Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_00-cv-00497/USCOURTS-azd-3_00-cv-00497-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 In accordance with the Ninth Circuit's mandate, on February 23, 2007,

the court ordered defendants Van Wagner and the Carioca Company to "file and serve

. . . brief[s] addressing the issue of 'whether [attorneys'] fees should be awarded

under federal law.'" Doc. 272 at 2 (quoting doc. 271 (mandate) at 3). Defendant

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Virgil Langley, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 00-00497-PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Raymond W. Brown, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

Currently pending before the court is a March 20, 2007, letter

from plaintiff pro se Virgil Langley, which the court construes as

a motion for recusal and/or disqualification. See Doc. 275. Also

pending before the court is a motion by defendant Albert E. Van

Wagner, Jr., for "an award of attorneys' fees as a sanction under

federal law against Plaintiff Langley[.]" Doc. 274 at 1.1

 Having

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Van Wagner timely filed such a motion, and plaintiff timely responded (doc. 276).

However, the Carioca Company did not file a motion and the time to do so has since

passed. 

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carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, and given its

extensive familiarity with this litigation, the court finds oral

argument unnecessary. 

Discussion

I. Removal

Plaintiff identifies several reasons why he does not "believe,

. . . that [the court] can be fair and impartial." Doc. 275 at 2. 

Plaintiff claims that he learned of at least some of those reasons

while this case was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. See id. at 2. More specifically, during that time,

plaintiff claims that he learned that the court "hold[s] a

substantial interest in the Bell Grande Investment in Phoenix[;]"

and that "[t]he Bell Grande Investments are represented by the same

law firm that represents defendant [t]he Carioca Company" in this

action, i.e. Mariscal Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander P.A. ("Mariscal

Weeks"). Id. at 1. Although he does not provide any details or

evidence, plaintiff further states that "[t]here is additional

information that points to [the court's] professional/personal

relationships with the parties in this as well as related state

litigation." Id.

Again, without providing any details, plaintiff further claims

that during the course of this litigation the court has

"demonstrated indifference" to him." Id. at 2. As plaintiff

perceives it the court's "previous rulings were made with prejudice

and bias." Id. According to plaintiff, "the decisions in this

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case . . . are an apparent result of error and indifference." Id.

In a similar vein, plaintiff continues that "[r]epetitious error

and denial of discovery interfered with the reasoned resolution of

legal issues." Id. Plaintiff devotes the remainder of his letter

to outlining why he believes grounds exist for sanctioning the

defendants. See id.

Although plaintiff does not specifically seek recusal or 

disqualification, the excerpted parts of his letter, especially

when taken together with his assertion that the court's

"continuation with this case is an abuse of judicial discretion[,]"

persuades the court that he is seeking to have the undersigned

removed from this case. 

There are two possible statutory bases for this removal

request – 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Under both statutes 

"the substantive test for bias or prejudice is identical[,]" but

the "procedural requirements . . . are different." United States

v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Substantively, under

either statute, "recusal is appropriate where a reasonable person

with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's

impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Yagman v. Republic

Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Significantly, "[b]oth statutes require

recusal only if the perceived bias and prejudice stem from an

extra-judicial source, not from conduct or rulings made in the case

itself." In re Jansen, 107 B.R. 249, 251 (Bankr. D.Ariz. 1989)

(citing, inter alia, Toth v. Trans World Airlines, 862 F.2d 1381,

1388 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Furthermore, "[b]ias or prejudice is disqualifying only if it

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is an attitude, a fair-minded person could not set aside while

judging a case." Id. "An animus more active and deep-rooted than

mere disapproval is required." Id. (citing, inter alia, Matter of

Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1182 (9th Cir. 1986)). "Because a federal

judge is presumed to be impartial, the party claiming bias bears a

substantial burden to show that the judge is not impartial." 

Shafler v. HSBC Bank USA, 2007 WL 578993 at *7 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 21

2007) (citation omitted). 

Procedurally, section 144 provides for the removal of a

district court judge where a party "files a timely and sufficient

affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any

adverse party[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 144 (West 2006). The affidavit must

"state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists[.]" Id. If a motion under section 144 is timely

filed and the supporting affidavit is legally sufficient, the court

"shall proceed no further" and the matter must be assigned to

another judge. Id.

