mahoney and his co-plaintiffs do not seek compulsion or even permission

to participate in the Inaugural Parade organized by the Inaugural Committees and other supporters

of President Clinton. All they seek is the First Amendment-protected right to stand on the sidewalk

and peacefully note their dissent as the parade goes by. Nothing in Hurley says that the organizers

of the St. Patrick's Day Parade at issue in that case ever tried to prevent their ideological opponents

from doing precisely that. No case called to our attention says that anyone has ever successfully

established the power of a government to so suppress opposing viewpoints; indeed, in few cases has

the government of the United States even tried.

Attempting to offer a prior example ofsuch a successfulsuppression, the government points

to Sanders v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 679 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1982),

in which District Judge Smith upheld the arrest of a demonstrator forsilentlydemonstrating with four

signs within the Christmas Pageant for Peace on the Ellipse. While of course that district court's

decision would not be binding authority upon this court, it is not on point even if it were. In Sanders,

before deciding that the regulation under which the plaintiff had been arrested was a reasonable time,

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place, and manner restriction serving a significant government interest, Judge Smith was at pains to

identify what that "case [did] not concern." 518 F. Supp. at 729. He made clear that there was "no

allegation of either impermissible discrimination or arbitrariness in the application of [the] policy,"

and evenmore tellinglythat "there [was] no suggestion that this plaintiff's arrest wasin anyway based

on the content of his views." Id. Finally, Judge Smith assured himself that the area to which the

prohibition applied did not extend "beyond the immediate area used and needed by the Pageant." Id.

All of these factors are dramatically and critically opposite to the present case.

In Sanders the court found that the reasonable time, place and manner restriction served a

significant interest of protecting "the safety, order, and convenience of those other citizens already

participating in the preexisting event," 518 F. Supp. at 729. By taking the position that sign-carrying

parade viewers would be arrested based not upon their number or placement but upon the content

of their signs, however, the government has taken itself outside the realm of permissible time, place,

and manner regulation serving legitimate government interests. Indeed, that was the very point in the

passage we quoted earlier from Boos v. Barry. In Boos the Supreme Court, after rejecting the lesser

standards applicable to time, place, and manner regulation, subjected content-based restriction on

political speech in a public forum, to the "most exacting scrutiny." 485 U.S. at 321. Here, the

expressed intention ofthe government actorsto suppressthe First Amendment activities of appellants

was not only content but viewpoint based. Therefore, as in Boos, if we are to uphold thisrestriction,

we will "require[ ] the [government] to show that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling

state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " 485 U.S. at 321 (quoting Perry

Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The government has not

recognized the applicability of the more stringent test applied in Boos and has made no real attempt

to meet it, nor do we believe it could if it tried.

Lest there be any doubt that the "most exacting scrutiny" standard is the one which applies,

we note that the location of the proposed protest, that is the sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue,

decidedly constitute a public forum. As the Supreme Court has held, it has long been established that

" "public places' historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets,

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sidewalks, and parks, are considered without more, to be "public forums.' " United States v. Grace,

461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citing numerous cases). Nothing more appearing, then, the government

here is attempting to ban, on a viewpoint-determined basis, First Amendment activity from a

quintessentialpublic forum. Unfortunately for the government, nothing else appearsat least nothing

of relevance. Of course, the government granted itself a permit for the sidewalks from which it then

sought to ban the "inconsistent" First Amendment-protected activity of CDC. However, there is no

authority for the proposition that the government may by fiat take a public forum out of the

protection of the First Amendment by behaving as if it were a private actor. Indeed, such authority

as exists is directly to the contrary.

In Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1992), a federal agency, in fact NPS,

sought to delete a segment ofthe sidewalks abutting Constitution Avenue fromthe category of public

forum by first declaring those sidewalks to be within the official boundaries of the Viet Nam

Memorial and then banning "the sale or distribution of newspapers, leaflets, and pamphlets" in the

entire area so designated. We rejected the government's attempt, holding that the sidewalks at issue

in that case were "classic instances" of public forum sidewalks. 964 F.2d at 1182. We noted that

they were "physically indistinguishable from [other] sidewalks used for the full gamut of urban

walking." Id. We further concluded that our decision followed from the Supreme Court's decision

in Grace, which rejected as unconstitutional a ban on picketing and leafletting on the sidewalks

abutting the property of the Supreme Court itself, holding that the government could not "transform

the character of property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might

be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property." 461 U.S. at 180. As the Supreme Court had

earlier noted in language perhaps even more pertinent to the present case, the government "may not

by its own ipse dixit destroy the "public forum' status of streets and parks which have historically

been public forums." United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S.

114, 133 (1981).

Neither willwe permit the government to destroy the public forum character of the sidewalks

along Pennsylvania Avenue by the ipse dixit act of declaring itself a permittee. We do not purport

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to hold that the government can never control the use ofsegments of its own property against actual

inconsistent usage bypersons attempting First Amendment expression. In Grace, the SupremeCourt

reiterated its "regular[ ] rejection" of "the assertion that people who wish "to propagandize protests

or views have a constitutionalright to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.' " 461

U.S. at 177-78 (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966)). But the Grace Court went

on to note, as the Adderly Court had previously recognized, that the government's power over the

property under its control isto preserve it "for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. By way

of example, in Adderly, the Court upheld the arrest of demonstrators who would have blocked the

necessary flow of traffic in and out of a Florida jail. Here, the dedicated use of the property in

question is as a sidewalka quintessentially public forum. Its use on the date on which appellants

sought to exercise their First Amendment rights was not only as a forum as public as ever, but if

anything more so. The event in question was the observance of the inauguration of the Chief

Executive of the United States, an event less private than almost anything else conceivable. NPS,

however, even more overassertive of its authority and overprotective of the property under its

protection than in Henderson, issued itself a permit not for a limited segment of the Pennsylvania

Avenue sidewalks for the time of the Parade, but for the entire length of Pennsylvania Avenue

sidewalks for a five-month period, a time frame more than twenty times as long as permitted under

its own regulation. There can be no doubt that the standard of narrow tailoring to meet a compelling

state interest applies and has been violated.

