Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_19-cv-00346/USCOURTS-ared-3_19-cv-00346-44/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

IN RE ELIJAH AND MARY 

STINY TRUSTS No. 3:19-cv-346-DPM 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Introduction. Disputes rooted in the trust created by Elijah G. 

Stiny and his last wife, Mary Moore Stiny, have been in one court or 

another for almost a decade. At this point, one issue remains for 

decision. Should the current trustee be required to provide an 

accounting, covering his predecessors' actions and his, from the time 

of Mr. Stiny's death in 2010 until the present? And should this 

accounting be overseen by a special master and done by a forensic 

accountant having no connection with the trust? Three of the seven 

Stiny grandchildren request that relief. These three remainder 

beneficiaries stand to receive most of Mr. Stiny' s 50 % share of the trust 

corpus. 

The Court has resolved many other issues along the way. 

Three about this phase of the case bear mention at the threshold. 

First, before convening a bench trial in June 2022, the Court 

rejected as untimely an undue-influence challenge by Elijah Nicholas 

Stiny, Mr. Stiny's son, to the trust's creation. Doc. 272. He, along with 

other remainder beneficiaries, received notice of trust administration 

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 1 of 41
in the months following Mr. Stiny's 2010 death but did not assert 

undue influence in the estate plan until 2020. 

Second, the Court recently denied motions to approve a 

proposed family settlement about Della Moore's interest. Doc. 320. 

Moore was Mrs. Stiny's mother. She predeceased Mrs. Stiny. And the 

Court held that the applicable trust provisions about her potential 

share were neither contradictory nor ambiguous. The gift to Della 

Moore lapsed. The shares of Mrs. Stiny' s other intended beneficiaries 

increase proportionally, as Mrs. Stiny provided. 

Third, the Court had to address what happens to Rena (Powell) 

Wood's share after her untimely death, mid-litigation, in a hit-and-run 

accident. Rena was Mrs. Stiny' s daughter from a prior marriage and 

deeply involved in trust affairs. She died intestate. The Court 

received evidence and argument on this issue at the bench trial. 

And the Court recently rejected Rena's daughters' request to modify 

Mrs. Stiny' s survivor's trust such that each daughter would receive an 

8 % share at final distribution. Rena's entire share goes to her estate. 

Tennessee law will govern who gets what. Doc. 321. 

The Court held a three-day bench trial in June 2022. The parties' 

undecided motions and briefs seeking summary judgment were 

converted into trial briefs and arguments for judgment based on the 

whole record. The Court has weighed the credibility of all the 

witnesses. The Court has considered all the exhibits, joint and 

-2-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 2 of 41
separate. And the Court has drawn on what it has learned and 

decided in presiding over this case and earlier phases of the Stiny 

litigation for almost seven years. See Centennial Bank v. Rena Wood, 

Case No. 3:17-cv-226-DPM (E.D. Ark.); In re Guardianship of Mary 

Moore Stiny, Case No. 3:17-cv-227-DPM (E.D. Ark.).* 

Findings of Fact. Elijah G. Stiny and Mary Moore Stiny had 

each been married before and had children from those marriages. 

He was much older and wealthier when they married. They lived in 

California. Both came from modest backgrounds. He started work as 

a child in coal mines in Colorado; she was part of a large family in 

rural Lawrence County, Arkansas. In 2000, as part of a 

comprehensive estate plan, they created a revocable trust. Mr. Stiny' s 

long-time lawyer prepared the instrument. He testified by deposition 

that both of the Stinys knew what they were doing and wanted to sign 

the documents. The main trust assets were two apartment complexes 

in Burbank, California. Mr. Stiny had owned and maintained these 

income-producing assets for years. The Stinys also put in their trust 

their home in Burbank, a condominium in San Clemente, a home in 

Walnut Ridge, Arkansas, bank accounts, and unspecified personal 

* The Court will use the abbreviations "Centennial Bank" and 

"In re Guardianship" to cite materials in these cases. 

-3-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 3 of 41
property. These additional assets were all community property. 

Joint Ex. 1. 

The trust, as amended over the years, is attached in an 

Addendum. Its purpose was to provide for the couple, and then the 

surviving spouse, eventually with sub-trusts for tax purposes. 

After both Stinys died, the remaining corpus would flow into one of 

those sub-trusts, and then be divided equally between some of 

Mr. Stiny's family members (the Stiny share) and some of Mrs. Stiny's 

family members (the Moore share). The trust specified that California 

law controls. It included a no-contest clause: Any beneficiary who 

challenged the trust's creation or any of its terms would not inherit. 

Art. Eleven (J), at Addendum page 20. During their joint lifetimes, the 

Stinys had complete control. Their trust was revocable. They were 

co-trustees. They were entitled to income and principal. 

Over the next eight years, the Stinys amended their trust three 

times. These changes were also made with the help of Mr. Stiny's 

long-time lawyer. Their substance was to change who got what 

within the Stiny share and the Moore share. The changes show 

tensions within each extended family. For example, the share of Elijah 

Nicholas Stiny, Mr. Stiny's only son, was reduced from 15% of the 

Stiny half to a straight $25,000. Based on an earlier family agreement, 

Patricia Sorley, one of Mr. Stiny' s daughters, and her children 

continued to be excluded entirely. On the Moore side, Rena 

-4-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 4 of 41
(Mrs. Stiny' s daughter) had been excluded originally, but she 

eventually became a major beneficiary. John Moore, Mrs. Stiny's son, 

was an original beneficiary and then specifically excluded. 

The Stinys lived in California. There were also tensions between 

Mrs. Stiny and Mr. Stiny's extended family there. In his papers 

contesting the trust, Mr. Stiny's son claimed that Mrs. Stiny had 

pushed him and his sister out of their roles helping manage the 

apartments and bent the aging Mr. Stiny to her will. At trial, 

grandson Eli Stiny testified that Mrs. Stiny limited his and other 

family members' access to Mr. Stiny, was not trustworthy, and was a 

prostitute. Mr. Stiny' s daughters, Ms. Sorley and Ms. Ratzenberger, 

offered similar testimony by deposition. In summary, there was 

deep-seated and long-standing enmity between Mr. Stiny's extended 

family and Mrs. Stiny. 

Mr. Stiny died in October 2010. His passing triggered division of 

the trust into sub-trusts. Three were possible, though only two were 

needed to maximize tax advantages. Mr. Stiny's long-time lawyerEric Nelson - started this process, but he and Mrs. Stiny soon fell out. 

He testified that she was tough and cunning. Nelson thought 

Mr. Stiny had been in the marriage for sex, while Mrs. Stiny was in it 

for the money. Stiny Ex. 28 at 56 & 102; Doc. 186-9 at 14 & 16. 

Two months after Mr. Stiny's death, Nelson withdrew from the 

representation. He said Mrs. Stiny was upset she was not getting 

-5-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 5 of 41
everything through the trusts, as Mr. Stiny had promised her. 

