Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03012/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2790

No. 15-2873

No. 15-3012

___________

JILL E. MANCINI,

Appellant in No. 15-2873

v.

NORTHAMPTON COUNTY; JOHN BROWN, IN HIS 

INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; 

VICTOR E. SCOMILLIO, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND 

OFFICAL CAPACITY

Northampton County,

Appellant in Nos. 15-2790 and 15-3012

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 5-14-cv-00963)

District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez

____________________________________

Argued: March 14, 2016

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2

Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and RESTREPO, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 9, 2016)

_____________

Samuel E. Cohen, Esq.

Patrick J. Reilly, Esq. [ARGUED]

Gross McGinley

33 South 7th Street

P.O. Box 4060

Allentown, PA 18105

Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant

David L. Schwalm, Esq. [ARGUED]

Jill L. Walsh, Esq. 

Thomas Thomas & Hafer

305 N. Front Street

P.O. Box 999

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Jill L. Walsh, Esq.

Thomas, Thomas & Hafer

1550 Pond Road

Suite 210

Allentown, PA 18104

Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee

___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

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3

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Jill Mancini, a former assistant county solicitor in

Northampton County, Pennsylvania, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 action against Northampton County, County Executive 

John Brown, and County Solicitor Victor Scomillio, in 

connection with their termination of her employment. 

Mancini, a Democrat, alleged that she was a protected career 

service employee and that the newly elected Republican 

administration wrongfully dismissed her in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the First 

Amendment. A jury found that Northampton County, but not

Brown or Scomillio, violated Mancini’s procedural due 

process rights and awarded her $94,232 in damages. The jury 

found in favor of all Defendants on Mancini’s First 

Amendment claims. We conclude that the able trial judge 

appropriately handled the numerous issues raised by the 

parties, and we will affirm.

This case requires us to consider whether there is an 

exception to the ordinary requirements of procedural due 

process when a government employee with a protected 

property interest in her job is dismissed as part of a 

departmental reorganization that results in the elimination of 

her position. We have not previously considered this socalled “reorganization exception.” We hold that a 

reorganization exception to constitutional procedural due 

process cannot apply as a matter of law where, as here, there 

is a genuine factual dispute about whether the reorganization 

was pretext for an unlawful termination.

I.

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A. Factual Background

1. Mancini’s Employment in Northampton 

County

Mancini began her employment with Northampton 

County in 2001 as a part-time assistant district attorney. In 

December 2006, the Northampton County Council approved 

a request from Karl Longenbach, then County Solicitor, to 

create one full-time assistant county solicitor position. Prior 

to that time, the Northampton County assistant solicitors were 

all part-time employees. The County Council eliminated a

vacant part-time assistant county solicitor position when it 

created the full-time position. In February 2007, Mancini was 

hired into the newly created full-time position, which she 

believed was part of the Northampton career service. In 

2012, the Northampton County Council created a second fulltime assistant county solicitor position, which was filled in 

early 2013. 

In November 2013, Defendant John Brown was 

elected County Executive of Northampton County. He 

tapped Defendant Victor Scomillio to serve under him as 

County Solicitor. Before taking office, Brown and Scomillio 

decided that they would make changes to the staffing of the 

Solicitor’s Office. According to Mancini, Scomillio told her 

on December 23, 2013, that her position would be eliminated

on January 7, 2014.

 

On January 7, 2014, Brown formally requested that the 

County Council eliminate the two full-time assistant county

solicitor positions and replace them with two additional parttime positions. Mancini filed a grievance that same day 

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challenging her forthcoming dismissal on numerous grounds, 

including that her discharge violated Northampton’s Home 

Rule Charter, its Career Service Regulations, and 

Northampton County Employee Policy No. 3.525, “Reduction 

in Force and Recall” (the “Layoff Policy”).

 

The County Council acted on Brown’s request on 

January 23, 2014, eliminating the two full-time positions and 

creating the requested part-time positions. Mancini’s last day 

of work was Friday, January 24, 2014, the last business day 

before the reorganization took effect. She was suspended

with pay until her February 17, 2014 termination. Mancini

was not offered either of the newly created assistant county 

solicitor jobs, and she was not permitted to displace an 

existing part-time assistant county solicitor.

 

Mancini did not receive formal written notice of her 

termination until a letter dated January 27, 2014, advised her

that on January 23 her position had been eliminated. The 

elimination of her position was the only ground Northampton 

provided for Mancini’s dismissal. In the notice, the County 

took the position that the “full time assistant county solicitor 

positions were career exempt positions.” J.A. 3416.

