Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00861/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00861-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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1 Under the E-Government Act of 2002, this is a written opinion and therefore is

available electronically. However, it has been entered only to decide the motion or matter

addressed herein and is not intended for official publication or to serve as precedent.

2 Ratcliff does not purport to bring any claims against International Paper in these

proceedings, and the summary judgment record confirms that he settled his workers’

compensation claims against that entity in March 2006 in exchange for a lump-sum payment of

$40,000. (Doc. 16, at Exh. C.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ERIC RATCLIFF, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0861-WS-M

 )

HEAVY MACHINES, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Heavy Machines, Inc.’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. 16).1

 An Order (doc. 18) entered on April 25, 2007 directed any party

opposing the Motion to file a response on or before May 23, 2007. That deadline having expired

with no opposition brief being filed, the Motion is now ripe for disposition.

I. Background.

The court file reflects that plaintiff Eric Ratcliff, by and through counsel, initiated this

action by filing a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama on June 27, 2006. 

The Complaint purported to assert state-law causes of action for negligence and wantonness

against named defendant, Heavy Equipment, Inc., and fictitious defendants ABC, DEF, HIJ,

JKL, MNO, PQR, STU, VWX, and AA, and demanded judgment in the amount of $500,000 plus

costs. According to the Complaint, Ratcliff sustained on-the-job injuries on July 15, 2004 in the

course of his employment for non-party International Paper in Selma, Alabama.2

 In particular,

Ratcliff alleges that an industrial forklift known as a Taylor Log Stacker 1000 (“TLS 1000”)

failed or malfunctioned while he was operating it, causing injuries to his back and to his right

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3 Heavy Equipment did not join in the Notice of Removal; however, both its failure

to do so and its citizenship are immaterial because it had not been served with process in this

action. See, e.g., Air Starter Components, Inc. v. Molina, 442 F. Supp.2d 374, 377 (S.D. Tex.

2006) (“Under the unanimity rule, all properly served defendants must timely join in or consent

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shoulder. The Complaint seeks to hold defendants liable for Ratcliff’s injuries because they

“maintained, repaired, inspected, installed parts, attempted repair, contracted to maintain or

altered” the TLS 1000. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) The Complaint further reflects that Ratcliff initiated

this action pursuant to Alabama Code § 25-5-11, which permits a worker to bring an action

against a third party whom he contends is jointly liable with his employer for an injury that

would be covered by Alabama’s workers’ compensation scheme, and which states that the

amount of damages in such a third-party action is ascertained without regard to workers’

compensation principles.

On September 27, 2006, Ratcliff, by and through counsel, filed an Amended Complaint

in state court, with the amendment reading in its entirety as follows: “Plaintiff amends his

complaint by submitting Defendant Heavy Machines, Inc. [i]n place of fictitious defendant ABC

and refiles the complaint for service.” (Amended Complaint, at 1.) Heavy Machines had not

previously been a defendant in this action, and there is neither argument nor evidence that Heavy

Machines is in any way affiliated with, connected to, or an alter ego, alias or d/b/a of the

previously named defendant, Heavy Equipment, Inc. To the contrary, the uncontroverted

evidence in the summary judgment record is that “Heavy Machines, Inc. does not, nor has it

ever, done business under the name Heavy Equipment, Inc.” (Moseley Aff., at 1.) Moreover,

the pleadings confirm that plaintiff did not attempt to substitute Heavy Machines, Inc. for Heavy

Equipment, Inc. as a defendant in these proceedings, but that he rather substituted Heavy

Machines for fictitious defendant ABC, such that Heavy Equipment and Heavy Machines were

co-defendants herein following the filing of the Amended Complaint.

Heavy Machines removed this action to this District Court on December 19, 2006

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, alleging complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and all

properly served and joined defendants. Further, the $500,000 demand on the face of the

Complaint revealed that the amount in controversy far exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional

minimum. (See doc. 1.)3

 On April 10, 2007, upon the consent and agreement of the parties,

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to the removal.”); Frankston v. Denniston, 376 F. Supp.2d 35, 38 (D. Mass. 2005) (“As a general

matter, in cases involving multiple defendants, all defendants who have been served must join or

assent in the removal petition.”); GMFS, L.L.C. v. Bounds, 275 F. Supp.2d 1350, 1354 (S.D. Ala.

2003) (“a defendant that has not been served with process need not join in or consent to

removal”).

