Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00540/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Armando Munoz Randall, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-13-0540-PHX-DGC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Armando Munoz Randall filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 14,

2013, challenging his convictions in two criminal cause numbers for three counts of armed

robbery and one count of unlawful discharge of a firearm, and the trial court’s imposition of

aggravated, concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest being 18 years. Randall raises

four grounds for habeas relief: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and

post-conviction counsel; (2) he was denied his right to a jury trial on aggravating

circumstances; (3) Arizona sentencing statutes violate his due process rights; and (4) he was

denied his sixth amendment rights in plea bargaining proceedings. Respondents argue that

the petition is untimely filed, and that Randall is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.

The Court agrees and recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Following a September 28, 2007 sentencing on both cause numbers, Randall filed a

timely Notice of Post-Conviction relief in each case on November 2, 2007 (Doc. 13, Exh LCase 2:13-cv-00540-DGC Document 17 Filed 01/21/14 Page 1 of 5
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P). The trial court appointed counsel, who filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction

Review, indicating that he had found no claims for relief in either case (Id., Exh Q, R). On

September 9, 2008, Randall filed a joint pro per petition in each cause number (Id., Exh T).

On September 12, 2008, the trial court struck the petition for failing to comply with the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it did not “contain a memorandum of points

and authority, legal or record citations, and allegations of fact with support” (Id., Exh U).

The trial court allowed Randall 30 days to file a conforming petition (Id.). On December 3,

2008, 53 days after the expiration of the 30-day limit, the trial court dismissed the postconviction proceeding because of Randall’s failure to file a petition (Id., Exh V).

On April 13, 2011, two and one half years later, Randall filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in state court in both causes (Id., Exh W). The trial court treated each

petition as a successive and untimely petition for post-conviction relief. Randall argued that

his excuse for the untimely filing was his lack of legal knowledge. The trial court ruled that

ignorance of the law was not a valid excuse for an untimely filing. In addition, the trial court

decided that Randall failed to provide any support for his claim of newly discovered

evidence, and that his other claims were precluded. The trial court dismissed both petitions

(Id., Exh X, Y).

In one of the cause numbers, Randall filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals. On September 12, 2012, the court of appeals granted review but denied relief

(Id., Exh Z). The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that ignorance of the law was

not a valid excuse for an untimely filing, and that Randall had not established that the trial

court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition (Id.). The Arizona Supreme Court

granted Randall an extension of time to file his petition for review; he failed to file a petition

and the supreme court dismissed the review proceeding on November 30, 2012 (Id., AA).

Randall filed his federal petition on March 14, 2013.

Case 2:13-cv-00540-DGC Document 17 Filed 01/21/14 Page 2 of 5
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DISCUSSION

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is required

to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time in which a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Because Randall pleaded guilty, he was entitled to a Rule 32 “of-right” post-conviction relief

proceeding, and the conclusion of that proceeding was the date on which Randall’s

conviction became final. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2007).

Randall’s conviction became final when the time for filing a petition for review from

the trial court’s dismissal of his of-right petition for post-conviction relief expired. Summers.

The trial court dismissed his first post-conviction proceeding on December 3, 2008.

Therefore, his conviction became final on January 2, 2009, 30 days after the time expired for

him to petition for review from the trial court’s dismissal of his first post-conviction

proceeding. Randall was required to file his federal petition on or before January 2, 2010.

Absent any statutory tolling, his petition, filed on March 14, 2013, was untimely.

Randall’s post-conviction petition filed in 2011 did not toll the limitations period.

“[A] properly and timely filed petition in state court only tolls the time remaining in the

federal limitation period.” See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 949 (2003). There can be no tolling following the expiration of the

limitations period because “there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore,

199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000). In addition, his 2011

notice of post-conviction relief, filed after the expiration of the one-year limitations period,

does not restart the clock. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Randall is also not entitled to equitable tolling. He has not demonstrated that he was

pursuing his rights diligently nor the existence of any extraordinary circumstances which

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prevented him from timely filing his petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418-19

(2005). Randall gives no explanation in his federal petition why he waited two and one half

years before filing his second post-conviction petition. However, he indicated in his Petition

for Review from the dismissal of his second post-conviction petition that his lack of legal

knowledge should excuse his untimely filing. Both the trial court and the court of appeals

ruled that Randall’s ignorance of the law was not a valid excuse for an untimely filing.

Although the supreme court granted him an extension in which to file his petition for review,

he never filed a petition. A lack of legal sophistication by a pro se petitioner is not, by itself,

an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). In any event, that lack of legal knowledge did not prevent

him from timely filing his first notice of post-conviction relief, and later a petition for review

in the court of appeals.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Armando Munoz Randall’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

Case 2:13-cv-00540-DGC Document 17 Filed 01/21/14 Page 4 of 5
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factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 21st day of January, 2014.

Case 2:13-cv-00540-DGC Document 17 Filed 01/21/14 Page 5 of 5