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Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADELLE SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15cv456-CSC

) (WO)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff applied for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., alleging that she was unable to work because

of a disability. Her application was denied at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then

requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the

hearing, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the

Social Security Act, and denied her claim for benefits. The Appeals Council rejected a

subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,

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131 (11th Cir. 1986). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry of

final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge. The case is now before the court for

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3). Based on the court’s review of the

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 1

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Case 1:15-cv-00456-CSC Document 14 Filed 12/01/16 Page 1 of 8
record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the

Commissioner should be affirmed.

Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than 12 months . . . 

To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 2

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments

set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer

to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court must

find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 2

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI). 3

The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately

cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

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Case 1:15-cv-00456-CSC Document 14 Filed 12/01/16 Page 2 of 8
U.S.C. § 405(g); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence

is “more than a scintilla,” but less than a preponderance: it “is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The court “may

not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of the

[Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration

in original) (quotation marks omitted).

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

The Issues

A. Introduction. The plaintiff Adelle Smith (“Smith”) was 49 years old on the date

of onset (R. 28) and 52 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. (R. 40). She has

a high school education. (R. 28). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff

has severe impairments of “asthma, hypertension, depression and alcohol abuse.” (R. 22). The

ALJ concluded that Smith did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments, including

Listing 3.02A Chronic pulmonary insufficiency. (R. 23). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff

had no past relevant work, but, using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P., App. 2, as a framework and relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, he also

concluded that there were significant number of jobs in the national economy that the plaintiff

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Case 1:15-cv-00456-CSC Document 14 Filed 12/01/16 Page 3 of 8
could perform, and thus, Smith was not disabled. (R. 28-32).

B. Plaintiff’s Claim. The plaintiff’s sole issue for the Court’s review is whether “the

evidence of record demonstrates that Ms. Smith’s impairments meet or equal the requirements

of Listing 3.02 for chronic pulmonary insufficiency as well as Listing 3.03A for asthma.” 

(Doc. # 11 at 4). According to Smith, the ALJ improperly invalidated and rejected test results

to deny her benefits. 

Discussion

Smith asserts that she is presumptively disabled under Listing 3.02A because she suffers

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from “[c]hronic obstructive pulmonary disease, due to any cause, with the FEV equal to or less

than the values specified in table I corresponding to the person’s height without shoes.” 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 3.02A. She also contends that she meets Listing 3.03A

Chronic asthmatic bronchitis which requires evaluation under the criteria established for

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 3.03A. 

Tab 1le I sets forth the requisite FEV values as follows:

Table I

Height without Height without FEV1 equal to

shoes shoes or less than

(centimeters) (inches) (L, BTPS)

154 or less 60 or less 1.05

155–160 61–63 1.15

161–165 64–65 1.25

166–170 66–67 1.35

171–175 68–69 1.45

176–180 70–71 1.55

181 or more 75 or more 1.65

(Id.)

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On the date of testing, Smith measured 65.5 inches tall. (Tr. 309). Table I provides that

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the FEV level for individuals 65 inches tall is 1.25 while the FEV level for individuals 66

inches tall is 1.35. See id. Section 3.00 also suggests an evaluation of a claimant’s complete

med 1ical history and requires that the “highest value of the FEV and FVC, whether from the

same or different tracings, should be used to assess the severity of the respiratory impairment.” 

See 20 C.F.R. Subpt P, App. 1, Listing 3.00E (emphasis added). In this case, the ALJ

concluded 1that the plaintiff’s FEV scores did not meet Listing 3.02A or 3.03A, and thus, Smith

did not meet or equal a Listing at step three of the sequential analysis. (R. 23). 

Although the claimant has “severe” physical impairments, they do not meet the

criteria of any listed impairments described in Appendix 1 of the Regulations (20

CFR, Subpart P, Appendix 1). No treating or examining physician has mentioned

findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment, nor does

the evidence show medical findings that are the same or equivalent to those of

anylisted impairment ofthe Listing ofImpairment. The claimant’s representative

alleges that the claimant meets listing 3.02(A) under Chronic Pulmonary

Insufficiency because she has a height of 65.5 inches and a FEV1 score of 1.25

or 1.35 (Exhibit 16E). However, notes from her May 21, 2013 consultative exam

show that her initial FEV1 scores were 1.48, 1.66, and 1.62 (Exhibit 12F/14, 16). 

Although 20 minutes later the claimant’s FEV1 scores were 1.25, 1.38, and 1.05,

notes indicate that the claimant deviated from optimal testing criteria by using her

bronchodilator (Exhibit 12F/17-18).

