Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02445/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02445-56/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Property Damage

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, NO. CIV S-09-2445 KJM-EFB

v.

SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES; et al., ORDER

Defendants.

 /

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment on affirmative defenses. (ECF 351.) This matter was heard on February 10, 2012;

Kelli Taylor appeared for plaintiff and William Warne appeared for defendants. For the

following reasons, plaintiff’s motion is hereby granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this case on August 31, 2009. (ECF 1.)

On May 26, 2010, plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint against defendants

Sierra Pacific Industries (“SPI”); W.M. Beaty and Associates, Inc. (“Beaty”); Eunice E. Howell

individually and doing business as Howell’s Forest Harvesting Company (together, “Howell”);

1

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

and Landowners.1 (ECF 53 ¶¶ 5-8.) The second amended complaint alleges seven (7) causes of

action: 1) negligence against all defendants; 2) liability under the Fire Liability Law, California

Health & Safety Code §§ 13007-13009.1 & Civil Code §§ 3287 & 3288 against all defendants;

3) negligence and negligence per se under 14 Cal. Code Regs. § 938.8 & the Fire Protection Plan

against all defendants; 4) trespass by fire against all defendants; 5) negligent supervision against

SPI, Beaty, landowners, and Eunice Howell; 6) negligent hiring against SPI, Beaty, and

landowners; and 7) interest and penalties against all defendants. (Id.)

Beaty and Landowners filed their answers to the second amended complaint on

June 10, 2010 (ECF 54 & 55 respectively); Howell and SPI filed their answers to the second

amended complaint on June 15, 2010 (ECF 56 & 57 respectively).

Plaintiff filed the present motion for partial summary judgment on January 12,

2012. (ECF 351.) Defendants filed their joint opposition on January 27, 2012. (ECF 384.)2

Plaintiff filed its reply on February 3, 2012. (ECF 392.)

/////

/////

1

 Landowners refers to the following defendants: Anne McKeever Hatch, individually

and as trustee of the Hatch 1987 Revocable Trust, Richard L. Greene, individually and as trustee

of the Hatch Irrevocable Trust, Brooks Walker, Jr., individually and as trustee of the Brooks

Walker, Jr. Revocable Trust and the Della Walker Van Loben Sels Trust for the Issue of Brooks

Walker, Jr., Brooks Walker III, individually and as trustee of the Clayton Brooks Danielsen

Trust, the Myles Walker Danielsen Trust, the Margaret Charlotte Burlock Trust, and the

Benjamin Walker Burlock Trust, Leslie Walker, individually and as trustee of the Brooks

Thomas Walker Trust, the Susie Kate Walker Trust, and the Della Grace Walker Trust,

Wellington Smith Henderson, Jr., individually and as trustee of the Henderson Revocable Trust,

Elena D. Henderson, Mark W. Henderson, individually and as trustee of the Mark W. Henderson

Revocable Trust, John C. Walker, individually and as trustee of the Della Walker Van Loben

Sels Trust for the Issue of John C. Walker, James A. Henderson, Charles C. Henderson,

individually and as trustee of the Charles C. and Kirsten Henderson Revocable Trust, Joan H.

Henderson, Jennifer Walker, individually and as trustee of the Emma Walker Silverman Trust

and the Max Walker Silverman Trust, Kirby Walker, Lindsey Walker (a.k.a. Lindsey WalkerSilverman), individually and as trustee of the Reilly Hudson Keenan Trust and the Madison

Flanders Keenan Trust.

2

 The court addressed and denied defendants’ request to strike and plaintiff’s request the

court summarily adjudicate its facts at the motion hearing. See Transcript 52:16-20.

2

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).3

 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “that there

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish that

there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must “[cite] to particular parts

of materials in the record [or show] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

support that fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[the

nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to

the material facts”). Moreover, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material

fact . . . . Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and

views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

587-88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

3

 Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010. However, it is appropriate to rely

on cases decided before the amendment took effect, as “[t]he standard for granting summary

judgment remains unchanged.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56, Notes of Advisory Comm. on 2010

amendments.

3

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities

Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

B. Application

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of recoupment,

contributory negligence, and failure to mitigate pleaded in the second amended answers by

defendants SPI (ECF 57 at 16 (failure to mitigate, comparative fault, and recoupment)), Beaty

(ECF 54 at 12 (contributory negligence) & 14 (failure to mitigate)), and Howell (ECF 56 at 10

(comparative negligence) & 11 (failure to mitigate)). Plaintiff assumes for purposes of this

motion that the facts alleged by defendants in pleading their affirmative defenses are true:

specifically that the Forest Service’s policy of suppressing fires led to an accumulation of fuels

and the Forest Service did not take reasonable steps to reduce excessive fuel loads, and that the

lookout at the Red Rock Lookout tower was distracted and did not spot and report the fire when

it became visible. (Mot. at 3-4.) 

