Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05198/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05198-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The proper named respondent in this action is Robert Ayers, the Warden at the

San Quentin State Prison, where petitioner is incarcerated. Stanley v. Cal. Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994); Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, the clerk shall

terminate ORNOSKI and substitute ROBERT AYERS as the proper respondent.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES E. McCARTNEY,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-5198 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison,

has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging the January 2006 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) finding

petitioner unsuitable for parole. The court ordered respondent1 to show cause why the writ

should not be granted. This matter is now before the court for consideration on the merits

of the habeas petition. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

The Board reviewed the correctional counselor’s January 2006 evaluation report

which summarized the commitment offense as follows:

On December 11, 1978, at approximately 2:38 A.M. an officer of

the Corona Police Department responded to a Shell Station in the

city of Corona, California with regards to the discovery of the body

of a female identified as Kathy Marie McCartney. Subsequent

investigation revealed that the 22-year-old victim had died as the

result of fatal gunshot wounds to the chest area. A subsequent

interview of Ms. Sue Windsor revealed that the victim’s ex-husband

(McCartney) had made an appearance at the victim’s apartment at

approximately 12:30 A.M. The witness indicated that (McCartney)

had remained at the victim’s residence for approximately five

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minutes. Apparently, the victim had confided in Ms. Windsor that

(McCartney) was in some type of serious trouble and, therefore,

requested that the victim meet him at a gas station on the corner,

near her residence. Ms. Windsor stated that the victim was

responsive to the request of (McCartney) and did in fact leave the

residence to join him at approximately 1:30 A.M. Supportive

documents indicate that (McCartney) admitted to an investigation

officer that he had been in the company of his ex-wife on the day of

the instant offense. McCartney stated that he and his wife

discussed his dissatisfaction of a court ordered property settlement. 

According to McCartney, he concluded his discussion with the

victim and subsequently departed for Modesto in the company of

his brother-in-law, Steven Hammond. Supporting documents

indicate that Steven Hammond was subsequently arrested on

January 23, 1979, at which time he confessed to his involvement in

the commitment offense.

During the course of his confession, Hammond subsequently

implicated (McCartney) in the perpetration of this offense by stating

that McCartney lured the victim to the scene of the commitment

offense and subsequently shot her with a .22 caliber revolver. 

Answer Ex. 7 at 1 (Life Prisoner Evaluation Report, prepared for January 2006 Calendar)

(citation omitted).

On September 20, 1979, a jury of the Riverside County Superior Court convicted

petitioner of first degree murder with personal use of a firearm. Petitioner was sentenced to

twenty-five years to life, plus a two-year firearm enhancement which was stayed.

On January 12, 2006, petitioner, represented by counsel, appeared for his eighth

parole hearing before the Board, which denied him parole. Petitioner filed state habeas

petitions in the superior court and court of appeal, which denied relief. Answer Ex. 8. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the state supreme court, which denied review. 

Answer Ex. 9.

On August 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

District Court for the Central District of California, which transferred the petition to this court. 

On April 5, 2007, the court ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be issued. Respondent has filed an answer, and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

Respondent does not dispute that the petition is timely and presents claims that were

exhausted in state court. The petition is submitted for a decision on the merits.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

"unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under Section 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion of a state court. See Ylst v.

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Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001). Where the state court gives no

reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned

lower court decision on the claim, a federal court conducts “an independent review of the

record” to determine whether the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. See Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.

2006); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges that (1) his due process rights were denied when on January 12,

2006, the Board of Parole Hearings denied him parole based on the unchanging

circumstances of his crime; and (2) the denial of parole violated due process because there

was not “some evidence” to support the denial and parole was only denied because the

Board has a “no parole” policy. These claims do not merit habeas relief.

I. Due Process in Parole Suitability Determinations

A. Some Evidence Standard of Judicial Review

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California prisoner with a sentence of a term

of years to life with the possibility of parole has a protected liberty interest in release on

parole and therefore a right to due process in the parole suitability proceedings. See

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.

1 (1979)). See also Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc

denied, 506 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-16455 (9th Cir. Feb.

