Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00907/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00907-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PENSION TRUST FUND FOR

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 3;

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

PENSION TRUST FUND FOR

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 3;

GIL CROSTHWAITE; ROBERT DOUB;

THOMAS HOLSMAN; JOHN HUMBER;

JIM MURRAY; RICHARD PIOMBO;

RENE VERERUYSSEN; KEN WALTERS;

LANCE WILHELM; RUSS BURNS;

CARL GOFF; FRANK HERRERA;

ROBERT T. MILLER; WALT POWERS;

JOE VIEIRA; and ROB WISE;

NO. CIV. S-06-904 WBS JFM

NO. CIV. S-06-905 WBS JFM 

 Plaintiffs, NO. CIV. S-06-907 WBS JFM

v. ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS,

MOTIONS TO STRIKE, & MOTION

FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

MCMORGAN & COMPANY; MCMORGAN &

COMPANY, LLC; STANTON, KAY &

WATSON; WEINBERG, ROGER &

ROSENFELD; VAN BOURG, ROGER &

ROSENFELD; JAMES WATSON; BARRY

HINKLE; EDWARD MEVI; DAVID

HOWARD; PAYNE, THOMPSON,

WALKER & TAAFFE; JOHN BONILLA;

CURTIS BROOKS; and DOES 1 TO

100, INCLUSIVE;

Defendants.

Case 2:06-cv-00907-WBS -EFB Document 107 Filed 01/24/07 Page 1 of 32
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2

 

PENSION TRUST FUND FOR OPERATING

ENGINEERS LOCAL 3; BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES OF THE PENSION

TRUST FUND FOR OPERATING 

ENGINEERS LOCAL 3; JOHN BONILLA;

RUSS BURNS; GIL CROSTHWAITE;

ROBERT DOUB; CARL GOFF;

FRANK HERRERA; THOMAS HOLSMAN;

JOHN HUMBER; ROBERT T. MILLER;

JIM MURRAY; RICHARD PIOMBO;

WALT POWERS; RENE VERERUYSSEN; 

JOE VIEIRA; KEN WALTERS; LANCE

WILHELM; and ROB WISE; 

Plaintiffs.

v.

MCMORGAN & COMPANY, LLC; BARRY

HINKLE; DAVID HOWARD; EDWARD 

MEVI; PAYNE, THOMPSON, WALKER, 

& TAAFE; STANTON, KAY, & 

WATSON; VAN BOURG, WEINBERG, 

ROGER & ROSENFELD; JAMES WATSON;

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD; and 

DOES 1 TO 100, INCLUSIVE;

Defendants.

 

PENSION TRUST FUND FOR OPERATING 

ENGINEERS LOCAL 3; BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES OF THE PENSION TRUST 

FUND FOR OPERATING ENGINEERS 

LOCAL 3; JOHN BONILLA; CURTIS

BROOKS; RUSS BURNS; GIL 

CROSTHWAITE; ROBERT DOUB; CARL

GOFF; FRANK HERRERA; THOMAS 

HOLSMAN; JOHN HUMBER; ROBERT

T. MILLER; JIM MURRAY; RICHARD

PIOMBO; WALT POWERS; RENE 

VERERUYSSEN; JOE VIEIRA; KEN 

WALTERS; LANCE WILHELM; and ROB

WISE;

Plaintiffs.

v.

MCMORGAN & COMPANY; MCMORGAN & 

Case 2:06-cv-00907-WBS -EFB Document 107 Filed 01/24/07 Page 2 of 32
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COMPANY, LLC; LIFFEY, LLC; 

STANTON, KAY, & WATSON;

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD;

VAN BOURG, WEINBERG, ROGER, &

ROSENFELD; JAMES WATSON;

BARRY HINKLE; EDWARD MEVI;

DAVID HOWARD; and PAYNE, 

THOMPSON, WALKER, & TAAFE;

and DOES 1 TO 100, INCLUSIVE;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Currently before the court are four motions to dismiss

brought by three sets of defendants in each of three related

cases and a fourth defendant in one of the cases. All of these

complaints share allegations that an investment company and

retained counsel mismanaged the investments of a trust fund

organized to provide pension benefits to members of a labor

union. Accordingly, all of the motions in each of these three

cases are addressed herein. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers

Local 3 (“Pension Trust Fund”) is a trust fund organized to

provide pension benefits to members of a labor union. (06-904

FAC ¶ 1.) A board of trustees runs the fund, and this board is

also a plaintiff in this action. (Id.) The remaining plaintiffs

are trustees and fiduciaries who sit on the board. (Id. ¶ 2.) 

Defendant McMorgan and Company, L.L.C., agreed to serve

as the asset manager for Pension Trust Fund on or about September

1, 1995. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12.) Defendant David Howard (“Howard”) is

and was at all relevant times an employee of McMorgan and

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Defendants McMorgan & Company, L.L.C. and David Howard, 1

an employee of McMorgan & Company, L.L.C., will collectively be

referred to as “the McMorgan defendants” unless otherwise noted. 

The court takes judicial notice of Liffey’s evidence 2

attached to the Declaration of Gabriel Z. Reynoso (06-907 Docket

No. 87), including public documents related to the merger between

Liffey and McMorgan & Co. See Greeson v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 59

F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1932) (explaining that “[j]udicial

knowledge is taken of all matters generally known” and further

noting that “the court is bound to take notice of public facts”). 

