Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05133/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05133-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1364 Auto Negligence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAURA RESNANSKY, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 13-cv-05133-DMR 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 

TO INCREASE AD DAMNUM CLAIMS 

AMOUNTS 

Re: Dkt. No. 30 

Before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for an order permitting them to seek damages 

exceeding the amounts alleged in their administrative claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). 

[Docket No. 30.] The court held a hearing on the motion on April 9, 2015. Having considered the 

parties’ submissions and oral argument, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. The Incident 

The following allegations are taken from the Complaint. Plaintiffs Laura Resnansky and 

Kris Jacob are married to each other. On February 12, 2013, Resnansky was walking in a 

crosswalk near the Presidio National Park in San Francisco when she was struck by a vehicle 

owned by Defendant1

 being driven by Defendant’s employee, Karl Twiford. 

Plaintiffs allege that the collision “legally and proximately caused” the following injuries 

to Resnansky’s left wrist and right ankle: 

 

1

 The named Defendant is the United States of America. Plaintiffs allege that the entity that 

owned the vehicle that struck Resnansky was The Presidio Trust, which “is and at all relevant 

times was a federal executive agency or department as described in detail at Title 14 United States 

Code §1, et seq.” Compl. at 2. The court refers to The Presidio Trust and the United States of 

America as “Defendant.” 

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[A] comminuted intra-articular of the distal radius as well as a 

minimally displaced ulnar styloid fracture in her left wrist, as well as 

a displaced fracture of the distal fibula below the tibial plafond in 

her right lower extremity. She also suffered other injuries to her 

body. 

Complaint. at ¶ 1. 

B. The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) Claims 

On May 1, 2013, Plaintiffs presented written claims to The Presidio Trust as required by 

the FTCA. Resnansky filed a claim for $1 million, and Jacob filed a claim for $100,000. By 

November 4, 2013, the government had taken no action on either of the claims, therefore deeming 

them rejected by operation of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

C. The Lawsuit 

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on November 4, 2013. With respect to damages, the Complaint 

alleges that “[b]ased on current information, plaintiff believes her past medical bills total 

approximately $80,000, with approximately $60,000 paid.” Complaint at ¶ 5. Plaintiffs also 

sought special damages in the amount of $186,939.49 because Resnansky “has been unable at 

times to follow her regular work/occupational duties in her job as well as domestic chores,” but 

noted that “[t]his is an estimate and the presently unascertained sum is not yet finally determined.” 

Id. at ¶ 6. Furthermore, Plaintiffs alleged that Resnansky sustained “general damages for pain, 

suffering, disability, inconvenience, embarrassment, and all other compensable elements of noneconomic harm in the amount of $633,060.51.” Id. at ¶ 7. 

 In the claim for loss of consortium, the Complaint states that Jacob “suffered the loss of 

support, services, love, companionship, affection, society, and other elements of consortium, all to 

his general damage in an amount of $100,000.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

D. Resnansky’s Medical Treatment 

1. Initial Treatment 

After the incident, Resnansky was taken to San Francisco General Hospital, where she was 

diagnosed with a fracture in the radius of her left wrist and a fracture in her right ankle. 

Resnansky’s right leg was placed in a walking boot and her left wrist was splinted. 

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Dr. Jeffrey Yao treated Resnansky’s wrist. He determined that she had a comminuted, or 

“smashed,” wrist fracture. On February 15, 2013, Dr. Yao performed surgery, which included 

placing a plate and screws in the wrist. After surgery, Resnansky commenced physical therapy, 

which she continued through approximately June 2013. 

For her ankle, Resnansky was referred to Dr. Kirstina Olson. Dr. Olson did not perform or 

recommend surgery at that time. Instead, Dr. Olson kept Resnansky’s right ankle in the boot for 

six weeks, and prescribed physical therapy. Resnansky participated in physical therapy for her 

ankle from approximately April until the end of August 2013. 

2. December 2013: Second Wrist Surgery 

As noted above, Plaintiffs filed their FTCA claims on May 1, 2013. After May 1, 2013, 

Resnansky received additional treatment for her wrist and ankle. 

On November 18, 2013, Resnansky saw Dr. Yao, complaining of pain on the dorsal aspect 

of her wrist. Dr. Yao recommended a second surgery to see if Resnansky’s tendons were being 

irritated by the screws that Dr. Yao had placed into her wrist during the first surgery, and to 

remove the hardware since it was no longer necessary because the bone had healed. Dr. Yao also 

recommended an arthroscopy procedure since Resnansky was experiencing pain within the joint. 

