Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00520-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA J. FOX, ON BEHALF OF

HERSELF AND AS NEXT FRIEND TO 

C.M.R., A MINOR,

 Plaintiffs,

 

 vs.

COUNTY OF TULARE, LETICIA 

CASTANEDA, ERICA SOTO, RON 

CASTANEDA, JULIA LANGLEY, CAROL 

HELDING, JOHN ROZUM, STEVEN D. 

RODGERS and DOES 1-100, 

 

 

 Defendants. 

1:11-cv-O520 AWI SMS

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR 

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Doc. # 162

This is an action for damages by plaintiff Pamela J. Fox on behalf of herself and as next 

friend to her daughter, C.M.R. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). For purposes of analysis of the 

pending motions for summary judgment, there are two groups of defendants. The first group 

consists of County of Tulare (“County”) and the “Attorney Defendants,” Julia Langley 

(“Langley”), Carol Helding (“Helding”), and John Rozum (“Rozum”). The second group 

consists of social workers Leticia Castaneda (“Leticia”), Erica Soto (“Soto”) and Tulare County 

Police Officer Ron Castaneda (“Ron”) 1(the “Social Work Defendants”). Both groups have filed 

motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Defendant Steven Rogers (“Rogers”) 

is deceased and is not represented in the current motions. Plaintiffs‟ First Amended Complaint 

 

1

 The court uses the first names of Leticia Castaneda and Ron Castaneda to avoid confusion in the 

discussion that follows. No disrespect is intended.

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(“FAC”) alleges three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and one claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985. In addition, Plaintiffs‟ FAC alleges six claims pursuant to California statutory and 

common law. Federal subject matter exists over Plaintiffs‟ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331; supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ state law claims exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367. Venue is proper in this court.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND CLAIMS ALLEGED

C.M.R. was born in 2005 to the union of Fox and Rogers. Fox and Rogers were never 

married. Fox and Rogers separated soon after C.M.R.‟s birth and commenced a long and bitterly 

fought custody battle. Conditions of parental custody over C.M.R. shifted between Rodgers and 

Fox over time as claims and counterclaims of sexual molestation, abuse and endangerment were 

exchanged. The central allegation that underpins the instant action is that on July 23, 2008, law 

enforcement personnel investigated Fox‟s report of Rodger‟s molestation of C.M.R. Pursuant to 

that investigation, detectives seized the hard drive from Rodger‟s computer. Fox was informed

that over one hundred images classifiable as child pornography were recovered from Rodger‟s 

hard drive. Criminal charges stemming from the child pornography found on Rogers‟ computer 

were considered, but no charges were ultimately filed. Fox and Rodgers continued to trade 

allegations of endangerment, molestation or abuse of C.M.R. During Fox‟s efforts to gain 

custody of C.M.R. and deny same to Rodger‟s, Fox alleges that she was subjected to a concerted 

and conspiratorial effort by the Attorney Defendants to cover up the extent to which C.M.R. was 

being endangered by being in Rodgers‟ custody by preventing Fox‟s access to the images stored 

on Rogers‟ computer for presentation in Family Court. Fox also alleges a conspiracy by the 

Social Work Defendants to cast Fox in the role of an individual who fabricated reports of child 

molestation to further her own custody interests. Fox alleges that the Social Work Defendants 

breached required duties under California law and conspired against Fox, both on account of her 

gender and because of the friendship between Rodgers and Ron Castaneda, to keep the facts of 

Rodger‟s possession of child pornography from surfacing and to maintain Rogers custody of 

C.M.R.

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Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on March 24, 2011. Plaintiffs‟ FAC was filed on 

November 11, 2011. The principal difference between Plaintiffs‟ original Complaint and the 

FAC is that Plaintiffs‟ claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which had been dismissed with leave 

to amend because it failed to allege that the alleged conspiracy was the result of unlawful 

discrimination, was re-alleged as being conspiracy resulting from discrimination on account of 

gender. Plaintiffs‟ FAC alleges three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first claim for 

relief alleges “state created danger” against all Defendants except Rogers and County. The gist 

of Plaintiffs‟ state created endangerment claim, as the court understands it, is that Defendants 

carried out various acts that mislead the court and resulted eventually in the placement of C.M.R. 

in Roger‟s custody where C.M.R. was in danger of sexual molestation and Plaintiffs‟ Fourteenth 

Amendment right to be free from interference with the parental-child relationship was violated. 

Plaintiff‟s second claim for relief is alleged against Defendant County only, and alleges a policy 

and practice that ignores claims brought by parents “based on discrimination against protective 

parents who are automatically assumed to be making false allegations to gain advantage in the

Family Court.” Doc. # 46 at 46:2-5. Presumably, Plaintiffs are alleging that the policy and 

practice results in unreasonable interference with parent-child relationships in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiff‟s third and fourth claims for relief allege conspiracy to interfere with a 

constitutional right. Plaintiff‟s fourth claim for relief is alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against all Defendants except Rogers and County. The conspiracy is alleged by Plaintiffs to 

have begun with an agreement between Rogers and Ron to illegally access a state database to 

gather information on the criminal record of Fox‟s then-cohabiting boyfriend, a man named 

Edward Skelton. Rogers allegedly then conspired with Leticia and Soto to “derail the 

investigation conducted by the sheriff‟s department [concerning Fox‟s report of Rogers‟ sexual 

abuse of C.M.R.], and conceal the fact that child pornography was found on Rogers‟ computer.” 

