Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-06690/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-06690-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JESSE GRANT, III, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden, 

 Respondent. 

Case No.: C 11-6690 YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus of Jesse Grant, III, (“Petitioner”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2008 

conviction in Santa Clara County Superior Court. For the reasons set forth below, the petition 

is DENIED. In addition, no certificate of appealability will be issued. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Case History 

 In March 2008, a jury in Santa Clara County Superior Court found petitioner guilty of 

eight counts of second-degree burglary, and found true allegations that he had four prior 

“strike” convictions and four prior prison terms. (Ans. Ex. 1 at 380-89, 438.) On July 14, 

2008, the trial court sentenced him to a term of 232 years in state prison. (Id. at 680-82.) On 

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February 9, 2010, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Ans. Ex. 6.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied 

on April 28, 2010. (Ans. Ex. 7.) Petitioner proceeded to seek habeas relief in all three levels 

of the California courts. The superior court denied the petition on August 26, 2010, and the 

appellate and supreme courts subsequently issued summary denials of the petitions presented 

to them. (Ans. Exs. 8-10.) 

 On December 29, 2011, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant habeas petition 

in federal court setting forth five claims for relief: (1) the trial court violated his Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying a motion for a mistrial after a potential juror made 

prejudicial statements tainting the impartiality of the eventual jury; (2) the admission of 

identification testimony by four witnesses violated his right to due process and the prosecutor 

committed misconduct by using such testimony; (3) he received ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel; (4) the prosecutor suppressed evidence in violation of Petitioner’s right 

to due process; and (5) the trial court’s failure to excuse eight biased jurors violated his 

constitutional rights. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not be 

granted. Respondent filed an Answer denying the claims on their merits, with a supporting 

memorandum and exhibits. Petitioner filed a Traverse in response. Thereafter, counsel 

appeared on behalf of Petitioner. 

 On July 8, 2013, the parties notified the Court that Petitioner had been released from 

custody pursuant to the “compassionate release” provisions of California Penal Code Section 

1170(e) because he was suffering from a terminal illness. 

II. Facts 

 Petitioner was convicted of stealing laptop computers from various corporate offices in 

silicone valley in eight different incidents between October 26, 2006, and February 15, 2007.1

 

Thomas Haile, an employee of Seagate, testified that on October 26, 2007, he saw a person 

matching Petitioner’s description take a laptop from an employee’s desk and leave the 

 

1

 The jury acquitted Petitioner on a ninth robbery count stemming from a theft of laptops during this 

time period from another office in the area. 

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building; two laptops were stolen from Seagate that day. (Ans. Ex. 2 at 143-67.) Valeria 

Verra, a SanDisk employee, testified that she saw Petitioner in her building on November 7, 

2006, and surveillance cameras showed the same person walk towards the place where three 

laptops were stolen and leave the offices with a full, heavy backpack. (Id. at 248-97.) 

Another SanDisk employee, Elizabeth Dauda, testified that she saw Petitioner put a backpack 

in a Land Rover or Land Cruiser that same day at the SanDisk offices. (Id. at 645-48.) A 

Hitachi employee, Victor Nemechek, testified that on December 13, 2006, he saw a person 

with a full backpack leaving one of the cubicles where one of three laptops that were stolen 

that day had been. (Id. at 349-56.) A BAE Systems employee testified that he saw a person 

who looked like Petitioner in their offices on December 13, 2006, the day that two laptops 

were stolen. (Id. at 417-38.) 

Surveillance photos from at KLA Tencor offices on February 5 and 9, 2007, both days 

on which laptops were stolen, showed a person similar to the suspect in one of the earlier 

incidents entering and leaving the building; photos from February 5 showed him leaving with 

a full backpack. (Id. at 478-538.) A KLA employee, Deepa Rayadurg, testified that she saw 

the man in the photos on February 9, and at trial she identified him as Petitioner. (Id. at 567-

636.) Rayadurg confronted him, but he ran away. (Id.) Her co-worker chased him to the 

parking lot, where he got into a car, but her co-worker and security cameras caught the license 

plate number. (Id.) The registered owner of the car was Petitioner’s wife. (Id. at 782.) 

Laptops were also stolen from eBay offices on February 9 and 15, 2007. (Id. at 660-708.) 

Security footage showed a man entering the building on those days and leaving with a laptop 

bag and a full backpack. (Id. at 675-764.) 

