Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01203/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01203-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUELA CANCINO CONTRERAS

MORALES, individually and as

Successor-In-Interest to Ruben Mesa

Morales, deceased; R.A.M., individually

and as Successor-In-Interest to Ruben Mesa

Morales, deceased, by and through his

Guardian Ad Litem, Manuela Cancino

Contreras Morales,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

CITY OF DELANO, et al.

Defendants.

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Case No. 1:10-cv-1203-AWI-JLT

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 7.)

I. The Court must screen the First Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July

7, 2010, plaintiffs filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. (Doc. 3) Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed IFP, this Court must screen

the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires the

dismissal of a case at any time if the court determines that it (1) “is frivolous or malicious,” (2)

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a

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defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),(ii) and (iii). 

II. Legal authority

A. Section 1983

Plaintiff’s FAC seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To warrant relief under this

section, plaintiffs must show that the defendants’ acts or omissions caused the deprivation of the

their constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). “A

person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he

is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Id. 

There must be an actual causal connection or link between the actions of each defendant and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiffs. See Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-692 (1978)(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362, 370-371(1976)). 

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9

F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (the supervisor of someone who

allegedly violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights is not made liable for the violation by virtue of

that role). “Liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the

defendant. (Citation.) A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates

if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), citation omitted.

Recently, the Supreme Court rejected that a supervisor can be held liable for his mere

“knowledge and acquiescence” in unlawful conduct by his subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009). The Court held,

. . . respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s

discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor's violating the Constitution. We

reject this argument. Respondent's conception of “supervisory liability” is

inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners may not be held

accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens

action--where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants--the term

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“supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or

her own misconduct.

Id., emphasis added. 

B. Rule 8(a)

Section 1983 complaints are governed by the notice pleading standard in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading

policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of plaintiffs’ claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In

other words, the complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what constitutes the plaintiffs’

claims and the grounds upon which they rest. Although a complaint need not outline all of the

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the allegations that all of the elements exist

and that plaintiffs are entitled to relief under a viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent. Bell

Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990). 

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, the Court observed, 

[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual

allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. [Citations]. A pleading that

offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” [Citation]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” [Citation].

The Court further clarified that, 

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

[Citation]. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

[Citation]. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a

defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

of ‘entitlement to relief.’”

Id. The Court instructed, “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

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relief. Id. at 1950. However, the conclusions contained in the pleading “are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Id. 

III. Summary of the Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that their decedent, Ruben Alejandro Morales (“Morales”), was shot and

killed by a member of the Delano Police Department on July 6, 2009. (Doc. 7 at 8-9) At the

time, Morales rented a room in the home of Maria Nunez. Id. When Ms. Nunez arrived at the

home at about midnight, she noticed that the front door was ajar and that there were lights

flickering inside. Id. Nunez called the police and when they arrived, she reported that Morales

was lawfully inside. Id. Although other officers inspected the home and “cleared it,” Officers

Mejia and Manuele entered the residence from the backyard. Id. When they encountered

Morales in his bedroom, Mejia shot him at “point-blank” range. Id.

After the shooting, Morales “lay dying on the floor” but neither Mejia nor Manuele

provided medical attention in a timely fashion. (Doc. 7 at 8-9) Other Delano Police Officers who

were present at the scene, ignored Morales’ need for medical attention. Id. Eventually a call was

placed requesting medical assistance. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Kern dispatched its own

employees or dispatched agents of Kern to provide medical assistance but that this medical

personnel did not arrive at the scene for 20 minutes despite being only five miles away at the

time of the dispatch. (Doc. 7 at 9) When the medical personnel arrived at the scene, Morales was

still alive. Id. The medical personnel transported the decedent to Delano Regional Medical

Center where he was pronounced dead at 1:10 a.m. Id.

Based upon these factual allegations, the Plaintiffs seek to impose liability under 42 USC

§ 1983 for violations of Morales’ Fourth, Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments rights and for

violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They seek to impose liability based

upon state law claims for wrongful death, battery and negligence also.

