Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-03657/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-03657-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

DONNETTA BLOW, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-12-S-3657-NE

)

VIRGINIA COLLEGE, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Donnetta Blow, asserts claims against Virginia College, her former

employer, for: race discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; race discrimination

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and retaliation. The case currently is before the court

1

on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, 2

briefs, and evidentiary submissions, the court concludes the motion should be

granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

See doc. no. 11 (Amended Complaint). 1

 Doc. no. 22. 2

FILED

 2014 Aug-14 AM 10:08

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 1 of 32
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In

other words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

“In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v.

City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the nonmoving party are not unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is

only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but

is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d

1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis and alteration

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 2 of 32
(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”).

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

A. Background Information and Plaintiff’s Employment History

Defendant, Virginia College, is a private higher education institution with

campuses in several locations, including Huntsville, Alabama. Plaintiff, Donnetta 3

Blow, began working for Virginia College as a receptionist in the Admissions Office

at the Huntsville, Alabama campus on June 9, 2008. She was promoted to the

position of Admissions Associate I, with more than a fifty percent pay raise, on

August 11, 2008. All Admissions Associates were “responsible for the recruitment

4

and selection of qualified applicants for admission to programs of Virginia College

and for appropriate follow-up to assure successful matriculation.” There are three 5

levels of Admissions Associates at Virginia College: I, II, and III. Admissions

Associates begin working at Level I (as did plaintiff), and they are expected to

advance to Level II by the time of their second annual performance evaluation.

6

 Defendant’s evidentiary submission, Exhibit C (Declaration of Dean Mahaffey) ¶ 2. 3

Defendant’s evidentiary submission, Exhibit A (Deposition of Donnetta Blow), at 145-46. 4

Blow Deposition, Exhibit 11 (Education Corporation of America Admissions 5

Compensation Plan), at 3. 

 Mahaffey Declaration ¶ 7. 6

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 3 of 32
B. Evaluation Standards for Admissions Associates

Admissions Associates are evaluated based on certain performance standards

set forth in the Virginia College Compensation Plan and Job Description Summary

(“Compensation Plan). The performance standards and job responsibilities increase 7

for each Level of Admissions Associate. For example, a Level I Admissions

Associate is assigned an average of 18 “leads,” or potential recruits, each week, while

a Level II receives an average of 21 leads, and a Level III receives an average of 24. 

In addition to the leads assigned by the College, each Admissions Associate is

expected to independently generate referrals for recruitment development. 

8

All Admissions Associates also are expected to convert a certain number of

leads and referrals into applications, interviews, and enrollments, with the

expectations increasing for each Level. An Admissions Associate I is expected to

generate 10 appointments, 6 interviews, 3 applications, and 3 referrals each week. 

She also is expected to generate 20 new student starts each quarter, with 25% of those

starts coming from independent referrals. Ninety percent of the studentsrecruited by

an Admissions Associate I are expected to remain enrolled after 30 days; 80% are

expected to remain after 90 days, and 65% are expected to remain after 270 days. An

Id. ¶ 5. 7

 Blow Deposition, Exhibit 11, at 4. 8

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 4 of 32
Admissions Associate I is expected to convert 30% of her leads into interviews, 50%

of her interviews into applications, 75% of her applications into enrollments, and

80% of her enrollments into “starts” (i.e., students who actually start classes). Those

numbers translate into an overall expectation that 8% of an Admission Associate I’s

initial leads ultimately will be converted to starts.9

The expectations for a Level II Admissions Associate are slightly higher. An

Admissions Associate II is expected to generate 12 appointments, 8 interviews, 4

applications, and 4 referrals each week. She also is expected to generate 25 new

student starts each quarter, with 25% of those starts coming from independent

referrals. As with the Admissions Associate I, ninety percent ofthe studentsrecruited

by an Admissions Associate II are expected to remain enrolled after 30 days; 80% are

expected to remain after 90 days, and 65% are expected to remain after 270 days. An

Admissions Associate II is expected to convert 32% of her leads into interviews, 50%

of her interviews into applications, 75% of her applications into enrollments, and

80% of her enrollments into starts. Those numbers translate into an overall

expectation that 10% of an Admission Associate II’s initial leads ultimately will be

converted to starts.10

Id. at 5. 9

Id. 

10

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 5 of 32
Admissions Associates are evaluated against those standards in a weekly

Report Card, the purpose of which is to 

review weekly performance with each Associate, have a standard form

to communicate that activity, and formally record any remedial work

that needs to be accomplished to get or remain on track. The Report

Cards [also] measure pipeline activity and ensure that Associates are

practicing effective stewardship ofleads to achieve overall performance

goals.11

The Report Cards are based purely on objective data generated by the College’s

computerized record-keeping system. The primary areas reviewed each week by 12

management are whether the employee met her weekly Referral and Application

Targets, and whether she received an overall weekly performance score of at least 85.

