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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

THOMAS E. RICKY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MAPCO, INC., a Delaware 

Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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No. 93-5214 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAf~ 2 1 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerlt 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CV-91-879-E) 

Karen L. Long, Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John T. Schmidt, Conner & Winters 

Kevin Morrison, Conner & Winters; 

with him on the brief), Tulsa, 

Appellee. 

(Randolph L. Jones, Jr. and c. 

James N. Cundiff, Mapco, Inc., 

Oklahoma, for the DefendantBefore BRORBY, SETH, and LAY, Circuit Judges.• 

LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal by Thomas E. Ricky from the judgment of the 

district court denying him damages in an age discrimination case 

•Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge for the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-5214 Document: 01019282441 Date Filed: 03/21/1995 Page: 1 
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. 

§§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) ("ADEA"). The case was tried by 

a jury which found Ricky's former employer, Mapco, Inc. ("Mapco"), 

discriminated against him in violation of the ADEA. The jury, 

however, denied Ricky any damages, finding Mapco would have 

terminated him in any case if it had known about certain incidents 

of prior misconduct. Thus, Ricky was denied damages based upon the 

so-called "after-acquired evidence doctrine." This appeal 

followed. At the time the present case was argued, McKennon v. 

Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 s. Ct. 879 (1995), a case 

involving the after-acquired evidence doctrine, was pending before 

the Supreme Court of the United states. The Court rendered its 

decision in McKennon on January 23, 1995. On the basis of that 

decision, we now reverse and remand for a new trial limited to the 

issue of damages. 

BACKGROUND 

Ricky was an attorney at Mapco from 1980 until he was 

terminated in November 1989. In late 1991, he filed this action 

claiming Mapco terminated him because of his age in violation of 

the ADEA and Oklahoma public policy. Mapco asserted an affirmative 

defense, urging Ricky's claim was barred because he had sexually 

harassed a Mapco secretary and that if Mapco had known about these 

incidents, it would have terminated him for that misconduct. On 

this basis, it argues that neither backpay nor any other remedy is 

available to Ricky under the ADEA. 

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Mapco offered evidence that- Ricky had sexually harassed his 

secretary, Jane Malone, from the time he was hired until she left 

Mapco' s employment because of performance problems, which were 

unrelated to her work for Ricky, in December 1987. After her 

termination, Malone filed suit against Mapco in December 1989, 

claiming Mapco had discriminated against· her. Among Malone's 

allegations were charges that Ricky had sexually harassed her. 1 

In Ricky's ADEA action against Mapco, the district court 

bifurcated the trial into two parts: liability and damages. After 

the liability phase, the jury returned a verdict for Ricky, finding 

Mapco liable for age discrimination. During the damage phase of 

the trial, the district court allowed Mapco to present evidence 

that it would have terminated Ricky for his misconduct involving 

Malone if it had been aware of it. The court instructed the jury: 

"Thus, in this case, if you find that the defendant would have 

terminated plaintiff if it had known that certain legitimate reason 

or reasons existed for his termination--and that reason(s) alone 

1

In a deposition prepared in connection with the litigation 

between Mapco and Malone, Malone alleged that Ricky took her out 

for drinks after work and propositioned her. She told him she 

would not accept his proposition because she did not want to "mix 

business with pleasure." Appellant's App. at 360. Ricky admitted 

that he propositioned Malone in late 1981 or early 1982, but 

claimed that his advances ended there. Malone stated in her 

deposition that over the next few years, Ricky continued to ask her 

occasionally whether she "still [did not] mix business with 

pleasure." Id. She also claimed that Ricky made a racial slur in 

her presence. Malone's suit against Mapco was resolved on summary 

judgment in Mapco's favor; her sexual harassment claims were 

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See 

Malone v. Mapco, Inc., 955 F.2d 49 (lOth Cir. 1992). ---

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would justify termination--then ·.plaintiff is not entitled to any 

remedy. II Appellant's App. at 448 (Jury Instructions in 

Damage Phase). The jury awarded Ricky no damages, and this appeal 

followed. 

ANALYSIS 

In Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance co., 864 

F.2d 700, 708 (lOth Cir. 1988), this Court held that an employee 

may be barred from recovering for a discriminatory discharge if the 

employer discovers after the discharge that the employee engaged in 

misconduct justifying termination. On the authority of summers, 

the district court permitted Mapco to present evidence concerning 

Ricky's alleged misconduct involving Malone to the jury during the 

damage phase of the trial. Based on the jury's finding, the court 

then barred Ricky from any remedy. 

