Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-01930/USCOURTS-alnd-5_12-cv-01930-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

MELISSA ANN BOBO and )

SHANNON JEAN COX, as )

Co-Personal Representatives of the )

Estate of Barbara Bobo, deceased, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV 12-S-1930-NE

 )

TENNESSEE VALLEY )

AUTHORITY, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Barbara Bobo, now deceased, commenced this action during her lifetime. The

gravamen of her complaint was that she suffered from malignant pleural

mesothelioma as a result of being “wrongfully exposed” to airborne asbestos fibers,

“an inherently dangeroustoxic substance.”1 She alleged that the fibers came fromthe

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) on

the north shore of the Tennessee River near Athens, in Limestone County, Alabama. 

Mrs. Bobo, however, had never been inside the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. In fact,

she had never worked for TVA in any capacity. Instead, her claims were derivative:

they grew out of her practice of laundering the asbestos-laden work clothes worn by

1

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 12; doc. no. 171 (Amended Complaint), ¶ 12. 

FILED

 2015 Sep-29 AM 10:48

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 1 of 87
her husband, James Bobo, every week during the twenty-two years that he was

employed by TVA as a laborer at its Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

2 Such allegations

are typical of so-called “secondary exposure,” or “take-home exposure” claims, as

distinguished from “direct exposure” claims.

3

 

I. JURISDICTION

Mrs. Bobo’s original complaint asserted claims against TVA and eight other

defendants, seven of which had developed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, or

sold asbestos-containing products,

4

and one, the Metropolitan Life Insurance

2

See doc. no. 171 (Amended Complaint), ¶ 12(a) (alleging that Barbara Bobo’s husband was

employed by TVA “from 1975-1997”); doc. no. 174 (Memorandum Opinion and Order), at 3

(observing that the amended complaint expanded the amount of time during which plaintiff alleges

that she was exposed to airborne asbestos fibers brought into her home on the person and clothing

of her husband, a former TVA employee, from ten to twenty-two years: “that is, from 1975 to 1997,

as opposed to the period of 1975 to 1985 alleged in the original complaint”). 

3

In the typical “direct exposure” case, a plaintiff who works with or around products

containing asbestos alleges that manipulation of the products caused asbestos fibers to become

airborne and inhaled; and, that, following a long latency period, the ingested fibers caused an

aggressive form of cancer called mesothelioma. In contrast, the plaintiff in a “secondary,” or “takehome,” exposure case does not personally work with or around asbestos-containing products. 

Instead, such plaintiffs typically are family members like Mrs. Bobo, who wash the clothes of the

laborer in direct contact with the asbestos-containing products. (Such cases sometimes are referred

to as “bystander exposure” claims.) 

4The seven defendants that developed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, orsold asbestoscontaining products were: (i) Agco Corporation, formerly known as Allis Calmers Company, and

sued as successor to Massey Ferguson Limited (“Agco”) (doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 3); (ii) CBS

Corporation, formerly known as Viacom, Inc., and sued as the successor-by-merger to CBS

Corporation, formerly known asWestinghouse Electric Corporation (“CBS”)(id. ¶ 4); (iii)Conopco,

Inc., doing business as Unilever United States, Inc., and sued both individually, and, as successorby-merger to Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. (“Conopco”) (id. ¶ 5); (iv) Consolidated Aluminum

Corporation, also known asConlaco, Inc. (“Consolidated Aluminum”) (id. ¶ 6); (v) Dana Companies

LLC, sued both individually, and, assuccessor-in-interest toVictor Gasket ManufacturingCompany

(“Dana”) (id. ¶ 7); (vi) Ford Motor Company(“Ford”) (id. ¶ 8); and (vii) Unilever United States, Inc.,

2

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 2 of 87
Company, that allegedly had “conspired with other asbestos suppliers and product

manufacturers to mislead the public as to the hazards of asbestos.”5 Mrs. Bobo was

a resident of the State of Alabama on the date this action was commenced, and the

defendants other than TVA were corporate citizens of states other than Alabama. 

Apparently for that reason, Mrs. Bobo’s attorneys premised jurisdiction on the

diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

6 Mrs. Bobo’s claims against the eight, non-TVA

defendants were dismissed at various stages of these proceedings pursuant to

stipulations for dismissal,

7

thus leaving TVA as the only defendant. TVA’s status as

a wholly-owned corporate agency and instrumentality of the United States created

pursuant to an act of Congress

8

places subject matter jurisdiction under the federal

question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as opposed to the diversity statute. See, e.g.,

sued both individually, and, as successor-by-merger to Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. (“Unilever”)

(id. ¶ 11). 

5

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 9. 

6

See id. ¶¶ 18-20; see also doc. no. 171 (Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 18-20. 

7 The following defendants were dismissed in accordance with stipulations of dismissal filed

by Mrs. Bobo and the defendants noted: doc. no. 18 (Ford); doc. no. 19 (Order Dismissing Ford);

doc. no. 44 (AGCO); doc. no. 45 (Order Dismissing AGCO); doc. no. 47 (Conopco and Unilever);

doc. no. 48 (Order Dismissing Conopco and Unilever); doc. no. 53 (Consolidated Aluminum); doc.

no. 56 (Order Dismissing Consolidated Aluminum); doc. no. 60 (CBS); doc. no. 61 (Order

Dismissing CBS); doc. no. 62 (Dana Companies); doc. no. 64 (Order Dismissing Dana Companies);

doc. no. 78 (MetLife); doc. no. 79 (Order Dismissing MetLife). 

8

See 16 U.S.C. § 831 (creating “a body corporate by the name of the ‘Tennessee Valley

Authority’”); § 831r (referring to TVA as “an instrumentality and agency of the Government of the

United States for the purpose of executing its constitutional powers”). See also, e.g., United States

ex rel TVA v. An Easement & Right-of-Way Over Two Tracts of Land, 246 F. Supp. 263, 269 (W.D.

Ky. 1965) (observing that TVA “is a wholly owned corporate agency and instrumentality of the

United States”) (citations omitted), aff’d, 375 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1967). 

3

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 3 of 87
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Myers, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885) (the so-called “Pacific

Railroad Removal Case,” holding that a suit by or against a corporation of the United

States is a ground for federal question jurisdiction); Government National Mortgage

Association v. Terry, 608 F.2d 614, 620-21 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1979) (same);9

Jackson

v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 462 F. Supp. 45, 50-51 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (“The

courts have consistently relied upon the Pacific Railroad decision in finding

jurisdiction over tort actions against TVA under sections 1331 and 1337”) (citations

omitted); Monsanto Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 448 F. Supp. 648, 651 (N.D.

Ala. 1978) (observing that “the precedents going back over a hundred and fifty years

establish that any claim, even one created by state law,

[10]

against a federally created

corporation arises under federal law”) (emphasis and footnote supplied, citations

9 The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, in Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

10 With regard to the statement that any claim, “even one created by state law,” that is

asserted against a federally-created corporation “arises under federal law,” see 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2,

providing that: 

An action against the Tennessee Valley Authority for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or

wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority while

acting within the scope of this office or employment is exlusive [sic] of any other

civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee

or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. Any other civil action or

proceeding arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee

or his estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred. 

16 U.S.C. § 831c-2(a)(1). 

4

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 4 of 87
omitted). 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mrs. Bobo died about fifteen months after filing suit,

11

but her claims were not

extinguished by death, and survived in favor of her daughters, who were appointed

co-personal representatives of their mother’s estate by the Probate Court of

Lauderdale County, Alabama.12 A timelymotion to substitute Melissa Ann Bobo and

Shannon Jean Cox as plaintiffs was granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25(a)(1).13

 

Following denial of TVA’s motions for summary judgment,

14

the case

proceeded to a bench trial15on plaintiffs’ claims that their mother had contracted

malignant plural mesothelioma as a result of TVA’s negligence that allowed her to

11

See, e.g., doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 10. 

12

See Ala. Code § 6-5-462 (1975) (“In all proceedings not of an equitable nature, all claims

upon which an action has been filed and all claims upon which no action has been filed on a contract,

express or implied, and all personal claims upon which an action has been filed, except for injuries

to the reputation, survive in favor of and against personal representatives; and all personal claims

upon which no action has been filed survive against the personal representative of a deceased

tort-feasor.”); doc. no. 178-1 (Letters Testamentary, In re Estate of Barbara J. Bobo, Case No.

20091, Probate Court for Lauderdale County, Alabama).

13

See doc. no. 178 (Motion to Substitute Party), and doc. no. 179 (Order Granting Motion

to Substitute Party). 

14

See doc. no. 69 (TVA’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Discretionary Function

Grounds), granted in part and denied in part by doc. no. 174 (Memorandum Opinion and Order);

see also doc. no. 122 (TVA’s Motion for Summary Judgment), denied by doc. no. 187

(Memorandum Opinion and Order). 

15

See doc. no. 65 (TVA’s Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages Claims and to Strike Jury

Demand), granted by doc. no. 75 (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 

5

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 5 of 87
be exposed to a large quantity of asbestos fibers while laundering the work clothing

of her husband each week throughout the years he worked at TVA’s Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant.

16 Upon consideration of the parties’ pleadings, pre-trial evidentiary

submissions, trial testimony and exhibits, briefs, arguments of counsel, and

independent research, the court makes the following findings of fact and enters

conclusions of law. 

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs’ decedent, Barbara Wear Bobo, was born on March 3, 1942, and

lived with her father, Clifton Wear, on the family farm until she married James Bobo

on September 28, 1964.

17 They purchased a home in Florence, Alabama the

following year,18and lived together as husband and wife until Mr. Bobo died on

16

See doc. no. 191 (Pretrial Order), ¶ 5(b), at 5-6. See also doc. no. 174 (Memorandum

Opinion and Order Denying TVA’s Motion for Summary Judgment), at 56 (permitting the case to

proceed on the claim that TVA was negligent in at least the following respects: (1) TVA violated

Occupation Safety and Health Administration regulations concerning permissible levels of asbestos

exposure; (2) TVA failed to follow mandatorydirectives governing the monitoring of an employee’s

exposure to asbestos; (3) TVA failed to provide employees who were exposed to airborne asbestos

fibers protective clothing and equipment, as well as separate locker rooms and shower facilities; and

(4) TVA failed to administer annual medical examinations to employees exposed to airborne

asbestos fibers). 

17 Doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25, 2012 Deposition), at 11; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and

Stipulated Facts), ¶¶ 5, 12(b). James Bobo sometimes was referred to during his lifetime and

pleadings in this case as “Neal Bobo.” 

18 Doc. no. 123 (Barbara Bobo’s May 30, 2013 Deposition), at 16; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and

Stipulated Facts), ¶ 6. 

6

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 6 of 87
September 7, 1997,19

from lung cancer induced by asbestosis:20“a form of

pneumoconiosis (silicatosis) caused by inhaling fibers of asbestos” and “associated

with pleural mesothelioma.”21

 

Mrs. Bobo did notremarry and continued to reside in the marital home until her

own death.

22 She was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma in November

of 2011, and died as a result of that disease nearly two years later, on September 7,

2013.

23

 She was seventy-one years of age.24 

Defendant, Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA” or “the Authority”), is a

constitutionally authorized instrumentality of the United States created pursuant to

the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. (“the TVA

Act”), which broadly charges the Authority with the accomplishment of several

important missions, including: improving the navigability of the TennesseeRiver and

19

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 9. 

20

See doc. no. 145-3 (James Bobo Deposition) at 59, 70-71; Trial Transcript, Day 1, at 181

(ll 9-14). 

21 Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 161 (30th ed. 2003) (The entire definition of

asbestosis reads as follows: “a form of pneumoconiosis (silicatosis) caused by inhaling fibers of

asbestos, marked by interstitial fibrosis of the lung varying in extent from minor involvement of the

basal areas to extensive scarring; it is associated with pleural mesothelioma and bronchogenic

carcinoma”). 

22

See doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25, 2012 Deposition), at 16-17, 29-30; doc. no.

201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶¶ 9-10. 

23 Doc. no. 178 (Motion to Substitute Party); doc. no. 179 (Order Granting Motion to

Substitute Party); doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 10. 

24

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 67. 

7

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 7 of 87
its tributaries; flood control; improvement of marginal lands; reclamation of lands

ravaged by erosion; reforestation; and agricultural and industrial development of the

region served by TVA — an area of the nation that was particularly affected by the

Great Depression, and which covers most of Tennessee, portions of Alabama,

Mississippi, and Kentucky, and small slices of Georgia, North Carolina, and

Virginia.25 To assist in the accomplishment of its Congressionally-mandated

purposes, the TVA Act specifically authorizes the Authority “to acquire real estate

for the construction of dams, reservoirs, transmission lines, power houses, and other

structures, and navigation projects at any point along the Tennessee River, or any of

its tributaries,”26

and “[t]o produce, distribute, and sell electric power.”27 All real

property acquired by TVA is held “in the name of the United States of America,” and

is “entrusted to the [Authority] as the agent of the United States to accomplish the

purposes of the [TVA Act].”28

 

The land upon which the Browns FerryNuclear Plant was constructed is among

the real estate owned by the United States and entrusted to TVA for management and

25

See 16 U.S.C. § 831n and § 831n-4. See also, e.g., doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated

Facts), ¶ 12. 

26

 16 U.S.C. § 831c(i). 

27

16 U.S.C. § 831d(l) (alteration supplied). See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 831h-1; doc. no. 201

(Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 13. 

28

16 U.S.C. § 831c(h) (alterations supplied). See also doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated

Facts), ¶ 14. 

8

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 8 of 87
operational control.

29 The Browns Ferry facility was the Authority’s first nuclear

power plant and, when it began operation in 1974, the largest in the world. It also

wasthe first nuclear plant to generate more than one billion watts of electric power.30

The plant’s three operating units are General Electric boiling water reactors. They

produce electricity by splitting uraniumatoms, and the heat generated by that process

boils water, thereby producing steam that is piped to turbines, which in turn spin

generators to produce electricity.

31

 

A. Asbestos

The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2641 et seq., defines

asbestos as the asbestiform varieties of chrysotile (serpentine), crocidolite

(riebeckite), amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite), anthophyllite, tremolite, or

actinolite. 15 U.S.C. § 2642(3)(A)–(F). “Asbestiform” is a mineralogical term

29

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 15; doc. no. 31 (TVA Answer), ¶ 10. 

30 TVA intended to construct seventeen nuclear reactors during the 1950s and ‘60s, but

completed only five. The plans for the Browns Ferry facility were approved by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission on June 17, 1966; construction began in September of that year; and the

plant became operational in 1974. See, e.g., https://www.tva.gov/Energy/Our-Power-System/Nuclear/Browns-Ferry-Nuclear-Plant (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). As of the date of this opinion, TVA

operated six nuclear reactor units at three sites: three at Browns Ferry; two at the Sequoyah Plant

in Soddy-Daisy, Tenn.; and one at the Watts Bar Plant near Spring City, Tenn. (a second unit is

under construction). Together, those plants contribute about 6,600 megawatts of electricity to the

power grid, and generate about 30% of TVA’s power supply. Those plants alone make enough

electricity to power more than three million homes in the Tennessee Valley, thereby making the

“Nuclear Power Group” an integral part of TVA’s seven-state power system. See

http://www.tva.com/power/nuclear/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 

31

See, e.g., http://www.tva.gov/sites/brownsferry.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 

9

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 9 of 87
meaning that the fibers are long, thin, and possess high tensile strength.

32 Asbestos

fibers are flexible, and can be woven together. They also are resistant to heat and

most chemicals. “Because of these properties, asbestos fibers have been used in a

wide range of manufactured goods, including roofing shingles, ceiling and floor tiles,

paper and cement products, textiles, coatings, and friction products such as

automobile clutch, brake and transmission parts.”33 The use most relevant to the

issues of this case was the installation or replacement of insulation materials

wrapping the boilers, pipes, and other equipment involved in the transfer of hightemperature steam to the turbines driving TVA’s electrical generating equipment. 

