Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00296/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00296-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kathleen Kendrick, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 11-296-TUC-HCE

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Petition for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal

Access to Justice Act (Doc. 22). Defendant has filed a Response (Doc. 23) in opposition to

Plaintiff’s Petition (Doc. 23). The Magistrate Judge has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant

to the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. §636(c). The Court takes judicial notice that Michael

J. Astrue is no longer Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter

“SSA”). Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court

substitutes the Acting Commissioner of the SSA, Carolyn W. Colvin, as the named

Defendant in this action. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Petition. 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g),

requesting judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying her claim for

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disability insurance benefits, this Court remanded the matter for further administrative

proceedings. (See Doc. 20). Plaintiff now petitions the Court for $4,063.28 in attorney’s

fees and $350 in costs incurred in the form of the filing fee for Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

II. STANDARD

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter “EAJA”), a prevailing party in any

civil action brought against the United States shall be reimbursed for fees and other expenses

incurred by that party in the action unless the position of the United States was substantially

justified or special circumstances make the award of fees and costs unjust. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 2412(a) (relating to costs). “The EAJA creates

a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d

562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). To award attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA, the Court must

determine that: (1) the plaintiff is the prevailing party; (2) the government has not met its

burden of showing that its positions were substantially justified or that special circumstances

make an award unjust; and (3) the requested attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable. PerezArellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002). It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the

prevailing party, and Defendant has not argued that any special circumstances make an award

unjust or that the requested fees and costs are unreasonable. Instead, Defendant contends that

her position in defending the ALJ’s decision denying benefits was substantially justified.

Defendant also points out that Plaintiff’s request for $350 for filing costs would be payable

from the Judgment Fund, not agency funds. (Response, p. 1); see also Lopez v. Astrue, 2011

WL 1211562, at *1 (D.Ariz. Mar. 30, 2011) (“[C]osts, unlike expenses, are administered by

the Department of Justice.”).

The Commissioner bears the burden of proving that her position was substantially

justified at each stage of the proceeding. Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir.

1998). Substantial justification for purposes of the EAJA means that the Commissioner’s

position had “a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Id. (citations omitted). The

Commissioner’s positions must be “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable

person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). See also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281

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F.3d 1081, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Commissioner is ‘substantially justified’ if his position

met the traditional reasonableness standard–that is justified in substance or in the main, or

to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)). The Commissioner’s position can be substantially justified even if it is not correct.

Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566. The appropriate scope of inquiry in deciding substantial justification

is restricted to the issue or issues which led to remand. See Lewis, 281 F.3d at 1085. Further,

in deciding whether the Commissioner was substantially justified in her position, the Court

must examine both the underlying agency conduct as well as the Commissioner’s defense of

that conduct. Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

In her Opening Brief, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion

of her treating physician, Dr. Gecosala. The Court agreed and remanded the matter for

further proceedings. Defendant’s position was that the ALJ reasonably considered Dr.

Gecosala’s opinion and, therefore, the ALJ’s RFC finding was supported by substantial

evidence. Acknowledging that the ALJ was required to set forth specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record to reject Dr. Gecosala’s opinion,

Defendant accepted and relied upon the ALJ’s characterization of the evidence that Dr.

Gecosala treated Plaintiff only for a limited time, Dr. Gecosala’s examinations of Plaintiff

were not as thorough as other physicians’ examinations with regard to Plaintiff’s physical

capacity, and Dr. Gecosala’s opinion was contradicted by the examining state agency

physician, Dr. Petronella. In Plaintiff's case, the cited reasons for rejecting Dr. Gecosala's

opinion were not supported with specificity, nor could it reasonably be argued that they were

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Further, Defendant’s position that Dr.

Petronella’s opinion was based on independent clinical findings constituting substantial

evidence sufficient to support rejection of Dr. Gecosala’s opinion was foreclosed given that

there was no appreciable difference between their diagnoses, nor did Defendant cite any

reasonable basis for determining otherwise. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir.

2007) (where the diagnoses of the treating doctor and examining doctor are the same but their

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conclusions about the plaintiff’s functional limitations differ, the examining doctor’s

conclusion based on his examination is not considered to be an “independent finding” and

his “opinion does not alone constitute substantial evidence to support rejection of...[the

plaintiff’s] treating physicians’ opinions.”). On the instant record, Defendant’s position did

not have a reasonable basis in law and fact and, thus, Defendant was not substantially

justified in defending the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Gecosala’s opinion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In the context of the instant record, the Commissioner’s position on the issues on

which remand were based were not substantially justified. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled

to the requested costs and attorney’s fees. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Petition for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access

to Justice Act (Doc. 22) is GRANTED in the amount of $4,063.28 in attorney’s fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2412(a)(1), Plaintiff is

awarded $350 in costs, to be paid out of the Judgment Fund, as administered by the

Department of Justice.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to amend the judgment accordingly. 

The Clerk of Court is FURTHER DIRECTED to amend the docket to reflect that

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, has been

substituted as the named Defendant in this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d).

DATED this 13th day of May, 2013.

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