Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01250/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

LORENZO PEARSON and ) 

CLARISSA PEARSON, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 1:14cv1250-MHT-WC 

 ) 

THE COMMERCIAL BANK ) 

OF OZARK, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 This matter is before the court for review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1) 

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as well as several motions filed by 

Plaintiffs subsequent to the filing of their complaint. The District Judge referred this case 

to the undersigned Magistrate Judge “for consideration and disposition or 

recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate.” Order (Doc. 5). After a 

review of Plaintiffs’ filings and all supporting evidentiary materials, and for the reasons 

that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the complaint be dismissed pursuant 

to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On December 29, 2014, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se and requesting leave of the 

court to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), filed the instant 

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complaint. The specific factual allegations of Plaintiffs’ complaint are numerous, mostly 

conclusory, and, as a whole, difficult to decipher. There is no doubt that Plaintiffs’ 

complaint concerns what appears to be Defendant Commercial Bank of Ozark’s 

foreclosure on property that Plaintiffs previously owned in Alabama, as well as a 

subsequent—and perhaps ongoing—ejectment proceeding in state court, and related 

disputes between Plaintiffs and the defendants they are attempting to sue. As best the 

court can tell, Plaintiffs assert that, despite the 2010 foreclosure they reference in their 

complaint, they somehow retain title to the land at issue,1

 that they have not been justly 

compensated for use of the land undertaken by the City or Ariton, Alabama, after it was 

granted an easement by the Bank, and that, furthermore, the Bank is precluded from 

asserting an ejectment claim against Plaintiffs in state court because of its purported 

waiver of the claim when it failed to assert ejectment as a counterclaim in some prior 

state court proceeding. See Compl. (Doc. 1) at 2-3. 

II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

 Plaintiffs purport to bring numerous claims for relief sounding in both federal and 

state law. However, discerning those claims with considerable precision is difficult. In 

the “Jurisdiction” portion of the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that they bring claims for 

“Declaratory relief . . . pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202;” “Constitutional Taking 

 

1

 Plaintiffs’ theory of ownership of the land is never fully explicated. They concede in a separate filing 

that “Dale County Probate record show Commercial Bank as title holder to said property; at issue in this 

complaint from a legal foreclosure because of the judgment of the Court in January of 2012.” Pl.’s Mot. 

To Supp. (Doc. 11) at 2. Nevertheless, they claim to be “possessors” of the property, and that they 

somehow have “general and specific title.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at 2. Notwithstanding the foreclosure 

alluded to by Plaintiffs, it appears they believe they possess title because they “previously ha[ve] held 

open and notorious hostile possession of this property for multiple years.” Id. 

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Claim . . . pursuant 5th, Amendment of the United States Constitution. . . . Also § 1981 

and §1983 claims alleging race-based deprivation of full and equal benefit of the laws;” 

and “Due Process Violation is pursuant the 5th, and 14th Amendment of the United States 

U.S.C. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at 1. 

In addition to these purported federal causes of action, Plaintiffs appear to assert 

numerous state-law tort claims against various defendants, including “civil trespass” 

(Count Three), “illegal conversion” (Count Four), “negligence” (Count Five), 

“wantonness” (Count Six), “intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Count Seven), 

“aiding and abetting tort of outrage” (Count Eight), “nuisance” (Count Nine), “civil 

conspiracy” (Count Ten), “tortious interference with a business or contractual 

relationship” (Count Eleven), “illegal ejectment” (Count Twelve), “negligence per se” 

(Counts Thirteen and Fourteen), and “inverse condemnation” (Count Sixteen). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs have requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 9), 

which obligates the court to undertake review of their complaint pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (applying § 1915(e) in non-prisoner action). That statute instructs the court to 

dismiss any action wherein it is determined that an in forma pauperis applicant’s suit is 

“frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs’ 

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complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because Plaintiffs have 

failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. 

The undersigned begins with a discussion of the standards to be applied when 

assessing the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleadings for purposes of review under § 1915(e). 

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff file a “short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In general, then, a pleading is insufficient if it 

offers only mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (a complaint does not suffice under Rule 8(a) “if it tenders 

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”). In order to survive 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, then, Plaintiff’s complaint “‘must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief which is plausible on its face.’” 

Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1051 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678). “A claim is factually plausible where the facts alleged permit the court to 

reasonably infer that the defendant’s alleged misconduct was unlawful. Factual 

allegations that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,’ however, are not 

facially plausible.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

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 As a general matter, “[i]n the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe 

the complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell 

v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). However, although district courts must 

apply a “less stringent standard” to the pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff, such 

“‘leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to 

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air 

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. 

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thus, “[w]hile a complaint 

does not need detailed factual allegations, ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.’” Simpson v. Zwinge, 

531 F. App’x 985, 986 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ complaint, even if liberally construed, must 

minimally satisfy the dictates of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 

order to survive review under § 1915(e). As set out below, the undersigned concludes 

that the complaint fails to withstand such scrutiny. 

The undersigned begins the analysis of the complaint with claims purporting to 

assert some federal claim or cause of action within this court’s federal question 

jurisdiction. Plaintiffs allege in Count Fifteen of their complaint a “FAILURE OF DUE 

PROCESS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983” against Defendants Town of Ariton, Town of 

Ariton Water and Sewer Authority, Ronnie Danner as Chair of the Water and Sewer 

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Board, and Mayor Jivas Sutton. Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 184-200. In support, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference as to the Towns customs and or 

polices [sic] in doing business with Plaintiff(s), as to a protected constitutional right 

under the 5th Amendment” and provisions of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law. 

Id. ¶ 186. Plaintiffs appear to assert that they were denied due process because the 

“Town of Ariton has previously used others property in this manner and the providers 

were compensated for the Town of Ariton use of their land for a sewage dungeon or a 

similar structure.” Id. Plaintiffs thus claim that the “Defendants deprived the Plaintiff(s) 

of their property interest without just compensation by an illegal easement. . . . They also 

knew or should have known the issue of title and possession of the said property were 

being held in a court of law and or equity for adjudication. The Defendants action are 

widespread constitutional violations . . . .” Id. Plaintiffs maintain that they “had a legal 

right to allow due process to take its course as to their property interest and or possession 

of any action on the property of which they held possession in real property.” Id. ¶ 189. 

As it is presented in the complaint, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 “due process” claim appears 

to challenge the Town of Ariton’s actions in obtaining an easement from the Commercial 

Bank of Ozark to enter and make use of the property which Plaintiffs claim to own. 

Plaintiffs appear to believe that they were denied “due process” by Defendants because 

they were not properly compensated for the Town’s use of the land pursuant to the 

easement. However, Plaintiffs never clearly allege what additional “process” they were 

“due” and yet were deprived of by Defendants. Plaintiffs acknowledge throughout the 

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complaint that they are parties to an ejectment action in state court. It thus appears that 

Plaintiffs believe they were somehow denied due process because the Town obtained the 

easement from the bank before the ejectment action was fully resolved. 

Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim for a due process violation owing to the 

alleged actions of Defendants. Defendants could not have violated Plaintiffs’ due process 

rights merely by obtaining an easement from the only entity which, Plaintiffs admit, is the 

“title holder to said property at issue in this complaint” according to official “Dale 

County Probate record” and pursuant to a judgment of a state court in 2012. See Pls.’ 

Mot. To Supp. (Doc. 11) at 2. While Plaintiffs have certainly concocted a bizarre and 

legally problematic theory of how they own the land despite the “legal foreclosure” 

carried out by the Commercial Bank of Ozark and any subsequent state court 

proceeding,2

 there is no authority that due process requires a property owner to obtain 

ejectment of one party prior to granting an easement to use their land to another party. 

Nor can it be considered a due process violation for a municipal entity to enter and make 

use of land for which it has been granted an easement by the only properly recognized 

owner of the land in official records. 

 

2

 As alluded to above, Plaintiffs’ theory that they retain title to the land despite the foreclosure and 

subsequent state court judgment is that the Bank somehow waived any claim of ejectment against them 

when it failed to assert such as a counterclaim in a prior state court proceeding. See Pl.’s Mot. To Supp. 

(Doc. 11) at 2 (“We presented that in that judgment there was no counterclaims for any other relief and 

neither did the Bank request any. Specifically, the ejectment lawsuit they have before the court now is a 

new claim for additional relief. . . . Therefore we asserted even if they have title they can’t come to 

Court and file any other action surrounding the same issues and or nucleus of facts of a subsequent suit 

that was adjudicated on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, surrounding the same nucleus of 

operative facts, and between the same parties. Furthermore, we asserted under the facts if their claim is 

barred they can’t violate our possession. Similarly, we assert under applicable Alabama case law any 

deeds that should have been presented in a prior suit that is mandated by the ARCP/FRCP 13a, is barred 

now or when they should have been submitted in January of 2012.”). 

