Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01390/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01390-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER CORTINAS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1390 DFL CMK P

vs.

TOM CAREY, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The state moves to dismiss this petition on the

grounds that this petition is untimely under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (AEDPA).

Petitioner has filed an opposition to the state’s motion, arguing that he is entitled to equitable

tolling. 

I. Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. AEDPA places a one year statute of limitations on the filing of

petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year limitations period

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 applies to all federal petitions filed after the effective date of AEDPA. As this petition was filed

on June 22, 2006, AEDPA’s statute of limitations applies. Untimely petitions are barred from

federal review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Generally, a state prisoner challenging his custody has one year to file his federal

petition from the date on which his conviction became final by the conclusion of direct review,

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Calculating the timeliness of the federal petition requires more than simply looking at the date of

the final state court judgment and the date the federal petition was filed. That is because the

proper filing of a state habeas petition application concerning the pertinent conviction tolls the

one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling. 

See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled

in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.

1998)(en banc). In order to win equitable tolling, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) extraordinary

circumstances beyond the prisoners control that (2) made it impossible to file a petition on time. 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is “unavailable in

most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “the threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). This high bar is necessary to effectuate the

“AEDPA’s statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect

the federal system from being forced to hear stale claims.” See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015,

1018 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden of demonstrating grounds for equitable tolling rests with the

prisoner. See id. 

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The “mailbox rule” does not save petitioner as his proof of service for his federal habeas 1

petition is dated June 14, 2006, only eight days before the petition was actually filed with the

court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

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II. Discussion

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder with a knife in 1986, and he

was sentenced to sixteen years to life. In his habeas application, petitioner challenges the Board

of Prison Terms’s September 2000 decision denying him parole. Petitioner’s administrative

appeal of the Board’s decision was denied on June 12, 2001. (Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A.) Therefore,

his one-year limitation period began to run on June 13, 2001. 

When petitioner filed his superior court petition on January 14, 2002, 215 days of

the one-year limitations period had already run. (Mot. Dismiss, Exs. 1 and 2.) There is no

dispute that petitioner’s state habeas petitions were properly filed. (Mot. Dismiss at 4:14-18.) 

There is no dispute that petitioner was entitled to interval tolling–that is tolling of the statute of

limitations, during the time that he filed his petition in the superior court (January 14, 2002) to

the time that the California Supreme Court dismissed his petition for review (October 12, 2005). 

(Id. at 5.) Petitioner then waited another 252 days, until June 22, 2006 , to file his federal

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petition for habeas relief. In other words, even taking into account interval tolling, 467 days

elapsed between the date that the Board’s decision denying petitioner parole became final (June

12, 2001) and the date the petitioner filed his federal habeas petition (June 22, 2006.) Because

more than one year (365 days) elapsed, petitioner’s federal habeas petition is barred by the oneyear limitations period. 

In his December 29, 2006 opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioner argues

that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he did not have access to a law library. Petitioner

asserts that on approximately May 15, 2005, he (and all other Mexicans from northern

California) was placed on a lockdown at Solano State Prison. Petitioner has attached exhibits

which show that the Barrio Defense Committee wrote a letter in May 2005 concerning the

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lockdown of Mexican prisoners to the Warden of Solano State Prison and Director Woodford. 

(Opp’n, Ex. A.)

 While on lockdown, petitioner had no access to the legal library to research and

prepare a federal habeas petition. Petitioner states in his declaration, which is attached to his

opposition, that he assumed that he had one-year to file his federal petition from the date that his

remedies were exhausted in state court. He asserts that he was unaware of how the AEDPA

statute of limitations worked. He further asserts that he was unable to have access to the law

library except for November 3, 2006 through November 10, 2006 and then again on December 7,

2006 through December 30, 2006. 

As noted above, equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases and that threshold

for triggering such is very high. See Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107, Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d at

1063. Although petitioner asserts that he was unaware of how the one-year statute of limitations

worked and that he was denied access to the legal library, these circumstances do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See Felder v. Johnson, 204

F.3d 168, 171-172 & n. 10 (5th Cir. 2000)(petitioner’s unawareness of AEDPA filing

requirements insufficient to warrant equitable tolling); see also, Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that although the Ninth Circuit has yet to consider whether a pro se

petitioner’s ignorance of the law is an extraordinary circumstance, other circuits have held that it

is not and stating that “[w]e now join our sister circuits and hold that a pro se petitioner's lack of

legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

tolling.”) 

The lack of access to library material does not automatically qualify as grounds for

equitable tolling. See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.) (as amended). Indeed,

in the present case, petitioner avers that he was not allowed access to the library until November

3, 2006. (Opp’n at 7:24-27.) However, despite having no library access, he was still able to file

his federal petition on June 22, 2006. (Doc. 1.) 

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III. Conclusion

While the court is sympathetic to petitioner’s situation, it is bound by the AEDPA

and by the case law defining “extraordinary circumstances.” The court finds that petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not demonstrated that the prison lockdowns and

restricted access to the prison library amounted to “extraordinary circumstances” beyond his

control preventing him from filing a timely petition. 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that respondents’ motion to dismiss on the

grounds that it was filed beyond the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 18, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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