Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00578/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00578-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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*This Report and Recommendation supersedes the former (Doc. 141) nunc pro 

tunc to correct a typographical error only. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 On March 28, 2011, Petitioner Geary Wayne Walton, who is confined in the 

Central Arizona Correctional Facility in Florence, Arizona, filed a copy of an Order 

(Doc. 1) from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granting Petitioner’s application for 

authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in 

district court. Presently before the Court is Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND 

I. State Proceedings 

 A. Trial and Sentencing 

 On November 5, 1987, Petitioner was indicted for eleven offenses in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 87-09953. (Doc. 66-1, Exh. 1.) 

In Count I of the indictment, Petitioner was charged with attempted sexual abuse, 

alleging that between June 11 and June 14, 1987, he attempted to engage in direct or 

Geary Wayne Walton, 

 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 

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No. CV 11-00578-PHX-ROS (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION* 

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indirect fondling of T.W.,1 a minor under the age of fifteen. Counts II-VIII charged 

sexual conduct with a minor, alleging that between June 11 and June 14, 1987, Petitioner 

engaged in oral sexual contact with K.V.I., a minor under the age of fifteen. In Counts IX 

and X, Petitioner was charged with sexual conduct with a minor, alleging that between 

June 11 and June 14, 1987, Petitioner engaged in oral sexual contact with T.W. Lastly, 

Count XI charged Petitioner with public sexual indecency, alleging that between June 11 

and June 14, 1987, he recklessly engaged in an act of sexual contact in the presence of 

T.W., a minor under fifteen years of age. (Doc. 66-1, Exh. 1.) 

 On November 17, 1987, a second indictment was returned in the Superior Court, 

Case No. CR 87-10264. (Doc. 66-1, Exh. 2.) Counts I through IV of the indictment 

charged offenses against co-defendant Ray Green. In Counts V, VI, VII, and VIII, 

Petitioner was charged with sexual conduct with a minor, alleging that between May 15 

and June 10, 1987, he had engaged in oral sexual contact with T.W. In Count IX, he was 

charged with sexual conduct with a minor, alleging that on or about May 29, 1986, 

Petitioner had engaged in oral sexual contact with T.W. Counts X, XI, XII, and XIII, 

charged Petitioner with child prostitution, alleging that between May 15 and June 10, 

1987, he knowingly used T.W. for purposes of child prostitution. (Doc. 66-1, Exh. 2.) 

The indictment was subsequently amended to include an allegation of a prior conviction, 

in that on August 11, 1977, Petitioner had been convicted of lewd and lascivious acts, a 

felony offense, Case No. CR 97176. (Doc. 66-1, Exh. 3.) 

 On February 18, 1988, the Superior Court consolidated CR 87-09953 and CR 87-

10264, and Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX in CR 87-10264 were then renumbered XII, 

XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI, so as to sequentially follow the Counts in CR 87-09953. (Doc. 

66-1, Exh. 4 and 6.)2

 Counts XIII, XIV, and XV were subsequently dismissed (Doc. 66-1, 

Exh. 7), and Count XVI was renumbered as Count XIII to sequentially follow the 

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 The minor victims referred to in this report and recommendation are identified by their initials. 

2

 In CR 87-10264, the Superior Court remanded Counts X-XIII to the grand jury. Those charges, however, were not refiled. (Doc. 66-1, Exh. 5.) 

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remaining Counts I through XII (Doc. 67-1 at 62, Exh. 37). 

 Following a six-day jury trial, on October 14, 1988, Petitioner was acquitted of 

Counts VII, VIII, and XIII. He was found guilty of Count I (attempted sexual abuse), 

Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, and X (sexual conduct with a minor), Count XI (public 

sexual indecency with a minor), and Count XII (sexual contact with a minor with a prior 

predicate felony). (Doc. 66-3, Exh. 9.) On October 17, 1988, the jury further found that 

Petitioner had been convicted of the alleged 1977 offense. (Doc. 66-3, Exh. 10.) 

 Petitioner filed several pro se motions for a new hearing based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel (Doc 66-3, Exh. 11), which were subsequently denied (Doc. 66-3 at 

45, Exh. 12). On February 16, 1989, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 

fifteen years on Count I; a term of life without possibility of parole for thirty-five years 

on Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, and X; an aggravated term of six years on Count XI; and 

an aggravated term of thirty-five years on Count XII. Each sentence was imposed to run 

consecutively, a total of 301-years’ incarceration. (Doc. 66-3, Exh. 12; Doc. 66-4, Exh. 

13.) 

 B. Direct Appeal 

 On February 23, 1989, Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals (“Appellate Court”). (Doc. 66-4 at 23, Exh. 14.) In his opening brief, 

Petitioner raised three issues: (1) “[i]n sustaining an objection by the state at trial, did the 

court deny his sixth-amendment right to confrontation”; (2) “[i]n sustaining the same 

objection, did the trial court improperly comment on the evidence”; and (3) “[i]n the trial 

on his prior felony conviction, did the court erroneously deny the jury’s request for a 

magnifying glass?” (Doc. 66-4 at 73, Exh. 17; see also Doc. 66-4, Exh. 14.) In a 

memorandum decision filed on September 10, 1991, the Appellate Court affirmed 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 66-4, Exh. 17.) In doing so, it summarized 

his case, in part, as follows: 

In June 1987, defendant lived in a Glendale home with his 

daughter [T.W.], his girlfriend Jocelyn, and Jocelyn’s 

daughters [K.V.I.] and [K.V.II.]. While Jocelyn was at work, 

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defendant summoned [T.W.] and [K.V.I.] into his bedroom 

and performed various acts of oral sex with them both 

separately and together. Defendant injected himself with a syringe while the girls were in the bedroom with him. The 

following day, the girls revealed the incident to Jocelyn, who brought them to the police station. 

[T.W.] testified about a previous incident that occurred while 

she was living with her aunt. Defendant took her to a house 

trailer occupied by Ray Green. Defendant ordered [T.W.] to 

allow Green to perform cunnilingus on her. She then was forced to perform fellatio on Green. On two occasions during this incident, she also was required to perform fellatio on 

defendant. Ray Green testified that [T.W.] performed oral sex on defendant and that defendant performed oral sex on [T.W.] as well. 

The state also presented the testimony of two girls who stated that defendant forced them to perform oral sex upon him in 1977 when he lived with their mother. This incident was the 

basis of defendant’s prior conviction for lewd and lascivious 

acts. 

(Doc. 66-4, Exh. 17.)3

 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, which the Arizona Supreme 

Court summarily denied on March 4, 1992. (Doc. 66-4, Exh. 18.) 

C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

 On March 13, 1989, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(Doc. 66-4, Exh. 15), and was appointed counsel. Petitioner argued that newly discovered 

evidence entitled him to a new trial, and presented evidence of medications that he was 

prescribed at the time of his offenses. The Superior Court dismissed the petition on 

August 1, 1989, and a subsequent request for rehearing on September 25, 1989. (Doc. 66-

4, Exh. 16.) Petitioner sought review, and in a memorandum decision filed on September 

10, 1991, the Appellate Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. (Doc. 66-4, Exh. 

17.) 

 Between January of 1992 and July of 1992, Petitioner filed a series of 

unsuccessful motions in the Superior Court, including a Writ of Habeas Corpus and 

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 Petitioner does not appear to contest the Appellate Court’s recitation of the alleged facts. Therefore, the Court presumes the state court’s factual determinations are correct 

because Petitioner has not “rebutt[ed] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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Motion for Evidentiary Hearings, Motion to Amend and/or to Supplement at Later Date, 

Motion to Amend and/or to Supplement Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus Requested 

Expedition, Motion to Amend/Supplement Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and 

Motion to Supplement Petition of Ineffective Assistance of Counsels. (Doc. 66-5, Exh. 

19.) On July 20 1992, Petitioner filed a second post-conviction relief petition (Doc. 66-5 

at 54, Exh. 19), which was withdrawn at Petitioner’s request (Doc. 66-5 at 20). 

 In November of 1992, Petitioner again filed a series of unsuccessful motions in the 

Superior Court, including a Motion for Appointment of Defense Attorney (Doc. 66-6 at 

12, Exh. 21), Motion of Ineffective Assistant of Counsel (Doc. 66-6 at 12, Exh. 17), 

Motion for Appointment of Experts (Doc. 66-6 at 24, Exh. 21), and Motion to Dismiss 

Hanna Priors (Doc. 66-6 at 28, Exh. 21). (Doc. 66-6, Exh. 21.) 

 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a third post-conviction relief petition on 

November 27, 1992 (Doc. 66-6 at 2, Exh. 21), and a subsequent petition on December 9, 

1992 (Doc. 66-6 at 41, Exh. 21). Although he was initially appointed counsel, Petitioner 

retained counsel who then filed an amended post-conviction relief petition on July 29, 

1993. (Doc. 66-7, Exh. 22.) Petitioner, through counsel, argued: 

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts that he 

was denied the effective assistance of counsel in every crucial 

stage of his “pretrial, his jury trial, at sentencing, in his appeal of the criminal conviction, and in his previous petitions for 

post conviction proceedings;4

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 A. Defendant was denied effective assistance by his retained counsel because retained counsel was more interested in his 

fee than in assisting Defendant; B. Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

because his attorneys failed to pursue a Rule 11 request and failed to pursue a neurological examination of Defendant; C. Defendant's attorneys failed to “adequately investigate Defendant's medical history and the cause of his alleged psychotic behavior”; D. Defendant's attorneys failed to obtain an expert witness to investigate Defendant's medical background; E. Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal was hampered by a conflict of interest; F. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at 

sentencing because his attorneys failed to request a mitigation hearing; 

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2. Defendant alleges that he was improperly sentenced to 

consecutive sentences based on his interpretation of A.R.S. S13-604(H); 

3. Double jeopardy barred relitigation of Defendant’s prior conviction; 

4. Defendant had a medical problem and addiction to 

prescription medication which was not raised at trial; 

5. Defendant was denied a substantial right because of the 

admission of prior bad acts at the trial. 

