Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00023/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00023-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dale Gorney, a single man, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Board of Regents; Thomas P. 

Miller; Dan Nelson; Jacqueline Lee Mok; 

Allison Vaillancourt; Steve Husman, 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-00023-TUC-CKJ(HCE) 

ORDER 

 

 

 On July 10, 2013, Magistrate Judge Hector C. Estrada issued a Report and 

Recommendation, (Doc. 22), in which he recommended dismissing the Arizona Board of 

Regents from Plaintiff’s federal claims with prejudice, dismissing Counts One, Six and 

Seven of Plaintiff’s Complaint as untimely and dismissing Counts Two through Five 

without prejudice for failing to state a valid claim. Magistrate Judge Estrada further 

recommended denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings as moot. 

 Magistrate Judge Estrada advised the Parties that written objections to the Report 

and Recommendation were to be filed within fourteen days of service of a copy of the 

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b). Plaintiff has filed an 

objection. (Doc. 23). Defendants have filed a response. (Doc. 24). 

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I. Background1

In 2011, Plaintiff was employed with the University of Arizona. He alleges that 

from March 2011 through May 2011, he submitted three alleged wrongful conduct 

disclosures and one whistleblower complaint to the University of Arizona. Specifically, 

he alleges that he had information alleging wrongful conduct which evidenced a violation 

of law, mismanagement, and gross waste or misappropriation of public funds. He further 

alleged an abuse of authority to investigate alleged wrongful conduct by Steve Husman, 

the director of the University of Arizona, Tucson Area Agricultural Center. 

 Dr. Allison Vaillancourt, the Vice President of Human Resources, was assigned to 

investigate Plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful conduct. Dr. Vaillancourt forwarded 

Plaintiff’s disclosures to Thomas P. Miller, an Associate Provost for Faculty Affairs. 

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Miller acted in bad faith when he concluded that Plaintiff’s 

disclosures were illegitimate and did not warrant any investigation. 

 After reviewing Mr. Miller’s conclusions, Plaintiff requested a whistleblower 

review hearing. Dr. Vaillancourt reviewed Plaintiff’s request but ultimately agreed with 

Mr. Miller’s determination of Plaintiff’s disclosures. On May 17, 2011 Dr. Vaillancourt 

denied Plaintiff’s request for a whistleblower review hearing. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. 

Vaillancourt acted inappropriately in denying his request for a whistleblower review 

hearing due to her conflict of interest in the matter. 

 Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his disclosures, he was subjected to a retaliatory 

investigation on April 8, 2011 by Director Husman in connection with Plaintiff’s request 

for 18 hours of overtime compensation. During these 18 hours of overtime, Plaintiff 

worked on issues related to his disclosures. Director Husman denied Plaintiff’s overtime 

compensation and demanded that Plaintiff meet with him to discuss the specific job 

duties that required the use of 18 hours of overtime. Plaintiff refused to discuss his use of 

overtime with Director Husman and he received a written reprimand. Plaintiff was then 

 

1

 The background information is principally derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 1-2). The Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint for the purposes of resolving these motions. 

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placed on disciplinary probation, received a pre-discharge notice and was ultimately 

terminated from his employment on May 25, 2011. 

 Plaintiff alleges that his disclosures should have remained confidential pursuant to 

the University of Arizona whistleblower policy. Also, since his use of overtime was 

directly related to the filing of his disclosures, which were directly related to Director 

Husman’s conduct, he should not have been required to meet with Director Husman to 

discuss his use of overtime. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants including 

Jacqueline Lee Mok, the University of Arizona Investigation Officer for the President’s 

Office, failed to adhere to Arizona law by finding his disclosures illegitimate. 

Procedural History 

 On December 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Pima County Superior Court. 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his termination from employment at the University 

of Arizona was (1) in violation of state public policy; (2) a retaliatory discharge in 

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq.; (3) 

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; (4) a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) a violation of the Procedural Due Process 

rights of the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) a breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing; and (7) tortious interference with a contractual relationship. (Doc. 

