Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-01313/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-01313-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN LEMP, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SETERUS, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-01313-TLN-KJN

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Martin Lemp’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Amend. 

(ECF No. 33.) Defendant Seterus, Inc. (“Defendant”) opposed the motion. (ECF No. 34.) 

Plaintiff replied. (ECF No. 35.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

motion. (ECF No. 33.)

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in which he 

alleges that Defendant charged fees for making mortgage payments online or over the phone in 

violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788 et 

seq. (hereinafter, “Rosenthal Act”). (ECF No. 13.) On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant 

motion to amend. (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff seeks to add a claim for Defendant’s alleged violation 

of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (hereinafter, “FDCPA”) and 

to certify a nationwide class. (ECF No. 33-1.) Defendant filed an opposition on September 5, 

2019. (ECF No. 34.) On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 35.)

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Granting or denying leave to amend a complaint rests in the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Swanson v. United States Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). When the Court 

issues a pretrial scheduling order that establishes a timetable to amend the complaint, Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 16 governs any amendments to the complaint. Coleman v. 

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). To allow for amendment under Rule 16, 

a plaintiff must show good cause for not having amended the complaint before the time specified 

in the pretrial scheduling order. Id. The good cause standard primarily considers the diligence of 

the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th 

Cir. 1992). “Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no 

reason for a grant of relief.” Id. The focus of the inquiry is on the reasons why the moving party 

seeks to modify the complaint. Id. If the moving party was not diligent, then good cause cannot 

be shown and the inquiry should end. Id. 

Even if the good cause standard is met under Rule 16(b), the Court has the discretion to 

refuse amendment if it finds reasons to deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a). Johnson, 975 F.2d 

at 610. Under Rule 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s 

written consent or the court’s leave,” and the “court should freely give leave when justice so 

requires.” The Ninth Circuit has considered five factors in determining whether leave to amend 

should be given: “(1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of 

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amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States 

Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Allen v. City of 

Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Rule 16

Because the Court’s pretrial scheduling order requires Plaintiff to show good cause at this 

stage, Plaintiff must first meet Rule 16’s good cause standard. (See ECF No. 20 at 1.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show good cause because Plaintiff had the 

information necessary to add the FDCPA claim as early as May 2018. (ECF No. 34 at 6–9.) 

Moreover, Defendant states that on December 10, 2018, Defendant gave Plaintiff over 6,000 

pages of documents related to Plaintiff’s individual loan file. (ECF No. 34 at 7.) Defendant 

contends that Plaintiff’s failure to review Defendant’s documents and amend the FAC earlier

shows a lack of diligence. (ECF No. 34 at 5–7.) 

Despite Defendant’s arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff made a sufficient showing of 

diligence given the complexities and circumstances of this case. For example, Plaintiff argues 

that the documents he received in December 2018 only supported an individual FDCPA claim, 

not a class action. (ECF No. 35 at 2–4.) Plaintiff states that once he knew about his individual 

claim, Plaintiff submitted requests for production of information regarding both the California 

and potential FDCPA class. (ECF No. 35 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that he did not receive 

information about either class until May 3, 2019. (ECF No. 35 at 3.) Based on the limited 

information before the Court and given the inherently complex nature of class action litigation, 

the Court finds that Plaintiff was reasonably diligent such that he satisfies Rule 16’s good cause 

standard.

B. Rule 15

The Court now turns to whether Plaintiff’s motion is proper under Rule 15. Defendant 

does not argue that Plaintiff is acting in bad faith, nor does he argue that the proposed amendment 

would be futile. Rather, Defendant argues only that granting leave to amend would prejudice 

Defendant and cause undue delay. (ECF No. 34 at 10–11.) The Court will address Defendant’s 

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arguments in turn. 

i. Prejudice

Prejudice is the factor that weighs most heavily in the Court’s analysis of whether to grant 

leave to amend. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Prejudice results when an amendment would unnecessarily increase costs or would diminish the 

opposing party’s ability to respond to the amended pleading.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. San Joaquin 

Valley R.R. Co., No. 1:08-cv-01086-AWI, 2011 WL 3328398, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) 

(citation omitted). Courts have found proposed amendments to be prejudicial when leave to 

amend is requested as a relevant discovery deadline nears or has already passed. See, e.g.,

Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 

Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the time Defendant filed its opposition, the class discovery deadline was September 16, 

2019, and Defendant expressed concern that it would have less than a month to conduct discovery 

on the FDCPA claim before the deadline. (ECF No. 34 at 2, 10.) Approximately a month after 

Defendant filed its opposition, the parties stipulated to continue the discovery deadline and class 

certification hearing in the event the Court grants the instant motion. (ECF No. 39.) The Court 

finds that the parties’ intervening stipulation eliminates Defendant’s concern about discoveryrelated prejudice. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend. 

ii. Undue Delay

In evaluating undue delay, the Court inquires “whether the moving party knew or should 

have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” 

AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, “undue delay by itself 

. . . is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff had no good reason to wait over eight months to add 

the FDCPA claim. (ECF No. 34 at 11.) In reply, Plaintiff responds that he delayed amending the 

FAC to ensure that he could represent the potential FDCPA class. (ECF No. 35 at 3.) Plaintiff 

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also states that Defendant was at least partially responsible for the delay by not responding or 

producing requested information. (ECF No. 35 at 3.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that he was 

trying to be prudent before expanding this case to include a nationwide FDCPA class. (ECF No. 

35 at 3.) 

The Court notes that even if Plaintiff’s delay was unreasonable, that factor alone is 

insufficient to deny Plaintiff’s motion, especially when the remaining Rule 15 factors weigh in 

favor of granting leave to amend. See Bowles, 198 F.3d at 758. However, as discussed,

Plaintiff’s delay was not unreasonable based on the complexities of class action litigation and the 

circumstances of this particular case. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of granting leave 

to amend. 

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff met Rule 16’s good cause standard. The Court also 

finds that the Rule 15 factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion because (1) there is no 

evidence of bad faith, (2) the proposed amendment would not be futile, (3) the joint stipulation to 

continue the discovery deadlines and class certification hearing eliminates any prejudice to

Defendant, and (4) Plaintiff’s delay does not rise to the level of undue delay.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is GRANTED. (ECF No. 33.) 

The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file his amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of this 

Order. The Court also ORDERS the parties to file a joint status report or, if possible, a stipulation 

and proposed order within thirty (30) days of this Order, in which the parties shall propose dates 

for the class discovery deadline, expert witness disclosure deadline, and class certification 

hearing. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2020

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