Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00728/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00728-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0207 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TISHA CREEL, on behalf of )

herself and others )

similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:09cv728-MHT

) (WO)

TUESDAY MORNING, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tisha Creel brings this action under the

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, on

behalf of herself and others similarly situated, claiming

that defendant Tuesday Morning, Inc. violated the FLSA by

failing to pay her overtime wages. The jurisdiction of

the court is properly invoked pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This matter is now before

the court on Creel’s motion to conditionally certify a

national collective action and facilitate class notice

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the reasons that

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follow, the court will deny Creel’s motion, albeit

without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Creel is a former employee of Tuesday Morning, a

retailer that sells brand name merchandise at discounted

prices at 841 stores in 46 states. Creel alleges that

Tuesday Morning, as a matter of company policy, failed to

pay her and other similarly situated “store managers”

overtime compensation, in violation of 29 U.S.C.

§ 207(a), despite the fact that they routinely worked

over 40 hours a week for a weekly salary. Creel asserts

that she was routinely required to work 50-60 hours a

week at a Tuesday Morning store in Alabama. 

Creel contends that Tuesday Morning’s company policy

misclassifies store managers under the executive

exemption of the FLSA. She argues that she should have

been treated as a non-exempt employee and paid overtime

because most of her job duties were non-managerial.

Creel has provided deposition testimony from Judy Miller,

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the regional manager of 15 Tuesday Morning locations in

Georgia and Alabama. Miller’s testimony indicates that

store managers perform a range of manual labor and nonmanagerial tasks at Tuesday Morning stores. The

testimony also indicated that store managers have limited

discretion to change store hours, contract with service

vendors, purchase supplies, choose merchandise sold, and

hire, promote or terminate staff. Miller also testified

that Tuesday Morning uses one training manual to outline

policies and procedures for store managers. Creel offers

this testimony as evidence that store managers

principally engage in non-managerial tasks and that their

job duties are dictated by a uniform-company policy. 

Creel has also submitted four affidavits from current

or former employees who held or hold manager positions at

Tuesday Morning stores in Alabama and other States:

Brandon Johnson (Alabama), Dwan Benn (Alabama), Dawn Rush

(Florida), Linda Trombello (Illinois). All four

declarants state that they “routinely worked in excess of

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forty ... hours per week” and “did not receive overtime

compensation.” 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

As stated, Creel asserts that Tuesday Morning

violated the FLSA, as codified at 29 U.S.C §§ 207(a)(1)

& 215(a)(2). Section 207(a)(1) provides in relevant part

that “no employer shall employ any of his employees ...

for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such

employee receives compensation for his employment in

excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less

than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he

is employed.” Section 215(a)(2) provides that it shall

be unlawful to violate § 207.

Section 216(b) of the FLSA authorizes a plaintiff

seeking relief to bring a collective action on behalf of

similarly situated persons subject to the requirement

that any person who wishes to become a part of the

collective action must file a written consent in the

court in which such action is brought. 29 U.S.C.

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§ 216(b); Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 303

F.Supp.2d 1272, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). 

In Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165

(1989), the Supreme Court clarified the district court’s

authority to facilitate § 216(b) FLSA notice. The Court

found that early participation by the district court in

the notice process serves a number of important goals.

Judicial oversight of the contents of notice protects

against misleading communications and misuse of the class

device, id. at 171, and enables the court to resolve

disputes about the contents of the notice before it is

sent out, id. District court involvement also ensures

that all potential plaintiffs receive timely notice of a

pending suit and thus prevents the proliferation of

individual suits arising from the same allegedly illegal

activity. Id. at 172. Also by setting a cut-off date

for the receipt of consents, the court can expedite

resolution of the action. Id. For all of these reasons,

the Supreme Court concluded that a district court “ha[s]

discretion, in appropriate cases, ... [to] facilitat[e]

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notice to potential plaintiffs” in actions brought under

§ 216(b) of the FLSA. Id. at 169, 171. Similarly, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “the

broad remedial purpose of the Act ... is best served if

the district court is deemed to have the power to give

such notice to other potential members of the plaintiff

class to ‘opt-in’ if they so desire.” Dybach v. Florida

Dep't of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991)

(citation omitted).

Before intervening in the notice procedure, a

“district court should satisfy itself that there are

other employees ... [1] who desire to ‘opt-in’ and [2]

who are ‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job

requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.”

Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1567-68). To

satisfy the “similarly situated” requirement, plaintiffs

“need show only that their positions are similar, not

identical, to the positions held by the putative class

members.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d

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1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Grayson v. K Mart

Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)). Thus, “[a]

unified policy, plan, or scheme ... may not be required

to satisfy the ... ‘similarly situated’ requirements of

§ 216(b).” Id. at 1219 (internal quotations omitted).

In Hipp, the Eleventh Circuit recommended a

two-tiered procedure that district courts should use in

certifying collective actions under § 216(b). 252 F.3d

at 1218.

