Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00519/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00519-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOMER TYRONE LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN TILTON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-519-OWW-DLB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT AND REQUIRING PLAINTIFF

TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Homer Tyrone Lewis (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action

on April 2, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious;” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) &

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.

A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on

the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to

a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were

not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation State Prison in Corcoran, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff

names as defendants: James E. Tilton as Director of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Derral G. Adams, as Warden of California State Prison –

Corcoran; James D. Hartley, as Associate Warden; M.H. Botello, as Correctional Captain; C.M.

Boyer and D.B. Scaife, as Correctional Sergeants; and Correctional Officer J. Corbin, in their

individual and official capacities. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages,

reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, and other equitable relief.

Because plaintiff sets forth all of his factual allegations in narrative form and then lists

separately his claims for relief, some difficulty in ascertaining the precise bases for plaintiff’s

claims results. 

Plaintiff appears to allege that, in retaliation for his filing grievances regarding the

conditions of confinement in the Protective Housing Unit (PHU) and for staff misconduct as to

Corbin’s “over-familiarity” with another inmate, plaintiff was subjected to “Hatred and Prison

Guard (‘Retaliation’).” Plaintiff alleges that, because of his use of the grievance system: (1)

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Corbin attempted to secure plaintiff as a confidential-informant such that his safety in the PHU

would be put in jeopardy; (2) that when plaintiff refused to become a confidential-informant,

Corbin became very upset; that thereafter, plaintiff was removed from the PHU to the SHU based

on allegations subsequently deemed un-true by inmate J. West, which had been made at the

behest of Corbin; (3) that Corbin made false accusations against plaintiff in attempt(s) to

facilitate an unwarranted lock-up order; (4) Corbin broke into plaintiff’s “legal mail” and

ascertained that plaintiff’s complaints were about Corbin; (5) that Corbin falsely accused plaintiff

of making threats against another PHU inmate and secured plaintiff’s transfer to the SHU to

silence and humble plaintiff in to refraining from filing further grievances; (6) that Corbin

requested law library staff to monitory all of plaintiff’s legal mail being sent out; (7) that prison

officials are engaged in a conspiracy to transfer plaintiff to another prison knowing plaintiff has

an open-contract on his life due to his testimony against gang members; and (8) that plaintiff has

been denied the right to seek the assistance of a known “Jailhouse Lawyer.” 

C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Aside from his claims of retaliation, it is, at best, unclear which specific constitutional 

claims plaintiff is attempting to pursue in this action. Based on the allegations in plaintiff’s

complaint, he may be able to plead some claims for relief under section 1983, that are not yet

cognizable to the court. However, a number of the events complained of by plaintiff, as plead,

do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. 

The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that

complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant’s name, what action that defendant

took or failed to take, and why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for filing inmate grievances). In

the subsections that follow, the court will provide plaintiff with the legal standards that, based on

plaintiff’s allegations, appear to be applicable. Plaintiff should utilize the legal standards

provided in this order for guidance when filing his amended complaint.

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

Plaintiff has named seven defendants in this action. However, as best as the court can

decipher, plaintiff only states facts as to wrongful acts which are attributed to one defendant –

Corbin. In order to proceed under section 1983, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a

claim that each defendant named in the complaint either acted or failed to act in a manner that

was adverse to plaintiff and that the defendant(s) did so in retaliation against plaintiff for either

litigating in court or filing inmate grievances. Plaintiff is cautioned that in his amended

complaint, he must clearly identify what actions or omissions led to the violation of his rights and

which defendants were responsible for the acts or omissions.

2. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

firmness” from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770

(9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, 486

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing

inmate grievances are protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate

against inmates for engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will

be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in

this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action

taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary

confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation

for filing grievances); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative

segregation for filing grievances); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang

member for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory

issuance of false rules violation and subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory

prison transfer and double-cell status); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch

and approached by other inmates and threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-

32 (retaliatory reassignment out of vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

Plaintiff states that his constitutional rights were violated by the unjustified and

“penologically” unnecessary retaliation, interference, and punishment of the plaintiff by the

defendant(s) in their malicious and conspiratorial transfers of him from the PHU to the SHU so

as to place plaintiff’s life in danger to punish, humble, and silence plaintiff from filing inmate

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

grievances and pursuing his constitutional rights for redress. Doc. 1, pg. 14, para 38. Thus,

plaintiff has alleged the requisite elements for retaliation. However, plaintiff has failed to name

any defendants in connection with his claims of unconstitutional retaliation. It appears that

Corbin may have engaged in retaliation against plaintiff, but plaintiff does not clearly so allege. 

