Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02458/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02458-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFERSON D. WALKER, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

EDWARD S. ALAMEDA, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 02-2458 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

Jefferson D. Walker, a state prisoner incarcerated at the California Training

Facility, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

This matter is now before the Court for consideration of the merits of the habeas petition.

For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 4, 1982, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and

solicitation of murder. The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, sentenced

Petitioner to twenty-five years to life in prison, concurrent with a sentence of four years. 

Ans. Ex. A. 

On August 25, 1995, at his first parole suitability hearing, a panel of the Board of

Prison Terms (“BPT”) found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. His next parole hearing

was deferred for four years. Petitioner’s subsequent parole hearing was to be held on

August 25, 1999, but was not held until May 23, 2000. At that hearing, the BPT panel

again found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. Id. Ex. D. The BPT deferred the next

parole hearing for a period of four years. Id. at 70-71. Petitioner filed an administrative

appeal of the BPT decision, which was denied on the merits. Ans. Ex. B. Petitioner then

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The Court notes that Respondent has submitted an incomplete copy of the petition 

filed in the state Supreme Court (docket no. 7; Ans. Ex. C.), and finds that this filing

error causes no prejudice to Petitioner, as Respondent admits that “Petitioner sought

relief from the parole denial in the California state courts, concluding with the

California Supreme Court which summarily denied his petition on April 17, 2002.” 

(Answer, ¶ 2.) The parties do not dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for

the claims asserted in the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). 

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Thereafter, on January 27, 2004, Petitioner moved this Court to grant him leave to 

file a supplemental brief to amend his petition to include an additional claim (docket no.

10). The Court granted the request (docket no. 12.) Subsequently, Petitioner withdrew

his request to submit a supplemental brief (docket no. 13). Accordingly, only the claims

from the original petition are at issue. 

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Respondent erroneously filed the supplemental answer electronically. The 

Court’s order directed respondent to file the supplemental answer manually within five

days. However, it appears Respondent did not do so because the Court’s file does not

contain those documents. Therefore, the Court has relied upon the electronically filed

documents to address the issue raised in the supplemental answer. 

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sought relief from the parole denial in the state courts.1

 The California Supreme Court

summarily denied his petition without citation or comment on April 17, 2002. Ans. Ex.

C.

Petitioner timely filed his federal the petition for writ of habeas corpus on May

21, 2002. Following an order for amendment, Petitioner filed the first amended petition

on June 25, 2002 (docket no. 3). Judge Susan Illston issued an order to show cause on

January 6, 2003 (docket no. 5). On January 14, 2003, the petition was reassigned to this

Court (docket no. 6). On February 26, 2003, Respondent filed an answer (docket no. 7). 

Petitioner filed a traverse (docket no. 8).2

 On May 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for

discharge (docket no. 14), which the Court denied. On July 26, 2005, the Court granted

Respondent’s motion for leave to file a supplemental answer (docket no. 15).3

 The

supplemental answer contains a motion by Respondent to dismiss the petition for want of

federal subject matter jurisdiction. On August 10, 2005, Petitioner filed an opposition to

the supplemental answer.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

this Court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of

a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Courts are not required to address the merits of

a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground that relief is

precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 70-73 (2003). It is

the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief by 

§ 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002).

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s

decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“clearly established” federal law determined as of the time of the state court’s last

reasoned decision); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001). “Section

2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court’s

jurisprudence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained

that AEDPA--which embodies deep-seated principles of comity, finality, and federalism

-- establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing state-court determinations. See

id. at 436. Thus, the Court has emphasized that “[a] federal court may not overrule a

state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from

[the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003)

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(per curiam). 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing

law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, ‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at

405-06). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412. The objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear

error standard. Lockyer, 538 U. S. at 75-76; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067-69

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003). After Lockyer, "[t]he writ may not issue

simply because, in our determination, a state court’s application of federal law was

erroneous, clearly or otherwise. While the ‘objectively unreasonable’ standard is not

self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of deference to the state courts

than [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] previously afforded them.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068. 

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the

decision of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000); Packer v.

Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 578-79 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 3 (2002).

The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court gives

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no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim. In such a case, a review of the record is the

only means of deciding whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable.

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d

1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 975 (2006). A

district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state

court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption is not altered by the fact that the

finding was made by a state court of appeal, rather than by a state trial court. Sumner v.

Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.),

amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is structural

error or had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-96 (2001) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). Under this standard, if the federal court

determines that the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable,

and thus an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the federal court

then proceeds to the Brecht analysis. Id. at 787. 

The Ninth Circuit has applied § 2254(d) to review of parole suitability decisions. 

See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (assuming without deciding

that AEDPA deferential standard of review under § 2254 applies to such decisions).