Doc. # 46 at 54:19-21. The claim further alleges that Rogers, Leticia and Soto agreed to 

suppress reports made by Fox accusing Rogers of child abuse and accused Fox of making false 

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reports of abuse. Plaintiffs‟ fourth claim alleges that Langley, Helding and Rozum joined the 

conspiracy “by agreeing to prevent access to [Child Welfare Services (“CWS”)] records, thereby 

concealing the wrongfulness of Rogers‟ conduct and to permit Rogers to continue to seek and 

obtain full custody of C.M.R. in violation of Plaintiffs‟ liberty and due process rights as 

described herein.” Doc. # 46 at 55:6-12. Plaintiffs‟ third claim for relief alleges the same chain 

of alleged conspiratorial events but alleges that the Defendant‟s acts were “additionally 

motivated by gender class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Doc. # 46 at 49:24-25.

Plaintiffs‟ fifth through tenth claims for relief are alleged pursuant to California statutory 

or common law. In order, the claims are: negligent retention and supervision against County,

Leticia and Rozum, intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants except 

Langley and Helding, general negligence against all Defendants except Langley and Helding, 

sexual battery against Rogers, civil conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress, conceal 

evidence and deprive plaintiffs of liberty rights granted by the California State Constitution 

against all Defendants except Langley, Helding and Rozum, and negligence per se against 

Rogers.

PARTIES PROFFERS OF DISPUTED AND UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The parties have proffered an unusually large number of both disputed and undisputed 

material facts. As will be apparent from the discussion that follows, the court‟s decision in this 

case is based on a relatively small number of facts. The central fact of this case that underpins 

the court‟s decision is the fact that, over time, the Family Court of Tulare County made 

adjustments to orders for physical custody of C.M.R. based on information that became available 

to it. This fact is undisputed. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine 

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Poller v. 

Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 

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(9th Cir. 1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th 

Cir. 1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Although the party moving for summary 

judgment always has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, 

the nature of the responsibility varies “depending on whether the legal issues are ones on which 

the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” Cecala v. Newman, 532 

F.Supp.2d 1118, 1132-1133 (D. Ariz. 2007). A party that does not have the ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial – usually but not always the defendant – “has both the initial burden of 

production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “In 

order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating 

an essential element of the nonmoving party‟s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving 

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial.” Id. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. 

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 

1280 (9th Cir. 1979). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the 

opposing party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required 

to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery 

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). 

The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 

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affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 

630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; Wool v. 

Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need 

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the 

truth at trial.” First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the 

“purpose of summary judgment is to „pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 

whether there is a genuine need for trial.‟” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); International Union of Bricklayers v. 

Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any. Rule 56(c); Poller, 368 U.S. at 468; SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th 

Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and 

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. 

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam); Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 

F.2d 202, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the 

opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 

810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claims – General Considerations 

(1) Defendants acted under color of state law [and (2) that Defendants‟ actions] deprived 

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Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Karim-Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Dep‟t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). There is no dispute that Defendants 

were acting under color of California state law at all times pertinent to this action. What is less 

clear is whether any of the harms alleged by Plaintiffs, even if adequately supported by factual 

allegations, would give rise to a violation of a right under the Constitution or federal law. 

A. State Created Danger

Plaintiff‟s first claim for relief is against all Defendants except for Rogers and County for 

violation of C.M.R.‟s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right against violation of 

bodily integrity under the theory of state created danger in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

general rule is that government actors are not liable for injury to an individual arising from the 

actions of a non-state actor where the injury is due to failure to provide governmental aid, even 

when such aid is necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests guaranteed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep‟t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 

196 (1989). The exception to this general rule that Plaintiffs rely upon is the “state created 

danger” exception. To impose liability against a governmental actor for injury or risk caused by 

a third party under this exception a plaintiff must show (1) “affirmative conduct on the part of 

the state [actor] in placing the plaintiff in danger” and (2) “deliberate indifference by the state 

[actor] to a “known or obvious danger.” Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 648 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

The first element – affirmative conduct placing plaintiff in danger – requires that the state 

actor placed the plaintiff in the path of a danger that would not have existed but for the state 

actor‟s conduct. See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992 ) (“Grubbs I”) (danger 

creation by state actor requires affirmative act); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 

1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (court examines whether the state actor “left the person in a situation that 

was more dangerous than the one in which they found him”). The second element – deliberate 

indifference – is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring that a [government] actor disregarded a 

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bryan v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). In 

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L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (Grubbs II), the Ninth Circuit clarified the showing 

required to satisfy the element of “deliberate indifference.” Deliberate indifference is a standard 

requiring a showing of greater culpability than gross negligence in that it must be shown that 

“the defendant knows that something is going to happen but ignores the risk and exposes [the 

plaintiff] to it.” Id. at 900 (italics in original). “Deliberate indifference to a known, or so 

obvious as to imply knowledge of, danger, by a [government actor] who created the danger is 

enough. Less is not enough.” Id.

