Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02662/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02662-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM THOMAS MYERS,

CDCR #E-18846,

Civil No. 10cv2662 JAH (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING 

NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING $ 350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[Doc. No. 4]; 

AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, 

Defendant.

Plaintiff, William Thomas Myers, an inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 4].

/ / /

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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

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available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 4] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000)

(§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a

pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. Bivens Action

While Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he names only a Federal

agency as a Defendant. Accordingly, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s claims to arise under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens established

that “compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest [by federal officials alleged to

have acted under color of federal law] could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the

general federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz

v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978). “Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are

identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.”

Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991).

Bivens provides that “federal courts have the inherent authority to award damages against

federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional rights.” Western

Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a Bivens

action may only be brought against the responsible federal official in his or her individual

capacity. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988). Bivens does not

authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for monetary relief. FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988); DalyMurphy, 837 F.2d at 355. Thus, because Plaintiff names the United States Marshals Service,

which is an agency of the Federal Government, this Defendant must be dismissed from this

action. 

B. Access to Courts claim

Plaintiff alleges that his access to the courts has been denied because the United States

Marshals Service (“USMS”) has failed to properly serve Defendants in a separate action that

Plaintiff has filed. See Myers v. Small, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 08cv1810 JAH (WMc).

Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their

grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening,

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82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995).

In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right

of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing

of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).

To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts

sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions

of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a

result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing

deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.

1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093

(9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, however, Plaintiff cannot show the required “actual injury” because his action filed

as Myers v. Small, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 08cv1810 JAH (WMc) is still pending and has

not been dismissed. Any issues regarding service with the USMS should be addressed in that

matter rather than filing a separate action. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege facts sufficient to state an access to courts claim.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 4] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without

further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 15, 2011

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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