Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02571/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02571-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dominique Daron Ewing, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-02571-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

I. Status of this case 

On December 17, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On 

October 16, 2014, the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report 

and Recommendation (R&R) recommending the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. Doc. 22. Petitioner did not file objections to the R&R, and on November 20, 

2014, this Court accepted and adopted the R&R and denied and dismissed the Petition. 

Docs. 23 and 24. 

 Later, this Court discovered Petitioner may not have been receiving 

correspondence from the Court. Doc. 25. This Court permitted Petitioner to move to 

reopen the case and contemporaneously file his objections to the R&R by March 6, 2015. 

Id. On March 5, 2015, this Court received Petitioner’s objections to the R&R. Doc. 26. 

The Court will construe this filing as both objections and a motion to reopen this case. 

II. Reopening case 

Consistent with this Court’s February 5, 2015 Order (Doc. 25), the Court will 

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grant Petitioner’s motion to reopen and consider his objections de novo. 

III. Review of R&R 

As indicated above, pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus and an R&R recommending the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge=s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes 

that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not 

otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the 

[Magistrate Judge=s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are 

not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 

U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”). 

 As indicated above, Petitioner has now filed objections to the R&R. Accordingly, 

the Court will review the portions of the R&R to which there is an objection de novo. 

IV. Petition 

 A. Factual Background 

In his objections, Petitioner states, “The petitioner concedes to the correctness of 

the factual background....” Doc. 26 at 1. Accordingly, this Court accepts and adopts the 

factual background from the R&R, which is as follows: 

 I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 On November 10, 2010, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court on the following charges: (1) first-degree murder, a 

class one dangerous felony (Count One); (2) attempted armed robbery, a 

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class three dangerous felony (Count Two); (3) kidnapping, a class two 

dangerous felony (Count Three); (4) aggravated assault, a class three 

dangerous felony (Count Four); and (5) burglary in the first-degree, a class 

two dangerous felony (Count Five). (Doc. 17, Ex. A.) The State also 

alleged the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the offenses involved 

the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury; (2) the 

offenses involved the use, threatened use, or possession of a deadly weapon 

or dangerous instrument during the commission of the crime (a gun); (3) 

the offenses involved the presence of an accomplice; (4) Petitioner 

committed the offenses as consideration for the receipt, or in the 

expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; (5) the offenses 

caused physical, emotional, or financial harm to the victim’s immediate 

family; and (6) if the jury convicted Petitioner of multiple counts not used 

to enhance his sentence, the State alleged that the offenses resulted in 

multiple convictions. [footnote omitted] (Doc. 17, Ex. B.) 

 On August 29, 2011, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with 

the State. (Doc. 17, Ex. D.) The plea agreement provided that Petitioner 

would plead guilty to first degree murder, which carries a presumptive 

sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment. (Id. at 1.) The plea 

agreement also stated that Petitioner would be sentenced to the Arizona 

Department of Corrections and would pay restitution to the victims in an 

amount up to $50,000. (Id.) In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the 

State agreed to dismiss the other charges against him. (Id.) Paragraph six of 

the plea agreement provided that Petitioner waived “any and all motions, 

defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised or could 

assert hereafter to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition 

of a sentence upon him consistent with this agreement.” (Id. at 2.) 

Paragraph eleven of the plea agreement stated that Petitioner understood 

that by pleading guilty he was giving up “[his] right to remain silent, [his] 

privilege against self-incrimination, [and] presumption of innocence.” (Id.) 

 On August 29, 2011, the court held a change-of-plea hearing. (Doc. 

17, Ex. E.) At the outset of the hearing, the court asked Petitioner’s counsel 

whether he had any reason to believe that Petitioner was not competent to 

enter a guilty plea. (Id. at 4.) Defense counsel responded “no,” and stated 

that Petitioner was “an intelligent young man.” (Id.) In response to the 

court’s questions, Petitioner confirmed that he had not taken any 

medication, consumed any alcohol, or used any drugs that interfered with 

his ability to understand the proceedings. (Id.) He stated that he had 

discussed the plea agreement with counsel before signing it, that he 

initialed each paragraph of plea agreement, that he understood the plea 

agreement, that no promises had been made to him other than those 

contained in the plea agreement, and that he was not forced or threatened to 

enter the plea agreement. (Id. at 5-6, 12.) He also stated that counsel had 

answered his questions about the plea agreement and that counsel had done 

“an excellent job.” (Id. at 5-6.) 

