Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04866/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04866-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BAY AREA CELLULAR TELEPHONE

COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA

PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A AT & T WIRELESS,

Plaintiff, No. C 03-4866 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART 

AND DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN IN PART

FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, et al.

Defendants.

_______________________________/

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment came on for hearing on November 2,

2005 before this court. Plaintiff Bay Area Cellular Telephone, d/b/a AT & T Wireless (“ATTW”)

appeared through its counsel, Marc E. Miller, and defendants the City and County of San

Francisco et al. (“the City”) appeared through their counsel, William K. Sanders. Having read

all the papers submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion for summary judgment, for the

reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows. 

BACKGROUND

ATTW provides wireless telecommunication services in the Bay Area. On April 23,

2002, ATTW applied to the City for a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to install a wireless

facility atop a commercial building located near the intersection of 10th Ave. and Geary

Boulevard in San Francisco. See Declaration of Chung-Han Lee in Support of ATTW’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Lee Decl.”) Ex. 1. ATTW claims it needs this installation to

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1 The court refers herein to the administrative record, which was filed by the Cityas

“Certified Copy of the Administrative Record,” as “AR.” 

2

In addition to these four causes of action, ATTW brought a claim against the City

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, at the hearing counsel for ATTW stated that this claim

was being withdrawn. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. 

2

better serve its customers in the Richmond district. 

The San Francisco Planning Commission held a hearing on ATTW’s application, and

conditionally approved it on July 17, 2003. Lee Decl. Ex. 5 at 066-72. A month later, on

August 15, 2003, local resident Betty Chiao filed an appeal of the Planning Commission’s

decision with the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (the “Board”). Lee Decl. Ex. 6 at 084-

87. The stated grounds for the appeal were that “the proposed facility is unnecessary,

undesirable, and incompatible with the existing character of the neighborhood.” Id. at 086.

On September 16, 2003, the Board held a public hearing on the appeal of the Planning

Commission’s decision. Lee Decl. Ex. 7. At the hearing, a number of community residents

testified to varying degrees that ATTW’s proposed facility is undesirable, and unnecessary. 

Id. Many community residents also submitted evidence that wireless coverage in the area is

adequate. AR1 040-45, 019-26, 047-51, 108-118. ATTW, for its part, submitted the

testimony of a Planning Commission representative, as well as technical engineers, to

address the issues of necessity and adequate coverage. Lee Decl. Ex. 7 at 055-65. 

After hearing the evidence before it, the Board unanimously voted to deny ATTW the

CUP. Lee Decl. Ex. 8. The Board then adopted written findings and issued a written denial

on September 30, 2003. Lee Decl. Exs. 9-10. 

As a result of the Board’s decision, ATTW claims the City violated section 332(c)(7) of

the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”). See 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Specifically,

ATTW asserts the following four causes of action2: (1) that the Board violated the substantial

evidence requirement of the TCA; (2) that the Board improperly based its decision on the

environmental effects of radio frequency emissions; (3) that the Board unreasonably

discriminated against ATTW; and (4) that the Board’s decision improperly prohibited the

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3 The parties have also concurrently filed: (1) requests for judicial notice of certain

sections of the San Francisco Planning Code, Charter, and WTS Guidelines; (2) requests for

administrative leave to file certaindocuments under seal; and (3) objections to evidence (filed on

behalf ofthe Cityonly). The court hereby: (1) GRANTS both parties’ judicial notice requests; (2)

GRANTS the administrative requests, with the exception of the parties’ briefs, which the court

declines to file under seal; and (3) SUSTAINS the City’s objections to evidence, with the

exception of the City’s objection to Ex. G of the Lee Declaration, which the court OVERRULES.

 

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provision of personal wireless services. 

Both parties now move for summary judgment on all four claims.3 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows there is no genuine issue

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The court will resolve all disputed

issues of fact in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. 

B. Substantial Evidence

Under the TCA, a local government’s decision to deny a request to construct a wireless

facility must be based upon “substantial evidence.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). A city’s

decision is considered supported by substantial evidence if the record contains “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

MetroPCS, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 2005);

Telespectrum v. Public Service Commission, 227 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 2000). This requires

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance.” MetroPCS, F.3d at 725. In

conducting such a review, the court must examine the entire record, including evidence

unfavorable to the city. Id.