13, 2007); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to

set parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life sentence implicated prisoner’s liberty

interest). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some

evidence” supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence

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standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55

(1985)). See also Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. “To determine whether the some evidence

standard is met ‘does not require examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the

relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached’” by the parole board. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at

455-56). The “some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.’” Id. at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 

Respondent contends that an inmate is entitled to only minimal protections to satisfy

due process in a parole proceeding. Citing Greenholtz, respondent contends that due

process in state parole procedures is satisfied merely if they afford the inmate an

opportunity to be heard and a decision informing him why he did not qualify for parole

release. The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that requiring less than the some evidence

standard “would violate clearly established federal law because it would mean that a state

could interfere with a liberty interest - that in parole - without support or in an otherwise

arbitrary manner.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Thus, the some evidence standard of

Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the context of parole denial for purposes

of federal habeas review. Ibid. 

B. Some Evidence to Support Board’s Unsuitability Determination

First, petitioner contends that the Board improperly relied on the circumstances of

the offense to find petitioner unsuitable for parole. Second, petitioner contends that his due

process rights were violated because Board’s decision was not supported by some

evidence, and that he was denied parole pursuant to a “no-parole” policy. In assessing

whether the Board’s denial of parole was supported by some evidence, the court’s

“analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole suitability

determinations in the relevant state.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (citing Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915). 

“Accordingly, here we must look to California law to determine the findings that are

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necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must review the record in

order to determine whether the state court decision holding that these findings were

supported by ‘some evidence’ in [petitioner’s] case constituted an unreasonable application

of the ‘some evidence’ principle articulated in Hill, 472 U.S. at 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768.” Ibid.

Under California law, “[t]he Board must determine whether a prisoner is presently too

dangerous to be deemed suitable for parole based on the ‘circumstances tending to show

unsuitability’ and the ‘circumstances tending to show suitability’ set forth in Cal. Code.

Regs., tit.15 § 2402(c)-(d).” Ibid.

Title fifteen, section 2402, of the California Code of Regulations sets forth the criteria

for determining whether an inmate is suitable for release on parole. The circumstances

tending to show that a prisoner is unsuitable include the following: (1) the commitment

offense, where the offense was committed in “an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner;” (2) the prisoner's previous record of violence; (3) “a history of unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others;” (4) commission of “sadistic sexual offenses;” (5) “a

lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6) “serious

misconduct in prison or jail.” Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c). The circumstances

tending to show that a prisoner is suitable for parole include the following: (1) the prisoner

has no juvenile record; (2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships

with others; (3) the prisoner has shown remorse; (4) the prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life; (5) the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman

Syndrome at the time of committing the crime; (6) the prisoner lacks any significant history

of violent crime; (7) the prisoner’s present age reduces the risk of recidivism; (8) the

prisoner “has made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can

be put to use upon release;” and (9) institutional activities “indicate an enhanced ability to

function within the law upon release.” Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d).

The Board concluded that petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society

and a threat to public safety if released from prison based on the following factors: (1) the

commitment offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner; (2)

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petitioner’s prior record indicated that he had failed to profit from society’s previous

attempts to correct his criminality, including several juvenile parole terms for burglary; and

(3) petitioner did not demonstrate remorse or insight into the crime.

In order to determine whether the state court decisions were contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, the court looks to the last

reasoned state court opinion, which is that of the superior court denying the state habeas

petition. See Shackleford, 234 F.3d at 1079 n.2. The superior court held that “[t]he record

before the Board of Prison Terms contained some evidence in support of the Board’s

findings.” Answer Ex. 8.D. 

1. Biggs Challenge

In his first claim for relief, petitioner contends that the Board’s reliance on the

unchanging circumstances of the commitment offense twenty-seven years after the crime

violates due process because the commitment offense is no longer a reliable predictor of

petitioner’s present and future dangerousness and does not satisfy the “some evidence”

standard. The Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that sole reliance on the commitment

offense could raise “serious questions” about a state prisoner’s liberty interest in parole. 

See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of a parole release date

based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner's conduct before incarceration, but

cautioned that the value of the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor of parole

suitability: “The Parole Board's decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing

and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

As the Ninth Circuit noted in Sass, “Biggs affirmed a denial of parole after holding

that the circumstances of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment constituted some

evidence to support the Parole Board’s decision.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1126 (citing Biggs,

334 F.3d at 917). See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (“As in the present instance, the parole

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board’s sole supportable reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as fulfilling the requirements

set forth by state law.”). 