(Doc. 66-7 at 2-4, Exh. 22.) In a decision filed on December 14, 1993, the Superior Court 

denied relief, finding that the claims were precluded from review or failed on their merits. 

(Doc. 66-7 at 16, Exh. 23.) Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing and motion for 

reconsideration (Doc. 66-7, Exh. 23), which the Superior Court denied on March 10, 

1994 (Doc. 66-7 at 47, Exh. 23). 

 Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus for Special Action in the Superior Court 

on June 6, 1994, (Doc. 66-7 at 55, Exh. 26), a post-conviction relief petition on June 9, 

1994 (Doc. 66-7 at 73, Exh. 26), an amended petition on June 17, 1994 (Doc. 66-7 at 87, 

Exh. 25), and an amended petition on June 29, 1994 (Doc. 66-7 at 92, Exh. 26), which the 

Superior Court consolidated and construed as Petitioner’s fourth post-conviction relief 

proceedings. (Doc. 66-8, Exh. 27.) Thereby, Petitioner raised the following claims: 

1. Petitioner’s double jeopardy and ex post facto rights were violated when the court allowed evidence at trial of the child 

prostitution counts which had been remanded to the grand 

jury and upon which Petitioner was never re-indicted, and 

when the state used his prior conviction as evidence of guilt at trial. 

2. The state “breached” its plea agreement in another cause number by mentioning the pled-out conviction at trial. 

 G. Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

in a prior Rule 32 petition because Defendant's counsel failed 

to adequately support an amended petition for Rule 32 relief. 

(Doc. 66-7 at 3, Exh. 22.) 

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3. Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire 

expert witnesses and for not precluding evidence of the plea 

agreement at trial. 

4. The trial court misused aggravating circumstances at 

sentencing. 

(Doc. 66-8 at 24, Exh. 30.) On August 18, 1994, the Superior Court denied relief, finding 

that the claims were precluded from review. (See Doc. 66-8, Exh. 27.) 

 Petitioner appealed the Superior Court’s decisions on his third5

 and fourth 

petitions, and in an order dated December 19, 1994, the Appellate Court denied review. 

(Doc. 66-7, Exh. 24; Doc. 66-8, Exh. 28.) He then filed a petition for review, which the 

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied on July 3, 1995. (Doc. 66-7, Exh. 25; Doc. 66-

8, Exh. 29.) 

 On October 21, 1996, Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, 

and his fifth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 26, 1996. (Doc. 67-2, Exh. 

38.) On or about December 2, 1996, Petitioner filed an amended post-conviction relief 

petition. (Doc. 67-2 at 38, Exh. 38.) Petitioner argued that he was entitled to be 

resentenced or to have his release date recalculated based on State v. Tarango, and was 

alternatively entitled to relief on the following grounds: 

(1) violation of the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for 

the same offense; (2) the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the constitution or the laws of the this state, or the 

Constitution of the United states, including a right that was not recognized as existing at the time of the trial if 

retrospective application of that right is required, (3) the use by the state in determining sentence of a prior conviction obtained in violation of the united States of Arizona 

Constitutions and (4) sentence imposed other than in accordance with the sentencing procedures established by rule 

or statute. 

(Doc. 67-2 at 48-49, Exh. 39.) In a decision filed on May 2, 1997, the Superior Court 

denied relief, finding that the claims were precluded from review or failed on their merits. 

(Doc. 67-2, Exh. 39.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action, which the 

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 The Arizona Supreme Court cites, by typographical error, that the third petition was filed on November 27, 1993. (Doc. 66-8, Exh. 28.) 

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Appellate Court summarily denied on June 5, 1997. (Doc. 67-2, Exh. 40.) 

 On September 11, 2000, Petitioner filed his sixth post-conviction relief petition, 

and Motion Requesting DNA Fingerprinting, in which he requested “any all victim(s) 

medical records since they’ve been in the world.” (Doc. 67-2 at 64, Exh. 41.) In a minute 

entry dated November 10, 2000, the Superior Court dismissed the petition, finding that 

“[n]o newly discovered material facts have been presented which would entitle[] the 

defendant to Rule 32 relief. Mere speculation that ‘DNA fingerprinting’, which did not 

exist when the defendant was tried and sentenced, may change the verdict does not entitle 

a defendant to a Rule 32 hearing and relief.” (Doc. 67-2, Exh. 42.) In December of 2000, 

Petitioner appealed the Superior Court’s decision, and on September 21, 2001, the 

Appellate Court summarily denied review. (Doc. 67-3, Exh. 47.) He filed a Petition for 

Review in the Arizona Supreme Court on October 9, 2001, which was denied on 

December 13, 2001. (Doc. 67-3, Exh. 47.) 

 Concurrently, in December of 2000, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend 

Supplemental PCR Petition under Significant Change in Law Motion to Amend PCR 

Petition and Supplement Jury Instruction Exhibits Inadvertently Missed, Motion to 

Supplement Amended PCR Petition for Reconsideration / Review, and Motion to Amend 

Supplemental Pleading in Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which the Superior Court 

denied in a minute entry dated May 22, 2001. (Doc. 67-3, Exh. 44.) Petitioner filed a 

Motion for Leave to Amend Reply to Respondent’s Response (Doc. 67-3, Exh. 45), 

which the Superior Court treated as a motion for rehearing and summarily denied on June 

14, 2001 (Doc. 67-3, Exh. 46). 

 Petitioner filed a seventh post-conviction relief petition on April 10, 2002, in 

which he argued that newly discovered evidence established his innocence. (Doc. 67-4, 

Exh. 48.) In support of the petition, Petitioner attached an affidavit dated February 28, 

2002, which was purported to be signed by T.W. and stated that “she was in fact, subject 

to medical examination involving the crime(s) of sexual conduct.” (Doc. 67-4 at 19, Exh. 

48.) Further, Petitioner claimed that he had recently obtained medical records that show 

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in 1994, he was reported to have Hepatitis C. He claimed that since Hepatitis C is a 

sexually transmitted disease that the victim did not have, Petitioner could not have 

sexually assaulted her in 1987. (Doc. 67-4, Exh. 49.) The Superior Court dismissed the 

petition on May 13, 2002, finding that Petitioner’s claim did “not constitute newly 

discovered evidence that entitle[d] him to raise an untimely claim and to a hearing” and 

his other claim was precluded from review. (Id.) Petitioner appealed that decision, and on 

August 22, 2002, the Appellate Court denied review. (Doc. 67-4, Exh. 50.) The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied his following Petition for Review on December 16, 2002. (Doc. 

67-4, Exh. 51.) 

 In February of 2004, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and eighth 

post-conviction relief petition. (Doc. 67-4, Exh. 52.) Petitioner argued that trial and 

appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance, his sentences were unlawfully 

enhanced, and DNA testing would prove his innocence. Finding that the claims were 

previously raised in post-conviction proceedings and were precluded from review, the 

Superior Court dismissed the notice and petition on March 4, 2004. (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 53.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on May 28, 2004, which the Appellate Court denied 

as untimely on November 22, 2004. (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 54.) 

 In early 2004, Petitioner also filed a series of motions, including a Motion for 

Production of Court Records and DNA Evidence Pursuant to Rule 32.4(d), Motion for 

Reconsideration, Motion for Preparation and Production of Transcripts and Records, 

Motion for Reconsideration to Production of Court Records and DNA Evidence Under 

the Privacy Act and FOIA, Motion for Production of Victim Medical Record, Motion to 

Produce City of Phoenix Housing Department Records, and Motion to Produce CoDefendant Ray Anthony Green’s Medical and Psychiatric/Psychological Records, which 

the Superior Court denied in April, May, and July of 2004. (Doc. 67-5 at 21, Exh. 55; 

Doc. 67-5, Exh. 56 and 57.) 

 On May 13, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Deoxyribonucleic 

Acid Testing (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 55). He argued that “the DNA testing [would] show that 

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Petitioner is not the donor of the biological material found on the carpet, floor, 

papertowel, or victims... [t]he result of the DNA testing would provide that a large 

portion of the testimony of the victims was untruthful.” (Doc. 108-8 at 7, Exh. H.) The 

petition was denied on May 19, 2004. (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 56.) On November 3, 2004, 

Petitioner appealed the Superior Court’s decision; the Appellate Court dismissed the 

Petition for Review as untimely on November 8, 2004. (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 58.) Petitioner 

filed a Petition for Review on December 22, 2004, which the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied as untimely on December 29, 2004. (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 59.) 

 On January 4, 2005, Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Superior 

Court, which he supplemented on February 8, 2005. (Doc. 67-5, Exh. 60.) In the writ, 

Petitioner argued that because the “evaluation by Dr. Denise Schieffer shows in the 

victims medical record reports that no trauma was found with the victims in this case, 

whom Dr. Schieffer did in fact, examine and judge carefully” that it was an abuse of 

discretion for the trial court to admit the expert testimony of Dr. Harrison, who “gave 

false evidence to the jury of victims trauma.” (Doc. 67-5 at 51, Exh. 60.) On or about 

March 9, 2005, Petitioner moved to consolidate the writ with a post-conviction relief 

notice. (Doc. 68-1, Exh. 62.) Petitioner then filed an Amended Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief on March 29, 2005. (Doc. 67-6, Exh. 61.) In these sets of pleadings, Petitioner 

argued that trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance, 

he was subjected to illegal searches and/or seizures, his jury instructions were flawed, his 

Rule 20 motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted, his sentences were 

unlawfully enhanced, DNA testing would prove his innocence, and Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) constituted a significant change of law that applied to 

his case, entitling him to a jury determination of any facts that increased the penalty for 

his crime(s) beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. (See Doc. 68-1, Exh. 63.) 

