Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02256/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD M. FERGUSON,

Petitioner,

 vs.

M. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2256 WHA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The

petition is directed to denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it,

and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

STATEMENT

On December 30, 1981, petitioner was involved in the robbery of a liquor store in Napa,

California, and the shooting of two clerks, one of whom was killed and other severely maimed

(Exh. 3 (decision of Board of Prison Terms) at 14). Petitioner had formerly worked at the

liquor store and provided information about the layout of the store, and he also provided the

guns and masks for his two accomplices; he was, however, the getaway driver and did not go

into the store and did not personally shoot the victims (Exh. 3 at 14-15). 

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On August 11, 1983, he pled guilty to second-degree murder, attempted murder, and

conspiracy to commit robbery (Exh. 1). He was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison (id.). 

On February 19, 2003, after a hearing before the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”),

during which petitioner was represented and was given an opportunity to be heard, the Board

found petitioner unsuitable for parole for the eighth time (Exh. 3 at 71-79). The Board based its

decision upon the nature of the commitment offense, petitioner’s unstable social history, his

escalating pattern of criminal activity, his prior criminal activity, his disciplinary record in

prison, his lack of a firm job offer if paroled, and the opposition of the district attorney and the

victim’s widow (id.). 

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

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that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). In

this case that is the decision of the California Superior Court for Sonoma County denying

petitioner’s state habeas petition in which he challenged this parole denial (Exh. 13). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

As grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) his due process rights were

denied when the Board denied parole for the eighth time based on the circumstances of his

crime; (2) the denial of parole made his sentence the equivalent of a first degree murder life

sentence, which breached the plea bargain; and (3) the Board’s decision was arbitrary,

capricious, and not supported by the evidence. 

///

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1. DUE PROCESS

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. In Greenholtz

v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme

Court found that the inmates had a liberty interest in discretionary parole that was protected by

the Due Process Clause. The right was created by the “expectancy of release provided in [the

Nebraska parole statute.]” That statute provided that the parole board “shall order” release of

eligible inmates unless that release would have certain negative impacts. Id. at 11–12. The

Supreme Court returned to the issue in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987). There

it held that a similar liberty interest was created even though the parole board had great

discretion. Id. at 381. For parole decisions, this mode of analysis survived the Supreme Court’s

later rejection of it for prison disciplinary decisions in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (Sandin “does not affect the creation of

liberty interests in parole under Greenholtz and Allen.”). 

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a state's statutory parole scheme, if it

uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole release will be granted when or

unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected

liberty interest, see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (Montana parole

statute providing that board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due

process liberty interest in release on parole); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12 (Nebraska parole

statute providing that board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due

process liberty interest in release on parole). In such a case, a prisoner has liberty interest in

parole that cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen,

482 U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16. 

Respondent contends that California law does not create a liberty interest in parole. But

California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language and is similar to the schemes in Allen and

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Greenholtz which the Supreme Court held gave rise to a protected liberty interest in release on

parole. In California, the panel or board "shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be

fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Under the clearly established framework of

Allen and Greenholtz, “California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The scheme

requires that parole release be granted unless the statutorily defined determination (that

considerations of public safety forbid it) is made. Ibid.; Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16

(9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life sentence

implicated prisoner’s liberty interest). In sum, the structure of California's parole scheme --

with its mandatory language and substantive predicates – gives rise to a federally protected

liberty interest in parole such that an inmate has a federal right to due process in parole

proceedings.

Respondent relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

92 (2005), as authority for his contention that the California statute does not create a liberty

interest in parole. This argument has been rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit. See Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1127-28 (2006). 

Respondent’s argument as to a liberty interest is without merit. 

2. SOME EVIDENCE

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when (1) he was denied

parole for the eighth time because of the circumstances of the crime and (2) that the denial was

arbitrary and capricious and not supported by some evidence. As both these issues are really

claims that the evidence was not sufficient to satisfy due process, they will be considered

together. 

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by "some evidence in the

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record", or is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying

"some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). The evidence underlying the

Board’s decision must also have "some indicia of reliability." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904;

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established

federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. 

Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is met "does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that "the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 

Recent Ninth Circuit cases reflect that a critical issue in parole denial cases is the

Board’s use of evidence from the commitment offense and prior offenses. In Biggs, the court

explained that the some evidence standard may be considered in light of the Board’s decisions

over time. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-917. The court reasoned that "[t]he Parole Board’s decision

is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered . . .

A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and

conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison

system and could result in a due process violation." Id. Although the Biggs court upheld the

initial denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s

conduct before incarceration, the court cautioned that "[o]ver time, however, should Biggs

continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a

parole date simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious questions involving

his liberty interest." Id. at 916. 

