Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00114/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00114-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Craig R. Brittain, an individual and U.S. 

Senate candidate in Arizona; and Brittain for 

U.S. Senate, a campaign committee, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Twitter Inc., a California corporation, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-01714-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 

 Defendant Twitter, Inc. has filed a motion to transfer venue. Doc. 22. The motion 

is fully briefed. Docs. 27, 30, 33. Plaintiffs’ request for a hearing is denied because oral 

argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For reasons stated 

below, the Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background.

 Plaintiff Craig Brittain was a candidate for an Arizona U.S. Senate seat in the 2018 

election. He created several Twitter accounts for the campaign, including 

@CraigRBrittain, @AuditTheMedia, @SenatorBrittain, and @Brittain4Senate. Twitter 

suspended the accounts, and Brittain filed suit. Doc. 1. His amended complaint asserts 

eight causes of action: (1) First Amendment violations, (2) federal election law 

violations, (3) breach of contract, (4) conversion, (5) antitrust violations, (6) negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, (7) tortious interference, and (8) promissory estoppel. 

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Doc. 13. Brittain alleges, among other things, that his Twitter accounts are protected 

public forums and that the unlawful suspensions resulted in the loss of 500,000 followers. 

Id. ¶¶ 3-4. He seeks $1 billion in damages, a declaration that Twitter interfered in the 

2018 federal election, and an injunction preventing Twitter from suspending or otherwise 

limiting access to accounts. Id. at 9. 

 When Brittain registered for the account online, he agreed to Twitter’s Terms of 

Service (“Terms”) by affirmatively assenting to the “clickwrap” agreement. The Terms 

include forum selection clauses providing that any dispute related to the Terms or Twitter 

services are to be brought solely in the federal or state courts located in San Francisco 

County, California. Twitter seeks to enforce the forum selection clauses and have this 

case transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Doc. 22. 

II. Legal Standard.

 Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 

the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action . . . to any district or 

division to which all parties have consented.” Under this provision, the district court 

“[o]rdinarily . . . would weigh the relevant factors and decide whether, on balance, a 

transfer would serve ‘the convenience of parties and witnesses’ and otherwise promote 

‘the interest of justice.’” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 

571 U.S. 49, 62-63 (2013) (quoting § 1404(a)). When parties have agreed to a valid 

forum selection clause, however, “the calculus changes” because the clause “represents 

the parties’ agreement as to the most proper forum.” Id. at 63. “For that reason, and 

because the overarching consideration under § 1404(a) is whether a transfer would 

promote ‘the interest of justice,’ ‘a valid forum-selection clause should be given 

controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.’” Id. (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. 

v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988)). 

 When the parties have entered a forum selection clause, “[t]he plaintiff’s 

subsequent choice of forum merits no weight.” Yei A. Sun v. Advanced China 

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Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63-

64). All factors relating to the private interests of the parties must be deemed “as 

weighing ‘entirely in favor of the preselected forum.’” Id. at 1087-88 (quoting Atl. 

Marine, 571 U.S. at 64). And while factors relating to the public interest may be 

considered, “those factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion.” Id. at 1088.1

 In short, a forum selection clause is controlling unless the plaintiff makes a “strong 

showing that: (1) the clause is invalid due to ‘fraud or overreaching,’ (2) ‘enforcement 

would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, . . . or 

(3) ‘trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the 

litigant will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.’” Id. (quoting M/S 

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1972)); see Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 

F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A forum selection clause is presumptively valid; the 

party seeking to avoid a forum selection clause bears a ‘heavy burden’ to establish a 

ground upon which we will conclude the clause is unenforceable.” (quoting M/S 

Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17)). 

III. Discussion.

 When the @CraigRBrittain, @AuditTheMedia, and @Brittain4Senate Twitter 

accounts were created, the Terms governing the accounts provided that “[a]ll claims, 

legal proceedings or litigation arising in connection with the Services” are to be brought 

in San Francisco. Doc. 23 ¶ 5. Similarly, the Terms in effect when the @SenatorBrittain 

account was created stated that San Francisco is the sole venue for “[a]ll disputes related 

to these Terms or the Services[.]” Id. ¶ 6. Each forum selection clause provides that the 

account holder “consent[s] to personal jurisdiction” in the selected forum and “waives 

any objection as to inconvenient forum.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6; see id. at 21, 32. 

 

1

 The private interest factors include the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, and “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. Public interest factors include the 

administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion and the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. Id. 

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Brittain does not dispute that he voluntarily agreed to the Terms when he created 

each Twitter account, that the forum selection clauses are mandatory rather than 

permissive, and that his claims fall within the scope of the clauses.2

 Brittain makes 

several arguments as to why the forum selection clauses should not be enforced. Doc. 27. 

None has merit. 

A. Validity of the Contract.

The Terms contain provisions allowing Twitter, in its sole discretion, to revise the 

Terms from time to time. See Doc. 23 at 21, 32. Brittain argues that these unilateral 

modification provisions render the entire Terms unconscionable and illusory. Id. at 2-3, 

6-7. Brittain cites In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 

893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012), in support of this argument. Id.

But the terms of use at issue in Zappos.com involved a retroactive modification 

provision that allowed “Zappos to hold its customers and users to the promise to arbitrate 

while reserving its own escape hatch.” 893 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. Because the terms of 

use bound “consumers to arbitration while leaving Zappos free to litigate or arbitrate 

wherever it [saw] fit, there exist[ed] no mutuality of obligation,” and the arbitration 

clause therefore was illusory. Id.