On appeal, Ricky argues that the alleged misconduct was known 

to the company before his termination and therefore does not 

qualify as after-acquired evidence. On that basis, Ricky urges all 

evidence concerning allegations of misconduct involving Malone 

should have been excluded from both phases of the trial. The 

district court and the parties agree that Mapco's management knew 

about the initial proposition Ricky made to Malone. 2 The court 

2

The district court originally granted Ricky's motion in limine 

to exclude testimony concerning the first proposition Ricky made to 

Malone because that incident was known to management long before 

Ricky was terminated. When the court decided to bifurcate the 

trial, however, it admitted testimony about the first incident 

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concluded, however, that Mapco should be able to argue to the jury 

that had it known about Malone's allegations that Ricky renewed his 

request for sexual favors several times after the initial incident 

and also made a racial slur in her presence, it would have 

terminated him. 

Ricky argues that no reasonable jury could conclude that Mapco 

would have terminated Ricky based on Malone's allegations that he 

continued to sexually harass her and made a racial slur in her 

presence because those allegations are not credible and because 

Mapco's management failed to respond when it learned of the first 

incident. We agree with the district court, however, that the 

fact-finder is in a better position to make that determination. 

Thus, we find the district court did not err in permitting Mapco to 

present evidence to the jury concerning what it would have done if 

it knew about the allegations that Ricky renewed his request for 

during the damage phase of the trial to put the allegations 

concerning subsequent incidents between Ricky and Malone in 

context. Appellant's App. at 570 ("And I will let the record note 

further, the only reason I'm letting the prior incident in which 

was accepted by management, so that it puts in context the entire 

relationship and the information management would have in arriving 

at its decision."). On appeal, Mapco claims there is no evidence 

in the record that its management was aware of the first incident 

between Malone and Ricky except Ricky's own testimony. The record 

makes clear, however, that the district court made that assumption 

and that Mapco's counsel not only failed to object to the district 

court's assumption, but also actually made statements to the court 

admitting Mapco' s management was aware of the incident. 

Appellant's App. at 560 ("[I]t was known, that one incident was 

known before."). 

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sexual favors and made a racial remark to Malone. 3 

Ricky next argues that the allegations of misconduct should 

not act as a complete bar to his recovery, but rather should only 

partially reduce the damages to which he i~ entitled. In light of 

McKennon, we must now agree with Ricky. In McKennon, the Supreme 

Court rejected this Court's reasoning in Summers and held that 

after-acquired evidence of misconduct cannot act as a complete bar 

to recovery in an ADEA action, but rather only affects the amount 

of damages an employee may recover. McKennon, 115 s. ct. at 887. 

McKennon makes clear that Mapco must demonstrate to the jury, 

not only that it was unaware of the allegations of continued 

misconduct when Ricky was terminated, but also that the misconduct 

Malone alleged was serious enough to justify discharge and that 

Mapco would have discharged Ricky if it . had known about those 

allegations. See McKennon, 115 s. Ct. at 886-87. If Mapco proves 

these elements, the jury must then determine the precise date on 

which Mapco would have terminated Ricky so that backpay may be 

3

Ricky denied any misconduct other than the original incident, 

known to Mapco, which occurred in late 1981 or early 1982. Ricky 

points to Mapco's Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary 

Judgment in the litigation between Mapco and Malone which questions 

whether Ricky's conduct, as described by Malone, "occurred at all" 

and arguing at best that it was "isolated." Mapco's Brief in 

Support of Motion for summary Judgment at 22, Malone v. Mapco, No. 

89-C-1029-E (N.D. Okla.) (Appellant's App. at 504). We emphasize 

that under McKennon, Mapco must demonstrate that the wrongdoing was 

"of such severity that the employee in fact would have been 

terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it 

at the time of the discharge." McKennon, 115 s. ct. at 886-87. 

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calculated to that date. As the=McKennon Court indicated, "[t]he 

beginning point in the trial court's formulation of a remedy should 

be calculation of backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge 

to the date the new information was discovered. 114 McKennon, 115 s. 

ct. at 886. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion 

and the McKennon decision. 

4

Ricky has raised several other issues, including evidentiary 

ones. We need not pass on those issues at this time, but if 

necessary, can review these questions after the new trial on 

damages. We make clear that Ricky, as well as Mapco, may attempt 

to argue their various evidentiary claims in the district court and 

the trial court must rule anew on issues of exclusion and admission 

of the evidence as presented. 

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