Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05127/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 7, 2008 Decided March 6, 2009

No. 05-5117

KHALED A.F. AL ODAH, NEXT FRIEND OF FAWZI KHALID

ADBULLAH FAHAD AL ODAH, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 05-5120, 05-5121,05-5123, 05-5124,

05-5125, 05-5126, 05-5127

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00828)

August E. Flentje, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were

Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General at the time the

briefs were filed, Jonathan F. Cohn, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Douglas N. Letter, Terrorism Litigation Counsel, and

Robert M. Loeb, Attorney.

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1

The discovery order also predates Executive Order 13,492,

which directs the “prompt and thorough review of the factual and legal

bases for the continued detention of all individuals currently held at

Guantanamo.” Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the

Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities,

Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 2(d), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27,

2009).

David H. Remes argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellees.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM: These consolidated cases come to us with a

long history. We now review a 2005 order of the district court

compelling disclosure of certain classified information to

counsel for certain detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

That discovery order was issued well before the Supreme Court,

in its June 2008 opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229

(2008), ruled that the writ of habeas corpus is available to these

detainees, and well before the district court issued the case

management order that currently governs their habeas

proceedings.1

 After issuing the discovery order, the district

court stayed all proceedings in these cases pending resolution of

the government’s appeal from the court’s denial of its motion to

dismiss the detainees’ habeas petitions. This circuit, in turn,

held the government’s appeal from the discovery order in

abeyance pending the circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s

resolution of other appeals regarding the detainees’ legal status.

After the Supreme Court issued Boumediene, the parties filed

motions to govern, and this appeal from the discovery order was

taken out of abeyance and assigned to the present panel.

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The parties now largely agree upon the legal framework that

should govern the issuance of discovery orders of this kind, as

do we. In accordance with that framework, we remand the

discovery order to the district court so that it may consider the

findings required before such an order may issue. In so doing,

we note several specific points concerning the manner in which

a remand under that framework should proceed.

I

We begin with a brief overview of the relevant chronology

and then move to a more detailed description of the

developments that led to the discovery order at issue here.

A

The Department of Defense (DOD) ordered the detention at

the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba of certain

foreign nationals captured abroad after al Qaeda attacked the

World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. To determine whether

Guantanamo Bay detainees are “enemy combatants,” as defined

by DOD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established

Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs). Id. Each CSRT

relied on an administrative record compiled by a military officer

to support the government’s case for detention. See Bismullah

v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated, 128

S. Ct. 2960 (2008), reinstated, Order, No. 06-1197 (D.C. Cir.

Aug. 22, 2008), petitions dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 551

F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Separate CSRTs concluded that the

petitioners here were enemy combatants. To contest their

detentions, they filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

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Roughly two years after the first detainees arrived at

Guantanamo, the Supreme Court held that the federal habeas

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, applied to their detention. Rasul v.

Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004). Most of the Guantanamo

habeas cases were then consolidated before a single district

judge to “coordinate and manage all proceedings . . . and to the

extent necessary, rule on procedural and substantive issues.”

Order at 6, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-0299 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004).

On January 31, 2005, the district court denied the government’s

motion to dismiss the petitions for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,

355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, Boumediene

v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2229

(2008). The court also granted petitioners’ counsel access to the

complete (unredacted) classified factual returns filed by the

government in support of detention. Order Granting Nov. 8,

2004 Mot. to Designate “Protected Information” and Granting

Nov. 18, 2004 Mot. for Access to Unredacted Factual Returns

at 2, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, No. 02-0299 (D.D.C.

Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Discovery Order]. The government

appealed both orders. The district court then stayed the

proceedings “for ‘all purposes’ pending resolution of all appeals

in this matter.” Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Respondents’ Mot. for Certification of Jan. 31, 2005 Orders and

for Stay at 2, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, No. 02-0299

(D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2005).

While those appeals were pending, Congress twice amended

28 U.S.C. § 2241 to deny the Guantanamo detainees habeas

review. First, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of

2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005), but

the Supreme Court held that the provision of the DTA depriving

courts of jurisdiction over the detainees’ habeas petitions did not

apply to cases pending when the DTA was enacted. Hamdan v.

Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575-78 (2006). Next, Congress passed

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the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No.

109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §

2241 & note), but the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision

declared that the detainees have a constitutional right to habeas

and struck down the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA

as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 128 S. Ct. at 2240.