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim for retaliation against any of the named

defendants. 

3. Interference with Plaintiff’s use of the Prison Grievance System

To the extent plaintiff attempts to state a claim relating to the processing of his use of the

grievance system within the prison, plaintiff is advised that, “[a prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v.

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.

Ill. 1982)); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (Liberty interests created by state law are

generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence

of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); see also Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). The

failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation, and a prison official’s

involvement and actions in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis

for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. There is no constitutionally

protected right to an appeals process and there is no constitutionally protected right to a particular

outcome. Even if interference with plaintiff’s use of the prison grievance occurred in retaliation

for his prior use of that system, defendants’ actions in interference with and/or reviewing and

issuing decisions on the appeals do not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under

section 1983. Therefore, any claims plaintiff is attempting to assert, regarding the interference

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

with his use of the prison grievance system do not rise to the level of a protected constitutional

right. 

4. Interference with Plaintiff’s Mail

a. Personal Correspondence

Plaintiff does not appear to allege that his personal correspondence was handled in

violation of his constitutional rights. However, the court provides the following for plaintiff’s

reference in the event that he intended to state such claims that the court is simply unable to

decipher from his complaint. 

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52

F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are

analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-

91 (1987). Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In determining the

reasonableness of the regulation, the court must consider the following factors: (1) whether there

is a “valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put

forward to justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right,” (3) the

impact that the “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other

inmates,” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.

 Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional violations by the defendant(s) as he fails: to attribute

such denials to any specific defendant(s); to state any specific facts relating to such alleged

denials/interference with his personal mail; and to identify the regulation (if any) that such

denials were auspiciously conducted under. 

b. Legal Correspondence

The mere fact that prison officials open and conduct a visual inspection of a prisoner’s

legal correspondence does not state a claim for violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974); Mitchell v. Dupnick, 75 F.3d 517, 523 (9th

Cir. 1996). Prison officials may, consistent with the First Amendment, open mail from attorneys

in the presence of the prisoner for visual inspection. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

576-7 (1974); Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1981). In Wolff v.

McDonnell, the Supreme Court noted that inspecting mail from attorneys in the presence of the

inmate did all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires. Id. at 577. The issue of

whether or not prison officials may also, consistent with the First Amendment, open and visually

inspect mail from attorneys outside the presence of the prisoner has not been decided by the

Supreme Court or by the Ninth Circuit. In Wolff v. McDonnell, the legal mail at issue was mail

sent to respondent from his own attorney. Correspondence between an attorney and a client is

entitled to special protection under the attorney-client privilege. 

“Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.” 

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). “All correspondence from a court to a

litigant is a public document, which prison personnel could if they want inspect in the court’s

files.” Id. at 1094 citing to Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, plaintiff

does not have a protected interest in not having his mail to and from the court’s opened and

examined by prison officials.

Plaintiff fails to state whether the “legal mail” he refers to as being tampered with is

correspondence with the courts, with his retained attorney, or with the prison grievance system,

although it appears to possibly be the latter. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that Corbin took it upon himself to retrieve plaintiff’s outgoing mail,

break the seal, and discover the contents were about Corbin, do not rise to a violation of

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Likewise, Corbin’s request that law library peace officers keep a

“close-eye” and record of any/all plaintiff’s “legal mail” being sent out does not rise to a

violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff is referred to the discussion above under “3. Interference with Plaintiff’s use of

the Prison Grievance System” for the thefts of plaintiff’s mail regarding his filings within the

prison grievance system. 

Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for any violation of his constitutional rights as a

result of interference with his correspondence. 

/ / /

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

5. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiff alleges that his being transferred from the PHU to the SHU so as to place his life

in danger to punish, humble an silence him, constituted cruel, unusual, and unjust treatment. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal

quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution

or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). An officer

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

can be held liable for failing to intercede only if he had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede. 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). 

It appears to the court that plaintiff alleges that Corbin made false allegations against

plaintiff, to secure his transfer from the PHU to the SHU, so as to place plaintiff’s life in danger

as a means of punishing, humbling and/or silencing plaintiff into refraining from filing

grievances. This does not amount to the use of excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel

and Unusual Punishments Clause.

Plaintiff has not alleged specific action(s) against any of the other named defendant(s) to

support claims for failure to intercede on his behalf. Additionally, plaintiff fails to allege what, if

any injury he sustained, as a result of his transfers from the PHU to the SHU and back again.