The parties’ arguments regarding the substantial evidence requirement are twofold:

first, the partes raise arguments as to the proper scope of applicable laws that the Board was

required to consider. Specifically, ATTW claims that the Board was required to take the

Wireless Telecommunications Services Facilities Siting Guidelines (“WTS Guidelines”),

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adopted by the Planning Commission in 1996, into account. The City maintains that only the

Planning Code controls. Second, the parties dispute whether the actual evidence considered

by the Board, including the public testimony by local residents, is sufficient to satisfy the

substantial evidence requirement. 

1. Scope of Applicable Laws

 When conducting a “substantial evidence” inquiry, “local and state zoning laws govern

the weight to be given the evidence.” MetroPCS, F.3d at 725. A city’s interpretation of its

own zoning laws “is entitled to great weight and should be respected by the court unless it is

clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 70 Cal. App.

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th 281, 290 (1999). 

The WTS Guidelines were enacted by the Planning Commission with the aim of

providing “comprehensive policies and guidelines” for use in evaluating applications for

CUPs. See Lee Decl., Ex. 3 at 1183-84. On their face, the Guidelines do not purport to be

duly enacted laws. Rather, they are a statement of policies that set forth the applicable

standards under which the Planning Commission is to apply the Planning Code. Id. As such,

they do not have the force of binding law. 

Accordingly, there is no basis here for enlarging the scope of the substantial evidence

inquiry to include the WTS Guidelines in addition to the Planning Code (which neither side

disputes does have the force of binding law). 

2. Sufficiency of Evidence 

ATTW urges the court to consider the weight of the evidence considered by the Board. 

Specifically, it takes issue with the anecdotal and personal testimony in evidence at the

hearing before the Board, and argues that in view of ATTW’s technical testimony, such

anecdotal and personal testimony cannot qualify as substantial. 

The Ninth Circuit’s MetroPCS decision considered this same argument, and controls

here. In MetroPCS, as here, the Board had denied a CUP application on the basis of oral

testimony and numerous written petitions from local neighborhood residents, reporting that

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adequate wireless coverage already existed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this court’s holding

that such evidence was substantial. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the

Board’s inquiry into this issue was not a model of thoroughness or rigor,” but taken in totality,

the evidence constituted a showing that at the very least, “a reasonable mind might accept” as

adequate. 400 F.3d at 726. 

So here. It is undisputed that the record reflects testimony on the part of many

residents (at least 20) stating that the wireless coverage was adequate, and that there was no

need for the proposed facility. See generally Lee Decl., Ex. 7. It is also undisputed that the

Board’s findings state that they were grounding their decision to overturn the Planning

Commission’s ruling on the fact that the proposed facility was unnecessary, pursuant to the

Planning Code. Lee Decl., Ex. 10. Even though ATTW also submitted “technical” evidence to

the contrary, this court finds that, under MetroPCS, “a reasonable mind” might accept the

testimony before the Board as adequate. 

Accordingly, summary judgment as to ATTW’s substantial evidence claim is

GRANTED in favor of the City, and DENIED as to ATTW. 

C. RF Emissions

ATTW claims that the City based its denial on the purported adverse environmental

effects of radio frequency (“RF”) emissions, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). 

Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) states: “No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may

regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities

on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such

facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.” See also

MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 736; Iowa Wireless Services, L.P. v. City of Moline, 29 F. Supp. 2d

915, 924 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (emissions may not be the sole reason for the denial of a permit).

MetroPCS again controls. There, the Ninth Circuit found that the Board did not

improperly base its decision on environmental concerns, despite the fact that many of the

opponents of MetroPCS’ CUP application stated at the hearing that their comments were

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based on health concerns. See 400 F.3d at 736. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit found

instructive the fact that the Board’s formal decision did not once mention RF emissions, and

the Board never stated that it was basing its decision on all public comments. 

The same result is mandated here. ATTW has pointed to the existence of three

comments at the hearing which were purportedly motivated by concern over RF emissions. 

