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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2010 Decided January 21, 2011

No. 09-5315

IONA D. CALHOUN,

APPELLANT

v.

MARTHA N. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-01441)

James L. Fuchs argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Ari Taragin and Michael J. Snider.

Claire Whitaker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Iona Calhoun brought

suit against her employer, the General Services Administration

(GSA), claiming (inter alia) discrimination and retaliation in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of GSA. Before us on appeal are Calhoun’s claims that

GSA violated Title VII by failing to select her for positions in its

Office of Information Technology and Office of Real Property. 

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court’s

grant of summary judgment dismissing Calhoun’s claim that

GSA unlawfully discriminated against her in connection with

the Office of Information Technology position, and we remand

that claim for trial. We affirm the district court’s judgment with

respect to the remaining claims.

I

In 2000, Iona Calhoun, an African-American, was a GS-13

Computer Specialist in GSA’s Office of Information

Technology (OIT). In December of that year, she applied for a

newly created position as a GS-14 Computer Specialist. OIT’s

Division Director, Paul Whitson, left on vacation before the

application period ended and before Calhoun applied. Whitson

assigned his deputy, Wanda Peterson-Parker, as the selecting

official in his absence. As he was leaving, however, he directed

her to select Tokey Bradfield, an Asian-American, for the

position.1

 Peterson-Parker followed Whitson’s directive and

selected Bradfield. See GSA Br. 2.

1

See GSA Br. 2 (“For purposes of this appeal, GSA concedes that

Whitson directed Peterson-Parker to select Bradfield.”). 

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By 2003, Calhoun had become a Program Specialist in

GSA’s Office of Real Property (ORP). During 2003-04, she

applied for three higher-paying ORP vacancies. ORP’s director,

Stanley Langfeld, did not select Calhoun for any of the three

positions. Instead, he selected Kenneth Holstrom, Robert

Burmeister, and Virginia McDonald, all of whom are white.

Calhoun’s Title VII suit alleges that, by failing to select her

for the OIT and ORP positions, GSA discriminated against her

on account of race and retaliated against her for engaging in

protected activity. The district court disagreed and granted the

government’s motion for summary judgment. With respect to

the OIT position, the court concluded that, “[b]ecause Calhoun

has not presented any evidence to refute Whitson’s

nondiscriminatory reason [for hiring Bradfield], GSA is entitled

to summary judgment.” Calhoun v. Prouty, 643 F. Supp. 2d 87,

94 (D.D.C. 2009). With respect to the ORP positions, the court

found that Calhoun had failed to submit any “evidence that

would reasonably support a conclusion that Langfield’s stated

reasons [for selecting Holstrom, Burmeister, and McDonald] are

pretextual.” Id. 

II

“We review the district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment de novo.” Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298

F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is

appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A dispute about a material fact

“is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. In making that determination, the court “must view

the evidence in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving

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party], draw all reasonable inferences in her favor, and eschew

making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” 

Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

Title VII prohibits federal agencies from discriminating

against their employees on account of race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(a), and from retaliating against them for asserting their rights

under Title VII, see Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1088. Where, as here,

the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination or

retaliation, we analyze her claims under the framework of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05

(1973), as simplified by Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms,

520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under Brady, once the

employer has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for a challenged employment action, the “central question” is

whether “the employee produced sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted

non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the

employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on

the basis of race.” 520 F.3d at 494; see Jones v Bernanke, 557

F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that “these principles

apply equally to retaliation claims”). “Usually, proffering

‘evidence from which a jury could find that [the employer’s]

stated reasons . . . were pretextual . . . will be enough to get a

plaintiff’s claim to a jury.’” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405,

413 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Carpenter v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage

Ass’n, 165 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 

In subpart A, we consider Calhoun’s claims regarding

GSA’s failure to select her for the OIT Computer Specialist

position. In subpart B, we consider her claims regarding the

agency’s failure to select her for the ORP vacancies.

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A

Calhoun contends that Whitson discriminated against her on

the basis of race by directing his deputy, Peterson-Parker, to hire

Bradfield for the OIT position. GSA responds that Whitson

could not have knowingly discriminated against Calhoun

because he issued his directive as he was leaving for vacation --

before Calhoun had applied for the job. Calhoun counters,

supported by testimony from Peterson-Parker, that she was one

of only two employees in Whitson’s division who were qualified

to apply for the position. (Peterson-Parker pointedly excluded

Bradfield from that list. EEOC Hr’g Tr. 208-09 (June 6, 2006).) 