Unlike section 144, 28 U.S.C. § 455 is self-enforcing and thus

does not require the filing of a supporting affidavit. See id. at

867-868. Accordingly, there is no provision in section 455 for

referral to another judge. "[I]f the judge sitting on a case is

aware of grounds for recusal under section 455, that judge has a

duty to recuse himself[.]" Id. at 868 (citation omitted). 

A. 28 U.S.C. § 144

In the present case, plaintiff Langley did not file an

affidavit in support of his request for recusal. Instead, as

mentioned at the outset, his request is in letter form. The lack

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of an affidavit precludes plaintiff Langley from seeking recusal

under section 144. See Chapman v. Jensen, 2006 WL 3371135, at *3

(D. Mont. Nov. 20, 2006) (citation omitted) (denying section 144

motion for recusal as "procedurally defective[]" where plaintiff

did not file a supporting affidavit); see also Sibla, 624 F.2d at

868 (affirming denial of section 144 recusal motion where

supporting affidavit was not "legally sufficient" in that contained

only conclusory allegations and was "devoid of specific fact

allegations tending to show personal bias stemming from an

extrajudicial source[]"). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff

Langley is attempting to rely upon 28 U.S.C. § 144 as a basis for

recusal, the court DENIES this request.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 455

Notwithstanding the lack of any procedural barriers to

plaintiff's request for disqualification under section 455, he

still cannot prevail here. There are two aspects to plaintiff's

disqualification argument. First plaintiff suggests that the court

cannot be "fair and impartial[]" because of its connection to

"[t]he Belle Grande Investments[.]" See Doc. 275 at 2 and 1. 

Second, plaintiff believes that the court's "previous rulings" in

this case evince "prejudice and bias" against him, although he does

not explain how. See id. at 2.

In light of these arguments, two subparts of section 455 are

potentially implicated here. Under section 455(a), "[a]ny . . .

judge, . . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (West 2006). Thus, "[s]ection

455(a) covers circumstances that appear to create a conflict of

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interest, whether or not there is actual bias." Preston v. United

States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)

(emphasis in original). In contrast, "[s]ection 455(b) covers

situations in which an actual conflict of interest exits, even if

there is no appearance of one." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis

in original). For example, that section enumerates specific

circumstances requiring disqualification such as where a judge "has

a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party[,]" or where "[h]e

knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, . . . , has a

financial interest in the subject matter in controversy . . . , or

any other interest that could be substantially affected by the

outcome of the proceeding[.]" 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(1) and 455(b)(4)

(West 2006). Subsection (b) "also describes situations that create

an apparent conflict, because it provides examples of situations in

which a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned

pursuant to section 455(a)." Preston, 923 F.2d at 734 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Turning first to the court's prior rulings, the Supreme Court

has recognized that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute

a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion[]" under section 455. 

See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147,

1157 (1994) (citation omitted). Given that clear pronouncement,

there is no merit to plaintiff's argument that the court must

disqualify itself based upon its prior rulings in this case. 

Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that plaintiff "has not

shown that th[is] . . . court's substantive rulings were products

of 'deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that [made] fair judgment

impossible.'" In re Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir.

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2004) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). Indeed, plaintiff would

be hard-pressed to make such an argument, given that the Ninth

Circuit affirmed, inter alia, this court's order granting summary

judgment in favor of defendant Van Wagner as to plaintiff's abuse

of process claim against him. See Doc. 271 at 2. 

Likewise, the Bell Grande investments do not provide

justification for disqualifying the court from this lawsuit. This

is not a situation such as Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition

Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988), where the Supreme court

held that the district court judge, who was also a trustee of a

university, should have disqualified himself under section 455

because the plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership of a

corporation in which the university had an active interest. 

Obviously, the Bell Grande investments have never been the subject

of this litigation. Thus, the fact that the court at one time

served as a trustee in connection with those investments is

immaterial, and certainly does not demonstrate a conflict, actual

or apparent. 

