Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00014/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DANIEL SINIARD, Administrator of )

the Estate of DEBORAH S. SINIARD )

deceased, )

 )

PLAINTIFF, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO.: 2:08cv14-MEF

 )

FORD MOTOR COMPANY; et al., ) (WO- Recommended for Publication)

 )

DEFENDANTS. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Remand (Doc. # 6) filed on January

7, 2008 by Plaintiff. The defendants had removed this action from the Clayton Division of

the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendants

contend that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a). After careful consideration of the applicable law and the arguments of counsel

on the many issues raised by the motion to remand, the Court finds that the motion to remand

is due to be GRANTED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

This is a product liability case arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Alabama on

April 5, 2006, which claimed the life of a Tennessee resident citizen named Deborah S.

Siniard. The Administrator of her estate brought suit against the manufacturer of the vehicle,

Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) a corporate citizen of Delaware and Michigan, and against

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 The Court is aware that Paragraph 20 of the Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1) states that 1

“[t]his action is being removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq., inasmuch as this action

could have originally been brought in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331.” The Court assumes that the reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in this one paragraph is

a typographical error. The Court assumes this because there is no explanation of any basis

for subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 included anywhere in the Notice

of Removal and because there is never any argument made in opposition to the motion to

remand based on an of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

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the Tennessee automobile dealership from which the vehicle was purchased. Although the

accident is alleged to have occurred in Montgomery County, Alabama, Plaintiff filed suit in

the Clayton Division of the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama.

Ford filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1) on January 3, 2008. It argued that this

Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In so 1

arguing, Ford claimed that the Tennessee dealership had been fraudulently joined as a

defendant to the action and that without its presence diversity of citizenship exists in this

case. Furthermore, Ford argued that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000

exclusive of interest and costs. Ford acknowledged that the Complaint does not contain a

specific damage request, but noted that Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages

for the wrongful death of Deborah Siniard. As evidence that the claim in this case

necessarily exceeded $75,000, Ford asserted that other Alabama courts have routinely entered

wrongful death verdicts in excess of $75,000 in product liability claims. In support of this

proposition, Ford listed numerous cases from various courts within Alabama which resulted

in plaintiffs’ verdicts in wrongful death cases each of which exceeded $75,000. 

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DISCUSSION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994);

Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983). As

such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear

by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 

Among the cases over which a federal district court may exercise subject matter

jurisdiction are civil actions in which only state law claims are alleged if the civil action

arises under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The diversity

statute confers jurisdiction on the federal courtsin civil actions “between citizens of different

states,” in which the jurisdictional amount, currently in excess of $75,000, is met. Id. 

When a case is originally filed in state court, a party may remove it if the case

originally could have been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Accord,

Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007) (“the party seeking a

federal venue must establish the venue’s jurisdictional requirements” and therefore removing

defendants bear that burden in the context of a motion to remand). However, the non-moving

party may move for remand, which will be granted if “it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Because removal jurisdiction raises

significant federalism concerns, “removal statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff

and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.” Burns,

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31 F.3d at 1095. 

Recently the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided significant clarification of

“existing principles of law governing removal generally - who bears the burden of

establishing that removal is proper, how that party can satisfy its burden, and how a district

court must proceed in evaluating its jurisdiction after removal.” Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1187.

Although Lowery arose in the context of a removal pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act

of 2005 (“CAFA”), it is quite plain from the text of Lowery that the holdings of the case are

not limited solely to cases removed under CAFA. In Lowery, the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals reiterated that in cases, such as this one, where the complaint does not specify the

amount of damages sought, “the removing party bears burden of establishing the

jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence.” 483 F.3d at 1208-09, 1210. The

Court cautioned, however, that “[i]f the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the

face of the documents before the court, or readily deducible from them, then the court has

jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand. Under this approach, jurisdiction is either evident

from the removing documents or remand is appropriate.” Indeed, “in assessing the propriety

of removal, the court considers the documents received by the defendant from the plaintiff -

be it the initial complaint or a later received paper- and determines whether that document

and the notice of removal unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1213. The

defendant and the court may not speculate about the amount in controversy, nor should “the

existence of jurisdiction” be “divined by looking to the stars.” Id. at 1215. Importantly, the

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Lowery court stated that it is 

highly questionable whether a defendant could ever file a notice of removal on

diversity grounds in a case such as the one before us - where the defendant, the

party with the burden of proof, has only bare pleadings containing unspecified

damages on which to base its notice- without seriously testing the limits of

compliance with Rule 11. Unlike the typical plaintiff who originally brings a

diversity action in federal court, the removing defendant generally will have

no direct knowledge of the value of plaintiff’s claims. 

Id. at 1215. “When a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages and does not make a specific

demand, therefore, the factual information establishing the jurisdictional amount must come

from the plaintiff.” Id. at1215. Indeed, the Lowery court specifically rejected a removing

defendant’s attempt to satisfy its burden of proving amount in controversy by reliance on jury

verdicts in other supposedly similar cases. Id. at 1189, 1220-21. 

For obvious reasons, Lowery is a cornerstone for Plaintiff’s arguments in support of

the motion to remand. Initially, Ford argued that Lowery was distinguishable. The Court

finds those arguments to be unpersuasive. More recently, Ford appeared to conceded that

an application of the principles in Lowery would require remand of this case, but argued that

this Court should deny the motion to remand because the United States Supreme Court might

grant a writ of certiorari in the Lowery case. Ford pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has stayed the mandate in the Lowery case. While this Court agrees that

the precepts set forth in Lowery require the remand of this case which was removed on

nothing more than speculation about the amount in controversy, the Court cannot agree that

it has the option of ignoring Lowery until after the mandate issues or the Supreme Court

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addresses that case. It is well-settled that Lowery is binding on this Court even though the

mandate has not issued and even if the United States Supreme Court were to grant certiorari

in Lowery. See, e.g., Marin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, because

Ford has failed to carry its burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount by a

preponderance of the evidence. This finding alone requires remand of this case.

Consequently, the Court need not and will not address the merits of the other arguments

made in support of or in opposition to the motion to remand. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 2) is GRANTED.

2. This case is REMANDED to the Clayton Division of the Circuit Court of

Barbour County, Alabama.

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand.

4. All motions other than the Motion to Remand are left for resolution by the

Circuit Court of Barbour County after remand.

DONE this the 22 day of May, 2008. nd

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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