Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00594/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00594-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUANN KAY NELSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00594-MEJ 

ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 22

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Luann Kay Nelson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 

seeking judicial review of a final decision of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin (“Defendant”), the 

Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), which denied Plaintiff’s 

claim for disability benefits. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-Motions for Summary 

Judgment. Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 18; Def.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 20; Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 22.

1

 Plaintiff 

has not opposed Defendant’s Motion. See Not. of Submission on Briefs, Dkt. No. 21. Pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 16-5, the parties submit their motions on the papers without oral argument. Both 

parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8. Now, having carefully 

reviewed the parties’ positions, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and relevant legal authority, 

the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for the reasons 

set forth below.

//

 

1 Defendant originally docketed its cross-motion as a “response” in ECF. See Dkt. No. 20. 

Defendant subsequently corrected the docketing error by refiling the same document as a

“motion.” See Dkt No. 22.

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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff developed vestibular neuropathy, right-sided spine pain, visual disturbances, 

balance problems, dizziness, confusion, cervical spine and right-sided weakness, carpal tunnel 

syndrome, thoracic outlet syndrome, degenerative disc disease, migraines, exhaustion, and 

anxiety. AR 21, 179-80, 347. On May 7, 2012, she filed a claim for Disability Insurance 

Benefits, alleging disability beginning on April 9, 2011. AR 179-80. On October 3, 2012, the 

SSA denied Plaintiff’s claim, finding Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits. AR 76-90. 

Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for reconsideration, which SSA denied on May 9, 2013. AR

91-108. On May 22, 2013, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). AR 127-28. ALJ Amita Tracy conducted a hearing on March 24, 2014. AR 32-75. 

Plaintiff testified in person at the hearing and was represented by Dan McCaskell, a non-attorney 

claimant representative. AR 34, 38-68. The ALJ also heard testimony from vocational expert

Howard Goldfarb. AR 68-74.

A. Opinion of the Examining Physician Melody Samuelson

Examining Physician Melody Samuelson performed a comprehensive psychological 

evaluation of Plaintiff. AR 953-57. Dr. Samuelson administered a mental status examination and 

diagnosed mood disorder due to general medical condition. AR 956. She assessed the following 

limitations: ability to understand, remember and carry out simple one or two-step job instructions 

(unimpaired); ability to do detailed and complex instruction (mildly impaired); ability to relate and 

interact with co-workers and public (unimpaired); ability to maintain concentration and attention, 

persistence and pace (moderately impaired); ability to associate with day-to-day work activity, 

including attendance and safety (moderately impaired); ability to accept instructions from

supervisors (unimpaired); ability to maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform 

activities on a consistent basis (moderately impaired); and ability to perform work activities 

without special or additional supervision (mildly impaired). AR 957.

Dr. Samuelson wrote Plaintiff presented “with symptoms of depression, to include fatigue, 

lack of interest in daily activities. She is often in pain and will sleep excessively. She would not 

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be appropriate for work of any sort. She is not able to work for a sustained period.” Id. Dr. 

Samuelson further wrote, “[f]rom the psychiatric standpoint, the claimant’s condition is deemed as 

fair.” Id. 

B. Additional Medical Evidence2

Debra Zilavy, PhD, treated Plaintiff between March 15, 2012 and July 18, 2012. She 

produced her treatment notes to the SSA, but did not complete the requested Mental Disorder 

Questionnaire Form, nor otherwise indicate Plaintiff’s ability to attend work or stay on task. See

AR 866-85. 

None of the practitioners who treated Plaintiff at the North Bay Psychiatric Associates 

between September 6, 2011 and December 3, 2012 addressed Plaintiff’s ability to attend work or 

stay on task. See AR 1026-62. 

Dr. Jennifer Beck was Plaintiff’s psychiatrist between June 11, 2012 and August 24, 2012. 

See AR 1125-1240. She diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder (initially diagnosed as 

“severe, recurrent” and at end as “mild-moderate depression”), but wrote on her last appointment 

notes that Plaintiff’s response to treatment was “positive” and that her current mental status was 

“very good” due to her response to new medication. AR 1129, 1131. On August 22, 2012, 

Plaintiff reported her medications were “right and that she feels calm & happy”; she indicated her 

mood level was high (9 out of 10), her pain level was low (2 out of 10). AR 1168. Dr. Beck did 

not address Plaintiff’s ability to attend work or stay on task. 

An SSA psychiatrist also reviewed Plaintiff’s records the SSA had received through 

October 12, 2012 and did not find severe mental impairment because Plaintiff’s conditions had 

lasted less than 12 months and appeared to be responding to prescribed treatment. AR 86. 

On reconsideration, another SSA psychologist Elizabeth Covey, PsyD, found mild 

 

2

This section describes the evidence Plaintiff identified in her Separate Statement of the 

Administrative Record, as supplemented by Defendant’s Separate Statement where appropriate. 

