Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02302/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02302-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MGD 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Oscar Amaro, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-02302-PHX-DGC (DMF) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Oscar Amaro, who is currently confined in Arizona State Prison Complex 

(ASPC)-Lewis, brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 18.) 

Before the Court is Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio’s Motion for Summary Judgment for 

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, which Plaintiff opposes.1

 (Docs. 38, 56.) 

The Court will deny the Motion. 

I. Background 

 In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted three counts of deliberate 

indifference to his safety. (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff alleged that he had been housed in 

protective segregation at the ASPC-Lewis because he was on the New Mexican Mafia’s 

hit list. (Id. at 4-5.)2

 On August 13, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to the Maricopa 

 

1

 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 

952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 41.) 

2

 The page numbers cited refer to the Court’s electronically generated page 

numbers. 

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County Fourth Avenue Jail. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s request to be housed in protective 

segregation while at the jail was denied, and he was housed in the general population. 

(Id. at 5.) On December 25, 2013, Plaintiff was attacked by several inmates and suffered 

an abdominal hernia, blurred vision, chronic headaches, pain, anxiety, and weight loss. 

(Id. at 4-7.) Plaintiff alleged, in part, that Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio 

directed his subordinates to deny Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation and that 

Defendant implemented, created, and/or enforced “restrictive [protective segregation] 

policies[,] practices[,] and/or customs that unnecessarily limit” officers’ discretionary 

authority to grant an inmate’s legitimate request for protective segregation. (Id. at 11-

12.) Plaintiff alleged that he submitted a request for administrative relief, but never 

received a response and could not appeal to the highest level because he was transferred 

back to prison before he could exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id. at 11.) 

 On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff 

stated an Eighth Amendment threat-to-safety claim against Arpaio based on a policy, 

practice, or custom, and directed Arpaio to answer Count Three. (Doc. 21 at 7.) The 

Court also determined that Plaintiff stated a threat-to-safety claim in Count One against 

Defendants Jane and John Doe, but did not order service on these Doe Defendants and 

permitted Plaintiff to use the discovery process to obtain their names. (Id. at 7-8.) The 

Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id. at 6-7.)

II. Legal Standards 

 A. Summary Judgment 

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion 

and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

323. If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to 

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demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. 

v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The judge’s function is not to 

weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine 

issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The court must accept the nonmovant’s 

evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. 

 B. Exhaustion 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” 

administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 

422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative 

review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 

81, 92 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 

U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative 

process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

 The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available 

administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must 

demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once 

that showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that 

he exhausted administrative remedies, or “come forward with evidence showing that 

there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The 

ultimate burden rests with the defendant. Id. 

 If summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to exhaustion 

should be decided by the judge; a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of 

exhaustion. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170-71. If a court finds that the prisoner exhausted 

administrative remedies, that administrative remedies were not available, or that the 

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failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused, the case proceeds to the 

merits. Id. at 1171. 

III. Facts Relevant to Exhaustion 

The following facts are taken from Defendant’s Statement of Facts (DSOF) 

(Doc. 39) and Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Opposition (PSOF) (Doc. 57). 

 A. MCSO’s Grievance Process

 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) Policy DJ-3, Inmate Grievance 

Procedure, and Section 13 of the Rules and Regulations for Inmates, govern the 

grievance procedure at Maricopa County jails. (Doc. 39 ¶ 1.) MCSO provides all 

inmates with the grievance procedures at the time of booking into jail.3

 (Id. ¶ 3.) The 

Inmate Grievance Procedure in effect as of December 6, 2013, requires an inmate to first 

submit a grievance form to “detention personnel” within 48 hours.4

 (Id. ¶ 2.) If the 

detention officer cannot resolve the issue, the grievance is forwarded to the shift 

supervisor. (Id. ¶ 2.) If the shift supervisor is unable to resolve the grievance within 7 

 

3

 Plaintiff disputes DSOF ¶ 3 because he “cannot possibly verify one way or the 

other as to whether or not MCSO provides EVERY jail inmate with a copy of the 

grievance procedures at the time that they are booked into jail,” but he admits that he 

received a copy of the MCSO Inmate Rules and Regulation sometime between 

August 14, 2013 (the date of his booking) and January 28, 2014 (the date of his release). 

