Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01005/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01005-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK CONRAD FAUROT, II, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

TODD H. BARTON, Executive )

Officer, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-01005-AWI-SMS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (DOC. 16)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an

action for relief concerning alleged civil rights violations. The

matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304. 

Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (FAC) in this

action on October 13, 2006. On July 26, 2007, the Court found

that although Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

during an interlocutory appeal had been granted, Plaintiff had

not filed a notice of appeal, and further, Plaintiff could not

appeal the Court’s denial of his application for a temporary

restraining order because the appeal would be premature. The

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Court referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge for screening

of the amended complaint and issuance of any other appropriate

orders.

I. Screening the Complaint

A. Legal Standards

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

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or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id. 

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

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knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

In the FAC, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief as well as damages from Todd H. Barton, the executive

officer of the Kings County Superior Court, two court clerks

identified only by numbers (Clerks 1031 and 1049), and the

Judicial Council Members of California. Plaintiff’s complaint

stems from his attempts on February 27, 2006 and March 8 and 14,

2006, to file a habeas corpus petition with the court. He alleges

that his petition was on a 1999 form and was rejected by Barton

and the clerks, who failed to give it a case number because it

was not on the up-to-date 2005 version of the form which, it may

be inferred that Plaintiff alleges, was similar to the form he

used but reduced the copies required to be filed in the Supreme

Court of California and contained a reference to different rules

of court. (Cmplt. pp. 3, 4, 8.) Plaintiff also alleged that the

“3 defendants,” stated reasons for not filing Plaintiff’s

petition, including 1) the 1999 form was outdated; 2) two of the

1999 forms’ pages were incomplete; and 3) the court must receive

an original petition and not a copy of the petition with a

xeroxed signature. (Cmplt. p. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he added

a hand-written signature to his copy and added photocopied pages

separately, but Defendants still refused to file it. (Cmplt. p.

6.) Plaintiff mailed one petition with two pages partly combined

on one page, and filing was denied on February 27, 2006 with a

rejection notice dated February 23, 2006; Defendants could have

simply notified Plaintiff of the need for copies of the missing

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two pages (pp. 28-29) in order to protect Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights, or they could have asked for production of

exhibits from Plaintiff’s custodian. (Cmplt. p. 10-11.) Plaintiff

also alludes to a date and signature photocopied on February 21,

2006, before being printed and signed by hand on March 9, 2006.

(Cmplt. p. 13.) Plaintiff also alludes to “THE ORIGINAL,” stating

that it was not ever returned to him, unlike a copy sent and

returned to him on April 13, 2006, in a metered envelope mailed

on April 12, 2006. (Cmplt. p. 15.) Finally, Plaintiff states that

he is unsure if the third non-filing, effected on March 14, 2006,

was produced by intentionally evil motive to defy United States

law. (Cmplt. p. 15.) 

Plaintiff alleges that petitions must be filed on the form

approved by the state judicial council except for good cause and

except for petitions filed by attorneys that set forth the

required information. (Id. p. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that because

federal rules of evidence treat some copied documents or

signatures as admissible originals, the court did not need an

original petition. (Cmplt. p. 6.) 

He further alleges that California’s Rule 4.551(a)(2) was an

inadequate process to preserve his right to report “staff

crimes”, and it was arbitrarily disapproved by the Judicial

Council. (Cmplt. p. 10.)

Plaintiff alleged that his filing the petition was an

attempt to report “staff crimes” to a judge. (Cmplt. p. 5.)

Plaintiff also alleges that the procedure concerning the 2005

form is a policy or custom that constitutes a continuing

violation of California standards, a deprivation of First

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Amendment and procedural due process rights, and a violation of

equal protection as stated in Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1) and

(c)(2). (Id. pp. 6, 13.) Plaintiff alleges that in contrast to

their refusal, the three defendants “likely would favor” the

filing of an original 2005 form submitted by a non-white citizen

or alien resident of California, “thus discriminating racially.”

