Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02150/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02150-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Burton Colson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Javad Maghami a/k/a Javad

Ghaemmaghami Marie Debernardi

Ghaemmaghami, Javad and Marie

Maghami d/b/a Scottsdale Lamborghini

and/or Scottsdale Motorsports;

Lamborghini of Scottsdale LLC, an

Arizona limited liability company; Motor

Sports Of Scottsdale, Inc., Motorsports of

Scottsdale No. 2, LLC, and Automobili

Lamborghini America, LLC, a Delaware

Corporation, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-2150-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Dkt.#148), Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt.#145), and Plaintiff’s Motion for a Continuance Pursuant to Rule 56(f)

(Dkt.#154). Having considered these motions and their accompanying papers and

determined that oral argument is unnecessary, the Court issues the following Order. 

I. Factual Background

For the purposes of Colson’s motion for partial summary judgment, the undisputed

facts are as follows: The parties agree that Motor Sports of Scottsdale, Inc., an Arizona

Case 2:08-cv-02150-MHM Document 163 Filed 07/09/10 Page 1 of 24
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1

 Although parts of paragraph 9 are disputed (namely, the fact that Mr. Colson was

a substantial car collector who, at the time of the taking of his deposition, had approximately

295-325 automobiles), the disputed portions of paragraph 9 are not relied upon in this Order.

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corporation, operated both a high-end used car dealership in Scottsdale and a new car

Lamborghini dealership in Scottsdale. (Dkt.#157 ¶ 1; Dkt. #151 ¶ 1) The Scottsdale

dealership has been known as Motor Sports of Scottsdale or Lamborghini of Scottsdale.

(Dkt.#156 at 4) Javad Maghami (Mr. Maghami) and Marie DeBernardi Maghami (Mrs.

Maghami) own all of the stock of Motor Sports of Scottsdale, Inc. (Dkt.#152 ¶ 1; Dkt.#156

at 4-7) The parties dispute whether two related entities that were formed by Mr. and Mrs.

Maghami, Lamborghini of Scottsdale, LLC and Motor Sports of Scottsdale No. 2, LLC, were

ever operational. (Dkt. #156 at 4-5) 

As part of Motor Sports of Scottsdale’s regular course of business, it accepts deposits

from customers for the purchase of automobiles, whether new or used. (Dkt.#157 ¶ 3;

Dkt.#151 ¶ 3) Motor Sports of Scottsdale obtained its Lamborghini franchise/dealership

agreement in approximately August of 2004, pursuant to a written Dealership Agreement.

(Dkt.#157 ¶ 5; Dkt.#151 ¶ 5) 

Prior to September 24, 2007, Motor Sports of Scottsdale sold Barton Colson several

cars, including approximately five high-end used automobiles and new Lamborghini

automobiles. (Dkt. #157 ¶ 7; Dkt. #151 ¶ 7) On September 24, 2007, Barton Colson came

to the Motor Sports Scottsdale showroom. (Dkt.#157 ¶ 8; Dkt.#151 ¶ 8) Mr. Colson met

personally with Mr. Maghami. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 4; Dkt.#152 ¶ 4) They discussed a rare and

limited edition vehicle known as the Lamborghini Reventon (Dkt.#147 ¶ 5; Dkt.#152 ¶ 5).

Maghami told Colson that Lamborghini intended to create only 20 Reventons. (Dkt.#147

¶ 6; Dkt.#152 ¶ 6) Mr. Colson explained to Mr. Maghami that he had seen a limited edition

Reventon Lamborghini at a Lamborghini trade show and was interested in purchasing one.

(Dkt.#157 ¶ 9; Dkt.#151 ¶ 9)1

 When Colson expressed interest in the Reventon, Maghami

stated that he may be able to get one for Colson. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 7; Dkt.#152 ¶ 7) Maghami

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2

 Although the parties dispute whether it was disclosed that the additional funds

would be approximately six hundred thousand euros at this time or whether the full price had

not yet been determined, the timing of this disclosure does not appear dispositive to the

Court’s analysis.

3

 The only qualification that the Maghami defendants add to this statement is to add

that the Purchase Order is a “stand by” Order which makes it subject to Lamborghini’s

approval to sell Motor Sports of Scottsdale one of the Reventons. (Dkt.#152 ¶ 11) However,

this statement does not dispute the underlying statement that “[o]n the same day, Colson

signed an agreement with the Maghami [D]efendants for the purchase of a Reventon.”

(Dkt.#147 ¶ 11; Dkt.#152 ¶ 11)

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explained that, to purchase a Reventon, Colson would need to immediately place a $500,000

deposit to be considered to purchase the car. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 8; Dkt.#152 ¶ 8) Colson was also

told that he would need to submit an application for the Reventon and that if the application

was approved, he would need to submit additional funds. (Dkt.#147 ¶¶ 16, 17, 18; Dkt.#152

¶¶ 16, 17, 18)2

 The application was submitted to Lamborghini. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 21; Dkt.#152

¶ 21) On or about September 24, 2007, Colson wrote Lamborghini of Scottsdale a check

for $500,000 as a deposit for the Reventon. The check was subsequently deposited into Bank

of America account number 004878100888. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 10; Dkt.#152 ¶ 10) “On the same

day, Colson signed an agreement with the Maghami [D]efendants for the purchase of a

Reventon.” (Dkt.#147 ¶ 11; Dkt.#152 ¶ 11) 

While the preceding sentence is quoted verbatim from Plaintiff’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt.#147

¶ 11), it is not easy to determine the exact meaning of the “Maghami [D]efendants.” 

