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Nature of Suit Code: 200
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

GENERAL MILLS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2019-1124

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:14-cv-00089-PEC, Judge Patricia E. CampbellSmith.

______________________

Decided: April 23, 2020

______________________

SHERI DILLON, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JENNIFER BREEN, WILLIAM NELSON, JAMES 

GASTON STEELE, III. 

 JULIE CIAMPORCERO AVETTA, Tax Division, United 

States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for 

defendant-appellee. Also represented by ARTHUR THOMAS 

CATTERALL, RICHARD E. ZUCKERMAN. 

 ______________________

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2 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Before NEWMAN, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CHEN.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

General Mills, Inc. & Subsidiaries (collectively, GMI)

sued the United States seeking refunds of interest it paid 

on corporate income tax underpayments that the Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) assessed at the enhanced rate of interest for “large corporate underpayments” (LCU) set forth 

in Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6621(c). GMI is the 

parent corporation of a number of partners of General Mills 

Cereals, LLC, a limited liability company that is treated as 

a partnership for tax purposes (the Partnership). GMI alleges that after certain partnership-level audits of the 

Partnership’s returns for the 2002–2006 tax years were 

settled with the IRS, the IRS erroneously collected 

$5,958,695 in LCU interest by selecting incorrect “applicable dates” to start interest accrual. GMI paid the LCU interest in April 2011, and, in March 2013, filed 

administrative refund claims with the IRS. After the IRS 

denied the claims, GMI initiated the underlying refund suit 

in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The court 

dismissed GMI’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

concluding that GMI was required, but failed, to file its administrative refund claims with the IRS within the sixmonth limitations period set forth in I.R.C. § 6230(c). General Mills, Inc. v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 576 (2015). 

GMI contends that the general two-year tax refund 

claim limitations period under I.R.C. § 6511(a) should apply to its administrative refund claims, instead of the special six-month limitations period described in § 6230(c). 

Section 6230(c) provides that “[a] partner may file a claim 

for refund on the grounds that . . . the [IRS] erroneously 

computed any computational adjustment necessary . . . to 

apply to the partner a settlement.” § 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii). 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 3

Section 6230(c) further provides that any such claim “shall 

be filed within 6 months after the day on which the [IRS] 

mails the notice of computational adjustment to the partner.” § 6230(c)(2)(A). Because we agree with the Court of 

Federal Claims that the basis of GMI’s refund claims is 

that the IRS erroneously computed a computational adjustment resulting from a settlement by allegedly miscalculating the amount of LCU interest due, GMI’s refund claims

are subject to the six-month limitations period. Since GMI

received adequate notice of the computational adjustment, 

and yet, filed its refund claims well outside the six-month 

period, we affirm the dismissal. 

BACKGROUND

A. TEFRA’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

This appeal concerns determining the applicable statute of limitations for GMI’s administrative refund claims—

the six-month limitations period under § 6230(c) or the

general two-year limitations period under § 6511(a)—and 

then determining whether that limitations period began to 

run when the IRS provided GMI with certain notices of the 

amounts of LCU interest it owed. Before turning to the 

facts, we undertake a brief review of the Tax Equity and 

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), generally codified at I.R.C. §§ 6221–34, and its effect on the IRS’s auditing of partnerships. 

A partnership does not pay federal income taxes; instead, its taxable income and losses pass through to its

partners. I.R.C. § 701. A partnership must report its tax 

items on an information return, I.R.C. § 6031(a), and the 

partners must report their distributive shares of the partnership’s tax items on their own individual returns, I.R.C.

§§ 702, 704. TEFRA comes into play when the IRS reviews 

a partnership’s information return and disputes some aspect of it. Bush v. United States, 655 F.3d 1323, 1324–25

(Fed. Cir. 2011).

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4 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

“Partnership items” are items whose treatment affects 

the entire partnership such as the partnership’s income, 

gain, loss, or credit, and so analyzing them at the partnership level makes more sense than doing so partner-by-partner. See § 6231(a)(3) (defining “partnership item”); Treas. 

Reg. §§ 301.6231(a)(3)–1(a), 1(b). Prior to the 1982 enactment of TEFRA, the Internal Revenue Code treated partnership items at the individual partner level. Adjustments 

to the tax treatment of partnership items had to be determined in separate proceedings involving each individual 

partner. Olson v. United States, 172 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999). If a partnership had numerous partners located 

throughout the country, the piecemeal nature of the individual partner-level determinations sometimes resulted in 

inconsistent treatment of the same items between different 

partners and in duplication of administrative and judicial 

resources. Id.; Bassing v. United States, 563 F.3d 1280, 

1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also RJT Investments X v. 

Comm’r, 491 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2007) (“TEFRA was 

intended . . . to prevent inconsistent and inequitable income tax treatment between various partners of the same 

partnership resulting from conflicting determinations of 

partnership level items in individual partner proceedings.”). 

Consequently, TEFRA was enacted in order to streamline the tax audit, assessment, and litigation procedures 

for partnerships. Bush, 655 F.3d at 1325. Rather than undertake an arduous series of partner-by-partner audits, as 

had previously been required, TEFRA allows for a single, 

unified partnership-level procedure for auditing and litigating partnership items, thus addressing concerns about 

inconsistent treatment of the same partnership items 

across partners. Id.; Stobie Creek Investments LLC v. 

United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Partnership-related matters are addressed in two 

stages under TEFRA: partnership level and then individual partner level. United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 39 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 5

(2013). During the first stage, the IRS initiates a partnership-level proceeding to adjust partnership items reported 

on the partnership’s information return. Id.; § 6221. Each 

partner has the right to participate in the IRS’s audit of the 

partnership’s information return. Olson, 172 F.3d at 1317; 

see § 6224(a). A partner may waive this right and opt out 

of the partnership-level proceeding by entering into a binding settlement agreement with the IRS. Olson, 172 F.3d at 

1317; see §§ 6224(b), (c). Upon completion of the partnership-level proceeding, the IRS is required to mail to certain 

partners a copy of the resulting final partnership administrative adjustment, which notifies the partners of any adjustments to partnership items. Olson, 172 F.3d at 1317; 

see § 6223. 

During the second stage, the results of the partnershiplevel proceeding are applied to the individual partners. In

the partner-level proceeding, the IRS makes “computational adjustments” to each partner’s return to reflect the

adjustments to partnership items. See § 6231(a)(6) (defining “computational adjustment” as “the change in the tax 

liability of a partner which properly reflects the treatment 

under this subchapter of a partnership item”). 

The partner-level proceedings subsequently follow one 

of two procedures: direct assessment or deficiency procedure. Thompson v. Comm’r, 729 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 

2013). Most computational adjustments are directly assessed against the partners. Woods, 571 U.S. at 39. If the 

IRS’s calculation is purely computational, the IRS directly 

assesses the computational adjustment and issues to the 

partner a notice of computational adjustment. Chai v. 

Comm’r, 851 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2017). For direct assessments, the partners are permitted to challenge any error in the computational adjustments only in post-payment 

refund actions. Woods, 571 U.S. at 39; see §§ 6230(a)(1), (c). 

TEFRA added the provisions providing for direct assessment in order “to increase efficiency when the IRS audits 

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6 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

partnership returns that may affect a large number of individual taxpayers.” Bush, 655 F.3d at 1328; see § 6230(a). 