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DISCUSSION

I. Existence of a Federally Protected Liberty Interest in Parole

The supplemental answer filed by Respondent on July 13, 2005, contains a

motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that recent California Supreme Court

authority interpreting California’s parole scheme establishes that Petitioner has no

federally protected liberty interest in parole and, therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction

over the matter. Petitioner has filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that

Ninth Circuit precedent finding a protected liberty interest in California’s parole scheme

remains the applicable law.

In general, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to

be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, “a

state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that

parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and

thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901

(citing Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at

12).

The California statutory provision at issue provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he

panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses ... is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual and that a

parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed ... .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added). 

This “shall-unless” language is similar to the statutes that were at issue in Allen and

Greenholtz. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 376 (“Subject to the following restrictions, the board

shall release on parole ... any person confined in the Montana state prison or the

women’s correction center ... when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the

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prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or the community.”) (quoting

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-230201 (1985) (emphasis added and in original); Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 11 (“[w]henever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed

offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the

opinion that his release should be deferred because ... ”) (quoting Neb. Rev. Stats. § 83-

1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added).

Recognizing the similarity between California’s statutory scheme and the

statutory scheme at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, the Ninth Circuit has held that

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole. The scheme creates a presumption that parole release will be granted unless the

statutorily defined determinations are made.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). That court reiterated this holding in Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that “California’s parole scheme gives

rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”) (quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d

at 902). 

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), undermines the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Biggs

and McQuillion, and Respondent relies on Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376

F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Cal. 2005), in support of this argument. This Court disagrees with

the Sass court’s conclusion that the holding in Dannenberg clearly demonstrates

California’s parole scheme is not mandatory. The issue presented in Dannenberg was

whether the BPT was required to set uniform parole dates under section 3041(a) before it

determined whether a particular inmate was suitable for parole under section 3041(b). 

See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1069, 1077. It concluded the answer to that question was

no. Id. at 1096. However, the Dannenberg court used language throughout the opinion

which suggests that it presumed an inmate retained a protected liberty interest in the

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possibility of parole. See, e.g., id. at 1094 (noting continued reliance on commitment

offense “might thus also contravene the inmate’s constitutionally protected expectation

of parole”), 1095 n.16 (“well established principles” regarding parole discretion with

deferential judicial oversight “define and limit the expectancy in parole from a life

sentence to which due process interests attach”). Furthermore, California courts

addressing the issue post-Dannenberg continue to assume a protected liberty interest

exists. See In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573 (2005); In re DeLuna, 126 Cal. App. 4th

585 (2005).

Accordingly, this Court finds itself in agreement with a majority of courts that

have considered the impact of Dannenberg on the issue presented by Respondent’s

motion and cannot find that the Dannenberg opinion represents a clear holding that

California’s parole scheme is not mandatory. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Kane, 2006 WL

515627 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (citing cases). Accordingly, under the holdings

of McQuillion and Biggs, Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in parole,

the Court has jurisdiction over this matter, and Respondent’s motion is denied.

II. The Requirements of Federal Due Process

Petitioner argues that the BPT’s decision to deny him parole was arbitrary and

capricious, and that the BPT’s findings were unsubstantiated, thus violating his right to

due process. A parole board’s decision satisfies the requirements of due process if

“some evidence” supports the decision. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (adopting “some

evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445 (1985)); see also Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The evidence underlying the board’s

decision also must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillon, 306 F.3d at 904; Biggs,

334 F.3.d at 915. Most recently, in Biggs, the Ninth Circuit held that the some evidence

standard may be considered in light of the board’s decision-making process over time. 

See id. at 917 (concluding that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging

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factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary

to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.”).

III. Standards for Granting Parole to Convicted Murderers in California

In order to determine whether there was some evidence to support the BPT’s

decision that Petitioner was not suitable for parole, the Court must look to the relevant

California regulations.

California Penal Code section 3041(b) provides: 

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be

fixed at this meeting. 

California Code of Regulations, title 15 section 2402, sets forth the criteria for

determining whether an inmate is suitable for release on parole. The opening paragraph

of section 2402(a) states:

Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released

from prison.

Under section 2402(c), the listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for

parole include: 

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the

same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or

after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which

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demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if

the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually

assaulted another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear

upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious

misconduct in prison or jail.

Under section 2042(d), the listed circumstances tending to show suitability for

parole include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of

personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable

relationships with other.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage,

seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating that he

understands that nature and magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the result

of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long

period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the

crime, the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome . . . and it

appears the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history

of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

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One axis of the matrix concerns the relationship between murderer and victim and 

the other axis of the matrix concerns the circumstances of the murder. The choices on

the axis for the relationship of murderer and victim are “participating victim,” “prior

relationship,” “no prior relationship,” and “threat to public order or murder for hire.” 

The choices on the axis for the circumstances of the murder are “indirect,” “direct or

victim contribution,” “severe trauma,” or “torture.” Each of the choices are further

defined in the matrix. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c). 

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(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced

ability to function within the law upon release.

The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms depending on the

murder degree and the circumstances surrounding the murder. The matrix provides three

choices of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§ 2403. For first degree murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of 25, 26,

or 27 years, to a high of 31, 32, or 33 years, depending on some of the facts of the crime.4

Although the matrix is to be used to establish a base term, this occurs only once the

prisoner has been found suitable for parole. See id. § 2403(a). The statutory scheme

places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s expectancy in early setting of a

fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71.

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e.,

life-maximum) sentencees should “normally” receive “uniform” parole

dates for similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies

“unless [the Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be

set because the particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises

“public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. 

(Italics added.) Nothing in the statute states or suggests that the Board

must evaluate the case under standards of term uniformity before

exercising its authority to deny a parole date on the grounds the particular

offender’s criminality presents a continuing public danger.

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Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as in original). In sum, “the Board,

exercising its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case

by considering the dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime

individually.” Id. at 1071. The California Supreme Court's determination of state law is

binding in this federal habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988);

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can

alone support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else

about the prisoner is laudable. “While the board must point to factors beyond the

minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in

no further comparative analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense

make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for the prisoner’s release.” Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (2002), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) (“[t]he nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can

constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole” but might violate due process “where no

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent

than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense”). 

IV. Analysis

A. The Commitment Offense

The record before the Court does not contain a complete summary of the facts of

Petitioner’s commitment offense. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the

statement of facts by the California Court of Appeal in its published opinion affirming

the judgment of conviction, People v. Walker, 145 Cal. App. 3d 886 (1983).

In the early morning hours of June 7, 1981, Officers Seymour, Scott, and

Weakland of the Livermore Police Department received a dispatch call to

go to 341 Helen Way in Livermore. When they arrived, appellant Jeff

Walker met them at the front door and directed them to the master

bedroom where his wife was injured and in need of medical attention. 

The officers went to the master bedroom where they found appellant’s

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wife, Susie Walker, lying on the bed with massive head injuries. Susie

Walker was taken to the hospital by ambulance, underwent surgery, and

was placed in the critical care unit in a coma. She remained unconscious

for eight days and died on June 15, 1981.

Dr. Thomas Rogers, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy the

following day. The autopsy showed a large number of injuries to the

victim’s head, body, and limbs. In his opinion, the cause of death was

multiple blunt injuries to the head and neck caused by a blunt object. The

injuries caused a swelling of the brain that in turn caused other bodily

functions to cease. 

After Susie Walker had been taken to the hospital by ambulance, Jeff

Walker spoke with Officer Seymour of the Livermore Police Department. 

He told the officer that he had returned to their house with his wife and

in-laws around 10:00 that night. He and his wife had gone to bed

approximately [sic] 11:00. Approximately one hour later, he heard the

stereo go off, and got up out of bed to investigate. He stated that when he

got to the entrance way between the family room and living room, he was

struck over the head two or three times but did not see who did it. When

he woke up, he went to use the phone in the kitchen and found that the

cord had been pulled from the receiver. He went into the bedroom and

turned on the light to use the phone there and found his wife in bed in the

condition that the officers found her in. Officer Seymour further testified

that a window in the kitchen had been broken in.

Evidence Technician Gregory found that portions of the Walker’s [sic]

stereo system had been disturbed, that glass fragments from the broken

window were found in the interior of the house, indicating that the

window had been broken in from the outside, and that a small white

plastic bindle was found on the floor of the living room, directly

underneath a portion of the stereo. Crime Lab Technician Dorothea

Bernard performed an analysis of the contents in the bindle and testified

that the white powder contained methamphetamine. The scene of the

household as found by the Livermore police officers, and the injuries

suffered by the victim Susie Walker, appeared to be connected with a

burglary of the Walker residence.

After continuous investigation by the Livermore Police Department,

[Walker] was arrested for the murder of his wife in August 1981. While

he was being held at Santa Rita between August 24 and 26, he had

conversations with his cellmate, Mr. Charles Bell. According to Mr.

Bell’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, [Walker] solicited Mr. Bell to

murder a potential witness against [Walker], a Mr. Tommy Lee Olsen. 

[Walker] was released from Santa Rita approximately August 26 and was

not charged with any crimes, apparently due to insufficient evidence and

a hearsay problem. [Walker] retained his trial attorney on the same date

that he was arrested. On that date, [Walker’s] counsel contacted a

member of the district attorney’s office as well as the investigating

members of the Livermore Police Department to inform him of his

representation of Walker.

