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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 3, 2002 Decided November 8, 2002

No. 01-5103

Thomas B. Mudd,

Son of Richard D. Mudd and great-grandson of

Samuel A. Mudd, as heir and successor to

Samuel A. Mudd, deceased,

Appellant

v.

Thomas A. White, Secretary of the Army, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02946)

Philip A. Gagner argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

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R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs were

Roscoe C. Howard Jr., United States Attorney, Wyneva

Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney, and James R.

Agar II, Attorney, Office of the Judge Advocate General.

Before: Edwards and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Circuit Judge: The appellant, Thomas B. Mudd,*

whose great-grandfather, Dr. Samuel Mudd, was convicted by

a military tribunal for his alleged role in the assassination of

President Abraham Lincoln, seeks judicial review of the

Army's refusal to reverse that conviction more than a century

later. Appellant bases his claim on 10 U.S.C. s 1552(a)(1)

(2002), pursuant to which "[t]he Secretary of a military

department may correct any military record ... when the

Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice." The Army Board for Correction of

Military Records ("ABCMR"), upon reviewing appellant's application, recommended that Dr. Samuel Mudd's conviction

before a military commission be set aside. The Assistant

Secretary of the Army (the "Secretary"), however, denied

appellant's request for relief. Appellant then filed suit in the

District Court, claiming that the action of the Secretary was

arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure

Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. s 706(1)(A) (2002). The District Court

heard the case twice, see Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d

138 (D.D.C. 2001) ("Mudd II"); Mudd v. Caldera, 26 F. Supp.

2d 113 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Mudd I"), ultimately finding that the

Secretary's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise in violation of law. The District Court therefore granted

summary judgment for the Army. Mudd II, 134 F. Supp. 2d

at 147.

__________

* Richard D. Mudd, the original complainant in this case, passed

away earlier this year, leaving his son - the great-grandson of Dr.

Samuel Mudd - to pursue this appeal. See Richard D. Mudd, 101

Grandson of Booth Doctor, Wash. Post, May 22, 2002, at B07.

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We agree that appellant cannot prevail on his claim. But

we rely on different grounds than those advanced by the

District Court. In our view, appellant's claim must be dismissed for want of standing. Under 10 U.S.C. s 1552(g),

"military record" pertains only to "an individual member or

former member of the armed forces." Dr. Samuel Mudd was

never a member of the armed forces. Therefore, even if

appellant can establish Article III standing, his action must

be still dismissed for want of prudential standing. Appellant's

interest in correcting the military record that relates to his

great-grandfather's conviction is not within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute covering the correction of

military records.

I. Background

The factual and procedural history in this case are recounted fully and thoughtfully in the District Court's opinions in

Mudd I and Mudd II. We will thus not repeat the extensive

details of the actions before ABCMR, the Secretary, or the

District Court. Rather, we will focus on the portions of the

record that are most pertinent to this appeal.

On May 9, 1865, a special military tribunal charged eight

parties with conspiring to murder President Abraham Lincoln. One of these individuals was Dr. Samuel Mudd ("Dr.

Mudd"), a non-military physician who owned a tobacco farm

in Charles County, Maryland. Mudd II, 134 F. Supp. 2d at

140; Mudd I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 116. Dr. Mudd was visited

by John Wilkes Booth and an accomplice following the wellknown events at Ford's Theater on April 14, 1865. After

fatally wounding President Lincoln on that evening, Booth

stopped at Dr. Mudd's farm - possibly in disguise - to receive

medical treatment for an injury that he sustained during the

escape. Id. Dr. Mudd told others about this encounter, and

authorities soon thereafter arrested him for assisting in the

infamous assassin's flight.

President Andrew Johnson convened a special military

tribunal to try all cases having to do with the plot to kill

President Lincoln. Known as the Hunter Commission, the

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nine appointed members of this body considered the evidence

on the charges against Dr. Mudd. Id. Attorney General

James Speed announced his opinion that a military court

could preside over these hearings because the object of the

conspiracy was the murder of President Lincoln, who acted as

commander in chief. See 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 297-317 (1865),

reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 19-25.

