Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01998/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01998-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LUTRELL B HUDDLESTON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET 

AL., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-01998-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 9 

Plaintiff Lutrell B. Huddleston brings this pro se action against defendants the City & 

County of San Francisco (“CCSF”), the Office of Treasurer and Tax Collector for CCSF, and 

David Augustine and Debra Lew in their official capacities only1 for alleged employment 

discrimination. (Dkt. No. 1.) Specifically, plaintiff brings five counts against defendants for 

violations of: (i) Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act;2 (ii) 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 for 

prohibited discrimination in the making or enforcement of employment laws; (iii) 42 U.S.C. 

 1

 The complaint names David Augustine and Debra Lew in their individual capacities. 

However, neither Augustine nor Lew have been personally served. In her opposition, plaintiff 

clarifies that she did not intend to bring claims against Augustine and Lew in their individual 

capacities, but only in their official capacities as employees of the City and County of San 

Francisco. 

2

 In the complaint, plaintiff’s First Claim for Relief lists Title II of the Federal Civil Rights 

Act of 1964. In her opposition, plaintiff notes that she intended to plead a claim under Title VII of 

the Federal Civil Rights Act, which she lists in her form complaint as a cause of action but not in 

her detailed complaint. (Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 1 with Dkt. No. 1 at 6–14.) Courts construe 

pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally, and, therefore, the Court will consider her First Claim for 

Relief as a claim under Title VII. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court 

sees no prejudice to defendants in doing so as they also addressed plaintiff’s claims under Title 

VII in their motion to dismiss. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE any claims under Title II 

of the Federal Civil Rights Act, which provides a cause of action for discrimination or segregation 

in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 

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Section 1985 for conspiring to violate federal civil rights; (iv) the California Unruh Civil Rights 

Act, California Civil Code Section 51; and (v) San Francisco Charter Section 10.103, the City & 

County of San Francisco Civil Service Commission Rules 103, 203, 303, and 403, and California 

Civil Code 51.7. 

Now before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having carefully considered the pleadings and the papers 

submitted on this motion, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court GRANTS 

defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint consistent 

with the rulings made herein by October 17, 2016.

3

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of California residing in San Francisco County. (Compl. ¶ 

1.)4 She worked as a legal assistant within the Legal Section of the Office of the Treasurer & Tax 

Collector of CCSF. (Id. at ¶ 13.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory and retaliatory treatment begin in 2012, when 

defendant David Augustine became the manager of the Legal Section of the Office of the 

Treasurer & Tax Collector. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Augustine subjected her to “countless 

occasions of regular abuse, employment law violations, sexual and other discrimination, 

harassment, retaliation, humiliation and severe scrutiny, while in a protected class.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

also claims she was subject to a “‘special’ type of retaliation” in connection with a situation 

involving another employee. (Id. at ¶ 14.) The complaint provides that she filed informal reports 

and complaints with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and her 

local union regarding Augustine’s behavior. (Id. at ¶ 15; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 4 (2013 Charge of 

 3

 In connection with their motion to dismiss, defendants also filed a Request for Judicial 

Notice attaching the following: (i) Exhibit 1, San Francisco Charter section 10.103; (ii) Exhibit 2, 

Civil Service Commission Rule 103; (iii) Exhibit 3, Civil Service Commission Rules 203 and 303; 

and (iv) Exhibit 4, Civil Service Commission Rule 403. (Dkt. No. 10.) Plaintiff does not oppose. 

The Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. 

4

 “Compl.” refers to paragraphs of plaintiff’s detailed complaint at Docket Number 1, 

pages six through fourteen. 

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Discrimination).) 

Next, plaintiff alleges that she “experienced harassment and retaliation at the hands of her 

supervisor Debra D. Lew,” and that Augustine and another supervisor, Tajel Shaw, took no action 

in violation of Civil Service Commission Rule 103. (Id. ¶ 16.) As a result of this continued 

harassment, plaintiff claims that she had a “nervous breakdown” for which she was hospitalized. 

(Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Prior to returning to work, plaintiff claims that a senior staff member informed her 

that no action would be taken regarding her harassment complaints and that she should quit her 

job. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

At some point, the Legal Section hired a new manager. (Id.) Yet, plaintiff claims that she 

continued to be “subject to daily retaliation and harassment with scrutiny becoming worse,” 

causing her to have panic attacks. (Id.) Ultimately, plaintiff asserts she was forced to retire. (Id.) 

According to plaintiff, at the time she was forced into retirement in September 2014, she was 

sixty-three years old, had twelve years of experience working for the City & County of San 

Francisco, and was the only African American employee within the Legal Section. (Id. at ¶ 13.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1988)). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face 

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a mere 

possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678–79; see also In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a court is not required to accept as true “allegations 

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”) (citation 

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omitted). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–55 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Even under the liberal 

pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)). The Court will not assume facts not 

alleged, nor will it draw unwarranted inferences. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). 

