Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01332/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01332-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON LATRELL THOMAS,

Plaintiff, CV F 06 1332 LJO WMW PC

vs. ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO 

 FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

D. SHEPPARD-BROOKS, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the April 6, 2007, second amended complaint. Plaintiff, an

inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at CSP

Corcoran, brings this civil rights action against defendant correctional officials employed by the

Department of Corrections at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff sets forth claims of deliberate

indifference to his safety and retalitaion for Plaintiff’s exercise of his right to file prison

grievances. Plaintiff names the following individual defendants: Roderick Hickman, Director of

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at the time of the events at issue in

this lawsuit; Derral Adams, Warden of CSP Corcoran; D. Sheppard-Brooks, Associate Warden at

CSP Corcoran; M. L. Gonzales, a Correctional Counselor at CSP Corcoran; I. Garza, a

Case 1:06-cv-01332-JLT Document 18 Filed 03/13/08 Page 1 of 6
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Correctional Counselor at CSP Corcoran; M. Wilber, a Correctional Officer at CSP Corcoran;

Officers James; Officer Price; Officer Frescua; Officer M. Castro; Officer B.V. Kjord.

The Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be]

inflicted.” “An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived inmates of humane

conditions of confinement must meet two requirements, one objective and the other subjective.”

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9 Cir.) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065, (1995). The th

objective requirement is met if the prison official’s acts or omissions deprived a prisoner of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994)). To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show more than mere inadvertence

or negligence. Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, & n. 4; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Farmer court

concluded that “subjective recklesness as used in the criminal law is a familiar and workable

standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” and adopted this as

the test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40.

On September 14, 2005, while housed at Pelican Bay State Prison, Plaintiff was found

guilty of two incidents of indecent exposure, a prison rules violation. As a result, an “R” suffix

was attached to Plaintiff’s file, designating him a sex offender. Other than the prison rules

violation, Plaintiff was never charged with a crime. Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance, seeking

to have the R suffix removed. Plaintiff’s concern was the status of sex offenders in the prison

system, and the danger that such a classification would subject him to. The grievance was

denied. On April 14, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to Corcoran.

Plaintiff appeared at a classification hearing on April 27, 2006. At that hearing, Plaintiff

advised Defendant Sheppard-Brooks of his safety concerns. Plaintiff sent numerous requests to

Defendant Garza regarding the R suffix. Plaintiff filed another grievance on May 5, 2006,

“claiming that his safety was at risk.” Defendant Gonzales responded to the grievance on June

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14, 2006. Gonzales denied the request.

On July 29, 2006, Plaintiff’s cellmate, inmate Sharihore, discovered the suffix on

Plaintiff’s paperwork. Plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate. During the 5:00 p.m. food tray

pick up, Plaintiff and his cellmate “clearly informed Defendant M. Wilber of the altercation and

specifically told Wilber that do to his crip gang code Thomas could no longer be housed with

Sharihorne.” Wilber left Plaintiff and Sharihorne “to fight it out,” after he had informed

Defendant James. Plaintiff received back, neck and head injuries. Approximately 30 minutes

after Wilber left, “Thomas was placed in the headlock, punched in the head areas and rammed

forcefully back first into the steel sink and tolet as well as the walls. Only then that the

Defendant M. Wilber and other security officers responded.

On August 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance concerning deliberate indifference

on the part of Defendants Wilber, Garza and Gonzales. On August 8, 2006, Plaintiff’s appeal

was partially granted. On October 5, 2006, the R suffix was removed. Prior to the removal,

Defendant Gonzales placed Plaintiff’s request for interview into the institutional mail where

other inmates could see the R suffix.

Regarding Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to his safety, the second amended

complaint states a claim for relief as to Defendants Sheppard-Brooks, Wilber, James and

Gonzales.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Price, Frescura, Wilber and Carter starved Black inmates

in retaliation for filing grievances. Plaintiff alleges that they would “provoke” inmates into

acting out so they coul “beat and drag” them. Plaintiff alleges conduct on the part of Defendants

that relates to other inmates. 

 At the end of October 2006, Wilber approached Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff why he filed

an inmate grievance. On November 1, 2006, Defendant Vikjord handed Plaintiff an envelope

with a stamp indicating that the mail was returned. The letter had the word “deceased” stamped

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on it. Plaintiff alleges that for months, “the prison” refused to process the complaint. Plaintiff

wrote to Defendant Adams and the Internal Affairs Office. 

On November 17, 2006, Defendant Vikjord threatened to file a false rules violation report

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of inmate grievances. Plaintiff again wrote to the Warden. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vikjord carried out his threat, and issued a CDC 128A, charging

Plaintiff with refusing an order to uncover his cell light. 

On November 20, 2006, Defendant Frescua searched Plaintiff’s cell and confiscated a

blanket. Frescura told Plaintiff that he searched the cell in retaliation for filing inmate

grievances. 

Plaintiff sets forth further allegations of allegedly retaliatory conduct against other

inmates for filing inmate grievances. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, though Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that the conduct at issue was taken in

retaliation for the filing of inmate grievances, there are no facts alleged indicating that Plaintiff’s

exercise of his First Amendment right was actually chilled. Plaintiff continued to file inmate

grievances.

Further, Plaintiff refers to other inmate plaintiffs, and alleges retaliation on behalf of other

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inmates. Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, may not file claims on behalf of other inmates. The Court

will not address Plaintiff’s allegations of conduct related to other inmates. 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978).

As to the retaliation claim, the court finds the allegations in plaintiff's complaint vague

and conclusory. The court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain

statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible

pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

support plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file

an amended complaint.

As to Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to his safety, the second amended

complaint states a claim for relief as to Defendants Sheppard-Brooks, Wilber, James and

Gonzales. The court will grant Plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint. Should Plaintiff

fail to do so, this action will proceed on the second amended complaint against Defendants

Sheppard-Brooks, Wilber, James and Gonzales on the claim of deliberate indifference. The

remaining claims will be dismissed.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

third amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "Third Amended Complaint." 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

j14hj0 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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