Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01630/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01630-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332oc Diversity-Other Contract

---

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

EVENFLO COMPANY, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MARK DANIEL AUGUSTINE, 

 Defendant. 

 

: 

: CASE NO. 3:14-cv-00076

: 

: JUDGE THOMAS M. ROSE

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MARK 

DANIEL AUTUSTINE’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

GRANTING DEFENDANT MARK DANIEL AUGUSTINE’S 

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, DOC. 5. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Pending before the Court for decision is Defendant Mark Daniel Augustine’s (Augustine) 

Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 5. Therein, Augustine asserts: Plaintiff Evenflo Company, Inc.’s 

(Evenflo) Complaint should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) because Ohio’s long arm statute does not reach Augustine, the 

current forum will deprive him of his right to due process, and a forum selection clause in the 

Covenant he signed does not apply. Doc. 5 at 1, 6-8. Also, Augustine believes that venue in Ohio 

is improper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), because the alleged wrongs 

took place in Mexico, making Mexico the appropriate forum. Id. at 1, 16. Further, Augustine 

states that Evenflo’s Complaint should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 

since an alternate forum is available, and both private and public interest factors favor dismissal. 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 1 of 20
2 

Id. at 1, 11-15. Lastly, Augustine believes that if Evenflo’s Complaint is not dismissed, the Court 

should transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id.

 Evenflo alleges that venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Ohio and also that the Court has jurisdiction over Augustine. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3-4. Further, 

Evenflo believes venue is also proper because Defendant executed a Not to Compete and 

Maintain Confidentially Covenant which contained a forum-selection clause specifying that any 

disputes involving the Covenant would be resolve in Ohio courts under Ohio law. Id. at ¶ 6. The 

Court finds that personal jurisdiction exists in this case and venue is proper in this Court. Further, 

Augustine has not established that Mexico is an adequate alternative forum for all of the present 

causes of action. However, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses as well as for the 

interest of justice, this Court finds that the case should be transferred to the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California. 

I. Relevant Jurisdictional Factual Background 

 Per the Complaint, around June 17, 2003, Augustine became employed by Evenflo with 

the primary duty of operating Evenflo’s plant located in Tijuana, Mexico (Tijuana Plant). Doc. 1 

¶ 5. As a requirement of his employment, Augustine signed a Covenant Not to Compete and 

Maintain Confidentiality (Covenant) which stated that any disputes relating to the Covenant 

would be resolved in Ohio under Ohio law. Id. at ¶ 6. Even though Augustine worked solely in 

Mexico he remained in contact with supervisors in Ohio, received his paychecks from Evenflo in 

Ohio, and used a corporate credit card that was billed to Evenflo in Ohio. Id. at ¶ 7. Augustine 

would also make periodic trips to Ohio to meet with and report to his supervisors about the status 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 2 of 20
3 

of the Tijuana Plant. Id. Around January 17, 2014, Augustine resigned from his position at 

Evenflo. Id. at ¶ 8. 

During his employment, Evenflo claims that Augustine used company funds to pay his 

Employment Tax in Mexico and that Augustine sold scrap metal owned by Evenflo for his own 

personal benefit. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14. 

Augustine also was allegedly associated with a $1.8 million fine Evenflo received from 

Mexican tax authorities because mandated accounting software was not implemented at the 

Tijuana Plant. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18. Following the fine, Augustine hired a Mexican Law Firm to 

represent Evenflo in relation to the fine, subjecting Evenflo to $248,000 in legal fees. Id. at ¶¶ 

19, 22. Augustine supposedly never notified his superiors about the fine or the firm he hired, and 

hid the payout of legal expenses by coding the payments as maintenance expenses, paying them 

out of a building maintenance account. Id. at ¶ 19, 21. Also, Evenflo believes that Augustine is 

responsible for accumulated interest on the fine, bringing the fine and interest to a total of $2.1 

million. Id. at ¶ 23. Additionally, Evenflo states that Augustine is responsible for paying the 

senior manager at the Tijuana Plant two months past his resignation date. Id. at ¶ 24-25. Finally, 

Augustine had to complete an Ethics Questionnaire and Business Policy/Conflicts of Interest 

Compliance Certification (the Ethics Questionnaire) each year, which verified that he was not 

involved or aware of any conduct that would compromise Evenflo. Id. at ¶ 12. 