(Cmplt. p. 7.) Plaintiff’s sentences are lengthy and complex, but

it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants’ conduct

constituted interference with his freedom of association as

protected by the First Amendment (id. p. 7), right to free speech

and petition for a redress of habeas corpus grievances about good

time credits lost and non-eligibility to earn credits, right

peacefully to distribute to a judge his informational literature,

right of procedural due process that protects First Amendment

liberty interests, right of access to the state court, and right

to be protected against arbitrary discrimination that denies

equal protection of the law; Plaintiff alleges that it was a

prior restraint, and it chilled protected expression. (Cmplt. pp.

7-9, 12.) Plaintiff asserts that a later habeas corpus hearing

would not have been an adequate remedy or procedure for the

irreparable injury caused by the prior restraint, namely, the

non-filing of his copy. (Cmplt. pp. 9-10, 12.) Plaintiff asserts

that use of the 2005 form was unreasonably and arbitrarily

demanded, and that not filing what he submitted was because of

the content of the petition, retaliation motivated by intent or

desire to restrict First Amendment rights “EVEN IF IT WASN’T THE

SOLE FACTOR FOR ANTI-FILING DECISIONS ON 2/27/2006, 3/8/2006, AND

3/14/2006....” (Cmplt. pp. 12-13.) However, he also appears to

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admit that a 2005 form “was usable” (Cmplt. p. 12 l. 17), so it

does not appear that Plaintiff is alleging that he was completely

prevented from filing a petition, but only that his petition on

the 1999 form was not accepted.

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $212.00 per day on

which his petition is not filed; a declaratory judgment that his

First Amendment rights are “UPHELD” by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Privileges and Immunities clause, the Due Process clause, and the

Equal Protection clause, and that his rights are clearly

established, and that a 1999 form’s forty-nine page copy must be

filed. (Cmplt. pp. 15-16.)

Although Plaintiff occasionally refers to documents other

than the first amended complaint (see, e.g., p. 14 l. 14, “SEE

1ST NOTICE,” there are no documents attached to the FAC.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff names as defendants the Judicial Council Members

of the state of California. (Cmplt. p. 1.) He sues the members of

the judicial council in their official capacity for a suit in

equity. (Id. p. 2.)

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages

or injunctive relief against a state, an “arm of the state,” its

instrumentalities, or its agencies. Durning v. Citibank, N.A.,

950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir.1991). A suit against

California’s Judicial Council is a suit against a state agency.

Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9 Cir. 2004). However, a th

state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for

prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, is a person under

§ 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief

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are not treated as actions against the state. Id. 

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue

members of the judicial council in their official capacity for

damages, Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed; to the extent

that he sues the members of the judicial council in their

official capacity, Plaintiff’s claim should proceed with respect

to his prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief.

D. Quasi-judicial Immunity

Judicial or quasi-judicial immunity has been extended not

only to those who actually adjudicate disputes in an adversarial

setting, but also in appropriate cases to non-jurists who perform

functions closely associated with the judicial process. In re

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9 Cir. 2002). The doctrine is th

appropriately applied to persons other than judges who exercise

judgments functionally comparable to those of judges, i.e., those

who exercise a discretionary judgment as part of their function.

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993)

(holding that a court reporter who was charged with having failed

to provide a transcript and who was bound by statute to provide

verbatim reports of a criminal trial was not entitled to immunity

because she was afforded no discretion in carrying out the duty

to record proceedings). After Antoine, the key question is not

simply whether common law judges performed the task in question,

but rather, whether judges themselves, in performing the function

at issue, would be entitled to absolute immunity. Antoine, 508

U.S. at 435; In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 949 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Traditionally it has been recognized that court clerks have

absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

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violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of

the judicial process, such as filing documents and giving

notices. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of

Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9 Cir. 1987). After the decision th

in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, it has been

recognized in the Ninth Circuit that court clerks who are

performing tasks related to the judicial process of resolving

disputes, and who retain some measure of discretionary judgment

in performing those tasks, continue to be immune from suit. See,

Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (9 Cir. 1996) (holding th

that a court clerk, and a law clerk who assisted a judge by

performing functions closely associated with the judicial process

and duties most intimately connected with the judge’s own

exercise of judicial function, were entitled to absolute quasijudicial immunity), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1118 (1997); In re

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, (9 Cir. 2002) (holding that a th

bankruptcy trustee’s clerk was entitled to complete quasijudicial immunity with respect to the clerk’s scheduling of a

hearing and failing to give notice of a hearing because both were

functionally comparable to judicial actions, and were analogous

to judicial action, in that they involved control of the docket,

a task involving the exercise of discretionary judgment related

to the resolution of disputes). 

