Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02272/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:0794 Job Discrimination (Handicap)

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Ms. Brown’s request for oral argument is denied. The parties have thoroughly

discussed the law and the evidence, and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See

Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir.

1991).

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOAN W. BROWN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA AND THE

COUNTY OF MARICOPA, ARIZONA,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-2272-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Maricopa

County. (Dkt. # 13.) For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joan W. Brown (“Ms. Brown”) brought the instant lawsuit against both the

State of Arizona and Maricopa County, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §

794. (Dkt. # 1.) According to her Complaint, Ms. Brown was employed as the Media

Relations Director at the Maricopa County Superior Court when she began suffering

Case 2:09-cv-02272-GMS Document 19 Filed 01/28/10 Page 1 of 5
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In addressing the issues relevant to Ms. Brown’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims,

the Court relies on case law discussing joint employment in the context of Title VII as well

as other discrimination statutes. This is so because the “joint employer” doctrine applies in

the same manner across Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and ADA claims.

Rubino v. ACME Bldg. Maint., 2008 WL 5245219, at *3 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008)

(citation omitted); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447

n. 7 (2003) (holding that the standards for determining employment status apply equally to

the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963). See also Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933, 938

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (analogizing from Title VII and other discrimination cases to determine

whether an entity was a joint employer under the Rehabilitation Act). 

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“episodes of disabling anxiety and depression.” (Dkt. # 1 at ¶ 9.) Ms. Brown alleges that she

was terminated from her employment with the Superior Court as a result of her disability. (Id.

at ¶ 13.) In her Complaint, Ms. Brown further alleges that she was employed by both the

State of Arizona and Maricopa County because the State and the County “own and/or operate

the Maricopa County Superior Court.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)

On January 4, 2010, Maricopa County filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Maricopa County argues that it is not a proper party to this

case as Ms. Brown was employed exclusively by the state. 

DISCUSSION

The sole issue presented in the Motion to Dismiss is whether Ms. Brown, as the Media

Relations Director of the Superior Court, was employed exclusively by the State of Arizona

or whether she was employed jointly by the State and by Maricopa County. This issue is

generally a question of fact reserved for summary judgment.

Under employment discrimination statutes, such as the ADA and the Rehabilitation

Act,2

 the question of whether a plaintiff was jointly employed by two employers is an issue

of fact that is typically addressed on summary judgment after the plaintiff has had the

opportunity of conducting discovery. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481

(1964) (“[W]hether [an entity] possessed sufficient indicia of control” to be a joint employer

“is essentially a factual issue . . . .”); Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 338 and n. 9 (7th

Cir. 2003) (holding that the joint-employer question in the context of a discrimination claim

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against a state official and the county is “fact-bound”); see also Sibbald v. Johnson, 294 F.

Supp.2d 1173, 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (observing at the summary judgment stage that a Title

VII plaintiff has the burden of “com[ing] forward with evidence to show that there is a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to joint employment”). “[B]efore a person or

entity can be a joint employer, it must possess the attributes of an employer to some degree.”

EEOC v. Pac. Maritime Ass’n., 351 F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the

Supreme Court has elucidated the following list of non-exclusive factors for determining

whether an entity is an individual’s employer under discrimination statutes, such as the ADA:

(1) Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set

the rules and regulations of the individual's work;

(2) Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization

supervises the individual’s work;

(3) Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the

organization;

(4) Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to

influence the organization;

(5) Whether the parties intended that the individual be an

employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts

(6) Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and

liabilities of the organization.

Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50. Amongst these factors, the Ninth Circuit has observed that

the key to joint-employment is the alleged employers’ “right to hire, supervise, and fire

employees.” Pac. Maritime Ass’n, 351 F.3d at 1277. (citations omitted). 

In this case, Maricopa County argues that it was not Ms. Brown’s employer because,

under Arizona state law, employees of the county superior courts are agents and employees

of the state, rather than the county. See Salerno v. Espinoza, 210 Ariz. 586, 588, 115 P.3d

626, 628 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a deputy clerk of the Superior Court is an employee

of the State of Arizona). Relying on Salerno, the County insists that state principles of

separation of powers prevent counties, which are a part of Arizona’s executive branch, from

interfering with the operations of the judiciary. Accordingly, the County argues that it cannot

be considered a joint employer with the State of Arizona over judicial employees, such as

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Ms. Brown. In a recent decision, however, the Seventh Circuit rejected this separation of

powers argument. See Robinson, 351 F.3d at 339. In Robinson, a judicial clerk for a county

judge sued both the state and the county under Title VII for sexual harassment and a hostile

work environment. Id. at 320. At the summary judgment stage, the county argued that the

clerk was exclusively a state employee based on state-law principles of separation of powers.

Id. at 338. In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit explained why this argument was

fundamentally flawed:

First, a State’s principles of internal organization cannot

frustrate federal law. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 243 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2001). Second, “[i]dentification of

an ‘employer’ under [federal discrimination statutes] is a

question of federal law.” Id. at 382. Finally, “the source of

funds” needed to satisfy a . . . judgment “need not coincide with

the identity of the employer.” Id. Consequently, regardless

whether [the county] is [the plaintiff’s] sole employer or joint

employer, it still may be responsible for payment of an adverse

judgment.

Id. at 339 n. 14.

In other words, although Arizona law may imply that county superior court officers

are employees and agents of the state, Plaintiff does not explain why a state law definition

of an employer is dispositive of the employment relationship under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act. The cases cited by Plaintiff do not rely on the Supreme Court’s factors

for determining joint employment. See, e.g., Salerno, 210 Ariz. at 588, 115 P.3d at 628

(applying Arizona law, rather than federal law, in determining that an employee of the

Superior Court is an employee of the State rather than the County). Moreover, as in

Robinson, the County may be responsible for payment of an adverse judgment against the

State, regardless of the County’s employment relationship with Ms. Brown. See Robinson,

351 F.3d at 339 at n. 14.

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

Because the issue of joint employment is a question of fact, the Court will treat Ms.

Brown’s allegations of joint employment as true for the purposes of this Motion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Maricopa County’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt

# 13) is DENIED.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-02272-GMS Document 19 Filed 01/28/10 Page 5 of 5