Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1 In their moving papers, plaintiffs failed to identify

the procedural rule under which they bring their motion. In

their reply, plaintiffs inappropriately state that they bring

this motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. However, Rules 59(e) and 60(b) provide the

(continued...)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et

al.,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration of this court’s June 29, 2007 Memorandum and

Order (“Order”) pursuant to Eastern District Local Rule 78-230(k)

and Rule 54(b)1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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1

(...continued)

procedural rule for filing a motion for relief from final

judgment, and is therefore, not applicable. See Balla v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court’s Order granted in part and denied in part defendants’

motions for summary judgment. Therefore, Rule 54(b) provides the

appropriate procedural rule for this motion, as the court’s order

adjudicated “fewer than all the claims . . . of fewer than all

the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b). 

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

3 The facts of this case are set forth in the court’s

Memorandum and Order, filed June 29, 2007. (Docket # 181).

2

Defendants oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth below,2

plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.3 

STANDARD

An order that resolves fewer than all of the claims among

all of the parties “is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and

liabilities of all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 18B

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 4478 (2d Ed. 2005) (while authorized, reconsideration

of interlocutory orders disfavored). Where reconsideration of a

non-final order is sought, the court has “inherent jurisdiction

to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226

F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000). To succeed in a motion to

reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior

decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in

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4 While the standards applicable to motions for

reconsideration of final judgments or orders under Rules

59(e)(final judgments) and 60(b)(final judgments and orders)

technically do not delimit the court’s inherent discretion to

reconsider interlocutory orders, the court nonetheless finds them

to be helpful guides to the exercise of its discretion. 

3

part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.

1987).

Generally, and absent highly unusual circumstances,

reconsideration is appropriate only where (1) the party presents

the court with newly discovered evidence; (2) the court committed

clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3)

there is an intervening change in controlling law.4 See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. ACANDS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

At the outset of their motion, plaintiffs contend that a

number of grounds exist for the court’s reconsideration of its

Order. In general, plaintiffs contend that “[d]ue to the fact

that four very large and difficult motions were filed and the

time to answer was short, arguments were not completed on issues

where the law was settled.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration

(Docket # 182), filed July 9, 2007, at 3). Plaintiffs also filed

the Declaration of Treva J. Hearne, plaintiffs’ counsel. Hearne

declares that plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm consists of two

partners and one secretary and that the dispositive motion

calendar is “very difficult and burdensome.” (Decl. of Treva J.

Hearne (“Hearne Decl.”), filed July 9, 2007, ¶ 2). Hearne also

declares that plaintiff Amy McConnell lives a “marginal

existence” as a single mother with four children, working at

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minimum wage employment and that it is very difficult for

plaintiffs’ counsel to communicate with her. While the court is

not unsympathetic to the constraints on plaintiffs’ counsels’

resources, unfortunately such constraints cannot justify a motion

for reconsideration. The court is fully aware of the extensive

briefing filed by both parties in support of and in opposition to

defendants’ motions for summary judgment. However, plaintiffs

did not seek leave to amend the pretrial scheduling order to

extend the time for filing an opposition to defendants’ motions. 

Rather, now that the court has rendered its decision, granting

defendants’ motions for summary judgment in part, plaintiffs

argue that they had inadequate time and resources to respond. 

Such post-decision justifications are not well-received when

plaintiffs failed to address these issues in a timely fashion. 

Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for understanding because

she works “with little assistance for poverty level clients” is

unavailing. The court cannot apply special rules to certain

parties or counsel based upon their financial status or chosen

field of practice. Such an application would offend all notions

of due process. 

Plaintiffs also contend that the Court erred in failing “to

weigh the evidence as a whole.” Plaintiffs are correct in their

observation that the court did not weigh the evidence. Such is

beyond the court’s purview on a motion for summary judgment. 

Rather, the court examined the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits and all other admissible evidence to determine whether

(1) defendants had met their initial responsibility in

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5 In support of their argument and as further complaint

about the alleged unfairness of this court’s Order, plaintiffs

also contend that “the Court was willing to allow evidence that

was rank hearsay to support the actions and reactions of Terry

Chapman.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration at 16). Such a

contention underscores plaintiffs’ faulty understanding of the

Federal Rules of Evidence and general principles of evidentiary

admissibility. As set forth in the court’s Order, statements

made by a third party to defendant T. Chapman were not offered

for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for their effect

on the listener. Moreover, the court denied defendant T.