Plaintiff alleges that a decision by clerks or an executive

officer not to file a petition for not being on the form was not

discretionary or closely associated with, or an integral part of,

the judicial process of resolving disputes, which requires

adjudication. (Id. p. 4.) 

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However, the Court finds to the contrary. It appears that

the clerks and Defendant Barton, the executive officer, were

performing functions closely associated with the judicial process

and exercise of the judicial function, and they were doing so in

the context of a specific case which had been submitted to the

court for filing; further, it appears that the three employees of

the court retained considerable judgment, of the sort associated

with judicial action, with respect to evaluating under the

applicable standards whether the petitions were formally

sufficient for filing. The rule which Plaintiff challenges,

namely Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.551 provides in pertinent part

that although a petition for writ of habeas corpus must be on the

Judicial Council’s form MC-275, for good cause a court may also

accept for filing a petition that does not comply with the

requirement for use of the form, and a petition submitted by an

attorney need not be on the Judicial Council’s form. The

Defendant clerks were exercising their judgment with respect to

the formal sufficiency of the document which Plaintiff sought to

have filed as the initial pleading; they were determining whether

good cause was present with respect to a matter closely

associated with the judicial process and exercise of the judicial

function.

Accordingly, it appears that the court clerks and the

executive officer retained quasi-judicial immunity from a suit

for damages for rejecting Plaintiff’s petition for formal

insufficiency.

Further, it does not appear that Plaintiff could allege

facts that would overcome this immunity. Thus, granting Plaintiff

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another opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile.

Judges and those performing judicial functions are

absolutely immune from liability for damages for acts performed

in their official capacities. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,

1075 (9 Cir. 1986) (en banc). However, judicial immunity for th

state defendants does not extend to actions for prospective

injunctive relief, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 n.1 (1991),

Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075; the immunity also does not extend to

actions for declaratory relief, Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d

852, 860 n.8 (9 Cir. 1992). th

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Plaintiff’s claims

against the two clerks and the executive officer, Barton, for

damages be dismissed because of immunity.

E. Injunctive Relief

1. Bar to Recovery

The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides that a

court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay

proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by an

Act of Congress, where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or

to protect or effectuate its judgments. However, this statute

does not cover actions pursuant to § 1983. Mitchum v. Foster, 407

U.S. 225 (1972).

In 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to bar injunctive relief in

any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable. To the extent that Plaintiff sues the members of the

Judicial Council, it appears that he is complaining of conduct

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undertaken in its executive capacity in adopting the Court rule

in question, and not an act or omission undertaken in the

officer’s judicial capacity.

2. Injunctive Relief

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the

status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the

moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to

secure the positions until the merits of the action are

ultimately determined. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.

390, 395 (1981). A preliminary injunction is available to a

plaintiff who “demonstrates either (1) a combination of probable

success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that

serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in

its favor.” Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F. 2d

935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987). Under either approach the plaintiff

“must demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable injury.” 

Id. Also, an injunction should not issue if the plaintiff “shows

no chance of success on the merits.” Id. At a bare minimum, the

plaintiff “must demonstrate a fair chance of success of the

merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation.” Id.

a. Denial of Access to the Courts

With respect to his claim of denial of access to the courts,

Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants’ conduct constituted

interference with his freedom of association as protected by the

First Amendment (id. p. 7), right to free speech and petition for

a redress of habeas corpus grievances about good time credits

lost and non-eligibility to earn credits, right peacefully to

distribute to a judge his informational literature, right of

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procedural due process that protects First Amendment liberty

interests, and right of access to the state court; Plaintiff

alleges that it was a prior restraint, and it chilled protected

expression. (Cmplt. pp. 7-9, 12.) Plaintiff asserts that a later

habeas corpus hearing would not have been an adequate remedy or

procedure for the irreparable injury caused by the prior

restraint, namely, the non-filing of his copy. (Cmplt. p. 8.) 

