Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02853/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02853-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JWB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Hernandez 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-2853-PHX-DGC (JJM)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 91),

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. # 114), Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 110), and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 120). The Court will grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion, deny Plaintiff’s

motion, and dismiss this action with prejudice.

I. Background and Procedural History.

Plaintiff Edward Hernandez, a state prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights action on

September 19, 2005 regarding conditions in Special Management Unit II (“SMU II”), the

highest custody level in the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff’s

Complaint asserted the following claims against Defendants ADC Director Dora Schriro,

SMU II Deputy Warden Carson McWilliams, and ADC Correctional Classification Specialist

Dorinda Cordova. Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief.

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1

 Plaintiff alleges the following specific atypical conditions: (a) denial of outdoor

recreation, exercise equipment, direct sunlight, and fresh air; (b) constant illumination of his

cell; (c) lack of socialization or communication with other inmates; (d) denial of

environmental and social stimulation (e.g. visitation, phone visits, etc.); (e) denial of access

to prison programs (e.g. work, vocational, educational, recreational, etc.); (f) provision of a

reduced calorie “lockdown” diet; (g) denial of active or semi-active lifestyle; (h) visitation

limited in time and to non-contact visitation; (i) limited to 3 showers per week; (j) denial of

access to the inmate store for food, cold weather clothing, etc.; (k) limited access to

newspapers, music, etc.; (l) being subjected to “defecation watch”; (m) being subjected to

the overuse of shackles and security devices if sent to an outside court appearance; and (n)

being denied participation in sacred religious ceremonies.

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Count I: Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process rights have been

violated by his continued and indefinite detention in SMU II isolation, which has resulted in

the denial of a liberty interest, namely the interest in being free from continued indefinite

solitary confinement.1

 

Count II: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated

by: (a) indefinite solitary confinement; (b) the denial of outdoor recreation, direct sunlight,

fresh air and adequate clothing; (c) constant cell illumination; (d) reduced diet causing a

sedentary lifestyle; and (e) restricted social and environmental stimulation.

Count III: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free of excessive force has been

violated by the use of force in a malicious and sadistic manner, without showing any

disciplinary violation, but solely in retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of his right to remain

silent and an attempt to coerce him to waive that right.

Count IV: Plaintiff’s right to practice his religion has been substantially burdened by

Defendants in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

(RLUIPA). Specifically, Plaintiff claims he has been unable to practice his Native American

traditions because of his indefinite confinement in SMU II.

Defendants moved to dismiss Counts I and III of Plaintiff’s Complaint on January 3,

2006 (Doc. # 16). Defendants’ motion was initially granted on May 19, 2006 (Doc. # 36).

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 Warrior Society was designated as a Security Threat Group effective July 5, 2001

(Dunn Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 4. Doc. # 92).. 

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On reconsideration, however, Counts I and III were reinstated on October 18, 2006 (Doc. #

58). 

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on Counts II and IV of Plaintiff’s

Complaint (Doc. # 91). Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ summary judgment motion and

cross moved for summary judgment on October 4, 2007 (Doc. # 114). Defendants responded

to Plaintiff’s cross-motion, sought summary judgment on Counts I and III of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, and replied in support of their motion (Doc. # 110). Plaintiff replied with

evidence in support of his motion and responded to Defendants’ arguments (Doc. # 120). 

II. Underlying Facts.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff was validated as a member of a Security Threat Group

(STG) known as the Warrior Society2

 and, as a result, on December 19, 2003, he was placed

in a maximum custody arrangement known as SMU II. In SMU II, the inmates are severely

restricted in movement, and they lack privileges granted to inmates at lower custody levels.

Plaintiff filed the instant § 1983 action. 

Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment contending that

Plaintiff has not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in SMU II and that

Plaintiff’s religious exercise has not been substantially burdened (Doc. # 91). Plaintiff

responded and cross-moved for summary judgment, contending that because he has been

denied “meaningful review[s]” of his continued detention in SMU II, he has established a

violation of his due process rights. Specifically, Plaintiff acknowledges that while he is not

challenging the initial validation process, he does contest the lack of adequate process in the

Defendants’ review decisions (Doc. # 114 at 5). Plaintiff further alleges that the conditions

of confinement in SMU II violate the Eighth Amendment and he has been retaliated against

by the requirement that, to be transferred from SMU II, he must incriminate himself in a

debriefing process. In support of his motion, Plaintiff submitted copies of several reviews

of his STG status, the ADC’s policies regarding STG inmates, copies of depositions

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describing the living conditions in SMU II, and copies of grievances regarding the living

conditions in SMU II. 

