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Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 15-2980

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Willie B. Boyd, Jr.

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas 

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 Submitted: March 17, 2016

 Filed: August 5, 2016

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Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Willie Boyd, Jr. appeals the district court’s decision upholding the

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Commissioner’s denial of supplemental security income (SSI) and disability

The Honorable Joe J. Volpe, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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insurance benefits (DIB). Upon de novo review of the district court’s decision

upholding the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of benefits, see Anderson v. Astrue,

696 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012), we affirm.

I.

Boyd filed his applications for SSI and DIB benefits on October 31, 2011

alleging disability from August 11, 2011 due to diabetes mellitus, heart problems,

fatigue, and chest, back and leg pain. After his applications were denied initially and

after reconsideration, he received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) on May 28, 2013. Boyd was represented by counsel at the hearing. On July

24, 2013 the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Boyd was not disabled and

denying his applications for SSI and DIB benefits. The Appeals counsel denied

Boyd’s request for review, thus the ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the

Commissioner. See Davidson v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2007). Boyd

sought judicial review, and the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

The relevant medical record reveals that in April 2007, Boyd sought medical

attention for angina equivalent symptoms. A history of hypertension, Type II

diabetes mellitus, and heart murmur was noted. A history taken by Norman Pledger,

M.D., reflected that Boyd had recently stopped smoking but continued to smoke

marijuana “almost on a daily basis.” He noted that Boyd worked as a truck driver. 

He was treated with aspirin and prescribed sublingual nitroglycerin; a stress test and

echocardiogramwere ordered. Boyd was encouraged to stop smoking and avoid drug

and alcohol use. He was to return for followup in six weeks. A cardiac

catheritization, performed on April 20, 2007, showed non-ischemic cardiomyopathy. 

In October 2007, a consultative examination by Joel Cobb, M.D., showed

diabetes, paresthesia in Boyd’s hands and feet, cardiomyopathy, hypertension, and

chest pain. Boyd wasfound to have a decreased range of motion in his cervicalspine,

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lumbar spine, shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands, hips, knees, and ankles. Paresthesia

was present in Boyd’s fingertips. He showed no joint abnormalities, muscle spasms,

muscle weakness, or muscle atrophy, and he exhibited normal deep tendon reflexes,

gait, and coordination. Dr. Cobb assessed mild limitation with lifting, carrying, and

squatting repeatedly. In March 2010, Dr. Cobb again evaluated Boyd and diagnosed

Type II diabetes mellitus, hypertention, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, and chronic

fatigue. He limited Boyd to “[m]oderate lifting, carrying which likely would improve

with better management of blood sugars.” 

On December 21, 2010, January 5, 2011, and April 4, 2011, Linda Cabine, a

nurse practitioner, saw Boyd for diabetes, erectile dysfunction, and hypertension. In

December 2010 and January 2011, she noted that Boyd was still smoking. On all

three examinations she recorded that Boyd appeared well and was in no acute

distress. In November 2011, Boyd saw nurse practitioner Kathy Woods for a

medication check-up. It was noted that Boyd had not visited the clinic in six months

and that he was positive for twice per week chest pain, muscle cramps, and pain but

negative for fatigue and exhibited no clubbing, cyanosis, or edema. Nurse Kelly

assessed diabetes mellitus.

Chrystal Johnson, M.D., performed a consultative examination on January 26,

2012. Dr. Johnson noted that Boyd complained of diabetes mellitus, chronic pain in

his legs and back, difficulty sleeping, headaches, poor vision, peripheral vascular

disease, an inability to walk more than five to ten feet, moderate to severe pain in the

middle of his back to his toes, and sharp chest pain that occurred twice a week. Boyd

had decreased range of motion in his left shoulder, right knee, and both ankles. He

showed tenderness to palpitation of his shoulders, wrists, hips, and ankles. Dr.

Johnson also noted that Boyd had decreased reflexes in his biceps, triceps, patella,

and Achilles tendon. Boyd could tandem walk slowly, but he was not able to walk

on his heels or toes or squat and arise from a squatting position. Bilateral dorsalis

pedis pulse were absent, and he had trace edema in the left lower extremity and stasis

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dermatitis in both lower extremities. Dr. Johnson diagnosed: heart disease, leg pain

with vascular disease, chest pain, arthralgias, diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. 

She noted that Boyd had severe limitation in his ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, carry,

handle, finger, see, speak, and hear.

A state agency doctor, Larry Sauer, M.D., completed a review of Boyd’s

medical records in February 2012, although he did not examine Boyd. Dr. Sauer

reported thatBoyd had no postural ormanipulative limitations and could occasionally

lift and carry ten pounds, frequently lift and carry less than ten pounds, sit six hours,

and stand/walk two hours during an eight hour workday.