The surveillance photos and videos from these incidents showed that the same 

individual was involved. (Id. at 783-87.) When the police went to Petitioner’s home, 

Petitioner’s wife was driving the Land Rover that had been at the scene of one and possibly 

two of the thefts. Petitioner was also there on a motorcycle, but he fled and eventually 

crashed into another car; in his possession was a backpack with a stolen laptop inside. (Id. at 

793-804.) 

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Evidence that Petitioner had been convicted of stealing laptop computers from other 

corporate offices in various incidents between 2001 and 2004 using similar methods was 

admitted under California Evidence Code § 1101(b) to show intent, identity, and common 

scheme or plan. (Id. at 1040-55.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

 A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on 

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of 

law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384–86 (2000), while the second prong applies 

to decisions based on factual determinations. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or 

if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 

529 U.S. at 405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the 

Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law 

to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “A federal court may not overrule a state court for 

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simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] 

is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination 

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the 

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. Where 

constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001) 

(citation omitted). 

 In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to or involved an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state court to 

address the merits of a petitioner’s claims in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 

F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the California Court of Appeal was the highest court 

to address, in a reasoned opinion, Petitioner’s first claim. (Ans. Ex. 6.) Petitioner’s second 

through fifth claims were denied on state habeas review, and the only explained opinion 

denying those claims is the brief opinion of the superior court. (Ans. Exs. 8-10.) 

DISCUSSION 

1. Jury Contamination 

Petitioner claims that comments by a prospective juror during jury selection in the 

presence of the eventual jury, the parties and the trial court tainted the jury and violated his 

constitutional rights to due process, confrontation and a fair and impartial jury. 

Near the end of the jury selection process, after the jury had been sworn and alternate 

jurors were being selected, Prospective Juror 55 made the following statement: 

Good afternoon. I'm chairman and CEO of a software company. Married. My 

spouse is an executive assistant. Three grown children. I've been living in San Jose 

for the past ten years. [¶] The software we do is directly applicable to law 

enforcement work. I work regularly with the Justice Department, National 

Security Agency, Homeland Security, FBI relative to finding bad guys. And it's 

highly classified. That's about as much as I can say about it. One of our board 

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members is, in fact, was formally [sic ] number 2 in the New York City police 

department headed up to Virginia State Police and until recently was the head of 

the police department in Virginia. I work quite closely with him on a regular basis. 

[¶] I was on a criminal case five years ago. We reached a verdict. Our family has 

been victimized with a house burglarized in early 2007. We had exactly the same 

crime happen at our office that this case is about and, unfortunately, Mr. Grant 

looks an awful lot like the person who I would have identified as having committed 

that crime in our office.

(Ans. Ex. 6 at 2-3 (emphasis added by California Court of Appeal).) Prospective Juror 55 

then stated that he had seen the thief and spoken to him. (Id. at 3.) The trial court excused 

Prospective Juror 55 without objection from either side. (Id.) 

 The next day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the remarks 

“tainted the entire jury panel.” (Id. at 4.) The trial court denied the motion with the following 

explanation: 

I will acknowledge that it was an inappropriate statement to make. I believe we 

were towards the end. I don't know-I really can't say what type of impact it had on 

the other jurors, but it was a brief statement. I kind of jumped in there right after 

that and I indicated what I hear you're saying is you can't be fair and he said yes 

and he was gone. 

(Id.) 

Next, the trial court instructed the jury: “You must decide what the facts are in this 

case. You must use only the evidence that was presented in the courtroom. Evidence is the 

sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I told 

you to consider as evidence.” (Id. at 4-5.) With the agreement of defense counsel, the trial 

court also gave the jury the following admonishment specific to Prospective Juror 55’s 

statement as follows: 

Now, folks, one more thing before I turn it over to the attorneys. There was an 

incident that occurred yesterday during the jury selection toward the end of the 

day, there was a gentleman in the front row who indicated that he was the C.E.O. 

of a software company. That their company had suffered a burglary similar to 

what was described yesterday. And then he made a very unfortunate and 

inappropriate comment to the affect [sic ] that if he was to identify the perpetrator 

it looked like the defendant in this case. Again, inappropriate. Completely 

unfounded as far as we know. I don't want you to-if you didn't hear it, I'm sorry I 

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brought it up. But I think it's important. [¶] Two things about that. Number one, to 

our knowledge there's actually no basis in fact to that allegation. But most 

important for you as jurors, it's not evidence. It's not something that you should 

consider. In fact, I'm going to order you to completely disregard it. Not discuss it. 

