Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02024/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02024-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RATASHA D. KING-BAILEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-2024-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born August 20, 1980, applied on February 18, 2013 for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability beginning February 16, 2009. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 43, 94-95, 122-23, 

195-202. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to work due to bipolar disorder, a back injury, arthritis, 

depression, nerve disease, degenerative disc disease, and a cervical disc problem. AT 215. In a 

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decision dated April 27, 2015, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 9-25. The 

ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2014.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

February 16, 2009, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: back 

disorder, obesity, and major depression.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A 

parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920, 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 

140-142 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) except such an individual could occasionally climb, 

stoop, and crouch. Such an individual should avoid working at 

heights or dangerous machinery. Such an individual could 

understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions. Such 

an individual could maintain concentration, persistence and pace for 

simple job tasks. Such an individual could interact occasionally 

with the public, and such an individual could interact appropriately 

with supervisors and co-workers.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7. The claimant was born on August 20, 1980 and was 28 years 

old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the 

alleged disability onset date.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination 

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferrable job skills.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from February 16, 2009, through the date of 

this decision.

AT 11-24. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly assessed the impact of plaintiff’s obesity at step three of the sequential 

analysis; (2) improperly found plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of her limitations and 

pain less than fully credible; (3) improperly discounted the third party statement of plaintiff’s 

friend; (4) improperly considered and weighed the opinions in the record when determining 

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) improperly found that plaintiff could 

perform other jobs in the national economy that require the ability to perform “light work” after 

determining plaintiff could not perform her prior work that required only the ability to perform 

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“sedentary work.”

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ did not Erroneously Assess Plaintiff’s Obesity at Step Three

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the impact of plaintiff’s obesity at 

step three of the sequential analysis because she did not find that plaintiff’s physical impairments 

met or equaled listing-level severity when considered in conjunction with plaintiff’s obesity.

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The claimant “bears the burden of proving that . . . she has an impairment that meets or 

equals the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Commissioner’s regulations.” 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). “For a claimant to show that his 

impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment 

that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify . . . For a 

claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that his unlisted impairment, or combination of 

impairments, is ‘equivalent’ to a listed impairment, he must present medical findings equal in 

severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 

U.S. 521, 530-31 (1990). A determination of medical equivalence must rest on objective medical 

evidence. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A finding of equivalence must 

be based on medical evidence only.”); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Medical equivalence must be based on medical findings . . . A generalized assertion of 

functional problems is not enough to establish disability at step three.”); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(d)(3) (“In considering whether your symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings are 

medically equal to the symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings of a listed impairment, we will 

look to see whether your symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings are at least equal in severity to 

the listed criteria. However, we will not substitute your allegations of pain or other symptoms for 

a missing or deficient sign or laboratory finding to raise the severity of your impairment(s) to that 

of a listed impairment.”). Furthermore, “[t]he mere diagnosis of an impairment listed in 

Appendix 1 is not sufficient to sustain a finding of disability.” Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 

1549 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, all of the specified medical criteria must be met or equaled. Id. at 

1550.

Here, the ALJ “specifically considered whether [plaintiff’s] obesity might by itself be 

equivalent in severity to a listed condition” and “whether it could elevate [plaintiff’s] other 

impairments to listing-level significance.” AT 13. In determining that plaintiff’s obesity did not 

limit plaintiff to the degree of listing-level severity either by itself or in conjunction with 

plaintiff’s other impairments, the ALJ noted that plaintiff “ha[d] not come forward with any 

specific evidence on this point or advanced a credible theory as to why the undersigned should 

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find that obesity is or contributes to a listing-level impairment.” Id. Even now, on appeal of the 

ALJ’s decision, plaintiff fails to identify what specific listing or listings her impairments meet or 

equal, let alone identify any evidence in the record that would reasonably suggest that any of her 

impairments, individually or in combination, were sufficiently severe to meet the requirements of 

any listing. While plaintiff argues in her motion that the evidence shows that she grew 

progressively more obese over the course of the relevant period and that she suffered certain 

symptoms commonly associated with obesity, she in no way demonstrates how those symptoms 

caused her to suffer listing-level limitations, or interacted with her other impairments to cause 

such limitations. Because plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing that her impairments 

were of listing-level severity, the court finds the ALJ did not err in determining that plaintiff’s 

obesity did not reach listing-level severity, either by itself or in conjunction with plaintiff’s other 

impairments.

