Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00409/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURA AVILEZ, and ROES 1-50, on

behalf of themselves and in a

representative capacity for all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 14cv409 GPC(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE

COURT

vs. [Dkt. No. 5.]

OMNICARE, INC. and DOES 1-50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court. (Dkt. No. 5.) 

Defendant filed an opposition on May 9, 2014. (Dkt. No. 9.) A reply wasfiled on May

16, 2014. (Dkt. No. 10.) Based on the briefs, supporting documentation, and the

applicable law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand.

Background

Plaintiff Laura Avilez (“Plaintiff”) brought a putative class action case against

Defendant Omnicare, Inc. (“Defendant”) in state court on January 17, 2014. (Dkt. No.

1-1, N. of Removal, Compl.) Plaintiff alleges wage and hour causes of action for

failure to pay wages and overtime compensation; failure to provide rest periods and

proper meal periods or compensation; failure to timely pay wages due at termination;

unfair business practices; failure to provide accurate wage statements; declaratory

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relief; accounting; and injunctive relief. (Id.)

On February 21, 2014, Defendant filed a notice of removal to this Court 

pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), § 1441 and

§ 1446. (Dkt. No. 1.) In her motion, Plaintiff seeks to remand the case back to state

court arguing that Defendant has failed to demonstrate the amount in controversy

exceeds $5,000,000. 

Discussion

A. Motion to Remand/Amount in Controversy

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over class actions where 1) anymember

of the plaintiff class is diverse from any defendant; 2) the proposed class contains 100

or more putative class members; 3) and the amount in controversy exceeds the “sum

or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d);

Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs., LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Plaintiff moves on the third factor alleging that Defendant failed to demonstrate the

$5,000,000 amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant

contends that it has met its burden to demonstrate the amount in controversy. 

“A defendant seeking removal of a putative class action must demonstrate, by

a preponderance of evidence, that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds the

jurisdictional minimum. This standard conforms with a defendant’s burden of proof

when the plaintiff does not plead a specific amount in controversy.” Rodriguez, 728

F.3d at 981; Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A preponderance of the evidence standard requires a defendant to “provide evidence

establishing that it is‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy exceeds that

amount.” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted). This burden is not “daunting,” and the removing defendant is not

obligated to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages.” McCraw

v. Lyons, 863 F. Supp. 430, 434 (W.D. Ky. 1994). “Specifically, the removing

defendant must establish the amount in controversy by “[t]he greater weight of the

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evidence, . . . [a] superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the

mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial

mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.,

483 F.3d 1184, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

The removing defendant bears the burden of proof. Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d

at 678. The court looks at the amount in controversy at the time of the filing of the

complaint and the ultimate inquiry is what amount is put “in controversy” by the

plaintiff’s complaint, not what a defendant will actually owe. Rippee v. Boston Market

Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 

“[T]he amount-in-controversy inquiry in the removal context is not confined to

the face of the complaint.” Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2004). In addition to the complaint, the court considers “facts presented in the removal

petition as well as any ‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in

controversy at the time of removal.’” Id. (quoting Matheson v. Progressive Specialty

Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Calculations that are based on speculation and conjecture are not sufficient to

meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Fong v. Regis Corp., No. C 13-

04497 RS, 2014 WL 26996, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014); see also Lowdermilk v.

U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1002 (9thCir. 2007), overruled on other grounds,

Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2013). A

removing defendant is required to set forth underlying facts to support key variables

used in their calculations. Andersen v. The Schwan Food Co., No. C 13-2362 PJH,

2013 WL 3989562, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2013) (citing Singer v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)); Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp,

536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“a defendant must set forth the

underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the

statutory minimum”); Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992) (a defendant

must set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in

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controversy exceeds the statutory minimum). 

Here, the Complaint does not allege a specific amount in controversy and the

“preponderance of the evidence” standard applies. See Rodriguez, 728 F.3d at 978. 

In order to demonstrate the amount in controversy, Defendant presents the declaration

of Sandy Koch, the Human Resources Director, who is familiar with Omnicare’s

business operations and its record-keeping practices for employee personnel files. 

(Dkt. No. 1-4, Koch Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) She reviewed payroll and personnel information to

Omnicare’s California personnel who worked from January 17, 2010 through January

29, 2014 during the putative class period. (Id. ¶ 6.) She also “reviewed employment

start and end dates and rates of pay pertaining to all present and former employees

holding a non-exempt position as a dispensing pharmacist and/or pharmacy technician

and/or Order Entry Technicians during the putative class period.” (Id.) Based on her

review, she assessed there are 448 putative class members. (Id. ¶ 7.) Koch conducted

calculations as to meal periods, rest periods, overtime pay, wage statement penalties,

waiting time penalties and attorneys’ fees and came to a total amount in controversy

of $9,657,915.53. (Id. ¶¶ 9-15.) 

