Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04606/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN E. JAMES,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ANTHONY A. LAMARQUE, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 02- 4606 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

(Docket No. 47)

INTRODUCTION

John E. James, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on January

4, 2005, this Court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated cognizable

claims under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause. Respondent filed an

answer on May 6, 2005. Petitioner’s traverse to the answer was filed on June 29,

2005. This order denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A Contra Costa County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of 

robbery and being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm on July 12, 1998. On

October 5, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to thirteen years in state prison. Petitioner

appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First District, which affirmed the

conviction in a reasoned opinion filed on October 22, 1999. The Supreme Court of

California denied a petition for review in 1999. 

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1 Petition (“Pet.”) at 7-11.

2 Respondent (“R.”) at 2-5. Facts derived solely from Respondent’s Answer

are identified as such below. 

2

In 2000, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court restating

several claims that he had raised on direct appeal and raising numerous additional

claims. The state habeas petition was denied by the superior court on May 22, 2001. 

The California Court of Appeal, First District, denied the petition on June 26, 2001. 

The Supreme Court of California also denied the petition on February 27, 2002. 

Petition filed the instant matter on September 24, 2002.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses as articulated by Petitioner are

summarized below.1

 These facts are generally undisputed by Respondent and also

appear in Respondent’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of its

answer.2

On February 27, 1998, Betty Banuelos was working as a clerk at

the J & A Market in El Sobrante. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 328. At

approximately 8:30 p.m., a customer named James Glotch was

purchasing items from Banuelos at the counter. RT 297.

At that time, an [African American] male came into the store

wearing a ski mask over his face. RT 297. He was wearing a navy blue

nylon jogging suit, RT 304-305, and was holding a semi-automatic gun

in his hand, RT 298-299. The robber went behind the counter, stood

behind Banuelos and pointed a gun at her. RT 299, 331-332. He told

her to open the cash register drawer. RT 300, 333. Banuelos opened the

drawer and the man grabbed all of the money out of the drawer. RT

300, 344. He then asked where the rest of the money was and Banuelos

pointed at a money bag on a nearby shelf. RT 301-301, 334-335. The

zipper on the money bag was held together with a paper clip. RT 337. 

The robber grabbed the money bag and left the store. RT 302, 335. The

man’s clothes, the gun and the money bag were not muddy when he left

the store. RT 306, 337, 338-339. 

After the robber left the store, both Glotch and Banuelos waited

to hear a car leave from the store parking lot [before reporting the

robbery], but neither [one] ever heard a car engine. RT 305-306, 339. 

There was a very steep hillside which led to D’Avilla Way, near the

store. RT 308-309, 341-343. In February 1998, the hillside was very

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muddy due to rain. RT 314, 317, 343.

After approximately five minutes, Banuelos called the police [to

report the robbery]. RT 571. Sheriff’s Deputies Carrie Sanchez and

Bani Kollo responded to the scene. RT 571, 627-628.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. that night, San Pablo Police Officer

Terry Keefe was on duty at the Doctor’s Medical Center in San Pablo,

four to five miles away from the J & A Market. RT 369, 573. Officer

Keefe was in his patrol vehicle in the parking lot of the hospital when he

noticed a grey colored Dodge parked in the red zone of the hospital. RT

371. Petitioner was leaning on the open driver’s door of the car[,]

screaming in pain. RT 372. There were three other males and one

female near the car. RT 374. Officer Keefe went to assist Petitioner and

Petitioner told him that he was running, he fell and he thought that he

had broken his hip. RT 375. Petitioner was wearing a dark blue or

black nylon jogging suit. RT 376. Petitioner’s clothes were covered in

mud. RT 376. 

Officer Keefe and nurse Carl Groff helped Petitioner onto a

gurney and took him to the emergency room. RT 375-377, 419-420. 

The female standing by the car followed Petitioner into the hospital. RT

421. As Groff began to cut off Petitioner’s black nylon jogging pants so

that he could treat Petitioner’s hip, Petitioner called the young woman to

his side. RT 421-422, 653-654. Petitioner took something out of his

pocket and handed it to the female, and she left the area. RT 423. Groff

saw bullets in the item. RT 423. 

Believing that he saw Petitioner hand the female a weapon, Groff

called to Officer Keefe. RT 424. He told Officer Keefe that he thought

the female had a weapon. Officer Keefe followed the female. RT 424. 

After Officer Keefe left, Petitioner said, “That was the wrong thing to

do, Carl. You shouldn’t have done that. I know who you are. I know

how to find you. I will get you.” RT 425. Groff became frightened and

assigned Petitioner’s case to someone else. RT 426. Petitioner also told

Groff that he needed to get to his car. RT 427.

Officer Keefe detained and searched the female. RT 382. In her

left rear pants pocket, Officer Keefe found a loaded, nine-millimeter

magazine. RT 382, 386. Officer Keefe then searched Petitioner and

found nothing. Officer Keefe told Petitioner that the nurse had seen him

hand the magazine to the female. RT 385. Petitioner said, “So fucking

what. Its not illegal.” RT 385.

Officer Richard Smith of the San Pablo Police Department

responded to Officer Keefe’s call for backup. RT 433. Officer Keefe

pointed out Petitioner’s grey Dodge, which was still parked in the red

zone in front of the hospital. RT 433. Officer Smith looked through the

windows of the vehicle and noticed that the steering wheel and gear shift

were muddy. RT 439-440. He also noticed that the top edge of a

handgun protruding from underneath the front passenger seat. RT 435. 

When Officer Smith [went to retrieve the gun from under the seat, he

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noticed a ski mask and black money bag also under the seat, next to the

gun]. RT 436. The gun and the money bag were muddy. RT 436. 

Glotch, [a customer at the J & A Market and a witness to the

robbery,] identified the gun that Officer Smith found as the gun used

during the robbery. RT 321. There was a loaded magazine in the gun. 

RT 629. [J & A Market clerk] Banuelos identified the money bag found

in the Dodge as the one she gave the robber. It had a paper clip holding

the zipper together. RT 337. Later, the officers seized papers with

Petitioner’s name from the car. RT 703. 

After discovery of the money bag, gun, and ski mask, Deputies

Kollo and Sanchez were dispatched from the J & A Market to the

hospital. RT 627- 628. Upon arrival, Deputy Kollo contacted Officer

Smith who gave him the loaded gun, money bag, ski mask, and second

magazine. RT 629, 631.

Deputy Kollo then contacted Petitioner inside the hospital. RT

637. Deputy Kollo noticed that Petitioner has mud and dirt on his

hands. RT 637. [Kollo] asked his sergeant to get a camera so he could

photograph Petitioner’s hands. RT 638. At that point, Petitioner began

wiping his hands on the bed sheet. RT 638. Petitioner had removed

most of the mud by the time the pictures were taken. RT 639. 

The Officers also detained three males who were with Petitioner

when he first got out of the car. RT 647. None of the males had any

mud on them when they were detained. RT 573, 647. The female did

not have any mud on her either. RT 574. 

Isaiah Moore, one of the other men with Petitioner, testified that

he lived in Mill Valley, near Tyrae Patterson, the female companion of

Petitioner on the night of the robbery. RT 532. [On the evening of the

robbery,] Moore left Mill Valley with Petitioner, Patterson, and two

other males. RT 532-533. Petitioner was driving and Patterson was in

the front passenger seat. RT 534. Petitioner said he was going to pick

up some clothes from his grandmother’s house in Richmond. RT 535. 

Eventually, Petitioner stopped the car, and he and Patterson got out. 

Moore and the others stayed in the car. RT 536. [Petitioner and

Patterson] were gone about forty-five minutes. RT 537. When they

returned, Petitioner had a bag of clothes that he put in the trunk of the

car. RT 538.

Petitioner started to drive around again. They drove about two

miles and parked somewhere on a hill. RT 539. Moore did not know

the name of the street [where the car was parked], but his description of

the area was similar to the area near D’Avilla Way and the J & A

Market. RT 308, 340, 539, 576-577, 587. Moore could not see out of

the car windows because it was raining that night. RT 540.

Petitioner got out of the car and was gone about ten minutes. RT

540- 541. When Petitioner came back to the car, he was limping. RT

541. Petitioner drove to the hospital and parked in front of the

emergency entrance. RT 543. Moore never saw the other two males in

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3

 R. at 5. 

4

 Id. 

