Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00639/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00639-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY AUSTIN POOL,

Plaintiff, CV F 05 00639 REC WMW P

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

RE MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC 11 )

ROBERT HARO, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action. Pending

before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his available

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Plaintiff has opposed the motion.

This action proceeds on the second amended complaint. Plaintiff, currently in

the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons at the U.S. Penitentiary at Victorville, brings this

action against defendants for alleged constitutional violations that occurred while plaintiff was

housed at various federal prisons. The second amended complaint, set forth in narrative form,

fails to identify specific causes of action. In their motion, defendants respond to seven separate

“Claims for Relief” set forth by plaintiff. Plaintiff does not challenge defendants’

characterization of his claims.

First Claim

Plaintiff claims that defendants O’Brien, Schultz, Moorehead and Cole (at the

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time employed at USP Atwater) violated his rights under the Privacy Act and the Fifth

Amendment by reclassifying him as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood.

Second Claim

Plaintiff claims defendant Lynn violated his Constitutional rights under the First,

Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments by subjecting him to “urinalysis procedures as a

‘Disruptive Group Member’” while at USP Lompoc. Plaintiff also appears to claim defendant

Lorance violated his rights by disciplining him pursuant to such refusal. 

Third Claim

Plaintiff claims defendant Lorance violated his Fifth Amendment rights by

refusing to allow him to present witness testimony or present Bureau documentation from his

central file in defense of his disciplinary hearing at USP Atwater. 

Fourth Claim

Plaintiff claims defendant Haro violated his Fifth Amendment rights by “failing to

reverse or otherwise stop” the alleged actions of defendants Lynn and Herrera at USP Lompoc. 

Plaintiff charges Lynn with publicizing confidential information about plaintiff in a Special

Housing Unit. Plaintiff charges Herrera with denying plaintiff’s grievances regarding this

action.

Fifth Claim

Plaintiff claims defendants Lynn and Herrera (while plaintiff was housed at USP

Lompoc) violated various Constitutional rights by designating plaintiff as an “associate” or

“suspect” member of the Aryan Brotherhood. 

Sixth Claim

 Plaintiff claims defendant Haro (the Regional Director) violated various

Constitutional rights by failing to prevent defendants Lynn and Herrera from conducting urine

tests at USP Lompoc. 

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Seventh Claim

Plaintiff claims defendants Moorehead and Cole violated various rights under the

Constitution and Privacy Act by “disclosing confidential and privileged ‘classification’

information [about him] to other inmates.’” 

Exhaustion

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a)

exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, including those filed

by federal prisoners suing under Bivens. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (federal

prisoners suing under Bivens must first exhaust inmate grievance procedures; administrative

exhaustion is prerequisite even if administrative remedies are not plain, speedy, and effective,

and relief inmate seeks is not available). “All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those

remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” 

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 n.5 (2001)). Prisoners

must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner

and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741.

The Bureau of Prisons has established an administrative remedy procedure governing

prisoner complaints. The procedure is set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et. seq. 

First, an inmate must attempt to resolve the issue informally by presenting it to staff

before submitting a Request for Administrative Remedy. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If dissatisfied

with the response, the prisoner may proceed with the formal filing of an Administrative Remedy

Request, Form BP-9. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). Upon denial by the institution, the prisoner may

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appeal the decision by filing a complaint with the Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 

Form BP-10. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). The Regional Director’s decision may be appealed to the

General Counsel in Washington, D.C. Form BP-11. Id. Appeal to the General Counsel is the

final step in the administrative remedy process. Id. 

First Claim

Plaintiff’s claim is that he was improperly classified as a member of the Aryan

Brotherhood by defendants O’Brien, Schultz, Moorehead and Cole. Plaintiff’s grievance of this

issue is administrative claim no. 282610. (Declaration of Vickie Petricka, Supervisory Paralegal

at the BOP’s Western Regional Office). Exhibit A to the Petricka Declaration is plaintiff’s

grievance, framed as a request to be declassified from his Central Inmate Monitoring (CIM)

Disruptive Group Aryan Brotherhood assignment. The response from Administrator of

National Inmate Appeals indicates that “The Warden reviewed your CIM status and determined

insufficient documentation exists to support your CIM classification of Disruptive Group Aryan

Brotherhood.” 

