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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed February 1, 2002

No. 00-5016

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The Honorable John H. McBryde,

United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Texas,

Appellant

v.

Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and

Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the

United States, et al.,

Appellees

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BEFORE: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards, Sentelle,

Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

O R D E R

Appellant's petition for rehearing en banc and the response

thereto have been circulated to the full court. The taking of

a vote was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of

the court in regular, active service did not vote in favor of the

petition. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

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ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Clerk

Circuit Judges Sentelle, Rogers and Tatel would grant

the petition for rehearing en banc.

A statement of Circuit Judge Tatel dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc, in which Circuit Judge Sentelle

joins, is attached.

Circuit Judges Edwards, Randolph and Garland did not

participate in this matter.

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, with whom Sentelle, Circuit Judge,

joins, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:

In my view, this case warranted en banc review because

the panel's decision conflicts with well-established precedent

of both the Supreme Court and this circuit. In Webster v.

Doe, the Supreme Court held "that where Congress intends

to preclude review of judicial claims, its intent to do so must

be clear. ... We require this heightened showing in part to

avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a

federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for

a colorable constitutional claim." 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)

(quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476

U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)). See also Griffith v. Fed. Labor

Relations Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Ralpho v.

Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Here, the panel

reads section 372(c)(10) to preclude review of Judge

McBryde's as-applied constitutional claims even though the

statute contains no language expressly barring review, and

even though the legislative history may as easily be read to

permit as to preclude federal court jurisdiction over such

challenges. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of

the United States, 264 F.3d 52, 73-76 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Tatel,

J., dissenting). According to the panel, the purported "substantial redundancy" between review by an Article III court

and by the Judicial Conference reflects Congress's intent to

preclude review of as-applied constitutional claims. Id. at 62.

This position, however, rests not on primary evidence from

the legislative history itself, but on a secondary inference

drawn from the structure of the Act, and thus does not

amount to the kind of "clear and convincing" evidence required by the Supreme Court and this circuit. See Johnson

v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 371-75 (1974) (limiting its analysis

of legislative history to affirmative statements of congressional intent); see also Griffith, 842 F.2d at 494-95 (same);

Ungar, 667 F.2d at 193-96 & 195 n.2 (same); Ralpho, 569

F.2d at 620-22 (same). I respectfully dissent from the denial

of rehearing en banc.

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