Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07431/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07431-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

MAG

E-filed on 8/8/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RAYMOND CHARLES PERSIK,

Plaintiff,

v.

TUCCI LEARNING SOLUTIONS, INC., and

HEA-JUNG ATKINS,

Defendants.

No. C-06-07431 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Re Docket No. 35, 39]

Defendants Tucci Learning Solutions ("TLS") and Hea-Jung Atkins ("Atkins") move to

dismiss plaintiff Raymond Charles Persik's ("Persik") claims. TLS moves to dismiss Persik's first

claim on the basis that it fails to state a claim. Plaintiff did not file opposition to this motion. Atkins

separately moves to dismiss Persik's second claim on the basis that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over that claim, or, in the alternative, that it fails to state a claim. Plaintiff filed an

opposition to this motion. The court has read the moving papers and considered the arguments of

counsel and plaintiff (where provided). For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS TLS's

motion to dismiss plaintiff's first cause of action and GRANTS Atkins' motion to dismiss plaintiff's

second cause of action. 

Case 5:06-cv-07431-RMW Document 45 Filed 08/08/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

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I. BACKGROUND

TLS previously moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as time-barred and for failure to state

a claim. The court granted that motion as unopposed concluding, however, that plaintiff's claim was

not time-barred. The court subsequently permitted plaintiff to amend his complaint. 

Plaintiff brings a two-count complaint against defendants TLS and Atkins. The first claim is

solely against TLS and is for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq. The second claim is solely against Atkins, in her official capacity as Local Director of

the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") for the San Jose Local Office, for

"obstruction of justice" and failure to follow the EEOC's own procedures, thereby allowing alleged

discrimination and abuse to continue. Plaintiff seeks to bring his second claim as a class action.

Plaintiff's original complaint was filed December 1, 2006. The operative complaint, the first

amended complaint, was filed June 11, 2007.

Persik was employed by TLS as a counselor for autistic children from January 27, 2005 to

May 17, 2005. In his claim against TLS, Persik alleges that he is the victim of discrimination on

account of his gender and his religious pro-life views. FAC ¶¶ 19, 26-27. On May 11, 2005, he

filed a "Pro Life law suit" against his ex-wife "regarding a borderline late term abortion." Id. ¶ 20. 

Persik alleges that TLS retaliated by failing to provide him with full-time hours and by ultimately

discharging him on May 18, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 20, 26. 

On January 23, 2006, Persik filed an intake questionnaire with the EEOC. He filed a charge

of discrimination with the EEOC on June 21, 2006. Id. ¶ 11(e). The EEOC dismissed his claim and

mailed him a right-to-sue letter on August 29, 2006. As set forth above, the present action was filed

on December 1, 2006. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. TLS's Motion to Dismiss Persik's First Cause of Action

TLS argues that Persik's first amended complaint fails to state a Title VII claim against TLS. 

Plaintiff did not submit an opposition to TLS's complaint, stating at the hearing that he believed that

the court had already dismissed his claim against TLS. Nevertheless, the court finds that TLS's

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

MAG 3

motion is well-taken. For the following reasons, the allegations in Persik's first amended complaint

do not state facts upon which a viable claim against TLS can be based. 

Even viewing the complaint in whole and taking inferences in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, the court finds that plaintiff's allegations fail to meet his obligation "to provide the

'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'" and instead, at best, sets forth "labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). Plaintiff's complaint also sets forth a myriad of allegations which

appear to have nothing to do with TLS. Therefore, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a

claim against TLS. Id. Plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend his complaint and

yet has still failed to allege any factual basis for discrimination and retaliation claims against TLS. 

Because of the complete absence of any factual basis for his claims against TLS, the court finds that

further amendment of this claim would be futile. Accordingly, his first claim against TLS is

dismissed with prejudice.

B. Atkins's Motion to Dismiss Persik's Second Claim

Persik alleges that Atkins, in her official capacity as the San Jose Local Director of the

EEOC, "obstructed justice" because her office failed to turn over information about acts that plaintiff

asserts are crimes and because she "failed to supervise" the processing of his complaint. FAC ¶¶ 9,

39. First, according to plaintiff, Atkins' office obstructed justice by failing to forward information to

the U.S. Attorneys' Office about two "crimes:" (1) Persik's dismissal by an employer he had

previously sued during his EEOC proceedings, and (2) Persik's belief that technology that alters a

person's thought processes was used by an unknown third party on at least two of the children he

counseled (which he seems to maintain need to be reported by the EEOC because he is a mandatory

reporter under California law). Second, Persik asserts that the EEOC failed to investigate his charge

in a timely manner and accepted the recommendations of an intern which "possibly served to

prevent resolution in this case." ¶ 38, 40. Persik appears to take issue with the "'At Will

Employment" standard adopted by many companies such as [TLS]," id. at ¶ 42, and seeks to enjoin

the EEOC to "work with the [class] to provide added redress for alleged victims of discrimination

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

MAG 4

caused by an employers 'At Will Employment' which forbids true equal employment in the eyes of

the class." FAC ¶ 16.

