Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00622/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00622-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 Because Perry’s Complaint is not consecutively paginated,

the Court will use the page numbers assigned by the electronic case

filing system.

1 09cv622 LAB (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DANIEL PERRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLORIA GARCIA, D. BROWN, E.

DUARTA, M. WIERZBICKY, J.

VALDEZ, R. JACKSON, G.

PEDERSON, E. CONTRERAS, C.

FERNANDEZ, 

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 09cv622 LAB (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND ORDER DENYING

MOTION TO STRIKE [DOC. NO. 35]

Plaintiff Robert Daniel Perry, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on March 25, 2009,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [doc. no. 1].1

 A summons was returned

unexecuted for Defendants Gloria Garcia, C. Fernandez, R. Jackson,

J. Valdez, and E. Contreras [doc. nos. 14, 16-19]. Defendants M.

Wierzbicky, D. Brown, E. Duarta, and G. Pederson waived service of

the summons [doc. nos. 25-28]. Plaintiff has filed several Motions

for Default Judgment against Defendants, which were all denied or

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rejected by United States District Judge Larry Allen Burns [doc.

nos. 13, 15, 20, 23, 29, 31-34, 37-40, 46, 49]. 

On February 16, 2010, the four appearing Defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Motion, an attached exhibit, and Declarations from

J. Walker, D. Foston, and G. Pederson and exhibits [doc. no. 35]. 

The next day, the Court issued a Klingele/Rand Notice advising

Perry of Defendants’ pending Motion to Dismiss for failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies and allowing him time to

present any evidence demonstrating exhaustion [doc. no. 36]. 

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, titled

“Plaintiff Exhausted all of his Administrative Remedies,” was filed

on March 10, 2010 [doc. no. 41]. 

On March 22, 2010, Defendant E. Contreras filed a Joinder to

Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 42]. The Court issued a second

Klingele/Rand Notice and gave Perry additional time to oppose the

Motion and submit evidence [doc. no. 44]. Plaintiff’s second

Opposition, also titled “Plaintiff Exhausted All of his

Administrative Remedies,” was filed on March 26, 2010 [doc. no.

45].

The Court finds Defendants’ Motion suitable for decision

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). The

Court has reviewed the Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and

attachments, Defendant Contreras’s Joinder, and Plaintiff’s

Oppositions. For the reasons set forth below, the district court

should GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently a prisoner at the Folsom State Prison

(“Folsom”); however, the allegations in his Complaint arise from

events that occurred while he was incarcerated at Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) between April 2 and June

10, 2008. (Compl. 1.)

In count one, Perry argues that on April 2, 2008, he completed

an emergency dental request form. (Id. at 4.) He explains that he

“ran into the dentist office demanding treatment” due to serious

dental pain. (Id.) The dentist refused to treat him so he “made

so much noise that Correctional Sergeant [Brown], Correctional

Officer [Duarta] and Correctional Officer [Jackson] rushed [him] to

the ground and put [him] in handcuffs.” (Id.) Then Duarta and

Jackson beat and kicked him while Brown yelled racial obscenities. 

(Id.) Perry contends that he threatened to sue Defendants for

“$100 million for assault and battery, a violent hate crime and

medical negligence.” (Id.) He claims to have been taken to the

administrative segregation unit where he was beaten and kicked

again. (Id.) After two days in the “AD/SEG hospital,” Perry was

“blindfolded and put in a wheel chair and taken back to [his]

cell.” (Id.) He was told to drop his lawsuit and not to talk

about the incident or the Defendants would kill him. (Id.)

In count two, Plaintiff alleges that on April 17, 2008, an

announcement was made over the loud-speaker for him to report to

the main office. (Id. at 5.) Upon his arrival, Defendant Brown

placed him in handcuffs and leg restraints; then Brown, Wierzbicky,

and Jackson brought him into a room where Defendants Valdez,

Contreras, and Garcia were waiting. (Id.) Warden Garcia told

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Perry to drop his lawsuit or “[he’s] a dead man.” (Id.) Perry

responded with profanity, and Garcia slapped him. (Id.) Plaintiff

explained that he needed to see a dentist due to severe pain and

mouth disease, and he was going to sue “for $100 million for

conspiracy to cover up [his] lawsuit, medical malpractice, medical

negligence, cruel and unusual punishment and [he explained that he]

had already started [his] lawsuit.” (Id.) Then, Defendants Brown,

Jackson, and Wierzbicky beat and kicked him. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that the beating continued for fifteen minutes until Brown

took him back to the main office, wrote a rules violation report

against him, removed the restraints, and sent Perry back to his

cell. (Id.)