Associates missing at least one of the measures each week must

be monitored and coached to improve performance in the deficient area,

and this should be noted on the Report Card. Associates failing to

achieve two of the three measures in a week will earn a “strike.” After

three “strikes” in consecutive weeks, the Associate is automatically

placed on a formal Performance Improvement Plan. 

13

In addition to the objective criteria graded on the Report Card, each Admissions

Associate is evaluated for “other qualitative issues germane to the Associate’s overall

performance such as scheduling, attendance, judgment, code of conduct, and

Id. at 6 (alteration supplied). See also Blow Deposition, at 261. 11

 Blow Deposition, Exhibit 11, at 6. 12

Id. at 8. 13

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 6 of 32
professional behavior.”14

The Compensation Plan states the following with regard to the imposition of

Performance Improvement Plans:

The goal of the Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) is to ensure

the Associate clearly understands the requirements for success in the

role and what steps are required to raise performance to a satisfactory

level. In order to remain employed during the PIP, the Associate must

demonstrate a reasonable performance improvement each week by

meeting or exceeding targets in Referrals, Applications, and overall

score . . . .

An Associate who earns two additional “strikes” in the 30 Day

PIP period may be terminated. An Admissions Associate who meets or

exceeds theReferral, Application, and Overall Score objectives for three

consecutive weeks in the PIP period earns his/her way off the

performance plan. A PIP will last from 2-4 weeks depending on the

performance of the Associate — it can lead to termination in as little as

2 weeks or lead to a return to “good-standing” employment status in

three or four weeks.

Unsatisfactory performance can result from other factors than

Report Card measurements, and should be handled in the same fashion

and time frame. Examples include scheduling/attendance,

professionalism, code of conduct, or other behavioral/judgment issues,

irrespective of quantitative performance. For whatever reason,

whenever substandard performance indicates possible termination, the

DOA [i.e., Director of Admissions] must seek and obtain the advice and

support of the campus president and HR.

This PIP process will be implemented consistently in the ECA

[i.e., Education Corporation of America, the parent organization to

Virginia College] Admissions organization. A manager who fails to

implement this consistently is subject to his/her own performance and

Id. 14

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 7 of 32
disciplinary action.15

C. Assignment of Leads

Prospective student leads originate from a variety of sources. “Paid leads” are

generated when a prospective student clicks on a Virginia College link or logo on an

Internet site and provides contact information that is forwarded to an Admissions

Associate for follow-up. Leads also may be generated through the “CARS System,” 16

which connects interested telephone callers directly to available Admissions

Associates. Finally, a lead may be generated when a “walk-in” student physically 17

appears at the Admissions Office and expresses interest in attending the College.18

Distribution of leads among the various Admissions Associates is controlled

by the receptionist, who creates a distribution list each week based on the previous

week’s performance chart reflecting each Associate’s number of enrollments,

applications, referrals, interviews, and appointments. The receptionistranks all ofthe

Associates from highest to lowest, depending on their performance the previous

week. The general practice was for the receptionist to distribute the leads in a

19

Id. (alterations supplied). 15

 Blow Deposition, at 203-04. 16

Id. at 207-08. The record does not indicates what the acronym “CARS” stands for. 17

Id. at 218. 18

Defendant’s evidentiarysubmission, Exhibit D (Declaration of Susan Poyer) ¶ 3; Mahaffey 19

Declaration ¶ 9; Blow Deposition, at 218, 220-21, 231-32. 

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 8 of 32
“round-robin” fashion, beginning with the Associate whose name was on top of the

distribution list. Once each Associate on the distribution list had received a lead, the

receptionist would start again at the top of the list. Receptionists were supposed to

ensure that the distribution of leads was as balanced as possible each week.

20

However, plaintiff testified that, in practice, the distribution of leads was not always

equitable. For example, if an Associate was away from the office or otherwise

unavailable when the time came for a lead to be assigned to her, she would be

skipped, and the receptionist would not always go back and assign leads to that

Associate when she became available. Additionally, even if an Associate was

present, her name might not be placed on the list on any given day or week if the

Director of Admissions thought she was underperforming. It is undisputed, though,

21

that whenever the receptionist distributed leads, the only information she had wasthe

name of the lead, except in limited circumstances where the lead was a possible

duplicate of one already registered in the College’s computer system. The

receptionist had no way of knowing whether any given lead was “good” or “bad,” in

the sense of the likelihood that it would lead to an enrollment. 

