Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00006/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00006-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 At respondent’s request, the court substitutes Tom Carey, Warden of California State

Prison, Solano, where petitioner is now incarcerated, as respondent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM WADE PARSONS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-0006 LKK KJM P

vs.

TOM CAREY (Warden),1 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

the petition was not filed within the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted in Butte County in 1994 and 1995 on assault, burglary

and escape charges and sentenced to a term of thirteen years to be followed by a term of twentyfive-years-to-life. Lodged Document (Doc.) 1. The convictions were affirmed on appeal in

August 1996 and the California Supreme Court denied review on November 13, 1996. Docs. 2

& 4. 

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

On October 23, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

Butte County Superior Court. Doc. 5. This petition, consolidated with a motion to strike one of

petitioner’s “strikes” under People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996), was

denied on June 14, 2000. Doc. 7. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeal. Appointed

counsel filed a “no issues” brief under the authority of People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979)

and the decision was affirmed on June 22, 2001. Doc. 10. The subsequent petition for review

was denied on September 26, 2001. Doc. 12. 

On January 8, 2002, petitioner filed a second habeas petition in Butte County

Superior Court; it was denied on July 8, 2003. Docs. 13 & 14. Petitioner, through appointed

counsel, filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2003. Doc. 15. On August 21, 2003, the Court of

Appeal issued the following order:

On the court’s own motion, the appeal filed July 24, 2003, is

dismissed because it is taken from a nonappealable order. (In re

Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 621, fn. 8.)

Doc. 16. 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on November 18, 2003. Doc. 17. The court denied the petition on September 15, 2004,

citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998). Doc. 18.

The instant petition was filed on January 3, 2005. 

II. The Statute Of Limitations And Tolling During State Proceedings

One of the changes the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

made to the habeas statutes was to add a statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

A conviction is final for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations at the

expiration of the ninety day period for seeking certiorari, which was February 12, 1997 in this

case. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitations period began to run

on February 13, 1997 and would have expired on February 14, 1998. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)

(excluding the day from which the period begins to run from the calculation of the time). 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any “properly filed”

state collateral attack on the judgment. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 218-21 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA

statute of limitations is tolled not only between the actual filing and decision on a writ, but also

during those periods between filings as a petitioner works his or her way “up the ladder” through

higher courts to complete “one full round” of state court review of claims. Id. at 217, 219-20. 

Petitioner filed his first habeas petition on October 23, 1997, which stopped the

statute of limitations “clock” on day 253 of the limitations period. The time was tolled through

October 26, 2001, the day when the California Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for review

of this underlying proceeding was final. See Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Some of the Gaston court’s conclusions appear to have been undermined by Evans v. 

Chavis, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). 

4

2001). Accordingly, the 112 days remaining in the limitations period began to run again on

October 27, 2001, and would have expired on February 16, 2002 without further tolling. 

However, on January 8, 2002, petitioner filed a second habeas petition in Butte

County Superior Court. Although respondent appears to concede that the limitations time was

tolled during the pendency of this petition, he argues that petitioner was not entitled to the time

between the finality of the first round of collateral review and the filing of the second petition in

Butte County Superior Court. MTD at 6; Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit has suggested a somewhat broader view of tolling

might be available even when a prisoner is not moving in a straight line from Superior Court to

the Supreme Court, where, as here, the intervals between state filings are not unduly long and the

claims in separate petitions are overlapping. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005)

(habeas action may be “pending” even during a series of intervals between “non-ascending”

petitions).

2

 Even assuming the application (and continuing validity) of Gaston, however, the

instant case is not timely. 

In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000), the Supreme Court noted that a petition is

filed "when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the

official record." Id. at 8. The court determined that such a petition is "properly filed" for

§ 2244(d)(2) purposes “when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings.” Id. In this case, the state Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s

attempt to appeal the denial on the ground that the order was not appealable, citing In re Crow, 6

Cal. 3d 613, 621 n.8 (1971) (“the prisoner cannot assert any right to appeal the denial of his

petition for writ of habeas corpus. . . . Since the petitioner cannot appeal, his remedy lies in the

petition for habeas corpus to a higher court”). The Court of Appeal thus refused to accept the

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

notice of appeal because it was not “in compliance” with the procedural rules for seeking review

of habeas petitions. 

Moreover, petitioner’s subsequent writ petition in the California Supreme Court

was denied with a pinpoint cite to the page in In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780, that discusses the

timeliness requirements for state habeas petitions. This determination that the writ was untimely

means it was not “properly filed” and could not toll the statute of limitations. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, U.S. , 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005). 

Accordingly, even if petitioner was entitled to tolling through the July 24, 2003,

filing of the notice of appeal from the denial of his second superior court petition, the 112 days

remaining in the statute of limitations began to run again on July 25, 2003 and expired on

November 14, 2003. The instant petition is not timely unless petitioner is entitled to equitable

tolling, a new statute of limitations, or some other relief from the underlying rulings. 

III. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit has held: 

We will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period

only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

may be appropriate. 