The “standard” deficiency procedures are still required 

for certain computational adjustments that require a factual determination at the partner level, such as, for example, a determination of negligence by the partner. Olson, 

172 F.3d at 1317; see § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i). The deficiency procedures, set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6211–16, require the IRS to 

issue a pre-assessment notice of deficiency to each taxpayer, § 6212(a), who can file a petition in the Tax Court 

disputing the alleged deficiency before paying it, § 6213(a). 

Woods, 571 U.S. at 38. 

For those computational adjustments that are directly 

assessed against them, the partners may challenge any error in the computational adjustments by filing administrative refund claims with the IRS. See §§ 6230(a)(1), (c). For 

certain types of these administrative refund claims, 

§ 6230(c) requires the taxpayer to “file[] within 6 months 

after the day on which the Secretary mails notice of computational adjustment to the partner.” § 6230(c)(2)(A).1 

With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the facts. 

1 In the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Congress 

amended the TEFRA procedures and struck

§ 6230(c)(2)(A), the provision that set forth the six-month 

limitations period. Pub. L. No. 114–74, § 1101, 129 Stat. 

584, 625. The Bipartisan Budget Act reformed the partnership auditing procedures such that, in addition to making adjustments to partnership items at the partnership 

level, any additional tax liability resulting from those adjustments are assessed and collected from the partnership 

at the partnership level, rather than from the individual 

partners in the partner-level proceedings. BASR P’ship v. 

United States, 915 F.3d 771, 775 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The 

Bipartisan Budget Act is effective only for partnership tax 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 7

B. FACTS

GMI seeks a refund of interest the IRS assessed on 

large corporate underpayments2 of corporate income tax

for the 2002–2006 tax years. The interest rate applied to 

large corporate underpayments is not the interest rate typically applied to an underpayment of tax,3 but instead is 

two percent higher than the default underpayment rate.

See § 6621(c). The enhanced interest rate on large corporate underpayments applies, however, only to periods after 

the “applicable date” and only after the IRS satisfies certain notice requirements as specified in § 6621(c). Treas. 

Reg. § 301.6621–3(c)(1). At the Court of Federal Claims,

GMI alleged that the IRS miscalculated the amount of LCU 

interest owed by using incorrect applicable dates to start 

the accrual of LCU interest for the relevant tax years. The

court never reached that merits question because it agreed 

with the Government that GMI failed to file its administrative refund claims with the IRS within the six-month

limitations period established by § 6230(c). 

1. THE 2002 AND 2003 TAX YEARS

years beginning after December 31, 2017. See Bipartisan 

Budget Act of 2015 § 1101, 129 Stat. at 638. Because this 

case concerns the 2002–2006 tax years, the previous 

TEFRA provisions apply, including § 6230(c)(2)(A). Our 

holding today is limited to interpreting the TEFRA provisions as they existed before the amendment. 

2 The term “large corporate underpayment” means 

“any underpayment of a tax by a C corporation for any taxable period if the amount of such underpayment for such 

period exceeds $100,000.” § 6621(c)(3)(A).

3 Interest on underpayments of tax is generally imposed at the default underpayment rate of the federal 

short-term rate plus three percentage points. I.R.C. 

§§ 6601(a), 6621(a)(2). 

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8 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

GMI timely filed its corporate income tax returns for 

the 2002 and 2003 tax years, and the Partnership timely 

filed partnership income tax returns for those years as 

well. The partners of the Partnership are subsidiaries of 

the GMI corporate entity.4 In January 2005, the IRS commenced a TEFRA audit of the Partnership’s 2002 and 2003 

tax returns, and in April 2005, the IRS commenced an audit of GMI’s 2002 and 2003 corporate tax returns using deficiency procedures. 

On June 15, 2007, after completing the audit of GMI’s 

2002 and 2003 corporate tax returns, the IRS mailed a 30-

day letter to GMI with an enclosed “examination report” 

showing the results of the corporate tax audit and “proposed changes to [GMI’s] tax[es].” J.A. 178. The 30-day 

letter identified tax deficiencies of more than $143 million 

for 2002 and of nearly $93 million for 2003. The letter explained the conditions under which LCU interest would be 

imposed: “If you are a ‘C’ Corporation, Section 6621(c) of 

the Internal Revenue Code provides that an interest rate 

2% higher than the standard rate of interest will be 

charged on deficiencies of $100,000 or more.” It also stated: 

“If you pay the full amount due now, you will limit the 

amount of interest and penalties charged to your account.” 

As for the related TEFRA partnership proceeding for 

the 2002 and 2003 tax years, the partners entered into settlement agreements with the IRS in July 2010. The Partnership settlement agreements resulted in adjustments to 

partnership items reported on the Partnership’s 2002 and 

2003 tax returns. The partners and the IRS executed a

Form 870-LT(AD), “Settlement Agreement for Partnership 

Items and Partnership Level Determinations as to

4 The partners include, inter alia, General Mills Operations, Inc., GM Cereals Holdings, Inc., GM Cereals Operations, Inc., and the Pillsbury Company. J.A. 257, 262, 

272, 287. 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 9

Penalties, Additions to Tax and Additional Amounts and 

Agreement for Affected Items.” The Form 870-LT(AD)

shows that the Partnership settlement agreements contemplated an assessment of “any interest provided by law.”

J.A. 257–58, 262–63, 267–68, 272–73, 278–79, 287–88, 

296–97, 305–06, 314–15, 323–24.

On August 27, 2010, the IRS mailed a Form 5278 

(“Statement – Income Tax Changes”), informing GMI of 

how the adjustments to partnership items resulting from

the Partnership settlement agreements had increased 

GMI’s 2002–2003 corporate income tax liabilities beyond 

the deficiencies the IRS identified in the above-described 

30-day letter from June 15, 2007. The accompanying cover 

letter stated, “[t]he enclosed audit statement explains how 

the adjustments made during our examination of General 

Mills Cereal, LLC affect your income tax return.” J.A. 332. 

The Form 5278 reflected additional underpayments by 

GMI of about $16 million for 2002 and more than $33 million for 2003. J.A. 333. The cover letter advised GMI that 

the IRS “will adjust your account and figure the interest 

. . . [and] will send a bill for any additional amount you 

owe.” J.A. 332. One week later, the IRS assessed against 

GMI the identified tax deficiencies plus interest, which included LCU interest. J.A. 186, 197.

On April 11, 2011, GMI made payments of tax and interest to the IRS sufficient to eliminate its account balances with respect to the 2002 and 2003 tax years. 

J.A. 187, 344, 199, 338. On April 18, 2011 and April 20, 

2011, the IRS mailed detailed interest computation schedules to GMI for the 2002 and 2003 tax years. J.A. 334–38, 

342–44. The accompanying cover letters stated the interest computation schedules were used by the IRS to “calculate interest on the tax adjustment for the [2002 and 2003]

return[s].” J.A. 334, 342. 

The interest computation schedules informed GMI that 

for the 2002–2003 tax years, the IRS treated July 15, 2007 

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10 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

as the “applicable date” for imposing LCU interest. 

J.A. 335, 337. July 15, 2007 was the thirtieth day after the 

30-day letter was issued on June 15, 2007. As required by 

statute, the “applicable date” for LCU interest to begin accruing is determined “by taking into account any letter or 

notice provided by the [IRS] which notifies the taxpayer” of 

the assessment (or the proposed assessment) of the tax or 

of the deficiency (or the proposed deficiency). See

§§ 6621(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B)(i). The taxpayer has thirty days 

after notice to pay the large corporate underpayment before the enhanced interest rate will apply. Id. 

