Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00080/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rebecca D. Mazeau, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SHPS Acquisition Corporation, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-00080-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

(Doc. 20). The Court now rules on the motion. 

I. Background 

A. Procedural History 

 Plaintiff initially filed a complaint on April 19, 2013, but later withdrew this 

complaint. (Doc. 20 at 3, 6). On December 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed another complaint in 

the Arizona Superior Court for Maricopa County. (Doc. 20 at 3; Doc. 1 at 11). This case 

was then removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff amended her complaint several times and defendant now moves to dismiss the 

amended complaint. (Doc. 20). 

B. Factual History 

 On November 4, 2009, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants as a “Quality Assurance 

Lead.” (Doc. 19 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff suffered a stroke in July of 2010 that “required [] long 

term hospitalization.” (Id. at ¶ 2). Plaintiff “utilized her short term disability coverage 

from July 2010 through December 2010. (Id. at ¶ 5). After Plaintiff’s short term 

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disability coverage had run out, Plaintiff then inquired as to whether FMLA leave was 

available and elected to take FMLA leave in January 2011. (Id. at ¶ 7). While Plaintiff 

was on FMLA leave, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment on February 28, 

2011. (Doc. 20 at 6). Plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC, who decided not to pursue 

her claim and mailed her a right-to-sue letter on January 10, 2013. (Doc. 20 at 5; Doc. 8 

at Ex. C). Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint alleging FMLA and ADA violations on 

April 19, 2013. (Doc. 21 at 5; Doc. 20 at 6). Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint general 

factual violations of the FMLA and ADA: 

 9. SHPS failed to offer Petitioner FMLA leave at any time, rather, 

Petitioner had to inquire as to whether this was an option after her short 

term disability ended. 

 10. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), SHPS unlawfully 

interfered with Petitioner’s FMLA rights by failing to offer her the options 

to take FMLA leave after a triggering event occurred. . . . 

 13. While Petitioner was on FMLA leave, SHPS terminated 

Petitioner’s employment. 

 14. SHPS unlawfully interfered with Petitioner’s FMLA and ADA 

rights by failing to hold an employment position open for Petitioner during 

her leave, and terminating a person with a known and recorded disability. 

(Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 9, 10, 13, 14). 

II. Discussion1

 Defendants move to dismiss both the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 

and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claims2

 arguing that the claims are 

time-barred. (Doc. 20 at 1). Defendants do not specify whether they move to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1), but the Court 

interprets this motion as being pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Sisseton-Wahepton Oyate 

of Lake Traverse Reservation v. U.S. Corps. Of Engineers, 918 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 

(D.S.D. 2013) (“the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional limit”); see also St. Clair v. 

City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Like other challenges to a court’s 

 

1

 Defendants also assert a motion to strike the response to the motion to dismiss and a motion to dismiss for repeated rule violations. Doc. 22 at 3–4. However, due to 

the Court granting Defendants motion to dismiss, these motions are both moot. 

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subject matter jurisdiction, motions raising the ripeness issue are treated as brought under 

Rule 12(b)(1) even if improperly identified by the moving party as brought under Rule 

12(b)(6).”).

 The defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the 

parties or the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss 

“for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint 

or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th 

Cir. 1979). Here, it appears that Defendants make a facial attack because their briefs 

“examine[] whether the complaint has sufficiently alleged subject matter jurisdiction.” 

Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other 

grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (U.S. 2012). In resolving 

a “facial attack” under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must accept the allegations of the 

complaint as true, see Valdez v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Cal. 1993), 

aff’d, Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1995), and “draw all reasonable 

inferences in [the Plaintiff’s] favor.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Jetform 

Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 788, 789 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“The plaintiff is then 

afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under Rule 12(b)(6) 

consideration.”). 

a. ADA Claim 

 ADA claims must be filed with the Court ninety days from the receipt of the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(f)(1). There is a “presumption that the letter issuance date is also the date on 

 

2

 The Complaint also mentions COBRA, life insurance, and social security damages, along with a HIPAA violation. (Doc. 19 at 1, 4). To the extent that these 

allegations constitute legal claims, the Court agrees with Defendants that HIPAA does 

not provide a private right of action, Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 

1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007), and Plaintiff’s mention of COBRA life insurance, and social 

security damages are tied up with Plaintiff’s FMLA claim. (Doc. 19 at 1, 4). 

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which the letter was mailed.” Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Serv.s Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007). After the letter is mailed there is a further presumption that 

the recipient received the letter three days after it was mailed. Id. at 1125–26. 

 The EEOC issued their right-to-sue letter on Thursday, January 10, 2013. (Doc. 8 

at Ex. C).3

 Presuming three days from issuance to receipt, Plaintiff received the right-tosue letter on Monday, January 14, 2013. See Payan, 495 F.3d at 1125–26. Plaintiff filed 

her complaint on December 13, 2013, three hundred and thirty-three days after the 

presumed receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. (Doc. 1 at 11). This would 

time-bar Plaintiff’s ADA claim as a matter of law.4

 Even if the Court considers 

Plaintiff’s original complaint—filed on April 19, 2013—Plaintiff is still time barred. 

