Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07409/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07409-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Petitioner is presently serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole as a result of

having been convicted in 1999 of first degree murder with special circumstances. Petitioner is serving

that sentence consecutive to a sentence of 95 years to life imprisonment. Those sentences are not the

subject of the instant petition. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TARAY T. MORRIS,

Petitioner,

 v.

TONY MALFI, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 06-7409 SI

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD

In this petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner challenges his 2004 conviction, pursuant to

a guilty plea, for possession of a weapon while incarcerated.1 Petitioner waived his right to counsel and

represented himself in the 2004 case. In the instant petition, petitioner raises three challenges to the

2004 conviction. First, petitioner contends that he was denied substantive due process when he was

tried, adjudicated and sentenced in 2004 while mentally incompetent. Second, he contends that he was

denied his right to assistance of counsel because he was incompetent and did not validly waive his right

to counsel. Third, petitioner contends that he was denied his right to a jury trial because he was

incompetent and did not validly waive his right to trial. 

Petitioner has filed a motion to augment the record to include the October 19, 2009 declaration

of Natasha Khazanov, Ph.D, and the Bates stamped documents that Dr. Khazanov reviewed in

preparation for rendering her expert opinions in this case, pages 00001 through 000407. Dr. Khazanov

is a neuropsychologist, and in her declaration she opines about petitioner’s mental state and concludes,

Case 3:06-cv-07409-SI Document 48 Filed 01/14/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Section 2254(e)(2) provides: 

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that- 

(A) the claim relies on- 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;

or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

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inter alia, that petitioner suffers from “significant organic brain damage and chronic psychopathology,”

that petitioner was “seriously mentally impaired” as early as 1999, and that petitioner could not have

knowingly and intelligently entered the guilty plea in 2004. Petitioner contends that Dr. Khazanov’s

declaration, and the materials that she reviewed in preparing that declaration, are directly relevant to his

claims that he was mentally incompetent in 2004 when he waived his right to counsel and entered the

guilty plea.

Petitioner moves to expand the record pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,

which provides that “[i]f a petition is not dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to expand the

record by submitting additional materials relating to the petition.” Petitioners seeking relief based on

new evidence must either meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)2

 or show that they exercised

diligence to develop the factual basis of the claims in state court. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649,

652-53 (2004); Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner does not

argue that he meets the requirements of § 2254(e)(2), and instead the parties’ dispute focuses on whether

petitioner exercised diligence in his state court habeas petitions. 

Respondents contend that the record should not be expanded because petitioner has not acted

diligently because he did not seek an evidentiary hearing in state court. “While ‘diligence’ has not been

precisely defined in this context, the Supreme Court has advised that ‘[d]iligence will require in the

usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner

prescribed by state law.’ Williams v. Taylor (Williams II), 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000).” Libberton v.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1165 (9th Cir. 2009). However, as petitioner notes, in Williams II the Supreme

Court also stated: “For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the

prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional

error.” Williams II, 529 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added); see also Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1241

(Diligence “depends upon whether petitioner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.”). Petitioner argues that his mental

illness precluded him from requesting an evidentiary hearing in state court, and that his failure to seek

such a hearing in state court should not be construed as a lack of diligence. Petitioner notes that

throughout the state court habeas proceedings he acted pro se, with the help of a fellow inmate.

Petitioner argues that as a result of his mental illness, he was unable to seek funding from the state court,

obtain an expert witness, arrange for himself to be examined for symptoms of organic brain damage and

other neurological testing, and submit to the state court an expert report and documentation of his

psychiatric treatment in the state prison. 

This Court has already held that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations based on “uncontroverted evidence that [petitioner] had acute psychiatric symptoms as early

as February 10, 2005,” and that “Petitioner’s mental health history encompasses a genetic predisposition

for schizophrenia, severe head trauma, and hallucinations.” July 21, 2008 Order at 2. In light of

petitioner’s mental health history, and the fact that he was representing himself throughout the state

court habeas proceedings, the Court finds that there was no lack of diligence. 

Respondents also contend that if the record is augmented, the new evidence would render

petitioner’s claims unexhausted. Respondents do not identify any specific way in which Dr. Khazanov’s

declaration transforms the claims such that they would be unexhausted. A petitioner satisfies the

exhaustion requirement if the petitioner has “fairly presented” the federal claims to the state’s highest

court provide it with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise

in federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam). A claim has been “fairly

presented” if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the “the constitutional claim . .

. inherent in those facts.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971). New factual allegations render

a claim unexhausted if they “fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts.”

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United States District Court

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 In Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526 (1986), the state appellate court “upheld a consent

decree affirming the right of state prisoners to refuse antipsychotic medications except under certain

limited circumstances.” In re Qawi, 32 Cal.4th 1, 21 (2004). Under California law, the Keyhea

procedures govern the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications.

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Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). 

The Court finds that Dr. Khazanov’s declaration and the records on which she relied do not

render petitioner’s claims unexhausted. The pro se state court habeas petitions set forth the same basic

claims based on the same basic facts as those alleged in the federal petition. For example, the state

habeas petition filed with the California Supreme Court asserted that petitioner had been denied his

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because he was “tried and adjudicated to punishment while he

is mentally incompetent,” he was not provided with counsel, and he was deprived of his right to a jury

trial. Docket No.11, Ex. 7. The state habeas petitions were also accompanied by the Keyhea

involuntary medication petitions and orders3

, and the reports of petitioner’s hospitalization and

rehabilitation after suffering a severe brain injury in 1999 that resulted in a coma and brain damage. Id.

Ex. 8-9. Rather than fundamentally altering the claims that were presented to the state courts, Dr.

Khazanov’s declaration merely provides additional evidentiary support for those claims. See

Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), rev’d on other grds, 550 U.S. 465

(2007). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS petitioner’s motion to augment the record. (Docket No. 36).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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