Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00538/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00538-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEAN A. SCHWARTZMILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00538-JAH-PCL

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR 

ORDER AND SUA SPONTE 

GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME 

TO FILE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

I. Procedural History

On March 16, 2017, Dean Schwartzmiller (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Doc. No. 1). In addition, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2). On May 22, 2017, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to 

state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. (Doc. No. 

3 at 12-13.) 

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Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 13.) Instead of following 

the Court’s Order, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction which the Court 

denied on June 6, 2017. (Doc. Nos. 5, 6.) Plaintiff then filed a “Motion to Alter or 

Amend” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) & 59(e). (Doc. No. 8.) Soon after, Plaintiff filed 

a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit regarding the Court’s June 6, 2017 Order denying 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. No. 9.) On September 13, 2017, the 

Ninth Circuit issued an Order summarily affirming this Court’s June 6, 2017 Order 

finding that “a review of the record and the opening brief indicates that the questions 

raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as to not require further argument.” (Doc. No. 

13 at 1.)

II. Plaintiff’s Motion 

A. Standard of Review

While Plaintiff purports to bring this Motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(b), 

both of those sections relate to judgments and no judgment has yet to be entered in this 

matter. Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

However, a motion requesting reconsideration of a matter previously decided may be 

construed as a motion to alter an order pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. Ernst & 

Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 

1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Rule 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is 

shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court's 

decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied; (6) any other reason justifying relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J 

v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

/ / /

/ / /

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“Although the application of Rule 60(b) is committed to the discretion of the district 

courts . . ., as a general matter, Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and must be liberally 

applied.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695-96 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Nevertheless, Rule 60(b) provides for 

extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a showing of “exceptional 

circumstances.” Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994).

B. Plaintiff’s arguments

Plaintiff claims that this Court is “biased and prejudiced” as well as “legally, 

factually and morally wrong.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff maintains that each ground of 

dismissal contained in the Court’s May 22, 2017 Order were “improvidently decided for 

‘good ole boys’.” (Id. at 2.) 

1. IFP Motion

Plaintiff indicates that the granting of his IFP Motion “is the only portion of the 

documents submitted to this Court that was accepted as being correct but only so it could 

deduct the $350.00 filing fee from Plaintiff’s trust account.” (Id.) Plaintiff “suggests” 

that the Court “secure this money from Plaintiff’s Social Security account that he has 

paid into ever since 1952 but cannot draw out of now because he is in prison.” (Id.) 

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified 

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copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly 

deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the 

account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the 

prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's 

income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to 

the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. 

at 629.

There is no discretion for the Court to garnish the $400 filing fee from any account 

other than the one held in Plaintiff’s name in the institution where he is housed. 

Plaintiff’s request that the Court garnish the filing fee from any other source is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff claims that the Court “ignored” his claims of conspiracy between prison 

officials and John Larson, the journalist who produced a news story about Plaintiff which 

apparently aired in NBC in 2006. (Pl.’s Mtn. at 3.) Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a 

number of allegations that there are falsehoods and lies perpetuated by this journalist 

throughout the program that aired. Plaintiff allegations that there is a conspiracy

between a journalist and “prosecution authorities in San Jose, California,” as well as 

Defendant Noel, an FBI agent, all arise from events that occurred in 2006. (Compl. at 22, 

24.) As the Court found in the May 22, 2017 Order, these claims fall far outside the 

applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 3 at 9.) Plaintiff has offered no facts from 

which the Court could find that he is eligible for equitable tolling of these claims.

Plaintiff does not identify the alleged conspiracy between Larson and RJD 

officials. Instead, he alleges that Larson caused this story to be placed on the internet, 

presumably because it aired on a NBC news program, and many years later RJD officials 

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retrieved this story from the internet. (Pl.’s Mot. at 3.) He has been given leave to 

correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Even if Plaintiff does seek to 

amend his Complaint to add a clear conspiracy claim between Larson, NBC News and 

RJD officials, it is unlikely that such a claim would be plausible to survive the sua sponte 

screening process.

42 U.S.C. § 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights. 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). In 

order to state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must allege that two or more Defendants 

conspired “for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any 

manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny [him] the 

equal protection of the law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The absence of a § 1983 deprivation 

of rights precludes a § 1985 conspiracy claim based on the same allegations. Cassettari 

v. Nevada County, Cal., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Mahaney v. Warren 

County, 206 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that “bare” allegations are 

insufficient to support a claim under § 1985 for civil conspiracy). Here, Plaintiff’s 

claims that there is a connection between an airing of a broadcast in 2006, apparently also 

available on the internet since 2006, and prison officials locating this broadcast ten years 

later is not a plausible conspiracy claim. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Determining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The 

“mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting the Iqbal plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U. S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff also disagrees with the Court’s determination that he could not proceed on 

behalf “Christopher Dean Harmon, Jr., a minor child” whom he listed as a co-plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint describes Harmon as a “minor adolescent now 15 years of age” and 

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is Plaintiff’s “Heir Apparent.” (Compl. at 6.) In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that he 

should be able to represent other individuals because he has been named as a lead 

plaintiff in a class action and he has “over 40 years of both pleading and trial court 

experience for both attorneys and other prisoners.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 6.) 

Plaintiff appears to confuse the right to assist other prisoners in preparing legal 

work with actually appearing on behalf of other inmates or individuals in any Court. 

Rule 11 clearly provides “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be 

signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s original name, or if the party is 

not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a). Here, 

purported Plaintiff Harmon has not signed the Complaint nor filed a separate Motion to 

Proceed IFP. Plaintiff, as a non-attorney party appearing IFP on his own behalf, does not 

have the right to represent any other party. See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 

696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff further maintains this Court’s “decision to dismiss [Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim] epitomizes its bias and prejudice toward both this Plaintiff and the 

subject matter of this Complaint, but like it or not, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 

(2003) is reality and has been so now for 14 years.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 14.) Plaintiff’s 

argument relating to his Eighth Amendment claims is incoherent. These claims were 

dismissed because they were duplicative of claims he litigated in another matter. See 

Schwartzmiller, et al. v. Brown, et al., S.D. Cal Civil Case No. 3:13-cv-01253-WQHNLS. It is not at all clear on what basis Plaintiff claims that the Court was biased or 

prejudiced towards him. Plaintiff appears to have a misunderstanding that the Court 

dismissed his entire action as duplicative but this portion of the Order related only to his 

Eighth Amendment claims. (See Doc. No. 3 at 10.) 

Plaintiff’s entire Motion contains allegations that this Court is biased without any 

specific factual allegations. Plaintiff claims “when there is biased and prejudicial or 

bigoted states of mind, in either the Court or the carefully selected Orwellian law clerks, 

such an Order as was made here is the result.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff’s Motion 

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contains a number of such statements but he fails to properly support any of this 

arguments with coherent factual allegations or relevant legal authority. Because Plaintiff 

has provided no basis for the Court to vacate or set aside its May 22, 2017 Order, relief 

under Rule 60 is not warranted. See School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1442; Engleson, 972 

F.2d at 1044. A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted simply because Plaintiff is 

unhappy with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to binding 

precedent or because he disagrees with its ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan Wright 

& Arthur R. Miller Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 2858 (Supp. 2015) (citing 

Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (D. Wis. 1956)). 

III. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Order (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED.

(2) Plaintiff is sua sponte GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date 

of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of 

pleading noted in the Court’s May 22, 2017 Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must 

be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named 

and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See

S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with 

leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 

waived if not repled.”).

(3) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

Dated: September 19, 2017

Hon. John A. Houston

United States District Judge

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