Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08225/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Benjamin Reimer, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-08225-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff David Benjamin Reimer, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 24.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that determination. 

BACKGROUND

 In January 2012, David Benjamin Reimer filed a Title II application for benefits 

with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) alleging a disability onset date of 

August 20, 2010. (R. at 11.) Reimer’s application was denied both initially and upon 

reconsideration. (Id.) An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and heard 

testimony in April 2013. (Id.) In evaluation whether Reimer was disabled, the ALJ 

undertook the five-step sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 (R. at 11–24.) 

 1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. 

' 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

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 The SSA had already denied a previous application by Reimer in 2009, alleging an 

onset date in October 2007. (R. at 11.) The ALJ determined that the finding of nondisability for that previous period was final. (Id.) However, the ALJ held that Reimer 

rebutted the presumption of continuing non-disability by establishing changed 

circumstances. (Id.) 

 At step one, the ALJ found that Reimer did not engage in substantial gainful 

activity from the alleged onset date through that date that he last met the insured status 

requirement on March 31, 2012. (R. at 13–14.) At step two, the ALJ determined that 

Reimer had the following severe impairments: generalized anxiety disorder, possible 

major depressive disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, expressive language 

disorder, and mild-moderate obesity. (R. at 14.) At step three, the ALJ determine that 

none of these impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the 

SSA’s listed impairments. (R. at 14–16.) 

 At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Reimer’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that he could perform medium work with various 

 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96–8p (July 2, 1996). 

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limitations. (R. at 16–21.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Remier could not 

perform his past relevant work. (R. at 21–22.) At step five, the ALJ considered Reimer’s 

age, education, and transferability of skills. (R. at 22.) The ALJ determined that there 

were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Reimer could perform 

with his RFC. (R. at 22–23.) 

 Based on these determinations, the ALJ found that Reimer was not disabled and 

denied his application. (R. at 23.) The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. 

(R. at 1–3.) Reimer now appeals the ALJ’s determination before this Court. 

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support 

either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through 

four of the analysis. See Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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II. ANALYSIS

 Reimer argues that his case should be remanded to the ALJ for reconsideration 

based on several errors. First, he argues that his severe medical conditions should have 

been found to meet listing 12.05(c) at step three of the analysis. Second, he argues that 

various opinion and other evidence should have been weighed differently in determining 

his RFC and his ability to work at step five. Those allegations are considered in turn. 

 A. Step Three and Listing 12.05(c) 

 First, Reimer argues that the ALJ’s determination that Reimer did not meet or 

equal Listing 12.05(c) is not supported by substantial evidence. In order to meet Listing 

12.05(c) the claimant must have “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 

through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, app. 1, 

12.05(C). Reimer argues that the record demonstrates that he met both the IQ 

requirement and has the required additional impairment. 

 Reimer’s most recent IQ result is 71, which he admits is not within the listing 

range of 60 through 70. The only evidence of an IQ score within the listing range is a 

summary of other results created over a decade ago by Dr. Earnest Harman. (R. at 534–

37.) Under “Social History,” Dr. Harman begins by stating that “this area is quite sketchy 

and I have to obtain most of it from some very sketchy records.” (R. at 535.) He then 

notes that “there are various IQ scores listed . . . from a low of 67 to a high of 71.” (Id.) 

 In the beginning of the SSA listing covering Mental Disorders, it describes how 

documentation of intelligence tests will be considered. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, app. 

1, 12.00(D)(6). It provides that “since the results of intelligence tests are only part of the 

overall assessment, the narrative report that accompanies the test results should comment 

on whether the IQ scores are considered valid and consistent with the developmental 

history and the degree of functional limitation.” Id. at 12.00(D)(6)(a). It also discusses 

how different IQ test use different scales and have different results that must sometimes 

be converted in order to be used under listing 12.05. Id. at 12.00(D)(6)(c). 

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 Here, the only IQ scores that fall within the range are an unknown number of tests 

that are summarized second hand from “sketchy” records. It is unknown what scale was 

used on these tests, who performed them, or when they were done. There is no mention 

of accompanying reports that state whether the results are consistent with Reimer’s 

history or limitations. 

 It is the claimant’s burden to establish disability under the first four steps and 

Reimer failed to introduce any qualifying IQ tests results into the record. Even if those 

records had been introduced, Reimer has not shown why the ALJ would be required to 

credit those results from over a decade ago as opposed to the current results from after the 

time of alleged disability onset. The listings require consideration of the lowest score 

within the set of reported scores from one test, but do not require the same for multiple 

test administrations. Id.

 The ALJ’s decision regarding Listing 12.05(C) is supported by substantial 

evidence from the record as a whole. Reimer’s claim to meet that listing fails at the first 

prong and this Court need not consider whether he had the additional impairment also 

required. 

B. Step Five, the RFC, and Weighing of Opinion and Other Evidence 

 Reimer argues that various opinions and other evidence support a more restrictive 

RFC and a finding at step five that there are not significant numbers of jobs he can 

perform in the national economy. 

