Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01690/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01690-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STACY THRASHER, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv1690-LAB (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

vs. DISMISS

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

In her complaint, Plaintiff Stacy Thrasher brings claims arising from a search of her

home and an alleged campaign of harassment by police that followed it. She brings claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First and Fourth Amendment violations, as well as supplemental

state-law claims. Thrasher is proceeding in forma pauperis. She was initially represented by

counsel, but her attorney was granted leave to withdraw and she is now proceeding pro se.

Defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, and failure to state a claim against the County of San Diego.

Because Thrasher is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to dismiss her

complaint, sua sponte, to the extent it fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Thrasher argues that the Court’s screening order constitutes law of the case, so dismissal

for failure to state a claim is unavailable at this point. But a required screening order is

cumulative of, not a substitute for, any subsequent motion to dismiss. See Teahan v.

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Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D.Cal. 2007). The statutory language emphasizes

this; it requires the Court to dismiss the case “at any time” if the Court determines that the

complaint fails to state a claim. See § 1915(e)(2).

When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts all

allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National League of

Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A claim may be

dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if the running of the statute of limitations, or another

defense (such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies) is apparent on the face of a

complaint. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th

Cir. 2010).

Thrasher’s complaint alleges that her son Dalton, who lived with her, was on probation

for petty theft, and on June 28, 2010 was again arrested for petty theft. Two of the

Defendants, Deputies Martinez and Murphy, arrested him. On July 6, 2010, while Thrasher

was at work. deputies including Martinez and Murphy executed a warrantless probation

search on Thrasher’s home, which lasted 40 minutes. The search was based on a tip they

had received. Thrasher says they never searched the “garage or any other common sense

place on Plaintiff’s property” for some stolen property, but never says whether she knew

what the property was. Thrasher alleges two of her other sons and a family friend were

threatened by the officers. A lawyer acting on her behalf inquired into the search at the time,

and told officers they had violated the scope of the probation search and should leave.

Documentation of Thrasher’s and her lawyer’s correspondence is attached to the complaint. 

She claims this amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure, violating her Fourth

Amendment rights. 

She alleges sheriff’s officers also engaged in a campaign of harassment after her

lawyer sent them a letter asking for records documenting why they searched the house.

/ / /

/ / /

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 Thrasher lives in a rural area with dirt roads that she says are private. The alleged 1

harassment consisted of police driving past her house, parking or stopping near her house,

and on a few occasions shining spotlights on it at night as they drove past. Thrasher’s

correspondence documents her experiences with law enforcement officers and vehicles in

the month after the search. (Docket no. 1-1 at 8–10.) 

Defendants point out that the search took place on July 6, 2010 and Thrasher filed

suit July 7, 2012, one day past the two-year statute of limitations. Thrasher does not dispute 2

that the statute of limitations for her claims is two years, but argues that the period of

harassment makes the wrong done to her a continuing violation, and argues her claim did

not accrue until August 4, when the alleged harassment apparently ended.

Whatever the merits of Thrasher’s state-law claims, it is clear her federal cause of

action accrued on July 6, 2010, and not later. Accrual of causes of action under § 1983 is

determined by federal law, and the accrual date is the date on which a plaintiff can file suit

and obtain relief. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. California law, which the Court applies to

determine the accrual date of Thrasher’s supplemental claims, is similar; a cause of action

accrues on the date a plaintiff knew or had reason to know she has been injured. See K.J.

v. Arcadia Unified School Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4 1229, 1236 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2009). As th

soon as Thrasher found out about the search, she “ha[d] reason to know of the injury that

is the basis of [her] action.” See RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058

(9 Cir. 2002). Thus, under either federal law or state law, Thrasher’s cause of action based th

 Thrasher does not allege she alone owns the roads, only that they are private. See 1

United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 542 (9 Cir. 1984) (homeowner had no reasonable th

expectation of privacy in private road to which five other homeowners also had access). But

even assuming she could allege the roads were hers alone, it would not change the outcome

here because the roads are within the “open fields” doctrine, discussed below.

 The Court looks to state laws governing statutes of limitations and the possibility of 2

equitable tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007). Section 335.1 of the California

Code of Civil Procedure, whose application Thrasher does not challenge, provides that

actions must be filed within two years of the accrual of a cause of action. California law

provides that the statute of limitations for commencement of actions against public entities

is mandatory and strictly construed. See Ard v. County of Contra Costa, 93 Cal. App. 4 339, th

346 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2001); Loehr v. Ventura Cty Comm. Coll. Dist., 147 Cal. Ap. 3d 1071,

1084 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1983). Thrasher, who was represented by counsel from the start of

the running of the limitations period, identifies no basis for equitable tolling.

