Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-12357/USCOURTS-ca11-15-12357-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

---

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12357

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-01567-CLS

ANNETTE WHITTON, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(February 12, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 1 of 12
2

Appellant Annette Whitton appeals the district court’s order affirming the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her application for disability 

insurance benefits. On appeal, she challenges the weight the ALJ accorded to the 

medical opinion evidence, specifically arguing that the ALJ erred by assigning no 

weight to the opinion of her treating psychiatrist and improperly substituted his 

own opinion for the opinion of her consulting psychologist. After careful review, 

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2011, Whitton filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

with the Social Security Administration. Alleging a disability onset date of 

January 1, 2009, Whitton represented that she was unable to work because of 

migraines, high blood pressure, chronic back and knee pain, depression, and stressinduced boils. 

The Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denied 

Whitton’s application for benefits. At a subsequent hearing before the ALJ in 

March 2013, the ALJ heard testimony from Whitton, Whitton’s husband, and a 

vocational expert. 

Whitton testified that she had not worked since October 2010, and amended 

her disability onset date to October 27, 2010. While she left her previous job 

because the business closed, she had planned to leave because of knee and back 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 2 of 12
3

pain. Her mother also passed away in October 2010, and she was having trouble 

dealing with the loss. She received treatment for anxiety and depression at a 

mental health facility, but the medications she received did not help her. 

Whitton stated that she also had trouble sleeping and eating, she could not 

concentrate to watch a two-hour movie, she had little energy, and sometimes she 

had trouble bathing and getting dressed without assistance. She suffered from 

panic attacks approximately three times per week. Because her husband was in an 

accident in 2008, Whitton had to cook for him, help him get dressed, give him 

shots, and make sure he took his medication. She also stated that she drove herself 

to the hearing, which was a 45-minute drive from her home, without any problems. 

Moreover, she handled most of the family’s finances. 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision, concluding that Whitton 

was not disabled for purposes of eligibility for disability insurance benefits. Upon 

review of the evidence, the ALJ found that Whitton suffered from lumbago, 

hypertension, depression, and anxiety, but he determined that these impairments 

did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in the Social Security 

regulations. 

The ALJ further concluded that Whitton could perform light work, but that 

she needed to avoid heights, dangerous or moving equipment, as well as ropes, 

ladders, and scaffolds. Her work should also be limited to simple tasks, interaction 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 3 of 12
4

with co-workers should be casual, and she should not have any exposure to the

general public. The ALJ also reviewed the medical evidence, including the 

opinions of Whitton’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Grant, who opined that 

Whitton was severely limited in all areas of functioning, as well as the opinion of 

her consulting psychologist, Dr. David Wilson, who diagnosed Whitton with 

borderline intellectual functioning. The ALJ gave no weight to these opinions 

because Whitton did not see either doctor until after her date last insured, and 

because the medical opinions were inconsistent with the record as a whole, 

including the doctors’ own treatment notes. 

Based on the finding that Whitton could perform light work, in addition to 

the vocational expert’s opinion that a significant number of jobs accommodating 

Whitton’s limitations existed in the national economy, the ALJ concluded that 

Whitton was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Whitton’s request for 

review. 

In August 2014, Whitton filed a complaint in the district court challenging 

the denial of disability insurance benefits. She argued, among other things, that the 

ALJ did not accord proper weight to the opinions of Drs. Grant and Wilson. The 

district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits, concluding 

in relevant part that the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence was in 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 4 of 12
5

accordance with the relevant legal standards and was supported by substantial 

evidence. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review

We review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence, but its application of 

legal principles de novo. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 

2005). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quotations omitted). We may not reweigh the evidence and decide the facts anew, 

and must defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). 

B. Process for Determining Eligibility for Disability Insurance 

Benefits

To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must establish that 

she was under disability on or before the last date for which she was insured. 42 

U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1), Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. Because Whitton’s last 

insured date was December 31, 2010, she must show that she was disabled on or 

before that date. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. 

