Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03966/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03966-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY LEWIS HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD BIRDSONG,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-03966-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

TO FILE OPPOSITION TO MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 

FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), 

filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged a claim of deliberate 

indifference to medical needs against Defendant SVSP Physician Edward Birdsong, M.D., 

stemming from severe complications from treatment Plaintiff received from February and April 

2013. Dkt. 1 at 3. On January 6, 2016, the Court ordered service of process on Defendant. Dkt. 

9. 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 16.

Also before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 24. Plaintiff did 

not file a timely opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and instead, on October 19, 

2016, he filed a document entitled, “Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Responce 

[sic] to Defendant[’]s Motion for Summary Judgment.” Dkt. 26. 

The Court will resolve Plaintiff’s pending motions below.

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION 

TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In his “Motion for Extension of Time to File Responce [sic] to Defendant[’]s Motion for 

Summary Judgment,” Plaintiff makes a conclusory argument that outstanding discovery issues 

prevent him from filing an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 4. 

Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he served “discovery documents on Defendant Birdsong” on 

September 7, 2016, and that these “discovery documents are needed in order to oppose 

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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 5. Thus, the Court construes Plaintiff’s 

motion as a request for a continuance pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which 

involves a procedure by which a party may avoid summary judgment when such party has not had 

sufficient opportunity to discover affirmative evidence necessary to oppose the motion. See 

Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F. 2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987). In particular, Rule 56(d) provides 

that a court may deny a summary judgment motion and permit the opposing party to conduct 

discovery where it appears that the opposing party, in the absence of such discovery, is unable to 

present facts essential to opposing the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s request under Rule 56(d) and argue that Plaintiff failed to 

comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d), stating as follows:

[Plaintiff’s] brief and conclusory declaration does not identify the 

facts that the discovery would provide. He has not shown that the 

facts exist. He has not shown that the facts to be obtained from 

discovery are essential to oppose the motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff has not shown that the information he wishes to obtain from 

Dr. Birdsong would have any effect on the court’s determination of 

Defendant[’]s motion for summary judgment.

Dkt. 27 at 4 (brackets added). Furthermore, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not been diligent 

in seeking discovery. Id. at 5. Defendant claims that while Plaintiff had filed the instant 

complaint “more than fourteen months ago,” it was “undisputed that Plaintiff only recently 

propounded discovery.” Id. Defendant argues that “[i]t is not an abuse of discretion to deny a 

request to defer consideration of a motion for summary judgment where, as here, the movant has 

failed to diligently pursue discovery in the past.” Id. (citing California Union Ins. Co. v. Am. 

Diversified Sav. Bank, 914 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted)). 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant’s opposition. Dkt. 28. Plaintiff claims that 

he is seeking “initial discovery,” but he does not elaborate on what discovery he is seeking and 

why such discovery is necessary to oppose Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1. 

Instead, Plaintiff again makes a conclusory statement that “[t]he discovery sought is needed to 

oppose the Defendant[’]s motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 2. Finally, Plaintiff states that if 

the Court denies his Rule 56(d) motion, then he requests an extension of thirty days (from the date

of the Court’s ruling) to file his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

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Rule 56(d) allows the Court to defer consideration of a motion where “a nonmovant shows 

by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot represent facts essential to justify 

its opposition.” To obtain relief under Rule 56(d), “[t]he requesting party must show: (1) it has set 

forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts 

sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment.” Family 

Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Plaintiff failed to file the required affidavit setting forth specific facts he hopes to 

elicit from discovery, a deficiency that itself justifies denying the instant Rule 56(d) request. 

Specifically, Plaintiff fails to describe the specific facts that would be revealed or why this 

discovery would preclude summary judgment. “Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 

[56(d)] is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.” Brae 

Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

request for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(d) is DENIED.

However, the Court finds that a brief extension of time for Plaintiff to file his opposition is 

warranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “Motion for Extension of Time to File Responce [sic] to 

Defendant[’]s Motion for Summary Judgment” is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Dkt. 