AR 047-48, 054. However, even assuming this to be the case (only one comment actually

claims that the installation would cause negative health effects), it is undisputed that these

comments represent a small minority of the total evidence considered by the Board, and that

the Board at any rate expressly stated that its decision was not based on concerns over RF

emissions. AR 129. As such, the holding in MetroPCS controls. 

ATTW urges the court to view the Board’s findings as a mere pretext, and to look past

the findings to determine that the Board was in actuality motivated by concerns over adverse

health effects. The court declines to do so. In the first place, ATTW provides no authority for

overlooking and contravening the Board’s express findings where, as here, the only

undisputed evidence ATTW can point to is a small sample of testimony that only ambiguously

lends support for its argument. In the second, ATTW’s argument flies directly in the face of

MetroPCS, which, as stated above, requires a finding that the City did not improperly base its

decision on adverse health effects under the undisputed facts here. Accordingly, summary

judgment as to ATTW’s claim that the City improperly based its decision on adverse health

effects is GRANTED in favor of the City, and DENIED as to ATTW. 

D. Unreasonable Discrimination

ATTW next asserts that the City unreasonably discriminated against it in violation of 47

U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(I) of the TCA. This provision states that “[t]he regulation of the

placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State

or local government or instrumentality thereof – (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among

providers of functionally equivalent services.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(I). 

In determining whether a CUP should be granted to a telecommunications services

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4 During the time period in question here,Cingular was known as Pacific Bell. For

purposes of this order, however, the court refers to Cingular by its current name. 

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provider, the Ninth Circuit has held that “some discrimination among providers of functionally

equivalent services is allowed. Any discrimination need only be reasonable.” MetroPCS, 400

F.3d at 727; see also Sprint Spectrum v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 638 (2d Cir. 1999). In

demonstrating that discrimination is not reasonable, “providers alleging unreasonable

discrimination must show that they have been treated differently from other providers whose

facilities are ‘similarly situated’ in terms of the ‘structure, placement or cumulative impact’ as

the facilities in question.” MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 727. 

Here, ATTW bases its unreasonable discrimination claim on the fact that (1) the City

previously granted Cingular4 the right to have its wireless facility on the very same Property in

question; and (2) the City also previously granted Metricom the right to place 16 antennas on

the same Property. Accordingly, the issue before the court is whether the City’s denial of

ATTW’s CUP was reasonable in light of the permits previously granted to Cingular and

Metricom regarding the same Property. 

1. Cingular

The City does not dispute that it previously granted Cingular the right to house a

wireless facility on the same Property on which ATTW now seeks to install its own. It

contends, however, that its decision to deny ATTW’s CUP is nonetheless reasonable because

ATTW and Cingular are not “similarly situated,” as contemplated under MetroPCS. This is so,

argues the City, by virtue of (a) the cumulative impact that a second wireless facility would

have on the neighborhood; and (b) the different permit process that governed the grant of the

City’s permit to Cingular. 

While the City fails to prove the first of these, it persuasively argues the second.

(a) cumulative impact 

The City correctly asserts that proof of cumulative impact on a property already housing

other facilities may, in some cases, render the denial of additional facilities reasonable. See,

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e.g., Airtouch Cellular v. City of El Cajon, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2000). This

argument does not actually benefit the City, however, for the City has not pointed to any

evidence in the record demonstrating the cumulative impact that ATTW’s facility would have

on the property. Indeed, the City relies solely on various provisions contained in the WTS

Guidelines for support of its cumulative impact argument. The WTS Guidelines, as already

stated, are non-binding policies adopted by the Planning Commission for aid in evaluating

CUP applications. They cannot take the place of factual evidence. 

As such, the City cannot prove that its denial of ATTW’s CUP was reasonable by virtue

of the cumulative impact of ATTW’s proposed facility. 

(b) permit process

It is undisputed that at the time that Cingular was allowed to install a wireless facility on

the same Property on which ATTW seeks to install its facility (i.e., in 1995), the permit process

governing the installation of wireless facilities was different. Specifically, under applicable city

law at the time, Cingular only needed to apply for a building permit issued by the City’s

Department of Building Inspection, rather than a CUP. See Ionin Declaration in Support of the

City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. A. Accordingly, Cingular was not required,

as ATTW was, to demonstrate compliance and/or compatibility with the Planning Code prior

to issuance of its permit. 