GMI acknowledges that it owed some amount of LCU 

interest, but disputes when the LCU interest should have 

begun to accrue. GMI claims that September 26, 2010—

and not July 15, 2007—was the correct applicable date, because, in its view, it did not receive proper notice from the 

IRS before then. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6621–3(c)(1). September 26, 2010 was the thirtieth day after the IRS issued 

the Form 5278 on August 27, 2010 which, according to 

GMI, represented “the first notice it received upon the conclusion of the partnership proceedings that notified GMI of 

an assessment of tax attributable to partnership items.” 

General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 581. In GMI’s view, the IRS 

incorrectly applied § 6621(c)(2)(A) for determining the applicable date, when it should have instead applied 

§ 6621(c)(2)(B)(i).5 Appellant’s Br. at 4–5.

5 Section 6621(c)(2)(A) provides for the applicable 

date for any underpayment of a tax to which the deficiency 

procedures apply. In such circumstances, the applicable 

date is the thirtieth day after the earlier of the date on 

which the IRS sends a “letter of proposed deficiency” (30-

day letter) or a “deficiency notice.” § 6621(c)(2)(A); Treas. 

Reg. § 301.6621–3(c)(2). On the other hand, 

§ 6621(c)(2)(B)(i) supplies the applicable date for any underpayment of a tax to which nondeficiency procedures 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 11

2. THE 2004, 2005, AND 2006 TAX YEARS

GMI timely filed its corporate income tax returns for 

the 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax years. The Partnership 

timely filed its partnership income tax returns for those 

years as well. In September 2007, the IRS began auditing 

GMI’s 2004–2006 corporate tax returns. In November 

2007, the IRS notified the Partnership that it would initiate a TEFRA proceeding with respect to the Partnership’s 

2004–2006 tax returns. 

On April 29, 2009, the IRS sent a 30-day letter to GMI 

showing the results of the corporate tax audit for 2004–

2006 and enclosing an “examination report showing proposed changes to [GMI’s] tax[es].” J.A. 345. The 30-day 

letter identified tax deficiencies of more than $30 million 

for 2004, $347 million for 2005, and $58 million for 2006. 

J.A. 347. As was the case with the 30-day letter relating to 

2002–2003, the letter for 2004–2006 informed GMI of the

enhanced interest rate imposed on large corporate underpayments and advised GMI that “pay[ing] the full amount 

due now . . . will limit the amount of interest and penalties.” 

J.A. 347. 

As for the TEFRA partnership proceeding, in November 2010, the partners entered into settlement agreements

with the IRS, as reflected in executed Form 870-LT(AD). 

The settlement agreement Form 870-LT(AD) contemplated 

an assessment of “any interest provided by law.” J.A. 380–

81, 388–89, 398–99, 408–09, 418–19, 428–29, 438–39, 448–

49, 458–59, 468–69. The Partnership settlement agreements resulted in TEFRA adjustments to certain partnership items that increased GMI’s corporate tax liabilities for 

the 2004–2006 tax years. 

apply. There, the applicable date is thirty days after the 

IRS “notifies the taxpayer of the assessment or proposed 

assessment of the tax.” § 6621(c)(2)(B)(i). 

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12 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

On March 4, 2011, the IRS sent GMI a second 30-day 

letter along with multiple computational documents showing the impact of the TEFRA adjustments on GMI’s corporate tax liabilities for 2004–2006. J.A. 478–558. The 

second 30-day letter also enclosed a Form 870, “Waiver of 

Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in 

Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment,” which GMI’s representative later signed. The executed Form 870 stated 

that GMI “consent[s] to the immediate assessment and collection of any deficiencies (increase in tax and penalties) 

. . . shown [herein], plus any interest provided by law.” 

J.A. 480. The computational documents showed that the 

IRS computed underpayments in tax for GMI’s 2004, 2005, 

and 2006 tax years of, respectively, more than $19 million, 

more than $9 million, and about $52 million. J.A. 480, 483. 

As with the earlier 30-day letters, the letter informed GMI 

that the IRS would impose an enhanced interest rate on 

large corporate underpayments. J.A. 478. On April 11, 

2011, GMI paid these amounts together with designated 

interest, including LCU interest. J.A. 207, 217, 226.

Thereafter, on June 14, 2011, the IRS provided GMI 

with the interest computation schedules that it had used to 

compute the amount of interest due, including the amount 

of LCU interest due, on GMI’s tax underpayments for 

2004–2006. J.A. 559–63. The interest computation schedules informed GMI that the IRS had applied an applicable 

date of May 29, 2009 for beginning the accrual of LCU interest. May 29, 2009 was the thirtieth day after the IRS 

issued the first 30-day letter on April 29, 2009. See 

§ 6621(c)(2). 

As with the 2002–2003 tax years, GMI claims the IRS 

used the incorrect applicable date to compute the amount 

of LCU interest due for the 2004–2006 tax years. GMI argues that the correct applicable date should have been

April 3, 2011, i.e., the thirtieth day after the second 30-day 

letter dated March 4, 2011 and additional computational 

documents showing the impact of the Partnership 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 13

settlement agreements. As with GMI’s claims relating to 

the 2002–2003 tax years, GMI believes the IRS erroneously 

applied § 6621(c)(2)(A), when it should have applied 

§ 6621(c)(2)(B)(i), to determine the applicable date. 

C. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

GMI did not file administrative claims with the IRS for 

refund of the paid LCU interest until March 28, 2013,

which was more than six months after the IRS notified 

GMI of its obligations respecting LCU interest. After the 

IRS denied GMI’s administrative refund claims, GMI 

brought this refund suit in the Court of Federal Claims. 

The Government moved to dismiss GMI’s complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that GMI failed 

to file its administrative refund claims within the sixmonth limitations period under § 6230(c). GMI responded 

that its request for refund was timely because, in its view, 

the tax code’s general two-year statute of limitations applied to its administrative refund claims. See § 6511(a).

Before a tax refund claim can be considered by a court, 

it must be filed with the IRS within applicable statutory 

time limitations. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (barring suit for the 

refund of taxes unless and until an administrative refund 

claim that complies with statutory and regulatory requirements “has been duly filed with the [IRS]”); see also United 

States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 553 U.S. 1, 5 (2008)

(“Read together, the import of [I.R.C. § 7422(a) and 

§ 6511(a)] is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has 

been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a 

suit for refund . . . may not be maintained in any court.”) 

(quoting United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602 (1990)). 

We have held that a taxpayer’s failure to file a timely refund claim with the IRS deprives the trial court of subject 

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14 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

matter jurisdiction.6 Sun Chem. Corp. v. United States, 

698 F.2d 1203, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[A] timely, sufficient 

claim for refund is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a refund 

suit . . . .”) (citations omitted). 

The general statute of limitations for filing a refund 

claim is two years from the date of payment or three years 

from the date of filing a tax return, whichever is later. 

§ 6511(a).7 The parties agree that, if we were to find that 

§ 6511(a) supplies the relevant statute of limitations, then 

two years would be the applicable length. Appellant’s Br. 

at 30; Appellee’s Br. at 37. GMI filed administrative refund 

claims with the IRS on March 28, 2013, which is within two 

years of having paid the contested LCU interest on 

April 11, 2011. 

