Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04971/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04971-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

`

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD DOUGLAS BONE, 

Petitioner,

 v.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent. ____________________________

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No. C 01-4971 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show

cause why the petition should not be granted based on the cognizable claims in the petition,

specifically, the third, seventh and eighth claims. Thereafter, the Court granted respondent’s

motion to dismiss, on the ground the eighth claim, alleging a violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause, was not exhausted. Petitioner was granted leave to file an amended petition

with the Double Jeopardy claim deleted, which he did, and the matter was stayed while he

exhausted that claim. The Court thereafter granted petitioner leave to file a Second Amended

Petition, and ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted based

on the Double Jeopardy claim set forth in the Second Amended Petition and the two

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The First Amended Petition alleged the third and seventh claims from the original petition;

the Second Amended Petition alleged only the Double Jeopardy claim. The Second Amended

Petition was deemed an amendment to the First Amended Petition, as it was clear petitioner intended

to proceed on all three cognizable claims. Except as otherwise noted, the First and Second Amended

Petitions are referred to collectively herein as the “petition.” 

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cognizable claims set forth in the First Amended Petition.1 Respondent has filed an answer

and a supporting memorandum of points and authorities, and has lodged exhibits with the

Court. Petitioner has filed a traverse. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By an information filed August 10, 1998, petitioner was charged in Santa Clara

County Superior Court with one count of aggravated sexual assault upon a child in violation

of California Penal Code § 269. A motion to dismiss pursuant to California Penal Code

§ 995 was filed on September 29, 1998. On September 30, 1998, petitioner waived his right

to a jury trial, agreed to a court trial, and waived his confrontation rights to the extent of

allowing the child’s videotaped testimony from the preliminary hearing to be presented at

trial in lieu of her live testimony. The following day, October 1, 1998, petitioner agreed to a

plea bargain, pursuant to which the original charge was dismissed in exchange for

petitioner’s guilty plea to an amended information alleging one count of continuous sexual

abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code § 288.5 and four counts of lewd and lascivious

conduct upon a child in violation of Penal Code § 288(a) (Counts 2-6, respectively). 

Petitioner subsequently retained new counsel and, on January 4, 1999, filed a motion

to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds he had not received effective assistance of counsel

and the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, at

which petitioner testified; the trial court thereafter denied the motion, finding the plea

knowing and voluntary and the representation adequate. On February 26, 1999, the trial

court sentenced petitioner to a term of 24 years in state prison (16 years on Count 2 and four

consecutive two-year terms on Counts 3 through 6). A ten thousand dollar restitution fine

was imposed, and a second such fine was suspended. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal; he also filed therein

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a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and subsequently denied the petition. The

California Supreme Court denied petitions for review of the Court of Appeal’s decisions. A

subsequent habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court likewise was denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are taken from the opinion of

the California Court of Appeal: 

Victim, who was born on January 16, 1991, is defendant’s

adopted daughter. At the preliminary hearing, Victim testified that over

the course of three to four years, starting when she was four years old,

defendant had molested her “a lot of times.” Over that period of time,

defendant touched Victim’s vagina four to seven times, licked her

vagina, put his penis in her mouth and vagina, and opened her butt and

put his finger in. Defendant also made Victim touch and lick his penis. 

Defendant ejaculated once in Victim’s mouth. When defendant put his

penis in Victim’s vagina, it hurt Victim “a little bit.” Defendant also

dressed up Victim in black clothes to reveal her butt, videotaped

Victim’s butt, and showed pornographic movies and magazines to

Victim. The molestation occurred at the family residence, usually in

defendant’s bedroom and Victim’s bathroom. Once, defendant did it at

a Motel 6. 

Defendant admitted to his social worker that he had sexually

molested Victim 20 to 30 times starting shortly after her fifth birthday. 

Defendant also confessed to Sergeant Zaragoza on March 19, 1998, that

he had sexually molested Victim during the course of approximately

three years. In his confession to Zaragoza, defendant stated he had

touched Victim’s vagina “20 or 30" times, beginning when Victim was

“about 4 years old, just becoming a child. Not a baby anymore.” 