Furthermore, although plaintiff contends that the law firm of

Mariscal Weeks, attorneys of record for the defendant Carioca

Company, also represent or did represent the Bell Grande

investments, the court has no personal knowledge of that. Even if

Mariscal Weeks has represented or does represent the Carioca

Company, the court fails to see how that could lead "a reasonable

person," i.e. "a well-informed, thoughtful observer, as opposed to

a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person[,]" to conclude that

this court's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See

Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Central Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d

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1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff's bald assertion of "additional information . . .

point[ing] to [the court's] professional/personal relationships

with the parties[]" likewise does not demonstrate a conflict

warranting disqualification of this court. See Doc. 275 at 1. 

Conclusory, speculation of this sort, with no evidentiary support,

falls into the category of "matters not ordinarily sufficient to

require a § 455(a) recusal." See Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1179. 

Simply put, "[s]ection 455(a) does not require recusal based on

speculation[,]" yet that is the only basis for plaintiff's

Langley's request. See id. at 1180 (citation omitted). In short,

none of the reasons which plaintiffs advances for disqualification

overcome the presumption of this court's impartiality and satisfy

his "substantial burden" of showing the opposite, i.e. that the

court "is not impartial." See Shafler, 2007 WL 578993, at *7

(citation omitted). 

To conclude, the court holds no bias or prejudice toward

plaintiff. Nor is the court aware of any basis upon which its

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Indeed, because the

court is keenly aware that it has "as strong a duty to sit when

there is no legitimate reason to recuse as [it] does to recuse when

the law and facts require it[,]" the court DENIES plaintiff's

request for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. See id. at 1179

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

II. Sanctions

Having determined that there is no basis for its recusal, the

court will next consider whether defendant Van Wagner is entitled

to "an award of attorney's fees as a sanction under federal law[.]" 

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2 Defendant Van Wagner sought $5,000.00 in attorney's fees and then

sought to have the court double that amount, as A.R.S. § 12-349(A) allows.

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See Doc. 274 at 1. Originally defendant Van Wagner sought

$10,000.00 in attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C) and

§ 12-349.2 Doc. 244 at 15. In awarding attorney's fees of

$5,000.00, this court expressly found section 12-349(1) was

satisfied because there was "no substantial justification in

[plaintiff's] pursuit of this litigation." Id. at 17. The court

noted that its "ruling on Van Wagner's motion for summary judgment

reveal[ed] the fundamental lack of merit in [plaintiff's] claims

against Van Wagner." Id. The court also expressly found that

section 12-349(2) was satisfied because "the claim [was] brought

primarily for the purpose of harassing Defendant Van Wagner." Id.

In this regard, the court noted its "concern[] about [plaintiff's]

apparent pattern of filing claims against the players in the

Carioca Litigation which appear calculated to revive a claim long

resolved by a jury, and affirmed by the Court of appeals of

Arizona." Id. 

These findings, according to defendant Van Wagner, support an

award of attorney's fees as a sanction either pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927, or based upon the court's inherent power to make such an

award. The court will separately address these two possible

grounds for a fee award. Before doing so, however, the court notes

that plaintiff's pro se status "does not derogate" the court's

authority to award sanctions against him. See Whyte v. U.S. Dept.

of Veterans Affairs, 2005 WL 1367098, at *1 (E.D.Cal. May 18,

2005).

. . .

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A. 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Section 1927 authorizes courts to impose sanctions against a

pro se litigant, Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir.

1990) (citation omitted), among others, "who so multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously[.]" 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927 (West 2006). Such a litigant "may be required by the court

to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'

fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." Id. (emphasis

added). The Ninth Circuit has held that "a blanket award of all

fees cannot square with th[at] section's requirement that only

excess amounts be allowed." Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1184. "Thus, only

if the award is sufficiently itemized can the court be assured that

it is reasonable." Id.