Section 6511(a) establishes the limitations period for 

most claims for refund of overpayment, unless an exception 

applies. One exception to § 6511(a) is the six-month limitations period that applies to certain claims arising out of 

alleged IRS “erroneous[] comput[ations] [of] any computational adjustment.” See § 6230(c)(1)(A) (stating that “[a]

6 No party challenges whether the requirements of 

§ 7422(a) and relevant statutes of limitations in the tax 

code implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, that question is not at issue in this case. 7 Section 6511(a) states:

Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any 

tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the 

taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed 

by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the 

return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax 

was paid, whichever of such periods expires the 

later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, 

within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.

§ 6511(a). 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 15

partner may file a claim for refund on the grounds that the 

Secretary erroneously computed any computational adjustment necessary” for certain actions); § 6230(c)(2)(A). Accordingly, under TEFRA, if the IRS erroneously computes 

a computational adjustment under certain circumstances, 

the taxpayer must file an administrative refund claim 

within six months after the IRS mails a notice of computational adjustment to the partner. Id. 

The Court of Federal Claims agreed with the Government that the six-month limitations period applied because 

GMI made “a claim for refund on the grounds that . . . the 

[IRS] erroneously computed a[] computational adjustment

necessary . . . to apply to the partner a settlement” under

§ 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii). General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 586–87. 

The court held that the general two-year limitations period

of § 6511(a) had been preempted by the more specific provision of § 6230(c). General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 594. The 

court also found that the IRS had provided GMI with adequate notices of the computational adjustments to trigger 

the running of the limitations period. Id. at 590. With this 

six-month period having expired, the court held that it 

lacked jurisdiction to entertain GMI’s refund suit. Id. at 

594.

GMI timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

This court reviews de novo the determination by the 

Court of Federal Claims that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002, 1008 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). “In determining whether a motion to dismiss 

should be granted, the Claims Court may find it necessary 

to inquire into jurisdictional facts that are disputed.” Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

The court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id.

As the plaintiff, GMI bears the burden of establishing that 

the court has subject matter jurisdiction over its claims. 

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16 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 

178, 189 (1936); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 

846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

A. WHETHER GMI’S REFUND CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE 

SPECIAL SIX-MONTH LIMITATIONS PERIOD OR THE GENERAL 

TWO-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD

1. GMI’S REFUND CLAIMS FALL WITHIN SECTION 6230(c)

Section 6230(c)’s six-month limitations period, in relevant part, applies to particular claims for refund, including 

to claims under § 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii) that the IRS “erroneously computed a[] computational adjustment necessary . . . to apply to the partner a settlement.”

§§ 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(2)(A). GMI argues that its refund 

claims do not fall under this provision because its dispute 

over LCU interest allegedly does not involve [1] a “computational adjustment” that was [2] “erroneously computed” 

and [3] “necessary . . . to apply to the partner a settlement.” 

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that GMI’s 

claim that the IRS used the incorrect “applicable dates” to 

calculate the amount of LCU interest owed falls within the 

statutory language of § 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii). By its terms, 

§ 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii) covers circumstances when the IRS 

makes a computational error when changing a taxpayer’s 

tax liability to properly reflect the treatment of a partnership item based on the settlement of a TEFRA proceeding.8 

8 The dissent relies on United States v. Merriam for 

the premise that, “If the words are doubtful, the doubt 

must be resolved against the Government in favor of the 

taxpayer.” 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923). But in White v. United 

States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938), after noting that it was not 

“impressed” by this very argument, the Court said: 

It is the function and duty of courts to resolve 

doubts. We know of no reason why that function 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 17

That is what GMI alleges the IRS did in this case. As explained below, the essence of GMI’s challenge is to the 

IRS’s computation of the change in its tax liability resulting from the Partnership’s settlement of partnership items. 

First, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims’ analysis that the assessment of LCU interest in this case was 

the result of a “computational adjustment” as the term is 

defined by statute and regulation. General Mills, 123 Fed. 

Cl. at 586. The Internal Revenue Code defines “computational adjustment” as “the change in the tax liability of a 

partner which properly reflects the treatment . . . of a partnership item.” I.R.C. § 6231(a)(6). Moreover, “[a] computational adjustment includes any interest due with respect 

to any underpayment . . . of tax attributable to adjustments 

to reflect properly the treatment of partnership items.” 

Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)–1(b) (emphases added); see

also Olson, 172 F.3d at 1318 (stating that “the [Treasury]

regulations set forth that interest is to be included as a 

computational adjustment”). GMI does not challenge the 

validity of this Treasury regulation. The court correctly 

noted “[t]hat ‘any’ is the modifier for both ‘interest’ and ‘underpayment’ in” § 301.6231(a)(6)–1(b), and thus, “this regulatory provision makes clear that no interest attributable 

to an underpayment is to be excluded from its reach.” General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 584.

Second, GMI argues the ground for its refund claims—

that the IRS used the incorrect applicable dates to compute 

the amount of LCU interest—alleges a legal error and not 

a “computational” error. According to GMI, “[t]he 

should be abdicated in a tax case more than in any 

other where the rights of suitors turn on the construction of a statute and it is our duty to decide 

what that construction fairly should be.

305 U.S. at 292.

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18 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

underlying dispute . . . turns on a legal disagreement about 

which statutory provision prescribes the applicable date.”

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 11–12. The Court of Federal 

Claims found, and we agree, that GMI’s claim that the IRS 

used the incorrect applicable dates is a complaint that the 

IRS “erroneously computed” the amount of LCU interest. 

General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 586; see § 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii). 

The Internal Revenue Code does not provide a precise 

definition of what constitutes an “erroneous[] comput[ation]” under § 6230(c). However, the fact that this 

provision immediately follows § 6230(b), titled “Mathematical and clerical errors appearing on partnership returns,” 

indicates that the statutory phrase “erroneously computed”

refers to a class of errors that is distinct from mere “[m]athematical and clerical errors,” as the Court of Federal 

Claims observed. General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 586 (citing 

Acute Care Specialists II v. United States, 727 F.3d 802, 

813 (7th Cir. 2013)). 

In Acute Care Specialists II, the Court of Appeals for 

the Seventh Circuit rejected the taxpayers’ argument that 

the statutory phrase “erroneously computed any computational adjustment” refers exclusively to mathematical mistakes to the exclusion of substantive issues. 727 F.3d at

812–13. The court in Acute Care Specialists II relied on the

fact that the Internal Revenue Code provides separately for 

“[m]athematical and clerical errors” under § 6230(b) and 

“erroneous[] comput[ations]” under § 6230(c). Id. at 813. 

There, the taxpayers claimed that the IRS erroneously included in its tax computation an adjustment for a deduction that the taxpayers did not actually claim, and the 

court held that the taxpayers’ claim alleged an “erroneous 

computat[ion]” of a “computational adjustment,” thus requiring application of § 6230(c)’s six-month limitations period. Id. at 812. 

Acute Care Specialists II is analogous to the present 

case. GMI has effectively claimed that the IRS used an 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 19

incorrect variable in the formula for computing LCU interest, as the Court of Federal Claims observed. General

Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 586. As with Acute Care Specialists 

II, GMI’s complaint is based on a substantive issue with 

computing a computational adjustment, rather than a 

mere mathematical or clerical error. Further, while GMI 

attempts to differentiate between “legal” errors and “computational” errors, we see no basis for making that distinction. GMI cites no authority in support of its argument

that the statutory phrase “erroneously computed any computational adjustment” excludes a challenge such as GMI’s

to the IRS’s determination of the applicable date for computing the amount of LCU interest owed. 