22

Generally, if a given lead had already been assigned to a particular Admissions

 Poyer Declaration ¶ 3. 20

 Blow Deposition, at 218-20. 21

 Poyer Declaration ¶ 5. 22

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 9 of 32
Associate, any subsequent calls or other inquires from that lead would be channeled

to the same Associate, although if the previously assigned Associate was not

available, any available Associate could talk to the lead in order to address immediate

questions. Further, if a lead was generated that had been previously assigned to an 23

Associate who no longer worked for Virginia College, or who had not been in contact

with the lead during the last six months, that lead would be assigned to the next

Associate on the distribution list. Those leads generally are referred to as “reassigned

leads.”24

D. Plaintiff’s 2010 Performance Evaluations

Angela Beck, a white female, became the Admissions Manager (also referred

to as the Director of Admissions) and, therefore, plaintiff’s direct supervisor, during

June of 2010. On plaintiff’s July 2010 performance review, Beck rated plaintiff’s 25

performance as “Outstanding,” which was the second highest of five possible rating

categories. Plaintiff disputed thatrating, because a whitemale employee named Jeff 26

Brown received the same rating, and his performance was not as good as hers. 

Plaintiff believed her performance should have been rated at the higher,

 Blow Deposition, at 210-11. 23

Id. at 239-41. 24

Id. at 149-51. 25

Id. at 299-302; Blow Deposition, Exhibit 17, at 2. 26

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 10 of 32
“Exceptional” level, and the College elevated the rating to accommodate plaintiff’s

request. Angela Beck and Jim Foster, the President of the Huntsville campus, 27

signed the document memorializing the elevation of plaintiff’s rating. Even before 28

plaintiff’s rating was elevated from“Outstanding” to “Exceptional,” her performance

was good enough to warrant a promotion to Admissions Associate II. She received 29

that promotion, and a raise of approximately $2,000, in July of 2010. 

30

Plaintiff received three consecutive strikes on her October 24, October 31, and

November 7, 2010 performance evaluations as a result of her failure to meet the

minimum standards of her position. Those strikes were noted on the Report Card

plaintiff received on November 17, 2010. Because of those three strikes, plaintiff 31

received a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) on November 17, 2010. The PIP 32

notified plaintiff that her performance was not at an acceptable level, and that she

should work to attain at least the following minimum goals:

C Make a sufficient number of daily follow-up telephone calls to

 Blow Deposition, at 295-302, 305-06 and Exhibit 20. 27

 Blow Deposition, at Exhibit 20. 28

Blow Deposition, at Exhibit 19 (July 16, 2010 Email from Dean Mahaffey to Donnetta 29

Blow).

Blow Deposition, at 146 and Exhibit 7 (Personnel Action Form), at ECF 63. See also 30

Mahaffey Declaration ¶ 3. 

 Blow Deposition, at 313 and Exhibit 23 (November 17, 2010 Report Card). 31

Blow Deposition, at 314 and Exhibit 24 (November 17, 2010 Warning Letter and 32

Performance Improvement Plan).

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 11 of 32
prospective students to schedule a minimum average of 12 new

appointments per week.

C Conduct a minimum average of 8 new interviews per week with

prospective students.

C Secure a minimum weekly average of 4 new prospective students

by way of referral from past, present, or future students.

C Secure a minimum weekly average of 4 new applications for

admissions from prospective students.

C Recruit and start a minimum of 20 new students for the January

2010 start or a combined total of 25 starts for the entire 1st

Quarter (includes the February mini).

C Maintain a lead/new start conversion rate of at least 10% while

achieving the above minimum standards.33

Plaintiff was advised that she was ineligible to work overtime until her performance

improved, and she was cautioned that, if “acceptable performance levels are not

maintained, you may face continued disciplinary measures up to and including your

immediate termination.”34

Plaintiff received another strike on her November 22, 2010 Report Card, again

for failure to meet the minimum standards of her position. She disputed that strike

35

because she had been out sick during the relevant work period. Plaintiff did not

36

 Blow Deposition, Exhibit 24, at 1. 33

Id. at 2. 34

 Blow Deposition, at 315-16 and Exhibit 25 (November 22, 2010 Report Card). 35

 Blow Deposition, at 315-16. 36

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 12 of 32
recall receiving any disciplinary action as a result of the November 22 strike, and

37

there is no indication in the record thatshe was disciplined. There also is no evidence

regarding whether the strike remained on plaintiff’s record after she complained.

E. Plaintiff’s 2011 Performance Evaluations and Termination 

Plaintiff received strikes on her February 27, March 13, April 10, and April 24,

2011 Report Cards, due to her failure to meet the minimum standards of her

position. She did not receive a PIP as a result of those strikes, however, because 38

they did not occur in three consecutive weeks.

Plaintiff received her annual performance evaluation on May 19, 2011. The 39

subjective portions of the review, concerning areas such as job knowledge,

leadership, professionalism, ethics, and integrity, were completed by Beck, and they

reflected almost the same high ratings as plaintiff had received on her revised

performance review the previous year. The objective portion of the review, which 40

measured such areas as referrals, retention, and effectiveness, was a different story,

however, because plaintiff received much lower scores than she had the previous

year. In fact, plaintiff’s overall objective performance in 2011 was rated as

Id. at 319. 37

 Blow Deposition, at Exhibit 33 (May 25, 2011 Report Card). 

