Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05448/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2006 Decided March 31, 2006

Nos. 04-5448 and 05-5002

GUADALUPE L. GARCIA

FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF

G.A. GARCIA AND SONS FARM ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MICHAEL JOHANNS, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02445)

Stephen S. Hill argued the cause for the appellants. Alan M.

Wiseman, Robert L. Green and Kenneth C. Anderson were on

brief.

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Peter

D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L. Wainstein,

United States Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, United

States Department of Justice, were on brief.

USCA Case #04-5448 Document #959599 Filed: 03/31/2006 Page 1 of 19
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1

See, e.g., Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(black farmers); Keepseagle v. Glickman, 194 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2000)

(Native American farmers). A related appeal challenging the district

court’s denial of class certification to women farmers was heard the

same day as this appeal. See Love v. Johanns, No. 04-5449, slip op.

(D.C. Cir. March 3, 2006).

Glen D. Nager, Shay Dvoretzky, Jason J. Jarvis and Robin

S. Conrad were on brief for amicus curiae Chamber of

Commerce of the United States of America.

Before: SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: This appeal

arises from one of several actions brought against the United

States Department of Agriculture (Department or USDA)

alleging discrimination in the administration of various

federally-funded loan and benefit programs for American

farmers.1

 The appellants, individual Hispanic farmers, seek to

represent a class of similarly situated Hispanic farmers

throughout the nation who claim that the Department

discriminated against them in denying them farm loans and

other benefits because of their ethnicity and that it failed to

investigate the discrimination complaints they subsequently

filed with the Department. In the district court, the appellants

sought class certification and the USDA moved to dismiss, inter

alia, the failure-to-investigate claim. The district court granted

the Department’s motion to dismiss and denied class

certification, concluding that the appellants had failed to meet

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and

23(b). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and remand

in part. 

USCA Case #04-5448 Document #959599 Filed: 03/31/2006 Page 2 of 19
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2

In 1994, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) was

combined with other Department entities to form the FSA. See United

States v. Lewis County, 175 F.3d 671, 673 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

7 U.S.C. § 6932 (Supp. 1998)). All references are to the FSA. 

3

Although they subsequently amended their original complaint

twice, see infra, n.5, the substantive counts did not change. 

I.

The Farm Service Administration (FSA)2

 administers the

Department’s various loan programs for American farmers

through county committees, the members of which are selected

locally and are located in over 2,700 counties nationwide. A

farmer seeking a loan must first obtain an application from his

county committee. 7 C.F.R. § 1910.4(b). He then submits the

completed application to the committee which determines

whether the farmer meets specific USDA loan criteria,

including, inter alia, citizenship, legal capacity to incur debt,

education and farming experience, farm size, inability to obtain

sufficient credit elsewhere and character. Id. §§ 1941.12 (2006),

1943.12(a) (2006), 1943.12 (1988), 764.4 (2006). If an

unsuccessful applicant believes the committee discriminated

against him in denying his application, he may lodge a

complaint with either the USDA Secretary or the USDA Office

of Civil Rights. Id. § 15.6. USDA regulations provide that

complaints “shall be investigated in the manner determined by

the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights and such further action

taken by the Agency or the Secretary as may be warranted.” Id.

On October 13, 2000, ten Hispanic farmers filed this action

in the district court. The complaint set forth three counts.3

Count I sought a declaratory judgment to determine “the rights

of plaintiffs and the Class members under the defendant’s farm

programs including their right to equal credit, and equal

participation in farm program, and their right to full and timely

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4

ECOA creates a private right of action against a creditor,

including the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a), who

“discriminate[s] against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a

credit transaction” “on the basis of race, color, religion, national

origin, sex or marital status, or age” or “because the applicant has in

good faith exercised any right under this chapter.” Id. § 1691(a). The

regulations governing ECOA define a “credit transaction” as “every

aspect of an applicant’s dealings with a creditor regarding an

application for credit or an existing extension of credit (including, but

not limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures;

standards of creditworthiness; terms of credit; furnishing of credit

information; revocation, alteration, or termination of credit; and

collection procedures).” 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m). Although ECOA

claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see 15 U.S.C.

