Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00109/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00109-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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-1- 07cv109

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL DAVID LUGO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07-CV-109 W (POR)

ORDER GRANTING

THE DMV’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

v.

GEORGE VALVERDE, as

DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR

VEHICLES, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Manuel David Lugo filed a civil-rights complaint against Defendant

George Valverde (the DMV) alleging that the DMV violated his right to procedural due

process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The DMV moved to dismiss. Because res judicata

precludes Lugo from reasserting a constitutional claim, and in any event, his complaint

fails to state a claim, the court will GRANT the motion.

Case 3:07-cv-00109-W-POR Document 17 Filed 07/24/07 Page 1 of 14
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I. Background

On July 24, 2005, in the early morning, Lugo called the San Diego Police after

another driver rear-ended his car. (Compl. ¶ 10.) When they arrived, Lugo maintained

that the engine was off and the emergency flashers were on at the time of the accident.

(Id.) Because the reporting officer observed that Lugo exhibited objective signs of

alcohol intoxication—Lugo had bloodshot eyes and alcohol on his breath, lacked

balance, and slurred his speech—the officer arrested Lugo for driving a vehicle while

intoxicated. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 3.) Breath tests showed Lugo’s blood-alcohol

concentration (“BAC”) at 0.11 and 0.10 percent. (Id.)

On August 18, 2005, the DMV held a hearing before Driver Safety Officer Felicia

Davis, an employee of the DMV. (Compl. ¶ 12.) By statute, an “administrative per se”

hearing must occur before the DMV may suspend a license for driving under the

influence of alcohol. Prior to the hearing, Lugo requested that all available passengers

and percipient witnesses be permitted to testify that he was not driving. (Id.) DSO

Davis denied the request, limiting Lugo to two of the four witnesses he wanted. The

reporting officer also testified that Lugo admitted he was driving. (Id.) DSO Davis

credited the reporting officer’s testimony, and suspended Lugo’s license for four months.

(Id.)

On December 14, 2005, the DMV held a second administrative-per-se hearing

regarding Lugo’s suspension. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4 (citing RJN, Ex. B at 1–2).)

DSO Davis again denied Lugo’s request to allow the excluded witnesses to testify.

(Compl. ¶ 14.) The reporting officer again testified that Lugo admitted to being the

driver (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4), however, he could not recall whether the parked

vehicle’s engine was running when he arrived or who had the keys to the car. (Id.)

Neither the officer nor his report stated that he witnessed Lugo driving. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

On December 20, 2005, the DMV issued a decision upholding the written decision of

the first administrative-per-se hearing to suspend Lugo’s license. (Id.)

//

Case 3:07-cv-00109-W-POR Document 17 Filed 07/24/07 Page 2 of 14
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On August 21, 2006—over eight months later—Lugo petitioned for a writ of

mandate in San Diego Superior Court to overturn the suspension of his driver’s license.

(Compl. ¶ 18.) Lugo asserted that the DMV failed to meet its burden of proof, and

failed to afford him a fair hearing “under applicable standards of due process, statutory

and constitutional provisions.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4.) On December 5, 2006, the

Hon. Eugenia Eyherabide entered a judgment denying Lugo’s petition for writ of

mandate to overturn the four-month suspension of his driver’s license. (Id. at 6.)

On January 8, 2007, the DMV sent a letter notifying Lugo that it would suspend

his California driver’s license for four months beginning on January 16, 2007. (Compl.

¶ 19.) The letter stated that Lugo would be prosecuted if he failed to surrender his

driver’s license under California Vehicle Code § 14610. (Id.) The letter also stated, “If

you drive while your privilege is suspended or revoked you may be arrested, and if

convicted, you may be jailed, fined, or both. THIS ACTION IS INDEPENDENT OF

ANY OTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE COURT OR THIS DEPARTMENT.”

(Id.)

On January 16, 2007, Lugo commenced this action for injunctive relief to

prevent the DMV from suspending his license. He alleged that the DMV deprived him

of liberty without due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 1.) On February 6, 2007, the DMV filed a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Def.’s

Mem. in Supp. at 1.)

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See

N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). In reviewing

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all

factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The complaint and

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all reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Walleri v. Fed.

Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

conclusory legal allegations and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a

motion to dismiss. Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).

In other words, while a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it

must include “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

—, — (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Id.

Arguments relying on conclusory legal allegations or unwarranted inferences do not help

to defeat a motion to dismiss. Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).

Generally, the court may not consider material outside the complaint when ruling

on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d

1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). It may, however, consider any documents specifically

identified in the complaint whose authenticity is not questioned by the parties. Fecht

v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the court may consider

the full text of those documents, even when the complaint quotes only selected

portions. Id. The court may also consider material properly subject to judicial notice

without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich,

13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798

F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)).

III. Discussion

A. Res judicata bars Lugo’s civil-rights claims.

According to the full faith and credit statute, a party may not raise a claim that

another court already resolved. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1996); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.

City & County of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005). “[Full faith and credit] has long been

understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or ‘claim preclusion,’ and

collateral estoppel, or ‘issue preclusion.’” San Remo Hotel,545 U.S. at 336 (quoting

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Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Federal courts must apply the law of res

judicata in the state where they sit. Takahashi v. Bd. of Trs., 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th

Cir. 1986); Valley Wood Preserving, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus, 785 F.2d 751, 752

(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81

(1984)).

Under California law, res judicata precludes a plaintiff from litigating a claim if

(1) the claim relates to the same “primary right” as a claim in a prior action, (2) the

prior judgment was final and on the merits, and (3) the plaintiff was a party or in privity

with a party in the prior action. Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 651 (9th

Cir. 1988); Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985).

“California, as most states, recognizes that the doctrine of res judicata will bar not only

claims actually litigated in a prior proceeding, but also claims that could have been

litigated.” Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364

(9th Cir. 1993); see Valley Wood, 785 F.2d at 754 (ruling that res judicata precluded

claims because the party could have raised them in a prior action). Here, res judicata

prevents Lugo from litigating his § 1983 claim against the DMV because he could have

raised, and possibly did raise, constitutional claims in state court.

1. Lugo’s petition claimed harm to the same primary right as his § 1983 claim.

To determine the scope of a claim, California courts employ the “primary right

theory.” Takahashi, 783 F.2d at 851; Trujillo, 775 F.2d at 1366. Under this theory,

“the violation of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.” Takahashi, 783

F.2d at 851 (quoting Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795 (Cal. 1976)). A primary

right is defined in terms of the harm suffered by the plaintiff , or the substantive right

allegedly invaded—regardless of the legal theory of redress. Id. (quoting Argarwal v.

Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 935 (1979)); Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp.

653, 657 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 106 Cal. App. 3d 441

(1980)); Stafford v. Yerge, 129 Cal. App. 2d 165 (1954). Thus, for the purposes of res

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judicata, two claims constitute a single cause of action if they both seek redress for harm

to the same primary right. City of Simi Valley v. Sup. Ct., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 472 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2003).

Lugo alleges that the DMV invaded his right to procedural due process by

suspending his driver’s license without a full and fair hearing. (Compl. ¶ 1.) The U.S.

Constitution states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. Lugo’s driver’s licence is

undoubtedly a property interest entitled to the safeguards of procedural due process.

Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). Lugo sought judicial review of the

administrative hearing in state court because he claimed the DMV did not comport with

constitutional standards of procedural due process. He did not prevail.

Thus, the court must decide whether Lugo now claims harm to a different primary

right, or merely seeks redress using a different legal theory. See City of Simi Valley, 4

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 472. Here, Lugo seeks redress because he claims the DMV violated his

14th Amendment right to procedural due process. (Compl. ¶ 1.) But § 1983 only

provides a federal remedy for constitutional violations; it is not an independent source

of primary rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law . . . for redress . . . .”). During judicial review in state court, Lugo asserted

that he “was not afforded a fair hearing in this matter, under applicable standards of due

process, statutory and constitutional provisions.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4.) Because

§ 13559 of the California Vehicle Code permitted the state court to consider the DMV’s

constitutional authority, Lugo properly raised—or at the very least, could have raised—a

constitutional challenge. Therefore, Lugo cannot, regardless of the legal theory or form

of proceeding, bring another claim involving the same primary constitutional right.

