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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 2007 Decided March 28, 2008 

No. 06-5362 

STANDLEY BRADY, 

APPELLANT

v. 

OFFICE OF THE SERGEANT AT ARMS, UNITED STATES HOUSE 

OF REPRESENTATIVES,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 02cv00802) 

Lenore C. Garon argued the cause for appellant. With 

her on the briefs were Joseph D. Gebhardt and Charles W. 

Day, Jr. 

Victoria L. Botvin, Attorney, Office of House 

Employment Counsel, argued the cause for appellee. With 

her on the brief was Gloria J. Lett, Attorney, Office of House 

Employment Counsel. 

Before: GINSBURG and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #06-5362 Document #1108108 Filed: 03/28/2008 Page 1 of 12
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 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Seeking to punish and deter 

sexual harassment, the U.S. House Office of the Sergeant at 

Arms demoted Brady, a supervisor within the office, because 

it concluded that Brady grabbed his crotch in front of three 

employees. Brady sued under federal anti-discrimination 

laws, contending that he was demoted because of his race. 

The District Court granted summary judgment to the Sergeant 

at Arms on the ground that Brady had not made out a prima 

facie case of racial discrimination. In the alternative, the 

District Court ruled that Brady failed to present evidence 

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the Sergeant at 

Arms’ stated reason for demoting Brady was not the actual 

reason and that the Sergeant at Arms intentionally 

discriminated against Brady on account of his race. We 

affirm based on that alternative ground. In doing so, we 

emphasize that the question whether the plaintiff in a 

disparate-treatment discrimination suit actually made out a 

prima facie case is almost always irrelevant when the district 

court considers an employer’s motion for summary judgment 

or judgment as a matter of law. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of 

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-16 (1983). 

I 

 Brady worked as an assistant shift supervisor in House 

Garages & Parking Security, an entity within the Office of the 

Sergeant at Arms of the U.S. House of Representatives. In 

early 2001, two employees – one man and one woman – 

accused Brady of improper behavior in the workplace. They 

alleged that Brady grabbed his crotch in front of the two of 

them and another female employee. After learning of the 

USCA Case #06-5362 Document #1108108 Filed: 03/28/2008 Page 2 of 12
3 

incident, House Sergeant at Arms Wilson Livingood asked 

two supervisors to investigate. In the ensuing internal 

investigation, the two accusers claimed that Brady grabbed 

his crotch while discussing his need to use the restroom. The 

other employee who was present initially refused to discuss 

the incident, saying she did not want to be involved. After 

being required to give a statement, she said that Brady did not 

“present any offensive actions towards [her].” Joint 

Appendix (“J.A.”) 214. She explained that Brady had acted 

“in a very joking manner,” but she did not deny that Brady 

had grabbed his crotch in the way described by the other two 

employees. Id. 

The two investigating supervisors found that the crotchgrabbing incident had likely occurred and that Brady violated 

the office’s sexual harassment policy. One supervisor 

recommended demoting Brady. The other recommended 

firing him. Sergeant at Arms Livingood then determined that 

Brady “might have done it jokingly, but . . . even in a joking 

manner, it offended two of his employees.” Livingood 

Deposition Transcript (Nov. 10, 2005), J.A. 92. Particularly 

because Brady was a supervisor, Livingood concluded that 

“some action needed to be taken.” Id. Livingood demoted 

Brady but did not fire him. 

Brady asked Livingood to reconsider his decision. 

Livingood agreed to do so and hired a Washington, D.C., law 

firm to investigate. The law firm reviewed documents 

produced during the original investigation and interviewed 13 

current and former employees. The firm concluded that it 

was “likely that an incident occurred that was most accurately 

described” by Brady’s two initial accusers. Relman Report 

(June 28, 2001), J.A. 199. After receiving the law firm’s 

report, Livingood affirmed Brady’s demotion. 

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Brady sued, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, a law 

that applies to offices in the Legislative Branch as a result of 

the Congressional Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a), 

1311(a). The District Court granted summary judgment to the 

Office of the Sergeant at Arms, finding that Brady failed to 

make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination because 

he could not show that a similarly situated employee outside 

his racial group was treated differently. Brady v. Livingood, 

456 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006). In the alternative, the 

District Court stated that “even if plaintiff were able to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment would still be granted because 

defendant’s personnel actions were in fact undertaken for 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. at 9 n.9. 

Brady appeals; our review of the summary judgment is de 

novo. 

II 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an 

employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). This statutory text establishes two elements for an 

employment discrimination case: (i) the plaintiff suffered an 

adverse employment action (ii) because of the employee’s 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 

The District Court concluded that Brady had not made 

out a “prima facie case” under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

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Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

1 The court’s focus on the prima 

facie case was not atypical: When resolving an employer’s 

motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law 

in employment discrimination cases, district courts often 

wrestle with the question whether the employee made out a 

prima facie case. 

