Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01684/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01684-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROMON CALHOUN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF HERCULES POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01684-VC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 49

The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

The Claim Against Officer Collard

There is no genuine factual dispute about the information Officer Collard possessed when 

he decided to arrest Calhoun for violating Section 69 of the California Penal Code. Officer 

Collard relied on information he received from Inspector Chan during their phone conversation. 

No evidence in the record contradicts Collard's deposition testimony about what Chan told him or

otherwise calls into question Collard's credibility. Compare Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1053 

(9th Cir. 2015). 

Calhoun argues that Collard's deposition testimony about his call with Chan is unreliable

(indeed inadmissible) because Collard lacked an independent recollection of the call and merely 

recited facts from his police report. But the record does not indicate that Collard lacked an 

independent recollection. The transcript shows that Collard reviewed his report before the 

deposition, and there is an implication in the transcript that he reviewed the report again during his 

deposition. But there's nothing wrong with an officer refreshing his recollection of an incident by 

reviewing his report, either before or during a deposition. See Fed. R. Evid. 612; Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1376-77 

(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 1997). If, after Collard 

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United States District Court

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reviewed his report, Calhoun's lawyer had asked Collard whether the report refreshed his 

recollection, and if Collard had said no, Collard's testimony about what he'd read in the report 

would not have been admissible. United States v. Weller, 238 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001). 

But Calhoun's lawyer merely asked Collard whether he independently recalled the incident before

reviewing his report, to which Collard responded "very little." On that kind of record, without any 

real indication that Collard lacked an independent memory of the incident after refreshing his 

recollection with his report, there's no basis for concluding that his testimony about his call with 

Chan was unreliable or inadmissible, such that a material factual dispute exists about what took 

place in that conversation.1 

Calhoun also argues that Collard was not entitled to rely solely on information from Chan

because Collard had no basis for believing that Chan was reliable. But Chan was not some 

anonymous or otherwise unreliable informant. Compare Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 

919-20 (9th Cir. 2009). He was a county welfare investigator who was reporting the commission 

of a crime against him while he attempted to perform his duties. Nothing in the record suggests 

that Collard should have, at the time the call took place, questioned Chan's credibility or 

reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 2005); Panetta v. 

Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir. 2006). To put it another way, even if Chan lied or 

exaggerated in his own incident report and in his conversation with Collard about what happened 

at the apartment, there's no evidence in the record that would have given Collard reason to believe 

Chan was lying or exaggerating.

2

 

Whether probable cause actually existed to arrest Calhoun for violating Section 69 based 

 

1

If Calhoun's lawyer was concerned that Collard was responding to questions merely by reading 

the report out loud (which Calhoun's lawyer asserted at oral argument but which is not reflected in 

the transcript), the lawyer might have asked Collard if he was able to put aside his report before 

continuing his testimony, or otherwise found a way to make a record that might have helped 

support a claim that Collard lacked an independent recollection. 

2 Nor, for that matter, is there any evidence in the record to support Calhoun's apparent contention 

that Chan lied in his own incident report but then chose to tell the truth in his phone conversation 

with Collard (i.e., "Officer Collard, I realize I've never met you before, and I realize this guy 

Calhoun didn't violate Section 69, but he gave me attitude so I want you to help me trump up some 

charges against him.").

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on what Chan told Collard is perhaps a close question. On the one hand, Chan's statements to 

Collard could be interpreted to mean that Calhoun didn't actually threaten Chan with violence and 

that Chan merely "felt" threatened from a subjective standpoint. This wouldn't have been enough

for probable cause, because the statute has been interpreted to require the suspect to actually make 

a threat of violence. See, e.g., People v. Iboa, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 143, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). On 

the other hand, it might have been reasonable for Collard to conclude that Calhoun did intend to 

threaten Chan with violence by displaying a gun on his lap and telling Chan to get out of the 

house, even though Calhoun didn't point the gun at Chan or otherwise utter an explicit verbal 

threat. 

There is no case on point. The case on which Collard primarily relies involved a far more 

obvious threat of violence by civilians against executive officers. Iboa, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d at 149. 

But in the case on which Calhoun primarily relies, Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2008), it was equally obvious that the civilian did not threaten the officers with violence. This 

case is somewhere in the middle, and Calhoun can point to no case that would come close to 

compelling a conclusion that his conduct did not constitute a threat of violence within the meaning 

of Section 69. In other words, it was not obvious at the time of the incident (or now) that Collard 

lacked probable cause to arrest Calhoun for violating Section 69 based on what Chan reported, and 

therefore Collard is entitled to qualified immunity. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. 

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011); 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 

Monell Liability

Even if Collard arrested Calhoun without probable cause, the City of Hercules would not

be liable as a matter of law because there is no evidence that the alleged constitutional violation 

was pursuant to a municipal custom, policy, or practice. Calhoun's only argument on this issue is 

that Collard's superiors ratified his conduct by approving Collard's incident report. But Calhoun 

hasn't produced any evidence, or even argued, that those superiors were "policymakers" within the 

meaning of the Monell doctrine, such that their approval of the report would give rise to municipal 

liability. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) ("To show ratification, a plaintiff 

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must prove that the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it."

(quotation omitted)); Portnoy v. City of Woodland, 2013 WL 2156560, at *20 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 

2013) aff'd, 2015 WL 3390311 (9th Cir. 2015). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2015

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

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