 1. Vocational Rehabilitation Opinions 

 Reimer argues that the ALJ should have given greater consideration to the fact that 

despite over nine years of efforts by public and private vocational rehabilitation agencies, 

he was still not “employable.” He argues that the workers opinions should have been 

treated as “nonacceptable” medical sources. 

 First, it is not clear why the opinions of people helping Reimer to search for and 

apply to jobs should be considered medical in nature. More importantly, whether they are 

considered “nonacceptable medical source” or other opinion testimony, the ALJ is not 

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required to accept their opinions concerning Remier’s employment prospects as binding. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or 

‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”). Those 

determinations are reserved for the SSA and the opinions of vocational rehabilitation 

workers do not determine this outcome. The ALJ is obliged to consider them, which 

Reimer acknowledges that the ALJ did here. Although the record contains some 

statements that question Remier’s ability to obtain and maintain various jobs, it also 

shows that the agencies did place him in jobs. It also records that in the efforts to find 

work, Reimer was not always compliant with instructions and he sometimes missed his 

appointments and other obligations. The records also indicate other non-disability related 

obstacles to employment including the scarcity of work because of the economy and 

Remier’s troubles with transportation. 

 Reimer argues that the records from the vocational agencies should have weighed 

for him rather than against him. However, the Court defers to the ALJ’s determination 

when the evidence is subject to more than one rational interpretation. See Batson, 359 

F.3d at 1198. The records from the vocational rehabilitation service support the outcome 

in this case and this Court will not substitute its judgment even if they might be read 

another way to support the opposite conclusion. See Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. 

 2. Medical Opinions 

 Some of the records from the vocation rehabilitation agencies were made by 

medical sources. For example, the State of Arizona’s Vocational Rehabilitation 

Department referred Reimer for an assessment by Dr. Horan, who was an examining but 

not a treating psychiatrist. The SSA also had a psychologist, Dr. Delong, examine 

Reimer, but not treat him. Reimer argues that the opinions of Dr. Horan and Dr. Delong 

should have been given greater weight. Reimer also argues that the opinion of his treating 

therapist, Ms. O’Malley, should have been given greater weight by the ALJ. 

 The regulations impose a hierarchy for medical opinions offered by licensed 

physicians. The opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than non-treating 

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and non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In order to reject the testimony of a medically acceptable 

treating source, the ALJ must provide specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record. However, 

only licensed physicians and certain other qualified specialists are considered “[a]cceptable medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1513(a). Physician’s assistants are defined as “other 

sources,” § 404.1513(d), and are not entitled to the same 

deference, see § 404.1527; SSR 06–03p. The ALJ may discount testimony from these “other sources” if the ALJ 

“‘gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.’” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

 Here, the psychiatrist and psychologist were not treating physicians. The ALJ 

provided specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence for discounting their 

opinions. The ALJ cited other records and the opinions of other medical professionals. 

Although the ALJ did not specifically state the level of weight assigned to Dr. Horan’s 

report, the ALJ clearly described the findings and contrasted other medical records with 

different findings. (R. at 18–19.) This demonstrates the level of weight given even if it 

does not state it and any error in failing to state the level is harmless. This does not show 

that the ALJ failed to evaluate this medical opinion or to consider the proper factors in 

weighing it. The ALJ did assign a not significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Delong and 

gave adequate reasons which are equally applicable to Dr. Horan. (R. at 20–21.) 

 Ms. O’Malley, as a physician’s assistant, was an “other source.” Contrary to 

Reimer’s argument, non-acceptable medical sources are classified separately and treated 

differently. Although in some circumstances they can be given weight as great as other 

sources, that is neither the required nor the presumed outcome. The ALJ gave germane 

reasons for discounting her testimony, even if Reimer does not agree with the adjectives 

that the ALJ used to describe Ms. O’Malley’s opinion. 

 The ALJ noted in several places that Reimer was not taking his medication and 

had a history of noncompliance with treatment. (See, e.g., R. at 17, 20.) Reimer argues 

that the ALJ should have recognized that the noncompliance was not willful or extreme 

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and that it was caused in part by memory problems and a lack of insurance. Reimer is 

essential arguing that the noncompliance should have been given little weight. In the 

decision, the ALJ did give it little weight and emphasized that it was not the primary 

basis for his finding that Reimer was not disabled. (R. at 17, 19.) There is no error in 

mentioning this consideration which Reimer acknowledges is supported by the record. 

 In general, Reimer argues that the ALJ should have weighed the records and 

opinions of these various medical professionals differently. However, the Court defers to 

the ALJ’s determination when the evidence is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198. The records and opinions support the 

outcome in this case and this Court will not substitute its judgment even if they might be 

read another way to support the opposite conclusion. See Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019.The 

ALJ’s consideration of the medical record and opinion evidence was neither based on 

legal error nor unsupported by substantial evidence. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

TERMINATE this action and enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 29th day of September, 2014. 

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