Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00283/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00283-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA JOHNSON, et al., CASE NO. CV F 07-0283 LJO DLB

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

vs. (Doc. 44.)

GMRI, INC., et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this potential unfair wage class action, defendants GMRI, Inc. and Darden Restaurant’s, Inc.

(collectively “defendants”) seek to strike plaintiffs Anna Johnson (“Ms. Johnson”) and Landon

Brinkman’s (“Mr. Brinkman’s”) injunctive relief claims alleged in Ms. Johnson and Mr. Brinkman’s

(collectively “plaintiffs’”) sole remaining claim under the unfair competition law of California Business

& Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (“Unfair Competition Law”). Defendants contend that, as

former employees, Ms. Johnson and Mr. Brinkman lack standing to enjoin defendants’ current

employment practices. Plaintiffs argue that although they are no longer defendants’ employees,

plaintiffs are not deprived of standing to represent a class of current and prospective employees. This

Court considered defendants’ motion to strike on the record and VACATES the August 30, 2007

hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES

defendants’ motion to strike.

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 50 Filed 08/27/07 Page 1 of 7
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Plaintiffs’ operative first amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs ceased working for defendants in 2006. 1

CCR 11050.4(C) provides: “When an employee works a split shift, one (1) hour’s pay at the minimum wage

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shall be paid in addition to the minimum wage for that workday, except when the employee resides at the place of

employment.”

CCR 11050.8 provides: “No employer shall make any deduction from the wage or require any

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reimbursement from an employee for any cash shortage, breakage, or loss of equipment, unless it can be shown that the

shortage, breakage, or loss is caused by dishonest or willful act, or by gross negligence of the employee.”

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BACKGROUND

Defendants operate the Bakersfield Olive Garden restaurant where plaintiffs had worked as food

servers. Plaintiffs pursue this action for themselves and other food servers and bartenders employed 1

by defendants. No class has been certified. Plaintiffs contend that defendants:

1. Failed to pay plaintiffs and potential class members a bonus hour required by California

Code of Regulations (“CCR”), Title 8, section 11050.4(C) (“CCR 11050.4(C)”) when 2

they were required to work a split shift during a work day; and

2. Caused plaintiffs and potential class members to pay for cash shortages and walkouts as

proscribed by CCR, Title 8, section 11050.8 (“CCR 11050.8").

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Based on the success of defendants’ prior motions to dismiss and strike, plaintiffs proceed on

a sole remaining (fourth) unfair competition cause of action to allege that defendants violated California

Labor Code provisions and engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices to violate the Unfair

Competition Law. The (fourth) unfair competition cause of action seeks restitution and injunctive relief

for defendants’ alleged failure to pay split shift premiums in violation of CCR 11050.4(C) and for

requiring servers and bartenders to make up cash shortages (“severer banking”) in violation of CCR

11050.8. With this motion to strike, defendants focus on plaintiffs’ cash shortages claim. Defendants

seek to strike the following words in bold from the unfair competition cause of action of plaintiffs’ first

amended complaint:

48. Plaintiffs are “persons” within the meaning of Business & Professions

Code § 17204, and therefore has [sic] standing to bring this cause of action for

injunctive relief . . . and other appropriate equitable relief.

54. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to engage

in lawful conduct as alleged above. Pursuant to Business & Professions Code this

Court should make such orders or judgments, including appointment of a receiver, as

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may be necessary to prevent the use or employment, by Defendants, their agents or

employees, of any unlawful or deceptive practice prohibited by the Business &

Professions Code . . . (Bold added.)

Defendants further seek to strike paragraph 8 of the prayer of the first amended complaint, which states:

8. An injunctive order prohibiting Defendant from continuing to use server

banking or any other cash handling device that causes or is likely to cause employers to

pay for Defendant’s losses due to cash shortages or walkouts.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs, as former employees of defendants, cannot demonstrate threat of

irreparable injury from defendants’ current employment practices to invoke standing to seek injunctive

relief. Plaintiffs respond that as class representatives, they possess adequate standing to pursue

injunctive relief for current employees of defendants.

DISCUSSION

Motion To Strike Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 12(f) empowers a court to “order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Motions to strike may be granted if “it is clear that the

matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” LeDuc v.

Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 814 F.Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems,

Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). “[T]he function of a [F.R.Civ.P.] 12(f) motion to strike

is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th

Cir. 1983); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9 Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds,

th

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023 (1994).

An “immaterial” matter has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or

defenses pleaded. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527; Gilbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 116, 120,

n. 5 (D. P.R. 1972); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 180 F.Supp. 717 (D. Pa. 1958). An “impertinent”

allegation is neither responsive nor relevant to the issues involved in the action and which could not be

put in issue or given in evidence between the parties. Gilbert, 56 F.R.D. at 120, n. 6; Burke v. Mesta

Mach. Co., 5 F.R.D. 134 (D. Pa. 1946). An “impertinent” matter consists of statements that do not

pertain and are unnecessary to the issues in question. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527. Matters may be

stricken to reduce trial complication or if challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claims to

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be unworthy of consideration as a defense and their presence in the pleading will prejudice the party

seeking to strike matters. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527.

With these standards in mind, the Court turns to plaintiffs’ standing to pursue injunctive relief

against defendants.

Standing For Injunctive Relief

Defendants characterize plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims to seek to prohibit defendants’ “server

banking” at defendants’ restaurants. Defendants describe server banking as a “wide-spread” restaurant

practice where servers collect customer payments and turn in the payments at the end of a shift.

