Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03424/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03424-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:15 Antitrust Litigation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAVE CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OPTUMINSIGHT, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-03424-JCS 

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 

DISPUTE

Re: Dkt. No. 268

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant OptumInsight, Inc. seeks to strike as untimely pursuant to Rule 37 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure several supplemental expert reports and the declaration of a fact 

witness presented by Plaintiff Cave Consulting Group, Inc. (“CCGroup”). The parties submitted a 

joint letter brief pursuant to this Court’s standing order on discovery disputes. See Joint Letter 

(dkt. 268). Most of the issues raised in the joint letter brief relate to evidence at issue, or likely to 

be at issue, in the pending motions for summary judgment. Civil Local Rule 7-3 provides that 

evidentiary objections generally must be included within the briefs on a motion rather than in 

separate filings. Under the circumstances here, however, because expert discovery is ongoing and 

the hearing on the summary judgment motions is still months away, there is good reason to 

address the issues raised separately so that discovery may be concluded in an efficient manner. 

The schedule in this case has been modified several times. The operative schedule for fact 

discovery is set forth in the Superseding Case Management and Pretrial Order dated August 16, 

2017, which provides that “[a]ll non-expert discovery shall be completed by October 27, 2017.” 

Aug. 16, 2017 Order (dkt. 206) § II.B. The Court’s order dated March 20, 2018 on a stipulation 

by the parties sets forth the following deadlines for expert discovery:

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

January 22, 2018: Party with burden of proof to serve expert 

disclosures.

March 2, 2018: Expert rebuttal disclosures.

[. . .]

April 23, 2018: Completion of expert discovery.

Mar. 20, 2018 Order (dkt. 263) § I. The parties’ stipulation indicates that they intended the April 

23 deadline to account for “supplemental expert reports necessitated by a modified expert exhibit, 

and the deposition of nine expert witnesses, . . . among other things.” See id.

II. DECLARATION OF JAMES LOISELLE

Beginning with the fact witness, CCGroup does not separately respond to OptumInsight’s 

argument that the declaration of non-party witness James Loiselle, dated February 23, 2018, 

should be stricken for CCGroup’s failure to disclose Loiselle or his former employer McKesson 

(which his declaration relates to) before the close of fact discovery. Within its discussion of one 

of the supplemental expert reports that OptumInsight challenges, CCGroup asserts that it made 

“sustained, diligent efforts” to obtain Loiselle’s statement, beginning with a subpoena served on 

June 14, 2017, and that Loiselle and McKesson “were ‘otherwise made known to [OptumInsight] 

during the discovery process’ via subpoenas provided to OptumInsight.” Joint Letter at 5 & n.7 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A)) (alteration in original). According to CCGroup “[o]nly the 

threat of motion practice finally yielded the Declaration, which represents a compromise in lieu of 

full compliance with the subpoena.” Id. at 5.

Deviations from scheduling orders are governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, which provides that such orders “may be modified only for good cause and with the 

judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Ninth Circuit has established a standard for such 

modification that focuses on the diligence of the party seeking relief from a deadline:

Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy . . . , Rule 16(b)’s 

“good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial 

schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the 

party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s

notes (1983 amendment). Moreover, carelessness is not compatible 

with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. 

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing 

the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, 

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

Despite its conclusory assertion of diligence, CCGroup has not shown that it was diligent 

in its efforts to obtain evidence from Loiselle or his present or former employer1before the fact 

discovery deadline. CCGroup has provided no explanation for waiting until nearly the close of 

fact discovery—which, at the time CCGroup served the subpoena, was set to end on July 21, 

2017—to serve its subpoena. Apr. 28, 2017 Order (dkt. 189) ¶ 3. Although CCGroup discusses 

the “threat of motion practice,” Joint Letter at 5, it does not explain why it declined to bring a 

motion to compel compliance before the ultimate deadline for fact discovery that CCGroup itself 

(in conjunction with OptumInsight) proposed by stipulation. Because CCGroup “was not diligent, 

the inquiry should end.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.2 Loiselle’s declaration is STRICKEN, as is 

any portion of any expert report relying on that declaration, including the supplemental report of 

Ryan Sullivan.

III. SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORTS

As noted above, the scheduling orders in this case called for initial expert reports to be 

disclosed by January 22, 2018 and rebuttal reports to be disclosed by March 2, 2018. The 

schedule includes no provision for sur-rebuttal reports responding to the rebuttals. To the extent 

that some courts have permitted expert reports to be supplemented in response to criticism,3this 

Court disagrees with that approach both as it interprets Rule 26(e) and as a matter of a case 

 

1

It is not clear to whom CCGroup directed the June 14, 2017 subpoena that ultimately resulted in 

Loiselle’s declaration.

2 CCGroup has not formally sought to modify the scheduling order regarding fact discovery, 

instead simply disregarding the deadline. Although Johnson concerned a request for modification 

of a scheduling order rather than action taken in contravention of a scheduling order, “[t]he Court 

finds no justification for a different outcome where [CCGroup] has asked for forgiveness rather 

than for permission.” See Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 14-cv00930-JCS, 2016 WL 158874, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2016).

3

See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. CV 00-1693-

PA, 2003 WL 23715981, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 21, 2003). Another case cited by CCGroup is 

distinguishable on the basis that the supplemental report at issue appears to have been filed before 

the deadline for rebuttal. See Innovation Ventures, LLC v. NVE, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 703, 710 

(E.D. Mich. 2015) (“If Defendant wished to have [its expert] respond to the [challenged 

supplemental report], it could have done so during the time set aside for ‘rebuttal expert reports’ in 

the stipulated scheduling order.”).

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

management.

With respect to the interpretation of the rule, Rule 26(e) reads, in full, as follows:

(1) In General. A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—

or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or 

request for admission—must supplement or correct its disclosure or 

response:

(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material 

respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, 

and if the additional or corrective information has not 

otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 

discovery process or in writing; or

(B) as ordered by the court.

(2) Expert Witness. For an expert whose report must be disclosed 

under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the party’s duty to supplement extends both 

to information included in the report and to information given during 

the expert’s deposition. Any additions or changes to this information 

must be disclosed by the time the party’s pretrial disclosures under 

Rule 26(a)(3) are due.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (emphasis added).

“Duties are usually owed to other people, and are not for the benefit of the party who has 

the duty.” Sandata Techs., Inc. v. Infocrossing, Inc., No. 05 CIV. 09546 (LMM) (THK), 2007 WL 

4157163, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (holding that a party could not invoke Rule 26(e) to 

amend an expert report for its own benefit). The Middle District of North Carolina addressed the 

scope of Rule 26(e) supplementation in Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp.:

Rule 26(e)(1) requires supplementation when a “party learns that in 

some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or 

incorrect.” If the additional or corrective information has not 

otherwise been made known, a party must disclose at the times set out 

in Rule 26(a). . . . Plaintiff does not argue that [its expert’s] initial 

opinion was incorrect, but appears to argue that it was incomplete. 

The Court cannot accept a definition of supplementation which would 

essentially allow for unlimited bolstering of expert opinions. Rule 

26(e) envisions supplementation when a party’s discovery disclosures 

happen to be defective in some way so that the disclosure was 

incorrect or incomplete and, therefore, misleading. See Keener v. 

United States, 181 F.R.D. 639 (D. Mont. 1998). It does not cover 

failures of omission because the expert did an inadequate or 

incomplete preparation. Id. at 641; see Schweizer v. DEKALB Swine 

Breeders, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1495, 1510 (D. Kan. 1997) (no reason 

opinions could not have been stated earlier). To construe 

supplementation to apply whenever a party wants to bolster or submit 

additional expert opinions would [wreak] havoc in docket control and 

amount to unlimited expert opinion preparation.

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 212 F.R.D. 306, 310 (M.D.N.C. 2002); see also Medtronic 

Vascular, Inc. v. Abbot Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. C-06-1066 PJH (EMC), 2008 WL 4601038, 

at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2008) (citing Akeva with approval); Pac. Info. Res., Inc. v. Musselman, 

No. C06-2306 MMC (BZ), 2008 WL 2338505, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008) (same); Tesoro Ref. 