 On March 7, 2014, Evenflo filed a complaint alleging four claims: breach of contract, 

conversion and civil theft, breach of duty of good faith and loyalty, and fraud. Id. at ¶ 6-10. 

Subsequently, on April 10, 2014, Augustine filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and/or forum non conveniens. Doc. 5 at 1. Then, on May 5, 2014, Evenflo filed a 

memorandum in opposition to Augustine’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 6 at 1. Finally, on May 20, 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 3 of 20
4 

2014, Augustine filed a reply brief in support of his motion to dismiss. Doc. 7 at 1. Currently the 

motion to dismiss is ripe for decision. 

II. Jurisdiction 

Evenflo asserts in its Complaint that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this present case 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in 

controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $75,000. 

III. Standard of Review 

 Augustine seeks dismissal of Evenflo’s claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2),(3). The reason to file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) is to 

challenge the court’s personal jurisdiction of a case. In order to survive a motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, “the plaintiff need only make a ‘prima facie’ case that the court has 

personal jurisdiction.” Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Kroger Co. v. 

Malease Foods Corp., 437 F.3d 506, 510 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2006)). When an evidentiary hearing is 

held, the plaintiff must establish “’specific facts’ that personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant, and the plaintiff must make this demonstration by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Conn, 667 F.3d at 711 (citing Kroger, 437 F.3d at 510). A Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue will only be granted if the action was 

not filed in a proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Kerobo v. Southwestern Clean Fuels, 

Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2002). 

IV. Analysis

1. Personal Jurisdiction 

Augustine asserts that Evenflo’s Complaint must be dismissed because this Court does 

not have personal jurisdiction over him. Doc. 5 at 3. 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 4 of 20
5 

“In diversity cases, federal courts apply the law of the forum state to determine whether 

personal jurisdiction exists.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tryg Int’l Ins. Co., 91 F.3d 790, 793 

(6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit recognizes that there are two types of personal jurisdiction, 

general and specific. Brunner v. Hampson, 441 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2006). Ohio does not 

acknowledge general jurisdiction of parties who are non-residents of Ohio. Signom v. Schenck 

Fuels Inc., No. C-3-07-037, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42941, 2007 WL 1726492 at *3 (S.D. Ohio 

June 13, 2007). Therefore, a personal jurisdiction analysis of Augustine as a non-resident can 

only be based on specific jurisdiction determined by Ohio law. Id. “Under Ohio law, personal 

jurisdiction over non-resident defendants is available only if (1) the long-arm statute confers 

jurisdiction and (2) jurisdiction is proper under the Federal Due Process Clause.” Conn, 667 F.3d 

at 712. 

a. Ohio’s Long Arm Statute 

“Unlike other jurisdictions, Ohio does not have a long-arm statute that reaches to the 

limits of the Due Process Clause, and the analysis of Ohio's long-arm statute is a particularized 

inquiry wholly separate from the analysis of Federal Due Process law.” Conn, 667 F.3d at 712. 

“Ohio's long-arm statute grants Ohio courts personal jurisdiction over a non-resident if his 

conduct falls within the nine bases for jurisdiction listed by the statute.” Id. Also, when 

jurisdiction is based solely upon Ohio’s Long Arm Statute, only a cause of action arising from 

acts in the statute may be asserted against a defendant. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382(C). 

Ohio’s long-arm statute states that: 

(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an 

agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person:

(1) Transacting any business in this state;

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 5 of 20
6 

 (4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside the state if 

he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of 

conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 

rendered in this state; 

 (6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state 

committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have 

expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state; 

(B) For purposes of this section, a person who enters into an agreement, as a principal, 

with a sales representative for the solicitation of orders in this state is transacting business 

in this state. As used in this division, "principal" and "sales representative" have the same 

meanings as in section 1335.11 of the Revised Code.

(C) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of 

action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. 

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382. Evenflo asserts that this Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Augustine pursuant to sections (A)(1), (A)(4), and (A)(6). 

Ohio Revised Code § 2307.382(A)(1) 

This court has personal jurisdiction under section (A)(1) when an action arises from a 

defendant or a defendant’s agent transacting any business in Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio 

has concluded that section (A)(1) is “very broadly worded and permit[s] jurisdiction over 

nonresident defendants who are transacting any business in Ohio.” Ky. Oaks Mall Co. v. 

