Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02439/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02439-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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FILED'
 I AUG 31 lOll 

CLERK, u.s. D 

SOUTHERN DISTRIIOUIr&llu.JftI_",,.,,. 

fill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RODNEY BERNARD BARNO, CASE NO. 08cv2439 WQH (BGS) 

Petitioner, ORDER 

vs. 

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden, 

Res ondent. 

HAYES, Judge: 

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 143) ofthe 

Honorable Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 29,2004, a California Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of: (1) 

stalking in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a); (2) stalking after service of a restraining 

order in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(b); (3) seven counts of making a criminal threat 

in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 422; (4) vandalism causing damage exceeding $400 in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 594( a)(b)(1); (5) six counts of vandalism causing damage of 

less than $400, a misdemeanor, in violation ofCal. Penal Code § 594(a)(b )(2)(A); and (6) two 

counts of making harassing telephone calls, a misdemeanor, in violation of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 653m(a). (Lodgment 17 at Clerk's Transcript ("CT") 255-272; Lodgment 18 at Reporter's 

Transcript ("RT") 921-925). Petitioner admitted to suffering three prior convictions injuvenile 

court, including two convictions of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Cal. Penal 

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Code § 245(a) and one conviction ofdischarging a fire ann in a negligent manner in violation 

of Cal. Penal Code § 246. (Lodgment 17 at CT 253; Lodgment 18 at RT 928). On February 

22,2005, Petitioner was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison as a result of the three prior 

strikes. (Lodgment 17 at CT 208; Lodgment 18 at RT 965). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court ofAppeal alleging ten claims 

of error. On May 17, 2007, the California Court of Appeal affinned the judgment on all 

counts.l (Lodgment at 7). Petitioner filed a petition for review to the California Supreme 

Court. On August 8, 2007, that petition was denied without comment. (Lodgment 9). On 

November 1, 2007, Petitioner petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 

certiorari. (Lodgment 11). On January 7, 2008, the Court denied the petition. (Lodgment 12). 

On December 31,2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.c. § 2254. (ECF No. I). On September I, 2010, Petitioner filed an Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). (ECF No. 99). On December 16, 2011, 

Respondent filed an Answer. (ECF No. 140). On January 6, 2012, Petitioner filed a Traverse. 

(ECF No. 141). 

On July 6, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending that the Petition be denied. (ECF No. 143). 

On July 20, 2012, Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF 

No. 144). Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny claims 1-2 and 

8-9. Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings: (I) regarding claim I, that there is 

no clearly established federal law that precludes the use ofnon-jury juvenile adjudications to 

enhance a sentence; (2) regarding claim 2, that the jury instruction regarding the uncharged 

prior acts did not infect the trial to an extent that violated due process; (3) regarding claim 8, 

that there is no freestanding claim ofactual innocence cognizable on habeas review and, in the 

alternative, that Petitioner's evidence of actual innocence is not credible; and (4) regarding 

claim 9, that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies to Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of 

lThe California Court ofAppeal did find that the trial court erred when it failed to limit the 

instruction pertaining to prior acts involving domestic violence to the felony counts also involving 

domestic violence. However, the error was deemed harmless. (Lodgment 7 at 18-19). 

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counsel. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge's report and 

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72 ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). The district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report ... to which objection is made," and "may accept, reject, or modifY, in whole or in part, 

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l); see also 

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). When no objections are filed, 

the district court need not review the Report and Recommendation de novo. See Wang v. 

Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.l3 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane). 

DISCUSSION 

This Court's review of the Petition is governed by the deferential standard of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996. Under this standard, a 

petition cannot be granted unless the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,404-05 (2000). 

Petitioner has not objected to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to deny 

claims 3-7 and 10-11. This Court has reviewed the record and the Report and 

Recommendation in their entirety. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly 

concluded that there is no merit to claims 3-7 and 10-11. 

I. Claim 1: Juvenile Adjudications 

In his objections to the recommendation ofthe Magistrate Judge, Petitioner contends 

that there is "direct Supreme Court authority" holding "that where a defendant has been 

convicted without being afforded [a jury trial], the state may make not subsequently use that 

conviction for impeachment, sentencing or enhancement." (ECF No. 144 at 2-3) (citing Loper 

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v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 484 (1972); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Burgett v. 

Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)). Petitioner contends that "[t]he question is not whether the 

Supreme Court has decided whether a prior conviction obtained without ajury falls within the 

'prior conviction' exception .... " Id. at 4. Petitioner contends that the question is whether the 

juvenile adjudication was reliable. 

