Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01876/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01876-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL T PINES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIRECTOR OF ATASCADERO STATE 

HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-03849-SI 

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND 

TRANSFER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 10, 13

Michael T. Pines, currently in custody at Atascadero State Hospital in San Luis Obispo, 

California, filed a pro se civil rights complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He later 

filed a first amended complaint, which is now before the court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A.

BACKGROUND

Pines’ first amended complaint covers a wide range of problems he has encountered over 

the last decade. There are more than thirty defendants. See Docket No. 10 at 20-26. The vast 

majority of the events and omissions giving rise to his claims occurred in San Diego County, 

although a few occurred elsewhere. The first amended complaint can be divided roughly into four

subjects, although the allegations jump around among those different subjects.

The first subject in the first amended complaint is Pines’ disbarment from the practice of 

law in the State of California. The first amended complaint alleges that Pines was “wrongfully 

disbarred” in 2011. Docket No. 10 at 2. He further alleges that the State Bar of California and 

Kamala Harris, the Attorney General of the State of California, “mounted a relentless and vigorous 

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attack on homeowners foreclosure defense attorneys, legal staff, forensic loan auditors, and others 

who were trying to help property owners defend against what many considered criminal conduct 

of the banks.” Id. at 4. He alleges that “the acts of defendants in disbarring and prosecuting 

plaintiff [were] intentional, malicious, and without due [regard] for plaintiff’s rights.” Docket No. 

10 at 5. He alleges that the State Bar of California is a statewide bar regulating attorneys. Id. at 

21-22. He also alleges that Kamala Harris was the Attorney General of the State of California and 

is sued in her official capacity. Docket No. 10 at 22. 

The second subject matter area consists of numerous problems that appear to have 

occurred while Pines was still practicing law, i.e.., occurred in 2011 or earlier. The first amended 

complaint alleges that there was wrongdoing in Pines’ 2010 bankruptcy in U.S. Bankruptcy Court 

in San Diego, id. at 2; there was wrongdoing as Pines attempted to represent homeowners in 

connection with foreclosure proceedings in 2009-2010, id. at 4; defendants Chris McLaughlin and 

Lisa Benedetti (who reside in Carlsbad (located in San Diego County), id. at 20) committed 

wrongs against Pines and his law practice in San Diego, and colluded with the San Diego District 

Attorney and bankruptcy defendants, id. at 5-7; Pines was subjected to excessive force in Encinitas 

and received improper medical care at an Encinitas hospital (located in San Diego County), id. at 

9, 30; Pines was unjustifiably sanctioned in a bankruptcy case in Los Angeles County, id. at 10; 

McLaughlin and Benedetti made false statements to obtain harassing restraining orders and have 

renewed the restraining orders in San Diego County Superior Court,

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id. at 15; the tenant in a 

bankruptcy case in San Diego made false and defamatory statements, id. at 32; and an office buyer 

acted improperly in a San Diego bankruptcy, id. at 32. 

The third subject matter area in the first amended complaint consists of claims about the 

several criminal proceedings against Pines. The first amended complaint alleges that the San 

Diego, Orange County, and Los Angeles County District Attorneys prosecuted Pines for crimes 

they knew were based on false and improper evidence, id. at 8; Pines’ probation and parole was 

mishandled in San Diego County, id. at 10; Pines was wrongfully arrested in Encinitas for another 

 

1

See Docket No. 21 at 6 (copy of plea agreement form referring to restraining orders 

obtained by McLaughlin Benedetti and others in San Diego County Superior Court). 

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bankruptcy case in San Diego County and had to plead guilty, id. at 10-12; Pines was arrested for 

the unauthorized practice of law after unsuccessfully trying to help the FBI in San Diego and the 

U.S. Attorney in Atlanta deal with rebels who wanted to overthrow the government, id. at 12-13. 

He further alleges that there was “fraud, perjury, conspiracy” etc. by the Los Angeles District 

Attorney in a case in which Pines pled guilty and by the Orange County District Attorney in a case 

in which he was convicted and jailed immediately after the verdict, id. at 28-29; and that the San 

Diego public defenders did not properly represent him, id. at 31.

The fourth subject matter area pertains to several problems that arose while Pines was in 

custody. The first amended complaint alleges that McLaughlin, Benedetti, and the San Diego 

County District Attorney wrote untrue things that caused Pines’ early release date to be revoked

earlier this year, id. at 7; Pines was abused during his incarceration in the George Bailey Detention 

Center (located in San Diego), id. at 14; the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation2did something improper – possibly detained him too long -- as described in a writ 

Pines filed in San Diego County Superior Court, id. at 16; Pines wrongfully was sent to Patton 

State Hospital (located in San Bernardino County) on an unstated date, id. at 17-18; Pines 

wrongfully was sent to Atascadero State Hospital (located in San Luis Obispo County) as a 

mentally disordered offender on June 12, 2018 from the CDCR, id. at 18-20; and the Las Vegas 

County Sheriff’s failed to investigate the complaints Pines made while in custody in Las Vegas 

that rebels were trying to overthrow the government, id. at 31.