And not consider it for any purpose because it wasn't evidence in this case. [¶] 

Does anybody have a question about that or a problem with that? Okay I would 

appreciate that. 

(Id. at 5.) At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court again reiterated the instructions 

above that the jury was only to only to use the evidence presented at trial to decide what the 

facts are in the case. (Id. at 5-6.) 

The California Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not err in denying the 

motion for a mistrial because Prospective Juror 55’s statement was not “incurably 

prejudicial:” 

The circumstances surrounding Prospective Juror 55's comments do not reflect 

that the jury's exposure to those comments was so exceptional that it could not be 

cured by admonition or that defendant's prospects of receiving a fair trial had been 

irreparably damaged. First, by instructing the jury that Prospective Juror 55's 

comments were “[c]ompletely unfounded” and had “no basis in fact,” the trial 

court characterized the comments as false. Since it is reasonable to presume that a 

jury will honor the word of a court over off-hand remarks by a prospective juror, 

this instruction substantially limited the impact of the comments. Second, the trial 

court ordered the jury to “completely disregard” the comments and to “not 

consider [the comments] for any purpose,” and it confirmed that the jury had no 

“problem” in obeying this order. This order and the confirmation that it would be 

obeyed provided the requisite assurance that the comments would not play any 

role in the jury's deliberations. Third, while exposure to Prospective Juror 55's 

comments posed a potential risk of prejudice in the abstract, those comments had 

to be considered in light of the fact that the trial court had already approved the 

prosecution's plan to introduce evidence of defendant's prior similar offenses at 

trial to show identity. Any potential prejudice from the jury's exposure to 

Prospective Juror 55's comments would be reduced to insignificance in the shadow 

of this much more powerful evidence of defendant's prior criminality that would 

be legitimately introduced at trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court could 

reasonably conclude that Prospective Juror 55's comments were not incurably 

prejudicial. 

(Id. at 10.) 

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Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal opinion is contrary to and an unreasonable 

application of federal law under AEDPA because the type of error -- the jury’s exposure to 

improper, extrinsic information, such as the statement by Prospective Juror 55 -- is a structural 

error that requires relief regardless of whether or not there was prejudice. Petitioner is wrong. 

As discussed above, relief under AEDPA requires “clearly established” federal law in the 

form of United States Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 405–06. There is no Supreme Court precedent holding that a trial before biased jurors 

presents structural error, or that the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing to investigate 

potential juror bias constitutes structural error. Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th 

Cir. 2005). To the contrary, a jury’s exposure to extrinsic information is treated as a trial error 

subject to prejudice analysis on federal habeas review. See Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 

1108 (9th Cir. 2000); see Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993). A federal 

petitioner is entitled to habeas relief based on the jury’s exposure to the extrinsic information 

only if it can be established that it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict." Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1108 (applying Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)); Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190 (same). 

The authority Petitioner relies upon is not to the contrary. He relies on three cases that 

address different kinds of error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (failing 

to adhere to beyond a reasonable doubt standard is structural error); Gomez v. United States, 

490 U.S. at 876 (1989) (harmless error analysis does not apply where federal Magistrate 

Judge’s exceeding its jurisdiction by conducting jury selection); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 

648, 668 (1987) (no harmless error analysis where trial court erroneously excused qualified 

juror cause based on personal opposition to death penalty). He cites to a dissenting opinion in 

Bell v. Quintero, 544 U.S. 936, 940 (2005), which in any event does not state that juror 

exposure to extrinsic information is structural error. And he relies on a Ninth Circuit decision 

which stated that it “need not decide” whether the error was structural because it was not 

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harmless. See Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1998).2 Accordingly, the Court 

rejects Petitioner’s argument that the state court’s failure to treat the jury’s exposure to 

Prospective Juror 55’s statement as structural error was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of “clearly established” federal law under AEDPA. 

For the same reasons the California Court of Appeal found insufficient prejudice, this 

Court finds that Prospective Juror 55’s statement did not have a substantial and injurious 

effect on the verdict under Brecht. See Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1108; Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190. 