“Ordinarily, when matters outside the pleadings are introduced on

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and these matters are not excluded by the

court, the motion is to be treated as one for summary judgment

and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. However, under Rule 201

of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a district court may take

judicial notice of ‘matters of public record’ outside the

pleadings without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion

for summary judgment.” Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., No.

02-2099, 2006 WL 2473988, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing MGIC

Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986))

(other citations omitted). Plaintiffs do not oppose this

request.

Parties have submitted numerous requests for judicial

notice. The Court will adjudge these requests by the standard

4

Company, L.L.C. (Id. ¶ 10.) The duties of the McMorgan 1

defendants include supervising the investment of all assets of

the fund that the board of trustees requested it to manage,

selecting brokers and placing brokerage orders “[i]n its sole

discretion and authority,” complying with the standards of

fiduciary responsibility required by ERISA, and providing support

services necessary to manage the account. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Additionally, the Investment Management Agreement expressly

provided that defendant McMorgan was an ERISA fiduciary to the

Pension Trust Fund. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Defendant Liffey, L.L.C. (“Liffey”), assumed the

obligations and liabilities of McMorgan and Company, L.L.C.,

prior to September 28, 2001, pursuant to a merger between the two

entities. Plaintiff refers to Liffey and McMorgan and Company, 2

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indicated in the preceding paragraph. The court will note

whether it takes judicial notice throughout this order only when

such documents are necessary for the disposition of these

motions. 

The court properly reviews the Asset Purchase Agreement

between McMorgan Acquisition Company, L.L.C., and McMorgan and

Company, L.L.C. Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.

1994), overruled on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (Courts may properly review

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose

authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically

attached to the plaintiff’s pleading.”). 

In the court’s previous order of September 24, 2006, 3

the court declined to consider Liffey’s joinder in McMorgan

defendants’ motion, (September 24, 2006 Order 10, n. 7), because

Liffey served its joinder in the motion only two days prior to

the time the opposition was due, and plaintiffs did not have

sufficient notice to include arguments against Liffey in their

opposition. Further, Liffey failed to argue their motion or

explain in their moving papers their status as an ERISA

fiduciary. However, all of those problems have been cured for

purposes of the present motion. 

Defendant Barry Hinkle is and was an attorney and 4

partner in the law firm of Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld. (06-904

Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.) The court will refer to these defendants

collectively as the “Weinberg defendants.” 

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L.L.C., collectively as McMorgan. (06-907 FAC ¶ 3.) Liffey is a

defendant only in Case No. 06-907. 

3

The Pension Trust Fund also retained defendant

Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, L.L.C., to perform “routine and 4

recurrent legal services the Fund has required and will continue

to require in the future.” (06-904 FAC ¶ 23.) These services

included attending all board and committee meetings; reviewing,

interpreting, and advising Pension Trust Fund about laws and

regulations that would affect the trust; and reviewing and

advising Pension Trust Fund regarding investment issues in

collaboration with parties including the investment manager. 

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Defendant Edward Mevi is and was an attorney and 5

partner in the law firm of Stanton, Kay & Watson, L.L.P.;

defendant James Watson is and was an employee and/or agent of the

same law firm. (06-904 Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11.) The court will refer

to these defendants as the “Stanton defendants.” 

Each of the three related cases here–-06-904, 06-905, 6

and 06-907 (Apr. 28, 2006 Notice of Related Cases)--involves the

same four causes of action, but 06-907 contains an additional

cause of action for fraud. More significantly, each case

references a slightly different set of underlying facts. 

Briefly, Case No. 06-904 refers to the sale of different

investment properties for less than fair market value, Case No.

06-905 relates to attorney/fiduciary malpractice for the failure

to attend a foreclosure sale, and Case No. 06-907 concerns

allegations of overbilling for costs and fees by retained

attorneys. 

6

(Id.) Defendant Stanton, Kay & Watson, L.L.P., signed an almost 5

identical retainer agreement with Pension Trust Fund. (Id. ¶¶

24, 25.) 

6

A. Factual Allegations Underlying Case No. 06-904

Beginning in the late 1960s, the Pension Trust Fund

invested its assets in several properties. In approximately

1968, the Pension Trust Fund purchased about 3,590 acres of real

estate located in Rancho Murieta, California. (Id. ¶ 27.) The

relevant parts of this property were: Unit 5 (split into Parcels

A and B), and a “Hotel site” comprising 20.2 acres. (Id. ¶ 30.) 

The Hotel site was first sold to Jack Anderson in 1987 for

approximately $123,762.00 per acre. (Id.) However, Anderson

defaulted on the payments in approximately 1993 and the property

reverted back to the Pension Trust Fund. (Id.) In 2002, the

Pension Trust Fund sold the Hotel site and an additional 10.1

acres at a purchase price of approximately $72,528 per acre

(about half of the price the property was sold for in 1987). 

(Id. ¶ 31.) Escrow was extended over the next few years, but the

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purchase price remained the same. (Id. ¶ 32.) 

In 2002, defendant McMorgan entered into several

contracts on behalf of the Pension Trust Fund to sell

approximately 59.7 acres of Parcel A and approximately 86.17

acres of Parcel B of the Rancho Murieta property. (Id. ¶¶ 35,

37.) For the sale of Parcel A, the purchase price of the land

was $51,402.00 per acre. (Id. ¶ 35.) For the sale of Parcel B,

the price was set at $35,653.00 per acre. (Id. ¶ 37.) Although

the real estate market appreciated between 2002 and 2004,

defendant McMorgan allowed numerous extensions of the contracts,

and eventually sold parcels A and B in 2004 for the price

originally agreed upon, despite the properties’ subsequent

increase in value. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.) Defendant McMorgan

allegedly mismanaged the real estate properties belonging to the

Pension Trust Fund and caused it to incur significant losses. 

