Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16535/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEIF THURSTON CARLSON, SR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-16535

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-02976-

CRB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 20, 2014—San Francisco California

Filed June 26, 2015

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges and Elaine E. Bucklo,* Senior District

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

* The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Leif

Carlson, Sr.’s habeas corpus petition challenging his

conviction for willful infliction of harm or injury to a child,

in a case in which the trial court, invoking the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine, determined that Carlson had

surrendered his Sixth Amendment right to confront his wife

and son who did not appear in court but whose statements

were admitted through the testimony of a police officer.

The panel held that Supreme Court authority clearly

establishes that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine

applies where there has been affirmative action on the part

of the defendant that produces the desired result, nonappearance by a prospective witness against him in a criminal

case; and that simple tolerance of, or failure to foil, a third

party’s previously express decision either to skip town

himself rather than testifying or to prevent another witness

from appearing is not a sufficient reason to foreclose a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights at trial.

The panel held that because the trial court could have

reasonably inferred on the record before it that Carlson

directly participated in securing his wife’s and son’s absence,

and because Supreme Court authority permits application

of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception in such

circumstances, admission of their statements was not an

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 3

objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent.

COUNSEL

Mark McBride (argued), Kavinoky Law Firm, Encino,

California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jill M. Thayer (argued), DeputyAttorneyGeneral; Kamala D.

Harris, Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Peggy S. Ruffra, Supervising Deputy

AttorneyGeneral, San Francisco, California, for RespondentAppellee.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

One early Sunday afternoon, Joshua Barragan (“Joshua”)

called the Moraga Police Department to report that his stepfather, Leif Carlson, Sr. (“Carlson”), had hit seven-year-old

Leif Carlson, Jr. (“Leif Jr.”) in the face. When Officer

Ronald Ward arrived on the scene, he observed redness and

bruising on Leif Jr.’s left cheek. The state charged

Carlson—Leif Jr.’s father—with willful infliction of harm or

injury to a child, Cal. Penal Code § 273a(b).

The case went to trial. Carlson’s wife, Lena Carlson

(“Lena”), and Leif Jr. were subpoenaed to testify but never

appeared in court. Invoking the Supreme Court’s forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine, the trial court determined that

Carlson was complicit in their absence, and that he had

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4 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

surrendered his Sixth Amendment right to confront them. 

Accordingly, the trial judge allowed Officer Ward to testify

to statements made by Leif Jr. and Lena in the hours after the

incident.

Carlson was convicted and sentenced to ten days’ jail

time and four years’ probation. The Appellate Division

affirmed the judgment, the Court of Appeal denied a petition

for writ of mandate, and the California Supreme Court denied

habeas relief. Carlson then timely filed a federal habeas

petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the

petition, concluding that the trial court’s determination that

Carlson forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights was not an

unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine as articulated in Giles v. California,

554 U.S. 353 (2008).

We affirm. Simple acquiescence in another’s wrongful

conduct designed to keep a witness from testifying does not

amount to forfeiture by wrongdoing. But the state court’s

ruling on the forfeiture question, while murky, is consistent

with a finding that Carlson engaged in more culpable

conduct. The evidence supporting such a finding was not

trifling. Under the highly deferential standard of review

required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we can grant habeas relief only if

we find that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, orthat

the factual findings on which the decision relied were

unreasonable in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Because we cannot say that the state court’s decision was

unreasonable under that standard, we must affirm the denial

of the habeas petition. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.

465, 473 (2007).

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 5

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Incident

The incident underlying Carlson’s conviction occurred

while Carlson was supervising Leif Jr.’s guitar practice. The

two were tired, having arrived home earlier that morning

from Cub Scouts camp. According to Carlson’s testimony,

when he attempted to correct Leif Jr.’s hand positioning, Leif

Jr. started yelling, “literally screaming in [Carlson’s] ear.” 

Carlson struck Leif Jr. on the left cheek with the back of his

hand or with his fist. Leif Jr. began to cry.