5

 Id. 

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the car with the ski mask, gun, or money bag. RT 545-546.

Moore told Deputy Sanchez on the night of the robbery that when

Petitioner picked up the three males, Petitioner stated that he wanted to

commit a robbery. RT 585. Moore also stated that the three males

agreed to go along with Petitioner. RT 585. Moore was originally

charged as an accessory, but the charges were dropped. RT 547, 551.

Defense 

Defense counsel stipulated that three papers bearing Petitioner’s

name were found in the automobile driven by Petitioner to the

emergency room, and that Petitioner’s driver’s license was in the wallet

that was taken from him at the emergency room. RT 703. 

The defense presented evidence from a criminalist employed by

the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department that the hairs he extracted

from the ski mask ostensibly used in the robbery did not match the

Petitioner’s head. RT 724. It was possible that there was other hair in

the fibers of the mask that were not extracted, but it was logical to infer

that the hair of the last person to have worn the mask would be found. 

RT 706-09.

The parties stipulated that Petitioner is five-feet and five-inches

tall and at the time of trial weighed 120-125 pounds. RT 715. During

the trial, Glotch estimated that the robber was five-feet and six or seveninches tall.3

 RT 304, 325. Banuelos testified that the robber was

approximately five-feet six-inches tall and weighed 150-165 pounds.4

RT 356-357. During her testimony, Banuelos admitted that she may

have told the deputies on the night of the robbery that the robber was

five-feet, ten-inches tall.5

 RT 356-357.

The jury was instructed that there was a stipulation that the “ExFelon” element of the offense charged on Count II, Ex-Felon in

possession of a firearm (§ 12021), was proved. RT 744, 745.

At a separate court trial after Petitioner was found guilty by the

jury of the offenses and enhancements alleged in Counts I and II, the

court found it true that Petitioner committed the present offenses while

on probation for a previous felony, false imprisonment. RT 814-815.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he

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is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition challenging a state

conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in

state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if a state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit:

“A state court’s decision can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it

either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” 

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other grounds;

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application

must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord Middleton v. McNeil,

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541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state court’s application of

governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but objectively unreasonable);

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam) (“unreasonable”

application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect” application of law). In deciding

whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court to address the merits of the petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no

reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an

independent review of the record. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state

court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for the purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts

and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

In his petition for habeas corpus Petitioner asserts ten claims for relief: (1) the

trial court committed a prejudicial error in denying Petitioner’s challenge to

prospective juror No.18, denying Petitioner’s right to an impartial jury; (2)

handcuffing of petitioner in view of the jury violated Petitioner’s due process rights;

(3) the trial court denied Petitioner his constitutional rights to a fair trial by denying

his motion to sever Count II; (4) the trial court erred in accepting Petitioner’s

stipulation to his ex-felon status; (5) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of

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Petitioner’s actions while in custody in violation of his Miranda rights; (6)

prosecutorial misconduct; (7) ineffective assistance of counsel; (8) the trial court

abused its discretion and committed a reversible error by improperly admitting

evidence and denying Petitioner’s Marsden motion; (9) ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel; and (10) cumulative error. 

DISCUSSION

A. Right to an Impartial Jury

Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment and due process rights were

violated when the trial court denied Petitioner’s challenge to prospective Juror No. 18,

causing Petitioner to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror. During voir dire,

prospective Juror No. 18 indicated to the court that she had previous experience on a

jury and that she had felt “conned” by the defense in her previous jury experience. RT

196. In response, the court asked Juror No. 18 if she thought she would “be able to set

aside her experience from the last trial and be fair and impartial in this case,” to which

the juror replied, “That would be my objective.” RT 173. Asked again by the court

whether she could try to be fair and impartial, Juror No. 18 replied, “Yes.” RT 173. 

Defense attorney requested that the trial court dismiss Juror No. 18 for cause

and the trial court denied the request. In defense of its refusal to remove Juror No. 18,

the trial court stated, “[Juror No. 18] obviously had some feelings about what occurred

during the trial that she sat on. She also said that she would not hold it against the

defense in this case. So I did not believe it rose to the level of a challenge for cause.” 

RT 197. Defense counsel subsequently used a peremptory challenge to remove Juror

No. 18. RT 176. Defense counsel used up all ten of its peremptory challenges during

voir dire. RT 229. 

\

1. Legal Standard

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A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair and impartial

jury pool composed of a cross section of the community. See Holland v. Illinois, 493

U.S. 474, 476 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-58 (1968). A prospective juror must be removed for

cause if his views or beliefs would prevent or substantially impair the performance of

his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. See Wainwright

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). “Even if only one juror is unduly biased or

prejudicial, the defendant is denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury.” 

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991). 

The state court’s determination of juror impartiality is entitled to a presumption

of correctness on federal habeas review. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 429. Federal

habeas relief may be granted for a state court’s failure to strike a juror for cause only

where there is no fair support in the record for the trial court’s determination that the

juror was unbiased. Id. at 424. 

Additionally, a trial court’s failure to strike a biased juror will not amount to a

constitutional violation so long as the jury that sits is impartial. See Ross v.

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). The fact that a defendant had to use a peremptory

challenge to remedy a court’s failure to strike a juror for cause does not mean that the

his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or his due process rights were violated. 

See id. Having to use a peremptory challenge to help secure the constitutional

guarantee of trial by an impartial jury is in line with the principal reason for

peremptory challenges and it does not amount to the loss of a peremptory challenge. 

See United Stated v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 314-16 (2000).

\

2. Analysis

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Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated because the trial

court refused to remove Juror No. 18 for cause, forcing the defense to use one of its

peremptory challenges. This claim was brought by Petitioner on direct appeal. The

California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, in a reasoned opinion, addressed

Petitioner’s claim of trial court error in its failure to excuse Juror No. 18. 

The Court of Appeal noted that Juror No. 18's testimony was “conflicting” but

that the Supreme Court of California repeatedly holds that “when a juror gives

conflicting or equivocal answers to questions regarding his or her impartiality, the trial

court’s determination of the juror’s state of mind binds the appellate court.” People v.

James, No. A084516, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Ct App. Oct. 22, 1999). The Court of Appeal

also cited California law in finding, “(w)hen a defendant contends that the trial court

wrongly denied a challenge for cause, he or she must demonstrate that the right to a

fair and impartial jury was thereby affected.” Id. (citing People v. Crittenden, supra,

9 Cal.4th 83, 121 (1994)). 

The Court of Appeal noted that in order for Petitioner to show that the denial of

his challenge for cause deprived him of an impartial jury, he must show that he used

all his peremptory challenges and that he indicated a dissatisfaction with the jury as it

sat. The Court of Appeal concludes that although Petitioner used all of his

peremptory challenges, he never articulated an objection to the seated jury and thus he

failed to show that he was deprived of an impartial jury. 

The Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, established federal law as articulated by the Supreme Court of the

United States. The Court of Appeal afforded the trial court’s decision of Juror No.

18's impartiality the necessary discretion as required by Wainwright. The trial record

contained testimony by Juror No. 18 indicating that she would try to be fair and

impartial if asked to sit on the jury panel, supporting the trial court’s decision that she

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was unbiased and should not be struck for cause. As stated by the Supreme Court in

Wainwright, federal habeas relief may only granted for a state court’s failure to strike

a juror for cause where there is no fair support in the record for the trial court’s

determination that the juror was unbiased. 469 U.S. at 424. 

Additionally, a trial court’s failure to strike a biased juror will not amount to a

constitutional violation so long as the jury that sits is impartial. See Ross, 487 U.S. at

88. Thus, because Petitioner did not articulate a challenge to the impartiality of the

jury as it sat, he does not establish a constitutional violation that would merit habeas

relief. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s decision that Petitioner did not show that

denial of his challenge of Juror No. 18 deprived him of his right to an impartial jury is

consistent with controlling federal law.

B. Handcuffing of Petitioner in View of the Jury

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial

because it was improper to transport him to and from the courtroom in handcuffs in

view of the jury. Petitioner alleges that the handcuffing violated his right to due

process because “shackles, like prison attire, are a constant and prejudicial reminder of

the accused’s status, and as such, impermissible in the absence of manifest necessity.” 

