Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01737/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01737-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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 That petition challenged an order denying Park’s motion to disqualify the 1

undersigned Judge from presiding over this case. (See Dkt. No. 84.) In that motion, Park

argued, frivolously, that the undersigned Judge persuaded Judge Sammartino to recuse

from this case so that it could be transferred to him. (See Dkt. No. 80 at 3–4.) That claim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN M. PARK, MICHELLE PARK,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10cv1737-LAB (WMC)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

WELLS FARGO BANK HOME

MORTGAGE, et al.,

Defendants.

Sean Park filed this case on August 19, 2010. His original complaint was 19 pages

long and alleged 14 claims against various Defendants. Since then, and in no particular

order, Mr. Park: (1) has been sanctioned $10,434 for fraudulently removing another case

to this Court (See 13231 Sundance v. Cronin, 11CV477, Dkt. No. 20); (2) has been indicted

for perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements in connection with that

removal (see United States v. Sean Michael Park, 12CR494); (3) has called chambers and

threatened to report the incomplete docketing of his voluminous pleadings to then-Chief

Judge Irma Gonzalez; and (4) has been told by the Ninth Circuit that a petition for a writ of

mandamus he filed in this case was frivolous. (See Dkt. No. 89.) 1

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is simply false.

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Park’s complaint in this case has also been dismissed twice, though on both

occasions the Court has allowed him to file an amended complaint. (See Dkt. Nos. 31, 72.)

As a result, the complaint has grown from 19 pages with no supporting documents (Dkt. No.

1), to 64 pages with no supporting documents (Dkt. No. 32), to 100 pages with 185 pages

of exhibits. (Dkt. No. 75.) Now before the Court is Defendants’ (Wells Fargo, Bank of

America, and MERS) motion to dismiss Park’s Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 81.)

Park has opposed the motion (with 33 pages of briefing and over 400 pages of exhibits) and

Defendants have filed a reply.

Park’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, like his Second Amended

Complaint, is barely coherent. Rather than respond to Defendants’ arguments directly, it

meanders from one grievance to another, and the legal arguments it offers are too

conclusory and too divorced from the facts of this case to be very helpful. The brief also

harps on points that have no bearing on the Court’s adjudication of the actual claims before

it. For example, Park repeatedly claims Defendant Wells Fargo is being investigated and

prosecuted for deceptive lending and foreclosure practices, as if that somehow lends

substance to his particular claims. (See Opp’n Br. at 7, 13.) Park also accuses Defendants

of causing his complaint “to languish in pre-trial,” an interesting spin, to say the least, to put

on motions to dismiss that the Court found to be meritorious. (See Opp’n Br. at 8.)

When Park does defend those particular claims that Defendants aim to dismiss, he

does so without any acknowledgment of what Defendants’ arguments for dismissal actually

are. For example, Park’s fifth cause of action alleges that Wells Fargo violated the Real

Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), when it failed to respond to his

many Qualified Written Requests. Defendants raise several problems with the cause of

action: (1) Park sought an accounting and a reasonable compromise in his QWRs, neither

of which are available under the relevant RESPA statute; (2) Wells Fargo did respond to his

QWRs, as his own allegations and exhibits establish; and (3) Park cannot allege any

pecuniary loss that was attributable to the alleged RESPA violation. (Br. at 13–14.) In

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 Interestingly, Park doesn’t even respond to Defendants’ argument that he cannot 2

allege any pecuniary loss attributable to the alleged RESPA violation, even though he does

allege in his complaint that he has suffered: (1) negative credit reporting (SAC ¶ 263); (2)

attorney’s fees of $12,000 (SAC ¶ 264); (3) $40,000 in medical bills related to a nervous

breakdown (SAC ¶ 265); and (4) costs associated with ongoing discovery and legal research

(SAC ¶ 292). The Court does not mean to suggest that the above do qualify as “actual

damages” under RESPA. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). It is merely noteworthy that Park doesn’t

even try to make the argument. 

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response to this, Park: (1) asserts in a completely conclusory manner that he has alleged

adequate facts to show that Wells Fargo didn’t respond to his QWRs; (2) lays out the

general requirements of RESPA, which are not even at issue; and (3) insists that his QWRs

were valid because they gave Wells Fargo enough information to identify his account and

explain his bases for believing his account was in error, which completely misses

Defendants’ point. (Opp’n Br. at 15–16.)

2

Park also fails to meaningfully respond to Defendants’ two arguments for dismissal

of his claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Rosenthal Fair Debt

Collection Practice Act. Those arguments are that: (1) Park offers no factual allegations as

to how Defendants violated the statutes; (2) Defendants are creditors, not debt collectors;

and (3) foreclosure activities aren’t debt collection activities subject to the FDCPA or

RFDCPA. (Br. at 14.) Park’s feeble response to these arguments is that: (1) Defendants

are subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which completely misses the issue; and (2)

Wells Fargo, in documents Park doesn’t specifically identify, has identified itself as a debt

collector and bound itself to the FDCPA. (Opp’n Br. at 23–24.) Neither response is actually

responsive. First, it’s not particularly relevant what Wells Fargo calls itself in an unknown

document. Park doesn’t allege that Wells Fargo acquired his debt after he defaulted on his

mortgage payments, and therefore he fails to adequately allege that it is a “debt collector”

under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6); FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159,

172–74 (3d Cir. 2007) (“As the court explained in Schlosser, ‘[i]f the one who acquired the

debt continues to service it, it is acting much like the original creditor that created the debt.

On the other hand, if it simply acquires the debt for collection, it is acting more like a debt

collector.’”). Second, this is a foreclosure case, and the caselaw is clear that foreclosure

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 Park’s motion to strike Defendants’ reply brief is also DENIED. The motion is 3

frivolous. The supporting memo simply reincorporates all of Park’s grievances against

Defendants, adds some new ones, and suggests that the reply brief “contains a

preponderance of immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous matter.” (Dkt. No. 90-1 at 2.) Its

only kernel of merit is Park’s frustration with Defendants’ accusation that he failed to oppose

the motion to dismiss in its entirety. In fact, Park’s opposition contained so many pages that

only a fraction could be physically carried from the office of the Clerk, where they were

received, to the chambers of the assigned Judge, where they were accepted for filing. As

a result, only a fraction of Park’s opposition appeared in the case docket initially. This was

promptly corrected by a minute order. (See Dkt. No. 88.) This did not prejudice Park at all,

however. The Court had physical copies of his entire opposition, and he served the same

on opposing counsel. 

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isn’t the same thing as debt collection under the FDCPA or RFDCPA. See Walker v. Equity

1 Lenders Group, 2009 WL 1364430 at *7 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009). Mr. Park does not even

attempt to rebut these points.

The Court has reviewed Park’s amended complaint, Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

and Park’s opposition in great detail. It will not address each of Park’s claims, or each of the

Defendants’ arguments for dismissal, because it finds that Park’s arguments are at best

misguided and at worst downright frivolous. It offers the above analysis simply to add

substance to that view. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED in its entirety.

There is no argument that Defendants make that Park overcomes. This case is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. 

3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 24, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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