B. James Bobo’s Pre-TVA Employment and Exposure to Asbestos 

Barbara Bobo’s husband James was employed as a machine operator at the

“Alabama Wire” plant in Florence, Alabama for about ten years, from 1965 until

April 15, 1975, when he was hired by TVA.34 During that period, he was exposed to

airborne asbestos fibers that emanated from such products as: Careytemp pipe

covering, insulating cement, and block insulation;

35 GAF Building Materials

32 See https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=PREAMBLES

&p_id=785 (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 

33

 http://www.epa.gov/superfund/asbestos/compendium/basic_information.html.

34

 Doc. no. 123 (Barbara Bobo’s May 30, 2013 Deposition), at 52-70. 

35 Doc. no. 123-2 (Barbara Bobo Declaration in Support of Exposure to Celotex Corporation

Asbestos-Containing Products), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶¶ 16-17. 

10

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 10 of 87
Corporation pipe covering, insulating cement, and block insulation;

36 H.K. Porter

cloth;

37 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation block insulation;38 Keene

Corporation pipe covering, insulating cement, and block insulation;

39

 and Raymark

gaskets.

40

 

C. James Bobo’s TVA Employment and Exposure to Asbestos 

James Bobo was employed by TVA as either a temporary or annual employee

for more than twenty-two years, from April 15, 1975 until September 7, 1997:

41

the

day on which he died from lung cancer induced by asbestosis.

42 He worked primarily

36 Doc. no. 123-3 (Barbara Bobo Declaration in Support of Exposure to GAF Building

Materials Corporation Asbestos Related Products), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts),

¶ 17. 

37 Doc. no. 123-4 (Barbara Bobo Declaration in Support of Exposure to H.K. Porter Asbestos

Related Products), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 17.

38 Doc. no. 123-5 (Barbara Bobo Declaration in Support of Exposure to Kaiser Aluminum

& Chemical Corporation Asbestos Related Products), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated

Facts), ¶ 17. 

39 Doc. no. 123-6 (Barbara Bobo Declaration in Support of Exposure to Keene Corporation

Asbestos Related Products), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 17. 

40 Doc. no. 123-7 (Barbara Bobo Declaration in Support of Exposure to Raymark Asbestos

Related Products), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 17. 

41 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 28; doc. no. 83-3 (Exhibits to Priscilla

Carthen Deposition), at ECF 24. NOTE: “ECF” is an acronym formed from the initial letters of the

name of a filing system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically (i.e.,

“Electronic Case Filing”). Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 allows citation to page numbers generated by the

ECF header. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, at 21 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et

al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). Even so, the Bluebook recommends against citation to ECF pagination in

lieu of original pagination. Consequently, unless stated otherwise, this court will cite to the original

pagination in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites to pagination generated by the ECF

header, it will, as here, precede the page number with the letters “ECF.” 

42 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 9; see also notes 19-21, supra, and

accompanying text. 

11

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 11 of 87
in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

43 Numerous products and materials containing

asbestos fibers were present in that facility:

44

for example, thermal pipe coverings

and insulation; roofing cement; packing materials; and gasket packing materials.

45

Even so, there is no record of air monitoring measurements demonstrating either the

fact of Mr. Bobo’s exposure to airborne asbestosfibers during his TVA employment,

or the extent of any such exposure in some objectively measurable units.

46

 

Mr. Bobo held at various times job positions classified as “laborer,” “dual rate

laborer foreman,” and “laborer foreman.”47 He never held jobs classified as either

“asbestos worker” or “insulator.”48 

Mr. Bobo’s duties while working as a “laborer” included, among other things,

general clean-up work, tool decontamination, and the packing and storing of

radiological waste.49 Moreover, he often was directed to assist TVA employees who

43 Doc. no. 83-3 (Exhibits to Priscilla Carthen Deposition), at ECF 24; doc. no. 201 (Agreed

and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 28.

44 Doc. no. 175 (Answer to Amended Complaint), ¶ 10; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated

Facts), ¶ 31.

45 Doc. no. 83-2 (James Bobo Deposition), at 34-35. TVA’s 1967 Safety Manual noted that

asbestos thermal insulation was used at the plant and that “[e]xposures occurre[d] during application

and removal of insulation.” Doc. no. 91-1, at ECF 5 (alterations supplied). 

46

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 32. 

47

Id. ¶ 33.

48

Id. ¶ 34.

49

Id. ¶ 35.

12

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 12 of 87
installed insulation materials made from (or that contained) asbestos fibers.

50

Occasionally, he would assist the insulators in such work; but, more often than not,

Mr. Bobo was directed to clean up after the insulators had completed their duties by

sweeping insulation residue that had fallen to the floor.51 The act of sweeping

generated airborne “dust” containing asbestos fibers.

52 Mr. Bobo was often present

when insulators mixed refractory cement,53a process that also generated airborne

asbestos fibers. 

Mr. Bobo worked at varioustimesin parts of the nuclear facility that contained

radiologically contaminated materials: areas that are referred to in this record as “C

-Zones.”

54 Whenever Mr. Bobo did so, he was required to wear personal protective

gear — i.e., clothing and equipment worn to prevent or mitigate exposure to radiation

and radiological contamination.

55 Whenever Mr. Bobo swept insulation residue that

50

 Doc. no. 83-2 (James Bobo Deposition), at 36. 

51

Id. at 36-38. Laborers cleaned up the insulation residue using brooms, rags, and mops. 

Doc. no. 83-4 (Jimmy Myhan Deposition), at 60. 

52 Doc. no. 83-2 (James Bobo Deposition), at 34, 100, 109; doc. no. 83-4 (Jimmy Myhan

Deposition), at 61. 

53

 Doc. no. 83-2 (James Bobo Deposition), at 144-45, 147. 

54

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 36. 

55

Id. ¶ 37 (“Mr. Bobo was required to wear over-garment protection while working in CZones for purposes of preventing personal radiological contamination.”). See also, e.g., U.S. Dept.

of Health & Human Services website on “Radiation Emergency Medical Management,” found at

http://www.remm.nlm.gov/radiation_ppe.htm (last visited June 12, 2015). The term contamination

refers to particles of radioactivity deposited where they are not supposed to be. See, e.g.,

http://nuclear.duke-energy.com/2012/08/21/radiation-protection-for-nuclear-employees(last visited

Sept. 29, 2015). 

13

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 13 of 87
was not in a C-Zone, however, he wore only street clothes, with no over-garment

protective coverings,

56

even though such gearwould have prevented airborne asbestos

fibers from adhering to and contaminating his personal clothing.

57 Mr. Bobo’s

clothing always was clean when he departed his residence for work each morning, but

the same garments generally were “pretty dirty” when he returned home.58 

Jimmy Myhan was a TVA employee who worked with James Bobo at Browns

Ferry from March 16, 1976 until October 1, 1993, except for a two-year time period

between October 1978 and August 1980, when Myhan left TVA for other

employment.

59 Mr. Myhan testified that, during both periods he and James Bobo

worked together — i.e., 1976-78, and, 1980 through 1993 — James Bobo worked at

least once each week in a C-Zone, and at all other times he worked in one of the three

units of the nuclear plant where he cleaned up white pipe insulation.60 Mr. Myhan’s

description of the insulation as “white” in color issignificant, because heat-absorbing

materials made from (or containing) asbestos fibers generally are “white” in color. 

For example, Frank Mecke testified that the contractor he worked for during

construction of the Browns Ferry facility (Shook & Fletcher) installed all insulation

56

 Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 13-16. 

57

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 38.

58

 Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 28-29, 136-37. 

59

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶¶ 29-30.

60

 Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 11-16.

14

Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 14 of 87
in the Unit 1 reactor,61

and that the insulating materials made from (or containing)

asbestos fibers were white in color.62In like manner, Steven Brown, Director of

Maintenance at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, testified that all asbestos insulation

removed during abatement procedures was white in color, and that he encountered

asbestos insulation at the nuclear plant on a daily basis.

63

Indeed, TVA’s own

documentation confirmsthat asbestosinsulation was used pervasively throughout the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, including the three reactor units in which Mr. Bobo

worked. 

A list of TVA employee fatalities shows that, in 1977, a labor foreman (a

position sometimes held by Mr. Bobo) died of asbestosis, and an electrician foreman

died of mesothelioma.64 A 1978 internal memorandumnotesthat an evaluation of the

Browns Ferry insulator shop revealed the presence of airborne asbestos fibers.

65 A

1979 evaluation of TVA facilities by the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration noted that “asbestos exposure at numerous power plants” was one of

“[a] number of recognized and documented hazards within TVA [that] have been

61 The operating license for the Unit 1 reactor was issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission on Dec. 20, 1973, and a renewal license issued on May 4, 2006. The current licence

is due to expire on Dec. 20, 2033. See http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/bf1.html (last visited

June 12, 2015). 

62

 Trial Transcript, Day 1, at 163-67.

63

 Trial Transcript, Day 3, at 12-13, 21.

64

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 531, at 5.

65

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 530.

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known to exist for years and [were] still not abated.”

66 A 1980 draft of TVA’s

“Hazard Control Standard 407” for asbestos allowed the purchase of asbestos

insulation, but only if no suitable, non-toxic substitute existed. It also required nonasbestos materials to be designated as such, and required warning signs to be posted

in areas where airborne asbestos fiber concentrations might exceed the permissible

exposure level.

67 A 1988 “Asbestos Control ProgramReview Report” stated that “all

insulation (usually gray) is [to be] treated as asbestos unless bulk sample analysis

indicates otherwise,” and noted that “insulation containing asbestos was sometimes

substituted in some areas being insulated with asbestos-free insulation during

construction.”68 Even though air monitoring measurements were usually obtained

after wet methods had eliminated most of the airborne dust, elevated levels of

asbestos fibers still were detected in every reactor unit of the plant.

69

 Finally, even

though non-asbestos “mineral wool” was sometimes used during construction of the

Browns FerryNuclear Plant, it was covered (encased) with asbestosmud and asbestos

cloth.

70

The preponderance of the evidence presented at trial established that a

66

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 531, at 45 (alterations supplied). 

67

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 533, at 3, 9. 

68

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 536, at 4 (emphasis and alteration supplied). 

69

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 543; Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 57-59. 

70

 Trial Transcript, Day 1, at 164. 

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significant quantity of asbestosfibers accumulated on the clothing worn by Mr. Bobo

when he swept insulation residue in the non-C-Zone areas of all reactor units at the

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. 

D. Barbara Bobo’s Exposure to Airborne Asbestos Fibers That Originated

From Sources Other Than TVA’s Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

Barbara Bobo, like many Americans above the age of sixty, probably was

exposed to products containing some amount of asbestos at varioustimesthroughout

her life.71 Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that she experienced non-occupational

exposures to asbestos from 1965 until April 15, 1975, when her husband was

employed as a machine operator at the Alabama Wire plant, through laundering his

work clothes and traveling in the family automobile.72 Her exposures to asbestoscontaining products during that period, however, occurred thirty-five to forty-five

71 For example, it was alleged in both complaints filed in the present action that Barbara Bobo

was exposed to “asbestos-containing friction products” during the decades of the 1940s and 1950s

as a result of “observing her Father, who worked as a farmer, performing maintenance to his

tractors.” Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 12(b), and doc. no. 171 (Amended Complaint), ¶ 12(b). See

alsoRebecca Leah Levine, Clearing theAir: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos Exposure

Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 363 (2011) (“Because of the widespread past and present use of

asbestos, low levels of asbestos are present in air, soil, and water, and each person is exposed to it

at some point during his or her life.”) (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted). The same

commentator observed in the omitted footnote, however, that “[m]ost people do not become ill from

their exposure. People who become ill from asbestos are usually those who are exposed to it on a

regular basis, most often through a job where they work directly with the material or through

substantial environmental contact.” Id. at 363 n. 36 (alteration supplied) (citing National Cancer

Institute, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, ASBESTOS EXPOSURE AND CANCER RISK

FACT SHEET, at 2 (2009)). 

72 Doc. no. 123 (Barbara Bobo’s May 30, 2013 Deposition), at 52-70; doc. no. 201 (Agreed

and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 18.

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years before the date on which she was diagnosed with malignant pleural

mesothelioma.73 

In addition, Mrs. Bobo worked as a beautician for various employers from

1976 until 1983, when she opened her own beauty salon in a building adjacent to the

home that she shared with James Bobo.

74 From then until 2011 she was selfemployed as a beautician under the trade name of “Barbara’sBeauty Shop.”75 During

the approximately thirty-five yearsthat Mrs. Bobo was employed as a beautician, she

generally worked five and a half days each week, with a typical work day of eight

hours.

76 Mrs. Bobo used stationary hair dryers on her patrons twenty-five to thirty

times each day, and she inhaled dust particles while doing so.

77 She also inhaled dust

while cleaning hair dryer filters each month: a maintenance procedure that involved

removing, cleaning, and reinserting the filters.

78 The record does not indicate whether

the particles inhaled by Mrs. Bobo while performing such functions in her beauty

salon contained asbestosfibers, and neither the Bobo residence nor Mrs. Bobo’ssalon

73

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 21.

74 Doc. no. 123 (Barbara Bobo’s May 30, 2013 Deposition), at 16; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and

Stipulated Facts), ¶ 7.

75

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 19.

76 Doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25, 2012 Deposition), at 28, 31; doc. no. 201 (Agreed

and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 20.

77 Doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25, 2012 Deposition), at 26-28; doc. no. 201 (Agreed

and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 20.

78 Doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25, 2012 Deposition), at 29-30; doc. no. 201 (Agreed

and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 20.

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was ever tested for the presence of that substance.79

 

E. Barbara Bobo’s Exposures to Airborne Asbestos That Originated In

TVA’s Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

Plaintiffs contend that their deceased mother’s exposure to airborne asbestos

fibers from those sources sketched in the preceding section was not significant in

comparison to the large quantity of those inherently dangerous toxic substances to

which she was subjected through her practice of laundering James Bobo’s work

clothes over the course of the twenty-two yearsthat he worked for TVA at its Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant.

80 The laundry room located in the center of the Bobo home was

small: its floor dimensions were only about four feet by five feet (twenty square

feet).81 Mrs. Bobo washed her husband’s clothes twice each week, but her daily

practice was to pick up the dirty clothing that he had removed at the end of the

preceding work day, carry those articles into the laundry room, shut the door, empty

the pockets, shake the clothing to remove loose dirt particles, and place the articles

in the washing machine.82 Mrs. Bobo testified in her deposition that she inhaled

79 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 40; doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25,

2012 Deposition), at 41-42; doc. no. 51 (Plaintiff’s Answer to Interrogatories), at 3. 

80

See doc. no. 171 (Amended Complaint), ¶ 12; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts),

¶¶ 22, 39. 

81 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶¶ 23-24; doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept.

25, 2012 Deposition), at 18. 

82 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 24; doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25,

2012 Deposition), at 19. 

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“dust” while performing those tasks.

83 She described the atmosphere of the laundry

room as “[f]oggy,” but said she “just thought it was dust.”84 She also dry-swept the

washroom floor with a small broom and dustpan prior to mopping it, and said that the

air became “dusty” when she did so.

85 Again, the record does not indicate whether

that “dust” contained asbestosfibers, and the Bobo residence was never tested for the

presence of that substance.86 Even so, the preponderance of the evidence indicates

that James Bobo’s clothing was encased in asbestos fibers by the time he returned

home from the nuclear plant each evening. It is more likely than not that Mrs. Bobo

unknowingly inhaled dangerous concentrations of asbestosfibers asshe “shook out”

her husband’s clothing while sequestered within the small space of her laundry room. 

