Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00508/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00508-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOANNE DAPHNE ELLIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

K. ROSS JOHNSTON, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 07-508-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Joanne Daphne Ellis’s (“Plaintiff’) motion to

compel Barton L. Baker (“Baker”) to accept service of process. (Dkt. #58). On October

12, 2007, the Court granted Baker’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, dismissed

Plaintiff’s amended complaint without prejudice and with leave to file a second amended

complaint. (Dkt. #53). On November 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

that eliminated all original defendants and named only Kevin Ross Johnston (“K. Ross

Johnston”) and Does 1-20 as Defendants. On November 7, 2007, a summons was issued

as to K. Ross Johnston; service of that summons was attempted upon Baker on December

4, 2007, but was returned unexecuted after Baker refused to accept service of process

stating that “he no longer represents K. Ross Johnston.” (Dkt. #57). Then, on December

4, 2007, Plaintiff filed the instant action to compel Baker to accept service of process on

behalf of K. Ross Johnston. (Dkt. #58).

Case 2:07-cv-00508-MHM Document 59 Filed 02/21/08 Page 1 of 3
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Plaintiff contends that the Court should grant her motion to compel Baker to accept

service of process on behalf of K. Ross Johnston because Baker previously represented K.

Ross Johnston in a case that is related to the instant action. An agent’s authority to accept

service may be implied in fact from the surrounding circumstances. Gibbs v. Hawaiian

Eugenia Corp., 581 F.Supp. 1269, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also 4A Charles A. Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1097, at 84-85 (2d ed. 1987)

(“[A]lthough authority to accept process need not be explicit, it must either be express or

implied form the type of relationship between defendant and the alleged agent.”). 

However, an attorney does not become an agent for process simply because the attorney

previously represented the defendant in an earlier action. U.S. v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co.,

111 F.3d 878, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990)

(holding that the mere relationship between a defendant and his attorney does not, by

itself, convey authority to accept service of process). For an attorney to be considered an

agent for process, he or she must have been appointed for that precise task. Santos v. State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 902 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1990); see also 4A Wright & Miller

§1097, at 85-86 (“[D]efendant’s attorney probably will not be deemed an agent appointed

to receive process absent a factual basis for believing that an appointment of this type has

taken place.”).

Plaintiff provides the Court with no indication that Baker was granted the authority

to accept service of process on behalf of K. Ross Johnston in the instant action. Indeed,

although Plaintiff submits as an exhibit the first page of a 2004 affidavit of K. Ross

Johnston that states that at that time Baker represented K. Ross Johnston, Plaintiff

provides the Court no information to indicate that Baker still represents K. Ross Johnston,

let alone that K. Ross Johnston gave Baker the authority, express or implied, to accept

service on his behalf. Thus, the Court can not find that Baker presently represents K. Ross

Johnston or that he possesses the explicitly or implicit authority to accept service of

process on behalf of K. Ross Johnston in the instant action.

Case 2:07-cv-00508-MHM Document 59 Filed 02/21/08 Page 2 of 3
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In addition, Plaintiff refers to Baker as counsel of record for K. Ross Johnston and

requests that the Court not allow Baker to withdraw as such, but Baker has not sought to

withdraw, and he is and has never been counsel of record for K. Ross Johnston in the

instant action. Baker is counsel of record in this action only to the extent that he was

defending himself as one of the original named defendants. However, Plaintiff dismissed

Baker as a Defendant in her second amended complaint filed on November 1, 2007. Thus,

Baker is neither a party in this action, counsel of record for K. Ross Johnston, nor his

agent for purposes of service of process. As such, Plaintiff must either serve K. Ross

Johnston himself or an agent of K. Ross Johnston that has been explicitly or implicitly

granted the authority to accept service of process on his behalf in the instant action.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Dkt. #58) is

DENIED.

DATED this 19th day of February, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00508-MHM Document 59 Filed 02/21/08 Page 3 of 3