Mitchell’s Formal Wear, 559 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ohio 1990). The Ohio Supreme Court has found 

that the word “transact” means “to carry on business,” as well as “to have dealings,” and the 

word is farther reaching than the term “contract.” Shaker Construction Group, LLC v. Schilling, 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79645, 2008 WL 4346777, *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2008)). The best 

approach is to simply apply the language of section(A)(1) and the court must utilize a case-bycase determination. Genesis Insurance Co. v. Alfi, 425 F.Supp. 2d 876, 894 (S.D. Ohio 2006). To 

establish jurisdiction, ongoing substantive contacts must exist, the existence of a contract or 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 6 of 20
7 

simply soliciting business in Ohio is not enough. Burnshire Dev., LLC v. Cliffs Reduced Iron 

Corp., 198 Fed. Appx. 425, 431-32 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Two factors are also relevant to determine if a non-resident defendant “transacted 

business” in Ohio within the scope of Ohio’s long arm statute. Shaker Construction, 2008 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 79645, 2008 WL 4346777 at *3. The first factor is whether the non-resident 

defendant is the one initiated the business contacts. Id. (citing Paglioni & Assocs. v. 

WinnerComm, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-276, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18612, 2007 WL 852055 at *9 

(S.D. Ohio March 16, 2007). If the non-resident defendant is the one who reached out to create a 

business relationship, then the defendant transacted business in Ohio. Id. 

The second factor that must be taken into consideration is if the parties undertook 

business negotiations in Ohio or if the terms of the discussions affect Ohio. Shaker Construction, 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79645, 2008 WL 4346777 at *3. If discussions took place in Ohio or the 

terms affect Ohio, then this is sufficient to amount to the non-resident defendant “transacting 

business” in Ohio. Id. However, directly communicating with an Ohio resident to create a 

business agreement is not enough, “there must additionally be some continuing obligation that 

connects the nonresident defendant to the state or some terms of the agreement that affect the 

state.” Id. (citing Kentucky Oaks Mall, 559 N.E.2d at 480). 

In Coast to Coast Health Care Services, Inc. v. Meyerhoffer, a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction existed over a non-resident employee under sections (A)(1) and (A)(4). No. 2:10-cv734, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6250, 2012 WL 169963 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2012). This is 

because the plaintiff’s principal place of business was in Ohio, the defendant’s employment 

contract was discussed over the phone with plaintiff in Ohio, plaintiff gave defendant “software, 

programing, and other tools” necessary “to carry out her employment,” defendant was 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 7 of 20
8 

compensated for her work by plaintiff located in Ohio, and she communicated regularly with her 

supervisor located in Ohio. Id. Personal jurisdiction also existed when an employee located in a 

different state took advantage of an employment relationship with a company in Ohio, reported 

expenses weekly, performance reports, regularly contacted the Ohio company via email and 

telephone, and transferred money. Rexam Healthcare Packaging, Inc. v. Osiris Medical, Inc., 

No. 3:09-cv-1584, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21702, 2010 WL 819063 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 

2010). 

Augustine’s first contact with Evenflo began in 2003 after gaining employment at the 

Ohio company. Augustine knew that Evenflo was located in Ohio and he was working for an 

Ohio company even though he was responsible for the operations of the Tijuana Plant in Mexico. 

On an ongoing basis, Augustine communicated with his supervisors and other individuals 

located in Ohio. He admits that he traveled to Ohio on several occasions to meet with Evenflo 

executives and sign relevant documents. Even though Augustine worked in Mexico, he reported 

to Evenflo in Ohio. Also, his compensation was administered from Ohio and his company credit 

card was billed to Ohio. Due to these connection, section (A)(1) confers personal jurisdiction 

over Augustine. 

Ohio Revised Code § 2307.382(A)(4) 

Under section (A)(4), personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant that allegedly caused 

tortious injury in Ohio by an act or omission outside of Ohio if the defendant regularly does or 

solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial 

revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Ohio. 

In The Rightthing, LLC v. Brown, the plaintiff was a company with its principal place of 

business in Ohio, and filed suit against a previous employee who at all relevant times resided in 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 8 of 20
9 

California. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7464, 2009 WL 249694, *1 (N.D. Ohio 2009). The court 

found personal jurisdiction existed under section (A)(4) when an employee accessed the 

company’s computer system in Ohio, allegedly causing tortious injury to the company, the 

employee was compensated from his employer in Ohio, and he received “reports, proposals and 

agreements” straight from company headquarters in Ohio. Id. at *4. 