But judicial inquiry into the prima facie case is usually 

misplaced. In the years since McDonnell Douglas, the 

 1

 In a refusal-to-hire or refusal-to-promote discrimination case, 

the McDonnell Douglas prima facie factors are that: (i) the 

employee “belongs to a racial minority” or other protected class; 

(ii) the employee “applied and was qualified for a job for which the 

employer was seeking applicants”; (iii) despite the employee’s 

qualifications, the employee “was rejected”; and (iv) after the 

rejection, “the position remained open and the employer continued 

to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In 

firing, demotion, or other adverse-action cases, the factors 

sometimes have been articulated as: (i) the employee belongs to a 

protected class; (ii) the employee was still qualified for the position; 

(iii) despite still being qualified, the employee was fired, demoted, 

or otherwise adversely acted upon; and (iv) if the employee was 

removed, either someone else filled the position or the employer 

sought other applicants. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). Some of our decisions have 

allowed or required plaintiffs to present other evidence to satisfy 

the test and occasionally phrased the test more generally to require 

evidence that “the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of 

discrimination.” Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 

1999); see also Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 

2007); George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Disagreement and uncertainty over the content, meaning, and 

purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie factors have led to a 

plethora of problems; as we underscore today, however, the factors 

are usually irrelevant. 

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Supreme Court’s decisions have clarified that the question 

whether the employee made out a prima facie case is almost 

always irrelevant. At the motion to dismiss stage, the district 

court cannot throw out a complaint even if the plaintiff did 

not plead the elements of a prima facie case. Swierkiewicz v. 

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002). And by the time 

the district court considers an employer’s motion for summary 

judgment or judgment as a matter of law, the employer 

ordinarily will have asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for the challenged decision – for example, through a 

declaration, deposition, or other testimony from the 

employer’s decisionmaker. That’s important because once 

the employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, 

the question whether the employee actually made out a prima 

facie case is “no longer relevant” and thus “disappear[s]” and 

“drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 

509 U.S. 502, 510, 511 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson 

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). As the 

Supreme Court explained a generation ago in Aikens: “Where 

the defendant has done everything that would be required of 

him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, 

whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The 

district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide 

whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 

plaintiff.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 

U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Aikens principle applies, moreover, to summary judgment as 

well as trial proceedings. See Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Wells v. 

Colorado Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1227-28 (10th 

Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring); see also Vickers v. Powell, 

493 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 

F.3d 889, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 2006); George v. Leavitt, 407 

F.3d 405, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Aka v. Washington Hosp. 

Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

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Much ink has been spilled regarding the proper contours 

of the prima-facie-case aspect of McDonnell Douglas. But as 

we read the Supreme Court precedents beginning with Aikens, 

the prima facie case is a largely unnecessary sideshow. It has 

not benefited employees or employers; nor has it simplified or 

expedited court proceedings. In fact, it has done exactly the 

opposite, spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant 

and judicial resources. 

Lest there be any lingering uncertainty, we state the rule 

clearly: In a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an 

employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an 

employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 

for the decision, the district court need not – and should not – 

decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie 

case under McDonnell Douglas. Rather, in considering an 

employer’s motion for summary judgment or judgment as a 

matter of law in those circumstances, the district court must 

resolve one central question: Has the employee produced 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the 

employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the 

actual reason and that the employer intentionally 

discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin? See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-

08, 511; Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-16.2

 

 2

 For those rare situations where it still matters whether the 

employee made out a prima facie case – namely, those cases in 

which the defendant does not assert any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision – establishing a prima face 

case is “not onerous.” Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). For example, to make out a 

prima facie case, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that he or she was 

treated differently from a similarly situated employee or that the 

position was filled by a person outside the plaintiff’s group. See 

O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13 

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III 

In this case, the employer Sergeant at Arms asserted a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action – namely, that Brady committed sexual 

harassment. Under Aikens and related Supreme Court 

precedents, the question whether Brady actually made out a 

prima facie case is therefore irrelevant. So we turn directly to 

the central issue: whether Brady produced evidence sufficient 

for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason 

was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally 

discriminated against Brady based on his race. When 

determining whether summary judgment or judgment as a 

matter of law is warranted for the employer, the court 

considers all relevant evidence presented by the plaintiff and 

defendant. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000); see also Czekalski v. Peters, 

475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Aka v. Washington Hosp. 

Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The employer produced deposition testimony from its 

decisionmaker Livingood that Brady was demoted because he 

grabbed his crotch in front of three other employees. The 

employer submitted additional supporting evidence: that two 

employees saw and complained about the incident; that the 

 

(1996); Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 

Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 365-66; Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 

447 F.3d 843, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chappell-Johnson v. 

Powell, 440 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2006); George, 407 F.3d at 

412-13; Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1150-51 

(D.C. Cir. 2004); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 

758, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145-

46 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Rather, such evidence (or the lack of such 

evidence) may be relevant to the determination at summary 

judgment or trial whether intentional discrimination occurred. 

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initially reluctant third witness did not deny that Brady had 

grabbed his crotch; that the incident was thoroughly and 

independently investigated; and that Brady’s actions violated 

the office’s sexual harassment policy. 

