Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02491/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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04cv2491

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARBARA YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 04cv2491-L (WMc)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REVERSAL AND/OR

REMAND, GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY TO DENY BENEFITS

Plaintiff Barbara Young brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3) and

405(g) for Judicial Review and Remedy on Administrative Decision Under the Social Security

Act, requesting that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her disability

benefits be reversed. Plaintiff filed a motion for reversal and/or remand, and Defendant filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment. She maintains the Administrative Law Judge’s finding

that Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe psychiatric impairment is not supported by substantial

evidence, that he improperly relied on the vocational expert’s answer to an incomplete

hypothetical, and that he erroneously failed to resolve a conflict in the vocational expert’s

testimony. For the reasons which follow, Plaintiff’s motion for reversal and/or remand judgment

is DENIED, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is AFFIRMED.

/ / / / / 

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2 04cv2491

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has tenth-grade education, and performed past work as a home care attendant. 

She stopped working on October 1, 1999, at the age of 43, because of pain in her lower back,

arms, wrists, fingers, hips and legs, bilateral ankle pain and swelling, shortness of breath,

headaches, and depression. 

On June 13, 2000 Plaintiff initially applied for Supplemental Security Income Payments. 

Her application was denied, but she did not appeal the decision. On March 26, 2001, she filed

another application, which was denied initially and on reconsideration. After an administrative

hearing on August 15, 2002, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reopened the initial

application at Plaintiff’s request, and denied benefits to both applications. On November 12,

2004, the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s findings. She timely filed a complaint in this

Court.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff does not dispute any of the ALJ’s findings with respect to her physical

impairments. She argues the finding her depression was not severe is not supported by

substantial evidence because he gave too much weight to the opinion of Marc Capobianco, M.D.

Plaintiff’s examining psychiatrist. Based on this argument, she also maintains the ALJ failed to

incorporate all of Plaintiff’s mental limitations in his hypothetical questions to the vocational

expert. She further contends the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict in the vocational expert’s

testimony, which arose when the expert was asked about one of Plaintiff’s mental limitations on

cross-examination. 

I. Standard of Review of Agency Decision

The denial of benefits must be affirmed if the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence and applies the correct legal standards. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

Substantial evidence means "more than mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." 

Desrosiers v. Sec'y of HHS, 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

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3 04cv2491

to support a conclusion." Ostenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). "Under this

standard, the Commissioner's findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn

from the record, and if evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, [the

appellate court] must defer to the Commissioner's decision." Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193 (internal

citations omitted).

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff has the burden to

prove she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last at least 12

months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). The Social Security regulations establish a five-step sequential

evaluation for determining whether a claimant is disabled under this standard. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194. 

First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). If not, the ALJ must determine at step two of the

evaluation whether the claimant is suffering from a "severe" impairment within the meaning of

the regulations. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant's impairment is severe, the

Commissioner must determine at step three whether the impairment meets or equals a "Listing of

Impairments" contained in the regulations. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's

impairment meets or equals a listing, she must be found disabled. Id. "However, if a decision as

to whether a ‘severe’ impairment corresponds to a listed impairment cannot be made on medical

factors alone, the ALJ must proceed to the final two steps in the sequential evaluation process." 

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194. 

"At step four, the ALJ must consider the functional limitations imposed by the claimant's

impairments and determine the claimant's residual functional capacity. If the claimant retains

the capacity to perform her past relevant work, defined as work the claimant has performed in

the past fifteen years, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1), the claimant is not disabled." Batson, 359

F.3d at 1194 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)). If the claimant can no longer perform her past

relevant work, the ALJ at step five must consider whether she can perform other work in the

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). "If the claimant can perform other work in

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the national economy, then the claimant may not be found to be disabled." Batson, 359 F.3d at

1194 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v)). While the claimant carries the burden of proving

eligibility at steps one through four, the burden at step five rests on the Commissioner. Id. 

II. Agency Decision

The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments, and found at step two of

the sequential evaluation that Plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc and joint disease,

lumbosacral spine, with longitudinal history of complaint and treatment for low back and leg

pain, and depressive disorder, all of which were medically determinable impairments. 