In this case, Evenflo, with its principal place of business in Ohio, alleges that they 

suffered tortious injuries in the form of conversion and civil theft from the conduct of Augustine 

who was located outside of Ohio. Augustine did not collect substantial revenue from activities in 

Ohio so the question is whether or not the alleged tortious conduct caused an injury in Ohio and 

if it did, whether Augustine conducts regular business or engages in any other persistent course 

of conduct in Ohio. First, the alleged conversion and civil theft outside of Ohio does harm 

Evenflo who is located in Ohio. This is because a financial loss in Mexico would have a direct 

impact on the Ohio based company. Damages resulting from stolen scrap metal, and company 

funds paid to cover an employee’s taxes will surely impact Evenflo, headquartered in Ohio. 

Second, Augustine did not personally receive revenue from goods sold or services rendered in 

Ohio or conduct regular business in Ohio. However, Augustine did receive his paychecks from 

Ohio, he communicated with supervisors in Ohio, his company credit card bills were sent to 

Evenflo in Ohio, and he visited Ohio to meet with company employees on several occasions. The 

regular contacts by Augustine, outside of Ohio, with Evenflo, located in Ohio, amounts to 

engagement in a persistent course of conduct in Ohio. See International, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

73228, 2012 WL 1902557 at *5; Rightthing, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7464, 2009 WL 249694 at 

*4. Due to the tortious injury caused to Evenflo in Ohio and the persistent course of conduct by 

Augustine, section (A)(4) also confers personal jurisdiction over Augustine. 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 9 of 20
10 

Ohio Revised Code § 2307.382(A)(6) 

Section (A)(6) confers personal jurisdiction over a person that caused tortious injury in 

Ohio by an act committed outside of Ohio with the objective of injuring individuals and the 

person committing the act could have reasonably expected that some individual would be injured 

in Ohio. 

 Courts have found that personal jurisdiction exists in a range of cases involving section 

(A)(6). For example, section (A)(6) created personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 

where alleged acts of theft and conversion of a catalogue and customer list transpired when the 

defendant was outside of Ohio and a contract between the parties was created in Ohio. Innovative 

Digital Equipment, Inc. v. Quantum Technology, Inc., 597 F.Supp. 983, 987 (N.D. Ohio 1984). 

Another situation where personal jurisdiction was found over a defendant under section (A)(6) 

was where an out of state defendant allegedly committed conversion, fraud, and civil conspiracy 

from a location other than Ohio, with knowledge that the stock at issue was of and affected the 

Ohio corporation. Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital, No. 19586, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4668, 2000 

WL 1420282 at * 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2000). In both of these situations, section (A)(6) 

conferred personal jurisdiction because the actions involved property in Ohio and the tortious 

conduct was felt in Ohio. 

 As discussed in the analysis of section (A)(4) above, the alleged acts of conversion and 

civil theft outside of Ohio, if true, have injured Evenflo in Ohio. The only other issue is whether 

Augustine might reasonably have expected Evenflo to be damaged in Ohio from his tortious acts. 

Augustine, as an agent of Evenflo, had access to company funds to be used for authorized 

purposes. Augustine told Evenflo’s accounting personnel to pay his personal employment tax out 

of company funds. Further, he even had the payments disguised to conceal the true nature of the 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 10 of 20
11 

payments. This demonstrates that Augustine could reasonably expect that the unauthorized 

payments would cause injury to Evenflo. He also knew that Evenflo sold left over scrap metal to 

recover some of the cost involved with manufacturing. If Augustine took scrap material from the 

company for his own personal benefit, this means that the company could not sell the scrap and 

receive any revenue. Thus, Augustine could reasonably expect that selling scrap metal belonging 

to Evenflo would cause direct injury to Evenflo. Due to the tortious injury caused to Evenflo in 

Ohio and the reasonable expectation that the tortious injury would occur, section (A)(6) confers 

personal jurisdiction over Augustine. 

b. Right to Due Process 

“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment . . . if he 

be not present within territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 

maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 

(1940). 

Consistent with due process, the Sixth Circuit has established a three-part test for 

determining whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised: 

 First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the 

forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. 

 Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. 

 Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a 

substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction 

over the defendant reasonable. 

Third Nat’l Bank v. Wedge Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1090 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Southern 

Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)). 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 11 of 20
12 

For the first prong of the test, Ohio’s Long-Arm Statute’s “transacting any business” 

standard is the same as the “purposeful availment” prong of the constitutional standard. 