Third, the six-month limitations period covers circumstances, inter alia, where the “computational adjustment”

was “necessary . . . to apply to the partner a settlement.” 

§ 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii). GMI argues that circumstance does not 

apply to its case because choosing an applicable date and 

imposing LCU interest were not “necessary . . . to apply . . .

a settlement” to GMI. GMI points to the fact that the Partnership settlement agreements executed by Form 870-

LT(AD) did not expressly cover any aspect of how LCU interest would be imposed. Appellant’s Br. at 46–47. Instead, GMI argues, a global settlement agreement executed 

in November 2011 by GMI and its subsidiaries with the 

IRS carved out “the right [for GMI] to challenge interest 

calculations made by the Service with respect to” particular tax years that included 2002–2006. J.A. 604. 

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that the 

IRS’s assessment of LCU interest was “necessary . . . to apply” the Partnership settlement agreements to GMI. General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 586–87. The Court of Federal 

Claims noted that the executed Form 870-LT(AD) provided 

that the IRS could assess “any interest provided by law” 

against GMI with respect to the settled amounts of tax underpayments for the 2002–2006 tax years. E.g., J.A. 257–

58, 262–63, 267–68, 272–73, 379–477. By executing Forms 

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20 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

870-LT(AD), GMI agreed that it “consent[ed] to the assessment and collection of . . . any . . . additions to tax[] and additional amounts that relate to adjustments to partnership 

items . . . (plus any interest provided by law).” E.g., 

J.A. 257, 262 (emphasis added). Although the Partnership 

settlement agreements did not explicitly explain how LCU

interest would be determined, as the Court of Federal 

Claims noted, “the tax code prescribes the amount of interest that applies for a large corporate underpayment and 

the applicable date for determining interest accrual.” General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 587. We agree with the Court of 

Federal Claims that because interest was “clearly contemplated” as part of the Partnership settlement agreements, 

the particular aspects of how LCU interest would be imposed need not have been set forth in the executed 

Form 870-LT(AD). See id.

2. SECTION 6511(A) DOES NOT APPLY TO GMI’S REFUND 

CLAIMS

Unlike the general two-year limitations provision of 

§ 6511(a), the specifically drawn six-month limitations provision of § 6230(c) is particularly tailored to specific types 

of claims, including, inter alia, claims that the IRS “erroneously computed a[] computational adjustment.” 

§§ 6230(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C). The statutory language of 

§ 6511(a), which broadly covers “claim[s] for . . . refund of 

an overpayment of any tax imposed by [the Internal Revenue Code],” could reasonably be read to account for GMI’s 

refund claims. Nonetheless, because GMI’s refund claims 

fall within the narrower, specifically drawn statute, that is 

the provision that controls. Hinck v. United States, 550 

U.S. 501, 506 (2007) (“[I]n most contexts, a precisely 

drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”) (quoting EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 

550 U.S. 429, 434 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). 

GMI next asserts that the policy goal of the shortened 

six-month limitations period is to allow any errors affecting 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 21

the tax liability of multiple partners to flow through the 

IRS promptly. Oral Arg. at 6:45–8:15, General Mills, Inc. 

v. United States, No. 2019-1124 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 8, 2019), 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2019-1124.mp3. Based on that policy goal, 

GMI argues that any claims that are entirely dependent on 

one partner’s unique factual circumstances should not be 

governed by the shortened limitations period. Id. Further, 

GMI argues that its challenge to the IRS’s assessment of 

LCU interest depends on the unique factual circumstances 

of the individual partners. Appellant’s Br. at 40–42. GMI 

fails to point to any authority to support this position. Section 6230(c)’s six-month limitations provision is not so particularly drafted as GMI wishes. 

Finally, GMI argues that various other provisions in 

the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 6511(g), 7422(h), and 

6230(d)(6), suggest that the six-month limitations period 

applies only to refund claims that are “attributable to partnership items” and that the general two-year limitations 

period applies to claims for refund of tax that are “not attributable to partnership items.”9 Appellant’s Br. at 31–

34. GMI argues that its claim that the IRS applied the incorrect applicable dates is not attributable to a partnership 

item. Id. at 39. 

The plain language of § 6230(c), however, gives no hint

that the only refund claims governed by the six-month 

9 When interpreting § 7422(h), we explained that a 

tax item is “attributable to a partnership item” if it is “due 

to, caused by, or generated by a partnership item.” Bush v. 

United States, 717 F.3d 920, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

2009)); see also Russian Recovery Fund Ltd. v. United 

States, 851 F.3d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (defining “attributable to” in I.R.C. § 6229(a) to mean “due to, caused 

by, or generated by”).

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22 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

limitations period are those for tax “attributable to partnership items.” See § 6230(c)(2)(A). By its terms, § 6230(c) 

provides that the six-month limitations period applies to 

“claims for refund on the grounds that the Secretary erroneously computed any computational adjustment necessary” for certain actions including, among others, “to apply 

to the partner a settlement.” §§ 6230(c)(1), 6230(c)(2)(A). 

We decline GMI’s invitation to read into the six-month limitations provision a new requirement that the refund 

claims be “attributable to partnership items.”

As the Court of Federal Claims noted, none of the provisions cited by GMI, § 6511(g) or § 7422(h), “indicate that 

refund[] [claims] attributable to partnership items are the 

only instances in which § 6230(c) applies.” General Mills, 

123 Fed. Cl. at 592. We agree with the Court of Federal 

Claims that §§ 6511(g) and 7422(h) “do not expressly exclude” claims that are not attributable to partnership items

“from the reach of section 6230(c).” Id. at 594. The same 

is true for § 6230(d)(6). Instead, those provisions make 

clear that refund claims “attributable to partnership items”

are governed by § 6230(c). Id. at 594; see §§ 6511(g), 

7422(h), 6230(d)(6). Accordingly, §§ 6511(g), 7422(h), and 

6230(d)(6) do not confine the universe of refund claims to 

which the six-month limitations period applies to those 

that are “attributable to partnership items.” 

B. WHETHER THE IRS PROVIDED GMI WITH SUFFICIENT 

NOTICE OF COMPUTATIONAL ADJUSTMENT

GMI contends that even if the six-month limitations 

period under § 6230(c) applies, the notices it received from 

the IRS were inadequate to trigger the running of the limitations period and therefore, the six month period never 

began. We disagree.

The six-month limitations period is triggered by a “notice of computational adjustment.” § 6230(c)(2)(A) (providing that the taxpayer must file a refund claim “within 6 

months after . . . the [IRS] mails the notice of 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 23

computational adjustment to the partner”). Although 

§ 6230(c) does not define what constitutes adequate notice, 

“notice must meet the general ‘fairness’ requirements of 

due process.” Estate of Yaeger v. Comm’r, 889 F.2d 29, 35 

(2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Planned Invs., Inc. v. United States, 

881 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1989)). In a number of cases, 

courts have been called upon to examine notices of deficiency, which are issued pursuant to the deficiency procedures set forth in §§ 6211–16, to determine “whether the 

notice imparted enough information to provide the taxpayer with fair notice.” Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363, 

1367–68 (9th Cir. 1987). To be considered adequate, a notice of deficiency must (i) advise the taxpayer that the IRS 

determined that a deficiency exists for a particular year, 

and (ii) specify the amount of the deficiency or provide the 

information necessary to compute the deficiency. Acute 

Care Specialists II, 727 F.3d at 813 (considering the inquiry 

for whether a notice of deficiency imparted fair notice to be 

instructive for deciding whether the IRS provided taxpayer 

with fair notice of a computational adjustment); Portillo v. 

