Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02562/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02562-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELANIE LYNN POTTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-02562-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 22

Plaintiff Melanie Potter seeks social security disability benefits for a combination of 

physical and mental impairments, including: affective, anxiety, personality, and somatoform 

disorders; degenerative disc disease; knee pain; myofascial pain syndrome; headaches; and 

fibromyalgia. (AR 172.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff filed this lawsuit for judicial 

review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her benefits claim. On 

April 29, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded for an award of benefits. 

(Dkt. No. 19 (“Order”).)1 The Commissioner now moves to alter or amend the judgment pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Dkt. No. 22.) Having considered the parties’ briefs 

and the relevant legal authority the Court DENIES the motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) provides that a party may file a “motion to alter or amend a judgment.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e). The Ninth Circuit has explained the standard for a motion under Rule 59(e) as 

follows:

Since specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not listed 

in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable discretion in 

 

1

See Potter v. Colvin, No. 3-14-CV-02562-JSC, 2015 WL 1966715 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2015).

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granting or denying the motion.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 

1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). But amending a judgment after its entry 

remains “an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, there are four 

basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) 

if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact 

upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to 

present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if 

such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the 

amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law. 

Id.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir.2 011). This Rule “may not be used to 

relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been made prior to 

the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citation 

omitted). The Commissioner’s Motion focuses on the first and third grounds for relief, arguing 

that amendment of the judgment is warranted to “correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which 

the judgment rests” and to “prevent manifest injustice.”

DISCUSSION

The Commissioner argues that the Court’s decision was in error in three primary regards:

(1) finding that the ALJ erred with respect to weighing the medical evidence, (2) determining that 

the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) 

remanding for an award of benefits. Each of these arguments fail.

A. The ALJ Erred in Weighing the Medical Evidence

The Commissioner contends that the Court erred in concluding that the ALJ erred in her

weighing of the medical evidence from Plaintiff’s treating physicians Dr. Townsend and Dr. 

Wilson, and examining psychologist Dr. Cain. The Court concluded that the ALJ made three 

errors regarding Plaintiff’s medical evidence. First, she failed to provide clear and convincing 

reasons to discount Dr. Townsend’s opinion on Plaintiff’s psychological limitations. Second, she 

did not provide specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Wilson’s opinion about Plaintiff’s 

physical limitations. Third, while the ALJ gave appropriate consideration to Dr. Cain’s first 

opinion about Plaintiff’s psychological abilities, she gave no substantive basis to ignore Dr. 

Cain’s second opinion. (Order at 31.) 2

 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

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1) Dr. Townsend

The Commissioner first takes issue with the Court’s conclusion that the ALJ failed to 

provide clear and convincing reasons to discount Dr. Townsend’s opinion on Plaintiff’s 

psychological limitations arguing that the Court applied the wrong standard. “If a treating or 

examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it 

by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). In contrast, if a treating physician’s 

opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” 

reasons supported by substantial evidence. Id. Finally, “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 (9th 

Cir. 1995). 

The ALJ here gave “[p]artial weight” to Dr. Townsend’s opinion because: (1) the record as 

a whole did not support Dr. Townsend’s findings that Plaintiff had any “extreme limitations,” and 

(2) Dr. Townsend relied too heavily on Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms. (AR 31.) With respect 

to the first point, the Court noted that the record was replete with numerous medical evaluations 

consistent with Dr. Townsend’s conclusion that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in maintaining 

attention, concentration, regular attendance, or a normal workday or workweek, and cited 

examples from four different physicians which were consistent with these findings. (Order at 23.) 

In particular, these limitations are consistent with Dr. Cain’s opinion that “claimant has significant 

personality disorder, depression, and anxiety. It will be difficult for her to interact with coworkers 

supervisors, and the general public. The claimant will have difficulty with attendance secondary 

to her emphasis on pain.” (Compare AR 748 with AR 940 (Dr. Townsend: Plaintiff was severely 

limited in the ability to maintain attention and concentration for prolonged periods of time and in 

her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions).) Further, as the 

Court previously noted, Dr. Zukowsky found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her 

 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

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concentration. (Order at 23 citing AR 760.) Dr. Jacobs’ likewise concluded that Plaintiff was 

moderately limited in her concentration and her ability to complete a normal workday and 

workweek. (AR 86.) Thus, the Commissioner’s post-hoc suggestion that although the ALJ did 

not cite any particular conflicting opinion, the opinions of Drs. Cain, Zukowsky, and Jacobs in fact 

contradicted Dr. Townsend’s conclusion, is belied by the record. 

Even if the gradations in the severity of the limitations espoused by the various physicians 

were enough to “contradict” Dr. Townsend’s opinions—which the Court does not believe that it 

is—the ALJ’s conclusory statement would likewise fail under the “specific and legitimate reasons 

that are supported by substantial evidence” standard. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. The ALJ’s 

unsupported statement that “the record as a whole did not support Dr. Townsend’s findings that 

Plaintiff had “extreme limitations” (AR 31) does not “set[] out a detailed and thorough summary 

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stat[e] h[er] interpretation thereof, and mak[e]

findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).