Burnshire, 198 F. App’x at 432. Next, the second prong’s “arising from” standard only requires a 

substantial connection between the cause of action and the defendant’s association with Ohio. 

Genesis, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Thus, the cause of action does not have to directly or formally 

exist from defendant’s connections with Ohio, there just needs to be some sort of substantial 

connection. International Paper, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73228, 2012 WL 1902557 at *6 (citing 

Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 2002)). “If a defendant’s contacts with the forum 

state are related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to have 

arisen from those contacts.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1267 (6th Cir. 1996). 

Finally, the third prong is typically met when the first two prongs of the Due Process analysis are 

met, "an inference arises that the third, fairness, is also present; only the unusual case will not 

meet this third criterion." Genesis, 425 F.Supp.2d at 893 (citing First National Bank of 

Louisville v. J. W. Brewer Tire Co., 680 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1982)). 

In this case, the first prong of the test is satisfied. As determined above, Augustine is 

alleged to have engaged in a persistent course of conduct in Ohio purportedly creating an impact 

in Ohio. Therefore, exercising personal jurisdiction over Augustine is justified under the 

“purposeful availment” prong of the constitutional analysis. As for the second prong, Augustine 

may have resided outside of Ohio, but he would have been unable to convert company funds or 

sell scrap metal for his own use if he was not employed by Evenflo, headquartered in Ohio. The 

operative facts of Evenflo’s causes of action directly relate to Augustine’s employment with 

Evenflo. Augustine’s allegedly tortious activities and breach of obligations to Evenflo create a 

substantial connection to Ohio. Finally, the third prong is concerned with the reasonableness of 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 12 of 20
13 

exercising personal jurisdiction over Augustine. While witnesses may be located in Mexico, 

bringing non-residents to Ohio must be balanced with Ohio’s interest in protecting companies 

that conduct business in Ohio. Evenflo has an interest in obtaining a convenient and immediate 

relief after filing suit in Ohio. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable for personal jurisdiction 

to exist over Augustine in Ohio and it does not offend the Due Process Clause. 

C. Forum Selection Clause 

Evenflo believes that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Augustine because of a 

forum selection clause included in a non-compete agreement that was signed by Augustine. Doc. 

1 at ¶ 4. 

 The Court will follow the rationale in Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, 

Inc. and find that “Ohio law should apply to the interpretation of this forum selection clause.” 

489 F.3d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 2007). Further, Ohio law will be applied because it is the law of the 

jurisdiction agreed upon by the parties in the Covenant. Doc. 1-1; Bracken v. Dasco Home Med. 

Equip., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90628, 17 (S.D. Ohio June 27, 2013); see also Enquip 

Techs. Group Inc. v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I., 2012 986 N.E.2d 469, 479 (Ohio App. 2012). 

“The goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the parties' intent.” Bracken 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90628 at 18 (citing Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 

(Ohio 1996)). To determine the intentions of the parties, the four corners of the contract must be 

construed as whole to determine if any ambiguity exists. Graham, 667 N.E.2d at 952. “A term 

[or phrase] that would otherwise cause ambiguity can be construed in the context of other terms 

in the contract to resolve the ambiguity.” 18 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Contracts, Section 123 

(2012) (citing Seringetti Const. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 51 Ohio App. 3d 1, 553 N.E.2d 1371 

(Ohio App. 1988)).

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 13 of 20
14 

The relevant sections of the Covenant and the forum selection clause state: 

PURPOSE 

The intent and purpose of this Covenant is to protect the trade secrets, proprietary 

technical information and customer information of Evenflo Company, Inc. . . . from its 

competitors already in the business of designing, manufacturing and/or marketing 

juvenile products and those firms who desire to enter this business. 

COVENANT 

. . . Employee covenants that he/she will not directly or indirectly engage in any business 

endeavors or act as a consultant, representative or serve in the employ of any entity that is 

in competition with Evenflo in any market in which it participates. . . . 

BREACH OF COVENANT 

. . . Employee consents to an injunction enjoining any breach of this Covenant without 

limiting any other remedy, and agrees that any disputes relating to this Covenant shall be 

resolved in the courts of Ohio and pursuant to Ohio law. 

