Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barry Northcross Patterson, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV-05-1159-PHX-PGR (VAM)

)

vs. )

) ORDER and OPINION

Dora Schriro, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) ) 

On October 4, 2005, Magistrate Judge Mathis issued an Order and Report and

Recommendation (doc. #8) wherein she in part struck the plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint (doc. #7) from the record and recommended that this case be dismissed

without prejudice due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's initial screening

order (doc. # 5). On October 13, 2005, the plaintiff, who is pro se, filed a Motion to

Deny the Order and Report and Recommendation and to Request a Response to

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (doc. #9). The Court construes the plaintiff's document

as both an appeal from the order striking his amended complaint and as an objection to

the recommendation that this case be dismissed. As a result of its de novo review of

the record, the Court finds that the amended complaint should not have been stricken

and that this action should not be dismissed.

The Court initially notes that an error was made in the docketing of this case at

the time it was commenced in that the Clerk's Office inadvertently failed to notice

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1

 Mrs. Wilber has been to date mistakenly referred to as defendant "Wilkes" by the

Court in its docket and in its previous orders due to a misinterpretation of the plaintiff's

handwriting in his original complaint.

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 that the plaintiff's original complaint contained an addendum page 2A listing additional

defendants. As a result, the docket listed only Dora Schriro, K. McConnell, Chaplain

Broderich [sic-Broderick], and Chaplain Mason as defendants in the original complaint,

and failed to list Mrs. Wilber1

, CO Moore, Lt. Johnson, Capt. Carroll, J. Arnold, and CO

Adachi as named defendants. 

In its original screening order, entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the

Court dismissed without prejudice all of Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the original

complaint and dismissed all of Count IV with the exception of that portion dealing with

the alleged third retaliatory transfer; the Court ordered service of the remaining portion

of Count IV on defendants McConnell and Wilkes [sic-Wilber]. On May 26, 2005, the

plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint wherein he realleged all of the claims of the

original complaint with the exception of Counts VI and VII.

The Magistrate Judge determined that the First Amended Complaint should be

stricken, and that this action should proceed on the original complaint, on the ground

that the plaintiff was simply trying to avoid the results of the Court's screening order by

reasserting claims in the amended complaint that the Court found legally insufficient

when it screened the original complaint. The Court cannot agree. The plaintiff had the

right pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) to file an amended complaint as a matter of course

since no responsive pleadings have yet been filed in this action, and had the right to do

so notwithstanding that the Court had already dismissed some of the claims and

defendants from the original complaint without prejudice. Furthermore, while the First

Amended Complaint does reallege the same claims that the Court dismissed without

prejudice in its screening order, with the exception of Counts VI and VII of the original

complaint, a close reading of the First Amended Complaint reveals that the plaintiff

sufficiently rewrote certain of the allegations in those claims such that some of the

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2

 The First Amended Complaint, as the Court construes the plaintiff's handwriting, 

names as defendants Dora Schriro (identified as ADOC Director), K.J. McConnell (identified as

deputy warden, South Unit at Florence Complex), Chaplain Broderick (identifed as being at

Eyeman, Rynning), Chaplain Mason (identified as being at South Unit), Mrs. Wilber (identified

as being head of canteen kitchen staff at South Unit), CO Moore (identified as being a

corrections officer at South Unit), Lt. Johnson (identified as being an officer on staff at South

Unit), CO III Curran (identified as being the grievance coordinator at South Unit), and Capt.

Soulvie (identified as being an officer at Florence Complex).

3

 The Court notes that the record copy of the Clerk's service packet transmittal letter,

dated May 12, 2005, states that the plaintiff was sent two copies of the Marshal's Process

Receipt & Return form, two copies of the Notice of Lawsuit & Request for Waiver of Service of

Summons form, four copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons form, two copies of the

Summons form, two copies of the Court's screening order, and two copies of the plaintiff's

original complaint.

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deficiencies noted in the Court's original screening order have been corrected. Because

the Court cannot conclude that the First Amended Complaint, liberally read, fails in its

entirety to state any cognizable claim, the Court will order the Clerk of the Court to

reinstate the First Amended Complaint.2

 The original complaint is therefore

superseded, and any causes of action alleged in the original complaint and all

defendants named in the original complaint, not included in the amended complaint are

not longer part of this action. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).