As Atkins is being sued in her official capacity, the allegations against her are treated as a

suit against the EEOC. Accordingly, she argues that the EEOC is entitled to sovereign immunity as

an agency of the federal government and that this immunity has not been waived by Congress. 

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is immune from suit and may

define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. United States v. Sherwood,

312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). "Jurisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear

statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity, together with a claim falling within

the terms of the waiver." United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003)

(citations omitted). Any such consent to be sued "may not be inferred, but must be 'unequivocally

expressed' in order to 'define [a] court's jurisdiction.'" Id. (citations omitted, alteration in original). 

Absent an express waiver of sovereign immunity, neither the United States nor its agencies

can be sued for money damages. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Even where a plaintiff

seeks only injunctive relief, courts have nevertheless held that "Congress has not authorized, either

expressly or impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC's alleged negligence or

other malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge." Uberoi v. EEOC, 180 F.

Supp. 2d 42, 46 (D.D.C. 2001); see also D'Alessandro v. EEOC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 419, 421 (D. Del.

2002). 

To the extent that plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief and not money damages, the Ninth

Circuit has held that this court may not grant relief on the jurisdictional grounds plaintiff invokes. 

See FAC ¶¶ 5-6. First, plaintiff cannot assert a claim against the EEOC under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

because "Congress did not expressly create a cause of action against the EEOC by employees of

third parties. Only present or former employees of the EEOC (or applicants for employment) who

allege an unlawful employment practice committed by the EEOC as an employer may bring a Title

VII action against the EEOC." Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c)). Second, the Ninth Circuit has held that the actions of the EEOC alleged in

Persik's complaint are not reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

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§§ 702, 706. Id. at 313 (EEOC's inaction in the internal processing complaint has no "determinate

consequences for the party to the proceeding" and thus is not a reviewable action under the APA);

see also id. at 314 (requirement under the APA that there be "no other adequate remedy in a court" is

not met). 

Third, under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, court may issue a writ of mandamus "to compel an officer or

employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 

However, "[m]andamus writs, as extraordinary remedies, are appropriate only when a federal

officer, employee, or agency owes a nondiscretionary duty to the plaintiff that is so plainly

prescribed as to be free from doubt. A plaintiff must show (1) his claim is "clear and certain"; (2)

the official's duty to act is ministerial, and "so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt"; and (3)

no other adequate remedy is available. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986)). Plaintiff's obstruction of justice claim is far

from clear or certain, nor is it at all clear that the EEOC had any duty to act in under the

circumstances alleged. And, as set forth above, the Ninth Circuit has ruled in the context of the

APA that there is another adequate remedy available to plaintiff. Id. at 314. 

Even assuming that the court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's civil rights claim against Atkins

(whether those are under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or otherwise), his complaint nevertheless fails to state a

claim. Virtually every circuit has held that "Congress has not authorized, either expressly or

impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC's alleged negligence or other

malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge." Smith v. Casellas, 119 F.3d 33,

34 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau Int'l, Inc., 111 F.3d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing no

cause of action against the EEOC for any "improper investigation or processing of a discrimination

charge"); Scheerer v. Rose State College, 950 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir. 1991); McCottrell v. EEOC,

726 F.2d 350, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1984); Francis-Sobel v. University of Maine, 597 F.2d 15, 17-18 (1st

Cir. 1979); Gibson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 579 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1978); cf. Ward, 719 F.2d

at 313-14 (no implied cause of action for failure to investigate discrimination complaints

adequately). Further, the court has found no basis for plaintiff to assert his generic challenge to the

EEOC's stance, whatever it may be, as to at-will employment.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

MAG 6

Accordingly, it appears there are no grounds on which plaintiff can state a claim against the

EEOC or Atkins in her official capacity. Thus, plaintiff's second cause of action must be dismissed

with prejudice.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

1. GRANTS TLS's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first cause of action with prejudice for failure to

state a claim; and 

2. GRANTS Atkins' motion to dismiss plaintiff's second cause of action with prejudice for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

The dismissal with prejudice of both of plaintiff's claims disposes of this action. The clerk shall

close the file.

DATED: 8/7/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-07431 RMW

MAG 7

A copy of this order was mailed on 8/8/07 to:

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

Raymond Charles Persik

P.O. Box 3553

Santa Clara, CA 95055

PRO SE

Counsel for Defendants:

Lisa M. Pooley

Hanson Bridgett Marcus Vlahos & Rudy LLP

425 Market Street, 26th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105

James G. Allison

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

1801 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20507

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this order to co-counsel, as necessary.

Dated: 8/8/07 /s/ MAG

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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