38

Blow Deposition, at 342-44 and Exhibit 29 (May 19, 2011 Annual Performance Review). 39

Compare Blow Deposition, Exhibit 29 (May 19, 2011 Annual Performance Review) with 40

Blow Deposition, Exhibit 20 (July 21, 2010 Annual Performance Review). 

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 13 of 32
“Substandard.” 

41

According to the Compensation Plan, a Substandard evaluation would result

in the imposition of a Performance Improvement Plan, or, if the employee alreadywas

on a PIP, the Substandard evaluation could result in termination. Plaintiff was 42

placed on a second Performance Improvement Plan on May 23, 2011. She was 43

instructed that she needed to increase her lead-to-start ratio from 8% to 10%, and to

increase her 90-day retention rate from 69% to 80%, in accordance with the

requirements set forth in the Compensation Plan for her position. She also was

instructed that she needed to improve the consistency of her data entry and

paperwork. She was cautioned as follows: 

44

These issues are serious and your failure to correct the areas of

unacceptable performance as outlined in this plan while meeting all

other minimum standards of performance will result in your immediate

termination. Also note, immediate termination of your employment will

result should your improved performance fail to be sustained.45

Plaintiff next received strikes on her May 8 and May 15, 2011 Report Cards,

due to her failure to meet the performance goals of her position. Her May 25, 2011 46

 Blow Deposition, Exhibit 29 (May 19, 2011 Annual Performance Review), at 1. 41

 Blow Deposition, Exhibit 11 (Compensation Plan), at 12. 42

Blow Deposition, at 345-46 and Exhibit 30 (May 23, 2011 Performance Improvement 43

Plan).

 Blow Deposition, Exhibit 30 (May 31, 2011 Performance Improvement Plan), at 2. 44

Id. 45

 Blow Deposition, at Exhibit 33 (May 25, 2011 Report Card).

46

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 14 of 32
Report Card stated that she exhibited poor performance overall, and that all areas

other than referrals required improvement. When plaintiffsigned the May 25, 2011,

47

report, she also wrote that she had questions about her lead count, because she

believed some of her leads were “questionable.” At Beck’s request, plaintiff sent 48

Beck an e-mail on May 26, 2011, explaining that, even though she had received

twenty-two leads the previous week, only three of those were students with whom

plaintiff could legitimately make contact, because six leads were referrals, and

thirteen were “bad” leads. Of the thirteen leads plaintiff considered to be “bad,” two

had disconnected telephone numbers, one had provided the wrong telephone number,

two wanted online contact only, one came in after hours when plaintiff was at home,

one came in so late in the afternoon that plaintiff did not have time to make contact

the same day, one had previously been assigned to another Associate, four had been

transferred by the CARS System to another associate, and one was deferred for two

years. Plaintiff believed that those “bad” leads should not be counted in the total lead

count on which her performance reviews were based. Even so, she acknowledged

49

during her deposition that she did not have any evidence that Ms. Beck intentionally

Id. 47

Id. 48

Blow Deposition, at 247-48, 361, and Exhibit 12 (May 26, 2011 e-mail from Donnetta 49

Blow to Angela Beck). 

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 15 of 32
assigned her “bad” leads. In fact, she stated that she did not know how leads were 50

assigned, and she agreed that it was “just sort of potluck whether you got a good lead

or a bad lead.” The only way to know whether a lead was more likely to turn out

51

“bad” was if it was a “reassigned” lead, because those usually were older and did not

result in as much success. Even so, plaintiff has not presented any documentation 52

that she received more reassigned leads than other Admissions Associates.

53

Plaintiff had a coaching meeting with Beck on May 26, 2011, to address her

2011 PIP and her lead assignments. During that meeting, plaintiff expressed

54

concerns that Beck had been discriminating against her by giving her bad lead

assignments. Despite the meeting, plaintiff received a third consecutive strike on 55

her May 31 Report Card for the week ending May 22, 2011, for failure to meet

minimum weekly performance standards. Beck sent an e-mail to Dean Mahaffey,

56

Virginia College’s Corporate Vice-President of Admissions, stating:

Donnetta Blow has received a third strike in a row on her latest

Report Card (see attached). She is already on a PIP due to her

“Substandard” rating on her yearly evaluation.

 Blow Deposition, at 259-60. 50

Id. at 227-36. 51

Id. at 246-47, 375. 52

Id. at 372-76. 53

Id. at 362-64 and Exhibit 34 (May 26, 2011 Memo). 54

 Blow Deposition, at 363-64. 55

Id. at 378 and Exhibit 35 (May 31, 2011 Report Card). 