26. As mentioned above, Plaintiff’s request for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(d) is DENIED. 

However, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s alternative request for a brief extension of time to file his 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The parties shall abide by the briefing schedule 

outlined below.

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On April 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order 

(“TRO”) in which he contended that he had an appointment at the SVSP Correctional Treatment 

Center on March 29, 2016, but he refused to be examined when he found the appointment was 

with Defendant. Dkt. 16 at 1-2. Plaintiff further alleges that he needs to be examined for 

“medical issues resultive [sic] of the prior medical treatment by Defendant Birdsong.” Id. at 1. 

However, Plaintiff claims that he “should not be denied further medical treatment proximate of 

refusing healthcare services from Defendant Birdsong.” Id. at 2. On May 9, 2016, Defendant 

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filed a response to the motion for a TRO. Dkt. 17. However, in an Order dated May 11, 2016, the 

Court determined that Defendant’s response was not supported with adequate factual 

documentation. Dkt. 18 at 1. The Court then directed Defendant to file further briefing on the 

motion for a TRO. Id. at 2. Thereafter, Defendant filed a second opposition to Plaintiff’s motion 

for a TRO along with his declaration. Dkts. 19, 19-1. In his declaration, Defendant claims that he

“does not treat [Plaintiff] directly.” Dkt. 19 at 3; Birdsong Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant further claims 

that Plaintiff has “ready access to the ‘D’ Yard physician and is not being denied medical 

treatment” at “the ‘D’ Yard Medical Clinic, which, except on rare occasions, is staffed by another 

physician.” Dkt. 19 at 3; Birdsong Decl. ¶ 5. 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Winter did not, however, 

completely reject the validity of the sliding scale approach to preliminary injunctions. Alliance for 

the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the “sliding scale” 

approach used in the Ninth Circuit—also dubbed the “serious question” test in Alliance for Wild 

Rockies—“the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing 

of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131. Thus, even after Winter, 

“serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff 

can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also 

met.” Id. at 1132 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. Dkt. 16. Plaintiff has not 

satisfied the Winter standard for a preliminary injunction because he has not established a 

likelihood of success on the merits of his deliberate indifference claim. The record shows that 

Defendant does not treat Plaintiff directly, and that Plaintiff has ready access to the “D” Yard 

physician and is not being denied medical treatment. Birdsong Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. Plaintiff also has not 

satisfied the Alliance for Wild Rockies standard because: (1) Plaintiff does not face irreparable 

harm in the absence of an injunction—the record shows he obtains medical treatment, as 

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necessary, even when he refuses treatment from Defendant, because the “D” Yard Medical Clinic 

is staffed by another physician, see Birdsong Decl. ¶ 4; and (2) granting Plaintiff’s request to 

require the CDCR to prohibit Defendant from providing any and all health care services to 

Plaintiff during this litigation is too broad a request that would adversely impact SVSP’s

operations and its ability to offer medical treatment to Plaintiff and its inmates, especially in light 

of the fact that on rare occasions, “it is possible that [Defendant] would see [Plaintiff] for [a] 

follow-up appointment” when Defendant “occasionally” fills in for the “D” Yard physician if he is 

absent, see id. Finally, to grant such a request from Plaintiff would result in the Court interfering

with the ordinary day-to-day operations of the prison, which generally federal courts are 

discouraged from doing. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (“Running a prison is an 

inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of 

resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches 

of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the 

responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial 

restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to 

accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO, which has been construed as a motion for a 

preliminary injunction, is DENIED. Dkt. 16.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Extension of Time to File Responce [sic] to Defendant[’]s 

Motion for Summary Judgment” is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Dkt. 26. Plaintiff’s 

request for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(d) is DENIED. However, Plaintiff’s request for a 

brief extension of time to file his opposition is GRANTED. The parties shall abide by the 

following briefing schedule:

a. No later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file 

his opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

b. Defendant shall file a reply no later than fourteen (14) days from the date 

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the opposition is filed.

c. No further extensions of time will be granted absent extraordinary 

circumstances.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO, which has been construed as a motion for a 

preliminary injunction, is DENIED. Dkt. 16.

3. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 16 and 26.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

January 10, 2017

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