Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01558/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROSMAN ORTEGA, 

 Petitioner,

v. 

RAYMOND MADDEN, 

 Respondent.

 Case No.: 3:18-CV-1558-AJB-LL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

FOR ORDER: (1) DENYING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

AND (2) FINDING MIXED PETITION 

AND ISSUING OPTIONS ORDER IN 

LIEU OF DISMISSAL 

[ECF Nos. 9 and 12] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District 

Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 

72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On July 9, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)]. On August 15, 2018, Petitioner filed an Amended 

Petition [ECF No. 4]. Currently before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the 

Petition. ECF Nos. 9, 12. Petitioner did not file an opposition. See Docket. 

This Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and all 

other documents submitted by the Parties. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. In lieu of immediate dismissal, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner 

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be advised of the options available to him with regards to a mixed petition and be given an 

opportunity to select one of the following options: (1) voluntarily dismiss the Petition; (2) 

formally abandon the unexhausted claims; or (3) file a motion to stay the Federal 

proceedings. 

BACKGROUND 

The facts of the underlying offenses are not material to determining the motion to 

dismiss, and so they are not recounted here. A recounting of facts is contained in the 

California Court of Appeal’s Opinion. See ECF No. 11-15. 

I. State Court Trial 

On June 5, 2013, a jury found Petitioner guilty of the first degree murder of Jesus 

Enriquez (Count One) and the attempted murder of Isabel Enriquez (Count Two). ECF 

No. 11-2 at 156-58. In addition, the jury found true the following special allegations as to 

both counts: (1) that Petitioner was a principal; (2) that Petitioner intentionally and 

personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to a person; and (3) that 

Petitioner committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 

with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal 

conduct. Id. The jury also found true that Petitioner committed Count 2 in a willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated manner. Id. at 157. 

Petitioner was sentenced to eighty-two years to life in state prison. ECF No. 11-15 

at 2; ECF No. 11-2 at 214-15. 

II. The Appeal 

On June 17, 2016, Petitioner filed an appeal of his conviction to the California Court 

of Appeal. See ECF No. 11-12. In the appeal, Petitioner claimed: (1) Petitioner’s 

conviction for attempted murder violated his due process rights because there was 

insufficient evidence of intent to kill; (2) the admission of Petitioner’s private statements 

about the offenses to his wife violated the privilege governing confidential marital 

communications; (3) the exclusion of impeachment evidence violated Petitioner’s rights to 

confrontation, cross examination, due process and a fair trial; and (4) the trial court’s 

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comments about the jury instructions minimized their importance in the eyes of the jury 

constituting a structural error. Id. at 35-75. 

On June 20, 2017, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate Division, issued 

an opinion affirming the judgment of the Superior Court. ECF No. 11-15. Specifically, 

the Court of Appeal found: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s 

attempted murder conviction; (2) Petitioner’s statements to his wife were not protected by 

the marital privilege and would not have affected the trial even if excluded; (3) the 

impeachment evidence was properly excluded and regardless, was of minimal probative 

value; and (4) the trial court’s comments about the jury instructions did not constitute 

structural error. Id. at 6-17. 

III. Petition for Review To California Supreme Court 

On July 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court. ECF No. 11-16. Petitioner claimed the same four grounds previously presented in 

Petitioner’s appeal to the California Court of Appeal. Id. at 12-43. On October 11, 2017, 

the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. ECF No. 11-17. 

IV. Federal Habeas Petition 

On July 9, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. See Pet. 

Petitioner raised the following six grounds in his federal petition: (1) “Petitioner’s 

conviction for attempted murder violated the due process clause” where the evidence did 

not show an “intent to kill”; (2) “[t]he admission of Petitioner’s statements regarding the 

shooting to his wife violated the confidential marital communication privilege[]”; (3) 

“[e]xclusion of impeachment evidence violated Petitioner’s right to confrontation and 

cross-examination, to due process and a fair trial”; (4) “[t]he trial court (judge’s) comments 

about the instructions minimized their importance in the eyes of the jury”; (5) “[b]oth trial 

counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel”; and (6) the case 

should be remanded for reconsideration as to whether to “dismiss or strike the firearms 

enhancements.” Pet. at 5-16. 

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On July 17, 2018, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice. ECF No. 3. In 

dismissing the case, the Court held Petitioner had indicated in his Petition that he had not 

raised Grounds Five or Six to the California Supreme Court and therefore had not properly 

alleged exhaustion of state court remedies. Id. at 2-3. 

On August 15, 2018, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. ECF No. 4. In the 

Amended Petition, Petitioner sought to rectify the deficiencies in his Petition by attaching 

a copy of his appeal to the California Court of Appeal and his petition to the California 

Supreme Court. See ECF No. 4 at 3, 5, Exhibit 2.1 

On October 29, 2018, Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition. ECF No. 9.2 On 

November 26, 2018, Petitioner moved for an extension of time to file an opposition to 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 13. On November 27, 2018, the Court granted 

Petitioner’s request. ECF No. 14. Petitioner did not file an opposition to Respondent’s 

motion and the Court thereafter took the matter under submission. See Docket. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A federal court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner 

has first presented his claims to the state courts, thereby “exhausting” them. 28 U.S.C.A. 

