Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00744/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00744-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 1 Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-13,this order shall notbe cited except as provided by Civ.

L. R. 3-4(e).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM TAVAKE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 05-0744 PJH

v. ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS

AND TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED

ALAMEDA COUNTY BOARD OF COMPLAINT

SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before this court are the motions to dismiss and to strike filed by defendants Alameda

County Board of Supervisors, Tona Henninger, Barbara Bowman, and Chris Carmine

(collectively, “Alameda County defendants”), and defendants Arthur and Rebecca Durazo. 

Having read the papers and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court rules as

follows.1

BACKGROUND

Pro per plaintiffs Sam and Tami Tavake have sued the defendants for violating their

constitutional rights in connection with various searches made of their ranch for zoning

violations. 

Previously, this court granted leave to amend only to state Fourth Amendment claims

as to defendants Alameda County, Henninger, and Bowman based on the August 20, 2004

search only; Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims as to Alameda County, and §

1983 claims against the Durazos. All other claims were to be dismissed (including the claims

against Alameda County for denying their conditional use permit, time-barred claims under
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For the Northern District of California

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2 The FAC does notnumbertheircauses of actionconsecutively. For convenience,

the court will refer to each claim by the number used in the FAC. 

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the Fourth Amendment, the substantive due process claims, and conspiracy claims against

the Durazos, among others). June 17 Order at 12. 

The Tavakes have now filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”), in which they claim

that they have been discriminated against because of their inter-ethnic relationship (Sam

Tavake is Tongan/Samoan and Tami is Caucasian), and because they rent to Latino tenants. 

The Tavakes rename previously-dismissed defendant Chris Carmine as a defendant in the

FAC, claiming that Carmine ordered the August 20, 2004 search. 

The Tavakes number their claims in accordance with the numbering in their previous

complaint. They thus reallege in the “second” cause of action their Fourth Amendment claims

against the Alameda County defendants, claiming that the search was illegal and that it was

racially motivated.2 The Tavakes next claim in the “third” cause of action that they were

discriminated against on the basis of their interracial relationship by Alameda County, allege

that Alameda County is liable for the actions of its employees in the “fourth” cause of action,

and replead a conspiracy cause of action in the “fifth” cause of action against all defendants,

including the Durazos. The Tavakes also add a cause of action for fraud as the “seventh”

cause of action, claiming that Henninger, Bowman, Carmine, and the Durazos fraudulently

concealed information from the Alameda County Board of Supervisors about manure being

dumped in a creek near their house. The “tenth” cause of action alleges that Alameda County

is liable for the actions of its employees for the constitutional violations. 

The Alameda County defendants and the Durazos move to dismiss and to strike.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Motion to Strike 

A motion to strike is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and may be used to remove

insufficient defenses as well as “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” that
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For the Northern District of California

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might otherwise prejudice a party. See also, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524,

1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 

2. Motion to Dismiss

A court should dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See, e.g., Broam v. Brogan, 320 F.3d 1023,

1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. See, e.g., Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir.

2000) (citations omitted).

B. Motion to Strike

1. Incorporation by Reference

The Alameda County defendants first object to the Tavakes’ attempts in the FAC to

incorporate by reference allegations previously stated in their original complaint, on the

grounds that many elements of those previous allegations were subsequently dismissed by

the court. See FAC at 4:26-27, 5:25-27, 6:12-13, 7:2-3, 17-18, 25-26. The Alameda County

defendants request that the court strike from the FAC any references to allegations in the

original complaint that refer to matters that were previously dismissed.

Under the “law of the case” doctrine, the Tavakes are bound by the court’s previous

orders. Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

1016 (2003). They cannot simply reincorporate allegations made in their previous complaint

that have already been dismissed. Thus, all the previously-dismissed claims that the Tavakes

attempt to reassert by reincorporation in the FAC are stricken. This includes, for example, all

claims that were previously dismissed under the statute of limitations, all claims against

individual defendants who were previously dismissed and not realleged as defendants in the

FAC, and all claims based on searches of the Tavake Ranch to which the court has already
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3 Because incorporation by reference often creates confusing situations such as

these,where parties are notsurewhatallegations areatissue in the newcomplaint, incorporation

of previous complaints by reference is not permitted in this court. Civ. L. R. 10-1. However,

because the Tavakes are proceeding pro per, the court will not require that the Tavakes file a

second amended complaint to correct this error. 

