Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02385/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02385-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES HINES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-2385 GEB EFB P

vs.

SERGEANT NUCKLE, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s November 17, 2003, complaint alleges that

defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an attack by his

cellmate and failing to provide medical care for some of the injuries he sustained in the attack. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies on August

20, 2004. That motion was denied based on the December 22, 2004, findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge found that plaintiff had filed an

administrative grievance and appealed it to each appellate level, giving prison officials the

opportunity to address his claims, and meeting the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Defendants have renewed the exhaustion argument in a motion for summary judgment, or

in the alternative to dismiss, that was filed on December 1, 2006. The motion is based on the

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United States Supreme Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ngo v. Woodford, 403

F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005). See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006). For the following

reasons, the motion for summary judgment must be granted.

I. Summary of Facts 

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison

(“HDSP”) in Susanville, California. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. K, Deposition of Plaintiff

(“Pl.’s Dep.”), at 15:10-20. Defendants Amero, Harrison, Nuchols, Tutor, and Gale were

Correctional Sergeants at that prison. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Exs. in Supp. Thereof (“Defs.’

Ex.”), Ex. A, Decl. of Amero (“Amero Decl.”), ¶¶ 1-2. During the courses of plaintiff’s

incarceration at HDSP hostilities grew between he and another inmate named Wilson and they

became enemies. However, they were not identified as enemies at any time prior to a fight

between them that occurred on July 19, 2001. Pl.’s Dep., at 25:3-5; 81:6-8.

On July 6, 2001, plaintiff moved into inmate Wilson’s cell. Id., at 22:23-25. Plaintiff

and Wilson argued over the lower bunk. Although he had a chrono, i.e. a medical determination

of need, for a lower bunk, plaintiff quickly agreed to take the upper bunk. Id., at 24:6-17. On

July 6, 2001, plaintiff did not have any reason to fear Wilson. Id., at 22:13-15; 25:6-8. Plaintiff

has never been affiliated with any gang. Id., at 25:1-2; 81:9-12. Between July 7 and July 10,

2001, plaintiff and Wilson did not have any problems. Id., at 25:9-16; 29:4-7.

On July 11, 2001, plaintiff and Wilson argued over smoking, snoring, and exercising, and

Wilson threatened plaintiff during this argument. Id., at 29:8-18. Plaintiff did not tell anyone

about the argument on July 11, 2001. Id., at 33:7-16; 34:13-15; 34:23-35:1. On July 12, 2001,

plaintiff and Wilson argued over their cell conditions. Wilson threatened plaintiff during this

argument. Id., at 33:14-16. On July 12, 2001, plaintiff advised Tudor and Nuchols that he was

not compatible with his cellmate. Id., at 39:15-17; 38:15. Plaintiff did not tell Tudor or Nuchols

that Wilson had threatened him or that he feared for his safety. Pl.’s Dep., at 39:15-17; 38:15;

Defs.’ Ex. B, Decl. of Tutor (“Tutor Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-5; Defs.’ Ex. C, Decl. of Nuchols (“Nuchols

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Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-5. Between July 13 and July 18, 2001, plaintiff did not speak to anyone at HDSP

about his desire to change cells. Pl.’s Dep., at 44:6-12. Nor did he, during that time period, have

any arguments with Wilson. Id., at 48:3-6. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 19, 2001,

plaintiff told Sgt. Gale that he could no longer live in his cell and if he did, he and his cellmate

would fight. Id., at 48:24- 49:8. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 19, 2001, plaintiff and

Wilson engaged in mutual combat. Defs.’ Ex. E, Decl. of Gale (“Gale Decl.”), ¶ 3. 

Immediately, defendants Gale and Amero stopped the fight. Id. 

Once an incident of mutual combat among inmates is contained and the inmates are

removed from the cell, they must be taken to the program office and placed in a holding cell to

await evaluation by medical staff. Medical staff is sent to the program office from the

Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”) to evaluate the inmates and determine whether they can

be released back to the cell or whether further treatment is necessary, in which case the inmate

will be sent to the CTC for further evaluation. Defs.’ Ex. A, Amero Decl., ¶ 4; Defs.’ Ex. D,

Harrison Decl., ¶ 4.

According to defendants, plaintiff was escorted to the program office after the fight and

was placed into a holding cell. Harrison Decl., ¶ 3. On July 19, 2001, he was examined and

treated by Britton, a registered nurse. Defs.’ Ex. G, Report of Incident; Harrison Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. 