(Doc. 57 at 2 ¶ 3.) 

4

 Plaintiff disputes DSOF ¶ 2, asserting that the grievance procedure states that an 

inmate must first submit a grievance form to a shift supervisor within 48 hours of the 

event being grieved. (PSOF at 1 ¶ 2, citing DSOF Ex. 1, Att. 1 (Inmate Grievance 

Procedure, Eff. Date Dec. 6, 2013).) Plaintiff is correct that the 2013 version of the 

policy directs an inmate to submit the form to a shift supervisor. (See Doc. 40 at 15.) 

The Court notes that DSOF ¶ 2 cites only to Exhibit 1, Attachment 1, which is 22 pages 

and includes both a 2007 and a 2013 version of the Inmate Grievance Procedure. 

Defendant fails to direct the Court’s attention to where those policies state that an inmate 

is to submit a grievance to “detention personnel.” Nor does Defendant explain why it 

included the two different versions of the policy, or which one is applicable to Plaintiff’s 

claim. This briefing does not meet the level of professionalism the Court expects. 

Nevertheless, which version of the policy applies here does not impact the Court’s 

decision, and the Court will not further note where Plaintiff’s disputes appear to focus on 

differences between the two versions. 

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days, the shift supervisor forwards the grievance to the Shift Commander. (Id.) If the 

Shift Commander is unable to resolve the grievance within 7 days, the Shift Commander 

forwards the grievance to the Bureau Hearing Unit, where the Bureau Hearing Sergeant 

will have 11 working days “to resolve and return.” (Id.) If the grievance is not resolved 

by the Hearing Sergeant, the inmate is informed of his right to appeal to the Jail 

Commander “within 24 hours of the hearing sergeant’s response.” (Id. (emphasis in 

original).) The Jail Commander has 7 working days to respond to an “Institutional 

Grievance Appeal.” (Id.) If the Institutional Grievance Appeal is not resolved by the Jail 

Commander, the inmate is informed of his right to appeal to the External Referee “within 

24 hours of receipt of the jail commander’s response.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

An inmate’s “External Appeal” is forwarded to the Bureau Hearing Commander, who has 

7 calendar days to review it and determine whether the grievance goes forward or if that 

is the end of the grievance process. (Id.) If the grievance goes forward, it is sent to the 

External Referee, who has 25 calendar days to respond. (Id.) The External Referee’s 

response is sent to the Bureau Hearing Unit, which then forwards the response to the 

inmate. (Id.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Grievances 

 According to Defendant, Plaintiff submitted two grievances while he was 

incarcerated at the Fourth Avenue Jail. (Doc. 39 ¶ 5.) MCSO Sergeant James Maultsby 

states that he searched MCSO’s inmate grievance records for information regarding 

Plaintiff while he was incarcerated between August 14, 2013 and January 28, 2014. 

(Doc. 40 at 2 ¶ 7, citing Attach. 3 (Plaintiff’s “Grievance List/Report”).) Maultsby 

asserts that Plaintiff submitted two grievances, but only exhausted one of those 

grievances, which was related to medical charges on Plaintiff’s personal account. 

(Doc. 40 at 2 ¶ 8; Doc. 39 ¶ 6.) That grievance, #13-10310, was submitted to an External 

Hearing Officer, “thereby exhausting the grievance.” (Doc. 40 at ¶ 8.) Maultsby states 

that “our records show [Plaintiff] failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

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concerning his allegations which are the basis of the Second Amended Complaint.” (Id. 

¶ 9.) 

