Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04149/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FAR WEST CAPITAL, INC. and 

STEAMBOAT DEVELOPMENT CORP., 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, 

vs. 

DOROTHY A. TOWNE and FLEETWOOD 

CORPORATION, 

Defendants/Appellees. 

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PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-4149 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-C-0251-S) 

Mary Anne Q. Wood (Anthony B. Quinn and Kathryn 0. Balmforth, also 

of Wood, Spendlove & Quinn, Salt Lake City, Utah with her on the 

briefs) for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Charles E. Weller, Reno, Nevada, J. Douglas Clark of Clark & 

Dickey, Reno, Nevada, (Cecilia L. Rosenauer, Reno, Nevada with 

them on the briefs) for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge.* 

HENRY, Circuit Judge 

* The Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Plaintiff Far West Capital, Inc. (FWC)1 appeals a district 

court order denying personal jurisdiction in Utah over defendants 

Fleetwood Corporation and Dorothy Towne. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Ms. Towne is a Nevada resident who owns Nevada real property 

rich in geothermal resources.2 Fleetwood is an Oregon corporation 

associated with Ms. Towne. FWC alleged the following events in 

its complaint. In 1988, FWC and defendants entered into what 

would be the first of three phases of negotiations regarding the 

development of Ms. Towne's land. The parties initially discussed 

forming a joint-venture to develop the land. However, the 

negotiations failed, and Ms. Towne faxed a letter to FWC in Utah 

suggesting that FWC contact her if it wanted to explore any 

arrangement other than a joint-venture. 

In early 1991, the parties began a second phase of 

negotiations and discussed the sale of the land. However, the 

parties soon saw they would not be able to reach an agreement 

regarding the purchase price of the land and terminated 

negotiations. 

1 The actual corporate entity involved in this dispute is 

Steamboat Development corporation, a Utah corporation wholly owned 

by Far West Capital, Inc., another Utah corporation. However, we 

will refer to this party as FWC just as did the parties and the 

district court. 

2 Because the district court and the parties generally do not 

identify which agents acted for each defendant during 

negotiations, and because whether the defendants acted separately 

is irrelevant for our decision, we generally follow the parties 

and the district court and refer to Ms. Towne and Fleetwood as 

defendants. 

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Later in 1991, the parties entered the third phase of 

negotiations and explored a lease arrangement. During the course 

of the lease negotiations, defendants consulted with Robert 

Wright, a Utah resident and an expert in geothermal resources, 

land leases, and royalties. Mr. Wright also occasionally picked 

up drafts of leases from FWC in Utah and forwarded them to 

defendants. However, no evidence in the record suggests that Mr. 

Wright ever negotiated with FWC or that defendants hired Mr. 

Wright because he resided in Utah. 

Over the course of six months, the parties conducted 

extensive negotiations in Nevada. FWC also alleges that the 

parties exchanged phone calls and defendants mailed five drafts of 

the proposed lease and sent approximately twelve faxes regarding 

changes in the leases to FWC in Utah. These negotiations were 

more successful than the earlier discussions, and the parties 

agreed to a leasing arrangement which they memorialized in two 

documents. Under the terms of the lease, Ms. Towne conveyed her 

geothermal and surface mineral rights to FWC. The lease provided 

that FWC would pay Ms. Towne royalty payments. The lease also 

provided that the agreement would be governed by Nevada law. 

In a separate agreement, FWC then entered into a geothermal 

and mineral sublease with Fleetwood. The sublease recited that 

FWC had plans to build two geothermal power plants and had already 

executed agreements to provide power to a Nevada utility company. 

Also under the terms of the sublease, FWC agreed to establish an 

escrow account from which it would pay royalties to defendants. 

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Like the lease with Ms. Towne, the sublease between FWC and 

Fleetwood further provided that Nevada law would govern its terms. 