IV. Named defendants

In the caption of the pleading, Plaintiffs’ name the City of Delano, the City of Delano

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Police Department and Kern County. They name the Delano Police Chief, Mark DeRosia, and

Delano Police Officers Jose Mejia and Shaun Manuele.

V. The City of Delano Police Department is not amenable to suit.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ claim that the City of Delano Police Department is

amenable to suit. As set forth in the Court’s Order dated July 7, 2010, this municipal agency, is

not amenable to suit.

The Ninth Circuit’s last word on the subject was in United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d

1236, 1240 (9 Cir. 2005). In that case, the Court held, “municipal police departments and th 1

bureaus are generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

Moreover, the Court’s determination here is consistent with recent Eastern District decisions. In

Morris v. State Bar, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36945, 6-7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010), the Court

considered whether the City of Fresno Fire Department was amenable to suit. The Court held,

Municipal police departments and bureaus are generally not considered “persons”

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th

Cir.1995). Other types of governmental associations are only subject to suit under

Section 1983 if the parties that created them intended to create a separate legal

entity. Hervey, 65 F.3d at 792 (intergovernmental narcotics team is not subject to

suit). See also Sanders v. Aranas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402, 2008 WL 268972,

3 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (the Fresno Police Department is not a proper defendant

because it is a sub-division of the City of Fresno).

The Complaint alleges claims against the Fresno Fire Department, as well as the 

City of Fresno. The City of Fresno is the proper party because it is the

governmental entity considered a “person” under § 1983. The Fresno Fire

Department is a “sub-unit” of the City of Fresno and is not a person under § 1983.

Id. Other recent decisions hold similarly. “[M]unicipal departments and sub-units, including

The Court acknowledges Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 565-566 (9 Cir. 2001). However,

1 th

Streit is factually distinct from the situation here. In Streit, the Court was concerned with whether the LA County

Sheriff’s Department was a separate legal entity for purposes of § 1983 liability, “in its function of managing jails.”

Baker v. County of Sonoma, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14831 * at 16-17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2009). Here, traditional law

enforcement functions are at issue. Moreover, Karim-Panachi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 624

n. 2 (9 Cir. 1988) fails to provide any analysis for its conclusion that both the City of LA and the LAPD could be held

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liable for the actions of police officers. Instead, it merely cites to Shaw v. California Dep.’t of Alcohol Beverage Control,

788 F.2d 600,605 (9 Cir. 1986), which does not so hold. Instead, Shaw holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior

th

is inapplicable to a § 1983 action. Thus, United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d at 1240, and the cases following it, are on

point.

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police departments, are generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. 

Navarro v. California, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5388 at *18 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2010); Wade v.

Fresno Police Dep’t, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57093 at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2010); Garcia v.

City of Merced, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88277 at *5, n 4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009)(same);

Gonzalez v. Merced County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40307 at *3, n. 1 (E.D. Cal. May 13,

2009)(same); Wallace v. Sacramento Sheriff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79263 at *1 (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 12, 2007);(same) Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74383 at *11

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006)(same). This rationale is followed by other districts within the Ninth

Circuit also. Ortega v. Chula Vista Police Dep’t, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66960 at *1-2 (S.D.

Cal. June 29, 2010) (“. . . Chula Vista Police Department lacks capacity to be sued under Section

1983 . . .”); Paschelke v. Doe, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65187 at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)

(“The Court agrees that dismissal of the San Diego County Central Detention Facility is

appropriate as this Defendant is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.”); Smith v. L.A.

County, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110059 at *22-23 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008), (“[T]he Sheriff's

Department and the County are duplicative defendants and it is unnecessary for plaintiff to sue

both. Accordingly, the Sheriff's Department should be dismissed from this action.”); Banks v.

Clark County, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32671 at *7-8 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 2010); Moreno-Garcia v.

