Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01519/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01519-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PageMasters, Inc., )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 05-1519-PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Océ-Technologies, B.V., )

)

Defendant. ) )

On March 23, 2006, the court, inter alia, granted defendant,

Océ-Technologies B.V.’s (“Océ”) motion for summary judgment. 

PageMasters, Inc. v. Océ-Technologies B.V., 2006 WL 753164 (D.Ariz.

2006) (“PageMasters”) (doc. 34). Currently pending before the

court is a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 by plaintiff,

PageMasters, Inc., for relief from that order and the judgment

entered thereon (doc. 35). 

Finding oral argument unnecessary, the court denies

plaintiff’s request in this regard (doc. 52) and rules as follows.

Background

The court assumes familiarity with all prior proceedings and

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28 1 Knott v. McDonald’s Corp., 147 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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orders in this action, as well as in the related action, OcéTechnologies, B.V. v. PageMasters, Inc., No. CIV 04-0557 PHX RCB. 

To place the present motion in context, however, several aspects of

PageMasters bear repeating. There is no dispute that in January

1997, the parties entered into a Distribution Agreement. 

PageMasters, 2006 WL 753164, at *2. Likewise, the parties

“concede[d]” that three years after entering into that Distribution

Agreement “PageMasters entered into [an] Asset Purchase Agreement

that assigned essentially all of [its] assets, including the

Distribution Agreement, to Buzzsaw.” Id. The narrow issue before

the court in PageMasters was “whether PageMasters, in th[at] Asset

Purchase Agreement, reserved a right to audit Océ or assigned such

a right away to Buzzsaw.” Id. 

Agreeing with Océ that “‘all’ means all[,]”1 this court held

that when PageMasters “assign[ed] ‘all’ agreements, rights and

obligations created under the Distribution Agreement to Buzzsaw[,]”

that “includ[ed] the right to conduct the ‘single’ audit to collect

any remaining royalty payments due to PageMasters.” Id. at *3 and

*4 (citation omitted). Thus, the court concluded that “under the

language of the Asset Purchase Agreement PageMasters did not retain

a right to independently audit or collect royalties from Océ.” Id.

at *4. Implicitly then, the court adopted Océ’s argument that

PageMasters lacked standing to assert any rights under the

Distribution Agreement because it had assigned those rights to

Buzzsaw. See id. at *5. Because PageMasters did not have

standing, the court found no need to address Océ’s alternative

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argument that PageMasters’ claims are time barred. Id. 

Approximately six weeks after the issuance of that decision,

PageMasters contacted Autodesk, Inc., as the successor in interest

to Buzzsaw. PageMasters explained that in its view after the

PageMasters decision it became “Autodesk’s . . . responsibility to

demand and conduct the audit, to invoice any A/R [accounts

receivable] due and owing to PageMasters and to collect said A/R

from Oce.” McKee Aff., exh. 3 thereto (doc. 45-2, at 33) (emphasis

in original). PageMasters therefore “demand[ed]” that Autodesk

conduct such an audit of Océ. Id. For several months after that

initial “demand,” PageMasters and Autodesk discussed the audit

issue. Id. at 4, ¶ 9. 

Finally, on October 6, 2006, Autodesk informed PageMasters of

two transactions which from Autodesk’s standpoint relieved it of

any audit responsibilities it may have owed to PageMasters. The

first transaction is “a Software OEM Distribution Agreement dated

October 1, 2000 (the ‘2000 Distribution Agreement’)” between

Buzzsaw and Océ. McKee Aff., exh. 5 thereto at 1 (doc. 45-2 at

38). According to Autodesk, “[b]y its terms the 2000 Distribution

Agreement replaced and superseded” the 1997 Distribution Agreement

between PageMasters and Océ. Id. Thus, Autodesk took the position

that “the audit clause contained in the 1997 Distribution

Agreement,” which PageMasters has been relying upon as the basis

for its audit claim in this litigation, “was superseded by the

audit clause contained in the 2000 Distribution Agreement[.]” Id.

The second transaction which Autodesk referenced is a May 13,

2002 License and Option Agreement (“the License Agreement”) between

Buzzsaw and Océ. After Buzzsaw became a wholly owned subsidiary of

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2 “Buzzsaw has since been merged into Autodesk.” McKee Aff., exh. 5

thereto at 2, n.2 (doc. 45-2 at 39). 