A plaintiff such as Brady may try in multiple ways to 

show that the employer’s stated reason for the employment 

action was not the actual reason (in other words, was a 

pretext). Often, the employee attempts to produce evidence 

suggesting that the employer treated other employees of a 

different race, color, religion, sex, or national origin more 

favorably in the same factual circumstances. See 1 LEX K.

LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.04, at 8-66 (2d 

ed. 2007) (“Probably the most commonly employed method 

of demonstrating that an employer’s explanation is pretextual 

is to show that similarly situated persons of a different race or 

sex received more favorable treatment.”); 1 BARBARA 

LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 

DISCRIMINATION LAW 73 (4th ed. 2007) (“In most cases the 

key to proving pretext is comparative evidence.”). 

Alternatively, the employee may attempt to demonstrate that 

the employer is making up or lying about the underlying facts 

that formed the predicate for the employment decision. If the 

employer’s stated belief about the underlying facts is 

reasonable in light of the evidence, however, there ordinarily 

is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude that the employer 

is lying about the underlying facts. See George v. Leavitt, 407 

F.3d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n employer’s action may 

be justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason 

given even though that reason may turn out to be false.”); 

Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996) (employer prevails if it “honestly believes in the 

reasons it offers”); 1 LARSON § 8.04, at 8-73 (“[A]n 

employer’s action may be based on a good faith belief, even 

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though the reason may turn out in retrospect to be mistaken or 

false.”).3

 

Brady’s only argument for discrediting the employer’s 

asserted non-discriminatory reason is his contention that the 

underlying sexual harassment incident never occurred; he 

raises the specter that the original accusers were racially 

motivated and made up the incident. Brady further says it’s 

the jury’s job to decide factual and credibility questions of 

this kind. But Brady misunderstands the relevant factual 

issue. The question is not whether the underlying sexual 

harassment incident occurred; rather, the issue is whether the 

employer honestly and reasonably believed that the 

underlying sexual harassment incident occurred. See George, 

407 F.3d at 415; Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183. Brady himself 

acknowledges that Livingood believed the incident occurred. 

See Brady Deposition Transcript, J.A. 70 (“Q: Is it your 

understanding that Mr. Livingood believed that you grabbed 

yourself? A: Yes.”). Although Brady asserts that the 

accusations and ensuing investigation were racially tainted 

and the incident did not occur, he did not produce evidence 

sufficient to show that the Sergeant at Arms’ conclusion was 

dishonest or unreasonable. Cf. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. 

Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 855-57 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

 3

 Employees often try to cast doubt on an employer’s asserted 

reason in other ways as well, such as pointing to: changes and 

inconsistencies in the stated reasons for the adverse action; the 

employer’s failure to follow established procedures or criteria; the 

employer’s general treatment of minority employees; or 

discriminatory statements by the decisionmaker. See 1 LARSON

§ 8.04, at 8-74 to -75; 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN at 89; 

1 ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 

LAW § 1.9, at 1-134 to -39 (3d ed. 2007). 

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Therefore, summary judgment for the Sergeant at Arms was 

proper. 4 

Allowing Brady to end-run summary judgment in these 

circumstances would create significant practical problems. 

Employers obviously have to resolve factual disagreements 

all the time in order to make employment decisions regarding 

hiring, promotion, discipline, demotion, firing, and the like. 

In many situations, employers must decide disputes based on 

credibility assessments, circumstantial evidence, and 

incomplete information. But Brady’s argument would mean 

that every employee who is disciplined, demoted, or fired for 

alleged misconduct could sue for employment discrimination 

based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and – 

merely by denying the underlying allegation of misconduct – 

automatically obtain a jury trial. Brady cites no support for 

that proposition, which would wreak havoc on district courts’ 

orderly resolution of employment discrimination cases and 

improperly put employers in a damned-if-you-do, damned-ifyou-don’t posture when addressing disciplinary issues in the 

workplace. 

 Brady also implies that the Office of the Sergeant at 

Arms overreacted and adopted a hair-trigger approach to the 

reported incident. But many employers today aggressively 

react to sexual harassment allegations; an employer does not 

engage in discrimination on the basis of race by strictly and 

uniformly enforcing a policy against any remote hint or 

 4

 Even if Brady showed that the sexual harassment incident 

was not the actual reason for his demotion, he still would have to 

demonstrate that the actual reason was a racially discriminatory 

reason. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 

(1993). Of course, discrediting an employer’s asserted reason is 

often quite probative of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson 

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). 

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suggestion of sexual harassment in the workplace. It is not 

the Judiciary’s place to micro-manage an employer’s sexual 

harassment policies when resolving a claim of racial 

discrimination. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ourts 

are generally less competent than employers to restructure 

business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress 

they should not attempt it.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 

438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). 

In sum, the Office of the Sergeant at Arms produced 

evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

Brady’s demotion: that Brady engaged in sexual harassment 

in the workplace in violation of office policy. Brady failed to 

put forward sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 

that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was 

not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally 

discriminated against him on the basis of race. 

* * * 

 We affirm the judgment of the District Court granting 

summary judgment to the Office of the Sergeant at Arms. 

So ordered. 

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