Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02415/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02415-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDINE OSGOOD, an individual,

and ANTON EWING, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv2415-GPC(BGS)

ORDER 

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS; 

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE;

(3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; AND 

(4) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

REQUEST FOR LEAVE OF

COURT TO FILE A SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Dkt. Nos. 15, 16.]

v.

MAIN STREAT MARKETING, LLC,

a Utah limited liability company;

JERROD ROBKER, an individual aka

Jerrod McAllister; Does 1-100, ABC

Corporations 1-100, XYZ, LLC’s 1-

100,

Defendants.

Before the Court are Defendants Main Streat Marketing, LLC (“Main Streat”)

and Jerrod McAllister’s (“McAllister”) (collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss

1

Plaintiff Ewing complains that Defendants’ attorney has moved on behalf of 1

Jerrod McAllister which is only an aka for Jerrod Robker and fails to describe or

disclose anything about the realstatus ofJerrod Robker in order to conceal his criminal

record. (Dkt. No. 26 at 2 n. 2.) DefendantJerrod McAllister moved to dismiss the first

amended complaint without reference to whether Jerrod McAllister is an aka for Jerrod

Robker. Therefore, the Court refersto the individual Defendant as McAllister, and not

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), and motion to strike

pursuant to Rule 12(f). (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16.) Plaintiffs Anton Ewing (“Ewing”) and

Claudine Osgood (“Osgood”) separately filed oppositions to the motion to dismiss. 

(Dkt. No. 26, 30). Plaintiffs, together, also filed an opposition to the motion to strike. 

(Dkt. No. 28.) Replies to both motions were filed. (Dkt. Nos. 31, 32.) The motions

are submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7.1(d)(1). Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in

part Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend and GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to strike.

2

Procedural Background

On September 26, 2016, the case was removed from state court. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

On October 4, 2016, Plaintiffs Anton Ewing and Claudine Osgood, proceeding pro se, 

filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Dkt. No. 11.) The amended complaint

alleged three causes of action for violations under the California Invasion of Privacy

Act (“CIPA”) pursuant to California Penal Code section 630 et. seq.; the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962

Robker as Plaintiffs allege until discovery reveals whether they are the same person. 

Both Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not consider Defendants’ Rule 2

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Defendants did not properly file it because it was

withdrawn on November 8, 2016 and refiled the same day without Defendants

obtaining another hearing date from the Court. (Dkt. Nos. 21, 22.) On November 7,

2016, Defendants filed a notice of errata concerning its Rule 12(b)(6) motion

explaining that they did not reference Rule 12(b)(6) as a basis for dismissal of the FAC

in their notice ofmotion. Thereafter, Defendants received notification fromthe Clerk’s

Office that the filing was incorrect and to withdraw and refile the proper document. 

(Dkt. No. 20.) Therefore, on November 8, 2016, pursuant to the Clerk’s Office

direction, Defendants withdrew their motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 16) and refiled it,

(Dkt. No. 22). Due to the administrative clerical error, Defendants did not need to

obtain another hearing date when it refiled its notice of motion in order to correct a

clerical error and did not violate any rules of Court. 

The Court notes that the entirety of the motion was not refiled in Docket Number

22 and only the notice of motion was filed. Therefore, the Court considers the

memorandum of points and authorities docketed at Docket Number 16. 

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(c), and (d)); and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) pursuant to 47

U.S.C. § 227. (Dkt. No. 11, FAC). 

Factual Background

Plaintiffs are individuals who reside in California. Defendants Main Streat and

McAllister, as an alter ego of Main Streat, maintain three domestic and international

call centersfrom which consumer calls are placed by Defendants’ business units using

an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) and calls are recorded using

recording devices without Plaintiffs’ consent. (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶¶ 22, 57.) Using an

ATDS, Defendants can initiate up to two thousand calls a day to call consumers’

business and cellular telephones up to five times a day. (Id. ¶ 60.) Once consumer

information is uploaded onto Defendants’ computer system, the ATDS initiates the call,

and when a consumer answers, the call is routed to an available agent. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 62.) 

The recording of the calls begins when the Defendants’ agents pick up the call and the

agents do not know which calls are being recorded. (Id. ¶ 62.) Defendants use a

centralized call recording hardware and software to record the calls. (Id. ¶ 60.) 

Defendants and their employees have admitted that all calls are recorded and no

warnings about the recordings are provided to the consumers. (Id. ¶¶ 56, 62, 63, 64.) 

According to the first amended complaint, on August 11, 2016, Defendants or

one of their employees called Plaintiff Osgood on her personal cellular telephone even

though she is registered with the national do-not-call list for calls and/or texts. (Dkt.

No. 11, FAC ¶ 23.) Osgood informed the caller that her phone number was on the donot-call registry and requested a copy of the internal do-not-call policy. (Id. ¶ 24.) 

Despite her comments, Defendant Main Streat continues to repeatedly call her to

telemarket its “scam business program.” (Id.) 