The Ninth Circuit has expressed competing views on Biggs in subsequent panel

decisions. In Sass, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence of Sass’s prior offenses and the

gravity of his commitment offenses constituted some evidence to support the Board’s

decision. 461 F.3d at 1129. Acknowledging the cautionary statements in Biggs concerning

the potential for a due process violation by continued reliance in the future on immutable

factors, Sass criticized that part of the opinion as improper speculation about how future

parole hearings could proceed. Ibid. 

In Irons, however, the Ninth Circuit echoed the concern raised in Biggs and

expressed its “hope that the Board will come to recognize that in some cases, indefinite

detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his

rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that

flows from the relevant California statutes.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 854 (citing Biggs, 334 F.3d

at 917). Although the court determined that the Board’s unsuitability finding was supported

by “some evidence” that Irons’s crime was especially cruel and callous, the Irons panel

pointed out that in the cases holding that sole reliance on the commitment offense did not

violate due process, namely, Irons, Sass and Biggs, “the decision was made before the

inmate had served the minimum number of years required by his sentence.” Irons, 505

F.3d at 852-54. Irons reasoned that due process was not violated when these prisoners

were deemed unsuitable for parole “prior to the expiration of their minimum terms,” even if

they had demonstrated substantial evidence of rehabilitation. Id. at 854. 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit held rehearing en banc in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d

536 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008), which presented a state

prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of parole. The three-judge Hayward

panel had concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no predictive value

regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole, and held that the governor’s reversal of the

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Board’s grant of parole was not supported by some evidence and resulted in a due process

violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc decision in

Hayward; since holding rehearing en banc on June 24, 2008, the Ninth Circuit has ordered

briefing on the questions, inter alia, whether the order granting rehearing en banc should be

vacated and submission of the matter deferred, pending the California Supreme Court's

decisions in In re Lawrence, No. S154018 and In re Shaputis, No. S155872, both of which

cases were argued on June 4, 2008. Hayward v. Marshall, No. 06-55392, slip op. at 2 (9th

Cir. July 10, 2008). 

Unless or until the en banc court overrules the holdings of the earlier Ninth Circuit

panel decisions in Biggs, Sass and Irons, these cases hold that California’s parole scheme

creates a federally protected liberty interest in parole and therefore a right to due process

which is satisfied if some evidence supports the Board’s parole suitability decision. Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128-29. These cases also hold that the Board may rely on immutable events,

such as the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to find that the

prisoner is not currently suitable for parole, Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Biggs and Irons further

suggest, however, that over time, the commitment offense and pre-conviction behavior

become less reliable predictors of danger to society such that repeated denial of parole

based solely on immutable events, regardless of the extent of rehabilitation during

incarceration, could violate due process at some point after the prisoner serves the

minimum term on his sentence. See Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. 

Respondent contends that the court may not overturn the state court decision on the

purported Biggs claim because Biggs is not clearly established federal law as determined

by the Supreme Court. Assuming, without deciding, that under some circumstances,

habeas relief may be granted under Biggs on a claim that parole denial based on the

Board’s sole reliance on the commitment offense and other unchanging factors does not

satisfy the some evidence standard, the court finds that petitioner fails to establish the

predicate for a Biggs claim because the Board did not rely solely on unchanging factors

such as the commitment offense, but also considered petitioner’s prior criminal history and

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his lack of remorse and insight into the crime. Thus, the state courts’ denial of relief was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

2. Some Evidence of Unsuitability

a. Commitment Offense

With respect to the commitment offense, the Board determined that petitioner

committed the crime in a dispassionate and calculated manner based on the evidence that

the murder victim was petitioner’s ex-wife who was twenty-two years old; the victim was

shot four times in the torso and once in the head; the motive, i.e., anger over a divorce

settlement, was trivial in relation to the offense; petitioner had previously arranged to have

his ex-wife killed; and petitioner lured the victim from her home by calling her in the early

morning hours and telling her to go to a gas station where she was shot and killed. Answer

Ex. 2 at 64-65. 

