Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01992/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01992-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

REFUGIO RODRIGUEZ and JOSEPHINE 

RODRIGUEZ, husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipality; 

MARICOPA COUNTY, a political 

subdivision of the State of Arizona; 

Defendants. 

No. CV-11-01992-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Defendants Maricopa County and City of Phoenix’s 

Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 55, 57). Plaintiff Refugio Rodriguez has filed a 

single joint Response (Doc. 60) that does not respond to the merits of Defendants’ two 

Motions. Instead, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendants’ motions under Rule 

56(d). (Doc. 60 at 2). Additionally, Plaintiff moves to Amend the Complaint Under Rule 

15 and to Add Parties Under Rule 21. (Id.). The Court now rules on the motions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 For purposes of the Court’s resolution of the pending summary judgment motion, 

the Court considers the relevant facts and background to be as follows.1

 

1

 Along with their Motions for Summary Judgment, Defendants have each filed a separate Statement of Facts in Support. (Docs. 56, 58). Plaintiff’s Response includes neither a Controverting Statement of Facts as required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 

56.1(b), nor any discussion whatsoever of the allegedly undisputed facts presented by Defendants. The Court therefore accepts Defendants’ undisputed facts as true for the 

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 A. Factual Background 

On May 11, 2011, Officers Neidenbach and Mills were on patrol and observed 

Plaintiff, Refugio Rodriguez, drop something behind a small wall. (Defendant City of 

Phoenix’s Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment 

(“PHXSOF”), Doc. 58 ¶ 1). The officers investigated, discovered two baggies of 

marijuana, ordered Plaintiff to stop, and chased Plaintiff after Plaintiff refused. (Id. ¶¶ 2–

3). Upon catching up to Plaintiff, Plaintiff struggled, assaulted2

 Officer Mills, and the 

Officers attempted to physically restrain Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 3–5). During the struggle, 

Plaintiff refused multiple commands to cease resistance, flipped onto his back, struck 

Officer Mills repeatedly, and grabbed Officer Mill’s taser pouch inside Officer Mill’s 

vest. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7). After taking Plaintiff into custody, paramedics examined and cleared 

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was booked into jail. (Id. ¶ 8). Booking photos indicate only a 

minor “road rash” injury sustained by Plaintiff on his back while struggling with the 

Officers. (Id.). The City of Phoenix (“Phoenix”) Police Department investigated the 

incident and concluded that the Officers’ use of force was reasonable and necessary to 

restrain and arrest Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11). 

 Upon arrival at the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office jail facility, a Correctional 

Health Services (a subdivision of Maricopa County) technician reviewed Plaintiff’s 

medical condition and, in accordance with Correctional health Services’ policies, referred 

Plaintiff to Nurse Victoria Wray. (Defendant Maricopa County’s Statement of Facts in 

Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (“MCSOF”), Doc. 56 ¶¶ 6–13). Nurse 

Wray examined Plaintiff, identified no signs of head injury or neurological trauma, and 

did not identify any life-threatening injury or other urgent need for medical attention at an 

outside medical facility. (Id. ¶¶ 14–21). 

 On May 28, 2010, Plaintiff posted bail, was released from jail, and, two hours 

 purposes of this motion. L.R. Civ. P. 56.1(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

2

 On October 18, 2010, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault on a police officer. (PHXSOF ¶ 9). 

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later, reported to the emergency department at St. Joseph’s Hospital claiming he had been 

assaulted by the police the previous night. (Id. ¶¶ 22–27). Doctors examined Plaintiff, 

found no significant injuries, prescribed Motrin,3

 and discharged Plaintiff less than five 

hours after Plaintiff arrived at the hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 27–33; see PHXSOF ¶¶ 14–16). 

Plaintiff did not seek additional medical treatment until he presented with complaints of 

back and chest pain one year later. (MCSOF ¶ 33). 

B. Procedural Background

 On May 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in Arizona Superior. 

(Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleged various Arizona state tort claims and Federal civil rights 

violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Officers related to an allegation of excessive 

force and Nurse Wray related to an alleged refusal to provide medical treatment to 

Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleged that Maricopa County and Phoenix were liable 

for the unconstitutional and tortious actions of their employees under a theory of 

respondeat surperior and several civil rights theories. (Id.). Defendants removed 

Plaintiff’s suit to Federal Court on October 13, 2011. (Id.). 