(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 28.) He further found that all of the impairments in

combination were considered severe; however, the depressive disorder by itself was not severe. 

(Id.) 

At step three, he determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments, alone or

in combination, did not meet or medically equal a Listing of Impairments. (Id. at 29.) 

Accordingly, he continued to make a finding regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”). Based on his review of the record, he determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to

perform sedentary work with nonexertional limitations of only occasional climbing, balancing,

stooping, crouching, kneeling and crawling. (Id. at 30.) At step four, he determined Plaintiff

could no longer return to her past work as a home care attendant. (Id. at 34.) At step five, he

concluded based on the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff can perform and sustain on a

regular and continuing basis the sedentary jobs such as assembler, product inspector, or taper

(printer circuit layout). (Id. at 36.) Since the numbers of these jobs were significant, he found

Plaintiff not disabled. (Id.) 

He made an alternative finding based on the assumption Plaintiff’s depressive disorder

were severe so as to mentally limit her “to simple repetitive tasks with no close or frequent

interpersonal contact with supervisors, co-workers or the public.” (Id.) If this were the case, he

concluded Plaintiff could nevertheless perform the jobs of assembler, product inspector, or taper

(printer circuit layout). (Id.)

/ / / / /

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1 Harmless error rule applies on review of decisions by the Commissioner of Social

Security. Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1990). To the extent the ALJ may

have erred at step two of the sequential evaluation in finding Plaintiff’s depression nonsevere,

the error was harmless for the reasons discussed below.

5 04cv2491

Plaintiff makes three arguments in an attempt to show the ALJ erred. First, she maintains

he erred in finding her depressive disorder nonsevere. Second, she contends the vocational

expert’s opinion has no evidentiary weight because it does not take into account all of her mental

limitations. Last, she argues the ALJ failed to take into account the vocational expert’s opinion

that, assuming Plaintiff suffered from one to two episodes of decompensation, each of extended

duration, it would be difficult for her to maintain a job. These arguments are largely moot, since

the ALJ determined in the alternative that he would find her nondisabled even if her depressive

disorder were considered severe. (AR at 36.) Plaintiff’s arguments are relevant only to the

extent substantial evidence supports a finding of greater mental limitations than those assumed

by the ALJ.1

 

III. Analysis

Plaintiff’s mental condition was evaluated by three doctors. Her treating physician, Jane

Boyd, M.D. of Mid-City Community Clinic (“MCC”), Marc Capobianco, M.D., Plaintiff’s

examining psychiatrist, and David E. Gross, M.D., a nontreating, non-examining doctor. 

“[M]ore weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion than to the opinion of a nontreating

physician because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know

and observe the patient as an individual. Likewise, greater weight is accorded to the opinion of

an examining physician than a non-examining physician. Likewise, greater weight is accorded

to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining physician” Andrews v. Shalala,

53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Initially, Plaintiff contended the ALJ erred by giving more weight to Dr. Capobianco’s

opinions over Dr. Gross.’ However, she abandoned this argument. In her reply she posited that

“Drs. Capobianco and Boyd’s opinions remain the only pertinent opinions regarding Plaintiff’s

psychiatric condition.” (Reply at 5.) She argues the ALJ should have given more weight to the

opinion of Dr. Boyd. 

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2 “Clinicians use a GAF to rate the psychological, social, and occupational

functioning of a patient. The scale does not evaluate impairments caused by psychological or

environmental factors.” Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 598 n.1 (9th Cir.

1999); see also 65 Fed. Reg. 50,746 at 50,764-65 (8/21/00) (“The GAF scale . . . is the scale

used in the multiaxial evaluation system endorsed by the American Psychiatric Association.”). 

6 04cv2491

Dr. Boyd opined in April 2003 that Plaintiff was fully and permanently disabled. 

