Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02364/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02364-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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SRM

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WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dushan Stephan Nickolich, II,

Plaintiff

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Defendant(s)

CV-05-2364-PHX-SMM (JI)

ORDER

Under consideration is Defendants Greeley’s and Schriro’s Motion to Dismiss, filed

January 4, 2006 (#17). 

A. BACKGROUND

Complaint - Plaintiff commenced this action by filing his Complaint (#1) on August

8, 2005. Plaintiff’s Complaint named Defendants Greeley and Schriro, as well as Defendants

Dr. McCauley, Officer Goldsmith, and Dr. John Trezise. Each Defendant was named in their

individual and official capacities. (Complaint, #1 at 2A & 2B.) 

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of disputes over his mental health treatment while

incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered

cruel and unusual punishment in March 2004, when he was denied mental health services.

He further specifically alleges that Defendant Trezise refused Plaintiff treatment on May 5,

2004. (Complaint, #1 at 4.) In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that the failure to treat him is a

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at 5.) In Count III, Plaintiff

alleges that the failure to treat him is a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. (Id. at 6.) In

Count IV, Plaintiff alleges violations of due process when, on March 2, 2004, Defendant

McCauley refused treatment. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’

actions, his mental status has deteriorated, he has gone on hunger-strikes, and attempted

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suicide several times. (Id. at 5.) 

In each count, Plaintiff acknowledges administrative remedies were available, and

asserts that he pursued the procedures to the highest level. (Id. at 4, 5, 6, and 7.) He seeks

injunctive relief (including transfer to the Arizona State Hospital for treatment),

compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys fees and costs. (Id. at 8.)

Motion to Dismiss - Service on Defendants McCauley, Goldsmith, and Trezise has

been returned unexecuted (See Order 10/5/5, #12; #6, 7, and 8.) On January 4, 2006,

Defendants Greeley and Schriro filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (#17), asserting: (1)

Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”); (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims for

monetary damages against the Defendants in their official capacity; (3) the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act bar suits against persons in their individual capacities; (4) Plaintiff cannot

recover damages because he has not shown physical injury, as required by 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(e). Accordingly, Defendants request that they be dismissed.

Response - Plaintiff responded (#21), arguing that he has exhausted administrative

remedies by filing an appeal with Defendant Schriro in inmate grievance case number A16

099 004. Plaintiff appends as Exhibits copies of those grievances and appeals. Plaintiff does

not address Defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.

Reply - Defendants reply (#23) that Plaintiff’s original grievance pertained to his

treatment at the Meadows Unit, in February through March 2004, which is the subject of his

Complaint, but his appeal to Defendant Schriro concerned his treatment in June 2004 at

ASPC’s mental health unit, Aspen. 

B. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because he has failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies.

Exhaustion Requirement - Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA

is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statute provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,

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by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This

language has been interpreted to require “that an inmate must exhaust [available remedies]

irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.” Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, n.6 (2001). Additionally, the Court should not “read futility

or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements” where the statute provides for no

such exceptions. See id. The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes.” Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). A plaintiff must fully exhaust his administrative remedies

before filing a complaint. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002).

“If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the

proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Applicability to ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims - The exhaustion requirement

under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is not limited to prisoner civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Rather, “exhaustion is now required for all ‘action [s] AAA brought with respect to prison

conditions,’ whether under § 1983 or ‘any other Federal law.’ “ Porter v. Tussle, 534 U.S.

516, 524 (2002) (citations omitted); Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005)

(applying PLRA exhaustion requirement to ADA claims). Accordingly, each of Plaintiff’s

claims are subject to this exhaustion requirement, including his claims under the ADA and

the Rehabilitation Act.

Standard for Granting Unenumerated Rule 12(b) Motion - The failure to exhaust

administrative remedies under the PLRA is treated as a matter in abatement and is properly

raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 50 (2003). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense;

establishing exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is not a pleading

requirement or a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. Therefore, the Defendants bear the burden

of proving that Plaintiff had available administrative remedies that he did not utilize. Id.;

Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004). “In deciding a motion to dismiss for a

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failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide

disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. 

Exhaustion of Available Administrative Remedies - Plaintiff and Defendants agree

that Plaintiff had available to him the standard inmate grievance procedures under ADOC

Department Order 802. Under those procedures, Plaintiff was obliged to pursue any

grievance all the way through an appeal to Defendant Schriro, the Director of ADOC.

(Motion, #17, Exhibit 1, Pinkstaff Affix. at 2, ¶ 5.) 

The only dispute between the parties is whether Plaintiff’s exhausted grievances

included the claims he now raises. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case

concerns only the denial of treatment while housed in the Meadows Unit. While they

apparently concede that Plaintiff exhausted his remedies through initial levels, they argue that

his grievance appeal at the final level was limited to challenging the quality of his treatment

following his transfer to the Aspen Unit. (Reply, #23 at 2-3.) 

