Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01087/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORRIS ROBERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. GARCIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01087-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Docket No. 1, 12

I. INTRODUCTION

Morris Roberson, an inmate at the Kern Valley State Prison, filed a pro se civil rights 

complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court reviewed the complaint, noted that 

the exhibits referred to in it were missing and some additional information was needed, and 

required Mr. Roberson to file an amendment. Mr. Roberson then filed an amendment (Docket No. 

12) to his complaint. Dockets Nos. 1, 12. The complaint as amended is now before the Court for 

review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Roberson asserts claims against four correctional officials for failing to prevent his 

transfer to another prison. The facts giving rise to his claims are rather involved. The depth with 

which Mr. Roberson alleged the facts, and his mention of the actions of numerous other 

correctional officials (in addition to the five named Defendants) causes the Court to question 

whether Mr. Roberson wants to assert claims against other persons mentioned in the complaint or 

whether he actually wants to present only claims based on the failure to prevent the transfer to 

Corcoran. 

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The complaint and exhibits thereto provide the following information:

A. Original Rule Violation Report

On April 22, 2012, a riot erupted among a group of inmates on an exercise yard at Salinas 

Valley State Prison. Mr. Roberson was present but did not participate in the riot. 

Mr. Roberson received a rule violation report (“RVR”) charging him with participating in 

the riot. On May 8, 2012, correctional officer A. Garcia was assigned as his investigative 

employee. Mr. Roberson met with C/O Garcia and asked him to obtain photos of all weapons 

found, photos of all inmates involved, and camera footage of the event. Mr. Roberson also gave 

C/O Garcia a list of questions to be asked of all inmates involved in the riot.

A hearing was held on the RVR on June 1, 2012. The hearing officer found Mr. Roberson 

guilty of the RVR based on an officer’s report that Mr. Roberson ran to the scene and started 

fighting with other inmates. According to the disciplinary report, Mr. Roberson was assessed a 

90-day credit forfeiture and was referred to the institutional classification committee for program 

review and a possible SHU term assessment. Docket No. 12 at 18.

Mr. Roberson had an institutional classification committee (“ICC”) hearing on July 19, 

2012. Docket No. 12 at 43-44. The form from that hearing contains the following information: 

First, Mr. Roberson had been placed in administrative segregation on April 22, 2012, in 

connection with the RVR for participating in a riot, and now had been found guilty of that RVR. 

Second, the ICC imposed a “5 month aggravated SHU Term with MERD of 08-15-12” for the 

disciplinary offense of participating in a riot. Id.at 43. (MERD means minimum eligible release 

date, i.e., the date the SHU term would end.) Third, the ICC decided to refer Mr. Roberson for 

consideration of whether he also should get an indeterminate SHU placement for repeated 

misconduct. The ICC report states that, because Mr. Roberson had accumulated two RVRs for 

participating in two different riots (i.e., the current RVR for the April 22, 2012 riot and an earlier 

RVR for a January 20, 2011 riot), the committee “determined that his behavior clearly 

demonstrates a propensity for Violence and disruptive behavior which endangers the safety of 

others, as well as the security of the institution. Therefore, ICC elects to refer the case to the CSR 

[i.e., classification staff representative] for SHU audit and recommend transfer” to the SHU at 

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Corcoran State Prison or the SHU at CCI-Tehachapi on an indeterminate basis “upon completion 

of active MERD 8-15-12.” Id. The upshot of the ICC’s decision-making was that Mr. Roberson 

would spend at least five months in the SHU and was being put up for consideration to be kept in 

the SHU indefinitely. 

Mr. Roberson filed an inmate appeal, challenging the June 1, 2012 disciplinary decision on 

the RVR for participating in a riot. On August 3, 2012, the chief deputy warden granted some 

relief. The chief deputy warden determined that there was a procedural deficiency in the 

proceedings in that the hearing officer did not address Mr. Roberson’s request for evidence 

mentioned in the investigative employee’s report. In the inmate appeal response attached to the 

complaint, the chief deputy warden “partially granted” the inmate appeal and wrote:

[T]he appellant’s request for dismissal of the RVR is partially 

granted; the RVR will be ordered Reissue/Rehear by the Chief 

Disciplinary Officer (CDO). The appellant’s request for release 

from Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) must be appealed 

separately; this appeal (SVSP-L-12-02845) is only addressing the 

due process/procedural requirements of the RVR. The appellant’s 

request for reversal of the Security Housing Unit (SHU) term is 

partially granted; after reissue/rehear of the RVR by the CDO, the 

SHU term assessed for FC12-04-0048 will be vacated.

Docket No. 12 at 27.

Chief disciplinary officer McCall then issued an order for the RVR to be reissued and a

new hearing to be held. Docket No. 1 at 5; Docket No. 12 at 29.