Joshua—one of three Carlson stepchildren living with

Carlson and his wife—called the police. Officer Ward of the

Moraga Police Department arrived on the scene, briefly

questioned the family, and then placed Carlson under arrest. 

After securing Carlson in his car, Ward returned to the house

to take further statements from Leif Jr. and his mother, Lena. 

It is the admissibility of these statements, detailed below, that

underlies this appeal.

Carlson was charged with willful infliction of harm or

injury to a child, Cal. Penal Code § 273a(b), an offense that

requires, the jury was instructed, proof that “the defendant

wilfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental

suffering on a child,” and that he “did not act while

reasonably disciplining a child.”

B. Pre-Trial Proceedings

The trial was set for Thursday, July 9, 2009, in the Contra

Costa County Superior Court. Carlson did not appear. An

order to show cause for non-compliance issued, and trial was

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6 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

reset for Tuesday, July 14th.1 Subpoenas were issued for

Lena and Leif Jr. to appear as witnesses. One subpoena was

addressed to Lena, instructing her to bring her son to court,

and the other to Leif Jr. and “parent.”

On Tuesday, July 14, Carlson appeared, accompanied by

Lena but not Leif Jr. Judge Grossman, presiding, asked Lena

why she had not brought her son to court, inquiring whether

she had received the subpoenas.2 Lena stated that she had

observed an officer hand her husband some documents on

July 10th; the officer had been waiting for the Carlsons when

they pulled into the driveway upon return from their vacation. 

Carlson “told [her] not to worry about it.” She did not

specify whether she saw the subpoenas, or whether she knew

Leif Jr.’s presence in court was demanded, but she confirmed

that she was present “pursuant to the subpoena.” The judge

told her that unless she produced her son the next morning,

she would be in contempt of court.

1 Carlson’s attorney appeared, but Carlson, Lena, and Leif Jr. were on

vacation in Alaska. Carlson had earlier unsuccessfullymoved to postpone

the trial to accommodate the vacation. Carlson had been directed to bring

his son with him to court that day, although his counsel had argued

previously, and argued again at the July 9th appearance, that it was

inappropriate to require a defendant to bring an adverse witness to testify

against him.

2 The case was initially assigned to a different judge, Judge Hinton. 

Carlson’s counsel later summarized these proceedings before Judge

Hinton to Judge Grossman. He reported that Judge Hinton “said she did

not feel it was worth the trauma of bringing the child to court for this case,

and, therefore, she felt it was in the interest of justice that the case should

be dismissed.” According to Carlson’s counsel, the district attorney

“objected,” and the case was transferred to Judge Grossman for

proceedings that same day.

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 7

Lena did not appear on Wednesday morning. Neither did

her son. The court thereupon issued a warrant for her

detention. Recognizing the issue that would arise if Lena and

Leif Jr. did not appear (and, indeed, they never appeared over

the remaining three days of trial), the judge noted the

possibility that Carlson had forfeited his Sixth Amendment

right to confront them. Judge Grossman indicated that if he

found Carlson was “somewhat complicit” in or

“encourage[ed]” his wife and son’s absence, he would allow

their statements to Officer Ward to be introduced for the truth

of the matter asserted.

To aid in determining Carlson’s complicity, the court

called Officer Daniel Lynch to the stand. Officer Lynch had

been to the Carlson home earlier that day, to transport

Carlson’s stepson Joshua to court. Lynch testified that Joshua

told him Carlson, Lena, and Leif Jr. had not come home

Tuesday night—that is, after Lena had been instructed to

produce Leif Jr. the next day, under penalty of contempt. 

Over Carlson’s hearsay objection, Lynch also testified that

Joshua reported that his brother Christian, another of

Carlson’s stepsons, told him that their mother had said “she

was leaving the area . . . and not to call her.” After Lynch’s

testimony, the judge told the parties that he was “not prepared

to make a finding. . . at this time that Mr. Carlson is somehow

complicit in all this.”