James, slip op. at 5. Petitioner argues that there was no manifest necessity for

restraining him with handcuffs during transport

1. Legal Standard

 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints

visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion,

that restraints are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. Deck v.

Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005); Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir.

1999). 

A trial court’s discretion to use shackles is reviewed under an abuse of

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discretion standard. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 629; Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482,

1485 (9th Cir. 1985). In deciding whether the trial court’s erroneous decision to

shackle violated a defendant’s due process rights, a federal habeas court should

“determine whether what [the jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an

unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.

560, 572 (1986).

However, a jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in physical

restraints outside of the courtroom does not presumptively warrant habeas relief. See

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, where care is

taken to ensure that a defendant’s shackling is not visible to the jury in the courtroom,

prejudice is not presumed. Id. (juror’s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with coat

draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not

inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th

Cir. 1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle

chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense

table to ensure they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th

Cir. 1999). In such cases a defendant must show actual prejudice to warrant habeas

relief. See Rhoden, 172 F.3d at 636. To show actual prejudice, a defendant must

show that the shackling “‘had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.” 

Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims that handcuffing him in view of the jury during his transport

into and out of the courtroom violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Petitioner brought this claim on direct appeal and the Court of Appeal

rejected Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned opinion.

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The Court of Appeal noted that the record does not contain any evidence that

Petitioner was in restraints in the courtroom itself during trial and in the jury’s

presence, only that Petitioner was transported to and from the courtroom in handcuffs

where jurors may have seen him. Additionally, the Court of Appeal explained that the

trial court conducted voir dire with the jury to determine the effect of briefly seeing

Petitioner in handcuffs and none of the jurors indicated that it would have an impact

on their assessment of appellant’s guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeal also noted

that the trial court instructed the jury that they should not consider the presence of

restraints as an indication of Petitioner’s guilt and that it was the local Sheriff’s

Department’s policy to use handcuffs in all cases. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial was

properly denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeal based its conclusion on

California case law which routinely holds that brief observations of a defendant in

physical restraints by one or more of the jurors either inside or outside the courtroom

does not constitute prejudicial error. People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1084-1085

(1988); People v. Osband, 13 Cal. 4th 622, 674 (1996); People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th

569, 584-85 (1992); People v. Cecil, 127 Cal. App. 3d 769, 778 (1982). 

The Court of Appeal decision is consistent with controlling federal law. As

stated in Woodford, a jury’s brief inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in physical

restraints outside of the courtroom does not presumptively warrant habeas relief. 384

F.3d at 593. Prejudice is not presumed when the jury briefly views a defendant in

shackles outside of the courtroom during transport. Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 1002) (no prejudice from jury’s brief glance of shackles outside

of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Cf. Rhoden v. Rowland, 172

F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1999) (prejudice found when defendant was shackled in the

courtroom throughout the entire trial in view of the jury). 

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Because Petitioner relies solely on his allegation that one or more jurors may

have seen him in handcuffs during his transport to and from the courtroom, Petitioner

is not able to establish requisite prejudice necessary for habeas relief. Additionally,

the trial court’s attempt to assess the impact of seeing Petitioner in handcuffs on

potential jurors during voir dire and its limiting instructions to the jury to not consider

the presence of restraints work to prevent the juror’s brief view of Petitioner in

restraints from having a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Brecht, 507

U.S. at 623.

C. Denial of Motion to Sever

Prior to trial, defense counsel filed an in limine motion to sever the robbery

charge that of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm. RT 3. Defense counsel

filed this motion to prevent the jury from learning of Petitioner’s prior felony

convictions. The motion to sever was denied by the trial court. Petitioner

subsequently stipulated to having a prior felony conviction. RT 744. Petitioner

claims that the joinder of these counts violated his due process rights, depriving him

of a fair trial as required by the constitution.

1. Legal Standard

A joinder, or denial of severance, of counts may prejudice a defendant

sufficiently to render his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. See

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997). A federal court reviewing a

state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is not concerned with state law governing

severance or joinder in state trials. See id. Nor is it concerned with the procedural

rights to severance afforded in federal trials. See id. Its inquiry is limited to a

petitioner’s right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution. To prevail, a

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s joinder or denial of severance motion

resulted in prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally unfair. Id. In

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addition, the impermissible joinder must have had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 772 (9th

Cir. 2002).

There is a “high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . joinder of counts allows

evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which

the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.” United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d

1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986). This risk is especially great when the prosecutor

encourages the jury to consider two sets of charges in concert, e.g., as reflecting a

modus operandi even though the evidence is not cross-admissible, and when the

evidence of one crime is substantially weaker than the evidence of the other crime. 

Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084-85. But joinder generally does not result in

prejudice if the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct (even if the evidence is

not cross-admissible), and the jury is properly instructed so that it may

compartmentalize the evidence. Id. At 1085-86.

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims that the trial court deprived him of his federal right to a fair

trial for denying defense counsel’s motion to sever these charges. Petitioner argues

that the jury’s knowledge of his ex-felon status prejudiced their determination on the

robbery charge, rendering his trial fundamentally unfair and in violation of due

process. Petitioner filed this claim on direct appeal and the California Court of

Appeal addressed the claim in a reasoned opinion.

The Court of Appeal analyzed Petitioner’s claim under California law to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion

to sever the two counts. The Court of Appeal noted four factors used to determine

abuse of discretion by a trial court for failure to sever: “1) evidence on the crimes to

be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; 2) certain of the

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6 However, this Court notes that evidence pertaining to possession of the gun is

cross-admissible as to both counts. It is admissible on the robbery because it was used

16

charges are likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; 3) a weak case has been

joined with a strong case, or with another weak case, so that the spillover effect of

aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of

the charges; and 4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them

turns it into a capital case.” James, slip op. at 8 (citing Williams v. Superior Court, 36

Cal. 3d 441, 452-53 (1984); People v. Sandoval, 4 Cal. 4th 155, 172-73 (1992)). 

Petitioner contends that the evidence of his prior felony conviction was not

cross-admissible with the robbery charge and Respondent concedes this point. 

Petitioner also argues that the jury’s knowledge of his ex-felon status is particularly

inflammatory. In response to Petitioner’s argument, the Court of Appeal discussed

that although cross-admissibility may be considered a factor in suggesting possible

prejudice, the lack of cross-admissibility alone does not demonstrate prejudice. The

court also noted that the danger to be avoided by severance of counts is the possibility

that strong evidence of an inflammatory offense may by used to bolster a weak case

on another offense. The court found that this danger was not present in Petitioner’s

case due to the fact that there was ample evidence to support each offense and neither

count was substantially weak. The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim stating

that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the severance motion nor

was appellant deprived of a fair trial or due process of law by joinder of all counts.” 

James, slip op. at 9.

The decision of the Court of Appeal is consistent with controlling federal law. 

Although Petitioner argues that the fact that his ex-felon status was not crossadmissible to the robbery charge, the Court of Appeal correctly determined that this

fact was not prejudicial per se.6

 See Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503

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in the commission of the offense. It is also admissible to establish an element of the

charge of ex-felon in possession of a firearm. 

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(9th Cir. 1991). Moreover, the State did not join a “strong evidentiary case with a

much weaker case in the hope that the cumulation of evidence would lead to a

conviction in both cases.” Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772. Both the robbery charge and

the ex-felon in possession of a weapon convictions were based on substantial

evidence. Petitioner, when detained, was in possession of a loaded magazine that

matched the gun used in the robbery. The same gun that was used in the robbery was

found in Petitioner’s car along with a ski mask and the money bag that was taken from

the scene of the robbery. The gun, money bag, and ski mask were covered in mud and

the Petitioner was also covered in mud when arrived at the hospital. 

Additionally, any likelihood of prejudice was limited by the trial court’s

instructions to the jury to consider each count separately and not to consider the prior

felony conviction for any reason aside from the felon in possession charge. See Davis

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S.

438, 450 n.13 (1986)). “Although such jury instructions can pose difficulties by

asking juries to ‘compartmentalize damaging information about one defendant from

joint counts,’ the instructions have a better change of effectiveness ‘when the evidence

of each crime is simple and distinct, even in the absence of cross-admissibility.’”

Davis, 384 F.3d at 639 (quoting Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d, 1073, 1084-85 (9th Cir.