 On November 15, 2011, the Court dismissed Nurse Wray from this suit without 

prejudice as “Jane Doe” (Doc. 10; see Doc. 27 at 6). On November 22, 2011, the Court 

dismissed Officers Tedesco, Mills, and Neidenbach from this suit with prejudice per 

stipulation of the Parties. (Docs. 11–12). On January 9, 2012, the Court issued its Rule 

16 Scheduling Order. (Doc. 19). On May 7, 2012, the Court denied Maricopa County’s 

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the dismissal without prejudice of Nurse Wray (as 

“Jane Doe”) was not an adjudication on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. 27). 

Phoenix did not file a Motion to Dismiss, and discovery commenced, progressed, and 

concluded on January 31, 2013. (See CM/ECF Docket; Doc. 19). On March 14, 2013, 

Maricopa County and Phoenix each moved for summary judgment (Docs. 55, 57) and, on 

March 29, 2013, Plaintiff Responded by requesting the Court give Plaintiff leave to 

 

3

 Motrin is a non-narcotic, ibuprofen tablet available over the counter for the relief 

of pain, alleviation of fever, or reduction of inflammation. 

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amend the Complaint, add additional parties, and reopen discovery (Doc. 60); requests on 

which the Court now rules. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMMEND 

 Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 60) includes “(1) a Motion to Amend the Complaint 

under Rule 15 and/or (2) To Add Back as Parties, under Rule 21, Maricopa County Jail 

Nurse VICTORIA WRAY, previously dismissed without prejudice as “Jane Doe” [(Doc. 

27)], and Phoenix Police Officers TEDESCO, MILLS and NEIDENBACH,” previously 

dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 12). To justify his motions, Plaintiff scantly provides a 

single page that mentions Rule 15 but ignores Rule 21. (Doc. 60 at 2). Nonetheless, to 

the extent possible, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Response as making separate motions 

to amend the Complaint under Rule 15 and add additional defendants under Rule 21. 

 A. Rule 15 Motion to Amend 

 1. Legal Standard 

Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs a motion to amend 

pleadings to add claims or parties. However, in the present case, Rule 16 also applies 

because Plaintiff requested leave to amend his Complaint after the Rule 16 Scheduling 

Order deadline expired. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss both Rule 15 and Rule 16. 

 Rule 15(a) provides in pertinent part: 

 A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 

served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by 

written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 

given when justice so requires. 

Although the decision whether to grant or deny a motion to amend is within the trial 

court’s discretion, “Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when 

justice so requires’; this mandate is to be heeded.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962). “In exercising its discretion with regard to the amendment of pleadings ‘a court 

must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate a decision on the 

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merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.’ [] Thus, ‘Rule 15’s policy of 

favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.’ ” Eldridge 

v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). “Generally, this 

determination should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.” 

Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing DCD 

Programs v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

 The liberal policy in favor of amendments, however, is subject to limitations. 

After the defendant files a responsive pleading, leave to amend is not appropriate if the 

“amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, 

or creates undue delay.” Madeja v. Olympic Packers, 310 F.3d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting Yakima Indian Nation v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 

1999)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The party opposing amendment 

bears the burden of showing prejudice,” futility, or one of the other permissible reasons 

for denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187; see also Richardson v. 

United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that leave to amend should be 

freely given unless opposing party makes “an affirmative showing of either prejudice or 

bad faith”). 

 Prejudice can result where a defendant would be forced to participate in additional 

discovery. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Extending discovery can also create undue delay. Solomon v. N. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. 

Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998). Regarding futility, “[a] district court does not 

err in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile . . . or would be 

subject to dismissal.” Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations 

omitted); see also Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A 

motion for leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally insufficient.” 

(citation omitted)). Similarly, a motion for leave to amend is futile if it can be defeated 

on a motion for summary judgment. Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 

762, 766 (9th Cir. 1986). “However, a proposed amendment is futile only if no set of 

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facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid 

and sufficient claim or defense.” Miller, 845 F.2d at 214. 

 Rule 16, on the other hand, applies to pretrial conferences and scheduling orders. 

This Rule provides, in pertinent part: 

(b) [The district court] shall, after receiving the report from the parties under Rule 26(f) or after consulting with the 

attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties by a scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or other suitable 

means, enter a scheduling order that limits the time 

(1) to join other parties and to amend pleadings . . . . 

. . . . 

A schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of 

good cause and by leave of the district judge[.] 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on 

the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the 

opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of 

the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 

604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Generally, to meet its burden under Rule 16’s “good cause” 

standard, the movant may be required to show: 

(1) that [the movant] was diligent in assisting the Court in creating a workable Rule 16 [O]rder; (2) that [the movant’s] 

noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will 

occur, notwithstanding [the movant’s] diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and (3) that [the 

movant] was diligent in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 [O]rder, once it became apparent that [the movant] could not 

comply with the [O]rder. 

Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has 

also recognized that, “[t]he district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot 

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’ ” Johnson, 

975 F.2d at 609. However, “carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence 

and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Id. “Although the existence or degree of 

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prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny 

a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification . . . . If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id.

 With respect to the interplay between Rules 16 and 15(a), “[a]s the Ninth Circuit 

explained in Johnson [], once the district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order 

pursuant to Rule 16 pleadings, a motion seeking to amend pleadings is governed first by 

Rule 16(b), and only secondarily by Rule 15(a).” Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 607; Eckert 

Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 1996); see Coleman v. 

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000); Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 

42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994); Forstmann v. Culp, 114 F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1987) 

(finding that a party seeking to amend a pleading after the scheduling order date must 

first show “good cause” for not amending the complaint sooner, and if “good cause” is 

established, the party must demonstrate that the amendment was proper under Rule 15). 

“If [the court] considered only Rule 15(a) without regard to Rule 16(b), it would render 

scheduling orders meaningless and effectively would read Rule 16(b) and its good cause 

requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 

133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court will first evaluate 

Plaintiffs’ Motion under Rule 16, and then, if necessary, under Rule 15(a). 

 2. Analysis 

 Here, Plaintiff’s motion requests leave to “Amend the Complaint under Rule 15” 

(Doc. 60 at 2), but fails to attach a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint to 

Plaintiff’s motion.4

 Instead Plaintiff provides less than a single page of argument 

purportedly explaining both the substance of Plaintiff’s proposed amendments and the 

grounds on which the Court should grant Plaintiff’s motions. (Doc. 60 at 2). Plaintiff 

appears to request (id.), and the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as requesting, three 

 

4

 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1(a) requires Plaintiff to attach a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint to his Rule 15 Motion to Amend. Plaintiff’s noncompliance, alone, is sufficient grounds for denial of Plaintiff’s motion. L.R. Civ. P. 

7.2(i). 

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amendments to the Complaint: (1) the deletion of Plaintiff’s single Federal 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 claim against Defendants (Count 5); (2) the addition as a defendant of Maricopa 

County Jail Nurse Victoria Wray;5

 and (3) the addition as defendants of three individual 

Phoenix Police Department officers.6

 With regard to Rule 16, Plaintiffs’ March 29, 2013 Motion makes no attempt to 

demonstrate “good cause” for failing to comply with the Court’s Rule 16 Scheduling 

Order, which set a May 23, 2012 deadline for any motion to amend the complaint. 

(Doc. 19 at 2). Plaintiff does not argue that Plaintiff’s noncompliance occurred despite 

Plaintiff’s diligence. (Doc. 60 at 2). Instead, Plaintiff admits that he filed his Motion 

more than 10-months late because “Plaintiffs [sic] counsel neglected to follow the County 

Attorney’s advice in Document 177

 that Plaintiffs [sic] could ‘dismiss his federal claims 

so that the case returns to state court.’ ” (Id.). Plaintiff further acknowledges that as 

early as December 29, 2011, Plaintiff was aware that the inclusion of individual 

defendants may be necessary for Plaintiff’s case to proceed against Maricopa County and 

Phoenix. (Id. (explaining that in Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 15) to Maricopa County’s 

previous motion to dismiss, Plaintiff recognized that if the Court did not remand the case 

to Arizona Superior Court, then Plaintiff would need to identify and add the individual 

nurse). Plaintiff concludes his concessions with a self-aware understatement: 

“[u]nfortunately, Plaintiff did not then pursue an amendment.” (Id.). 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s admitted “neglect” and “unfortunate” litigation 

strategy, bereft of any showing of diligence, does not sufficiently demonstrate “good 

cause” for the Court to amend its Rule 16 Scheduling Order to extend the deadline for 

filing a motion to amend the Complaint. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“[C]arelessness 

 

5

 On November 15, 2011, the Court dismissed Nurse Wray from the suit without 

prejudice as “Jane Doe” (Doc. 10; see Doc. 27 at 6).

