Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00740/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00740-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1 The parties have substituted “BP West Coast Products

LLC” (“BPWCP”) for “Atlantic Richfield Company” (“ARCO”) in the

captions on their pleadings. This is not surprising because, in

the last round of litigation before this court, BPWCP argued that

it had been erroneously sued as “ARCO.” BPWCP’s counsel argued

on BPWCP’s behalf in the last round of litigation without

objection, and BPWCP has filed an opposition to this motion. The

parties thus seem to have agreed that BPWCP is the proper

defendant. Nevertheless, the court maintains the original case

caption for purposes of consistency.

1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GARY PALMER,

NO. CIV. S-03-0740 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION FOR RELIEF

FROM JUDGMENT BASED ON

CLERICAL ERROR OR, IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, FOR

RECONSIDERATION 

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY;1

BASRA ASSOCIATES, INC. dba

BASRA GAS & FOOD MARKET and

DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

----oo0oo---- 

On November 12, 2004, this court issued an order

granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on

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plaintiff’s claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and dismissing plaintiff’s remaining

state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction. (See November 12,

2004 Order at 8). Plaintiff now brings a motion for

clarification of that order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(a), or in the alternative, for reconsideration of that order

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On or about April 7, 2004, plaintiff filed its first

amended complaint (“FAC”) in this court against defendants for

violation of (1) the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq. (“ADA”); (2) the Disabled Persons Act, California

Civil Code § 54 et seq., (“the DPA”); (3) the Unruh Civil Rights

Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq., (“the Unruh Act”); (4)

California Health and Safety Code § 19955 et seq.; (5) the Unfair

Business Practices Act, California Business and Professions Code

§ 17200 et seq.; and for (6) negligence per se. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),

defendant BP West Coast Products, LLC (“BPWCP”) moved for

judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s claims under the ADA. 

Defendant Basra Associates, Inc. (“Basra”) joined BPWCP’s motion. 

After reviewing the papers and hearing oral argument,

the court concluded that the parties agreed that res judicata,

based on an order approving a consent decree in another case,

barred plaintiff’s ADA claim against BPWCP and Basra. (Nov. 12,

2004 Order at 4). In light of this fact, the court granted

defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s

ADA claim. (Id. at 8). 

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Next, the court turned to plaintiff’s “remaining”

state-law claims. The court found that the parties also agreed

that the same consent decree referenced above limited plaintiff’s

state-law claims to claims for money damages. (Id. at 4). The

court determined that it had neither federal question nor

diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff’s “remaining” state-law

claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

those claims. (Id. at 4, 7-8). The court then dismissed

plaintiff’s state-law claims for violation of the Disabled

Persons Act, Unruh Civil Rights Act, Unfair Business Practices

Act, and negligence per se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

(Id. at 8). 

Thereafter, plaintiff re-filed his state-law claims

against BPWCP and Basra in the Superior Court of California of

and for the County of Solano, Fairfield Branch on or about

December 3, 2004. (See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A (State Court Compl.)).

The complaint for his state lawsuit requested damages and

attorneys’ fees under the DPA and the Unruh Act based, in part,

on BPWCP and Basra’s violation of the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 19-31). 

On or about March 11, 2005, the defendants filed in

state court a motion to strike the portions of plaintiff’s

complaint relating to damages, attorneys’ fees, and any reference

to the ADA. (See Nendel-Flores Decl., Ex. A (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Strike Portions of Pl.’s Compl. filed in the

Superior Court for the Count of Solano) at 6-8)(responding to

this argument). Defendants’ motion was based, in part, on the

supposition that plaintiff’s claims were barred under res

judicata by this court’s November 12, 2004 Order. (See id.). 

