Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01094/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01094-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony Merrick, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Inmate Legal Services, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-1094-PHX-RCB (BSB) 

 O R D E R 

On April 4, 2013, Plaintiff Anthony Merrick, who is confined in the Arizona State 

Prison Complex-Yuma, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint in the Maricopa County 

Superior Court. On May 30, 2013, Defendants removed the action to this Court. In a 

August 20, 2013 Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint and gave Plaintiff 30 days to 

file an amended complaint on the court-approved form. 

 On August 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 5). On 

September 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8). Because Plaintiff 

was granted leave to amend in the August 20 Order, the Court will deny as moot the 

Motion to Amend. 

 On September 5, 2013, Plaintiff also filed an Objection to Removal. The Court 

will deny the Objection and order Defendant Lillie to answer Count Two of the First 

Amended Complaint. The Court will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants 

without prejudice. 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 1 of 10
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

I. Removal 

On September 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Notice of Removal. 

Plaintiff asks that the Court consider his untimely Objection because he did not 

understand that he was required to file the Objection in this Court rather than state court. 

Plaintiff further states that he is opposed to removal because he believes the federal court 

does not have jurisdiction to consider his state claims. 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441 authorizes removal of any civil action brought in the state 

court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. “Only . . . 

actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal 

court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Federal 

district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, including those actions 

where the plaintiff has requested a remedy under state law for an alleged violation of a 

federal substantive right. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). 

 “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the 

>well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a 

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” 

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. The plaintiff is the “master of the claim” and may avoid 

federal jurisdiction by “exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. Under the corollary to that 

rule, however, a state common law claim will be converted into one stating a federal 

claim where the preemptive force of a federal statute is so extraordinary that it displaces 

any state law claim in the area. 

 Plaintiff’s original Complaint was filed pursuant 42 U.S.C § 1983. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s original Complaint could have been filed in federal court and removal was 

appropriate. To the extent that Plaintiff raises state law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) 

provides that the district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in 

any civil action in which the district courts also have original federal jurisdiction over all 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 2 of 10
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

other claims in the case. The Court may therefore exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

II. First Amended Complaint

 Plaintiff names the following Defendants in the First Amended Complaint: 

Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio; Inmate Legal Services Carol Lillie; Inmate 

Legal Services Clerk A. Meyer; Captain J. Baumann; Captain Harmon; Sergeant Rogers; 

Grievance Sergeant J. Wade; Lieutenant Garcia; Sergeant O’Neal; External Referee 

James Garitson; and Chaplain Paul. 

 Plaintiff raises three claims for relief. In Count One, Plaintiff claims his First 

Amendment rights, rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

(“RLUIPA”), and rights under Arizona state law were violated when Defendants 

Baumann and Harmon denied Plaintiff unmonitored, unrecorded phone calls with his 

clergy, which Plaintiff alleges are “a requirement of his religious practices (confession, 

spiritual guidance, and counselling.)” Plaintiff claims that Defendants allowed him 

clergy calls but refused to allow unmonitored, unrecorded calls. Plaintiff was also 

advised that that he could request his pastor to visit him personally, or clergy that 

regularly visited the jail could hear his anonymous confession. Plaintiff claims that this 

was not sufficient because clergy of Plaintiff’s faith was not available and Plaintiff 

needed to speak with his own pastor. Plaintiff grieved the denial and received denials at 

all levels of review from Defendants O’Neal, Garcia, Wade, Paul, and Garitson. Plaintiff 

further alleges that Defendant Arpaio “made the policies, procedures, customs and failed 

to train employees.” 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims his First Amendment rights to access to the courts 

and rights under the Arizona Constitution were violated when Defendant Lille failed to 

file Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Plaintiff 

states that on October 30, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his criminal 

appeal and “stated that a motion for reconsideration could be filed pro-per within time 

frames under A.R.Cr.P. 31.18(b), which is 15 days.” Plaintiff states that he prepared the 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 3 of 10
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

Motion and, on November 7, 2012, sent it to Inmate Legal Services (“ILS”) to be filed. 