(Id. ¶ 40.) Additionally, the Stanton defendants and the

Weinberg defendants undertook the duty to oversee and participate

in the land sales and other real estate transactions by providing

legal counsel and advice. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs allege that

they did not discover the mismanagement of the Pension Trust

Fund’s assets by all of these defendants before August of 2005. 

(Id. ¶ 44.) 

B. Factual Allegations Underlying Case No. 06-905

After the Pension Trust Fund sold some of the Rancho

Murieta property to Jack Anderson, Anderson sold two parcels to

Winncrest Homes, Inc. (“Winncrest”). (06-905 FAC ¶¶ 25, 27, 28.) 

By 1993, Anderson and Winncrest had defaulted on making their

payments, and the Pension Trust Fund initiated judicial

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foreclosure proceedings against them on the advice of McMorgan

and Company. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 30.) Judgment on the foreclosure was

entered in 2000 and affirmed on appeal in 2003. (Id. ¶ 32.) The

Pension Trust Fund subsequently became the judgment creditor in

the amount of $17,000,000.00 against Winncrest (the judgment

debtor). (Id.) 

Pension Trust Fund petitioned for a writ of sale of the

property to execute the judgment, and such a writ was issued. 

(Id. ¶ 32.) Individuals from defendant McMorgan and Company and

agents of the Stanton defendants (who, in turn, were acting as

agents for the Weinberg defendants) were to attend the February

24, 2004, sale to bid on the property on behalf of Pension Trust

Fund. (Id. ¶ 34-35.) Although the sale was noticed, defendant

Mevi (of the Stanton defendants) received a personal phone call

regarding the sale, and defendants Mevi and Howard planned to

attend the sale, both of these defendants arrived late to the

sale, after the property had been sold for $2,000.00. (Id. ¶¶

35-42.) Significantly, however, the property was appraised for a

value of between $12,000,000.00 and $14,000,000.00. (Id. ¶ 42.)

Pension Trust Fund filed suit to have the foreclosure set aside,

but the suit was not successful. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 48.) 

C. Factual Allegations Underlying Case No. 06-907

In the context of the judicial foreclosure proceedings

against Anderson and Winncrest, defendant McMorgan allegedly had

the obligation and duty to protect Pension Trust Fund’s assets

from unethical or incompetent provision of services by these

providers, such as attorneys, to monitor the service providers

more generally, and to monitor the payment of bills and invoices. 

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(06-907 FAC ¶¶ 63, 70, 78.) The Weinberg defendants and the

Stanton defendants were retained by the Pension Trust Fund to

represent them in these proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35, 39.) 

Pursuant to the successful judicial foreclosure action, Pension

Trust Fund paid its attorneys what it now contends was an

exorbitant amount for attorneys’ fees, including improper costs

for office furniture and equipment. (Id. ¶¶ 34-47.) As evidence

that the amounts paid were excessive and unreasonable, plaintiff

notes that the court deciding the foreclosure proceedings, in the

context of an attorneys’ fees motion, halved the attorneys’ fees

requested by its attorneys (and previously billed to plaintiff),

denying the law firms more than $7,000,000.00 that they had

requested. (Id. ¶ 39.)

D. Legal Claims

Based upon these underlying facts, each of the three

complaints alleges the following causes of action against

substantially all defendants: (1) professional negligence; (2)

breach of contract; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4)

violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 1109, and 1132(a)(2) & (3). Case

No. 06-907 additionally contains a cause of action for fraud

against the Stanton and Weinberg defendants.

E. Previous Order 

In a previous hearing, the McMorgan defendants, the

Weinberg defendants, and the Stanton defendants brought different

challenges to the complaints in these cases. The court issued a

written order on September 24, 2006. 

The court denied the Weinberg defendants’ and the

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Stanton defendants’ motions to strike requests for attorneys’

fees and improper damages and the Stanton defendants’ motions for

a more definite statement. With regard to the McMorgan

defendants, the court dismissed without prejudice the first,

second, and third causes of action in all three cases. The court

also dismissed without prejudice all claims against the Weinberg

defendants in all three cases. With regard to the Stanton

defendants, the court dismissed without prejudice all claims in

Case No. 06-904. The court dismissed without prejudice the

fourth cause action as against the Stanton defendants in Case No.

06-905 and the fourth and fifth causes of action as against the

Stanton defendants in Case No. 06-907. Plaintiffs were given 30

days to file an amended complaint. The court’s rationale for its

previous order will be discussed at some length throughout this

order, as the instant action implicates many of the same issues. 

F. Pending Motions

The McMorgan defendants move to dismiss claims one

through three, as against them in Case No. 06-907, arguing that

these causes of action are state law claims that are preempted by

ERISA. In the alternative, the McMorgan defendants move to

dismiss the state law claims against Howard and all claims

against McMorgan and Company for time periods prior to September

28, 2001. As for Case Nos. 06-904 and 06-905, plaintiffs’ first

amended complaint alleged these claims only against Howard. 

Howard moves to dismiss these state law claims against him. 

