Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04244/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04244-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARP CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AU OPTRONICS CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-03-4244 MMC

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

CONTINUING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Before the Court are two motions for partial summary judgment filed by defendants. 

Plaintiff has filed opposition to each motion, and defendants have filed replies. The matters

came on regularly for hearing June 10, 2005. Having considered the papers filed in

support of and in opposition to the motions, and the arguments of counsel, the Court rules

as follows.

I. Defendants’ Motion Re: Sales Outside United States

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s damages claims

arising from sales defendants made outside the United States to customers who, in turn,

import or sell allegedly infringing products in the United States.

First, contrary to defendants’ argument, plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to

create a triable issue of fact as to defendants’ intent to induce their customers located

outside the United States (“non-U.S. customers”) to sell infringing products in the United

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States. Specifically, plaintiff has offered evidence that defendants, with knowledge of

plaintiff’s patents, marketed their allegedly infringing component products to U.S.

companies interested in purchasing finished products incorporating such components,

(see, e.g., Harris Decl., filed May 20, 2005, Ex B at 13, 17-18, Ex. D at 10-11, Ex. CC at 9),

and that defendants sold such allegedly infringing component products to non-U.S.

companies, knowing those non-U.S. customers intended to incorporate defendants’

component products into the finished products those non-U.S. companies sell directly to

the above-referenced U.S. companies, (see, e.g., Strickland Decl., filed May 20, 2005, Ex.

D at 18-19).

Second, contrary to defendants’ argument, plaintiff is not estopped from offering

expert testimony to calculate by means of approximation the number of infringing products

sold in the United States by parties who purchased, outside the United States, accused

component products from defendants; in particular, plaintiff did not previously assert an

“inconsistent position” regarding the manner by which it could prove the amount of such

sales. See Humetrix, Inc. v. Gemplus S.C.A., 268 F. 3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding

doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes party from “asserting inconsistent positions in the

same litigation”). Plaintiff’s previous statement that it could “only” obtain the actual number

of sales from the sellers directly, (see, e.g., Fox Decl., filed May 7, 2005, Ex. 4 at 4), is not

inconsistent with plaintiff’s current position that, in the absence of plaintiff’s having obtained

evidence from the sellers directly, plaintiff can rely on market research data to approximate

the number of such sales, (see, e.g., Strickland Decl. Ex. A ¶¶ 52-56).

Finally, defendants have failed to offer evidence, from an economist or otherwise, to

support their argument that the methodology employed by plaintiff’s damages expert, Allyn

D. Strickland, is not reliable under the test set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Imonex Services, Inc. v. W.H.

Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, — F. 3d —, 2005 WL 1204855 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(holding, where plaintiff “did not present any competent testimony of its own” to support

argument defendant’s opinion was “unreliable” under Daubert, district court did not err by

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admitting testimony of defendant’s expert).

II. Defendants’ Motion Re: Infringement/Invalidity

A. United States Patent 4,649,383 (“‘383 Patent”)

In light of defendants’ pending motion to strike certain evidence offered by plaintiff in

support of plaintiff’s opposition to this portion of the instant motion, the hearing with respect

to the merits of plaintiff’s infringement claim is continued to July 1, 2005, the date set for

hearing on defendants’ motion to strike.

B. United States Patent 5,028,122 (“‘122 Patent”)

1. Infringement

Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot establish defendants’ products infringe

certain claims of the ‘122 Patent.

Because defendants’ argument is based on defendants’ proposed construction of

“gate line,” the Court first construes that term.” Plaintiff argues that “gate line” should be

construed according to its ordinary meaning, which, plaintiff submits, is “a conductor that

connects a plurality of gate electrodes.” (See Pl.’s Opp., filed May 20, 2005, at 10:16-17). 

Defendants do not argue that “gate line” has an ordinary meaning different from that

proffered by plaintiff; rather, defendants argue that in the instant patent, the proper

construction includes an additional limitation that the “gate line” is a “separate” component

from the gate electrode. (See Defs.’ Mot., filed May 6, 2005, at 10:21-22).

