Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05008/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05008-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

WENDY LEE CONGER PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-5008

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff WendyLeeConger appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On March 14, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $954.95 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 7.50 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $125, and $17.45 in expenses. (Doc. # 10). The defendant has filed a response,

expressing objections to certain hours requested. (Doc. # 12).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

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An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

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counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's counsel entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

As to the number of hours for which plaintiff's counsel seeks compensation, defendant

argues that the 1.30 hours claimed by plaintiff's counsel for work performed on September 4,

2004, should be deducted because this work pertains to administrative matters. Plaintiff's

counsel seeks a total of 2.83 hours of work from September 4, 2004, through January 7, 2005.

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Plaintiff’s counsel has this date as March 25, 2005, however we believe that year was a typographical error and 1

 should read 2006. 

4

The Complaint was not filed in this court until January 14, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note, time spent

at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728

F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time submitted on the above referenced

dates was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we

will allow 1.50 hours. Accordingly, 1.33 hours must be deducted from the total compensable

time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 0.25 hour on July 27, 2005, (send client’s new address

to Social Security), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; and 0.25 hour on March 25, 2006,1

(electronically file brief), from which we deduct 0.25 hour. This time cannot be compensated,

under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th

Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the

EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 0.50 hour from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 hour on January 17, 2005, (receive and review Magistrate’s

order allowing client to proceed IFP); and 0.33 hour on March 24, 2005, (receive and review

Magistrate’s scheduling order and post to all calendars). This court concludes that the time

submitted on the above referenced dates, should not have taken an attorney experienced in

handling social securitycases more than five or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman

v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Therefore, we are reducing the time

submitted on the above referenced dates by 0.15 hour and 0.23 hour, respectively. Accordingly,

0.38 hour must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

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Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $17.45 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $17.45 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 5.29

(7.50-2.21) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, and $17.45 in expenses, for

a total attorney's fee award of $678.70. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out

of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12 day of May 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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