1-2). Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks (1) reinstatement of employment; (2) a written 

employment contract; (3) back-pay; (4) loss of earnings; (5) general damages; and (6) 

punitive damages. 

 On January 10, 2013, Defendants filed a notice of removal in this Court. (Doc. 1). 

After removal, Defendants moved to dismiss this matter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6), arguing the Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may 

be granted. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff filed his response on January 18, 2013. (Doc. 7). On 

January 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Response to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. (Doc. 9). Defendants filed a Reply on February 1, 2013. (Doc. 11). On 

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February 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendants’ Reply in Support of 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 13). Then on February 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed an 

Amended Objection to Defendants’ Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. 14). 

 On February 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 

15). Defendants filed a Response on March 21, 2013. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff filed a Reply 

on March 27, 2013. Then, on May 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings. (Doc. 18). Defendants filed a Response on May 15, 2013. (Doc. 19). 

Plaintiff filed his Reply on May 22, 2013. (Doc. 20). On June 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed an 

Amended Reply in support of his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 21). 

 On July 10, 2013, Magistrate Judge Hector C. Estrada issued a Report and 

Recommendation. (Doc. 22). In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge 

Estrada recommended dismissing the Arizona Board of Regents from Plaintiff’s federal 

claims with prejudice, dismissing Counts One, Six and Seven of Plaintiff’s Complaint as 

untimely and dismissing Counts Two through Five as failing to state a claim with leave to 

amend. Magistrate Judge Estrada further recommended denying Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as moot. 

 Plaintiff filed Objections to Magistrate Judge Estrada’s Report and 

Recommendation on July 26, 2013. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff agrees with Magistrate Judge 

Estrada’s recommendation that his Complaint was insufficient and he does not object to 

Magistrate Judge Estrada’s recommendation that Counts Three through Five of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. 

 However, Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of Count Two of his Complaint 

alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”). 

Further, Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of the Arizona Board of Regents from his 

federal claims, the dismissal of his state claims as untimely, and the denial of his Motions 

for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendants have filed a 

response to Plaintiff’s objections. (Doc. 24). 

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II. Standard of Review 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), if a party makes a timely objection to a magistrate judge's 

recommendation, then this Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.” See also 

Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D.Ariz. 2003) (reading the Ninth 

Circuit's decision in Reyna-Tapia as adopting the view that district courts are not required 

to review “any issue that is not the subject of an objection”); United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003) (disregarding the standard of review employed by 

the district court when reviewing a report and recommendation to which no objections 

were made). 

Arizona Board of Regents 

Magistrate Judge Estrada concluded that Plaintiff’s federal claims against the 

Arizona Board of Regents (“the Board”), specifically Counts Two through Five, fail as a 

matter of law. Counts Three, Four and Five allege violations of Plaintiff’s rights pursuant 

to the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. These claims are brought pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638 (1980)(citing 42 U.S.C. 

§1983)(“Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ by any person acting 

‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or 

Territory.’”). 

 “The eleventh amendment bars suits in federal courts by private citizens against a 

state.” Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1981). The Board’s funds 

consist of state funds and it is treated as the State of Arizona pursuant to Arizona law. 

Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (abrogated on 

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other grounds Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985). A State is not 

a person against whom a §1983 claim for money damages may be asserted. Will v. 

Michigan Dept. of State Policy, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). As such, the 

Board possesses Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s §1983 claims. See 

Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988); see 

also Ansel Adams Publishing Rights Trust v. PRS Media Partners, LLC, 502 Fed. Appx. 

659, 660-661 (9th Cir. 2012)(the Board, as the governing body for Arizona’s public 

universities, is immune from federal law suits pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment). 

 Count Two alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. 

Congress has not abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity from FLSA law suits. See 

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999). Thus, the Eleventh 

Amendment protects the Board from suit under the FLSA absent a waiver of immunity. 

See Id. Plaintiff argues that the Board waived its immunity when it removed this action 

from state court to federal court. See Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of 

Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 616-617, 122 S.Ct. 1640 (2002)(holding that a State’s act of 

removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waives its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity from State based claims). 

