Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-57253/USCOURTS-ca9-12-57253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDI RUSH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SPORT CHALET, INC., DBA Sport

Chalet No. 0038; FOOTHILL RANCH,

LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-57253

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-04139-

ODW-DTB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 4, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 3, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit

Judges, and J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Motz

* The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

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2 RUSH V. SPORT CHALET

SUMMARY**

Joinder

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing

three defendants after holding that they were improperly

joined in an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The panel held that, as originally filed, two defendants

were properly joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

20(a)(2) because they shared the common transaction or

occurrence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The plaintiff

settled with the tenant, but the plaintiff retained viable claims

against the landlord. Accordingly, the panel reversed the

district court’s dismissal of the landlord defendant.

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion

by dismissing rather than severing the plaintiff’s complaint

against two other defendants without evaluating the prejudice

to the plaintiff. Following other circuits, the panel held that

district courts that dismiss rather than sever must conduct a

prejudice analysis, including loss of otherwise timely claims

if new suits are blocked by statutes of limitations.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RUSH V. SPORT CHALET 3

COUNSEL

Scottlynn J. Hubbard, IV (argued), Law Offices of Lynn

Hubbard, Chico, California; Anthony M. Bettencourt

(argued), Disabled Advocacy Group, Chico, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Henry A. Platt and Robert L. Duston, Saul Ewing LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee Foothill Ranch.

OPINION

MOTZ, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff SandiRush appeals the district court’s sua sponte

order that dismissed Defendants Petsmart, Inc.; Sport Chalet,

Inc.; and Foothill Ranch, LLC (collectively “defendants”)

after holding that they were improperly joined. We reverse

the district court’s legal conclusion under Rule 20 as to

Foothill Ranch. We also vacate its decision to dismiss rather

than sever the retail defendants and remand with instructions.

I.

Rush is wheelchair-bound and “physically disabled”

under applicable federal and California law. She alleges she

encountered physical barriers that interfered with her access

at three retail stores located in a shopping mall at 26532

Towne Center Drive in Foothill Ranch, CA (“Towne

Center”). Although not pleaded, the district court below

found that defendant Foothill Ranch is “likely the landlord

. . . and has a landlord-tenant relationship with each of the

other Defendants.” The barriers complained of by Rush

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4 RUSH V. SPORT CHALET

include various obstructions in each of the retailers’

restrooms, and also inside the dressing room at Sport Chalet.

Rush filed her complaint on May 14, 2012. After settling

her claims with Babies “R” Us, Rush filed a notice of

dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) on October 3, 2012 as to that

defendant only. Six days later, on October 9, the district

court below sua sponte issued an order that held “the various

Defendants are improperly joined” because Rush’s complaint

did not allege that her injuries arose “out of the same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences.” Pursuant to its discretion under Rule 21, the

court severed and dismissed Rush’s claims against Petsmart,

Sport Chalet, and Foothill Ranch without prejudice. The

district court denied Rush’s motion for reconsideration, and

Rush filed this timely appeal.1

II.

We review de novo the district court’s holding that the codefendants were improperly joined under Rule 20(a)(2). See,

e.g., EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070,

1076 (9th Cir. 2010). We review the district court’s decision

to sever and dismiss the co-defendants under Rule 21 for

abuse of discretion. See id.

III.

As originally filed, Foothill Ranch and Babies “R” Us

were properlyjoined under Rule 20(a)(2). Permissive joinder

1 Rush’s appeal is unopposed. Only Foothill Ranch filed a brief for the

limited purpose of contesting various factual allegations made by Rush. 

Foothill Ranch took no formal position on the legal issues in the case.

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RUSH V. SPORT CHALET 5

is appropriate if a plaintiff’s “right to relief is asserted against

[the defendants] . . . with respect to or arising out of the same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences,” and also if there is a “question of law or fact

common to” the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Here,

the common transaction or occurrence as to Foothill Ranch

and Babies “R” Us is their landlord-tenant relationship. See

Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir.

2000) (“[T]he landlord is a necessary party in an ADA action,

regardless of what the lease provides.”). The Botosan court

established that a landlord and tenant are jointly liable for

ADA violations in the tenant’s establishment regardless of

any contractual provisions that shift liability. Either codefendant is free to seek indemnification from the other, but

that does not affect an ADA plaintiff’s right to recovery. Id.

Here, Foothill Ranch would be liable for any unlawful

barriers and obstructions encountered by Rush at Babies “R”

Us, and the facts and applicable law are common to both

defendants. Accordingly, Foothill Ranch and Babies “R” Us

were properly joined under Rule 20. Moreover, after Rush

settled with Babies “R” Us, she retained viable claims against

Foothill Ranch. We reverse, therefore, the district court’s

dismissal of Foothill Ranch because it was properly joined

under Rule 20.

IV.

As for Sport Chalet and Petsmart, the district court may

have been correct in holding that they were misjoined. 

Rush’s injuries at each are distinct and independent from one

another, and she has not alleged any legal relationship

between them. The district court abused its discretion,

however, by dismissing rather than severing Rush’s

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6 RUSH V. SPORT CHALET

complaint against Sport Chalet and Petsmart without

evaluating the prejudice to Rush. Many of our fellow circuits

have held that district courts who dismiss rather than sever

must conduct a prejudice analysis, including “loss of

otherwise timely claims if new suits are blocked by statutes

of limitations.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 846–47

(3d Cir. 2006); see also Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009,

1011–13 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The judge could and should have

allowed [plaintiff’s] claims against [a co-defendant] to

continue as a separate suit so that it would not be timebarred.”). We adopt that rule as well. Here, because the

district court below conducted no such analysis, we vacate

and remand. The judge should reevaluate whether allowing

two severed complaints to remain against Sport Chalet and

Petsmart, each with Foothill Ranch as a named co-defendant,

is necessary to avoid prejudice to Rush.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

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