C. Evidentiary Hearing

By the next morning, however, the judge had switched

gears. He announced his intention to revisit the forfeiture-bywrongdoing question by conducting an evidentiary hearing.

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8 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

At the outset of the hearing, the state called Christian to

the stand. Christian testified that on Tuesday, the first day of

trial, Lena had been “really freaked out” about coming to

court and had done so only in response to his coaxing. When

asked what his mother was scared of, Christian responded

that “[s]he did not want [Leif Jr.] to testify,” and that he was

under the impression that “she thought it would be extremely

traumatizing for him.”

Christian went on to report that Lena never came home

Tuesday night. Carlson did, but only briefly. While at home,

he told Christian that his mother was “really stressed out”and

“was going to be somewhere else for a while,” and that the

kids were not to call her. By the time of his Thursday

testimony, Christian had not seen Lena or Leif Jr. since the

trial began. Carlson had stopped at home again on

Wednesday evening, but, once more, did not stay the night.

On cross-examination, Christian reported that Lena was

currently receiving treatment for anxiety, and possibly for

bipolar disorder. He described Carlson’s relationship with

Leif Jr. as a very good one—the two were “pretty much as

close as can be for father and son,” he testified. Carlson and

Joshua, however, did not get along.

Before Christian’s testimony, Carlson’s counsel had

informed the court of an interchange between Lena and Judge

Hinton, the judge initially assigned to the case. Lena, counsel

recounted, had told Judge Hinton she “had no intention of

bringing the child to court,” despite orders to do so. Judge

Grossman expressed surprise and frustration that no one had

informed him of that statement before. At the end of the

evidentiary hearing, the judge remarked that, based on all he

had heard, he did not think the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 9

exception applied, as “it would be difficult” to find that

Carlson “took actions with specific intent to make Lena

Carlson and Leif Carlson unavailable.” The case then

proceeded to trial.

D. Trial

The state’s principal witnesses were Joshua and Officer

Ward. Joshua, who acknowledged that he did not get along

with his stepfather, testified that on October 12th, 2008, he

was in the midst of doing laundry when he heard a

“smacking” noise and then heard Leif Jr. crying, “Why did

you punch me?” The judge instructed the jury that Leif Jr.’s

statement could be considered only for Joshua’s state of

mind. Joshua entered the room where Carlson was helping

Leif Jr. with his guitar practice and saw that Leif Jr.’s face

was red on the left side. When Joshua tried to comfort his

half-brother, Carlson intervened, telling him it was “none of

[his] business” that he had “the power to kick [him] out.” 

Several hours later Joshua called the police.

Officer Ward testified that on the day of the incident, he

met Joshua at a parking lot near the Carlson home, as

arranged by the police dispatcher. Ward went on to

state—over Carlson’s objection to the statements as double

hearsay—that Joshua had reported encountering his younger

brother crying and saying “daddy punched me, daddy

punched me.”

Officer Ward’s testimony continued as follows: Ward

went to the Carlson home, where he observed Leif Jr. with a

red and lightly bruised cheek. Ward thought Leif Jr.’s

condition consistent with “some type of closed fist contact.” 

He also described Leif Jr.’s timid appearance and his apparent

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10 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

relief when his father was taken from the home. Lena was

nervous but cooperative.

When Ward informed Carlson that he was under arrest,

Carlson asked,“For what? . . . What are you doing? It was an

accident. My hand slipped. I did not mean to hit him with

the back of my hand.” Later, after he was given Miranda

warnings, Carlson said “I just wanted to slap him to get his

attention and somehow my hand got turned around, and I hit

him with the back of my hand.” Carlson continued: “I knew

I should not have hit him. I knew it was wrong, but I was

tired and frustrated, and I lost control.”

