Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01988/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01988-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DAVID RICHARD HALLIBURTON, II, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CV 05-1988 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

IVAN BARTOS and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On July 5, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on November 14, 2005. Docket No. 7.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and that Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were

not properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a

traverse (Docket No. 9) to the answer to his habeas petition on

January 3, 2006. On May 4, 2006, this matter was reassigned due

to the retirement of the Honorable Morton Sitver.

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1

 The Notice of Post-Conviction Relief is signed August 31,

2001.

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I Procedural History

In March of 2001, Petitioner was charged by indictment

with two counts of forgery, one count of criminal possession of

a forgery device, and one count of attempted fraudulent schemes

and artifices. See Answer, Exh. A. On July 18, 2001,

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he

pled guilty to the charge of attempted fraudulent schemes and

artifices, a class 3 felony, with the stipulation that his

sentence would reflect one prior felony conviction. Id., Exh.

D. The plea agreement also stipulated Petitioner actually had

five prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. D. On August 31,

2001, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 10 years

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for attempted fraudulent

schemes and artifices. Id., Exhs. G & H.

Petitioner did not take a direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. On September 17, 2001, Petitioner

filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the state trial

court pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.1

Id., Exh. I. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him

in his Rule 32 proceedings. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner’s

appointed counsel filed a pleading on February 15, 2001,

averring she could find no colorable claim to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. K. 

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on March 27, 2002. Id.,

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Exh. L. Petitioner asserted he had been denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel in his plea proceedings and that

his plea was coerced. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner also argued he

had no notice of the charges against him, in violation of his

Sixth Amendment rights. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner further

alleged he was denied his right to a jury trial with regard to

the stipulated prior felony conviction which was used as a basis

for enhancing his sentence, in violation of the doctrine stated

in Apprendi v. New Jersey. Id., Exh. L.

The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action

in a summary decision issued June 4, 2002. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which denied review in a decision issued July 25,

2003. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner contends he sought review of the

Court of Appeals’ decision by the Arizona Supreme Court,

asserting he “did mail out petition for review on 8-6-2003 to

Arizona Supreme Court...” Docket No. 11 (affidavit in support

of motion to compel production of Arizona Department of

Corrections records, filed January 19, 2005). However,

Petitioner claims he actually

mailed out petition for review on 8-6-2003 to

a friend Fred Cleere to have copied and

mailed to the courts, because I did not have

the moneys (sic) to do it.... Almost one year

past (sic) before I knew he never [received]

the motion and I attempted to track the lost

mail through Douglas Mohave legal mail and

all they would say is yes they mailed it out

on 08-06-2003.

Id. Respondents aver: “Petitioner claims to have petitioned for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court, [however,] no such petition

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appears in the record.” Answer at 3.

On August 7, 2004, more than one year after the Arizona

Court of Appeals denied review of the dismissal of his first

Rule 32 petition, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Stipulate to

Presumptive Sentence” in the Arizona trial court. Id., Exh. O.

Petitioner argued he was entitled to relief based on the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington. Id.,

Exh. O. The state trial court construed the motion as a notice

of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. P. The Arizona trial

court dismissed the action on September 9, 2004, concluding the

petition for relief was not timely filed and that the action did

not meet any listed exception to the Arizona rule regarding

timely filing of an action for post-conviction relief. Id.,

Exh. P. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals in a pleading filed February 15, 2005.

Id., Exh. Q. On March 3, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals

dismissed the petition for review as not timely filed, i.e., not

filed within 30 days of the trial court’s decision dismissing

the notice of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. Q. 

Petitioner also filed a third action for postconviction relief in the state trial court on February 15, 2005.

Id., Exh. R. The state trial court dismissed the action on

March 31, 2005, concluding the issues raised had previously been

adjudicated. Id., Exh. R. Petitioner sought review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which declined to

accept the petition for review as untimely filed on May 17,

2005. Id., Exh. S.

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Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel in his plea proceedings; (2) the trial court’s use of

prior felonies to enhance his sentence violated his rights

pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey; (3) his post-conviction

counsel was ineffective for not challenging his sentence; (4)

the Arizona courts erred by dismissing his second action for

post-conviction relief which asserted a Blakely claim.

Respondents argue the petition must be dismissed because it was

not timely filed and also contend that Petitioner’s third and

fourth claims for relief were procedurally defaulted and may not

be considered on the merits.

