Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00102/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00102-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS LEON SPELLS,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-cv-102-BAS (WVG)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

ON PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Chris Leon Spells, a state inmate serving an indeterminate term of 26 years to life, 

has filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

challenging the denial of his petition for resentencing under the California Three Strikes 

Reform Act of 2012. The matter is before the undersigned magistrate judge for preparation 

of a report and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local 

Rule 72.1(d)(4). The Court has considered the Petition (ECF No. 1), Respondent’s Answer 

(ECF No. 7), the Traverse (ECF No. 9), and the lodgments (ECF No. 8). For the reasons 

that follow, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

On April 6, 2010, a jury of the San Diego County Superior Court convicted Spells 

of unlawfully causing an inhabited structure to burn. (ECF No. 8-2 at 9.) The Three Strikes 

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sentencing law then in effect mandated that a defendant convicted of two or more violent 

or serious felonies be sentenced to 25 years to life upon conviction of a third felony. Former 

California Penal Code (hereinafter “C.P.C.”) §§ 667, 1170.12. Spells’s prior criminal 

history included a 1986 robbery conviction and a 1990 conviction on three counts of 

assault. (ECF No. 8-2 at 9.) Spells also had a prison prior. (ECF No. 8-2 at 9.) The trial 

court accordingly sentenced Spells to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison, 

plus one year for the prison prior. (ECF No. 8-8 at 2.)

On November 6, 2012, voters approved Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform 

Act (“Reform Act”). Under the Reform Act, a defendant convicted of two prior serious or 

violent felonies is subject to a sentence of 25 years to life only if the third felony is also 

serious or violent. C.P.C. §§ 667, 1170.12. The Reform Act also provides a means for 

certain inmates currently serving 25 years to life for a third felony conviction imposed 

under the old law to petition for recall of sentence and resentencing. Id. § 1170.126. To be 

eligible, the inmate must satisfy the criteria set forth in C.P.C. § 1170.126(e): (1) the 

indeterminate life sentence must have been imposed under the Three Strikes Law for a 

conviction of a felony not defined as serious or violent by C.P.C. §§ 667.5(c) or 1192.7(c); 

(2) the current sentence must not have been imposed for any of the offenses appearing in 

revised C.P.C. §§ 667(e)(2)(C)(i-iii) or 1170.12(c)(2)(C)(i-iii); and (3) the inmate must not 

have been convicted of any of the offenses appearing in the new C.P.C. §§ 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) 

or 1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iv). Id. § 1170.126(e)(1-3). If the C.P.C. § 1170.126(e) criteria are 

satisfied, the inmate “shall be resentenced . . . unless the court, in its discretion, determines 

resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Id.

§ 1170.126(f). In making the risk of danger determination, the court may consider the 

inmate’s criminal conviction history, disciplinary and rehabilitation record while 

incarcerated, and any other evidence the court deems relevant. Id. § 1170.126(g).

On December 20, 2012, Spells filed a petition in San Diego Superior Court seeking 

resentencing under the Reform Act. (ECF No. 8-2 at 26.) The court appointed counsel and 

Spells filed an amended petition on March 26, 2013. (ECF No. 8-2 at 36.) In its opposition, 

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the government conceded that Spells met the criteria for resentencing under C.P.C. § 

1170.126(e) but argued that Spells remained an unreasonable risk of danger to public 

safety. (ECF No. 8-2 at 93-94.) In supplemental briefing, Spells argued that under Apprendi 

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, he had a constitutional right to have 

the question of whether he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety submitted 

to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (ECF No. 8-2 at 116.) Using a 

preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial court concluded that Spells posed an 

unreasonable risk of danger to society, and denied Spells’s petition for recall of sentence. 

(ECF No. 8-8 at 4.)

Spells appealed to the California Court of Appeal Fourth District. On appeal, Spells 

renewed his argument that the trial court’s preponderance of the evidence dangerousness

determination violated Apprendi. Spells also argued that the trial court’s determination that 

he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety was an abuse of discretion. (ECF 

No. 8-9.) Relying on People v. Superior Court (Kaulick), 215 Cal. App. 4th 1279 (2013), 

People v. Osuna, 225 Cal. App. 4th 1020 (2014), and Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 

(2010), the Court of Appeal held that C.P.C. § 1170.126 did not implicate Apprendi

because it permitted only a downward modification of an inmate’s original sentence and 

because the trial court’s dangerousness determination did nothing more than “disqualif[y]

[Spells] from an act of lenity on part of the electorate to which [he] was not constitutionally 

entitled.” (ECF No. 8-8 at 7.) The court also held that the trial court’s factual findings were 

supported by the record and thus was not an abuse of discretion. (ECF No. 8-8 at 9.) 

Spells’s petition for review in the California Supreme Court was summarily denied on 

September 9, 2015. (ECF No. 8-10.) 

Spells filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus in this Court on January 14, 2016. (ECF 

No. 1.) Therein, Spells argues once again that the C.P.C. § 1170.126 proceeding violated 

his rights under Apprendi and its progeny to have facts that increase the prescribed range 

of penalties for a crime found by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent 

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filed an Answer on April 4, 2016. (ECF. No. 7.) Spells filed a Traverse on May 3, 2016. 

(ECF No. 9.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Petition was filed after April 24, 1996 and thus is governed by the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

326 (1997). Under AEDPA, a court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

unless the state court’s judgment “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 

§ 2254(d)(2).

