Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00636/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00636-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEIL PARIS SUGARMAN, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-636 AWI (HC) 

(No. CR-F-95-5018 REC) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

RECUSE (Doc. 96), 

DISMISSING MOTION TO VACATE,

SET ASIDE OR CORRECT

SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc.98),

DENYING MOTION TO AMEND

SECTION 2255 MOTION (Doc.

100), DENYING MOTION TO HOLD

SECTION 2255 MOTION IN

ABEYANCE (Doc. 99), AND

DIRECTING CLERK TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT 

On May 24, 2006, petitioner Neil Paris Sugarman, proceeding

in pro per, filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Also on May 24, 2006,

petitioner filed a motion to stay consideration of petitioner’s

Section 2255 motion for 90 days. On June 2, 2006, petitioner

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On May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion to recuse Judge 1

Robert E. Coyle. (Doc. 96). Because the civil action in which the

Section 2255 motion was filed has been assigned to the docket of

Judge Anthony Ishii because of Judge Coyle’s senior status, the

motion to recuse is moot and is denied on that ground. 

2

filed a motion for leave to amend the Section 2255 motion.1

A. Background. 

Petitioner pleaded guilty on June 26, 1995 pursuant to a

written Plea Agreement to five counts of bank robbery in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7), to

one count of armed bank robbery in violation of Section 2113(a)

and (d) (Count 8), one count of interference with commerce by

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Count 4), and one

count of use of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Five). Petitioner was sentenced on

September 11, 1995 to 121 months as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and

7 to be served concurrently with each other, 60 months as to

Count 5 to be served consecutively to the terms imposed in Counts

1-4 and 6-8 for a total term of 181 months. Petitioner did not

file an appeal. 

On April 18, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set

aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (No. CVF-97-5375 REC). On April 27, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to

amend the Section 2255 motion, which motion to amend was granted

by Order filed on April 30, 1997. On May 7, 1997, petitioner

filed a motion to file amendment pursuant to Section 2255. By

Order filed on June 10, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the June

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10 Order), petitioner’s May 7, 1997 motion was deemed to be an

amended Section 2255 motion and the amended Section 2255 motion

was denied. (Doc. 39) Petitioner contended that his guilty plea

to Count 4 was involuntary because the court lacked jurisdiction

to prosecute him for this offense, petitioner asserting that the

United States must establish that it owns the land on which the

business he robbed was located and must provide documentation

establishing that the land has been ceded to the United States by

the State of California. The court denied this claim on the

ground that the jurisdictional element for a violation of Section

1915(a) is provided by the requirement that interstate commerce

be obstructed, delayed or affected. The court rejected

petitioner’s related challenge that it lacked jurisdiction to

prosecute Count 5 because of the conclusion that jurisdiction to

prosecute Count 4 existed. Petitioner further contended that the

five-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) for

displaying and pointing a firearm at the teller during the

robbery applied in determining the offense level for Count 8

constituted double punishment because he was also sentenced for

use and carrying a firearm in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in

connection with Count 5. The court rejected petitioner’s claim,

ruling that in determining the offense level for Count 4, no

adjustment to the offense level was applied because petitioner

had pleaded guilty to Count 5 and Count 5 required a mandatory

five-year consecutive sentence. In determining the offense level

for Count 8, the five-level increase mandated by § 2B1.3(b)(2)(C)

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was applied because there was no separate charge in the

Superseding Indictment that petitioner had violated Section

924(c) in committing the armed bank robbery alleged in Count 8. 

The court further ruled that the Ninth Circuit has held that

imposition of consecutive sentences for armed bank robbery in

violation of Section 2113(a) and (d) and for the use of a firearm

during the commission of that armed bank robbery does not

constitute double jeopardy, citing United States v. Brown, 829

F.3d 760, 766-767 (9 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991 th

(1988). The court stated that it was aware of no authority

holding that an adjustment to the offense level pursuant to §

2B1.3(b)(2)(C) in a count charging only bank robbery constitutes

double jeopardy or double punishment, and that petitioner’s

arguments in support of his position were not persuasive. On

June 14, 1997, petitioner filed a notice of intent to appeal the

June 10 Order. By Order filed on June 24, 1997, the court

declined to issue a certificate of appealability in connection

with the appeal of the June 10 Order. By Order filed with this

court on December 5, 1997, the Ninth Circuit declined to issue a

certificate of appealability.