56

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 16 of 32
What is the next step required of me? Do I place her on another

PIP? If so, will you please send me the correct PIP format for this

situation?57

Mahaffey responded, “I think we are at the point of a request for termination, unless

Mitch [i.e., Mitch Srail, the Regional Vice-President of Human Resources], says

no.” Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on an unspecified date during June of 58

2011, in a meeting with Mitch Srail and Jim Foster.59

F. Comparators and Other Employees’ Experiences

During her deposition, plaintiff could notidentify any other individual— white

or black — who received three consecutive strikes while already on a PIP, but whose

employment was not terminated. Virginia College also is unaware of any such 60

individual.

61

Stacy Hall, a white female Admissions Associate, received strikes in three

consecutive weeks on at least four occasions: April 11, 18, and 25, 2010; June 20,

June 27, and July 4, 2010; October 3, 10, 17, and 24, 2010; and December 12, 19, and

26, 2010. Plaintiff asserts in her brief that Hall was not placed on a PIP on any of 62

MahaffeyDeclaration ¶ 13 and Exhibit A (May31, 2011 e-mail from Angela Beck to Dean

57

Mahaffey). 

Id. (May 31, 2011 e-mail from Dean Mahaffey to Angela Beck) (alteration supplied). 58

 Blow Deposition, at 24, 393. 59

Id. at 283-86, 414-15. 60

 Mahaffey Declaration ¶ 16. 61

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 (Stacy Hall July 19, 2010 Report Card); Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8

62

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 17 of 32
those occasions, but the evidence she cites does not support that assertion. The only

evidence cited is Ms. Hall’s Report Cards, which indicate that she received three or

more strikes in a row on these occasions. The July 19, 2010 Report Card states that

a “PIP is forthcoming,” and the January 15, 2011 Report Card indicates that the

63

lower production numbers were due to the Christmas and New Years holidays, but

there is no affirmative evidence to indicate, one way or another, whether Ms. Hall

actuallywas placed on a PIP on any occasion. The record doesindicate, nevertheless,

that Ms. Hall was reassigned to an entry-level Admissions Associate on April 21,

2011. The record does not contain any information regarding the significance of 64

that reassignment. 

Charles Garrett, a white male, received strikes in three consecutive weeks:

April 17, April 24, and May 1, 2011. There is no date, no signature, and no 65

comment on the copy of Mr. Garrett’s Report Card plaintiff submitted as evidence. 

Further, there is no evidence to support plaintiff’s assertion that Mr. Garrett was not

placed on a PIP. At some point prior to March 9, 2011, Mr. Garrett was reassigned

(Stacy Hall November 2, 2010 Report Card); Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 (Stacy Hall January 15, 2011

Report Card).

 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7. 63

 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12 (April 21, 2011 Personnel Action Form for Stacy Hall). 64

 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 (Charles Garrett undated Report Card). 

65

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 18 of 32
to an entry-level Admissions Associate. The record does not contain any

66

information regarding the significance of that reassignment.

James Young, a white male, received strikes in three consecutive weeks: June

27, July 4, and July 11, 2010. There is no date, no signature, and no comment on 67

the copy of Mr. Young’s Report Card plaintiff submitted as evidence. Further, there

is no evidence to support plaintiff’s assertion that Mr. Young was not placed on a

PIP. 

Virginia College also terminated the employment of Regina Bolden, a black

female Admissions Associate, on an unspecified date. At the time of her termination,

Ms. Bolden’s direct supervisor was Angela Beck.

68

G. Plaintiff’s Complaints to Management

At some unspecified point during her employment with Virginia College,

plaintiff reported that two white Admissions Associates named Stacy Hall and Hollie

Tesigni had a practice of changing the assignments of leads that were generated by

the CARS System. Whenever Hall and Tesigni received a CARS call froma potential

student who had previously made contact with another Admissions Associate, they

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13 (March 9, 2011 Employee Contributions & Development Appraisal 66

for Charles Garrett, indicating that his position was “Re-entry Admissions Associate.”). 

 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11 (James Young undated Report Card). 67

 Blow Deposition, at 404. 68

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 19 of 32
would make a change in the computer system to indicate that the lead was assigned

to them instead. Plaintiff stated during her deposition that she believed Hall and

Tesigni only claimed leads previously assigned to black Admissions Associates, but

she did ultimately acknowledge that she did not have any evidence to support that

belief. When plaintiff reported that practice to Mr. Foster, he made a change to the

computer system so that no Admissions Officer could alter the assignment of a lead.

Plaintiff sent an e-mail to Angela Beck, James Foster, and Mitch Srail on

March 23, 2011, stating:

I wanted to voice the general concern I still have about being

singled out/treated different here at VirginiaCollege. I know by sending

this it may get me the label as “trouble maker,” but it has been bothering

me for a while and I think it is an issue thatshould be addressed not only

for myself but for the company also.