Petitioner also attached a Sexual Abuse Medical Report of T.W., dated June 18, 1987. 

(Doc. 67-6 at 66, Exh. 61.) Finding that the claims were precluded as having been 

previously raised, not cognizable, or without merit, the Superior Court dismissed the 

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proceedings on May 11, 2005. (Doc. 68-1, Exh. 63; Doc. 70-7 at 51, Exh. 116.) Petitioner 

sought reconsideration, which the Superior Court summarily denied on June 6, 2005. 

(Doc. 68-1, Exh. 63.) 

 In June, July, and August of 2005, Petitioner again filed a series of motions, 

including a Motion to Reinstate Plea Negotiations Under Significant Change of Law, 

Second Motion by Petitioner Requesting Court to Recall Its Minute Entry/Mandate and 

Request for Time Extension, Motion to Clarify Petitioner’s Request to Extend Time For 

Filing For Review, Motion to Amend Memorandum Pleading for Appropriate Relief, and 

Motion Requesting Court Appointed Defense Counsel. (Doc. 68-2, Exh. 64; see also

Doc. 70-7, Exh. 116.) In a minute entry filed on August 19, 2005, the Superior Court 

denied all motions. (Doc. 68-3, Exh. 65; Doc. 70-7 at 36, Exh. 116.) Further, in August of 

2005, Petitioner filed a Motion to Request Copy of Plea Agreement in CR 97176 and 

Record of Acceptance, Motion to Remand for New Trial and to Define Law to Enforce 

Rule 410 No Contest Plea, and Motion to Remand For New Trial With Option to 

Renegotiate Plea Agreement. (Doc. 68-3, Exh. 66.) The Superior Court denied these 

motions in a minute entry filed on October 13, 2005. (Doc. 68-3, Exh. 67.) 

 In October of 2005, Petitioner retained private counsel. (Doc. 68-3 at 43.) On 

February 15, 2006, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Rehearing in PostConviction Action and Leave to File Amended Petition. (Doc. 68-1 at 36, Exh. 63.) Oral 

argument was held on April 14, 2006, and in a minute entry filed on April 21, 2006, the 

Superior Court denied the motions. (Doc. 68-1 at 78, Exh. 63.)6

 

 On May 22, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review “seeking review of the 

5/2/2005 thru 4/21/2006 Superior Court Minute Entry Order dismissing his Petition for 

Post Conviction Relief and the trial court’s April 21, 2006 denied of his Motion for 

Rehearing.” (Doc. 68-3 at 25, Exh. 68; Doc. 70-7, Exh. 116.) In an order filed on April 

26, 2007, the Appellate Court denied review. (Doc. 68-3 at 63 and 86, Exh. 68.) 

 6

 It appears counsel withdrew in May of 2006. See http://www.superiorcourt. maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumber=CR1987-009953 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 

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Petitioner appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on 

September 10, 2007. (Doc. 68-3 at 66, Exh. 68.) 

 On July 23, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief with 

various attachments. (Doc. 68-4, Exh. 69(a).) He filed his ninth post-conviction relief 

petition on March 25, 2008 (Doc. 68-5, Exh. 69(b); Doc. 68-6, Exh. 69(c); Doc. 68-7 at 

2-25, Exh. 69(d)), and filed a reply in support of the petition on May 22, 2008 (Doc. 68-7 

at 26, Exh. 69(d)). In these pleadings, Petitioner argued that actual innocence entitled 

him to relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal 32.1(h); he was denied his constitutional 

right to cross-examine James Harris; his prior conviction was inadmissible at trial and 

violated his double jeopardy rights; the trial court improperly considered aggravating 

factors and overlooked mitigating factors at sentencing; trial and PCR counsel was 

ineffective; the medical exam report of T.W. showed no evidence of trauma and was 

wrongfully withheld from the defense; and Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir. 1994) 

and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) entitled him to a new trial. In a minute 

entry filed on June 9, 2008, the Superior Court summarily denied relief. (Doc. 68-7 at 77, 

Exh. 70.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing and a supplement to that motion, which 

was denied in a minute entry filed on July 24, 2008. (Doc. 68-7 at 90, Exh. 70.) He 

appealed that decision, which the Appellate Court summarily denied as untimely on 

August 21, 2008. (Doc. 68-7, Exh. 71.) 

 On August 14, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Request In-Camera Inspection by 

Court for Possible Electronic Recordings of Petitioner and his Ex-Wife Helen (Newsom) 

Jordon and to Reinstate PCR Action as a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 69-1, 

Exh. 72). The motion was construed as subsequent Rule 32 post-conviction relief 

proceedings, and the Superior Court construed denied relief in a minute entry filed on 

September 5, 2008. (Doc. 69-2, Exh. 73.) In doing so, the Superior Court reasoned, in 

part, 

Defendant also contends he is actually innocent. However, Defendant fails to present any evidence of innocence. Defendant fails to demonstrate by clear and convincing 

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evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would not have found 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Rule 32.1 (h), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

(Doc. 69-2 at 3, Exh. 73.) Petitioner moved for rehearing, which was denied in a minute 

entry filed on January 12, 2009. (Doc. 69-1 at 125, Exh. 72.) Thereafter, he filed a 

Petition for Review, which the Appellate Court denied on March 29, 2010. (Doc. 69-2, 

Exh. 74.) Petitioner appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on August 

6, 2010. (Doc. 69-2, Exh. 75.) 

 In March of 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in state 

court (Doc. 69-2, Exh. 76) and supplement (Doc. 77-1, Supp. Exh. 76), which was treated 

as a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 69-2, Exh. 77). Finding Petitioner’s claims 

were precluded because they were untimely and/or successive, the Superior Court 

dismissed the notice on March 30, 2010. (Doc. 69-2 at 58, Exh. 77.) On April 15, 2010, 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Doc. 77-1 at 34, Exh. 78), No. CA-CR 10-0291 

PRPC, which the Appellate Court denied on September 21, 2011 (Doc. 69-2 at 60, Exh. 

78). Petitioner appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review 

on February 2, 2012. (Doc. 69-2 at 61, Exh. 78.) 

 In November of 2010, Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief notice, his eleventh 

post-conviction relief petition, and a subsequent amended petition. (Doc. 69-3, Exh. 79; 

see also Doc. 69-4, Exh. 80.) He filed a second amended post-conviction relief petition 

on December 13, 2010. (Doc. 69-3, Exh. 79.) In a minute entry filed on December 28, 

2010, the Superior Court dismissed the petition, reasoning: 

First, Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

(g), that there has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn Defendant’s conviction or sentence. 

Specifically, Defendant contends Blakely v. Washington, 542 

U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 

(2000), constitute a significant change of law that applies to his case, Defendant raised this exact claim in a previous petition for post-conviction relief filed on March 29, 2005. 

The Court rejected Defendant’s claim and dismissed his 

petition on May 11, 2005. Defendant cannot raise this issue 

again in a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

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Second, Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

(a), that Defendant was not given effective assistance of 

counsel during all of his previous proceedings. Defendant has raised this claim in many previous petitions for post- conviction relief. Defendant is precluded from continually raising this claim in successive petitions. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Third, Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(a), that the jury that convicted him was given 

insufficient jury instructions. Defendant raised this claim in a 

previous petition for post-conviction relief filed on March 29, 

2005. The Court considered and rejected Defendant’s claim resulting in a dismissal of the petition for post-conviction 

relief on May 11, 2005. Defendant cannot raise this issue 

again in a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Fourth, Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(a), that the prosecutor engaged in conduct during Defendant’s trial that amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant raised this issue in at least two previously filed petitions for post-conviction relief. Defendant raised this 

claim in a petition filed on August 14, 2008, which was dismissed by the Court on August 29, 2008. Defendant also 

raised this claim in a petition dated March 19, 2010, which 

was later dismissed by the Court on March 30, 2010. 

Defendant is precluded from continually raising this claim in successive petitions. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Fifth, Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

(g), that there has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn Defendant’s sentence or conviction. 

Specifically, Defendant claims that Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.CT. 1029 (2008), and Crawford v. Washington, 541 

U.S. 36 (2004), constitute a significant change in the law that applies to his case. Defendant raised this claim in a previous petition for post-conviction relief filed on August 14, 2008. The Court considered Defendant’s claim at that time and 

rejected it resulting in the petition being dismissed on August 29, 2008. Defendant is precluded from raising this issue again in a successive petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Finally, Defendant claims that there are newly discovered material facts that would probably have changed the verdict or sentence in Defendant’s case. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.l(e). 

Defendant also claims that he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is evidence to suggest that Defendant is actua1ly innocent of the crimes he was 

convicted of. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h). Defendant fails to 

support these claims with sufficient facts, evidence, or law. 

Pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(a), “Facts within the 

Defendant’s personal knowledge shall be noted separately 

from other allegations of fact and shall be under oath. 

Affidavits, records, or other evidence currently available to 

the Defendant supporting the allegations of the petition shall 

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be attached to it. Legal and record citations and memoranda 

of points and authorities are required.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. 

Defendant has failed to allege any facts, affidavits, records, or 

other evidence to support his claims. 

Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be 

granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. 