 Two years after the Supreme Court decided Lapides, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals extended the ruling in Lapides to federal claims. Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 

566 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the Embury court noted that its holding did not apply to 

cases where Congress acted beyond its power over the States and had not validly 

abrogated the State’s immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment. Embury v. King, 361 

F.3d 562, 566, n.20 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, since Congress has not validly abrogated the 

States’ sovereign immunity on FLSA claims, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712, 119 

S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999), the Court finds that the Board did not waive its immunity on 

Plaintiff’s FLSA claim by removing this action to federal court. Accordingly, the Board 

is dismissed as to the federal claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

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State Claims – Statute of Limitations 

 When the statute of limitations forms the basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, the motion can only be granted “if the assertions of the complaint, read with 

the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” 

Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980); see also TwoRivers v. 

Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999). The complaint cannot be dismissed unless “it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the 

timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th 

Cir.1995). 

 Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute §12-821, claims against any public entity or 

public employee are subject to a one year statute of limitations.2

 Dube v. Likins, 216 

Ariz. 406, 416 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Plaintiff does not dispute that his state claims are 

subject to a one year statute of limitations. A cause of action against a public entity or 

public employee accrues “when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged 

and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or 

condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12–821.01(B). 

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim accrued when his employment was 

terminated on May 25, 2011. As such, Plaintiff was required to file suit against 

Defendants on or before May 25, 2012. Since Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed with the 

Pima County Superior Court on December 12, 2012, it was untimely. 

 Plaintiff does not dispute that he was terminated on May 25, 2011 or that he filed 

his Complaint on December 12, 2012. However, Plaintiff argues that pursuant to 

Ariz.R.Stat. §12-821.01(C), the statute of limitations is tolled pending the resolution of 

any administrative remedies. Plaintiff explains that after he was terminated, he appealed 

his termination pursuant to The University of Arizona policy 406.3

 On July 14, 2012, 

 

2

 The Defendants in this case consist of the Arizona Board of Regents, a public entity, and several public employees. 

3

 The University of Arizona Staff Dispute Resolution Procedures provide that “any 

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Plaintiff alleges that he received the final determination affirming his termination, thus 

concluding his administrative remedies. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that since his 

claim was filed within one year after July 14, 2012, it is timely. 

 Pursuant to Ariz.R.Stat. §12-821.01(C), “any claim that must be submitted to a 

binding or nonbinding dispute resolution process or an administrative claims process or 

review process pursuant to ... administrative or governmental rule or regulation or 

contractual term shall not accrue for the purposes of this section until all such procedures, 

processes, or remedies have been exhausted.” Ariz.R.Stat. §12-821.01(C)(emphasis 

added). 

 Thus, A.R.S. §12-821.01(C) applies only if Plaintiff was required to exhaust the 

administrative remedies provided by UA Policy 406.0 before seeking relief in the courts. 

See Kosman v. State, 199 Ariz. 184, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). Defendants argue that the 

use of the word “may” in the University of Arizona Staff Dispute Resolution Procedure 

makes it permissive rather than mandatory. See Walters v. Maricopa County, 195 Ariz. 

476, 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). As such, it is not subject to §12-821.01(C) tolling. 

Magistrate Judge Estrada agreed with Defendants and recommended dismissing Counts 

One, Six and Seven as untimely. However, Plaintiff argues that even if the statute of 

limitations was not tolled pursuant to §12-821.01(C), his claim is subject to equitable 

tolling. Magistrate Judge Estrada did not address the issue of equitable tolling in his 

Report and Recommendation. 

 The doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized in Arizona. McCloud v. State, Ariz. 

Dept. of Public Safety, 217 Ariz. 82, 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). The Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals has applied the doctrine of equitable tolling when there is a lack of clarity in 

the law. Capital Tracing, Inc. v. United States, 63 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1995). In 

 classified employee may file a dispute resolution request where the action complained about involves a violation of public policy such as retaliatory action for making a good- faith disclosure of alleged wrongful conduct to a public body or to the designated University official.” (Doc. 11, Staff Dispute Resolution Procedure, UA Policy 406.0 at 1)(emphasis added). 