Last year I wastold in a meeting with Mr. Foster and Angela, that

if I am not on the clock I should not be working or at my desk. Mitch

met with us as a group and told us the same. I understand and have no

problems with that. I am afraid for anyone to even ask me a question

after I clock out. The problem I have is that since we have been at this

location there have been several incidents where admissions associates

have come into enter information in to campus vue; referrals, [69]

enrollments etc. on their off days. One associate even came in on a

Saturday to remove files. I have been told that I can’t ask my coworkers anything about their hours or what they are doing here. I just

feel as thought [sic] if I wastold I can’t work off the clock and everyone

else was told the same, why is it okay for certain employee’s [sic] to

continually do so. I have been really hesitant to say anything to anyone

The court deduces from the record that Campus Vue is Virginia College’s internal 69

computer operating system. 

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 20 of 32
because Angela has already told me that she feels as though she has to

walk on eggshells around me. Therefore when I do have a problem I

have no one to discuss it with.

The reason I am bring[ing] this up now is because it happened

again on last Friday, one of the admission associates came in to turn in

an enrollment on her day off. If anything has changed please update me,

therefore I will not feel as though the rules of the company are only

directed to certain people.

Again, I apologize for sending the email and I hope I won’t be

reprimanded for it.

70

Plaintiffsent another e-mail to James Foster, Angela Beck, and Hollie Tersigni

on May 12, 2011, stating:

I just wanted to explain the reason why I requested to record the

conversation I was going to have with Angel and Hollie. Earlier this

week when Angela and Hollie called me into her office to review my

report card, I could not see all of the information on the piece of paper. 

When I started to ask what something was on the paper because I

couldn’t see it, Angela took the defensive with me right away. I then

explained to her that I couldn’t see what was on the paper because I

have on new contacts. Hollie confirmed it by saying they had been

teasing me all day about the blinking. The majority of the time I speak

with Angela it seems to me that she is always on the defensive. When

discussing how she treats me she always says that she is not defensive

with me; and it is me that is the “insubordinate.” Just to protect myself,

I stated that our conversation would be recorded. I really feel

uncomfortable meeting with Angela, I know it is part of the job so I

limit my conversation as much as possible with her. For some reason

she is always angry with me. That is the reason why I went in, signed

my report card and didn’t have any questions and didn’t make any

statements because whatever I may say, for some reason is

misinterpreted by Angela and reported.

 Blow Deposition, at Exhibit 31 (March 23, 2011 email) (alterations supplied). 70

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Regarding the picture, I mention[ed] last night that I didn’t look

well do [sic] to the fact that I have been wearing new contacts and they

keep my eyes swollen and I just don’t feel picture pretty. I also feel

extremely bad today from lack of sleep. It didn’t say the picture was

mandatory and I did not want to look less than my best. I would always

like for my true beauty to show through when I take photographs.[ ]

71

Lately, it appears that no matter what I do, try to do or say I am

constantly brought into “the office.” I would love to be able to come to

work and do what I love and what I was hired to do and that’s to enroll

students. Over the weekend I gave a lot of thought to my working

conditions here at VC. I realized that I am the same person I was when

I started, I asked questions when I was not sure or felt that there was a

problem. I made suggestions and I always helped anyone that needed

a hand. I didn’t have any problems with management or employee’s

[sic], students, etc. Now, it seem[s] like any question that I ask, is

treated as if I am attempting to start a war. I tried to explained [sic] that

this is the way I was raised, to ask questions and I have always worked

in an environment that encouraged questions from employees without

retaliation. Even in the handbook it says that: “every employee has the

responsibility to ask question[s], seek guidance and report suspected

violations to the code of conduct.” I love what I do but lately it seems

as though I am so busy trying to defend myself to truly benefit from

being able to help the students. At this point I am not sure who I can

talk to about anything, but I would love to come and be able to do what

I love to do. I love what I do and I believe the majority of the people I

speak with have no issues with me. 

I would like for someone to please, please tell me what I am doing

wrong, this constant pick, pick, pick, and slandering of my name is

making this a hostile and stressful work environment.

Again I like always apologize for any problems.72

Plaintiff is referring here to her refusal to participate in a group photograph of the 71

employees in the Admissions Department. Plaintiff also stated in her deposition that she did not

want to participate in the picture because her hair wasn’t done. Blow Deposition, at 331-32. 

 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15 (May 12, 2011 e-mail) (alterations supplied). 72

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 22 of 32
Plaintiff also had an in-person meeting with Beck and Foster to discuss why

she had wanted to record her conversation with Beck. The record is not entirely

73

clear about the date on which that meeting occurred, but presumably it was close to

May 12, 2011, the date of plaintiff’s e-mail. Plaintiff also met separately with Foster

that same day to inform him that she believed Beck had been treating her negatively

because she was black.

74

III. DISCUSSION

A. Race Discrimination Pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff contends that her termination was the result of unlawful race

discrimination. She does not claim to have direct evidence of a race-based

discriminatory animus, however. Therefore, she must prove her claims with

circumstantial evidence, navigating the burden-shifting framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Under this analysis, a plaintiff

must first establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, which creates a

presumption of discrimination. To rebut the presumption, the employer then must

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed employment action. 