6

 On November 22, 2011, the Court dismissed Officers Tedesco, Mills, and 

Neidenbach with prejudice per stipulation of the Parties. (Docs. 11–12). 

7

 Doc. 17 is Defendant Maricopa County’s January 3, 2012 Reply in Support of Maricopa County’s previous motion to dismiss (Doc. 14). 

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is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.”). 

Therefore, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to modify its Rule 16 Scheduling 

Order, and an application of Rule 15(a) is not necessary. Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1419 (holding 

that the Court need not evaluate Rule 15(a) unless the movant first meets the “good 

cause” requirement of Rule 16). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the 

Complaint under Rule 15 (Doc. 60 at 1) is denied. 

 B. Rule 21 Motion to Add Defendants 

 1. Legal Standard 

Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, titled 

“Misjoinder and Non–Joinder of Parties,” provides that “[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.” Id. The power to drop or add parties is vested to the sound discretion of the court. 

See Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 

1980); see also Fair Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (citing 3A Moore’s 

Federal Practice § 21.05 (1970)) (Rule 21 affords broad 

discretion to court in adding or dropping parties). 

Siren, Inc. v. Firstline Sec., Inc., No. 06-1109-PHX-RCB, 2006 WL 3257440, at *3 

(D. Ariz. May 17, 2006). 

 Because Rule 21 gives no guidance other than that the addition of parties must be 

“on such terms as are just,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, when “deciding whether to permit the 

addition of defendants, courts apply the ‘same standard of liberality afforded to motions 

to amend pleadings under Rule 15.’ ” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elzanaty, 916 F. Supp. 2d 273, 

302–03 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Soler v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 

1980)); c.f. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 523 F.2d 1073, 

1079–80 (9th Cir. 1975) (where the Court of Appeals uses Rules 19 and 20 to furnish 

standards for the addition of a plaintiff because “[b]y itself, Rule 21 cannot furnish 

standards for the propriety of joinder, for it contains none”). “Thus, leave to amend a 

complaint to assert claims against additional defendants should be denied only because of 

undue delay, bad faith, futility, or prejudice to the non-moving party, and the decision to 

grant or deny a motion to amend rests within the sound discretion of the district court.” 

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Allstate, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (internal quotation and citation omitted). “In addition, 

‘the court typically will deny a request that comes so late in the litigation that it will delay 

the case or prejudice any of the parties to the action.’ ” S.E.C. v. Leslie, No. C 07-3444, 

2010 WL 2991038, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (quoting City of Syracuse v. 

Onondaga Cnty., 464 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing to 7 Wright, Miller & Kane, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1688.1 at 510 (West 2001))). 

 2. Analysis 

 Here, Plaintiff appears to request the addition as defendants of (1) Maricopa 

County Jail Nurse Victoria Wray; and (2) three individual Phoenix Police Department 

officers. (Doc. 60 at 2). 

 First, with regard to Nurse Wray, the Court finds that the addition of Nurse Wray 

as a defendant would be futile. Nurse Wray was never individually served with a notice 

of claim8

 as required by the Arizona Notice of Claim Statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). 

(Doc. 61 at 7–9; Doc. 62 ¶ 1, Ex. 1). Consequently, the statute bars Plaintiff’s claims 

against Nurse Wray. Salerno v. Espinoza, 115 P.3d 626, 628 ¶ 7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 

Moreover, because Plaintiff admits that he knew Nurse Wray should be added to the 

litigation no later than December 29, 2011 (see Doc. 60 at 2), the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s more than 10-month late motion to add Nurse Wray is an “undue delay.” 

 Second, with regard to the three individual officers, the Court finds that the 

addition of the Officers as defendants would be futile. Pursuant to the Parties’ 

stipulation, the Court dismissed the Officers from Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice. 

(Docs. 11, 12). “[A] stipulated dismissal of an action with prejudice in a federal district 

court generally constitutes a final judgment on the merits and precludes a party from 

reasserting the same claims in a subsequent action in the same court.” Headwaters Inc. v. 