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After Walker was released from Santa Rita without being charged, he

returned to the jail to visit Mr. Bell. According to Mr. Bell, they

discussed the agreement for Bell to murder witness Olsen. Two days

after that visit, [Walker] once again visited Bell at Santa Rita and again

briefly discussed the deal. However, prior to this visit, Bell contacted

police authorities and informed them about Mr. Walker’s solicitation of

him for murder. It was then arranged that Bell would telephone [Walker]

at his home and that the conversation would be tape recorded with the

consent of Bell and unknown to Walker. The contents of that tape

recording, and Bell’s testimony from the preliminary hearing was the sole

evidence against [Walker] regarding the charge against [Walker] that he

solicited Bell to commit the crime of murder. Although Bell had never

been asked to inform on cellmates or other prisoners before, after he was

seen visiting with Mr. Walker after Mr. Walker’s release, he was

approached by authorities that if he had any information to tell the police

about Walker, he should go ahead and tell them. Bell was promised by

the authorities, at their suggestion, that if he was later convicted on the

crime for which he was being held, they would do all they could to have

him serve the time outside of the State of California due to Bell’s falsely

wearing a ‘snitch jacket.’ Despite that label, Bell insisted that he had

never informed on anyone before.

Charles Bell refused to testify at the trial of [Walker]. He refused to

make any comment as to why he would not do so. The court demanded

that he testify, but Bell refused even after immunity was given him. The

court initially indicated that it would hold Bell in contempt but later

admitted that such sanction was not much of an inducement for him to

testify since he was facing a possible 60 years in prison for pending

criminal accusations.

***

At trial, the prosecution put on numerous witnesses, including Tommy

Lee Olsen, a close friend of Walker’s. Olsen testified that on numerous

occasions during the weeks preceding the attack on the victim, [Walker]

discussed with him his plans and desire to do away with his wife. Olsen

further testified that he went to [Walker’s] house on the evening of the

attack, helped Walker make the residence look like the scene of a

burglary by carrying away valuable property and leaving a bag of

methamphetamine on the floor, and that he hit or struck [Walker] several

times on the head and chest.

[] Walker testified at trial in his own behalf. He told the jury about his

early childhood, including the death of his father in an industrial accident

when he was five years old. He had a religious upbringing and training,

and slept in the same room as his mother, who never remarried, until he

was ten years old. He had met and married Susie Walker at a fairly early

age and in fact had not had sexual relations with any other woman prior

to his marriage. The great bulk of his testimony related to his

relationship with his wife, in which it was indicated that he was

compelled to give up dancing, hobbies, etc. due to the wishes of his wife. 

She controlled everything and was obsessed with her appearance and

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perfectionism. He eventually reached the conclusion that all other

options to end the relationship were unworkable and it was either suicide

or murder. He admitted administering the severe beating of his wife with

a heavy lead fishing weight, and testified to his state of mind as being

that of intense anger at the time of the commission of the crime. The gist

of [Walker’s] testimony as well as that of the other defense witnesses was

to the effect that Walker was an emotionally battered husband and that

his mind formulated the thought that his only option to end the repressive

situation he found himself in was murder. In his final argument, defense

counsel argued the existence of the emotionally battered psychological

state of mind of [Walker] and that Walker did not and could not have

deliberated the act of murder at the time that it was committed.

145 Cal. App. 3d at 890-93.

The appellate opinion also contains the following colloquy from Walker’s crossexamination by the prosecutor regarding Walker’s admission that he had, over a long

period of time, deliberated the murder of his wife:

Q: You had previously considered getting a divorce?

A: Yes.

Q: And you previously considered leaving her?

A: Yes.

Q: And you previously considered suicide?

A: Yes.

Q: You rejected all those?

A: When I – At the point when I decided it was suicide, I made the

decision it was either her or me, and that I chose her, and after that I

didn’t look back.

Q: You thought about it, and you decided one of us is going to die, and

it’s not going to be me?

A: Yes, that’s true.

Q: And you decided that your life was more valuable than hers?

A: I guess it was out of selfish motives, yes.

Q: And you killed her for selfish motives?

A: Yes.

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Q: You killed her because you wanted to live and that meant she had to

die?

A: Yes . . . I wanted my freedom, yes . . .

Q: You wanted your freedom to do what?

A: I just wanted to be able to do what I wanted to, whatever that might

be, make my own decisions, buy my own clothes, have money in my

pocket, go where I wanted to go when I wanted to go.

Q: You decided that not only were you going to murder your wife but

you were going to cover it?

A: Yes. When I decided that I was going to do it, I had – I wanted to

cover it.

Q: You wanted to get away with it?

A: Yes.

Q: You didn’t want to pay any price?

A: Anybody that do something like that would want to get away. It’s a

natural condition.

Q: That’s not my question. You wanted to get away?

A: Yes.

Q: You didn’t want to pay the price?

A: No, I didn’t.

Q: You didn’t want to accept responsibility for it?

A: No, I didn’t.

