Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02132/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 “CT” is the Clerk’s Transcript and “RT” is the Reporter’s Transcript of the state trial,

lodged with this court. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY SCOTT TAMAGNI,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2132 FCD KJM P

vs.

JOE McGRATH, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his Tehama County convictions for attempted

voluntary manslaughter, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant and the findings that he had

inflicted great bodily injury during the attempted voluntary manslaughter and had a conviction

for a prior serious felony. CT 132.1 He challenges the court’s failure to instruct on self-defense

in relation to the attempted voluntary manslaughter charge and on accident in relation to the

corporal injury charge. 

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A. Procedural And Factual Background

Petitioner was charged with attempted murder, infliction of corporal injury on a

cohabitant and several sentence enhancements. CT 2-4. 

The jury found petitioner guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a lesser

included offense to attempted murder, and found that he had inflicted great bodily injury on the

victim. It also found him guilty of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and found he had a

prior conviction for a serious felony. CT 26-29.

Based on a reading of the record, this court finds the state Court of Appeal’s

statement of facts to be accurate:

At about 7 p.m. on July 20, 1999, defendant and his girlfriend,

Jennifer Gipson, arrived at Dwayne Keith Shafer’s house with

Lane McKinney. Shafer and another man (who was never

identified) were present. The group sat around and drank beer.

However, after defendant refused to allow Gipson to join others

who were taking drugs (on the ground that she was pregnant with

his baby), Gipson became upset. Defendant and Gipson then

started arguing, and defendant hit her a few times in the head with

his hand. McKinney and Shafer asked defendant to stop. But,

according to McKinney, defendant slapped Gipson a few more

times. According to Shafer, defendant grabbed Gipson’s head and

“kneed her on the forehead.” Shafer told McKinney that since he

had brought the couple over, he had to take care of the situation.

McKinney and the defendant then started a fistfight in the kitchen,

which lasted less than five minutes and proceeded to other parts of

the house. According to Shafer, the fight was fair, and McKinney

was winning. However, Shafer subsequently saw defendant with a

12-inch fishing knife in his hand, pursuing McKinney, who was

running out of the house. Bleeding badly, McKinney went to his

mother’s house and passed out from loss of blood. Shafer found

blood all over his house, which he had originally thought was

defendant’s blood, given his knowledge of McKinney’s fighting

prowess. (Shafer only referred vaguely to McKinney’s prowess,

testifying that McKinney was doing “what he was supposed to

do.”)

Defendant, Gipson, and the unidentified man fled. The knife,

inside its sheath, was thrown over a fence. Gipson flagged down a

friend who was driving by in a Peugeot, and all three got in the

vehicle and drove off. But an eyewitness reported the license plate

number of the Peugeot, and the car was stopped by Sheriff’s

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deputies. With a two-inch goose egg on her forehead, Gipson

explained to an officer that defendant had hit her four or five times

in the head and then kneed her in the head. She also said that

McKinney and Shafer had told defendant to stop hitting her, but he

had not.

While in custody, defendant told the officer that he had an

abscessed tooth that had caused his jaw to swell and asked to be

taken to the hospital. En route to the hospital, defendant told an

officer he would plead to attempted murder as “it was no big deal,”

but was upset that he was being charged with domestic violence

with injury. Indeed, at the hospital, defendant offered to lead the

officer to the knife in exchange for dropping the domestic violence

charge.

While defendant was in custody, he did not have and never

complained of any injuries from the fight. There was no blood on

his clothing, except for a drop on one tennis shoe.

The knife was found in its sheath. The blade had blood stains

matching McKinney’s blood type. No fingerprints were lifted from

the knife.

McKinney spent almost two weeks in the hospital. He had

sustained three stab wounds in his arm and two stab wounds to his

side, lost his spleen, a piece of lung, and part of his diaphragm, and

needed a colon resection. At trial, however, McKinney admitted

he had bragged to a nurse at the hospital that she “‘should see the

other guy.’”

In the past, McKinney had been convicted of several crimes,

including transportation or sale of methamphetamine, sale of a

substance in lieu of a controlled substance, receipt of stolen

property, and assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, his foot. There

was no evidence, however, that defendant knew of McKinney’s

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.

At trial, Gipson stated that she had lived with defendant since

January 1999 and was pregnant with defendant’s child. Contrary

to her report to the police, at trial, Gipson denied that defendant

had hit her. She testified that defendant had grabbed her hands and

pulled her towards him, and that she had c[o]me forward and hit

his chin. McKinney then hit defendant and the two men started

fighting. She could not recall everything she told the officer, but

said she was lying when she told the officer that defendant had hit

her.