 In addition to Maultsby’s Declaration, Defendant submitted one document as 

evidence of the grievances Plaintiff filed while in MCSO custody. (Doc. 40 at 33.) That 

document is a single page, possibly from a log book, and appears to contain summaries of 

two grievances by Plaintiff; Defendant did not provide either of the actual grievances 

referenced in the log. The first item in the log is Plaintiff’s Grievance #201310310, dated 

September 17, 2013. (Id.) It describes the grievance as “Inmate Disputes Medical 

Service Charges” and concludes with an entry stating: “On 11/12/13, Inmate Signed for 

and Received External Response to Grievance.” (Id.) The other item is Plaintiff’s 

Grievance #201401398 dated January 25, 2014. (Id.) The summary of this grievance 

reads: “Claims he was assaulted by 3 inmates when he came to jail.” (Id.) The only 

other notation regarding this grievance is “Released 1/28/14.” (Id.) 

 In a declaration, Plaintiff states that that he filed a grievance with the Shift 

Supervisor at the Fourth Avenue Jail on December 26, 2013. (Doc. 57 at 9 ¶ 9, citing 

Attach. 5 (Doc. 57 at 27).) That grievance, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff’s 

Declaration, addressed the December 25 assault on Plaintiff by other inmates and 

Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation when he arrived at the jail. (Id. at 27.) On 

December 27, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to the Lower Buckeye Jail (LBJ) where he 

was “finally housed in [protective segregation].” (Id. at 9 ¶ 10.) On January 23, 2014, a 

Sergeant at the LBJ instructed Plaintiff to re-file the grievance he had submitted at the 

Fourth Avenue Jail on December 26, 2013; Plaintiff re-filed his grievance that same day, 

noting on the grievance that the Sergeant had instructed him to re-file the grievance. 

(Id. ¶ 11, citing Attach. 6 (Doc. 57 at 29.) The grievance was returned to Plaintiff on 

January 28, 2014 with a case number (#14-01398), but nothing else. (Id. ¶ 12, citing 

Attach. 6 (Doc. 57 at 29).) Plaintiff filed a three-page grievance appeal to the Jail 

Commander that day. (Id. ¶ 13, citing Attach. 7 (Doc. 57 at 31-33).) In his grievance 

appeal, Plaintiff wrote that he had no choice but to file an appeal because he had received 

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no response to his original grievances filed on December 26, 2013 and again on 

January 23, 2014 “per Sergeant’s instruction.” (Id. at 33.) On January 28, 2014, Plaintiff 

was released from the custody of the MCSO and “no additional administrative remedies 

were available” to him after that date. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

 C. Discussion

Defendant has established that the jail had an administrative remedy procedure 

and that Plaintiff was aware of the procedure. The Declaration of Sergeant Maultsby 

asserts that Plaintiff exhausted one of his grievances, which related to medical charges, 

but that MCSO “records show he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

concerning his allegations which are the basis of the Second Amended Complaint.” 

(Doc. 40 at 2 ¶¶ 8-9.) Maultsby does not cite to any evidence in support of the assertion 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendant has not produced 

either of the grievances referred to by Maultsby, and neither Maultsby nor Defendant 

provide any explanation of the document attached to Maultsby’s Declaration, which 

appears to be from a grievance log. No one asserts that the one-page document is a 

complete list of all grievances filed by Plaintiff while he was incarcerated by MCSO. 

 Defendant’s evidence is insufficient to show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(finding the defendants’ evidence inadequate where affidavit describing inmate appeals 

process does not state whether the plaintiff exhausted his appeals and there was “no 

evidence in the record establishing that the ‘Appeal Record’ is what defendants say it 

is”), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d 1162; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 

advisory comm. note to 2010 amendments (movant must cite to particular parts of the 

materials that support its position, and “[m]aterials that are not yet in the record—

including materials referred to in an affidavit or declaration—must be placed in the 

record”). 

