Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00241/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00241-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLETA HADDOX, individually

and on behalf of B.S. and D.S.

minors, OTIS HADDOX,

individually and on behalf of

similarly situated class of

persons, and VINCENT ANDREWS,

individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, CHIEF JERRY

DYER, DOES 1 through 10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

1:07-CV-00241-OWW-SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 15)

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Fresno (“Fresno”) and Chief Jerry Dyer

(“Chief Dyer”) bring this motion to dismiss against Plaintiffs

Arleta Haddox’s (“Arleta”), B.S.’ (“B.S.”), D.S.’(“D.S.”), Otis

Haddox’s (“Otis”) and Vincent Andrews’ (“Andrews”) complaint

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The original complaint was filed on February 13, 2007. (Doc.

1, Original Complaint.) An amended class action complaint was

filed on June 12, 2007. (Doc. 12, Amended Class Action Complaint

(“Complaint”).) Defendants moved to dismiss on July 2, 2007

Plaintiff Arleta’s and Andrews’ entire case and moved to dismiss

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on the basis of qualified immunity. (Doc. 15, Motion to Dismiss.) 

Plaintiffs opposed the motion on August 10, 2007. (Doc. 16,

Opposition.) This matter was heard on August 27, 2007.

3. FACTUAL HISTORY

On November 13, 2006 between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., City of

Fresno police officers, Defendants Does 1 through 10, allegedly

initiated a traffic stop without probable cause on the parked

vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs. (Doc. 15, Motion to Dismiss, ¶

3.) Plaintiffs contend that Plaintiff B.S. was driving

Plaintiffs D.S. and Otis, in a vehicle owned by Plaintiff

Andrews. All Plaintiffs are person of color and B.S. and D.S.

are minors. 

During their drive to a relative’s house, B.S., D.S. and

Otis became aware they were being followed by a Fresno Police

Department vehicle for a distance of approximately two miles. 

B.S., D.S. and Otis allege that this created fear, apprehension

and severe emotional distress for all occupants of the vehicle.

(Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶¶ 20-24.) Plaintiffs contend that upon

reaching their destination, after their vehicle was parked, a

Fresno Police Department vehicle activated its emergency lights

and verbally warned the occupants of the vehicle that “Whoever

moves will get shot!” which terrified Plaintiffs who were in the

vehicle. (Doc. 4, Complaint, ¶¶ 25-26.) 

During the traffic stop, City of Fresno police officers

allegedly verbally threatened Plaintiffs with deadly force,

handcuffed and physically mistreated them. (Doc. 15, Motion to

Dismiss, ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that B.S., who suffers from

asthma was terrified as a result of the above incidents and was

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unable to breathe. After parking the vehicle and being verbally

warned/threatened she reached for her asthma pump in response,

and contends that this action was interpreted by Doe 1, a City of

Fresno policeman, as a threat and he drew his service weapon,

pointing it at B.S. Plaintiffs allege that Doe 1 then pulled

B.S. from the vehicle, shoved her to the ground, handcuffed and

placed her in the Fresno Police Department vehicle. (Doc. 12,

Complaint, ¶¶ 26-29.) Plaintiffs also allege that a City of

Fresno policeman, identified as Doe 2, then ordered a police dog

to sniff the vehicle for illegal narcotics, as part of a “general

interest in crime control.” (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiff Otis alleges he receives disability compensation

as he is disabled and suffers from ulcerative sores on his legs. 

Plaintiffs allege that a City of Fresno policeman, identified as

Doe 3, drew his service weapon on Otis, pulled Otis from the

vehicle by his coat causing him to be choked, handcuffed and

placed him in the Fresno Police Department vehicle. (Doc. 12,

Complaint, ¶¶ 30-31.) Plaintiffs allege that D.S., age 14, was

terrified. A City of Fresno policeman, identified as Doe 4, then

drew his service weapon on her and shouted “Keep your hands up or

I will shoot.” (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶ 32.) D.S. exited the

vehicle at gunpoint and upon getting to her knees was pushed

further to the ground by Doe 4 and then handcuffed and placed in

the Fresno Police Department vehicle. 

