Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00597/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00597-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN W. WYSKIVER, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15cv597-LAB (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[ECF Nos. 15, 16] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff John W. Wyskiver (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act requesting judicial review of the 

final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner” 

or “Defendant”) regarding the denial of Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security 

Income. (ECF No. 1.) On August 7, 2015, Defendant filed an answer and the 

administrative record (“A.R.”). (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) On October 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 

motion for summary judgment seeking reversal of Defendant’s denial of benefits and 

remand for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff contends the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed legal error by failing to satisfy the burden 

at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process when the ALJ determined there are a 

significant number of jobs that Plaintiff can perform in the national economy. On 

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November 3, 2015, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and an 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) On November 

4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply and response to Defendant’s filings. (ECF No. 18.) The 

Court took the parties’ motions under submission on November 25, 2015. (ECF No. 19.) 

For the reasons set forth herein, after careful consideration of the parties’ motions, 

the administrative record, and the applicable law, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that 

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED; (2) Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED; and (3) the case be REMANDED for further 

administrative proceedings. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Determination of Disability 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show 

two things: (1) he suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

that can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would 

result in death; and (2) the impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the 

work he previously performed or any other substantial gainful employment which exists in 

the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(2)(A). A claimant must meet 

both requirements to be classified as “disabled.” Id. 

 The Commissioner makes the assessment of disability through a five-step sequential 

evaluation process. If an applicant is found to be “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step, 

there is no need to proceed further. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 

968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000). The five steps are: 

1. Is claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, 

then the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act. If not, proceed to step two. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 

2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If so, proceed to step three. If 

not, then the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 

416.920(c) 

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3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific 

impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1? If so, then the 

claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). 

4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? 

If so, then the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). 

5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If so, then the claimant is 

not disabled. If not, then the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 Although the ALJ must assist the claimant in developing a record, the claimant bears 

the burden of proof during the first four steps, while the Commissioner bears the burden of 

proof at the fifth step. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 & n.3 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d)). 

At step five, the Commissioner must “show that the claimant can perform some other work 

that exists in ‘significant numbers’ in the national economy, taking into consideration the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Id. at 1100 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3)). 

B. Scope of Review

 The Social Security Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of 

judicial review is limited. The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision unless it 

“is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.” Tidwell v. Apfel, 

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 

F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“We may reverse the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits only if it is based upon 

legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” (citing Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601)). 

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 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 

Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601 (citing Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

“Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a 

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten, 44 F.3d at 

1457 (citing Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985)). In considering the 

record as a whole, the Court must weigh both the evidence that supports and detracts from 

the ALJ’s conclusions. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Vidal 

v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981); Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1975)). The Court must uphold the denial of benefits if the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision. Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” (citing Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F. 3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995))); Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457 (“If the 

evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, 

the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.” (citing Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 

1992)). However, even if the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

conclusions, the Court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal 

standards in weighing the evidence and reaching a conclusion. Benitez v. Califano, 573 

F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 

1968)). 

Section 405(g) permits the Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter may also be 

remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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II. BACKGROUND1

On September 20, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for Supplemental 

Security Income alleging disability beginning January 14, 2010. (A.R. at 14, 132.) 

Plaintiff alleged in his application that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder 

(“PTSD”) and anxiety due to a December 13, 2006 home invasion robbery, nightmares, 

back injuries including a herniated disc, spinal stenosis causing numbness in his right leg, 

and human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). (Id. at 132.) Plaintiff alleges he became 

disabled on January 14, 2010. (Id.) Prior to the onset of his disability, Plaintiff worked as 

a funeral home director. (Id. at 80.) 

After a December 29, 2011 denial at the initial determination (id. at 169-73) and a 

June 7, 2012 denial on reconsideration (id. at 183-87), Plaintiff filed a timely request for 

hearing before an ALJ. (Id. at 188.) Following an April 15, 2013 administrative hearing 

at which Plaintiff, a medical expert, and a vocational expert testified (id. at 77-115), ALJ 

James Carletti denied Plaintiff’s application on June 26, 2013. (Id. at 14-23.) 

At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff “has 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 20, 2011, the application date.” 