Nelson was concerned she would not follow his advice, and foresaw 

disputes between the two sides of the family, which would create a 

conflict of interest for him. The record contains his strongly worded 

withdrawal letter. Doc. 217-4. 

Mrs. Stiny then engaged Robert Smith, a California lawyer who 

specialized in estate and tax issues. Smith began formal trust 

administration. He sent the various required notices to all the 

beneficiaries. Copies of the trust were provided. Grandson Eli Stiny 

testified that he recalled discussing with one of his aunts that he was, 

in her words, the big winner. None of the extended Stiny family 

members requested any information about the trusts from Smith. 

No one filed a contest. A person who identified himself as Mr. Stiny's 

son called and asked Smith about a picture of a sailboat. In mid-2011, 

a California probate court divided the trust into two sub-trusts: 

an exemption trust and a survivor's trust, as the original trust 

directed. At that point, the trust contained the assets contributed a 

decade before, plus a second house in Arkansas. Joint Ex. 13. 

Each sub-trust received an undivided one-half interest in each asset. 

Ibid. Smith mailed copies of the division orders to all beneficiaries; 

none were returned. Doc. 186-5; Doc. 272 at 5-6. 

Around this time, Smith also prepared Mr. Stiny' s estate tax 

return. It included values for all the property in the trust supported 

-6-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 6 of 41
by appraisals and listing current indebtedness. The apartment 

complexes were worth approximately $15.2 million. They were 

encumbered by mortgages securing about $5.2 million in debt. 

The family home on Vista Ridge in Burbank was worth 

approximately $785,000 and carried approximately $413,000 in debt. 

The condominium in San Clemente was worth $1 million with 

approximately $216,000 in debt. The house in Walnut Ridge was 

worth $125,000, free and clear. The house in Hoxie, also 

unencumbered, was valued at $45,000. The two Bank of America 

accounts contained approximately $50,000. There was miscellaneous 

personal property of approximately $56,000. Mr. Stiny' s estate tax 

return notes that the total gross estate was approximately $7.3 million, 

but this amount reflects tax-related discounts for joint ownership of 

the assets. Setting aside these discounts, the return indicates that the 

net value of all the assets in the Stiny trust was approximately 

$11.5 million at Mr. Stiny's death. 

The Stiny grandchildren testified that these numbers were low. 

They pointed to a 1989 personal ledger of Mr. Stiny' s that listed 

several real properties, including those in the trust, related debt, and 

rental income. Stiny Ex. 11. That 1989 document, however, does not 

cast real doubt on the values in the estate tax return. Together the 

documents show the property increasing in value over time. 

Appraisals done in connection with estate tax returns are not known 

-7-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 7 of 41
for being generous, but they must be solid. This return was based on 

appraisals, prepared by an experienced tax lawyer, and filed under 

penalty of perjury. Though the Stiny grandchildren were critical of 

the fact that the return was not filed until 2011, this was because of a 

wrinkle in changes to the Internal Revenue Code. See Tax Relief, 

Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 

2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 301, 124 Stat. 3296, 3300. Mr. Stiny's estate 

tax return is reliable and persuasive evidence. The Court finds that 

the entire Stiny trust corpus was worth approximately $11.5 millionat most-when it came under Mrs. Stiny' s control. 

As the surviving spouse, Mrs. Stiny was the sole trustee and sole 

lifetime beneficiary of the survivor's trust. She had the unconditional 

right to all net income. Art. Six (B), at Add. 8. In addition, as trustee, 

she had discretion to distribute principal to herself as she deemed 

necessary for several purposes. 

If the Trustee considers such income insufficient, the 

Trustee shall also pay to or apply for the benefit of the 

Surviving Spouse any sums from the principal of the 

Survivor's Trust that the Trustee, in the Trustee's 

discretion, considers necessary for the Surviving Spouse's 

proper health, support, comfort, enjoyment and welfare. 

Ibid. She could amend, revoke, or terminate the survivor's trust. 

Art. Eight (C), at Add. 15. Mrs. Stiny exercised her power of 

amendment twice. She never revoked or terminated the survivor's 

trust. Had she done so, she was entitled to all its assets outright. Ibid. 

-8-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 8 of 41
She also had a power of appointment, which gave her the right to 

dispose of the survivor's trust's assets in her will. Art. Seven (A), 

at Add. 9-10. She did not exercise this power, either. 

Mrs. Stiny also had the conditional right to net income and 

principal from the exemption trust. She was the sole trustee, and sole 

lifetime beneficiary, of this trust, too. These distributions were within 

her discretion, guided by what sums she decided were necessary to 

maintain her standard of living. 

On the Deceased Spouse's death, the Trustee shall pay to or 

apply for the benefit of the Surviving Spouse, from the net 

income of the Exemption Trust, all sums and in any 

proportion that may be necessary, in the Trustee's 

discretion, for his or her health, education, support and 

maintenance, in accordance with his or her accustomed 

standard of living at the date of the Deceased Spouse's 

death, in monthly or more frequent installments. 

Any income not distributed shall be added to principal. 

If the Trustee considers the income insufficient, the Trustee 

shall also pay to or apply for the benefit of the Surviving 

Spouse, all sums from principal as the trustee, in the 

Trustee's discretion, considers necessary for his or her 

proper health, education, support and maintenance. 

Art. Six (D), at Add. 9. As to any payments from principal, those were 

to come first from the survivor's trust until it was exhausted, and then 

from the exemption trust, though Mrs. Stiny could make "all or any 

part of those payments" from the exemption trust first "if the Trustee 

considers it advisable." Ibid. The approved spending categories-

-9-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 9 of 41
health, education, support, and maintenance-are familiar to the law. 

They're rooted in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 2041 

& 2514, and California law, CAL. PROB. CODE § 16081, both of which 

the Court will discuss below. 

The trustee's discretion looms large in these prov1s1ons. 

The trust described that discretion in a later section about the trustee's 

powers. Art. Ten, at Add. 16. And the trust said why all these powers 

were granted: "To carry out the provisions of the trust created by this 

instrument .... " Ibid. On discretion: 

Unless specifically limited, all discretions conferred upon 

the Trustee shall be absolute, and their exercise conclusive 

on all persons interested in this trust. The enumeration of 

certain powers of the Trustee shall not limit his general or 

implied powers, and the Trustee, subject always to the 

discharge of his fiduciary obligations, is vested with and 

shall have all rights, powers and privileges which an 

absolute owner of the same property would have. 

Art. Ten(]), at Add. 17-18. 