On December 17, 2013, Dr. Yao performed a second surgery on Resnansky’s wrist. 

During the second surgery, Dr. Yao removed the plate and screws that he had previously installed. 

He also performed an arthroscopy and discovered a stretched scapholunate ligament, which he 

treated with heat. During the surgery, Dr. Yao noted “a nerve that we often find that may be 

irritated and may cause pain in the exact area where [Resnansky] was having pain.” Yao Dep. at 

44:14-19. Dr. Yao removed the nerve as a pain-relieving procedure.

3. September 2014: Ankle Surgery 

Resnansky finished a course of physical therapy for her ankle in August 2013. She 

contends that her right ankle began bothering her in the spring and summer of 2014, as she 

attempted to increase the duration of her exercise. On June 9, 2014, Resnansky went back to 

consult with Dr. Olson. Dr. Olson ordered an MRI, which revealed that Resnansky had some 

inflammation or edema, some fluid around her tendons, bone marrow edema of the talus, and an 

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osteochondral defect (i.e., a cartilage injury) with thinning of the subchondral bone underneath. 

Dr. Olson then recommended ankle surgery. On September 25, 2014, Resnansky underwent 

surgery on her right ankle. 

Resnansky and Jacob now claim that newly discovered evidence and/or intervening facts 

justify an increase beyond their original administrative FTCA claims. Resnansky seeks to 

increase her claim from $1,000,000 to $4,000,000. Jacobs seeks an increase from $100,000 to 

$500,000. Neither Plaintiff provides a breakdown to explain the type or quantity of damages, or 

how the increased amounts are tethered to the newly discovered or intervening evidence. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The FTCA provides plaintiffs an exclusive remedy against the United States for injuries 

arising out of tortious acts committed by federal government employees within the scope of their 

employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. As a prerequisite to filing suit under the FTCA, a plaintiff 

must exhaust his or her administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Particularly, Section 

2675(a) requires a plaintiff to first present an administrative claim to the appropriate federal 

agency and then receive a final denial of the claim from the agency or allow six months to pass 

without a final disposition. Id. Thereafter, if the plaintiff files an action in the district court for 

damages, the FTCA prohibits the plaintiff from seeking damages “in excess of the amount of the 

claim presented to the federal agency.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). 

However, Section 2675(b) carves out two exceptions to this cap on recoverable damages: 

Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum in 

excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, 

except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered 

evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the 

claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of 

intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim. 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (emphasis added.) 

“The two exceptions are distinct: ‘newly discovered evidence’ denotes evidence that 

existed when the administrative claim was filed, but was ‘not discoverable’ at that time; 

‘intervening facts,’ on the other hand, concern information or events arising after the filing of the 

claim.” Von Bargen v. United States, No. C 06-04744 MEJ, 2009 WL 1765767, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

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June 22, 2009) (quoting Lowry v. United States, 958 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Mass. 1997)). “While 

a plaintiff may seek a larger amount if he meets either of these tests, the burden of proof under 

both falls on the plaintiff.” Salcedo–Albanez v. United States, 149 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1243 (C.D. 

Cal. 2001) (citing Spivey v. United States, 912 F.2d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1990)); see also Zurba v. 

United States, 318 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit has yet to issue significant guidance regarding Section 2675(b). In 

Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988), the court held that a plaintiff 

cannot seek damages beyond the amount set forth in the administrative claim if the injuries were 

“reasonably foreseeable” at the time the claim was filed. The court further noted that the newly 

discovered evidence or intervening facts must have come to light after the date of the claim. 

Other circuit courts have elaborated upon the widely-recognized “reasonably foreseeable” 

standard. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the FTCA does not charge plaintiffs with 

“knowing what the doctors could not tell [them].” Fraysier v. United States, 766 F.2d 478, 481 

(11th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit, building on Fraysier, acknowledged that claimants should not 

be responsible for information beyond that provided by their doctors, but went on to note that “the 

information [offered to support an increased claim] must not have been discoverable through the 

exercise of reasonable diligence.” Low v. United States, 795 F.2d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 1986).2 The 

 2

 Nothing in Low suggests that “reasonable diligence” requires a plaintiff to engage 

in affirmative efforts to determine what is “reasonably foreseeable” before filing an administrative 

claim. In fact, an earlier sentence in Low states that alleged newly discovered evidence or 

intervening facts simply must not have been “reasonabl[y] capable of detection” when the claim 

was filed. 795 F.2d at 470. See also Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 173 (1st Cir. 1988) 

(charging plaintiffs with “matters known or easily deducible” when claim is filed). This court is 

persuaded that the law does not require claimants to take steps to obtain medical information 

beyond what is recommended by the treating providers in order to ascertain what is reasonably 

foreseeable before filing a claim. However, a claimant should not be permitted to ignore their own 

symptoms, or facts or possible outcomes that flow from a straightforward connecting of the dots in 

existing treatment records. 