This circuit had held the appeal of the Discovery Order in

abeyance pending the outcome of Boumediene. See Order at

1-2, Al Odah v. United States, No. 05-5117 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17,

2006); see also Order at 1, Al Odah v. United States, No.

05-5117 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2007). After Boumediene issued, the

parties filed motions to govern, and the case was set for

supplemental appellate briefing and oral argument. At the same

time, the district court made additional preparations to manage

the detainee habeas caseload and resolved, through executive

session on July 1, 2008, to designate another district judge “to

coordinate and manage proceedings in [nearly] all cases

involving petitioners presently detained at Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba.” See Order at 1-2, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee

Litigation, No. 08-442 (D.D.C. July 2, 2008). On November 6,

the day before oral argument in the present appeal, the new

coordinating judge issued a case management order detailing the

procedures for the disclosure of classified information going

forward. See Case Management Order, In re: Guantanamo Bay

Detainee Litigation, No. 08-442 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008),

amended by Order (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008). At oral argument,

both sides agreed that the district court’s new case management

order does not affect the finality of this appeal.

And so, in this case we confront a January 31, 2005,

Discovery Order that predates both Boumediene and the district

court’s current case management order, but nonetheless remains

operative with respect to a small group of classified factual

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returns. We discuss the genesis and content of that order in

more detail below. 

B

In August 2004, the district court issued an order that

incorporated the government’s proposed schedule for filing

returns identifying the factual support for each petitioner’s

detention as an enemy combatant. See In re Guantanamo

Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 451. As factual support, the

government submitted the records from the petitioners’ CSRT

proceedings. Id. The government filed its returns on a rolling

basis as the CSRT proceedings were completed, submitting the

earliest in September and the latest in December 2004. Id. at

451-52. Because each CSRT record contained classified

information, the government filed redacted, unclassified

versions on the public record and submitted the full, classified

versions for the court’s in camera review. Id. at 452. The

government also served copies containing most but not all of the

classified information in the court’s copies on those petitioners’

counsel who had obtained security clearances. Id. During this

period, the district court issued multiple orders regarding the

submission of the factual returns, including a protective order.

Amended Protective Order and Procedures for Counsel Access

to Detainees at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, No. 02-0299

(D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Protective Order]. 

In November 2004, in response to the government’s notice

indicating that it would not provide cleared counsel with all of

the classified information in the factual returns submitted to the

court, the petitioners’ counsel moved for “immediate access to

the unredacted returns.” Petitioners’ Motion for Access to

Unredacted Factual Returns and to Compel Respondents to

Comply with Order on Protected Information Procedures at 1-2,

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In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, No. 02-0299 (D.D.C. Nov.

18, 2004). In reply, the government stated that it had redacted

from counsel’s copies two categories of classified information:

(1) information “pertain[ing] to individuals other than the

detainee at issue,” Government’s Supp. Br. 5, which

information, the government said, the detainee had no “need to

know,” id. at 4; and (2) “especially sensitive source-identifying

information,” id. at 5. To justify the redactions, the government

submitted boilerplate certifications stating that the redacted

information “do[es] not support a determination that the detainee

is not an enemy combatant.” Id. at 5; see Supp. Pub. App. 13.

After reviewing the in camera submissions, the district

court found the redacted information “relevant to the merits of

this litigation” and concluded that petitioners’ counsel with

security clearances were entitled to see it, subject to the terms of

the Protective Order. Before us today is the government’s

appeal from the order granting counsel access to the redacted

information. Discovery Order at 2. 

II

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that the government’s

notice of appeal was timely. The district court’s order directing

disclosure of the unredacted classified information was issued

on January 31, 2005, and the government filed its notice of

appeal on March 14, 2005. This was well within the sixty-day

time limit provided under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

4(a)(1)(B).

We also conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the

district court’s Discovery Order under the collateral order

exception to the final judgment rule. The collateral order

exception allows appellate review of an interlocutory order if the

order: “‘[1] conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [2]

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resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the

merits of the action, and [3] [is] effectively unreviewable on

appeal from a final judgment.’” La Reunion Aerienne v.

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 533 F.3d 837, 843

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). The Discovery Order meets these

requirements.

First, the order conclusively determines the disputed

question: the government’s obligation to disseminate classified

information to the petitioners’ attorneys. Second, the order

resolves an important issue that is separate from the merits of

the case. The classified materials at issue are designated by the

government at the “secret” level. By Executive Order, the

“secret” classification applies to information, “the unauthorized

disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause

serious damage to the national security that the original

classification authority is able to identify or describe.” Exec.