However, her opinion was based on Plaintiff’s “intolerable” back pain, not her depression. (AR

at 375). Plaintiff was treated at MCC for her physical condition. During treatment, she was

diagnosed in December 2001 with depression due to her medical condition, and prescribed an

antidepressant. (Id. at 365, 366.) However, depression is not mentioned in Dr. Boyd’s disability

opinion, which states in its entirety:

The patient has intolerable low back pain which did not improve with injections. 

She saw Dr. Leung, a pain management specialist @ UCSD who recommended

daily narcotics in addition to other pain medicines. Barbara is visibly

uncomfortable at all of her visits to me and cannot sit or stand for over a few

minutes at a time. I believe she is fully disabled, as well as permanently.

(Id. at 375.) Accordingly, other than a diagnosis of depression due to Plaintiff’s medical

condition, as to which Dr. Capobianco agrees (id. at 301), Dr. Boyd’s opinion does not support

any specific findings regarding Plaintiff’s mental functional limitations.

With respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairment, the ALJ relied primarily on Dr.

Capobianco. (Id. at 32.) On January 25, 2002, Dr. Capobianco prepared an Adult Psychiatric

Evaluation. (Id. at 299.) Although he was not provided with Plaintiff’s medical records to

review, he is the only psychiatrist who examined Plaintiff for her complaints of depression. (Id.) 

Upon interviewing and briefly testing Plaintiff, he diagnosed her with depression, secondary to

general medical condition, and assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 65.2

(Id. at 301.) A GAF score between 51 to 60 indicates moderate symptoms, such as flat affect

and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks, or moderate difficulty in social,

occupational, or school settings, and a score between 61 and 70 indicates mild symptoms or

some difficulty in social, occupational, or school settings. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV”) at 32-34 (4th ed. 1994)). While Dr. Capobianco did not itemize

Plaintiff’s current level of functioning, he reported her test results and his observations during

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3 The ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Boyd’s opinions than other treating and

examining physicians. (AR at 30-32.) However, this is relevant primarily to evidence of

Plaintiff’s physical impairments. With respect to Dr. Boyd’s opinion of disability, the ALJ

noted it was inconsistent with Dr. Capobianco’s opinion that Plaintiff had no work related

psychiatric limitations. (Id. at 31.) As discussed above, rather than finding the opinions

inconsistent, the Court concludes Dr. Boyd’s disability opinion was not based on Plaintiff’s

mental impairments. 

7 04cv2491

the interview, none of which indicated the presence of severe depression. (AR at 300-01.) He

concluded Plaintiff “is “being adequately treated for her depression. Whatever limitations she

possesses are most likely from a physical standpoint . . ..” (Id. at 302.) 

Dr. Boyd’s and Dr. Capobianco’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment do not

contradict each other.3

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have accorded

more weight to Dr. Boyd’s opinion is irrelevant to the finding that Plaintiff’s depression was

nonsevere and to his nondisability decision.

Even if Plaintiff had not abandoned her argument based on Dr. Gross’ opinions, there

would be no ground to reverse the ALJ’s nondisability determination. Dr. Gross reviewed

Plaintiff’s medical records, and on February 2, 2002 prepared a Psychiatric Review Technique

form and a Mental Functional Capacity Assessment form for the Social Security Administration. 

(Id. at 306, 320.) He evaluated Plaintiff under Listing of Impairment no. 12.04, Affective

Disorders. (Id. at 309.) He opined Plaintiff suffered from a “[d]isturbance of mood,

accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome,” and that “[a] medically

determinable impairment is present that does not precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria . . ..” 

(Id.) He rated Plaintiff’s functional limitations as moderate in terms of restriction of activities of

daily living, difficulties in maintaining social functioning and difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace, and checked one or two episodes of decompensation, each of

extended duration. (Id. at 316.) In the assessment of Plaintiff’s mental RFC, he opined Plaintiff

was moderately limited in most of the categories, and was otherwise not significantly limited. 