1998)). In Petitioner’s case, the strength of the evidence in support of each charge and

Petitioner’s stipulation that he had committed a prior felony, rather than allow the

admission of evidence regarding the particular type of felony he had been convicted

of, bolster the effectiveness of the trial court’s instructions to the jury and diminish

any risk of prejudice from joinder of the two counts. 

D. Petitioner’s Stipulation to his Ex-Felon Status

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To prevent the jury from hearing the nature of his prior felony conviction,

Petitioner stipulated to the fact that he had been previously convicted of a felony. 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by failing to advise Petitioner of his

constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and

against self-incrimination prior to accepting his stipulation.

1. Legal Standard

Due process requires that a guilty plea entered by a defendant be both knowing

and voluntary because it constitutes the waiver of three constitutional rights: the right

to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against selfincrimination. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). A trial judge

may not accept a defendant's guilty plea without creating a record affirmatively

showing that the plea was knowing and voluntary; a silent record is invalid. Id. at

242. 

A conviction based on stipulated facts is valid only if the defendant knowingly

and voluntarily agreed to the stipulation. Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 843 (9th

Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defendant must enter into the stipulation with “sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 844. Unlike

a situation where a defendant enters a guilty plea, with a stipulation, there is no

requirement that there be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant’s

constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin. Id. at 839. “A stipulation to the facts from

which the judge or jury may infer guilt is simply not the same as a stipulation to guilt

or a guilty plea.” Id. 

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in failing to admonish Petitioner of

his constitutional rights before accepting his guilty plea. This claim was brought by

Petitioner on direct appeal and the California Court of Appeal addressed Petitioner’s

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claim in a reasoned opinion.

The Court of Appeal analyzed Petitioner’s claim in accordance with California

law. The court cites People v. Newman, 21 Cal. 4th 413 (1999), where the Supreme

Court of California rejected the proposition that a defendant’s stipulation to his status

as a felon required Boykin advice and made it clear that the failure to obtain

defendant’s waiver of rights is not error by the trial court. The Court of Appeal noted

that the Newman court refused to extend the Boykin requirements “beyond admissions

and stipulations that are legally tantamount to a guilty plea, or that necessarily result

in penal consequences.” James, slip op. at 9. The Court of Appeal also found that the

Newman court determined that “a defendant’s status as a felon was neither the legal

equivalent of a guilty plea nor an admission from which penal consequences would

necessarily flow . . . It was merely an evidentiary stipulation reflecting a single

element of one of the charged offenses.” Id. at 10. The Court of Appeal concluded

that there was no error by the trial court in its failure to procure a waiver of

constitutional rights prior to his stipulation to his status as a felon. 

The Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of controlling federal law. The United States Supreme Court clearly

indicates in Boykin that a trial court must ensure knowing and voluntary waiver of

rights prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea. 395 U.S. at 243. Under Ninth

Circuit precedent, a conviction based on stipulated facts only requires that the

defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the stipulation, not a knowing and

voluntary waiver of constitutional rights as required in Boykin. Adams, 968 F.2d at

839. Petitioner does not allege that he did not have knowledge or agree to the

stipulation, merely that he was not advised of and did not waive his constitutional

rights in entering into the stipulation. Thus, because federal law does not require a

trial court to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of a defendant’s constitutional

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rights upon accepting a defendant’s stipulation to his status as a felon, the Court of

Appeal’s decision is consistent with controlling federal law. 

E. Miranda Violation

While Petitioner was receiving treatment at the hospital, Deputy Kollo noticed

that Petitioner’s hands were muddy and asked a sergeant to photograph Petitioner’s

hands. Petitioner claims evidence that he attempted to remove mud from his hands

while in police custody should have been suppressed as being in violation of his Fifth

Amendment rights against self-incrimination pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). 

1. Legal Standard

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that a person subjected to custodial

interrogation must be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that statements

made can be used against him, that he has the right to counsel, and that he has the

right to have counsel appointed. These warnings must precede any custodial

interrogation, which occurs whenever law enforcement officers question a person after

taking that person into custody or otherwise significantly deprive a person of freedom

of action. Id at 444. The requirements of Miranda are “clearly established” federal

law for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Juan

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2005); Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d 1002,

1009 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Interrogation means questioning or ‘its functional equivalent,’ including

‘words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to

arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.’” Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). However, the

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “offers no protection against

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compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or

speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to

make a particular gesture.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination

was violated by admission of evidence of Petitioner wiping his muddy hands on his

bed sheet in response to Deputy Kollo’s attempt to take a photograph of Petitioner’s

hands. Petitioner brought this claim on direct appeal before the California Court of

Appeal, which denied his claim.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the privilege against self-incrimination

protects the accused from being forced to give evidence of a testimonial or

communicated nature. However, the court stated that this privilege does not protect

the accused from being compelled to produce physical or identification evidence. The

court analyzed Petitioner’s claim using Supreme Court case law, citing Schmerber,

384 U.S. at 764. The court also cited various California cases that indicate that an

accused’s refusal to provide bodily evidence is admissible to demonstrate

consciousness of guilt. Finding no error by the trial court, the Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner’s claim of violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. 

The Court of Appeal decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of federal law. The court’s determination that the privilege against selfincrimination did not extend to Petitioner’s actions of wiping his hands is consistent

with law stated by the Supreme Court in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. Additionally,

under Ninth Circuit precedent a defendant’s actions of refusal to produce physical or

identification evidence indicate a consciousness of guilt and are therefore admissible. 

See United States v. Parhms, 424 F.2d 152, 154-155 (9th Cir. 1970) (allowing the

admission of evidence of appellant’s refusal to participate in a pre-trial line-up due to

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the refusal being conduct tending to indicate a feeling of guilt on appellant’s part). As

such, Petitioner’s claim fails.

F. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims that the prosecution engaged in misconduct in their case

against him. Petitioner alleges six separate instances of prosecutorial misconduct,

which he claims violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

1. Legal Standard

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. The

appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of due process and not the broad

exercise of supervisory power. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). 

A defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders

a trial “fundamentally unfair.” Id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”). Under Darden, the first

issue is whether the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct were improper; if so, the next

question is whether such remarks or conduct infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v.

Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). A prosecutorial misconduct claim is

decided “on the merits, examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the

prosecutor’s [conduct] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1017 (1995). Federal habeas relief for claims of

prosecutorial misconduct is appropriate only if the misconduct has a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

2. Analysis

I. Improper Prosecutorial Comment on Petitioner’s Failure to

Testify

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Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed Griffin error during closing

argument by stating that Petitioner was “hiding behind a brick wall.” Griffin v.

California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Under Griffin, when a prosecutor on his own

initiative asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence, or to

treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt, the defendant’s privilege

against self-incrimination is violated. Id. Petitioner claims that the prosecutor’s

statements to the jury about the “brick wall” were a reference to Petitioner’s failure to

testify in his defense and thus constituted Griffin error. Petitioner brought this claim

of Griffin error on direct appeal before the California Court of Appeal, which denied

Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned opinion.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that the prosecutor’s reference to the

“brick wall” was an analogy, describing “the bricks that make up this wall” as “the

elements of the crimes” that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. James, slip

op. at 12. The court found the prosecutor’s analogy an “innocuous comment on the

state of the evidence” and stated that it could not reasonably construed as a comment

on the Petitioner’s failure to testify. Id. at 13. 

The Court of Appeal determination that the prosecutor’s comments were

“innocuous” and therefore, not Griffin error, is consistent with federal law. The

prosecutor’s comments about the “brick wall” did not directly refer to Petitioner’s

failure to testify and the prosecution specifically stated that the bricks were metaphors

for the elements of each crime that needed to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,

not a metaphor for Petitioner’s silence. The prosecutor’s comments were ambiguous

and Ninth Circuit precedent instructs that “a court should not lightly infer that a

prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a

jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation will draw that meaning from the plethora of

less damaging interpretations.” Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1998)

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(citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 616 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).

 Even if the prosecutor’s comments are considered to be improper and in

violation of Griffin, Petitioner cannot show that the comments rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair as required by Darden. 477 U.S. at 181. A prosecutor’s

comments calling to attention a defendant’s failure to testify require reversal only if

“(1) the commentary is extensive; (2) an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to

the jury as a basis for the conviction; and (3) where there is evidence that could have

supported an acquittal.” Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994). In Petitioner’s case, the “brick

wall” analogy were referred to numerous times throughout the prosecutor’s closing

argument. RT 748, 750, 752, 754. However, the prosecutor does not stress that the

jury should infer guilt from the “brick wall,” but that they should use the physical and

testimonial evidence to dismantle the brick wall. RT 750. 