Plaintiffs‟ FAC alleges different actions by Different groups of Defendants placed 

C.M.R. in danger of being molested by Rogers. With regard to the Attorney Defendants -- 

Langley Helding and Rozum -- Plaintiffs allege that the attorney Defendants‟ opposition to the 

disclosure of information in possession of the Tulare County Sheriff‟s Department (“TCSD”), 

including the contents of Rogers‟ computer allegedly containing pictures qualifying as child 

pornography, resulted in C.M.R. remaining in Rogers‟ custody and being denied protection by 

Plaintiff for a longer period of time than would have been the case if the Attorney Defendants

had not opposed the disclosure. With regard to the Sheriff‟s Department and Child Welfare 

Services Defendants – Leticia, Soto and Ron – the FAC alleges violation of standards of care in 

carrying out the investigative process, erroneous determinations of lack of risk from Rogers, 

erroneous determinations of false reporting by Fox and a conscientious effort by all the 

Defendants to deprive Fox of custody over C.M.R. 

First, as the Attorney Defendants point out, there is no affirmative act by any Defendants 

that placed C.M.G. in danger in the first instance. The record is clear that Fox and Rogers 

separated and went before a Family Law judge to establish custody and contested the custody 

decision prior to the involvement of CWS, the Sheriff‟s Department or the Attorney Defendants. 

To the extent that C.M.R. was in danger of sexual molestation as a result of being in the physical 

custody of Rogers, that danger pre-existed any actions by any of the Defendants and nothing the

Defendants did had increased or decreased whatever danger previously existed. Plaintiffs 

contend that the opposition of the Attorney Defendants to Plaintiffs‟ efforts to obtain release of 

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all of the requested information of the Sheriff‟s Department investigation of the investigation of 

Rogers and the failure of the CWS Defendants to adequately investigate and properly report 

findings resulted in an extension of the time that C.M.R. was left in Rogers‟ physical custody 

and therefore exposed C.M.R. to risk of sexual molestation that she would not have existed had 

the evidence been promptly made available. 

However, substantive due process does not require that a state actor extricate someone 

from a situation that pre-existed the state actors‟ involvement. See Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 

1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984) (no Fourteenth Amendment liability against firefighters for 

inadequate response during strike); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 

1983) (no Fourteenth Amendment liability against police officers for failing to aide persons 

discovered in burning car); Johnson v. City of Oakland, 1997 WL 776368 (N.D. Cal. 1997) at *6 

(no Fourteenth Amendment liability against police who gave chase to stolen van with plaintiff 

hanging on the roof). To the extent any of the Defendants acts may have caused a delay in the 

placement of C.M.R. in Plaintiff‟s physical custody, that delay did not result in any danger to 

C.M.R. that did not previously exist. Defendants cannot therefore be held liable because they 

are not responsible for the creation of danger to C.M.R.

Second, Plaintiffs‟ effort to impose liability under a theory of state created danger fails 

because there is absolutely no evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference to any 

danger that C.M.R. might have faced by any Defendant. The history of proceedings in the 

family and juvenile courts in the underlying custody battle between the parties is a history of 

more-or-less continuous marshaling county judicial and agency resources to assess and reassess 

the relative risks of one or the other parent‟s custody, and the crafting and re-crafting of custody 

and visitation rights for C.M.R.‟s protection and benefit. It is not inconsequential that both 

C.M.R.‟s parents were found to have presented their own set of risks to C.M.R.‟s safety and 

welfare at one time or another during the on-going custody dispute. Fox has alleged that the 

attorney Defendants had a thorough understanding of both the history of the custody dispute and 

the fruits of the sheriff‟s department‟s investigation and understood the relevance of the 

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investigation material to Plaintiff‟s custody dispute. Even taking that allegation, which is 

disputed by Defendants, as completely true, it remains the case that the Attorney Defendants 

were called upon to balance the risks to interests of their clients – the County and its agencies –

resulting from improper disclosure of investigation information against the known and already 

existing risks to C.M.R. from both of her parents. Similarly, there is no evidentiary basis to 

suggest that the CWS Defendants were at all unmindful of the risks to all parties or that they 

disregarded risk to C.M.R. given their extensive involvement in the dispute and their contacts 

with Fox, Rogers, and C.M.R. The fact that the CWS Defendants may not have assessed the 

relative risk of custody by Fox or Rogers in a way that favored Fox does not mean that the 

Defendants were unmindful or uncaring of the risks that C.M.R. faced. The record before the 

court is completely unsupportive of any claim of deliberate indifference.

