Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00267/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00267-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

BLACK WARRIOR RIVERKEEPER, 

INC., 

)

) 

) 

 Plaintiff, )

) 

 v. ) 

) 

CASE NO. 2:11-CV-267-WKW 

(WO) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION, et al., 

)

) 

) 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________ 

BLACK WARRIOR RIVERKEEPER, 

INC., 

)

) 

) 

 Plaintiff, )

) 

 v. ) 

) 

CASE NO. 2:13-CV-794-WKW 

(WO) 

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS, et al., 

)

) 

) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Mere administrative difficulty does not interpose such 

flexibility into the requirements of NEPA as to undercut the 

duty of compliance “to the fullest extent possible.” But if this 

requirement is not rubber, neither is it iron. The statute must 

be construed in the light of reason if it is not to demand what 

is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible, given the 

obvious, that the resources of energy and research – and time 

– available to meet the Nation’s needs are not infinite. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 4332; footnote omitted). 

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In these consolidated cases, Plaintiff Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief to require Defendants to perform a comprehensive 

supplemental environmental impact statement (“SEIS”) for the Northern Beltline Project, 

a proposed six-lane controlled-access highway north of Birmingham, Alabama. Before 

the court are Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docs. # 

163, 165, 167.) The parties have fully briefed the motions and have submitted evidence 

in support of their opposing positions. After careful consideration of the arguments of 

counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants’ 

motions are due to be granted and Plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied. 

I. DEFINITIONS 

 This case involves numerous federal agencies, statutes, and regulations pertinent 

to environmental issues. The multiplicity of acronyms and terms of art can be confusing. 

For clarity, the relevant ones are defined as follows: 

 AOI: Area of influence. The geographic area within which the project’s indirect 

and cumulative environmental effects are expected to occur. (USACOE000629; 

USACOE000677.) 

 ALDOT: Alabama Department of Transportation. 

 APA: Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06. 

 AR: Documents from the administrative record submitted by FHWA are 

designated with this prefix. 

 CEQ: Council on Environmental Quality. NEPA established CEQ as a research 

and advisory body in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. 

42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-44. CEQ issues general regulations for implementing NEPA; 

each federal agency then issues its own implementing regulations not inconsistent 

with CEQ regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a); 40 C.F.R. § 

1500.2; 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3; 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6; Robertson v. Methow Valley 

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Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354 (1989). 

 COE: Army Corps of Engineers. 

 CWA: Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. 

 Cumulative impact: a major federal action’s “impact on the environment which 

results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, 

present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency 

(Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 

1508.7. Sometimes also referred to as “cumulative effect.”1

 Direct impact: an effect of a major federal action that is “caused by the action and 

occur[s] at the same time and place.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a). Also referred to as a 

“direct effect.” Id. 

 Eastern section: the section of the Northern Beltline that joins I-65 with the 

eastern terminus of the Beltline at I-59 in Trussville. 

 EA: Environmental assessment, which is a concise public document that “(1) 

[b]riefly provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to 

prepare an environmental impact statement [(‘EIS’)] or a finding of no significant 

impact [(‘FONSI’),] (2) [a]ids an agency’s compliance with the Act when no [EIS] 

is necessary[, and] (3) [f]acilitate[s] preparation of a statement when one is 

necessary.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a). 

 EIS: Environmental impact statement, which is the detailed written statement 

required by section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, discussing the 

environmental impacts of, and proposed alternatives to, a major federal action. 42 

U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11. An EIS can be a draft environmental 

impact statement, a final environmental impact statement (“FEIS”), or a 

supplemental environmental impact statement (“SEIS). 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9. 

 The EIS Action: The action Plaintiff filed in April 2011 against the Highway 

Defendants. In the EIS action, Plaintiff challenges the approval of the 2012 Reevaluation. 

 FEIS: Final environmental impact statement. Drafting environmental impact 

statements involves a number of steps, including circulation of drafts, making 

                                                            

1

 As used in the CEQ regulations, “effects” and “impacts” are synonymous. 40 C.F.R. § 

1508.8. 

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revisions, responding to public comments, and so forth. The final product of this 

process is the FEIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (b). The fact that the FEIS is a called a 

“final” environmental impact statement does not mean that additional 

environmental impact statements will not be required in the event that new 

information comes to light or changes occur that are relevant to the environmental 

impacts of the project. See “SEIS,” infra. 

 FHWA: Federal Highway Administration. 

 FONSI: Finding of no significant impact, which is “a document by a Federal 

agency briefly presenting the reasons why an action . . . will not have a significant 

effect on the human environment and for which an [EIS] therefore will not be 

prepared. It shall include the [EA] or a summary of it and shall note any other 

environmental documents related to it.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 

 Highway Defendants: Collectively, FHWA, Mark Bartlett in his official capacity 

as Division Administrator of FHWA, ALDOT, and John Cooper in his official 

capacity as director of ALDOT. The Highway Defendants are the defendants in 

the lead case, Case No. 2:11-CV-267-WKW-WC, in which Plaintiff challenges the 

sufficiency of a re-evaluation of the SEIS for the Northern Beltline. 

 Indirect impact: an effect of a major federal action that is “caused by the action 

and [is] later in time or farther removed in distance, but [is] still reasonably 

foreseeable. Indirect [impacts] may include growth inducing effects and other 

effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population density or 

growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other natural systems, 

including ecosystems.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). Sometimes also referred to as an 

“indirect effect.” Id. 

 NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47. NEPA 

requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS before undertaking major federal 

action that will significantly affect the quality of the human environment. 42 

U.S.C. § 4332. 

 ROD: Record of Decision. When an agency is required to prepare an EIS, the 

agency is not allowed to make a decision on a proposed action until certain time 

periods have expired after the publication of the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10. At the 

time the agency makes the decision, it prepares a concise public ROD, which 

states what the decision is, identifies all alternatives considered, and discusses the 

means adopted to avoid or minimize the environmental harm from the decision. 

40 C.F.R. § 1505.2. 

 2012 Re-evaluation: Refers to a Re-evaluation that was completed in 2012 to 

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review the continuing validity of the FEIS and ROD for the Northern Beltline 

Project. FHWA regulations require a written evaluation of a FEIS “before further 

approvals may be granted” when, as in this case, major steps to advance the 

project have not occurred within three years after completion of the FEIS. 23 

C.F.R. § 771.129(b). The purpose of the re-evaluation is to determine whether a 

SEIS is needed for the project. See S. Trenton Residents Against 29 v. Fed. 

Highway Admin., 176 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1999). 

 § 404 permit: a permit issued by COE pursuant to § 404 of the CWA. In the 

absence of § 404 permit, the discharge of pollutants, including dredged or fill 

material, into the waters of the United States is prohibited. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); 

33 U.S.C. § 1344. 

 The § 404 permit action: The action Plaintiff filed in 2013 against COE, COE’s 

district commander, ALDOT, and ALDOT’s director. In the § 404 permit action, 

Plaintiff challenges a § 404 permit issued for a 1.86-mile section of the beltline 

joining SR 75 and SR 79. The 1.86-mile section is located wholly within the 

eastern section of the Beltline. 

 SEIS: Supplemental environmental impact statement. A SEIS is a supplement to 

a FEIS. Supplementation is required when “the agency makes substantial changes 

in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns[,] or” when 

“there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental 

concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 

1502.9(c)(1); 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a). See also 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a) (requiring 

supplementation “whenever [FHWA] determines that: (1) [c]hanges to the 

proposed action would result in significant environmental impacts that were not 

evaluated in the EIS; or (2) [n]ew information or circumstances relevant to 

environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts would 

result in significant environmental impacts not evaluated in the EIS.”). The duty 

to consider the necessity of a supplement is a continuing duty so long as major 

federal action remains to occur. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b); Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. 

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). 

 SR: State route. 

 Tiering: “Tiering refers to the coverage of general matters in broader 

environmental impact statements (such as national program or policy statements) 

with subsequent narrower statements or environmental analyses (such as regional 

or basinwide program statements or ultimately site-specific statements) 

incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating solely on the 

issues specific to the statement subsequently prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 

“Agencies are encouraged to tier their environmental impact statements to 

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eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues 

ripe for decision at each level of environmental review.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20. 

 USACOE: Documents from the administrative record submitted by COE are 

designated with this prefix. 

 Western section: refers to the section of the Northern Beltline that joins I-65 with 

the western terminus of the Beltline at I-459/59/20 in Bessemer. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. The EIS Action 

The Northern Beltline Project is a 52-mile2

 stretch of proposed interstate highway 

bypassing Birmingham, Alabama. The Beltline will have its western terminus at 

Interstate 459/20/59 in Bessemer and its eastern terminus at Interstate 59 in Trussville. 

The estimated cost is $5.4 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars, with an estimated 

completion date of 2048. (AR 16782.)3

 Defendants are just beginning a 1.86-mile 

section of the highway between State Route (“SR”) 75 and SR 79 near Palmerdale, 

Alabama, which will be the first construction phase of the Beltline. 

Pursuant to NEPA, FHWA and ALDOT completed a Final Environmental Impact 

Statement for the Northern Beltline in 1997 and issued a ROD in 1999. (AR 01199; AR 

2005.) 

In 2006, FWHA approved a re-evaluation of a 3.4-mile portion of the project prior 

                                                             2

 In the administrative record, the Northern Beltline is alternately described as being 50.1 

miles long and 52 miles long. The discrepancy is due to whether ramps are included in the 

measurement. (USACOE004804.) 

3

 FHWA and COE both submitted voluminous administrative records. Citations to the 

administrative record supplied by FHWA are designated with an “AR” before the page number. 

Citations to the administrative record supplied by COE are designated with “USACOE” before 

the page number. 

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to ALDOT taking steps to obtain right-of-way for that portion of the highway. (AR 

05538.) In the 2006 Re-Evaluation, FHWA stated: 

As indicated in the project description, this reevaluation 

covers only that portion of the beltline project from west of 

S.R. 79 to east of S.R. 75 near Palmerdale . . . , a distance of 

approximately 3.4[ ]miles. Design studies have been 

advanced on this section of the project to the point of FHWA 

authorization of design contracts and right-of-way 

acquisition. The balance of the Northern Beltline project will 

be reevaluated as design work progresses. Although an 

assessment of the indirect and cumulative impacts (ICI) is 

being performed for the entire project, including this section, 

no project authorizations outside of the S.R. 79/S.R. 75 

section will be approved by ALDOT or the FHWA until the 

ICI is completed. 

(AR 05540.) 

 In April 2011, Plaintiff Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., filed suit against the 

Highway Defendants. Plaintiff contended that the Highway Defendants failed to comply 

with NEPA’s requirement to take a “hard look” at the Northern Beltline’s environmental 

effects. 

 In 2012, the U.S. Department of Transportation, FHWA, and ALDOT completed 

the 2012 Re-evaluation of the entire Northern Beltline Project “to assess any new 

information or changes that have occurred in the design or scope of the project and/or the 

affected environment and evaluate their effect on the validity of the [FEIS].” 

(USACOE000511-512.) On March 29, 2012, FHWA approved the 2012 Re-evaluation 

subject to certain limitations, including the following: 

Changes and adjustments occurring in the western section of 

the project between I-459/59/20 and I-65 include a number of 

alignment shifts that were not covered by the 1997 FEIS. The 

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Reevaluation included information on the initial reviews of 

the alignment shifts and found no new significant impacts 

were readily identifiable. In accordance with Section 

771.130(c) of Title 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

FHWA has determined that additional environmental studies 

are needed to fully evaluate the potential impacts associated 

with the modified alignment. Based on the findings of the 

additional environmental studies, FHWA will determine if a 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is needed.

Therefore, the Alabama Department of Transportation 

(ALDOT) may not proceed at this time with any activities in 

the western portions of the project until the additional 

environmental studies are completed. 

Changes in the eastern area of the project between I-65 and 

I-59 will not result in any new significant environmental 

impacts. 

Based on the above determinations, ALDOT may proceed 

with [Northern Beltline] project activities on the eastern 

section of the project, between I-65 and I-59. 

 (USACOE000511-513 (emphasis added).) 

After the issuance of the 2012 Re-evaluation, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint 

(Doc. # 82) against the Highway Defendants seeking declaratory relief and an injunction 

against construction of any portion of the Northern Beltline Project until Defendants 

perform a comprehensive SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline project. 

B. The § 404 Permit Action 

On August 8, 2011, ALDOT sent COE a preconstruction notification letter 

seeking concurrence with ALDOT’s determination that a pre-existing nationwide permit4

                                                             4

 “Nationwide permits (NWPs) are a type of general permit issued by the Chief of 

Engineers and are designed to regulate with little, if any, delay or paperwork certain activities 

having minimal impacts. . . . An activity is authorized under an NWP only if that activity and 

the permittee satisfy all of the NWP’s terms and conditions. Activities that do not qualify for 

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covered the first construction project of the eastern section of the Northern Beltline, a 

3.4-mile section from west of SR 79 to east of SR 75. (USACOE000001-3). 

Construction would impact wetlands and streams through discharges “associated with 

filling activities for roadway construction (including stream relocation and 

channelization), culvert installation and extension, fill associated with detention ponds, 

culvert for a temporary access road to access an archaeological site, and rip rap 

installation.” (USACOE004805.) COE determined that, because the nationwide permit 

did not allow for stream relocation or channelization, the project would have to be 

reviewed under the individual permitting process. (USACOE004807.) 

Prior to October 12, 2011, ALDOT submitted information to review the project 

under the individual permitting process. (USACOE004807.) However, in November 

2011, ALDOT requested that the project be withdrawn from further processing to allow 

time for additional wildlife studies and the completion of the 2012 Re-evaluation. 

(USACOE004808.) On May 31, 2012, after FHWA approved the 2012 Re-evaluation, 

ALDOT requested that COE reopen the § 404 permit application file for the 3.4-mile 

project. (USACOE004808.) Because there had been no changes to the project during the 

time the file was closed, COE proceeded to evaluate the original project as it had been 

submitted in 2011. (USACOE004808.) 

On June 13, 2013, COE, ALDOT, and FHWA representatives met to discuss 

minimization of the project’s impacts, particularly impacts related to the portions of the 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

authorization under an NWP still may be authorized by an individual or regional general permit.” 

33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)-(c). 

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project east of SR 75 and west of SR 79. (USACOE004808.) After this discussion, 

ALDOT agreed to remove those portions of the project so the project would have logical 

termini at SR 75 and SR 79. (USACOE004808-09.) As revised, the proposed project 

was a six-lane, 1.86-mile limited-access divided highway connecting SR 75 and SR 79 in 

Palmerdale, Alabama. (USACOE004804; USACOE004806; USACOE004852-53.) 

COE recognized that the 1.86-mile project was intended to eventually be incorporated 

into the 52-mile Beltline. (USACOE004804.) 

During the permitting process, COE noted for the record that “[o]ther segments of 

the [Northern Beltline] project may not happen for 10-20 years down the road. Or they 

may not happen at all. It all depends on funding. The Corps cannot issue a 20-year 

permit, which is one of the reasons just a portion of the project is being considered at this 

time.” (USACOE000171.) COE, as a cooperating agency, focused its efforts during the 

§ 404 permitting process on site-specific considerations for the 1.86-mile project, while 

relying on the extensive analysis of impacts contained in the 1997 Final Environmental 

Impact Statement (“FEIS”) and the 2012 FEIS Re-evaluation prepared by FHWA. 

On September 30, 2013, COE approved a discharge permit for the 1.86-mile 

connector, thus allowing construction to begin on the first section of the Northern 

Beltline. (USACOE004955.) On October 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed suit against COE, 

COE’s Mobile District Commander, Jon J. Chytka, ALDOT, and ALDOT Director John 

R. Cooper. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief rescinding the § 404 permit 

and requiring that a SEIS be prepared to reevaluate the environmental impacts of, and 

alternatives to, the entire 50.1-mile Northern Beltline project. 

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Plaintiff’s § 404 permit action has been consolidated with Plaintiff’s SEIS action. 

Both are APA cases that involve judicial review of administrative actions related to the 

Northern Beltline, and both cases involve Plaintiff’s contention that a comprehensive 

SEIS is required for the entire Northern Beltline. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. Standard of Review Applicable to Summary Judgment Cross-Motions 

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the inferences from 

that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jean–Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 

627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility 

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record 

illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant 

who does not have a trial burden of production can assert, without citing the record, that 

the nonmoving party “cannot produce admissible evidence to support” a material fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note 

(“Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record 

materials. . . . [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a 

showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence 

to carry its burden as to the fact.”). If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to 

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the nonmoving party to establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine 

dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a 

reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental 

Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). 

 Cross-motions for summary judgment “must be considered separately,” and “each 

movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and 

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser 

Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Bricklayers, Masons & 

Plasterers Int’l Union of Am., Local Union No. 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 

1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1975)5

 (“Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in 

themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.”). In 

some cases, “[c]ross motions for summary judgment may be probative of the 

nonexistence of a factual dispute.” Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir. 

1983). However, the existence of cross motions for summary judgment “‘do[es] not 

automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of 

material fact exist.’” Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 

775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 

Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir. 1983)). This is so 

                                                             5

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) the Eleventh Circuit 

adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior 

to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 

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because “each party moving for summary judgment may do so on different legal theories 

dependent on different constellations of material facts. Indeed, cross-motions for 

summary judgment may demonstrate a genuine dispute as to material facts as often as 

not.” Bricklayers, 512 F.2d at 1023. 

“‘[W]hen both parties proceed on the same legal theory and rely on the same 

material facts[,] the court is signaled that the case is ripe for summary judgment.” Shook, 

713 F.2d at 665. Even then, however, “[a] court may discover questions of material fact 

even though both parties, in support of cross-motions for summary judgment, have 

asserted that no such questions exist. . . . . Thus, before the court can consider the legal 

issues raised by the parties on cross-motions for summary judgment, it must have no 

doubt as to the relevant facts that are beyond dispute.” Griffis v. Delta Family-Care 

Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1984) (adopting order of district judge on 

summary judgment). 

B. APA Standard of Review Applicable to Challenges to Administrative Actions 

 under CWA and NEPA 

In the SEIS action, Plaintiff alleges that the Highway Defendants violated NEPA 

and its implementing regulations. In the § 404 action, Plaintiff alleges that COE and 

ALDOT violated NEPA, the CWA, and regulations implementing both of those statutes. 

 “NEPA declares a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting 

environmental quality.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 

(1989). To ensure that federal agencies “use all practicable means, consistent with other 

essential considerations of national policy” to comply with that commitment, 42 U.S.C. § 

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4331(b), NEPA imposes “action-forcing” procedures that require federal agencies (1) to 

take a hard look at the environmental impact of major federal actions and (2) to inform 

the public regarding the environmental decisionmaking process. Id. at 348-50; Baltimore 

Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); see also 40 

C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (describing the policy and function of NEPA). “Although these 

procedures are almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision, . . . NEPA itself 

does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. . . . If 

the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and 

evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values 

outweigh the environmental costs.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350. Thus, NEPA does not 

prohibit federal projects that are highly destructive of the environment; “NEPA merely 

prohibits uninformed – rather than unwise – agency action.” Id. at 351; see also Sierra 

Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2008) (“NEPA is procedural, 

setting forth no substantive limits on agency decision-making. . . . In this case, it would 

not violate NEPA if the EIS noted that granting the permits would result in the 

permanent, irreversible destruction of the entire Florida Everglades, but the [federal 

agency] decided that economic benefits outweighed that negative environmental impact. 

That capricious decision might run afoul of a duty imposed by a different statute, but it 

would not violate any duty imposed by NEPA.”). 

The Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., at issue in the § 404 

permit action, was enacted to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 

integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The CWA prohibits the discharge 

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of pollutants, including dredged or fill material, into the waters of the United States 

without a permit issued by COE pursuant to § 404 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); 33 

U.S.C. § 1344. All § 404 discharge permits must meet the § 404(b)(1) Guidelines 

codified at 40 C.F.R. § 230, as well as other applicable regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 

1344(b)(1); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4; 33 C.F.R. § 323.1; 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(a); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 

325, App. B. 

Because neither NEPA nor the CWA creates a private right of action challenging 

discretionary agency actions, plaintiffs challenging an agency action on the basis of these 

statutes must do so under Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06. 

Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1356; Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. 

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 1996). Pursuant to the APA, the 

reviewing court may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), or “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 

conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

In reviewing actions brought pursuant to the APA, “[t]o the extent necessary to 

decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of 

law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 

applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. However, the standard 

for determining whether an agency action is arbitrary and capricious “is exceedingly 

deferential.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996); see N. 

Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Along the 

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16 

standard of review continuum, the arbitrary and capricious standard gives an appellate 

court the least latitude in finding grounds for reversal.”). The deference that the 

“arbitrary and capricious” standard affords to the agency applies “not only when 

reviewing decisions like what evidence to find credible and whether to issue a FONSI or 

EIS, but also when reviewing drafting decisions like how much discussion to include on 

each topic, and how much data is necessary to fully address each issue.” Van Antwerp, 

526 F.3d at 1361. “[E]ven in the context of summary judgment, an agency action is 

entitled to great deference.” Pres. Endangered Areas, 87 F.3d at 1246. 

The APA requires that, at the administrative stage of the proceedings, “the agency 

must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 

including ‘a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 

(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The focal 

point at the judicial stage of review of an administrative agency’s action is the 

administrative record. Pres. Endangered Areas, 87 F.3d at 1246. The reviewing court 

looks to the entire administrative record that was before the agency at the time of its 

decision to determine (1) whether the agency’s decision was based on a consideration of 

the relevant factors and (2) whether the agency “committed a clear error of judgment that 

lacks a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Legal Envtl. 

Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 276 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 378; Camp 

v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’s, 295 F.3d 

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1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that an agency’s decision is “arbitrary and 

capricious under ‘hard look’ review if it suffers from one of the following: (1) the 

decision does not rely on the factors that Congress intended the agency to consider; (2) 

the agency failed entirely to consider an important aspect of the problem; (3) the agency 

offers an explanation which runs counter to the evidence; or (4) the decision is so 

implausible that it cannot be the result of differing viewpoints or the result of agency 

expertise.”); N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 

1990). 

To determine whether the agency’s decision manifests a “clear error of judgment,” 

the court must determine only whether the agency’s decision was “reasonably supported 

by the information before it. This does not require that all of the data support the 

agency’s decision. It is enough that the [agency] considered all relevant factors and that 

there is credible evidence in the record to support its action.” Envtl. Coal. of Broward 

Cnty., Inc. v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1987). The court will not uphold the 

agency’s action by supplying a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency has 

not invoked, but the court will uphold an agency decision of less than ideal clarity if the 

agency’s path may be reasonably discerned from the record. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 

U.S. at 43. The reviewing court’s inquiry must be “searching and careful,” but the court 

may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or prudence 

of the proposed action, and the court must defer to the agency’s technical expertise. Or. 

Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 378; City Of Oxford, Ga. v. F.A.A., 428 F.3d 1346, 1352 

(11th Cir. 2005); Fund for Animals, 85 F.3d at 542; N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n, 903 F.2d at 

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1538-39. The deference afforded to agency’s determinations is particularly appropriate 

in cases such as this one that involve complex environmental statutes. Envtl. Coal., 831 

F.2d at 986. 

Before proceeding further, a word about the parties’ relative burdens in this APA 

case is required. On summary judgment, Plaintiff raises a plethora of objections to the 

agency decisions at issue – often in the most conclusory way possible – and then argues 

that the administrative agencies failed to articulate a satisfactory reason why those 

objections are without merit. Plaintiff’s shotgun approach is inappropriate because, in 

effect, Plaintiff is attempting to reverse the burden of proof.6

 At this stage of review, the 

burden is on Plaintiff to demonstrate that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 

The agency’s obligation at the administrative phase of proceedings to “articulate a 

satisfactory explanation for its action,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43, should not 

be confused with the parties’ relative burdens during the judicial phase of the 

proceedings. At the judicial stage of review, “‘[a]dministrative action . . . comes before 

the courts clothed with a presumption of regularity,’” and Plaintiff bears the “difficult” 

and “heavy” burden to demonstrate that the agency decisions were arbitrary, capricious, 

or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 

                                                             6 See, e.g., Doc. # 164 at 40-41 (Plaintiff’s initial brief, arguing that Defendants were 

required to issue a SEIS because “changes have occurred in the Northern Beltline’s 

environment” including the fact that “[b]usiness and residential relocation impacts in the corridor 

have increased twofold since the 1997 EIS”); Doc. # 170 at 5 (Plaintiff’s reply brief, arguing that 

“Defendants have attempted to shift NEPA’s requirements onto Plaintiff by arguing that Plaintiff 

has not shown the increased number of relocations is significant”). Contrary to Plaintiff’s 

argument, Plaintiff indeed has the burden of to show that the Highway Defendants’ finding of no 

significance was arbitrary and capricious. 