1. Recoupment

Plaintiff argues that sovereign immunity protects it from defendants’ affirmative

defense of recoupment flowing from the United States Forest Service’s forest mismanagement. 

(Mot. at 15-17.) It concedes that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) operates as a waiver of

sovereign immunity for counter-claims, but argues the discretionary function exception shields it

from liability. (Id. at 15-16). Defendants counter that the affirmative defense of recoupment is

authorized under a waiver of sovereign immunity completely independent of the FTCA. (Opp'n

at 5.) Defendants recognize that recoupment must arise from the same transaction or occurrence

as implicated by plaintiff's suit, among other things. (Id.) In reply, plaintiff argues that neither

forest mismanagement nor the failure of the Red Rock Lookout to spot the fire arise out of the

same transaction or occurrence as the genesis of the Moonlight Fire. Reply at 2-3. The court

approves this observation; this finding resolves the question without a resort to the doctrine of

sovereign immunity.

4

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

“In modern practice, the recoupment has been replaced by the compulsory

counterclaim.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also F.D.I.C. v. F.S.S.S., 829

F.Supp. 317, 320 (D. Alaska 1993) (“claims for recoupment are compulsory counterclaims under

FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)(1)(A), a compulsory

counterclaim is one that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of

the opposing party's claim . . . .” The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “flexible approach” to

evaluating whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, which calls on the

court “‘to analyze whether the essential facts of the various claims are so logically connected

that considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one

lawsuit.’” Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 827 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 1987)

(quoting Harris v. Steinem, 571 F.2d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1978)); see Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co.,

689 F.Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (“recoupment is a demand arising out of the same

transaction as the plaintiff's claim”). One consideration is whether “‘the facts necessary to prove

the two claims substantially overlap . . . .’” Competitive Techs. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d

1118, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Pochiro, 827 F.2d at 1251). If the counterclaim “arises

from the same aggregate set of operative facts as the initial claim, in that the same operative facts

serve as the basis of both claims,” it is a compulsory counterclaim. In re Pegasus Gold Corp.,

394 F.3d. 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005). 

None of the bases defendants assert for their affirmative defense of recoupment

are logically connected to the origin of the Moonlight Fire, nor have defendants explained how

the facts underlying their defenses “substantially overlap” with the facts surrounding the origins

of the Moonlight Fire. As it is undisputed that the fire began on private land (Statement of

Undisputed Facts ¶ 15, ECF 392-1), defendants’ claims arising from plaintiff’s acts or omissions

after the fire began or years before it ignited are not compulsory counter-claims. As they are not

compulsory counter-claims, there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity.

5

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2. Comparative Negligence4

“‘Contributory negligence is the conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls

below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and is a legally

contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the

plaintiff’s harm.’” Gyerman v. U.S. Lines Co., 7 Cal. 3d 488, 500 (1972) (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463). “A plaintiff is required to exercise only that amount

of care which would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence in the same circumstances.” 

Id. at 500-01 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff contends defendants’ affirmative defense of comparative negligence fails

because the Forest Service had no duty to act in anticipation of defendants’ negligent invasion

onto government property. (Mot. at 5-12.) Defendants counter that “comparative negligence . . .

[is] not premised on a plaintiff’s tort duty to a defendant but on the plaintiff’s failure to take

proper care for the protection of his own interests.” (Opp’n at 18 (internal quotation marks

omitted).)

“[P]laintiffs were under no duty to anticipate defendants’ negligent invasion of

their land . . . .” Kleinclaus v. Marin Realty Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736 (1949); Atlas

Assurance Co. v. State, 102 Cal. App. 2d 789, 799 (1951); see also County of Humboldt v.

Shelly, 220 Cal. App. 2d 194, 201 (1963).5

 “[A] landowner may make any lawful use of his land

4

 Plaintiff uses the term “contributory negligence.” The use of contributory negligence to

describe comparative negligence “is innocuous. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 . . .

abolished the legal doctrine, but not the phrase or the concept of ‘contributory negligence.’ A

claimant’s negligence contributing causally to his own injury may be considered now not as a

bar to his recovery, but merely as a factor to be considered in measuring the amount thereof.” 

Bradfield v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 681, 686 (1979) (emphasis omitted).