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Walters, the court held that the use of the word “may” in A.R.S. §38-532(H)4 rendered 

use of the administrative remedies permissive and did not require a complaint to such a 

board prior to filing a civil action pursuant to §23-1501. Walters v. Maricopa County, 

195 Ariz. 476, 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 

 Plaintiff has brought his wrongful termination claim pursuant to §23-1501. As 

such, it appears that Defendants may be correct that the use of the word “may” in the 

University of Arizona Staff Dispute Resolution Procedure 406.0 made it a permissive 

administrative remedy and not mandatory as required for the §12-821.01(C) tolling 

provision. 

 However, Walters did not address the procedures set forth in the University of 

Arizona Dispute Resolution Procedure 406.0. See Walters v. Maricopa County, 195 

Ariz. 476 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). Further, “Arizona case law solidly supports the ... 

argument that the presence of the word “may” in an administrative procedure does not 

necessarily render the procedure permissive.” Mullenaux v. Graham County, 207 Ariz. 1, 

5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)(holding that use of the word “may” in A.R.S. §11-356(B) did not 

render administrative review permissive and required a former employee to comply with 

the county grievance procedures prior to filing a civil suit). Additionally, there are 

several courts in Arizona that have interpreted the word “may” in an administrative 

procedure to refer to the option for review as opposed to making the use of the statute 

itself optional. See Id. 

 Further, the doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied in situations analogous 

to the present case. In Kosman v. State, 199 Ariz. 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), the Arizona 

Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to a pro se prisoner who failed 

to timely file a notice of claim against the State because he first pursued his claim 

 

4

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through the prison’s permissive administrative grievance procedure. Kosman v. State, 

199 Ariz. 184, 186-187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). The court in Kosman determined that 

plaintiff’s tort claim did not require submission to the prison’s grievance system, and thus 

was not subject to tolling pursuant to §12-821.01(C). However, the Court held that if 

plaintiff’s assumption that exhaustion of administrative remedies was required was 

reasonable then his failure to timely file his notice of claim was excusable and is subject 

to equitable tolling. Id. 

 The Court finds that the doctrine of equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. 

After a review of the case law in conjunction with the factual issues in this case, the 

Court concludes that there is a lack of clarity in the law regarding whether use of the 

word “may” in UA Policy 406.0 renders those procedures permissive, and it was 

reasonable for the pro se Plaintiff to assume that he was required to complete the 

administrative review process pursuant to the University of Arizona Dispute Resolution 

Procedure 406.0 prior to filing a civil action. Thus, his failure to timely file his claim was 

excusable. Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, the administrative review process 

concluded on July 14, 2011. Since Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed within one year of 

July 14, 2011, it is timely. Accordingly, the Court rejects that portion of Magistrate 

Judge Estrada’s Report and Recommendation that recommended dismissing Counts One, 

Six and Seven as untimely. 

Failure to State a Claim 

Count One – Wrongful Termination 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated in violation of 

A.R.S. §23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). Pursuant to Arizona Employment Protection Act, A.R.S. § 

23–1501(3)(c) (Supp.2006) (“AEPA”), an employee may bring a claim 

for wrongful termination if the employer terminated the employment relationship in 

violation of public policy. The AEPA enumerates the public policy violations that 

support a wrongful termination action in Arizona. See A.R.S. §23-1501. Plaintiff alleges 

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that his wrongful termination claim is supported by A.R.S. §23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), which 

provides: 

[t]he disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that 

the employee has information or a reasonable belief that the 

employer, or an employee of the employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the 

statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of the employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial or supervisory position and has the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations of the Constitution of 

Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a public body or political subdivision. 

 A.R.S. §23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii). Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in 

retaliation for filing four disclosures. However, Plaintiff does not identify the contents of 

his disclosures. Plaintiff only makes one reference to the contents of his second 

disclosure. According to Plaintiff, his second disclosure related to a violation of federal 

law, the FLSA. However, there is no statutory public policy exception for whistleblowing 

associated with federal regulations. See Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 

290, 294 (Ariz. Ct. of App. 2003)(holding that §23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii) does not support a 

claim for wrongful discharge based on a whistleblower disclosure related to federal law). 