Additionally, the evidence indicating Petitioner’s guilt was extensive. 

Petitioner was found with a loaded magazine that matched the gun identified as the

one used in the robbery. A gun, ski mask, and money bag from the store that was

robbed were found in Petitioner’s car. The gun from the robbery was covered in mud

and Petitioner was also covered in mud at the time of his arrival at the hospital. None

of the other occupants of Petitioner’s car were muddy or had seen one another with

the gun, money bag, and ski mask. Regardless of whether the prosecutor’s comment

regarding the “brick wall” were improper, Petitioner is not able to establish that the

comments warrant reversal. Thus, the Court of Appeal opinion not to reverse

Petitioner’s conviction based on the alleged Griffin error is consistent with controlling

federal law. 

ii. Vindictive Prosecution

Petitioner claims that he was prosecuted only after another case, charging

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Petitioner with possession of a firearm (identified as No. 166092-7), was dismissed. 

Petitioner alleges that the case against him for possession of a firearm was dismissed

by the prosecution because Petitioner was “illegally detained, interrogated, and

charged” by Police Officer A. Charles. Pet. at 15. After this alleged mistreatment by

police, Petitioner claims he filed several civil suits against county employees. Pet.

Trav. at 46. Petitioner claims vindictive prosecution, arguing that the instant case for

robbery was brought in retaliation for dismissal of the possession case and Petitioner’s

filing of civil suits against county employees.

A prosecutor violates a defendant’s due process rights when he brings

additional charges solely to punish the defendant for exercising a constitutional or

statutory right. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). The

defendant has the burden to show that the “charges of increased severity were filed

because the accused exercised a statutory, procedural, or constitutional right in

circumstances that give rise to an appearance of vindictiveness.” United States v.

Gallegos-Curiel, 682 F.2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1982). The defendant must show that

the prosecutorial conduct would not have occurred “but for” the prosecutor’s

“hostility or punitive animus towards the defendant because he had exercised his

specific legal rights.” Id. At 1168-69. 

Petitioner fails to satisfy his burden of showing vindictive prosecution. 

Petitioner puts forth no evidence of a prior case against him for possession of a

weapon, nor does Petitioner put forth any evidence indicating that he filed any civil

suits against county employees. Even if his petition had included this evidence,

Petitioner does not show that vindictive prosecution occurred. The case against

Petitioner was extremely persuasive, thus the evidence against Petitioner suggests that

the charges against him were brought for resolution of the robbery. Noting the strong

evidence against Petitioner, he does not show that “but for” the prosecutor’s “hostility

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or punitive animus towards the defendant,” Petitioner would not have been charged

and tried for robbery. Gallegos-Curiel, 682 F.2d at 1168-69. 

iii. Destroying Exculpatory Evidence

Petitioner claims that the prosecution committed misconduct by failing to

preserve evidence of Petitioner’s shoes from the night of the robbery and Petitioner’s

car. The police, during their detention of Petitioner at the hospital and their

investigation of the crime, misplaced Petitioner’s shoes. RT 654. Also, after

Petitioner was arrested, the grey Dodge was sent to the impound lot where the people

who had a lien on the car came and recovered the car. RT 38, 63. Petitioner claims

that the government’s failure to preserve the evidence of his shoes and his car violate

his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

For a defendant claiming a due process violation based on failure to preserve

evidence he must show that the evidence that was destroyed was material. See

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). Thus, defendant must show that

the evidence had exculpatory value before it was destroyed and that it is of such a

nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably

available means. Id. Although the good faith or bad faith of the police is irrelevant to

the analysis when the police destroy material exculpatory evidence, the analysis is

different if the evidence is potentially useful. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48

(2004); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). When evidence is only

potentially useful there is no due process violation unless there is bad faith conduct by

the police in failing to preserve the evidence. Id.

Petitioner cannot show that the evidence of his shoes was exculpatory, merely

that it was potentially useful. Petitioner claims that his shoes on the night of the

robbery were not muddy, which he states would exclude him as the suspect that the

prosecution asserted was running through mud to flee the scene of the crime. Pet.

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Trav. 50. However, several witnesses testified to seeing Petitioner’s muddy shoes

before they were misplaced. Additionally, Petitioner’s clothing and hands were

covered in mud while he was detained at the hospital, supporting the prosecution’s

theory. Because the evidence of Petitioner’s shoes were potentially useful and not

clearly exculpatory, Petitioner has the burden of showing bad faith on the part of

police. Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-48. Petitioner presents no evidence that the police

exhibited bad faith in failing to preserve Petitioner’s shoes. 

Petitioner also cannot show that the evidence of his car was exculpatory. 

Police testimony indicated that Petitioner was leaning on the driver’s door of the car

when he arrived at the hospital and that the steering wheel and gear shift were muddy. 

RT 372, 439-440. Witness Moore testified that Petitioner was driving the car when

they arrived at the hospital. RT 542-43. Photos presented by the prosecution showed

that the driver’s side of the car was muddy. RT 631- 661. Additionally, papers were

found in the car containing Petitioner’s name. RT 703. Noting this evidence,

Petitioner can at best establish that the evidence of the car would be potentially useful,

requiring Petitioner to establish bad faith on the police to prove a violation of his due

process rights. Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-48. Petitioner does not present any evidence

that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence of the car.

Because the evidence of the shoes and the car are only potentially useful for

Petitioner, he needs to show bad faith on the part of the police in failing to preserve

the evidence to demonstrate that this due process rights were violated. Id. Petitioner

does not put forth any evidence that the police acted in bad faith in misplacing his

shoes at the hospital or allowing the car to be taken from the impound lot. The trial

record indicates that the police were at most negligent in failing to preserve the

evidence. Negligent failure to preserve potentially useful evidence is not enough to

establish bad faith and does not constitute a violation of due process. See Grisby v.

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Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1997).

iv. Brady Violation

Petitioner claims that the prosecution committed misconduct by

suppressing statements of witness Isaiah Moore. Moore testified at trial that on the

night of the robbery he spoke to three different police officers and that when he was in

juvenile hall, a parole officer questioned him about the night of the robbery. RT 474,

466. Petitioner alleges that Moore’s statements to police were inconsistent with

Moore’s trial testimony, information that would be useful to the defense in

impeaching Moore. Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to present the defense

with any of the police reports recording Moore’s statements, thereby violating his due

process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where it is

material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective or good faith or bad faith by the

prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material only it there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682

(1985) (plurality opinion). A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. To establish a Brady violation, Petitioner

must show that the exculpatory or impeaching evidence was suppressed by the state,

either wilfully or inadvertently, resulting in prejudice. Morris v. Y1st, 447 F.3d 735,

743 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 In his petition, Petitioner does not present any evidence indicating that

defense counsel did not obtain copies of the police reports containing Moore’s

statements. There is no declaration from defense counsel that these reports were not

received. Even if Petitioner were able to show that these reports were suppressed

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improperly, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. Petitioner does not present any

evidence that shows that Moore’s statements to police and trial testimony were

inconsistent. Moore testifies that he spoke to three officers and that he told each one

of them the truth as to what happened on the night of the robbery. RT 470-77, 551. 

Additionally, Moore’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence, such as

Petitioner’s injury, Petitioner’s muddy clothes, and testimony from a police officer

that Petitioner was outside the driver’s side door at the hospital. 

Even if Moore’s testimony and police statements were inconsistent and defense

counsel were able to impeach Moore, the evidence against Petitioner is still

sufficiently strong to support a guilty verdict. Petitioner was found with a loaded

magazine that matched the gun identified as the one used in the robbery. Several

witnesses testified as to Petitioner’s clothes and shoes being muddy on the night of the

robbery, consistent with the prosecution’s assertion that Petitioner fell down a muddy

hill while fleeing the robbery. The gun, ski mask, and money bag were muddy and

found in Petitioner’s car, which witness testimony established Petitioner was driving

on the night of the robbery. A police officer testified that the steering wheel and

driver’s side of Petitioner’s car were muddy. None of the other passengers in the car

had mud on them. Thus, even assuming suppression of Moore’s statements by the

prosecution and that the statements were inconsistent with Moore’s trial testimony,

noting the remaining evidence against Petitioner, Petitioner cannot show that evidence

of Moore’s statements would sufficient to undermine the outcome of the proceedings.

v. Stating Facts Not in Evidence

Petitioner claims that the prosecution committed prosecutorial misconduct by

stating facts not in evidence during opening and closing argument. During opening

argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Petitioner gave two separate stories to Dr.