Chapman’s motion for summary judgment on the issue to which these

statements would be relevant.

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demonstrating that there existed no genuine issue as to any

material fact; and (2) whether plaintiffs then met their burden

in establishing that there was a genuine issue as to any material

fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); See Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First

Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); SEC

v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Plaintiffs also contend that the court erred in finding that

documents submitted by plaintiffs, specifically documents

purporting to be grand jury reports, were inadmissible.5

Plaintiffs fail to offer any persuasive argument that these

documents were properly authenticated or that a proper basis was

laid (or argued) as to why the documents did not constitute

inadmissible hearsay at the time the motion was filed. 

Plaintiffs contend that defendants did not object to the

documents when previously disclosed to them or questioned about

them at their depositions. In fact and more importantly,

defendants did object to these documents at the time plaintiffs

submitted them in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

Based upon the submissions of the parties, the strictures of the

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6

Federal Rules of Evidence, and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court

sustained defendants’ objections and found the documents

inadmissible. Nothing proffered by plaintiffs in the motion for

reconsideration alters the court’s ruling. 

I. Defendant Chapman

Plaintiffs contend that defendant Terry Chapman’s (“T.

Chapman”) motion for summary judgment should not have been

granted because he unreasonably relied upon a third party when

taking custody of the children. Specifically, plaintiffs contend

that in determining whether to detain the minor children without

a warrant, defendant T. Chapman should not have relied upon the

statements of the minor plaintiffs’ grandfather, statements made

by the minor children to policemen while at Lassen County CPS, or

a prior referral of the McConnell family to a child protective

services agency in Kern County. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration on this issue is

baffling to the court. The court, in fact, DENIED defendant

Terry Chapman’s motion for summary judgement on this issue. 

(Order at 38-41). In its Order, the court found that “[b]ased

upon the circumstances presented in this case, there exists a

material question of fact whether the minor plaintiffs were at a

risk of an immediate threat of serious bodily harm if left with

their mother and therefore, a triable issue regarding whether

defendant T. Chapman violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights

by detaining the children without a warrant.” (Order at 38). 

Plaintiffs’ challenges to the court’s Order, regarding whether

defendant unreasonably relied upon certain information, all

relate to the pre-hearing detention of the minor plaintiffs, an

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6 Not only did plaintiffs fail to authenticate the

document, but defendant Terry Chapman vigorously contested that

he wrote the memo. Defendant Chapman offered the testimony of

two experts, both of whom opined that the purported memo is not

genuine. (See Order at 35-36). 

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issue for which the court found there are material issues of

fact. As such, unless plaintiffs request the court to grant

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, their arguments for

reconsideration of this issue are ill conceived and obviously

contrary to their clients’ own interest. 

Plaintiffs also contend that summary judgment was improper

because defendant T. Chapman’s credibility is in question. 

However, as the court stated in its Order, the Ninth Circuit has

found that “[n]either a desire to cross-examine an affiant or an

unspecified hope of undermining his or her credibility suffices

to avert summary judgment.” Nat’l Union Fire. Ins. Co. v.

Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations

omitted) (finding that summary judgment was properly granted

despite the plaintiff’s assertion that the evidence relied on by

the court came from witnesses whose interests were identical and

biased). Moreover, as with plaintiffs’ challenges to defendant

T. Chapman’s reliance on certain information, plaintiffs attack

defendant’s credibility as it relates to testimony he gave

regarding his decision to detain the children prior to the

hearing. Although the court did not consider the unauthenticated

and inadmissible document allegedly written by defendant T.

Chapman6 and submitted by plaintiffs, the court nevertheless

found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether

defendant T. Chapman’s decision to detain the children without a

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warrant violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. As such,

plaintiffs’ arguments in support of a motion for reconsideration

on this issue are also misplaced, as defendant T. Chapman’s

motion for summary judgement was DENIED on this claim.

