Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06326/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

KENNETH E • HALL I JR. I 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

HENRY BELLMON, Governor; ROBERT 

HENRY, Attorney General; GARY 

MAYNARD; STEVEN KAISER; CAPTAIN 

E. SMITH; SGT. B. JONES; BUDDY 

HONAKER; TWO UNNAMED GUARDS 1 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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FILED 

United States Court ot Appeals. 

Tenth circuit 

JVN C 31991i 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6326 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-133-T) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Kenneth E. Hall, Jr., prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Karin M. Kriz, 

Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for defendants-appellees. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-6326 Document: 01019297908 Date Filed: 06/03/1991 Page: 1 
Pro se plaintiff Kenneth E. Hall, Jr. appeals the district 

court's dismissal of his claim that the policies and procedures of 

the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC), as well as 

the actions of LARC employees, violated his First Amendment right 

to free exercise of religion. He contends that the district court 

applied the wrong legal standards in dismissing his case, 

improperly relied on evidence not in the pleadings, and failed to 

give proper notice and opportunity for discovery. 1 

I 

Because all are relevant to our discussion of the issues, we 

summarize here the procedure and law applicable to the three most 

common pretrial points at which a district court may dispose of a 

pro se complaint. 

A 

First, if the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a 

court "may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is 

untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d). A§ 1915(d) dismissal may be sua 

sponte when "on the face of the complaint it clearly appears that 

the action is frivolous or malicious." Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 

F.2d 852, 854 (lOth Cir. 1981); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

u.s. 319, 324 (1989). 2 The term "frivolous" refers to "the 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 The court may dismiss pursuant to§ 1915(d), even if defendants 

have sought dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6). Tavlor v. Wallace, No. 

90-7000, slip op. at 3 (lOth Cir. Apr. 30, 1991). 

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inarguable legal conclusion" and "the fanciful factual allegation." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. The purpose of§ 1915(d) is "to 

discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private 

resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally 

do not initiate " Id. at 327. 

In contrast to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which authorizes 

dismissal whenever a complaint fails to state a claim on which 

relief can be granted "without regard to whether [the claim] is 

based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately 

unavailing one," § 1915(d) authorizes dismissal of "a claim based 

on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke, 490 u.s. at 

327. "(W]henever a plaintiff states an arguable claim for relief, 

dismissal for frivolousness under § 1915(d) is improper, even if 

the legal basis underlying the claim ultimately proves incorrect." 

McKinney v. Oklahoma, No. 90-6282, slip op. at 3 (lOth Cir. 

Feb. 8, 1991) (emphasis in original) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 

328). Examples of claims based on inarguable legal theories 

include those against which the defendants are undeniably immune 

from suit and those alleging an infringement of a legal interest 

that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 u.s. at 327. 

Section 1915(d) also gives the district court "the unusual 

power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations 

and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly 

baseless." Id. Clearly baseless factual allegations are those 

that are "fantastic" or "delusional." Id. at 327-28. The concern 

that pro se litigants have notice and opportunity to avoid 

dismissal of their legitimate claims by amending and supporting 

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their pleadings militates against equating § 1915(d) and Rule 

12(b)(6) standards, id. at 329-30; that same concern forbids 

equating § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment 

standards. A plausible factual allegation, even if it lacks 

evidentiary support, is not "frivolous" as contemplated by 

§ 1915(d), even though it may not survive a motion for summary 

judgment. 

When the pro se plaintiff is a prisoner, a court-authorized 

investigation and report by prison officials (referred to as a 

Martinez report) is not only proper, but may be necessary to 

develop a record sufficient to ascertain whether there are any 

factual or legal bases for the prisoner's claims. Martinez v. 

Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 318-19 (lOth Cir. 1978); see also Gee v. 

Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1007 (lOth Cir. 1987). Telephone 

evidentiary hearings before a judge or magistrate may serve the 

same purpose as a Martinez report. Gee, 829 F.2d at 1008. 

