Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00113/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Parker, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Glacier Water Services Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-00113-PHX-BSB

ORDER 

 Defendants Glacier Water Services, Inc., Trevor Barrows, and Rosemary Barrows 

(Defendants) have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(a).1

 (Doc. 52.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims because Plaintiffs have not 

offered any evidence of causation. (Id.) Plaintiffs Robert Parker, Linda Parker, and 

Jerold Jones (Plaintiffs) oppose the motion on the ground that Defendants waived any 

arguments regarding causation. (Doc. 55.) Plaintiffs alternatively argue that they have 

established causation. (Id.) Plaintiffs have also filed a cross-motion for summary 

 

1

 This matter was initially assigned to the honorable Neil V. Wake. During the Rule 16 conference, the parties stated that “at [that] time,” they did not anticipate filing any motions. (Doc. 25 at 2.) Thus, the Scheduling Order omitted a dispositive motion deadline. (Doc. 29 at 4.) The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction and this matter was randomly reassigned to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade. (Doc. 31.) On 

May 22, 2014, the Court amended the Scheduling Order to permit dispositive motions and set a June 19, 2014 deadline for filing such motions. (Doc. 54.) Considering this procedural history, the Court will not further consider Plaintiffs’ arguments that summary judgment motions should not be permitted. (Doc. 55 at 4 (filed June 18, 2014).) 

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judgment on the issues of duty, causation, and damages. (Id.) As set forth below, the 

Court denies both motions for summary judgment. 

I. Factual Background

This matter arises from a two-vehicle, intersection-related collision that occurred 

in Washington, Kansas on January 19, 2011.2

 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7, 10, 11; DSOF ¶ 7.)3 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Trevor Barrows (Barrows) was negligent in causing the 

accident, and that Defendant Glacier Water Services, Inc. (Glacier), his employer, is 

vicariously responsible for his negligence. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9-15.) Plaintiff Robert Parker 

(Parker) was driving one of the vehicles (a truck with a horse trailer) involved in the 

collision and Plaintiff Jerold Jones (Jones) was a passenger in Parker’s vehicle. Parker 

was travelling westbound. (PSOF ¶ 10.)4

 Barrows was travelling southbound. (Doc. 55 

at 3.) Plaintiffs allege that Barrows had a stop sign before the intersection and that Parker 

had the right way because there was no traffic control device in his direction as he 

entered the intersection. (PSOF ¶¶ 10, 12.) Plaintiffs allege that Barrows failed to yield 

at the stop sign for westbound traffic and collided with the vehicle in which Parker and 

Jones were travelling. (PSOF ¶ 11, 12.) Parker and Jones allegedly sustained injuries as 

a result of collision. (PSOF ¶¶ 14,15, Exs. B, C.) 

II. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiffs filed their complaint in January 2013. (Doc. 1.) In June 2013, 

Defendants filed an answer denying that they were negligent and denying Plaintiffs’ 

allegations that “[a]s a direct a proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs 

sustained injuries and damages.” (Doc. 15 ¶ 9 (denying Plaintiffs’ allegations in ¶ 15 of 

 

2

 Plaintiffs invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction and the parties do not dispute venue. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶1-3, 6; Doc. 25.) 

3

 Citations to “DSOF” are to Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 53.) 

4

 Citations to “PSOF” are to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts in Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 56.) 

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the Complaint).) In August 2013, the parties filed a joint proposed discovery plan in 

which Defendants disputed “liability” and the “nature and extent of any damages that 

may have resulted from the accident.” (Doc. 25 at 2.) 

 In October 2013, the Court issued a Rule 16 Scheduling Order that directed the 

parties to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to disclosure and 

discovery. (Doc. 29.) The Scheduling Order specifically directed Plaintiffs to “provide 

full and complete expert disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(2)(A)-(C) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure no later than February 14, 2014.” (Doc. 29 at 2.) Defendants 

were to disclose their experts by March 14, 2014, and rebuttal opinions, if any, were to be 

disclosed by March 28, 2014. (Id.) Both fact and expert discovery was to be completed 

by April 18, 2014. (Id. at 2-3.) 

