Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00860/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00860-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

06cv0860

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIE TOOMER, JAYA MARIE

LITTLE, a minor through her guardian

ad litem, DYLIN BARUSO,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No.06cv0860 JAH (LSP)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 18]

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The

motion was heard before this Court on February 25, 2008. After hearing argument by

counsel, and a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits filed, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from the death of Navy Seaman Roderick Little. On the evening

of November 18, 2003, Club Metro, a facility on the 32nd Street Naval Base in San Diego

(“NBSD”) was holding an event called “hip hop night.” Little and a group of friends were

at the club. Myron Thomas, a marine, and several friends were also at the club. A fight

broke out on the dance floor and was broken up by security personnel. At one point

during the night, Thomas was asked to leave the club for carrying a drink on the dance

floor, but later re-entered the club. After closing, an altercation occurred in the parking

lot between the two groups. Military police officers intervened and instructed the groups

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 06cv0860

to leave the base. Military security officers were assisting traffic exiting the base when they

heard a voice from inside a vehicle say “I’m going to do a 187.” Neither officer called to

report the incident, although one officer, at some point after the encounter, explained he

picked up the telephone at the guard booth with the intention of calling in the incident

when he heard shots.

After exiting NBSD, Little and his group proceeded to at the Del Taco on 28th and

Main Street. After exiting NBSD, Thomas drove to an apartment, obtained a gun and

then proceeded to Del Taco. He shot into the crowd at Del Taco and killed Little.

Marie Toomer, Little’s mother and Jaya Marie Little, Little’s minor daughter,

through her mother and guardian ad litem, Dylin Baruso, filed the pending action for

wrongful death on April 12, 2006, against the United States of America. Defendant filed

an answer on August 25, 2006.

Defendant filed the pending motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18) on

January 22, 2008. Plaintiff’s filed an opposition (Doc. No. 24) on February 8, 2008, and

Defendant filed a reply on February 15, 2008.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the

initial burden of establishing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. Where the party moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden

of proof at trial, it may show that no genuine issue of material fact exists by demonstrating

that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

The moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact, nor is it required to offer evidence negating the moving party’s claim.

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 06cv0860

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); United Steelworkers v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989). “Rather, the motion may, and

should, be granted so long as whatever is before the District Court demonstrates that the

standard for the entry of judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Lujan, 497

U.S. at 885 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the

party resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

Without specific facts to support the conclusion, a bald assertion of the “ultimate fact” is

insufficient. See Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1991). A

material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and the existence

of which might affect the outcome of the suit. The materiality of a fact is thus determined

by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. Disputes over irrelevant or

unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. T.W. Electrical Service,

Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn

from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); see also

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because it owed no

duty to Little beyond what was done. Defendant also contends that even if it did owe a

duty, Plaintiffs cannot prove causation and the discretionary function doctrine bars

Plaintiffs from recovery.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act “(FTCA”), the United States may be sued in a

tort action for actions caused by a government employee “if a private person would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 06cv0860

occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). In California negligence actions, the plaintiff bears the

burden of showing the“defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, the defendant breached

the duty, and the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the

plaintiff.” Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 673 (1993).

Defendant argues it owes no duty to protect persons located outside of a military

installation. Relying on California law regarding police personnel, Defendant argues the

United States had no special relationship with Little and owed no legal duty to take any

action beyond what was done. 

Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s reliance on cases involving state or local police is

improper. Instead, Plaintiffs argue the United States may be held liable under a premises

liability theory. Plaintiff argues a special relationship exists between a club owner and its

patrons and other invitees. The relationship imposes a duty on Defendant and its

employees to take affirmative and appropriate action to control the wrongful acts of third

persons which threaten the patron. 

I. Proper Inquiry for Legal Duty

Under the FTCA the United States is liable “in the same manner and to the same

extent as a private individual under like circumstances. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The

Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean “the United States waives sovereign immunity

‘under circumstances’ where local law would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort.” United

States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 - 45 (2005) (reversing Ninth Circuit precedent

permitting courts to base a waiver simply upon a finding the local law would make a state

or municipal entity liable.).

Olson involved an FTCA action against the Mine Safety and Health Administration

alleging negligent mine inspectors caused a mine accident resulting in injuries to two

workers. The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s two premises regarding liability

under the FTCA: (1) “where ‘unique governmental functions’ are at issue, the Act waives

sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be subject to liability under the

law where the activity occurred” (internal quotations omitted); and (2) “federal mine

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 06cv0860

inspections being regulatory in nature are such ‘unique governmental functions’ since there

is no private-sector analogue for mine inspections.” Olson 546 U.S. at 45.

