Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02457/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02457-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

r:ILED 

16 NOV 23 PH 2: 00 

ClE~t( > q ,), nt"tT;I~T C(}U~~T

.""':;t~:;''t :,,~liUcr vI' C!,l!~U",W,\ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AARON PACHITO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

CYNTHIA Y. TAMPKINS, 

Res ondent. 

Case No.: 15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

REPORT AND RECONIMENDATION RE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Aaron Pachito, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") challenging his December 12, 2012 jury conviction in 

San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD233973 for making criminal threats in 

violation of California Penal Code Section 422. [Doc. No. 10-1, at p. 158.] 

This Court has reviewed the Petition and exhibits [Doc. No.1]; respondent's 

Answer and supporting Memorandum of Point and Authorities [Doc. No.9]; the 

Lodgments submitted by respondent, including the state court record [Doc. No. 10]; and 

petitioner's Reply and supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities [Doc. No. 11]. 

For the reasons outlined below, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Court DENY the Petition in its entirety. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On November 30,2011, petitioner was charged in an Amended Information with 

one count of making a criminal threat in violation of California Penal Code Section 422. 

[Doc. No. 10-1, at pp. 10-11.] On December 12,2012, a jury found petitioner guilty of 

making a criminal threat. [Doc. No. 10-3, at p. 17; Doc. No. 10-13, at pp. 8-9.] 

Petitioner was sentenced to a total of eleven (11) years in state prison. [Doc. No. 10-14, 

at p. 33.] To reach the total of eleven (11) years, the trial court imposed three years for 

the violation of Section 422, doubled to six years because petitioner had a prior 

conviction that qualified as a strike under California's Three Strikes law, and then added 

another five years because petitioner had a prior conviction that qualified as a serious 

felony under California Penal Code Section 677(a)(1). [Doc. No. 10-1, at p. 158; Doc. 

No. 10-14, at p. 33.] 

On direct appeal, petitioner argued that: (1) the evidence is constitutionally 

insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 

a lesser included offense; (3) the trial court erred in admitting prior conviction evidence; 

(4) the trial court erred in giving instructions concerning petitioner's pre-trial statements; 

(5) the trial court improperly admitted prior acts evidence; and (6) cumulative errors 

adversely affected the jury's verdict. [Doc. No. 10-15, at p. 2-3.] The California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion filed on October 27, 2014. 

[Doc. No. 10-17, at pp. 1-31.] Petitioner raised the same arguments in a Petition for 

Review before the California Supreme Court. [Doc. No. 10-18, at pp. 2-3.] The 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the Petition for Review on January 21,2015. 

[Doc. No. 10-19, at p. 1.] The Petition in this case was then filed on October 28,2015, 

raising only the sufficiency of the evidence claim. [Doc. No. 1.] 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In reviewing a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, this Court gives 

deference to the state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner 

may rebut this presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 

2 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(l); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992). The following 

facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal's unpublished decision denying 

petitioner's direct appeal in Case No. D063925 (San Diego Superior Court Case No. 

SCD233973). 

Durae Delisle and [petitioner] began a relationship in 2007, and she 

gave birth to their daughter, N.P., in 2009. [Petitioner] has a history of 

domestic violence toward Delisle, particularly when under the influence of 

alcohol. 

In the spring of 2008, he slapped her in the face after hearing a 

message a man left on her phone. A few months later, he threw a cup of 

coffee at her face. It split her lip and broke a front tooth, requiring a root 

canal. In December 2008, he came home from a sporting event 'very, very 

drunk,' 'went on and on' about how much he hated her religion, and struck 

her 'very hard' on the side of her head, popping her eardrum. As she lay on 

the floor crying, he kicked her and smashed her head several times into a 

cupboard. She went to urgent care, and had pain in her ear for two to three 

weeks and difficulty hearing. 