In response, Plaintiff presents his Inmate Grievance Appeal to Director Schriro filed

July 14, 2004 in Case No. A16 099 004. (Response, #21, Exhibits.) In that appeal, Plaintiff

does not repeat his entire journey in pursuit of mental health treatment. Rather, Plaintiff

appended to his appeal all of his prior submissions on the grievance and the responses, and

in the body of the grievance he posed objections to the responses made at the lower level by

Defendant Greeley, the Facility Health Administrator. (Response, #21, Exhibits, Grievance

Appeal at 2.) Defendant Greeley had responded to Plaintiff’s grievance that he could not

respond because Plaintiff’s file had been forwarded to the Aspen - Special Program Unit

(“SPU”) where Plaintiff had been sent for treatment. (Response, #21, Exhibits, Grievance

Response dated 6/21/04.) In appealing to Defendant Schriro, Plaintiff asserted that his

medical file must have been available for review as part of the decision to transfer him to

SPU, and further argued that SPU was not a licensed mental health unit and therefore that

was not an adequate response to his requests for treatment. (Response, #21, Exhibits,

Grievance Appeal at 2.)

/ / / 

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 It appears that the response to Plaintiff may have actually been issued by a another ADOC employee on

behalf of Defendant Schriro. See Response, #21, Exhibits, Grievance Response dated 9/23/04.

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 Defendants seek to treat this appeal to Director Schriro as a grievance of the quality

of care at Aspen SPU, thereby divorcing it from Plaintiff’s challenges to the lack of treatment

at Meadows. However, Defendants read Plaintiff’s grievance appeal too narrowly. Plaintiff

plainly was continuing to challenge his denial of treatment. But, rather than treating his

appeal to the director as a trial de novo, he attacked the perceived errors in rejecting his

claims at the lower level. Thus, his appeal did not ignore the fact that he had been transferred

to the SPU, but argued that he was still not being treated because the SPU was not licensed

to provide mental health care. (Response, #21, Exhibits, Grievance Appeal at 2.) The

grievance form itself invites such a response. It does not ask for an explanation of the

underlying facts, but only an explanation of the reasons why the inmate is “appealing the

decision.” (Id. at 1.)

When she responded to the grievance appeal, it was apparently clear to Defendant

Schriro that Plaintiff was challenging the earlier treatment decisions.1

 Her response did not

address the conditions at Aspen-SPU, but went back to the process leading up to Plaintiff’s

transfer, stating: “Mental Health Staff made an appropriate referral to the mental health

treatment unit. Your referral packet was processed according to standard procedure.”

(Response, #21, Exhibits, Grievance Response dated 9/23/04.) Thus, it is clear to the Court

that Plaintiff was continuing throughout the grievance process to challenge ADOC’s denial

of mental health treatment, beginning at Meadows and continuing through the events

occurring during his pursuit of his grievance. 

Plaintiff having exhausted his administrative remedies on his claims of being denied

mental health treatment, this portion of Defendants’ motion must be denied.

C. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Defendants also argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims for

monetary damages against the Defendants in their official capacity. Plaintiff does not

respond to this claim. 

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Standard for Remaining Defenses - Defendants’ remaining defenses amount to a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6). A court reviewing a motion to dismiss a

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must accept all material factual allegations of the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Leatherman

v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993).

A claim may be dismissed only when it has been established “beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Monetary Claims in Official Capacity - Although Defendants’ couch their argument

in constitutional terms, it may be resolved on statutory grounds. In their official capacities,

Defendants are not persons for purposes of a damages award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[A]

suit against a state official in his official capacity is no different from a suit against the State

itself. Therefore, state officials sued in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ within the

meaning of § 1983.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Laboratory, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th

Cir. 1997). As such, under § 1983 these state defendants are subject, in their official

capacities, only to claims for prospective injunctive relief. Id. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion will be granted on this issue, and Plaintiff’s claims

under § 1983 for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities will be

dismissed with prejudice.

D. SUITS UNDER THE ADA AND REHABILITATION ACT

Defendants argue that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act bar suits against persons

in their individual capacities. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. 

In Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit joined

the Fifth, Eight and Eleventh Circuits in holding “that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created

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 The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that Congress had the power in the ADA to “abrogate state sovereign

immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the States” U.S. v. Georgia, 543 U.S. - - - , 126 S.Ct. 877,

882 (2006). However, as noted in Vinson, a plaintiff’s individual capacity claim “does not implicate the State’s

sovereign immunity under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.” Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1155.