//

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2. The state-court judgment was final and on the merits.

 “A decision on a petition for writ of mandate seeking review of an administrative

order is considered a final decision on the merits for res judicata under California law.”

Mir, 844 F.2d at 651 (citing Trujillo, 775 F.2d at 1366); Clark v. Yosemite Cmty. Coll.,

785 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1986) (“It is well established in California that the doctrine

of res judicata applies to judgments in mandamus proceedings”) (quoting Eichman v.

Fotomat Corp., 197 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). The state court could

have reviewed whether the DMV exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority.

Cal. Veh. Code § 13559. Prior to judicial review, the California Vehicle Code permits

a person to seek an administrative hearing with the DMV before a hearing

officer—Lugo received two hearings—where evidence may be presented prior to the

date the suspension becomes effective. Cal. Veh. Code §§ 14100–14112. Though the

hearing officer has the discretion to exclude cumulative evidence, this discretion is

limited to the introduction of cumulative evidence similarly afforded in judicial actions.

Cal. Gov. Code § 11513(f); Cal. Evid. Code, § 352; Horn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 17 Cal.

3d 359, 371 (Cal. 1976). Thus, Lugo utilized all aspects of a cohesive process

culminating with a final state-court judgment on the merits. This court is not at liberty

to disregard that judgment to allow Lugo to litigate his claim again. See Takahashi, 783

F.2d at 850–52.

In short, Lugo’s § 1983 claim stems from alleged constitutional defects in the

DMV’s administrative-per-se hearing—defects which the state court could, and

probably did, consider. Thus, the procedural-due-process claim is based on the same

“primary right” as the claim that was or could have been brought in state court. Lugo

only has one primary right to procedural due process under the 14th Amendment. See

Mir, 844 F.2d at 653. He has merely presented a new legal theory of recovery: § 1983.

But the state-court judgment must receive full faith and credit, so res judicata bars him

from suing on that primary right a second time. See Mir, 844 F.2d at 651–52 (finding

§ 1983 claims barred because it was based on the same “primary right” presented in a

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prior petition for writ of mandate); Clark, 785 F.2d at 786 (finding § 1983 claim for

violation of due process barred where claim was based on denial hearing that was the

express complaint in prior mandate proceeding); Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. Cal.

Coastal Comm’n, 9 Cal. App. 4th 592, 617 (1992).

B. Even if Lugo had not already litigated his dispute with the DMV, he fails to

state a claim under § 1983.

Lugo brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his rights to due

process and liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution. Two threshold allegations are required to state a claim under § 1983: (1)

some “person” deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, and (2) that person acted “under

color of” state or territorial law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The

DMV concedes that Lugo asserted the threshold § 1983 allegations. (Def.’s Mem. in

Supp at 14.) Further, the DMV also concedes that the suspension of Lugo’s driver’s

license affects a property interest and thus entitles him to the safeguards of procedural

due process. (Id. n.6 (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977)).)

Because § 1983 is a remedial statute, it does not create any substantive rights.

Rather, it allows a party to enforce other constitutional and federal statutory rights

through litigation. Here, Lugo sues under the 14th Amendment itself. Thus, the court

must decide whether California’s license-suspension procedure violates the 14th

Amendment, either facially or as applied against Lugo. Courts must consider three

factors in procedural-due-process challenges:

[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by official action; second,

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). While Lugo’s interest in his driver’s

license is undoubtedly important, the court concludes that the numerous predeprivation

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safeguards and the state’s weighty interest in removing dangerous drivers from the

streets adequately protect against the slight risk of an erroneous deprivation. Therefore,

the court must grant the DMV’s motion to dismiss.

The DMV’s alleged violations primarily fall under the second Mathews factor: the

risk of erroneous deprivation, and the probable value of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards. Lugo contends that the DMV violated his procedural-dueprocess rights in three ways: (1) the unlawful admission of incriminating evidence and

unlawful exclusion of rebuttal evidence, (2) lack of notice informing him of the

procedure to request a hearing in the notification letter, and (3) the officer presiding

over the hearing was both prosecutor and judge.