At the hearing, petitioner invoked his right not to discuss the crime, but the Board

noted that the most recent evaluation report reflected his contention that although he was

present during the commission of the murder, it was Mr. Hammond who murdered the

victim. Answer Ex. 2 at 13 and Ex. 7 at 2 (“McCartney chooses not to discuss the crime in

detail, stating that he has already described his role, as he believed it had been, a multitude

of times in the past, and that he had nothing to add or change.”). Petitioner testified about

his background, stating that his mother passed away when he was eleven months old, and

that he and his brother went into foster care when his father went to prison. Answer Ex. 2

at 14. Petitioner testified that he lived in a dozen different foster homes, and that he usually

ran away from them. Id. at 14-15. In 1967, he was arrested for burglary at the age of

fifteen and sent to the California Youth Authority (“CYA”). Id. at 13-14. While on parole

from the CYA, petitioner violated parole in 1969 and then again in 1970. Id. at 14. At the

age of eighteen, when he was released on parole from the CYA and no longer in foster

care, he lived at the home of the victim’s parents, whom he had met on a camping trip. Id.

at 16-17.

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Petitioner testified about the victim, Kathy McCartney, who underwent surgery as a

child to repair a minor deformity in her foot, and suffered gangrene in the hospital during

post-operative care, resulting in the loss of part of her foot. Id. at 18-19. According to the

mental health evaluation, petitioner married the victim in 1971 against her parents wishes

when she was fifteen and he was nineteen years old. Answer Ex. 6 at 2-3. In 1974, the

victim received $45,000 in a settlement related to her foot surgery. Id. at 3. Within a few

years, the couple suffered financial trouble after petitioner invested in a fraudulent

business. Ibid. Petitioner also reported that he became “possessive” of his wife because

she wanted to spend more time “partying” with her friends. Ibid. In January 1978, the

couple separated, and after initially agreeing to the terms of the divorce, the victim sought

custody of their two children. Ibid. Petitioner stated that he and the victim constantly

bickered from that time up to the time of her murder. Ibid. Petitioner testified that he has

lost contact with his two children, now grown. Answer Ex. 2 at 19.

The Board reviewed the probation officer’s report (“POR”), which reflected a

statement to investigating officers by the victim’s friend (Ms. Windsor) who reported that

petitioner came to the victim’s apartment at about 12:30 a.m. on the night of the murder,

and that the victim stated that her ex-husband was in trouble and wanted to meet her at a

gas station. Answer Ex. 2 at 64-65; Answer Ex. 3 at 3. The witness also stated that the

victim told her that petitioner had presents for the victim’s children. Ibid. The POR also

reflected petitioner’s statement to an investigating officer that he had been with the victim

on the day she was murdered, that he had asked her to meet him at the gas station to

discuss a court-ordered property settlement, and that he and Mr. Hammond left the victim

at the gas station and drove back to Modesto. Id. at 3-4. 

The POR reflected statements by Mr. Hammond following his arrest in January

1979:

At that time, [Hammond] confessed to his involvement in the killing. 

He indicated that James McCartney had lured the victim to the

Lincoln Shell Station and then retrieved a .22 caliber revolver from

underneath the seat of a motorcycle in the rear area of the van, in

which they were riding. McCartney then killed the victim in the gas

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station parking lot and he stated that the victim screamed and then

was shot repeatedly. Three months prior to this, Hammond had

acted as an intermediary in a murder for hire, receiving $250.00

from McCartney and delivering it to another subject named “Bob”,

who was supposed to kill the victim. The subject failed to complete

the contract. He also indicated that in November, 1978, he,

Roberta Snover, the defendant’s common-law wife, and James

McCartney, went to Corona. During this time, McCartney had

indicated he was going to execute the victim by bludgeoning her to

death with a hammer. He had previously solicited Hammond to

borrow his shotgun to complete the murder. It was noted, that

Hammond denied pulling the trigger or having any other

involvement in the murder . At one point he did admit that he had

agreed to “spot” for McCartney during the execution.

Answer Ex. 3 at 3-4.

The POR also summarized statements by Mr. Hammond’s wife, Patricia Leigh

Hammond, which indicated that in the few months prior to the victim’s murder, petitioner

had sought her help to hire someone to kill the victim:

