Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00675/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Ali Aljibory, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in 

Phoenix, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). 

BACKGROUND 

 On April 27, 2011, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Maricopa County 

Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 2011-006062-001, charging him with 

unlawful discharge of a firearm in violation of A.R.S. § 13–3107 (Count I), disorderly 

conduct in violation of A.R.S. § 13–2904 (Count II), and misconduct involving weapons 

(as a prohibited possessor) in violation of A.R.S. § 13–3102 (Count III). (Doc. 9-1, Exh. 

A.) Following a jury trial, on October 12, 2011, Petitioner was found guilty on all three 

counts. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. B.) On November 16, 2011, the Superior Court sentenced 

Petitioner to concurrent terms of 2.25 years’ imprisonment for Counts I and II, and 4.5 

Ali Zugair Aljibory, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-00675-PHX-SRB (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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years’ imprisonment for Count III. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. C.) 

 Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal (Doc. 9-1, Exh. E), and on May 18, 2012, 

appellate counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that he had searched the record on appeal and found no question of law 

that was not frivolous (Doc. 9-1, Exh. F). Appellate counsel further requested that the 

Arizona Court of Appeals search the record for fundamental error (Doc. 9-1, Exh. F), and 

that Petitioner be permitted to file a supplemental brief in propria persona (Doc. 9-1, 

Exh. G). The Arizona Court of Appeals granted counsel’s requests (Doc. 9-1, Exh. H), 

and Petitioner’s supplemental brief followed (Doc. 9-1, Exh. I). Therein, Petitioner raised 

three issues: 

I. Lack of Interpreter 

During the trial process, the judge denied me an interpreter. 

II. Denial of Own Counsel 

During the trial process, the judge denied me the right to hire private counsel. 

III. Denial of Evidence 

I told the courts that the gun had fallen and hit the ground, causing it to discharge. Also that it broke because of the fall. 

So there[] was no way I could of discharge[d] it. The witness lived with me and used drugs and had run-ins with the law. 

My lawyer or the courts didn’t discredit them. 

(Doc. 9-1, Exh. I.) In a memorandum decision filed on September 11, 2012, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 9-1, Exh, J); See 

also State v. Aljibory, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0810, 2012 WL 3939352 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sep. 11, 

2012). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 9-1, 

Exh. K), which was summarily denied on February 15, 2013 (Doc. 9-1, Exh. L). Mandate 

was issued on March 18, 2013. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. M.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 1, 2013. 

(Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 9), to which no reply was filed. 

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DISCUSSION

 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. 

In their answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims, without more, are not 

cognizable on federal habeas review. Alternatively, Respondents argue that Petitioner 

failed to exhaust his claims, and therefore they are procedurally barred from review. For 

the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred from review and further fail on their merits. Therefore, the Court will recommend 

that the petition be denied. 

I. Applicable Law 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

 A. Standard for Habeas Relief 

Under AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 It follows that, “[b]y its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated 

on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” 

Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). In applying this standard, 

the federal habeas court reviews “the last reasoned state court decision addressing the 

 1

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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claim in question.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013); Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). A state court decision adjudicated a 

claim “on the merits” where it resolved the substance of the claim rather than relied on a 

procedural or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2004). But see Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) (“When 

a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal 

habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—but that 

presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.”). “Where a state court’s 

decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be 

met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief” under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. 

Fisher, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 

(2003); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal principle is ‘clearly 

established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding 

of this Court.”). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if 

(1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme 

Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a 

result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A 

state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but applies that rule to the facts of a particular case in an 

objectively unreasonable manner. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408; Lockyer v, 538 U.S. at 

75. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was 

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. 

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at 786-87. 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state 

court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 

proceeding[.]” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 

F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 611 (2012); Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the state courts plainly 

misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension 

goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension 

can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding 

unreasonable.” Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. 

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 With regard to either exception under § 2254(d), “it is only noncompliance with 

federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the 

federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue 

a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. 

Corcoran, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (original emphasis) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a)). In other words, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state 

law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 

(1990). Federal courts accept a state court’s interpretation of state law “and alleged errors 

in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). A habeas petitioner also cannot “transform a 

state law issue into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland 

v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389). 

“[T]he Supreme Court has long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure 

immunity from judicial error or uniformity of judicial decisions.” Little v. Crawford, 449 

F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant habeas relief under AEDPA if the petitioner has 

failed to exhaust his claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); see O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to 

the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the 

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

 First, a petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. A petitioner “must give 

the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at 845. “[C]laims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them” either on direct appeal or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, if a petitioner fails to invoke the 

required procedure, exhaustion is not satisfied even if the petitioner raises the claim 

through an alternative procedure. See e.g., Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38 (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies when he presented claim in the state habeas petition 

instead of Arizona Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding).

