Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00577/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00577-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Damon Shane Tucker, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00577-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition”). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed because it is barred by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations. (Doc. 15 

at 9). The R&R further recommended that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied. Id. 

I. Review of an R&R 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). District courts are not required to conduct “any 

review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall 

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make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to 

which objection is made”). In this case, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R, and the 

Court will review those objections de novo. 

II. Factual and Procedural Background 

 The R&R summarized the factual and procedural history and neither party 

objected to this history. (Doc. 15 at 1–4; Doc. 16). Therefore, the Court adopts that 

portion of the R&R in this case. That history is as follows: 

 In January, 2003, Petitioner was charged by the State 

of Arizona with thirteen counts of sexual exploitation of a 

minor. (Doc. 10-1, at 3, 17.) These charges came as a result of 

a search warrant served by Mesa police officers on 

Petitioner’s home, during which computer-generated 

photographic images of nude females appearing to be 

between eight and ten years old and posing in sexually 

explicit positions were found on Petitioner’s computer and in 

a black binder. (Id. at 3–4.) Petitioner admitted that the 

images were his. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner was tried on six of the 

counts charged. (Id.) During his trial Petitioner denied 

downloading the images or ownership and knowledge of the 

images in the binder. (Id.) Petitioner was convicted on all 

counts, all class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against 

children, and sentenced to six consecutive ten-year terms of 

imprisonment. (Id. at 2, 4.) 

 On appeal, Petitioner’s court-appointed counsel filed a 

brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), finding no colorable claims to raise on appeal. (Doc. 

10-1, at 25.) Petitioner thereafter filed a pro se supplemental 

opening brief raising the following claims on appeal: (1) that 

the sexual exploitation of a minor statute is unconstitutional; 

(2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

his statement to police; (3) that his sentence was excessive 

and unconstitutional; and (4) ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. (Doc. 10-2, at 3; Doc. 10-3, 17–27.) On September 

13, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences, finding the ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim non-cognizable on direct appeal, and finding 

the other claims meritless. (Doc. 10-1, at 2–12.) Petitioner 

sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, and on June 5, 

2006, that court summarily denied review. (Doc. 10-4, at 2.) 

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 On October 4, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of 

Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 10-4, at 4.) 

Petitioner’s counsel thereafter filed a Notice of Completion of 

Post-Conviction Review by Counsel; Request for Extension 

of Time to Allow Defendant to File Pro-Per Supplement to 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, indicating that he had 

reviewed the record for fundamental errors pursuant to 

Anders, and found no claims to raise in post-conviction 

proceedings. (Doc. 10-4, at 11–12.) Petitioner then filed a pro 

se supplemental PCR petition, raising the following claims: 

(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) insufficient 

evidence to support his convictions; (3) his convictions 

otherwise violated ex-post-facto principles; and (4) his 

sentences were excessive. (Doc. 10-4, at 14–23.) On August 

28, 2007, the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s 

PCR, pursuant to Rule 32-6(C), Ariz.R.Cim.P., “for the 

reasons stated in the State’s Response.” (Doc. 11-1, at 14.) 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

and on December 29, 2008, that court denied review without 

comment. (Id., at 16.) 

 On May 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a second PCR 

notice. (Doc. 11-1, at 22–24.) In his pro se PCR petition, 

Petitioner claimed that a jury instruction omitted an essential 

element of the charged offense, and that his failure to raise 

this claim in his previous PCR petition was due to the “lack 

of law libraries.” (Doc. 11-2, at 2–4.) Petitioner also claimed 

that the faulty jury instruction constituted fundamental error, 

and that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the instruction 

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 5.) On 

November 30, 2009, the trial court summarily denied relief, 

finding that Petitioner’s claims were untimely: 

[A]n untimely notice may only 

raise claims pursuant to Rule 

32.1(d), (f), (g), or (h). Rule 

32.4(a), Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. In addition, 

defendant is precluded from relief 

on these claims pursuant to Rule 

32(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., because 

these claims either were or could 

have been raised on appeal or in a 

prior Rule 32 proceeding. 

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(Id. at 14.) 

 The Court also found that Petitioner’s faulty jury 

instruction claim was not “newly discovered,” because it 

“could have reasonably been discovered prior to [Petitioner]’s 

sentencing,” and, in any event, Petitioner had “not shown that 

a different jury instruction would have changed the verdict.” 

(Id. at 15.) Although Petitioner claims that he sought review 

of the trial court’s decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

counsel for Respondents avows that the record of that court 

does not reflect that filing. (Doc. 10, at 4 n.3.) 

