Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05396/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2008 Decided June 3, 2008

Nos. 06-5396 & 06-5397

THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION AND

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL,

APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cv01279)

Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellants. Andrew C.

Mergen and M. Alice Thurston, Attorneys, were on brief. R.

Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Anna M. Seidman argued for Safari Club International and

Safari Club International Foundation. Douglas S. Burdin was on

brief.

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1

The other organizations include the Animal Protection Institute,

Friends of Animals and Their Environment, Help Our Wolves Live,

the Indigenous Environmental Network, the Klamath Forest Alliance

and RESTORE: The North Woods.

Sanne H. Knudsen argued for the appellees. Brian B.

O'Neill, Richard A. Duncan, and Jonathan R. Lovvorn, were on

brief. Patricia R. Lane entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Dirk

Kempthorne, Secretary of the United States Department of the

Interior (Secretary), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) of the

Department of the Interior (Interior) and H. Dale Hall, Director

of the FWS (collectively federal appellants), together with the

Safari Club International and Safari Club International

Foundation (collectively Safari Club), appeal the district court

judgment enjoining the FWS “from authorizing the lethal take

of any more gray wolves for depredation control purposes” by

the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (Wisconsin

DNR). Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Kempthorne,

CV06-1279, slip op. at 34 (Aug. 9, 2006); id. Order (Sept. 6,

2006). The Humane Society of the United States (Humane

Society) and other environmental organizations1

 had sought the

injunction because, in their view, the gray wolf, as an

endangered species, could not be the object of a lethal

depredation control program under the Endangered Species Act

(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. The district court agreed.

While the appeal was pending, Interior removed the gray wolf

population located in the Western Great Lakes Region (which

includes Wisconsin) from the endangered species list. See Final

Rule Designating the Western Great Lakes Populations of Gray

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2

“The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,

wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any

such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 

3

See Reclassification of the Gray Wolf in the United States and

Mexico, with Determination of Critical Habitat in Michigan and

Minnesota, 43 Fed. Reg. 9607 (March 9, 1978).

Wolves as a Distinct Population Segment; Removing the

Western Great Lakes Distinct Population Segment of the Gray

Wolf From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72

Fed. Reg. 6052 (Feb. 8, 2007). The parties agree that the

delisting moots the appeal. The federal appellants and the Safari

Club have moved to vacate the district court judgment and the

Humane Society opposes vacatur. For the reasons set forth

below, we grant the appellants’ motion and vacate the district

court judgment.

I.

The ESA protects species of fish and wildlife listed as

endangered or threatened by making it unlawful for any person

to “take any such species within the United States.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1)(B).2 Nevertheless, section 10(a)(1)(A) of the ESA

authorizes the Secretary to “permit . . . any act otherwise

prohibited by section 1538 of this title for scientific purposes or

to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species,

including, but not limited to, acts necessary for the

establishment and maintenance of experimental populations.”

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A). 

Since 1978 the gray wolf has been listed as an endangered

species in 47 states.3 In recent years, the gray wolf population

in Wisconsin has exceeded the recovery goal, resulting in wolf

depredation of livestock and domestic animals. Set of Findings:

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Wolf Depredation

Permit (TE111360), 2-4 (Apr. 24, 2006). The FWS concluded

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4

See Final Rule to Reclassify and Remove the Gray Wolf from the

List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife in Portions of the

Conterminous United States; Establishment of Two Special

Regulations for Threatened Gray Wolves, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,804, 15,868

(Apr. 1, 2003).

5

68 Fed. Reg. at 15,809-11, 15,868.

that depredation endangers gray wolf recovery because “[i]f the

State or Federal government does not act, livestock owners

likely will act and their actions could lead to the indiscriminate

killing of wolves.” Id. at 2 (citation omitted). Accordingly, in

2003 the FWS, in conjunction with the Wisconsin DNR,

attempted to implement a depredation control program in

Wisconsin. 

 Pursuant to section 4(d) of the ESA—which applies only to

threatened species—the Secretary is authorized to promulgate

regulations “as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for

the conservation of such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). In

2003, the depredation control program was established as one

such regulation.4

 In the regulation, the FWS reclassified the

gray wolf in certain states (including Wisconsin) from

endangered to threatened and simultaneously promulgated a

section 4(d) rule to permit the taking of gray wolves in those

regions.5 Different environmental organizations challenged the

rule, however, and two federal district courts invalidated the

FWS’s reclassification of the gray wolf as threatened and,

accordingly, enjoined the depredation control programs. See

Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 354 F.

Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Or. 2005); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton,

386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005). 

