Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01630/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01630-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMPSON S. AUSTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

STU SHERMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-01630-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 15)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Sampson S. Austin (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and 

in forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint, filed on August 20, 2019, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 15.) 

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S.

Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted 

unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner. The events in the complaint are alleged to have 

occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in 

Corcoran, California. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is confusing and disjointed. As best as the Court can 

determine, Plaintiff is alleging that defendants intentionally failed to remove an administrative 

determination of violent, which was removable seven years from Plaintiff’s last violent crime. 

Plaintiff alleges that the last violent crime was 23 years before the removal of the determination. 

Plaintiff also appears to allege that a few weeks before his release, he was finally “given 

the 33% reduction of time” instead of the 50% at the time of his incarceration when an arbitrary 

violent administrative determination was assigned to him without reason. Plaintiff contends that 

this precluded his constitutional interest in his right to liberty. 

Plaintiff further alleges that since he was afforded the 33% reduction without any 

exigency “there was no REASON WHATSOVER to withhold LEGAL-RIGHTFUL credits 

which would have CUT down his imprisonment by 7% over the course of the sentenced 7 (seven) 

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years at 50% given by the SENTENCIG COURT per Penal Code and Statute construct, or 1277 

days MINUS 130 days of credit by the Court, leaving 1147 days which represented the 50% 

reduction.” (Doc. No. 15 at 2.)

Plaintiff further appears to allege that under Title 15 he should have been assigned to level 

one housing. If he had been assigned to level one housing, then he also should have received 

one-for-one good conduct credits beginning on May 1, 2017. Plaintiff appears to claim that 

because he wrongfully was not assigned to level one housing, he was deliberately denied one-toone good conduct credit in addition to his 33% decrease. Plaintiff essentially contends that he 

was over-detained by 411 days, and he should be compensated for this over-detention. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 

state a cognizable claim for relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be given an 

opportunity to the cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. 

To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and legal standards that appear applicable to 

his claims. 

A. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, 

any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed. 2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] 

person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 

1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978).

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Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to identify any defendant in connection with his 

allegations. Although Warden Stu Sherman is identified in the caption, he also is not named in 

the allegations. Plaintiff has not adequately identified or linked any defendant to an action or 

omission that resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. If Plaintiff elects to amend his 

complaint for a second time, he must identify each defendant and allege what each of these 

defendants did or did not do that resulted in a constitutional violation. 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 

omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556–557; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims. 

Plaintiff may not simply refer to his prior pleading in order to state a claim. Plaintiff is advised 

that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 

896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. In any amended 

complaint, Plaintiff should clearly state what happened, when it happened and who was involved 

without reference to any prior pleading. 

C. Eighth Amendment

A prisoner’s claim for damages resulting from excessive custody may support a legitimate 

section 1983 claim. See Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985). “Detention 

beyond the termination of a sentence could constitute cruel and unusual punishment [in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment] if it is the result of ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s liberty 

interest; otherwise, such detention can be held to be unconstitutional only if it violates due 

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process.” Id. at 1354 (internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a cognizable deliberate indifference 

claim against any defendant. There is no indication in Plaintiff’s amended complaint that prison 

officials knew of, but were deliberately indifferent to, the appropriate length of Plaintiff’s 

sentence or that any reduction should have been applied. 

D. Due Process 

“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from unlawful 

state deprivation.” Ward v. Brown, 891 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2012). The Ninth 

Circuit has found that over detention can violate a prisoner’s civil rights. Id. In assessing a due 

process violation related to excessive custody, the “court’s first task is to determine whether 

Paratt (random act) or Logan (official practice and procedure) controls.” Haygood, 769 F.2d at

1359. Random and unauthorized deprivations by state prison officers cannot be prevented by due 

process hearings,” and “a remedial hearing after the injury can provide due process in a narrowly 

limited class of cases.” Id. at 1357. However, “where the injury is the product of the operation of 

state law, regulation or institutionalized practice, it is neither random nor unauthorized.” Id. Thus,

[i]f the wrongful taking of liberty results from either affirmatively enacted or de 

facto policies, practices or customs, the court must determine when the responsible 

state officers received notice of a claim that a wrong was being done. When an 

official with the authority to rectify an erroneous practice receives notice of the 

wrongful practice and its harmful consequences, due process requires the state to 

provide a hearing before a further denial of liberty can be said to be free from § 

1983 liability.

Id. at 1359. 

Here, there is no indication in Plaintiff’s amended complaint that any official with the 

requisite authority knew of any erroneous or wrongful practice or alleged miscalculation of 

Plaintiff’s release date. 

E. Housing/Classification Level 

Plaintiff appears to complain about the housing level to which he was assigned. Plaintiff, 

however, does not have a liberty interest in any particular classification level while in prison. See, 

e.g., Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does not have a freestanding 

constitutional right to a particular classification level or to be housed in a particular prison. See

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Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244–245 (1983) (finding no justifiable expectation of 

incarceration in a particular state or in any particular prison); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 

224–225 (1976) (finding no justifiable expectation of incarceration in a particular prison within a 

state). 

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the 

Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the above-identified 

deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must 

be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (citations omitted). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 

“buckshot” complaints). 

Finally, as previously noted, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the 

original complaint. Lacey., 693 F.3d at 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 

Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or 

file a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

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the Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a 

court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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