The issue before the court is whether the City’s denial of ATTW’s CUP was

unreasonable given the change in permit process that had taken place. The court can find no

authority, nor have the parties cited any, dealing with this issue of an intervening change in law. 

The issue is one of first impression. As such, the court holds that the City’s denial of ATTW’s

CUP was not unreasonable. It simply cannot, and should not, be said that the City’s denial of

a subsequent permit is unreasonable where – as here – such a claim is based on the prior

grant of a building permit nearly 10 years earlier, pursuant to different law, taking into

consideration different factors, and issued by a different governing body. Indeed, to hold

otherwise would expose the City to potential discrimination claims for all prior permits issued

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5 The City argues that, as an initial matter, ATTW cannot proceed on its claims

regarding Metricom because ATTW failed to make any allegations as to Metricom in its

complaint (though neither party disputes that the allegations came to light through the course of

proper discovery). At the hearing, the court raised, and ATTW was amenable to, the issue of

amending the complaint in order to include the Metricom allegations. Despite this exchange, the

court herebydeems the Metricom allegations incorporated as part ofATTW’s complaint. ATTW

need not separately amend its complaint. 

6 The City also argues that no unreasonable discrimination occurred because

Metricom is notsimilarly situated to ATTW, in thatthe Metricom CUP was never appealed to the

Board. The court finds this argument unpersuasive; contrary to the different permit process in

effect for Cingular, a mere failure to appeal does not qualify as a sufficient change in law or

process, on its own, to circumvent a finding of unreasonable discrimination. 

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under different laws and pursuant to different procedures. This, in turn, would render

meaningless the evaluations and findings made by both the Board and the Planning

Commission in choosing to grant those prior permit holders the right to install their various

facilities. This cannot be what the TCA contemplated when it was enacted. 

Accordingly, on the issue of whether the City unreasonably discriminated against ATTW,

based on the City’s prior grant of a building permit to Cingular, summary judgment is

GRANTED in favor of the City, and DENIED as to ATTW. 

2. Metricom5

ATTW asserts, as a secondary ground for finding unreasonable discrimination, that the

City discriminated against it by previously granting Metricom a CUP to install 16 antennas on

the same Property on which ATTW now seeks to install its own. The City does not dispute that

it granted Metricom the above CUP, but asserts that this can provide no basis for a finding of

unreasonable discrimination since Metricom did not provide “personal wireless services” that

were “functionally equivalent” to those provided by ATTW.6

(a) “personal wireless services”

The parties dispute whether Metricom is a provider of “personal wireless services,” as

that term is defined under the TCA. The TCA, somewhat unhelpfully, defines the term

“personal wireless services” to mean “commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless

services, and common carrier wireless exchange access services.” See 47 U.S.C. §

332(c)(7)(C)(I). ATTW contends that the court should rely on the definition provided by the

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In Sprint Spectrum, the Second Circuit did not engage in an analysis of what

“personal wireless services” means with respect to the unreasonable discrimination claim, but

rather with respect to the prohibitionof wireless services claim. While ATTW contends that this

distinction makes the case inapposite for our purposes, the court disagrees. The definition for

“personalwireless services” thatapplies to the prohibitionof wireless services claimis based on

the same definition that applies to unreasonable discrimination claims under the TCA. See 47

U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(b)(i)(I-II) and (C)(i-iii). Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s analysis is relevant

to the unreasonable discrimination claim we face here. 

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TCA itself in resolving this inquiry. The City contends that the definition provided by Sprint

Spectrum v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999), in which “personal wireless services” was

interpreted to refer to voice telephone services only, should control. 

Neither the court nor the parties have found any Ninth Circuit authority in which the term

“personal wireless services” is defined. As such, the court is free to look to persuasive

authority as a guide. Sprint Spectrum, however, does not provide that guidance. 