Plaintiff states that he was indigent and could not afford copies or postage. Plaintiff 

claims that on November 8, 2012, Defendant Meyer returned the Motion, telling Plaintiff 

that ILS would not process the Motion because Plaintiff was not pro per. Plaintiff filed a 

grievance on the same date. On November 14, 2012, Defendant Lille responded to the 

grievance and stated that she had filed Plaintiff’s Petition for Review, but never 

mentioned the Motion for Reconsideration. On November 20, 2012, Sergeant Rogers 

informed Plaintiff that the Motion was timely filed. On December 6, 2012, Defendant 

Baumann responded to Plaintiff’s grievance appeal by informing Plaintiff that the Motion 

was timely filed. On January 13, 2013, Plaintiff received a Response from Defendant 

Wilson stating that it had been discovered Plaintiff’s Motion had not been filed and ILS 

had erred. Defendant Lille then sent Plaintiff a letter stating that she erred in not sending 

the Motion and that Defendant Meyer was acting pursuant to her direction. 

 Plaintiff claims that his Motion contained non-frivolous claims that would have 

resulted in a favorable outcome and he was unable to “correct the court on facts of the 

case or the law involved.” Plaintiff further claims in Count Two that he filed a grievance 

regarding inadequate legal supplies, but that the grievance was never answered. Finally, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Arpaio “made jail policies, procedures, customs, and 

failed to train employees.” 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges the same facts as Count One but claims that 

“Defendants were acting under Rules, Policies, Procedures and customs to sponsor and 

enforce what they felt were acceptable religious practices in the jail and denied Plaintiff 

his beliefs and practices.” 

 Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and money damages. 

III. Failure to State a Claim 

 A. Defendant Arpaio 

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 4 of 10
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and 

therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 

(9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious 

liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Arpaio personally participated in a 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or was aware of a deprivation and failed to 

act. Although Plaintiff states in each count that “J. Arpaio made jail policies, procedures, 

customs and failed to train employees, which led to the violation,” Plaintiff has offered 

no facts in support of these conclusory allegations. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

against Defendant Arpaio and the Court will dismiss Defendant Arpaio from this action. 

B. Grievances 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Baumann, Harmon, Rogers, Wade, Garcia, 

O’Neal, Garitson, and Paul denied his grievances at various levels of the grievance 

process. The mere denial of a grievance does not give rise to the inference of active 

unconstitutional behavior. Where a defendant’s only involvement in the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative grievances, the failure to 

intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to remedy alleged unconstitutional behavior does not 

amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 

199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

against these Defendants and they will be dismissed. 

C. Counts One and Three 

 To state a First Amendment, free-exercise-of-religion claim, a plaintiff must allege 

that a defendant burdened the practice of plaintiff=s religion by preventing him from 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 5 of 10
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

engaging in a sincerely held religious belief and that the defendant did so without any 

justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 

F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Under RLUIPA, a government may not impose a substantial burden on the 

religious exercise of a confined person unless the government establishes that the burden 

furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive 

means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). 

 Similarly, to state a claim under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01(c), Plaintiff must 

establish “(1) that an action or refusal to act is motivated by a religious belief, (2) that the 

religious belief is sincerely held, and (3) that the governmental action substantially 

burdens the exercise of religious beliefs.” Arizona v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1007 

(Ariz. 2009). 

 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the practice of his religion 

was substantially burdened by Defendants’ policies or that he was prevented from 

engaging in a sincerely held religious belief. Plaintiff was informed that he could request 

an in-person visit from his clergy, could write to his clergy, or could have unmonitored 

and unrecorded religious confession with clergy who regularly visited the jail. Plaintiff 

has failed to explain how being denied unmonitored and unrecorded clergy calls with a 

specific pastor substantially burdened his religious practice; Plaintiff has expressed a 

personal preference for his personal clergy but has not demonstrated interference with his 

sincerely held religious beliefs. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that 

the Jail’s phone policies were enforced without a legitimate penological purpose. 

