Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00675/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00675-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY J. BURTON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0675 LKK PAN (JFM) P

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction on

charges of forcible rape and false imprisonment. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s introduction of his unMirandized statement to two deputy sheriffs; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

through numerous errors of counsel; and (3) the California Superior Court erred when it denied

petitioner’s motions for DNA testing. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus

relief be denied. Petitioner has also filed a motion for discovery. That motion will be denied.

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 This statement of facts is taken from the January 18, 2001, opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-5, appended as

Exhibit F to Respondents’ August 21, 2003, motion to dismiss. 

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 2

 Evidence Code section 402 provides in relevant part as follows: 3

“(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its

existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in this

article.

“(b) The court may hear and determine the question of the

admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury;

but in a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the

question of the admissibility of a confession or admission of the

defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury if any party so

requests . . . .”

 Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, [16 L.Ed.2d 694].) 4

2

I. Procedural and Factual Background1

[Petitioner] was charged by an amended information with one

count of forcible oral copulation (count I - Pen. Code, § 288a,

subd. (c)(2)), two counts of forcible rape (counts II & IV - §261, 2

subd. (a)(2)), and one count of false imprisonment (count III - §

236). The information also included special allegations that (1)

[petitioner] committed the acts in counts I, II and IV by means of

kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)); (2) he had suffered two prior

strike convictions, both for robbery (§§211, 667, subds. (b) - (I),

1170.12); (3) the robbery convictions qualified as prior convictions

of serious felonies (§§ 667, subd. (a); 1192.7, subd. (c) (19)); and

(4) [petitioner] had suffered three prior prison terms, one for

burglary (§ 459) and two for the above robberies (§§ 667, subd. (a)

and 667.5, subd. (b)). [Petitioner] pleaded not guilty to the charges

and denied the special allegations.

Before the trial, the court held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code

section 402. [Petitioner] argued that the conversations about why 3

he was being detained constituted custodial interrogation, and also,

that his statement denying the rape should have been suppressed

because of the failure of the officers to give him adequate Miranda

warnings. The trial court concluded there was no violation of 4

Miranda. Also, the court concluded the statement denying rape

was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule for excited

utterances, and additionally, that the remark’s probative value

outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court denied the motion to

exclude the statement.

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 The term “three strikes law” refers to the sentencing provisions contained in sections 5

667, subdivisions (b) through (I), and 1170.12.

 The sentence for count III, false imprisonment, was stayed pursuant to section 654. 6

3

The matter proceeded to trial by jury. [Petitioner] was acquitted of

count I - forcible oral copulation, and found guilty of one count of

forcible rape (count II) with an additional finding that the special

circumstances allegation that [petitioner] had kidnapped the victim

during commission of the rape was true. [Petitioner] was also

found guilty of false imprisonment (count III). The jury

deadlocked as to the second count of forcible rape (count IV), and

the court declared a mistrial as to that count.

In a bifurcated court trial, the judge found true the allegations that

[petitioner] had suffered three prior convictions and served three

prior prison terms, as charged. [Petitioner] was sentenced pursuant

to the three strikes law to an aggregate term of 75 years to life, 5

with an additional 11 years to be served consecutively for the two

serious prior felony convictions and one prior prison term.

6

At trial, testimony was admitted relating the following facts

relevant to this appeal:

[Petitioner] and the victim met when they were walking on a

sidewalk one night in January 1998. They had known each other

slightly for several years. Suddenly, [petitioner] attacked the

victim, punched her face, grabbed her by her hair, and dragged and

pushed her some 80 feet to a muddy and secluded area next to a

freeway pedestrian overcrossing. He forced her to perform oral sex

on him, made her pull her pants down, raped her once while facing

her, and then again from behind.

After the attack, the victim and [petitioner] got up and he told her

to “keep walking.” They walked to a nearby taco stand. The

victim testified she was too frightened to run away, although she

did see a police cruiser go by on the way to the stand. Once there,

[petitioner] ordered a taco, while the victim obtained the key to the

restroom. She mouthed the word “help” to one employee and told

the other that she had been raped. She locked herself in the

restroom for a few minutes, then ran home with the restroom key.

She then called 911, whereupon the sheriff’s deputies and fire

department arrived. She was taken to a field showup. The victim

was situated behind the headlights of a fire truck and patrol cars

when she identified the [petitioner]. 