On December 12, 2008, an officer with the San Diego Police 

Department responded to a call from Delisle. She had been crying, and she 

told the officer that she broke up with [petitioner] a few days earlier and he 

'wanted to physically fight with her and punch her face.' She reported the 

cup incident to the officer. 

In February 2009, when Delisle was two months pregnant, [petitioner] 

punched her in the stomach because he was upset about the pregnancy. 

About a month later, he became upset because she was crying while reading 

an e-mail. He was drunk, and he put both hands around her neck and choked 

her 'really bad' until she 'start[ed] to get dizzy.' He stopped for a few 

seconds, but then resumed choking her. She knew from experience that if 

she pretended to be calm he would calm down. 

In approximately April 2010, [petitioner] punched Delisle in the leg 

while she was seated on a bed along with N.P. He had agreed to stop 

drinking and abusing her. He was not drinking this time, which made her 

believe he would never stop the abuse. After this incident she took N.P. and 

left the area for several months. 

3 

15cv2457 ·JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 18
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

1 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

11 

12 

13 

14 

16 

17 

18 

19 

21 

22 

23 

24 

26 

27 

28 

At one point, Delisle went to Seattle, Washington, and stayed with a 

friend. [Petitioner] joined her in Seattle and they spent the night in a hoteL 

The following day 'he got really mad that he was spending so much money 

on hotel rooms' when he could be staying at the friend's house. The friend 

was afraid of [petitioner] and Delisle promised not to reveal the friend's 

address to him. He screamed at her as she was driving, and she pulled over 

and told him to get out of the car. He refused. She went into a cafe and 

called the police because she was afraid of him. When they arrived, he fled. 

In September 2010, Delisle returned to San Diego because she wanted 

to get orders for custody and child support In October 2010, she reported to 

a police officer that 'she got into an argument with her boyfriend, and he 

pushed her while she was holding their one-year-old daughter.' She told the 

officer '[s]he was afraid of him and ran out of the house to the neighbor's 

house next door and had the neighbors call 911.' 

In January 2011, Delisle obtained a restraining order against 

[petitioner]. According to Delisle, child protective services intended to 

remove N.P. from her custody unless she obtained one. Delisle and 

[petitioner] agreed he would have reasonable visitation with N.P. 

[Petitioner] broke the restraining order by calling her 'nonstop' about 

resuming their relationship. She did not want to do so because he was 

'drinking continuously,' and sometimes when he drank he was 'very 

violent.' 

In January 2011, Delisle reported to a police officer that he made 35 

calls to her within a few hours. The officer arrested [petitioner] for violating 

the restraining order. [Petitioner] told the officer he knew about the order, 

but he continued to call her because he 'needed to know whether or not she 

was dating someone else so that if she was, he could move on with his life.' 

He admitted to the officer that he had physically abused her. 

In one of [petitioner]'s calls to Delisle, he commented that he could 

pick the lock of her apartment door. That concerned her because she lived in 

'a very old building' and 'it would have been so easy to break inside.' She 

asked the police to give her safety tips, and they helped her with window 

locks and showed her 'how to block a door with a chair.' 

One night in February or March 2011, Delisle left her apartment to 

retrieve something from her car. [Petitioner] was outside her apartment, and 

4 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

he was 'very upset' because he had gotten into her e-mail account and saw 

she was corresponding with a man. He put one hand around her neck and 

choked her for approximately five seconds. After this incident, she obtained 

a criminal protective order against him. 

The night of March 24, 2011, Delisle received between 10 and 15 

phone calls while she was driving home. She believed they were from 

[petitioner] and she ignored them. When she arrived outside of her 

apartment she called him. She could tell from his tone of voice that he was 

'very, very angry: 'angrier than usual.' He wanted to see N.P. the following 

day, and Delisle had not called him for several days to schedule visitation. 