In Sprint Spectrum, Sprint desired to convert its analog cellular technology in the

Buffalo, New York area to PCS technology, which utilized digital cellular technology. When

Sprint’s application to do so was denied by local authorities, Sprint claimed it had been

unreasonably discriminated against, and that local authorities had improperly prohibited the

provision of personal wireless services, all in violation of the TCA. In analyzing Sprint’s claims,

the Second Circuit concluded that, “in the context of [that] case,” the definition of “personal

wireless services” referred to “the ability of mobile, handheld telephones to reach a cell site

that provides access to a land-line exchange and allows phone calls to be made to and from

the national telephone network.” Sprint Spectrum, 176 F.3d at 641. In other words, “personal

wireless services” was construed to refer solely to telephone services.7

While the City understandably urges this court to adopt a similar definition, this

argument is too forced. The TCA would be rendered obsolete as a policy matter, if “personal

wireless services” were read to refer only to telephone services. The concept of wireless

services is constantly evolving, and technological advances – especially since 1999, when

Sprint Spectrum was decided – have brought the wireless provider market to the point where

traditional telephone-only service providers are now providing services that expand beyond

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the boundaries of telephone service alone. Indeed, ATTW itself is proof of this, as by its own

admissions, it attempts to upgrade its services to provide newer offerings that include the

provision of Internet services. See, e.g., Lee Decl. Ex. 4. As such, the court finds that the

overall purpose and intent of the TCA supports a broader definition of “personal wireless

services” rather than the narrower definition espoused by Sprint Spectrum. 

Moreover, this finding is consistent with the TCA’s stated definition for “personal

wireless services,” which is defined to mean, in part, “unlicensed wireless services.” This

definition on its face is broad enough to encompass Metricom’s offerings, which include, by

the City’s own admission, “wireless Internet services on unlicensed spectrum.” See

Declaration of Jonathan L. Kramer in Opposition to ATTW’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Kramer Decl.”), ¶ 10. 

As such, Metricom is deemed a provider of “personal wireless services” pursuant to 47

U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(I) of the TCA. 

(b) “functionally equivalent”

The parties also dispute whether the services that Metricom and ATTW provide are

“functionally equivalent.” ATTW asserts that they are, as both Metricom and ATTW sought to

provide wireless Internet services. The City contends they are not, and points to the Kramer

Declaration in support of the fact that Metricom’s Internet services are not functionally

equivalent to ATTW’s “voice telephone services.” See Kramer Decl., ¶ 11. 

Preliminarily, the court must first address what the term “functionally equivalent” means. 

Again, there is no controlling Ninth Circuit authority that addresses the definition of, or

requirements for, “functional equivalence” under the TCA. As such, both parties again urge

the adoption of sister circuit case law in deciding the issue. The City relies on Aegerter v. City

of Delafield, Wisconsin, 174 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 1999), and ATTW relies on Nextel West Corp.

v. Unity Township, 282 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2002). 

In Aegerter, the issue was whether a provider of a one-way paging service was

functionally equivalent to two-way cellular telephone service. In holding that the two were not

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functionally equivalent, the Seventh Circuit crafted its own interpretation of what “functionally

equivalent” means. In sum, the court analogized the functional equivalence test under the TCA

to the relevant market analysis that must be undertaken under antitrust law, and held that

functional equivalence exists if two services or products are direct substitutes for one another

(which inquiry in turn took into account service, product, and cost comparison). See 174 F.3d

at 891. 

Nextel West, by contrast, took a broader approach and held that “the equivalency of

function relates to the telecommunications services the entity provides, not to the technical

particularities (design, technology, or frequency) of its operations.” 282 F.3d at 266 n.13. It

then went on to hold that Nextel and Sprint, the two competing providers in that case, were

functionally equivalent, as they both provided “personal wireless communications services” to

remote users. 

The court finds that Nextel West provides the better approach. Though broad in its

definition of “functional equivalence,” there is no question but that it purports to mirror the

language of the TCA itself, while the antitrust analysis that Aegerter employs is tenuous, at

best; there is no indication in any persuasive authority that antitrust law is regularly employed

as an analogous field of law in the telecommunications arena. Accordingly, the court hereby

finds that “functional equivalence,” as referenced in the TCA, relates to the

telecommunications services that the actual competing entities provide, and does not relate to

the specific design, technology, or frequencies employed in the operation of the

telecommunications services themselves. 

