Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01815/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01815-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stewart Shaver and Maria Shaver, husband 

and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Arizona Fire & Water Restoration, Inc., 

Defendant. 

No. CV 11-01815-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 16). 

The motion will be denied for the reasons stated below. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Shaver worked for Defendant Arizona Fire & Water Restoration as a 

“project manager.” Plaintiff’s job was to provide written estimates to potential customers 

(i.e., those needing restoration work after suffering fire damage, water damage, and so 

forth), and if hired, to oversee the entire restoration project. Plaintiff was terminated by 

Defendant on March 22, 2011. Based on the compensation plan governing his 

employment, which he describes in significant detail in the complaint, Plaintiff believes 

that defendant wrongfully withheld various wages owed to him before and after his 

termination, including for overtime services. Plaintiff has alleged causes of action for 

unpaid wages, violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, breach of contract, and breach 

of good faith and fair dealing. 

Case 2:11-cv-01815-NVW Document 37 Filed 04/05/12 Page 1 of 5
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are substantially identical.” Strigliabotti v. Franklin 

Resources, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Rule 12(c) motions for 

judgment on the pleadings are therefore reviewed under the standard applicable to a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). In ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must “determine 

whether the facts alleged in the complaint, to be taken for [the purposes of a Rule 12(c) 

motion] as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Strigliabotti, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 

1097. “If the complaint fails to articulate a legally sufficient claim, the complaint should 

be dismissed or judgment granted on the pleadings.” Id. A Rule 12(c) motion is thus 

properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 

936, 939 (9th Cir. 2009). As with a motion to dismiss, the analysis is generally limited to 

the facts as stated in the complaint, but the “court may [also] consider evidence on which 

the complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the 

document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of 

the copy attached to the . . . motion.” Marder v. Lopez. 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Fair Labor Standards Act Claim 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s overtime claim under the Fair Labor Standards 

Act fails because plaintiff is an “outside salesperson,” or an “administrative employee,” 

or a combination of the two — all of which are exempt from overtime requirements. 

Defendant attempts to establish this contention partially through certain allegations in the 

complaint, but largely through Plaintiff’s written job description. Plaintiff has not 

contested the authenticity of this job description, and he relied on it in his complaint, so it 

may be considered at the motion to dismiss phase even though technically outside the 

pleadings. 

Case 2:11-cv-01815-NVW Document 37 Filed 04/05/12 Page 2 of 5
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

However, the Court’s ability to consider it does not mean it must be taken as true. 

Plaintiff relies on the job description almost entirely for its account of the compensation 

structure. To that extent, its accuracy is effectively undisputed. But Defendant relies on 

it for significantly more, teasing from it Plaintiff’s supposed primary activities, even 

though the job description may not necessarily match what Plaintiff actually did. 

Perhaps for this reason, decisions discussing the outside salesperson and 

administrative employee exemptions — including every decision Defendant cites — 

nearly always result from a summary judgment motion after discovery into the duties the 

plaintiff in fact performed for his or her employer. See, e.g., Velazquez-Fernandez v. 

NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2007); Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, 

Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931 (W.D. Wis. 2009); Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham 

Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2009 WL 4051075 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009); Black 

v. Colaska Inc., No. C07-823JLR, 2008 WL 4681567 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2008). 

Plaintiff’s actual duties simply cannot be determined at the pleading phase. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion will be denied as to Plaintiff’s Fair Labor Standards 

Act claim. 

B. Statute of Limitations on State Law Claims 

Plaintiff’s unpaid wages, breach of contract, and breach of good faith and fair 

dealing claims all address the same conduct — Defendant’s failure to pay amounts 

allegedly owed to Plaintiff. Defendant argues that any claim for wages accruing before 

September 15, 2010 is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant’s argument may 

have merit, but on the face of the pleadings alone it is impossible to tell when Plaintiff’s 

various unpaid wages claims accrued. Further, the scope of discovery would not be 

materially different if these claims were dismissed now. Accordingly, Defendant’s 

motion will be denied as to Plaintiff’s unpaid wages, breach of contract, and breach of 

good faith and fair dealing claims. 

Case 2:11-cv-01815-NVW Document 37 Filed 04/05/12 Page 3 of 5
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Although the Court will deny Defendant’s motion, it does so in the face of a 

compelling reasons to dismiss this case considering Plaintiff’s counsel’s extreme delays 

and failure to follow court orders thus far. On the day Plaintiff’s response was originally 

due, counsel filed a motion for a two-day extension of time because of “long-standing 

travel plans that changed at the last minute, making the undersigned unable to thoroughly 

respond to [Defendant]’s Motion by tonight’s deadline.” (Doc. 22.) The Court granted 

that motion. (Doc. 23.) Two days later — the new due date — at 11:58 p.m., counsel 

again filed for an extension until the following Monday, based on recently discovered 

evidence of handwritten notes that Plaintiff while working for Defendant. Counsel did 

not explain how these notes, which were obviously outside the pleadings, could influence 

the motion, but asked for further time to fully review these documents, including a “built 

in . . . cushion . . . to ensure that there is no need for a third extension.” (Doc. 24.) The 

Court granted that motion, extending the response deadline to the following Tuesday 

(because of a Monday holiday). (Doc. 25.) 

On that following Tuesday, counsel filed nothing. The next day, counsel 

requested “a third and final extension” until the coming Friday. “The reason for this 

request is because undersigned counsel had planned to Respond . . . over the Holiday 

weekend, but was unable to due to an unplanned family obligation.” (Doc. 28.) The 

Court first denied that motion (Doc. 29), then reconsidered and granted a five-day 

extension, until February 29, 2012 (Doc. 30). On February 29 at 11:57 p.m., counsel 

filed a fourth motion for extension of time (although styled as his third motion), claiming 

he had suffered a physical injury. (Doc. 31.) The Court granted that motion, extending 

Plaintiff’s deadline “to March 12, 2012, at 5:00 p.m. No further extensions will be 

granted.” (Doc. 32.) March 12 and 5:00 p.m. came and went, with no filing from 

Plaintiff. Seven hours later — precisely at midnight — counsel filed his response. 

(Doc. 33.) 

Case 2:11-cv-01815-NVW Document 37 Filed 04/05/12 Page 4 of 5
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

In sum, counsel required four extensions of time — one of which was filed after 

the deadline expired — and when he finally filed his response, it was still late. While 

counsel may have had valid reasons for certain extensions, that cannot be said of all of 

them. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings (Doc. 16) is DENIED. 

Dated this 5th day of April, 2012. 

Case 2:11-cv-01815-NVW Document 37 Filed 04/05/12 Page 5 of 5