Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01833/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01833-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD BEUTLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-1833 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

THE AMENDED

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff pro se commenced this action claiming that Defendant

illegally discriminated against him on the basis of his race and

disability. Defendant moves to dismiss the amended complaint on

the basis that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative

remedies and did not file the complaint within the limitations

period. Having considered the papers filed by both parties, the

Court grants Defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a United States Postal Service employee. On

March 9, 2006, he filed a form complaint for employment

discrimination, alleging that he was discriminated against based on

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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his race (white) and mental disability (attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder) when he was suspended for seven days for

failing to follow instructions. The alleged discrimination

occurred on or about March 26, 2005. According to the complaint,

Plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) on or about June 14, 2005.

The EEOC issued a final decision on June 30, 2005; Plaintiff

states that he received it on or about August 1, 2005. The

decision, which is attached to the complaint, states that Plaintiff

first sought counseling from the Postal Service’s office of Equal

Employment Opportunity (EEO) on May 25, 2005. It notes that

Plaintiff should have sought EEO counseling forty-five days after

the alleged discrimination occurred on March 26, 2005. Because he

did not, his complaint was dismissed as untimely. The EEOC advised

Plaintiff that if he was dissatisfied with the decision, he “may

file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

within 90 calendar days” of his receipt of the final decision. 

EEOC Decision at 2 (emphasis in original).

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies and to file within the

limitations period. The Court granted Defendant’s motion, but

granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege facts

showing that he had exhausted his claims and that they were not

barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 23, 2007. 

The amended complaint contains many of the same allegations

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1The amended complaint does not contain a statement of the

underlying facts supporting Plaintiff’s discrimination claim; it

contains only the allegations he added to avoid dismissal based on

failure to exhaust and the statute of limitations. However,

because pro se complaints should be read liberally, the Court

construes the amended complaint to incorporate the allegations set

forth in the original complaint.

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Plaintiff made in opposing Defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss.1

Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff “didn’t

find out that he was discriminated against until the grievance was

settled a month and a half later do [sic] to a union officer of the

NALC being on vacation for a month and this is what made the delay

of the settlement of this grievance.” Am. Compl. at 1. The

amended complaint also states that Plaintiff attempted to commence

the present action on September 23, 2005 by leaving the complaint

in the court’s after-hours drop box. He claims he did not learn

that the complaint had not been filed until he inquired with the

court clerk on March 9, 2006. On that date, he completed and filed

a duplicate complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist

at the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). A Rule 12(b)(1)

motion may either attack the sufficiency of the pleadings to

establish federal jurisdiction, or allege an actual lack of

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jurisdiction which exists despite the formal sufficiency of the

complaint. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594

F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). “A district court may hear evidence

and make findings of fact necessary to rule on the subject matter

jurisdiction question prior to trial, if the jurisdictional facts

are not intertwined with the merits.” Rosales v. United States,

824 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1987). Under these circumstances, the

allegations in the complaint are not presumed to be true. Id.; see

also McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988)

(district court “may review any evidence, such as affidavits and

testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of

[subject matter] jurisdiction”).

Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes to

the power of the court to hear the case. A federal court is

presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction until the contrary

affirmatively appears. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes,

873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). An action should not be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without giving

the plaintiff an opportunity to amend unless it is clear that the

jurisdictional deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. May Dep’t

Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980). 

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

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only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964

(2007). However, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

at 1964–65 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations

“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at

1965.

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a

claim, all material allegations will be taken as true and construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the court is

generally confined to consideration of the allegations in the

pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached documents,

such documents are deemed part of the complaint and may be

considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, a court examines whether the complaint could be

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2

Plaintiff states that he brings this action under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The federal government is

not an employer within the meaning of the ADA, however, and thus

Plaintiff’s disability claim must proceed under the Rehabilitation

Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(1).

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amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims because he did not contact an EEO counselor

within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination and thus did

not exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendant also argues

that Plaintiff did not file this action within ninety days of

receiving his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, and therefore his

claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before bringing a federal employment discrimination claim

under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act,2

 a plaintiff must first

exhaust his or her administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707-08

(9th Cir. 2001); Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2003). Exhaustion requires compliance with any applicable

regulations governing when and how complaints must be made. See

Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995). According

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to EEOC regulations, a federal employee “must initiate contact with

[an EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged

to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45

days of the effective date of the action." 29 C.F.R.