Northampton County held an informal hearing on 

Mancini’s grievance on February 19, 2014, two days after it

stopped paying her, and nearly a month after she was relieved 

of her duties. She was not permitted to have counsel present

at the hearing. The County denied Mancini’s grievance. 

Mancini appealed to the Northampton Personnel Appeals

Board (the “Board”), which held two hearings on her 

grievance—one in May 2014 and one in June 2014. Months 

passed with no decision. Finally, in response to an inquiry 

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from her lawyer, the Board informed Mancini by letter dated 

November 19, 2014, that the Board was “hopelessly 

deadlocked.” J.A. 3425. No further action was taken on 

Mancini’s appeal, and the Board never reached or

communicated a final decision to Mancini. 

2. The Northampton County Career Service

Under the Northampton Home Rule Charter, members 

of the career service can only be dismissed for “just cause” 

and they have the right to appeal to the Northampton 

Personnel Appeals Board for a pretermination just cause 

determination. See id. at 3326, 2688. The distinction 

between career service and exempt service has important 

consequences for Northampton employees, and for our 

analysis of Mancini’s due process claim. While Mancini’s 

status as a career service employee is not at issue on appeal, it 

was contested at trial.

 

The Northampton Home Rule Charter1 states that all 

County employees “shall be members of the career service,” 

except for nine discrete categories of exempt employees. Id.

 1 Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, counties “have 

the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters.” 

Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2. A county “which has a home rule 

charter may exercise any power or perform any function not 

denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the 

General Assembly at any time.” Id.; see 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 

2961. 

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at 3325. We agree with the parties that Mancini’s position 

did not fall within the meaning of any one of the nine

enumerated exemptions.2

 The Resolution that created 

Mancini’s full-time assistant county solicitor position did not 

state whether the position was exempt or career service. 

However, former County Solicitor Longenbach testified that 

he intended the full-time assistant county solicitor position to 

be part of the career service, and that he believed the position 

the County Council approved, and that Mancini occupied, 

was, in fact, a career service position. Linda Markwith, a 

personnel analyst in the Northampton County Human 

Resources Department responsible for recruitment and hiring 

when Mancini was hired as a solicitor, testified that 

Mancini’s position was designated as career service from the 

outset and the designation never changed. An email from

Markwith to Longenbach confirmed that Mancini’s position 

was “included in the Career Service category.” Id. at 3388. 

Meanwhile, defendant Scomillio testified that, based on his 

research in 2013, he believed Mancini was not a member of 

 2 The nine exemptions from the career service are:

(1) all elected officials; (2) the heads of agencies immediately 

under the direction and supervision of the County Executive;

(3) one confidential or clerical employee for each of the 

above officials, except for members of the County Council;

(4) the Clerk of Council and the staff of the County Council;

(5) the members of authorities, boards, and commissions; (6) 

permanent, part-time professional employees; (7) provisional, 

probationary, and temporary employees; (8) officers and 

employees required to be included in a state merit or civil 

service system; and (9) officers and employees whose 

inclusion in the career service would be prohibited by the law 

of Pennsylvania. J.A. 3325. 

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the career service and that she could be laid off as part of a

reorganization. But, he conceded, if it were determined that 

she was a career service employee, the County could not 

terminate her without just cause. 

B. Procedural History

Mancini filed a Complaint in the District Court against 

Northampton County, Brown, and Scomillio (collectively, the 

“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant to these 

appeals, she alleged the Defendants violated her Fourteenth 

Amendment right to procedural due process when they 

terminated her without a pretermination hearing or just cause 

determination, and they violated her First Amendment rights 

when they terminated her based on her political affiliation.

3

 

The Defendants responded in their motion to dismiss that 

Mancini failed to state a claim on either theory because she

was an exempt, or at-will, employee and her position was 

eliminated pursuant to a legitimate, cost-driven reorganization

of the Solicitor’s Office. Mancini countered that the 

“reorganization” was pretext for an unlawful termination and 

that, as a Northampton County career service employee, she 

was entitled to pretermination due process, which she did not 

receive. The District Court denied the Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss.

 

The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all 

claims. They argued that Brown and Scomillio were entitled 

to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate 

 3 Mancini’s equal protection claims were dismissed 

before the case was submitted to the jury and are not a subject 

of these appeals.