 On February 14, 2014, Plaintiffs disclosed their expert witnesses. (DSOF, Ex. 1.) 

Plaintiffs disclosed Parker’s treating doctor, Eric J. Eross, D.O., and Jones’s treating 

doctor, Dr. Alan Corbett, under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. (Id. at 1-2.) 

Plaintiffs stated that the “subject matter” of Dr. Eross’s testimony was expected to 

include his examination of Parker regarding his complaints of headaches and head pain. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs also stated that Dr. Eross would offers his opinions regarding Parker’s 

post-concussive syndrome and memory loss and that Parker’s symptoms “are consistent 

with trauma sustained in the motor vehicle accident which is the subject matter of this 

proceeding.” (Id. at 1-2.) 

 Plaintiffs stated that Dr. Corbett was expected to present evidence regarding his 

examination of Jones related to his complaints of knee pain, numbness in his hands, neck 

pain, and shoulder pain. (Id.) Plaintiffs further stated that Dr. Corbett was expected to 

opine that Jones’s “symptoms are consistent with the trauma sustained in the motor 

vehicle accident which is the subject matter of this proceeding.” (Id.) Plaintiff also 

produced Dr. Eross’s and Dr. Corbett’s treatment records. (DSOF, Exs. 2, 3.) 

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III. Summary Judgment Standard 

 A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed 

evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

IV. Standards to Establish Negligence under Arizona Law 

 Plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against Defendants for the injuries they 

allegedly sustained as a result of the 2011 accident. (Doc. 1.) To prevail on a negligence 

claim, Plaintiffs must prove four elements: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant to 

exercise reasonable care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the 

negligent conduct and the resulting injury, and (4) actual damages.5

 Gipson v. Kasey, 

150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007). 

 The existence of a duty is generally a question of law, while the other three 

elements are factual issues “generally within the province of the jury.” Ritchie v. 

Krasner, 211 P.3d 1272, 1279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Gipson, 150 P.3d at 230); see

Ball v. Prentice, 781 P.2d 628, 630 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (the “nature, severity and extent 

of [a plaintiff’s] injuries and whether they are supported by medical or other expert 

witnesses is a question for the trier of fact.”); Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 

 

5

 “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Enterprise Bank & Trust v. Vintage Ranch Inv., LLC, 2012 WL 

1267988 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2012) (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 

761 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Arizona substantive 

law applies to this action. 

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(Ariz. 1977) (en banc) (stating that whether an accident is “the proximate cause of the 

injury or damages is, generally, a question for the jury.”). 

 To establish causation under Arizona law, the plaintiff “must show some 

reasonable connection between defendant’s act or omission and plaintiff’s damages or 

injuries.” Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. 1990) (en 

banc). “The defendant’s act or omission need not be a ‘large’ or ‘abundant’ cause of the 

injury; even if defendant’s conduct contributes ‘only a little’ to plaintiff’s damages, 

liability exists if the damages would not have occurred but for that conduct.” Id. 

(quoting Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 205 (Ariz. 1983)). 

V. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

 In their pending motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that they are 

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims because there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of causation and they are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 52.) Defendants specifically argue that Plaintiffs’ 

expert disclosures and the supporting medical records from Dr. Eross and Dr. Corbett 

“are silent as to any opinions that the accident caused any injuries, as well as the nature 

and extent of any such injuries.” (Id. at 3.) 

 A. Defendants Did Not Concede Causation 

 In opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue that 

Defendants conceded the issue of causation because they “stipulated in the Joint 

Proposed Discovery Plan that the only defenses and issues in dispute were liability and 

damages.” (Doc. 55 at 1 (citing Doc. 25).) Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants 

cannot now move for summary judgment on causation and their motion must be denied. 

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ initial and supplemental disclosure 

statements did not assert the “absence of causation” as part of their defense. (Id.) 