§ 1691e(f), the Congress retroactively extended the limitations period

for individuals who had filed administrative complaints with the

USDA between January 1, 1981, and July 1, 1997 for alleged acts of

discrimination occurring between January 1, 1981 and December 31,

1996. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (reprinted in 7

U.S.C.A. § 2279 notes).

enforcement of racial discrimination complaints.” 2d Am.

Compl. at 56, reprinted in Joint Appendix (JA) 83. The second

count alleged a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act

(ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.4

 JA 84. Specifically, the

appellants alleged that the “[d]efendant’s acts of denying

plaintiffs and Class members credit and other benefits and

systematically failing to properly process their discrimination

complaints was racially discriminatory and contrary to the

[ECOA].” JA 84. Finally, the appellants alleged a violation of

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. JA

84. The appellants sought declaratory relief as well as $20

billion in damages. JA 85. Their complaint also proposed a

class of 

all Hispanic participants in FSA farm programs who

petitioned or would have petitioned had they not been

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5

All references are to the appellants’ Second Amended Complaint.

The appellants eventually moved to file a Third Amended Complaint,

which the district court denied. See Garcia v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D.

8, 16 (D.D.C. 2004); see also infra n.13.

. . . prevented from timely filing a complaint [against]

USDA at any time between January 1, 1981, and the

present for relief from . . . racial discrimination . . . and

who, because of the failings in the USDA civil rights

complaint processing system . . . were denied equal

protection . . . and due process in the handling of their

. . . complaints. 

JA 78 (emphasis in original).5 

On December 22, 2000, the Department moved to dismiss

the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over the

ECOA claim because the appellants had not exhausted their

administrative remedies and that, in any event, their claims were

time-barred. In addition, the Department moved to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the

appellants had failed to state a claim under ECOA, the APA or

the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. On

March 20, 2002, the district denied the motion in part and

granted it in part, relying on its earlier—and similar—order in

Love v. Johanns, No. 00-2502 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2001). Garcia

v. Veneman, No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2002), reprinted in

JA 95-99. Of relevance here, the court dismissed the failure-toinvestigate claim, concluding that the appellants failed to state

a claim under ECOA because the investigation of a

discrimination complaint is not a “credit transaction” within the

meaning of ECOA. JA 97-98. It further held that the claim was

not cognizable under the APA because ECOA provides “an

adequate remedy.” JA 97-98. 

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On December 2, 2002, the district court denied class

certification. Garcia v. Veneman, 211 F.R.D. 15 (D.D.C. 2002)

(Garcia I). It concluded that the appellants failed to show the

required “commonality” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(a)(2) and did not represent a certifiable class under Rule

23(b). They did not show commonality, the court concluded,

because they did not demonstrate that the Department operated

under a general policy of discrimination nor did they identify a

common USDA policy or practice that disparately affected

them. Id. at 19-22. The court then considered whether the

requested class could be certified under Rule 23(b) and

concluded that Rule 23(b)(2) certification was inappropriate

because the $20 billion in damages they sought predominated

over their request for equitable relief. Id. at 22-23. The court

also found Rule 23(b)(3) certification inappropriate because they

had not shown that common questions predominated. Id. at 23-

24. 

After additional discovery, the appellants submitted a

supplemental brief on the issue of commonality, which the

district court treated as a renewed motion for class certification.

Garcia v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2004) (Garcia II).