Defendant masturbated his penis between Victim’s legs, close to her

vagina, “rubb[ing] it very closely on . . . just the outer, the outer part” of

her vagina. He orally copulated her vagina and had her lick his penis a

dozen times or more. When defendant was aroused, he ejaculated on

Victim’s body. Defendant used hair lotion as a lubricant. On March 18,

1998, the day before his arrest, defendant rubbed his penis against the

outer part of Victim’s vagina. This was at approximately 8:00 p.m.,

after Victim had finished her bath.

Defendant’s confession to Zaragoza was stipulated to by the

parties during the preliminary hearing, introduced into evidence, and

made part of the record.

People v. Bone, No. H019966, slip op. 1, 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2000) (“Slip Op.”)

(attached as Resp. Ex. F). 

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The initial petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Consequently, the provisions of

AEDPA are applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Under AEDPA, a

district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis

of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d).

B. Issues Presented

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first claim, petitioner states: “I was denied constitutional rights to effective

assistance of counsel AND unvoluntary [sic] and uninformed acceptance of plea.” (emphasis

in original). For a petitioner who pleads guilty in state court, the only challenges available to

be pleaded in a federal habeas petition are with respect to the voluntary and intelligent

character of the plea and the advice of counsel to enter such plea. See Tollett v. Henderson,

411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). Moreover,

where, as here, the petitioner pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel, he may only attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of that plea by showing the advice he received from

counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 

See id. To succeed on such a claim, a petitioner must satisfy the two-part standard of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), i.e., that his counsel's advice to plead

guilty constituted deficient performance, and that such deficient performance prejudiced his

defense. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59. 

Petitioner claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance, in that he advised

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The only consequence specifically referenced in the excerpts concerns the parole term, in

particular, an instance when the trial court, while informing petitioner that he would be subject to up

to four years of parole at the end of his sentence, stated that a violation of parole would return him to

prison “like a probation violation.” See Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) (attached as Respt. Ex. B, Vol.

1) at 7. Petitioner appears to be arguing that his counsel should have advised him this analogy

rendered his plea involuntary and uninformed, and therefore not to enter it. The trial court’s analogy

did not undermine the clear warning the trial court had given to petitioner that he would incur up to 

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petitioner to enter a guilty plea despite the fact such plea was involuntary and uninformed. 

The waiver of the constitutional rights to a trial and to a jury “not only must be voluntary but

must also be knowing and intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant

circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 

The defendant must also have an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. See

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Here, the record of the change-of-plea

proceeding demonstrates that the trial judge explained to petitioner each of the five counts to

which petitioner indicated his intention to plead guilty. The record further reflects

petitioner’s express representation to the trial court that he understood the charges, that he

had discussed them with his attorney, and that the elements of each of the counts had been

explained to him. Petitioner also stated he understood that if he pled guilty he would be

subject to a prison sentence of between 16 and 24 years, an additional parole term of up to

four years, a restitution fine of $200 to $10,000, an additional general restitution fine, sex

offender registration requirements, submission of blood and saliva samples, and potential

deportation. Petitioner further stated that no one had made any contrary representations to

him, that he was entering his plea “freely and voluntarily,” that he had not been threatened or

coerced, and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol or suffering from any

mental illness. 

In his petition, petitioner does not explain how his plea was not knowing and

voluntary. Rather, he provides a series of short excerpts from the transcript of the hearing on

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which hearing was held approximately four months

after that plea was entered. Petitioner’s purpose in submitting these excerpts apparently is to

show that, contrary to the statements he made on the record prior to entering his guilty plea,

he actually was confused, did not understand all of the consequences of the plea,2

 and needed

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four years of “parole” as a consequence of his plea, and that a violation of “parole” would subject

him to additional time in prison. Id. The record includes petitioner’s unequivocal statement that he

understood this consequence of his plea, as well as the other direct consequences of which the trial

court informed him, including the prison term, restitution fines, other fines, sex offender registration

requirements, blood and saliva sample requirements, and potential deportation. See id. at 6-10. As a

result, counsel did not have a reason to advise petitioner that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.

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more time to think. The record of the change-of-plea proceeding contains no indication of

any confusion, hesitation or lack of understanding on the part of petitioner, however. 