 The court recited the charge to which Petitioner was pleading guilty, 

advised Petitioner of his sentencing exposure, and of the constitutional 

rights and appeal rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. (Id. at 7-8, 10-

12.) The court also explained that Petitioner faced a sentence of twenty-five 

years to life imprisonment and that he would serve “every day” of that 

sentence and that he was not eligible for any early release. (Id. at 8-9.) 

Petitioner affirmed that he understood the charge and his potential sentence 

and that he agreed to waive his rights and plead guilty. (Id. at 7-8, 12.) 

Petitioner’s counsel provided a factual basis for the guilty plea and 

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Petitioner affirmed that he had committed the acts contained in the factual 

basis. (Id. at 12-14.) The trial court found that Petitioner entered the guilty 

plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and accepted the guilty plea. 

(Id. at 14.) 

 The trial court held a sentencing hearing on October 14, 2011. (Doc. 

17, Exs. G, H.) During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel advised the 

court that Petitioner had no prior criminal record, he had earned his GED, 

and that, before the incident giving rise to his conviction, “he was in 

college” and had earned “two A’s and two B’s in his semester.” (Doc. 17, 

Ex. G. at 20.) Counsel also stated that Petitioner was “intelligent.” (Id. at 

20.) The court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life 

imprisonment, in accordance with the plea agreement. (Id. at 25; Doc. 17, 

Ex. H.) The court also ordered Petitioner to pay $5,763.94 in restitution. 

(Doc. 17, Ex. G. at 25.) 

 B. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On December 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction 

relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

(Doc. 17, Ex. I.) On January 9, 2012, the court appointed the Office of the 

Legal Advocate to represent Petitioner and ordered transcripts. (Doc. 17, 

Ex. J.) The Office of Legal the Advocate moved to withdraw based on a 

conflict and, on February 27, 2012, the court appointed Robert Gaffney as 

counsel for Petitioner. (Doc. 17, Exs. K, L.) On May 29, 2012, Petitioner’s 

counsel filed a notice of completion of post-conviction review and advised 

the court that he was “unable to find a meritorious issue, including a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, to justify the filing of a Petition in this 

matter.” (Doc. 17, Ex. M.) The court granted Petitioner forty-five days to 

file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 17, Ex. N.) Petitioner 

filed a petition for post-conviction relief on August 23, 2012. (Doc. 17, 

Exs. O, P, Q.) 

 In his petition, Petitioner asserted that trial counsel was ineffective 

because counsel lied to him after he refused to sign a plea agreement that 

provided for a sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment. (Doc. 17, 

Ex. Q.) Petitioner argued that trial counsel told him and his family members 

that he would only serve fifteen years’ imprisonment because he would 

only have to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence. (Id.) He asserted that 

trial counsel told him that his plea agreement was more favorable than his 

co-defendant’s plea agreement. (Id.) Petitioner asked the post-conviction 

court to correct his sentence. (Id.) 

 The State responded to the petition and argued that Petitioner failed 

to assert a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 17, 

Ex. R at 6) The State noted that Petitioner had not included an affidavit 

from trial counsel or any witness who knew about the alleged “secret deal” 

regarding his sentence under the plea agreement. (Id.) The State also noted 

that Petitioner’s claims contradicted the statements he made during the 

change-of-plea hearing, including his statement that no promises had been 

made to him other than the promises contained in the plea agreement, and 

the trial court’s statement that Petitioner would serve twenty-five calendar 

years and would not be eligible for early release after serving only eightyfive percent of his sentence. (Id. at 6-7.) 

 Petitioner replied to the State’s response and requested an 

evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 17, Ex. S.) In his reply, he reiterated that trial 

counsel told him he would only have to serve eighty-five percent of his 

sentence. (Id.) Petitioner attached an affidavit from his aunt stating that 

Petitioner’s trial counsel had told her that he would not get a life sentence 

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and that he would be eligible for parole. (Id.) 

