Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00199/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00199-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Seaside was erroneously served as "County of Monterey Seaside Police Department."

2 Beasley did appear for the hearing long after the scheduled time and after defense

counsel had left.

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

C-06-00199 RMW

SPT

E-filed on: 9/7/06

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CURTIS BEASLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY SEASIDE

POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

No. C-06-00199 RMW

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

Re Docket Nos. [27, 31]

 Defendant City of Seaside ("Seaside")1 moves to dismiss pro se plaintiff Curtis Beasley's

("Beasley") first amended complaint ("FAC") for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for a

more definite statement. Beasley did not file either an opposition or notice of non-opposition.2

Seaside also requests the court to grant summary disposition of its motion to dismiss because of

Beasley's failure to oppose the motion to dismiss. The court declines to do so. The court has

reviewed the parties' papers and considered their arguments. For the reasons set forth below, the

court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

Case 5:06-cv-00199-RMW Document 34 Filed 09/07/06 Page 1 of 6
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3 Plaintiff appears to contend that "throughout the criminal proceedings" the

prosecution never informed plaintiff that he could hire private counsel.

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

C-06-00199 RMW

SPT 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

On November 24, 2004, three Seaside police officers approached seventy year old Beasley at

his residence and immediately informed him he was under arrest. FAC at 2. Beasley was unarmed. 

Id. Beasley alleges that the officers then entered his residence, closed the door, and proceeded to (1)

grab and twist his arm in a complete circular motion, (2) forcefully stab him continuously in the

abdomen with a baton, and (3) kick him after he fell to his knees until he was flat on the ground

before handcuffing him and shackling both his legs. Id. at 2-3. The officers continued to strike

Beasley in the back with a baton as they walked him to the police car. Id. at 3. When placing him

into the police car, one officer allegedly pushed Beasley's head so forcefully against the car roof that

he suffered "blurred vision and pain." Id. Immediately after Beasley arrived at the Seaside police

station, he was taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries and an x-ray for fractures. Id.

Beasley was then booked into Monterey County Jail. Id. Beasley contends that while in custody, he

was deliberately deprived access to prescription medication. Id. at 3-4.

Beasley contends that he was not made aware of the Miranda rule at the time of his arrest

which deprived him from seeking private legal counsel.3

 Id. at 2. Beasley alleges that while he was

in custody awaiting trial the prosecution offered "complete liberty in exchange for a guilty

confession" on numerous occasions. Id. at 3. Beasley contends that the prosecution "continuously

harassed and attempted to coach the plaintiff to perjure [himself] by pleading guilty to all criminal

charges without any evidence." Id. Beasley also states that the prosecution attempted to plea

bargain with him well over twenty-one times during the two years before the matter was brought to

trial. Id.

Beasley was tried in the Superior Court of the State of California. On December 14, 2005,

after a three day jury trial, Beasley was found guilty of one count of spousal battery against his wife,

one count of battery against his wife, one count of child endangerment, and one count of resisting

arrest. Id.; Seaside's Mot. Dismiss at 1-2. Beasley was sentenced January 12, 2006.

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ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

C-06-00199 RMW

SPT 3

B. Procedural History

Beasley filed his initial complaint on January 11, 2006, and defendants Seaside and Judge

Gary E. Meyer filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for more definite statement. On May

5, 2006 the court issued an order granting Judge Meyer's motion to dismiss with prejudice and

granting Seaside's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Beasley's filed a first amended complaint

and defendant Seaside filed the present motion to dismiss (or for more definite statement). 

The FAC asserts "defendants deliberately violated plaintiff's constitutional privileges

guaranteed by the 14th, 8th, and 5th Amendments." Based on the facts alleged, Beasley appears to

assert defendants deprived him of certain constitutional rights in connection with his November 24,

2004 arrest and subsequent incarceration. Beasley generally claims: (1) excessive force in

connection with his arrest, (2) deliberate deprivation of access to prescription medication while

incarcerated, (3) "continuous" harassment by the prosecution in attempting to get him to plead

guilty, and (4) omission of Miranda warnings for his arrest and criminal proceedings. FAC at 2-4. 