Petitioner’s statements that he understood the various consequences of the plea, that he

understood all the charges he faced, and that he was acting freely and voluntarily, were

consistently unequivocal and unqualified. Moreover, prior to accepting petitioner’s plea, the

trial court had recessed the proceedings overnight to allow petitioner time to contemplate

whether he wanted to enter a guilty plea pursuant to the plea bargain offered. Further, to

whatever extent petitioner harbored any confusion about his plea, he does not assert that he

ever informed his attorney of any such confusion, or that counsel had any other reason to

suspect his client was confused. Petitioner’s counsel has supplied a declaration stating he

discussed the plea with petitioner, and that to his knowledge, petitioner understood the

charges against him and the consequences of his guilty plea, in accordance with petitioner’s

statements at the change-of-plea hearing. See Respt. Ex. O ¶¶ 5-8. Petitioner’s unequivocal

statements to this effect at the hearing constitute more than a sufficient basis for counsel’s

belief that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Under such circumstances, counsel cannot

be found to have been deficient on the claimed basis of his having advised petitioner to enter

an uninformed and involuntary guilty plea. 

Petitioner next contends his counsel was ineffective because he advised petitioner to

plead guilty instead of pursuing a motion to dismiss the initial charge against him and a

motion to suppress his confession. Petitioner’s counsel filed the motion to dismiss on

September 29, 1998. The trial court never ruled on the motion, however, because the next

day, September 30, 1998, the parties notified the court they had reached a plea agreement. 

The trial court then recessed proceedings until the following day, October 1, 1998, at which

time petitioner entered the guilty plea. In his declaration filed herein, as well as in a letter

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As noted, the motion to dismiss was made pursuant to Penal Code § 995; it was based on the

contention that the testimony at the preliminary hearing was insufficient as a matter of state law to

sustain the charge. See Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 48-53 (attached as Respt. Ex. A). That

argument subsequently was raised on appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which found the

preliminary hearing transcript provided a sufficient factual basis for the plea under state law, a

decision binding on this Court. See Resp. Ex. F; see also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 &

n.3 (1988) (holding interpretation of state law by state court, including interpretation announced by

intermediate appellate court, binds federal court in habeas proceedings).

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In his state habeas petitions, petitioner also argued that the confession could have been

suppressed based on a failure to notify petitioner that he had the right as a Canadian national to

contact his consulate under the Vienna Convention. It is highly unlikely that the confession would

have been suppressed on that basis. See United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding failure to inform defendant of right to notification of consulate

under Vienna Convention does not require exclusion in criminal prosecution of evidence obtained as

result of post-arrest interrogation).

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written to petitioner’s appellate attorney, petitioner’s trial counsel explains that he did not

await a ruling on the motion to dismiss because the trial judge indicated during settlement

discussions that the motion would not be granted. See Respt. Ex. O ¶ 9; see also Ex D to

Respt. Ex. I. Petitioner does not dispute this statement by defense counsel, nor does he

suggest any additional or different arguments defense counsel should have made to ensure

the motion’s success.3

 Consequently, petitioner has not shown counsel acted unreasonably in

advising petitioner to accept the plea agreement rather than pursuing the motion to dismiss. 

With respect to the motion to suppress, although petitioner, in the instant petition, fails

to identify a basis for such motion, in his state habeas petitions, petitioner argued the

confession would have been suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

Under Miranda , a suspect has the right to have counsel present during a custodial

interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). When a suspect expresses a

desire to have counsel present at the interrogation, he may not be subjected to further

interrogation by the authorities until counsel is made available to him. Id. at 484-85 (citing

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). Interrogation consists of words or actions on the part of a police

officer that the officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980). The remedy for a violation of a suspect’s

Miranda rights is suppression, at the subsequent trial, of any such incriminating responses. 

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479;4

 see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 480 (finding Fifth Amendment

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The facts surrounding the questioning of petitioner as set forth in Zaragoza’s report, which is

attached to petitioner’s state habeas petition, see Ex. G to Respt. Ex. I, are not disputed by either

party.

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Although a police officer may continue an interrogation if the request for an attorney is

ambiguous, see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459-62 (1994), Zaragoza’s characterization of

petitioner’s request does not suggest any ambiguity. Moreover, the fact that Zaragoza advised

petitioner of his Miranda rights at a later stage of the interview, when the taped confession began,

does not serve to cure the violation. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding provision of Miranda warnings at beginning of interrogation of no consequence where

petitioner asked to speak to attorney prior to such admonition and questioning). 

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violations where trial court admitted confession obtained after request for counsel). 

