Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05539/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05539-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY E. JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

 v.

TONY MALFI, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 06-05539 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

On September 11, 2006, Petitioner Anthony E. Johnson filed his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to vacate convictions

resulting from two separate jury trials. On April 9, 2007,

Respondent filed an answer. On April 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a

traverse. On December 28, 2007, Petitioner filed a second

traverse. On February 12, 2008, Respondent filed a supplemental

answer. On May 16, 2008, Petitioner filed a supplemental traverse. 

Petitioner has also filed a “motion of inquiry” and a motion to

appoint counsel.

Having considered all the papers filed by the parties and the

state court trial record, the Court DENIES the petition and DENIES

the “motion of inquiry” and motion to appoint counsel.

BACKGROUND

On October 9, 2002, in case number SCR-31910, Petitioner was

found guilty of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, forcible

sexual penetration by a foreign object, robbery, burglary and

terrorist threats. As to the first three counts, the jury found to

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be true the allegations that Petitioner had tied or bound the

victim and that he committed the sexual offense during a burglary. 

Petitioner admitted that he had served two prior prison terms. 

On December 11, 2002, in case number SCR-31911, Petitioner was

found guilty of solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy to

commit murder. 

On April 10, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced on both cases to a

determinate term of twenty-five years and an indeterminate term of

fifty years to life in prison. Petitioner filed a direct appeal to

the California court of appeal which affirmed the convictions in a

written opinion. The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

petition for review.

The state court of appeal described the following facts

underlying Petitioner’s convictions.

Rape and Robbery Trial

On November 21, 2001, the victim, P., was working in the

Redwood Gospel Mission Thrift Store in Santa Rosa. 

Defendant had previously worked in the store, and P.

recognized him immediately when he walked in. He did not

say hello, and walked straight to the back of the store. 

P. soon forgot defendant was there, and at 5:00 p.m. she

emptied the register and turned out the lights. As she

walked to the front of the store, she was tackled from

behind, and thrown to the ground. Her assailant dragged

her by the hair into the employee break room, covered her

eyes with duct tape, and bound her hands and feet. P.

recognized defendant's voice when he demanded money. She

could also see him through gaps in the duct tape. She

told him to calm down and she would give him whatever he

wanted. Defendant took her purse and then dragged her to

the office, where he took the keys from her purse and

unlocked the safe. Defendant told her to kneel in a

corner while he removed the money and a surveillance

videotape. Defendant then dragged P. back to the

employee break room where he sexually assaulted her,

committing each of the sexual offenses with which he was

charged. He then asked P., "Do you know who I am?"

Fearing for her life, P. lied, and said she did not.

Defendant responded, "Well, I know who you are, and if

you tell . . . I'll come back and I will kill you." He

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left the store, taking her purse with him. P.

immediately called 911. She told the police she knew her

assailant, but could not remember his name. She

identified defendant in a photographic lineup, and at

trial. DNA testing matched sperm found in a sexual

assault exam of P. to a known sample from defendant. The

chances of a false match were 1 in 3.3 trillion African

Americans, 1 in 3.3 trillion Caucasians, and 1 in 14

trillion Hispanics. After defendant was arrested, P.

received two collect calls from him, which she refused. 

Defendant also called the thrift store manager, and asked

if she intended to testify at the preliminary hearing.

She said no, and hung up.

Conspiracy and Solicitation to Commit Murder Trial

P. testified in this separate trial and recounted the

sexual assault and robbery. She also testified that

defendant told her he knew who she was and that he would

come back and kill her if she reported the incident. 

Defendant's wife, Cathy Petersen-Johnson (hereafter

Petersen) pleaded guilty to solicitation to commit the

murder of P., and agreed to testify truthfully at

defendant's trial in exchange for a sentence of nine

years eight months in prison. Petersen testified that

defendant was arrested on November 22, 2001. She visited

him every day, after she finished work. During one of

her visits, defendant asked her whether she thought the

charges would be dismissed if P. were "gone." She said

she did not know. Defendant asked her to visit the

thrift shop and find out whether P. still worked there. 

He gave Petersen a description of P. and a copy of the

police report. Petersen suspected that defendant wanted

to locate P. so he could have her killed. Hoping to get

him "off the track," she suggested she could call people

in Oakland for help. Although she did not actually call

anybody, she told defendant that she had, and that it

would cost $5,000, but that the people in Oakland were

busy. 

During the last week in November 2001, Detective Mike

Tosti of the Santa Rosa Police Department received

information from a confidential informant that defendant

was trying to find someone to kill P. Tosti consulted

with Detective Badger, who was working on the rape and

robbery case, and after Detective Tosti had two or three

more contacts with the informant to verify the

credibility of the tip and to get more information, Tosti

decided to go undercover as a hit man to meet defendant. 

Around that same time, defendant told Petersen that

someone in jail had offered to help with his

"predicament." Eventually defendant called her at home

with the number of a hit man named "Kev," and asked her

to call and arrange a meeting between "Kev" and

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defendant. Before defendant gave her this telephone

number, she and defendant had already discussed that she

would take care of "the money end." Petersen understood

that "Kev" was the hit man defendant wanted to hire to

kill P., and Petersen agreed to act as the "money

person." 

Petersen then called Detective Tosti, who was posing as

"Kev," and arranged for "Kev" to meet defendant the next

day. In a tape-recorded conversation, defendant told

Detective Tosti that "this person's just in the way, you

know," and "I just need her handled . . . whatever the

price is . . . ." Detective Tosti asked if defendant

just wanted to scare her, and defendant replied, "No 

. . . . That's another chance of her coming back." 

Detective Tosti cautioned defendant that it would cost

more to kill her, and defendant replied that money would

not be a problem. They agreed on a price of $5,000, with

$1,000 as a down payment. Detective Tosti asked whether

defendant wanted to send a message or make it look like

an accident. Defendant replied that he wanted her

"chopped up." At the end of the conversation Detective

Tosti asked whether defendant was sure this is what he

wanted, and defendant confirmed, "I'm positive," adding,

"It's either you, or I go find somebody else."