Q: You decided to cover it up?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: You decided to make it look like a burglary?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: You decided to mislead and lie to everybody close to you, the entire

community, and to the police?

A: Yes, I did, including my church.

Q: You decided to make it look like people that used dope did it;

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correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you thought that would mislead the police?

A: Yes.

Q: And you considered how you were going to mislead the police, didn’t

you?

A: I just put the – planted the dope there, and whatever they took off was

theirs.

Q: But you thought about how you were going to get away with this?

A: I thought that would get me away with it, yes.

Q: You thought that making it look like a burglary would help your

getting away with it?

A: Yes. I thought making it look like a burglary would help me get

away.

Q: You thought planting the dope would help you get away?

A: Yes. I thought that that would help or they’d be looking for

somebody that used these . . .

Q: And you decided to gather up property to make it look like a burglar

had taken property?

A: After he got there, yes.

Q: And you picked June 6, 1981, didn’t you?

A: Yes.

Q: You planned that date in advance?

A: Yes, I did.

Id. at 898-900.

B. Petitioner’s Prior Parole-Related Proceedings

The following facts are derived from Petitioner’s traverse and the exhibits

submitted in support thereof. Petitioner was first seen by the BPT for a parole

recommendation hearing on April 11, 1983, at which time his personal history and

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offense were reviewed and recommendations made which would be revisited by the BPT

panel for compliance at his initial parole hearing under California Penal Code section

3041(a). Because Petitioner had employable skills as a journeyman gas and diesel

mechanic, there was no recommendation made for vocational training. It was

recommended that Petitioner upgrade educationally, which Petitioner was in the process

of doing, and that he enroll in therapy, which he also was doing. Petitioner was seen by

the BPT for his first documentation hearing in July 1985, and a psychological evaluation

was prepared for that hearing by Dr. Elem. At that time, the severity of the stressors at

the time of the offense was noted as “extreme.” At the documentation hearing, no

recommendation was made by the BPT for vocational training; it was recommended that

Petitioner continue his college education, positive work efforts, and therapy, and it was

noted that a “positive psychological evaluation” is, generally, necessary to be granted

parole. Petitioner’s second documentation hearing was held on July 25, 1988. Another

psychological evaluation was prepared, by Dr. Hodges, in which it was noted that

Petitioner’s “‘acting out’ tendencies, a measure of violence potential, is well within the

normal limits.” Also, that Petitioner had “made significant and lasting personality

changes during his incarceration. Such changes are suggestive of an excellent parole

candidate with low violence and alcohol abuse potential.” Trav. Ex. 8. No

recommendations were made by the BPT except for Petitioner to continue programming

in the positive manner he had to date. Trav. Ex. 7.

Petitioner’s third documentation hearing was held on July 7, 1991. Trav. Ex. 9. 

A psychological evaluation was prepared by Dr. Tolchin. Although Dr. Tolchin noted

that Petitioner needed therapy to extricate himself emotionally from his dead wife, Dr.

Tolchin nonetheless concluded: “This inmate will never again pose a threat to society

and, once released, will resume his life as a productive citizen.” Trav. Ex. 10. The BPT

noted that Petitioner had received his bachelor’s degree and participated in group therapy

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and psychiatric treatment, and his “excellent” behavior. No recommendations were

made.

Petitioner’s initial parole hearing was held on August 15, 1995. At that time,

Petitioner’s minimum eligible parole date was set at June 4, 1996. For this parole

hearing, a psychological evaluation was prepared by Dr. O’Meara, who wrote as follows

regarding the insights gained by Petitioner into the commitment offense:

[Walker] reflects back on [his relationship with his wife] and sees the

insidious development of a lopsided marriage where his wife became

increasingly controlling and domineering. Rather than asserting his

dissatisfaction with her authoritarian behavior, he submitted to her

demands. . . . He had no skills for a healthy catharsis for his resentment

and anger. He felt increasingly frustrated, helpless, and depressed. 

Thoughts of suicide were entertained. He recalls feeling like he

psychologically “snapped.” Remorse for the offense appears genuine. 

He speaks of the victim in a sincere manner. . . . [H]e has considerably

above average personal insight. He appears to have gained a lot from his

many years of therapy. Psychological insights seem well integrated into

his personality and given this, it is likely that he will maintain the gains

he has achieved in therapy.

There is no indication of any signs of poor judgment or weakened

impulse control. He is pro-social and conforming. This is underscored

by his lack of disciplinaries during the entirety of his incarceration.

Diagnostic impression reveals no mental illness or disorder. By history

he has had one explosive episode. . . . He seems to have made

considerable progress in altering personality pathology. Drugs or alcohol

have not played any significant role in his functioning. 

. . . He has made maximum use of psychotherapy and self-help. Violence

potential is below average.

Trav. Ex. 12.