Further, Plaintiffs note that Defendants disclosed that their expert, Harry S. Tamm, M.D., 

was expected to opine that the accident “likely resulted in relatively minor injuries to 

Mr. Parker.” (Doc. 55 at 3 (citing PSOF, Ex. B at 4).) Relying on this procedural 

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history, and this portion of Dr. Tamm’s anticipated testimony, Plaintiffs argue that 

Defendants conceded the issue of causation. 

 The record, however, does not support Plaintiffs’ arguments. In their answer, 

Defendants denied that they were negligent and denied Plaintiffs’ allegations that “[a]s a 

direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs sustained injuries and 

damages.” (Doc. 15, ¶ 9 (denying Plaintiffs’ allegations in ¶ 15 of the Complaint).) 

Thus, Defendants’ Answer denied Plaintiffs’ allegation of proximate cause. 

 Additionally, in the Joint Proposed Discovery Plan, Defendants disputed 

“liability” and the “nature and extent of any damages that may have resulted from the 

accident.” (Doc. 25 at 2.) Thus, Defendants denied “liability,” which can be construed to 

encompass the element of causation. See Wilson v. City of Tucson, 446 P.2d 504, 508 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (stating that “[t]here can be no liability in a negligence case unless 

there is negligent conduct on the part of one which invades a protected legal interest of 

another who is ‘within the range of apprehension’ and which is the proximate cause of 

the injuries for which such other person claims damages. These three elements — 

negligence, an apprehensible interest, and proximate causation — blend into each other. 

It is in many cases difficult, if not impossible to consider one of the elements apart from 

the others.”). 

 Finally, Defendants disclosed Dr. Tamm to “address causation and damages.” 

(PSOF, Ex. B at 3.) Defendants stated that Dr. Tamm was expected to opine that the 

accident “likely resulted in relatively minor injuries to Mr. Parker,” and that Dr. Tamm 

would likely opine that “any tremors and peripheral neuropathy, as well as memory 

deficits, are not related to the accident.” (Id. at 4.) Thus, Defendants’ disclosures did not 

concede the cause and extent of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Although Defendants did not 

specifically identify causation as a defense in their disclosure statements, Rule 

26(a)(1)(A) does not impose such a requirement. Therefore, the Court concludes that 

Defendants are not precluded from moving for summary judgment on the issue of 

causation and will address Defendants’ motion. 

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B. Causation is Disputed 

 Although the Court addresses Defendants’ motion, it finds that the motion fails 

because Plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on 

Parker’s and Jones’s negligence claims. To support Parker’s claims, Plaintiffs have 

disclosed Dr. Eross’s records which indicate that: (1) Parker’s head pain began when he 

was involved in the accident at issue; (2) Parker “struck the left occipital portion of his 

head, perhaps losing consciousness and his head has hurt ever since”; and (3) his 

“headaches/head pain is most consistent with that of the left-sided lesser occipital 

neuralgia induced by trauma.” (Doc. 55 at 5 (citing DSOF, Ex. 2).) Plaintiffs notified 

Defendants that Dr. Eross would testify concerning his examination of Parker, his 

symptoms, and that his symptoms are consistent with the trauma sustained in the motor 

vehicle accident at issue. (DSOF, Ex. 1.) 

 To support Jones’s claims, Plaintiffs have disclosed Dr. Corbett’s records which 

describe Jones’s complaints of knee and ankle pain. (Doc. 55 at 6 (citing DSOF, Ex. 3).) 

Dr. Corbett’s records refer to “left knee pain” and note that Jones was in a car accident 

about a year ago. (DSOF, Ex. 3 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs notified Defendants that Dr. Corbett 

would present evidence regarding his examination of Jones related to his complaints of 

knee pain, numbness in his hands, neck pain and shoulder pain and opine that those 

symptoms “are consistent with the trauma sustained in the motor vehicle accident at 

issue.” (DSOF, Ex. 1 at 3.) 

