Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05391/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05391-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DriveTime Sales and Finance Company LLC, 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Drivetime Incorporated,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-05391-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation for entry of a protective order. 

(Doc. 29). The parties allege that discovery “may” contain, “confidential data, proprietary 

or nonpublic commercial information, information involving privacy interests, and other 

commercially and/or competitively sensitive information of a nonpublic nature, or received 

on a confidential basis.” (Doc. 29 at 1). The parties therefore seek to mark confidential, 

“confidential, proprietary, technical, development, marketing, business and financial 

information.” (Doc. 29-1 at 1).

The Court finds that the parties have failed to show good cause for the need for a 

protective order in this case. Specifically, global protective orders are not appropriate. See 

AGA Shareholders, LLC v. CSK Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 

2007). Rule 26(c) requires a party seeking a protective order to show good cause for 

issuance of such an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule 

26(c), ‘the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or 

harm will result if no protective order is granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL 

Case 2:19-cv-05391-JAT Document 30 Filed 01/28/20 Page 1 of 2
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4225450, at *1 (emphasis added) (quoting Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 

(9th Cir. 2002)). The party seeking protection “must make a ‘particularized showing of 

good cause with respect to [each] individual document.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 

San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). Thus, 

“[t]he burden is on the party requesting a protective order to demonstrate that (1) the 

material in question is a trade secret or other confidential information within the scope of 

Rule 26(c), and (2) disclosure would cause an identifiable, significant harm.” Foltz v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Deford v. Schmid 

Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md. 1987)).

Here, the proposed protective order is both too broad and too generalized to meet 

the Ninth Circuit’s test for when protective orders are appropriate. Additionally, the parties 

seek to mark confidential information “received on a confidential basis.” This Court will 

not authorize the parties to breach confidential agreements with third parties. For the 

foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the stipulation for entry of a protective order (Doc. 29) is 

denied, without prejudice.

Dated this 28th day of January, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-05391-JAT Document 30 Filed 01/28/20 Page 2 of 2