On an unspecified date, employees of Main Streat, Kim Swanson and Cory

Williams, called Plaintiff Ewing repeatedly even after Ewing demanded that they stop

calling. (Id. ¶ 36.) Devoy and Cory Williams confessed that Main Streat uses a third

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party company in India to originate its telemarketing calls in an effort to intentionally

evade federal and California criminal laws that prohibit telemarketing and illegal

recording. (Id. ¶ 37.) Cory Williams also admitted that Main Streat records calls

without providing any advance warning. (Id. ¶ 38.) 

Plaintiffs Osgood and Ewing were not advised at the outset of their calls that the

calls might be recorded. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs allege they had a reasonable expectation

that the conversations were not being recorded, monitored or overheard. (Id.)

Defendant McAllister refused to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of its do-not-call policy

and refused to take their name and telephone numbers off the telemarketing list. (Id.

¶ 54.) 

Discussion

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULES 12(b)(6) & 12(b)(1)

A. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required

only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). 

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

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liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for

a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as

true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). The court

evaluates lack of statutory standing under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Maya v. Centex

Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). 

However, because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, their complaint “must be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and must be

“liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)

(reaffirming standard reviewing pro se complaints post-Twombly). The Ninth Circuit

has concluded that the court's treatment of pro se filings after Twombly and Iqbal

remain the same and pro se pleadings must continue to be liberally construed. Hebbe

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d

636, 640-42 (7th Cir. 2010); Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461-62 (5th

Cir. 2010); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even

following Twombly and Iqbal, “we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint

liberally”). 

Defendants argue that the Court should not liberally construe the FAC because

Plaintiff Ewing attended law school and has filed dozens of TCPA and RICO cases in

California state and federal courts over the past decade. Defendants do not dispute that

Plaintiff Osgood should be entitled to the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant. 

District courts have held that licensed attorneys representing themselves are not

entitled to the same liberal treatments as pro se litigants if they are registered members

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of the bar. See Rossmann v. Donaldson, 2016 WL 6605148, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 4,

2016) (citing Rossman v. Steizel, No. 11-CV-4293(JS)(ETB), 2011 WL 4916898, at

*3 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Here, given that the Plaintiff is an attorney having

attended Harvard Law School and who is currently registered as a member of Bar of

the State of New York since 1990, his pleading is not entitled to the degree of liberality

ordinarily given to pro se plaintiffs.”)); Rossmann v. Lazarus, No. 1:08cv316(JCC),

2008 WL 4550791 at *1, n.1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2008) (“The Court notes that while

Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit pro se, he is an attorney licensed to practice law in the

state of New York. Consequently, the Court will hold Plaintiff's pleadings and briefs

to the same standard it would if he were represented by counsel, and not provide him

the benefit of the doubt that is normally afforded a pro se plaintiff not versed in the

practice of law.”). Other courts have further declined to grant a plaintiff, who

graduated from law school and demonstrated familiarity with the law based on past

litigation, liberal construction of pleadings. See Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380,

389 (2nd Cir. 1983) (declining to make allowances for plaintiff who filed an improper

writ of habeas corpus where plaintiff was a law school graduate and demonstrated his

familiaritywith substantive and procedural lawin hisfrequent litigation); Day–Petrano

v. Levine, No. 8:06–CV–1647–T–27TBM, 2006 WL 3841789, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Dec.14, 2006) (in light of Plaintiff’s extensive litigation experience and legal

education, she was “not entitled to the usual liberal construction of pleadings afforded

pro se litigants.”). 

The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on whether a pro per litigant, who graduated

from law school and has familiarity with the law based on prior litigation in courts, is

entitled to liberal construction of his or her pleadings. One district court questioned

whether a plaintiff who is a law school graduate, but not a practicing attorney should

be entitled to the leniency traditionally afforded to a pro se litigant. See Hupp v. City

of Walnut Creek, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

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Since the law is not settled in this circuit on whether a pro se plaintiff who

attended law school and has past litigation experience is entitled to liberal construction

of his or her pleadings, the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff Ewing’s pleadings. 

Moreover, since one of the two plaintiffs, Osgood, is pro se and Defendants do not

allege she has any legal training, the Court must, nonetheless, construe the pleadings

in the FAC liberally. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to

amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at

658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401. 

B. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Defendants also move to dismiss challenging subject matter jurisction of this

Court under Rule 12(b)(1) arguing that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing as to their

claims under CIPA and the TCPA.3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule

12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d

1214, 1242 (9thCir. 2000). In resolving a facial challenge, the court considers whether

“the allegations contained in [the] complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke

federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

2004). The court must accept the allegations as true and must draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2004).

While Defendants’ notice ofmotion statesthat itmoves under Rule 12(b)(1) and

3

12(b)(6), (Dkt. No. 22), the memorandum of points and authorities only provides a

legal standard under Rule 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 16-1.) 

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In resolving a factual challenge, the court may consider evidence outside the complaint

and ordinarily “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Safe

Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. Here, while not addressed by Defendants, it

appears they are launching a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction as no

evidence outside the complaint is presented to challenge subject matter jurisdiction. 

