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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 17, 2004 Decided May 14, 2004

No. 03-5079

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

ANN M. VENEMAN, SECRETARY,

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

03–5080

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01978)

(No. 98cv01693)

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S.

Department of Justice.

Alexander J. Pires, Jr. argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellees.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON, Circuit

Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: The Secretary of Agriculture appeals an order of the district court requiring the Department

of Agriculture to advance $500,000 against attorneys’ fees due

counsel representing a class of black farmers in an antidiscrimination suit against the Department. The Government contends the district court abused its discretion because

it failed to support the order with any findings regarding the

hours claimed and the hourly rates sought by class counsel.

Class counsel argue we lack jurisdiction to entertain the

Government’s appeal because the order to pay is not a ‘‘final

decision’’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We agree

with class counsel and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

I. Background

In 1997 a class of black farmers filed a lawsuit alleging the

Department of Agriculture discriminated against them on

account of their race, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States, the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the Equal

Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq. See Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In

1999 the Government and the plaintiff class agreed upon the

terms of a consent decree settling the lawsuit. The Consent

Decree established a two-track system for resolving the

claims of individual class members: Each class member chose

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either arbitration or mediation as the process for obtaining

the relief available under the Consent Decree. Class counsel

continue to work to implement the Consent Decree and to

represent class members in both types of proceedings.

The Consent Decree also provided (¶ 14(a)) that class counsel

shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

under [the] ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), and to reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses under the APA,

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (as appropriate), that are generated

in connection with the filing of this action and the

implementation of this Consent Decree.

The Government and class counsel have since settled for

$14.9 million all claims for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses

incurred from the filing of the case in 1997 through June 30,

2001.

The present appeal arises out of class counsel’s November

2002 petition for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for the

year ended June 30, 2002. Class counsel seek $858,685 for

work in ‘‘implementation’’ of the Decree generally, and

$836,000 for ‘‘nonimplementation work,’’ which is the parties’

term for work representing a claimant in either arbitration or

mediation.

In December 2002 the district court ordered the Government to advance class counsel ‘‘$500,000 for implementation

fees and costs.’’ The Government paid the advance and now

appeals the order to pay.

II. Analysis

The Government argues its appeal presents an issue of first

impression in this circuit, to wit: Whether ‘‘an advance of fees

or an ‘interim’ fee award in the post-judgment period of

litigation is immediately appealable’’ as a ‘‘final decision’’

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. (Emphasis in original.) The Government argues the post-judgment phase

‘‘should be treated as legally different from the pre-judgment

period’’ for purposes of § 1291 because ‘‘the post-judgment

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period can theoretically extend indefinitely,’’ creating substantial uncertainty as to whether and when a party may

appeal an adverse order.

Class counsel respond that we resolved this issue in Trout

v. Garrett, 891 F.2d 332, 333 (1989). Trout was an appeal

from an order requiring an advance of $276,044 in attorneys’

fees. A motions panel of this court, following the lead of the

Ninth Circuit in Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717

(1988), had ‘‘dismissed the appeal for want of a final or

otherwise appealable order,’’ and upon rehearing a merits

panel did the same. 891 F.2d at 333 (‘‘the sum and substance

of the particular interlocutory order before us is not immediately appealable’’). Because the appeal in Trout did not arise,

however, after entry of a final judgment upon the merits of all

the claims advanced against the appellant, Trout did not

decide the precise jurisdictional issue presented here.

The Government argues Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439

(9th Cir. 1994), ‘‘supports the proposition that all postjudgment orders to pay fees are immediately appealable.’’

Class counsel maintain Gates does not support the rationale

for jurisdiction advanced by the Government, and we quite

agree. In that case the Ninth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 1291 because the orders of the district

court disposing of several petitions for attorneys’ fees ‘‘follow[ed] a final judgment on the merits, and they [did] dispose

of the issue of attorneys’ fees for monitoring work performed

during the first period of the consent decree.’’ Id. at 1450

(emphasis added). Where an order does not finally dispose of

a fee petition even for a finite part of the post-judgment

period, it is irrelevant that, as the Government points out, the

post-judgment phase may be of indefinite duration.