§2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522, (1982). “[E]xhaustion of state 

remedies requires that petitioners fairly present federal claims to the state courts in order 

to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ 

federal rights[.]” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (per curiam) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the Petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) “he 

has ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to 

                                               

1

 In actuality, the Amended Petition attached a copy of Petitioner’s petition to the California Supreme 

Court, and as an Appendix, the California Court of Appeal’s decision. 

2

 Respondent filed a second, identical Motion to Dismiss on October 31. ECF No. 12. 

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consider it”; or (2) “that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 

828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

Claims are not exhausted by mere presentation to the state appellate system. A 

petitioner must also “alert[] [the state] court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin 

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29. A petitioner may indicate a federal claim by “citing in 

conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding 

such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim ‘federal.’” Id. at 32. 

If state remedies have not been exhausted as to any of the federal claims, the habeas 

petition typically should be dismissed. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 

(1989); Rose, 455 U.S. at 522; see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (confirming 

continued applicability of “total exhaustion” rule even after enactment of AEDPA). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Grounds Five And Six Of The Petition Are Unexhausted 

Respondent argues Grounds Five and Six of the Petition are unexhausted because 

they were never presented to the California Supreme Court. Mot. at 6-8. 

In Petitioner’s Fifth Ground, Petitioner claims an ineffective assistance of counsel 

defense, identifying several instances where his trial counsel allegedly provided ineffective 

assistance. Pet. at 6-9. Petitioner claims his appellate counsel was also ineffective by 

failing to raise these same issues on appeal. Id. at 9-11. 

In Petitioner’s Sixth Ground, Petitioner alleges the Court should remand the case for 

reconsideration as to whether to dismiss or strike the firearms enhancement based on an 

amendment to Penal Code Section 12022.53, subdivision (h), effective January 1, 2018. 

Pet. at 11-17. 

Petitioner has provided no evidence any state court was given the opportunity to 

consider these claims. Indeed, Petitioner indicated in his original Petition that he had not 

raised these grounds to the California Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court. 

Pet. at 6, 17. Although Petitioner sought to rectify this deficiency by pointing to his appeal 

to the California Court of Appeal and petition to the California Supreme Court, from the 

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papers, Plaintiff did not actually raise these grounds to either state court. See ECF Nos. 

11-12 and 11-16. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Grounds Fix and Six were not fairly presented 

to the California Supreme Court and are unexhausted, rendering the Petitioner’s Petition a 

“mixed” petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 

II. Petitioner’s Options 

To avoid the Court dismissing the petition on its own accord, it is 

RECOMMENDED that Petitioner choose one of the following options. The Court is not 

in a position to give legal advice to Petitioner. The Court merely identifies the options that 

may be available to petitioners who file unexhausted claims in federal court. The decision 

on how to proceed is solely and exclusively up to Petitioner. 

a. First Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition 

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to 

state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition 

containing only exhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21. 

Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration 

of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his 

conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or 

equitable “tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d). Absent some basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a 

federal habeas petition is pending. Id. at 181-82. 

b. Second Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claims 

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his 

exhausted one(s). See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21. Petitioner is cautioned that once he 

abandons his unexhausted claims, he may lose the ability to ever raise them in federal 

court. 

/// 

/// 

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c. Third Option: File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings 

Petitioner may move to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state court to 

exhaust his unexhausted claims. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 659-60 (9th Cir. 

2005); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d. 742, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Calderon v. 

United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 134 F.3d 981, 986-88 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The two methods to stay the case are the “stay and abeyance” and “withdrawal and 

abeyance” procedures. Under the “stay and abeyance” procedure, the Court is 

empowered to stay the claims in a “mixed” petition while Petitioner returns to the state 

courts to exhaust his unexhausted claims. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. To obtain a 

stay pursuant to Rhines, Petitioner must demonstrate that good cause exists for his 

failure to timely exhaust his state court remedies, that his unexhausted claims are not 

“plainly meritless[,]” and that he did not engage in “intentionally dilatory litigation 

tactics.” Id. 

Under the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure, the Petitioner may dismiss any 

unexhausted claims, and the Court is empowered to stay his remaining fully exhausted 

claims while he returns to the state courts to exhaust his dismissed claims. Kelly v. 

Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner is warned, however, that “[a] 

petitioner seeking to use the Kelly procedure will be able to amend his unexhausted 

claims back into his federal petition once he has exhausted them only if those claims are 

determined to be timely” and that “demonstrating timeliness will often be problematic 

under the now-applicable legal principles.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Additionally, Petitioner may only amend a new claim into a pending federal 

habeas petition after the expiration of the limitations period if the new claim shares a 

“common core of operative facts” with the previously exhausted claims in the pending 

petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) 

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DENYING Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (3) finding the 

Petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and (4) that Petitioner be sent an 

Order specifying his options with regards to a mixed petition. 

The Court further RECOMMENDS that the District Judge notify Petitioner that if 

he does not inform the Court within thirty days of the District Judge’s final order on this 

Report and Recommendation of how he intends to proceed, the Court will recommend to 

the District Judge assigned to the case that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed 

with the Court and served on all parties no later than March 1, 2019. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

this Court and served on all parties no later than March 15, 2019. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 8, 2019 

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