Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02080/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2080

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Larry Ball; Steven Baltzley; *

Vincent A. Bejarano, Named as: *

Vincent Berjarano; Michael Bell; *

Larry Benz; Michael Bolten; Terry *

Boobyer; Dennis Brummett; Melvern *

Butts; Luther Carey; Marvin Cason; *

Robert A. Cerretti, Named as: Robert *

Cerretti; Michael D. Chance, Named *

as: Michael Chance; Michael L. *

Cosner, Named as Michael Cosner; *

James Couch; James Cruchelow; *

Kenneth Cruchelow; Larry E. Culver, * Appeal from the United States

Named as: Larry Culver; Robert * District Court for the Southern

Dale; Richard Dolan; Kevin Ensley; * District of Iowa.

John Flynn; Ronald Gilbert; James *

Griffin; Virgil Grimm; Kenneth * [PUBLISHED]

Hagen, Sr.; Harold B. Hathaway, *

Named as: Harold Hathaway; *

Michael Heinen; James Hook; *

Harvey Hunter, Sr.; Gary Jenkins; *

Richard Keeling; Thomas King; *

Ronald Leib; Gary D. Loomis, Named *

as: Gary Loomis; William Lynch; *

Daniel Maldonado; Michael Marquis; *

Robert E. McPherson, Named as: *

Robert McPherson; David McElvogue; *

Marcus Mireles; Gary Mobley; Dana *

Mongar; Clyde Parker; John Patton; *

James Praska; Lloyd Putney; Lee *

Reinholdt; Thomas Roach; Richard *

Shafer; Bruce Sheets; Donald Somers; *

Appellate Case: 04-2080 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/29/2005 Entry ID: 1934230
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Donald Van Hal; Joseph Vincent; *

Richard W. West, Named as: Richard *

West; Kevin White; Dennis V. *

Wicker, Named as: Dennis Wicker; *

Kareny Williamson, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

Maurice Taylor, Jr., *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: May 9, 2005

Filed: July 29, 2005

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Before BENTON, LAY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Maurice Taylor, Jr., a principal in Titan Tire Corporation, Titan Wheel

Corporation, and Titan International, Inc. (collectively Titan) held a press conference

and announced Titan was filing a RICO lawsuit against the United Steelworkers of

America, local unions, and about one hundred employees who had filed fraudulent

disability claims for hearing loss. Taylor announced, “You have a situation here in

Des Moines . . . when the strike started . . . over one hundred people filed disability

for their hearing. It was fraudulent.” Taylor handed out copies of the RICO lawsuit,

which specified the names, places of residence, and positions of the employees, and

which alleged the employees had committed mail fraud by sending their fraudulent

claims through the mail. A news article about the lawsuit appeared in the local paper,

but did not identify the employees. 

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Fifty-eight of the employees then filed this action in Iowa state court alleging

Taylor defamed them. Taylor removed the action to federal court and filed a motion

for summary judgment alleging the group defamation doctrine precluded the

employees’ lawsuit. Taylor argued the defamatory statements were directed at a

group rather than individual employees and the defamatory statements did not have

any particular application to any of the employees. The district court granted

summary judgment to Taylor, holding the employees could not prevail on their claims

as a matter of law. According to the district court, the group defamation doctrine

precluded recovery because Taylor had not verbally named the employees

individually at the press conference. The employees appeal, and we reverse and

remand. 

The employees contend the district court improperly granted summary

judgment based on the group defamation doctrine. Specifically, the employees argue

the Iowa Supreme Court has not adopted the doctrine, and even if it would, an

exception applies. The group defamation doctrine states that a plaintiff’s membership

in a defamed group does not give rise to an individual cause of action for defamation

unless, as relevant here, “the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the

conclusion that there is particular reference to the member.” Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 564A (1977). 

We need not predict whether the Iowa Supreme Court would adopt the doctrine

because we believe the quoted exception applies in this case, and thus the district

court improperly granted summary judgment based on the doctrine. In any event,

Iowa law, which the parties agree controls in this diversity action, see Midwest

Oilseeds, Inc. v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 387 F.3d 705, 711 (8th Cir. 2004), is

consistent with the doctrine’s exception and precludes summary judgment for Taylor.

To establish a prima facie case of defamation under Iowa law, the plaintiff must show

the defendant “(1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and

concerning the plaintiff.” Taggart v. Drake Univ., 549 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Iowa 1996).

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The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted the third element in a manner consistent

with the group defamation exception: Although defamatory words must refer to an

ascertainable person, the plaintiff need not be named “‘if the alleged libel contains

matters of description or other references therein, or the extraneous facts and

circumstances . . . show that plaintiff was intended to be the object of the alleged

libel, and was so understood by others.’” Wisner v. Nichols, 143 N.W. 1020, 1025

(Iowa 1913). 

Here, Taylor’s statements and actions at the press conference could reasonably

be understood to be of and concerning each employee. Although Taylor did not state

the employees names individually, he referred to them as a group, stated he was suing

them because they had committed fraud, then handed his audience copies of the

complaint, which identified the individual employees by name in the caption and

contained their names, addresses, and positions in an appendix. These circumstances

reasonably give rise to the conclusion that Taylor’s oral statement specifically

referenced each of the employees. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A;

Wisner, 143 N.W. at 1025. Unlike the situation in the case relied on by the district

court, those listening to Taylor could easily ascertain the identities of the group

members by simply glancing at the document handed to them. See Alexis v. District

of Columbia, 77 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 1999) (not clearly established for purpose

of qualified immunity that group of over one hundred terminated employees allegedly

defamed at press conference were sufficiently named and identified by posting of list

of their names on worksite door for security personnel). 

Because Taylor specifically referred to the employees at the press conference

by distributing the complaint containing their names, we reverse the grant of

summary judgment for Taylor. 

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