Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00832/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00832-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 42:11601 International Child Abduction Remedies Act

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

OSCAR MANUEL REYES )

PASTÉN, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:06cv832-MHT

) (WO) 

FLAVIA CECILIA RUIZ )

VELÁSQUEZ, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION

In this lawsuit, petitioner Oscar Manuel Reyes

Pastén asks that this court require respondent Flavia

Cecilia Ruiz Velásquez to return their daughter RMRV

from Alabama to Chile, pursuant to the Hague Convention

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,

Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89,

reprinted in 1988 WL 411501, and implemented by the

International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.

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§§ 11601-11611. This court has jurisdiction under 42

U.S.C. § 11603 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. At the end of a

hearing held on October 11, 2006, and based on the

evidence presented and arguments of counsel for the

parties, the court orally granted in part Reyes’s

relief requested; the court promised that a written

opinion and judgment would follow. This is the

promised opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

RMRV was born to Reyes and Ruiz in 1998. The two

were never married, and they terminated their

relationship in 2000. Since then, Ruiz married an

American citizen. Reyes still resides in Chile. 

Ruiz lived in Chile until late 2003, when she and

RMRV came to the United States, ostensibly so that Ruiz

could enroll in oceanography school at Texas A & M

University. Under Chilean law, Ruiz could not remove

RMRV from Chile without Reyes’s permission, which he

declined to give. Therefore, before leaving Chile,

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Ruiz sought, and a Chilean court granted, permission to

bring her daughter to the United States for three

years, during her enrollment in the oceanography

school. However, Ruiz never attended the university;

instead, sometime in 2006, she moved to Alabama. She

did not notify Reyes or the Chilean court. 

Upon learning that Ruiz had moved to Alabama, Reyes

filed a petition in this court for the return of RMRV

to Chile based on the Hague Convention. Out of concern

that Ruiz would further flee with RMRV, this court

immediately issued a restraining order prohibiting the

removal of RMRV from this court’s jurisdiction until

Reyes’s petition could be heard on the merits. At the

hearing on the matter on October 11, 2006, Ruiz

expressed that she intends to take RMRV, permanently,

to live in Australia. She said that she had already

initiated legal proceedings in Chile, seeking

permission to take RMRV there.

At the end of the hearing, the court orally held

that, by taking RMRV from Texas to Alabama, Ruiz had

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exceeded the limitation placed on her by the Chilean

court and had, thereby, violated Reyes’s custody rights

under the Hague Convention. The court required that

Ruiz take RMRV back to Chile. However, in order to

allow resolution of Ruiz’s request to the Chilean

courts to take RMRV to Australia, this court gave Ruiz

approximately 45 day to return RMRV to Chile. Also,

our of concern that Ruiz might flee with RMRV pending

resolution of her new litigation in Chile, the court

required that Ruiz turn over her passport to the court

and not take RMRV out of the jurisdiction of the court

without its permission. As stated, the court promised

that a written opinion and judgment would follow.

II. DISCUSSION

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction has the stated purpose of

“protect[ing] children internationally from the harmful

effects of their wrongful removal or retention and

establish[ing] procedures to ensure their prompt return

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to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to

secur[ing] protection for rights of access.” Hague

Convention, introduction. 

The purpose of the Convention is not to adjudicate

custody rights in the State to which the child was

removed, but rather “to return to the status quo before

the wrongful removal or retention.” Ruiz v. Tenorio,

392 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Shealy v.

Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002)). To that

end, the Convention establishes, among other things, a

remedy of return to the “State of habitual residence”

of the child. Hague Convention, Arts. III, XII.

Article III of the Hague Convention sets forth the

standards for determining whether a case of wrongful

removal has been made out such that the child must be

returned to the State of habitual residence. Hague

Convention, Art. XII. That Article provides that:

“The removal or the retention of a

child is to be considered wrongful

where- a) it is in breach of rights of

custody attributed to a person, an

institution or any other body, either

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jointly or alone, under the law of the

State in which the child was

habitually resident immediately before

the removal or retention; and b) at

the time of removal or retention those

rights were actually exercised, either

jointly or alone, or would have been

so exercised but for the removal or

retention.”

Hague Convention, Art. III. 

As this language makes clear, there are three

elements to be examined by a court here. First, a

court should determine where the child was habitually a

resident immediately before the purportedly wrongful

removal. Second, the court should determine whether

the complaining party had a right of custody under that

country’s law, and whether the respondent violated that

right of custody by removal. Third, the court should

determine whether the right was being exercised at the

time of the removal or would have been exercised but

for the removal. 

1. Habitual Residence 

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Neither the Hague Convention nor its implementing

legislation defines “habitual residence.” The Eleventh

Circuit, however, recently considered the issue in Ruiz

v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir 2004). In that

court’s view, the “crucial factor” in establishing

habitual residence is that “the person or persons

entitled to fix the place of the child's residence”

have “form[ed] a settled intention to abandon the

[place] one left behind.” 392 F.3d at 1253. Under

Chilean law, Reyes and Ruiz were jointly entitled to

fix the child’s residence, but they did not “settle”

any intention that RMRV would abandon Chile. Reyes

has, at all times relevant here, strenuously objected

to RMRV’s removal from Chile.

Further, whatever Ruiz’s later-developed or

concealed intention, she represented to the Chilean

court, and RMRV’s removal was premised on, her

intention to return to Chile after a period of three

years. Thus, here there was not a settled intention to

abandon Chile on the part of both of those entitled to

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1. At the outset, it is important to note that the

Hague Convention distinguishes between rights of custody

and rights of access; only in the event of a breach of a

right to custody will removal of the child be

appropriate. Compare, Hague Convention Art. XI (relating

to custody right) and Hague Convention Art. XXI (relating

to rights of access).