She advised that in approximately August or September, 1978,

while she was residing in Westwood, California, she spoke with the

defendant via telephone. During this conversation, the defendant

advised her “I want to get rid of Kathy”. In response to this Patricia

Hammond asked what he meant and he stated, “I just can’t stand

the bull shit I’m putting up with any longer.[“] At this time, and

during subsequent conversations, the defendant solicited her to

attempt to locate somebody who would murder Kathy McCartney

for money. He indicated he would be willing to pay $2,000.00 or

$3,000.00 to have his ex-wife killed. Various other conversations

took place during the following months, prior to December 11,

1978. During these times, the defendant solicited Patricia

Hammond to arrange to have his ex-wife murdered for money. On

December 9, 1978, she advised that the defendant came to her

residence on the pretense of going fishing with her husband, Steve

Hammond. At that time, he requested that Steve Hammond

accompany him to murder Kathy McCartney. She advised her

husband that he should take no part in anything having to do with

the murder. At one point, the defendant advised her something in

words to the effect, “Steven is going to be miles away when it

happens. All I need him for is to be a lookout”. Subsequent to this,

both individuals left in the defendant’s van. They returned to the

residence during the morning hours of December 11, 1978. Upon

arriving at home, [and] after James McCartney departed from the

Hammond residence, Steve Hammond advised Patricia Hammond

that McCartney had in fact killed Kathy McCartney. He further

related that he had been in James McCartney’s company when the

murder had occurred, and that James McCartney had shot the

victim repeatedly.

Answer Ex. 3 at 4-5.

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A deputy district attorney from Riverside County District Attorney’s Office appeared

at the Board hearing to oppose parole and emphasized the premeditated, calculated nature

of the offense, as evidenced by petitioner’s two attempts at murder-for-hire, and his

statement that he would kill the victim with a hammer. The district attorney also

emphasized that petitioner lured the victim to a gas station in the middle of the night, and

questioned the plausibility of petitioner’s explanation that he met the victim at the gas

station to discuss their divorce settlement. Answer Ex. 2 at 53-54.

Regarding motive, the district attorney argued that petitioner murdered his wife

because he was controlling and possessive, as he himself admitted, and he was upset and

angry that she had separated from him, as suggested by the evidence that petitioner drove

from Modesto to Riverside County to murder his wife. Id. at 54. The district attorney also

argued that petitioner has not shown insight into his life crime or remorse for the victim,

noting that petitioner refuses to admit responsibility for the murder and blames Mr.

Hammond, who had no motive for killing the victim. Id. at 55. The district attorney also

noted that petitioner had an unstable social history and bad juvenile history. Ibid. 

Petitioner points out that his psychological report concludes that his risk of violence

to the community is low to low moderate. Answer Ex. 6 at 4. However, the mental health

evaluator indicated that although petitioner has not been violent since his incarceration and

posed a low risk of violence in a controlled setting, “it is difficult to assess his risk of

dangerousness outside this setting. His history of violence places him at higher risk for

future violence when compared with someone with no such history.” Ibid. The evaluator

also noted, “If Mr. McCartney did commit the commitment crime, then being in a stressful

intimate relationship may increase the risk for violence.” Ibid. The evaluation thus reflects

the psychiatrist’s opinion that even though the petitioner committed the crime nearly twentyseven years earlier, the commitment offense still has some predictive value concerning his

risk of violence if released from a controlled prison environment. 

The record contains ample evidence to support the Board’s finding that the

commitment offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, and that

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the motive, anger over the divorce settlement, was trivial in relation to the offense. The

passage of twenty-seven years from the time of the commitment offense to the Board’s

unsuitability determination, did not render the nature of the commitment offense completely

unreliable as an indicator of risk to public safety, particularly in light of the Board’s further

findings about petitioner’s past criminal history and his lack of remorse, which were also

supported by some evidence. 

b. Past Criminal History

The Board considered petitioner’s prior juvenile record: at age fifteen, petitioner was

sentenced to the CYA for burglary, and was returned to the CYA twice for parole violations

involving burglary and absconding from foster placement. Answer Ex. 2 at 13-14; Ex. 6 at

2. Petitioner’s only adult arrest and conviction was for the commitment offense. The Board

noted that throughout petitioner’s incarceration, he received only one “115" serious rules

violation report for falsifying documents in 1992, and has remained discipline-free since

then. Answer Ex. 2 at 32. 