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any clearly established rights. As to Mancini’s due process 

claims, they also argued that Mancini had failed to establish

that she held a protected property interest in her position or 

that she was entitled to due process when her position was 

eliminated by reorganization. The District Court granted 

Brown and Scomillio qualified immunity for all claims 

brought against them in their individual capacities. As to the 

remaining claims, the court reserved judgment on the 

Defendants’ due process arguments and on all claims against 

Northampton.

 

Mancini tried her claims against Northampton County,

and Brown and Scomillio in their official capacities. After a 

five-day trial, the jury returned a split verdict. It found that

Northampton violated Mancini’s procedural due process

rights, but that Brown and Scomillio did not. Significantly, 

the jury also found that Mancini’s full-time assistant county 

solicitor position was a career service position. The jury 

found no violation of Mancini’s First Amendment rights. The 

jury awarded Mancini $94,232 in damages and the District 

Court entered judgment consistent with the verdict. 

Northampton moved for judgment as a matter of law 

or a new trial under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. It asserted four bases for relief: (1) a miscarriage 

of justice would result if the verdict were allowed to stand 

because it was contrary to law, the evidence was insufficient 

to support the verdict, and the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence; (2) the elimination of Mancini’s position fell 

within a so-called “reorganization exception” to constitutional 

procedural due process; (3) Northampton County law and 

policy do not require procedural due process where a position 

is eliminated as part of a reorganization; and (4) Pennsylvania 

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assistant county solicitors are employed at-will as a matter of 

law and are not entitled to pretermination procedural due 

process. Northampton advances these same four arguments 

on appeal.

 

The District Court denied Northampton’s Rule 50 

post-trial motion. Over Northampton’s objections, the 

District Court granted Mancini $186,018.60 in attorney’s fees 

and costs as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

These timely appeals followed. In Appeal No. 2790,

Northampton appeals the denial in part of its motion for 

summary judgment and the denial of its post-trial motion for 

judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. In Appeal No. 15-

3012, Northampton appeals the District Court’s award of 

Mancini’s attorney’s fees and costs.4

 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction over this civil rights 

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 

We have jurisdiction over the final decisions of a district 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

 4

 Mancini cross-appealed seeking a new trial on her 

First Amendment claims (Appeal No. 15-2873), but at oral 

argument before this Court she withdrew her appeal, agreeing 

with the Court that a second trial would be redundant. We 

therefore do not reach the issues she presented in her crossappeal. In addition, even if Mancini had not withdrawn her 

cross-appeal, we have reviewed her arguments regarding her 

First Amendment claims and find those arguments 

unconvincing in view of the jury’s factual determinations. 

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Our review of orders entered on motions for summary 

judgment is plenary. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 

767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). “‘[W]e may affirm the 

District Court on any grounds supported by the record,’ even 

if the court did not rely on those grounds.” Id. (quoting 

Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)). “In

considering an order entered on a motion for summary 

judgment, ‘we view the underlying facts and all reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion.’” Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v. 

Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995)). If the “nonmoving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an 

essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of 

proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a 

material fact and thus the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 

Our review of orders concerning post-trial motions for 

judgment as a matter of law is also plenary and we apply the 

same standard as the district court. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 

Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). The motion 

may be granted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage 

of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient 

evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” 

Id. We “may not weigh the evidence, determine the 

credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] version of the facts 

for the jury’s version.” Id. “Because the jury returned a 

verdict in favor of the plaintiff, we must examine the record 

in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving her the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences, even though contrary inferences 

might reasonably be drawn.” In re Lemington Home for the 

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Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Dudley v. S. 

Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1977)).

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for 

abuse of discretion, unless it was based on an application of 

law, in which case our review is plenary. McKenna v. City of 

Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009). An abuse of 

discretion occurs if a “court’s decision rests upon a clearly 

erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law or an 

improper application of law to fact” or “when no reasonable 

person would adopt the district court’s view.” Blunt, 767 

F.3d at 265 (quotation marks omitted).

We similarly review the reasonableness of attorney’s 

fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for abuse of discretion. 

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).

 

III.

A. Northampton County’s Appeal of the Due 

Process Judgment

Northampton appeals the denial of its post-trial motion 

for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, and the partial 

denial of its motion for summary judgment. The County

reasserts on appeal the same four arguments it made in its 

post-trial motion. 