Defendants partially admit this sentence in their Response (Dkt.#152 ¶ 11), adding an

unrelated qualification.3

 Plaintiff did not define “Maghami [D]efendants” in its Statement

of Facts; however, Defendants state that the “Maghami Defendants” are “all Defendants

except Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, a Delaware corporation” in their Response

to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt.#152 at 1) Plaintiff did define the term

“Maghami [D]efendants” in its Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.#148 at 2) as “Javad

Maghami a/k/a Javad Ghaemmaghami and Marie DeBernardi Maghami a/k/a/ Marie

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DeBernardi Ghaemmaghami, Javad and Marie Maghami d/b/a Scottsdale Lamborghini

and/or Scottsdale Motorsports, Lamborghini of Scottsdale LLC, and Motor Sports of

Scottsdale, Inc.” Curiously, Motor Sports of Scottsdale No. 2, LLC does not appear to be

included on this list. However, Plaintiff appears to accept Defendants’ definition in

Plaintiff’s Reply, defining the “Maghami [D]efendants” to include “Javad Maghami a/k/a

Javad Ghaemmaghami; Marie DeBernardi Maghami a/k/a/ Marie DeBernardi

Ghaemmaghami; Javad and Marie Maghami d/b/a Scottsdale Lamborghini and/or Scottsdale

Motorsports; Lamborghini of Scottsdale LLC; Motor Sports of Scottsdale, Inc.; and

Motorsports of Scottsdale No. 2, LLC.” (Dkt.#158 at 1-2) For the purposes of this Order,

the term “Maghami Defendants” will hereafter be defined to include all Defendants except

for Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, a Delaware Corporation unless otherwise

specified.

Many subsequent events appear to be disputed; however, it is undisputed that on or

about January 16, 2008, Colson wired $881,000 into Wells Fargo Account Number

402001823, held by defendant Motor Sports of Scottsdale Inc. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 29; Dkt.#152 ¶

29) Colson received confirmation from Wells Fargo Bank that the wire transfer was

complete. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 30; Dkt.#152 ¶ 30) In response to Maghami’s statement that Colson

is “ready to give a $500,000 deposit,” Lamborghini’s representative stated: “I cannot

guarantee you any slot. It would be interesting to have the contacts of the customer in order

to keep updated the waiting list in case some customer drops out.” (Dkt.#147 ¶ 32; Dkt.#152

¶ 32) 

The Maghami Defendants admit that Colson was never advised that there were no cars

available (Dkt. #152 ¶ 33); however, they claim that Colson was aware that there was a

waiting list and never demanded the return of his money. (Id.) The Maghami Defendants

further assert that Mr. Maghami “at all times believed that Mr. Frigerio would make a

Reventon available to Colson,” and therefore, he saw no reason to return the deposit at this

time. (Id.) However, Colson asserts that in his deposition, Mr. Maghami claimed that he did

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4

 Based on this and several other discrepancies between Mr. Maghami’s Affidavit in

support of the Maghami Defendants’ Opposition to Summary Judgment, and his prior

deposition testimony, Colson moves to strike the Maghami Affidavit, the Maghami

Statement of Facts Response, all parts of the Maghami Defendants’ Response that rely on

these two documents, and asks that all portions of these documents be stricken from the

record and not considered. (Dkt. #156 at 20) While “the general rule . . . is that a party

cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony,”

Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit has

also ruled that a district court must make a factual determination that an affidavit

contradicting prior deposition testimony was actually a “sham” before striking such

testimony because of the possibility that such discrepancies are an honest mistake, or a result

of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 266-67. The Court is unwilling to find that Mr.

Maghami’s affidavit is wholly a “sham,”given that the Maghami Defendants never had the

opportunity to respond to this argument in the briefing; therefore, the request to strike will

be denied. The discrepancies between the affidavit and the deposition testimony obviously

impugn Mr. Maghami’s credibility; however, the Court is not permitted to make credibility

determinations at summary judgment. Slumier v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir.

2010) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge [when] ruling on

a motion for summary judgment.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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not know there was a waiting list and admitted that he never told Colson about any such list.4

(Dkt. # 156 ¶ 33) Because of these discrepancies, the Court will treat this matter as a

disputed issue of fact.

In August 2008, Colson personally visited a Lamborghini assembling factory in Italy

to discuss the delivery date for the Reventon he purchased. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 38; Dkt.#152 ¶ 38)

At the same time, Colson’s brother Brad Colson began contacting the Maghami defendants

to discuss Colson’s Reventon. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 40; Dkt.#152 ¶ 40)

In September 2008, Colson contacted Pietro Frigerio, the Chief Operating Officer of

defendant Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC (“Lamborghini America”), to inquire

about the status of Reventon Number 10. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 42; Dkt.#152 ¶ 42) Frigerio informed

Colson that Colson would never receive Reventon Number 10 or any other Reventon because

they had all been sold. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 44; Dkt.#152 ¶ 44) Colson never received Reventon

Number 10 or any other Reventon. The Maghami defendants also admit that Colson never

received the Reventon he purchased. (Dkt.#147 ¶ 44; Dkt.#152 ¶ 44)

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Colson filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, negligent or intentional misrepresentation,

fraudulent concealment, fraud, and aiding and abetting against a number of defendants,

including Motor Sports of Scottsdale, Mr. and Mrs. Maghami, Lamborghini of Scottsdale,

Motor Sports 2 of Scottsdale, and Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC. (Dkt.#123)

Colson subsequently moved for partial summary judgment. (Dkt.#148) Automobili

Lamborghini of America, LLC cross-moved for summary judgment. (Dkt.#145)

II. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows “that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A material issue of fact is one that

affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the differing versions of

the truth. S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). To defeat the

motion, the non-moving party must show that there are genuine factual issues “that properly

can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of

either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Summary

judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

III. Colson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Colson moves for partial summary judgment on Counts 1-5 of his amended

Complaint. (Dkt.#148 at 2). These Counts include: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of

the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (3) Unjust Enrichment, (4) Negligent or

Intentional Misrepresentation, and (5) Fraudulent Concealment. (Dkt.#123) Colson seeks

judgment on these counts against defendants Javad Maghami, Marie Maghami, Motor Sports

of Scottsdale, Inc., Lamborghini of Scottsdale LLC and Motor Sports of Scottsdale No. 2,

LLC (collectively, the “Maghami Defendants”). In their Response, the Maghami Defendants

concede the liability of Motor Sports of Scottsdale regarding the two contract-related claims,

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5

 Colson’s Reply does raise a number of derivative liability theories (such as alter ego

liability) that are addressed below in section F.; this section will only address direct liability

for the breach of contract claim.