Defendants replied and moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, contending that (1) Plaintiff was given more than adequate due process

in the periodic reviews of his placement; (2) there is no evidence to show that the conditions

violated the Eighth Amendment nor that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s health or safety; (3) there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s placement was retaliatory;

and (4) Plaintiff’s religious exercise has not been substantially burdened, and even if it had,

Defendants’ actions furthered a compelling government interest (Doc. ## 110, 111).

III. Summary Judgment Standard.

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is “to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, “to those

upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co.,

68 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after

adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56(e) compels the nonmoving party to “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleading.” The nonmoving party must do more than

“simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). There is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. Anderson, 477

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U.S. at 249. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence is “merely colorable” or “not

significantly probative.” Id. at 249-50. 

IV. Count I.

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violations of both his procedural and

substantive due process rights. 

A. Procedural Due Process.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot make out a due process claim because he has

received all the process he is due under the STG review procedures (Doc. # 110 at 2-3).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from

“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To determine whether a procedural due process violation has

occurred, a court engages in a two-step analysis. First, a court looks to whether the person

possesses a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest with which the state has interfered.

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Second, if the state has interfered with a liberty

interest, a court looks to whether this interference was accompanied by sufficient procedural

and evidentiary safeguards. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989);

see also Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s initial placement in SMU II implicates a

liberty interest requiring due process protections, nor could they after Wilkinson v. Austin,

125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005), in which the Supreme Court found that inmates in Ohio’s prison

system had a liberty interest in remaining free from maximum security segregation units. An

inmate may be deprived of his liberty interest as long as he is accorded the proper procedural

protections. For the initial decision to place an inmate in maximum custody, due process is

generally satisfied by notice of the factual basis for the placement and an opportunity to be

heard. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2395-97; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983). 

In the ADC, certain groups are designated as a STG to help minimize the threat that

gang activity poses to the safe and secure operation of the prison (Dunn Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 4.

Doc. # 92). A STG is defined under ADC policy as:

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Any organization, club, association or group of individuals, either formal or

informal (including traditional prison gangs), that may have a common name

or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members engage in activities that

include, but are not limited to: planning, organizing, threatening, financing,

soliciting, committing or attempting to commit unlawful acts or acts that would

violate the Department’s written instructions, which detract from the safe and

orderly operation of prisons.

(Id. ¶ 4). Validated STG members are housed in SMU II (Id. ¶ 12).

 The Warrior Society was designated as an STG effective on July 5, 2001 (Id. ¶ 5).

Plaintiff was validated as a member of the Warrior Society on December 7, 2001 (Id. ¶ 19).

The validation process included notice and a hearing, and an evaluation of certain criteria (Id.

¶¶ 6-10). The information relied upon to validate Plaintiff included the fact that Plaintiff

admitted he was a member of Warrior Society during a documented interview dated

September 29, 1998, and the fact that Plaintiff bears gang-specific tattoos on his neck, chest,

and left forearm (Id. ¶ 19; STG Validation Packet at 2, 25-26, Ex. 4, Attach. C, Doc. # 92).

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard at his

initial validation hearing. He also had an opportunity to appeal, which was denied (Doc. #

115, Ex. 15). On May 18, 2004, Plaintiff was transferred to SMU II.

Plaintiff does not contest the validation of his membership in the Warrior Society

(Doc. # 111 ¶ 13, Ex. 1 at 8). Thus, whether his due process rights were violated by his

initial placement in SMU II is not at issue. His proper validation as an STG member bears

on how much process he was due for his retention in SMU II. 

1. Retention in SMU II.

The parties dispute whether the review of Plaintiff’s continued retention in SMU II

violated due process. Plaintiff avers he has been denied adequate process in the Defendants’

review decisions that take place annually and keep Plaintiff in SMU II (Doc. # 114 at 15).

