Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08011/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Patricia Nance, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc.; Toyota

Motor Corp.; Takata Corp., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-13-8011-PCT-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 74), plaintiffs’

response (doc. 76), and defendants’ reply (doc. 79).

I.

This is a products liability action arising out of a single vehicle rollover crash that

occurred on September 19, 2010 in Coconino County, Arizona. Decedent Kevin Nance was

driving a 1999 Toyota 4Runner southbound on Forest Service Highway 505 outside of

Flagstaff. He lost control of his vehicle, causing the vehicle to roll multiple times. Although

he stayed strapped into his seatbelt, at some point during the crash, decedent’s head struck

the ground, possibly through the sun roof, causing severe head trauma, resulting in his death.

There were no eyewitnesses to the crash.

Plaintiffs, decedent’s statutory beneficiaries, filed this action under Arizona’s

Case 3:13-cv-08011-FJM Document 83 Filed 09/22/14 Page 1 of 6
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wrongful death statute, asserting claims for strict products liability, negligence, breach of

warranty, and punitive damages. On December 30, 2013, we denied plaintiffs’ motion to

amend the Rule 16 scheduling order to extend the time for plaintiffs to disclose their expert

witnesses. (Doc. 40). We held that plaintiffs failed to show either good cause or excusable

neglect to excuse the untimely filing. Because plaintiffs did not timely disclose an expert,

they may not use an expert in their case-in-chief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment arguing that all of plaintiffs’

claims fail as a matter of law. 

II.

Defendants first argue that because plaintiffs have no expert for their case-in-chief,

they cannot prove their strict products liability or negligence claims. A manufacturer is

strictly liable for injuries caused by the use of any product that was in a “defective condition

unreasonably dangerous.” Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 244, 709 P.2d 876, 878

(1985) (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A (1965)). Therefore, to prevail on their

claim for strict products liability, plaintiffs “must show the product was in a defective

condition that made it unreasonably dangerous, the defective condition existed when the

product left the defendant’s control, and the defective condition proximately caused the

plaintiffs’ injuries.” State Farm Ins. Co. v. Premier Manufactured Sys. Inc., 213 Ariz. 419,

426, 142 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Ct. App. 2006). 

Similarly, plaintiffs’ negligence claim requires proof that the product was in a

defective condition and unreasonably dangerous. Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23

Ariz. App. 409, 411, 533 P.2d 717, 719 (Ct. App. 1975). Plaintiffs must also show that

defendants failed to use reasonable care in the design of their product, and the negligence

proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Id.; Golonka v. General Motors Corp., 204 Ariz. 575,

581, 65 P.3d 956, 962 (Ct. App. 2003).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot prove their claims for strict products liability

and negligence because they have no evidence that the seatbelt was in a defective,

unreasonably dangerous condition. They argue that expert testimony is required to show

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defect and causation, and because plaintiffs have no expert, they cannot prove their claims.

Arizona courts have developed two tests to determine whether a product was in a

defective condition and unreasonably dangerous—the “consumer expectation test” and the

“risk/benefit analysis” test. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244-45, 709 P.2d at 878-79. Under the

consumer expectation test, a plaintiff must show that the product “failed to perform as safely

as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonable manner.” Id.

at 245, 709 P.2d at 879. “No expert testimony is necessary to establish a design defect under

the consumer expectation test because the test focuses on the safety expectations of an

ordinary consumer rather than those of an expert.” Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc.,

796 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010 (D. Ariz. 2011) (quotation omitted); Martinez v. Terex Corp.,

241 F.R.D. 631, 641 (D. Ariz. 2007); Dietz v. Waller, 141 Ariz. 107, 110, 685 P.2d 744, 747

(1984) (holding that plaintiffs “must be permitted to rely upon circumstantial evidence alone

in strict liability cases”).

The consumer expectation test has limited application in design defect cases where

“the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the

product could be made.” Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244, 709 P.2d at 878. In such cases, “courts

additionally or alternatively employ the risk/benefit analysis to determine whether a design

is defective and unreasonably dangerous.” Golonka, 204 Ariz. at 581, 65 P.3d at 962. 

Under a risk/benefit analysis, a plaintiff must prove, in light of relevant factors,

whether “the benefits of [a] challenged design . . . outweigh the risk of danger inherent in

[the] design.” Id. (alterations in original, citation omitted). If the benefits do not outweigh

the risks, the design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id.