3 The court emphasizes that this is PageMasters’ interpretation of the

License Agreement. That Agreement is not part of the record on this motion

however. Therefore, the court does not have the benefit of knowing exactly what,

if anything, that Agreement provides with respect to the original Distribution

Agreement between PageMasters and Océ. 

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Autodesk,2 it entered into that Agreement with Océ “amending and

replacing the 2000 Distribution Agreement.” Id., exh. 5 thereto at

2 (doc. 45-2 at 39). Under that 2002 License Agreement, “Océ

acquired the option to purchase certain assets of Buzzsaw,

including those relating to . . . PageMasters[.]” Id. Autodesk

explained however that “[n]o right of audit was provided for under

the License . . . Agreement in the event that Océ elected to

exercise its option to purchase[]” -- an option which Océ elected

to exercise effective May 1, 2003. Id. “As a result of these

transactions[,]” Autodesk informed PageMasters that “Autodesk no

longer has a current right, if it ever did, to audit Océ’s use of

the PageMasters technology.” Id. 

Asserting that Océ “never disclosed to PageMasters or [to]

this Court . . . the fact that under the License . . . Agreement

[Océ] acquired Autodesk’s rights and assumed the responsibilities

under the original Distribution Agreement between Océ and

PageMasters[,]”3 PageMasters maintains that it is entitled to

relief from judgment. Mot. (doc. 45) at 4 (citation omitted). 

PageMasters theorizes that the License Agreement constitutes “newly

discovered evidence,” and thus it is entitled to relief from

judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). PageMasters further

contends that “Océ[] repeated[ly], active[ly] and intentional[ly]

conceal[ed] . . . the critical fact that [Océ] had acquired from

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Autodesk its rights and responsibilities under the original . . .

Distribution Agreement[]” between PageMasters and Océ. This

alleged conduct, from PageMasters’ viewpoint, amounts to “fraud on

the Court and PageMasters[,]” and thus a basis for relief from

judgment under subsection (b)(3) of Rule 60. Reply (doc. 51) at 7

and 8. At the very least, PageMasters contends that Océ’s “lack of

candor with the Court and violation of at least the spirit of

disclosure embodied in Rule 26 provide[]” grounds for relief under

Rule 60(b)(6). Mot. (doc. 45) at 9. 

Discussion

I. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) - Governing Legal Standards

Rule 60(b) enumerates six bases warranting “relief from

judgment or order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Such motions “are

addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Singh v.

Yellow Transp., Inc., 2007 WL 1795778, at *2 (E.D.Cal. June 21,

2007) (citing Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th

Cir. 2004)). As just noted, PageMasters asserts that it is

entitled to relief from judgment based upon subsections (2), (3),

and (6) of Rule 60(b). The court will address each in turn. 

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)

Rule 60(b)(2) allows relief from judgment when there is “newly

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). PageMasters contends that it is entitled to

relief under this subsection because Océ “never disclosed . . . the

fact that under the License . . . Agreement it acquired Autodesk’s

rights and assumed the responsibilities under the original

Distribution Agreement between Oce and PageMasters.” Mot. (doc.

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45) at 4 (citation omitted). Thus, in PageMasters’ view the

License Agreement is “newly discovered evidence” warranting relief

from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). 

Océ responds that because PageMasters cannot show either

that the assertedly “new evidence,” in the form of the 2002 License

Agreement, would “likely . . . change the” result here, or that

PageMasters exercised “due diligence” to “discover” that evidence,

the court should deny this aspect of PageMasters’ motion for relief

from judgment. Resp. (doc. 48) at 7.

“Relief from final judgment on the basis of newly discovered

evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) ‘is warranted if (1) the moving party

can show the evidence relied on in fact constitutes ‘newly

discovered evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b); (2) the

moving party exercised due diligence to discover this evidence; and

(3) the newly discovered evidence must be of such magnitude that

production of it earlier would have been likely to change the

disposition of the case.’” Immersion Corporation v. Sony Computer

Entertainment America, Inc., 2006 WL 618599, at *15 (N.D.Cal. March

8, 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting, inter alia, Feature Realty,

Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)),

appeal dismissed, 2007 WL 930714 (Fed. Cir. March 8, 2007).