At the close of the prosecution’s case, the court returned

to the forfeiture question. Still of the view that there was

insufficient proof that Carlson had forfeited his Sixth

Amendment right to confront Lena and Leif Jr. by his

involvement in their failure to appear, the judge considered

declaring a mistrial or ordering the trial continued until the

witnesses’ presence could be secured.

By the following morning, Judge Grossman had changed

his mind on the confrontation issue. He told counsel he had

reviewed Giles overnight and was “prepared, based on [his]

reading of Giles to make the finding that the defendant has

engaged in conduct designed to keep the witnesses from

testifying.”

Christian and Officer Ward were then each recalled to

testify. Christian’s testimony repeated what had been elicited

at the evidentiary hearing: Lena and Leif Jr. had not been

home since Tuesday, and Carlson had not slept at home;

Christian believed Lena to have anxiety and bipolar disorder

and had had to persuade her to go to court on Tuesday; Lena

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 11

“did not want Leif to testify because she thought he would be

traumatized by the experience”; and Carlson had told him not

to contact his mother because “she was on the verge of

having a breakdown.” He also testified that it was not

unprecedented for Lena to leave home when overly stressed,

explaining that “sometimes she will leave for a few days to

just get away from it all.”

Officer Ward testified to the statements made to him by

Lena and Leif Jr. When he arrived on scene, Leif Jr. told him

“daddy punched me,” and indicated that he had done it with

a closed fist. Lena told him Leif Jr. was crying when she got

home and told her he was in pain.3

Carlson then took the stand in his own defense. His

version of events was as follows: The afternoon in question,

he was explaining to Leif Jr. how to position his fingers for

a chord Leif Jr. was playing incorrectly. Leif Jr. got upset. 

Carlson said he patiently and calmly pointed Leif Jr. to the

printed demonstrations in his music book. Leif Jr.’s agitation

escalated, and soon he began to shout in his father’s ear, “you

are wrong, you are wrong[!]” Carlson said he then tried to

“swat” Leif Jr. on the left shoulder with the back of his hand,

but missed and hit “what [he] thought was the underside of

his chin.” He avowed that he “absolutely did not punch” his

son, and that he could not have done so, as severed tendons

in his right hand prevented him from making a closed fist.

3 Ward also reported that, according to Lena, Leif Jr. said Carlson did

not want Lena to know what happened. That comment was admitted only

for Officer Ward’s state of mind, and was therefore not subject to

Confrontation Clause protection. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221,

2235 (2012).

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12 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

The jury returned a guilty verdict after two hours of

deliberation. The Superior Court, Appellate Division

affirmed, and the Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ

of mandate. The California Supreme Court denied Carlson’s

habeas petition. All state rulings on review were summary.

The district court denied Carlson’s federal habeas petition

and entered judgment for the state. A certificate of

appealability issued on the question whether admission of

Lena and Leif Jr.’s statements violated Carlson’s

Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

As Carlson’s petition was filed after passage of AEDPA,

the constraints of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 apply. We review the

district court’s application of AEDPA de novo, Lambert v.

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 964 (9th Cir. 2004), and may grant

relief only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal law as

determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or was based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here, because all

the California appellate court decisions in Carlson’s case

were summary denials, we “look through” to the trial court’s

reasoning. See Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1157–58

(9th Cir. 2013). We review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error. Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110,

1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 13

B. The Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment

ordinarily bars “admission of testimonial statements of a

witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable

to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for

cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

53–54 (2004). Statements made in response to the

questioning of a law enforcement officer are testimonial if the

circumstances establish that “the primary purpose of the

interrogation [was] to establish or prove past events

potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v.

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Michigan v.

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154 (2011).

Not surprisingly, the state has not disputed that Lena’s

and Leif Jr.’s contested statements were testimonial. Without

a doubt they were. Officer Ward questioned Lena and Leif

Jr. several hours after Leif Jr. was hit. Carlson had already

been taken into custody and secured in the back of Ward’s

vehicle. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Ward’s questions

reflected a concern for what had “happened” rather than what

was “happening.” Id. at 830 (internal quotation marks

omitted). So, unless the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception

applies, admission of those statements against Carlson was

prohibited by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54, 68–69.