The Commissioner’s argument that Court also erred in concluding that the ALJ improperly 

disregarded Dr. Townsend’s opinion as overly relying on Plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain is 

likewise unavailing. As the Court noted in its Order, the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated that 

ALJs may not reject medical opinions simply because they are based on a patient’s subjective 

complaints: “when an opinion is not more heavily based on a patient’s self-reports than on clinical 

observations, there is no evidentiary basis for rejecting the opinion.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.2d 

1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). Here, there was no indication in the record

that Dr. Townsend relied more on Plaintiff’s complaints than her own clinical observations. The 

Commissioner’s arguments to the contrary could have been raised previously and thus are not the 

proper subject of a Rule 59(e) motion. 3

2) Dr. Wilson & Dr. Cain

The Commissioner also quibbles with various aspects of the Court’s findings with respect 

 

3

The Court declines to address the Commissioner’s argument regarding Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 

967, 971 (9th Cir. 1996), as the issue of acceptable treating source was not raised by the ALJ’s 

decision or this Court’s Order.

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to the other two physicians, Dr. Wilson and Dr. Cain. The Court previously concluded that the 

ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Wilson’s opinion about 

Plaintiff’s physical limitations and she gave no substantive basis to ignore Dr. Cain’s second 

opinion after giving great weight to her first opinion. The Court has reviewed each of the grounds 

the Commissioner raises and finds them all without merit. 

With respect to Dr. Wilson, the Commissioner argues two instances of error based on 

mischaracterizations of the language of the Court’s Order. Contrary to the Commissioner’s 

argument, the Court did not state that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had the medical 

conditions severe obesity, degenerative disc disease, myofascial pain syndrome, and fibromyalgia 

sufficed to support Dr. Wilson’s opinion regarding the extent of Plaintiff’s limitations. Rather, 

the Court stated “that there are numerous medical records and opinions that support the 

conclusion that Plaintiff has severe limitations and is incapable of sedentary work; the ALJ herself 

found that Plaintiff had, among other illnesses, severe obesity, degenerative disc disease, 

myofascial pain syndrome, and fibromyalgia.” (Order at 26 citing AR 22.) 

The Commissioner also mischaracterizes the Court’s statements regarding the ALJ’s 

failure to offer specific and legitimate reasons to support her rejection of Dr. Wilson’s opinions 

regarding Plaintiff’s severe manipulative limitations. Finally, the Commissioner’s arguments 

regarding the propriety of the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Wilson’s opinion was conclusory as the 

opinion was expressed on a check-box form ignores that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that checkbox forms that are based on significant experience with the claimant and supported by numerous 

records are ‘entitled to weight that an otherwise unsupported and unexplained check-box form 

would not merit.’” Long v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-05716-SI, 2015 WL 971198, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 3, 2015) (citing to Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013 (9th Cir.2014)). As the Court 

noted, the record shows that Dr. Wilson (and/or Ms. Sonderer) had been treating Plaintiff for 

months prior to completing her disability form. (Order at 27; see also AR 835-852.) Even if the 

treatment was provided by Nurse Sonderer rather than Dr. Wilson, “as a nurse practitioner, [Nurse 

Sonderer] qualified as “an other source[ ]” that can provide evidence about the severity of [a 

claimant’s] impairment(s) and how it affects [the claimant’s] ability to work.” Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1013-14 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d).) The ALJ thus erred in disregarding the check-box 

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form outright without considering that it was supported by Dr. Wilson (and/or Ms. Sonderer)’s 

treatment records and experience with Plaintiff.

The Commissioner’s arguments with respect to Dr. Cain simply rehash arguments were 

made or could have been made in the Commissioner’s response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment. A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate matters or raise new arguments that 

could have been previously presented prior to the entry of judgment. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. 

Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008).

B. The ALJ’s Adverse Credibility Finding was in Error

The Court found that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s pain testimony because she 

failed to set forth specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective 

testimony. (Order at 32 citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 v. F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).) In 

particular, the Court found that the ALJ did not offer clear and convincing evidence in support of 

her conclusion that: (1) the lack of support in the record for Plaintiff’s claims of medication side 

effects including dizziness, drowsiness, and difficulty concentrating justified discounting 

Plaintiff’s pain testimony, (2) Plaintiff was “exceptionally focused on obtaining disability 

benefits”, (3) Plaintiff exaggerated her symptoms, and (4) there was evidence of drug-seeking 

behavior. (Order at 32-35.) The Commissioner’s arguments of error either could have been made 

or were made in opposing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and thus are not the proper 

subject of a Rule 59(e) motion with one exception noted below. See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 

U.S. at 485 n.5. 