Plaintiff objects to Koch’s declaration as rife with speculation and conjecture

which does not support the amount in controversy. Plaintiff alleges that Koch’s

calculations are not supported by any evidence or data and speculates asto the number

of actual violations that occurred and the specific amount of damages for each

potentially affected class member. Defendant argues that it has provided sufficient

information to support its calculations. 

Courts have held that assumptions without any supporting evidentiary support

is speculative and cannot be used to support an amount in controversy. Roth v.

Comerica Bank, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1124 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (granting

plaintiff’s motion to remand holding that assumptions upon which defendant’s

calculations were based were unsupported by summary judgment-type evidence under

preponderance ofthe evidence standard); Ray v.NordstromInc.,No. 2:11cv7277-JHN-

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CWx, 2011 WL 6148668 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9. 2011) (granting motion to remand in wage

and hour case where Defendant did not support its assumptions with evidence under

preponderance of the evidence standard); see also De Leon v. NCR Corp., 2013 WL

503092 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8. 2013) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion to remand for failure

to meet the $5,000,000 amount in controversy due to lack of any evidence to support

numbers stated in HR’s declaration under “legal certainty” standard). 

In Roth, the defendant assumed the potential class members were owed 3 to 5

hours of overtime per work week. Based on the approximate 65,413 weeks worked

during the class period multiplied by 3 or 5 hours and multiplying the resulting number

by $19.50, plaintiff’s standard overtime wage, the defendant came to an unpaid

overtime range of $3,826,660 to $6,377,767. Roth, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. The

complaint alleged “class member[s] regularly and/or consistently worked in excess of

eight (8) hours in a day, in excess of twelve (12) hours in a day, and/or in excess of

forty (40) hours in a week.” Id. at 1124. The court noted that the failure to pay

overtime allegation did not support defendant’s assumption that the class members

routinely worked 3-5 hours of overtime per week without receiving overtime pay. Id. 

The Court concluded the calculations were speculative. Id. The same analysis and 

conclusion applied to the other wage and hour causes of action. Id. 

Similarly, in Ray, the vice president for human resources operations provided

competent evidence as to the number of California hourly employees, their average

hourly wage, the number of hours worked per day and average days worked per pay

period. Ray, 2011 WL 6148668 at 3. However, defendant relied on a number of

assumptions. For example, as to the claim for failure to pay regular and overtime

wages, defendant assumed that 1,500 out of 2,500 hourly employees did not receive

full compensation for all regular and overtime hours worked. Next, it assumed that

those 1,500 employees missed one hour of regular pay and one hour of overtime pay

per pay period. Id. Because the complaint only alleged that the defendant “failed to

pay ‘all’ California hourly employees at least some regular and overtime hours,” the

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court concluded that Defendant’s contention that the purported class members missed

one hour of regular pay and one hour of overtime pay per pay period is not supported. 

Id.

In this case, the Complaint alleges a “pattern and practice” of denying meal

breaks. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl. ¶ 26.)

As to meal periods, Koch wrote:

Based on my review of the aforementioned data, I was able to

determine the actual hourly rate of pay corresponding to each week

worked by a putative class member during the putative class period.

Multiplying the rate of pay by one (1) to represent one hour’s premium

pay for a missed meal period for each of those workweeks, and adding

together the one hour’s pay figures for every week that was worked by

the putative class member during the putative class period for all of the

448 individual members of the putative class results in a total of

$2,097,027.35 for the putative class. 

(Dkt. No. 1-4, N. of Removal, Koch Decl. ¶ 9.) 

First, Koch’s declaration provides lessfacts or calculations than the other district

court cases cited above that granted plaintiff’s motion to remand. Next, she improperly

assumes that all employees missed one hour of rest period for every week during the

purported class period. This assumption is not supported by evidence or data and is

not alleged in the complaint. Moreover, she does not provide any evidence to support

an hourly rate of pay, the number of hours worked per day, and the number of work

weeks during the class period. 

Similar problems exist with Defendant’s other calculations of Plaintiff’s rest

period as well as overtime pay. As to overtime pay and rest period, Defendant

improperly assumes that each class member worked one hour of overtime or missed

one hour of rest period each week. The complaint makes no such allegation. As to

wage statement penalties, Defendant improperly assumes that all of the putative

membersreceived inaccurate wage statements during every single pay period; however,

the complaint merely alleges that Defendant knowingly failed to provide the putative

class members with a true and accurate wage statement. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl. ¶ 58.) 

Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s complaint supports its assumptions and has

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not supported these assumptions with evidence. See Ray, 2011 WL 6148668 at 3. 

Lastly, asto waiting time penalties, Defendant has not provided the “most recent hourly

rate” and why that rate was used to support its calculations. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

$5 million amount in controversy is met. 

B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Plaintiffrequests attorneys’ fees and costs for improper removal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c). “[C]ourts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the

removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Lussier

v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). “[R]emoval is not

objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s argumentslack merit, or

else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand is granted.” Id. The

Court concludes that there was not a lack of an objectively reasonable basis by

Defendants to seek removal. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state

court. The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. The

Court vacates the hearing set for May 30, 2014.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 27, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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