Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cv-00448/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cv-00448-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CASEY DEAN BARGER, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 3:13cv448-WHA

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on a pro se motion by federal inmate Casey Dean

Barger (“Barger”) to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 13, 2009, Barger pled guilty under a plea agreement to receiving or

distributing child pornography in interstate commerce, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2252A(a)(2). On November 19, 2009, the district court sentenced him to 210 months’

imprisonment. The court entered its judgment on November 30, 2009. Barger took no

appeal.

On June 21, 2013, Barger filed the instant § 2255 motion (Doc. No. 1) challenging his

conviction and sentence and claiming that he is actually innocent of the crime to which he

pled guilty. The government argues that Barger’s actual-innocence claim is without merit

and that his motion should be dismissed as untimely under the one-year limitation period in

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). See Doc. No. 3 at 5-8. For the reasons that follow, the court agrees

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with the government.1

II. DISCUSSION

Limitation Period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)

The timeliness of Barger’s motion is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), which

provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction

becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion

created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was

prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

Because Barger did not pursue a direct appeal, his conviction became final for

The government also argues that Barger’s motion is barred by a provision in the plea 1

agreement under which he waived his right to attack his sentence collaterally except on grounds of

ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. See Doc. No. 3 at 8-9. Because a

transcript of the change of plea hearing has not been generated in Barger’s case, and because

Barger’s § 2255 motion is plainly time-barred, the court pretermits discussion of the government’s

argument that the motion is also barred by the waiver provision in the plea agreement.

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purposes of § 2255 on December 14, 2009, upon expiration of the time for him to file a

timely appeal, which was 14 days after the district court’s November 30, 2009, entry of

judgment. See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11 Cir. 2011) (“When a

th

defendant does not appeal his sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the

time for seeking that review expires.”); Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1). Under § 2255(f)(1), then,

Barger had until December 14, 2010, to file a timely § 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 

However, he did not file his § 2255 motion until June 21, 2013.

Actual Innocence

Seeking to avoid the time-bar in § 2255(f), Barger maintains that he is actually

innocent of the crime of which he was convicted and that to allow his conviction to stand

would represent a “complete miscarriage of justice.” Doc. No. 1 at 1. Actual innocence may

provide a gateway to review of an otherwise time-barred § 2255 motion. See McQuiggin v.

Perkins, __ U.S. __, __, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1298 (2013) (“[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves

as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural

bar ... or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations.”).

In asserting his actual innocence, Barger argues that the recent Supreme Court

decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct.

2566 (2012) (“Sebelius”), effectively overruled prior precedent establishing Congress’s

power under the Commerce Clause to regulate purely local activities that are part of an

economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce and thus

establishing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to regulate crimes involving the

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internet and child pornography. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); United

States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11 Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d th

1276, 1285 (11 Cir. 2006). The issue in Sebelius was whether the Affordable Care Act’s th

mandate that virtually all Americans obtain health insurance or pay a penalty was an

unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 132 S.Ct. at

2585–91. The Court determined that the mandate “cannot be sustained” under Congress’s

Commerce Clause power because it forces into commerce individuals who have elected to

refrain from such commercial activity, which goes beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause

powers. Id. at 2591.

According toBarger, Sebelius changed the scope of activitycovered bythe Commerce

Clause, so that the crime to which he pled guilty has been removed from federal jurisdiction. 

See Doc. No. 1 at 1-20. He maintains that, in light of Sebelius, his downloading of “free

unseen-unknown file folders [containing images of child pornography] by title or search

word only” from the internet via his computer was non-economic activity that had no effect

on interstate commerce. Id. at 17-20. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently

rejected a criminal defendant’s similar argument in United States v. Parton, 749 F.3d 1329

(11 Cir. 2014). The defendant in Parton sought to have his conviction for production of th

child pornography overturned in light of Sebelius, on the basis that the “interstate commerce

nexus was insufficient” because the only basis was that the device used to make the

pornographic images was a camera that had traveled in interstate commerce. 749 F.3d at