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At bottom, the fact that neither the Commercial Bank of Ozark nor the Town of 

Ariton or any other Defendant recognizes Plaintiffs’ attenuated claim of ownership, and 

that Plaintiffs’ theory of ownership has apparently received no traction in any of the state 

court proceedings prior to their filing of this case, does not constitute a violation by any 

Defendant of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Moreover, there is “process” available to 

Plaintiffs. They have filed and prosecuted state court actions concerning the property. 

They have also defended their actions in state court proceedings concerning the property, 

including contesting the ejectment proceeding against them at the time they filed the 

instant complaint. The mere fact that their arguments have not succeeded, and that 

apparently none of these proceedings have resolved to Plaintiffs’ satisfaction, does not, 

and cannot, suffice as a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights. Rather, 

“[i]t is the state’s failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise 

procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal 

procedural due process claim.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000). 

The complaint is utterly devoid of any allegations that state procedures were inadequate 

or unavailable to protect Plaintiffs’ purported interest in the property. As such, they have 

failed to state a claim upon which any relief could be granted for any due process 

violation. 

In Count Seventeen of the complaint, Plaintiffs assert a “CONSTITUTIONAL 

TAKIN [sic] CLAIM PURSUANT 5TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 212-34. In this claim, Plaintiffs appear 

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generally to repeat their claim that the Town of Ariton’s securing an easement from the 

Commercial Bank of Ozark, and further acting consistent with the terms of the easement, 

somehow constitutes a taking of their land without just compensation. Id. at ¶¶ 215-16. 

Plaintiffs find support for this theory in the fact that the Town’s Attorney, Defendant 

Danner, provided Plaintiffs with a letter which directed Plaintiffs to cease and desist from 

their activities, including erecting locked fences and gates, which were inhibiting the 

Town’s use of facilities which it placed on the land pursuant to the terms of the easement 

granted by Commercial Bank of Ozark, and further threatened Plaintiffs with civil and 

criminal penalties if they continued to do so. Id. at ¶ 217-19. Plaintiffs appear to believe 

that the fact that Defendants sent them this letter somehow constitutes some sort of 

concession by the Town that Plaintiffs have a cognizable interest in the property. See id.

at ¶¶ 218-19 (“This leads one to see there was a conflict between all parties and Plaintiff 

Lorenzo Pearson needed to be notified by Defendants. Otherwise if there was no rights 

and or objection by Plaintiff Lorenzo Pearson there would be no need to notice him.”). Of 

course, the reason the letter was sent to Plaintiffs is manifest: the Town wished for 

Plaintiffs to stop impeding its use and enjoyment of the easement which it had obtained. 

The Town was not seeking Plaintiffs’ blessing to continue using the easement granted to 

it out of some concern that it might impede on Plaintiffs’ rights; it was demanding that 

Plaintiffs discontinue actively trying to thwart the Town’s activities. Nothing in the letter 

lends any support to any theory that the Town recognized some valid interest of Plaintiffs 

for which Plaintiffs were entitled to some form of compensation. 

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In any event, as with Plaintiffs’ due process claim, which, as set forth above, is 

virtually identical to the instant “taking” claim, Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim 

upon which relief could be granted. First, Plaintiffs would lack standing to assert an 

unconstitutional taking as to any property which they did not own. Plaintiffs have 

offered nothing but extremely attenuated conclusions that they retain some ownership 

interest in the property while elsewhere they have conceded that the Commercial Bank of 

Ozark is the “title holder” of the property in Dale County probate records and pursuant to 

a state court judgment entered in January of 2012. There can be no taking of Plaintiffs’ 

land if the land was not owned by Plaintiffs and it was not, in fact, “taken” because it was 

the subject of an easement granted in due course by the lawful owner of the property. 

Nevertheless, even indulging Plaintiffs’ convoluted theory of continued ownership 

by virtue of some purported waiver of rights by the Bank and Plaintiffs’ supposed 

“adverse possession,” Plaintiffs still have failed to state any claim upon which relief 

could be granted for any unconstitutional taking. In order to state such a claim, “the 

property owner must allege that the governmental action . . . has denied all economically 

beneficial or productive use of his property. In other words, the governmental action 

must have made the property worthless.” Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., ex rel. 