First, the statement was effectively neutralized by the trial court strong and unequivocal 

admonishment to the jury that the statement was “completely unfounded,” had “no basis in 

fact” and did not constitute evidence. The jury is presumed to follow this instruction, as well 

as the instructions before and after trial that it could only consider evidence in reaching its 

verdict. See Manduso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (curative instruction my 

render harmless jury’s inadvertent exposure to extrinsic information). Secondly, the jury was 

already properly exposed to Petitioner’s prior thefts of laptops, which greatly diminished the 

significance and impact of Prospective Juror 55’s statement. 3 For these reasons, there is 

insufficient prejudice under the Brecht standard to warrant federal habeas relief based upon 

the jury’s exposure to Prospective Juror 55’s statement. 

2. Admission of Identification Testimony 

Petitioner claims that admission of in-court identification testimony by four witnesses 

violated his right to due process and that the prosecutor committed misconduct by using such 

testimony. The in-court identifications were by witnesses Deepa Rayadurg, Jaikaran Shukla, 

Elizabeth Dauda, and Valerie Vierra, employees three of the businesses where the thefts 

 2

 The California Court of Appeal also persuasively distinguished Mach from this case on its 

facts. (Ans. Ex. 6 at 11.) 

3

 In his Traverse, Petitioner claims for the first time that admission of evidence of the prior 

convictions violated his right to due process. New claims may not be raised in a Traverse. See 

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). In any event, habeas relief is not 

available on such a claim under AEDPA. See Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 

2009) (no Supreme Court precedent that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence 

violates due process violation so as to warrant federal habeas relief under AEDPA). 

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occurred. Petitioner argues that the evidence should not have been admitted because there 

was no lineup or identification procedure conducted prior to trial, and because 13-16 months 

had passed since the thefts took place. He also cites discrepancies between the witnesses’ 

descriptions of the thief, the suspect in the surveillance photos and videos, and Petitioner. 

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial 

of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 

1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). The incourt identifications were certainly relevant to the issue of who committed the thefts. 

Petitioner cites no authority, and this Court is aware of none, that due process or any other 

constitutional guarantee prohibits the admission of in-court identification testimony if there 

has been no pre-trial identification procedure, or if 13-16 months have elapsed since the crime 

occurred. Defense counsel was free to, and did, raise these and any other factors that called 

into question the reliability of the in-court identifications when cross-examining the witnesses 

and arguing the case to the jury. Petitioner has not shown that the admission of the in-court 

identification testimony violates his right to due process.4

 

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor, Angela Alvarado, committed misconduct in 

violation of his right to due process by eliciting the in-court identification testimony. 

Petitioner cites the prosecutor’s opposition to a pre-trial defense motion that witnesses view 

physical lineups before trial. In that opposition, the prosecutor stated that the witnesses would 

not provide in-court identifications. (Pet. Ex. B.) Petitioner claims that the prosecutor 

breached this “contractual obligation” under Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), 

when she elicited the identification testimony at trial. Santobello does not support Petitioner’s 

claim. Santobello concerns prosecutorial promises in a plea agreement, and provides that 

“when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 

 4

 In his Traverse, Petitioner argues that photographic lineups were unduly suggestive. This 

argument is not in the Petition. Petitioner may not make new claims in a Traverse. See Cacoperdo v. 

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner also does not explain where or when the 

photo lineup took place, when or if they were used at trial, or which witness(es) participated in them. 

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that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 

fulfilled.” Id. at 262. Petitioner cites no authority, let alone “clearly established” Supreme 

Court precedent that the prosecutor’s statements in the opposition created a “contract” with 

Petitioner or gave him a right protected by due process to avoid in-court identifications by the 

witnesses. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ denial of this claim 

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law so as to 

warrant federal habeas relief. 5 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to prevail on a Sixth 

Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he 

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective 

standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-

88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., 

that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 

the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 

387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed 

according to the standard set out in Strickland. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 

First, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, 

which in the appellate context requires the petitioner to demonstrate that counsel acted 

 5

 Simply because there is no clearly established Supreme Court authority holding that the 

prosecutor’s conduct renders the trial fundamentally unfair, this does not make the prosecutor’s 

conduct acceptable. 

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unreasonably in failing to discover and brief a merit-worthy issue. Id. Second, the petitioner 

must show prejudice, which in this context means that the petitioner must demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue, the petitioner 

would have prevailed in his appeal. Id. at 285-86. 