Although a court may consider the Martinez report in dismissing a 

claim pursuant to§ 1915(d), id. at 1007, it cannot resolve material disputed factual issues by accepting the report's factual 

findings when they are in conflict with pleadings or affidavits. 

Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285, 287 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1990); El'Amin v. 

Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 832 (lOth Cir. 1984); Sampley v. Ruettgers, 

704 F.2d 491, 493 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1983). A bona fide factual 

dispute exists even when the plaintiff's factual allegations that 

are in conflict with the Martinez report are less specific or 

well-documented than those contained in the report. Because pro 

se litigants may be unfamiliar with the requirements to sustain a 

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cause of action, they should be provided an opportunity to 

controvert the facts set out in the Martinez report. 

B 

Second, the court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 

entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 

(1957) (footnote omitted); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 

(lOth Cir. 1988); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 

1148 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989). A court 

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of 

plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 

u.s. 232, 236 (1974); Meade, 841 F.2d at 1526; Morgan v. City of 

Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (lOth Cir. 1986). If matters outside 

the pleadings are considered by the court, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Reed, 893 

F.2d at 287 n.2. Although dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) 

typically follow a motion to dismiss, giving plaintiff notice and 

opportunity to amend his complaint, a court may dismiss sua sponte 

"when it is 'patently obvious' that the plaintiff could not 

prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to 

amend his complaint would be futile." McKinney, slip op. at 4 

(citations omitted). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6326 Document: 01019297908 Date Filed: 06/03/1991 Page: 5 
A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally 

and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 u.s. 519, 520-21 

(1972); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); 

Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (lOth Cir. 1989). We 

believe that this rule means that if the court can reasonably read 

the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could 

prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite 

proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, 

his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity 

with pleading requirements. 3 At the same time, we do not believe 

it is the proper function of the district court to assume the role 

of advocate for the pro se litigant. 

The broad reading of the plaintiff's complaint does not 

relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts 

on which a recognized legal claim could be based. Not every fact 

must be described in specific detail, Conley, 355 u.s. at 47, and 

the plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a 

claim but are missing some important element that may not have 

occurred to him, should be allowed to amend his complaint, 

Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126-27 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

3 The Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se 

litigant, including § 1915(d) and summary judgment proceedings. 

See, ~, Reed, 893 F.2d at 286 (liberally construing pleadings 

dismissed under§ 1915(d)); Overton v. United States, No. 90-2084, 

slip op. at 2 (lOth Cir. Feb. 12, 1990) (liberally construing pro 

se pleadings in review of summary judgment). In addition, prose 

litigants are to be given reasonable opportunity to remedy the 

defects in their pleadings. See, ~' Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 

907 F.2d 124, 126 (lOth Cir. 1990); Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 

F.2d 1138, 1140 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6326 Document: 01019297908 Date Filed: 06/03/1991 Page: 6 
Nevertheless, conclusory allegations without supporting factual 

averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be 

based. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 871 (1990); Sooner Products Co. v. McBride, 708 

F.2d 510, 512 (lOth Cir. 1983); Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 

1303 (lOth Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds sub nom, Garcia 

v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (lOth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 u.s. 261 

(1985); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (lOth Cir. 1981); 

Lorraine v. United States, 444 F.2d 1, 2 (lOth Cir. 1971). This 

is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he 

must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he 

makes out a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, in 

analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, the court 

need accept as true only the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual 

contentions, not his conclusory allegations. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 

1190 (quoting Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (lOth Cir. 

1984)). 

c 

Third, the court may grant swmnary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). A motion for swmnary judgment that is supported by affidavits or other materials provided under oath gives the adverse 

party notice that swmnary judgment is possible; the adverse party 

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Appellate Case: 90-6326 Document: 01019297908 Date Filed: 06/03/1991 Page: 7 
must respond with affidavits or other evidence to show a genuine 

issue of material fact. Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 

1139 (lOth Cir. 1985). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) is treated as a motion for summary judgment when premised 

on materials outside the pleadings, and the opposing party is afforded the same notice and opportunity to respond as provided in 

Rule 56. 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Reed, 893 F.2d at 287 n.2. "The 

provisions of Rule 56(c) for notice to the opposing party and an 

opportunity for him to serve opposing affidavits are mandatory. 