The court found only one decision which suggests an affirmative requirement. See Van 

Bargen, 2009 WL 1765767 at *7 (denying increase where plaintiff argued that post-claim MRI 

indicated spinal disc protrusion, and holding that “it was not the disc protrusion that was 

undiscoverable prior to [filing of the claim]— it was the fact that Plaintiff had not undergone an 

MRI that left the condition undiagnosed.”) (emphasis in original). This court respectfully 

disagrees with Van Bargen to the extent it imposes a requirement that a claimant must obtain 

additional medical testing beyond that which is prescribed or recommended by the claimant’s 

providers. 

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Eighth Circuit recognized that even a known injury can “worsen in ways not reasonably 

discoverable by the claimant and his or her treating physician.” Michels v. United States, 31 F.3d 

686, 688 (8th Cir. 1994). However, according to the Fourth Circuit, where doctors later confirm 

what a plaintiff knew prior to filing the claim, the later diagnoses do not support an increase in 

damages because they are merely “cumulative and confirmatory,” and therefore cannot be 

considered “intervening facts.” Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1976). 

Some courts have articulated a standard that requires plaintiffs to contemplate the “worst 

case scenario” presented by the medical evidence before filing a claim. See, e.g., Michels, 31 

F.3d at 688 (“[W]hen existing medical evidence and advice put the claimant ‘on fair notice to 

guard against the worst-case scenario’ in preparing the administrative claim,” an attempt to 

increase the amount of the claim during litigation should be rejected) (citing Reilly, 863 F.2d at 

172). However, cases have also recognized that just because an outcome may be conceivable does 

not render it reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., id. (allowing increased claim; plaintiff’s postclaim surgery was not reasonably foreseeable even though doctor noted possibility but low 

likelihood of future surgery); Smith v. United States, No. C 10-00212 WHA, 2011 WL 4551471, 

at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (foot surgeries performed or anticipated after administrative claims 

were not reasonably foreseeable where, prior to administrative claim, doctor stated that “it is 

conceivable that [plaintiff] might require some surgical intervention in the future but, if the 

fracture is not severe, this would be rather unlikely.”). But see Van Bargen, 2009 WL 1765767 

(applying “worst case scenario” standard and rejecting argument for increase in FTCA claim 

amount). 

Taken literally, a “worst case scenario” standard would incentivize plaintiffs to err on the 

side of filing higher administrative claims, in order to guard against theoretical catastrophic 

outcomes. This is contrary to the policies underlying the FTCA claim process, which encourage 

realistic valuation of a claim against the government in aid of early settlement. Accord Milano v. 

United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“[Defendant’s] position would require 

 

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that Plaintiff inflate his claim based on events that are, although arguably foreseeable, highly 

unlikely. Defendant aptly notes that one of the purposes of the FTCA is allowing the government 

to know at all relevant times its maximum possible exposure to liability and make a realistic 

assessment of the settlement value of the case. Requiring that Plaintiff inflate his claim to account 

for the unlikely worst possible scenario places the government in no better position to realistically 

assess the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.”). 

On the other hand, allowing a Plaintiff to seek damages beyond the amount of the 

administrative claim without a searching standard is also counterproductive to FTCA policies. 

Indeed, in the present case, Defendant argues that defending against a $1 million claim is by its 

very nature different from facing a $4 million claim. A significantly higher claim can be a gamechanger, for the government may well have decided to allocate a higher level of resources to 

defend against the claim had it been originally filed with the increased amount. Accord Allgeier v. 

United States, 909 F. 2d 869, 878 (6th Cir. 1990); Salcedo-Albanez, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1245 

(increase in claim value may have affected government’s prior analysis and handling of Plaintiff’s 

claim). 

The question of whether an increase is justified by newly discovered evidence or 

intervening facts is inherently fact-specific. A review of the cases drives this point home. In some 

cases where a doctor explained a medical risk prior to the claim filing, the plaintiff was 

subsequently allowed to increase the claim value. This is because the risk, although known at the 

time the claim was filed, was not expected to develop into a reality. For example, in Michels, 31 

F.3d at 687, after the plaintiff’s motorcycle was struck by a government vehicle, the plaintiff 

required surgery and physical therapy on his lower limbs. At the time the plaintiff filed his 

administrative claim, his doctor opined that the development of arthritis and hip necrosis as well 

as the need for further surgery could ensue, but were not presently indicated by medical signs. Id.