In concluding that the “ALJ failed to use specific facts to support her conclusion that 

Plaintiff is not credible due to her drug-seeking behavior, or adequately analyze conflicting 

evidence” (Order at 35), the Court observed that “the ALJ merely wrote a single line that Plaintiff 

exhibited drug-seeking behavior. (AR 29.) She did not cite to specific examples of such behavior, 

or analyze how it demonstrates that Plaintiff is in any less pain than she claims to be.” (Order at 

35.) As the Commissioner points out, the ALJ actually did cite to three examples of alleged drug 

seeking behavior, see AR 31, although none were discussed. The Court’s statement then is only 

partially correct; however, any error does not change the result as the ALJ’s record citations 

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support neither the ALJ’s conclusion nor the Commissioner’s post-hoc rationalization. First, Dr. 

Boorstein’s treatment notes at AR 346 (cited by the ALJ as Exhibit 2F at 22) do not, as the 

Commissioner represents, “document Dr. Boorstein’s belief that Plaintiff should not be taking 

habit forming medication” (Dtk. No. 22 at 14), but instead, conclude that “I will not fill her meds. 

I do not feel soma is appropriate.” Likewise, the emergency room notes at AR 385-386 (cited by

the ALJ at Exhibit 5F at 4) indicate that “she has not received an excessive number of 

prescriptions” and was seeking a refill of her pain medication to carry her through the 10 days 

until she could get an appointment with her primary care facility. (AR 386.) Finally, the note 

from Dr. Pope at AR 788 (cited as Exhibit 17F at 3) simply states that he will no longer be able to 

provide pain management services for Plaintiff. Thus, the Court should have stated that the ALJ

did not cite to any relevant examples of such behavior or explain how it demonstrates that Plaintiff 

is in any less pain that she claims.

C. The Scope of Remand

The Commissioner argues at length that the Court erred in remanding for an award of 

benefits rather than further proceedings to correct the identified errors. In particular, the 

Commissioner urges that that Court erred by not applying the credit as true rule as set forth in the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 

2014), and instead following the rule as set forth in the Ninth Circuit’s decision from four months 

previously in Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019. There is a tension between the Ninth Circuit’s 

application of the credit as true rule in Treichler and that in Garrison. In Treicher, the Court 

stated that district courts must determine “whether there are outstanding issues requiring 

resolution before considering whether to hold that the claimant’s testimony is credible as a matter 

of law. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105 (citing Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020; Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Garrison, the Court stated that courts should “remand for 

further proceedings when, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an 

evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.”

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. 

Under either approach, however, there are no outstanding issues to be determined and 

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remand for an award of benefits is appropriate. The finding of disability here was not based on 

Plaintiff’s testimony alone, but rather, upon a proper determination of her RFC based on her 

cumulative medical impairments, and the Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) testimony that a person with 

Plaintiff’s limitations could not perform any work in the national economy. The Ninth Circuit has 

consistently remanded for an award of benefits in cases where the VE was posed a hypothetical 

that included the RFC that the plaintiff would possess if the improperly discredited opinions or 

testimony were taken as true. See, e.g., Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 

F.3d 1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); Varney v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 

1401.

Here, Dr. Townsend concluded that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in maintaining 

attention and concentration, maintaining regular attendance, and completing a normal workday or 

week. Dr. Cain likewise concluded that Plaintiff would have difficulty with attendance. Dr. 

Wilson concluded that Plaintiff had a number of severe limitations and was not capable of 

performing sedentary work and opined that Plaintiff would need to lie down for four hours every 

day. According to the VE an individual with these limitations—the need to miss three days of 

work per month due to her impairments and lie down for four hours a day—could not find and/or 

maintain gainful employment in the national economy. There are thus “no outstanding issues 

that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made,” such that the Court has 

“discretion to credit [the] claimant’s testimony as true and remand for benefits,” because “it is 

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find [the claimant] disabled were such

evidence credited.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1106 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Further, the record here leaves no serious doubt that Plaintiff is disabled. In addition to all 

the other evidence cited in this and the Court’s prior Order, it is worth noting that Plaintiff’s 

youngest child was removed from her care because she was too disabled to care for him (AR 58), 

and prior to losing her job at Kaiser in 2010, Plaintiff was being accommodated by having three to 

four days off per month (AR 59-60)—an accommodation the Vocational Expert testified would 

make it very difficult for Plaintiff to keep and maintain a job. (AR 72.) The record thus does not 

create “serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the 

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Social Security Act.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. 

As a final matter, the Court notes that as with nearly all of the Commissioner’s arguments,

the arguments she raises regarding the propriety of remand given the outstanding issues to be 

decided could have been raised in her cross-motion for summary judgment. Instead, the 

Commissioner opted not to address the scope of Plaintiff’s request for remand for benefits and 

instead noted only in a footnote that if the Court found reversible error it should remand for further 

proceedings. 

CONCLUSION

As the Commissioner has failed to demonstrate that amendment of the judgment is 

necessary to “correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests” or to “prevent 

manifest injustice,” her motion is DENIED. 

This Order disposes of Docket No. 22.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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