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Gipson did not watch or hear McKinney and defendant fight. 

However, she saw blood in the kitchen and observed defendant

chase McKinney outside. She did not know who stabbed

McKinney, and denied seeing defendant with a knife or seeing him

throw anything over a fence. She claimed defendant’s face was

swollen after the fight.

Answer, Ex. D (Court of Appeal Opinion) at 2-5.

II. AEDPA Standards

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Although “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one

methodology,” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S 63, 71 (2003), there are certain principles that guide

its application. 

First, the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses are different. As

the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

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objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show the state

court’s decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002). It is appropriate to look to lower court

decisions to determine what law has been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the

reasonableness of a particular application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

598 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Second, so long as the state court adjudicated petitioner’s claims on the merits, its

decision is entitled to deference, no matter how brief. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76; Downs v. Hoyt,

232 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2000). However, when the state court does not issue a “reasoned

opinion,” this court must undertake an independent review of the claims. Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Third, in determining whether a state court decision is entitled to deference, it is

not necessary for the state court to cite or even be aware of the controlling federal authorities “so

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). Moreover, a state court opinion need not contain “a formulary

statement” of federal law, so long as the fair import of its conclusion is consonant with federal

law. Id. 

III. Instruction On Self-Defense

Petitioner claims the trial court erred in refusing his request for instructions on

self-defense to be given in connection with the charge of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Pet.

at 5 & Attach. at 4-11.

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 CALJIC No. 5.30 reads: 

It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend [himself]

[herself] from attack if, as a reasonable person, [he] [she] has

grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about

to be inflicted upon [him] [her]. In doing so, that person may use

all force and means which [he] [she] believes to be reasonably

necessary and which would appear to a reasonable person, in the

same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury

which appears to be imminent.

CALJIC No. 5.31 provides:

An assault with the fists does not justify the person being assaulted

in using a deadly weapon in self-defense unless that person

believes and a reasonable person in the same or similar

circumstances would believe that the assault is likely to inflict

great bodily injury upon [him] [her].

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At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel asked the court to instruct the

jury with CALJIC Nos. 5.30 and 5.31 on self-defense. RT 195.2 He argued the instructions were

appropriate because the victim struck the first blow, and the witness Shafer believed the blood on

the floor was petitioner’s, which suggested petitioner was losing the fight. RT 196. The court

found that while the victim’s conduct might have suggested the need to defend oneself, there was

no evidence suggesting petitioner was actually in fear of his life. RT 196-197. 

On appeal, petitioner challenged the omission of the self-defense instructions. 

The Court of Appeal rejected his claim:

In this case, defendant notes the following circumstantial evidence

as substantial evidence of his right to self-defense: McKinney’s

manner of fighting was “highly dangerous”; McKinney “had

cornered [defendant]”; Shafer thought that McKinney was

“winning the fist fight [sic]” and that the blood on the floor was

defendant’s, not McKinney’s; McKinney had been convicted of

assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, his foot; upon admittance to

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the hospital, the nurse asked McKinney about his wounds and

McKinney replied, “You should see the other guy”; and McKinney

did not feel the stab wounds.

This does not, however, amount to substantial evidence that would

support the use of a knife in a fistfight in the exercise of selfdefense. First, as the Attorney General observes, there was no

evidence that defendant knew about McKinney’s conviction of

assault with a deadly weapon, namely, his foot. Nor was there any

evidence that McKinney used his feet in the fight. Thus, the

unknown assault conviction could not give rise to an actual or

reasonable belief of the need to use deadly force. Second, Shafer’s

belief that the blood on the floor and elsewhere belonged to

defendant is irrelevant: Defendant obviously knew that he was

using the knife and that the blood was McKinney’s; a reasonable

person in defendant’s position, while repeatedly stabbing a 12-inch

knife into an adversary, would not think that the blood was his

own. Third, McKinney’s statements to a nurse that “You should

see the other guy” can easily be dismissed as bravado in view of

defendant’s lack of any injuries. In other words, the post-fight

statement cannot alter the evidence of defendant’s actual condition

during the fight, as reflected by his seeming lack of injuries.

