Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_03-cv-00053/USCOURTS-ared-1_03-cv-00053-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

ADOLFO RAMIREZ

Plaintiff

VS. 

GENCORP, INC., doing business as

GDX Automotive

Defendant

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NO: 1:03CV00053 SWW

ORDER

Plaintiff Adolfo Ramirez (“Ramirez”) brings this employment discrimination lawsuit

pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

claiming that his former employer, GDX Automotive (“GDX”), terminated his employment

based on his national origin. Ramirez also alleges a supplemental breach of contract claim

pursuant to state law. 

Before the Court is GDX’s motion for summary judgment (docket entries #31, #32, #33),

Ramirez’s response (docket entries #36, #37, #38, #39), and GDX’s reply (docket entry #40). 

After careful consideration, and for the reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment

will be granted, and Ramirez’s contract claim will be dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

I. Background

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Unless stated otherwise, the following facts are undisputed. Ramirez, an Hispanic

American citizen, began working for GDX in January 1989 at a plant in Batesville, Arkansas,

where GDX manufactures automotive sealing systems for several automobile manufacturers. 

GDX terminated Ramirez’s employment in March 2003. During his fourteen years with GDX,

Ramirez received several promotions, and in 1994, he received a promotion to production

supervisor of GDX’s mixing and extrusion (M&E) department. During Ramirez’s tenure as a

production supervisor, Scott Conger (“Conger”), the M&E small business unit (“SBU”) manager

headed the M&E department, and Don Mills, the M&E area manager, served as Ramirez’s direct

supervisor. 

In January 2003, Conger became the operations manager for the entire Blytheville plant;

Mills replaced Conger as the M&E SBU manager; and Mills recommended Ramirez as his

replacement for the M&E area manager position. Conger promoted Ramirez to area manager,

and on January 7, 2003, Ramirez and Conger signed the following agreement:

Beginning January 2, 2003, GDX . . . is happy to offer you the position of a

Department Manager Extruding/mixing. 

In your new responsibility, you will be given a ninety (90) day evaluation period to

give both you and the Company the opportunity to determine if you want to remain

as Department Manager or return to your old position as Supervisor. At the end of

the 90 day period the Company will sit down with you to determine your desire and

success in your new position. At that time if your performance is at the acceptable

level for this position, a pay increase will be given. Your wage will increase to

$3,832.60 per month and paid in semi monthly payments as your current salary is

paid. This increase will be retroactive back to the beginning date of the promotion

which would be January 2, 2003. 

Your signature below signifies that you have read this agreement and understand and

agree to the terms set forth in it.

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Docket entry #31, Ex. A. 

GDX asserts that immediately after Ramirez’s promotion to area manager, his job

performance declined dramatically. According to affidavits submitted by Conger and Mills,

Ramirez fought with Mills about changes that Mills sought to implement in the M&E

department, and he sought to please his subordinates, who were his friends, instead of following

the direction of his supervisors. See docket entry #31, Exs. A, C. Ramirez claims that “the job

was getting done” but Conger and Mills wanted him to be a “hatchet person, terminating

employees for fraudulent reasons in violation of the union contract procedure.” Docket entry

#39, ¶ 30. According to Ramirez’s deposition testimony, he wanted to manage with positive

discipline, not threats and fear tactics, and his method of managing employees did not conform to

what Conger and Mills desired of him. Docket entry #36, Ex. D at 39-40. 

In mid February 2003, Ramirez concluded that he was not “cut out” for the area manager

position, and he told Mills that he wanted to return to his production supervisor position. 

According to Ramirez, Mills replied, “Amigo, you can do this job.” Docket entry #36, ¶ 48. 

It is undisputed that from 2001 to 2003, GDX suffered a decline in business, which

necessitated a substantial reduction in GDX’s workforce. In March 2003, Conger eliminated

several management positions, including Ramirez’s area manager position, because of continued

economic downturn. When Conger made the decision to eliminate the area manager position,

there were three production supervisor positions in the M&E department, occupied by employees

who were performing satisfactorily. Rather than return Ramirez to a production supervisor

position and displace an existing production supervisor, Conger terminated Ramirez’s

employment. 

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After his termination, Ramirez filed this lawsuit, claiming that GDX terminated his

employment based on his national origin, in violation of Title VII. Ramirez also claims that

GDX breached the January 7, 2003 agreement, in violation of state contract law, by refusing his

request to return a production supervisor position. 

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a moving party must

demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for

summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading but

must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at

587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a

dispute of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is

genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc.

v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995). 

III. Discussion

Wrongful Termination 

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This is not a case in which the decisionmaker’s statements are plainly related to the

specific decisional process at issue. See Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839 (8th Cir.

2002)(finding direct evidence race discrimination in compensation decision where vice president

stated he would not pay employee a certain amount because “he’s just a white guy”); Simmons v.

New Public School Dist. No. Eight, 251 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 2001)(finding direct evidence of

gender discriminatory in contract renewal decision when school board president stated “a woman

can’t handle” the job). 

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Ramirez contends that he has direct evidence that GDX terminated his employment based

on his national origin. Specifically, he claims that Mills made remarks that were disparaging to

Hispanics, which provide a “direct nexus” between his termination and national origin. 