[Petitioner] was picked up by Deputy Bankie, the same deputy who

had cruised by the taco stand earlier. When [petitioner] asked

Deputy Bankie why he was being detained, Bankie told him

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“Terry, you know why, just relax. It’s all over now.” A second

deputy, Deputy Anderson, transported [petitioner] to the scene of

the showup. Deputy Anderson responded to [petitioner’s]

questions regarding why he was being arrested with assurances he

was not under arrest, just being detained. In the patrol car after the

showup, [petitioner] remarked “You talk to that girl! I didn’t rape .

. . her and I didn’t rip her clothes off.” Neither deputy had said

anything to [petitioner] about why he was being picked up or

disclosing the nature of their investigation.

II. Timeliness of Petition

In the answer to the petition respondents argue that petitioner’s claim 2

(ineffective assistance of trial counsel) and claim 3 (improper denial of DNA testing) are barred

by the statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). This court agrees that the petition

is untimely with respect to these two claims and will recommend that they be dismissed.

A. Statute of Limitations and Tolling Provision Under the AEDPA

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides as follows:

(d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

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 For purposes of consistency, this court will refer to the lodged state court records in the 7

same manner in which respondents refer to them. Accordingly, “Pet.” refers to petitioner’s June

1, 2005 second-amended petition; “LD” followed by a numeric designation refers to respondents’

documents lodged April 7, designated by respondents as “lodging documents;” and “Ex.”

followed by an alphabetic designation refers to the exhibits filed in support of respondents’

August 21, 2003, motion to dismiss. See Answer at 1 n.1.

 Justice Mosk was of the opinion that the petition should have been granted. (Id.) 8

5

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A petition is “‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4,

8 (2000). 

B. Factual Background

For purposes of statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this case

is as follows:

1. Following his conviction, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in state

court, in which he claimed that: (1) his motion to suppress the statements he made to police

preceding his arrest should have been granted; (2) the jury’s finding of special circumstances

involving kidnapping during the rape was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) the trial

court committed sentencing error. (Ex. A.) The California Court of Appeal for the Third 7

Appellate District affirmed petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished opinion filed on January 17,

2001. (Id.) 

2. On February 27, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, in which he raised the same claims. (Ex. B.) That petition was summarily

denied on March 28, 2001. (Ex. C.)8

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 See Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1978) (judicial 9

notice may be taken of court records), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981).

 In its decision denying petitioner’s motions for DNA testing, the Superior Court made 10

the following statements:

The court finds that the identity of the perpetrator was not a

significant issue at the trial that was held in the case (see Penal

Code § 1405(f)(3). The victim was acquainted with [petitioner] at

the time of the crime, and identified him immediately afterward in

a field show-up as the perpetrator. The victim testified in detail

regarding the sexual attack on her by [petitioner]. This was

corroborated by evidence of the presence of semen and the vaginal

tear to her. Conventional testing on at least one biological sample

indicated that [petitioner] could have been its donor. [Petitioner]

and the victim were seen together immediately before the assault

by a witness, and another witness testified to seeing them together

at the taco stand immediately after the assault, at which time the

victim asked the witness for help and said she had been raped. 

When arrested and taken to the show-up, and without being

informed first that the victim was claiming that he had raped her,

6

3. On March 28, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

court, alleging only his Miranda claim. (See order filed June 1, 2005.) 

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4. On May 3, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that

the sentencing judge erred when he failed to make a full inquiry into petitioner’s complaints

about his trial counsel. (Exs. D, E.) That petition was denied on the merits and as untimely by

order dated May 24, 2002. (Ex. E.) 

5. On approximately June 4, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of

the Superior Court’s May 24, 2002, order. (Ex. F.) Petitioner also requested funds for an

investigator to conduct DNA testing. (Id.) That motion was denied on July 29, 2002. (Ex. G.)

6. On December 11, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for DNA testing, pursuant to

Cal. Pen. Code § 1405, in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Ex. H.) Petitioner filed a

second such motion on March 19, 2003. (Ex. I.) The Superior Court denied petitioner’s

motions for DNA testing by order dated May 16, 2003. (Ex. J.)10

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[petitioner] blurted out, “I didn’t rape her and I didn’t rip her

clothes off,” a damaging admission of guilt. At the trial,

[petitioner] did not testify, and argued to the jury that [petitioner]

had engaged in consensual sex with the victim.

Nor would identity of the perpetrator be a significant issue at a

retrial of the [petitioner], were DNA testing performed. Although

[petitioner] now for the first time claims that he did not have sex

with the victim at all, it appears that he has stated otherwise in the

past: in the probation report for the case, the probation officer

reported that [petitioner] admitted to the probation officer that he

had had sex with the victim but that the sex was consensual. This

damaging admission is a party admission that would be admissible

at a retrial, under Evid. Code § 1220. (citation omitted.) Identity,

in light of this admission, his previous admission upon arrest, and

the strong evidence against him, even with DNA testing of the

samples, simply would not be a significant issue at a retrial of the

case.

