Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00038/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00038-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 Although the complaints filed in this matter state that copies of the agreements are attached as

exhibits (Dkt. # 1 at 2; Dkt. # 2 at 2; Dkt. # 8 at 2), the agreements are not in the electronic docket. 

Because the agreement is referenced extensively in the complaint and forms the basis of some of

plaintiffs’ claims (United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2003)), the Court has

considered the copy of Ricky Garza’s agreement that is attached to the Declaration of Gregory P.

Cavagnaro (Dkt. # 19), Ex. A.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

_______________________________________)

TIM SMITH, et al., ) No. C11-1311RSL

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

v. ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

) DISMISS AND GRANTING LEAVE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) TO AMEND

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________________)

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss.” Dkt.

# 17. Plaintiffs allege that, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan,

Oregon, they were offered the opportunity to participate in a Residential Drug Abuse Program

(“RDAP”) which would make them eligible for early release in December 2009. The Bureau of

Prisons (“BOP”) prepared written agreements regarding plaintiffs’ participation in the RDAP,

which the individual plaintiffs signed based on the BOP’s representations that the successful

completion of the program would result in a 12 month reduction of their sentences.1

 Shortly

after plaintiffs entered the RDAP, BOP revised the guidelines for determining the length of an

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2

 Because plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation are, in large part, based on the existence and

success of Mr. Smith’s habeas petition, the Court has considered the orders attached as Exhibit D to the

Decl. of Gregory P. Cavagnaro (Dkt. # 19). Although not alleged in the complaint, Mr. Bailey and Mr.

Garza also filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus which were granted on June 1, 2010. 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -2-

inmate’s sentence reduction upon completion of the program. Although no details regarding the

calculation of release dates are provided, plaintiffs allege that the revision adversely affected

their release dates. Plaintiffs allege that the BOP knew about and intentionally failed to disclose

the upcoming changes at the time the RDAP agreements were negotiated and signed. 

Plaintiffs objected to the change. Plaintiffs allege that their complaints and efforts

to obtain judicial relief triggered retaliation by and threats from BOP staff. In particular,

plaintiffs allege that they were assigned extra duties, were told they could not win against the

government, and were threatened with false reports designed to further impede plaintiffs’ ability

to obtain release or to cause the revocation of parole. Mr. Smith filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus based on the change in the RDAP guidelines. The Honorable James A. Redden,

United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, found that the BOP had impermissibly

disrupted Mr. Smith’s settled expectations when it retroactively disqualified him from eligibility

for a one-year sentence reduction after telling him he was eligible. On January 19, 2010, Mr.

Smith’s petition was granted, and the BOP was ordered to transfer him immediately to a

residential reentry center so that he could complete his 180-day community-based segment of the

RDAP.2

 Mr. Smith and Mr. Carlson allege that they were told that their incarceration would be

extended because they had complained about the RDAP guideline changes, and Mr. Smith

alleges that, despite obtaining a court order for his release, the BOP ignored the order in

retaliation for his decision to seek judicial relief. Plaintiffs do not, however, provide any facts in

support of these allegations: no dates or calculations are provided from which one could

determine that a delay occurred or how long it lasted. In fact, the evidence provided by plaintiffs

with their opposition suggests no delay at all. Mr. Garza and Mr. Bailey were released from the

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3

 Mr. Cavagnaro is advised that Rule 56(f), to which he cites in his memorandum, was

recodified as Rule 56(d) effective December 1, 2010.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -3-

halfway house on June 2, 2010, the day after they obtained their writs of habeas corpus. Mr.

Smith and Mr. Carlson (who apparently did not file a petition for writ of habeas corpus) were

released on June 21, 2010. According to Judge Redden, the application of the new RDAP

guidelines to Mr. Smith would have resulted in a release date of August 9, 2010, twenty-one

days after he would have been released under the original guidelines. The obvious inference

from the facts of record is that, despite his bald allegation of delay, Mr. Smith’s June 21, 2010,

actual release date preceded the earliest date on which he could have been eligible for release as

a result of his participation in the RDAP. 