During the call, [petitioner] stated, 'You're lucky you called me, you 

fucking bitch, because I was just about to come over there and knock down 

your front door and murder you.' He added, 'I'm not going to hurt you, I'm 

going to murder you, and the restraining order is not going to protect you 

and the police aren't going to protect you.' He also said something to the 

effect of, 'Why the fuck didn't you answer your phone after I called you 

10 times, you fucking bitch. ' 

Delisle knew [petitioner] was at his home, which was approximately 

10 to 15 minutes from her apartment by car. She testified, '1 was afraid he 

was going to come over,' and, 'when he's drinking, if he comes over to my 

house, it's not a good situation.' When asked whether he could be violent, 

she responded, 'Of course.' Further, child protective services had been at 

her home that morning, and she believed she should report the incident to 

avoid having N.P. removed from her custody. [Footnote 2: "Delisle 

testified child protective services had visited her three times after N.P.'s 

name showed up in police reports pertaining to petitioner's conduct."] She 

testified, 'I'm afraid of him. I'm afraid of child protective services. I'm 

afraid of there being proof that he's calling me and I'm not reporting it. I'm 

afraid of the whole situation. It's a nightmare.' 

She decided to flag down a police officer to report the threats. She 

also decided to spend the night in a hotel, and as a 'safety precaution' she 

asked the officer, Cary Ochab, to escort her to her apartment and wait 

outside with N.P. while she grabbed some clothes. She paid approximately 

$60 for a room, money she would rather have had for other expenses. She 

returned home the next day and [petitioner] left her alone for several months. 

[Footnote 3: "The preliminary hearing was held in July 2011. The same 

month, Delisle contacted [petitioner] and asked him to pay his ordered child 

5 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 18
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

11 

12 

13 

14 

16 

17 

18 

19 

21 

22 

23 

24 

26 

27 

28 

support. Between then and September of that year they saw each other 

about five times and had sexual relations twice. He asked her to lie about 

his March 24. 2011, phone call, but she refused. After he was rude to her, 

she ended the relationship because it reminded her 'of his old ways' and she 

was afraid the violence would resume."] 

Officer Ochab testified Delisle "appeared nervous, anxious, almost 

like physically shaking, like she was concerned about something.' His 

report stated she told him [petitioner] said, 'Why the fuck didn't you answer 

the phone after I called you 10 times, you fucking bitch? I was about to 

come over and knock down your front door and kill you. I'm not going to 

hurt you, I'm just going to come over and murder you.' 

While Delisle was speaking with Ochab, [petitioner] phoned her. She 

put the call on speaker phone. She told [petitioner] he should not be calling 

her, and he responded, 'I don't care if you have a restraining order. It can't 

protect you,' and, 'I'm not afraid of the police.' Ochab could 'hear a male's 

voice going on a rant, yelling and screaming over the phone, making some 

reference to seeing his daughter.' Ochab attempted to interrupt 

[petitioner] several times, but he 'continued with his yelling and screaming.' 

Ochab later phoned [petitioner] and 'asked him about the threat that 

he made and kind of cautioned him about making such threats, especially if 

he was concerned about child custody in the future.' [Petitioner] asked 

Ochab, 'am I going out with her, if I was fucking her.' [Petitioner] did not 

deny threatening Delisle, but said 'he would never hurt her.' [Petitioner] 

'tended to agree ... that he should probably be a little more cautious with 

what he says towards Delisle.' He asked Ochab 'numerous times if I could 

just drop the case.' 

John Serrano, an investigator with the district attorney's office, 

conducted a recorded interview of Delisle in May 2011. When asked 

whether she denied being afraid of [petitioner], Serrano testified, 'No. She 

was definitely afraid of him.' He added, 'She said that she was constantly 

having to watch her back; she wasn't sure if he was perhaps sitting down the 

street, watching her come home, so she was definitely fearful of him.' 

Delisle told Serrano she was afraid to spend the night of March 24, 2011, at 

her home, 'and she said she wanted to spend the money [on a hotel room] to 

make sure that she was safe.' 