Plaintiffs assert that B.S., D.S. and Otis were detained for

one and half hours for driving without a driver’s license, in

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The California Vehicle Code § 12801.5 provides that “a peace officer 1

shall not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the person is an

unlicensed driver, unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe that

person is under the age of 16 years. Cal. Veh. Code § 12801.5(a). 

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violation of California Vehicle Code § 12801.5(e) . Plaintiffs 1

allege that they were also falsely accused of not having the

required registration documentation in the vehicle. (Doc. 12,

Complaint, ¶¶ 33-35.) 

Plaintiff Andrews, owner of the vehicle, alleges that at the

scene of the incident, he offered to retrieve the registration

documentation from the vehicle but the Fresno police officers

denied him access and his vehicle was subsequently towed and

impounded, requiring him to pay a fee to retrieve the vehicle. 

Plaintiff Andrews claims that he has proof of the registration

documentation being in the vehicle at the time of the alleged

incident, citing a recently issued traffic ticket that does not

state any such “document deficiency” existed. (Doc. 12,

Complaint, ¶¶ 41-46.) 

Plaintiffs also contend that Arleta suffered extreme

emotional distress upon hearing a City of Fresno policeman shout,

“If you drop your hands you will be shot” directed at her child

Plaintiff D.S., through a friend’s cell phone, who had the cell

phone at the scene. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶¶ 36-39.) Chief Dyer

was acting Chief of Police at the time of the alleged incident

for the Fresno Police Department. 

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. 12(b)(6) Motion

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. Gilligan

v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the Court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The question before

the court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail;

rather, it is whether the plaintiff could prove any set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). “A complaint

should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d

977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002)(citations omitted).

5. FEDERAL CLAIMS

A. CHIEF DYER SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Plaintiffs bring suit for § 1983 and § 1985(3) claims

against Defendant Chief Dyer in his official capacity of Chief of

Police. This is redundant as Defendant Chief Dyer is employed by

the City of Fresno Police Department, an agency managed, directed

and controlled by the City of Fresno, a named Defendant in the

Complaint. Suing state officials in their official-capacities

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are treated as suits against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131

F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). “1983 claims against government

officials in their official capacities are really suits against

the governmental employer because the employer must pay any

damages awarded.” Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 fn. 8 (9th

Cir. 2002). In such suits, the real party in interest is the

entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

25 (1991). “As long as the government entity receives notice and

an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.

By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Id. at 165. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ suit against Defendant Chief Dyer in

his official capacity for causes of action under Section § 1983

and § 1985(3) is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as it is

redundant.

B. FIRST CLAIM: § 1983 EXCESSIVE FORCE - QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

DEFENSE

Defendants invoke the defense of qualified immunity against

Plaintiffs B.S.’, D.S.’ and Otis’ first cause of action of

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Qualified immunity

grows out of the policy concern that few individuals would enter

public service if they risked personal liability for their

official decisions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814

(1982). The immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or

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those who knowingly violate the law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 228 (1991), and "spare[s] a defendant not only unwarranted

liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those

defending a long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.

226, 232 (1991). Qualified immunity is not a defense on the

merits; it is an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the

burdens of litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200

(2001). 

Deciding qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. 

First, the threshold question a court must ask is, taken in light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show the officers’ actions resulted in a constitutional

violation. If this threshold question is answered in the

affirmative, then the qualified immunity issue is addressed.

Robinson v. County of Solano, 278 F.3d 1007, 1012-1013 (9th Cir.

2002); Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999),

rev’d, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The court must then inquire whether

the right violated was “clearly established” by asking whether a

reasonable officer could believe that the defendant’s actions

were lawful in the situation confronted. See Katz, 533 U.S. at

201. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that

a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). It is not enough that there is a general proposition on

action that violates a right, it must be “clearly established” in

a more particularized manner. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201-202.)

I. Constitutional Violations and Qualified Immunity

Plaintiffs sue Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming

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constitutional violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. “Section 1983 provides for liability against

any person acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws’ of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa

Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

“The rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and

beneficently construed.’” Id.(quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.

439, 443 (1991)). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs may

bring a civil action for deprivation of rights under the

following circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District

of Columbia. 

To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the

United States Constitution or a federal law and (2) that

the deprivation was effected “under color of state law.”

Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).

a. § 1983 Execessive Force in Violation of the

Fourth Amendment

Plaintiffs allege that they were deprived of their

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constitutional right to be free from excessive force under

the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he fundamental premise that the

use of force to effect an arrest is subject to the Fourth

Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures.” Chew v.

Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994). The Chew Court

describes excessive force factors to be taken into

consideration in determining reasonableness under a claim

of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment: "whether a

warrant was used, whether the plaintiff resisted or was

armed, whether more than one arrestee or officer was

involved, whether the plaintiff was sober, whether other

dangerous or exigent circumstances existed at the time of

the arrest, and the nature of the arrest charges." 27 F.3d

at 1441 n.5. The analysis proceeds in three steps. Miller

v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). First,

an assessment is made into the gravity of the particular

intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests by evaluating the

type and amount of force inflicted. Second, the importance

of the government interest at stake is assessed by

evaluating: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2)

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight. Id. Third, the gravity of the intrusion on the

individual is balanced against the government's need for

the intrusion to determine whether it was constitutionally

reasonable. Id. The Supreme Court has cautioned that in

such an analysis, “careful attention to the facts and

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circumstances of each particular case” is to be undertaken.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

Plaintiffs contend that one or more Defendants in a

Fresno police vehicle verbally threatened them without any

provocation, wrongdoing or probable cause. After being

followed and then subjected to verbal threats by

Defendants, B.S. suffered an asthma attack and reached for

her pump. Plaintiffs contend that B.S.’ action was

perceived as a threat that precipitated Defendants to pull

their service weapons on Plaintiffs. B.S. and Otis, both

allegedly unarmed and unresisting, were pulled from the

vehicle by officers with drawn guns. Otis, who was

disabled and suffering from ulcerative sores on his legs

was choked in the process. The youngest of the Plaintiffs,

D.S., 14 years old, unarmed and unresisting, was verbally

threatened she would be shot if her hands were not up. She

was then forced out of the vehicle at gunpoint and ordered

to get on her knees where Defendant Doe 4, pushed her to

the ground. She was then handcuffed and placed in the

Fresno Police vehicle. 

All three Plaintiffs were detained for one and half

hours on account of alleged "document deficiencies." 

Plaintiffs were then charged with minor traffic violations

(driving without a license and lack of registration

documents in the vehicle). B.S. admits she did not a have

driver's license. Plaintiffs' contend however that

Defendants falsely stated there were no registration

documents in the vehicle at the time of the alleged

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incident. 

The City of Fresno police officers present at the scene

of the alleged incident on November 13, 2006 did not

formally arrest B.S., D.S. and Otis, but while conducting a

traffic stop, detained Plaintiffs at gunpoint, shouted,

pushed, choked, handcuffed and kept them for over an hour

without probable cause. A trier of fact could find such

conduct by Fresno Police officers excessive, unreasonable

and unjustified.

In Robinson v. County of Solano, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th

Cir. 2002), the mere pointing of a gun at an individual not

resisting arrest, holding the individual in a police

vehicle for 15-30 minutes and never officially arresting

the invididual, was found to be excessive force. Though in

Robinson, the individual was never charged with a crime,

the plaintiff was also not pulled out of a vehicle at

gunpoint, verbally threatened or detained for one and half

hours for minor traffic violations as Plaintiffs allege,

providing support for their excessive force claim. Under

the Fourth Amendment, failing to produce a driver’s license

and registration papers would not justify the conduct

alleged. The Complaint does not allege any facts that

would provide reasonable suspicion for Defendants’ search

and seizure of Plaintiffs and their vehicle. All

Plaintiffs were unarmed, and none, according to the facts

alleged in the Complaint, were actively attempting to evade

arrest or resisting the officers. Further, the officers

outnumbered Plaintiffs at the scene of the alleged

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incident, at least five officers were identified to the

three occupants in the vehicle. Even assuming that B.S.

reached for her asthma pump shortly after Defendants

shouted "Whoever moves will get shot!" (Doc. 12, Complaint

¶ 25.), the reasonableness of this interaction will have to

be decided by a trier of fact. 

