Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03915/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03915-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joshua Patrick Driggs,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-03915-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

At issue is Defendant Social Security Commissioner’s Motion to Transfer Pursuant 

to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 or, in the alternative, to Stay All Proceedings Pending 

Class-Certification Decision in a Related Case (Doc. 20). Defendant argues that transfer is 

appropriate because Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald is currently handling a case 

“raising essentially the same questions of law that Plaintiff” raises here. (Doc. 20 at 1.) Ely 

v. Berryhill, No. 4:18-cv-00557-BGM (D. Ariz.). The Ely case before Magistrate Judge 

Macdonald is awaiting a decision on the Ely plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and 

Plaintiff here is a member of the putative class in Ely. In the alternative, Defendant argues 

that the Court should stay this case pending resolution of the Ely plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification, and if that motion is granted, pending resolution of that entire case, including 

any appeals. (Doc. 20 at 5.) Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion because he has not

consented to adjudication of his case by a magistrate judge. (Docs. 24, 26.) Plaintiff also 

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states that he will not consent in the future to adjudication of his case by a magistrate judge. 

(Docs. 24, 26.)

When two or more cases are pending before different judges Local Rule of Civil 

Procedure 42.1 permits transfer of a case to another judge when the cases: (1) arise from 

substantially the same transaction or event; (2) involve substantially the same parties or 

property; (3) involve the same patent, trademark, or copyright; (4) call for determination 

of substantially the same questions of law; or (5) for any other reason would entail 

substantial duplication of labor if heard by different Judges. When considering a motion to 

transfer under Local Rule 42.1, the “principal factor is whether party economy or judicial 

economy is substantially served by transfer to another judge.” Cagle v. Ryan, No. 

CV1603912-PHX-JAT-JFM, 2018 WL 2688775, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2018) (citation 

omitted). The Court considers these factors, but “has broad discretion in deciding 

a motion to transfer under Local Rule 42.1(a).” Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. 

CV-08-01633-PHX-NVW, 2010 WL 4117216, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2010).

The Court will not transfer Plaintiff’s case to Magistrate Judge Macdonald because 

transfer will “entail substantial duplication of labor” rather than avoid duplicative labor. 

LRCiv 42.1(a). Plaintiff has unequivocally expressed an unwillingness to have his case 

adjudicated by a magistrate judge. Plaintiff is within his rights to decline adjudication of his 

case by a magistrate judge and Plaintiff’s consent is required before a magistrate judge may 

properly exercise jurisdiction over his case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); see Columbia Record 

Prods. v. Hot Wax Records, Inc., 966 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, even if the 

Court transferred Plaintiff’s case, Magistrate Judge Macdonald likely would not hear the 

case without Plaintiff’s consent. Indeed, he could not. Since Plaintiff has expressed that he 

will not consent to Magistrate Judge Macdonald hearing his case, transfer would effectively 

send this case to a third judge. Such a result would “entail substantial duplication of labor”, 

which is what LRCiv 42.1(a) seeks to avoid. Thus, the Court will not transfer Plaintiff’s case 

to Magistrate Judge Macdonald. 

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Similarly, the Court will not stay Plaintiff’s case until resolution of the Ely plaintiffs’ 

motion for class certification, or until resolution of the entire Ely case. A district court has 

broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. 

Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 

681, 706-07 (1997) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). Staying 

Plaintiff’s case would have little practical effect besides inconveniencing Plaintiff and 

delaying resolution of his case. Even if a class was certified in the Ely case, there is no 

indication that Plaintiff would join the class since the case would be adjudicated by a 

magistrate judge and Plaintiff has not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Further, 

staying Plaintiff’s case through the resolution of the Ely case, including through resolution 

of an appeal that is not guaranteed to occur, provides no tangible benefit to the administration 

of justice in Plaintiff’s case or in any other case. For example, the Ely case could settle at any 

moment and render a stay in Plaintiff’s case pointless. Accordingly, the Court will not stay 

Plaintiff’s case. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Transfer 

Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 or, in the alternative, to Stay All 

Proceedings Pending Class-Certification Decision in Related Case (Doc. 20). 

Dated this 27th day of May, 2020.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

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