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of his constitutional rights due to cruel

and unusual punishment.

6. Failure to Protect

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9 Cir. 1982); see also Farmer v. Brennan

th

511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1313 (9 Cir. 1995). However, to prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner may rely on th

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish

knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1995). th

To grant injunctive relief concerning serious risks to the inmate’s safety, the court must

find that at the time the relief will be granted there is still a serious, present risk to the inmate and

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

that the prison officials are still acting with deliberate indifference to that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 845-47; see also Helling v. McKInney 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993) (discussing injunctive relief

where there is a threat of harm to inmate’s health).

The Ninth Circuit has held that placing a pre-operative transsexual, who acts and dresses

effeminately, in the prison’s general population evidenced of deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848-49; cf. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2 1435,

1444-45 (9 Cir. 1991)(en banc)(concluding that placing a young pre-trial detainee in a cell with th

a known aggressive sexual offender was deliberate indifference to the detainee’s safety). The

Ninth Circuit has also held that allegations that prison officials called a prisoner a “snitch” in the

presence of other inmates were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to an inmate’s

safety. See Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9 Cir. 1989). But see also th

Morgan v. MacDonald 41 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (9 Cir. 1994) (rejecting Eighth Amendment th

claim where prisoner who had been labeled a snitch had not been retaliated against). 

Plaintiff asserts that on October 18, 2005 he was moved from the PHU to the SHU, and

that the next day, after the charging allegation was deemed untrue, he was released from the

SHU. Doc. 1, pg. 10. Plaintiff asserts that on March 24, 2005, he was placed in the SHU; that on

March 28, 2005 he was assessed as posing no threat to inmate West, and “shortly thereafter” was

released from the SHU and returned to the PHU. Doc. 1, pg. 12. It appears to the court that

plaintiff might be attempting to assert that Corbin instigated erroneous charges against plaintiff

so as to instigate plaintiff’s transfers from the PHU to the SHU; that in doing so, Corbin knew of

the basis for plaintiff’s original placement in the PHU (due to plaintiff’s activities of testifying

against gang members regarding gang related activities of various inmates and that a contract

exists on plaintiff’s life as a result) such that plaintiff’s life would be in danger on transfer to the

SHU. However, the facts do not show any injury or damage to plaintiff as a result of his transfers

from the PHU to the SHU. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of his

constitutional rights in this regard. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Administrative segregation is a catch-all phrase for any non-punitive segregation. For 1

example, prisoners may be segregated to protect them from other inmates, to protect other

inmates from the segregated prisoner, or pending investigation of disciplinary charges, transfer,

or re-classification. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468. 

12

7. Due Process – Liberty

Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated when

he was denied a fair hearing and protection prior to his removal from the PHU and transfer to the

SHU. 

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the

Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” 

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). 

The Supreme Court has concluded that the Due Process Clause itself does not grant

prisoners a liberty interest in remaining in the general population, see Sandin v. Conner 515 U.S.

472, 485-86 (1995) and Hewit, 459 U.S. at 468 or in not losing privileges, Baxter v. Palmigiano

425 U.S. 308, 322 (1976). 

However, when a prisoner is placed in administrative segregation , prison officials must, 1

within a reasonable time after the prisoner’s placement, conduct an informal, non-adversary

review of the evidence justifying the decision to segregate the prisoner. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at

473. 

Under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-

84 (1995). Such interests are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff asserts that on October 18, 2005 he was moved from the PHU to the SHU, and

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

that the next day, after the charging allegation was deemed untrue, he was released from the

SHU. Doc. 1, pg. 10. Plaintiff also asserts that on March 24, 2005, he was placed in the SHU;

that on March 28, 2005 he was assessed as posing no threat to inmate West; and “shortly

thereafter” was released from the SHU and returned to the PHU. Doc. 1, pg. 12. Assuming that

moving plaintiff from the PHU to the SHU falls under administrative segregation, plaintiff has

failed to show that the review of the evidence against him was not conducted within a reasonable

time from his removal from the PHU and placement in the SHU (the first review and result

occurred within 24 hours, and the second review and result occurred within just a few days). 

Plaintiff did not allege that either of his removals from the PHU and placement in the SHU

occurred without review. Thus, plaintiff has not stated a violation of his constitutional rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

8. 1 Amendment – Access to Jailhouse Lawyer. st

A prisoner’s legal assistance to other inmates is protected by the First Amendment. See

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9 Cir. 1985). Prison officials must allow prisoners to th

assist one another with habeas corpus petitions, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490

(19969), and with civil rights actions, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-580 (1974),

where the state does not provide assistance. 