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on the search accrued on July 6, 2010 and she had two years after that date, i.e., July 6,

2012, to file suit. The later events she alleges, while possibly related, do not amount to an 3

injury for which § 1983 or state law provides any redress. 

This case is analogous to DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636 (9 Cir. 2000). th

There, the plaintiff alleged an initial First Amendment violation, followed by what she called

a “campaign of harassment and intimidation.” Id. at 644–45. The panel determined that the

plaintiff’s “allegations may show a long-standing state of animosity and hostility, marked by

incidents of personal conflict between her and other City officials, but they do not establish

a series of related wrongful acts.” Id. In other words, a series of related hostile acts does not 

give rise to a “continuing wrong,” unless the related acts themselves are also wrongful; the

mere fact that they are related is not enough.

Here, Thrasher has alleged twenty-two contacts with law enforcement officers in the

month following the search. Three of those involved unidentified sheriff’s officials merely

driving past her house. Four involved unidentified sheriff’s officials driving past and shining

a spotlight on her house. Three involved them temporarily pulling into her driveway, and

seven involved them parking on roads nearby. Two involved unidentified sheriff’s officials

following a different adult son, Roah, to or from home, and one involved arrests of other

people at a raucous party where Roah was present, and where sheriff’s deputies berated

him for not cooperating and called him a drug dealer. An additional incident involved

Thrasher finding a California Highway Patrol officer parked in her driveway, who said he was

investigating an accident. The final incident involved Thrasher complaining to and

disagreeing with a sheriff’s department sergeant about her claim. The details Thrasher has

alleged shows the sergeant was requesting documents related to her claim, and Thrasher

thought he should not have been investigating it or calling her. Discounting the incident not

 The usual method of calculating a two-year limitations period under California law 3

is to begin on the day the claim accrued and continue until the same date two years hence. 

See, e.g., Low v. City of Sacramento, 2011 WL 2935858 at *7 (E.D.Cal., July 18, 2011)

(claim for false imprisonment began to run on January 12, 2008, the date the plaintiff was

released, and expired on January 12, 2010). Cf. Bullard v. Calif. State Automobile Ass’n, 129

Cal. App. 4 211, 217–18 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2005) (where automobile accident occurred on th

June 16, 2002, one-year limitations period expired on June 16, 2003).

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involving the sheriff’s department and the quarrel over documents, Thrasher has identified

twenty instances of some kind of contact with sheriff’s department officers.

Thrasher hasn’t alleged what level of patrol by sheriff’s officers is normal in her area,

but for purposes of analyzing the complaint, the Court will assume it is significantly lower

than twenty occasions per month. Nor has she alleged facts showing that the heightened

surveillance was intended to intimidate her, and was not motivated by something else such

as the fact that two of her sons were suspected of theft and drug dealing. See Lacey v.

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (retaliation claim depends

on showing that desire to chill plaintiff’s speech was a but-for cause of the allegedly unlawful

conduct). And, while Defendants correctly point out Thrasher never alleged who conducted

the various acts of surveillance, the Court will assume, arguendo, for purposes of analysis

it was some kind of concerted effort among Defendants. Even making these assumptions 

in Thrasher’s favor, the fact remains that the alleged campaign of harassment does not

amount to any actionable wrong. 

To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, Thrasher must

allege facts showing that Defendants engaged in conduct that “would chill or silence a

person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Lacey, 693 F.3d at 916.

Law enforcement officials commonly engage in actions like those alleged here in the course

of patrolling and carrying out their other duties, and no threats or coercion are ordinarily

intended or implied. Increasing the frequency of such actions to the degree alleged in this

case would not have the effect of coercing or intimidating a person of reasonable firmness.

Thrasher also cannot state a claim for any Fourth Amendment violation arising from

any of the later alleged actions. The surveillance of or intrusions onto Thrasher’s property

are all covered by the “open fields” doctrine. They are far less intrusive than the searches

that the Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) and Oliver v. United

States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) held were covered by that doctrine.

Because the alleged harassment campaign is not actionable, it cannot count as part

of a continuing wrong so as to render her § 1983 claims timely.

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With regard to the supplemental state-law claims, Defendants argue Thrasher failed

to file a timely government claim as required by Cal. Govt. Code §§ 911.2(a) and 945.4. The

date the claim was filed is alleged in the complaint, so this defense may properly be raised

in a motion to dismiss. See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 969. Compliance with these

requirements is mandatory. See Loehr, 147 Cal. Ap. 3d at 1084 (citing Cal. Govt Code

§ 911.2). Thrasher alleges she filed her complaint with the Citizen’s Law Enforcement

Review Board (“CLERB”), but Defendants cite Cal. Govt. Code § 915(a) for the principle that

the complaint must be filed with the county clerk, not a citizen’s review board. A complaint

must also contain the elements required under Cal. Govt. Code § 910, and Defendants point

out Thrasher never alleged that. Defendants also argue the complaint was due within six

months, i.e., January 6, 2011, and she first filed her CLERB complaint on January 25, 2011. 