On July 28, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for writ of

error coram nobis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, contending that

petitioner’s guilty plea was involuntary because of ineffective

assistance of counsel and that counsel was ineffective because of

counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal as requested by

petitioner. This petition was denied by Order filed on July 31,

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The original of the Order denying the petition for writ of 2

error coram nobis is missing from the file in the underlying

criminal action. However, the basis for the denial of the writ of

error coram nobis set forth in the Order is referred to in

subsequent Orders by the court. 

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1998, the court ruling that the writ of error coram nobis affords

a remedy to attack an unconstitutional or unlawful conviction in

cases where the petitioner has already served his sentence and

that petitioner cannot circumvent the requirements of Section

2255 by seeking relief pursuant to a writ of error coram nobis. 

2

On December 7, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal,

appealing “from the imposition of sentence in CR-F-95-5018 REC

and in accordance with 18 USC § 3742, that such sentence was

imposed in violation of law.” By Order filed on December 29,

1998, the court declined to issue a certificate of appealability

“[t]o the extent a Certificate of Appealability is a prerequisite

to the prosecution of this appeal”, the court describing the

background set forth above. On January 19, 1999, petitioner

filed a motion for leave to file a notice of appeal “out of time”

with regard to the Order denying the petition for writ of error

coram nobis, and a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 

By Order filed on February 16, 1999, the court granted the motion

for leave to file the notice of appeal “out of time” but denied

the request to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground that the

appeal is frivolous and not taken in good faith. 

On September 22, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal

“out of time”, requesting leave to file a notice of appeal of his

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conviction and sentence imposed on September 11, 1995 because of

defense counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal. By

Order filed on September 25, 2000, the court struck the notice of

appeal “out of time” on the ground that it was “improper and

ineffective”. The court described the previous filings made by

petitioner and further ruled:

In the Petition for Writ of Error Coram

Nobis, Sugarman contended that his guilty

plea was not knowing and voluntary because of

ineffective assistance of counsel and that he

was denied the effective assistance of

counsel because of counsel’s failure to file

an appeal from Sugarman’s conviction and

sentence as requested by him. None of these

grounds were raised in the Section 2255

motion. Sugarman asserted that these grounds

were not raised in his Section 2255 motion

because of a lockdown at the institution and

because of pressure to at least attempt to

file the Section 2255 motion prior to the

‘deadline’. Recognizing that the amendments

to Section 2255 enacted by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 which

added a one-year limitations period and a

requirement that certification be obtained

from the Court of Appeals for the filing of a

second or successive petition may preclude

petitioner from seeking relief pursuant to

Section 2255, Sugarman asserted that he is

entitled to seek the vacation of his

conviction and sentence pursuant to the All

Writs Act by petitioning for a writ of error

coram nobis. In its Order Denying Petition

for Writ of Error Coram Nobis filed on July

31, 1998, the court did not agree, holding

that the writ of error coram nobis affords a

remedy to attack an unconstitutional or

unlawful conviction in cases where the

petitioner has already served his sentence,

that Sugarman could not circumvent the

requirements of Section 2255 by seeking

relief pursuant to a writ of error coram

nobis, and that Sugarman may now be

procedurally precluded from obtaining relief

pursuant to Section 2255 does not render a

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remedy under Section 2255 unavailable for

purposes of coram nobis. This procedural

background makes clear that Sugarman is

attempting to overcome the one year

limitations period applicable and the

requirement that a second or successive

motion for relief pursuant to Section 2255 be

certified by the Ninth Circuit by belatedly

seeking to file a notice of appeal. 

On October 11, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal,

appealing this Order. By Order filed on October 12, 2000, the

court denied petitioner’s motion to prosecute this appeal in

forma pauperis, the court ruling that the appeal was in bad

faith. By Order filed with this court on March 19, 2001, the

Ninth Circuit dismissed this appeal for failure to prosecute.

On August 22, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to compel

production of documents, seeking an order to the Clerk’s Office

to copy and provide petitioner at government expense the docket

sheet; the Superseding Indictment; “any and all sentencing

memorandums; concerning plea offers, especially (1) one in

particular dated prior to said superseding indictment; where as

gov’t does make a plea offer of 57-71 months in exchange for a

plea of guilty”; the Plea Agreement; and “any and all copies of

all motions concerning an alleged illegal search of defendant’s

person and property at the time of arrest (January 18, 1995)”. 

By Order filed on August 22, 2003, this motion was denied, the

court ruling in pertinent part:

Although there is no explanation in the

motion for Sugarman’s need for these copies,

the court assumes that Sugarman intends to

file a post-conviction collateral attack on

his conviction or sentence. Sugarman is not

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A court is permitted to take judicial notice of court records 3

in another case, including court records available to the public

through the PACER system via the internet. See United States v.

Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9 Cir. 2004); Jacobsen v. th

Schwarsenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1207 (C.D.Cal.2004).

8

entitled to these copies at government

expense in order to prepare a post-conviction

motion or writ. Sugarman must first file the

motion or writ alleging grounds for relief. 

The court will then decide whether or not

Sugarman is entitled to proceed and, if so,

whether copies of documents are necessary to

the resolution of the motion or writ.

The court takes judicial notice that petitioner filed an

application for leave to file a second or successive Section 2255

motion with the Ninth Circuit on November 11, 2005. See 3

Sugarman v. United States, Ninth Circuit Docket, No. 05-76812. 

According to the Ninth Circuit’s docket, on February 24, 2006,

the following Order was filed:

A review of the record shows the district

court dismissewd [sic] petitioner’s first

habeas corpus petition for failure to state a

cognizable claim. A federal habeas petition

filed after an earlier petition had been

dismissed for technical or procedural reasons

is not a second or successive petition. 

Accordingly, the application for

authorization to filed a second or successive

28 U.S.C. 2254 [sic] habeas corpus petition

in the district court is denied as

unnecessary. All other pending motions are

denied as moot. (Terminated on the Merits

after Submission Without Oral Hearing;

Denied; Written, Unsigned, Unpublished. Mary

M. SCHROEDER, Alfred T. GOODWIN, Johnnie B.

RAWLINSON) [05-76812] (ba)

On March 13, 2006, petitioner filed what is described on the

Ninth Circuit’s docket as a “motion for a clarification/direction

of order of 2/24/06; Granting petitioner permission to file

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another 2255 motion ....” 

On March 24, 2006, petitioner filed with this court a

“Motion to Take Leave to File a Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

2255". In this motion, petitioner referred the court to his

application for leave to file a second or successive Section 2255

petition, noted that the Ninth Circuit’s Order had several

mistakes in it, noted that he had filed a motion for

clarification with the Ninth Circuit, that the motion for

clarification remained under submission with the Ninth Circuit. 

Petitioner moved for permission of this court to file a Section

2255 motion, stating that “[s]ince time is of the essence and

Petitioner does not want to file a § 2255 motion until it is

clarified if that this the correct vehicle to file at this time

and based on the Ninth Circuit’s Order.” By Order filed on April

26, 2006, the court denied petitioner’s motion, concluding:

If petitioner believes that he is entitled to

file a motion for relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255, petitioner can file that

motion without permission from this court,

setting forth in that motion the grounds for

relief and why petitioner believes he is

entitled to raise them at this juncture,

notwithstanding the denial by this court of

his Section 2255 motion by Order filed on

June 10, 1997 and the denial by this court of

petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram

nobis by Order filed on July 31, 1998. 

Because the court has no information

concerning the content of petitioner’s

request to the Ninth Circuit in No. 05-76812

and no information concerning the grounds

upon which petitioner intends to base his

Section 2255 motion, the court cannot and

does not express any opinion with regard to

the procedural or substantive merits of any

claims petitioner may have. 

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According to the Ninth Circuit’s docket in No. 05-76812, the

following Order was filed on May 23, 2006:

Petitioner’s motion for clarification of the

court’s 2/24/06 order is granted. The

court’s 2/24/06 order is hereby vacated as

having been issued in error. Petitioner’s

application for authorization to file a

second or successive 28 U.S.C § 2255 motion

in the district court is denied. No petition

for rehearing or motion for reconsideration

shall be filed or entertained in this case. 

(Terminated on the Merits after Submission

Without Oral Hearing; Denied; Written,

Unsigned, Unpublished. Mary M. SCHROEDER,

Alfred T. GOODWIN, Johnnie B. RAWLINSON) [05-

76812] (ba)

B. Claims in Instant Section 2255 Motion.

Petitioner raises the following claims for relief in the

Section 2255 motion filed with this court on May 24, 2006:

1. Claim I: “Petitioner can show that he is

actually innocent of the nine (9) count

superseding indictment ... all due to

petitioner convicted by the use of evidence

obtained through an illegal search and

seizure, all in violation of his

constitutional rights under the U.S.

Constitution”;

2. Claim II: “That through ineffective

assistance of counsel evidence obtained

through an illegal search and seizure was

admitted, all in violation of petitioner’s

4 , 5 and 6 Amendment rights under the th th th

U.S. Constitution”;

3. Claim III: “Petitioner was denied

effective assistance of counsel in violation

of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, due to counsel’s failure to

file a notice of appeal and appeal

petitioner’s conviction and sentence as

requested”;

4. Claim IV: “Petitioner’s guilty plea was

not voluntary and knowingly entered in

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Because of this conclusion, the court does not address the 4

issues of timeliness and equitable tolling apparent from the face

of the motion and the record set forth above.

