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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

DEC 161992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT oF APPEALS Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

BROWN MACKIE COLLEGE , 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

V. 

GENE P. GRAHAM, JR.; GRAHAM & 

GRAHAM, P.C. I 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No . 91-3321 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

D.C. No. 88-2220-V 

Barry W. McCormick (James J. Cramer with him on the briefs) o f 

Payne & Jones, Chartered, Overland Park, Kansas, for Plainti ff - Appe llant. 

J ohn J. Jurcyk, Jr., (Daniel F . Church of McAnany, Van Cleave & 

Phillips; and Gene P. Graham, Jr., of White, Allinder, Grate & 

Graham, Independence, Missouri, with him on the briefs) , Kansas 

City, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 1 
In this appeal, 

reverse an order of 

plaintiff Brown Mackie College seeks to 

summary judgment entered in favor of 

defendant, Gene P. Graham, Jr., in its action for tortious 

interference with contract. The district court found that even if 

plaintiff could show Mr. Graham interfered with Brown Mackie 

enrollment contracts, his actions were privileged by the attorneyclient relationship. Despite Brown Mackie's crafting the issue as 

one of first impression requiring us to draw a bright line between 

properly counselling clients and tortiously interfering with their 

contracts, plenary review stops far short of that destination. 

Even while viewing the entire record through plaintiff's lens and 

indulging all possible inferences in its favor, we cannot find a 

triable issue and affirm. 

I. 

Brown Mackie operates a proprietary business college and 

offers a program of court reporting at its two campuses in Salina 

and Overland Park, Kansas. In 1986, Brown Mackie sued Pamela 

Fennelly, a student enrolled in the court reporting program, for 

breach of the enrollment agreement she had signed and sought 

payment of unpaid fees. In that state action, Ms. Fennelly 

retained an attorney, Mr . Graham, who asserted a counterclaim for 

damages based on fraud and misrepresentation. To prepare for 

trial, Mr. Graham contacted several past and present Brown Mackie 

court reporting students whom he intended to call as witnesses. 

However, Ms. Fennelly and Brown Mackie settled the case before 

trial, and the action was dismissed. 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 2 
At about the same time, Brown Mackie instituted a second 

similar collection action against another student who also 

retained Mr. Graham. Given the proximity in time between the two 

cases and the information he had already gathered in his 

preparation of the Fennelly case, Mr. Graham instructed his 

secretary to call those present and former Brown Mackie students 

who had expressed similar dissatisfaction with the program to 

inform them he would hold a meeting on February 20, 1988, to 

discuss their rights with relation to a possible legal action 

against Brown Mackie. Mr. Graham's secretary made the calls, 

contacting students who wanted to air their grievances and others 

who were not interested in attending or suing Brown Mackie. 

Mr. Graham called a second meeting at his office on April 16, 

1988, attended by many students who were present at the first 

session, additional students present for the first time, and 

Shelly Gasper, an attorney with the Kansas Attorney General's 

office who was investigating Brown Mackie for alleged violations 

of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. 1 Ms. Gasper distributed 

complaint forms for students to submit to her office. Ms. Gasper 

also attended a third meeting at Mr. Graham's office and told 

students interested in pursuing their grievances to withhold 

payment until the matter was resolved. Between January and April 

1988, approximately thirty-five students withdrew from the court 

1

A year later, Brown Mackie signed an Assurance of Voluntary 

Compliance negotiated with t he office of the Attorney General of 

Kansas and agreed to rectify those areas of conduct in which the 

school violated the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 3 
reporting program. Subsequently, Brown Mackie filed this action 

against Mr. Graham for tortious interference with contract. 2 

Memorializing Brown Mackie's theory that Mr. Graham 

interfered with existing contracts, the pretrial order identified 

fifteen students who had quit school as a result of Mr. Graham's 

alleged conduct and listed actual damages of $27,217.22 in 

relation to those enrollment contracts. Additionally, Brown 

Mackie alleged other students breached their contracts although 

those breaches did not result in financial loss to the school. 

Key to its theory was, Brown Mackie claimed, evidence of certain 

"cold calls," calls made during the week of February 15, 1988, to 

students who had never signed a list, expressed any interest in 

suing the school, or had any prior relationship with Mr . Graham. 