Reviewing the alleged facts in light of such factors

and assuming facts alleged are true supports a finding that

the use of force applied in this case was excessive. Under

the "objective reasonableness" standard of Graham,

Plaintiffs have properly alleged a Fourth Amendment claim

of excessive force. 

i. Qualified Immunity

The qualified immunity analysis begins with whether the

law is “clearly established” such that a reasonable

official could believe that his or her actions were lawful.

See Katz, 533 U.S. at 194-195. The inquiry is more

particularized and thus more relevant than the general

proposition that excessive use of force by an officer is

contrary to the Fourth Amendment (under objective standards

of reasonableness). "Reasonable mistakes can be made as to

the legal constraints on particular police conduct" Id. at

195. 

At the time of the alleged incident on November 13,

2006, it was clearly established law that the use of

excessive force is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

at 202 (“if it is excessive of reasonableness”).

There is a factual dispute over whether the force was

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of the amount used by Defendants. Defendants’ Mot. to.

Dismiss omits any reference to the alleged choking, pushing

and drawing of a weapon from their description of alleged

facts. (Doc. 15, Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 4.) And while

Defendants provide case law to support the reasonableness

of each type of force Defendants allege was used on the day

of the incident, Defendants chose to ignore the entire

description in the Complaint. 

Assuming, as is required that Plaintiffs’ facts are

true, the allegations defeat qualified immunity. “Under

ordinary circumstances, when the police have only

reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, drawing

weapons and using handcuffs and other restraints will

violate the Fourth Amendment.” Washington v. Lambert, 98

F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996)(“In this nation, all people

have a right to be free from the terrifying and humiliating

experience of being pulled from their cars at gunpoint,

handcuffed, or made to lie face down on the pavement when

insufficient reason for such intrusive police conduct

exists.”) In “[i]nvestigatory stops or Terry stops, we

have consistently applied the principle that drawing

weapons and using handcuffs or other restraints is

unreasonable in many situations.” Robinson, 278 F.3d at

1015. If Defendants drew their weapons against unarmed,

unresisting Plaintiffs and handcuffed them for an

investigatory detention after an investigatory stop without

probable cause, a reasonable officer in the same

circumstances would not believe such actions to be lawful. 

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b. § 1983 Supervisor Liability

Defendants are likewise asserting qualified immunity on

behalf of Chief Dyer, therefore, to determine if there is a

constitutional violation for purposes of satisfying the

first immunity prong it must be determined if there is a

sufficient causal link between any alleged wrongful conduct

and the constitutional violation. 

A supervisor can be held liable for excessive force

under the Fourth Amendment if he was personally involved in

depriving a plaintiff of constitutional rights, or if there

is sufficient causal connection between the wrongful

conduct of the supervisor and the violation of the

constitutional right. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942

F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S.

1074 (1992). It is not alleged that Defendant Chief Dyer

was personally involved in the alleged application of

excessive force. Plaintiffs do not claim he arrested or

used excessive force on the day of the alleged incident. 

However, it is well-established that supervisors, in their

supervisory role, can be held liable under a § 1983 claim

in their individual capacity for their participation in the

deprivation of a constitutional right if there is

sufficient casual connection between the supervisor’s

wrongful conduct and constitutional violation. See Larez v.

City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991) (chief of

police can be held liable as supervisor for police

officers’ excessive force); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145

F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1998)(chief of police can be held

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liable in his individual capacity for participation in

deprivation of Plaintiffs’ right regarding the use of

excessive force by officers); Phillips v. City of

Fairfield, 406 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2005)(chief of

police can be held liable in individual capacity under §

1983 for his participation in failing to train and

discipline officers in regards to excessive force by

police). 

Liability by Chief Dyer only arises when (1) Chief

Dyer’s own “‘culpable action or inaction in the training,

supervision, or control of his subordinates’ caused the

constitutional injury”; for which Chief Dyer “acquiesce[d]

in the constitutional deprivations of which [the] complaint

is made;” or that (2) Chief Dyer’s conduct showed a

“reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.”

Phillips v. City of Fairfield, 406 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1116

(E.D.Cal. 2005) (citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946

F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)). To establish a causal

connection between Chief Dyer’s action and the

constitutional violation, Plaintiff must allege that Chief

Dyer “set in motion a series of acts by others, or

knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others,

which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause

others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Larez, 946

F.2d at 646). 

