Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02186/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02186-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE SALVADOR MORENO,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

BILL GORE, et al.,

 Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 13cv2186-DMS (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS.

[ECF NO. 15]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and

Local Civil Rule 72.3 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

I. Procedural History

On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff Jorge Salvador Moreno, an

inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s sole

claim in his Complaint appears to be that the conditions of his

confinement violate his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id.) Specifically,

Plaintiff states that his placement in isolation, rather than

administrative segregation or general population, violates his rights

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and his sole prayer for relief is that he be transferred back to

administrative segregation. (Id.) On November 12, 2013, Defendants

filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 15.) On January 8, 2014,

Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (“Opp”). (ECF No. 17.) On

February 4, 2014, Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiff’s Response. 

(ECF No. 18.) 

II. Statement of Facts

1. Plaintiff’s Confinement

Since on or about August 12, 2009, Plaintiff has been in custody at

the Vista Detention Facility awaiting trial in a state court action, case

number SCD 208824. (ECF No. 15-1 at 13.) Plaintiff was transferred

to Vista from another state prison where he was serving a sentence for

a separate murder conviction. 

According to Plaintiff, on December 17, 2010, Deputy District

Attorney Mark Amador caused Plaintiff to be removed from

administrative segregation and placed in isolation. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 

Plaintiff was told that the reason for the transfer was that Plaintiff is

too dangerous to inmates, staff, and the public, but Plaintiff contends he

never received notice of a rule violation regarding these allegations. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff states that he has remained in isolation since December

2010. (Id.) He does not interact with anyone while in isolation and

does not have a window. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff also contends that he is

not in a proper cell, but rather a holding cell that has been converted to

a cell by the addition of a bed, phone, TV, shower, and toilet. (Id. at 2.) 

There is a camera pointed directly at the cell which monitors Plaintiff at

all times, even when he uses the toilet. (Id.) 

Plaintiff further contends that this unique treatment extends to

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his medical care. (Id.) Rather than being taken to see a doctor, a doctor

is brought to Plaintiff. (Id.) These visits are inferior because the doctor

does not take Plaintiff’s blood pressure, temperature, or weight. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he has difficulty communicating with the doctor

because there are always several deputies in the room with him. (Id.) 

Further, Plaintiff states that the nature of these visits has lead to

problems receiving and taking medication, despite the fact that Plaintiff

suffers from chronic pain. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff also has difficulty receiving legal visits while in isolation. 

(Id.) His attorneys are not allowed to bring in computers for Plaintiff to

use to review documents, and deputies listen in on his conversations

with attorneys. (Id.) Plaintiff also experiences delays receiving mail. 

(Id.) Plaintiff has repeatedly complained about the conditions of his

confinement to deputies, but officials have refused to place Plaintiff

back into administrative segregation. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff contends

that confinement in isolation is adverse to his mental health and he

experiences behavioral changes, mood swings, and depression. (Id. at

7.)

2. Prior State Court Actions Challenging Plaintiff’s

Conditions of Confinement1

 On January 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Petition for a Writ of

Mandate to Remedy Unconstitutional Conditions of Pretrial

Confinement in San Diego County Superior Court. (ECF No. 15-2 at 9.) 

In his Petition, Plaintiff contended that his placement in isolation

violated his constitutional rights. (Id. at 13.) Specifically, Plaintiff

stated that he had been placed in a holding cell not intended to serve for

1

Defendants request judicial notice of these decisions and their relevant

filings. (ECF No. 15-1 (Notice of Lodgment and Request for Judicial Notice).) The Court takes judicial notice pursuant to Fed. Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2). 

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continuous incarceration, that he lacked adequate contact with legal

counsel, that isolation from other inmates was harmful to his mental

state, and that the conditions were otherwise below minimum

acceptable standards. (Id. at 19-30.) On March 8, 2012, a hearing was

held on Plaintiff’s Petition. After hearing argument from both sides, the

court found that the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement did not violate

his constitutional rights, and accordingly denied the Petition. (Id. at 3.) 

In addition to the Petition for a Writ of Mandate, Plaintiff also

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in San Diego County Superior

Court, case number HCN 1177 (CSD 2088824, SCD 226640), on the

same grounds. On July 1, 2011, the superior court issued an Order

Denying the Petition . (ECF No. 15-2 at 80-84.) The superior court

noted that Plaintiff was placed in isolation because he: had threatened

other inmates and their families while in administrative segregation;

had a record of numerous assaults while in custody; had been

improperly communicating with people outside the jail, including the

attorney prosecuting his case, in part by sending mail through other

inmates; and that Plaintiff had asked another inmate (who was actually

serving as an informant) to commit various crimes when the inmate

was released from prison, including the murder of the family member of

a witness scheduled to testify against Plaintiff. (Id. at 81-82.) Plaintiff

had also asked the informant to murder the attorney prosecuting

Plaintiff’s case, and later indicated that he had arranged for another

person to perform the murder. (Id. at 82.) The superior court found

that Plaintiff’s placement in isolation only limited his communication

with other inmates, and that Plaintiff had made no showing that his

placement in isolation restricts him in any way or is not justified based

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on Plaintiff’s actions while in custody. (Id.) Accordingly, the court

found that the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement did not violate any

Constitutional right.

III. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th

Cir. 2001). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need

only give the defendant fair notice of what the ...claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, “[w]hile a complaint

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Bell v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Thus, while specific

detail is not required, every complaint must, at a minimum, plead

“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

at 547; Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir.

2008). 

The court must assume the truth of the facts which are presented

and construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002). A pro se party’s pleadings should be construed liberally. Id. 