Order No. 13,292, § 1.2(a)(2), 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315, 15,315-16

(Mar. 25, 2003). The lawfulness of an order directing the

dissemination of this information over the objection of the

government is an important issue entirely separate from the

merits of this case. Finally, the Discovery Order is effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Once the

information is disclosed, the “cat is out of the bag” and appellate

review is futile. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir.

1998); see United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 619

(D.C. Cir. 2003).

III

We review the district court’s Discovery Order for abuse of

discretion. Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d

728, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“‘The district court has broad

discretion in its handling of discovery, and its decision to allow

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2

On January 9, 2009, the court in Bismullah v. Gates held, on

rehearing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene, that “this

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over . . . detainees’ petitions for

review of their status determinations by a CSRT” under the DTA.

Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2009). That

holding does not affect our disposition of this habeas case because

both we and the parties have employed Bismullah’s language and

framework only by analogy.

or deny discovery is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.’”

(quoting Brune v. IRS, 861 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1988));

see Stillman v. CIA, 319 F.3d 546, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The

parties’ positions have evolved over the course of this litigation,

and the most recent round of briefs shows that there is little

disagreement regarding the appropriate legal framework for

resolving this matter. Both the government and the petitioners

urge us to rely, by analogy, on the procedures applicable to

criminal proceedings and to appellate review under the DTA.2

They disagree, however, as to how we should apply those

procedures here.

A

The district court directed disclosure to petitioners’ counsel

of the redacted classified information on the ground that it was

“relevant to the merits of this litigation.” In the context of

criminal proceedings, however, this court has held that

“classified information is not discoverable on a mere showing of

theoretical relevance in the face of the government’s classified

information privilege.” United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617,

623 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Rather, “the threshold for discovery in

this context further requires that . . . [the] information . . . is at

least ‘helpful to the defense of [the] accused.’” Id. (quoting

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)); see United

States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United

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States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This

standard applies with equal force to partially classified

documents: “if some portion or aspect of a document is

classified, a defendant is entitled to receive it only if it may be

helpful to his defense.” Rezaq, 134 F.2d at 1142. Hence, before

the district court may compel the disclosure of classified

information, it must determine that the information is both

relevant and material -- in the sense that it is at least helpful to

the petitioner’s habeas case. And because such disclosure is in

the context of a habeas proceeding, the touchstone of which is

the court’s “authority to conduct a meaningful review of both

the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain,”

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269, the court must further conclude

that access by petitioner’s counsel (pursuant to a court-approved

protective order) is necessary to facilitate such review.

Although both sides agree that materiality and not mere

relevance is the threshold standard, they dispute whether the

district court ordered disclosure based solely on relevance or

whether it in fact made a materiality determination. The court’s

order simply states that the classified information is “relevant.”

Discovery Order at 2. Although we acknowledge that the

district court may well have considered materiality as an implicit

part of the relevance analysis, the Order does not indicate

whether that is the case. Absent such an indication and an

explanation of the court’s reasoning, we cannot at this stage

conclude that the redacted information is in fact material. 

At the same time, we reject the government’s suggestion

that its mere “certification” -- that the information redacted from

the version of the return provided to a detainee’s counsel “do[es]

not support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy

combatant” -- is sufficient to establish that the information is not

material. Government’s Supp. Br. 10, 17 n.5. That naked

declaration simply cannot resolve the issue. Cf. Parhat v. Gates,

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532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting “the government’s

contention that it can prevail by submitting documents that read

as if they were indictments or civil complaints, and that simply

assert as facts the elements required to prove that a detainee falls

within the definition of enemy combatant[, because] [t]o do

otherwise would require the courts to rubber-stamp the

government’s charges”). As the unredacted material was

submitted to the court, it is the court’s responsibility to make the

materiality determination itself.

Moreover, even if it is true that the redacted information in

the return “does not support a determination that the detainee is

not an enemy combatant” -- i.e., that the information is not

directly exculpatory -- that is not the only ground upon which

information may be material in the habeas context. The court

must still assess whether the information is actually inculpatory,

because the government submitted the full habeas return in

support of its contention that the detainee is an enemy

combatant. Evaluation of that contention requires the court to

assess the reliability of the sources upon which the return is

based. Hence, indications of unreliability are themselves

material. Cf. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269 (noting that the

most relevant deficiencies of the CSRTs as compared to habeas

proceedings are “the constraints upon the detainee’s ability to

rebut the factual basis for the Government’s assertion that he is

an enemy combatant”). For example, the court may fear, or

counsel may proffer evidence, that a source is biased or that his

testimony was the product of coercion. Similarly, if a source

asserts that he saw the petitioner at a particular place and time,

evidence that the source was elsewhere at that time would

discredit his claim.