Plaintiff further states:

ALTHOUGH THERE WASN’T AN INABILITY TO MEET A FILING

DEADLINE OR PRESENT A HABEAS CORPUS CLAIM VIA THE

2005 FORM’S ORIGINAL THAT COULD BE BUT WASN’T USED

IN LIEU OF THE 1999 FORM I USED BY SENDING THE 49-

PAGE COPY FOR FILING, NON-FILING SUCH COPY PREJUDICED

CONTEMPLATED HABEAS CORPUS LITIGATION’S COMMENCEMENT,

I.E., IRREPARABLE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY NON-FILING, 

3 TIMES....

(Cmplt. p. 9.)

With respect to access to the courts, in Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court defined a prisoner’s right of

access to the courts as simply the “right to bring to court a

grievance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). The right

to access the courts is limited to direct criminal appeals,

habeas corpus proceedings, and civil rights actions challenging

conditions of confinement. Id. at 354-55. A prisoner alleging a

violation of his right of access to the courts must demonstrate

that he has suffered “actual injury.” Id. 349-50. To succeed on

this action for denial of access to the courts, Plaintiff must

allege he suffered a specific, concrete, injury as a result of

Defendants’ actions. See Casey, 518 U.S. at 351; Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1998). Actual injury

means “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

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litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or

present a claim.” Casey, 518 U.S. at 348. If the prisoner retains

the ability to present his or her arguments to the court, there

is no actual injury. 

As Plaintiff himself admitted, he is not being denied the

ability to file his state habeas corpus petition. Defendants

simply required Plaintiff to file his petition on a form required

by the Kings County Superior Court and provide an original copy

of the petition, including original signatures, to the Kings

County Superior Court. While Plaintiff disagrees with these

procedural rules, based on the facts as alleged by Plaintiff,

Defendants have not deprived Plaintiff of his ability to file a

state habeas corpus petition in the Kings County Superior Court.

Plaintiff must simply file his petition on the standard form used

by the Kings County Superior Court with an original signature.

Because it appears Plaintiff will be able to file his petition in

the Kings County Superior Court if he complies with the court’s

procedural rules, Plaintiff has not been denied the ability to

file a state habeas corpus petition in the Kings County Superior

Court. As such, Plaintiff has failed to show an actual injury,

and thus he cannot state a claim for obstruction of access to the

courts.

Likewise, because Plaintiff has not been prevented from

filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it does not appear

that Plaintiff has alleged any obstruction of any right to

petition for a redress of grievances about good time credits

lost, non-eligibility to earn credits, or other matters that

might be the subject of a petition, or of his right peacefully to

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distribute to a judge his petition.

b. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally deprived him

of his First Amendment rights without a meaningful predeprivation process, and that a post-deprivation habeas corpus

hearing would not have been an adequate remedy. He alleges in

substance that the clerks unreasonably and arbitrarily declined

the petition while knowing that there was no material difference

between the 1999 and 2005 forms and without any emergency need,

other necessity, or impracticality and thus denied meaningful and

possible pre-deprivation process. (Cmplt. pp. 9-11.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects

prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556

(1974). To establish a procedural due process claim, a prisoner

must generally show 1) a protected liberty or property interest,

and 2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Thornton v.

City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Here, the only interest alleged by Plaintiff to have been

affected is his First Amendment right of access to the courts to

file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. As the Court has

already ruled, Plaintiff was not denied his right of access

because he did not suffer any actual injury. Plaintiff was not

barred from filing a petition; rather, he was given an up-to-date

form and was given the opportunity to fill it out, affix an

original signature, and file it. Plaintiff simply declined to use

the form. It thus does not appear that Plaintiff has alleged a

denial of adequate procedural protections.

