Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00463/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Tony Lewis Ruff, II is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on April 18, 2016. Local Rule 302.

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff‟s complaint, filed April 4, 2016. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

TONY LEWIS RUFF, II,

 Plaintiff,

v.

FRIEDA ROBERTS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00463-SAB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF

[ECF No. 1]

Case 1:16-cv-00463-SAB Document 6 Filed 05/16/16 Page 1 of 6
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely 

consistent with‟ a defendant‟s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

While confined at Tehachapi State Prison, Plaintiff submitted three separate health care request 

forms, dated December 23, 2014, December 29, 2014, and January 9, 2015. Medical personnel 

charged Plaintiff a copayment fee of $5.00 per visit. However, it was established that if Plaintiff 

remained indigent for thirty days after the medical appointments then Plaintiff would not be charged 

the $5.00 copayment fee. Plaintiff was not reimbursed the $5.00 copayment fee for the December 23, 

2014 and December 29, 2014, appointments even though he was indigent. 

Plaintiff submitted a health care services request form #0868244, on December 23, 2014, and 

Plaintiff was subsequently seen on December 26, 2014, by medical charge and charged a $5.00 copayment fee. 

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Plaintiff submitted another health care services request form #0868342 on December 29, 2014, 

and Plaintiff was seen on December 31, 2014, by medical staff and charged a $5.00 co-payment fee. 

Plaintiff filed a health care inmate appeal to the first, second, and third levels of review. In the 

second level appeal response, it was noted that “at the time of the [co-payment fee] charge on 

03/05/2015, you were not indigent and were charged your copayment.” (ECF No. 1, Ex. C.) In the 

third level review it was also noted, “Your trust account contained sufficient funds to cover your visits 

by March 5, 2015, less than 30 days from the date of charge, in accordance with CCR, Title 15, 

Section 3354.2(c)(3).” (Id.) 

On March 4, 2015, Plaintiff‟s trust account had a balance of $0.15. (ECF No. 1, Ex. D.) 

However, on March 5, 2015, two separate payments of $100.00 and $50.00 were deposited to 

Plaintiff‟s trust account. (Id.) 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Claim-Copayment Fee for Health Care Visits

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, 

but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada 

ex rel. Nevada Sec‟y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant‟s actions or 

omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep‟t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 

F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff alleges a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which

protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Due process protections extend only to deprivations of protected 

interests,” Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Bd. of Regents of State 

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Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)), and prisoners have a protected property interest in the 

funds in their prison trust accounts, Shinault, 782 F.3d at 1057 (citing Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 

1523 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable 

under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. 

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982)); Quick, 754 F.2d at 1524, “[a]n unauthorized 

intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the 

procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful 

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

Pursuant to Title 15 state prison regulations, “[i]nmates shall be charged and inmates shall pay 

a fee of five dollars ($5.00) for each inmate-initiated health care visit.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 

§3354.2(c). This fee is “charged to the trust account of the inmate,” but “[w]hen the inmate is without 

sufficient funds at the time for the charge, and remains without sufficient funds for 30 days after this 

time, the inmate shall not be charged for any remaining balance of the fee.” Tit. 15, § 3354.2(c)(3). 

In this case, Plaintiff is challenging not state-authorized deductions for $5.00 medical copayments incurred by non-indigent inmates, but the deductions made to his trust account in the 

violation of the state-authorized process articulated in prison regulations. Nevada Dep‟t of Corr. v. 

Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 

2003)); Gardner v. Wilson, 959 F.Supp. 1224, 1229 (C.D.Cal. 1997). Plaintiff alleges that the $5.00 

copayment obligation for his December 23, 2014 and December 29, 2014, medical visits expired thirty 

days later, during which period of time he was indigent, and the fee was wrongfully deducted from his 

account more than thirty days later, at which time he had funds. In both instances, the assessment of 

costs against his trust account was allegedly in violation of the prison regulations setting forth the 

processes for fee assessment. Tit. 15, §§ 3138(h)(3), 3354.2. 

A state agency “violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it 

prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property „[w]ithout underlying [statutory] authority and 

competent procedural protections.‟” Greene, 648 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Vance, 345 F.3d at 1090). 

Here, the trust account deductions forming the basis for Plaintiff‟s procedural due process claim were 

not authorized by the state; they were allegedly imposed by staff in direct contravention of the state‟s 

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procedures governing such deductions, and therefore, they are not redressable under the federal Due 

Process Clause. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (“The state can no more anticipate and control in advance 

the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar 

negligence conduct,” and such a deprivation “does not constitute a violation of the procedural 

requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if” the state “provides a 

suitable postdeprivation remedy.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable federal due process violation.

B. Deliberate Indifference-Copayment for Medical Services

To the extent Plaintiff contends that the requirement of the $5.00 copayment fee for medical 

services constitutes deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, such claim fails on the merits. 

Charging inmates a co-pay for medical care does not violation the Constitution where medical 

care is not denied. See Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm‟rs, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 

1985) ($3.00 co-pay fee for prisoners cannot be construed as deliberate indifference to inmates‟ 

medical needs); see also Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Gardner v. 

Wilson, 959 F.Supp. 1224, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ($5.00 co-pay does not amount to deliberate 

indifference to inmates‟ medical needs); Bihms v. Klevenhagen, 928 F.Supp. 717, 718 (D. Tex. 1996) 

(state may require inmate to pay toward his medical care); Martin v. Debruyn, 880 F.Supp. 610, 614 

(N.D. Ind. 1995) (“Nothing in the Eighth Amendment ... requires a state to provide an inmate, free of 

charge, with a necessary commodity that would not be free outside the prison walls and which the 

inmate has the legal means to obtain.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment violation based on the requirement of the co-payment fee deduced from his trust account.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s complaint fails to state any claims for relief under section 1983. Based on the nature

of the deficiencies, leave to amend would be futile. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 

2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The bases for Plaintiff‟s claims are clear,

but his constitutional rights were not violated by the events at issue and section 1983 provides no 

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redress for prison officials‟ mere violation of state prison regulations. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 

F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal 

constitutional right); Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (section 1983 

creates cause of action for violation of federal law); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 

370-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal and state law claims should not be conflated; to the extent the violation 

of a state law amounts to a deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed 

by the federal Constitution, section 1983 offers no redress) (quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, this action is HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to 

state a claim under section 1983, and the Clerk‟s Office shall enter judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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