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the Breach of Contract claim and the Unjust Enrichment claim. (Dkt.#149 at 2) Given this

concession, judgment will be entered against Motor Sports of Scottsdale for both these

claims. The rest of this section will analyze whether summary judgement may be granted

against the remaining Maghami Defendants for any of the remaining five claims. 

A. Breach of Contract Liability for Remaining Maghami Defendants

Colson initially argued that “the Maghami defendants” executed the Contract,

breached the Contract, were paid for the Reventon, but never provided the Reventon.

(Dkt.#148 at 6-7). 

The Maghami Defendants’ Response argues that there is no undisputed factual basis

to hold any of the other defendants (besides Motor Sports of Scottsdale) liable for breach of

contract. (Dkt.#149 at 8). The Maghami Defendants’ Response points out that Lamborghini

of Scottsdale’s only tie to the contract was the fact that Colson’s check was made payable

to it rather than to Motor Sports of Scottsdale, and that all money paid by Mr. Colson was

ultimately deposited or wired into the Motor Sports of Scottsdale account. (Id. at 9) 

Colson’s Reply focuses on whether Lamborghini of Scottsdale is liable for the breach

of contract claim (and thus appears to concede that summary judgment against the other

Maghami Defendants [except Motor Sports of Scottsdale] is inappropriate by failing to

marshal undisputed facts that would suggest that the other individual defendants are also

personally liable for breach of contract).5

 (Dkt.#158 at 7-8) Colson asserted that

“Lamborghini of Scottsdale . . .agreed to sell Plaintiff the Reventon,” and that it . . . cashed

[P]laintiff’s $500,000 check, which was a deposit for the Reventon” in his Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Dkt.#148 at 6-7) Regarding Lamborghini of Scottsdale, the Reply

alleges that it is undisputed that this entity operated the dealership and retained Colson’s

funds. However, merely accepting funds would not be a sufficient factual basis for judgment

that Lamborghini of Scottsdale breached its contract with Colson. To prevail on a breach of

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contract claim, it is axiomatic that a party must first prove that a contract existed. Graham

v. Asbury, 112 Ariz. 184, 185, 540 P.2d 656, 657 (1975) (“To bring an action for the breach

of the contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of the contract, its breach

and the resulting damages.”). Defendants dispute whether Lamborghini of Scottsdale had

a valid contract with Colson. (Dkt.#149 at 8-9) Although Defendants concede that the preprinted Purchase Order that formed the basis of the relationship of the parties was on a form

entitled “Lamborghini Scottsdale,” Defendants claim that “[o]nly Motor Sports of Scottsdale

was the authorized Lamborghini new car dealer and the only entity that had the legal ability

to contract for the purchase of the Reventon and secure the same form Lamborghini.”

(Dkt.#149 at 8) Because the existence of a contract between Lamborghini of Scottsdale and

Colson is disputed, the Court cannot grant summary judgment against Lamborghini of

Scottsdale on this claim. Accordingly, Colson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

his contract claim is granted only against Motor Sports of Scottsdale.

B. Unjust Enrichment for the Remaining Maghami Defendants

Colson’s Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that all of the Maghami Defendants

are liable for unjust enrichment. (Dkt.#148 at 7-8) While Motor Sports of Scottsdale accepts

liability for unjust enrichment, the remaining Maghami Defendants dispute liability on this

claim. (Dkt. #149 at 9) Colson’s Reply points out undisputed facts to support this claim only

with respect to Lamborghini of Scottsdale. To demonstrate a claim for unjust enrichment,

Plaintiff must show that defendant has been enriched, Plaintiff has been impoverished, there

is a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment, there is an absence of

justification for the impoverishment, and that Plaintiff lacks a legal remedy. Trustmark Ins.

Co. v. Bank One, Ariz., 202 Ariz. 535, 541, 48 P.3d 485, 491 (App. 2002). It appears

undisputed that (1) Colson paid Lamborghini of Scottsdale at least $500,000 for the purchase

of a car (an impoverishment), (2) Lamborghini of Scottsdale retained the money and did not

return it to Colson (an enrichment), and (c) Lamborghini of Scottsdale did not deliver a car

to Colson, through no fault of Colson (an absence of justification for the enrichment and

impoverishment). (Dkt.#147 ¶¶ 10, 29, 44; Dkt.#152 ¶¶ 10, 29, 44; Dkt.#156 ¶¶ 1-3;

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Dkt.#157 ¶ 26) These undisputed facts make summary judgment against Lamborghini of

Scottsdale appropriate on Colson’s unjust enrichment claim.

The Maghami Defendants assert that a number of facts are disputed notwithstanding

their earlier admissions regarding these facts in their answer. However, “[u]nder federal law,

stipulations and admissions in the pleadings are generally binding on the parties and the

Court.” American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). The

underlying purpose in requiring an answer to a pleading is because admissions in the

pleadings “have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the

need for proof of the fact.” Id. Thus, “[f]actual assertions in the pleadings and pretrial

orders, unless amended, are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party

who made them.” Id. Because of this rule, Lamborghini of Scottsdale’s admission that it

“own[ed] and operate[d] the dealership,”(Dkt.# 130 ¶ 15), in its answer will be binding,

notwithstanding its attempt to dispute this fact now. As explained above, Colson’s Reply

focused on liability only for Lamborghini of Scottsdale on this claim and did not present a

factual basis for holding Mr. and Mrs. Maghami or Motor Sports 2 of Scottsdale directly

liable for the breach of good faith and fair dealing.