The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is an exception to

the Confrontation Clause’s protections. That doctrine permits

the introduction of a testimonial statement by an unavailable

witness if the preponderance of the evidence shows that the

“witness is absent by [the defendant’s] own wrongful

procurement.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158

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14 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

(1878); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th

Cir. 2014) (holding that forfeiture by wrongdoing must be

proven by a preponderance of the evidence).

The leading post-Crawford case on forfeiture by

wrongdoing, Giles, explains that the rationale behind the rule

is avoidance of “an intolerable incentive for defendants to

bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” 

554 U.S. at 365. Relying on that rationale, Giles rejected a

theory of forfeiture bywrongdoing that would have permitted

unconfronted testimonial statements to be admitted against a

defendant any time the defendant had by his own culpable

acts rendered the witness unavailable. Id. at 364–65, 368. 

Explaining that the “bad acts” theory could not be reconciled

with “the common law’s uniform exclusion of unconfronted

inculpatory testimony by murder victims,” id. at 368, Giles

held that forfeiture by wrongdoing applies only where the

defendant engaged in “conduct designed to prevent a witness

from testifying,” id. at 365.

As the parties here agree,4 Giles established the mens rea

aspect of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception: The

defendant must intend that a witness be made unavailable to

testify. Neither party’s briefing, however, articulates a

standard for the kind of action a defendant must take to

effectuate that intent.

4 Carlson’s argument that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applies

only to statements made by the defendant’s “victims” has no merit. 

Supreme Court authority does not so limit the forfeiture exception, and the

rule’s incentive-avoidance rationale applies as fully to non-victim

witnesses as to victims. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (explaining that the

forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applies “when defendants seek to

undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from

witnesses and victims” (emphasis added)).

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 15

Despite the parties’ reticence, Supreme Court authority is

as clear on the overt act point as on the mens rea question. 

The standard was articulated in the Court’s first opinion

applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Reynolds,

98 U.S. 145, and cited approvingly in Giles. See Giles,

554 U.S. at 366; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing

Reynolds).

Reynolds explained that, “as long ago as the year 1666,”

in Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L.1666),

adjudicators had admitted statements of an absent witness

who “was detained by the means or procurement of the

[defendant],” and that “now, in the leading text-books, it is

laid down that if a witness is kept away by the adverse party,

his testimony . . . may be given in evidence.” Id. at 158–59

(emphasis added) (citing evidence textbooks). Reynolds

concluded that, in that case, the state had proven enough to

shift the burden to the defendant to show that he was not

“instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away.”5

Id. at 160.

Well over a century later, Davis and Giles reaffirmed that

the Confrontation Clause does not protect statements by a

witness kept from testifying “by the means or procurement of

the [defendant].” Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (describing

5 An 1866 edition of the Dictionary of the English Language defines

“instrumental” as “(1) Conducive as means to some end; . . . (2) Acting to

some end; contributing to some purpose; helpful.” 1 Robert Gordon

Latham, A Dictionary of the English Language 1273 (1866) (emphasis

added). See also 1 B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in

American or English Jurisprudence 630 (1878) (defining “instrument” as

“a means of accomplishing something; a thing useful in the execution of

a purpose”).

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16 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

a defendant who “procur[es] or coerc[es] silence from

witnesses . . . who obtains the absence of a witness by

wrongdoing”). In examining what “means or procurement”

signifies, Giles cited dictionaries defining “to procure” as,

inter alia, “to contrive and effect”; “to get . . . as by request,

loan, effort, labor or purchase”; “to contrive or devise with

care . . . ; to endeavour to cause or bring about.” Giles,

554 U.S. at 360 (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted).

The pertinent Supreme Court authority, then, clearly

establishesthat the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applies

where there has been affirmative action on the part of the

defendant that produces the desired result, non-appearance by

a prospective witness against him in a criminal case. Simple

tolerance of, or failure to foil, a third party’s previously

expressed decision either to skip town himself rather than

testifying or to prevent another witness from appearing does

not “cause” or “effect” or “bring about” or “procure” a

witness’s absence. Such passive behavior is therefore not a

sufficient reason to foreclose a defendant’s Sixth Amendment

confrontation rights at trial.