Noncompliance therewith deprives the court of authority to grant 

summary judgment." Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 

550 F.2d 1255, 1257 (lOth Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, "'[d]istrict courts must take care to insure that pro 

se litigants are provided with proper notice regarding the complex 

procedural issues involved in summary judgment proceedings.'" 

Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1140 (quoting Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 

439 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 

310 (4th Cir. 1975) (pro se plaintiff should "be advised of his 

right to file counter-affidavits or other responsive material and 

alerted to the fact that his failure to so respond might result in 

the entry of summary judgment against him"). 

4 We will treat a dismissal as proper under Rule 12(b) even when 

the district court does not exclude materials outside the pleadings if the court does not refer to or rely on the outside materials in its order and if, as a matter of law, the complaint is 

insufficient. Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Bryan 

County, 676 F.2d 1338, 1340 (lOth Cir. 1982); Torres v. First 

State Bank of Sierra County, 550 F.2d 1255, 1257 (lOth Cir. 1977). 

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Material factual disputes cannot be resolved at summary judgment based on conflicting affidavits. 5 See, ~' Sampley, 704 

F.2d at 496. To come within the protection of this rule, however, 

the nonmovant's affidavits must be based upon personal knowledge 

and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence; 

conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 

1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989). Likewise, only material factual 

disputes preclude summary judgment; factual disputes about immaterial items are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Affidavits or other evidence offered by 

a nonmovant must create a genuine issue for trial; viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, it is not 

enough that the evidence be "merely colorable" or anything short 

of "significantly probative." Id. at 249-50. This is because 

when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is 'no genuine 

issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 u.s. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 u.s. 253, 289 (1968)). 

A Martinez report is treated like an affidavit, and the court 

is not authorized to accept the factual findings of the prison 

investigation when the plaintiff has presented conflicting 

5 A movant is not always required to come forward with affidavits 

or other evidence to obtain summary judgment; once the movant 

points out an absence of proof on an essential element of the 

nonmovant's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to provide 

evidence to the contrary. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 

322-23 ( 1986). 

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evidence. See Sampley, 704 F.2d at 493 n.3. The plaintiff's 

complaint may also be treated as an affidavit if it alleges facts 

based on the plaintiff's personal knowledge and has been sworn 

under penalty of perjury. Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1139 n.l (citing, 

inter alia, Gordon v. Watson,, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980) 

("In certain circumstances a verified pleading may itself be 

treated as an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment, but only if it satisfies the standards for affidavits set 

out in Rule 56(e)."). 

II 

In the instant case, plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleges 

three separate violations of his First Amendment right to free 

exercise of religion while an inmate at LARC, in that LARC officials (1) confiscated his medicine bag and talisman, which are 

used in the practice of his Native American religion; 

(2) improperly destroyed the medicine bag and talisman; and 

(3) cut his hair, without giving him an opportunity to apply for 

an exemption, in violation of his religious beliefs. 

In a thorough memorandum opinion, the district court 

considered and dismissed each of plaintiff's claims pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff contends that the district 

court improperly dismissed his complaint as frivolous under 

§ 1915(d). Although the court did say that it had "also reviewed 

the complaint under 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d)," R. tab 52 at 2-3 

(emphasis added), it never characterized plaintiff's claims as 

frivolous. The only plausible reading of the district court's 

opinion is that the court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure 

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to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

A 

Plaintiff argues that his claim regarding confiscation of his 

religious items should not have been dismissed because the court 

considered and referred to the Martinez report. 6 As noted above, 

when the court does not exclude materials outside the pleadings, a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as one for summary judgment and 

the plaintiff must be given notice and the opportunity to respond 

with affidavits or similar evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Reed, 

893 F.2d at 287 n.2. Here, plaintiff was not provided with the 

notice and opportunity to respond required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

We hold, however, that in particular circumstances the 

Martinez report may be considered part of the pleadings for 

purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). A written document that is 

attached to the complaint as an exhibit is considered part of the 

complaint and may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Chester County Intermediate Unit v. 

Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990); Morton 

v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986); Sullivan v. United 

States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986); Quiller v. Barclays 

Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. 

6 The court requested LARC officials to investigate plaintiff's 

claims and prepare a Martinez report. The court found the 

original report, which was filed with defendants' brief in support 

of their motion to dismiss, R. tab 35, to be deficient in certain 

respects and ordered defendants to prepare a supplemental report, 

R. tab 41 at 3 and 4. The supplemental report was filed with 

defendants' supplemental brief in support of their motion to 

dismiss. R. tabs 44, 45. The court referred to both reports in 

its Memorandum Opinion of September 28, 1990. R. tab 52. The 

term "Martinez report" is used here to mean both reports taken 

together. 

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denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall 

of Tempe, 583 F.2d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1978). One circuit 

court, however, has held that affidavits, in contrast to other 

written documents attached to the complaint, may not be considered 

in dismissing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rose v. Bartle, 871 

F.2d 331, 339-40 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); contra Schnell v. City of 

Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that affidavits attached to the complaint are part thereof). The 

Martinez report is often treated like an affidavit. See, ~' 

Sampley, 704 F.2d at 493 n.3. Further, here the Martinez report 

was attached not to plaintiff's complaint, but to defendants' 

brief in support of their motion to dismiss. See Goldman v. 

Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1066 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding Rule 12(b)(6) 

consideration of documents attached to defendants' motion to 

dismiss improper). 

Nevertheless, we have authorized the district courts to 

require a Martinez report to develop a basis for determining 

whether a prisoner plaintiff has a possibly meritorious claim. 

The purpose of the Martinez report is to identify and clarify the 

issues plaintiff raises in his complaint. Martinez, 570 F.2d at 

319; Gee, 829 F.2d at 1007. It also aids the court in its broad 

reading of the pro se litigant's pleadings under Haines, 404 u.s. 

at 520-21, by supplementing a plaintiff's often inadequate 

description of the practices that he contends are 

unconstitutional. See Gee, 829 F.2d at 1007. When the plaintiff 

challenges a prison's policies or established procedures and the 

Martinez report's description of the policies or procedures 

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remains undisputed after plaintiff has an opportunity to respond, 

we should, and will, treat the portion of the Martinez report 

describing the policies or procedures like a written document that 

has been attached to plaintiff's complaint. Thus, the court appropriately considered the Martinez report. 

In the instant case, plaintiff essentially is challenging a 

policy of the LARC not to allow prisoners to have sharp items that 

can be used as weapons or items that can be worn around the neck, 

which can be used to choke inmates or guards or to commit suicide. 

Plaintiff's talisman is a sharp bear tooth necklace, and his 

medicine bag has a thong which could be used for wearing around 

the neck. The court referred only to those portions of the 

Martinez report that describe the challenged policy and the 

reasons for it; the court does not use the report to resolve 

factual issues or to find that there are no disputed facts. 

Plaintiff had the opportunity to respond to the Martinez report, 

R. tab 37, and he did respond, R. tabs 40 & 47. He does not challenge the Martinez report's description of the policy or its 

reasons; instead he disputes the reasonableness of the policy in 

light of his constitutional right to free exercise of his 

religion, a legal question appropriately resolved in a 12(b)(6) 

ruling. 

Although plaintiff retains his fundamental right to practice 

his religion in prison, prison regulations may constitutionally 

impinge on plaintiff's right if "the regulation is 'reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests.'" Washington v. 

Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 

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482 u.s. 78, 89 (1987)): see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 

u.s. 342, 349 (1987): Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197. Turner set forth 

four factors that the court is to consider in reviewing a challenged prison regulation. 