In count three, Perry asserts that on June 10, 2008, his gums

were infected and bleeding, so he went to the dentist’s office and

demanded treatment. (Id. at 6.) The dentist and his staff refused

to treat him, and Defendants Wierzbicky, Jackson, Duarta, and Brown

placed him in handcuffs and leg restraints. (Id.) Lieutenant

Pederson ordered Defendants to take Plaintiff to his cell block

where they placed him in “a cage.” (Id.) Defendants gathered his

legal and personal property. (Id.) They put Perry in the

administrative segregation unit where Defendants beat and kicked

him while Brown yelled racial obscenities at Perry. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that Brown hit him on the head and neck with a

four-foot stick for about fifteen minutes until the stick broke. 

(Id.) Defendants continued to beat and kick him for another thirty

minutes to an hour. (Id. at 6-7.) Each Defendant kicked and spat

on him; then Defendants Pederson, Wierzbicky, Jackson, Duarta, and

Brown yelled racial profanities at Perry while warning him not to

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sue the prison. (Id. at 7.) Lieutenant Pederson told the other

Defendants, “Now let’s go destroy his property.” (Id.) Plaintiff

never saw his property again. (Id.) He was placed in the

administrative segregation unit’s hospital for two weeks until he

was released by the doctor on June 24, 2008. (Id.) Upon his

release, Perry tried to commit suicide. (Id.) He was taken back

to the hospital and was provided sleeping medication. (Id.) When

he awoke, he had been transferred to Folsom. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

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most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The test is not whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there “is no

cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged

to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))

(stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “‘is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged[]’”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

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When resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside the

pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197

n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120

F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v. Gen.

Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). “The focus of

any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider,

151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of “new”

allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a

motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993).

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

The court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading . . . .” Branch v.

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir. 2002); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312,

1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

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Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “‘unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where

amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial

of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

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C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Brown, Duarta, Wierzbicky, Pederson, and Contreras

move to dismiss Perry’s Complaint. (Mot. Dismiss 1; Def. Contreras

Joinder 1.) Defendants assert Plaintiff failed to exhaust the

administrative remedies for his claims. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 5-8.) In addition, they argue that Plaintiff’s

allegations regarding attempted murder and a violent hate crime

should be stricken because Plaintiff cannot initiate criminal

charges against them. (Id. at 8.) Defendants contend they are

immune from a suit for damages against them in their official

capacities. (Id. at 8-9.) They maintain that Perry’s state law

claim is barred because he failed to file a tort claim with the

Victim’s Compensation Government Claim Board. (Id. at 9-11.) 

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to

injunctive relief. (Id. at 11-12.) 

A. Exhaustion

1. Motion to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the 

Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

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prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (citation omitted). 

“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk[]’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b). Id. (citations omitted).

Unlike motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for

which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond

the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20

(citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837

F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)) (footnote omitted). Courts have

discretion regarding the method they use to resolve such factual

disputes. Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369 (citations omitted). “A court

ruling on a motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of

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‘matters of public record.’” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d

926, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d at 688 (citations omitted)). But “if the district court looks

beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that

[the plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a

record.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

“[When] the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d

at 368 n.3). 

2. The Administrative Grievance Process

“The California Department of Corrections [“CDC”] provides a

four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal

level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the

Director’s level.” Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative

appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5,

and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations. See Brown, 422

F.3d at 929-30 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a),

3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c)). 

To comply with the CDC’s administrative grievance procedure,

an inmate must file his grievance at the informal level “within 15

working days of the event or decision being appealed . . . .” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2009); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at

929. An inmate must proceed through all levels of the

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administrative grievance process before initiating a § 1983 suit in

federal court. See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051.

A prisoner’s grievances must be “sufficient under the

circumstances to put the prison on notice of the potential claims

and to fulfill the basic purposes of the exhaustion requirement.” 

Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

Exhaustion serves several important goals, including “allowing a

prison to address complaints about the program it administers

before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent

complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation

that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (citing Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 88-91 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524

(2002)). 

3. Plaintiff’s Failure To Exhaust

 Defendants argue that Perry attempted to exhaust his

administrative remedies for his dental care claims, but he never

alleged that there had been “beatings, property confiscation,

institution wide conspiracies, attempted murder, and all other

allegations advanced in the complaint.” (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 7.) Defendants explain that Perry filed two

grievances regarding dental care at the Director’s level, but both

were screened out. (Id.) One grievance had added a new demand for

payment of $5,000,000, and the other was submitted directly to the

third level of review in an attempt to bypass prison procedures. 

(Id.) Thus, Perry failed to properly exhausted his administrative

remedies. (Id. at 8); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 

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2 Perry claims that prison officials stole his completed

grievance forms, but in his Oppositions, he does not explain

whether the grievance and appeals Defendants submit along with the

Motion to Dismiss are copies of the forms he claims he no longer

possesses. (Opp’n 2, Mar. 26, 2010.)

13 09cv622 LAB (RBB)

Perry alleges in his Complaint that he “did everything on a

timely basis[.] [His] appeal form 602 was denied at all 3 levels. 

[He] sought medical dental help. [He] was refused treatment time

after time . . . .” (Compl. 8.) In his first Opposition,

Plaintiff declares his statements are true and correct and explains

that “[he] exhausted all of [his] administrative remedies . . . .” 

(Opp’n 1, Mar. 10, 2010.) In his second Opposition, Perry again

declares that his statements are true and correct and argues, “[he]

exhausted all of his administrative remedies on or about June 10,

2008 when [he] was [prevented] from seeking dental treatment

. . . .” (Opp’n 1, Mar. 26, 2010.) Plaintiff reiterates the

allegations in his Complaint and asserts that “among the property

that was stolen on or about June 10, 2008 was 3 completed appeals

forms for [his] dental care, hospital care, [and] assaults . . . .” 

(Id. at 2.) 

a. Dental Care Claims

In ruling on Defendants’ Motion, the Court may “look beyond

the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369). Although Plaintiff did

not provide a copy of any 602 with either of his Oppositions,

Defendants submitted copies of Perry’s grievance and appeals as

exhibits to the Declarations of J. Walker, chief of the third level

appeal -- health care, and G. Pederson, appeals coordinator at

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility.2 (Mot. Dismiss Attach.

#2 Decl. Walker Exs. A-D; id. Attach. #4 Decl. Pederson Exs. A-B.) 

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3 Appeals Coordinator of Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility, G. Pederson, also submitted a copy of this grievance

along with his Declaration. (Id. Attach. #4 Decl. Pederson Ex. B.) 

14 09cv622 LAB (RBB)

In his informal grievance dated February 21, 2008, Perry

alleged that he had filed an emergency dental request form two

months earlier and was told he would be re-ducated, but “it [was]

two months later and [he has] not been called.”3 (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #2 Decl. Walker Ex. A at 1.) Plaintiff explained it “[was]

an urgent emergency [because he had] ‘pyorrhea of the gums’ due to

excessive plaque build up over the last ten years.” (Id.) Perry

listed his symptoms as inflamed gums, bleeding during brushing, and

foul smelling breath; he described the negative effect his dental

problems had on his relationship with cellmates. (Id.) Perry

concluded by asserting that “[Donovan was] not providing [him]

constitutionally adequate dental treatment.” (Id.) He requested

“an Emergency Dental Appointment” and that his teeth be cleaned and

that he be provided Penicillin. (Id.)

On March 3, 2008, Plaintiff’s grievance form was returned to

him after being partially granted; it stated, “You were seen and

examined on [February 22, 2008] by the facility dentist; oral

hygiene instructions [were] given to you. You are considered a

Dental Priority 3, treatment within one year. You will be ducated

in chronological order for treatment.” (Id.) 

