Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01903/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01903-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIAN LING,

Plaintiff,

v.

DURAVENT; DURAVENT, INC.; and 

M&M DURAVENT, INC.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this action, Plaintiff Julian Ling (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief from Defendants 

Duravent, Inc. and M&M Duravent, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the 

California Labor Code and California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§§ 17200 et seq. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a Class 

Action Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Solano. On 

September 19, 2019, Defendants removed Plaintiff’s case to federal court pursuant to 

the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). ECF No. 1. Presently 

before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. ECF No. 6. For the reasons set forth 

below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

1

///

1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).

Case 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC Document 13 Filed 03/17/20 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff brings the present action on behalf of himself and other current and 

former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants 

within California at any time during the period from four years preceding the filing of this 

Complaint to final judgment (“Relevant Time Period”) and who reside in California. 

Compl., ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 15. Defendants employed Plaintiff in the County of Solano as an 

hourly-paid, non-exempt employee from approximately July 2013 to October 2015, and 

from approximately March 2016 to September 2018. Id. ¶ 27. Defendants directly hired 

and paid wages and benefits to Plaintiff and other class members. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff and 

other class members worked over eight hours a day and/or forty hours a week during

their employment with Defendants.2 Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged 

in a pattern and practice of wage abuse against putative class members, which involved, 

among other things, failing to pay them, during employment or upon termination, for all 

regular and/or overtime wages earned and for missed meal periods and rest breaks in 

violation of California law. Id. ¶ 34.

When a case “of which the district courts of the United States have original

jurisdiction” is initially brought in state court, the defendant may remove it to federal court 

“embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There are 

two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district court 

has federal question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 

or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. A district court has diversity jurisdiction

“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is 

between citizens of different states, or citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 

foreign state . . . .” Id. § 1332(a)(1)–(2).

A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal district court if 

the district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The 

2 Defendants state their full-time or temporary employees are scheduled to work ten hours per day 

at four days per week. Hamilton Decl., ECF No. 10-1, ¶ 4.

Case 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC Document 13 Filed 03/17/20 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 

Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Williams v. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts “strictly construe the 

removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 

(9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). “[I]f there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal in the first instance,” the motion for remand must be granted. Id. Therefore, “[i]f 

at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded” to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

CAFA gives federal district courts original jurisdiction in any civil action where: 

(1) “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of 

interest and costs,” (2) the action is pleaded as a class action involving more than 100 

putative class members, and (3) “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 

State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). It also provides that “the 

claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the 

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.” Id. § 1332(d)(6). 

The only question for this Court to resolve with the instant Motion is whether the 

amount in controversy in this action exceeds $5,000,000 as required for federal court 

jurisdiction under CAFA. “A defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible 

allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart 

Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). When a plaintiff 

challenges the amount in controversy under CAFA, the Ninth Circuit requires the 

defendant opposing remand to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the amount in controversy will likely exceed $5,000,000. Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, 

Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). Where damages are not stated in the 

complaint or, “in the defendant’s view are understated,” the defendant must submit 

competent, summary judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at 

///

///

Case 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC Document 13 Filed 03/17/20 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the time of removal in order to carry its burden.3 Id. Although a defendant may rely on 

good-faith calculations to satisfy its burden, those calculations must not be based on 

unreasonable or speculative assumptions. Ellis v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., No. SACV 10-

01141, 2011 WL 499390, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011); Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197.

Defendants’ calculations here are far too conjectural to meet their burden of 

proving that the amount in controversy in this action exceeds $5,000,000.

4

 First, 

Defendants originally estimated that the size of the non-exempt, purported class 

exceeds 350 people over the Relevant Time Period with average hourly wages 

exceeding $16.50 per hour.5 Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, at 6. However, Defendants 

do not specify how many employees were permanent or temporary, or how many weeks 

each employee worked for Defendants.

Next, Plaintiffs take issue with Defendants’ assumed violation rate, i.e., that each 

class member experienced one meal and rest period violation per workweek. Pl.’s Mot. 

Remand, ECF No. 6, at 7–8. Conversely, Defendants argue that the assumed rate is in 

fact conservative based on Plaintiff’s allegations as laid out in the Complaint. Defs.’ 

