Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06030/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06030-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Linda S. McMahon became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

DAVID A. CRUMPTON PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-6030

LINDA S. MCMAHON, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff, David Crumpton, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On May 15, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $2550.00 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 17 attorney hours work before the court at

an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour. (Doc. # 11). The defendant has filed a response, expressing

no objection to the award of fees but points out that plaintiff’s counsel has requested a fee of

$150.00 based on a portion of counsel’s normal hourly rate for other civil actions, rather than a

cost of living increase as evidence by the consumer price index . (Doc. 14). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

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the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the record, we find plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

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or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.

1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the

absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th

Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

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Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $150.00 an hour based on

the normal hourly rate charged by attorneys in similar matters. However, attorney's fees may not

be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) -

unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision

to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court.

McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th

Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested

proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than

$75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff’s counsel did not attach

a summary of the Consumer Price Index or present evidence of an increase in the cost of living.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is not entitled to an award above the maximum statutory

$125.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 3.25 hours of attorney work

performed between April 4, 2005, and April 28, 2005. The Complaint was not filed in this court

until April 28, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note that time spent at the administrative level is not

compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984).

However, the time submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the

filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we will allow 2.00 hours and deduct 1.25

hours from counsel’s total number of compensable hours. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 5.75 hours for reviewing the consent forms, signing

and returning the consent forms, preparing a letter to plaintiff, preparing three affidavits,

reviewing defendant’s answer, reviewing the court’s memorandum opinion and judgment,

preparing a letter to his client, and preparing the EAJA pleadings. However, this time cannot be

compensated, in full, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d

881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not

compensable under the EAJA). The amount of time claimed is also excessive, given the nature

of the tasks performed. Therefore, we will deduct 2.60 hours.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 13.15

(17-3.85) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour for a total attorney’s fee award

of $1,643.75. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits

which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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