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in August 2011 asserting violations of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, false imprisonment,

and breach of contract. Defendant seeks dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ claims. Having reviewed

the memoranda, declaration, and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court finds as follows: 

A. Request for Continuance

Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. These are preliminary matters going to the Court’s power to hear the case and the

viability of plaintiffs’ allegations. Nevertheless, plaintiffs seek a continuance of this motion

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)3

 so that they can conduct unspecified discovery. Plaintiffs offer no

legal justification for delaying consideration of a Rule 12(b) motion under a procedure set forth

in Rule 56, nor have they provided any factual basis for their request for discovery. The issues

raised by defendant’s motion can be decided on the pleadings and papers submitted: no

additional discovery or time is needed. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -4-

B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant’s first argument is that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case and

that the action should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Jurisdiction is a

threshold matter that should be considered before addressing the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-96 (1998). When evaluating its

jurisdiction, the Court may consider facts outside of the four-corners of the complaint to assure

itself that it does, in fact, have the power to hear this matter. Americopters, LCC v. Fed.

Aviation Admin., 441 F.3d 726, 732 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court has, therefore, considered

the documents attached to the Declaration of Gregory P. Cavagnaro (Dkt. # 19), Exs. A-E, for

purposes of determining jurisdiction.

The existence of sovereign immunity deprives district courts of both subject matter

and personal jurisdiction over a claim against the United States or its agencies. U.S. v. Mitchell,

445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). The United States enjoys immunity from suit unless there is “an

express waiver of this immunity by Congress.” Tobar v. U.S., 639 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting Block v. N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983)). If

the government consents to be sued, any limitations or conditions imposed upon that consent

“must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Soriano v. United

States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). If the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity

with regards to a particular act or claim, this Court has no power to hear the case and dismissal is

appropriate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

1. Breach of Contract Claim

Congress has waived sovereign immunity regarding contract claims with the

following limitation: “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to

render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded . . . upon any express or

implied contract with the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Supreme Court has

stated that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over nontort claims against the

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -5-

United States for more than $10,000. Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 540 n.13 (1999). 

Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim because

plaintiffs are seeking at least $50,000 in damages.

Plaintiffs fail to respond to defendant’s jurisdictional argument. Instead, they

discuss the merits of their contract claim and the potential res judicata effect of the earlier

habeas corpus action(s). As discussed above, however, the Court’s power to hear this claim

must be determined before the merits of the claim are addressed. Plaintiffs collectively seek

damages exceeding $50,000, and Mr. Smith alone seeks lost earnings between December 24,

2009, and his release date of more than $10,000 related to the alleged breach of contract. The

Court therefore finds that the limitations and conditions imposed by § 1491(a)(1) deprive this

Court of subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ contract claim. 

2. State Tort Claims

 Through the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), the United States has waived

sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

Not every state tort is actionable under the FTCA, however. Congress expressly limited the

waiver set forth in § 1346(b), stating that it shall not apply to –

* * * *

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,

malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,

or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or

omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States

Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall

apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out

of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious

prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement

officer” means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to

execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal

law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2680. At least two of plaintiffs’ claims are impacted by this provision. The main

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4

 This narrow interpretation of the § 2680(h) proviso has not been universally adopted. See

Ignacio v. U.S., 674 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2012) (concurring opinion) (acknowledging Orsay, but

noting that, “[a]s tempting as it is to follow the lead of our sister circuits, settled principles of statutory

construction prevent us from limiting the waiver of immunity contained in the law enforcement proviso. 

To begin with, absent an ambiguity in the words of a statute, our analysis begins and ends with the

statute’s plan language.”); Sheppard v. U.S., 537 F. Supp.2d 785, 790-91 (D. Md. 2008) (declining to

follow “the very narrow interpretation of the § 2680(h) proviso”); Harris v. U.S., 677 F. Supp. 403, 406

(W.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that “[t]he more viable reading of the proviso is that it does not restrict the

category of intentional torts for which sovereign immunity is waived to those committed in the course of

a search, seizure, or arrest.”).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -6-

part of § 2680(h) excludes from the general FTCA waiver claims arising from false

imprisonment and misrepresentation. While the proviso to § 2680(h) arguably salvages

plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims, the misrepresentation claim is clearly barred by § 2680(h)

and sovereign immunity. 

With regards to plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims, BOP officers and employees

have authority to make arrests for violations of federal law (18 U.S.C. § 3050; Bramwell v. U.S.

