Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01532/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01532-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Francis Luna-Lara,

Movant/Defendant,

v. 

United States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

No. CV-16-01532-PHX-ROS (MHB)

 CR-03-01097-004-ROS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSYLN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On June 27, 2016, Movant, who is confined in the Federal Correctional Institution

in Beaumont, Texas, filed through counsel an Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“2255 motion”). (Doc. 8.) In his 2255

motion, Movant challenged his conviction for brandishing a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence (hostage taking), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), based 

upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2551 (2015). (Id.) 

On March December 8, 2016, the Court stayed the case pending a decision by the 

United States Supreme Court in Lynch v. Dimaya1. (Doc. 26.) On May 14, 2018, this 

Court again stayed the case pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 

Begay2 (Doc. 28.) On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United 

States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (June 24, 2019), holding that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is 

 

1 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).

2

 934 F. 3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2019). 

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unconstitutionally vague. On August 19, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in 

Begay, reiterating the holding in Davis. Begay, 934 F. 3d 1033. 

On October 2, 2019, the United States filed its Response to Movant’s 2255 

motion. (Doc. 31.) In its motion, the United States concedes that Movant’s 2255 motion 

should be granted and that Movant’s § 924 (c) conviction should be vacated. The United 

States argues, however, that on remand the Court should substitute Movant’s § 924 

conviction with the crime of hostage taking, and that the Court then re-sentence Movant 

according to the original terms of his plea agreement. On October 16, 2019, Movant filed 

a Reply, in which he agrees that his § 924 conviction should be vacated, but asserts that 

his plea agreement should be set aside on remand, and the original charges should be 

reinstated. (Doc. 32.)

BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute the factual and procedural background of the case. On 

October 22, 2003, an indictment was filed against Movant charging him with one count 

of Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (count 1); 

one count of Hostage Taking and Aid and Abet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1203 and 2 

(count 2); one count of Conspiracy to Harbor Illegal Aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(A)(v)(II), and (a)(1)(B)(i) (count 3); and one count of 

Harboring Illegal Aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(A)(v)(I), 

and (a)(1)(B)(i) (count 4). (CRDoc3. 1.) Although as part of the hostage taking count, the 

grand jury had alleged as an overt act that “[a]t least two of the defendants possessed and 

brandished firearms in threatening ways to intimidate the hostage aliens,” Movant was 

not separately charged with a § 924(c) count. (Id. at 2.) 

On September 22, 2005, Movant pleaded guilty to an information charging one

count of Possession (Brandishing) a Firearm in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence 

(hostage taking), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (CRDocs. 108; 168.) In the plea 

agreement, the parties stipulated that Movant would receive a sentence of between 20 and 

 

3

“CRDoc.” refers to docket entries in the underlying criminal case: CR-03-01097-004-

ROS.

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25 years in prison, that the sentence would run concurrently with the sentence imposed 

by the Maricopa County Superior Court4, and that he would receive credit for the time he 

had served since his incarceration in October 2003. (CRDoc. 168 at 2-3.) The 

indictment would be dismissed at sentencing. (Id. at 3.) Movant’s plea agreement also 

provided as follows:

If Defendant’s guilty plea is rejected, withdrawn, vacated, or reversed at 

any time, the United States will be free to prosecute Defendant for all 

charges of which it has knowledge, and any charges that have been 

dismissed because of this plea agreement will be automatically reinstated.

(Id. at 4.) 

Movant was subsequently sentenced to 25 years in prison, with “credit for time 

served to date from defendant’s incarceration in October of 2003 in Maricopa County 

Superior Court.” (CRDoc. 172.)

The United States asserts that the crime of hostage taking, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

1203, is no longer a crime of violence, in that the elements of the crime do not satisfy the 

elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), because a ‘“threat[] . . . to continue to detain’ can be 

accomplished without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force.” 

(Doc. 31 at 6.) And, since the residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B), has been determined by 

the Supreme Court to be unconstitutionally vague, Movant’s conviction under § 924(c) 

must be vacated. Movant agrees. This Court concurs and will thus recommend that 

Movant’s 2255 motion be granted. The parties disagree however, on what should happen 

next.

The United States asserts that, because Movant admitted all the elements of the 

underlying predicate offense § to 924(c) – hostage taking – that the Court should 

substitute that offense for Movant’s offense of conviction. The United States cites 

several cases in support of this assertion, but the facts and holdings of those cases are 

 

4 Movant had also been charged in the Maricopa County Superior Court with other 

crimes arising out of the same course of conduct, and, after he was sentenced in that case 

to 12 years in prison, he was brought to federal court on a writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum. (CRDoc. 170; PSR § 30.)

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distinguishable in that they all involve jury trial convictions, and a later substitution of a 

lesser included offense for the crime of conviction. In the instant case there was no jury 

finding of guilt. Movant pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. 

The United States cites in support, for instance, Rutledge v. United States, 517 

U.S. 292, 305-06 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that a court has the authority 

to enter a conviction on a lesser offense for an erroneous conviction of a greater offense. 

Similarly, in United States v. Cabaccang, 481 F.3d 1176, 1183 (9 th Cir. 2007), the Court 

held that when a jury convicts on both a greater and lesser offense, and the court enters 

conviction on the greater offense and vacates the lesser offense, the court may reinstate 

the lesser-offense conviction when the greater offense conviction is reversed on appeal. 

“We conclude that the district court correctly reinstated [Appellant]’s previously-vacated 

conspiracy conviction after vacating his CCE conviction on grounds that did not affect 

the lesser-included conspiracy conviction.” Id. at 1184. In United States v. SepulvedaHernandez, 762 F.3d 22, 28-29 (2014), the Court applied a four-part test to determine 

when the court may enter conviction on a lesser-included offense when a jury conviction 

for the greater offense is vacated. See, accord, U.S. v. Skipper, 74 F.3d 608, 612 (Fifth 

Cir. 1996) (jury necessarily found all of the elements of simple possession in rendering 

its verdict so it was appropriate to enter conviction after possession with intent to 

distribute conviction was reversed); United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 380 (10th Cir. 1993); 

U.S. v.Figueroa, 666 F.2d at 1375 (11th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2nd

Cir. 1977).

Although Movant does not dispute that he admitted, in the factual basis of his plea 

agreement, all the elements of hostage taking, he emphasizes the obvious - that he did not 

plead guilty to that crime. Thus, even if hostage taking is a lesser-included offense of 

924(c), once the 924(c) conviction is vacated, there is no longer a plea of guilty, or a

finding of guilt. Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 410, statements made by Movant in his plea 

colloquy can not be used to support a finding of guilt on the lesser included offense of 

hostage taking. Specifically, and in relevant part, the rule provides that “[i]n a civil or 

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criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the defendant who 

made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: (1) a guilty plea that was later 

withdrawn; []; (3) a statement made during a [guilty plea] proceeding [] under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.” Fed. R. Evid. 410(a). The cases relied upon by the 

United States in support of its position all involve a jury determination of all of the facts 

necessary for conviction of the lesser and greater offense. That reasoning does not apply 

to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, and additionally, is inconsistent with the 

terms of Movant’s plea agreement.

For all of the above reasons, this Court will recommend that Movant’s amended 

2255 motion be granted, and that Movant’s conviction and sentence be vacated, and the 

original charges in the Indictment be reinstated. Wherefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Movant’s amended Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 225 

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 8) be 

GRANTED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the 

parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to 

Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed 

seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any 

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s 

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right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

Dated this 25th day of October, 2019.

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