Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01105/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01105-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL GARCIA, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

R. A. HOREL, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:07-CV-01105 AWI GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

AMEND 

[Doc. #28]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On July 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. On August 22,

2007, Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck dismissed the petition with leave to amend for failure to

specify grounds for relief. On September 26, 2007, Petitioner filed an amended petition wherein he

raised the following four grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner claims the trial court incorrectly prevented

him from presenting a defense of third party liability; (2) He claims the trial court erroneously failed

to grant defense counsel’s request that the jury be given accomplice instructions; (3) He claims he

received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to clarify Petitioner’s objection to the

testimony of a witness who had testified Petitioner said he shot a little kid; and (4) He claims the

evidence of a videotape was erroneously admitted. Following a review of the amended petition, on

October 3, 2007, Magistrate Judge Beck found Ground Four was unexhausted and granted Petitioner

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Petitioner further places the blame on this Court for his failure to seek amendment sooner. He cites to Kelly v.

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Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9 Cir.2002), asserting this Court was under obligation to inform him that he could amend his petition th

to delete the unexhausted claim, seek a stay of the proceedings and then re-include the claims after exhaustion, and inform

him of the status of the statute of limitations. However, Kelly v. Small is no longer good law as it was overruled in Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir.2007), in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 124 S.Ct. th

2441, 159 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004). In Pliler, the Supreme Court specifically held that the district court is not required to give

these warnings. Id. at 234. Moreover, Petitioner was in fact informed that he could amend the petition to delete the

unexhausted claim, and he did so.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

leave to withdraw the unexhausted claim, which he did. Respondent was then directed to file a

response to the petition.

On December 27, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as a mixed petition

containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Specifically, Respondent argued that Ground Three

was unexhausted. Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion on January 14, 2008. On

January 28, 2008, the District Court issued its Order granting Respondent’s motion to dismiss,

dismissing the petition without prejudice, denying Petitioner’s motion for stay, and granting

Petitioner thirty (30) days to file a motion to withdraw the unexhausted claim. 

On February 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a second motion to stay. He subsequently filed a

motion to withdraw the unexhausted claim on February 22, 2008. The District Court issued an Order

on March 7, 2008, wherein Petitioner’s motion for stay was denied and the motion to withdraw the

unexhausted claim was granted.

Now pending before the Court is Petitioner’ s March 10, 2008, motion to amend the petition

to reinsert Ground Four. This claim was withdrawn from the petition on October 30, 2007, for failure

to exhaust; however, Petitioner states the California Supreme Court denied the claim on December

12, 2007, with citation to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953). He argues he should be granted leave to

reinsert the claim since it is now exhausted.1

DISCUSSION

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:

(a) Amendments. A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter 

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 

pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action 

has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any 

time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the 

party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 

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U.S. District Court

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party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 

The Court does not find good cause to grant Petitioner’s motion to amend and reinsert his

claim. As noted by Petitioner, the California Supreme Court denied the state court habeas petition as

procedurally defaulted pursuant to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953). 

A federal court will not review claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the state court

has denied relief on those claims on a state law ground that is independent of federal law and

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). This doctrine

of procedural default is based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Id., at 730-32.

There are limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and refuse

to evaluate the merits of a claim because the petitioner violated a state’s procedural rules. Procedural

default can only block a claim in federal court if the state court “clearly and expressly states that its

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). 

In addition, the state law ground must be independent of federal law. “For a state procedural

rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal

law.” LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704, citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Morales

v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9 Cir. 1996), quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 (“Federal habeas th

review is not barred if the state decision ‘fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law.’”) “A state law is so interwoven if ‘the state has made application of

the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the determination of

whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152

(9 Cir. 2000), quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). th

Also, a federal court may only impose a procedural bar on claims if the procedural rule that

the state used is adequate to support the judgment. To be adequate, “the state’s legal grounds for its

decision must be firmly established and consistently applied.” King v. LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 965

(9 Cir. 2006), citing Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9 Cir. 2003). To be firmly established th th

and consistently applied, the rule must be clear and certain. King, 464 F.3d at 965-66, citing

Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9 Cir. 2002); see also Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, th

760 (9 Cir. 1997) (The state procedural rule used must be clear, consistently applied, and well- th

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U.S. District Court

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established at the time of the petitioner's purported default). 

If the court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas

review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual

prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9 Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. th

at 750; Park, 202 F.3d at 1150. 

In this case, it appears that Petitioner is procedurally barred from presenting the additional

claim. Therefore, the Court does not find good cause to grant his motion to amend.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion to amend be

DENIED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be

submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 27, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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