Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05939/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05939-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GURMUKH KAUR SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Respondents.

NO. C07-5939 TEH

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner Gurmukh Kaur Singh has been ordered removed from the United States

and, pending his removal to India, has been detained by United States Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since January 31, 2007. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, directing his release from custody. 

Respondents filed a timely answer, and Petitioner filed a timely traverse. After carefully

reviewing the parties’ written arguments, the record presented, and governing law, the Court

now DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute the underlying history of this case: Petitioner, a native and

citizen of India, entered the United States on April 7, 1999. Petitioner has no criminal

history and does not present any public-health or terrorism concerns. Upon entry, he was

issued a notice to appear, charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He subsequently filed a request for asylum and withholding of removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), as well as for protection under Article 3 of the Convention

Against Torture.

An immigration judge denied both requests on February 23, 2001. The Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed on April 9, 2003. Petitioner’s removal was stayed by

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the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on October 17, 2003, pending

appeal. On September 24, 2004, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, and the

mandate issued on November 16, 2004. ICE, a division of the Department of Homeland

Security, issued a warrant of removal/deportation for Petitioner on December 8, 2004.

The record becomes somewhat unclear at this point, but it is not disputed that

Petitioner failed to surrender for removal; the only lack of clarity concerns the respective date

or dates. Exhibit B to the Declaration of Ila C. Deiss is a notice from ICE, dated March 15,

2005, directing Petitioner to surrender on April 19, 2005. Exhibit C to the same declaration

purportedly gives a procedural history of this case but neglects to mention either the

March 15, 2005 notice or the April 19, 2005 surrender date. However, Exhibit C states that

notice to surrender on January 12, 2005, was issued on December 8, 2004, and that Petitioner

failed to surrender on the specified date. Thus, regardless of which set of dates is correct – or

perhaps two notices to surrender were issued and both are correct – it is not disputed that

Petitioner was given at least one notice to surrender for his removal and failed to do so.

On February 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his case before the BIA. 

That appeal was denied on April 11, 2005.

Petitioner was finally brought into ICE custody on January 31, 2007, after being

apprehended by the fugitive operations unit. While in custody, he filed a second motion to

reopen his case before the BIA, which denied the motion on April 30, 2007. Petitioner’s

appeal of that decision to the Ninth Circuit remains pending, and Petitioner has not sought a

stay of removal based on his pending appeal.

ICE officials completed a custody review of Petitioner’s file on May 3, 2007. That

review noted that a request for Petitioner’s travel documents was mailed to the General

Consulate of India in San Francisco, California, as well as to the Indian Embassy in

Washington, D.C., on March 9, 2007, but that, as of April 27, 2007, the request for travel

documents remained pending.

The review also noted that Petitioner failed to comply and fill out his travel document

application – an allegation that appears unfounded, given that a handwritten application,

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apparently signed by Petitioner, is attached as Exhibit E to the Deiss Declaration. On the

application for Petitioner’s travel documents, Petitioner’s name is listed as “Gurmukh SinghKaur,” and his date of birth as October 11, 1977. Ex. E to Deiss Decl. The application also

includes Petitioner’s signature and thumbprint and purports to attach a copy of Petitioner’s

driver’s license from the Government of Punjab. However, the driver’s license bears the

name “Lakhwinder Singh” with a date of birth of July 10, 1977.

The ICE reviewer recommended, based in part on the conclusion that Petitioner’s

prior failure to surrender voluntarily for removal rendered him a flight risk, that Petitioner be

retained in custody another 90 days until he could be removed from the United States after

obtaining the requisite travel documents. That recommendation was approved by the ICE

field office director on May 7, 2007.

On August 3, 2007, the field office director issued a decision to continue Petitioner’s

detention following a subsequent file review. The decision stated that, “[t]he Agency is

continuing its efforts to obtain a travel document for your removal to India. In addition[,]

your history of absconding from the Agency indicates that you present an unacceptable flight

risk.” Ex. F to Deiss Decl. To date, no travel documents for Petitioner have yet been issued.

DISCUSSION

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over Petitioner’s claims that he is

being unlawfully detained. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001). Although the

petition also discusses issues relevant to Petitioner’s asylum claims, Petitioner concedes that

he is barred from challenging his removal order in this Court by the REAL ID Act of 2005. 

Traverse at 1 n.1.

Once an alien has been ordered removed, “the Attorney General shall remove the alien

from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal

period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The removal period in this case began in November

2004, when the Ninth Circuit issued its “final order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). “The

removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and the alien may remain in

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detention during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses to make timely application

in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or conspires or

acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to an order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). 

The Supreme Court has held that detention for a total period of six months is

presumptively valid. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The Court further explained that:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with

evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to

remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement

grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely

would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does not

mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. 

To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been

determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.

Id.

In this case, although the Court is troubled by the length of time during which

Petitioner’s application for travel documents has been pending, it cannot say that Petitioner

has provided “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Petitioner’s case is unlike those considered by the

Supreme Court in Zadvydas because it is not disputed that Petitioner is a citizen of India, and

Petitioner has failed to provide any reason as to why India might reject his request for travel

documents or might not accept him upon removal due to, for example, a lack of repatriation

agreement with the United States. Compare id. at 684-86 (discussing facts of the cases

considered in Zadvydas). Similarly, Petitioner’s reliance on Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443

F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), is unhelpful because the petitioner in that case had been in custody

for nearly five years – a period “plainly unreasonable under any measure,” 443 F.3d at 1080

– and “had won relief at every administrative level,” id. at 1081, in contrast to the thirteen

months during which Petitioner has been detained and the repeated denials of Petitioner’s

appeal of his removal order in this case. Petitioner also cites Thai v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 967

(9th Cir. 2004), for support, but that citation is to a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc;

moreover, the cited language merely repeats the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas.

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Respondents contend that Petitioner will be removed from the United States as soon

as Petitioner receives travel documents from India, and nothing in the record belies that

contention. Nor does anything in the record indicate any reason why India might deny travel

documents or refuse to accept Petitioner. In addition, the reason for the delay in processing

Petitioner’s application for travel documents may be that Petitioner submitted a driver’s

license that bears a different name and birth date from his own, and Respondents’ conclusion

that Petitioner represents a flight risk is reasonable given Petitioner’s prior failure to

surrender for removal voluntarily when ordered to do so. Consequently, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s detention continues to be reasonable and lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), and

habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is therefore unwarranted.

However, as the Supreme Court explained, “for detention to remain reasonable, as the

period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable

future’ would conversely have to shrink.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Thus, should Singh

remain in custody for a substantial additional period of time without any clearer indication of

when travel documents might issue, it is possible that he may be able to demonstrate “good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” Id. Because habeas relief in that instance may be proper, the Court’s

denial of the instant petition shall be without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

With good cause appearing for the reasons discussed above, the petition for writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED without prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/07/08 

 THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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