Courts ordinarily construe complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs liberally. Pena, 976 F.2d at 

471. However, a “liberal interpretation of a [pro se] civil rights complaint may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Vague and conclusory allegations of 

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id. (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to subject an employee to (i) discrimination on 

account of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” or (ii) retaliation because of involvement 

in certain protected activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation 

against employees for opposing any practice made unlawful by Title VII or for making a charge, 

testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII).5

 

 5

 The parties do not dispute that plaintiff timely filed this action within ninety days of 

receiving a dismissal and notice of right to sue from the EEOC. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5); see 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(f)(1) (stating that an individual has ninety days after receiving a notice of dismissal from 

the EEOC to initiate a civil action under Title VII). 

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With respect to claims of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff may proceed under 

several legal theories. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Comm. College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 

(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs may proceed pursuant to Title VII under theories of 

disparate treatment, disparate impact, or the existence of a hostile work environment), superseded 

by statute on other grounds as rec’d in Recinto v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, 706 F.3d 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2013). Based on the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff appears to raise claims under Title 

VII based on a theory of disparate treatment or the existence of a hostile work environment.6 To 

assert a claim for disparate treatment, plaintiff must allege that: (i) she is a member of a protected 

class; (ii) she was qualified for her position; (iii) she experienced an adverse employment action; 

and (iv) similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class were treated more favorably, 

or that other circumstances existed surrounding the adverse employment action that give rise to an 

inference of discrimination. See Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Az., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The elements for a claim of hostile work environment are: (i) plaintiff was subjected 

to verbal or physical conduct because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (ii) the 

conduct was unwelcome; and (iii) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the 

condition of plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment. See Manatt v. Bank 

of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). 

With respect to her retaliation claim under Title VII, plaintiff must allege that: (i) she 

engaged in a protected activity; (ii) the employer subjected her to an adverse employment action; 

and (iii) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Klat v. Mitchell 

Repair Info. Co., LLC, No. 10-CV-0100, 2010 WL 1028157, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) 

(citing Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

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 Plaintiffs may also show unlawful discrimination under Title VII by proving the 

existence of disparate impact. However, based on the allegations in the complaint, it does not 

appear that plaintiff is proceeding under such a theory. See Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 

1174, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that to make out a claim for disparate impact, plaintiffs must: 

(i) show a significant disparate impact on a protected class or group; (ii) identify specific 

employment practices or selection criteria; and (iii) show a causal relationship between the 

challenged practices or criteria and the disparate impact); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 

U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (explaining that disparate impact cases “usually focus[] on statistical 

disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities”). 

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Plaintiff’s bare allegations that she experienced “countless occasions of regular abuse, 

employment law violations, sexual and other discrimination, harassment, retaliation, humiliation[,] 

and severe scrutiny, while in a protected class” are only conclusions. They lack the factual 

allegations upon which the conclusions are based. Accordingly, they fail to meet basic pleading 

standards. (Compl. ¶ 13); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). For instance, plaintiff at 

one point alleges that she was subjected to a “special” type of retaliation in connection with 

another employee, but she provides no details as to the incident with the other employee or what 

retaliation she received. (Id. ¶ 14.) Similarly, plaintiff claims that she experienced harassment 

and retaliation at the hands of Lew, but again fails to allege any facts describing the harassment or 

retaliation. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Such allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim under Title VII 

because they fail not only to raise an inference of discriminatory intent but also because they lack 

facts to support plaintiff’s conclusion that she was subjected to any adverse employment actions or 

abusive physical or verbal conduct at all. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that labels, 

conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim are insufficient at the pleadings 

stage). 

Plaintiff also alleges that she was forced into retirement in September 2014. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Although such an allegation can support plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to an adverse 

employment action, that she was forced into retirement while being a member of a protected 

class—in this case, a black woman—is insufficient without more to raise an inference that such 

action was taken for a discriminatory or retaliatory purpose. See, e.g., Xing Xing Lin v. Potter, No. 

10-CV-03757, 2011 WL 1522382, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011) (dismissing claims under Title 

VII where plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts “regarding the causal link between the adverse 

employment action and the protected activity”); Williams v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., No. 

10-CV-01417, 2010 WL 4794943, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2010) (dismissing discrimination 

claims under Title VII where plaintiff failed to plead “non-conclusory factual allegations” that 

gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination). Plaintiff must allege the facts upon which 

she concludes she was so “forced.” Thus, for the same reasons, plaintiff’s allegations that 

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defendants failed to investigate her complaints are insufficient to raise an inference that 

defendants’ failure to act was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent. (See Compl. ¶¶ 

16–18); cf. Brown v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 446 F. App’x 70, 72–73 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding at 

summary judgment that plaintiff must demonstrate that any failure to investigate complaints of 

harassment was motivated by racial discrimination). 