(Doc. 69-4, Exh. 80.) Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was summarily denied in a 

minute entry filed on February 1, 2011. (Doc. 69-4, Exh. 80.) Petitioner filed a Petition 

for Review on February 14, 2011 (Doc. 77-1 at 12, Supp. Exh. 81; Doc. 69-4 at 8, Exh, 

81), No. CA-CR 11-0106 PRPC, which the Appellate Court denied in or around April of 

2013.7

 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in state court on June 8, 2012, 

and amended petition on June 15, 2012. (Doc. 69-4, Exh. 82.) The petition was treated as 

a post-conviction relief notice and dismissed. (Doc. 69-4, Exh. 83.) In its minute entry 

filed on June 27, 2012, the Superior Court summarized and concluded: 

The Defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a), that his convictions and sentences were obtained in violation 

of his constitutional rights. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that: 

1) The statutes requiring the Defendant to register as a sex offender are unconstitutional; 2) Punishing the Defendant for failure to register as a sex offender constitutes a violation of 

the ban on double jeopardy; 3) The Defendant entered into his 

plea agreement involuntarily and without knowledge of what the plea agreement contained; and 4) The Defendant received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The Defendant cannot raise claims of this nature in an 

untimely or successive notice of post-conviction relief. See 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Additionally, the Defendant should have raised these claims on either direct appeal or in previous Rule 32 proceedings. Therefore, the Defendant is now 

precluded from raising the claim at this time. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2. 

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting 

substantive grounds which bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order for the Court to grant relief. State v. 

Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 318, 320 (1984). 

Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be 

 7

 See http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumber =CR1987-009953 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 

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granted in an untimely or successive Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4(a). 

(Doc. 69-4 at 41, Exh. 83.) 

II. Federal Proceedings 

 A. Previous Habeas Proceedings 

On August 7, 1995, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District of Arizona. (Doc. 66-8 at 25, Exh. 30; D. 

Ariz. Doc. CV-95-01606-PHX-CAM (VAM).) Petitioner filed an amended petition on 

September 11, 1995, in which he raised the following issues: 

1. Trial, sentencing and appellate counsel each rendered ineffective assistance. 

2. Petitioner was denied access to an expert psychiatric witness due to his indigency. 

3. Petitioner was punished multiple times for acts which should have been treated as one offense, the sentences 

should have been imposed concurrently rather than consecutively, and Petitioner was re-indicted and tried on a 

count which had previously been dismissed with prejudice. 

4. The trial court violated Petitioner’s double jeopardy rights and the ex post facto clause by admitting evidence of his prior acts of abuse. 

(Doc. 66-8 at 25, Exh. 31.) 

 On July 31, 1996, the Honorable Virginia A. Mathis issued a Report and 

Recommendation, recommending that the petition be dismissed because his claims were 

procedurally barred. (Doc. 66-8, Exh. 31.) In an order filed on September 30, 1996, the 

Honorable Charles A. Meucke adopted the report and recommendation, and denied the 

petition. (Doc. 67-1, Exh. 32.) Petitioner appealed the decision, and in a memorandum 

decision filed on August 12, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 

part and remanded in part. (Doc. 67-1, Exh. 34); Walton v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 1241, 1998 

WL 482937 (9th Cir. 1998). In so doing, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: 

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Because both sides agree that the district court incorrectly concluded that Walton procedurally defaulted his claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of that claim and remand for 

consideration on the merits. 

Assuming, without deciding, that conflict of counsel in state 

habeas proceedings can constitute cause for failing to raise an issue in a post-conviction relief petition, it is clear from the 

district court’s record that Walton was adequately represented by unconflicted counsel in his state habeas petition. On July 26, 1989, Walton moved to dismiss James H. Kemper of the Maricopa Public Defender’s Office so that he could argue that Kemper was ineffective as trial counsel. The motion was 

granted the same day, and the superior court appointed John C. Williams to represent Walton. On August 2, 1989, the superior court summarily dismissed Walton’s petition for post-conviction relief, a ruling adverse to Walton on the three 

claims that had been previously raised by Kemper. 

This series of events would seem unfair to Walton were it not 

for the fact that on August 25, 1989, within thirty days of the dismissal, Williams filed a notice with the superior court that he “has failed to discover any additional colorable claims for 

relief and therefore will not file a supplement to the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” This notice reveals two facts. 

First, Williams had reviewed Walton’s case and concluded 

that there were no colorable claims to be raised beyond the 

three that Kemper had previously presented in the state habeas petition. Second, Williams obviously believed that had he discovered additional colorable claims, such as ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, he would have been able to raise 

them in an amended petition for post-conviction relief. These facts convince us that Walton was represented by unconflicted counsel during his state habeas proceedings. 

Regarding the remaining claims in Walton’s petition, the district court correctly concluded that they were without merit or had been procedurally defaulted. Appellate counsel is not ineffective simply for failing to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754, 103 

S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Miller v. Keeney, 882 

F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989). “Under Arizona law, 

fundamental error review does not prevent subsequent procedural preclusion.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 

1301, 1306 (9th Cir.1996). See also Poland v. Stewart, 117 

F.3d 1094, 1105-06 (9th Cir.1997). 

(Id.) The State of Arizona petitioned for rehearing, which the Ninth Circuit denied on 

September 24, 1998. (Doc. 67-1, Exh. 35.) The United States Supreme Court denied writ 

of certiorari on April 26, 1999. (Doc. 67-1, Exh. 36); Walton v. Stewart, 526 U.S. 1090 

(1999). 

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 On remand to the district court, Petitioner was appointed counsel. (Doc. 67-1 at 

65, Exh. 37.) In addition to the filings of his attorney, Petitioner filed a series of pro se

motions which included, among others, a Motion to Supplement Petitioner’s 

Memorandum Regarding Further Proceedings, Motion to Request Consideration of 

Petitioner’s Memorandum Letter Supplemented Regarding Further Proceedings, and 

Motion by Petitioner Pro Se to Supplement his Affidavit in Memorandum Regarding 

Further Proceedings. In an order dated August 28, 2000, the Honorable Earl H. Carroll, to 

whom the case had been reassigned, denied the motions and dismissed the petition. (Doc. 

67-1, Exh. 37.) Petitioner filed an appeal, and the Ninth Circuit denied certificate of 

appealability on February 16, 2001. (9th Cir. Doc. No. 00-17005.) Petitioner sought 

reconsideration, which was denied on June 1, 2001. (Doc. 67-1, Exh. 37.) 

 On January 29, 2002, Petitioner filed an Application for Leave to File Second or 

Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Ninth 

Circuit, which was denied on March 14, 2002. (9th Cir. Doc. 02-70153.) Petitioner filed a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District of Arizona on January 16, 2003, which 

was dismissed without prejudice on January 27, 2013, due to his failure to first obtain 

authorization from the Ninth Circuit. (D. Ariz. Doc. CV-03-0111-PHX-EHC (LOA).) 

Petitioner filed an Application for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus in the Ninth Circuit on June 12, 2003, which was denied on July 28, 

2003. (9th Cir. Doc. 03-722880.) On November 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District of Arizona, which was 

dismissed without prejudice on April 2, 2010 at Petitioner’s request. (D. Ariz. Doc. CV09-02418-PHX-FJM (LOA).) 

 B. Second Federal Habeas Proceedings

 On August 25, 2010, Petitioner again filed an Application for Leave to File 

Second or Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the 

Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 69-4, Exh. 84; 9th Cir. Doc. 10-72604.) On March 16, 2011, the 

Ninth Circuit authorized Petitioner to file a Second or Successive Petition for Writ of 

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Habeas Corpus in the district court. (Doc. 1.) In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: 

We have reviewed the responses to the court’s December 9, 

2010 order, as well as the claims raised in petitioner’s “Motion for Leave to Amend Petitioner’s Reply to 

Respondents [sic] Response to Application to File Second or 

Successive Habeas Corpus Petition,” and we grant the application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the district court. The 

Clerk shall serve this order and a copy of the application on the district court. 

Petitioner shall submit a copy of this order with the 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 habeas corpus petition to the district court. The district 

court may wish to appoint counsel to represent petitioner for this petition. 

(Doc. 69-4, Exh. 84; 9th Cir. Doc. 10-72604.) 

 Having obtained such authorization, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 28, 2011 (Doc. 2), commencing the 

instant action. Petitioner filed a pro se amended habeas petition on July 14, 2011 (Doc. 

11). Petitioner was appointed counsel (Doc. 9), and on January 31, 2012, counsel filed an 

amended habeas petition (Doc. 36). That same day, Petitioner also filed a pro se amended 

habeas petition. In an Order dated March 5, 2012 (Doc. 42), the Court struck the pro se

petition. (Doc. 35.) Following Petitioner’s request for new counsel, granted on March 5, 

2012 (Doc. 42), Michael Bresnehan filed his notice of appearance as attorney of record 

on March 15, 2012 (Doc. 43). Petitioner, through counsel, filed a third amended habeas 

petition on September 14, 2012 (Doc. 65). In an Order dated October 30, 2012 (Doc. 85), 

the Court granted Petitioner, through counsel, leave to amend. Pursuant to that Order, the 

Fourth Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 86)8

 was filed. Respondents 

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 The Court notes that Petitioner entitles the Second, Fourth Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 86), as the “Third Amended Successive Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus” in error. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (an 

amended petition supersedes the original or prior petition in entirety); Hal Roach Studios 

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990); King v. Atiyeh, 814 

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Given the volume of the previously filed exhibits, the Court permitted their incorporation to the amended petition. (See Doc. 85.) Petitioner’s exhibits considered in 

support of the Fourth Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 86) include: Doc. 66 (Exh. 1-31), Doc. 67 (Exh. 32-61), Doc. 68 (Exh. 62-71), Doc. 69 (Exh. 72-90), 

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have filed a Response (Doc. 104, 108), and Petitioner, through counsel, has filed a Reply 

(Doc. 122). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Second or Successive Petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs 

any second or successive petition filed after April 24, 1996, even in instances where the 

earlier habeas petition predated the AEDPA. See United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 

F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 917 (9th Cir. 