Plaintiffs allege that Chief Dyer is responsible for

”providing training, supervision, instruction, oversight

and discipline concerning the policies, practices, customs,

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and activities” of the entire Fresno Police Department. And

he “established, maintained, encouraged, allowed and/or

ratified a custom, practice or policy of providing

inadequate training, supervision, instruction, oversight,

and discipline to Fresno police officers...” (Doc. 12,

Complaint, ¶ 54.) 

A failure to train claim requires that Plaintiffs allege: (1)

they were deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the training

policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the protection of

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights - knowing City of Fresno police

officers would come into contact with; and (3) Plaintiffs

constitutional injuries would have been avoided had Chief Dyer

properly trained his officers. Blackenhorn v. City of Orange, 485

F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs properly assert Chief

Dyer has established a custom or policy of providing inadequate

training, supervision and training to City of Fresno police

officers that caused the Fresno Police Department to use

excessive force to perpetuate constitutional violations of

citizens’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. 

These customs and practices “demonstrate a deliberate

indifference” by all Defendants, including Chief Dyer, to the

“constitutional rights of persons of color.” And these

violations caused the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs. (Doc. 12,

Complaint, ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs claim, such actions demonstrate a

deliberate indifference to those who come into contact with City

of Fresno police officers. 

The alleged serial use of excessive force or a pattern of

failing to discipline police officers in response to justified

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citizen complaints, sufficiently pleads content no reasonable

supervisor would engage in. See Larez, 946 F.2d at 646. The

absence of evidence to support these allegations must be

addressed by dispositive motions.

i. Qualified Immunity

While the right to be free from excessive force is clearly

established, the precise contours of Chief Dyer’s (and the

City’s) duties as to the Fresno police officers’ challenged

actions cannot be decided without hearing evidence. Qualified

immunity cannot be established as a matter of law on the

allegations of Plaintiffs’ first cause of action against Chief

Dyer. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is DENIED. 

C. SECOND CLAIM: § 1983 FOURTH AMENDMENT ARREST WITHOUT

PROBABLE CAUSE

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff Arleta’s and Andrews’

second § 1983 claim, deprivation of liberty by unlawful arrest

without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Defendants Fresno and Chief Dyer contend in their Motion to

Dismiss that Plaintiff Arleta was not deprived of rights under

the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable search and

seizure because she was not seized. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16

(1968). Under the Fourth Amendment, a "seizure" has occurred

only when government actors have by means of physical force or

show of authority in some way restrained the liberty of a

citizen. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 at fn. 10

(1989)(citing Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 19, fn. 16). The

Complaint does not state Arleta was an occupant of the vehicle at

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the time of detention, nor that she was detained upon approaching

the scene of the accident. (Doc. 15, Motion to Dismiss ¶ 4.) The

Complaint does not allege Arleta was ever seized. An analysis

into whether City of Fresno police officers, Does 1 through 10,

had probable cause for her arrest is moot. 

Similarly, Plaintiff Andrews in the facts alleged was never

"seized" by Defendants. He was not an identified occupant of the

vehicle at the time of detention nor is it alleged that he was

detained when he approached the scene of the accident or when he

spoke to Defendants regarding the registration documentation. 

Defendants Fresno’s and Chief Dyer’s Motion to Dismiss the

second cause of action for deprivation of liberty on account of

unlawful arrest without probable cause as to Plaintiffs Arleta

and Andrews is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. THIRD CLAIM: § 1983 RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION ON ACCOUNT OF

RACE

A claim for equal protection under § 1983 requires

Plaintiffs to show that Defendants, under color of law, “acted

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiffs

based on membership in a protected class,” in violation of

Plaintiffs right to equal protection of the laws under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-

95 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-

40 (1976)). Plaintiffs properly plead in their third cause of

action that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to equal

protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment on account

of their race. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶ 51.) “The central purpose

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 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 2

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). 

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of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the

prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of

race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239. Plaintiffs have

asserted that they are persons of color for purposes of

satisfying a “protected class” under the Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protection claim. The facts allege that Plaintiffs are all

African-American and none of the police officers at the scene of

the incident were persons of color and do not treat persons of

color in the same way. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants acted at all relevant times under the

color of the law. Plaintiffs’ Arleta and Andrews third cause of

action under a § 1983 claim for the Fourteenth Amendment

deprivation of the right to equal protection under the Fourth

Amendment is sufficiently pled. 