Opp., ECF No. 10, at 3–4. Courts have found that such an assumption is too 

speculative when unsupported by any evidence. See Armstrong v. Ruan Transp. Corp.,

EDCV 16-1143-VAP (SPx), 2016 WL 6267931, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (finding 

one meal and rest period violation per workweek was not a “conservative estimate” when 

///

3 Defendants suggest that Plaintiff was required to submit evidence showing that the amount in 

controversy falls below $5,000,000. Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 10, at 3. However, the burden is on Defendants 

to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. See

Contreras v. J.R. Simplot Co., No. 2:17-cv-00585-KJM-EFB, 2017 WL 4457228, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 

2017) (“Because plaintiff challenges defendant’s estimate, defendant bears the burden to establish 

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . [T]he absence of plaintiffs’ rebuttal evidence does 

not change that requirement.”).

4 Defendants assert the amount in controversy is $12,514,549.90: $2,073,736.70 for meal and 

rest period violations; $3,178,320.00 for waiting time penalties; $1,943,483.18 for overtime compensation; 

$2,100,900.00 for minimum wage penalties; and $3,218,109.97 for attorneys’ fees. See Hamilton Decl., 

ECF No. 10-1.

5 Defendants later claim the purported class is 894 people and the average hourly wage is $13.94. 

Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 10, at 5.

Case 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC Document 13 Filed 03/17/20 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

defendant’s declaration set forth only the number of class members, average number of 

workdays and hours, and frequency wage statements were issued).

Here, Defendants’ violation rate is invalid because Defendants provide no 

reasonable ground for assuming the entire putative class experienced one meal period 

or rest period violation per week, especially given the fact that the Complaint does not 

support any such claims. See Compl., ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 36–38. Defendants argue their 

estimate was “conservative” because California courts have “assumed a 100% violation 

rate in calculating the amount in controversy when the complaint does not allege a more 

precise calculation.” Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 10, at 4 (citing Coleman v. Estes Express 

Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149–50 (C.D. Cal. 2010)). However, the Ninth 

Circuit has since held that an unsupported assumption of a 100 percent violation rate is 

unreasonable. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.

The only piece of summary judgment-type evidence proffered by Defendants in 

support of its amount in controversy calculation is the Declaration of Sherry Hamilton, 

Defendants’ Human Resources Manager. Hamilton Decl., ECF 10-1. The Hamilton 

Declaration states that 894 employees worked at the facilities from August 14, 2015, to 

August 14, 2019, provides the regular rates of pay for each employee, and lists each 

employee’s hire date. Ex. A, Hamilton Decl., ECF 10-1. However, Hamilton ignored the 

hire date of each employee in her meal and rest period calculations and instead 

assumed that all putative class members worked every week during the entire Relevant 

Time Period. Hamilton Decl., ECF 10-1, ¶ 6; see Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199 (“[A] damages 

assessment may require a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions. When that is 

so, those assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground 

underlying them.”). 

Further, the calculations for waiting time penalties assume the maximum penalty of 

ten hours per day for thirty days, but Defendants do not provide the necessary concrete 

evidence as to why the maximum penalty should apply to each class member. Hamilton 

Decl., ECF No. 10-1, ¶ 7. Hamilton next assumes thirty minutes of overtime compensation

Case 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC Document 13 Filed 03/17/20 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

and applies it to all the putative class members who worked during the Relevant Time 

Period without considering the employee’s hire date or providing any other rationale.

Id. ¶ 8. Additionally, the calculations for the minimum wage penalties assume ten 

violations per putative class member without providing any rationale for the assumption.

Id. ¶ 9. Finally, Defendants’ attorney’s fee calculations are unsubstantiated because the 

projected fees were based on the presumptive calculations described above. Id. ¶ 10.

Defendants ultimately failed to provide any evidence regarding the mentioned 

assumptions and the calculations described in the Hamilton Declaration are 

unnecessarily speculative. Defendants’ failure to submit competent evidence is 

particularly inexcusable given that it has easy and unlimited access to the employee 

records and other documents which would show whether its figures have any basis in 

fact.

6

In sum, Defendants have failed to establish to a legal certainty that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Accordingly, CAFA does not provide a proper basis 

for subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is therefore GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 6, is 

GRANTED.

7

 The case is hereby remanded to the Superior Court of the State of 

California, County of Solano. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2020

6 Defendants request “Plaintiff’s Motion be continued in order to conduct discovery specific to the 

amount in controversy.” Defs.’ Opp., ECF No. 10, at 9. The Court declines to exercise its discretion to 

request additional discovery regarding the amount in controversy given that Defendants already had

access to the relevant records and documents.

7 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, is DENIED as moot.

Case 2:19-cv-01903-MCE-AC Document 13 Filed 03/17/20 Page 6 of 6