The BPT denied parole. The reasons stated were:

(1) The commitment offense was cruel, callous, brutal, dispassionate,

planned, showed a total disregard for the suffering of another;

(2) The prisoner has no history of violent behavior or criminality, which

relates to the unpredictability of the prisoner; 

(3) The panel finds that the prisoner needs therapy in order to discuss,

understand and cope with the life offense, and until progress is made, he

continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others; 

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(4) The prisoner has not had sufficient participation in substance-abuse

programming; 

(5) The prisoner shows no evidence of remorse and shows little insight

into the commitment offense;

(6) He tended to minimize his act of soliciting to have his crime partner

killed.

Trav. Ex. 3 at 67-69. Petitioner’s next parole hearing was deferred for four years.

C. Petitioner's May 23, 2000 Parole Hearing

The hearing at issue in the present petition was held on May 23, 2000. Petitioner

appeared before the BPT panel in pro per. At the hearing, the commissioners noted that

since his last hearing Petitioner had become a certified paralegal, completed a recovery

addiction program, and participated in therapy. In addition, the psychological evaluation

prepared for the hearing by staff psychologist Dr. Reed was summarized as follows by

Commissioner Bordonaro:

Under assessment of dangerousness the doctor says that on one hand he

has no prior criminal history. He has received no CDC 115s [rules

violation reports], only one CDC 128 [custodial counseling chrono]

during his 17 years of incarceration. He has never received a disciplinary

for violent behavior. On the other hand, . . . he talks about that your

violence potential within a control [sic] setting is significantly below the

average level II inmate, and basis [sic] that on your institutional behavior. 

And then he says, “Therefore, in light of these factors, his violence

potential is considered to be significantly below average.” . . . And then

[], he says that, “If released to the community his violence potential is

considered to be no more than the average citizen in the community.” 

And it says that there are no significant risk factors which may be

precursors to violence for this individual. Again, that’s signed by Joe

Reed, Ph.D., staff psychologist.

Ans. Ex. D at 35.

Letters of three offers of employment and housing were offered into the record

by Petitioner, including one from his son. Petitioner also spoke about the fact that he had

maintained relationships with his sons since his incarceration, and with other family and

community members. 

The BPT denied parole. The decision was relayed by Presiding Deputy

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Commissioner Carol Bentley as follows:

COMMISSIONER BENTLEY: Mr. Walker, the Panel has reviewed all

the information we’ve received from the public and we’ve determined

that you’re not suitable for parole and that you’d pose an unreasonable

risk or danger to others. This is a unanimous decision. And it’s based

first of all on the commitment offense, which was just a horrible crime,

something I cannot fathom how a person can live with a woman, make

love to a woman for at least 17 days all while he’s plotting on killing her. 

And then we come to the actual night of the killing where you made love

to her and then a short time later ended up bludgeoning her with a weight

resulting – and then making her unconscious. And then this criminal act,

awful as it was, didn’t stop you from going on and committing other

crimes, and that was solicitation for the murder of [Tommy Olsen]. . . .

[by Mr. Bell].

We find in prison, as would be expected from your background, you’ve

been doing a good job. You’ve been working, getting good work reports. 

You’ve been disciplinary free. You’ve upgraded educationally. You’ve

also assisted others in the prison situation. However, these positive

factors do not outweigh those factors of unsuitability. This denial is for

four years. We don’t think it’s likely a hearing Panel would find you

suitable for parole during the following four years. This, again, is a

separate decision. It’s based on the very callous, extremely callous,

manner in which you could plot and take the life of your wife. And it’s

also based on your following criminality, the solicitation for the murder. 

The Panel is basing this decision of course on the crime. And then also,

it’s very obvious from this hearing today you do need more time in some

sort of self-help, some sort of self-study that would enable you to gain

more insight into these criminal activities. You’ve spent most of this

time mitigating the whole crime. I couldn’t believe you had the audacity

to sit there and say that, “I did, I bludgeoned her, but then I stopped and

called for help.” Which isn’t the case at all. I’m quite sure you thought

she was dead, and you didn’t stop –

INMATE WALKER: I knew she was not dead.

COMMISSIONER BENTLEY: Don’t interrupt me. You didn’t stop and

call for help. You went ahead with [Olsen] and did the rest of the

burglary scene, and then had him knock you out. Your insight is

extremely poor and we believe that this would make you a risk if released

to society. I’m go[i]ng to recommend that you of course become

disciplinary-free, you continue your good programming, find some selfstudy or self-help programming. 

***

INMATE WALKER: Could you recommend what self-help is available.

COMMISSIONER BENTLEY: I’m just saying that maybe you can do

some on your own like you did your paralegal. Maybe you can find some

books or something that’s going to give you some more insight into this. 

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This hearing is concluded. Here’s your paperwork,

INMATE WALKER: Thank you. I’m sorry I angered you so much

personally, Ms. Bentley.