Defendants, in support of their argument that gate lines are “separate” components

from gate electrodes, rely primarily on language in claim 1 providing for “gate lines each

connecting a plurality of said gate electrodes.” See ‘122 Patent, col. 5, lines 35-37. To the

extent the word “connect” might suggest gate lines and gate electrodes are separate

components, the specification, which is the “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed

term,” see Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F. 3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996),

suggests otherwise. See id. (holding “specification is always highly relevant to the claim

construction analysis”). Specifically, the figures illustrating the preferred embodiment show

the gate line as an extension of the gate electrode and without a break between them. See

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The applicant stated as follows: “Further, with regard to claims 13 and 20, each

gate line overlaps the peripher[y] of a plurality of adjacent picture element electrodes, to

thereby minimize light from leaking from each of the picture element electrodes. The area

where each of the picture element electrodes overlaps each of the gate electrodes is

preferably, as claimed in claims 13 and 20, located in a long, narrow strip fashion on the

outskirts of the picture element electrodes.” (See id.) (emphasis added).

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Defendants do not offer any extrinsic evidence, from their expert or otherwise, to

support a finding that persons skilled in the art would understand “gate line” and “gate

electrode,” as those terms are used in the ‘122 Patent, to refer to two separate

components.

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‘122 Patent, Figure 1a. Consistent therewith, the specification states that the gate

electrode “can include a gate line.” See id., col. 4, lines 14-16. In other words, the

specification teaches that the gate line and gate electrode are not two “separate”

components.

Such construction is supported by the prosecution history, in which the applicant,

while discussing claims later allowed as claims 8 and 15, used the terms “gate line” and

“gate electrode” interchangeably. (See Dang Decl., filed May 6, 2005, Ex. 3 at SHC

000894.)1 Such construction is further supported by the only extrinsic evidence offered as

to the meaning of the two terms to those skilled in the art. Specifically, plaintiff’s expert

testified that “a particular part of the gate metal may be part of both a gate electrode and a

gate line.” See Silzars Decl., filed May 20, 2005, ¶ 23; Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 182 F. 3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing district court may consider

extrinsic evidence “to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent file

is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings

in the pertinent technical field”).2

Accordingly, the Court construes “gate line” to mean “a conductor that connects a

plurality of gate electrodes.”

Because defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of infringement of

the ‘122 Patent is dependent on the Court’s accepting defendants’ proposed construction of

“gate line,” defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of infringement of

the ‘122 Patent.

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As defendants point out, plaintiff does not argue in its opposition that claim 9 is

valid. Plaintiff’s lack of argument, however, does not warrant entry of summary judgment. 

See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F. 3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding moving party

not entitled to summary judgment, even if no opposition filed, unless moving party

establishes lack of triable issues). This is particularly true as to a claim of invalidity

because a patent holder does not have the initial burden to prove validity. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”)

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2. Invalidity

Defendants, alternatively, seek summary judgment on their affirmative defense and

counterclaim that claims 1, 4, 7, 9, and 10 of the ‘122 Patent are invalid. Defendants,

however, have failed to establish, as a matter of law, any such claims are invalid.

First, as to claim 9, defendants have failed to show that, as a matter of law, such

claim is anticipated by or obvious from Japanese Patent Publication 60-230118 to Oota

(“Oota”). Although plaintiff’s expert testified that a device illustrated in Oota includes the

same elements as those set forth in claim 9, (see Dang Decl. Ex. 18 at 114:2-118:16),

defendants have not offered any expert opinion to support a finding that the manner in

which claim 9 discloses the arrangement of those elements is disclosed in or obvious from

Oota. See Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen Gmbh & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.