6 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 18
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

1 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

11 

12 

13 

]4 

16 

17 

18 

19 

21 

22 

23 

24 

26 

27 

28 

Josette Basso testified she and [petitioner] began a relationship in 

2001 or 2002, and he was frequently violent toward her. The first time, they 

were driving when he became angry over something 'silly' and slapped her. 

In 2002 they went to Big Bear and were having a good time in a bar, when 

he became 'very upset' [because] he felt she stayed in the restroom too long. 

He ushered her outside, where they argued. He grabbed her by the back of 

her head and pushed her head into a wall. 

In 2003, [petitioner] slapped Basso when she told him she had two 

male friends coming to visit from out of town. Later that evening, she heard 

[petitioner] 'screaming and yelling' that if she did not open her front door by 

the time he counted to 10 he was going to 'kick the door in.' He counted to 

five and kicked the door in, cracking it in half. He ran up the stairs and 

began choking one of her friends, who was sleeping on a couch. Basso 

threw her mobile phone to the friend and told him to call the police, at which 

point [petitioner] punched her, causing 'a very ugly black eye.' 

[Petitioner] and Basso were once kicked out of a bar after he made 

derogatory remarks to the female bartender. He became angry and Basso 

did not feel safe so she left in her car. She parked on a residential street and 

waited, hoping he would 'sober up and be in a better mood later.' She 

eventually phoned him, and he told her to 'get to his house immediately.' 

He met her at her car, took her purse, and guided her into his apartment. 

He rifled through her purse for her car keys, but could not find them. When 

she refused his request for the keys, he punched her in the eye, causing 

profuse bleeding. He took her to a hospital and she required 19 stitches over 

her eye. 

In April 2004, [petitioner] sent Basso threatening text messages, and 

then showed up at her home and threatened to hurt or kill her and her 

parents. At the time, a criminal case was pending against him for assaulting 

her, and he demanded that she not testify against him. She explained, 'I was 

scared for my life' because 'I believe he's capable of it.' She called the 

police, and the officer who responded retrieved text messages from Basso's 

phone that stated, 'F cunt, your dead same w family'; 'Liars, suffer or die!'; 

and, 'Kill you if you dare think cheating J no excuses!' 

[Doc. No. 10-17, at pp. 2-9.] 

III 

/ / / 

7 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard ofReview. 

Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to those who are in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "A 

federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law." Pulley 

v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,41 (1984). "[A] mere error of state law is not a denial of due 

process." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,327 (1997). 

AEDP A imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which 

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petition "on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States~ or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1 )&(2). For purposes of section 2254(d)(1), "clearly established Federal law" 

means "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the 

time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). 

Therefore, a lack of controlling Supreme Court precedent can preclude habeas corpus 

relief. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008). 

The AEDPA standard is highly deferential and "difficult to meet." Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Federal habeas relief may be granted under the 

"contrary to" clause of section 2254 if the state court applied a rule different from the 

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the 

8 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Supreme Court "on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 

685,694 (2002). The focus of inquiry under the "contrary to" clause is "whether the state 

court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable." ld. 

"[A]n unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." ld. In other words, 

federal habeas relief cannot be granted simply because a reviewing court concludes based 

on its own independent judgment that the state court decision is erroneous or incorrect. 

[d. Habeas relief is only available under Section 2254( d)( 1) "where there is no 

possibility fair minded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts" with 

Supreme Court precedents. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. In addition, "review 

under § 2254( d)( 1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 

the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, Federal Courts 

"look through" to the "last reasoned state-court opinion" and presume it provides the 

basis for the higher court's denial of a claim or claims. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-806 (1991). Ifthe state court does not provide a reason for its decision, the 

Federal Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether 

the state court's decision is objectively unreasonable. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 

947 (9th Cir. 2010). To be objectively reasonable, a state court's decision need not 

specifically cite Supreme Court precedent. "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent]," the state court's 

decision will not be "contrary to clearly established Federal law." Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

II. Review ofPetitioner's Sufficiency ofthe Evidence Claim. 

A. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law. 