Defendants argue that the grievance makes no mention of defendants (former

Warden) O’Brien or Warden Schultz. Defendants further argue that the claim is moot, as the

classification has been removed. 

In general, prisoners have no liberty interest in their classification status. Moody

v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1996);

Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9

th Cir. 1987). Prisoners are entitled to the

protections of procedural due process only with respect to “deprivations of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Neal v.

Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997). If the conditions or degree of confinement to

which plaintiff is subjected are within the sentence imposed upon him and do not otherwise

violate the Constitution, then no liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause is

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implicated. Liberty interests are limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding

the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process

Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Here, there are no such allegations. The second amended complaint alleges, at

most, that plaintiff was classified as an Aryan Brotherhood Disruptive Group member. By

pursuing the administrative grievance process, plaintiff was able to have the classification

changed. Such a temporary classification, of itself, does not create a protected liberty interest. 

Plaintiff does allege that as a result, he “would be denied educational, vocational, employment

programs or otherwise opportunities to habilitate and/or rehabilitate as afforded inmates not

classified as AB or disruptive group members.” (SAC ¶ 24). Prisoners have no constitutional

right to a prison job or educational opportunties. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.

1985); Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982). Prisoners have no protected constitutional right to

any work assignment. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). 

Plaintiff also contends that such erroneous classification resulted in being housed

at various maximum security penitentiaries. Prisoners have no liberty interest in being housed at

a particular institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976); United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1991)(per

curiam); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991)(per curiam); Coakley v. Murphy,

884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff does contend that he was subjected to potential

harm, but alleges no facts indicating that he suffered any actual injury.

 There are no allegations that plaintiff was actually subjected to atypical and significant

conditions of confinement in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life as a result of his

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classification. This claim therefore fails to state a claim for relief. 

Second Claim

Plaintiff’s second claim relates to discipline for refusing to take a urine test at

USP Atwater. Exhibit B to the Petricka declaration are copies of plaintiff’s administrative

grievances regarding his appeal of the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report for refusing to

provide a urine sample. The crux of plaintiff’s grievance is that the prison violated policy by

directing plaintiff, a classified Disruptive Group member, to take a urine test. Plaintiff contends

that the policy directs that only confirmed Disruptive Group members are subject to designated

urine tests. 

Prison inmates only retain privacy rights not inconsistent with legitimate

penological objectives. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Thus, while prisoners have

some right to bodily privacy, prisons must be able to meet their "internal security needs". 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988). The court notes that urinalysis

reports have been found to be sufficiently reliable to satisfy the "some evidence" standard for

due process (see discussion below). See Harrison v. Dahm, 911 F.2d 37, 41 (8th Cir. 1990);

Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500, 501 (3d Cir. 1989); Higgs v. Band, 888 F.2d 443, 449 (6th

Cir. 1989). Thus, plaintiff again fails to state a claim.

Third Claim

Plaintiff’s third claim relates to his punishment for refusing his urinalysis test. 

Plaintiff’s specific allegation is that defendant Lorance refused to allow him to present witnesses

and obtain file documents within his appeal of his punishment for refusing the urine test. 

Defendants argue that this particular allegation is not contained within the initial filing of any

administrative file, and therefore is not viable. 

In his opposition, plaintiff refers to defendants’ Exhibit B. Exhibit B includes

copies of Administrative Remedies no. 312848 regarding plaintiff’s appeal of the amended DHO

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report for refusing to provide a urine sample. Page 2 is a copy of the Central Office DHO

Appeal, which indicates that plaintiff is alleging that the DHO “was aware of the above and

deliberately denied me due process by insisting the designation of urine test in question was

irrelevant and by refusing to allow evidence and witnesses to the contrary.” Page 3 is a copy of

the response from the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals, upholding the decision of the

DHO on the ground that “the required disciplinary procedures were substantially followed, the

greater weight of the evidence supports the DHO’s decision, and an appropriate sanction was

imposed.” 

