Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00040/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN A. GISSLER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-CV-40- IEG (JMA)

ORDER 

1. GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS;

2. DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STRIKE

[Doc. No. 6.]

vs.

CITIMORTGAGE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss and strike pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f), respectively. [Doc. No. 6.] For

the reasons below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and motion to

strike is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is a mortgage case. Plaintiff John Gissler asserts claims of wrongful

foreclosure, to quiet title, for slander of title, for declaratory relief, and under the

Truth in Lending Act and Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, all premised on a

purportedly wrongful foreclosure. [Doc. No. 1.] Defendant moves to dismiss all

claims and to strike the demand for punitive damages. 

DISCUSSION

Even affording every benefit of the doubt, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege

sufficient facts to support any cognizable legal theory. Thus, to the extent and for

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the additional reasons specified below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to strike is procedurally improper and thus

DENIED.

I. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Motions to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) test the sufficiency of this

required showing. New Mexico State Investment Council v. Ernst & Young LLP,

641 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). “Dismissal is proper when the complaint does

not make out a cognizable legal theory or does not allege sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d

1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff’s claims premised on California Civil Code sections 2923, [see Doc.

No. 1 at 19], constitute wrongful foreclosure claims. See Small v. Mortgage

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 3719314, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16,

2010). Wrongful foreclosure claims require allegations of credible tender. See

Alicia v. G.E. Money Bank, 2009 WL 2136969, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2009)

(“When a debtor is in default of a home mortgage loan, and a foreclosure is either

pending or has taken place, the debtor must allege a credible tender of the amount of

the secured debt to maintain any cause of action for wrongful foreclosure.”). 

Plaintiff fails to make any such allegation. [See Doc. No. 1.] But amendment could

potentially cure this deficiency, and thus Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claims are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Quiet Title Claim

 So too, a “quiet title action is doomed in the absence of Plaintiffs’ tender of

the full amount owed.” Gjurovich v. Cal., 2010 WL 4321604, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct.

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26, 2010). Because Plaintiff fails to allege tender, see supra, his quiet title claim is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. Slander of Title Claim

Slander of title claims require “(1) a publication, (2) which is without

privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and

immediate pecuniary loss.” Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc., 173

Cal.App.4th 1040, 1050 (2009). Plaintiff does not allege that the notice of default at

issue was false, much less how such falsity caused direct and immediate pecuniary

loss. [See Doc. No. 1.] These deficiencies are fatal, see Velasco v. Security Nat.

Mortg. Co., 823 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1069 (D. Hawai’i 2011), but could be cured by

amendment, and thus Plaintiff’s slander of title claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. 

4. TILA Claims

Plaintiff’s TILA claims for damages are subject to a one-year statute of

limitation that may, under certain circumstances, be equitably tolled. King v.

California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). The statute runs from the date the

subject loan was consummated. See King, 784 F.2d at 915; see also McOmie-Gray

v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s

complaint was filed on January 8, 2013, [see Doc. No. 1], nearly seven years after

the subject loan was consummated on September 20, 2006, [see Doc. No. 8-1, Ex.

A], and no basis for equitable tolling has been pled. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at

1045 (equitable tolling only available “in situations where, despite all due diligence,

the party . . . is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the

claim.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s TILA claims are untimely and barred. See King, 784 F.2d

at 915. Because amendment could potentially provide a basis for equitable tolling,

Plaintiff’s TILA claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

5. FDCPA

Claims under the FDCPA are only viable against debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. §

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1692(a)(6). Here, Defendants do not qualify as debt collectors. See Vieira v.

Prospect Mortg., LLC, 2012 WL 3356947, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2012)

(“Originators of loans secured by real property and their assignees . . . are not debt

collectors, and therefore are not subject to the FDCPA.”). This deficiency cannot be

cured through amendment, and thus Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

6. Declaratory Relief Claim

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is premised on the alleged securitization

of his mortgage and seeks confirmation that Defendants have authority to foreclose

notwithstanding the alleged securitization. [Doc. No. 1 at 13-15.] “[A]s a general

rule, plaintiffs may not bring actions for proof of a defendant’s authority to

foreclose.” Vieira, 2012 WL 3356947, at *4. “Nor does improper securitization

excuse a borrower from loan repayment obligations.” Id. Rather, even if

established, “securitization merely creates a separate contract, distinct from [a

borrower’s] debt obligations under the Note, and does not change the relationship of

the parties in any way.” Moseley v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 5175598, at *7

(W.D. Wash. Oct.31, 2011). As such, the declaration Plaintiff seeks would provide

no grounds for relief. Id. Because Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim fails to “make

out a cognizable legal theory,” see Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041, it is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. 

II. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Rule 12(f) does not authorize district courts to strike claims

for damages.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.

2010). Defendants compound this procedural error by invoking inapplicable

California pleading standards. [See Doc. No. 6 at 17-18.] “Although in [a] diversity

action [state] substantive law is to be applied to determine the ultimate validity of the

plaintiff’s claims, the Federal Rules govern issues concerning the adequacy of the

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pleadings.” Clement v. American Greetings Corp., 636 F.Supp 1326, 1329 (S.D.

Cal. 1986) (citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Hanna v.

Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 485 (1965)). Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

and DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike. Plaintiff’s FDCPA and declaratory

relief claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s wrongful

foreclosure, quiet title, slander of title, and TILA claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint

no later than July 29, 2013, including only, and curing the defects specified above in

regard to, those claims dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 19, 2013 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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