Not only is this evidence insufficient to justify the use of a knife in

a fistfight, but the other evidence either failed to support the right

to use such force or was inconsistent with such a right. First and

foremost, this was a fistfight; McKinney had not drawn any

weapons. Second, defendant showed no signs of injury from the

fight and never complained of any injuries. The absence of injury 

is inconsistent with a finding that the repeated use of the knife was

reasonably necessary to prevent great bodily injury, without some

further explanation. Third, when asked whether he thought about

breaking up the fight, Shafer stated that the fight was fair. (The

fact that at one point Shafer thought McKinney was winning such a

fair fight does not suggest that defendant was facing an imminent

threat of great bodily harm, making the use of the knife reasonably

necessary. In any fight, someone has to win.) Fourth, defendant

concedes that “[n]o one testified to a blow-by-blow account of the

fight.” In fact, Gipson claimed she did not even watch the fight,

and McKinney could not remember much. This underscores the

deficiency in evidence supporting the use of the knife at any stage

of the fight. And finally, while defendant argues that his pursuit of

the wounded and bleeding McKinney is not relevant to whether he

reasonably believed in the need for self-defense because he did not

inflict any wounds during the chase, the chase undercuts

defendant’s claim that he was acting defensively and not

aggressively.

The bottom line is that there was virtually no evidence–and

certainly no substantial evidence–that it was necessary for

defendant to use a knife in a fistfight for purposes of self-defense. 

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There was no evidence that the repeated stabbings to McKinney’s

arms and side, resulting in the loss of vital organs, was reasonably

necessary to avoid the imminent threat of great bodily injury. 

Thus, there was insufficient evidence to require a self-defense

instruction.

Answer, Ex. D at 8-10 (footnote omitted).

In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984), the Supreme Court noted its

long-held premise, that due process requires “criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.” Several Courts of Appeal have interpreted this to

encompass a defendant’s right to jury instructions on recognized defenses supported by sufficient

evidence. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1007 (2002);

Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 963 (2003). 

These courts have relied on the fact that the same rule is recognized in federal criminal

procedure:

As a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as

to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.

Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). 

Whether there was the requisite evidentiary support for the omitted instruction is

determined by examining state law and the facts before the state court. Taylor v. Withrow, 288

F.3d at 853-54; Lannert v. Jones, 321 F.3d 747, 754-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 917

(2003). 

In California, a person is entitled to defend himself when, as a reasonable person,

he is justified in believing that his assailant is going to commit a felony against him. People v.

Clark, 130 Cal. App. 3d 371, 377 (3d Dist. 1982), overruled on other grounds in People v.

Blakeley, 23 Cal. 4th 82 (2000). However, 

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[f]irst, only that force which is necessary to repel an attack may be

used in self-defense; force which exceeds the necessity is not

justified. Second, deadly force or force likely to cause great bodily

injury may be used only to repel an attack which is in itself deadly

or likely to cause great bodily injury . . . . 

Id. at 380. A defendant may not use “deadly force to repel a nonlethal attack.” People v.

Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 966 (1992). 

The evidence in the record of petitioner’s trial does not support self-defense

instructions. McKinney remembered “exchang[ing] blows” with petitioner, but remembered

little after going outside and seeing blood all over his pants. RT 24, 25.

Shafer testified that McKinney and petitioner began a fistfight after petitioner

refused to stop hassling Gipson. RT 56-57. The fight moved through the house, but when the

two reached the front door, Shafer saw petitioner had a knife. RT 59, 60. McKinney did not

have a weapon. RT 70. Before that, it had not occurred to Shafer to break up the fight because

he “thought it was a fair fight,” though McKinney appeared to be winning. RT 68. There was no

testimony suggesting that petitioner was aware of McKinney’s conviction for assault with a

deadly weapon.

Gipson testified that McKinney punched petitioner after petitioner refused to let

go of Gipson. RT 112. She kept her head down and did not see the subsequent fight. RT 112. 

She did see petitioner chase McKinney out of the house and might have seen some blood in the

house. RT 113.

When petitioner was arrested, his jaw was swollen and he asked to be taken to a

hospital to be treated for an abscessed tooth. RT 153. Petitioner attributed the swelling to the

tooth, not to any injuries inflicted by McKinney. RT 154. The arresting officer did not notice

any injuries on petitioner. RT 153. 

This evidence is insufficient to show that petitioner’s “resort to deadly force was

necessary or appeared to be necessary at the time.” Clark, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 380. 

Accordingly, the state Court of Appeal’s determination that the facts did not support the

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 CALJIC No. 4.45 provides:

When a person commits an act or makes an omission through

misfortune or by accident under circumstances that show [no]

[neither] [criminal intent [n]or purpose,] [nor] [[criminal]

negligence,] [he] [she] does not thereby commit a crime.

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requested self-defense instruction was not unreasonable in light of the record, nor was its

decision an unreasonable application of federal law.

IV. Instruction On Accident

Although Shafer testified that petitioner “grabbed [Gipson] and kneed her on the

forehead . . .” and Gipson police told the “goose egg” on her head was the result of petitioner’s

kneeing her in the head, she testified at trial that as petitioner pulled her toward him, she fell

forward and hit her forehead on petitioner’s chin. RT 55, 110, 151.

Appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred by not giving an instruction on

accidental injury sua sponte.

3

 Answer, Ex. A at 21 (brief in the Court of Appeal); Pet. at 5 &

Attach. at 12-15. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim:

There was evidence in this case of an accidental injury. Although

Gipson reported to an officer that the goose-egg bump on her

forehead was caused by defendant who kneed her in the head –a

report corroborated by Shafer at trial–Gipson denied at trial that

defendant hit her. She explained that during their quarrel,

defendant grabbed her hands, bent them backwards, and pulled her

toward him, at which point she hit her head on his chin.

However, even assuming that this constituted substantial evidence

that warranted the accident instruction, the jury resolved the issue

adversely to defendant and thus there was no prejudice. The

infliction of corporal injury is committed by “[a]ny person who

willfully inflicts upon a person who is his or her . . . cohabitant . . .

corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. (§ 273.5, subd. 

(a).) One of the elements for corporal injury is the willful

infliction of the corporal injury. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) “As used in

our penal statutes, the word ‘willfully’ ‘implies simply a purpose or

willingness to commit the act’ (Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1).” (In re

Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 364. Accordingly, in convicting

defendant of this offense, the jury necessarily found that 

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defendant’s act was willful and not accidental – in other words, that he

intentionally inflicted what turned out to be the corporal injury.

As stated in People v. Jackson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 578

“[t]he history of section 273.5 supports the inference that the

Legislature intended to define a crime in which the corporal injury

results from a direct application of force by the defendant upon the

victim.” The court concluded that “the section is not violated

unless the corporal injury results from a direct application of force

on the victim by the defendant.” (77 Cal.App.4th at p. 580.) That

of course, would not be the case if Gipson’s trial testimony is

credited.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

In this case, even assuming error, defendant has failed to

demonstrate any prejudice. The jury expressed no confusion over

whether defendant’s conduct was willful. There is nothing to

suggest that the jury did not use the common and instructed

meaning of willful to find that defendant’s infliction of corporal

injury was intentional, thereby rejecting Gipson’s contradicted trial

testimony that her injury was accidental.

Answer, Ex. D at 12-18 (footnote omitted). 

Accident is a defense under California law, People v. Gonzales, 74 Cal. App. 4th

382, 390 (2d Dist. 1999), so petitioner was entitled to an instruction if the theory had evidentiary

support. Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d at 1098-99. The state Court of Appeal assumed that

Gipson’s testimony provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the instruction, but found

petitioner had suffered no prejudice from the omission. 

In Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a

habeas petitioner’s burden to show prejudice from the omission of a jury instruction “is

especially heavy,” because an omission or an incomplete instruction has less potential for

prejudice than a misstatement of the law. In Henderson, the court found a failure to give specific

instruction on causation was not prejudicial error when the jury had been instructed on the

statutory language, which required the jury to find that the defendant had caused the death of the

victim, and was told the prosecution must prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

at 153-54. 

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The jury in petitioner’s trial was instructed that “[e]very person who willfully

inflicts upon a person with whom he is cohabitating (sic) corporal injury . . . is guilty of violation

of Section 273.5 of the Penal Code . . . .” RT 260; CT 76. “Willfully” was defined as “a purpose

or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word ‘willfully’ does

not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” 

RT 243; CT 42; see also People v. Thurston, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1055 (4th Dist. 1999)

(spousal injury statute is a general intent crime, requiring only the intent to do the assaultive act). 

Because the jury found petitioner acted “willfully,” see CT 107, it rejected Gipson’s testimony

that the knee-forehead contact was accidental. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) at 15

(accident is “an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence . . . .”).

Although the Court of Appeal was troubled by the instruction that defined

“willfully” as not requiring an intent to injure, it found no prejudice from the trial court’s failure

to give an instruction on accident, because the “willfulness” instruction also told the jury that the

term translated to a purpose or willingness to commit the act and because, in the context of

assault, the jury was told that “willfully means that the person committing the act did so

intentionally.” Answer, Ex. D at 15-16; RT 258-259; CT 74. 

This approach is consonant with Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 153-54, which

evaluated prejudice from an omitted instruction by considering what the jury was told in other,

properly given instructions. Accordingly, this court cannot say that the state court unreasonably

applied federal law in finding that petitioner was not prejudiced by the court’s failure to instruct

on accident. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 9, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2/tama2132.157

Case 2:02-cv-02132-FCD-KJM Document 27 Filed 06/10/05 Page 13 of 13