Defendants contend that the design and performance of a seatbelt system in the

context of a rollover crash is highly technical and not within the understanding of an ordinary

consumer. Therefore, defendants argue that only the risk/benefit analysis is applicable in this

case. Motion at 9. We disagree.

If the facts are such that a “consumer may form an expectation” about how safe a

product could be made, the consumer expectations test applies. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 246, 709

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P.2d at 880. In other words, the consumer expectation test is applicable where “the ordinary

consumer, through the use of a product, has developed an expectation regarding the

performance safety of the product.” Long, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (quoting Brethauer v.

General Motors Corp., 221 Ariz. 192, 198, 211 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Ct. App. 2010)). 

In Arizona, the consumer expectation test applies to claims that seatbelts were

defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous when they failed to restrain belted

passengers. In Brethauer, the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that “a seat belt is a

familiar product whose basic function is well understood by the general population.” 221

Ariz. at 200, 211 P.3d at 1184. “[M]ost consumers use seatbelts daily and are familiar with

their single, safety-related function: keeping belted passengers restrained within a vehicle.”

Id. By their daily use of seatbelts, ordinary consumers have developed an expectation

regarding the safety performance of seatbelts. Therefore, the consumer expectations test

applies in this case. It is for the jury to decide whether ordinary consumers expect that

properly functioning seatbelts will keep a passenger’s head inside a vehicle during a rollover

crash.

We reject defendants’ argument that this case is distinguishable from Brethauer and

Long because the passengers in those cases were fully ejected from the vehicles, whereas

here only decedent’s head hit the pavement. Defendants describe the relevant inquiry as

“how much occupant excursion is permissible for a properly functioning seat belt during a

high speed, severe, rollover crash.” Reply at 3. Regardless of whether the facts involve full

or partial ejection, however, most consumers expect that a seatbelt’s “single, safety-related

function,” is to “keep[] belted passengers restrained within a vehicle.” Brethauer, 221 Ariz.

at 200, 211 P.3d at 1184. Ordinary consumers could reasonably expect that a seatbelt should

restrain a passenger’s body within the confines of the vehicle. 

Similarly, plaintiffs can prove causation under either strict liability or negligence by

showing that decedent’s head trauma resulted from a defect in the design of the seatbelt,

which allowed his head to protrude outside an opening in the vehicle. The proximate cause

of an injury is defined as “that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any

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efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the injury would not have

occurred.” Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546, 789 P.2d 1040,

1047 (1990). A defect causes an injury if it helps produce the injury, and if the injury would

not have happened without the defect. A plaintiff “need only present probable facts from

which the causal relationship may be inferred. Id. 

Citing a medical malpractice case, defendants contend that plaintiffs need expert

testimony to establish causation. See Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists

Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528, 269 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2012). But there is no requirement under

Arizona law that expert testimony be given in a products liability action. Dietz, 141 Ariz.

at 110, 685 P.2d at 747. Instead, a jury could reasonably infer in this case that a design

defect in the seatbelt proximately caused decedent’s injuries. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ strict products liability and

negligence claims is denied.

III.

Defendants also seek summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express and

implied warranties. Plaintiffs claim that defendants expressly and impliedly warranted to

each buyer and user that the vehicle was reasonably fit and safe for its intended purpose, and

that the vehicle was of merchantable quality. Defendants contend that they are entitled to

summary judgment because plaintiffs have failed to show either an express warranty or

privity between decedent and defendants. 

Under Arizona law, privity of contract is required to maintain an action for breach of

an implied warranty. Chaurasia v. General Motors Corp., 212 Ariz. 18, 24, 126 P.3d 165,

171 (Ct. App. 2006). Purchasers who buy vehicles from dealerships and other third parties

are not in privity of contract with manufacturers. Id. Plaintiffs have made no effort to

establish either that decedent bought the vehicle from defendants, or that there was otherwise

privity between decedent and defendants. Nor do plaintiffs attempt to identify an express

warranty that applies to the subject vehicle. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to support their

claims for breach of warranties. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’

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breach of warranty claims is granted.

IV.

Plaintiffs concede they have no evidence to support their punitive damages claim.

Reply at 11; Plfs’ Resp. to Def’s SOF ¶ 18 (doc. 77 at 9). Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the claim for punitive damages is granted.

V.

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART defendants’

motion for summary judgment (doc. 74). Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ claims

for breach of express and implied warranties and for punitive damages. Summary judgment

is denied on plaintiffs’ claims for strict products liability and negligence.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2014.

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