U.S. Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005); see also In re Marino, 181 F.3d 

 

8

 Plaintiff does not dispute this fact (see Doc. 60) and failed to Reply to Defendant Maricopa County’s Response (Doc. 61) in which Maricopa County submitted a Supplemental Statement of Fact, supported by affidavit, stating that Nurse Wray had never been served a Notice of Claim (Doc. 62 ¶ 1, Ex. 1). 

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1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999) (Under res judicata, “a dismissal with prejudice has res 

judicata effect [and] . . . bars any further action between the parties on the issues 

subtended by the case.”). 

 In sum, because the Court finds that the addition of Nurse Wray or the Officers 

would be futile, the Court finds that adding either party would not be “just” as required 

by Rule 21. Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request comes so late in the 

litigation that it will delay the case and prejudice Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Add Back as Parties under Rule 21 (Doc. 60 at 1) is denied. 

III. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Defendants Maricopa County and Phoenix have each moved for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 55, 57). Plaintiff has filed a single joint Response (Doc. 60) that does 

not respond to the merits of Defendants’ two Motions. Instead, Plaintiff requests Rule 

56(d) relief. (Doc. 60 at 2). The Court first considers Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) request, and 

second considers the merits of Defendants’ two motions. 

 A. Relief Under Rule 56(d) 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), 

When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. If a 

nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for 

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: 

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it; 

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take 

discovery; or 

(3) issue any other appropriate order. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The party requesting Rule 56(d) relief must show that: “(1) it has 

set forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) 

the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary 

judgment.” Family Home and Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 

525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “Failure to comply with 

these requirements is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary 

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judgment.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 Here, in a single sentence, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendants’ 

Motions for Summary Judgment on Rule 56(d) grounds. (Doc. 60 at 2). Plaintiff makes 

no attempt to identify what essential facts are unavailable but discoverable, let alone 

specify reasons in an affidavit or declaration. (Doc. 60 at 2). Indeed, Plaintiff makes no 

argument whatsoever as to why discovery should be reopened when Defendants’ motions 

were filed on March 14, 2013, six weeks after the January 31, 2013 discovery deadline. 

(See Docs. 19, 55, 57). Plaintiff’s abject noncompliance with Rule 56(d) provides the 

Court no recourse but to deny Plaintiff’s request. Accordingly, the Court will adjudicate 

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on their merits. 

 B. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record,” including depositions, affidavits, interrogatory answers or other 

materials, or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.” Id. at 56(c)(1). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586B87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247B48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at the 

summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of 

credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.”) (internal citations 

omitted). 

 C. Maricopa County’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) includes three Counts against Maricopa County: 

(1) Count Three, Willful or Wanton Negligence; (2) Count Four, Intentional or Reckless 

Inflection of Emotional Distress; and (3) Count Five, Civil Rights Violations under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts Three and Four base Maricopa County’s liability solely on 

respondeat superior. Count Five bases Maricopa County’s liability on alleged 

unconstitutional policies, practices, or procedures. 

 1. Arizona State Law: Counts Three & Four—Respondeat Superior

 Plaintiff claims that a Maricopa County employee, Jane Doe,9

 refused Plaintiff 

medical treatment with willful and wanton negligence, and thereby caused Plaintiff 

severe emotional distress. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 63–65, 69–70). Plaintiff further alleges that 

Maricopa County is responsible for the tortious actions of its employee, Jane Doe, 

 

9

 At this point in the litigation, Jane Doe is known to be Nurse Wray. However, because Plaintiff declined to timely amend his Complaint to add Nurse Wray as an individual Defendant, the Complaint still alleges that “Jane Doe” committed negligent or tortious acts. 

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pursuant to the principle of respondeat superior. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 71). 

 Maricopa County argues that it cannot be liable for the state law tort claims under 

respondeat superior because the individual “Jane Doe” defendant has been dismissed and 

therefore there is no underlying tortfeasor. “An employer is vicariously liable for the 

negligent or tortious acts of its employee acting within the scope and course of 

employment.” Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, 

Inc., 5 P.3d 249, 254 ¶ 17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). First, because Jane Doe has been 

dismissed from this case and Plaintiff never added Nurse Wray as a party, there is no 

“employee” for Plaintiff to point to establish an employee/employer relationship. 

