Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02275/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02275-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KAB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Suhad Abdullah, as the personal 

representative for Mariam Abdullah,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Douglas Anthony Ducey, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 18-02275-PHX-DGC (JZB)

ORDER

Plaintiff Suhad Abdullah, as the personal representative for Mariam Abdullah, 

brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Ryan and Lutz 

move for summary judgment. (Doc. 97, 109.) 

I. Background

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff relevantly alleges as follows. Mariam 

Abdullah, an 18-year-old inmate in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections 

(ADC), was confined at ASPC-Perryville. (Doc. 78 at ¶ 27.) Mariam had a welldocumented history of mental illness and suicide attempts and was classified by the ADC 

as Mental Health level 5, the highest level requiring the most care. (Id. at 2, 8 ¶ 31.) On 

July 19, 2016, Mariam was observed looking at family photos and crying; she requested a 

consultation with psychology services, but did not receive the consultation. (Id. at 2.) 

Mariam had been the victim of a gang rape perpetrated by her then-boyfriend and his 

friends, and discussed the rape the day she died with Defendant Lieutenant Lutz; Lutz told 

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Mariam “you suck at picking boyfriends.” (Id.) Less than two hours later, Mariam was 

found unresponsive, hanging in her cell by her neck. (Id.) She was pronounced dead 

several hours later. (Id.) 

Plaintiff is Mariam’s mother and the administrator of her estate. (Id. at 4.) 

Defendant Ryan, the Director of the ADC, had the power to order his staff and Defendant 

Corizon to comply with the Parsons v. Ryan stipulations, but he did not, “leaving in place 

conditions that led to Miss Abdullah’s death.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 4.) Defendant Corizon, “by policy 

and practice . . . did not provide on-site mental health services necessary to meet the needs 

of someone with severe mental illnesses like [Mariam].” (Id. at 5 ¶ 6.) Defendant Lutz 

was aware that Mariam was suicidal, but allowed her to be placed in isolation conditions 

and in a cell with hanging points. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

Mental Health Performance Measures agreed on by the Parties in Parsons v. Ryan 

include: (1) “MH-5 prisoners shall be seen by a mental health clinician for a 1:1 session a 

minimum of every seven days”; (2) “MH-5 prisoners who are actively psychotic or actively 

suicidal shall be seen by a mental health clinician or mental health provider daily”; (3) “All 

prisoners on a suicide or mental health watch shall be seen daily by a licensed mental health 

clinician or on weekend or holidays, by a registered nurse”; (4) “Only licensed mental 

health staff may remove a prisoner from a suicide or mental health watch. Any prisoner 

discontinued from a suicide or mental health watch shall be seen by a mental health 

provider, mental health clinician, or psychiatric registered nurse between 24 and 72 hours 

after discontinuation, between seven and ten days after discontinuation, and between 21 

and 24 days after discontinuation of the watch.” (Id. at 8 ¶¶ 32-35.) 

On June 7, 2016, an attorney in Parsons documented that Mariam was not being 

treated in accordance with these measures and wrote a letter to the Arizona Attorney 

General’s Office with this information. (Id. at 10¶ 43.) 

Plaintiff asserts that Mariam’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated because 

Defendants knew or should have known that Mariam posed a serious risk of harm to 

herself, but failed to act to abate the risk, and placed her in isolation, despite knowledge 

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that isolation would exacerbate her condition, denied her psychiatric treatment, and placed 

her in a cell that contained hanging points. (Id. at 16.) 

In Count Three for wrongful death, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Corizon and 

Psychology Associate Ling (“Corizon Defendants”) were aware of both systemic 

deficiencies in mental healthcare and deficiencies in Mariam’s mental healthcare and yet 

failed to take measures to abate the risk of harm to Mariam. Plaintiff alleges that as a result 

of the negligence and gross negligence of the Corizon Defendants, Mariam died. (Id. at 

19-21.)

The Court dismissed Defendants Ducey and Frigo, the Eighth Amendment official 

capacity claims against Defendants Ryan and Lutz, and Count Two of the Second 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 77.) The remaining claims are: (1) Count One Eighth 

Amendment claims against Defendants Ryan and Lutz in their individual capacities; 

(2) Count One Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Ling and Corizon; and 

(3) Count Three Wrongful Death claims against Defendants Ling and Corizon. Defendants 

Ryan and Lutz move for summary judgment as to the claims against them in Count One. 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 

movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 

produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 

1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 

to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

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jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 

favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 

it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 

citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 

all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 

materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

III. Eighth Amendment

Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must demonstrate that a defendant acted 

with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are two 

prongs to the deliberate-indifference analysis: an objective prong and a subjective prong. 