Shortly after it executed the agreements with Fleetwood and 

Ms. Towne, FWC concluded negotiations with General Electric in 

California regarding financing for the construction of the two 

power plants in Nevada, a $63,000,000 project in which it had 

already invested $1,500,000. General Electric asked FWC to secure 

a consent to the assignments of mineral rights from Ms. Towne and 

Fleetwood as a condition for financing. According to FWC's 

complaint, Ms. Towne agreed to the request, but asked for $50,000 

as additional consideration. FWC agreed to make the payment under 

protest, arguing that Ms. Towne was bound by contract to consent. 

Later, General Electric asked FWC to incorporate a resource trust 

into the financing. Ms. Towne and Fleetwood refused to cooperate 

in establishing the resource trust unless FWC placed $500,000 in 

the trust for land reclamation, agreed that one-half of that 

amount would be paid to defendants whether the land required 

reclamation or not, and agreed that defendants would be entitled 

to one-half of the depletion allowance associated with the 

development of the land. In addition, in a letter to FWC's 

offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, Fleetwood threatened to declare 

FWC in default under the sublease unless FWC paid it royalties· 

during the "start-up period" when FWC tested the generating 

equipment. 

FWC brought this diversity action in the United States 

District Court for the District of Utah alleging breach of 

contract and several business torts, including counts for 

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intentional interference with contractual relationships, economic 

duress, and bad faith breach of contract. Defendants filed a 

motion to dismiss, citing a lack of personal jurisdiction. The 

district court granted the defendant's motion, holding that FWC 

could not claim personal jurisdiction under either the Utah longarm statute or constitutional minimum contacts jurisprudence. 

FWC argues that the district court erred by not finding a 

prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in light of Ms. 

Towne's invitation to discuss an alternate business arrangement 

with FWC, the location of the escrow account in Utah, the 

defendants' retention of an "agent" in Utah, the flow of mail and 

telecommunications between defendants and Utah, and the 

defendants' alleged commission of intentional business torts 

against FWC in Utah. 

DISCUSSION 

To obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 

in a diversity action, a plaintiff must show that jurisdiction is 

legitimate under the laws of the forum state and that the exercise 

of jurisdiction does not offend the due process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See Rambo v. American So. Ins. Co., 839 

F.2d 1415, 1416 (lOth Cir. 1988). In Utah, jurisdiction is 

appropriate only if plaintiff establishes that: (1) the defendant 

conducted certain enumerated activities in Utah, and (2) there is 

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a nexus between plaintiff's claim and defendant's conduct. See 

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24.3 

The general constitutional test for personal jurisdiction is 

well-established. A federal court sitting in diversity "may 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only 

so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant 

and the forum State." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 

U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); First City Bank. N.A. v. 

Air Capitol Aircraft Sales. Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1130 (lOth Cir. 

1987). The defendant's contacts with the forum state must also be 

such that maintenance of the suit "does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice." International 

Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. A defendant's contacts are sufficient if 

the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla, 

357 u.s. 235, 253 (1958). 

The Supreme Court applied this constitutional standard to a 

contract case in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

478-79 (1985). The court "rejected ... 'mechanical' tests" and 

adopted a "realistic approach," which analyzed the entire 

relationship of the parties. Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 

U.S. at 319). "It is ... prior negotiations and contemplated 

3 The Utah long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction over an out 

of state resident based upon a "claim arising from" seven 

"enumerated acts," including: "(1) the transaction of any business 

within the state ... (3) the causing of any injury within the 

state whether tortious or by breach of warranty." Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78-27-24. 

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future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the 

parties' actual course of dealing--that must be evaluated in 

determining whether the defendant purposefully established minimum 

contacts within the forum." Id.; see also Rainbow Travel Serv. 

Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233, 1237 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(applying Burger King) . 

This circuit has also discussed the process for determining 

whether there are sufficient contacts to establish personal 

jurisdiction. "'The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Prior to trial, 

however, when a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is 

decided on the basis of affidavits and other written materials, 

the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing.'" Rambo, 839 

F.2d at 1417 (quoting Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the 

United States, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 

471 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citations omitted in original). We resolve 

all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff in determining 

whether plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that establishes 

jurisdiction. Id. 