(Ex. J at 2-3.)

7

7. On May 29, 2003, petitioner sought reconsideration of the Superior Court’s

May 16, 2003, order. (Ex. K.) On June 13, 2003, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was

denied. (Ex. L.) 

8. On June 4, 2003, petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this court. The court served the amended petition and ordered a response.

9. On August 21, 2003, respondent, construing the amended petition as one

alleging three claims (the Miranda claim, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the claim

concerning the DNA testing), moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the ineffective

assistance and DNA testing claims were untimely and not exhausted.

10. In January 28, 2004, findings and recommendations, this court construed the

June 4, 2003, amended petition to allege only the Miranda claim and recommended abeyance to

permit petitioner the opportunity to exhaust his ineffective assistance and DNA testing claims. 

The district court adopted these recommendations on March 12, 2004, and the case was abeyed

with instructions to petitioner to move for leave to amend once exhaustion was complete.

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11. On February 22, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file an amended

petition and a proposed second-amended petition . This court dismissed as unexhausted several

claims contained in the proposed second-amended petition (designated as claim 4 and sub-claims

2 (I), (J) and (L)) and allowed the action to proceed with the remaining claims, described above

in the first paragraph of these findings and recommendations. 

C. Analysis

The California Supreme Court denied review of petitioner’s judgment of

conviction on direct appeal on March 28, 2001. The ninety-day period during which petitioner

could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired on

June 26, 2001. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, petitioner’s

judgment of conviction became final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on June 26, 2001. (Id.)

The AEDPA period of limitation is not tolled during the interval between the date

on which a petitioner’s judgment becomes final and the date on which the petitioner files his first

state collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly,

the one-year statute of limitations began to run on June 27, 2001, and ran without interruption

until March 28, 2002, when petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

court. Because less than one year had elapsed, petitioner’s first petition, containing his Miranda

claim, was timely filed.

Petitioner’s second petition in this court, also containing only a Miranda claim,

was filed on June 4, 2003. Respondents argue that this petition was untimely. As noted above,

the one-year statute of limitations in this case began to run on June 27, 2001. The statute ran

without interruption until May 3, 2002, when petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

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 The federal petition filed March 28, 2002 did not operate to toll the statute of 11

limitations. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180 (2001) (holding that the tolling provision

of section 2244(d)(2) applies only to state post-conviction review but not during the pendency of

applications for federal review). 

 As described above, on December 11, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for DNA testing 12

pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 1405 in the California Superior Court. (Ex. H.) This motion did

not toll the statute of limitations. See Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 957-59 (9th Cir. 2002)

(petition for clemency under Washington state law was not an application for "state

post-conviction or other collateral review" and therefore did not toll the statute); Moore v. Cain,

298 F.3d 361, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2002) (state court mandamus application requesting that trial

court be directed to rule on state habeas application was not an application for collateral review

with respect to prisoner's conviction, and thus did not toll one-year limitation period); Hodge v.

Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no basis for equitable tolling where petitioner

sought discovery, on which he intended to base his collateral attack, through state law proceeding

rather than timely filing habeas petition); Johnson v. Lewis, 310 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125-26 

(CD.Cal. 2004) (petitioner not entitled to statutory tolling for a petition for writ of mandate

because it only sought the return of property seized during his arrest and was not directed at his

underlying conviction and sentence). See also Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir.

2002) (noting that prisoner has the option of filing a timely petition and then seeking the district

court's help in obtaining discovery to fill in missing portions of the petition).

 There is no basis for a finding of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in the 13

record before this court. 

9

in the California Superior Court. A total of 310 days elapsed between June 27, 2001, and May 11

3, 2002, leaving petitioner with 55 days remaining in which to file his federal petition.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court was

denied on May 24, 2002. Petitioner next filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 24, 2002

order. That motion was denied on July 29, 2002. The statute of limitations began to run again

on July 30, 2002 and ran without further interruption for 55 days, until September 22, 2002,

when it expired. Petitioner’s first-amended federal habeas corpus petition was received for 12

filing in this court on June 4, 2003, well after the one-year period of limitation had run. 