1. “Newly Discovered Evidence”

“Newly discovered evidence” for Rule 60(b)(2) purposes

“requires that [it] not have been in the party’s possession at the

time of summary judgment or discoverable with reasonable

diligence.” Sanchez v. Corrections Corporation of America, 2007 WL

1390675, at *7 (E.D.Cal. May 9, 2007) (citing Coastal Transfer Co.

v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1987))

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(emphasis added). The 2002 License Agreement which PageMasters now

claims is newly discovered evidence, clearly was not in

PageMasters’ possession when Océ moved for summary judgment. As

the record shows, PageMasters did not become aware of that

Agreement until October 6, 2006 - approximately six months after

the PageMasters decision. See Aff. of Jeffrey A. McKee (Dec. 11,

2006) (doc. 45-2) at 4, ¶ 9. 

The issue thus becomes whether PageMasters “exercised due

diligence to discover” the License Agreement. See Immersion, 2006

WL 618599, at *15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

This due diligence “inquiry ‘looks not to what the litigant

actually discovered, but to what he or she could have discovered.’”

International Center for Technology Assessment v. Leavitt, 468

F.Supp.2d 200, 207 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (quoting 12 FED. PRAC. 3d

§ 60.42[5]) (emphasis in original) (other citation omitted). Thus,

if PageMasters “could have discovered” the License Agreement by

exercising due diligence, by definition, that Agreement would not

be newly discovered evidence. Hence, it could not form the basis

for relief under Rule 60(b)(2). 

Applying that standard to the present case, in the exercise of

due diligence PageMasters “could have discovered” the License

Agreement. PageMasters readily concedes that it “did not inquire

about or seek production” of documents such as the License

Agreement. See Mot. (doc. 45) at 5 and 6. PageMasters claims that

it did not pursue that type of discovery because it “could not

reasonably be expected to fathom that Oce had acquired such rights

when it was asserting that PageMasters had no right to an audit and

that if any party had a right to . . . an audit it would be

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Autodesk (as successor to Buzzsaw).” Id. at 6. In a similar vein,

PageMasters declares that it “did not contemplate making . . . a

request” for documents such as the License Agreement given “Oce’s

argument that PageMasters did not retain any rights to perform an

audit[.]” Id. at 5. The fact remains, however, that PageMasters

easily “could have” discovered the existence of the License

Agreement, but it did not.

Indeed, even without formal discovery, PageMasters could have

become aware of the 2002 License Agreement through a May 13, 2002,

press release detailing that Agreement. See Resp. (doc. 48), exh.

A thereto at 1. Further, according to Océ’s Product Manager,

“since no later than July 29, 2005[,]” its website which is

“publicly accessible[],” outlined Océ’s history, including the 2002

License Agreement. Id., exh. B thereto (Decl’n of Timothy Moore). 

Based upon that press release and website, Océ asserts that the

2002 License Agreement was “publicly available information” and

thus “easily ascertainable with [the] exercise of . . . due

diligence[]” by PageMasters. Id. at 9. 

Not only that, because the License Agreement was “[p]ublicly

available” through the press release and Océ’s website, Océ further

maintains that that Agreement “cannot constitute newly discovered

evidence.” See Leavitt, 468 F.Supp.2d at 207 (citing, inter alia,

Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 794 (11th Cir. 1987)). 

Accordingly, the court should deny PageMasters’ motion for relief

under Rule 60(b)(2). 

Océ’s argument is persuasive. First of all, the License

Agreement is not “newly discovered evidence” as that phrase is used

in Rule 60(b)(2) because it was publicly available. Second, even

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if the License Agreement was not publicly available because it was,

as PageMasters puts it, mentioned in “an obscure press release[,]”

as set forth above, that Agreement readily could have been

discovered with due diligence. See Reply (doc. 51) at 6. 

Evidently PageMasters realizes this because in its Reply

PageMasters notes “that a new trial may be granted even though

proper diligence was not used if this is necessary to prevent a

manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 4 (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). PageMasters overlooks the fact, however, that

this is a “narrow exception” and “has been restricted to cases in

which the evidence is practically conclusive.” Ope Shipping, Ltd.

v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 100 F.R.D. 428, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)

(citation omitted). “In short, the evidence must make a ‘prima

facie showing that a different result should have been reached

initially.’” Id. (quoting Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Evans

Products, Co., 403 F.2d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 1968)). As more fully

explained below, PageMasters is not entitled to invoke this “narrow

exception” to the due diligence requirement because the License

Agreement is not “practically conclusive.” See id. In fact, given

the unequivocal nature of the assignment in the Asset Purchase

Agreement, it is difficult to see how any subsequent transactions

could impact that assignment. 