Theo Kory and that Petitioner had mud on his shoes. RT 290, 289. During closing,

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the prosecutor told the jury to “follow the trail of mud and you will find who

committed the crime” and that it was the defendant’s fault that his shoes were not in

evidence. RT 797, 768. Petitioner argues that these statements by the prosecution

amounted to misconduct because the prosecution commented on evidence that was

outside the trial record. 

To show prosecutorial misconduct due to a prosecutor’s remarks at trial,

Petitioner must show first, that the prosecutor’s comments were improper; and if so,

second, that the remarks infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d

1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). Regardless of whether Petitioner can show that the

prosecutor’s remarks were improper, he is not able to establish a prosecutorial

misconduct claim because he cannot prove prejudice by showing that the prosecutor’s

comments infected the trial with unfairness. The trial court instructed the jury that

they must determine facts “from the evidence received in the trial and not from any

other source.” RT 725. The Supreme Court has held that when a curative instruction

is issued a court presumes that the jury has disregarded inadmissible evidence and that

no due process violation occurred. See Greer v. Miller, 438 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987);

Tan, 413 F.3d at 1115 (“we presume jurors follow the court’s instructions absent

extraordinary circumstances”). Because Petitioner cannot show prejudice, the

prosecutor’s comments, even if deemed to be improper, do not result in a denial of

Petitioner’s due process rights.

vi. Coached Testimony

Petitioner claims that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct by “coaching” the testimony of witness Groff. Petitioner claims that

Detective A. Charles contacted Groff on March 5, 1998, days after the robbery, and

coached Groff as to description of Petitioner’s clothing on the night of the robbery. 

Petitioner’s contention that Detective Charles contacted and coached witness Groff is

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completely conclusory. Although Petitioner refers to Charles’s April 15, 1998 police

report to show that Charles contacted Groff on March 5, 1998, Petitioner does not put

forth any evidence, aside from his allegations, that Charles “coached” Groff during

this contact. Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994). 

G. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to

deficient performance on the part of his defense counsel. Petitioner alleges nineteen

separate deficiencies on the part of the defense counsel: 1) failure to investigate the

scene of the crime to examine whether it was muddy; 2) failure to investigate

prosecution witnesses prior to the time of trial; 3) failure to move to suppress evidence

about Petitioner’s muddy shoes; 4) failure to object to the admission of evidence of

Petitioner’s reaction to being photographed; 5) failure to move to exclude statements

made by the prosecution in its opening statement regarding Dr. Kory; 6) failure to file

a meritorious motion to exclude testimony of destroyed exculpatory evidence; 7)

failure to object to “coached” testimony provided by witness Moore; 8) failure to

move to suppress Moore’s testimony as a sanction for a discovery violation on the part

of the prosecution; 9) failure to object to prosecution’s “vouching” for facts not in

evidence; 10) failure to refuse to stipulate to the authenticity of the documents found

in the vehicle containing Petitioner’s name; 11) failure to object to Officer Bublak’s

testimony; 12) failure to investigate and call all relevant defense witnesses,

specifically, Satrina Emerson, Dejarnette Branch, and Tyrae Patterson; 13) failure to

present expert medical testimony concerning Petitioner’s ability to drive a manual

transmission vehicle while suffering a dislocated right hip; 14) failure to move to

exclude Deputy Kollo’s testimony concerning the extent to which the crime scene was

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muddy on the night of the robbery; 15) informing the court prior to sentencing that

Petitioner had previously threatened defense counsel; 16) failure to present material

evidence to impeach witness Moore; 17) failure to move for suppression of

photographic evidence; 18) failure to raise a defense of “third party” culpability; and

19) failure to move for dismissal of verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence. 

1. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial

of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but

effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. 

To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner

must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. 

Additionally, Petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome of the proceedings. Id. 

A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies. See Id. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir.

1995) (applauding district court’s refusal to consider whether counsel’s conduct was

deficient after determining Petitioner could not establish prejudice), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1124 (1996). 

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The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel

claims is considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. 

See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). In a federal habeas

challenge to a state criminal judgment, a state court’s conclusion that counsel rendered

effective assistance is not a fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Both the performance and the prejudice components of the

ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact. See Strickland 466 U.S.

at 698. Claims of ineffective assistance therefore require a review of the record as a

whole.

A habeas petitioner cannot simply allege ineffective assistance of counsel

without evidence to support his allegations. James, 24 F.3d at 26. A habeas petitioner

has the burden of showing through evidentiary proof that counsel's performance was

deficient. See Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

960 (1990); see also Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 813 n.23 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting

two ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on petitioner's failure to produce

evidence of prejudice). 

2. Analysis

I. Ineffective Assistance Claims Based on Unmeritorious Underlying

Claims.

Petitioner makes several ineffective assistance claims that rely on

unmeritorious claims of trial court error or prosecutorial misconduct: failure to move

to suppress evidence about Petitioner’s muddy shoes; failure to object to the

admission of evidence to Petitioner’s reaction to being photographed; failure to move

to exclude statements made by the prosecution in its opening statement regarding Dr.

Kory; failure to file a motion to exclude testimony of destroyed exculpatory evidence;

and failure to move to suppress Moore’s testimony as a sanction for a discovery

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violation on the part of the prosecution. Thus, Petitioner’s five ineffective assistance

claims set forth above fail because trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to

make a meritless objection. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005).

ii. Failure to Investigate the Scene of the Crime

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate the scene of the crime “to determine the extent to which it would have

been muddy” on February 27, 1998, the night of the robbery. Pet. at 14. In his

traverse, Petitioner refers to the report of a private investigator hired by defense

counsel which indicates that the investigator did visit the J & A Market. Pet. Trav.

Exh. B at 1. Thus, Petitioner fails to put forth any evidence that defense counsel did

not investigate the scene of the crime.

Even if Petitioner was able to show that defense counsel did not investigate the

scene of the crime, Petitioner has not shown either deficient performance or prejudice.

 Petitioner was not charged with the instant crimes until May 1998, when defense

counsel was assigned to Petitioner’s case. It goes without saying that investigating the

crime scene in May, three months after commission of the crime, would not have

determined the extent to which the crime scene was muddy on February 27, 1998. 

Nor has Petitioner identified another method of investigation which would have

provided information favorable to his defense. Petitioner has failed to establish

through evidentiary proof the elements in support of his claim. See Toomey, 898 F.2d

at 743; Rios, 299 F.3d at 813 n.23.

iii. Failure to Investigate Prosecution and Defense Witnesses

Prior to Trial 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel failed to investigate any of

the prosecution’s ten witnesses prior to trial. The duty to investigate and prepare a

defense does not require that every conceivable witness be interviewed. Hendricks v.

Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995). When the record shows that the lawyer

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was well-informed and the defendant fails to state what additional information would

be gained by further discovery he now claims was necessary, an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim fails. Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir, 1986). 

A review of the trial record does not indicate that defense counsel was poorly

informed as to any of the prosecution witnesses. Additionally, Petitioner fails to state

what additional information would have been gained had these witnesses been

interviewed by the defense. A defendant’s mere speculation that a witness might have

given helpful information if interviewed is not enough to establish ineffective

assistance. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d

1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

iv. Failure to Object to “Coached” Testimony Provided by

Witness Moore

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to

object to the “coached” testimony of witness Moore at the California Evidence Code §

402 Hearing on August 13, 1998. During this hearing, the court noticed that Moore’s

mother was making head gestures at Moore while he was testifying. The court

admonished Moore’s mother by stating, “I’m going to ask you if you’re going to

remain in the courtroom, you can’t make head gestures to your son, all right?” RT

459. Noting the trial court’s admonishment of Moore’s mother and the fact that

following the admonishment, she ceased making gestures, defense counsel did not

have any legal grounds upon which to object. Trial counsel cannot be ineffective for

failing to make a meritless objection. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir.