During the fight, plaintiff suffered a laceration above his left eye, a bloody lip, abrasions, and

sore ribs, groin and head. Pl’s Dep., at 65:15-66:15; James Decl., ¶ 5. Britton examined the

laceration above plaintiff’s eye and determined that stitches were unnecessary. Ex. G, Report of

Incident; Pl.’s Dep., at 66:20-25; Harrison Decl., ¶ 5. Britton applied Steri-Strips to close the

laceration above plaintiff’s eye and advised him to follow up with the medical clinic in the

morning. Report of Incident; Pl.’s Dep., at 66:20-25; James Decl., ¶ 5. After examining plaintiff

and treating his injuries, Britton medically cleared him for placement in administrative

segregation. Report of Incident; Harrison Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; James Decl., ¶ 5.

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All of the treatment provided to plaintiff on July 19, 2001, was appropriate for his

medical condition and consistent with community standards. James Decl., ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff did

not suffer or exacerbate any injury as a result of the treatment he received on July 19, 2001. Id.,

¶ 8. Before plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Amero did not believe, and had no

reason to believe, that anyone posed a threat of harm to plaintiff. Pl.’s Dep., at 70:1-22; Amero

Decl., ¶ 10. 

Before plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Amero was not aware of any

problems between plaintiff and Wilson. Pl.’s Dep., at 70:1-22; Amero Decl., ¶ 11. Before

plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Harrison did not believe, and had no reason to

believe, that anyone posed a threat of harm to plaintiff. Pl.’s Dep., at 70:1-22; Harrison Decl., 

¶ 12. Before plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Harrison was not aware of any

problems between plaintiff and Wilson. Pl.’s Dep., at 70:1-22; Harrison Decl., ¶ 13. Before

plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Nuchols did not believe, and had no reason to

believe, that anyone posed a threat of harm to plaintiff. Nuchols Decl., ¶¶ 3-4. Before plaintiff

fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Nuchols was not aware of any problems between plaintiff

and Wilson. Id., ¶ 5. Before plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Tutor did not

believe, and had no reason to believe, that anyone posed a threat of harm to plaintiff. Tutor

Decl., ¶¶ 3-4. 

Before plaintiff fought his cellmate on July 19, 2001, Tutor was not aware of any

problems between plaintiff and Wilson. Tutor Decl., ¶ 5. Approximately 3:30 a.m. on July 19,

2001, plaintiff was moved to another cell. Pl.’s Dep., at 73:23-74:8. On the morning of July 19,

2001, plaintiff assaulted his new cellmate, Granville, on two separate occasions. Pl.’s Dep., at

74:7-76:10. Neither plaintiff or Granville reported the assaults. Id., at 76:11-16. 

The Inmate Appeals Branch (IAB) issues Director’s level review of inmate appeals for

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Defs.’ Ex. I, Decl. of Grannis

(“Grannis Decl.”), ¶ 4. Plaintiff did not obtain a decision from the Director’s level of Review

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 Wyatt is clear that regardless of nomenclature, a motion attacking failure to exhaust is

not a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. It is a motion in which defendant must raise

and prove by evidence the absence of exhaustion. Id. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit in Wyatt

provides further guidance. It recognizes that when the district court looks beyond the pleadings

to a factual record in deciding the exhaustion motion it necessarily does so under “a procedure

closely analogous to summary judgment.” Id., n.14

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regarding this incident. Pl.’s Compl., at 4; Grannis Decl., ¶¶ 7-10; Defs.’ Ex. J, Wagner Decl., 

¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff did not file a grievance regarding this incident until January 8, 2002. Grannis

Decl., at 4. 

II. Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants’ motion to dismiss challenges whether plaintiff has met the requirement of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that “[n]o action shall be brought” until available

administrative remedies are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather is an affirmative defense. 

III. Standards Applicable to This Motion

Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

While the Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 12(b) is the proper mechanism for resolving

questions arising under 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a), Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003),

the reason underlying that decision has been undermined. The Ninth Circuit found that failure to

exhaust was a matter in abatement which should be raised in a motion made under

“unenumerated Rule 12(b).”1

 Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However, the United States Supreme

Court recently clarified that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendant has the

burden of pleading and proving. Jones v. Bock, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Federal

courts appropriately consider affirmative defenses on summary judgment. Here, defendants rely

on evidence extrinsic to the complaint that should be considered under the Rule 56 standards. 