B. The ALJ Properly Found Plaintiff’s Pain and Symptom Testimony to be Less than 

Fully Credible

Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding plaintiff’s pain and symptom 

testimony less than fully credible.

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

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testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7p; SSR 95-5p; SSR 88-13. Work records, 

physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and effect of symptoms, and 

inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. Light v. Social Security 

Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek treatment for an allegedly 

debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ in determining whether the 

alleged associated pain is not a significant non-exertional impairment. See Flaten v. Secretary of 

HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, on his or her own 

observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989), which cannot 

substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s 

reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” Morgan v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of the symptoms and 

limitations arising from her physical and mental impairments for the following reasons: (1) her 

reported daily living activities are inconsistent with her claims that she is not able to prepare her 

own meals, only able to lift 5 to 10 pounds, is not able to finish what she starts, and her more 

general claim of having disabling symptoms and limitations; (2) she received relatively 

conservative treatment that was successful in controlling her symptoms; (3) she did not take any 

psychotropic medication for her mental impairments for a significant period of time after her 

alleged onset date; (4) she allowed her pain medication to run out and would try to obtain refills 

during visits to the emergency room; and (5) her demeanor while testifying at the hearing was 

generally unpersuasive. AT 21-23. As discussed below, these reasons were clear and convincing 

reasons in support of the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination that were supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.

First, the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s allegations that she is not able to prepare her own 

meals, only able to lift 5 to 10 pounds, is not able to finish what she starts, and suffers from

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disabling symptoms and limitations because they were at odds with plaintiff’s reported activities 

of daily living. “While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for 

benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in 

everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting . . . Even where 

those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the 

claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ properly considered claimant’s ability 

to care for her own needs, cook, clean, shop, interact with her nephew and boyfriend, and manage 

her finances and those of her nephew in the credibility analysis); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix 

meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific 

finding sufficient to discredit the claimant’s credibility). 

Here, the record shows that plaintiff lives with and cares for four of her five children, 

whose ages ranged from 2 to 17, and spends her days watching her 2-year-old and 4-year-old. 

AT 49-50. Plaintiff also reported that she is able to regularly perform household chores such as 

dusting, wiping tables and counters, doing laundry, and preparing simple meals. AT 227, 256-57, 

550. The record indicates further that plaintiff goes out to shop for groceries and clothes, 

regularly attends a Bible study class at her church or hosts it at her house, and visits parks and her 

mother’s house. AT 50, 52, 55, 228, 550. The record also shows that plaintiff engages in hobbies 

such as decorating, scrapbooking, and reading the Bible. AT 557. The ALJ reasonably cited to 

this evidence of plaintiff’s daily living activities to provide substantial support for her finding that 

the particular aspects of plaintiff’s testimony listed above were less than fully credible. AT 21.

To be sure, the record also contains some contrary evidence, such as plaintiff’s and her 

friend’s statements that plaintiff receives assistance from others in caring for her children and 

performing certain household chores, suggesting that plaintiff’s activities are more limited than 

they would initially appear. AT 49-50, 52, 57, 62-63, 255-57, 264-65. However, it is the 

function of the ALJ to resolve any ambiguities, and the court finds the ALJ’s assessment to be 

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reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 

(9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s credibility determination even where the claimant’s testimony 

was somewhat equivocal about how regularly she was able to keep up with all of the activities 

and noting that the ALJ’s interpretation “may not be the only reasonable one”).

Second, the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony because the record shows that plaintiff 

received only conservative treatment during the relevant period and that plaintiff’s medical 

condition improved with that treatment. Plaintiff’s relatively conservative treatment was a proper 

consideration. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039-40 (reasoning that a favorable response to 

conservative treatment undermines complaints of disabling symptoms); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 

742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence of conservative treatment 

is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.”); Fair v. 

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). It was also proper for the ALJ to consider plaintiff’s 

positive reaction to the treatment she received. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 

2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to 

discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment”); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that a condition that can be controlled 

or corrected by medication is not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits 

under the Act); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989); Montijo v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 729 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1984); Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 

1983).