“The first determination is made at the

so-called ‘notice stage.’ At the notice

stage, the district court makes a

decision--usually based only on the

pleadings and any affidavits which have

been submitted--whether notice of the

action should be given to potential

class members.

“Because the court has minimal evidence,

this determination is made using a

fairly lenient standard, and typically

results in ‘conditional certification’

of a representative class. If the

district court ‘conditionally certifies'

the class, putative class members are

given notice and the opportunity to

‘opt-in.’ The action proceeds as a

representative action throughout

discovery.

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“The second determination is typically

precipitated by a motion for

‘decertification’ by the defendant

usually filed after discovery is largely

complete and the matter is ready for

trial. At this stage, the court has

much more information on which to base

its decision, and makes a factual

determination on the similarly situated

question. If the claimants are

similarly situated, the district court

allows the representative action to

proceed to trial. If the claimants are

not similarly situated, the district

court decertifies the class, and the

opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without

prejudice. The class representatives--

i.e., the original plaintiffs--proceed

to trial on their individual claims.”

Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Mooney v. Aramco Servs.

Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995)). District

courts have generally applied the Hipp two-stage

framework. See, e.g., Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare

Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1242 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“Since Hipp, the district courts in our circuit have

utilized the two-tiered approach.”).

At the notice stage, “[t]he plaintiffs bear the

burden of demonstrating a ‘reasonable basis’ for their

claim of class-wide discrimination.” Grayson v. Kmart

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Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996). “[T]he

standard for determining similarity, at this initial

stage, [is] ‘not particularly stringent,’ ... ‘fairly

lenient,’ ... ‘not heavy,’ ... and ‘less stringent than

that for joinder under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 20(a) or for

separate trials under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 42(b).’” Morgan,

551 F.3d at 1260-61 (quoting Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218).

“The plaintiffs may meet this burden ... by making

substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination,

that is, detailed allegations supported by affidavits

which ‘successfully engage defendants’ affidavits to the

contrary.’” Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Sperling

v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 118 F.R.D. 392, 406-07 (D.N.J. 1988)

(Ackerman, J.)). “The rationale for the ‘fairly lenient

standard’ [at the ‘notice stage’] is that at the early

stages of litigation, plaintiffs have not had time to

conduct discovery and marshal their best evidence.”

Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 303 F.Supp.2d

1272, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.) (citing Hipp,

252 F.3d at 1218). 

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Tuesday Morning contends that, because the parties

have conducted discovery, the court should “apply a more

rigorous standard than that called for by Hipp” before

facilitating class notice. Id. If by “rigorous,” Tuesday

Morning is suggesting that the court should apply a

‘harsher’ or ‘more demanding’ standard, this court in

Davis did not mean that. Instead, the court meant that,

because the parties had conducted some discovery, the

court could, and should, be ‘more accurate’ in its

assessment of whether a collective action is warranted.

As this court stated, a more rigorous standard is

appropriate when parties have conducted “extensive

discovery” and can “marshal their best evidence.” Id.

In short, the court should make use of whatever

information it has available at the time; it would be a

waste of judicial resources to do otherwise. Indeed, it

would be illogical and wasteful to all concerned to

certify a collective action if the evidence is already

sufficient to indicate that a decertification is likely

to follow.

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III. DISCUSSION

Creel “seeks to represent all ‘similarly situated’

Store Managers employed by Tuesday Morning who were

subject to the company’s uniform policy of not paying its

managers one and one-half times their hourly wage for time

worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week during

the three (3) years prior to filing of the Complaint.”

Pl’s Mot. Conditional Class Cert. (Doc. No. 19) at 1.

Creel has moved for the court to facilitate notice to the

class by (1) granting conditional class certification; (2)

allowing nationwide notice to be sent to all managers

currently employed by Tuesday Morning or previously

employed within three years of the filing of Creel’s suit;

and (3) directing Tuesday Morning to provide contact

information for all such employees. 

Tuesday Morning contends, among other things, that

Creel has not established that she is similarly situated

to other members of the putative class. Courts have

affirmed the existence of other employees who desire to

opt-in on the basis of affidavits of other employees,

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Harper v. Lovett's Buffet, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 358, 362 (M.D.

Ala. 1999) (Albritton, C.J.) (affidavits from 15 other

employees); White, 204 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (affidavits from

three other employees), consents to join the lawsuit filed

by other employees, Tucker v. Labor Leasing, Inc., 872

F.Supp. 941, 947-48 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (Schlesinger, J.),

and expert evidence on the existence of other

similarly-situated employees, Barron v. Henry County

School Sys., 242 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1105 (M.D. Ala. 2003)

(Albritton, C.J.). Courts have been clear, however, that

a plaintiff's mere stated belief in the existence of other

employees who desire to opt-in is insufficient, Horne v.

United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 279 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1236 (M.D.

Ala. 2003) (Albritton, C.J.), and that “unsupported

expectations that additional plaintiffs will subsequently

come forward” are also insufficient, Mackenzie v. Kindred

Hosps. East, L.L.C., 276 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1220 (M.D. Fla.