Analysis

A. California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”)

The FAC alleges violations of California Penal Code sections 632 and 637.2(a)-

(b) for Defendants’ recording of confidential telephone conversations without

informing Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶¶ 76-84.) 

Defendants argue that this claimshould be dismissed becausePenal Code section

632(a) only applies to landline communications while PenalCode section 632.7 applies

to unconsented recordings of cellular phone communications. Since Plaintiffs allege

only a violation of section 632, which does not apply to the facts in this case, and 

Plaintiffs failed to correct the deficiency even after defense counsel raised this issue to

Plaintiff Ewing in an email dated September 21, 2016, (Dkt. No. 16-2, Mahmood Decl.,

Ex. A), Defendants argue that the claim should be dismissed without leave to amend. 

Plaintiffs oppose arguing they should be granted leave to amend a “mistake” in drafting

their complaint especially as they are proceeding pro se. 

Penal Code section 632 applies to landline communications while Penal Code 4

California Penal Code section 632 provides, 4

(a) Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all

parties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic

amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the

confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on

among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a

telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished

by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or

imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state

prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. 

Cal. Penal Code § 632. 

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section 632.7 applies to cellular or cordless telephone communications. See Hataishi 5

v First American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 223 Cal. App. 4th 1454, 1469 (2014). 

It is not disputed that section 632.7 applies to the facts of this case since Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants called their cellular telephone, and Plaintiffs mistakenly listed

section 632 instead of section 632.7 in the FAC. In liberally construing a pleading

drafted by pro per plaintiffs, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with

leave to amend to assert the proper statutory provision involving cellular telephone

communications.

6

B. Article III Standing

1. TCPA

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert a TCPA claim

because they have failed to allege an injury in fact. Plaintiffs oppose arguing that they

have suffered concrete harm that is particularized.

“[T]he ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of [Article III] standing’” requires

that “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)

California Penal Code section 632.7 provides, 5

(a) Every person who, without the consent of all parties to a

communication, intercepts or receives and intentionally records, or

assists in the interception or reception and intentional recordation of,

a communication transmitted between two cellular radio telephones, a

cellular radio telephone and a landline telephone, two cordless

telephones, a cordlesstelephone and a landline telephone, or a cordless

telephone and a cellular radio telephone, shall be punished by a fine

not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by

imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state

prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. 

Cal. Penal Code § 632.7.

Defendants do not provide any legal authority that the Court should deny a pro

6

per plaintiff leave to amend if defense counsel alerted the plaintiff to the deficiencies

in the complaint and the plaintiff failed to correct the deficiencies.

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(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The plaintiff bears the

burden of demonstrating these elements. Id. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff “must

‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Id. 

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an

invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560). The Supreme Court noted that concreteness is quite distinct from

particularization. Id. An injury is “particularized” if it affects “the plaintiff in a

personal and individual way.” Id. In addition, for an injury to be “concrete”, it must

be “de facto,” meaning that it is “real” and not “abstract.” Id. However, an injury need

not be “tangible” in order to be “concrete,” and intangible injuriesmay constitute injury

in fact. Id. at 1549. 

In order to determine whether an intangible harm constitute injury in fact,

Spokeo provided two factors to be considered: “history and the judgment ofCongress.” 

Id. at 1549. Specifically, “(1) whether the statutory violation bears a ‘close relationship

to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in

English or American courts,’ and (2) congressional judgment in establishing the

statutory right, including whether the statutory right is substantive or procedural.” 

Matera v. Google, No. 15cv 4062-LHK, 2016 WL 5339806, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23,

2016). 

Spokeo also held that “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can

be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at

1549. In such a case, a plaintiff “need not allege any additional harm beyond the one

[the legislature] has identified.” Id. But, a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the

injury requirement whenever a statute grants a right and purports to authorize a suit to

vindicate it. Id. “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of

a statutory violation.” Id.

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In Spokeo, the defendant allegedly violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(“FCRA”), which requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable

procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of” consumer reports. Id. at 1545

(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)). The U.S. Supreme Court expressed no opinion as to

whether this procedural FCRA violation constituted a “concrete injury” and remanded

the issue to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 550. However, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that

“[i]t is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code [in violation

of the FCRA], without more, could work any concrete harm.” Id. Thus, while “the

violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some

circumstancesto constitute injury in fact,” a “bare procedural violation, divorced from

any concrete harm” is not. Id. at 1549 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.

488, 496 (2009)).

Defendants move to dismiss solely on whether Plaintiffs have alleged a concrete

injury and they do not dispute that Plaintiffs have alleged a particularized injury. As

to concrete injury, Plaintiffs claim no injuries in the FAC for TCPA violations.

7

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged an injury in

fact to satisfy Article III standing, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

TCPA for lack of Article III standing. 

2. CIPA

Defendants also allege that Plaintiffs have not alleged a concrete injury sufficient

to confer Article III standing resulting from the alleged recordings of calls. Plaintiffs

oppose. 