2005). Petitioner has not established prejudice with regard to this claim. 

\

\

vi. Stipulating to the Authenticity of Documents Found in the

Grey Dodge

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Petitioner claims defense counsel was ineffective for stipulating

to the authenticity of documents found in the grey Dodge that contained Petitioner’s

name. Petitioner now claims that these documents were manufactured by the

prosecution and that defense counsel erred in stipulating to their authenticity. 

However, Petitioner is unable to show prejudice to establish an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the

alleged deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams, 52 F.3d at 1470 &

n.3.

There was ample evidence of Petitioner’s possession of the grey Dodge on the

night of the robbery. Witness testimony included that Petitioner was driving the car

on the night of the robbery, that Petitioner left the car and returned muddy and injured,

and that Petitioner was seen at the hospital leaning up against the driver’s side door of

the car. Petitioner’s clothing and hands were covered in mud, linking him to the

muddy money bag, gun, and ski mask used in the robbery. Also, none of the other

passengers in the grey Dodge, who Petitioner contends are the likely culprits, had mud

on them. Noting the strong evidence against Petitioner, he cannot show that, but for

defense counsel’s stipulation to the authenticity of the documents in the car, there is a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

vii. Failure to Object to Officer Bublak’s Testimony

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to Officer Bublak’s testimony regarding a traffic citation that Petitioner

received in December 1997, which was offered by the prosecution to establish that

Petitioner was the owner of the grey Dodge. A review of the record contradicts

Petitioner’s claim, showing that defense counsel did in fact object to the admission of

Bublak’s testimony, claiming it was “not extremely relevant and potentially

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prejudicial.” RT 526. Thus, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim for defense

counsel’s failure to object to Bublak’s testimony is without merit as Petitioner has not

established that counsel was deficient in the way he alleges. 

viii. Failure to Investigate and Call Relevant Defense Witnesses

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to

investigate and call relevant defense witnesses Satrina Emerson, Dejarnette Branch,

and Tyrae Patterson. Petitioner contends that these witnesses would present testimony

that would impeach witness Moore. Petitioner has not established through evidentiary

proof what witnesses would say and how they would aid in his defense. Petitioner’s

claim fails because it does not amount to prejudice necessary under Strickland.

To establish prejudice cause by the failure to call a witness, a petitioner must

show that the witness was likely to have been available to testify, that the witness

would have given the proffered testimony, and that the witness’s testimony created a

reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to

the petitioner. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner

does not present any information explaining what these potential witnesses would

have testified about. Additionally, Petitioner fails to show how the testimony of these

three potential witnesses could have created a reasonable probability that the jury

would have reached a verdict more favorable to Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because Petitioner is unable to show

prejudice. United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989) (failure to

demonstrate prejudice where petitioner offers no indication of what potential

witnesses would have testified to, or how their testimony might have changed the

outcome of the proceedings). 

\

\

ix. Failure to Present Expert Medical Testimony in Petitioner’s

Defense

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Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to present expert medical testimony concerning Petitioner’s ability to drive a manual

transmission vehicle while suffering from a dislocated hip. Petitioner has provided no

evidence in his petition that shows that defense counsel did not investigate the

possibility of calling a medical expert whose testimony would be helpful to Petitioner. 

Additionally, Petitioner does not provide declarations from any medical expert that

would testify as to his claim or any information that such testimony would be

favorable to his defense. See Toomey, 898 F.2d at 7; Rios, 299 F.3d at 813 n.23. 

Because Petitioner merely speculates as to how a medical expert would testify, he

does not establish prejudice necessary under Strickland. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d

365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“speculation about what an expert could have said is not

enough to establish prejudice”). 

x. Failure to Move to Exclude Deputy Kollo’s Testimony 

 Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to move to exclude the testimony of Deputy Kollo concerning the extent to which the

crime scene was muddy on February 27, 1998. Petitioner argues that Deputy Kollo

did not actually visit the scene of the crime on the night of the robbery and thus his

testimony was hearsay and should have been excluded. 

Regardless of whether Petitioner can establish whether Kollo’s testimony was

hearsay, his claim lacks merit because he cannot establish prejudice. Review of the

trial record reveals that eyewitnesses Glotch and Banuelos both testified that the

hillside near the scene of the crime was muddy on the night of February 27, 1998. RT

314, 317, 343. Additionally, Kollo testified at trial that his knowledge of the area in

question being muddy in February 1998 was based on his background knowledge and

experience in the area, and not on his presence in the area at the time of the incident. 

RT 657. Thus, Petitioner is not able to show that, but for defense counsel’s failure to

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move to exclude Kollo’s testimony, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.

xi. Informing the Court of Petitioner’s Threats

 Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for

informing the court during sentencing that Petitioner had threatened her. During an in

camera hearing, defense counsel informed the court that Petitioner had said “he would

like to hit [her]” and that “he would come after [her].” RT 846. Petitioner denies

making threats to defense counsel and contends that her allegations prejudiced the

court during sentencing. Petitioner does not present any evidence, aside from his

conclusory allegations, that defense counsel’s accusations prejudiced the sentencing

decision made by the court. Conclusory allegations of the effect of defense counsel’s

statements over the trial court’s sentencing decision which not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief. James, 24 F.3d at 26. Thus,

Petitioner’s claim lacks merit.

xii. Failure to Impeach Moore’s Testimony

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective by failing

to present material evidence for impeachment purposes of witness Moore. Petitioner

claims that on July 1, 1998, Moore mailed Petitioner a letter detailing the events of

February 27, 1998. Petitioner claims that this letter contradicted Moore’s trial

testimony and that he gave the letter to defense counsel to use to impeach Moore

during cross-examination. Petitioner fails to attach the letter written by Moore to his

petition or to establish what the letter said and how it would have been helpful to

Petitioner’s defense. Thus, Petitioner’s claim is based solely on his conclusory

allegations about the usefulness of the letter. Without the letter and any information

about its contents, Petition is unable to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

James, 24 F.3d at 26 (conclusory allegations not supported by a statement of specific

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facts do not warrant habeas relief). 

xiii. Failure to Move for the Suppression of Photographic

Evidence

Several photographs were admitted at trial that pictured Petitioner

after he attempted to wipe mud from his hands at the hospital, the interior and exterior

of the grey Dodge, and the gun and money bag found under the seat of the Dodge. 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the

“veracity” of these photographs and the existence of additional photographic

evidence. Pet. at 17. Additionally, Petitioner claims that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to move to suppress the photographs. 

Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Petitioner does not present any evidence that

defense counsel did not investigate the “veracity” of the photographs or that there was

any problem with the veracity of the photographs. Nor has Petitioner provided any

legal basis for a motion to suppress the photographic evidence. Petitioner’s claim

lacks factual support and has no legal basis, thus habeas relief is not merited. James,

24 F.3d at 26 (conclusory allegations not supported by a statement of specific facts do

not warrant habeas relief). 

xiv. Failure to Raise a Defense of “Third Party” Culpability

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to argue a defense of “third party” culpability, specifically that Isaiah Moore was

responsible for the robbery. Petitioner claims that eyewitness Banuelos was

unsuccessful in identifying Petitioner’s voice in a voice sample and that her

description of the robber did not match Petitioner’s description. Petitioner also

contends that physical evidence from hairs found in the ski cap did not match

Petitioner’s hair. Petitioner claims that defense counsel’s “failure to present obvious

inconsistencies in the physical discription[sic] of Petitioner and the obvious

similarities of the physical caracheristics[sic] of a third party resulted in ineffective

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assistance of counsel.” Pet. at 18.

However, despite Petitioner’s claim, defense counsel did raise a third party

defense on behalf of Petitioner. Defense counsel cross-examined Banuelos about her

inconsistencies in her description of the robber. RT 355-360. Defense counsel

pointed out to the jury the similarities in height between the robber described by

Banuelos and Isaiah Moore. RT 548. Defense counsel also presented evidence to the

jury that the hairs found in the ski mask did not belong to Petitioner. RT 708. 

Additionally, during closing argument, defense counsel specifically argues a third

party defense. RT 786-787. Thus, because a review of the trial record clearly shows

that defense counsel did raise this defense, though unsuccessfully, Petitioner’s claim

lacks merit. 

xv. Failure to Move for Dismissal Based on Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to move for dismissal of the jury verdict due to insufficiency of the evidence. A state

prisoner who alleges that evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly

categorized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 321 (1979). A federal habeas court reviewing a claim of insufficiency of

the evidence “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d

335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993) (quoting Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319). 