In addition to presenting a claim in the proper forum and vehicle, to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement, “a petitioner must ‘present the substance of his claim to the state 

courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts 

that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1026, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Bland v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other 

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In presenting 

the factual basis of a claim, a petitioner need not present “every piece of evidence 

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supporting his federal claims,” but must “provide the state court with the operative facts, 

that is, all of the facts necessary to give application to the constitutional principle upon 

which [the petitioner] relies.” Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004). In presenting the legal basis of a claim, a petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that he is asserting a federal claim and cite to the specific constitutional guarantee 

upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 

(9th Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Our rule is that a 

state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state 

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law”) amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” 

such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial” is 

insufficient); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (finding a mere reference 

to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a federal claim). 

 If a petitioner fails to fairly and fully present his federal claim in state court, and 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state courts’ procedural rules would 

bar consideration of the claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted and is barred from 

federal review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); 32.9 (stating 

that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state 

post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, 

distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as 

“technical” exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state 

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court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 

 A claim may also be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review if it 

was actually raised in state court, but found by that court to be defaulted on an adequate 

and independent state procedural ground, such as waiver or preclusion. Beard v. Kindler, 

558 U.S. 53 (2009); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991). Arizona courts 

have been consistent in their application of procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and 

independent procedural bar); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has 

been regularly and consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a 

claim.”); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review “if the 

petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as 

well as to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish 

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 488-89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional 

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish 

prejudice, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or 

prejudice, the court need not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 

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1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 fn. 13. 

 Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

II. Petitioner’s Claims 

 A. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner essentially argues that he was deprived of due process 

when the Superior Court denied his request for an Arabic translator. As a result, he 

received constitutionally excessive sentences. 

 While Petitioner presented the facts of this claim on direct appeal, it was “not 

sufficient to give a ‘fair opportunity’ to the [state court] to decide a federal claim.” Cook, 

538 F.3d at 1029 (citing Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (en banc) (9th Cir. 

2003). “‘[M]ere similarity’ between [the] state claim presented in state court and the 

federal claim made in th[is] habeas petition does not suffice to avoid procedural default.” 

Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1159-60 (citing Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)). A return 

to state court to present this claim would be futile under Arizona’s procedural rules. The 

time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a) of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Petitioner has not shown that any of the 

exceptions under Rule 32.1 apply to him. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). Therefore, this 

claim is technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not filed a reply 

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and does not offer any reason to excuse the default. Further, although Petitioner 

maintains that his convictions are unfair, he does not demonstrate that failure to review 

the merits of his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

 Alternatively, Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2);

Henry, 720 F.3d at 1084 (court may deny the a habeas claim on the merits, even if 

petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 777 fn. 

10 (9th Cir. 2012); Simmons v. Blodgett, 110 F.3d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1997) (exhaustion is 

not jurisdictional). Petitioner has not demonstrated that the decision of the state court was 

contrary to clearly established federal law, was based on an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts considering the evidence presented in state court. The memorandum decision issued 

by the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct appeal, the last relevant reasoned state court 

decision, addressed Petitioner’s claim as follows: 

¶ 16 Appellant also argues, “During the Trial process, the 

judge denied me an interpreter.” 

¶ 17 Appellant’s argument stems from a request he made on 

the third and final day of trial. Defense counsel stated that 

Appellant had, “about a moment ago ... brought to my 

attention he feels more comfortable with an interpreter, should he testify.” Counsel also noted that, with the exception of two earlier “probation matters,” Appellant had not utilized an interpreter in his prior court appearances, including in cases from 2006 and 2008. The court asked Appellant, who speaks both Arabic and English, why he had not made the request earlier, and Appellant claimed that he had not asked 

the court because he had broached the subject with both the 

prosecutor and his attorney several weeks prior.FN7 He 

admitted, however, that he had no trouble understanding previous proceedings or anything the court said to him, but 

then further stated that “some conversation I can’t understand 

because [English] is my second dialect.” 

FN7. Appellant also claimed he had broached the 

subject with private counsel, Mr. Anderson, and the 

court noted “that was not listed in [Mr. Anderson’s] 

motion.” The prosecutor denied that he had been 

involved in any such conversation, stating that he had “never talked to [Appellant],” and that “Mr. Tosto has 

always been more than frank with me, and I have no 

doubt that had [Appellant] raised this before, I would 

have known about it from Mr. Tosto.” 