2007); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322, 336 (1997). Acting as a gatekeeper under the 

AEDPA, the court of appeals must first authorize the filing of a second or successive 

petition before a petitioner may proceed. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 130 S. Ct. 

2788, 2796 (2010); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

see also Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008); Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 

at 918. “The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive 

application only if it determines that the application makes a “prima facie showing” that 

is satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3). A “prima facie showing” means 

“simply a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller ... exploration by the 

district court.” Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

 Therefore, if the court of appeals authorizes the filing of a second or successive 

habeas petition, the district court must then examine the petition and dismiss any claim 

that does not actually satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(4) (“A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive 

application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows 

that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section”); Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d at 

917 (“The Ninth Circuit’s authorization which enabled Petitioner to file a successive 

habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)... does not relieve Petitioner of his 

 Doc. 70 (Exh. 91-117), Doc. 79 (Exhibits 118-128), Doc. 77-1 (Supp. Exh. 76, 78, 81); Doc. 130 (Exh. 130); Doc. 139 (Exh. 131); and Doc. 133 (Exh. 132). 

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burden of demonstrating compliance with those requirements...”). See also Tyler v. Cain, 

533 U.S. 656, 661, n. 3 (2001) (bracket in original) (“A court of appeals may authorize 

such a filing only if it determines that the applicant makes a ‘prima facie showing’ that 

the application satisfies the statutory standard. § 2244(b)(3)(C). But to survive dismissal 

in district court, the application must actually ‘sho[w]’ that claim satisfies the standard”). 

The district court considers and addresses each claim contained in the second or 

successive petition to determine whether they were presented in a prior petition, and 

reexamines whether it satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) by conducting “a 

thorough review of all allegations and evidence presented by the prisoner.” VillaGonzalez, 208 F.3d at 1165. 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), the district court must first determine “whether a 

‘claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application’ was also ‘presented 

in a prior application.’” West v. Ryan, 652 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005)). “If it has, ‘the claim must be dismissed.’” 

Id. See also Magwood, 130 S. Ct. at 2795-96; Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661; Cooper, 510 F.3d 

at 918. “The Supreme Court has clarified that the term ‘claim’ means ‘an asserted federal 

basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.’” West, 652 F.3d at 1077 

(quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. at 530). A claim “is successive if the basic thrust 

or gravamen of the legal claim is the same, regardless of whether the basic claim is 

supported by new and different legal arguments ... [or] proved by different factual 

allegations.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 5779188, *17 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Further, “[a] habeas petition is second or successive only if it raises claims that were or 

could have been adjudicated on the merits. A disposition is ‘on the merits’ if the district 

court either considers and rejects the claims or determines that the underlying claim will 

not be considered by a federal court.” McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he dismissal of a first petition with prejudice 

because of a procedural default (and a failure to show cause and prejudice) forecloses the 

possibility that the underlying claims will be addressed by a federal court.... Such a 

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dismissal therefore constitutes a disposition on the merits and renders a subsequent 

petition second or successive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).” Pizzuto v. Blades, 

673 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting McNabb, 576 F.3d at 1029). 

 Second, for claims not previously presented, the district court considers whether 

the claims in the second or successive petition meet AEDPA’s “stringent standards” 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). West, 652 F.3d at 1077. The AEDPA requires dismissal 

unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 

discovered previously through the exercise of due 

diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), there are “three prerequisites for a permissible 

second or successive petition.” First, “the claim must rely on a ‘new rule of constitutional 

law’.” Second, “the rule must have been ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review 

by the Supreme Court’.” And third, “the claim must have been ‘previously unavailable.’ 

‘[T]he Supreme Court is the only entity that can ‘ma[k]e’ a new rule retroactive,’ and it 

only does so ‘through a holding.’” Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 843 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(bracket in original)(internal citations omitted). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B), a petitioner must demonstrate that his or her 

“claim (1) is based on newly discovered evidence and (2) establishes that he is actually 

innocent of the crimes alleged.” Pizzuto, 673 F.3d at 1007 (quoting King v. Trujillo, 638 

F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2011)). Evidence is “newly-discovered” where “it ‘could not have 

been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.’” West, 652 F.3d at 

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1077 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)). To show that he or she is actually innocent, 

petitioner must demonstrate that “no reasonable factfinder would have found [petitioner] 

guilty of the underlying offense.” Pizzuto, 673 F.3d at 1008. “‘[A]ctual innocence’ means 

factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” King, 638 F.3d at 733. The question is 

not whether [a] jury... would have acquitted [petitioner], but whether, ‘in light of the 

evidence as a whole ... no reasonable factfinder would have found [petitioner] guilty.” 

Pizzuto, 673 F.3d at 1009. 

II. Analysis 

 In the instant petition (Doc. 86), Petitioner raises three claims for relief: (1) the 

State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963);9

 (2) trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

695 (1984) for failing to undertake a reasonable pretrial investigation that would likely 

have unearthed exculpatory evidence; 10 and (3) a freestanding claim of actual innocence 

under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).11

 At the center of his claims, Petitioner argues that a newly discovered medical 

 9

 “A Brady claim has three components. There must be (1) evidence that is exculpatory or impeaching (2) that is suppressed by the state and (3) resulting prejudice. ... To determine whether prejudice exists, we look to the materiality of the suppressed evidence. Brady evidence is material if the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict... 

[Petitioner] needs to show only that the state court unreasonably decided that there was not a reasonable probability of a different result.” Aguilar v. Woodford, 725 F.3d 970, 

982-983 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

10 “To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel's 

performance was deficient and that (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. ... To establish prejudice, the defendant must show ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Under this standard, we ask whether it is reasonably likely the result would have been 

different.” Gulbrandson, 2013 WL 5779188 at *8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

11 “[T]o be entitled to relief [under Herrera], a habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 

463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). A finding of “actual innocence” is not to be based upon a finding that insufficient evidence to support the charge was presented at trial, but rather upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

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report establishes his actual innocence. Petitioner contends that the State withheld the 

results of a 1987 medical examination performed on T.W. which reveals no evidence of 

physical sexual trauma, “despite Ray Green’s testimony and that of Detective Louis 

Marotta suggesting that Petitioner may have engaged in sexual intercourse with T.W..” 

(Doc. 86 at 54.) “At trial, the missing medical report would have further discredited Ray 

Green’s testimony regarding what, if anything, illegal occurred at Mr. Green’s mobile 

home. It would have also further discredited T.W., who apparently told others she had 

been subjected to sexual intercourse. The medical report would have been useful in crossexamining Dr. Harrison in the pretrial propensity hearing, and would have been useful at 

sentencing as well... [and] is the kind of clear and convincing evidence contemplated in 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).” (Doc. 86 at 60.) 

 In turning to the evidentiary record on review, there appear to be two pertinent sets 

of records. 

 First, on June 19, 1986, a Child Abuse Report Form was completed in connection 

with an investigation of sexual assault by the Phoenix Police Department. (Doc. 74-8 at 

20-27, Exh. 126(d).) The form reported that Abbie Walton, Petitioner’s then wife, took 

T.W. to the Maricopa Medical Center (MMC), and a medical examination was 

conducted. The MMC contacted Debbie Marburry, a caseworker for Child Protective 

Services (CPS).12 Progress notes and a Sexual Abuse Medical Report were completed by 

Dr. Gerard, who reported no physical findings of vaginal trauma. The report and notes 

indicated that T.W. stated she had performed oral sex on Petitioner. (Doc. 74-8 at 20-27, 

Exh. 126(d).) 

 Second, in 1987, Cindy Copp, a CPS caseworker, contacted the MMC for an 

evaluation of T.W. in connection with an investigation of sexual assault by the Glendale 

Police Department. (Doc. 108-8 at 26-33, Exh. H.) A Child Abuse Report Form was 

completed on June 18, 1987, which indicated that a medical examination of T.W. was 

 12 Upon contacting Marburry, the MMC was referred to Susan Young, the CPS caseworker assigned to the case. (Doc. 74-8 at 24, Exh. 126(d).) 

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conducted. Progress notes and a Sexual Abuse Medical Report were completed by Dr. 

Denise Schaffert,13 assessed a normal physical examination. Specifically, upon 

conducting an examination of T.W.’s external genitalia, Dr. Schaffert found that T.W.’s 

hymen was intact and showed no signs of physical trauma. The report and notes indicated 

that T.W. stated that Petitioner attempted to have her perform oral sex on him and that 

she was not penetrated. (Doc. 108-8 at 26-33, Exh. H.) 

 A. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) 

First, the claim presented in Petitioner’s prior habeas proceeding is sufficiently 

related to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised here, precluding it from 

review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim in his first habeas petition which was denied as procedurally barred (see

Doc. 66-8, Exh. 31), and he now only seeks to present different evidence to support his 

claim. “But a claim ‘is successive if the basic thrust or gravamen of the legal claim is the 

same, regardless of whether the basic claim is supported by new and different legal 

arguments ... [or] proved by different factual allegations.’” Gulbranson, 2013 WL 

5779188 at * 17 (quoting Babbit v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1999)); see 

also Pizzutto, 673 F.3d at 1008 (“[F]ederal courts will not consider new factual grounds 

in support of the same legal claim that was previously presented.”). 

If Petitioner has previously adjudicated a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in this Court, his pending claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel must be dismissed. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b). New factual grounds in support of a legal 

claim that has already been presented, i.e., ineffective assistance, are not sufficient to evade the mandatory dismissal requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 

746. Petitioner already complained about his defense trial 

counsel’s performance in a myriad of claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in his first habeas corpus petition ... all of which were denied on the merits by this Court... The gravamen of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel is the same, regardless of whether Petitioner presents new and different legal arguments or different factual 

allegations. See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 746. 

