Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01191/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES KILES,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

CIV. NO. S-06-1191 EJG 

CR. NO. S-99-0551 EJG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT

SENTENCE

Defendant, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a

motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255. After reviewing the record and the documents

filed in connection with the motion, the court has determined

that this matter may be decided without an evidentiary hearing

because the files and the records of the case affirmatively show

the factual and legal invalidity of defendant’s arguments. Shah

v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (9 Cir. 1989). For th

the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

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 The conviction followed a second trial. An initial trial resulted in a hung jury on the 1

conspiracy counts and the subsequent declaration of a mistrial by the court.

 The Ninth Circuit found a lack of evidence to support a finding that the firearms were 2

used in connection with destruction of the propane tanks, the underlying conspiracy.

2

BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of one

count of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction and one

count of conspiracy to use a destructive device. In addition, 1

defendant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas of guilty, of one

count of conspiracy to violate federal firearms laws and one

count of felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced

September 9, 2002 to 264 months imprisonment and a five year term

of supervised release. He appealed his sentence and convictions. 

The convictions were affirmed on appeal; however, the case was

remanded for a recalculation of sentence, the appellate court

having determined that the district court erred when it applied a

four level upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).2

On January 9, 2004, the district court issued an amended

judgment, sentencing the defendant to 262 months imprisonment and

a term of five years supervised release. That sentence was

affirmed on appeal. On June 1, 2006, defendant filed the instant

motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, raising

eighteen claims supported by a memorandum of points and

authorities and exhibits. The government has filed an opposition

and the defendant a reply. After considering the matter at

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length, the court is now prepared to rule. The claims will be

addressed seriatim. 

DISCUSSION

In his first claim for relief, labeled “Found Guilty on

False Testimony,” defendant argues that he was wrongly convicted

on the basis of perjured testimony. This issue was decided

adversely to defendant on direct appeal. He may not relitigate

it on collateral review absent changed circumstances of law or

fact, neither of which are present here. Olmstead v. United

States, 55 F.3d 316, 319 (7 Cir. 1995). See also United States th

v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9 Cir. 1985) (federal habeas th

petition may not be used to relitigate issues already decided on

direct appeal). Accordingly, the first claim is DENIED.

His second claim for relief, titled “Found Guilty By Mere

Association,” alleges defendant was found guilty solely on the

basis of his association with co-defendant Patterson. In

support, defendant refers to juror interviews conducted after the

trial in which certain jurors found significant the fact that

defendant failed to disassociate himself from his co-defendants

once he learned about the plan to blow up the propane tanks. As

the government points out, defendant is precluded from asserting

this claim on collateral review because he failed to raise it in

a motion for new trial, or on direct appeal, nor has he provided

an explanation for his failure to do so. “Where a defendant has

procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct

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review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant

can first demonstrate either “cause” and actual “prejudice”

[citations omitted] or that he is “actually innocent. . . .”

Bousley v. United States 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998). Defendant

has offered no evidence of cause and prejudice, or actual

innocence of the crime charged.

Moreover, the claim fails on the merits. The testimony of

numerous witnesses provided evidence linking defendant with

specific actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, thus

providing more than sufficient evidence from which the jury could

find him guilty of conspiracy. The second claim is DENIED.

The third claim, labeled “found guilty on conspiracy”, is

another claim asserting guilt by association; this time with

terrorism in general following the events of September 11, 2001.

Like the previous claim, this, too, was procedurally defaulted

since it was not raised on direct review. In connection with

this claim defendant reiterates the statements he made in

connection with his first claim, namely, that witness testimony

was perjured. For the same reasons the issue was rejected above,

it is rejected now. Moreover, evidence placed in the record by

defendant himself contradicts his assertion of guilt by

association with terrorism in general. Defendant’s Exhibit 7, a

copy of a newspaper article written after the conviction, recites

that jurors were unanimous in their belief that the September

11 attacks did not enter their deliberations. For all these th

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reasons, the third claim for relief is DENIED. 

Defendant’s fourth claim is labeled, “Inhanced [sic] for

anti-government views.” This claim, like its predecessors is

denied on both procedural and substantive grounds. Since not

raised previously, and in the absence of a showing of cause and

prejudice or actual innocence, defendant has procedurally

defaulted on this claim. 

On the merits, defendant is simply mistaken. While the

title of the claim implies that the court enhanced defendant’s

sentence, in reality, the court declined to grant defendant a

downward departure finding that the type of offense and the

danger posed to the community warranted a lengthy period of

incarceration. Defendant’s sentence, rather than a punishment

for the holding of anti-government views, as defendant maintains,

reflects his demonstrated willingness to act on those views. The

first amendment right to freedom of expression is not absolute,

is subject to governmental regulation and does not extend to the

protection of criminal conduct. See e.g., United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (first amendment interest can

be overridden by government interest unrelated to suppression of

free expression); Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1405

(9 Cir. 1987) (law penalizes criminal conduct, not expression th

of views). Accordingly, the fourth claim is DENIED.