& Mktg. Co. LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 14-cv-00930-JCS, 2016 WL 158874, at *10 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 14, 2016).

As a matter of case management, there is no meaningful limiting factor to CCGroup’s 

approach of preparing supplemental reports to respond to criticism by of OptumInsight’s experts. 

If CCGroup were entitled to do so, it would follow that OptumInsight should be permitted to 

prepare additional reports responding to CCGroup’s supplemental reports, and CCGroup might 

well wish to respond to those reports as well. The schedule in this case called for two rounds of 

reports, and absent a need for supplementation within the meaning of Rule 26, the Court will hold 

to that structure. The supplemental reports of Bryan Bergeron, Stephen Kunin, and Ryan Sullivan

are therefore STRICKEN, except for the portions discussed below addressing the microfiche 

evidence of the conception date of certain patents in the Seare patent family. 

The experts may, however, testify at their depositions regarding not only the subject matter 

of their initial reports but also any critiques of their opinions presented in the rebuttal reports, 

although they may not present new opinions, arguments, or evidence as alternatives to opinions, 

arguments, or evidence that OptumInsight’s experts criticized. In other words, true rebuttal to 

criticism is permitted—facts and opinions that should have been in the original reports are not. 

For example, Dr. Bergeron may testify about the significance of the notes that Dr. van Duren 

addressed in his rebuttal report, but may not testify regarding claims 7 and 21 of ’897 patent, 

which are not addressed in either his own or Dr. van Duren’s initial reports, as a substitute for the 

only claim that Dr. Bergeron initially chose to address. Any objections based on this distinction 

shall be raised in a Daubert motion or motion in limine and preserved at the deposition either by 

objection without instruction not to answer or by a motion to strike. Opinions, facts, and 

reasoning not included either in an expert’s non-stricken report or in that expert’s deposition will 

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

also be subject to exclusion.4

As a limited exception to the ruling above, the Court agrees with CCGroup and the Eastern 

District of Louisiana that a supplemental report can be appropriate “in light of newly discovered 

evidence”—as opposed to new arguments or expert interpretations—where the party seeking to 

supplement the report is not at fault for failure to identify the evidence earlier. See Ferman v. 

Double J Marine, LLC, No. 15-3941, 2016 WL 9330712, at *2 (E.D. La. July 6, 2016).5 Although 

CCGroup may have had other reason to believe that OptumInsight believed the patents at issue 

were conceived before June of 1994, see Joint Letter at 3 (citing Ex. G), OptumInsight offers no 

explanation for its failure to identify the microfiche source code on which its expert relied as 

evidence of the conception date in response to CCGroup’s interrogatory seeking identification of 

such evidence. The Court therefore declines to strike the supplemental reports to the limited 

extent that they address that evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the declaration of James Loiselle and the supplemental 

reports of Bryan Bergeron, Stephen Kunin, and Ryan Sullivan are hereby STRICKEN, except to 

the extent that the supplemental reports address the microfiche source code evidence that 

OptumInsight failed to identify in response to CCGroup’s interrogatory. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

4 Alternatively, if both parties believe that structuring their experts’ responses to critiques in 

reports—rather than only allowing such responses in deposition testimony—would be beneficial, 

the parties may stipulate that the existing supplemental reports will be allowed, and that 

OptumInsight may serve responsive reports by its own expert witnesses, subject to motions to 

strike if the existing supplemental reports and any responses thereto by OptumInsight’s experts are 

not true rebuttals.

5

In the joint letter brief, CCGroup twice erroneously cited this case as German rather than 

Ferman, and provided an inaccurate Westlaw citation number (9930712 rather than the correct 

citation of 9330712). See Joint Letter at 3, 5. The parties are admonished that such errors may 

limit the Court’s ability to locate and rely on authorities that the parties present in support of their 

arguments.

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

As noted, the operative deadline for completion of expert discovery was April 23, 2018. 

The Court understands that both parties have not yet completed expert discovery. The parties are 

therefore ORDERED to file no later than May 2, 2018 a stipulation setting a new deadline.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2018

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-03424-JCS Document 272 Filed 04/25/18 Page 7 of 7