(Id. at 16.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe 

impairments: HIV, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and PTSD. (Id.) At step 

three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.” 

(Id.) Before conducting step four of the analysis, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “has the 

residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to perform the full range of light work. [Plaintiff] 

can perform simple repetitive tasks, non-public, minimum contact with supervisors 

secondary to post-traumatic stress disorder, herniated disc disease of the lumbar spine and 

                                                                

1

 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s severe impairment or RFC determinations, or 

his adverse credibility findings. In light of the arguments presented in the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, the Court declines to set forth a detailed summary of 

Plaintiff’s medical records or the administrative hearing testimony.

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symptoms from the HIV virus.” (Id. at 17.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

“is unable to perform past relevant work as a funeral home director.” (Id. at 21.) At the 

final step, by relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 2, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and 

RFC, “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

[Plaintiff] can perform.” (Id. at 22.) As a result, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is not disabled 

as defined in the Social Security Act. (Id. at 23.) 

Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Counsel. The Commissioner’s decision 

became final on January 9, 2015, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review of the ALJ’s June 26, 2013 decision. (Id. at 1-4.) 

III. DISCUSSION

The sole issue here is whether or not the ALJ committed legal error at step five of 

the sequential evaluation process. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by not satisfying the burden at step five of the 

sequential evaluation process. (ECF No. 15-1 at 3:15-7:22.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

contends the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of the vocational expert when arriving 

at the conclusion that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Plaintiff can perform. Plaintiff further contends that because the vocational 

expert, who had testified that Plaintiff could perform work as a “production inspector” and 

“assembler,” had failed to provide the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) numbers 

associated with those job descriptions, the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational expert’s 

testimony was legally erroneous in violation of Social Security Ruling 00-4p.2

 However, 

                                                                

2

 Social Security Ruling 00-4p “emphasizes that before relying on [vocational expert] 

or [vocational specialist] evidence to support a disability determination or decision, 

[ALJ’s] must: [1] Identify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflicts between 

occupational evidence provided by [vocational experts] or [vocations specialists] and 

information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles . . . and [2] Explain in the 

determination or decision how any conflict that has been identified was resolved.” 

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Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the vocational expert’s 

testimony that Plaintiff can perform the occupations of “production inspector” and 

“assembler.” Although the ALJ summarized the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ 

did not rely on that testimony in reaching the decision that there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (A.R. at 22.) 

Rather, the ALJ relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, albeit erroneously, as 

discussed below. 

In the cross-motion for summary judgment, the Commissioner contends the ALJ 

properly relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines instead of the vocational expert’s 

testimony. (ECF No. 16-1 at 3:20-5:5.) 

A. Legal Standards

“Once a claimant has established that he or she suffers from a severe impairment 

that prevents the claimant from doing any work he or she has done in the past, the claimant 

has made a prima facie showing of disability.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100. If the claimant 

successfully makes a prima facie showing of disability, at step five of the sequential 

evaluation process “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can 

perform some other work that exists in ‘significant numbers’ in the national economy, 

taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work experience.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3)). “‘[W]ork which exists in the 

national economy’ means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region 

where [the claimant] lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that 

there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national economy that 

claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by 

reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” 

and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then 

the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits. 

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099. 

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1. Vocational Expert 

“The ALJ may meet his burden at step five by asking a vocational expert a 

hypothetical question based on medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence in 

the record and reflecting all the claimant’s limitations, both physical and mental, supported 

by the record.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Valentine v. 

Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 

F.3d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 

573, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) (Pregerson, J., concurring)). “The ALJ’s depiction of the 

claimant’s disability must be accurate, detailed, and supported by the medical record.” 

Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 578 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (citing Gamer v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The vocational expert is then 

called upon to ‘translate[] factual scenarios in to realistic job market probabilities’ by 

testifying, on the record, to what kinds of jobs the claimant still can perform and whether 

there is a sufficient number of those jobs available in the claimant’s region or in several 

other regions of the economy to support a finding of ‘not disabled.’” Desrosiers, 846 F.2d 

at 578 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (quoting Gamer, 815 F.2d at 1280). 

