Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06074/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06074-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CATHERINE DIANNE CRABTREE, a minor, by ) 

and through her next friend, F. Dale ) 

Crabtree; DAVID LYNN CRABTREE, a minor, ) 

by and through his next friend, F. Dale ) 

Crabtree; AVONDALE, INC., an Oklahoma ) 

corporation, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

CLYDE D. MUCHMORE; BROOKES. MURPHY; 

HARVEY D. ELLIS, JR., 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

DAVID M. COOK, Judge of the District 

Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, 

Defendant. 

CATHERINE DIANNE CRABTREE, a minor, by ) 

and through her next friend, F. Dale ) 

Crabtree; DAVID LYNN CRABTREE, a minor, ) 

by and through his next friend, F. Dale) 

Crabtree; AVONDALE, INC., an Oklahoma ) 

corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CLYDE D. MUCHMORE; BROOKES. MURPHY; ) 

HARVEY D. ELLIS, JR., ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

and ) 

FI LED 

United State, Cwrc c,l Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 4 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER . Clerk · 

No. 89-6073 

No. 89-6074 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 1 
DAVID M. COOK, Judge of the District 

Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, 

Defendant/Appellee, 

CATHERINE DIANNE CRABTREE, a minor, by ) 

and through her next friend, F. Dale ) 

Crabtree; DAVID LYNN CRABTREE, a minor, ) 

by and through his next friend, F. Dale ) 

Crabtree; AVONDALE, INC., an Oklahoma ) 

corporation, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

CLYDE D. MUCHMORE; BROOKES. MURPHY; 

HARVEY D, ELLIS, JR., 

Defendants/Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-6170 

Appeal from the pnited States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D,C. No. CIV-88-988-W) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Charles E. 'Geister III and Patrick M. Ryan of Ryan, Corbyn & 

Geister, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Clyde D, Muchmore, Brooke S. 

Murphy and Harvey D. Ellis, Jr. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Robert A. 

Nance, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief, Federal Division, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for David M. Cook, 

William B. Rogers of William B. Rogers & Associates, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Catherine Dianne Crabtree, a minor, by and 

through her next friend, F, Dale Crabtree, David Lynn Crabtree, 

and Avondale, Inc. 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 2 
~ These companion appeals arise out of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit 

filed by Catherine Dianne Crabtree, David Lynn Crabtree and 

Avondale, Inc., against Oklahoma State District Judge David M. 

Cook and attorneys Clyde A. Muchmore, Brooke S. Murphy, and 

Harvey D. Ellis, Jr. (attorney defendants). The district court 

dismissed the actions against the attorney defendants under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim on which relief 

could be granted. Judge Cook also filed a motion to dismiss, 

which the court considered as a motion for summary judgment and 

granted on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. The court 

awarded attorney's fees und~r Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988 against plaintiffs and their counsel in favor of Judge Cook 

but refused to enter such sanctions in favor of the attorney 

defendants. In No. 89-6073, the Crabtrees appeal the dismissal in 

favor of the defendant attorneys, and in No. 89-6074 they 

challenge the dismissal and grant of attorney's fees in favor of 

the defendant judge. 1 The attorney defendants appeal the district 

court's denial of sanctions and attorney's fees in No. 89-6170. 2 

1 Although it makes no difference in outcome, Avondale, Inc. is 

not a party to the appeals in Nos. 89-6073 and 89-6074 because 

only the Crabtrees filed a notice of appeal. IR. doc 55, See 

Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (court 

has no jurisdiction to hear appeal of party not named in notice of 

appeal). 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed, R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 3 
No. 89-6073 

In No. 89-6073, we affirm the district court's dismissal of 

the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for substantially the 

reasons stated in the district court's order of January 30, 1989, 

which we attach hereto. We hold that the district court correctly 

construed the complaint as stating insufficient facts tending to 

show that the attorneys had an understanding or agreed plan with 

Judge Cook sufficient to state a cause of action for conspiracy. 

We also hold that the district court properly analyzed the 

requirements under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 

(1982), for alleging a cause of action under a "joint participation" theory. Because the complaint does not state a cause of 

action, we do not analyze the attorney defendants' alternate argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the 

action was an attempt to gain review of state court decisions. 