The record in the criminal action demonstrates that 5

petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence was denied following an

evidentiary hearing. 

11

violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

of the U.S. Constitution due to petitioner’s

receiving ineffective assistance of counsel”;

5. Claim V: “Lack of subject matter

jurisdiction in Count IV and Count V of the

Superseding Indictment”.

This court lacks jurisdiction to consider any of these

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As judicially noted above, 4

the Ninth Circuit has denied petitioner’s application to file a

second or successive Section 2255 petition. If a petitioner has

previously sought relief pursuant to Section 2255 and has not

received from the Ninth Circuit certification as required by

Sections 2244 and 2255, this court does not have jurisdiction to

consider the merits of this second motion. United States v.

Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9 Cir. 1998). th

Petitioner’s assertion in Claim I that he is “actually

innocent” of the crimes charged in the Superseding Indictment

because evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment does not change this conclusion. In Bousley v. 5

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998), the Supreme Court

defined “actual innocence” as “factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency.” Petitioner’s claim in the instant motion that

evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not

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based on “actual innocence” but, rather, “mere legal

insufficiency”. Furthermore, as explained in Ivy v. Pontesso,

328 F.3d 1057, 1059-1060 (9 Cir. 2003): th

‘In general, § 2255 provides the exclusive

procedural mechanism by which a federal

prisoner may test the legality of his

detention.’ ... However, a prisoner may

proceed under § 2241 if he can show that ‘the

remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate

or ineffective to test the legality of his

detention.’ ... This Court has not fully

explained when § 2255's remedy is ‘inadequate

or ineffective.’ ... However, we have stated

that this exception is narrow ... and that §

2255's remedy is not ‘inadequate or

ineffective’ merely because § 2255's

gatekeeping provisions prevent the petitioner

from filing a second or successive petition

....

...

We have not had occasion to decide when a

claim of actual innocence entitles a

petitioner who is procedurally barred from

filing a second or successive motion under §

2255 to seek relief under § 2241. Our sister

circuits, however, have held that § 2255

provides an ‘inadequate or ineffective’

remedy (and thus the petitioner may proceed 

under § 2241) when the petitioner claims to

be: (1) factually innocent of the crime for

which he has been convicted; and (2) has

never had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’

at presenting this claim ... In other words,

it is not enough that the petitioner is

presently barred from raising his claim of

innocence by motion under § 2255. He must

never have had the opportunity to raise it by

motion.

Here, petitioner has not made a showing that he is factually

innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted and has not made

a showing that he never had an unobstructed procedural shot at

raising this claim. Therefore, the court cannot deem

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Furthermore, it is apparent from petitioner’s motion to amend 6

that the claimed lack of subject matter jurisdiction with regard to

Counts IV and V of the Superseding Indictment is based on

petitioner’s contention that, in committing the robbery charged in

Count 4, interstate commerce was not obstructed, delayed or

affected. However, petitioner admitted in the Plea Agreement and

under oath during the change of plea proceedings that “[a]t the

time of the robbery, Edmonds Jewelers and Goldsmiths was engaged in

the sale of jewelry in interstate commerce and an industry which

affects interstate commerce.” 

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petitioner’s instant motion for relief pursuant to Section 2255

to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. 

C. Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Instant Section 2255

Motion.

As noted, on June 2, 2006, petitioner filed a motion to

amend or supplement the instant Section 2255 motion to add

argument in support of Claim V asserted in the Section 2255

motion, e.g., “[l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction in Count IV

and Count V of the Superseding Indictment”.

The court denies petitioner’s motion to amend as futile. As

ruled above, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the

claim.6

D. Petitioner’s Motion to Hold Section 2255 Motion in

Abeyance for 90 Days.

By this motion, petitioner requests the court to hold the

instant Section 2255 motion in abeyance for 90 days or until such

time as petitioner can file a “typed more legible § 2255 motion.”

Because of the rulings made herein, this motion is denied.

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ACCORDINGLY:

1. Petitioner Neil Sugarman’s motion to recuse is denied.

2. Petitioner Neil Sugarman’s motion to vacate, set aside

or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed on May 24,

2006 is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

3. Petitioner’s motion to amend Section 2255 motion filed

on June 2, 2006 is denied.

4. Petitioner’s motion to hold Section 2255 motion in

abeyance is denied.

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for

respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

9h0d30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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