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

It is a habeas petitioner’s burden to establish his entitlement to equitable tolling. Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because his two appointed

appellate lawyers failed to inform him how to file a federal petition and the lawyer appointed on

the second Butte County writ filed a notice of appeal when he should have advised petitioner to

pursue a new writ petition in the Court of Appeal. Petitioner also faults habeas counsel for not

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

advising him how to perfect further challenges in the California Supreme Court and federal court. 

Opposition (Opp’n) at 11-13. 

State appellate counsel were appointed only to pursue petitioner’s remedies in the

state Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, not to advise petitioner about further challenges to his

conviction; he “had no right to that advice.” Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068. Moreover, there is no

right to appointed counsel in state post-conviction proceedings and accordingly, no right to the

effective assistance of such counsel. Id.; see also Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1431-32 

(9th Cir. 1989).

Even if counsel had an obligation to assist petitioner with filings outside the scope

of appointment, petitioner still is not entitled to equitable tolling. In Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d

1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001), the court held that counsel’s negligence in miscalculating the filing

date for a federal petition “in general do[es] not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient

to warrant equitable tolling.” See also Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)

(attorney’s miscalculation not basis for equitable tolling). Counsel’s failure to advise petitioner

or to pursue further relief after the denial of the second Butte County habeas is negligent, if error

at all. 

Finally, petitioner has not suggested how the purported lack of advice or improper

attempt to appeal the denial of the second state habeas petition made it impossible for petitioner

to pursue his remaining state or federal remedies in a timely fashion. Petitioner’s status as a

litigator in pro per is an insufficient basis for equitable tolling. Neither an inmate’s ignorance of

the law nor his pro se status are the sort of extraordinary events upon which a finding of

equitable tolling may be based. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)

(ignorance of the law); Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (pro per status). 

IV. Adequacy Of The Timeliness Ruling

Petitioner presents a long and elaborate analysis of the independent and adequate

nature of the timeliness bar as developed in the law of procedural default. Opp’n at 17-74. If a

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

habeas petitioner has failed to comply with state procedures and thus not obtained a ruling on the

merits of a claim, a federal court will not consider the claim in a habeas petition if the procedural

bar is adequate and independent. If a petitioner can show cause for the default and prejudice

from the error, the court may consider the claim in a habeas petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Timeliness, with a citation to Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780, can be a

procedural bar in habeas cases. See Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1153 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000).

The congruence between the two doctrines cannot be taken as far as petitioner

suggests, at least as the law now stands. Pace held that “[w]hen a postconviction petition is

untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Pace, 

 U.S. , 125 S.Ct. at 1812. It did not suggest that a district court should undertake the sort of

inquiry pursued in the context of a procedural default.

Moreover, in Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1447 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth

Circuit considered the application of Pace to a petition that had been denied for a number of

reasons, including successive presentation of some claims and timeliness. Generally, a

procedural bar is not “adequate” when it is unclear what claims are subject to the bar. Calderon

v. U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of California, 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996). In

Bonner, however, the Court of Appeals found the finding of untimeliness to “determine[] the

outcome” of the case. It did not find that the state court’s reliance on two different procedural

grounds to deny the writ had any impact on the untimeliness finding for the purpose of statute of

limitations analysis. Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1147. 

Accordingly, the court will not consider plaintiff’s attack on the adequacy of the

timeliness finding nor consider whether any alleged problems in applying untimeliness as a

procedural bar undercut applying untimeliness as a determinant of proper filing. 

V. Newly Discovered Factual Predicate

Under § 2242(d)(1)(D), a new limitations period begins to run on the date when

the factual predicate for the claim “could have been discovered through the exercise of due

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 3

 Petitioner has not suggested he is actually innocent of the escape charge. 

8

diligence.” Petitioner suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Andrade v. Attorney General

of the State of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), issued on November 2, 2001, provides

him with such a factual predicate. Opp’n at 16. Andrade has been reversed by the Supreme

Court. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). The Ninth Circuit has held, moreover, that

a “decision establishing an abstract proposition of law arguably helpful to the petitioner’s claim

does not constitute the ‘factual predicate’ for that claim.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083,

1089 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, __ S.Ct. __, 74 U.S.L.W. 3460, 74 U.S.L.W. 3471 (2006). 

Even if Andrade were still good law, it would not give rise to a new limitations period for

petitioner. 

VI. Application Of Pace’s New Rule Of Law

Petitioner argues that application of Pace to his case is barred by the principle of

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion), which held “new constitutional

rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which had become final before

the new rules are announced.” Opp’n at 74-77. Teague may be used by the state, but not by

petitioner, as a shield. Moore v. Anderson, 222 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 2000). 

VII. Actual Innocence

Relying on a number of exhibits to his habeas petition, petitioner argues that his

actual innocence of the assault and burglary charges permits this court to consider the merits of

his case even though his petition may be time-barred.3 Opp’n at 78-79. 