Comm’r, 932 F.2d 1128, 1132 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Donley 

v. Comm’r, 791 F.2d 383, 384–85 (5th Cir. 1986)); Abrams 

v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1987); Geiselman 

v. United States, 961 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992); Estate of Yaeger, 889 F.2d at 35; Benzvi v. Comm’r, 787 F.2d 1541, 1542 

(11th Cir. 1986); Del Castillo v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 

112, 2006 WL 2346452, at *2 (2006).

The record shows GMI received interest computation 

schedules from the IRS dated April 18, 2011 and April 20, 

2011 for the 2002–2003 tax years and dated June 14, 2011 

for the 2004–2006 tax years. J.A. 334–38, 342–44, 559–63.

The interest computation schedules were accompanied by 

cover letters (Letter 3535)10 informing GMI that: “As 

10 The Internal Revenue Manual states that the interest computation cover letter (Letter 3535) should be 

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24 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

required by Internal Revenue Code Section 6631, [the IRS

is] providing a copy of the schedule we used to calculate 

interest on the tax adjustment for the return” for each respective tax year. J.A. 334, 342, 559. The interest computation schedules themselves identified GMI’s tax 

underpayments, payments, and refunds for each of the tax 

years and computed the amount of interest (including LCU 

interest) on GMI’s tax underpayments that had accrued to 

date.

Further, each of the interest computation schedules

identified the “applicable date” in two places: the line titled 

“LCU Interest Date” and the line for the earliest date of 

“Underpay LCU.” The schedules for the 2002 and 2003 tax 

years each stated, “LCU Interest Date: 07/15/2007,” as the 

Court of Federal Claims noted. General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. 

at 590 (citing J.A. 335, 337). The interest computation

schedules described the accrued interest as “Underpay” for 

the dates prior to and including July 15, 2007 and as “Underpay LCU” for the dates following July 15, 2007. 

J.A. 336, 338. The schedules thus informed GMI that interest accrued at the default underpayment rate prior to 

and on July 15, 2007, and then at an enhanced interest rate 

following July 15, 2007. Id. Likewise, the schedules for 

the 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax years each stated, “LCU Interest Date: 05/29/2009,” as the Court of Federal Claims 

noted. General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 590. The schedules

described the accrued interest prior to and on this date as 

“Underpay” and after this date as “Underpay LCU.” 

J.A. 560, 562–63. In other words, the schedules showed 

used “when providing an interest computation report to the 

taxpayer as required by IRC 6631.” Internal Revenue 

Manual § 20.2.8.3 (2011). Further, “IRC 6631 requires 

that an explanation of interest computation be sent to an 

individual (IMF) taxpayer with each notice; which includes 

an amount of interest required to be paid.” Id. 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 25

GMI that, after May 29, 2009, the IRS began calculating 

accrued interest at a higher interest rate than the default 

underpayment rate. Id.

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims’ conclusion

that the schedules provided GMI with fair notice of a computational adjustment as to LCU interest and were adequate to trigger the running of the limitations period. See 

General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 590. The schedules clearly

informed GMI that the IRS had imposed the enhanced interest rate for large corporate underpayments at specific 

trigger dates. The schedules clearly identified July 15, 

2007 and May 29, 2009 as the applicable dates for computing LCU interest for 2002–2003 and 2004–2006, respectively. The schedules further informed GMI of the amount

of LCU interest actually assessed due to the enhanced interest rate for each tax year. 

GMI contends that the notices were defective for various reasons. First, GMI says that the IRS was required to 

give notice that “a jurisdictional period was being triggered,” and the schedules failed to mention § 6230(c) or the 

six-month limitations period. See Appellant’s Br. at 56–57.

GMI also argues that the schedules were tainted by the 

failure to mention the Partnership proceedings and the 

failure to separate the accrued interest on underpayments 

resulting from the corporate proceedings from that of the 

Partnership proceedings. These contentions lack merit. 

The Court of Federal Claims stated that the notice of computational adjustment need not be in any particular form, 

and we agree. General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at 589; see Urban 

v. Comm’r, 964 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1992); Abrams v. 

Comm’r, 787 F.2d 939, 941 (4th Cir.1986); Benzvi, 787 F.2d 

at 1542. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code does not define 

what a notice of computational adjustment should contain. 

In Acute Care Specialists II, the taxpayers claimed that 

the IRS failed to provide adequate notice of computational 

adjustment, even though the IRS mailed them a 

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26 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Form 4549A showing the amount of tax deficiency and the 

balance due. 727 F.3d at 812–13. The Form 4549A “did 

not, however, specifically indicate that it was a notice of 

computational adjustment or state the length of time that 

the [taxpayers] had in which to challenge the adjustment.” 

Id. at 812. The Seventh Circuit found the Form 4549A met 

the standard for adequate notice because it showed “the existence and amount of the [taxpayers’] tax deficiency.” Id.

at 813. Here, the interest computation schedules gave GMI

fair notice of the tax years at issue, the means to compute 

the accrued LCU interest, and the balance due. In other 

words, the schedules provided GMI with all the information it needed to assess whether the IRS may have erroneously computed the computational adjustment. 

GMI urges upon us the case of McGann v. United 

States, 76 Fed. Cl. 745 (2007), as analogous to this case. 

GMI argues that, like in McGann, the IRS provided GMI 

with misleading information that contradicts the documents the Government now relies on for providing adequate notice. GMI points to the cover letters accompanying 

the interest computation schedules that stated: “[The IRS]

will either send you a bill within the next few weeks or send 

you a statement of any refund.” J.A. 334, 342, 559. According to GMI, the cover letters “suggest[ed] that a refund 

could be automatic.” Appellant’s Br. at 56. GMI also suggests that, based on other documents provided by the IRS, 

the IRS misled it to believe LCU interest would not be imposed. GMI refers to interest computation schedules for 

the 2004 and 2005 tax years that were issued by the IRS 

prior to, and were later superseded by, the June 14, 2011 

interest computation schedules. The superseded interest 

computation schedules stated, “LCU Interest Date: LCU 

Interest is OFF.” J.A. 339, 341. GMI also points to a

Form 4549-A, issued on March 4, 2011 to inform GMI of its

underpayments for the 2004–2006 tax years. GMI argues 

the Form 4549-A was misleading because it showed “0” 

(zero) in the line for “Interest (IRC § 6601).” J.A. 483. 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 27

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that 

McGann is not analogous to GMI’s case. General Mills, 123 

Fed. Cl. at 590. The Court of Federal Claims determined 

that, unlike in McGann, “none of the notices sent by the 

IRS to [GMI] in this case were misleading or contradictory.” Id. By stating that the IRS would either send a bill 

or send a refund, the cover letters could not have reasonably misled GMI to conclude that it need not file an administrative refund claim in order to contest the IRS’s 

calculation of the amount of LCU interest owed. See 

J.A. 334, 342, 559. Nor were the superseded interest computation schedules misleading as to whether LCU interest 

would be imposed on GMI. The schedules simply notified

GMI that the IRS would later account for LCU interest in 

subsequently issued interest computation schedules. 