The terms "absolute" and "conclusive" might appear to close 

and lock the door against the Stiny grandchildren' s request for an 

accounting now. Under California law, though, the door is closed but 

not locked. Mrs. Stiny had wide and deep discretion. But, as the trust 

said, she had fiduciary obligations, too. This combination of 

discretion and obligation echoes the applicable California statute, 

CAL. PROB. CODE § 16081, and venerable California precedent, 

-10-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 10 of 41
e.g., In re Ferrall's Estate, 258 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Cal. 1953); Estate of 

Collins, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 

In the months after Mr. Stiny's passing in October 2010, as 

administration of the trusts began with lawyer Robert Smith's work, 

Mrs. Stiny also formally involved her daughter Rena in managing the 

trust's assets. In February 2011, Mrs. Stiny executed a "Delegation of 

Management Duties" pursuant to CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16012 & 16052, 

which authorized Rena to work with tax and legal professionals, 

as well as " [ e ]ngage in real property management or assist with real 

property management including communication with property 

managers or management companies; reporting to the trustee relative 

to such management and reviewing the information provided by 

professional real property managers and management companies." 

Doc. 172-2 at 54-55 in Centennial Bank. This delegation was to Rena 

and an Arkansas grandson, Wesley Gates, but it provided that Rena 

could act without consulting him. Doc. 172-2 at 54 in Centennial Bank. 

Mrs. Stiny also • executed a durable power of attorney for asset 

management and a uniform statutory form power of attorney. 

Doc. 172-2 at 45-52 in Centennial Bank. The former granted Rena the 

power "to the extent authorized by law[]" to act on Mrs. Stiny' s behalf 

as trustee of the Elijah and Mary Stiny Trust dated 6 June 2000. 

Doc. 172-2 at 47 in Centennial Bank. 

-11-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 11 of 41
Mrs. Stiny took all these steps approximately four months after 

Mr. Stiny died. The proof at the first trial established that, from early 

2011, Rena was deeply involved with managing the two apartment 

complexes and handling trust assets. The testimony and evidence 

likewise established that Mrs. Stiny made or approved all major 

decisions. 

As the Court said in an earlier Order, Mrs. Stiny's handling of 

trust-related issues was, at best, lax. She delegated substantial 

authority to others, including Rena. There was no formal separation 

of the survivor's trust and the exemption trust: all their assets were 

jointly owned and operated, especially the two apartment complexes 

and the two bank accounts. After 2013, Mrs. Stiny and Rena relied on 

Linder & Associates, a property manager, to handle day-to-day 

matters at the apartment complexes. Mrs. Stiny moved to Arkansas. 

Rena moved to Tennessee. Rena and one of Mrs. Stiny' s sisters in 

Arkansas, Helen Robins, had signature authority on Mrs. Stiny' s 

Arkansas bank account. 

For several years, Mrs. Stiny paid several members of her 

extended family here to take care of her - to cook, clean, buy 

groceries, run errands, drive her around, and keep her company. 

When three new vehicles were bought, supposedly to help handle all 

those chores, Rena got concerned and moved Mrs. Stiny' s money out 

of the First National Bank of Lawrence County. This was in late 2014 

-12-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 12 of 41
and early 2015. And that's when litigation began in Arkansas, 

California, and Tennessee. The first Arkansas matters were 

guardianship proceedings over Mrs. Stiny' s person and her estate. 

In 2015, an Arkansas court declared Mrs. Stiny incompetent 

based on her doctor's finding of dementia. Doc. 6 in In re 

Guardianship. Robins, and then another sister, Joyce Roberts, served as 

guardian of her person. Doc. 303 at 1 in Centennial Bank. She was 

cared for at her home. Then she was moved to a nursing home where 

she lived until she passed away. After the cases were removed here 

and consolidated, disputes about payment for caregiving services by 

some of Mrs. Stiny's extended Arkansas family arose between those 

family members, Rena, and Centennial Bank, the guardian of Mrs. 

Stiny' s estate. This Court heard testimony, received evidence, and 

resolved those disputes. Doc. 155, 167 & 209 in Centennial Bank. 

As Mrs. Stiny' s mental capacities declined, and concerns about 

expenditures arose, a guardian of her estate was also sought. 

Rena was concerned about spending by extended Arkansas family; 

they were concerned about her handling of Mrs. Stiny' s assets. Other 

family members got involved, and there was tangled litigation about 

who would serve as guardian of her estate. See In re Guardianship, 

passim. In early 2016, Centennial Bank was appointed temporary 

guardian and then permanent guardian of Mrs. Stiny' s estate. 

The Bank retained Lyons & Cone, an established Jonesboro law firm, 

-13-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 13 of 41
to handle the matter. The firm began investigating and litigating. 

It did so with thoroughness and vigor. 

While there were some issues about spending connected with 

the Arkansas caregivers, Centennial' s focus was on the trust and 

Rena. Though cliche, "no stone unturned" captures what happened. 

The Bank delved into the apartments, trust spending, and handling 

of trust assets. Discovery was done in California, Arkansas, and 

Tennessee. The Bank pursued various claims against Rena, 

abandoning some that turned out to be empty. This was a two-year 

effort. 

One of Centennial Bank's claims that was pursued from start to 

finish was removal of Rena as trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. 

Before the case was removed, the three Stiny grandchildren who now 

press claims for a comprehensive accounting and information joined 

in this effort. In April 2017, through a relative who was a California 

lawyer, they filed a joinder and consent to the Bank's petition to 

replace Rena. Doc. 21 in In re Guardianship. This was a few months 

before the case was removed. Thereafter, the Stiny grandchildren 

chose not to participate further in the ongoing litigation in either state 

court or this Court. 

After it became guardian of Mrs. Stiny' s estate, Centennial Bank 

took over managing her non-trust assets and exercising indirect 

oversight, through the litigation, of the trust. The Bank filed annual 

-14-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 14 of 41
accountings for each year it served. There was no objection to any of 

those accountings. The state court and this Court approved them all. 

E.g., Doc. 22 in In re Guardianship (for 2016); Doc. 91 & 106 in 

Centennial Bank (for 2017); Doc. 292 & 300 in Centennial Bank (for 2018); 

Doc. 308-1, 309, 318 & 321 in Centennial Bank (for 2019). The trust's 

2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 federal and state tax returns were prepared 

by an outside certified public accountant. Mrs. Stiny' s federal and 

state tax returns for the same years were amended by another certified 

public accountant. Doc. 125, 129 & 131 in Centennial Bank. When Mrs. 

Stiny died, her non-trust assets were transferred to her probate estate 

with this Court's approval. Joint Ex. 14. 

From the time the cases were removed here and consolidated in 

August 2017, this Court oversaw all trust assets and expenditures of 

trust funds. These included, among other things, expenses connected 

with refinancing debt on the apartment complexes, tax payments, 

income from the apartments, attorney's fees, the sale of both Arkansas 

homes, the sale of Mrs. Stiny' s vehicle, and payment of her living, 

medical, and funeral expenses. Because Rena's status was under 

challenge, the Court brought much of the cash-more than $700,000-

into its registry. In due course, the Court provided the parties a 

ledger showing all receipts and disbursements. Doc. 106. In addition, 

this Court mandated pre-approval of all expenditures from the trust's 

remaining bank accounts. E.g., Doc. 51 in Centennial Bank. No trust 

-15-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 15 of 41
money was spent, and no significant trust-related action was done, 

after August 2017 without this Court's approval. 

