Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00661/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00661-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Although this motion was originally filed in 2:07-cv1492 FCD/JFM the court issues the order in 2:07-cv-0661 FCD/JFM

pursuant to the consolidation order filed March 3, 2008. All

references herein to docket numbers are from 2:07-cv-1492

FCD/JFM.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LORRAINE SERVANTEZ,

NO. 2:07-CV-0661 FCD/JFM1

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a

California municipality, 

et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motion of defendants

Gregory Sokolov, M.D., Mark Sussman, LCSW, and Mark Hopkins, RASW

(“defendants”) to dismiss plaintiff Lorraine Servantz’

(“plaintiff”) negligence cause of action on the ground said claim

is barred by the statute of limitations. Fed. R. Civ. 

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Case 2:07-cv-00661-FCD-JFM Document 24 Filed 03/12/08 Page 1 of 8
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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 Defendants move to dismiss only with respect to

plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence. As to

plaintiff’s other causes of action asserted against defendants,

defendants answered the complaint. (Answer, filed Feb. 1, 2008

[Docket #21].) County defendants, including the County of

Sacramento, Sheriff John McGuinness, Brian Moore, Adam Taylor,

Wayne Kitade and Dale Kramer, answered the complaint on December

28, 2007 (Docket #19). Said County defendants filed a nonopposition to the instant motion (Docket #23).

2

P. 12(b)(6); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5.2

 Specifically,

defendants assert plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to

state a negligence claim against them because they were each, at

all times relevant to the complaint, “healthcare practitioners”

within the meaning of the applicable one year statute of

limitations.3 Because plaintiff filed her complaint more than

one year after the death of her son, which event gave rise to

this action, defendants contend plaintiff’s negligence claim must

be dismissed pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.5. For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS

defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts a wrongful death claim for the suicide of

her son, David Trujillo Lopez (hereinafter “Lopez”). (Second

Amended Complaint, filed Dec. 13, 2007 [“Compl.”], ¶ 3). Lopez

was incarcerated in the Sacramento County Main Jail from October

2003 until his death on April 7, 2005. (Compl. ¶ 23). 

Defendants are healthcare providers, licensed by the State of

California, who were providing healthcare services and

supervision to Lopez during his incarceration. (Motion to

Case 2:07-cv-00661-FCD-JFM Document 24 Filed 03/12/08 Page 2 of 8
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3

Dismiss, filed Feb. 1, 2008 [“Mot.”], at 1, 3). On October 7,

2003, while incarcerated, Lopez was placed on suicide watch and

prescribed psychiatric medications. (Compl. ¶ 28). Plaintiff

alleges that defendants witnessed Lopez become increasing

distraught and depressed on April 6, 2005, but nevertheless

placed him in “temporary separation” or solitary confinement. 

(Id. ¶¶ 19, 29). While in solitary confinement, Lopez hung

himself with a bed sheet. (Id. ¶ 24).

Plaintiff alleges defendants’ negligent supervision, failure

to provide Lopez with proper medical and psychiatric attention,

and placement of Lopez in solitary confinement directly caused

his death. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21-31). Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint asserts claims for negligence, negligent supervision,

and violation of civil rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-40). Defendants

argue plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence should be

dismissed because California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5 time

bars plaintiff’s negligence claim. (Mot. at 2). Defendants

contend they are “healthcare practitioners” within the meaning of

California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5, and that plaintiff

failed to file her original complaint within the applicable one

year statute of limitations. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

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4

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

ANALYSIS

A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitation period

after the accural of the cause of action. Norgart v. Upjohn Co.,

21 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999). A cause of action accures at “the

time when the cause of action is complete with all of its

elements.” Id.; see Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart &

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5

Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187 (1971). 

The “discovery rule,” an exception to the general rule of

accural, postpones accural of a cause of action until the

plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of

action. Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 397; Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 187. A

plaintiff discovers the cause of action when he at least suspects

a factual basis for its elements. Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 397. 

For example, when a plaintiff has enough information that would

lead a reasonable person to suspect his injury was caused by

another’s negligence, the plaintiff has “discovered” the cause of

action. Failure to discover the identity of the defendant does

not delay the accrual of a cause of action. Id. at 399. It is

the factual basis of the cause, not the identity of the

defendant, that are the elements of a cause of action. Id.

In order to rely on the discovery rule for a delayed accural

of a cause of action, a plaintiff’s complaint must plead facts

“to show: (1) time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability

to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” 

Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 35 Cal. 4th 797, 808 (2005). For a

plaintiff to demonstrate diligence he must conduct a reasonable

investigation after becoming aware of an injury. Id. The

plaintiff is charged with knowledge of the information that would

have been revealed by such an investigation. Id. Thus, to delay

the accural of the cause of action, the plaintiff must show that

despite diligent efforts, he could not have reasonably discovered

facts supporting the cause of action within the applicable

statute of limitations period.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5 provides that

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professional negligence actions against healthcare providers must

be brought within “three years after the date of injury or one

year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of

reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,

whichever occurs first.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5. Under

California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5, plaintiff had to

bring her negligence cause of action within one year of accrual.

The date of accrual for plaintiff’s negligence cause of

action was April 7, 2005, the date on which plaintiff at least

came to suspect, or had reason to suspect, a factual basis for

its elements. Plaintiff admits in her deposition taken April 25,

2007 that even prior to her son’s death she had misgivings about

the healthcare services being provided at the jail. Plaintiff

admits her son told her that while he was supposed to be

receiving psychiatric medications, “they were not giving it to

him.” (Servantez Deposition at 69:3-8, Apr. 25, 2007 [“Dep.”],

lodged Mar. 3, 2008). Plaintiff’s son complained to her that he

was not getting the medications he needed. (Dep. 70:19-71:1).

Further, plaintiff admits receiving a phone call from

Lopez’s public defender on the day of Lopez’s death in which the

attorney said he “had the name of an attorney.” (Dep. 95:11-23). 

The attorney told plaintiff that the jail psychiatrist had

strongly urged that Lopez should be on suicide watch. (Dep.

95:11-23). When plaintiff was asked if it was her understanding

from the attorney’s phone call that she should contact an

attorney to investigate a possible lawsuit arising out of her

son’s death, plaintiff responded: “I was angry when he said that,

I didn’t want to hear that then.” (Dep. 96:18-23).

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7

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony reveals that she had reason

to believe defendants’ actions may be professionally negligent

prior to her son’s death. Therefore, on the date of her son’s

death, the cause of action became complete with all its elements.

Plaintiff had enough facts at her disposal to discover, or at

least through reasonable diligence should have discovered, her

wrongful death claim against defendants. See Norgart, 21 Cal.

4th at 405 (finding that the cause of action for wrongful death

accrued when the plaintiff had reason to suspect the death was a

result of wrongdoing). Any reasonable person with the facts

known to plaintiff would have reason to suspect wrongdoing in the

death of her son on April 7, 2005. 

In sum, the discovery rule does not postpone the date of

accrual past April 7, 2005 because if plaintiff conducted a

reasonably diligent investigation into the causes of her son’s

death, she would have discovered the cause of action against

defendants. See Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 896 (1985)

(holding that once a patient knows, or through reasonable

diligence should have known, that he has been harmed through

professional negligence, he has one year to bring his suit). 

Since the one year period commenced on April 7, 2005 and the

plaintiff did not file her action until April 18, 2006, her

negligence claim against defendants is barred by California Code

of Civil Procedure § 340.5.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s negligence cause of action is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 12, 2008

 FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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