In this case, by contrast, the unilateral modification provisions do not permit 

Twitter to make any revision to the Terms retroactive. Doc. 23 at 21 (“By continuing to 

access or use the Services after . . . revisions become effective, you agree to be bound by 

the revised Terms.”); id. at 32 (“We may revise these Terms from time to time. The 

changes will not be retroactive.”); see Williams v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 

WL 708123, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013) (finding that retroactivity was the “fatal 

flaw” that rendered the arbitration clause in Zappos.com illusory). The forum selection 

clauses also impose mutual obligations – they mandate that both Brittain and Twitter 

 

2

 “[F]orum-selection clauses covering disputes ‘relating to’ a particular agreement apply to any disputes that reference the agreement or have some ‘logical or causal connection’ to the agreement.” Yei, 901 F.3d at 1086 (citation omitted). Each cause of 

action alleged in the amended complaint has some logical or causal connection to Brittain’s agreements with Twitter. 

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pursue claims in the courts of San Francisco. See id. Twitter has not sought to modify 

the Terms on this point. Doc. 30 at 4. 

Brittain asserts that the Terms are unconscionable because they contain no 

arbitration clause and “have changed over time without arbitration.” Doc. 27 at 4. But 

Brittain cites no legal authority suggesting that Twitter is required to include an 

arbitration clause in its Terms. Nor has he otherwise shown that the Terms are 

unconscionable or illusory. See Ekin v. Amazon Servs., LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 

1175-76 & n.6 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (upholding clickwrap terms of use with unilateral 

modification clause and distinguishing the Zappos.com clause because it “was forced on 

those plaintiffs through a ‘browsewrap’ ‘agreement’ which required absolutely no 

affirmative action on the part of the consumer”); Davis v. USA Nutra Labs, 303 F. Supp. 

3d 1183, 1196 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting argument that Groupon’s terms of use were 

unconscionable because they were “offered by Groupon to its members through a 

clickwrap process on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without an opportunity for bargaining”). 

B. Brittain’s Pro Se and In Forma Pauperis Status.

Brittain asserts that his status makes it “gravely difficult” for him to participate in 

the litigation. Doc. 27 at 2, 5. He notes that he “is traveling primarily by bicycle and/or 

public transportation to file, upwards of 40 miles per trip[.]” Id. at 2. But the Northern 

District of California permits filing by mail, eliminating the need for Brittain to bicycle or 

use public transportation to file court documents.3

 The fact that Brittain is a selfrepresented, indigent litigant is no basis for not enforcing the forum selection clauses. As 

noted, the private interests of the parties must be weighed in favor of the preselected 

forum. See Yei, 901 F.3d at 1087. Brittain has not shown that litigating in California 

“will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be 

deprived of his day in court.” M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. 

 3 See U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Filing Procedures (San 

Francisco), available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/filingprocsf; Pro Se Handbook at 13, 

available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). 

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C. Federal Questions Raised by the First Amendment Claim. 

Brittain asserts that whether Twitter constitutes a protected public forum is a 

textbook federal question, and federal questions must be answered in the venue where 

most events occurred. Doc. 27 at 3. Brittain notes that he filed the action in this District 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Id. That general venue statute provides that 

“[a] civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred[.]” § 1391(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

Nothing in the statute suggests that federal questions must be answered in a particular 

venue, and Brittain cites no legal authority for the proposition that § 1391(b)(2) trumps a 

valid and mandatory forum selection clause. See Stone v. Cty. of Lassen, No. 2:12-CV01946-MCE, 2013 WL 269085, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013) (enforcing forum 

selection clause with respect to a First Amendment claim and noting that “a federal court 

need not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over federal question claims when there is a 

valid forum selection clause”). 

D. Arizona’s Public Policy.

Brittain further asserts that enforcement of the forum selection clauses would 

“contravene a strong public policy of the venue in which the suit was brought,” and “the 

public policy of . . . the District of Arizona is superior to that of the requested forum.” 

Doc. 27 at 5. He cites the purported “public interest of over one billion total users,” 

including “tens of millions who have been censored, deverified, or suspended by 

Twitter,” but draws no connection between the interests of those alleged users and 

Arizona public policy. See id. Twitter notes, correctly, that Arizona public policy favors

enforcing forum selection clauses. Doc. 30 at 8. “Enforcement of a forum selection 

clause such as the one[s] at issue does not contravene any strong Arizona public policy as 

Arizona courts routinely hold that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and 

that the party claiming the oppressiveness or unreasonableness needed to invalidate such 

a clause must meet a heavy burden of proof.” Kingman Hosp. Inc. v. MPC Computers, 

LLC, No. CV-07-8160-PCT-PGR, 2008 WL 2065241, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2008) 

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(citing Bennett v. Appaloosa Horse Club, 35 P.3d 426, 428-31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)); 

see Societe Jean Nicolas Et Fils v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541, 543 (Ariz. 1979) (holding 

that a valid forum selection clause “will be enforced so long as to do so is reasonable at 

the time of litigation and does not deprive a litigant of his day in court”). 

IV. Conclusion.

 The forum selection clauses contained in Twitter’s Terms of Service, which 

Brittain accepted when he created and continued using his Twitter accounts, are 

presumptively valid and enforceable. Brittain has not met his heavy burden of showing 

the extraordinary circumstances necessary to render the clauses unenforceable. The 

clauses must therefore be enforced, and the case transferred to the Northern District of 

California.4

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion to transfer venue (Doc. 22) is granted. 

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel (Doc. 27) is denied. 

3. The clerk is directed to transfer this case to the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of California. 

Dated this 4th day of January, 2019. 

 

4

 In his reply brief, Brittain brings a motion to compel Twitter to immediately respond to MIDP requests. Doc. 27 at 9-11. The motion will be denied as premature. 

See Doc. 42. 

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