No, 89-6074 

In No. 89-6074, we affirm the district court's grant of 

judgment in favor of the defendant judge on grounds of absolute 

judicial immunity and its award of attorney's fees as sanctions 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 42 u.s.c. § 1988. The Crabtrees 

concede that the judge acted only in a judicial capacity. Their 

complaint is based upon a theory that somehow he acted absent 

jurisdiction because, they allege, he had no personal jurisdiction 

over the Crabtree children. At the same time they acknowledge 

that the judge did have before him the Crabtree children's trust 

and he found that the trust owned the property that forms the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 4 
basis of the children's claim of an unconstitutional deprivation. 3 

They also acknowledge that the Crabtree children filed a motion in 

state court to vacate the court's judgment, that they appealed the 

denial of their motion to vacate and brought several original 

actions before the Oklahoma Supreme Court with respect to the 

property, that their attorney made the statement in court that the 

Crabtree "family" claimed the property as exempt, and that 

Avondale was served with a notice of the motion for a temporary 

restraining order. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 3-4. If we 

accepted the Crabtrees' theory, no judge could claim judicial 

immunity for his actions if he incorrectly determined that his 

court had personal jurisdiction over parties to a suit, or over 

persons who held an interest in property in which the court was 

adjudicating ownership at the behest of another. We hold th~t no 

attorney, charged with the responsibility of reading the Supreme 

Court's decision in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and 

our opinion in Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431 (10th Cir. 

1986), could believe that absolute judicial immunity would not bar 

the action against Judge Cook. Therefore, the district court 

properly dismissed the action against the state court judge and 

did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions and assessing 

attorney's fees. 

3 A federal bankruptcy court, handling the bankruptcy estates of 

plaintiff children's parents and the children's trust, also found 

that the property forming the basis of plaintiffs' claims here was 

owned by the parents or the trusts, not the plaintiffs. See Order 

of Br. Ct. W. D. Okla. Adv. No. 88-281, May 4, 1989,, Addendum to 

Answer Brief of Appellees Muchmore, Murphy & Ellis, tab 7. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 5 
No. 89-6170 

In No. 89-6170, the defendant attorneys appeal from the 

district court's denial of their motions for attorney's fees under 

42 u.s.c. § 1988 and sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In its 

order denying these defendants attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1988 the court relied upon Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 

434 U.S. 412 (1978), and its rule that a prevailing defendant 

recovers fees only when the suit "was frivolous, unreasonable, or 

without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad 

faith." Id. at 421. The district court stated that it had 

reviewed the complaint's allegations "under the complex and 

evolving case law regarding the pleading of conspiracy and joint 

participation in 1983 actions," IR. (No. 89-6074) tab 68 at 2, 

and reasoned that it had evaluated the complaint under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b) (6), but "did not delve into, or address, the merits 

of such claims; it merely found that pleading requirements had not 

been satisfied. Based upon the same, the court finds in its 

discretion that an award of attorney's fees is not warranted under 

section 1988." IR. (No. 89-6074) tab 68 at 2. 

By referencing the "complex and evolving case law" on 

pleading conspiracy and joint participation, we assume that the 

district court was referring to the difficulties lower courts have 

had in determining the exact parameters of the Lugar requirements 

for joint participation. The court may have been giving 

plaintiffs and their counsel the benefit of the doubt, apparently 

both as to the form of pleading a cause of action and the 

possibility of stating a valid claim. We have some sympathy for 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 6 
the difficulties of pleading a§ 1983 conspiracy between private 

actors and state officials who have immunity, but it is not enough 

for the district court to base a denial of§ 1988 fees on its own 

failure to "delve into, or address, the merits" of the claims 

pleaded. It must look to the merits to the extent of determining 

whether the action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without 

foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. 4 In the instant 

context, we think that is the same inquiry that it should make 

with respect to imposing upon counsel Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 

sanctions. So we turn now to the district court's consideration 

of Rule 11. 

The court gave the following reasoning for denying Rule 11 

sanctions: 

"In determining whether monetary sanctions under 

Rule 11 are appropriate in this instance, the Court has 

focused on that language in the Rule that requires the 

pleadings to be well grounded in fact and not interposed 

for any improper purpose. In so doing, the Court finds 

that while it determined that the plaintiffs had failed 

to allege to this Court's satisfaction under extant case 

law sufficient facts to support claims of conspiracy 

and/or joint participation, such failure does not rise 

to the level of sanctionable conduct. The plaintiffs' 

claims were arguable; as stated, the Court merely 

determined under the stringent requirements for pleading 

4 We understand that in a typical case the district judge will 

have to make a determination of frivolity on the basis of the 

pleadings alone, with little other guidance. Thus, in many cases, 

when the defendant's motion to dismiss follows immediately upon 

the filing of the complaint, the district court may be unable to 

tell whether a claim is simply not sufficiently pleaded, therefore 

meriting dismissal, or additionally, not warranted in fact or law, 

which might require sanctions as well. We do not mean to require 

the district courts in such situations to hold evidentiary 

hearings to probe the background of the suit. But if background 

information is already available, as it was in this case, the 

court must consider that in making its determination on a§ 1988 

fee award, as we discuss hereinafter in connection with Rule 11 

sanctions. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 7 
conspiracy and joint participation for purposes of 

section 1983 that the plaintiffs had failed under Rule 

12(b) (6). 