They had obtained in discovery 37 USDA loan and disaster

benefit files as well as two USDA databases which, they alleged,

showed the requisite commonality for both their disparate

impact and their disparate treatment allegations of

discrimination. Id. at 10. They argued that the files revealed

that the USDA had denied Hispanic farmers’ applications based

on the subjective, rather than the objective, eligibility criteria set

forth in 7 C.F.R. § 15.6 and that, as a result, the use of subjective

criteria had a disparate impact on them. Id. at 13-15. They also

claimed that the USDA as a “single actor” had treated them

discriminatorily through a pattern and practice of discrimination.

Id. at 10. They listed five sub-patterns of discrimination,

including (i) refusal to provide Hispanic farmers with loan

applications or assistance in completing applications; (ii)

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subjecting Hispanic farmers to protracted delays in processing

and funding their loans; (iii) using subjective criteria to reject

the applications of Hispanic farmers; (iv) unnecessarily

subjecting Hispanic farmers to the inconvenience of supervised

bank accounts; and (v) delaying or denying loan servicing for

Hispanic farmers. Id. at 10. The court nevertheless concluded

that, even with their supplementation, they failed to demonstrate

commonality. 

On September 24, 2004, the appellants moved the district

court to certify the order dismissing their failure-to-investigate

claim for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which

motion the court granted. Garcia v. Veneman, No. 00-2445

(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004). In accordance with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(f), the appellants petitioned this court on

September 22, 2004 for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of

the class certification denial, which petition we granted. In re

Garcia, No. 04-8008 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 2004). Before us for

review, then, are three orders, namely Garcia, No. 00-2445

(D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2002) (granting motion to dismiss), Garcia I,

211 F.R.D. 15 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying class certification), and

Garcia II, 224 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying class

certification again). 

II.

As we have recognized, the district court is “uniquely well

situated” to rule on class certification matters. Wagner v.

Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we

review a certification ruling “conservatively only to ensure

against abuse of discretion or erroneous application of legal

criteria,” id., and we will affirm the district court even if we

would have ruled differently in the first instance. See McCarthy

v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a plaintiff

seeking class certification must show that:

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6

If a plaintiff meets the requirements of Rule 23(a), he must then

establish that class certification is appropriate under one of the three

alternatives of Rule 23(b). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521

U.S. 591, 613-16 (1997). Although the district court found that

certification was also inappropriate under subsections (b)(2) and (3),

we do not reach that holding because of our affirmance of its

subsection (a)(2) holding. See Love v. Johanns, No. 04-5449, slip op.

at 13 n.3 (D.C. Cir. March 3, 2006). 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members

is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact

common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the claims or

defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class.

Failure to adequately demonstrate any of the four is fatal to class

certification. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust

Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The district court

found that the appellants failed to show “questions of law or fact

common to the class” or “commonality” under Rule 23(a)(2).

We affirm that ruling.6

To establish commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), a plaintiff

must identify at least one question common to all members of

the class. See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d

516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004). Not every common question, however,

suffices under subsection (a)(2). As the United States Supreme

Court declared of an alleged disparate treatment class in a Title

VII action, 

there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that

he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory

grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that

the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the

existence of a class of persons who have suffered the

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7

Other courts have used Title VII precedent in cases involving

ECOA. See, e.g., Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 277 F.3d

873, 876 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Given the similar purposes of the ECOA

and Title VII, the burden-allocation system of federal employment

discrimination law provides an analytical framework for claims of

credit discrimination.”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d

213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In interpreting the ECOA, this court looks

to Title VII case law . . . .”); Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of

Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The language [of

ECOA] is closely related to that of Title VII of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Act (“EEOA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and was intended

to be interpreted similarly.”). 

same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s

claim and the class claims will share common questions

of law or fact and that the individual’s claim will be

typical of the class claims. 

Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).7

Following Falcon, we have required a plaintiff seeking to certify

a disparate treatment class under Title VII to “make a significant

showing to permit the court to infer that members of the class

suffered from a common policy of discrimination that pervaded

all of the employer’s challenged employment decisions.”

Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1994). And

in Love v. Veneman, we held that a showing of commonality for

a disparate treatment class under ECOA requires the plaintiff to

show “(i) discrimination (ii) against a particular group (iii) of

which the plaintiff is a member, plus (iv) some additional factor

that ‘permit[s] the court to infer that members of the class

suffered from a common policy of discrimination.’ ” No. 04-

5449, slip op. at 9. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)

(alteration in original).

Regarding the appellants’ challenge to Department action

with an allegedly class-wide discriminatory impact, they must

make a showing sufficient to permit the court to infer that

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members of the class experienced discrimination as a result of

the disparate effect of a facially neutral policy. See Cooper v. S.

Co., 390 F.3d 695, 716 (11th Cir. 2004). That is, similar to our

formulation of the commonality showing necessary for a

disparate treatment class set out in Love v. Johanns, the

appellants must show for their disparate impact class (i) a

discriminatory impact, (ii) affecting a particular group, (iii) of

which the plaintiffs are members, (iv) resulting from a common

facially neutral policy or practice. 

A.

First, the appellants contend that the district court erred in

denying class certification of their discriminatory treatment

claim based on the geographic spread of the local

decisionmakers, labeling it a “pattern and practice” claim, see

Appellants’ Br. at 40. But see Garcia I, 211 F.R.D. at 22

(“Commonality is defeated . . . by the large numbers and

geographic dispersion of the decision-makers . . . .”). As with

a Title VII claim, to establish a charge of pattern and practice

discrimination under ECOA, a putative class must prove that

“discrimination was the company’s standard operating

procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.”

Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398 (1986) (quoting

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).

Similarly, to show commonality under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(a)(2), the plaintiff must “make a significant

showing to permit the court to infer that members of the class

suffered from a common policy of discrimination that pervaded

all of the [defendant’s] challenged . . . decisions.” Hartman, 19

F.3d at 1472.

“As is now well recognized, the class action

commonality criteria are, in general, more easily met when a

disparate impact rather than a disparate treatment theory

underlies a class claim.” Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628

F.2d 267, 274 n.10 (4th Cir. 1980). Establishing commonality

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8

The appellants contend that we cannot rely on the geographic

spread of defendant decisionmakers in deciding whether to certify a

disparate treatment class. Appellants’ Br. at 40. They are wrong.

See, e.g., Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 571 (6th

Cir. 2004) (no abuse of discretion in denying certification of class of

all black employees at four separate facilities of defendant over 20

year period); Cooper, 390 F.3d at 715 (no abuse of discretion in

denying class certification to employees working for different

defendants throughout wide geographic area and encompassing range

of working environments); Stastny, 628 F.2d at 278-79 (no abuse of

discretion in denying class certification to employees working in

different plants with local decisionmakers throughout state); Webb v.

Merck & Co., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 399, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (denying

class certification “cut[ting] across employment status, job categories,

facilities and geographic regions”).

for a disparate treatment class is particularly difficult where, as

here, multiple decisionmakers with significant local autonomy

exist. Id at 278-80 (reversing class certification because of

geographic separation of workforce and autonomy of local

decisionmakers); see also Cooper, 390 F.3d at 715. The

appellants failed to identify any centralized, uniform policy or

practice of discrimination by the USDA that formed the basis for

discrimination against Hispanic loan applicants with varied

eligibility criteria in over 2,700 counties nationwide over a 20-

year period. Rather, despite the appellants’ allegation that the

USDA’s actions are those of a “single actor,” their claims arise

from multiple individual decisions made by multiple individual

committees. Moreover, they do not cite a single reversal of a

district court’s denial of class certification based on no

commonality resulting from the geographic spread of the

decisionmakers.8

 Cf. Stastny, 628 F.2d at 278-79 (district court

abused discretion in certifying class of employees spread

through “great number of geographically dispersed facilities”

with “almost complete local autonomy”). Our standard of

review is deferential and the appellants have failed to convince

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Both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA) prohibit actions that “otherwise adversely affect” a protected

individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).