Yakima Police Dep’t, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69213 at *5-6 (E.D. Wash. July 9, 2010) (“The

Yakima Police Department is not a legal entity separate from the City of Yakima, and it lacks

capacity to be sued.”) Likewise, in Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-996

(N.D. Cal. 1996), the court held, 

The term “persons” encompasses state and local officials sued in their individual

capacities, private individuals and entities which acted under color of state law,

and local governmental entities. Martin Schwartz and John Kirklin, Section 1983

Litigation: Claims Defenses and Fees, § 5.2 (2d ed. 1991). However, the term

“persons” does not encompass municipal departments. “Naming a municipal

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action

against a municipality.” Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991).

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Therefore, the legal authority belies Plaintiffs’ claim that they can maintain this action against the

City of Delano and its agency the City of Delano Police Department.

Moreover, though Plaintiffs assert that California Government Code section 38630 is

evidence that the Police Department is a separate legal entity from the City of Delano, they

ignore that the Chief of Police is appointed by the City Council and serves at “the pleasure of the

city counsel.” Cal. Gov. Code §§ 36505, 36506. Also, unless the City Council delegates the

authority to the Police Chief or other person, it is the City Council, not the Police Chief, who has

the power to hire police officers. Cal. Gov. Code § 38631. Although the police chief is given 2

control of the Police Department, he is not given budgetary control, which is vested in the City

Council. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 37200 et seq.

Finally, despite Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, to allow the matter to proceed

against the agency of the City of Delano and the City itself, ignores the likelihood of an improper

award of a double recovery against a single funding source. Therefore, the Court will, once

again, DISMISS the FAC as to the City of Delano Police Department.

VI. The FAC is vague due to its allegation that each defendant is responsible for the

actions of every other defendant.

The FAC seeks to impose liability upon Kern due to its action in “regulat[ing] medical

services, including ambulance services within KERN COUNTY.” (Doc. 7 at 5-6) Moreover, the

FAC alleges quite clearly that DeRosia, Mejia and Manuele were employed by the City of

Delano at the Delano Police Department. (Doc. 7 at 5) However, the FAC then veers off and

seems to allege inconsistently that the individuals and the City of Delano and its police

department are involved in a type of employment/agency relationship with the County of Kern. 

(Doc. 7 at 6) Similarly, the FAC alleges that each entity defendant and each individual defendant

Ironically, the City Council retains the authority to contract with ambulance services “to serve the residents

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of the city as convenience requires.” Cal. Gov. Code § 38794. Given this, Plaintiffs must contend, although they do not

allege, that the City Delano somehow delegated this authority to the County of Kern.

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is responsible for the actions of each other, including the action of hiring the individuals and,

therefore, implicitly for the policies that gave rise to the alleged wrongful acts. Id. 

Due to these inconsistencies, these allegations fail to give fair notice to all of the

defendants, but most notably to Kern, what wrongful acts are attributed to each. On the other

hand, if Plaintiffs believe that Kern is the employer of the individuals along with the Delano

entity, they must plead facts to support these conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

Based upon this significant ambiguity, the Court must DISMISS the FAC. However, the

Court will grant leave to amend.

VII. The liability of the County of Kern

A. The FAC fails to give fair notice of the wrongful acts attributed to Kern

The FAC initially seems to claim that Kern is being sued due to its role in “regulat[ing]

medical services, including ambulance services within KERN COUNTY.” (Doc. 7 at 5-6, ¶ 15)

The FAC clarifies that Kern “established criteria for the selection of qualified ambulance

providers to provide ambulance services within KERN COUNTY.” Id. Then the FAC states that

when medical services were requested by the officers at the scene of the shooting that,

KERN COUNTY dispatched medical personnel to the RESIDENCE. Plaintiffs

are informed, believe and based thereon allege, that defendant KERN COUNTY

or its agents took over twenty minutes to arrive at the scene of the shooting

despite being located within five (5) miles of the scene of the shooting. When

defendant KERN COUNTY or its agents arrived at the scene, Mr. Morales was

still alive. Mrs. Nunez and neighbors could hear Mr. Morales breathing and

making gurgling sounds as he was carried away. Mr. Morales was transported by

defendant KERN COUNTY or its agents to Delano Regional Medical Center

where he was pronounced dead at 1:10 a.m. on July 7, 2009.

