Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01260/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01260-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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1 • FILED 

Umred Stat<:•~ C!>urr of Appeals 

Tenth Ci:-cuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

PAUL F. RATHER and RANDY s. 

KAILEY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

ROYS. ROMER, Governor; DUANE L. 

WOODARD, Attorney General; 

FRANK GUNTER; JOHN ENRIGHT; 

RODNEY COZZETTO; CARLOS BACA; 

VELMA M. GARNER; DAVID SANCHEZ; 

and ROBERT N. SHOEMAKER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-1260 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 90-B-920) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Paul F. Rather and Randy s. Kailey, inmates at Arkansas 

Valley Correctional Facility, filed a prose action pursuant to 42 

u.s.c. S 1983 on behalf of themselves and others similarly 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1260 Document: 010110031879 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 1 
situated against members of the Colorado State Board of Parole and 

various other state officials. The central allegation of the 

complaint relates to an opinion issued by the Colorado Attorney 

General which concludes that sex offenders can be excepted from 

the general parole practices under Colorado state law. The 

plaintiffs, who have been convicted of sex offenses, contend that 

such an exception violates their constitutionally protected 

liberty interest in a mandatory parole date under Colorado law. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The United States 

Magistrate Judge to whom the case was referred recommended that 

the motion be granted on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing since neither was eligible for parole under any interpretation 

of Colorado law, that their- claims for S 1983 damages were factually unsupported, and that all defendants were immune from 

damages. Rather and Kailey filed objections to the Magistrate's 

recommendation, asserting that their complaint did not seek 

damages. They also filed a motion for leave to amend their 

complaint, adding a new plaintiff, one Tom Luther, to cure the 

standing defect identified by the magistrate on the grounds that 

Luther, who is also a convicted sex offender, was being held 

beyond the parole date allegedly applicable to those convicted of 

other crimes. The district court denied the motion for leave to 

file the amended complaint and granted the motion to dismiss. We 

affirm. 

This action is defective for a variety of reasons. The 

district court correctly concluded that neither Rather nor Kailey 

have standing since neither was eligible for parole under any 

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'4 

interpretation of Colorado law at the time they filed the 

complaint. Thus, there .is no cognizable injury upon which a 

complaint could be based. 

Perhaps more to the point, at its core, the action asserted 

here is in reality one for habeas corpus relief. Thus, even if 

the district court abused its discretion (and we do not believe 

that it did) in denying leave to amend the complaint to add Tom 

Luther as a plaintiff, the complaint, which seeks relief under 

S 1983, would still be defective. The essence of Luther's 

complaint would be that he is illegally confined. "[W]hen a state 

prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical 

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he 

is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that 

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." 

Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Layton v. 

Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984); Henderson v. 

Secretary of Corrections, 518 F.2d 694, 695 (10th Cir. 1975); 

Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1975). Because 

"Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate 

remedy •.• that specific determination must override the general 

terms of S 1983." Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 490. 

A habeas corpus petitioner must exhaust available state 

remedies prior to seeking relief in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. 

S 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). The 

exhaustion requirement serves as a way for the federal courts to 

accommodate the states and give their courts an initial opportunity to correct violations of prisoners' federal rights, thus 

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• 

enhancing the integrity of both court systems. Id. at 518. 

Neither Luther nor the named plaintiffs have satisfied the exhaustion requirement. "It would wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent to hold that .•. [plaintiffs] .•• could evade 

this [exhaustion] requirement by the simple expedient of putting a 

different label on their pleadings." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 

U.S. at 489-90. 

Finally, even were we to reach the merits of the complaint in 

this case, the cause of action would fail. Although plaintiffs 

have alleged a variety of constitutional violations, only their 

argument for a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a 

mandatory parole date goes beyond bare and insufficient assertion. 

The Supreme Court has concluded that where the grant or denial of 

parole is a purely discretionary matter within the plain meaning 

of the statutes, no right to a mandatory parole date exists. And, 

where there is no right to a mandatory parole date, a protected 

liberty interest cannot be found. Jago v. Vancuren, 454 U.S. 14, 

20-21 (1981) (per curiam). Cf. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 

U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 

Correctional Complex, 442 u.s. 1 (1979). 

A decision on the merits would turn, then, on whether the 

statutes in question do indeed guarantee a mandatory parole date, 

as plaintiffs allege. The Colorado Supreme Court has recently 

construed the precise statutory language comprising the basis of 

plaintiffs' complaint. The court concluded that "under the plain 

language of these sections, ... the Parole Board has discretion 

to deny or to grant parole to all persons sentenced for a sex 

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., 

offense as defined by section 16-13-202(5), even though they were 

not sentenced pursuant t .o the Sex Of fenders Act. " Thiret v. 

Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 807 (Colo. 1990). 

The Colorado court's reading of the statutes is unambiguous, 

leading to a plain conclusion. Absent any statutory guarantee of 

a mandatory parole date, we would not infer a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest. Plaintiffs' cause of action under 42 

u.s.c. S 1983 has no other grounds on which to stand and must 

fail. In referring to Thiret we do not mean to imply that exhaustion of remedies in state court is a futile exercise. Thiret did 

not address federal or state constitutional challenges. Cf. Foote 

v. Utah Board of Pardons, No. 900132, slip. op. at 1 (Utah Mar. 

14, 1991) (reaching the state constitutional issue). 

For the reasons stated above, the complaint was properly 

dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be 

granted. The decision of the district court is accordingly 

AFFIRMED. Appellants' motion for sanctions is denied. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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