However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in

the complaint are true.” Bell, 127 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the court is

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not required to “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

citation omitted). Furthermore, the court may not “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

IV. Analysis

In their Motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim should

be dismissed for two reasons. (ECF No. 15.) First, Defendants contend

that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata. (Id. at 2.) Second,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim fails because the evidence

presented in Plaintiff’s state court cases shows that Plaintiff was

properly placed in isolation because he is a threat to “inmates, deputies,

witnesses, and prosecutors.” (Id.) 

1. Plaintiff’s Claim is Barred by Res Judicata

Defendants contends that Plaintiff’s claim is barred from

consideration by this Court under the doctrine of res judicata. (ECF No.

15 at 2.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff previously litigated the

same issues presented in the instant Complaint in state court in his

Petition for a Writ of Mandate in case number MCR 12-015 and in his

Petition for a Writ of Habeas in case number HCN 1177 (SCD 2088824,

SCD 226640). (ECF No. 15 at 2.) Both state court decisions examined

Plaintiff’s placement in isolation and determined that the conditions of

Plaintiff’s confinement did not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. (ECF No. 15-2 at 3, 80-84.) 

“A federal court must give State court judgments the same

preclusive effect those judgment would have in State court.” Clement v.

California Dept. Of Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (quoting

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Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84 (Cal.

1984). Thus, if a California court would give preclusive effect to these

prior decisions, this Court must do so as well. Id. The Ninth Circuit

has explicitly held that a federal court is required to give preclusive

effect to a state habeas decision in a subsequent section 1983 claim

brought in federal court, provided preclusion is warranted under

California state law. Id. The party must have had a full and fair

opportunity to be heard on the issue and the issue must have been

determined under federal standards. Silverton v. Department of

Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (giving preclusive effect to

state habeas decision in a subsequent § 1983 claim brought in federal

court). 

In California, a prior decision will preclude subsequent

consideration of an issue if three conditions are met: (1) the issues

decided in the prior adjudication were identical to those presented in

the subsequent action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in

the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine of res

judicata is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the prior

adjudication. Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 637

(Cal. 1943); Citizens for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift

Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1065 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 

Here, the state court issued two final judgments dispensing of

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, and Plaintiff was the party

alleging the constitutional violation in both prior actions. Thus, prongs

two and three are met. Panos, 21 Cal. 2d at 637. The only remaining

question is whether the prior actions involved the same issues as

Plaintiff’s instant Complaint. Whether a prior action involved the same

issue is determined by examining the “primary right” at stake. 

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Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. Ct. App.

1983). If the two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the

same wrong by the defendant, “then the same primary right is at stake

even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of

recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts

supporting recovery. Id.

The same primary right is at issue here as in the prior decisions. 

Plaintiff raised the same issues: the effect on his mental health, the fact

that his holding cell was not a proper cell, his inability to meet with his

legal counsel without interference, and the general conditions of his cell. 

(ECF No. 15-2 at 18-30.) The “injury” in both prior claims was

Plaintiff’s confinement in isolation while awaiting trial as opposed to

confinement in administrative segregation or general population, and

the “wrongs” by Defendants were their treatment of Plaintiff and

refusal to remove him from isolation prior to his trial. (Id.) Even if

Plaintiff’s instant Complaint contains some additional facts or is based

on a different theory of recovery, this Court must still give preclusive

effect to the prior state court decisions.2

 Eichman, 147 Cal. App. 3d at

1175. 

The state courts provided a full and fair opportunity to be heard,

2

The only fact in the instant case that differs from the facts presented in Plaintiff’s state court proceedings is the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement. 

This does not affect the applicability of res judicata to Plaintiff’s claim. While

the duration of confinement is a factor to be considered by the court, even indefinite confinement does not necessarily rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. Hutto v. Finley, 437 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1978). Here, Plaintiff’s placement in isolation is only scheduled to last until his trial concludes, just as in Plaintiff’s state court cases. Further, the state court noted that Plaintiff was placed in isolation based on his violent interactions with other inmates

while in less restrictive confinement, including asking other inmates to murder the prosecuting attorney and a family member of a witness. (ECF No. 15-2 at 80-84.) Thus, the extended duration of Plaintiff’s confinement

does not materially affect his claim. 

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and their decision is in accordance with federal standards. Silverton,

644 F.2d at 1347; Clement, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s claimed is barred from reconsideration by

the doctrine of res judicata. The Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint

be DISMISSED. Further, as amendment to Plaintiff’s Complaint

would be futile, leave to amend should be denied. Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182; Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th

Cir. 1999).

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is barred, the Court

need not address Defendants’ argument that this Court should adopt

the reasoning and evidentiary findings of the state court. 

2. Additional Claims

In his Opposition, though it is unclear, Plaintiff appears to

contend that dismissal is inappropriate because he also intended to

allege claims not presented to the state court. (ECF No. 17.) These

allegations, however, are not enough to rescue Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Plaintiff does not enumerate the claims in his Complaint and the Court

cannot decipher any clearly stated claim for relief in his Complaint

other than the Eighth Amendment claim based on his confinement in

isolation. If Plaintiff believes he possesses legally cognizable claims

other than an Eighth Amendment claim based on the conditions of his

confinement, he must seek amendment of his Complaint pursuant to

Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc 15 or file a new action clearly alleging those

claims in compliance with Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 8. 

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint be GRANTED,

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and Plaintiff’s claim be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988). Any party may filed written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties by May 28, 2014. The

document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed

by June 11, 2014.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 7, 2014

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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