Accordingly, that petition is not timely filed. Petitioner’s second amended petition, on which this

action is proceeding, was filed on June 1, 2005. Because the statute of limitations had already

expired, this petition is also untimely.13

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III. Relation Back of New Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or supplemented as

provided in the rules of civil procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. See also

Rule 11, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

may be applied in habeas corpus proceedings to the extent that the rules of civil procedure are not

inconsistent with any statutory provision or with the rules governing habeas cases); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 81(a)(2) (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings for

habeas corpus “to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the

United States, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a habeas petitioner may amend his

pleadings once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served and may seek leave of

court to amend his pleading at any time during the proceeding. Mayle v. Felix, U.S. ,

125 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (2005). Under Rule 15(c), a petitioner’s amendments made after the

statute of limitations has run will relate back to the date of his original pleading if the new claims

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the

original pleading. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)).

In Mayle v. Felix, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he ‘original pleading’ to

which Rule 15 refers is the complaint in an ordinary civil case, and the petition in a habeas

proceeding.” Id. at 2569-70. The Court observed that the complaint in an ordinary civil case

need only provide fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds on which the claim rests,

while a habeas petition is required to specify all grounds for relief available to the petitioner and

state the facts supporting each ground. Id. at 2570. Because of this difference between civil

complaints and habeas petitions, the relation back of new habeas claims “depends on the

existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” 

Id. at 2572. The common core of operative facts must not be viewed at too high a level of

generality, and an “occurrence” will consist of each separate set of facts that supports a ground

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 None of petitioner’s sub-claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relates to the 14

Miranda issue.

11

for relief. Id. at 2573. Applying these principles in Mayle, the Court ruled that the petitioner’s

new claim did not relate back to his original claim because the new claim arose from the

petitioner’s own pretrial interrogation and was different in time and place from his original claim,

which arose from the pretrial police interrogation of a witness. Id. at 2572-73.

The court now turns to a comparison of the claim raised in petitioner’s first two

petitions filed in this court and the two additional claims raised in his second-amended petition

filed on June 1, 2005. The claim alleged in the original petition and the first amended petition is

that petitioner’s statements made to the police preceding his arrest should have been suppressed

because they were taken in violation of Miranda. In his second amended petition filed on June 1,

2005, petitioner adds additional claims that (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

through numerous errors of counsel; and (2) the California Superior Court erred when it denied

petitioner’s motions for DNA testing. 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of petitioner’s Miranda claim and this

court finds that the Miranda claim is timely filed. However, after careful consideration of

petitioner’s original and amended petitions, the court finds that petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claims and his claim that the trial court erred in failing to conduct DNA testing do not

share a common core of operative facts with petitioner’s original Miranda claim and therefore do

not relate back to the original timely filed petition. Each claim is based on a completely separate

set of facts and each is different in time and place from petitioner’s original Miranda claim.14

Therefore, petitioner’s DNA and ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be dismissed as

untimely.

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IV. Miranda Claim

A. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

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reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Analysis

Petitioner claims that his rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

were violated by the trial court’s introduction of his statement to Officers Bankie and Anderson

that “I didn’t rape . . . her and I didn’t rip her clothes off.” This claim was rejected by the

California Court of Appeal in a written decision on petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the

California Supreme Court without comment on petition for review. (See Exs. A, C.) 

Respondent urges that the claim be denied on the merits. The state appellate court rejected

petitioner’s Miranda claim as follows:

The Attorney General concedes that [petitioner] was in custody

when he made the subject statement, but denies that the

conversations between [petitioner] and the deputies constituted

interrogation. Therefore, the Attorney General argues,

[petitioner’s] statement was voluntary and admissible . . .

. . . Miranda holds that before a suspect in custody may be

interrogated concerning possible involvement in a crime, he must

first be advised of his right to remain silent and be represented by

counsel, that anything he says may be used against him and that if

he is indigent an attorney will be appointed to represent him. 

(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 472-474 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 

706-707, 722-723].) On an appeal from denial of a motion to

exclude statements alleged to have been obtained in violation of

Miranda, we accept as true the trial court’s factual findings if

supported by sutstantial evidence, but exercise our independent

judgment to determine whether the statement at issue was obtained

illegally. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1032.) A

party admission elicited from a defendant in custody pursuant to

interrogation is inadmissible if not preceded by adequate Miranda

advisement given at the accusatory stage of the case. (Miranda,

supra, at pp. 478-479.) Volunteered statements, by contrast, are

not barred. (Id. at p. 478.)

Since the fact of custody is not contested here, the issue turns on

whether the statement was elicited by law enforcement

interrogation. The test is whether the officers should have known

that their remarks were likely to evince incriminating statements. 

(Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300, 301 [64 L.Ed.2d

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197, 307-308]; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 336-337.)

