Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01488/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01488-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON GRAYSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFF LYNCH, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 2:24-cv-1488-JDP (P)

ORDER

Plaintiff Jason Grayson, a state inmate proceeding without counsel in this civil rights 

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sues Warden Jeff Lynch and correctional officers Nelson 

and Vang. The complaint, as drafted, does not state a cognizable claim. I will grant plaintiff the 

opportunity to amend his complaint. 

Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 

entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 

claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

Case 2:24-cv-01488-JDP Document 12 Filed 12/03/24 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Analysis

The complaint alleges that around 5:00 p.m. on March 14, 2024, plaintiff notified officer 

J. Diaz that he was experiencing suicidal ideations. ECF No. 11 at 6. Diaz and officer Vazquez, 

who was also on duty, escorted plaintiff to the medical facility to be evaluated by a clinician. Id. 

A clinician arrived between two and four hours later. Id. When plaintiff tried to explain his 

concerns, the clinician claimed he could not hear plaintiff and left. Id. at 6-7. Diaz and Vazquez 

asked plaintiff if he wanted to return to his cell or wait for a different clinician. Id. at 7. Plaintiff 

opted to see another clinician, but this time, the officers returned plaintiff to a safety cell, which, 

according to the complaint, was covered with blood and bird feces and was outside. Id. at 8. 

Plaintiff waited in the safety cell for four hours until another clinician arrived. Id. The clinician 

did not help plaintiff and instead told plaintiff he needed to return to his cell. Id. at 8-9. Diaz 

Case 2:24-cv-01488-JDP Document 12 Filed 12/03/24 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

offered plaintiff the opportunity to wait for yet another clinician, which plaintiff accepted. Id. at 

9. 

Shortly after plaintiff agreed to wait for another clinician, Diaz was relieved by defendant 

Vang; this occurred during a shift change, around 10:00 p.m. Id. Plaintiff started to get cold in 

the safety cell and his arthritis started to flare up from standing for so many hours. Id. Plaintiff 

asked Vang if he called for another clinician, to which Vang responded that defendant Nelson had

called for one. Id. Following this interaction, Vang ignored plaintiff for the remainder of Vang’s 

shift, which lasted approximately eleven hours. Id. at 9, 11. During the next shift change, 

plaintiff agreed to return to his cell because he believed he was not going to receive help. 

Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with medical care as punishment for seeking medical

help. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Warden Lynch is at fault for failing to correct 

the misconduct of the other defendants. Id. at 11. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable claim against any of the defendants. As an 

initial matter, plaintiff’s claims against Warden Lynch are nonviable. He alleges that, as warden, 

he is responsible for correcting misconduct by officers. Id. at 5. There is no respondeat superior

liability under section 1983, however. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Instead, Warden Lynch can be held liable only for his own personal involvement, and plaintiff 

has not alleged that he was directly involved in or aware of his situation. 

As for the remaining two defendants, the complaint fails to state a claim against them. 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other 

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 

determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the 

seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 

Case 2:24-cv-01488-JDP Document 12 Filed 12/03/24 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

429 U.S. at 104). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate 

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 

he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but 

was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 

Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

The complaint alleges that plaintiff opted to wait for a clinician and that Vang and Nelson 

called for a clinician during their shift. The fact that a third clinician did not evaluate plaintiff in 

the span of one day does not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Indeed, plaintiff alleges that the 

harm he suffered was waiting for the third clinician, but he also admits that it was his choice to 

wait a third clinician instead of returning to his cell. Finally, plaintiff’s allegation that Vang and 

Nelson punished him for seeking medical help is conclusory and unsupported by any factual 

allegation. 

I will allow plaintiff a chance to amend his complaint. If plaintiff decides to file an 

amended complaint, the amended complaint will supersede the current one. See Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended 

complaint will need to be complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. 

Cal. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the current complaint no longer serves 

any function. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, plaintiff will need 

to assert each claim and allege each defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended 

complaint should be titled “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case 

number. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, I will recommend that this action be 

dismissed. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 11, is dismissed with leave to amend. 

2. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended 

complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 

Case 2:24-cv-01488-JDP Document 12 Filed 12/03/24 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

3. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 

result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed 

with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

4. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 3, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:24-cv-01488-JDP Document 12 Filed 12/03/24 Page 5 of 5