F. Plaintiff’s Expert

Dr. Eugene Mark testified, based upon his review of depositions, medical

records, and other materials in the case, that Mrs. Bobo was exposed to asbestos by

laundering her husband’s clothes for more than twenty-two years.

87 He also testified

that studies in the scientific literature link mesothelioma to asbestos exposure from

83 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 25; doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25,

2012 Deposition), at 20.

84 Doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25, 2012 Deposition), at 19 (alteration supplied). 

85 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 26; doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25,

2012 Deposition), at 20. 

86 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 40; doc. no. 83-1 (Barbara Bobo’s Sept. 25,

2012 Deposition), at 41-42; doc. no. 51 (Plaintiff’s Answer to Interrogatories), at 3. 

87

 Trial Transcript, Day 1, at 86.

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laundering the clothes of a person who works with asbestos.

88 One study relied upon

byDr. Mark (an article byGunnar Hillerdal entitled “Mesothelioma Cases Associated

with Non-Occupational and Low-Dose Exposures”) reported that asbestos fiber

concentrations in domestic exposure cases might be as high as in occupational

exposure cases.

89

 The same study reported that “[o]rdinary vacuum cleaning is not

effective in removing asbestos fibers, which can remain for years in the house and be

airborne again whenever disturbed. Thus, domestic exposure is not low exposure.”90

Dr. Mark concluded that Mrs. Bobo’s exposure to asbestos from her husband’s work

at TVA was a substantial factor contributing to the development of her

mesothelioma.91 

G. The Application of Regulations Promulgated by the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration to TVA’s Operations 

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“the OSH Act”) required

“the head of each Federal agency . . . to establish and maintain an effective and

comprehensive occupational safety and health program which is consistent with the

standards promulgated under section 665” of the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. § 668(a).92 

88

Id. at 87, 141, 145-51.

89

Id. at 158.

90

Id. (alteration supplied).

91

Id. at 97.

92 The remainder of that same section of the OSH Act mandates that the head of each Federal

agency: 

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Executive Order 11,612, promulgated in 1971, observed that, “[a]sthe Nation’s

largest employer, the Federal Government has a special obligation to set an example

for safe and healthful employment.” 36 Fed. Reg. 13,891 (July 26, 1971) (alteration

supplied). For that reason, the order required the head of each federal department and

agency to “establish an occupational safety and health program . . . in compliance

with the requirements of . . . section 19(a) of [the OSH Act],” and the programs were

required to “be consistent with the standards prescribed by section 6 of [the OSH

Act],” now codified as 29 U.S.C. § 668. Id. (alterations supplied). 

Yet another Executive Order promulgated three years later recognized that

“even greater efforts” were needed in order to establish occupationalsafety and health

programs that were consistent with the standards prescribed by Section 6 of the OSH

(1) provide safe and healthful places and conditions of employment,

consistent with the standards set under section 655 of this title; 

(2) acquire, maintain, and require the use of safety equipment, personal

protective equipment, and devices reasonably necessary to protect employees; 

(3) keep adequate records of all occupational accidents and illnesses for

proper evaluation and necessary corrective action; 

(4) consult with the Secretary with regard to the adequacy as to form and

content of records kept pursuant to subsection (a)(3) of this section; and 

(5) make an annual report to the Secretary with respect to occupational

accidents and injuries and the agency's program under this section. Such report shall

include any report submitted under section 7902(e)(2) of Title 5.

29 U.S.C. § 668(a). 

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Act. Executive Order No. 11,807, recorded at 39 Fed. Reg. 35,559 (Sept. 28, 1974)

(alteration supplied). Thus, this 1974 Executive Order was designed to provide

additional guidance to ensure effective occupational safety and health programs

within executive agencies, and to allow for detailed evaluations of such programs by

the Secretary of the Department of Labor. See id. 

It was not until the promulgation of Executive Order 12,196 in February of

1980, however, that federal executive agencies were explicitly required to comply

with the regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. See 45

Fed. Reg. 12,769 (Feb. 26, 1980) (providing that the head of each agency must

“[c]omply with all standards issued under section 6 of [the OSH Act],” now codified

as 29 U.S.C. § 668 (alterations supplied)). 

H. The Evolution of OSHA Standards 

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) promulgated

an emergency temporary standard for exposure to asbestos fibers under Section 6 of

the OSH Act in 1971 (now codified as 29 U.S.C. § 668). 36 Fed. Reg. 23,207

(December 7, 1971). The temporary standard provided that an employee’s exposure

could not exceed five fibers longer than five micrometers in length per milliliter of

air over an eight-hour, time-weighted average, and could not exceed a peak

concentration level of ten fibers longer than five micrometers in length per cubic

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centimeter of air. See 36 Fed. Reg. 23,208.

93 The concentration level of airborne

asbestos fibers was to be determined by “the membrane filter method at 400-450x

magnification (4 millimeter objective) phase contrast illumination.” Id. 

The exposure limits stated in the 1971 temporary standard became final in

1972, when OSHA notified employers to prepare for the following reductions in

exposure limits that were to take effect, initially, on July 7, 1972, and then be further

reduced four years thereafter, on July 1, 1976: 

(b) Permissible exposure to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers

(1) Standard effective July 7, 1972. The 8-hour time-weighted

average airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers to which any

employee may be exposed shall not exceed five fibers, longer than 5

micrometers, per cubic centimeter of air, as determined by the method

prescribed in paragraph (e) of this section.

(2) Standard effective July 1, 1976. The 8-hour time-weighted

average air-borne concentrations of asbestos fibers to which any

employee may be exposed shall not exceed two fibers, longer than 5

micrometers, per cubic centimeter of air, as determined by the method

prescribed in paragraph (e) of this section. 

(3) Ceiling concentration. No employee shall be exposed at any

given time to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers in excess of 10

fibers, longer than 5 micrometers, per cubic centimeter of air, as

determined by the method prescribed in paragraph (e) of this section.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a(b) (1972), recodified as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1975)

93 The Federal Register notice issued by OSHA announced the creation of 29 C.F.R. §

1910.93a (1971), recodified as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1975). The emergency temporary standard

for exposure to asbestos fibers was codified as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a(a). 

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Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 24 of 87
(emphasis supplied).94

 

OSHA also specified requirements for protective equipment and clothing for

employees, such as James Bobo, who were exposed to airborne concentrations of

asbestos fibers that exceeded the permissible exposure levels prescribed in Section

1910.93a(b). 

(d)(3) Special clothing: The employer shall provide, and require

the use of, special clothing, such as coveralls or similar whole body

clothing, head coverings, gloves, and foot coverings for any employee

exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers, which exceed the

ceiling level prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section.

(4) Change rooms: (i) At any fixed place of employment exposed

to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers in excess of the exposure

limits prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section, the employer shall

provide change rooms for employees working regularly at the place.

(ii) Clothes lockers: The employer shall provide two separate

lockers or containers for each employee, so separated or isolated as to

prevent contamination of the employee’s street clothes from his work

clothes. 

(iii) Laundering: (a) Laundering of asbestos contaminated

clothing shall be done so as to prevent the release of airborne asbestos

fibersin excess of the exposure limits prescribed in paragraph (b) of this

section . . . .

29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a(d) (1972), recodified as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1975). 

In addition, OSHA mandated particular methods of measuring and monitoring

94 At the time OSHA notified employers to prepare for the upcoming reductions in exposure

limits, it also amended 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a to eliminate the provision containing the temporary

standard. See 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318-20 (June 7, 1972).

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Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 25 of 87
the concentrations of airborne asbestos fibers. 

(e) Method of measurement. All determinations of airborne

concentrations of asbestos fibers shall be made by the membrane filter

method at 400-450 x (magnification) (4millimeter objective) with phase

contrast illumination. 

(f) Monitoring — (1) Initial determinations. Within 6 months of

the publication of this section, every employer shall cause every place

of employment where asbestos fibers are released to be monitored in

such a way as to determine whether every employee’s exposure to

asbestos fibers is below the limits prescribed in paragraph (b) of this

section . . . . 

(2) Personal monitoring — (i) Samples shall be collected from

within the breathing zone of the employees, on membrane filters of 0.8

micrometer porossity mounted in an open-face filter holder. Samples

shall be taken for the determination of the 8-hour time-weighted average

airborne concentrations and of the ceiling concentrations of asbestos

fibers.

(ii) Sampling frequency and patterns. After the initial

determinations required by subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, samples

shall be of such frequency and pattern as to represent with reasonable

accuracy the levels of exposure of employees. In no case shall the

sampling be done at intervals greater than 6 months for employees

whose exposure to asbestos may reasonably be foreseen to exceed the

limits prescribed by paragraph (b) of this section.

29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.93a(e)-(f) (1972), recodified as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1975).

The 1972 OSHA standard for asbestos exposure also contained a mandate for

employer-provided medical examinations: i.e., “[E]very employer shall provide, or

make available, comprehensive medical examinations to each of his employees

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Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 26 of 87
engaged in occupations exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers.” 29

C.F.R. § 1910.93a(j)(3) (alteration supplied). 

I. TVA Internal Policies 

TVA has an internal safety organization that is “responsible for establishing

TVA policies and procedures for assuring safe and healthful work conditions for all

employees on TVA properties (TVA safety practices).”95 Such safety practices “are

organized generally into three tiers: agency safety practices established by the TVA

safety organization; business unitsafety practices established bymajor business units

such as nuclear power . . . ; and site specific safety practices established by local

facilities such as Browns Ferry . . . .”96 Further, many of those safety practices

address specific standards relating to the use of asbestos at TVA properties, such as

the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.

97

 

1. TVA Hazard Control Standard 407

TVA adopted “Hazard Control Standard 407” for asbestos on April 15, 1974.

98

Paragraph 1.0 of that standard stated that it applied “primarily, but not exclusively,

to operations where asbestos or insulating material containing asbestos is handled,

95

 Doc. no. 68 (Christopher Jeter Affidavit), ¶ 2. 

96

Id. ¶ 3; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 44.

97 Doc. no. 68 (Christopher Jeter Affidavit), ¶ 4; doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts),

¶ 45.

98 Doc. no. 68 (Christopher Jeter Affidavit), ¶ 4; see also Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 528 (TVA

Hazard Control Standard 407); doc. no. 68-1 (same). 

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Case 5:12-cv-01930-CLS Document 218 Filed 09/29/15 Page 27 of 87
mixed, sprayed, applied, removed, cut, or scored.”

99

 Paragraph 4.1.2 noted that the

following materials are examples of substances that may contain asbestos: heat

insulating materials; fireproofing materials; transite;100limpet fibers;

101

calcium

silicate block and pipe insulation; asbestos cement, mortars, wire covers, grouting,

paper, blankets, tape, and plaster; and vehicle brake linings.

102 Paragraph 4.3 of

Hazard Control Standard 407 prescribed the permissible exposure level for airborne

concentrations of asbestos in the following terms: 

4.3.1 The 8-hour time-weighted average airborne concentration of

asbestos fibers to which an employee may be exposed shall not

exceed five fibers, each longer than five micrometers, per cubic

centimeter of air. (On July 1, 1976, the permissible concentration

for asbestos will be reduced from five fibers to two fibers, each

longer than five micrometers, per cubic centimeter of air.)

4.3.2 An employee shall not be exposed for any length of time to

airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers in excess of the ceiling

limit of 10 fibers, each longer than five micrometers, per cubic

centimeter of air without appropriate personal protective

equipment as described in paragraph 4.5 of this standard.

103

 

99

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 528 (TVA Hazard Control Standard 407), at 1 (alteration supplied).

100

“Transite” originated as a trade name for a line of asbestos-cement products, but over time,

it became a generic term for “a hard, fireproof composite material” and “fiber cement boards” that

were frequently used in wall construction. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transite (last visited

Sept. 29, 2015). 

101

“Limpet” is a mixture of cement and asbestos, and it was often used in a spray-form. See

Geoffrey Tweedale, Limpet Asbestos: Spraying Ill-Health World-Wide, World Asbestos Report,

http://worldasbestosreport.org/conferences/gac/gac2000/A5_8_182.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).

It was often used for insulation, sound-proofing, fireproofing, and condensation control. Id. 

102

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 528 (TVA Hazard Control Standard 407), at 2. 

103

Id. at 2-3. 

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Paragraph 4.4 provided instructions on the proper use of asbestos-containing

products: 

4.4.1 Engineering controls, except when technically not feasible, shall

be utilized to ensure that each individual working with or near

materials containing asbestos is not exposed to concentrations of

asbestos dust in excess of the permissible limits. Administrative

controls shall be used only if engineering controls are not

feasible.

4.4.2 When both respiratory protection and control of exposure time are

practicable, control of exposure time shall be used. The

permissible exposure time can be determined by allowing a

precalculated length of exposure to airborne concentrations of

asbestos above the permissible concentration (but in no case,

above the ceiling limit), followed by a comparable period of no

exposure. Accurate records of exposure times and airborne

asbestos concentrations shall be maintained.

4.4.3 Asbestos and materials containing asbestos shall be handled,

mixed, applied, removed, cut, scored, or otherwise used in a wet

state (except where impracticable or where the usefulness of the

product would be diminished) to prevent airborne concentrations

of asbestos fibers in excess of the permissible limits . . . .

104

Paragraph 4.5 of Hazard Control Standard 407 defined the requirements for

personal protective equipment as follows: 

4.5.1.1 The use of respiratory protection for controlling employee

exposure to asbestos shall be limited to the following conditions:

A. Prior to implementation of engineering controls or work

methods designed to maintain airborne asbestos

concentrations within the permissible limits required by

104

Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied). 

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paragraph 4.3 of this standard.

B. Where engineering controls or administrative controls are

technically not feasible.

C. In emergency situations.

D. Prior to determining the airborne concentrations of

asbestos in a work environment.

4.5.2 Employees exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers

greater than the ceiling limit shall be provided with and required

to use personal protective equipment to protect the eyes, head,

hands, feet, and trunk fromasbestos. . . . Protective clothing shall

be utilized for exposures of undetermined concentrations until it

has been proven by tests that the activity will not produce

concentrations above the ceiling limits.

105

Paragraph 4.6.2 contained standards for changing rooms, and stated that

“[e]ach employee exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos in excess of the

ceiling limit shall be provided with two separate lockers or containers so separated

or isolated [as] to prevent contamination of the employee’s street clothes from his

work clothes.”106

Paragraph 4.7 established requirements for “Personal and Environmental

Monitoring,” and provided that:

Initial and continuingmonitoring shall be performed by theTVAHazard

Control Branch which will quantitatively determine airborne asbestos

105

Id. at 3-5 (emphasis supplied). 

106 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 528 (TVA Hazard Control Standard 407), at 5 (alterations and emphasis

supplied). 

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fiber concentration in the breathing zone of exposed employees, and in

areas of a work environment which are representative of airborne

concentrations which may reach the breathing zone of employees. 

Eight-hour time-weighted average and ceiling concentrations shall be

determined. Such evaluations shall be accomplished at least

semiannually and shall represent with reasonable accuracy the levels of

exposure of employees.

107

 

TVA also was required to “maintain records of personal monitoring and

environmental monitoring.”108 

Paragraph 4.9, addressing the subject of “Housekeeping,” provided that “the

use of air jets or dry sweeping to clean up asbestos accumulations is prohibited.”109

Finally, Paragraph 4.10.2 of Hazard Control Standard 407 mandated that

“[e]mployees exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers shall receive an

annual medical examination.”110

 Significantly, TVA was required to retain records

of those medical examinations for twenty years.

111

 

2. TVA nuclear power safety and hazard control manual

TVA’s Nuclear Power Division adopted a safety and hazard control manual on

May 8, 1978.