COMMISSIONER BENTLEY: No, I’m not angry.

INMATE WALKER: Well, I could tell when you –

COMMISSIONER BENTLEY: Okay. This hearing is concluded and

I’m not angry.

INMATE WALKER: I know.

Ans. Ex. D at 70-73.

D. Whether Some Evidence Supports the BPT’s Decision

The BPT denied parole based on its conclusion that Petitioner presented an

unreasonable risk or danger to others based on the nature of the commitment offense,

including his solicitation of murder subsequent to the initial offense, and Petitioner’s

need for more therapy or self-help programming. As discussed below, the Court finds

that the BPT’s reliance on the nature of the offense to deny parole was supported by

some evidence, but its finding that Petitioner must participate in further therapy or selfhelp programming in order to be found suitable for parole was not. Because reliance on

the nature of the crime is sufficient in and of itself to deny parole under California law,

however, the BPT’s decision to deny parole is not devoid of the quantum of some

evidence required to satisfy due process.

 1. The nature of the offense

One of the factors that the BPT can consider in denying parole is that the offense

was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2042(c)(1). This includes consideration of whether “[t]he offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering.” The BPT denial of parole was based “on the very callous, extremely callous,

manner in which you could plot and take the life of your wife. And it’s also based on

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your following criminality, the solicitation for the murder.” Ans. Ex. D at 71. 

This Court must consider whether there was some evidence to support this

finding and concludes that there was. Petitioner planned the murder for seventeen days. 

On the night of the murder he had sexual relations with his wife. Shortly thereafter he

struck her on the head ten to twelve times with a fishing weight. He then “grabbed her

from behind and gave her a chop to the back of the neck and knocked her out.” Id. at 19. 

Knowing that she was unconscious and suffering from massive head injuries, Petitioner

nevertheless proceeded to stage the house as if a burglary had occurred, including having

Tommy Olsen physically assault him. Petitioner did not come forward and admit his

involvement while his wife lay in a coma for eight days before she died, nor did he do so

when he was arrested three months later. After being released because of insufficient

evidence to charge him he solicited another inmate, Mr. Bell, to kill his crime partner,

Tommy Olsen. It was only because Mr. Bell informed the police of the solicitation and

the police recorded a conversation between Mr. Bell and Petitioner, that Petitioner could

no longer deny his involvement in his wife’s murder. He later was convicted of the

crime of soliciting murder, as well. 

Petitioner’s actions in committing the offense were beyond the minimum

elements necessary to constitute first degree murder. Thus, the Court finds that the

BPT’s decision to deny parole by relying on the facts of the crime are based on some

evidence, see Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071 (the BPT can use the facts of the crime

alone to deny parole if it can point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed), and the state Supreme Court’s rejection of

Petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief on this ground was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). 

//

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2. The need for further therapy or self-help programming

One of the factors the BPT can consider to determine unsuitability for parole is

whether the prisoner “has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the

offense.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2042(c)(5). Similarly, one of the factors the BPT can

consider to determine parole suitability is evidence that “[t]he prisoner [has] performed

acts . . . indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the offense.” Id.

§ 2042(d)(3). The Court finds that the BPT’s determination that Petitioner requires

further therapy or self-help programming in order to qualify for parole is not based on

some evidence. 

As discussed in detail above, Petitioner began participating in therapy in 1983

and has done so throughout his term of incarceration. Since 1988 Petitioner’s

psychological evaluations consistently have noted his increasing insight into the

circumstances which led him to murder his wife and a concomitant decreasing potential

for violence. At his 2000 parole hearing Petitioner testified that after his prior hearing in

1995, where it was recommended that he participate in more therapy, he met with two

therapists, both of whom found that he had no further need for therapy. The BPT also

acknowledged that Dr. Reed, who psychologically evaluated Petitioner for the present

hearing, agreed with that assessment. In a further attempt to comply with the BPT’s

prior recommendation Petitioner also participated in a “twelve step” drug and alcohol

rehabilitation program, even though it is clear from the record of the hearing that

Petitioner never had a drug or alcohol problem. Even so, he testified to insights he has

gained about himself and the commitment offense from that participation. The record

contains abundant evidence of Petitioner’s participation in therapy and self-help

programming, see e.g., Trav. Ex. 11 (between 1983 and 1993 Petitioner completed no

less than twenty-two group and individual therapies and other self-help programs), as

well as the undisputed statements of mental health experts that Petitioner understands the

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nature and magnitude of the commitment offense, that he is below average in future

potential for violence, and that he no longer is in need of therapy. 