Defendants Chief Dyer’s and Fresno’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs Arleta’s and Andrews’ third claim for violation of

equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment is

DENIED.

E. FOURTH CLAIM: § 1983 MONELL CUSTOM AND POLICY

Plaintiffs’ fourth claim is a Monell § 1983 claim against

the City of Fresno. Local governments are “persons” subject to

suit for “constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen 2

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There is no “basis for concluding that the Eleventh

Amendment is a bar to municipal liability.” Id. (citing

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).

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v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) “[O]ur

holding...that local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.55. “Local governing bodies,

therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that

is alleged to be unconstitutional, implements or executes a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body's officers...[or for]

deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the

body’s official decision making channels.” Id. 690-91. 

Although a local government can be held liable for its

official policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an

employee’s actions outside of the scope of these policies or

customs. “[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background

of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that

Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort. In particular,...a municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. A

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 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he 3

causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his

constitutional rights.’” Brass, 328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

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municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Id. at 691. The statute’s “language plainly

imposes liability on a government that, under color of some

official policy, [that] ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s

constitutional rights.” Id. at 692. 

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: (1) The

official(s) must have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and 3

may not be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the

specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 690-92. There are three ways to show a policy or

custom of a municipality:

(1) By showing a longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local

government entity; 

(2) By showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of

decision or 

(3) By showing that an official with final

policymaking authority either delegated

that authority to, or ratified the

decision of, a subordinate. 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).

A municipal policy may be inferred from widespread practices or

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evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. 

Id. Municipalities can be held liable "if its deliberate policy

caused the constitutional violation alleged." Blackenhorn, 485

F.3d at 484.

Plaintiffs claim municipal liability as a result of Chief

Dyer’s acting as chief of police and the final policymaker. To

determine final policymaking authority, the court must find the

individual has authority “in a particular area, or on a

particular issue.” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.

2004)(quoting McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785

(1997)). In Lytle, the court found that the superintendent of

the school district was not constrained by policies other than

his own, and he was not subject to review by anyone within the

district, which made the superintendent a final policymaker with

respect to teacher employment. 382 F.3d at 985. 

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Chief Chief Dyer is

“responsible for establishing, ratifying and enforcing policies,

practices and customs of the FPD and providing training,

supervision, instruction, oversight and discipline concerning the

policies, practices, customs, and activities of the entire Fresno

Police Department...” (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶ 11.) The violations

are alleged to be part of policy and custom of Defendants

providing inadequate training, supervision and discipline of

“Fresno police officers...thereby failing to adequately

discourage constitutional violations and tacitly agreeing to

violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” (Doc. 12, Complaint ¶

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54.) Plaintiffs allege that such customs, practices and policies

“demonstrate a deliberate indifference” by Defendants to the

constitutional rights of Fresno citizen and as such caused the

constitutional violations, including Plaintiff Arleta’s and

Andrews’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection constitutional

rights. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶¶ 52, 55.) Plaintiffs' allegations

of Defendants' failure to train an officer is not limited to a

single-incidence, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled there is a

"program-wide inadequacy of training." Alexander v. City and

County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). 

"In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under

section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss ‘even

if based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the

individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.'" Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624 (quoting

Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir.

1986)). Plaintiffs have alleged more facts than conclusory

allegations. Under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, an examination of the

sufficiency of the complaint not the sufficiency of evidence is

at review and Plaintiffs have met such requirements to state a

claim against a municipality under § 1983. See Brockmeier v.

Solano County Sheriffs' Dept., No. CIV-S-05-2090 MCE EFB PS, 2006

WL 3760276, at *5 fn.4 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 18, 2006). 

These allegations are sufficient to state a Monell claim

against the City of Fresno. 

I. Qualified Immunity Limitations

Municipal corporations are not afforded immunity from suit

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like individuals acting under the color of law. Owen v. City of

Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). While a municipality cannot

be held liable under a respondeat superior, it is not afforded

qualified immunity. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). 

