Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05177/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05177-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 2010 Decided May 18, 2010

No. 09-5177

MICHAEL A. DIAMEN, ALSO KNOWN AS

SALVATORE INFANTOLINO,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00-cv-3045-RMC)

Patrick Michael Regan argued the cause for the appellant.

Paul J. Cornoni and John K. Zwerling were on brief. Andrew B.

Weissman made an appearance.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Roy W. McLeese III and Carolyn K.

Kolben, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Salvatore

Infantolino a/k/a Michael A. Diamen served twenty years in

prison on a 1976 murder conviction. Diamen and two codefendants—Joseph Wayne Eastridge and Joseph N.

Sousa—sought habeas corpus relief in the district court on the

ground they had been wrongly convicted. The district court

issued a writ for Eastridge and Sousa but not for Diamen who

had died while the action was pending. Diamen’s estate

(Estate), along with Eastridge and Sousa, then moved for a

“certificate of innocence” in order to pursue a damages claim in

the Court of Federal Claims for unjust conviction and

imprisonment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1495. The district court

granted the motion as to Eastridge and Sousa but denied it as to

Diamen because his conviction had not “been reversed or set

aside,” a prerequisite to obtaining a certificate of innocence

under section 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1). The Estate appealed. We

affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I.

In 1976, Diamen, along with three other members of the

“Pagans” gang— Eastridge, Sousa and Stephen C. Jones—was

convicted in the District of Columbia Superior Court of the first

degree murder while armed of Johnnie Battle in northwest

Washington, D.C. Diamen, like Eastridge and Sousa, was

sentenced to twenty years to life in prison. In December 2000,

after unsuccessful appeals and motions for post-conviction relief

in superior court, Diamen, Eastridge and Sousa petitioned the

district court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

At the time, Eastridge was still incarcerated and Diamen and

Sousa had been released on parole. Diamen was arrested again

in August 2002, on a charge of possession of a firearm by a

felon, and was again incarcerated. He died in prison in

December 2002. 

In May 2005, following an evidentiary hearing, the district

court granted the habeas petition as to Eastridge and Sousa,

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finding that (1) “[b]ased on the full record, no reasonable juror

would now find Petitioners guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”1

and (2) in addition to “their ‘actual innocence’ of the crime

charged,” the petitioners “c[ould] prove . . . violations of their

constitutional rights at trial.”2 Eastridge v. United States, 372 F.

Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2005) (Eastridge I); see Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (habeas petitioner must “show that a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent”) (internal quotation omitted).

Regarding Diamen, the court noted that “[p]resumably, the same

analysis would apply” but he had died during the proceeding

and, “[a]s a result, the habeas record and briefs do not focus on

him.” Eastridge I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 29 n.3. The court vacated

Eastridge’s and Sousa’s convictions on July 15, 2005. 

In April 2008, Eastridge, Sousa and the Estate moved for a

certificate of innocence “in order to proceed with wrongful

conviction claims before [t]he Court of Federal Claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495; 2513.” Mem. of Points and Authorities

in Supp. of Pet’rs’ Mot. for Certificate of Innocence at 1,

Eastridge v. United States, C.A. No. 00-3045 (D.D.C. Apr. 17,

2008). In an opinion dated March 12, 2009, the district court

concluded the petition should be granted as to Eastridge and

Sousa because they had “demonstrated that they were actually

innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted,” 

1

The court found that new evidence (including testimony

recantation) showed that the petitioners were not involved in the

murder itself but only picked up Jones, who had participated in the

murder, after the fact. See Eastridge v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d

26, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2005) (Eastridge I).

2

The constitutional violations involved their Sixth Amendment

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and their Fifth

Amendment right to due process (for withholding exculpatory grand

jury testimony). Eastridge I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 57-60.

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Eastridge v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73 (D.D.C.

2009) (Eastridge II). As to Diamen, however, the court agreed

with the government’s position that “it did not formally

adjudicate Mr. Diamen’s innocence and it cannot, therefore,

issue a Certificate of Innocence to his Estate.” Id. at 68. 

The Estate filed a timely notice of appeal on May 11, 2009.

II.

We ordinarily review the district court’s denial of a

certificate of innocence for abuse of discretion. Rigsbee v. United

States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (“Whether to issue such

a certificate is committed to the discretion of the presiding

judge.”); accord Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278 (7th Cir.

1993). Here, however, because the court’s interpretation of

section 2513 presents a purely legal issue—whether section 2513

requires a conviction to have been set aside before a certificate of

innocence may be granted—we review the interpretation de novo.

