Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03349/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03349-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GEORGE R. FORD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FI LED 

Unired States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 2 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 91-3349 

) (D.C. No. 91-2275-V) 

BENSON TITLE; COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE, 

INC.; EDWARDSVILLE STATE BANK; NORMAN 

STEFFEY; GARY L. HALL; WILLIAM M. 

MODRCIN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) (D. Kan.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant, appearing prose, brought this action 

against Defendants alleging violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust 

Act, 15 u.s.c. S 1, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36~3-

Appellate Case: 91-3349 Document: 010110275117 Date Filed: 07/28/1992 Page: 1
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968, and Kansas state 

law. Upon motions by two of the Defendants, the district court 

dismissed Plaintiff's anti-trust and RICO claims, pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failing to state claims upon which 

relief could be granted. The district court found that 

Plaintiff's allegations of restraint of trade did not implicate 

interstate commerce as necessary for a valid anti-trust claim. 

The district court also determined that Plaintiff had not alleged 

the basic elements of a RICO cause of action much less met the 

requirement of pleading the RICO claim with particularity. 

Because federal court jurisdiction depended on the ·existence of 

the dismissed federal law claims, the district court dismissed 

Plaintiff's pendent state law claims and then dismissed the case 

as to all Defendants. 

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal: ( 1 ) whether 

Defendants' allegedly concerted actions constituted an 

unreasonable restraint of trade affecting interstate commerce, as 

proscribed by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; (2) whether Plaintiff 

alleged sufficient facts to adequately plead a RICO claim; and (3) 

whether a Plaintiff proceeding prose needs to plead a civil RICO 

claim with particularity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

We note first that Plaintiff has already been before this 

Court once appealing dismissal of anti-trust, RICO, and state law 

claims arising out of the same transactions involved here. Ford 

v. Hall, No. 86-2261 (10th Cir. July 1, 1988). One of the 

Defendants (Hall) in the current case was also a defendant in the 

earlier case. Moreover, the district court dismissed the earlier 

2 

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case for the same reasons it dismissed the present one--failure to 

state claims for relief under the federal causes of action and 

lack of jurisdiction for the state law causes of action. We 

affirmed. 

In the current case, we again affirm the district court. For 

substantially the same reasons as the district court gave, we hold 

that Plaintiff failed to state valid anti-trust and RICO claims 

and that Plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed for lack 

f o Juris ' . d' t' l ic ion. 

Additionally, we find no merit in Plaintiff's contention that 

as a prose Plaintiff, he should not be required to plead RICO 

claims with particularity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). While 

a prose Plaintiff's pleadings are to be construed liberally, this 

"broad reading of the plaintiff's complaint does not relieve the 

plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a 

recognized legal claim could be based." Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). See Cornett v. Manufacturers Hanover 

Trust Co., 684 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(dismissing prose 

plaintiff's RICO complaint for failing to plead with 

particularity), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

111 S. Ct. 754 (1991). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

1 We also note that Plaintiff's anti-trust and RICO claims are 

likely barred by the four-year statute of limitations applicable 

to those claims. Because we affirm the district court on other 

grounds, we need not decide this issue. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-3349 Document: 010110275117 Date Filed: 07/28/1992 Page: 3
The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

4 

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