 Plaintiff offers no persuasive argument as to why her ADA claim is not timebarred. Plaintiff mentions that her EEOC claim was filed “within the time frame required 

by the EEOC – after the charge was perfected internally.” (Doc. 22 at 2). However, the 

statute of limitations begins running when Plaintiff receives a right-to-sue letter, not 

when Plaintiff files an EEOC claim or when the claim is perfected. Furthermore, Plaintiff 

mentions that Defendants’ “internal records related to [Plaintiff’s] short term disability 

leave of absence . . . are incorrect” and that “[t]heir poor record keeping created issues for 

Plaintiff when she applied for unemployment and Social Security Disability Insurance.” 

(Doc. 21 at 2). But again, these records have no bearing on Plaintiff adhering to the 

 

3

 Plaintiff relies upon this right-to-sue letter as a procedural prerequisite to her filing of her complaint. Therefore, the Court may consider this document on a motion to 

dismiss. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (superseded by statute on other grounds by Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006)) 

(Where “an attached document is integral to plaintiff’s claims and its authenticity is not disputed, the plaintiff ‘obviously is on notice of the contents of the document and the 

need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished.”). 4

 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the EEOC right-to-sue letter was not received until April 15, 2013. However, this statement is not supported by any evidence and was not alleged in the amended complaint. Further, even if the statement is 

taken at face value, the EEOC claim would still be time barred. Plaintiff’s claim was not 

filed until December 13, 2013, still well outside the ninety day statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s initial claim, filed on April 19, 2013, was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff and is a nullity. See, e.g., Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of action “leaves the parties as though no action had been 

brought”). 

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ninety day filing deadline for a civil action. While this “poor record keeping” may have 

created issues for Plaintiff filing her EEOC claim, the statute of limitations does not start 

to run until Plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter after the EEOC has declined to pursue 

Plaintiff’s EEOC claim. Therefore, the ADA claim is time-barred. 

 b. FMLA Claim 

 FMLA claims may be brought no “later than 2 years after the date of the last event 

constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 

2617(c)(1). However, if there is a willful violation of the FMLA, a claim “may be 

brought within 3 years of the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation.” 29 

U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2). The FMLA does not define willful, but in the context of the Fair 

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), willful has been defined as circumstances where “the 

employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct 

was prohibited by statute.” Hanger v. Lake Cnty., 390 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2004); see, 

e.g., Rigel, 2006 WL 3831384, at *13 (“The Court specifically rejected a standard for 

willfulness that ‘would . . . permit a finding of willfulness to be based on nothing more 

than negligence’ . . . .” (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 

(1988)). The 8th Circuit has thus applied the FLSA’s definition of “willful” to the FMLA 

because both acts use “willful” similarly and in identical contexts. Hanger, 390 F.3d at 

583. Under this standard, “an employer’s general knowledge regarding a statute’s 

potential applicability does not prove willfulness.” Id. at 584. 

 Here, the last event constituting an alleged violation of the FMLA is the allegedly 

unlawful discharge of Plaintiff, which occurred on February 28, 2011.5

 (Doc. 20 at 6). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleging an FMLA violation was not filed until December 13, 2013,6

 

 

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 The EEOC right-to-sue letter states that Plaintiff was discharged on February 28, 2011. Plaintiff relies upon this right-to-sue letter as a procedural prerequisite to her filing of her EEOC complaint. Therefore, the Court may consider this document on a motion to dismiss. Parrino, 146 F.3d at 706 n.4 (Where “an attached document is integral to plaintiff’s claims and its authenticity is not disputed, the plaintiff ‘obviously is on notice of the contents of the document and the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished.”). 

6

 Plaintiff initially filed a complaint alleging a FMLA violation on April 19, 2013. 

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well past the two year statute of limitations. Thus, Plaintiff is time-bared unless 

Defendants willfully violated the FMLA, thereby giving Plaintiff three years to file an 

FMLA claim. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2). 

 Plaintiff directs the Court to no allegations in the Complaint of a willful FMLA 

violation by Defendants and the Court cannot find any, even when drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor. Indeed, the only allegations of FMLA violations seem 

to simply parallel the statute’s description of a violation. See Doc. 23-1 at ¶¶ 9, 10, 13, 

14. The Complaint contains factual allegations of an FMLA violation, but does not go 

beyond alleging the basic elements of a violation.7

 See Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 9, 10, 13, 14. 

Therefore, because the Complaint contains no allegations of “willful” FMLA violations, 

the FMLA claim is time-barred. 

III. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is GRANTED. 

This case is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED all pending motions are denied as moot. 

 Dated this 24th day of March, 2015. 

 Even if the Court used this earlier filing date, Plaintiff still filed over two years from Plaintiff’s discharge. 

7

 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel was urged to point to the record where a 

“willful” violation of the FMLA is alleged. Plaintiff was unable to do so. 

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