Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02246/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02246-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROGER BETTENCOURT,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-2246 FCD DAD P

vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an amended petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On December 3, 2007, the undersigned ordered

respondent to file a response to the petition. On January 2, 2008, respondent filed a motion to

dismiss on the grounds that petitioner failed to exhaust his state judicial remedies. On January

24, 2008, petitioner filed opposition to the motion and thereafter respondent filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

In his application petitioner challenges the December 27, 2005 decision by the

Board of Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole. (Am. Pet. at 1.) Petitioner

contends that the Board’s multi-year denial of parole in his case is without evidentiary support,

demonstrates abuse of discretion, and violates his due process rights under the state and federal

constitution. (Id.)

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On May 26, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

Santa Clara County Superior Court challenging the Board’s decision. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss,

Ex. 2.) The court denied his petition on the merits on July 10, 2006. (Id., Ex. 3.) On or about

October 24, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of

Appeal for the First Appellate District. (Id., Ex. 6.) On November 9, 2006, the Court of Appeal

denied the petition without prejudice to filing a petition in the Court of Appeal for the Sixth

Appellate District. (Id., Ex. 7.) On December 21, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District. (Id., Ex. 8.) 

The Sixth District Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition on January 12, 2007. (Id., Ex.

9.) On March 8, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court. (Id., Ex. 10.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition apparently with

a bare citation to the decision in People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995). (Id., Ex. 11.) 

Petitioner filed his original petition in this court on October 22, 2007 and his amended petition

on November 15, 2007. 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Respondent’s Motion

Respondent argues that petitioner failed to fairly present his federal claims to the

state’s highest court as required. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Specifically, respondent argues

that the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s state habeas petition with a citation to

People v. Duvall. (Id.) The California Supreme Court has held that a habeas petitioner in this

state bears “a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief” and to satisfy that

burden should in the petition (1) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is

sought, and (2) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the

claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations. (Id. at 4)

(citing Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474). 

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Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court’s citation to Duvall, made

clear that the state high court denied petitioner’s petition based on the insufficiency of the

petition. (Id.) Respondent argues that a citation to Duvall is equivalent to the court declining

review because the claims raised in the petition were procedurally deficient and maintains that

the denial of petitioner’s state petition on a state procedural ground demonstrates that petitioner

has failed to exhausted his state remedies. (Id.) Respondent concludes that since the state high

court was not given a fair opportunity to address the merits of petitioner’s claims, this court

should dismiss the petition before it for failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement. 

II. Petitioner’s Opposition

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioner argues he provided the highest

state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all of his claims. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to

Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Petitioner contends that respondent does not and cannot point to

any claim in his federal petition before this court that was not fully and fairly presented to the

state’s highest court. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner argues that the “real problem” here is that state courts

routinely fail to follow state habeas corpus rules, and procedures. (Id.) For example, petitioner

argues that the factual allegations and evidence in his petition filed with the state courts

established a prima facie case for relief, but those courts simply passed the responsibility on to

the federal court to adjudicate the petition. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that respondent’s attempt to transform Duvall’s pleading and

requirements into a procedural bar to federal habeas review must fail because the decision of the

California Supreme Court in Duvall has never been read to construct such a bar. (Pet’r’s Opp’n

to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3.) Petitioner contends that at most a citation to Duvall merely

conveys a conclusion by the California Supreme Court that he failed to state a prima facie case

for relief. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner notes that, even if the decision in Duvall did create a potential

procedural bar to federal court habeas review, it would not be an “adequate or independent” state

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law ground for denial of relief in this case. Accordingly, petitioner concludes that the court

should deny respondent’s motion to dismiss.

III. Respondent’s Reply

Respondent reiterates the arguments advanced in his motion and notes that

petitioner could have attempted to cure the defect by renewing his petition before the California

Supreme Court with sufficient particularity, but instead filed his federal petition. (Resp’t’s Reply

at 2.) In so doing, respondent contends that, petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies. (Id.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion of State Remedies

State courts must have the first opportunity to decide a state prisoner’s habeas

corpus claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2005) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 518-19 (1982)). In general, a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus will not

be granted unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state will not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement

unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A

petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting to the highest state court all

federal claims before presenting the claims to the federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). A federal claim is fairly presented if

the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory upon which his claim

is based. Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Bland v. California

Department of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, a claim is unexhausted where the

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 “[N]ew factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted.” Beatty v. 1

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 989 (9th Cir. 2002). A claim is unexhausted only if new factual

allegations “fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts.” Vasquez

v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Beatty, 303 F.3d at 989-90; Weaver, 197 F.3d at

364. It is not necessary that “every piece of evidence” supporting federal claims have been

presented to the state court. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1469 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis

in original). The introduction of new evidence effects the fair presentation requirement when it

“substantially improves the evidentiary basis” for petitioner’s claims. Aiken v. Spalding, 841

F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1988). New factual allegations that are merely cumulative of those

presented to the state court do not transform the claim and thus do not require exhaustion. 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189, 1200-02 (E.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.

1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). See also Weaver, 197 F.3d at 364 (acknowledging that

although the “precise factual predicate” for a claim had changed after the evidentiary hearing in

federal court, the claim remained rooted in the same incident and was therefore exhausted).

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petitioner did not fairly present the factual or legal basis for the claim to the state court. See 1

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 275. 

II. Discussion

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s habeas petition without

comment and with a bare citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995). (Resp’t’s Mot.

to Dismiss, Ex. 11.) Respondent relies entirely on that bare citation in claiming a failure to

exhaust.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court petitioner

clearly challenged on federal due process grounds the December 27, 2005 decision of the Board

denying him parole. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 10.) The petition filed with the California

Supreme Court, included an exhibit list indicating that petitioner had submitted exhibits

designated “A” through “Z” and spanning two volumes. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 10.) 

Exhibit B is described as “Challenged 12/27/05 BPT Decision (2 year denial).” (Id.) Moreover,

throughout the twenty-eight page type-written petition filed with the California Supreme Court

petitioner made specific reference to the challenged Board decision and its contents, including

the evidence relied upon by the Board, by citing the numbered pages of the decision.

As one District Judge has recently concluded under almost the exact

circumstances presented here:

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In addition, in numerous places throughout the petition filed with

the California Supreme Court, Petitioner makes specific references

to the exhibits by page number. In the absence of certification that

the Petition appended by Respondent to the motion to dismiss is

the complete petition filed with the California Supreme Court, this

Court is unable to determine whether Duvall was an adequate

independent state-law ground for denial. If the enumerated exhibits

were in fact appended to the Petition, this Court is at a loss as to

what further supporting documentation was needed.

Walker v. Kramer, No. 2:07-cv-00803-JKS-CMK, 2008 WL 356965,* 2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008).

Accordingly, the court concludes that respondent’s motion to dismiss should be

denied without prejudice. (Id.)

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s January 2, 2008 motion to dismiss be denied; and

2. If these findings and recommendation are adopted, within 45 days of the date

of the order so adopting them, respondent be ordered to file a response to the petition and

petitioner be ordered to file his traverse, if any, within 30 days after service of that response.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 21, 2008.

DAD:9

bett2246.157

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