2003) (Merryday, J.).

Creel has met her “burden of demonstrating a

reasonable basis for crediting the[] assertions that

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aggrieved individuals exist[] in the broad class ...

proposed.” Haynes v. Singer Co., Inc., 696 F.2d 884, 887

(11th Cir. 1983). Here, Creel introduces more than her

own statement that other potential class members exist.

Horne, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1236; Mackenzie, 276 F.Supp.2d at

1220. Four other managers in three States have submitted

affidavits indicating their consent to join the lawsuit

as party plaintiffs. Thus, the court concludes that Creel

has carried her low burden of demonstrating that other

aggrieved individuals exist in her proposed class and that

some desire to opt-into her suit.

The last inquiry is whether the proposed class

consists of similarly situated individuals. To satisfy

the “similarly situated” requirement, plaintiffs “need

show only that their positions are similar, not identical,

to the positions held by the putative class members.”

Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1217. “A unified policy, plan, or

scheme ... may not be required to satisfy the more liberal

‘similarly situated’ requirements of § 216(b).” Id. at

1219 (internal quotations omitted).

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Cases from district courts show a variety of

approaches to applying the “similarly situated”

requirement. Some cases have focused on the similarity

between job responsibilities and pay provisions of

plaintiffs and those of the proposed class. See, e.g.,

Bradford v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 184 F.Supp.2d 1342,

1345 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (Story, J.) (“The only determinative

issue is whether Plaintiffs' job duties were similar.”).

Other decisions, most notably a series of opinions

authored by former Chief Judge Albritton of this court,

have required evidence of a factual or legal nexus between

plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the proposed class.

For example, in White v. Osmose, Inc., 204 F.Supp.2d 1309,

1314 (2002), he wrote: “[A] plaintiff must make some

rudimentary showing of commonality between the basis for

his claims and that of the potential claims of the

proposed class, beyond the mere facts of job duties and

pay provisions. Without such a requirement, it is

doubtful that § 216(b) would further the interests of

judicial economy, and it would undoubtedly present a ready

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opportunity for abuse.” See also Anderson v. Cagle’s,

Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing White’s

nexus requirement approvingly, but at the second stage of

the Hipp analysis). Finally, at least one court has

employed a multi-factor approach. See Stone v. First

Union Corp., 203 F.R.D. 532, 542-43 (S.D. Fla. 2001)

(Gold, J.).

Without committing to a single approach for all

future cases, the court concludes that the similarly

situated requirement can be met either by showing

similarity between job responsibilities and pay provisions

of plaintiffs and proposed class members or by providing

evidence of a nexus between plaintiff’s claims and the

claims of the proposed class.

Of course, the broader and more numerous and complex

the collective action the plaintiff wants, the more

careful the court must be. The consequences of

decertification (wasted resources for all involved) for

a class that has few members and simple and legal factual

issues would be dramatically different from the

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decertification consequences of a class with a huge

membership and extremely complex legal and factual issues.

 In short, the court must be reasonably certain that the

proposed litigation is not biting off more than can be

chewed.

Here, Creel is asking that the court certify a

‘national’ collective action. Such a putative collection

would, therefore, span the entire nation and, according

to the evidence, include over 1250 members. However,

after extensive discovery, Creel has presented, in

addition to her own testimony, affidavits from only four

other store managers and from only two other States

(Florida and Illinois). This evidence does not provide

an adequate platform from which to make the grand leap to

a national collective action.

Admittedly, Creel has also established that Tuesday

Morning uses one training manual to outline policies and

procedures for store managers and that store managers are

trained in Dallas, Texas. However, in assessing this

evidence, the court cannot turn a blind eye to the

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observations made by a California appellate court, Keller

v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 1389 (Cal.

App. 2d Dist. 2009),in upholding the decertification of

a class of store managers who claimed that they were

entitled to overtime compensation because they did not

qualify for the overtime exemption under the California

wage-and-hour laws. There, the appellate court held that,

although store managers have the same written job

description, many other factors (including the size of

stores, the number of employees at stores, the location

of the stores, the configuration of the stores, and the

amount of store sales) all result in store managers

performing their duties in significantly different ways.

The court therefore concluded that the amount of time each

store manager spends performing managerial and

non-managerial duties varies too much for them to be

considered similarly situated. To be sure, the California

court was applying state law and state class-certification

rules and was deciding whether a class should be

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decertified; nevertheless, that court's observations are

still instructive.

Moreover, consistent with the observations from the

California appellate court, Tuesday Morning has submitted

substantial evidence that many of its store managers

perform duties quite different from those of Creel.

Of course, if Creel had restricted herself to stores

of only a certain location and size and other limiting

characteristics, a collective-action certification might

very well be appropriate. The platform here might then

be adequate for such a substantially more modest leap.

Certification of a national collective action is not

warranted here. 

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiff Tisha

Creel‘s motion for class certification (doc. no. 19) is

denied without prejudice.

DONE, this the 6th day of May, 2013.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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