More importantly, the record provides substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s 

reasoning regarding the conservative nature and effectiveness of the treatment plaintiff received. 

For instance, plaintiff’s treatment for her complaints of back and neck pain consisted largely of 

prescribed medicines, which generally helped with her symptoms when she was using them, and 

stretching exercises. E.g., AT 577, 579, 581, 583, 585-89, 591, 593, 596-99. The ALJ properly 

noted this evidence in support of her reasoning. AT 21.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly take into account the side effects that her 

medications caused her to suffer in reasoning that those medications were effective. While there 

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is some evidence of plaintiff suffering certain side effects from her medication, AT 52-54, the 

record also contains ample evidence of plaintiff stating to her physicians that her medications 

were generally effective in treating her pain and symptoms, e.g., AT 571, 573, 587. The ALJ’s 

use of this evidence to support her conclusion that plaintiff’s pain and symptom testimony was 

less than fully credible was reasonable, even in light of the evidence that plaintiff’s medications 

caused some side effects. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (“The court will uphold the ALJ’s 

conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.”).

Third, the ALJ noted plaintiff’s unexplained failure to obtain treatment for her alleged 

mental impairments for a significant period after her alleged disability onset date. Indeed, the 

first record regarding plaintiff having received mental health treatment shows that plaintiff had 

first been prescribed with an antidepressant medication by her OB/GYN physician in the fall of 

2012, over three years after her alleged onset date of February 16, 2009. AT 455. Moreover, that 

record noted that plaintiff had stopped taking that medication and had not had any prior treatment 

by a mental health professional. Id. The ALJ properly relied on plaintiff’s unexplained lack of 

mental health treatment and failure to take her prescribed antidepressant for a substantial portion 

of the relevant period in support of her adverse credibility determination. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d 

at 1039 (“The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including . . . 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course 

of treatment . . . .”).

Fourth, the ALJ determined that the evidence in the record showing that plaintiff ran out 

of her prescribed medications on several occasions and attempted to obtain refills during visits to 

the emergency room also undermined plaintiff’s credibility. Indeed, the record shows that 

plaintiff ran out of medications on several occasions throughout the course of the relevant period 

and tried to obtain refills on at least two occasions during visits to the emergency room. AT 396, 

401, 471, 473, 503. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasoning that these occurrences undermined 

her testimony is not substantially supported by the record because it shows that plaintiff far more 

consistently obtained refills for her medications through appointments with her treating 

physicians. In any event, even if this were not a legitimate reason to discount plaintiff’s 

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testimony, the error is harmless because the ALJ provided several other valid reasons for only 

partially crediting plaintiff’s testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (harmless error when ALJ 

provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s testimony, but also provided 

valid reasons that were supported by the record).

Finally, the ALJ cited to her own personal observations regarding plaintiff’s demeanor 

during the administrative hearing in support of her adverse credibility determination. Although 

the ALJ’s observations of the claimant at the hearing may not form the sole basis for discrediting 

the claimant’s testimony, such observations may be used in the overall credibility evaluation. 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 

1985); SSR 96-7p, at *8. Because the ALJ also provided other clear and convincing reasons in 

support of her adverse credibility determination, she did not err in providing her own observations 

as an additional rationale.

In short, the ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

plaintiff’s testimony that were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the 

ALJ’s adverse credibility determination was not erroneous.

C. The ALJ Properly Discounted the Third Party Statement of Plaintiff’s Friend

Third, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the lay witness testimony of 

plaintiff’s friend without providing germane reasons for doing so that were specific to that 

witness. “[L]ay witness testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects 

ability to work is competent evidence, and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” 

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 

918-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (friends and family members in a position to observe a plaintiff’s 

symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify to condition). “If the ALJ wishes to 

discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. Nevertheless, the ALJ is not required “to discuss every 

witness’s testimony on a[n] individualized, witness-by-witness basis.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. 

Indeed, while the applicable regulations require “the ALJ to consider testimony from family and 

friends submitted on behalf of the claimant,” they “do not require the ALJ to provide express 

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reasons for rejecting testimony from each lay witness.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 

404.1545(a)(3)). “Rather, if the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one 

witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different 

witness.” Molina, 674 at 1114.