Information that is not exculpatory on its face may also be

material if it contains the names of witnesses who can provide

helpful information. In this regard, the government’s further

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3

The government has redacted such names in the returns that are

at issue on this appeal. See Government’s Supp. Br. 5 n.1 (“[W]hen

a petitioner was just one among many individuals identified in an

intelligence report -- such as a list of individuals who trained at certain

al Qaeda training camps -- the government redacted the names of the

other individuals.”).

“certification,” again on its own authority and without

explanation, that the petitioner does not have a “need to know”

“information pertaining to individuals other than the detainee”

cannot end the inquiry. A list of individuals “other than the

detainee” may be a list of witnesses useful to the detainee: for

example, when the list names other detainees the government

alleges trained at a certain al Qaeda training camp with the

detainee,3 but who would testify to the contrary. 

At oral argument, counsel for the government stated his

“understanding that in the factual returns” that the government

had been filing in more recent detainee habeas cases, “in most

circumstances other detainee identities are not being withheld.”

Oral Arg. Recording at 49:50. In light of counsel’s statement

that “the government is using a somewhat different standard

now,” id., we asked the government to reconsider whether it

wanted to continue withholding such material in the instant

cases. Soon after oral argument, however, the Justice

Department advised the court that the government continues to

redact material pertaining to individuals other than the detainee

at issue. “The rationale,” the Department stated, is that a “list of

individuals other than the petitioner . . . do[es] not serve as

affirmative evidence that the petitioner is an enemy combatant.”

Dep’t of Justice Rule 28(j) Letter, Nov. 10, 2008. 

The government’s rationale in this letter appears to be the

inverse of the rationale it advanced in the declarations that

originally accompanied the factual returns: the initial

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declarations stated that the redacted material does not tend to

show that the detainee is not an enemy combatant (i.e., that it is

not exculpatory), while this most recent letter states that the

redacted material is not affirmative evidence that the detainee is

an enemy combatant (i.e., that it is not inculpatory). But the fact

that information does not serve as “affirmative evidence” against

a detainee does not render it immaterial. Information that is

exculpatory, that undermines the reliability of other purportedly

inculpatory evidence, or that names potential witnesses capable

of providing material evidence may all be material. Cf.

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270 (“[The court] also must have the

authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence

that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding. Federal

habeas petitioners long have had the means to supplement the

record on review . . . . Here that opportunity is constitutionally

required.”).

The government’s letter also belatedly offers to provide the

district court with the government’s own “particularized

assessment of whether the information is material.” Dep’t of

Justice Rule 28(j) Letter, Nov. 10, 2008. Such a proffer,

combined with an explanation of why nondisclosure is

warranted, is necessary for meaningful judicial decisionmaking,

and the district court should not hesitate to require that it be filed

contemporaneously with a government request for redactions.

Cf. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 853 (requiring the government to file a

statement “specifically explaining why protected status is

required for the information that has been marked” for

redaction); id. (“Without an explanation tailored to the specific

information at issue, we are left with no way to determine if it

warrants protection -- other than to accept the government’s own

designation.”). In this case, the district court should require the

government to make the filing upon remand.

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As the record now stands, without an explanation of the

grounds for finding materiality by the district court and without

support for the claim of immateriality from the government, we

cannot resolve the issue of materiality on our own. A remand is

therefore required. 

B

As neither side disputes, the analogy to criminal

proceedings also indicates that, before ordering disclosure of

classified material to counsel, the court must determine that

alternatives to disclosure would not effectively substitute for

unredacted access. In criminal proceedings under the Classified

Information Procedures Act (CIPA), for example, the

government may move for alternatives to disclosing classified

information, such as substituting “a statement admitting relevant

facts that the specific classified information would tend to

prove” or “a summary of the specific classified information.”

18 U.S.C. App. III, § 6(c)(1). The district court must “grant

such a motion . . . if it finds that the statement or summary will

provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to

make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified

information.” Id.