Thrasher again relies on the continuing violation doctrine to allege her complaint was timely

filed.

Thrasher’s claims for violations of the Unruh/Banes Civil Rights Act, for invasion of

privacy, and for trespass and nuisance, all arise out of the search itself. The only claims

based on the later actions is her tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

for negligence based on vague allegations of mental anguish and physical harm. These

claims fail, because Defendants had no duty to avoid driving past, parking near, looking at,

or occasionally shining lights on Thrasher’s house. Moreover, the conduct described, while

potentially annoying, is not outrageous. See Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868,

903 (1991) (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982) (“Conduct

to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community.”) They therefore are not a part of any “continuing wrong” for purposes

of compliance with exhaustion requirements. 

Because there was no actionable campaign of harassment, Thrasher cannot rely on

it as part of a continuing wrong to extend the statute of limitations for her state claims, or the

time by which her government claim was due. Thrasher apparently didn’t comply with the

mandatory exhaustion requirements, and the attempt she made to comply with them was

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late. Her state law claims must therefore be dismissed. And, like the federal claims, they are

time-barred and cannot be saved by treating later actions as a continuing wrong.

The Court also notes that even if Thrasher’s underlying Fourth Amendment claim

stemming from the search of her house were not time-barred, it would be dismissed on the

merits That search was a probation search, authorized because Thrasher’s son Dalton, a

resident in her house, had consented to it as a condition of his probation. Defendants

therefore were authorized to search all areas under his control, including areas he had joint

or common access to. See generally People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668 (1999) (discussing

authorization for and scope of probation searches, in light of Supreme Court precedent and

state law). 

Under California law, the fact that Thrasher owned and lived in the house her son

Dalton, the probationer, lived in does not authorize her to withhold consent to a search of

areas subject to his control. See People v. Robles, 23 Cal.4th 789, 798 (2000). She only

retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas to her own exclusive access or control,

and her reasonable expectation depends on officers having no reasonable basis for

believing Dalton had authority or control over those areas. See id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990) and Woods, 21 Cal.4th at 682.)

There is no authority for the proposition Thrasher advances, that Dalton no longer

lived there because he had been arrested and was in jail. Temporary absence from a home

does not mean it is no longer the probationer’s residence. See People v. Alvitre, 2011 WL

5119005 at *2–3, *7 (Cal. App. 6 Dist., Oct. 27, 2011) (reciting and affirming trial court’s

determination that, although probationer may have been temporarily absent from his usual

abode while participating in a drug rehabilitation program, the residence was still subject to

probation search). The pleadings show that the sheriff’s deputies were not looking for Dalton

himself, but rather were looking for stolen property he may have brought into the house

before being arrested, which would have been evidence of a probation violation.

/ / /

/ / /

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The only area potentially under Thrasher’s exclusive control was her bedroom. But 4

there is no allegation her son did not also have access to that room or, more importantly, that

officers had reason to know that. Even if it turned out later that they were wrong about who

had access to Thrasher’s bedroom, or if they made a reasonable mistake about the law, they

would be entitled to qualified immunity. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)) (“The qualified immunity standard ‘gives

ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.’”)

Defendants argue that Thrasher has not identified a basis, either under federal or

state law, for holding the County of San Diego liable. This argument appears to be correct,

and Thrasher’s opposition to the motion to dismiss does not respond to or dispute it.

For the reasons set forth above, Thrasher’s § 1983 claim based on alleged Fourth

Amendment violations is DISMISSED as time-barred. Her § 1983 claim based on retaliation

in violation of the First Amendment is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, and it is clear

she could not successfully amend. Her supplemental claims are also time-barred and subject

to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, except that her claims for

negligence and for intentional infliction of emotional distress are dismissed for failure to state

a claim. Because it is clear Thrasher cannot successfully amend, this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 28, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

 Exhibit B to the Complaint is Thrasher’s own account, identifying some areas of the 4

house and items that had been searched. Some of these include the belongings of

Thrasher’s other son, Roah, but Thrasher has no standing to complain about searches of

other people’s belongings. Thrasher might have standing to object to a search of Roah’s

bedroom. See United States v. $40,955.00, 554 F.3d 752, 757 (9 Cir. 2009) (parents who th

owned and occupied a family had standing to object to a search of their son’s bedroom). But

there is no indication Dalton didn’t have joint access to that room, or that officers had reason

to know he didn’t.

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