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295 F.3d at 1222-23 (quoting Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 649 (5th Cir. 1979)); 

see also Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 276 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (“In reviewing the reasonableness of an agency’s decision-making process 

under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the [APA], we are mindful that a party 

seeking to have a court declare an agency action to be arbitrary and capricious carries a 

heavy burden indeed.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Tex. Comm. on 

Nat. Res. v. Marsh, 736 F.2d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 1984), on reh’g, 741 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 

1984) (“[T]he district court required the Corps to prove that its selection of alternative 

water-supply sources was reasonable. This approach turns the review process on its head: 

it is the party seeking to invalidate an EIS, not the agency, which has the burden of proof 

on this issue.” (emphasis in original)). “Absent evidence to the contrary, [the court will] 

presume that an agency has acted in accordance with its regulations.” Sierra Club v. U.S. 

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d at 1223. 

IV. DISCUSSION: OVERVIEW 

Section V. addresses the motions for summary judgment in the EIS action. In the 

EIS action, Plaintiff presents two claims for relief. Section V.A. and V.B. identify the 

final agency actions that are subject to review in the EIS action. No final agency decision 

has been made as to the necessity of a SEIS for the western section; that decision will be 

made after more detailed designs and additional environmental studies. FHWA’s 

decision that no SEIS is needed for the eastern portion of the Beltline is a final agency 

action that is ripe for review, as is its decision that it may reach a conclusion about the 

necessity of a SEIS for the eastern section while its decision regarding the western 

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section is still pending. 

Section V.C. explains that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 

I of Plaintiff’s complaint, in which Plaintiff alleges that the Highway Defendants 

improperly divided (“segmented”) the Beltline into the eastern and western sections to 

avoid conducting a comprehensive SEIS for the Northern Beltline Project. Section V.D. 

explains that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are due to be dismissed because, by failing to 

direct its arguments toward the Highway Defendants’ decision not to issue an SEIS for 

the eastern section, Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the final 

agency action at issue was arbitrary or capricious. 

However, in an abundance of caution, and as an alternative basis for granting 

summary judgment in favor of the Highway Defendants, Section V.E. addresses 

Plaintiff’s allegations in both Counts I and II that the Highway Defendants acted 

arbitrarily and capriciously and failed to take a hard look at all relevant factors in 

deciding whether a SEIS is needed. 

Section VI. explains why the motions for summary judgment are due to be granted 

in the § 404 action. 

V. ANALYSIS: THE EIS ACTION

A. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review Governs Plaintiff’s Claims 

 In Count I of its complaint in the EIS action, Plaintiff contends that the failure to 

create a SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline constitutes an “agency action unlawfully 

withheld or unreasonably delayed” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “Failures to 

act are sometimes remediable under the APA, but not always.” Norton v. S. Utah 

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Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004) (“SUWA”). The APA authorizes suit by “[a] 

person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 

by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also 5 

U.S.C.A. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for 

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”). The 

APA defines “agency action” to include “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, 

license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 

551(13) (emphasis added). The APA provides relief for a failure to act in 5 U.S.C. § 

706(1): “The reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 

unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1). 

 To be subject to judicial review under § 706(1) of the APA, an agency’s failure to 

act must be the failure to take a discrete agency action, and the agency action must be one 

that is “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1); SUWA, 542 

U.S. at 61-63. “[A] claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that 

an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” SUWA, 542 

U.S. at 64 (emphasis in original). Further, “§ 706(1) empowers a court only to compel an 

agency ‘to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act,’ or ‘to take action upon a 

matter, without directing how it shall act.’” Id. (quoting Attorney General’s Manual on 

the Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947)). Thus, the court can compel the Highway 

Defendants to issue a single SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline only if issuing a single 

SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline is a discrete, non-discretionary agency action that 

the Highway Defendants failed to take despite being legally required to do so. 

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The issuance of a SEIS is not a ministerial or nondiscretionary act. Rather, 

whether to issue a SEIS is, of necessity, a decision that “requires a high level of 

expertise” that is committed to “the informed discretion of the responsible federal 

agencies.” Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 373; see 23 C.F.R. § 771.130 (providing 

that “[a]n EIS shall be supplemented whenever the Administration determines” certain 

circumstances exist). Presumably, Plaintiff recognizes this fact, because, on summary 

judgment, Plaintiff correctly proposes that the operable standard of review is the 

“arbitrary and capricious” standard applicable to final agency action under § 706(2), not 

to inaction under § 706(1). Section 706(1) does not provide relief for arbitrary and 

capricious conduct. (Doc. # 164 at 33.) See Georgia v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 

1242, 1249 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that different standards govern review under § 

706(1) and 706(2)). 

FHWA has decided that further study is needed before it can determine whether a 

SEIS is necessary for the western section. FHWA has also determined that changes in 

the eastern section do not require issuance of a SEIS. These decisions are committed to 

the discretion of the agency. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a) (providing that an EIS “shall be 

supplemented whenever the Administration determines” that changes, new information, 

or new circumstances result in significant environmental impacts that were not evaluated 

in the EIS); 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(b) (“Where the Administration is uncertain of the 

significance of the new impacts, the applicant will develop appropriate environmental 

studies or, if the Administration deems appropriate, an EA to assess the impacts of the 

changes, new information, or new circumstances.”). 

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Plaintiff does not argue that FHWA’s decision to delay a determination regarding 

the necessity of a SEIS due to the need for further study of changes in the western section 

is an “unreasonable delay” pursuant to § 706(1). Rather, Plaintiff contends that, upon 

consideration of the 2012 Re-evaluation and all of the presently available information 

about the impacts of the project, FHWA should have instead reached a decision that 

changes in both the eastern and western sections of the Beltline have significant impacts 

that require that a SEIS be conducted for the entire Beltline. Plaintiff contends that 

FHWA’s failure to reach Plaintiff’s preferred decision is an “agency action unlawfully 

withheld or unreasonably delayed” under § 706(1). (Doc. # 86.) 

In other words, by characterizing the failure to conclude that a SEIS is necessary 

for the entire Beltline as a “failure-to-act” claim, Plaintiff attempts to substitute its 

preferred outcome for the decision that the FHWA reached. Section 706(1) is not a back 

door through which a plaintiff may, by artful pleading, invite a court to substitute its 

judgment for that of the agency or to compel the agency to deploy its lawful discretion in 

a way preferred by the plaintiff. See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65 (“[W]hen an agency is 

compelled by law to act within a certain time period, but the manner of its action is left to 

the agency’s discretion, a court can compel the agency to act, but has no power [under § 

706(1)] to specify what the action must be.”).7

 Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 

                                                             7 See also Charles Alan Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., 33 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Judicial 

Review § 8387 (1st ed.) (footnotes omitted): 

An obvious countermove to [the holding of SUWA that § 706(1) 

reaches only failure to take “discrete” action] might be for a 

petitioner to request more specific relief. For instance . . . rather 

than seeking a generalized order requiring an agency to implement 

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Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“The scope of review 

under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard [for actions brought pursuant to § 706(2)] is 

narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). 

Therefore, the Highway Defendants’ failure to issue a single SEIS for the entire 

Northern Beltline is not justiciable as a failure-to-act claim under § 706(1). See SUWA

542 U.S. at 65 (“[A] claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that 

an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”). Rather, as 

Plaintiff implicitly acknowledges on summary judgment by challenging the decision as 

“arbitrary and capricious,” both claims in Plaintiff’s complaint are subject to review, if at 

all, under § 706(2). See Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 375-76 (holding that an 

agency’s decision not to supplement a FEIS “is controlled by the ‘arbitrary and 

capricious’ standard of § 706(2)(A)”). 

B. The Final Agency Action at Issue in This Case 

“If [a] claim attacks an agency’s action, instead of its failure to act, and the statute 

allegedly violated does not provide a private right of action, then the ‘agency action’ 

must also be a ‘final agency action.’” Fanin v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 

868, 877 (11th Cir. 2009). “[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

a broad statutory duty, [a plaintiff] could instead seek an order 

requiring the agency to implement that broad statutory duty in 

some particular way - e.g., by adopting a rule that [the plaintiff] 

has kindly drafted for the agency’s consideration. . . . The Court 

[in SUWA] blocked this avenue, too, however, by emphasizing that 

courts must not use their remedial authority to usurp agency 

discretion. Determining how, precisely, to implement a broad 

statutory duty is up to the expert agency charged with the task, not 

the courts. 

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initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an 

actual, concrete injury.” Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of 

Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds, 47 

U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). “The core question [in the finality determination] is whether 

the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that 

process is one that will directly affect the parties.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 

788, 797 (1992). Thus, “[t]o be considered ‘final,’ an agency’s action: (1) ‘must mark 

the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process – it must not be of a merely 

tentative or interlocutory nature;’ and (2) ‘must be one by which rights or obligations 

have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.’” U.S. Steel Corp. v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 

177-78 (1997)). “By contrast, ‘the Supreme Court has defined a nonfinal agency order as 

one that “does not itself adversely affect complainant but only affects his rights adversely 

on the contingency of future administrative action.”‘” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. 

Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Herman, 

176 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting in turn Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 

307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939)). “[F]ederal jurisdiction is . . . lacking when the administrative 

action in question is not ‘final’ within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.” Id. at 1236. 

In Count I, Plaintiff contends that, because of the cumulative effect of project 

changes, new information, and new circumstances throughout both the eastern and 

western sections of the Northern Beltline, a comprehensive SEIS must be issued for the 

entire project. Also in Count I, Plaintiff contends that the Highway Defendants failed to 

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comply with NEPA by dividing the Northern Beltline into two segments to avoid 

preparation of a SEIS for the Northern Beltline. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that, in the 

2012 Re-evaluation, the Highway Defendants failed to comply with NEPA procedures by 

failing to consider all of the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the Northern 

Beltline project. In other words, Plaintiff is not merely seeking review of the validity of 

FHWA’s conclusion that no SEIS is needed for the eastern section and that construction 

may proceed that eastern section. Rather, Plaintiff seeks a judgment requiring FHWA 

and ALDOT to complete a SEIS for the entire project. 

The Highway Defendants have not yet made a decision as to the necessity or scope 

of any SEIS that may be issued, if at all, for the western section of the Beltline; that 

decision will be made after FHWA and ALDOT create more detailed designs of the 

project and complete their studies of the environmental impacts of the western section. 8 

Therefore, FHWA’s reservation of further consideration of the necessity of a SEIS in the 

western section is not a final agency action because it “only affects [Plaintiff’s] rights 

adversely on the contingency of future administrative action.” Nat’l Parks, 324 F.3d at 

1236-37. Moreover, because the NEPA-imposed duty to take a hard look at the 

environmental consequences of major federal action is procedural in nature, a claim 

alleging failure to satisfy that duty is ripe for review “at the time the failure takes place.’” 

                                                             8

 In theory, under certain circumstances, it is possible that development of a SEIS to 

address issues of limited scope, such as changes in location or design variations for a limited 

portion of the project, may require a reassessment of the entire action or of more than a limited 

portion of the entire action. 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(f). In this case, there is no indication that the 

Highway Defendants anticipate issuing a SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline after they 

complete their studies of the western section. 

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Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ohio 

Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998)). It is simply not possible 

to predict whether the Highway Defendants will fail to take a hard look at whether a SEIS 

should be issued for the western section because that decision has yet to be made pending 

further study and review. The substance of and reasons for whatever decision will be 

made are unknown, and there is no way to meaningfully subject the issue to judicial 

review at this time. Because “[w]e have no idea whether or when” a SEIS will be issued 

for the western section, “the issue is not fit for adjudication.” Texas v. United States, 523 

U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, 

the Highway Defendants have not taken a final agency action as to the necessity of a 

SEIS for the western section, and the issue is not ripe for review. See id. at 300 (“A 

claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not 

occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

However, a determination has been made that any SEIS that may be issued will 

not include a comprehensive evaluation of the eastern section of the beltline.

(USCOE000523 (“For the project sections between I-65 and I-59 . . . significant changes 

in impacts or in the affected environment have not been identified. Therefore, no 

additional analysis of the project between I-65 and I-59 is required and a supplemental 

EIS is not warranted under the applicable NEPA regulations.”).) Further, based on the 

decision that no SEIS is required for the eastern section of the Beltline, FHWA has 

authorized ALDOT to proceed with construction of the eastern section of the Northern 

Beltline. (USACOE000511-513.) 

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Accordingly, FHWA’s decision that no SEIS is needed for the eastern portion of 

the Beltline is ripe for review, as is its decision that it may reach a conclusion about the 

necessity of a SEIS for the eastern section while reserving a decision regarding the 

western section pending further development and review. Ouachita, 463 F.3d at 1174 

(“[A] person . . . who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may 

complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place. As we see it, that is the end of 

the proper ripeness analysis in a NEPA suit.”); see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining “agency 

action” to include “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, 

or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act” (emphasis added)); Bennett, 520 U.S. 

154, 177 (1997) (holding that an agency action is final for purposes of review if it marks 

the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process and is a decision from which 

legal consequences will flow). 

C. Segmentation of the Eastern and Western Sections of the Beltline 

Count I challenges FHWA’s decision that it may reach a conclusion about the 

necessity of a SEIS for the eastern section while reserving consideration of the necessity 

of a SEIS for the western section pending further design development and environmental 

studies. Plaintiff contends that Defendants “improperly divided the Northern Beltline 

into two segments to avoid preparation of a SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline.” (Doc. 

# 82 ¶ 86.) However, on summary judgment, Plaintiff has put forth only very scant 

arguments to support its position that the Highway Defendants engaged in improper 

segmentation by finding that no SEIS was required for the eastern section of the Beltline 

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while reserving consideration of the western section for further study.9

In its summary judgment reply brief, Plaintiff cites 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(f)(3) in 

support of its argument that the Highway Defendants improperly determined “that further 

study would only be required for half of the Northern Beltline.” (Doc. # 170 at 3.) 23 

C.F.R. § 771.130(f) provides: 

(f) In some cases, a supplemental EIS may be required to 

address issues of limited scope, such as the extent of proposed 

mitigation or the evaluation of location or design variations 

for a limited portion of the overall project. Where this is the 

case, the preparation of a supplemental EIS shall not 

necessarily: 

(1) Prevent the granting of new approvals; 

(2) Require the withdrawal of previous approvals; 

or 

(3) Require the suspension of project activities[] for 

any activity not directly affected by the 

supplement. If the changes in question are of 

such magnitude to require a reassessment of the 

entire action, or more than a limited portion of 

the overall action, the Administration shall 

suspend any activities which would have an 

adverse environmental impact or limit the 

choice of reasonable alternatives, until the 

supplemental EIS is completed.

23 C.F.R. § 771.130(f) (emphasis added). 

By its terms, 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(f)(3) does not place any limitation on an 

                                                             9

 In its summary judgment briefs, Plaintiff’s argument regarding the propriety of 

segmentation almost exclusively consists of argument that COE improperly issued the § 404 

permit for the 1.86 mile section of highway that is located wholly within the eastern section. 

That argument is addressed in Sections VI.A and VI.C. of this memorandum opinion. 

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agency’s decision whether to complete a SEIS for some portion of the project smaller 

than the entire Beltline; in fact, § 771.130(f) specifically contemplates that “[i]n some 

cases, a [SEIS] may be required to address issues of limited scope, such as . . . evaluation 

of . . . design variations for a limited portion of the overall project.” Id. Rather, 23 

C.F.R. § 771.130(f)(3) requires that, under certain circumstances while the completion of 

a limited SEIS is pending, construction of a segment of a project that is not the subject of 

that limited SEIS must be suspended. However, constructing or moving forward with 

project activities for a “segment” of a project is not the kind of “segmentation” that 

Plaintiff challenges in its complaint as a procedural misstep in the NEPA process, i.e., the 

act of breaking a complex project into smaller sections for purposes of environmental 

analysis to avoid issuing a SEIS or to reduce the scope of a SEIS. (Doc. # 82 ¶ 86.) See

Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1116 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(defining the “anti-segmentation” principle as the “fundamental NEPA principle . . . that 

connected actions be analyzed together in one EIS”). Cf. Hoosier Envtl. Council v. U.S. 

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F.3d 1053, 1059 (7th Cir. 2013) (“There is a difference 

between “segmentation” in its pejorative sense, and—what is within administrative 

discretion—breaking a complex investigation into manageable bits.”). Plaintiff did not 

allege a violation of § 771.130(f)(3) in its amended complaint, and summary judgment is 

due to be granted for that reason. Cf. Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 

Transp., 669 F.3d 1203, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff’s] argument on appeal—that 

the decision to utilize phasing must be examined further in an SEIS—is substantially 

different than that alleged in its Complaint, and we will not consider a claim not detailed 

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in the plaintiff’s pleadings.”). 

Moreover, assuming without deciding that any SEIS that may or may not be 

prepared sometime in the future constitutes a “supplemental EIS . . . to address issues of 

limited scope” regarding “changes . . . of such magnitude [as] to require reassessment of 

the entire action or more than a limited portion of the overall action” as contemplated by 

§ 771.130(f)(3), the preparation of that SEIS would only require the suspension of 

construction in the eastern section that “would have an adverse environmental impact or 

limit the choice of reasonable alternatives, until the supplemental EIS is completed.” 23 

C.F.R. § 771.130(f)(3). Plaintiff argues in its reply brief that the Highway Defendants 

have violated 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(f)(3) because construction of a relatively short 

segment of the highway between SR 79 and SR 75 located entirely within the eastern 

section would limit the choice of reasonable alternatives by “effectively locking in” the 

route of the entire Beltline. (Doc. # 170 at 3). However, Plaintiff has not provided any 

legal authority or evidence to support a finding that all (or any) project activities specific 

to construction of the eastern section would lock in the route for the western section10 of 

                                                             10 Elsewhere in its summary judgment filings, Plaintiff does provide a record cite to 

support its position that construction of a portion of the eastern section effectively locks in the 

route of the entire eastern section of the Beltline. (Doc. # 164 at 48-49.) The court has reviewed 

that evidence, and it does not support Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff cites USACOE00496-99, a 

December 13, 2011 letter in which the EPA, writing to a district engineer for COE, opined that 

construction of a 3.4 mile section located within eastern section of the Beltline “that precedes 

comprehensive evaluation could force the interstate toward a more environmentally damaging 

alternative, restricting consideration for other reasonably foreseeable transportation 

improvements. . . . The project must be considered in totality to accurately address cumulative 

and indirect effects as required by 40 CFR Parts 1508.7 and 1508.8; subsections cannot be 

considered in isolation. Proceeding towards permitting any subsection before such analysis is 

complete would prejudge the outcome of environmental reviews and could commit resources 

toward a project that may not proceed or a design that may not be part of the ultimately preferred 

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32 

the Beltline. On the contrary, the route in the western section is not yet finalized, despite 

the initiation of construction in the eastern section. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that the Highway Defendants violated § 771.130(f). 

In contrast to § 771.130(f)(3), the regulations prohibiting segmentation of the kind 

that Plaintiff challenges in its complaint do not prohibit construction of a project in 

segments of whatever length, utility, or termini. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 requires that 

“[c]onnected actions . . . should be discussed in the same impact statement.” (Emphasis 

added.) 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(B)(7) prohibits avoiding a finding of significance by 

breaking an action down into small component parts in the course of evaluating the 

environmental impacts of the action. 23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f) prohibits issuing an EIS (or 

SEIS) or finding of no significant impact for a section of a project that does not meet 

certain standards. Thus, “segmentation” of the kind that Plaintiff seeks to challenge in 

its complaint involves the act of improperly breaking a complex project into smaller 

sections for purposes of environmental analysis. NEPA prohibits the “segmentation” of a 

project when it is done to mask the overall significance of the project’s environmental 

impacts, particularly its cumulative impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(B)(7) (“Significance 

cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into small 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

alternative.” USACOE00497. However, the necessary “comprehensive evaluation” to which the 

district engineer referred was not a SEIS for the entire beltline, but the forthcoming 2012 Reevaluation of the FEIS in its totality, which was subsequently completed in March 2012. 

USACOE00496, -97, -99). In November 2011, COE placed ALDOT’s permit on hold to allow 

for completion of the 2012 Re-evaluation, and COE’s file was not reopened until June, 2012. 

(USACOE004808.) COE subsequently granted the permit for the project after it was reduced to 

a 1.86-mile section with termini at SR 75 and SR 79. Thus, COE did not issue a § 404 permit 

prior to the completion of the comprehensive review that was in progress at the time the EPA 

expressed its concern about “[p]roceeding towards permitting any subsection before such 

analysis is complete.” 

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component parts.”). Cf. Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 

439 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (“As a general rule under NEPA, segmentation of highway 

projects is improper for purposes of preparing environmental impact statements. . . . 

However, the rule against segmentation is not required to be applied in every situation.” 

(emphasis added)). 

FHWA regulations, based on CEQ guidelines, set forth the standard for 

segmentation in the context of a highway project: 

In order to ensure meaningful evaluation of alternatives and 

to avoid commitments to transportation improvements before 

they are fully evaluated, the action evaluated in each EIS or 

finding of no significant impact (FONSI) shall (1) connect 

logical termini and be of sufficient length to address 

environmental matters on a broad scope; (2) have 

independent utility or independent significance, i.e., be usable 

and be a reasonable expenditure even if no additional 

transportation improvements in the area are made; and (3) not 

restrict consideration of alternatives for other reasonably 

foreseeable transportation improvements. 

23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f) (emphasis added). Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (setting forth the 

range of actions that must be covered in an individual EIS). 

Defendants argue that they did not improperly segment the Beltline in finding that 

changes in the eastern section of the Beltline did not require a SEIS. (Doc. # 166 at 16-

17; Doc. # 168 at 21-22). For the reasons stated in Defendants’ briefs, id., and for the 

reasons stated in this Opinion, Plaintiff has not carried its burden to demonstrate that the 

Highway Defendants violated NEPA by improperly segmenting the eastern and western 

sections of the Northern Beltline. Specifically, Plaintiff has not made any legal or 

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34 

evidentiary showing that the eastern11 section (which comprises approximately 1/3 of the 

52-mile Northern Beltline Project and has endpoints that connect two major interstate 

highways, I-65 and I-59) fails to connect logical termini, is of insufficient length to 

address environmental matters on a broad scope, has no independent utility or 

independent significance, would unusable or an unreasonable expenditure even if no 

additional transportation improvements in the area are made, or restricts consideration of 

alternatives for other reasonably foreseeable transportation improvements. 23 C.F.R. § 

771.111; see Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 295 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (“Administrative action ... comes before the courts clothed with a presumption 

of regularity.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Tex. Comm. on Nat. Res. 

v. Marsh, 736 F.2d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 1984), on reh’g, 741 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1984) 

(holding that a party challenging the agency decision had the burden of proving that a 

SEIS should have issued). 

                                                             11 Because no determination has yet been made as to the necessity of a SEIS for the 

western section or for the project as a whole, it is not possible to predict whether any SEIS that 

may or may not be completed in the future will contain an evaluation of the western section only, 

or of some smaller section(s) of the project. Thus, it is not possible to evaluate whether the 

action evaluated in such a SEIS would connect logical termini, have independent utility or 

independent significance, or restrict alternatives for other reasonably foreseeable transportation 

improvements. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff contends that the Highway Defendants 

have improperly segmented the western section, that issue is not ripe for review. See § 23 C.F.R. 

§ 771.111(f) (providing that “the action evaluated in each EIS” must meet certain segmentation 

requirements); Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for 

adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed 

may not occur at all. . . . Under these circumstances, where we have no idea whether or when [a 

certain agency action will take place], the issue is not fit for adjudication.” (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted)); Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, 727 F.3d 1349, 

1356 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the 

courts from prematurely entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative 

policy and to shield agencies from judicial interaction until an administrative decision has been 

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way). 

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Accordingly, the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s segmentation claim in Count I of the complaint in the EIS action. 

D. Ripeness and Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims 

As foreshadowed in Section V.B, a jurisdictional problem limits consideration of 

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions that the Highway Defendants failed to satisfy the “hard 

look” requirements of NEPA in deciding not to issue a SEIS. Plaintiff’s claims arise in 

context of the final agency action at issue, i.e., FHWA’s conditional approval of the 2012 

Re-evaluation while reserving a determination about the necessity of a SEIS pending 

further study of alignment changes in the western section of the Beltline, but allowing 

construction to proceed in the eastern section on grounds that changes in the eastern 

section did not warrant a SEIS. 

The Highway Defendants determined that, because the western section was in the 

early stages of design, it was not possible to fully evaluate a number of direct, indirect, 

and cumulative impacts relevant to the western section12 (including a number of impacts 

                                                             12 (See, e.g., USACOE000513; USACOE000515; USACOE000517-18 (additional study 

of cultural resources will be conducted); USACOE000520 (additional noise study needed 

pending availability of more detailed design); USACOE000522 (additional threatened and 

endangered species studies to be conducted); USACOE000523; USACOE000558 (additional 

environmental studies will be needed as design progresses); USACOE000558; USACOE000571; 

USACOE000595 (further accommodations to be made for pedestrian, bicycle, and greenway 

projects); USACOE000602-05 (further archeological and historic structure surveys to be 

conducted); USACOE000609 (additional information to be developed regarding mineral 

resources); USACOE000610-12 (further testing of possible hazardous materials sites will be 

conducted as needed pursuant to design development); USACOE000612-15 (ozone conformity 

to be addressed and particulate emission to be studied); USACOE000625 (wetland and stream 

studies to be updated); USACOE000627 (additional threatened and endangered species studies 

to be conducted); USACOE000670; USACOE000691 (additional consideration of cumulative 

and indirect effects may be needed for project sections where alignment shifts occur as design 

progresses); USACOE000713-14; USACOE000716.) 

