Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02755/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02755-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Compucom Systems, Inc. is erroneously sued as “GE Capital Information Technology

Solutions, Inc.” 

- 1 - 06cv2755

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENEE HARRIS BRUNELLE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV2755 JLS (CAB)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. No. 17)

vs.

COMPUCOM SYSTEMS, INC.,1

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Compucom Systems, Inc.’s (“defendant”) motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. No. 17.) For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

During the period in question, defendant contracted with Pfizer, Inc. to provide information

technology solutions at Pfizer’s La Jolla campus. (Ruwe Decla. ¶ 2; Collins Decla. ¶ 2.) Lisa

Collins became defendant’s service delivery manager at the La Jolla location in June 2003. 

(Collins Depo., at 11.) Beginning in January 2004, Renee Harris Brunelle (“plaintiff”), an

African-American female, began working under Collins’s supervision as a part-time Junior

Technician. (Brunelle Depo., at 14.) Plaintiff had responded to defendant’s online advertisement

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 06cv2755

and interviewed with Collins. (Brunelle Decla. ¶ 1; Collins Depo., at 20-21.) After the interview,

Collins directed plaintiff to Manpower Professional (“Manpower”), a temporary staffing agency,

to fill out Manpower’s employment application and undergo a drug screen and background check. 

(Def. Notice of Lodgment, Exhibit 2; Collins Depo., at 20.) Throughout the period when plaintiff

rendered services to defendant, she was paid by Manpower. (Brunelle Depo., at 72.) 

In March 2004, Collins offered to change plaintiff’s employment to a full-time position as

Video Conference Technician. (Brunelle Decla. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff accepted the full-time position. 

(Id.; Brunelle Depo., at 68.) Collins emailed Manpower, “As of March 15th, [plaintiff] will be a

full time contractor here at Pfizer. . . . Her rate of pay should change to $18.00/hour.” (Collins

Decla. ¶ 4.) In the same conversation, plaintiff alleges that Collins also offered a future

employment position as Video Conference Technician to begin in January 2005, contingent on

defendant’s renewal of its contract with Pfizer. (Brunelle Decla. ¶ 4.) In the future position,

plaintiff would receive payment directly from defendant, along with defendant’s benefits package. 

(Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff claims to have accepted this offer of future employment also. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

Defendant never memorialized this employment offer in writing. (Brunelle Depo., at 71.) The

contract between defendant and Pfizer was renewed for 2005. (Opp., at 2.)

In August 2004, Ryan Ruwe, a Caucasian male, succeeded Collins as plaintiff’s supervisor. 

(Ruwe Decla. ¶ 3.) Videoconference technicians under Ruwe’s supervision kept their time,

including a record of the time when they began work each day, using a computer-based system. 

(Ruwe Depo., at 39.) All employees at Pfizer’s La Jolla facility gained entry to the building by

swiping a Pfizer-issued security badge at an electronic card reader. (Id. at 41.) On occasion, when

groups of employees entered the building, one employee would swipe the security badge and allow

other employees to enter without swiping their badges. (Id. at 44; Soto Depo., at 60.) Also,

security guards would occasionally admit employees without swiping their badges. (Ruwe Depo.,

at 44-45; Brunelle Decla. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff also claims to have gained entry to buildings on Pfizer’s

La Jolla campus without using her security badge when the security system was inoperative or her

badge did not work. (Brunelle Decla. ¶ 16.) Gaining entry to the Pfizer facility without swiping

one’s individual badge violated Pfizer security protocols. (Ruwe Depo., at 43-44.)

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 06cv2755

Ruwe reviewed his employees’ time records to ensure that they worked the expected

number of hours and recorded the hours that they actually worked. (Ruwe Depo., at 37-38.) In

August 2004, Ruwe reviewed plaintiff’s time records and determined that he had not seen plaintiff

at work during times when she claimed to be working. (Ruwe Decla. ¶ 10.) Specifically, Ruwe

noted that plaintiff recorded her start time as 6:00 a.m. on August 16 and 18-20, 2004. (Ruwe

Decla. ¶ 11 & Exhibit B.) However, according to Pfizer’s building access logs, plaintiff first

swiped her security badge later than 6:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 11 & Exhibit A.) In particular, plaintiff first

swiped her badge at 6:31 a.m. on August 18 and 6:50 a.m. on August 20. (Id., Exhibit A, at D0002.) Ruwe then informed Manpower that defendant was ending plaintiff’s placement. (Id. ¶

12.) Manpower contacted plaintiff to direct her not to return to the Pfizer campus. (Brunelle

Depo., at 52-53.) Plaintiff entered the Pfizer building for the last time on August 31, 2004. (Ruwe

Decla., Exhibit B, at D-0008.)