112 The threshold limit for airborne asbestos concentrations under the

107

Id. at 5 (emphasis supplied). 

108

Id. at 6. 

109

 Id. (emphasis supplied). 

110

 Id. (alteration supplied).

111

Id. 

112

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 529 (Division of Nuclear Power Safety and Hazard Control

Manual); doc. no. 86-4 (same); doc. no. 68-2 (TVA Asbestos Standards – Browns Ferry Nuclear

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standards of that manual was “five fibers per cubic centimeter, greater than five

micrometers in length.”113 Requirement number 4 specified that “[e]mployees

exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestosshall wear an approved respirator and

protective coveralls . . . .”114 Additionally, requirement number 12 mandated that

“[e]ach employee exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos shall be provided

with two separate lockers. One locker shall be used for street clothes and must not

be contaminated with asbestos.”115 Similarly, a 1979 internal plant memorandum

stated that “[l]ocker and shower facilities separate from other plant facilities should

be provided for all insulators and designated cleanup laborers.”116 

3. Browns Ferry Standard Practice 14.45 

“Standard Practice 14.45,” adopted by the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on

October 15, 1980, is a reference point that established site-specific policies and

procedures governing the use of asbestos and asbestos-containing materials.

117 That

standard set the threshold limit value for airborne asbestos concentrations at “five

Plant (1975-1985)). 

113 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 529 (Division of Nuclear Power Safety and Hazard Control Manual),

at 2965. 

114

Id. (alteration supplied). 

115

Id. at 2966 (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

116

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 530 (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

117

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 534 (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Standard Practice 14.45), at 1;

doc. no. 90-2 (same), at ECF 2; doc. no. 68-2 (TVA Asbestos Standards – Browns Ferry Nuclear

Plant (1975-1985)).

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fibers per cubic centimeter, greater than five micrometers in length.”118

In addition,

the same standard provided that “[e]mployees exposed to airborne concentrations of

asbestos shall wear an approved respirator and protective coveralls . . . .”119 Annual

medical examinations were also mandated for “employees exposed to airborne

concentrations of asbestos fibers.”120 Although other requirements in Standard

Practice 14.45 applied to “concentrations of asbestos dust in excess of the permissible

limits,” the respirator and coveralls requirement did not make that distinction.

121

Thus, that requirement applied to any quantity of asbestos exposure.

4. 1984 memorandum – “TVA Policy on Asbestos”

A 1984 memorandum entitled “TVA Policy on Asbestos” established

“additional requirements to better protect employees from exposure to asbestos

fibers.”122 The first requirement lowered the agency target for asbestos to “no more

than 0.5 fibers, longer than 5 micrometers, per cubic centimeter of air (f/cc) as the

permissible 8-hourtime-weighted average (TWA) airborne concentration of allforms

of asbestos. The ceiling level will be lowered from 10 f/cc to 5 f/cc.”123 Employees

118

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 534 (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Standard Practice 14.45), at 1. 

119

Id. (alteration supplied).

120

Id. at 2.

121

Id. at 1.

122

See TVA’s Exhibit 67 (Memorandum by W.F. Willis), at 1; doc. no. 90-3 (same), at 1;

doc. no. 68-2 (TVA Asbestos Standards – Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (1975-1985)), at 1. 

123

 TVA’s Exhibit 67 (Memorandum by W.F. Willis), at 1. 

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who could “reasonably be expected to be exposed above a TWA of .1 fiber/cc” were

to be identified, given initial and annual training, and offered medical

examinations.

124

 

J. TVA’s Response to OSHA Regulations, Policies, and Procedures 

The parties stipulated that no statute, regulation, or policy — including the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and regulations promulgated thereunder

by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration — imposed a mandatory

requirement that TVA prevent all exposure to airborne asbestos fibers during the

years that James Bobo worked at Browns Ferry.

125

 In other words, that Act and the

regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as TVA’s own internal polices and

procedures, allowed employees to be exposed to airborne asbestos fibers at

concentration levels between zero and the permissible exposure levelsin effect on the

date of the occupational exposure.126 Even so, TVA was aware of the regulations

promulgated pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act by the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration.

127 As early as 1974, TVA knew that there was a

124

Id. at 2. 

125

See doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 46 (1st sentence). 

126

Id. (2d sentence) (“In other words, the OSH Act of 1970, OSHA regulations, and TVA

procedures allow for occupational exposures to asbestos at levels between zero and the permissible

exposure levels (PELs) in effect at the time of the occupational exposure.”). 

127

Id. ¶ 48.

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certain amount of airborne asbestosfibersthat could land on an employee’s clothing,

and that should be avoided for reasons of the employee’s health.

128 TVA first

established an asbestos standard in 1974 as part of its Hazard Control Manual.

129

Moreover, as previously discussed in Parts III.I.1. and III.I.2. of this opinion, supra,

TVA’s internal polices required that protective clothing and separate lockers be

provided to employees exposed to any quantity of airborne asbestos fibers. Further,

TVA was aware that, of nine employee deaths that occurred during 1977, two were

attributable to asbestos: a labor foreman died of asbestosis, and an electrician

foreman died of mesothelioma.130 Finally, even though Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

employees began to use insulation materials that were not made of (or did not

contain) asbestos (generally brown or greenish-brown in color) during the 1980s,

131

insulation materials containing asbestos continued to be used and installed until at

least 1991.

132

TVA’s industrial hygiene database lists no record of air sampling to determine

concentrations of airborne asbestos fibers prior to October 1979.133Indeed,

128

Id. ¶ 49.

129

Id. ¶ 50.

130

Id. ¶ 51; see also Part III.C. of this opinion, supra. 

131

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 53.

132

Id. ¶ 52.

133

Id. ¶ 55.

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employees at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant were not monitored for asbestos

exposure until at least the early 1980s.

134 A 1979 internal plant memorandum stated

that “TVA and Federalsafety and health standardsrequire that we provide locker and

shower facilitiesfor insulators and designated cleanup laborersthat are separate from

the plant’s regular facilities.”

135

 

The extent to which employees in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant were

exposed to airborne asbestos fibers was to be determined by a visual inspection

conducted by supervisory personnel, but plant managers were not provided any

meaningful criteria to measure the concentration levels to which employees were

exposed.

136 Further, Browns Ferry supervisors conducted asbestos air monitoring

measurements of only three employees in 1980.

137 Only eight employees were

sampled in 1981, and only five in 1982.

138 For such reasons, an internal review

conducted in 1988 determined that asbestos monitoring “has been very limited and

does not meet the monitoring requirements of the OSHA asbestos standard.”139

Further, TVA did not provide laborers with protective clothing, separate lockers, or

134

Id. ¶ 56.

135

Id. ¶ 57.

136

 Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 62-64, 67, 71. 

137

Id. at 65-66. Air monitoring was performed by measuring the number of asbestos fibers

in the air in the work area of the employee. Id. at 57.

138

Id. at 66.

139

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 536, at 7 (emphasis supplied). 

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separate showers, unless they worked in a C-Zone.140

 

J. Plaintiffs’ Damage Claims

Barbara Bobo was subjected to a “thoracentesis” — a procedure in which a

long needle is used to perforate the chest-wall and draw off morbid accumulations of

excess fluid from the pleural space between the inner wall of the chest cavity and the

lungs

141 — during November of 2011.142 Approximately two liters of fluid were

removed.

143 ANovember 11, 2011 laboratory analysis of the extracted fluid produced

a diagnosis of mesothelioma:144

“a tumor derived from mesothelial tissue . . . .”145 A

pathological evaluation conducted on December 13, 2011 resulted in a diagnosis of

malignant pleural mesothelioma:146a condition that is “often the result of excessive

exposure to asbestos,”147and one that often spreads widely, invading other thoracic

structures. “It is usually fatal within one year.”148 Mrs. Bobo survived nearly twice

that length of time, but the remainder of her term on this earth was filled with pain. 

140

See Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 13, 16; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 530. 

141

See http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics(“Whatis Thoracentesis?”) (last

visited June 10, 2015). 

142

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 58. 

143

Id. ¶ 59. 

144

Id. ¶ 60. 

145 Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1134 (30th ed. 2003).

146

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 61. 

147 Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1134 (30th ed. 2003). 

148

Id. 1135. 

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She was subjected to multiple rounds of chemotherapy from January through April

of 2012,

149

and endured a number of undesirable side effects from the treatments,

including pain when drinking fluids and spitting up raw flesh.

150 The therapy became

so painful that she referred to the chemical administered to her as the “Red Devil.”151

Dr. David Sugarbaker performed a pleurectomy on Mrs. Bobo on June 14, 2012,

during which he removed a rib and the pleural lining of one lung.

152 Mrs. Bobo was

hospitalized for twenty-two days following that procedure, after which she was

discharged to begin a painful rehabilitation regime.153

 

Plaintiffs claim $8,000,000 in damagesfor the physical pain, suffering, mental

anguish, and loss of the enjoyment of life endured by their mother during the twentytwo month period between her diagnosis of mesothelioma and resulting death.

154

They also assert a claimfor the aggregate amount of $537,131.82 in medical expenses

incurred in the unsuccessful attempt to force Mrs. Bobo’s mesothelioma into

remission.

155

 

149

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 62.

150

Id. ¶ 64.

151

Id. ¶ 63.

152

Id. ¶ 65.

153

Id. ¶ 66.

154

Id. ¶ 68; doc. no. 191 (Pretrial Order), at 6.

155 Doc. no. 180 (Stipulations Regarding Plaintiffs’ Final Medical Expenses Damages Claim

for Purposes of Trial); doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶¶ 70-71.

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Barbara Bobo was insured at all relevant times by Medicare and Blue Cross

Blue Shield of Alabama.156 Those insurers paid or satisfied 99.1% of Mrs. Bobo’s

medical expenses (i.e., $532,131.82 of the $537,131.82 aggregate).157 Medicare

asserts a subrogation claimof $82,793.81 for its paymentsto her medical providers.

158

Plaintiffs retained Garretson Resolution Group, Inc., to represent them in

negotiating with Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Contractors regarding the

amount of Medicare’s subrogation claim.

159 Garretson has contested $1,180.06 of

Medicare’s subrogation claim in an effort to reduce the amount plaintiffs will be

required to pay.

160 The amount of the claim recoverable from plaintiffs may be

subject to reduction as provided in 42 C.F.R. § 411.37 (2013).161 

L. Plaintiffs’ Settlements 

Barbara Bobo submitted claims for compensation to seventeen asbestos

bankruptcy trusts following her diagnosis of mesothelioma.162 Plaintiffs’ attorneys

156

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 72.

157 Doc. no. 179 (Stipulations Regarding Plaintiffs’ Final Medical Expenses Damages Claim

for Purposes of Trial); doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 73.

158 Doc. no. 179 (Stipulations Regarding Plaintiffs’ Final Medical Expenses Damages Claim

for Purposes of Trial); doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 74.

159

 Doc. no. 201(Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 75.

160

Id. ¶ 76.

161

Id. ¶ 77.

162

 Doc. no. 81 (Notice of Service of Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Claims); doc. no. 201 (Agreed

and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 78.

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prepared and submitted the claims forms to the asbestos bankruptcy trusts for the

purpose of obtaining monetary compensation for Mrs. Bobo’s asbestos-related

injuries.

163 As of February 9, 2015, plaintiffs had entered into settlements with

asbestos bankruptcy trusts in the aggregate amount of $136,176.37. Accordingly,

TVA is entitled to an offset in that amount.

164

As of February 9, 2015, plaintiffs had seven pending claims with other asbestos

bankruptcy trusts, and potential claims against other bankrupt entities that may, or

may not, establish trusts for the compensation of asbestos victims. TVA is entitled

to an offset in the amount of all payments received by plaintiffs in connection with

any of those pending claims, if any.

165

 

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

“We bring more than a paycheck to our loved ones and family. We

bring asbestosis, silicosis, brown lung, black lung disease. And

radiation hits the children before they’ve even been conceived.”

“More Than a Paycheck,” sung bySweet Honey in the

Rock on the Collector Records album entitled We Just

Come to Work Here, We Don’t Come to Die.

166

This case proceeded to trial on plaintiffs’ claimsthat TVA negligently violated

163

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 79.

164

Id. ¶ 80.

165

Id. ¶ 81.

166

See http://www.folkways.si.edu/sweet-honey-in-the-rock/more-than-a-paycheck/americanfolk/music/track/smithsonian (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 

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numerous regulations and standards promulgated by OSHA, as well as its own

internal policies relating to monitoring and reducing exposure to asbestos and

preventing the transport of asbestos fibers off TVA property. Specifically, plaintiffs

alleged that TVA negligently violated OSHA regulations and its own policies in at

least the following ways: exceeding permissible levels of exposure; failing to follow

mandatory directives governing the monitoring of an employee’s exposure; failing

to administer annual medical examinationsto employees who, like JamesBobo, were

exposed to airborne asbestos fibers as a result of their work duties; and failing to

provide protective equipment, clothing, lockers, and shower facilities for employees

like James Bobo.

167

In order to prevail on any of those claims, plaintiffs were

required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: TVA owed a duty of care

to Barbara Bobo; TVA breached that duty; Barbara Bobo was harmed; and TVA’s

breach of duty was the proximate cause of the harm to Mrs. Bobo and of the damages

claimed by plaintiffs. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Burdeshaw, 661 So. 2d 236, 238 (Ala.

167

See doc. no. 191 (Pretrial Order) ¶ 5(b), at 6; see also doc. no. 174 (Memorandum Opinion

and Order Denying TVA’s Motion for Summary Judgment), at 56 (permitting case to proceed on

plaintiffs’ claims that TVA was negligent in at least the following respects: (1) TVA violated

Occupation Safety and Health Administration regulations concerning permissible levels of asbestos

exposure; (2) TVA failed to follow mandatorydirectives governing the monitoring of an employee’s

exposure to asbestos; (3) TVA failed to provide employees who were exposed to airborne asbestos

fibers protective clothing and equipment, as well as separate locker rooms and shower facilities; and

(4) TVA failed to administer annual medical examinations to employees exposed to airborne

asbestos fibers). 

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1995). See also, e.g., Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002) (“In

[a] premises-liability case, the elements of negligence are the same asthose in any tort

litigation: duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate or legal cause, and

damages.”) (quoting Ex parte Harold L. Martin Distributing Co., 769 So. 2d 313, 314

(Ala. 2000) (in turn quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 969

(Ala. 1985)) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted). 

In addition to disputing plaintiffs’ proof of the elements of a prima facie case,

TVA contends that the statute of limitations has expired, and that it is shielded from

liability by the so-called “discretionary function doctrine.” 

A. Did TVA Owe Barbara Bobo a Duty of Care? 

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that TVA was subject to a legal “duty” in order to

maintain an action based upon a theory of negligence. E.g., Thompson v. Mindis

Metals, 692 So. 2d 805, 807 (Ala. 1997);see also, e.g., Pugh v. Butler Telephone Co.,

512 So. 2d 1317, 1319 (Ala. 1987) (stating that “the existence of a legal duty of care

owed by the defendant to the plaintiff” is fundamental to the maintenance of a

negligence action); Bessemer v. Brantley, 65 So. 2d 160, 165 (Ala. 1953) (observing

that “where there is no duty, there can be no negligence”). 

Negligence is a matter of risk — that is to say, of recognizable

danger of injury. It has been defined as “conduct which involves an

unreasonably great risk of causing damage,” or, more fully, conduct

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“which falls below the standard established by law forthe protection of

others against unreasonably great risk of harm.” . . . 

William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 31, at 145 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis supplied,

footnotes omitted). In the context of the present discussion, the phrase “the standard

established by law for the protection of others against [an] unreasonably great risk of

harm” is synonymous with the concept of “duty.” 