For reasons stated above, Defendants Chief Dyer’s and

Fresno’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Arleta’s and Andrews’ § 1983

Monell fourth cause of action is DENIED.

F. FIFTH CLAIM: § 1985(3) CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL

RIGHTS

The fifth cause of action is a § 1985(3) claim for violation

of all Plaintiffs’, including Andrews’ and Arleta’s, right to be

free from conspiracy to interfere with their civil rights on

account of their race. 

A § 1985(3) claim, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

requires three elements: (1) existence of a conspiracy to deprive

Plaintiff of equal protection under the law; (2) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury. Addisu

v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing

Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998)). An

essential requirement for a § 1985(3) claim is that there must be

some racial or otherwise class-based “invidious discriminatory

animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health

Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993)(quoting Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). 

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together to act and at all relevant times each was a coCase 1:07-cv-00241-OWW -SMS Document 24 Filed 01/02/08 Page 24 of 32
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conspirator of the remaining Defendants, for the purpose of

denying Plaintiffs’ equal protection of the laws. The

Complaint’s fifth cause of action states that under the color of

law, Defendants purposely planned and conspired together to deny

Plaintiffs equal protection of the laws by (1) denying them the

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2)

denying them the right to not be deprived of life, property or

liberty without due process of law. The Complaint asserts that

as a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct alleged,

Plaintiffs have been damaged. 

Arleta, however, has not been deprived of such

constitutional protections. The Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable search and seizure is invoked when a

person has been “seized.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 

Arleta did not allege any facts to show she was subject to a

seizure by Defendants at the scene of the alleged incident. She

was merely a bystander and only viewed B.S. and D.S. in the

police vehicle. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶ 40.) Nor did Arleta

allege any facts for a claim of denial of her Fourteenth

Amendment due process right not to be deprived of life, property

or liberty. She never claimed she was an owner of the vehicle

seized, nor any other property seized nor that she was personally

seized. Arleta's § 1985(3) cause of action for conspiracy to

deny her equal protection under the law does not survive. 

Likewise, Andrews did not allege in the Complaint that he

was “seized” in violation of his right to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure. 

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 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss incorrectly cites the tenth 1

cause of action as the intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim, however under the amended complaint, the cause of

action is now the ninth cause of action. The tenth cause of

action is for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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Andrews has alleged facts that his vehicle was seized after

the police allegedly wrongfully prohibited Andrews access to the

vehicle to produce the documents. Andrews also has alleged facts

that he was deprived of his vehicle and was forced to pay a large

amount of funds to retrieve it after it was wrongfully impounded. 

Andrews also alleges facts that his car was searched without

probable cause. The alleged facts, may if expounded, be

sufficient to support a claim for deprivation of property without

due process of law. However, the property was temporarily

detained, not confiscated. 

Defendants Chief Dyer’s and Fresno’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs Arleta’s and Andrew’s claim for § 1985(3) conspiracy

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A. NINTH CLAIM: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Defendants move to dismiss Andrews’ ninth cause of action1

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Andrews concedes dismissal of his ninth cause of action. See

Doc. 16, Opposition, p. 2:10-18.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress under state law, a plaintiff must allege: 1) extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant, with the intent or reckless

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disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; 2)

plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and 3) defendant

was the cause of the emotional distress. Cervantez v. J. C.

Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 (1979), superseded on other

grounds in Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 469

(Cal.App.2 Dist. 1998).

Defendants Fresno’s and Chief Dyer’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ ninth cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND.

B. TENTH CLAIM: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

I. Victim

To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress under state law plaintiff must plead: 1) serious

emotional distress, 2) actually and proximately caused by, 3)

wrongful conduct, 4) by a defendant who should have foreseen that

the conduct would cause such distress. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire

Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 155 n.7 (1987). It is well

settled that negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an

independent tort, rather it is the tort of negligence to which

the duty of care, breach of the duty, causation and damage

elements applies. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med.

Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588 (1989); see also Friedman v.

Merck & Co., 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 885 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 2003)(no duty

to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another, a

duty must arise (1) independently by law and (2) be assumed by

defendant or found through some special relationship between the

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parties).