Thus, in this portion of the FAC, Plaintiffs seem to allege that not only did Kern regulate and

select ambulance providers but it also dispatched and operated the ambulance that responded to

Morales. This is inconsistent with the earlier allegation and creates an ambiguity. Due to this the

Court will DISMISS the FAC with leave to amend.

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B. The failure to provide timely medical attention does not state a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

It is without dispute that a detainee who has been injured during a detention may state a

claim against the detaining agency for failure to provide him medical care. Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090,

1098-1099 (9 Cir. 2006). However, here, Morales was not in Kern’s custody nor was he injured th

by employees of Kern in affecting his detention. 

The law is clear that the government has no general duty to provide medical care to a

private citizen except in limited circumstances not alleged here. For example, in Penilla By &

Through Penilla, 115 F.3d 707, 709-711 (9 Cir. 1997), neighbors found the decedent on his th

front porch in medical distress and called 911. Id. The defendant-police officers arrived first and

found Penilla to be in grave condition. Id. Despite this, the officers broke into the decedent’s

home, dragged him inside, locked the door and left him there. Id. All of this occurred after they

cancelled the call to paramedics. Id.

In finding that the officers could be held liable for his death by failing to provide medical

care, Penilla relied heavily upon DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489

U.S. 189, 196 (1989). In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court held, “Consistent with

these principles, our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no

affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,

liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the

individual.” (Emphasis added.) The Court continued, “While the State may have been aware of

the dangers that [the victim] faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it

do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” Id. at 201.

Penilla clarified that a constitutional duty to provide medical care is not triggered solely

when the person is in custody. Penilla, at 710. However, this duty arises only if the state created

the danger or increased the level of danger through its action. Penilla held, “We have interpreted

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DeShaney to mean that if affirmative conduct on the part of a state actor places a plaintiff in

danger, and the officer acts in deliberate indifference to that plaintiff's safety, a claim arises under

§ 1983.” Id. The Court outlined the “critical distinction” between a situation that may impose

liability and one that would not, depends on whether the state’s action, rather than its inaction,

placed the person at risk. Id.

In Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 636-637 (9 Cir. 2007), the plaintiffs were th

injured at a Mardi Gras celebration. They asserted a § 1983 claim against the police department

for its deficient policies regarding “large crowd disturbances” that resulted in the “deprivation of

their liberty interest in personal security” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 637. In

the alternative, they argued that the police enhanced their danger and caused their injuries by

changing their enforcement plan to one that required a more passive presence and which was

limited to the perimeter of the crowd. Id.

In rejecting that the defendants owed a the plaintiffs a constitutional duty, the Court relied

upon DeShaney once again when it noted,

In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.

Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989), the Supreme Court held that “a State’s failure

to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a

violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 197. The Court reasoned as follows:

[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires

the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens

against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a

limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of

certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the

State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property

without “due process of law, “ but its language cannot fairly be

extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to

ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other

means.

Id. at 195.

(Emphasis added.) Johnson rejected also that the defendants enhanced the danger of the situation

when it changed its crowd control plan. Id. at 641. “The decision to switch from a more

aggressive operation plan to a more passive one was not affirmative conduct that placed the

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Pioneer Square Plaintiffs in danger, because it did not place them in any worse position than they

would have been in had the police not come up with any operational plan whatsoever.” 

Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claim. Id. at 635.

In Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1089-1090 (9 Cir. 2001), the decedent th

was involved in a car accident after which he left the scene and entered the Arizona desert. 

When police arrived, they noted blood in the decedent’s car. Id. At the time, they conducted

only a cursory search for the decedent. Id. Nearly three years later, the decedent’s remains were

located some distance from the collision scene. Id. 

