Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00098/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00098-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD E. HARRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-EFB

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

BARBARA DILLMAN, individually and )

as Superintendent of Schools for )

Siskiyou County Department of )

Education; TIMOTHY PAPPAS, )

individually and as Deputy )

District Attorney in the Office of )

Siskiyou County District Attorney; )

PETER F. KNOLL, individually and )

as District Attorney for the )

County of Siskiyou; KIRK ANDRUS, )

individually and as District )

Attorney for the County of )

Siskiyou; SISKIYOU COUNTY, a )

political subdivision; SISKIYOU )

COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; and)

SISKIYOU COUNTY OFFICE OF )

EDUCATION, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On May 28, 2008, Plaintiff Edward E. Harris (“Harris”) filed

a motion seeking to recuse and disqualify attorney John P. Kelley

(“Kelley”) and the law firm of Halkides, Morgan and Kelley (“the

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Firm”) from participating in this action, based on the allegation that

the firm previously represented Harris in a lawsuit filed by Gina

Villani. Defendants Barbara Dillman and Siskiyou County Office of

Education (collectively “Defendants”) oppose Plaintiff’s motion. For

the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

On July 23, 2002, Gina Villani (“Villani”) filed suit (“the

Villani case”) against Harris and the Big Springs Elementary School

District (“the District”). (Mot. at 3:22-24.) Villani, a minor

student employed by the District, alleged that Harris, the District’s

Superintendent, had sent her inappropriate e-mails. (Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 10, 18; Decl. of Arthur L. Morgan in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot.

to Disqualify (“Morgan Decl.”), Ex. 1, Villani’s Compl. for Damages

(“Villani Compl.”) ¶ 13.) It is undisputed that the Firm represented

the District in the Villani case. (Harris Decl. in Reply to Opp’n to

Mot. to Disqualify (“Harris Reply Decl.”) ¶ 9; Opp’n to Mot. to

Disqualify (“Opp’n”) at 2:5-7.) However, it is disputed whether the

Firm represented Harris in the Villani case. (Mot. at 3:22-24; Opp’n

at 2:5-7.) On January 14, 2008, Harris filed suit in the instant case

against Defendants alleging, inter alia, a conspiracy to defame him

using Villani’s false allegations. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 58,

61.) Kelley and the Firm represent Defendants in the instant case. 

(Mot. at 3:3-6.)

DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS

Harris moves to disqualify Kelley and the Firm for engaging

in “successive representation” under California Rule of Professional

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Attorneys practicing in this district are held to “the 1

standards of professional conduct required of members of the State Bar

of California and contained in . . . the Rules of Professional Conduct

of the State Bar of California and decisions of any Court applicable

thereto.” L.R. 83-180(e).

3

Conduct (“Rule”) 3-310(E). (Mot. at 3:17-18.) Rule 3-310(E) 1

prescribes: “[an attorney] shall not, without the informed written

consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to

the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of

the client or former client, the [attorney] has obtained confidential

information material to the employment.” Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct

R. 3-310(E). Absent informed written consent from the first client,

an attorney must be disqualified for successive representation under

Rule 3-310(E) when (1) the attorney successively represents clients

with adverse interests and (2) the subjects of the two representations

are substantially related. People ex rel. Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee

Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1146 (1999). At issue here

is whether the first prong has been satisfied.

The issue is whether Harris had an attorney-client

relationship in connection with the Villani case. See Oaks Mgmt.

Corp. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 145 Cal. App. 4th 453,

465 (2006) (holding “rule 3-310 controls . . . disqualification

motions only in the context of attorney-client relationships”). 

[A] formal retainer agreement is not required

before attorneys acquire fiduciary obligations of

loyalty and confidentiality, which begin when

attorney-client discussions proceed beyond initial

or peripheral contacts. An attorney represents a

client-for purposes of a conflict of interest

analysis-when the attorney knowingly obtains

material confidential information from the client

and renders legal advice or services as a result. 

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal. 4th at 1148. Harris has the burden of

establishing the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Id. at

1149.

ANALYSIS

Harris argues he was represented by Kelley and the Firm in

the Villani case. (Mot. at 3:22-24, 4:19-20.) Harris declares

“Kelley . . . was retained to represent me in the 2002 Villani civil

suit.” (Decl. of Edward E. Harris in Supp. of Mot. to Disqualify

(“Harris Decl. I”) ¶ 14.) Harris also declares “I recall discussing

with [Kelley] on one or more occasions in late 2002 the Gina Villani

accusations. I was very candid with him and provided substantial

information to use in my defense.” (Id.) Harris further argues that

Kelley filed an answer to the complaint on his behalf. (Mot. at 4:10-

12.) Harris submits a Superior Court Docket Sheet from the Villani

case as support of these assertions. In the caption of this docket

sheet, the defendant is listed as “Harris Ed,” and immediately

underneath, the attorney is listed as “Kelly Halkides, Morgan &.” 

(Harris Decl. I, Ex. A, Siskiyou County Superior Court Docket Sheet in

Villani vs. Harris Case No. CVP0020001273 (“Docket Sheet”) at 1.) 

However, the District is not listed as a defendant in the Docket

Sheet’s caption. (Id.) Moreover, the entry on October 21, 2002,

states “answer filed by atty for dfnt, Big Springs Elem. School.” 

(Id.) The status conference entry on July 24, 2002 states “counsel

Morgan is pres tele on behalf of dft School; there are no other

appearances.” (Id. at 2.)

Defendants argue Arthur Morgan (“Morgan”), a partner at the

Firm, represented only the District in the Villani case. (Opp’n at

2:5-8.) Erik Knak (“Knak”), the claims administrator for Northern

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

California Schools Insurance Group (“the Group”), the District’s

insurance provider, questioned whether Harris was entitled to a

defense and retained Morgan and the Firm to represent the District

only. (Decl. of Erik Knak in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. to Disqualify

(“Knak Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-4; Knak Decl., Ex. 1, Letter of Representation.) 