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Plaintiff contends were not adequately considered in the Re-evaluation) and that further 

study and consideration of the necessity of a SEIS will be required prior to advancing the 

western section of the project. Thus, although the Highway Defendants did consider 

those factors on the basis of limited information available (see USCOE000515), it is not 

possible at this time to know the extent to which those factors will ultimately be 

considered or the extent to which a SEIS (if any) will be prepared for the western portion 

of the project (or for some portion(s) of the western section). Accordingly, as explained 

more fully in Section V.B., the portion of the agency decision reserving further 

consideration of the factors relevant to the western section and postponing a decision as 

to the necessity of a SEIS for that section is not a final agency decision and is not ripe for 

review. Ouachita, 463 F.3d at 1175 (“Because of the rather special nature of the injury 

(that is, the failure to follow NEPA [by failing to take a hard look at the environmental 

consequences of an agency action]), the issue is ripe at the time the agency fails to 

comply.” (emphasis added)); see also Texas, 523 U.S. at 300 (holding that an issue is not 

ripe if “we have no idea whether or when” the issue will arise). 

Plaintiff does not directly challenge the Highway Defendants’ decision that further 

study of changes in alignment in the western section is needed before they can determine 

whether a SEIS must be prepared for the western section. Instead, Plaintiff challenges 

the decision not to “prepare a comprehensive Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statement for the Northern Beltline project,” and insists that the eastern and western 

sections must be evaluated in a single, comprehensive SEIS. The court has already 

determined in Section V.C. that the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary 

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judgment in their favor with respect to their decision to independently evaluate the need 

for a SEIS for the eastern and western sections. 

Thus, the only remaining “hard look” issues that are ripe for review are whether 

the Highway Defendants considered the relevant environmental factors and reached a 

rational decision free of clear error in determining that, “[f]or the [eastern section] . . . 

significant changes in impacts or in the affected environment have not been identified. 

Therefore, no additional analysis of the [eastern section] is required and a supplemental 

EIS is not warranted under the applicable NEPA regulations.” (USCOE000523 

(emphasis added).) 

Plaintiff has not raised or argued the issues that are ripe for review as to the 

eastern section, and for that reason the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on all of the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s complaint against them. See

Citizens for Smart Growth., 669 F.3d at 1211 (“A challenging party has the burden of 

showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency did not comply with 

NEPA’s procedures.”); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc., v. U.S. E.P.A., 276 F.3d 

1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (“In reviewing the reasonableness of an agency’s decisionmaking process under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA), see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), we are mindful that a party seeking to 

have a court declare an agency action to be arbitrary and capricious carries a heavy 

burden indeed.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 

709 n.9 (“The plaintiffs had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the defendants failed to adhere to the requirements of NEPA.”). 

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Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution and as an alternative basis for granting 

summary judgment in favor of the Highway Defendants, the court will proceed to 

evaluate Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the Highway Defendants. 

E. Plaintiff’s Argument that the Highway Defendants Failed to Take a “Hard 

Look” at the Relevant Environmental Factors 

The completion of the 1997 FEIS did not put an end to the Highway Defendants’ 

duties to consider the environmental consequences of the project. The duty to consider 

the necessity of a supplement is a continuing duty so long as major federal action remains 

to occur. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 374. Further, when, as here, major steps to 

advance the project have not occurred within three years after completion of the FEIS, 

the agency must complete a written evaluation (“re-evaluation”) of the FEIS before 

further approvals may be granted. 23 C.F.R. § 771.129(b). 

However, a re-evaluation is not an EIS or SEIS.13 The purpose of the reevaluation is to determine whether a SEIS is needed for the project. See S. Trenton 

Residents, 176 F.3d at 661. “[A] federal agency need not perform the detailed 

environmental analysis of an EIS before it can determine that no EIS need be prepared. 

Such a requirement would eliminate the threshold requirements of the regulations in 

                                                             13 “Where FHWA is uncertain of the significance of new impacts, the applicant will 

develop appropriate environmental studies or, if the Administration deems appropriate, an EA to 

assess the impacts of the changes, new information, or new circumstances. If, based upon the 

studies, the Administration determines that a supplemental EIS is not necessary, the 

Administration shall so indicate in the project file.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(c); see also 40 C.F.R. § 

1501.3(b); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1). In this case, the Re-evaluation is not an EA, but is based on 

studies developed by ALDOT. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.10 (defining “environmental documents”); 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (defining “environmental impact statement”). Plaintiff does not argue that 

the Re-evaluation should have included an EA to analyze whether a SEIS was needed to address 

changed circumstances or new information, including the indirect and cumulative effects 

analysis.

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favor of a full EIS or SEIS in every case. This is clearly not the law.” Airport Impact 

Relief, Inc. v. Wykle, 192 F.3d 197, 209 (1st Cir. 1999). 

 Further, “an agency need not supplement an EIS every time new information 

comes to light after the EIS is finalized. To require otherwise would render agency 

decisionmaking intractable, always awaiting updated information only to find the new 

information outdated by the time a decision is made.” Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 

373. “The new circumstance must present a seriously different picture of the 

environmental impact of the proposed project from what was previously envisioned.” 

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). This is 

so because requiring supplementation with every project change or every new piece of 

information—regardless of its environmental significance—would “‘task agencies with a 

sisyphean feat of forever starting over in their environmental evaluations, regardless of 

the usefulness of such efforts.’” Florida Keys Citz. Coal., Inc., 374 F. Supp.2d 116, 1145 

(S.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting Price Road Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of 

Transp., 113 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Regulations implementing NEPA require a SEIS when changes to the proposed 

action would result in significant environmental impacts that were not evaluated in the 

EIS, or when new information or circumstances relevant to environmental concerns and 

bearing on the proposed action or its impacts would result in significant environmental 

impacts not evaluated in the EIS. 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c); Sierra 

Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2002). The 

standard for whether an impact is “significant” for purposes of determining whether a 

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SEIS is needed “is essentially the same” as the standard for whether an impact is 

“significant” for purposes of determining whether an EIS is needed. Sierra Club v. U.S. 

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d at 1215-16. With respect to determining whether to issue 

a SEIS, the standard merely “focuses the inquiry on a different body of information,” i.e., 

those environmental impacts that result from the new information or the change in the 

project design or circumstance and that were not considered in the original EIS, “to 

evaluate the ‘significance’ of the environmental impact.” Id.; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 

Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 782 (11th Cir. 1983) (“‘[T]he legal standard of the need for a 

supplemental EIS . . . is whether the post-[original EIS] changes in the [project] will have 

a ‘significant’ impact on the environment that has not previously been covered by the 

[original] EIS.’ If a ‘significant’ impact on the environment will result, either ‘in 

qualitative or quantitative terms,’ from subsequent project changes, an SEIS is required.” 

(quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (all 

but first alteration in original)); see also Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 374 

(“Application of the ‘rule of reason’ thus turns on the value of the new information to the 

still pending decisionmaking process. In this respect the decision whether to prepare a 

supplemental EIS is similar to the decision whether to prepare an EIS in the first instance: 

If there remains ‘major Federal actio[n]’ to occur, and if the new information is sufficient 

to show that the remaining action will ‘affec[t] the quality of the human environment’ in 

a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental EIS 

must be prepared.”). 

 “Significant,” at that term is used in NEPA, is defined by “considerations of both 

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context and intensity.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. “Context” consideration “means that the 

significance of an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole 

(human, national), the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality. . . . . Both 

short- and long-term effects are relevant.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a). “Intensity . . . refers 

to the severity of an impact” and requires considerations of a number of factors, including 

“[i]mpacts that may be both beneficial and adverse,” “[u]nique characteristics of the 

geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime 

farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas,” “[t]he degree 

to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly 

controversial,” “[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are 

highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks,” and “[w]hether the action is 

related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant 

impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b). 

NEPA requires that, “regardless of [the agency’s] eventual assessment of the 

significance” of the environmental impacts resulting from new circumstances, the agency 

has a duty to take a hard look at the evidence. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 385. A 

challenge to an agency’s decision whether to supplement an EIS “is a classic example of 

a factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency expertise” that 

requires substantial deference; accordingly, “as long as the agency’s decision not to 

supplement the [EIS] was not ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ it should not be set aside” by a 

reviewing court. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 376-77. “[I]n making the factual 

inquiry concerning whether an agency decision was ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ the 

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reviewing court ‘must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 

relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’ This inquiry must 

‘be searching and careful,’ but ‘the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.’” Id. at 

378 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), 

abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). Thus, in 

reviewing whether the Highway Defendants complied with the procedural requirements 

of NEPA in determining whether to supplement the FEIS, the court must first consider 

the administrative record to determine whether the agencies took a hard look at the 

environmental consequences of new information and changes to the project, and then 

determine whether the agency reached a decision free of clear error. 

E.1. Plaintiff’s Claim that the Highway Defendants Failed to Take a Hard Look at 

 “All” Direct, Indirect, and Cumulative Impacts of the Northern Beltline 

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated NEPA in the 2012 Reevaluation by failing to take a “hard look” at all direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts 

of the entire Northern Beltline Project. (Doc. # 82 at ¶¶ 88-91; Doc. # 164 at 41-43.) 

Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the conclusion that a re-evaluation requires a de 

novo consideration of all of the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts of 

the entire project or that a re-evaluation must include a de novo consideration of whether 

the 1997 FEIS was sufficient at the time it was approved. In fact, at this late date, the 

statute of limitations precludes this court’s review of the validity of the FEIS at the time it 

was approved. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. 

The focus of a re-evaluation is not on all of the potential environmental impacts of 

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the entire project, but on whether environmental impacts resulting from changes in the 

project, new information, or new circumstances are significant environmental impacts 

that were not evaluated in the EIS. 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c); Sierra 

Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1215-16, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); 

Price Rd. Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 113 F.3d 1505, 1509-10 

(9th Cir. 1997); Froehlke, 816 F.2d at 209-10 (holding that, in determining whether a 

SEIS is required, “the test is whether the new information so alters the project’s character 

that a new ‘hard-look’ at the environmental consequences is necessary” (emphasis 

omitted)); S. Trenton Residents, 176 F.3d at 661 (“The Supreme Court has set forth a 

three-part test to guide our review of an agency’s decision that a [SEIS] is unnecessary: 

(1) whether any major federal action remains to occur; (2) whether any substantial 

changes have occurred or new information has come to light; and (3) whether these 

changes were significant enough to require preparation of a Supplemental Environmental 

Impact Statement despite the defendant agency’s conclusion to the contrary.” (citing Or. 

Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at at 374) (emphasis added)). 

Accordingly, the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s claim that they violated NEPA by failing to take a hard look at “all” of the 

direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the entire Northern Beltline. 

E.2. Plaintiff’s Claim that the Highway Defendants Failed to Take a Hard Look at 

 Certain Specific Direct, Indirect, and Cumulative Impacts of the Northern 

 Beltline 

In Counts I and II, Plaintiff also contends that the Highway Defendants violated 

the “hard look” procedural requirements of NEPA by failing to adequately consider 

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certain specific direct impacts caused by changes in design and circumstances and all 

indirect effects and cumulative impacts14 of the project. (Doc. # 82 at ¶¶ 85, 90.) The 

court now turns to the merits of that argument. 

Rather than making an argument that the Highway Defendants failed to take a 

hard look at whether a SEIS was needed for the eastern section, Plaintiff has lumped into 

one heap all of the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts throughout the 

entire Beltline that the Highway Defendants allegedly failed to consider, regardless of 

whether those impacts pertain specifically to the eastern section. Because the only final 

agency action ripe for review is whether the Highway Defendants violated NEPA by 

determining that no SEIS was needed for the eastern section ̧ Plaintiff’s approach creates 

practical difficulties for the court as it digs through that heap. As noted in Section V.D., 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s “hard look” claims because 

(1) the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor regarding 

their decision to determine the necessity of a SEIS for the eastern section while reserving 

the decision as to the western section for further study and (2) Plaintiff has completely 

failed to make any argument that the decision not to issue a SEIS for the eastern section

resulted from failure to consider the relevant factors or a clear error of judgment. 

However, in an abundance of caution, the court will attempt to sort through the mixed 

stack of individual impacts that Plaintiff contends were either not considered at all or 

                                                             14 To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the 1997 FEIS failed to include consideration 

of all of the indirect effects and cumulative impacts of the entire Northern Beltline project, 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the APA’s 6 year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. 

Plaintiff acknowledges this fact and is not challenging the validity of the 1997 FEIS for failure to 

include an indirect and cumulative effects analysis. (Doc. # 170 at 2.) 

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were subject to a faulty determination that no significant impact existed. 

At the outset of this discussion, it should be noted that the relief Plaintiff seeks is 

not a limited SEIS to address one or more of these particular issues, but a 

“comprehensive” SEIS that examines all of the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of 

the entire Northern Beltline. (Doc.# 82 at 15-17). Even if one or more of particular 

issues did require a SEIS, that would not automatically mean that a SEIS must be created 

to cover every direct, indirect, or cumulative effect of an entire project or to function as 

an updated replacement for the entire FEIS. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(f) (“In some cases, 

a supplemental EIS may be required to address issues of limited scope, such as the extent 

of proposed mitigation or the evaluation of location or design variations for a limited 

portion of the overall project.”). Thus, to support the comprehensive relief it seeks,15

Plaintiff must demonstrate not only that a SEIS is required, but also that the new 

information and changes in the environment and project design individually or 

cumulatively require that the scope of that SEIS must encompass all the environmental 

impacts of the entire 52-mile Northern Beltline. Plaintiff has not done so. 

E.2.i. Added Lanes. 

Plaintiff argues that the 2012 Re-evaluation failed to examine the direct impacts16

of the addition of new lanes to the Beltline. (Doc. # 82 ¶ 73.) This particular design 

                                                             15 Plaintiff also requested “such other relief as the [c]ourt deems just and proper.” (Doc. # 

82 at 17.) To the extent that this could theoretically be construed as a request for an injunction 

requiring a less than “comprehensive” SEIS for anything other than the entire Beltline, Plaintiff’s 

arguments on summary judgment do not support such relief. 

16 Direct impacts “are caused by an action and occur at the same time and place.” 40 

C.F.R. § 1508.8(a). 

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change is relevant to the Eastern Section. The Re-evaluation states: 

Since the approval of the 1997 FEIS and 1999 ROD, the 

typical section of the project has changed. A four-lane typical 

section was shown in the 1997 FEIS. As currently designed, 

the roadway would include a six lane section - three, 12-foot 

travel lanes in each direction with a 26-foot median and 14-

foot outside shoulders (with 12 feet being paved). However, 

the roadway would be graded for an eight lane section and 

will ultimately consists of four, 12-foot travel lanes in each 

direction with a 26-foot median and 12-foot outside shoulders 

(with 10 feet being paved). This change in the typical section 

does not, however, increase the footprint of the roadway due 

to the decrease in the median width from what was shown in 

the 1997 FEIS and 1999 ROD. Refer to Figures 3a and 3b for 

each of the typical sections discussed above. 

(USACOE000549.) 

 Plaintiff argues that “there is nothing in the record that substantiates Defendants’ 

claims that there will be zero increase in project footprint throughout [the Beltline’s] 52-

mile length.” (Doc. # 170 p. 4). However, basic arithmetic, as well as the figures 

representing typical sections that were referenced in the Re-evaluation, support the 

conclusion that typical sections of the former four-lane design do not have a larger 

footprint than the typical footprint of the updated design. (1997 FEIS 01250, 01252; 

2012 Re-evaluation, USACOE000549, USACOE000552-53). Envtl. Coal. of Broward 

Cnty., Inc. v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1987) (“It is enough that the [agency] 

considered all relevant factors and that there is credible evidence in the record to support 

its action.”). 

Plaintiff also argues that “there is nothing in the record that substantiates 

Defendants’ claims that . . . a decrease in the median width will have zero impact on 

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waterways and other resources.” (Doc. # 170 p. 4). However, in the 2012 ReEvaluation, Defendants did not claim that the design change to eight lanes would have 

“zero impact on waterways and other resources.” The standard for whether a SEIS is 

required is not whether a design change will have “zero” environmental impact or 

whether impacts from the design change would be identical to those considered in the 

FEIS. The Highway Defendants are not obligated to produce hydrologic studies to 

demonstrate that the additional lanes of highway will result in “zero” impacts or impacts 

that are “identical” to those considered in the FEIS. Instead, the applicable standard 

requires the Highway Defendants to take a hard look at the relevant factors and determine 

whether the change in design will result in “significant” impact that was not already 

considered in the FEIS. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 373-74; Froehlke, 816 F.2d at 

210 (“[N]ot every new circumstance, however small, requires filing a SEIS; the new 

circumstance must present a seriously different picture of the environmental impact of the 

proposed project from what was previously envisioned.”). 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the Re-evaluation did take into consideration 

whether increased stormwater runoff from paving the width of the road and clearing 

vegetation for the right-of-way will result in significant environmental impacts to 

waterways that were not already considered in the 1997 FEIS. (USACOE000608.) 

ALDOT and FHWA considered numerous impacts due to the updated road design. (E.g., 

USACOE000549 (“Table 3 provides a summarization/comparison of the direct project 

impacts to all resources as reported in the FEIS and to any changes in impacts resulting 

from the design changes discussed in Section 5.0.”).) While acknowledging that impact 

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to water quality is dependent in part on the amount of land that will be converted to a 

paved surface (USACOE000608), the Re-evaluation concludes that there would not be 

any “substantial” long-term adverse impacts to water quality. (USACOE000607 

(“Quality and quantity of storm water runoff would be altered by the proposed project. 

The potential impacts on surface water quality would occur in two ways 1) direct effects 

from construction, and 2) effects from long-term operation of the roadway;” 

USACOE000606-09 (discussing long-term water quality impacts of the project due to 

paving the roadway and removing vegetation).) Based on various design, permitting, and 

monitoring requirements for minimizing the impacts of the project on water quality, 

including stormwater management plans that “will minimize impacts from changes in the 

quantity and quality of runoff during the long-term operation of the roadway,” the Reevaluation concludes that “impacts to water quality as a result of the proposed project 

remain unchanged from what was presented in the FEIS and ROD.” (USACOE000608-

09.) 

Thus, the Highway Defendants did take a hard look at the environmental impacts 

due to paving the road surface, and they articulated a satisfactory explanation for their 

conclusion that establishes a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 

made and is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the decision not to issue a SEIS on the 

basis of the added lanes was not arbitrary and capricious. 

E.2.ii. Alignment Shifts

Plaintiff argues that changes in the proposed route of the Beltline are significant 

changes that require issuance of a SEIS. The Highway Defendants considered the 

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environmental impacts of alignment shifts in the eastern section and determined that 

those changes did not necessitate a SEIS. (USACOE000558-63.) As explained in the 

Re-evaluation, the routing changes were either slight and located within the original 

study area of the FEIS, or were made for the express purpose of reducing environmental 

impacts, or had been subjected to studies that indicated that no significant impacts would 

result from the shift and that the shifts would reduce impacts to open water. Id. Plaintiff 

does not offer any argument as to why those findings are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or as to 

why these routing changes necessitate their requested relief, i.e., a comprehensive SEIS 

evaluating all impacts of the entire Northern Beltline project. The Highway Defendants 

met the “hard look” requirements of examining the relevant data and articulating an 

explanation for their decision regarding alignment shifts in the eastern section that is not 

clearly erroneous. 

Plaintiff also argues that changes in the proposed route of the Beltline in the 

western section are significant changes that require issuance of a SEIS. (Doc. # 164 at 

28.) As the Highway Defendants stated in the Re-evaluation, however, the design of the 

western section is in its early stages, the precise alignment of the western section has not 

been finalized, and further studies will be necessary before determining which (if any, or 

all) portions of the western section will require a SEIS. (USACOE000558.) Plaintiff 

appears to agree with the conclusion that further consideration of the impacts of the 

design changes in the western section is necessary. Further, in approving the 2012 ReEvaluation, FHWA specifically provided that “ALDOT may not proceed at this time with 

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any activities in the western portions of the project” until additional studies were 

completed to evaluate the impacts of the alignment shifts in the western portion and to 

determine if a SEIS is needed as a result of those alignment shifts. (USACOE000513.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the Highway Defendants 

failed to examine the relevant data or that the decision to engage in further study is the 

product of clear error, and Plaintiff’s argument that alignment shifts in the western 

section require a SEIS is not ripe for review. 

E.2.iii. Worsening Water Quality In Area Streams 

Plaintiff argues that, since the issuance of the FEIS, numerous streams in the 

Black Warrior and Cahaba River basins have experienced worsening water quality. 

Plaintiff does not provide any analysis regarding which of these streams would be 

affected by construction of the eastern section; thus, to an unknown extent, this argument 

pertains to the matter of the necessity of a SEIS for the western section, an issue that has 

not been the subject of a final agency action and is not ripe for review. 

Plaintiff argues that, because worsening water quality is a significant “change in 

the Northern Beltline’s environment,” the fact of worsening water quality necessitates a 

SEIS for the entire project. (Doc. # 164 at 28-29.) Not every change in the environment, 

however momentous, requires issuance of a SEIS. “[T]he key to whether a 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is necessary is not whether the area has 

undergone significant change, but whether the proposed roadwork will have a significant 

impact on the environment in a manner not previously evaluated and considered.” S. 

Trenton Residents, 176 F.3d at 663; see also 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 

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1502.9(c)(ii). The Highway Defendants considered the fact of worsening water quality 

and the extent to which worsening water quality and the project had any bearing on one 

another, and, to the extent that reasonably available information allowed,17 the Highway 

Defendants concluded that “appreciable differences in water quality are not anticipated 

with and without the construction of the project with implementation” of various 

mitigation measures. (USACOE000695; see also USACOE000520-21; 

USACOE000606-09; USACOE000654-63; USACOE000668-69; USACOE000680; 

USCOE000690-91, USCOE000695; USACOE000700-10.) Plaintiff does not present 

any argument to show that the Highway Defendants’ conclusion in this regard was 

arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the 

Highway Defendants failed to take a hard look at effects of the project as it relates to 

worsening water quality in streams.18

                                                             17 As the design of the Beltline is revised, more detailed information about the direct 

impacts to water quality will be available. The Highway Defendants will continue to develop 

mitigation measures and to work with COE to determine the direct impacts of the project on 

water quality throughout the process. (See USACOE000608; USACOE000691; see also

USACOE004844 (in response to suggestion that COE and ALDOT work together to make 

certain determinations regarding the potential indirect effects of the entire Beltline, explaining 

that “ALDOT has a general idea of the footprint for the remainder of the Beltline, but final 

engineering is not complete and on the ground waters of the US determinations have not been 

conducted. This is because the funding is not available to get this far along in the planning 

stages. They have a general idea of the direct impacts, but until they get to the stage where they 

have the funding for in-depth studies, this type of project planning cannot be conducted at this 

time. The Corps will work with ALDOT when the appropriate time comes.”). 

18 Additional arguments raised by Plaintiff regarding indirect and cumulative effects 

relating to water quality are discussed in Section V.E.2.x. In addition, Section V.E.2.i. addresses 

Plaintiff’s argument that a comprehensive SEIS is necessary to consider the water quality 

impacts of increased stormwater runoff from paving the width of the road and clearing 

vegetation for the right-of-way. 

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E.2.iv. Newly Listed Endangered Species and Indirect and Cumulative Impacts to 

 Endangered Species 

 Plaintiff argues that, since 1997, at least eight species in the vicinity of the Beltline 

have been newly listed as endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act. In 

addition, Plaintiff argues that federally-protected critical habitat has been designated in 

Jefferson County for the vermillion darter and several freshwater mussels. (Doc. # 164 at 

39; USACOE000521.) Plaintiff argues that the identification of additional endangered 

species constitutes new information or a significant change in the Northern Beltline’s 

environment that necessitates issuing a SEIS for the entire project. (Doc. # 164 at 28-29.) 

Not all of the federally protected species at issue are necessarily located in the area 

of the project affected by the eastern section, but Plaintiff supplies no analysis regarding 

which of these endangered species it believes would be affected by construction of the 

eastern section; thus, to an unknown extent, Plaintiff’s argument pertains to matters 

reserved for further study and the necessity of a SEIS for the western section, an issue 

that is not ripe for review. Further, Plaintiff has failed to establish (or even argue) that 

the entire Northern Beltline must be analyzed as a whole to properly address the impact 

of the Beltline on any particular endangered species. 

Not every piece of new information or change in circumstances that is “relevant to 

environmental concerns” requires issuance of a SEIS. The existence of newly identified 

endangered species is a “significant new circumstance[]” that requires issuance of a SEIS 

only if it “has a bearing on the [project] or its impacts” and “would result in significant 

environmental impacts not evaluated in the EIS.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 

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1502.9(c)(ii); Environmental Impact and Related Procedures, 52 FR 32646-01 (noting 

that § 772.130(a) “is intended to distinguish, for example, between new information that 

may be very important or interesting, and thus, significant in one context, such as to the 

scientific community” and information that “should not be considered ‘significant’ so as 

to trigger preparation of a supplemental EIS because the information does not result in a 

significant change in the anticipated environmental impacts of the proposed action”). 

