Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04650/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04650-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT E. CONNER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

K.R. CRUSE, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 09-4650 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE

On September 30, 2009, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Pelican Bay

State Prison (“PBSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. By separate order filed concurrently herewith, plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988).

B. Plaintiff’s Claim

The following allegations are derived from plaintiff’s complaint and the attachments

thereto. On October 23, 2007, plaintiff appeared at a classification hearing, for which he had

received no prior notice, and was reassigned from his housing placement in A-Facility to the

Behavior Modification Unit (“BMU”). Initially, plaintiff remained in the BMU for ninetynine days, until January 29, 2008, at which point he was moved to administrative segregation

pending a hearing on charges of attempted murder. Thereafter, on March 5, 2008, plaintiff

was returned to the BMU, where he remained until he was released to B-Facility on March

20, 2008. 

During the period relevant to the allegations in the complaint, the BMU was used as a

housing unit for general population inmates who had been “designated as requiring

modification due to significant disciplinary problems.” (Compl. Ex. E at 1.) Inmates placed

in the BMU came from four categories: (1) those with a significant disciplinary history

within 180 days of the most current rules violation report; (2) those found guilty of an

offense for which a determinate term of confinement in administrative segregation had been

assessed, or deemed a threat to the safety of others or the security of the institution;

(3) inmates engaged in organized criminal activity; and (4) inmates who were determined to

be compatible with another inmate but refused to voluntarily double cell, or who refused to

participate in the prison’s racial integration policy. (Id. at 1-3.) Inmates placed in the BMU

are not released back to normal general population housing until they complete four

behavioral steps, each of which takes approximately thirty days. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff

alleges that while housed in the BMU he was denied family visits, had limited canteen

access, no telephone calls, limited yard access, no recreational activities, limited access to

personal property, and lost his job and A1A work group status. 

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Plaintiff appealed his placement in the BMU. At the first and second levels of review

the appeals were denied. On June 13, 2008, at the Director’s Level of review, however, it

was determined that plaintiff erroneously had been placed in the BMU in October 2007, as

none of the four categories for inmate BMU-placement was applicable to him. (Compl. Ex.

H (“Director’s Level Appeal Decision” at 1-2.) Specifically, plaintiff had been placed and

held in the BMU pending an investigation of the rules violation report he had been issued on

the attempted murder charge, and the BMU is not used to hold inmates pending

investigations. (Id.) Consequently, the Director ordered the following remedy: “The PBSP

shall direct the UCC [Classification Committee] to restore the penalties that were assessed as

a result of the appellant’s placement in the BMU on October 23, 2007. The appellant’s

WG/PG [Work Group/Privilege Group] shall be restored to the previous designation and the

behavioral credits recalculated.” (Id. at 2.) 

In the instant action plaintiff alleges the violation of his right to due process because

he was not provided with notice and a hearing prior to his BMU placement. He seeks

injunctive relief to compel compliance with the Director’s order, and damages.

The requirements of due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). A protected liberty interest may be created either

by the Due Process Clause of its own force or by states through statutes or regulations. 

Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Where prison conditions are at issue, a

change in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner

implicates the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not such change is authorized by state

law. Id. at 484. Neither changes in conditions relating to classification and reclassification

nor the hardship associated with administrative segregation, such as loss of recreational and

rehabilitative programs or confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of time, violate the

Due Process Clause itself. See Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987)

(classification); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986)

(administrative segregation).

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A deprivation authorized by state law that is less severe or more closely related to the

expected terms of confinement also may amount to deprivation of a protected liberty interest,

provided such deprivation “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, or “will inevitably

affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. Once a protected interest is established, the

court must determine what process is due before the interest may be taken away. See

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224-25 (2005).

Here, when liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations that he was placed in the BMU

without a hearing and, as a result, was denied access to various privileges and amenities that

he had received in the general population, state a cognizable claim for the denial of due

process. Additionally, plaintiff has adequately linked to his allegations those defendants who

are prison officials at PBSP. Defendant Matthew Cate, Director of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is named solely in his respondent superior

capacity, however, and, consequently, will be dismissed. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding respondeat superior liability does not attach under § 1983

under any circumstance).

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall

serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint in this matter and all

attachments thereto (Docket No. 1), and a copy of this order upon the following

defendants, all at Pelican Bay State Prison: K.R. Cruse, D. Melton, B. Patton, M. Moss,

M.A. Cook, Robert A. Horel and F. Jacquez.

The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the AC and this order to the California

Attorney General’s Office.

2. Within ninety (90) days of the date this order is filed, defendants shall file a

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the claims found to

be cognizable above. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved

by summary judgment or other dispositive motion, defendants shall so inform the

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The following notice is adapted from the summary judgment notice to be given to pro

se prisoners as set forth in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14.

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Court prior to the date the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion is

due. 

3. The Court hereby extends the time to file an answer or waiver of answer, see 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(1), to a date to be set after the Court has ruled on the above-referenced

motion or received notice that such a motion cannot be filed.

4. If defendants elect to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds plaintiff failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),

defendants shall do so in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied Alameida v. Terhune, 540 U.S. 810

(2003). 

5. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate factual

documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 

6. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court and

served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendants’ motion is filed. 

a. In the event defendants file an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b), plaintiff is hereby cautioned as follows:1

The defendants have made a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground you have not exhausted

your administrative remedies. The motion will, if granted, result in the

dismissal of your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust, and that motion is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony) and/or documents, you may not simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or documents, that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that you have

in fact exhausted your claims. If you do not submit your own evidence in

opposition, the motion to dismiss, if appropriate, may be granted and the case

dismissed.

b. In the event defendants file a motion for summary judgment, the Ninth

Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

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The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which

they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there

is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any

fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is

properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot

simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendants’ declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary

judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised to

read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is

cautioned that failure to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment may

be deemed to be a consent by plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of

judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

7. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after plaintiff’s

opposition is filed. 

8. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No

hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

9. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants,

or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

10. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16-1 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

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11. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

12. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline

sought to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 23, 2010 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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