The case culminated in a week-long combined jury and bench 

trial. Centennial Bank contended that Rena had mishandled 

trust assets, spent money on herself, mismanaged the apartments 

(in particular by letting some of her children live there rent-free or for 

reduced rent), and failed to spend money on Mrs. Stiny. The Bank 

continued to seek Rena's removal as trustee. At trial, this Court 

received fifty-six exhibits and extended testimony from five witnesses. 

Thousands of pages of documents - trust materials, bank records, 

apartment-related records, and other papers -were presented. 

The Court put the legal issues to the jury in a single question. 

"Did Rena Wood, in violation of her fiduciary duties, convert income 

from the survivor's trust that should have been paid to, or applied for 

the benefit of, Mrs. Stiny?" Doc. 2 71 in Centennial Bank. The question 

spoke in terms of the survivor's trust because the record established 

that- again, the laxness point-the exemption trust existed in name, 

but Mrs. Stiny and Rena handled everything as one. The jury 

answered "No." This Court then handled the equitable issues, 

concluding that Rena should not be removed as the trustee but 

needed a co-trustee to help handle the complex issues presented 

by administration of this big-dollar trust. Doc. 295 & Doc. 338 at 179-

185 in Centennial Bank. 

-16-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 16 of 41
In the summer of 2019, after receiving the parties' nominees, this 

Court appointed G.S. "Brant" Perkins as co-trustee of the survivor's 

trust. Doc. 309 in Centennial Bank. Any action required agreement 

between Rena and Perkins. No expenditure more than $25,000 could 

be made without prior Court authorization. And Perkins had to file a 

bond, as the trust required. In due course, the Court appointed him 

and Rena as co-trustees of the exemption trust on the same terms. 

After Rena's untimely death, and without objection, the Court 

confirmed Perkins' s status as sole trustee of both trusts. Doc. 92. 

Perkins has served faithfully and well for almost five years. 

During that time, he has filed seventeen comprehensive status reports. 

Doc. 322 in Centennial Bank; Doc. 2, 6, 56, 78, 85, 119, 159, 175, 185, 206, 

279, 288, 306, 308 & 322. When Rena was co-trustee, these reports 

were from her and Perkins. Each report was detailed, covering 

actions taken since the last report. Attachments were plentiful. 

These included bank statements, monthly management reports from 

Linder & Associates about the apartment complexes, tax returns, 

billing statements from lawyers, and itemized statements from 

Perkins describing his work as trustee on a task/hourly basis. 

When any supplement was needed, he provided it. E.g., Doc. 289. 

With two exceptions, Doc. 207 & 297, the Stiny grandchildren did not 

object to these status reports. No one else objected to any of them 

or any of the co-trustees' (and eventually trustee's) actions. 

-17-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 17 of 41
The seventeenth report is pending. The Court has approved all the 

other status reports and the actions specified in them. 

On large matters - for example, selling the apartment complexes, 

paying income taxes, investment plans, and selling other property 

(real and personal) -the trustee filed separate motions with 

supporting documents. Sometimes the Stiny grandchildren disagreed 

with the trustee's proposal. In those instances, the Court ruled after 

briefing and (if needed) a hearing. E.g., Doc. 73 (sale of apartment 

complexes). A dispute about the proposed sale of personal property 

was resolved by the Stiny grandchildren' s purchase of it. 

By December 2019, the case was entering a new phase. 

The Centennial Bank/Wood litigation had been resolved, and no 

appeal was taken. Mrs. Stiny had passed away. Perkins and Rena 

were in place as co-trustees of both the survivor's and exemption 

trusts. To conform the docket to the developing circumstances, the 

Court closed Case No. 3:17-cv-226-DPM and Case No. 3:17-cv-227-

DPM and opened this case to address trust administration and 

distribution of the trust's assets. The Court noted that key Orders in 

the two original cases would be landmarks in this one. Doc. 1. 

The co-trustees continued to work. They handled tax issues. 

They petitioned the Court to construe and declare the trust's terms so 

distribution could occur. Doc. 9. They served that petition and 

summonses on all the remainder beneficiaries. And they began 

-18-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 18 of 41
exploring sale of the apartment complexes to liquidate the trust's 

main assets in anticipation of distribution among those many 

beneficiaries. The Court had directed this needed step. Doc. 7. 

The co-trustees eventually petitioned to approve the sale of the 

apartments for more than thirty-one million dollars, an amount 

exceeding the apartments' 2019 appraised value by several million 

dollars. Doc. 58 at 3-4. 

The three Stiny grandchildren-Eli, Andrew, and Alexis -

re-entered the case at this point. They sought an accounting since 

Mr. Stiny's death in 2010 and information. Doc. 66. Alone among the 

beneficiaries, they also opposed the apartments' sale. They sought 

more time to present an offer to buy the two apartment complexes 

themselves, thus keeping them in the family as they said Mr. Stiny 

wanted. Doc. 67. The Court held a hearing, overruled that objection, 

went with the firm and beneficial offer in hand, and approved the 

sale. Doc. 68, 72, & 73. It was consummated. The trust netted 

approximately twenty-six million dollars. Doc. 85 at 6. 

In due course, the Court convened a status conference to 

develop a plan for moving the case to resolution. In light of all that 

had gone before, to expedite discovery, and with the parties' 

agreement in principle, the Court ordered these steps. 

• A period of informal discovery with wholesale sharing 

of all non-privileged materials; 

-19-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 19 of 41
• The trustee would have transcripts of all hearings 

(federal and state) and the trial prepared at the trust's 

expense and filed; 

• Rena's former lawyers would open their files ( electronic 

and paper) and provide copies. These materials 

included all trial exhibits, deposition transcripts, and 

non-privileged case-related documents; 

• The trustee would secure and provide a similar 

comprehensive set of materials from Centennial Bank's 

lawyers; and 

• Formal clean-up discovery. 

Doc. 95. 

All this was done. The Centennial Bank records amounted to 

more than forty banker's boxes of paper material. Doc. 119 at 2. 

In addition, Rena's estate made available more than a decade's worth 

of records, sixty-plus banker's boxes. Doc. 119 at 2-3. It was at this 

point that the Court prepared and filed its ledger of all registry 

transactions. Doc. 106. The Stiny grandchildren have made no 

complaint about the scope, contents, or timeliness of these 

productions. The parties also agreed that a post-discovery global 

mediation might narrow or resolve the disputed issues. The Court 

ordered one. Doc. 95 at 2. It did not bear fruit, though. 

After approximately fifteen months, during which many trust 

administration issues were addressed, some more discovery was 

done, and some motion practice occurred, the Court held another 

-20-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 20 of 41
bench trial. In the twenty-two months since, the flow of trustadministration issues has continued unabated. See Doc. 270 to 331. 

Conclusions of Law. The three Stiny grandchildren seek a 

comprehensive accounting, overseen by a special master, and 

performed by a third-party forensic accountant. The accounting, they 

continue, should cover the exemption trust from 2010 (when Mr. Stiny 

died) to the present and cover the survivor's trust from the date of 

Mrs. Stiny' s incapacity (2015) until the present. 