Later that same day Detective Tosti contacted Petersen,

and tape-recorded his conversation with her. They

discussed a payment plan, and agreed that Petersen would

pay $200 that day and $800 on the following Friday. They

met later in a parking lot, and Petersen gave Tosti $200. 

Detective Tosti told Petersen that defendant wanted P.

dead, and asked Petersen if she was "all right with

that," and she confirmed that she was. 

When Petersen met with defendant in jail, defendant was

upset that she had only paid "Kev" $200. Petersen said

she did not want to go through with it. Defendant became

angry, and yelled at Petersen to "squash it," meaning to

cancel the plan. Soon thereafter Petersen was arrested.

Defense

Defendant presented no defense evidence in the rape and

robbery case. In the solicitation to commit murder trial

he testified on his own behalf. He testified that

shortly after his arrest, an inmate named Marvin Jackson,

also known as "M.J.," asked him about the pending

charges, and offered to help. Defendant understood the

offer to relate to hiring private counsel. When he

finally realized that Jackson was suggesting killing the

witness, defendant was "shocked," and declined. Jackson

continued to pressure defendant, telling him that it

"needs to be done." Eventually Jackson stated that

defendant would die in prison if he did not kill P. He

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told defendant that there were people waiting for him in

prison who would make him die a "slow and long death." 

Defendant knew he had enemies in prison, but thought he

had "squashed them." Defendant knew Jackson was

affiliated with gang members, and understood Jackson to

be saying that he would issue an order to kill defendant,

if defendant went to prison. Defendant ultimately agreed

to call a hit man and arrange to have P. killed because

he was afraid of what Jackson had threatened would happen

to him if he were convicted and went to prison. 

Defendant also admitted sending letters to his wife while

he was awaiting trial on these charges. These letters

set forth the elements of entrapment, and statements in

them could be construed as attempts to coach her

testimony. One letter warned her, ". . . anything you do

in life, whether it be petty or large, there is always

consequences to everything, no matter what. Just be

ready to pay the price."

Respondent’s Ex. 9 at 2-5.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim

that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal

law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if

it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

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materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court's ruling is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, that error

justifies habeas relief only if the error resulted in "actual

prejudice." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). If the state court only considered state law, the

federal court must ask whether state law, as explained by the state

court, is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). 

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Evidence of Other Sexual Offenses

Petitioner presents a facial and as-applied due process

challenge to California Evidence Code § 1108, which allows the

admission of evidence of prior sexual offenses, so long as the

evidence is admissible under California Evidence Code § 352, which

requires excluding evidence where its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the possibility that it will consume an

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undue amount of time or create a substantial danger of undue

prejudice or confusion. Section 1108 changed the general rule that

character evidence is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s conduct

on a specified occasion. See Cal. Code Evid. § 1101; People v.

Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 911 (1999). Petitioner also argues his

equal protection rights were violated by the trial court's

admission of prior sexual offenses.

A. State Court's Opinion

The state appellate court addressed this claim as follows.

In the rape and robbery trial the court admitted evidence

of several uncharged sexual offenses, pursuant to

Evidence Code § 1108. The evidence was as follows: A

clinical psychologist testified that on August 7, 2000,

defendant stayed after an evening class and exposed his

penis to her. She reported the incident the next day. A

correctional officer testified that on March 5, 2002,

defendant was in the exercise yard, and was holding his

erect penis while glaring at her. She reported the

incident and defendant was removed from the yard. He

later apologized to her. Finally, on August 7, 2002, a

doctor who worked at the county jail observed defendant

standing on a bed facing her and rubbing his penis. The

doctor immediately reported the incident to a

correctional officer.

Defendant first raises a due process challenge to section

1108 that he acknowledges our state Supreme Court has

already rejected in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal. 4th

903, 913-9 7, 919-922. He raises the argument only to

preserve it for federal review. This court, of course,

is bound to follow Falsetta. . . . Although the court

did not decide an equal protection challenge to section

1108, it did cite with approval the decision in People v.

Fitch (1997) 55 Cal. App. 4th 172. (Falsetta, supra, at

918.) In Fitch, the court offered a well-reasoned

analysis of the rational basis for distinguishing sex

offenses from other types of offenses, and concluded that

the seriousness and secretive commission of sex offenses,

resulting in trials that are primarily credibility

contests, justified the admission of uncharged sex

offenses. (Fitch, supra, at 184.) We agree with this

analysis. . . .

Defendant next contends that, even if otherwise

admissible pursuant to section 1108, the court abused its

discretion by failing to exclude the evidence of these

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uncharged sexual offenses under section 352 because the

uncharged acts were too dissimilar to the charged

offenses to have any relevance. We find no abuse of

discretion. "The charged and uncharged crimes need not

be sufficiently similar that evidence of the latter would

be admissible under [section] 1101, otherwise [section]

1108 would serve no purpose. It is enough the charged

and uncharged offenses are sex offenses as defined in

section 1108." (People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal. App.

4th 30, 40-41.) Each of the uncharged acts were sex

offenses as defined in section 1108. They were not

remote because they occurred within two years of the

charged offenses. They were less inflammatory than the

charged offense because they only involved nonviolent

conduct. (Cf. People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th

727, 738.) . . . There was little risk of confusion of

issues or undue consumption of time because the facts

were not complex, and the testimony concerning each

uncharged offense was brief. (See People v. Branch (2001)

91 Cal. App. 4th 274, 282; People v. Harris, supra, at

737-741.)

In any event, any error in the admission of the evidence

of the uncharged sexual offenses was harmless, in light

of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. (People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836.) The victim recognized

defendant from prior contacts, and identified him in a

photographic lineup at trial. The DNA test matched

defendant's sperm with the sample taken from the victim. 

Nor was there any plausible defense of consent, because

the sexual assault exam was consistent with forced

intercourse, and when the police arrived on the scene the

victim was still bound with duct tape and crying

hysterically.

Respondent’s Ex. 9 at 5-7.

B. Applicable Federal Law

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas

review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or

the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Henry v.

