Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02183/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-02183-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS ARMANDO GONZALEZTORRES,

Plaintiff,

v.

ZUMPER, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-02183-PJH 

ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION 

AND STAYING ACTION

Re: Dkt. No. 24

Defendant Zumper, Inc.’s (“Zumper”) motion to compel arbitration and stay 

proceedings came on for hearing before this court on October 23, 2019. Plaintiff 

appeared through his counsel, Erika Heath. Defendant appeared through its counsel, 

David Goldstein and John Shope. Having read the papers filed by the parties and 

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause 

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion, for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2019, plaintiff Luis Armando Gonzalez-Torres filed a class-action 

complaint against Zumper, originating this action. Compl., Dkt. 1. Zumper operates a 

website that enables prospective renters to search and apply for apartment rentals, and 

allows landlords and realtors to evaluate and communicate with prospective tenants. 

Plaintiff signed up for and used the website as a prospective renter looking for an 

apartment to rent.

The complaint asserts seven causes of action: (1) violation of the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), for failing to follow reasonable procedures 

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to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information it reported about prospective 

renters when preparing reports about them; (2) violation of California Consumer Credit 

Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.14(b), based on the same 

conduct; (3) violation of FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A), for failing to conduct a 

reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether plaintiff’s disputes about inaccuracies in 

his record were accurate, or delete the disputed item within 30 days; (4) violation of 

CCRAA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.16(a), based on the same conduct; (5) violation of FCRA, 

15 U.S.C. § 1681j(f), for charging plaintiff more than the maximum allowable amount to 

disclose all information in plaintiff’s Zumper file; (6) violation of FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681g(a)(2), for failure to disclose to plaintiff the sources of the public record 

information it includes in the Zumper file; and (7) violation of CCRAA, Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1785.18(a), for the same conduct. See Compl.

On June 17, 2019, Zumper filed the present motion to compel arbitration and stay 

the action. Dkt. 24. Zumper argues that plaintiff and Zumper entered into an enforceable

arbitration agreement encompassing plaintiff’s claims when plaintiff created a Zumper 

account. 

Gonzalez-Torres alleges that on or about February 27, 2018, he accessed 

Zumper’s website and submitted a rental application. Compl. ¶¶ 34–38. Zumper’s 

records align with that allegation and indicate that an individual with the name Luis 

Gonzalez created an account on February 27, 2018, and then submitted a rental 

application, including credit, criminal history, and eviction reports to a realtor. Declaration 

of Brian Coyne, Dkt. 24-1 (“First Coyne Decl.”) ¶¶ 19–24. 

Gonzalez-Torres alleges that Zumper published a consumer report that 

erroneously associated him with criminal offenses of an individual named Luis Raymond 

Gonzalez. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 43. Gonzalez-Torres alleges that this error was the result of 

Zumper’s having used “very loose matching criteria” in preparing the report. Id. ¶ 44. 

Gonzalez-Torres alleges that his rental applications were denied and that the inaccuracy 

was a “substantial factor” in the denial. Id. ¶¶ 45–46. He further alleges that he 

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contacted Zumper to dispute the entry on his criminal history report, but that he did not 

receive an adequate response. Id. ¶¶ 48, 52–59.

A prospective Zumper user attempting to rent an apartment would begin the 

process by creating a Zumper account. Before doing so, the user views a notice 

informing him that by creating an account, he accepts Zumper’s “Terms and Conditions.” 

That phrase “Terms and Conditions” is a blue hyperlink. Neither party disputes these 

facts, nor that plaintiff viewed a screen with these elements before creating his account. 

See, e.g., First Coyne Decl. ¶¶ 4–17; Reply at 4 (“when a consumer such as 

Mr. Gonzalez-Torres creates a Zumper account” he does not agree to the linked-to 

document); Declaration of Maria Battle, Dkt. 32-1 (“Battle Decl.”) ¶ 3 (plaintiff’s witness 

describing website functioning after clicking “Create an account”). The screen looked 

approximately like this: 

First Coyne Decl. ¶¶ 11–12 (the phrases “Terms and Conditions,” “Privacy Policy,” and 

“Sign In” are in blue, and are readily recognizable as hyperlinks).

The blue phrase “Terms and Conditions” linked to www.zumper.com/terms-of-use. 