The third count of their counter-petition challenged some of 

Rena's actions as co-trustee after the Centennial Bank litigation. But the 

parties resolved their differences about the personal property, and this 

issue has dropped out. Doc. 166. On motion, the Court approved this 

resolution. Doc. 170. No proof was presented at trial on this claim. 

As noted, Mrs. Stiny and Rena handled the two trusts as one. 

So, as they acknowledged at trial, the Stiny grandchildren actually 

seek an accounting of the whole from the time Mr. Stiny was no 

longer in the picture. The trustee opposes this request, arguing that 

the Stiny grandchildren are not entitled to this from-the-start 

accounting in general or from him as a successor trustee in particular. 

He also contends that the Court should not exercise its discretion to 

order such an accounting because no sufficient reason to do it exists, 

the task would be complex, plenty of information has already been 

provided, and it would further delay final distribution. Rena's estate 

-21-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 21 of 41
seconds the trustee's points. No other trust beneficiary has joined in 

the three Stiny grandchildren' s request or otherwise indicated support 

of it. 

First, the Stiny grandchildren are not entitled as a matter of law 

to the comprehensive accounting they seek. Under California law, 

a trustee must account at least annually, at a trust's termination, and 

upon a change of trustee "to each beneficiary to whom income or 

principal is required or authorized in the trustee's discretion to be 

currently distributed." CAL. PROB. CODE § 16062(a). The Stiny 

grandchildren were not entitled to receive income or principal from 

the trust at Mr. Stiny's death. They were not entitled to receive 

income or principal at Mrs. Stiny's incapacity. After Mr. Stiny died, 

Mrs. Stiny was the sole income and principal beneficiary of both the 

exemption trust and survivor's trust for her lifetime. Art. Six (B) 

& (C), at Add. 8-9. The Stiny grandchildren acknowledge this fact. 

Doc. 226 at 3. It was only at Mrs. Stiny' s death-in June 2019-that the 

Stiny grandchildren and all the other remainder beneficiaries became 

entitled to at least annual accountings from Perkins and Rena, who 

was still alive at that point. From that point forward, those 

accountings only needed to cover the period during "the last complete 

fiscal year of the trust or since the last account." CAL. PROB. CODE 

§ 16063(a)(l), (3) & (4); see also§ 16063(a)(2). 

-22-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 22 of 41
Second, Perkins and Rena satisfied their statutory obligation to 

account before and since Mrs. Stiny' s death with their seventeen 

status reports. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16063. Those reports covered 

receipts and disbursements of principal and income, assets and 

liabilities, trustee compensation, taxes, and agents hired by the 

trustee. The reports covered many other details, too. And all of this 

information was rooted in attached documents. 

The Stiny grandchildren correctly point out that the reports did 

not contain a statement that any recipient could obtain court review of 

the account and trustees' actions. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16063(a)(5). 

But everyone involved in the case knew that this Court was reviewing 

the reports. And this Court approved each of them after having 

done so - twice after ruling on the Stiny grandchildren' s objections. 

Doc. 220 & 307. 

The status reports also omitted a statement about the three-year 

statute of limitation for claims against the trustee for breach of trust. 

CAL. PROB. CODE § 16063(a)(6). That omission wasn't prejudicial 

either. Since June 2020, the Stiny grandchildren have been well 

represented by able counsel who have zealously represented their 

clients, advancing objections and voicing their views and positions. 

The status reports were sufficient to put the Stiny grandchildren and 

their lawyers on notice of any claims against the trustee for breach of 

trust. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16460(c); Noggle v. Bank of America, 

-23-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 23 of 41
82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 859-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). And anyway, except 

for the pending seventeenth status report, it is now too late to press 

these form-over-substance challenges. Coberly v. Superior Court for 

Los Angeles County, 42 Cal. Rptr. 64, 66 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 

Perkins has satisfied his statutory obligations to account as a successor 

co-trustee and successor trustee. Rena satisfied her obligations here, 

too. 

Third, the Stiny grandchildren are correct that Perkins, like all 

trustees, has a duty to keep beneficiaries J'/reasonably informed of the 

trust and its administration." CAL. PROB. CODE § 16060. This duty is 

broader than the duty to account. Babbitt v. Superior Court, 

201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). Perkins, and Rena 

while she was co-trustee, fulfilled this duty. They did so in their 

many status reports. They did so in sharing all the Centennial 

Bank/Wood litigation documents-trial transcripts, trial exhibits, 

depositions, bank reports, and other voluminous materials. 

Perkins confirmed that he made available everything in his control 

and coordinated with the lawyers in the Centennial Bank/Wood 

litigation Oim Lyons and Marty Lilly) to open their files to the Stiny 

grandchildren' s lawyers. Counsel for Rena's estate confirmed that a 

storage unit full of Rena's records was also made available. 

In addition, this is not the typical trust dispute. Materials on this 

Court's docket in the three cases have been open to the public in 

-24-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 24 of 41
general and to the Stiny grandchildren in particular since 2017. 

The Court also credits Perkins' s trial testimony on this score: when 

any beneficiary requested information, he provided it if he had it. 

Nothing has been held back or hidden. 

A related point bears mention. As the commentary to § 16060 

notes, in general, a trustee's duty to provide information requires 

an ask. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d 

(AM. L. INST. 1959). "This duty is consistent with the duty stated in 

prior California case law to give beneficiaries complete and accurate 

information relative to the administration of a trust when requested at 

reasonable times." Salter v. Lerner, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2009) (quotation omitted and emphasis added). There was no 

evidence that, in the years after Mr. Stiny's death in 2010, the Stiny 

grandchildren ever asked Mrs. Stiny or Rena for information or that 

any such request was refused. Grandson Andrew Stiny' s trial 

testimony corroborates this. And even though the Stiny 

grandchildren joined in Centennial Bank's 2017 petition to remove 

Rena as trustee and to appoint Perkins in her place, they did not, 

insofar as the Court knows, seek any information from Rena or 

Perkins until they filed their petition in the summer of 2020. 

If the Stiny grandchildren' s silence and chosen inaction through 

the years does not amount to a full-fledged waiver, it suffices to work 

a forfeiture. E.g., Breslin v. Breslin, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d 913, 919 

-25-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 25 of 41
(Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (forfeiture); compare In re Kirkpatrick's Estate, 

241 P.2d 555, 558 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (waiver). By not seeking 

information at reasonable and seasonable times, they have forgone the 

right to get perfect information now about trust-related 

transactions that occurred before the litigation began a decade ago. 

This conclusion follows especially because the folks with first-hand 

knowledge-Mrs. Stiny and Rena-have passed away. The Stiny 

grandchildren are entitled to information reasonably available now, 

not more. And all that voluminous material has been provided to 

them. 