But Lugo fails to state a procedural-due-process claim under § 1983 for three

main reasons. First, in light of the government’s strong interest in safety on the public

roads, the hypothetical possibility that an erroneous evidentiary ruling could result in

an erroneous license suspension carries little force. Second, Lugo has no standing to

assert lack of notice because Lugo suffered no harm. Third, Lugo never identifies how

the adjudicator’s employment at the DMV contributed to the erroneous deprivation of

his license—and the mere suggestion of entrenched bias against drivers again pales in

comparison to the state’s weighty interest in safety on the public roads. Thus, even

assuming some prejudice against drivers generally or Lugo specifically, the court

concludes that two predeprivation hearings culminating with independent judicial

review adequately insulates against the minor risk of an erroneous deprivation.

1. The risk of erroneous deprivation of Lugo’s driver’s license is minimal, and

probable values of additional or substitute procedural safeguards are minimal.

a. Lugo had available and used California’s extensive procedural framework.

California law entitles Lugo to a hearing within ten days of receiving notice of the

administrative suspension of his license. Cal. Veh. Code § 14100; Lake v. Reed, 16 Cal.

4th 448, 454 n.1 (Cal. 1997). The California Vehicle Code and Administrative

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Procedures Act govern administrative hearings. Cal. Veh. Code §§ 14112–14112; Gov.

Code §§ 11500–11530. Though the administrative-hearing framework is less formal

than the judicial model, the procedure provides a driver with the opportunity to present

and rebut evidence. Cal. Gov. Code § 11425.10(a)(1). The presiding hearing officer

has discretion to exclude cumulative evidence. Id. § 11513(f). But this discretion is

limited to the introduction of cumulative evidence that is similarly afforded in judicial

actions. Cf. Cal. Evid. Code § 352; Horn, 17 Cal. 3d at 371. Also, the driver may seek

administrative review of the administrative hearing under California Vehicle Code §

14105. Furthermore, the DMV conducts its own review to determine whether the

evidence supports the suspension because the DMV bears the burden of proving

grounds for suspension by a preponderance of evidence. Gikas v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4th 841,

846–47 (1993); Lake, 16 Cal. 4th at 456.

After the administrative hearings, the driver may also seek judicial review of the

decision through a petition for a writ of mandate to the state court. Cal. Veh. Code §

13559; Gikas, 6 Cal. 4th at 847. The state court is required to exercise its independent

judgment in reviewing whether the weight of the evidence supports the administrative

decision. Lake, 16 Cal. 4th at 456. The court can order the DMV to rescind the

suspension if it finds that the department exceeded either its constitutional or statutory

authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and

capricious manner, or made a determination not supported by the evidence in the

record. Cal. Veh. Code § 13559(a).

Under the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Lugo’s

driver’s license is minimal because of the extensive procedural framework he had

available and used. After his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, the DMV

held two administrative hearings to determine whether Lugo’s license should be

suspended. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14.) Prior to the first administrative hearing, Lugo

requested that four of his witnesses be allowed to testify at the hearing on his behalf.

(Id. ¶ 12.) Two were permitted to testify. (Id.) After hearing their testimony, the

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hearing officer found that the two witnesses’ testimony lacked credibility and

contradicted Lugo’s admission to the police. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4.) Thus, the first

administrative-hearing officer upheld Lugo’s suspension. (Id.)

Lugo then requested departmental review under California Vehicle Code §

14105. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The hearing officer affirmed the ruling excluding the two

witnesses and added an explanation justifying her decision. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 4.)

The second officer ultimately upheld the suspension. (Id.) Then Lugo invoked his right

to judicial review, where the superior court independently reviewed the evidence and

upheld the suspension. (Id. at 5.)

Thus, even assuming the hearing officer wrongfully excluded the two witnesses’

testimony, and that admitting the testimony would have changed the outcome, Lugo

cannot establish that the administrative procedure as a whole denied him due process.

With two layers of appeal—including full-fledged review in state court—California’s

license-suspension procedure adequately safeguards against erroneous deprivations of

property. Further, Lugo does not anywhere suggest what additional procedural

safeguards would work more effectively. Consequently, the court concludes that the

second Mathews factor tips in the DMV’s favor.

b. The statute requiring procedural notice probably does not apply to the notification letter.