B. Procedural Background

On November 29, 2006, plaintiff filed this action in San Diego County Superior Court for

breach of contract and business torts arising from the termination of her employment. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant agreed to employ plaintiff as a videoconference technician in 2005 if

defendant secured an IT contract with Pfizer. (Compl., at 3-4.) Despite securing the contract,

defendant allegedly failed to employ plaintiff on the agreed-upon terms. (Id.) Plaintiff further

alleges that defendant falsely told Manpower that plaintiff engaged in time theft when, in fact,

plaintiff recorded her time as Collins had directed her. (Id. at 6-9.) 

Defendant removed the action to this Court on December 21, 2006. (Notice of Removal.) 

On August 22, 2007, defendant moved for summary judgment on each of plaintiff’s five

causes of action: breach of an oral employment contract, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, tortious interference, and negligence. (Doc. No. 17.) On October 12, 2007, plaintiff filed

her opposition, requesting a continuance to allow further discovery. (Doc. No. 29.) After a

hearing on plaintiff’s request, the Court granted the continuance by written Order on November 2,

2007. (Doc. No. 34.) 

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 06cv2755

Plaintiff filed her Court-ordered supplemental opposition on December 7, 2007. (Doc. No.

39.) The supplemental opposition voluntarily dismissed plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud. (Id.

at 3.) Defendant filed its reply on December 14, 2007. (Doc. No. 43.) The Court held oral

argument on the motion on Tuesday, January 22, 2008, and the motion is now appropriate for

disposition. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when,

under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A

dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. 

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary

judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Triton

Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

252) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position

is not sufficient.”). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 06cv2755

DISCUSSION

A. Breach of Oral Contract

1. Contract formation

In moving for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for breach of an oral contract for

employment, defendant first argues that plaintiff cannot prove formation of a contract. The

parties’ consent (i.e., “mutual assent”) is an essential element of a contract. Cal. Civ. Code §

1550; Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2006);

Donovan v. RRL Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 261, 270 (2001). Mutual assent means that “the parties all

agree on the same thing in the same sense.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1580; Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc., 141

Cal. App. 4th 199, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th

793, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). “‘The existence of mutual [assent] is determined by objective

rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would

lead a reasonable person to believe.’” Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 811 (quoting Meyer v. Benko, 55

Cal. App. 3d 937, 943 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). Those outward manifestations include “‘the

reasonable meaning of [the parties’] words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or

understandings.’” Bustamante, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 208 (quoting Alexander v. Codemasters Group

Ltd., 104 Cal. App. 4th 129, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 

Defendant argues the absence of mutual assent in this case because there is supposedly no

evidence of an agreement between defendant and plaintiff. (Memo. ISO Motion, at 7.) Defendant

goes to great lengths to show that plaintiff remained an employee of Manpower, rather than

defendant, when plaintiff began the videoconferencing position in March 2004. In opposition,

plaintiff argues that the precise identity of her employer during the January–August 2004 is

irrelevant to the alleged oral contract for future employment that would begin in 2005 with

defendant. By providing an entirely different factual account of the conversation between plaintiff

and Collins in March 2004, plaintiff makes it impossible for the Court to find an absence of mutual

assent, as a matter of law. If Collins offered the full-time position with defendant beginning

January 2005 in the way that plaintiff claims, a reasonable jury could find that the parties’ outward

manifestations of consent gave rise to mutual assent.

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 The parties have each filed evidentiary objections to the other’s statement of undisputed

material facts. In deciding the present motion, the Court has considered only admissible evidence.

- 6 - 06cv2755

Under the authority of Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, defendant claims that the

assertions of plaintiff’s declaration are too conclusory to manufacture a triable issue of fact on the

issue of whether a contract existed.2

 74 Cal. App. 4th 1359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Eisenberg,

however, is distinguishable because that plaintiff was arguing not for the existence of a contract,

but for an implied term that the employer would terminate only for cause. Id. at 1386. 

Where“overwhelming evidence” supported the statutory presumption of at-will employment, the

court refused to deny the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on vague allegations

that the employer implied a promise not to terminate without good cause. Id. at 1387-89. In the

case at bar, the parties are instead offering competing versions of the facts concerning a particular

conversation. California has no statutory presumption against contract formation, and defendant

has not offered “overwhelming evidence” that the parties did not form a contract for future

employment. 