In their reply brief, plaintiffs assert for the first time

that defendant T. Chapman should not be entitled to immunity for

his alleged conduct related to the minor plaintiffs’ post-hearing

detention. The law in the Ninth Circuit is well-established that

“social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for the

initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings, including their

testimony offered in such proceedings.” Mabe v. San Bernardino

County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that social

workers were immune from plaintiff’s allegations that they did

not conduct the investigation properly and were allowed to submit

false evidence to the juvenile court); see Beltran v. Santa Clara

County, – F.3d –, 2007 WL 1805559 at *4 (9th Cir. June 25, 2007)

(holding that social workers are afforded absolute immunity for

their actions that are “closely connected to the judicial

process,” including verified statements in petitions filed with a

dependency court); Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d, 820 825-26 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that social worker was absolutely immune for her

actions in investigating and presenting evidence to the

dependency court); (see also Order at 41-42). “Moreover, social

workers ‘enjoy absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when making

post-adjudication custody decisions pursuant to a valid court

order.” Id.; (see Order at 42). In their reply, plaintiffs

acknowledge that “the Ninth Circuit has historically allowed

broad based immunity to social workers.” (Pls.’ Reply, filed

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July 31, 2007, at 4). Despite this acknowledgment of binding

precedent, plaintiffs apparently request the court to disregard

Ninth Circuit authority and rely solely on arguments raised in a

pending request for en banc reconsideration of Beltran. The

court declines to do so. 

Finally, plaintiffs challenge the court’s Order as it

relates to Defendant T. Chapman’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ state law claims. Plaintiffs assert that defendant

T. Chapman admitted that he only visited the minor plaintiffs

once while they were in foster care in violation of California

law. In its Order, the court granted defendant T. Chapman’s

motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs state law claims

because plaintiffs failed to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act. Defendant T. Chapman ceased to be the social worker

assigned to the McConnell family after September 29, 2003. 

Plaintiffs filed their tort claims some fourteen months later in

December 2004 and January 2005. Pursuant to California

Government Code § 911.2, claims relating to personal injury must

be filed no later than six months after the accrual of the cause

of action. Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that

defendant T. Chapman performed any act that violated their rights

or California law after he ceased to be the McConnell family’s

social worker on September 29, 2003. Therefore, the court found

that plaintiffs failed to comply with the timely filing

requirement of the California Tort Claims Act.

In their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs again argue

that their claims against defendant T. Chapman and Lassen County

are timely because the minor plaintiffs were not reunited with

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7 In their opposition, plaintiffs cited to California

Government Code § 916, a section that does not exist. (See Order

at 45).

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their mother until November 2004. As such, plaintiffs contend

that their causes of action continued to accrue until that time. 

Plaintiffs concede in their motion that the timely-filing clock

begins to run after the “last act” that constitutes the violation

of the claim. (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration at 14-15) (citing

Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023

(1998)). The undisputed evidence demonstrates that defendant T.

Chapman had no further involvement in the case after September

29, 2003. At best, the last act performed by defendant T.

Chapman was on September 29, 2003. That plaintiffs may have

experienced emotional distress after that point is both likely

and lamentable, but irrelevant to this court’s mandated inquiry. 

However sympathetic the court is for plaintiffs’ plight, it is

not within the court’s discretion or power to choose when it will

and will not apply the timely filing requirements of the

California Tort Claims Act. Because defendant T. Chapman’s last

act relating to the McConnell family occurred well more than six

months prior to their filing of their claims, plaintiffs’ state

law claims against defendant T. Chapman are untimely.

As also argued in opposition to defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, plaintiffs contend that they were not required

to comply with the timely filing requirement if they have a claim

for breach of a mandatory duty. Plaintiffs cite to California

Government Code § 815.67

 which provides:

Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed

by an enactment that is designed to protect against the

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risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity

is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused

by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public

entity establishes that it exercised reasonable

diligence to discharge the duty.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.6 (West 2007). Under § 815 of the

California Government Code, except as otherwise provided by

statute, a public entity is generally not liable for an injury. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a) (West 2007). Section 815.6 provides a

statutory exception to this general principle and explicitly

holds public entities liable for failure to discharge a mandatory

duty. However, a plain reading of this statute reveals no

exception to compliance with the timely-filing requirement set

forth in the California Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, the court

can find no authority for plaintiff’s assertion that they were

not required to submit a claim in this context. Cf. Renteria v.

Juvenile Justice, Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 135 Cal. App. 4th 903,

908 (2006) (stating that the § 815.6 of the California Tort

Claims Act authorizes limited governmental liability for damages

and establish a uniform claim procedure that requires filing of a

claim within a brief period of the injury); Tapia v. Alameida,

03-CV-5422, 2006 WL 3457214, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2006)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for breach of a mandatory duty

for failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act)

(adopted by Tapia v. Alameida, 03-CV-5422, 2007 WL 499637, at *1

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007)).