Manager, 195 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citation omitted). In 

addition, Plaintiffs must “allege either that the state law provides him no process for 

obtaining just compensation (such as an action for inverse condemnation) or that the state 

law appears to provide such process, but due to state court interpretation, the process is 

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inadequate.” Id.3 In this case, Plaintiff has made no allegation that the subject property 

has been rendered worthless by the Town’s use of its easement, no allegation that state 

law provides him with no process for obtaining just compensation, and—apart from his 

implicit complaint that the state courts have not credited his various legal theories 

described above—no allegation that a state court interpretation of any available process 

to obtain compensation renders the process inadequate. Where the complaint is devoid of 

such allegations, the takings claim is not ripe and “the district court must dismiss it for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction since the owner has failed to establish an Article III 

‘case or controversy.’” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim upon 

which relief could be granted for an unconstitutional taking. 

Plaintiffs’ “Count Eighteen” presents as a cause of action “RACIAL AND OR 

DISCRIMINATION WITH RETALIATION.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 236. This 

nomenclature, of course, sounds in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, 

Plaintiffs asserted in the “JURISDICTION” portion of their complaint that their “Due 

Process Violation is pursuant . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” 

Id. at ¶ 4. However, to the extent Plaintiffs might have actually intended to present a 

viable claim for an alleged Title VII violation, they plainly have failed to do so. An 

essential element of any claim of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII is that the 

 

3

 Notably, a state court interpretation of a process which will render it inadequate occurs where “the state 

law provided an . . . action to remedy a taking, but the state court interpreted the law as capping the 

property owner’s damages at less than the value of what was taken.” Agripost, Inc., 195 F.3d at 1231 

n.13. It follows, then, that a state court’s mere disagreement with Plaintiffs’ novel theory that the 

Commercial Bank of Ozark has waived any right to seek ejectment—that is, a mere disagreement with 

Plaintiffs about their ownership of the land—could not render any process provided by Alabama to 

remedy a taking inadequate. 

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alleged discrimination is in the form of an unlawful employment practice committed by 

an employer of the plaintiff, an employment agency, or a labor organization. See 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c). Plaintiffs’ allegations utterly fail to allege any practice or 

relationship which would be actionable as to any Defendant under any theory of recovery 

encompassed by Title VII. 

If Title VII cannot be the basis for Plaintiffs’ “Count Eighteen,” then the court is 

left to try and discern the lawful basis of the claim from the confusing jumble of 

allegations constituting the claim. This circumstance alone violates the short and plain 

statement requirement of Rule 8(a) and warrants dismissal of the claim. Nevertheless, 

construing the claim liberally, as the court is required to do given Plaintiffs’ pro se status, 

the undersigned will hazard a guess as to what Plaintiffs are trying to complain about in 

“Count Eighteen.” In essence, Plaintiffs appear to be complaining that they received 

disparate treatment from the Town of Ariton due to their race. 

When the town of Ariton started its sewage project it purchased from 

Roger/Annette Phillips and Ed Jones who are white. Certainly, they knew 

the municipalities laws or should have as to their action then as to now. 

When it came time to situate a same circumstances with Plaintiffs who are 

black the Town disregarded the law and their previous actions. Their 

disregard has continued over years. Therefore when the Plaintiffs taken 

action to stop their aggression, they circumvented the law again and as the 

easement reads, forever. The easement is stipulated as permanent. This 

would lead one to see their action given to whites is the total opposite when 

dealing with blacks. Not only is it different they have continued it for 

many years without recourse. The circumstances are the same, using 

property for public use. . . . We believe and assert that it is because we are 

black and the others are white or that we were treated different under 

similar circumstances. . . . 

 Their only opposition to the blacks requesting the same service as 

given to whites was we will do what we want and you better not stop us or 

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else we will sue you and lock you up. Further to this thought their action 

was always assisted by police force. In any logic their action to others were 

different under the same or similar circumstances whether it was a black or 

white issue or just preferential treatment: Surely, when the Town started 

collecting fees from the sewage pumping station the Plaintiffs were in 

possession and had undisputed legal title. Or even When the Town of 

Ariton placed the pumping station on the said land title and possession was 

held in Plaintiff(s) name, undisputed. Although now as the final straw has 

risen the Plaintiffs see the same legal possession and rights to legal title 

with claims for title and possession that are barred as a matter of law. As a 

matter of another fact, the Plaintiffs presented this argument in their 

answer, defense, and counterclaim on February 24th, 2014 in CV-2014-

900012. Ironically to those assertion the Defendants The Commercial 

Bank of Ozark has not once disputed those assertions and neither can they. 