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

The District Court held that sufficient evidence 

supported the jury’s verdict that Northampton violated 

Mancini’s due process rights. We agree.

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In response to special interrogatories, the jury found by 

a preponderance of the evidence that “Jill Mancini’s position 

as a full time assistant county solicitor in Northampton 

County was a career service position” and that Northampton 

County “violated Jill Mancini’s due process rights by not 

providing her with a meaningful pre-termination opportunity 

to respond to the elimination of her position.” J.A. 1634.

 

Northampton did not challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Mancini held a 

career service position. See Br. of Northampton at 51-55. 

Northampton has therefore waived any such argument. See 

Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler 

Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is 

waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief”). We 

accept in this appeal, as we must, that Mancini was in fact a 

career service employee. See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at

1166. Nevertheless, given the significance of Mancini’s 

status as a career service employee to our decision, we review 

the evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 

Mancini was a career service employee. 

The plain text of the Northampton Home Rule Charter 

states that all non-exempt County employees are members of 

the career service. Full-time professional employees are not 

listed among the exemptions, and none of the exemptions 

could fairly include a full-time permanent assistant county 

solicitor such as Mancini. Karl Longenbach, the County 

Solicitor who headed the Solicitor’s Office when Mancini 

was hired and who presented the concept of a full-time 

assistant county solicitor to the County Council, testified that 

Mancini occupied a career service position. Linda Markwith, 

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the Northampton Human Resources representative who 

handled Mancini’s hiring, further testified that the 

Northampton Human Resources information system

designated Mancini as a member of the career service during 

the entire time she held the position. Defendant Scomillio 

testified that even though he thought Mancini was an at-will 

employee, he and Brown decided to eliminate her position 

though a reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office, rather than 

terminating her like the other at-will employees they 

dismissed. Based on these facts, had Northampton 

challenged this aspect of the jury’s verdict, we would have 

concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the

finding that Mancini was a member of the Northampton 

County career service.

The evidence was also sufficient to establish that 

Northampton did not provide Mancini the meaningful process 

she was due. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment prohibits a State from “depriv[ing] any person of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discharged government 

employee to succeed on a violation of procedural due process 

claim, the employee must first prove that she possessed a 

constitutionally protected property right in her continued 

employment. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 177 

(3d Cir. 2007). A “unilateral expectation of continued 

employment” does not amount to a constitutionally protected 

property interest in one’s job. Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 

279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005). Where, however, an employee can 

only be fired for “just cause,” the employee develops a 

cognizable property interest in her continued employment,

and the government may not fire her without providing 

procedural due process. Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 

F.3d 225, 230-32 (3d Cir. 2008).

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The Northampton Home Rule Charter provides that no 

member of the career service shall be “dismissed . . . except 

for just cause.” See J.A. 3326. We have already established 

that Mancini was a career service employee. Because career 

service employees in Northampton can only be terminated for 

just cause, we conclude that Mancini had a protected property 

interest in her job, and she was entitled to notice and an 

opportunity to be heard on the cause for her termination prior

to dismissal.

 

Fundamentally, procedural due process requires notice 

and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 

U.S. 319, 333, 348 (1976). The hearing must be “at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 333. 

Except in emergency situations not present here, procedural 

due process requires that when the government seeks to 

discharge an employee who possess a protected property 

interest in her job, “it must afford notice and opportunity for 

hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the 

termination becomes effective.” Dee, 549 F.3d at 232

(emphasis added).

 

Mancini did not receive adequate due process. Even 

now, Northampton maintains that, in light of the 

reorganization, it did not need just cause to terminate Mancini

and that it would have been idle to provide her with due 

process. Northampton is incorrect that no process was due. 

At a minimum, Mancini’s protected property interest in her 

continued employment entitled her to “notice of the charges 

against [her], an explanation of the [Defendants’] evidence, 

and an opportunity to present [her] side of the story.” 

Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2011) 

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(quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 

546 (1985)). The process she received was deficient on all 

fronts.

 

Mancini was notified that the full-time assistant county 

solicitor position was being changed to a part-time position, 

but the Defendants did not inform her of their charges against 

her or their reasons for selecting her for dismissal.

5

 Without 

knowing the Defendants’ rationale for selecting her for layoff, 

Mancini was not able to present her side of the story. 