In February 2005, with the gray wolf having been returned

to endangered status, the Wisconsin DNR applied for a

depredation control permit pursuant to section 10(a)(1)(A) of the

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6

See ESA § 10(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).

7

See Authorization to Use Region 3 Endangered and Threatened

Species Permit to Carry Out the Following Activities Within the

State(s) of Wisconsin (Apr. 1, 2005) (authorizing the taking of up to

34 wolves).

8

See Notice of Receipt of Applications, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,401 (Sept.

14, 2005).

ESA. In contrast to section 4(d), which permits the Secretary to

issue regulations allowing the taking of a threatened species as

the Secretary “deems necessary and advisable to provide for the

conservation of such species,” section 10(a)(1)(A) permits the

Secretary to issue regulations allowing the taking of an

endangered species “for scientific purposes or to enhance the

propagation or survival of the affected species” only.6

 On April

1, 2005 the FWS issued a section 10 depredation control permit

to the Wisconsin DNR7

 but the district court invalidated the

permit because the FWS had failed to provide for notice and

comment before issuing it. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton,

No. 05cv1573 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2005). 

The Wisconsin DNR immediately reapplied for a section 10

permit8

 and, following a public comment period, the FWS issued

a new section 10 permit on April 24, 2006. See Federal Fish and

Wildlife Permit, No. TE111380-0 (Apr. 24, 2006). The permit,

which was effective from April 24, 2006 until December 31,

2006, permitted the Wisconsin DNR to euthanize up to 43

wolves subject to several conditions, including that “[l]ethal

wolf control is preceded by verification that wolves were

involved in the depredation,” “depredation occurred on lawfully

present domestic animals, including livestock” and

“[d]epredation at the site is likely to continue in the immediate

future if the depredating wolf or wolves are not removed.” Id.

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9

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (“On timely motion, the court must

permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the

property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so

situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair

or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing

parties adequately represent that interest.”).

The Humane Society sought preliminary injunctive relief in

the district court on July 25, 2006, claiming that section 10 of

the ESA does not authorize the FWS to issue a permit for a

lethal depredation control program for an endangered species.

Safari Club then moved to intervene as of right to defend the

legality of the permit,9 arguing that its members “hunt in

Wisconsin, frequently encounter wolves, . . . have witnessed

wolves on their properties, in close proximity to their families

and pets[,] . . . have also competed with wolves during hunting

expeditions[,] . . . have lost prey to aggressive wolves . . . [and]

have lost family pets and have witnessed the carnage of a wolf

attack on these highly valued animals.” Mot. to Intervene 5

(Aug. 1, 2006).

On August 9, 2006, the district court both granted Safari

Club’s motion to intervene and issued a preliminary injunction

prohibiting the FWS from authorizing the Wisconsin DNR to

engage in the lethal take of gray wolves for the purpose of

depredation control. See Humane Soc’y of the United States v.

Kempthorne, No. 06cv1279 (Aug. 9, 2006). The court

converted the preliminary injunction into a final judgment on the

merits on September 6, 2006 and the federal appellants and

Safari Club filed timely notices of appeal on November 1, 2006

and November 13, 2006, respectively. See Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(3). 

On February 8, 2007, Interior promulgated its final rule

removing the gray wolf in the Western Great Lakes Region from

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10The Humane Society is challenging the delisting in a separate

district court proceeding. See Humane Soc’y of the United States v.

Kempthorne, No. 07cv0677 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 16, 2007). 

the endangered and threatened species list.10 See 72 Fed. Reg.

6052. Because the gray wolf is no longer a protected species,

the ESA no longer prohibits the Wisconsin DNR from taking the

species. Accordingly, Safari Club moved to dismiss the appeal

as moot and to vacate the district court judgment on May 4,

2007 and the federal appellants likewise moved on May 11,

2007. The Humane Society agrees that the March 12, 2007

delisting mooted the appeal. See Appellees’ Br. 18. 

II.

“When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate

adjudication, ‘[t]he established practice . . . in the federal system

. . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with

a direction to dismiss.’” Arizonans for Official English v.

Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) (quoting United States v.

Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)) (alterations in

Arizonans); see also United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35, 38

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (“When a case becomes

moot on appeal, whether it be during initial review or in

connection with consideration of a petition for rehearing or

rehearing en banc, this court generally vacates the District

Court’s judgment, vacates any outstanding panel decisions, and

remands to the District Court with direction to dismiss.”).

“Vacatur ‘clears the path for future relitigation’ by eliminating

a judgment the loser was stopped from opposing on direct

review.” Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 71 (quoting Munsingwear, 340

U.S. at 40).