Bureau of Prisons, 348 F.3d 804, 806-07 (9th Cir. 2003)) and are therefore “investigative or law

enforcement officers” for purposes of § 2680(h)’s proviso. The Ninth Circuit has, however,

determined that the proviso does not save a false imprisonment claim unless the “investigative or

law enforcement officers” committed one of the torts listed in the proviso while actually

performing investigative or law enforcement activities. Orsay v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 289 F.3d

1125, 1133-36 (9th Cir. 2002).4

 The facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint do not give rise to a

plausible inference that the BOP was acting in an investigative or law enforcement capacity

when it failed to release plaintiffs in a timely manner. The false imprisonment claims are not,

therefore, saved by the proviso to § 2680(h) and are barred by sovereign immunity.

Defendant also argues that, despite the specific lists of claims included in

§ 2680(h) and its proviso, plaintiffs’ state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional

distress and loss of consortium should also be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

because the gravamen of those claims is the misrepresentation regarding how early release dates

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -7-

would be calculated or the failure to timely release plaintiffs. “Regardless of the plaintiff[s’]

characterization of the cause of action, § 2680(h) bars suit for claims based on conduct which

constitutes one of the excepted torts . . . .” Sheehan v. U.S., 896 F.2d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir.

1990). Thus, the issue in this case is whether the conduct upon which plaintiffs’ emotional

distress and loss of consortium claims rests is conduct that is barred from suit under § 2680(h). 

For the most part, plaintiffs’ emotional distress and consortium claims are derivative of their

false imprisonment claim: by keeping plaintiffs incarcerated beyond their release dates,

defendant allegedly interfered with the parent-child relationship and caused emotional distress. 

Because the sovereign has not waived its immunity for the underlying false imprisonment claim,

plaintiffs cannot pursue their derivative emotional distress or loss of consortium claims. See

Ward v. Brown, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2012 WL 3764041 at *25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012). 

There is one element of plaintiffs’ emotional distress claim that is not derivative of

the false imprisonment or the misrepresentation claims, however. Plaintiffs have alleged that

defendant engaged in retaliatory acts and made threatening statements to punish plaintiffs for

complaining and/or seeking judicial relief. This conduct may constitute a separate and

independent wrong. Because defendant has not shown that the retaliation claims are based on

the misrepresentation and/or false imprisonment, the general FTCA waiver of sovereign

immunity applies. The Court will therefore consider whether plaintiffs have stated a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress upon which relief can be granted. 

The Court finds that, under existing Ninth Circuit precedent, plaintiffs’

misrepresentation and false imprisonment claims are expressly excepted from the general waiver

provided by the FTCA and are not saved by the § 2680(h) proviso. The Court therefore lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. Plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claim is wholly

derivative of the barred false imprisonment claim and is therefore also barred. Part of plaintiffs’

emotional distress claim fails for the same reason. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

only that portion of plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related to the

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -8-

conduct alleged to be in retaliation for plaintiffs’ complaints and/or judicial suits. 

C. Venue for Claims of Robert Bailey and Steve Carlson 

 Plaintiffs Robert Bailey and Steve Carlson reside in Idaho and Arizona,

respectively, and have asserted claims arising out of conduct and omissions that occurred in the

State of Oregon. In these circumstances, the Western District of Washington is not the proper

venue for their claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) and § 1402(b). Plaintiffs, apparently recognizing

that venue is improper here, request that the Court transfer venue over their claims to their home

districts. Opposition (Dkt. # 18) at 10. The United States does not object to a transfer. Reply

(Dkt. # 22) at 3. 

D. Failure to State a Claim

1. Pleading Standard

Although a complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not

provide detailed factual allegations, it must offer “more than labels and conclusions” and contain

more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When a complaint fails to adequately state a claim, such

deficiency should be “exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the

parties and the court.” Id. at 558. A complaint may be lacking for one of two reasons: 

(i) absence of a cognizable legal theory or (ii) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume the truth of the plaintiffs’

allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Usher v. City of Los

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The allegations must give rise to something more

than mere speculation that plaintiff has a right to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

question for the Court is whether the facts in the complaint sufficiently state a “plausible”

ground for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. If the Court dismisses the complaint or portions

thereof, it must consider whether the pleading could be cured by the allegation of additional

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5

 To the extent plaintiffs’ emotional distress arose from the alleged misrepresentation and/or

false imprisonment, the claim has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -9-

facts, even in the absence of a request for leave to amend. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,

1117 (9th Cir. 2012). 

2. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983

In order to state a claim under § 1981 and § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs

must allege conduct taken “under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c); Jones v. Williams,

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Neither statute applies to actions taken by federal officials

under color of federal law (see Russell v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.

1999); Nelson v. Everson, (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2007)), and plaintiffs have not alleged any

facts from which state action could plausibly be inferred.

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Arising From Retaliatory Acts5 

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Oregon law,

one must allege that “(1) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the

plaintiff, (2) the defendant’s acts were the cause of the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress, and

(3) the defendant’s acts constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially

tolerable conduct.” Babick v. Or. Arena Corp., 40 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Or. 2002). Whether

conduct is so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to be utterly intolerable in

civilized society “is a fact-specific inquiry, based on the totality of the circumstances. . . . The

totality of the circumstances includes the conduct itself as well as any special relationship of the

parties, characteristics of the plaintiff that were known to the defendant, and the setting in which

the conduct occurred.” Schoen v. Freightliner LLC, 199 P.3d 332, 341 (Or. App. 2008) (internal

citation omitted). 

Defendant appears to concede that BOP officers hold a special relationship of

power over prisoners. Plaintiffs allege that the officers intentionally set out to punish plaintiffs

for complaining about the calculation of their release dates, not only assigning them extra duties

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -10-

and telling them they could never win against the BOP, but also refusing to release Mr. Smith

and Mr. Garza despite a court order. Plaintiffs allege that this conduct was intended to cause,

and has caused, emotional distress and that past threats of retribution continue to make plaintiffs

fearful and nervous. 

“It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s

conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery . . . . 

Where reasonable [persons] may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to

determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and

outrageous to result in liability.” House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730, 736 (Or. App. 2008) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment h (1965)). Even taking into consideration the

custodial nature of prison life and the gross disparity of power in the parties’ relationship, the

Court has serious doubts that the unspecified extra duties and negative statements are conduct

that is “extraordinarily beyond the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.” Checkley v. Boyd,

107 P.3d 651, 660 (2005). Oregon courts have already determined that being tyrannical, making

derogatory, harsh, or intimidating statements, or threatening incarceration does not necessarily

support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kraemer v. Harding, 976 P.2d,

1160 (1999); Pakos v. Clark, 453 P.2d 682 (Or. 1969). 

For purposes of this motion, the Court is willing to assume that a deliberate

decision to ignore a court-ordered release date in order to punish plaintiffs for their complaints

would fall outside the bounds of socially tolerable behavior under the tort of outrage. With

regards to this particular aspect of plaintiffs’ claim, the problem lies not with the nature of the

conduct alleged, but with the adequacy of the supporting allegations. Plaintiffs offer nothing

from which the Court could conclude that defendants ignored a court-ordered release date. The

record suggests that Mr. Garza and Mr. Bailey were released the day after obtaining their writs

of habeas corpus and that Mr. Smith was released more than a month before he was otherwise

eligible under the either version of the RDAP guidelines. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND -11-

Plaintiffs’ complaint is written in such a general, narrative way that their claim for

relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress is merely possible, not plausible. In the

absence of specifics regarding what was said to each plaintiff, what duties/insults/threats they

encountered, and the basis for their allegations of delay, a claim of outrage is merely a

hypothetical exercise, giving rise to no more than the possibility that plaintiffs have a viable

claim for relief. Because plaintiffs may be able to allege additional facts that would nudge this

claim into the realm of plausibility, they shall have an opportunity to amend. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium claims are

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The portion of plaintiffs’ emotional distress

claim arising from the alleged false imprisonment is also DISMISSED for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The remaining claims asserted on behalf of Robert Bailey and Steve Carlson are

hereby TRANSFERRED to the District Court of Idaho and the District Court of Arizona,

respectively. The § 1981 and § 1983 claims and that portion of their intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim regarding defendant’s efforts to punish plaintiffs for complaining about

the calculation of their release dates asserted on behalf of Tim Smith and Ricky Garza are

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs Smith and

Garza may file a third amended complaint related to their retaliation-based outrage claim on or

before February 1, 2013. If no amended complaint is filed by that date or if the allegations do

not remedy the deficiencies discussed in this order, this matter will be closed. 

Dated this 17th day of January, 2013.

A

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

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