The Supreme Court has held that this language gives rise to a cause of

action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VII and the

ADEA. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005)

(ADEA); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (Title

VII). ECOA contains no such language. We express no opinion about

whether a disparate impact claim can be pursued under ECOA. See

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 418 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974) (court

should not examine whether “plaintiffs have stated a cause of action

or will prevail on the merits” in determining class certification vel

non).

us that the district court abused its discretion in denying class

certification to the appellants’ alleged disparate treatment class.

B.

We next consider the appellants’ claim that the district court

erred in failing to certify a class on whose members the

Department’s facially neutral action has had a discriminatorily

disparate impact. Assuming without deciding that a disparate

impact claim is cognizable under ECOA,9

 the claim would

require a plaintiff to “identify a specific policy or practice which

the defendant has used to discriminate and must also

demonstrate with statistical evidence that the practice or policy

has an adverse effect on the protected group.” Powell v. Am.

Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)

(recognizing disparate impact claim under ECOA). 

The appellants press two alternative theories to support their

contention that the district court erred in not certifying a

disparate impact class. First, they argue that they do not need to

specify a facially neutral practice if it is impossible to determine

which of the USDA eligibility criteria have had the

discriminatory effect, instead borrowing from Title VII’s “one

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10The appellants cite the“one employment practice” language of

Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(I), and argue that it

relieves them from having to tie a disparate impact to a facially neutral

USDA policy. Appellants Br. at 34-38. The Congress added the “one

employment policy” language following the Supreme Court’s holding

in Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). It

provides that “if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court

that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not

capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be

analyzed as one employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(B)(I). Assuming—again, without deciding—the “one

employment practice” notion applies to an ECOA disparate impact

claim, it does not alter the required commonality showing under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2). The appellants erroneously

confuse the commonality showing with the prima facie case of

disparate impact discrimination. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,

Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiffs cannot avoid the

heavy lifting of showing eligibility for class certification by conflating

two exceptions to separate rules for adjudicating discrimination

cases.”). Under Rule 23(a)(2), the appellants must show that the

putative class members have something in common—they all suffered

an adverse effect from the same facially neutral policy, see id.—and

their showing must be “significant,” see Hartman, 19 F.3d at 1470.

On the other hand, courts have set a lower bar for establishing a prima

facie discrimination case. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,

950 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing difficulty plaintiff faces in proving

motive behind employer’s actions).

employment practice” notion.10 Alternately, they argue the

USDA’s subjective decisionmaking process constitutes the

common facially neutral practice. We reject both theories and

instead affirm the district court’s denial of class certification

because the appellants failed to show a common facially neutral

USDA farm loan policy, resulting in the disparate effect on them

and the putative class of Hispanic farmers. See Caridad v.

Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999)

USCA Case #04-5448 Document #959599 Filed: 03/31/2006 Page 13 of 19
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(“Of course, class certification would not be warranted absent

some showing that the challenged practice . . . has a disparate

impact on African-American employees at Metro-North.”). As

the Supreme Court noted in Falcon—where class certification

was denied—“[t]he mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff

is a member of an identifiable class of persons of the same race

or national origin is insufficient to establish his standing to

litigate on their behalf all possible claims of discrimination

against a common employer.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.

In Garcia I, 211 F.R.D. at 21-22, the district court rejected

the appellants’ disparate impact claim because they did not

connect disparate impact with a common facially neutral USDA

policy. They had submitted the declaration of Jerry Hausman,

an expert in econometrics and microeconomics, in which

declaration he concluded that Hispanic farmers received a lower

percentage of USDA loans than white farmers received in 1997.