The Magistrate Judge recommended that this action be dismissed because the

plaintiff failed to return the service packet within twenty days of its receipt, as required

by the Court's original screening order. The plaintiff has objected to the Report and

Recommendation on the grounds that he did not return a completed service packet

because he only received one copy of the USM service form from the Clerk of the Court

whereas the Court had ordered two defendants to be served3

, and because he was

waiting for a response from the Court regarding his First Amended Complaint. In light of

the five factors that the Court must weigh before dismissing an action pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) as a sanction for failing to obey a court order, see Malone v. United

States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819

(1988), the Court concludes that a dismissal is not now warranted, particularly in light of

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4

 The Court wishes to make clear to the plaintiff that he should have immediately

notified the Court if he did not receive all of the necessary service documents, and that it was

his responsibility to seek an extension of time to comply with the Court's service order if he

could not timely comply with it for some reason.

5

 The plaintiff alleges in Count I of the amended complaint that notwithstanding that he

is a Messianic Jew who applied for a kosher diet under ADOC regulations, he is receiving only

kosher dinners and non-kosher breakfasts and lunches over his objections because defendants

Broderick and Mason have said that only Orthodox Jewish inmates can receive three kosher

meals a day.

 The plaintiff alleges in Count II of the amended complaint that he is being subjected

to religious discrimination and unequal protection because special meals are given for such

holidays as the Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, and Christmas and Cinco de Mayo to all inmates

except those on kosher diets notwithstanding that most if not all of the foods served in the

special meals can be served kosher. The claim does not identify any defendant as being the

cause of the alleged discrimination.

The plaintiff alleges in Count III of the amended complaint that defendant Moore

interfered with his right to practice his religion when she gave him a major disciplinary ticket for

putting non-kosher spaghetti on his kosher tray, which the plaintiff states he did because the

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the fact that the Court is reinstating the First Amended Complaint.4

In its original screening order, the Court dismissed without prejudice Counts I-III,

the plaintiff's religious diet-related claims, for failure to state a First Amendment and/or

Equal Protection Clause claim because the Court concluded that the allegations related

to those counts, taken together, facially revealed that the plaintiff lacked a sincerely held

belief that he must adhere to a kosher diet. See Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th

Cir. 1994) (Court noted that a religious claim must be sincerely held and be rooted in

religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns, in order to merit protection

under the First Amendment.); see also, DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000)

("[I]f a prisoner's request for a particular diet is not the result of sincerely-held religious

beliefs, the First Amendment imposes no obligation on the prison to honor the request[.]

,,, It is in this way that prisons are protected from random requests for special diets by

inmates whose alleged dietary restrictions are not the result of their religious convictions

but rather their secular predilections.") (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

Having reviewed the revised allegations in Counts I-III of the First Amended

Complaint5

, the Court concludes that it would no longer be appropriate for it to

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spaghetti was otherwise going to be thrown out and he has a moral and spiritual belief that food

should not be wasted. He further alleges that the major disciplinary ticket was not based on any

violation of the ADOC rules but on Moore's desire to define the plaintiff's religious practices, that

the major disciplinary ticket was elemental in him being transferred to a maximum security unit,

and it was given at a time when ADOC officials were providing him with non-kosher breakfasts

and lunches over his objections.

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determine as a matter of law through a § 1915A screening order that the plaintiff does

not sincerely believe that he must follow a kosher diet as a Messianic Jew. While the

Court will thus not dismiss Counts I and III at this time, the Court will dismiss Count II

without prejudice because the alleged constitutional violation raised therein is not linked

to any named defendant. In order to state a constitutional claim, the plaintiff must allege

that he suffered specific injury as a result of the specific conduct of a defendant, and

show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of the defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976).

In its original screening order, the Court also dismissed without prejudice those

portions of Count IV dealing with the first alleged retaliatory transfer, because it was

time-barred on its face, and the second alleged retaliatory transfer, because it did not

involve any named defendants; the Court permitted service on defendants McConnell

and Wilkes [sic-Wilber] regarding the third alleged retaliatory transfer. The plaintiff, in 

re-raising all three alleged retaliatory transfers in his amended Count IV in the First

Amended Complaint, stated that the allegations concerning the first alleged retaliatory

transfer are meant as history only, and he included Curran and Soulvie, the prison

officials allegedly responsible for the second retaliatory transfer, as named defendants

in the amended complaint; the plaintiff also reiterated the allegations as to defendants

McConnell and Wilber regarding the alleged third retaliatory transfer. Based on those

changes, the Court concludes that Count IV of the amended complaint (consisting of the

alleged second and third retaliatory transfers) should be not be dismissed at this time. 

