Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00730/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00730-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS KOHLER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv730 - IEG (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS,

ATTORNEY’S FEES, AND COSTS

[Doc. 131]; DIRECTING CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT

vs.

FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC., doing

business as House of Flava,

Defendant.

On September 26, 2011, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and

denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Presently before the Court is Defendant Flava

Enterprises, Inc.’s motion for sanctions, attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs.

As the prevailing party, Defendant is entitled to submit a bill of costs to the Clerk in

accordance with Civil L.R. 54.1. In all other respects, Defendant’s motion for sanctions and

attorney’s fees is DENIED.

Discussion

Defendant argues it is entitled to fees as the prevailing party in this ADA case because

Plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Alternatively, Defendant

argues it is entitled to fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the Court’s inherent powers because

Plaintiff’s counsel knowingly and in bad faith raised frivolous claims.

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1. Fees as Prevailing Party Under the ADA

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, provides for a discretionary

award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Courts have interpreted the statute to mean that

attorneys fees may only be awarded to a prevailing defendant in an ADA case where the plaintiff’s

claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d

742, 744 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

1997)). Although the Court in this case ultimately found Plaintiff’s claims to be without merit,

they were not so unreasonable and without foundation as to warrant fees in favor of Defendant in

this case. Perhaps Plaintiff should have voluntarily dismissed his claims regarding the height of

the checkout counter, the presence of accessibility signs, and the height of the clothing hooks in

the dressing room. However, the Court does not find Plaintiff frivolously pursued those claims. In

addition, the fact two other judges in the Southern District of California had rejected Plaintiff’s

claim regarding the length of the dressing room bench does not render such claim frivolous. The

Court declines to exercises its discretion to award Defendant fees under § 12205.

2. Fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Powers

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, "[a]ny attorney or other person ... who so multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such

conduct." An award of sanctions under § 1927 must be supported by a finding of subjective bad

faith. Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995). "Bad faith is present when an attorney

knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose

of harassing an opponent." New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir.

1989). Aside from the authority provided under § 1927 and other rules of procedure, the court

may sanction a party under its own inherent power. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 45-47

(1991). Sanctions are only appropriate under the court’s inherent power where there has been a

showing of bad faith – where the party acted "for an improper purpose." Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d

989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, the Court is well-aware of the hotly disputed nature of the claims not only in this

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case, but also in other cases involving these parties and attorneys. What should be straightforward

legal and factual issues have become mired in the acrimonious relationship between counsel in

both this and other cases pending in this Court. The Court further notes the frequency with which

both defense counsel and Plaintiff’s counsel have sought sanctions in the actions between them.

The Court will not award Defendant attorneys fees as a sanction in this case under either § 1927 or

its inherent power because to do so would only encourage counsel’s pattern of obstinate behavior

toward each other, to the detriment of both their clients and the judicial process. 

Conclusion

As the prevailing party, Defendant may file a bill of costs with the Clerk pursuant to Civ.

L.R. 54.1. The Court, however, DENIES Defendant’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and

expenses. In addition, finding no reason for further delay, the Clerk is directed to enter judgment

in favor of Defendant, and against Plaintiff, on Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, Plaintiff’s claim for violations of the California Unruh Act, and Plaintiff’s

claim for violation of the California Disabled Persons Act. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 13, 2012

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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