Plaintiffs filed a statement of non-opposition to Howard’s

request in 06-904 and 06-905. Therefore, the court will dismiss

the state law claims against Howard with prejudice in those cases

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The Stanton defendants signed tolling agreements with 7

plaintiff Pension Trust Fund regarding the claims in cases 06-905

and 06-907, and therefore do not make this argument in those

cases.

11

only. The court will consider the motion of the McMorgan

defendants (including Howard) in Case No. 06-907 on the merits. 

Liffey, which is only a defendant in Case No. 06-907,

moves to dismiss claims one through three arguing that these

causes of action are state law claims that are preempted by

ERISA. 

The Weinberg defendants, with regard to Case Nos. 06-

904 and 06-905, move to dismiss claims one through three as

barred by the statute of limitations and claim four as improperly

brought against defendants not subject to the fiduciary duties

imposed by ERISA. With regard to Case No. 06-907, the Weinberg

defendants move to dismiss claims one through four for the same

reasons and to strike plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages in

the event claim one and three are not dismissed. Further, the

Weinberg defendants move to dismiss claim five for failure to

plead fraud with particularity and to strike all allegations of

fraud prior to March, 2003, as barred by the statute of

limitations, in the event claim five is not dismissed.

The Stanton defendants move to dismiss claims one

through three in Case No. 06-907 only as barred by the statute of

limitations. The Stanton defendants move to dismiss claims one 7

through three in 06-905 as not ripe for adjudication by this

court. The Stanton defendants move to dismiss the fourth cause

of action in all three cases for failure to state a claim under

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The Weinberg defendants join in this motion. However, 8

court will dismiss with prejudice the underlying claims, as

against the Weinberg defendants, as time-barred. 

12

ERISA or alternatively move for a more definite statement of the

claim. With regard to Case No. 06-907, the Stanton defendants

move to strike plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages in claims

one and three. Finally, the Stanton defendants move to dismiss

the fifth cause of action in case no. 06-907 for failure to plead

fraud with particularity.

II. Discussion

A. Stanton and Weinberg Defendants’ Motions to Strike8

The Stanton and Weinberg defendants move to strike

plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages in the first and third

causes of action with respect to Case No. 06-907. Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Such motions are designed “to avoid the expenditure

of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues

by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” 

Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.

1983). However, “[m]otions to strike are generally disfavored.” 

Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1234 (S.D. Cal. 2004);

Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996)

(“Rule 12(f) motions are generally ‘disfavored’ because they are

‘often used as delaying tactics, and because of the limited

importance of pleadings in federal practice.’” (quoting William

W. Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil

Procedure Before Trial § 9:375)). “If there is any doubt as to

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whether the allegations might be an issue in the action, [the]

court [should] deny the motion.” In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec.

Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)

rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1994)).

The Stanton defendants argue that plaintiffs’ action is

a run-of-the-mill negligence case and as such plaintiffs are not

entitled to punitive damages. (06-907 Stanton Defs.’ Mot. to

Strike 11-12.) The Stanton defendants cite Jackson v. Jackson,

which held that mere negligence will not support an award of

punitive damages. 5 Cal. App. 1350 (1992). However, the Jackson

court in fact held that because the pleadings at the time of

trial did not allege fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive conduct

or include a prayer for punitive damages, punitive damages could

not be awarded. Id. at 1354. Plaintiffs specifically include in

their prayer for relief punitive damages and allege that conduct

by the Stanton defendants was done “knowingly and maliciously”

and was “malicious” and “reckless.” (06-907 FAC ¶¶ 58-60, 74-

75.) Indeed, “in an action for the breach of an obligation . .

., where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the

defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the

plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages

for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a

claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, the Stanton defendants’

motion to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages will be

denied.

B. Motions to Dismiss

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At the pleading stage, the plaintiff need only set

forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). A complaint need

only “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Consequently, on a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court

accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). 

Additionally, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, “[a] party may set forth two or more statements

of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically.” Rule 8

does not require that claims pled in the alternative be

consistent with each other. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has

explained that, because of the liberality of Rule 8 pleading

standards, “a pleading should not be construed as an admission

against another alternative or inconsistent pleading in the same

case.” McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th

Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit instructs that “a district court

should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the

pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Nunes

v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Doe v.

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U.S., 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, “in assessing

the propriety of a motion for leave to amend, [courts may]

consider five factors: (1) bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3)

prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and

(5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.”

Id. (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir.

1995)). Where plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend

his complaint and fails to cure its original defects, courts may

dismiss without leave to amend. Nicholson v. Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office, No. 06-470, slip op. at *1 (D. Ariz. July 26,

2006) (“Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed

without leave to amend because the defects in the original

Complaint were not corrected.”); Colbert v. Yamamoto, No. 04-

6417, slip op. at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2005) (dismissing second

amended complaint with prejudice where plaintiff had simply

“restate[d] the facts of an earlier complaint after court had

“advised plaintiff of the deficiencies”).

1. McMorgan Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss State Law

Claims as Preempted by ERISA

The court granted the McMorgan defendants’ previous

motion to dismiss because they were not “given sufficient notice

of how these state law claims against them do not duplicate,

supplement, or supplant the provisions of ERISA referenced by

plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action.” (September 24, 2006 Order

15.) Plaintiffs amended their complaint, alleging that the

McMorgan defendants entered into an “oral and/or written”

agreement to review attorneys’ fees that “was outside the

investment management Agreement and included attorney billings

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unrelated to investment matters and unrelated to the legal

services described in the Agreement.” (06-907 FAC ¶ 22.) 

