Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-01797/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-01797-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GREGORY McCOY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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2:12-cv-1797-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Gregory McCoy, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his application for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

Mr. McCoy timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the

decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3).

Mr. McCoy was fifty years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ’s”) decision, and he has an eleventh grade education. (Tr. at 17, 46, 122, 126,

150.) His past work experiences include employment as a groundskeeper and

FILED

 2014 Sep-18 AM 11:55

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 1 of 13
construction worker. (Tr. at 48-49, 146-47, 160-67.) Mr. McCoy claims that he

became disabled on September 1, 2008, due to “[d]iabetes/hbp/weak arms and

legs/numb.” (Tr. at 145-46.)

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920;see also Doughty v.Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The

first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the

claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the

Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments

combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments

must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be

found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.

See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments

are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether

the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 2 of 13
will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a

determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made

and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s

impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops.Id.If the claimant

cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five

requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,

education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other

work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. McCoy

meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB, and was

insured through September 30, 2012. (Tr. at 22.) The ALJ further determined that

Mr. McCoy has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of

his disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus and glaucoma

are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.)

However, the ALJfound that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any

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of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 23.)

The ALJ did not findMr. McCoy’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence

and limiting effects of [his] symptoms” to be credible, and he determined that he has

the following RFC:

[L]ight work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)

except can lift/carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently; stand/walk six hours in an eight hour day; sit six hours in an

eight hour day; needs a sit stand option; unlimited ability to push and

pull to the same extent as lifting and carrying ability; able to frequently

climb ramps and stairs; occasionally climb ladders and scaffolding; never

climb ropes; no postural limitations; no overhead reaching with the right

upper extremity and occasional reaching overhead with the left upper

extremity; visually could not do any job that requires reading fine writing

or printing; no communicative limitations; avoid concentrated exposure

to extreme cold,dangerous movingmachinery, and unprotected heights;

and experiences mild pain.

(Tr. at 23-25.) According to the ALJ, Mr. McCoy is unable to perform any of his past

relevant work, he is a “younger individual,” and he has a “limited education,” as

those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 26-27.) He determined that

“transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability.” (Tr. at

27.) Even though Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of light work, the ALJ used

Medical-Vocation Rule 202.18 as a guideline for finding that there are a significant

number of jobs in the national economy that he is capable of performing, such as

sorter, assembler, and production worker.(Id.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has 

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 4 of 13
been under a disability from September 2, 2008 through the decision date. (Tr. at 28.)

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the

Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See

Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,

weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The

substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with

considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions

from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being

supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.

1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,

620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against

the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for

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“despite this deferential standard [for reviewof claims] it is imperative that the Court

scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision

reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to

apply the correct legalstandardsis grounds for reversal. See Bowen v.Heckler, 748F.2d

629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

III. Discussion

Mr. McCoy alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded

for two reasons. First, he believes that the ALJ erred in not considering carpal tunnel

syndrome to be a “severe” impairment. (Doc. 8 at 5.) Second, Mr. McCoy contends

that the ALJfailed to properly consider his impairments in combination. (Doc. 8 at 7.)

A. Failure to Find Carpal Tunnel Syndrome as a Severe Impairment

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider his carpal tunnel

syndrome as a “severe” impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation process.

(Doc. 8 at 5.) At step two, the ALJ must evaluate Plaintiff’s medical evidence in the

record to determine whether he had a severe impairment(s), which is an impairment

that significantly limits his ability to perform basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). As noted, if the claimant does not have a severe

impairment, the analysis stops, but if the claimant does have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the analysis proceeds to the third step.

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 6 of 13
In this case, the ALJ found in favor of the plaintiff and determined that he had

severe impairments at step two: diabetes mellitus and glaucoma; then proceeded to

subsequent steps in the sequential evaluation as required by the regulations. (Tr. at

22.) The specific impairments listed in the step two finding do not affect the outcome

of the case. This is because the Commissioner is obligated to continue with the

remaining steps in the sequential evaluation process after finding at least one severe

impairment. Thus, the Commissioner’s designation of a claimant’s other

impairments as “severe” or “non-severe” is of little consequence since all of these

impairmentsmustbe considered in combination in the RFC determination. “Nothing

requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be

considered severe. Instead, at step three, the ALJis required to demonstrate that it has

considered all ofthe claimant’s impairments, whether severe or not, in combination.”

Heathy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 824-825 (11thCir. 2010). “Even if

the ALJ erred in not indicating whether [a condition] was a severe impairment, the

error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that [the claimant] had a severe

impairment: and that finding is all that step two requires.” Id. at 825; see also Diorio

v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11thCir. 1991) (applying the harmless error doctrine to

social security cases); Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (“the

finding of any severe impairment. . . whether or not it results from a single severe

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 7 of 13
impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as severe” is

enough to satisfy step two). Once one severe impairment is found, the essential

question is the extent to which Plaintiff’s impairments limited his ability to work

during the relevant period. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir.

2005). As discussed in more detail in the next section, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s

alleged carpal tunnel syndrome inhis RFC assessment and found that Plaintiffstill had

the RFC to perform a range of light work. (Tr. at 23.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),

416.967(b) (defining light work). 

