Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00261/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00261-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN JUSTIN BROWNLEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY W. LYNCH, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-00261-JDP (PC)

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a first amended complaint alleging that defendants 

violated her1 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 16. Her allegations do not state 

a cognizable claim and, as such, I will order that a district judge be assigned to this action and 

will recommend that this action be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 

Screening Order

I. Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 

entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 

claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

1 Plaintiff uses female pronouns in the complaint. 

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A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that, on May 14, 2022, she was in line to receive her medication from 

defendant Lopez. ECF No. 16 at 6. Lopez offered plaintiff her medication but said she would 

give it to her only on the condition that she take it with water. Id. Plaintiff refused, maintaining 

that her medication was designed to dissolve under the tongue. Id. After arguing with Lopez to 

no avail, plaintiff returned to her cell without receiving her medication. Id. 

Two hours later, plaintiff was called from her cell by another correctional officer and 

informed that Lopez had filed a battery disciplinary against her for trying to take the medication 

from his hand. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that this charge was false, but that the officers 

responsible for informing her of the charges, including defendant Hibbard, refused to review 

video footage that would have exonerated her. Id. Plaintiff was eventually taken to 

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administrative segregation, where she spent sixty-eight days. Id. at 7-8. There, she went on 

hunger strike for fifty-five days, before a hearing officer found her not guilty of battery. Id. at 8-

9. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that she believes that the false battery accusation was undertaken in 

retaliation for certain unspecified civil rights litigation. Id. at 9. 

These allegations, taken as true, do not state a cognizable claim. There is no 

constitutional protection from false prison disciplinary charges. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 

F.2d 949, 951-53 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity 

from being falsely accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty 

interest.”); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). The Ninth Circuit has 

affirmed district court decisions citing these cases. See Muhammad v. Rubia, 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 39818, 2010 WL 1260425, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010), aff'd, 453 F. App'x 751 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (“[A] prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or 

wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. 

As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, allegations of 

a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983.”) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff was 

exonerated in her disciplinary hearing and, thus, has no claim that her procedural protections were 

inadequate in that respect. 

While plaintiff does briefly allege that the false disciplinary was retaliatory, her 

allegations are insufficient to state a First Amendment claim. She does not allege how she knew 

Lopez’s disciplinary was undertaken in retaliation for her litigation, rather than because of their 

argument earlier that day. Nor does she allege how Lopez knew of her litigation or why he would 

have been motivated to retaliate against her because of it. 

Finally, nothing in the complaint indicates that any defendant used excessive force against 

the defendant. Her argument with Lopez did not result in violence and, while she undoubtedly 

suffered physically during her hunger strike in administrative segregation, no defendant forced 

her to undertake that strike. 

I conclude that further leave to amend is unwarranted, as only changing the fundamental 

nature of the claims at issue would permit this action to move past screening.

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge 

to this action.

Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 16, be 

DISMISSED without further leave to amend and for failure to state a claim. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2023 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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