CIPA is California’s anti-wiretapping and antieavesdropping statute and is

In their opposition, Plaintiffs allege numerous “concrete” injures such as 7

depletion of their cell phone batteries, the cost of time and money to recharge, the

increased cell phone bills due to the unwanted calls, and the potential lost income from

paying clients that could have called while they were charging their phone and while

they were on the phone with Defendants, (Dkt. No. 26 at 7; Dkt. No. 30 at 5); however,

such asserted injuries are not alleged in the FAC. 

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designed “to protect the right of privacy.” Cal. Penal Code § 630. California Penal

Code section 632.7 prohibits the intentional recording of any communication without

the consent of all parties where one of the parties is using a cellular or cordless

telephone. See Cal. Penal Code § 632.7. “Any person who has been injured” as a

result of this invasion of privacy “may bring an action . . . for the greater of the

following amounts: (1) Five thousand dollars($5,000), [or] (2) Three timesthe amount

of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff.” Id. § 637.2. The person may also

request injunctive relief. Id. 

The FAC alleges that Defendants admit that Main Streat records calls and does

not provide advance warning to callers. (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶¶ 38, 56, 62, 63.) 

Defendants have a policy to record confidential telephone communication with

California individuals without advising them at the outset of each telephone call that

the call is being recorded. (Id. ¶ 55.) Defendants recorded Plaintiffs’ telephone calls

without Osgood and Ewing’s express consent. (Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiff Osgood answered

telephone callsthat were recorded without her consent. (Id. ¶ 62.) Both Plaintiffs were

not advised that the calls might be recorded. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs allege that they had

an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that the calls were not being recorded. 

(Id. ¶¶ 53, 68.) 

District courts as well as this Court have held that allegations of violations of

Plaintiffs’ statutory rights under CIPA, without more, constitute injury in fact because

instead of a bare technical violation of a statute, as was the case under the FCRA

considered in Spokeo, a CIPA violation “involves much greater concrete and

particularized harm . . . a violation of privacy rights”, and therefore, a violation of

CIPA is a “violation of a procedural right granted by statute . . . sufficient . . . to

constitute injury in fact.” Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc., –F. Supp. 3d –, 2016 WL

6157953, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (J. Miller); Bona Fide Conglomerate, Inc. v.

SourceAmerica, No. 14CV00751-GPC(DHB), 2016WL3543699, at *8 (S.D.Cal. June

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29, 2016) (holding that allegation of CIPA violation is sufficient to confer standing);

Matera v. Google, Inc., No. 15cv4062-LHK, 2016 WL 5339806, at *14 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss holding that alleged violations of Plaintiff’s

statutory rights under CIPA constitute concrete injury in fact under Spokeo). A

violation of CIPA “involves more tangible rights than a technical violation of the

[FCRA] . . . a violation of CIPA implies a violation of privacy rights.” Bona Fide

Conglomerate, Inc., 2016 WL 3543699, at *8. 

Defendants citation to NEI Contracting & Eng’gr, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates

Pacific Southwest, Inc., No. 12cv1685-BAS(JLB), 2016 WL 4886933 (S.D. Cal. Sept.

15, 2016) in support of their argument is inapposite. NEI involved a bench trial where

evidence was presented that plaintiff admitted he would have consented to the

recording if asked, did not object to the existence of the recorded call and was injured

because the recording was not provided to him sooner in the dispute. Id. at *5. The

plaintiff was not claiming an invasion of privacy injury but alleged injury because he

did not keep records of the transactions at issue. Id. Therefore, the district court found

that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its claims under CIPA based on those facts. 

Id.

Here, Plaintiffs allege an invasion of privacy injury which is sufficient to confer

Article III standing under Spokeo. See Romero, 2016 WL 6157953, at *5; Matera,

2016 WL 5339806, at *14. 

C. RICO

Defendants move to dismiss the RICO claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because

Plaintiffs have no statutory standing to assert a violation under RICO because they

have failed to allege an injury and causation. Plaintiffs oppose. 

The FAC alleges that Defendants have engaged in wire fraud and money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and conspiracy to violate RICO under

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18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶ 86.) According to the FAC, the enterprise

8

includes Defendants McAllister and Main Streat. (Id. ¶ 87.) The conspiracy lasted

from May 2014 to the present although the conspiracy began in 2009 when McAllister

created the enterprise. (Id.) The two predicate acts alleged are wire fraud for illegal

recordings of Ewing and Osgood’s telephone conversations and money laundering of

over $10,000 of the proceeds of the wire fraud through financial institutions. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs further summarily allege additional predicate acts of “extortion, . . . and

illegal robo-dialing with an ATDS in 2016.” (Id.) 

Under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)

through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. ImrexCo., Inc., 473

U.S. 479, 496 (1985) 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides a civil remedy for “[a]ny person

injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1964(c). “[T]he plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that,

he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the

violation.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. To recover under RICO, a plaintiff “must show

proof of concrete financial loss” and demonstrate that the “racketeering activity

proximately caused the loss.” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 707 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

As to injury, the FAC asserts that Plaintiffs “have been injured in their business

and property” that “financial harm to each Plaintiffs’ property has been substantial”

that Plaintiffs’ businesses have “suffered a significant economic downturn,” and that

“Plaintiffs have lost money and revenues that could have been earned but for

[McAllister’s] racketeering activity.” (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶¶ 90, 91, 92.) The FAC also

alleges that Defendants “attempted” to get Plaintiffs to send money. (Id. ¶ 49.) The

In his opposition, Plaintiff Ewing argues that Plaintiffs are not asserting a claim

8

for racketeering but are alleging a conspiracy to commit racketeering by Defendants. 