However, by trial, the plaintiff required further surgery on his hip and knee. The court found that 

the plaintiff’s hip necrosis, arthritis and need for future hip and knee surgery were “not reasonably 

discoverable” even though the risks that led to those outcomes were known at the time of the 

plaintiff’s claim, because a “known injury can worsen in ways not reasonably discoverable by the 

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claimant and his or her treating physician.” Id. at 688. 

Similarly, in Allgeier, 909 F.2d at 869, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident resulting 

in injuries to both knees. The plaintiff’s doctor advised that both knees needed arthroscopic 

surgery, but the plaintiff elected to have surgery only on her right knee. The plaintiff then filed 

her administrative claim. At that time, her “condition had improved and . . . the additional surgery 

was no longer contemplated.” Id. at 878. The plaintiff told her doctor that both of her knees were 

feeling much better. The doctor had discharged her from his care, which “may have . . . led [the 

plaintiff] thereby to believe that her injuries were, to some extent, cured.” Id. at 878-79. 

However, some months after filing the claim, her condition began to deteriorate, leading to 

surgery on the second knee. The district court ultimately awarded the plaintiff $54,000 more than 

the amount she had stated in her administrative claim. The Sixth Circuit upheld the award, even 

though plaintiff’s doctor had originally advised surgery in both knees, but plaintiff opted for 

surgery in only one. The court held that “because of the relative improvement in [the plaintiff’s] 

condition immediately before the administrative claim was filed and the significant worsening of 

her condition well over a year later, the need for the second operation and extensive additional 

treatment were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the administrative claim was filed.” Id. at 

879. 

Similarly, courts have allowed increases for subsequent surgery where medical providers 

first take a conservative non-surgical approach that appears to be sufficient at the time the claim is 

filed. For example, in Craig v. United States, No. 00 C 958, 2002 WL 31115604 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 

23, 2002), the plaintiff filed her administrative claim only seventeen days after a car accident with 

a government vehicle. At that time, “the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries was virtually unknown . . 

. . [and] there [was] no evidence in the record that either she or her doctors reasonably expected 

that she would ultimately have to have invasive surgery to alleviate her back pain” after she had 

filed her claim. Id. at *3. “Instead, what is clear from the record is that, at the time she submitted 

her claim . . . she had been informed by her doctors that a conservative course of treatment with an 

emphasis on physical therapy should have been sufficient to treat her pain.” Id. at *4. The court 

permitted an increase over the amount of the administrative claim, finding that because “surgery 

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was not considered as a realistic possibility” until nearly two years after the plaintiff filed her 

administrative claim, “the progressive deterioration of the condition of her back as potentially an 

intervening fact not foreseeable at the time she filed her administrative claim.” Id. at *4. 

However, in other cases, claim increases for subsequent surgery have been denied because 

the surgery was reasonably foreseeable at the time the claim for filed. For example, in Myers v. 

United States, 805 F.Supp. 90 (D.N.H. 1992), the plaintiff was involved in an accident with a 

postal service vehicle that caused injury requiring knee surgery. Subsequent to the filing of the 

claim, the plaintiff’s doctor recommended further reconstructive knee surgery. The district court 

denied plaintiff’s motion to recover additional damages, ruling that “[i]n the face of welldocumented ACL damage, one surgery, and subsequent ongoing knee problems . . . the court is 

unable to say that [the plaintiff’s] need for additional surgery was unforeseeable.” Id. at 93. 

Similarly, in Salcedo-Albanez, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1240, the plaintiff had been struck by a 

border control car, causing dislocation of a lens implant in her eye, as well as elevated pressure in 

her other eye. After performing eye surgery, her doctor continued to monitor her medication, 

which he warned would be essential to reducing the risk of permanent damage to the optical nerve. 

The doctor later determined that medication was not adequately controlling the pressure in her 

eye, and that surgery was required. Plaintiff did not opt for surgery, and later filed an FTCA claim 

for $75,000. Several months later, a second doctor advised her that she had sustained permanent 

damage to her vision and recommended surgery, which she finally underwent. The court denied 

her motion to amend her complaint to seek greater damages, finding that the basis for her 

increased claim was reasonably foreseeable. In so doing, the court noted that the record “plainly 

establishe[d] that Plaintiff was on notice that her optical nerve was at risk of permanent damage in 

the absence of adequate medical treatment, . . . [and] that she needed surgery to alleviate the 

intraocular pressure in her right eye two months before she filed her claim.” Id. at 1244. 