To the extent that the court’s prior order on defendants’

motion to dismiss was unclear with regard to this issue, the

court clarifies its prior holding. On defendant Lassen County,

Loel Griffith, and T. Chapman’s prior motion to dismiss, the

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court GRANTED in part and DENIED in part defendants’ motion. 

(Mem. & Order (Docket # 34), filed Sept. 21, 2005). The court

granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence for

failure to plead compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. 

However, the court went on to discuss the viability of

plaintiffs’ negligence claims based upon failure to fulfill a

mandatory duty and stated that defendants’ motion to dismiss as

to some of those claims were DENIED. The court’s statement was

in error. Those claims should have been dismissed for failure to

comply with the California Tort Claims Act, as they were

encompassed in plaintiffs’ negligence claims. The court’s

further discussion of the viability of such claims were for

purposes of determining the futility of granting leave to amend

with respect to certain mandatory duty claims, assuming that

plaintiffs could plead compliance with the timely filing

requirement. However, the court’s language in denying

defendants’ motion did not reflect the true purpose of its

subsequent discussion.

In their motion, plaintiffs also argue that “[t]he County’s

Insurance and Claim Adjustor made no mention of the investigation

that is afforded the public entity or that it was prejudiced

because of the time expired.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration,

filed July 9, 2007, at 14). Plaintiffs argue that no advisement

was given that the plaintiffs needed to seek an extension of the

statute. (Id.) While it is unclear exactly what point

plaintiffs are seeking to make through these assertions, the

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8 To the extent plaintiffs request the court to reject

its own independent analysis of plaintiffs’ compliance with the

timely filing requirement and replace it with the opinion of a

manager of George Hills Company, Inc., Insurance Adjusters and

Claim Administrators, set forth in an unauthenticated preliminary

report, the court declines to do so. Moreover, while the

preliminary report stated at the outset that the claim appeared

to be timely, the report also recommended that the claim be

rejected to set forth the six-month time limitation for the

filing of any state causes of action. (Ex. 3 to Pls.’ Mot. for

Reconsideration, filed July 9, 2007). 

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court will liberally construe plaintiffs’ contentions in an

effort to address the possible implications of these assertions.8

To the extent that plaintiffs point to a lack of

demonstrated prejudice by defendant T. Chapman or defendant

Lassen County, plaintiffs fail to cite any authority in support

of a position that a defendant must be prejudiced in order to

apply the timely filing requirement of the California Tort Claims

Act. Rather, the California Supreme Court has stated that

“[c]ompliance with the claims statutes is mandatory and failure

to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action.” City of San

Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974) (internal

citations omitted). The California Supreme Court further

clarified that it is not the purpose of the claims statutes to

prevent surprise. Id. at 455. “It is well-settled that claims

statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the public

entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the

claim. Such knowledge . . . constitutes neither substantial

compliance nor basis for estoppel.” Id. at 455 (citations

omitted). As such, the court cannot dispense with the timely

filing requirement of the California Tort Claims Act merely

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because plaintiffs allege that defendants were not prejudiced by

plaintiffs’ untimely filing. 

To the extent that plaintiffs are seeking to argue an

estoppel theory in order to preclude defendants from relying upon

the timely filing requirement of the California Tort Claims Act,

such an argument is improper on a motion for reconsideration. “A

motion for reconsideration is not a proper mechanism for

presenting new legal theories that the movant failed to raise

with respect to the underlying motion for summary judgment.” 

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Doctors Co., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1154 (D.

Hi. 2003) (citing Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th

Cir. 2003) (stating that a motion for reconsideration “may not be

used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time

when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the

litigation”); see also Garber v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ.,

259 F. Supp. 2d 979, 982 (D. Az. 2003). Moreover, “claims of

estoppel have been rejected . . . where the plaintiff cannot show

calculated conduct or representations by the public entity or its

agents that induced plaintiff to remain inactive and not to

comply with the claims-presentation requirements.” Ortega v.

Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 1045

(1998) (citing Calabrese v. County of Monterey, 251 Cal. App. 2d

131 (1967); DeYoung v. Del Mar Thoroughbred Club, 159 Cal. App.

3d 858 (1984); Munoz v. State of California, 33 Cal. App. 4th

1767, 1786 (1995)). Plaintiffs have failed to proffer any

argument, let alone admissible evidence, that the public entity

or its agents engaged in such calculated conduct.

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Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration regarding the court’s Order as it relates to

defendant T. Chapman’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

II. Defendant Environmental Alternatives

Plaintiffs assert, with great vehemence and a degree of

disdain, that they disagree with the court’s finding that in

light of the evidence submitted to the court, defendant

Environment Alternatives (“EA”) did not owe a duty of care to

plaintiffs under general negligence principals. This is not

grounds for the grant of reconsideration. Plaintiffs advanced

arguments in their motion for reconsideration identical to the

arguments they advanced in their opposition to defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. The court found these arguments

unpersuasive then and unpersuasive now. In sum, plaintiffs

simply offer no new evidence or legal support for their

contention that the court committed clear error.

Plaintiffs again premise their argument on the basis that

the sexual molestation was “was attributable to a change in the

medical condition of Hank Coy.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration

at 6). However, again plaintiffs fail to present any evidence

that age, Alzheimer’s disease, lethargy, or hearing loss are

predictors of sexual molestation such that defendant EA should

have foreseen the subsequent molestation of one or more of the

minor children. (Order at 58). Rather, as in their motion for

summary judgment, plaintiffs fail to present affirmative evidence

in support of their claims but ask the court to submit this claim

to the jury on the basis that testimony favorable to the

defendant should not be believed because it is biased. (See Mot.

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for Reconsideration at 7). The court rejected this approach in

granting defendant EA’s motion for summary judgment, and it

rejects it again now. Nat’l Union Fire. Ins. Co., 701 F.2d at 97

(finding that summary judgment was properly granted despite the

plaintiff’s assertion that the evidence relied on by the court

came from witnesses whose interests were identical and biased). 

Just as plaintiffs have a penchant for mis-characterizing

the actual admissible evidence they have submitted to the court,

they similarly mis-characterize the court’s Order. Plaintiffs

argue that “[t]he court has given Environmental Alternatives and

all other private foster family agencies in California free

license to make money and neglect minor children defenseless

[sic].” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration at 7). The court has

done no such thing. Rather, the court found that plaintiffs

failed to present any admissible evidence justifying the

imposition of a duty of care owed by defendant EA to plaintiffs. 

The court did not hold that defendant EA was immune from suit as

a matter of law. The court found that plaintiffs had failed to

meet their burden. Now, plaintiffs seek to pawn these legal

deficiencies off upon the court by contemptuously declaring that

the court’s order is “leaving defenseless children at the mercy

of sexual predators.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration at 8 n.4). 

No matter how fervently plaintiffs seek to vilify the court and

its Order, the court will not disregard the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and decades of

precedent. Plaintiffs were required under the Rules and the law

to submit relevant, admissible evidence to the court sufficient

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9 Plaintiffs cite to Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta, 102 Cal.

App. 4th 899 (2002) in support of their argument that this court

should impose a duty of care upon defendant EA. In Murrieta, the

court found that an explorer advisor’s sexual involvement with

plaintiffs was reasonably foreseeable to his supervisor who

witnessed the advisor and the plaintiffs spending an unusual

amount of time together, the advisor and the plaintiffs going on

frequent one-on-one ride-alongs late at night, the plaintiffs

frequently calling the advisor at the station, and the plaintiffs

often waiting for the advisor for a ride home. Id. at 914. 

Defendant supervisor was also aware of the plaintiffs’

infatuation with the advisor. Id. Further, content of

leadership handbooks acknowledged the foreseeability of explorer

advisors sexually exploiting explorers. Id. Plaintiffs have

failed to proffer any similar evidence in this case. Rather,

plaintiffs admitted that they are not aware of any evidence that

EA had knowledge of the propensity of Hank Coy to engage in acts

of sexual molestation or abuse of minors prior to the time that

the minor plaintiffs were placed at the Coy home. (Order at 57).

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to demonstrate a triable issue of fact. Plaintiffs simply failed

to do so. 

