Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_90-cv-00478/USCOURTS-caed-1_90-cv-00478-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONSTANTINO CARRERA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

JILL L. BROWN, as Warden of )

San Quentin State Prison, )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. CIV. F-90-478-A.I.-P

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER PARTIALLY DENYING

PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO

CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SETTING

DUE DATE FOR RESPONDENT’S

OPPOSITION

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Petitioner

Constantino Carrera (“Carrera”) for leave to conduct discovery by

propounding a document production request. The documents requested

are variously believed to be in the possession of the Kern County

District Attorneys’ Office, the Kern County Sheriff’s Department, the

Kern County Superior Court, “any” Kern County medical or mental health

department or facility (with information pertaining the Carrera’s

mental health or drug use), and the Attorney General’s Office. For

discovery granted by the Court, Carrera will be entitled to any of the

approved documents which are in the possession, custody, or control

of the Attorney General’s Office. For documents in the possession,

custody, or control of the other entities, with the exception of the

Kern County Superior Court, Carrera will have to serve subpoenas duces

Case 1:90-cv-00478-AWI Document 257 Filed 07/12/05 Page 1 of 11
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1 Records maintained by a state court of its cases are available

to Carrera’s litigation team as public records. If any trouble is

encountered in obtaining records from the Kern County Superior Court,

Carrera should advise this Court.

2 This order was filed under seal due to the confidential nature

of proceedings inherent in the budgeting process. Not all the

information contained in the order, however, is confidential.

90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 2

tecum.

1 The actual Request for Production of Documents incorrectly

seems to presume that the Warden and her counsel (the Attorney

General), are responsible for producing the documents specified. 

No opposition of other response has been received from Respondent

Jill L. Brown, As Warden of San Quentin State Prison (the “Warden”),

but the Court understands that an opposition brief is intended to be

filed within 30 days from the filing of Carrera’s motion. Not all of

the seven categories of documents specified in the motion, however,

need be addressed by the Warden. This conclusion follows from the

fact that the Court already addressed permissible areas of

investigation Carrera’s litigation team may pursue in the recently

filed (February 4, 2005) Order re: Phase III Budget.2 Three of the

seven categories of documents specified in the motion are not within

this permissible area. Therefore, without the necessity of the Warden

addressing any of these categories, discovery with respect to the

following categories is denied. The Warden shall respond to the

remaining four categories.

Category 1 All documents in possession of the Kern County district

attorney’s office, and the Kern County sheriff’s office, including all

documents in the prosecutor’s files in this case, regarding

prosecution witness Miguel (Mike) Santana.

In the supporting declaration of Carrera’s counsel Stephen

Bedrick, Mr. Bedrick explains that these documents may lead to the

Case 1:90-cv-00478-AWI Document 257 Filed 07/12/05 Page 2 of 11
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3 Carrera’s February 28, 2001 Points and Authorities asserts that

the denial of adequate cross examination “variously resulted from

trial court error, and/or prosecutorial misconduct, and/or ineffective

assistance of counsel.” 2/28/01 Ps & As, p. 108. 

90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 3

discovery of relevant evidence supporting Carrera’s claim that his

defense counsel was not allowed to conduct adequate cross examination

of Miguel Santana at trial. The evidence sought to be uncovered

pertains to Miguel Santana’s alleged motive to testify falsely against

Carrera or to testify inconsistently at the respective trials of

Carrera and co-perpetrator Ramiro Ruiz-Gonzales (“Ruiz”).3

The Court addressed the denial of adequate cross examination

claims in the February 4, 2005 Budgeting Order. After undertaking a

thorough examination of the claims and arguments in Carrera’s Points

and Authorities, the Court concluded that no evidentiary development

of this category of claims would be permitted. Nothing has transpired

since February to alter the view that proving the fact of inadequate

cross examination would not entitle Carrera to relief.