In April 2012, Boyd was treated for chest pain in the emergency room at

Baptist Health Medical Center, North Little Rock, Arkansas. A cardiac

catheterization was performed which revealed non-ischemic cardiomyopathy and

minimal coronary artery disease. He was treated with medication and instructed that

he should not lift, drive, or engage in strenuous exercise for two days and follow-up

in two months.

A hearing before an ALJ was conducted on May 28, 2013. Boyd appeared

represented by counsel and testified. Boyd testified that he was 44 years of age as of

the date of the hearing and has a general equivalency degree. He last worked in May

2011 as a warehouse worker and driver. He was incarcerated for 22 months for

possession of cocaine and was released on August 24, 2009. He was subsequently

arrested for possession of marijuana. He was on parole as of the date of the hearing. 

Boyd testified that he is prevented from working by diabetes; high blood pressure;

and pain in his arms, left shoulder, feet, and legs. He stated that he experiences chest

pain twice a day and constant pain in his legs, feet, ankles, and hands. He further

stated that his feet and hands swell and he can not perform a job that requires him to

answer the phone or use a keyboard due to constant pain. He uses the restroom two

times an hour and urinates on himself at least once per day because he is unable to

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make it to the restroom. Boyd testified that he spends most of each day sitting or

lying down due to pain and swelling in his feet and legs, and he is unable to drive. 

He further stated that he has trouble sleeping three times a week and sometimes

oversleeps. Boyd’s wife testified that it is her understanding that Boyd spends most

of his day sitting and lying around, complaining about pain. She stated that Boyd has

difficulty walking and standing due to swelling in his feet, and he is unable to do

housework. 

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified and noted that Boyd has relevant past

work as a delivery truck driver and front-end loader operator which is medium, semiskilled work. The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE which included the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) of the full range of sedentary work with the

ability to occasionally climb, balance, stoop, bend, crouch, kneel, and crawl. The VE

testified that an individual with Boyd’s age, education, work experience, and

specified RFC could not perform Boyd’s past relevant work but could perform other

jobs in the regional and national economy such as unskilled sedentary assembly and

inspecting jobs. According to the VE, a person with Boyd’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC can perform all of the unskilled, sedentary jobs in the assembly

and inspecting larger job categories, for example, fishing reel assembler and table

worker. The VE testified that there are 150,000 to 155,000 unskilled sedentary

assembly jobs and more than 200,000 unskilled, sedentary inspecting jobs in the

national economy.

In his written hearing decision denying Boyd’s claims, the ALJ followed the

required five-step sequential evaluation process and determined: (1) Boyd had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 11, 2011; (2) Boyd had the

following severe impairments: left shoulder pain, left leg pain, heart disease, and

diabetes mellitus; (3) he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1; (4) Boyd could not perform his last relevant work which required a medium and

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heavy exertional level; and (5) he retained the RFC to perform work at the sedentary

level of exertion with the limitation that such work must involve only occasional

climbing, balancing, stooping, bending, crouching, kneeling, and crawling. Based

upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that Boyd could perform a

significant number of jobs existing in the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ

found Boyd not disabled and not entitled to benefits.

In this appeal, Boyd contendsthat the ALJ’s RFC assessment atstep four of the

sequential evaluation process is not supported by substantial evidence in that the ALJ

failed to include in his RFC determination limitation of the ability to lift, carry, and

reach related to his left shoulder pain, limitation with respect to Boyd’s ability to

handle and finger, and limitation related to decreased reflexes in his biceps and

triceps. He further assertsthat the vocational expert’s testimony does not support the

conclusion of the ALJ, at step five, that there are a significant number of jobs

available to Boyd in the national economy given his RFC. 

II.

We will affirm the Commissioner’s decision denying SSI and DIB benefits if

it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Jones v. Astrue,

619 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is “lessthan a preponderance

but . . . enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the

conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). We “consider the evidence that supports the

Commissioner’s decision as well asthe evidence that detracts fromit.” Id. (quotation

omitted). “If, after reviewing the entire record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions, and the Commissioner has adopted one ofthose positions, we must affirm.” 

Cypress v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2015).

“Prior to step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC], which is the

most a claimant can do despite his limitations.” Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523

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(8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)). “RFC is an administrative

assessment of the extent to which an individual’s medically determinable

impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or

mental limitations orrestrictionsthatmay affect his or her capacity to do work-related

physical and mental activities.” Social Security Ruling 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 at

*2. “[A] claimant’s RFC [is] based on all relevant evidence, including the medical

records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own

description of his limitations.” Moore, 572 F.3d at 523 (quotation and citation

omitted). Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not a physician, to

determine a claimant’s RFC.

The ALJ found that Boyd has the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined

by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) with additional limitations. Sedentary

work:

involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally

lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. 

Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a

certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying

out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required

occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a)

The ALJ added the additional limitation thatBoyd can only occasionally climb,

balance, stoop, bend, crouch, kneel, and crawl. In reaching this conclusion, Boyd

asserts that the ALJ disregarded the opinions of Dr. Cobb, who, according to Boyd,

found limited range of motion in Boyd’s shoulders, elbows, wrists, and hands along

with paresthesia in Boyd’s fingertips. However, Dr. Cobb’s opinions were rendered

after examining Boyd in 2007 and 2010, well before the time period in question. 

Further, in 2007, Dr. Cobb expressed Boyd’s limitations as mild limitation in lifting,

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carrying, and repeatedly squatting, and in 2010 as moderate limitation in lifting and

carrying “which would likely improve with better management of blood sugars.” 

Second, Boyd contends that the ALJ gave insufficient weight to the findings

of Dr. Johnson who examined Boyd at the request of the Commissioner on February

17, 2012. Dr. Johnson stated thatBoyd experienced “severe” limitationsin his ability

to walk, stand, sit, lift, carry, handle, finger, see, hear, or speak. However, the ALJ

discounted this opinion based upon lack of support in the examination record. For

example, the ALJ noted that Boyd did not “present with clinical signs of severe

restrictions in the ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, or carry.” Dr. Johnson also observed

“no joint or gait abnormalities, muscle spasms, muscle weakness, or muscle atrophy.” 

Appellant App. Vol. 3, pgs 389-99. Further, upon examination, although Dr. Johnson

noted reduced range of motion in Boyd’s left shoulder, right wrist, and ankles and

tenderness of the wriststo palpation, these findings are countered by the notation that

Boyd exhibited no joint or gait abnormalities, no muscle weakness, normal grip

strength, as well as the ability to hold a pen, write, and pick up a coin. An absence

of clinical findings supports the rejection of a physician’s opinion as to physical

limitations. Davidson, 501 F.3d at 990-92 (holding inconsistencies between

physician’s treatment notes and physician’s opinion provide support for discrediting

the physician’s opinions); Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006).

Third, Boyd asserts that his description of limited activities of daily living

support Dr. Johnson’s opinion as to Boyd’s physical limitations and that the ALJ

improperly discounted Boyd’s testimony as to such activities. However, the ALJ

adequately explained that he discountedBoyd’s description oflimited daily activities

because it could not be adequately verified, wasinconsistent with the “relativelyweak

medical evidence,” and was not supported by corresponding specific restrictions on

activities imposed by a treating physician. We conclude that the ALJ’s determination

in this regard is supported by substantial evidence. See Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d

710, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) (court normally defers to ALJ’s credibility determination if

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ALJ explicitly discredits claimant’s testimony and gives good reason for doing so);

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing credibility

factors).

Finally, Boyd contendsthat the ALJ erred in accepting the testimony of the VE

because the “VE improperly testified as to the number of jobs available to [Boyd]

based upon an entire group or category of jobs, rather than giving the numbers of

individual sedentary jobs.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. “Once it is established that the

claimant cannot return to her previous occupation, the Commissioner bears the

burden to show that a significant number of appropriate jobs exist for the claimant.” 

Dipple v. Astrue, 601 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2010); see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

“One way in which the Commissioner can meet the burden of proof necessary to

show that a claimant who suffers from nonexertional pain is not disabled under the

Social Security Act is through the testimony of a vocational expert.” Johnson v.

Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997). In response to the ALJ’s hypothetical

question, which assumed an individual who had Boyd’s age, education, work

experience, and the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work with the

additional limitation of no more than occasional climbing, balancing, stooping,

bending, crouching, kneeling, and crawling, the VE stated that such an individual

could performunskilled, sedentary assembly jobs and unskilled, sedentary inspecting

jobs. He identified fishing reel assembler and table worker as examples. He stated

that there are 500 jobs available in the state, 15,000 to 16,000 jobs available in the

region and 150,000 to 155,000 jobs available in the national economy in the assembly

category, and 15,000 to 16,000 jobs available in the region and 200,000 jobs available

in the national economy in the inspecting category. Boyd argues that it is not clear

that all of these jobs are available at the sedentary level of RFC. We disagree. 

The VE acknowledged that fishing reel assembler and table worker were

merely examples of the job descriptions available in the region and nationally. 

However, he clearly confirmed that all of the job numbers to which he referred were

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unskilled sedentary jobs–jobs which comply with the hypothetical RFC provided by

the ALJ. While the ALJ’s written decision identified fishing reel assembler and table

worker inspector as encompassing the entirety of the job numbers provided by the

VE, this is of no consequence as the VE’s testimony as presented constitutes

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding at step five of the sequential

evaluation process. See Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927 (8th Cir. 2011) (where

hypothetical includes impairments ALJ found credible and excluded those he

discredited for legally sufficient reasons, VE’s opinion that claimant could perform

work existing in significant numbers in the national economy was substantial

evidence supporting ALJ’s determination).

III.

We affirm.

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