 As such, A.R.S. §23-1501 does not support Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful 

termination based on his disclosures related to a violation of federal law. Further, since 

the Complaint does not identify the contents of Plaintiff’s other disclosures nor does it 

specify whether any of his disclosures were related to a violation of Arizona State law, 

Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 

Count Two - FLSA 

 In Count Two Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in violation 

of the FLSA. Pursuant to the Act’s anti-retaliation provision, it is unlawful for an 

employer to discharge an employee because the employee “caused to be instituted any 

proceeding” related to the assertion of wage rights or “filed any complaint”, regarding 

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wage rights. 29 U.S.C § 215(a)(3). 

 In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to the FLSA, 

Plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse 

employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between his activity and the 

employment decision. Cf. Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 

1185, 1196-1197 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 In order for a claim to “fall within the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, a 

complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand 

it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute 

and a call for their protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., -- 

U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011). Magistrate Judge Estrada found that Plaintiff failed 

to allege that he placed his employers on notice that he was making a complaint pursuant 

to the FLSA. However, the Court disagrees with Magistrate Judge Estrada’s conclusions. 

 Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that on April 17, 2011, he submitted a disclosure 

of wrongful conduct to Thomas P. Miller. This disclosure alleged an abuse of authority, 

mismanagement, and a violation of law against Director Husman related to his failure to 

compensate Plaintiff for the 18 hours of overtime he accumulated.5

 Plaintiff further 

alleged that in his opinion that was a violation of the FLSA. Accepting Plaintiff’s 

assertion of facts related to his April 17, 2011 disclosure as true, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff sufficiently placed his employer on notice that he was filing a complaint related 

to his rights pursuant to the FLSA. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 

Corp., -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011). 

 As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was engaged in protected activity 

by filing a complaint related to his overtime compensation. Since Plaintiff alleges that he 

was terminated from employment, he has also sufficiently alleged that he suffered an 

 

5

 According to §207(a)(2)(C) of the FLSA, any employee that works in addition to 

40 hours in one week is entitled to compensation for his employment in excess of 40 hours at a “rate not less than one and one half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(2)(C). 

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adverse employment action. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege 

or provide any factual allegations to demonstrate that his termination was linked to the 

filing of his complaint related to his overtime compensation. 

A reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to allege that Director Husman initiated 

a retaliatory investigation against Plaintiff for filing a whistleblower complaint against 

him. Plaintiff has not indicated in his Complaint the contents of his whistleblower 

complaint or even alleged that it was related to wage rights.6

 As such, his Complaint fails 

to sufficiently allege that he was retaliated against by Director Husman as a result of a 

complaint related to wage rights when Director Husman began investigating Plaintiff’s 

use of overtime. 

 Plaintiff acknowledges that he refused to meet with Director Husman to discuss 

his use of overtime and as a result he was terminated for insubordination. Plaintiff asserts 

in conclusory form that he was terminated by Director Husman as a result of his filing. 

However, Plaintiff does not allege that Director Husman was even aware of his filing, 

which related to wage issues, at the time he was terminated or that Director Husman or 

any other Defendant retaliated against him by terminating his employment due to his 

filing related to wage issues.7

 

 Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege how the actions of the other Defendants 

correlated to Director Husman’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment allegedly in 

retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of a complaint related to his wage issues. Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is conclusory and there are no factual assertions alleged in Plaintiff’s 

 

6

 Plaintiff attached as Exhibit D to his Objections to the Report and Recommendation a copy of his email related to his whistleblower complaint. His complaint appears to relate to Director Husman’s refusal to share the work schedules of 

Plaintiff’s co-workers with Plaintiff that Plaintiff alleged were being compensated for a full 40 hour week when they were not working a full 40 hours. In response Defendant Thomas P. Miller asserted that his allegations that his supervisor refused to share the 

work schedules of his co-workers with Plaintiff rose to the level of a matter of public concern warranting whistleblower protection. (Doc. 23-4). 

