Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02167/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02167-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVAN VON STAICH,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2167 DFL DAD P

vs.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action. By order

filed July 26, 2005, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s

amended complaint is now before the court.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against any governmental entity or officer or employee of such an entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of the claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). For

purposes of reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of

the complaint. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The

court also construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolves all

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976).

“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Supervisory

personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory

of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the

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causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441

(9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official

personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In his amended complaint, which exceeds three hundred pages in length, plaintiff

seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against the commissioners of the California Board of

Prison Terms for “currently violating his United States Constitutional due process rights in

accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Plaintiff asserts that he is suing “all BPT

Commissioners” but names only Commissioner Welch and Deputy Commissioner Quintiliani,

whom he has sued in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff states that he is serving a

fifteen-year indeterminate prison term for one count of second degree murder pursuant to his

conviction in Orange County Superior Court in 1983.

Plaintiff sets forth ten claims for relief regarding his parole consideration hearing

conducted on November 5, 2002: (1) the BPT commissioners used “special circumstances”

language as the primary basis for deferring further parole consideration for four years, contrary to

a 1988 decision of the United States Supreme Court finding such language unconstitutionally

vague; (2) the BPT commissioners illegally placed plaintiff’s crime under the state’s matrix for

first degree murder when they used “special circumstances” language as the primary basis for

deferring further parole consideration for four years; (3) the BPT commissioners applied the

wrong standard when they used the “some evidence” standard instead of a “substantial evidence”

standard; (4) the BPT commissioners converted plaintiff’s sentence to life without possibility of

parole when they considered and relied on plaintiff’s nine disciplinary convictions; (5) the BPT

commissioners failed to use appropriate procedures when they failed to follow “the statutory

mandate of PC §2931(b),” (6) the BPT commissioners violated plaintiff’s due process rights

when they deferred further parole consideration hearing for four years; (7) the BPT

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commissioners violated principles of state law when they relied on a staff psychologist’s report

dated February 22, 2002, to conclude that plaintiff’s violence potential in the community is

somewhat higher than the average citizen’s and to defer further parole consideration for four

years; (8) the BPT commissioners violated plaintiff’s procedural due process rights when they

refused to consider plaintiff’s extensive physical injuries and documented disabilities that fall

within the parameters of the Americans With Disabilities Act; (9) the BPT commissioners denied

plaintiff his religious rights when they relied on seven disciplinary convictions for violating

prison grooming standards as part of their decision to defer further parole consideration for four

years; and (10) the BPT commissioners deliberately followed a political policy supported by the

executive branch when they denied parole. Plaintiff does not allege any further actions by the

BPT commissioners after November 5, 2002, but alleges that the defendants’ actions are ongoing

and comprise a continuing violation.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring BPT commissioners to

cease all acts, policies, and practices described in his amended complaint, to stop using special

circumstances language, to stop using first degree murder matrices for second degree murderers,

to stop conducting “mini-trials” to enhance plaintiff’s sentence, to use the “substantial evidence”

standard instead of the “some evidence” standard, to follow applicable administrative procedures

regarding credits, to defer further consideration for only one year, to stop using the staff

psychologist’s 2002 evaluation of plaintiff’s violence potential or, in the alternative, to allow

plaintiff to obtain an independent psychologist’s evaluation, to stop using plaintiff’s failure to

pursue a vocational trade as a basis for a four-year deferral, to stop using plaintiff’s crime of

conviction and previous convictions as the primary reason for a four-year deferral, to stop using

plaintiff’s nine disciplinary convictions as a reason for a four-year deferral when seven of the

convictions were for grooming violations arising from plaintiff’s religious beliefs, and to follow

state law with regard to procedures for inmates convicted of second degree murder.

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The court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state claims upon

which relief can be granted under § 1983. Although plaintiff does not seek damages and does

not request an order declaring the BPT’s 2002 decision invalid, plaintiff’s claims for declaratory

relief are predicated on allegations concerning the invalidity of the 2002 decision to deny parole

and defer further consideration for four years. The judgment plaintiff seeks would necessarily

invalidate the 2002 decision. Plaintiff’s sole federal remedy for obtaining such relief is a writ of

habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

In 2001, eighteen California state prisoners brought similar claims in a civil rights

action in which they alleged that the current and previous governors of California and the

chairman and members of the Board of Prison Terms, among others, have administered and

continue to administer the state’s parole statutes to achieve an unwritten, unconstitutional policy

of denying parole to inmates convicted of certain offenses and serving life sentences. 

McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the civil rights complaint. The prisoners’ claims for

monetary damages implied the invalidity of their continuing confinement and were not

cognizable. 369 F.3d at 1097-98. The inmates were precluded from seeking prospective relief

requiring constitutionally adequate parole hearings in the future because, in order to establish

their standing to seek such relief, each plaintiff would have to allege personal injury traceable to

the defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct, and any allegation of personal injury would

necessarily imply the invalidity of the inmate’s confinement. Id. at 1098-99. The court

concluded that “the prospective relief they seek is unattainable in § 1983 proceedings, illustrating

why their remedy lies in federal habeas proceedings.” Id. at 1098.

In this case, as in McQuillion, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate standing for the

prospective relief he seeks unless he alleges personal injury in the form of unconstitutional

confinement. Because the sole remedy for unconstitutional confinement lies in habeas

proceedings, plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

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under § 1983. Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed as legally frivolous and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to amend his complaint and has been

unable to cure all of the defects of the original complaint. It does not appear that plaintiff can

cure the defect described above.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed as

legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 29, 2005.

DAD:13

stai2167.56

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