TVA denies that it had a duty to avoid harming non-employees like Barbara

Bobo, saying that “no Alabama appellate court has issued an opinion regarding the

availability of take-home claims under Alabama law,”168and that a majority of the

jurisdictionsthat have considered similar claims have dismissed them “for lack of [a]

legal duty.”169

168 Doc. no. 128 (TVA’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 20 (citations omitted);

see also doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 19 (“TVA incorporates its summary judgment

briefing that TVA owed no legal duty of care to Mrs. Bobo, who was never present at BFN.”) (citing

doc. no. 128, at 20-30). 

169

See doc. no. 128 (TVA’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 20 (alteration

supplied) (citing Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)

(concluding that “a propertyowner has no duty to protect familymembers of workers on its premises

from secondary exposure to asbestos used during the course of the property owner’s business”);

Price v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 170 (Del. 2011) (holding that there was no

legal duty because the plaintiff did not have a “special relationship” with the premises owner); Boley

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ohio 2010) (holding in accordance with an

Ohio statute that “a premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure

originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, unless the exposure occurred at the owner’s

property”); In re CertifiedQuestion from Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas, 740 N.W.2d

206, 222 (Mich. 2007) (“[W]e hold that, under Michigan law, defendant, as owner of the property

. . . did not owe to the deceased, who was never on or near that property, a legal duty to protect her

from exposure to any asbestos fibers carried home on the clothing of a member of her household .

. . .”) (alteration supplied); In re Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation, 815 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817

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“A legal duty to exercise care . . . arises where the parties are bound by

contract, . . . or where the obligations are expressly or impliedly imposed by statute,

municipal ordinance, or by administrative rules or regulations, or by judicial

decisions.” King v. National Spa & Pool Institute, 570 So. 2d 612, 614 (Ala. 1990)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).170 Here, obligationsthat established

legal duties against which the actions of TVA can be measured were imposed by

regulations promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, as

well as by TVA itself. 

Moreover, as plaintiffs point out, the cases relied upon by TVA do not place

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (holding that employer did not owe duty of care to spouse of employee who

contracted mesothelioma as a result of laundering her husband’s asbestos-laden work clothes); CSX

Transportation, Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005) (“[W]e decline to extend on the

basis of foreseeability the employer’s duty beyond the workplace to encompass all who might come

into contact with an employee or an employee’s clothing outside the workplace.”) (alteration

supplied); Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 705 A.2d 58, 66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (holding that

a steel company did not owe a duty of care to an employee’s wife to maintain a safe workplace for

its employees); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-4905(a) (2012) (“No premises owner shall be liable

for any injury to any individual resulting from silica or asbestos exposure unless such individual’s

alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at or near the premises owner’s property.”); Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.941(A)(1) (“A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual

resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the

individual was at the premises owner’s property.”)). 

170

See also I Thomas Atkins Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability, at 92 (1906): 

In every situation where a man undertakes to act or to pursue a particular course he

is under an implied legal obligation or duty to act with reasonable care, to the end

that the person or property of others may not be injured by any force which he sets

in operation or by any agent for which he is responsible. If he fails to exercise the

degree of caution which the law requires in a particular situation, he is held liable for

any damage that results to another just as if he had bound himself by an obligatory

promise to exercise the required degree of care. 

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the same emphasis upon the foreseeability of the risk of harm as do the courts of

Alabama.171In this State, the “key factor” for determining whether a duty should be

imposed as a matter of law in novel factual circumstances is the “foreseeability” of

the harm that might result if care is not exercised. DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Electric

Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d 454, 461 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Patrick v. Union State

Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Ala. 1996) (in turn quoting Smitherman v. McCafferty,

622 So. 2d 322, 324 (Ala. 1993)); see also, e.g., Yanmar America Corp. v. Nichols,

166 So. 3d 70, 83 (Ala. 2014) (observing that “[t]he ultimate test of duty to use [due]

care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if care is not exercised”)

(quoting King, 570 So. 2d at 615 (in turn quoting Bush v. Alabama Power Co., 457

So. 2d 350, 353 (Ala. 1984)) (alterations in original)); see also, e.g., Taylor v. Smith,

892 So. 2d 887, 892 (Ala. 2004) (holding that, when determining whether a duty

exists, “[t]he key factor is whether the injury was foreseeable by the defendant”)

(emphasis in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted, alteration

supplied). 

The foreseeability of the harm to Mrs. Bobo was evident from the very nature

of the relevant OSHA regulations and TVA’s internal standards, all of which

171

See doc. no. 211 (Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief), at 22-23 (citations omitted); see also doc.

no. 145 (Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgement) at 27-30 (citations omitted). See

supra note 169 for a listing of the cases relied upon by TVA. 

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mandated, among other things, that TVA provide two lockers for each employee, so

separated or isolated as to prevent contamination of the employee’s street clothes

from his work clothes, separate changing facilities, and showers for its employees. 

The common thread linking those rules was the goal of preventing asbestos fibers

from clinging to an employee’s street clothes, skin, or hair, and being carried off of

TVA property. Other regulations, such as those setting limits on airborne asbestos

concentrations at the nuclear plant, and those requiring periodic medical

examinations, clearly contemplated that TVA employees would be exposed to and

inhale airborne asbestosfibers while at work. Note well, however, that no reasonable

person can argue that the regulations which sought to prevent the transport of

asbestos fibers off TVA property did not contemplate that employees’ household

members would be exposed to asbestos originating at the plant.

Plaintiffs argue, based upon the Alabama Supreme Court’s repeated

characterization of the foreseeability of an injury as the “key factor” in determining

whether a duty exists under novelfactual circumstances, that this State likelywill join

those jurisdictions holding that the employers of persons exposed to asbestos during

the performance of their work responsibilities owe a duty of reasonable care to nonemployeesin “take-home cases” such asthis one.172

See, e.g., Simpkins v. CSX Corp.,

172

See doc. no. 145 (Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 27-30. 

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929 N.E.2d 1257, 1263-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[W]e believe that it takes little

imagination to presume that when an employee who is exposed to asbestos brings

home his work clothes, members of hisfamily are likely to be exposed as well. Thus,

the general character of the harm to be prevented was reasonably foreseeable.”)

(alteration supplied); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 367

(Tenn. 2008) (holding that the harm to the plaintiff wasforeseeable, because she was

regularly in contact with asbestos-contaminated work clothes for extended periods

of time); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (holding that

a premises owner owed a duty to spouses handling asbestos-contaminated work

clothes based on the foreseeable risk of harm arising from such exposures); Zimko v.

American Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 483 (La. App. 2005) (same). In fact, “[i]n

nearly every case in which a court has used foreseeability as the primary

consideration in duty analysis, the court has recognized a duty of care in take-home

exposure cases.” Meghan E. Flinn, A Continuing War with Asbestos: The Stalemate

Among State Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure, 71 WASH.&LEE

L. REV. 707, 719 (2014).

In the final analysis, the determination of the issue of whether a duty was owed

Because TVA incorporated its brief in support of summary judgment into its post-trial arguments,

this court will also consider plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to summary judgment. 

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by TVA to Mrs. Bobo and others like her under the circumstances of this case is

“strictly a legal question” to be answered by the court. DiBiasi, 988 So. 2d at 460;

see also, e.g., William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953)

(“There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is

what we make it.”).173 In exercising that responsibility, this court does not find the

cases relied upon by TVA to be persuasive predictors of what Alabama appellate

courts will hold. For example, when deciding that no duty was owed to nonemployees in a take-home exposure claim similar to the present action, the Supreme

Court of Erie County, New York (a trial court), stated that “[d]uty in negligence

cases is not defined by foreseeability of injury . . . . Rather, foreseeability determines

merely ‘the scope of the duty once it is determined to exist . . . .’” In re Eighth

Judicial District Asbestos Litigation, 815 N.Y.S.2d 815, 938-39 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 2006)

(internal citations omitted, alteration supplied).174 Further, while the Supreme Court

173 Benjamin N. Cardozo, while serving as a Judge of the New York Court of Appeals (but

later nominated and confirmed as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court), spoke generally of

the scope of the risk of harm that must be guarded against in the classic case of Palsgraf v. Long

Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928), saying that “the orbit of the danger

as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty. . . . The risk

reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to

another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . .” Id. at 343-44, 162 N.E. at 100. 

174

Indeed, New York does not include the foreseeability of harm in its calculus for

determining whether a duty exists in novel factual circumstances, as indicated by the following

quotation from Holdampf v. A.C. & S., Inc., 5 N.Y.3d 486 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2005): 

The threshold question in any negligence action is: does defendant owe a

legally recognized duty of care to plaintiff? Courts traditionally fix the duty point by

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of Georgia declined to extend an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace beyond

its employees based on policy considerations, that court did not place the same

emphasis on foreseeability that an Alabama court would. See CSX Transportation,

Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005) (“[W]e decline to extend on the

basis of foreseeability the employer’s duty beyond the workplace to encompass all

who might come into contact with an employee or an employee’s clothing outside the

workplace.”). Finally, even though the California Court of Appeals assumed that a

property owner could “reasonably be expected to foresee the risk of latent disease to

a worker’s family members secondarily exposed to asbestos used on its premises,” it

concluded that “strong public policy considerations counsel against imposing a duty

of care on property owners for such secondary exposure.” Campbell v. Ford Motor

Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). Notably, however, the

California court did not characterize foreseeability of the risk as the “key factor” in

balancing factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties and society

generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like

liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting

the expansion or limitation of new channels of liability. Thus, in determining

whether a duty exists, courts must be mindful of the precedential, and consequential,

future effects of their rulings, and limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a

controllable degree” . . . .

Further, “[f]oreseeability, alone, does not define duty— it merelydetermines

the scope of the duty once it is determined to exist” . . . .

Id. at 493 (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 232 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001))

(alteration in original). 

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its determination. 

Policy factorsrelied upon by jurisdictionsthat decline to recognize a legal duty

in take-home exposure cases include preventing unfairness to defendants and further

clogging of court dockets. This court finds, however, that other policy factors are of

higher importance in this, and similar, cases: e.g., the mandatory nature of the

alternative conduct; the fact that TVA, a government entity provably aware of OSHA

regulations (as evidenced by TVA internal memoranda reciting OSHA findings and

regulations concerning asbestos exposure and TVA’s promulgation of its own

exposure reduction policies), was in a far better position to protect Mrs. Bobo than

either James Bobo or Mrs. Bobo herself; and the relatively simple, low-cost methods

which, if implemented as directed both by federal law and TVA internal policy, may

have prevented Barbara Bobo’s contraction of mesothelioma. 

In contrast to TVA, plaintiffs rely upon cases that are actually persuasive

because, in the opinions they cite, the courts emphasized the foreseeability of an

injury, while also considering public policy. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 373-75

(observing that “Tennessee’s courts rely heavily on foreseeability when determining

the existence and scope of a duty,” and that “the existence of a duty to exercise

reasonable care to avoid the risk of harm to another involves considerations of

fairness and public policy”); Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1148 (“Foreseeability is significant

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in the assessment of a duty of care to another,” and “[o]nce the ability to foresee harm

to a particular individual has been established . . . considerations of fairness and

policy govern whether the imposition of a duty is warranted.”) (alteration supplied).

Furthermore, as the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized, there is no danger

to the business community in finding that “a sophisticated [employer] that was aware

of, or should have been aware of, the risk to others that could result from exposure

to asbestos fibers, . . . knew its employees’ work clothes contained significant

quantities of asbestos fibers, and [] understood the danger of transmitting these

asbestos fibers to others” outside the workplace, owes a duty to protect members of

its employees’ families in take-home exposure claims. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at

371; see also Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1150 (“Although Exxon Mobil fears limitless

exposure to liability based on a theory of foreseeability built on contact with

Anthony’s asbestos-contaminated clothing, such fears are overstated. The duty we

recognize in these circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of

harm to plaintiff’s wife, who ordinarily would perform typical household choresthat

would include laundering the work clothes worn by her husband.”) (emphasis

supplied); Simpkins, 929 N.E.2d at 1266 (dismissing policy concerns of “limitless

liability to ‘the entire world’” based upon the fact that “the scope of liability will be

inherently limited by the foreseeability of the harm”). Finding that employers have

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a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to their employees’

spouses does not raise a “specter of limitless liability.”175 A bright-line rule, limiting

liability to an employee and the members of his household (nuclear family) is both

appropriate and manageable. The liability of entities like TVA is also restricted by

the discretionary function doctrine and a plaintiff’s burden of proving that an

employer’s conduct was both the factual and proximate cause of his or her injuries.

This court also finds that the policy considerationsthat might weigh against the

recognition of a duty of reasonable care to family members of employees in takehome asbestos exposure cases do not outweigh either the foreseeability of the risk of

harm in a jurisdiction like Alabama that relies heavily on that consideration as “the

key factor” in its duty analysis,176

or policy considerations that weigh in favor of

175

 Meghan E. Flinn, A Continuing War with Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State Courts

on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 724 (2014).

176

In recognition of the fact that there were no clear, controlling, precedents by Alabama’s

appellate courts, and that the significance of this issue extended beyond the present case, this court

concluded following trial that the question should be certified to the State’s highest court. See, e.g.,

Jones v. Dillard’s, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003) (observing that, whenever there is

“substantial doubt about a question of state law upon which a case turns,” the issue “should be

resolved by certifying the question to the state supreme court. Resolution in this way avoids the

unnecessary practice of guessing the outcome under state law and offers the state court an

opportunity to explicate state law”) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d

1494, 1504 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Carnes, J., dissenting) (“Only through certification can

federal courts get definitive answers to unsettled state law questions. Only a state supreme court can

provide what we can be assured are ‘correct’ answers to state law questions, because a state’s highest

court is the one true and final arbiter of state law.”). Accordingly, the following question was

presented to the Alabama Supreme Court pursuant to Article VI, § 6.02(b)(3) of the 1901 Alabama

Constitution, as amended, and Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18: 

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recognizing such a duty. In the present case, TVA: treated mandatory federal

regulations as discretionary guidelines, and nullified its own exposure reduction

standards by failing to implement them; had actual knowledge that asbestos was

carcinogenic, and that its employees were daily coming into contact with that

substance and taking it home to their spouses and children; and did not use that

knowledge to enact low-cost measures to restrict airborne asbestos concentrations to

permissible levels at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant or prevent its employees from

transporting asbestos to their homes after work. Individuals like Mrs. Bobo — who

did not work at the nuclear plant or ever enter TVA’s premises — cannot be made

whole for TVA’s derelictions, if a common law negligence claim is unavailable. 

Finally, even though the Alabama Supreme Court has notspoken to the precise

issue of duty in take-home exposure cases, it has not always limited the finding of a

legal duty to situations in which there was a contractual, or employer-employee,

relationship between an identifiable victim and the defendant. See, e.g., Wyeth v.

WHETHER A PREMISES OWNER HAS A DUTY TO PROTECT THE

FAMILY MEMBERS OF PERSONS WHO WORK ON THE PROPERTY

OWNER’S PREMISES FROM SECONDARY EXPOSURE TO A TOXIC

AGENT, SUCH AS ASBESTOS, USED DURING THE COURSE OF THE

PROPERTY OWNER’S BUSINESS? 

Doc. no. 215 (Memorandum Opinion Submitting Certified Questions), at 53 (emphasis in original). 

Regrettably, the Alabama Supreme Court declined to accept that question. Cf. Price v. Time, Inc.,

416 F.3d 1327, (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that, “[t]o the disappointment of the district court (and

this one as well), the Alabama Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question”) (alteration

supplied). 