 A causal relationship between the accident and Parker’s and Jones’s injuries may 

be inferred from this evidence. Therefore, whether Parker’s and Jones’s alleged injuries 

were caused by the accident is a factual question to be resolved at trial. See Ontiveros, 

667 P.2d at 208 (the issue of causation “should ordinarily be a question of fact for the 

jury under usual principles of Arizona tort law”). Accordingly, the Court denies 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

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VI. Plaintiffs’ Cross- Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

 Plaintiffs’ cross-motion seeks partial summary judgment on the issues of duty, 

causation, and damages. (Doc. 55 at 8.) Plaintiffs argue that, throughout this proceeding, 

Defendants have not disputed the issues of duty and causation and therefore have 

conceded these issues. (Id.) Plaintiffs further argue that they are entitled to summary 

judgment on the issues of causation and damages because Defendants’ expert disclosure 

for Dr. Tamm was untimely and the reports of both defense experts, Dr. Tamm and Glen 

R. Bair, M.D., were incomplete in violation of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). (Id.) Plaintiffs argue 

that the Court should preclude the testimony of Dr. Tamm and Dr. Bair based on these 

violations of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). (Id.) 

A. Defendants Did Not Concede Duty and Causation 

 As discussed above in Section V.A, the Court finds that Defendants have not 

conceded the issue of causation and have not waived arguments related to that element of 

Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion asserts that Defendants have also conceded 

duty. Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants conceded duty is apparently based on their 

argument that Defendants “stipulated” in the Joint Proposed Discovery Plan that “liability 

and damages” were the only disputed issues. (Doc. 55 at 1 and 8.) As set forth above, 

the Court finds that Defendants disputed liability and, therefore, disputed the elements of 

Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. See Wilson, 446 P.2d at 508. Therefore, the Court 

concludes that Defendants did not concede the issue of duty. 

 However, “[t]he existence of a duty is generally a question of law.” Ritchie, 211 

P.3d at, 1279. While Plaintiffs’ motion did not present an argument on the existence of 

Defendants’ duty (other than their argument that Defendants conceded this issue), the 

Court recognizes that it is very unlikely that this legal issue will be disputed at trial and 

anticipates that the parties will address it in the proposed final pretrial order or in the 

proposed jury instructions. 

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B. Timeliness of Defendants’ Expert Disclosure 

Plaintiffs also move for partial summary judgment on the ground that Defendants’ 

expert disclosure was untimely and did not fully comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs 

argue that Dr. Tamm’s report was untimely because it was disclosed on March 19, 2014, 

five days after the March 14, 2014 expert disclosure deadline. (Doc. 55 at 8.) In their 

Response, Defendants state that they disclosed Dr. Tamm’s opinions on March 14, 2014, 

and disclosed his report five days later. (Doc. 59 at 5.) Defendants state that Plaintiffs’ 

counsel approved the March 19, 2014 disclosure of Dr. Tamm’s report.6

 (Id.) 

 In their reply, Plaintiffs confirm that they extended Defendants’ counsel a 

“professional courtesy of 5 days beyond the March 14 deadline” to disclose Dr. Tamm’s 

report. (Doc. 61 at 2.) While Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendants’ disclosure of 

Dr. Tamm’s report was timely pursuant to their agreement, they argue that the report was 

not complete and that the supplemental information provided was not timely. (Id.) 

Accordingly, the Court will not further address the timeliness of Defendants’ disclosure 

of Dr. Tamm’s report, but addresses below Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants’ expert 

disclosures were incomplete. 

C. Compliance with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 

 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ disclosure of its expert reports from Dr. Tamm 

and Dr. Bair was incomplete because Defendants did not disclose the experts’ fee 

schedules or a list of their past trial and deposition testimony until March 31, 2014, after 

the March 14, 2014 deadline.7

 (Doc. 55 at 8). Plaintiffs request that the Court preclude 

 

6

 Under Rule 26(a)(2), a party must disclose the identity of expert witnesses it may use at trial and, for retained experts, must accompany that disclosure with “a written 

report” summarizing the expert’s opinions and qualifications. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(2)(A)-(B). 