The court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of material fact 

showing that the Defendants either affirmatively placed C.M.R. in a position of danger or that

they did so with deliberate indifference. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment 

as to Plaintiffs‟ claim for state created danger.

B. Physical Custody Allocation Does Not Implicate the Constitution

Claims two, three and four allege claims based on violation of the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Substantive due process analysis “must begin with a careful 

description of the asserted right[,] for the more general is the right‟s description, i.e. the free 

movement of people, the easier is the extension of substantive due process.” Hutchins v. Dist. 

Of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 

(1993)). The proper level of generality for the description of the right being asserted is “the 

most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted 

right can be identified.” Michael H. v. Gerarald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). In their FAC, 

Plaintiffs allege the violation of a number of constitutional “rights.” Plaintiff‟s second and 

fourth claims for relief allege the most extensive set of violations as follows:

(a) the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law by 

misleading a Family Court Judge to remove C.M.R. from the custody of 

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[Fox].

(b) the right to be free from reasonable interference with parent- child 

relationships by misleading Family Court judges to remove C.M.R. from 

the custody of [Fox]. 

(c) the right to equal protection under the law by not acting on what was 

determined by CWS and TCSD to be false allegations of child sexual and 

physical abuse and neglect made against [Fox] by [Rogers] when they, in 

fact, did act against [Fox] when they wrongly determined that [Fox] had 

made false allegations of sexual abuse against [Rogers]. 

(d) the right not to be deprived of liberty by removing C.M.R. from the 

custody of [Fox].

(e) the right to be free from unreasonable interference with parent-child 

relationships by removing C.M.R. from the custody of [Fox]. 

Doc. # 46 at 47:26-48:26. Plaintiff‟s third claim for relief alleges more simply that “[t]he 

separation of parent from child intrudes upon a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 

substantive due process provisions of the Fifth (5th) and Fourteenth (14th) Amendments to the 

Constitution of the United States.” Doc. # 46 at ¶ 219. And “[f]or more than a year, as a result 

of Defendants‟ acts, C.M.R. was removed from [Fox‟s] custody and the two were deprived of 

their liberty and parent-child relationships.” Doc. # 46 at ¶225. 

Applying the advice from Hutchins and Michael H., the court finds that the claims 

alleged by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §1985 are based on violation of two 

constitutional rights. The first right that is alleged to have been violated is a right pertaining to 

the allocation of physical custody between the parents of a child in a contested custody dispute. 

The essence of Plaintiffs‟ claims relating custody is that the separation of parent from child (in 

the context of a division of custody between parents) intrudes upon a fundamental liberty interest

protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Behind Plaintiffs‟

claims based on the removal of C/M.R. from Fox‟s custody is the notion that the allocation of 

physical custody of a child by a parent is protected under the liberty prong of the Fourteenth 

Amendment in the context of a custody dispute between the parents of the child. Further, 

Plaintiff‟s FAC implies that that the right alleged to have been violated – the right to parental 

custody – is fundamental within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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The second right claimed to have been violated is a right to unimpeded access to 

evidence material to the family court‟s determination of disputed custody issues. To the extent a 

right can be asserted that guarantees unimpeded access to material evidence, the court concludes 

that right would be found under the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process.

1. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a parent‟s “liberty 

interest in the „companionship, care, custody and management of [their] children.‟” James v. 

Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep‟t of Soc. Servs, 452 U.S. 

18, 27 (1981). The liberty interest in the care, companionship, custody and management of 

children has two aspects; a custodial aspect that has to do with the allocation of physical custody 

and visitation between the parents and the aspect of participation of a parent in decisions 

regarding the child, which is generally not subject to allocation between parents but is a right of 

both parents simultaneously. See James, 606 F.3d at 651 (noting the continuing right of the noncustodial parent to participate in decisions involving care, custody and management of the child). 

With regard to physical custody of a child in the context of the divorce or separation of the 

parents, it is elementary that the physical placement of a child with one of its parents necessarily 

deprives the other parent of the physical presence of the child during the time it is with the other 

parent. 

InTroxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny in 

invalidating a state law that provided for visitation rights to non-parents of a child. The Troxel

court held that the right of a biological parent to custody of their children was a fundamental 

right in the context of competing requests for visitation rights by grandparents or other nonparents and the state statute did not meet strict scrutiny standards in its intrusion onto the 

custodial rights of the biological parent. However, as a California appellate court has noted, no 

court has applied strict scrutiny to the review of the allocation of custody between biological 

parents. See Enrique M. v. Angelina V., 174 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154 (4th Dist. 2009) (no court 

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related dispute between two parents of a minor child”). “[I]nsofar as disputes between natural

parents are concerned, while parents do have a natural right to care and custody of their children 

this does not mean that parents have a „fundamental‟ right to „equal placement periods‟ after 

divorce.” Id. at 1157 (quoting with approval, Arnold v. Arnold , 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 

(Wis.App. 2004)). “We agree with the Arnold court that Troxel, which involved nonparental 

visitation, does not compel courts to a apply substantive due process analysis in resolving 

custody or custody related disputes between parents.” Id. (italics in original). 