The simple matter is, they fail to counterclaim surrounding the same facts 

at issue here that were adjudicated on the merits, by a court of competent 

jurisdiction, among the same parties, for the same property the pumping 

station is placed on. 

Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 238. Although Plaintiffs never articulate, apart from the 

inapplicable provisions of Title VII, precisely what provision of law entitles them to 

relief given these factual allegations, Plaintiffs’ claim is nevertheless fatally encumbered 

under any imaginable theory of relief. First and foremost, Plaintiffs cannot plausibly 

claim to be similarly situated to other landowners whom it is alleged the Town 

compensated for use of their land where Plaintiffs have conceded that the Commercial 

Bank of Ozark was the “title holder to said property” in “Dale County Probate record.” 

The easement granted by the Bank to the Town, which was attached to Plaintiff’s 

complaint, makes clear that the Town did indeed offer consideration to the Bank in 

exchange for the grant of the easement. See Compl. Ex. A (Doc. 1-1) at 1. As such, any 

assertion that Plaintiffs’ claim to the land and title was undisputed is patently conclusory 

and implausible. The mere fact that the Bank has not “disputed” Plaintiffs’ attenuated 

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theory of waiver and continued ownership of the property simply does not place Plaintiffs 

in the same position as lawful property owners whom the Town decided to compensate, 

as it did the Bank, for its use of the owners’ properties. As such, rather than plausibly 

alleging some actionable form of racial discrimination or disparate treatment, the 

complaint only establishes that the Town determined whom it would compensate based 

not upon race but, rather, who actually owned the property and was entitled to such 

compensation. Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim upon which relief could be 

granted for racial discrimination as alleged in Count Eighteen. 

 Plaintiffs also appear to assert a federal cause of action for “DECLARATORY 

JUDGMENT ACT USC 28 AS TO ALL PARTIES.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 17. Plaintiffs 

appear to seek a declaratory judgment from this court concerning the dispute which is 

ongoing in the state courts. They seek a declaration that, inter alia, the Commercial Bank 

of Ariton “should be prohibited and enjoined of their action to give easement until the 

dispute of this property is settled in a court of law and or equity OR made to pay just 

compensation for their use[;]” that “legal rights of the dispute of property interest and the 

deeds has not been adjudicated and therefore the Defendants action was illegal and 

improper[;]” that “Plaintiffs are subject to legal title of this property under theory of a 

barred claim of title and right to possession[;]” that the Town trespassed on their 

property; that both the Federal and Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that, where 

a claim is barred, “there is no relief that can be granted in a future lawsuit[;]” and that the 

Bank’s ejectment action is barred because it failed to assert that claim as a counterclaim 

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in Plaintiff’s lawsuit two and a half years ago and that, therefore, the Bank had no right to 

grant an easement to the Town. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 20-26. 

 The Declaratory Judgment Act does not require a court to exercise jurisdiction to 

declare a party’s rights or legal obligations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added) 

(“any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare 

the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration”). Thus, the 

Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide an independent basis for federal court 

jurisdiction. See Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1989). Rather, 

“[s]ince its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on 

federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights 

of litigants.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). This court is vested 

“with discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing on the usefulness of the 

declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution, are peculiarly 

within [this court’s] grasp.” Id. at 289. 

 This court should decline Plaintiffs’ request to enter any declaratory judgment in 

this matter. As set forth above, Plaintiffs have wholly failed to state any federal cause of 

action for which any relief could be granted. Stripped of any pretense that Plaintiffs have 

presented viable federal constitutional claims, the complaint consists entirely of vague, 

confusing, and conclusory allegations in support of state law torts. It follows, then, 

especially considering that a substantial portion of Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory 

judgment involves the application of principles of Alabama law concerning waiver and 

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bars to claims stemming from prior state court suits, that the state courts are the most 

appropriate forum to go about the process of declaring the parties’ rights in the disputed 

property or otherwise adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims. This is especially so considering 

that, according to the complaint, state law actions concerning the subject property remain 

pending. Given all of the above, there can be no justifiable conclusion that the issues 

raised by Plaintiffs in their complaint are fit for resolution in this court via a declaratory 

judgment. 