The inquiry into 'improper purpose' appears to 

require the Court to fathom the motives of counsel and 

parties despite the appellate court's statements 

regarding objective reasonableness. In reviewing the 

record to determine the existen·ce of this factor, the 

Court finds despite the defendants' strenuous and 

repeated contentions that the actions of Messrs. 

Crabtree and Rogers and Avondale are 'vexatious and 

contumacious,' that monetary sanctions will not be 

imposed under Rule 11." 

I R, (No. 89-6074) tab 68 at 4-5. 

The key statements here were the court's conclusions that 

plaintiffs' claims were "arguable," that the court had "merely 

determined under the stringent requirement for pleading conspiracy 

and joint participation" that plaintiffs had failed, and that 

inquiry into '"improper purpose' appears to require the Court to 

fathom the motives of counsel and parties," despite the "objective 

reasonableness" standard stated in cases such as Adamson v. Bowen, 

855 F.2d 688, 673 (10th Cir. 1988). 

As an appellate court we must give deference to fact findings 

by a district court; the "abuse of discretion" standard for review 

of sanctions also requires considerable deference. Given the 

circumstances of this case, however, the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying sanctions to the defendant attorneys. 

In the instant case, the Crabtree children's failure to 

allege specific facts indicating a conspiracy between the judge 

and defendant attorneys may be interpreted either as a purely 

technical failure (which could be remedied through amendment of 

pleadings) or as a fundamental lack of evidentiary support for the 

claims made in the complaint. In determining which scenario is 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 8 
applicable, the district court cannot ignore the context in which 

the pleading arises. Thus, the court cannot ignore the fact that 

both an Oklahoma state· court and a federal bankruptcy court had 

found plaintiffs have no ownership interest in the property they 

claim, and that the alleged conveyances to plaintiffs were shams. 

In addition to attempting the sham transfers, for which they 

provided handwritten, unnotarized, antedated conveyances, the 

record shows that the children plaintiffs' parents had attempted 

to deny knowledge of, hide, or claim exemption for many articles 

of value owned by them. Thus, they claimed that a $250,000 Renoir 

painting had been given to an art dealer, with no written 

indication of a sale, loan or gift, that antiques and art held for 

investment purposes were entitled to exempt status, and that 

properties for which expend~tures and deductions were claimed on 

tax returns of the children's trust and the Crabtree parents were 

in fact properties of the Crabtree children, individually. 

We believe the court could not ignore that plaintiffs were 

represented by counsel in both proceedings and unsuccessfully 

sought relief from the Oklahoma Supreme Court; that so far as 

appears from voluminous documentation the defendant judge acted 

strictly in a judicial capacity and the defendant attorneys acted 

solely as counsel for creditors seeking to trace and secure assets 

from, to say the least, somewhat uncooperative parents of ·the 

plaintiff children to satisfy state court judgments against them. 

Also the district court itself, in the case at bar here, found the 

plaintiffs pleaded insufficient facts to state a§ 1983 cause of 

action against these defendants. Plaintiffs pleaded no facts 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 9 
showing a conspiracy; and on the basis of the record the existence 

of a conspiracy between the state judge and defendant attorneys 

seems preposterous. 

The only arguable basis for plaintiffs' claim of a violation 

of their constitut1onal rights would appear to be that they were 

not named as parties to the lawsuits seeking to reach assets they 

claim to own. How should they assert that due process violation? 

Apparently the district court believed it was at least not 

sanctionable to do so by a federal§ 1983 suit alleging a 

conspiracy between the judge and the lawyers who filed suit to 

attach assets which to outward appearances were owned by the 

parents and the children's trust, who were sued. Despite some 

uncertainty in what Lugar requires to plead a joint participation 

conspiracy, we believe no reasonable attorney could think that an 

acceptable way to assert plaintiffs' title claims, or to redress 

counsel's failure to give notice to the allegedly true owner of 

property sought to be attached, would be to institute a§ 1983 

conspiracy suit. The obvious options were to intervene in the 

state and/or bankruptcy court proceedings, as plaintiffs appear to 

have done, or to retain possession of the assets, if they have 

possession, until a court action was brought to attach the asset, 

and in such a suit litigate the due process claim based upon 

failure to give notice. 