The evidence against Petitioner was extremely persuasive. Witness testimony

stated that Petitioner was driving the grey Dodge on the night of the robbery, parked

the car in an area matching the description of where the robbery occurred, left the car,

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and returned ten minutes later muddy and injured. Evidence also suggests that when

petitioner arrived at the hospital, his clothing and hands were covered in mud, linking

him to the muddy money bag, gun, and ski mask used in the robbery. Petitioner was

seen leaning outside the driver’s side door to the Dodge, where the steering wheel and

driver’s side area were muddy. Additionally, the prosecutor put forth evidence that

none of the other passengers in the Dodge had mud on them. Also, while in the

hospital, Petitioner handed his girlfriend a loaded magazine that matched the gun used

in the robbery. Considering the substantial evidence against Petitioner, he cannot

establish that no rational trier of fact could have found the elements of crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish

ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing

to raise a meritless motion. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273. 

H. Improper Admission of Evidence, Denial of Marsden Motion

Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the

prosecution to enter into evidence a traffic citation which was ruled inadmissible in

another case against Petitioner. Petitioner also claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying the five Marsden motions filed by Petitioner.

1. Improper Admission of Evidence

I. Legal Standard

The admission of evidence is not subject to habeas review unless

a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such a magnitude that

the result is a denial of a fundamentally unfair trial guaranteed by due process. See

Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d

984, 990 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). The due process inquiry in

federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so

prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45

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F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). 

ii. Analysis

Petitioner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and

caused reversible error by admitting evidence that was ruled previously inadmissible

in a different case in another court. Pet. at 16. In his traverse, Petitioner argues that

the trial court allowed the prosecution to use a December 1997 traffic citation to

connect Petitioner to the grey Dodge. Pet. Trav. at 60. Petitioner claims that this

citation was obtained by the prosecution after a search of Petitioner’s grandmother’s

house, whose name was given to law enforcement officials during an interrogation of

Petitioner that violated his Miranda rights. Id. Petitioner contends that evidence of

the traffic citation was ruled inadmissible in a prior case against Petitioner in Superior

Court by Judge Laural Lindenbaum. Id. Petitioner asserts that, in the instant case, the

admission of traffic citation evidence led the prosecution to obtain the name of Officer

Bublak, who was able to testify at trial and connect Petitioner to the grey Dodge that

was allegedly used in the commission of the robbery of J & A Market. Id. 

Regardless of whether Petitioner can prove error on the part of the trial court in

admitting of the traffic citation evidence, Petitioner is not able to establish a due

process claim. Petitioner does not show that the admission of the traffic citation

evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial to render his trial fundamentally unfair. 

Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. As stated previously, the evidence presented by the

prosecution linking Petitioner to the robbery was extremely persuasive. In light of the

strong evidence against Petitioner, the admission of evidence connecting Petitioner to

the grey Dodge two months prior to the robbery is not so prejudicial to render

Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. See Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 979

(9th Cir. 2006) (finding that polygraph evidence played only a minor role at trial and,

therefore, the erroneous introduction of evidence that defendant refused a polygraph

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was not prejudicial in light of sufficient evidence supporting petitioner’s conviction). 

2. Improper Denial of Petitioner’s Marsden Motions

I. Legal Standard

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is properly considered in federal

habeas. Bland v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). Ninth Circuit precedent states that when a defendant voices a seemingly

substantial complaint about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry

into the reasons for the defendant’s dissatisfaction. Id. at 1475-76; United States v.

Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the inquiry need only be as

comprehensive as the circumstances would reasonably permit. King v. Rowland, 977

F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992) (record may demonstrate that extensive inquiry was

not necessary). A federal court of habeas review should consider whether the trial

court’s denial of a Marsden motion “actually violated [petitioner’s] constitutional

rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney had become so great

that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment that

resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the

Sixth Amendment.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026.

ii. Analysis

Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional rights were

violated by the trial court’s denial of his five separate Marsden motions seeking to

substitute counsel. The trial record indicates that the trial court held hearings on

Petitioner’s Marsden motions on July 23, 1998 and August 10, 1997 and subsequently

denied the motion. R. Exh. O, R. Exh. N. The record also indicates that Petitioner

filed another Marsden motion prior to sentencing, that was denied without a hearing. 

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Petitioner’s motion to substitute counsel was denied by the trial court. 

Petitioner’s Marsden motions exclusively contain claims that are brought

before this court on habeas review. Petitioner asserts that his case requires 

substitution of counsel for defense counsel’s alleged deficient acts and refusal to bring

certain motions during pre-trial proceedings. As discussed earlier, none of

Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel have merit. Additionally,

the motions Petitioner claims defense counsel should have brought are determined by

this court to lack merit. 

Petitioner’s conflict with his attorney arises from their differences in opinion

involving strategic matters, which does not require substitution. Schell, 218 F.3d at

1026 & n.8 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966) (“[A] lawyer may

properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial even in the face of his

client’s incomprehension or explicit disapproval”)). Petitioner does not establish that

the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motions. Petitioner is not able to exhibit

that the relationship with his defense counsel was so conflicted to violate his Sixth

Amendment right to adequate counsel. Although Petitioner shows that he and defense

counsel had disagreements over trial tactics and that they did not generally get along

with one another, Petitioner does not show that his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated by the trial court’s denial of his Marsden motions. See Morris v. Slappy, 461

U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (holding that Sixth Amendment requires only competent

representation and does not guarantee a meaningful relationship between a defendant

and counsel). 

I. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel committed ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to raise on appeal: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 

2) prosecutorial misconduct and; 3) abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

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1. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a

criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. 

See Evitts v. Lucy, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel are reviewed according to the standard set forth in Strickland, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United

States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). A defendant must show that

appellate counsel’s advice or actions fell below an objective standard of competence

and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

defendant would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9.

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54

(1983). The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 (footnote and

citations omitted). Appellate counsel will frequently remain above an objective

standard of competence and have caused his client no prejudice for the same reason,

because he declined to raise a weak issue. See id. 

2. Analysis

Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise on appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and abuse

of discretion by the trial court. As discussed above, each of the claims Petitioner

asserts should have been raised by appellate counsel lacks merit and thus would not

have been meritorious on appeal. The weeding out of weaker issues is one of the

hallmarks of appellate advocacy. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Appellate counsel’s

failure to raise a weak issue will frequently fall within an objective standard of

competence, and have caused his client no prejudice. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. 

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The failure of appellate counsel to raise the weak and likely unsuccessful claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and abuse of discretion by

the trial court did not amount to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under

Strickland. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

J. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims that cumulative error and failure to record the trial

proceedings rendered his trial fundamentally unfair requiring reversal. 

1. Legal Standard

The Ninth Circuit has held that the cumulative effect of several trial

errors may prejudice a defendant so much that he is deprived of his due process right

to a fair trial, requiring that his conviction be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford,

334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179-81

(9th Cir. 2002). However, where there is no single constitutional error, nothing can

accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292

F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999); Rupe

v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). 

2. Analysis

Despite Petitioner’s claim of cumulative error, it does not appear that 

constitutional error exists here. Regardless, habeas relief is not in order because this is

not one the exceedingly rare cases in which the cumulative effect of the alleged trial

errors so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process. Cf. Alcala, 334 F.3d at 893-95 (reversing a conviction where multiple

constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge every important element

of proof offered by prosecution); Thomas, 273 F.3d at 1179-81 (reversing conviction

based on cumulative prejudicial effect of (a) admission of triple hearsay statement

providing only evidence that defendant had motive and access to murder weapon; (b)

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prosecutorial misconduct in disclosing to the jury that defendant had committed prior

crime with use of firearm; and (c) truncation of defense cross-examination of a police

officer, which prevented defense from adducing evidence that someone else may have

committed the crime and evidence casting doubt on credibility of main prosecution

witness). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim of cumulative error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Petitioner’s motions seeking the Court’s judicial notice of his writ is DENIED as moot

(docket no. 47). The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: August 28, 2006

 _____________________

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

 United States District Judge 

 

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