Specifically, Plaintiff states that the sole issue is that Plaintiff is denied a “meaningful

review” of his status when no actual misconduct is alleged to indefinitely confine him to

SMU II (Id.). Defendants responded that Plaintiff has been given reviews of his status

annually, and that absent security concerns, Plaintiff is able to be present, make a statement,

and present information to the Institutional Classification Committee (Doc. # 110 at 3).

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The requirements of due process are flexible and variable depending on the particular

situation being examined. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Traditionally, the amount of process due is determined by

the framework established in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This requires

considering (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of

an erroneous deprivation of such interest though the procedures used, and the probative

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. In

the prison context, the private interest of avoiding placement in SMU II “while more than

minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison system and its

attendant curtailment of liberties.” Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2395.

There is no precedent which sets forth the precise standard for the process that must

be accorded an inmate in Plaintiff’s circumstances. The starting place for this analysis,

however, is dicta in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). The Hewitt Court addressed the

degree of process due for an inmate who was placed in segregation following a riot and

pending an investigation of his role in the riot. The Court stated that due process required

only an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting the decision to place

him in segregation. Id. at 472. In a footnote, the Supreme Court addressed the type of

review required to retain an inmate in segregation. Administrative segregation “may not be

used as a pretext for indefinite confinement,” which means that prison officials must engage

“in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates.” Id. at 477 n.9. 

This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the

submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a

prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular

prisoner – which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the

inmate to administrative segregation – and on the officials’ general knowledge

of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for “proof” in

any highly structured manner.

Id. Prison officials are entitled to rely on their “purely subjective evaluations and predictions

of future behavior,” as well as their evaluations of risk to the institution. See id. at 474. 

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Prison officials view Plaintiff as an ongoing threat to security because he was

validated as a member of the Warrior Society STG (Dunn Decl. ¶ 23). He will not be

transferred from SMU II unless he renounces membership in the Warrior Society,

successfully debriefs, or successfully completes the STG Step-Down Program (Dunn Decl.

¶ 13). Plaintiff’s contention that he should be transferred because he has not committed any

misconduct while in prison misses the reason for his confinement. Plaintiff is confined

because of his STG membership, not his disciplinary history. Thus, his placement in SMU

II is not a “pretext for indefinite confinement.” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9. As long as

Plaintiff has an opportunity to debrief or participate in the step-down program and be

transferred, the risk of error in the retention process is minimal. Plaintiff acknowledges that

he can debrief to escape the “indefinite confin[ement]” of SMU II isolation (Doc. # 114 at

5). But Plaintiff protests that he refuses to incriminate himself and place a “snitch” label on

himself (Id.). Plaintiff has affirmatively avowed, however, that he is not challenging the

validation process (Doc. # 111 ¶ 13, Ex. 1 at 8). His claim that he cannot renounce and

debrief is an improper backdoor attack on the validation process. 

In addition to the open opportunity for debriefing and participation in the step-down

program, there are periodic retention reviews of Plaintiff’s classification in SMU II. As

indicated in Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 477 n.9, these reviews may be informal and

nonadversary, and prison officials are not required to accept additional evidence or

statements. 

Defendants claim the reviews occurred approximately every 180 days until February

13, 2006 when Plaintiff began receiving annual reviews (Crabtree Decl. ¶ 12). The time

between reviews is only one factor to be considered in determining whether due process has

been satisfied. Because there is no dispute that Plaintiff was properly validated as an STG

member and because he has an opportunity to debrief at any time, the time that has elapsed

between his retention reviews need not be brief. Annual reviews suffice.

In addition, Defendants have presented evidence that when the classification reviews

occurred, Plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to submit information (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff

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3

 Plaintiff has another opportunity to be transferred out of SMU II. The Court takes

judicial notice of Arizona Department of Corrections Department Order Manual 806.09

detailing the prison’s “STG Step-Down Program” wherein STG inmates may be transferred

to an “appropriate close custody housing unit in general population” after a period of 180

days. Arizona Department of Corrections, Department Order Manual 806.09, (Doc. # 92,

Ex. 4A). 