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fix the place of residence. Chile, and not the United

States, is therefore the habitual place of RMRV’s

residence. 

2. Right of Custody and Violation 

Of Right of Custody

Whether a right of custody exists is to be

determined by reference to the law of the country of

habitual residence. Hague Convention, Article III(a).1

Under the law of Chile, and under the Chilean court’s

decision on RMRV’s custody, Reyes’s custody rights have

been violated. 

Chile grants a non-custodial parent a ne exeat

right: the right to determine whether the child will

leave the country. Admittedly, Ruiz was granted

conditional permission by order of a Chilean court to

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2. Pet. For Return of the Child (Doc. No. 1-13),

Chilean Code, § 225. 

3. Id. (Doc. No. 2-3), Chilean Court Decision ¶ 18

(discussing § 49 of the juvenile code).

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leave the country. Reyes argues, however, that

violation of the conditions of the Chilean court’s

order can be a violation of his ne exeat right. Reyes

is correct.

Under Chilean law, although when parents live

separately Chile vests the responsibility for personal

care of the child in the mother,2

 a non-custodial parent

still has a ne exeat right.3

 In interpreting the Hague

Convention, the Eleventh Circuit has held that

violation of the ne exeat right is enough to qualify

as a violation of custody rights. In Furnes v. Reeves,

362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004), the appellate court

found that the ne exeat right was a “custody right”

within the meaning of the Hague Convention. Custody

under the Convention, the court further explained, does

not mean the right to possess the child or physical

control over the child; rather, certain rights of

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control will qualify as custody rights. 362 F.3d at

714. The court cited the Hague Convention for the

proposition that those rights are those “relating to

the care of the person of the child” and, in

particular, the right to determine the child's place of

residence. Id. at 714, 716 (quoting Hague Convention,

Art. V(a)). The court said that the ne exeat right was

exactly such a right: a right to determine where the

child will live, even if, as was the case in Furnes,

the country of habitual residence grants only the right

to veto exit from the country, and not the right to

determine where within the country of habitual

residence the child will live. Id. 

On the issue of whether Reyes’s right was violated,

this case is similar to the one confronted by the South

African Constitutional Court in Sonderup v. Tondelli,

2000(1) Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 (CC).

In that case, which was cited with approval by the

Eleventh Circuit in Furnes, the South African court

held that a father’s ne exeat right was violated

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because the mother of the child had violated an order

issued by the country of habitual residence. The order

provided that the mother was allowed to leave with the

child for one month; the mother, however, did not

return to the country of habitual residence after a

month. After finding that the court’s order gave the

father a ne exeat right, the court there concluded

that, “[The mother’s] failure to return ... with the

child [after a month] was a breach of the conditions

upon which she was entitled to exercise her rights of

custody and a concomitant breach of the father's rights

under the agreement and order.” Sonderup, 2000(1)

Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 ¶ 25. Here,

the situation is similar: a breach of the court’s order

granting the mother a right to remove is a breach of

the father’s custody right.

Ruiz’s violation of the Chilean court’s order

amounts to a violation of Reyes’s ne exeat right. The

Chilean court determined that Reyes had a legitimate ne

exeat right, but that Ruiz could leave the country

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under certain conditions without violating that right.

Thus, the Chilean court limited Reyes’s ne exeat right,

but only to the degree that it allowed Ruiz to take

RMRV to Texas so that Ruiz could study oceanography.

Because those conditions have been violated, Ruiz is no

longer within the boundaries of Reyes’s right, set

forth in the Chilean court’s opinion. That is, to

whatever extent Reyes’s right to prohibit RMRV’s exit

from the country was limited by the Chilean court’s

opinion, Ruiz is beyond the limit of that right in

going beyond the court’s order. 

3. Exercise of Custody Rights 

The third condition is that the right in question

was being exercised at the time of removal, or would

have been but for the removal. It is clear that Reyes

sought to exercise the ne exeat right within the

meaning of the Hague Convention. Before the removal,

Reyes has sought to prevent removal through the

exercise of his ne exeat right. As in Garcia v.

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Angarita, 440 F.Supp.2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (Huck,

J.), which considered the “exercise” of the ne exeat

right, because, "[a]t the outset, [the mother]

recognized that the children could not travel abroad

without [the father's] consent, and [because] he gave

his consent to international travel only for [a]

limited purpose,” there “can be no question that [the

father] was actually exercising his custody rights."

440 F.Supp.2d at 1379. What happened between Reyes and

Ruiz is similar: Ruiz, the mother, had to seek consent

from Reyes, the father, to remove their child; however,

Reyes strenuously disagreed. Like the father in

Garcia, Reyes sought to retain control over the place

of residence, even if the children were, at the outset,

legitimately removed. 

***

The court, therefore, holds that Ruiz wrongfully

removed RMRV within the meaning of the Hague

Convention. The court will therefore memorialize the

oral order entered on October 11, 2006, by entering a

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written judgment and injunction as follows: The court

will require that Ruiz take RMRV back to Chile, but, so

as first to allow resolution of Ruiz’s pending request

to the Chilean courts to take RMRV to Australia, this

court will give Ruiz until November 28, 2006, to return

RMRV to Chile. Also, out of concern that Ruiz might

flee with RMRV pending resolution of her new litigation

in Chile, the court will continue to prohibit Ruiz from

removing RMRV from the jurisdiction of this court

without this court’s permission and will keep Ruiz’s

passport until she files with the court a copy of her

plane ticket and an affidavit reflecting that, and

explaining why, she needs her passport to carry out

immediately the judgment and injunction entered today.

To the extent the written judgment and injunction

entered today conflict with the oral order, the written

judgment and injunction control.

DONE, this the 27th day of October, 2006.

_____________________________ /s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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