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Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 675 (Ala. 2014) (the absence of a contractual relationship

does not mean there is no duty); Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 895 (Ala. 2004)

(differentiating between situations in which the defendant did not create the risk of

harm and, thus, owed no duty to a plaintiff, and other situations in which the

defendant performs “an affirmative actwhich createsthe risk that unidentifiable third

parties might be injured,” and stating that, under the latter circumstance, “there is,

most certainly, a duty to unidentifiable third parties who might be injured as a result”)

(emphasisin original); State Farm Fire &Casualty Co. v. Owen, 729 So. 2d 834, 839

(Ala. 1998) (“Determining whether there is a duty necessarily requires analyzing the

factual background of the case. In that sense, whether a duty exists is a mixed

question of law and fact.”). 

In light of the Alabama Supreme Court’s emphasis on foreseeability, that

Court’srecognition of a duty where a defendant createsthe risk of harm, and the very

serious public policy considerations at issue, this court holds that TVA owed a duty

of reasonable care to Barbara Bobo, and others like her. 

B. Did TVA Breach the Duty of Reasonable Care Owed to Barbara Bobo?

Plaintiffs contend that TVA breached its duty of care to Mrs. Bobo by failing

to prevent her exposure to asbestos fibers that contaminated her husband’s clothes

during his employment at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Plaintiffs argue that Mrs.

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Bobo was exposed to asbestos because TVA: violated OSHA regulations concerning

the permissible levels of asbestos exposure; failed to follow mandatory directives

governing the monitoring of an employee’s exposure to asbestos (including both

OSHA regulations and TVA’s internal policies); failed to provide special, protective

clothes; failed to provide two lockers for each employee, so separated or isolated as

to prevent contamination of the employee’s street clothes from his work clothes;

failed to provide separate change rooms and showersfor workers exposed to asbestos;

failed to provide facilities for laundering asbestos-contaminated clothing inside the

Browns Ferry facility, rather than being worn home and laundered there; and, failed

to administer annual medical examinationsto employees exposed to airborne asbestos

fibers.

177

 

TVA’s initial response was that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence

showing that James Bobo was exposed to asbestos while working inside the Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant.

178

 

Because Mrs. Bobo’s alleged second hand exposures are derivative of

her husband’s occupational exposures, Plaintiffs must first prove that

her husband had occupational exposures to asbestos and that those

exposures were the result of TVA’s negligent conduct and were not, for

example, occupational exposures to asbestos at levels allowed under

OSHA regulations and TVA procedures in effect at that time. (Stip.

Fact 46, Doc. 201 at 10-11.) Plaintiffs also must show that any

177

See doc. no. 211 (Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief), at 25-26. 

178

See doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 3.

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exposures resulting from TVA’s negligent conduct caused the clothes

that Mr. Bobo wore home from work to be burdened with asbestos

fibers. In other words, that the occupational exposures did not occur in

a C-Zone where Mr. Bobo would have been wearing protective over

garments that would have prevented asbestos fibers from burdening his

personal clothing. 

Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 3-4 (boldface emphasis in original). See

also, e.g., Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th

Cir. 1985) (“Regardless of the theory of liability in [asbestos-related tort] cases, the

threshold for every theory is proof that an injured plaintiff was exposed to asbestoscontaining products for which the defendant is responsible.”) (alteration supplied). 

This court finds, however, that a preponderance of the credible evidence clearly

established that James Bobo was exposed to airborne asbestos fibers when he swept

insulation residue containing that inherently dangeroustoxic substance —which was

pervasive throughout the nuclear plant, in areas other than the C-Zones — and that

he was not provided protective work-clothing and equipment, separate lockers for

work and personal clothing, showers, or on-site laundry facilities. Further, the

evidence clearly and convincingly established that Barbara Bobo was exposed to

airborne asbestos fibers over the course of more than twenty-two years, when

laundering her husband’s work clothes. Accordingly, TVA breached its duty of care

to Mrs. Bobo by failing to implement eminently reasonable and minimally expensive

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safety procedures that would have prevented her exposure to asbestos fibers carried

home on her husband’s work clothes. 

C. Causation

As to what is the cause of an event, philosophers and logicians

may differ from jurists. John Stuart Mill, in his work on Logic, says, in

substance, that the cause of an event is the sum of all the antecedents,

and that we have no right to single out one antecedent and call that the

cause. Whether from the standpoint of philosophy or logic Mr. Mill is

right is a question which it does not concern us here to discuss. His

view cannot be adopted as a working rule by courts. On that view no

tortfeasor would be regarded as the cause of any damage. The practical

question for a jurist is whether the tortious conduct of any human being

has had such an operation in subjecting a plaintiff to damage as to make

it just that the tortfeasor should be held liable to compensate the

plaintiff.

“The lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with

philosophersin the logical and metaphysical controversies

that beset the idea of cause.” 

If, for practical legal purposes, we reject the philosophic view of

causation, and instead adopt the juristic view, it follows that the

defendant’s tort [breach of duty], in order to be regarded as the legal

cause of the damage, need not be the sole cause, need not be the only

causative antecedent. . . . 

Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause of Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 104 (1911)

(quoting Sir Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts 36 (6th ed. 1890)) (other citations

omitted, alteration and emphasis supplied). 

More specifically, one commentator has observed that toxic tort cases such as

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the present one 

present major challenges to tort law and the judicial system. Causation

requirements pose one such challenge. Proving the cause of injuriesthat

remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and

occur at background levels even without any apparent cause, is the

“central problem” for toxic tort plaintiffs. . . . 

Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion,

and Statistical Evidence, YALE L.J. 376, 376-77 (1986). 

In approaching the issue of causation, therefore, a distinction must be made

between “general causation,” on the one hand, and “proximate causation,” on the

other. “General causation” refers to the question of whether an allegedly toxic

substance has the potential to cause injury. In that regard, the Eleventh Circuit has

observed that

toxic tort cases usually come in two broad categories: first, those cases

in which the medical community generally recognizesthe toxicity of the

drug or chemical at issue, and second, those cases in which the medical

community does not generally recognize the agent as both toxic and

causing the injury plaintiff alleges. Examples of the first type include

toxins like asbestos, which causes asbestosis and mesothelioma; silica,

which causes silicosis; and cigarette smoke, which causes cancer. . . .

McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005)

(emphasis and ellipsis supplied); see also, e.g., Chapman v. Procter & Gamble

Distributing, LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); doc. no. 201

(Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 82 (“[A]sbestos is generally recognized in the

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medical community as having the potential to cause mesothelioma.”) (alteration

supplied). 

In order to recover on a claim of negligence, however, plaintiffs must also

prove “proximate causation” by demonstrating that TVA’s conduct “naturally and

probably brought about the harm,” and that “the harm would not have happened

without the conduct.” 2 Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions — Civil § 33.00 (3d ed.

2013). Accord Lingefelt v. International Paper Co., 57 So. 3d 118, 122-23 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2010) (“Proximate cause is an act or omission that, in a natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any new independent causes, producesthe injury and without

which the injury would not have occurred.”) (quoting Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d

564, 567 (Ala. 1994)); Vines v. Plantation Motor Lodge, 336 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Ala.

1976) (“Liability will be imposed only when negligence is the proximate cause of

injury; injury must be a natural and probable consequence of the negligent act or

omission which an ordinarily prudent person ought reasonably to foresee would result

in injury.”); City of Mobile v. Havard, 268 So. 2d 805, 810 (Ala. 1972) (“For an act

to constitute actionable negligence, there must be not only some causal connection

between the negligent act complained of and the injury suffered, but also the

connection must be by a natural and unbroken sequence, without intervening,

efficient causes, so that, but for the negligence of the defendant, the injury would not

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have occurred.”). 

Even though the foregoing standards for determining proximate causation are

appropriate in most actions based upon a theory of negligence, the parties do not

agree on the question of whether Alabama would apply traditional “but-for”

causation, or “substantial factor” causation, where multiple exposures to a toxic

agent, such as airborne asbestos fibers, combine to produce the plaintiffs’ injuries.

179

The Alabama Supreme Court has addressed that issue, but did so in the context of

maritime law, in connection with the claims asserted against shipowners by three

former seamen under the Jones Act, 3 U.S.C. § 688,

180

and alleging injury as a result

of exposure to asbestos products while serving on board the defendants’ ships. 

Sheffield v. Owens–Corning Fiberglass Corp., 595 So. 2d 443 (Ala. 1992). The

shipownerssought indemnity and contribution under principles of maritime law, and

filed third-partycomplaints against twenty-seven entitiesthatmanufactured asbestoscontaining products that could have been on board the ships on which the plaintiffs

served. In turn, the plaintiffs amended their complaintsto allege claims under general

179 TVA incorporates its summary judgment briefing regarding the causation standard that

should apply in this case. Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 8 n.9. Plaintiffs, likewise,

incorporate their summary judgment briefing regarding that issue. Doc. no. 213 (Plaintiffs’

Response to TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 7-8.

180 The Jones Act “extend[s] to seamen the rights accorded railwayworkers under the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60.” Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 224 (5th

Cir. 1975), clarified on other grounds, 546 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1977) (alteration supplied). 

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maritime law against the same twenty-seven manufacturers. See id. at 446.

Several of the manufacturers, including Crane and OCF [OwensCorning Fiberglass Corporation], moved for summary judgments on the

ground that there was insufficient evidence linking the plaintiffs’

injuriesto any particular manufacturer’s product. On February 22, 1991,

the trial court granted the motions of Crane and OCF and certified its

summary judgments asfinal, pursuant to Ala.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The issues

presented on appeal from those summary judgments are (1) whether

maritime law controls the claims of the plaintiffs and shipowners against

OCF and Crane, and (2) whether evidence of a causal connection

between products manufactured by Crane and OCF was sufficiently

established in each plaintiff’s case to preclude summary judgment. 

Id. at 446-47 (alteration supplied). The Alabama Supreme Court initially addressed

the law that applied to the issues raised by the shipowners’ indemnity claims against

third-party defendants Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation (“OCF”) and another

manufacturer of asbestos products, John Crane, Inc. (“Crane”), and concluded that

those claims — like the underlying Jones Act claims of the seamen against the

shipowners — were governed by federal maritime law: 

Although the claims of the plaintiffs against the shipowners for

Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness are not at issue in this appeal,

it is undisputed that federal law governs those claims. It follows,

therefore, that federal maritime law also governs the indemnity claims

of the shipowners against OCF and Crane. Vaughn v. Farrell Lines,

Inc., 937 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1991) (where the “underlying tort

claims from which the indemnity claim is derived . . . are maritime tort

claims,” the “‘indemnity claim arising therefrom is similarly a maritime

claim’”); White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243, 247 (4th Cir.

1981); Swogger v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 151 A.D.2d 100, 546 N.Y.S.2d

80 (1989); T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4-15, at 146

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(1987) (“There is admiralty jurisdiction over controversies involving

contribution and indemnification if jurisdiction exists over the

underlying primary cause of action”). 

In our view, the underlying claims in this suit are the plaintiffs’

claims against the shipowners alleging Jones Act negligence and

unseaworthiness; therefore, the above-cited authoritiesfully answer the

question regarding the applicable law. However, because the strenuous

arguments of OCF and Crane focus principally on the product liability

claims involved in this suit, as if those claims formed the “underlying

primary cause of action,” we will, out of deference to OCF and Crane,

inquire whether the product liability claims of the plaintiffs against OCF

and Crane, standing alone, would be subject to admiralty jurisdiction.

Sheffield, 595 So. 2d at 447 (footnotes omitted). 

The maritime law basis of the Sheffield opinion confused the issue of whether

its causation principles also applied in a case like the present one. Indeed, TVA

argues that “[t]here is no indication in that opinion that the Alabama Supreme Court

would deviate from Alabama’s traditional causation standard (requiring conduct

without which the injury would not have occurred) in an asbestos case against a

premises owner governed by Alabama negligence law.”181

Accordingly, in an attempt to ascertain the standard that the Alabama Supreme

Court would apply in cases involving multiple exposures to a toxic agent, this court

certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: 

181 Doc. no. 128 (TVA’s Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 14 n.6 (emphasis

supplied); see also doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 8 n.9 (“TVA incorporates its summary

judgment briefing regarding the causation standard that should apply in this case.”). 

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WHAT CAUSATION STANDARD APPLIES WHEN MULTIPLE

EXPOSURES TO A TOXIC AGENT, SUCH AS ASBESTOS,

COMBINE TO PRODUCE THE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY?

Doc. no. 215 (Memorandum Opinion Submitting Certified Questions), at 53

(emphasis in original). Regrettably, the Alabama Supreme Court declined to accept

the question. Even so, its order included citations that directed this court to

reconsider the Sheffield opinion, and its proper scope: 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declinesto accept the

second certified question. See Sheffield v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass

Corp., 595 So. 2d 443, 450 (Ala. 1992). See also Owens-Corning

Fiberglass Corp. v. Gant, 662 So. 2d 255, 256 (Ala. 1995). 

Doc. no. 217 (Alabama Supreme Court Order Declining Certified Questions) (all

emphasisin original). The Sheffield pincite references Part III of the Court’s opinion,

discussing “PROOF OF CAUSATION” in the following manner: 

At the outset, we point out that although these three plaintiffs

have outstanding Jones Act claims against their employers, the

applicable standard of proof of causation in all these claims against

nonemployer manufacturers is the standard of proof applicable under

general principles of maritime law, not, as the shipowners seem to

imply, under the standard of proof for Jones Act negligence. See Brief

of Appellants, at 31. 

The principles of maritime law are “[d]rawn from state and

federal sources” and represent an “amalgam of traditional

common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created

rules.” East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.

858, 864-65, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2299, 90 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1986). In

formulating the corpus of maritime law, “[a]dmiralty courts have felt

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free to cull what they considered the best principles from the

decisions of various courts and from treatise and textwriters.” Watz

v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 113 (5th Cir. 1970). Courts

sitting in admiralty, therefore, apply “the general law of torts” when

those general principles are consistent with admiralty’s policies and

purposes. Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d

968, 977 (5th Cir. 1978); Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 222,

222 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975), clarified on other grounds, 546 F.2d 675 (5th

Cir. 1977).

The general tort law to which the admiralty courts often look

for the substantive standards of proof of causation is the

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965). See, e.g., Chavez v. Noble

Drilling Corp., 567 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1978); Harrison v. Flota

Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978); Spinks

v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975), clarified on other

grounds, 546 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1977); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,

431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 692 F. Supp.

734 (W.D. Mich. 1987), aff’d, 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990). 

Section 431 provides that “[t]he actor’s negligent conduct is

a legal cause of harm to another if . . . his conduct is a substantial

factor in bringing about the harm.” (Emphasis added.) In order to

prevail, the plaintiff “must make it appear that it is [1] more likely

than not that the conduct of the defendant was [2] a substantial

factor in bringing about the harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §

433B, comment a (emphasis added). 

Sheffield, 595 So. 2d at 450 (italicized emphasis and bracketed alterationsin original,

boldface emphasissupplied, footnotes omitted). The emphasized language from the

Sheffield Court’s discussion of causation hollows TVA’s contention that substantial

factor causation is confined to the context of maritime cases. If the Alabama Supreme

Court desired to indicate that the concept of substantial factor causation applies only

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to maritime cases, then it would not have instructed this court to “See Sheffield v.

Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 595 So. 2d 443, 450 (Ala. 1992),” in response to

this court’s certification of a question governed by Alabama negligence law. 

Moreover, as plaintiffs noted, even though Sheffield was a maritime case, the

Alabama Supreme Court followed the rationale of that decision in the second case

cited in the Court’s response to this court’s certified question, i.e., “Owens-Corning

Fiberglass Corp. v. Gant, 662 So. 2d 255, 256 (Ala. 1995),” which determined the

sufficiency of the evidence needed to create a jury question on proximate cause in an

asbestos case.182See doc. no. 145 (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Summary

Judgment), at 24-25. 