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The state court concluded that this court had

determined that all plaintiff’s claims for violation of the ADA,

statutory minimum damages claims, and all state-law claims for

attorneys’ fees were released by consent decree. (See NendelFlores Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. F (Proposed Order Signed by Superior Court

on May 20, 2005) at 1-3). The state court then struck any

allegations in plaintiff’s complaint referring to the ADA,

declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees, any reference to “federal

law,” and the phrase “all available relief under Civil Code

Section 52(a) or 54.3(a) of the Civil Code (but not both)

according to the proof.” (Id. at 2-3).

 Thereafter, plaintiff brought this motion under Rule 

60(a) seeking clarification as to whether this court’s November

12, 2004 order was intended to adjudicate plaintiff’s state-law

claims for attorneys’ fees and damages - including those based on

a violation of the ADA. If the court did intend to adjudicate

these claims, plaintiff requests that the court reconsider its

decision on the issue pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).

II. Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) authorizes the

court to correct “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments [or] orders .

. . and errors therein arising from oversight or omission. . . at

any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party. . .

.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that the

Rule grants a district court “very wide latitude” to correct a

judgment to make it reflect the court’s “actual intentions” and

the “necessary implications” of its intentions where they are

unclear. Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir.

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1987). The Rule does not authorize the court to make corrections

merely because it has changed its mind, made a legal or factual

mistake, or decided to exercise its discretion in a different way

since issuing a prior order. Id.(citing United States v.

Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1986)). However, where

there is confusion as to whether a district court intended to

dismiss state-law claims on the merits or to dismiss them only

for lack of jurisdiction, Rule 60(a) is an appropriate basis for

clarifying the court’s original intent. Big Bear Lodging Ass’n

v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“A Rule 60(a) motion is a direct attack rather than a

collateral attack and properly should be made in the case in

which the correction would be made,” regardless of whether it

affects the interpretation of the subject order in another

proceeding. See In re Bestway Prods., Inc. v. Willow Lane, Inc.,

151 B.R. 530, 541 (E.D. Cal. Bankr. 1993)(disregarding any

prejudice to party opposing Rule 60(a) motion that would arise in

adversary proceeding in which he sought declaratory judgment

regarding effect of subject order). Such a direct attack on a

federal court judgment is not barred by res judicata. See Watts

v. United States, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985)(“The doctrine

of res judicata does not apply to direct attacks on judgments. 

Res judicata does not preclude a litigant from making a direct

attack [under Rule 60(b)] upon the judgment before the court

which rendered it.”)(emphasis, internal quotations marks and

citation omitted; brackets in original). 

The parties assume that this court intended to reach

the merits of his state-law claims for injunctive relief,

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2 Specifically, the court noted that:

The parties also agree that under the Molski Consent

Decree and order, plaintiff released claims for

injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney’s

fees related to access at the Fairfield Station arising

under, inter alia, the Disabled Persons Act, Unruh

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declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees incident to such relief

in the court’s November 12, 2004 order. The parties also assume

that the court determined that plaintiff’s “remaining” state

claims for money damages were not barred. (See Pl.’s Am. Mot.

for Relief from J. Based on Clerical Error at 3, 5-6(arguing that

this court did not reach his state-law claims for money damages

but ignoring issue of whether court reached other state-law

claims); Def. Basra’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Relief from J.

Based on Clerical Error at 8(stating that this court determined

which of plaintiff’s state-law claims were affected by a prior

consent decree); Def. BPWCP’s Opp’n to Mot. for Relief from J. at

9(contending that only certain of Palmer’s state-law claims

survived the November 12, 2004 Order)). These assumptions are

both wrong.

As noted previously, the court determined in its

November 12, 2004 order that the parties agreed that res judicata

barred plaintiff’s ADA claim. (November 12, 2004 Order at 4).

Therefore, the court explicitly granted “defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s ADA claim. . . .” (Id.

at 8). In doing so, the court did not speak to the merits of

plaintiff’s state-law claims. The court also noted that the

parties agreed as to which of plaintiff’s state-law claims

survived a consent decree in another case. (See id. at 4).2

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Civil Rights Act, California Health and Safety Code,

and related common law. However, the parties agree

that plaintiff’s remaining state law claims for money

damages are not barred.