7

 Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that an expert’s written report must contain: (1) a complete statement of all of the witness’s opinions and the basis and reasons for them; 

(2) “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them”; (3) exhibits the expert will use to support or summarize the opinions; (4) “the witness’s qualifications”; (5) “a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an 

expert at trial or by deposition”; and (6) “a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). 

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Defendants from relying on Dr. Tamm’s and Dr. Bair’s opinions and testimony. (Id.

(“Defendants have not provided any of the justifications set forth in the Scheduling Order 

that would serve to excuse the non-compliance and permit either witness to testify.”).)8

 

Thus, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment because they argue that Defendants did not 

“identify any other witnesses that would testify on Defendants’ behalf on the issues of 

damages and causation.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that Defendants must present expert testimony to 

dispute causation and damages and therefore that Plaintiffs would be entitled to summary 

judgment if Defendants’ experts were precluded from testifying. Plaintiffs, however, 

have the burden of proof on these issues. See Gipson, 150 P.3d at 230 (plaintiff must 

prove the elements of negligence claim). Thus, even if Defendants’ witnesses were 

precluded from testifying, Plaintiffs would still be required to prove these elements — 

which Defendants may dispute through cross examination, impeachment, and argument 

— and would not be entitled to summary judgment. 

 In addition, Plaintiffs did not move for sanctions under Rule 37 or to preclude the 

testimony of Dr. Tamm and Dr. Bair based on Defendants’ alleged violation of the 

Scheduling Order. Rule 37(c)(1) authorizes sanctions for a party’s failure to make the 

required disclosures and provides that: “[i]f a party fails to provide information or 

identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that 

information or witness . . . at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is 

harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, Rule 37(c)(1) 

“gives teeth to [the disclosure] requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any 

information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed.” Yeti by 

Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 

exclusion of untimely expert report). Rule 37(c)(1) is a “‘self-executing,’ ‘automatic 

 

8

 The Scheduling Order provides that “[n]o expert witness not timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify” unless several conditions are met. (Doc. 29 at 3.) 

However, the Scheduling Order does specifically address the disclosure of an incomplete written report. (Id.) 

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sanction’ to ‘provide[] a strong inducement for disclosure of material . . . .’” Id. (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, Ad. Comm. Notes (1993 amendments)). 

 Rule 37(c)(1), however, allows the use of information or witnesses that were not 

properly disclosed if the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless, but 

places “the burden [] on the party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness.” Yeti by Molly, 

259 F.3d at 1107 (citing Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 21 (1st 

Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the obligation of the party facing sanctions for belated disclosure to 

show that its failure to comply with [Rule 26] was either justified or harmless . . . .”)). 

Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have addressed whether Defendants’ late disclosure of 

their experts’ fee schedules and the lists of prior testimony was “substantially justified” 

or “harmless” under Rule 37(c)(1). 

 Although Defendants have the burden of establishing that the late disclosure was 

harmless, Plaintiffs have not presented any information or argument from which the 

Court could find that any prejudice resulted from the late disclosure of the fee schedules 

and testimony lists. Plaintiffs note that the Defendants’ supplemental disclosure of this 

information occurred after the deadline to disclose rebuttal experts, but they have not 

stated that they intended to disclose rebuttal experts, that they needed to review the fee 

schedules and testimony lists to determine whether to disclose rebuttal experts, or that 

this information was necessary for them to rebut the “opinions” of Defendants’ experts. 

(See Doc. 29 (“Rebuttal experts shall be limited to responding to opinions stated by initial 

experts.”).) Therefore, the Court finds that this issue has not been appropriately 

presented and denies Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment based on 

Defendants’ untimely disclosure of their experts’ fee schedules and lists of testimony. 

 Accordingly, 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52) and 

Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 55) are DENIED. 

 Dated this 6th day of November, 2014. 

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