Perry appealed this decision on March 6, 2008, asserting, “I

am totally dissatisfied: last week I was called into the dental

office and I was told that I would be re-ducated for a dentist

appointment. [My] dental condition is an emergency [and] I need my

teeth cleaned immediately.” (Id.) He complained that the proposed

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year delay in treatment was “a convenient method for [Donovan]

dental to evade providing [him] emergency treatment.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff also asserted that he had “hoof and mouth disease.” 

(Id.) 

At the first formal level, his appeal was reviewed, partially

granted, and returned to him on May 13, 2008. (Id. at 2.) The

appeal decision reiterated that Perry had been examined on February

22, 2008, and a treatment plan was formulated at that time. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was again informed that he was categorized as a priority

level three and would receive treatment within a year. (Id.) He

was also informed, “If you have a dental emergency, contact your

supervisor or building officer, or complete a health care service

request form (CDC 7362).” (Id.)

Perry was dissatisfied with this response and appealed to the

second level of review on June 2, 2008, stating, “[Donovan] medical

[and] dental staff[‘s] continued [refusal] to provide me dental

treatment for my serious condition does constitute deliberate

indifference [and] I will file a Federal Civil Right[s] Action

under U.S.C. § 1983. You state above [that my] 602 is granted. 

This is frivolous.” (Id.)

His second level appeal was again partially granted and

returned to Perry on July 3, 2008. (Id.) In a separate letter

containing the appeal response, Plaintiff’s initial request and

subsequent treatment on February 22, 2008, were referenced, and it

was noted that Perry was also “seen and treated on May 21, 2008 and

tooth #30 was filled and [he] was instructed to submit a Health

Care Service Request Form (CDC 7362) for a comprehensive

examination and treatment plan.” (Id. Ex. B at 1.) The appeal

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4

 Chief of Inmate Appeals Branch, D. Foston explains that he

had no record of accepting or rejecting any third level appeal from

Perry from April 2, 2008, through the present, but “[t]he Office of

Third Level Medical Appeals –- Health Care, started receiving and

reviewing medical appeals in August of 2008 . . . .” (Id. Attach.

#3 Decl. Foston 2, 4; id. Ex. A.) 

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response also explained that Perry was “pending an appointment”

with the dental facility. (Id.) But on June 24, 2008, he was

transferred to Folsom. (Id.) 

On August 20, 2008, the Office of Third Level Appeals –-

Health Care sent a letter to Perry explaining it had “received an

appeal from [him] and [had] determined that it [did] not comply

with appeal procedures . . . and [was] being screened-out and

returned . . . .”4 (Id. Ex. C. at 1.) Perry’s Director’s level

appeal was screened out because he “submitted an appeal for Third

Level Review that contain[ed] a new request.” (Id.) The letter

stated, “Your new medical issues, request for $5,000,000.00 for

pain and suffering, must be submitted on a new CDCR for 602-HC to

the Health Appeals Coordinator at your institution for processing.” 

(Id.) The letter also explained that “[t]o submit your appeal for

Third Level review, please line out your request for the

$5,000,000.00 for pain and suffering, initial, and return all

documentation, including this letter to the Office of Third Level

Appeals.” (Id.) 

On September 10, 2008, the Office of Third Level Appeals –-

Health Care sent a second letter to Perry explaining it had

“received an appeal from [Perry] and [had] determined that it [did]

not comply with the appeal procedures . . . and [was] being

screened-out and returned to [him] . . . .” (Id. Ex. D at 1.) 

Plaintiff was informed that his appeal was incomplete. (Id.) The

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letter explained, “You have added the new demand for payment of

$5,000,000.00 for pain and suffering to your originally submitted

appeal. Please line out on this appeal document your request for

$5,000,000.00; initial and return . . . for continued processing.” 

(Id. (emphasis omitted).) The letter also stated, “You have

submitted a new CDC Form 602. Please submit this appeal to the

Health Care Appeals Coordinator at your institution for review and

processing. If you are still not satisfied after the Second Level

of Review, you may then submit your appeal to this office for

continued processing.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) 

Thus, Perry completed the informal, first level of appeal, and

second level of appeal for his grievance regarding dental care, but

his appeals were screened out at the Director’s level. CDC

administrative procedures are not properly exhausted until an

inmate has pursued a grievance through all available levels of

review. Brown, 422 F.3d at 935; Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181,

1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Hazleton, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 929 (citations

omitted). Perry could have resubmitted his original appeal to the

third level without the additional claim for monetary damages or he

could have initiated and pursued through all levels of review a new

grievance including both his dental claim and a claim for damages. 