 In the Re-evaluation, the Highway Defendants considered the direct, indirect, and 

cumulative impacts of the project in light of the newly listed threatened and endangered 

species. (USACOE000521-22; USACOE00625-27; USACOE000630; 

USACOE000654-55; USACOE000663; USACOE000671; USACOE000682-83; 

USACOE000690-95; USACOE000710-11; USACOE000712-13; USACOE716). Based 

on data and studies available at the time of the Re-evaluation, the Highway Defendants 

concluded that the project would not have a significant impact on federally protected 

species. (USACOE000521-22; USACOE000627-28.) The Highway Defendants also 

committed to conducting further surveys of endangered species “once more detailed 

design is available” for the western portion and also for the portions of the project in the 

eastern section outside the area between SR 79 and SR 75, which had recently been 

subjected to an updated survey. (USACOE000522; USACOE000627-28; 

USACOE000712-13; USACOE000716; USACOE001107.) 

In coordinating with the Highway Defendants for the Re-evaluation, the United 

States Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) stated that it remained “extremely 

concerned that the listed species in the area could, depending on the exact route selected, 

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experience substantial adverse impacts as a result of the direct and indirect effects” of the 

project.19 (USACOE001108 (emphasis added).) However, in reliance on the Highway 

Defendants’ agreement that additional studies would be performed on the remaining 

sections of the highway as more detailed designs became available, “[f]or purposes of the 

EIS and construction of the initial segment between SR-75 and 79,” USFWS concurred 

with the finding that “this project is not likely to adversely affect listed species.” 

(USACOE001107; see also USACOE000521-22; USACOE000627-28.) 

Rather than taking specific issue with the factors and data that the Highway 

Defendants considered or the conclusion they reached with respect to the indirect and 

cumulative effects of the project on threatened and endangered species, Plaintiff merely 

contends that those effects “should be analyzed,” and they were. 

Plaintiff points out that, in the Re-evaluation, the Highway Defendants stated that 

“the proposed project is anticipated to induce growth and affect land use and land use 

patterns, although to what degree is uncertain due to current sewer and financial problems 

being experienced by Jefferson County . . . . This growth, coupled with past development 

and transportation projects is anticipated to have some cumulative effects on water 

quality, threatened and endangered species, and critical habitat.” (USACOE000523.) 

                                                             19 In its summary judgment brief, Plaintiff argues that USFWS has “repeatedly raised 

concerns about the project’s indirect and cumulative impacts.” (Doc. # 164 at 41.) In support of 

this statement, Plaintiff cites a March 9, 2011 letter from USFWS to FHWA expressing concern 

that, “Since the completion of the Projects initial [FEIS] in 1997 there has been one re-evaluation 

study completed for a single segment in 2006. Given the length of time since the original EIS 

and a re-evaluation coupled with the ongoing planning process for the entire multi-segment 

Project the Service would like to request that a supplemental EIS and an indirect and Cumulative 

Impacts Analysis be prepared to assist in our environmental review and comment for this 

Project.” (AR 9918-19.) The March 9, 2011 letter is of limited relevance because it was sent 

prior to the completion of the 2012 Re-evaluation. (USACOE001108.) 

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However, the potential for “some effects” is not the same thing as evidence of 

“significant environmental effects.” As UFWS stated, the significance of the Beltline’s 

effects on endangered species will depend on the exact route selected; however, the exact 

route has not yet been selected, and additional endangered species studies will be 

conducted as more detailed designs for the exact route of the Beltline became available. 

The Highway Defendants made their finding of significance (with which USFWS 

concurred) on the basis of the studies that were reasonably available, and those studies do 

not demonstrate that the Northern Beltline will have a significant environmental effect on 

threatened and endangered species. Plaintiff has not addressed any specific error in the 

Highway Defendants’ analysis. 

Accordingly, to the extent that issues related to federally protected species are ripe 

for review, Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the Highway Defendants failed to 

take a hard look or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding whether the existence of 

newly listed endangered species necessitated a SEIS, or whether the indirect and 

cumulative effects of the project would have a significant effect on threatened and 

endangered species. 

E.2.v. Floodplains

Since the issuance of the FEIS, the number of floodplains mapped by the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) that will be crossed or encroached upon by 

the Northern Beltline has increased from 14 in 1997 to 54 in 2012 due to alignment 

changes in the western section and due to the development of conceptual interchange 

configurations, tie-ins, and side road relocations along the entire Beltline. 

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(USACOE000518.) Plaintiff does not provide any analysis regarding which of the 

additional floodplains would be crossed or encroached upon by design changes in the 

eastern section; thus, to an unknown extent, this issue pertains to the matter of the 

necessity of a SEIS for the western section, an issue that is not ripe for review. 

The Highway Defendants considered the significance of the direct, indirect, and 

cumulative impacts of the project with respect to the additional floodplain crossings and 

encroachments. (USACOE000518; USACOE000571-72; USACOE000593; 

USACOE000605-06; USACOE000653; USACOE000667-68; USACOE000680; 

USACOE000691; USACOE712-13). Plaintiff does not take issue with the factors and 

data that the Highway Defendants considered or the conclusions they reached with 

respect to the significance of the increased number of floodplain crossings and 

encroachments. Plaintiff merely contends that the fact that the project will cross 

additional floodplains is a significant change in the project’s design that necessitates the 

issuance of a SEIS. (Doc. # 164 at 39.) 

Again, not every change in the project requires the issuance of a SEIS. Changes 

require a SEIS if they are “substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to 

environmental concerns” and if those changes would result in significant environmental 

impacts that were not anticipated in the FEIS. 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 

1502.9(c)(a). The Highway Defendants noted that the additional crossings and 

encroachments “have increased from 14 to 54 due to alignment changes on the western 

portion of the project . . . and the development of conceptual interchange configurations, 

tie-ins, and side road relocations along the entire corridor (compared to the [conceptual] 

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centerline [design] that was analyzed for the FEIS.” (USACOE000518; 

USACOE000605.) Specifically, the Northern Beltline Project currently contemplates 50 

floodplain crossings and 4 encroachments. (USACOE000654.) The Highway 

Defendants also noted that “the project would be designed in such a way that it would 

have no significant encroachment on any floodplain areas.” (USACOE000605.) The 

Highway Defendants explained that the increase in the number of floodplain crossings 

and encroachments implicated in the project “is expected as design progresses from the 

conceptual centerline alignment evaluated in the 1997 FEIS.” (USACOE000606.) 

Accordingly, the Highway Defendants concluded that “no significant changes to 

anticipated impacts on FEMA mapped floodplains have occurred.” Id.; see Froehlke, 

816 F.2d at 210 (holding that, to require issuance of a SEIS, a new circumstance must 

present a seriously different picture of the environmental impact of the proposed project 

from what was previously envisioned.” (emphasis in original)). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the Highway Defendants 

failed to take a hard look at whether a SEIS was needed to address the increased number 

of floodplain crossings. 

E.2.vi. Change in Available Federal Funding

NEPA requires that an EIS must include “a detailed statement” on “alternatives to 

the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii). However, “as should be obvious even 

upon a moment’s reflection, the term ‘alternatives’ is not self-defining. To make an 

impact statement something more than an exercise in frivolous boilerplate the concept of 

alternatives must be bounded by some notion of feasibility.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 

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Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978). “Common sense also 

teaches us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’ cannot be found wanting simply 

because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by 

the mind of man. Time and resources are simply too limited to hold that an impact 

statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out every possible alternative, 

regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may have been at the time the 

project was approved.” Id. Thus, “[c]onsideration need only be given to reasonable 

alternatives.” Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 713. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 

the Highway Defendants failed to comply with NEPA’s requirement that alternatives be 

considered. Id., at 709 & n.9. 

Plaintiff argues that, in 2012, Congress passed a new transportation bill that took 

effect on October 1, 2012 (after the 2012 Re-evaluation was approved) and that “greatly 

expanded the number and types of transportation projects that can be funded.” (Doc. # 

164 at 39.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]his sea change in federal transportation funding 

greatly expands the range of practicable alternatives that would satisfy the Northern 

Beltline’s stated purposes of enhancing cross-regional accessibility and stimulating 

economic development.” Id. However, as the Federal Defendants point out (Doc. # 168 

at 41), Plaintiff did not raise this claim in its amended complaint, and summary judgment 

is due to be granted for that reason. 

Further, Plaintiff does not identify any particular alternatives that might have been 

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considered in the 2012 Re-evaluation20 but were not. Cf. Upper W. Fork Watershed 

Assoc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, U.S. Army, 414 F. Supp. 908, 920 (N.D.W. Va. 1976), aff’d 

sub nom. Upper W. Fork River Watershed Ass’n v. Corps of Eng’rs, U.S. Army, 556 F.2d 

576 (4th Cir. 1977) (“The Corps, in undertaking the authorship of the EIS, had the burden 

of meeting NEPA standards. But this does not mean that Plaintiff, in charging that the 

discussion of alternatives is inadequate, may rest upon the naked conclusion that a 

‘watershed project’ should have been listed in the EIS as an alternative.”). 

Moreover, assuming without deciding that the availability of other regional 

transportation projects can qualify as a “significant new circumstance[] . . . relevant to 

environmental concerns,” Plaintiff has not demonstrated that other available regional 

transportation projects “ha[ve] a bearing on the [project] or its impacts,” 23 C.F.R. § 

771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(ii). Viewed another way, Plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate that the Highway Defendants had a duty to take a hard look at transportation 

alternatives (1) for which funding was not available at the time the Re-evaluation was 

completed and (2) that are not specifically identified by Plaintiff in a way that would 

permit the court or the relevant agencies to determine what they are. In fact, the Highway 

Defendants have no such duty. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551 (“‘There is reason for 

concluding that NEPA was not meant to require detailed discussion of the environmental 

                                                            

20 Elsewhere in its summary judgment brief (Doc. # 164 at 54), in addressing COE’s 

consideration of the § 404 permit for the section of road between SR 79 and SR 75, Plaintiff cites 

comments made by the Southern Environmental Law Center in July 2012 and April 2013 (after 

the Re-evaluation was completed) stating that alternatives for the project would include 

extending Corridor X, the interstate connecting Birmingham and Memphis, Tennessee, farther 

into Birmingham, and pursuing 35 other transportation projects. (USACOE0002497; 

USACOE003940-58.) That argument is addressed in Section VI.B.2. 

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effects of “alternatives” put forward in comments when these effects cannot be readily 

ascertained and the alternatives are deemed only remote and speculative possibilities, in 

view of basic changes required in statutes and policies of other agencies—making them 

available, if at all, only after protracted debate and litigation not meaningfully compatible 

with the time-frame of the needs to which the underlying proposal is addressed.’” 

(quoting Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-838 (1972)). 

Accordingly, the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this 

issue. 

E.2.vii. Increased Business and Residential Relocations

 Plaintiff argues that business and residential relocation impacts across the 

Northern Beltline have increased almost twofold since the 1997 EIS. (Doc. # 164 at 39-

40.) Plaintiff does not provide any analysis regarding which of these relocations would 

be affected by construction of the eastern section as opposed to the western section, 

which is still in early design stages; thus, to an unknown extent, this argument pertains to 

the necessity of a SEIS for the western section, an issue that is not ripe for review. 

Plaintiff argues that the increase in relocations is a significant change in 

circumstance that necessitates issuing a SEIS for the entire project. (Doc. # 164 at 28-29; 

Doc. # 170 at 4-5.) However, not every changed circumstance requires issuance of a 

SEIS. The additional relocations are doubtless important to the people and communities 

they affect and thus may be “significant” in that context, but they are not “significant” in 

the context of determining whether a SEIS is necessary unless they “‘result in a 

significant change in the anticipated environmental impacts of the proposed action.’” S. 

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Trenton Residents., 176 F.3d at 664 (quoting 52 F.R. 32646, 32656 (1987)); see also 23 

C.F.R. § 771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(ii). 

In the 1997 FEIS, the Highway Defendants noted that, “since the project consists 

of constructing a new roadway through or near developed areas, relocation impacts are 

unavoidable.” (AR01294.) At that time, the Highway Defendants found that the 

preferred alternative route for the Northern Beltline would “potentially impact 279 

residences, 13 businesses,” and one non-profit, and stated that “[t]hese numbers will 

likely decrease as efforts to reduce locations will be made during the design phase of the 

project.” (AR0124.) However, the Highway Defendants also noted that “[t]he number of 

relocations required by each alternative is an estimate, as the exact alignment for the road 

is not yet determined. . . . The actual number of relocations will likely change as the 

alignment is adjusted to minimize impacts. This will be determined during the location 

phase of the project.” (AR01321.) 

In 2010, the Highway Defendants undertook updated relocation studies confirming 

that, since the FEIS, the number of relocations had increased from a total of 293 to a total 

of 520 (485 residences, 35 businesses, and 0 nonprofits). (USACOE000586.) In the 2012 

Re-evaluation, the Highway Defendants considered the direct, indirect, and cumulative 

impacts of those relocations. (USACOE000515-16; USACOE000569; USACOE000575-

76; USACOE000586-88; USACOE000663-64; USACOE678; USACOE000741-42; 

USACOE001983-1990.) The Highway Defendants examined the causes of the increased 

number of relocations and found that those relocations were the result of more detailed 

design and new, scattered residential and commercial construction. (USACOE586.) The 

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Highway Defendants noted that, because of the alignment changes that had occurred 

since the 1997 FEIS, the number of relocations did not increase as much as it would have 

if the alignment had remained the same as was contemplated in the 1997 FEIS. 

(USACOE586.) The Highway Defendants also noted that adequate replacement housing 

and funding for relocations was available for all relocations. (USACOE586.) Further, 

the Highway Defendants found that the relocations would not disproportionately affect 

minority and low income populations. (USACOE588.) 

Accordingly, and as demonstrated in FHWA’s summary judgment brief (Doc. # 

168 at 40), the Highway Defendants did not violate NEPA by failing to take a hard look 

at whether the additional relocation of 206 residences and 10 businesses over the course 

of building the 52-mile Beltline represented a significant new circumstance that 

warranted issuance of a SEIS. Moreover, Plaintiff has not carried its burden to 

demonstrate that the additional relocations require the comprehensive relief it requests: a 

SEIS addressing all direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts of the entire 

Northern Beltline. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (noting significance of an action depends 

on its context and intensity). 

E.2.viii. Increased Cost Estimate of Constructing Beltline

In the 1997 FEIS, the Highway Defendants found that the preferred alternative 

route for the Beltline had “the lowest right-of-way costs ($90.80 million) and the lowest 

cost per mile ($12.91 million). . . . Total cost was not a significant factor in 

recommending a preferred alternative because overall, the difference in total costs among 

the alternatives is relatively minor.” (AR 1203.) As of March 28, 2011, the project was 

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expected to have a total cost of $5.4 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars, with an 

estimated completion date of 2048. (AR16782.) The Re-evaluation disclosed updated 

cost estimates for the project (USACOE000719-33) and, where the cost of the Beltline 

was considered, the Re-evaluation did not rely on the cost estimates in the 1997 FEIS. 

(See USACOE001209-1249.) However, Plaintiff argues that the post-1997 increase in 

the estimated cost21 of the total project is itself a significant change in circumstance 

necessitating a comprehensive SEIS for the entire Beltline. 

An increase in the estimated total project cost is not, without more, a “significant” 

change “relevant to environmental concerns” that requires a SEIS. The necessity of a 

supplement “turns on the value of the new information to the still pending 

decisionmaking process.” Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 374. Only if the increased 

cost will cause the remaining federal action to “‘affec[t] the quality of the human 

environment’ in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a 

supplemental EIS must be prepared.” Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 374 (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 4332(c)); see also 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(ii). Project 

cost may be relevant to environmental concerns and the quality of the human 

environment insofar as the cost of the project is a factor in (1) the evaluation of the 

relative environmental and economic costs and benefits of the project and in (2) the 

selection of project alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23; Sand, 692 F.2d at 1011-12. 

                                                             21 Plaintiff does not make any effort to explain the exact amount of actual increase in cost 

between the 1997 estimate (which may or may not be in 1997 dollars) and the current estimate, 

which is in year-of-expenditure dollars. For purposes of this opinion, the court assumes, as do the 

parties, that the estimated cost of construction has increased. 

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The decision to proceed with a project in light of relative costs and benefits of the 

project is among the “fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress 

and in the state legislatures [that] are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts 

under the guise of judicial review of agency action.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); S. Louisiana Envtl. Council, Inc. 

v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that “determination of economic 

benefits and costs that are tangential to environmental consequences are within th[e] wide 

area of agency discretion” in policymaking decisions). “Over time, . . . economic 

realities do change. But once Congress has authorized a project, it is not for the courts to 

review its economic justification.” Id. at 1014-15. “NEPA . . . permits, at most, a 

narrowly focused, indirect review of the economic assumptions underlying” an agency’s 

consideration of a project. Id. When the economic realities of a project change 

significantly over time, a court may evaluate the economic justification for a project only 

if the plaintiff demonstrates that the economic considerations of the project have become 

so grossly distorted as to impair fair consideration of the environmental factors against 

which the economic considerations have been weighed. Id. at 1011-12, 1015. Plaintiff 

has made no such showing in this case. 

Plaintiff also has failed to show that the increase in total project cost necessitates a 

SEIS to reevaluate project alternatives. In the 1997 FEIS, the agencies concluded that the 

total cost of each alternative was not a significant factor in choosing one alternative over 

another, because the total cost of each alternative was roughly equal. (AR 1203.) 

Plaintiff submits no evidence and no argument that the relative costs of each alternative 

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evaluated in the FEIS have changed significantly or are now so different as to require 

reconsideration of the alternatives. Moreover, the updated cost estimates for the current 

Beltline alignment could only be meaningful for evaluating alternatives if Defendants are 

obligated to perpetually and at every stage of environmental review create updated 

designs and cost estimates for the previously rejected alternative routes for the entire 

Northern Beltline in order to re-compare all of the alternatives. Not even this Plaintiff 

argues that Defendants carry such a heavy burden at every stage of the environmental 

review process. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden to show the increased cost 

of the project is relevant to environmental concerns or that the cost increase would result 

in significant environmental impacts not already evaluated in the FEIS. 

E.2.ix. Jefferson County Financial and Sewer Issues 

 Plaintiff argues that the Highway Defendants failed to take a hard look at the fact 

that, in 2011, Jefferson County, Alabama declared bankruptcy largely as a result of 

rampant fraud and public corruption that left an insurmountable debt for sewer-related 

work. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Highway Defendants failed to consider 

whether the indirect effects of Jefferson County’s ability to construct sewer infrastructure 

would limit the project’s potential to create economic growth. (Doc. # 164 at 40.) In the 

Re-evaluation, the Highway Defendants noted that Jefferson County’s sewer and 

financial problems would, to an unforseeable extent, affect the speed and timing of the 

project’s indirect and cumulative impacts on economic growth, land use, and 

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development patterns.22 After acknowledging and disclosing the uncertainties associated 

with Jefferson County’s sewer and financial problems, the Highway Defendants 

proceeded to consider the project’s environmental impacts. (See USACOE000664 

(“While other factors influence the development of an area (e.g. favorable economic 

conditions, zoning and other land use controls, water and sewer availability, and 

amenities), the link between transportation improvements and development is strong. 

Induced growth is expected to occur as a result of the proposed project; therefore, its 

effects on the surrounding environment should be [and were] analyzed.”). 

NEPA’s requirement that the Highway Defendants describe the anticipated 

environmental effects of Northern Beltline Project “is subject to a rule of reason;” the 

agencies are not required to “foresee the unforseeable.” Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., 

Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§ 4332(B) (requiring that, “to the fullest extent possible,” federal agencies must supply a 

detailed environmental impact statement that complies with NEPA); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 

                                                             22 (USACOE000523 (“As stated in the FEIS, the proposed project is anticipated to induce 

growth and affect land use and land use patterns; although to what degree is uncertain, due to 

current sewer and financial problems being experienced by Jefferson County.”); 

USACOE000651 (“Noted differences between the 2009 and 2011 [expert panel survey on land 

use and development] results” included “Jefferson County’s current sewer and financial issues 

which could limit growth severely.”); USACOE000664; USACOE000700 (“[A]ll development 

(regardless of the project) would be influenced by Jefferson County’s current sewer and financial 

issues. . . . Based on discussion with the Expert Panel, development would occur even if the 

project were not constructed; however, the project will speed the pace of development to some 

degree. To what degree this will be influenced by Jefferson County’s current sewer and financial 

problems cannot be readily determined as the outcome of the issues is not reasonably 

foreseeable.”); USACOE000715; USACOE001893; (“Some [of the surveyed experts] were 

concerned that the current sewer situation in Jefferson County may negatively affect the ability 

to service the area with sewer service but at the same time many indicated local city governments 

may initiate the service if needed.”)). 

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(“Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental 

impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 

actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such 

other actions.” (emphasis added)); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (“Indirect effects . . . are caused by 

the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably 

foreseeable.” (emphasis added)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818-19 (5th Cir. 

1975) (“In determining whether an agency has complied with [NEPA] we are governed 

by the rule of reason, i.e., we must recognize on the one hand that the Act mandates that 

no agency limit its environmental activity by the use of an artificial framework and on the 

other that the act does not intend to impose an impossible standard on the agency.” 

(footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Plaintiff has not made any argument or showing that Jefferson County’s financial 

and sewer difficulties would affect the project’s environmental impacts in some 

foreseeable way that could reasonably have been more accurately forecast and considered 

in the Re-evaluation or the 1997 FEIS. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that 

the Highway Defendants failed to take a hard look at the issue. 

E.2.x. Indirect and Cumulative Impacts

 The 1997 FEIS did not include an analysis of the indirect23 and cumulative24

                                                             23 In contrast to direct impacts, “indirect [impacts] . . . are caused by the action and are 

later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects 

may include growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern 

of land use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other 

natural systems, including ecosystems.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). 

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effects of the Northern Beltline. NEPA requires that an EIS must include an analysis of 

the indirect and cumulative effects of a project and that public review and comment 

procedures be followed before a decision is made. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16; 40 C.F.R. § 

1508.27(b)(7); see also Froehlke, 816 F.2d at 212 (“As a general matter, we do not 

condone post hoc review of, or rationalizations for, decisions already made. We 

recognize and assign great importance to NEPA’s review and comment procedures for 

obtaining and incorporating opposing viewpoints into the final EIS, and thus into the 

heart of the decision process.”).25 

This case is in an unusual posture because the statute of limitations has run on any 

argument that the 1997 FEIS was deficient for failure to comply with NEPA’s 

requirement to include an indirect and cumulative effects analysis. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. 

Recognizing this fact (Doc. # 170 at 2), Plaintiff does not expressly argue that the 1997 

FEIS should be supplemented because it is inadequate. However, Plaintiff does argue 

that an SEIS is necessary because all indirect and cumulative impacts of the Northern 

Beltline “should be analyzed” and “should be considered.” (Doc. # 170 at 42-43.) To the 

                                                                                                                                                                                                24 “Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the 

incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 

future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such 

other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant 

actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 

25 The Re-evaluation is not an EIS, EA, or other NEPA document. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 

(defining “environmental impact statement”); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.10 (defining “environmental 

documents”). Plaintiff does not argue that the Highway Defendants should have conducted an 

EA to analyze whether a SEIS was needed to address changed circumstances or new 

information, including the indirect and cumulative effects analysis. See 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(c); 

40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(b); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1). 

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extent that Plaintiff is suggesting that failure to include indirect and cumulative effects 

analysis in the FEIS automatically requires an SEIS, that argument is barred by the 

statute of limitations. To the extent that Plaintiff is suggesting generally that the 2012

Re-evaluation is deficient because indirect and cumulative effects “should be 

considered,” that argument misses the mark because the Highway Defendants did

consider the indirect and cumulative impacts for the Northern Beltline. (See

USCOE000522-23, USCOE000567 (“The indirect effects and cumulative impacts (ICI) 

analysis for this project required additional evaluation, which is included in Sections 6.4-

6.8.”), USCOE000628-716.) 

Plaintiff also argues that all of the indirect and cumulative impacts of the entire 

Northern Beltline project must be considered “new information” because those impacts 

were not considered in the 1997 FEIS and, therefore, the Highway Defendants were 

obligated to consider whether the indirect and cumulative impacts of the project would 

have significant environmental effects that require issuance of a SEIS. The Highway 

Defendants do not dispute that the Re-evaluation required an analysis of all indirect and 

cumulative effects of the entire Northern Beltline to determine whether to issue a SEIS, 

and they did analyze those effects in the Re-evaluation.26 Accordingly, the court will 

review whether the Highway Defendants acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding 

whether the indirect and cumulative effects of the project necessitate a SEIS. 

                                                             26 Therefore, it is not necessary to consider whether, in light of the statute of limitations, 

the Highway Defendants were required to consider only “new information or circumstances” that 

arose after the FEIS was issued, 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a) (emphasis added), or whether they were 

also required to also consider whether information and circumstances that existed at the time of 

the 1997 FEIS and 1999 ROD required a SEIS. 