Thus, Colson is granted partial summary judgment against both Motor Sports of

Scottsdale and Lamborghini of Scottsdale on his unjust enrichment claim; however, there do

not appear to be sufficient undisputed facts to support summary judgment against the

remaining Maghami Defendants.

C. Liability for Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Colson seeks summary judgment against all of the Maghami Defendants (including

Motor Sports of Scottsdale) on its Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claim.

Arizona recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.

Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 153, 726 P.2d 596, 600 (1986). In essence, this

covenant means that “neither party will act to impair the rights of the other to receive the

benefits which flow from their agreement or contractual relationship.” Id., 151 Ariz. at 153-

54, 726 P.2d 600-601. Colson asserts that “[b]y failing to provide plaintiff with a Reventon

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that plaintiff had paid for, by failing to secure a Reventon as promised, and by failing to

inform plaintiff about the status of Reventons [or] his place on any waiting list, the Maghami

[D]efendants are liable for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”

(Dkt.#148 at 7)

However, as the Maghami Defendants point out in their Response, there are a

multitude of disputed factual questions surrounding this issue. (Dkt.#149 at 9) Mr. Maghami

asserts that he did everything he could do to secure the Reventon; he also asserts that he

believed that a Reventon would become available later, after the initial Reventon he had

hoped to secure Colson fell through. (Dkt.#149 at 10) The Maghami Defendants also assert

that it is a customary business practice to place customer deposits in the dealership’s general

fund, and that they could not have known that the luxury car business would face as steep a

decline as it did at the end of 2008. (Dkt.#149 at 9-11)

Colson disputes these facts and asserts that the Maghami “deliberately refused” to

communicate the fact that the dealership “would not be immediately receiving a car,” and

instead kept his money and avoided his inquiries for eight months. (Dkt. #158 at 8) Almost

every fact relating to the period after Colson submitted his deposit until he ultimately

discovered that he would not be receiving a Reventon several months later is hotly disputed,

as is the motivation behind the Maghami’s actions (such as whether they were motivated by

good faith or bad faith). (Dkt.#147 ¶¶ 33-37; Dkt.#151 ¶¶ 33-37) Because these disputed

facts are crucial to the determination of whether the Maghami Defendants breached the duty

of good faith and fair dealing, it is inappropriate for the Court to grant summary judgment

on this claim. See National Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562,

569-70 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that questions of fact as to whether duty of good faith and

fair dealing was breached, and if so, who breached the duty, precluded summary judgment).

Accordingly, Colson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his breach of good faith and

fair dealing claim is denied.

D. Negligent or Intentional Misrepresentation & Fraudulent Concealment

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Colson also moved for summary judgment regarding his misrepresentation and

fraudulent concealment claims against all of the Maghami Defendants. (Dkt.#148 at 8) A

party is liable for a negligent misrepresentation when it supplies false information for the

guidance of others in a business transaction and fails to use reasonable care in supplying the

information. St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 307, 312

(1987). A party is liable for fraudulent concealment for “intentionally prevent[ing] [an]other

from acquiring material information.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters,

and Cement Masons Local No. 395 Defined Contribution Pension Trust Fund, 201 Ariz. 474,

496, 38 P.3d 12, 34 (2002); see also Fomento v. Encanto Business Park, 154 Ariz. 495, 501,

744 P.2d 22, 28 (App. 1987) (“A representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which

the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state

additional or qualifying information is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”) (internal quotations

and citations omitted).

Colson argues that the Maghami Defendants are liable for misrepresentation and

fraudulent concealment because they misled him regarding the purchase of the Reventon by

telling him that they had access to a Reventon when then were being told otherwise by

Lamborghini. Colson also argues that for eight months after he deposited an additional

$881,000, the Maghami Defendants repeatedly failed to notify him (Colson) that they had

no Reventon to deliver. Colson points to ¶¶ 28, 31-33, 36-37, 39, 41, 47 of his Statement

of Facts (Dkt.# 147); however, these facts appear to be hotly disputed. (Dkt.#156) The

Maghami Defendants assert that the reason they did not tell Colson that no Reventon was

available was based on their good faith but mistaken belief that another Reventon would

become available. (Dkt.#149 at 13-14) The Maghami Defendants further assert that Mr.

Frigerio continually assured Mr. Maghami that a Reventon would ultimately be made

available to Colson if he was patient. Because these facts are material and disputed,

summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate. 

The Maghami Defendants also assert that this claim would be barred by the economic

loss rule. The economic loss rule limits a "contracting party to contractual remedies for the

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 The parties should be on notice that the Court may direct supplemental briefing on

the appropriate timing and procedure for this election (and whether it is required) at the

pretrial conference. 

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recovery of economic losses unaccompanied by physical injury to person or other property."

Flagstaff Affordable Housing Ltd. P'ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 667 (Ariz.

2010). Since Motor Sports of Scottsdale is a contracting party, Colson is limited to

contractual remedies for the recovery of economic losses against Motor Sports of Scottsdale

since there does not appear to be any allegation of physical injury to a person or any other

property. Thus, the economic loss rule would bar Colson from recovering for

misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment against Motor Sports of Scottsdale. However,

since none of the other Maghami Defendants have been deemed contracting parties, the

economic loss rule would not bar Colson from recovering against them for other torts.