Fourth, the Stiny grandchildren are correct that, even if they' re 

not entitled to an accounting as of right, the Court can order one if the 

circumstances justify that relief. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16061 & 

17200(b)(7)(B); Esslinger v. Cummins, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 538, 543-44 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Babbitt, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 357. All material 

things considered, should the Court exercise its discretion and order 

the requested accounting back to 2010? No. Here is how the Court 

weighs the circumstances. 

As to the survivor's trust, Perkins argues that no trustee should 

have to account during the period it was revocable. That period 

would run from 2011, when it was funded, until 2015, when Mrs. 

Stiny was declared incompetent. The applicable California statute so 

provides. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16069. And the precedent so holds. 

-26-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 26 of 41
Babbitt, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 360-61; Evangelho v. Presoto, 79 Cal. Rptr. 

2d 146, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). It is undisputed here, though, that 

the survivor's trust and the exemption trust were not managed 

separately. Everything was handled together. This made some sense 

because each trust held an undivided one-half interest in the main 

income-producing properties, the two apartment complexes. 

The exemption trust became irrevocable when it was created after 

Mr. Stiny' s death. Art. 8 (C), at Add. 15. The revocability of the 

survivor's trust weighs against an accounting. Given how the trust 

corpus was handled, however, this statute and precedent do not 

determine whether there should be one. 

The long arc of litigation, though, shows why no accounting is 

justified. Start with the recent years. Every trust-related action, every 

dollar earned and every dollar spent, has been under this Court's 

oversight since the case arrived here in August 2017. And all these 

things are documented on this Court's docket. Centennial Bank had 

been appointed guardian of Mrs. Stiny' s estate in February 2016. 

It accounted for assets, liabilities, income, and expenses from that 

point until this Court ended the guardianship after Mrs. Stiny' s death. 

No useful purpose would be served by a forensic accounting of the 

trust when it was under the eye of the state court and this Court. 

The next relevant period is from early 2011 to 2016. That is the 

period from the time trust administration began, a few months after 

-27-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 27 of 41
Mr. Stiny's death, until Centennial Bank came on the scene. For the 

first part of that period, Mrs. Stiny and Rena handled all trust-related 

matters without oversight; then Centennial Bank entered the state 

litigation as guardian of Mrs. Stiny' s estate. Through the first trial, 

which was in December 2019, the Bank faithfully discharged its 

fiduciary duties with birddog investigation and bulldog litigation, 

mostly against Rena. What seemed to this Court to have been every 

instance of allegedly improper conduct by Rena from 2011 on was 

explored by Centennial Bank. The issues where facts were murky or 

motivations debatable were tried. The jury and the Court ruled for 

Rena. Doc. 295 in Centennial Bank. 

This Court's 2019 judgment precludes the Stiny grandchildren' s 

attempt, by way of accounting, to litigate Rena's many trust-related 

activities now. It has already been done. One of the main reasons the 

Stiny grandchildren advance for doing a comprehensive accounting, 

for example, is mismanagement of the apartments. In particular, they 

point to some of Rena's children living there for free or reduced rent 

in return for doing some on-site management chores. But this precise 

dispute was presented in detail to the jury and the Court in service of 

Centennial Bank's failed conversion and breach-of-fiduciary claims as 

guardian of Mrs. Stiny' s estate. The Stiny grandchildren also instance 

Rena's prior felony drug conviction. This fact, too, was emphasized at 

-28-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 28 of 41
the first trial. Neither fact-finder was persuaded that this part of 

Rena's past made any difference on trust-related issues. 

The law of the forum, Arkansas, provides the rule of decision on 

preclusion issues. Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); In re Bair Hugger Forced Air Warming Devices 

Products Liability Litigation, 999 F.3d 534, 537-38 (8th Cir. 2021). 

The record establishes each element of claim preclusion. 

• This Court had jurisdiction, which is undisputed; 

• Privity existed. Mrs. Stiny and the Stiny grandchildren 

were trust beneficiaries with aligned interests. 

As guardian of her estate, Centennial Bank pursued 

those interests; 

• The same issues were, or could have been, litigatedRena's alleged mishandling of trust assets; 

• A full and fair opportunity to litigate, illustrated by the 

two years of vigorous litigation, which is undisputed; 

and 

• A final judgment on the merits, which is also 

undisputed. 

Scott v. City of Sherwood, 94 F.4th 778, 780 (8th Cir. 2024) 

(Arkansas law). The Stiny grandchildren argue that they weren't in 

privity with the Bank and that their claim is different. Doc. 275 at 5. 

Their arguments are unpersuasive. 

The Stiny grandchildren are Centennial Bank's privies because 

their interests aligned with Mrs. Stiny' s - they were all trust 

-29-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 29 of 41
beneficiaries. The Bank, as guardian of Mrs. Stiny' s estate, acted to 

protect Mrs. Stiny' s beneficial interests. It petitioned to remove Rena 

as trustee and to replace her with Perkins. Doc. 18 in In re 

Guardianship. The Stiny grandchildren filed a "Joinder and Consent" 

to that petition. They said: 

The Stiny Family Beneficiaries are informed and believe 

that the failure to remove Rena Wood[] as trustee of the 

Stiny Trust would harm Mary Moore Stiny for the 

remainder of her life, and it would significantly diminish 

the available assets that should be distributed to the Stiny 

Family Beneficiaries under the Stiny Trust and the express 

requests of Elijah Stiny ( deceased) and Mary Moore Stiny, 

due to Rena [Wood's] illegal and fraudulent handling of 

the Stiny Trust funds. 

Doc. 21 at 1 6 in In re Guardianship. The Stiny grandchildren 

understood that what was good for Mrs. Stiny was good for them. 

Their consent to and joinder in Centennial Bank's efforts made clear 

that the Bank was "so identified in interest with [the Stiny 

grandchildren] that [it] represent[ed] the same legal right." 

Francis v. Francis, 343 Ark. 104, 111-13, 31 S.W.3d 841, 845-46 (2000) 

(quotation omitted). 

The Stiny grandchildren also try to cabin the Judgment's reach, 

pointing out that Centennial Bank made no claim for an accounting in 

its second amended complaint, Doc. 3 7 in Centennial Bank. They' re 

correct about what specific claims were made in that complaint, 

-30-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 30 of 41
but incorrect about the legal effect of that fact and exactly what 

happened in the case. 

It is immaterial whether the prior litigation involved identical 

claims or causes of action. Deer/Mt. Judea School District v. Kimbrell, 

2013 Ark. 393, at 11-12, 430 S.W.3d 29, 39. That's because the Stiny 

grandchildren' s claim for an accounting for this period is rooted in the 

same factual soil as Centennial Bank's claims for breach of fiduciary 

duty, conversion, and removal. This discretionary remedy was 

available in the prior litigation. And under Arkansas law, "res 

judicata will apply even if the subsequent lawsuit raises new legal 

issues and seeks additional remedies." Ibid. 