When the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for discounting a claimant’s 

testimony and the third-party lay witness’s testimony is similar to the claimant’s testimony, the 

ALJ’s reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony may also constitute germane reasons for 

rejecting the third-party lay witness’s testimony. Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Molina, 674 at 1114. Furthermore, even when the ALJ 

errs by failing to explain his or her reasons for disregarding a layperson’s testimony, such error is 

harmless if that layperson’s testimony largely reflects the limitations described by the claimant 

and the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony, 

because the layperson’s testimony in such a circumstance is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination in the context of the record as a whole.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 

(quotation marks omitted).

Here, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to the third party statement provided by plaintiff’s 

friend and in-home support worker, Rhonda McDonald, because it was inconsistent with 

plaintiff’s reported daily living activities, the objective medical findings in the record, and the 

medical opinions in the record. AT 22. These constituted germane reasons for discounting 

McDonald’s statement that were specific to that witness.

First, the ALJ determined that McDonald’s allegation that plaintiff spent most of her time 

in bed everyday was contradicted by plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living. As discussed 

above, the ALJ also provided this reason for discounting plaintiff’s allegations of debilitating pain 

and symptoms, and the court has determined that this was a clear and convincing reason for 

discounting plaintiff’s testimony that was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the 

ALJ’s use of this reason to also discount McDonald’s statement was a germane reason supported 

by substantial evidence. Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694.

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The ALJ also provided other germane reasons for discounting McDonald’s third-party 

statement in determining that it conflicted with the objective medical findings and opinion 

evidence in the record. Indeed, as the ALJ noted, while McDonald alleged that plaintiff 

experienced numbness in her hands, plaintiff’s medical records do not substantiate this claim. 

E.g., AT 404. Furthermore, the objective medical findings from plaintiff’s physicians in the 

record generally suggest that plaintiff’s symptoms do not cause plaintiff to suffer the degree of 

limitations McDonald alleged in her statement. E.g., AT 396, 404, 463-64, 490, 505. Similarly, 

the medical opinion evidence the ALJ found to be persuasive indicates that McDonald’s opinion

regarding the extent of plaintiff’s limitations is overly restrictive. AT 76-80, 87-90, 104, 117, 

553.

In addition to the reasons discussed above, the ALJ also determined that McDonald’s 

credibility was undermined by virtue of her relationship with plaintiff as plaintiff’s friend. 

Plaintiff argues that this was an improper reason for discounting her friend’s statement. 

However, even assuming that this reason was, by itself, insufficient to support the ALJ’s 

determination, such an error would have been harmless in light of the other germane reasons the 

ALJ provided. Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (finding that the ALJ erred in discounting the 

claimant’s wife’s testimony because she was an “interested party,” but that such an error was 

harmless in light of the other germane reasons the ALJ provided for discounting the wife’s 

statements).

In sum, the ALJ provided multiple germane reasons for discounting McDonald’s thirdparty statement that were specific to that witness and were supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in her assessment of McDonald’s statement.

D. The ALJ Properly Considered the Medical Opinion Evidence in the Record

Fourth, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion evidence in the 

record. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in her assessment of the opinions issued 

by Dr. Soares, Dr. Canty, and Blanca Vasquez, I.M.F.2

 

2

Plaintiff also appears to argue that the ALJ improperly failed to weigh the medical records of 

Dr. Haddadan. ECF No. 17 at 16. To the extent plaintiff makes such an argument, it is without 

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To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

1. Dr. Soares

Dr. Soares conducted a psychiatric examination of plaintiff on November 19, 2014, which 

consisted of a review of plaintiff’s psychiatric history and a mental status examination. AT 550-

53. During the mental status examination, Dr. Soares noted that plaintiff was oriented, had fair 

insight in judgment, and a linear thought process. AT 550. She also noted that plaintiff’s mood 

was a “little bit” sad and that plaintiff’s affect was “tearful at times.” Id. Overall, Dr. Soares 

assessed plaintiff with a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 50, indicating 

 

merit. A review of the record reveals that plaintiff received treatment from several physicians, 

including Dr. Haddadan, at Kayvan D. Haddadan, Inc., between February 21, 2013 and August 5, 

2014. AT 564-601. The ALJ expressly considered and discussed these records in her decision. 

AT 16-17. A review of these records fails to show that any of the physicians who treated plaintiff 

at that facility, including Dr. Haddadan, provided an opinion regarding the functional limitations 

caused by plaintiff’s impairments. Instead, those records merely discussed plaintiff’s claimed 

symptoms and the course of treatment plaintiff was prescribed during each visit to that facility. 