Furthermore, the Defendants did not hold a hearing on 

Mancini’s termination until after she was fired, despite the 

fact that she had promptly and properly availed herself of the 

Northampton grievance procedure several weeks before her 

termination. We hold that this evidence was sufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict that Northampton did not provide 

Mancini a meaningful pre-termination opportunity to respond 

to her planned dismissal. The finding was not contrary to 

law, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Northampton a new trial on Mancini’s due process 

claims.

 

2. A “Reorganization Exception” to Procedural 

Due Process?

Northampton asks us to excuse its conduct by adopting

and applying an exception to the ordinary requirements of 

constitutional procedural due process. Northampton argues 

that “[a]lthough a property right and procedural due process 

 5 Evidence supporting a finding that the purportedly 

neutral, cost-driven reorganization was in fact pretext for 

targeting Mancini is discussed in the next section.

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typically go hand-in-hand triggering a requirement for some 

kind of hearing before discharge, [there is] a limited 

reorganization exception to due process that eliminates the 

need for a hearing where a reorganization or other costcutting measure results in the dismissal of an employee.” Br. 

of Northampton at 37 (alterations in original) (quoting 

Whalen v. Mass. Trial Ct., 397 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2005))

(quotation marks omitted). Northampton contends it was not 

required to provide Mancini with any procedural due process 

before, or after, it terminated her, because once the

reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office occurred, Mancini’s 

position no longer existed. Any challenge to the injustice of 

Mancini’s dismissal would have been “futile,” according to 

Northampton, because as a factual matter there was no longer 

room for her in the County government. Id. at 39 (quoting 

Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 658 F.3d 

125, 130 (1st Cir. 2011)).

We have not previously considered the existence of 

this so-called “reorganization exception” to procedural due 

process, and we decline to apply any exception to 

Northampton’s conduct in this case. Because the jury could 

have reasonably concluded that the reorganization of the 

Solicitor’s Office was pretext for unlawfully terminating 

Mancini, we do not reach the question of whether there are 

exceptions to the requirements of procedural due process 

where the government engages in a legitimate person-neutral 

reorganization.

 

Although the jury was not directed to make a specific 

finding on pretext, the jury found that Northampton violated 

Mancini’s due process rights, and we agree with the District 

Court that Mancini presented sufficient evidence of pretext to 

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18

support that finding. Mancini presented evidence from which 

a jury could reasonably conclude that the Defendants’ 

purported concern for cost-savings did not actually animate 

the reorganization. There was ample evidence that the 

Defendants decided to eliminate the two full-time assistant 

county solicitor positions, and replace them with part-time 

positions, based not on identity-neutral, cost-driven reasons, 

but based on their knowledge of Mancini and the people who 

would come to occupy the part-time positions.6

 

Evidence of pretext included the following. Scomillio

and Brown decided to reorganize the Solicitor’s Office 

shortly after Brown was elected County Executive in 

November 2013, even before he took office. Brown testified 

that when he asked Scomillio to consider a reorganization, 

Brown did not know what the budget of the Solicitor’s Office 

was and he did not have any personal knowledge of whether 

the office was running efficiently. Without any investigation, 

without asking Human Resources to conduct a desk audit to 

determine the volume of work, and without looking at 

solicitors offices in comparable counties, Scomillio 

recommended, based on his knowledge of who was on the 

staff of the Solicitor’s Office, that they shift the work of the 

 6 Northampton is incorrect in its view that the jury 

found that the reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office was 

legitimate. The jury found that Mancini’s political affiliation 

was not a substantial or motivating factor in the elimination 

of her position. However, this does not rule out a multitude 

of other improper bases for her termination, including the 

possibility that Northampton orchestrated a sham 

reorganization to target Mancini and circumvent the process 

she was due as a member of the career service.

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full-time solicitors to part-time solicitors. Scomillio had 

experience with the individuals he planned to hire as parttime solicitors and he believed they would work more 

efficiently than the existing staff. 

 

When they decided to conduct the reorganization, 

Brown and Scomillio had concerns about the competency of 

the Solicitor’s Office in general, and about Mancini in 

particular. Brown testified that the “reputation of the 

[Solicitor’s Office] was not strong.” J.A. at 2496. Scomillio 

testified that his prior experience with Mancini, when she 

worked in the district attorney’s office, “wasn’t good” and he 

“didn’t come off with a good experience about her abilities.” 