The Sass court criticized the decision in Biggs: "Under AEDPA it is not our function to

speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Sass

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determined that it is not a due process violation per se if the Board determines parole suitability

based solely on the unchanging factors of the commitment offense and prior offenses. See id.

(prisoner’s commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses amounted to some

evidence to support the Board’s denial of parole). However, Sass does not dispute the argument

in Biggs that, over time, a commitment offense may be less probative of a prisoner’s current

threat to the public safety. 

In Irons the Ninth Circuit emphasized the continuing vitality of Biggs, but concluded

that relief for Irons was precluded by Sass. See Irons, 470 F.3d at 664. The Ninth Circuit

explained that all of the cases in which it previously held that denying parole based solely on

the commitment offense comported with due process were ones in which the prisoner had not

yet served the minimum years required by the sentence. Id. at 665. Also, noting that the parole

board in Sass and Irons appeared to give little or no weight to evidence of the prisoner’s

rehabilitation, the Ninth Circuit stressed its hope that "the Board will come to recognize that in

some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of

the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest

in parole that flows from relevant California statutes." Id. (citing Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917). Even

so, the Ninth Circuit has not set a standard as to when a complete reliance on unchanging

circumstances would amount to a due process violation. 

That is not what happened here, however.

In denying petitioner’s state petition, the Sonoma County Superior Court held that after

an individualized analysis, the Board gave sufficient reasons on the record for denying

petitioner’s parole (Exh. 13). The Board, in denying petitioner parole, cited not only the nature

of the commitment offense, but also petitioner’s unstable social history, his escalating pattern of

criminal activity, his prior criminal activity, his disciplinary record in prison, his lack of a firm

job offer if paroled, and the opposition of the district attorney and the victim’s widow (id.). 

With the exception of the opposition of the prosecutor and the victim, all these circumstances

“tend to indicate unsuitability for parole” under California regulations. Cal. Code Regs. Title

15, § 2402(a), (c)(1)(A). The Board did not deny parole solely because of the unchanging

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factor of the nature of petitioner’s offense, so the concern expressed in Biggs, that after passage

of enough time such a factor would cease to be “some evidence,” is not triggered here. 

Petitioner argues that it was irrational for the Board to rely on the gruesome details of

the execution-style shootings of the two clerks by his accomplices as grounds to conclude that

the public safety requires a more lengthy incarceration for him. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b)

(public safety standard). To some extent he has a point; when the issue is someone’s guilt, it

makes sense to attribute the conduct of accomplices to the defendant, as happened here, but

when predicting that person’s future dangerousness, only conduct that is actually attributable to

the defendant/petitioner seems relevant. That does not cause the characteristics of petitioner’s

offense to have no evidentiary value, however, because he helped plan the robbery and provided

guns and ammunition. It may be that he did not expect or intend that the guns would be used,

but in providing the guns and ammunition he had to have foreseen that they might be used, or

should have done so. In terms of predicting his current dangerousness, then, what matters is

that at the time of his crime he was the sort of person who would plan a violent robbery and

provide guns and ammunition, with the attendant dangers. If he were still that sort of person, he

would indeed be a danger to public safety, so the fact that he once was that sort of person is

relevant to the Board’s difficult task of attempting to predict whether he is still dangerous. 

At the time of the hearing petitioner’s crime was twenty years in the past. The

evidentiary value of his offense thus was slight. The Board, however, also based its decision on 

petitioner’s disciplinary record in prison, his lack of contrition, and his lack of a firm job offer if

paroled (Exh. 3 at 71-79). Perhaps rather marginally, this was sufficient evidence to support the

denial. See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2005) (facts of the offense and

psychiatric reports about the would-be parolee sufficient to support denial). 

Because there was no constitutional violation, the state courts’ denial of this claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

2. BREACH OF PLEA BARGAIN

Petitioner contends that by denying him parole the Board has breached his plea bargain,

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because it is in effect treating him as if he had been convicted of first-degree murder. The plea

bargain called for a sentence of fifteen years to life (Exh. 18 at 2), and that is what petitioner

received (Exh. 1). Although plaintiff contends he is being punished as if he had pleaded to

first-degree murder, he in fact is receiving the parole considerations that his fifteen-to-life

sentence entitles him. First degree murder is punishable by death, life without parole, or a term

of twenty-five years to life. Cal. Penal Code § 190(a). If petitioner had been convicted of firstdegree murder, he would not even yet be receiving consideration for parole.

This claim is without merit. The state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s argument was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18 , 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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