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a

habeas petitioner who makes “a colorable showing of actual innocence” that would implicate a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” may be entitled to have “otherwise barred constitutional

claim[s]” considered on the merits. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that a sufficient Schlup

showing might overcome the bar of the statute of limitations. Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

 Petitioner pleaded no contest while denying his guilt under North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25 (1970). Petition, Attached Mem. P. & A. (Attach.) at 12. 

9

76 (9th Cir. 2002). Ultimately, it is petitioner’s burden to demonstrate actual innocence. 

Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that this exception to the statute of limitations

is concerned with actual, as opposed to legal, innocence and must be based on reliable evidence

not presented at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559

(1998). A petitioner’s own “late-offered testimony is not ‘new’ because it was available at trial,”

nor is a mere “repackaging of the record as presented at trial.” Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d

333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Hubbard v. Moore, 543 U.S. 1070 (2005). 

Once petitioner has presented such evidence, a court must consider the new

evidence in light of the evidence as a whole, and must determine whether in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 166 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,

___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 489 (2005). The same standard is applied even when, as here, the

conviction is based on a plea. United States v. Torres, 163 F.3d 909, 912 n.15 (5th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner pleaded no contest to assault and burglary charges4 and was convicted

of escape following a jury trial. Petitioner summarizes the facts underlying the assault and

burglary charges as follows:

Count I. Eric Miller was assaulted on January 5, 1993, while

standing on a street corner in Chico. He reported that he was hit on

the head by a baseball bat. He gave the police a description and

license plate of the assailant’s car. The car belonged to petitioner’s

parents. Mr. Miller identified petitioner from a photo lineup seven

months after the attack.

Count II. During the early morning of June 10, 1993, two

witnesses saw the front window of a P.D.Q. Market in Chico

broken and several young men standing near the store. When they

approached the market four young men were in the store. The two

men ran accross [sic] the street into an orchard; two men walked

away from the market. One of the men, identified by the witness

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

as petitioner, pulled a gun and told witnesses to leave or he would

shoot them.

Count III. On July 22, 1993, Lazaro Santander, was assaulted at

the Safeway parking lot in Chico. He suffered a severe head

injury. After recuperating from his injuries he identified petitioner

from a photo lineup as the individual responsible for beating him

with a baseball bat.

Count IV. On July 24, 1993, Jonnie Cole was injured in a fight at a

Taco Bell in Chico. He reported that he was hit and kicked by

several young men including petitioner.

Count V. Jacob Honan was stabbed in the chest and upper right

arm after on July 24, 1993, while sitting in the front seat of a car

stopped at a traffic light. Petitioner’s palm print was found on the

victim’s car.

Attach. at 14-15. 

Petitioner has submitted a declaration from his father, who avers that petitioner

and his friend Sean Henninger were at the parents’ home on June 10, 1993, the night of the

P.D.Q. Market burglary. Pet., Ex. 6 ¶¶ 5-6. Petitioner’s father also explains how he had

disconnected the distributor cap of a pick-up truck described by the victim of the Safeway assault

and had to reconnect it on the morning of July 22. Id., Ex. 6 ¶¶ 14-15.

Petitioner’s mother avers that petitioner and several friends were in her living

room, apparently having slept on the floor on the night of the Safeway assault. Pet., Ex. 7 ¶ 3.

Petitioner’s mother concedes, however, that on January 5, 1993, petitioner was driving the

BMW whose license plate Miller provided to police. Pet., Ex. 7 ¶ 7.

Petitioner has attached a declaration from the mother of his child, Lydia Orner,

who avers that Parsons and a friend picked her up around 1:00 a.m. on the evening of July 21-22,

1993. The group went to Parsons’ home, where they spent the night. Pet., Ex. 9 ¶¶ 5-10.

In addition, he has provided a declaration from Aimee Barrow (nee George), a

witness to the Safeway assault in the early morning hours of July 22. Barrow avers that she did

not identify petitioner as the person who assaulted Santander, even though she is reported to have

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

done so in the police report. Barrow says she knows petitioner and did not see him among the

group assaulting Santander. Pet., Ex. 18 ¶¶ 2, 6. 

Finally, petitioner has submitted several additional statements, some unsworn, of

people who were with him at the Taco Bell on July 24, 1993. They concede that petitioner was

in a fight with Cole, but say that Cole was the aggressor. Pet., unnumbered exhibits (statement of

Tony DeLuca III and interview with William Bates). 

This evidence does not satisfy the Schlup standard. Although the various

declarations cast some doubt on petitioner’s participation in the offenses, his mother’s

concession that petitioner was driving the BMW that the victim of the January 5 assault

identified and his friends’ admissions that he had indeed fought with Jonnie Cole on July 24

undercut the utility of this evidence. He has presented nothing suggesting that any of the victims

had a motive to implicate him in any of the offenses. In light of the victims and witnesses’

identifications of petitioner, his palm print on Honan’s car, and his own witnesses’ concession

that he fought with Cole, the court cannot say it is more likely than not that a reasonable juror

would have not have found him guilty. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to

dismiss be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 7, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2/pars0006.157

Case 2:05-cv-00006-LKK -KJM Document 20 Filed 03/08/06 Page 12 of 12