The fifth claim alleges ineffective assistance of counsel

against trial counsel in both the first and second trials. 

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Defendant asserts that his attorney during the first trial, Mr.

Gable, failed to obtain evidence which, and interview witnesses

who, would have been helpful to the defense. Defendant charges

the attorney in his second trial, Mr. Locke, with some of the

same failings. In addition, defendant contends that Mr. Locke

was misinformed about the effect of certain firearm laws, and

failed to communicate with defendant concerning the appellate

decision in this case. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must demonstrate first that counsel’s performance was

deficient, and second, that but for the deficiencies, the outcome

would have been different. See generally Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In both his opening and reply

briefs, defendant fails to explain how any of these actions or

failures to act by his attorneys detrimentally affected his case

other than to speculate that the persons not called, the evidence

not produced, and the law not utilized might have created doubt

as to the veracity of key prosecution witnesses.

Defendant’s unsubstantiated speculation is insufficient to

overcome his attorneys’ strategic evidentiary decisions made at

the time of trial. Moreover, even if defendant were able to show

that counsels’ errors constituted deficient performance, he has

not demonstrated that the outcome would have been different but

for those errors. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its affirmance,

there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. The

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fifth claim is DENIED.

Defendant’s sixth claim for relief is titled “Impeached

Testimony” and alleges that the witnesses against him were

impeached. This claim appears to be part and parcel of

defendant’s first claim of perjured testimony, and, to that

extent, it has previously been decided adverse to him at the

appellate level and may not be relitigated on collateral attack. 

To the extent defendant here raises something broader, he did not

raise it on direct appeal and may not raise it now absent a

showing of cause and effect, or actual innocence. Even were the

court to consider the claim, it fails on the merits. “While no

party is permitted to put on testimony that it knows or should

know to be untrue, it is not improper to put on a witness whose

testimony may be impeached.” United States v. Perkins, 94 F.3d

429, 433 (8 Cir 1996). It is within the jury’s province, in th

fact, it is the jury’s sworn responsibility, to resolve the

dispute when presented with two conflicting versions of the

facts. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9 Cir. th

2002). Moreover, defendant has not identified any way in which

the witnesses were impeached. The sixth claim is DENIED. 

The seventh claim is titled “Court withheld evidence” and

appears to allege that the court erred when it used firearms

allegedly owned by someone other than the defendant as a basis

for an upward adjustment on the section 922 count of conviction,

one of the counts to which defendant entered a plea of guilty. 

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Defendant’s claim is confusing because it appears to mix two

separate arguments. First, that his guilty plea to § 922(g) is

improper because he did not own the firearms, and second, that

his sentence cannot be enhanced by firearms he did not own. Both

arguments fail. 

Initially, the court notes that ownership is not an element

of section 922(g)(1). Rather, the statute imposes liability on a

convicted felon who “ships”, “transports”, “possesses” or

“receives” any firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate

commerce. On April 22, 2002 when defendant pled guilty, he

admitted possessing 49 firearms and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. 

Second, the four level upward adjustment was made pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) because the court determined that

defendant possessed the firearms and ammunition in connection

with the underlying conspiracy. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

disagreed, finding no evidence that the firearms were part of the

conspiracy. Accordingly, the case was remanded for recalculation

of sentence. This court heeded the appellate court’s mandate and 

re-sentenced the defendant, reducing the offense level for the

felon in possession conviction by four levels from the original

guideline calculation. For these reasons, the seventh claim is

DENIED.

The eighth claim is titled “vindictive judge” and alleges

that the court should have disqualified itself on grounds of

bias. Defendant is precluded from raising this issue on a

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collateral attack of his conviction since he failed to raise it

on direct appeal. As he has with a number of other claims raised

in this motion, defendant has procedurally defaulted this claim. 

See supra, discussion regarding procedural default. Moreover, a

review of the record shows that defendant failed to raise the

issue before the district court. While defendant asserts that he

petitioned the court for its recusal, in actuality, he petitioned

the court to recuse his first trial counsel citing as a reason

therefor, counsel’s failure to seek the court’s recusal. Motion

to Recuse Counsel, filed November 19, 2001; Transcript of 12-17-

01 hearing on motion to recuse counsel, Docket Entry 243. In any

event the claim fails on the merits.

Disqualification of federal judges is governed by two

statutes. The first, section 144 of Title 28 of the United

States Code, requires the person seeking removal to file a timely

and sufficient affidavit showing that the judge has a personal

bias against him, or in favor of an adverse party. The statute

is strictly construed and filing of a timely and sufficient

affidavit is a mandatory pre-requisite. United States v.

Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9 Cir. 1978)(failure to follow th

procedural requirements of statute defeat any charge of bias). 

The second statute, section 455 of Title 28, is directed to

the judge and requires that he disqualify himself in any

proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 

This section also mandates disqualification if the judge has a

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 The court does not have a gavel on the bench, thus making that portion of defendant’s

3

claim physically impossible.

10

personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. 

Defendant complains that at various times during the course

of these criminal proceedings, “Judge Garcia showed his bias and

prejudice” by making derogatory remarks to defendant, attempting

to throw his gavel at defendant, ignoring appellate orders and

imposing a lengthy sentence because of defendant’s antigovernment views. None of defendant’s complaints provide a basis 3

for the court’s disqualification.

It is a well-settled principle of law that to warrant

recusal, a judge’s bias and prejudice must originate from an

extrajudicial source, that is, from a source outside judicial

proceedings. United States v. Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct.

1147 (1994). A judge’s adverse rulings do not constitute bias

and his “views on legal issues may not serve as the basis for

motions to disqualify.” United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869,

882 (9 Cir. 1980). th

Here, defendant alleges the court relied on perjured

testimony, failed to remove ineffective appointed counsel, and

was hostile toward defendant. However, all of these incidents

occurred in connection with the court’s ruling on legal issues

and, as such, do not stem from an extrajudicial source, and are

not a proper grounds for disqualification. “[O]pinions formed by

the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in

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the course of the current proceedings, do not constitute a basis

for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. at 1157. No

such showing has been made here, instead, defendant has only

submitted conclusory allegations.

As far as a judge’s courtroom demeanor, remarks which are

“critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to . . . the

parties, or their cases” ordinarily do not support 

disqualification. See id. In fact, “[t]he judge who presides at

a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill

disposed towards the defendant. . . [b]ut the judge is not

thereby recusable for bias or prejudice since his knowledge and

the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in

the course of the proceedings. . . .” Id. 510 U.S. at 550-51,

114 S.Ct. at 1155. 

A judge, like all persons, may at times be stern and shorttempered. But, his demeanor, when it is a part of his effort to

maintain courtroom administration, does not provide a basis for

disqualification. The fact that the trial judge may display

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance and anger reveals not that

he is biased, but only that he is “within the bounds of what

imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as

federal judges, sometimes display.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114

S.Ct. at 1157. Accordingly there is no basis for recusal under

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section 455. In addition, defendant’s failure to file a timely

and sufficient affidavit precludes a finding of bias under

section 144. The eighth claim is DENIED. 

The ninth claim is titled “Judge practicing law from bench”,

and is yet another version of a refrain that runs through a

number of defendant’s claims, in which he attacks the sentence

imposed by the court. To the extent the court enhanced the

defendant’s sentence by finding that the firearms were used in

connection with the conspiracy, that finding was overruled by the

Ninth Circuit. The sentence imposed by the court following

remand was within the sentencing guideline range, albeit at the

top of that range, and was an exercise of the court’s sentencing

discretion. Moreover, it was affirmed on appeal. United States

v. Kiles, 136 Fed. Appx. 62 (9 Cir. 2005). Defendant’s th

continued attempts to relitigate this issue are unavailing. The

ninth claim is DENIED. 

The tenth claim is titled “Bias [sic] judge”, and is another

attempt to disqualify the court. For all the reasons previously

articulated in the court’s ruling on the eighth claim, supra, the

tenth claim for relief is also DENIED.

The eleventh claim alleges that defendant was denied the

right to appeal from the amended judgment. This claim is without

merit. An appeal from this court’s amended judgment, following

remand, was perfected. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s

sentence, and the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of

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certiorari. United States v. Kiles, 136 Fed. Appx. 62 (9 Cir. th

2005), cert. denied, Kiles v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 1666

(2006). The eleventh claim is DENIED.

The twelfth claim is titled “double jeopardy”, and contends

that retrial after a hung jury violates defendant’s Fifth

Amendment constitutional right not to twice be placed in jeopardy

for the same offense. Defendant’s contention is not the law. 

“[A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial following a hung

jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to

which [defendant] was subjected. . . .[J]eopardy does not

terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to

agree.” Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104

S.Ct. 3081, 3086 (1984). Since the original jeopardy which

attached when the jury was sworn did not end with the jury’s

inability to reach a verdict on the conspiracy counts, the

commencement of the second trial and the resulting verdicts of

guilty on those counts did not constitute double jeopardy. The

twelfth claim is DENIED.