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). The due process

inquiry on federal habeas review is whether the admission of

evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th

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Cir. 1995). Only if there are no permissible inferences that the

jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 The United States Supreme Court has left open the question of

whether admission of propensity evidence violates due process. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). The Ninth Circuit

has held that a petitioner’s due process right concerning the

admission of propensity evidence is not clearly established as

required by AEDPA based upon the Supreme Court’s reservation of

this issue as an “open question” in Estelle. Alberni v. McDaniel,

458 F.3d 860, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2006). However, the Ninth Circuit

has also held that Federal Rule of Evidence 411, allowing evidence

of prior sexual offenses to show a propensity to commit a charged

sexual offense, does not violate due process because the evidence

is still subject to the trial court’s balancing test which provides

for meaningful review. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001).

C. Analysis

1. Facial Challenge

Because the United States Supreme Court explicitly reserved

the issue of whether admission of propensity evidence is

unconstitutional, a habeas petitioner cannot show, as is required

by AEDPA, that a state court unreasonably applied established

federal law by concluding that an evidentiary rule allowing

propensity evidence is constitutional. Thus, Petitioner’s claim

that California Evidence Code § 1108 is unconstitutional on its

face fails. 

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2. As-Applied Challenge

Petitioner argues that the admission of the uncharged sexual

misconduct rendered his trial fundamentally unfair because his past

acts of indecent exposure were so dissimilar to the violent sexual

offenses charged against him that they were irrelevant on the issue

of propensity. Petitioner argues that the court should have ruled

the evidence was inadmissible under California Rule of Evidence 352

because it was more prejudicial than probative.

The appellate court reviewed the uncharged offenses and

determined that they would not prejudice the jury. They were not

remote in time because they had occurred within two years of the

charged offenses; they were not inflammatory because they were not

violent; and there was little risk of confusion of issues because

the facts were not complex and the testimony regarding each offense

was very brief. 

The state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

3. Equal Protection Claim

Petitioner merely mentions this claim in his federal petition

but presents no argument on it. He submits his petition to the

California Supreme Court in which he did present argument on this

claim. Respondent addresses this claim in his answer. Therefore,

in the interests of justice, the Court addresses the Equal

Protection claim.

Petitioner argues that § 1108 violated his equal protection

rights because the statute singles out for unequal treatment

individuals who are accused of committing sexual offenses. 

Petitioner contends that he should be treated like other

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individuals who are accused of committing non-sexual crimes. 

Petitioner fails to point to any Supreme Court authority which

supports the theory that persons accused of committing sexual

offenses should be treated the same as those accused of committing

non-sexual offenses. For this reason alone, under AEDPA,

Petitioner’s claim fails because the state court, in denying this

claim, did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court authority.

Furthermore, in Lemay, 260 F.3d at 1030-31, the Ninth Circuit

rejected an equal protection claim in regard to Federal Rule of

Evidence 414, which applies to child molestation cases, but which

is otherwise identical to § 1108. In Lemay, the court pointed out

that sex offenders are not a suspect class under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. at 1030. The court found that “Rule 414 is

constitutional if it bears a reasonable relationship to a

legitimate governmental interest,” that prosecuting crime

effectively is a legitimate governmental interest and that Rule 414

furthers that interest by allowing the prosecution to introduce

relevant evidence to help convict sex offenders. Id. at 1031. 

This analysis also applies to § 1108. Therefore, Petitioner’s

Equal Protection claim is DENIED.

II. Instructing Jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.01

Petitioner argues that the jury instructions with respect to

prior acts of sexual offenses violated his due process rights

because they allowed the jury to convict him based solely on the

prior acts under a preponderance of the evidence standard.

A. State Court’s Opinion

The state appellate court addressed this claim as follows.

Defendant also challenges the court's instruction to the

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jury on the use of evidence of uncharged sexual offenses

in accordance with the revised version of CALJIC No.

2.50.01. His contention that this instruction violates

due process, because it permits a jury to convict the

defendant of the charged offense solely on evidence of

the uncharged offenses proved by a preponderance of the

evidence and therefore impermissibly lowers the

prosecutor's burden of proof, has been rejected by our

Supreme Court in People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 

1007, 1013-1016. Defendant acknowledges that Reliford is

binding on this court.

Respondent’s Ex. 9 at 7.

In regard to CALJIC 2.50.01, the Reliford court explained:

We do not find it reasonably likely a jury could

interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the

charged offenses based on a lowered standard of proof. 

Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use

the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for anything

other than the preliminary determination whether

defendant committed a prior offense . . . The

instructions instead explain that, in all other respects,

the People had the burden of proving defendant guilty

“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Any other reading would

have rendered the reference to reasonable doubt a

nullity. 

Reliford, 29 Cal. 4th at 1016.

B. Applicable Federal Law

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury

charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violated due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; see also Donnelly

v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) ("'[I]t must be

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable,

erroneous or even "universally condemned," but that it violated

some [constitutional right].'"). The instruction may not be judged

in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of

the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72.

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C. Analysis

The instruction the court gave to the jury, based on CALJIC

No. 2.50.01 on the use of uncharged offenses, provided, in relevant

part:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing

that the defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or

more occasions other than that charged in the case.

. . . 

If you find that the defendant committed a sexual offense

on another occasion other than this charged, you may but

are not required to infer that the defendant had a

disposition to commit sexual offenses. If you find that

the defendant had this disposition, you may but are not

required to infer that he was likely to commit and did

commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused.

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence

that the defendant committed other sexual offenses, then

it’s not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he committed the charged offenses. 

If you determine an inference can properly be drawn from

this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you

to consider along with all the other evidence in

determining whether the defendant has been proved guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. 

You must not consider this evidence for any other

purpose.

RT 924-25; CT 187.

The trial court also instructed the jury, based on CALJIC No. 

2.50.1, as follows:

Within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the

prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that a defendant committed sexual

offenses other than those for which he is on trial.

You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose

unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a

defendant committed a sexual offense.

If you find sexual offenses were committed by a

preponderance of the evidence, you are nevertheless

cautioned and reminded that before a defendant can be

found guilty of any crime charged or any included crime

in this trial, the evidence as a whole must persuade you

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beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of

that crime.

RT 925; CT 188.