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has not submitted any evidence to the contrary. Indeed, he has submitted evidence that he

was given notice of subsequent classification reviews and had the opportunity to present

information to the committee (Doc. # 115, Ex. 7). These protections go beyond what was

required in Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9. Although Plaintiff believes these reviews were

pretextual because he would not be transferred without renouncing his gang membership,

there is no evidence to show any pretext on the part of the Defendants, who were entitled to

rely on his validation as an STG member. Because there is no evidence to show that

Plaintiff’s retention reviews contravened due process, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.3

B. Substantive Due Process.

In addition to asserting procedural due process rights, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges

that he has been denied his substantive due process rights by his confinement in SMU II

(Doc. # 1 at 4). “To establish a violation of substantive due process in this context, a plaintiff

ordinarily must prove that a challenged government action was ‘clearly arbitrary and

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general

welfare’. However, ‘[w]here a particular amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source

of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that

Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide

for analyzing [a plaintiff’s] claims’.’” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff does not support his allegation with any argument in his briefs. To the extent

he intended to challenge the procedures resulting in his placement in SMU II, those claims

are addressed above. 

After conviction, the Eighth Amendment “serves as the primary source of substantive

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4

 At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s reliance on the decision in Koch v.

Lewis, 216 F.Supp. 2d 994 (D. Ariz. 2001) is misplaced because the decision was vacated.

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protection . . . in cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and

unjustified.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). “Any protection that ‘substantive

due process’ affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best

redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

395 (1989). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to challenge the conditions themselves,

they are addressed in connection with Plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claims. 

Because any freestanding substantive due process claim is unsupported by Plaintiff,

Defendants will be granted summary judgment on such claim.

V. Count II.

Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the conditions of confinement in SMU

II violate the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff specifically challenges (a) his indefinite solitary

confinement; (b) the denial of outdoor recreation, direct sunlight, fresh air and adequate

clothing; (c) constant cell illumination; (d) reduced diet causing a sedentary lifestyle; and (e)

restricted social and environmental stimulation. The Court will address each allegation in

turn.4

A. Isolation and Restricted Social and Environmental Stimulation.

Plaintiff alleges that he has served 4 years in isolation and faces at least another 3

years. Courts must identify the specific conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment and

cannot rely on a vague conclusion of the “totality of conditions.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at

1247. The Ninth Circuit has found that “administrative segregation, even in a single cell for

twenty-three hours a day, is within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a

sentence.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1091-92). Even so, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the

harsh conditions such as SMU II can cause psychological harm. See Miller v. Stewart, 231

F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 2000) (in a death row case, experts stated that conditions such as

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 Moreover, as noted previously, Plaintiff has the opportunity to be transferred out of

SMU II through the prison’s step-down program.

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SMU inmates can cause psychological decompensation to the point of incompetency); Comer

v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing harsh conditions of Arizona’s

death row can adversely affect mental health). Other courts, however, have found that,

standing alone, the isolation inherent in segregation does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d

464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (“the isolation inherent in administrative segregation or maximum

custody is not itself constitutionally objectionable”); Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578,

581-83 (1st Cir. 1983) (no Eighth Amendment violation by confining inmate in indefinite

segregation that was otherwise satisfactory except for the virtually no communication or

association with other inmates, even when conditions caused depression). While it is clear

that something more than isolation is required to violate the Eighth Amendment, it is not

exactly clear what the standard is. Regardless, the Court need not reach that question

because the evidence does not show that Plaintiff is incarcerated in isolation. 

 Defendants submit evidence that SMU II inmates have a variety of opportunities for

social contact. They may (1) make one five-minute phone call per week, (2) send and

receive letters, (3) communicate with other inmates in the pod from cell to cell,

(4) communicate with staff and counselors, and (5) have non-contact visitation weekly for

two hours and up to four visitors (McWilliams Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, 20, 22, 23, Ex. 5, Doc. # 92).

They also have access to a library for reading and legal materials and may order materials

by mail, and they may have a television and walkman radio in their cells (McWilliams Decl.

¶¶ 17-18). 

At his deposition in March 2007, Plaintiff admitted that he availed himself of these

opportunities. He stated that he corresponded with his family members and he received

regular visits from family members. (Doc. # 92, Ex. 7 at 46-47). Plaintiff also has a

television and radio in his cell (Id. at 17-18). The evidence does not show that Plaintiff is

isolated to a degree that would violate the Eighth Amendment.5

 Defendants are entitled to

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summary judgment on this claim.