Given the fact-driven nature of the “reasonably foreseeable” analysis, it is difficult to 

articulate a clear statement of how to apply it in any given case. The court distills the following 

tenets from prior cases, and is persuaded that their application will serve the policies underlying 

the FTCA. A plaintiff should not be charged with knowing what his or her medical providers do 

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not articulate, nor is a plaintiff required to obtain additional medical information through 

procedures not otherwise ordered or suggested. In valuing an administrative claim, a plaintiff 

need not account for “conceivable but unlikely” risks. However, when filing a claim, a plaintiff is 

on fair notice of all present information, including his or her own symptoms as well as the 

providers’ advice, prognoses and recommendations. In evaluating reasonable foreseeability, a 

court should examine the arc of the plaintiff’s medical status, including ongoing symptoms and 

periods of recovery or deterioration. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Reasonable Foreseeability of Resnansky’s Newly Claimed Injuries 

With these principles in mind, the court turns to Plaintiffs’ contentions. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs assert that “Mrs. Resnansky and her own treating physicians did not anticipate the 

ligament damage [in her wrist], the osteochondral lesion [in her ankle], or the need for either the 

December 2013 wrist surgery or the September 2014 ankle surgery.” Id. The court considers each 

of these below. 

1. Ankle Surgery 

 In support of the contention that Resnansky’s September 2013 ankle surgery was not 

reasonably foreseeable, Plaintiffs rely on records and statements from Dr. Olson. On April 8, 

2013, after several weeks of using the ankle boot, Resnansky saw Dr. Olson for a follow-up visit. 

Dr. Olson’s record from this date notes “good evidence of healing,” and that she is releasing 

Resnansky to be seen on an as-needed basis. Dr. Olson continued to see Resnansky until August 

13, 2013. Resnansky went back to see Dr. Olson approximately ten months later, complaining 

that she could not return to her normal activities, including physical exercise, due to pain and 

instability in her ankle. At her deposition, Dr. Olson was asked about the “significance” of 

Resnansky’s subjective complaints on the June 9, 2014 return visit, and replied, “Being that she’s 

otherwise young and healthy and active and she had—apparently had more than a year . . . I would 

anticipate that at this point she would be able to get back to her activity.” 

In response, Defendant points to evidence that Resnansky’s ankle pain was ongoing since 

the time of her injuries. Resnansky testified that her ankle was “weak and sore” once the boot was 

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removed in April 2013. She also testified that she had been traveling internationally for work 

about once or twice a month since June 2013, and that her ankle and wrist both experienced 

swelling and pain during air travel. Resnansky Dep. at 83:9-84:24. Dr. Olson examined 

Resnansky’s ankle in April 2013 and found that it “appeared to be improving at that point but still 

had pain on the outside of her ankle,” effusion (swelling) of the ankle joint, tenderness over her 

lateral ligaments, and that Resnansky’s gait “was still antalgic or painful.” Olson Dep. at 19:3-19. 

In this case, Dr. Olson released Resnansky from her care in August 2013 based upon the 

belief that Resnansky’s ankle showed good evidence of healing. This suggests that Dr. Olson 

believed, like the treating doctor in Craig, that “a conservative course of treatment with an 

emphasis on physical therapy should have been sufficient to treat her pain.” Nothing in the record 

suggests that Dr. Olson recommended surgery, or forecast surgery as a likely future outcome. 

Moreover, there is no evidence to support non-diminishing pain or deterioration of her ankle 

condition near the May 1, 2013 claim filing date. In fact, Resnansky had been discharged from 

regular care as well as physical therapy by August 2013, and did not return to see Dr. Olson with 

further complaints until nearly a year later in June 2014. 

On balance, the court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that 

Resnansky’s September 2014 ankle surgery was not reasonably foreseeable at the time she filed 

her FTCA claim in May 2013, and grants Plaintiffs’ motion insofar as it is premised on 

Resnansky’s ankle surgery. 

2. Osteochondral Lesion in Ankle 

Plaintiffs also contend that the osteochondral lesion in her ankle, which was first diagnosed 

after her June 2014 MRI, was not reasonably foreseeable at the time that Resnansky filed her 

FTCA claim. 

For this contention, Plaintiffs note that Resnansky’s initial post-incident records from San 

Francisco General Hospital do not mention the osteochondral lesion. Plaintiffs also note that 

Defendant’s orthopedic expert, Dr. James Glick, agreed that the osteochondral lesion was not 

diagnosed until 2014. 