2. Medical-Vocational Guidelines 

 Alternatively, the ALJ may satisfy the step five burden of showing that a claimant 

can perform work by relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, commonly referred to 

as “the grids.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2; Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101). The grids 

“present, in table form, a short-hand method for determining the availability and numbers 

of suitable jobs for a claimant.” Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2006) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101). The grids categorize jobs based on exertional or 

physical strength requirements.3

 Each table sets forth combinations of age, education, and 

                                                                

3

 “The grids categorize jobs by their physical-exertional requirements and consist of 

three separate tables-one for each category: ‘[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited 

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work experience, and for each combination directs a finding of either “disabled” or “not 

disabled” based upon the number of jobs in the national economy for someone with the 

listed characteristics. Id. at 1115; see also Lockwood, 616 F3d at 1071 (“The grids are 

matrices of the ‘four factors identified by Congress—physical ability, age, education, and 

work experience—and set forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific 

combinations of these factors exist in significant numbers in the national economy.’” 

(quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1983))); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 

1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When the grids match the claimant’s qualifications, ‘the 

guidelines direct a conclusion as to whether work exists that the claimant could perform.’” 

(quoting Heckler, 461 U.S. at 462)). Reliance on the grids “allows the Commissioner to 

streamline the administrative process and encourages uniform treatment of claims.” 

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101 (citing Heckler, 461 U.S. at 460-62). 

When a claimant suffers only exertional limitations, the ALJ must use the grids. 

Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a (b). On the other hand, when a 

claimant has only non-exertional limitations4

, “the grids are inappropriate, and the ALJ 

                                                                

to sedentary work,’ ‘[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited to light work,’ and 

[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited to medium work.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, rule 200.00). 

4

 Non-exertional limitations, which “are limitations that do not directly affect a 

claimant’s strength,” Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988), include 

“mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, or environmental limitations . . . that affect a 

claimant’s ability to work.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 

1101 (explaining that non-exertional impairments include “poor vision or inability to 

tolerate dust or gases.”); cf. Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 579 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (“Pain 

may serve as either an exertional or a non-exertional limitation. Pain is an exertional 

limitation when it directly affects a claimant’s strength (for example, when the neurological 

sensation of pain literally prevents a claimant’s muscles from lifting an object). Pain is a 

non-exertional limitation when it does not affect a claimant’s strength, but nonetheless 

affects a claimant’s ability to work (for example, when a claimant’s muscles enable him or 

her to lift an object, but the claimant is so distracted by the pain that he or she realistically 

cannot perform the work).”). 

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must rely on other evidence.” Id. If a claimant has both exertional and non-exertional 

limitations, the grids may be used as a framework for decision making. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1569a(d). 

[S]ignificant non-exertional impairments . . . may make reliance on the grids 

inappropriate. . . . 

However, the fact that a non-exertional limitation is alleged does not 

automatically preclude application of the grids. The ALJ should first 

determine if a claimant’s non-exertional limitations significantly limit the 

range of work permitted by his exertional limitations. . . . 

. . . A non-exertional impairment, if sufficiently severe, may limit the 

claimant’s functional capacity in ways not contemplated by the guidelines. In 

such a case, the guidelines would be inapplicable. 

Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 577 (citations omitted). 

B. Analysis

 There are “strict limits” on when the Commissioner may rely on the grids. 

Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 578 (Pregerson, J., concurring). An ALJ may substitute the grids 

for vocational expert testimony only when the grids “completely and accurately represent 

a claimant’s limitations.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. In other words, for the grids to apply, 

“a claimant must be able to perform the full range of jobs in a given [exertional] category.” 

Id.; see also Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340 (“[T]he grids will be inappropriate where the 

predicate for using the grids—the ability to perform a full range of either medium, light or 

sedentary activities—is not present.”). Because “the grids are predicated on a claimant 

suffering from an impairment which manifests itself by limitations in meeting the strength 

requirements of jobs (‘exertional limitations’)[,] they may not be fully applicable” when 

the claimant has non-exertional limitations. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115 (citing 20 C.F.R. 

pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, rule 200.00(e)). Mere allegations of a non-exertional limitation, 

however, do not preclude application of the grids. Rather, the non-exertional limitations 

must be “‘sufficiently severe’ so as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by 

the claimant’s exertional limitations.’” Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340 (quoting Desrosiers, 

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846 F.2d at 577; see also Polny v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[W]here 

. . . a claimant’s nonexertional limitations are in themselves enough to limit his range of 

work, the grids do not apply, and the testimony of a vocational expert is required to identify 

specific jobs within the claimant’s abilities.”). 