Instead, he chose to file this lawsuit. Because Plaintiff did not

follow prison grievance policies, the dental care and appended

claims are unexhausted.

Existing Ninth Circuit case law directs the district court to

dismiss unexhausted claims without prejudice. Vaden, 449 F.3d at

1051 (citing Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120). But Vaden and Wyatt were

decided prior to Woodford. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in

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Woodford, it may no longer be appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint with leave to amend if it is too late for Perry to

properly exhaust administrative remedies. An inmate must submit

his grievance “within 15 working days” of the unacceptable lower

level decision. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). But the

letters from the Office of Third Level Appeals –- Health Care do

not refer to that deadline. Although it appears that Plaintiff has

exceeded the amount of time available to him, the August 20 and

September 10, 2008 letters instructing him on how to cure the

deficiencies in his Director’s Level appeals do not expressly limit

the time in which he may do so. It is uncertain whether a future

attempt by Perry to cure the noted deficiencies will be rejected as

untimely. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #3 Decl. Foston 3-4 n.1.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s dental care claims should be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

b. All Other Claims

Defendants Wierzbicky, Brown, Duarta, Pederson, and Contreras

also move to dismiss Perry’s Complaint because he has not submitted

any grievances against them. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

8.) They explain that the unexhausted grievance regarding dental

care does name any of them and is “silent as to any alleged

beating, property confiscation, institution wide conspiracies,

attempted murder, and all other allegations advanced in his

complaint.” (Id. at 7.)

Defendants have provided three declarations asserting that

Perry did not submit any grievances naming or referring to

Defendants Wierzbicky, Brown, Duarta, Pederson, and Contreras, or

alleging the incidents described in the Complaint that occurred on

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5 As noted above, during the relevant time period any claims

regarding medical care would have gone to the Third Level Appeal --

Health Care rather than the Inmate Appeals Branch. (Id. at 2.) 

Even so, Foston searched his records, but the search yielded no

results. 

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April 2, 17, and June 10, 2008. (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Walker 3;

Attach. #3 Decl. Foston 3-4; Attach. #4 Decl. Pederson 3; see also

Compl. 1, 4-7.) 

Chief of the Third Level Appeal -- Health Care, Walker,

searched for any grievances for the period of April 2, 2008,

through June 10, 2008, alleging that “Defendants[] Garcia, Brown,

Durta, Wierzbicky, Valdez, Jackson, Pederson, and Contreras, were

deliberately indifferent to Perry’s safety when they conspired

against him and inflicted upon him several retaliatory beatings.” 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Decl. Walker 2-3.) Walker noted the two

grievances regarding dental care but concluded that “Plaintiff

failed to submit an appeal to this Office regarding injuries

through use of force against [Perry] and did not submit any appeals

during the complained about time period.” (Id. at 3.)

Chief of Inmate Appeals Branch, Foston, also searched for any

grievances regarding the relevant time period that named any

Defendant for claims “relating to [Perry’s] dental treatment,

conspiracy, deliberate indifference to his safety, and medical

negligence . . . .” (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #3 Decl. Foston 3.) 

Foston concluded that “Perry [had] no appeals that were rejected

between April 2, 2008 and present. . . . [T]he Inmate Appeals

Branch [had] not accepted any Third Level appeal from Plaintiff

relating to [the claims stated in the Complaint]. Therefore, any

claims resulting from said incident are unexhausted.”5 (Id. at

4.) 

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Appeals Coordinator Pederson also searched for any grievances

during the relevant time period, naming any Defendant in claims

that they “were deliberately indifferent to [Perry’s] safety when

they conspired against him and inflicted upon him several

retaliatory beatings.” (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #4 Decl. Pederson 3.) 

Pederson noted the February 21, 2008 grievance relating to dental

care and concluded that “[a] thorough search of our records . . .

revealed that Plaintiff did not file an appeal against [Defendants]

relating to allegations of deliberate indifference to his safety or

excessive force, or injuries from retaliatory beatings.” (Id. at

3.) 