(Id. at 320-21.) Most notably, he opined she was at most moderately limited in her ability to

maintain regular attendance; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions

from psychologically based symptoms; interact appropriately with the general public; accept

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instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with coworkers;

and maintain socially appropriate behavior.” (Id.) He summed up that Plaintiff’s “understanding

and memory are compatible with remembering short and simple instructions;” “concentration

and attention should be adequate for simple repetitive tasks for a full workday and full

workweek;” “social interaction capacity should be adequate for dealing with peers and

supervisors, but not with the public;” and “adaptation capacity should be intact for the usual

work setting.” (Id. at 322.)

For purposes of his alternative finding, the ALJ assumed Plaintiff were “mentally limited

to simple repetitive tasks with no close or frequent interpersonal contact with supervisors, coworkers or the public.” (AR at 36.) These assumptions are more limiting than Dr. Gross’

opinion of Plaintiff’s mental RFC. At the hearing, the ALJ posed hypothetical questions to the

vocational expert, which took into account the limitations he assumed. (Id. at 105-07.) The

vocational expert opined Plaintiff could nevertheless perform sedentary jobs such as assembler,

production inspector and taper of printed circuit layouts. (Id.) 

Plaintiff seizes on a hypothetical question posed by her counsel on vocational expert’s

cross-examination, whether a person who had one or two episodes of decompensation resulting

in an inability to function socially for an extended period of time, i.e., an inability for greater

than a two week period, once or twice in a year, could sustain or maintain gainful employment. 

(Id. at 112-13.) The vocational expert opined that it would be difficult for such person to

maintain employment with a single employer. (Id.) The ALJ did not include this limitation

either in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert or in the assumptions for his

alternative finding. 

“If a vocational expert's hypothetical does not reflect all the claimant's limitations, then

the ‘expert's testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can

perform jobs in the national economy.’” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quoting DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, the ALJ does not

have to include in his hypothetical questions limitations which are not supported by the record. 

See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). The only record mentioning periods

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of decompensation resulting in an inability to function socially for an extended period of time is

Dr. Gross’ report. However, Dr. Gross did not examine Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s

medical records reviewed by Dr. Gross do not show Plaintiff suffered any episodes of

decompensation resulting in an inability to function socially for an extended period of time. 

Plaintiff did not testify to it at the hearing (see AR at 4-64), and, other than Dr. Gross’ report,

she offers no citation to evidence supporting this limitation in her motion papers. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s argument that the vocational expert’s testimony is without evidentiary weight due to

the ALJ’s failure to include periods of decompensation in his hypothetical question is without

merit.

Also without merit is Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in resolving the conflict in

the vocational expert’s testimony with respect to Plaintiff’s periods of decompensation. The

ALJ reviewed medical records, and provided a detailed evaluation of medical sources in his

decision. He explained he gave more weight to Dr. Capobianco’s opinions than Dr. Gross’

because Dr. Capobianco examined Plaintiff, while Dr. Gross did not. (AR at 32.) As discussed

above, the record does not support Dr. Gross’ opinion with respect to periods of

decompensation. Accordingly, there was no conflict in the vocational expert’s testimony for the

ALJ to resolve.

Last, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s alternative nondisability finding was based on a false

premise because “[t]here are a myriad of psychiatric limitations that could prevent Plaintiff from

performing alternate work.” (Reply at 7.) There is no support in the medical records for the

“myriad of psychiatric conditions.” In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites only to her own

testimony regarding her lack of concentration, lack of memory, and inability to sustain tasks. 

These complaints are not supported by medical records. Furthermore, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s

allegations of disabling functional limitations not fully credible. (AR at 32.) 

The ALJ may engage in a credibility analysis to determine whether to credit the testimony

regarding severity of the symptoms, and may reject the claimant’s testimony 

only if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing

so. ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what

facts in the record lead to that conclusion. [¶] To determine whether the

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claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms is credible, the ALJ

may consider, for example: (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such

as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the

symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2)

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see also id. at 1281-82. For his

credibility finding, the ALJ enumerated nineteen reasons supported by citations to the record,

and his finding is supported by substantial evidence. (AR at 32-34.) 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reversal and/or remand is DENIED. 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s decision to

deny benefits is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 27, 2006

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. WILLIAM McCURINE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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