 In Hargrove v. Astrue, No. CV 09-8553-MLG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42044 (C.D. 

Cal. April 29, 2010), the court concluded that the ALJ’s reliance on the grids was 

inappropriate where the ALJ determined the claimant could perform medium work but, 

due to the claimant’s mental condition (i.e., bipolar disorder), the claimant was limited to 

“simple routine work tasks” and “limited contact with co-workers, supervisors and the 

general public.” Id. at *8. The court reasoned: 

The grids do not completely describe these nonexertional limitations, which 

would preclude [claimant] from performing the full range of work at any 

exertional level. As such, it was improper for the ALJ to rely on the grids at 

step five rather than taking vocational expert testimony. See, e.g., Holohan, 

246 F.3d at 1208-09 (ALJ committed legal error by relying on grids where 

claimaint’s [sic] only severe impairments were psychiatric); Tackett, 180 F.3d 

at 1103-04 (vocational expert testimony necessary because claimant’s need to 

shift, stand up, or walk around every thirty minutes is significant 

nonexertional limitation not contemplated by grids); Polny, 864 F.2d at 663-

64 (grids inapplicable because, although claimaint [sic] was “capable of 

performing a wide range of jobs,” he could not perform ones that were “highly 

stressful,” that “require[d] comprehension of complex instructions,” or 

“require[d] dealing with the public”); Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1341 & n.4 (grids 

inapplicable because they did not account for the claimaint’s [sic] need to 

avoid stressful environments, his inability to regularly use his hands, or his 

vision problems). 

Hargrove, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42044, at *8-9. 

 Similarly, in Castro v. Astrue, No. EDCV 09-1966-MLG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

49970 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2010), the ALJ concluded that the medical evidence established 

the claimant suffered from the severe impairments of psychotic disorder and substance 

abuse, and the claimant retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional 

levels but with the non-exertional limitation of performing simple, repetitive tasks. Id. at 

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*8. After finding that the claimant had no past relevant work, the ALJ relied on the grids 

and concluded there existed jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant could perform and, as a result, a finding of “not disabled” was warranted. Id. The 

court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further administrative 

proceedings because “the ALJ erred by neglecting to obtain vocational expert testimony 

on the issue of whether there existed work in the national economy that [the claimant] could 

perform and instead relying solely on the grids.” Id. at *5-6. The court reasoned that the 

ALJ’s reliance on the grids was improper because, “while [the claimant] had an RFC to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, her psychiatric impairments limited 

her to ‘simple, repetitive tasks,’” and “[t]he grids do not completely describe these 

nonexertional limitations, which would preclude her from performing the full range of 

work at any exertional level. As such, it was improper for the ALJ to rely on the grids at 

step five rather than taking vocational expert testimony.” Id. at *8 (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d 

at 1103-04; Polny, 864 F.2d at 663-64; Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1341 & n.4). 

 In the present case, the ALJ made the same error as in Hargrove and Castro. 

Specifically, the ALJ initially found the medical evidence established that Plaintiff suffers 

from the following severe impairments: HIV, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 

spine, and PTSD. (A.R. at 16.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff retained the RFC “to 

perform the full range of light work” with the following non-exertional limitations: “simple 

repetitive tasks non-public, [with] minimum contact with supervisors secondary to [PTSD], 

herniated disc disease of the lumbar spine and symptoms from the HIV virus.” (Id. at 17.) 

However, these non-exertional limitations would preclude Plaintiff from performing the 

full range of light work. Therefore, the grids are inapplicable because they do not 

“completely and accurately represent [Plaintiff’s] limitations.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101; 

see also Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340 (“[T]he grids will be inappropriate where the predicate 

for using the grids—the ability to perform a full range of either medium, light or sedentary 

activities—is not present.”); Jones, 760 F.2d at 998 (“The very fact that the ALJ chose to 

call a vocational expert indicates his implicit assumption that [claimant’s] claim could not 

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be decided by grids alone.”). 

