Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00791/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00791-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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28 1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

VICKY M. MEDINA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

Defendant. __________________________________

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Case No.: C- 06-791 JW PVT

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RELIEF UNDER RULE 60

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Vicky Medina (“Medina”) is a former employee of Defendant United Parcel

Service (“UPS”).1 Medina has sued UPS alleging disability discrimination, violation of the

California Family Rights Act, Wrongful Termination, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress. 

On March 29, 2007, UPS filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery from

Medina and a Motion to Shorten Time to Hear the Motion to Compel. On April 3, 2007, the

Court granted the Motion to Shorten Time, set a deadline for opposition and issued an Order to

Show Cause Why Plaintiff’s Counsel Should Not Be Sanctioned (“Order to Show Cause”). The

Order to Show Cause required Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Schramm, to file, no later than April 10,

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ORDER, page 2

2007, an Opposition to the Motion to Compel and a Declaration showing cause why he should

not be sanctioned in the amount of the fees and costs incurred by Defendant in bringing the

Motion to Compel. On April 19, 2007, the Court had not received any response to the Order to

Show Cause and issued an Order Granting the Motion to Compel Discovery and Sanctioning

Plaintiff’s counsel, Richard Schramm, in the amount of $4,500 (the “Sanctions Order”). 

On June 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion entitled “Motion for Leave to File a Motion for

Reconsideration and a Motion to Reconsider, Vacate or Modify the Sanctions Order”. The

Motion sought leave to file a motion for reconsideration and relief under Rule 60 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 14, 2007, the Court issued an order denying the Motion for

Leave to file a motion for reconsideration. On July 10, 2007, the Court held a hearing on the

Motion for Relief pursuant to Rule 60. For the following reasons, the Motion for Relief is

Denied.

II. Facts

A. Informal Attempts to Get the Necessary Information

On October 16, 2006, Medina served initial disclosures identifying a “Dr. Susan [LNU]

as a witness who will testify as to Medina’s emotional distress damages.” (Pfyl Decl. Exh. B). 

At the conclusion of Plaintiff’s October 24, 2007 deposition, Plaintiff and her counsel, Mr.

Schramm, promised to provide additional information about her health care providers, but they

never did. (Pfyl Decl. ¶ 6). In January, 2007 Defense counsel, Mr. Pfyl, left several messages

with Mr. Schramm seeking the promised information about the healthcare providers, but

received no response. (Id. at ¶ 7). 

B. The Interrogatories and Responses

On January 31, 2007, Defendant served modest discovery seeking the names and

addresses of Plaintiff’s health care providers as well as information about Medina’s income

subsequent to leaving employment with UPS. On March 5, 2007, Plaintiff served the identical

response to each interrogatory: “ Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. [ ] to the extent it requests

responses protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, FRE 412, and

plaintiff’s right to privacy.” Plaintiff provided no substantive information in the original

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 2The deadline for filing dispositive motions was extended on June 8, 2007 to July 16, 2007.

 3The Electronic Court Filing System shows that the motion was filed at 9:45 a.m. Mr.

Schramm’s legal assistant, Ms. Osterhaus, states that she served the supplemental responses at

10:45 a.m. (Osterhaus Decl. ¶ 14.)

ORDER, page 3

response. Indeed, Plaintiff did not even tailor the objections to the discovery sought. Mr.

Schramm, Plaintiff’s counsel, merely left a phone message for Defendant stating the objections

were made to preserve them and that substantive responses would follow. (Schramm Decl. ¶ 3).

C. The Meet and Confer Process

On February 27, 2007, Defense counsel sent Plaintiff’s counsel a fax stating that he

would be unavailable from March 11, 2007 through March 21, 2007. (Schramm Reply Decl.

Exh. 1).

On March 9, 2007, Defendant sent Plaintiff a meet and confer letter specifically warning

that it would have no choice but to file a motion to compel if Plaintiff did not supplement her

responses by March 12, 2007. (Pfyl Decl. Exh. F). Defendant explained that it needed the

information in advance of the March 28, 2007 Early Neutral Evaluation. (Id.). Mr. Schramm

was on vacation from March 11 through March 20. (Schramm Decl. ¶ 4). Mr. Schramm was ill

from March 21, 2007 through March 30, 2007. (Schramm Decl. ¶ 7). 

On March 26, 2007, UPS sent Plaintiff a second meet and confer letter, again warning of

the need to file a motion to compel if Medina did not supplement the responses. (Pfyl Decl. Exh.

G.) As of March 28, 2007, UPS had received no response to the meet and confer attempts. (Pfyl

Decl. ¶ 14.) 

D. The Motions and Non-Opposition

On March 29, 2007, UPS filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery from

Medina and a Motion to Shorten Time to Hear the Motion to Compel. Defendant argued that

hearing on the regular thirty-five day hearing schedule (on May 8, 2007), would be too close to

the June 15, 2007 date for the close of discovery and the June 25, 2007 deadline for filing

dispositive motions.2

 Also on March 29, 2007, after the motion was filed, Plaintiff served

supplemental responses to the discovery.3

 The Court was not informed of the service of

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Thus, the Order to Show Cause was filed after Mr. Schramm’s vacation and illness were both

over.

ORDER, page 4

supplemental responses until June 5, 2007.

On April 3, 2007, the Court granted the Motion to Shorten Time and Issued an Order to

Show Cause Why Plaintiff’s Counsel Should Not Be Sanctioned (“Order to Show Cause”).4 The

Order to Show Cause required Mr. Schramm to file, no later than April 10, 2007, an Opposition

to the Motion to Compel and a Declaration showing cause why he should not be sanctioned in

the amount of the fees and costs incurred by Defendant in bringing the Motion to Compel. The

Order to Show Cause stated that, absent further order of the court, no reply brief would be filed

and no hearing held. 

E. The Sanctions Order

On April 19, 2007, the Court had not received any response to the Order to Show Cause

and issued an Order Granting the Motion to Compel Discovery and Sanctioning Plaintiff’s

counsel, Richard Schramm, in the amount of $4,500 (the “Sanctions Order”). The Court found:

1) Plaintiff’s objections as to attorney-client privilege and work product immunity could not be

justified; 2) Medina’s assertion of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress

outweighed any privacy interest in information relating to her mental condition; and 3)

Plaintiff’s objection as to Federal Rule of Evidence 412 was unavailing as that section deals with

admissibility of the sexual history of an alleged victim of sexual assault. The Court also found

sanctions appropriate because Plaintiff’s Counsel’s service of boilerplate objections without any

substantive information was inappropriate and patently insufficient. 

F. The Motion for Reconsideration

On June 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration

and a Motion to Reconsider, Vacate or Modify the Sanctions Order. On June 14, 2007, the

Court issued an order denying the Motion for Leave to file a motion for reconsideration. 

Mr. Schramm argued that leave was appropriate because the court did not have the

information that supplemental responses had been served the same day as the motion to compel

the discovery had been filed. A motion for reconsideration is only permitted under the civil local

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 5The court is not impressed with Mr. Schramm’s attempt to shift blame to his assistant. Even

though Mr. Schramm delegated the task of reading court orders to his assistant, he cannot avoid

his responsibility for being informed of court deadlines. The error may have been Ms.

Osterhaus’ but the responsibility remains Shramm’s. 

ORDER, page 5

rules when a party can “show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for

reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order.” Civil L.R.

7-9(b)(1). The Court found that Mr. Schramm knew about the service of supplemental responses

at the time of the interlocutory order, but simply failed to inform the court. 

Plaintiff’s counsel argued that he did not have a chance to tell the court because: 1) “I

never heard from my staff or others about Opposing Counsel bringing a Motion to Compel the

Special Interrogatories” (Schramm Decl. ¶ 7); 2) he “assumed both from what my Legal

Assistant had said and written that any such Motion was off calendar” due to the serving of

supplemental responses (Schramm Decl. ¶ 10); and 3) his legal assistant failed to inform him of

the Order to Show Cause. Mr. Schramm declares: “It is the practice in our office that my Legal

Assistant will review all documents coming from U.S. District Court and let me know of

pertinent items to which I need attend.” (Schramm Decl. ¶ 11.) Thus, Mr. Schramm argued that

his legal assistant’s failure to inform him about the motion excuses his failure to respond.5

 

The Court did not credit Mr. Schramm’s assertion that he did not hear about the Motion

because it contradicted the declaration of his legal assistant, who stated: “I sent Mr. Schramm an

e-mail notifying him that the Motion to Compel was filed a few minutes before I sent Mr. Pfyl

the documents and responses he wanted. I also spoke with Mr. Schramm and complained about

Mr. Pfyl’s having brought a motion on something already resolved earlier that same date.” 

(Osterhaus Decl. ¶ 15.) Moreover, Mr. Schramm’s assumption that “any such Motion was off

calendar” is also at odds with his claimed ignorance of the motion.

The court found that Mr. Schramm had not been reasonably diligent: “the Court disagrees

that the assumption that a properly filed motion was off-calendar along with the failure to notice

an order to show cause constitutes reasonable diligence.” (June 14, 2007 Order at 3.) 

However, the Court did credit Mr. Schramm’s assertion that he was not aware of the

Order to Show Cause until after the deadline to respond had passed. Accordingly, the Court

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ORDER, page 6

imposed no penalty for the failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause. (June 14, 2007 Order

at 3.) Moreover, the Court did not enquire into the discrepancies between Mr. Schramm’s

declaration and that of Ms. Osterhaus, or the internal discrepancies in Mr. Schramm’s

declaration.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Sanctions

The standard governing in this court is provided by Rule 37 which states:

If the motion is granted or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided

after the motion was filed, the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be

heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the

party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving

party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's

fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first

making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court

action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was

substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses

unjust. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Thus, under Rule 37, when the discovery is provided only after a motion

has been filed, an award of reasonable expenses is presumptively appropriate unless certain

circumstances are shown.

2. Relief Pursuant to Rule 60

Rule 60 provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a

party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the

judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying

relief from the operation of the judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). By its terms, Rule 60 only applies to “final orders.” The advisory

committee notes explain: “The addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character

of the judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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 6The Court recognizes that it may be common practice for attorneys to forgive the failure to

timely respond to discovery. No matter how common this practice is, however, any party who

has not stipulated to the delay is entitled to enforce his or her rights as provided by the Federal

ORDER, page 7

60 advisory committee’s note to 1946 Amendment. An order imposing sanctions under Rule 37

is not a final order. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 200 (1999). 

Accordingly, relief is not available under Rule 60 in relation to the order in question. The Court

nontheless addresses why Mr. Schramm would not be entitled to relief even if Rule 60 applied.

B. The Motion for Relief Under Rule 60

1. Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise or Excusable Neglect

Mr. Schramm appears to base his motion on mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable

neglect. Mr. Schramm cites Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 59-61 (2nd Cir. 1993)

and In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1993) in support of his motion for relief. 

Both cases, however, apply only to default judgments, which should be set aside to allow for

decision on the merits when there is any doubt. The principal that cases should be resolved on

their merits has no bearing on the question currently before the court of reconsideration of

monetary sanctions.

The question is whether Mr. Schramm’s unjustified failure to timely respond to

discovery, combined with his failure to timely respond to meet and confer efforts and his failure

to respond to the Order to Show Cause was the result of excusable neglect. Mr. Schramm has

provided no justification whatsoever for his failure to timely respond to the discovery in the first

place. The complete names of Plaintiff’s medical providers should have been provided with

initial disclosures in October. Mr. Schramm does not explain why the information was not

provided without forcing Defendant to propound interrogatories. The only explanation Mr.

Schramm gives for his patently insufficient response to the interrogatories is that he “was filing

objections to the Special Interrogatories in order to preserve the objections, and more thorough

responses to each question would follow. (Schramm Decl. ¶ 3.) Tellingly, Mr. Schramm does

not provide any authority for his right to decide that any substantive response could be delayed

for an indefinite period of time.6

 

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Rules of Civil Procedure.

 7Additionally, at the hearing Mr. Schramm stated that he had an associate working on this

case. Mr. Schramm did not explain why the associate could not have handled the meet and

confer and the responses to interrogatories in Mr. Schramm’s absence.

ORDER, page 8

Mr. Schramm also provides no explanation of why he failed to respond to the meet and

confer letter he admits he received prior to his vacation. Mr. Schramm complains that it was

unfair of Defendant to give him only a single day to respond. Mr. Schramm, however, could

have sought an extension of time from Defendant or from the court. Accordingly, even if the

vacation and illness excuses Mr. Schramm’s failure to respond from March 12 through March

29, Mr. Schramm has not provided any justification for his failures prior to March 12. 

Accordingly, Mr. Schramm’s failure to respond to the discovery in a timely fashion was not the

result of excusable neglect.7

2. Newly Discovered Evidence

Mr. Schramm may have also meant to move under subsection (2) of Rule 60 for relief

based upon newly discovered evidence. Mr. Schramm has not presented any evidence that he

could not have presented to the court prior to the issuance of the sanctions order if he had been

reasonably diligent. The pieces of information that were not available to the court when the

sanctions order was issued are that: 1) supplemental responses were served shortly after the

motion was filed and Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of those responses; 2)

Defendant knew Plaintiff’s counsel was unavailable from March 11, 2007 through March 21,

2007; and 3) at some point, Mr. Schramm’s assistant, Ms. Osterhaus, informed Defendant of Mr.

Schramm’s illness. 

As this Court ruled in denying leave to file a motion for reconsideration, these facts could

have been presented before the Sanctions order, if Mr. Schramm had timely Opposed the Motion

to Compel or Responded to the Order to Show Cause. As discussed above, Mr. Schramm’s

failure to respond to the motion to compel was not the product of excusable neglect. 