7

 Moreover, Plaintiff specifically alleges that he was terminated for insubordination for failing to meet with Director Husman to discuss his use of overtime. 

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Complaint to support Plaintiff’s claim that he was retaliated against in violation of the 

Fair Labor Standards Act. However, since it is possible that Plaintiff can amend this 

claim, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend. 

Counts Three to Five – First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims 

Magistrate Judge Estrada’s Report and Recommendation recommended 

dismissing Counts Three through Five of Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a valid 

claim. However, Magistrate Judge Estrada also recommended granting Plaintiff leave to 

file an amended complaint. Plaintiff has not objected to Magistrate Judge Estrada’s 

recommendation related to Counts Three through Five and has conceded that his 

Complaint was insufficient in certain respects. Further, Defendants have not objected to 

granting Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. As such, the Court adopts the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation regarding Counts Three through Five of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. 

Count Six – Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith 

 In Count Six Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing. Pursuant to Arizona law, an employment relationship is contractual in 

nature. A.R.S. §23-1501(A)(1). “The law implies a covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing in every contract.” McAlister v. Citibank (Arizona), a Subsidiary of Citicorp, 171 

Ariz. 207, 213 (Ariz. Ct. of App. 1992). “This implied covenant prevents either party 

from acting to ‘impair the right of the other [to] receive the benefits which flow from 

their agreement’” Id. quoting Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 153 (Ariz. 1986). 

While this implied covenant is normally remedied by an action on contract, it can also 

provide the basis for imposing tort damages. McAlister v. Citibank (Arizona), a 

Subsidiary of Citicorp, 171 Ariz. 207, 213 (Ariz. Ct. of App. 1992). The contract at issue 

in the case at bar is Plaintiff’s at-will employment contract with the University of 

Arizona. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a tortious breach of the implied covenant of 

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good faith and fair dealing related to that contract. 

 However, in Arizona, a “tortious ‘bad faith’ cause of action arising out of a breach 

of an employment agreement, when no public policy is violated, is prohibited.” Harris v. 

Superior Court of Arizona ex rel, County of Maricopa, 278 Fed. Appx. 719, 721 (9th Cir. 

2008) citing Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 181 Ariz. 188, 198 (Ariz. Ct. of App. 1994). 

Since the Court has already determined that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that he 

was terminated as retaliation for filing a complaint in violation of Arizona public policy, 

his cause of action for tortious bad faith in prohibited. See Id. Further, Plaintiff has 

alleged that he was terminated from his employment for insubordination based on his 

failure to discuss his use of overtime with Director Husman. Assuming the allegations in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint are true, it appears he was fired for cause. As such, Count Six is 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

Count Seven - Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relationship 

 In Count Seven Plaintiff alleges that Defendant interfered with his contractual 

relationship with the University of Arizona. “Tort liability may be imposed upon a 

defendant who intentionally and improperly interferes with the plaintiff's rights under a 

contract with another if the interference causes the plaintiff to lose a right under the 

contract.” Snow v. Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Ariz. 27, 730 P.2d 204, 211 

(Ariz.1986) (internal citations omitted). The five elements of the tort of interference with 

an employment contract are: (1) the existence of a contractual relationship or business 

expectancy between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge that the 

contract exists; (3) defendant’s intentional interference with the contract, which causes 

the third party to breach the contract; (4) defendant acted improperly; and (5) damage 

resulted to the plaintiff. Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Cas., 843 F.2d 359, 366 (9th Cir. 1988) 

citing Antwerp Diamond Exch. V. Better Business Bureau of Maricopa County, 130 Ariz. 

523, 530, 637 P.2d 733, 739-40 (1981) (for the first four elements); Wagenseller v. 

Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985). 