These or other alternatives should also be available in

habeas if the district court determines that a proposed admission

or summary would suffice to provide the detainee with “a

meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held

pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of

relevant law.” Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266; see id. (holding

that the “privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to [such

an] opportunity”). See generally id. at 2276 (“We recognize . . .

that the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting

sources and methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect

that the District Court will use its discretion to accommodate

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this interest to the greatest extent possible.”); Parhat, 532 F.3d

at 849-50 (discussing the use of the CIPA analogy in dealing

with sensitive classified information in DTA reviews). We note,

moreover, that although a finding of materiality is a prerequisite

to ordering disclosure of classified information, it is not a

prerequisite to ordering disclosure of an unclassified

substitution. If the court determines that the assistance of

petitioner’s counsel would facilitate the making of a materiality

determination, nothing bars it (assuming no other privilege is at

issue) from compelling the government to produce an

unclassified substitution that will enable counsel to assist the

court. 

As the record does not indicate whether the district court

considered unclassified alternatives before ordering disclosure

of classified information, this issue must be addressed on

remand as well.

C

In Boumediene, the Supreme Court made clear that,

although “[h]abeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a

criminal trial,” the “writ must be effective. The habeas court

must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review

of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to

detain.” 128 S. Ct. at 2269. Contrary to the government’s

suggestion, this court’s opinion in Bismullah did not hold that

the government’s submission of classified materials to the court

for in camera, ex parte review ends that inquiry. Bismullah did

indicate that, in DTA cases, “highly sensitive information, or

information pertaining to a highly sensitive source or to anyone

other than the detainee” should be presented first “to the court

ex parte and in camera.” 501 F.3d at 187. And it further stated

that, once such information is presented to the court, the

“presumption” under the DTA that “counsel for a detainee has

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4

We do not address the applicability of such a presumption in the

cases under consideration here, as this appeal only concerns counsel’s

access to classified information contained in factual returns filed by

the government in support of the petitioners’ detention.

a ‘need to know’ all Government Information concerning his

client” “is overcome.” Id.4 But Bismullah did not address how

a district court should proceed once that presumption was

overcome by an ex parte, in camera presentation. As indicated

above, we now conclude that the habeas court should proceed by

determining whether the classified information is material and

counsel’s access to it is necessary to facilitate meaningful

review, and whether no alternatives to access would suffice to

provide the detainee with the meaningful opportunity required

by Boumediene. 

On the current record, we are unable to determine whether

the district court found that the redacted classified information

was material to the detainees’ cases and necessary to facilitate

meaningful habeas review. Nor can we determine whether the

court found that alternatives to disclosure were insufficient.

Given the scope of the problems presented to the district court

in the underlying proceedings, and the court’s prescience in

anticipating the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Boumediene

regarding the availability of habeas, we do not make these

observations by way of criticism. Nonetheless, they do require

us to vacate the discovery order and to remand for further

proceedings. Because we do so, we do not address additional

issues that may become relevant if the threshold requirements

for disclosure to counsel are met. As the Court said in

Boumediene, “[w]e make no attempt to anticipate all of the

evidentiary . . . issues that will arise during the course of the

detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings,” because “[t]hese and the

other remaining questions are within the expertise and

competence of the District Court to address in the first instance.”

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5

For example, as has also been true in the analogous criminal

cases that this court has decided to date: “[W]e need not decide

whether a defendant’s [or detainee’s] interest in information that is

helpful, but that does not rise to the level that is subject to disclosure

under Brady v. Maryland, can overcome the government’s interest in

protecting properly classified information.” Mejia, 448 F.3d at 457

n.18 (citing United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir.

2004)); cf. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276 (noting that the Court has

“recogniz[ed] an evidentiary privilege in a civil damages case where

there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will

expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,

should not be divulged” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

128 S. Ct. at 2276.5 Nor do we address “the content of the law

that governs petitioners’ detention,” which is also a “matter yet

to be determined.” Id. at 2277.

We are cognizant, however, of the detainees’ concern that

listing these threshold requirements as if they were iterative

steps that must be accomplished one at a time may inordinately

delay resolution of their habeas petitions, in contravention of

Boumediene’s declaration that “detainees in these cases are

entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing.” Id. at 2275.

Accordingly, and contrary to the view of the government, we do

not suggest that the district court must make these findings

seriatim. Nothing precludes the court from concluding, in its

discretion, that simultaneous resolution would be more efficient.

But however the court resolves the disclosure issue, it must state

its individualized determinations on the record in order to enable

informed appellate review. 

USCA Case #05-5127 Document #1168849 Filed: 03/06/2009 Page 17 of 18
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IV

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is

vacated and the cases are remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered. 

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