Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01390/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01390-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER LANDON BUSTIN,

Booking # 14754438,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S 

MEDICAL SERVICES DIVISION; 

ALFRED JOSHUA, M.D.; SAN DIEGO 

COUNTY SHERIFFS; WILLIAM GORE

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01390-BEN-JMA

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[Doc. No. 2]

2) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL

[Doc. No. 5]

AND

3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff, Christopher Landon Bustin, is a pretrial detainee at the Vista Detention 

Facility. He has filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requests leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and the appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(a) and (e)(1) (Doc. Nos. 2, 5). Because Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP 

complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court grants him leave to proceed without full 

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prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but denies his motion 

for appointment of counsel and dismisses his complaint for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his San Diego

Sheriff’s Department inmate trust account activity. See Doc. No. 2 at 5; 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that 

he is unable to pay any initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that 

“[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a 

civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay [a] initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing 

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of 

funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to “exact” any 

initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has no means to pay it,” 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Watch Commander at the Vista Detention 

Facility to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 

and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff also asks the Court to appoint counsel in this matter. (Doc. No. 5.) There 

is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 

U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). And while 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to “request” that an 

attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 

1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion may be exercised only under “exceptional 

circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider whether there is a 

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‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is unable to articulate his 

claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Harrington v. Scribner, 

785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice because nothing in either 

Plaintiff’s complaint or his motion suggests he is incapable of articulating the factual 

basis for his inadequate medical care claims. However, at this initial stage of the 

pleadings, any evaluation of Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is premature. 

Id. Therefore, the Court finds no exceptional circumstances justify the appointment of 

counsel at this time. 

III. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

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as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

2. Inadequate Medical Care

Plaintiff’s factual allegations are not entirely clear but it appears that he claims that 

he has been denied a prescription medication which was prescribed by his doctors prior to 

his incarceration. (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff claims that medical officials at the Vista 

Detention Facility have provided him with less effective pain medication pursuant to a 

“Zero Tolerance Protection Policy.” (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff believes that he is being 

provided an inadequate medication because it does not contain a narcotic. (Id.) 

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier 

v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s 

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Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims 

alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from “herniated discs and neuropathy.” 

(Compl. at 3.) For the purposes of this stage of the screening process, the Court will view 

Plaintiff’s facts in the light most favorable to him and find that he has alleged that his

medical needs were objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 

(9th Cir. 1991) (defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat ... 

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.’”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). The “existence 

of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples 

of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 

F.3d at 1059-60.

However, even assuming Plaintiff’s medical condition is “objectively serious,” 

nothing in his Complaint supports a “reasonable inference that [any individual] 

defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In 

order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate 

that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 

302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate 

treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990)). 

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Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are based on a difference of opinion as to the type of 

pain medication he required. However, a difference of opinion between a pretrial 

detainee and the doctors or other trained medical personnel at the Jail as to the 

appropriate course or type of medical attention he requires does not amount to deliberate 

indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. 

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate 

course of treatment does not by itself show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is 

alleged to have caused harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of 

State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Without more, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint currently amounts only to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmedme accusation[s],” which “stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

‘entitlement to relief’” as to any constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

4. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint 

fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to 

fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. 

IV. Conclusion

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel without prejudice (Doc. No. 

5); 

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2).

/ / /

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3. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of the Vista Detention Facility, or his 

designee, to collect from Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by 

garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent 

(20%) of the preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of 

the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME 

AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, Vista Detention Facility, 325 S. Melrose Drive, Vista, California 92081.

5. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

6. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be 

complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim 

not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

7. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2016

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