Here, defendant Van Wagner is seeking a lump sum fee award of

$5,000.00. Van Wagner, himself an attorney, bases this fee request

upon the fact that he "personally expended" that amount in

"defending [plaintiff's] claims[]" because his insurer went into

receivership prior to October, 2003, and the $5,000.00 represents

his deductible. See Doc. 208, exh. A thereto at 6, ¶ 19; see also

Mot. (doc. 274) at 3. Without defendant Van Wagner's billing

records, however, there is no meaningful way for the court to

ascertain whether the $5,000.00 represents "excess . . . attorneys'

fees reasonably incurred because of" plaintiff Langley's conduct. 

28 U.S.C. § 1927. This is not a situation such as that presented

in Morgan v. County of Yolo, 2006 WL 2692872, at *2 (E.D.Cal.

Sept. 18, 2006), where the court awarded fees of $5332.50 by

examining defense counsel's billings to ascertain the amount

attributable to "unreasonable multiplication of [the]

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proceedings[.]" Id. Plainly, the lack of any similar billing

records from defendant Van Wagner makes it impossible for the court

to undertake the "excess" inquiry which section 1927 requires.

Accordingly, the court DENIES defendant Van Wagner's request for

fees insofar as it is premised upon section 1927. 

B. Inherent Power of the Court

As an alternative basis for a fee award, as mentioned at the

outset, defendant Van Wagner is seeking to have the court invoke

its "inherent power" to make such an award. "The federal courts

possess inherent power to impose sanctions, 'when the losing party

has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive

reasons.'" Stone v. Baum, 409 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1171 (D.Ariz. 2006)

(quoting Aloe Vera of America, Inc. v. United States, 376 F.3d 960,

964-65 (9th Cir. 2004)) (other citation omitted). "[F]or purposes

of imposing sanctions under the inherent power of the court, a

finding of bad faith does not require that the legal and factual

basis for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is

substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides,

the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of

attorney's fees." B.K.B. v. Maui Police Department, 276 F.3d 1091,

1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

Assessing plaintiff Langley's conduct in pursuing this

litigation against those standards, as it did previously, the court

finds that "the claim [was] brought primarily for the purpose of

harassing defendant Van Wagner." See Doc. 244 at 17. The court

continues to be "concerned about [plaintiff's] apparent pattern of

filing claims against the players in the Carioca Litigation which

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appear calculated to revive a claim long resolved by a jury, and

affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Arizona." Id. Nor can the

court ignore the fact that on the merits of the underlying abuse of

process claim, it found "no basis whatsoever to conclude that

[defendant Van Wagner] took any action in regard to the Carioca

Litigation that abused the litigation process." Id. at 15

(emphasis added). These reasons persuade the court that plaintiff

Langley acted in bad faith warranting sanctions against him in the

form of payment of defendant Van Wagner's attorney's fees. 

By the same token, however, as the court is fully cognizant of

the "restraint and discretion" with which it must exercise in

invoking its inherent powers to award sanctions, Chambers v. NASCO,

Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (1991), the court DENIES

defendant Van Wagner's motion for attorney's fees. Such an award

is not proper because the record as presently constituted does not

allow the court to make a finding of reasonableness in terms of the

amount which Van Wagner is seeking. Cf. United States v. Blodgett,

709 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted) ("[C]ases that

have considered the district court's inherent power to sanction

attorneys for litigating in bad faith have related such sanctions

to the amount of fees incurred by the opposing party[.]") 

Finally, there is no basis for plaintiff's suggestion that

defendants should be sanctioned. Moreover, that argument is beyond

the scope of this court's February 23, 2007, Order and the Ninth

Circuit mandate which formed the basis for that Order. The issue,

as framed by the Ninth Circuit and reiterated in this court's

subsequent order, was the propriety of an attorneys' fee award

against plaintiff. The issue was not whether defendants should be

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sanctioned.

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that defendant Albert E. Van

Wagner, Jr.'s motion for attorney's fees (doc. 274) is DENIED; and

It is further ORDERED that the letter request for recusal

and/or disqualification by plaintiff Virgil H. Langley (doc. 275)

is construed as a motion, and is DENIED; and 

FINALLY, it is ORDERED that plaintiff Virgil H. Langley's for

sanctions against defendants (doc. 276) is DENIED.

IT IS ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of April, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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