Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02516/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02516-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2516

___________

The Estate of Robert Rudolph *

Hutchins, Deceased, Malcolm *

Richard Hutchins, Personal *

Representative, *

*

Appellant, * 

 * Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

 * Eastern District of Arkansas. 

Motel 6 Operating LP, previously *

identified as Accor North America, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Inc., d/b/a Motel 6 of Conway, *

Arkansas, *

 * 

Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2008

Filed: July 28, 2008

___________

Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Robert Rudolph Hutchins died of a hydrocodone overdose on February 28,

2003, in a motel room. His Estate sued Motel 6 Operating LP, claiming its agents

unreasonably delayed calling emergency personnel. After a jury allocated 70 percent

Appellate Case: 07-2516 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/28/2008 Entry ID: 3455508
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The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota, sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

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fault to Hutchins, the district court1

 entered judgment for Motel 6. Objecting to

evidentiary rulings, the Estate appeals the denial of its motion for new trial. Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

The Estate focuses on two pieces of evidence: (1) a page of notes from

Hutchins’s employment record from City Lumber Company, Inc. that his behavior

was affected by “prescription drugs,” and (2) a weather report that sunrise was at 6:40

a.m. on the date of death.

This court reviews for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for new trial.

Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1059 (8th

Cir. 2005). This court accords substantial deference to the district court’s evidentiary

rulings and reverses only if they amount to clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Id.

The Estate claims Motel 6 conducted discovery past the discovery deadline,

arguing the employment record and weather report were presented on the eve of trial.

The Estate asserts the district court should have excluded the evidence. 

The court did not clearly and prejudicially err by admitting the employment

record and weather report. Contrary to the Estate’s claims, it had notice before the

deadline of the employment record, and the option to order a copy shortly after the

deadline. As for the weather report, Motel 6 gave the Estate a copy before the final

pretrial conference, and it was the subject of one impeachment question at trial.

The Estate contends that the probative value of the employment record was

substantially outweighed by its prejudice, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The

Estate further argues the record should have been excluded under Rule 404(b).

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Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, allowing evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts relevant to any issue in the trial other than the criminal

disposition of the accused. United States v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 979 (8th Cir.

2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1388 (2007). “Evidence of prior acts may be admitted

if (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) proved by a preponderance of the evidence; (3)

higher in probative value than in prejudicial effect; and (4) similar in kind and close

in time to the event at issue.” Batiste-Davis v. Lincare, Inc., 526 F.3d 377, 380 (8th

Cir. 2008) (noting that the third requirement is “an analysis equivalent to that in Rule

403”). Evidence of other acts is relevant to a material issue where it shows proof of

knowledge. See Lakoskey, 462 F.3d at 980. The prior act must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence. See id. To be similar in kind, a prior act need not

involve the same drug as the past act. See United States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941

(8th Cir. 2006). There is no fixed period within which acts must have occurred to be

sufficiently close in time; it is a question of reasonableness under the circumstances.

United States v. Walker, 428 F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion: (1) the employment record

is relevant to the material issue of Hutchins’s knowledge of prescription drugs and

therefore relevant to Motel 6’s theory that his negligence caused his death; (2) the

employment record proved Hutchins’s drug-affected work behavior by a

preponderance of the evidence; (3) the probative value of the record outweighs its

prejudicial value, as the record helped the jury compare responsibility for the death;

and (4) prescription-drug use in the employment record is sufficiently similar in kind

to Hutchins’s hydrocodone overdose and occurred less than four months before his

death. 

The Estate also maintains that testimony by Hutchins’s girlfriend that he lost

his job at Wal-Mart because of drug use should not have been admitted under Rule

404(b). However, she did not state that Hutchins lost his job at Wal-Mart because of

prescription-drug use. When asked if he was “staggering around while on the job”

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from taking too many pain pills, she answered “yes.” Like the employment record,

this testimony is relevant and admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

 

The district court did not clearly and prejudicially abuse its discretion in

denying the motion for new trial. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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