Having made this determination, the court must now decide whether, under the above

definition, Metricom and ATTW provide equivalent telecommunications services. The City,

through the Kramer Declaration, indicates that the two entities do not provide equivalent

services, since Metricom provided “wireless Internet services on unlicensed spectrum,” and

ATTW “provides voice telephone services to its subscribers ... pursuant to a license issued by

the Federal Communications Commission.” Kramer Decl., ¶¶ 10-11. ATTW, by contrast,

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points to the fact that both ATTW and Metricom sought to provide Internet services. See, e.g.,

Lee Decl. Ex. 4 at D0659, D0692-93. 

Given this competing testimony regarding the actual services provided by ATTW and

Metricom, the court finds that a triable issue of fact exists as to the extent and nature of the

services offered by both entities. Only after consideration of all the evidence as to this issue,

can the court correctly decide whether any unreasonable discrimination among functionally

equivalent providers has occurred. 

Accordingly, on the issue of whether the City unreasonably discriminated against

ATTW, based on the City’s prior grant of a building permit to Metricom, summary judgment is

DENIED as to both parties. 

E. Prohibition of Wireless Services

ATTW claims that the City’s decision has the effect of prohibiting the provision of

wireless services, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Section 332(c)(7)(B)(I) states

that: “[t]he regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless

service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof – (II) shall not

prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.” 

A plaintiff can prove that it is prohibited from providing wireless services by proving that

it has been “prevented from filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.” See

MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733 (noting also that “significant gap” determinations are “extremely

fact-specific inquiries that defy any bright-line legal rule.”). Once a wireless service provider

has demonstrated that the requisite significant gap in coverage exists, it must then make

some showing that the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in service “is the

least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve.” Id. at 734-35. 

1. Significant Gap

The parties dispute whether a “significant gap” in ATTW’s coverage exists. Both

parties seek to prove the significant gap issue through presentation of expert testimony. But

as to that expert testimony, the parties are at odds. ATTW attacks the expert testimony of the

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8 Preliminarily, the parties dispute whether consideration should be given to events

that occurred after the denial ofATTW’s CUP application. ATTW contends that the court should

not consider lesser intrusive alternatives post-denial, as these alternatives would nothave been

available at the time the CUP was considered. The City disagrees. The court finds ATTW’s

argument persuasive and resolves the issue in favor of ATTW. 

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City’s expert, Mr. Kramer. See Lee Reply Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. F. The City, by contrast, attacks

ATTW’s expert, Mr. Pontin. See e.g., Declaration of William Sanders in Opposition to

ATTW’s Motion, Ex. A. Both allege that the testimony discloses opposite results – that either

a significant gap did, or did not, exist. Accordingly, the dispute is material, and the trier of fact

is entitled to assess the evidence and choose what weight to give it. 

2. Least Intrusive Means 

For the reasons above, the court need not even reach the “least intrusive” element, but

even if it did, it would find that the same is true as above – the parties materially dispute the

various alternatives that would have been available to ATTW as a means of filling any

purported “significant gap.”8 

In essence, the parties dispute whether ATTW could have converted its existing TDMA

facilities to GSM facilities, retained ownership of the Cingular facility already existing on the

Property, or allowed its customers to obtain service from the T-Mobile wireless services

network. These disputes are material in that they directly bear on whether they were the least

intrusive means for ATTW to fulfill any significant gap, if it existed. 

Accordingly, on the issue of whether the City prohibited the provision of wireless

services in violation of the TCA, summary judgment is DENIED as to both parties. 

F. Conclusion

Summary judgment as to ATTW’s claim that the Board violated the substantial

evidence requirement of the TCA is GRANTED as to the City and DENIED as to ATTW. 

Summary judgment as to ATTW’s claim that the Board improperly based its decision on the

environmental effects of radio frequency emissions is GRANTED as to the City and DENIED

as to ATTW. Summary judgment as to ATTW’s unreasonable discrimination claim is

GRANTED as to the City and DENIED as to ATTW, but only as to ATTW’s allegations

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regarding Cingular; summary judgment on this claim is DENIED as to both parties as to

ATTW’s allegations regarding Metricom. Finally, summary judgment as to ATTW’s claim that

the Board’s decision improperly prohibited the provision of personal wireless services is

DENIED as to both parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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