Under the five-step sequential evaluation process used to determine if a 

claimant has demonstrated a disability, the ALJ considers: (1) whether the 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 5 of 12
6

claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether the 

claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed impairment; (4) if not, whether the 

claimant is able to do her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether the claimant, 

in light of her age, education, and work experience, can perform other work in the 

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 

1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). 

C. Weight ALJ Assigned to Medical Opinion Evidence

To determine whether a disability exists, the ALJ considers the medical 

opinions in the record, in addition to the other relevant evidence in the record. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). The ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician 

“substantial or considerable weight” unless there is good cause not to do so. 

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations 

omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (stating that the opinion of a treating 

physician will be given controlling weight if it is supported by medically 

acceptable and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the 

other substantial evidence in the record). 

We have concluded that good cause exists for affording less weight to a 

treating physician’s opinion when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 6 of 12
7

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical 

records.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240–41. Moreover, the opinion of a treating 

physician may be entitled to less weight when the physician’s assessment conflicts 

with a claimant’s own reported daily activities. See id. If the ALJ chooses to 

assign less weight to a treating physician’s opinion, he must clearly articulate his 

reasons for doing so. Id. 

1. Opinion of Whitton’s Treating Psychiatrist

Whitton argues that the ALJ did not give proper weight to the opinion of her

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Grant, and instead substituted his own opinion for that of 

Dr. Grant. 

Whitton’s case record includes a November 2012 mental health source 

statement completed by Dr. Grant, in which he opined that Whitton had marked 

and extreme limitations in all areas of understanding and memory, sustained 

concentration and persistence, social interaction, and adaptation. In a disability 

questionnaire also dated November 2012, Dr. Grant concluded that Whitton was 

disabled, that the disability began before March 2012, and that the disability was

based on the following impairments: a diminished mental capacity, an inability to 

cope with daily stressors, and severe recurrent depression. Dr. Grant also stated 

that Whitton exhibited “agoraphobic behaviors” and her mental health issues were 

of “such intensity” that it made it difficult for her to cope with the activities of 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 7 of 12
8

daily life. The ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Grant’s opinion because it was 

inconsistent with the other evidence in the record, including Dr. Grant’s treatment 

notes, and because the report and questionnaire were dated long after the date 

Whitton was last insured. 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s articulation of 

good cause for giving no weight to Dr. Grant’s opinion that Whitton was severely 

limited in all areas of functioning. First, Dr. Grant did not treat Whitton during the 

relevant time period, as Whitton did not begin receiving treatment from him until 

March 2012, which was more than one year after her date last insured—December 

31, 2010. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 

(providing that a claimant must demonstrate disability on or before the date last 

insured to demonstrate eligibility for disability insurance benefits). Although Dr. 

Grant stated that Whitton had suffered from moderate depression for 15 years and 

listed her disability onset date as before March 22, 2012, he never evaluated the 

severity of her conditions during the relevant time period. 

Even if Dr. Grant’s opinion applied to the relevant time period, good cause 

still existed for assigning no weight to his opinion. In particular, Dr. Grant’s own 

treatment notes contradicted his opinion that Whitton was severely depressed and 

had marked or extreme limitations in all areas of functioning. See Phillips, 357 

F.3d at 1241. His treatment notes from June 2012 show that Whitton’s insight and 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 8 of 12
9

judgment were fair, her thought process was logical, her thought content was 

within the normal limits, and she exhibited appropriate behavior. Likewise, in his 

notes from December 2012—only one month after opining that Whitton had 

marked or extreme limitations in all functioning areas—Dr. Grant indicated that 

Whitton’s sleep patterns, attention and concentration, appetite, and energy had all 

improved. 

The ALJ’s decision to give no weight to Dr. Grant’s opinion is also 

supported by other evidence in the record. Although the record contains limited 

evidence related to Whitton’s treatment from before the date she was last insured, 

the evidence that is in the record indicates that she received treatment at Quality of 

Life Health Services, Inc. in October 2010, and reported no issues with memory, 

interaction, or concentration. In a subsequent visit in November 2010, Whitton 

presented with normal affect, insight, judgment, attention span, and concentration, 

and reported no issues with memory. 