 The Commissioner argues that “the ALJ permissibly concluded that Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations were not sufficiently severe to require vocational expert testimony.” 

(ECF No. 16-1 at 4:2-3.) The Commissioner cites to Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983), in support of the 

contention that “the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s limitations in social interactions 

and to simple, repetitive (i.e. unskilled work) did not significantly affect his vocational 

capabilities.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 4:20-22.) However, both cases serve to reinforce that the 

ALJ’s reliance of the grids was improper. In Razey, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]he 

regulations do not . . . preclude the use of the grids when a nonexertional limitation is 

alleged. They explicitly provide for the evaluation of claimants asserting both exertional 

and nonexertional limitations.” 785 F.2d at 1430 (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 

2, rule 200.00(e)). However, in that case the Appeals Council found the medical evidence 

was insufficient to support the claimant’s assertion of non-exertional limitations (i.e., that 

he suffered a reduced pain threshold due to his psychiatric disorder) and, thus, the Appeals 

Council properly concluded that the claimant’s alleged “nonexertional limitations did not 

so affect [his] residual capacity that the use of the grids was inappropriate.” Id. Similarly, 

in Odle, the claimant’s alleged non-exertional limitations (i.e., deafness, dizziness, and 

drug dependence) “were found not to significantly limit [the claimant’s] exertional 

capabilities.” 707 F.2d at 440. 

 Here, in contrast, and contrary to the Commissioner’s assertion, the ALJ did not 

conclude that Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations do not significantly limit his vocational 

capabilities. Rather, the non-exertional limitations, which resulted from Plaintiff’s severe 

impairments of PTSD, degenerative disc disease, and HIV, limit Plaintiff to simple 

repetitive tasks in a non-public setting with minimum contact with supervisors. These 

findings are inconsistent with the ability to perform a full range of light work. Accordingly, 

the ALJ’s reliance on the grids was insufficient to meet the Commissioner’s burden at step 

five. The ALJ should have instead relied on the testimony of a vocational expert. See 

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Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ required to obtain 

testimony from a vocational expert where the claimant suffered from severe back pain 

amounting to a “significant non-exertional limitation.”). These errors warrant remand for 

further administrative proceedings.5

B. Remand for Further Proceedings Is Appropriate

The Court has “discretion to remand for further proceedings or to award benefits.” 

Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Winans v. Bowen 853 F.2d 

643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). Remand is the appropriate remedy “[i]f additional proceedings 

can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding.” Id. at 176 (quoting Lewin 

v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

Here, the ALJ committed legal error when he relied on the grids rather than on the 

testimony of a vocational expert at step five of the sequential evaluation process. 

Therefore, remand is appropriate. On remand, the ALJ cannot solely rely on the grids to 

complete step five of the sequential analysis. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101-02 (citing 

Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 577 (Pregerson, J., concurring)). Additionally, the ALJ must 

inquire about the DOT numbers before relying on the vocational expert’s testimony. See 

Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153. 

                                                                

5

 The Court notes that although a vocational expert testified during the administrative 

hearing, the ALJ did not obtain the DOT numbers associated with the occupations the 

vocational expert stated Plaintiff could perform, i.e., “production inspector” and 

“assembler.” (A.R. at 112-13.) The ALJ erred by failing to inquire about the DOT 

numbers. See Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he ALJ 

did not ask the vocational expert whether her testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles . . . [t]hus, [the court] cannot determine whether the ALJ properly 

relied on her testimony.”); Social Security Ruling 00-4p (“When a [vocational expert] or 

[vocational specialist] provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the 

adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that 

[vocational expert] or [vocational specialist] evidence and information provided in the 

DOT.”). The Court advises the Commissioner that, on remand, vocational expert 

testimony unaccompanied by adequate reference to the DOT is insufficient to satisfy the 

Commissioner’s burden at step five. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing 

analysis, this Court RECOMMENDS that (1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

be GRANTED, (2) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and 

(3) the case be REMANDED for further administrative proceedings. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted 

to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(d). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than March 28, 2016, any party may file 

and serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The documents 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and 

served no later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 14, 2016 

DAVID H. BARTICK 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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