 13 The report indicates that Dr. Denise Schaffert and Dr. Bartley jointly conducted the examination. 

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Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d at 931. 

 Second, the thrust of Petitioner’s attack on the undisclosed medical evidence 

presented in Petitioner’s prior habeas proceeding is sufficiently related to the Brady claim 

raised in the instant petition, and is also precluded from review under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(1). On January 26, 2000, on remand in Petitioner’s prior federal habeas 

proceedings, Petitioner filed a “Motion by Petitioner Pro Se to Supplement his Affidavit 

in Memorandum Regarding Further Proceedings.” (Doc. 67-1, Exh. 37; D. Ariz. CV-95-

01606-PHX-EHC, Doc. 72.) Therein, Petitioner contended that 

the Glendale Police Department should have recorded its 

interview(s) or kept notes of its interview(s) with the alleged victims in this case; and that the victims alleged, being minors should have immediately been take[n] for psychological/ psychiatric and medical examination after having suffered an eight (8) hour trauma of assault as alleged in the instance.

(D. Ariz. CV-95-01606-PHX-EHC, Doc. 72 at 2.) Petitioner argued that he was entitled 

to relief because the prosecution failed to disclose such material evidence; 

[w]here there had been suppression of favorable evidence in 

violation of Brady, non-disclosed evidence is “material” if 

there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to defense, result of proceeding would have been different, and [“]reasonable probability” is probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 

(D. Ariz. CV-95-01606-PHX-EHC, Doc. 72 at 2 (quoting U.S. v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 

(11th Cir. 1995)). In denying his motion and rejecting his claim, the Court found 

Petitioner had not previously raised it in his habeas proceedings nor presented it in state 

court, and was unrelated to his remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

 Hence, Petitioner previously presented the same “basic thrust or gravamen” as the 

Brady claim raised here, namely, that had the prosecution disclosed medical evidence 

showing no physical trauma to the victim(s) at trial, the outcome would have been 

different. See Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying claims in a 

second or successive petition that were “predicated on the same challenges [to the state 

court decision] that were previously considered” by the court). Further, the denial of the 

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motion along with the dismissal of the first petition with prejudice constituted a 

disposition on the merits. See Pizzuto, 673 F.3d at 1008; Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 

1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding claims were previously presented where motions 

were used as a vehicle to bring a new claim that could have been raised earlier and 

petitioner was not denied the opportunity to litigate a claim that had been presented); 

Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court recognizes that under 

certain circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has found that a Brady violation claim in a 

habeas petition may not be subject to AEDPA standards for second or successive 

petitions where the potential Brady evidence is disclosed after the first habeas petition 

was resolved. See United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 

King, 638 F.3d at 729. However, this claim does not fall within that exception. Although 

Petitioner maintains he did not obtain the 1987 medical report until after the resolution of 

his first petition, it was not newly or diligently discovered. See infra.

 Lastly, although Petitioner did not explicitly raise Herrera as the basis for his 

claim in his first habeas proceedings, he repeatedly raised freestanding claims of actual 

innocence based upon a lack of incriminating medical evidence. For instance, in denying 

a “Motion to Supplement Petitioner’s Memorandum Regarding Further Proceedings” (D. 

Ariz. CV-95-01606-PHX-EHC Doc. 59), the Court provided, 

In this motion, Petitioner asks the Court to order DNA and 

other testing of himself and the victims arguing that in the absence of such testing there was insufficient scientific and 

medical evidence at trial to convict him. The sufficiency of the evidence upon which Petitioner was convicted has not 

previously been raised in the state courts and therefore has 

not been exhausted. 

(Doc. 67-1, Exh. 37.) Similarly, in denying a “Motion by Petitioner Pro Se Requesting 

DNA Fingerprinting Regarding Further Proceedings” (D. Ariz. CV-95-01606-PHX-EHC 

Doc. 76), the Court reasoned that 

Petitioner again questions the sufficiency of the medical and scientific evidence and seeks a new trial or to add additional 

bases of habeas relief. These issues have not been presented 

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to the state court and are not relevant to Petitioner’s 

remaining claim for ineffective assistance of sentencing 

counsel. 

(Doc. 67-1, Exh. 37.) 

 Because Petitioner’s claims presented in the second habeas petition were presented 

in his prior federal habeas proceedings, the Court recommends that the petition be 

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).14

 B. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)

 Even if his claims were not precluded under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), for the 

reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not shown due diligence or 

actual innocence under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).15

 (1) Due Diligence - 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(b)(i) 

 First, the factual predicate of Petitioner’s claims is neither new nor was it 

diligently discovered. Rather, the record persuades that the defense had obtained the 1987 

medical report prior to trial. On September 19, 1988, Pamela Wiens, who was acting on 

behalf of defense counsel, took a pretrial deposition of Cindy Copp. (Doc. 68-6 at 10, 

Exh. 69(c).) The parties discussed the records that Copp had retrieved and reviewed at the 

time of T.W.’s referral in 1987. Copp, not having reviewed the files from prior 

investigations, appears to discuss her review of the 1987 medical report, the contents of 

which Weins was familiar with; 

[Pamela Wiens]. Okay. Were you aware when you talked to or at any time during your investigation, did you become aware of the prior CPS reports on [T.W.]? 

[Cindy Copp]. Yes. 

 14 Petitioner’s subsequent federal habeas actions were dismissed without a 

disposition on the merits and without prejudice. See McNabb, 576 F.3d at 1029 (“A 

habeas petition is second or successive only if it raises claims that were or could have 

been adjudicated on the merits.... A prior petition that has been dismissed without prejudice... leaves open the possibility for future litigation and has not, therefore, been adjudicated on the merits”). 

15 Because Petitioner’s claims do not rest on a “new rule of constitutional law,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), Petitioner must show due diligence and actual innocence. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B); Morales, 439 F.3d at 531. 

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[Pamela Wiens]. Did you read them and review? 

[Cindy Copp]. Yes. I brought them up on the computer and 

read them. 

... 

[Pamela Wiens]. Okay. Now, let me show you this. When you pull up there are things on the computer. Is this what you get, basically that print out? 

[Cindy Copp]. Um, huh. 

... 

[Pamela Wiens]. Okay. So you don’t get the actual, it’s not 

like you go and pull reports? 

[Cindy Copp]. No, no. And I think that those were probably all old enough referrals that they were long closed and wouldn’t have been like I could have run next door to some 

body else’s office and pulled a file. They were in closed in files some where, but 

[Pamela Wiens]. Okay. Did you ever review the medical 

records? I think you said.. 

[Cindy Copp]. The (inaudible) exams? 

[Pamela Wiens]. Yeah. 

[Cindy Copp]. yeah. 

[Pamela Wiens]. And as I recall there were no physical findings. 

[Cindy Copp]. Yeah. what I believe they said is that they were consistent with um, the information provided and that was just oral sex. 

[Pamela Wiens]. (inaudible) 

[Cindy Copp]. There wouldn’t be any signs. 

(Doc. 68-6 at 29-32, Exh. 69(c).) During defense counsel’s cross-examination of 

Detective Louis Marotta, both he and Marotta indicated they were aware of the 1987 

medical report; 

[Mr. Chornenky]. Okay. You are aware that [T.W.] was taken 

to the hospital for medical examination, correct? 

[Louis Marotta]. Yes. 

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[Mr. Chornenky]. And you aware that [T.W.] had at least 

somewhere along the line made some reference to vaginal 

intercourse? 

[Louis Marotta]. Which exam are we talking about? 

[Mr. Chornenky]. We are talking about a medical exam. Do 

you know what - 

[Louis Marotta]. From 1986 or the ‘87? 

[Mr. Chornenky]. Either one. Did any of those - 

[Louis Marotta]. She did, yes. 

[Mr. Chornenky]. I’m sorry? 

[Louis Marotta]. Yes, she did make some statements of that 

sort. 

[Mr. Chornenky]. Of vaginal intercourse. 

[Louis Marotta]. I’m not sure exactly what she said without 

referring to the report. 

[Mr. Chornenky]. Did any of those medical reports come and 

show that there was evidence of vaginal intercourse? 

[Louis Marotta]. No. 

 (Doc. 108-3 at 95, Exh. C.) (emphasis added). 

 Even if the 1987 medical report was not disclosed to the defense and is “new 

evidence,” Petitioner has not shown that it could not have been discovered previously 

through the exercise of due diligence. In response, Petitioner (i.e., the affiant) maintains 

that 

2. During 2002, the affiant first learned about a medical exam 

that had been performed on, his daughter, [T.W.], shortly 

after her alleged molestation in June, 1987; 

3. Affiant learned about the examination while speaking with [T.W.] in early 2000 during a visit by [T.W.] with affiant at the Arizona Department of Corrections facility in Florence, Arizona; 

4. Affiant then began contacting Arizona State, Maricopa County, and various local agencies by mail, to attempt to acquire a copy of the of the report emanating from that examination. Through persistence affiant eventually acquired a copy of the medical report around early 2005. It arrived as part of Phoenix Police Departmental report. DR 87-141393 

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(the report connected with the investigation of 1987 alleged mobile home incident); 

5. To the best of affiant’s knowledge, the brief references at trial to a medical exam of [T.W.] was in reference to an exam 

that occurred in 1986 after the 1986 allegations, not the 1987 

exam; 

6, Petitioner’s trial counsel informed petitioner that there was no 1987 exam of [T.W.], or medical report emanating from 

same. It was not until 2002 that the affiant learned otherwise. 

(Doc. 70-7 at 13, Exh. 115; see also Doc. 86 at 55; Doc. 122 at 20.) 