The final arguably federal cause of action articulated in the complaint is “Count 

Two,” which is styled “STATUTORY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 

32. Plaintiffs allege that the “Constitution is statutory in nature under 5th Amendment,” 

and further that the Alabama Constitution and provisions of Alabama Code entitle him to 

some sort of injunction prohibiting the Town from making use of its easement “until just 

compensation is given to the Plaintiff(s) for their use of the said property as contemplated 

by the 5th Amendment of the U.S.C.” Id. at ¶¶ 35, 39. Plaintiffs have failed to state any 

claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs do not cite to any viable federal 

statute authorizing this court to enjoin the Town and, more importantly, as the 

undersigned has already discussed, Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim for a 

constitutional taking for which any relief could be granted. 

As set forth above, Plaintiffs have failed to state any federal cause of action for 

which any relief could be granted and, as such, all purported claims over which this court 

might have exercised federal question jurisdiction are due to be dismissed. However, in 

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addition to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the complaint purports to allege separate state-law 

claims for including “civil trespass” (Count Three), “illegal conversion” (Count Four), 

“negligence” (Count Five), “wantonness” (Count Six), “intentional infliction of 

emotional distress” (Count Seven), “aiding and abetting tort of outrage” (Count Eight), 

“nuisance” (Count Nine), “civil conspiracy” (Count Ten), “tortious interference with a 

business or contractual relationship” (Count Eleven), “illegal ejectment” (Count Twelve), 

“negligence per se” (Counts Thirteen and Fourteen), and “inverse condemnation” (Count 

Sixteen). While it appears that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are likely encumbered with 

the same pleading defects afflicting their federal claims, the undersigned believes that 

this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) rather than attempting to further parse the allegations of claims 

over which this court lacks original jurisdiction. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has 

“encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when . . . the federal 

claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 

1089 (11th Cir. 2004). 

At bottom, this is a dispute about a foreclosure on private land by a private bank 

and what remedies are available to the concerned parties in the aftermath of the 

foreclosure. Furthermore, as conceded in the complaint itself, this dispute has been 

playing out in numerous iterations in the state courts over a period of years. Plaintiffs 

have attempted numerous times to improperly obtain a federal forum to air their 

grievances with the ongoing proceedings in the state courts. This court has repeatedly 

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been required to admonish Plaintiffs for their improper efforts to remove various state 

court proceedings to this court. Indeed, United States Chief District Judge Keith Watkins 

recently issued an order enjoining Plaintiffs from attempting to remove state court actions 

or filing direct suits in this Court without first following certain procedures to ensure prefiling screening of the action. See Order (Doc. 12) at 5-9, The Commercial Bank of 

Ozark v. Lorenzo Pearson and Clarissa Pearson, Civ. Case No. 1:15-cv-073-WKW 

(entered June 10, 2015).4

 Although this case was filed prior to Chief Judge Watkins’ 

order, this action should fare no better at obtaining a federal forum for Plaintiffs’ 

predominately state law issues, especially considering that Plaintiffs’ federal claims, as 

pleaded, are overwhelmingly implausible, conclusory, and frivolous. 

Apart from the court’s review of Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to § 1915(e), a few 

other matters are due to be addressed. On January 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a “MOTION 

TO SUPPLEMENT HEARING ARGUMENT PURSUANT TO COMPLAINT AND 

SUBMISSIONS OF RECORDS REQUESTED PRIOR TO HEARING” (Doc. 11). The 

“motion” appears to be in response to the undersigned’s instruction at a hearing 

conducted on January 21, 2015, that Plaintiffs supplement the record with clarification of 

their arguments and additional information about prior and pending state court 

 

4

 In his order, Chief Judge Watkins specifically identified seven cases improperly removed to this Court 

by Plaintiffs. See Order (Doc. 12) at 5-6, The Commercial Bank of Ozark v. Lorenzo Pearson and 

Clarissa Pearson, Civ. Case No. 1:15-cv-073-WKW (entered June 10, 2015). Pointedly, Chief Judge 

Watkins found that “Lorenzo Pearson and Clarissa Pearson have abused process by repeatedly removing 

cases to federal court on the basis of arguments that are patently frivolous and violative of their Rule 11 

certifications.” Id. at 8. Plaintiffs’ litigiousness is exemplified in their representation that they are selfemployed pro se litigants. See Pls’ Mot. (Doc. 9-1) at 1 (“Clearly our job is pro se litigants of which has 

been rewarding, but very minimal in pay.”). 