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found the Tavakes had consented (for example, the January 2005 search), among others.3 

2. Previous Admissions

The Tavakes are also bound by the previous admissions they have made in this case. 

Sicor Limited v. Cetus Corporation, 51 F.3d 848, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1995). At the last hearing,

the Tavakes stated in open court in response to direct questioning by the court that their

complaint against the Durazos was based solely on the Durazos’ alleged personal animosity

towards them. Accordingly, the Tavakes may not now allege that the Durazos’ actions were

racially-motivated, and all such allegations are stricken from the FAC as well. 

In their reply brief, the Alameda County defendants raise the similar argument that the

allegations that they discriminated against the Tavakes on the basis of race should be

stricken as well, since the Tavakes previously stated in the original complaint that the

Alameda County defendants had discriminated against them on the basis of the location of

the Tavake Ranch. However, because the court granted the Tavakes leave to explain the

reasons for their allegations that the Alameda County defendants had no rational basis to

discriminate against them, and because the Tavakes never explicitly stated in open court that

the location of their property was the only basis for the discrimination claim against the

Alameda County defendants, the court declines to strike these allegations as to the claims

against the Alameda County defendants. 

3. Duplicative Claims

Finally, the Alameda County defendants argue that the “tenth” cause of action should be

stricken because it is entirely duplicative of the “third” cause of action. The Alameda County

defendants are correct, and the “tenth” cause of action is stricken.

C. Motions to Dismiss

The Alameda County defendants move to dismiss the “seventh” cause of action only. 
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The Durazos move to dismiss all claims pending against them. 

1. “Second” Cause of Action

The Durazos request clarification as to whether this cause of action has been pled

against them. In reviewing the FAC, the court finds that the Tavakes have only asserted this

cause of action against the Alameda County defendants and not against the Durazos. 

2. “Fifth” Cause of Action

The Durazos, however, claim that the Tavakes may not allege this claim against them,

because the § 1985(3) claim was previously dismissed with prejudice as to them. June 17

Order at 10. This is correct. The “fifth” cause of action is dismissed, again with prejudice, as

to the Durazos. 

3. “Seventh” Cause of Action

In the “seventh” cause of action, the Tavakes attempt to state a claim for fraud on behalf

of the Alameda County Board of Supervisors, claiming that defendants Henninger, Bowman,

and Carmine defrauded the Board by failing to disclose that the Tavakes’ neighbors were

dumping manure into a creek. All defendants move to dismiss this claim. 

The defendants are correct that the Tavakes do not have standing to pursue a fraud

claim on behalf of third party Alameda County. See, e.g., Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and

Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003). 

The fraud claim is thus DISMISSED with prejudice against all parties. 

D. Conclusion

The motions to strike are thus GRANTED as to the Durazos and GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART as to the Alameda County defendants. The motions to dismiss are

GRANTED as to both the Durazos and the Alameda County defendants

All the claims against the Durazos in the FAC are now dismissed with prejudice. The

case against the Durazos is thus concluded, and they may request that judgment be entered in

their favor pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

The only parties that remain in the lawsuit are the Alameda County defendants. As for
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For the Northern District of California

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them, the “seventh” and “tenth” causes of action in the FAC are dismissed with prejudice, and

all allegations incorporated by reference from the original complaint that refer to previouslyadjudicated issues in this litigation are stricken. The following causes of action remain at

issue: the “second” cause of action against defendants Henninger, Bowman and Carmine for

violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment; the “third” and “fourth” causes of action against

Alameda County for violations of the Tavakes’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights,

and the “fifth” cause of action against Bowman, Henninger, and Carmine for conspiracy. 

No further amended complaints shall be filed. The Alameda County defendants shall

prepare their response to the FAC within 30 days of the filing of this order, and in a manner

consistent with this court’s previous rulings. A case management conference is scheduled for

October 27, 2005 at 2:30 p.m. 

This order fully adjudicates the matters listed at nos. 51 and 60 on the clerk’s docket for

this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge