Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01769/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01769-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jaime Flores, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Pinal County Sheriff's Office, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-1769-PHX-RCB (LOA) 

 O R D E R 

 Plaintiff Jaime Flores, who is confined the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis, 

filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Pinal County Superior Court. 

On August 27, 2013, Defendants removed the action to this Court and paid the filing fee. 

In a November 26, 2013 Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint and gave Plaintiff 30 

days to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On December 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 6). Defendants filed a Response and Plaintiff filed a Reply. 

On February 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). 

 The Court will order grant the Motion for Extension of Time and accept the First 

Amended Complaint as timely filed. The Court will also order Defendant Agangan to 

answer the retaliation claim in the First Amended Complaint and will dismiss the 

remaining Defendants without prejudice. 

. . . 

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I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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II. First Amended Complaint 

 Plaintiff names the following Defendants in the First Amended Complaint: the 

Pinal County Sheriff’s Office; Sergeants Slinendoll and Agangan; and Detention Officers 

N. Youssef and Young. 

 Plaintiff raises one claim for relief in which he alleges that on August 24, 2012, he 

was sexually assaulted during his sleep while confined in the Pinal County Detention 

Center. Plaintiff states that the next day his underwear was sent to a lab for processing 

and that “Pinal County Detention ignored [his] complaints of sexual assault.” Plaintiff 

further claims that Defendant Agangan “retaliated against [him] for filing grievances 

(about being sexually assaulted and complaining of sexual assault) by putting [him] in the 

hole and writing a ticket for fighting [his] cellmate (the same one that raped [him]).” 

Plaintiff claims that he complained about the sexual assault to Defendants Slinendoll, 

Agangan, Youssef, and Young. 

 Plaintiff seeks money damages. 

III. Failure to State a Claim

A. Pinal County Sheriff’s Office 

 The Pinal County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper defendant. In Arizona, the 

responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-101. A sheriff’s office is 

simply an administrative creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his 

statutory duties and not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the 

Pinal County Sheriff’s Office will be dismissed from this action. 

B. Failure to Protect 

 The Supreme Court has held that mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from 

another inmate is not actionable under § 1983. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 

(1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment in failing to protect one inmate 

from another only when two conditions are met. First, the alleged constitutional 

deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious;” the official’s act or omission 

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must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Second, the prison official must have a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to 

inmate health or safety. Id. In defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the 

Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of the 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 839 (emphasis supplied). 

 Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s safety. Specifically, Plaintiff 

has not alleged that Defendants were aware Plaintiff’s cellmate posed a risk to Plaintiff’s 

safety and failed to act. 

 Further, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants “did nothing” after the attack is too 

vague to state a claim. It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to claim he was denied 

medical or other treatment after the attack or if he intends to claim Defendants failed to 

investigate or punish Plaintiff’s attacker. The Court will dismiss without prejudice these 

portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as well as Defendants Slinendoll, 

Youssef, and Young. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has adequately stated a retaliation claim against 

Defendant Agangan and the Court will require Defendant Agangan to answer the First 

Amended Complaint. 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

. . . 

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B. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 6) is granted. The Court 

will accept the First Amended Complaint as timely filed. 

 (2) Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim in the First Amended Complaint is 

dismissed without prejudice. 

 (3) Defendants Pinal County Sheriff’s Office, Slinendoll, Youssef, and Young 

are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (4) Defendant Agangan must answer the retaliation claim in First Amended 

Complaint. 

 (5) Defendant Agangan must answer the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) 

or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable 

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

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 (6) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson pursuant 

to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings 

as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 DATED this 9th day of May, 2014. 

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