B. Recreation, Sunlight, and Fresh Air.

Defendants contended that effective November 29, 2005, the ADC increased the hours

in the exercise yard from 3 to 6 per week (McWilliams Decl. ¶ 24, Doc. # 92). Defendants

contend that 6 hours is constitutionally sufficient. They also assert that the yard is exposed

to fresh air and sunlight, and the inmate can see the sky through the steel mesh top (Id. ¶¶ 24-

25). Plaintiff responds that he is being completely denied outdoor recreation and the fact that

he now receives six hours per week of recreation does not change the fact that it is not

outdoors, but merely a “backdoor cell” with a skylight (Doc. # 114 at 14). Defendants reply

that the cell for recreation is an over-sized cell, with the roof open to the elements, which is

located contiguous to his pod (Doc. # 110 at 4-5). Defendants contend that while outdoor

recreation conditions are restrictive, they do not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.

They further contend that Plaintiff can work his major muscle groups by running in place,

walking, playing handball, and doing callisthenics (Doc. # 91 at 10).

The deprivation of outdoor exercise for inmates who are under long-term segregation

violates the Eighth Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). Five

hours of exercise per week has been found to be constitutionally sufficient. See Baptisto v

Ryan, 2006 WL 798879, at *33 (D. Ariz. March 28, 2006) (collecting decisions of the

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). Plaintiff admits that he now has

the opportunity for exercise six hours per week.

Plaintiff states that the exercise yard does not equate to outdoor recreation, and further

that he has been denied access to exercise equipment for four years. The recreation yard has

cement walls with a steel mesh top that allows fresh air and sunlight into the yard

(McWilliams Decl. ¶ 25). It is thus undisputed that in the recreation yard, Plaintiff has light,

except on days that are not sunny. Infrequent deprivation of sunlight, direct or indirect, does

not constitute a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 542 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). To determine whether an Eighth Amendment violation

has occurred, a Court should consider the circumstances, nature and duration of a deprivation

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of these necessities. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). “The more basic

the need, the shorter the time it can be withheld.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1287, 1259 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the official knew

of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

the official must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Here there is no evidence to show that these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference,

especially in light of Plaintiff’s failure to introduce evidence of a physical injury resulting

from the restrictions on his recreation. Defendants will be granted summary judgment on this

claim. 

C. Lighting.

Defendants acknowledge that one light in each cell in SMU II remains illuminated

twenty-four hours per day. Specifically, Defendants contend that the one security light

illuminated at night (between the hours of 10 p.m. and 4 a.m.)6

 is one seven-watt florescent

bulb. Defendants contend that the brightness of the security light is equivalent to a child’s

nightlight. The remaining three forty-watt light bulbs are on from 4 a.m. and 10 p.m.

Defendants posit that the security lights are necessary to serve the penological purpose

of enabling officers to perform health and safety checks each hour on the inmates. The

purpose of the safety checks are to ensure all inmates are in their cells and are alive. 

Plaintiff responds that the constant illumination has an impact on his physical,

psychological, and emotional state (Doc. # 114 at 28). Defendants reply that Plaintiff has

failed to articulate any specific instances of mental or physical harm resulting from his cell’s

illumination. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be given appropriate lighting. Keenan

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083,1090 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court finds that Defendants have

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demonstrated that the security light illuminated from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m. does not contravene

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Gonzalez v. Stewart, 2006 WL 2460634 at *2 (D.

Ariz., Aug. 22, 2006). This is especially true because of Plaintiff’s failure to specifically

articulate or demonstrate any mental or physical injury as a result of his cell’s illumination.

In light of this evidence, there is nothing to show that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference in dimming the lights at night for the purposes of inmate health and security.

As a result, Defendants will be granted summary judgment on this claim.

D. Food.

The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be provided with food that is adequate

to maintain health. Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1091; LeMaire v. Maas, 12 F.3d 1444, 1445-46 (9th

Cir. 1993). Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was given limited amounts of food as

punishment. Defendants assert that SMU II inmates receive a “diet consistent with a lessactive lifestyle” (McWilliams Decl. ¶ 27). Defendants further aver that a nutritionist

determines the adequate amount of calories for inmates with low levels of activity. Inmates

are fed three times daily during the weekend and twice daily on the weekends (Id.). 

Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to demonstrate that he is malnourished or

significantly underweight. There is no evidence to show that any of the named Defendants

were aware that Plaintiff did not receive the same quantities of food that other inmates in

SMU II were receiving. Without such evidence, deliberate indifference cannot be shown.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.