2. Changed Outcome

Even if the court agreed with PageMasters that the License

Agreement qualifies as “newly discovered evidence” within the

meaning of Rule 60(b)(2), nonetheless, it would deny PageMasters’’s

motion for relief thereunder. Relief from judgment pursuant to

that Rule is not proper because PageMasters has not met its burden

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4 As previously noted, the License Agreement is not part of the record

herein. Thus, it would be sheer speculation for this court to find, as PageMasters

so vigorously contends, that based upon that Agreement “Oce had the responsibility

to perform and PageMasters had standing to demand, an audit for PageMasters benefit

and thus Oce was required to pay PageMasters any accounts receivable resulting from

the audit.” Reply (doc. 51) at 7 (emphasis in original). 

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of showing that the License Agreement is “of such magnitude that

production of it earlier would have been likely to change the

disposition of the case.” See Immersion, 2006 WL 618599, at *15

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In PageMasters, this court reiterated its earlier holding that

“the language of the Asset Purchase Agreement ‘clearly and

unequivocally assign[ed] to Buzzsaw all rights and responsibilities

created by the Distribution Agreement.’” PageMasters, 2006 WL

753164, at *3 (quoting Océ-Technologies B.V. v. PageMasters, Inc.,

No. CIV 04-0557 PHX RCB, Order (doc. 35) at 7). Buzzsaw’s

subsequent disposition of its rights in the License Agreement does

not “undo” the original assignment made through the Asset Purchase

Agreement. See Resp. (doc. 48) at 2. Thus, PageMasters has not

met its burden of convincing the court that the License Agreement

“would have been likely to change the disposition of the case.”4

See Immersion, 2006 WL 618599, at *15 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

In sum, because PageMasters has not met any of the three

criteria justifying relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(2), the court denies this aspect of PageMasters’ motion. 

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)

PageMasters contends that Océ “misrepresented by [o]mission

the [e]xistence of the License . . . Agreement.” Mot. (Doc. 45) at

7. Therefore, PageMasters also is relying upon Rule 60(b)(3),

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5 In its motion PageMasters invokes the “fraud upon the court” doctrine.

 See Mot. (doc. 45) at 7. To make that argument, however, a party must institute

a separate action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“This rule does not limit the power of

a court to entertain an independent action . . . to set aside a judgment for fraud

upon the court.”). Obviously PageMasters has not commenced such an action. Thus,

the court declines to consider whether, as PageMasters suggests, Océ engaged in

“fraud upon the court,” as distinguished from fraud within the meaning of Rule

60(b)(3). 

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which permits relief from judgment due to “fraud . . .,

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party[.]” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).5

To prevail on a motion brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) “‘the

moving party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other

misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing party

from fully and fairly presenting the defense.’” Berry v. Hawaii

Express Service, Inc., 2006 WL 1582430, at *1 (D.Hawaii June 5,

2006) (quoting DeSaracho v. Custom Food Mach. Inc., 206 F.3d 874,

880 (9th Cir. 2000)) (other citation omitted). As the Ninth

Circuit has made clear, “Rule 60(b)(3) ‘is aimed at judgments which

were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually

incorrect.’” Id. (quoting DeSaracho, 206 F.3d at 880) (citing, in

turn, In re M/V Peacock, 809 F.3d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Further, as with Rule 60(b)(2), there is a due diligence component

to Rule 60(b)(3). That Rule “require[s] that fraud . . . not be

discoverable by due diligence before or during the proceedings.”

Casey, 362 F.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

Océ is taking the position that PageMasters is not entitled to

have the judgment set aside pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)

because it has “proffer[ed] no evidence, let alone the clear and

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convincing evidence required[]” thereunder to show “that . . . the

judgment was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or other

misconduct[.]” Resp. (doc. 48) at 10 (citation omitted). Océ’s

position is well taken.