In Burgett, the Supreme Court held that the state court could not enhance the 

punishment for a conviction based on a prior conviction which was obtained without providing 

the defendant with counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment. In Lewis v. United States, 

445 U.S. 55 (1980), the Supreme Court stated: "[in] Burgett, Tucker, and Loper ... [the 

Supreme Court] found that the subsequent conviction or sentence violated the Sixth 

Amendment because it depended upon the reliability of a past uncounseled conviction." Id. 

at 67. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a nonjury juvenile adjudication 

may be used for enhancement of a sentence. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit has held that a nonjury juvenile adjudication may be used for enhancement of a 

sentence in John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 2011) and Boyd v. 

Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Magistrate Judge stated: 

In Boyd v. Newland, the Ninth Circuit addressed the claim 

whether a state court's use of juvenile adjudications to enhance a 

Retitioner's sentence under the AEDPA standard of review, violates 

'clearly established" federal law as pronounced by the United States 

Supreme Court. 467 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006), citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933, 127 S. Ct. 2249 (2007). In 

applying the AEDP A standard of review, the Ninth Circuit observed 

that th~ California court disagreed .wit~ the holding in Tighe, and that 

the ThIrd, EIghth, and Eleventh CIrcUIts have held that the Apprendi 

"prior conviction" exception includes nonjury juvenile adjudications 

that are used to enhance a defendant's sentence. Boyd, 467 F.3d at 

1152. The Boyd court further stated that Tighe did not represent 

"clearly establIshed federal law 'as detennined by the Supreme Court 

ofthe United States.'" Id. The court in BOld held, "we cannot hold that 

the California courts' use of Petitioner s juvenile adjudication as a 

sentencing enhancement was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, Supreme Court precedent. Id. The court therefore denied 

Boyd's request for habeas relief based on the precise claim that Barno 

asserts here. Id. 

The California Supreme Court has also held that the use of a 

prior juvenile conviction as a strike does not offend Apprendi and its 

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progeny. See People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. 4th 1007,1021-28 (2009), cert. 

oem ed, 130 S. Ct. 2091 (April 19, 2010) (noting that the 

"overwhelming majority of federal decisions and cases from other 

states" have held that nonjury juvenile adjudications may be used to 

enhance later adult sentences, and that the United States Supreme Court 

"has declined numerous opportunities to decide otherwise"). 

For the reasons explained in Boyd, this Court finds that in the 

absence ofSupreme Court authority on this issue, it cannot be said that 

the California courts' denial was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254( d). Accordingly, no habeas relief is warranted for this claim. 

(ECF No. 143 at 14-15). 

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the reasoning in Boyd 

applies to this case. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the 

California courts' denial ofPetitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

by the use of a nonjury juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence was not contrary to, and 

did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

II. Claim 2: Jury Instruction 

In this case, the trial court admitted evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence 

allegedly committed by Petitioner pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 1109. The jury was instructed 

as follows: 

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose ofshowing the defendant 

engaged in a offense involving domestic violence [on one or more 

occasions] other than that charged in the case. 

"Domestic violence" means abuse committed against an adult or 

a fully emancipated minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, 

former cohabitant, or person with wliom the defendant has had a child 

or is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship. 

"Abuse" means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting 

to cause bodily injury, or placmg another person in reasonable 

apprehension or imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, 

or another. 

If you find that the defendant committed a prior offense 

involving domestic violence you may, but are not required to, infer that 

the defendant had a disposition to commit other offenses involving 

domestic violence. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, 

you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and 

did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. However, if 

you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

committed a prior crime or crimes involving domestic violence, that is 

not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

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committed the charged offenses. Ifyou detennine an inference properly 

drawn from this eVIdence, this inference is simply on item for you to 

consider, along with all the other evidence, in detennining whether the 

defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the 

charged crime. 

Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider this 

evidence for any other purpose. 

Cal. JIC No. 2.50.02 (ECF No. 143 at 16). 