At least one aspect of Dr. Glick’s report suggests that the lesion may have been

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foreseeable. Dr. Glick’s report reviews the June 2014 MRI of Resnansky’s ankle as well as Dr. 

Olson’s report after the MRI. Dr. Glick notes that the MRI shows “an osteochondral defect or a 

cartilage injury with thinning of the subchondral bone underneath,” and that “Dr. Olson noted that 

. . . very often when people have a twisting injury that is consistent with an avulsion type of 

fracture or a distal fibula fracture, it tears or tethers the lateral ligaments through an inversion type 

of strain.” Tseng Surreply Decl. [Docket No. 44-1] at ¶ 2, Ex. R (Glick Report) at 12. Thus, Dr. 

Glick’s report suggests that an osteochondral lesion occurs “very often” when people suffer the 

type of fracture sustained by Resnansky. 

However, just because a type of injury is typical of or consistent with a medical scenario 

does not mean that it was reasonably foreseeable. As noted above, Dr. Olson released Resnansky 

from her care, and her symptoms did not give her cause to return until ten months later. It is 

undisputed that the osteochondral lesion was not discovered until well after Resnansky filed her 

claim. The court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing that the osteochondral 

lesion was not reasonably foreseeable. 

3. Second Wrist Surgery 

Plaintiffs assert that Resnansky’s second wrist surgery was not reasonably foreseeable. 

For this contention, Plaintiffs raise evidence of Dr. Yao’s generally positive assessment of 

Resnansky’s progress on April 25, 2013. This was approximately two months after her first 

surgery, when Resnansky returned to Dr. Yao for a post-operative follow-up visit. Dr. Yao’s 

notes state that Resnansky reported that she was “doing quite well.” Saeltzer Decl. at ¶ 5, Ex. D 

(records from Stanford Hospital) at 000154. The record indicates that Resnansky still had 

numbness in the tip of her thumb, but it was improving, and generally “the wound [was] healing 

well.” Id. An x-ray taken on the same day showed “excellent interval healing of the distal radius 

fracture.” Id. Dr. Yao states that he is “pleased with how this is doing” and further notes that 

Resnansky “is improving relatively slowly in terms of therapy, therefore, I recommend that she 

continue with aggressive hand therapy.” Id. at 000155. Dr. Yao released Resnansky to “full duty 

in terms of work” at that time. Id. At his deposition, when questioned about the April 25, 2013 

visit, Dr. Yao explained that Resnansky was “overall doing quite well.” See Saeltzer Decl. at ¶ 6, 

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Ex. E (Yao Dep.) at 34:5-83 

In response, Defendant first notes that Resnansky’s wrist pain was essentially ongoing 

between the time of the accident and the second wrist surgery. Resnansky went on medical leave 

for approximately five or six weeks from March to May 2013. Resnansky Dep. at 68:9-69:8. 

When she returned to work in May 2013, her wrist was still bothering her. Id. at 69:24-70:3 (“A: 

It was better, but it was still bothering me. So typing was hard.”). Her wrist pain became 

progressively worse from May to November 2013, prompting her to seek Dr. Yao for additional 

treatment, including the second wrist surgery. Id. at 69:24-70:18 (“A: It was—probably got 

progressively worse from May until about November.”). Accord Yao Dep. at 40-:19-25 (“A: 

Apparently she’d been doing very well but then two months prior to that encounter, which was in 

November [2013], so let’s say September, she began to develop pain along the dorsal or top aspect 

of her wrist.”). Defendant also notes that Dr. Yao told Resnansky at the time of her first wrist 

surgery that even with a good surgical outcome, there could be persistent pain, stiffness, loss of 

range of motion, and incomplete resolution of symptoms. Defendant also points to Dr. Yao’s 

testimony that the surgically-placed screw may have irritated a tendon, thereby causing pain, and 

that this was a “normal risk” of the type of surgery he had performed. Id. at 42:10-13. 

Here, Plaintiffs’ evidence of the unforeseeability of the second wrist surgery hinges on Dr. 

Yao’s optimistic assessment of the healing of Resnansky’s wrist as of April 25, 2013. However, 

this ignores Resnansky’s own symptomology. She testified that she was experiencing ongoing 

pain from the date of the accident and continuing to her return to work in May 2013. She further 

testified that her pain got “progressively worse” from May until November 2013, when she 

returned to see Dr. Yao. Resnansky must be charged with knowledge of her own symptoms as of 

the date of her May 2013 claim, notwithstanding her doctor’s rosier view of her medical condition. 