The lack of evidentiary support for the BPT’s finding is highlighted further by

Commissioner Bentley’s answer to Petitioner’s question at the end of his hearing as to

what further self-help programming she could recommend for him. Rather than provide

Petitioner with concrete options that would be available to an inmate whom the BPT’s

own staff psychologist has found no longer to be in need of therapy, and who had

participated in the available self-help programs, she replied: “I’m just saying that maybe

you can do some on your own like you did your paralegal. Maybe you can find some

books or something that’s going to give you some more insight into this.” Ans. Ex. D at

72. Based on this response, it seems unlikely that Petitioner ever would be able to

overcome the BPT’s finding that he had not participated in sufficient therapy or self-help

programming to be found suitable for parole.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the BPT’s determination to deny Petitioner

parole on this ground was not based on some evidence, and the state Supreme Court’s

rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the record. As noted above, the BPT’s decision to deny parole on this ground does not

entitle Petitioner to habeas corpus relief because the BPT’s reliance on the nature of the

crime is sufficient in and of itself to meet the some evidence standard and deny parole

under California law . 

E. Whether the BPT’s Reliance on the Unchanging Facts of the

Crime Violates Due Process

Having found that the only factor the BPT relied upon to deny Petitioner parole

which was supported by some evidence was the nature of the commitment offense, the

Court now turns to the question whether the BPT’s sole reliance on the unchanging facts

of the crime amounts to a violation of due process. In Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910

(2003), the Ninth Circuit indicated that a continued reliance on an unchanging factor

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such as the circumstances of the offense could result in a due process violation. Biggs

was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life following a 1985 first degree murder

conviction. In the case before the Ninth Circuit, Biggs challenged the 1999 decision by

the BPT finding him unsuitable for parole despite his record as a model prisoner. 334

F.3d at 913. While the Ninth Circuit rejected several of the reasons given by the BPT for

finding Biggs unsuitable, it upheld three: (1) the commitment offense involved the

murder of a witness, (2) the murder was carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous

disregard for the life and suffering of another, and (3) Biggs could benefit from therapy. 

Id. However, the Ninth Circuit cautioned the BPT regarding its continued reliance on the

gravity of the offense and Biggs’s conduct prior to the offense:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable reliance on

the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify

denial of parole can be initially justified as fulfilling the requirements set

forth by state law. Over time, however, should Biggs continue to

demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying

him a parole date simply because of the nature of his offense would raise

serious questions involving his liberty interest.

Id. at 916.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in

a due process violation.” Id. at 917. The Ninth Circuit did not specify what number of

hearings or years might constitute the requisite length of time to find that continuing

reliance on an unchanging fact to deny parole amounts to a violation of due process, nor

has it since. Neither have the district courts which have addressed challenges to the

denial of parole based solely on the commitment offense. In cases similar to Biggs,

however, where the denial of parole was made at the petitioner’s first parole suitability

hearing, or at the first parole suitability hearing where the BPT relied solely on the facts

of the commitment offense to deny parole, no due process violation has been found

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because there was some evidence to support the BPT’s finding and Biggs has not been

addressed, see, e.g., Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005) (denial of

parole at first parole suitability hearing); or no due process violation has been found

because there was some evidence to support the BPT’s finding and the circumstances

have been found not to rise to the level of the concerns raised in Biggs, see, e.g., Hudson

v. Kane, 2005 WL 2035590, *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (denial of parole at third

parole suitability hearing, but first denial based solely on the facts of the commitment

offense). 

In contrast, in those cases where the petitioner has had several parole suitability

hearings over a long period of time and the BPT panel relied solely on the commitment

offense to deny parole, a violation of due process and entitlement to relief under Biggs

has been found. See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 947 (2005) (finding due

process violation in denial of parole at fifth parole suitability hearing after petitioner had

served sixteen years of fifteen years to life sentence for second degree murder and met

circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole), appeal docketed, No. 05-15275

(9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2005); Johnson v. Finn, 2006 WL 195159, *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19,

2006) (finding due process violation in denial of parole at twelfth parole suitability

hearing after petitioner had served twenty-four years of sentence of life with the

possibility of parole and met circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole);

Masoner v. State, No. CV-03-1261-ER (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004) (finding due process

violation based on BPT’s “continued reliance” on pre-conviction factors to justify denial

of parole suitability after petitioner had served twenty-one years of fifteen years to life

sentence for second degree murder, had participated in therapy and self-help

programming and had impeccable prison record). 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s case here more closely resembles the facts of

Biggs than it does those cases where a due process violation has been found. At the time

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of his May 23, 2000 parole denial, Petitioner had served eighteen years of a twenty-five

years to life sentence, had only had one previous parole suitability hearing, and the denial

of parole suitability at the first hearing had been based on grounds in addition to the

nature of the commitment offense. While the Court can envision that at some point the

facts of Petitioner’s case will more resemble those cases where relief has been granted

than not, at this time the Court does not find that the BPT’s reliance solely on the nature

of the offense in denying Petitioner parole at his 2000 hearing violated his federal due

process rights. Accordingly, this claim for relief is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2006

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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