District courts have recognized that the legal standard properly used by California courts 

in making child custody and visitation decisions is the “best interests of the child” standard. See

Monteagudo v. Alksne, 2011 WL 3903226 (S.D. Cal. 2011) at *1 (citing In re Marriage of 

Brown & Yana, 37 Cal.4th 947, 955-956 (2006) (“Brown”). The “best interests of the child” 

standard requires consideration of “all relevant factors, including the child‟s health, safety, and 

welfare, any history of abuse by one parent against any child or the other parent, and the nature 

and amount of the child‟s connection with the parents.” Brown, 37 Cal. at 956. Obviously, 

custody disputes decided under the best interests of the child standard do not turn on any single 

piece of evidence or information. Equally obviously, the allocation of physical custody between 

parents may be uneven and may be changed upon reconsideration of the multiple factors that 

inform custody decisions without violation of any fundamental right of either parent. In short, 

case authority clearly establishes that there is no particular amount of physical custody of a child 

that is constitutionally guaranteed by any particular factor at any particular time. It follows that 

a parent of a minor child who comes out on the short end of the custodial stick following a 

family court adjudication of a custody dispute does not suffer a cognizable constitutional 

deprivation resulting from that decision so long as some provisions for visitation and full 

participation in decision making for the benefit of the child remain available.

The facts of this case indicate Fox was never denied all visitation and physical custody 

rights for any period of time nor have any facts been alleged to show that she suffered any denial 

of her right to participate in the making of decisions regarding C.M.R. welfare. Plaintiffs‟ 

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central complaint is that access to facts in the custody of TCSD concerning the presence of child 

pornography on Rogers‟ computer were not timely made available for proceedings in the Family 

Law court. The court concludes no constitutional violation arises from this fact because the 

Family Law Court knew of the allegation of the presence of child pornography and, given the 

multiplicity of factors the Family Court was required to consider, there is no constitutional 

guarantee that the timely production of all the evidence requested would have resulted in a 

different determination of the division of custody between Fox and Rogers. In short, the court 

finds Fox did not suffer a constitutional violation as a result of the Family Court‟s decision 

because she had no constitutionally guaranteed right to a particular outcome.

The federal claims in Plaintiffs‟ FAC also appear to allege that C.M.R suffered harm that 

is cognizable as a constitutional violation as a result of being placed in Rogers‟ physical custody. 

The “[f]allure to investigate or intervene when child abuse is suspected can subject a [state 

jurisdiction] and its employees to liability.” Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 

F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs fail to support the 

contention that there was a failure to investigate or intervene. Rather, the allegations of both 

parties makes it clear that there were multiple reports by both parties, multiple investigations and 

various adjustments in custody arrangements over the entire period of time C.M.R.‟s custody 

was being disputed. The timeline provided by Defendants indicates that Physical custody of 

C.M.R. was adjusted between Rogers and Fox as various reports, recommendations, and other 

pieces of evidence became available and were considered by Family Law judges. See Doc. # 

161-1 at 16:9-20:25. The gist of Plaintiffs‟ factual allegations regarding the response by officials 

to the reports of child molestation or abuse is not that response was absent, but that it was 

improperly carried out, was carried out untimely, or that the complaints and the results of 

investigation were given improper weight, were misinterpreted, or that Fox was improperly 

accused of over-reporting or that her reports were given less consideration that was warranted. 

While there has been some debate as to what level of care is required under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that “[m]ere negligence of lack of due care by state officials 

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in the conduct of their duties does not trigger the substantive due process protections of the 

Fourteenth Amendment and therefore does not state a claim under section 1983.” Woodrum, 

866 F.2d at 1126. To the extent that Plaintiffs‟ substantive due process claim can be held to be 

distinct from their claim for state created danger, there is no basis to presume that anything less 

than a showing of deliberate indifference is necessary to raise a constitutional claim based on the 

Defendants‟ alleged failures investigate allegations of child abuse or to give proper weight and 

consideration to reports that were made. The court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show the 

Defendants acted with the requisite level of culpability in addressing Fox‟s claims. The court 

therefore finds that C.M.R. did not suffer a constitutional violation from being placed at times in 

Rogers‟ custody for the same reasons the court has determined that that Fox did not suffer any 

constitutional violation. Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence or argument that, upon 

presentation of some particular quantum of evidence concerning the allegation of mistreatment 

at the hands of one parent, the other parent is constitutionally entitled to physical custody of their 

child to the exclusion of the allegedly offending parent. 