Perry attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies

regarding inadequate dental care. He did not, however, mention

Defendants by name or reference in his grievance and did not assert

the factual allegations that are described in his Complaint. (Id.

Attach. #2 Decl. Walker Exs. A-D; id. Attach. #4 Decl. Pederson

Exs. A-B.) Plaintiff made no charges of “conspiracy to cover up a

lawsuit, attempted murder, a violent hate crime, cruel and unusual

punishment, [and an] Eighth Amendment rights violation.” (Compl.

2-3.) Perry explains the absence of administrative grievances for

these claims with a self-serving statement that he exhausted all of

his administrative remedies and that on June 10, 2008, three

completed appeal forms were stolen from him. (See Opp’n 1, Mar.

10, 2010; Opp’n 1-2, Mar. 26, 2010.)

“[E]xhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an

individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones v.

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). “Prisoners need comply only with

the prison’s own grievance procedures to properly exhaust . . . .” 

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Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing

Jones, 549 U.S. at 218). A prisoner in California is not required

to name all defendants in his grievance but must “describe the

problem and action requested.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.2(a) (2006); see also Thorns v. Ryan, No. 07-CV-00218-H (AJB),

2009 WL 230035, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (citing Lewis v.

Mitchell, 416 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941-45 (S.D. Cal. 2005)); Jensen v.

Knowles, No. 2:02-cv-02373 JKS P, 2008 WL 5156694, at *4 (E.D. Cal.

Dec. 9, 2008) (explaining that a prisoner in California is not

required to “expressly name the defendant[]”). “[W]hen a prison’s

grievance procedures are silent or incomplete as to factual

specificity, ‘a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the

nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” Griffin, 557

F.3d at 1120 (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.

2002)). 

Even reading Perry’s grievance in the light most favorable to

him, the grievance regarding dental care does not describe the

“problem and action requested” for other claims in his Complaint or

state a claim against these Defendants. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.2(a); Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1119. 

Perry has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies for

his claims and assertions of conspiracy, attempted murder, a

violent hate crime, cruel and unusual punishment, and Eighth

Amendment violations alleged in his Complaint, and the Motion to

Dismiss should be GRANTED. 

It may no longer be appropriate to dismiss this Complaint with

leave to amend if it is too late for Perry to properly exhaust

administrative remedies. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95. A prisoner

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would “have little incentive to comply with the system’s procedural

rules unless noncompliance carries a sanction.” Id. Plaintiff is

in that situation. Because a grievance against Defendants was not

filed within fifteen working days of the action being challenged,

any attempt to file it now is untimely. See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.6(c).

Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are limited. See

Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. In Booth, the Supreme Court explained, 

“Thus, we think that Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly

enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures.” Id. (citing McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144) (footnote

omitted). “‘Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is

required[.]’” Id. (quoting McCarthy, id.) Booth and Woodford

effectively eliminated most exceptions to exhaustion. 

An inmate must file his grievance “within 15 working days” of

the event being appealed. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). 

Perry’s injury and interactions with Defendants occurred between

April 2 and June 10, 2008, over two years ago; Plaintiff no longer

has time to exhaust his administrative remedies against Defendants. 

See id.; (Compl. 1.) There are no applicable exceptions to the

exhaustion requirement. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s

Complaint against Defendants Wierzbicky, Brown, Duarta, Pederson,

and Contreras, none of whom appear to be involved in Plaintiff’s

dental care, should be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

B. Motion to Strike Allegations of Criminal Conduct

Perry’s Complaint asserts that Defendants Wierzbicky, Jackson,

Brown, Duarta, and Pederson attempted to murder him and committed a

violent hate crime against him. (Compl. 2-3.) This assertion is

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detailed in the remainder of his Complaint. (Id. at 4-7.) 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding attempted

murder and a violent hate crime should be stricken because

“individuals cannot initiate criminal charges in civil court

. . . .” (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8 (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 2).) They do not cite the specific page and line

references they seek to strike.