These instructions, taken together, clearly informed the jury

that proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner

committed another sexual offense is not sufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes. The

instructions also clearly informed the jury that, before Petitioner

could be found guilty of any charged crime, the evidence as a whole

must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty

of committing that crime. 

The state court’s analysis of this claim was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 

III. Jury Trial on Sentencing Factors.

Petitioner urges that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial because the court imposed upper terms on counts

two, three and four based on factual findings made by the court,

instead of a jury, in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

A. State Court Opinion

The state appellate court based its denial of this claim on

People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 1254 (2005), in which the

California Supreme Court had held that “a trial court’s imposition

of an upper term sentence does not violate a defendant’s right to a

jury trial under the principles set forth in Apprendi, Blakely, and

Booker.”1

 However, in Cunningham v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127

S.Ct. 856, 871 (2007), the United States Supreme Court held that

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California’s determinate sentencing law was unconstitutional

because it allowed the judge, not the jury, to find the facts

permitting the court to impose an upper term sentence. In Butler

v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 639 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit held

that Cunningham did not announce a new rule and thus applies

retroactively on habeas review. 

B. Relevant Federal Law

In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that, “other

than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530

U.S. at 488-90. The “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is

the maximum sentence a judge could impose based solely on the facts

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant; that

is, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the sentence the judge

could impose after finding additional facts, but rather is the

maximum he or she could impose without any additional findings. 

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. In Cunningham, the Court concluded

that the middle term specified in California's statutes, not the

upper term, was the relevant statutory maximum; therefore,

California's determinate sentencing law violated the Sixth

Amendment because it authorized the judge, not the jury, to find

the facts permitting an upper term sentence. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct.

at 871. 

C. Analysis

Respondent argues that this claim must be dismissed because

Cunningham does not apply retroactively. However, as noted above,

this argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Butler, 528 F.3d

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Respondent did not have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Butler when he submitted his answer; Butler was decided

on June 9, 2008; Respondent’s answer was submitted on April 9, 2007

and his supplemental answer was submitted on February 12, 2008.

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at 639. 

Respondent next argues that this claim must be dismissed

because Cunningham was not decided when the California appellate

court ruled on this claim and, thus, the claim is unexhausted. 

However, again, in Butler, the Ninth Circuit explained that “where

there is no new rule announced, the state court has had a fair

chance to address the issue when it was raised, and there is no

reason to require further exhaustion.” 528 F.3d at 639. 

Therefore, this claim is exhausted; Respondent’s second argument

for dismissal fails.2

Pointing to the sentencing hearing, Respondent’s Ex. 4, Vol. 8

at 26, Respondent argues that the appellate court’s decision was

not unreasonable because the upper term sentences were acceptable

under Apprendi and Cunningham in that they were based, in part, on

Petitioner’s prior convictions. Respondent points out that the

trial court found that Petitioner was “on State parole when [he]

committed these crimes” and that Petitioner’s “performance on

probation and parole were unsatisfactory.” Id. Citing United

States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 2005) and United

States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 141 (10th Cir. 2005), Respondent

submits that other circuits have ruled that the prior conviction

exception to Apprendi extends to subsidiary findings regarding the

priors, such as that a defendant was on probation or under another

type of court supervision when he or she committed the subsequent

crime. 

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The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in Butler as well. 

There, the petitioner, who had been sentenced to the upper term

under California’s determinate sentencing law, claimed that this

violated his Sixth Amendment rights because it was based on two

aggravating factors not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 

528 F.3d at 628. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state

court’s decision was contrary to established Supreme Court

precedent because it violated Apprendi. 

The Ninth Circuit addressed the respondent’s argument that the 

aggravating factor that the petitioner was on probation at the time

of the crime came within the prior conviction exception. The court

explained that the prior-conviction exception is a narrow one that

applies only to “those facts that can be established by the ‘prior

judicial record’ of conviction,” not to secondary facts that are

derived from that record. Id. at 644-45. In California, a judge

retains the authority to terminate probation early; thus, the fact

that a defendant was sentenced to a certain term of probation at

the time of the prior conviction is insufficient to prove that he

was on probation at the time of the current crime. Id. at 646. 

Butler specifically disapproved of Corchado and Fagans, the cases

upon which Respondent relies. Id. at 641. 

However, the Ninth Circuit noted that a petitioner is entitled

to relief only if the sentencing error is prejudicial under Brecht

v. Abrahamson. Id. at 648. 

Under [the Brecht] standard, we must grant relief if we

are in “grave doubt” as to whether a jury would have

found the relevant aggravating factors beyond a

reasonable doubt. . . . Further, in conducting harmless

error review of an Apprendi violation, we may consider

evidence presented at sentencing proceedings. 

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Apprendi errors are harmless when we can ascertain that a

judge was presented with sufficient documents at

sentencing–-including the original conviction documents

and any documents evidencing modification, termination,

or revocation of probation–-to enable a reviewing or

sentencing court to conclude that a jury would have found

the relevant fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 647 n.14, 648 (citations omitted). 

Noting that California requires only one aggravating factor to

impose the upper term, the court explained that any Apprendi error

“will be harmless if it is not prejudicial as to just one of the

aggravating factors at issue.” Id. at 648. As well as finding

that the petitioner was on probation at the time of the crime, the

trial court had found a second aggravating factor: a vulnerable

victim. Id. at 649, 651. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it had

grave doubt as to whether a jury would have found, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the victim was particularly vulnerable. Id.

at 651. Regarding the petitioner’s probationary status, the court

found that the record did not reveal what evidence was presented to

the state sentencing court and thus it remanded to the district

court for an evidentiary hearing.

Here, the record does not establish that the fact that

Petitioner was on probation or parole at the time of the offense

was plead and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,

the Court must address whether, under Brecht, this violation had a

substantial and injurious effect on the sentence. As in Butler,

the record does not show that sufficient evidence was presented to

the sentencing court to prove that Petitioner was on parole at the

time of his conviction. 