The clearly established Supreme Court law for evaluating sufficiency of the 

evidence claims is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). With reference 

to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Jackson 

9 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

1 0 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

v. Virginia held that the "relevant question" for a Federal Court reviewing a sufficiency 

of the evidence claim by a state prisoner is "whether, after reviewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319,324 (emphasis in 

original). The role of the Federal Court on federal habeas review is not to re-weigh the 

evidence or to resolve conflicts in the testimony. "Once a defendant has been found 

guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved 

through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all ofthe evidence is to be 

considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Id. at 319. "[A] federal 

habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting 

inferences must presume - even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record - that the 

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that 

resolution." Id. at 326. 

The sufficiency of the evidence "must be gauged in light of applicable [state] law 

defining the e1ement[s]" of the offense. Id. at 324. California Penal Code Section 422 

provides as follows: "Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will 

result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the 

statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, 

is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its 

face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, 

immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and 

an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person 

reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate 

family's safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one 

year, or by imprisonment in the state prison." Cal. Penal Code § 422(a). 

Under California law, "it is the circumstances under which the threat is made that 

give meaning to the actual words used. Even an ambiguous statement may be a basis for 

a violation of section 422." People v. Butler, 85 Cal.AppAth 745, 753 (2008). "The 

10 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

circumstances surrounding a communication include such things as the prior relationship 

of the parties and the manner in which the communication was made." In re Ryan D., 

100 Ca1.App.4th 854, 860 (2002). "To constitute a criminal threat, a communication 

need not be absolutely unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. The statute 

includes the qualifier 'so' unequivocal, etc., which establishes that the test is whether, in 

light of the surrounding circumstances, the communication was sufficiently unequivocal, 

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the victim a gravity of purpose 

and immediate prospect of execution." [d. at 861. 

B. The Last Reasoned State Court Opinion. 

In its unpublished decision affirming petitioner's conviction, the California Court 

of Appeal responded to petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence argument by applying a 

standard of review equivalent to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Jackson 

v. Virginia. [Doc. No. 10-17, at pp. 9,13.] The California Court of Appeal concluded 

that the circumstances presented were more than enough to support a conviction under 

Section 422. [Doc. No. 10-17, at p. 12.] Although acknowledging that some of the 

language petitioner used was "conditional," the California Court of Appeal noted that: 

(1) Section 422 does not require an "unconditional" threat, because this would ignore the 

statutory qualification marked by the use of the word "so"; and (2) petitioner also made 

statements in the present tense that were not "conditional," such as "I'm not going to hurt 

you, I'm going to murder you, and the restraining order is not going to protect you and 

the police aren't going to protect you." [Doc. No. 10-17, at p. 12-13.] 

Other evidence cited in the Court of Appeal's analysis included petitioner's history 

of physically abusing the victim and her knowledge that he was capable of hurting her. 

The Court of Appeal also noted that the victim testified she could tell by petitioner's tone 

of voice that he was "very, very angry" and "angrier than usual" when he made the 

statements in question. [Doc. No. 10-17, at p. 12.] In addition, the Court of Appeal cited 

the responding police officer's testimony. He testified that the victim was "visibly upset" 

when he arrived and he was able to hear petitioner "ranting" on the speaker phone. The 

I I 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

18
1 officer further testified that the victim was so frightened petitioner would actually show 

2 up and harm her that she decided to spend the night in a hotel and requested a police 

3 escort to pick up clothing at her apartment. [Doc. No. 10-17, at p. 12.] 