Thatsaid, the government has offered no compelling governmentalinterest and no convincing

argument that its policy was narrowly crafted to achieve such a legitimate end. Indeed, the only

justification offered for barring groups of demonstrators oftwenty-five or fewer isthat their presence

on the Pennsylvania Avenue sidewalks would constitute a "physical intrusion into another event for

the purpose of interjecting one's own convictions or beliefs." Government Brief at 12. The goal of

the government to prevent that action on appellants' part hardly constitutes a compelling state

interest, or, in the face of the First Amendment, any legitimate state interest at all. We may first lay

aside the matter of physical intrusion. The government has conceded that if appellants were carrying

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2The government's attempt to assert a legitimate interest in excluding from the entire area all

expression of views "not consistent with [the parade organizers'] message," see Appellees'

Opposition at p. 10, adds nothing. Such a claim is a viewpoint-based content restriction valueless

on its face and inconsistent with such clear Supreme Court doctrine as that reiterated in Forsyth

County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) ("Speech cannot be ... burdened,

any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.")

(citations omitted). All the more may it not be banned from a public area because it might offend

the organizers of a public event. 

no signs or, indeed, if they were carrying signs favorable to the administration whose second

Inauguralwas being celebrated, their "physicalintrusion" would be welcomed. It is only the "purpose

of injecting [their] own convictions or beliefs" that causes the government to exclude them. But it

is also the appellants' desire to "interject" their own convictions and beliefs that entitles them to the

protection of the First Amendment. If the free speech clause of the First Amendment does not

protect the right of citizens to "interject" their own convictions and beliefs into a public event on a

public forum then it is difficult to understand why the Framers bothered including it all. Although in

light ofthe complete lack of a compelling state interest we find it unnecessary to explore the question

of narrow tailoring, it seems unlikely that the government could make a convincing case that it was

necessary to issue itself a blocking permit covering the sidewalk for the entire length of Pennsylvania

Avenue for a five-month time frame in order to protect the President or the inaugural celebrantsfrom

dissenters for a few hours on a single day.2

We note briefly one other defense of the government, that is that appellants were granted

permits for two other areas on Inauguration Day, areas not on Pennsylvania Avenue and not along

the parade route. Appellees have offered us no authority for the proposition that the government may

choose for a First Amendment actor what public forums it will use. Indeed, it cannot rightly be said

that all such forums are equal. The very fact that the government here struggles to bar the speech

it fears or dislikes from one forum while offering, whether freely or grudgingly, access to another

belies the proposition of equality. Once before, in Henderson v. Lujan, the government argued that

leafletters banned from a sidewalk needed no remedy because they had access to other channels of

communication, such as other stretches of sidewalk. We declined to discuss that rationale in

Henderson, as "the ban fails the narrow tailoring requirement in any case." 964 F.2d at 1184. As in

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Henderson, so here, and again we will not belabor the government's alternative site theory.

In short, all constitutional authority supports the position we would have thought

unremarkable, that a government entity may not exclude from a public forum persons who wish to

engage in First Amendment protected activity solely because the government actor fears, dislikes, or

disagrees with the opinions of those citizens. None of the authorities offered by the government is

to the contrary. Indeed, none is on point.

Factually, one of the closest parallel cases is a decision called to our attention by the amicus

ACLU. Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir.

1979). In 1971, then-President Nixon was attending a public function at the Coliseum in Charlotte,

North Carolina, in honor of another public figure, the Reverend Dr. Billy Graham. According to the

allegations of the plaintiffs in that case, and the findings at the preliminary injunction hearing before

the district court, certain federal and local officials excluded persons, principally anti-war

demonstrators, because of their use of signs or leaflets critical of the policies of the Administration.

Calling that viewpoint-based exclusion a "wholesale assault[ ]" on the "right to freedom of assembly

and right to petition for redress of grievances," the district court had no difficulty holding for the

plaintiffs. 361 F. Supp. at 585. On appeal, under the name of Rowley v. MacMillan, 502 F.2d 1326

(4th Cir. 1974), our sibling circuit affirmed with virtually no discussion of the constitutional issue.

While of course, Sparrow is not binding upon us, we agree with and adopt its fundamental holding

that the government cannot exclude froma public gathering in a public forum on no other basisthose

citizens whose views it fears or dislikes or prevent their peaceful expression of those views.

Conclusion

For the reasonsset forth above, and as mandated in our prior order, the portion of the district

court opinion appealed from, which permitted appellees to bar groups of twenty-five or fewer of

appellants from engaging in sign-bearing protests against the policies of the Clinton Administration

on the sidewalks of the Pennsylvania Avenue during the second Inaugural Parade, is vacated and

reversed.

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