The gravamen of Carrera’s argument in this category of claims is

that his defense counsel, Donnalee Mendez (now Huffman), was not

allowed to elicit from Santana whether the source of the information

he relayed at Carrera’s trial came solely from Carrera, Ruiz, or from

both Ruiz and Carrera. He claims that if Santana’s testimony was

based on Ruiz’s statements, in any part, the convictions of robbery

and robbery felony murder must be set aside because the statements

constituted hearsay and, additionally, violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause of the Constitution. Of concern to Carrera is

that absent the ability to fully cross examine Santana, the jury was

unaware that his testimony at Carrera’s trial was inconsistent from

his testimony at Ruiz’s earlier trial in two important particulars.

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4 The Court previously explained in the October 4, 2004 Order

that Santana’s testimony at Carrera’s trial was ambiguous as to who

obtained the larger knife. Based on this ambiguous testimony, the

prosecutor argued on summation that Santana said it was Carrera who

obtained the larger knife. At Ruiz’s trial, in contrast, Santana

clearly testified that Ruiz went into the kitchen to obtain the larger

knife, and the prosecutor so argued.

90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 4

The first was whether Ruiz asked Santana if he (Santana) had the

“guts” or nerve to kill someone, which is how Santana testified at

Ruiz’s trial, or, whether Carrera asked Santana the “guts to kill”

question, which is how Santana testified at Carrera’s trial. The

second is whether Ruiz went into the kitchen to obtain a larger knife

during the attack on victim Jack Hayes, as Santana testified a Ruiz’s

trial, or whether it was Carrera who went into the kitchen to obtain

a larger knife, as the prosecutor argued at Carrera’s trial.4

The inquiry need be pursued no further. As the Court previously

observed, from careful examination of the transcripts of Ruiz’s and

Carrera’s trials, Santana’s testimony at Ruiz’s trial was based on

what Santana said Ruiz told him, and his testimony at Carrera’s trial

was based on what he said Carrera told him. June 22, 2000 Ord., p.

11; October 4, 2004 Ord., pp. 12-13. The Court further discerns that

Carrera’s trial counsel, Mrs. Huffman, preserved no objection to the

challenged trial court ruling barring cross examination. In fact, it

was Mrs. Huffman’ objection to the prosecutor’s questioning Santana

about what Ruiz said that prompted the court ruling Carrera now

challenges. The sustaining of Mrs. Huffman’s objection prevented the

prosecutor from eliciting statements from Santana which were

attributable to Ruiz, precisely the result sought by Mrs. Huffman.

See RT-2: 162; RT-13: 1720. In any event, the bases for Carrera’s

current allegation of prejudice, namely the source of the “guts to

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90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 5

kill” question and the identity of the perpetrator who obtained the

larger knife, already have been addressed in Carrera’s favor when the

Court recognized prosecutorial overreaching and misconduct in its

discussion of Claims 2, 2A, and 44 in the October 4, 2004 Order

granting Carrera summary judgment on those claims.

Carrera’s present discovery request adds a new dimension to the

inadequate cross examination claim, that is, a potential ill-motive

Santana may have had to testify falsely at Carrera’s and/or Ruiz’s

respective trials. Evidence of a bad motive on Santana’s part,

however, is not an issue Carrera previously raised in his moving

papers. Nor are there any other facts Carrera has brought to the

Court’s attention to support the notion that Santana testified as he

did for some ill-motive. Mr. Bedrick’s supporting declaration in this

regard is telling. He characterizes the discovery sought as

information which “may lead to relevant evidence,” not that it is

relevant itself. In characterizing the supposed good cause for

discovery, as required by Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, in this manner, Carrera demonstrates that he perceives

discovery available on habeas corpus as ordinary civil litigation

discovery. This is not the case.