(Dkt. No. 26 at 13.) Since the FAC allege both a violation of RICO and conspiracy to

violate RICO, the Court addresses both claims. 

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FAC further contends that Defendants laundered over $10,000 through financial

institutions. (Id. ¶¶ 87, 99.) It is not clear whether the $10,000 was obtained

fraudulently by Defendants from Plaintiffs. 

The allegations ofinjury to “business or property” in the FAC are conclusory and 

mere recitation of the elements of a RICO injury and fail to provide sufficient facts to

support an alleged injury caused by the alleged illegal conduct. See Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 (“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.”). There are also conflicting facts asto whether Plaintiffs were swindled out of any

money by Defendants. Moreover, because Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege an injury,

the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to support the claim that the “racketeering

activity proximately caused the loss.” See Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 707. Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the RICO claim for lack of standing. 

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged a pattern of racketeering

activities of wire fraud, money laundering and extortion as they are conclusory. 

Defendants also contend that the wire fraud allegation fails to comply with the

heightened pleading requirement under Rule 9(b). Lastly, Defendants assert RICO

based on a TCPA violation cannot state a claim for relief. 

“‘Racketeering activity’ is any act indictable under the several provisions ofTitle

18 of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).” Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d

1219, 1229 (9th Cir. 2004). A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two

predicate acts within ten years of one another. Id. Wire fraud, money laundering, and

extortion are predicate acts under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 

“[A] wire fraud violation consists of (1) the formation of a scheme or artifice to

defraud; (2) use of the United States wires or causing a use of the United States wires

in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) specific intent to deceive or defraud.” Odom v.

Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 554 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.

Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, Plaintiffs

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must comply with the heightened pleading requirement under Rule 9(b) to allege wire

fraud. Id.; Edwards v. Marin Park. Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004)

(stating that Rule 9(b) applies equally to civil RICO claims and that the plaintiff must

state with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud). Under Rule 9(b),

while the state of mind may be alleged generally, the circumstances constituting fraud

must be stated with particularity and a party must set forth “the time, place, and specific

content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the

misrepresentation.” Odom, 486 F.3d at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted). In

Odom, the Ninth Circuit explained that while the specific intent to deceive or defraud

requires only general allegations, the factual circumstances of the fraud itself must be

particularized. Id. at 554. 

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants, using the telephone infrastructure in the United

States and crossing state lines to commit their interstate criminal activity continuously

during 2015 and 2016, illegally bought and sold names of persons on the National DoNot-Call list and called such persons without permission and without consent to record

these calls. (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶¶ 42, 47.) Defendants used the “wires of the United

States to illegally record Plaintiff Ewing and Plaintiff Osgood’s telephonic

conversations” and “ to solicit confidential information over the wires of the United

States.” (Id. ¶ 87.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that McAllister personally texted them

and recorded telephone calls in violation of California law and his call was a scheme

to obtain money and property from Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 49.) McAllister attempted to get

Plaintiffs to send him money. (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege the wire fraud involved the

criminal acts of recording calls of using ATDS robo dialing to Plaintiffs’ cell phones. 

(Id.) Specifically, McAllister or his agent called on August 11, 2016 at 11:37 a.m. as

well as other multiple times. (Id.) 9

The FAC merely provides conclusory allegations of wire fraud. As to Ewing,

This call was made to Plaintiff Osgood. (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶ 23.) 9

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the allegations fail to provide the specificity required under Rule 9(b) as to the time,

place and specific representations made to Ewing. As to Osgood, while she alleges one

call was made to her on August 11, 2016 at 11:37 a.m., she fails to provide specific

facts concerning the call and specifics as to the “multiple” other calls made to her. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to comply with Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b). 

10

For money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), Plaintiffs must allege that

Defendants “(1) engaged in a financial transaction which involved proceeds from

specified illegal activity, (2) knew the proceeds were from illegal activity, and (3)

intended the transaction either to promote the illegal activity or to conceal the nature,

source, or ownership of the illegal proceeds.” United States v. Marbella, 73 F.3d 1508,

1514 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiffs only allege that Defendants laundered over $10,000 of the proceeds 

by wire fraud through financial institutions, (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶ 87), and do not allege

any facts to support the elements of a predicate claim for money laundering under

RICO. 

As to extortion, Plaintiffs must assert “obtaining of property from another, with

his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,

or under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). No facts in the FAC are

asserted to support a claim for extortion. 

Finally, Defendants argue that a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 is not a predicate

act under RICO. Plaintiffs do not dispute this argument. Since a violation of the

TCPA is not listed as a predicate act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), a RICO claim based

on TCPA violations cannot stand. 