(November 12, 2004 Order at 4)(internal citations omitted,

emphasis added).

7

However, the court did not decide whether the parties’

understanding regarding the effect of the consent decree on

plaintiff’s state-law claims was correct. Instead, the court

explicitly “decline[d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state-law claims.” (November 12, 2004 Order at 8). 

The court is aware, however, that plaintiff’s state-law

claims under the DPA and the Unruh Act can be established by

demonstrating a violation of the ADA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f)

(“A violation of the right of any individual under the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall also constitute a

violation of this section [of the Unruh Act].”); Cal. Civ. Code §

54.1(7)(d)(“A violation of the right of an individual under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . also constitutes a

violation of this section [of the DPA]. . . .”). The court

presumes that these are what plaintiff refers to as “state-law

claims . . . based on the ADA.” (See Pl.’s Am. Mot. for Relief

from J. Based on Clerical Error at 2). For the parties’ benefit,

the court clarifies that its November 12, 2004 order did not

address whether any of plaintiff’s state-law claims could be

established by demonstrating a violation of the ADA. 

The court can see how some language in its November 12,

2004 order may have been misconstrued. Particularly, the court

wrote in that order that “[w]ith the dismissal of plaintiff’s ADA

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3 The order line from the November 12, 2004 order reads,

in full:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on

plaintiff’s ADA claim be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and

(2) plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for

violation of the Disabled Persons Act, Unruh Civil Rights Act,

and Unfair Business Practices Act, and negligence per se be, and

the same hereby are, DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). 

(See November 12, 2004 Order at 8). 

8

claim, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over

the remaining state claims.” (Id. at 4)(emphasis added). This

reference to the remaining state claims could, on its face, be

interpreted in two different ways: (1) it could refer to the

state-law claims remaining after the dismissal of plaintiff’s

federal ADA claim; or (2) it could refer to the state-law claims

which the parties agreed were still viable after a related

consent decree. However, a comprehensive reading of the order

clarifies that the former interpretation is the one intended. 

That the court was referring to all of plaintiff’s

state-law claims remaining after the dismissal of plaintiff’s

federal ADA claim is established by the fact that the court

included nothing in its order line regarding the merits of any of

plaintiff’s state-law claims.3 Instead, the court determined

that it had only supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state

claims and dismissed “plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims”

after declining to exercise that jurisdiction “pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3),” the statutory provision that expressly

authorizes the court to decline to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction under certain circumstances. (Id. at 7-8)(emphasis

added). The only other facially valid interpretation of the

court’s reference to plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims would

lead to an absurd result. One would have to read the court’s

order to mean that the court were exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over some of plaintiff’s state-law claims solely to

reach the merits of those claims, but selectively declining to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the rest of plaintiff’s

state-law claims. No such extraordinary procedural move is

suggested in the court’s order line. Nor can this court find any

authority establishing that such a procedural move is even

authorized by federal law. 

Further, whatever effect this order may have on

plaintiff’s ability to attack a related state court judgment is

of no concern to this court. This motion was properly before the

court pursuant to Rule 60(a). Had it been so inclined, the court

even had authority to invoke Rule 60(a) sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(a). The state court judgment does not preclude this court

from exercising its rightful authority to address a direct attack

on its own judgment. See In re Bestway Prods., Inc., 151 B.R. at

541; Watts, 752 F.2d at 410. 

 Plaintiff specifically conditioned his request for

reconsideration of the November 12, 2004 order on clarification

that the court originally intended to adjudicate his state-law 

claims for damages and attorneys’ fees. Because the court never 

intended to adjudicate any of plaintiff’s state-law claims,

plaintiff’s request for reconsideration is moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

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clarification be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. The court’s

November 12, 2004 order was not meant to adjudicate the merits of

any of plaintiff’s state-law claims - including those based on

the ADA. Plaintiff’s state-law claims were dismissed on purely

jurisdictional grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot. 

DATED: July 6, 2005

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