In this case, the district court held that FWC met the first 

element of the Utah statute by alleging that Ms. Towne had 

committed torts against it and showing that defendants were 

conducting business in Utah. However, the district court held 

that FWC did not meet the nexus requirement because defendants' 

allegedly tortious conduct did not arise from their Utah conduct. 

Far West Capital. Inc. v. Towne, 828 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D. Utah 

1993). The district court also found that the exercise of 

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personal jurisdiction would violate constitutional due process 

requirements. Id. at 913-15. 

On appeal, FWC argues that the district court erred in 

applying both the Utah long-arm statute and the federal 

constitutional requirements. Because Utah law regarding the longarm statute is limited and because the district court based its 

conclusions regarding the Utah long-arm statute on factors that 

inform our constitutional analysis, we proceed to the 

constitutional analysis, reviewing the district court's ruling on 

a jurisdictional question de novo. Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1417. We 

first consider the specific factors that FWC claims create 

personal jurisdiction over defendants. After analyzing each 

factor individually and determining that none, by themselves, is 

sufficient to convey personal jurisdiction, we conclude that even 

aggregating all the alleged factors does not establish personal 

jurisdiction over defendants in Utah. 

Escrow Account 

FWC first argues that its placement of the escrow account in 

Utah is sufficient to provide minimum contacts. Because 

defendants could claim rights to funds in the Utah account and 

because they received royalties from this account, FWC argues, 

defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of 

Utah law. 

However, we do not find FWC's argument persuasive because FWC 

unilaterally chose the location of the escrow account. 

Unilateral activity of those claiming a relationship 

with a nonresident defendant is not sufficient and "it 

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is essential in each case that there be some act by 

which the defendant purposely [Sic] avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum 

State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the 

laws." 

Institutional Food Mktg. Assocs .. Ltd. v. Golden State 

Strawberries. Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 455-56 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting 

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de 

Colombia. S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1983) (holding that 

a court should not consider where check from bank was drawn 

because choosing a bank is a unilateral activity and cashing check 

is not purposeful availment) . 

FWC argues that the location of the escrow account was the 

subject of negotiations and that defendants could have negotiated 

to place the escrow account in Nevada. However, at the time of 

the negotiations, there is no evidence that defendants even knew 

the account would be located in Utah. There is thus no evidence 

that defendants purposefully availed themselves of Utah law by 

drawing royalties from the account. Because defendants did not 

purposefully avail themselves of Utah law when FWC unilaterally 

selected the location of the escrow account, we hold that FWC's 

choice of a Utah institution to administer the escrow account is 

irrelevant to the defendants' jurisdictional contacts with Utah. 

Solicitation 

FWC next argues that Ms. Towne's offer to explore other 

relationships with FWC during the first phase of negotiations is 

itself sufficient to establish minimum contacts. The solicitation 

is some evidence suggesting purposeful availment on behalf of Mrs. 

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Towne. See. e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (emphasizing that 

parties who reach into another state to create continuing 

contractual relationships are subject to· personal jurisdiction). 

However, this solicitation was so remote that it is of little 

value to FWC in its quest for personal jurisdiction. The 

solicitation took place during the first phase of negotiations, 

while the parties made their agreement during the third phase of 

negotiations--a phase substantively different and three years 

later than the first phase of negotiations.4 

Utah Agent 

FWC next argues that defendants are subject to personal 

jurisdiction in Utah because they hired an "agent" in Utah to 

assist in negotiations and pickup drafts of proposed leases. By 

hiring Mr. Wright, FWC argues, defendants availed themselves of 

the privilege of conducting business in Utah and are therefore 

subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah. 

We disagree. Nothing in the record suggests that defendants 

hired Mr. Wright because of his Utah residence or that Mr. 

Wright's Utah residence played any part in his role as a 

consultant. To hold that the defendants' retention of Mr. Wright 

as a consultant established minimum contacts between defendants 

4 We emphasize that FWC has not alleged that Fleetwood has failed 

to observe corporate formalities and the legal separation between 

entities and is thus an alter ego for Ms. Towne. See William M. 

Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 

41.10 at 614 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990). As such, all availment 

based upon the remote solicitation applies to Ms. Towne alone and 

not Fleetwood. See Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1417-18 n.3. (holding that 

contacts of multiple parties cannot be aggregated to reach the 

personal jurisdiction standard) . 

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and Utah would suggest that retaining legal counsel or contracting 

with an accounting firm simply to consult regarding a part of a 

transaction would necessarily establish minimum contacts with the 

consultant's home forum. Such results are inconsistent with our 

personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and we find the defendants' 

retention of Mr. Wright as a consultant irrelevant to our 

jurisdictional discussion. 

Although Mr. Wright also acted as an agent for defendants in 

picking up the documents, the degree of contacts attributable to 

this activity is severely limited by Mr. Wright's rather 

mechanical role as a messenger. See. e.g., Romero v. Argentinas, 

834 F. Supp. 673, 682 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that the presence of 

a travel agent in the forum is not sufficient to establish 

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation). We 

therefore hold that although Mr. Wright's role as an agent for 

defendants in collecting drafts of proposed agreements from FWC 

created slight contacts with Utah, the contacts are insufficient 

to establish personal jurisdiction in this case. 

Telecommunications and Correspondence 

FWC next cites Ealing Corp. v. Harrods Ltd., 790 F.2d 978 

(1st Cir. 1986), for the proposition that the defendants' phone 

calls, and ten-to-twenty faxes and letters are sufficient to 

establish minimum contacts. In Ealing, a Massachusetts corporate 

plaintiff brought suit in Massachusetts against the British 

department store, Harrods, for fraudulent misrepresentation. 

Ealing and Harrods had joined in a venture to sell goods from 

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Harrods in the United States through a direct mail catalog 

program. Although Ealing initially approached Harrods, and all of 

the face to face negotiations took place in London, England, the 

Ealing court held that the "almost daily" flow of communications 

between the parties for most of one year was sufficient to 

establish personal jurisdiction. Id. at 981. 

We find Ealing inapposite. It is well-established that phone 

calls and letters are not necessarily sufficient in themselves to 

establish minimum contacts. Continental American Corp. v. Camera 

Controls Co:r:p., 692 F.2d 1309, 1314 (lOth Cir. 1982) ("It is 

fundamental that the mere quantum of contacts between the forum 

and the defendant is not determinative"); Nicholas v. Buchanan, 

806 F.2d 305, 307-08 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 

481 U.S. 1071 (1987) (collecting cases). In this case, moreover, 

defendants' contacts with Utah were far fewer and less important 

than the contacts in Ealing. In Ealing, there were almost daily 

telephone and fax communications involved in administering an 

ongoing venture rather than the ten-to-twenty scattered contacts 

alleged in negotiating a contract in this case. In addition, 

Harrods mailed 250,000 catalogs to the United States and 

established a toll-free number for Massachusetts customers--

indications that Harrods took advantage of the market and laws of 

that jurisdiction. In this case, on the other hand, the 

transaction was governed by Nevada law and was designed to build a 

power plant in Nevada to provide power from Nevada geothermal 

resources to a Nevada utility. The communications between Nevada 

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and Utah in this case are thus insufficient to establish minimum 

contacts. 

Intentional Torts 

Perhaps FWC's strongest argument is that defendants 

intentionally committed tortsS against FWC in Utah and that 

defendants are therefore subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah 

under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1983). We therefore examine 

Calder and its progeny. 

In Calder, a California resident brought suit in California 

against a Florida-based corporation for libel, invasion of 

privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional harm. Id. at 

785. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's 

contacts with California were sufficient to establish minimum 

contacts. Id. at 790. The Calder Court reasoned that the 

allegedly libelous publication reported activities in California, 

that most of the harm or "effects" to the plaintiff's reputation 

and career occurred in California and that the defendant's 

5 FWC's claim is a novel one. It cites no clear authority for 

establishing personal jurisdiction based upon an intentional tort 

theory when the focus of the relationship is a contract not 

centered in the forum state. In addition, FWC has not defined its 

tort theories or marshalled more than limited facts explaining the 

connection of the alleged torts to Utah. At oral argument, FWC 

stated that it hoped to develop its theories through discovery. 