In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the RICO cause of

While the FAC is devoid of specific facts concerning calls made to Ewing, the

10

Court notes his opposition provides some additional facts as to the date and time of

several calls made to him by Defendant Main Streat. (Dkt. No. 26 at 20-24.) However,

since the FAC failsto allege specific facts asto wire fraud, it must dismissed for failing

to state a claim.

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action for lack of standing and failing to state a claim. Because Plaintiffs have failed

to allege a violation of RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), they have also failed to allege

a violation of RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d). See Odom, 486 F.3d at 547 (“the

survival of plaintiffs’ claim under § 1962(c) will ensure the survival of their claim

under § 1962(d).”). Accordingly, the Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the RICO conspiracy claim. 

MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO RULE 12(f)

Discussion

Defendants also filed a motion to strike seeking dismissal of the FAC as

untimely under Rule 15(a); seeking to strike certain immaterial and scandalous

materials in the FAC and Exhibits A-E attached to the FAC; and seeking sanctions in

the form of attorney’s fees and costs. (Dkt. No. 16.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition. 

(Dkt. No. 28.) 

A. Legal Standard on Motion to Strike Pursuant to Rule 12(f). 

Rule 12(f) provides that the court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, orscandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(f). “[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to

be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” 

Colaprico v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). “Courts

will not grant motions to strike unless ‘convinced that there are no questions of fact,

that any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of

circumstances could the claim or defense succeed.’” Novick v. UNUM Life Ins. Co.

of America, 570 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting RDF Media Ltd. v.

Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). “When ruling on a

motion to strike, this Court ‘must view the pleading under attack in the light most

favorable to the pleader.” Id. (citing RDF Media Ltd., 372 F. Supp. 2d at 561). 

“Motions to strike apply only to pleadings, and courts are unwilling to construe

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the rule broadly and refuse to strike motions, briefs, objections, affidavits, or exhibits

attached thereto.” Foley v. Pont, No. 11cv1769-ECR-VCF, 2013 WL 782856, at *4

(D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2013); Caldwell v. Smith, No. 94-3066-CO, 1995 WL 555080, at *1

(D. Or. Sept. 1, 1995) (denying motion to strike since motion to dismiss is not a

pleading). “Pleadings” include: “(1) a complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an

answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim;

(5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and (7) if the court

orders one, a reply to an answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)(1)-(7). However, Rule 10

provides that a “copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part

of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Typically, the types of

instruments that fall within the scope of Rule 10(c) “‘consist largely of documentary

evidence, specifically, contracts, notes, and other writings on which a party’s action or

defense is based.’” DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1220 (S.D.

Cal. 2001) (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)). Evidentiary

materials do not usually qualify as “written instruments” under Rule 10(c) and courts

have granted motions to strike when the exhibits do not qualify as “written

instruments.” Montgomery v. Buege, No. CIV 08-385 WBS KJM, 2009 WL 1034518,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2009) (citing cases); see United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d

903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing DeMarco, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-21) (“Affidavits

and declarations . . . are not allowed as pleading exhibits unless they form the basis of

the complaint.”). 

Analysis

A. Motion to Strike the FAC

First, Defendants move to strike the FAC as untimely under Rule 15(a). 

Plaintiffs oppose arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not begin to

apply until after the notice of removal is filed; therefore, it appears Plaintiffs are

asserting that since they filed the first amended complaint in federal court within 21

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days of removal, their FAC is timely. 

Rule 15(a) allows a plaintiff to amend a pleading as a matter of course within

“21 days after serving it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15(b) also provides that leave

to amend should freely be granted when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). A

district court “takes the case asit findsit on removal and treats everything that occurred

in the state court as if it had taken place in federal court.” Butner v. Neustadter, 324

F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1963). 

Plaintiffs’ argument that they had 21 days from the date of removal to file an

amended complaint as a matter of right is without merit. See id. On August 16, 2016,

Plaintiffs served the complaint and summons on Defendants. Defendants timely

removed the case on September 26, 2016. On October 4, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the

FAC. Since the complaint was served on August 16, 2016, service was deemed

complete on August 26, 2016, ten days later. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.40. 

Twenty-one days after August 26, 2016 was September 16, 2016. Therefore, the FAC

filed on October 4, 2016 is untimely. 

While Defendants are correct that the FAC was not timely filed under Rule

15(a), the Court will accept the FAC as filed for purposes of efficiency because leave

to amend must be freely granted. See Lasher v. City of Santa Clara, No. 10cv4173-

LHK, 2011 WL 1560662, at *2 (Apr. 25, 2011) (allowing the untimely filing of the

amended complaint in light of Rule 15(b)’s guidance to grant leave freely when justice

so requires); Shirley v. Wachovia Mortg. FSB, No. 10-3870 SC, 2010 WL 4977743,

at *2 (N. D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010) (accepting untimely amended complaint for practical

reasons). Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike the FAC.

B. Motion to Strike Allegations and Exhibits in the FAC

Next, Defendants seek to strike paragraphs 2, 3, 38, 44, 113, Prayer for Relief

¶ E seeking attorney’s fees and costs of the FAC, and Exhibits A-E attached to the first

amended complaint as immaterial and scandalous. Plaintiffs filed an opposition. 