We conclude [petitioner’s] conversations with Bankie and

Anderson did not qualify as interrogation under this standard.

The officers’s comments in the present case were off-hand,

innocuous comments more like those at issue in People v. Clark

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 984-985 [police respond to the defendant’s

questions about possible penalties for murder with estimate of

seven and one-half years], or People v. Sullivan (1990) 217

Cal.App.3d 237, 240 [“I think I have something here”]. Deputy

Anderson simply explained that [petitioner] was not under arrest. 

Deputy Bankie effectively cut off further conversation when he

told [petitioner] to “relax. It’s all over now.” Their remarks do not

resemble the cases where officers have confronted a defendant with

some incriminating evidence, or used coercive techniques to

extract a confession or an admission. (citations omitted.) Viewed

objectively, these remarks were not likely to elicit incriminating

statements, and there is nothing in the record to suggest the officers

should reasonably have believed they would. Since the

conversations with [petitioner] did not qualify as “custodial

interrogation,” the requirements of Miranda for a constitutional

advisement were not triggered.

[Petitioner] nevertheless argues that the officers’ conduct in

handcuffing him and transporting him to a field showup “was

‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ from

[petitioner as] to what was taking place.” This argument confuses

the distinction between custody and interrogation. There is no

question, taking into account the officers’ conduct, that [petitioner]

was in custody. The conversations [petitioner] has pinpointed did

not require any response from him. Thus, as in Innis, supra, it

cannot be said the officers should have known their remarks were

likely to elicit an incriminating response. (446 U.S. at pp. 302-303

[64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 308-309].)

(Opinion at 5-8.)

To prevail on a Miranda claim, a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief must

demonstrate that his statements were obtained in violation of the rules of custodial interrogation

established by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In

Miranda, the Supreme Court held that a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has a right to

consult with an attorney and have counsel present during questioning and that police must

explain this right to the suspect before questioning begins. 384 U.S. at 469-73. The advisements

required by Miranda arise from the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which

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guarantees that any person taken into custody shall be informed of his important constitutional

rights and shall be given the opportunity knowingly and voluntarily to waive those rights before

being interrogated. 384 U.S. at 444.

“An individual is ‘in custody’ at the point a reasonable person would feel that he

was not free to terminate the interrogation.” Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1995)). When an individual in custody

makes a statement, “custody alone is not sufficient to demonstrate involuntariness.” Medeiros v.

Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 825 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424

(1976)). “‘The fundamental import of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege while an individual is in

custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and

counsel, but whether he can be interrogated.’” Medeiros, 889 F.2d at 825 (quoting Miranda, 384

U.S. at 478). It is well established that not every question asked in a custodial setting constitutes

interrogation. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing

United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also United States v. Foster,

227 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). Questions asked while in custody constitute

interrogation if, under all the circumstances involved in the case, the questions were reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,

301 (1980); United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894

F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1990). Spontaneous statements not made in response to interrogation

are admissible. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 318 (1985); Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01;

Medeiros, 889 F.2d at 824-25.

In the present case, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the remarks of

Officers Bankie and Anderson were simply innocuous comments that were not likely to elicit

incriminating statements. This court would add that the officers’ comments were not likely to

elicit any statements at all, incriminating or not, because they were not questions or likely to be

perceived as questions. It does not appear to this court that the state appellate court’s conclusion

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in this regard is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law, or that the

ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

at trial. There is no evidence that petitioner’s statement was made in response to any inquiry by

the two officers or that any interrogation had taken place prior to petitioner’s statement. 

Petitioner’s allegation of a Miranda violation is not supported by specific facts that warrant

habeas relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Boehme v. Maxwell, 423

F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970)).

V. Motion for Discovery

On June 22, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for discovery. Therein, he seeks

discovery related to all three of his claims before this court. Rule 6 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts permits discovery in habeas corpus

actions. A habeas petitioner does not enjoy the presumptive entitlement to discovery of a

traditional civil litigant and discovery is available only in the discretion of the court and for good

cause shown. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 6(a) 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Rich

v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054,

1065 n.6 (9th Cir.2002) (discovery is available "only in the discretion of the court and for good

cause"). After a review of the motion and in light of the recommended disposition of petitioner’s

claims, the court does not find good cause for an order granting the discovery petitioner seeks. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s June 22, 2005, motion

for discovery is denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that

the California Superior Court erred when it denied petitioner’s motions for DNA testing be

dismissed as untimely; and

2. Petitioner’s claim that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by the trial court’s introduction of his un-Mirandized statement be denied on the merits.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 20, 2006.

008:burton675.hc

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