Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01845/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01845-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jamonz Ross,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney General,

Respondents.

No. CV 13-01845 PHX JAT (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Petitioner, who is pro se in this matter, docketed a motion seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 6, 2013. Petitioner lodged a motion 

for leave to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis on September 27, 2013. See Doc. 4. 

In on order entered January 7, 2014, see Doc. 12, the Court granted Petitioner leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis and ordered the petition dismissed with leave to amend. 

Petitioner docketed a first amended petition on January 15, 2014. See Doc. 15. 

Respondents docketed a limited answer to the amended petition for habeas corpus relief 

on October 10, 2014. See Doc. 41 (“Answer”). On October 24, 2014, Petitioner 

docketed a reply to the answer to the petition. See Doc. 43.

I Procedural background

The following facts were found by the Arizona Court of Appeals:

[Petitioner] was pulled over for a traffic violation on December 23, 2009. 

The officer noticed a pill bottle sticking out of [Petitioner’s] pocket, and 

noticed that the name “Ross” was not on the bottle. The officer suspected 

the pills were Alprazolam, a controlled substance, but did not charge 

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[Petitioner] until the substance contained in the pills could be verified by 

the lab. The officer impounded the pills and sent them to a crime lab. A 

forensic scientist testified that in fact, the pills were Alprazolam.1

[At his trial in July of 2011, Petitioner] (who was representing himself)

testified that the pills belonged to someone named Lisa and that she had left 

them at his house earlier that week. However, he admitted on crossexamination that he did not know Lisa’s last name, although he had known 

her for 10 years. He also admitted he had three prior felony convictions 

between 1999 and 2005. He was found guilty on both charges.

On September 25, 2010, a police officer was notified by a detective that 

[Petitioner] might be in the area and that there was a warrant for his arrest

[for the crimes charged in CR 2010–007952]. After [Petitioner] was 

arrested and transported to county jail, “several items of drugs” consisting 

of pills, methamphetamine and marijuana were found on his person. He 

was booked under the original warrant because the drugs [seized on 

September 25, 2010,] had not yet been officially tested and identified, so he 

was released. However, a forensic scientist for the Phoenix Police 

Department testified [at Petitioner’s trial] that her analysis of items

submitted for testing were the controlled substances alleged in the

indictment.

On October 30, 2010, [Petitioner] was arrested based on the September 25, 

2010 charges. When he was searched, another two baggies of 

methamphetamine and marijuana were found.

Doc. 41 (Answer), Exh. CC at 3-4.

Petitioner was indicted for the September 25, 2010, and October 30, 2010 

offenses in CR 2010–158088 in the Maricopa County Superior Court on 

November 10, 2010, with two counts of possession or use of dangerous 

drugs, class 4 felonies (Counts 1 & 4); two counts of possession or use of 

marijuana, class 6 felonies (Counts 2 & 5); and one count of possession or 

use of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony (Count 3). (Exhibit B.) 

Id. at 3.

On November 9, 2010, at the time of his indictment in CR 2010–007952,

Petitioner filed a written waiver of counsel, indicating he wished to exercise his right to 

represent himself at his criminal proceedings; Petitioner was appointed advisory counsel. 

 

1

For the December 23, 2009 offenses, Petitioner was indicted in CR 2010–007952 in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court with one count of possession of dangerous drugs, a class 4 

felony (Count 1); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony (Count 2). Answer, Exh. 

D.

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See id., Exh. A. On November 10, 2010, the grand jury indictment was returned in CR 

2010-158088. Id., Exh. B. On January 25, 2011, Petitioner signed a waiver of counsel in 

the second case. Exh. F. 

A “final” pretrial conference in these two cases, plus an additional pending 

criminal matter, was set for April 4, 2011. Petitioner’s advisory counsel was present at 

the pretrial conference. At that time Petitioner presented the court and the prosecutor 

with a motion to dismiss the indictments. The court found, with regard to Petitioner’s 

“jurisdictional plea” asserting the charges must be dismissed because he had not been 

properly arraigned, that arraignments had occurred in all pending criminal matters. 

Petitioner averred to the court that, although an investigator was to be appointed to him 

by an order issued in January of 2011, he had not spoken with or seen an investigator. 

Although authorization for an investigator had occurred in January, advisory counsel told 

the court they were unaware of an investigator being appointed. 

The court noted a witness list had been provided. At that time, trial was set for the 

first matter for April 11, 2011. The trial court set a final trial management conference in 

the first case for April 6 and set a date for trial for April 11, noting that these dates might 

be delayed by the appointment of the investigator. 

Petitioner’s trial in the first matter began on or about July 27, 2011. Exh. JJ. On 

that date the trial court explained to Petitioner that the court could conduct an evidentiary 

hearing on Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence in one of the other pending cases, 

which would require “excluding” time regarding the trials, which had been ordered to be 

held sequentially with different juries. Petitioner chose to go to trial at that time on the 

first case.

Petitioner represented himself at his first trial and testified on his own behalf at his 

first trial. Petitioner’s primary argument at his first trial was that he did not know the 

pills he possessed were Alprazolam or that possession of the pills was illegal and, 

accordingly, that he did not “knowingly” possess the drugs. Petitioner also argued that 

the investigating officer never made any attempt to verify that the pills did belong to Lisa 

and that Lisa lawfully possessed the pills. The investigating officer testified that 

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Petitioner had not provided information regarding Lisa and that testing revealed the 

Alprazolam in the pill bottle was not the same medication as listed on the bottle as being 

prescribed for Lisa. The prosecutor noted to the jury that Petitioner had not exercised his 

right to subpoena witnesses to subpoena Lisa to substantiate his explanation of the events. 

The jury in the first trial deliberated for about an hour before returning a guilty verdict.

Petitioner was tried separately in each matter, and in both instances, waived 

his right to counsel. (Exhibits A & F.) Midtrial, Petitioner filed a special 

action in the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss, which asserted seven claims for relief, 

including: (1) a supervening indictment was not a proper probable cause 

determination; (2) the indictment insufficiently stated the facts and 

informed Petitioner of the charges he was facing; (3) Petitioner was not 

arraigned; and (4) the court lacked jurisdiction. (Exhibit G.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition. (Exhibit H.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court from the 

dismissal of his special action, setting forth the same arguments. (Exhibit I.) 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review on September 

27, 2011. (Exhibit P.)

In CR 2010–007952, the jury found Petitioner guilty of both counts of 

possession on July 28, 2011. (Exhibits L.) Almost a month later, Petitioner

petitioned for special action in both cause numbers in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Exhibit M.) In the petition, Petitioner argued that he had been 

denied the “right to a preliminary hearing and/or probable cause 

determination,” and the right to challenge jurisdiction. (Id.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction. (Exhibit N.) In CR 2010–158088, 

the jury found Petitioner guilty of all five counts of possession on 

November 9, 2011. (Exhibit R.)2

On December 16, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to presumptive 

sentences in CR 2010–007952, to be served concurrently to each other and 

concurrently with the sentences in CR 2010–158088. (Exhibit T.) The trial 

court credited Petitioner with 378 days of presentence incarceration. (Id.) 

That same day, in CR 2010–158088, the trial court sentenced Petitioner, 

with two prior felony convictions, to presumptive sentences, to be served 

 

2

Petitioner’s second trial, on the charges of possession of methamphetamine and 

marijuana, began on November 9, 2011. Petitioner represented himself at this trial and did not 

testify on his own behalf at this trial. After deliberating for less than an hour the jury found 

Petitioner guilty on all counts charged. After the conclusion of the second trial the state decided 

not to proceed with the charges asserted in Petitioner’s third case and those charges were 

dismissed.

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concurrently to each other and concurrently with the sentences in CR 2010–

007952. (Exhibit S.) The trial court credited Petitioner with 411 days of 

presentence incarceration. (Id.) In both cases, Petitioner’s sentences totaled 

10 years. (Exhibits S& T.)

Answer at 2-4 (internal quotations omitted).

Petitioner took a timely appeal of his convictions and sentences in both cases and 

consolidated his two trials for purposes of the appeal. Id., Exh. U. Petitioner’s appointed 

appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Arizona v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), informing the court that they could 

find no meritorious issue to raise, and asking the state appellate court to search the record 

for fundamental error. Id., Exh. Z. 

In his pro per supplemental brief, Petitioner asserted that: 

(1) his due process and equal protection rights were violated because the 

indictments were insufficient as a matter of law to put him on notice of the 

charges; (2) he was never arraigned thus depriving the court of jurisdiction, 

a “not-guilty” arraignment is unconstitutional, and the failure to arraign him 

in accordance with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (Rule) 14.3 

amounted to a denial of due process; (3) after moving to dismiss his case 

for Rule 8 speedy trial violations, he was forced to go to trial without 

adequate time to prepare; and (4) his defense was hindered by the county 

jail’s policy of not allowing inmates to call witnesses or investigators 

directly, making him unable to call witnesses or investigators at trial. 

(Exhibit AA.)

Id. at 5.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in a 

memorandum decision issued April 2, 2013. Id., Exh. CC. The appellate court 

concluded that Petitioner had failed to explain specifically how any of the charges were 

insufficient and also found that the indictments included descriptions sufficient to inform 

Petitioner of the charged offenses. The appellate court also found Petitioner was 

arraigned in both cases and that he was represented by counsel at each of these hearings. 

With regard to Petitioner’s claim that he had insufficient time to prepare for trial, the 

appellate court summarily found that the trial court had twice offered to give Petitioner 

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more time to prepare for trial and that Petitioner had declined both opportunities to do so. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals also found Petitioner failed to explain how access to a 

telephone would have affected his defense claims or why he did not seek assistance from 

advisory counsel. The appellate court determined there were no meritorious grounds for 

reversal of Petitioner’s conviction or for modification of the imposed sentences. Id., Exh. 

CC.

On April 5, 2013, Petitioner moved for reconsideration, requested an 

evidentiary hearing, and moved to supplement the record with the notguilty arraignment transcripts. (Exhibits DD & EE.) In his motion for 

reconsideration, Petitioner stated that the court failed to address “the federal 

claim portion” of his indictment and arraignment issues. (Exhibit DD.) 

Petitioner then reiterated his arguments, and countered the court’s findings 

that he had failed to explain portions of his claims. (Id.) Finally, Petitioner 

argued that he had a federal constitutional right to call witnesses and 

introduce evidence on his behalf, and this right and his due process rights 

were violated when he could not call witnesses or the investigator. (Id.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motions. (Exhibit FF.)

Id. at 5-6. Petitioner sought reconsideration, which motion was denied.

Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Id., Exh. GG. Petitioner asserted the same four issues raised in his 

supplemental pro per brief to the Court of Appeals, and reiterated and expanded upon the 

issues raised in his motion for reconsideration. Id., Exh. GG. Petitioner also filed a 

supplement to his petition for review, expanding upon the arguments regarding his 

arraignment. Id., Exh. HH. On October 8, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the

petition for review. Id., Exh. II. Petitioner did not seek certiorari and the Arizona Court 

of Appeals issued the mandate in his direct appeal on November 7, 2013. Id., Exh. JJ.

On July 9, 2012, while his direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. W. Petitioner argued that, 

because he was never arraigned, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed against him. 

Id., Exh. W. Petitioner asserted that, at the “12.10 not-guilty hearing,” he was not 

informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him, that he was not read the 

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charges, that he was not allowed to submit his own plea, and that he was not represented 

by counsel, all in violation of his rights pursuant to the “due process, equal protection, 

and fair process clauses.” Id., Exh W. The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 25, 2012, finding that the issues raised 

had already been denied. The Arizona Supreme Court also concluded that Petitioner had 

been arraigned, that Petitioner was represented by counsel at each arraignment, and that 

Petitioner had entered a plea of not guilty as to all charges. Id., Exh. X. 

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and requested an evidentiary hearing. Id., 

Exh. Y. In this motion Petitioner argued that the state court minute entries were “lying” 

and that his affidavit and the recordings of the proceedings would prove his claims. Id., 

Exh. Y. The motion was denied on January 18, 2013. Id., Exh. BB.

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because:

(1) Petitioner’s due process and equal protection rights were violated when 

he did not receive a proper arraignment;

(2) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the indictments 

were insufficient to notify Petitioner of the charges against him;

(3) Petitioner’s due process and fair trial rights were violated because he 

was unable to place telephone calls to witnesses or an investigator before 

trial;

(4) Petitioner’s due process and fair trial rights were violated when, after he 

refused to waive his right to a speedy trial, the trial judge set trial to begin 

two hours after a status conference; and

(5) Petitioner’s due process, fair trial, and equal protection rights were 

violated when he was denied arraignment transcripts.

Id. at 7.

Respondents allow Petitioner’s first, second, and fifth claims for relief were 

exhausted in the state courts. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s third and fourth claims 

for federal habeas relief were not properly exhausted in the state courts and that Petitioner 

has not shown cause nor prejudice with regard to his procedural default of these claims.

Petitioner did not raise and exhaust his Ground III and IV claims as federal 

claims in the state court. In his direct appeal and corresponding petition for 

review, Petitioner argued that he was forced to go to trial without adequate 

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time to prepare and that his defense was hindered by the county jail’s 

policy of not allowing inmates to call witnesses or investigators directly. 

(Exhibits AA & GG.) In each instance, Petitioner failed to cite any 

authority. (Id.) He did not assert, as he does now, that his federal 

constitutional due process and fair trial rights were violated. (Id.; see also 

Docket #1.) “If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that [a state court ruling] 

denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.” 

Duncan[v. Henry], 513 U.S. [364], 366, [115 S.Ct. 887, 887 (1995)]. And 

while his state court claims may have been related to the claims he presents 

in Grounds III and IV, they were not the federal claims he now raises and 

their mere similarity is insufficient to exhaust. Id.

For the first time in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, 

Petitioner cited to Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1446–47 (9th Cir. 

1985), for the proposition that due process is violated when the state 

unjustifiably hinders self-representation efforts by denying meaningful 

access to a telephone. (Exhibit GG.) Petitioner’s mere mention of due 

process in the Arizona Supreme Court was insufficient to exhaust his claim 

in the state courts. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915–19 (9th Cir. 

2004) (finding petitioner failed to fairly present federal claims when he 

raised them “for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review”)

.

Answer at 15 & n.8.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the District Court may only grant federal habeas 

relief on the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. 

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly 

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity 

to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s 

“highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 

346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 

2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). In Baldwin v. Reese, the 

Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 

124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal 

habeas claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a specific federal 

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state law or a state procedural rule, the 

federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. 

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2014). 

However,

[The] AEDPA “leav[es] ‘primary responsibility’ for adjudicating federal 

claims to the States.” Johnson v. Williams, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 

1097, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 

27, 123 S.Ct. 357, [] (2002)). It follows that absent “evidence lead[ing] 

very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently 

overlooked in state court,” a federal habeas court presumes that the state 

court reached a petitioner’s fairly presented federal claim. Id.

Williams v. Swarthout, 771 F.3d 501, 2014 WL 5368854, at *5 (9th Cir. 2014)

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state 

courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

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1302, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 2014); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the 

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of 

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1138; Gulbrandson 

v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013); Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 

2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas 

petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a 

claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do 

more than present the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727–28, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553–57(1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 

F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a 

state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar 

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direct review ... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 

2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review in an action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, are generally barred from federal review because 

an attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow 

category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are limited to claims of being held in 

custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for 

delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably 

overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 

887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009).

For the procedural default rule to apply, “the application of the state 

procedural rule must provide an adequate and independent state law basis 

on which the state court can deny relief.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 

580 (9th Cir. 2003) (amended) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 859–60, 122 S.Ct. 2578, []

(2002) (per curiam) (holding denials pursuant to Arizona waiver rules are 

independent of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (finding Arizona waiver rule consistently and regularly applied).

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Dec. 

1, 2014).

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Murray v.

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2014) A state rule is considered consistently 

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the “vast majority of cases.” 

Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 

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1211, 1221 n.6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to preclude 

the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must actually have relied on the 

procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v. 

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). See also Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 

either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a 

judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, [ ].... Sanders 

v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate 

court’s discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis, the state 

court’s decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law 

ground) ....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims, which have been found to be consistently applied and wellestablished, bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, 

any claim not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal or in 

his Rule 32 action. See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s 

state rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on 

criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a 

conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar.

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See

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Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 375 (9th Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of 

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance 

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 

2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. 

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must 

show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting 

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 

1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated that 

prejudice is established by a petitioner’s “actual innocence.” See Vosgien v. Persson, 

742 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise 

is not cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 

800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional 

error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal 

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617; Correll, 137 

F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the 

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been 

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 

2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and 

prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

A state criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987); Graves v. 

McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the general rule is that errors 

of counsel during a state post-conviction action cannot constitute “cause” to excuse the

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procedural default of a federal habeas claim. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S. 

Ct. at 2565; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 374. However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), established a limited exception to this general 

rule, which exception applies only to Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of post conviction counsel or lack of 

counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1315. In 

Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit 

expanded Martinez, holding that this doctrine can also apply to excuse the procedural 

default of claims asserting ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel.

In Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court delineated the Martinez analysis as 

consisting of four prongs:

We consequently read Coleman as containing an exception, allowing a 

federal habeas court to find “cause,” thereby excusing a defendant’s 

procedural default, where (1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” 

review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”

133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013), citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19, 1320–21 

(alterations in original).

The first prong of this test requires a petitioner seeking to rely on Martinez to 

bring forward facts demonstrating that his underlying ineffective assistance of trial or 

appellate counsel claim is substantial. The Supreme Court has defined “substantial” as a 

claim that “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Stated inversely, a claim is 

“insubstantial” if “it does not have any merit or ... is wholly without factual support.” Id.

at 1319. Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial 

requires the Court to examine the claim under the standard stated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective 

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assistance of counsel must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and 

that counsel’s errors “deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Additionally, not just any error or 

omission of counsel will be deemed “deficient performance” that will satisfy Martinez; if 

post-conviction counsel “in the initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below 

constitutional standards,” that attorney’s performance does not constitute “cause.” 132 S. 

Ct. at 1319. Most notably, counsel “is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even 

a non-frivolous claim,” much less a frivolous claim. Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 

1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

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Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The AEDPA requires that the 

habeas court review the “last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that 

when the final state court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last 

decision from the state court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. 

Schriro 746 F.3d at 441, quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000).

A state court applies a clearly established standard unreasonably only if no 

“reasonable interpretation of the controlling [Supreme Court] standard” can 

“support [the state court’s] legal ruling.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, [] (2007). So, when evaluating the reasonableness 

of a state court’s application of a general standard, we must defer to any 

“principled reason for the state court to distinguish between the case before 

it and Supreme Court precedent.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 992 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court 

recently explained,

does not require state courts to extend [a Supreme Court] 

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as 

error. Thus, “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can 

apply to the facts at hand,” then by definition the rationale was not 

“clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.” 

AEDPA’s carefully constructed framework “would be undermined 

if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the 

guise of extensions to existing law.”

White, 134 S.Ct. at 1706 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Yarborough, 

541 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. 2140).

Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1133-34.

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in 

state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

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in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–

787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is 

because it was meant to be.” Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not 

lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the 

“extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., 

at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 

758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 

 The “only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as 

of the time of the state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 

1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, [] (2003). If Supreme Court “cases give no 

clear answer to the question presented, ... it cannot be said that the state 

court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, [] (2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In other words, “‘[i]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme 

Court].’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 

U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, [] (2009)).

McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2013).

To satisfy the “unreasonable application” portion of the first prong, the 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s application of Supreme 

Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 

357, 360 (2002). “While Supreme Court precedent is the only authority that 

is controlling under AEDPA, we look to Ninth Circuit case law as 

‘persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state 

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court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law.’” 

Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Van Tran v. 

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)...[] 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Woods, 764 F.3d at 

1121.

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

the state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable 

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; 

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one 

and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have 

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

Pursuant to section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a statecourt’s factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court 

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 

724-25 (9th Cir. 2014). Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and 

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can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with 

clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. 

Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v. 

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption of correctness is 

equally applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes 

the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304–05 

(1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to 

claims adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited 

to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 

at 998.

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2014);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 

2011); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008).

E. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts his right to due process and his right to equal protection 

were violated because he did not receive a proper arraignment.

Petitioner asserts his right to due process and equal protection were violated 

because, rather than being arraigned in Superior Court, Petitioner appeared before a 

Commissioner. Petitioner alleges the Commissioner entered a not guilty plea on behalf 

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of Petitioner without informing Petitioner of the charges against him, and that he was not 

represented by counsel at these “12.10” hearings. Petitioner alleges that the “12.10” 

hearings he received “lacks[] the constitutional safeguards required by the United States 

and Arizona constitutions”. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The state appellate court found 

Petitioner was properly arraigned. The Court of Appeals found, as a matter of fact, that 

Petitioner was represented by counsel at the hearings. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

further found that the indictments included descriptions sufficient to inform Petitioner of 

the offenses charged. 

Respondents argue:

“Due process of law, [the United States Supreme Court] has held, does not 

require the state to adopt any particular form of procedure, so long as it 

appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of the accusation and an 

adequate opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution. Garland v. 

Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 645 (1914) (citing Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 

425, 435 (1905)).

***

Here, Petitioner was arraigned on both cause numbers. (Exhibits C & E.) In 

each instance, the minute entry denotes that Petitioner appeared before 

Commissioner Brian S. Rees, was represented by counsel, and “enter[ed] a 

plea of not guilty to all charges.” (Id.) The minute entries thus demonstrate 

that Petitioner was made aware of the charges against him and chose to 

proceed to trial at a proceeding consistent with both federal due process and 

Arizona Rule 14.

Petitioner, however, contends that he was “unlawfully brought before a 

T.V. where Commissioner Reese appeared” and Commissioner Reese 

“entered a plea of not guilty for him.” (Docket # 15, at 6.) Petitioner 

ignores the language of Rules 14.2 and 14.3. Rule 14.2 provides that “[t]he 

defendant shall be arraigned personally before the trial court or by video 

telephone.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 14.2 (emphasis added). The rules thus 

specifically provide for appearance by video telephone. Moreover, Rule 

14.3 provides that “[u]nless the defendant pleads guilty or no contest, the 

court shall enter a plea of not guilty.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 14.3(a) (emphasis 

added). Petitioner does not suggest that he intended to plead guilty or no 

contest, or that he attempted to do so at the arraignment. The trial court 

accordingly entered a not guilty plea when Petitioner failed to do otherwise, 

without possible prejudice to Petitioner.

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Answer at 19-20.

The state court’s conclusion that the arraignments did not violate Petitioner’s right 

to due process of law was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Petitioner contends that he has wrongfully been denied transcripts of his 

arraignment hearings which, he alleges, would establish that he was denied counsel and 

notice of the charges against him. However, the state court’s findings of fact--that 

Petitioner was afforded counsel and notice of the charges at the hearings--are not belied 

by the unavailability of the transcripts.

 Woods contends the state supreme court wrongfully denied him an 

evidentiary hearing to develop this claim. We construe his argument as a 

claim that the state court’s factfinding process was flawed and was 

therefore an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). A state court’s fact-finding process is unreasonable under § 

2254(d)(2) only when we are “satisfied that any appellate court to whom 

the defect is pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the state 

court’s factfinding process was adequate.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).

Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1128 (9th Cir. 2014).

When determining if a state court’s decision was an “unreasonable application” of 

the facts to the established federal law, the state court decision decision under review 

must be found to be more than “incorrect or erroneous” for a petitioner to be entitled to a 

writ of habeas corpus. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1174-75

(2003). The same standard of objective unreasonableness is applied to a state court’s

factual determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 

957 (9th Cir. 2014); Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d at 999. Because the state court’s factual 

determination that Petitioner was informed of the charges against him and represented by 

counsel at the arraignments is supported by the record, and the facts as reasonably found 

by the Arizona Court of Appeals controvert Petitioner’s claim that he was not represented 

by counsel and that he was not informed of the charges against him, the state court’s 

decision that Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process is not clearly contrary 

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to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

Because the Arizona state courts’ conclusion that Petitioner’s arraignment did not 

violate his constitutional rights was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim. 

2. Petitioner contends his right to due process of law was violated because the 

indictments did not sufficiently notify Petitioner of the charges against him.

Petitioner exhausted this claim by presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 

his direct appeal. The appellate court concluded that Petitioner had failed to specifically 

explain how any of the charges stated in the indictment were deficient, and also found 

that the indictments included descriptions which sufficiently informed Petitioner of the 

charged offenses. 

Respondents argue:

Due process requires that a defendant be given “‘notice of the specific 

charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that 

charge.’” State v. Blakley, 65 P.3d 77, 87, ¶ 47 (Ariz. 2003), quoting Cole 

v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). “Beyond notice, a claimed 

deficiency in a state criminal indictment is not cognizable on federal 

collateral review.” Roe v. Baker, 316 F.3d 557, 570 (6th Cir. 2002). See

also Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446 (1925) (“It has been uniformly 

held by this court that the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be reviewed 

in habeas corpus proceedings.”); Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1227 

(10th Cir. 2002) (“A challenge to the adequacy of the Information under 

Oklahoma law, however, is a question of state law, which this court has no 

power to address.”) 

***

To the extent that Petitioner argues that alleged defects in the indictment 

somehow divested the Maricopa County Superior Court of subject matter to 

try him on the charged felonies, that claim does not warrant habeas relief 

because such an outcome would contradict overwhelming federal and state 

precedent holding that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of 

its power to adjudicate a case.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accord United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 66 (1951) (holding 

that a ruling “that the indictment is defective does not affect the jurisdiction 

of the trial court to determine the case presented by the indictment”); Lamar 

v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) (noting that “[t]he objection that 

the indictment does not charge a crime against the United States goes only 

to the merits of the case,” rather than the court’s jurisdiction); United States 

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v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting contention that the 

indictment’s “failure to assert residence stripped the district court of 

jurisdiction to hear the case,” because “defects in an indictment do not 

deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.”) (quoting Cotton, 535 

U.S. at 630); Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1342 (“Precedent bolsters our 

conclusion that the substantive sufficiency of the indictment is a question 

that goes to the merits of the case, rather than the district court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.”); State v. Ortiz, 34 A.3d 599, 603 (N.H. 2011).

Answer at 21-22 & n.12.

The indictments in this case were sufficient under Arizona law, and 

provided due process. For example, Count 1 in the indictment for CR 

2010–158088 read, “[Petitioner], on or about the 25th day of September, 

2010, knowingly possessed or used Methamphetamine, a dangerous drug, 

in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-3401, 13-3401, 13-3418, 13-701, 13-702, and 

13-801.” (Exhibit B.) The remaining counts in CR 2010–158088 and the 

two counts in CR 2010–007952 similarly set forth the approximate date of 

the offense, the elements of possession––that Petitioner “knowingly 

possessed or used” illegal drugs and paraphernalia, and the applicable 

statutes. (Exhibits B & D.) This is all that is required under the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Id. at 24.

 “The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to 

be informed of the nature and cause of the charges made against him so as to permit 

adequate preparation of a defense.” Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

We therefore conclude that, for purposes of AEDPA’s “clearly established 

Federal law” requirement, it is “clearly established” that a criminal 

defendant has a right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and applied 

against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be informed of 

any charges against him, and that a charging document, such as an 

information, is the means by which such notice is provided. To satisfy this 

constitutional guarantee, the charging document need not contain a citation 

to the specific statute at issue; the substance of the information, however, 

must in some appreciable way apprise the defendant of the charges against 

him so that he may prepare a defense accordingly.

Id. at 1004.