 Blow Deposition, at 334-35. 73

Id. 74

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If the employer does so, the presumption of discrimination drops from the case, and

the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reason

is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.

at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56.

To establish a prima facie case of race-based discrimination in the termination

of employment, plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2)

her employment was terminated, (3) the employer treated similarly situated

employees outside of her protected class more favorably, and (4) she was qualified

to perform the duties of her job. See, e.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295

F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2002); Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017,

1020 (11th Cir. 2001). Only the third element — whether a similarly situated 75

employee outside plaintiff’s protected class was treated more favorably — is in

dispute here.76

The elements for a claim of discrimination are the same under both Title VII and § 1981. 75

See Bass v. Board of County Commissioners, 256 F.3d 1095, 1109 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The elements of

a claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are also the same as a Title VII disparate

treatment claim in the employment context.”).

Plaintiff, who is African-American, clearly is a member of a class of persons protected by 76

both Title VII and § 1981. Further, the termination of plaintiff’s employment unquestionably was

an adverse employment action. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1246 n.18

(11th Cir. 1998)(stating that termination is the “classic and ultimate ‘tangible employment action’”). 

Finally, construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she was qualified to perform the

duties of her job. In termination cases — as contrasted to cases involving an employer’s failure to

hire or promote — the question of whether a plaintiff was qualified to perform the duties of her job

often is not an issue. See Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001). The

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The following is a concise summary ofthe EleventhCircuit’s guidance on what

is required to show that two employees are similarly situated:

“In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes

of establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the

employees are involved in or accused of the same orsimilar conduct and

are disciplined in different ways.” Jones v. BessemerCarraway Medical

Center, 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.), opinion modified by 151 F.3d

1321 (1998) (quoting Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.

1997)). “The most important factors in the disciplinary context are the

nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments

imposed.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). We require

that the quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct be nearly

identical to prevent courtsfromsecond-guessing employers’ reasonable

decisions and confusing apples with oranges. See Dartmouth Review v.

Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Exact correlation

is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair congeners. In

other words, apples should be compared to apples.”). 

Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis supplied). 

Thus, plaintiff must show that employees outside her protected class (i.e., nonAfrican-Americans) were found guilty of the same or “nearly identical” misconduct,

yet were disciplined in different ways. Id. “Absent some other similarly situated but

differently disciplined worker, there can be no disparate treatment.” Abel v.

Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000).

Eleventh Circuit has recognized that, “in cases where a plaintiff has held a position for a significant

period of time, qualification for that position sufficient to satisfy the test of a prima facie case can

be inferred.” Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Products, Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.2 (11th Cir.

1987); see also Pace v. Southern Railway System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1386 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983). Here,

due to plaintiff’s employment history with defendant, her qualification for her position can be

inferred.

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Where there are clear differences in either the quantity or quality of the acts of

misconduct committed by the plaintiff and her alleged comparators, it cannot be said

that they are “nearly identical.” See Silvera v. Orange County School Board, 244

F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough Silvera and Ritter have in common the

fact that they were arrested in the 1970’s . . . Silvera has three additional arrests . . .

. The fact that Silvera had multiple arrests is by itself sufficient to establish that he

is not similarly situated to Ritter.”) (alteration supplied); Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368-

69 (holding that a female plaintiff in a Title VII sex discrimination case was not

similarly situated to male employees who each committed a single policy violation,

whereasthe female plaintiff had committed at least four policy violations); Jones, 137

F.3d at 1312-13 (holding that employees who allegedly committed one act of

misconduct were not similarly situated to the plaintiff, who engaged in multiple acts

of misconduct in the same day).

Here, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of a similarly situated, nonAfrican-American comparator who was treated more favorably. In fact, she has not

identified anyone who is similarly situated to her. Plaintiff was terminated for

receiving “strikes” on her Report Cards in three consecutive weeks while she was

already under a PIP for underperformance. There is no evidence of any other

employee of any race who received three consecutive strikes on her Report Card

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while already under a PIP. 

Plaintiff’s attempts to identify similarly situated comparators all fail. First, she

asserts that Stacy Hall, Charles Garrett, and James Young, all of whom are white,

received three consecutive strikes, but were not placed on a PIP. Even if that were

true, it would not make those individuals similarly situated comparators. Plaintiff is

complaining of discrimination in her termination, not in being placed on a PIP. Even

more importantly, there is no actual evidence that Hall, Garrett, and Young did not

receive PIPs. Plaintiff presented only those individuals’ Report Cards, which reflect

that they received consecutive strikes, but not whether they received a PIP. Plaintiff’s

conclusory statement that those individuals did not receive PIPs is insufficient. 