The Court therefore DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff’s Title VII claims with 

leave to amend. 

B. Count II: Violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act 

Section 1981 guarantees to all persons the same right to “make and enforce contracts, to 

sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 

security of persons and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The same elements that apply in 

discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII in Count I also apply under Section 1981. 

See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103, 1106–09 (9th Cir. 2008); Fonseca, 374 

F.3d at 850 (“Analysis of an employment discrimination claim under [Section] 1981 follows the 

same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”). “Both require 

proof of discriminatory treatment and the same set of facts can give rise to both claims.” Fonseca, 

374 F.3d at 850 (citing Lowe v. Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985)). Thus, for the same 

reasons discussed above in the context of plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, plaintiff has failed to 

state a claim under Section 1981.7

Additionally, a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1981 unless the alleged 

constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice. See 

Fed. of African Am. Contractors v. Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that under Section 

1983 municipalities may only be held liable if the violation was committed pursuant to an official 

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 The Court notes, however, that whereas Title VII “prohibits employment discrimination 

on account of race, sex, religion, and national origin,” Section 1981 “is limited to a prohibition of 

racial discrimination.” Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 

536 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that “Title VII and section 1981 are thus overlapping, but 

independent remedies for racial discrimination in employment”). 

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policy, custom, or practice).8 Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting the existence of any policy, 

custom, or practice responsible for the alleged discrimination and retaliation to which she was 

subjected. Instead, plaintiff has made a bare conclusory allegation that defendants “engaged in a 

systemic level [sic] and grossly disparate hiring & promotion practices, management intimidation, 

bias, cronyism; nepotism; sexism; favortism [sic] and race discrimination within its citywide 

departments.” (Compl. ¶ 10.) Such bare allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss. See Via v. Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding in the context 

of a claim against a state actor under Section 1983 that “conclusory allegations that lack factual 

content” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).9

Therefore, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff’s claims under Section 

1981 of the Civil Rights Act with leave to amend. 

C. Count III: Violation of Section 1985 of the Civil Rights Act 

To state a claim under Section 1985, plaintiff must allege: (i) the existence of a 

conspiracy; (ii) that the goal of the conspiracy was to deprive her of the equal privileges and 

immunities under the laws; (iii) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (iv) that plaintiff 

suffered an injury or deprivation of her rights or privileges. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see Sever v. 

Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). “A mere allegation of conspiracy 

without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). The absence of an underlying claim for a deprivation of plaintiff’s rights 

 8

 The Court notes that the majority of judicial circuits have held that a Section 1983 claim 

is the exclusive cause of action for violations of Section 1981 committed by state actors. See 

Campbell v. Forest Preserve Dist. Of Cook Cty., 752 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 

135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (explaining that all six circuits to consider the issue since the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Fed. of Am. Contractors have held that Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for 

Section 1981 violations committed by state actors). In the Ninth Circuit, however, plaintiffs can 

file such claims under Section 1981. 

9

 Plaintiff argues that CCSF is liable because CCSF employed Augustine and Lew. (Dkt. 

No. 18-1 at 2.) However, the mere fact that a local governmental entity employed a person who 

engaged in discriminatory or retaliatory practices is alone insufficient to sustain a claim against a 

municipality. See, e.g., Williams v. Cty. Of Santa Clara, No. 15-CV-04859, 2016 WL 879837, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (finding that hiring an employee without alleging the existence of a 

municipal custom or policy is insufficient to establish a Section 1983 Monell claim). 

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“precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same allegations.” Thornton v. St. 

Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, the alleged conspiracy relates to the violations asserted in Counts I and II. Because 

plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to sustain her underlying claims for constitutional 

violations under Title VII and under Section 1981, her Section 1985 claim also fails. Further, 

plaintiff has also failed to allege any facts that support the existence of a conspiracy. Accordingly, 

the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff’s section 1985 claim with leave to amend.10

D. Counts IV and V: Causes of Action Under California Law 

Plaintiff also brings two counts under California law: (i) Count Four under California 

Civil Code Section 51, the Unruh Civil Rights Act; and (ii) Count Five under the San Francisco 

Charter, certain Civil Commission Rules, and California Civil Code Section 51.7. 

As a threshold matter, the Court addresses whether plaintiff’s claims under California law 

are barred as a result of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act 

(“CTCA”). See Cal. Gov. Code § 905. Under the CTCA, “a plaintiff may not maintain an action 

for damages against a public entity unless a written claim has first been presented to the 

appropriate entity and has been acted upon by that entity before filing suit in court.” Butler v. Los 

Angeles, 617 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4, 950.2 

and Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The California 

Tort Claims Act requires, as a condition precedent to suit against a public entity, the timely 

presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in whole or in part.”)). Plaintiffs 

 10 Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s Section 1985 claim would be barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Under the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, a corporation and its 

agents are considered to be a single person under the law and therefore cannot form a conspiracy. 