C. The State Court’s Ruling

Judge Grossman correctly identified Giles as the

governing standard, and in general terms stated that standard

correctly—whether a witness is “kept away” by a defendant

who “engaged in conduct designed to keep the witness from

testifying.” It is not clear from the record precisely what

conduct toward that end the court found Carlson to have

committed. AEDPA, however, “demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). Because the

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 17

court could have reasonably inferred on the record before it

that Carlson directly participated in securing Lena’s and

Leif’s Jr.’s absence, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and because

Supreme Court authoritypermits application of the forfeitureby-wrongdoing exception in such circumstances, admission

of Lena and Leif Jr.’s statements was not an objectively

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Before proceeding to survey the evidence, we note that on

several occasions, Judge Grossman appeared to state a

weaker standard, characterizing what Carlson did as

“acquiesc[ing]” in the wrongful procurement of Lena and

Leif Jr.’s absence, and justifying his ruling by stating his

conviction that Carlson was “involved” in or “acquiesced” in

Lena and Leif Jr.’s absence, without specifying that Carlson

had any responsibility for or meaningfully participated in

securing the witnesses’ absence.6 As we have explained,

6 The only reference Giles made to “acquiescence” was in quoting the

Federal Rule of Evidence codifying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing

exception to the hearsay rule. That Rule states that forfeiture by

wrongdoing occurs when the defendant has “engaged or acquiesced in

wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability ofthe

declarant as a witness.” Giles, 554 U.S. at 367 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

804(b)(6) (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Johnson,

767 F.3d at 822. Giles was, at that juncture, summarizing Rule 804(b)(6),

not independently construing it. Neither Giles nor Davis, which described

Rule 804(b)(6) as “codif[ying] the forfeiture doctrine,” ever mentioned

“acquiescence” other than in quoting the Rule, and both referred to the

kind of act required only in active terms, as we have seen. Giles, 554 U.S.

at 367 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833).

Further, “it is beyond doubt that evidentiary rules cannot abrogate

constitutional rights.” Thus, to the extent that the Rule does “codify” the

forfeiture doctrine, it must be read “to permit the admission of those

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18 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

simple acquiescence in another’s decision not to appear or to

cause someone else not to appear is insufficient to trigger the

forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation

Clause.

Judge Grossman, however, also made other statements,

using language drawn almost verbatim from Giles, indicating

that he found that Carlson had engaged in active, culpable

conduct, as Giles requires. The judge found, for example,

that the witnesses were “kept away bymeans of the defendant

or . . . the defendant’s procurement defined in Giles to

contrive and effect.” At one point, he noted his conclusion

that “the defendant has procured this development on his

own.” It would not be unreasonable to conclude that Carlson

engaged both in passive acquiescence and in more active

involvement in the witnesses’ absence. So the dual

articulation of standards cannot demonstrate the application

of an erroneous constitutional template. Given that

consideration as well as the judge’s correct statements of the

applicable standard, AEDPA does not allow us to suppose

that the trial judge applied a standard contrary to clearly

hearsay statements that would be admissible under the constitutional

doctrine of waiver bymisconduct.” United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811,

816 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see also id. at 820 (concluding

that “the following interpretation of the ‘acquiescence’ prong of Rule

804(b)(6) is consistent with the Confrontation Clause: . . . [the defendant]

participated directly in planning or procuring the declarant’s

unavailability through wrongdoing”). Indeed, the 2011 stylistic

amendments to Rule 804(b)(6) make more clear that Rule applies where

the defendant is responsible for the result—where he “wrongfully

caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s

unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Fed. R.