Prior to the commitment offense, petitioner did not have a history of violent offenses,

and has had no record of violent behavior during incarceration. The regulations provide,

however, that the Board consider not only violent criminal history, but all relevant, reliable

information, such as “past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(b). The Board

concluded from petitioner’s juvenile record that he had failed to profit from previous

attempts to correct his criminality, as evidenced by several juvenile parole terms and at

least two parole violations between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. The record contains

some evidence to support the Board’s determination that petitioner’s prior record

demonstrates that his release would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.

c. Lack of Remorse

The Board further determined that petitioner had not demonstrated remorse and

insight into the crime, particularly because petitioner did not discuss the commitment

offense, and the Board could not gauge his progress. During the hearing, the Board

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explained that it needed to measure petitioner’s insight into the crime, even if he did not

admit that he shot the victim, such as explaining why he was he was even at the scene of

the crime when the victim was murdered. Answer Ex. 2 at 43-44. Because petitioner

exercised his right not to discuss the commitment offense pursuant to section 5011 of the

California Penal Code, the Board explained that it was at a disadvantage in assessing

petitioner’s remorse. Ibid. 

The psychiatrist who evaluated petitioner noted that he declined to discuss the

details of the crime, stating that “it is too emotional for me to go over again.” Answer Ex. 6

at 2. The psychiatrist also concluded, “Given Mr. McCartney’s reluctance to discuss his life

crime, it is difficult to gauge his level of remorse or insight. He does adhere to previous

accounts of his crime in which he states he was not responsible for his wife’s death.” Id. at

5. 

Under questioning by the district attorney, petitioner expressed how he felt about the

victim’s death: “It was something that should never have happened. Because of her death,

her children have suffered, her parents have suffered, and I’m sorry for that. If I could

change places with her today, I would.” Answer Ex. 2 at 49. 

Petitioner’s attorney argued at the hearing that petitioner consistently maintained his

innocence about shooting the victim, naming Mr. Hammond as the actual shooter and

suggesting that Mr. Hammond’s testimony against petitioner was not credible considering

his criminal history. The Board considered Hammond’s criminal record, including many

arrests for drug related offenses and his current incarceration for twenty years to life after

pleading guilty to burglary. Id. at 56. Hammond was also charged with second degree

murder connected to the burglary. Ibid.

The record contains some evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that petitioner

lacks remorse or sufficient insight into his role in the commitment offense. From the record

available to the Board at the time of the hearing, petitioner expressed sorrow over the tragic

loss of his ex-wife’s life and the impact on their children, but did not appear to take any

responsibility for her murder. Even accepting petitioner’s version of the crime, he has not

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accounted for his role in luring his ex-wife from her apartment to the gas station in the

middle of the night, or his failure to intervene when his companion, Mr. Hammond,

purportedly shot her several times, or petitioner’s failure to come forward to authorities after

Mr. Hammond murdered his ex-wife, or petitioner’s false statements to the investigating

officer indicating that he and Mr. Hammond left the victim alive at the gas station when they

drove back to Modesto. The record contains some evidence to support the Board’s

determination that petitioner’s lack of remorse and insight demonstrates that his release

would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.

3. The Board’s Unsuitability Determination

The Board considered factors favoring petitioner’s suitability for parole: an

exemplary prison disciplinary record, participation in self-help and therapy activities,

vocational training and education during incarceration, viable parole plans for housing and

employment, and laudatory work performance reports and letters from supervisors. The

Board also considered his psychological report, which listed several factors likely to lower

his risk of violence, including his age (fifty-three), his non-violent record during

incarceration, and the absence of psychotic symptoms, antisocial behavior or substance

abuse. The Board concluded, however, that petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of

danger to society and a threat to public safety if released from prison based on the factors

of unsuitability, discussed above. 

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision violated his right to due

process, the record contains some evidence to support the Board’s parole unsuitability

determination. The state courts’ denial of habeas relief on this claim was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

II. “No-Parole” Policy Claim

Petitioner further alleges that the Board denied him parole under a “no-parole”

policy, denying him an impartial, unbiased review and depriving him of due process.

In the absence of a reasoned state court opinion addressing this habeas claim, the

court conducts an independent review of the record which reveals that the Board provided

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petitioner an opportunity to testify at the hearing and present documentary evidence of

positive behavior during incarceration. The transcript reflects that the Board reviewed the

evidence extensively and discussed it with petitioner and his attorney. Answer Ex. 2 at 10-

63. In announcing its decision, the Board explained the facts it relied upon in finding him

not suitable for parole. Id. at 64-69. These factors tend to negate the accusation of bias by

demonstrating that the Board considered individualized facts and evidence in petitioner’s

case, and petitioner has not shown otherwise. Nor has petitioner made the showing

necessary for an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The state courts’

rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk of the court shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment for respondent, and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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