The Ninth Circuit has yet to resolve “whether individual members of a single governmental entity 

can form a ‘conspiracy’ within the meaning of section 1985.” Mustafa v. Clark Cty. School Dist., 

157 F.3d 1169, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Portman v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 910 

(9th Cir. 1993)). Courts have recognized that the circuits, and the courts in this district, have split 

on whether the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine applies to civil rights actions. See Bey v. 

Oakland, No. 14-CV-01626, 2015 WL 8752762, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015) (discussing split 

in authority within this district and among the circuit courts explaining that five circuits currently 

bar conspiracy claims where allegations involve a single governmental entity conspiring with its 

employees whereas four circuits have refused to apply the doctrine). The Court need not address 

the issue at this time because it finds plaintiff’s Section 1985 claims deficient on other grounds. 

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must present such claims to the entity they intend to sue “not later than six months after the 

accrual of the cause of action.” Id. at 1002. “Plaintiffs must ‘allege facts demonstrating or 

excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirements’” to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Id. at 1001 (quoting California v. Sup. Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (2004)); see also 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, plaintiff concedes in her opposition that “she did not file a written claim with CCSF 

within six months of the date of the injury.” (Dkt. 18 at 4.) Plaintiff argues that the ongoing 

nature of the discrimination she faced was the reason why she did not file a written claim with 

CCSF. (Id.) Even if that were an acceptable excuse, plaintiff herself alleges that she was forced 

into retirement in September 2014. At the very latest, therefore, plaintiff would have had to have 

filed a claim with CCSF by March 2015. Because no amendment could cure this deficiency in 

plaintiff’s complaint, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff’s state law claims under 

Counts Four and Five.11 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts I, II, and III 

of the complaint. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE claims under Title II of the Civil Rights 

 11 Additionally, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under either the Unruh Civil Rights Act 

in Count Four or the rules and statutes listed in Count Five. With respect to plaintiff’s claim in 

Count Four under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the “California Supreme Court has expressly held 

that employment discrimination claims are excluded from § 51’s protection.” Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, 

Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 500 (1970) and Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 77 (1990)). With respect to 

plaintiff’s claim in Count Five under California Civil Code 51.7, Section 51.7 guarantees to all 

persons “the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed 

against their persons or property” on account of certain characteristics. Plaintiff has not made any 

allegations related to violence or intimidation by threat of violence here. With respect to 

plaintiff’s claims in Count Five under the San Francisco Charter or the Civil Service Commission 

rules, plaintiff concedes that Rules 203 (related to the San Francisco Police Department), 303 (San 

Francisco Fire Department), and 403 (Municipal Transportation Agency) have no applicability to 

her case. As to claims under San Francisco Charter 10.103—related to the office and duties of the 

Human Resources Director—plaintiff makes no allegations in the complaint related to the Human 

Resources Director for San Francisco. Civil Service Commission Rule 103 sets forth general 

Equal Employment Opportunities policies for CCSF, which include a prohibition on retaliation 

and discrimination and a procedure for filing complaints with the Human Resources Director. As 

set forth above, plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to sustain allegations of retaliation and 

discrimination and has not alleged any facts relating to the Human Resources Director. 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Act and Counts Four and Five of the complaint. Plaintiff must file her amended complaint by 

Monday, October 17, 2016. Defendants’ response shall be filed twenty-one (21) days thereafter. 

The Court advises plaintiff that a Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which contains helpful 

information about proceeding without an attorney, is available in the Clerk’s office or through the 

Court’s website, http://cand.uscourts.gov. The Court also advises plaintiff that additional 

assistance may be available by making an appointment with the Legal Help Center. There is no 

fee for this service. Please visit the Court’s website or call the phone numbers listed below for 

current office hours, forms, and policies. 

To make an appointment with the Legal Help Center in Oakland, plaintiff may visit the 

Oakland Courthouse, located at 1301 Clay Street, Room 470S, Oakland, California or call (415) 

782-8982. 

To make an appointment with the Legal Help Center in San Francisco, plaintiff may visit 

the San Francisco Courthouse, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15th Floor, Room 2796, San 

Francisco, California, or call (415) 782-8982. 

To make an appointment with the Federal Legal Assistance Self-Help Center in San Jose, 

plaintiff may visit the San Jose Federal Courthouse, located at 280 South 1st Street, 4th Floor, 

Rooms 4093 & 4095, San Jose, California, or call (408) 297-1480. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 9. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 12, 2016 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 3:16-cv-01998-JCS Document 20 Filed 09/12/16 Page 11 of 11