Andrews claims that he suffered distress, aggravation, great

humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish which was

proximately caused by Fresno police Defendants negligently

charging him with not having proper documents for his vehicle,

falsely informing Andrews the vehicle was reported stolen, and as

a result seizing the vehicle. Andrews was unable to use the

vehicle and expended funds to retrieve it after it was allegedly

unlawfully impounded by Defendants. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶¶ 42-

47, 74.) Andrews does not fully allege that Defendants should

have foreseen that their conduct would cause such distress. The

claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is

insufficient. 

Defendants Fresno’s and Chief Dyer’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff Andrews’ tenth cause of action for negligent infliction

of emotional distress is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

II. Bystander

Plaintiff Arleta alleges a bystander negligent infliction of

emotional distress claim. A bystander negligent infliction of

emotional distress claim requires the following: “if, but only

if”, plaintiff (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2)

is present at the scene of the injury - producing event at the

time it occurs and is then aware, although not visually aware,

that it is causing injury to plaintiff; and (3) as a result

suffers serious emotional distress - a reaction beyond that which

would be anticipated in a disinterested witness, can a plaintiff

claim a bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress

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claim. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 667-668 (1989); Bird v.

Saenz, 28 Cal.4th 910, 915 (2002). For the first element, the

phrase “closely related” has been defined to include any

relatives residing in the same household, or any parents,

siblings, children, and grandparents of the victim. Moon v.

Guardian Postacute Services, Inc., 95 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1009

(Cal.App.1 Dist. 2002). A visual perception of the impact

causing injury is not essential as long as it was perceived by

other senses, and assuming the event is contemporaneously known

to cause the injuries to victim. Estrada v. Aeronaves de Mexico,

967 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1992). A plaintiff can claim damages if

she or he observes an injury-producing event in progress, even

though not present from the start, so long as the plaintiff is

aware of the cause of the injury when finally present. Ortiz v.

HPM Corp., 234 Cal.App.3d 178, 183-186 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991).

Arleta was a bystander to the alleged incident and claims

she suffered extreme emotional distress proximately caused by the

negligent actions of Fresno police Defendants. The facts she

alleges that caused her extreme emotional distress are the verbal

death-threats by Defendants directed at her minor children,

Plaintiffs B.S and D.S. She alleges that Defendants by

reasonable prudence should have foreseen, that in today’s

electronic age, such a shout would likely be heard over a cell

phone and that the person on the receiving end would become

terrified upon hearing such threats. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶¶ 13

and 74.) The Complaint alleges Arleta received a phone call

stating that the someone or some persons had her child D.S. and

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guns were drawn. Through the cell phone, Arleta was able to hear

the following threat “If you drop your hands you will be shot.” 

Arleta realized that threat was directed at her fourteen-year old

child, Plaintiff D.S., causing her extreme emotional distress.

Arleta than arrived at the scene of alleged incident and viewed

her two children in the police vehicles. (Doc. 12, Complaint, ¶¶

36-38, 40.) It is not clear from the alleged facts where Arleta

was in relation to the location of the alleged incident. 

However, she has facially alleged the bystander negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim.

Defendants Fresno’s and Chief Dyer’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff Arleta’s tenth cause of action for bystander negligent

infliction of emotional distress is DENIED.

7. CONCLUSION

(1) Defendant Chief Dyer’s motion to dismiss the suit

against him in his official capacity is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND.

(2) Defendants’ qualified immunity defense to Plaintiffs

first cause of action, § 1983 Fourth Amendment right to be free

from excessive force is DENIED.

(3) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action on Plaintiff Arleta Haddox’s and

Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ § 1983 second cause of action for

unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment is GRANTED WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND.

(4) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

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state a cause of action on Plaintiff Arleta Haddox’s and

Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ § 1983 third cause of action for equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is DENIED.

(5) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action on Plaintiff Arleta Haddox’s and

Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ fourth cause of action regarding §

1983 Monell claim is DENIED.

(6) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action on Plaintiff Arleta Haddox’s and

Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ fifth cause of action regarding §

1985(3) conspiracy is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(7) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action on Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ ninth cause

of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(8) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action on Plaintiff Vincent Andrews’ tenth cause

of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(9) Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action on Plaintiff Arleta Haddox’s tenth cause

of action for bystander negligent infliction of emotional

distress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

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bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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