Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04989/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04989-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Freddie has also filed a motion to strike a reference in the Commissioner's motion regarding

his offer to remand the case voluntarily for further administrative proceedings, which Freddie

contends is an inadmissible reference to settlement negotiations. As the Commissioner correctly

points out, Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence is inapplicable as the reference was made only

to explain the procedural history of this case and was not offered as evidence of the validity or

invalidity of plaintiff's claims.

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*E-FILED 4/23/07*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WANDA FREDDIE, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant. /

NO. 06-4989 RS

ORDER REMANDING MATTER

FOR FURTHER

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Wanda Freddie filed this action seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security finding her “not disabled.” Freddie has filed a motion for

summary judgment. The Commissioner has opposed the motion for summary judgment and seeks

remand of this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C § 405 (g). In response, Freddie has

indicated she does not oppose remand, on appropriate terms.1

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5, the matter has been submitted for decision without oral

argument. Upon consideration of the papers and the record herein, the matter will be remanded to

Case 5:06-cv-04989-RS Document 21 Filed 04/23/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 As discussed below, the question on remand will not be whether plaintiff is disabled now,

but whether she was disabled at any time after her original application but prior to April 19, 2005.

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the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings, on the terms requested by Freddie.

 II. BACKGROUND

In July of 2002, Freddie filed an application for social security benefits alleging that she had

become disabled as of July 16, 2001. After her claim was denied, Freddie sought a hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge. After taking testimony and reviewing medical records, the ALJ

issued a decision against Freddie in September of 2004. The Appeals Council declined to review the

ALJ’s decision, and this action followed.

In Freddie’s brief she represents that she filed a new application for benefits after the denial

of her first application. In October 2005, the Commissioner issued a decision with regards to the

new application and found that Freddie was disabled from and after April 19, 2005.

III. DISCUSSION

Freddie’s contention that she is and was disabled is based on a variety of claimed physical

and psychological ailments, which need not be recounted in detail here, given the Commissioner’s

acknowledgment that there was a “critical error” in the original administrative proceedings.

Specifically, the Commissioner "agrees that the ALJ did not appropriately consider Plaintiff's mental

impairment." Defendant's motion at 3:24-25. The Commissioner concedes that additional

proceedings would allow the Commissioner to obtain "medical expert testimony to clarify the nature

and extent of [plaintiff's] mental impairment, the date of disability onset, and whether the

[plaintiff's] mental impairment meet [sic] or equaled the severity of an impairment listed in the

Listings of Impairments." Defendant's motion at 3:26-28. Furthermore, the Commissioner also

concedes that the ALJ may reassess plaintiff's residual functional capacity if warranted.2

“If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding, a

social security case should be remanded.” Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir.1981)). Nevertheless, where “a rehearing would

simply delay receipt of benefits, reversal is appropriate.” Lewin, 654 F.2d at 635. This decision to

remand rather than simply reverse lies within the discretion of the court. Id.

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United States District Court

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 Because the matter is being remanded for rehearing, “reversed” in this context does not

mean that Freddie is immediately entitled to benefits or that the Commissioner will be precluded

from reaching the same result upon rehearing. To avoid confusion, appellate courts sometimes use

the term “vacated” instead of “reversed” under circumstances like these. Sentence four of 42 U.S.C

§ 405 (g), however, speaks of “reversing . . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”

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 As is the case any time a motion for summary judgment is granted, this does not mean that

all of the arguments made therein have necessarily been found to have merit.

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Despite agreeing that there were defects in the administrative proceedings and requesting

remand to remedy those defects, the Commissioner has requested that Freddie’s motion for summary

judgment be denied. The Commissioner’s proposed order states that the remand is made “pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C § 405 (g).” That sentence provides: “The court shall have power to

enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing

the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a

rehearing.” (emphasis added).

The Commissioner appears to be seeking a remand without an express statement that the

original decision has been “reversed.” The Commissioner’s concession of defects in the

administrative proceeding, and the request for a remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C § 405 (g),

however, is tantamount to a concession that the decision must be reversed.3

 Additionally, in effect,

Freddie’s motion will have been granted.4

In stating that she has no objection to remand, Freddie raises a concern that the October 2005

finding that she has been disabled since April 19, 2005 not be reopened for review. Freddie’s

subsequent application for benefits and the decision thereon are not part of the record in this

proceeding. For that reason, the October 2005 award of benefits will not be subject to

reconsideration as part of the remand hereunder. This proceeding, and the administrative rehearing

that will follow, concern only Freddie’s application for benefits made in July of 2002, alleging that

she had become disabled as of July 16, 2001. Because there is now a finding under a separate

application that Freddie has been disabled since April 19, 2005, all that remains to be decided in this

matter is whether she was disabled during any period between July 16, 2001 and that date. That

being said, however, the Court expresses no opinion as to the circumstances, if any exist, under

which the Commissioner might be entitled to initiate a proceeding to re-examine the October 2005

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decision or Freddie’s present condition.

IV. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C § 405 (g), the decision of the Commissioner is

reversed and this action is remanded for rehearing. Upon remand an Administrative Law Judge will

obtain medial expert testimony to clarify the nature and extent of plaintiff's mental impairment, the

date of onset, and whether plaintiff's mental impairment meets or equals the severity of an

impairment listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No.4 (20 C.F.R. 404.1527(f) and

416.927(f), and the Social Security Ruling 96-6p). The ALJ will also reassess plaintiff's residual

functional capacity if warranted. The scope of the ALJ's review on remand is limited to the period

between July 16, 2001 and April 19, 2005. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2007 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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