It stands to reason, Calhoun argues, that Whitson would have

expected one of the few qualified GS-13 Computer Specialists

in his division to apply for his new GS-14 Computer Specialist

position. The fact that Calhoun had not done so by the time

Whitson left for vacation is hardly dispositive, she maintains,

given that the application period had not yet closed. PetersonParker’s testimony that Whitson “knew who was eligible and

who could apply for the position,” id. at 207, supports Calhoun’s

contention. This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to

conclude that Whitson knew Calhoun would likely be a

candidate for the position, and thus to reject the argument that

he could not have knowingly discriminated against her.

GSA also suggests that Whitson did not discriminate, but

merely gave the position to Bradfield because she was already

performing the work. There is, however, a genuine dispute on

that point. Even Whitson’s strongest statement claimed nothing

more than that “Bradfield had performed work similar to the

work required by the announced position, but at a lower grade

level . . . . She was clearly ready and able to undertake similar

work at the higher grade level.” Whitson Aff. 3 (Mar. 12, 2004)

(emphasis added). Whitson’s statement that Bradfield was

“ready” to perform “similar” work suggests he believed that

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Bradfield was qualified for the new position. It does not

indicate that she was already performing its responsibilities. 

Moreover, Peterson-Parker bluntly disputed GSA’s contention: 

she testified that Bradfield had neither performed similar work

nor demonstrated the capacity to do so. EEOC Hr’g Tr. 175-77.

GSA’s principal defense to the claim of discriminatory nonselection is that Whitson chose Bradfield because he believed

she was the most qualified candidate. Peterson-Parker,

however, strongly disputed that Bradfield was better qualified

than Calhoun. See id. at 176. And because Peterson-Parker was

Whitson’s deputy and at least formally the selecting official for

the position, see EEO Counselor’s Rep. 4 (June 7, 2001); EEOC

Hr’g Tr. 126, a jury could reasonably conclude that she was

well-positioned to evaluate the candidates’ relative

qualifications. 

Peterson-Parker’s testimony regarding those qualifications

was quite specific. On three of the four factors listed in the job

vacancy notice, Peterson-Parker testified that Calhoun was the

superior candidate by a wide margin. Calhoun, she said: (1)

had superior “knowledge of internet and Federal Information

Technology policies, principles, and guidance”; (2) had better

“demonstrated the ability to provide guidance and assistance to

inter-agency committees [and] other constituencies in support of

government-wide activities”; and (3) had a greater “ability to

communicate effectively, orally and in writing.” EEOC Hr’g Tr.

145-47, 152-54, 160-63, 165-67; Peterson-Parker Dep. 28-31

(Aug. 12, 2005). On a scale of 0 to 100, Peterson-Parker gave

Calhoun scores of 90, 95, and 100 on these factors; she gave

Bradfield scores of only 60, 40, and 50. EEOC Hr’g Tr. 152-54,

163, 165-67. 

Moreover, Peterson-Parker testified to a significant failing

on Bradfield’s part, which she also substantiated with

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specificity. Bradfield, she said, was unable to effectively

provide guidance to inter-agency committees, a skill expressly

required in the vacancy announcement. As evidence, PetersonParker testified that Bradfield refused her requests to address

quarterly inter-agency forums because “it was a form of public

speaking she did not care to do.” Peterson-Parker Dep. 28. 

Bradfield, she said, “was not a communicator.” Id.; see also

EEOC Hr’g Tr. 162 (testifying that Bradfield “was insecure with

her oral communication skills”). 

GSA maintains that Whitson’s decision was nonetheless

justified because Bradfield was superior with respect to a fourth

job factor that Whitson believed to be of paramount importance: 

“technical skill relating to the GSA internet page.” EEO

Counselor’s Rep. 4 (June 7, 2001). But Peterson-Parker

contradicted Whitson’s evaluation of the candidates’ technical

skills, rating the two as roughly equivalent in that regard. Id. at

154-55. More important, all four factors were listed in the

vacancy announcement, and Peterson-Parker testified that

Calhoun was not only far superior in three of those respects, but

far superior overall. Indeed, she gave Calhoun an overall rating

of 100/100, while giving Bradfield a rating of only 50/100. 