First, a prisoner must show a “serious medical need.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations 

omitted). A “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds 

by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal 

citation omitted). Examples of a serious medical need include “[t]he existence of an injury 

that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s 

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 

1059-60. 

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Second, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s response to that need was 

deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. An official acts with deliberate indifference 

if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; to satisfy the 

knowledge component, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Prison officials are 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), or when they fail to respond to 

a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due 

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross 

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of Corr., 

220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical 

malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does not 

amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is 

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley 

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The 

indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

IV. Ryan’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Ryan argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to the Eighth 

Amendment claim because he had no knowledge of Mariam’s medical/psychological 

condition or treatment, and was thus not deliberately indifferent to Mariam’s serious 

medical needs. (Doc. 97.) Ryan argues that he is alternatively entitled to qualified 

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immunity because he did not act in violation of established Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit 

precedent. (Id.) 

A. Facts

Defendant Ryan was the Director of the ADC between January 30, 2009 and 

September 13, 2019. (Doc. 98 ¶ 1; Doc. 115 ¶ 1.) Ryan was not personally acquainted or 

familiar with Mariam. (Doc. 98 ¶ 2; Doc. 115 ¶ 2.) A June 7, 2016 letter was sent from 

the American Civil Liberties Union lawyer to Assistant Attorney General Lucy Rand in 

Parsons v. Ryan describing Plaintiff’s mental health condition and to notify Defendants of 

their non-compliance with Measures 3 and 8 of the Maximum Custody Outcome Measures 

at ASPC-Perryville as demonstrated by the treatment of Mariam. (Doc. 98 ¶ 4; Doc. 115 

¶ 6 ; Doc. 117 ¶ 24.) Parsons is a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of ADC prisoners 

alleging that health care, including mental health care, provided to inmates by the ADC 

was constitutionally inadequate. (Doc. 98 ¶ 20; Doc. 115 ¶ 20.) Ryan was sued in his 

official capacity in Parsons and understands that Plaintiffs’ attorneys in Parsons 

consistently sent letters to Defendants’ attorneys concerning individual inmate’s medical 

care and that those letters were forwarded to the appropriate medical provider for a 

response. (Doc. 98 ¶¶ 5, 8; Doc. 115 ¶¶ 6, 7.) 

Between March 2, 2013 and July 1, 2019, the ADC contracted with Corizon, LLC 

to provide inmate health care services to prisoners in the custody of the ADC. (Doc. 98 

¶ 11; Doc. 115 ¶ 10.) Ryan is not a licensed medical professional and he was never 

involved in the medical diagnosis or treatment of any inmate. Clinical actions regarding 

health care services provided to inmates, including decisions regarding treatment for 

mental health issues, are the responsibility of the qualified health care professionals upon 

whom Ryan relied. (Doc. 98 ¶ 14; Doc. 115 ¶ 13.) Ryan did not know anything about 

Mariam’s medical care until he saw the Complaint in this action. (Doc. 98 ¶ 14; Doc. 115 

¶ 14.) 

Pursuant to the Parsons stipulation, if counsel for plaintiffs allege that defendants 

have failed to comply with the Stipulation and plaintiffs’ counsel provide defendants a 

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written statement describing the alleged non-compliance (Notice of Non-Compliance), 

then defendants have 30 days in which to respond to the allegations of non-compliance. 

(Doc. 98 ¶ 21; Doc. 115 ¶ 21.) The Parsons plaintiffs’ attorneys send the Notice of NonCompliance to Rand, and if the Notice is healthcare-related, Rand forwards it to the top 

local contact or designee for the contracted healthcare provider at the time and that person 

delegates responsibility of responding to the appropriate individuals. (Doc. 98 ¶¶ 22-23; 

Doc. 115 ¶¶ 21.) 

B. Discussion

Ryan asserts that he had no knowledge of Mariam’s medical condition and 

knowledge cannot be imputed to him based on the Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Rand 

in the Parsons case because he was sued in his official capacity and had no individual 

involvement in dealing with the way Notices of Non-Compliance were handled. In 

Response, Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Ryan’s 

“ultimate liability” for the decision to “delegate the duties of oversight of mental health 

care for prisoners and Plaintiff.” (Doc. 113 at 2.) 