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¶ 18 The court then took a recess. When the court returned, it 

stated that it had reviewed the superior court’s records 

involving numerous court appearances by Appellant, and noted that the records failed to “indicate any concern or request for an interpreter,” including in 2006 when Appellant had entered a plea agreement with the State. The court also 

found Appellant’s request for an interpreter untimely, and after determining “in an abundance of caution” that no Arabic 

interpreter was still available that day, denied Appellant’s request. The court clarified its ruling by stating that it was “not making its decision based on the availability of the 

[A]rabic interpreter,” but on its conclusion that Appellant had failed to raise “an actual issue with needing an interpreter, considering the past record.” Appellant ultimately opted not to testify.FN8 We find no error, much less fundamental, 

reversible error in the court’s decision not to delay the final 

day of trial to procure an interpreter for Appellant. 

FN8. In announcing his decision not to testify, Appellant nonetheless chose to inform the court that 

“sometimes I can speak very well.” 

¶ 19 “It is axiomatic that an indigent defendant who is unable to speak and understand the English language should be afforded the right to have the trial proceedings translated into his native language in order to participate effectively in his own defense, provided he makes a timely request for such assistance.” State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, 194, 526 P.2d 

730, 733 (1974). A failure to provide a necessary interpreter would effectively deny a defendant his due process rights to a fair trial and constitute fundamental error. See id. In general, we will adhere to the trial court’s discretion whether an 

interpreter is required, because that court “is in the best 

position to determine whether a defendant possesses the requisite degree of fluency in the English language.” Id.

¶ 20 In this case, Appellant points to nothing in the record to 

suggest that he was unable to sufficiently comprehend the evidence and procedure. Also, neither Appellant nor his counsel ever suggested that they were unable to communicate 

with each other throughout the duration of the trial. In fact, 

the record, including Appellant’s conversations with the court 

throughout trial, supports the court’s conclusion that 

Appellant failed to raise “an actual issue with needing an interpreter,” and we find no abuse of discretion, much less 

fundamental error, in the court’s decision not to appoint an interpreter. See id. There is no evidence in the record 

suggesting that the court’s denial of Appellant’s last-minute request for an interpreter interfered with Appellant’s 

constitutional rights or in any way caused him prejudice. 

Aljibory, 2012 WL 3939352 at *4. 

 While the Supreme Court of the United States has not specially addressed whether 

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there is a constitutional right to a court-appointed interpreter, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has found “that a constitutional right to an interpreter exists in certain 

situations.” United States v. Si, 333 F.3d 1041, 1042-1043, 1043 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citing United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding defendant’s 

inability to communicate in English may interfere with his Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation or Fifth Amendment due process right or his right to testify on his own 

behalf); United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1179–81 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 

defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by 

the court); United States v. Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that “[a]s a 

constitutional matter, the appointment of interpreters is within the district court’s 

discretion.”)). In interpreting this right, the Ninth Circuit has looked to whether there are 

“specific instances of prejudice resulting from the translation procedure employed” by 

the court such that the “defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings [was] actually

compromised.” United States v. Lee, 967 F.2d 594, 1992 WL 144716 (9th Cir. Jun. 25, 

1992) (unpublished) (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 

1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The basic inquiry on whether or not the failure to provide an 

interpreter was error... must be whether... [the defendant was] inhibited from such 

comprehension of the proceedings or the testimony given against him in English to such 

an extent as to have made the trial fundamentally unfair”); Valladares v. United States, 

871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The ultimate question is whether any inadequacy 

in the interpretation “made the trial fundamentally unfair.”). 

 As found by the state court and reflected in the record (Doc. 9-1, Exh. J; Doc. 9-2 

at 132-140, Exh. P), following Petitioner’s request, the Superior Court reviewed the 

available information concerning Petitioner’s conduct during the trial and in former 

proceedings. It found Petitioner had communicated with the Superior Court throughout 

trial without an interpreter. In his prior court appearances, both in that case and in 

previous criminal proceedings, Petitioner had proceeded without the use of an interpreter. 

It was not until the final day of trial that Petitioner requested an interpreter. Because 

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Petitioner had demonstrated an ability to sufficiently comprehend the evidence and 

procedure during those proceedings, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the 

Superior Court’s denial of the request for an interpreter did not result in prejudice, nor 

was an abuse of discretion. 

 This conclusion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. There was no indication that Petitioner was unable to 

comprehend the proceedings or instructions of the court. Petitioner did not testify at trial, 

and there was no indication that Petitioner was unable to communicate with the court or 

counsel. Thus, there were no circumstances that presented a basis for a finding of a 

violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. A fairminded 

jurist could reasonably find that Petitioner’s apparent ability to proceed with without an 

interpreter in prior proceedings and throughout trial demonstrated an ability to 

communicate effectively in the English language. As long as Petitioner’s ability to 

understand the proceedings and communicate was unimpaired, the appropriate use of an 

interpreter was a matter within the Superior Court’s discretion. Therefore, the Court will 

recommend that Ground One be denied. 

B. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that he received constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. He implicitly argues that had he been able to effectively 

communicate with defense counsel and understood the possible consequences of his 

convictions, he would have entered into a plea agreement rather than proceeded to trial. 

 Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in state court. Petitioner did not 

present this claim to state court in post-conviction relief proceedings. While Petitioner 

appears to have generally alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals explicitly declined to consider the claim. Aljibory, 2012 WL 

3939352 at *4. “As a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be 

raised in post-conviction relief proceedings pursuant to rule 32, Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Because a return to state court would be futile, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not filed 

a reply, nor has he offered any reason to excuse the default or demonstrated that failure to 

review the merits of his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.2

 Alternatively, Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. To prevail on an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim under § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner must show that “the statecourt decision unreasonably applied the more general standard for ineffective-assistanceof counsel claims established by” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Saesee 

v. McDonald, 725 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Strickland, a petitioner must 

show: (1) deficient performance, in that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice, in that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 466 U.S. at 687-88. A defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel 

when considering whether to accept or reject a plea offer. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52, 57 (1985) (holding that the same two-part standard announced in Strickland is 

applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process.”). Where a 

petitioner alleges that counsel’s ineffective performance led to the rejection of a plea 

offer, he “must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable 

probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the 

defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it 

in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and 

that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less 

severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” Lafler v. 

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 In states like Arizona, which require that ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claims be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez v. Ryan, __U.S.__ 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). See also Dickens v. Ryan, __F.3d__, 2014 WL 

241871 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2014). In the instant case however, Petitioner did not seek post- conviction relief, nor does he argue that his claim was not properly presented in state court in an initial-review collateral proceeding due to an attorney’s error. See Martinez, 

132 S.Ct. at 1313. Thus, Martinez is not applicable to case at bar. 

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Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012). 

 Petitioner has not met his burden to show that there was no reasonable basis for 

the state court to deny relief based on this claim. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. In his 

habeas petition, Petitioner avers that he is “worried about how to communicate with [his] 

feeling and thoughts about [his] conviction. [He] didn’t fully understand the 

consequences of taking [his] case to trial. Now that [he has] been convicted [he] feel[s] 

that [he] would have made a more appropriate decision concerning [the] outcome if [he] 

would have had proper counseling with an interpreter.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Undoubtedly, 

Petitioner would prefer a lesser sentence than the one he received, and he may have 

achieved that had he accepted a plea offer instead of going to trial. Nonetheless, 

accepting Petitioner’s contentions as true, nothing suggests that counsel’s performance 

was deficient or that had Petitioner received the benefit of an interpreter, the outcome 

would have been different. 

 It was not until the final day of trial that Petitioner first voiced a request to the 

court for an interpreter, which initially, was merely preemptive in the event he would 

decide to testify. (Doc. 9-2 at 132, Exh. P.) Only then, did Petitioner first allege that 

several weeks earlier, he had asked defense counsel to obtain interpreter services. 

However, as recounted by the Superior Court, Petitioner, nor his defense counsel, had 

previously expressed any concern to the court regarding the need for an interpreter. 

Petitioner also never submitted to the court that he required the assistance of an 

interpreter or was unable to communicate with defense counsel during his 2006 and 2008 

criminal proceedings. (Doc. 9-2 at 136-139, Exh. P.) The record does not compel that 

counsel unreasonably failed to secure the assistance of an interpreter for Petitioner. 

 The record also fails to persuade that there was a reasonable probability that had 

the language barrier been removed, Petitioner would have accepted a plea offer. 

Petitioner has not identified what information was inadequately communicated to him 

and could have swayed his decision. He does not specify what plea offer was made which 

he would have accepted, nor does he contend that defense counsel failed to adequately 

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communicate the terms of a plea offer to him in a manner he could understand. Petitioner 

does offer any set of facts that show that he was unable to communicate with defense 

counsel such that it precluded him from understanding the benefits of a plea agreement. 

In fact, the record shows Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in a prior criminal 

matter without the aid of an interpreter. Instead, the record illustrates that Petitioner was 

resolute in proceeding to trial; in the petition he alleges that the gun discharge was 

accidental, not intentional, so he “went to trial.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Having lost, he “was 

punished for doing the right thing and going to trial.” (Id.) 

 Based on these facts, the Court cannot conclude that counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness or that different actions by trial counsel 

would likely have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, Petitioner does not assert a 

viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and the Court will recommend that 

Ground Two be denied. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred from review and further fail on their merits. The Court will therefore recommend 

that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

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the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 21st day of February, 2014. 

 

 

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