See Pl.’s Sep. Stmt., Dkt. No. 19; Def.’s Sep. Stmt., Dkt. No. 20-1. In their Separate Statements, 

the parties identified “all relevant medical evidence of record.” Order re Stmt. of Rec. at 1, Dkt. 

No. 13. 

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restrictions on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and her social functioning, and moderate 

limitations on maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. AR 101. She noted Plaintiff’s 

“overall cognitive is consistently assessed as intact . . . with some limitations in CPP 

[concentration, persistence, and pace].” AR 101. Dr. Covey further noted that due to Plaintiff’s 

symptoms, she would only be able to successfully carry out simple and detailed instructions on a 

consistent basis throughout a normal work day. AR 101-02. Dr. Covey specifically wrote that 

Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” in ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain 

regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances. AR 105. She found Plaintiff’s 

ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from her symptoms and 

ability to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest period

both moderately limited. AR 106. In explaining the basis for this limitation, Dr. Covey explained 

Plaintiff’s overall MER (“medical evidence of record”) indicated she appeared capable of carrying 

out simple and detailed, but not complex, instructions on a consistent basis in a work environment. 

Id. Thus, Dr. Covey explicitly opined Plaintiff could work on a consistent basis as long as she was 

limited to simple and detailed instructions. 

On January 2, 2014, Dr. Tracy Newkirk examined Plaintiff. AR 1083-87. She described 

in detail the results of her examination and noted Plaintiff had an essentially normal mental health 

status. She also observed Plaintiff was “better” with respect to her depression and was able to 

“partially manage” with medications. AR 1083.

C. The ALJ’s Findings

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Social Security provide for a fivestep sequential analysis to determine whether a Social Security claimant is disabled.3

 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520. The sequential inquiry is terminated when “a question is answered affirmatively or 

negatively in such a way that a decision can be made that a claimant is or is not disabled.” Pitzer 

 

3 Disability is “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” because of a medical 

impairment which can result in death or “which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). During the first four steps of this sequential 

inquiry, the claimant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate disability. Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). At step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner “to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work.” Id. (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)).

At the first step, the ALJ must initially determine whether the claimant is performing 

“substantial gainful activity,” which would mandate that the claimant be found not disabled 

regardless of medical condition, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not performed substantial 

gainful activity since April 9, 2011. AR 20.

At step two, the ALJ must determine, based on medical findings, whether the claimant has 

a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled. Id. 

§ 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

“right vestibu[lar] neuropathy; right-sided spine pain; visual disturbances; anxiety; fatigue; right 

carpal tunnel syndrome; thoracic outlet syndrome; migraines; and degenerative disc disease.” AR 

21.

If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a severe impairment, the process proceeds to 

the third step, where the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meet or equal a “listed impairment.” See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (the “Listing of Impairments”). If a claimant’s impairment either meets the 

listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent to the criteria of the diagnosis, he is 

conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering age, education and work experience. 

Id. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets the listings. AR 21.

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual Function 

Capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). RFC refers to what an individual can do in a work 

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setting, despite mental or physical limitations caused by impairments or related symptoms. Id. § 

404.1545(a)(1). In assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant’s 

medically determinable impairments, including the medically determinable impairments that are 

non-severe. Id. § 404.1545(e). Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the RFC “to perform 

light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(h) with postural, manipulative, and mental 

limitations. The claimant is able to occasionally perform all postural activities, such as climbing 

ladders/ropes/scaffolds; balancing; stooping; kneeling; c[rou]ching; and crawling. The claimant 

has manipulative limitations of the right upper extremity in that she is limited to occasional 

overhead reaching, frequent fingering; and frequent handling. Also, she is unable to perform 

forceful gripping over 20 pounds with her right upper extremity. Mentally, the claimant is limited 

to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, superficial interaction with co-workers and the public, and low 

stress work defined as no work at a production rate pace but can perform goal orientated tasks.” 

AR 22.

The fourth step of the evaluation process requires that the ALJ determine whether the 

claimant’s RFC is sufficient to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 

404.1520(f). Past relevant work is work performed within the past 15 years that was substantial 

gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. Id. § 

404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to do his past relevant work, the claimant is not 

disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4) (iv). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform any past 

relevant work. AR 25.

In the fifth step of the analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove there are 

other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform 

consistent with the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(g); 404.1560(c). The Commissioner can meet this burden by relying on the 

testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. See

Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, based on the testimony of the 

vocational expert, Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined 

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Claimant could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. AR 25.

D. ALJ’s Decision and Plaintiff’s Appeal

On July 28, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. AR 15-31. This decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to review it 

on December 10, 2015. AR 1-6. Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Plaintiff 

commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Compl. On July 

30, 2016, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 17, 2016, 

Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The single issue on appeal before this 

Court is whether the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Examining Physician Samuelson.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if the findings are “supported by 

substantial evidence and if the [ALJ] applied the correct legal standards.” Holohan v. Massanari, 

246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence means more than a 

scintilla but less than a preponderance” of evidence that “a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). The 

court must consider the administrative record as a whole, weighing the evidence that both supports 

and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the court 

must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, and all other 

ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. Id. 

Additionally, the harmless error rule applies where substantial evidence otherwise supports 

the ALJ’s decision. Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1990). A court may not 

reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, SSA, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

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“‘[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the 

agency’s determination.’” Id. (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 

DISCUSSION

A. Evaluating Medical Evidence

Physicians opining about a social security claimant’s condition “may render medical, 

clinical opinions, or they may render opinions on the ultimate issue of disability—the claimant’s 

ability to perform work.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 

“Generally, the opinions of examining physicians are afforded more weight than those of nonexamining physicians, and the opinions of examining non-treating physicians are afforded less 

weight than those of treating physicians.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 

“To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must 

state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Reddick, 157 F.3d 

at 725 (quotation and citation omitted). “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and 

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 

F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). An ALJ can satisfy the “substantial evidence” requirement by 

“setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 

his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. “The ALJ must do 

more than state conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, 

rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Id. (citation omitted).

Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate 

reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, she errs. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 

1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996). In other words, an ALJ errs when she rejects a medical opinion or 

assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation 

that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that 

fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion. See id.

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B. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that she can perform light work, implicitly 

rejects Dr. Samuelson’s opinion that she was “significantly limited, i.e., moderately” in two 

distinct functions: “the ability to associate with day to day work activity, including attendance and 

safety; and the ability to maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform activities on a 

consistent basis.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7. Plaintiff argues these functions are necessary for unskilled 

work, and that the ALJ (1) simply ignored Dr. Samuelson’s findings that Plaintiff was 

“moderately limited” in these two functions, and (2) did not explain why the ALJ rejected this 

probative evidence. Id. at 7-8. She further argues the ALJ simply ignored Dr. Samuelson’s 

opinion that she “would not be appropriate for work of any sort. She is not able to work for a 

sustained period.” Id. at 5 (quoting AR 957), 7-8. Plaintiff contends the ALJ was required to 

explain the weight given to the opinions of a physician who examined her at the request of the 

State agency, and to explain why she did not adopt Dr. Samuelson’s opinion. 

Defendant argues the ALJ included moderate limitations in the RFC, and thus in fact 

incorporated the limitations Dr. Samuelson articulated in her report. Def.’s Mot. at 4-6. 

Defendant also argues the ALJ appropriately found Plaintiff was able to work despite Dr. 

Samuelson’s statement that Plaintiff was unable to “work for a sustained period.” Id. at 6-7.

C. Analysis

In her decision, the ALJ describes Dr. Samuelson as “opin[ing] that the claimant’s ability 

to perform simple instructions was unimpaired, while her ability to perform detailed and complex 

instructions was mildly impaired. She was unimpaired in interacting with co-workers and 

supervisors. However, her ability to maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace was 

moderately impaired. Furthermore, the claimant ability to maintain regular attendance in the 

workplace and perform activities on a consistent basis was moderately impaired.” AR 23 (citing 

Exhibit 17F, AR 953-57). This accurately reflects Dr. Samuelson’s opinion. See AR 953-57.

The ALJ did not specifically adopt or reject any part of Dr. Samuelson’s opinion at either 

Step 2 or Step 4 of her analysis. At Step 2 of her analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff was moderately 

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limited in her ability to maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace. AR 21. This is 

consistent with Dr. Samuelson’s opinion. See AR 957 (“Ability to maintain concentration and 

attention, persistence and pace: Moderately Impaired.”). At Step 4 of her analysis, the ALJ 

concluded Plaintiff was capable of performing light work with postural, manipulative, and mental 

limitations. AR 24. The ALJ identified the following mental limitations as applicable to Plaintiff: 

(1) superficial interaction with co-workers and the public; (2) simple, repetitive, routine mental 

tasks; and (3) “low stress work, defined as no work at a production rate pace[.]” Id. The ALJ did 

not reject Dr. Samuelson’s opinion in devising these limitations. On the contrary, the ALJ’s 

limitations are either consistent with or more stringent than the limitations identified by Dr. 

Samuelson, who opined Plaintiff was “unimpaired” in her ability to relate and interact with coworkers and the public; in her ability to accept instructions from others; and in her ability to 

understand, remember and carry out simple one or two-step job instructions. AR 957. Plaintiff 

acknowledges that limiting her to simple, repetitive tasks is consistent with moderate limitations in 

concentration, persistence, and pace. See Pl.’s Mot. at 7 n.1 (citing Sabin v. Astrue, 337 Fed. 

App’x 617, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2009) (no error where ALJ found claimant could perform “simple and 

repetitive tasks on a consistent basis” despite moderate difficulties in concentration and pace)); see 

also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 2008) (“an ALJ’s assessment 

of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where 

the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.”). 

In addition, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to “low stress” work that would not be performed at a 

production pace. AR 24. This limitation was added after the ALJ accurately described Dr. 

Samuelson’s opinion as supporting “moderate” limitations for Plaintiff’s ability to maintain 

attention, concentration, persistence and pace; as well as ability to maintain regular attendance and 

perform activities on a consistent basis. AR 23. Importantly, Dr. Samuelson did not opine how 

many days a month Plaintiff would be expected to miss work, nor the percentage of time Plaintiff 

would be off-task. See AR 957. Dr. Samuelson did not indicate Plaintiff’s mild to moderate 

limitations would result in excessive absences beyond a number customarily tolerated in the 

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workplace, nor that Plaintiff would be unable to sustain concentration and attention required to 

perform day to day work activity. Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the AR that any of her 

treating or examining physicians opined that she would miss work more than a “moderate” 

number of days, be off-task more than a “moderate” amount of time during the day, or require an 

atypical number or length of rest periods. See supra, at 2-4. Although no treating or examining 

physician opined specifically about Plaintiff’s ability to attend work and stay on task, Dr. Covey 

opined Plaintiff would “be able to successfully carry out simple and detailed instructions on a 

consistent basis throughout a normal work day[;]” was not significantly limited in her ability to 

maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary preferences; and that she appeared 

to be capable of carrying out simple and detailed, but not complex, instructions on a consistent 

basis in a work environment. AR 101-05. The ALJ did not err in failing to include limitations 

that were not articulated by any physician who treated or examined Plaintiff, and that were not 

supported by the medical evidence of record.

The ALJ also did not reject Dr. Samuelson’s medical opinion when she found Plaintiff 

could perform some type of work despite suffering from some moderate limitations: “Moderate 

mental functional limitations are not per se disabling, nor do they preclude the performance of jobs 

that involve simple, repetitive tasks.” Herrera-Schmitz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 

5258701, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015) (citing cases). On the contrary, a claimant with 

moderate limitations “is still able to function satisfactorily.” HALLEX41-2-5-20, 1992 WL 

601808; see also Cantu v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1062101, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (the 

SSA “defines a moderate limitation as there is more than a slight limitation in this area, but the 

individual can still function satisfactorily[; ] the ALJ’s explanation of ‘moderate’ limitation as 

one which still allows the individual to ‘perform the function satisfactorily’ was proper” (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 

4 HALLEX is the SSA’s Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Manual. It is “strictly an internal 

guidance tool, providing policy and procedural guidelines to ALJs and other staff members.” 

Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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Finally, in a section of her report entitled “Discussion of Claimed Conditions,” Dr. 

Samuelson writes that Plaintiff “would not be appropriate for work of any sort. She is not able to 

work for a sustained period.” AR 957. The Court notes these statements do not appear in the 

Functional Assessment section of Dr. Samuelson’s report, and it is not clear to the undersigned 

whether this represents Dr. Samuelson’s opinion of Plaintiff’s symptoms or a summary of 

Plaintiff’s self-assessment of her condition. Defendant does not address the location of these 

statements or their source but suggests the opinion relates to Plaintiff’s physical condition or selfreported pain, not the psychiatric conditions at issue in this appeal. See Def.’s Mot. at 6-7. In any 

event, to the extent Dr. Samuelson’s statement is an assessment of Plaintiff’s psychiatric 

limitations, it is not well-supported and not consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)-(4) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an 

opinion . . . the more weight we will give that opinion[;]” “Generally, the more consistent an 

opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.”). Indeed, the 

statement is inconsistent with Dr. Samuelson’s own assessment that Plaintiff’s psychiatric 

condition was “fair” and that her functional assessment ranged from “unimpaired” to “moderate” 

but included no “severe” limitations. The medical evidence in the record does not support a 

finding that Plaintiff’s psychiatric conditions make Plaintiff inappropriate “for work of any sort” 

or prevent her from working “for a sustained period.” To the extent Dr. Samuelson opines that 

Plaintiff “would not be appropriate for work of any sort[,]” the ultimate issue of disability is

reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the 

determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A 

statement that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that 

you are disabled.”). 

The ALJ did not reject Dr. Samuelson’s opinion in evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC. The Court 

accordingly finds the AJL used the correct legal standards in evaluating the medical opinions of 

record, and that her decision is supported by substantial evidence.

//

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will enter a 

separate judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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