Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01219/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01219-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Salman and Suzanne Salman, 

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

City of Phoenix, a municipal corporation of 

the State of Arizona, 

Defendant. 

No. CV 12-1219-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction. (Doc. 44). On June 15, 2012, this Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motions for a 

Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction and dismissed this case 

without prejudice. (Doc. 36). On July 3, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal with 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 40). Plaintiffs also sought emergency 

injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief “without prejudice to its renewal 

following presentation to the district court.” (Doc. 42 at 1). Plaintiffs then re-filed their 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this Court. (Doc. 44). 

 It appears that Plaintiffs attempted to appeal to the Court of Appeals under Ninth 

Circuit Rule 3-3 by titling the caption of their Notice of Appeal “Preliminary Injunction 

Appeal.” However, because this entire action has been dismissed on the merits, the Court 

of Appeals noted that, in reality, this is not an appeal of a denial of a preliminary 

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injunction, but instead is an appeal of the entire case. To that end, the Court of Appeals 

confirmed the prior briefing schedule for the merits of the appeal. 

 The Court of Appeals went on to note that Plaintiffs could seek a stay or 

injunction pending appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a). Pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1), to obtain a stay or injunction from the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals while an appeal is pending, “[a] party must ordinarily move first 

in the district court.” Fed. R.App. P. 8(a)(1)(C), as Plaintiffs have now done. Plaintiffs 

do not attempt to satisfy the test for a stay pending appeal under Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 8(a). Instead, Plaintiffs re-filed with this Court what they had 

originally filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is essentially an attempt to 

appeal the denial of the original preliminary injunction motion. 

 At the district court level, the Court analyzes a request for a stay or injunction 

pending appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62. Pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 62(c), while an appeal is pending, a district court “may suspend, modify, 

restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing 

party’s rights.” Fed.R.Civ. P.62(c). Rule 62(c) codifies the exception to the general rule 

of exclusive appellate jurisdiction. McClatchy Newspapers v. Cent. Valley 

Typographical Union No. 46, 686 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1982). Rule 62(c) “does not 

restore jurisdiction to the district court to adjudicate anew the merits of the case.” Id. 

 The Supreme Court has held that “[u]nder both [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

62(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) ], . . . the factors regulating the 

issuance of a stay are generally the same: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a 

strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure 

the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” 

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (internal citations omitted). 

 To find that Plaintiffs have made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed 

on the merits, the Court would have to reconsider its previous Order that Plaintiffs’ 

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claims are barred by either res judicata, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and/or 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because Plaintiffs’ present motion does not state any new 

reasons that they are likely to succeed on the merits that were not already asserted in their 

prior motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, this Court 

cannot find that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal. Because 

Plaintiffs must meet all four prongs of the Hilton test to obtain Rule 62(c) relief, the 

Court need not examine the other three prongs of the Hilton test. 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

(Doc. 44) is denied. 

 Dated this 9th day of July, 2012. 

Case 2:12-cv-01219-JAT Document 45 Filed 07/09/12 Page 3 of 3