Though it appears that plaintiff did administratively appeal an alleged due process

violation, in order to state a claim for a due process violation at a prison disciplinary hearing,

plaintiff must allege facts indicating that his disciplinary conviction has been invalidated. In

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997), the United States Supreme Court applied the

doctrine articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), to prison disciplinary

hearings. In Heck, the Court held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages for unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in favor of

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless the prisoner

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated. 512 U.S. at

487. In applying the principle to the facts of Balisok, the Court held that a claim challenging the

procedures used in a prison disciplinary hearing, even if such a claim seeks money damages and

no injunctive relief, is not cognizable under § 1983 if the nature of the inmate’s allegations are

such that, if proven, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the result of the prison disciplinary

hearing. 520 U.S. at 646. Because such a challenge, if successful, would invalidate the duration

of the inmate’s confinement, it is properly brought as a habeas corpus petition and not under §

1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

Although the specific facts of Balisok involved allegations of deceit and bias on

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the part of a hearing officer, the Court’s reasoning applies to any claim which, if proven, would

have the effect of invalidating the result of a disciplinary hearing. Here, plaintiff alleges that he

was denied due process. Specifically, that he was denied the right to call witnesses and seek

discovery of charging documents. Because plaintiff’s claim necessarily implies the invalidity of

plaintiff’s continued confinement as a result of his disciplinary hearing, plaintiff’s claim will not

accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. This claim therefore fails.

Fourth Claim

Plaintiff’s fourth claim is an allegation that Regional Director Haro failed to

prevent the conduct of defendants Lynn and Herrera at USP Lompoc. Defendants argue that

plaintiff failed to file any grievance related to this conduct. In his opposition, plaintiff refers to

defendants’ Exhibit D. Plaintiff contends that Exhibit D “establishes that plaintiff did in fact file

an appeal to the Central Office of the BOP claiming that defendant Haro decision was arbitrary

and ignoring plaintiff’s claims against defendants Herrera and Lynn in that these two defendants

were retaliating against plaintiff in direct response to plaintiff’s filing of grievances against

defendants Herrera and Lynn. . . .” (Opposition at p. 5, ¶ 2). 

Defendants’ Exhibit D is, as plaintiff notes, the record of plaintiff’s

Administrative Grievance no. 336030. Page 2 of Exhibit D is a copy of the grievance written

and signed by plaintiff. Plaintiff specifies the issue: “The issue is SIS Lt. Lynn initiated ‘prior

use’ testing in retaliation for filing grievance # 330749 against him.” Plaintiff does indicate that

“the Regional Director erred in assuming UA test on 5-12-04 was based on my placement on

‘prior use’ list for refusing to provide urine sample in December 2002. That is not an issue

here.” (original underlined). 

There is no indication that the grievance indicated that Haro knew of conduct that

constituted a civil rights violation, nor any allegations that Haro failed in any obligation to

prevent it. Plaintiff was clear that the issue was Lt. Lynn’s conduct in administering a urinalysis

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test. Plaintiff offers no evidence that this claim was administratively exhausted. This claim

should therefore be dismissed. 

Fifth Claim

Plaintiff’s fifth claim is that defendants Lynn and Herrera each violated his Fifth

and Eighth Amendment rights by designating him an “associate” or “suspect” member of the

Aryan Brotherhood at USP Lompoc. Defendants submit Exhibit F, administrative claim no.

330749. Defendants note that the administrative grievance does not include any references to

conduct by defendant Herrera. In opposition, plaintiff refers to the same exhibit, arguing that he

“did complain to the Central Office of the BOP about both defendants Lynn and Herrera’s

actions of then classifying plaintiff as a suspect member of the Aryan Brotherhood in order to

continue the harassment plaintiff had been previously subjected to for approximately 20 years.” 

(Opposition at p. 6, ¶ 2).

Defendants’ Exhibit F includes copies of administrative grievance no. 330749. 

The issue in that grievance is the allegedly wrongful classification. As relief, plaintiff sought to

have documentation in his central file expunged, and to have Lt. Lynn investigated for

discussing plaintiff’s alleged history and classification with other inmates. On Page 2 of his

grievance (dated May 4, 2004), plaintiff specifically refers to Lt. Lynn’s conduct in discussing

his history and classification with other inmates.