However, FWC's lack of specificity diminishes its argument 

for personal jurisdiction. A better course of action may have 

been to request limited discovery from the district court in 

connection with the defendants' motion to dismiss. See, ~, 

Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982) ("when a 

defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, courts generally 

permit depositions confined to the issues raised in the motion to 

dismiss.") (Wisdom, J.). 

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intentional tortious actions were aimed at California. Id. at 787 

n.6, 788-89. 

In Burt v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 242, 244-45 (lOth Cir. 

1985), we applied Calder to a libel claim. We held that a Nebraska 

physician who had supervised the plaintiff in a Nebraska residency 

program had the requisite minimum contacts with Colorado when he 

mailed an allegedly defamatory letter to Colorado, where the 

plaintiff intended to establish a medical practice. We reasoned 

that "no due process notions of fairness are violated by requiring 

one who intentionally libels another to answer for the truth of 

his statements in any state where the libel causes harm to the 

victim." Id. at 245. 

Courts have also applied Calder to business torts. However, 

these courts have reached different conclusions. Some courts have 

found allegations that out-of-state defendants have injured 

residents of the forum state sufficient to establish in personam 

jurisdiction.6 However, those courts finding personal 

6 Defendants cite a competing line of cases that conceptualizes 

business torts in an entirely different manner. These cases focus 

upon the location of the breach, rather than the location of the 

alleged tort victim, and hold that a business tort creates damages 

where it is committed. The leading case is American Eutectic 

Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428 (2nd 

Cir. 1971), decided prior to Calder. In American Eutectic, the 

Second Circuit held that a corporation's domicile should not be 

determinative in creating personal jurisdiction: 

Conceptually, it is difficult for this Court to hold 

that a personal or property injury in another state by 

virtue of a tortious act committed in that state can be 

said to have suffered some injury within the state of 

New York simply because he is domiciled here. . . . To 

hold otherwise would open a veritable Pandora's Box of 

litigation subjecting every conceivable prospective 

defendant involved in an accident with a New York 

domiciliary to defend actions brought against them in 

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jurisdiction based upon an intentional tort analysis have not 

created a per se rule that an allegation of an intentional tort 

creates personal jurisdiction. Instead, they have emphasized that 

the defendant had additional contacts with the forum. 

For example, in Coblentz GMC/Freightliner, Inc. v. General 

Motors CokP., 724 F. Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1989), an Alabama 

corporation brought suit against the Swedish Volvo Corporation for 

intentional torts involving the termination of an Alabama Volvo 

automobile dealership. The district court noted that Volvo had 

established a "litigation fund" to finance litigation resulting 

from dealership terminations and held that the Swedish corporation 

could foresee the possibility of being haled into court in the 

victim's home forum: 

[W]hen a defendant intentionally takes some action with 

the knowledge that the result will be harm to a specific 

victim in another state, the picture involves more than 

mere foreseeability or the likelihood that fortuitous 

and undirected conduct will have an effect in that 

state. When the conduct is intentional and is directed 

at a victim in another state, the defendant may be held 

to have expected its conduct to have an effect in that 

state, and further to have expected that the victim will 

bring suit for redress there. 

the State of New York. 

Id. at 434 (quoting Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc., 285 N.Y.S.2d 

226, 229 (1967). Although the district court adopted this line of 

cases in its opinion by citing STV Int'l Mktg. v. Cannondale 

Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Utah 1990), Far West Capital, 

Inc. v. Towne, 828 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 (D. Utah 1993), we do not 

attempt to reconcile or choose between these two lines of cases 

because it is clear that the contacts do not rise to the 

constitutional minimum for jurisdiction under either line of 

cases. We also note that although the district court's analysis 

relates to both the Utah long-arm statute and federal 

constitutional analysis, this line of cases proceeds from state 

jurisdictional statutes and is therefore arguably distinguishable 

from federal constitutional analysis in spite of the conceptual 

similarity. 