Petitioner complains that his first trial attorney, Gregory Martin, failed to file a motion 

to suppress. “To show prejudice under Strickland from the failure to file a motion, 

[petitioner] must show (1) that had counsel filed the motion it is reasonable that the trial court 

would have granted it as meritorious; and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable 

that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 

986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner does not identify or explain on what grounds counsel 

could have filed a motion to suppress or what evidence he should have sought to suppress. He 

certainly does not show that there was any reasonable probability either that such a motion 

would have succeeded or that the success of the motion would have changed the outcome of 

the trial. In his Traverse he argues that Martin should have moved to suppress the in-court 

identifications when they were given, but Martin was no longer trial counsel at that time. 

Petitioner also faults Martin for not filing the motion for a physical line-up sooner, 

before the preliminary hearing. To succeed on such a motion, a defendant must show that 

there is a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identity that the lineup would resolve. See Evans 

v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 625 (1974). Petitioner has not shown that there was a 

reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification in this case given the surveillance photos and 

videos depicting him at the scene of the crimes. More importantly, Petitioner has not shown 

or attempted to show that the witnesses would have been unlikely to identify him at the 

physical line-ups or that such line-ups would not have simply produced more unfavorable 

evidence identifying him as the man the witnesses had seen. As a result, Petitioner has not 

shown that even if the motion had been granted, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the trial would have changed. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that Martin’s 

performance was prejudicial under Strickland. 

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Petitioner complains that his second trial, Dennis Dawson, who took over for Martin on 

the first day of trial, failed to object to the admission of the in-court identification of Petitioner 

by four witnesses. Petitioner asserts that counsel should have objected because of the 

statement by the prosecutor, Angela Alvarado, in a pretrial filing that she would not elicit incourt identification testimony from witnesses, including two of the witnesses who identified 

Petitioner in court. Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that the objection would 

succeed. The testimony was indisputably admissible. See Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 

1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (counsel not ineffective for failing to object to admission of admissible 

testimony). While the trial court presumably would have discretion to exclude the testimony 

because of the prosecutor’s statements, Petitioner has not shown why the trial court would 

have excluded admissible testimony rather than take some other step such as referred the 

prosecutor for discipline. In any event, even if the objection was successful, there is no 

reasonable probability of a different outcome. The objection would not have excluded the 

other two in-court identifications of Petitioner, which, along with the surveillance footage 

showing Petitioner at the scene of the crimes and the ample modus operandi evidence would 

have likely led to a conviction in any event. (See also Pet. Ex. G (discussion by appellate 

counsel of surveillance evidence).) Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Dawson’s failure to 

object was prejudicial under Strickland. 

Lastly, Petitioner complains that his appellate attorney, Candace Hale, failed to raise 

the above claims on appeal. Appellate counsel will frequently remain above an objective 

standard of competence and have caused his client no prejudice for the same reason--because 

he declined to raise a weak issue. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Petitioner complains that Hale failed to raise on appeal the lack of physical line-ups, the 

admission of in-court identification testimony, the prosecutor’s misconduct, and his trial 

attorneys’ performance with respect to these issues. These would have weak claims without a 

reasonable chance of success because of the uncertainty about the results of the physical 

lineups, the admissibility of the in-court identifications, and the lack of prejudice from trial 

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counsels’ performance. Thus, Hale’s failure to bring these claims in appeal was neither 

deficient performance nor prejudicial. 

Petitioner also claims that Hale did not investigate his claim that he was in Las Vegas 

when the ninth charged robbery took place (at eBay on February 15, 2007). Petitioner’s 

exhibits show that Hale did in fact investigate the Las Vegas trip. (Pet. Ex. G.) She 

concluded that the alibi was not a worthy issue to pursue on appeal because she learned from 

Dawson that the trip receipts did not show Petitioner’s absence during the last robbery, and in 

any event the surveillance footage from that robbery and the prior robbery at eBay clearly 

showed Petitioner there on the days in question. (Id.) Petitioner does not identify any 

additional information that she could have or should have pursued that would have made his 

purported alibi worth pursuing on appeal after her investigation showed that the alibi was 

unsubstantiated. Petitioner also complains that she did not investigate alleged perjury by a 

witness at his 2004 trial and an allegedly false police report by another witness at that trial. 

(Pet. Exs. H., I.) Petitioner has not identified what claims Hale could have brought in the 

appeal of his present convictions based on these matters. He has also not explained why such 

claims had a reasonable chance of success given that it concerned only certain of the prior 

convictions used to show Petitioner’s common scheme, identity and intent. Accordingly, 

Petitioner has failed to show that Hale violated his right to effective assistance of counsel on 

appeal by failing to investigate his alibi and two witnesses at his 2004 trial. 