Similarly, the lack of a specific employee precludes Plaintiff from establishing that 

Maricopa County’s employee caused damage to Plaintiff “within the scope and course of 

employment.” Moreover, because there is no underlying employee, there can be no 

determination that the non-existent employee acted negligently or tortiously. Thus, 

because Maricopa County’s liability is solely derivative of its employee under respondeat 

superior (Plaintiff does not allege that Maricopa County is a joint-tortfeasor), “there is no 

fault to impute and the party potentially vicariously liable [(Maricopa County)] is not 

responsible for the fault of the other person.” Law v. Verde Valley Med. Ctr., 170 P.3d 

701, 705 ¶13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim could proceed against 

Maricopa County without identifying a particular employee and examining her conduct, 

the undisputed facts show that Nurse Wray’s conduct was reasonable, appropriate, and 

complied with the applicable standards of care. (MCSOF ¶¶ 46, 55). Thus, there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact that a Maricopa County employee acted negligently or 

tortiously. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an essential element of his respondeat 

superior claims and Maricopa County is entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, the 

Court grants Defendant Maricopa County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 55) 

with respect to Counts Three and Four. 

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 2. Federal Law: Count Five—Section 1983 

Plaintiff claims that a Maricopa County employee, Jane Doe, unconstitutionally 

violated Plaintiff’s civil rights by needlessly and unreasonably denying Plaintiff access to 

immediate emergency medical care. (Doc. 1 ¶ 75). Plaintiff further alleges that 

Maricopa County is responsible for the unconstitutional actions of its employee, Jane 

Doe, because (1) Jane Doe acted in accordance with Maricopa County’s unconstitutional 

policies or practices; (2) Maricopa County instructed Jane Doe to deny Plaintiff medical 

treatment; (3) Maricopa County improperly hired, trained, and supervised, Jane Doe; and 

(4) Maricopa County failed to adequately discipline Jane Done for prior improper 

conduct. (Id. at ¶ 76). 

 First, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of an 

unconstitutional Maricopa County policy, practice, or procedure. “[A] municipality 

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dept. of 

Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y. et al., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Under Monell, municipal 

liability may be based on any of three theories: (1) an expressly adopted official policy; 

(2) a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) the decision of a person with final 

policymaking authority. Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff 

appears to claim that Maricopa County’s unconstitutional policies were to deny prisoners 

access to medical care (MCSOF ¶ 58) and “to help cover up acts of other police agencies 

by delaying immediate Emergency Room treatment which dissipated the proximate cause 

from the City of Phoenix Police brutality.” (MCSOF ¶ 56 (quoting Plaintiff’s Responses 

to Defendant’s 2nd Set of Interrogatories, id. at Ex. 13)). However, the undisputed facts 

demonstrate that Maricopa County had no such express or implied policies, practices, or 

procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 57–59, 70). Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that 

Maricopa County had an unconstitutional policy, procedure, or practice. Consequently, 

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an essential element of his Monell § 1983 claim against 

Maricopa County. 

 Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Maricopa County 

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instructed Jane Doe to deny Plaintiff medical treatment. Here, it is undisputed that Nurse 

Wray was never instructed to deny a patient emergency medical care. (MCSOF ¶ 70). 

Moreover, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Nurse Wray did not apply any of 

Maricopa County’s existing policies, practices, and procedures in an unconstitutional 

way. (See id. ¶¶ 47–55 (establishing that “Nurse Wray’s dealings with [Plaintiff] were 

reasonable and appropriate and complied with the standard of care for a reasonable 

correctional health nurse under like or similar circumstances”)). Moreover, it is 

undisputed that, despite not needing emergency medical care (id. ¶¶ 15, 19–20, 29, 63), 

Plaintiff was examined at and released by the hospital without further treatment. 

(Id. ¶¶ 31, 33). Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Maricopa County 

instructed Nurse Wray to deny Plaintiff medical treatment. Consequently, Plaintiff 

cannot demonstrate an essential element of his § 1983 claim against Maricopa County. 

 Third, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Maricopa County 

improperly hired, trained, or supervised Jane Doe. (See Doc. 55 at 12–15). To prevail on 

a § 1983 claim of improper hiring, training, or supervision, “[a] plaintiff must 

demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a 

violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.” Bd. of 

Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997); see City of 

Canton, Oh. v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (improper training requires a failure to 

train so inadequate that it “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons” 

impacted by the training); Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(sufficiently inadequate supervision of an employee may amount to deliberate 

indifference for purposes of establishing § 1983 municipal liability). Here, the 

undisputed facts demonstrate that Correctional Health Services’10 hiring, training, and 

supervision policies and practices conform to the reasonable and prevailing practices in 

the community and are designed and implemented to avoid personnel violating patients’ 

 

10 Correctional Health Services is the subdivision of Maricopa County that directly employed Nurse Wray. 

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rights. (MCSOF ¶¶ 71–85). Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that 

Maricopa County acted with deliberate indifference when hiring, training, and 

supervising Nurse Wray. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an essential 

element of his § 1983 improper hiring, training, and supervision claims against Maricopa 

County. 