The Court determined the Ninth Circuit’s first premise in Olson read something

into the FTCA that is not there, namely that the Act waives sovereign immunity “under

circumstances where the United States. . .if a state or municipal entity would be liable.”

Id. Relying on the discussions in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)

and Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), the Court noted that the Act

requires a court to look to the state law liability of private entities, not public entities when

assessing liability under the FTCA. The Court found the second premise too narrow.

Pursuant to the holding in Indian Towing, the Court determined the words “‘like

circumstances’ do not restrict a court’s inquiry to the same circumstances, but require it to

look further afield.” Olson 546 U.S. at 46 (emphasis in original). 

Relying on the Tekle ex rel. Tekle v. U.S., 437 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2006), Plaintiffs

argue only “private person” liability is relevant under the FTCA. In reply, Defendant

argues Plaintiffs’ position proceeds from a fundamental misreading of the Tekle decision.

Defendant contends the amended opinion in Tekle v. U.S., 511 F.3d 839, 850 (2007),

withdrew majority support of the portion of the original opinion relying on Olson and

thereby implicitly reaffirming the line of Ninth Circuit cases examining state law as it

applies to state or municipal employees in FTCA cases involving unique governmental

functions. During oral argument, Plaintiffs argued this matter does not deal with someone

acting as a police officer, but is more closely related to a private person who operates a bar.

This Court recognizes there are certain functions performed by government actors

that are purely governmental in nature and have no private person analogy. This is

particularly true with certain law enforcement duties. The concurring opinion in Teckle

puts courts on notice that those cases may require a different inquiry. This Court,

however, need not make the determination in this case, as the actions taken by Defendant

here are not unique government functions. The undisputed facts of this action

demonstrate Little was a patron at Club Metro located on the NBSD and was killed after

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 06cv0860

leaving the club and the base. The closest private person analogy, as Plaintiff argues, is

that of a private person who operates a bar or club on his land.

II. Analysis

Generally, there is no duty to protect an individual from the wrongful conduct of

a third party. See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 434

(1976). However, a duty may arise where a “special relationship” exists between the

parties. See id.; Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (2005). California

courts recognize a special relationship exists between business proprietors and their

patrons. Id. Based upon the special relationship, a proprietor owes a patron a duty “to

take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third

parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.” Id. (Citing

Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 (1993). The scope of the

duty to protect patrons from foreseeable third party crime “is determined in part by

balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed.”

Ann M., 6 Cal.4th at 678. Other factors courts consider in determining the existence and

scope of a duty are “the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness

of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral

blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm , the

extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing

a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and

prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” Id. at 675, n.5.

Here, there is no dispute that Little was a patron of the club. Accordingly,

Defendant owed Little a duty to take reasonable steps to protect him from foreseeable

harm from third parties. Defendants argue the duty did not extend to acts occurring offbase. Plaintiff argues the scope and extent of the duty extended to the harm that occurred

off-base and asserts this duty required Defendant to have adequate security staff.

Providing security or guards is a burdensome measure that requires a heightened

foreseeability. See Delgado, 36 Cal.4th at 244. Accordingly, there must be evidence of

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiffs further maintain there is other evidence in the form of incident reports of previous fights

at Club Metro that were required to be kept for 50 years, but was never produced or was spoilated by NCIS.

Plaintiffs ask the court to presume the evidence to be adverse to Defendant based upon the spoilation.

Defendant maintains it did not fail to turn over and it did not destroy any evidence. Defendant contends

it conducted a search based upon Plaintiffs’ request for reports of violent incidents at Club Metro and did

not locate any documents. Because there is no evidence of spoilation, a presumption in favor of Plaintiffs

is not warranted. Additionally, the record does not reflect this matter was presented to and addressed by

the Magistrate Judge during the discovery phase of this case.

7 06cv0860

past similar criminal conduct. Defendant argues this requires evidence of an on-base

verbal altercation escalating into an off-base violent incident. Defendant asserts there is

no evidence that a verbal argument resulted in an off-base violent incident of any type.