4 C. Petitioner's Sufficiency oflhe Evidence Arguments. 

5 Petitioner believes the words he used during the telephone call with the victim at 

6 the time in question are insufficient to support a conviction under Section 422, because 

7 they were "conditional." [Doc. No.1, at p. 23.] He objects to the California Court of 

8 Appeal's reliance on the word "so" in Section 422 "to muddle the analysis." [Doc. No.1, 

9 at p. 23.] According to petitioner, the California Court of Appeal "ignore[d] the obvious 

1 0 conditionality of the statement and focuse[ d] on a fragment of it to find the immediacy 

11 element" and "[t]his was not a fair or accurate reading of the record." [Doc. No.1, at pp. 

12 24-25.] Petitioner believes his words, when viewed as a whole, did not convey "the 

13 prospect of immediate execution" of harm to the victim, particularly because he also 

14 spoke about seeing his daughter the following day, which indicated his goal in contacting 

15 the victim was to arrange to see his daughter. [Doc. No. 11-1, at p. 6-7; Doc. No. 10-17, 

16 at pp. 5,7; Doc. No. 10-9, at p. 65.] Instead, petitioner believes it is clear he only 

17 intended to "chastise" the victim for not answering her phone and to talk to her about 

18 visiting with his daughter. [Doc. No. 11-1, at p. 7.] There are at least two problems with 

19 petitioner's contentions. 

20 First, as noted above and in the California Court of Appeal's Opinion in this case, 

21 petitioner's interpretation of Section 422 is contrary to California law. California courts, 

22 including the California Supreme Court, have concluded that Section 422 does not 

23 require an unconditional threat. [Doc. No.1 0-17, at p. 11, citing People v. Bolin, 18 

24 Ca1.4th 297,339 (1998).] In other words, petitioner's argument challenges the California 

25 Court of Appeal's decision on an issue of state law. The California Supreme Court has 

26 resolved this issue against petitioner, and issues of state law are not cognizable on federal 

27 habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,67-68 (1991) (reiterating that "federal 

28 habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law" and stating that "it is not the 

12 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court detenninations on state-law 

questions"). 

Second, petitioner's contention that the California Court of Appeal unfairly 

focused on some of his statements to the victim and ignored others in order to affirm his 

conviction is not a viable challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

conviction. Specifically, petitioner contends that the California Court of Appeal focused 

on his unconditional statements to the victim (i.e., that "I'm not going to hurt you, I'm 

going to murder you, and the restraining order is not going to protect you and the police 

aren't going to protect you") and unfairly ignored his remaining "past conditional" 

statements (i.e., that "[y]ou're lucky you called me, you fucking bitch, because I was just 

about to come over there and knock down your front door and murder you"). [Doc. No. 

10-17, at pp. 5-6, 12-13; Doc. No.1, at p. 23 (emphasis in original).] Petitioner believes 

these "past conditional" statements "did not convey the prospect of immediate 

execution" that is required under Section 422. [Doc. No.1, at p. 23-24 (emphasis in 

original).] In addition, petitioner believes that the Court of Appeal ignored testimony 

indicating the purpose of his telephone call to the victim was to arrange for visitation 

with his daughter. [Doc. No.1, at p. 42.] At most, petitioner has cited conflicting 

evidence in the record, and, as explained above, the standard of review set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, does not permit a reviewing court to 

re-weigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence. Rather, a reviewing court must presume 

that the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in favor of the prosecution. [d. at 326. 

Petitioner's other "factual omission" arguments similarly challenge the weight or 

emphasis afforded conflicting evidence in the record. [Doc. No.1, at pp. 23-26.] For 

example, petitioner argues there is insufficient evidence to indicate the victim suffered 

from "sustained fear" as a result of his words at the time in question, because she testified 

she did not always take his words literally and he said things "all the time" that she knew 

not to take seriously. [Doc. No.1, at p. 25; Doc. No. 10-11, at pp. 46-48; Doc. No. 11-1, 

at p. 8.] In addition, the victim testified she "wasn't thinking that [petitioner] was going 

13 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to come over or not come over" at the moment when she contacted the police officer. 