In the instant case, according to Zaragoza’s police report5

, petitioner was placed under

arrest and, while Zaragoza was retrieving a form for admonishing petitioner of his Miranda

rights, petitioner “opted for the choice of wishing to speak to a lawyer rather than discussing

the case with this investigator.” See Ex. G to Respt. Ex. I at 1-2. Zaragoza did not

discontinue the interrogation at that point, however. Instead, according to Zaragoza’s report,

when petitioner made this request for counsel, Zaragoza “mentioned to [petitioner] that this

might be the only chance that [Zaragoza], as a police officer would have to speak with him

and that there were always two sides to every story and this may be the only chance that he

would have to explain his side of the story.” Id. Zaragoza’s remarks were both intended to,

and reasonably likely to, elicit an incriminating response from petitioner and, consequently,

were in violation of petitioner’s rights under Miranda and Edwards.

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Nevertheless, counsel here had a reasonable tactical basis for recommending that

petitioner accept the plea bargain rather than pursuing a motion to suppress. As counsel

states in a declaration filed herein, and petitioner does not dispute, the prosecutor informed

counsel that if a motion to suppress the confession were filed, the prosecution would

withdraw its offer. See Respt. Ex. O ¶ 13. Consequently, pursuing the motion to suppress

would have meant going to trial, and, even with the confession suppressed, there were

numerous considerations that made the prospect of going to trial in this case a very bad idea

from petitioner’s standpoint. At trial, the prosecutor would have proved the charge of child

molestation by using the victim’s testimony. Petitioner would have had few options for

refuting this evidence. He would not have been able to cross-examine her during the trial,

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Petitioner had expressed a strong desire to spare his daughter the trauma of going through a

trial. RT at 46; Respt. Ex. O ¶ 11.

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The evidence against petitioner included not only the victim’s testimony but also a videotape

showing petitioner using a doll to teach her about having sex. See Respt. Ex. O ¶ 10.

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At the hearing on petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial judge similarly

assessed the case against petitioner:

And I was aware of the strength of the People’s case, obviously. I saw the

video tape of the testimony of the victim, because that was, in fact, part and parcel of

the 995. And counsel asked if I would view that, and I did. I was aware of the fact

that he confessed. I was aware of the fact that there was really no trial issue for the

defense, unless there is something that you are aware of that I’m not. 

RT at 60.

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because he had agreed to allow her videotaped preliminary hearing testimony to be used in

lieu of her live testimony.7

 Under such circumstances, petitioner would have been left with

little choice but to take the stand himself. Had petitioner testified, however, the prosecution

would have been allowed to introduce his confession for purposes of impeachment. See

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (holding statements taken in violation of

Miranda may be used to impeach defendant's credibility even though inadmissible to prove

guilt in prosecution’s case-in-chief). Thus, even if the suppression motion had succeeded,

there is a strong likelihood the confession nonetheless would have been admitted in evidence

had the case gone to trial. 

Other considerations also militated against petitioner’s going to trial in this case. 

Petitioner faced a life sentence if convicted at trial. The evidence against him, as described

in defense counsel’s declaration, was “very strong”8

 and “would have substantiated at least

30 or more counts of sexual molestation and oral copulation on a child under seven years of

age.” See Respt. Ex. O ¶ 10.9

 As defense counsel states, if the motion to dismiss were

successful, the prosecutor intended to re-file the information to add numerous additional

charges based on the additional acts of sexual molestation described in the victim’s

statement; the trial court also noted that the prosecutor had given such indication. See id. ¶ 9;

RT at 11-12, 56-57. Presumably, the prosecutor likewise would have been inclined to add

these charges if the case had proceeded to trial following a motion to suppress. Finally,

defense counsel states, and petitioner does not dispute, that he discussed the foregoing facts

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10Because the Court has determined counsel’s representation was not deficient, it need not

address whether petitioner suffered prejudice therefrom. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732,

737 (9th Cir. 1998). 

11In his traverse, in discussing the “defective” plea, petitioner further states he “received more

than he bargained for” because he was assessed a restitution fine of $10,000 pursuant to California

Penal Code § 1202.4. Petitioner also references therein the first claim from his original petition, in

which he alleged he “was not advised of the $10,000 restitution fine.” The Court dismissed that

claim upon initial review because it appeared to raise an issue arising prior to entry of the guilty plea. 

