Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02975/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02975-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2975

___________

WILLIE FORD, 

Appellant

v.

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY 

(“SEPTA”)

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-08-cv-02018)

District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 10, 2010

Before: MCKEE, FUENTES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed March 26, 2010 )

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Willie Ford appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting defendant’s

motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 

Case: 09-2975 Document: 003110075803 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2010
2

In April 2008, Ford filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against his

employer SEPTA for race discrimination. Specifically, Ford alleges that on September

12, 2005, SEPTA wrongfully fired him for taking a break when similarly situated White

employees were permitted to take a break without being disciplined. 

SEPTA filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) alleging that

there is no private right of action under § 1981 for violations by a state actor. The District

Court granted the motion to dismiss by relying on McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554

F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2009), which provides that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the sole remedy for civil

rights violations by state actors. The court also denied Ford the opportunity to amend his

pleading to include a § 1983 claim because the additional claim would be time-barred

under § 1983's two-year statute of limitations. 

Ford timely appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction to review the judgment and

our review is plenary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Miller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 475 F.3d

516, 519 (3d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is proper if a party fails to allege sufficient factual

matter, which if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Dismissal of a case without leave to amend is

proper when amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d

103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002). 

No private right of action lies against a state actor under § 1981. McGovern, 554

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F.3d at 121; see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731, 733 (1989) (§

1981 does not itself provide a remedy against state actors). The exclusive remedy for

relief from a state agency for civil rights violations, including race discrimination, is §

1983. McGovern, 554 F.3d at 121. We have previously found that SEPTA is a state

actor. See e.g., Dykes v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly,

both McGovern and Jett compel us to conclude that Ford’s complaint is without any

viable legal basis. Although Ford also argues that McGovern was not decided at the time

he filed his complaint, Jett has stood for the same principle since 1989. Therefore, the

District Court’s dismissal was proper as Ford cannot state a claim of relief under § 1981 

against SEPTA. 

Furthermore, Ford’s claim arose on the date of his termination: September 12,

2005. Thus, any amendment to his complaint would have been futile, as Ford filed his

suit in April 2008, and any additional claims would be time-barred under § 1983's twoyear statute of limitations. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). We note

that Ford argues to this Court that his claim did not arise until July 2006, when his case

was denied after arbitration. Even if we could consider this argument, which he raised for

the first time on appeal, it is without merit. Ford knew of his injury – his termination – in

September 2005, which is when the statute of limitations began to run. See id. (citing

Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)). Accordingly,

we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal.

Case: 09-2975 Document: 003110075803 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/26/2010