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Plaintiff takes issue with the Highway Defendants’ indirect and cumulative effects 

analysis by arguing the Highway Defendants failed to consider a number of specific 

indirect and cumulative impacts of the project and that the Highway Defendants used 

deficient water quality models in their analysis. (Doc. # 164 at 42.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff argues that “indirect impacts that should be analyzed include, but are not limited 

to” the following: increased impervious surfaces in the Black Warrior and Cahaba River 

watersheds from secondary construction, impacts to sewage treatment27 and water 

supplies, the costs to local governments of maintaining the Northern Beltline and 

constructing accessory infrastructure, and indirect effects of the project on sewage 

treatment and drinking water supplies. (Doc. # 164 at 42.) Plaintiff also argues that the 

Re-evaluation “fails to evaluate the indirect and cumulative effects on endangered 

species.” Further, Plaintiff argues that “the cumulative impacts of the project” must be 

evaluated in conjunction with the reasonably foreseeable impacts of the completed 

Corridor X, another highway project in the Birmingham area which will ultimately be 

Interstate 22, a limited-access interstate highway running from Birmingham to Memphis, 

Tennessee. (See USACOE000908.) (Doc. # 164 at 41-43.) 

Plaintiff’s argument that the 2012 Re-evaluation failed to adequately consider 

indirect and cumulative impacts of the Northern Beltline suffers from several terminal 

problems. First, the jurisdictional problem persists with respect to the indirect and 

                                                             27 Plaintiff does not provide any explanation of what significant environmental “impact to 

sewage treatment facilities” the project may pose that was not considered in the FEIS or the Reevaluation. Therefore, the court will not consider this argument. 

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cumulative effects of the western section. (See USACOE000691 (“For the cumulative 

effects analysis, the area of direct impact is defined as the ROW of the current alignment. 

. . . [A]lignment shifts may occur, particularly on those areas where preliminary design is 

in the early stages. For project sections where alignment shifts occur, additional 

consideration of indirect impacts and cumulative effects may be needed prior to 

advancing those sections of the project.”); see also USACOE000558; USACOE000567). 

No determination has been made as to whether a SEIS will be required for the western 

section, and the court has already determined in Section V.C. that the Highway 

Defendants did not violate NEPA by choosing to reserve consideration of the necessity of 

a SEIS for that section. 

Therefore, the only final agency decision that is currently subject to review is the 

decision that no SEIS is required for the eastern section, but Plaintiff does not specifically 

challenge that decision; instead, it directs its arguments at the entire Beltline as a whole, 

regardless of which sections have or have not been subject to a final agency decision at 

this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that a SEIS is required to evaluate all of the 

indirect and cumulative effects of the entire Beltline implicates issues that were not the 

subject of a final agency action and are not ripe for review. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

met its burden to demonstrate noncompliance with NEPA, and the Highway Defendants 

are entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 

Further, Plaintiff utterly fails to acknowledge that the 2012 Re-evaluation did

consider the indirect and cumulative impacts of increased impervious surfaces in the 

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Black Warrior and Cahaba River watersheds from secondary construction.28 (Doc. # 170 

at 42-43.) For example: 

 USACOE000661 (identifying indirect ecological effects of the project, including 

“increased runoff from the additional impervious surface that would result from 

development”); 

 USACOE000663 (“Indirect effects could also occur to the area’s water quality 

including the impaired streams. These impacts include degradation to the area’s 

water quality due to increased runoff from the additional impervious surface that 

would result from development. With this anticipated increase in impervious 

surface, there is potential for future impacts to water quality. Due to the sensitivity 

of the overall aquatic habitat and the protected status of the species known to 

                                                             28 For example, Plaintiff argues that, “[w]hile the 2012 Re-evaluation acknowledges that 

there could be future increases in stormwater runoff levels and non-point source pollution due to 

induced development, it completely fails to analyze the extent of these impacts.” (Doc. # 164 at 

42.) This is but one of many examples of Plaintiff misstating the evidence. Alleging “complete” 

failure to do a thing is too easy from a proof perspective, and can be a tactic that encourages a 

fact-finder to be lazy. With each allegation that the agencies “completely failed” to consider a 

certain issue, a conscientious court must closely examine the administrative record (which in this 

case is both highly technical and exceedingly voluminous) to verify whether Plaintiff’s statement 

regarding the absence of any administrative consideration of a particular subject is in fact 

supported by the record. Defendants’ briefs have been useful in aiding the court in this 

endeavor, but the court is ultimately responsible for reviewing the entire administrative record to 

verify whether the facts regarding what the agency did or did not consider are as the parties 

represent them to be. See Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 378 (“[I]n the context of reviewing 

a decision not to supplement an EIS, courts should not automatically defer to the agency’s 

express reliance on an interest in finality without carefully reviewing the record and satisfying 

themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the 

significance-or lack of significance-of the new information.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the court’s “duty is to ensure that 

the agency took a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of the proposed action” is a 

duty that “requires the court to consider not only the final documents prepared by the agency, but 

also the entire administrative record”); see also Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 

395 F.3d 533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that cross-motions for summary judgment “must 

be considered separately,” and “each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine 

issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); Griffis v. 

Delta Family-Care Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1984) (adopting order of district 

judge on summary judgment) (“A court may discover questions of material fact even though 

both parties, in support of cross-motions for summary judgment, have asserted that no such 

questions exist. . . . . Thus, before the court can consider the legal issues raised by the parties on 

cross-motions for summary judgment, it must have no doubt as to the relevant facts that are 

beyond dispute.”). 

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occur, all of the indirect effects identified have the potential to affect water 

quality, habitat and protected aquatic species and will be studied in further detail 

(see Section 6.5.6).”); 

 USACOE000668-69 (“Future increases in storm water runoff levels and NPS 

pollution could occur due to induced development. . . . Water quality modeling 

was undertaken in order to determine the proposed project’s potential cumulative 

impact on water quality (refer to Section 6.6.6 and Appendix N for detailed 

information). . . . When comparing the difference between the change from the 

baseline (existing) of the build and no build (2035) scenarios, the results show the 

pollutant loads for total suspended solids (TSS) (sedimentation) decrease within 

the AOI [i.e., the area of the project’s environmental influence] while the loads for 

nitrogen (TN) and phosphorous (TP) increase. Results of the model show that TN 

and TP loads would increase even if the proposed project is not constructed. The 

change in the TN and TP load increase between the 2035 build and 2035 no build 

scenarios is generally less than two percent, and for most cases is 0.5 percent or 

less. It should be noted that the water quality model is not able to take into account 

the beneficial effects of BMPs, so these numbers represent a conservative estimate 

of what increases in TN and TP loads would be. . . . Appreciable differences in 

water quality are not anticipated with and without the construction of the project 

with implementation of Jefferson County’s Storm Water Management program, 

ALDOT’s monitoring program and ADEM’s erosion control guidelines for 

construction sites.”); 

 USACOE000680 (“Future increases in storm water runoff levels and NPS 

pollution would occur due to induced development. The network of future 

roadways and subdivision streets, in conjunction with the proposed project, would 

contribute to increased runoff as impermeable surface area increases. The density 

and type of development within the AOI would contribute to the overall changes 

in runoff. . . . [W]ater quality will be carried forward for consideration of 

cumulative effects. Cumulative impacts to streams will also be discussed in this 

section.”); 

 USACOE682 (“[W]etlands will be carried forward for consideration of 

cumulative effects. Streams will not be assessed here but will be discussed with 

respect to water quality and federally protected species/critical habitat in their 

respective sections.”); 

 USACOE000700-701 (“Cumulative effects to water quality and streams would 

include direct and indirect effects discussed in Section 6.5.6 as well as the effects 

caused by the projects listed in Section 6.5.5. It should be noted that the effects to 

water quality and streams caused by the projects listed in Section 6.6.5 would 

occur even if the proposed project were not constructed as it is anticipated these 

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transportation improvements will be constructed even if the proposed project is 

not. The most common cause and effect issue is increased quantity and quality of 

runoff, increased sedimentation, and direct impacts to streams that resulted from 

past development and linear transportation projects, that will result from the 

proposed action and that is anticipated to occur due to future development and 

transportation projects.”); 

 USACOE000701-02 (“Water quality modeling was undertaken in order to 

determine what the proposed project’s potential cumulative impact on water 

quality might be. . . . After consultation with ALDOT, the Pollutant Load 

(PLOAD) model was chosen as the preferred modeling platform for this project. 

PLOAD . . . estimates [non-point source] pollution at watershed and subwatershed levels. . . . For this study, nitrogen (IN), phosphorus (TP) and 

sedimentation (TSS) were estimated using the PLOAD model, which is considered 

to be a screening-level tool to assess large geographic units for initiating 

permitting and impact discussion and is part of the BASINS (Better Assessment 

Science Integrating point & Non-point Sources) modeling system promulgated 

through the USEPA. PLOAD does not calculate in-stream effects, nor was there 

any attempt to estimate the effects of [best management practices] on the pollutant 

loading figures . . . . Within the PLOAD [water quality] model, the Simple Method 

was used to calculate the pollutant loads for the Baseline scenario and the five 

Build scenarios. This method requires input data consisting of watershed area, 

land use types and areas, pollutant loading rate (Event Mean Concentration), the 

impervious factor, annual precipitation data, and ratio of storms generating runoff. 

. . . PLOAD outputs generated for the baseline scenario and the five Build 

scenarios are shown in Appendix N. These figures and tables include summaries 

of the total pollutant loads for total suspended solids (TSS), total nitrogen (TN), 

and total phosphorus (TP) by basin and hydro logic unit. The appendix also 

contains additional supporting figures. Please note that although located outside 

the AOI, portions of the Coosa River Basin were included in the PLOAD model.”) 

 USACOE000710 (“The proposed project is expected to have some cumulative 

impact to water quality and streams. Results of the water quality modeling show 

that, generally, the pollutant loads for TSS decrease in each subbasin of the AOI 

[i.e., areas of impact] by 2035 while the loads for TN and TP increase. However, 

although the model shows a decrease in TSS, the model does not take into account 

the in-stream effects of storm water runoff flows. Therefore it is anticipated that 

with the increased quantity and quality of runoff expected to occur as a direct and 

indirect result of the project and the increased runoff expected to occur as part of 

the reasonably foreseeable projects discussed in Section 6.2.5, that in-stream 

erosion and sedimentation will lead to increased TSS loads within the AOI.”). 

At the same time that Plaintiff argues that the Highway Defendants failed to 

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consider the indirect and cumulative impacts of the Northern Beltline on water quality, 

Plaintiff also contends that the Highway Defendants’ chosen water quality model 

“deliberately ignored the impact of in-stream sediment.” (Doc. # 170 at 42.) The record 

does not support Plaintiff’s contention. The Highway Defendants’ consideration of the 

effects of development on water quality included water-quality modeling, and the 

Highway Defendants explained the basis for its choice of a water-quality model. 

(USACOE000663, USACOE000668-69; USACOE000700-710; USACOE1955; 

USACOE1959). The chosen water quality model accounted for total nitrogen, total 

phosphorus, and total suspended solids (sedimentation) as a result of runoff from 

variations in projected development and impervious surfaces under different scenarios, 

including build and no-build scenarios. (USACOE000702). The model projected that 

total suspended solids would decrease with increased development because urban land 

uses generate smaller sediment loads from runoff than less-developed areas due to the 

higher amount of impervious surfaces in urban areas. (USACOE000702, 

USACOE000710). However, as the Highway Defendants fully acknowledged and 

explained in the Re-evaluation, the chosen model’s projection for total suspended solids 

underestimated the ultimate effect of development because the model did not account for 

in-stream erosion caused by intensified stormwater runoff flows due to the increased 

impervious surfaces typical of urbanized areas. (USACOE000710). The Highway 

Defendants concluded that, “[t]herefore, it is anticipated that with the increased quantity 

and quality of runoff expected to occur as a direct and indirect result of the project and 

the increased runoff expected to occur . . . that in-stream erosion and sedimentation will 

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lead to increased [total suspended solid] loads within the [area of impact.]” 

(USACOE000710). 

Wholly contrary to the record, Plaintiff contends that the 2012 Re-evaluation 

contains an “admission” that the model “was not designed to analyze stream impacts” 

and that the Highway Defendants “never used modeling or any other technique to 

evaluate stream impacts.” (Doc. # 170 at 6.) The Highway Defendants did state that 

“PLOAD does not calculate in-stream effects,” (USACOE000702), but they further 

clarified that the “in-stream effects” to which they referred were the effects of “TSS loads 

due to in-stream erosion” caused by the intensification of storm water runoff flows in 

increasingly urbanized areas. (USACOE000710.) The model did calculate for changes 

to sediment loads due to the effects of urbanization and increased impervious surfaces on 

“land-based soil erosion.” (USACOE000702.) Thus, the statement in the Re-evaluation 

that the model failed to calculate for “in-stream effects” does not reasonably suggest a 

failure to consider or calculate the project’s effects on water quality in streams. 

On the contrary, the record makes it painfully obvious that the Highway 

Defendants did consider the effects of the project on the quality of water in streams, and 

it is not clear why Plaintiff argues otherwise.29 Perhaps Plaintiff misunderstands the 

                                                             29As has happened in a number of other instances in this case, only some of which are 

noted in this Opinion, Plaintiff’s mischaracterization of the record to argue that the Highway 

Defendants “completely failed” to consider a potentially significant environmental impact 

required the devotion of a disproportionate amount of judicial time and resources to determining 

what the record says and what it truly means. The 2012 Re-evaluation is quite clear about what 

“in-stream effects” the model did and did not take into calculation, and about how the model’s 

projection of the Beltline’s impact on sediment loads in streams should be evaluated in light of 

the model’s acknowledged shortcomings. (USACOE000702; USACOE000710.) 

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difference between in-stream erosion and sediment and other pollutants that have been 

carried into the stream from overland runoff (a difference made clear by the discussion in 

the Re-evaluation itself), or perhaps Plaintiff was simply careless and imprecise in 

mixing and matching hydrological terms to make broad statements that are incorrect. 

Whatever the reason, in Plaintiff’s briefs, the Highway Defendants’ acknowledgement 

that they did not model for “TSS loads due to in-stream erosion” (USACOE000710) 

morphs progressively (and inappropriately) into “evidence” that the Highway Defendants 

failed to consider the impact of “in-stream sediment” (Doc. # 164 at 42), then “in-stream 

impacts” (Doc. # 164 at 42; Doc. # 170 at 6), and then all “stream impacts” of the project 

in general (Doc. # 170 at 6). 

Despite the fact that the model did not calculate for TSS due to in-stream erosion, 

the Highway Defendants did not “ignore” the impacts of in-stream erosion on water 

quality in streams. Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the water quality model

“ignored” those impacts, but Plaintiff has not explained why it would have been 

necessary for the Highway Defendants to analyze in-stream erosion by using a different 

computer model or any model at all. See City of Oxford, Ga. v. F.A.A., 428 F.3d 1346, 

1358 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The methodology used to make technical determinations . . . is a 

matter of agency expertise. Th[e] court’s role is simply to ensure that the agency utilized 

legally adequate procedures in applying its expertise. We therefore owe particular 

deference to the [agency’s] choice of methodologies.”). 

Plaintiff also alleges that urbanization, to which the project will contribute, will 

increase pollution and decrease groundwater recharge, thereby increasing the cost and 

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decreasing the supply of treating drinking water. However, as noted, the Highway 

Defendants did consider the impact of urbanization and pollution on water quality. 

Plaintiff has not shown that increased cost of treating drinking water or reduction in 

drinking water supply are relevant to environmental concerns, or that these factors would 

result in significant environmental impacts not already evaluated in the FEIS. 23 C.F.R. 

§ 771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(ii). 

Plaintiff has also similarly failed to demonstrate or even argue that “the cost to 

Jefferson County and affected local governments of maintaining the Northern Beltline 

and constructing accessory infrastructure” (Doc. # 164 at 42) is relevant to environmental 

concerns or would result in significant environmental impacts not already evaluated in 

the FEIS. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated those costs are relevant to whether a 

SEIS should be issued. 23 C.F.R. § 771.130(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(ii); Or. Nat. 

Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 374. 

Further, there is no basis for Plaintiff’s argument that “the Re-evaluation . . . fails 

to evaluate the indirect and cumulative effects on endangered species.” (Doc. # 164 at 

32.) The 2012 Re-evaluation did consider the indirect and cumulative impacts of the 

project on threatened and endangered species.30 (USACOE000521-22; USACOE00625-

27; USACOE000630; USACOE000654; USACOE000663; USACOE000671; 

USACOE000682-83; USACOE000690-95; USACOE000710-11; USACOE000712-13; 

                                                             30 This is yet another example of a broad misstatement of negative fact by Plaintiff. 

Technically, as the Re-evaluation acknowledges, the indirect and cumulative impacts of the 

project will be studied in more detail as more detailed designs become available for the western 

section as well as portions of the eastern section. (USACOE000627.) However, this does not 

mean that the Highway Defendants failed to consider the issue. 

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USACOE716). As the court has already explained in Section V.E.2.iv., Plaintiff has 

failed to demonstrate error in the Highway Defendants’ assessment of those effects. 

Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate error in the decision that no SEIS is required for 

the eastern section, that further environmental studies will be conducted in the eastern 

section as more detailed designs become available, or that further environmental studies 

are needed to analyze the significance of the effects of the western section on threatened 

and endangered species. The endangered aquatic species at issue do not necessarily live 

in all the water bodies in all three major watersheds that would potentially be impacted 

by the Beltline. (USACOE000625-28; USACOE692-94). However, Plaintiff has made 

no attempt to demonstrate that the entire Northern Beltline must be analyzed as a whole 

to properly address the impact of the Beltline (or even just the entire eastern section) on 

any or all of those endangered species. 

Plaintiff argues that “the cumulative impacts of the project” must be evaluated in 

conjunction with the reasonably foreseeable impacts of the completed Corridor X, 

particularly with respect to water quality. (Doc. # 164 at 41-43; USACOE00090.) The 

Re-evaluation did consider the cumulative effects of the Beltline in conjunction with 

Corridor X, particularly with respect to development at the connector between the 

Northern Beltline and Corridor X, but also generally.31 Plaintiff has not offered any 

                                                             31 (See, e.g., USACOE000649, -51 (noting, in identifying trends for use in indirect effects 

analysis, that “the construction of Corridor X and the proposed BNB will encourage further 

development towards the traditional rural and suburban areas of the county, most notably within 

the Gardendale/ Fultondale area where significant residential developments are planned or 

proposed,” that “areas of notable increase [in employment] include the Adamsville/Graysville 

area and the Mulberry Forks/ North Johns Area, both projected to increase over 100 percent with 

the completion of Corridor X,” and that “[t]hose interviewed [for the expert panel survey 

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argument or explanation as to why the Highway Defendants were required to perform a 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

regarding land use trends] indicated that the proposed project would spur new development and 

redevelopment and at a faster rate than would otherwise occur. Interchange locations located 

north and east of Corridor X are particularly favorable for accelerated development and changes 

to non-residential development patterns as a result of the proposed project.”); USACOE000664 

(noting, for purposes of analyzing cumulative impacts of “existing and future land use and the 

proposed project[‘]s potential impact on land use, development, redevelopment, rate of growth 

and the potential impacts of any new development on sensitive environmental and community 

resources (see Section 6.6.6 and Appendix M)” that “the influence of the project is expected to 

be primarily on residential development, but there could also be an influence on commercial 

development through land use conversion at . . . the Corridor X interchange,” and “that 

interchange locations north and east of Corridor X are particularly favorable for accelerated 

development and changes to non-residential development patterns as a result of the proposed 

project. These changes were generally found to be supported and even anticipated by local 

government.”); USACOE000696-99 (Section 6.6.5: “Identification of Other Reasonably 

Foreseeable Actions That May Affect Resources,” including the interchange at Corridor X); 

USACOE000700 (“Cumulative effects to water quality and streams would include direct and 

indirect effects discussed in Section 6.5.6 as well as the effects caused by the projects listed in 

Section 6.5.5. It should be noted that the effects to water quality and streams caused by the 

projects listed in Section 6.6.5 would occur even if the proposed project were not constructed as 

it is anticipated these transportation improvements will be constructed even if the proposed 

project is not.”); USACOE000710-11 (“Cumulative effects to wetlands would include direct and 

indirect effects discussed in Section 6.5.6 as well as the effects caused by the projects listed in 

Section 6.6.5. . . . Cumulative effects to T&E species and critical habitat would include indirect 

effects discussed in Section 6.5.6, as well as the effects caused by the projects listed in Section 

6.6.5. It should be noted that the effects caused by the projects listed in Section 6.6.5 would 

occur even if the proposed project were not constructed. . . . It is anticipated that with the 

increased quantity and quality of runoff expected to occur as a direct and indirect result of the 

project and the increased runoff expected to occur as part of the reasonably foreseeable projects 

discussed in Sections 6.5.6 and 6.6.5, that in-stream erosion and sedimentation will lead to 

increased sedimentation (thus resulting in decreased water quality) within the AOI.”); see also, 

e.g. USACOE000696 (“The Expert Panel, tax maps, and zoning were all used to determine 

reasonably foreseeable development within the AOI.”); USACOE000700 (“The Expert Panel 

concluded that the proposed project could change development patterns by causing relatively 

rural areas to convert to more suburban areas. . . . The project’s cumulative effect on land use 

would include direct and indirect effects discussed in Section 6.5.6 as well as the effects caused 

by the projects listed in Section 6.6.5. In sum, the proposed project’s cumulative effect on land 

use is the conversion of relatively rural and undeveloped land to residential and commercial uses 

with some potential for industrial. New residential development is already occurring or will 

occur around . . . Corridor X . . . . Based on discussion with the Expert Panel, development 

would occur even if the project were not constructed; however, the project will speed the pace of 

development to some degree. To what degree this will be influenced by Jefferson County’s 

current sewer and financial problems cannot be readily determined as the outcome of the issues 

is not reasonably foreseeable.”). 

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more detailed or more broadly scoped cumulative effects analysis of the Northern 

Beltline in conjunction with Corridor X (or, for that matter, the cumulative water quality 

effects of any or all of the other reasonably foreseeable transportation projects in the three 

watersheds potentially impacted by the 52-mile Northern Beltline). See Fritiofson v. 

Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1245 n.15 (5th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by

Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(“Obviously, we are not suggesting that at this stage of the process [i.e., determining 

whether an EIS is necessary,] a full-blown environmental analysis of the impacts of other 

actions, akin to that which they would receive if they were the subject of NEPA review, 

is necessary.”). Cf. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 413-14 (1976) 

(“[D]etermination of the extent and effect of [cumulative impacts], and particularly 

identification of the geographic area within which they may occur, is a task assigned to 

the special competency of the appropriate agencies. . . . Even if environmental 

interrelationships could be shown conclusively to extend across basins and drainage 

areas, practical considerations of feasibility might well necessitate restricting the scope of 

comprehensive statements.”). 

Moreover, the portion of Corridor X that could potentially share water quality 

impacts with the Northern Beltline is located in the western section of the Beltline. (See 

USACOE1646.) See D’Olive Bay Restoration & Pres. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps 

of Eng’rs, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1292-93 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (“A reasonable cumulative 

impacts analysis is to include . . . other actions – past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 

proposed – that have had or are expected to have impacts in the same area.” (emphasis 

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added)). At this time, the Highway Defendants have decided that the direct and indirect, 

and cumulative effects of the western beltline on water quality require further study 

pending more detailed design of that section, and the court does not have jurisdiction to 

review that decision. Corridor X is not located in the eastern section of the Northern 

Beltline (see USACOE1646), and the court has already determined that the Highway 

Defendants did not improperly segment the Beltline for purposes of determining whether 

the eastern section requires a SEIS. Plaintiff has not made any effort to show that 

Corridor X would have environmental effects in the same area as the eastern section of 

the Beltline. 

Plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate that the Highway Defendants failed 

to take a hard look at indirect and cumulative impacts or acted arbitrarily or capriciously 

in determining that no SEIS is needed for the eastern section of the Beltline. 

F. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, the Highway Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s complaint against them, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is due to 

be denied as to that complaint 

VI. ANALYSIS: THE § 404 ACTION 

 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, prohibits the discharge of 

dredged or fill material into the waters of the United States without a permit from COE. 

On September 30, 2013, COE issued a § 404 permit to ALDOT for the discharge of 

dredge and fill material into waters of the United States in conjunction with the 

construction of a 1.86-mile section of the Northern Beltline near Palmerdale, Alabama. 

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The 1.86-mile section is located roughly in the center of the eastern section of the 

Beltline for which FHWA authorized construction after conditionally approving the 2012 

Re-evaluation. 

COE’s decision to issue the permit is subject to the deferential standard of review 

set forth in the APA, pursuant to which final agency action will be set aside only if it is 

found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.” Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2008); Fund for 

Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Envtl. Coal. of Broward 

County, Inc. v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that deference to 

agency decisions is “particularly appropriate in the case of complex environmental 

statutes such as the Clean Water Act”). 