(R. 23). 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. It is undisputed that in May 21,

2013, Smith underwent two pulmonary function tests which yielded six spirometer tracings. 

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(R. 309-14). At the conclusion of the first pulmonary function test, Smith’s recorded FEV

1

scores were 1.62, 1.66 and 1.48. All three scores exceed the FEV level of 1.25 for a person

65 1inches tall and the FEV level of 1.35 for a person 66 inches tall. These results were

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Case 1:15-cv-00456-CSC Document 14 Filed 12/01/16 Page 5 of 8
“questionable” because Smith was sitting during the test, and the tester was “unsure if claimant

understood the instructions given.” (R. 311). The results of the second pulmonary function test

were FEV1scores of 1.23, 1.38 and 1.05. Smith argues that she presumptively meets Listings

3 1.02A and 3.03A because of the FEV score of 1.05. The Commissioner asserts that the

1

regulations require the ALJ to consider the highest FEV score of 1.38, and when the highest

FEV1 score of each test set is considered, it is clear that Smith does not meet the Listing.

Wh 1ile Smith is correct that the second set of tests yielded a FEV score of 1.05, the

1

regulations require that the ALJ consider the highest FEV score. See 20 C.F.R. Subpt P,

App. 1, Listing 3.00E. See also Deventure v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 492482, * 6

(N.D. Ohio, Jan. 22, 2016) (Case 5:15CV872) (“the highest FEV1 value of the three testing

maneuvers prevails as the determinant score.”). Therefore, under either set ofscores, Smith had

FEV1 1 scores in excess of the required FEV score necessary to meet the listing. 

Moreover, the plaintiff’s longitudinal medical records do not contain the requisite

description of treatment for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or asthma. See 20 C.F.R.

Subpt P, App. 1, Listing 3.00E. For example, Smith presented to the Shands Jacksonville

Medical Center on April 17, 2010, suffering an acute asthma exacerbation and acute bronchitis. 

(R. 198). She was prescribed Albuterol. On July 6, 2012, Smith next presented to the Southeast

Alabama Medical Center complaining of difficulty breathing. (R. 255-59; 281-87). While she

was diagnosed with COPD, she was prescribed Albuterol and released. Her breathing was

clear. (R. 287). This is the extent of her medical treatment. There are no records of treatment

after her 2012 diagnosis of COPD. 

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Case 1:15-cv-00456-CSC Document 14 Filed 12/01/16 Page 6 of 8
The introduction to listings related to the respiratory system recognize that because

symptoms of respiratory impairments “are common to many other diseases, a thorough medical

history, and chest x-ray or other appropriate imaging techniques are required to assess the

severity of the respiratory impairment. . . .” 20 C.F.R. Subpt P, App. 1, Listing 3.00E. The

mere presence of 1some FEV scores equal to or below the values listed in Table 1 is simply

insufficient under the regulations to meet Listing 3.02A or 3.03A. Based on its review of the

record, the court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that Smith did not satisfy the requisites of

Listings 3.02A or 3.03A was supported by substantial evidence. Smith’s reliance on

Merritt v. Barnhart, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (N. D. Ala. 2006) and Seals v. Barnhart, 308 F.

Supp. 2d 1241 (N. D. Ala. 2004) is misplaced. In Merritt, the court reversed the ALJ’s

cred 1ibility findings and determined that the objective FEV medical testing supported her

allegations of fatigue. Merritt, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1250. Any comments by the court on Listing

3.02A are simply dicta and inapplicable to the facts of this case. The facts of Seals are also

d 1istinguishable from the case at bar. In Seals, the plaintiff’s highest FEV score was sufficient

to meet the listing which was not the case for Smith. Seals, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. To meet

Listing 3.02 or 3.03, the critical FEV1 score is the highest score, not the lowest.

In this case, the ALJ concluded, after from a review of the evidence, that Smith suffered

from asthma, and did not meet the criteria of Listing 3.02A or 3.03A. Pursuant to the

substantial evidence standard, this court’s review is a limited one; the entire record must be

scrutinized to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ’s factual findings. Lowery, 979 F.2d

837. The ALJ’s findings meet the reasonableness standard. 

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Case 1:15-cv-00456-CSC Document 14 Filed 12/01/16 Page 7 of 8
Conclusion

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that the

decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is due to be affirmed.

Thus, this case will be dismissed with prejudice.

A separate order will issue. 

Done this 1st day of December, 2016.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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