Because they do not appear to have been parties to the contract, Mr. and Mrs. Maghami could

still theoretically be liable for misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment. It should be

noted that Colson may ultimately have to elect between the tort and contractual theories of

liability at trial.6

 Accordingly, Colson’s motion for partial summary judgment on these

claims against Motor Sports of Scottsdale is denied. Colson’s motion for partial summary

judgment on Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent concealment against the remaining

Maghami Defendants is denied based on disputed issues of material fact.

F. Alter Ego Liability

After Motor Sports of Scottsdale conceded that it was liable for breach of contract and

unjust enrichment in its Response to Colson’s motion for summary judgment, Colson

asserted in his Reply that the Maghami Defendants were the alter egos of Mr. and Mrs.

Maghami. Because of this, Colson asserts that justice requires that Mr. and Mr. Maghami

be held personally liable (although he does not specify for which causes of action,

specifically). Colson asserts that there was a unity of interest in Mr. and Mrs. Maghami and

their businesses and that failing to hold Mr. and Mrs. Maghami personally liable would result

in injustice. (Dkt.#158 at 5-7) While it is true that theoretically, Mr. and Mrs. Maghami

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 See, e.g., Maryln Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Improvita Health Prods., 663 F. Supp. 2d

841, 847 (D. Ariz. 2009) (explaining that “a director or officer of a corporation is

individually liable for fraudulent acts or false representations of his own ... even though his

action in such respect may be in furtherance of the corporate business”) (quoting Albers v.

Edelson Technology Partners L.P., 201 Ariz. 47, 52, 31 P.3d 821 (App. 2001)).

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could be personally liable for their own tortious acts,7

 the fact that this argument was not

raised until the reply means that the Maghami Defendants were not given a fair opportunity

to controvert these purportedly undisputed facts. Cutrona v. Sun Health Corp., 2008 WL

4446710 at *18 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply are

generally not considered by the Court, because to do so unfairly deprives the opposing party

of the opportunity to meaningfully respond.”). The Court is therefore unable to grant

summary judgment on this theory.

G. Summary

In summary, judgment is granted against Motor Sports of Scottsdale for Colson’s

breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. Judgment is also granted against

Lamborghini of Scottsdale for Colson’s unjust enrichment claim, but denied as to Mr. and

Mrs. Maghami and Motor Sports of Scottsdale No. 2, LLC. Judgment is denied on the

breach of good faith and fair dealing claim; this claim will proceed against all of the

Maghami Defendants. Also, Colson’s claims for Misrepresentation and Fraudulent

Concealment will proceed against all of the Maghami Defendants except for Motor Sports

of Scottsdale. 

IV. Automobili Lamborghini’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, (“ALA”) seeks summary

judgment on all of Colson’s claims in his First Amended Complaint. (Dkt.#145) ALA

asserts that the factual record is clear with respect to ALA’s lack of involvement with Motor

Sports’ fraud. (Dkt. #145 at 3) It also asserts that “neither ALA nor any Lamborghini

company knew of Motorsports’ theft or participated in the theft in any manner” and that “no

Lamborghini company ever received so much as one penny of Colson’s deposit.” (Id.)

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Colson set forth three theories of liability for ALA in his Amended Complaint: (1) that

ALA aided and abetted Motor Sports in committing the fraud, (2) that ALA breached a duty

to warn Colson, and (3) that Motor Sports was an agent of ALA. (Dkt. #123)

ALA contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because (1) there is no factual

support for Colson’s assertion that ALA aided and abetted Motor Sports’ fraud; (2) Colson

cannot proceed against ALA on a “failure to warn” theory because no such independent tort

is recognized in Arizona, and no suggestion that ALA had a relationship with Colson

sufficient to give rise to any duty towards him; (3) Motor Sports was not an agent of any

Lamborghini company, and thus ALA cannot be vicariously liable for Motor Sports’

conduct; and (4) ALA cannot be liable because it was not a franchisor of Motor Sports at the

time of the alleged fraud (at that time, the Lamborghini Franchisor was an Italian company,

Automobili Lamborghini, S.p.A. (“ALSPA”). (Dkt.#145) Each argument, along with

Colson’s response, is addressed below.

A. Aiding and Abetting Liability

ALA contends that there is no factual support for the notion that ALA “aided and

abetted” the fraud perpetrated by Motor Sports because there is no evidence that ALA knew

that Maghami intended to defraud Colson or that ALA substantially assisted Motor Sports’

fraud. (Dkt.#145 at 8) 

Colson responds by asserting that the Maghami Defendants defrauded him and that

genuine issues of fact remain as to whether ALA knew that the Maghami Defendants

committed torts. (Dkt. #154 at 13-14) He also argues that ALA substantially assisted the

Maghami Defendants in the commission of torts by ignoring Colson’s questions about the

Reventon until after the Maghami Defendants had already spent Colson’s money. (Dkt.#154

at 16) 

To succeed on a claim for aiding and abetting a fraud, Plaintiff must demonstrate that

a Defendant had knowledge of a fraudulent scheme and that the Defendant provided

substantial assistance which was the cause of the Plaintiff’s damages. Dawson v.

Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 102 (App. 2007) 216 Ariz. at 102 (aiding and abetting claim

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failed where there was no evidence of knowledge of a fraudulent scheme); Sec. Title Agency,

Inc. v. Pope, 219 Ariz. 480, 491-92 (App. 2008) (aiding and abetting claim requires causal

connection between defendant’s assistance and tortfeasor’s commission of tort). While

Colson is correct that a Plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of

all of the details of the alleged fraud, a Plaintiff must still prove that the Defendant had actual

knowledge that a fraud either “had been” or “would in fact” be committed. Dawson, 216

Ariz. at 103.

