Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01470/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01470-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONELL ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01470-OWW-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON

WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED

(Doc. 1)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Lionell Rose (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on June 8, 2005.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

Case 1:05-cv-01470-OWW -SMS Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at California State PrisonCorcoran (CSP-Corcoran), where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names California

Department of Corrections Director Jeanne Woodford, Warden A. K. Scribner, and Correctional

Officers D. Adkison, Alafa, and Fugioka as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and

equitable relief. 

Plaintiff alleges claims for relief for violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basis of plaintiff’s claims is the confiscation of his

property pursuant to an operational procedure applicable to inmates housed in the Security Housing

Unit (SHU).

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Due Process Claim

Following his transfer to a SHU at CSP-Corcoran, plaintiff’s personal property was

confiscated and later destroyed after plaintiff failed to pay to have it shipped home. Plaintiff alleges

that the confiscation and destruction of his personal property pursuant to Operational Procedure 806,

which applies to inmates housed in the SHU, constituted deprivation of property without due process

of law, in violation of the Due Process Clause. 

First, plaintiff’s assertion that he is entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) is without merit. The Wolff procedures apply to prison

disciplinary proceedings where there is a liberty interest at stake, not to the deprivation of a property

interest. Second, the confiscation of plaintiff’s property pursuant to a more restrictive property

Case 1:05-cv-01470-OWW -SMS Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

possession policy which applies to inmates in the SHU does not state a claim for relief under section

1983. Plaintiff has state law remedies available to him with respect to the property deprivation, and

as a result, his claim does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirement of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (due

process claim not cognizable where inmate was deprived of property due to reclassification and

California provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

530-34 (1984)). 

2. Equal Protection Claim

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that

defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of inmates which

included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal protection

claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740

(9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998,

1010 (9th Cir. 1985). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an

individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

Plaintiff has set forth no facts supporting a claim that he was denied equal protection.

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that the property policy was discriminatory and that SHU inmates

were treated differently do not support a claim for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. (See e.g., Comp., p. 6, 27-30.) Plaintiff’s allegation that inmates housed in the

SHU are similarly situated to inmates in the Psychiatric Management Unit, Protective Housing Unit,

and Administrative Segregation Unit yet are treated differently with respect to property possession

policies is unavailing. The SHU is the most restrictive housing unit in the state prison system, and

is designed to house inmates “whose conduct endangers the safety of others or the security of the

institution.” Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3341.5 (2006). Inmates found guilty of serious disciplinary

Case 1:05-cv-01470-OWW -SMS Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Like the SHU, the PMU and PHU are designated for extended term programming. Cal. Code Regs. tit 15,

§ 3341.5 (2006). However, unlike SHU inmates, PHU inmates are segregated for their own protection, are not gang

affiliates or members, and do not pose a threat to the safety or security of other inmates in the unit. Id. Inmates in

PMU have diagnosed psychiatric disorders and do not pose an undue risk to the safety of themselves or others in the

unit. Id. 

4

violations and/or inmates validated as gang members or affiliates fall into this category. Id. The

court is unpersuaded that plaintiff, as a SHU inmate, is similarly situated to inmates in other special

housing units.1

3. Claim Against Defendants Woodford and Sherman

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 forsupervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Because plaintiff’s complaint does not state cognizable due process or equal protection

claims, there is no basis upon which to impose liability either defendant Woodford or defendant

Scribner under a theory of supervisory liability. In addition, plaintiff’s complaint does not contain

any facts any facts linking either defendant to an act or omission that rose to a level of a

constitutional violation. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983 against either defendant.

///

Case 1:05-cv-01470-OWW -SMS Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief may

be granted under section 1983. Based on the deficiencies of plaintiff’s claims, the court finds that

justice does not require that leave to amend be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th

Cir. 2000). The court therefore HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01470-OWW -SMS Document 14 Filed 03/31/06 Page 5 of 5