See AT 564-601. Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to weigh those records as medical 

opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).

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serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. AT 20, 453.

The ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Soares’ GAF score “because it was not 

accompanied by a detailed function-by-function analysis and is inconsistent with [plaintiff’s] 

activities of daily living.” AT 20. The ALJ reasoned further that “Dr. Soares’ assessment was 

based on a one-time evaluation of [plaintiff] and her evaluation was conducted upon a referral 

from [plaintiff’s] representative presumably to establish supporting evidence for [plaintiff’s] 

upcoming hearing.” AT 21. These were specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 

Soares’ opined GAF score.

First, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Soares’ opinion because it provided little in the 

way of a function-by-function analysis of plaintiff’s mental limitations. Even though plaintiff 

makes much of the GAF score Dr. Soares opined, such a score is not dispositive in social security 

cases. Trinchere v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4395283, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). A low GAF score 

does not alone determine disability, but is a piece of evidence to be considered with the rest of the 

record. Olds v. Astrue, 2008 WL 339757, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2008) (citation omitted). An 

ALJ is permitted to discredit a GAF score where it is unsupported by objective evidence. Clark v. 

Astrue, 2009 WL 542166, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009). Here, Dr. Soares provided little in the 

way of objective findings that would support the restrictive GAF score she opined, and the ALJ 

properly considered that lack of objective findings and the lack of a function-by-function 

breakdown of opined mental limitations that support such a restrictive GAF score. See Meanel, 

172 F.3d at 1114 (upholding the ALJ’s rejection of physician’s opinion that was “conclusory and 

unsubstantiated by relevant medical documentation”).

The ALJ also properly noted that plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living conflicted 

with the GAF score Dr. Soares opined. As the ALJ specifically noted in her decision, Dr. Soares

restrictive GAF score was at odds with plaintiff’s own reports that she participates in a weekly 

group Bible study, shops at grocery stores and the mall, lives on her own while caring for 

multiple adolescent children, and regularly communicates with others on the phone and by 

computer. AT 20-21.

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Finally, the ALJ found that Dr. Soares’ opinion was undermined by the fact that it was 

based on a one-time examination of plaintiff that was conducted upon a referral from plaintiff’s 

attorney. The ALJ properly cited to this observation as an additional reason for discounting Dr.

Soares’ opinion. Saelee, 94 F.3d at 523; Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1339 (upholding ALJ’s decision to 

discount a physician’s opinion in part on the basis that that opinion had been solicited by the 

plaintiff’s counsel).

In short, the ALJ provided multiple specific and legitimate reasons for assigning “little 

weight” to the GAF score Dr. Soares assessed to plaintiff. Accordingly, she did not err in her 

consideration of that physician’s opinion.

2. Dr. Canty

Dr. Canty conducted a psychiatric examination of plaintiff on June 10, 2013 for purposes 

of aiding in plaintiff’s Social Security disability evaluation. AT 455-58. Dr. Canty noted that 

there were no psychiatric records for him to review and that plaintiff was not taking any 

psychiatric medications as of that time. AT 455. Dr. Canty also noted that plaintiff’s thought 

content was “[c]lear, logical and goal-directed,” but that “she appeared moderately to 

significantly depressed with a blunted affect.” AT 456. He noted further that plaintiff claimed to 

not know the day of the week or date, but was able to complete immediate and recent memory 

exercises with little difficulty and had a “[g]ood” fund of knowledge. AT 457. Based on his 

examination, Dr. Canty diagnosed plaintiff with major depression and assigned her a GAF score 

of “45/50.” AT 457. With regard to how plaintiff’s mental condition impacted her ability to 

perform work, Dr. Canty opined that “she would not be able to attend work reliably.” AT 458. 

He opined further that “[s]he would not be able to concentrate on work activities” and “would not 

be able to keep up with coworkers or supervisors.” Id.