Id. 2657. Scomillio had no interest in keeping Mancini on 

staff after she reacted negatively to his suggestion of a 

reorganization and informed him that she could only be fired 

for cause. Scomillio also testified that Daniel Spengler, his 

predecessor,7 advised him to retain the position of full-time 

assistant solicitor but was “equivocal at best regarding his 

feeling about Attorney Mancini and her . . . work ability.” 

J.A. at 2650. Instead of taking Spengler’s advice to keep the 

full-time positions but not Mancini, the Defendants 

eliminated the full-time positions and told Mancini that her 

job no longer existed. They redistributed Mancini’s work to 

part-time solicitors—both old and new—without giving her

the option to remain employed with the County.

 

Evidence that Northampton failed to comply with its 

Layoff Policy casts further doubt on its claim that it engaged 

 7 Longenbach resigned as County Solicitor at the end 

of 2012. Daniel Spengler was appointed to serve the final 

year of Longenbach’s term.

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in a bona fide reorganization plan. Under the Layoff Policy, 

career service employees are entitled to retention priority over 

part-time employees, to notice of existing vacancies and the 

right to displace less senior employees in the same or lower 

job title, and to be placed on a recall list to fill subsequent 

vacancies in the same or lower job title. The Layoff Policy 

thus favors regular and full-time career service employees 

over part-time employees, and requires the County to give 

notice of vacancies to career service employees who are 

subject to layoff. Despite these enumerated rights,

Northampton laid-off Mancini, a regular, full-time career 

service employee, and distributed her work to part-time 

employees of the same title without allowing her to displace a 

less senior assistant county solicitor or to assume one of the 

newly created positions.

 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Mancini and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor,

the evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to determine 

that the Defendants targeted Mancini based on her personal 

performance, and that the reorganization was pretext for 

firing her. Northampton’s argument that “pre-termination 

hearings are not required by due process where a bona fide

government reorganization plan bases dismissals on factors 

unrelated to personal performance” is therefore misplaced. 

Br. of Northampton at 39 (quoting Rodriguez-Sanchez, 658 

F.3d at 130) (emphasis added). The cases on which 

Northampton relies do not apply where a reorganization was 

pretextual. See id. at 35-40.

8

 8 In Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court, the First 

Circuit held that a “limited ‘reorganization exception’” did 

not apply to a court clerk because his job performance and 

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21

 

other individual qualifications were decisive factors in the 

decision of the Springfield District Court to terminate him

during a deficit-driven layoff. 397 F.3d at 22-26. The First 

Circuit held that the Government violated Whalen’s due 

process rights because it targeted him, not his position, in the 

layoff. Id. at 25-26. Similarly, Mancini was one of only two 

people “reorganized” out of a job in the Solicitor’s Office and 

there was evidence that the Defendants targeted her based on 

her individual qualifications and not her position. 

In Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 

the First Circuit did permit the government to lay off 

employees during a reorganization without the process they 

were otherwise due, but the neutral reduction in force in that 

case bears little resemblance to the evidence Mancini 

presented. See 658 F.3d at 132. Rodriguez-Sanchez involved 

the claims of ninety-eight terminated employees of the 

Municipality of Santa Isabel, Puerto Rico. See id. at 129. An 

independent accounting firm determined that Santa Isabel’s 

$7 million deficit was largely due to the size of the city’s 

workforce. Id. at 127, 130. There was no question that the 

system-wide layoff plan alleviated the deficit problem. Id. at 

130. Significantly, the record in Rodriguez-Sanchez was 

devoid of evidence of pretext, and the mayor had no 

knowledge of the identities of the individuals selected for 

layoff. Id. at 130-31. The First Circuit was thus satisfied that 

Santa Isabel had engaged in a bona fide reduction in force in 

response to a deficit crisis. Id. at 130-32. Unlike the systemwide, identity-neutral layoff scenario the First Circuit 

confronted in Rodriguez-Sanchez, Mancini was one of only 

two solicitors laid-off for purported budgetary reasons, and 

her identity was well known to County Executive Brown. 

There was no independent evaluation of the cost-savings that 

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22

Finally, we reject Northampton’s argument that a “due 

process claim is not available if a layoff was made pursuant to 

a reorganization in fact, regardless of a possible improper 

motive behind the reorganization.” See Reply Br. of 

Northampton at 23. We are aware of no court that has 

permitted the government to subvert the requirements of the 

Fourteenth Amendment with a sham reorganization. If the 

government were allowed to undertake sham reorganizations 

to dismiss an employee who was otherwise entitled to due 

process, Northampton’s proposed “reorganization exception” 

would eviscerate a public employee’s procedural due process 

rights altogether.