VI. Count III.

Plaintiff alleged that his placement in SMU II is retaliatory for his refusal to

incriminate himself and inform on others (Doc. # 1 at 6). A viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse

action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct and that such

action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights (or that the inmate

suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) was not narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate

correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th Cir. 2005); Hines v.

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Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997). These types of claims must be evaluated in light

of the deference and flexibility that must be accorded to prison officials. Pratt v. Rowland,

65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Defendants correctly contend that there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s refusal to

debrief interferes with his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. The Fifth

Amendment protects against disclosures that a witness reasonably believes could be used in

a criminal prosecution or leads to other evidence that might be so used. Hiibel v. Sixth

Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 190 (2004); United States v. Bodwell, 66 F.3d

1000, 10001 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendants assert that under prison policy, the information

obtained in a debriefing is not for the purpose of future criminal proceedings, but is to ensure

that the inmate has withdrawn from the STG, to provide information about the STG so it can

be managed, and to determine if the inmate requires protection (Dunn Decl. ¶ 14 & Attach.

A, Dep’t Order 806.06 (1.1)). There is no evidence to show that the information gained in

a debriefing has ever been used in a criminal proceeding by the State. See Baxter v.

Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317 (1976) (State did not seek make evidentiary use of silence at

a disciplinary hearing in any criminal proceeding). Thus, there is no evidence to show that

it would reasonable to believe that any disclosures Plaintiff made regarding gang

involvement would be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights were not implicated by the debriefing requirement.

Moreover, Defendants correctly contend that the evidence shows that Plaintiff’s

placement in SMU II is not retaliatory, but is for a legitimate correctional goal. It is not

disputed that Plaintiff is viewed by prison officials as an ongoing security threat because of

his validation as a gang member. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this

retaliation claim.

VII. Count IV.

Plaintiff has alleged that his placement in SMU II has substantially burdened his right

to practice his Native American religion (Doc. # 1 at 7). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that

he is not able to engage in pipe ceremonies and sweat lodges, possess red and blue

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headbands, wear his religious medicine bag outside his cell, obtain certain herbs, or work

with a spiritual advisor because Defendants will not hire one (Id.). 

Under RLUIPA, a government may not impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a confined person unless the government establishes that the burden furthers a

“compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). This “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive means”

test replaced Turner’s “legitimate penological interest” test. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). Under its own terms, RLUIPA must be “construed broadly

in favor of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. at 995 (citing

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). The Supreme Court has upheld RLUIPA against an Establishment

Clause challenge. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 

The inmate bears the burden of establishing prima facie that RLUIPA has been

violated and that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened. Warsoldier, 418

F.3d at 994 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). The government then bears the burden of

proving that the substantial burden on the inmate’s religious practice both furthers a

compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Id. at 995

(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b)). 

An inmate-plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that his religious exercise

rights have been substantially burdened. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. “[A] ‘substantial

burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon

such exercise.” Id. at 995 (quotations omitted). An inmate’s religious exercise is

substantially burdened “‘where the state . . . denies [an important benefit] because of conduct

mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify

his behavior and to violate his belief.’” Id. Even indirect compulsion can substantially

burden religious exercise. Id.

A. Sweatlodge Ceremonies

Plaintiff’s main complaint is that he is prohibited from participating in Native

American sweatlodges (Doc. # 1 at 6; Doc. # 114 at 63). Defendants acknowledge that

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sweatlodges are not permitted in SMU II because they require that the participant be outside

the view of security when they enter the sweatlodge and inmates housed at SMU II have the

highest institutional scores, requiring that they be in view of security at all times (Doc. # 92,

Ex. 9 ¶¶ 22-23). Defendants do not dispute that the SMU II prohibition on sweatlodges

constitutes a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise (Doc. # 91 at 14).

Consequently, the Court must determine whether the prohibition advances a compelling

governmental interest and is the least restrictive means available. 