Plaintiff argues there was a history of fights at Club Metro of which at least 30 lead to

arrests between 2001 and 2003 and therefore the fatal shooting of Little was foreseeable.1

The evidence demonstrates there were numerous previous violent incidents within

Club Metro and it its parking lot some of which resulted in apprehension of the

participants. See Baruso Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Eglan Dec. ¶ 2; Rhodes Depo., Plas’ Exh. 16 at 19:

11-20; Lopez Depo., Plas’ Exh. 12 at 8:12-25 at 9:1-25; Otero Depo., Plas’ Exh. 13 at

16:17-25, p. 17:1-14, p. 20:12-25, p. 21:1-25; Hargreaves Depo., Plas’ Exh. 7 at 18-22.

Del Taco, located near the base, was a know post-Club Metro hangout. Reporter’s

Transcript, Plas’ Exh. 1 at 300; Otero Depo., at 76:10-13. There is no evidence of violent

acts taking place off-base following “hip hop night” at Club Metro. In fact, there is

testimony from Navy security officers that they never head of an on-base argument

escalating into off-base violence. See Lopez Depo., Def’s Exh. 2 at 68:25 - 69:5;

Hargreaves Depo., Def’s Exh. 4 at 100: 14-24. As such, the Court finds there is no

evidence of past similar criminal incidents or other factors supporting foreseeability that

would require Defendants to provide security to prevent violent acts off-base.

Plaintiffs also maintain the scope of the duty owed includes calling the police in

response to a murder threat. This would entail a lesser burden than providing adequately

trained security. However, the harm to a person off-base is not sufficiently foreseeable to

extend the scope of the duty as requested by Plaintiffs. 

According to the undisputed facts, there was an verbal altercation between Thomas’

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Gordon testified that the meaning of a 187 was to shoot someone. Gordon Depo. at 30:19-24.

8 06cv0860

and group of friends and Little and his group of friends in the parking lot of the club.

Harbreaves Depo., Plas’ Exh. 7 at 26. Thomas was very angry and was restrained by a

friend. See Bernard Jones Testimony, Reporter’s Transcript of Trial in The People of the

State of California v. Thomas, Plas’ Exh. 10 at 2468, 2469. One of the officers reported

lots of cursing, arguing and a mention to “take it off-base.” Hargreaves Depo. At 47:8-

49:11. The groups were told to leave and dispersed by Officers Anthony Hargreaves and

Pedro Lopez. After the altercation, traffic was moving toward the gate to exit the base.

Security officers Darrell Gordon and Juan Salazar were assigned to the gate to assist

with the large amount of traffic leaving the base, because there was a large amount of auto

and pedestrian traffic leaving the base after Club Metro closed. See Salazar Depo., Def’s

Exh. 7 at 61:6-15. The officers were not required to check identification of those leaving

the base. See Gordon Depo., Def’s Exh. 6 at 28:5-29:4, 87:10-88:10. Gordon testified

that those leaving the based often yelled something at the officers. See Gordon Depo. at

90:8-23. During the departure of cars the night of the shooting, the officers heard

someone from inside a dark vehicle say he was “going to do a 187.”2 See Salazar Depo.

at 27:14-16, 28:20-29:2; Gordon Depo. at 30:10-30:18. Gordon attempted to speak to

those in the car, but it passed quickly to exit the base and neither officer was able to take

down the license number. See Gordon Depo. at 33:9-17, 90:5-7; Salazar Depo. at 62:3-5.

Gordon observed the car turn left onto Harbor. Gordon Depo., Plas’ Exh. 5 at 35:12-16.

The encounter with the car containing the person who made the statement took no more

than 20 seconds. See Salazar Depo. at 61:24-62:2. 

Based on the undisputed facts the Court finds the off-base shooting was not a

foreseeable act. There is a clear absence of any prior violent act off-base following an onbase altercation despite evidence of numerous on-base altercations. The officers at the exit

were unaware of the altercation that took place in the parking lot. Also, in light of the

many comments yelled at the officers by those exiting the base following the closure of

Club Metro, the statement that someone was going “to do a 187” was at best a vague

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 06cv0860

threat. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any weapon brandished or seen by the

officers.

Additionally, it is questionable whether a call to the police would have protected

against the violence that occurred in this case. Although the security officers saw the

vehicle from which the vague threat was made, they did not obtain the license plate

number and they did not know where the car was traveling. It is unclear whether the

police would have been able to locate the car based upon the officers description.

Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s duty to protect its patrons from third

party crime did not extend to violent acts outside the base. Plaintiffs’ claim is based upon

the shooting of Little that occurred off-base. Because duty is a required element of

Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the absence of any duty to protect Little from the off-base

shooting is fatal to the FTCA claim. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED.

DATED: September 22, 2008

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00860-JAH-LSP Document 30 Filed 09/22/08 Page 9 of 9