However, the sentencing court found the following additional

aggravating factors: (1) the criminal activity reveals a high level

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3

Rule 4.421 of the California Court Rules provides the

circumstances in aggravation for purposes of sentencing. Three of

the circumstances are: (1) “the crime involved great violence,

great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts

disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness,”

Cal. Ct. Rule 4.421(a)(1); (2) “the manner in which the crime was

carried out indicates planning, sophistication, or

professionalism,” Cal. Ct. Rule 4.421(a)(8); and (3) “the defendant

has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to

society,” Cal. Ct. Rule 4.421(b)(1).

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of cruelty and callousness; (2) the manner in which the crimes were

committed indicates planning; and (3) the crimes involved violent

conduct which indicates that Petitioner is a serious danger to

society. Ex. 4. Vol. 8, at 26.3 Before making these findings, the

trial court recited the circumstances of the offenses for which

Petitioner was found guilty.

It started out with the burglary of a store and then, for

reasons which this Court can never understand, rather

than simply committing a burglary, Mr. Johnson, you then

sexually assaulted, raped and violated the woman in

there. . . . 

When you’re in there apparently to perform the burglary,

and then because, I guess the opportunity presents

itself, that’s what happened. That turned out [to] be a

very vicious, vicious rape, with the binding of the

hands, feet, putting the tape around her head. I mean,

it’s a very vicious crime.

Then after the arrest on that, the next event we have is

you decide if there is, as I think your phrase was, “No

victim, no crime.” So you decided you wanted to have her

killed. So you did what you could to hire somebody to go

out and kill her.

. . . 

It’s the Court’s purpose, at this phase, really, given

crimes of this nature, to protect society and protect our

citizens from people like you, willing to commit crimes

like this. . . . I can’t find a word to describe these

kinds of crimes; horrible, heinous, despicable. All

those words are available, but to be so violative of

another person and then, on top of it to try to kill

them, I just -- I have –- I can’t find a word that would

express the distaste with which this Court views those

kinds of acts.

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Ex. 4, Vol. 8 at 24-25.

Under California law, aggravation means that, when compared to

other ways in which such a crime could be committed, the manner of

commission of the crime indicates that the offense was

distinctively worse than the ordinary. People v. Webber, 228 Cal.

App. 3d 1146, 1169 (1991). Although this question was not

presented to a jury, there is little doubt that, based on the

evidence presented at trial, a jury would have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s crimes revealed a high level of

cruelty and callousness and that the crimes involved violent

conduct which indicated Petitioner is a serious danger to society. 

See Rich v. Martel, 2008 WL 2788322, *11 (E.D. Cal.) (concluding,

under Brecht, that Sixth Amendment sentencing violation was

harmless because, based on the indisputable facts, the jury would

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was

particularly vulnerable). 

For this reason, the Apprendi violation was not prejudicial

and thus does not warrant habeas relief.

IV. Refusal to Instruct on Entrapment Defense

In Petitioner’s trial for conspiracy and solicitation to

commit murder, he sought a jury instruction on entrapment, which

the trial court refused to give. Petitioner claims that this

refusal violated his due process right to present a defense and his

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 

A. State Court Opinion

The appellate court addressed this claim, in relevant part, as

follows:

The entrapment defense was based upon defendant's

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testimony that another inmate, Marvin Jackson, had

threatened defendant, telling him he would be killed if

he went to prison, and the only way to avoid that fate

would be to arrange for someone to kill P., the victim. 

Defendant also testified that Marvin Jackson went by the

nickname "M.J." and, in his meeting with defendant,

Detective Tosti asked defendant how "M.J." was doing,

thereby supporting an inference that M.J. was working

with Tosti as an informant. The trial court found this

was insufficient evidence to support giving the

instruction. Defendant contends that he presented

substantial evidence to support an entrapment

instruction, and the error violated his due process right

to present a defense and his Sixth Amendment right to a

jury trial because entrapment was his only defense to the

solicitation charge.

"The trial court was required to instruct . . . on the

defense of entrapment if, but only if, substantial

evidence supported the defense. [Citations.] In

California, the test for entrapment focuses on the police

conduct and is objective. Entrapment is established if

the law enforcement conduct is likely to induce a

normally law-abiding person to commit the offense. 

[Citation.] '[S]uch a person would normally resist the

temptation to commit a crime presented by the simple

opportunity to act unlawfully. Official conduct that

does no more than offer that opportunity to the suspect

–-for example, a decoy program--is therefore permissible;

but it is impermissible for the police or their agents to

pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as

badgering, cajoling, importuning, or other affirmative

acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to

commit the crime.’ [Citation].” (People v. Watson, (2000)

22 Cal. 4th 220, 222-223.)

The mere fact that Detective Tosti pretended to be a hit

man in response to information that defendant was looking

for one would not constitute entrapment. “[T]he rule is

clear that ‘ruses, stings, and decoys are permissible

stratagems in the enforcement of criminal law, and they

become invalid only when badgering or importuning takes

place to an extent and degree that is likely to induce an

otherwise law-abiding person to commit a crime.’”

(Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.

(1994) 7 Cal. 4th 561, 569.) . . . Yet, defendant does

not contend that Detective Tosti, in his undercover role

as a hit man, said or did anything to induce defendant to

commit the crime. To the contrary, the transcripts of

Tosti’s meetings with defendant show that he gave

defendant the option to simply “fuck [P.] up and put the

fear of God” in her, in other words, to beat up or scare

the victim. Defendant rejected this alternative to

killing P. because “[t]hat’s another chance of her coming

back.” The only other matters Tosti and defendant

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discussed were terms of payment, whether defendant’s wife

would go along with the plan, and how to cover Tosti’s

tracks so it would not lead back to him or defendant. 

This conversation lead to defendant’s assertion that,

instead of leaving P.’s body at the scene, he wanted

“that bitch chopped up.” At the close of their

conversation Tosti also gave defendant another

opportunity to back out by saying, “[Y]ou tell me,

‘Forget it,’ and I walk out and I forget we even had a

conversation . . .” Defendant responded: “It’s either

you or I go find someone else.” Thus, in the entirety of

Tosti’s interaction with defendant there was not a

scintilla of evidence that Tosti importuned, badgered, or

cajoled defendant to induce him to solicit the murder of

P.