Beasley also alleges that defendant "falsified reports" and "assigned the plaintiff legal counsel." Id.

at 2. In moving to dismiss Beasley's complaint, Seaside treats Beasley's complaint as attempting to

state 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for excessive force in violation of Beasley's Fourth (and Fourteenth)

Amendment rights, a Fifth Amendment violation for omitting Miranda warnings, and violations of

plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.

II. ANALYSIS

The court's May 5, 2006 Order dismissed Beasley's section 1983 claims because the

complaint failed to allege that Seaside, by official policy, practice, or custom caused the alleged

deprivations of Beasley's constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not sued any individual police officers.

Under Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), actions by law enforcement

officers or employees do not create a § 1983 claim against a local government absent a showing that

the alleged violation was a result of official policy: 

[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by

its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity

is responsible under § 1983.

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4 As in its prior motion to dismiss, Seaside relies heavily upon Suhag v. City of Lake

Forest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401 (2002) to invalidate Beasley's § 1983 claim on the basis that a claim

of excessive force necessarily implies the invalidity of Beasley's Penal Code § 148(a)(1) jury

conviction. Seaside's Mot. Dismiss at 4-6. In Suhag, a California appellate court concluded that

"any claim of excessive force based on discrete acts that occurred immediately preceding [the

plaintiff's] arrest is barred by . . . Heck . . . since a finding in his favor would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction." 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1410. However, in Smith the Ninth Circuit's

majority opinion distinguished Suhag. Smith, 394 F.3d at 699 n.5 (disagreeing with the dissent's

reliance on Suhag). 

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

C-06-00199 RMW

SPT 4

Id. at 694. As with the initial complaint, the FAC is devoid of any allegations that the asserted

deprivations of constitutional rights were a result of Seaside's official policy, practice, or custom. 

Absent such allegations, Beasley's § 1983 claims against Seaside cannot survive. Beasley has not

sued any individual police officers who would be proper defendants under § 1983. 

As additional grounds for its motion Seaside again argues that Beasley's claims would

otherwise be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because the success of the claims

would necessarily imply the invalidity of Beasley's standing conviction for resisting arrest. Here,

Beasley's jury conviction of resisting arrest under Penal Code § 148(a)(1) has not been held invalid. 

As noted in the court's May 5, 2006 Order, under Heck if "a criminal conviction arising out of the

same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section

1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed." Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951,

952 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the May 5, 2006 Order also recognized that allegations of excessive

force that occurred after the arrest could be grounds for a section 1983 claim. See Smith v. City of

Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that "conduct that occurred before the

officers commence the process of arresting the defendant" and "excessive force used after a

defendant has been arrested may properly be the subject of a § 1983 action notwithstanding the

defendant's conviction on a charge of resisting an arrest that was itself lawfully conducted").4

Beasley appears to complain, in part, that excessive force was used after his arrest and after the

conduct underlying his Penal Code § 148(a)(1) conviction. Nevertheless, as discussed above,

Beasley's claims fail because he has not set forth the requisite threshold pleadings that defendant

Seaside acted pursuant to policy, practice, or custom.

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ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

C-06-00199 RMW

SPT 5

Finally, Beasley's allegations that he was not given Miranda warnings fail to state a claim

because he has not alleged use of any coerced statements. The Supreme Court has rejected the

notion that "mere compulsion [in violation of Miranda] violates the Self-Incrimination Clause." 

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003). Rather, "Miranda's safeguards [are] not themselves

rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against

compulsory self-incrimination was protected." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's

complaint for failure to state a claim against Seaside with leave to amend. Plaintiff has twenty (20)

days to amend his complaint.

DATED: 9/6/06

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SEASIDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

C-06-00199 RMW

SPT 6

THIS SHALL CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WAS PROVIDED TO:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

Curtis Beasley

P.O. Box 492

Seaside, CA 93955

Counsel for Defendants:

Thomas E. Francis tfrancis@bfka-law.com 

Lee A. Wood rnassar@leeawoodlaw.com;

ksmith@leeawoodlaw.com

Paul T. Hammerness paul.hammerness@doj.ca.gov 

Bill Lockyer

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 9/7/06 SPT

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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