Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05019/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05019-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been

substituted for Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

We note that counsel did report her time in minutes rather than hours. In the future,

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counsel is directed to report her time in hours.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DOROTHEA B. KEITH PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-5019

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Dorothea Keith, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On November 7, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 10). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $3361.17 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 20.8 hours of work before the court at an 2

hourly rate of $156.25 for work performed in 2005 and $160.00 per hour for work performed in

2006, as well as $61.17 in expenses. (Doc. # 13). The defendant has filed a response objecting

the counsel’s request for fees. (Doc. # 13). Specifically, the defendant objected to counsel’s

time entries for December 1, 2005, and December 2, 2005, as those entries were made prior to

the time that the complaint was filed with the court. The defendant also contends that the time

entries for March 10, 2006, are not compensable under EAJA, as these tasks could have been

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The defendant also raises an objection to the amount of costs requested by counsel, 3

stating that the amount sought in counsel’s itemized statement is different from the amount

noted in counsel’s motion. However, after reviewing the pleadings, the court is of the

opinion that counsel has sufficiently stated her fees and is entitled to receive $61.17.

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performed by member’s of counsel’s staff. In addition, the defendant states that the court should

only award plaintiff’s counsel 6 hours for the preparation of her brief because said brief was filed

approximately three months after its due date.3

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

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Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

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$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory

rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special

factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the

discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson

v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased

when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly

attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit and has

presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. She has also requested an hourly rate of

$156.25 for work performed in 2005 and $160.00 per hour for work performed in 2006.

The Commissioner has not raised an objection to the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s

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counsel. We note, however, that an award based upon an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour,

reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards in cases

in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon

the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this

case is $150.00 per hour. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 3.33 hours of attorney work performed

between December 1, 2005, and January 26, 2006. The Complaint was not filed in this court

until February 1, 2006. (Doc. # 1). We note that time spent at the administrative level is not

compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984).

However, we do note that some of the time submitted was clearly in preparation for the filing

of the Complaint with this court and should be allowed. Therefore, we will deduct 1.33 hour.

Counsel also requests reimbursement for 1.00 hour of time for preparing letters of

service, .16 hour for sending and receiving email notifications of filing, and .25 hour for

forwarding a copy of her appeal brief to her client. However, the court finds that these tasks

could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813

F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not

compensable under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are not compensable under the EAJA.

Therefore, 1.41 attorney hours must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by

counsel.

Counsel has also requested .17 for reviewing the order adopting the report and

recommendation and 3.25 hours for preparing her motion for EAJA fees. This court concludes

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that it should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases this

amount of time to perform this task. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark.

1989). Therefore we are deducting 1.82 hour from the total number of compensable hours

sought. 

We note the defendant’s argument that we should reduce the number of hours awarded

to plaintiff’s counsel for preparation of her appeal brief. However, although counsel’s brief was

filed late, it was not strickened from the record. Further, it appears as though the brief was

considered when this court entered the order directing remand. Accordingly, because the time

requested is not excessive, we will award counsel the time she has requested for the preparation

of said appeal brief. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $58.61 in expenses incurred with regard to the

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $61.17 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 16.24 (20.8-4.56) attorney hours, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, and $61.17 in expenses,

for a total attorney's fee award of $2497.17. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

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at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 16th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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