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plaintiff’s claims against Heavy Equipment were dismissed without prejudice, leaving Heavy

Machines as the only remaining defendant. (See doc. 13.) On April 25, 2007, Heavy Machines

moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Ratcliff’s claims against it are barred by the

applicable statute of limitations and there is no genuine issue of material fact that might support

a determination that Heavy Machines either negligently or wantonly failed to maintain the TLS

1000 properly. Upon the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the undersigned entered

an Order (doc. 18) setting forth a briefing schedule pursuant to which plaintiff’s opposition brief

was due on May 23, 2007. To date, however, plaintiff has failed to file a response, to request an

enlargement of time, or in any way to acknowledge or address the pending Motion for Summary

Judgment. The Court-ordered deadline for Ratcliff’s opposition brief having passed in silence,

there is no reason to tarry in taking the Motion under submission at this time.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of

a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

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4 See, e.g., Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2nd

Cir. 2004) (“Although the failure to respond may allow the district court to accept the movant’s

factual assertions as true ..., the moving party must still establish that the undisputed facts entitle

him to a judgment as a matter of law”); Custer v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416

(4th Cir. 1993) (“the court, in considering a motion for summary judgment, must review the

motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it whether the moving party is

entitled to summary judgment”); but see Isquith for and on Behalf of Isquith v. Middle South

Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 199 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing as “general rule” that “summary

judgment was appropriate because the nonmovant, although faced with a summary judgment

motion, chose not to respond to the motion at all”).

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(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, the mere existence of any

factual dispute will not necessarily compel denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather,

only material factual disputes preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept.

of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004).

As noted, Ratcliff filed no response to the Motion. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion in

its Reply (doc. 20), summary judgment is not automatically granted by virtue of a nonmovant’s

silence.4 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit has provided clear guidance that a court is not

obligated to read minds or to construct arguments or theories of relief that counsel have failed to

raise and that are not reasonably presented on the face of the pleadings. See Resolution Trust

Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“There is no burden upon the district

court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on

summary judgment.”); see also Gleason v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 142 (3rd Cir.

2001) (“The ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to be made on the record the parties

have actually presented, not on one potentially possible.”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic

Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260 (1st Cir. 1999) (declaring that a “party who aspires to oppose a

summary judgment motion must spell out his arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever

hold his peace,” as district court may ignore arguments not adequately developed by

nonmovant). Clearly, “the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments.” Resolution Trust,

43 F.3d at 599. For that reason, Ratcliff’s election not to proffer argument, evidence or authority

in response to the Motion is made at his peril, and this Court will not devote scarce judicial

resources to ferreting out every possible contention Ratcliff could have made, but chose not to

make, in opposition to the Motion.

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5 Although plaintiff nominally brought his claim under Alabama Code § 25-5-11,

the law is clear that nothing in that section alters, amends or abrogates in any way the two-year

limitations period promulgated by § 6-2-38. See Hubbard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 599 So.2d 20,

21-22 (Ala. 1992) (holding that third-party claims filed pursuant to § 25-5-11 are tort actions for

damages, not claims for workers’ compensation benefits, such that the two-year statute of

limitations set forth in § 6-2-38(g) is applicable to third-party suits authorized under the

Workers’ Compensation Act); Dudley v. Mesa Industries, 770 So.2d 1082, 1084 (Ala. 2000)

(“This Court has specifically held that a claim based on the provisions of § 25-5-11 is a tort

claim for damages, and is not a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.”). This conclusion is

reinforced by the fact that § 6-2-38 includes a specific subsection providing a two-year

limitations period for actions brought under § 25-5-11(b), which is the same statute, albeit not

the same subsection, invoked by plaintiff here. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(g).

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III. Analysis.

Plaintiff’s negligence and wantonness claims are subject to Alabama Code § 6-2-38,

which prescribes a two-year limitations period for such causes of action. See Ala. Code § 6-2-

38)(l) (“All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and

not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.”); Piazza v. Ebsco

Industries, Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Under Alabama law, claims for

negligence are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.”).5 Ratcliff sustained his injuries on

July 14, 2004; therefore, the two-year limitations period commenced running that day. See

generally Long v. Jefferson County, 623 So.2d 1130, 1137 (Ala. 1993) (“A negligence cause of

action accrues as soon as the plaintiff is entitled to maintain the action, i.e., at the time of the first

legal injury, regardless of whether the full amount of damages is apparent.”). There being no

record facts or circumstances that might warrant tolling that deadline, Ratcliff was obligated to

prosecute his claims against Heavy Machines on or before July 14, 2006 to comport with the

applicable limitations period. The potentially interesting wrinkle here is that Ratcliff filed his

Complaint in state court against Heavy Equipment and certain fictitious entities on June 27,

2006, within the statutory period, but did not file an Amended Complaint substituting Heavy

Machines for a fictitious defendant until September 27, 2006, nearly 11 weeks after the statute of

limitations had run.