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides in

pertinent part: “A judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to

conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may

limit the extent of discovery.” Good cause under this standard is

established where “specific allegations before the court show reason

to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed,

be able to demonstrate that he . . . is entitled to relief.” Harris

v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969), quoted in Advisory Committee Note

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90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 6

to Rule 6; Bracey v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997). The

present discovery request does not meet this requirement. The request

for prosecution file documents regarding Miguel Santana is denied.

Category 2. Petitioner requests that the Kern County Superior Court

and/or the prosecution make available for examination, including

scientific, microscopic, and chemical analysis, the piece of unburned

alleged corduroy material in People’s Exh. #186 and/or #190.

Mr. Bedrick’s supporting declaration recites the underlying

contention for this discovery request, namely that jury misconduct

occurred when jury members, during deliberations, manually pulled

apart pieces of partially burned (and melted together) clothing they

were given to examine. In the process, they apparently discovered

some material consistent with the description of corduroy pants said

to have been worn by Carrera on the night of the robbery and murders.

The unburned corduroy material is characterized in Carrera’s February

28, 2001 Points and Authorities as extraneous evidence. Carrera

further alleges that the juror misconduct claim then took on the

mantle of prosecutorial misconduct when the jurors told the prosecutor

after the trial what they had discovered, but neither they nor the

prosecutor ever told defense counsel. 

In the Court’s February 4, 2005 Budgeting Order, Carrera’s

request to investigate and develop evidence supporting this claim was

denied, and nothing is presently offered to change that disposition

regarding discovery. First, Carrera offers no support for the notion

that physical evidence given jurors to examine during deliberations

assumes the character of extraneous evidence when the jurors actually

and carefully examine it. Thus, the claims that juror misconduct or

prosecutorial misconduct occurred is highly questionable.

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90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 7

Second, even if Carrera were to prevail in showing misconduct,

the result would be to cast doubt on the already determined fact that

he was present at the scene of the crime where Mr. and Mrs. Hayes were

robbed and murdered. In both the June 22, 2000 and October 4, 2004

orders, the Court determined that Carrera was present. June 22, 2000

Ord., pp. 45-47, 51; October 4, 2004 Ord., pp. 60-63. This

determination was made without regard to evidence that some material

available to the jurors for examination was of a similar nature to the

fabric of Carrera’s corduroy pants. Any conclusion drawn by jurors

that fabric evidence connected Carrera to the crime was cumulative,

at best.

Third, and finally, an inextricable part of Carrera’s argument

is a description of how jurors purportedly deliberated based on

evidence they had before them. Evidence of the deliberative process,

however, is inadmissible in federal proceedings. Fed. R.Evid., Rule

606(b). Discovery relative to burned material examined by the jurors

is denied.

Category 3. All documents in possession of the Kern County Superior

Court, the Kern County district attorney’s office, the Kern County

sheriff’s office, and the Attorney General’s office of the State of

California, other than those previously supplied by Petitioner in this

case, regarding whether the personal life and financial situation of

trial counsel Donnalee Mendez [Huffman], as described in Petitioner’s

February 28, 2001 memorandum sec. XXXI, pp. 215-223, presented any

obstacles to the preparation of trial in this case. This request

includes, but is not limited to (a) all records of any request for

compensation by her as court-appointed counsel between the times of

January 1, 1982, and December 31, 1983; (b) all requests and motions

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5 Separately, Carrera argues a conflict of existed because Mrs.

Huffman represented Carmen Santana (Miguel Santana’s sister) in

dissolution proceedings and therefore had divided loyalties. The

alleged conflict of interest on this ground is not relevant to the

present discovery request.

90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 8

by Ms. Mendez for court authorization and/or payment for investigators

and/or experts, and/or co-counsel fees during that period, and (c)

notes in the prosecutor’s files regarding any discussions regarding

delays or continuances of the subject trial.

Mr. Bedrick’s supporting declaration reiterates the argument in

Carrera’s Points and Authorities that Mrs. Huffman’s personal

financial difficulties caused her to go to trial before she was

properly prepared.5 Under this theory, Mrs. Huffman’s financial

reimbursement requests sought in discovery would tend to prove

Carrera’s claim that Mrs. Huffman needed money, and, in order to

receive reimbursement, agreed to go to trial without being fully

prepared.