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c. Retaliation 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants declined to file his

petition because of the content of his petition, but he does not

state the precise content that he alleges caused them to act.

(Cmpt. p. 13, ll. 19-20.) However, Plaintiff has also alleged

that they declined the petition because it was not on the proper

form. Plaintiff also appears to allege that the Defendants

declined to file his petition as retaliation motivated by intent

or desire to restrict his First Amendment rights, although it was

not the sole factor; it was also motivated by Plaintiff’s

annotations made to notices he received in response to his

submission. (Cmplt. p. 13, ll. 16-28; p. 14, ll. 1-14.) Plaintiff

states that Defendants had reckless or callous disregard for or

indifference towards his rights, but he is unsure if the third

rejection of his petition on March 14, 2006, was produced by an

intentionally evil motive to defy United States law. (Cmplt. p.

15.)

A claim of retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of First

Amendment rights entails five basic elements: 1) a state actor

took some adverse action against an inmate 2) because of 3) the

prisoner’s protected conduct, and the action 4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 5) the

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9 Cir. 2005). th

The proper test with respect to the element of chilling

exercise of First Amendment rights is whether an official’s acts

would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future

First Amendment activities. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568

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(9 Cir. 2005). A plaintiff need not allege that his speech was th

actually inhibited or suppressed, but there must be facts alleged

that First Amendment rights were chilled.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged only that his petition/s were

not filed; however, it is clear that Plaintiff remained able to

file his petitions by sending in the petition on a 2005 form.

There are no circumstances alleged that would elevate the routine

rejection of a pleading not on a required form to an adverse

action that would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness

from future First Amendment activities. It appears that Plaintiff

had access to the up-to-date form and was able to put his

petition on the form. Considering the circumstances alleged,

requiring a petition to be filed on an up-to-date form mandated

statewide is not an act that would chill or silence a person of

ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing a chill

with respect to his First Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for

retaliation. Plaintiff has already had one opportunity to amend

his complaint, and it does not appear that Plaintiff could allege

facts that would state a claim. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim should be dismissed. Further, Plaintiff has

further not shown any likelihood of success on the merits on such

a claim.

d. Discrimination

Plaintiff also appears to allege that he was treated in a

discriminatory manner (Cmplt. pp. 13-14), although he does not

indicate the nature of any class involved or any prohibited basis

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for discrimination other than a fanciful reference to the

likelihood of Defendants’ welcoming a petition from someone of

another race or nationality, and his mention of attorneys’ being

exempt from the requirements of the court rule requiring habeas

petitions to be on the required form. (Cmpt. p. 7.) Plaintiff

mentions Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1), which defines crimes and

punishments relating to intimidation of victims or witnesses to

crimes who seek to report crimes to various law enforcement

officers or to a judge. He also adverts to § 1981.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination by

private actors. Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.

1989). The defendants in this case are state actors. A claim of

racial discrimination advanced by plaintiff in this action must

be brought pursuant section 1983 rather than section 1981.

To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal

Protection clause, a plaintiff must show that the defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the

plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class. Thornton v.

City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9 Cir. 2005). The th

appropriate analysis is first to identify the defendants’

asserted classification of groups; the groups must be comprised

of similarly situated persons so that the factor motivating the

alleged discrimination can be identified; an equal protection

claim will not lie by conflating all persons not injured into a

preferred class receiving better treatment. Id. at 1167.

Plaintiff is apparently a layperson and thus is not

similarly situated with attorneys. Plaintiff does not allege that

his white race or origin was the basis of the Defendants’

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rejection of his petition. Plaintiff only speculates that the

clerks and executive officers “likely would favor filing of a

2005 form’s original submitted by a non-white citizen or alien

resident of California,” and thus would discriminate between

races. (Cmplt. p. 7.) 

With respect to equal protection of the laws, Plaintiff has

not alleged that he is a member of a class deserving of

protection under the laws of the United States or that he has

been treated in a manner inconsistent with others similarly

situated in violation of the equal protection clause of the

Constitution. See, Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158,

1167 (9 Cir. 2005). The facts do not suggest a viable theory of th

equal protection violation.