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by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 1156.2 Accordingly,

the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act against

Defendants in their individual capacities.

E. PRIOR PHYSICAL INJURY

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot recover damages because he has not

shown physical injury, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), but has alleged only emotional

and psychological injuries. (Motion, #17 at 5.) Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides, in pertinent part:

No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Thus, if any of Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages fails to

allege a physical injury, it is subject to dismissal.

Plaintiff’s Allegations - In analyzing the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court

is obligated to construe the document liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972) (per curiam) (pro se pleadings are liberally construed); see also United States v. Ten

Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in U.S. Currency, 860 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir.1988) ( “We

have consistently held in this circuit that courts should liberally construe the pleadings and

efforts of pro se litigants, particularly ‘where highly technical requirements are involved.’”)

(quoting Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir.1984)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (“All

pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice.”)

In Count II of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has “attempted suicide several

times” as a result of his lack of mental health treatment. Because the four counts of

Plaintiff’s Complaint all arise out of the same core facts, i.e. Plaintiff’s pursuit of mental

health treatment, the Court reads the counts in pari materia. See David v. Sinclair Refining

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Co., 25 F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“A complaint must be considered in its entirety

and not by separating and considering separately isolated words or paragraphs.”). That is,

the Court reads each of Plaintiff’s counts to include the allegation that suicide attempts have

resulted from the lack of mental health treatment. Moreover, the Court considers that

allegation to create the inference that there was some physical injury or trauma associated

with those attempts.

However, those physical injuries did not result from actions of Defendants, but rather

from Plaintiff’s own conduct. Arguably, that conduct may have resulted from the lack of

treatment. However, it is not sufficient that Plaintiff’s claimed mental and emotional injuries

may have resulted in associated physical ailments. See Alonzo v. Sqyres, 2002 WL 1880736

(N.D.Cal. Aug.9, 2002) (plaintiff taken to hospital for high blood pressure, brought on by

“gruesome psycholog[ical] harassment[ ],” has not suffered a prior physical injury);

Ashann-Ra v. Com. of Va., 112 F.Supp.2d 559 (W.D.Va. 2000) (no prior physical injury

shown where emotional distress and sexual dysfunction were allegedly caused by the

emotional distress of having to shower in front of opposite gender); but see Scarver v.

Litscher, 371 F.Supp.2d 986, 997 (W.D.Wis. 2005) (discussing potential for finding physical

injury from self-inflicted harm and suicide attempts resulting from failure to provide mental

health treatment).

In Todd v. Graves, 217 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Iowa 2002), the Court held that where

stress from a refusal to allow an inmate to visit his dying mother, which in turn caused

increased blood pressure, hypertension, dizziness, insomnia and loss of appetite, the prisoner

had not shown the requisite physical injury. In so holding, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s

purported physical injuries “are all symptoms typically associated with people suffering

stress or mental distress. Prison itself is a stressful environment. If the symptoms alleged by

Todd were enough to satisfy the physical injury requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), very

few plaintiffs would be barred by the physical injury rule from seeking compensation on

claims for emotional distress.” Id. at 960.

/ / / 

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While certainly attempted suicide is a more drastic consequence than hypertension,

the intervening effect of Plaintiff’s mental function between Defendants’ action and

Plaintiff’s physical injury, requires that the shield of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) apply.

Effect of Failure to Allege Physical Injury - Because Plaintiff seeks compensatory

damages for his mental and emotional injuries, without the prerequisite physical injury, those

claims must be dismissed. However, the PLRA’s physical injury requirement only precludes

suits for compensatory damages. It does not preclude suits for injunctive relief or nominal

or punitive damages. Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff

seeks not only compensatory damages, but injunctive relief and punitive damages.

Accordingly, his claims need not be dismissed in their entirety, but only insofar as they seek

compensatory damages.

Moreover, where a plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite physical injury,

“dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear that the complaint could not

be saved by any amendment.” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). Further,

even a clearly barred claim is not subject to dismissal with prejudice. “Because section

1997e(e) applies only to claims filed while an inmate is confined, it does not prevent a former

prisoner from filing after release a monetary damages claim for mental and emotional injury

suffered while confined, without a prior showing of physical injury. Accordingly, dismissal

under this statutory provision of a claim that is filed during confinement should be without

prejudice to re-filing the claim if and when the plaintiff is released.” Harris v. Garner, 216

F.3d 970, 979-980 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s compensatory damages claims

must be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Greeley and Schriro’s Motion to

Dismiss, filed January 4, 2006 (#17) is GRANTED in part, as provided hereinafter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act against Defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff twenty days from the filing of this

Order to file a motion for leave to amend his Complaint to properly allege claims for

compensatory damages with the requisite physical injury.

DATED this 21st day of July, 2006.

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