The McMorgan defendants argue that even if a “separate”

agreement exists, it is wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether

plaintiffs’ state law claims are preempted by ERISA. (McMorgan

Defs.’ 06-907 Mot. to Dismiss 9.) Their preemption argument

rests on the notion that “any state-law cause of action that

duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement

remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the

ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.” Aetna

Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (citations

omitted) (concluding that ERISA preempted state law claims where

the complaint did not allege “any violation of a legal duty

independent of ERISA”). In response, plaintiffs contend that,

pursuant to Rule 8, they have alternatively pled state and

federal claims in an effort to protect themselves if it is

determined at a later stage in the litigation that they cannot

maintain the ERISA claim. 

Regardless of whether plaintiffs have plead the ERISA

and state law causes of action in the alternative, it is unclear

what basis plaintiffs have for claiming that the McMorgan

defendants are subject to state law claims. The contract signed

by the Pension Trust Fund and the McMorgan defendants states that

McMorgan and Company was hired as an investment manager and an

ERISA fiduciary. It is difficult to understand how state law

claims are colorable against the McMorgan defendants given

“ERISA’s provision that ‘a person is a fiduciary with respect to

a plan to the extent [that] he renders investment advice for a

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Plaintiffs continue to cite Coleman v. Standard Life 9

Insurance Company, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2003), 

which the court has already found inapplicable to this case. 

(September 24, 2006 Order 15, n.9.)

Plaintiffs cite Meyer v. Berkshire Life Insurance Co., 10

for the proposition that “fiduciary status under ERISA is not an

all-or-nothing concept.” 250 F. Supp. 2d 544, 562 (D. Md. 2003). 

However, that very case instructs courts to consider “‘whether

the acts in question were like traditional fiduciary decisions,

which are typically ‘decisions about managing assets and

distributing property to beneficiaries.’” Id. (citations

omitted). The act in question here is the alleged failure of the

McMorgan defendants to exercise discretionary authority in

supervising legal billings incurred in legal matters directly

related to the management of the plan’s investment assets. The

contract between the McMorgan defendants and plaintiffs

stipulated that McMorgan assumed the obligation to manage all of

assets of Pension Trust Fund. (06-907 FAC ¶¶ 13, 14.) There are

not any allegations that the McMorgan defendants failed to manage

any attorneys’ fee bills not related investment assets. 

Therefore, if the McMorgan defendants acted, or failed to act,

with regard to the attorneys’ fees management, it was as an ERISA

fiduciary. 

17

fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to

any moneys or other property of such plan.’” See Dudley

Supermarket, Inc. v. Transamerica Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 302

F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21))

(dismissing state law claims as preempted by ERISA against an

investment manager who acted as an ERISA fiduciary). Even 9

assuming the existence of a “separate” agreement to review

attorneys’ fees, plaintiffs have not alleged how defendants may

have acted beyond the scope of exercising their discretion as an

ERISA fiduciary such that they may be subject to state law claims

that do not relate to the ERISA claim. 

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Defendants have not been given sufficient notice of how

these state law claims against them do not duplicate, supplement,

or supplant the provisions of ERISA referenced by plaintiffs’

fourth cause of action. Because this court has already given the

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Because the court dismisses plaintiffs’ state law 11

claims against the McMorgan defendants, the court need not

address the McMorgan defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law

claims against Howard and motion to dismiss all claims for time

periods prior to September 28, 2001. 

18

defendant an opportunity to cure this defect, the state law

claims, as against the McMorgan defendants, will be dismissed

with prejudice.11

2. Liffey’s Motion to Dismiss State Law Claims as

Preempted by ERISA

Liffey, which assumed the McMorgan defendants’

liabilities prior to September 28, 2001, advances many of the

same arguments as the McMorgan defendants to support its

contention that plaintiffs’ state law claims are preempted by

ERISA. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will

grant Liffey’s motion.

The court separates its treatment of Liffey here

because Liffey’s present motion is its first motion to dismiss

these claims. Liffey urges dismissal with prejudice, citing an

informal agreement among parties’ counsel to avoid unnecessary

motion practice that plaintiffs’ counsel broke by making its

request for leave to amend. Regardless of whether plaintiffs

request leave to amend, (Opp’n. to Liffey’s Mot. to Dismiss 5),

the court must consider it. Nunes, 375 F.3d at 808. However,

the relevant standard for granting leave to amend is whether the

defect in plaintiffs’ complaint “could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts.” Id. 

Because plaintiffs could allege facts demonstrating

that Liffey may have acted beyond the scope of exercising its

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The allegations relevant here are the same in all three 12

complaints.

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discretion as an ERISA fiduciary, the court will grant Liffey’s

motion to dismiss, but will give plaintiffs an opportunity to

amend. 

3. Stanton and Weinberg Defendants’ ERISA Fiduciary

Status

The court granted the Stanton and Weinberg defendants’

previous motions to dismiss the fourth cause action in all three

related cases because plaintiffs’ allegations did “not

sufficiently allege that the Stanton defendants or the Weinberg

defendants acted or undertook to act beyond the ordinary role of

retained counsel to exercise discretion over the plan or to make

investment decisions.” (September 24, 2006 Order 17.) 

Plaintiffs were given leave to amend to include allegations

explaining what actions the Stanton and Weinberg defendants

undertook beyond the actions a lawyer would undertake for a

client. (Id.)