These documents were not misleading or contradictory as 

to identifying the amount of LCU interest due and the 

years at issue. See Estate of Yaeger, 889 F.2d at 35 (“The 

taxpayer must demonstrate that the notice was misleading.”). 

The Form 4549-A, issued on March 4, 2011 for the 

2004–2006 tax years, does not change our conclusion. As a 

general rule, notices containing technical defects are still 

valid unless the taxpayer has been prejudiced or misled by 

the error. See Stewart v. Comm’r, 714 F.2d 977, 986 (9th 

Cir. 1983) (“The basic consideration is whether the taxpayer is surprised and disadvantaged.”) (quoting Comm’r 

v. Transp. Mfg. & Equip. Co., 478 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 

1973)); see also Sanderling, Inc. v. Comm’r, 571 F.2d 174, 

176 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that the deficiency notice is 

valid if a taxpayer has not been misled as to the year or 

amount involved; notice was valid since it referenced correct year and transaction despite references to wrong 

years); Estate of Yaeger, 889 F.2d at 36 (finding that the 

deficiency notice was valid, even though it incorrectly identified year in question, because information in notice was 

sufficient for taxpayer to determine actual year in 

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28 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

question). As the Court of Federal Claims noted, the 

Form 4549-A was accompanied by a cover letter informing 

GMI of the conditions under which the IRS would impose 

the enhanced interest rate on large corporate underpayments. J.A. 478 (“If you are a ‘C’ Corporation, Section 

6621(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that an interest rate 2% higher than the standard rate of interest will 

be charged on [large corporate underpayments].”). We 

agree with the Court of Federal Claims that, irrespective 

of the documents issued prior to the interest computation 

schedules, by the time GMI “receive[d] the detailed interest 

computation schedules, [GMI] was well aware of the IRS’s 

computation of its LCU interest and the interest accrual 

dates the IRS had used.” General Mills, 123 Fed. Cl. at

590. GMI could not have been prejudiced or misled as to 

the IRS’s intent to impose LCU interest for the 2004–2006 

tax years, as well as the amounts, once it received the interest computation schedules on June 14, 2011. 

In sum, at the latest, the six-month limitations period 

began to run by April 2011 and June 2011 for the 2002–

2003 and the 2004–2006 tax years, respectively. GMI did 

not file its refund claims until March 28, 2013, which was 

over a year too late. Accordingly, GMI did not file a timely 

claim for refund under the governing statute. See

§ 6230(c)(2)(A).

CONCLUSION

GMI’s refund claims based on alleged IRS computational errors were brought well after the period established 

by the applicable statute of limitations had run. Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over GMI’s refund 

claims.

AFFIRMED

Case: 19-1124 Document: 42 Page: 28 Filed: 04/23/2020
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

GENERAL MILLS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2019-1124

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:14-cv-00089-PEC, Judge Patricia E. CampbellSmith.

______________________

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent, for this interest refund claim was 

timely filed in conformity with the statutory time period for 

filing such claim. That period is two or three years after 

the payment was made or the tax return was filed, as provided in 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a):

§ 6511(a). Period of limitation on filing claim.

Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any 

tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the 

taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed 

by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the 

return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax 

was paid, whichever of such periods expires the 

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2 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, 

within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.

There was a special 6-month period in TEFRA1 for filing 

claims arising from “computational adjustment” of “partnership items,” at 26 U.S.C. § 6230(c)(2)(A):

§ 6230(c)(2)(A). [repealed] Any claim under subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (1) shall be filed 

within 6 months after the day on which the Secretary mails the notice of computational adjustment 

to the partner.

This 6-month period applied to § 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii), specific 

to computational adjustments of a partner’s tax liability 

based on settlement, adjustment, or decision:

§ 6230(c)(1)(A)(ii). [repealed] A partner may file 

a claim for refund on the grounds that . . . the Secretary erroneously computed any computational 

adjustment necessary . . . to apply to the partner a 

settlement, a final partnership administrative adjustment, or the decision of a court in an action 

brought under section 6226 or section 6228(a).

The question on appeal is whether the special 6-month 

limitations period applies to the present claim for refund of 

1 This provision arose in the Tax Treatment of Partnership Items Act of 1982, as Title IV of the Tax Equity and 

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”). Pub. L. 

No. 97-248, §§ 6221–6232, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71. TEFRA 

amended the Internal Revenue Code by adding Subchapter 

C, codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221–6232. The special 6-month 

limitation period was repealed in 2015. See Bipartisan 

Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101, 129 Stat. 

584, 625 (“(a) REPEAL OF TEFRA PARTNERSHIP 

AUDIT RULES.—Chapter 63 of the Internal Revenue 

Code of 1986 is amended by striking subchapter C.”)

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 3

overpayment of interest. Interest is required and calculated and levied in accordance with the general tax law. 

This claim for refund of interest was filed in accordance 

with the general rules for filing refund claims under 

§ 6511(a). The court errs in applying, to this interest refund claim, the 6-month limitations period that was specific to computational adjustment of tax on partnership 

items.

A

The statutory scheme contained several special provisions to provide clarity and assure absence of conflict between these statutory periods of limitation. For example, 

26 U.S.C. § 6231(a)(6) elaborated that “computational adjustment” in these sections relates to the tax treatment of 

partnership items:

§ 6231(a)(6). [repealed] The term “computational 

adjustment” means the change in the tax liability 

of a partner which properly reflects the treatment 

under this subchapter of a partnership item.

The payment of interest is not a “tax liability.”

The Internal Revenue Manual elaborates on the meaning of “computational adjustment”:

IRM 8.19.1.6.9.3.1. A direct computational assessment is only appropriate where the effect of the 

partnership item on the partner’s tax liability can 

be computed mathematically without further determinations at the partner level. If an additional 

factual determination is required, the adjustment 

cannot be made as a computational adjustment.

Additional elaboration of the role of these provisions is seen 

in the statutory definition of “partnership item”:

§ 6231(a)(3). [repealed] The term “partnership 

item” means, with respect to a partnership, any 

item required to be taken into account for the 

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4 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

partnership’s taxable year under any provision of 

subtitle A to the extent regulations prescribed by 

the Secretary provide that, for purposes of this subtitle, such item is more appropriately determined 

at the partnership level than at the partner level.

Precedent has considered the scope of “partnership item” 

under these provisions, see, e.g., Prochorenko v. United 

States, 243 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001):

Construing the phrase “attributable to partnership 

items” so broadly as to cover claims that depend on 

the unique circumstances of an individual partner, 

and that only affect that partner, would be contrary 

to the system of separate treatment of partnership 

items and nonpartnership items established by 

Congress in enacting TEFRA.

Id. at 1363; see also Field v. United States, 328 F.3d 58, 59 

(2d Cir. 2003); Monti v. United States, 223 F.3d 76, 82 (2d

Cir. 2000); McGann v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 745, 753 

(2007).

B

On this statutory background, General Mills, Inc. & 

Subsidiaries (collectively, “GMI”) filed the subject claim for 

refund of overpaid interest, within two years of GMI’s voluntary payment of its estimated interest. The IRS denied 

the requested refund, and GMI filed this refund suit in the 

Court of Federal Claims.2

GMI outlines the lengthy history of these proceedings 

for tax years starting in 2002, and including Partnership 

Proceedings and Corporate Proceedings involving 

2 General Mills, Inc. v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 

576 (2015) (“Fed. Cl. Op.”).