While Plaintiffs have complained of what they assert was the effect of Defendants 

actions on the determinations of the Family Law judges, they have failed to produce any 

argument to show that the conclusion of a Family Law Judge, whether favorable or unfavorable, 

has a constitutional dimension. As noted above, a child who is the object of a custody battle 

between biological parents is entitled to proceedings that use the “best interest of the child‟ legal 

standard. There is no evidence that the Family Court Judges in this case ever strayed from this 

standard. That a family law court may fail in some particular instance to achieve what may, in 

retrospect, be the optimal determination of physical custody does not give rise to a constitutional 

claim. The fundamental harm alleged by Plaintiffs is encapsulated in a sentence that is repeated 

in Plaintiffs‟ third and fourth claims for relief: “For more than a year, as a result of Defendants‟ 

acts, C.M.R. was removed from Fox‟s custody and the two were deprived of their liberty and 

parent-child relationships.” Doc. # 46 at ¶¶ 225, 236. The court finds that Plaintiffs have 

alleged no facts to show that the parent child relationship between Fox and C.M.R. was ever 

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interfered with to the extent that could possibly give rise to a violation of either‟s rights under 

substantive due process. While there is a constitutionally protected right to meaningfully 

participate as a parent in the life of one‟s child, there is no constitutional right known to this 

court to a particular allocation of physical custody of a child between two parents in a custody 

dispute. It is Plaintiffs‟ burden to show that a constitutional right to some particular amount of 

physical custody existed and was denied. Plaintiffs have failed to carry this burden.

2. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiffs‟ FAC is ambiguous in its invocation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. To the 

extent Plaintiffs intended to assert the violation of procedural due process rights at all, it would 

appear that the allegation centers around two issues; the failure of the CWS Defendants to 

adequately discharge investigatory duties imposed by California statutes, and the delay of 

production of evidence in the custody of the Sheriff‟s Department regarding the presence of 

images constituting child pornography on the hard drive of Rogers‟ computer. 

The court interprets Plaintiffs‟ FAC to possibly allege a procedural due process violation

based on the alleged failure of Defendants to adequately carry out state-mandated investigation, 

evaluation or assessment, or to have inaccurately represented such evaluations or assessments in 

hearings before a family law judge. Such claim must fail because no new constitutional due 

process right is created when a state enacts a law “designed to protect an existing constitutional 

right.” James, 606 F.3d at 657. Arguably, the procedural requirements imposed by California 

statutes on agencies charged with protecting child welfare exist, at least in part, for the purpose 

of safeguarding the life and liberty interests of the parents and children involved. However, the 

violation or inadequate performance of the mandated procedures does not create a separate right 

where the harm suffered does not, itself, implicate a constitutional right. Since the allocation of 

child custody unequally between biological parents does not give rise to a substantive due 

process violation, pursuant to James, the violation or substandard performance of any of the 

statutory duties resulting in a distribution of physical custody that disadvantages one parent to 

the benefit of the other does not give rise to an independent constitutional claim so long as the 

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fundamental right to participate meaningfully in the life of the child is not unduly interfered 

with.

A second basis for a claim of procedural due process violation may be inferred from 

Plaintiffs‟ allegations of civil conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and conspiracy to violate 

equal protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). In order to survive Defendants‟ motion 

for summary judgment as to a claim for civil conspiracy under section 1983, Plaintiffs must 

show there remains an issue of material fact as to whether (1) there was an agreement or meeting 

of the minds between the alleged conspirators, (2) to violate a constitutional right of the plaintiff. 

Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2.d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). “[M]ere acquiescence” of one party to the 

demands of another is insufficient to prove conspiratorial intent. Id. Further, the conspiracy to 

violate the constitutional right of the plaintiff must result in an actual depravation of a 

constitutional right. See Woodrum, 866 at 1126. Mere allegation of a conspiracy, without 

material facts to show a meeting of minds to accomplish the constitutional violation, are 

insufficient to support a claim for civil conspiracy. Id.

To the extent Plaintiffs may have intended to assert a procedural due process claim based 

on the allegation that the alleged civil conspiracy between the Defendants rendered the process 

that Fox and Rogers participated in constitutionally inadequate, any such claim fails for two 

reasons. First, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any evidence to show that there was a meeting of 

the minds between any of the Defendants. It is not disputed that Rogers approached Ron 

Castaneda for the purpose of getting the latter to run a criminal background check on Fox‟s thencurrent boyfriend and that Ron provided the requested background check. However, there are no 

facts alleged to suggest that the production of the background check was anything other than a 

“favor for a friend;” or mere acquiescence to a request. Plaintiffs‟ FAC alleges that Ron 

Casteneda entered into a conspiracy with Leticia Casteneda on the basis of their relationship. 

However, Defendants point out that Leticia Casteneda is only related to Ron by her marriage to 

Ron Casteneda‟s cousin. Plaintiffs present no material facts to rebut Defendants‟ allegation that 

Ron and Leticia are not closely acquainted and that they have never spoken to each other 

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regarding any matters pertaining to this case. Plaintiffs also point to the declaration of expert 

witness Ann Haralambie to support their allegation of conspiracy against the Attorney 

Defendants. Notwithstanding Defendants‟ contention that expert opinion is insufficient to 

establish the elements of a claim for relief; the court has reviewed Haralambie‟s Declaration, 

Exhibit #6, Doc. # 208-6, and finds that it does not support the allegation of conspiracy against 

the Attorney Defendants. Haralambie‟s declaration criticizes County Counsel‟s priorities in 

preventing the release of the requested information without a clear order from the Juvenile Court 

and calls into question the presumed motivation of the Attorney Defendants, speculating that a 

trier of fact could find that they sought to “cover up the wrongdoing by the CWS workers,[or] to 

protect the County from potential liability. . . .” Id. at 6. These criticisms, whether accurate or 

not, do not suffice to show a conspiratorial meeting of the minds with the intent to deprive 

anyone of a constitutional right. To the extent Plaintiffs have alleged any meeting of the minds 

between any other alleged conspirators, such allegations are without any material facts at all.