The Stanton and Weinberg defendants were retained as

counsel by the Pension Trust Fund. Their retainer agreements,

which were virtually identical, set forth responsibilities to

review and advise Pension Trust Fund regarding legal issues

related to investments. (06-907 FAC ¶ 24.) In their first 12

amended complaint, plaintiffs added an allegation that the

Stanton and Weinberg defendants exercised “discretionary

authority over plan assets,” “approved contracts for sale of real

estate,” extended sale contracts, and worked closely with the

McMorgan defendants on investment matters. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

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As the court previously noted, “ERISA permits suits for

breach of fiduciary duty only against ERISA defined fiduciaries.” 

Kyle Ry., Inc. v. Pac. Admin. Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 513, 516

(9th Cir. 1993). “To become a[n ERISA] fiduciary, the person or

entity must have control respecting the management of the plan or

its assets, give investment advice for a fee, or have

discretionary responsibility in the administration of the plan.” 

Az. State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank, 125 F.3d

715, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1997). Absent a showing of the assignment

of one of these duties, an attorney is not an ERISA fiduciary. 

Yeseta v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding

that an attorney was not an ERISA fiduciary when neither his

“status as an attorney nor as executor showed he controlled the

Plan in a manner other than by usual professional functions”). 

Although plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the

Stanton and Weinberg defendants exercised discretionary control,

plaintiffs fail to differentiate the Stanton and Weinberg

defendants’ activities from those of the McMorgan defendants, for

whom they served as counsel. “[T]he mere fact that an attorney

represents an ERISA plan does not make the attorney an ERISA

fiduciary.” Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir.

1996). While such a finding is not automatically precluded, id.,

plaintiffs must make specific allegations capable of

demonstrating that these defendants “transcended [their] role as

legal counsel.” Id. at 1163 (citing 5A Charles A. Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, 317-18

(2d ed. 1990) (noting that court need not accept plaintiff’s

“‘unwarranted deductions,’ ‘footless conclusions of law,’ or

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The Stanton defendants move, in the alternative, for a 13

more definite statement of the ERISA claims against them. 

Because the court will grant their motions to dismiss, it need

not consider the motions for a more definite statement.

21

‘sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations’” (footnotes and further citations omitted))). 

Plaintiffs have not specifically differentiated the

actions of the Stanton and Weinberg defendants from those of the

McMorgan defendants, but merely alleged conclusory allegations of

discretionary control over plan investments. Because this court

has already given plaintiffs an opportunity to cure this defect,

the fourth claim, as against the Stanton and Weinberg defendants,

will be dismissed with prejudice.13

4. Stanton and Weinberg Defendants’ Statute of

Limitations Arguments

The court previously dismissed claims one through three

in Case No. 06-904, as against the Stanton and Weinberg

defendants, as time-barred. (September 24, 2006 Order 19-20). 

These claims were dismissed against the Weinberg defendants with

respect to Cases No. 06-905 and 06-907. (Id. 21-24.) The court

gave plaintiffs specific instructions to remedy their

deficiencies. Plaintiffs refiled these claims, and the Stanton

and Weinberg defendants make the same motions for dismissal. 

The court previously found that California Code of

Civil Procedure § 340.6 provides the limitations period for these

claims. (Id. 18.) Moreover, the court found that plaintiffs

must comply with the heightened pleading standard set out under

California law. (Id. 19, n.12.) Under California Code § 340.6,

unless it is tolled, the statute of limitations expires “one year

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after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable

diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the

wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the

wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 340.6. “[W]hen the plaintiff has notice of information of

circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the

opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his

investigation (such as public records or corporation books), the

statute commences to run.” McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 74

Cal. App. 4th 151, 160 n.11 (1999) (quoting 3 B.E. Witkin,

California Procedure § 602 at 773 (4th ed. 1996)). Moreover, a

“plaintiff must plead (and later prove) the facts showing . . .

[that] in the exercise of reasonable diligence the facts could

not have been discovered at an earlier date.” Id. However, the

statute of limitations can be tolled if “[t]he attorney continues

to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter

in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred . . . .” 

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 340.6.

a. Case No. 06-904

The court previously dismissed claims one through

three, as against the Stanton and Weinberg defendants, finding

that plaintiffs should have filed this action within one year of

the 2004 property sales. (September 24, 2006 Order 19-20.) The

court granted plaintiffs leave to amend because it was unclear

whether the Stanton and Weinberg defendants continued to

represent plaintiffs “regarding the specific subject matter in

which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred” pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.6(a)(2). (Id. 20-21.) 

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More specifically, 

The continuous representation rule, as 

codified in section 340.6, subdivision (a), 

is not triggered by the mere existence of an

attorney-client relationship. Instead, the 

statute’s tolling language addresses a 

particular phase of such a relationship--

representation regarding a specific subject 

matter. Moreover, the limitations period 

is not tolled when an attorney’s subsequent 

role is only tangentially related to the 

legal representation the attorney provided 

to the plaintiff. 

Foxborough v. Van Atta, 26 Cal. App. 4th 217, 228-29 (1994). The

specific subject matter at issue here is sale of the properties

in 2004 for less than their market value. 

Plaintiffs have not explained or alleged how their

attorneys continued to represent them specifically with regard to

completed transactions after those transactions were completed. 