 On November 27, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s request for 

an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 17, Ex. T.) The court found that Petitioner’s allegations regarding 

trial counsel’s statements to him “were in direct conflict with what 

[Petitioner] himself said at the change of plea proceeding.” (Id. at 2.) The 

court also found that Petitioner’s allegations were “not supported by any 

independent verification or any supporting affidavit as required by Rule 

32.5 [of the] Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (Id.) The court further 

found that “[b]ecause there is no credible evidence of a secret deal, and 

[Petitioner] himself stated that he understood the sentence he now 

complains of, the Court does not believe that [Petitioner] can establish that 

his attorney was ineffective.” (Id.) Petitioner did not petition the Arizona 

Court of Appeals for review of the denial of his petition for post conviction 

relief. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

Doc. 22 at 1-5. 

B. Claim in the Federal Habeas Petition 

Petitioner made one claim in his Petition: that his confession/statements to the 

police were inadmissible, and thus tainted his plea negotiations. Doc. 22 at 5. The R&R 

concludes that due to Petitioner’s plea, this claim is not cognizable as a basis for federal 

habeas relief. Doc. 22 at 6-7. Alternatively, the R&R conclude that this claim is 

procedurally barred. Doc. 22 at 7-10. 

 In his objections, Petitioner purports to be objecting to the R&R’s conclusion 

regarding his claim that his statements were illegally obtained. Doc. 26 at 1. However, 

in reality his objections are targeted to the issue he raised in his post-conviction relief 

petition in state court; specifically: that his attorney failed to explain to him the sentence 

he was facing under the plea agreement. Doc. 26 at 3.1

 Petitioner makes no legal or 

factual argument in his objections regarding his statements and/or confession. 

 Turning first to the claim raised in the Petition wherein Petitioner claims his 

statements were illegally obtained by law enforcement, the Court agrees with the R&R 

both that this claim is not cognizable on habeas as a result of Petitioner’s plea agreement, 

and alternatively that this claim is procedurally barred. Accordingly, the R&R will be 

 

1

 One difference between the state court post-conviction relief proceedings and the objections is that in the state court proceeding, Petitioner claims his counsel told him he would serve 15 years, Doc. 22 at 4, but in his habeas Petition he claims his counsel 

told him he would serve 20 years, Doc. 26 at 3. 

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accepted and adopted as to this claim and relief will be denied. 

 Regarding Petitioner’s “claim” raised in his objections (that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to advise him of the sentence he faced following the plea), the 

Court will construe the objections liberally as a request to amend his Petition to add a 

second claim. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). As discussed 

above, the claim was presented to the state court in Petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief. 

 Because this claim was exhausted before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny relief on this claim unless the “state court 

decision [was] contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law” or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the 

state court’s factual findings regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1); 

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 This Court has reviewed the state court’s determination on post-conviction relief 

that Petitioner’s claim that his counsel did not advise him thoroughly is so contradicted 

by the record of the trial court at the change of plea hearing that the claim lacks 

credibility. This Court finds that the state court’s factual findings and legal conclusions 

are not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, nor did the state court 

unreasonably determine the facts. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner, if allowed to amend his Petition, would not be entitled to 

relief on this claim. Thus, construing the objections liberally as a request for leave to 

amend to add this theory of ineffective assistance of counsel,2

 the Court denies the 

request for leave to amend because it is futile. 

 

2

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242, a habeas petition may be amended “as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” Rule 15(a) allows a party to amend his complaint by leave of the court, and such leave Ashall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that a district court was correct in denying leave to amend a habeas petition where allowing the amendments would be futile. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th Cir. 

1995). 

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V. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to reopen (construed by this Court to be part of 

Doc. 26) is granted; accordingly, this Court’s prior Order and Judgment dismissing this 

case (Docs. 23 and 24) are vacated. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 22) is 

accepted and adopted; the objections are overruled (Doc. 26); to the extent the Court 

construed the objections as seeking leave to amend, leave to amend is denied; 

accordingly, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying and dismissing the 

Petition, with prejudice. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). 

 Dated this 4th day of June, 2015. 

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