Individual liability hinges upon a defendant’s participation in the deprivation of a 

constitutional right. To connect a defendant to a particular claim, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant 

and show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). In other words, a defendant’s liability under 

§ 1983 exists only where a plaintiff makes a showing of personal participation by the 

defendant in the alleged violation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

On the record before the Court, there is no evidence that Ryan was personally 

involved in decisions regarding Mariam’s mental health care or knew about the letter sent 

to Ms. Rand regarding the alleged deficiencies in the care provided to Mariam. Plaintiff 

does not present any evidence that the system set up to respond to Notices of NonCompliance was so deficient that it amounted to conscious disregard of Mariam’s health 

or safety. See Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014) (defendant not 

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aware of risk of harm where he was not a dentist, he did not independently review medical 

chart before signing off on appeal and had no expertise to contribute to a review, and he 

relied on dental staff who investigated the plaintiff’s complaints). Accordingly, there is no 

evidence that Ryan was aware of a serious risk of harm to Mariam. His Motion for 

Summary Judgment will be granted. 

V. Lutz’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Lutz argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because she had no 

medical training, access to or knowledge of Mariam’s medical or psychiatric records, her

statement to Mariam that she “sucked at picking boyfriends” cannot be shown as the cause 

of Mariam’s death, and there is no established law that the conversation between Lutz and 

Mariam could be the basis for a constitutional violation. (Doc. 109.) 

A. Facts

Defendant Lutz was an employee of the ADC from April 30, 2011 to September 1, 

2019 and was assigned as a Lieutenant at the ASPC-Perryville Lumley Unit in July 2016. 

(Doc. 110 ¶ 1; Doc. 118 ¶ 1.) At the time of Mariam’s suicide, she was housed at the 

Lumley Unit. (Doc. 110 ¶ 2; Doc. 118 ¶ 2.) On July 19, 2016, Lutz heard that Mariam 

wanted to speak with her and Lutz brought Mariam into the sergeant’s office so they could 

converse in private. (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 4-5; Doc. 118 ¶¶ 4-5.) Lutz thought Mariam was in in 

good spirits and was opening up to her because Mariam was smiling and talking. (Doc. 110 

¶¶ 6, 8.) 

During the conversation, Lutz asked Mariam if she wanted to speak with Psychiatric

Associate Patricia Ling, but Mariam said she was fine and did not want to go to Mental 

Health. (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 118 ¶¶ 10-11.) Mariam told Lutz that she had been in 

to see PA Ling earlier and had confided in Ling that when she was 14, she was raped by 

friends of her boyfriend and the rape occurred at her boyfriend’s orders. (Doc. 110 ¶ 12; 

Doc. 118 ¶ 12.) Lutz then told Mariam “you suck at picking boyfriends and you are not 

allowed to pick another boyfriend when you get out of here,” or told her that when she gets 

out she needs help picking boyfriends because she “sucks” at it. (Doc. 110 ¶ 13; Doc. 118 

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¶ 13.) Mariam then confided in Lutz that she had never told anyone about the rape, not 

even her mother. (Doc. 110 ¶ 15; Doc. 118 ¶ 15.) Lutz told Mariam that the rape was not 

her fault and she did not need to feel bad about it. Mariam responded that Lutz sounded 

like her mom. (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 16-17; Doc. 118 ¶¶ 16-17.) Lutz often took time out to speak 

with the inmates when they wanted someone to talk to and would help them if she was 

able. (Doc. 110 ¶ 18; Doc. 118 ¶ 18.) Lutz stayed late to talk to Mariam and be with her 

that day. (Doc. 110 ¶ 19; Doc. 118 ¶ 19.) Mariam thanked Lutz for speaking with her. 

(Doc. 110 ¶ 20; Doc. 118 ¶ 20.) 

After Mariam left, Lutz told Ling that Mariam had opened up to her and what they

had discussed. (Doc. 110 ¶ 21; Doc. 118 ¶ 21.) Ling told Lutz that Mariam had also 

opened up to Ling when they spoke earlier that day and said it was a good thing that Mariam 

had begun to open up. (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 22-23; Doc. 118 ¶¶ 22-23.) Lutz was shocked and 

sad when she learned that Mariam committed suicide. (Doc. 110 ¶ 26.) 