§ 1614.105(a)(1). Failure to comply with this regulation is “fatal

to a federal employee’s discrimination claim.” Lyons v. England,

307 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As noted above, according to the final EEOC decision,

Plaintiff did not contact an EEO counselor within forty-five days

of the alleged discriminatory act. The amended complaint states

that Plaintiff did not learn that he had been discriminated against

until his union grievance was settled, at which time the fortyfive-day period had already passed. Aside from Plaintiff’s vague

assertion that he “didn’t find out all of the fact [sic] of this

case when [he] had time to do so,” he does not explain how the

resolution of his grievance informed his belief that he had been

discriminated against. Nor do the grievance documents attached to

the amended complaint provide any insight into the circumstances

surrounding Plaintiff’s discovery of the alleged discrimination.

Plaintiff also claims that “it took the EEO Office from May 6,

2005 until May 26, 2005 to make the case an EEO case.” It is not

clear what Plaintiff means by this. In any event, the amended

complaint does not contend that he contacted an EEO counselor

within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination, as he was

required to do.

Because the amended complaint neither alleges that Plaintiff

contacted an EEO counselor within forty-five days of his suspension

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nor establishes that Plaintiff could not reasonably have suspected

he had been discriminated against until his union grievance was

settled, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not exhausted his

administrative remedies. Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied the

statutory precondition to bringing a claim under Title VII or the

Rehabilitation Act. See Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762,

768, n.5 (9th Cir. 1991).

II. Statute of Limitations

A plaintiff must bring a claim under Title VII or the

Rehabilitation Act within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue

letter from the EEOC. See, e.g., Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d

264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992). It is not disputed that the complaint

in this action was not filed within the ninety-day period. 

However, Plaintiff impliedly argues that the Court should apply the

doctrine of equitable tolling to excuse his late filing.

Equitable tolling may be invoked to “excuse a claimant's

failure to comply with the time limitations where she had neither

actual nor constructive notice of the filing period.” Leorna v.

U.S. Dep’t of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997). “If a

reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a

possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable

tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing

suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.” 

Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, courts apply the doctrine of equitable tolling only

sparingly, and are “much less forgiving in receiving late filings

where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving

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his legal rights.” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.

89, 96 (1990).

As made clear by the EEOC’s final decision, Plaintiff was

informed that he had ninety days after receiving the decision to

file an action in federal district court. This action was not

filed until March 9, 2006, months after the ninety-day window had

passed. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff contends that he

actually attempted to file the action on September 23, 2005 by

leaving the complaint in the court’s after-hours drop box. In

explaining why he did not realize until March 9, 2006 that the case

had not been filed, he states that he “didn’t know how long it

would take for the court to respond to the case.” Am. Compl. at 1.

Even if the Court were to give full credence to Plaintiff’s

allegation that his failure to file on time was due to the clerk’s

error, and even if equitable tolling could be invoked to excuse

Plaintiff for this error, Plaintiff’s subsequent actions

demonstrate a lack of the required due diligence. If Plaintiff had

promptly attempted to confirm with the clerk’s office that his

complaint had been received, he would have learned that it had not,

and he would have been able to re-file the complaint in time to

meet the ninety-day deadline. Instead, he waited nearly six months

before establishing that his case had not been filed and taking

appropriate action. While Plaintiff points to his unfamiliarity

with the workings of the federal courts to explain his delay, a

reasonably diligent pro se litigant unfamiliar with the court’s

filing procedures would have followed up by attempting to contact

the court after leaving a complaint in the court’s after-hours drop

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box. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff inexcusably

failed to file his action within the appropriate limitations

period.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket No. 21). Because

the amended complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome

the shortcomings for which the original complaint was dismissed

previously, it is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter

judgment in favor of Defendant and close the file. Each party

shall bear its own costs of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/11/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD BEUTLER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN E. POTTER et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-01833 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on October 11, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

James A. Scharf

Office of the United States Attorney

150 Almaden Blvd., Suite 900

San Jose, CA 95113

Richard Beutler

2780 Goodwin Ave.

Redwood City, CA 94061

Dated: October 11, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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