It is well established that a private citizen has no authority

to initiate a federal criminal prosecution; that power is vested

exclusively in the executive branch. See Morrison v. Olson, 487

U.S. 654, 705 (1988); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693

(1974); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating

that only the United States as prosecutor can bring a criminal

complaint under RICO). Additionally, § 1983 allows a prisoner to

file a civil action where he has been deprived “any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

. . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Attempted murder and a violent hate

crime are criminal charges, not properly part of a civil action. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West Supp. 2010); id. §§ 422.75, 664

(West 2008). 

But Defendants read Perry’s Complaint too narrowly. “To

prevail on this motion to strike, the movant must clearly show that

the challenged matter ‘has no bearing on the subject matter of the

litigation and that its inclusion will prejudice the defendants.’” 

2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.37[3], at

12-129 (3d ed. 2010) (footnote omitted). The summary references to

“attempted murder” and “a violent hate crime” correspond to factual

allegations in the Complaint. (See Compl. 4-7.) A plaintiff’s

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reference to a “hate crime” in a civil rights complaint is not

uncommon. (See, e.g., Hubbard v. Folsom State Prison, No. Civ. S07-2562 MCE DAD PS (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2008) (noting that “reference

to hate crimes suggests that [Plaintiff] may be attempting to

allege civil rights violations . . . .”) In another context, the

court denied a motion to strike a discussion of an organized crime

figure and alleged illegal activity of some defendants. See First

City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 730 F. Supp. 501, 514

(E.D.N.Y. 1990). Thus, Defendants’ request to strike the

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint that refer to attempted murder

and a violent hate crime is DENIED. See Brace v. IBM, 953 F. Supp.

561, 563 n.1 (D. Vt. 1997) (noting that motion to strike is

nondispositive and within the pretrial authority of magistrate

judges). 

C. Immunity

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants Wierzbicky, Brown, Duarta, Pederson, and Contreras 

argue that they “are immune to suit for damages in their official

capacity.” (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8-9.) The

Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private civil

suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d

512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.

1998). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official

capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit

against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.

464, 471 (1985)). 

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Plaintiff makes claims against all Defendants in their

individual and official capacities. (Compl. 2-3.) He seeks

injunctive and monetary relief from each. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff’s

claim for monetary damages is properly alleged against Defendants

in their individual capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 166 (1985). But the claims against them in their official

capacities are claims against the State of California, which is

absolutely immune from liability for damages. See Brandon, 469

U.S. at 471. 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity,

and their Motion to Dismiss monetary claims against them in their

official capacities should be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. If

Perry is permitted to proceed with his Complaint, he may only seek

monetary damages from Defendants in their individual capacities. 

D. California Tort Claims Act

Defendants assert that Perry’s allegation regarding stolen

property is barred because it is a supplemental state law claim,

and Plaintiff failed to properly file a tort claim with the Victim

Compensation and Government Claims Board. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 9.) Defendants have provided a copy of a January 23,

2009 letter addressed to Perry from the Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board which explains that Plaintiff’s claim was

not presented to the Board until after the six-month claim filing

period had expired. (Id. Ex. A 1.) Attached to the letter is

Perry’s claim form which was received by the Board on January 16,

2009; Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred from Donovan to

Folsom, but he never received his property. (Id. at 6.) Perry’s

claim form also included two grievance forms asserting that he was

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transferred on June 23, 2008, but he never received his property

after transfer. (Id. at 7, 9.) 

When adjudicating a supplemental state law claim, this Court

must apply state substantive law. United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Under the California Tort Claims

Act, filing a tort claim within the time and in the manner

prescribed by statute is a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit

against any state employee or agency. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§

905.2, 911.2 (West Supp. 2010); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 945.4, 950.2

(West 1995). A tort claim must be filed within six months of when

the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. This

applies to “injur[ies] resulting from an act or omission [of a

public employee] in the scope of his employment as a public

employee . . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2. 

In his Complaint, Perry alleges that Defendants stole his

property on June 10, 2008. (Compl. 6-7.) In his claim to the

Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, Plaintiff asserts

his property was never returned to him after his transfer on June

23, 2008. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. Ex. A 6-7, 9.) 

His tort claim was received by the Board on January 16, 2009, over

six months after either June 10 or 23, 2008. (Id. at 1, 6.) Perry

has not provided any evidence that he submitted a tort claim within

the time and in the manner prescribed by statute. Thus, he did not

fulfill a prerequisite to bringing his state claim. Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claim should

be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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E. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants “to stay

1000 yards away from [him], [and] reimburse [him] $500,000 for all

[his] property that R.J. Donovan officials destroyed.” (Compl. 9.) 