Both the federal appellants and Safari Club ask us to vacate

the district court’s judgment. The Humane Society opposes

vacatur, asserting that “vacatur should be not granted when ‘the

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party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the

mootness by voluntary action.’” Appellees’ Br. 19 (quoting U.S.

Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24

(1994)). Vacatur does not apply, according to the Humane

Society, because “[t]he mootness of this appeal is not

happenstance” but was instead caused by the FWS’s “timing of

both the issuance of the Section 10(a)(1)(A) permits and the

delisting decision.” Id. The Humane Society acknowledges that

the delisting of the gray wolf was proposed before the FWS

issued Wisconsin DNR’s section 10 permit but emphasizes that

Wisconsin DNR applied for the permit over six months before

the delisting proposal. Further, the FWS could reasonably

anticipate that that permit would be challenged in court, the

Humane Society maintains, and the delisting proposal was thus

an attempt to head off litigation. Additionally, “[b]oth the

Western Great Lakes Delisting Rule and the 2006 Permit were

handled out of the same FWS Regional Office in Fort Snelling,

Minnesota . . . [and] the principal author of the Western Great

Lakes Delisting Rule also authored the Wisconsin Memo, which

urged the issuance of a Section 10(a)(1)(A) permit to Wisconsin

in 2005.” Id. at 23. 

The Humane Society’s argument is based on its

interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513

U.S. 18, 24 (1994). In Bancorp, “[t]he contested question [was]

whether courts should vacate where mootness results from a

settlement.” 513 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). “[T]he

determination is an equitable one,” the Court explained, and

“[t]he principal condition to which we have looked is whether

the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the

mootness by voluntary action.” Id. at 29, 24-25. It concluded

that “[w]here mootness results from settlement . . . the losing

party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary

processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim

to the equitable remedy of vacatur.” Id. at 25. But it cautioned

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that “[t]his is not to say that vacatur can never be granted when

mootness is produced in that fashion.” Id. at 29 (emphases

added).

We have interpreted Bancorp narrowly. In National Black

Police Association v. District of Columbia,108 F.3d 346 (D.C.

Cir. 1997), the Police Association brought a First Amendment

challenge to the political campaign contribution limits imposed

by the District. The district court struck down the limits and

enjoined their implementation, id. at 348; while the District’s

appeal was pending, the District increased the contribution

limits, thus mooting the appeal, id. at 347. Although we noted

that Bancorp’s “voluntary action” exception might apply to

Governmental action we nonetheless vacated the district court

judgment:

The issue we face here is whether Bancorp’s

presumption against vacatur should apply where the

party seeking relief from the judgment below is the

government and the case has been mooted by passage of

new legislation. Clearly, the passage of new legislation

represents voluntary action, and thus on its face the

Bancorp presumption might seem to govern. We believe,

however, that application of the Bancorp presumption in

this context is not required by the Bancorp opinion’s

rationale and would be inappropriate, at least if there is

no evidence indicating that the legislation was enacted

in order to overturn an unfavorable precedent. The

rationale underlying the Bancorp presumption is that

litigants should not be able to manipulate the judicial

system by “roll[ing] the dice . . . in the district court”

and then “wash[ing] away” any “unfavorable outcome”

through use of settlement and vacatur. Bancorp, 513

U.S. at 27-29. The mere fact that a legislature has

enacted legislation that moots an appeal, without more,

provides no grounds for assuming that the legislature

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was motivated by such a manipulative purpose. The

legislature may act out of reasons totally independent of

the pending lawsuit, or because the lawsuit has

convinced it that the existing law is flawed. In American

Library Association v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir.

1992), we rejected the argument that vacatur was not

appropriate where a case had become moot on appeal

due to Congress’ passage of new legislation, arguing that

Congress’ action “to repair what may have been a

constitutionally defective statute . . . represents

responsible lawmaking, not manipulation of the judicial

process.” Id. at 1187.

Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added and citation omitted) (alterations

in Nat’l Black Police Ass’n).

We thus vacated the judgment although the District had

mooted the appeal by enacting new legislation. Analogizing to

Black Police Association, the FWS argues that the judgment

here should be vacated because the Government is an appellant

and it mooted the appeal by delisting the gray wolf. But the

Black Police Association opinion in dicta seems to distinguish

legislative from executive action:

Separation of powers concerns provide further reason to

exempt from Bancorp’s presumption against vacatur the

situation of a case which has become moot on appeal

due to passage of legislation. As is true of the District,

in most multi-branch governments defense of existing

laws falls to the executive whereas initiation of

legislation is the responsibility of the legislature.

Although the executive has the option of refusing to sign

legislation, so as to avoid mooting litigation, this option

is a hollow one if the executive believes both that the

new legislation would be beneficial and that the pending

challenge has no merit. To a degree, therefore, the

executive branch is in a position akin to a party who

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finds its case mooted on appeal by “happenstance,”

rather than events within its control. This argument

suggests that the Bancorp presumption against vacatur

might apply if the case has been rendered moot on

appeal by enactment or repeal of a regulation, even

though the courts accord the executive branch the same

presumption of legitimate motive as is given the

legislative branch. We need not reach this question,

however, and therefore express no views on the matter

other than to note the limits of our holding here that the

Bancorp presumption is usually inapplicable when

legislative action moots a case and the government seeks

vacatur.

Id. at 353 (emphasis added and citation omitted).

Relying on our language highlighted above, the Humane

Society maintains that the Black Police Association holding

supports its position because the FWS mooted the appeal by its

delisting decision. Central to the Humane Society’s argument,

however, is the premise that the voluntary action exception

applies to governmental action in the first place. And neither

Bancorp nor Black Police Association decided that threshold

issue. See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25 (holding that “[w]here

mootness results from settlement, . . . the losing party has

voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes

of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the

equitable remedy of vacatur”); Black Police Ass’n, 108 F.3d at

351 (observing that while “the passage of new legislation

represents voluntary action, and thus on its face the Bancorp

presumption might seem to govern,” District was nonetheless

entitled to vacatur) (emphasis added).

Moreover, in American Family Life Assurance Co. of

Columbus v. FCC, 129 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(AFLAC)—issued less than six months after Black Police

Association—we suggested that the Bancorp exception may be

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limited to appeals mooted by settlement. In AFLAC, the

successor of a broadcast company that owned multiple television

stations petitioned for review of an FCC order. While review

was pending, the petitioner sold all of its interests in the

television stations, thus mooting its petition. The FCC argued

that its order should not be vacated because the petitioner

mooted the case through its “unilateral, voluntary action.” Id. at

630. We noted that “[t]he Commission’s first point

misinterprets [Bancorp] . . . [because] [t]he specific holding of

Bancorp, concerning as it does settlements, has no application

here.” Id. at 630 (emphasis added). We then analyzed the

“equities” of vacatur, rejecting the Commission’s argument that

it was “entirely ‘speculative’ that the Commission’s Order will

have any preclusive effects on petitioner in the future” and that

“the continuing precedential force of the Order remain[ed]

valuable to the public.” Id. at 630-31.

While the Black Police Association dicta and AFLAC’s

interpretation of Bancorp may not be seamlessly consistent,

neither squarely decided that Bancorp’s voluntary action

exception applies to “executive branch” action. We likewise

need not resolve the issue because any doubt about the federal

appellants’ entitlement to vacatur is removed by intervenor

Safari Club’s entitlement thereto. As noted earlier, Safari Club

intervened as of right and filed its own motion to dismiss the

appeal as moot and to vacate the district court’s judgment.

“Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through

happenstance—circumstances not attributable to the

parties . . . .” Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 71; see

also Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25 (“A party who seeks review of the

merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of

circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the

judgment”); N. Cal. Power Agency v. Nuclear Regulatory

Comm’n, 393 F.3d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the party

who lost below did not cause the case to become moot, that is,

if happenstance or the actions of the prevailing party ended the

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11The Humane Society contends that “permitting Safari Club,

which intervened as a defendant on behalf of the government, to seek

vacatur where the government could not, would open a serious

loophole in the rule of U.S. Bancorp for any case involving

intervenors.” Appellees’ Br. 25-26 (emphasis in original). Safari

Club, however, intervened as of right because its interest was not

adequately represented. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

controversy, vacatur remains the standard form of relief.”)

(citations omitted). Plainly, Safari Club did not moot the

appeal—the delisting decision was made by the FWS.

Moreover, “vacatur is an equitable remedy,” Columbian Rope

Co. v. West, 142 F.3d 1313, 1318 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing

Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25), and here the equities favor vacatur.

This is “not a case in which a litigant is attempting to manipulate

the courts to obtain the relief it was not able to win in the

judicial system.” Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d

1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (vacating district court judgment

mooted by promulgation of U.S. Forest Service regulation

because vacatur was sought by non-governmental intervenors).

And “because the party seeking appellate relief is not the party

responsible for mooting the case, the orderly operation of the

appellate system is not being frustrated.” Id.11 Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is vacated. 

So ordered.

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