Second, based on the above discussion, the court has found that there was no actual 

violation of a constitutionally protected right. To the extent Plaintiffs may have intended to 

allege they were constitutionally entitled to process unhindered by conspiracy to deny timely 

production of evidence that claim fails because, as noted above, the process of adjudication of 

disputes over physical custody of a child does not produce an outcome (the allocation of physical 

custody) that can be the basis of a constitutional claim absent a showing of deliberate 

indifference. Pursuant to James, a claim of interference in the process of adjudication does not 

rise to the level of constitutional violation unless the right being protected by the process is a 

constitutional right. Since the right in this case – the allocation of physical custody of a 

biological child – is not a right with constitutional implications , the processes pertaining to that 

right do not have independent constitutional significance.

Plaintiffs also assert a claim for conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 

1985 “establishes five classes of prohibited conspiracy.” Kush v. Rutlege, 460 U.S. 719, 724 

(1983). Of these five categories, two – the second clause of subsection 1985(2) and subsection 

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1985(3) – pertain to proceedings in state courts. Id. at 725. The second clause of subsection 

1985(2) makes it unlawful for “two or more persons [to] conspire for the purpose of impeding, 

hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or 

Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 

1985(2). Subsection 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies “aimed at interfering with rights that are 

protected against private, as well as official, encroachment.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 42 F.3d 

1389, 1994 WL 680992 (C.A.9 (Wash.) 1994) at *4. Plaintiffs do not specify the applicable 

subsection, but a review of the facts alleged by Plaintiffs and the language of Plaintiffs‟ third 

claim for relief indicate the claim is alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C,§ 1983(2). Both categories of 

conspiracy aimed at obstructing justice in state courts require an “intent to deprive their victims 

of the equal protections of the laws,” Kush, 460 U.S. at 725, which means there must be some 

“racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the 

conspiratorial action.” Id. at 726.

Plaintiffs claim pursuant to section 1985 alleges that Fox was denied due process because 

of invidious discrimination against her on account of her gender. As an initial matter, neither 

party has addressed the issue of whether a single parent in a custody proceeding can be a 

member of a protected class for equal protection purposes on the basis of gender. While 

authority on this issue is admittedly sparse, district courts that have addressed the issue appear to 

have come to the conclusion that the classification of single parent of either gender in a custody 

proceeding is not a member of a protected class. See Borlawsky v. Town of Windham, 115 

F.Supp.2d 27, 29 (D. Maine 2000) (female parent in custody dispute not a protected class); 

Nielson v. Legacy Health Sys., 230 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1211 (D.Or. 2001) (divorced fathers 

seeking custody not a protected class). Given the nature of child custody disputes involving, as 

they most commonly do, one party of one gender opposing the other party of the other gender; 

the refusal of district courts to recognize gender as the basis for membership in a protected class 

for equal protection purposes seems logical. Because evidence of any conspiracy is lacking 

based on the absence of facts indicating a meeting of minds for the purpose of depriving 

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Plaintiffs of any constitutional right, the court will not spend additional time or effort 

determining if gender should be the basis for a protected class in the context of child custody 

disputes. Should the issue be taken up for appellate review, however, the issue is one that could 

benefit from review.

Even if gender could be considered a basis for Fourteenth Amendment protection in the 

context of a parental custody dispute, Plaintiffs‟ claim pursuant to section 1985(2) would fail 

both because of Plaintiffs‟ failure to allege facts supporting a conspiracy as discussed above, and 

because of Plaintiffs‟ failure to allege facts from which a trier of fact could infer gender-based 

discrimination. To support their claim that the alleged conspiracy against Fox was motivated by 

invidious discrimination based on gender, Plaintiffs have collected what they consider evidence 

of gender bias by the CWS workers in a declaration by Plaintiffs‟ attorney, Seth Goldstein, 

which is set forth at Docket Number 205-2 (“Goldstein Dec.”). The evidence compiled in the 

Goldstein Dec. is of two types; instances where the CWS Defendants asked questions of Fox that 

they did not ask Rogers, particularly questions regarding past sexual assault, and instances where 

the CWS Defendants appear to have given credence to statements by Rogers that they did not 

give to Fox‟s statements. What is lacking from the Goldstein Dec. is any indication that there is 

an institutional bias in favor of or against either gender. 