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proceedings involving the subject matter of the instant complaint. Plaintiffs’ “motion” 

addresses some of the matters raised at the hearing, and the undersigned has relied on 

some of the information in the “motion” in issuing this Recommendation. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Supplement” is due to be granted. 

On January 26, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a “MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT MOTION 

FILED JANUARY 23RD, 2015” (Doc. 12). In this motion, Plaintiffs sought to add into 

the record of this case certain exhibits, consisting of orders dismissing prior state court 

actions due to Plaintiffs’ misconduct in discovery, which were referenced in their prior 

“Motion to Supplement.” Plaintiffs’ second “Motion to Supplement” is due to be 

granted. 

On February 26, 2015, Plaintiff Lorenzo Pearson filed a motion to amend 

Plaintiffs’ complaint to assert an additional claim against the Town of Ariton and 

Defendant Sutton for allegedly violating Lorenzo Pearson’s First Amendment rights. 

Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 13). Lorenzo Pearson alleges that on February 11, 2015, he placed a 

“petition to impeach Mayor Jivas Sutton in the Hobo Pantry in Ariton[,] Alabama[,] with 

agreement of the Hobo Management.” Pl.’s Mot. Am. ¶ 6. He further alleges that Mayor 

Sutton subsequently removed the petition from Hobo Pantry. Id. at ¶ 7. Lorenzo Pearson 

alleges that Defendant Sutton’s action “was in violation of the free speech and petition 

clause under the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when a public citizen petition 

issues of public interest[,]” and that he has “been deprived of [his] right to free speech 

and petition included and embodied in the [F]irst [A]mendment to U.S. Constitution.” Id.

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at ¶¶ 10-11. Lorenzo Pearson also asserts additional state law claims of negligence and 

wantonness based upon the same factual allegations as his First Amendment claim. 

 In general, leave to amend a complaint under Rule 15(a) should be freely given 

where “justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, leave to amend is not 

required where amendment of the complaint would be futile. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Bank 

of America, NA, 585 F. App’x 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished decision) (“While 

a pro se litigant generally must be given at least one opportunity to amend his complaint, 

a district judge need not allow an amendment where amendment would be futile.”). In 

this case, Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment is patently frivolous and, accordingly, leave to 

amend should be denied. “At a minimum, to state a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff 

must allege that her First Amendment rights were impermissibly burdened in some way.” 

Bey v. City of Tampa Code Enforcement, F. App’x , 2015 WL 1543646, *3 (11th Cir. 

April 8, 2015) (unpublished decision). Plaintiff does not allege any such impermissible 

burden. First, Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to conduct the activities he describes is 

constricted. Plaintiff does not allege that the Hobo Pantry is a public building, space, or 

facility, or is otherwise government-owned. Plaintiff does not have an unlimited right to 

engage in First Amendment activities on private property, including a private business, 

like a retail store, which is open to the public. Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 

(1972). Hence, the Hobo Pantry could lawfully have precluded Plaintiff from leaving his 

petition. Id. Although the complaint alleges that Plaintiff left his petitions with the 

permission of the Hobo Pantry, the complaint does not allege that the Hobo Pantry did 

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not also later assent to Defendant Sutton’s alleged actions in removing the petition. In 

addition, Plaintiff cites to no law which authorized him to place his petition at the Hobo 

Pantry and which further precluded any entity from removing the petition. Plaintiff also 

does not complain about the enforcement of any law which precluded him from placing 

his petition at the Hobo Pantry. 

In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiff had some 

limited right to leave his petition at the Hobo Pantry, Plaintiff does not allege that he was 

harassed, arrested, fined, punished, or otherwise retaliated against by government 

authorities for his speech. He does not allege that he was denied the opportunity to 

petition the government for redress of any grievances. He does not even allege that he 

was somehow prevented or discouraged from standing in or around the Hobo Pantry and 

speaking to patrons or otherwise soliciting their signatures for his petition. Rather, 

Plaintiff simply alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated because Defendant 

Sutton allegedly removed a petition which Plaintiff had left at the Hobo Pantry. Even if 

one assumes that Defendant Sutton’s actions could be viewed as some retaliatory move to 

stifle or affect Plaintiff’s speech, Plaintiff does not allege that any threat, express or 

implied, was conveyed to him by Defendant Sutton. Nor does Plaintiff allege even that 

Defendant’s conduct would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising their 

First Amendment rights. See O’Bryant v. Finch, 667 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). 