EEOC Hr’g Tr. 167. Based on Whitson’s affidavit, GSA further

maintains that he reasonably discounted Calhoun’s

qualifications because they “were based primarily on education

and . . . she did not have the depth of experience [Bradfield]

had.” Whitson Aff. 3 (Mar. 12, 2004). But once again,

Peterson-Parker offered contrary testimony, stating that Calhoun

was significantly more experienced with respect to the majority

of the factors listed in the vacancy announcement. See, e.g.,

EEOC Hr’g Tr. 152-54, 160-63, 165-67 (testifying that Calhoun

“was highly qualified based upon the work she had done for

years” and had superior communications skills “based upon the

experience gained over the years”); see also Peterson-Parker

Dep. 20-23. 

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As we have repeatedly held, “‘[i]f a factfinder can conclude

that a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be

significantly better qualified for the job, but this employer did

not, the factfinder can legitimately infer that the employer

consciously selected a less-qualified candidate -- something that

employers do not usually do, unless some other strong

consideration, such as discrimination, enters into the picture.’” 

Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1091-92 (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr.,

156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)); see Holcomb

v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under such

circumstances, a grant of summary judgment in favor of the

employer is unwarranted. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1299 (reversing

grant of summary judgment where there was “sufficient

evidence in the record so that a reasonable jury could conclude

that [the plaintiff] was markedly more qualified than [the

selectee], thus throwing into doubt the reason given for his

rejection”); see Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897; Lathram, 336 F.3d at

1091. In Calhoun’s case, “because a reasonable jury could find

that [she] was not only qualified for the job but substantially

more qualified than [the selectee], and because such a jury could

further conclude that [GSA’s] assertions to the contrary were

pretextual, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

this count was in error and must be reversed.” Lathram, 336

F.3d at 1092.2

2

In addition to contending that GSA failed to select her for the

OIT position because of racial discrimination, Calhoun further

contends that the non-selection constituted retaliation for her prior

“EEO activity.” Am. Compl. ¶ 67. The only such activity that she

identifies is an “EEOC complaint” that she apparently filed in 1989

and settled in 1993. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 14. This activity, however,

took place at least seven years before the non-selection of which she

complains. Calhoun offers no direct evidence that the reason for her

non-selection was retaliatory, and the length of time between the

activity and the non-selection is far too great to suggest a causal

connection on its own. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532

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B

Calhoun also charges that GSA discriminated and retaliated

against her by selecting three other candidates for positions as

Program Experts in the Office of Real Property during 2003-04. 

With respect to these positions, however, the qualifications gap

between Calhoun and the selectees ran decidedly in the

selectees’ favor.

Langfeld, the ORP supervisor, testified that he chose the

winning candidates on the basis of their real estate experience,

and that Calhoun’s experience was inferior to that of the

selectees. Langfeld Aff. 3-4 (June 15, 2004); Langfeld Aff. 2-4

(Dec. 13, 2004); Langfeld Dep. 12-15 (Jan. 11, 2006). 

Holstrom, Burmeister, and McDonald, the selectees, had twentynine, sixteen, and twenty-two years of real estate experience

respectively. Langfeld Aff. 3 (June 15, 2004); Langfeld Aff. 3

(Dec. 13, 2004). Calhoun, by contrast, had no more than three. 

Calhoun Dep. 87 (Apr. 10, 2008). Although Calhoun maintains

that real estate experience was not “apposite to the Program

Expert position,” Calhoun Br. 32, she offers no evidence for that

assertion.

Calhoun contends that she was more qualified than

Burmeister and Holstrom because GSA’s human resources

department gave her a higher initial rating than it gave them. 

But a qualifications gap alone will not support an inference that

an employer’s claim that it hired based on merit was pretextual

U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (finding that a two-year gap was too great to

raise the inference of causality necessary to a prima facie case). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment for GSA on the OIT retaliation claim.

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unless the gap is “great enough to be inherently indicative of

discrimination.” Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d

1222, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In this case it was not. With respect to Burmeister, Calhoun’s

evidence is -- at best -- that her initial rating was only

marginally higher than his. See Calhoun Dep. 86-87 (Apr. 10,

2008) (asserting that Calhoun received a score of 91.60, while

Burmeister received a score of 91.49). With respect to

Holstrom, she says nothing more than that her rating was

“higher,” with no measure of quantification at all. Id. at 64-65. 

 Moreover, Calhoun does not dispute the district court’s finding

that the selecting officer would not even have received those

initial ratings. See Calhoun, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 94. Under these

circumstances, and considering her far more limited real estate

experience, the district court correctly held that Calhoun’s

claims regarding the ORP positions could not survive. 

III

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of Calhoun’s claim that GSA violated Title VII by

failing to select her for the OIT position in 2000, and we remand

that claim for trial. With respect to Calhoun’s other claims, the

district court’s judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

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