JA 123. Hausman, however, analyzed all farmers (white and

Hispanic) as opposed to only those farmers (white and Hispanic)

who had applied for USDA loans. After further discovery

produced USDA loan databases, two of which the appellants

used to support their renewed class certification motion, they

submitted the declaration of statistician Karl Pavlovic, who

found that 72 per cent of white applications were approved in

the period from October 1997 to January 2003 while 59 per cent

of Hispanic applications were approved in the same period. JA

477. In Garcia II, the district court assumed a disparate impact

without discussion of Pavlovic’s declaration. Garcia II, 224

F.R.D. at 11. The court, however, again concluded that the

appellants had failed to connect the disparate impact to a

common facially neutral USDA policy. Id. (rejecting

appellants’ argument because “[n]ot only does it ‘leapfrog to the

merits,’ . . . but it also boils down to the proposition that

unexplained discrepancies in the distribution of government

benefits satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)

without more”).

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The appellants attempted to connect the disparate impact to

USDA’s subjective loan decisionmaking criteria, relying in part

on statistical evidence. But their statistical analyses were

analytically flawed because they did not incorporate key

relevant variables connecting disparate impact to loan

decisionmaking criteria. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385,

400 n.10 (1986) (“some regressions [are] so incomplete as to be

inadmissible as irrelevant”). It does not suffice under Rule

23(a)(2) to show an ethnic imbalance in the USDA’s award of

loans to farmers; rather, the appellants must show that a

common facially neutral policy caused the imbalance. See

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989)

(“[A] Title VII plaintiff does not make a case of disparate

impact simply by showing that, ‘at the bottom line,’ there is

racial imbalance in the work force.”); Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292.

The appellants could have done this, for instance, by employing

multiple regression. See Love v. Johanns, No. 04-5449, slip

op. at 16 (“Instead of conducting a relatively simple statistical

analysis (such as a multiple regression) to control for any or all

of these variables, O’Brien simply reported a series of

elementary cross-tabulations, from which it is impossible—as a

statistical matter—to draw meaningful conclusions.”); see also

Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Multiple

regression is a form of statistical analysis used increasingly in

Title VII actions that measures the discrete influence

independent variables have on a dependent variable such as

salary levels.”). The appellants’ statistics failed to account for

variables that affected the analyses such as whether fewer

Hispanic farmers were U.S. citizens, whether Hispanic farmers

had worse credit and whether Hispanic farmers had less

experience. Love, No. 04-5449, slip. op. at 15-16. 

The district court thus acted within its discretion in rejecting

the appellants’ statistical showing as insufficient to infer

classwide discrimination arising from the Department’s

administration of the farmers’ loan programs. Its decision to

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11We think the class certification issue here is similar to that in

Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004), in which the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification in a Title VII

action. Seven African-American employees of Southern Company

and several of its subsidiaries sought to represent a class alleging

disparate impact and disparate treatment claims in connection with

promotion opportunities, performance evaluations and compensation.

The court found that the “plaintiffs’ statistical evidence was

insufficient to establish a presumption of discrimination common to

the claims of all members of the putative class.” Id. at 719 (emphasis

in original). “[A]nalytical flaws in the statistical evidence” prevented

the Cooper plaintiffs from making a showing sufficient to “ ‘raise a

presumption of discrimination arising from the collective whole of

Defendant’s compensation and promotion policies. Thus, disparate

impact analysis produce[d] no evidence common to the claims of all

class members.’ ” Id. at 716 (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 205 F.R.D.

596, 613 (N.D. Ga. 2001)) (alteration and emphases in original). The

statistical evidence there did not account for variables such as an

employee’s type or level of acquired skills and field of study, the

quality, type and relevance of an employee’s experience, an

employee’s job performance, etc., to ensure that black and white

employees were similarly situated. Compare id. at 717 with Caridad

v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1999)

(reversing denial of class certification because expert “controlled for

various factors that one would expect to be relevant to the likelihood

of disciplinary action and promotion”). In addition, the statistical

deny class certification “did not constitute a clear error of

judgment, nor [was it] otherwise outside the range of choices the

district court was allowed to make.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 715.