 Considering the active and uninterrupted series of challenges Petitioner has made 

since his conviction, he has not shown that the 1987 medical report could not have been 

discovered years earlier. Petitioner’s diligence is severely undermined by the fact that this 

evidence has been available since the time of trial. Petitioner was on notice in 1988 of the 

existence of “medical reports,” as discussed at trial. In Copp’s Progress Notes, she 

remarked on June 16, 1987 that Jocelyn Vinson “will take girls to MMC for S/A exams” 

(Doc. 74-5 at 29, Exh. 126) and subsequently, “S/A exams scheduled for Friday.” Those 

notes were submitted as an exhibit on September 22, 1988 (Doc. 74-5 at 21-32, Exh. 

126), and the content of those notes were addressed at length in both pre-trial proceedings 

and at trial in 1988. (Doc. 66-2, Exh. 8; Doc. 108-5, Exh. E.) Despite any misbelief or 

misinformation, Petitioner has not offered any reason why he did not previously 

investigate or verify whether a medical report existed. Instead, Petitioner did not begin 

his pursuit of medical evidence until a decade after he was convicted. (See e.g., Doc. 67-

1, Exh. 37.) 

 In February of 2002, T.W. signed an affidavit in which she attested that “she was 

in fact, subject to medical examination involving the crime(s) of sexual conduct in this 

matter.” (Doc. 67-4 at 19, Exh. 48.) Yet, it was not until 2004 that Petitioner submitted 

the requests that lead to the medical report he now presents. (See Doc. 108-8, Exh. H). 

Similarly, having obtained the report in 2004, Petitioner fails to explain why he did not 

present his arguments in federal court until 2010. Because Petitioners provides “no 

legitimate justification” for why he could not obtain the factual predicate of his claims 

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earlier, Petitioner has not demonstrated the diligence required under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). 

Morales, 439 F.3d at 533; see also Bible v. Schriro, 651 F.3d 1060, 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 

2011) (holding that a wait of ten years after an evidentiary request could have been 

brought was not diligent). 

 (2) Actual Innocence - 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(b)(ii) 

 Notwithstanding the lack of due diligence exercised, Petitioner has not met his 

burden to demonstrate that the factual predicate of his claims, namely, the 1987 medical 

report, when viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, is sufficient to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. 

 In his reply, Petitioner reiterates that “both Ray Green and Detective Moratta 

suggested, through their trial testimony, that Petitioner had engaged in sexual intercourse 

with T.W..” (Doc. 122 at 17-18.) “[T]he medical report would have severely weakened 

Ray Green’s testimony regarding the mobile home incident” and “may very well have 

affected Dr. Harrison’s conclusion.” (Doc. 122 at 18.) Petitioner’s arguments are simply 

unpersuasive. The record does not show that the report would have been meaningful to 

the defense or even germane. No criminal charge alleged T.W. had been sexually 

penetrated. In fact, Petitioner does not specifically cite any portion of the trial record 

containing such allegation. 

 T.W. did not testify or imply that she had been sexually penetrated in 1986 or 

1987. (See Doc. 108-1 and 108-2, Exh. B.) Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, Detective 

Louis Marotta did not testify to that effect either; rather, the trial transcript provides: 

[Louis Marotta]. I asked her if her daddy had put a finger inside her private spot and she said no. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. Did she ever indicate to you that he put his penis in her private spot? 

[Louis Marotta]. No. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. So you are familiar with the medical 

exmainations that are conducted in relation to these 

individuals, aren’t you? 

[Louis Marotta]. Yes. 

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[Mr. Imbordino]. Do you expect to find – if a person had not put anything inside a little girl’s vagina, would you expect there to be any medical evidence there? 

[Louis Marotta]. No. 

(Doc. 108-3 at 110-111, Exh. C.) Nor did Ray Green testify or clearly imply that 

Petitioner had sexually penetrated T.W.; 

[Ray Green]. He told her to get on the bed. He proceeded to 

do what he was going to do. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. What did he do to her, Mr. Green? 

[Ray Green]. I know it wasn’t too good. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. Did he touch her? 

[Ray Green]. Yes. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. What with? 

[Ray Green]. His hand. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. His hand? 

[Ray Green]. His hands. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. What else? 

[Ray Green]. He got on top of her. That much I do remember. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. Okay. Did he touch her with his mouth? 

[Ray Green]. Yes. 

[Mr. Imbordino]. On her vagina? 

[Ray Green]. Yes. 

(Doc. 108-4 at 8, Exh. D.) 

 CPS caseworker Susan Young testified regarding her investigation of the 

allegations involving T.W. in 1986, yet also did not testify or clearly imply that T.W. had 

been or had reported being sexually penetrated. (Doc. 108-5 at 17, Exh. E.) She testified 

concerning her interview with T.W. and her following report. Young recounted that T.W. 

had stated that Petitioner had made her “perform sex on him.” (Doc. 108-5 at 17, Exh. E.) 

She testified that T.W. stated Petitioner had “yelled out for [her] to have sex with others 

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in the house... [h]owever, no one was in the house.” (Doc. 108-5 at 17, Exh. E.) Young 

testified that a medical exam was conducted in 1986, and the result of the exam was 

“negative.” (Doc. 108-5 at 18, Exh. E.) In closing remarks, the defense discussed 

Young’s testimony and the value of the medical examination results; 

Well, CPS worker Susan Young says no, we’re not going to buy that story. We’re going to get you a medical exam. We 

all heard things about medical exams. Apparently there had 

been some allegations about vaginal intercourse. Well, the medical exam didn’t show that, and so the vaginal allegations 

disappeared. We don’t have any here in this case, okay? 

(Doc. 108-7 at 91, Exh. G.) 

 Lastly, in his reply, Petitioner cites to the sentencing Court’s finding “that the 

physical and, particularly, emotional harm to the victim [was] substantial.” (Doc. 66-3 at 

50, Exh. 12; Doc. 122 at 18.) Yet, there is simply no foundation to interpret this as a 

finding of sexual penetration by the sentencing court. In short, Petitioner has failed to 

identify any portion of the trial record in which it is alleged that T.W. was sexually 

penetrated, or that she was subject to any form of sexual abuse that could be substantiated 

or controverted by the 1987 medical report. There is no testimony to be discredited. 

Rather, the only suggestion of “vaginal intercourse” at trial appears to stem from defense 

counsel, who then asked the jury to disregard any such allegation. (See, e.g., Doc. 108-3 

at 95, Exh. C; Doc. 108-7 at 91, Exh. G.) Consequently, the medical report neither 

explains nor diminishes the evidence of guilt presented at trial. 

 Petitioner urges the Court to consider the medical report in conjunction with 

“other evidence that has come to light, post trial.” (Doc. 86 at 60.) Petitioner proffers 

post-trial recantations of T.W. and Ray Green, as well as new information concerning 

expert Dr. Jeffrey Harrison. The medical report however, even when coupled with this 

“other evidence,” does not meet the standards necessary for a second or successive 

habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(b)(ii). 

First, Petitioner offers an affidavit signed by T.W. on February 20, 2002. (Doc. 

68-4 at 80, Exh. 69(a).) The affidavit avows that T.W. was “subject to a medical 

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examination involving the crime[s] of sexual in this matter.” (Doc. 68-4 at 80, Exh. 

69(a).) Petitioner next offers an affidavit signed by T.W. on June 24, 2006. (Doc. 68-4 at 

79, Exh. 69(a).) The affidavit provides that T.W. “unequivocally assert[s] that [she] was 

not and h[as] never been sexually molested or victimized by [her] father, and the truth 

can be fully verified from the medical report for which [her] father is currently 

imprisoned.... [A]s a frightened child, [she] gave false statements and testimony against 

[Petitioner] to avoid being place [sic] in ‘permanent-foster-care’ away from [her] parents 

and family, as described to [her] by Detective Marotta and the CPS caseworker.” (Doc. 

68-4 at 79, Exh. 69(a).) Petitioner additionally offers an affidavit signed by T.W. on 

February 24, 2007, T.W. (Doc. 68-4 at 78, Exh. 69(a).) The affidavit avows that T.W. nor 

K.V.I. “were never sexually victimized nor molested, at anytime, or in anyway, shape or 

form by” Petitioner. “[A]ny statement(s) or testimony given to the contrary [was] a 

complete lie.” (Doc. 68-4 at 78, Exh. 69(a).) Lastly, Petitioner cites to an affidavit signed 

by Ray Green on January 12, 2006. Green avows that neither he, nor Petitioner had ever 

engaged in “any type of sexual acts or, other abnormal affair(s) and/or acts” with T.W.. 

He further asserted that no such conduct ever took place in his trailer home. (Doc. 68-7 at 

41, Exh. 69(d).) 

 Assuming their credibility, the statements presented in the affidavits are 

essentially no different from those made at trial over twenty-five years ago. T.W., then 12 

years old, testified at trial on September 27, 1988. (Doc. 108-1, Exh. B.) She testified that 

she had told a series of individuals that she had not been sexually abused and had 

previously recanted. (Doc. 108-1 at 51.) For example, she testified that several months 

prior to trial, she had testified in the court that she had not been molested. (Doc. 108-1 at 

51, 89, Exh. B.) T.W. testified to telling Detective Luis Marotta that she had lied about 

her father in order to get him to stop hitting her stepmother, Abbie Walton, and to get him 

out of the house. (Doc. 108-1, Exh. B.) In fact, at trial on September 27, 1988, she 

initially denied sexual abuse, then testified she had been molested. (Doc. 108-1 at 65-66, 

Exh. B.) On cross, defense counsel extensively questioned T.W. regarding the 

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inconsistencies in her testimony, and instances in which she recanted her allegations of 

molestation between 1986 and 1988. (Doc. 108-2, Exh. B.) Detective Marotta and 

Sergeant Linda Greer testified at trial on September 28, 1988. (Doc. 108-3, Exh. C.) They 

also testified regarding T.W.’s inconsistent statements and recanted allegations they 

encountered during their investigation. (See, e.g., Doc. 108-3 at 89, Exh. C.) In its 

closing, defense redirected the jury to the inconsistencies in T.W’s testimony and 

highlighted her prior recantation(s). (Doc. 108-7 at 91-92.) 