The thirteenth claim is titled “violation of codes and

treaties” and alleges that defendant’s convictions were the

result of “paid perjured testimony”, and a violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 201( c)(2). Defendant’s perjury allegations were addressed in

connection with the court’s ruling on the first claim. There the

court found that the issue had been decided adversely to

defendant by the Ninth Circuit thus precluding him from raising

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it on collateral attack. Defendant’s remaining contention, that

the testimony was given in exchange for a lenient sentence and

thus a violation of § 201( c)(2), is erroneous.

Section 201 criminalizes the bribery of public officials and

witnesses, making it an offense punishable by fine or

imprisonment to, among other things, promise anything of value to

a witness at trial because of his testimony. The statute appears

broad in its scope, imposing liability on “whoever” commits the

violation. Seizing upon that language, defendant argues that the

government attorneys violated federal law by giving leniency to

co-defendant Donald Rudolph for his testimony. The law is wellsettled in this circuit, and every circuit to consider the issue,

that § 201 ( c)(2) does not apply to the United States or an

assistant U.S. Attorney acting in his official capacity. See

United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (9 Cir. 1999) th

(summarizing holdings). An interpretation such as that sought by

defendant would not only hinder the government’s ability to

enforce the law, but would erode sovereign immunity. “[I]t is

clear . . . that Congress would have legislated more expressly if

it had intended for 18 U.S.C. § 201( c)(2) to prohibit the

government from conferring immunity, leniency, and other

traditionally permissible benefits upon cooperating witnesses in

the course of a legitimate prosecution.” Id. at 1039. The

thirteenth claim is DENIED.

The fourteenth claim alleges that defendant has been denied 

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access to the court and legal counsel while serving the sentence

imposed in this case. Such a claim is not cognizable as part of

the instant motion. Section 2255 of Title 28, the statute on

which the motion is based, provides a remedy for limited types of

claims: 1) that the sentence was imposed in violation of federal

law; 2) that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the

sentence; 3) that the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by

law; and 4) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral

attack. The conditions under which defendant is serving the

sentence are not within the scope of section 2255. See e.g.,

United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19 (7 Cir. 1962) (restriction th

on defendant’s mail by jail officials not grounds for postjudgment relief); Sanders v. United States, 183 F.2d 748 (4 Cir. th

1950) (mistreatment by prison officials subsequent to conviction

not grounds for relief under section 2255). The fourteenth claim

is DENIED.

The fifteenth claim is titled “unlawful arrest” and

complains that defendant was arrested without a warrant, in

violation of the fourth amendment. As he has with several other 

claims, defendant has procedurally defaulted by failing to raise

this claim on direct appeal. Absent a showing of either “cause

and prejudice” for his failure to raise it, or “actual

innocence”, he may not raise it anew in a collateral attack. See

Bousley v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998). See also,

Lewis v. United States, 235 F.2d 580, 581 (9 Cir. 1956) (claim th

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of arrest without a warrant is not proper subject of a § 2255

motion). The fifteenth claim is DENIED.

The sixteenth claim is titled malicious prosecution and

alleges that the government intentionally presented false

testimony, and was overzealous and vindictive in its prosecution

of the case. Defendant has also procedurally defaulted this

claim, failing to raise it on appeal. In any event, the claim

does not succeed on the merits. Defendant has failed to state a

prima facie claim of either malicious or vindictive prosecution. 

To prove malicious prosecution a defendant must show that 1) a

criminal proceeding was initiated against the defendant; 2) with

malice; 3) without probable cause; and 4) terminated in

defendant’s favor. McCall v. Gates, 36 F.3d 1103 & n.2 (9 Cir. th

1994). Vindictive prosecution, on the other hand, “usually

arises when the government increases the severity of . . .

charges . . . in response to the exercise of constitutional or

statutory rights.” United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 633-34

(9 Cir. 1981). Defendant has not presented any facts which th

support either of these theories. The sixteenth claim is DENIED. 

The seventeenth claim appears to allege that a weapon

purchased by co-defendant Patterson was not unlawful to possess. 

Initially, the court notes that defendant’s assertion fails to

state a claim. In any event, this claim, too, is procedurally

defaulted, not having been raised pre-trial, at trial or on

appeal. The seventeenth claim is DENIED.

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The eighteenth claim challenges defendant’s § 922(g)

conviction by arguing he is not a felon and therefore cannot be

convicted of a crime which has as an element, a requirement of

being a felon. Again, this claim is procedurally defaulted.

Moreover, defendant is incorrect. Suffice it to say that

defendant was properly charged with and convicted of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g), felon in possession of a firearm. He had previously been

convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year, thus meeting the felony element of the

statute. The eighteenth claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to vacate, set

aside or correct his sentence is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to close companion civil case CV. S-06-1191 EJG.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2007

/s/ Edward J. Garcia 

EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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