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First Coyne Decl. ¶ 17. That document, as displayed at the relevant time (February 27, 

2018), presented with a heading entitled “Terms of Use.” Id. ¶¶ 36–39 & Ex. C

(Exhibit C, filed at Dkt. 24-4, is the “Agreement”) at ECF p. 2. Following that title, the first 

paragraph stated in part: “These terms of use are entered into by and between you and 

Zumper. The following terms and conditions, together with any documents they 

expressly incorporate by reference (collectively, the ‘Agreement’), govern your access to 

and use of the Website and the Services, whether as a guest or a registered user.” 

Agreement at ECF p. 2.

The Agreement later included the following provision, at Section 14 (entitled 

“Arbitration and Dispute Resolution”):

All disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the 

Website or the Services shall be resolved exclusively by 

binding arbitration before a single arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”) in 

accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the 

American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”) then in effect (for 

information on the AAA and its rules, see www.adr.org.) and 

the further procedures set forth herein, except that each party 

retains the right to seek injunctive or other equitable relief in a 

court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the actual or 

threatened infringement, misappropriation or violation of a 

party’s copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, patents or other 

intellectual property rights. The arbitration shall be conducted 

in San Francisco, California, unless the Arbitrator shall 

determine that that venue is not reasonably convenient to all 

parties, in which case the Arbitrator shall determine another 

venue that is. In the event that the AAA is unavailable or 

unwilling to administer the arbitration, and the parties are 

unable to agree to a substitute, a substitute shall be appointed 

by the court. The Arbitrator shall have authority to issue any 

and all remedies authorized by law. The arbitration shall be 

governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2 et seq.

Notwithstanding any rules of the AAA to the contrary, any 

claims shall be adjudicated on an individual basis only, and 

YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO BRING ANY CLAIM AS A 

REPRESENTATIVE OF A PROPOSED CLASS, ON AN 

AGGREGATED OR MASS BASIS, OR AS A PRIVATE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, OR TO CONSOLIDATE 

ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT THE CONSENT 

OF ALL PARTIES THERETO. Any award rendered by the 

Arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the parties 

hereto. . . .

Id. § 14.

Subsequent to the account creation process, other materials were presented to 

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the website’s users. For example, the parties agree that to the extent a user was initially 

directed to Zumper to create an account from a realtor’s referral link, after finishing the 

account creation process described above he would be presented with a pop-up screen 

entitled “Terms and Conditions,” which displayed terms and conditions that a user agreed 

to “[b]y using Zumper[.]” Third Declaration of Brian Coyne, Dkt. 39 (“Third Coyne Decl.”) 

¶¶ 10 & 15; Declaration of Luis Armando Gonzalez-Torres, Dkt. 26-2 (“Gonzalez-Torres

Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–4. Plaintiff alleges that he was directed to create an account with Zumper 

through a realtor’s referral link, and as such after creating an account he was presented 

with that “Terms and Conditions” pop-up screen. Compl. ¶¶ 34–36; Battle Decl. ¶ 3; 

Third Coyne Decl. ¶ 15.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Compel Arbitration

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (“FAA”), any party bound 

to an arbitration agreement that falls within the scope of the FAA may bring a motion in 

federal district court to compel arbitration and stay the proceeding pending resolution of 

the arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4; see also Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 

363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 

119 (2001) (FAA applies to arbitration agreements in any contract affecting interstate 

commerce). The FAA requires the court to compel arbitration of issues covered by the 

arbitration agreement. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). 

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the district court’s role is 

typically limited to determining whether (i) an agreement exists between the parties to 

arbitrate; (ii) the claims at issue fall within the scope of the agreement; and (iii) the 

agreement is valid and enforceable. Lifescan., 363 F.3d at 1012; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho 

Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). If the answers are yes, the 

court must enforce the agreement. Lifescan, 363 F.3d at 1012.

Regarding whether an agreement exists to arbitrate, the “first principle” that 

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underscores the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions is that “[a]rbitration is strictly 

a matter of consent, and thus is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those 

disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l 

B’hd of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted); see also

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Thus, “a court may 

order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties 

agreed to arbitrate that dispute.” Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 297.

Regarding the validity of the agreement, the FAA provides that arbitration clauses 

“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 

equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, state contract defenses 

may be applied to invalidate arbitration clauses if those defenses apply to contracts 

generally. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Circuit City 

Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (state law defense, such as 

unconscionability, that applies to contracts generally may also invalidate an arbitration 

agreement). “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of 

an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of 

proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. 

Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223, 236 (2012). 

Regarding the scope of the agreement, “any doubts concerning the scope of 

arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. 

v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). Nevertheless, a motion to compel 

arbitration should be denied if “it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 

clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” AT&T 

Techs., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). 

2. Motion to Stay

“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon 

any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the 

court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such 

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suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on 

application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 

had in accordance with the terms of the agreement[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). 

Therefore, if the court has determined that the arbitration agreement is valid, and that the 

dispute falls within its terms, the court must stay further proceedings pending arbitration.

B. Analysis

First, plaintiff disputes that the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate. Second, 

he argues that if an agreement to arbitrate was formed, it is unconscionable. Third, he 

argues that if an enforceable arbitration agreement exists, he asserts claims that are not 

subject to arbitration. The court addresses each issue in turn.

1. Whether an Agreement to Arbitrate was Formed

“While the FAA requires a writing, it does not require that the writing be signed by 

the parties.” Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “We ‘apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 

formation of contracts’ to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.’” Norcia v. 

Samsung Telecommunications Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 

First Options of Chi., Inc., 514 U.S. at 944). Here, the parties agree that California law 

governs the issue of contract formation. Mot. at 11; Opp. at 3, 5. “In discerning 

California law, we are bound by the decisions of the California Supreme Court, ‘including 

reasoned dicta.’” Norcia, 845 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 

738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013)). “We generally will ‘follow a published intermediate 

state court decision regarding California law unless we are convinced that the California 

Supreme Court would reject it.’” Id. (quoting Muniz, 738 F.3d at 219).

“Under California law, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of 

an arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence” (Perez v. Maid Brigade, 

Inc., Case No. 07-cv-3473-SI, 2007 WL 2990368, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2007)), “and 

the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as 

unconscionability.” Pinnacle Museum, 55 Cal. 4th at 236. “A contract to arbitrate will not 

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be inferred absent a ‘clear agreement.’” Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1092 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th 

50, 59 (2013)). “In California, a ‘clear agreement’ to arbitrate may be either express or 

implied in fact.” Davis, 755 F.3d at 1093. 

In California, “mutual consent is gathered from the reasonable meaning of the 

words and acts of the parties, and not from their unexpressed intentions or 

understanding.” Reigelsperger v. Siller, 40 Cal. 4th 574, 579 (2007) (citing 1 Witkin, 

Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 116, p. 155). “[T]he terms of a 

contract ordinarily are to be determined by an external, not an internal, standard; the 

outward manifestation or expression of assent is the controlling factor.” Windsor Mills, 

Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 992 (1972). “Although mutual 

consent is a question of fact, whether a certain or undisputed state of facts establishes a 

contract is a question of law for the court.” Deleon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC, 207 Cal. 

App. 4th 800, 813 (2012).

When an offer is accepted, “[a] party who is bound by a contract is bound by all its 

terms, whether or not the party was aware of them. A party cannot avoid the terms of a 

contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.” Norcia, 845 F.3d at 

1284 (internal quotation marks omitted); Pinnacle Museum, 55 Cal. 4th at 236 (“An 

arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never 

actually read the clause.”); Windsor Mills, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 992 (“an offeree, knowing 

that an offer has been made to him but not knowing all of its terms, may be held to have 

accepted, by his conduct, whatever terms the offer contains”). 

The parties do not dispute the relevant facts necessary to determine whether an 

agreement to arbitrate was formed. Because defendant was able to determine that 

plaintiff used a computer with the Windows 10 operating system to create his account, 

defendant was able to provide an image of the account creation window, shown above, 

as it would have appeared to plaintiff. See First Coyne Decl. ¶¶ 11–12 & 23. Plaintiff has 

not disputed the accuracy or relevance of that image. 

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Plaintiff does not dispute that, before creating his account, he was presented with 

a link to “Terms and Conditions.” See, e.g., Reply at 4; Battle Decl. ¶ 3; see also First 

Coyne Decl. ¶¶ 4–17. The same screen also provided that “By creating a Zumper 

account you indicate your acceptance of our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy.” 