 Finally, Plaintiff’s credibility as well as the sincerity of his beliefs are cast into 

severe doubt by his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court, CR 2010-007643-001 

for conspiracy to commit tempering with a witness, conspiracy to commit perjury, and 

obstructing criminal investigations or prosecutions. A jury found that Plaintiff attempted 

to fabricate testimony in another criminal action by inducing witnesses to testify in his 

favor. Key to Plaintiff’s conviction were written and recorded telephone conversations 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 6 of 10
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

between Plaintiff and Vicki McFarland, a person Plaintiff claims was his pastor, in which 

Plaintiff directed McFarland to contact other witnesses for the purpose of securing 

testimony favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argued the calls were “confessions, counseling 

and spiritual guidance, as well as other religious sacraments.” However, evidence 

presented at trial demonstrated that Plaintiff’s conversations with McFarland did not 

mention that Plaintiff was confessing and needed religious or spiritual assistance, but 

showed Plaintiff intended to create the “‘Fundamental Christian Temple’ as his church 

and religion.” Plaintiff instructed McFarland to check with the Corporation Commission 

to determine whether that name was available as a non-profit church and to check with 

the Internal Revenue Service because Plaintiff was “going to want to incorporate the nonprofit church and get I.R.S. approval as a 501(c)(3).” See Arizona v. Merrick, No.11-

8034, 2012 WL 5333539, at *3 (Ariz. App. Oct. 30, 2012). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals concluded that Plaintiff’s letter to McFarland 

demonstrates that the church did not exist before April 2010, 

McFarland was not then an ordained member of the church 

and Defendant only wanted to create it to attempt to hide 

behind religion. The communications did not evince a 

“human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and 

absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or 

thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in 

return.” 

Id. 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of his First 

Amendment rights, violations of RLUIPA, or violations of State law. The Court will 

dismiss Counts One and Three for failure to state a claim. 

D. Count Two 

 As noted above, the portions of Count Two in which Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants denied his grievances fail to state a claim. Further, to the extent that he 

alleges he was denied adequate legal supplies, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. As a 

matter of standing, for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered an 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 7 of 10
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

“actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 

(1996). To show actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the defendants’ conduct frustrated or impeded him from bringing to 

court a nonfrivolous claim that he wished to present. Id. at 352-53. Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that the denial of adequate legal supplies impeded him from bringing to 

court a nonfrivolous claim. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the grievance and legal 

supplies portions on Count Two. 

 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Meyer informed him ILS would not 

process his motion for reconsideration because Plaintiff was not “pro-per.” Plaintiff 

further states that Defendant Meyer was acting on Defendant Lillie’s instruction. 

Plaintiff demonstrates only that Defendant Meyer was acting according to a supervisors’ 

direction; this is not sufficient to state a claim and the Court will dismiss Defendant 

Meyer. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a First Amendment access-to-courts claim 

in Count Two against Defendant Lillie for failing to process and file Plaintiff’s motion 

for reconsideration. The Court will require Defendant Lillie to answer this portion of 

Count Two. 

V. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 8 of 10
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s August 19, 2013 Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 5) is denied

as moot. 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal (Doc. 9) is denied. 

 (3) Counts One and Three, and the grievance and legal supplies claims in 

Count Two, are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (4) Defendants Arpaio, Meyer, Baumann, Harmon, Rogers, Wade, Garcia, 

Paul, O’Neal, and Garitson are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (5) Defendant Lillie must answer the portion of Count Two relating to 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration in his criminal case. 

 (6) Defendant Lillie must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise 

respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 

Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

. . . 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 9 of 10
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 (7) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 DATED this 27th day of December, 2013, 

Case 2:13-cv-01094-SPL-BSB Document 10 Filed 12/30/13 Page 10 of 10