Doc. 1-1. Evenflo argues that Augustine breached this Covenant by allegedly selling scrap metal 

owned by Evenflo for his own personal benefit. This was supposedly completed in competition 

with Evenflo in the scrap metal market. However, the Covenant only mentions “protecting trade 

secrets, proprietary technical information and customer information.” Selling scrap metal does 

not fall under any of those categories. Further, the Covenant has conflicting language by first 

mentioning protection from those businesses that already are “marketing juvenile products” or 

desire to enter the market and later stating “any market.” When reading the Covenant in the 

context of the non-compete agreement, the Court believes that the Covenant was created to 

address the specific disputes that could arise from an employee competing in the market where 

Evenflo dispenses its product, not from the scrap metal market where manufacturing by-products 

are disposed of. Scrap metal in the capacity that Evenflo acquires it, is a secondary effect from 

manufacturing and not one of the staple products that Evenflo competitively markets. The scrap 

metal argument presented by Evenflo exceeds the scope of the Covenant and is not founded in 

the purpose of the Non-Compete Agreement. 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 14 of 20
15 

Since the forum selection clause in the Non-Compete Agreement only applies to the 

specific breaches mentioned in the agreement, this Court finds that the forum selection clause 

does not bind Augustine to the courts of Ohio or Ohio law. 

2. Forum Non Conveniens 

Even if this Court properly has jurisdiction over the present case, Augustine believes that 

this court should decline to accept jurisdiction over this action based on the common law 

doctrine of forum non conveniens. Doc. 5 at 10. 

 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “when an alternative forum has jurisdiction 

to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would ‘establish . . . oppressiveness and 

vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience,’ or when the ‘chosen 

forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and 

legal problems,’ the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case.” Piper 

Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (U.S. 1981) (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. 

Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). Even if jurisdiction and venue are properly established, a court 

still has the discretion to dismiss an action on the grounds of forum non conveniens. American 

Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 448 (1994). When applying the doctrine of forum non 

conveniens an alternate forum must first be established, then the court must weigh the relevant 

private and public factors to determine if forum non conveniens justifies dismissal of the case. 

a. Adequate Alternative Forum 

To dismiss a case for forum non conveniens, a defendant must first demonstrate that an 

adequate alternative forum exists and is available to resolve the dispute. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255. 

An alternate forum meets the above requirements “when the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ 

in the other jurisdiction” and the remedy offered is satisfactory, meaning that the alternate forum 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 15 of 20
16 

“permit[s] litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.” Piper, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22 (quoting 

Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 506-07 (1947)). "A foreign forum is adequate when 

the parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may not 

enjoy all the benefits of an American court.” DTEX, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A.., 508 F.3d 

785, 796 (5th Cir. 2007). Defendants can meet their burden of establishing an adequate forum by 

offering support, such as affidavits from experts, to demonstrate analogous causes of action and 

adequate remedies in the alternative forum. Stalinski v. Bakoczy, 41 F. Supp. 2d 755, 759 (S.D. 

Ohio 1998); see also Rustal Trading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 Fed. Appx. 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(defendant submitted affidavits establishing the law of the alternate forum recognized the 

plaintiff’s causes of action). 

Augustine asserts that Mexico is an adequate alternative forum, the Court disagrees. 

There are no affidavits or evidence by experts demonstrating that Mexico is an adequate forum 

in this case for the present causes of action. Augustine cited to several non-binding Fifth Circuit 

cases, where under the specifics facts, the Fifth Circuit found Mexico was an adequate 

alternative forum. In this case, Augustine has not established that if this case was brought in 

Mexico, adequate substantive law, procedural law, and damages would be available under the 

Evenflo’s causes of action. Just because the acts took place in Mexico does not in and of itself 

make Mexico an adequate alternative forum. Evenflo has decided to file its case in Ohio and 

without Augustine demonstrating the adequacy of Mexico as an alternate forum the Court is 

unable to conclude that Mexico is an adequate alternative forum under the present causes of 

action. 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 16 of 20
17 

Since the alternative forum suggested by Augustine is not adequate, the Court does not 

need to balance the private and public factors. This case will not be dismissed under forum non 

conveniens. 

3. Improper Venue 

Defendant asserts this case should be dismissed because venue in this Court is improper 

and that the proper forum for this action is Mexico. Doc. 5 at 16. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2), venue exists in “a judicial district in which a substantial 

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property 

that is subject of the action is situated.” 

As discussed in the personal jurisdiction section above, substantial connections between 

Augustine and Ohio exist to warrant venue. Also, the consequences of Augustine’s alleged 

actions can be traced back to Ohio and felt financially in Ohio. Venue is proper in the Southern 

District of Ohio. 

