Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01035/USCOURTS-ca7-09-01035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23, 2010*

Decided July 27, 2010

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1035

CEDRIC DUPREE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

EARLY LASTER, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

02‐cv‐1059‐DRH

David R. Herndon,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Cedric Dupree, an Illinois inmate, sued employees of the Illinois Department of

Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they had interfered with his right to

practice his religion in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc—cc‐5.  The district court

initially dismissed the complaint at screening, and we remanded, concluding that Dupree’s

complaint sufficiently stated claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA.  Dupree v.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1035 Page 2

Laster, 106 F. App’x 503 (7th Cir. 2004).  On remand the district court recruited counsel to

represent Dupree and, after a three‐day jury trial, entered judgment in favor of the

defendants.  Dupree appeals, but because he has failed to provide us with a trial transcript,

we are unable to consider many of his arguments.  See FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2).  Of those that

we are able to review, none has merit, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Dupree tried his First Amendment and RLUIPA claims before a jury and focused on

three incidents.  He claimed that the defendants violated his right to religious exercise when

they suspended him from attending group church services while in segregation, and when

they disciplined him for having a Bible in the “chow hall” and for gathering inmates for

prayer in the dietary unit.  After the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, Dupree filed

pro se a motion for a new trial or to set aside the jury verdict and three supplemental

motions for a new trial.  The district court treated the first three of his filings as motions for

a new trial under Rule 59(a) and his last filing as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from

judgment; the court denied each.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).  Dupree’s

attorney moved to withdraw, citing Dupree’s claim that he had received ineffective

assistance of counsel during the trial.  The district court granted counsel’s request and later

denied Dupree’s motion for reappointment of counsel.  

On appeal Dupree challenges the district court’s denial of his post‐trial motions.  His

most substantive arguments for a new trial are that the district court erred in allowing the

defendants to introduce evidence of his prior convictions and prison discipline,

misinstructing the jury as to the burdens of proof for establishing a violation under

RLUIPA, and not overturning the jury’s verdict denying his claim that the defendants

prohibited him from attending group worship.  Dupree also asserts that the court ignored

his complaints that he was not allowed to bring his legal documents to court, that on one

occasion the jury saw him in shackles as he exited the courtroom, and that he was not

allowed to present evidence that during the trial prison employees beat him in retaliation

for his lawsuit.  Each of these purported errors, Dupree contends, prejudiced his case and

warrants a new trial.

Ordinarily our review of a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is for an

abuse of discretion.  Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2008).  A

new trial may be granted only if the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, meaning “no rational jury” could have rendered the verdict.  Id. (quoting King v.

Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2006)).  At the outset, we note that Dupree has not

specified what his prior convictions or prison discipline were for, and thus we cannot

evaluate his claim that the district court should have excluded them at trial.  Moreover, we

are unable to determine whether the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence

or whether the purported errors prejudiced Dupree because he has not included a trial

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No. 09‐1035 Page 3

transcript in the record.  Without the transcript, we are unable to verify his claims or

conduct any meaningful appellate review of his arguments for a new trial.  See Learning

Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 731 n.10 (7th Cir. 2003); LaFollette v.

Savage, 63 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1995).  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(2)

provides that “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is

unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in

the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”  FED. R. APP. P.

10(b)(2); see Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 731 n.10.  Because Dupree’s arguments

require us to evaluate the trial evidence as well as steps taken by the district court to

minimize any prejudice, his failure to provide the transcript renders the arguments

forfeited.  See Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 731 n.10.  Dupree’s pro se status does not

prohibit this result.  See Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 1993) (dismissing in part

the appeal of pro se plaintiff for failure to provide transcript).  

We could order Dupree to supplement the record as authorized under Federal Rule

of Appellate Procedure 10(e), see LaFollette, 63 F.3d at 545, but we decline to do so here.  In

their response brief, the appellees gave Dupree notice of his obligation to have the transcript

prepared and the consequences of his failure to do so.  Despite this notice, Dupree has made

no attempt to secure a transcript.  See Learning Curve Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d at 731 n.10;

LaFollette, 63 F.3d at 545‐46.

We can, however, address a few of Dupree’s arguments on their face.  Dupree

complains that his recruited counsel was ineffective in failing to serve one of the defendants

who, Dupree contends, could have testified to support his claims.  But as the district court

correctly explained when it denied his Rule 59(a) motion, there is no Sixth‐Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case, so his dissatisfaction with counsel’s

performance does not warrant a new trial.  See Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir.

2001).

Dupree also contends that after this court’s remand, the case should have been

reassigned to a new district judge.  In his third supplemental motion for a new trial, he

relied upon Supreme Court Rule 36 in arguing that he was entitled upon remand to a

change of venue and hence a new judge.  Supreme Court Rule 36, however, governs the

custody of prisoners in habeas corpus proceedings, and the district court correctly noted

that the rule does not apply to Dupree’s case.  The court thus denied Dupree’s motion,

which it construed as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment because it was filed more

than ten days after the entry of judgment.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (2008) (amended Dec. 1,

2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); Talano v. Nw. Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.

2001).  Perhaps Dupree intended to rely on our Circuit Rule 36, which provides that

“[w]henever a case tried in a district court is remanded by this court for a new trial, it shall

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No. 09‐1035 Page 4

be reassigned by the district court for trial before a judge other than the judge who heard

the prior trial . . . .”  But Dupree’s case had been dismissed upon screening, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1), and remanded for further proceedings.  “Orders directing the district court to

undertake further proceedings are routinely heard by the district judge who entered the

order that was the subject of the appeal,” and Circuit Rule 36 does not require reassignment.

In re United States, 572 F.3d 301, 305 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009).  Dupree further asserts that

reassignment was necessary because the judge’s prior dismissal of the complaint

demonstrated his prejudice against the case.  Judicial rulings, however, rarely present a

valid basis to question a judge’s impartiality, Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994),

and Dupree has presented no reason why the judge could not fairly rule in his case

following remand, see Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Liteky, 510

U.S. at 551 (“It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same

case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.”).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dupree’s post‐trial

request for reappointment of counsel.  The court applied the correct legal standard and

based its decision on facts supported by the record.  See Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760‐

61 (7th Cir. 2010); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The court

considered Dupree’s arguments regarding the complexity of his claims and his experience

with mental illness, but noted that Dupree had been able to adequately file two pro se post‐

trial motions.  The court added that Dupree had found fault with each of the four lawyers

recruited to assist him and had simply been unable to maintain an attorney‐client

relationship.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the court’s decision to deny the

reappointment of counsel was reasonable.  See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658‐59.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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