Plaintiffs simply contend that defendants have “represented the

[Pension Trust Fund (PTF)] on the same subject matter up to and

after March of 2005” and continued to represent them through

August 2006 for matters involving the Rancho Murieta properties

(06-904 FAC ¶ 43.) However, “the limitations period is not

tolled when an attorney’s subsequent role is only tangentially

related to the legal representation the attorney provided to the 

plaintiff.” Foxborough, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 229. Plaintiffs’

amended complaint fails to address this court’s command that

plaintiffs allege these defendants “continued to represent them

specifically with regard to completed transactions after those

transactions were completed.” (September 24, 2006 Order 20.) 

Further, plaintiffs’ reliance on the liberal pleading standards

of Rule 8 are misplaced where this court has specifically held

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that plaintiffs must meet the pleading requirements of state law

in order to rely on a defense to a statute of limitations

challenge. Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1070,

1081 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Cal. Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 55

F.3d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995)). Because this court has already

given plaintiffs an opportunity to cure this defect, claims one

through three, as against the Stanton and Weinberg defendants,

will be dismissed with prejudice.

b. Case No. 06-905

Plaintiffs’ first three causes of action in Case No.

06-905 are based on the foreclosure sale that occurred on

February 24, 2004. The court previously dismissed plaintiffs’

first three causes of action, as against the Weinberg defendants,

but gave plaintiffs’ leave to amend because “[i]t is possible

that the Weinberg defendants’ representation in attempting to

undo the sale or in drafting tolling agreements between

plaintiffs and other defendants was representation on this

specific subject matter, and that this representation may have

tolled the statute of limitations such that this case was timely

filed.” (September 24, 2006 Order 22.) 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants represented the

Pension Trust Fund well into the year 2006 and “continue to

participate in the pending appeal of this matter.” (06-905 FAC ¶

51.) Plaintiffs specifically allege that “[d]efendants have

submitted billings to the Trust for services rendered on the

Rancho Murieta properties, including the Winncrest foreclosure

and appeal until after mid-2006 and many of said invoices are

coded by [d]efendants as pertaining to the “Winncrest matter,”

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The court takes judicial notice of the documents 14

attached to the declaration of Rachel Meny (06-905 Docket No.

70), which are a declarations of Mevi and Howard in support of

summary judgement for Pension Trust Fund in an action to set

aside the foreclosure sale in California Superior Court. 

Plaintiffs do not oppose this request. These matters are of

public record. 

The court also takes judicial notice of the declaration

of Thomas J. D’Amato (06-905 Docket No. 77) reflecting that the

appeal of the California Superior Court’s judgment to not set

aside the foreclosure sale has been argued but no decision has

been rendered. Plaintiffs do not oppose this request. These

matters are of public record. 

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“Winncrest appeal” and/or “Winncrest foreclosure.” (Id.) The

specific subject matter underlying these claims is the

foreclosure sale and the Weinberg defendants continued their

representation of Pension Trust Fund on this matter by attempting

to set aside the foreclosure sale. “The inquiry is not whether 14

an attorney-client relationship still exists but when the

representation of the specific matter terminated.” Foxborough,

26 Cal. App. 4th at 229 (citing 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal

Malpractice, Statutes of Limitations, § 18.12, at p. 119,

(footnotes omitted)). Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the

Weinberg defendants continued to represent them on the subject

matter of the foreclosure sale into 2006. Accordingly,

plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to avoid dismissal of

their action as time-barred. The Weinberg defendants may, of

course, bring a summary judgment motion if these facts are

untrue, but the court must deny their motion to dismiss. 

c. Case No. 06-907

The court previously dismissed the first three causes

of action in Case No. 06-907, as against the Weinberg defendants,

because it was “unclear how long the Weinberg defendants

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The court takes judicial notice of the documents 15

attached to the declaration of Rachel Meny (06-907 Docket No.

80), which include the California Superior Court proceedings, 

which resulted in a judgment of foreclosure against Winncrest. 

Plaintiffs do not oppose this request. These matters are of

public record. 

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represented plaintiffs on this specific subject matter, and the

court cannot determine from the allegations in the complaint that

the statute of limitations is tolled with respect to these causes

of action.” The specific subject matter at issue in these causes

of action is the purported overbilling by the attorneys during

the foreclosure proceedings. 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants represented the

Pension Trust Fund well into the year 2006 on the “same subject

matter.” (06-907 FAC ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs specifically allege that

“[d]efendants have submitted billings to the Trust for services

rendered on the Rancho Murieta properties, including the

Winncrest foreclosure and appeal until after mid-2006 and many of

said invoices are coded by defendants as pertaining to the

‘Winncrest matter,’ ‘Winncrest appeal’ and/or ‘Winncrest

foreclosure.’” (Id.) However, plaintiffs also allege that

defendants “continue to participate in the pending appeal of the

matter which primarily gave rise to the claim for attorney’s fees

and costs which were unreasonable.” It is clear that plaintiffs

are referring to litigation that ended prior to the foreclosure

sale on February 24, 2004. 

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Therefore, the Weinberg defendants did not continue to

represent plaintiffs on the same subject matter–-thus the statute

of limitations cannot be tolled here. Because this court has

already given plaintiffs an opportunity to cure this defect,

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Because the court dismisses plaintiffs’ first three 16

claims against the Weinberg defendants, the court need not

address the Weinberg defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’

improper requests for relief associated with these claims. 