There does not appear to be any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that

ALA had actual knowledge of the fraud. Drawing all factual inferences in favor of Colson,

the most that a jury could infer was that ALA knew that the Maghami Defendants continued

to hold Colson’s deposits while they attempted to locate a Reventon for him. This would be

insufficient to support a finding of liability for aiding and abetting, given the common

practice among dealers to hold onto customer deposits while attempting to locate a vehicle

for a customer. Even assuming that ALA had information about “suspicious activity,” this

would not be sufficient for a finding of scienter. Stern v. Charles Schwab & Co., 2009 WL

3352408 at *7, No. CV 09-1229 (D. Ariz. October 16, 2009) (explaining “suspicion is not

enough. The aiding and abetting defendant must be aware of the fraud.”). For similar

reasons, Colson’s attempt to assert that ALA “substantially assisted” the Maghami

Defendants in committing the fraud fails because a Plaintiff must demonstrate that the

Defendant knew it was assisting in the commission of a tort in order to be liable for

substantially assisting a fraud. Colson has failed to identify any evidence that would support

a finding of actual knowledge. Even assuming that ALA (1) allowed Motor Sports to

operate as a dealer, (2) failed to disclose to Colson that Lamborghini had threatened to

terminate the dealership for breaching the Dealership Agreement, (3) failed to disclose to

Colson that the Reventon was sold out, and (4) ignored Plaintiff’s telephone calls, none of

these facts could support a finding of actual knowledge of the Maghami Defendants’ fraud.

For this reason, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of ALA on Colson’s aiding

and abetting claim.

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B. Failure to Warn

ALA also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Count Twelve of Colson’s

Amended Complaint (“failure to warn”) because Arizona does not recognize an independent

tort of “failure to warn.” (Dkt.#145 at 10) Because of this, ALA asserts that Colson must

establish that ALA owed him some independent duty from which a “duty to warn could arise.

(Id.) ALA further asserts that there is no evidence to support the existence of any such

independent duty. (Id.) 

According to the Arizona Court of Appeals, “[t]here is no separate tort named ‘failure

to warn.’ Where liability is incurred by reason of a ‘failure to warn’ it is because there is

found present a duty to prevent harm to the individual who is injured.” McGeorge v. City

of Phoenix, 117 Ariz. 272, 277-78, 572 P.2d 100, 105-106 (App. 1977). Colson cites two

cases that mention “failure to warn;” however, these cases stand merely for the proposition

that failure to warn may arise out of an already existing independent duty. (Dkt.#154 at 12-

13) (citing Martinez v. State, 177 Ariz. 270, 272 (App. 1993) and Robertson v. Sixpence Ins.

of Am., 163 Ariz. 539, 541 (App. 1990)). Colson fails to address McGeorge’s clear

statement that no such tort exists in Arizona. (Dkt.#154 at 12-12)

Alternatively, Colson argues that ALA owed to Colson a duty to supervise Motor

Sports’ activities, that this duty gave rise to a “duty to warn,” and that ALA breached the

“duty to warn” by failing to warn Colson that the Maghami Defendants were going to steal

his money. (Dkt.#154 at 13) However, Colson does not cite any authority that would

support that a franchisor has a duty to supervise a franchisee. Colson relies on Dejonghe v.

E.F. Hutton, 171 Ariz. 341 (App. 1991); however, Dejonghe appears inapplicable because

it concerned an employer-employee relationship, not a franchisor-franchisee relationship.

As ALA points out, “long-standing authority explicitly rejects the notion that a franchisor has

a duty to supervise its franchisees.” See, e.g., Freedman v. Tenn. Dev. Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 11021, No. 91-475, at *44-45 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 1993) (“no duty exists in law requiring

a franchisor to supervise in [franchisee’s] financial dealings with third parties”); Cullen v.

BMW of North America, Inc., 691 F.2d 1097, 1101 (2d Cir. 1982) (franchisor not liable for

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negligent failure to “police the methods or operation of [its] independent franchisee . . .

because of its precarious financial condition”).

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that there was a duty to supervise, Colson fails

to provide any support for his contention that a duty to supervise could provide the basis for

a “failure to warn” under Arizona law. (Dkt.#154 at 13) The only case he cites, Beneficial

Commercial Corp. v. Murray Glick Datsun, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), was

decided under New York law where “failure to warn” is an independent tort. It is thus

inapplicable here. 

Finally, Colson’s argument that a jury could find that ALA had reason to suspect that

the Maghami Defendants were going to steal Colson’s money (and therefore should have

warned him) is farfetched. Even assuming (1) that ALA knew that the Maghami Defendants

had a history of missing payments and misrepresenting financial matters, (2) that ALA

terminated the Maghami Defendants’ dealership as a result of these issues, and (3) that ALA

knew that Colson paid for the Reventon, these facts would not support a finding that ALA

should somehow have known that the Maghami Defendants would attempt to steal Colson’s

money and that ALA therefore had a duty to warn Colson of this possible contingency. Quite

simply, “[t]he fact that a franchisor may know that one of its franchisees is having financial

difficulties or may not be accurately disclosing its financial data does not mean that a

franchisor knows that a franchisee is about to steal a customer deposit,” as ALA points out.

 (Dkt.#160 at 7-8) Thus, drawing all factual inferences in favor of Colson, these facts could

not support a finding in Colson’s favor.

Given that Arizona does not recognize an independent tort of “failure to warn,” and

given that Colson has not provided any basis from which an independent duty might have

arisen to create a duty to warn, ALA is hereby granted summary judgment on Count Twelve

of Colson’s Amended Complaint. (Dkt.#123)

C. Vicarious Liability/ Agency Theory

The sole basis for Colson’s assertion of liability against ALA on Counts One through

Six of the Amended Complaint (Dkt.#123) is that “at all times relevant to Colson’s claims,

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 Apparently, Colson’s counsel has stipulated that Colson is not proceeding against

ALA on an agency theory for Counts Eight through Ten. (Dkt.#145 at 12 n.2) Count Eleven

has been resolved.