 

In conclusion, we will not permit the government to 

target an individual for dismissal and then violate that 

individual’s procedural due process rights under the guise of a 

reorganization. “To hold otherwise would allow government 

officials to cry ‘reorganization’ in order to circumvent the 

constitutional and statutory protections guaranteed” to 

government employees who may only be fired for cause. 

Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 101 (7th Cir. 1986). 

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 

conclude that the reorganization was a pretext for targeting 

Mancini. Northampton was therefore not exempt from 

providing Mancini, a protected career service employee, with 

procedural due process when it selected her for dismissal.

 

3. Northampton County’s Grievance Procedure

 

would result from the Defendants’ plan, and there was 

evidence that the Defendants considered Mancini’s individual 

qualifications when selecting her for layoff. 

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Northampton next argues that its own law and policy

contain a reorganization exception that permitted the County 

to terminate Mancini without providing her procedural due 

process. See Br. of Northampton at 40-45. The District 

Court properly denied Northampton’s request for judgment as 

a matter of law on this basis. The Northampton Home Rule 

Charter, Grievance Policy, and Layoff Policy entitled 

Mancini to a hearing before the Personnel Appeals Board to 

challenge the legitimacy of her discharge, despite the 

purported reorganization.

The Northampton Home Rule Charter, as discussed 

above, establishes the right of career service employees to 

remain employed, except on a finding of “just cause.” The 

Charter makes no exception or special provision for 

reorganizations. Mancini, as a member of the Northampton 

career service, was therefore entitled to a pretermination just

cause determination, regardless of any bona fide 

reorganization plan. See Dee, 549 F.3d at 232; Elmore, 399 

F.3d at 282.

Under Northampton County Employee Policy No. 

3.15, “Grievance Procedure” (the “Grievance Policy”), career 

service employees have the right to appeal “a suspension or 

discharge from employment,” or to challenge “an alleged 

violation of the County’s Home Rule Charter, Administrative 

Code, Career Service Regulations, County policy, or 

departmental procedure relating to terms and conditions of 

employment.” J.A. 3374. The four-step escalated grievance 

process culminates in a formal hearing before the 

Northampton County Personnel Appeals Board. Id. at 3376-

78. Following the hearing, the Board must issue to the parties

a final written adjudication that contains the “findings and 

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reasons as adopted by the majority of the Board.” Id. at 3378. 

Like the Home Rule Charter, the Grievance Policy contains 

no exceptions for employment actions taken as part of a 

reorganization or cost-driven layoff. Mancini, a career 

service employee, properly filed a grievance after receiving 

notice of her impending dismissal. She alleged wrongful

discharge, unlawful discrimination, and violations of

Northampton’s Career Service Regulations and Layoff 

Policy. She was therefore entitled to pursue her claims 

through the Northampton County grievance process.

Northampton boldly asserts that its Layoff Policy 

“does not offer a right to due process in response to a 

legitimate reorganization.” Br. of Northampton at 43. The 

Layoff Policy, however, does not provide the escape hatch 

Northampton seeks. It, too, entitled Mancini to due process. 

The Layoff Policy governs dismissals where the “County may 

need to institute a Reduction in Force (RIF, Layoff) due to 

economy, efficiency, restructuring, reorganization, or other 

related reasons.” J.A. 3380. By its own terms, the policy

applies “to all County employees.” Id.9

 The Layoff Policy 

permits employees to appeal a layoff to the Personnel 

Appeals Board on the grounds that the “Career Service 

Regulations were not followed, or that the decision to select 

this layoff unit was arbitrary, capricious, or a violation of 

law.” Id. at 3383. Mancini was therefore entitled under the 

 9 The Layoff Policy applies to all County employees, 

“except where collective bargaining agreements, 

Pennsylvania State regulations, and/or State Civil Service 

regulations conflict,” but none of these exceptions are 

implicated here. J.A. 3380.

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policy to appeal her discharge precisely because the County 

called it a layoff. Mancini’s grievance specifically referenced 

violations of the Career Service Regulations as well as 

violations of the Layoff Policy. If, as Northampton 

maintains, Mancini was dismissed pursuant to a layoff, under 

the Layoff Policy she was entitled to a hearing on her claims. 