 Even if Defendant met his initial burden, Defendant has failed to rebut Plaintiff’s 

evidence that he effectively exhausted his administrative remedies and that administrative 

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remedies were unavailable once he left the custody of MCSO. Defendant argues that 

there is no record of Plaintiff submitting a grievance “prior to the December 25, 2013 

assault which is the basis for this lawsuit, regarding denial of a request for protective 

segregation or fully exhausting the process to the final step.” (Doc. 39 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff 

responds that he did submit a grievance on December 26, 2013, and he was told to resubmit his grievance on January 23, 2014. (Doc. 57 at 9 ¶¶ 9, 11.) Plaintiff produced a 

copy of the grievance that he says he submitted on December 26, 2013 and re-submitted 

on January 23, 2014. It states: 

On 12-25-13 I was ass[au]lted by 3 inmates. When I came to the county 

jail I told the lady on my initial classification I need (Protective 

Segregation). She still housed me in GP! Now Officer Graham (2C2 

House) let 2 inmates out of their cell to ass[au]lt me. These 2 inmates had 

weapons and w[]ere locked down. If you check JMS (Jail Management 

System) cameras on 12-25-13 on second shift you’ll see the whole assault. 

I am request[ing] to resolve this by classification lady being terminated and 

Officer Graham being terminated for his reckless [e]ndangerment of my 

life. 

(Doc. 57 at 27.) The original date on the grievance is crossed out and illegible and is 

replaced with “1-23-14.” (Id.) The final two lines on the grievance state “SGT. on 1-23-

14 at 2:00 am told me to file a new gr[ie]vance cause the one at 4th Ave was never filed. 

SGT that walked/worked T24B cause I filed orig[i]nal grievance at 4th Ave . . . on 12-26-

13.” (Id. (ellipses in original).) 

 Defendant replies that “there is no evidence that [Plaintiff] ever filed a timely 

grievance of the December 25th incident as the grievance has not been produced by 

Plaintiff and does not show up in the jail records.” (Doc. 58 at 2.) In a footnote, 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s grievance “shows both the date of 12-26-13, and 1-28-

14, but refers to what a Sergeant reputedly told him on 1-23-14 and Plaintiff dates this 

document 1-28-14.”5

 (Doc. 58 at 1 n.1.) Defendant does not explain the significance of 

these arguments and the Court will not guess as to Defendant’s meaning. Defendant has 

 

5

 The date on the grievance next to Plaintiff’s signature is January 23, 2014, not 

January 28, 2014. 

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not shown as a matter of undisputed fact that Plaintiff failed to submit a grievance on 

December 26, 2013, within 48 hours of the assault, as Plaintiff claims. 

 Defendant next argues that the grievance Plaintiff submitted “was for being 

assaulted, not for a supposed refusal to grant him administrative segregation” (Doc. 38 at 

7), and that Plaintiff’s “request for relief in his January 23rd and 28th grievances (which 

are the only ones we have a record of) is for two guards to be terminated,” which “is not 

dependent on where Plaintiff is housed.” (Doc. 58 at 2-3.) These arguments are without 

merit. Plaintiff’s grievance clearly relates to both the assault and his prior request for 

protective segregation: “When I came to the county jail I told the lady on my initial 

classification I need (Protective Segregation). She still housed me in GP!” (Doc. 57 at 

27.) As relief, Plaintiff asked, in part, that the “classification lady” be terminated. (Id.) 

This grievance put jail officials on notice that Plaintiff was complaining about his 

classification and the failure to put him in protective segregation. 

 The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to “afford corrections officials time 

and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a 

federal case.” Brown, 422 F.3d at 935 (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525). Plaintiff met 

this requirement. A grievance need only provide enough information to allow prison 

officials to take the appropriate responsive measure. See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 

1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004) (“the 

primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem”). Indeed, in this 

case, jail officials did take responsive measures by putting Plaintiff in protective 

segregation two days after he was assaulted. 