At most, then, Plaintiff’s allegations describe something tantamount to political 

rivals removing each other’s signs or advertisements from private property. While such 

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allegations might support a claim by the owner or proprietor of the private property for a 

violation of his or her First Amendment rights, or perhaps even for some state-law tort in 

the nature of a conversion, they do not support a claim for a violation of the First 

Amendment rights of the persons who originally placed the materials. In other words, 

Plaintiff—not having been injured or otherwise deprived of his ability to exercise his 

First Amendment rights—cannot assert a First Amendment violation against Defendant 

Sutton and, moreover, lacks standing to assert any such claim on behalf of the only 

arguably injured party, the owner or proprietor of the Hobo Pantry. 

Likewise, because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any cognizable injury 

attributable to Defendant Sutton’s conduct, he cannot state a viable claim of negligence 

or wantonness related to Defendant Sutton’s actions. Plaintiff cannot complain that his 

property was stolen by Defendant Sutton where the complaint makes clear that he 

conveyed the property to and left it in the custody of the Hobo Pantry. Because Plaintiff 

therefore fails to state any claim upon which relief could be granted in his motion to 

amend his complaint, the motion is due to be denied as futile. Indeed, Plaintiff’s motion 

to amend is yet another example of the combined litigiousness and ignorance of the law 

which Chief Judge Watkins described in his order enjoining Plaintiffs from filing further 

cases in this Court without pre-filing screening procedures imposed by the order. 

On March 13, 2015, Plaintiff Lorenzo Pearson filed a “MOTION FOR LEAVE 

OF COURT FREELY GIVEN PURSUAN[T] FRCP 15(a) OR ANY OF ITS 

SUBPARTS TO AMEND THIS ACTION AGAINST JIVAS SUTTON 

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INDIVIDUALLY, AND MAYOR JIVAS SUTTON FOR AND OF THE TOWN OF 

ARITON ONLY” (Doc. 14). In this document, Plaintiff appears to seek to amend his 

complaint only to “demand a jury trial as to all issues.” Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 14) at 1. 

Because Plaintiffs’ complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend his complaint to add a jury trial demand is due to be denied 

as futile. 

On July 31, 2015, Defendants, who have not yet been properly served with 

Plaintiffs’ complaint because the stay on service of process has remained in effect 

pending this court’s review under § 1915(e), filed a “Motion for Leave to Take 

Deposition” (Doc. 20) of Defendant Ronnie Danner. In the motion, Defendants describe 

Mr. Danner’s serious health issues and request leave to depose him in order to preserve 

his testimony for use in this litigation. Simultaneous with this motion, Defendants filed a 

motion (Doc. 21) requesting that the court enter an order confirming that they are not 

required to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs’ complaint despite their limited 

appearance for purposes of requesting leave to depose Mr. Danner. A few days later, on 

August 4, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to withdraw (Doc. 23) their motion for leave 

to depose Mr. Danner, advising that Mr. Danner’s condition had deteriorated and that he 

would not be able to testify at a deposition. The next day, Defendants filed a Suggestion 

of Death (Doc. 24), advising that Mr. Danner passed away on August 4, 2015. Because 

the undersigned is hereby recommending that Plaintiffs’ action be dismissed pursuant to 

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and because of the death of Mr. Danner, Defendants’ motions are due 

to be denied as moot. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS as follows: 

 a. that Plaintiffs’ federal claims against Defendants be DISMISSED pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because Plaintiffs have failed to state any federal cause 

of action upon which relief could be granted; 

 b. that Plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action be DISMISSED, without 

prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 

 c. that Plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED; 

 d. that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 4) be 

DENIED; 

 e. that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 9) be 

GRANTED; 

 f. that Plaintiffs’ “MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT HEARING ARGUMENT 

PURSUANT TO COMPLAINT AND SUBMISSIONS OF RECORDS REQUESTED 

PRIOR TO HEARING” (Doc. 11) be GRANTED; 

 g. that Plaintiffs’ “MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT MOTION FILED 

JANUARY 23RD, 2015” (Doc. 12) be GRANTED; 

 h. that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend (Doc. 13) be DENIED; 

 i. that Plaintiffs’ second Motion to Amend (Doc. 14) be DENIED; and 

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 j. that Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Take Deposition (Doc. 20), Motion 

for Order (Doc. 21), and Motion to Withdraw (Doc. 23) be DENIED as moot. 

 It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before August 26, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 12th day of August, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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