1330. The court held that Sebelius did not overrule prior precedent regarding the application

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of the Commerce Clause in crimes involving child pornography:

In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts was of the opinion that the Affordable Care

Act could not be sustained under Congress’s power pursuant to the Commerce

Clause. However, his rationale has no application to this case or to the

situation addressed in Smith II [United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276 (11 Cir. th

2006)] or Maxwell II [United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11 Cir. th

2005)]. The Chief Justice reasoned that although Congress has the power to

regulate existing commercial activity, the Commerce Clause cannot be

interpreted to grant Congress the power to “compel [ ] individuals to become

active in commerce by purchasing a product.” __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2587;

see also id. at __ , 132 S.Ct. at 2644 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and

Alito, J., dissenting) (“But that failure [i.e., the failure to maintain health

insurance] – that abstention from commerce – is not ‘Commerce.’ To be sure,

purchasing insurance is ‘Commerce’; but one does not regulate commerce that

does not exist by compelling its existence.”). Unlike the inactivity of the

uninsured individuals addressed by the ChiefJustice and the four dissenters in

Sebelius, Parton produced child pornography; it was this activity which was

criminalized by § 2251(a).

We conclude that the Supreme Court in Sebelius said nothing to

abrogate its holding in Raich [v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)] to the effect that

Congress has the power, as part of a comprehensive regulation of economic

activity, to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class

of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Similarly,

Sebelius said nothing to abrogate the holdings of this court in Smith II and

Maxwell II, which closely followed the rationale of Raich. Indeed, Maxwell

II found very little to distinguish Maxwell’s claim from that of Raich. 

Maxwell II, 446 F.3d at 1216.

749 F.3d at 1331-32 (footnote omitted).

Although Barger argues – contra Parton – that Sebelius overruled Raich v. Gonzales,

545 U.S. 1 (2005), “the case merely distinguishes Raich, which held that Congress has the

power to enact comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market for marijuana,

even when the specific transactions are wholly intrastate, because marijuana is a ‘fungible

commodity.’ The same can be said of child pornography.” Cobb v. United States, 2014 WL

5

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6893085, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 2014). Other circuit courts have similarly determined that

Sebelius did nothing to restrict Congress’s power to control the intrastate manufacture and

possession of child pornography. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 370-71 (6th

Cir. 2013); United States v. Boyle, 700 F.3d 1138, 1146 (8 Cir. 2012). And other circuits th

have also rejected arguments that Sebelius eroded prior precedent regarding Congress’s

power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities that

have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Robbins, 729

F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting an argument that Sebelius eroded prior precedent

sustaining the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

requiring the defendant to update his registration after traveling in interstate commerce;

United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 57-59 (1 Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that st

Sebelius eroded prior precedent sustaining the constitutionality of the statute criminalizing

possession by a convicted felon of a firearmthat previously traveled in interstate commerce);

United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5 Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. th

Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 641 & n.5 (9 Cir. 2012) (stating that Sebelius did nothing to abrogate th

prior precedent upholding the constitutionality of a ban on possession of machine guns even

though that ban included homemade machine guns that had not traveled in interstate

commerce). 

Because the rationale in Sebelius has no application to Barger’s case, and in light of

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Parton, this court finds that Barger’s claim

of actual innocence is without merit. The holding in Sebelius did not change the law

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regarding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the manufacture and

possession of child pornography. Accordingly, Barger’s § 2255 motion is time-barred under

the one-year period of limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).2

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion be denied and this case dismissed with prejudice, as the § 2255 motion

was not filed within the controlling federal limitation period, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before March 4, 2015. A partymust specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation

to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be

considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal

factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. th

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

th

661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc). th

Barger makes no attempt to argue that the limitation period in his case is governed by any 2

provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2)-(4) or that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. The burden

of establishing entitlement to equitable tolling rests with the petitioner. Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297

F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). th

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DONE, this 18 day of February, 2015. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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