Plaintiffs also contend that “[a]ccording to this Court one

child must be sacrificed so that the ‘system’ can discover the

reasonable foreseeability whether a foster parent is a sexual

predator.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration at 8 n.4). The court

made no such findings. Based upon the admissible evidence

submitted (and plaintiffs’ utter lack thereof), the court found

it was not foreseeable to defendant EA that Hank Coy would molest

any of the minor children. (See Order at 56-61). The court did

not hold that foreseeability could only be demonstrated by prior

acts of molestation by Hank Coy. However, again, plaintiffs

failed to proffer any evidence, such as particular behavior by

Hank Coy or expert analysis of predictors exhibited by Hank Coy,

that defendants were on notice of or should have been on notice

that the minor plaintiffs were at risk.9

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Plaintiffs seek to focus primarily on the public policy

aspect of the court’s analysis of the Rowland factors. In doing

so, plaintiffs misconstrue the purpose of the Rowland factors. 

The court’s analysis and findings with regard to the public

policy factor should not be taken in a vacuum or as a broad

pronouncement to be applied in all foster care cases, as

plaintiffs seemingly argue it will. Rather, the Rowland analysis

is a “policy-driven, multifactor weighing process for determining

whether in a particular case a defendant owed a tort duty to a

given plaintiff.” Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1091 (emphasis

added). In accordance with California law, the court analyzed

the negligence liability of defendant EA, considering all

relevant factors set forth by the California Supreme Court in

Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 15 Cal. 4th 456, 472-73 (1997),

and bearing in mind that the foreseeability of harm to the

plaintiff is “the most important factor” in determining whether a

duty should be imposed upon a defendant. See Margaret W. v.

Kelley R., 139 Cal. App. 4th 141, 161 (2006). In light of the

absence of any evidence demonstrating the foreseeability of the

harm inflicted upon the minor plaintiffs, the court found that

where foreseeability is not reasonable, the policy of preventing

future harm would not be served by imposing liability. (Order at

62 (citing Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1093-94)). The court also

found that, based upon the admissible evidence in this case, the

remaining Rowland factors militated against a finding that

defendant EA owed a duty of care to plaintiffs under general

negligence principles. (See Order at 61-63). Clearly,

plaintiffs disagree with this court’s holding. However,

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disagreement, no matter how vehement and inflammatory, does not

justify a grant of reconsideration. 

The court notes again that it is wholly sympathetic to the

injuries suffered by the minor plaintiffs in this case. However,

such sympathy cannot override the court’s duty to correctly apply

the law as it interprets it. Simply put, absent admissible

evidence, a court of law cannot be a curative for the tragic

consequences that may have been caused by the defendants in this

case. As such, and for the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion

for reconsideration regarding the court’s Order as it relates to

defendant EA’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

III. Board Defendants

Plaintiffs assert that the failure to act by the

individual members of the Lassen County Board of Supervisors,

defendants Hanson, Dahle, Keefer, Pyle, and J. Chapman

(collectively, the “Board defendants”) was an administrative

function, and thus they are not entitled to legislative immunity. 

As such, plaintiffs assert that the court erred in granting the

Board defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs raise the same arguments, citing the same cases,

as they raised in their opposition to the Board defendants’

motion for summary judgment. The court considered such arguments

and found that the Board defendants were entitled to absolute

legislative immunity. Once again, it is clear that plaintiffs

disagree with the court’s holding. However, such disagreement is

not a basis for reconsideration. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion

for reconsideration regarding the court’s Order as it relates to

Board Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

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IV. Defendant Lassen County

Plaintiffs contend that defendant Lassen County’s motion for

summary judgment should not have been granted because it is

liable for the failure of its employees to carry out their

duties. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that Lassen County and

its employees failed to conduct regular visits to the foster

parent and the child. For the reasons set forth above, to the

extent that plaintiffs seek to hold the County liable for

defendant T. Chapman’s failure to conduct regular visits, such

claims did not comply with the timely filing requirement set

forth in the California Tort Claims Act. To the extent that

plaintiffs seek to hold the County liable for defendant Loel

Griffith’s conduct, as set forth in the court’s Order,

plaintiffs’ failed to proffer evidence to support that defendant

Griffith is liable based on either their federal or state claims. 

Moreover, plaintiffs noticeably do not move for reconsideration

as to court’s Order granting defendant Griffith’s motion for

summary judgment.

Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding Lassen County’s alleged

negligence in its performance of mandatory duties were discussed

at length in this court’s Order. (See Order at 50-54). 

Plaintiffs fail to offer any new evidence or argument in their

motion for reconsideration that would change this court’s prior

analysis of the issues. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration regarding the court’s Order as it relates to

Lassen County’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 16, 2007 

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