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claims one through three, as against the Weinberg defendants,

will be dismissed with prejudice.16

5. Stanton Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Case No. 

06-905 for Lack of Jurisdiction

The Stanton defendants move to dismiss the entire first

amended complaint in Case No. 06-905 for lack of jurisdiction,

arguing that the case or controversy is not ripe for review. 

(06-905 Stanton Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 6-8; Stanton Defs.’ Reply

1-2.) Because ripeness pertains to a federal court’s subject

matter jurisdiction under Article III of the United States

Constitution, it is properly raised in a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880

F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (ripeness goes to a federal court’s

subject matter jurisdiction). 

The ripeness doctrine prevents premature adjudication

where a case has had no concrete impact on the parties. Exxon

Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). In

assessing ripeness claims, courts generally consider two factors:

(1) whether the relevant issues are sufficiently focused to

permit judicial resolution without further factual development,

Clinton v. Acequia, Inc., 94 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1996); and

(2) whether the parties would suffer any hardship from postponed

judicial action. Exxon, 32 F.3d at 1404. 

The Stanton defendants argue that the allegations

contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint are premature in light of

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The court has already taken judicial notice that a 17

decision has not yet been rendered in the appeal of the

California Superior Court’s summary judgment that the foreclosure

sale was valid. (06-905 Docket No. 77) 

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the pending appeal on the legitimacy of the foreclosure sale.17

Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive. First, ripeness “is

measured at the time an action is instituted.” Cf. Malama Makua

v. Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D. Haw. 2002) (citing

Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1990)). The

Stanton defendants bring this motion in their second wave of

motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs had and continue to have a

cognizable claim of action. The proper inquiry is “whether the

relevant issues are sufficiently focused to permit judicial

resolution without further factual development.” Clinton, 94

F.3d at 572. Plaintiffs allege professional negligence, breach

of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Missing the

foreclosure sale is cognizable under all three causes of actions,

regardless of further state court proceedings.

More importantly for this particular case, plaintiffs

would suffer significant hardship with judicial postponement. In

addition to the potential for their claims to become stale as the

memories of witness fades, plaintiffs could potentially be

deprived of the use of assets should they prevail on their

claims. Further, the cases upon which the Stanton defendants

rely, mostly concern challenges to administrative procedures and

are inapplicable to this case.

The Stanton defendants have not persuaded this court

that this matter is not ripe. The court will therefore deny this

motion. 

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6. Stanton and Weinberg Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Cause of Action for Fraud in 06-907

The court previously dismissed claim five because it

lacked “specificity as to times, dates, the contents of and the

parties to these alleged misrepresentations.” The Stanton and

Weinberg defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to meet the

heightened pleading requirements for fraud actions.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that

“[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with

particularity.” “To avoid dismissal for inadequacy under Rule

9(b), [a] complaint would need to ‘state the time, place, and

specific content of the false representations as well as the

identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.’” Edwards v.

Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The

complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places,

benefits received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent

activity.”).

Plaintiffs allege that the Stanton defendants, the

Weinberg defendants, and two other sets of defendants

“intentionally concealed the specific amounts of the billings,

itemized statements, and the court rulings on issues of attorneys

[sic] fees and costs to avoid discovery by Plaintiffs.” (06-907

FAC ¶ 87.) Further, plaintiffs allege that the defendants did

not submit bills to proper vendors and only submitted nonitemized statements. (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that the

defendants double billed for the same activities. (Id.) 

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Because the court dismisses plaintiffs’ claim five, as 18

against the Weinberg defendants, the court need not address the

Weinberg defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ improper

requests for relief associated with this claim. 

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Plaintiffs do not allege specific instances of these allegations

in their fraud claim. Plaintiffs have done little to remedy the

deficiencies in their first complaint. Without greater

specificity as to times, dates, the contents of and the parties

to these alleged misrepresentations, the complaint does not

sufficiently allege a cause of action for fraud. Because this

court has already given plaintiffs an opportunity to cure this

defect, claim five, as against the Stanton and Weinberg

defendants, will be dismissed with prejudice.18

III. Conclusion

In Case No. 06-904, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) the first, second, and third causes of action, as

against Howard be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

(2) the complaint, as against the Stanton defendants

and the Weinberg defendants be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

(3) with respect to all other defendants and/or claims,

defendants’ motions to dismiss, to strike, and for a more

definite statement be, and the same hereby are, DENIED.

In Case No. 06-905, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) the first, second, and third causes of action, as

against Howard be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

(2) the fourth cause of action, as against the Stanton

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defendants and the Weinberg defendants be, and the same hereby

is, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

(3) with respect to all other defendants and/or claims,

defendants’ motions to dismiss, to strike, and for a more

definite statement be, and the same hereby are, DENIED.

In Case No. 06-907, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) the first, second, and third causes of action, as

against the McMorgan defendants (McMorgan and Company, L.L.C.,

and Howard) be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

(2) the first, second, and third causes of action, as

against Liffey be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; 

(3) the complaint as against the Weinberg defendants

be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

(4) the fourth and fifth causes of action as against

the Stanton defendants be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

(5) with respect to all other defendants and/or claims,

defendants’ motions to dismiss, to strike, and for a more

definite statement be, and the same hereby are, DENIED.

Plaintiff is hereby given 30 days from the date of this

order to file an amended complaint in Case No. 06-907 consistent

with this order. Another amended complaint should not be filed

///

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unless counsel believes in good faith that plaintiffs can state a

claim upon which relief can be granted consistent with this

order. 

DATED: January 23, 2007

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