As defendants note, “those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy

the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or

controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (1983). A plaintiff must

demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome” and that he/she “has sustained or is immediately in danger

of sustaining some direct injury.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-102, 103 S.Ct. 1660. The threat of injury must

be both “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-102, 103

S.Ct. 1660.

“Article III standing requires an injury that is actual orimminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.

In the context of injunctive relief, the plaintiff must demonstrate real or immediate threat of an

irreparable injury.” Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9 Cir. 2004) th

(quoting Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1007 (9 Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). The United th

States Supreme Court has observed that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a

present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present

adverse effects.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675-676 (1974). “[P]ast

wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and immediate threat of injury necessary to make out

a case or controversy.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103, 103 S.Ct. 1660; see Walsh v. Nevada Dept. of Human

Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9 Cir. 2006) (former employee “would not stand to benefit from an th

injunction” and “lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief from which she would likely benefit.”)

Defendants further contend that plaintiffs are not entitled to seek injunctive relief based on

potential future injury to unnamed putative class members. “[S]ystemwide injunctive relief is not

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available based on alleged injuries to unnamed members of a proposed class.” Hodgers-Durin v. De La

Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9 Cir. 1999). “That a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the th

question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they

personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the

class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.’” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357,

116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20, 96

S.Ct. 1917 (1976)).

Plaintiffs respond that defendants’ server banking “is ongoing and continues to make susceptible

named plaintiffs and class members to further injury.” Plaintiffs argue that striking their injunctive relief

claim would be premature that this early stage. Plaintiffs point out that former employees often have

standing to pursue injunctive relief for themselves and other class members in that “current employees

often fear retaliation and therefore may be unlikely to bring suit.” Plaintiffs advocate that “former

employees may make superior class representatives because they are not susceptible to the same fears

as current employees.” (Italics in original.) Plaintiffs urge this Court to focus on “the standing of the

class to seek equitable relief” and to consider injunctive relief “in light of further evidence of the class

as a whole.” (Italics in original.)

Plaintiffs rely on the following from Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 490, n. 6

(N.D. Cal. 1978), which addressed claims under TitleVII ofthe Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, et seq.,:

A rule disqualifying discharged employees from representing current employees as a

matter of law would be intolerable, since it would allow an unscrupulous employer to

immunize himself from class action suits. The fact that the employee does not seek

reinstatement should not change this result. . . .The extent of their dissatisfaction and

their freedom from fear of retaliation makes these former employees among the most

likely plaintiffs in Title VII actions. To bar them from representing current employees

unless they stay on the job would either impose a hardship on individuals who feel that

those jobs offer them no future, or prevent class treatment in a significant number of

cases. The Court finds that in these circumstances the dangers to Title VII enforcement

outweigh the dangers arising from the differing interests of former and current

employees, particularly since the divergent interests are limited to one area, and a court

should thus be able to monitor the conduct of the action to assure that adequate

representation is being provided.

Plaintiffs also point to Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3 Cir. 1975), another Title

rd

VII case, where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals observed:

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We believe that a former employee, who is not entitled to reinstatement, may still

be an adequate representative of a class of past and present employees alleging

discriminatory employment practices. Whether a party adequately represents a class

depends on all the circumstances of the particular case. 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice

P23.07(1) (2d ed. 1974) (hereinafter cited as Moore). . . . In fact, as the court observed

in Mack v. General Electric Co., 329 F.Supp. 72, 76 (E.D.Pa.1971), with respect to

plaintiffs who were former employees of the company, ‘being familiar with (the

company's) employment practices and being free from any possible coercive influence

of (the company's) management, (the plaintiffs) are better situated than either job

applicants or present employees to present an intelligent and strongly adverse case

against (the company's) alleged discriminatory practices.’ Moreover, were the position

advanced by LibertyMutual adopted, employerswould be encouraged to discharge those

employees suspected as most likely to initiate a Title VII suit in the expectation that such

employees would thereby be rendered incapable of bringing the suit as a class action.

Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854, 94 S.Ct.

153, 38 L.Ed.2d 103 (1973).

For further support, plaintiffs turn to cases under the Employment Retirement Income Security

Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§1001, et seq., and which allowed former employees to pursue class

injunctive relief. See Flanagan v. Inland Empire Elec. Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F.3d 1246,

1248 (9 Cir. 1993) (“former employees similarly situated were participants in the Plan when the Plan th

fully terminated”);Church v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 1991 WL 284083 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

This Court agrees with plaintiffs that public policy purposes dissuade striking injunctive relief

at this early stage. Disqualifying plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief would unfairly advantage defendants

and rob potential class members of a remedy. The circumstances here raise at least an inference that

current employees may be resistant to champion the claims of potential class members. As plaintiffs

allege, the server banking poses an actual or immediate injury to potential class members. Plaintiffs

correctly note that the circumstances here differ from those in Walsh, 471 F.3d 1003 (relied upon by

defendants), where the Ninth Circuit did not address a potential class, merely a former employee’s

attempt to seek injunctive relief. Defendants’ claim that they challenge plaintiffs’ Article III standing,

not plaintiffs’ ability to represent a class, is a distinction without form in that plaintiffs seek to represent

a potential class. Defendants offer no definitive authority that plaintiffs are unable to rely on unnamed

putative class members for standing. At this point, striking plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claim would be

premature.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

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1. DENIES defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claims; and

2. ORDERS defendants, no later than September 15, 2007, to file and serve an answer to

plaintiffs’ Unfair Competition Law cause of action and claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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