The Court further dismissed Count V of the original complaint without prejudice in

its screening order because the plaintiff, to the extent he was attempting to do so, had

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no standing to assert a claim on behalf of family members as a result of him not being

allowed to complete a family-related bereavement telephone call, and because the

plaintiff did not state a retaliation claim on his own behalf since he had no

constitutionally-protected right under the First Amendment to make the bereavement

call. While the plaintiff has somewhat revised this claim in Count V in the First

Amended Complaint, he has still failed to state a claim because a prisoner has no First

Amendment right to make telephone calls to family members if other methods of familial

communication are available. See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1047 (2003).

The plaintiff is advised that he should take notice that if he fails to timely comply

with every provision of this Order, or any order entered in this matter, this action may be

dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (District

court may dismiss action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion to Deny the Order and Report and

Recommendation (doc. #9) is granted to the extent that the portion of Magistrate

Judge's order (doc. #8) striking the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is vacated and

that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (doc. #8) is rejected.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts II and V of the First Amended Complaint

(doc. #7) are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Broderick and Mason shall be

required to answer Count I of the First Amended Complaint, that defendant Moore shall

be required to answer Count III of the First Amended Complaint, that defendants Curran

and Soulvie shall be required to answer Part B of Count IV of the First Amended

Complaint (pertaining to the alleged second retaliatory transfer), and that defendants

McConnell and Wilber shall be required to answer Part C of Count IV of the First

Amended Complaint (pertaining to the alleged third retaliatory transfer). All other

defendants named in the First Amended Complaint are dismissed.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send the plaintiff a

service packet including the First Amended Complaint (doc. #7), this Order, and both

summons and request for waiver forms for defendants Broderick, Mason, Moore,

Curran, Soulvie, McConnell, and Wilber.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall complete and return the

service packet to the Clerk of the Court no later than twenty (20) days of the filing of this

Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service of process if the plaintiff fails

to comply with this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of

service of the summons or complete service of the Summons and First Amended

Complaint on the defendants within 120 days of the filing of the First Amended

Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may

be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) as to each defendant not timely served.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall retain the

Summons, a copy of the First Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future

use.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall notify the

defendants of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the

summons pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d). The notice to the defendants shall include a

copy of this Order. The Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or

requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. 

If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a defendant within thirty days from

the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint,

and this Order upon the defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2);

(b) Within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of

service for the defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver

of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting

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service upon the defendant. The costs of service shall be enumerated on the

return of service form (USM-285) and shall include the costs incurred by the

Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended

Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms

(USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally

served defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2) and (5), unless otherwise

ordered by the Court;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any defendant who agrees to waive service

of the Summons and First Amended Complaint shall return the signed waiver

forms to the United States Marshal, not to the plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each served defendant shall answer the First

Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time

provided by the applicable provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(a).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any answer or responsive pleading shall state

the specific defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any

answer, responsive pleading, or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific

defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall serve upon the defendants, or

if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon counsel, a copy of every further

pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. The plaintiff shall

include with the original document and copy, to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a

certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of the pleading or document was

mailed to the defendants or their counsel. Any paper received by a District Court Judge

or Magistrate Judge which has not been filed with the Clerk of Court may be

disregarded by the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that at all times during the pendency of this action,

the plaintiff shall immediately advise the Court and the United States Marshal of any

change of address and its effective date. Such notice shall be captioned “NOTICE OF

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CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” The notice shall contain only information pertaining to the

change of address and its effective date. The plaintiff shall serve a copy of the notice

on all opposing parties. The notice shall not include any motions for any other relief.

Failure to file a Notice of Change of Address may result in the dismissal of the action for

failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 41(b). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a clear, legible copy of every pleading or other

document filed shall accompany each original pleading or other document filed with the

Clerk for use by the District Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom the case is assigned. 

Failure to comply with this requirement may result in the pleading or document being

stricken without further notice to the plaintiff. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge

Virginia A. Mathis for further proceedings.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2005.

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