Thus Plaintiffs’ motion, insofar as it is premised on the second wrist surgery, is denied. 

 

3

 In their motion, Plaintiffs state that Dr. Yao testified that as of July 1, 2013, Resnansky 

was “doing ‘extremely well’ with radiographic evidence of good healing of the fracture and that 

he placed no restrictions on her.” Mot. at 3 n. 1 (citing Yao Dep. at 36:14-37:4). However, 

Plaintiffs did not include the cited portion of Dr. Yao’s deposition in its submissions, so this 

testimony cannot be confirmed. 

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4. Scapholunate Ligament Damage in Wrist 

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the damage to the scapholunate ligament in Resnansky’s 

wrist was caused by the accident and was also unforeseeable. 

The court need not address the issue of whether Resnansky sustained this injury as a result 

of the accident. The relevant question is whether Plaintiffs can seek increased damages if they 

succeed in establishing causation at trial. 

To show that the scapholunate injury was not reasonably foreseeable, Plaintiffs raise 

evidence from Defendant’s expert, Dr. Glick, who was deposed on March 5, 2015 after Plaintiffs 

filed the present motion.4

 Dr. Glick noted that the scapholunate injury was “probably something 

that was diagnosed actually during the December 2013 [second wrist surgery] procedure,” and that 

“there was no evidence of this at the time of [the first] surgery.” Saeltzer Supp. Decl. [Docket No. 

40] at ¶ 2, Ex. G (Glick Dep.) at 24:4-15. Dr. Glick stated that immediately after Resnansky’s 

injury, her doctors did not “look in the wrist” for damage to her scapholunate ligament, which was 

“usual” because they were focused on operating on her wrist fracture during the first surgery. Id.

at 24:18-25. Dr. Glick stated that “[t]his is sort of a surprise, in a way, that she had injured this.” 

Id. at 24:23-25; see also id. at 25:8-19 (“Q: The failure to look and detect a ligament injury was 

not due to any malpractice, true? A: Yes . . . . Q: It’s a complicated injury and sometimes it takes 

a while to present and be diagnosed. A: Well, yes. I think if this was me, I’d be surprised to have 

found it.”); 28:4-8 (“She was having pain following a good reduction of the fracture. Okay? So 

now they’re looking for something else. And they found later on that she had these ligament 

problems in the wrist.”). 

Here, the evidence from Defendant’s own expert indicates that the scapholunate injury was 

 

4

 The court notes that Plaintiffs raised this evidence on reply, which is generally improper. See, 

e.g., Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“In general, it is 

improper for the moving party to ‘shift gears' and introduce new facts or different legal arguments 

in the reply brief than those that were presented in the moving papers. For this reason, the court 

has discretion to decline to consider new facts or arguments raised in a reply.”) (formatting and 

citation omitted). However, the district court may, in its discretion, “consider the [new] issue even 

if it was raised in a reply brief.” Glenn K. Jackson, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quotation omitted). If the court elects to consider new material in a reply brief, it must 

afford the opposing party an opportunity to respond. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Here, the court permitted Defendant to file a Surreply to respond to the new evidence 

in Plaintiffs’ Reply. See Docket No. 44. 

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a “surprise.” Defendant essentially concedes that Dr. Glick’s testimony supports a finding that the 

scapholunate ligament injury was not reasonably foreseeable. Surreply [Docket No. 44] at 3. For 

this reason, the court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden.. 

B. Prejudice 

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15 because it is untimely and unanticipated. Specifically, Plaintiffs waited until the day 

before the close of fact discovery to inform Defendant of their intent to bring this motion despite 

knowing since December 2013 of Resnansky’s second wrist surgery, and since June 2014 of the 

MRI that led to Resnansky’s ankle surgery in September 2014. Defendant also argues that 

Plaintiffs brought the motion despite stating numerous times to the court and to Defendant that 

they did not intend to bring any pretrial motions. See Opp. at 3, 8; Tseng Decl. [Docket No. 34] at 

Ex. N; Case Management Conference Statement [Docket No. 11] at 4. Defendant argues that 

Plaintiffs’ motion was unduly delayed and will cause prejudice to Defendant. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to the pleadings, and states that 

the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This 

policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.’” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 

F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). In the absence of an “apparent reason,” such 

as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice to defendants, futility of the amendments, or 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies in the Complaint by prior amendment, it is an abuse of 

discretion for a district court to refuse to grant leave to amend a complaint. Foman v. Davis, 371 

U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Rule 15 also governs amendments to the pleadings made during or after

trial. See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(1) (“If, at trial, a party objects that evidence is not within the 

issues raised in the pleadings, the court may permit the pleadings to be amended. The court should 

freely permit an amendment when doing so will aid in presenting the merits and the objecting 

party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence would prejudice that party's action or defense on 

the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet the 

evidence.”). 