That, in a particular instance, a CWS worker may find it relevant to ask questions that are 

gender guided does not mean that the worker or process is biased. Gender equality does not 

mean that interviews of two parents must be restricted to the same questions for both parents. 

Similarly, when a CWS worker forms an opinion or impression of the relative reliability of one 

parent‟s narrative over that of the other parent, that opinion or impression is not unlawful; it is 

simply part of the process of sorting out facts to recommend actions in the best interests of the 

child. The fact that Fox‟s narrative may have been given less credence than Rogers proves 

nothing with regard to gender bias without additional evidence that points to a systemic bias. 

The evidence proffered in the Goldstein Dec. merely establishes that, presuming the accuracy of 

the allegations set forth, the CWS Defendants found Rogers‟ narrative of pertinent facts more 

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credible than Fox‟s. In doing so, the CWS Defendants did not impair Fox‟s right to equal 

protection.

 The court concludes that Plaintiffs‟ have failed to show the existence of any material fact 

that would entitle them to relief on a procedural due process claim.

II. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

The court has found that Defendants have adequately demonstrated the absence of any 

material fact as to their liability with regard to Plaintiffs first, third and fourth claims for relief. 

Because the court has found that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing they were denied 

any right protected by the Constitution or federal law, Plaintiffs‟ second claim for relief based on 

municipal liability is also subject to summary adjudication. In summary, the reasons for this are 

that Plaintiffs have failed to set forth facts to show that Plaintiffs suffered the injury of any 

interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and have failed to set forth facts to show that 

there was ever a meeting of the minds to deprive Plaintiff of any constitutionally guaranteed 

right. The court is mindful that a portion of the court‟s opinion, particularly the portion of the 

opinion finding that Plaintiffs have failed to show they suffered the violation of any interest 

protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, has not been addressed by the parties. 

For that reason, the court will issue this opinion in the form of a proposed order giving the 

parties the parties the opportunity to argue those portions of this opinion that they feel have not 

been thoroughly explored or that are legally incorrect.

What remains to be decided is the court‟s exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ state 

law claims. Pursuant to Rule 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it 

has original jurisdiction.” Id. “With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a federal 

court has subject-matter jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it may (or may not) 

choose to exercise. See [F.R.C.P.] §§ 1367(a), (c). A district court's decision whether to exercise 

that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely 

discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Generally, the 

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exercise of jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed should 

be the exception, not the rule. See United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-727 (1966) 

(exercise of supplemental jurisdiction should be rare). The decision to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over pendant state law claims is informed by the values of judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness and comity. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 

(1988) (citing values to be considered from Gibbs). 

Of the values district courts are instructed to consider, the value of comity looms largest 

by far in this case. The state law claims in this action arise out of decisions made by the Tulare 

County Family Law Court concerning the allocation of physical custody over C.M.R. Family 

law is “an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.” 

Sousa v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 304 (1975). Fundamentally, Plaintiffs‟ state law claims allege the 

Family Law Court issued erroneous decisions because it was misled by the actions of the 

Defendants. It is difficult to see how this court could provide relief to Fox under the state law 

claims without at least impliedly finding that certain Family Law Court decisions were 

erroneous. “If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a 

state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, [the] RookerFeldman [doctrine] bars subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district court.” Noel v. Hall, 

341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). Although this action is nominally against Defendants who 

where participants in the proceedings before the Family Law Court, this case would not have 

arisen were it not for the rulings of the Family Law court, which denied Fox the physical custody 

of C.M.R. that she sought. 

Along the same lines, the court notes its own discomfort with the parties‟ evident 

presumption that proceedings are not ongoing in state court because of the death of Rogers 

during the pendency of this case. Were there any matters still pending in the state court, this 

court would be required to abstain pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The 

primary policy purpose behind Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrine is avoid 

unnecessary conflict between state and federal governments. United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 

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695, 707 (9th Cir. 2001). Neither party has raised the issue of abstention and the court need not 

decide the matter to reach a conclusion regarding its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over 

the pendent state law claims. The state law claims in this case lie in the middle of a legal area –

California family law – that this court is convinced it should assiduously avoid absent some 

extraordinary and compelling reason. This case presents no such extraordinary or compelling 

reason and, consequently, it is this court‟s intention to decline to exercise subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ pendent state law claims upon the entry of judgment against 

Plaintiffs on their federal claims.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In consideration of the fact this court has reached the conclusion that Defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment as to each of Plaintiffs‟ federal claims on legal grounds that have 

largely not been addressed by the parties, the court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs shall SHOW 

CAUSE why summary judgment should not be awarded to Defendants as to the first, second, 

third and fourth claims for relief on the grounds set forth above. Plaintiffs shall file and serve 

their response to this order to show cause not later than fourteen (14) days from the date of 

service of this order. Defendants shall file their opposition, if any, not later than fourteen (14) 

days following the service of Plaintiff‟s response. If Plaintiffs fail to file a response to this order 

within the time period allotted, Defendants shall so notify the court and judgment will be entered 

in accordance with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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