Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_12-cv-00245/USCOURTS-akd-3_12-cv-00245-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Wrongful Death

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ALASKA

THERESA DAYTON, PERSONALLY, )

AND AS THE REPRESENTATIVE )

OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS E. )

CICARDO, )

) 3:12-cv-00245 JWS

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

STATE OF ALASKA, ) [Re: Motion at Doc. 104]

)

Defendant and Third- )

Party Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Third-Party Defendant. )

)

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 104 plaintiff Theresa Dayton (“Dayton”) moves for reconsideration of

the court’s order at docket 81. Defendant and third-party plaintiff State of Alaska (“the

State”) responds at docket 108. Dayton replies at docket 114. Oral argument was not

requested, and it would not be of additional assistance to the court.

Case 3:12-cv-00245-JWS Document 121 Filed 12/03/15 Page 1 of 6
II. BACKGROUND

 Dayton sued the State for the wrongful death of Thomas Cicardo who was a

member of the flight crew aboard a United States Air Force C-17 when it crashed during

an Alaska Air National Guard (AANG) practice flight in preparation for a public air show. 

All of the flight crew perished in the crash. Dayton filed suit in state court based on

state law claims.

The State filed a third-party complaint against the United States and the estates

of the flight crew, alleging negligence pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (“FTCA”). The United States removed the case to

federal court, and the court dismissed the claim against the United States pursuant to

Feres v. United States.1

 With only a state law claim against the State remaining, the

court remanded the case.2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the remand order,

holding that the Attorney General’s certification under the Westfall Act precludes a

remand to state court, and the lawsuit returned to this court’s docket.3 The State moved

to dismiss Dayton’s claims, and the court granted the motion.4 It found that Dayton’s

claim is based on the allegation that the pilot engaged in intentional misconduct when

he deviated from military standards and procedures during the practice flight at issue

1

340 U.S. 135 (1950) (holding that the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for

allegedly tortious conduct that is incident to military service and thus bars suits brought

by service members against the United States and any third-party actions against the

United States arising from injuries to service members incident to their military service). 

2Order at doc. 39. The State moved for reconsideration, but that request was denied in

an Order at doc. 43.

3Doc. 50 at p. 4.

4Doc. 81. 

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and therefore the resolution of the case will necessarily involve uniquely military issues

and military expertise. The court concluded that, because the case will involve uniquely

military standards and military expertise, intra-military immunity would apply under state

law based on dicta in Himsel v. State.

5

 The court had issued the order on a preliminary

basis at docket 79, three days before oral argument, but after hearing from the parties,

the court concluded its analysis was correct and promptly issued the order in final form

at docket 81, and judgment was entered against Dayton.6

Dayton then filed a motion to vacate the judgment. She argued that the court’s

dismissal relied on grounds not raised by the State in its motion and that she was not

given sufficient opportunity to address the issue of state intra-miliary immunity as it was

discussed by the court. She argued that her state tort claim could proceed on purely

civilian standards, without involvement of uniquely military matters, and offered to

provide supplemental evidence to show that despite the language in her complaint, the

pilot’s conduct was also in violation of general aviation standards. The court granted

Dayton’s motion. It then permitted Dayton to move for reconsideration of the order at

docket 81 and allowed for an additional round of briefing. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the law of the case doctrine, a court is generally precluded from

reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court or a higher

5

36 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2001). 

6Doc. 82.

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court in the same case.7

 However, as long as a district court retains jurisdiction over a

case, it has inherent power to reconsider and modify an interlocutory order for sufficient

cause.8 That inherent power is not unfettered: “the court may reconsider previously

decided questions in cases in which there has been an intervening change of controlling

authority, new evidence has surfaced, or the previous disposition was clearly erroneous

and would work a manifest injustice.”9

IV. DISCUSSION

 In the order at docket 81, the court relied on Dayton’s complaint—which alleges

that the pilot acted with intentional disregard of military procedures and regulations—in

finding that Dayton did not dispute the involvement of military expertise in the case. 

Dayton objects to the court’s assessment of her position. She asserts that despite her

complaint, she can alternatively prove her claim for intentional misconduct based on the

pilot’s failure to follow basic civilian flight protocols, and thus her claim against the State

does not necessarily implicate military issues or expertise. She argues that just like

reliance on federal regulation in pleading a negligence claim does not create a federal

question for purposes of jurisdiction, the reliance on military procedures in her complaint

does not necessarily make her tort claim one involving military issues; that is, she

7Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993).

8City of Los Angeles v. Santa Monica, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001).

9

Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir. 1995); see also School

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993);

LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (“The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent

a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been

brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.”).

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Case 3:12-cv-00245-JWS Document 121 Filed 12/03/15 Page 4 of 6
believes her complaint does not dictate the theory of her case and her claim can be

examined in terms of non-military, civilian aviation regulations. 

In support of her position, she relies on an affidavit from Retired Lt. Col. Kevin

Edenborough.10 Edenborough states that the pilot’s conduct during the flight in question

“was not sanctioned by any military policy” and that his failure to correct the stall

warnings was a violation “of safety principles taught in both the FAA’s and military’s pilot

training programs.”11

 After due consideration of the record itself and without regard to the complaint,

the court concludes that its analysis at docket 81 remains correct; resolution of Dayton’s

claim involves military expertise. It is undisputed that the aircraft was exclusively

military and that the flight occurred in the military airspace above the military base. It is

undisputed that it was a training flight for the aerial demonstration crew and that the

pilot’s conduct was governed by military flight protocols and practices; there were

specific Air Force “demonstration profiles” governing the flight. Therefore, the crew

members aboard the flight, whether wearing federal or state “hats” if you will, were

operating under military protocols for the air show and the aircraft. 

Dayton stresses the pilot ignored stall warnings and basic safety procedures

followed by all civilian pilots. She argues that by deviating from the military protocols,

he was also deviating from basic flight principles, making this case indistinguishable

from an ordinary civil-aviation case. While Plaintiff provides support in the record for the

10Doc. 90-1.

11Doc. 90-1 at pp. 7, 11.

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Case 3:12-cv-00245-JWS Document 121 Filed 12/03/15 Page 5 of 6
fact that the pilot ignored stall warnings and deviated from civil aviation standards, the

court concludes that such facts do not change the analysis. The pilot was actually

operating under Air Force instructions and specified flight profiles and therefore the

case necessarily implicates military matters. Resolution of the case will require

examination of the military instructions and protocols that governed the flight and the

pilot’s deviation from those orders. It also implicates military pilot training, as well as the

pilot’s common practices during his aerial demonstrations of the C-17.12 The fact that

the crew member’s participation was voluntary and the air show itself was a public event

does not remove the military nature of the training flight in question. Dayton also

stresses that the flight did not have a defense objective, but, again, the court concludes

that the military regulations governing the flight necessarily implicate military training,

protocols, and practices. 

Dayton also objects to the court’s conclusion that the state would apply intramilitary immunity and to its analysis of Alaska Statute § 26.05.145. The court also

maintains its position in that regard. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Dayton’s motion for reconsideration at

docket 104 is DENIED.

DATED this 3rd day of December 2015.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12Doc. 109 at ¶¶ 5, 6. 

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