Plaintiff fails to state any facts to support his allegations as to interference with his

contact with other inmates in relation to his civil rights actions. Plaintiff also fails to name,

which, if any specific defendant denied him the ability to provide assistance to and/or receive

assistance from another inmate regarding his civil rights claims. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for violation of his constitutional right in this regard. 

9. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff indicates a number of violations by staff designated to the PHU, which were

apparently the basis and/or subject of plaintiff’s use of the grievance system for which he feels he

is now being retaliated against. Doc 1, pg. 8. However, the court is unable to discern whether

plaintiff is making any claims at this time for constitutional violations regarding the conditions of

his confinement. Plaintiff does not name any defendants he feel are responsible for those

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

violations. Yet, the court provides plaintiff the necessary law for making claims regarding the

conditions of his confinement which must be met when/if he files an amended complaint. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective

prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under

the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that

inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

As stated above, plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim for relief under section 1983

for violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding his conditions of confinement in as much as he

has not named any specific defendant actors, nor the acts they engaged in so as to amount to the

general conclusions plaintiff states on page 8 of his complaint. Any such allegations regarding

his conditions of confinement, while not yet adequate, may be able to be amended so as to

adequately state additional cognizable claims for relief under section 1983 for violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff is reminded that his allegations must also indicate that any

defendant actors were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. 

Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

10. Transfers

Prisoners have no liberty interest in avoiding being transferred to another prison. See

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); United States v. Brown 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th

Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9 Cir. 1991) (per curiam); th

Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989).

Prisoners do, however have a liberty interest in not being transferred for involuntary

psychiatric treatment. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).

Prisoners also may not be transferred in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment

rights. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,

530 (9th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff states that there is a “Calculated Campaign of Conspiracy to Transfer the

Plaintiff against his will to another prison in (‘Retaliation’).” Doc. 1, pg. 13. However, plaintiff

has not stated: that he has been transferred; that any transfer is currently pending; or the names of

any of the defendants responsible for his allegations regarding any such transfer. Therefore, he

has failed to state a claim for being transferred in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment

rights.

/ / /

/ / / 

///

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

11. Supervisory Liability Claim

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To

state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’

and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646

(9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims

under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993). 

In his caption, and under the subheading of “III. Parties,” plaintiff names the following

supervisory personnel defendants: “James E. Tilton as Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Derral G. Adams, as Warden of California State

Prison – Corcoran; James Hartley, as Associate Warden; M.H. Botello, as Correctional Captain;

C.M. Boyer and D.B. Scaife, as Correctional Sergeants;. . . . In their individual and official

capacities.” 

As to each defendant in a supervisorial position, plaintiff must allege facts giving rise to a

claim for relief under section 1983. Plaintiff states general allegations as to the practice and

condoning of policies by correctional officers and their subordinates. However, plaintiff fails to

state which of the defendants in a supervisory position he feels errantly condoned and

implemented the alleged policies. The only supervisory defendant referred to by name in the

body of plaintiff’s complaint is Sergeant Scaife. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Scaife conducted

a threat assessment and concluded (1) that plaintiff posed no threat to another PHU inmate, and

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

(2) that plaintiff should be returned to the PHU. Doc. 1, pg. 12. As plaintiff is complaining

about actions by defendants that removed him from the PHU, and Sergeant Scaife recommended

plaintiff be returned to the PHU, the court is unable to ascertain what, if any actions by Sergeant

Scaife, plaintiff feels were wrongful. 

Plaintiff may be able to state cognizable claims for relief against the named defendants in

supervisorial positions under section 1983. However, the court is unable to identify any such

claims at this time. 

12. State Law Claims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under §

1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Plaintiff states that he “... invokes the pendent jurisdiction of this court.” Doc. 1, pg. 5. 

However , plaintiff fails to reference any state law or make any claims thereunder. Plaintiff may

be able to state a claims for relief under section 1983. Therefore, the court reserves discretion to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and to address plaintiff’s state law claims after plaintiff

files his amended complaint so as to allow plaintiff opportunity to state cognizable claims for

relief under section 1983.

II. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to file an

amended complaint within thirty days. 

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have

resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227

(9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the court

as viable/cognizable in this order; and

4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 30, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00519-OWW -DLB Document 8 Filed 01/31/08 Page 18 of 18