Instead, the source of the alleged improper inducement

was defendant's fellow inmate, Marvin Jackson. Defendant

contends that if his testimony were credited, the jury 

could have found Jackson's threat constituted the type of

conduct that would induce a normally law-abiding citizen

to commit the crime.5 He also notes that the fact that 

defendant had expressly threatened to kill P. if she

reported the crime does not preclude giving the

instruction because in California the availability of the

entrapment defense does not require him to show absence

of predisposition to commit the crime. Instead, the 

test is objective, and focuses on the conduct of law

enforcement, which is viewed in light of "the effect it

would have on a normally law-abiding person situated in

the circumstances of the case at hand. Among the

circumstances that may be relevant for this purpose, for

example, are the transactions preceding the offense, the

suspect's response to the inducements of the officer, the

gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting 

instances of its commission. [Citation.]" (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 690.) Yet, the more severe the

crime is, the less likely it is that a normally

law-abiding citizen could be badgered, cajoled, or

importuned to commit it. We question whether, even under

threat of death at the hands of fellow inmates in prison, 

a normally law-abiding citizen would agree to arrange to

kill an innocent victim in the hope of avoiding going to

prison, rather than availing him or herself of legal 

alternatives to murder, such as seeking protective 

custody. Nonetheless, we shall accept, for the sake of

argument, defendant's premise that the threat he would be

killed by gang affiliates in prison if he did not 

arrange to have P. killed is the type of conduct that

would meet this objective standard. 

_______________________________________________

5. For the purpose of determining whether there is

substantial evidence to support the Entrapment

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instruction the court may not weigh it or assess its

credibility. We therefore must disregard the

implausibility of the scenario, i.e., that Marvin

Jackson, a person who intended to order a hit on

defendant when he went to prison and had no interest in

defendant avoiding the penal consequences of his crime,

would prevail upon defendant to kill his victim and

thereby avoid the fate Jackson planned for him.

_____________________________________________________

Assuming arguendo that a law-biding citizen might have

been induced to conspire and solicit to commit murder by

Jackson's threat, we find no error because there was no 

substantial evidence to support the conclusion that

Marvin Jackson was acting as an agent for the police when 

he made the threat. Entrapment may not be committed by 

a private citizen who is not acting for law enforcement,

because the defense is “'designed to prevent the 

seduction of innocent people into criminality by 

officers of the law.'" (People v. Gregg (1970) 5 Cal.

App. 3d 502, 505.) “[Elntrapment is a defense not 

because the accused is innocent, but in fulfillment of a

judicial policy to prevent police officers from 

fostering crime. To say that a non-police decoy may 

commit entrapment ignores both the defendant's guilt and

the law's policy to deter illegal police conduct. If the

defendant has committed a crime without the helping hand 

of organized society, he should not escape conviction." 

(Id. at p. 508.) 

. . . To establish agency defendant would at least have

to show that Marvin Jackson was acting at the direction,

suggestion, or under the control of law enforcement when

he made the alleged threat. . . . The record is devoid of

such evidence. Detective Tosti testified that during the

week of November 26, 2001, just days after defendant’s

arrest, he received information from a confidential

informant that defendant was looking for someone to kill

the victim of the robbery and rape that defendant

allegedly committed. Tosti testified that he had several

more contacts with the informant to assess the

credibility of the tip, and exchange information before

Tosti went undercover as “Kev,” the hit man, to meet with

defendant. Defendant rests his argument that the

foregoing is substantial evidence permitting an inference

that Marvin Jackson was acting as an agent of the police

at the time he made the alleged threat on two slim reeds: 

First, he assumes that Marvin Jackson was the

confidential informant. Although the court below refused

to compel disclosure of the identity of the confidential

informant, defendant suggests that the jury could have

drawn an inference that Marvin Jackson was the informant

based upon defendant’s testimony that Marvin Jackson

regularly used the nickname M.J. and the fact that during

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Tosti’s tape-recorded meeting with defendant, Tosti asked

defendant how “M.J.” was doing, and that in Peterson’s

recorded call, she also referred to “M.J.,” and Tosti

appeared to know to whom she was referring. Second,

defendant argues that Detective Tosti’s testimony that he

had two or three meetings with the informant to exchange

information before he met undercover with defendant was

sufficient to support the inference that Marvin Jackson

was acting as an agent for the police when he made the

threat that allegedly induced defendant to seek a hit man

to kill P.

. . . No agency is shown “where law enforcement

officials merely accept information elicited by the

informant-inmate on his or her own initiative, with no

official promises, encouragement, or guidance.” (In re

Neely (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 901, 915.) Agency may be

inferred where, however, law enforcement officials direct

the informant to focus on a specific person, or instruct

the informant to obtain specific information. (Ibid.)

. . .

The evidence upon which defendant relied failed to meet

the minimum threshold necessary to support an inference

of agency. He presented nothing more than his suspicion

that Jackson was the confidential informant who provided

Tosti with the tip, and evidence that Detective Tosti had

several meetings with the informant after the initial

tip. Assuming arguendo that the jury could infer that

Marvin Jackson was the confidential informant, the mere

possibility that Jackson provided information to the

police that defendant was looking for a hit man, or even

that he facilitated a meeting between defendant and

Tosti, does not support any inference that he was under

the direction or control of law enforcement when he made

a threat. . . . Detective Tosti testified that he began

his investigation after the initial tip from the 

informant who told Tosti defendant was looking for a hit 

man. Since defendant was already seeking a hit man, it 

follows that any threat Jackson may have made to induce

defendant to look for a hit man would have preceded this 

call. The evidence of meetings with Tosti to verify the

credibility of the original tip, after it was made, does

not support any inference that the informant was working

as an agent of the police before he called with the tip. 

Nor was there any evidence that, prior to receiving the

tip, Tosti had focused his investigation on defendant, or

advised or directed the informant to find out whether

defendant was planning to kill P. There also was no

evidence of any agreement between the informant and

Tosti, or any other law enforcement official, whereby the

informant would solicit information from other inmates in

exchange for compensation or leniency of pending 

charges. In the absence of evidence the informant was

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acting under Tosti's direction, suggestion or control,

Tosti's testimony that he had several meetings with the

informant after receiving the tip simply does not support

a reasonable inference that the informant was under

Tosti's direction and control before giving Tosti the tip

when the alleged threat was made.