As an initial matter, the court doubts it may entertain Lugo’s claim to the extent

it challenges the notification letter. Lugo argues that the DMV violated California

Vehicle Code § 13353.2(c), requiring the DMV to send a “notice of the order of

suspension” that (1) informs the person that the driver’s license will be suspended, (2)

states the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension, and (3) explains the right to

seek an administrative hearing. Gikas v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4th 841, 846 (Cal. 1993).

Because Lugo initiated the administrative hearing, he tacitly admits that he suffered no

prejudice from the failure—and therefore, that the procedural safeguard would have

been of nominal additional value in protecting against an erroneous deprivation.

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Furthermore, § 13353.2(c) does not conclusively apply to the letter Lugo received

on January 8, 2007. By its own terms, the statute requires notice if the department

“immediately” suspends a license under § 13353.2(a). Lugo, by contrast, received a

letter after his administrative hearings and judicial review, and over one year after the

incident. For obvious reasons, notice of the right to a hearing at that point would have

been of no value whatsoever.

c. An external procedure would add little value.

Lugo also argues that the DMV served as both prosecutor and judge, from which

the court can only infer a risk of erroneous deprivation due to entrenched bias.

Implicitly, then, Lugo reasons that the DMV could use ordinary civil courts or an

outside dispute-resolution agency to adjudicate license suspensions more fairly. But

under Mathews, the abstract possibility of a substitute procedure does not render the

existing procedure unconstitutional. Rather, the court must consider its “the probable

value,” i.e., the likelihood that a different or additional safeguard would reduce the risk

of an erroneous deprivation. Without some allegation that the DMV’s evidentiary

rulings are systematically biased against drivers, the court cannot infer that a third-party

adjudicator would often accord dispositive weight to admittedly cumulative testimony

and arrive at a different outcome.

2. California has a strong interest in removing dangerous drivers from the roads.

An express legislative purpose of the license-suspension procedure is to ensure

public safety on the roads by suspending the driving privileges of suspected drunk

drivers. Cal. Veh Code § 13353.2; MacDonald v. Gutierrez, 81 P.3d 975, 977 (Cal.

2004). California courts routinely agree that public safety is a substantial state interest.

See Cal. Veh. Code § 13353.2; MacDonald, 81 P.3d at 977; Komizu v. Gourley, 127

Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 231–32 (2002). Besides specific deterrence (keeping the suspect off

the roads), the statutory scheme provides general deterrence (influencing the conduct

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of other would-be drunk drivers). Under the third Mathews factor, the court cannot

doubt that the state’s strong interest in public safety outweighs Lugo’s important—

though not paramount—interest in his driver’s license. Komizu, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

231 (quoting Lake, 16 Cal. 4th at 462). In Lake, the California Supreme Court upheld

an administrative suspension over the petitioner’s objections to evidentiary rulings. The

court stated:

The administrative per se laws were deemed necessary due to the time lag

that often occurs between an arrest and a conviction for driving while

intoxicated or with a prohibited BAC. During this interim period, arrestees

who could eventually be convicted of an intoxication-related driving

offense were permitted to continue driving and, possibly, endangering the

public thereby. Moreover, without administrative per se laws, persons with

extremely high BAC levels at the time of arrest could escape license

suspension or revocation by plea bargaining to lesser crimes or entering

pretrial diversion. Thus, by providing for an administrative license

suspension prior to the criminal proceeding, the law affords the public

added protection.

Lugo provides no argument why California’s interest in public safety should not

yield to Lugo’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle upon evidence that he drove while

intoxicated. At best, Lugo alleges that more testimony would have persuaded the DMV

hearing officer to disregard a police officer’s testimony that he admitted driving. But

even if the procedure did not give the hearing officer discretion to exclude evidence,

Lugo could not prevail. On its face, and as applied against Lugo, the California Vehicle

Code presents minimal risk of an erroneous deprivation, the probable value of any

additional or substitute procedural safeguards would be minimal, if not nonexistent, and

California has a strong interest in public safety requiring predictable hearing dates and

prompt decisions.

//

//

//

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the DMV’s motion to

dismiss with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 24, 2007

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00109-W-POR Document 17 Filed 07/24/07 Page 14 of 14