Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02729/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02729-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE PUTINI, individually

and as Successor-in-Interest to and

Administrator of the Estates of

EVELYN and MURRAY ROGOFF,

deceased; and SUSAN BRENT,

individually, and as Successor-InInterest to EVELYN and MURRAY

ROGOFF,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 09-CV-2729-W (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING IN-PART

AND DENYING IN-PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS (DOC. 21)

v.

BLAIR CORPORATION, BLAIR

L.L.C., GOLDEN GATE CAPITAL,

and ORCHARD BRANDS

CORPORATION, AND DOES 1

TO 100,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Defendants Blair Corporation, Blair L.L.C., Golden

Gate Capital, and Orchard Brands Corportation’s (“Defendants”) motion to dismiss.

(Doc. 21.) Plaintiffs Michelle Putini and Susan Brent (“Plaintiffs”) oppose. 

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons stated herein, the Court

GRANTS IN-PART and DENIES IN-PART Defendants’ motion (Doc. 21).

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I. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ mother, Evelyn Rogoff, purchased a Blair

robe on or about December 2008, in response to a catalog solicitation. (First Amended

Compl. (“FAC”) [Doc 1, Ex. 2] at 5, ¶ 2.) On February 4, 2009, Ms. Rogoff was wearing

the robe while making tea in her kitchen. (Id., ¶ 3.) The Blair robe ignited when it was

exposed to the surface of the electric burner Ms. Rogoff was using to heat the tea pot.

(Id.) The fire traveled up the arm of the Blair robe and quickly spread to Ms. Rogoff’s

neck, face, and chest. (Id.) Ms. Rogoff’s husband, Murray Rogoff, threw himself onto

her to smother the fire and his robe also caught fire. (Id.)

Plaintiff Susan Brent entered her parent’s home, heard their screams, and saw

them on fire on the floor. (FAC at 2, ¶ 4.) She grabbed nearby water bottles and doused

the flames, then transported her parents to the hospital. (Id.) Both Mr. and Ms. Rogoff

died as a result of their injuries. (Id. at 6, ¶ 4.)

Plaintiffs filed this action on October 23, 2009, alleging two claims: products

liability and violation of a statute. (Compl. [Doc 1, Ex. 1].) On January 15, 2010,

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second

claim, as well as their request for punitive damages. (MTD [Doc. 21].)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See

North Star Int’l. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). The

Court must dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for

two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a

cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th

Cir. 1984). 

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all material allegations in the complaint,

“even if doubtful in fact,” are assumed to be true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

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Because Plaintiffs do not argue that a private right of action is available under the

FFFA, the Court need not address the issue.

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U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Additionally, the complaint and all reasonable inferences

therefrom are construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of

Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, conclusory legal allegations

and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Ove v.

Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, [citation omitted], a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do [citation omitted].”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for Violation of a Statute

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for “Violation of a

Statute” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which provides that a court

may dismiss a claim for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter[.]” FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(1). Defendants argue that because the Federal Flammable Fabrics Act (“FFFA”)

does not create a private right of action, the claim must be dismissed. (MTD at 2.)

Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’ jurisdictional attack, and instead urge in

their Opposition that they are not asserting a private right of action under the FFFA,

but are instead asserting a negligence per se claim. (Opp. [Doc. 28] at 4–5.) Defendants

accuse Plaintiffs of using their Opposition to re-draft their complaint.1

 (Reply [Doc. 29]

at 3.)

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is entitled “Violation of Statute (15 U.S.C. 1192

et. seq.).” (FAC at 6.) Plaintiffs identify Mr. and Ms. Rogoff as within the class of

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people meant to be protected by the FFFA, and accuse Defendants of violating section

3 of the FFFA by offering into sale material that failed to conform to the FFFA’s

standards. (Id. at ¶ 2–3.) Plaintiffs allege that the violation resulted in the deaths of Mr.

and Mrs. Rogoff. Id. at ¶ 4.) As part of their claim for relief, Plaintiffs seek “attorneys

fees as provided by law for Violation of Statute....” (Id. at 3, ¶ 11.)

 The Court agrees that by naming their second cause of action “Violation of a

Statute” and seeking attorneys fees based on the violation of the statute, the FAC

appears to be asserting a claim for violation of the FFFA, rather than a claim for

negligence per se. And because Plaintiffs do not assert that a private right of action

exists under the FFFA, the Court will grant Defendants motion to dismiss with leave to

amend.

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Claim to Punitive Damages.

Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages, arguing

that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support punitive damages under

California Civil Code Section 3294. Section 3294 requires that a party requesting

punitive damages prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been

guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice...” CAL. CIV CODE § 3294 (a). Focusing on this

part of the statute, Defendants urge the Court to apply the heightened pleading

standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), to Plaintiffs’ damage request. 

As an initial matter, the Court is not convinced that the Iqbal standard applies

to punitive damage requests. However, the Court need not address this issue because

even under the Iqbal standard, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim

for punitive damages.

Plaintiffs allege that prior the death of their parents, Defendants received timely

notice of a similar serious personal injury involving the Blair robe. (FAC at 7.) Plaintiffs

further allege that Defendants knew, or should have known, that the robes would be

used around stoves. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs allege that despite the knowledge and

foreseeability regarding the robe’s risks, Defendants did not insert a warning label into

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the robes, something Plaintiffs allege would have cost approximately one penny per robe.

(Id.) Additionally, Plaintiffs urge that Defendants intentionally delayed recalling the

robes in order to avoid adverse publicity. (Id. at 7.)

California Civil Code Section 3294 defines “malice” as “conduct which is

intended by the defendant to cause injury to the Plaintiff or despicable conduct which

is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or

safety of others.” CAL. CIV CODE § 3294 (c) (1). The Code defines “oppression” as

“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious

disregard of that person’s rights.” CAL.CIV CODE § 3294 (c) (2). Accepting Plaintiffs’

factual allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient for

punitive damages. Specifically, the facts alleged suggest that Defendants engaged in

despicable conduct with conscious disregard for the safety and rights of others by

allegedly placing their desire for profit ahead of their customer’s safety. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN-PART and DENIES INPART Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) as follows:

1. The second cause of action for violation of the FFFA is dismissed with

leave to amend to state a claim for negligence per se.

2. The motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is denied.

Any second amended complaint must be filed on or before May 21, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 3, 2010

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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