Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00940/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00940-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 11:101 Bankruptcy

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re:

ESTRELLA A. KINCAID and

JAMES M. KINCAID

NO. CIV. S-05-940 WBS

Debtors.

ESTRELLA A. KINCAID and

JAMES M. KINCAID,

Appellants, O R D E R

v.

SUSAN K. SMITH,

Appellee.

 /

The parties in this case filed a motion for a temporary

restraining order on November 3, 2006. They request that the court

reopen a bankruptcy appeal and restrain a hearing before the

bankruptcy court on November 7, 2006, which they maintain will

result in the sale of their real property. The court decides the

matter based on the debtors’ papers, without oral argument. For

Case 2:05-cv-00940-WBS Document 9 Filed 11/06/06 Page 1 of 4
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the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

I. Facts

The parties are pro se debtors. They have filed an “Emergency

Ex Parte Motion to Reopen Appeal,” which the court construes as a

temporary restraining order. They request that the court reopen

an appeal of a bankruptcy decision, which was dismissed on June 12,

2006 for failure to perfect the appeal. According to the debtors,

the underlying bankruptcy decision will permit the Chapter 7

trustee to sell their real property. The trustee filed a motion

for authority to sell the debtors’ real property and a hearing is

scheduled on that motion for Tuesday, November 7, 2006. The

debtors request that the court restrain that hearing, in addition

to reopening the appeal.

II. Standard

The standard for a temporary restraining order and for a

preliminary injunction are substantially the same. Stuhlbarg Int’l

Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit’s standard for a preliminary

injunction requires that the moving party show either (1) a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility

of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and

the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party.

Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1397

n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). These standards “are not separate tests but

the outer reaches of a single continuum.” Int’l Jensen, Inc. v.

Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation

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omitted). 

 The court in any situation must find that there is at least

a fair chance of success on the merits, Johnnson v. California

State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995), and

that there is some threat of an immediate irreparable injury, Big

County Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Anchorage Sch. Dist., 868

F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. Analysis

Assuming, arguendo, that the debtors have established a

likelihood of success on the merits, they have not demonstrated

that concrete irreparable injury will result without a temporary

restraining order. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v.

Balridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Speculative injury

does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant

granting a preliminary injunction.”); Colorado River Indian Tribes

v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1985) (“We have long

since determined that speculative injury does not constitute

irreparable injury.”). For this reason alone, the motion should

be denied.

The facts indicate that the trustee has merely filed a motion

for authority to sell the debtors’ property, and a hearing is

scheduled for that motion on November 7, 2006. In order for the

debtors to prove that the sale of their property is concrete,

rather than speculative, they would need to demonstrate, at the

very least, that there is a fair possibility that the motion will

be granted. They have not done so here. Indeed, in their

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opposition papers to that motion, they have argued that it is

improper for various procedural reasons. The court need not pass

on the merits of that motion to hold that, for purposes here, the

debtors have not met their burden of proving the existence of

concrete irreparable injury. 

The court also need not address the likelihood of success

regarding the debtors’ motion to reopen their appeal, as they have

failed to establish the existence of irreparable injury.

Accordingly, the motion for a temporary restraining order is

hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 6, 2006.

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