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[the Maghamis] were acting as agents of, and on behalf of, Lamborghini America.”

(Dkt.#123 ¶ 10).8

 ALA seeks summary judgment that it cannot be liable for these counts

because it did not have an agency relationship with Motor Sports of Scottsdale. (Dkt.#145

at 12) 

Under Arizona law, there are four ways an agency relationship may be created: (1)

by “express agency,” where a principal gives express oral or written delegation of power to

the agent; (2) “agency by implication,” where a principal’s intention to create an agency is

inferred by the words or conduct of the parties; (3) “agency by ratification,” where the

principal subsequently affirms the agent’s conduct or accepts the benefits of the agent’s

conduct; and (4) “apparent agency,” where the conduct of the principal would cause a

reasonable person to infer the existence of an agency relationship and rely upon such

inference. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mendoza, 2006 WL 44376 at *17 (D. Ariz.

2006). Each potential method is analyzed below.

1. Express Agency

ALA points to the Lamborghini Dealer Agreement as evidence that there was no

express agency relationship between it and Motor Sports. (Dkt.#145 at 13) Article 3(2) of

this Agreement states that the dealer is “an independent entrepreneur” who is not authorized

as an agent to act on behalf of, or bind, Lamborghini. (Dkt.#146 ¶ 7) Though Colson

purports to dispute ¶ 7 in his Controverting Statement of Facts (Dkt.#153 ¶ 7), his assertion

that “Lamborghini dealers were not only authorized to act on Lamborghini’s behalf, but were

required to take actions as representatives of Lamborghini,” (Id.), is a legal conclusion that

does not create a dispute of material fact. While Colson cites to a number of paragraphs of

his Controverting Statement of Facts (Dkt.#153 ¶ 7, citing ¶¶ 57-58, 61, 66, 70, 93, 97), none

of these paragraphs challenge the authenticity of the Dealer Agreement or the accuracy of

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Controverting Statement of Facts (Dkt.#161 ¶¶107-35).

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the excerpt cited above. Colson has failed to point to any evidentiary basis to support a

finding that an “express agency” existed between ALA and Motor Sports.

2. Agency by Implication

ALA argues that the record lacks any evidence by which it can be inferred that any

Lamborghini company intended to create an agency relationship between itself and Motor

Sports. (Dkt. #145 at 13) ALA points out that during Colson’s deposition, he explicitly

admitted that nobody from ALSPA or ALA ever represented to him that Motorsports was an

agent for purposes of selling the Reventon. (Id.)

Colson responds by suggesting that a general agency can be implied because the

evidence in the record suggests that Lamborghini “controls nearly every aspect of its

dealerships.” (Dkt.# 154 at 10) He argues that “Lamborghini gave Maghami the express

authority to act as its dealer” and thus “impliedly authorized the Maghami defendants to take

all actions necessary to carry out the express authorized acts.” (Id.) However, even

assuming for the sake of argument that ALA did have such a level of control over Motor

Sports,9

 this fact would be irrelevant under Arizona law. The level of control that ALA may

or may not exert over a dealership is not the test in Arizona for determining whether an

“agency by implication” exists. “Agency by implication” requires evidence that a principal

intended to create an agency relationship. Phoenix Western Holding Corp. v. Gleeson, 500

P.2d 320, 326 (App. 1972). Colson failed to point to any act or statement by ALA that would

suggest that it intended to create an agency relationship. As mentioned above, the Dealer

Agreement explicitly disavows the existence of an agency relationship. Thus, there appears

to be no evidence in the record that would support a finding that there was an agency

relationship by implication between Motor Sports and ALA.

3. Agency by Ratification

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ALA argues that the record lacks any evidence to suggest that any Lamborghini

company ratified Motor Sports’ actions. (Dkt.#145) ALA asserts that no Lamborghini

company ever affirmed Motor Sports’ conduct or received any benefit from Motor Sports’

fraud. (Id.) 

For agency by ratification to exist, there must be evidence that an alleged principal

had knowledge of material facts related to an act by a person claiming to be its agent and

accepted benefits of the unauthorized act. Phoenix Western Holding Corp., 500 P.2d at 326-

27. Colson argues that because ALA failed to notify Colson that the Reventon would not be

delivered after being told by both Colson and the Maghami Defendants that the Maghami

Defendants sold the car to Plaintiff, ALA effectively “ratified” the sale. (Dkt.#154 at 11)

However, Colson has failed to identify any benefit of the authorized act that ALA accepted

or any act by ALA that “affirmed” Motor Sports’ conduct. (Id.) Thus, even assuming ALA

did have knowledge of the material facts (something that is questionable, given the lack of

evidence regarding its knowledge of the fraudulent scheme discussed in the “aiding and

abetting” section above), there would not be a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a

finding of agency by ratification.

4. Apparent Agency/ Agency by Estoppel 

ALA argues that the record lacks evidence to support a finding of apparent agency.

(Dkt.#145 at 14) While ALA admits that the record does establish that Motor Sports was an

authorized Lamborghini dealer who displayed Lamborghini brand signs, it points to Arizona

cases holding that an apparent agency cannot be established merely by showing that a motor

vehicle dealer is an authorized dealer who displays brand signage. (Id.) (citing Am. Motor

Sales Corp. v. Sup. Ct. , 494 P.2d 394, 396 (App. 1972) (automobile dealer agreements,

advertising and stationary not indicia of agency); see also Ocana v. Ford Motor Co., 992 So.

2d 319, 326-27 (Fl. App. 2008) (permitting dealer to “hold himself out” as authorized dealer,

displaying Ford logos and other advertising, providing warranty, and training personnel

insufficient to establish agency)). ALA argues that the record lacks any other facts upon

which an agency relationship could be established. (Dkt.#145 at 14) It further points out that

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Colson “candidly admitted during his deposition that nobody from ALSPA or ALA or

Motorsports ever told him that Motorsports was an agent for the manufacturer.” (Id.)