The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right 

to be clearly informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against 

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him. To determine whether a defendant has received fair notice of the 

charges against him, we look first to the indictment. The principal purpose 

of an indictment is to provide the defendant with a description of the 

charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense 

and plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution. However, an indictment is 

not constitutionally defective if it states the elements of an offense charged 

with sufficient clarity to apprise a defendant of what to defend against.

Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

The state court’s conclusion that the indictments were not constitutionally 

defective was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Compare Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1235-37 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding there was 

insufficient notice where felony murder was never raised in pleading, pretrial proceedings 

or at trial, but only in jury instructions); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 

(9th Cir. 1986) (holding an information charging murder “by striking [victim] about the 

head and body with his fists” insufficient to charge murder by torture); Kreck v. 

Spalding, 721 F.2d 1229, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding an indictment was insufficient 

where it failed to specify what crime was the predicate for a charge of felony murder). 

Because the state court’s decision that the indictments were not defective was not 

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonably application of federal law, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on the merits of this claim.

3. Petitioner contends his right to due process and fair trial rights were 

violated because, as a self-representing defendant, he was unable to place telephone 

calls to witnesses or an investigator before trial.

Respondents assert Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the state courts 

by fairly presenting it as a claim that his federal constitutional rights were violated. 

In his pro se brief in his direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals Petitioner 

did not place “*ALERT TO FEDERAL CLAIM*” in this section of his brief, as he did in 

other sections of his brief. However, in his pleadings appealing the Court of Appeals’ 

decision to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner added a citation and quotation from 

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Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1985) when discussing this claim for relief. 

Respondent argues: 

Petitioner did not raise and exhaust his Ground III and IV claims as federal 

claims in the state court. In his direct appeal and corresponding petition for 

review, Petitioner argued that he was forced to go to trial without adequate 

time to prepare and that his defense was hindered by the county jail’s 

policy of not allowing inmates to call witnesses or investigators directly. 

(Exhibits AA & GG.) In each instance, Petitioner failed to cite any 

authority. (Id.) He did not assert, as he does now, that his federal 

constitutional due process and fair trial rights were violated. (Id.; see also 

Docket #1.) “If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that [a state court ruling] 

denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.” 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. And while his state court claims may have been 

related to the claims he presents in Grounds III and IV, they were not the 

federal claims he now raises and their mere similarity is insufficient to 

exhaust. Id.

Answer at 15.

Petitioner did not “fairly present” this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals as a 

federal constitutional claim. Petitioner did not cite to any specific federal constitutional 

right or any federal legal opinion in his brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals. In his 

brief seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision by the state Supreme Court 

Petitioner did cite a single federal case in his brief. Respondent contends: “Petitioner’s 

mere mention of due process in the Arizona Supreme Court was insufficient to exhaust 

his claim in the state courts.” Answer at 15 n.8, citing Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 

915–19 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding the petitioner failed to fairly present their federal claims 

when they raised them “for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review”).

In response to Respondents’ assertion that he did not properly exhaust some his 

claims in the state courts as federal constitutional claims, Petitioner argues he “asserted 

his claims in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the 

constitution or alleged a pattern of facts well within the mainstream of constitutional 

litigation.” Doc. 43 at 2. Petitioner asserts Respondents mis-state the facts by averring he 

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did not cite federal law until his direct appeal brief in the state Supreme Court and, 

accordingly, he contends he did exhaust his third claim for relief. Petitioner further 

asserts he repeatedly “exhausted” this claim by repeatedly raising the facts and legal basis 

for the claim in the state courts.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the state courts as a federal 

constitutional claim because he did not provide both the factual basis and the operative 

legal theory on which he sought relief to the state courts. “Mere general appeals to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,

do not establish exhaustion.” Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (quotations omitted). General and 

conclusory references to “due process” do not suffice to exhaust a claim that the 

petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. See Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000–02 (concluding it is not 

sufficient to engage in “scattershot citation of federal constitutional provisions” without 

developing “any articulated federal legal theory ...”); Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 

397 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Briefing a case is not like writing a poem, where 

the message may be conveyed entirely through allusions and connotations....”). The 

exhaustion requirement is not “satisfied by the mere circumstance that the ‘due process 

ramifications' of an argument might be ‘self-evident.’” Gatlin v.. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 

888 (9th Cir.1999). See also Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 

2005).

3

 Compare McKinney v. Ryan 730 F.3d 903, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2013); Robinson v. 

 

3

Petitioner’s briefing to the state court mentioned the “federal Constitution” twice, 

and “due process” once, but discussed an applicable provision of the state 

constitution throughout the remainder of the argument. Petitioner’s mere mention 

of the federal Constitution as a whole, without specifying an applicable provision, 

or an underlying federal legal theory, does not suffice to exhaust the federal 

claim. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

exhaustion demands more than a citation to a general constitutional provision, 

detached from any articulation of the underlying federal legal theory). Nor is a 

federal claim exhausted by a petitioner’s mention, in passing, of a broad 

constitutional concept, such as due process. See Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106 

(holding that “general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due 

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish 

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Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010).

Additionally, Petitioner’s citation to Milton in his brief to the Arizona Supreme 

Court does not constitute proper presentment of a claim that his federal constitutional 

right to due process was violated because his access to a telephone to contact witnesses 

and an investigator was hampered, because the citation to Milton appeared in his petition 

for review to the Arizona Supreme Court rather than in his brief to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals (although it was cited in his motion for reconsideration) and because Milton

does not establish the proposition of federal constitutional law for which Petitioner cited 

this case. 

Had Arrendondo included Nobles in his briefs, it might have satisfied the 

fair-presentation requirement. That requirement may be satisfied “by citing 

... a case deciding [a sufficiently similar] claim on federal grounds.” 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). 

