Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00494/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00494-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORRIS GILCHRIST,

Booking # 16179894,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALFRED JOSHUA; BERKMAN; 

MARTINEZ; TONG; SANTOS; 

EVANGELISTA; PREVOST; GORE,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0494-LAB-MDD

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff, Morris B. Gilchrist, is currently housed at the San Diego Central Jail 

(“SDCJ”). On March 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Because 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court 

granted him leave to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 3.)

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However, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to 

correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 8.) In 

addition, the Court informed Plaintiff that any “[d]efendants not named and any claims 

not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived.” (Id., citing S.D. 

Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 

1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).)

On May 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 

4.) In his FAC, Plaintiff no longer names Defendants Martinez, Tong, Santos, 

Evangelista, Prevost, and Gore in this action. (See FAC at 1-2.) Accordingly, 

Defendants Martinez, Tong, Santos, Evangelista, Prevost, and Gore are DISMISSED 

from this action. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate these Defendants from the 

Court’s docket. 

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is currently incarcerated

and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte 

dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous 

or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 

F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 

F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

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F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed in the SDJC. (See FAC at 1.) Plaintiff claims that he 

suffers from “severely torn tendons” in his “right shoulder rotator cuff.” (Id. at 7.) 

Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Alfred Joshua, SDCJ Chief Medical Officer, and 

Defendant Berkman, SDCJ Supervising Medical Officer, “refused to provide” Plaintiff 

with “medical relief.” (Id. at 8.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his injury requires 

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surgery and claims his “primary Veteran Administration Physician” indicated that his 

injury would “become even more ‘serious’” if left “untreated.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff 

acknowledges that the three physicians have “very different medical opinions.” (Id. at 

10.) 

C. Inadequate Medical Care

It is not clear whether Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. The rights of pretrial 

detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but the 

Court uses the standards for Eighth Amendment claims regarding allegations of pretrial 

detainees’ conditions of confinement claims. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 

1011, 1017-16 (9th Cir. 2010). Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately 

indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-

06 (1976); see also Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 

2010) (applying Estelle’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to 

inadequate medical care claims alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from “severely torn tendons” in his “right 

shoulder rotator cuff.” (FAC at 7.) For the purposes of this stage of the screening 

process, the Court will view Plaintiff’s facts in the light most favorable to him and find 

that he has alleged that his medical needs were objectively serious. See McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining a “serious medical need” as one 

which the “failure to treat ... could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. 

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). 

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The “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find 

important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for 

medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

However, even assuming Plaintiff’s medical condition is “objectively serious,” 

nothing in his FAC supports a “reasonable inference that [any individual] defendant” 

acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In order to show 

deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that prison 

officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 

(1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate treatment 

due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional 

violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 

F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 

1990)). 

Plaintiff alleges that he has seen different physicians who do not agree as to the 

proper course of care for his medical need. However, a difference of opinion between a 

pretrial detainee and the doctors at the Jail as to the appropriate course or type of medical 

attention he requires does not amount to deliberate indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 

681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate course of treatment does not by itself 

show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged have caused harm. See

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). While he appears to allege that they have denied his request for 

surgery, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied all forms of medical treatment as it 

relates to his shoulder injury. 

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Thus, Plaintiff has merely alleged a difference of opinion regarding his need for 

medical care, and has not alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his 

plight by “knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to his health and safety.” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 837; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 

1019 (claims of medical malpractice, negligence or a difference of opinion concerning the 

course of treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation).

In addition, Plaintiff claims that he has received no treatment for his post-traumatic

stress disorder. (See FAC at 14.) However, there are no other factual allegations regarding 

these claims and Plaintiff does not identify any particular individual as being responsible 

for allegedly failing to provide him with treatment. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with a 

claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based on a failure to provide 

care for his medical conditions, he must not rely on conclusory allegations, but must allege 

facts which show that the Defendants knew of and deliberately disregarded his serious 

medical needs. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837.

Without more, the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC currently amounts only to 

“unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” which “stop[] short 

of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief’” as to any

constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555, 557).

4. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). While the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state 

any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the 

pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. 

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III. Conclusion and Orders

Based on the forgoing, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Defendants Martinez, Tong, Santos, Evangelista, Prevost and 

Gore from this action. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate these Defendants from 

the docket.

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS him 

forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

Dated: May 16, 2017

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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