Colson argues that “[a] principal may be estopped to deny the agent’s authority where

he has allowed others to detrimentally rely on the apparent authority of the agent.”

(Dkt.#154 at 10) (quoting Gertz v. Selin, 112 Ariz. 562, 564 (Ariz. 1976)). Colson asserts

that “Lamborghini led [P]laintiff to believe that the Maghami defendants were its agents and

authorized to act on its behalf by authorizing them to be a Lamborghini dealer,” and that he

would not have done business with the Maghami Defendants but for their status as a

Lamborghini dealer. (Dkt. #154 at 10). 

However, to prove apparent agency/ agency by estoppel, Colson must point to conduct

by Lamborghini that Colson reasonably could have relied upon to infer the existence of an

agency relationship. State Farm, 2006 WL 44376 at *17. Colson’s reliance on the

Lamborghini brand signage as a means of establishing apparent agency/agency by estoppel

fails to account for the Arizona cases holding that a franchisor’s corporate identity does not

provide a basis for a finding of apparent agency. In addition to the Am Motor Sales case

cited above, Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 131 Ariz. 1 (App. 1981), also held that

an automobile manufacturer was not liable to a dealership’s customer under an agency theory

because the sale of a vehicle was an ordinary retail transaction and the manufacturer was not

a party to the transaction. Colson has failed to point to any other action by ALA that would

create an apparent agency/agency by estoppel.

Given that Colson’s failure to support his theory of ALA’s vicarious liability based

on an agency relationship with Motor Sports for Counts One through Six of the Amended

Complaint (Dkt. #123), summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of ALA on these

claims. 

D. Timing of ALA’s agreement with ALSPA

Finally, ALA argues that it cannot be liable for the conduct alleged in the Amended

Complaint because it did not assume the U.S. Lamborghini Dealer Agreement from its

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predecessor-in-interest, ALSPA, and did not become the “franchisor” under Motorsports’

Lamborghini Dealer Agreement, until May 2008. (Dkt. #145 at 15) 

Colson contends that (a) ALA assumed the contracts from SPA in July 2007 and (b)

ALA is independently liable for its own actions after May 2008. (Dkt. #154 at 16-17)

However, there appears to be a number of factual disputes regarding the timing and execution

of the documents, which documents governed, and when the documents would be

implemented. (Dkt. #146 ¶¶ 5, 49, 64) (Dkt. #153 ¶¶ 5, 49, 64) (Dkt.#161 ¶ 95).

Accordingly, this part of ALA’s motion for summary judgment will be denied. However,

this argument is an alternative basis for granting summary judgment to ALA, and does not

prevent the Court from granting summary judgment in favor of ALA based on the arguments

mentioned above.

E. Summary

Given that there is no evidentiary and/or legal basis to support a finding (1) that ALA

aided and abetted Motor Sports’ fraud, (2) that ALA committed the alleged tort of “failure

to warn,” or (3) that Motor Sports is an agent of ALA, making ALA vicariously liable for

Motor Sports’ conduct, ALA will be dismissed from this action. 

V. Colson’s Rule 56(f) Motion 

Colson requested a continuance of ALA’s summary judgment motion pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), arguing that he needed to conduct additional discovery

as to whether the Maghami Defendants were agents of Lamborghini and whether

Lamborghini aided and abetted the fraud. Specifically, Colson desired to (1) review ALA’s

supplemental responses to his discovery requests and (2) depose one additional witness. 

The purpose of a Rule 56(f) motion is to ensure that parties have a reasonable

opportunity to prepare their case. U.S. v. Real Property Located at 414 Riverside Rd.,

Oakview, CA, 1994 WL 6603 at *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1993). It appears that Colson waited

until six weeks after ALA filed its summary judgment motion to serve ALA with a one and

a half page supplemental discovery letter, virtually ensuring that Colson would not receive

a reply in time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the supplemental

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discovery request was served solely by regular U.S. Mail, rather than by email or fax, which

had apparently been the parties’ past practice. (Dkt.#159 at 4). ALA responded to the

supplemental discovery in 24 hours. (Dkt.#159 at 4) Similarly, it appears that Colson did

not notice the additional witness’s deposition until November 24, 2009, one week prior to

the date its response was due, notwithstanding the fact that Colson must have known that this

witness existed, given his prior testimony that he spoke with the witness at the dealership on

September 17, 2009. (Dkt.#159 at 10)

Given that it appears that Colson failed to diligently pursue discovery, this request will

be denied. Real Property Located at 414 Riverside Rd., Oakview, CA, 1994 WL 6603 at *5

(denying continuance where failure to conduct discovery was due to movant’s own delay);

Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Corp., 284 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (Rule 56(f) motion

denied due to lack of diligence). 

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Colson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

partially granted and partially denied. ALA’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Colson’s Request for a Rule 56(f) Continuance is denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt.#148). Judgment is granted against Motor Sports of

Scottsdale for Colson’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. Judgment is also

granted against Lamborghini of Scottsdale for Colson’s unjust enrichment claim, but denied

as to Mr. and Mrs. Maghami and Motor Sports of Scottsdale No. 2, LLC. Judgment is denied

on the breach of good faith and fair dealing claim. Also, Colson’s claims for

Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Concealment will proceed against all of the Maghami

Defendants except for Motor Sports of Scottsdale.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.#145). Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC will

hereby be dismissed from this action.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Request for a Continuance

Pursuant to Rule 56(f) (Dkt.#154). 

DATED this 8th day of July, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-02150-MHM Document 163 Filed 07/09/10 Page 24 of 24