Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01655/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01655-38/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS BRANCH,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. UMPHENOUR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:08-cv-01655-SAB-PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO WITHDRAW CONSENT TO 

JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE (ECF Nos. 198, 199)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF No. 169)

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Louis Branch is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge on 

November 20, 2008. (ECF No. 5.) The action was reassigned to the undersigned after the

Defendants consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge on November 3, 2015. (ECF 

No. 184). On December 21, 2015, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration 

of a prior discovery order and motions in limine filed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 190.) 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Withdraw Consent

Plaintiff now moves to withdraw his consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Plaintiff 

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contends that the decisions of Judges Wunderlich, Snyder, Austin, and Boone have enabled 

Defendants to commit a fraud on the court which establishes good cause for him to withdraw his 

consent.

“The right to adjudication before an Article III judge is an important constitutional right” 

which can be waived. United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 1993). Once the 

parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction in a civil case under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c)(1), the reference to the magistrate judge can be withdrawn by the Court only “for good 

cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (emphasis added); Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993) (“There is 

no absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other proceedings before a 

magistrate judge.”). Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that he previously consented to magistrate 

judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) Although Plaintiff voluntarily consented to the jurisdiction of 

the magistrate judge, he now seeks to withdraw consent on the ground of abuse of discretion by 

judges previously assigned to this case. 

Plaintiff sets forth multiple sentences pulled from various orders that he contends show 

an abuse of discretion by omitting what he considers to be relevant evidence. Plaintiff argues 

that the undersigned failure to do what is right and equitable under the circumstances is a willful 

abuse of discretion. Further, Plaintiff contends that the prior judges assigned to this action have 

abused their discretion by ruling against him while assigned to this action. However, Plaintiff’s 

disagreement with reasonable court rulings constitutes neither good cause nor extraordinary 

circumstance to allow him to withdraw consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. 

Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 172 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff contends that this Court has expressed an intent to reject Judge Ishii’s ruling 

denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however Plaintiff’s interpretation is an 

unreasonable reading of the selection cited. The Court merely stated that claims which were not 

addressed in the prior findings and recommendations due to the finding that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies would be addressed by subsequent order. Plaintiff has failed to 

make a showing of “extraordinary circumstances to justify withdrawal of his voluntary consent, 

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and the Court does not sua sponte find “good cause” to vacate the reference.

B. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff also contends that his motion for reconsideration filed June 5, 2015 was not 

addressed by Judge Ishii. Plaintiff is correct that the magistrate judge improperly addressed the 

motion for reconsideration which was directed to Judge Ishii as at the time Defendants had not 

consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. At this time, the parties have all consented 

to the jurisdiction to the Magistrate Judge, and therefore this Court shall consider Plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on June 5, 2015. (ECF No. 169.) Plaintiff 

sought reconsideration of the denial of his motion to compel on the ground that the ruling was 

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states, in pertinent part:

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or 

Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a 

party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

...

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

A motion for reconsideration is not the proper mechanism to raise arguments that could 

reasonably have been presented earlier in litigation. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th 

Cir. 2003); O’Neal v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CIV S-06-1063 FCD/DAD, 2008 WL 

1721891, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2008) (“party may not use a motion for reconsideration to 

present new arguments or claims not raised in the summary judgment motion”); Reliance Ins. 

Co. v. Doctors Co., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1154 (D. Hawai’i 2003).

Requests for reconsideration are also governed by Local Rule 230(j). Local Rule 230(j) 

states:

Whenever any motion has been granted or denied in whole or in 

part, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration is made upon the 

same or any alleged different set of facts, counsel shall present to 

the Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom such subsequent motion is 

made an affidavit or brief, as appropriate, setting forth the material 

facts and circumstances surrounding each motion for which 

reconsideration is sought, including:

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(1) when and to what Judge or Magistrate Judge the prior 

motion was made;

(2) what ruling, decision, or order was made thereon;

(3) what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to 

exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior 

motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion; and

(4) why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time 

of the prior motion.

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants invocation of attorney client privilege to his 

requests for interrogatories 17 and 18 is invalid and prejudicial to Plaintiff. Judge Austin denied 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel because

Plaintiff has not met his burden of informing the court, for each disputed 

response, why the information sought is relevant and why the responding party’s 

objections are not meritorious. Plaintiff fails to inform the court to whom he 

propounded the Interrogatories, and he has not submitted copies of the 

Interrogatories and Responses at issue. Plaintiff refers to “Appendix J, 

Interrogatory Requests and Responses,” but no attachments, appendices, or copies 

of the Interrogatories and Responses were submitted in support of the motion to 

compel. (Motion at 2:24-25.) The parties’ pleadings, in themselves, do not offer 

sufficient information for the court to fairly resolve Plaintiff’s motion to compel 

on the merits. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to compel must be denied.

In his motion, Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s inappropriately invoked attorney-client 

privilege in response to Interrogatories Nos. 17 and 18. Plaintiff contended that because the 

“defendants themselves voluntarily submitted the information contained in their General 

Chronos as evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact” they cannot use attorney client 

privilege to protect the requested information. However, Plaintiff did not set forth the substance 

of the discovery requests and responses in his motion to compel or attach the discovery requests 

to his motion or his reply. (ECF Nos. 154, 163.) The magistrate judge’s determination that 

Plaintiff provided insufficient information for the court to resolve the motion to compel on its 

merits was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Plaintiff has included the substance of Interrogatories Nos. 17 and 18 in the motion for 

reconsideration. In both interrogatories Plaintiff states that Defendants failed to inform counsel 

of information and asks why. (ECF No. 169 at 4.) Defendants responded that the information 

assumes facts not in evidence and is protected by attorney-client privilege. To the extent that 

Defendants had conversations with counsel regarding the subjects covered by Interrogatories No. 

17 and 18, such communications would fall within attorney-client privilege and would clearly be 

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protected from disclosure in this action. 

Plaintiff contends that the “dilatory submission of their alibi CHRONOS’ as evidence 

was voluntary” and therefore Defendants’ waived attorney client privilege. However, even if 

Plaintiffs have produced a chrono, such production does not waive attorney-client privilege to 

the request for information sought in Interrogatories Nos. 17 and 18. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw consent is DENIED; 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, filed June 5, 2015 is DENIED; and

3. No further motions for reconsideration of prior orders which have been addressed 

by motion for reconsideration in this action shall be entertained by the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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