We hold that the district court abused its discretion in not 

awarding attorney's fees to the attorney defendants under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. On remand, the court should 

determine the proper amount of such fees, and where the fault lies 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 10 
as between the attorney and plaintiffs. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 

v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1985). 

The district court's judgments in Nos. 89~6073 and 89-6074 

are AFFIRMED. The judgment in No. 89-6710 is REVERSED and the 

case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 11 
, 

• • 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THEFI I 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA • ED 

CATHERINE DIANNE CRABTREE, a 

minor, by and through her next 

friend, F. DALE CRABTREE, 

et.al., 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

tW! 5 ~- 89 

"°om D. DENNIS 

"' '"~:~ U !'l.~OISTRICT C'.:' '"'7 ~ ..• ,~,;,40.~r· ~ ·c: .. • ...... 

11 DtPll':""' . •···· . .. ---

vs. 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

) No. CIV-88-988-W 

DAVID M. COOK, et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

0 R D E R 

~-·o ... ,... .. _ r;- ! " ~· . ; . ·. ·l,. ·, a., 

( 'I·.'_·.\ C • L 1 ~ .... A.. ..... ' 

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss 

of defendants Clyde A. Muchmore, Brooke S. Murphy and Harvey D. 

Ellis, Jr., wherein dismissal is sought pursuant to Rules 

12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), F~R.Civ.P. The plaintiffs, Catherine 

Dianne Crabtree and David Lynn Crabtree, minors, by and through 

their next friend, F. Dale Crabtree, and Avondale, Inc. , have 

responded in opposition to the motion. Based upon these submissions and the defendants' reply, the Court makes its determination. 

In so doing, the Court finds first that recitation of the 

many events giving rise to this litigation and reference to the 

numerous pleadings and filings of the parties in the state court 

action are not necessary except to the extent such events and 

pleadings impact on this Court's ruling. Having found the 

defendants' argument under Rule 12(b)(6) dispositive of this 

litigation, the Court finds further that the defendants' argument 

under Rule 12(b)(l) will not be considered. 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 12 
This action was commenced under title 42, section 1983 of 

the United States Code against these three defendants and The 

Honorable David M. Cook, District Judge for Oklahoma County, 

Oklahoma, for alleged violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The actions of which the plaintiffs have complained 

occurred after entry of judgment in Campbell v. Crabtree, No. 

CJ-86-4434, over which Judge Cook presided and to which F. Dale 

Crabtree, the father of the minor plaintiffs and a stockholder of 

the corporate plaintiff involved herein, was a party defendant. 

Defendants Muchmore, Murphy and Ellis were counsel for the state 

court plaintiffs. 

The plaintiffs have alleged that these three defendants 

willfully and jointly participated and conspired with Judge Cook 

in the seizure of certain property, that they directed Judge Cook 

in his actions and were asked by Judge Cook what actions to take, 

which in all instances were subsequently taken and that they had 

ex parte communications with Judge Cook. The plaintiffs have 

further complained that all motions made by these defendants were 

granted and that all factual findings and legal conclusions 

proposed by said defendants were adopted by Judge Cook verbatim 

(save for corrections of typographical errors). The plaintiffs 

have alleged that these actions were accomplished by these 

defendants under color of state law by virtue of their joint 

activity with and as co-conspirators with Judge Cook. 

The defendants in challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations argued that the plaintiffs had failed to state 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 13 
a claim under section 1983 since they had failed to allege 

adequately a conspiracy among the defendants. The plaintiffs not 

only denied that their pleading was insufficient in this regard 

but also argued that the defendants had not challenged whether 

their claim of "joint activity" was pled properly and thus, 

dismissal was not warranted. This suggestion that the defendants 

had questioned only one of the two methods of stating a claim and 

thus, establishing liability under section 1983 advanced by the 

plaintiffs prompted a reply by defendants. 

Because the parties have focused on both theories and 

because case law demonstrates that the inability to state a claim 

under one approach does not preclude consideration of a · second 

I 

approach, the Court has examined both bases for liability advanced by the plaintiffs. The Court finds however that under 

either theory, the plaintiffs' pleading is fatally defective. 

Section 1983 provides that every person who acts under color 

of state law to deprive another of constitutional rights shall be 

liable in a suit for damages. While section 1983 by its "under 

color of state law" limitation (and the equivalent "state action" 

language in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution) regulates only governmental actions as opposed to purely 

private conduct, private parties such as the instant defendants 

can act under certain circumstances "under color of state law" 

and thus, as state actors be liable under section 1983. !.:A.:_, 

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Dennis v. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 14 
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 

144 (1970). 

When plaintiffs in a civil rights action attempt to assert 

the necessary element of "state action" by implicating a state 

judge in a conspiracy with private defendants, "mere conclusory 

allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to 

show agreement and concerted action." Sooner Products Co. v. 

McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983)(citing Clulow v. 

Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1303 (10th Cir. 1983)). "The standard 

is even stricter when the state official[} allegedly involved in 

the conspiracy [isJ immune from suit," 708 F.2d at 518 (citing 

Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir. 1980); Norton v. 

Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1980)), as this Court has 

determined Judge Cook to be. Order of January 10, 1989. 

The plaintiffs' allegations of conspiratorial conduct· fall 

into four categories: ex parte communications, adverse rulings, 

adoption of proposed orders, findings and conclusions and direction of activities. In taking as true those facts pled to 

support these allegations and in drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom as required under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds 

that there are no facts in the instant complaint which tend to 

show that these alleged conspirators had an understanding or 

agreed plan with Judge Cook to cause harm or injur_y to the 

plaintiffs. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 15 
The Court is mindful that direct evidence of a conspiracy is 

rarely available and that the · existence of a . conspiracy must 

usually be inferred from the circumstances. The Court is equally 

"mindful that caution is advised in any pre-trial disposition of 

conspiracy allegations in civil rights actions." Clulow, 700 

F.2d at 1303 (citing Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156, 162 (10th 

Cir. 1980)). 

However, the rule is clear that allegations of conspiracy 

must provide-some factual basis to support the existence of the 

elements of a conspira..:y: agreement and concerted action. A 

conspiracy cannot be found from allegations of judicial error, ex 

parte communications (the manner of occurrence and the substance 

of which were not alleged) or I adverse rulings absent specific 

facts demonstrating an agreement to commit the alleged improper 

actions. The Court likewise finds in this instance that the 

allegations pertaining to "direction of activities" are insufficient since the facts supporting such claim,.!!!, Complaint 11 11, 

14, demonstrate that Mr. Crabtree, and not his children, was the 

target of such alleged directed activities. 

The second theory advanced by the plaintiffs for establishing the requisite "state action" is predicated on the United 

States Supreme Court's decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 

457 U.S. 922 (1982), a nonconspiracy case, wherein the Supreme 

Court affirmed the principle "that the conduct allegedly causing 

the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributed to 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 16 
the State." g. at 937. A two-part test for determining this 

question of "fair attribution" was devised. 

"First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise 

of some right or privilege created by the State ...• 

Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be 

a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor .. . because he is a state official, because he has acted 

together with or has obtained significant aid from 

state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise 

chargeable to the State." 

g. (emphasis added);~ Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th 

Cir. 1983) (as modified)(joint participation theory used as basis 

for stating cause of action against wrecker service). 

A conspiracy necessarily involves a plan to accomplish a 

common goal, preconceived and agreed upon by the alleged conspirators; concerted action as used in this context requires only 

willful participation in a joint activity. The requirements 

however for pleading "state action" under this "joint participation" theory are no less stringent than the requirements for 

pleading a conspiracy. 

No explanation in the complaint accompanies the allegation 

of ex parte communications and the allegations of direction of 

activities (assuming such applies to these plaintiffs), adoption 

of orders and adverse rulings, while accompanied by reference to 

date and explanation of action, demonstrate only conduct associated with resorting to the judicial process. The requisite joint 

participation envisioned by the Supreme Court goes beyond the 

mere use of the state court system by ·private litigants in the 

course of an ordinary lawsuit. There are no facts demonstrating 

that the defendant-attorneys acted outside the confines of the 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 17 
normal judicial process. Accordingly, such allegations fail to 

demonstrate willful participation in a joint activity, namely to 

cause harm or injury to the plaintiffs, which would justify 

characterization of these three defendants as "state actors" for 

purposes of section 1983. 

The Court finds based upon the foregoing that the Motion to 

Dismiss of defendants Muchmore, Murphy and Ellis should be and is 

hereby GRANTED since the Court has determined under Rule 12(b)(6) 

not only that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of 

action upon which relief could be granted under section 1983 but 

also, in the absence of any alleged agreement and because it 

appears that there are no events giving rise to this litigation 

which occurred without the normal judicial process, that amendment could not cur·e the plaintiffs' deficient pleading. The 

Court finds further, having determined that the plaintiffs have 

fai~ed to assert a federal claim (either in Count I or Count V), 

that it will not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law 

claims advanced in Counts III and IV. 

ENTERED this ?tJ ~ay of January, 1989 . 

. NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

,ntJ ~ IE'I') /,<J :TV/,) '""'lf'J(/7 JJO C ME'f" 

CIA.I , ... rtJ ·8'! . 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6074 Document: 01019855170 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 18