Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00318/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00318-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Upon screening, the Court dismissed the Towers Jail and Lower Buckeye Jail

facilities, and the City of Glendale Police Department as Defendants (See Order, Doc. #15).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pedro O. Camarena, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Correctional Health

Services, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-0318-PHX-MHM (DKD)

ORDER

In this civil rights action brought by a former county jail inmate, Defendant Maricopa

County Correctional Health Services (CHS) moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies and CHS is a non-jural entity that cannot be sued

(Doc. #36). Plaintiff filed a response and then the Court provided him a second opportunity

to respond, which he did (Doc. ##39, 52). CHS replied to Plaintiff’s first response and

moved to strike his second response (Doc. #43, 61). The Court will deny CHS’s Motion to

Strike, and grant its Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

Plaintiff sued CHS and Glendale Police Officer #10704, who has been identified as

Robert MacDonald1

 (Doc. #1; see Doc. #26). Plaintiff alleged that he was denied medication

to treat a painful bone disease (Count I), and that MacDonald illegally searched his home and

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Plaintiff also alleged that the jails were overcrowded (Count II), but the Court

dismissed the count for failure to state a claim against a named Defendant (See Order, Doc.

#15).

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destroyed property after arrest (Count III)2 (Id.). The Court ordered an answer, and CHS

filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. ##15, 36).

In its motion, CHS argued that as a subdivision of the county, it is a not an entity

capable of being sued (Doc. #36 at 2). CHS also contended that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (Id. at 3). In support, CHS submitted the affidavit of Susan Fisher, a Sergeant

assigned to the Inmate Hearing Unit (Id., Ex. 1). Fisher attested that inmates may grieve all

issues that pertain to conditions of confinement and that officers pass out grievances as part

of their daily duties (Fisher Aff. ¶ 5). She further attested that, according to the inmate

grievance records, Plaintiff filed just two grievances during his confinement at the jail (Id.

¶ 7). One grievance concerned a request to be housed in a different pod, and the other was

about legal materials (Id.). CHS also proffered copies of the Inmate Grievance Procedure,

Policy DJ-3, and two pages from the “Rules and Regulations for Inmates” (Exs. A-B, Doc.

#36).

Plaintiff responded to the motion and argued that because the caption of his Complaint

was corrected to reflect the proper name of CHS, the argument that it cannot be sued is moot

(Doc. #39 ¶¶ 5-7). Plaintiff also argued that he did submit numerous grievances about

medical care and claimed that he has copies of all these forms and will submit them upon his

release from prison (Id. ¶¶ 12, 26). As to the grievance procedures at the jail, Plaintiff

asserted that medical grievances were unnecessarily delayed in an effort to discourage

inmates from filing grievances (Id. ¶ 18). He further claimed that detention officers often

informed inmates that “they ran out of forms,” thereby making the grievance system

unavailable (Id. ¶ 28). Finally, he alleged that when he was transferred from the jail to the

state prison facility, all jail copies of grievances were destroyed (Id. ¶ 25). 

The Court then issued an order that informed Plaintiff of the evidence necessary to

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successfully rebut CHS’s contentions and provided additional time to file another response

to CHS’s motion (Doc. #41). In his second response Plaintiff argued that the grievance

forms were misleading and, because the sheriff’s office had full control over the grievance

system, they were able to stop grievances at the initial steps so that there was no

administrative record of exhaustion (Doc. #52 ¶¶ 5-7). He reiterated his claim that the

grievance system was delayed so that once a grievance proceeds to a higher level, the inmate

has already been transferred to another facility (Id. ¶ 8). 

Plaintiff also filed a Motion of Judicial Notice, which the Court construed as a

supplement response to CHS’s motion (Doc. #55, see Order, Doc. #62). Plaintiff again

argued that he corrected the caption of the Complaint to reflect the proper name of the

defendant (Id. ¶¶ 2-6). And he contended that many of the rules set forth in the Inmate

Grievance Procedures allow for CHS to stop grievances at any stage in the process (Id. ¶¶

14-18). 

Plaintiff submitted an affidavit that primarily addressed the merits of his underlying

claim (Doc. #56 ¶¶ 1-11). As to the issue of exhaustion, Plaintiff attested that the majority

of inmate grievance forms were thrown away thereby prohibiting medical grievances from

reaching the appellate levels of the grievance system (Id. ¶¶ 15, 17). Attached to the affidavit

were copies of (1) Special Needs Orders, Health Needs Requests, and grievances submitted

by Plaintiff in 2006 and 2007; (2) letters from previous physicians who treated Plaintiff in

2002 and 2004 for degenerative disc disease in his lumbar spine; and (3) an inmate letter and

response dated February 2007 (Attachs., Doc. #56).