Although no conclusion on the propriety of discovering Mrs.

Huffman’s reimbursement requests has been made, the Court has already

generally addressed the propriety of investigation into Mrs. Huffman’s

personal finances. Again, nothing now offered indicates that this

prior determination should be revisited. 

 According to Carrera, the alleged lack of trial preparation

manifested itself in two ways. First Mrs. Huffman failed to develop

a mental health defense. Second, she did not note inconsistencies in

the testimony of the same witnesses between the respective trials of

Carrera and Ruiz (notably Miguel Santana’s inconsistent testimony).

Moreover, she accepted appointment in another felony case (for which

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6 It is possible one of the parties may wish to introduce Mrs.

Huffman’s trial billing statements and reimbursement requests to show

what professional efforts were undertaken on Carrera’s behalf.

7 This subject matter is covered by another category of documents

specified by Carrera in the present discovery motion.

90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 9

she was compensated) which interrupted her preparation for Carrera’s

trial from October 1982 through May 1983.

As the Court stated in its February 4, 2005 Budgeting Order, it

is hard to understand how Carrera perceives prejudice from Mrs.

Huffman’s alleged conflicts in light of the Court’s prior ruling and

the viability of other claims. It is not necessary to explore Mrs.

Huffman’s personal or financial problems or even her early and

frequent requests for reimbursement in order to bring to light the

inconsistencies between Ruiz’s and Carrera’s trials.6 The Court

already has recognized the problem and rendered a ruling favorable to

Carrera in the October 4, 2004 Order. No further evidentiary

development need be pursued. With respect to Mrs. Huffman’s failure

to develop a mental state defense, the Court has given Carrera the

green light to explore this area, particularly with respect to

Carrera’s drug use (or abuse).7 If Carrera is successful in showing

that a drug or other mental incapacity defense could have altered the

outcome of the robbery verdict, then relief will follow, without

delving into Mrs. Huffman’s personal or financial affairs. For this

reason, the Court previously ruled that no investigation into these

matters would be permitted. The ruling stands and applies to

Carrera’s discovery efforts as well.

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90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 10

In light of the foregoing, the Court denies discovery with

respect to each of the following categories of evidence specified in

Carrera’s motion for leave to conduct discovery:

1. All documents in possession of the Kern County district

attorney’s office, and the Kern County sheriff’s office,

including all documents in the prosecutor’s files in this case,

regarding prosecution witness Miguel (Mike) Santana;

2. Petitioner requests that the Kern County Superior Court and/or

the prosecution make available for examination, including

scientific, microscopic, and chemical analysis, the piece of

unburned alleged corduroy material in People’s Exh. #186 and/or

#190; and

3. All documents in possession of the Kern County Superior Court,

the Kern County district attorney’s office, the Kern County

sheriff’s office, and the Attorney General’s office of the State

of California, other than those previously supplied by

Petitioner in this case, regarding whether the personal life and

financial situation of trial counsel Donnalee Mendez [Huffman],

as described in Petitioner’s February 28, 2001 memorandum sec.

XXXI, pp. 215-223, presented any obstacles to the preparation of

trial in this case. This request includes, but is not limited

to (a) all records of any request for compensation by her as

court-appointed counsel between the times of January 1, 1982,

and December 31, 1983; (b) all requests and motions by Ms.

Mendez for court authorization and/or payment for investigators

and/or experts, and/or co-counsel fees during that period, and

(c) notes in the prosecutor’s files regarding any discussions

regarding delays or continuances of the subject trial.

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90dp0478.O.ReDiscoReq.Car.wpd 11

With respect to the remaining four categories of documents sought

be discovered, the Warden is directed file an opposition or responsive

brief no later than August 5, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

c508d4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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