The fee order here simply could not be a final decision

under § 1291 regardless when issued because it ‘‘determines

neither the total amount of fees due TTT nor [the] absolute

entitlement to attorney’s fees.’’ Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720;

see Trout, 891 F.2d at 335 (‘‘The award does not even

dispositively determine fees due up to this stage of the

litigation’’). In fact, the district court ‘‘clearly contemplates

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revising [the] fee award’’ at a later time. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d

at 722. The district court would hardly have encouraged the

parties to settle if the order finally had resolved counsel’s

claim for attorneys’ fees for the year ended June 30, 2002.

Cf. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (a final

decision ‘‘leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment’’).

In a more practical and discriminating vein, the Government also argues a post-judgment order to pay attorneys’

fees ‘‘should be immediately appealable where counsel is

unlikely to be able to repay an overpayment.’’ The suggestion is that ‘‘irreparable harm to the government fisc TTT

bolsters the finality of orders like the one[ ] at issue here.’’

The courts of appeal have considered ‘‘irreparable harm’’

relevant in determining whether jurisdiction is available pursuant to the collateral order doctrine — which the Government does not invoke — but not pursuant to § 1291 itself.

See Trout, 891 F.2d at 335; Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721–22;

Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir.

1986). Although the Government does not cite the case, its

irreparable harm argument finds some support in Forgay v.

Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848), which held an

interlocutory appeal will lie from an order that ‘‘directs the

property in dispute to be delivered to the complainant’’ and

‘‘subject[s the appellant] to irreparable injury.’’ We have

questioned, however, whether ‘‘Forgay has continuing vitality

apart from the collateral order doctrine.’’ Petties v. District

of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (‘‘The Supreme Court has recognized but a single variation on the

theme of finality, namely the collateral order doctrine’’). If

Forgay indeed has been overtaken by the collateral order

doctrine, then the Government’s present argument is surely

foreclosed.

Be that as it may, the Government has failed to establish it

is likely to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the fee order

in this case. See Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 721–22 (government

bears burden of proving it could not obtain repayment). The

Government can be deemed irreparably harmed ex ante only

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if the party and counsel awarded fees will ‘‘likely be unable to

repay the fees if the award is later reduced or overturned.’’

National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 182 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see

Trout, 891 F.2d at 335 (requiring ‘‘real prospect of irreparable

harm’’ to permit exercise of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to

collateral order doctrine). The Government does not present

any evidence from which we could infer that class counsel

‘‘will likely’’ be unable to repay any amount advanced in error.

Before the district court the Government disputed class counsel’s entitlement to $413,500 of the $500,000 it was required to

advance. When the Government filed this appeal, however,

class counsel had pending petitions for almost $1.7 million in

fees. Although some of the $1.2 million not here at issue may

be disputed as well, we think it unlikely counsel will not

ultimately be awarded at least enough to cover the amount

now in dispute. In fact, the district court explicitly stated, ‘‘It

is inconceivable that the Court would disallow as much as

$792,000 of the fees sought based on poor record keeping,

unreasonable hourly rates[,] or too many hours (or too many

lawyers) spent on a given task.’’

Of course, if the district court were to continue to award

class counsel additional advances against fees disputed by the

Government, then at some point the amount in dispute may

become so large in relation to counsel’s fee petitions (and

other assets) that the risk of default, should the Government

prevail on its objections, would indeed constitute irreparable

harm to the Government. The Government has not, however,

made such a showing at this time.

Finally, the Government argues that, if the order at issue is

not deemed final, then the district court may become inclined

to issue a series of ‘‘interim’’ advances rather than to address

and to resolve in a timely fashion the multiple attorneys’ fees

petitions pending before it. We cannot merely assume, however, the district court will shirk its responsibility to decide

fee questions. The district court now has before it petitions

for attorneys’ fees covering a period of more than two years,

which petitions it will, we trust, resolve soon, and not in a

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piecemeal fashion, lest the Government’s fears of irreparable

harm acquire some substance.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is

Dismissed.

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