Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04004/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this

suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

PAUL G. DOWLING PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-4004

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Paul G. Dowling brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying his claim for disability insurance benefits under the

provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act). Both

parties have filed appeal briefs (Docs. 7, 11). Plaintiff has

also filed two Supplements to his brief (Docs. 10, 12), requesting

the Court consider additional medical evidence that was not before

the Commissioner. The Court construes this request as seeking

remand to the Commissioner for consideration of the additional

evidence. The Commissioner opposes such a remand. (Doc. 14.) 

The Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders

as follows with respect thereto: 

BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on

August 28, 2003, alleging that he became disabled on August 18,

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2003, due to injuries he sustained to his back in a motor vehicle

accident on that date, and also due to depression and anxiety.

(Tr. 35, 45-48.) 

2. With regard to his physical impairments, at a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on July 6, 2005,

plaintiff testified that he injured his back in the accident and

also aggravated a pre-existing injury to his right shoulder.

Plaintiff testified that he experiences severe pain in his back,

radiating down into his legs and feet. (Tr. 242-46.) An MRI

taken on December 4, 2003, revealed the following:

Disc degeneration and chronic bulging or subligamentous

protrusion at the 3-4 and 4-5 levels causing only mild

right lateral recess stenosis and canal narrowing at the

3-4 level as well as minimal impingement of the ventral

canal in the midline at the 4-5 interspace. Mild

predominately right L4 foraminal narrowing. No disc

extrusion or significant change. (Tr. 116.)

On September 15, 2004, plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.

George Covert, completed a form assessing plaintiff’s ability to

perform work-related activities, in which he concluded that

plaintiff was “not fit for any work at this time.” 

3. With regard to his depression and anxiety, plaintiff

testified, “[B]asically, I don’t want to see anyone. I don’t want

to come out of my house. I just want to be alone and if I get

around very many people or things[,] that triggers [an] anxiety

attack.” (Tr. 247.) Plaintiff also acknowledged having suicidal

thoughts. (Tr. 251.) Plaintiff testified that he had sought 

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treatment for his depression and anxiety and was taking medication

for these conditions. 

Plaintiff’s wife testified, “[H]e gets very depressed and

upset real easy. And he don’t want to do nothing [sic]. He will

get in a little shell and he likely don’t want to come out. And

he will just lay there and just mope, I guess you call it.” (Tr.

254.)

The medical evidence indicates that plaintiff sought

treatment at the Southwest Arkansas Counseling and Mental Health

Center from March 21, 2005 through May 26, 2005. (Tr. 217-33.)

Plaintiff reported crying spells, depressed mood, loss of selfesteem, poor self-image, anxiety, and past suicidal thoughts.

(Tr. 217.) At plaintiff’s last visit, Dr. Oladele Adebogun

stated, “I will work on a diagnosis of moderate major depression

with anxiety features.” (Id.) 

4. The ALJ, in a written decision dated November 1, 2005,

rejected Dr. Covert’s opinion that plaintiff was unable to work

due to his back impairments. The ALJ found that Dr. Covert’s

assessment was not supported by clinical findings and was based on

an acceptance of plaintiff’s “subjective allegations at face

value.” (Tr. 17.) With regard to plaintiff’s depression and

anxiety, the ALJ found that these were not severe impairments.

The ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled, as he had the

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physical residual functional capacity to perform the full range of

light work.

APPLICABLE LAW

5. Our review of the Commissioner's determination is

limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's role is to

determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Siemers v.

Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence

means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, it means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993). In

deciding whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence, the Court must consider the evidence that

supports the Commissioner's decision, along with evidence that

detracts from it. Siemers, 47 F.3d at 301; Barrett v. Shalala, 38

F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1994).

6. To be eligible for DIB benefits, a claimant has the

burden of establishing the existence of a disability under the

Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). To meet this burden, the claimant

must show:

* that he has a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for at

least one year;

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* that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful

activity; and

* that this inability results from the impairment.

See Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8 Cir. 2001); see th

also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

7. The Commissioner follows a familiar five-step process to

determine whether a claimant is disabled:

(1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing his claim; 

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to

perform basic work activities; 

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a presumptively

disabling impairment listed in the regulations; 

(4) whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity – that is, what he can do despite his limitations -- to

perform his past relevant work; and

(5) if the claimant cannot perform his past work, the burden

then shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform given his

age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920; see also Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217. 

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DISCUSSION

8. The ALJ found that plaintiff did not have a severe mental

impairment under step two of the sequential evaluation. An ALJ

may deny benefits at step two of the sequential evaluation only if

a claimant's medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely

he or she would be found to be disabled even if their age,

education, and work experience were taken into account. See Bowen

v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987). "A majority of the Supreme

Court has adopted what has been referred to as a 'de minimis

standard' with regard to the step two severity standard." Hudson

v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1392, 1395 (8th Cir. 1989); Funderburg v.

Bowen, 666 F.Supp. 1291 (W.D. Ark. 1987). "Only those claimants

with slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit any

'basic work activity' can be denied benefits without undertaking

the vocational analysis." Bowen, 482 U.S. at 158. 

9. As stated above, plaintiff has submitted additional

medical evidence to this Court that was not before the ALJ. This

evidence indicates that plaintiff was hospitalized for

approximately six days in April 2006 for depression and suicidal

ideation, having inflicted a “large number of superficial

scratches” to his forearm with a utility knife. (Doc. 10 Ex. A at

pg. 1.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with “Schizoaffective Disorder,

Bipolar Type, Current Episode Depressed.” (Id.) Plaintiff was 

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treated with medications for mood stabilization and psychotic

features and also participated in individual and group therapy.

Additional medical records indicate that plaintiff was

admitted to a psychiatric unit in June 2006 for depression and

suicidal thoughts. The diagnosis was “Major depression,

recurrent, severe with psychotic features.... Rule out bipolar

disorder.” (Doc. 13 Ex. B.) 

10. Reviewing courts have the authority to order the

Commissioner to consider additional evidence but "only upon a

showing that there is new evidence which is material and that

there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence

into the record in a prior proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1993); Chandler v.

Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 722 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.

1983). "To be material, new evidence must be non-cumulative,

relevant, and probative of the claimant's condition for the time

period for which benefits were denied, and there must be a

reasonable likelihood that it would have changed the

Commissioner's determination." Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1215. 

11. The evidence plaintiff now provides did not exist in

November 2005, when the ALL issued his decision, and that fact

serves as cause sufficient to excuse plaintiff's failure to

include these records in the administrative proceedings. Goad v.

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Shalala, 7 F.3d 1397, 1398 (8th Cir. 1993)(citing Thomas v.

Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1991)). 

12. Next, we consider the issue of materiality. "Medical

evidence obtained after an ALJ decision is material if it relates

to the claimant's condition on or before the date of the ALJ's

decision." Thomas, 928 F.2d at 260 (quoting Williams v. Sullivan,

905 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1990)). The medical evidence at issue

is dated just five to seven months after the issuance of the ALJ’s

decision. The Court finds that remand is appropriate for

consideration of this evidence, as it appears to indicate,

contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, that plaintiff’s depression and

anxiety were in fact severe impairments during the time period in

question.

13. With regard to plaintiff’s back impairments, the ALJ

rejected plaintiff’s treating physician’s assessment of

plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities. The Court

strongly suggests that, on remand, the ALJ order a consultative

examination, including a statement from the examiner setting forth

what plaintiff can still do despite his impairments.

CONCLUSION

14. Based on the foregoing, this case is hereby remanded to

the Commissioner for consideration of additional medical evidence

pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 29 day of March 2007. th

/S/JIMM LARRY HENDREN 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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