The ALJ assigned “reduced weight” to Dr. Canty’s opinion. AT 20. More specifically, 

she assigned “some weight to Dr. Canty’s general findings that [plaintiff] does have some mental 

functioning limitations but not to the extent Dr. Canty opine[d].” Id. In reaching this conclusion, 

the ALJ reasoned as follows:

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the undersigned assigns little weight to Dr. Canty’s findings that the 

claimant would not be able to attend work reliably and struggled 

with relatively simple cognitive questions. The undersigned finds 

that Dr. Canty’s opinion is overly restrictive and that his 

observation that the claimant was not fully oriented is inconsistent 

with the record as a whole. Dr. Canty noted that [plaintiff] was 

genuinely surprised when he informed her of the correct day, date 

and month. However, the record as a whole reflects numerous 

medical visits where the claimant was described as fully alert and 

fully oriented. On March 11, 2012, the claimant did not report any 

psychological symptoms. On August 24, 2013, the claimant was 

oriented to person, place, day, date, year and situation. The 

undersigned notes that one of the only instances of the record when 

the claimant was not fully oriented was during her consultative 

examination. The undersigned finds that the claimant is not fully 

credible and that Dr. Canty’s mental functioning limitations are 

overly restrictive given the claimant’s limited mental treatment 

record and the fact that the claimant was not taking any 

psychotropic medications.

AT 20 (references to the record omitted). This rationale provided specific and legitimate reasons 

in support of the ALJ’s decision to assign reduced weight to Dr. Canty’s opinion.

First, the ALJ properly reasoned that Dr. Canty’s opinion was entitled to reduced weight 

because the other medical evidence in the record did not support Dr. Canty’s observation that 

plaintiff was not fully oriented. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (“Generally, the 

more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that 

opinion.”). Indeed, the record is replete with findings from plaintiff’s treating physicians 

describing plaintiff as alert and fully oriented. E.g., AT 320, 322, 338, 344, 352, 359, 505, 527. 

As the ALJ noted, the only instance in the record where plaintiff appeared not fully oriented was 

during her consultative examination with Dr. Canty. AT 20.

The ALJ also noted that plaintiff was not fully credible and that Dr. Canty’s opinion 

appeared to reflect plaintiff’s complaints. “An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it 

is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as 

incredible.” Tommasetti, 533 F .3d at 1041. Here, the ALJ properly found plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints regarding the extent of her pain and symptoms to be less than fully credible, and a 

review of Dr. Canty’s opinion reasonably indicates that it was largely based on plaintiff’s own 

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self-reports regarding the impact of her mental impairments. See AT 455-58. Accordingly, the 

ALJ’s determination was reasonable and properly supported her decision to discount Dr. Canty’s 

opinion.

Finally, the ALJ also noted that the limited mental health treatment plaintiff received and 

the fact that she was not taking any psychotropic medications at the time of Dr. Canty’s 

examination indicated that that physician’s opinion was overly restrictive. A review of the rest of 

the record supports the ALJ’s determination as it indicates that plaintiff’s depression was well 

controlled once she began taking medication and receiving mental health treatment. E.g., AT 

595.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her assessment of Dr. Canty’s opinion because the 

GAF score he assigned to plaintiff was largely consistent with the GAF score assigned by Dr. 

Soares. However, the ALJ properly discounted the GAF score Dr. Soares assigned for the 

reasons discussed above. Moreover, the ALJ provided the above specific and legitimate reasons 

for discounting Dr. Canty’s opinion that were supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Such reasons were sufficient to support the ALJ’s assignment of weight to Dr. Canty’s opinion 

regardless of any similarities between that physician’s opinion and Dr. Soares’ opinion. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s argument is without merit and the ALJ did not err in her assessment of Dr. 

Canty’s opinion.

3. Blanca Velasquez, I.M.F.

On October 6, 2014, Blanca Velasquez, I.M.F., performed a mental evaluation of plaintiff 

and assigned her a GAF score of 56, indicating moderate difficulties in social, occupational, or 

school functioning. AT 553. While the ALJ noted in her decision that Ms. Velasquez was not a 

doctor, she assigned “substantial weight” to her assessment because it was consistent with 

plaintiff’s reported daily activities and also took into account plaintiff’s depression and plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints regarding the impact of that mental impairment to the extent they were 

credible. AT 20. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assignment of substantial weight to Ms. 

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Velasquez’s GAF score was in error because Ms. Velasquez was not a doctor.3 This argument, 

however, is without merit.