TVA contends that, even if the Alabama Supreme Court adopted substantial

182 Gant was an appeal that arose from the trial of four asbestos personal injury actions that

had been consolidated for trial, and in which the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs. 

Owens Corning Fiberglass Corporation (“OCF”) contended that the trial judge had erred when

denying its motion for a directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause, and argued that plaintiffs

had failed to prove sufficient exposure to OCF’s asbestos-containing product, “Kaylo.” The

Alabama Supreme Court rejected that argument, and cited its opinion in Sheffield approvingly. 

OCF contends that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of

proximate cause, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to prove sufficient exposure to

OCF’s asbestos-containing product, Kaylo. We have carefully and thoroughly

studied the record. We conclude that the trial court properly sent the cases to the

jury. See Sheffield v. Owens–Corning Fiberglass Corp., 595 So. 2d 443, 456 (Ala.

1992); Rule 50, A. R. Civ. P.; K.S. v. Carr, 618 So. 2d 707, 713 (Ala. 1993); Bailey

v. Avera, 560 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Ala. 1990); Woodruff v. Johnson, 560 So. 2d 1040,

1041 (Ala. 1990); Timmerman v. Fitts, 514 So. 2d 907, 910 (Ala. 1987). 

Gant, 662 So. 2d at 256. 

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factor causation as the proper standard, plaintiffsfailed to satisfy that standard under

either “the Bostic ‘doubling of the risk’ standard,”183 or “the Lohrmann ‘frequency,

regularity, and proximity’ test.”184 Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 8-11. 

However, neither the Alabama Supreme Court, nor any of the lower courts in that

State, has ever cited either the Bostic “doubling of the risk” standard, or the

183

See Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. 2014), concluding that

in all asbestos cases involvingmultiple sources of exposure, includingmesothelioma

cases, the standards for proof of causation in fact are the same. In reviewing the legal

sufficiency of the evidence:

• proof of “any exposure” to a defendant’s product will not suffice and

instead the plaintiff must establish the dose of asbestos fibers to which he was

exposed by his exposure to the defendant’s product;

• the dose must be quantified but need not be established with

mathematical precision;

• the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s product was a

substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s disease; 

• the defendant’s product is not a substantial factor in causing the

plaintiff’s disease if, in light of the evidence of the plaintiff’s total exposure

to asbestos or other toxins, reasonable persons would not regard the

defendant’s product as a cause of the disease; [and]

• to establish substantial factor causation in the absence of direct

evidence of causation, the plaintiff must prove with scientifically reliable

expert testimonythat the plaintiff’s exposure to the defendant’s product more

than doubled the plaintiff’s risk of contracting the disease.

Id. at 353 (emphasis and alteration supplied); see also doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 8-9

(same). 

184

See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (“To

support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from circumstantial evidence, there must be

evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in

proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”).

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Lohrmann “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test. 

In summary, based upon the guidance contained in the Alabama Supreme

Court’s pincite references to its holdings in Sheffield and Gant, it appears that the

language of Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, without

embellishment, states the proper causation standard in a negligence case involving

multiple exposuresto asbestos: that is, “the actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause

of harm to another if . . . his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the

harm.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) (emphasis supplied). By

definition, substantial factor causation takes more than one exposure or cause into

account. And, when a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that one

particular exposure, or pattern of exposures, was a “substantial factor in bringing

about the harm,” then that plaintiff satisfies the element of proximate causation. See

Holland v. Armstrong International, Inc., No. 2:11–67221–ER, 2012 WL 7761438,

at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2012) (observing that, even though the Alabama Supreme

Court had not definitively addressed the causation standard to be applied in asbestos

cases, that Court “has held under maritime law that proof that defendant’s

asbestos-containing product caused plaintiff’s injuries is an essential element to any

claim based on asbestos exposure”). 

TVA additionally argues that there is no reason to deviate from Alabama’s

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traditional “but-for” causation standard, and that the Alabama Supreme Court will

adopt the following adaptation of thatstandard in a multiple exposure toxic tort case:

either “(1) that the illness would not have occurred without exposure to the

defendant’s asbestos or (2) that exposure to the defendant’s asbestos was

independently sufficient to cause the illness.” Doc. no. 128 (TVA’s Brief in Support

of Summary Judgment), at 17 (emphasis supplied).185See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.

Boomer, 736 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 2013); Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d

1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying New Mexico but-for causation standard to a

toxic tort case involving radiation exposure). The standard advocated by TVA

appears, however, to be the minority position in asbestos cases. See, e.g., Lindstrom

v. A-C Product Liability Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying

substantial factor test under maritime law); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,

782 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding substantial factor test in a

Maryland asbestos case); Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1088 (La.

2009); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 773-74 (Tex. 2007);

Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219 (Cal. 1997); Thacker v. UNR

Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 455 (Ill. 1992). 

Moreover, the causation standard advocated by TVA does not “recognize the

185

See also doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 8 n. 9 (“TVA incorporates its summary

judgment briefing regarding the causation standard that should apply in this case.”).

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proof difficulties accompanying asbestos claims. The long latency period for

asbestos-related diseases, coupled with the inability to trace precisely which fibers

caused disease and from whose product they emanated, make this process inexact.”

Borg-Warner Corp., 232 S.W.3d at 772. The Illinois Supreme Court addressed some

of those issues in the Thacker case, saying that: 

Courts throughout the country . . . have struggled with how a

plaintiff in an asbestos case can fairly meet the burden of production

with regard to causation. Several factors complicate the analysis . . . . 

First, because asbestos fibers are friable and may float in the air, it is

possible that even those who do not come into direct physical contact

with asbestos products may suffer from asbestos poisoning. Second,

due to the microscopic size of asbestosfibers, asbestos cannot always be

seen drifting in the air or entering a plaintiff’s body. The small size of

these fibers also means that asbestos fibers from different sources are

generally indistinguishable from one another, even when removed from

a plaintiff’s body and examined through a microscope. Third, asbestos

injury takes an extended time period to manifest itself. Evidence

presented to the jury showed that the time between when asbestos fibers

are first inhaled and when scarring in the lungs becomes symptomatic

is commonly between 25 and 30 years. This means that a plaintiff

injured by asbestos fibers often does not know exactly when or where

he was injured and therefore is unable to describe the details of how

such injury occurred. In addition, we note that even when a plaintiff is

able to narrow the circumstances of exposure to a single event or

circumstance, the extended passage of time between exposure and

illness often means that witnesses are no longer readily available or that

the memories of those who are available have become unreliable. 

Thacker, 603 N.E.2d at 455-56 (emphasis and alterations supplied). 

In light of such issues, as well as the Alabama Supreme Court’s apparent

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adoption of Sheffield’s “substantialfactor causation” standard in a case involving jury

verdicts against a major manufacturer of asbestos products and in favor of plaintiffs

who had sustained personal injuries as a result of exposure to that company’s asbestos

products, Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Corp. v. Gant, supra, this court presumes that

the Alabama Supreme Court would apply the substantial factor causation standard in

cases like this one. 

Under thatstandard, plaintiffsmustshow thatTVA’s conduct, more likely than

not, was a substantial factor in causing Mrs. Bobo’s harm. See Sheffield, 595 So. 2d

at 450. TVA argues that plaintiffs cannot meet that standard, because they did not

offer sufficient evidence “that Mr. Bobo experienced occupational exposures to

asbestos at[the Browns FerryNuclear Plant], and no evidence quantifying the amount

of asbestos fibers that potentially burdened his personal clothing” to satisfy the

“frequency, regularity, and proximity” test.

186

Contrary to TVA’s argument, however, a single exposure to asbestosfibers can

be, under Alabama law, a “substantial factor” contributing to the development of

mesothelioma, without having to satisfy either Bostic’s stringent “doubling of the

risk” standard, or Lohrmann’s “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test. Indeed,

186 Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 8-11 (quoting Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,

439 S.W.3d 332, 353 (Tex. 2014), and Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.3d 1156 (4th

Cir. 1986)). 

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the Alabama Supreme Court observed in its Sheffield opinion that evidence showing

that a plaintiff was “close to” a person who worked with asbestosinsulation, “coupled

with expert testimony that ‘each and every exposure to asbestos contributes in a

causally significant and substantial manner to asbestos-related lung impairment,’”

is sufficient to find that “airborne asbestos fibers from [the defendant’s] product

[were] a substantial factor in producing the disease from which [the plaintiff] claims

to suffer.” Sheffield, 595 So. 2d at 456 (emphasis and alterations supplied). In that

regard, the evidence in this case established that one of Mr. Bobo’s primary duties

during the years that he worked in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant was cleaning up

the residue left by insulators and asbestos workers. Further, some of the residue he

swept from the floor contained asbestos, and fibers of that toxic substance clung to

his work clothing. Mr. Bobo came home from work wearing “dusty” clothing, and

Mrs. Bobo laundered that clothing twice each week for more than twenty-two years.

In addition, this court previously found, based upon the testimony of plaintiffs’

expert, Dr. Eugene Mark, that studies in generally-accepted scientific literature link

mesothelioma to asbestos exposure from laundering the clothes of a person who, like

Mr. Bobo, worked with asbestos. One study relied upon by Dr. Mark (Gunnar

Hillerdal’s article entitled “Mesothelioma Cases Associated with Non-Occupational

and Low-Dose Exposures”) reported that asbestos fiber concentrations in domestic

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exposure cases might be as high asin occupational exposure cases.

187 The same study

reported that “[o]rdinary vacuum cleaning is not effective in removing asbestos

fibers, which can remain for years in the house and be airborne again whenever

disturbed. Thus, domestic exposure is not low exposure.”188 Dr. Mark ultimately

concluded, based upon hisreview of depositions, medicalrecords, and othermaterials

in the case, that Mrs. Bobo’s exposure to asbestosfibersthat originated in the Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant, but which were bought into her home on her husband’s work

clothes, was a substantialfactor contributing to cause the disease that claimed her life,

malignant pleural mesothelioma. 

TVA contends, nevertheless, that Dr. Mark’stestimonydid not prove causation

because he did not opine that Mrs. Bobo’s mesothelioma was caused by her exposure

to non-discretionary asbestos: i.e., a concentration of asbestos fibers above the

permissible exposure limits established by mandatory federal regulations: 

At all times during Mr. Bobo’s TVA employment, the mandatory

Federal regulations applicable to TVA allowed for the release (and

resultant employee exposure) of “some” asbestos fibers. (Stip. Fact 46,

Doc. 201 at 10-11); see also Botts v. United States, No. C12-1943JLR,

2013 WL 6729002, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2013) (holding in

mesothelioma case involving the discretionary function doctrine that

“the Navy’s rules were not intended to prevent all asbestos

contamination”). In Botts, plaintiffs’ expert witness did not distinguish

between actionable exposures(e.g., exposuresfor which the government

187

 Trial Transcript, Day 1, at 158.

188

Id. (alteration supplied).

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may not be found liable on discretionary function grounds [sic]), on the

one hand, and on-actionable exposures, on the other. Without this

distinction, plaintiffs’ expert failed to show that plaintiff’s [sic]

mesothelioma was caused by any actionable exposuresfrom mandatory

rule violations. Botts, 2013 WL 6729002, at *9 (granting discretionary

function immunity to the Navy because plaintiff did not present

sufficient causation evidence linking plaintiff’s mesothelioma to

exposures arising frommandatory rule violations; “[o]nly the percentage

of [plaintiff’s] exposure to asbestos at the Shipyard due to rule

violations is relevant to the causation analysis”). In the absence of such

distinction, the extent to which actionable exposures contributed to

plaintiff’s disease “amounts to little more than a guessing game.” Id. at

*10. 

Here, the parties have stipulated that “the OSH Act of 1970,

OSHA regulations, and TVA procedures allow for occupational

exposures to asbestos at levels between zero and the permissible

exposure levels (PELs) in effect at the time of the occupational

exposure.” (Stip. Fact 46, Doc. 201 at 10-11.) As in Botts, Plaintiffs

failed to meet their causation burden because they offered no expert

testimony that distinguished between legally permissible exposures to

asbestos (e.g., exposures below a PEL) and alleged exposures in

violation of a mandatory Federal obligation (e.g., exposuresin excess of

a PEL).189 

TVA’s internal policies, however, prohibited the activitiesthat led to Mr. Bobo

taking asbestos fibers home, on his work clothes, and thereby exposing Mrs. Bobo

to the inherently dangerous toxic substances. In light of those policies, it is

inconsequential that Dr. Mark did not opine that Mrs. Bobo’s exposure to asbestos

was above the permissible exposure limits established by the Occupational Safety and

189

 Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 11-12 (first two alterations supplied, last two

alterations in original).

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Health Administration, because TVA had no discretion to expose Mrs. Bobo to any

asbestos when Mr. Bobo left the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. 

Finally, TVA argues that Dr. Mark’s opinion testimony is not reliable because

he opined that

all exposures to asbestos preceding a mesothelioma diagnosis “that are

reasonable or significant . . . contribute to the cause of the

mesothelioma.” Dr. Mark does not, however, quantify the number of

fibers or level of exposure that he considers to be significant other than

to acknowledge that it must be greater than a single fiber. 

Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 12-13 (quoting Trial Transcript, Day 1, at

77) (ellipsisin original). This court previously rejected TVA’s argument when it was

raised in TVA’s motion to exclude Dr. Mark’sspecific causation opinion.

190

In doing

so, this court held that

Dr. Mark did not opine that every asbestos fiber inhaled causes

mesothelioma, or that the inhalation of a single asbestos fiber was

sufficient to cause mesothelioma. Instead, based upon a review of the

report, the court concludes that Dr. Mark’s opinion, in sum, is that each

“significant” exposure to asbestos constitutes a substantial contributing

factor to the development of diffuse malignant mesothelioma. Dr. Mark

defined “significant” exposures as the type of exposures which have

been proven by science to cause mesothelioma, including those rising

to the level of occupational or para-occupational exposures. In Dr.

Mark’s opinion, each of those “significant” exposures contributesto the

total dose of asbestosfibersthat causes diffuse malignant mesothelioma

in a given patient and, therefore, shortens the period of time necessary

for the disease to develop. Therefore, Dr. Mark concluded that each

significant exposure to asbestosis a substantial contributing factor to the

190

See doc. no. 129 (Motion to Exclude); doc. no. 188 (Order Denying Motion to Exclude).

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development of the disease that actually occurred, when it occurred. 

In addition, both the former Fifth Circuit and the Alabama

Supreme Court have accepted expert testimony that each exposure to

asbestos can contribute to the development of asbestos-related diseases. 

See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083

(5th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he effect of the disease may be cumulative since

each exposure to asbestos dust can result in additional tissue changes.”)

(alteration supplied); Sheffield v. Owens-CorningFiberglass, 595 So. 2d

443, 456 (Ala. 1992) (holding that a jury question existed regarding

causation because of the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that each exposure

to asbestos was causative). 

Further, the court does not find Dr. Mark’s opinionsregarding the

cumulative nature of asbestos diseases and the effect that each

significant exposure of asbestos has on the development of such

diseasesto be inherently unreliable. Indeed, Dr. Mark not only provided

an extensive summary of both James and Barbara Bobo’s exposures to

asbestos as a result of Mr. Bobo’s employment with TVA, but also

ample citations to scientific literature and studies to support each of the

underlying basesto his opinion. In addition, Dr. Mark devoted an entire

section of hisreport to scientific studiesregarding the risks of household

exposuresto asbestosfromlaundering clothing laden with asbestos. Dr.

Mark also relied on numerous epidemiologicalstudiesfinding that even

relatively low cumulative exposures to asbestos can cause

mesothelioma. 