Defendants Wierzbicky, Brown, Duarta, Pederson, and Contreras

assert that Perry’s Complaint “does not meet the standard for

entitlement to injunctive relief . . . .” (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 11.) They explain that an injunction is not necessary

because Perry has been transferred to Folsom State Prison. (Id.) 

“[M]oreover, the remainder of plaintiff’s request is a demand for

monetary compensation, in addition to the compensatory and punitive

damages he demands.” (Id.) Defendants also contend that Perry

“fails to allege any ongoing or prospective violations of his

constitutional rights, but instead seeks compensation for past

wrongs . . . .” (Id.) 

Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that is appropriate

where the plaintiff can show he will suffer a “likelihood of

substantial and immediate irreparable injury” if an injunction is

not granted. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1049

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422

U.S. 922, 932 (1975). 

The traditional criteria for granting an injunction are “‘(1)

a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the possibility

of irreparable injury to the plaintiffs if injunctive relief is not

granted; (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiffs; and

(4) advancement of the public interest.’” Mayweathers v. Newland,

258 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Textile Unltd., Inc. v.

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A.BMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001). Under the

alternative test for granting injunctive relief, the Court examines

whether “serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships

tips sharply in favor of the moving party.” Stuhlbarg Intern.

Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d

1394, 1397 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997)). Under either measure, this

Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.

As Defendants correctly observe, Perry’s remedies are limited

by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 11-12.) Section 3626(a)(1) of the Act states, “Prospective

relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall

extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18

U.S.C.A. § 3626(a) (West 2006). This statutory restriction limits

available relief. 

Plaintiff requests an injunction preventing Defendants from

coming within one thousand yards of him. (Compl. 9.) The Court

does not have jurisdiction to issue wide-reaching injunctions that

extend beyond any actual injury suffered by a plaintiff. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 357. “The remedy must of course be limited to the

inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has

established.” Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88,

89 (1995)).

Perry has also failed to demonstrate that he may suffer an

imminent injury. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-

02, the Court explained that “[t]he plaintiff must show that he

‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some

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direct injury’ as a result of the challenged official conduct and

the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’

not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Plaintiff is no longer

housed at Donovan, the location where the Defendants are employed. 

(Compl. 2-5.) Thus, he has failed to demonstrate an imminent

injury. 

Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief unless he can

show that he will suffer substantial and immediate irreparable

injury for which there is an inadequate remedy at law. Easyriders

Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“Under any formulation of the test [for injunctive relief],

plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat

of irreparable injury.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g

Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). Perry has made no

showing of irreparable harm. In addition, because he is no longer

housed at Donovan, Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive

relief directed at these Defendants.

Additionally, “[i]t is a basic doctrine of equity

jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . when the

moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer

irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Morales v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (quotations omitted)

(citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974); Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971)). Perry seeks compensation as

part of his request for an injunction; he has a remedy at law to

recover monetary damages. Thus, equitable relief is not

appropriate. 

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Nevertheless, Rule 12(b)(6) does not provide for striking

prayers for relief, and Rule 12(f) does not apply to Perry’s

request for injunctive relief. At this stage, Defendants’

arguments are premature. If Plaintiff prevails on any claim, the

parties may then litigate the appropriate remedy. See, e.g.,

Mariscal v. Aqua Supreme, No. C 09-3279 JF(RS), 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 121033, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2009). For all these

reasons, Defendants’ request to strike Perry’s prayer for

injunctive relief is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies should be GRANTED. Perry’s claims regarding inadequate

dental care should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND, but Perry’s other claims relating to conspiracy, attempted

murder, a violent hate crime, cruel and unusual punishment, and

Eighth Amendment violations should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Additionally, Defendants’ request to strike the allegations

regarding attempted murder and a violent hate crime as well as

Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be DENIED. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss monetary claims against them in their

official capacities as well as Plaintiff’s supplemental state law

claim regarding his property should also be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 16, 2010. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before August 30, 2010. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: July 16, 2010 _____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

All Parties of Record

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