In addition, Plaintiff proffered a declaration supporting his claims that grievance

forms were delayed and/or destroyed and never reached the higher levels of the

administrative grievance process (Doc. #57 ¶¶ 6, 14(4-5)). He avowed that the jail’s

grievance system was corrupt and that the sheriff’s office purposefully withheld evidence of

his grievances (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff attached more copies of inmate letters and grievances from

2006, and pages from the “Rules and Regulations for Inmates” (Attachs., Doc. #57).

CHS did not file a reply to Plaintiff’s second response. Instead, CHS moved to strike

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the second response on the ground that only one responsive memorandum is permitted under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (Doc. #61).

II. Exhaustion

Plaintiff must first exhaust “available” administrative remedies before bringing this

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life,

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through

the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21 (2007).

Defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method

to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). 

III. Analysis

At the outset, the Court will deny CHS’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s second response

(Doc. #61). After Plaintiff’s first response was filed, the Court issued its Order notifying

Plaintiff of his responsibility to respond to CHS’s motion (Doc. #41). Pursuant to that Order,

Plaintiff timely filed his second response (Doc. #52).

As stated, CHS bears the burden of proving lack of exhaustion, and therefore must

demonstrate that there were remedies available to Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119;

Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37. CHS demonstrated that a grievance system was available at the

jail for Plaintiff’s claim concerning the denial of medication (Fisher Aff. ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. A, Doc.

#36). 

Plaintiff’s contentions regarding exhaustion of Count I are inconsistent. In his

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Complaint, he asserted that he filed a request for administrative relief on his claim and

appealed it to the highest level; yet, he also indicated that he was told his complaint was not

a grievable issue (Doc. #1 at 4). Then in his response memorandums and sworn statements,

Plaintiff alleged that officials at the jail frustrated his ability to exhaust by delaying

grievances or throwing them away (Doc. ##39, 52, 56-57). Plaintiff has not alleged,

however, exactly what transpired when he attempted to grieve his claim, nor has he specified

who was involved in delaying or frustrating his ability to appeal. Without more specific

allegations, Plaintiff cannot overcome CHS’s evidence showing that a grievance system was

available at the jail for Count I.

Plaintiff also claimed that he was unable to complete the grievance process because

he was transferred. A transfer between two different systems may render remedies

unavailable. See, e.g., Bradley v. Washington, 441 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102-03 (D. D. C. 2006)

(denying motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion where inmate was transferred from jail to

federal system, and jail’s grievance procedures made no provision for submission of

complaint for persons no longer detained in the jail). But Plaintiff’s evidence does not

support a finding that remedies were unavailable due to his transfer. The inmate letters and

grievances that Plaintiff submitted are all dated after January 26, 2006—the date this action

was filed. Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust remedies before filing suit. Vaden, 449

F.3d at 1051. Plaintiff filed his Complaint while he was still confined in the Lower Buckeye

Jail; thus, his inability to complete the grievance procedures before filing suit cannot be

attributed to a transfer (See Doc. #1 at 1).

CHS claimed that Plaintiff did not file any grievances concerning medical care;

however, Plaintiff proffered evidence that in March 2006, he submitted a grievance about

medication (Attach., Doc. #57). Regardless, because this grievance was submitted after

Plaintiff’s suit was filed, it does not support his claim for exhaustion. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s lack of sufficient evidence that he exhausted available grievances

prior to filing suit, and his conflicting statements regarding whether he filed grievances, are

insufficient to overcome CHS’s evidence of nonexhaustion for Count I. 

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IV. CHS Status as a Defendant

In the alternative, the Court finds that CHS’s second argument for dismissal—that it

is not a legal entity capable of being sued—has merit. Municipalities and other local

governing bodies are included among those “persons” who may be sued under § 1983.

Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Because CHS is not a municipal corporation, a local governing body, or a private

corporation, it is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Maricopa County is

responsible for providing medical care to county jail inmates. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-

291(A). Any actions against a county policy must be brought against the county itself and

not against an administrative subdivision of the county; thus, CHS is an improper defendant.

In light of the reasons set forth above, CHS’s motion will be granted and CHS will

be dismissed from this action.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendant CHS’s Motion to Strike (Doc. #61) is denied. 

(2) Defendant CHS’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #36) is granted. Count I is dismissed

without prejudice for lack of exhaustion and Maricopa County Correctional Health Services

is dismissed as a Defendant. 

(3) The remaining claim is Count III against Defendant MacDonald.

DATED this 23rd day of March, 2007.

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