Clearly established federal law is “the governing principle or principles set forth by 

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Precedent is not “clearly established” law under § 2254(d)(1) 

“unless it ‘squarely addresses the issue’ in the case before the state court [citation omitted] 

or ‘establishes a legal principle that clearly extends’ to the case before the state court.” 

Andrews v. Davis, 798 F.3d 759, 773 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 

U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) and Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2006). “[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale 

before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly 

established at the time of the state-court decision.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 

(2014). “Section 2254(d)(1) ... does not require state courts to extend [Supreme Court] 

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.” Id. “[W]hen a state 

court may draw a principled distinction between the case before it and Supreme Court 

caselaw, the law is not clearly established for the state-court case.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 

F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010). “A principle is clearly established law governing the case 

‘if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts 

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that there could be no fairminded disagreement on the question. Andrews, 798 F.3d at 774 

(quoting White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706-07).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” 

or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). “The court may 

grant relief under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly identifies 

the governing legal principle ... but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a particular 

case.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The “unreasonable application” clause 

requires that the state court decision be more than “incorrect or erroneous.” Andrews, 798 

F.3d at 774. “The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of [the law] was 

unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

In deciding a habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it 

agrees with the state court’s determination. Rather, § 2254(d) “sets forth a ‘highly 

deferential standard, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.’” Andrews, 798 F.3d at 774 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 

(2011)). While not a complete bar on the relitigation of claims already rejected in state 

court proceedings, § 2254(d) merely ‘“preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where 

there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision 

conflicts with [Supreme Court precedent]’ and ‘goes no further.’” Andrews, 798 F.3d at 

774 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean 

that the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus 

claim. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor 

the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court 

decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

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IV. DISCUSSION

The Sixth Amendment1requires that “any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for 

a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013); see also Apprendi v. New 

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). “The rule’s 

animating principle is the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the

State and the accused at the trial of an alleged offense.” Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 717 

(2009). 

The Supreme Court, however, has never held that Apprendi and its progeny apply to 

proceedings to recall, reduce, or modify a lawfully imposed sentence. In Dillon, on which 

the California Court of Appeal relied, the Court addressed the role of judicial fact-finding 

in proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which authorizes courts to reduce the 

sentence of a federal prisoner sentenced under a guidelines range subsequently lowered by 

the federal Sentencing Commission. 560 U.S. at 819. Finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 

authorized only a “modif[ication of] a term of imprisonment,” not “a plenary resentencing 

proceeding,” id. at 826, the Court held that proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) did 

not implicate the interests addressed in Apprendi and its progeny, id. at 828-829. The Court 

noted that sentence modification proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) were not 

constitutionally compelled, but rather represented a “congressional act of lenity.” Id. at 

828. The original sentence therefore could be taken “as given,” and “any facts found by a 

judge at a 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) proceeding d[id] not serve to increase the prescribed 

 

1 Although Respondent argues that the Petition presents only a claim of state law error not 

cognizable on habeas corpus, Spells’s claim is plainly federal. The cases cited by 

Respondent, (ECF No. 7-1 at 3) are not to the contrary. In each of the cases cited, the 

inmate was found ineligible under C.P.C. § 1170.126(e), and the state trial courts were

therefore never called on to make a risk of danger determination under C.P.C. § 

1170.126(f).

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range of punishment; instead, they affect[ed] only the judge’s exercise of discretion within 

that range.” Id. at 828. The Court also found relevant that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) authorized 

only a limited reduction in sentence among only a limited class of prisoners, id. at 825; that 

the court’s authority to modify a sentence was contingent on decisions made in the first 

instance by the Sentencing Commission, id. at 826; and that Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 43(b)(4) excepts 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) proceedings from the general rule that 

defendants must be present at sentencing, id. at 828. 

Proceedings under C.P.C. § 1170.126 are, in several respects, similar to those under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Like 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the Reform Act permits prisoners 

who have been lawfully sentenced to seek a sentence reduction in specific and limited 

circumstances. Like 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the Reform Act applies only to a limited 

category of prisoners—inmates serving an indeterminate sentence under the Three Strikes 

law whose underlying convictions do not render them ineligible and who are not found to 

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society. And, like 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the 

Reform Act limits the court’s discretion during resentencing to a sentence that was equal 

to, or less than, the sentence previously imposed. 

On the other hand, C.P.C. § 1170.126 differs from 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in several 

relevant particulars. Notably, it expressly provides for a “resentencing,” C.P.C. §§

1170.126(e) and (f); provides that prisoners have the right to be present at resentencing

proceedings, id. § 1170.126(m); and, unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), it does not make the 

court’s power to grant relief dependent on the policy decisions of an outside agency. 

These distinctions ultimately make no difference. Although Dillon’s narrow holding

does not necessarily foreclose the application of Apprendi and its progeny to proceedings 

to recall, reduce or modify a lawfully imposed sentence, the Supreme Court has never 

applied Apprendi in such circumstances. Nor is this Court aware of any court that has 

applied Apprendi in a context analogous to this one. What Spells asks for is thus an 

extension of Supreme Court precedent to an entirely new context, something this Court has 

no authority to do. See White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706; Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 991. Accordingly, 

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the decision of the California Court of Appeal was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 9, 2016, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned, “Objections to Report and Recommendations.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 30, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 5, 2016

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