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 5

overlapping entities. The tax obligations were eventually 

settled and paid.

For the 2002–2003 tax years, GMI entered into settlement agreements with the IRS in July of 2010, using Form 

870-LT(AD) entitled Settlement Agreement for Partnership 

Items and Partnership Level Determinations as to Penalties, Additions to Tax and Additional Amounts and Agreement for Affected Items, which states that interest will be 

assessed as “provided by law.” J.A. 257, 262, 267, 272, 278, 

287, 296, 305, 314, 323. The IRS also sent GMI a Form 

5278 in August 2010 that provided computational adjustments in the assessed tax, which included a letter that 

stated: “We will adjust your account and figure the interest. The Service Center will send a bill for any additional 

amount you owe.” J.A. 332. GMI states, without contradiction, that “No such bill was ever sent.” GMI Br. 14.

For the 2004–2006 tax years, GMI entered into settlement agreements with the IRS in November of 2010, using 

Form 870-LT(AD), which stated that interest will be assessed as “provided by law.” J.A. 380, 388, 398, 408, 418, 

428, 438, 448, 458, 468. The IRS sent GMI Form 4549-A, 

entitled Income Tax Discrepancy Adjustments, which 

shows “0” on the interest lines for years 2004–2006. 

J.A. 482–83.

GMI states that on April 11, 2011 it calculated and paid 

its estimated amount of interest for both the 2002–2003 

and 2004–2006 tax periods “in order to stop the accrual of 

interest.” GMI Br. 15, 20.

On April 18, April 20, and June 14, 2011, the IRS sent

GMI Letters 3535 and attachments, stating that:

As required by Internal Revenue Code Section 

6631, we are providing a copy of the schedule we 

used to calculate interest on the tax adjustment for 

the return identified above. This computation is 

for your information. The enclosed Interest 

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6 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Computation Schedule is not a bill for tax due. We 

will either send you a bill within the next few 

weeks or send you a statement of any refund.

J.A. 334, 342, 559. Neither bill nor refund followed. The 

Majority states that “the schedules provided GMI with fair 

notice of a computational adjustment as to LCU interest 

and were adequate to trigger the running of the limitations 

period” of § 6230(c). Maj. Op. at 25. This is not statutory 

notice under the tax law.

This 6-month limitations period ends “6 months after 

the day on which the Secretary mails the notice of computational adjustment to the partner.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6230(c)(2)(A). However, the notice relied on by the Majority “bears no indication that it is to be taken as a notice 

of computational adjustment, nor does it disclose that [the 

taxpayer] would have had to contest any amounts said to 

be due within a six-months’ period thereafter.” McGann, 

76 Fed. Cl. at 760. At best, the Majority has pointed to 

documents from which GMI may “decipher the position 

that the IRS might in fact be taking respecting interest.” 

Id. at 761. The inadequacy of notice of the amount of interest is conspicuous; for there was no assessment of interest during the period now held to have exhausted the 6-

month refund period.

The record contains a copy of a Global Settlement 

Agreement, IRS Form 870-AD, prepared by the IRS and 

executed by GMI in November 2011 and the IRS in December 2011, that states that: 

The Taxpayer reserves the right to challenge Interest calculations made by the Service with respect 

to all years/periods covered by [the settlement 

agreement].

J.A. 604–05. GMI points out that by the time of this agreement, which stated GMI’s reserved right to challenge interest calculations, “the six-month limitations period that the 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 7

government now argues applies had expired.” GMI Reply 

Br. 23. The government does not dispute this statement, 

or explain its position in contradiction of the explicit statement in the agreement it drafted.

C

The refund claim here at issue is not for a “computational adjustment” of a “partnership item.” It is for refund

of an overpayment of interest. This claim is subject to the 

standard two-year period of 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a).

The government takes the position that this refund 

claim is barred by the 6-month period of § 6230(c). The 

Court of Federal Claims agreed, holding that it is it “irrelevant” whether this refund claim is “attributable to a partnership item” as required by § 6230(c). Fed. Cl. Op. at 592–

93. My colleagues now agree.

My colleagues hold that this is a matter of “preemption” between conflicting statutes, whereby the narrower

statute preempts the general one. Maj. Op. at 20. However, there is no conflict between the 6-month period of 

§ 6230(c) and the 2–3 year period of § 6511(a), for they apply to different aspects of the tax law. Section 6230(c) is 

specific to the 6-month period for review of computational 

adjustment of partnership items, and § 6511 sets the 

standard 2–3 year period for refund claims.

Throughout the TEFRA statute, the legislature carefully defined its focus and clarified its provisions. For example, section 6511(g) made explicit that only partnership 

items are subject to the 6-month limit:

§ 6511(g). [repealed] In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle A with respect to any person 

which is attributable to any partnership item (as 

defined in section 6231(a)(3)), the provisions of . . . 

subsections (c) and (d) of section 6230 shall apply 

in lieu of the provisions of this subchapter [which 

includes section 6511(a)].

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8 GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

The statute itself foresaw, and forestalled, any conflict 

between these periods of limitation. There is a “strong presumption that repeals by implication are disfavored and 

that Congress will specifically address preexisting law 

when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later 

statute.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 

(2018) (citing United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452–

53 (1988)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also id. (“When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on the same topic, this Court is not 

at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments and must instead strive to give effect to both.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The legislative record contains no hint that Congress 

intended to truncate the standard period for filing interest 

refund claims and to enlarge the explicit scope of § 6230(c). 

The enactment and then cancellation of the special 6-

month period of limitations for computational adjustments 

of tax on partnership items did not change the general 2–3 

year statutory period applicable to a claim for refund of interest paid.

The government’s present theory, now supported by 

this court, confronts constitutional principles of judicial review, as well as the policy embodied in adjudication of taxpayer issues. See, e.g., United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 

179, 188 (1923) (“If the words are doubtful, the doubt must 

be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.”); Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273

U.S. 346, 350 (1927) (“The provision is a part of a taxing 

statute; and such laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers.”).

These principles of fairness are not obsolete, as the 

panel majority proposes. See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 839 (2001) 

(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n cases such as this one, in 

which the complex statutory and regulatory scheme lends 

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GENERAL MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES 9

itself to any number of interpretations, we should be inclined to rely on the traditional canon that construes revenue-raising laws against their drafter.”). This is not a 

matter whereby the court can simply look to “every other 

material part of the statute” and “their legislative history,” 

as in White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938), on 

which the panel majority relies; its interpretation requires 

preemption of the general limitation statute. Maj. Op. at 

16 n.8, 20. As in this case, “if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved 

in favor of the taxpayer.” Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 

F.3d 647, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Hassett v. Welch, 

303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938)); see also Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 

161, 168 (1925) (although “the tax laws should be construed 

favorably for the taxpayers . . . that is not a reason for creating a doubt or for exaggerating one”).

CONCLUSION

GMI has the clear right to be heard on its claim for refund of interest paid, which claim was filed within the 2-

year period set by § 6511(a) for refund of payments made. 

The Court of Federal Claims, and now my colleagues, err 

in ruling that this claim was required to be filed within 6 

months of an unknown date for which no notice was given. 

I respectfully dissent.

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