 Plaintiff’s equal protection claim should thus be dismissed

without leave to amend. Further, Plaintiff has not shown any

likelihood of prevailing on such a claim.

e. Conspiracy

Plaintiff makes vague references to conspiring defendants

(Cmplt. p. 8 l. 24) and conspiracy (id. p. 14 l. 1).

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof

of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate

constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge

Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights,

Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th

Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy

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need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant

must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’”

Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d

at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court

may not apply a heightened pleading standard to plaintiff’s

allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of San

Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v.

County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However,

although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,

1965 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. at 1964-65 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation

that defendants conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional

rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under

section 1983.

Here, there are no affirmative allegations of agreement.

However, more fundamentally, as the preceding analysis reflects,

Plaintiff failed to allege an actual deprivation of

constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for

conspiracy. 

In summary, even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations to be

true, Plaintiff nevertheless has not shown a fair chance of

success of the merits, or questions serious enough to require

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litigation, with respect to his claims of denial of access to the

courts, right to petition for redress of grievances or to

distribute his petition, retaliation, conspiracy, and

discrimination. Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege any

irreparable injury. Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing

entitlement, or likelihood of entitlement, to an injunction.

F. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment as follows:

I SEEK A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT 1 AMENDMENT ST

RIGHTS ARE UPHELD BY THE 14 AMENDMENT’S PRIVILEGES AND TH

IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, AND EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE, AS WELL AS THAT SUCH RIGHTS ARE 

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

39. I ALSO SEEK DECLARATORY RELIEF THAT A 1999

FORM’S 49-PAGE COPY MUST BE FILED UNDER UNREASONABLY

VIOLATED AND CLEARLY ESTABLISHED U.S. LAW THAT § 1983

MAKES ENFORCEMENT APPLICABLE TO, FOR THE ACTS

AND OMISSION BY 3 DEFENDANTS AT THE KINGS COUNTY 

SUPERIOR COURT WHERE JUDICIAL COUNCIL APPROVAL HAS 

BEEN LIMITED TO THE 2005 FORM. 

(Cmplt. pp. 15-16.) Plaintiff does not appear to state a separate

claim for declaratory relief; rather, he relies on the

allegations previously analyzed as the basis for his prayer.

The Court assumes that Plaintiff is seeking relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2201. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, is

a procedural statute pursuant to which a federal court determines

whether to exercise its jurisdiction to hear a declaratory relief

action. It does not itself confer jurisdiction; an independent

basis for federal court subject matter jurisdiction is required.

Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Companies, 103 F.3d 750, 753

(9 Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds in Government th

Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizo, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9 Cir. 1998). th

It gives the federal courts discretion to award declaratory

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relief in cases in which the federal court otherwise has

jurisdiction, and it applies even in diversity cases. DeFeo v.

Proctor & Gamble Co., 831 F.Supp. 776, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1993).

Here, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, Plaintiff

failed to state a federal claim, and Plaintiff failed to state

facts upon which there would be jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

complaint in this Court. Thus, no basis for declaratory relief

has been stated. 

Further, for purposes of declaratory relief, “past exposure

to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or

controversy... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present

adverse effects.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102

(1983); Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff has failed to allege that there is any cognizable

damage presently being suffered or that he faces any such damage

in the future. The present case relates to only past conduct,

where the harm has already occurred, and where there appears to

be no continuing adverse effects. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that he is

entitled to declaratory relief, or that declaratory relief is

appropriate.

II. Recommendation

Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim and has failed

to allege facts showing jurisdiction in this Court. Plaintiff has

already had one opportunity to amend his complaint, and it

appears from the facts alleged that it would be futile to grant

leave to amend because Plaintiff could not allege facts stating a

claim and showing jurisdiction in this Court.

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Accordingly, pursuant to the foregoing analysis, it IS

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaint BE DISMISSED without leave

to amend.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff is admonished not to attempt to file an amended

complaint as Plaintiff’s recourse is to object to these findings

and recommendations. Plaintiff is further admonished that this

Court will strike any amended complaint filed without the Court’s

specific grant of permission to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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