Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01145/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01145-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-1145

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William G. Carter, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Julia Hassell; Dillian Hogan, * Eastern District of Missouri.

*

Appellees, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Janet Sidebottom, *

*

Defendant, *

*

Jennifer Chamberlin; Alan Blake, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: March 6, 2008

Filed: March 12, 2008

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Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

William G. Carter, who is civilly committed to the Missouri Sexual Offender

Treatment Center (MSOTC), appeals the district court’s Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against MSOTC

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employees Julia Hassell, Dillian Hogan, Jennifer Chamberlin, and Alan Blake. For

the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the

district court.

Reviewing the dismissal de novo, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1974 (2007) (pleading standard to avoid Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Levy v. Ohl, 477

F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review), we hold that dismissal of Carter’s

claims against Blake was proper, because Blake could not be held liable for the

conduct alleged, see Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (§ 1983

liability requires personal involvement in or direct responsibility for actions resulting

in violation). In addition, it was proper to dismiss Carter’s claim against Chamberlin,

because the allegations are insufficient to describe the violation of a constitutional

right. See Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964-69 (factual allegations of complaint must

do more than state speculative right to relief on assumption that all allegations in

complaint are true; complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal

theory). 

Likewise, Carter’s allegation that Hogan “sexual[ly assault[ed]” him by

touching him “around his genital area” are too vague and nonspecific to raise a section

1983 Fourth Amendment claim that the touching constituted an unreasonable search,

i.e., one the scope of which was not warranted by its purpose.

We further conclude that the court correctly denied Carter’s motion for default

judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(4) (defendants who timely waive

service must serve answer within 60 days; if defendant serves motion under Rule 12,

period for filing responsive pleading is extended to 10 days after court decides

motion), and did not abuse its discretion in denying Carter’s motions for appointed

counsel, see Phillips v. Jasper County Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard

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Carter also complains that the district court failed to issue a case management

order notifying Carter about when he could amend his complaint, but Carter could

have amended his complaint at any time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (party may amend

party’s pleading once as matter of course before responsive pleading is filed).

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of review and factors); Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996) (trial court has

broad discretion in deciding whether to appoint counsel to indigent civil litigant).1

We conclude, however, that Carter’s allegations are sufficient to state a section

1983 excessive force claim against Hassell. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197,

2200 (2007) (per curiam) (pro se complaints should be liberally construed). Carter

alleged that Hassell hit him with a walkie-talkie “for no justified reason” and injured

him, facts that do not facially show that the force Hassell used was reasonably

necessary under the circumstances. See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 & n.7

(8th Cir. 2001) (setting forth elements of excessive-force claim and applying

“objective reasonableness” standard to such claims brought by civilly committed

individuals; listing relevant factors for determining if force was excessive); Ring v.

First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissal is

appropriate only in unusual case where plaintiff includes allegations showing on face

of complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief). The facts Carter alleged also

fairly imply that Hassell struck Carter on purpose, and thus they state an assault-andbattery claim under Missouri law. See Phelps v. Boss, 73 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2002) (discussing elements of state assault-and-battery claim).

The dismissal of Carter’s claims against Blake, Chamberlin, and Hogan is

affirmed. The dismissal of the claim against Hassell is reversed, and the case is

remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

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