Plaintiff does not, however, make any reference to defendant Herrera. There are

no references to defendant Herrera in the grievance, and no allegations of conduct by defendant

Herrera. Plaintiff contends that the grievance refers to conduct by both defendants. 

Throughout his grievance, plaintiff is specific about individual conduct. He does not complaint

about classification in general, but about conduct by certain individuals. Herrera is not named in

the grievance. 

Further, as noted above, plaintiff has no liberty interest , absent some allegation of

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atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, in his

classification status. Assuming the factual allegations of the complaint as true, plaintiff has

failed to articulate a claim for relief.

Sixth Claim

Plaintiff’s sixth claim is a re-articulation of his fourth claim. He claims that

defendant Haro failed to prevent the conduct of Lynn and Herrera. In this case, he failed to

prevent them from testing his urine. As noted above, plaintiff has no protected interest in being

free from urinalysis testing. There are no allegations that Haro knew of a Constitutional

violation and failed to prevent it. The response to plaintiff’s grievance from the National Inmate

Appeals Administrator reveals that BOP policy was followed. The response indicates that

plaintiff’s refusal to submit a urine sample resulted in monthly testing for 24 months. The

response referred to Program Statement 6060.08, Urine Surveillance and Narcotic Identification.

Assuming the facts alleged by plaintiff, plaintiff has no protected interest in being free from

urinalysis testing. Haro can not therefore be liable for failure to prevent unconstitutional

conduct. This claim therefore fails.

Seventh Claim

Plaintiff’s seventh claim is that defendants (at Atwater and Lompoc) disclosed

confidential classification information about plaintiff to other inmates. Defendants refer to

administrative grievance no. 286658 (against defendants Moorehead and Cole) and

administrative grievance no. 330749 (against defendant Lynn). Defendants argue, and plaintiff

concedes that there was no grievance filed at the final level. Plaintiff failed address the matter

with the General Counsel, as required by 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). 

In his opposition, plaintiff alleges generally that “he never filed a BP-11

grievance with the Central Office, it was only a result of prison officials, Milligan and Simmons,

acts and omissions to interfere with and frustrate plaintiff’s attempts to exhaust his

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administrative remedies.” (Opposition at p. 8, ¶ 2). In his second amended complaint, however,

plaintiff indicates that, as to defendant Lynn his efforts to exhaust included the following”

“Plaintiff initiated the formal grievance against defendant Lynn on April 5, 2004 which was

subsequently denied by defendant Herrera, and later by defendant Haro. Appeal was then

submitted timely to the Central Office and later denied on August 12, 2004.” There is no

mention of the grievance number, nor any allegation that he filed a grievance against defendants

Moorehead and Cole. Nor are there any allegations that support plaintiff’s argument in his

opposition - there are no allegations that plaintiff attempted to file a grievance and was frustrated

by the actions of prison officials Milligan and Simmons. 

Plaintiff concedes in his opposition that he did not fully exhaust this claim. 

Defendants have met their burden by coming forward with specific evidence that plaintiff has

not fully exhausted this claim. Plaintiff’s generalized argument that he was frustrated in his

efforts to do so are not supported by any factual allegations in the second amended complaint. 

This claim should therefore be dismissed for failure to exhaust.

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,

and this action should therefore be dismissed for his failure to do so. Defendants further argue

that this action is subject to dismissal even though some claims may be exhausted. The Ninth

Circuit recently addressed the issue of “mixed” complaints containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims. Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). The court framed the

question as what the district court should do when confronted with a mixed complaint. The

Ninth Circuit held that the district court should adopt the approach used in the habeas context. 

“When a district court is faced with a complaint containing claims that are closely related, the

court should follow the approach set forth in Rose and its progeny: dismiss the complaint and

allow the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to excise the unexhausted claims. In

following this procedure, we expect that district courts will exercise their usual discretion in

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1The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); See

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F. 3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).

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granting leave to amend such defective complaints.” Lira, 427 F.3d at 1176. 

Here, plaintiff clearly failed to exhaust claims 4 and 7. As to claims 1,2,3,5 and

6, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Claims 1,2,3,5 and 7 be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted.

2. Claims 4 and 7 be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust available

administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. Failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: March 8, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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