The decedent’s estate sued because of the insufficient search efforts and asserted that they

violated the decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment “substantive due process rights to life, personal

security, and bodily integrity.” Estate of Amos, at 1090. In rejecting this claim, the Court held

that, “‘If the defendants deprived [Amos] of anything it was of some right to competent rescue

services. But ... there is no such right in the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. at 1091.

Here, the FAC alleges that Kern dispatched its personnel or a private ambulance service

to the scene of the shooting. By this time, Morales already lay “dying . . . on the floor.” (Doc. 7 3

at 8-9) Thus, the delay in arriving at the scene did not cause Morales’ medical condition nor did

it exacerbate it. Instead, Kern’s action merely failed to remedy his medical condition and

deprived him of “competent rescue services.” However, this is insufficient to state a

constitutional claim.

The allegations of the FAC that Kern should be held liable for improperly selecting the

ambulance service, likewise, will not impose constitutional liability. In Tobin v. Washington,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84358 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 2007), the state licensed and re-licensed a

home which allowed it to provide daycare services. Id. at *4-5. The home was located near a

The inference presented by the pleading is that the shooting occurred within the jurisdiction of the City of

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Delano. Thus, should they choose to continue to proceed against Kern, in any amended pleading, Plaintiffs should

address the fact that California Government Code § 38794 vests the authority to select the ambulance service provider

with the City Council of City of Delano, not with the County of Kern.

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lake, that could be seen from the front porch. Id. The licensing evaluator and re-evaluator were

aware of the lake and were aware that the home did not have a fence around the front yard,

although this was required by law. Subsequently, the plaintiffs placed their two-year-old child in

the home for daycare. Id. One day when the daycare provider’s attention was focused on other

children, the plaintiffs’ child left the home and went to the lake, where he drowned. Id.

The parents of the child sued and raised various legal theories including a claim under 42

USC § 1983. Tobin, at *5-6. They claimed that the daycare was a “state created danger” due to

its acts of licensing and re-licensing it despite that the home did not comply with the state law

that required a front yard fence. Id. at 15-16. In rejecting this argument, the Court held,

. . . there is no evidence that the state took an affirmative action which placed G.

M. T. in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which they found

him. The named Defendants did not require that G. M. T. attend Fish’s daycare.

The named Defendants did not take G. M. T. out of the custody of his parents and

place him in the daycare. The only action taken by the above named Defendants

was the decision to license and renew the license of the daycare which Plaintiffs

contend was not in compliance with state regulations governing fencing for

daycares. That action is simply not sufficient to prevail. See Ruiz v. McDonnell,

299 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2002). As was the case in Johnson and Ruiz, here there

was no affirmative state action: no involuntary exposure to harm as a result of a

state actor’s command. None of the state created danger theory cases, cited by

either party or that have been found to state a claim in the Ninth Circuit, include a

case where the state’s affirmative conduct was the licensing of a facility which

arguably was in violation of a regulation. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any

violation of their constitutional rights caused by the named Defendants’ actions

here.

Id. at 20-21. Thus, Kern’s act in “regulating” or “selecting” an ambulance provider, is

insufficient to impose a constitutional duty. On the other hand, the claim that the non-Kern

ambulance provider was an agent of Kern, likewise, does not state a claim under 42 USC § 1983

because there is no respondeat superior liability in constitutional litigation. Palmer v. Sanderson,

9 F.3d at 1437-1438; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 

Thus, for all of the these reasons, the Court finds that the complaint is vague and fails to

state a claim against the Kern. Therefore, the Court will DISMISS the FAC with leave to

amend.

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VIII. Conclusion

The Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC as to all defendants because it is vague and, as

such, it fails to state a cognizable claim. Moreover, the FAC fails to state a claim against the

County of Kern. Finally, the Delano Police Department is not amenable to suit. However, the

Court will grant Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the complaint to address the above

deficiencies. 

Plaintiffs are informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an

amended complaint supercedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiffs file an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and

2. Plaintiffs are GRANTED 14 days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint. The amended complaint must reference the docket number

assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a

recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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