Even assuming that it would be possible for the ALJto commit error at step two

after having found at least one severe impairment, Plaintiff still bears the burden of

showing why each of his impairments should have been considered severe. See

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). As stated in the regulations,

“[a]n impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not

significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). An impairment must be severe for at least twelve consecutive

months to satisfy step two. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 404.1509,

404.1529(a)(4)(ii). Plaintiff failed to show that carpal tunnel syndrome significantly

limited his ability to do basic work activities during the relevant period. The mere

diagnosis of impairments “does not reveal the extent to which they limit [his] ability

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 8 of 13
to work or undermine the ALJ’s determination in thatregard.”Moore v.Barnhart, 405

F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff continued to work from April 2001,

when he first sought treatment for right hand numbness, through July 15, 2008, when

he was laid off from his job in the construction industry. (Tr. at 22, 139-40, 146, 198.)

Plaintiff’s ability to work for more than seven years despite his carpal tunnel syndrome

provides evidence that he did not have a severe impairment related to his right hand.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d

1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2003). Moreover, he never sought additional treatment for

carpal tunnel syndrome after 2001, and an examination onDecember 7, 2009, revealed

“normal strength in both arms—biceps, triceps, deltoids, grip.” (Tr. at 259.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s treating physician noted that he is out of work due to the

economy. (Tr. at 257.) Through his receipt of unemployment compensation benefits,

Plaintiff certified to the State that “he is able to and looking for work.” (Id. at 26.)

Plaintiff also testified that he takes care of his disabled brother and their household.

(Id. at 58.) 

Accordingly, Plaintifffailed to showthat his carpal tunnel syndrome limited his

ability to do basic work activities, and the Court finds the ALJ did not err in failing to

recognize his carpal tunnel syndrome as a severe impairment.

B. Combined Effects of Plaintiff’s Multiple Impairments

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 9 of 13
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the combined

effects of his multiple impairments, noting that he complained of symptoms and

limitations related to diabetes mellitus, glaucoma, carpel tunnel syndrome, and

chronic and severe pain. (Doc. 8 at 7.) Plaintiff specifically argues that the ALJ failed

to consider his carpal tunnel syndrome and chronic pain “at all.” (Id.) 

The ALJ must consider the combined effect of all impairments in order to

assess Plaintiff’s disability. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987). A

plaintiff should be considered in the whole and not evaluated in the abstract as having

several hypothetical andisolated illnesses. Davis v.Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 532-33 (11th

Cir. 1993). 

Here, the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments in evaluating his claim,

including in assessing his RFC.(Tr. at 22-26.) Indeed, the ALJsufficiently considered

the combined effects of the plaintiff’s impairments at steps three and four of the

assessment process. (Tr. at 23-26.) At step three, the ALJ assessed that “[t]he

claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals one of the listed impairments.” (Id. at 23.) Notably, the ALJ’s

finding at step three that Plaintiff did not have an “impairment or combination of

impairments” that met or equaled a listed impairment has been held by the Eleventh

Circuit to be sufficient to show that the ALJ considered the combined effect of

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 10 of 13
Plaintiff’s impairments. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224-1225 (11th Cir.

2002); Hutchinson v. Astrue, 408 F. App’x 324, 327 (11th Cir. 2011). The ALJ’s

decision plainly does not “stop[]” at step three, as Plaintiff contends. At step four,

the ALJ made his RFC assessment “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire

record.” (Tr. at 23.) Throughout step four, the ALJ discussed and analyzed

Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus, glaucoma, carpal tunnel syndrome, and hypertension in

great detail. (Tr. at 23-26.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome,

reiterating that his medical records show “normal strength in both arms” and

“normal findings.” (Id. at 248-52, 256, 259, 293.) The ALJ’s decision reflects that

Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was evaluated in connectionwith the RFC finding,

as the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s testimony about his limited ability to lift anything

heavier than a gallon of milk and his right hand weakness and pain, as well as his

inability to hold a hammer. (Id. at 50-52.) Indeed, the ALJ expressly considered

Plaintiff’s symptoms in assessing his RFC:

Even in the absence of objective medical abnormalities, i.e., medical

signs and laboratory findings, the undersigned gives the claimant the

benefit of the doubt, and reconciles the residual functional capacity with

those statements made by the claimant concerning the limiting effects of

his symptoms that the undersigned found to be credible.

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 11 of 13
(Tr. at 26.) The ALJ ultimately included a limitation in Plaintiff’s RFC restricting him

from reaching overhead with his right upper extremity and only occasionally reaching

overhead with his left upper extremity. (Id. at 26.) The ALJ determined that

Plaintiff’s combination of impairments limited him to light work as defined in 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with specific restrictions that addressed the

limitations reasonably caused by his physical impairments. (Id.) 

As to Plaintiff’s allegations of chronic pain, the ALJ found that “[t]he medical

evidence ofrecord does not support the level of disabling limitations and pain that the

claimant alleges.” (Id. at 26.) In support, the ALJfound that Plaintiff’s description of

his daily activities was not “strong evidence” in favor of finding himdisabled, due to

the lack of objective verification as well as the weak medical evidence. (Tr. at 25-26.) 

The ALJ noted that none of Plaintiff’s treating physicians recommended specific

activity restrictions. (Id.) Plaintiff offers no evidence to counter this conclusion and

does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility determination.

In sum, Plaintiff failed to show that his impairments, singularly or in

combination, caused any additional limitations on his ability to work. Plaintiff failed

to identify any limitations caused by his alleged pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, or

another impairment that the ALJ should have added to his RFC assessment. See

Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 n.6 (“[T]he mere existence of these impairments does not

Case 2:12-cv-01797-LSC Document 10 Filed 09/18/14 Page 12 of 13
reveal the extent to which they limit [his] ability to work or undermine the ALJ’s

determination in that regard.”) The Court finds the ALJ did not err, as he considered

all of Plaintiff’s impairments in combination. See, e.g., Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1224-25.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Mr. McCoy’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.

Done this 18 day of September 2014.

th

 

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

[160704]

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