Although plaintiff’s rationale for why his claims against Heavy Machines are not timebarred is difficult to discern because he has never articulated it in these proceedings, it appears

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that Ratcliff would rely on Alabama principles of fictitious party pleading and the relation back

doctrine to support the timeliness of his claims. If the Amended Complaint relates back to the

date of the filing of the original Complaint, then Ratcliff’s claims against Heavy Machines are

timely. If it does not, then those claims fail a limitations analysis and are due to be dismissed as

untimely.

As an initial matter, it is clear that Alabama law, rather than federal law, controls the

question of whether the Amended Complaint relates back, inasmuch as the amendment predated

the removal of this action to federal court. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of

Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2002) (opining that amended complaint filed in state

court prior to removal must be examined under state version of relation-back rules, not the

federal version, because federal rules applied only post-removal); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

630 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (state law governs whether amended complaint relates back

“because the relevant amendments and service of process preceded removal to federal court”). 

Under Alabama law, an amended pleading relates back to the date of its predecessor where

“relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule

9(h).” Rule 15(c)(4), Ala.R.Civ.P. In turn, Rule 9(h) sets forth Alabama courts’ fictitious party

practice in the following terms: “When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and

so alleges in the party’s pleading, the opposing party may be designated by any name, and when

that party’s true name is discovered, the process and all pleadings and proceedings in the action

may be amended by substituting the true name.” Rule 9(h), Ala.R.Civ.P.

Reading Rules 9(h) and 15(c)(4) together, the Alabama Supreme Court has explained that

a plaintiff may “avoid the bar of a statute of limitations by fictitiously naming defendants for

which actual parties can later be substituted. ... In order for the substitution to relate back, the

plaintiff must have been ignorant of the true identity of the defendant and must have used due

diligence in attempting to discover it.” Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916 So.2d

594, 597-98 (Ala. 2005) (citation omitted). “The correct test is whether the plaintiff knew, or

should have known, or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties

described fictitiously.” Davis v. Mims, 510 So.2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987). If that question is

answered affirmatively, then relation back is not permitted. Alabama courts have consistently

refused to allow relation back on a fictitious party pleading rationale where the “ignorance” and

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“due diligence” requirements are not satisfied. See, e.g., Chemical Lime, 916 So.2d at 599

(concluding that relation-back doctrine was inapplicable where plaintiffs did not exercise due

diligence in naming defendant in place of fictitious defendant); Pearson v. Brooks, 883 So.2d

185, 191-92 (Ala. 2003) (plaintiff could not substitute defendants for fictitious parties after

expiration of limitations period because she was not ignorant of their identities when she filed

the original complaint); Davis, 510 So.2d at 529 (no relation back where it was apparent from

record that plaintiff knew identities and general responsibilities of defendants at the time he filed

the original complaint and that plaintiff was aware, or should have been aware, at that time that

those entities were in fact the parties described fictitiously).

Here, Ratcliff has never suggested, much less offered competent evidence, that he was

ignorant of Heavy Machines’ true identity at the time he filed his original Complaint in state

court. Nor has he contended or presented evidence tending to demonstrate that he exercised due

diligence in attempting to unearth Heavy Machines’ identity in a timely fashion. Not only is

there a dearth of evidence of ignorance or due diligence, but also the evidence of record is

precisely to the contrary. Indeed, Heavy Machines submits discovery responses from plaintiff in

this litigation wherein plaintiff appended a copy of a letter addressed to his then-counsel and

dated September 6, 2005 (some nine months before the Complaint was filed and ten months

before expiration of the applicable statute of limitations). This letter, which was sent from the

manufacturer of the TLS 1000 equipment that allegedly malfunctioned on the date of plaintiff's

injury, included the following pertinent statement: “International Paper contracted with Heavy

Machines, Inc. to perform their daily machine maintenance” on the machine in question. (Doc.