But the Nobles citation appeared in a collateral pro se motion, not in the 

merits brief filed by counsel. “As a general rule, a petitioner satisfies the 

exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting the federal claim to the 

appropriate state courts (plural) in the manner required by the state courts.” 

Casey, 386 F.3d at 915–16. That usually means “present[ing] his federal, 

constitutional issue before the ... [state courts] within the four corners of his 

appellate briefing.” Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000. A pro se procedural motion 

unrelated to the substantive merits of Arrendondo’s claim briefed by 

counsel is not part of the “appellate briefing” for purposes of the Castillo

“four corners” requirement. 

Arrendondo v. Neven 763 F.3d 1122, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Gulbrandson v. 

Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013).

The claim may be denied on the merits regardless of Petitioner’s procedural 

default of the claim. In his brief to the Arizona Supreme Court Petitioner cited Milton for 

the proposition that, presumably pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 

2525 (1975), a pro se defendant has a federal constitutional right to have access to “law 

books ... [and] other tools to prepare a defense”. Milton, 767 F.2d at 1446. However, the 

Supreme Court expressly rejected this interpretation of Faretta in Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 

546 U.S. 9, 126 S.Ct. 407 (2005). In Kane the Supreme Court explicitly stated that “it is 

 

exhaustion” (emphasis added)).

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clear that Faretta does not...‘clearly establis[h]’ the law library access right,” and “[i]n 

fact, Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se 

criminal defendant.” Id. 546 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added) (holding that the denial of 

access to a law library cannot provide the basis for federal habeas corpus relief because 

there is no Supreme Court authority establishing a pro se petitioner’s constitutional right 

to law library access).

Whether the right of self-representation or due process includes library access is 

an unsettled question of federal law. See Kane, 126 S.Ct. at 408. Derivatively, there is 

no established federal law as to the parameters of self-representation, such as unfettered 

use of a telephone to contact witnesses or an investigator. Because Petitioner was not 

deprived of a federal constitutional right, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the 

merits of the claim. 

4. Petitioner asserts his right to due process and a fair trial were violated 

because, after he refused to waive his right to a speedy trial, the trial judge set trial 

to begin two hours after a status conference.

In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted that he was forced to chose between his 

“speedy trial rights” and going to trial before he was prepared to do so. Petitioner 

asserted this claim in his direct appeal, without citation to any federal constitutional law 

or published opinion by a federal court. The state appellate court summarily found that 

Petitioner had twice been offered a continuance and refused these offers. 

Petitioner asserts that, on July 26, 2011, his “last day” with regard to all of the 

pending charges, the case was set for a status conference before Judge McMurdie. At 

that time Petitioner, inter alia, submitted a motion to dismiss, asserting that because he 

had not been tried within the time specified by Rule 8, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, all of charges against him in all of his pending cases must be dismissed. 

Petitioner alleged that the trial court told him he could “either go to trial today or waive 

time.” Petitioner asserts that he chose to go to trial and that he was prejudiced thereby. 

At that trial Petitioner cross-examined witnesses, challenged evidence, and testified in his 

own behalf. Petitioner did not aver that anyone who might be subpoenaed as a witness 

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on his behalf was not subpoenaed because he was unprepared to try his case.

Respondent argues:

Petitioner did not raise and exhaust his Ground ... IV claims as federal 

claims in the state court. In his direct appeal and corresponding petition for 

review, Petitioner argued that he was forced to go to trial without adequate 

time to prepare and that his defense was hindered by the county jail’s 

policy of not allowing inmates to call witnesses or investigators directly. 

(Exhibits AA & GG.) In each instance, Petitioner failed to cite any 

authority. (Id.) He did not assert, as he does now, that his federal 

constitutional due process and fair trial rights were violated. (Id.; see also 

Docket #1.) “If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that [a state court ruling] 

denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.” 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. And while his state court claims may have been 

related to the claims he presents in Grounds ... IV, they were not the federal 

claims he now raises and their mere similarity is insufficient to exhaust. Id.

Answer at 15.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his fourth habeas claim as a federal 

constitutional claim by fairly presenting it to the Arizona courts as asserting the violation 

of his federal constitutional right to due process of law or a fair trial. Presenting the 

claim to the state courts as a violation of Petitioner’s rights pursuant to Arizona’s laws 

and rules of procedure was not sufficient to exhaust a Sixth Amendment claim. “Though 

the rule and the Sixth Amendment both contain the right to a “speedy trial,” they mean 

different things. The constitutional rule imposes a flexible limit that is far longer than the 

Arizona rule in most or all cases.” Stuard v. Stewart, 401 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

Petitioner has not established cause nor prejudice with regard to his procedural 

default of the claim, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent 

consideration of the merits of the claim.

Petitioner further seeks to amend his petition to state a claim that his right to a 

speedy trial was violated by the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss all of the 

charges against him based on a violation of Rule 8, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

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Procedure.4 At the beginning of the first trial the trial court denied the motion, finding 

Petitioner was tried within the time required by the rule and that, with regard to the 

subsequent trials, the time spent in the first trial was excluded. Absent a failure to 

exhaust a claim based on Petitioner’s federal constitutional right to a speedy trial, as 

compared to Petiitioner’s “right” based on Rule 8, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

such a claim could be denied on the merits.

The Sixth Amendment’s provision of a “right to a speedy and public trial ...” 

applies to state court proceedings pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v. 

North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993 (1967). The Sixth Amendment 

guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 

 

4 Rule 8.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

a. General. Subject to the provisions of Rule 8.4, every person against whom an 

indictment, information or complaint is filed shall be tried by the court having 

jurisdiction of the offense within the following time periods:

(1) Defendants in Custody. 150 days from arraignment if the person is held in 

custody, except as provided in subsection (a), paragraph (3) of this section.