The first amended complaint has a section labeled “first cause of action” that purports to 

allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conclusorily alleges: “The following civil rights, inter 

alia, have been violated: right to due process, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, right to 

access to courts that are not corrupt, rights under the Equal Protection Clause (18 U.S.C. § § 241, 

242), right to free association and travel, and right to liberty, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 14th U.S. 

Constitutional Amendment, California Constitution Art 1 § 1.” Docket No. 10 at 26. The “second 

 

2

Pines does not specifically allege where he was in prison before being transferred to 

Atascadero, but his inclusion of the warden at the California Institution for Men in Chino, see id.

at 24, suggests Pines may have been that prison in San Bernardino County.

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cause of action” is against all but two defendants and alleges a conspiracy or multiple conspiracies 

but has no facts are alleged to support the conclusory allegation of conspiracy. Id.

In his prayer for relief, Pines requests a temporary restraining order and injunction “setting 

aside the judgments in all plaintiff’s criminal convictions and purging plaintiff’s criminal records,” 

“declaring the rights of the parties of the State Bar and plaintiff, and that plaintiff’s license to 

practice law be restored forthwith,” damages, and that the sale of a property in Encinitas, 

California, be set aside. Docket No. 10 at 32-33. 

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The first amended complaint overflows with pleading problems, including a potential bar 

under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994) to some claims, a need to pursue some 

claims in habeas rather than a civil rights action, likely improper joinder of some 

claims/defendants, and statute of limitations concerns as to many claims. This court chooses to 

address the claim regarding Pines’ disbarment and the accompanying venue concerns first, and 

will leave the remaining problems for the transferee court to address.

A. Claim Regarding Disbarment

As mentioned earlier, the first subject in the first amended complaint is Pines’ claim that 

he was wrongfully disbarred in 2011. He sues the State Bar of California and Kamala Harris, in 

her official capacity, for this alleged wrong and seeks damages as well as a restoration of his 

license to practice law. The claim must be dismissed because both the State Bar of California and 

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Kamala Harris, acting in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of California,

have Eleventh Amendment immunity against Pines’ suit. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution bars from the federal courts suits against a state by its own citizens, citizens of 

another state, or citizens or subjects of any foreign state, absent consent to the filing of such suit. 

Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985). Eleventh Amendment immunity 

also extends to suits against an arm of the state, such as the State Bar of California and California 

state courts. See Simmons v. Justices of the Supreme Court of State of California, 67 F.3d 708, 

715 (9th Cir. 1995) (“sovereign immunity bars monetary relief from state agencies such as 

California’s Bar Association and Bar Court”); see also Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct.,

318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (11th Amendment bars suit against state superior court and its 

employees). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials sued in their official 

capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985). Defendants State Bar of 

California and Kamala Harris, sued in her official capacity, thus have Eleventh Amendment 

immunity from this action. Defendants State Bar of California and Kamala Harris therefore are 

DISMISSED from this action. Leave to amend will not be granted because the problems with the 

claim against these defendants cannot be cured by amendment.3

 

3

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a suit against a 

state official seeking prospective injunctive relief from unconstitutional state action is not 

considered an action against the state. Here, the injunctive relief sought with respect to the 

disbarment claim is the restoration of Pines’ license to practice law in California arguably would 

allow him to get around the Eleventh Amendment immunity problem for that part of his claim. 

The Ex parte Young exception that might allow him to get around the Eleventh Amendment 

immunity problem provides no real relief, however, because his request for prospective relief runs 

into the obstacle posed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

A federal district court is a court of original jurisdiction and does not have appellate 

jurisdiction over a decision from a state superior court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 

(1923) (district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts). The RookerFeldman doctrine bars federal district courts “from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a 

suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 

1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). Insofar as Pines requests the restoration of his license to practice law

because he was wrongly disbarred, his claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This part 

of his claim is in essence an attack on the judgment of the California Supreme Court disbarring 

him in Pines on Discipline, Cal. S. Ct. No. S204611, in which the California Supreme Court on 

October 17, 2012, ordered that Pines be disbarred from the practice of law in California. See 

Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2005) (under RookerFeldman, district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the conduct of Oklahoma bar 

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With the dismissal of those defendants and claim, the court considers venue in this action

in which the vast majority of the relevant events and omissions giving rise to his claims took place 

in San Diego County. 