3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s finding patent was valid where

defendant failed to offer expert opinion as to why prior art references rendered patent

invalid; rejecting defendant’s argument that “district court should have read the cited

references and determined for itself whether they could invalidate the [plaintiff’s] patents”).3

Second, as to claims 1, 4, 7, and 10, defendants have failed to show that, as a

matter of law, any of such claims is invalid as anticipated by or obvious from Oota, the Luo

1985 article, or U.S. Patent No. 4,955,697, for the reason that plaintiff has offered sufficient

evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude such prior art references do not

invalidate claims 1, 4, 7, or 10. (See Silzars Decl. ¶¶ 33-63.) Moreover, even if such

evidence had not been offered by plaintiff, defendants, as with claim 9, would not be

entitled to judgment, for the reason that defendants have not offered any expert opinion in

support of their invalidity argument. See Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen, 249 F. 3d

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at 1353.

C. United States Patent 5,280,372 (“‘372 Patent”)

Defendants argue that certain of the accused products do not infringe the ‘372

Patent because such products lack one of the required components, specifically, a “slide

mechanism.”

Each claim of the ‘372 Patent includes a limitation that the invention has a “slide

mechanism for allowing [a] reflector to be slidably detached from [a] light transmitting

plate.” See ‘372 Patent, col. 4, lines 6-7. Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff’s expert

testified he was personally able to, or witnessed others, slidably detach a reflector located

in defendants’ accused products, after metal tabs in the accused products were bent back

or removed and/or after screws in such products were removed. (See, e.g., Presta Decl.,

filed May 20, 2005, Ex. 2 at 329-331.) Defendants argue, however, that bending tabs

and/or removing tabs or screws from the accused products constitutes an impermissible

modification of the product. See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F. 3d

1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding evidence accused product was “capable of being

modified” to operate in infringing manner insufficient to support finding of infringement).

As pointed out by plaintiff at the hearing, the figures illustrating the preferred

embodiment of the device claimed in the ‘372 Patent show the claimed device has screws

to hold the components, including the reflector, in place, see ‘372 Patent, Fig. 3, and that,

to remove the slidably-detachable reflector, the outer frame with tabs must be removed

from the device, see id., Fig. 4. In other words, the preferred embodiment itself includes

tabs and/or screws that retain the reflector in place, and must be bent or removed before

the reflector can be “slidably detached.” Consequently, evidence that the reflector in the

accused products cannot be removed without bending tabs and/or removing tabs or screws

is insufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that the accused products are non-

//

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The object of the claimed invention, as set forth in the specification, is to provide a

liquid crystal device in which it is “easy to exchange a built-in light source.” See id., col. 1,

lines 34-36. To the extent defendants argue that the tabs and/or screws employed in the

accused products function to make exchange of the reflector difficult, such argument does

not entitle defendants to summary judgment, in light of the testimony of plaintiff’s expert

that it was not “difficult” to bend tabs and/or remove tabs and screws in the accused

products. (See Presta Decl., filed May 20, 2005, Ex. 2 at 331:9-20.)

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infringing.4

Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of

infringement of the ‘372 Patent.

D. United States Patent 5,335,102 (“‘102 Patent”)

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their affirmative defense and

counterclaim that claim 1 of the ‘102 Patent is invalid as anticipated by either Japanese

Patent Publication 59-101693 or Japanese Patent Publication 64-48037, for the reason that

plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude such prior

art does not invalidate claim 1. (See Fonash Decl., filed May 20, 2005, ¶¶ 17-34.) 

Moreover, even if such evidence had not been offered by plaintiff, defendants would not be

entitled to summary judgment, having failed to offer any expert opinion in support of their

invalidity contentions. See Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen, 249 F. 3d at 1353 (“It is

not the trial judge’s burden to search through lengthy technologic documents for possible

evidence.”).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of non-U.S. sales

is hereby DENIED.

2. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of infringement

and invalidity is hereby DENIED, to the extent the motion pertains to the ‘122, ‘372 and

‘102 Patents. To the extent the motion pertains to the ‘383 Patent, the hearing on the

motion is CONTINUED to July 1, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June ___, 2005 /s/ Maxine M. Chesney 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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