Direct evidence of discrimination includes “conduct or statements by persons involved in

making the employment decision directly manifesting a discriminatory attitude, of a sufficient

quantum and gravity that would allow the factfinder to conclude that attitude more than likely not

was a motivating factor in the employment decision.’” E.E.O.C. v. Liberal R-II School Dist., 314

F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002)(quoting Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (8th

Cir. 2001)). Additionally, there must be evidence “showing a specific link between the

discriminatory animus and the challenged decision.” Id. (quoting Stacks v. Southwestern Bell

Yellow Pages, Inc., 996 F.2d 200, 202 n.1 (8thCir. 1993)). 

Ramirez claims that Mills called him “amigo” and, in a facetious way, asked him for his

green card. Ramirez provides no evidence indicating that Mills used the word “amigo”, the

Spanish word for friend, in a derogatory manner. Additionally, Ramirez provides no evidence

specifically linking Mills’ remarks to the decisional process that lead to his termination.1

 In fact,

the timing of Mills’ green card remarks indicates that they were not reflective of a discriminatory

attitude. In his deposition, Ramirez testified that the last time Mills asked him for his green card

occurred during a staff meeting when Mills served as area manager, before Mills recommended

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that Ramirez be promoted to the area manager position. See docket entry #36, Ex. D. at 34. 

Because Ramirez lacks evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive

for his termination, “he must avoid summary judgment by creating the requisite inference of

unlawful discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence

of pretext.” Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Under the three-stage order of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1972), Ramirez must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. If

Ramirez establishes a prima facie case, GDX must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating him. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir.

1996). Finally, the burden shifts back to Ramirez to show that the proffered reasons are

pretextual and that his national origin was the real reason for his termination. 

GDX asserts that Ramirez cannot prevail on his discrimination claim because, even if he

could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he is unable to establish a triable issue of

pretext. To make the showing of pretext necessary to survive summary judgment, Ramirez must

(1) discredit GDX’s asserted reasons for terminating him and (2) show that the circumstances

permit a reasonable inference that his national origin was the real reason for his termination. 

Johnson v. AT & T Corp., 2005 WL 2138808, at *5 (8th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005)(citation omitted).

GDX has articulated a legitimate reason for terminating Ramirez’s employment: a

reduction in force coupled with poor job performance. GDX maintains that Ramirez performed

poorly as an area manager, failed to support management’s goals, and refused to take directions

from Mills. According to GDX, Ramirez’s refusal to support company goals “weighted heavily

against retaining Ramirez as a supervisor during this critical period of business decline, in which

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cooperation with management and support for management goals, as opposed to conflict and

confrontation, was mandatory.” Docket entry #37, at 8. 

Ramirez does not dispute that his termination occurred as part of a reduction in force

necessitated by a business downturn, and he acknowledges that he disagreed with Mills’

instruction and declined to follow his lead. However, Ramirez defends his conduct by claiming

that he simply refused to act as Mills’ and Conger’s “hatchet man.” Ramirez maintains that

Mills’ and Conger’s business decisions and management styles were unsound, but he provides no

evidence indicating that the proffered reasons for his termination are pretended or unworthy of

credence. 

Ramirez asserts that it is obvious that GDX terminated him based on his national origin

for several reasons. First, Ramirez argues that he had more seniority and experience than the

production supervisors that GDX retained. However, he provides no evidence showing that he

was similarly situated to the production supervisors who remained employed after the March

2003 reduction in force. See Hesse v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 394 F.3d 624, 631 (8th Cir.

2005)(holding that plaintiff failed to meet her prima facie burden on discriminatory termination

and failure to recall claims because she presented no evidence that she was similarly situated to

male employees who were retained or recalled). In fact, Ramirez acknowledges that when GDX

selected him for termination, the existing production supervisors were performing their jobs

satisfactorily. See docket entry #39, ¶ 50. Additionally, although Ramirez disagrees with Mills’

and Conger’s assessment of his performance as area manager, he does not dispute that they 

regarded his performance unsatisfactory. 

Second, Ramirez points to Conger’s failure to promote him in 2002 as evidence that his

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termination was based on his national origin. In late 2001, Conger interviewed Ramirez for a

promotion to the position of Engineer I. According to Ramirez, Conger indicated to him that he

would receive the promotion, but he awarded the job to Robin Bowren, a Caucasian male. 

Conger states that he decided against promoting Ramirez in 2002 because, on December

9, 2001, Ramirez received disciplinary action for falsifying his time card. See docket entry #31,

Ex. A, ¶17; Ex. H. Ramirez denies that he falsified his time record. He claims that a disgruntled

employee, who he had disciplined, made a false report that he had misrepresented his time

worked. However, Ramirez offers no evidence showing that Conger’s stated reason for failing to

promote him in 2002 is pretext for discrimination. 

Third, Ramirez points to Mills’ “amigo” and green card remarks as evidence that Conger

terminated him because of his national origin. For the reasons previously stated, the Court

disagrees that Mills’ remarks, without more, permit a reasonable inference that discrimination

was the real motivation behind Ramirez’s termination. 

The Court concludes that Ramirez has failed to establish a triable issue of pretext and that

GDX is entitled to summary judgment. 

Breach of Contract 

Ramirez’s breach of contract claim is distinct from his discrimination claim. He

acknowledges that GDX made similar agreements with other employees it promoted, and he does

not claim that GDX’s alleged failure to adhere to the agreement amounts to evidence of

discrimination. Having dismissed Ramirez’s discrimination claim, the only claim over which the 

Court has original jurisdiction, the Court will dismiss his supplemental breach of contract claim, 

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

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IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (docket

entry #31) is GRANTED. Pursuant to the judgment entered together with this order, Plaintiff’s

claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to

state law are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 15th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2005.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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