We, of course, do not suggest that statistical evidence alone

could never show commonality; we simply believe that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the

appellants’ statistical evidence inadequate. See Hartman, 19

F.3d at 1473 (“While statistics can generally be probative of the

question of commonality, we would feel uncomfortable in

resting on the trial statistics in the present record for a final

determination of commonality.”).11

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evidence did not reference the named plaintiffs or their specific

similarly-situated comparators and, accordingly, the court found that

they had not established “commonality among these named plaintiffs’

claims and the overall affected class.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 718

(emphasis in original). 

12For instance, Roberto Salinas and his son jointly applied for an

ownership loan in 2000 and Roberto Salinas solely applied for an

operating loan in the same year. The USDA denied both loans

because of the infeasibility of the farm plan as well as inadequate

verification of Roberto Salinas’s debt. Mem. in Response to the

Court’s July 15, 2003 Order with Respect to Commonality at app. 7,

Garcia v. Veneman, No. 02-2445 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2003). 

13In addition to the disparate impact and treatment classes already

discussed, the appellants sought certification of five subclasses.

Garcia II, 224 F.R.D. at 15-16. The five subclasses were set forth in

their proposed Third Amended Complaint, see JA 512-13, which the

The other evidence the appellants relied on—namely, the 37

USDA case files—arguably may have come closer to

establishing commonality because it showed that the USDA

often used the infeasibility of an applicant’s farm plan as one

reason for denying a loan. See Garcia II, 224 F.R.D. 14 (farm

plan infeasibility given as one reason for almost half of loan

rejections). Nonetheless, mindful of our limited scope of

review, see supra at 9, we do not believe that the district court

abused its discretion in denying class certification. The USDA

denied loans for a variety of reasons, including inadequate farm

plans and lack of funds.12 Mem. in Response to the Court’s July

15, 2003 Order with Respect to Commonality at app. 7, Garcia

v. Veneman, No. 02-2445 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 2003). The case

files as well as the anecdotal evidence upon which the appellants

relied showed that often the appellants were denied loans based

on objective financial data. See id. In sum, the Department

used an array of objective—and individual—justifications in

denying the appellants loans.13 Accordingly, we affirm the

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district court denied without prejudice. Garcia II, 224 F.R.D. at 16.

Their challenge to the district court’s denial of their motion to amend

is supported by conclusionary assertions only, see Appellants’ Br. at

44, and they have therefore waived the issue. See United States v.

Yeh, 278 F.3d 9, 16 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

14Before us, the appellants used slightly more than four pages of

their 59-page brief and no time at oral argument addressing the APA

failure-to-investigate claim.

district court’s denial of class certification of the appellants’

disparate impact claim.

III.

We have jurisdiction to review, in our discretion, the district

court’s dismissal of the appellants’ failure-to-investigate claim

under ECOA and the APA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The

appellants must persuade us that exceptional circumstances

justify a departure from the ordinary policy of postponing

appellate review until after entry of final judgment. See United

States. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1209 (D.C.

Cir. 2005). 

We exercise our jurisdiction over the dismissal of the ECOA

failure-to-investigate claim, as we did in Love v. Johanns, and

affirm the district court’s dismissal for the same reason—the

failure to investigate a discrimination complaint is not a “credit

transaction” within the meaning of ECOA. Love v. Veneman,

No. 04-5449, slip op. at 17-18. We decline, however, to

exercise our jurisdiction regarding the appeal of the denial of the

appellants’ failure-to-investigate claim made under the APA.

As in Love, the class certification issues took most of the trial

court’s and the parties’ attention and unlike the straightforward

statutory construction issue the appellants’ ECOA failure-toinvestigate claim presents, we think this claim will benefit from

further development in the district court.14 Id. at 18. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of class certification as well as its dismissal of the failureto-investigate claim asserted under ECOA. We dismiss the

appeal of the APA failure-to-investigate claim and remand to the

district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. 

So ordered.

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