 Defendant argues in his Reply that “Plaintiff did not appeal his failure to get a 

response within seven days as required by the rules, thus affirming that he did not exhaust 

his remedies.” (Doc. 58 at 2, citing “page 24 of 33 of the Declaration of Sergeant James 

Maultsby.”) Defendant further argues that “[t]his failure to grieve his not getting a 

response applies (1) to his alleged December 26th grievance, (2) to his January 23rd 

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grievance, and (3) to his January 28th grievance which is noted in Attachment 3 of the 

Declaration of Sgt. Maultsby.” (Id.) 

 Defendant does not explain why the “Inmate Institutional Grievance Appeal” filed 

by Plaintiff on January 28, 2014 is not an appeal of the failure to receive a response. In 

that appeal, Plaintiff specifically states that he has “no choice but to file these 

institutional grievance appeals to the jail commander due to the failure of a response to 

my original grievance filed on 12-26-13 and again on 1-23-14 per sergeant’s instruction.” 

(Doc. 57 at 33.) Therefore, Plaintiff did file an appeal of the failure to respond to his 

December 26, 2013 grievance, which he re-submitted on January 23, 2014. Nor does 

Defendant cite to any rule that requires an inmate to appeal the failure to receive a 

response within seven days. “[P]age 24 of 33 of the Declaration of Sergeant James 

Maultsby,” Defendant’s only citation on this issue, is merely a flow chart of the grievance 

process; it says nothing about an inmate needing to appeal the failure to receive a 

response within seven days. (See Doc. 40 at 24.) Although not obligated to do so, the 

Court has reviewed the two versions of the Inmate Grievance Procedure provided by 

Defendant and finds no language requiring an inmate to appeal the failure to receive a 

written response. For example, the 2007 version states that “[a]n inmate who has not 

received a written response to his grievance within seven calendar days of submitting it 

or having it submitted to the shift supervisor, may submit an Institutional Grievance 

Appeal through the Hearing Unit, with the pink copy of the original grievance attached, 

unless he has agreed in writing to an extension of time.” (Doc. 40 at 6 (emphasis 

added).) The 2013 version states that “[a]n inmate who has not received a resolution or a 

written response to his grievance within seven working days may submit an Inmate 

Request Form directly to a shift commander . . . .” (Id. at 17 (emphasis added).) Neither 

version requires that an inmate file an appeal if he does not receive a response to a 

grievance in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

 Plaintiff argues that after re-submitting his grievance on January 23, 2014, and 

then his grievance appeal on January 28, 2014, he was released from MCSO custody and 

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“no additional administrative remedies were available to [him] after 1-28-2014.” 

(Doc. 56 at 4.) Defendant responds “that is clearly not true as he could have appealed the 

failure to grant his request and continue to seek termination.” (Doc. 58 at 3.) Defendant 

does not explain how Plaintiff could have continued the MCSO grievance process after 

he was released. The Court finds that administrative remedies were effectively 

unavailable to Plaintiff once he was released from MCSO custody. 

 Defendant argues for the first time in his reply that Plaintiff failed to respond to a 

Request for Admissions that grievance #14-01398 “is the only grievance regarding 

‘refusal of administrative segregation’ that you filed while in jail, from your booking date 

of August 13, 2013 to your release to ADOC on January 28, 2014.” (Doc. 58 at 4.) 

Defendant contends that because Plaintiff failed to respond to this Request for 

Admission, he has “judicially admitted that his only grievance re administrative 

segregation, which is the sole basis for his lawsuit, was filed about a month beyond the 

appropriate deadline.” (Id.) Because Defendant improperly raised this argument for the 

first time in his Reply, the Court need not consider it. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 

983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (the court will not consider arguments raised for 

the first time in the reply brief); United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 

2006) (recognizing the general principle that arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief are waived). 

 Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. The Court will therefore deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38). 

 (2) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) is denied. 

 

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 (3) The Court will schedule a hearing by separate order. 

 Dated this 9th day of September, 2016. 

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