 On February 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a third PCR 

notice, and in his pro se PCR petition he raised numerous 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, reurged his jury 

instruction challenge, and challenged his enhanced sentences. 

(Doc. 11-2, at 17–19; Doc. 14, at 2–11.) The trial court 

dismissed the petition, finding that “[t]his is [Petitioner]’s 

third Rule 32 proceeding and it has been initiated in an 

untimely manner.” (Doc. 11-3, at 2.) Petitioner filed a petition 

for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and on 

September 21, 2011, that court denied review without 

comment. (Id. at 5.) 

 On October 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a fourth PCR 

notice, and in it, claimed that a significant change in the law, 

specifically the holding in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 

(2012), had occurred that probably would overturn his 

conviction or sentence. (Doc. 11-3, at 7, 9–10.) On October 

31, 2012, the trial court denied relief, holding that “[t]he 

Martinez holding does not apply to the defendant nor does it 

provide relief at the state court level.” (Id. at 13–14.) 

Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

and, on February 27, 2013, that court denied review without 

comment. (Id. at 16.) 

 On March 20, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant habeas 

petition, in which he raises three claims: (1) that he was 

entitled to new counsel in state court pursuant to Martinez; 

(2) that the sexual exploitation of a minor statute is 

unconstitutional; and (3) that he is actually innocent and is 

thus entitled to present any unexhausted claims pursuant to 

the gateway exception articulated in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298 (1995). (Doc. 1, at 6–9.) In their Limited Answer, 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s petition is untimely and 

should be dismissed, as it was filed past the 1-year deadline 

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imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). 

(Doc. 15 at 1–4). 

III. R&R 

As indicated above, on August 7, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R 

recommending that the Petition be denied as barred by the AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. (Id. at 1–9). As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the AEDPA provides a 

one year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in federal court. (Id. at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1))). That period generally 

commences on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” (Id. at 4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A))). Examining Petitioner’s procedural history in state court, the 

Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 2, 

2006, 90 days after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id. at 5). Petitioner timely 

filed a PCR petition which was denied by the trial court and then dismissed by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals on December 29, 2008. (Id. at 5). 

 Starting with statutory tolling, the Magistrate Judge explained that the one-year 

limitations period is tolled during the time that a “properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending.” (Id. at 4–5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2))). However, the time between a 

first and second PCR petition is not tolled. (Id. at 5 (citing Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 

1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003))). Therefore, while statutory tolling applied to the first PCR 

petition, “[m]ore than 2-and-a-half years of non-tolled time elapsed in the interim 

between each of Petitioner’s subsequent PCR proceedings.” (Id. at 5). Additionally, about 

17 months “elapsed while Petitioner’s second, third and fourth proceedings were 

pending,” which arguably did not toll the statute of limitations either because those 

petitions were not properly filed. (Id. at 6). 

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 Turning to equitable tolling, the Magistrate Judge explained that a Petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling if he shows: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” (Id. at 6 

(quoting Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))). The Magistrate Judge 

determined that Petitioner failed the second prong of this test, because he “has not 

proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify equitable tolling.” In 

addition, “Petitioner concedes that his habeas petition is untimely under the AEDPA.” 

(Id. at 7 (citing Doc. 12 at 1)). 

 Finally, the Magistrate Judge turned to Petitioner’s claim that he is innocent. (Id. 

at 7). The Magistrate Judge noted that a credible showing of actual innocence excuses the 

statute of limitations period established by the AEDPA. (Id. at 7). However, to pass 

through that gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” (Id. at 7 

(quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). The Magistrate Judge determined 

that Petitioner did not present any new facts or law, and his claims were that of legal 

error, not claims of actual innocence. (Id. at 8). 

IV. The Petitioner’s Objections 

 Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s application of the AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations to his procedural history and the Court adopts those 

recommendations. Instead, Petitioner objects to the R&R by arguing that, based on 

equitable tolling, the AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not apply to his case, because: 

(1) “he was entitled to new counsel in state court pursuant to Martinez [v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 

1309 (2012)]” (Doc. 16 at 2); (2) the state trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

(Doc. 16 at 6); (3) “he is actually innocent and thus entitled to present any unexhausted 

claims pursuant to the gateway exception articulated is [sic] Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 

(1995)” (Doc. 16 at 8); and (4) he did not have access to a copy of the AEDPA in the 

prison law library (Doc. 16 at 4–5). 