1. Compelling Government Interest and Least Restrictive Means.

A defendant has the burden of showing that a substantial burden on an inmate’s

religious practice furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means

of doing so. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. Further, “‘prison officials must set forth detailed

evidence, tailored to the situation, . . . that identifies the failings in the alternatives advanced

by the prisoner.’” Id. at 1000 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Defendants argue that ADC’s prohibition on sweatlodges in SMU II is the least

restrictive policy to maintain the security of the prison. Prison security and safety are

compelling governmental interests. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 998. According to the affidavit

of Michael Linderman, Administrator of Pastoral Activities, ADC has limited resources and

staff and to enhance both the safety and security of its maximum security facilities, it restricts

the ability of SMU II inmates to gather in groups (Doc. # 92, Ex. 9 at ¶ 25). In general

population, where sweatlodges are permitted, inmates disappear from the view of security

when they enter the sweatlodge (Id. ¶ 23). Because inmates in SMU II are classified as the

most dangerous and require the most security, ADC does not allow inmates to disappear from

view of security or congregate in groups (Id. ¶ 22). This is sufficient to establish the

existence of a compelling governmental interest in maintaining safety of maximum security

facilities. 

ADC’s policy also appears to be the least restrictive means available. Because the

inmates in SMU II represent the most dangerous and violent inmates in ADC custody, it is

imperative to restrict their activities and monitor them closely (Doc. # 92, Ex. 5 at ¶ 11).

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Plaintiff has suggested no alternative that is less restrictive but still accommodates the ADC’s

compelling interests in security and safety.

Moreover, Plaintiff is permitted to practice his religion by engaging in other Native

American ceremonies during recreation time, receiving visits from a religious leader, and

practicing his religion in his cell. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

B. Pipe Ceremonies.

Plaintiff contends that he is prohibited from engaging in a pipe ceremony with a

spiritual advisor, not that he is prohibited from engaging in a pipe ceremony at all (Doc. #

114 at 38). Indeed, in his deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged that he is permitted to perform

his ceremonies while outside at recreation (Doc. # 92, Ex. 7 at 76). And Plaintiff has not

countered Defendants’ evidence that he is able to perform the ceremonies that produce smoke

outside (Doc. # 92, Ex. 9 at ¶ 18). Nor has Plaintiff submitted any evidence that he cannot

perform a pipe ceremony by himself. Plaintiff has not established that his religion has been

substantially burdened by the requirement that he perform his pipe ceremonies outside during

recreation. 

C. Red and Blue Headbands.

Plaintiff acknowledged during his deposition that he possesses headbands in the four

colors central to his faith (Doc. # 92, Ex. 7 at 80-81). Plaintiff has not articulated how his

religious exercise rights have been substantially burdened by not being permitted to possess

a blue headband. 

D. Medicine Bag.

Similarly, Plaintiff is permitted to wear his medicine bag in his cell and at recreation

(Doc. # 92, Ex. 9 at ¶ 11). If Plaintiff wishes to have a medicine bag in both places, he must

possess two of them because inmates are not permitted to wear medicine bags in transit (Id.

at ¶ 12). Plaintiff has not articulated how this prohibition has substantially burdened his

religious exercise. 

E. Herbs.

Plaintiff acknowledges that he is permitted to purchase his sacred herbs from an ADC

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approved vendor (Doc. # 114 at 43). Plaintiff’s complaint is that he would like to purchase

the herbs from another source or have them provided by family members because the ADC’s

vendor takes too long (Id.). Plaintiff is not entitled to purchase his supplies from any source

he chooses – and Plaintiff has not argued that he is unable to get the supplies that he needs

from the ADC’s vendor. The fact that Plaintiff is able to obtain the supplies he needs

precludes a finding that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened.

F. Spiritual Advisor.

Plaintiff requests that the ADC employ a Native American spiritual advisor (Doc. #

114 at 39), but Plaintiff acknowledged during his deposition that he conducts his religious

ceremonies during his recreation time without a spiritual advisor (Doc. # 92, Ex. 7 at 35).

Plaintiff has been informed that he must find a spiritual advisor to visit with him (Doc. # 92,

Ex. 9, Attach. B). Plaintiff has not demonstrated how being responsible for locating a

spiritual advisor to visit with him has substantially burdened his religious exercise.

VIII. Conclusion.

Defendants have demonstrated that no reasonable jury could find that they have

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As a result, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment as to all claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 91) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 114) is DENIED.

3. This action is dismissed with prejudice and the Clerk of Court must enter

judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 22nd day of January, 2008.

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