Morgan prepared and filed an answer to the complaint on behalf of the

District only. (Morgan Decl. ¶ 7; Decl. of John P. Kelley in Supp. of

Opp’n to Mot. to Disqualify (“Kelley Decl.”), Ex. 3, Answer to Villani

Complaint at 1.) The Villani case settled before Knak could determine

whether the Group owed Harris a defense, and Knak never retained the

Firm to represent Harris. (Knak Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) No answer was ever

filed on behalf of Harris. (Morgan Decl. ¶ 7.)

Defendants argue Kelley and Morgan never spoke with Harris

during the Villani case. (Opp’n at 2:5-8.) Both Morgan and Kelley

declare that they had no direct contact with Harris. (Morgan Decl. ¶

9; Kelley Decl. ¶ 7.) The Firm’s billing records show no direct

contact with Harris. (Morgan Decl. ¶ 9; Kelley Decl., Ex. 1, The

Firm’s Villani Case Billing Records (“Billing Records”) at 1-2.) The

Firm’s file and computer database for the Villani case also show no

direct contact with Harris. (Morgan Decl. ¶ 9; Kelley Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Defendants further argue Harris was represented by attorney Dugan Barr

(“Barr”) during the Villani case. (Opp’n at 3:27-28, 4:1.) On

October 8, 2002, Barr sent a letter to Alan L. Swanson (“Swanson”),

the District’s transactional attorney, stating “[the Villani case]

appears to me to be something for which the District should be

defending Mr. Harris. I would appreciate knowing who defense counsel

is going to be.” (Id. at 4:1-6; Knak Decl., Ex. 2, Letter from Barr

to Swanson (“Barr Letter”).) On October 24, 2002, after Villani and

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the District agreed to settle, Morgan sent Villani’s father a letter

saying “I will talk to Mr. Harris’ attorney on Tuesday in hopes of

getting more settlement funds from Harris.” (Morgan Decl. ¶ 7; Morgan

Decl., Ex. 2, Letter from Morgan to Villani (“Morgan Letter”).) Barr

and Morgan had three telephone conversations regarding the settlement,

two of which occurred after the Morgan Letter was sent. (Morgan Decl.

¶ 7; Billing Records at 2.)

In his Reply, Harris argues he reasonably but mistakenly

believed he was represented by the Firm in the Villani case. (Reply

to Opp’n to Mot. to Disqualify (“Reply”) at 2:18-20, 5:8-9.) Harris

declares he knew that the Firm represented the District so he assumed

the Firm also represented him. (Harris Reply Decl. ¶ 9.) Harris

declares he called the Firm and spoke with Kelley or Morgan, who told

Harris “not to worry about [the complaint].” (Id. ¶ 10.) Harris then

called Barr, a “long-time family friend,” and asked Barr if he should

ignore the complaint. (Id. ¶ 11.) “[Barr] did not respond.” (Id.) 

Harris declares he again called the Firm and spoke with Kelley, who

told Harris “not to worry about showing up in court.” (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Harris followed these instructions and did nothing to defend himself

in the Villani case. (Id.) Harris further declares Kelley asked him

to agree to a settlement and he “strenuously opposed offering any

settlement of any kind.” (Id. ¶ 13.)

Harris submits a “Master Document” to the Superior Court

Docket Sheet from the Villani case, arguing it shows that he, “so far

as the Siskiyou court records are concerned, was represented.” (Id. ¶

14.) The Master Document lists the “1st Defendant Attorney” as

“Halkides, Morgan & Kelly.” (Harris Reply Decl., Ex. A, Master

Document to the Siskiyou County Superior Court Docket Sheet from the

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Villani Case (“Master Document”).) Harris was the first named

defendant in the Villani case. (Villani Compl. at 1.) 

Neither the Master Document nor the Docket Sheet support

Harris’s position that an attorney-client relationship existed. The

source for the listings is unclear, and the District is not listed as

a defendant in either document. The Docket Sheet states: “ANSWER

FILED BY ATTY FOR DFNT, BIG SPRINGS ELEM. SCHO DL (TO),” and during

the status conference the Firm appeared on behalf of the District and

there were no other appearances. Knak’s Declaration and the Barr

Letter also show that Harris was unrepresented.

Nonetheless, it must be determined whether the alleged

discussions between Harris and the Firm were sufficient to establish

an attorney-client relationship for the purpose of a conflict of

interest analysis. Harris’s conclusory declaration that he provided

“candid” and “substantial” information to the Firm is insufficient to

establish that confidential information was disclosed. See SpeeDee

Oil, 20 Cal. 4th at 1149 (citing In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 16 Cal.

App. 4th 556, 565 (1993), which affirmed denial of motion to

disqualify where movant claimed she “outlined” case to attorney by

disclosing all “pertinent” information but “the [movant]’s declaration

in support of her motion failed to show, or even claim, that she

disclosed confidential information to [the attorney]”). Moreover,

Harris’s declarations do not show that anyone in the Firm rendered 

legal advice as a result of disclosed confidential information. 

Lastly, Defendants request that Plaintiff be sanctioned for

filing the instant motion, arguing “Plaintiff’s counsel was sent an

email detailing the reasons why the motion was frivolous [and] 

[d]espite this email, the motion remains on calendar. (Opp’n at 8:9-

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

12.) This argument is insufficient to justify treating it as a

motion for sanctions; therefore, it is disregarded.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify 

Kelley and the law Firm from participating in this action is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:08-cv-00098-GEB-CMK Document 32 Filed 07/07/08 Page 8 of 8