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 Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to adhere to University of Arizona 

policies and as a result they interfered with his contractual relationship with the 

University of Arizona. Plaintiff concludes without factual support that the Defendants 

colluded with each other to condone Plaintiff’s termination. He alleges that the 

Defendants falsified his time records, interfered with his disclosures and denied him 

confidentiality during his disclosure investigations. While Plaintiff alleges the 

Defendants falsified his time records, he does not allege anywhere in his Complaint that 

the falsification of his time records resulted in his termination. 

 There is no allegation in his Complaint that Director Husman terminated Plaintiff 

due to the actions of the other four Defendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint is clear that he was 

terminated due to his own actions in refusing to discuss his use of overtime with Director 

Husman. Regardless of whether Plaintiff was entitled to whistleblower protection related 

to his initial disclosure regarding Director Husman or not, the fact that his plea for 

whistleblower protection was denied does not establish that the Defendants intentionally 

interfered with his contract. There is nothing in the Complaint to establish that the 

Defendants did anything other than act within the scope of their authority in assessing 

Plaintiff’s disclosures and making a determination that the Defendant disagreed with. 

 Since the Defendants are all employees of the University of Arizona and according 

to the Complaint were acting within the scope of their authority in assessing Plaintiff’s 

disclosures, Defendants cannot be liable for interfering with Plaintiff’s contractual 

relationship. See Barrow v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 158 Ariz. 71, 78, 761 (Ariz, Ct. of App. 

1988) (an individual defendant that acts within the scope of his authority for Defendant’s 

employer, could not interfere with their own contract). 

 As drafted, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a claim of tortious interference 

with a contractual relationship. However, since Plaintiff may be able to sufficiently 

amend his Complaint, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. 

Leave to Amend 

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 Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint consistent with 

the terms of this Order. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that 

it is the AFirst Amended Complaint.@ The first amended complaint must be retyped or 

rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by 

reference. Additionally Plaintiff’s complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. 

 Plaintiff’s initial Complaint contained numbered sections. However, the sentences 

are disjointed, which makes it difficult to read and each section contains multiple 

allegations. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint must set forth all his claims in numbered 

paragraphs that should be limited to a single set of circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 

"Each claim . . . shall be stated in a separate count . . . whenever a separation facilitates 

the clear presentation of the matters set forth." Id. Failure to set forth claims in such 

a manner places the onus on the court to decipher which, if any, facts support which 

claims, as well as to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. Haynes 

v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F.Supp. 1303 (D.C.Va. 1981). Enforcement of this 

rule is discretionary with the Court, but such enforcement is appropriate where it is 

necessary to facilitate a clear presentation of the claims. See, Benoit v. Ocwen Financial 

Corp., Inc., 960 F.Supp. 287 (S.D.Fla. 1997), affirmed 162 F.3d 1177 (compliance with 

rule required where allegations were so confusing and conclusory, claims were 

commingled, and impossible to determine nature of claims). 

 Further, Plaintiff is reminded that conclusory allegations are not facts and he must 

plead actual facts that raise his right to relief above the speculative level. Papasan v. 

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Additionally, Plaintiff must allege that he suffered a 

specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-372, 377 (1976). 

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 Finally, Plaintiff is reminded that a first amended complaint supersedes the 

original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach 

Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After 

amendment, the Court will treat his original complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d 

at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original complaint is waived if it is 

not raised in a first amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

Summary Judgment Motion and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

 On February 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 

One, Two, Six and Seven. (Doc. 15). Then, on May 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion 

for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 18). However, in light of the Court’s dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend, his Motion for Summary Judgment and his 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings are denied. 

 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. The Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 22), is ADOPTED IN PART, 

MODIFIED IN PART, and REJECTED IN PART. 

 2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 3) is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. 

 3. Defendant Arizona Board of Regents is dismissed from the federal claims, 

Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five of Plaintiff’s Complaint, with prejudice. 

 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is 

granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint on or before October 24, 2013 consistent 

with the terms of this Order. 

 5. If Plaintiff fails to file a First Amended Complaint on or before October 24, 

2013, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment dismissing this 

case with prejudice. 

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 6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 15), is DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

 7. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 18), is DENIED 

AS MOOT. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2013. 

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