. . .

Defendant also suggests that, if his showing of agency

was insufficient to support an instruction on entrapment,

the deficiency in his evidence was caused by the court's 

refusal to compel disclosure of the confidential

informant's identity, and denial of discovery requests

regarding the relationship between Marvin Jackson and the

police department and district attorney's office, which

were predicated upon the assumption that Jackson was the

informant. Defendant, however, had other means to 

develop evidence concerning the relationship between the

confidential informant and Detective Tosti. For 

example, the court offered to hold a section 402 hearing

with Tosti on the subject of agency and permit defendant

to ask questions about the relationship between Tosti and 

the informant without disclosing the informant's name. 

Defense counsel rejected that suggestion, arguing that 

Tosti's testimony that he met with the informant several

times was sufficient evidence of agency. Nor did 

defendant use the opportunity on cross-examination to ask

Tosti whether he had any agreement with the informant to

target defendant and elicit information from him, when

such an agreement was made, and what direction or

control, if any, Tosti exerted over the informant's 

communications with defendant before the informant called

Tosti with the tip. In light of the availability of 

alternative means to develop evidence on the issue of

agency without forcing disclosure of the informant's 

identity, we conclude that the court's ruling on his 

motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the

confidential informant, and the related denial of

discovery predicated on the assumption that Jackson was

the informant, did not cause defendant's failure or

inability to present evidence on the key issue of agency

to support an instruction on entrapment.8

We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing

to instruct on entrapment because there was insufficient

evidence to support a finding that Jackson, a private

citizen, was acting as the agent of law enforcement when

he induced defendant to commit the crime.

________________________________________________________

8. In any event, even if defendant had presented evidence

that the informant had provided information in the past, 

or that the police had generally requested the informant 

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to provide any information he acquired in the future,

that would not be sufficient to submit the issue of

agency to the jury, because it would not show agency at

the time of the alleged inducement. (United States v.

Busby, (1986) 780 F.2d 804, 806-807.)

Respondent’s Ex. 9 at 8-17.

B. Relevant Federal Law

As noted above, claimed instructional error must so infect the

trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed

by the Fourteenth Amendment. Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110,

114 (9th Cir. 1988). It is true that a criminal defendant is

entitled to adequate instructions on the defense theory of the

case. Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000). Failure

to instruct on the theory of defense violates due process if “‘the

theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it

applicable.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2006). However, a state trial court's refusal to give an

instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal

habeas corpus proceedings. Dunckhurst, 859 F.2d at 114. Due

process does not require that an instruction be given unless the

evidence supports it. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982);

Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005).

C. Analysis

Although the state appellate court employed only state law in

its analysis of the denial of an entrapment instruction, that law

was not contrary to federal law. Therefore, the appellate court’s

denial of this claim was not contrary or an unreasonable

application of established federal law.

The appellate court undertook a thorough analysis of 

Petitioner’s arguments and the evidence he presented at trial. The

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court’s determination that Petitioner had presented insufficient

evidence at trial to warrant an instruction on entrapment was not

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. 

The appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim that the trial

court’s denial of his discovery motions deprived him of his Sixth

Amendment right to present a defense because he might have

discovered evidence that established that Jackson was an agent of

the police. The court reasoned that Petitioner could have obtained

the evidence he sought in discovery through other means. This was

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

authority. 

Furthermore, to obtain habeas relief, any constitutional error

must have had a “substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619. There was a wealth of evidence pointing

to the fact that Petitioner was not coerced into soliciting Tosti

to murder P. Petitioner threatened during the rape that he would

kill P. if she reported it, Petitioner’s statement to Tosti that P.

had to die or there would be a “chance of her coming back,” and his

instruction to chop P. up after he killed her, incriminated

Petitioner and revealed that he was not an ordinary citizen who had

to be coerced into soliciting P.’s murder. Furthermore, as noted

by the appellate court, the theory that Petitioner would believe

that Jackson wanted to protect him by advising him to have P.

killed, so that he would not end up in prison where Jackson would

order that he be murdered, would most likely be found to be

implausible by the jury. Finally, because agency must be shown at

the time of the alleged inducement, the discovery of evidence that

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Jackson had been an informant for the police in the past or that

the police had generally requested he provide to them any

information he acquired in the future would have been insufficient

to submit the issue of agency to the jury.

Thus, the appellate court’s determination of this claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent; nor did it result in a decision based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

V. Jackson’s Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

Petitioner argues that his right to due process and to present

a defense was violated because the trial court denied his request

to call Jackson and to instruct the jury that it could draw a

negative inference from Jackson’s refusal to testify. Citing Crane

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) and Taylor v. United States,

484 U.S. 400, 4008-09 (1988), Petitioner argues that the appellate

court was unreasonable in its decision that Jackson had a valid

basis for asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege not to

incriminate himself and that he should not have been required to

invoke it before the jury.

A. Appellate Court Opinion

The appellate court addressed this claim, in relevant part, as

follows:

Defendant attempted to call Jackson as a witness, but 

Jackson, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, 

stated his intention to refuse to answer any questions,

and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination. Jackson's appointed counsel

explained that his client had stated his intent to refuse

to testify, and since that refusal exposed Jackson to

contempt charges his counsel had advised him to invoke

the Fifth Amendment privilege. The court informed

Jackson it did not believe that he had "any penal

interest to be protected," and ordered him to answer

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defense counsel's questions. When Jackson again refused

to answer, defendant argued that Jackson had no valid 

basis for invoking the privilege. Defendant asked that

Jackson be sworn and forced to invoke the privilege

before the jury. The court refused that request, and it

deferred taking action on the contempt matter until 

after trial. 

Defendant later renewed his request that the court either

inform the jury that Jackson refused to testify, or allow

defendant to call Jackson as a witness and force him to

invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. His renewed

request was predicated upon his assertion that facing

contempt charges for refusing to testify was not a valid 

basis for asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege, and 

it therefore was permissible to compel Jackson to be 

sworn and invoke the privilege in front of the jury. The

district attorney argued that Jackson would face

questions whether he "was making criminal threats of 

death" to defendant, and therefore he did have a valid

basis for invoking the privilege against self

-incrimination. The court again refused defendant's

request, and defendant now contends that this was

prejudicial error. 