II Analysis

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). The federal habeas petition “must be filed within one

year of the latest of the date on which ... the judgment became

final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed

for seeking direct review ...” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1994 &

Supp. 2005). The running of this one-year statute of

limitations is tolled during any period when “a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review

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2

 The Court notes the Arizona Superior Court stated

Petitioner’s conviction became final, for purposes of applicability

of Blakely to Petitioner’s sentence, on August 4, 2003, when the

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision denying the “Rule 32 ofright proceeding.” Answer, Exh. P.

3

 The petition is not timely filed even if the Court does

not include in the calculation the two weeks between the date

Petitioner’s conviction became final, August 31, 2001, which is the

date he signed his notice of post-conviction relief, and the date the

notice of post-conviction relief was filed by the Arizona Superior

Court, September 17, 2001.

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with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in

any state court. Id. § 2244(d)(2); see also Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d

530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 31,

2001, the date judgment was entered and he was sentenced. See

Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir.

2004) (“The facts are not complex. Isley entered a no contest

plea and was sentenced August 19, 1998. His conviction was then

final... ”); Mares v. Schriro, 2006 WL 898164, at *3 (D. Ariz.).2

The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations ran against

Petitioner for approximately two weeks, from September 1, 2001,

until September 17, 2001, when he initiated a timely state

action for post-conviction relief which tolled the statute of

limitations.3 

The Arizona trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32

action in a summary decision issued June 4, 2002. Petitioner

sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which denied review in a decision issued July 25, 2003. The

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statute of limitations was further tolled until August 26, 2003,

when the time expired for seeking review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Compare

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820-21 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2004);

Jones v. Nagle, 349 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003); Williams

v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2002); Swartz v.

Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421 (3d Cir. 2000).

The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s action for

federal habeas relief then ran against Petitioner from August

27, 2003, and expired on August 9, 2004, approximately eleven

months and two weeks later, unless tolled by another properly

filed action for state post-conviction relief. The statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action, therefore,

expired on or about August 9, 2004.

The statute of limitations was not tolled during the

pendency of Petitioner’s second action for post-conviction

relief, filed August 7, 2004, because the Arizona trial court

concluded the petition for relief was not timely filed. See

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12

(2005); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005).

Because the second action for state post-conviction relief was

not timely filed in accordance with the governing state rule, it

was not a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction

relief which would have tolled the statute of limitations. See

Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148; Johnson v. Schriro, 401 F. Supp. 2d

1013, 1017 (D. Ariz. 2005).

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Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Malcom v.

Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002); Allen v. Lewis, 255

F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). Equitable tolling is only

appropriate when “extraordinary” or external forces, rather than

a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely petition. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). “‘[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting United States v.

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

“Equitable tolling applies principally where the

plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of

action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting

his rights.” United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930-31

(5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To

be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner “must show

that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the but-for and

proximate causes of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Lott, 304 F.3d at 922

(concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling for time

period that the petitioner was denied access to his legal files

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while being transferred). 

Petitioner has not established there were extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible for

him to file a timely federal habeas petition. In reply to

Respondents’ answer to his petition, Petitioner contends that he

“did mail motion to supreme court on 08-06-2003, which was lost

in mail due to DOC. []Petitioner did not have knowledge of this

for over a year by which time it was to late to file again.”

Docket No. 9. As noted supra, Petitioner averred in a separate

pleading that he mailed a pleading appealing the Arizona Court

of Appeals’ decision to the Arizona Supreme Court to a friend,

who was to file the appeal for him. However, Petitioner

provides no evidence, such as a copy of a pleading, indicating

he did appeal the relevant decision to the Arizona Supreme

Court, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. Petitioner

offers no explanation why he did not inquire as to the status of

his action for relief when he received no confirmation of an

appeal for over one year. Petitioner further contends he is not

learned in the law, and asks the Court to “understand the many

problems and extraordinary circumstances that have happen[ed] in

this case due to limitations of legal library access and ...

Petitioner’s lack of legal knowledge ...”. Id. 

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition,

or that any state action was the “but for” cause for his failure

to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace, 125 S. Ct.

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at 1815 (concluding the petitioner was not entitled to equitable

tolling because he was misled or confused about the timing of

exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068

(concluding that counsel’s errors in miscalculating the statute

of limitations and mis-advising the petitioner did not warrant

equitable tolling). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App.

989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006);

Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002); Faught

v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Halliburton’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 10th day of May, 2006.

 

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