16, at Exh. B.) Thus, the September 2005 letter, which plaintiff produced in discovery in this

action, unambiguously establishes that, far from being ignorant of Heavy Machines’ identity,

Ratcliff had actual notice of it nearly a year before the statute of limitations expired. Not only

that, but Ratcliff’s discovery responses concede his contemporaneous knowledge of Heavy

Machines’ role in maintaining or repairing the TLS 1000. In particular, Ratcliff states that he

had seen Heavy Machines working on that TLS 1000 before, that Heavy Machines was located

on-site at his workplace, and that he had previously driven machines to the Heavy Machines

shop. (Doc. 16, at Exh. B #21.) Given these admitted facts, Ratcliff clearly knew as of June

2006 that Heavy Machines was in fact the entity that his Complaint described fictitiously. These

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6 In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to reach Heavy Machines’

alternative argument that there is insufficient evidence of negligence or wantonness to allow

those claims to proceed. Nonetheless, the Court notes that defendant’s position is predicated on

an overly narrow view of plaintiff’s theory of liability and the summary judgment evidence. 

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Heavy Machines had contracted to perform daily

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circumstances negate any possible showing of “ignorance” and “due diligence,” as required to

qualify for relation back using Alabama’s fictitious party rules.

Nor could any reasonable argument be made that this is a case of mistaken identity, that

Ratcliff somehow confused Heavy Equipment for Heavy Machines, and that he added the latter

to his pleadings in an attempt to supplant the former. Even if plaintiff had propounded such a

contention (which he has not), it would necessarily fail because Ratcliff’s actions in filing his

Amended Complaint confirm that he regarded Heavy Equipment and Heavy Machines as distinct

entities and distinct defendants, rather than asserting that one was simply a mistaken

identification of the other. Significantly, the Amended Complaint reflects on its face that Heavy

Machines was being substituted for fictitious defendant ABC, not for Heavy Equipment, and

Heavy Machines and Heavy Equipment were co-defendants for approximately seven months

before plaintiff consented to the dismissal of his claims against Heavy Equipment. From this

record, it is apparent that Ratcliff intended to rely on fictitious party relation back principles, and

not on any notions of mistaken identity, in adding Heavy Machines to his pleadings after the

statute of limitations had run.

In short, the summary judgment record leaves no doubt that Ratcliff’s claims against

Heavy Machines are untimely. The statute of limitations expired more than two months before

Ratcliff pleaded Heavy Machines into this action via his Amended Complaint. Alabama

fictitious party relation back principles cannot save these claims, inasmuch as the prerequisites of

that rule – namely, that Ratcliff must have been ignorant of Heavy Machines’ identity despite

due diligence in attempting to ascertain it at the time of filing his Complaint – are

unquestionably not satisfied here. Based on this record, and in the absence of any argument,

evidence or theory propounded by Ratcliff for why his claims against Heavy Machines might be

deemed timely, the Court determines that his causes of action against Heavy Machines are timebarred by operation of Ala. Code § 6-2-38.6

Case 1:06-cv-00861-WS-M Document 24 Filed 06/20/07 Page 8 of 9
maintenance and inspections of the TLS 1000, and offers an affidavit from a company

representative to support its position. (Moseley Aff., at 1.) But there is an obvious factual

dispute in the record on this question, as the manufacturer’s letter of September 6, 2005 states

that Heavy Machines had contracted to perform such daily services. (Doc. 16 at Exh. B.) Courts

are ill-suited to resolve such conflicting evidence at the summary judgment stage. Besides,

defendant assumes that plaintiff’s negligence and wantonness theories hinge exclusively on a

duty to perform daily maintenance and inspections, but this assumption is unwarranted. The

pleadings are not so narrowly circumscribed, instead referring to negligence in maintenance,

repairs or inspections generally, not just daily inspections or maintenance. Thus, plaintiff claims

that Heavy Machines performed negligent or wanton maintenance or repair of the forklift, not

necessarily that its negligence arose from a daily inspection obligation. And plaintiff states in

his discovery responses that (i) he had personally seen Heavy Machines work on this equipment

in the past; and (ii) Heavy Machines had previously replaced broken studs on the right wheel,

but had performed that repair improperly, causing the wheel to fall off on the date of the

accident. (Id.) This evidence suffices to create genuine issues of fact, and defendant would not

be entitled to summary judgment on its argument concerning daily inspections and maintenance.

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IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 16) is

granted, and plaintiff’s claims against Heavy Machines are dismissed with prejudice as

untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. A separate judgment will enter. In light of

this determination, defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 21) is moot.

DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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