Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01034/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01034-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter Robles Martinez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 08-1034-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner Peter Robles Martinez’s Petition for Writ of

Habeus Corpus. On April 7, 2009, the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned

issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the Petition be dismissed

because it is barred by the statute of limitations. On April 17, 2009, Petitioner filed

objections to the R&R.

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original). Because the Petitioner has filed objections

to the R&R, this Court will review de novo the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the

Petition in this case is barred by the statute of limitations.

Case 2:08-cv-01034-JAT Document 16 Filed 06/11/09 Page 1 of 4
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As the R&R correctly recounts, under the Anti-Terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Petitioner had one year from the date his conviction

became final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court. R&R at 4. In this

case, the Petitioner’s conviction became final in state court on June 5, 2000. See id. at 4;

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-717 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, Petitioner’s Petition in

this Court was due by June 5, 2001. R&R at 5. The Petition in this case was filed on June

2, 2008 and is therefore untimely unless Petitioner is entitled to either “statutory” or equitable

tolling of the statute of limitation prior to that date. Id. at 4; see § 2244(d). 

Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during any time that a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). In this case, Petitioner pled guilty and was

sentenced on March 7, 2000, but failed to file a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) within

the allowed 90 day period, which expired on June 5, 2000. R&R at 4. In fact, Petitioner did

not file a PCR until August 27, 2007. Thus, the Petition was untimely for purposes of

statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (untimely petition is

not properly filed and does not entitle petitioner to statutory tolling). 

The Magistrate Judge also determined that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling. R&R at 6. For Petitioner to be entitled to equitable tolling, he must show “‘(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007)

(citing Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion.

Petitioner argues that equitable tolling applies because the State failed to give

Petitioner notice of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation requirement. Objections at

7-9. However, Petitioner acknowledges in his objection that the prison law library contains

Post Conviction Remedies, by Larry W. Yackle, which includes 28 U.S.C. § 2244 at

Appendix A. Objections at 9; R&R at 6. As determined by the Magistrate Judge,

Petitioner’s failure to locate the statute in that book does not create an “impediment” that can

form the basis for equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th

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Cir. 2000) (en banc). Furthermore, Petitioner’s ignorance of the law alone is also not

sufficient for equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

Thus, this Court finds that, in failing to discover this material within the time frame imposed

by the AEDPA’s statute of limitation, Petitioner did not diligently pursue his rights and is

thus not entitled to equitable tolling.

Petitioner also argues that the Rule of Lenity should apply to this case. The Rule of

Lenity is the doctrine that ambiguity or uncertainty in a criminal statute must be construed

in favor of the defendant. 73 AM.JUR. 2d §197. It is well established that this rule “is only

an aid to construction and cannot be invoked until the statute is shown to be ambiguous or

uncertain as applied to the particular defendant.” Id. (quoting California v. Alday, 515 P.2d

1169, 1169 (Cal. 1973)) (emphasis added). Petitioner argues that once he became aware of

the AEDPA’s requirements, he exercised due diligence by timely filing the Petition, thereby

satisfying the language of §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and (d)(1)(B). Objections at 9. However,

Petitioner has failed to show any ambiguity in § 2244 that would allow his interpretation of

the statute. Rather, as discussed above, no impediment was present to prevent Petitioner

from filing the Petition by the June 5, 2001 deadline. Thus, the statute required Petitioner

to exercise due diligence prior to that date, which Petitioner failed to do.

Finally, Petitioner is asserting a claim based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). However, Blakely is not available to cases on collateral review, which is the

procedural posture of this case. R&R at 5 (citing Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th

Cir. 2005)). Thus, even if this Court reached the merits of Petitioner’s Petition, habeas relief

would be denied. 

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Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #14) is accepted and

adopted, the Motion of Objections (Doc. #15) is permitted to the extent that the Court

considered the objections, but the objections are overruled; the Petition is dismissed with

prejudice because it is barred by the statute of limitations and the Clerk of the Court shall

enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01034-JAT Document 16 Filed 06/11/09 Page 4 of 4