We reject Northampton’s selective reading of its own laws. 10 

We hold instead that those laws required the County to 

provide Mancini with a pretermination hearing.

11

***

In sum, we agree with the District Court that 

Northampton County is not entitled to a judgment that, as a 

matter of law, it was not required to provide Mancini with 

procedural due process prior to terminating her employment. 

We will therefore affirm the orders of the District Court 

 10 We note the irony of Northampton’s argument that 

the Layoff Policy deprived Mancini of rights, when in fact, as 

discussed above, the policy enumerates the array of rights and 

privileges Northampton grants to full-time career service 

employees in the event of a reduction in force. 11 We also find no merit to Northampton’s contention 

that Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981), dictates 

the outcome of Mancini’s Due Process claims. Ness 

concerned the First Amendment rights of solicitors for the 

City of York, who, under that city’s administrative code, were 

political appointees and could be terminated at-will. Id. at 

521-22. Contrary to Northampton’s suggestion, we have 

never held that every town or county solicitor in Pennsylvania 

is employed at-will as a matter of law.

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denying Northampton’s motion for summary judgment and 

denying its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law 

or a new trial.

B. Attorney’s Fees

Over Northampton’s objection, the District Court 

awarded Mancini $186,018.60 in attorney’s fees and costs as 

the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Northampton 

argues that Mancini’s requested attorney’s fees were not

reasonable because she “prevailed only minimally, on a single 

claim out of 15 available claims, receiving a jury award that 

was 5% of the damages requested.” Br. of Northampton at 

55; see id. at 55-58; Reply Br. of Northampton at 31-32 

(“Plaintiff was negligibly successful, recovering $94,232 

where she had sought nearly two million dollars.”).12 The 

District Court reduced the fees by the amount Mancini’s 

counsel incurred preparing for oral argument on her post-trial 

motion ($1,627.67), and subtracted an additional $126 to 

adjust for a duplicative entry on a bill. After these 

adjustments, the District Court awarded Mancini her 

requested fees, explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has 

expressly rejected the County’s proffered ‘mathematical 

 12 Northampton does not contest the reasonableness of 

Mancini’s lawyers’ rates. See Br. of Northampton at 55-58. 

Northampton also does not contest the reasonableness of the 

award of costs and expenses. See id. These issues are 

therefore waived. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFLCIO, 26 F.3d at 398.

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approach.’” J.A. 37-8 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424, 435, n.11 (1983)). 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a “prevailing plaintiff” in a 

civil rights action should ordinarily recover her attorney’s 

fees. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429. A plaintiff is a 

“prevailing party” for the purposes of an attorney’s fee award 

if she succeeds “on any significant issue in litigation which 

achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing 

suit.” Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Where a 

plaintiff does not succeed on every claim, the Supreme Court 

has rejected a fee calculation approach that compares the total 

number of issues in the case with the number of issues on 

which the plaintiff prevailed. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 

n.11. Rather, where the plaintiff’s claims involve a “common 

core of facts,” or are based on “related legal theories,” but the 

plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success, the district 

court may choose to reduce the award if a full compensatory 

fee would be unreasonable in consideration of the degree of 

success obtained. Id. at 435-36. How to measure the degree 

of success is left to the district court’s discretion. Id. at 436-

37.

 

The District Court in this case held that Mancini’s 

claims all shared “a common core of facts” because “[a]ll

three claims emerged from how and why Mancini was

terminated from her employment.” J.A. 38. Furthermore,

Mancini “prevailed on a crucial issue which informed

inquiries into all three claims and occupied much of the

trial testimony: The jury found she was a career service

employee.” Id. The District Court therefore concluded that

“although Mancini ultimately prevailed only on one claim 

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and received a portion of the relief she sought, reduction 

would be inappropriate because her claims are 

interconnected.” Id.

 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion. 

Mancini prevailed on her due process claim against 

Northampton as well as a central issue in the case. There was 

substantial overlap in the evidence required to prove 

Mancini’s due process, First Amendment, and equal 

protection claims, including the circumstances surrounding 

the creation of the full-time assistant solicitor positions and 

the decision to eliminate those positions and replace them 

with part-time assistant solicitors. The District Court 

considered the extent of Mancini’s success and made a 

reasoned judgment that the time Mancini’s attorneys spent on 

her unsuccessful claims did not warrant a reduced fee.

Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the District 

Court’s award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 

Court’s judgment and we will dismiss Mancini’s crossappeal. 

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