B. Venue transfer

Pines has chosen to file his action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

California, alleging that this is the proper venue because he is housed at Atascadero “within this 

judicial district,” he “couldn’t possibly get a fair hearing in the Southern District since he harshly 

criticizes judges and public officials in that district,” and “most of the defendants are public 

entities that can be sued anywhere in the state and defendant State Bar’s home office is in San 

Francisco.” Docket No. 10 at 3. 

Pines is wrong insofar as he asserts that venue is proper in the Northern District of 

California because he is in custody in this district. Atascadero State Hospital, where he is housed, 

is located in San Luis Obispo County and is within the Central District of California. Pines’ 

assertion that he cannot get a fair hearing in the Southern District does not provide grounds for 

keeping the case in the Northern District of California because the assertion is unsupported by any 

plausible facts showing bias in that district. Cf. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 

89 F.R.D. 497, 502-12 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (mere perception by defense that local jurors would be 

prejudiced due to adverse publicity is not sufficient for a transfer). The only claim that arguably 

has an actual connection to the Northern District of California -- that is, the claim that Pines was 

 

disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff); Dixon v. State Bar of California, 32 F. App’x 355 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (disbarred attorney’s § 1983 action against the State Bar, State Bar officials and the 

California Supreme Court was barred by Rooker-Feldman because it presented the same claims 

made in her petition to the California Supreme Court to review the decision recommending her 

disbarment); see also Clark v. State of Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966) (district court 

lacked jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a disbarred attorney to set aside the disbarment). But see

Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607-08 (although Rooker-Feldman bars challenges to a state-court 

decision in a particular case (such as plaintiff’s claims that defendants failed to apply a particular 

rule during his own state bar disciplinary hearing and failed to issue a summons), claims that 

challenged the rules themselves, rather than the individualized decision, would not be barred). 

Here, Rooker-Feldman bars Pines’ claim that he is entitled to have his license to practice law 

restored because it was wrongly taken away; that claim would require this court to determine that 

the California Supreme Court erroneously disbarred him. 

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wrongfully disbarred and the headquarters of the State Bar of California is located in San 

Francisco, within the Northern District of California -- is being dismissed today, as explained 

above. 

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to 

any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Venue for this action is proper in the Southern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b)(2). The Southern District of California also would be the more convenient forum for 

several reasons. Almost all of the defendants are located in San Diego County. That county is 

within the venue of the Southern District of California. The witnesses and evidence likely will be 

found primarily in the Southern District of California as that is the district in which most of the 

relevant events and omissions occurred and the plaintiff is in custody. None of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the remaining claims in the first amended complaint occurred in the 

Northern District of California, and it does not appear that any witnesses are located in the 

Northern District of California. Although Pines would prefer to litigate in the Northern District of 

California, he does not reside here and does not allege that his claims have any substantial 

connection to the Northern District of California.4 See IBM Credit Corp. v. Definitive Computer 

Serv., Inc., 1996 WL 101172, *2 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Ordinarily, where the forum lacks any 

significant contact with the activities alleged in the complaint, plaintiff’s choice of forum is given 

considerably less weight, even if the plaintiff is a resident of the forum.”); 17 Moore’s Federal 

Practice, § 111,13[1][c] (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.) (“When the chosen forum is neither the 

plaintiff’s residence nor the place where the operative events occurred, the court is likely to 

override the plaintiff’s choice . . . unless the plaintiff can show that some other valid reason 

 

4

Even the disbarment claim (which is being dismissed) has a limited connection to the 

Northern District. The disciplinary decision available online shows that the hearing was done at 

the State Bar Court’s hearing department in Los Angeles. See In the Matter of Michael T. Pines, 

Case Nos. 10-O-10600, 10-O-11023, and 11-O-11401, Decision and Order of Involuntary Inactive 

Enrollment filed 6/11/12, available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/77771. In 

fact, the last time Pines sued the State Bar regarding his discipline, he filed his action in the 

Central District of California. See Pines v. State of California, C. D. Cal. No. CV 12-1287 RGK 

(MRWx) (voluntarily dismissed on June 13, 2012, while motion to dismiss was pending).

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supports the plaintiff’s choice of forum”). For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in 

the interest of justice, the court now determines that this action should be transferred to the 

Southern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

CONCLUSION

The State Bar of California and Kamala Harris in her official capacity as the Attorney 

General of the State of California, and the claims against them, are dismissed with prejudice.

For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, this action is 

now transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1404(a). The clerk shall transfer this matter forthwith.

Pines’ motion for reconsideration of the order denying his request for a TRO is DENIED 

because it is frivolous. Docket No. 13. Pines is not entitled to the requested relief for the reasons 

stated in the order denying the request for the TRO and the order denying the amended request for 

a TRO. See Docket Nos. 5, 9.

Finally, because this action is being transferred to the Southern District of California, Pines 

should not file any more documents in the Northern District of California and instead should send 

everything for filing in this case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, 

located in San Diego, California. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2018

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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