 Ray Green’s recantation is equally unavailing. While on October 3, 1988, Green 

testified that he had “touched” or attempted to touch T.W. (Doc. 108-4 at 21, Exh. D), on 

cross examination, he conceded previously denying any involvement with T.W.; 

[Mr. Bernays]. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Green. Do you remember this question being asked of you by Detective Marotta and this answer being given: 

Question: Okay, did something happen between you and the little girl? 

Answer: Not really because I flat out turned it down. 

Do you remember giving him that answer? 

[Ray Green]. I was under stress. 

(Doc. 108-4 at 21-22, Exh. D.) In fact, Petitioner argues that because Green testified to 

taking a plea deal, his credibility was necessarily at issue at trial “and, frankly, was 

patently unbelievable.” (Doc. 86 at 51.) 

 Without question, credibility is crucial to a defense of actual innocence, because 

testimony of a victim may be enough to sustain a conviction for child molestation. See 

Vega v. Ryan, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2013.) (finding that where only the mother 

had testified that daughter had recanted to her, that evidence of multiple recantations was 

not merely cumulative) (citing State v. Munoz, 561 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Ariz. App. 1976)). 

However here, Petitioner offers nothing to demonstrate that the post-judgment 

recantations are more damaging or probative than those presented at trial. Instead, 

Petitioner proffers that 

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during November, 2007, in correspondence between T.W. and Petitioner’s then attorney, Nicole Farnum, T.W. refused 

to sign an updated affidavit. In that communiqué, T.W. essentially recanted her earlier recantations. It is unknown 

what T.W.’s current position is regarding the alleged molestations. 

(Doc. 86 at 52.)16 

Lastly, Petitioner argues that “Dr. Jeffrey Harrison has since lost his state 

credentials to practice psychology due to malfeasance, arguably casting doubt on his 

credibility.” (Doc. 86 at 52.) During an evidentiary hearing held on September 23, 1988, 

the State sought to introduce evidence at trial of prior sexual acts Petitioner had with two 

young girls in 1977. (Doc. 67-2 at 16, Exh. 48.) Dr. Jeffrey Harrison testified at that 

hearing “as an expert and testified [Petitioner] has a continuing propensity to commit 

these acts against young girls.” (Doc. 67-2 at 17, Exh. 48.) Based on the hearing and the 

evidence presented, the Court allowed admission of 1977 acts at trial. (Id.) Harrison 

further testified at trial on October 3, 1988, as an expert regarding “child accommodation 

syndrome.” (Doc. 108-4, Exh. D.) Petitioner now presents that on August 21, 2000, the 

Arizona Board of Psychologist Examiners revoked Dr. Harrison’s license pursuant to a 

consent agreement. (Doc. 68-7 at 47, Exh. 69(d).) The record appears to indicate that 

Harrison entered into the consent agreement to revoke his license due to a sexual or 

romantic affair he had with one of his female patients in 1998. (Doc. 68-7 at 47, Exh. 

69(d); Doc. 70-7, Exh. 117.) Other than a blanket challenge to his ethical character, 

Petitioner fails to show how these circumstances have any bearing on Harrison’s ability 

to credibly testify as an expert in 1988 on the matters which were at issue at trial. 

 Petitioner argues that “[e]ven without the newly discovered evidence... it is 

 16 The defense also presented other theories to discredit T.W.’s testimony and challenge the evidence against Petitioner, including T.W. “felt a great responsibility for protecting her stepmother,” she wanted her father out of the house and, after having “observed a TV show... on sexual abuse,” T.W. falsely reported that Petitioner had abused her. (Doc. 108-1 at 27-28.) The defense argued “the allegations against him by [T.W.] and [K.V.I.] were a fabrication inspired by [T.W.]’s stepfather because, in his role as a confidential police informant, defendant had implicated the stepfather on a drug possession charge.” (Doc. 66-4, Exh. 17.) The defense further “presented evidence to establish an alibi on the day of the incident involving [K.V.I.] and [T.W.].” (Id.) 

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remarkable that the jury did not find reasonable doubt.” (Doc. 86 at 50.) Inherently, 

Petitioner challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. However, 

“‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Morales, 439 

F.3d at 533. Considering the evidence as a whole, including the additional evidence cited 

above, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the new facts “unquestionably” establish his 

innocence. Morales, 439 F.3d at 534. Although the testimony of the primary victim T.W. 

may have been inconsistent or incredible, the jury could have continued to believe that 

her testimony and the testimony of other prosecution witnesses were more accurate than 

that of the defense witnesses. The prosecution presented evidence that T.W. had given a 

detailed physical description of Ray Green, who she then was also able to identify in a 

photo line-up. Testimony was presented that T.W. was able to direct investigators to the 

mobile home where the crime was committed. Testimony was presented regarding the 

allegations of abuse of T.W. alleged and investigated in 1986. On September 28, 1988, 

K.V.I., who was then 14 years old, and K.V.II, then 11 years old, testified regarding the 

June 1987 incident, corroborating the allegations against Petitioner. (Doc. 108-3, Exh. C.) 

The prosecution also presented two other girls who testified that in 1977, while living 

with Petitioner and their mother, his then girlfriend, they were forced to perform oral sex 

on Petitioner. (Doc. 108-4, Exh. D; Doc. 66-4, Exh. 17.) 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated that the factual predicate for his claims could not 

have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence, and that if proven 

and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 

have found him guilty. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Therefore, Petitioner has failed to satisfy 

the standards allowing review of a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b). Further, given the preceding discussion, if the Court were to reach the claims in 

the petition, it is clear that the alleged nondisclosure in no way amounts to a material 

Brady violation, nor supports a viable Strickland claim; Petitioner has not shown a 

reasonable probability that had any this evidence been offered at trial, the result of the 

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proceeding would have been any different. Likewise, because the evidence offered by 

Petitioner challenges only the legal insufficiency of the evidence produced at his trial, he 

fails to meet the standard for a “freestanding” actual innocence under Herrera. See infra. 

 C. Application of AEDPA, Schlup and Herrera

 Petitioner argues that because he has shown a credible claim of actual innocence, 

he may pass through the Schlup “gateway” and have his otherwise defaulted and timebarred Brady and Strickland claims heard on the merits. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 315-16 (1995). 17 However, the Court need reach whether Petitioner his claims are, 

in fact, procedurally barred, or whether he has demonstrated that a “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” would result and can pass through the Schlup “gateway.” Cf. See 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (analyzing a first habeas petition seeking 

consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence under Schlup

rather than AEDPA). For the proceeding reasons, Petitioner has not satisfied his burden 

under the AEDPA in order to allow review of his claims.18

 Additionally, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim under Herrera v. Collins, 

 17 The AEDPA requirements for a second or successive 

application are stricter than the Schlup standard in two ways. First, § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) requires that “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” There is no requirement under Schlup that the factual claim was not 

discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. Second, § 

2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) requires that “the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” (Emphasis added.) Schlup requires only that an applicant show that it is “more likely than not” that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. 

Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 

18 Even if Petitioner surpassed the AEDPA standard, his circumstances would not 

satisfy the actual innocence standard under Schlup. For the reasons discussed, the medical 

report appears irrelevant to whether Petitioner committed his crimes and therefore do not 

prove factual innocence. To demonstrate actual innocence under Schlup, a petitioner must “show actual, factual innocence, not just legal insufficiency of the evidence.” United 

States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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506 U.S. 390 (1993) is not cognizable in these proceedings. The United States Supreme 

Court has not held that a “freestanding” claim of factual innocence, i.e., one 

unaccompanied by a substantive claim of constitutional error in trial proceedings, 

provides a basis for federal habeas relief in a non-capital case. See Herrera, supra; see 

also District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-74 (2009). In other words, the 

Supreme Court has not decided whether a persuasive demonstration of actual innocence 

after trial, in which the death penalty was not imposed, would render unconstitutional a 

conviction and sentence that is otherwise free of constitutional error. See House, 547 U.S. 

at 554-55. Similarly, the Court also need not reach Respondents’ argument because 

Petitioner has not satisfied his burden under the AEDPA to proceed on his Herrera

claim.19

III. Evidentiary Hearing 

“[S]ummary denial of [a second or successive petition] is proper when the 

[petition] and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner’s 

[petition] does not meet the second or successive [petition] requirements.” Villa–

Gonzalez, 208 F.3d at 1165. Here, even assuming Petitioner’s evidence is credible, he has 

not met his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable jury 

would not have convicted him. Accordingly, the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is warranted to consider the new evidence presented, nor is otherwise necessary 

for resolution of this matter. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2007);

Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 

768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 19 The threshold for any such claim, if it were recognized, would be “extraordinarily high.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. Even if Petitioner surpassed the AEDPA standard however, his circumstances would not satisfy the actual innocence standard under 

Herrera. “[T]he Herrera majority’s statement that the threshold for a freestanding claim of innocence would have to be ‘extraordinarily high,’ contemplates a stronger showing than insufficiency of the evidence to convict.” See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). The evidence offered by Petitioner does not affirmatively prove that he is innocent. The evidence offered by Petitioner challenges only the legal insufficiency of the evidence produced at his trial, which fails to meet the standard for a “freestanding” actual innocence under Herrera. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner has failed to show that he has satisfied the standards allowing review of 

a second or successive petition delineated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(1) and (2). Therefore, 

the Court recommends that the (Second) Fourth Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 86) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

RECOMMENDATION

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Fourth Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 86) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

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 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 4th day of December, 2013. 

 

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