 Fourth, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Maricopa County 

failed to adequately discipline Jane Doe for prior improper conduct. Like an improper 

hiring, training, or supervision claim, to prevail on a § 1983 failure to discipline claim, 

Plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference by the municipality. Long v. City & 

Cnty. of Honolulu, 378 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1246–48 (D. Haw. 2005). Additionally, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate previous grounds to discipline the individual employee, a municipal 

policy not to discipline, and causation. Id. Here, Plaintiff does not point to any fact 

suggesting that Nurse Wray ever previously provided grounds for discipline, let alone 

that Maricopa County acted with deliberate indifference towards disciplining Nurse Wray 

or any other employee. (Doc. 60). In contrast, it is undisputed that Maricopa County 

does not hire medical professionals with previous disciplinary issues and implements its 

policies and procedures in order to avoid the violation of patient’s rights. 

(MCSOF ¶¶ 83–84). Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Maricopa 

County acted with deliberate indifference when disciplining (or failing to discipline) 

Nurse Wray. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an essential element of his 

§ 1983 failure to discipline claim against Maricopa County. 

 In sum, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate at least one essential element in each of his 

§ 1983 claims against Maricopa County. Thus, Maricopa County is entitled to summary 

judgment. Accordingly, the Court grants Maricopa County’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 55) with respect to Count Five. 

 D. City of Phoenix’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) includes five Counts against Phoenix: (1) Count 

One, Assault and Battery; (2) Count Two, Negligence Per Se; (3) Count Three, Willful or 

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Wanton Negligence; (4) Count Four, Intentional or Reckless Inflection of Emotional 

Distress; and (5) Count Five, Civil Rights Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts 

One through Four base Phoenix’s liability solely on respondeat superior. Count Five 

bases Phoenix’s liability on alleged unconstitutional policies, practices, or procedures. 

1. Arizona State Law: Counts One, Two, Three, & Four—

Respondeat Superior

 Plaintiff claims that three Phoenix Police Department Officers either employed 

excessive force when arresting Plaintiff or failed to intervene when other officers 

employed excessive force, and thereby caused Plaintiff severe physical injuries and 

emotional distress. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 44–49, 53–55, 59–61, 69–70). Plaintiff further alleges 

that Phoenix is responsible for the tortious actions of its employee officers pursuant to the 

principle of respondeat superior. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 54, 62, 71). 

 Phoenix argues that it cannot be liable for the state law tort claims under 

respondeat superior because the three individual officers have been dismissed from this 

suit with prejudice and therefore there is no underlying tortfeasor. “An employer is 

vicariously liable for the negligent or tortious acts of its employee acting within the scope 

and course of employment.” Baker, 5 P.3d at 254 ¶ 17. “When a judgment on the 

merits—including a dismissal with prejudice—is entered in favor of the ‘other person’ in 

A.R.S. § 12–2506(D)(2) (such as each [officer] here), there is no fault to impute and the 

party potentially vicariously liable ([Phoenix] here) is not responsible for the fault of the 

other person.” Law, 170 P.3d at 705 ¶ 13. Because respondeat superior for the actions 

of the Officers is the sole basis for Plaintiff’s claims against Phoenix, Phoenix is entitled 

to summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court grants Phoenix’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 57) with respect to Counts One, Two, Three, and Four. 

 2. Federal Law: Count Five—Section 1983 

 Plaintiff claims that three individual Phoenix Police officers unconstitutionally 

violated Plaintiff’s civil rights by employing excessive force against Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 1 ¶ 73). Plaintiff further alleges that Phoenix is responsible for the unconstitutional 

actions of its employees, the Officers, because (1) the Officers acted in accordance with 

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Phoenix’s unconstitutional policies or practices; (2) Phoenix improperly hired, trained, 

and supervised the Officers; and (3) Phoenix failed to adequately discipline the Officers 

for prior improper conduct. (Id. at ¶ 74). 