(2) Defendants Released From Custody. 180 days from arraignment if the person 

is released under Rule 7, except as provided in subsection (a), paragraph (3) of 

this section.

Rule 8.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

The following periods shall be excluded from the computation of the time limits 

set forth in Rules 8.2 and 8.3:

a. Delays occasioned by or on behalf of the defendant, including, but not limited 

to, delays caused by an examination and hearing to determine competency or 

intellectual disability, the defendant's absence or incompetence, or his or her 

inability to be arrested or taken into custody in Arizona.

b. Delays resulting from a remand for new probable cause determination under 

Rules 5.5 or 12.9.

c. Delays resulting from extension of the time for disclosure under Rule 15.6.

d. Delays necessitated by congestion of the trial calendar, but only when the 

congestion is attributable to extraordinary circumstances, in which case the 

presiding judge shall promptly apply to the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme 

Court for suspension of any of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

e. Delays resulting from continuances in accordance with Rule 8.5, but only for 

the time periods prescribed therein.

f. Delays resulting from joinder for trial with another defendant as to whom the 

time limits have not run when there is good cause for denying severance. In all 

other cases, severance should be granted to preserve the applicable time limits.

g. Delays resulting from the setting of a transfer hearing pursuant to Rule 40 of 

these rules.

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speedy ... trial.” The speedy-trial right is “amorphous,” “slippery,” and “necessarily 

relative.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972). In Barker, the 

Court refused to quantify the right or to predicate the right on a defendant’s explicit 

request for a speedy trial. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89–90, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 

1290 (2009). Rejecting such “inflexible approaches,” Barker established a “balancing 

test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” 407 

U.S. at 529, 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191–92. Some of the factors that should be weighed when 

considering such claims include the length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s 

assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant of the delay. Brillon, 556 U.S. at 

89–90, 129 S.Ct. at 1290; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. 

To trigger a speedy trial inquiry, an accused must show that the period between 

indictment and trial passes a threshold point of “presumptively prejudicial” delay. See, 

e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Prejudice normally is presumed if the 

delay in bringing the defendant to trial has exceeded one year. Doggett v. United States, 

505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 n.1 (1992). If this threshold is not met, the 

Court need not proceed with the other Barker factors. Id., 505 U.S. at 651–52, 112 S.Ct. 

at 2691; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 

1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1993). Deliberate delay “to hamper the defense” weighs heavily 

against the prosecution. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. “[M]ore neutral 

reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts” weigh less heavily “but nevertheless 

should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 

with the government rather than with the defendant.” Id.

The delay in Petitioner’s criminal proceedings was not so lengthy or prejudicial as 

to implicate his federal constitutional rights. The delay in Petitioner’s criminal 

proceedings from the time of indictment to the time of his trial was not longer than the 

one-year presumptively prejudicial delay and, because of the absence of evidence of 

prejudice, any delay did not violate his constitutional rights. See Stuard v. Stewart, 401 

F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1385–86 (9th Cir.

1978); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 328 (6th Cir. 1998). Compare McNeely v. 

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Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2003). 

5. Petitioner asserts his right to due process, to a fair trial, and to equal 

protection were violated when he was denied arraignment transcripts.

Petitioner claims that he has repeatedly requested the video and audio recordings 

of the not guilty arraignments and that the state courts have failed to produce these 

recordings or transcripts of the hearings. Petitioner contends that the recordings would 

“prove his claim” that these proceedings were constitutionally deficient. Petitioner 

asserted in his state court proceedings that he was wrongfully denied these transcripts and 

recordings. Petitioner asserted that depriving him of the recordings and transcripts 

violated his right to due process of law.

The state’s court’s denial of a petitioner’s claim precludes habeas corpus relief 

unless that decision unreasonably applied or contravened federal law, or the decision was 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1), (2). Federal courts must not “lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice 

system has experienced the ‘extreme malfunction’ for which federal habeas relief is the 

remedy.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 16. See also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 

1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (Federal law “imposes a highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit 

of the doubt.”).

Petitioner contends that he has wrongfully been denied transcripts of his 

arraignment hearings which, he alleges, would establish that he was denied counsel and 

notice of the charges against him. However, as noted supra, this allegation does not 

assert the violation of a federal constitutional right but, rather, a claim that the state’s 

fact-finding process resulted in error prejudicial to Petitioner, i.e., that the state court’s 

process in determining the sufficiency of Petitioner’s arraignment or “12.10” hearing was 

unreasonable. See Woods, 764 F.3d at 1128 (9th Cir. 2014) (“A state court’s fact-finding 

process is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) only when we are “’satisfied that any 

appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that 

the state court’s factfinding process was adequate.’”, quoting Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

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992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). The state court decision was based on reasonable 

interpretation of the record before the court, which record is not clearly incorrect or 

erroneous. Because the state court’s factual determination that Petitioner was informed 

of the charges against him and represented by counsel at the arraignments is supported by 

the record, and the facts as reasonably found by the Arizona Court of Appeals controvert 

Petitioner’s claim that he was not represented by counsel and that he was not informed of 

the charges against him, the state court’s decision that Petitioner was not deprived of his 

right to due process because he was not provided video or transcripts of the hearings was 

not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his third and fourth claims for habeas relief in 

the state courts. Petitioner has not established cause for, nor prejudice arising from his 

procedural default of these claims nor has Petitioner established that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice will occur absent consideration of the claims. The state courts 

considered and rejected Petitioner’s first, second, and fifth claims for relief. The state 

court’s decision rejecting these claims was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Ross’ Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

Dated this 8th day of December, 2014.

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