Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03314/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03314-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Isaiah Hoover,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Swift Transportation Company,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-03314-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Isaiah Hoover’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 

Extension of Time to Amend Complaint. (Docs. 40; 41). Although Defendant Swift 

Transportation Company (“Defendant”) has not responded, in the interest of efficiency and 

promptly resetting the deadline, the Court will now rule on the motion.

On November 19, 2019, this Court entered an order partially granting Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss because Plaintiff’s own allegations indicated that he filed his Title VII 

claims outside the applicable ninety-day statute of limitations. (Doc. 39 at 4–5). Given that 

Plaintiff could possibly plead facts tolling the statute of limitations, however, the Court 

granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to affirmatively plead such facts. (Id. at 5). 

The Court gave the Plaintiff 14 days to exercise that option. (Id. at 9). As of December 3, 

2019, Plaintiff had not done so. On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting 

additional time to amend his complaint. (Doc. 40). Plaintiff asserts an extension is justified 

because his noncompliance was attributable to the post office’s alleged failure to timely 

deliver his mail. (Doc. 41 at 1). “Ironically,” Plaintiff explains, “the date my letter was 

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received was on the final day the courts gave me to amend my complaint.” (Id. at 1–2).

By rule, “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, 

for good cause, extend time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Where, as here, the motion is made 

after the relevant deadline has expired, the court should grant the extension only upon

finding excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). “[D]etermining what sorts of neglect 

will be considered ‘excusable’” generally calls for an equitable inquiry, “taking account of 

all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. 

Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The Court must assess “the danger of 

prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 

proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable 

control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id.; see also Kettle 

Range Conservation Grp. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F. App’x 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“Failure to consider the ‘Pioneer factors’ . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.”).

Considering the Pioneer factors, the Court will exercise its discretion to grant 

Plaintiff an extension. Although Plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive notice of this 

Court’s prior order until after the deadline expired may appear unlikely,

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the Court has no 

basis upon which it can conclude that the claim is false. If true, that allegation resolves the 

Pioneer factors in Plaintiff’s favor. For example, Plaintiff’s failure to amend his complaint 

within the applicable deadline is a paradigmatic example of excusable neglect under Rule

6(b): an omission caused by circumstances beyond his control. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 

392. At this early stage of the litigation, this short delay is also unlikely to significantly 

impact the proceedings or otherwise prejudice the Defendant. Indeed, Defendant has not 

yet even filed its answer. Lastly, Plaintiff acted in good faith by filing this motion within 

one week of the deadline lapsing, indicating that he acted at least reasonably promptly after 

becoming aware of his noncompliance. Cf. Smallwood v. Allied Pickfords, LLC, No. 

08cv2196 BTM (RBB), 2009 WL 3247180, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) 

(“Furthermore, Atlas acted in good faith by promptly for an extension of time . . . .”).

 

1 The Court notes, for instance, that both of Plaintiff’s submissions to this Court are dated 

December 3, 2019, the final day of the deadline to amend the complaint.

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Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Time to Amend Complaint (Doc. 40) 

is GRANTED such that Plaintiff may, if he chooses, file an amended complaint repleading 

his Title VII claims within 14 days of the date of this order. The Court reminds Plaintiff 

that an amended pleading must comply with Local Rule 15.1(a).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant must answer or otherwise respond 

to the complaint (if no amended complaint is filed) or the amended complaint (if an 

amended complaint is filed) within 28 days of the date of this order.

Dated this 16th day of December, 2019.

Case 2:18-cv-03314-JAT Document 46 Filed 12/16/19 Page 3 of 3