Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01645/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01645-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HENDON, No. CIV S-06-1645-DFL-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

WALKER, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondents’ motion to

dismiss (Doc. 8). Petitioner has not filed an opposition. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges prison disciplinary actions occurring between 1997 and

2002. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court

on March 15, 2003. That petition was denied on April 18, 2003. Petition then filed a petition in

the California Court of Appeal on September 22, 2003, which was denied on October 9, 2003. 

Almost three years later, on May 18, 2006, petitioner filed a second petition in the California

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Court of Appeal raising the same claims as his prior petitions. That petition was denied on May

25, 2006. Finally, petitioner sought relief in the California Supreme Court on June 20, 2006,

which denied the request on July 12, 2006. The instant federal petition was filed on July 26,

2006. 

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues, among other things, that the instant petition is untimely and

that petitioner has failed to state a claim. The court agrees. 

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of:

(1) the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek

direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period begins running the

day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). Imposition of a state procedural bar, however, does not

necessarily render the application improperly filed. See id. at 9. For example, California’s rule

governing the timeliness of bringing an application for post-conviction relief is subject to

numerous exceptions. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993). Because the state court would be

required to examine the merits of a petition before deciding whether an exception applies, it

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should be considered by the federal court to have been properly filed, even if untimely. See

Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2001). A state court application for postconviction relief is “pending”during all the time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use

of state court procedures, to present his claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between state court applications, however,

there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state

court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as untimely, the federal court must

independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id. at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

Here, because petitioner challenged an administrative decision, the one-year

statute of limitations began to run under § 2244(d)(1)(D) when the petitioner became aware of

the factual predicate for his claim. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 

According to the petition, petitioner became aware of his claim at the earliest in 1997 and at the

latest in 2002. If he became aware of the claim in 1997, the one-year statute of limitations ran

before he filed his first state habeas petition in 2003. If he became aware of his claim in 2002 (

which seems unlikely given that he presented habeas petitions prior to that), the instant petition

would still be untimely because he waited until 2006 to file his second petition in the California

Court of Appeal. 

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To the extent petitioner would assert that he is entitled to tolling for the time

between his state court petitions, the court does not agree. Where the petitioner unreasonably

delays between state court applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. The

court finds that the delay between October 9, 2003 – when his second petition was denied – and

May 18, 2006 – when his third petition was filed – is unreasonable and petitioner offers no

argument to the contrary. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be granted;

2. This petition be dismissed; and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 24, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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