The California Court ofAppeal found that there was an error in the instruction because 

it did not state that consideration of a prior offense involving domestic violence should only 

apply to current charges involving domestic violence. The California Court ofAppeal found 

that the error did not require reversal, stating: 

[A]ny error by the court in using CALJIC No. 2.50.02 without limiting 

Its application to counts 3, 4 and 10 does not require a reversal. First, 

defense counsel admitted that Barno committed tlie acts that fonned the 

basis for the other felony charges, but argued that they only amounted 

to at most misdemeanor conduct. CALJIC No. 2.50.02 did not tell the 

jury, and the prosecutor in closing argument in no way argued, that the 

prior domestIc violence evidence tended to prove Barno was guilty of 

felony, as opposed to misdemeanor conduct. Additionally, the 

prosecutor's argument concerning the prior domestic violence incident 

Involving Jasmin L. consisted of less than two pages of a closing 

argument that totaled 30 pages. Finally, the evidence overwhelmingly 

supported the jury's verdict on all char~ed offenses. Thus, it was not 

reasonably likely that, but for the court s error in instructing the jury 

under CALJIC No. 2.50.02, Barno would have received a more 

favorable result at trial. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,836.) 

(ECF No. 143 at 16~17). 

In his objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Petitioner contends that 

the jury was pennitted to consider "inflammatory evidence" of prior instances of domestic 

violence in detennining whether Petitioner was guilty ofother criminal charges. (ECF No. 144 

at 5). Petitioner contends that the trial court's failure to limit the jury's consideration ofthe 

uncharged domestic violence evidence to only the domestic violence charges violated his rights 

to due process and a fair trial. Petitioner contends that the jury was pennitted to rely on prior 

acts of domestic violence to find that Petitioner was likely to commit unrelated charged 

offenses. Petitioner contends that the entire trial was infected on the grounds that the 

prosecutor argued the instruction in his closing argument, the prosecutor advanced a theory 

that Petitioner had engaged in a pattern of fear and retaliation, and the jury asked for a read 

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back ofthe testimony regarding the prior acts of domestic violence. 

A petitioner may obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge by showing 

that the disputed instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the reSUlting conviction 

violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The instruction must 

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and in connection with the trial 

record. Jd.; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982). 

The Magistrate Judge stated: 

Barno has not shown that the instruction infected the trial to the 

extent that he was denied a fair trial under due process standards. First, 

the instruction permitted, but does not require, the jury to consider 

evidence that Barno committed other offenses. Because the instruction 

was permissive, the jury was not even required to consider such 

evidence, must less reqUIred to make a finding of ~uilt based upon it. 

Rather, the jury was free to accept or reject such eVIdence, and even if 

it accepted such evidence as true, to give it any weight it chose. 

Second, nothin~ in the instruction lowered the prosecution's 

burden of proof. The Instructions themselves explicitly state that the 

prior act evidence "is not sufficient by itself to prove that [petitioner] 

IS guilty of the charged offense." The jury was also separately 

instructed that it had to be convinced of Barno's guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The Court must presume that the jurors followed the 

instructions and applied the prqper legal standard. See Richardson v. 

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (198'1). 

The California Court of Appeal's decision that CALJIC No. 

2.50.02 did not affect the prosecutIon's burden to prove Barno's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt on counts not involving domestic violence 

was not an incorrect application of Supreme Court law. After an 

independent review ofthe record and for the reasons stated above, the 

Court finds that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect 

on the jury's verdict. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 147 (1998) 

(citingBrechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Accordingly, 

Barno's claim is denied. 

(ECF No. 143 at 18). 

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly stated that the prosecutor was held 

to the burden ofproving Petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court finds that the 

Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner was not denied a fair trial under due 

process standards due to the jury instruction. 

III. Claim 8: Actual Innocence 

In this case, Petitioner has not alleged a claim ofactual innocence to avoid a procedural 

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bar to a separate claim for habeas corpus relief. Rather, petitioner asserts a freestanding claim 

of actual innocence. 

In his objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Petitioner contends that 

"a freestanding claim of innocence is cognizable ... [in] habeas proceedings." (ECF No. 144 

at 7). Petitioner contends that an evidentiary hearing is required to determine defendant's 

actual innocence on the grounds that "[t]he Magistrate Judge appears to have at least implicitly 

assumed that the truth ofthe facts were disputed by the parties, and went on to make credibility 

determinations, all without an evidentiary hearing." Id. at 8. 

A. Habeas review of freestanding claim of actual innocence 

The function offederal habeas relief is to redress constitutional errors, not to relitigate 

state criminal cases. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (l993) ("[T]he existence 

merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the innocence of a state prisoner is not a 

ground for federal habeas corpus relief'). "Habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of 

actual innocence is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the 

merits." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.; see also Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184 (lIth Cir. 2008) 

(finding that a freestanding claim of actual innocence, without an independent claim of a 

constitutional violation, does not constitute a basis for federal habeas reliet). 