B. The Proceedings on the Re-Issued Rule Violation Report

A new RVR was issued. C/O Navarro was assigned as the investigative employee for the

new hearing. Mr. Roberson met with Navarro on August 26, 2012 and gave C/O Navarro a list of 

new questions to be asked of several inmates. C/O Navarro submitted his investigative 

employee’s report, which included a list of questions for eight different inmates Mr. Roberson 

wanted questioned and the inmates’ responses to those questions. Docket No. 12 at 31-33. Each 

of the inmate-witnesses gave responses that he did not fight with Mr. Roberson, he did not see 

anyone else fighting with Mr. Roberson, and he could safely be on the same yard as Mr. Roberson. 

See id .

On September 6, 2012, a re-hearing was held, at which Mr. Roberson was once again 

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found guilty of participating in the riot on April 22, 2012. He was assessed a forfeiture of 90 days 

of time credits. Docket No. 12 at 39. In addition to the time-credit forfeiture, “the sentence was 

reinstated to Corcoran SHU.” Docket No. 1 at 5. Mr. Roberson alleges that he requested photos 

of all weapons found, all inmates involved, and camera footage if any existed. The SHO denied 

the request because the weapons evidence was irrelevant because Mr. Roberson was not charged 

with any weapons-related offenses. Docket No. 1 at 5-6. There was no footage of the incident 

because the camera system was not working. Id. at 6. The hearing officer’s report also stated that 

photos of the involved inmates would not be material to the hearing because Mr. Roberson had 

been identified by name in the reporting official in the RVR. Docket No. 12 at 41. 

Mr. Roberson was not referred back to a new classification for a new SHU determination 

after the RVR was reheard, as he contends was required by a state regulation. Docket No. 1 at 7. 

He contends that this made his confinement in administrative segregation unlawful.

C. The Defendants Fail To Stop Mr. Roberson’s Transfer

All of the foregoing allegations and recitations are merely background information for Mr. 

Roberson’s claims in this action. His claims are based on the failure of four correctional staff 

members to prevent his transfer to the Corcoran SHU. 

After the second RVR hearing resulted in Mr. Roberson being found guilty, Mr. Roberson

remained in administrative segregation. Mr. Roberson spoke with defendant sergeant Lopez on a 

couple of occasions while in administrative segregation. Sergeant Lopez “assured plaintiff that he 

was going to take plaintiff to classification after reading the memorandum order to vacate the 

June 1, 2012 guilty finding.” Docket No. 1 at 7. CCII Hughes also “assured plaintiff that he 

would take plaintiff to classification to vacate the June 1, 2012 guilty findings.” Id. But Mr. 

Roberson was not taken to a classification hearing. 

On September 10, 2012, CCI Garcia, a staff member in the administrative segregation unit,

told Mr. Roberson he was on the transfer list to the Corcoran SHU. Docket No. 1 at 8. Mr. 

Roberson asked CCI Garcia “to call the appeals office to see why the transfer had not been 

cancelled” because Mr. Roberson believed the appeal response had vacated the transfer order. Id. 

(The appeal response had not mentioned any transfer order.)

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“Officer Lopez told lieutenant McDonald that plaintiff would not be transferred but never 

acted to stop the transfer.” Id.

“On September 11, 2012, prison officials removed plaintiff from administrative 

segregation at Salinas Valley State Prison, and placed plaintiff in administrative segregation in 

Corcoran-SHU after a disciplinary rehearing rule violation report issued by prison personnel.” Id. 

Mr. Roberson contends that, when the RVR was ordered re-heard, all dispositions, including a 

SHU term, were voided pursuant to provisions in the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation Operating Manual. Therefore, he contends, he should not have been transferred to 

the Corcoran SHU. 

Mr. Roberson contends that defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights “when they allowed plaintiff’s transfer to Corcoran Security Housing (Corcoran SHU) after 

plaintiff’s successful appeal, which ordered the reissue and rehearing of the rule violation report at 

issue in this case.” Id. at 11. He further contends that the conditions were harsh at the Corcoran 

SHU, and amounted to an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life. 

III. DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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A. Eighth Amendment

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 

inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Deliberate indifference to an 

inmate’s health or safety may violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prison official violates the 

Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, 

objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the 

inmate’s health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Merely negligent conduct does not 

violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 835-36.

Mr. Roberson alleges that four correctional officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights 

by letting him be transferred to the Corcoran SHU. But those defendants worked at Salinas Valley 

and are not alleged to have controlled the conditions at Corcoran. It would relax the causation 

element necessary for a § 1983 violation too far to hold that a prison official at one prison could 

be liable for conditions at another prison simply because that prison officials allowed the inmate to 

be transferred to the second prison. Moreover, the complaint fails to allege facts suggesting that 

any of those defendants at Salinas Valley acted with the requisite mental state of deliberate 

indifference. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 

inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., 

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See id. at 837. 