2. The nature of the parties’ contract

Presuming (without conceding) that the parties formed an oral contract for future

employment, defendant next argues that, because the contract was for employment at-will,

defendant did not breach the contract by refusing to employ plaintiff despite obtaining the 2005

contract with Pfizer. “An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of

either party on notice to the other.” Cal. Labor Code § 2922; Ali v. L.A. Focus Publ’n, 112 Cal.

App. 4th 1477, 1489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). “If an employee is ‘at-will,” the employer may ‘act

peremptorily, arbitrarily, or inconsistently [in terminating the employee], without providing

specific protections such as prior warning, fair procedures, objective evaluation, or preferential

reassignment.’” Agosta v. Astor, 120 Cal. App. 4th 596, 603-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Guz

v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 350 (Cal. 2000)). Therefore, “either party may terminate

the employer-employee relationship without cause.” Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880,

887 (Cal. 1997), and an employer needs no reason to terminate an at-will employment, Sneddon v.

ABF Freight Sys., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1131 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 06cv2755

Here, plaintiff does not dispute that any contract between plaintiff and defendant was for

employment at-will. Therefore, plaintiff does not rebut the evidence that defendant implemented

an at-will policy prior to January 2004 and conditioned employment with defendant on agreement

to that policy. (Collins Decla. ¶ 3; Ruwe Decla. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff conceded in her deposition that

Collins did not specify a duration for the term of plaintiff’s future employment. (Brunelle Depo.,

at 75.) Plaintiff does not allege any public policy restricting defendant’s right to discharge her. 

Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 665 (Cal. 1988); Franklin v. Monadnock Co., 151

Cal. App. 4th 252, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Plaintiff presents no evidence of an express or

implied agreement to terminate plaintiff only for good cause. Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 336; Foley, 47

Cal. 3d at 680. At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel described this claim as one for “anticipatory

breach”; however, that recasting of the cause of action does not change the fact of what was

breached, i.e., a contract for employment at-will. Therefore, the undisputed facts establish that any

oral contract between plaintiff and defendant was for at-will employment, and defendant’s

termination of that employment in advance did not breach that contract, as a matter of law. The

Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for breach of oral

contract.

B. Fraud

As discussed supra, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second cause of action for fraud in

her opposition memorandum. 

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In moving for summary judgment on plaintiff’s third claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”), defendant argues that its conduct was not outrageous, as a matter of

law. IIED “‘is committed when defendant’s conduct is intentionally intrusive and outrageous and

has a severe and traumatic effect on the plaintiff’s emotional tranquility.’” Kraslawsky v. Upper

Deck Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th 179, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App.

3d 1087, 1095 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). “To be outrageous, the conduct ‘must be so extreme as to

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” Garamendi v. Golden

Eagle Ins. Co., 128 Cal. App. 4th 452, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel expressed confusion regarding the Court’s use of the

phrase “undisputed discrepancies.” By that term, the Court means the fact that plaintiff recorded the

beginning of her workday at 6:00 a.m., but did not swipe her building card to enter Pfizer’s facility

until 30-50 minutes later on August 18 and 20, 2004.

4

 “There are also racial and gender components,” plaintiff vaguely alleges, reminding the Court

that she is an African-American female, and Ruwe is a Caucasian male. (Opp., at 3-4.) 

- 8 - 06cv2755

& Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (Cal. 1993)). A court may find outrageous conduct where the

defendant “(1) abuses a relation or position which gives him a power to damage the plaintiff’s

interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts

intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness

through mental distress.” Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n.7 (Cal. 1987). 

The Court finds that plaintiff’s allegation that defendant falsely informed Manpower of

plaintiff’s time theft, resulting in the termination of plaintiff’s employment at Pfizer’s La Jolla

campus, does not satisfy the legal standard for outrageous conduct. Of the cases cited by

defendant, the most relevant is Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1996). There, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of individual

supervisors from an action alleging that the employer terminated or forced the resignation of

plaintiffs above age 40 without good cause. Id. at 62, 80. The court reasoned that plaintiff’s

allegations failed to satisfy the “outrageous conduct” element of the IIED claim: 

Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human

decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society. A

simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim

of [IIED], even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management

decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for

discrimination.

Id. at 80. Applied to these facts, the Court finds that Ruwe did not act outrageously. In light of

the undisputed discrepancies in plaintiff’s time records,3

 Ruwe instead engaged in “personnel

management activity” by contacting Manpower to indicate that defendant no longer needed

plaintiff’s services at the Pfizer facility. Although plaintiff alludes to a discriminatory motive in

her opposition,4

 plaintiff does not bring a suit for discrimination, which, per Janken, is the correct

legal remedy for improperly motivated personnel management decisions. Therefore, the Court

grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s IIED claim. 