See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (holding guilty plea forecloses consideration of

pre-plea violations). To whatever extent this claim did not raise a pre-plea error barred by Haring, it

is clear from the record that the claim has no merit. Prior to entering his guilty plea, petitioner was

advised by the trial court that he would be ordered to pay a restitution fine of up to $10,000, plus a

possible additional restitution amount. See RT at 7. Petitioner stated that he understood. See id.

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and tactical considerations with petitioner, and petitioner agreed to proceed with the plea

bargain instead of pursuing the motions to dismiss and suppress. See id. ¶¶ 9, 13-14. Indeed,

at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, petitioner confirmed that he believed the

case against him was strong, and that he knew he risked a life sentence if he did not accept

the prosecution’s offer. See RT at 32, 46. In light of the foregoing tactical considerations,

defense counsel’s decision to recommend that petitioner accept the plea agreement instead of

pursuing the motion to suppress was reasonable. 

In sum, under the circumstances presented, defense counsel’s advice to petitioner to

enter a guilty plea pursuant to the plea bargain offered by the prosecution fell well within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Consequently, the claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel fails.10

2. “Defective” Plea

Petitioner also claims that his plea was “defective on its face.” As explained above,

because petitioner pled guilty pursuant to the advice of counsel, the only challenge to his

conviction available to him on federal habeas review is that he received ineffective assistance

in connection with that advice. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56; Tollett v. Henderson,

411 U.S. at 267. The Court cannot discern the basis of this claim because petitioner simply

lists a series of short excerpts from the transcript of the hearing on his motion to withdraw

the plea. The significance of these excerpts is unexplained.11 To the extent petitioner bases

this claim on something other than counsel’s asserted deficiencies or double jeopardy, the

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12After the prosecutor, in petitioner’s presence, set forth the above-described dates for Counts

2 through 6 and the trial court ordered the information so amended, the trial court stated the new

charges to petitioner. RT at 3-5. In so doing, the trial court erroneously described Count 3 as

“alleged to have been committed on and between January 1, 1995, and June 1, 1996.” RT at 4-5. 

This inadvertent misstatement is immaterial for purposes of the Court’s analysis of petitioner’s

Double Jeopardy claim.

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claim is not cognizable. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. To the extent this

claim is based on the asserted deficiencies in counsel’s representation and/or double

jeopardy, the claim, for the reasons discussed elsewhere herein, is without merit. 

3. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner claims he received duplicate punishment in violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Even assuming a double jeopardy claim is

exempted from the bar on review announced in Tollett, see Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306,

320 (1983) (holding defendant who pleads guilty nonetheless may challenge in habeas

proceedings “the very power of the State to bring [him] into court to answer the charge

brought against him”) (internal quotation and citation omitted), petitioner’s argument in

support of the instant claim is not persuasive. 

Petitioner claims he received multiple punishments for the same offense because, as

pleaded in the information, the dates of the offenses in Counts 2 through 6 were overlapping. 

At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor made an oral motion to amend the information

to dismiss the initial charge and to add certain others. Those new counts, as described by the

prosecutor, were a violation of California Penal Code § 288.5 “charging the dates from

December 1st of 1994 through January 1st of 1995” (count 2); a violation of Penal Code

§ 288(a) where the “charging dates would be January 1st of 1995 through January 1st of 1996”

(count 3); a violation of Penal Code § 288(a) which “charge would be from the dates of

January 1st of 1996 through January 1st of 1997” (count 4); a violation of Penal Code § 288(a)

with “charging dates begin[ing] January 1st, 1997 through January 1st, 1998” (count 5); and a

violation of Penal Code § 288(a), the “charging dates being on or about March of 1998”

(count 6). RT at 3-4. As discussed, petitioner was sentenced on the five new counts. 

Although there was a one-day overlap in four of the time periods,12 such overlap does not

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mean the counts were based on the same conduct. Indeed, even if the offenses charged in

two separate counts both occurred on an overlapping day, petitioner could have committed

separate offenses on that date. Petitioner confessed to molesting his daughter on 20 to 30

separate occasions over the course of four years. He was punished for only five of those

offenses, each of which could have occurred at any point within the time periods alleged. In

short, the overlap in the dates alleged in the counts to which petitioner pled guilty does not

support a finding that he received multiple punishments for the same offense. Accordingly,

petitioner’s Double Jeopardy claim fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 19, 2006

_________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:01-cv-04971-MMC Document 52 Filed 05/19/06 Page 12 of 12