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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 15-1544 

_____________ 

DOREEN BURGESS; 

RICHARD BURGESS, indiv & h/w, 

 Appellants 

v. 

DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC.; 

RANDI FREEMAN; 

JOHN DOES 1-10 

_______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. No. 2-14-cv-1727) 

District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell 

_______________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

January 26, 2016 

Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: February 9, 2016) 

 _______________ 

 OPINION

 

 _______________ 

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent. 

Case: 15-1544 Document: 003112201965 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/09/2016
2 

JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 

 Doreen Burgess appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing her claims of unlawful employment 

discrimination. We will affirm. 

I. Background1

Doreen Burgess was hired by Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (“Dollar Tree”) in 

December of 2010 and was promoted to the position of assistant manager soon thereafter. 

In January 2012, the store brought in Randi Freeman as Burgess’s new supervisor. 

Burgess argues that Freeman engaged in sexual harassment and religious discrimination 

from January 2012 until her termination a month later. Specifically, Burgess alleges that 

Freeman refused to sell “testimonial gum”2

 in the store (App. at 62a), and told Burgess 

that, if Burgess wore her necklace with a cross pendant to work again, Freeman would 

“rip it off” her neck (id. at 63a). Freeman also allegedly touched Burgess’s hair, told her 

it was soft, and asked if she would ever “go to the other side,” (which she took as a 

sexual advance) (id. at 62a), and she told Burgess that she wanted to transfer her so that 

she did not become “like another Cathy,” an employee who Freeman allegedly did not 

like (id. at 63a). Freeman also fired a friend of Burgess’s, which Burgess understood as 

indirect retaliation against her. Burgess believed that other employees had called the 

 1

 Because this case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, we accept the facts 

recited in the operative complaint as true, for purposes of appeal. Kaymark v. Bank of 

Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015). 

2

 From Burgess’s description, this is apparently gum bearing a religious message. 

Case: 15-1544 Document: 003112201965 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/09/2016
3 

corporate hotline to complain about Freeman’s behavior. Finally, Burgess alleges that 

Freeman “set [her] up” to get fired by telling her to show up for work at a time she had 

not been scheduled to work.3

 (Id. at 65a.)

 In March 2014, Burgess filed this suit in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County. Dollar Tree removed the case to the District Court on the basis of 

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Burgess’s initial complaint alleged 

violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) for religious and sexual orientation 

discrimination and retaliation, analogous violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations 

Act (“PHRA”), and loss of consortium. Dollar Tree moved to dismiss all but the 

retaliation claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), at which time Burgess 

filed an amended complaint. Dollar Tree again moved to dismiss the Title VII and 

PHRA discrimination claims4

 as well as the loss of consortium claim. The District Court 

granted that motion. Burgess moved for reconsideration of the District Court’s dismissal 

and its denial of Burgess’s request to amend the complaint a second time. The District 

Court rejected both motions. In January of 2015, Dollar Tree moved for summary 

judgment on the remaining retaliation claim. That motion was granted, concluding the 

case in the District Court. 

This timely appeal followed. 

 3

 While Burgess pled several other facts regarding alleged retaliation, those facts 

bear only on her retaliation claim, which was dismissed on summary judgment and 

waived on appeal. 

4

 In the same motion, Dollar Tree moved to dismiss both the Title VII 

discrimination and retaliation claims against the individual defendants on grounds that 

the statute does not provide for individual liability. 

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4 

II. Discussion5

Although Burgess brought numerous claims in the District Court, her appeal 

addresses only a single contention – that the District Court erred in dismissing her hostile 

work environment claim against Dollar Tree under Title VII and the PHRA.6

 Our review 

of the order of dismissal is plenary. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 

(3d Cir. 2015). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we consider only the complaint, 

accepting factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Id. “[W]e are not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and 

unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow 

v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, 

taken as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fleisher v. Standard 

 5

 The District Court had original jurisdiction over the federal claims in this case 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 

U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

6

 Burgess’s appeal, at least facially, could also be understood to contest the district 

court’s summary judgment decision, its dismissal of the claims against Randi Freeman 

and the other individual defendants, its dismissal of her religious discrimination claim, 

and its denial of her motion to amend her complaint a second time. But Burgess has 

forgone all of those claims. Her argument against summary judgment was explicitly 

waived, and she forfeited any argument as to the dismissal of claims against individual 

defendants, the dismissal of her religious discrimination claim, or denial of the motion to 

amend by failing to raise such arguments in her opening brief. In re Fosamax 

(Alendronate Sodium) Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(“We have consistently held that an issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening 

brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue ... will not suffice to bring 

that issue before this court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Case: 15-1544 Document: 003112201965 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/09/2016
5 

Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). 

To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim under Title VII and the 

PHRA,7

 Burgess must show “(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination 

because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the 

discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would 

detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the 

existence of respondeat superior liability.” Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. 

Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

An unpleasant work environment is not a good thing, but it is not necessarily actionable, 

either. Title VII is violated only “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory 

intimidation, ridicule, and insult ... that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to ... create an 

abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts “to determine whether an 

environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive by looking at all the circumstances, 

including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Faragher v. City of 

 7

 Because the protections of the PHRA replicate those of Title VII, we consider 

these claims together. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 

U.S. 53 (2006) (“The proper analysis under Title VII and the [PHRA] is identical, as 

Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two acts interchangeably.”). 

Case: 15-1544 Document: 003112201965 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/09/2016
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Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Title VII is not intended as a “general civility code,” and requires that “conduct 

must be extreme” to constitute the kind of “change in the terms and conditions of 

employment” the statute was intended to target. Id. at 788 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

 Burgess’s allegations, taken together and as true, do not suffice to state a plausible 

claim under that standard. None of the facts alleged demonstrate any meaningful 

frequency of the conduct towards Burgess, and only two instances, Freeman’s vague 

sexual advance and the threat to rip Burgess’s cross from her neck, could rightly be 

considered physically threatening or abusive. These two isolated instances do not 

represent the kind of pervasive prejudice, disparagement, and interference with one’s job 

functions necessary to make out a plausible hostile work environment claim. In short, 

Freeman’s behavior, while no doubt disturbing to Burgess if it occurred as alleged, does 

not reach the level of permeating intimidation, ridicule, and insult necessary to be 

considered severe or pervasive for purposes of Title VII. Consequently, the District 

Court’s conclusion that Burgess failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted 

was sound, and the decision to dismiss those claims was proper. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 

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