In any event, and going back to the joined and consented-to 

petition, the Bank did seek an accounting. It asked that Rena fully 

account for all property, income, costs, and attorney's fees for all Stiny 

trusts or sub-trusts. Doc. 18 at 9 in In re Guardianship. This Court 

denied that part of the Bank's petition without prejudice in 

September 2017. Doc. 27 at 2 in Centennial Bank. In early 2018, 

Centennial Bank renewed its request; it again sought an accounting of 

all trust assets. Doc. 57 at 2 (motion) & Doc. 326 at 4 (oral argument) in 

Centennial Bank. This Court held a hearing, and instead directed Rena 

to provide all trust-related bank records and the trust's tax returns. 

Doc. 326 at 59-62 (bench ruling) & Doc. 79 (Order) in Centennial Bank. 

She did. E.g., Doc. 89, 99, 131 & 151 in Centennial Bank. Full disclosure 

-31-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 31 of 41
of all records to the Bank's experienced lawyers, so they could 

evaluate all trust activities, was a more effective way of getting at the 

truth than ordering Rena to prepare an accounting. Thereafter, 

having received full information, the Bank didn't press the accounting 

issue further. Any potential claim that the Stiny grandchildren had 

for an accounting about Rena's trust-related actions before the first 

trial merged into this Court's prior Judgment. Coleman's Service 

Center, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 55 Ark. App. 275, 293, 935 S.W.2d 289, 299 

(1996). 

Whatever the preclusive effect of the prior Judgment, the deeper 

point remains. Mrs. Stiny involved Rena in handling the trust four 

months after Mr. Stiny died. The trustee argues that the Stiny 

grandchildren want an investigation, rather than an accounting, of 

how Rena and Mrs. Stiny handled everything. The Stiny 

grandchildren' s request for a special master and an outside forensic 

accountant illustrates the comprehensiveness of their request. 

In truth, they seek a second investigation. Centennial Bank and its 

lawyers provided outsider scrutiny. Considering all the material 

circumstances, and exercising the discretion conferred by California 

law on this point, this Court holds that, apart from any preclusion bar, 

no useful purpose would be served by another investigation of Rena's 

trust-related activities between 2011 and 2016-2017, when the Bank 

took over and then this Court's oversight began. Esslinger, 50 Cal. 

-32-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 32 of 41
Rptr. 3d at 543-44. Any such effort would only further delay final 

distribution to the detriment of the trust's beneficiaries with only 

conjectural benefit. 

The Stiny grandchildren emphasize that they' re skeptical about 

Mrs. Stiny's actions, as well as Rena's, and perhaps even more so. 

A large part of Rena's defense was that Mrs. Stiny had approved or 

authorized many challenged actions. The Stiny grandchildren are 

correct here. The earlier Judgment weighs in the balance but doesn't 

preclude their effort to call Mrs. Stiny to account. That issue turns, 

instead, on the trust's terms and the facts. 

The words that Mr. and Mrs. Stiny chose to capture their 

intentions gave Mrs. Stiny the broadest discretion that California law 

allowed. Compare Art. Ten (]), at Add. 17-18, with CAL. PROB. CODE 

§ 16081, and Tubbs v. Berkowitz, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 852, 857-59 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2020). Mrs. Stiny could not act arbitrarily or unreasonably, 

but the law presumes that she acted in good faith. In re Ferrall' s Estate, 

258 P.2d at 1015; Estate of Nicholas, 223 Cal. Rptr. 410, 418 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1986). To overcome that presumption, the Stiny grandchildren 

would have "to show a bad faith exercise of absolute powers." 

Estate of Nicholas, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 418. They have not done so; 

nor have they shown a reasonable probability that they could do so. 

The Court recognizes that the Stiny grandchildren aren't yet pressing 

a claim that Mrs. Stiny violated her fiduciary duty. But they have not 

-33-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 33 of 41
made a sufficient preliminary showing of unreasonable or arbitrary 

decisions. Instead, the record as a whole undermines their 

discretionary request for an accounting of Mrs. Stiny' s actions 

between 2011 and 2016, when the Bank became guardian of her estate. 

Even though the Stiny grandchildren have had unfettered access 

to this Court's voluminous dockets (which include many of the state 

court papers), and approximately one hundred banker's boxes full of 

trust-related documents (including records from the trust's two longstanding bank accounts), they have pointed to no instance where it 

appears that Mrs. Stiny may have acted in bad faith. They question, 

for example, where the approximately $650,000 in proceeds from the 

2011 sale of the San Clemente condo went. But the closing statement 

from that transaction reflects that they were paid to the trust. 

Stiny Ex. 6. Absent some evidence to the contrary, the most 

reasonable inference is that those proceeds went into the trust pot. 

Instead, the Stiny grandchildren impugn Mrs. Stiny's character. 

But, again, no proof was offered of her throwing money out the 

window, making substantial gifts to non-family members, or making 

otherwise unreasoned decisions. In addition, there was no evidence 

that she was squirrelling away assets. Administration of her probate 

estate in state court is mostly done. After all obligations have been 

satisfied, and the expenses of administration paid, her probate estate 

contains approximately $4,000 today. Doc. 322 at 1-2. 

-34-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 34 of 41
Consider the bottom line. Mrs. Stiny lived, spent, and left the 

trust in better shape than she found it. The current trust corpus 

available for distribution is approximately twenty-four million 

dollars. Doc. 322 at 3-6. That number is net of the millions of dollars 

paid during the last seven years for taxes (federal and state), 

professional fees (CPAs, lawyers, real estate commissions), debt, and 

other expenses of trust administration. Recall that approximately 

eleven-and-a-half million dollars of trust assets came into Mrs. Stiny' s 

hands at her husband's death. The available trust corpus has more 

than doubled in the intervening fourteen years. The Stiny 

grandchildren discount this fact, saying it just reflects an inflationdriven increase in the apartment complexes' value. Of course the 

property values increased over time. But that is only part of the story. 

These assets were managed, maintained, improved, plus debts were 

repaid. The trust also supported Mrs. Stiny in her accustomed 

lifestyle. And there was no evidence that she lived lavishly, which 

brings the Court back to the trust's terms. 

As to the survivor's trust, Mrs. Stiny could spend all the income 

for any purpose she chose and all the principal for her proper health, 

support, comfort, enjoyment, and welfare. Art. Six (B), at Add. 8. 

Those categories spring from the Internal Revenue Code. See CAL. 

PROB. CODE 16081(c); 26 U.S.C. §§ 2041 & 2514. They cover many 

things and are "not limited to the bare necessities of life." 

-35-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 35 of 41
26 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1. California law broadly construes them, too. 

Examples include, but are not limited to: housing, feeding, clothing, 

recreation, vacation, travel expenses, proper care, nursing, medical 

expenses, mortgage payments, life insurance, attorneys fees, 

community debts, and provisions for future debts. In re Marriage 

of Benjamins, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 315-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 

Black's Law Dictionary echoes these categories and includes in its 

definition of support "the courtesies and kindness usually obtaining 

between individuals that have the same ties of blood[,]" and "[o]ne or 

more monetary payments to a current or former family member for 

the purpose of helping the recipient maintain an acceptable standard 

of living." Support, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 

And, according to the Stinys' trust, these enumerated powers "shall 

not limit [Mrs. Stiny's] general or implied powers .... " Art. Ten (]), 

at Add. 18; see also Estate of Friedman, 156 Cal. Rptr. 597, 598-99 

(Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 

Mrs. Stiny could also spend income, and principle, if necessary, 

from the exemption trust, to maintain her standard of living. 