While the ALJ could only rely on evidence provided by plaintiff’s physicians to establish 

her medically determinable impairments, she was permitted to consider and weigh the evidence 

from those defined by the applicable regulations as “other sources,” including other medical 

sources such as Ms. Velasquez, in determining the impact those impairments had on plaintiff’s 

work-related functioning. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). Furthermore, the Social 

Security Agency-promulgated SSR 06-03p states that, under certain circumstances, “an opinion 

from a medical source who is not an ‘acceptable medical source’ may outweigh the opinion of an 

‘acceptable medical source,’ including the medical opinion of a treating source.” 2006 WL 

2329939 at *5. Accordingly, the ALJ was permitted to assign greater weight to Ms. Velasquez’s 

opinion over those of plaintiff’s other physicians provided that there existed substantial evidence 

to support her conclusion.

Here, the ALJ determined that Ms. Velasquez’s opinion most accurately reflected a 

balance between plaintiff’s reported daily activities, such as plaintiff’s ability to live on her own 

with four children, complete household chores, and prepare meals for herself, and plaintiff’s own 

testimony regarding the impact of her mental impairments to the extent it was credible. AT 20. 

Such a determination was reasonable in light of the other opinion evidence in the record. Outside 

of Dr. Canty’s properly-discredited opinion, the other two physicians who opined on plaintiff’s 

mental impairments, Dr. Mateus and Dr. Dalton, both found that plaintiff had no severe mental 

impairments. AT 78-80, 89-91, 104-05, 117-18. The ALJ assigned these physicians’ opinions 

“reduced weight” because they had not examined plaintiff nor considered her subjective 

 

3

Plaintiff also argues that Ms. Velasquez actually assigned plaintiff a GAF score of 50 instead of 

56. However, a review of Ms. Velasquez’s opinion shows that the ALJ reasonably determined 

that she had assigned plaintiff a GAF score of 56. At the top of the page of Ms. Velasquez’s 

opinion, a GAF score of 50 is noted; however, Ms. Velasquez noted specifically in her analysis of 

plaintiff’s mental impairments that she assigned plaintiff a GAF score of 56. AT 553. The ALJ 

reasonably concluded that the operative score provided by Ms. Velasquez was 56. See Edlund, 

253 F.3d at 1156 (noting that the ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities in the record); 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.”).

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complaints, and reasonably determined that Ms. Velasquez, who had examined plaintiff and heard

and considered her subjective complaints, provided a more persuasive opinion. AT 19-20. In 

short, substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s reasoning for weighing Ms. 

Velasquez’s opinion as she did.

E. The ALJ Made a Proper Determination that Plaintiff Could Perform Other Work at 

Step Five

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her step five determination that plaintiff 

could perform other work available in the national economy. Specifically, plaintiff contends that 

the ALJ improperly found that plaintiff could still perform the occupations of mail clerk, 

cleaning/housekeeping, and car wash attendant, all of which the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 

(“DOT”) defines as requiring the exertional capacity to perform “light work,” despite previously 

finding at step four that plaintiff could not perform her past work in customer service, which the 

DOT defines as requiring the exertional capacity to perform “sedentary work.” Plaintiff asserts 

that the ALJ’s step four and step five determinations are inherently contradictory because, on the 

one hand, she determined at step four that plaintiff’s RFC prevented her from performing her 

prior work that required only a sedentary capacity, while, on the other, she found at step five that 

plaintiff was still capable of performing other occupations that all required the capacity to 

perform light work. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit, however, because the ALJ did not find 

that plaintiff could not perform her prior work on the basis that her RFC rendered her incapable of 

performing work at a sedentary exertional level. Instead, the ALJ relied at step four on the 

vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony that plaintiff could not perform her past work due to her 

non-exertional mental limitation to simple repetitive tasks. AT 23, 68. The VE testified in 

response to a hypothetical posed by the ALJ based on the limitations contained in the ALJ’s wellreasoned RFC determination that a person with plaintiff’s limitations would not be able to 

perform plaintiff’s past work due to the limitation to simple repetitive tasks, but could perform 

work in the occupations of mail clerk, cleaning/housekeeping, and car wash attendant given those 

same limitations. AT 68-69. The ALJ properly relied on this testimony to support her

determinations at steps four and five of the sequential analysis.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: October 6, 2016

11 king-bailey2024.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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