The Magistrate Judge stated: 

Barno presents a free-standing actual innocence claim. In other 

words, he does not assert actual innocence as a procedural gateway to 

get past a procedural bar. Instead, he alleges iliat "newly discovered 

evidence,' proves he is actually innocent of the crimes that he was 

convicted .... 

Because Petitioner has not alleged an independent constitutional 

violation, this is a freestanding claim of actual innocence. The United 

States Supreme Court has never held that a freestanding claim ofactual 

innocence is cognizable on federal habeas review. Herrera v. Collins, 

506 U. S. 390, 400 ( 1993) ("[T]he existence merely 0 f newly discovered 

evidence relevant to the innocence of a state prisoner is not a ground 

for federal habeas corpus relief."); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 

545-55 (2006) (declining ''to answer the question left oJ?en in Herrera" 

ofwhether "freestanding innocence claims are possible '). Because the 

Supreme Court has never held that a freestanding claim of actual 

innocence is cognizable on habeas, the state courts' denial ofthis claim 

could not be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

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established United States Supreme Court law. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 

786. As a result, Barno's claim fails. 

(ECF No. 143 at 30). 

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the reasoning in Herrera 

applies to this case. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the 

California courts' denial ofPetitioner' s freestanding actual innocence claim was not contrary 

to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law . 

B. Credibility of Petitioner's evidence of actual innocence 

In Herrera, the Court assumed "for the sake ofargument" that "in a capital case, a truly 

persuasive demonstration of'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of 

a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas as relief ifthere were no state avenue 

open to process such a claim." 506 U.S. at 417. The Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit has 

gone further, and "assume [ d] for the sake of argument that such claims are cognizable in 

federal habeas proceedings in both capital and non-capital cases." Osborne v. District 

Attorney's Office/or Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2008) (overruled 

on other grounds by District Attorney's Office/or Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 

52 (2009». Petitioner must "go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt" and meet the 

"extraordinarily high" burden of "affirmatively prov[ing] that he is probably innocent." 

Carrigerv. Stewart, 132 F.3d463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 

442-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting»; see also Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th 

Cir.2000). 

The Magistrate Judge stated: 

In order to prevail on a claim of actual innocence, Barno's 

burden is "extraordinarily high" and reguires a showing that is "truly 

persuasive." Carriger, 132 F~d at 476. '[A] habeas petItioner must go 

beyond demonstrating doubt about his gUIlt, and must affirmatively 

prove that he is probably innocent." Id. ... 

None of this purported "evidence" is the kind of reliable and 

credible evidence tliat affirmatively proves Barno's innocence. See 

Herrera ,506 U.S. at 423, (O'Connor, J. concurring) (~ost-trial 

affidavits "are to be treated with a fair degree of skepticIsm"); Baran 

v. Hill, 2010 WL 466153, at *7 (D. Or. Feb.9, 2010) (finding that 

petitioner's self-serving and unsupported statements were not "new and 

reliable" evidence sufficient to prove actual innocence); McArdle v. 

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Sniff, 2009 WL 1097324, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr.20, 2009) (same); Porter 

v. Xdams, 2007 WL 2703195, at *9 (E.D. CaL Sept. 14, 2007) (finding 

"new" evidence unreliable to support actual innocence claim, where 

petitioner had "simply provided his own self-serving declaration, 

corroborated by declarations from his cousin and his cousin's cousin," 

dated five years after petitioner's conviction). 

Even if the factual portions of the declarations do constitute 

reliable evidence, at best they do no more than cast doubt on Barno's 

guilt. It is not probable that the admission ofthese statements at trial 

would have resulted in his acquittal. Considering the newly discovered 

evidence in combination with the other evidence presented at trial, 

Barno has failed to demonstrate that he is ~robably innocent. See, e.g., 

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417-18 (affidavits' given over eight years after 

petitioner's trial[,] ... must be considered in light of the proof of 

petitioner's guilt at trial"); Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477 ("[T]J1e [third 

party] confession by itselffalls short of affirmatively provmg that [the 

petitioner] more likely than not is innocent."); Cress v. Palmer, 484 

F.3d 844, 855 (6th Cir.2007) (holding petitioner failed to satisfY 

"hypothetical Herrera standard" with new evidence, including "a 

confession from someone who was strongly motivated to confess 

falsely for ulterior reasons"). As addressed above, there was significant 

evidence presented at trial such that this "newly discovered evidence" 

falls short ofproving that Barno is more likely than not innocent ofthe 

charges. 