4. Transfer Venue to California 

Should this Court determine that it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Augustine, 

which it has, Augustine urges that this Court transfer venue of this action to the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Doc. 5 at 

16. 

 As Augustine points out, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 

justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it 

might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Venue is proper in the district where the 

defendant resides when the case is a diversity action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 17 of 20
18 

 When the parties are almost equally divided the court cannot shift the inconvenience to 

the plaintiff. Candela Mgmt. Group v. Taco Maker, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90152, 19, 2009 

UL 2983074 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2009). See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645-646 

(1964) ("Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more convenient forum, not a forum likely to 

prove equally convenient or inconvenient."); Copeland Corp. v. Choice Fabricators, Inc., 492 F. 

Supp. 2d 783, 789 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("It is axiomatic that a motion under § 1404(a) cannot be 

used to transfer the inconvenience of litigating in a distant court from the defendant to the 

plaintiff."). Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff's choice of 

forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 

 First, Augustine admits that he is subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of California and venue would lie there. Evenflo does not 

dispute personal jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California but Evenflo does challenge whether this district is reasonable. Therefore, this action 

could have been brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. 

 Second, since personal jurisdiction and venue are satisfied, the issue becomes whether 

transfer is justified for the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and in the interest of justice. As 

for convenience of the parties, Augustine is located in California and argues that Spanish 

speaking witnesses and documents, most of which are located in Mexico, are closer to California 

making travel and expense of litigation less. Augustine mentions that Mexican law issues will be 

involved, requiring the testimony of a Mexican law expert, presumable from Mexico, making 

travel and expense even greater. Also, Augustine believes that since Evenflo already does 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 18 of 20
19 

business in Southern California and Mexico it is reasonable that this matter be transferred to 

California. 

This Court believes that with all of the difficulties in obtaining witnesses and documents 

that are located in Mexico it is appropriate to transfer this case to the Southern District of 

California. Augustine has identified multiple crucial witnesses to this case, all of which reside in 

Mexico and the trouble that would entail trying to compel these witnesses to present themselves 

in Ohio. Doc. 5-1 at ¶ 25. Additionally, the majority of the documents and events occurred in 

Mexico making California a more convenient forum for the parties and witnesses because of how 

close the information is to California. Since Evenflo already operates a plant in Mexico and 

conducts business in California, the Court finds it reasonable that Evenflo pursue the remainder 

of its case in California. 

Concerning the interest of justice, Evenflo will still have the same rights in California as 

in Ohio. Also, the Southern District of California had less civil cases per judge on its docket in 

the past 12-month period (2013) with 271 as compared to 333 per judge in the Southern District 

of Ohio.1

 Also, in the same timeframe the average time it took from filing to disposition of a civil 

case in the Southern District of California was 6.6 months as compared to 9.8 months in the 

Southern District of Ohio.2

 The interests of justice weigh in favor of California acquiring 

jurisdiction. 

 

1

 California Southern U.S. District Court – Judicial Caseload Profile, June 17, 2014, 

http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/districtfcms-profiles-december-2013.pdf&page=69; Ohio Southern U.S. District Court – Judicial Caseload Profile, June 17, 

2014, 

http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/districtfcms-profiles-december-2013.pdf&page=43. 2

 California Southern U.S. District Court – Judicial Caseload Profile, June 17, 2014, 

http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/districtfcms-profiles-december-2013.pdf&page=69; Ohio Southern U.S. District Court – Judicial Caseload Profile, June 17, 

2014, 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 19 of 20
20 

Venue is proper in either this Court or the District Court for the Southern District of 

California. Further, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice 

it is proper to transfer this case to the Southern District of California. Therefore, Augustine’s 

Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED. 

IV. Conclusion 

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Augustine, venue is proper, and forum non 

conveniens does not warrant dismissal of Evenflo’s Complaint. However, venue will be 

transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Therefore, 

Augustine’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the personal jurisdiction, forum non 

conveniens, and improper venue claims. Augustine’s Motion to Transfer venue is GRANTED. 

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Thursday, July 3, 2014.3

 s/Thomas M. Rose 

_______________________________ 

 THOMAS M. ROSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/districtfcms-profiles-december-2013.pdf&page=43. 3

 The Court acknowledges the valuable contribution of judicial extern Jacob Gebelle from the University of Dayton 

School of Law in the drafting of this order. 

Case 3:14-cv-01630-AJB-JLB Document 8 Filed 07/07/14 Page 20 of 20