Second, plaintiff asserts that she and Regina Bolden “were the only two AfricanAmerican associates terminated by Angela Beck while other Caucasian associates

were not terminated for performance.” It is irrelevant how many black and how

77

many white associates were terminated, as long as no similarly situated white

associates were retained despite their performance deficiencies. Third, plaintiff

asserts that Stacy Hall and Charles Garrett “were afforded the opportunity to be

reassigned in March and April 2011 while not disciplined in the same or similar

 Doc. no. 27 (Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Response Brief), at 11. 77

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 27 of 32
manner as Blow in June 2011.” That factual statement is supported by the record,

78

but it is irrelevant, as there is no evidence that either Hall or Garrett had the same

performance problems as plaintiff.

In summary, because plaintiff has failed to identify a similarly situated, nonAfrican-American employee who was treated more favorably than her, she cannot

establish a prima facie case of race discrimination in the termination of her

employment. Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted on plaintiff’s race

discrimination claim.

B. Retaliation 

“Retaliation is a separate violation of Title VII [and § 1981].” Gupta v. Florida

Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 586 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration supplied). A

plaintiff generally must prove three elements to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal linkage between the protected

conduct and the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Shannon v. BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002).

Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of retaliation] by

proving only that the protected activity and the negative employment

action are not completely unrelated, the burden shifts to the defendant

to proffer a legitimate reason for the adverse action . . . . The burden

Id. 78

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then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the “legitimate” reason is merely pretext for prohibited,

retaliatory conduct.

Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corporation, 216 F.3d 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted). 

Even assuming plaintiff can establish a prima facie case that her termination

was the result of unlawful retaliation, she cannot demonstrate that defendant’s

proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the termination decision are

pretextual. Defendant states that it terminated plaintiff’s employment “because she

repeatedly failed to meet the minimum performance requirements for her position. 

While already on her second PIP, Plaintiff earned a third consecutive strike for not

meeting performance goals.” That is a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the

79

termination decision. 

Thus, plaintiff can survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim only if

she comes “forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the

adverse employment decision.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528

(11th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

 Doc. no. 23 (Defendant’s Summary Judgment Brief), at 24. 79

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Case 5:12-cv-03657-CLS Document 35 Filed 08/14/14 Page 29 of 32
804). Plaintiff’s burden at this step of the analysis is that of “cast[ing] sufficient

doubt on the defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered ‘legitimate reasons were not what

actually motivated its conduct . . . .’” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (quoting CooperHouston v. Southern Railway Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir. 1994)) (alteration

supplied); see also Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25. Plaintiff shoulders that burden

by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies,

or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a

reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs, 106 F.3d at

1538 (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont deNemours &Company, 100 F.3d 1061, 1072

(3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff must

produce “sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact

as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.”

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529 (emphasis supplied). 

Plaintiff asserts that the following demonstrate pretext: (1) the fact that Stacy

Hall, Charles Garrett, and James Young (all of whom are white) received at least

three consecutive strikes but were not placed on a PIP, and (2) the fact that Stacy Hall

and Charles Garrett were reassigned instead of terminated. Third, she states: 

“Finally, Plaintiff has presented evidence which challenged her supervisor and

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complained about the manner in which leads were distributed and clearly expressing

her concerns over discrimination and being ‘singled out’ while labeled a

‘troublemaker.’ . . . . Defendant, themselves, failed to follow their own policy within

the compensation plan.”80

As an initial matter, the court once again notes that plaintiff has not produced

any evidence that defendant failed to place Hall, Garrett, and Young on PIPs after

they received three strikes. Even if she had produced such evidence, however, it

would not call into question defendant’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff’s

employment. Defendant did not terminate plaintiff’s employment for receiving three

strikes and being placed on a PIP; it terminated her for receiving three consecutive

strikes while already on a PIP. Similarly, defendant’s reassignment of Hall and

Garrett also does not call into question defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. It is irrelevant whether Hall and Garrett received more

favorable treatment than plaintiff, because they did not have the same disciplinary

background as plaintiff. As for plaintiff’s third pretext argument, it is difficult to

decipher. To the extent plaintiff is arguing that defendant essentially caused her

performance problems by intentionally assigning her “bad” leads that could not be

converted into enrollments, there is no evidence to support that argument. Instead,

 Doc. no. 27 (Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Response Brief), at 14. 80

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the evidence indicates that there was no way of knowing, when a lead was assigned

to an Admissions Associate, whether the lead was likely to be converted into an

enrollment. Further, plaintiff has not made any argument that defendant failed to

assign her enough leads. To the extent plaintiff is arguing that defendant failed to

follow its own policies, there is no evidence to support that argument either. To the

contrary, plaintiff’s termination for poor performance while on a PIP isin accordance

with the Compensation Plan, and there is no evidence that defendant violated any

other policies. 

In summary, because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendant’s

proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons actually are a mere pretext for retaliation,

summary judgment is due to be granted on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED, and all of plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Costs are

taxed to plaintiff. The Clerk is directed to close this file.

DONE this 14th day of August, 2014.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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