F or all ofthe above stated reasons, Barno has not shown that the 

California courts' adjUdication of his actual innocence claim was 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. 

Accordingly, Barno is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his actual 

innocence claim. 

(ECF No. 143 at 31-34). 

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly stated that Petitioner had the burden 

ofaffirmatively proving that he is probably innocent. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge 

correctly concluded that even ifthe declarations submitted on Petitioner's behalfwere reliable, 

the California courts' denial ofPetitioner' s actual innocence claim was not contrary to, and did 

not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

IV. Claim 9: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

In his objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Petitioner contends that 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply to the performance prong of the Strickland test for 

ineffective assistance of counsel because the state court did not address performance. 

Petitioner contends that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply to the prejudice prong of the 

Stricklandtest "[b]ecause the court ignored facts critical to the resolution ofpetitioner's claim 

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[which was] ... patently unreasonable." (ECF No. 144 at 11). 

F or ineffective assistance ofcounsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must 

demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel's perfonnance was deficient. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "This requires showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed to the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. Second, he must show that counsel's deficient 

perfonnance prejudiced the defense. Id. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 

serious that they deprived Petitioner "of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. Under 

federal habeas review, "the pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 

(2011); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.362, 412 (2000) ("[A]n unreasonable application 

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law"). 

The Magistrate Judge stated: 

The superior court concluded that Barno failed to establish "a 

prima facie showing that his trial counsel committed 'error of 

constitutional magnitude that led to a trial that was so fundamentally 

unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have 

convicted the petitioner.' (In re Clark (5 Ca1.4th 750, 797 (1993).) " 

(Lodgment 21 at 15.) The California Court of Appeal also rejected 

Barno's claim, finding that no prejudice had been established because 

Barno had failed to show that, but for counsel's conduct or omissions, 

Barno would have obtained a more favorable outcome. (Lodgment 14 

at2.) 

The state courts applied the appropriate standard of review as 

required b)' Strickland, and their deciSIOns were based on a reasonable 

detennination of the facts as presented in the state court proceeding. 

Barno has not shown that the California state courts' dental of any of 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claims was objectively 

unreasonable. Nor has Barno established that had trial counsel acted 

differently, it would have been reasonably likely to produce a different 

result. 

In addition, this Court cannot properly second-guess trial 

counsel's tactical choices. Matylinskv v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1092 

(9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, this Court cannot conclude that the 

California courts unreasonably applied federal law or unreasonably 

detennined the facts as presented when rejectins Barno's ineffective 

assistance ofcounsel claIm. Because fainnmded Jurists could a~ee on 

the correctness of the state courts' decision, Barno is not entItled to 

habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Strickland. 466 U.S. 687; Alvarado, 

541 U.S. at 664. 

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For the same reasons as stated above, Barno's claim in Ground 

Eleven alleging cumulative error based on trial counsel's multiple 

alleged errors must be rejected as without merit. (Pet. at 64; Doc. No. 

99-2.) See Ennic v. Neven, 415 Fed. Appx. 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(rejecting cumulative error contention where petitioner failed to show 

individual act of ineffective assistance of counsel). Barno has not 

shown that counsel made one error, let alone more than one error, thus 

even if clearly established federal law mandated a cumulative-effect 

analysis of ineffective-assistance of counsel claims, Barno would not 

be entitled to relief. 

(ECF No. 143 at 38-39). 

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the California state courts 

addressed both the performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland test. The Court finds 

that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the California state courts' denial of 

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not contrary to, and did not involve 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

A certificate of appealability must be obtained by a petitioner in order to pursue an 

appeal from a final order in a Section 2254 habeas corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(l)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, "[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate ofappealability when 

it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." 

A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial 

showing ofthe denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). It must appear that 

reasonable jurists could find the district court's assessment of the petitioner's constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484-85 (2000). The Court 

concludes that jurists of reason could find it debatable whether this Court was correct in 

denying the Petition. The Court issues a certificate of appealability. 

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CONCLUSION 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 143) is 

adopted in its entirety. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The certificate 

of appealability is GRANTED. 

DATED: ~Lfz

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