5

 Defendants argue that all cases regarding contributory negligence decided prior to the

1975 case Li v. Yellow Cab Co. no longer reflect California law, so the cases cited in the above

analysis are irrelevant. (Opp’n at 13.) In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court

adopted a comparative negligence rule, supplanting the common law contributory negligence

rule. 13 Cal. 3d 804 (1975). In doing so, the Li court found that the old rule of contributory

negligence did two things: it defined conduct that “render[ed] [a plaintiff] subject to the doctrine

of contributory negligence,” and it defined the result of such conduct. Id. at 809, 810. The year

6

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

and [] it is not contributory negligence to neglect to take precautions to avoid future injury which

can only occur as the result of another’s negligence.” Kleinclaus, 94 Cal. App. 2d at 738. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted insofar as defendants’

comparative negligence affirmative defense relates to the Forest Service’s suppression of forest

fires and related allowance of fuel accumulation. However, these cases are inapposite in relation

to defendants’ claims regarding the Red Rock Lookout. 

Plaintiff maintains it had “no duty to detect a fire on private land that Defendants

negligently ignited” or to respond to the fire once ignited. (Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff relies in part

on Grijalva v. Superior Court, which held “‘[i]n the absence of duty, there can be no tort

liability, and no fault can be allocated to a party that is not a tortfeasor.’” Grijalva v. Superior

Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1078 (2008) (quoting Munoz v. City of Union City, 148 Cal. App.

4th 173, 182 (2007)). Defendants contend Grijalva was wrongly decided. (Opp’n at 15.) 

Defendants rely primarily on Prosser on Torts: 

‘It is perhaps unfortunate that contributory negligence is called

negligence at all. ‘Contributory fault’ would be a more descriptive

terms. Negligence as it is commonly understood is conduct which

creates an undue risk of harm to others. Contributory negligence is

conduct that involves an undue risk of harm to the actor himself.

Negligence requires a duty, an obligation of conduct to another

person. Contributory negligence involves no duty, unless we are to

be so ingenious as to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to

protect the defendant against liability for the consequences of

plaintiff’s own negligence.’ 

(Opp’n at 15 (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON, TORTS 453 (5th ed. 1984).) However, Prosser

does not preclude the requirement that plaintiff owe a duty in order for comparative negligence

after Li was decided, the court of appeal held that “Li abolished the doctrine of contributory

negligence only as to its result. It did not abolish the term ‘contributory negligence,’ nor did it

abolish the concept of contributory negligence, meaning negligence on the part of the plaintiff

contributing causally to plaintiff’s injury.” Wittenbach v. Ryan, 63 Cal. App. 3d 712, 718

(1976). Li merely changed the result a court must reach if it found conduct constituting

comparative negligence; it did not alter the determination of what conduct could constitute such

negligence. See id. at 718.

7

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

to stand. Rather, plaintiff’s duty is to conform its conduct to the standard a reasonable person

under like circumstances would exercise for his or her own protection. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 & cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464. Regardless of

whether or not plaintiff owed a duty to defendants to respond to the Moonlight Fire, the relevant

question is whether plaintiff’s conduct comported with the requisite standard of care.

Defendants contend the Red Rock Lookout’s delay in spotting and reporting the

fire allowed the fire to spread to National Forest lands. (See ECF 57 ¶¶ 70-75.) Plaintiff

provides evidence it maintained a lookout, the Red Rock Lookout spotted and reported the

Moonlight Fire at approximately 2:24 p.m.,6 and the Moonlight Fire started on private land and

burned on private land for several hours before coming into contact with the National Forest

lands.7 (Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 16, 15, ECF 392-1.) The question remains, however,

whether plaintiff’s conduct met the standard of reasonableness. There is a triable question of

fact whether comparative negligence is applicable to plaintiff’s conduct as it regards the Red

Rock Lookout. See Lang v. Barry, 71 Cal. App. 2d 121, 125 (1945). 

Grijalva is not instructive with respect to plaintiff’s property damage; it

considered only the costs and manner of fighting a fire rather than damages for injuries the fire

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

6

 Defendants do not dispute the fire was spotted at approximately 2:24 p.m. Defendants’

objections to this evidence are overruled. 

7

 Defendants’ objections are overruled.

8

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

caused to plaintiff’s physical property. Id. at 1075. The reasoning in Grijalva is likewise

inapposite:

[a]pplication of [comparative negligence] would reduce

petitioner’s recovery based on a judge or jury’s finding that

petitioner used unreasonable or inefficient methods to fight the

fire. This is precisely the line of argument foreclosed by the

Government Code. The immunity statutes protect . . . fire fighting

entities from incurring a financial penalty based on the ‘fire

protection service’ . . . they provide[ ] or do not provide . . . . The

affirmative defense[] of comparative fault . . . therefore cannot be

available in an action to recover fire fighting costs . . . .

Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 850, 850.2, 850.4). Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether

plaintiff exercised the care a reasonable person would exercise in the same circumstances for his

or her own safety. Gyerman, 7 Cal. 3d at 500-01 (quotation omitted).

3. Failure to Mitigate Damages

Plaintiff contends defendants’ affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages

fails because it is based on plaintiff’s alleged pre-injury conduct. (Mot. at 12-14.) Defendants

concede the “forest mismanagement at issue occurred before the Moonlight Fire”; accordingly,

plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted as to defendants’ failure to mitigate

affirmative defense insofar as it relies on the Forest Service’s suppression of forest fires and

related allowance of fuel accumulation. 

Defendants maintain that their failure to mitigate defense is proper insofar as it

relates to the alleged Red Rock Lookout misconduct. (Opp’n at 19.) Defendants also contend

plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not reasonably salvaging dead timber after the fire had

been extinguished and by conducting fire-suppression in an unreasonable manner. (Opp’n at

20.)

“The rule of [mitigation of damages] comes into play after a legal wrong has

occurred, but while some damages may still be averted.” Pool v. City of Oakland, 42 Cal.3d

1051, 1066 (1986) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). “A person injured by the wrongful

act of another is bound . . . to exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid loss or minimize

9

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the resulting damages and cannot recover for losses which might have been prevented by

reasonable efforts and expenditures on his part.” Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 844

(1944). “The duty to mitigate damages does not require an injured party to do what is

unreasonable or impracticable.” Valle de Oro Bank v. Gamboa, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1686, 1691

(1994).

The alleged Red Rock Lookout misconduct occurred before the legal wrong

occurred; as relates to plaintiff, the legal wrong was the fire’s spread to the National Forest

lands, not the fire’s ignition. (See Reply at 8.) Accordingly, this misconduct does not support

defendants’ failure to mitigate defense. 

In contrast, the allegedly inadequate salvage of timber and unreasonable fire

suppression occurred after the legal wrong. (Opp’n at 20.) However, plaintiff is immune from

this claim insofar as it is based on fire suppression based on the FTCA. (Mot. at 17; Reply at 5.) 

The FTCA provides: “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title

relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under

like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2674.

The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity for tort

claims arising out of negligent conduct of government employees

acting within the scope of their employment. The government can

be sued ‘under circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law

of the place where the act or omission occurred.

Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(b)(1)).

The discretionary function exception to the FTCA “is a qualification on the

federal government’s general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims,” Sutton v. Earles, 26

F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 1994), and “provides immunity from suit for ‘[a]ny claim . . . based upon

the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty

10

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion

involved be abused.’” Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)) (internal

alterations in original). The Supreme Court has set out a two-step analysis to determine the

applicability of the discretionary function exception: first, a court asks whether the challenged

actions involve an element of judgment or choice; second, a court asks whether the judgments

involve governmental actions or considerations of public policy. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129

(citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) and United States v. Gaubert,

499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)). “The discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to

follow.” Sutton, 26 F.3d at 907. Moreover, “[t]o be shielded the judgment must be grounded in

social, economic, and political policy.” Id. Fire suppression clearly involves an element of

judgment involving governmental action and considerations of public policy; plaintiff was not

under any sort of obligation to suppress the fire, much less suppress the fire in a certain way.

See City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 837, 842 (1984); see

also Grijalva, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1078.

With regard to its allegedly inadequate salvage of timber, plaintiff contends

defendants have failed to establish a triable issue of fact. (Reply at 10.) Defendants cite to the

declaration of their purported expert, Mark Rasmussen, who states that “there were

approximately 453 million board feet of fire-killed timber with value that could have been

recovered through prompt salvage logging”; “delays in salvaging the fire-killed timber[] will

reduce the value recovered” and “increase reforestation costs”; and that “there were delays in

salvage logging caused by the United States Forest Service after the Moonlight Fire.” 

(Rasmussen Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, ECF 384-3.) “An affidavit or declaration used to . . . oppose a motion

must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and

show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c)(4). The declaration on which defendants rely is conclusory and self-serving; moreover,

11

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Rasmussen does not provide any basis for his alleged personal knowledge. See Rodriguez v.

Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This circuit has held that self-serving

affidavits are cognizable to establish a genuine issue of material fact so long as they state facts

based on personal knowledge and are not too conclusory.”). Plaintiff’s motion is granted with

respect to failure to mitigate damages.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is

granted as to recoupment, comparative negligence based on alleged mismanagement of the

National Forest lands, and failure to mitigate damages. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment is denied as to comparative negligence based on the alleged conduct of the Red Rock

Lookout.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 4, 2012.

12

Case 2:09-cv-02445-WBS-AC Document 522 Filed 06/04/12 Page 12 of 12