The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. See id.

As it cannot be said with certainty that amendment would be futile, leave to amend is 

granted so that Mr. Roberson may attempt to plead facts showing both the subjective and objective 

prongs of an Eighth Amendment claim based on the defendants’ failure to prevent his transfer to 

Corcoran. 

B. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects 

individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process of 

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law. Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two 

sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 

215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining to liberty. 

Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 

implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) 

(transfer to mental hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary 

administration of psychotropic drugs)). Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to 

the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected 

liberty interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be limited to freedom from restraint 

that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Id. at 484, 487. 

Mr. Roberson’s contention that he had a right to due process in connection with the 

decision to transfer him from the administrative segregation in the SHU at Salinas Valley to 

administrative segregation in the SHU at Corcoran fails to state a claim as pled. In general, the 

transfer of an inmate from one prison to another does not implicate the federal right to due 

process. The liberty in question generally is not protected by the Due Process Clause because the 

deprivation of a correct classification or custody designation cannot be characterized as one of 

“real substance,” i.e., it does not impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, or “inevitably affect the 

duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. And the changes in conditions relating to classification and 

reclassification do not implicate the Due Process Clause itself. See Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 

F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976)) (no 

constitutional right to particular classification). Prisoners also have no constitutional right to 

incarceration in a particular institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). Mr. Roberson had no due process right not to be 

transferred from administrative segregation in one prison to administrative segregation in another 

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prison, assuming the conditions were roughly similar. He fails to state a claim against the 

defendants for failing to prevent his transfer to Corcoran. However, an inmate may have a right to 

due process in connection with a transfer from one administrative segregation unit to another if the 

conditions at the second prison’s administrative segregation unit were so dramatically worse than 

the conditions at the first prison’s administrative segregation unit that the change amounted to the 

imposition of an “atypical and significant hardship,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. If Mr. Roberson 

wishes to assert such a claim, he needs to allege specific facts showing that administrative 

segregation at the Corcoran SHU was so much worse than the administrative segregation at the 

Salinas Valley SHU that the transfer amounted to the imposition of an atypical and significant 

hardship. He also needs to link appropriate defendants to such a claim by alleging what each 

defendant did or failed to do that caused his transfer.

Insofar as Mr. Roberson is attempting to hold the named defendants liable for the alleged 

problems at the earlier disciplinary hearing, or the earlier ICC hearing, he fails to show that the 

named defendants took part in either of those decisions. The complaint does not state a claim 

against the named defendants for any alleged problems at those hearings. 

If Mr. Roberson wants to assert a claim that he was entitled to a second ICC hearing before 

leaving Salinas Valley, he should so allege in his amended complaint and must take particular care 

to link one or more defendants to such a claim, by alleging what each defendant did or failed to do 

that caused him not to receive a second ICC hearing. In his amended complaint, Mr. Roberson 

also must clarify what hearings and other procedures were used to determine his placement in the 

time he was at the Corcoran SHU. It is especially important that he describe each and every 

procedure or hearing that was used in the first three months after his arrival at Corcoran. 

If Mr. Roberson wants to allege a claim against one or more other officials for due process 

violations in connection with the disciplinary hearing or the ICC hearing, he should name such 

persons in his amended complaint and explain what each of those defendants did or failed to do 

that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. For his reference, the Court will set out the

procedural protections required when there is a federally protected liberty interest. 

Administrative Segregation: When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner 

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is to be segregated for administrative reasons and a liberty interest of real substance is implicated, 

due process requires that prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a 

reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or 

the reasons segregation is being considered, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint 

v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 

515 U.S. 472. Due process also requires that there be some evidence to support the prison 

officials' decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-

05. 

Disciplinary decisions: An inmate in California is entitled to due process before being 

disciplined when the discipline results in the deprivation of a liberty interest of real substance. See 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487. The process due in such a prison disciplinary proceeding includes 

written notice, time to prepare for the hearing, a written statement of decision, allowance of 

witnesses and documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous, and aid to the accused where the 

inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67 (1974). 

Due process also requires that there be “some evidence” to support the disciplinary decision. 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Roberson named five defendants, see Docket No. 1 at 10, 

but makes no allegations against the defendant correctional lieutenant Moffet. Mr. Roberson 

should dismiss this defendant or include allegations against him/her in his amended complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Mr. Roberson must file an amended 

complaint that complies with the directions in this order no later than January 31, 2017, and must 

include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED 

COMPLAINT on the first page. Mr. Roberson is cautioned that his amended complaint must be a 

complete statement of his claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc) (“For claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not 

require that they be repled in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. But for 

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any claims voluntarily dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”) 

Failure to file the amended complaint will result in the dismissal of this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2017

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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