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Id. at 1368. The Coblentz court further reasoned that it was fair 

to allow a plaintiff to bring suit in its horne forum based on 

fairness concerns: 

In the typical intentional tort case, it is both fair 

and just to allow the victim of an alleged tort to call 

the tortfeasor to account in the victim's horne forum. A 

contrary result would force injured parties to go to the 

alleged tortfeasor for redress even though, taking the 

victim's position as justified at the institution of 

suit, the tortfeasor has knowingly brought about the 

situation through its actions. 

Id. at 1371. 

The court in Borschow Hasp. & Medical Supplies, Inc. v. 

Burdick-Siemens Corp., 143 F.R.D. 472, 485 (D. Puerto Rico 1992), 

reached a similar conclusion. The Borschow court found personal 

jurisdiction in a case involving a claim for interference with a 

contract for the distribution of medical equipment in Puerto Rico 

and the Virgin Islands. The court held: "[W]hen a non-resident 

foreign defendant sends a series of letters which evince an intent 

to tortiously interfere with contractual obligations and travels 

to the forum in order to settle claims arising from such 

cancellation, defendant has purposely availed himself of the forum 

and should foresee being subject to jurisdiction." Id. at 485. 

In contrast to Coblentz and Borschow, several circuits have 

found allegations of an out-of-state defendant's tortious 

interference with the contractual rights of a forum resident 

insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. In Reynolds v. 

International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994), American and international 

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amateur athletic organizations banned world-class sprinter Butch 

Reynolds from competing in international track meets for two years 

because he had tested positive for steroid use at a track meet in 

Monaco. Reynolds brought claims in Ohio against the athletic 

organizations for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional 

interference with business relations. The Sixth Circuit held that 

the Ohio district court did not have jurisdiction over the 

international organization. Id. at 1118-20. 

As to the contractual claims, the court noted that there was 

"no real evidence that a contract was negotiated in Ohio, created 

in Ohio, performed in Ohio, or breached in Ohio." Id. at 1118. 

The court found the fact that Mr. Reynolds resided in Ohio 

insufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts with the 

foreign defendant. Relying upon Helicopteros Nacionales, the 

court reasoned that absent other availing factors, the choice of a 

residence is a unilateral one that will not allow a plaintiff to 

establish jurisdiction over a non-forum defendant. Id. at 1118-

19. Even when combined with phone calls and correspondence to Mr. 

Reynolds in Ohio, the court found that the defendant organization 

did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits of Ohio law. 

Id. 

Significantly, the Reynolds court found Calder 

distinguishable even with regard to the defamation claim. It 

noted that, in contrast to the defamatory publication in Calder, 

the alleged defamatory press release concerning the positive drug 

test involved the plaintiff's activities in Monaco, not Ohio. The 

court also observed that the defendant did not publish or 

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circulate the press release in Ohio itself. Finally, the court 

noted that Reynolds was "an international athlete whose 

professional reputation is not centered in Ohio." Id. at 1120. 

The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Southmark 

CokP. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir. 

1988). The Southmark court found that a United States district 

court in Texas lacked jurisdiction over a Virginia corporation 

that allegedly interfered with the contractual rights of the 

plaintiff, a company with its principal place of business in 

Texas. In rejecting the argument that the district court could 

exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Virginia defendant 

because the plaintiff suffered injuries in Texas, the court 

observed that the agreement with which the defendant allegedly 

interfered "was apparently negotiated and made in Atlanta and/or 

New York, and there is no evidence that the agreement was made or 

to be performed in Texas or governed by Texas law." Id. at 772. 

Like Reynolds, the Fifth Circuit characterized the plaintiff's 

principle place of business as a "mere fortuity." Id. at 773. 