Cf. United States v. Hall, 324 F.3d 720, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(although court ordinarily reviews order granting new trial for

abuse of discretion, “purely legal question” is reviewed de novo).

Applying this standard, we conclude the district court did not err

when it denied the Estate’s motion for a certificate of innocence

because it had not adjudicated Diamen’s innocence in the habeas

proceeding, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 68.

On its face, section 2513 requires that a “person suing under

section 1495 . . . must allege and prove” two “requisite facts . . .

by a certificate of the court or pardon wherein such facts are

alleged to appear,” namely, (1) that “[h]is conviction has been

reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the

offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing

he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the

record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such

conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground

of innocence and unjust conviction,” 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1); and

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(2) that he “did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts,

deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no

offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the

District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect

cause or bring about his own prosecution,” id. § 2513(a)(2). We

addressed these prerequisites to certification in Rigsbee, supra.

The claimant in Rigsbee was convicted of murder and assault

with a deadly weapon but on appeal was granted a new trial at

which the jury acquitted him of both counts, thereby establishing

the statute’s first requisite fact. Based on the second verdict, the

defendant applied to the district court for a certificate of

innocence. The district court, however, denied the application

based on its own “finding as a fact that defendant’s admitted acts

in connection with the charge constituted offenses against the

United States and the District of Columbia,” 204 F.2d at 71. On

appeal, we concluded that in so finding, the district court did not

abuse its discretion and we therefore upheld its denial of the

application. See id. at 72 (“Where, as here, [the judge] has

exercised [his] discretion, we cannot require him to stultify

himself by certifying an opinion contrary to his real

conviction—no matter what our own view might be—except,

perhaps, in a case in which the refusal to certify innocence was

completely capricious and without rational basis.”). We made

clear there that a certificate of innocence may issue only upon a

finding that both of the statute’s “requisite facts” exist; neither

one by itself suffices. See id. (“Not only must the plaintiff show

in the Court of Claims that he was acquitted; he must also show

that the trial judge thought he did not commit the acts charged or

that, if he did, his acts were justifiable and so not criminal.”). 

In this case, the court found that the first requisite fact was

absent. Although the district judge observed in the habeas

proceeding that “[p]resumably, the same analysis would apply”

to Diamen as led her to set aside the convictions of Eastridge and

Sousa, Eastridge I, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 29 n.3 (emphasis added),

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she did not issue a habeas corpus writ setting aside Diamen’s

conviction. The judge was therefore unable in the subsequent

section 2513 proceeding to certify the statute’s first requisite

fact—that Diamen’s conviction “ha[d] been reversed or set

aside”—for the simple reason that it had not been.3 The Estate

was therefore not entitled to a certificate of innocence,

notwithstanding Diamen might well have obtained one himself

were he still living.

The Estate argues that the district court “failed to recognize

that it had the authority to reverse Appellant’s conviction even

though it lacked the authority to do so in the habeas proceeding”

and, specifically, that it erred in “refus[ing] to set aside

Appellant’s conviction and adjudicate Appellant’s innocence in

a non-habeas context—that is, Appellant’s Motion for Certificate

of Innocence.” Reply Br. 6. The Estate, however, identifies no

source of jurisdiction to set aside a conviction in the section 2513

certification proceeding. Although the Estate claims the court has

jurisdiction to do so in the course of the “investigation implicit in

§ 2513’s requirements,” Appellant’s Opening Br. 20, section

2513(a)(1) on its face authorizes the court only to certify that the

conviction already “has been reversed or set aside” (emphasis

added), not to proceed to set it aside in the certification

proceeding itself. 

The Estate also argues it is unreasonable and unfair to deny

Diamen’s surviving family the relief under section 1495 to which

Diamen himself might be entitled—but this is the effect of

section 2513(a)(1)’s plain language. In fact, the statutory

language generally contemplates a remedy personal to the

individual wrongfully convicted rather than one available to his

heirs suing on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) (“Any

person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and

3

Because the court found the first fact absent, it did not make a

finding as to the second. 

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prove that: (1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside

. . . and (2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts,

deeds, or omissions . . . constituted no offense against the United

States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he

did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own

prosecution.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1495 (“The

United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to

render judgment upon any claim for damages by any person

unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and

imprisoned.”) (emphasis added). To so limit relief was “within

legislative competence, since waiver of sovereign immunity from

suit is a matter of grace which the Congress may condition as it

chooses.” Rigsbee, 204 F.2d at 72.

Because the district court correctly applied the statute as

written, it did not err in denying the Estate’s motion for a

certificate of innocence. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s judgment. 

So ordered.

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