"First, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' 

between the prison regulation and the legitimate 

governmental interest put forward to justify it .... A second factor . . . is whether there are alternative 

means of exercising the right that remain open to prison 

inmates. . . . A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will 

have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation 

of prison resources generally. . . . Finally, the 

absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the 

reasonableness of a prison regulation." 

Turner, 482 u.s. at 89-90 (citations omitted). 

The district court found that the LARC regulations which 

prohibit any inmate from possessing sharp objects or items that 

can be worn around the neck, including religious items, were, on 

their face, reasonably related to the legitimate penological 

interest in protecting the safety of other inmates and prison 

personnel and preventing suicide attempts. The court also noted 

that the regulations guarantee inmates other avenues for the 

practice of their respective religions, including Native American 

beliefs. We are convinced that the district court correctly applied the proper standards and that plaintiff cannot state a claim 

for relief on the facts alleged. 

B 

Plaintiff also challenges the dismissal of his claim for the 

destruction of his religious items. The district court found that 

plaintiff must allege intentional destruction of his property to 

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sustain a § 1983 action and that plaintiff's conclusory allegations of intent are insufficient. We agree. A valid claim for 

loss of prisoner's property in violation of the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment must include allegations of deliberate 

conduct by state actors. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 

333-34 (1986); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497-99 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). Although plaintiff need not allege every element of 

his action in specific detail, Conley, 355 u.s. at 47, he cannot 

rely on conclusory allegations, Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197; Sooner 

Products, 708 F.2d at 512; Clulow, 700 F.2d at 1303; Wise, 666 

F.2d at 1333; Lorraine, 444 F.2d at 2. Plaintiff's mere words 

"with malous [sic] and forthougth [sic]" are insufficient without 

any facts to support the conclusion. Plaintiff has not even 

presented his theory as to why defendants would intentionally 

destroy his property. 

c 

Finally, we consider the dismissal of plaintiff's claim 

regarding the cutting of his hair in violation of his religious 

beliefs. LARC policy requires that the hair of all new inmates be 

cut. The justifications advanced to support the requirement, that 

we believe have merit, are that it prevents inmates from hiding 

weapons in long hair and from easily changing their appearance 

should they escape, and it facilitates good hygiene. The court 

found the policy, as set forth in the Martinez report, reasonably 

related to a legitimate penological interest. The nature of the 

policy is undisputed, and plaintiff had the opportunity to 

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respond. Thus, the district court properly considered this portion of the Martinez report as if it were part of plaintiff's 

complaint. 

The district court also appears to have accepted the Martinez 

report's assertions that LARC's status as an intake facility, in 

which inmates stay only ten days on average, makes an exemption 

process for religious beliefs unfeasible. The lack of alternatives to a regulation that otherwise violates a prisoner's 

constitutional rights is relevant to determining the validity of 

the regulation. Turner, 482 u.s. at 90. Whether the existence of 

alternatives to the regulation renders the regulation unreasonable 

is a legal question appropriately resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Plaintiff disputes defendants' assertion that there is no 

reasonable opportunity for religious exemptions to the haircut 

requirement. He states that he was an inmate at LARC for thirtyone days, which was the norm at the time his hair was cut--in 

contrast to the Martinez report's ten days. R. tab 47 at 2. 

Thus, if the time difference is important to a determination 

whether an exemption process for religious beliefs is feasible, 

the district court, by accepting the ten-day average stay assertion in the Martinez report, has improperly resolved a factual 

dispute more properly the subject of a summary judgment proceeding 

or a trial. 

We do not believe, however, that the ten-day, thirty-one-day 

difference is legally significant. LARC is still a temporary 

detention facility, receiving and processing for redeployment to 

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other facilities many inmates incarcerated for different crimes. 

That some or even many are kept for a month does not require, we 

hold, establishment of a haircut exemption procedure. Thus, the 

district court permissibly rejected this claim under a 12(b)(6) 

ruling. 

AFFIRMED. 

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