In evaluating a § 404 permit application, COE must follow the requirements of 

CWA and NEPA, as well as a number of other environmental statutes and regulations 

such as the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.). In its complaint in the § 

404 action (Doc. # 1 in case No. 2:13-cv-794), Plaintiff challenges the § 404 permit’s 

compliance with CWA and NEPA only. Plaintiff asserts four claims. First, Plaintiff 

alleges that COE and ALDOT “segmented” the Northern Beltline and violated NEPA 

because the permit application and permit were limited to the section of highway 

connecting SR 75 and SR 79. Second, Plaintiff contends that COE’s public interest 

review and analysis of alternatives violate the CWA. Third, Plaintiff contends that 

NEPA required COE and ALDOT to create a SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline. 

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that COE’s EA and FONSI violate NEPA because COE’s NEPA 

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analysis improperly “segmented” the Beltline and because COE failed to take a hard look 

at the relevant environmental factors. 

A. Count I: Plaintiff’s Claim that Application and Issuance of a Permit for the 

 1.86-Mile Section Violates Rules Against Segmentation 

 In Count I, Plaintiff contends that, by ALDOT applying for a permit for less than 

the entire Beltline, and by COE issuing a permit for the 1.86-mile section, ALDOT and 

COE improperly segmented the Northern Beltline in violation of NEPA and § 404. As 

explained at length, supra, “[t]here is a difference between ‘segmentation’ in its 

pejorative sense, and—what is within administrative discretion—breaking a complex 

investigation into manageable bits.” Hoosier Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Eng’rs, 722 F.3d 1053, 1059 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 

412–15 (1976)). While the law does not “allow an agency to segregate its actions in 

order to support a contention of minimal environmental impact,” the law also does not 

“force an agency to aggregate diverse actions to the point where problems must be 

tackled from every angle at once. To do so risks further paralysis of agency 

decisionmaking.” Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 

1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995). Massive interstate highways are not “built all at once.” 

Hoosier, 722 F.3d at 1060. Commonly, as occurred in this case, the general route of the 

highway is chosen and an EIS is developed for the project as a whole, while the costly 

process of determining precise alignment and engineering design of the highway, 

including the number, location, and design of ancillary structures such as bridges, 

culverts, and interchanges, is reserved for future development to be done for various 

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sections of the highway in turn. See id. at 1059-60. 

At each stage of the design process, the relevant agencies have a continuing duty 

to consider whether new information or changes in the environment or project design 

necessitate additional studies and NEPA documents. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 

372-73. In fact, it is often the case that advanced environmental review cannot

meaningfully occur until the designs for the various sections of the highway progress to a 

sufficiently detailed point that the necessary data can be obtained for the environmental 

analysis. This is especially true with respect to the § 404 permitting process. Generally, 

as in this case, COE coordinates with FHWA at the early stages of review when the 

initial FEIS is produced for the project as a whole. 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 8(c); see 

Hoosier, 722 F.3d at 1059-61. However, COE usually does not perform a § 404 permit 

analysis for the entire highway project all at once. Instead, because “[t]he . . . task of 

determining the optimal alignment of the highway, and the optimal location and design of 

ancillary structures, within each section to minimize wetlands damage” is “best . . . 

performed piecemeal” after the overall route of the highway has been chosen, COE will 

defer issuance of § 404 permits until designs for the various sections are developed 

enough to enable COE to “kn[ow] exactly where the new highway and its crossings and 

any other ancillary structures [are] planned to be.” Hoosier, 722 F.3d at 1060. In this 

way, COE is better able to determine the highway’s effects on wetlands and waters of the 

United States. See id. 

Thus, COE does not generally wait to begin issuing permits until all designs for all 

sections of a massive interstate highway project have been completed. Instead, § 404 

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permits are granted or denied as the analysis of the wetland effects of alternative 

configurations is completed for each segment. Id. Otherwise, COE would have to 

“either . . . devote [many] times the resources to conduct the permit analysis for all . . . 

sections at once, to the prejudice of its other assignments,” or “delay[] the start and 

completion of construction for years as a smaller staff did first section 1, and then section 

2, and so forth but did not grant a permit until it had analyzed all . . . sections.” Id. 

The practical necessity of this approach is especially evident in this case. It would 

be impossible for ALDOT to apply for, and COE to review, a permit for the entire 

Northern Beltline at once – not only because of the time, logistics, and volume of 

information that would be involved in permitting every discharge at every point along the 

entire 52-mile-long Beltline at once, but also because much of the Beltline has not even 

reached the point in the design stage where COE could meaningfully review such a 

permit application. (USACOE000567; USACOE000625.) COE explained in the 

administrative record its reasoning for approaching the § 404 permit process by sections: 

 “This project involves the construction of a 3.4 mile [later reduced to 1.86-mile] 

segment of a larger proposal to construct a 52-mile expressway from 1-59/20 in 

Bessemer to 1-59 north of Trussville. This initial . . . segment has funds already 

appropriated. . . . Other segments of the project may not happen for 10-20 years 

down the road. Or they may not happen at all. It all depends on funding. The 

Corps cannot issue a 20-year permit, which is one of the reasons just a portion of 

the project is being considered at this time.” (USACOE000171 (September 20, 

2011 Memorandum for Record).) 

 “Regarding working with ALDOT on the potential indirect effects for the entire 

project, if and when the future phases progress (it is reasonable to assume they 

will), the Corps will work with ALDOT at the time the project is submitted to 

assess avoidance and minimization of impacts. ALDOT has a general idea of the 

footprint for the remainder of the Beltline, but final engineering is not complete 

and on the ground waters of the US determinations have not been conducted. This 

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is because the funding is not available to get this far along in the planning stages. 

They have a general idea of the direct impacts, but until they get to the stage 

where they have the funding for in-depth studies, this type of project planning 

cannot be conducted at this time. The Corps will work with ALDOT when the 

appropriate time comes.” (USACOE4844.) 

In the considerable length of time that it would take for ALDOT to create a 

detailed design of the entire 52-mile long Beltline, for ALDOT, FHWA, and COE to 

conduct all of the studies and assessments that will be completed as the design becomes 

more detailed, and for COE to complete a § 404 permit analysis for the entire project, 

changes will no doubt occur in the environment and in the project design, and new 

information and new circumstances will come to light. The inevitable ebb and flow of 

updated and outdated information over time would require constant monitoring to ensure 

that the myriad decisions made throughout the entire process remained valid under 

NEPA, CWA, and other applicable regulatory schemes until the final, massive § 404 

permit decision can be made and then (if applicable) run through the gauntlet of judicial 

review.32 In other words, Plaintiff’s preferred approach would effectively reduce the 

Northern Beltline Project to nothing more than an intractable administrative mess. That 

                                                             32 The United States Supreme Court has observed in other contexts: 

Administrative consideration of evidence . . . always creates a gap 

between the time the record is closed and the time the 

administrative decision is promulgated [and, we might add, the 

time the decision is judicially reviewed]. . . . If upon the coming 

down of the order litigants might demand rehearing as a matter of 

law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend 

has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be 

little hope that the administrative process could ever be 

consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening. 

Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 374 n.19 (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. 

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 554-555 (1978)) (alterations in original). 

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is neither the goal, nor should it be the result, of the regulatory process. 23 U.S.C. § 

101(b)(4) (“Congress declares that it is in the national interest to expedite the delivery of 

surface transportation projects by substantially reducing the average length of the 

environmental review process.”); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (c) (“Ultimately, of course, it is not 

better documents but better decisions that count. NEPA’s purpose is not to generate 

paperwork—even excellent paperwork—but to foster excellent action. The NEPA 

process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on 

understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and 

enhance the environment.” (emphasis added).) 

 Nevertheless, in Count I of its complaint, Plaintiff insists that issuance of a § 404 

permit for less than the entire Northern Beltline violates 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(2). 33 

C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(2) provides: “All activities which the applicant plans to undertake 

which are reasonably related to the same project and for which a [§ 404] permit would be 

required should be included in the same permit application. District engineers should 

reject, as incomplete, any permit application which fails to comply with this requirement. 

For example, a permit application for a marina will include dredging required for access 

as well as any fill associated with construction of the marina.” Except to mention 33 

C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(2) in a conclusory fashion (Doc. # 164 at 7), Plaintiff does not argue 

this point in its summary judgment briefing.33 Plaintiff’s mere citation to § 325.1(d)(2), 

                                                            

33 Closely related to the issue of “how much of the project must be included in the same 

permit application” is the issue of whether COE’s EA/§ 404 analysis may be based on a 

component or phase of a larger project. William L. Want, Law of Wetlands Regulation, § 6.63 

(Westlaw 2015) (emphasis added). In some circumstances, NEPA requires the scope of the 

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without more, is not sufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden on summary judgment. See 

Ryan v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 675, 794 F.2d 641, 643 (11th Cir. 1986) 

(holding that “mere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts will 

not prevent the award of summary judgment,” and “a party may not rely on his pleadings 

to avoid [summary] judgment against him.” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 182 F.3d 888, 892 

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A]ssertions made in the pleadings (e.g., complaint or answer), but not 

made in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, need not be considered by the 

district court or the appellate court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.”); 

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“There is no 

burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based 

upon the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the parties to 

formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

activities addressed in the EA/§ 404 document to be broader than the scope of the activity 

presented in the permit application. For example, regulations governing NEPA implementation 

in COE’s EA/404(b)(1)/FONSI analysis provide that, in some situations when COE is called 

upon to review a permit application for a specific activity that is part of a larger project, COE 

must address not only the “specific activity” for which the permit is sought, but also “those 

portions of the entire project over which the district engineer has sufficient control and 

responsibility to warrant Federal review.” 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b). The existence of 

such regulations confirms that the scope of the activity that must be included in the permit 

application is not necessarily coextensive with the scope of the activities contemplated in COE’s 

§ 404 or NEPA analysis of the permit application. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the 

scope of COE’s § 404 analysis was improperly narrowed to the 1.86-mile section of highway for 

which the permit was sought, that argument is properly addressed in Section VI.B., which 

contains the discussion of Plaintiff’s challenge to COE’s § 404 analysis. To the extent that 

Plaintiff relies on 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b) or other regulations to argue that COE’s 

NEPA analysis focused too narrowly on the activity for which the permit is sought, those 

arguments are properly analyzed in Section VI.C., which covers Plaintiff’s claim that the scope 

of the EA (rather than the scope of the permit application itself) violated NEPA. 

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judgment are deemed abandoned.”). 

Plaintiff also contends that the issuance of a permit for less than the entire 

Northern Beltline violates 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). (Doc. # 164 at 44). Section 

1508.27(b)(7) does not prohibit permitting a manageable segment of a project. Rather, § 

1508.27(b)(7) provides that, for purposes of NEPA’s requirement that an EIS must be 

prepared for major federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the human 

environment, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c), a finding of significance (and, by extension, the 

decision to issue a SEIS) “cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary or by 

breaking it down into small component parts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). 

 In its summary judgment brief, Plaintiff also argues that the issuance of the permit 

violates 23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f). (Doc. # 164 at 44). Section 771.111(f) does not require 

that a COE permit must issue for the entire Northern Beltline or not at all. Rather, § 

771.111(f) provides that “the action evaluated in each EIS or finding of no significant 

impact (FONSI)” must connect logical termini, be of sufficient length to address 

environmental matters on a broad scope, and not restrict consideration of alternatives for 

reasonably foreseeable transportation alternatives. 23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f) (emphasis 

added). 

 Thus, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) and 23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f) prohibit improper 

segmentation of an agency action in the preparation of (or decision not to prepare) a SEIS 

or FONSI. To the extent that Plaintiff raises the related argument that COE improperly 

segmented the 1.84-mile section in order to avoid issuing a SEIS for the entire Northern 

Beltline and in issuing an EA and FONSI, those contentions are raised in Counts III and 

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IV of the complaint in the § 404 action and will be evaluated separately. (Doc. # 1 in 

Case No. 12:13-cv-794, ¶¶ 119-131). However, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on Count I of the complaint in the § 404 action because 40 C.F.R. § 

1508.27(b)(7) and 23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f) do not require that the ALDOT must include 

the entire Northern Beltline in its permit application, or that COE must issue or deny a 

permit, if at all, for the entire Northern Beltline. 

B.1. Count II: Plaintiff’s Claim that COE Violated § 404 by Impermissibly 

 Narrow Public Interest Review and Alternatives Analysis 

Section 404 permits must meet the guidelines (the “§ 404(b)(1) Guidelines,” 

codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) developed by the Administrator of the Environmental 

Protection Agency (“EPA”), in conjunction with COE. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1). In 

relevant part, the § 404(b)(1) Guidelines specify that COE must ensure that the proposed 

fill will not cause significant adverse effects on human health or welfare, aquatic life, and 

aquatic ecosystems. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c)(1)-(3). COE must make a written 

determination of the effects of a proposed activity “on the physical, chemical, and 

biological components of the aquatic environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.11. COE’s 

implementing regulations incorporate the § 404(b)(1) Guidelines. 33 C.F.R. § 

320.4(b)(4); 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(6). Under the applicable regulations, “[t]he decision 

whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the probable impacts, 

including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public 

interest.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a). Further, a permit generally will not be issued “if there is 

a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact 

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on the aquatic ecosystem.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). In Count II, Plaintiff contends that 

COE violated § 404 by conducting inadequate review of the impacts of the proposed 

activity on public interest and by failing to adequately consider the existence of other 

practicable alternatives. 

B.2. Alternatives Analysis

 The prohibition on the permitting of projects “if there is a practicable alternative to 

the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, 

so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse environmental 

consequences,” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a), is often referred to as the “least environmentally 

damaging practicable alternative” requirement. To be “practicable,” an alternative must 

be “available and capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing 

technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2). 

For projects that are not water dependent, the Guidelines establish a presumption 

that practicable alternatives are available that do not involve wetlands unless clearly 

demonstrated otherwise. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3).34 “In addition, where a discharge is 

proposed for a special aquatic site, all practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge 

which do not involve a discharge into a special aquatic site are presumed to have less 

adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.” Id. 

                                                             34 COE determined that the project is not water dependent. (USACOE004805.) See 40 

C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (providing that a project is not water dependent if it “does not require 

access or proximity to or siting within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic 

purpose). In addition, after reviewing the alternative routes of the Beltline, COE, concluded that 

“there are no practicable alternatives that would not involve a discharge into a special aquatic 

site.” USACOE004853. 

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At the administrative stage of review of ALDOT’s § 404 permit application, 

ALDOT had the burden of “clearly demonstrating” to COE that no practicable 

alternatives exist that avoid discharges to wetlands. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). However, 

COE must “conduct[] its own independent evaluation [of available alternatives], and its 

practicable alternative analysis is not susceptible to numerical precision, but instead 

requires a balancing of the applicant’s needs and environmental concerns.” Fund for 

Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 543 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, at the stage of judicial

review, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that COE acted arbitrarily or 

capriciously in analyzing the alternatives and granting the permit. See id. at 544 

(“[I]nsofar as the CWA practicable alternatives analysis is concerned, we hold that the 

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

granting a permit to fill seventy-four acres of wetlands on the Walton Tract.”); see also

Alliance For Legal Action v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 314 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543 

(M.D.N.C. 2004) (“[T]he court’s inquiry is not whether the Corps has clearly 

demonstrated a lack of practicable alternatives, but whether its decision that [the 

applicant] had done so was a clear error of judgment.”). 

In this case, COE requested ALDOT to provide information showing that no less 

environmentally damaging practicable alternatives to the proposed project were available. 

(USACOE004846.) ALDOT provided the requested information regarding alternatives 

to the proposed project. (USACOE003575-82; USACOE003619-26.) COE evaluated 

the alternative locations for the project and four alternative on-site design plans for the 

project and found two of them impracticable. (USCOE004847-52). COE also 

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considered a no-action plan, but noted that the no-action plan would not meet the project 

purpose. (USACOE4852). Of the alternative locations determined to be practicable, 

COE concluded that ALDOT’s preferred location (“Alternative A”) for the project was 

the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative because it would impact fewer 

acres of wetlands and would have fewer stream crossings than either of the other two 

practicable alternative locations. (USACOE4852-53.) Of the practicable alternative 

design plans, after discussions with COE, ALDOT agreed that, rather than using its 

original proposed plan for the project, it would use the plan that would minimize the 

impacts to aquatic resources and ensure that the project would have logical termini and 

independent utility by removing portions of the project that would have extended west of 

SR 79 and east of SR 75. (USACOE004807-10, -4853.) 

In its summary judgment reply brief (Doc. # 170 at 14), Plaintiff argues that a 

letter in which “the EPA described the negative environmental consequences” of 

Alternative A is evidence that alternative A is not the least environmentally damaging 

practicable alternative. Plaintiff then quotes from a September 8, 1997 letter in which the 

EPA opined that “Alternative A . . . has the most impacts to natural resources,” “will 

disrupt streams at 14 crossings, will impact over 4050 acres of forested lands located 

within the [right-of-way], . . . will destroy up to 68 acres of wetlands at 114 different 

sites,” and “will have the greatest impact on wildlife of all the alignments discussed.” 

FHWA 01998. The EPA preferred Alternative D, which was not a feasible alternative. 

As explained by COE, “Altemative D was eliminated from further consideration because 

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it involved the use of land from a Section 4(f) property.”35 Further, COE provided 

information showing that, of the remaining feasible alternatives, Alternative A was “the 

least environmentally damaging practicable alternative because it would impact fewer 

acres of wetlands and would have fewer stream crossings than either” of the remaining 

feasible alternative routes,36 and Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence demonstrating 

otherwise. (USACOE4853-57.) See N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 

1533, 1539 (11th Cir. 1990) (“‘When specialists express contrary views, an agency must 

have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as 

an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.’” (quoting Or. Nat. 

Res. Council, 490 U.S. at 378)). 

Plaintiff also argues that COE failed to consider numerous other alternatives to 

                                                             35 Section 4(f) of the Transportation Act provides: “[T]he Secretary [of the FHWA] may 

approve a transportation program or project . . . requiring the use of publicly owned land of a 

public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local 

significance, or land of an historic site of national, State, or local significance (as determined by 

the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or site) only 

if— (1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and (2) the program or 

project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and 

waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.” 49 U.S.C. § 303(c). COE explained 

that Alternative D was not feasible in light of the requirements of Section 4(f) because other 

feasible alternatives existed. (USACOE004849.) 

36 The court recognizes that, for Alternative A, the estimated number of floodplains and 

wetlands has been revised since 1997 due to more detailed design for that alternative and that the 

estimated acres of affected wetlands has decreased due to a difference in the way impacted 

streams and wetlands are reported, and those changes were considered in the 2012 Reevaluation. (USACOE605-06; USACOE000623-25.) Further, these numbers may change again 

in the future because, as more detailed designs are developed, additional wetland and stream 

surveys will be conducted. (USACOE000625.) Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants are 

obligated to similarly (and perpetually at every stage of environmental review) create equally 

more detailed designs for the previously rejected alternative routes for the entire Northern 

Beltline in order to re-compare all of the alternatives, and, in any event, such an argument would 

have no merit. 

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building the entire Northern Beltline, such as pursuing other transportation projects 

instead or extending Corridor x farther into the City of Birmingham. (Doc. # 164 at 41-

45.) However, a “practicable alternative” is one that is “available and capable of being 

done after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of 

overall project purposes.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, COE 

“analyzes practicable alternatives in light of a project’s ‘overall purpose,’ which is more 

particularized to the applicant’s project than is the basic purpose, and reflects the various 

objectives the applicant is trying to achieve.” Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 709 F. Supp. 

2d 1254, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 100 (11th Cir. 2010). 

In this case, “[t]he overall project purpose, as determined by the Corps, is the 

construction of a limited access, divided highway linking SR 79 and SR 75 in Jefferson 

County, Alabama (Figures 2 and 3 - Attachment 1). The project is part of a larger project 

to construct a 50.01-mile expressway from 1-459/59/20 in Bessemer to 1-59 north of 

Trussville, to enhance cross-region accessibility.” (USACOE004805.) COE used “the 

overall project purpose . . . as a basis for assessing the practicable alternatives for the 

proposal.” (USACOE004805.) Plaintiff has not explained how its preferred alternatives 

(such as pursuing other transportation projects or extending Corridor X farther into the 

City of Birmingham) further the overall project purpose of building a limited access, 

divided highway linking SR 75 and SR79 as part of a larger expressway connecting 

Bessemer and Trussville. Plaintiff also has not demonstrated that any of its preferred 

alternatives are “available and capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, 

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existing technology, and logistics” in light of this overall purpose.37 

In conjunction with its argument that COE’s § 404 alternatives analysis is arbitrary 

or capricious, Plaintiff offers a conclusory argument that the “public interest review 

requirements” of § 404 have not been met because COE allegedly relied on “outdated” 

data, specifically with respect to its analysis of the economic impacts of the Beltline. 

(Doc. # 164 at 55.) COE did consider and rely on the alternative comparison in the 1997 

FEIS that was used to select the Beltline route. The outcome of the alternatives analysis 

was based on the relative costs of each alternative, which were roughly equal. (AR 1203.) 

Thus, the cost was not a deciding factor in choosing an alternative, and as explained in 

Section V.E.2.viii., Plaintiff has failed to establish that the updated cost estimate for the 

current preferred Beltline alignment requires Defendants to re-consider the continuing 

validity of that alternatives analysis. 

                                                             37 “For actions subject to NEPA, where the Corps of Engineers is the permitting agency, 

the analysis of alternatives required for NEPA environmental documents . . . will in most cases 

provide the information for the evaluation of alternatives under these Guidelines. On occasion, 

these NEPA documents may address a broader range of alternatives than required to be 

considered under [the § 404(b)(1) guidelines] or may not have considered the alternatives in 

sufficient to respond to the requirements of these Guidelines. In the latter case, it may be 

necessary to supplement these NEPA documents with this additional information.” 40 C.F.R. § 

230.10(a)(ii)(4); see also Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 

1163 (10th Cir. 2002) as modified on reh’g, 319 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (“For actions subject 

to NEPA, the analysis of alternatives required for the NEPA environmental documents will in 

most cases provide the information for the evaluation of alternatives under the CWA 

Guidelines.”). Plaintiff contends that NEPA regulations prohibiting segmentation require that 

COE’s EA include a broader analysis of alternatives than those that would serve the overall 

purpose of the proposed activity as defined by COE (i.e., overall purpose of the 1.86 mile 

section). See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14, 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b). Because Plaintiff frames 

that argument in terms of the proper scope of the EA, and to avoid unnecessarily duplicative 

analysis, the court will evaluate that argument in conjunction with Counts III and IV of the 

complaint in the § 404 action. 

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In its summary judgment reply brief, Plaintiff argues that COE “is charged with 

studying economics as well as environmental impacts in its [§] 404 public interest 

review,”38 and that COE “unequivocally failed to analyze the project’s skyrocketing 

economic costs and respond to direct comments on this point from Plaintiff and others 

during the permitting process that this change in cost affects the project’s purpose and 

practicable alternatives.” (Doc. # 170 at 15.) However, COE did respond to comments 

on the issue. As COE explained those responses, it was not required to include in its a 

study of the economics of the entire Northern Beltline or a determination as to whether 

the 1.86-mile project should be pursued in light of the overall cost of the entire Beltline. 

(USACOE004820; USACOE004828-29 (explaining that the OCHS center report about 

the costs of the entire Beltline did not affect the alternatives analysis because the 

alternatives analysis was based on the project’s “overall purpose,” which was “the 

construction of a limited access, divided highway linking SR 19 and SR 75 in Jefferson 

County, Alabama”)); see Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (noting 

that a project’s alternatives are analyzed in terms of a project’s overall purpose, not its 

                                                             38 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (“All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must 

be considered including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, 

economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and 

wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and 

accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food 

and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the 

needs and welfare of the people.”). Plaintiff also cites Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 

639 (7th Cir. 1986), which held that, “[w]here. . . a proposal’s benefits are entirely economic and 

its costs environmental, the Corps must make at least a minimally reliable effort to establish 

economic benefit. Obviously, the Corps is not an expert in every business seeking a permit, but, 

as guardian of the public welfare, it must credibly attempt to appraise economic benefit.” 

Plaintiff has not explained why (contrary to COE’s public interest review findings 

(USACOE004857)), this is a case where the project’s benefits are “purely economic,” or how 

COE failed to “make at least a minimally reliable effort to establish economic benefit.” 

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basic purpose); see also S. Louisiana Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011 

(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that “[d]etermination of economic benefits and costs that are 

tangential to environmental consequences are within th[e] wide area of agency 

discretion” in policymaking decisions). From COE’s perspective, cost was considered in 

the § 404 alternatives analysis solely “to ensure the cost would not be prohibitive or 

impractical.” (USACOE004848.) Plaintiff has demonstrated neither that COE 

“unequivocally failed to analyze” the costs, nor that the increased cost estimates for the 

preferred alternative render that alternative impracticable. Thus, Plaintiff has not 

established that COE’s alternatives analysis was arbitrary or capricious in light of 

updated cost estimates of the Beltline. 

Plaintiff also argues that COE erred in failing to consider alternatives to building 

the 1.86-mile section as a two- or four-lane parkway instead of a six- or eight-lane 

interstate. (Doc. # 164 at 55.) However, COE did not fail to comply with a procedural 

duty to consider the need for the number of lanes requested or whether the requested 

number of lanes presented the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative. As 

part of its independent review of this issue, COE specifically requested, and ALDOT 

provided, documentation justifying “a six-lane Beltline as opposed to the original fourlane design analyzed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, as well as the need 

for the six-lane highway for this [1.86-mile] portion of the project.” (USACOE004846-

47). As COE explained in the § 404(b)(1) Guidelines Evaluation: 

 “[COE] requested documentation for the need for 6 lanes, as opposed to 4 lanes. 

ALDOT explained that the Beltline, once completed, will become part of the 

National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. The FHWA, therefore, 

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requires ALDOT to design the roadway in accordance with the American 

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ‘(AASHTO’s) ‘A 

Policy on Design Standards-Interstate System.’ This policy requires that 

interstates must be designed with control of access to ensure their safety, 

permanence and utility, and with flexibility to provide for predicted growth. The 

policy further sets the design year to be at least twenty years and requires the 

number of lanes shall be sufficient to accommodate the predicted volumes at an 

acceptable level of service. The current traffic projections, supplied by the 

Birmingham Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), were analyzed using the 

2010 version of Highway Capacity Software for Basic Freeway Segments, Release 

6.1. The results indicate that six lanes are needed to achieve level of service “C”, 

which is the minimum acceptable standard. The analysis is located in the project 

file. The Corps defers to FHWA’s decision on the number of lanes required as it is 

not up to the Corps to make that determination. As discussed, the Corps gave an 

objective review of the need by requesting the analysis and reviewing the analysis. 

The Corps ultimately defers to FHWA for this determination.” (USACOE004821.) 

 “The alternatives analysis and [least environmentally damaging practicable 

alternative] determination is provided in Section 4 of this document. ALDOT 

addressed the comment regarding why a 4-lane interstate or a 2-lane or 4-lane 

parkway could not satisfy the project purpose. . . . This explanation addresses why 

a 4-lane interstate or 2-or 4-lane parkway could not be used. The Corps required 

ALDOT to provide the numbers and analysis proving that 6 lanes are needed to 

provide the appropriate level of service. This was provided in ALDOT’s letter to 

the Corps dated December 19, 2012. FHWA is ultimately the lead agency that 

determines appropriateness of the need for a 6-lane interstate. It is not within the 

Corps purview to dispute that FHWA has determined that the need is there.” 

(USACOE004828.) 

 “Regarding the comparison of environmental impacts associated with 4 lanes 

versus 6 lanes, the direct impacts to aquatic resources remain the same regardless 

of the number of lanes. ALDOT stated that the footprint associated with the road 

is the same with the 4 lanes as the 6 lanes and ultimately, 8 lanes. The project was 

planned to conduct all direct impacts to aquatic resources when the project is first 

constructed, allowing for the expansion to 8 lanes in the future without having to 

come back and acquire additional right-of-way (ROW) and expand culverts. 

Conducting all of the impacts upfront minimizes the amount of ground disturbance 

that would be required if they were to come back at a later date to conduct 

additional impacts. The current design has six lanes - three, 12-foot lanes in each 

direction with a 26-foot median and 14-foot outer shoulders. The road would be 

graded for all eight lanes, which would ultimately consist of four, 12-foot travel 

lanes in each direction with a 26-foot median and 12-foot outer shoulders. The 

reason there is not an increase in the footprint of the roadway is because of the 

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decrease in the median width from what was shown in the 1997 EIS. Figures 3 a 

and 3b on pages 5-4 and 5-5 of the Re-evaluation depict the typical sections for 

each design. The concern may be regarding the increase in impervious surfaces 

and the environmental effect that may have. ALDOT states the additional 

impervious areas resulting from the additional 2 lanes amount to less than one 

tenth of one percent of the affected drainage area. It does not appear that the small 

amount of increase in impervious surfaces would have an adverse effect on the 

environment.” (USACOE004830.) 

 “The need for the six lanes is approved by FHWA, as the lead federal agency. It 

has been shown that regardless of the number of lanes proposed to be paved, 

ALDOT planned from the beginning to apply for a permit for the entire width that 

is being proposed now, just with two fewer lanes. So, from the Corps perspective, 

the direct impacts to aquatic resources would be the same, whether four lanes or 

six lanes are being paved.” (USACOE004837.) 

 “The EIS proposed four lanes with a wide median to accommodate four additional 

lanes on the inside in the future. The current proposed plan calls for six lanes with 

a graded area to accommodate two additional lanes on the outside, rather than the 

inside, when needed in the future. The additional impervious surface for six lanes 

versus four amounts to less than one tenth of one percent of the affected drainage 

area. The plan to widen to the outside rather than the inside is now a standard 

practice by highway departments, according to ALDOT. This method provides a 

safer construction area for the workers that construct the new lanes as well as the 

traveling public. ALDOT also stated that constructing the six lanes now versus 

four would decrease safety concerns for both the traveling public and construction 

workers. Regardless, ALDOT provided the analysis showing that based on current 

traffic projections, six lanes are required for the Beltline. The Corps defers to 

FHWA’s determination that six lanes are appropriate for this project.” 

(USACOE004839-40.) 

 “ALDOT noted that there is no increased grading associated with the additional 

two lanes. The project has always been the width that is proposed. It has been their 

plan from the beginning to grade for the maximum eight lanes (four in each 

direction); therefore, they would not have to come back in the future to perform 

additional clearing and grading activities and extend culverts, which would require 

re- exposing the soil to add the additional lanes. ALDOT says this is standard 

practice with highway departments, to clear and grade for the maximum number 

of lanes and not necessarily pave all lanes but leave it grassed and ready to add a 

lane in the future if needed. This way, they will not have to come back to the 

Corps to get another permit for additional fill in waters of the U.S.” 

(USACOE004840.) 

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 Thus, COE considered and explained why a two- or four-lane interstate “could not 

be used,” (USACOE00428; USACOE004821; USACOE004839-40), and why, from its 

perspective, a four-lane highway would not necessarily be a less environmentally 

damaging practicable alternative than the final six-lane design (with the built-in potential 

for expanding the road to eight lanes) (USACOE004829-30; USACOE004837). Plaintiff 

has provided no evidence and no substantive argument to the contrary. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated why, contrary to COE’s findings, a 2- or 4-lane highway is 

either “practicable” or “less environmentally damaging.” There is no clear error in 

COE’s judgment. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its heavy burden to demonstrate that COE’s § 

404 analysis of alternatives was arbitrary or capricious. See Fund for Animals, Inc, 85 

F.3d at 544 (holding that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that COE’s 

practicable alternatives analysis was arbitrary or capricious). 

B.3. Public Interest Analysis 

 In processing § 404 permits, COE conducts a “public interest review.” 33 C.F.R. § 

320.4(a). Public interest review requires COE to evaluate “the probable impacts, 

including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public 

interest,” and to balance “the benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from 

the proposal . . . against its reasonably foreseeable detriments.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1). 

Thus, while the “least environmentally damaging practicable alternative” focuses on 

impacts on the aquatic ecosystem, the public interest review involves broader 

considerations. Id. “The decision whether to authorize a proposal, and if so, the 

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conditions under which it will be allowed to occur, are . . . determined by the outcome of 

this general balancing process” of the public interest review. Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that COE’s public interest review for the permit was inadequate 

and skewed because, “[o]n the one hand, the Corps must use data and assumptions 

associated with the entire 52-mile Beltline to justify the project’s overall need and the 

supposed benefits of the interstate,” but, “[o]n the other hand, when it comes to analyzing 

the Northern Beltline’s total direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts to 

water resources, the Corps adopts the fiction that this 1.86-mile interstate is actually a 

stand-alone project.” (Doc. # 164 at 53.) However, Plaintiff has not provided a citation 

to the record showing that COE’s public interest analysis relied on the need for and 

benefits of the entire Northern Beltline as the justification for the benefits and need for 

the 1.86-mile section.39 In fact, COE found that the project had utility independent of the 

rest of the Beltline, and therefore, with respect to the direct effects of the project, COE 

considered the direct impacts of the 1.86-mile segment. (USACOE004819; USACOE 

4857-59.) For example, COE noted that “[t]he project would provide a more efficient 

and safe east/west connection between SR 75 and SR 79 and provide increased 

accessibility for emergency response vehicles” and that “[t]he project would create new 

jobs and businesses and provide a more efficient east/west connection between SR 75 and 

SR 79, reducing travel times and allow increased accessibility for emergency response 

vehicles.” (USACOE4819.) 

                                                             39 The citation provided by Plaintiff in its brief (Doc. # 164 at 53 n. 43 (citing USACOE 

4848-51)) is COE’s alternatives analysis. COE’s public interest analysis is located at 

USACOE004856 – 72. 

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 The language defining the focus of the public interest review limits that focus to 

“the proposed activity,” “the proposed structure or work,” and “the particular proposal.” 

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a).40 Thus, the language of 33 § C.F.R. 320.4(a) makes clear that the 

public interest review is to be conducted with respect to the proposal for which COE is 

considering issuing a permit41 – in this case, the 1.86-mile road between SR 79 and SR 

75. (See USACOE004804 (defining the “proposed work”)); see also 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(g) 

(“The term individual permit means a Department of the Army authorization that is 

issued following a case-by-case evaluation of a specific project involving the proposed 

discharge(s) in accordance with the procedures of this part and 33 CFR part 325 and a 

determination that the proposed discharge is in the public interest pursuant to 33 CFR 

part 320.”). With respect to that activity, COE did conduct a public interest analysis. 

                                                             40 COE’s NEPA implementation procedures require that, generally, the EA should be 

combined in the same document as the § 404 public interest analysis, as was done in this case. 

33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7. Arguably, therefore, “the extent of the entire project reviewable 

by the Corps under its [§ 404] public interest review is essentially the same as the extent of 

review permitted under the NEPA [EA/FONSI] analysis.” Water Works & Sewer Bd. of the City 

of Birmingham v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Corps of Eng’rs, 983 F. Supp. 1052, 1067 (N.D. Ala. 

1997) aff’d without opinion sub nom. Water Works v. U.S. Army Corps Engineers, 162 F.3d 98 

(11th Cir. 1998). In certain circumstances where a § 404 permit is sought for “a specific activity . 

. . which is merely one component of a larger project,” the scope of the EA must “address the 

impacts of the specific activity requiring a [§ 404] permit and those portions of the entire project 

over which the district engineer has sufficient control and responsibility to warrant Federal 

review.” 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B. ¶ 7(b). In conjunction with its argument that the EA and 

FONSI violate NEPA, Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B. ¶ 7(b), the EA 

and FONSI should have included an analysis of the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of 

the entire Northern Beltline. Because Plaintiff raises that argument in conjunction with Count IV 

alleging NEPA violations, but not in conjunction with its § 404 public interest analysis claim, 

that argument is addressed in Section VI.C. to reduce unnecessarily duplicative analysis and 

discussion. 

41 Plaintiff’s argument that the proposed activity as presented in the permit application 

should not have been limited to the 1.86-mile highway between SR 75 and SR 79 is discussed in 

Section VI.A. 

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(USACOE4856 -72.) Even if, in its public interest analysis, COE did consider that one of 

the benefits accruing from the proposed action would be the facilitation of the Northern 

Beltline project (although Plaintiff does not provide a citation to the record to 

demonstrate that this was in fact the case), that does not mean that the analysis of the 

direct effects of the proposed action is impermissibly skewed. Cf. Hoosier Envtl. Council 

v. U.S Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:11-CV-0202-LJM-DML, 2012 WL 3028014, at *12-

13 (S.D. Ind. July 24, 2012), aff’d, 722 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting an argument 

similar to Plaintiff’s). 

Moreover, simply because COE determined that “[e]valuation of the [§] 404(b)(1) 

Guidelines for remaining portions of the 50.01 mile road will be conducted at the time the 

permit application is submitted for review,” (USACOE004853) this does not mean that 

COE’s public interest analysis failed to take into consideration the Northern Beltline’s 

total direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts to water resources. Although 

33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) focuses the public interest inquiry on the proposed project, 33 

C.F.R. § 320.4(a) requires that “[a]ll factors which may be relevant to the proposal must 

be considered including the cumulative effects thereof.”42 Consistent with this 

requirement, COE expressly considered the Northern Beltline’s indirect and cumulative 

                                                             42 Similarly, NEPA provides that, to determine whether an action “significantly” affects 

the quality of the human environment, thereby necessitating the preparation of an EIS, an agency 

may first prepare an EA, which must take cumulative effects into consideration. 40 C.F.R. § 

1501.4(c). NEPA requires that an EA must take into consideration “the environmental impacts of 

the proposed action,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b), which would include cumulative impacts. 40 

C.F.R. § 1508.7. NEPA’s requirements are discussed in Section VI.C. in conjunction with 

Plaintiff’s NEPA claims. 

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effects in its public interest analysis. COE stated that, “[b]ecause the 50.01 mile 

[Northern Beltline] is a reasonably foreseeable future action, [COE’s] scope for 

cumulative and [indirect ] effects include[d]” not just the watersheds crossed by the 1.86-

mile section, but “all three watersheds that the Beltline would cross: the Upper Black 

Warrior, Locust Fork, and Cahaba.” (USACOE004860.) Therefore, COE considered the 

indirect and cumulative effects of the 1.86-mile section in conjunction with the 

environmental effects of entire Beltline. (USACOE4859-72.) With respect to indirect 

effects, COE “largely defer[red] to the analysis in the FHWA 2012 Re-evaluation” and 

COE provided a discussion in the EA/§ 404(b)(1)/FONSI document that summarized that 

analysis. “For the in-depth analysis” of indirect effects, COE referred readers “to Section 

6.5 in the 2012 Re-evaluation,” which was “located in the project file and included in the 

administrative record for this project.” (USACOE004860.) For cumulative effects, COE 

also relied on and provided a summary of FHWA’s cumulative effects analysis, noting 

that “[t]he full description of the cumulative effects analysis is located in Section 6.6 of 

the Re-evaluation.” (USACOE004861.) COE also requested and analyzed additional 

information from ALDOT regarding cumulative effects and independently performed its 

own additional analysis of certain cumulative effects of the project in conjunction with 

the effects of the Northern Beltline. (USACOE004827; USACOE004846-47; 

USACOE4862-72.) 

Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, COE did not compromise its public interest 

analysis by “adopt[ing] the fiction that the 1.86-mile interstate is actually a standalone 

project” or by ignoring the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the Northern 

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Beltline as a whole. (Doc. # 164 at 53.) 

B.4. Count II - Conclusion 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion, and for the 

reasons more fully expressed in Defendants’ briefs, Plaintiff has not carried its burden to 

show that COE’s public interest and alternatives analysis violates § 404 of the CWA, and 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count II of Plaintiff’s complaint. 

C. COUNT IV: NEPA 

 In Count IV, 43 Plaintiff argues that COE’s44 EA/FONSI document violated NEPA 

in two ways. First, Plaintiff claims that COE improperly segmented its analysis of the 

1.86-mile section to avoid requiring a SEIS for the Northern Beltline. Second, Plaintiff 

claims that COE failed to take a hard look at direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts. 

C.1. Count IV: COE’s EA/FONSI Did Not “Segment” the Beltline In Violation of 

 CEQ or FHWA Regulations 

NEPA prohibits the “segmentation” of a project when it is done to mask the 

overall significance of the project’s impacts, particularly its cumulative impacts. 40 

                                                             43 The purpose of the EA is to determine whether an EIS is necessary. See 33 C.F.R. Pt. 

325, App. B ¶ 7 (“The [EA] . . . shall conclude with a FONSI (See 40 CFR 1508.13) or a 

determination that an EIS is required. . . . In those cases where it is obvious an EIS is required, 

an EA is not required.”). Thus, the disposition of Count IV of Plaintiff’s , which challenges the 

validity of COE’s EA analysis under NEPA, largely controls the disposition of Count III, in 

which Plaintiff alleges that COE should have concluded that a SEIS was needed for the entire 

Northern Beltline. Accordingly, the analysis of Count IV is presented before the analysis of 

Count III. 

44 Plaintiff asserts in the last paragraph of Count IV that “Defendants” in the § 404 action 

violated NEPA by creating a deficient EA and FONSI. Defendants in the § 404 action include 

not only COE and COE’s District Commander, but also ALDOT and ALDOT’s Director. 

However, all factual allegations in Count IV pertain to the alleged conduct of COE. Therefore, it 

does not appear that Count IV is directed at ALDOT or its Director. Moreover, for the reasons 

stated in this Section and in Section V., Plaintiff has not demonstrated that ALDOT violated 

NEPA. 

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C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). To fully evaluate whether a project has been improperly 

segmented for purposes of evading a thorough NEPA analysis, FHWA regulations 

require that the project “connect logical termini,” “have independent utility,” and not 

“restrict considerations of alternatives for other reasonably foreseeable transportation 

improvements.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.111(f).

ALDOT originally submitted an application for a 3.6-mile highway that extended 

beyond SR79 and SR 75, but COE rejected that plan because it did not have logical 

termini and independent utility. (USACOE004809.) ALDOT then revised its design so 

that it would connect SR 75 and SR 79. (USACOE004809.) COE concluded that, as 

revised, the 1.86-mile project connects logical termini and has independent utility even if 

the remainder of the Beltline is never constructed. (USACOE004808-09; 

USACOE004819; USACOE004824; USACOE004837; see USACOE USACOE004819 

(“[R]egulations allow for the consideration of permit applications for projects that are 

phased as long as they have independent utility. This project begins and ends at two 

major roads, SR 79 and SR 75, so it has logical termini. This project does not rely on 

other phases because it joins two roads. It is not a ‘road to nowhere.’”)). 

Plaintiff argues that the 1.86-mile section is “located at the top of the Northern 

Beltline’s arc” and, therefore, “locks in substantial portions of the route, particularly the 

eastern section.” (Doc. # 164 at 49.) Transportation projects have to begin somewhere.45 

The Northern Beltline is roughly half of an ellipsis; Plaintiff does not explain why the 

                                                             45 To paraphrase G.K. Chesterton on morality, “[highways,] like art, consist[] of drawing 

a line somewhere.” 

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fact that, on a map, the 1.86-mile section is located roughly at the “top” (northernmost 

area) of the Beltline gives that section any particular controlling significance compared to 

any other section of that half-ellipsis. Of course, either end of the phased construction of 

any nonterminal section of the Northern Beltline will, in all likelihood, establish two 

connection points for the Beltline, but this does not mean that phased construction 

impermissibly “restrict[s] consideration of alternatives for other reasonably foreseeable 

transportation improvements” by “locking in” the rest of the Beltline’s route. If 23 

C.F.R. § 771.111(f)(3) necessarily requires COE’s EA/FONSI to encompass the entirety 

of a larger project every time transportation agencies seek a § 404 permit for a road that 

has independent utility and logical termini and that also happens to have ends that will 

eventually connect to other phases of a larger project, then all interstate highways would 

have to be built and permitted all at once, or COE would be required to perpetually issue 

comprehensive EAs for the entire interstate project each time a new phase is built – a 

result that is neither possible nor what the law requires. Cf. Hoosier Envtl. Council v. 

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

46 722 F.3d 1053, 1060 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The Tier II analysis 

required sectioning in order to be manageable. . . . The highway wasn’t going to be built 

all at once. Construction would start at its southernmost point and Clean Water Act 

                                                             46 Hoosier involved a challenge to the scope of COE’s § 404 alternatives analysis. In 

Hoosier, the plaintiffs did not argue that the interstate project was “sectioned in order to prevent 

consideration of its total environmental harms” in violation of NEPA. Hoosier, 722 F.3d at 

1063. Nevertheless, Hoosier is cited here because its discussion of the practicalities of tiering is 

relevant to the point that COE is not legally required and cannot reasonably be expected to issue 

an EA/§ 404 document that encompasses all phases of an entire interstate project in every 

circumstance where a permit is sought for one phase of that project. See 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. 

B ¶ 7. (“The EA should normally be combined with other required documents 

(EA/404(b)(1)/SOF/FONSI).”) 

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permits would be granted or denied when the analysis of the wetland effects of alternative 

configurations was completed for each segment.”). 

Aside from the fact that the Northern Beltline will eventually connect to the ends 

of the 1.86-mile section, the record does not support Plaintiff’s argument that the 

construction of the 1.86-mile section will pose any meaningful restriction for considering 

construction alternatives for the remainder of the Northern Beltline. COE independently 

considered ALDOT’s analysis of the alternative conceptual alignment routes for the 

Northern Beltline, and COE’s analysis demonstrated that the currently preferred 

alignment (which includes the 1.86-mile section) presents the least environmentally 

damaging practical alternative. (USACOE004847-53.) Again, the precise alignment of 

much of the remainder of the Beltline has not yet been determined, and environmental 

and other public interest factors will be taken into consideration as selection of the 

precise route and design of the remainder of the Beltline progress. (See, 

e.g.,USACOE004837; USACOE004844; USACOE000517-18; USACOE000520; 

USACOE000522; USACOE000558; USACOE000595; USACOE000000609; 

USACOE000612.) 

In ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the court previously 

determined that “the SR 79/75 project satisfies NEPA regulations because it has 

independent utility, logical termini, and does not foreclose other alternatives for the 

overall project.” (Doc. # 157 at 11). Thorough consideration of Plaintiff’s and 

Defendants’ summary judgment arguments regarding segmentation of the 1.86-mile 

section has not provided any basis for the court to alter its previous conclusions on the 

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subject. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the January 17, 2014 Memorandum 

Opinion and Order (Doc. # 157 at 6-12), for the reasons stated in this memorandum 

opinion, and for the reasons stated in Defendants’ summary judgment briefs, Plaintiff has 

not demonstrated that the EA/FONSI document violated NEPA by improperly 

segmenting the 1.86-mile road between SR 75 and SR 79. 

C.2. Count IV: COE’s EA/FONSI Did Not “Segment” the Beltline in Violation of

 Its Own NEPA Implementation Procedures 

On summary judgment, in addition to relying on § 771.111(f)(3) to make a 

traditional segmentation argument, Plaintiff also argues that COE’s own NEPA 

implementation procedures required COE to conduct its EA analysis for the entire 

Northern Beltline. Specifically, Plaintiff cites 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b), which 

provides: 

In some situations, a permit applicant may propose to conduct 

a specific activity requiring a [§ 404] permit (e.g., 

construction of a pier in a navigable water of the United 

States) which is merely one component of a larger project 

(e.g., construction of an oil refinery on an upland area). The 

district engineer should establish the scope of the NEPA 

document (e.g., the EA or EIS) to address the impacts of the 

specific activity requiring a [§ 404] permit and those portions 

of the entire project over which the district engineer has 

sufficient control and responsibility to warrant Federal 

review. 

 

Plaintiff also cites 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b)(2) and (3), which provide 

guidelines for determining when COE has sufficient “control and responsibility for 

portions of the project beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction” to argue that COE should 

have concluded that it was required to conduct a NEPA review of the entire Northern 

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Beltline. 

Plaintiff’s argument fails because, as explained in Section VI.B.3, COE did

consider the indirect and cumulative effects of the 1.86-mile section in conjunction with 

the environmental effects of entire Beltline. (USACOE4859-72.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s interpretation of ¶ 7 would prohibit COE from ever limiting 

its EA analysis of direct effects to one phased construction section of an interstate project 

whenever the remainder of the interstate project also crosses wetlands and streams, even 

if the phased section does not otherwise run afoul of rules and regulations that prohibit 

segmentation. (Doc. # 164 at 51.) Although Plaintiff’s interpretation of ¶ 7(b) would 

severely (if not completely) foreclose COE’s ability to conduct an EA and issue permits 

for anything less than an entire interstate project all at once, Plaintiff has not offered any 

relevant47 legal authority for its interpretation of ¶ 7(b) other than its own representation 

of the meaning of the text of the paragraph itself. Essentially, Plaintiff interprets ¶ 7(b)’s 

                                                             47 In support of its argument that COE’s implementation procedures require it to conduct 

an EA for the entire Northern Beltline, Plaintiff cites Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364, 368 (7th 

Cir. 1976), in which the Seventh Circuit held that an EIS prepared by the Illinois Department of 

Transportation and reviewed by FHWA violated NEPA because it was confined to a 15-mile 

segment of a 42-mile freeway that did not have logical termini or independent utility, and that 

foreclosed other reasonable alternatives. The portion of Swain cited by Plaintiff is not applicable 

to Plaintiff’s argument regarding COE’s NEPA implementation procedures because it relies on 

regulations that are no longer current, because it does not address the proper scope of an EA 

issued by COE in conjunction with a permit application for one phase of construction of an 

interstate for which an EIS has already been completed, and because it was decided before the 

existence of COE’s current NEPA implementation procedures upon which Plaintiff relies. 49 FR 

1387-01; see William L. Want, Law of Wetlands Regulation, §§ 6.24-25 (Westlaw 2015) (2015) 

(noting that COE’s NEPA implementation regulations were amended in 1988, and that “the 

principal aspect of [the amendment] was to limit the scope of review in evaluating permit 

applications”). Furthermore, Swain does not prohibit segmentation of a project that has logical 

termini and independent utility and that does not foreclose other reasonable alternatives. 