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 Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if he shows: “(1) that he has been pursuing 

his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” 

Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

A. Petitioner’s Reliance on Martinez

 Petitioner claims he is permitted equitable tolling, because he “was entitled to new 

counsel in state court pursuant to [v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012)]” (Doc. 16 at 2). 

However, Martinez applies only to excusing procedural default and/or lack of exhaustion 

in state court. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. In Martinez, the Court only held: 

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral 

proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas 

court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that 

proceeding was ineffective. 

Id. at 1320. Thus, nothing in Martinez requires the state court to appoint new counsel for 

a defendant. 

 Moreover, Martinez has no application to the statute of limitations in the AEDPA 

which governs Petitioner’s filing in federal court. Accord McKinnie v. Long, 2013 WL 

1890618, at *7–8 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) (“Martinez dealt solely with the state 

procedural default doctrine, which is entirely different from the issue presented here of 

whether petitioner’s claims are time barred under the AEDPA statute of limitations.”); 

Moore v. Williams, 2013 WL 271454, at *5 (D.Nev. Jan. 23, 2013) (“Petitioner has 

conflated the federal timeliness question with the issue of whether a claim in the federal 

petition is barred due to procedural default in state court.”). Accordingly, Martinez does 

not present a basis for equitable tolling. 

 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 Petitioner claims the state trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 

Arizona’s child pornography statute, A.R.S. § 13-3553 (2014), is unconstitutional. (Doc. 

16 at 3). “Equitable exceptions” can apply to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, such as 

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when a petitioner demonstrates diligence and extraordinary circumstances, or actual 

innocence. Lee v. Lampart, 653 F.3d 929, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 

 Petitioner cites no authority that places the state court’s alleged lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction among such exceptions. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by 

Petitioner’s argument that, because the state trial court allegedly lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction, the AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not apply to his case. Accordingly, 

the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R concluding that the Petition is barred by the 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

 Further, even if Petitioner’s Petition was not barred by the AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations, habeas relief would not be available. Specifically, Petitioner’s arguments fail 

because this Court cannot review alleged state court errors, such as a state court’s lack of 

jurisdiction. See Reel v. Ryan, 2013 WL 2284988 at *5 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2013). A 

federal habeas court cannot reexamine state court determinations of state law questions. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 

 When the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s PCR petition, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals effectively concluded that the state trial court had jurisdiction. This 

Court cannot review the state court’s decision regarding state law. Accordingly, the 

Court cannot grant habeas relief under a theory that the state court lacked jurisdiction. 

 C. Actual Innocence Gateway Articulated in Schlup

 Petitioner argues that under the equitable exception to the statute of limitations for 

actual innocence recognized in Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 

banc), he is entitled to the “gateway” around the statute of limitations. (Doc. 16 at 8). The 

Court in Lee held “that a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable 

exception to AEDPA’s limitations,” adopting the actual innocence gateway previously 

recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314–15 (1995). Lee, 653 F.3d at 932. For 

Petitioner to meet the equitable exception of the actual innocence gateway, he must first 

“support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence . . . that was not 

presented at trial.” Id. at 939 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). “The evidence of 

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innocence must be ‘so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the 

trial.’” Id. at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 316). The Court must then determine whether 

“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of 

the new evidence.” Id. at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

 In this case, Petitioner does not present any new facts or law in order to pass 

through the actual innocence gateway. Instead, Petitioner argues that “there was no 

specific criminal act charged in the indictment, the indictment charged file names and the 

identity and age of the participants were not alleged, nor was there any statement of fact 

and all counts were multiplicitous.” (Doc. 16 at 6). These claims are claims of legal error 

and do not constitute “new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.” Lee, 653 

F.3d at 939 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Therefore, Petitioner has not presented 

new evidence establishing that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 

have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

327). Accordingly, Petitioner cannot pass through the actual innocence gateway around 

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and his Petition is untimely. 

D. Petitioner Did Not Have Access to a Copy of the AEDPA in the Prison 

 Law Library 

Petitioner claims he is entitled to an equitable exception from AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations, because he did not have access to a copy of the AEDPA in the prison law 

library. (Doc. 16 at 4–5). Petitioner raises this claim for the first time in his objection to 

the R&R. The Court “has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented 

for the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation.” U.S. v. 

Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “in making a decision on whether 

to consider newly offered evidence, the district court must actually exercise its discretion, 

rather than summarily accepting or denying the motion.” Id. at 622. Additionally, “in 

certain circumstances a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider new 

arguments or evidence proffered by a pro se habeas petitioner.” Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 

1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 

1026 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[b]ecause [Petitioner] was a pro se petitioner at all relevant 

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times . . . the district court should have exercised its discretion to review the supplemental 

evidence”). Therefore, because Petitioner was a pro se petitioner at all relevant times, the 

Court exercises its discretion to review the merits of this claim that is raised for the first 

time in Petitioner’s objection to the R&R. 

 Equitable tolling may be appropriate where the petitioner did not have access to 

the AEDPA in the law library of the prison at which he resided. See Whalem/Hunt v. 

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where 

the petitioner alleged the law library of the prison in which he was incarcerated did not 

have legal materials describing the AEDPA and he had no knowledge of the limitations 

period). However, to be entitled to equitable tolling, Petitioner must first demonstrate that 

he was diligent in pursuing his rights. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969–73 (9th Cir. 

2006) (requiring petitioners to establish diligence to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

over their claims of insufficient legal resources in the prison law libraries); see also 

Crihalmean v. Ryan, 2013 WL 5524509 at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2013). Petitioner must 

exercise “reasonable diligence” but not “maximum feasible diligence.” Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010). 

 Petitioner has not diligently pursued his rights. Petitioner’s conviction became 

final on September 2, 2006. His only timely PCR petition was dismissed by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals on December 29, 2008. Not until March 20, 2013 did Petitioner file the 

instant habeas Petition. Petitioner does not explain his substantial delay in filing his 

Petition. “[P]ro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.” Roy, 465 

F.3d at 970. Additionally, Petitioner does not allege what he did to pursue his claims and 

seek resources before the AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired. Compare id. at 973 

(“[b]y alleging what they did to pursue their claims and complain about their situations, 

and alleging that they did so before the AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired, 

[Petitioners] have done enough to demonstrate that they were not the cause of the 

tardiness”). Petitioner also does not allege that he had no knowledge of the AEDPA’s 

limitations period. Therefore, Petitioner has not made sufficient allegations regarding his 

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diligence. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of his claim based 

upon his alleged lack of access to the AEDPA in the law library of the prison at which he 

resided. 

V. Request for Appointment of Counsel 

 In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner requests appointment of counsel. (Doc. 16 

at 9). There is no constitutional right to counsel on habeas. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 

425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993). Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not 

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances indicate that appointed counsel is 

necessary to prevent due process violations. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th 

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1911 (1987) 

 The Court has discretion to appoint counsel when a magistrate judge or the district 

court judge determines that the interests of justice so require. Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 

912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B)). In deciding 

whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the district court must evaluate the 

likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his 

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Weygandt v. Look, 

718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 In this case, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Petitioner has no 

likelihood of success on the merits of his Petition. Additionally, the Court finds that the 

issues in this case are not complex and that Petitioner has articulated his claims 

adequately pro se. As a result, the Court denies the request for appointment of counsel. 

VI. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

 Also in his objections to the R&R, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. 

(Doc. 16 at 9). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing if he presents a “meritorious claim,” and he exercised reasonable diligence in 

developing the factual record in the state proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 

434–37 (2000). A petitioner exercises the diligence necessary to preserve a claim if the 

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petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to 

investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 435. 

Thus, in order to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must both: “(1) 

allege facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not 

receive a full and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a 

collateral proceeding.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d 

on other grounds, 549 U.S. 7 (2006). Additionally, a habeas petitioner “should receive an 

evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle 

him to equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). No hearing is necessary, however, 

if this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that the allegations are without 

credibility or that the allegations if true would not warrant a new trial . . . .” United States 

v. Navarro–Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner fails to offer any specific information on 

what additional evidence would be revealed at the evidentiary hearing. Petitioner does 

specifically claim that “he [did] not have access to a copy of the AEDPA” in the prison 

law library. (Doc. 16 at 4–5). However, even if true, that fact would not entitle Petitioner 

to relief. As discussed above, Petitioner has not pursued that claim diligently, as is 

required by Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) for a petitioner to be entitled 

to the equitable exception from AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Thus, the Court finds 

that Petitioner has not made any allegations that, if true, would warrant equitable tolling, 

or, ultimately, habeas relief. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing. 

VII. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 15) is accepted and 

adopted; the objections (Doc. 16) are overruled; and the request for an evidentiary 

hearing (id.) and the request for appointment of counsel (id.) are denied. The Petition in 

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this case is denied with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2554 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability, because dismissal of the Petition is based on a plain 

procedural bar, and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling 

debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Further, Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). 

 Dated this 1st day of April, 2014. 

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