However controverted the evidence of other contacts may have been, 

Brown Mackie contended these cold calls fully demonstrated Mr. 

Graham crossed the line between permissibly advising clients and 

tortiously interfering with contracts. 

The district court disagreed, concluding none of Brown 

Mackie's submissions showed Mr. Graham "induced any of the fifteen 

students listed in the pretrial order to breach their contracts 

with plaintiff." The court rejected Brown Mackie's attempt to 

connect the telephone calls and meetings to the "unprecedented" 

drop-out rate experienced in the spring term of 1988. 3 Moreover, 

2

Although Brown Mackie initially filed the case in 

court, Mr. Graham, a Missouri citizen, removed 

court. 

Kansas state 

it to federal 

3The record contains no comparative enrollment 

evidence to demonstrate the spring 1988 

unprecedented. 

figures 

drop-out 

o r other 

rate was 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 4 
the district court found Mr. Graham was justified in contacting 

potential witnesses and individuals connected with his 

investigation and at all relevant times was practicing his 

profession which conferred a privilege upon him that immunized his 

actions. 

II. 

Brown Mackie's appeal is premised on a fundamental 

misunderstanding of summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) . 4 

What emerges from a synthesis of plaintiff's argument is the 

proposition that the nonmoving party's disputing a material fact 

is sufficient to overcome summary judgment. Were this the rule 

announced in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986 ) , 

and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), we would have 

to conclude Brown Mackie survived the motion for summary judgment 

based on its bare assertion in the brief that it controverted 33 

of defendant's 71 submitted 23 11 uncontroverted 11 facts and 

additional facts to which defendant never responded. (Appellant's 

Brie f at 14). However, Anderson provides no such tally sheet . 

Instead, the dispute about a material fact must be genuine, 

"that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

4

Rule 56 (c) states in part: 

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 5 
248. This inquiry, the Court added, "necessarily implicates the 

substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the 

trial on the merits." Id. at 252. In short, 

[i)f the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves 

for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on 

the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask 

himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably 

favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded 

jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the 

evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla 

of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will 

be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the 

jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. 

Id. (emphasis added) . 

When Brown Mackie's burden of proof under Kansas substantive 

5 law is set against this standard, we must ask whether there is a 

genuine dispute about a material fact necessary to establish Mr. 

Graham, without legal privilege to do so, induced or otherwise 

intentionally caused a third person not to perform a contract with 

another. International Union. (UAW) v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 416 F. 

Supp. 1267, 1290 (D. Kan. 1976). Under Cardwell, Brown Mackie 

must present evidence of (1) the existence of a contract between 

plaintiff and students; (2) knowledge of the contract on 

defendant's part; (3) an intentional interference with these known 

contract rights without legal justification; and (4) resulting 

damage to plaintiff. Id. Only the third element is contested; 

however, Brown Mackie contends it sufficiently met its burden here 

to warrant a trial. We disagree. 

5

The parties do not challenge the court's holding Kansas law 

applies to the tortious interference with contract claim. 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 6 
As the district court noted, of the fifteen students Brown 

Mackie alleged had quit school as a result of Mr. Graham's 

tortious conduct, not one stated in the depositions offered that 

Mr. Graham had anything to do with the decision to stop attending 

court reporting classes. Indeed, most of the students stated 

their decisions were based on dissatisfaction with the program, 

for example, quality of the teaching, availability of classes, and 

confusion over course requirements. Sharon Hunter, who stopped 

attending classes in December 1986, stated she and other students 

asked Mr. Graham to hold a meeting after learning of the Fennelly 

case. Other students testified they called Mr. Graham's office 

for directions after being told of the meeting by fellow students. 

Sue Drew, Carol Sue Lane, Donna Byerley, Cecelia Harrison, and 

Laurie Smith, named among the fifteen students, stated in their 

depositions they quit Brown Mackie before the February 20th 

meeting. Laurie and Bill Slaughter stated in affidavits they 

contacted Mr. Graham and quit because they were dissatisfied with 

the program. Cherri Germany, who stopped attending classes on 

May 16, 1988 , described her dissatisfaction with the quality of 

the teachers, stating she felt she was not making any progress in 

the program. In her letter to Brown Mackie, she stated, " I've 

been instructed by Shelly Gasper from the attorney general's 

office not to pay you any money." (Appellant's Appendix at 369) . 