In his defense, Dr. Mudd argued that allowing the Commission to assert jurisdiction over his case was unlawful. Mudd

I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 116. He reasoned that a non-military

citizen was entitled to adjudication in the civilian courts

during peace time. Since the state of Maryland was not part

of the Confederacy and local civilian courts remained open, a

military tribunal had no power to try the case. The Hunter

Commission rejected this argument, issued a final judgment

against Dr. Mudd, and then sentenced him to life imprisonment. Id.

During his incarceration, Dr. Mudd petitioned the federal

courts for habeas relief. See Mudd II 134 F. Supp. 2d at 140;

Mudd I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 117; see also Ex Parte Mudd, 17

F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868), reprinted in J.A. 41-43. Dr.

Mudd relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Ex Parte

Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), a case adopting a limited view of a

military tribunal's jurisdiction over civilians from nonsecessionist states. See also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1

(1942). The District judge rejected these arguments and

denied the habeas petition. J.A. 43. An appeal of that ruling

on the merits never occurred due to intervening events

leading to Dr. Mudd's release from prison. On February 8,

1869, President Andrew Johnson issued a full and unconditional pardon to Dr. Mudd in recognition of his efforts to

assist medical officers during an epidemic of yellow fever.

See Pres. Pardon of Samuel A. Mudd, reprinted in J.A. 44-48;

Mudd I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 117; see also Mudd Compl. at p 26.

More than a century later, Richard D. Mudd, Dr. Samuel

Mudd's grandson, filed a formal petition with the Army to

overturn the judgment of the Hunter Commission. Mudd II,

134 F. Supp. 2d at 140; Mudd I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 117.

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Richard Mudd based his claim solely on 10 U.S.C.

s 1552(a)(1), pursuant to which "[t]he Secretary of a military

department may correct any military record ... when the

Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice." He asked the Army to expunge the

official documents relating to his grandfather's conviction.

He specifically argued that the judgment of the Hunter

Commission was invalid, because his grandfather was factually innocent of the conspiracy charge and because a military

tribunal had no jurisdiction to try civilians during times of

peace. Mudd II, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 140; Mudd I, 26

F. Supp. 2d at 117.

ABCMR conducted a hearing on the petition and determined that circumstances warranted a reversal of Dr. Mudd's

conviction on the ground that the Hunter Commission's jurisdiction did not extend to noncombatant civilians like Dr.

Mudd. Mudd I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 122. On January 22, 1992,

ABCMR recommended that the Secretary of the Army alter

the necessary records and void the 19th Century conviction.

Id.

The Secretary rejected ABCMR's recommendation and

declined to alter the records relating to Dr. Mudd's conviction. Mudd II 134 F. Supp. 2d at 141. Following a remand

from the District Court to conduct additional administrative

proceedings, see Mudd I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 120, the Secretary

held steadfast to the view that the Hunter Commission acted

within its lawful jurisdiction in convicting Dr. Mudd. Mudd

II, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 142. The Secretary reasoned that John

Wilkes Booth was an unlawful belligerent who had committed

the Lincoln assassination as an act of war. Therefore, according to the Secretary, the military tribunal's power to try

Dr. Mudd was appropriate because the laws of war applied to

all parts of the underlying conspiracy. Id.

Richard Mudd then sought judicial review in District Court,

claiming that the Secretary's action in denying relief under 10

U.S.C. s 1552(a)(1) was arbitrary and capricious under the

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. s 706(1)(A).

On March 14, 2001, the District Court granted summary

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judgment in favor of the Army. Mudd II, 134 F. Supp. 2d at

147-48. The trial judge found that the Army reached its

decision after properly weighing the evidence presented in

favor of reversing the conviction. Id. at 143-44. The District

Court also found that the Secretary's application of the "law

of war" principle instead of the martial law principle found in

Milligan was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Id. at 146-47. Appellant then sought review in this court.

Richard D. Mudd died earlier this year, leaving his son -

the great-grandson of Dr. Mudd - to pursue this appeal. On

August 20, 2002, after the initial submission of briefs, the

court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on

the issue as to whether appellant lacked standing to seek

judicial relief in federal court. See Mudd v. White, No.