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As an initial matter, Defendants seek to strike Exhibits A-E attached to the FAC. 

Exhibit A contains an email from Jerrod McAllister to Plaintiff Ewing dated May 4,

2016 concerning foul language directed at Plaintiff Ewing concerning the lawsuit. 

(Dkt. No. 11-2, FAC, Ex. A.) Exhibit B contains an internet search result for a Jerrod

Robker concerning his background. (Dkt. No. 11-2, FAC, Ex. B.) Exhibit C contains

a State Bar of California Attorney Complaint Form against defense counsel and an

email correspondence concerning a meet and confer between Plaintiff Ewing and

defense counsel. (Dkt. No. 11-2, FAC, Ex. C .) Exhibit D contains an article 11

concerning an arrest of Jerrod Grant Robker during a bowling alley brawl. (Dkt. No.

11-2, FAC, Ex. D .) Lastly, though not addressed specifically by Defendants and this 12

Exhibit has not been identified by either party, Exhibit E is an email from Plaintiff

Ewing to a person named Anthony. (Dkt. No. 11-2, FAC, Ex. E.) 

The Court concludes that the documents attached to the FAC do not qualify as

“written instruments” under Rule 10(c) and primarily contain evidentiary materials. 

See Montgomery v. Buege, No. CIV 08-385 WBS KJM, 2009 WL 1034518, at *3

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2009) (granting motion to strike multiple exhibits from complaint

because they were “in the nature of evidence submitted to bolster allegations contained

in the complaint”); Galvan v. Yates, No. CVF 05-986 AWI LJO, 2006 WL 1495261,

at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2006) (striking from a complaint witness declarations

designed to substantiate allegations that the plaintiff satisfied the presentment

requirements of the California Tort Claims Act). Because Exhibit A-E are not “written

instruments” as defined under Rule 10(c), the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

strike Exhibits A-E of the FAC. 

Next, Defendants generally argue the Court should strike paragraphs 2 and 113

While Defendants refersto Exhibit D in their brief, (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 4); in fact,

11

it appears that they are referring to Exhibit C of the FAC. 

Similarly, while their brief states ExhibitC; it appears Defendants meant to cite 12

to Exhibit D. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 5.)

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asimmaterial and scandalous communications between the parties before and after the

lawsuit was filed. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants improperly seek to strike

McAllister’s own email containing foul language that are relevant to the RICO claim

asthey provide examples of McAllister’s bullying, threatening and intimidating others. 

Paragraph 2 of the FAC states, 

Defendant Jerrod McAllister sent several false and fraudulent emails

to Plaintiff Ewing that stated, in part, the following:

"I'm not afraid to go to court with you. My attorneys will chew you up

and shit you out like the piece of shit you are . . ."

"you deserve to be beaten"

" Fuck yourself"

"You're seriously pathetic"

"Goodbye, loser."

"you're a tool and an ambulance chaser"

"dickheads like you . . . "

(Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶ 2.) Paragraph 113 recites certain portions of an email in Exhibit A

stating,

On May 4, 2016 Jerrod McAllister aka JerrodRobert wrote as emailfrom

jerrod@mainstreatmarketing.com to Plaintiff Ewing that stated ‘chew

[me] up and shit down [my] throat like the peace ofshit [ I am]’ followed

by ‘[I] deserve to be beaten’ and then ended the email with ‘Fuck

yourself.’ 

(Id. ¶ 113.) 

“Immaterial matter isthat which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d

1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1993), rev'd on other grounds 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). “Impertinentmatter consists of statementsthat do not

pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

Defendants argue that the communications are superfluous but it is not clear how

they are superfluous. Based on the pleading, the Court is not entirely convinced the

communications by McAllister are immaterial; therefore, at this time, the Court

DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 2 and 113. 

Next, Defendants contend that the contents of a meet and confer discussion

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between Plaintiff and Defendant’s counsel contained in paragraph 3 should be struck. 

Plaintiffs argue that the credibility of the attorney is relevant at trial. 

Paragraph 3 of the FAC states, 

On September 20, 2016, Defendant’s attorney, Yosef Mahmood called

Plaintiff Ewing and threatened Ewing with sanctions and attorney fees

under CCP § 128.7 because Mahmood stated that a cellular phone is a

radio and thus not protected from illegal recording under California's

Penal Code. 

(Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiffs provide no authority that the credibility of an attorney isrelevant to the

issues in a case. Moreover, contents of a meet and confer concerning the case between

Plaintiff Ewing and defense counsel do not allege facts to support the causes of action

against Defendants in this case. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion

to strike paragraph 3 of the FAC.

Finally, Defendants seek to strike paragraphs 38 and 44, alleging that McAllister

is a registered sex offender, asfalse and scandalous. Plaintiffs note that McAllister did

not provide a declaration stating that he is not a registered sex offender or a felon and

such conduct is critical to his credibility.

