Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02429/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02429-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Phil Degginger, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

McGraw-Hill Global Education Holdings 

LLC, and McGraw-Hill School Education 

Holdings, LLC, 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-02429-TUC-DCB (DTF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Two. (Docs. 

28, 29.) Plaintiff responded and Defendants replied. (Docs. 30, 31.) Pursuant to the Rules 

of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a report 

and recommendation. The Magistrate recommends the District Court, after its 

independent review of the record, enter an order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Phil Degginger brought a complaint against McGraw-Hill Global 

Education Holdings, LLC and McGraw-Hill School Education Holdings, LLC. (Doc. 1.) 

Degginger alleges that he holds the copyright (solely or with his sister) to photographs 

authored by him and his father. Degginger alleges that he and various stock photography 

agencies sold Defendants limited licenses to use certain photographs. He alleges 

Defendants used some photographs beyond what was permitted by the licenses, and used 

other photographs in ways unconnected to a license. Count 1 of the Complaint alleges 

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copyright infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. Count 2 alleges that 

Degginger is entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees, pursuant to the Copyright Act 

and licensing agency contracts.

DISCUSSION 

 Defendants request that the Court dismiss Count 2 of the Complaint, which seeks 

attorney’s fees, because it does not state a cause of action. Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s 

fees is premised on two grounds. First, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees “under 17 U.S.C. 

§ 505, for any claim on which he prevails against McGraw where the photograph at issue 

was registered with the United States Copyright Office prior to McGraw’s infringement, 

pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 412.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that his licensing 

agency contracts with Defendants provide that “the prevailing party in any dispute is 

entitled to recover its attorney’s fees.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) The Court finds the motion to 

dismiss should be granted on two grounds. First, the Court finds no subject matter 

jurisdiction. Second, the Court finds Claim 2 fails to state a claim for relief. 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 Although not raised by Defendants, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over Claim 2. In this claim, Plaintiff seeks relief contingent on a future event. There is no 

claim or controversy before the court ripe for adjudication. See St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 

‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at 

all.’” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union 

Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (quoting 13A Charles A. 

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532, 

112 (1984))). At this time, there are no attorney’s fees in controversy. Plaintiff’s 

speculation that he will be the prevailing party under the Copyright Act or the alleged 

contracts is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. See Frontline Processing Corp. v. First 

State Bank of Eldorado, 389 F.App’x 748, 754, amended on denial of reh’g, 399 F.App’x 

185 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction over indemnification claim 

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because party had not yet realized a loss and the loss might never occur). Because Claim 

2 is not ripe, it should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 785 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

Failure to State a Claim 

Claim 2 should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) due to “the lack of a cognizable 

legal theory” and “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 

(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim for attorney’s fees, under 

either the Copyright Act or the alleged contracts, Plaintiff must allege that he is a 

prevailing party and Defendant is responsible for fees. Id. (holding that complaint must 

allow inference that defendant is liable). Plaintiff does not, and cannot, make these 

essential allegations until there is a resolution of his claim for copyright infringement. 

(See Doc. 1 at 9 (alleging Plaintiff will submit fee totals for conduct of this litigation 

upon order of the Court).) Claim 2 is wholly dependent upon the outcome of Claim 1.1

Therefore, Plaintiff has yet to allege facts establishing a right to relief because his request 

for attorney’s fees is speculative. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. 

 Plaintiff also fails to allege a cognizable legal theory for Claim 2. Section 501(b) 

of the Copyright Act provides a cause of action for the infringement of a copyright. The 

Act then provides “Remedies for infringement.” See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05. The Act 

includes as a remedy that, “the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the 

prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. Thus, the only relevant “action” 

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 Plaintiff appears to concede this point as to the claim for fees under the Copyright Act. (Doc. 30 at 10.) It is equally applicable to his claim based on contract, because the 

language of the contracts as set forth in the Complaint requires that he be the prevailing party. Until Claim 1 is decided, he cannot allege that there is a prevailing party. 

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established by the Copyright Act is for infringement. Attorney’s fees are merely one of 

the remedies for a civil infringement action, awarded at the court’s discretion. Hence, 

Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable legal theory for a separate attorney’s fees claim 

under the Copyright Act. 

 Plaintiff also failed to plead a legal theory for fees pursuant to contract. Plaintiff 

points to the contracts solely as a source for attorney’s fees as a remedy for successful 

litigation. If Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and Defendants fail to pay fees 

owed under the alleged contracts, then Plaintiff could plead a claim for breach of 

contract. At this time, Plaintiff alleges neither the facts nor the legal theory necessary to 

support such a claim. 

 Finally, Claim 2 contravenes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(A), which 

provides that a request for fees must be made by motion “unless the substantive law 

requires those fees to be proved at trial.” The Copyright Act allows a person to bring an 

action solely for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). It does not compel fees to be proven 

at trial, rather, it grants the court discretion to award fees to a prevailing party as a 

remedy in an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Additionally, Plaintiff points to no 

law suggesting that attorney’s fees must be proven at trial if they arise from a contract 

that awards them to a prevailing party. Thus, attorney’s fees are properly sought on 

motion after a decision on Claim 1. 

RECOMMENDATION 

 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Claim 2, therefore, it should be 

dismissed without prejudice. Alternatively, Claim 2 fails to state a claim and it should be 

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court 

grant the motion to dismiss Claim 2 (Doc. 28.) 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

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days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 11th day of February, 2015. 

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