01-5103 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 20, 2002) (Order).

II. Analysis

Most of the oral argument before this court focused on

appellant's standing to sue. Because standing is a threshold

requirement, and because (as we explain below) appellant has

failed to demonstrate standing in this case, this will be the

sole focus of our decision.

There are two principal forms of standing: "Article III

(case or controversy)" and "prudential." The former, which

is jurisdictional and cannot be modified by Congress, entails

three requirements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in

fact"--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is

(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " Second, there

must be a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of--the injury has to be "fairly ...

trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and

not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some

third party not before the court." Third, it must be

"likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the

injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."

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The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Since they are not

mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable

part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner

and degree of evidence required at the successive stages

of the litigation.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)

(citations omitted).

Prudential standing "denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent

with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot

reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the

suit." Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).

The Court has amplified the doctrine, as follows:

In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III,

"the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing."

Like their constitutional counterparts, these "judicially

self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction"

are "founded in concern about the proper--and properly

limited--role of the courts in a democratic society"; but

unlike their constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by Congress. Numbered among these

prudential requirements is the doctrine of particular

concern in this case: that a plaintiff's grievance must

arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or

regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional

guarantee invoked in the suit.

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citations omitted).

The Government argues strenuously that appellant cannot

satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirements of Article

III, because he has not demonstrated that his alleged injury

is fairly traceable to the actions of the Secretary, or that the

alleged injury will likely be redressed by a decision from this

court ordering the Army to correct its records. In particular,

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the Government argues that the reputational injury alleged

by appellant is more likely the result of the ravages of history

than of any official decision by the Secretary. The Government also contends that an action by the Army to change its

records will not remedy the alleged reputational harm suffered by appellant. We need not address these arguments,

however, because we find that appellant's claim assuredly

fails for want of prudential standing.

Appellant's insurmountable problem in this case is that his

claim, resting on 10 U.S.C. s 1552(a)(1), is not "arguably

within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by

the statute ... in question." Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.

Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The "zone of

interests" requirement has neither been eliminated nor adjusted by Congress with respect to the coverage of claims

arising under 10 U.S.C. s 1552(a)(1). Therefore, appellant

must show that his asserted interest is among the group of

claims that is envisioned by the relevant statute. See Sierra

Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cement Kiln

Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 870 (D.C. Cir.

2001). He fails this test if his interests are so marginally

related to or inconsistent with the implicit purposes in the

statute "that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress

intended to permit the suit." Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479

U.S. at 399; see also Scheduled Airlines Traffic Officers, Inc.

v. Dep't of Def., 87 F.3d 1356, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In this case, appellant asserts an interest in correcting

records to vacate the criminal conviction of his greatgrandfather. The applicable federal statute that gives rise to

appellant's claim was last amended by Congress before the

present lawsuit was initiated. Compare 10 U.S.C. s 1552

(1998) (amending subsection (g)), with Mudd I, 134 F. Supp.

2d at 140 (noting Army's final denial of Richard Mudd's

petition on Mar. 6, 2000). The amended subsection 1552(g)

defines a "military record" as a document that "pertains to (1)

an individual member or former member of the armed forces,

or (2) ... any other military matter affecting a member or

former member of the armed forces...." 10 U.S.C.

s 1552(g). And 10 U.S.C. s 1552(b) makes it clear that only

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a "claimant or his heir or legal representative" may file a

petition under s 1552(a) to correct a "military record." See

also 32 C.F.R. s 581.3(d)(1)(iii) (2002). Therefore, the statute

plainly contemplates that only the claimant member of the

armed forces (or his heir or legal representative) may seek to

alter a "military record" pertaining to the claimant. We

assume arguendo that Dr. Mudd's grandson and greatgrandson indeed qualify as heirs or legal representatives.

However, as Dr. Mudd was not a "member or former member

of the armed forces," neither the grandson nor the greatgrandson is an heir or legal representative of the type of

"claimant" contemplated by the statute. In other words,

their petition does not pertain to "a member or former

member of the armed services." Appellant is thus not within

the "zone of interests" protected or regulated by the statute.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons enumerated above, the appeal is denied

and the case is dismissed.

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