Evid. 804(b)(6) (2011) (emphasis added).

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 19

established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24.

Turning to the record before us, we cannot say that, under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the trial court’s finding that Carlson

himself actively procured the witnesses’ failure to appear was

“objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented

in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The evidence is, to be

sure, essentially circumstantial. But the applicable trial court

burden of proof in this instance was preponderance of the

evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People

v. Zambrano, 41 Cal. 4th 1082, 1147 n.21 (2007),

disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal.

4th 390 (2009); see also Johnson, 767 F.3d at 822–23.

The evidence upon which the judge could have relied was

as follows:

(1) Lena was distraught and may have had

mental health issues. That evidence could

support an inference that she would require

emotional care and practical help.

(2) Carlson was away from his own home

on the nights during the trial when his wife

and son were not there. That evidence

suggests that he knew where they were and

was with them while they were absent.

(3) According to Christian, Carlson had

instructed him and the other children not to

call their mother. Also, Christian had been

the family member who encouraged Lena’s

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20 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.

attendance on the first day of trial. That

evidence could support both (i) an inference

that Carlson wanted to keep his wife and son’s

whereabouts secret so they would not be

found and compelled to appear, and (ii) an

inference that he wished to keep his wife

away from any influence that might persuade

her to reappear, with their son or without him.

In Reynolds, the Supreme Court concluded that the

forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applied to a similar set of

facts. 98 U.S. at 160. There, the defendant had told an

officer looking for a witness that the witness was not home,

when the facts suggested that she was, and informed the

officer that the witness would “not appear in this case.” Id.

(internal quotation mark omitted). The facts in Reynolds in

some respects more strongly supported the inference of

wrongful procurement—there, the defendant directlyrebuffed

law enforcement’s efforts to locate a witness, id., whereas

here, Carlson suggested his knowledge of his wife’s

whereabouts to his own family, not to the police. Also,

Christian testified that Lena had her own aversions to

testifying, and to allowing Leif Jr. to testify, while in

Reynolds we learned nothing about the witness’s own

motivation to avoid testifying, one way or the other. But the

reason a defendant procures a witness’s absence is not

pertinent to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, once the

court has rejected the witness’s protests and insisted that the

witness appear.7

7 We recognize that requiring a young child to testify against his own

father could well be traumatizing to the child. We note that the dilemma

presented by this case perhaps could have been minimized by cooperation

among the parties and the court. The fear of trauma to LeifJr. might have

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CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 21

Also, in some other respects, the facts supporting a

finding of wrongful procurement here are at least as strong as

those in Reynolds. Carlson himself was not at home on the

nights his wife and son were away, and he affirmatively

sought to keep other family members from communicating

with his wife or knowing where she was. Like the facts in

Reynolds, those circumstances demonstrate both concealment

of the witnesses’ whereabouts and insulation of the witnesses

from the reach of either compulsion or persuasion regarding

showing up at trial. They also indicate that Carlson had some

involvement in assuring their wellbeing while they were

evading process. Overall, then, the facts in this case are

approximately as strong in suggesting active involvement in

the witnesses’ nonappearance as those in Reynolds—or, at

least, a reasonable jurist could so conclude.

Under AEDPA’s “highly deferential” standard, Visciotti,

537 U.S. at 24 (internal quotation mark omitted), we cannot

say that it was objectively unreasonable for the court to make

an inference with regard to Carlson’s conduct here similar to

the one Reynolds sanctions. We therefore deny relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

been lessened, for example, had he been allowed to testify from a

comfortable location remotely, via one-way, closed-circuit TV. See

People v. Lujan, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1506 (2012), as modified on

denial of reh’g (Jan. 15, 2013); see also United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d

885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Child Victims’ and Child

Witnesses’ Rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3509, allowing victims of child

abuse to testify via closed circuit television, does not violate a defendant’s

Confrontation Clause rights).

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