Moreover, even if the Court had been aware of these facts, the motion for sanctions

would still have been issued. Defendant expended money in the form of attorney’s fees to

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ORDER, page 9

prepare the motion to compel. Under Rule 37, sanctions are warranted unless: 1) the moving

party filed the motion without making a good faith effort to obtain the discovery without court

action; 2) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response or objection was substantially justified;

or 3) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. As described above, UPS made a

good faith effort to obtain the discovery by seeking the information informally and sending two

meet and confer letters prior to filing the motion to compel. Additionally, Plaintiff’s boilerplate

objections were not substantially justified. Finally, no other circumstances make an award

unjust. The question is whether Defendant should bear the cost of the motion to compel or Mr.

Schramm should bear the cost. Because Mr. Schramm’s failure to timely respond to discovery

or the meet and confer letter prior to his vacation and illness necessitated the filing of the motion

to compel, it is proper for Mr. Schramm, and not Defendant, to bear that cost.

3. Any Other Reason Justifying Relief

a. Defendant did not take unfair advantage

Mr. Schramm asserts that sanctions were not appropriate in light of Defendant’s “sharp

practices.” Defendant did not, as asserted by Mr. Schramm, unreasonably take advantage of Mr.

Schramm’s absence. Defendant did not file the motion to compel during Mr. Schramm’s stated

period of unavailability. Indeed, Defendant waited until March 26, 2007, after Mr. Schramm

returned from vacation, to send the second meet and confer letter. Mr. Schramm also complains

that it was unfair for Defendant to threaten to file a motion to compel if it did not receive

supplemental responses in a single day. This was not unreasonable, however, given that

Defendant had been promised this information since October of 2006. 

Finally, Mr. Schramm argues that it was unfair for Mr. Pfyl to file the motion after Mr.

Schramm promised supplemental responses would be served “right away.” (Reply at 3.) Mr.

Schramm cites to Pfly’s declaration in support of the motion to compel as proof that Pfyl only

filed the motion after he knew about of Mr. Schramm’s commitment to provide supplemental

responses. The Pfyl declaration, however, provides no information about the conversation on

March 29, 2007. The Schramm declaration in support of the reply brief does not state when on

the 29th the conversation took place. Thus, there is no evidence before the court that the

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ORDER, page 10

conversation took place prior to the filing of the motion. Moreover, even if the conversation did

take place, Pfyl still would have been justified in filing the motion in light of the five month

delay and the approaching close of discovery and deadline for filing dispositive motions. 

Mr. Schramm also argues that UPS purposefully chose not to file a reply brief in order to

avoid informing the court about the supplemental responses and that UPS “apparently misled” the

Court at the hearing on the motion to compel by not informing the court about the supplemental

responses. (Reply at 4). As late as the hearing on the motion for relief, Scrhamm argued that

UPS inappropriately failed to mention the supplemental responses at the hearing on the motion to

compel. Mr. Schramm bases this argument on the erroneous assumption that UPS filed a reply

brief and the court held a hearing on the motion to compel. As clearly stated in the Order to

Show Cause, the court allowed no reply brief and held no hearing on the motion to compel. 

Accordingly, Mr. Schramm’s allegation of misconduct by UPS is unavailing.

b. State disciplinary rules are not relevant

At the hearing, Mr. Schramm argued that he believed that any sanction over $1,500 must

be reported to the state bar because it carried the presumption of misconduct and ethical violation. 

Mr. Schramm confessed that he could not find any authority to support this belief, but argued that

the sanction was inappropriate because he had committed no misconduct. The Court’s research

reveals that California Business and Professions Code Section 6068 requires an attorney to

“report to the agency charged with attorney discipline, in writing, within 30 days of . . . . The

imposition of judicial sanctions against the attorney, except for sanctions for failure to make

discovery or monetary sanctions of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).” Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 6068(o)(3). That statute mentions no presumption of misconduct and exempts discovery

sanctions. Moreover, the standard governing in this court is provided by Rule 37and the reporting

requirements of state law are irrelevant here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).

c. Totality of Circumstances

Mr. Schramm also argued that the sanctions were inappropriate in light of his cooperation

on the other issue in the motion to compel, the independent medical examination (“IME”). Mr.

Schramm is in error. The motion to compel did not address the IME. In fact, the IME issue was

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ORDER, page 11

not resolved until after Defendant filed a separate motion to compel the IME. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the Foregoing Reasons, It Is Hereby Ordered that: The Motion for Relief pursuant to

Rule 60 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2007

____________________________

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge 

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