At the outset, it is not entirely clear that Plaintiffs must make a Rule 15 motion in order to 

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seek an increase in damages above the amounts stated in their FTCA claims. Courts have 

permitted plaintiffs to recover in excess of the amounts stated in their administrative claims at 

various stages of lawsuits, including after trial, without requiring those plaintiffs to move 

separately under Rule 15 to amend their pleadings. See, e.g., Michels, 31 F.3d at 687 (where 

plaintiff filed FTCA claim for $450,000 in damages resulting from motorcycle collision with 

government vehicle, district court properly awarded plaintiff $710,000 after bench trial based on 

conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) permitted plaintiff to recover damages in excess of 

administrative claim); Von Bargen, 2009 WL 1765767 at *8 (denying plaintiff’s motion for 

permission to seek damages exceeding amount alleged in FTCA claim, without considering 

whether plaintiff was required to amend his pleadings under Rule 15 or 16). See also Richardson, 

841 F. 3d at 999 (plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to amend complaint at trial to recover increased 

amount; Ninth Circuit remanded for consideration of the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s injuries, 

and also ordered district court to “determine whether the government would be prejudiced by 

allowing the amendment” under Rule 15); Salcedo-Albanez, 149 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (denying 

plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15 to increase her damages claim above 

FTCA claim amount). 

 Indeed, there is no need for Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint in order to state a higher 

damages amount, since the prayer for damages in a contested case (as opposed to a case in which 

the defendant defaults) does not limit the relief that the trial court may grant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) 

(“A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the 

pleadings. Every other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even 

if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”). In any event, Plaintiffs’ Complaint 

notes that its damages prayer is an “an estimate” and a “presently unascertained sum.” 

Even so, it is appropriate to consider what prejudice might result from a late request to 

augment damages beyond the administrative claim. See Salcedo-Albanez, 149 F.Supp.2d at 1245 

(“Plaintiff’s proposal to increase her claim to $500,000 would increase the government's potential 

for liability six times over. For purposes of settlement, such an increase may have affected the 

government’s prior analysis and handling of Plaintiff's claim, notwithstanding Defendant’s present 

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denials of legal liability. To permit Plaintiff to now claim $500,000 in damages would seriously 

undermine the primary goal of the FTCA—to facilitate administrative settlement prior to the 

commencement of a civil action.”). The court is concerned that Plaintiffs waited until the day 

before the close of fact discovery to inform Defendant of their intent to bring this motion, and 

brought the motion despite informing the court and Defendant that it did not intend to bring any 

pretrial motions. However, because it appears that courts routinely consider whether a plaintiff 

may recover in excess of his or her administrative claim at or after trial, the court cannot say that 

Defendant was not on notice that this issue might arise in this case. Defendant had the opportunity 

to take full discovery regarding both subsequent surgeries and the additional claimed injuries. 

Accordingly, the court declines to find that the late date of Plaintiffs’ motion justifies its denial. 

C. Requested Amount 

Finally, the court turns to the amount that Plaintiffs’ request to recover in excess of the 

amounts stated in their administrative claim. Plaintiffs’ administrative claims demanded $1.1 

million; their present motion states their intention to seek $4.5 million in damages. The court 

notes that if “recovery in excess of the amount originally sought in an administrative claim is 

justified, the plaintiff may only recover to the extent that the increased amount is attributable to 

the newly discovered evidence or intervening facts.” Craig v. United States, No. 00 C 958, 2002 

WL 31115604, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2002) (citations omitted). See also Michels, 31 F.3d at 

687 (permitting damages award in excess of claim amount only to the extent that the excess 

amount was “directly attributable to damages arising from newly discovered evidence or 

intervening facts”). 

Here, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to support their request for a very substantial 

increase in recovery. Plaintiffs document no additional expenses, lost wages, emotional distress or 

loss of consortium. Ultimately, “the burden is squarely on the plaintiff to present evidence 

demonstrating why and how the requested increase is connected to the newly discovered evidence 

or intervening facts.” Craig, 2002 WL 31115604 at *6. Although Plaintiffs have met their burden 

of establishing that they can seek damages beyond the amounts of their administrative claims for 

specific injuries that were not reasonably foreseeable, Plaintiffs will have to establish at trial that 

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tho

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GE 

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