Defendants’ motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and exhibits that

were presented for the purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. Accordingly, the court

finds that a motion for summary judgment is the proper mechanism for resolving the question of

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whether plaintiff satisfied the exhaustion requirement.

IV. Summary Judgment/Rule 56 STANDARDS

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) avoids unnecessary trials in cases

with no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine

disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be determined

through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility determinations of

conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

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2

 On June 10, 2004, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to overcome summary judgement an opposing party must show a dispute that is

both genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome.2 Two steps are

necessary. First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are

material. Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether

material factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id., at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. The opposing

party must demonstrate that the disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that disputes are

genuine, i.e., the parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see T.W. Elec.,

809 F.2d at 631. There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact where there is a complete

failure of proof as to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case because all other facts

are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The opposing party may not rest

upon the pleadings’ mere allegations or denials, but must present evidence of specific disputed

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3

 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.3 Conclusory statements cannot defeat a properly

supported summary judgment motion. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir.

1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand,“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment. 

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Equally critical is that “deliberate indifference”

is an essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, to withstand defendants’ motion,

plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a

genuine issue for trial, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989), and he 

must do so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the

evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

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V. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which provides in relevant part:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

This requirement is mandatory and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001);

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute

making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statue makes

exhaustion a precondition to suit.” (citation omitted)). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in an action challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of

judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th

Cir. 2002). Defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff did not exhaust. Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no guidelines for

grievance content. Id., at §§ 3084.2, 3085. Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal levels of review, although the informal and the first formal levels

may be bypassed. Id., at § 3084.5. A division head reviews appeals on the first formal level, see

Id., at § 3084.5(b)(3) (authorizing bypass of the first formal level when the division head cannot

resolve it), and the warden or a designee thereof reviews appeals on the second formal level. See

Id., at § 3084.5(e)(1). Generally, completion of the third level, the Director’s Level of Review,

exhausts the remedy. Id., at § 3084.1(a).

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VI. Analysis 

Plaintiff filed his first appeal on January 8, 2002. Defs.’ Ex. I, Grannis Decl., at 4. It

contained claims arising in 2001, regarding problems he has with his cellmates. Plaintiff

explains, in the body of his appeal, that he first “filed a law suit concerning this matter to the

Eastern District Court ... and was told by the Court to exhaust his administrative remedies, and

that this appeal is being filed for the sole purpose of exhausting his administrative remedies.” 

The filing of the lawsuit before seeking exhaustion might explain plaintiff’s delay in seeking to

exhaust his administrative remedies, the filing of a federal lawsuit prior to exhaustion does not

toll the 15-day limitations period for filing an administrative grievance in the prison system. 

Plaintiff did not file his grievance/appeal until one and a half years after the factual basis for his

grievance arose. Plaintiff’s appeal, at seven typed and single-spaced pages, was first denied for

containing excess attachments on January 10, 2002. See Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint

(“Compl.”). It was next denied on January 22, 2002, for being abusive of the appeals process for

containing “excess verbiage.” Id. It was denied again on January 28, 2002, for the same reason. 

Id. Plaintiff resubmitted the grievance on March 7, 2002, and it was denied a third time on the

same basis and because it contained excess attachments, combined staff complaints with other

appeal issues, and presented more than one issue that cannot be addressed by one department. 

Id. On October 24, 2002, plaintiff’s appeal was finally denied as having been filed in excess of

the 15-day time limit for submitting the appeal. At this point, there had been a more than sixmonth delay between plaintiff’s last attempts to resubmit his grievance.

Understandably, plaintiff is confused and frustrated with the process. The dizzying litany

of refusals to process plaintiff’s multiple attempts to present an administrative appeal for what

appears to be the most technical of reasons is difficult to even summarize. However, had the

inmate appeals coordinator read the content of plaintiff’s grievance in the first instance, the

grievance could have been denied as untimely at that point. The grievance contained complaints

arising in July 2001 and the appeal was dated January 2002. It is clear that plaintiff’s grievance

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was untimely filed regardless.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court recommends that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be granted. 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendants’ December 1, 2006, motion

for summary judgment be granted and the Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 6, 2008.

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