A pleading is scandalous if it “improperly casts a derogatory light on someone,

most typically on a party to the action.” Cortina v. Goya Foods, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d

1174, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2015). If an offensive or scandalous allegation is relevant, it

may not be subject to a motion to strike. 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382. “Nonetheless, the disfavored character ofRule

12(f) is relaxed somewhat in the context of scandalous allegations and matter of this

type often will be stricken from the pleadings in order to purge the court’s files and

protect the person who is the subject of the allegations.” Id. 

While not specified, it appears Defendants seek to strike one sentence from

Paragraph 38 which states, “Upon information and belief formed after reasonable and

diligent research, Robker is a felon and convicted child molester according to public

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records.” (Dkt. No. 11, FAC ¶ 38.) Next, paragraph 44 provides a screen shot of

criminal chargesfor a Jerrod Grant Robker in the state of Utah for lewdness involving

a child in 1998 and attempted assault by prisoner and interference with arresting officer

in 2010. (Id. ¶ 44.) 

The Court concludes that the allegation that McAllister is a convicted child

molester isscandalous and casts a derogatory light on him. Moreover, the assertion has

no relevance to the causes of action in this case. Thus, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 38 and 44 of the FAC. 

Furthermore, Defendants seek to strike reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

sought in the prayer for relief since Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. Plaintiffs do not

dispute they are not entitled to attorney’s fees but they claim they intend to hire a trial

attorney to conduct the trial. 

It is well settled that a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to

attorney’s fees. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991) (holding that even pro se

litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to attorney fees); see also Gonzalez v. Kangas,

814 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (non attorney prisoner could not obtain attorney’s fees). 

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, are not entitled to

attorney’s fees and costs. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to retain an attorney during

prosecution of this case, and in order to preserve those rights, the Court DENIES

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. 

C. Request for Sanctions in the Form of Attorney’s Fees

In their motion to strike, Defendants seek sanctions in the amount of attorney’s

fees incurred in connection with the filing of the motion to strike against Plaintiffs

because the allegations presented have no relevancy to their claims and are presented

in order to harass and demean Defendants and their counsel. 

The Court may award attorney’s fees against a party that has acted in “bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501

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U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)(citations and quotations omitted). Under thisstandard, the court

has inherent powers to impose sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees when a party 

“shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement

of a court order.” Id. at 46 (citation omitted). Before imposing such sanctions, the

court must make an express finding that the sanctioned party's behavior “constituted

or was tantamount to bad faith.” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d

644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). 

First, the Court notes that at this early stage of the proceedings, it cannot make

an express finding that Plaintiffs’ conduct amounts to bad faith. Specifically,

Defendants argue that the allegation that McAllister is a registered sex offender in the

FAC is improperly meant to demean and harm McAllister. However, as discussed

above, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to strike this allegation as a factual dispute

that cannot be resolved at the early stage of the case without discovery. 

Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ submission as an exhibit to the FAC

of a California Bar Complaint against defense counsel accusing him of “the crime of

deceit” based on their litigation position is meritless and was alleged without

investigation of the law. The Court is not in a position to determine whether Plaintiffs’

allegation in the State Bar Complaint has merit or not. Moreover, Defendants have not

provided evidence that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith. As pro per plaintiffs, they are

entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. Lastly, regardless of whether the

California Bar Complaint contains meritless claims, the Court granted Defendants’

motion to strike Exhibit C, which contains the State Bar Complaint against defense

counsel, as not material. Thurs, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for sanction

under its inherent powers. 

In addition, Defendants also cite to Rule 11 as another basis to impose sanctions

against Plaintiffs. “Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify by their signature

that (1) they have read the pleadings or motionsthey file and (2) the pleading or motion

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is ‘well-grounded in fact,’ has a colorable basis in law, and is not filed for an improper

purpose.” Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994). The purpose of Rule

11 is to “deter baselessfilingsin district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496

U.S. 384, 393 (1990). In order to seek sanctions under Rule 11, the party must comply

with Rule 11's safe harbor provision which requiresservice of the motion 21 days prior

to filing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). This allows a party to retract the allegedly

offending allegations before the motion is filed with the Court. Radcliffe v. Rainbow

Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001). The procedural requirement of the safe

harbor period is mandatory, and an “absolute prerequisite” to a motion for sanctions

brought by any party. Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 209 F.R.D. 169, 174

(C.D. Cal. 2002); Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 789 (informal warnings not sufficient to satisfy

safe harbor requirement). Here, Defendants have not shown they complied with the

safe harbor requirement, and thus, are barred from seeking sanctions under Rule 11.

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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions at this time. 

D. Leave to Amend

In their opposition, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend if the Court dismisses any of

their claims. Leave to amend, whether or not requested by the plaintiff, should be

granted unless amendment would be futile. Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401. 

Here, an amendment would not be futile and the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for

leave to file a second amended complaint. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’

motion to dismiss and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to

strike. The Court also DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions. Plaintiffs shall file

a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of this Order curing the

Rule 11 also requires that the motion for sanction be filed separately from any

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other motion which Defendants have not done. Fed. R. Civ. P. (c)(2). 

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deficiencies noted by the Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 13, 2017

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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