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 06cv2755

D. Negligence

In moving for summary judgment on plaintiff’s fifth claim for negligence, defendant first

attempts to recharacterize this cause of action as an artfully pled claim for defamation. Even if the

language of the complaint, taken in a vacuum, might support the recharacterization for which

defendant argues, plaintiff’s opposition makes clear that she is alleging a bona fide negligence

case: 

[a]lthough [p]laintiff was an at-will employee in August of 2004, Ruwe had a duty

to conduct a reasonable investigation before telling Manpower that [p]laintiff was

not to work for [d]efendant any more because her reported work hours did not

correlate with the reported use of her security badge and that, in other words, she

engaged in time-theft. Both Ruwe’s investigation and his accusation of time theft

were negligent.

(Opp., at 5.) Therefore, the Court does not reach defendant’s argument that this claim is timebarred by the statute of limitations.

However, as defendant argues, no legal authority supports the proposition that defendant

“had a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation that gives rise to a claim for ‘general’

negligence.” (Reply, at 10.) Case law imposing an obligation to conduct a reasonable

investigation before terminating an employee arises only in the context of the breach of an implied

contract not to terminate without good cause. E.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 17 Cal.

4th 93, 95-96 (Cal. 1998). In at-will employment contracts, however, plaintiff’s remedies are

exclusively contractual, and the plaintiff cannot recover in tort. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 351-52

(where the contract lacked an implied promise not to terminate without good cause, rejecting claim

for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and limiting plaintiff to the terms

of the parties’ agreement). Having already granted summary judgment to defendant on the claim

for breach of contract, the Court finds that plaintiff’s negligence claim likewise fails, as a matter of

law.

E. Tortious Interference with Economic Advantage

In moving for summary judgment on plaintiff’s fourth claim for tortious interference with

prospective economic advantage, defendant points out that plaintiff alleges a cause of action for

intentional interference. (See Compl., at 7 (“Defendant’s intentional acts were designed to disrupt

of sever the economic relationship of [p]laintiff with Manpower[.]”)) To plead such a claim

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Defendant argues that the causes of action for IIED, tortious interference, and negligence all

fail because they are predicated on statements protected by the common interest privilege of California

Civil Code § 47(c). However, defendant’s privilege arguments are problematic because the complaint

does not plead a speech-based tort. Plaintiff relies on a California Court of Appeal which applied the

privilege to preclude claims for IIED and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but that complaint

also included causes of action for libel and slander. Terry v. Davis Cmty. Church, 131 Cal. App. 4th

1534, 1551, 1558 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Applying the privilege to this case would require an extension

of Terry to facts where no underlying cause of action for libel or slander was pled. See Kacludis v.

GTE Spring Commc’ns Corp., 806 F. Supp. 866, 872 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (applying the privilege to

dismiss a claim for slander per se, but dismissing claims for misrepresentation, IIED, and intentional

interference with economic advantage on other grounds). 

- 10 - 06cv2755

successfully, “a plaintiff must plead that the defendant engaged in an act that is wrongful apart

from the interference itself.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1154

(Cal. 2003); Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc., 138

Cal. App. 4th 1215, 1220 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). “[A]n act is independently wrongful if it is

unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or

other determinable legal standard.” Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1159; Stevenson Real Estate

Servs., 138 Cal. App. 4th at 1220. 

At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel argued that the claim only requires an independent

wrong, even if that wrong is not pled as a separate cause of action. However, rather than actually

allege a specific wrongful act (aside from the other, failed causes of action), plaintiff merely

provides a laundry list of conclusory allegations: “[t]he false accusations were motivated by

Ruwe’s racial and/or gender bias and/or discrimination and/or slander and/or constituted

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress or slander[.]” (Opp., at 5.) At trial, plaintiff

would have to “plead and prove as part of its case-in-chief that the defendant . . . engaged in

conduct that was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.” Della

Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393 (Cal. 1995) (emphasis added). 

Reciting various causes of action does not create a material question of fact as to whether

defendant acted wrongfully, above and beyond the interference itself. Therefore, the Court grants

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with economic advantage.5

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on plaintiff’s causes

of action for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 06cv2755

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed

her cause of action for fraud. Therefore, this Order CONCLUDES the litigation in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 8, 2008

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02755-JLS-CAB Document 46 Filed 02/08/08 Page 11 of 11