Once again, PageMasters has not met its burden of showing that

it is entitled to relief from judgment. And once again, part of

the reason for that failure is the fact that PageMasters did not

exercise due diligence. PageMasters contends that Océ obtained

summary judgment in its favor as a result of fraud or

misrepresentation. However, PageMasters has failed, as it must, to

prove either fraud or misrepresentation by clear and convincing

evidence. 

In the context of the litigation as a whole, Océ’s silence as

to the 2002 License Agreement does not amount to fraud or

misrepresentation. PageMasters’ admission that it never sought

discovery in this regard significantly undermines its argument that

Océ engaged in fraud or misrepresentation. Furthermore, the Ninth

Circuit has held that “discovery recalcitrance does not constitute

fraud” for purposes of obtaining relief from judgment under Rule

60(b)(3). Casey, 362 F.3d at 1260. Surely if “discovery

recalcitrance” is insufficient to establish fraud within the

meaning of Rule 60(b)(3), silence when no discovery request was

made, nor any discovery obligation imposed under the Federal Rules,

cannot be deemed fraud.

Additionally, PageMasters has not shown by clear and

convincing evidence that the conduct complained of, i.e. not

revealing the existence of the 2002 License Agreement, “prevent[ed]

[it] from fully and fairly presenting” its case.” See id.

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(citation omitted). Given the broad scope of the assignment by

PageMasters, subsequent agreements, such as the License Agreement

(to which PageMasters was not a party) did not prevent PageMasters

from “fully and fairly presenting” its arguments. At worst this

judgment was possibly “factually incorrect” because the License

Agreement was not part of the record. That is an insufficient

basis, however, upon which to obtain relief from judgment under

Rule 60(b)(3). See Berry, 2006 WL 1582430, at *1 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the court

denies this aspect of PageMasters’ motion as well. 

 C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) - “Any Other Reason”

Initially PageMasters mentioned subsection (b)(6) as another

possible basis for this motion. That catch-all provision of Rule

60(b) allows for relief from judgment for “any other reason[.]”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). PageMasters’’s Reply does not mention

Rule 60(b)(6) at all though. Thus, the court assumes that

PageMasters has correctly realized that Rule 60(b)(6) does not

apply here. 

The Ninth Circuit views “‘[c]lause 60(b)(6) [a]s residual and

. . . as being exclusive of the preceding clauses.” Neufeld v.

Wimbish, 2007 WL 1875965, at *2 (E.D.Cal. June 28, 2007) (quoting,

inter alia, LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791

F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)). “Thus, if the circumstances

alleged fall into any of the other subsections allowing set aside,

then relief under subsection (6) can not be had.” Brown v. Eastman

Kodak Company, 2000 WL 1732522, at *3 (Guam Terr. Nov. 27, 2000)

(citing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1948)). 

Plainly because PageMasters is relying upon two “preceding clauses”

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6 Almost as an afterthought, in its Reply PageMasters argues that

“Autodesk and Oce were not empowered to terminate PageMasters’ right, without its

consent, to an audit and accounts receivable.” Reply (doc. 51) at 8. The court

declines to consider this argument for two reasons. First, PageMasters has not set

forth any procedural basis for it. Second, as already noted, without having the

License Agreement before it, the court can only (improperly )speculate as to what

that Agreement provided. 

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of Rule 60(b) – subsections (2) and (3) – it may not, as Océ is

quick to point out, also rely upon the catch-all provision found in

subsection (6). 

Moreover, even if PageMasters was not relying upon any

preceding clauses of Rule 60(b), it still would not be entitled to

relief under subsection (6) of that Rule. “Judgments are not often

set aside under Rule 60(b)(6).” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co.,

Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). That is so because Rule

60(b)(6) “is used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent

manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary

circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to

prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “Accordingly, a party who moves

for such relief must demonstrate both injury and circumstances

beyond his control that prevented [it] from proceeding with . . . 

the action in a proper fashion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). PageMasters has shown neither. Therefore

PageMasters cannot avail itself of Rule 60(b)(6) as a basis for

setting aside summary judgment in Océ’s favor.6

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Relief from Judgment by

. . . 

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plaintiff PageMasters, Inc. (doc. 45) is DENIED. 

DATED this 11th day of September, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:05-cv-01519-RCB Document 53 Filed 09/12/07 Page 15 of 15