[Doc. No. 10-11, at pp. 48-49; Doc, No, 11-1, at p. 8-9.] She said she had been 

contacted by child protective services (CPS) the same day, and she was afraid they were 

going to take her daughter away if he came over to her house and she let him come 

inside. Her fear of CPS was equal to her fear of petitioner. [Doc. No. 10-11, at pp. 49­

53.] In connection with a separate issue petitioner raised on direct appeal, the California 

Court of Appeal concluded this testimony was "unavailing because it [did] not pertain to 

[petitioner's] threats of March 24, 2011. It was merely general information about their 

relationship." [Doc. No. 10-17, at p. 14.] 

Once again, it is apparent that petitioner's view is that sufficient weight was not 

afforded the victim's conflicting testimony indicating she did not always take his words 

seriously and did not necessarily believe he would go over to her house after threatening 

her on the telephone. The cited testimony only indicates there is conflicting evidence in 

the record on the victim's state of mind. As noted above, other testimony indicated the 

victim was afraid of petitioner because of their history and was so afraid petitioner would 

go over to her home after he made the threatening statements to her on the telephone that 

she flagged down a police officer, decided to spend the night in a hotel, and asked the 

police officer to escort her to her apartment and wait outside while she grabbed some 

clothes. [Doc. No. 10-17, at pp. 6-7.] As noted above, when the record includes 

conflicting inferences, a reviewing court "must presume - even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record - that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in 

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Id. at 326. 

Petitioner also argues that the evidence is insufficient to show an "immediate 

prospect of execution" under Section 422, because he only spoke to the victim by 

telephone while he and the victim were separated by a distance of ten miles. [Doc. No.1, 

at pp. 23,41; Doc. No. 11 1, at p. 9.] However, this argument also goes to the weight 

given conflicting evidence in the record as the victim testified she was afraid petitioner 

would go to her house. There is other evidence indicating that a relatively short distance 

14 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of ten miles was not enough to protect the victim from threat of violence. In addition, 

California courts have also decided this issue against petitioner. For example, the 

defendant in People v. Gaut, 95 Cal.App.4th 1425 (2002), called his girlfriend from jail 

while he was awaiting his parole hearing and told her she was going to die. Id. at 1428­

1429. Fearing his release, the girlfriend went to the parole hearing and gave police a 

recording of the defendant's telephone messages. Id. at 1429. Based on the recorded 

messages, the defendant was convicted of making criminal threats under Section 422 and 

appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, because he was 

incarcerated when he made the threats. Id. at 1427. The California Court of Appeal 

concluded the telephonic threats conveyed an immediate prospect of execution even 

though he was incarcerated and was unable to immediately carry out the threats when he 

made the calls. Id. at 1430-1432. See also People v. Wilson, 186 Cal.app.4th 789,814­

819 (2010) (upholding conviction under Section 422 based on threats made by a prisoner 

against a correctional officer that he would "blast" the correctional officer when he was 

released from prison in ten months). Once again, issues of state law are not cognizable 

on Federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Based on the evidence cited by the California Court of Appeal, a rational jury 

could infer that petitioner specifically intended his words at the time in question to be 

taken by the victim as a threat to carry out acts of physical violence against her that could 

result in "death or great bodily injury." CaL Penal Code § 422(a). A reasonable jury 

could also conclude from the cited evidence that petitioner's statements to the victim at 

the time in question were "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to 

convey to the [victim], a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of 

the threat" and that petitioner's words caused the victim to "be in sustained fear" for her 

safety. Cal. Penal Code § 422(a). Accordingly, it is this Court's view that the California 

Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply the clearly established Supreme Court law 

set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307. Nor is the California Court of Appeal's 

15 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

rejection of petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence argument contrary to clearly 

established Supreme Court law as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia. 

III. Application ofAEDPA Deference. 

The Petition also raises a procedural issue. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in 

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Frantz v. 

Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008), petitioner argues that his sufficiency of the evidence 

claim "must be reviewed outside of AEDPA deference." [Doc. No.1, at p. 40.] 

According to petitioner, the deferential standards set forth under AEDP A do not apply in 

this case, because the California Court of Appeal's decision is based on an unreasonable 

application of Federal law or on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented. In support of this argument, petitioner cites the alleged 

"misstatements [or omissions] of fact" discussed in the previous section that he believes 

are essential to evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. [Doc. No.1, at pp. 23-26,40­

45; Doc. No. 11-1, at p. 8.] 

In Panetti v. Quartennan, 551 U.S. 930, the Supreme Court concluded that a state 

court's adjudication of a habeas petitioner's claim "resulted in a decision ... that 

involved an unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law under 

Section 2254(d)(l). According to the Supreme Court, the state court's decision involved 

an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law, because a full 

and fair hearing was constitutionally required under the circumstances, but the state court 

did not provide the petitioner with this procedural safeguard. As a result, the Supreme 

Court agreed with the petitioner's argument that Federal habeas review of his 

incompetency claim was "unencumbered by the deference AEDPA normally requires" 

under Section 2254(d). [d. at 948-952. In other words, the petitioner was entitled to 

consideration of his claim in Federal Court on the merits "without deferring to the state 

court's finding of competency." [d. at 954. 

Similarly, in Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 

state court's decision was "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined 

16 

15cv2457 -JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

18
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

by the Supreme Court" under Section 2254( d)( 1). According to the Ninth Circuit, the 

state court misapplied clearly established Supreme Court law when it denied the 

petitioner's claim based on harmless error analysis, because the petitioner had a viable 

claim of structural error, which is not amenable to harmless error analysis. 733. Guided 

by the Supreme Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, the Ninth 

Circuit considered the petitioner's claim "de novo" without the deference normally 

required under AEDPA. ld. at 735-739. 

Here, the Supreme Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, and 

the Ninth Circuit's decision in Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, do not apply. For the 

reasons outlined more fully above in the preceding section of this Report and 

Recommendation, the decision of the California Court of Appeal in this case is not 

contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law. Nor does the California Court of 

Appeal's decision involve an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme 

Court law. As noted above, the clearly established Supreme Court law for evaluating 

sufficiency of the evidence claims is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307. The 

California Court of Appeal responded to petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim by 

applying a standard of review equivalent to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court 

in Jackson v. Virginia and reached a determination based on the evidence in the record 

that is objectively reasonable. For the reasons outlined in the preceding section of this 

Report and Recommendation, neither the reasoning nor the result of the California Court 

of Appeal's decision in this case contradicts clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

Moreover, there is more than enough evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict 

even if petitioner's claim is considered under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia 

without the deference required by AEDPA. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that 

the District Court REJECT petitioner's contention that his sufficiency of the evidence 

claim "must be reviewed outside of AEDPA deference." [Doc. No.1, at pp. 23-26,40­

45.] 

/ / / 

17 

15cv2457-JAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

18
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

1 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

11 

12 

13 

14 

16 

17 

18 

19 

21 

22 

23 

24 

26 

27 

28 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Judge pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil Local 

Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. 

Based on the parties' moving and opposing papers and exhibits, IT IS HEREBY 

RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an order: (1) approving and adopting 

this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that judgment be entered DENYING 

the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than December 30,2016 any party to this 

action may file and serve written objections to this Report and Recommendation. The 

document should be captioned "Objection to Report and Recommendation. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall be filed and 

served no later than January 16, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to fi1e 

objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appear 

of this Court order. Martinez v. fist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November :2.:7,2016 

l-1on. Kare raw ford 

United States Magistrate Judge 

18 

15cv2457-lAH(KSC) 

Case 3:15-cv-02457-JAH-KSC Document 12 Filed 11/23/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

18