It is well established that it is error to force a

witness who validly invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination to do so in front of the jury, 

because this procedure would encourage "inappropriate 

speculation on the part of jurors about the reasons for

the invocation. An adverse inference, damaging to the

defense, may be drawn by jurors despite the possibility

the assertion of the privilege may be based upon reasons

unrelated to guilt." [Citations omitted]. Yet, if the

witness "has no constitutional or statutory right to

refuse to testify, a different analysis applies. Juries

are entitled to draw a negative inference when such a

witness refuses to provide relevant testimony." (People

v. Lopez, supra, at p. 1554.) 

Defendant argues that Jackson had no valid basis for

asserting the privilege based upon the possibility that

he faced contempt charges, and that the court must have

so found because it ordered Jackson to answer questions

in the proceedings outside the presence of the jury. He

further contends that the court's ruling deprived him of

the opportunity to invite the jury to draw a negative

inference from Jackson's refusal to testify. This, he

argues, was prejudicial error because Jackson was the

only person who could have corroborated defendant's

testimony concerning the threat. He reasons that the 

negative inference the jury might have drawn from his

refusal to testify could have bolstered the credibility

of defendant's testimony that Jackson had pressured him 

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into devising the plan to kill P. 

We question defendant's premise that the trial court

determined Jackson did not have a valid basis for

asserting the privilege against self-incrimination. 

Defendant is correct that Jackson's counsel advanced only

the argument that Jackson faced contempt charges based 

upon his stated intention to refuse to testify at all,

and the court rejected this ground. Nevertheless, 

later, when defendant reasserted his contention that the

court should force Jackson to invoke the privilege 

before the jury, the district attorney pointed out that

defendant had made an offer of proof that Jackson had 

threatened defendant with death if he did not arrange to

kill P. If true, this conduct could have furnished "'"a 

link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute"'" him 

for the criminal offense of making criminal threats (Pen.

Code, § 422) or other criminal liability. (In re

Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1151.) 

Thus, the court would have been within its discretion to

conclude that, on this key issue, the assertion of the

privilege would be valid, and that it would therefore be 

error to force Jackson to invoke it before the jury. 

. . .

In any event, whether measured under the federal standard

that defendant invokes, (Chapman v. California (1967) 3

86 U.S. 18, 20-21) or under People v. Watson, supra, 46 

Cal.2d at p.836, any error was harmless. Since Jackson

clearly stated he would refuse to testify, the only 

consequence of the court's ruling was that defendant was 

deprived of the right to invite the jury to draw a

negative inference from Jackson's refusal to testify. 

Defendant reasons that he could have relied upon this

negative inference to bolster the credibility of his own

testimony that Jackson did in fact threaten him. Yet,

such a threat would only have been relevant to the

entrapment defense. As we have held, defendant failed to

present sufficient evidence to support an inference that

Jackson was Tosti's agent when the alleged threat was

made, and the court did not err in refusing to instruct 

on the entrapment defense. Consequently, even if we

accept the assertion that on the slim thread of this

negative inference, the jury might have believed Jackson

made the threat, there is no reasonable possibility that 

drawing a negative inference from Jackson's refusal to

testify would have resulted in a more favorable outcome.

Respondent’s Ex. 9 at 17-20.

B. Relevant Federal Authority

As noted above, a claim of a violation of Due Process and the

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right to present a defense requires that the defendant be deprived

of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Pulley,

465 U.S. at 41. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth

Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any

criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself." The Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to evidence

which may directly support a criminal conviction, information which

would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to a

prosecution, and evidence which an individual reasonably believes

could be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Maness v.

Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975)(citing Hoffman v. United States,

341 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1951)). 

C. Analysis

Petitioner contends that the appellate court’s ruling on this

claim was erroneous because Jackson and his attorney invoked the

privilege on the improper basis that if Jackson refused to testify,

he would be held in contempt of court; they did not claim that

Jackson’s assertion of the privilege was based on his fear of being

prosecuted for threatening Petitioner. Petitioner characterizes as

speculative the appellate court’s reliance on the prosecutor’s

statement that Petitioner had made an offer of proof that he

intended to question Jackson about his threats to torture and kill

Petitioner. 

However, Petitioner does not dispute that he intended to

question Jackson about the alleged threats he made to Petitioner. 

Furthermore, the fact that the prosecutor, rather than Jackson's

attorney, pointed out this possibility is not determinative. 

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Therefore, the appellate court’s finding that Jackson had a valid

reason for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege was not an

unreasonable finding of fact based on the evidence before the state

trial court. 

Furthermore, the appellate court found that any potential

error was harmless. If the court had required Jackson to invoke

his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury, it would have been

relevant only to Petitioner’s entrapment defense. However, as

discussed above, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence

to support a finding that Jackson was a police agent when the

alleged threat was made. Therefore, the state court was not

unreasonable in finding that any error would not have affected the

jury’s verdict. 

Therefore, the state court’s denial of this claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of established Supreme

Court authority nor was it based upon an unreasonable finding of

facts in light of the evidence presented to the trial court.

VI. Cumulative Effect of Court’s Rulings

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently

prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several

errors may prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction must

be overturned. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir.

2003). However, where there is no single constitutional error,

nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

Because the Court finds no constitutional error in this case,

there can be no cumulative error. Therefore, the state appellate

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court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court authority.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus (Docket # 1) is DENIED and his motions for inquiry

and to appoint counsel (Docket # 14) are DENIED as moot. Judgment 

shall enter accordingly and the clerk shall close the file. The

parties shall bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/2/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNSON et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MALFI et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-05539 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on September 2, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Amy Haddix

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Anthony E. Johnson

California State Prison - Sacramento

Prisoner Id K-00750

P.O. Box 290066

Represa, CA 95671-0066

Dated: September 2, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-05539-CW Document 21 Filed 09/02/08 Page 34 of 34