Similarly, in Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394-95 (7th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986), the Seventh 

Circuit held that the mere allegation of an intentional tort does 

not create jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home forum under 

Calder. The court held that an intentional tort suggests 

purposeful availment, but is only one factor in creating minimum 

contacts. Id. 

Our review of these post-Calder decisions indicates that the 

mere allegation that an out-of-state defendant has tortiously 

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interfered with contractual rights or has committed other business 

torts that have allegedly injured a forum resident does not 

necessarily establish that the defendant possesses the 

constitutionally required minimum contacts. Instead, in order to 

resolve the jurisdictional question, a court must undertake a 

particularized inquiry as to the extent to which the defendant has 

purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum's laws. 

The Supreme Court's observations in Burger King, although 

specifically addressed to a breach of contract claim, provide a 

useful framework. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79. We 

therefore examine "prior negotiations and contemplated future 

consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the 

parties' actual course of dealing." Id. at 479. In addition, we 

examine the contacts created by the out-of-state defendant in 

committing the alleged tort. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1118-19; 

Southmark, 851 F.2d at 772-73; Borschow, 143 F.R.D. at 484-85; 

Coblentz, 724 F. Supp. at 1370-71. 

In this case, the negotiations between FWC and the 

defendants, the terms of the agreements, the future consequences 

of the agreements, and the parties' course of dealing all fail to 

establish the necessary minimum contacts with Utah. As we have 

noted, the most important negotiations took place in Nevada, and 

the enterprise was designed to use Nevada resources to supply 

power to a Nevada utility. Moreover, the lease and sublease 

expressly provided that their interpretation was governed by 

Nevada law.7 Unlike Calder, where the defendants actions "were 

7 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the choice of law 

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expressly aimed at" the forum jurisdiction and the forum 

jurisdiction was "the focal point" of the tort and its harm, the 

focal point of this relationship was Nevada rather than Utah. 

Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. In short, there is no indication that 

Utah had anything but a fortuitous role in the parties' past 

dealing or would have any role in their continuing relationship. 

In addition, defendants' alleged interference with FWC's 

contractual rights does not establish the necessary minimum 

contacts. According to FWC's complaint, the defendants wrongful 

acts consist of Ms. Towne's request for additional consideration 

to sign a consent to assignment submitted to her by FWC, Ms. 

Towne's and Fleetwood's refusal to cooperate with FWC in 

establishing a resource trust unless they received additional 

benefits, and Fleetwood's sending a letter to FWC threatening to 

declare the sublease in default unless FWC paid certain royalties. 

These allegedly tortious acts all involve disputes about rights 

under a series of Nevada-centered agreements. There is thus no 

evidence that defendants' alleged torts had any connection to Utah 

beyond plaintiff's corporate domicile. Although FWC argues that 

it suffered the financial effects of these alleged torts in Utah 

where it is incorporated, we hold that under Calder and its 

progeny, the defendants' contacts with Utah are insufficient to 

establish personal jurisdiction in this case.8 

provision implicating the law of the forum was relevant in 

assessing minimal contacts. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481-82. 

Although the choice of law provision in this case implicates the 

law of another jurisdiction, we believe that it is still relevant 

in assessing the parties' relationship and expectations. 

8 FWC submitted an affidavit with its opening appellate brief 

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CONCLUSION 

We hold that the contacts surrounding the alleged torts, 

solicitation, telecommunications from defendants to Utah, and Mr. 

Wright's forwarding of drafts of the lease agreement are so 

minimal that they do not establish minimum contacts and are 

therefore an insufficient basis for FWC to obtain personal 

jurisdiction in Utah over Fleetwood or Ms. Towne. 

Because FWC's claim does not meet constitutional due process 

requirements, we do not discuss the Utah statute. For the reasons 

stated above, the district court's decision is AFFIRMED. 

stating that Ms. Towne initiated the original contact prior to the 

1988 negotiations. Because that statement of a contact so remote 

would not affect our holding, we decline to decide whether FWC can 

legitimately supplement the record on appeal. 

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