Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00463/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00463-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDE TIMOTHY STEVENSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0463-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), is pending before the court. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff seeks fees in 

the amount of $6,885.38 based on 36.3 hours at the rate of $189.68 per hour for attorney time

spent in pursuing this action.

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 Defendant contends fees under the EAJA should not be awarded 

because the government’s position was substantially justified. In the event fees are awarded, 

defendant contends that plaintiff cannot be compensated for hours spent on issues not reached by 

the court in deciding the motion for summary judgment. In addition, defendant contends any fee 

that is awarded must be made payable to the plaintiff.

 

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Plaintiff claims in his initial motion for EAJA fees that his counsel spent a total of 34.8 hours in 

pursuing this action, but asserts in his reply to defendant’s opposition to his motion that his 

counsel spent an additional 1.5 hours in reviewing defendant’s opposition and drafting a reply. 

Accordingly, plaintiff requests fees based on a total of 36.3 hours of his attorney’s work.

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A. Substantial Justification

The EAJA provides that the prevailing party in a civil action against the United States 

may apply for an order for attorneys’ fees and expenses within thirty days of final judgment in the 

action. An applicant for Social Security benefits receiving a remand under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant later succeeds in 

obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993). In this case, the 

matter was remanded under sentence four for further administrative proceedings pursuant to the 

order of the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF No. 28. Plaintiff thus is 

entitled to an award of fees under the EAJA. The court must allow the fee award unless it finds 

that the position of the United States was substantially justified. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 

568-69 (9th Cir. 1995).

The burden of establishing substantial justification is on the government. Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the 

Supreme Court defined “substantial justification” as ‘justified in substance or in the main’ -- that 

is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from the 

‘reasonable basis in both law and fact’ formulation adopted by the Ninth Circuit and the vast 

majority of other Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue. Id. at 565. A position does 

not have to be correct to be substantially justified. Id. at 566 n.2; see also Russell v. Sullivan, 930 

F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991), receded from on other grounds, Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 

1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002).

In determining substantial justification, the court reviews both the underlying 

governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government in 

the litigation itself. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on other 

grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the underlying government action 

was not substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government’s litigation 

position was substantially justified. Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1988).

Defendant contends the government’s position was substantially justified. In support of 

this contention, defendant makes two arguments. First, defendant argues that the court remanded 

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this action based on only one of the three issues raised in the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment and declined to address the other two, therefore limiting plaintiff from recovering 

EAJA fees based on the two unadjudicated challenges. While defendant is correct that fees may 

not be awarded with respect to issues not addressed by the reviewing court, see Hardisty v. 

Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010), defendant’s argument does not actually address 

whether her position was substantially justified. Accordingly, defendant’s first argument is not 

well taken insofar as it is asserted in support of her claim that the government’s position was 

substantially justified.

Second, with respect to the issue of the ALJ’s failure to develop the record — the sole 

issue adjudicated and the basis on which the court remanded this action — defendant asserts that 

its position was substantially justified because although the court found that there did not exist 

substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s RFC determination, the ALJ still based 

that determination on an assessment of all of the evidence in the record and reasonably concluded 

that further development of the record was not necessary. Although defendant is correct that the 

government can lose on the merits and its position still be substantially justified for purposes of 

EAJA, defendant’s argument in this instance is unavailing. As discussed in the order remanding 

this action for further proceedings, the ALJ based his RFC determination on the sole medical 

opinion in the record, which was issued by a nonexamining physician who only reviewed the 

limited medical evidence developed between November 2008 and June 2010. That evidence —

and, in turn, the nonexamining physician’s opinion based on a review of that evidence — did not 

address plaintiff’s alleged spinal impairments that primarily formed the basis for plaintiff’s claim 

of disability. 

The evidence in the record regarding the development of plaintiff’s spinal impairments 

was established between November 2011 and May 2014, well after December 20, 2010, the date 

on which the nonexamining physician issued his opinion. There was no medical opinion in the 

record addressing the nearly three years’ worth of medical evidence indicating that plaintiff had 

developed severe spinal impairments. Despite this fact, the ALJ did not attempt to obtain a 

medical opinion addressing that evidence. Instead, he made an independent evaluation of that 

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evidence and improperly substituted his judgement for that of a medical expert regarding the 

impact of plaintiff’s spinal impairments. Such practice clearly contravened the relevant case law 

preventing an ALJ from substituting his own judgement for that of a medical expert and 

establishing an ALJ’s special duty to ensure that the record is fully and fairly developed before 

rendering a decision. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001); Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 

1999); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the government’s position

in defending the ALJ’s erroneous conduct was not substantially justified and fees under the EAJA 

will be awarded. See Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he defense of 

basic and fundamental errors . . . is difficult to justify.”).

B. Reasonable Fee

The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. In determining whether a fee is 

reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the reasonable hourly rate, and the results 

obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant does not contest the hourly 

rate claimed but contends the fee award provisions of EAJA are not available with respect to 

issues not actually adjudicated. This contention is well taken. See Hardisty, 592 F.3d at 1079. In 

remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings, the court found dispositive the 

ALJ’s error in determining the functional impact of plaintiff’s spinal impairments without 

obtaining medical opinion evidence addressing those impairments. The court declined to address 

the other two issues raised in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. With respect to 

plaintiff’s counsel’s time reviewing the transcript, briefing on the cross-motions for summary 

judgment and order granting remand in this case, as well as the time expended on tasks as set 

forth in counsel’s schedule of hours, the court has determined the hours claimed are reasonable. 

The court has determined, however, that three of the hours claimed with regard to the drafting of 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and reply to defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

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judgment were devoted to issues not addressed by the court.2 Accordingly, the number of hours 

compensated will be reduced to 33.3 hours at the hourly rate of $189.68, for a total of $6,316.34.

The court notes that plaintiff has executed an assignment of EAJA fees to plaintiff’s counsel. 

ECF No. 30-3. The EAJA award must be made by this court to plaintiff, and not to counsel. See

Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). Nevertheless, if the government determines that plaintiff 

does not owe a federal debt that qualifies for offset, payment may be made in the name of 

plaintiff’s attorney.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA is GRANTED IN PART.

2. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $6,316.34 pursuant to the 

EAJA. If the government determines that plaintiff does not owe a federal debt that qualifies for 

offset, payment may be made in the name of plaintiff’s attorney.

Dated: March 14, 2016

11 stevenson0463.fee-eaja

 

2

The court bases this determination on plaintiff’s counsel’s stated hours spent drafting plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment with respect to the unadjudicated issues and the apparent amount 

of time plaintiff’s counsel spent on those issues when drafting plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment.

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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