Other students also stated Ms. Gasper told them at the May meeting 

they could stop payments on their enrollment contracts. In sum, 

not one of the fifteen students said Mr. Graham called and induced 

the subsequent breach of contract . 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 7 
Nevertheless, Brown Mackie urges the district court made too 

much of this facet of proof, ignoring the fact that at the time of 

the depositions, Mr. Graham represented each student. Brown 

Mackie contends what these fifteen students testified to is not 

the issue, but "the real question is . [whether] plaintiff 

presented evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find that 

Graham induced these students to breach their enrollment 

agreements through his entire course of conduct." That entire 

course of conduct, Brown Mackie insists, can only be gleaned from 

all of the circumstantial evidence arising from "the web of 

interactions" between the act of solicitation and the actual 

advice to breach the contract. This evidence, Brown Mackie 

contends, satisfies its Rule 56(c) burden. 

For example, Brown Mackie cites Debora Randolph's deposition 

in which she stated Mr. Graham's secretary called her although she 

had never attended a meeting, signed any l ist, or expressed any 

interest in suing the school. Ms . Randolph testified she told the 

caller she was not interested. Mr. Graham later contacted Ms. 

Randolph, asking her to come to his office to answer an 

interrogatory, and telephoned again requesting she inform him if 

she received a subpoena from Brown Mackie . Ms. Randolph completed 

h . 6 t e court reporting program. 

6

r n its brief, Brown Mackie cites to that portion in the 

deposition in which Ms . Randolph "testified that, when she saw 

Germany at the store, Germany told her she had breached her 

contract with BMC because Gene Graham told her to and that she was 

told by Mr. Graham to quit paying BMC . " (Appe lla nt ' s Brief at 17- 18 ) . In her deposition, Ms . Randolph a nswers the question, "No, I 

saw her in the grocery store and I don't know how it got started 

but s he said she had been contacted by Gene Graham and he had told 

(Continued to next page . ) 

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Appellate Case: 91-3321 Document: 010110152651 Date Filed: 12/16/1992 Page: 8 
We are at a loss to understand how this testimony or the 

circumstantial evidence arising from this testimony could alter or 

affect Brown Mackie's burden in responding to defendant's motion 

for summary judgment. While the evidence may present an alleged 

disputed fact, that alone cannot overcome a properly supported 

motion for summary judgment. "By its very terms, this standard 

[of Rule 56(c)] provides that the mere existence of some alleged 

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 

properly supported motion for summary judgment ... 

477 U.S. at 247-48. 

II Anderson, 

In addition, Brown Mackie's discrediting the testimony of the 

fifteen students it targeted in the action because they retained 

Mr. Graham to represent them only begs the question. The position 

now taken by Brown Mackie belies its unilateral allegation that 

these students were induced to breach their contracts. For Brown 

Mackie to predicate its case upon that assertion but now argue the 

students are unworthy of belief calls into question its own 

credibility. 

Moreover, if these fifteen students were clients at that 

time, Mr. Graham's advice was privileged by the attorney-client 

relationship. Although the district court analyzed Mr. Graham's 

conduct and professional relationship with the students, and 

plaintiff invites us to probe that conduct behind the defense of 

(Continued from prior page.) 

her --- she didn't say breach her contract but he said don't pay 

Brown Mackie and she had gone to some meetings and she did drop 

out of school and she hasn't paid back her loans." (Appellant's 

Appendix at 515). 

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• 

attorney-client privilege, 7 we do not believe the record requires 

we even reach that question. Albeit we adopt the district court's 

analysis under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 767, 770 

(1977), and Kansas case 

8 law. The district court correctly 

concluded Mr. Graham's professional conduct circumscribed by his 

investigating the Fennelly and Dennis cases and preparing the 

proposed class action was not improper. 

Finding Brown Mackie is unable to direct us to any "facts 

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law, 11 id. at 248, we hold the district court properly denied 

Brown Mackie's motion to reconsider its order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Mr. Graham. We therefore AFFIRM . 

7

we do not address the various ethical violations Brown Mackie 

raised for the first time in this appeal or other allegations not 

in the record. Pell v. Azar Nut Co., 711 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1983 ) . 

8Brown Mackie's reliance on Adler. Barish. Daniels. Levin & 

Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978), is misplaced. 

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