 First, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of an 

unconstitutional Phoenix policy, practice, or procedure. “[A] municipality cannot be held 

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Under 

Monell, municipal liability may be based on any of three theories: (1) an expressly 

adopted official policy; (2) a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) the decision of a 

person with final policymaking authority. Lytle, 382 F.3d at 982. Here, Plaintiff scantly 

alleges that Phoenix’s policies, practices, or customs “contributed to the illegal actions of 

the officers.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 74). However, Plaintiff offers neither any factual allegations nor 

makes an attempt to specifically identify which, if any, of Phoenix’s policies, practices, 

or customs “contributed” to the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (See

Doc. 1 ¶ 74; Doc. 60; Doc. 57 at 7). Such a bare recitation of an element of the cause of 

action, alone, is insufficient to support Plaintiff’s claim and create a genuine dispute of 

material fact. Cf. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 

2012) (where the court applied the motion to dismiss standard from Twombly and Iqbal, 

which is more lenient that the Celotex summary judgment standard, and held that a 

conclusory allegation that defendant county had unconstitutional policy, practices, or 

customs relating to the care and custody of dependent minors failed to state a claim). 

 Moreover, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Phoenix had an express policy, 

practice, and custom of investigating complaints (including claims of excessive force) 

against police officers. (See PHXSOF ¶¶ 10–11, 17–19). The existence of such policies 

supports the reasonable inference that Phoenix did not have policies, practices, or 

customs that “contributed” to the officer’s alleged unconstitutional conduct in this case. 

Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Phoenix had an unconstitutional 

policy, procedure, or practice, and Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an essential element of 

his Monell § 1983 claim against Phoenix. 

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 Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Phoenix improperly 

hired, trained, or supervised the officers. (See Doc. 57 at 7–9). To prevail on a § 1983 

claim of improper hiring, training, or supervision, “[a] plaintiff must demonstrate that a 

municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a 

particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 

411; see City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 (improper training requires a failure to train so 

inadequate that it “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons” impacted 

by the training); Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 (sufficiently inadequate supervision of an 

employee may amount to deliberate indifference for purposes of establishing § 1983 

municipal liability). Here, Plaintiff again fails to offer any factual allegation, let alone 

evidence, which could be interpreted as supporting that Phoenix acted with any sort of 

deliberate indifference when hiring, training, or supervising the officers. (See 

Doc. 1 ¶ 74; Doc. 60; Doc. 57 at 7–9). Moreover, the undisputed facts demonstrate that 

the Officers’ backgrounds provided no indication of any propensity to violate a person’s 

constitutional rights (PHXSOF ¶ 17) and the City of Phoenix followed its policies of 

reviewing (supervising) the officers’ use of force (id. ¶ 10–11). Thus, there is no genuine 

dispute of material fact that Phoenix acted with deliberate indifference when hiring, 

training, and supervising the Officers. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an 

essential element of his § 1983 improper hiring, training, and supervision claims against 

Phoenix. 

 Third, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Phoenix failed to 

adequately discipline the Officers for prior improper conduct. Like an improper hiring, 

training, or supervision claim, to prevail on a § 1983 failure to discipline claim, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate deliberate indifference by the municipality. Long, 378 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1246–48. Additionally, Plaintiff must demonstrate previous grounds to discipline the 

individual officers, a municipal policy not to discipline, and causation. Id. Here, the 

undisputed facts demonstrate that Phoenix adequately investigated prior complaints 

(including of excessive force) against the Officers and subsequently disciplined the 

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Officers appropriately. (PHXSOF ¶¶ 18–19). Thus, there is no genuine dispute of 

material fact that Phoenix acted with deliberate indifference when disciplining (or failing 

to discipline) the Officers. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an essential 

element of his § 1983 failure to discipline claim against Phoenix. 

 In sum, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate at least one essential element in each of his 

§ 1983 claims against Phoenix. Thus, Phoenix is entitled to summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Phoenix’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) with 

respect to Count Five. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend the Complaint Under Rule 

15, to Add Parties Under Rule 21, and for Rule 56(d) Relief (Doc. 60) are DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Maricopa County’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 55) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant the City of Phoenix’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that because this Order resolves all remaining 

Claims against all remaining Defendants, the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment for 

the remaining Defendants and Plaintiff shall take nothing. 

 Dated this 19th day of March, 2014. 

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