The state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel at trial and on appeal was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on these claims. 

4. Suppression of Evidence 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by suppressing 

favorable evidence concerning two witnesses in his 2004 trial. He states that his trial attorney 

gave the prosecutor “Discovery” about Inspector J. Lage from the Hayward Police 

Department writing a false police report, and about Kathleen Smith, a Safeway employee, 

committing perjury. According to Petitioner, Smith committed perjury in 2004 when she said 

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that she had not seen a photographic lineup of the suspect, but in the present case, when 

testifying about the 2004 robbery, she stated that she had seen a photographic lineup. 

To succeed on a claim that the prosecutor suppressed evidence in violation due process, 

petitioner must show: (1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because 

it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that it was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully 

or inadvertently; and (3) that it was material (or, put differently, that prejudice ensued). Banks 

v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Here, Petitioner alleges that the defense gave evidence 

to the prosecutor. The prosecutor cannot withhold or suppress evidence supplied by the 

defense. The prosecutor also did not have any constitutional obligation to investigate the 

evidence supplied by Petitioner. See Rhoades v. Henry (Baldwin), 638 F.3d 1027, 1038-39 

(9th Cir. 2011) (no disclosure violation defendant was "aware of the essential facts enabling 

him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence"); United States v. Bond, 552 F.3d 1092, 

1095-96 (9th Cir. 2009) (where government discloses all information necessary for defense to 

discover alleged Brady material on its own, government is not guilty of suppressing 

evidence). Petitioner has not shown a due process violation occurred. Accordingly, and the 

state courts’ rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law, and habeas relief is not warranted on this claim. 

5. Biased Jurors 

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s failure to strike eight jurors on the grounds of 

bias violated his right to due process. He claims that these jurors were biased because four of 

them had been victims of computer theft, two others had been victims of other thefts, one 

knew someone who had been killed by a burglar, and one said that a person is likely to 

commit a crime if they have committed a crime in the past. 

The Constitution "does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a 

potentially compromising situation." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). The 

safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial 

judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or 

influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Id. Due process only means a jury capable 

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and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it and a trial judge ever watchful 

to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they 

happen. Id. Petitioner does not show that the jurors’ prior experiences or beliefs made them 

incapable or unwilling to decide the case on the evidence and law presented to them. A victim 

of theft or someone who knew a crime victim could certainly put that aside for purposes of 

deliberating over a different case. Similarly, Juror No. 34’s belief that a prior criminal was 

more likely to offend again does not mean that he would necessarily seek to convict a person 

with a criminal history. These facts do not, on their own, show that the jury was incapable or 

unwilling to decide the case before it so as to violate his Sixth Amendment rights. 

Furthermore, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by any bias from these 

jurors or the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on the issue. See Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 

1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (juror bias or failure of trial court to hold hearing to investigate 

matter are subject to harmless error analysis because no Supreme Court precedent holding that 

either constitute structural error). The harmless error standard on federal habeas review is 

whether the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s 

determination of guilty. See Brecht v Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). If the 

jury’s verdict was based on its purported bias, they would have had no reason not to convict 

him on all counts. But the jury acquitted Petitioner on one of the counts, which strongly 

indicates that its verdict was not based on bias but on a consideration of the evidence and the 

law. In addition, the evidence of guilt was very strong. Petitioner was caught on surveillance 

video and photographs at the scene of the crimes, there was eyewitness testimony identifying 

him in several of the incidents, the charged offenses followed a similar modus operandi to 

each other and to prior crimes by Petitioner, his wife’s car was at the getaway car at one of the 

incidents, and Petitioner fled the police in possession of a stolen laptop. Under these 

circumstances, the jurors’ prior experiences and beliefs did not have a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence on the outcome of the case. 

Petitioner also claims that the Equal Protection Clause was violated because there was 

only one African-American in his jury pool, and she was not on his jury. See Batson v. 

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Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (the Equal Protection Clause forbids the challenging of 

potential jurors solely on account of their race). Petitioner may not raise a Batson claim in 

federal habeas review, however, because he failed to object to the venire or to the selection of 

jurors at trial. See Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168, 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (joining sister 

circuits in concluding that denial of Batson claim by state court was not contrary to or 

unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA where defendant failed to make timely 

objection at trial). 

For the reasons described above, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim of jury 

bias and an equal protection violation was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of federal law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Court of 

Appeals. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 19, 2015 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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