Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00523/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00523-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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28 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH BLUFORD, on his behalf and )

on behalf of all those similarly )

situated, )

) 02:06-cv-0523-GEB-PAN(JFM)

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER*

v. )

)

SAFEWAY STORES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

Plaintiff moves to remand this action to state court, and

requests an award of attorney fees if the remand motion is granted. 

Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that federal jurisdiction exists

since Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by federal law.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is employed by Defendant as a truck driver based

out of Defendant’s distribution center in Tracy, California. (Def.’s

Notice Removal, Ex. A (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 6, 11.) Plaintiff’s employment

with Defendant is governed by a collective bargaining agreement

entitled “Agreement Between Safeway Inc. and Local 439 International

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Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, and Helpers of

America” (the “CBA”). (Ramnitz Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, May 8, 2006.) The CBA

provides that Plaintiff is compensated according to the Activity Based

Compensation system (the “ABC system”) outlined in the CBA.

On February 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in San

Joaquin County Superior Court alleging three claims against Defendant. 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges Defendant “failed to

provide or permit Plaintiff . . . meal periods and rest periods as

required by [California] Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and [Industrial

Welfare Commission] Wage Order 9.” (Compl. ¶ 64.) Plaintiff’s third

cause of action alleges the “wage statements provided to Plaintiff

[are] inadequate [under California Labor Code § 226(a) since they]

fail[] to provide an accurate representation of all applicable piece

rates . . . Plaintiff earned.” (Compl. ¶ 87.) Plaintiff’s first

cause of action alleges Defendant “engaged in unlawful and unfair

business practices [in violation of California Business and

Professions Code § 17200 et seq.] including, but not limited to,” the

acts described in the second and third causes of action. (Compl. ¶

49.)

Defendant removed this action on March 10, 2006, asserting

federal jurisdiction exists since Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by

federal law. Defendant argued Plaintiff’s second and third causes of

action are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), since “they require the

interpretation and application of terms of a collective bargaining

agreement.” (Def.’s Notice of Removal at 1.) Defendant also argued

the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq., and the Motor

Carrier Safety Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. § 31136 et seq., (jointly

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referred to as the “MCA”) preempt Plaintiff’s second cause of action

since the claim “invade[s] [a] federally occupied field” and “directly

conflict[s] with federal regulation[s] . . . .” (Def.’s Notice of

Removal at 1.)

DISCUSSION

A defendant is entitled to remove to federal court any civil

action over which the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1441. The removal statute is strictly construed against

removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th

Cir.1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction

means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that

removal is proper.” Id. (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red

Cab, Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938)). “If at any time before final

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Where there is no diversity of citizenship, as here, an

action may be removed under section 1441 only where the complaint

presents a federal question. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482

U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The presence or absence of federal-question

jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which

provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question

is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded

complaint.” Id. 

“This rule makes a plaintiff the master of his complaint: it

allows him to avoid federal jurisdiction by relying

exclusively on state law. . . . There does exist, however, a

corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, known as the

‘complete preemption’ doctrine. The Supreme Court has

concluded that the preemptive force of some statutes is so

strong that they ‘completely preempt’ an area of state law. 

In such instances, any claim purportedly based on that

preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a

federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” 

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Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106-07

(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

I. Preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA

The complete preemption doctrine applies primarily under

section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 1107. Section 301 provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between

any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district

court of the United States having jurisdiction of the

parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or

without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

The Supreme Court has held that section 301 preempts state law claims

whose resolution is “substantially dependent upon analysis of the

terms of [a collective-bargaining agreement].” Allis-Chalmers Corp.

v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). However, “not every dispute

concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a

collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . . .” Id.

at 211.

“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that

[section] 301 preemption is not designed to trump substantive and

mandatory state law regulation of the employee-employer relationship;

[section] 301 has not become a ‘mighty oak’ that might supply cover to

employers from all substantive aspects of state law.” Humble v.

Boeing, 305 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lingle v. Norge

Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1988); Livadas v.

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 (1994)). Thus, “not every claim which

requires a court to refer to the language of a [collective bargaining]

agreement is necessarily preempted.” Associated Builders &

Contractors, Inc. v. Local 302 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 109 F.3d

1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1997) (as amended). In addition, “when the

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meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact

that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course

of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be

extinguished.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at

413, n.12). Thus, in order for complete preemption to apply, “the

need to interpret the [collective bargaining agreement] must inhere in

the nature of the plaintiff’s claim. If the claim is plainly based on

state law, [section] 301 pre-emption is not mandated simply because

the defendant refers to the [collective bargaining agreement] in

mounting a defense.” Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, 255 F.3d 683, 691

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (as amended).