Additionally, Dr. Grant’s opinion conflicted with Whitton’s own description 

of her daily activities. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. Although Dr. Grant opined 

that the severity of Whitton’s mental health issues severely limited her daily life 

activities, Whitton stated on her application for disability benefits that she cooks 

breakfast, washes dishes, makes the bed, mops the floor, and gives her husband 

shots and takes him to doctor’s appointments. She also testified that she drove to 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 9 of 12
10

the disability hearing, which was a 45-minute drive from her home, and handled 

most of the family’s finances. 

We therefore reject Whitton’s contentions on appeal that the ALJ substituted 

his own opinion for that of Dr. Grant, as the record shows that the ALJ considered 

all of the medical evidence, clearly articulated reasons for rejecting Dr. Grant’s 

opinion, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. See Sryock v. 

Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that “the ALJ is free to reject 

the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion”). 

Based on the inconsistencies between Dr. Grant’s opinion and the record, including 

Dr. Grant’s own treatment notes, the ALJ had good cause for assigning no weight 

to the opinion. 

2. Opinion of Whitton’s Consulting Psychologist

Whitton asserts that the ALJ improperly substituted his own opinion for the 

opinion of Whitton’s consulting psychologist, Dr. Wilson. 

The record includes a November 2012 psychological evaluation from Dr. 

Wilson, in which he diagnosed Whitton with major depressive disorder, recurrent 

panic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. Moreover, in a January 

2013 mental health source statement, Dr. Wilson opined that Whitton had marked 

and extreme limitations in almost all areas of functioning. However, he further 

opined that she was only mildly or moderately limited in (1) the ability to

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 10 of 12
11

understand, remember, and carry out short, simple instructions, and (2) the ability 

to ask simple questions and request assistance. The ALJ gave no weight to Dr. 

Wilson’s opinion, concluding that his examination and opinion occurred after 

Whitton’s date last insured. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Wilson’s opinion 

was inconsistent with his own examination of Whitton and was not supported by 

other evidence in the record. 

Similar to the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Grant’s opinion, we conclude that the 

ALJ did not substitute his own opinion for Dr. Wilson’s because substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s articulation of good cause for assigning no weight to 

that opinion. As the ALJ correctly stated, Dr. Wilson’s psychological evaluation 

and mental health source statement, which were dated November 2012 and January 

2013, respectively, were rendered after Whitton’s date last insured, and did not 

address the severity of Whitton’s conditions during the relevant time period. 42 

U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. More importantly, Dr. 

Wilson’s opinion was inconsistent with his own examination of Whitton. 

Following his examination, Dr. Wilson diagnosed Whitton with borderline 

intellectual functioning and ultimately concluded that Whitton had significant 

medical problems that would cause difficulty in a work environment. Yet, he 

stated in the psychological evaluation that Whitton reported that she had done 

“excellent” in school, but had dropped out in the 10th grade because she got 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 11 of 12
12

married. Moreover, despite not obtaining a GED, Whitton received a degree in 

Office Business Education from the USA Training Academy in Hoover and 

“graduated at the top of the class.” As if that were not enough, Whitton was an 

office manager for approximately eight years, six of which were at a security firm. 

Likewise, in the January 2013 mental health source statement, he opined that 

Whitton was markedly limited in the ability to understand and remember detailed 

instructions and extremely limited in almost all areas of sustained concentration 

and persistence. However, in his evaluation of Whitton, he concluded that she had 

good mental control, attention, and concentration, as well as an adequate short term 

memory. Because Dr. Wilson’s examination of Whitton was clearly at odds with 

his ultimate findings and conclusions, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

decision to give it no weight. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159 (concluding that 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s rejection of treating physician’s medical 

opinion in part because it was inconsistent with physician’s own treatment notes). 

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s order affirming 

the Commissioner’s denial of Whitton’s application for disability insurance 

benefits. 

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 15-12357 Date Filed: 02/12/2016 Page: 12 of 12