Mariam never told Lutz that she had a problem with other inmates or ADC staff and 

never requested to be moved out of her unit. (Doc. 110 ¶ 27; Doc. 118 ¶ 27.) Months later, 

some inmates told Lutz that Mariam was being harassed in the unit, but Lutz did not know 

it at the time. (Doc. 110 ¶ 28; Doc. 118 ¶ 28.) Lutz does not have access to any inmate’s 

medical or mental health records and is not a licensed mental health provider. (Doc. 110 ¶ 

30; Doc. 118 ¶ 30.) 

B. Arguments

Defendant Lutz asserts that there was nothing in the conversation between her and 

Plaintiff that could be characterized as a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s 

pain or possible medical need. Lutz asserts that even knowing Mariam’s history of selfharm and suicidal issues, there was nothing in Mariam’s demeanor or conduct during their 

interaction the day Mariam died that would have led Lutz to believe Mariam had a serious 

medical need or that there was an excessive risk to Mariam’s health. 

. . . .

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Lutz asserts that she specifically asked Mariam if she wanted to talk to PA Ling, but 

Mariam said she was fine and did not want to go to Mental Health, and that Lutz went to 

Ling to discuss the conversation she had with Mariam. Lutz asserts that she acted 

reasonably by asking Mariam if she wanted to speak to a psychiatric associate and telling 

the psychiatric associate about the conversation. Lutz asserts that there is no evidence that 

the conversation she had with Mariam was the cause of her suicide, and that she had 

nothing to do with Mariam’s housing assignment, who she lived with, or where she lived.

Plaintiff argues that Lutz’s decision to speak with Mariam in private about topics 

that Lutz knew to be disturbing to Mariam, without a trained mental health provider 

present, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether these decisions rise to 

deliberate indifference to Mariam’s serious health need. Plaintiff asserts that “Lutz should 

have known that the purpose of separating the security and mental health roles is because 

patients should be able to trust mental health staff in order to give them accurate 

information on which to base treatment, and not fear restraint for having been candid about 

their ideation.” (Doc. 116 at 11-12.) 

C. Discussion

Mariam’s was a tragic loss, but there is no evidence in this record that Lutz acted 

with deliberate indifference to Mariam’s serious medical needs. Although the evidence 

shows that Lutz knew that Mariam had a serious medical need in the form of serious mental 

health issues, the record evidence does not support that Lutz was deliberately indifferent 

to her serious medical needs. Rather, the evidence shows that Mariam asked to speak with 

Lutz and Lutz complied. 

Plaintiff appears to argue that Lutz should have known that speaking to Mariam 

would exacerbate her serious mental health issues, but there is nothing in the record to 

support this assertion. Indeed, if Lutz had refused to speak with Mariam, it is possible that 

such refusal could constitute indifference to Mariam’s needs. Rather, the undisputed 

evidence shows that Lutz agreed to speak with Mariam and then asked Mariam if she would 

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like to see Ling, but Mariam declined to speak with Ling. The fact that Lutz did not force 

a meeting with Ling does not constitute deliberate indifference. 

With regard to the content of their conversation, the undisputed evidence shows that 

Lutz was trying to be supportive of Mariam. As Plaintiff points out, Lutz was not a 

qualified mental health expert and may have upset Mariam by criticizing or joking about 

her ability to pick boyfriends, but whether Mariam was upset by this conversation is 

conjecture. 

In sum, the evidence in the record shows that Lutz was responsive to Mariam’s 

needs, that she asked Mariam if she would like to see Ling, but Mariam refused, and there 

was no evidence in Mariam’s demeanor that she needed to be seen immediately by Ling. 

The fact that Lutz was unqualified to assess Mariam’s mental state does not equate to 

conscious disregard of Mariam’s serious medical needs or that she subjected Mariam to 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Accordingly, Defendant Lutz’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment will be granted. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Ryan’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 97) and Defendant Lutz’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 109). 

(2) Defendant Ryan’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 97) is granted. 

Defendant Ryan is dismissed from this action with prejudice.

(3) Defendant Lutz’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 109) is granted. 

Defendant Lutz is dismissed from this action with prejudice. 

(4) The remaining claims in this action are: (1) Count One Eighth Amendment 

claims against Defendants Ling and Corizon; and (2) Count Three Wrongful Death claims 

against Defendants Ling and Corizon.

Dated this 22nd day of May, 2020.

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