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reference to “the specific activity requiring a § 404 permit” to mean the specific 1.86-

mile project for which this permit is sought, and ¶ 7(b)’s reference to “the larger project” 

and “the entire project” to refer to the entire Northern Beltline. Plaintiff also interprets ¶ 

7(b)(2)’s reference to “the limits of Corps jurisdiction” as referring to the geographic 

boundaries of the 1.86-mile section that is the subject of the permit, and ¶ 7(b)(2)’s 

reference to “portions of the project beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction” as referring 

to any larger project outside of the 1.86-mile section that may one day incorporate that 

section. 

COE addressed the scoping requirements of ¶ 7(B) in the EA, and, on summary 

judgment, all Defendants presented arguments regarding the applicability of ¶ 7(b). 

(USACOE004815-16; Doc. # 166 at 11-13, 32; Doc. # 168 at 49-51.) COE’s analysis of 

¶ 7(b) is in direct conflict with Plaintiff’s interpretation of ¶ 7(b). In the EA, COE 

evaluated the requirements of ¶ 7(b) and concluded that the scope of NEPA analysis must 

encompass not only “the footprint of the regulated activity within the delineated water,” 

i.e., the specific portions of the 1.86-mile project that involve regulated activities that 

cross or directly affect the waters of the United States, but also “the entire property,” i.e., 

all portions 1.86-mile project. (USACOE004816.)48 Thus, under COE’s approach, ¶ 7’s 

                                                             48 The copy of the EA/FONSI document attached to Plaintiff’s is not a final copy and it 

differs materially from the final version with respect to the section analyzing the scope of NEPA 

considerations for the EA. (Doc. # 1 in case No. 2:13-cv-794 at 14 n.1; Doc. # 1-2 at 13-14; 

USACOE004815-16.) COE’s NEPA analysis, even those portions that did not change between 

the draft and the final version, was consistent COE’s determination that it was obligated to 

perform the NEPA analysis not only with respect to the specific discharge and fill activities that 

required a permit, but also over those portions of the 1.86-mile section that did not cross 

wetlands and streams. 

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reference to “portions of the project beyond the Corps’ jurisdiction” means those upland 

“portions” that are part of the specific “project” that is the subject of the permit, but that 

are not located within the jurisdictional limits of the waters of the United States. 

COE’s interpretation of ¶ 7(b) is not inconsistent with the language of COE’s 

regulations or the purpose of ¶ 7(b). See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (“The term waters of the 

United States and all other terms relating to the geographic scope of jurisdiction are 

defined at 33 CFR part 328.”); 33 C.F.R. § 328.4 (“The limits of jurisdiction in non-tidal 

waters: (1) In the absence of adjacent wetlands, the jurisdiction extends to the ordinary 

high water mark, or (2) When adjacent wetlands are present, the jurisdiction extends . . . 

to the limit of the adjacent wetlands. (3) When the water of the United States consists 

only of wetlands the jurisdiction extends to the limit of the wetland.”); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, 

App. B ¶ 7(b)(2) (“The district engineer is considered to have control and responsibility 

for portions of the project beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction where the Federal 

involvement is sufficient to turn an essentially private action into a Federal action. These 

are cases where the environmental consequences of the larger project are essentially 

products of the Corps permit action.”); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b)(1) (“In some 

situations, a permit applicant may propose to conduct a specific activity requiring a [§ 

404] permit (e.g., construction of a pier in a navigable water of the United States) which 

is merely one component of a larger project (e.g., construction of an oil refinery on an 

upland area).” (emphasis added)); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7(b)(3) (discussing when 

NEPA review should be “extended to the entire project, including portions outside 

waters of the United States. . . if sufficient Federal control and responsibility over the 

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entire project is determined to exist” and noting that “[f]or those regulated activities that 

comprise merely a link in a transportation . . . project, the scope of analysis should 

address the Federal action, i.e., the specific activity requiring a [§ 404] permit and any 

other portion of the project that is within the control or responsibility of the Corps of 

Engineers” (emphasis added)); Environmental Quality, Procedures for Implementing the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 49 FR 1387-01 (explaining that, where a 

utility line crosses waters of the United States, the “specific activity” requiring the permit 

is “the crossing itself,” and “the entire project” is the entire length of the utility line);

William L. Want, Law of Wetlands Regulation, §§ 6:24-25 (Westlaw 2015) (explaining 

that ¶ 7 was introduced to limit COE’s previously very broad scope of review of an entire 

project of which the regulated dredge or fill site was merely a part). 

Further, unlike Plaintiff’s preferred interpretation, COE’s interpretation avoids the 

illogical effect of prohibiting tiering49 with respect to highway projects (which CEQ 

regulations encourage, see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20) and does not prevent COE from issuing 

permits for individual, manageable phases of massive highway projects that do not 

otherwise run afoul of other regulations that prohibit segmentation and overly narrow 

permit applications. 

                                                             49 “Tiering refers to the coverage of general matters in broader environmental impact 

statements (such as national program or policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements 

or environmental analyses (such as regional or basinwide program statements or ultimately sitespecific statements) incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating solely 

on the issues specific to the statement subsequently prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. “Agencies 

are encouraged to tier their environmental impact statements to eliminate repetitive discussions 

of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of 

environmental review.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (emphasis added). 

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Accordingly, the court finds that COE’s interpretation of ¶ 7(b) is persuasive, 

reasonable, not clearly erroneous, and not inconsistent with the regulation. Moreover, 

because Plaintiff has not provided any relevant legal authority to support its preferred 

interpretation, which is contrary to that of COE’s interpretation, Plaintiff has not shown 

that COE acted arbitrarily or capriciously in determining the proper scope of NEPA 

review. See Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 

1311-12 (S.D. Fla. 2005)50 (“The Corps’ determination of the appropriate scope of the 

environmental review process is entitled to deference. See Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 

U.S. at 375-76; Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 

(1989).”); see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 359 (upholding an agency’s interpretation of 

its own regulation as “controlling” where that interpretation was not “plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation”); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 912 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts must give deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its 

own regulations.”). 

C.3. Count IV: Hard Look Analysis 

 In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that COE’s EA/FONSI “fail[ed] to properly examine 

the direct, indirect, and cumulative project impacts, either by ignoring them altogether or 

by merely listing them with no analysis.” (Doc. # 1 in case No. 2:13-cv-794 at ¶ 128.) 

On summary judgment, Plaintiff puts forth several arguments to support its contention 

                                                             50 In Florida Wildlife, the court held that ¶ 7 did not allow COE to confine its EA to the 

first phase of a project to build a research institute. Florida Wildlife is distinguishable on its facts 

(see Doc. # 168 at 55 (distinguishing the case)) and, perhaps for that reason, Plaintiff did not cite 

Florida Wildlife in support of its ¶ 7 argument. 

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that the EA failed to take a hard look at the project’s impacts. 

 First, Plaintiff argues that COE had an “incomplete picture” of the Northern 

Beltline’s direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts because COE used 

“improper segmentation” to evaluate the 1.86-mile segment “as a standalone project.” 

(Doc. # 164 at 49-50.) However, Sections VI.C.1 and VI.C.2 explain why COE did not 

improperly limit its EA/FONSI analysis to the 1.86-mile project. 

 Second, Plaintiff argues that “much of [COE’s] EA is merely a listing of impacts 

with no analysis whatsoever.” (Doc. # 164 at 50.) Plaintiff specifically points to only 

one particular portion of the EA/FONSI (USACOE004862-68) as allegedly “listing 

impacts with no analysis whatsoever.” (Doc. # 164 at 50 n.99.) The section of the EA 

that spans the page numbers cited by Plaintiff consists of COE’s own independent 

cumulative effects analysis, which addresses the cumulative effects of the Northern 

Beltline in combination with other COE-permitted projects in each of the relevant 

watersheds. The cited portion is concise,51 but it does provide data and brief explanations 

                                                             51 So long as an EA/FONSI contains sufficient information and analysis to support 

COE’s decision whether to issue an EIS or a FONSI, brevity and concision in the document are 

not defects, but a required feature. By law, an EA is a “concise” public document that “briefly

provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental 

impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (emphasis 

added). It “include[s] brief discussions of the need for the proposal, . . . of the environmental 

impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (emphasis added); see also 33 C.F.R. § 230.10 (“An EA is a brief

document which provides sufficient information to the district commander on potential 

environmental effects of the proposed action and, if appropriate, its alternatives, for determining 

whether to prepare an EIS or a FONSI . . . . While no special format is required, the EA should 

include a brief discussion of the need for the proposed action, or appropriate alternatives if there 

are unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources, of the environmental 

impacts of the proposed action and alternatives and a list of the agencies, interested groups and 

the public consulted. The document is to be concise for meaningful review and decision.” 

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supporting COE’s conclusions and is not simply a “listing of impacts with no analysis 

whatsoever.” Plaintiff has not explained what “analysis” is lacking from COE’s 

discussion. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show that COE’s 

independent cumulative effects analysis was arbitrary or capricious. See Motor Vehicle 

Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (holding that an agency is required to consider the relevant 

data and articulate an explanation of its action that demonstrates a rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice made, and “ideal clarity” is not required if the 

basis of the agency’s decision can be reasonably discerned); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army 

Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Absent evidence to the contrary, 

we presume that an agency has acted in accordance with its regulations.”). Cf. Pres. 

Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 

1248 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Although the plaintiffs disagree with the conclusion of the Corps, 

they can point to nothing that would make the Corps decision arbitrary and capricious.”). 

Third, Plaintiff argues that COE “bases its FONSI in part on past environmental 

studies that are “either out of date or themselves lacking in probative analysis.” (Doc. # 

164 at 50.) The only use of “out of date” information Plaintiff specifically mentions is 

COE’s reliance on the cost projections in the 1997 FEIS. As explained in Section VI.B.2, 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

(emphasis added)). A FONSI is “a document by a Federal agency briefly presenting the reasons 

why an action . . . will not have a significant effect on the human environment and for which an 

environmental impact statement therefore will not be prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (emphasis 

added); see also 33 C.F.R. § 230.11 (“The FONSI will be a brief summary document as noted in 

40 CFR 1508.13.” (emphasis added)). COE’s NEPA implementation procedures provide that the 

combined EA/§ 404(b)(1)/FONSI document “normally should not exceed 15 pages,” 33 C.F.R. 

Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 7, although, in this case, the document is 75 pages in length, excluding 

appendixes. 

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COE did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its use of the cost projections in 1997 FEIS. 

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that COE cannot rely on the 2012 Re-evaluation because it 

is a “flawed document.” (Doc. # 170 at 12.) However, for the reasons stated in Part V., 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 2012 Re-evaluation is a “flawed document.” 

Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that COE failed to take a hard look at direct, 

indirect, and cumulative impacts of the project in issuing the EA/FONSI. 

D. Count III: COE’s Decision Not to Prepare a SEIS For the Entire Northern 

 Beltline 

 In Count III of the complaint in the § 404 action, Plaintiff alleges that COE 

violated NEPA by failing to independently determine that a SEIS was necessary for the 

entire Northern Beltline. 52 In its summary judgment motion and initial supporting brief, 

Plaintiff does not discuss this claim against COE. In its summary judgment response 

brief, Plaintiff argues that somebody should have determined that a SEIS for the whole 

Northern Beltline was needed, and that COE should have concluded that a 

comprehensive SEIS was needed for all the same reasons that the Highway Defendants 

should have come to that conclusion. However, as explained in Section VI.C., Plaintiff 

failed to demonstrate that NEPA obligated the Highway Defendants to create a 

comprehensive SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline; therefore, Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that, if COE had independently assessed the issue, COE would have been 

obligated to require a comprehensive SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline. Therefore, 

                                                             52 Also in Count III, Plaintiff asserts that COE’s decision not to conduct a SEIS for the 

entire Northern Beltline was the product of improper segmentation. COE is entitled to summary 

judgment on that issue because, for the reasons stated in Sections V.1.C.1 and .2, COE did not 

improperly segment the Beltline. 

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COE is entitled to summary judgment on Count III. 

Alternatively, summary judgment should be granted on Count III for the reasons 

given by Defendants, who do address Count III in their summary judgment briefs. (Doc. 

# 166 at 25-31; Doc. # 168 at 40.) Defendants argue that COE is entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim because FHWA, as the lead federal agency on the Northern 

Beltline Project, was responsible for preparing the FEIS and ensuring its continuing 

validity, and COE properly deferred to FHWA’s determination that no SEIS was needed 

for the entire Northern Beltline. 

In response to Defendants’ summary judgment arguments, Plaintiff argues that 

COE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in two ways when it relied on FHWA’s decision 

not to supplement the EIS for the entire Northern Beltline. (Doc. # 170 at 12-13.) First, 

Plaintiff argues that FHWA’s decision not to supplement the EIS was wrong because the 

FEIS is outdated and because it did not include an analysis of the indirect and cumulative 

effects of the Beltline. (Doc. # 170 at 12-13.) See 33 C.F.R. § 230.21 (“[COE] will 

normally adopt another Federal agency’s EIS and consider it to be adequate unless [COE] 

finds substantial doubt as to technical or procedural adequacy or omission of factors 

important to the Corps decision.”). However, for the reasons stated in Section V., 

Plaintiff has not shown that FHWA’s decision not to supplement the FEIS was arbitrary 

or capricious. 

Second, Plaintiff argues that COE could not have relied on FHWA’s conclusion in 

the 2012 Re-evaluation that no SEIS was needed because because the Re-evaluation itself 

was a “flawed document” and because, in any event, COE was not a cooperating 

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agency53 in the preparation of the Re-evaluation. (Doc. # 170 at 12.) 

For the reasons stated in Section V., Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Reevaluation was a “flawed document.” Further, Plaintiff does not cite any authority to 

support its contention that COE was required to serve as a cooperating agency in the 

preparation of the 2012 Re-evaluation in order to defer to FHWA’s decision that no SEIS 

was needed for the entire Northern Beltline. It appears that Plaintiff is conflating the 

issue of whether COE was allowed to defer to FHWA’s conclusion about the necessity of 

a SEIS for the Northern Beltline with Defendants’ (separate) argument that COE was 

allowed to “tier” to the 1997 FEIS. “Tiering” allows a cooperating agency to adopt an 

                                                             53 In fact, COE was asked to cooperate on the Re-evaluation, although ALDOT did not 

coordinate with COE outside of the permitting process. (USACOE004818.) Plaintiff does not 

explain what “cooperation” COE ought to have provided in the 2012 Re-evaluation. 

Cooperating agencies normally assist lead agencies with information concerning which the 

cooperating agency has special expertise. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(c)(3); see also 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, 

App. B ¶ 8(c) (“If another agency is the lead agency as set forth by the CEQ regulations . . . , the 

district engineer will coordinate with that agency as a cooperating agency under 40 CFR 

1501.6(b) and 1508.5 to insure that agency’s resulting EIS may be adopted by the Corps for 

purposes of exercising its regulatory authority. As a cooperating agency the Corps will be 

responsible to the lead agency for providing environmental information which is directly related 

to the regulatory matter involved and which is required for the preparation of an EIS.”). There is 

no evidence that the project designs were sufficiently advanced for COE’s expertise to be useful 

in evaluating the necessity of a SEIS for the entire Northern Beltline. (See USACOE4844 

(“Regarding working with ALDOT on the potential indirect effects for the entire project, if and 

when the future phases progress (it is reasonable to assume they will), the Corps will work with 

ALDOT at the time the project is submitted to assess avoidance and minimization of impacts. 

ALDOT has a general idea of the footprint for the remainder of the Beltline, but final 

engineering is not complete and on the ground waters of the US determinations have not been 

conducted. This is because the funding is not available to get this far along in the planning 

stages. They have a general idea of the direct impacts, but until they get to the stage where they 

have the funding for in-depth studies, this type of project planning cannot be conducted at this 

time. The Corps will work with ALDOT when the appropriate time comes.”). Thus, Plaintiff has 

not demonstrated that COE failed in any of its responsibilities as “cooperating agency” in the 

2012 Re-evaluation to ensure that the 1997 FEIS was still valid. 

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EIS of a lead agency,54 and, in the EA/FONSI, COE stated that, as a cooperating agency 

in the 1997 FIES, it was “adopting” the FEIS. (USACOE004804.) 

A Re-evaluation, however, is not an EIS, and, in the EA/FONSI, COE did not 

purport to “tier” to that document, and it did not purport to “adopt” the Re-evaluation on 

the same grounds or under the same legal authority that it adopted the EIS. 

                                                             54 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (“Agencies are encouraged to tier their environmental impact 

statements to eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues 

ripe for decision at each level of environmental review.”); 23 U.S.C. § 101(b)(4) (“Congress 

declares that it is in the national interest to expedite the delivery of surface transportation 

projects by substantially reducing the average length of the environmental review process. . . . 

Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States that . . . the [Department of Transportation] 

Secretary shall have the lead role among Federal agencies in carrying out the environmental 

review process for surface transportation projects.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 

295 F.3d 1209, 1215, 1223 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Agencies are not required to duplicate the work 

done by another federal agency which also has jurisdiction over a project. NEPA regulations 

encourage agencies to coordinate on such efforts. As early as possible, a lead agency should be 

designated. Other involved agencies are designated ‘cooperating agencies.’ 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6. 

A lead agency, who ultimately signs the EIS, is responsible for ensuring the involvement of all 

other agencies involved and supervising the EIS preparation. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5(a), 1501.6(a). . 

. . Cooperating agencies are permitted to adopt an EIS signed by the lead agency, provided they 

undertake ‘an independent review of the statement’ and determine that their ‘comments and 

suggestions have been satisfied.’ 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(c). . . . . The Corps acted as a cooperating 

agency in the development of the 1994 EIS . . . . In such a situation, the Corps’ regulations 

require the district engineer to coordinate with a lead agency to ‘insure that agency’s resulting 

EIS may be adopted by the Corps for purposes of exercising its regulatory authority.’ 33 C.F.R. 

Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 8(c). . . . In addition, NEPA regulations require an agency to undertake an 

independent review of a lead agency’s EIS before adopting it. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(c). If the Corps 

undertook no independent consideration of the [EIS], it would be in violation of both NEPA and 

its own regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3; 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 8(c). However, it is 

apparent from the administrative record that the Corps amply fulfilled its independent review 

duty. Moreover, we presume that the Corps complied with all regulatory requirements; Sierra 

Club has adduced no evidence to the contrary.”). 

In addition to specifically providing for “tiering” an EA to a previous EIS, CEQ 

regulations also more generally provide for the adoption of “appropriate environmental 

documents” (which, by definition, include EISs, EAs, FONSIs, and notices of intent) that have 

been prepared by other agencies. See D’Agnillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 965 F. 

Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing relevant regulations); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.4 (“Any 

environmental document in compliance with NEPA may be combined with any other agency 

document to reduce duplication and paperwork.”). 

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(USACOE004804; USACOE004818; USACOE4860-62.) Instead, COE “made [the 

2012 Re-evaluation] a part of [its] administrative record and [the Re-evaluation] serve[d] 

as a source of some data related to” the Northern Beltline.” (USACOE004804; 

USACOE004818; USACOE4860-62.) In the EA/FONSI, COE considered the data from 

the Re-evaluation along with other data and its own independent analysis and conducted 

an independent NEPA evaluation that focused on whether an EIS was needed for the 

1.86-mile section. (USACOE004804; USACOE4860-72; USACOE004876.) COE also 

“assessed additional items not considered during the EIS and Re-evaluation process to 

satisfy Corps regulations.” (USACOE004804; USACOE004862-72.) The regulations 

do not prohibit COE from relying on data from the Re-evaluation so long as COE 

conducted its own independent assessment of the data,55 and Plaintiff does not argue that 

                                                            

55 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B ¶ 3 (“The district engineer may require the applicant to 

furnish appropriate information that the district engineer considers necessary for the preparation 

of an Environmental Assessment (EA) or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).”); Hoosier 

Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F.3d 1053, 1061 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Although 

the Corps has an independent responsibility to enforce the Clean Water Act and so cannot just 

rubberstamp another agency’s assurances concerning practicability and environmental harm, it 

isn’t required to reinvent the wheel. If another agency has conducted a responsible analysis the 

Corps can rely on it in making its own decision. After all, it is permitted to rely (though not 

uncritically) on submissions by private permit applicants and on consultants . . . and it 

necessarily relies heavily on them—so why not on federal agencies that have relevant 

responsibilities and experience?”); see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 834 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (“The Corps’ regulations do not require the Corps to undertake an independent 

investigation or to gather its own information upon which to base an EA.”); Save the Bay, Inc. v. 

U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 610 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[I]t is clear that the Corps had 

testimony, evidence and comments from individuals and governmental agencies which could 

lead it to reasonably conclude that an EIS would not be necessary. The Corps received and 

reviewed comments from several governmental agencies as well as from quasi-governmental and 

business organizations. . . . We cannot agree . . . that consulting with these agencies was 

improper. [NEPA] requires that federal agencies consult with other agencies whose area of 

expertise is superior to their own.” (footnote omitted)). Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(a) (“If an agency 

requires an applicant to submit environmental information for possible use by the agency in 

preparing an environmental impact statement, then the agency should assist the applicant by 

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they do. 

In addition to relying on the Re-evaluation as a source of data, COE also stated 

repeatedly throughout the EA that it deferred to FHWA’s decision, as the lead agency for 

the Northern Beltline Project, that no SEIS was needed. (USACOE004804; 

USACOE004818-20; USACOE004821; USACOE004829-30; USACOE004834.) Taken 

in context, however, these statements clearly refer to COE’s deference to FHWA’s 

administrative decision regarding whether a SEIS was needed for the entire Northern 

Beltline. More specifically, COE deferred to FHWA’s decision that no SEIS was needed 

for the entire eastern portion of the Beltline and also deferred to FHWA’s decision to 

reserve for future consideration whether a SEIS will be issued “on just the western 

section and not the entire route.” (See USACOE004819-20.) 

However, COE did not defer to or adopt the 2012 Re-evaluation with respect to 

whether an EIS (or SEIS) was needed for the 1.86-mile section that was the subject of the 

permit. (See, e.g., USACOE004818; USACOE004821; USACOE004876 (“Having 

reviewed the information provided by the applicant and all interested parties and an 

assessment of the environmental impacts, [COE finds] that this permit action will not 

have a significant impact on the quality of the human environment. Therefore, an 

Environmental Impact Statement will not be required.”). COE explained in the EA that it 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

outlining the types of information required. The agency shall independently evaluate the 

information submitted and shall be responsible for its accuracy. . . . It is the intent of this 

paragraph that acceptable work not be redone, but that it be verified by the agency.”) 

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was not responsible for determining whether a SEIS was needed for the entire route, but 

COE maintained that its obligation was to determine whether the significance of the 

impacts of the 1.86-mile section required an EIS. (See, e.g., USACOE004817-21; 

USACOE004876.) As explained in Section VI.C., Plaintiff has not demonstrated that 

COE’s decision to focus its NEPA analysis on the necessity of an EIS for the 1.86-mile 

section was arbitrary or capricious. 

Accordingly, regardless of COE’s status or actual participation as a “cooperating 

agency” in the 2012 Re-evaluation, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that COE acted 

arbitrarily or capriciously in declining to second-guess FHWA’s lead-agency 

determination regarding whether a SEIS was needed for the entire Northern Beltline. Cf. 

Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(“[Plaintiff] makes three additional claims which are essentially challenges to decisions 

by other agencies. [Plaintiff] bears a difficult burden in proving the Corps was arbitrary 

and capricious in relying on these decisions, which were entirely within those agencies’ 

areas of expertise.”). 

For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion, the January 17, 2014 Order, 

and Defendants’ briefs, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that COE56 failed to follow proper 

procedures or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in declining to consider whether a SEIS 

                                                             56 Plaintiff asserts in the last paragraph of Count III that “Defendants” in the § 404 action 

violated NEPA. Defendants in the § 404 action include not only COE and COE’s District 

Commander, but also ALDOT and ALDOT’s Director. However, all factual allegations in 

Count III pertain to the alleged conduct of COE. Therefore, it does not appear that Count III is 

directed at ALDOT or its Director. Moreover, for the reasons stated in this Section and in 

Section V., Plaintiff has not demonstrated that ALDOT violated NEPA by not preparing a SEIS 

for the entire Northern Beltline. 

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was required for the entire Northern Beltline. Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on Count III of the complaint in the § 404 action. 

E. The § 404 Action: Conclusion 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted 

in the complaint in the § 404 action, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the 

claims in that complaint is due to be denied. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 Finally, for the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, in the 

January 17, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. # 157), and in Defendants’ 

summary judgment briefs, it is ORDERED: 

1. that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 163) is DENIED; 

2. that the motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 165) filed by ALDOT and ALDOT 

Director, John R. Cooper, is GRANTED; 

3. that the motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 167) filed by FHWA, Mark 

Bartlett, COE, and Col. Jon J. Chytka is GRANTED; 

4. that judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on all claims; and 

5. that these consolidated cases are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 A separate final judgment will be entered. 

DONE this 19th day of January, 2016. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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