A. Meal and Break Periods Claim

To support its position that Plaintiff’s claim for failure

to provide meal and rest periods as required under California law is

completely preempted, Defendant argues the claim requires interpreting

the CBA. Specifically, Defendant contends the claim cannot be

adjudicated without determining whether the ABC system “built-in” time

for meal and rest breaks, and since that determination would require

interpreting a CBA provision the claim is preempted. Defendant’s

argument is that “it complies with [the meal and break period]

requirements” through the ABC system. (Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Me. P & A

Supp. Mot. Remand (“Opp’n”) at 21.)

Defendant’s “argument is unavailing after Cramer, which held

that reliance on CBA provisions to defend against an independent state

law claim does not trigger [section] 301 preemption.” Humble, 305

F.3d at 1011. “A state law claim is not preempted under [section] 301

unless it necessarily requires the court to interpret an existing

provision of a CBA that can reasonably be said to be relevant to the

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resolution of the dispute.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 693. Defendant’s

alleged “hypothetical connection between the claim[,] the terms of the

CBA[, and a potential defense] is not enough to preempt [Plaintiff’s]

claim . . . .” Id. at 691. Since Defendant has not shown “the need

to interpret the [CBA] inheres in the nature of” Plaintiff’s claim for

failure to provide meal and rest periods as required under California

law, it is not preempted by section 301. Id. 

B. Inadequate Wage Statement Claim 

To support its position that Plaintiff’s claim for

inadequate wage statements is completely preempted, Defendant argues

the claim requires interpreting the CBA. Specifically, Defendant

contends the claim cannot be adjudicated without determining whether

Plaintiff was paid under a piece-rate or a hybrid system of

compensation, and, if Plaintiff was compensated on a piece-rate, the

applicable rate. These determinations, Defendant asserts, require

interpreting the CBA and the ABC system.

“This case does not present a disputed disagreement over

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. The parties do

not dispute how [Defendant] calculates [Plaintiff’s compensation].” 

Lujan v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 96 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 1210 (2002). Rather,

Defendant has raised a “dispute” as to whether Plaintiff is

compensated by a straight piece-rate system or a hybrid system. 

“Thus, the issue is not how to resolve a dispute over the

interpretation of the [ABC system], but a legal question of whether

the [ABC system constitutes a ‘hybrid’ or piece[-]rate system, and if

the wage statements reflecting compensation under that system]

compl[y] with state law.” Id. Moreover, a court need not interpret

the ABC system to determine that at least some part of Plaintiff’s

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compensation is based on a piece rate. (See Def.’s Notice Removal,

Ex. B at 58 (establishing rate of pay for specified activities

performed by drivers).) Accordingly, determining whether the wage

statements received by Plaintiff comply with California law can be

accomplished by simply reviewing Plaintiff’s wage statements. Since

Defendant has not shown “the need to interpret the [CBA] inheres in

the nature of” Plaintiff’s claim for inadequate wage statements, it is

not preempted by section 301. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691.

II. Preemption under the MCA 

Defendant contends the MCA provides a basis for removal

distinct from complete preemption under section 301 of the LMRA. 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide meal and

rest periods as required under California law conflicts with the MCA,

because California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 “have the effect

of establishing a firm maximum on [consecutive] hours worked different

from the maximum set by federal law . . . .” (Opp’n at 24 (quotation

marks omitted).) 

Defendant asserts this “conflict” raises a federal

question—whether Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the MCA–justifying

removal. However, “[u]nder the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule, the

federal question, which invokes federal jurisdiction, must appear from

the complaint and not from any federal defense[, including

preemption,] the defendant might raise to defeat the claim.” Bright

v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10

(1983)). Therefore, the “conflict” identified by Defendant and the

possibility that Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the MCA does not

provide a basis for federal jurisdiction.

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In conclusion, in light of the “strong presumption” against

removal jurisdiction, Defendant has not established that Plaintiff’s

state law claims present a federal question. Therefore, federal

jurisdiction “must be rejected . . . [because] there is . . . doubt as

to the right of removal in the first instance.” Duncan v. Stuetzle,

76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. Request for Attorney Fees

Plaintiff requests attorney fees incurred as a result of

improper removal from state court. “An order remanding [a] case may

require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including

attorney fees, incurred as the result of removal.” 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). 

“Such fee awards are within the sound discretion of the court.” 

Rawson v. Tosco Refining Co., 1996 WL 33991, *4 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 24,

1996). The exercise of this discretion “should turn on the

reasonableness of the removal. Absent unusual circumstances, courts

may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing

party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. 

Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should

be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 126 S. Ct. 704, 711

(2005). Defendant had an objectively reasonable basis for removal. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand this

action to San Joaquin Superior Court is granted, but his request for 

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attorney fees is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand

this action to San Joaquin Superior Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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