Doc. no. 188 (Order Denying Motion to Exclude), at 20-22 (alteration, emphasis, and

footnote in original). In other words, this court concludes that Dr. Mark did not

substitute the adjective “significant” for the phrase “single fiber.” Instead, he defined

“significant exposures” as those which have been proven by science to cause

mesothelioma, including those rising to the level of occupational or para-occupational

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exposures — such as those exposures shown in this case, through Mrs. Bobo’s

practice of laundering her husband’s dirty work clothing twice each week, for more

than twenty-two years, in a small, confined, four-by-five foot space. 

Based upon the evidence presented, this court concludes that plaintiffs have

established that Barbara Bobo’s exposure to asbestos originating in TVA’s Browns

Ferry Nuclear Plant and carried home on her husband’s work clothing was, more

likely than not, a substantialfactor contributing to the development of the disease that

claimed her life and, consequently, the proximate cause of her injuries. 

D. Statute of Limitations

TVA contendsthat “injuries arising fromasbestos exposure that occurred prior

to May 19, 1980, are time barred if they were not brought within one year of the date

of exposure,” and that “Plaintiffs introduced insufficient evidence at trial showing

that Mr. Bobo worked with or around asbestos containing materials after May 19,

1980.”191 Contrary to those assertions, however, plaintiffs established that James

Bobo was exposed to asbestos into at least the mid-to-late 1980s.

192

 

Alabama Code § 6-2-30(b) provides that, on May 19, 1980 and after, actions

for asbestos exposure “shall be deemed to accrue on the first date the injured party,

through reasonable diligence, should have reason to discover the injury giving rise

191

 Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post Trial Brief), at 19.

192

See supra Part III.C.

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to such civil action.” Personal injury claims must be brought within two years of

accrual. Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (1975). Barbara Bobo first discovered her injury in

November of 2011, when she was diagnosed with mesothelioma.193 This lawsuit was

filed lessthan one year later, on May 21, 2012.

194 Accordingly, plaintiffs are allowed

to recover for all injuries proximately caused by her exposure. See Cazalas v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 435 So. 2d 55, 57-58 (Ala. 1983) (“[W]e rule that the plaintiffs

should not be limited to a recovery for injuries occurring after May 19, 1979, but

should be allowed to recover all injuries proximately caused by exposure to

asbestos”) (alteration supplied, emphasis in original). 

E. Discretionary Function Doctrine

This court previously dealt extensively with the contours of the “discretionary

function” exception to the tort liability of governmental entities when ruling upon

TVA’s first motion for summary judgment.

195 That analysis will not be reiterated

193 Trial Transcript, Day 1, at 190; see also doc. no. 83-1 (Deposition of Barbara Bobo), at

40-41 (stating that a physician pronounced the diagnosis of “pleural mesothelioma” in November

of 2011).

194

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint).

195

See doc. no. 69 (“TVA’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Discretionary Function

Grounds”), and doc. no. 174 (Memorandum Opinion and Order), at 21-56 (subsequently reported

as Bobo v. AGCO Corp., 981 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143-59 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (Smith, J.)). Pursuant to 

the discretionary function doctrine, the United States is not liable for “[a]ny claim . . . based upon

the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on

the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion

involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1948) (alteration and emphasis supplied). See also Mays

v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 699 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1006 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).

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here, except to say in summary that the claimssurviving summary judgment included

plaintiffs’ contentions that TVA exceeded its discretion by violating regulations

promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and TVA’s own,

internal guidelines: (1) setting a mandatory, numeric limit for employees’ exposure

to asbestos fibers; (2) governing the means of monitoring and determining the

concentration of airborne asbestos fibers in the work environment; (3) requiring

protective equipment and clothing, as well as separate lockers and shower facilities

for employees exposed to asbestos fibers; and (4) mandating annual medical

examinationsfor all employees whose work duties exposed themto airborne asbestos

fibers. See doc. no. 174 (Memorandum Opinion and Order), at 36-56 (subsequently

reported as Bobo v. AGCO Corp., 981 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1150-59 (N.D. Ala. 2013)

(Smith, J.)). 

The trial evidence established that TVA exceeded its discretion by violating

OSHA regulations and its own internal policies regarding three separate activities. 

First, prior to October 1, 1980, TVA’s occupational health and safety program was

required to be consistent with OSHA standards, see Executive Order 11612, 36 Fed.

Reg. 13891 (July 28, 1971). On and after October 1, 1980, TVA’s occupational

health and safety program was required to comply with those standards. See

Executive Order 12196, 45 Fed. Reg. 12769 (Feb. 26, 1980). Although the OSHA

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standard for permissible exposure levelsto asbestos was 2 fibers per cubic centimeter

of air in 1980, see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a(b)(2) (1972), recodified as 29 C.F.R. §

1910.1001 (1975), TVA set a standard for permissible levels at 5 fibers per cubic

centimeter.196 

Second, TVA failed to follow mandatory directives governing the monitoring

of each employee’s exposure to asbestos. The 1972 OSHA asbestos standard

provided that “[a]ll determinations of airborne concentrations of asbestosfibersshall

be made by the membrane filter method at 400–450x (magnification) (4 millimeter

objective) with phase contrast illumination,” and that monitoring should occur within

six months of publication of the asbestosstandard, and repeated every six monthsfor

exposed employees. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.93a(e), (f) (1972), recodified as 29 C.F.R. §

1910.1001 (1975) (alteration supplied). Further, the 1987 TVA guidelines provided

that employees with “any exposure” to asbestos must be monitored to determine their

exposure levels.

197 Despite those requirements, no one within the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant conducted an analysis of the airborne concentrations of asbestosfibers

prior to October of 1979. Instead, the concentration of airborne asbestos fibers to

which TVA employees were exposed was determined by a visual inspection

conducted by supervisory personnel, who were not provided objectively meaningful

196

See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 534.

197

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 542, at 6-7.

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criteria to consider in “estimating” the extent of exposure. Further, TVA only

conducted asbestos air monitoring of three employees at Browns Ferry in 1980, eight

employees in 1981, and five employees in 1982. A 1988 internal review determined

that asbestos monitoring within the nuclear facility “ha[d] been very limited and [did]

not meet the monitoring requirements of the OSHA asbestos standard.”198 

Finally, TVA failed to provide either protective equipment and clothing, or

separate lockers and shower facilities for employees exposed to asbestos fibers as

required by OSHA regulations and TVA’s own internal policies. For employees

whose exposures exceeded the limits prescribed by OSHA regulations, TVA was

required to provide special work clothing such as coveralls, changing rooms, and two

lockers for each exposed employee, and launder asbestos-contaminated clothing

within the Browns Ferry facility, in order to prevent asbestos fibers exceeding the

prescribed exposure limits from being carried off TVA property on the clothing of

employees. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.93a(d) (1972), recodified as 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001

(1975). Further, the 1974 TVA asbestos policy stated that “[e]mployees engaged in

. . . the removal or demolition of asbestos insulation or coverings . . . shall be

provided respiratory protection and special clothing.”199 That same policy also

required employees exposed to asbestos in concentrations greater than ten fibers per

198

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 536, at 7 (alterations supplied). 

199

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 528, at 988 (alteration supplied).

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cubic centimeter to be provided with special clothing, changing rooms, two lockers,

and separate shower facilities, and employees exposed to undetermined

concentrations of asbestos were required to be provided with protective clothing until

tests established that their work activities did not expose them to concentrations

above ten fibers per cubic centimeter.200 TVA’s 1979 Division of Power Safety and

Hazard Control Manual provided that “[e]ach employee exposed to airborne

concentrations of asbestos shall be provided with two separate lockers. One locker

shall be used for street clothes and must not be contaminated with asbestos.”201 That

policy did not set a permissible exposure limit for application in the Browns Ferry

Nuclear Plant.

202 A 1979 internal plantmemorandumstated that “[l]ocker and shower

facilities separate from other plant facilities should be provided for all insulators and

designated cleanup laborers.”203 Despite those federal requirements and internal

regulations, TVA did not provide laborers with protective clothing,separate changing

rooms, lockers, or showers, unless they were working in a C-Zone.204 As previously

shown, however, asbestos was present above the threshold limitsin places other than

200

Id. at 988-90.

201

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 529, at 2966 (alteration supplied).

202

 Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 73-74.

203

 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 530 (alteration supplied).

204

See Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 13, 16; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 530. 

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C-Zones.

205

 

TVA contends that it is not sufficient for plaintiffs “to merely show conduct

in violation of a rule; they must also show that Mrs. Bobo’s exposures resulting from

that non-discretionary conduct caused her illness.”206 The court has already

determined, however,that plaintiffs demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence

that: (1) James Bobo worked within areas of the plant where he was exposed to

asbestos in excess of the permissible exposure limits; (2) notwithstanding this, TVA

failed to provide him the required protective clothing, changing rooms, separate

lockers, separate shower facilities, or in-plant laundry services; (3) as a result, he

carried asbestos fibers home on his work clothes; and (4) Mrs. Bobo was exposed to

those same fibers when laundering those clothes.

207

In summary, a governmental agency retains discretion to adopt rules and

guidelines as its sees fit, but once it decides to promulgate mandatory regulatory

guidelines, itsfailure to complywith those rules exposesthe agency to liability. Once

promulgated, an agency should be required to follow its own, mandatory procedures

and guidelines. For all of the foregoing reasons, TVA is not shielded from liability

by the discretionary function doctrine. 

205

See supra Part III.C.

206

 Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 17.

207

See supra Parts III.C., III.E. 

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F. Damages

Plaintiffs seek the following damages for the injuries sustained by Barbara

Bobo as a result of TVA’s negligence: $547,008.93 in medical billsfor the diagnosis

and treatment of her disease, and $8,000,000 for physical pain, suffering, mental

anguish, and loss of the enjoyment of life.208 TVA is entitled to an offset in the

amount of $136,176.37, representing the aggregate amount received by plaintiffs or

their decedent from settlements with various asbestos bankruptcy trusts.

209

Additionally, as of February 9, 2015, plaintiffs had seven pending claims with other

asbestos bankruptcy trusts, and potential claims against other bankrupt entities that

may or may not establish trustsfor the compensation of asbestos victims. In the event

plaintiffs enter into additional settlements with such trusts, or judgment should be

entered in favor of plaintiffs against such entities, TVA may be entitled to additional

offsets in the aggregate amount of such settlements or judgments.

210

 

Although Barbara Bobo died prior to trial, plaintiffs are entitled to recover

damages under the Alabama survivalstatute for the personal injuriesthat their mother

suffered before her death. See Ala. Code § 6-5-462 (1975).211

In Alabama, “all

208

See doc. no. 191 (Pretrial Order), at 6.

209

 Doc. no. 201 (Agreed and Stipulated Facts), ¶ 80. 

210

Id. ¶ 81. 

211

See supra note 12. 

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injurious residuals proximately resulting from permanent injury negligently inflicted

by one party upon another, properly plead and proved, are due to be considered by the

[court] in arriving at its verdict.” Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So. 2d 992, 998 (Ala.

1976) (alteration supplied). Those “injurious residuals” include mental anguish,

physical pain and suffering,impaired health, diminished earning or working capacity,

mutilation or disfigurement, and medical expenses. Id. (citing Alabama Great

Southern Railroad Co. v. Flinn, 74 So. 246 (Ala. 1917)). 

Mrs. Bobo’s medical expenses for medical care, services, and treatment of her

mesothelioma totaled $537,131.82. Mrs. Bobo’s health insurerssatisfied virtually all

of those expenses(i.e., $532,131.82), but Medicare asserts a subrogation claim in the

amount of $82,793.81 for its payments to Mrs. Bobo’s healthcare providers. TVA

contends that, “[b]ecause Plaintiffs have no obligation to pay amounts that were

written off, any judgment awarding damages for medical expenses that may be

entered in their favor should be limited to the amount of the Medicare subrogation

claim of $82,793.81, plus [Mrs. Bobo’s] out-of-pocket expenses of $5,000.00.”212

This court disagrees: “damages recoverable by plaintiff[s]should not be diminished

by the fact that [they have] been wholly or partially indemnified for [their] loss by

hospital insurance to which defendant did not contribute.” Roland v. Krazy Glue,

212

 Doc. no. 209 (TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 20 (alterations supplied). 

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Inc., 342 So. 2d 383, 386 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (alterations supplied). Accordingly,

the court will award plaintiffs the full amount of Mrs. Bobo’s medical expenses:

$537,131.82. 

Plaintiffs contend that they also are entitled to recover damagesto compensate

for Mrs. Bobo’s permanent injury and disfigurement.

213 The Pretrial Order, however, 

does not include a damages claim for permanent injury and disfigurement.

214 Under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a final pretrial order . . . supersede[s] all prior

pleadings and ‘control[s] the subsequent course of the action.’” Rockwell

International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 (2007) (quoting former

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e)) (alterations supplied).215 As plaintiffs

concede, theories of damages not included in the Pretrial Order are waived, even if

they appeared in the complaint.

216 Accordingly, the court will not award plaintiffs

any amount as damages for Mrs. Bobo’s permanent injury and disfigurement. 

Finally, plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for Mrs. Bobo’s mental

anguish, physical pain and suffering, and loss of the enjoyment of life. The Supreme

213

 Doc. no. 211 (Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), at 28-29.

214

 Doc. no. 191 (Pretrial Order), at 6.

215 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) was amended in 2007, after the Rockwell opinion,

“as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make

style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes [were] intended to be stylistic

only.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 2007 Advisory Committee Notes (alteration supplied). 

216

See doc. no. 213 (Plaintiffs’ Response to TVA’s Post-Trial Brief), at 13.

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Court of Alabama has long held that

“[t]here is no fixed standard for ascertainment of compensatory damages

recoverable . . . for physical pain and mental suffering” and that “the

amount of such [an] award is left to the sound discretion of the jury,

subject only to correction by the court for clear abuse or passionate

exercise of that discretion.” 

Black v. Comer, 38 So. 3d 16, 27 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Daniels v. East Alabama

Paving, Inc., 740 So. 2d 1033, 1044 (Ala. 1999)) (alterations and omissions in

original). Because this case was tried without a jury, the court assumes the role of

finder of fact. See, e.g., Prickett v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1192 (M.D.

Ala. 2000), aff’d without opinion, 268 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, the

ascertainment of damagesfor pain and suffering isleft to the court’ssound discretion.

Here, Mrs. Bobo was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma in

November of 2011, and was subjected to numerous rounds of chemotherapy from

January through April of 2012. She referred to the initial rounds of that treatment as

the “Red Devil,” because she experienced many adverse side effects, including

reduced appetite, pain when drinking fluids, and spitting up raw flesh. In June of

2012, Dr. David Sugarbaker removed one of Mrs. Bobo’s ribs and the pleural lining

of one of her lungs. She was hospitalized for 22 days following that procedure, and

then was discharged to begin rehabilitation. Mrs. Bobo died on September 7, 2013. 

The court finds that $3,000,000 is an appropriate award for the physical pain and

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suffering Mrs. Bobo endured during her mesothelioma treatment, and will award

plaintiffs that amount in compensatory damages.

217

 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the court finds in favor of plaintiffs. A

Judgment consistent with this memorandum of opinion will be entered

contemporaneously herewith. 

DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 2015. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

217 The court notes that this award is consistent with other damage awards for pain and

suffering in similar mesothelioma cases. See, e.g., Crane v. Hardick, 722 S.E.2d 610, 622 (Va.

2012) (affirming award of $2,000,000 in damages for pain and suffering in a mesothelioma case

where the plaintiff was diagnosed with the disease in February of 2007, and died in March of 2009).

See also Goede v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 143 S.W.3d 14, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming award of

$2,000,000 in damages for pain and suffering in a mesothelioma case where the plaintiff’s

mesothelioma manifested in May of 2001, and she died in March of 2002).

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