Art. Six (D), at Add. 9. As the trustee points out, the trust's structure 

allowed Mrs. Stiny to spend the survivor's trust down to zero ( or even 

revoke it), then live out of the exemption trust, with any remaining 

balance being split fifty-fifty between the Moore share and the 

Stiny share. Art. Six (B) & (D), at Add. 8-9; Art. Seven (D), at Add. 10; 

-36-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 36 of 41
Art. Eight (C), at Add. 15. Mrs. Stiny lived as she chose, but she didn't 

loot the two sub-trusts. 

The trust also gave Mrs. Stiny a power of appointment over the 

assets in the survivor's trust. Art. Seven (A), at Add. 9-10. She could 

have used that power and disposed of all those assets through her will 

to any beneficiary she chose. Ibid. Because all the Stiny trust assets 

were jointly held, this maneuver would have cut in half the corpus 

available for the 50 / 50 family distribution. Mrs. Stiny, however, did 

not exercise her power of appointment. This decision shows her 

fidelity to the distribution originally planned by Mr. Stiny and her: 

an eventual 50 / 50 split between the families. 

The Stiny grandchildren ask for the accounting and information 

now, but they seek more. They candidly acknowledge that, assuming 

any misstep or questionable action by Mrs. Stiny, they intend to seek a 

reapportionment- deductions from the Moore share, as a true-up. 

Doc. 275 at 8. The Court declines to endorse this plan because Mr. and 

Mrs. Stiny' s trust forbids it in no uncertain terms. 

In the event any beneficiary under this trust shall ... 

contest in any court the validity of this trust . . . or shall 

seek to obtain an adjudication in any proceeding in any 

court that this trust or any of its provisions . . . is void, or 

seek otherwise to void, nullify, or set aside this trust or any 

of its provisions, then the right of that person to take any 

interest given to him by this trust shall be determined as it 

would have been determined had the person predeceased 

-37-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 37 of 41
the execution of this Declaration of Trust without surviving 

issue. 

Art. Eleven (J), at Add. 20. The Stiny grandchildren's plan would 

attack the trust's provisions on two fronts. 

First, it would challenge Mrs. Stiny's discretion and authority to 

manage the two sub-trusts for her benefit, as the sole lifetime income 

and principal beneficiary. See Dae v. Traver, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495, 

504 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021). Bare allegations that a trustee violated her 

fiduciary duty do not entitle beneficiaries to challenge that conduct 

-"without risking forfeiture under the no contest clause." Hearst v. 

Ganzi, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473,483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 

Second, any reapportionment would challenge Mr. and Mrs. 

Stiny' s unambiguous distribution scheme. No-contest clauses 

"promote the public policies of honoring the intent of the donor and 

discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are frustrated 

by the donative scheme of the instrument." Donkin v. Donkin, 

314 P.3d 780, 787 (Cal. 2013). The Stiny grandchildren's proposed 

reapportionment in the final distribution would be, in effect, a 

challenge to the trust itself. Doc. 275 at 8; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 

84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 

The Stiny grandchildren say they' re not challenging the trust. 

Doc. 66 at 6. The Court does not hold that they are. But, having heard 

their testimony and studied their many papers, it is clear that the 

-38-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 38 of 41
Stiny grandchildren seek this from-the-start accounting to mount 

what would quickly become a challenge to the Stiny trust's core: 

plenary discretion and entitlement during Mrs. Stiny' s lifetime; and a 

50 / 50 distribution between the Stiny and Moore families after her 

passing. Based on the record as a whole, the Court will not exercise 

its discretion in service of that end. 

The Court understands. The Stiny family ( or at least those 

who've testified) view Mrs. Stiny as an interloper who benefitted 

unfairly from Mr. Stiny's wealth and whose extended family now 

stands to benefit. Those were the terms, though, of Mr. and Mrs. 

Stiny's estate plan. They created this plan with the help of his longtime lawyer, who was unequivocal that Mr. and Mrs. Stiny' s trust 

terms were exactly what they wanted. 

All material things considered, and exere1s1ng its discretion 

under California law, the Court declines to order the current trustee to 

provide the Stiny grandchildren more information or to facilitate a 

comprehensive forensic accounting prepared by a third party and 

overseen by a special master. A superabundance of information has 

been provided. This Court has overseen the trust since 2017, for 

almost seven years. Nothing material has happened in the trust 

without Court approval during that period. As guardian of Mrs. 

Stiny' s estate, Centennial Bank thoroughly investigated and faithfully 

pursued potential claims arising out of the 2011 to 2017 period, 

-39-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 39 of 41
especially against Rena. A jury and this Court found for Rena, and 

she was not removed as a trustee. As to Mrs. Stiny, nothing offered 

by the Stiny grandchildren, or otherwise known to the Court, triggers 

any obligation under California law by Perkins to further investigate 

or account for his predecessor trustees' actions. CAL. PROB. CODE 

§ 16403. And the Court declines to order an accounting of Mrs. Stiny' s 

discretionary spending of trust income and principle. No preliminary 

showing of bad faith has been made. Looseness there was. 

Generosity to family members, too. But there is insufficient evidence 

of arbitrary or unreasoned actions to justify an expensive, timeconsuming, and distribution-delaying effort to puzzle out every last 

detail. Mr. and Mrs. Stiny's clear intentions, as modified by the 

applicable statutory law and precedent, were that the trustee's 

discretions were broad and the trustee's decisions well-nigh final. 

No sufficient reason exists to keep investigating in an effort to upset 

Mr. and Mrs. Stinys' chosen disposition of their estate. 

* * * 

1. The parties' motions for summary judgment, Doc. 212, 215 

& 217, which the Court did not have time to rule on before the bench 

trial, are denied without prejudice as mooted by the trial. The Court 

has considered the arguments and authorities in all those papers in 

support of the parties' various petitions. 

-40-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 40 of 41
2. The Elijah and Mary Stiny Trust, as amended, see 

Addendum, is valid. 

3. The trustee's amended petition to construe the trust, Doc. 9, 

is granted as modified as specified in this Order, the Order on Della 

Moore's share, Doc. 320, and the Order on Rena (Powell) Wood's 

share, Doc. 321. 

4. The Stiny grandchildren' s counter-petition, Doc. 66, 1s 

denied. 

5. The Court directs the trustee to prepare and file a proposed 

final distribution plan by 31 May 2024. Any beneficiary who has 

suggestions about the architecture of that plan must submit them to 

the trustee by 10 May 2024. 

So Ordered. 

D .P. Marshall Jr. 

United States District Judge 

-41-

Case 3:19-cv-00346-DPM Document 332 Filed 04/12/24 Page 41 of 41