First Coyne Decl. ¶¶ 11 & 15. The entirety of the account creation window, including that 

text, was immediately visible and did not require any scrolling to read. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. The 

words “Terms and Conditions” and “Privacy Policy” appeared in blue, indicating they 

were hyperlinks, whereas the rest of the sentence (including the word “and” between the 

two blue phrases) appeared in black. Id. ¶¶ 11, 16. The text “Terms and Conditions” 

linked to a document with a heading “Terms of Use” found at www.zumper.com/terms-ofuse, where Gonzalez-Torres could have read Zumper’s terms. Id. ¶¶ 17, 37. As they 

existed at the time plaintiff created his account, the terms included an arbitration 

agreement. Id. ¶¶ 36–39 & Ex. C. After being presented with that screen, GonzalezTorres created an account at 11:36 a.m. Pacific Standard Time, on February 27, 2018. 

Id. ¶¶ 7, 19, 22; Compl. ¶¶ 34–37. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that under normal circumstances, the applicable 

principles of contract law dictate that those linked-to terms would be part of the 

contractual agreement. But plaintiff argues that defendant pulled a bait-and-switch, 

based on two features of Zumper’s account-creation process. 

First, the initial signup page indicated that the user was agreeing to “Terms and 

Conditions” (which was linked text), but if a user clicked on the link, he would have been 

brought to a document titled “Terms of Use.” So, plaintiff argues that if someone clicked 

that link, it would not be clear whether he was agreeing to the terms in the linked-to

document because its heading differed from the linked text.1

The Agreement’s language here is clear, and the parties’ actions evidence mutual 

 

1 Plaintiff’s arguments are all asserted with respect to a hypothetical reasonable user, as 

he does not allege that he was actually confused, that he noticed the discrepancy in 

language, or even that he clicked on the “Terms and Conditions” link.

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consent to the linked-to terms. The signup page clearly incorporates the linked-to terms, 

and although the heading is different from the linked text, a reasonable person reading 

that document would understand that it contained the terms agreed to when creating an 

account. To the extent plaintiff argues that a reasonable person would be confused by 

the Agreement’s heading, it would require reading only to the third sentence to clarify that 

the document referred to its own contents as “terms and conditions.” See Agreement at 

ECF p. 2. Plaintiff is not saved by declining to read the incorporated terms, because 

when an offer is accepted, “[a] party who is bound by a contract is bound by all its terms, 

whether or not the party was aware of them. A party cannot avoid the terms of a contract 

on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.” Norcia, 845 F.3d at 1284 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, plaintiff argues that there was no mutual assent to the arbitration clause 

because, after the account creation process was complete, Zumper displayed a pop-up 

screen with the heading “Terms and Conditions.” See Gonzalez-Torres Decl. ¶¶ 2–5; 

Battle Decl. ¶¶ 2–5; Third Coyne Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, 10 & 15 (explaining the website 

functioned this way for users who created an account using an invitation link from a 

realtor). Given the existence of that pop-up screen, plaintiff argues that it was ambiguous

as to which set of terms the user agreed when creating his account. But by the time a 

user would have been presented with this new pop-up screen, the user would have 

already created an account and therefore have already entered into the Agreement,

which included a provision requiring arbitration of certain disputes. Plaintiff’s argument 

that these separate terms and conditions were presented simply alleges a separate 

contractual agreement. But plaintiff has not argued that the terms of this second 

agreement revoked or superseded the arbitration provision in the Agreement entered into

during account creation.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that defendant has met its burden to 

establish that the Agreement—containing an arbitration provision—was entered into by 

the parties.

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2. Whether the Agreement is Unconscionable

“Under California law, courts may refuse to enforce any contract found ‘to have 

been unconscionable at the time it was made,’ or may ‘limit the application of any 

unconscionable clause.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011) 

(quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a)). “The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of 

proving unconscionability. Both procedural unconscionability and substantive 

unconscionability must be shown, but they need not be present in the same degree and 

are evaluated on a sliding scale. The more substantively oppressive the contract term, 

the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion 

that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” Pinnacle Museum, 55 Cal. 4th at 247 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“To determine whether the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable 

the court must examine the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the 

circumstances of the parties at that time.” Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 

1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[P]rocedural 

unconscionability requires oppression or surprise. Oppression occurs where a contract 

involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice[.]” Pinnacle Museum, 55 Cal. 4th at 

247 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “A contract is oppressive if an 

inequality of bargaining power between the parties precludes the weaker party from 

enjoying a meaningful opportunity to negotiate and choose the terms of the contract.” 

Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171. “Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreedupon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party 

seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” Id.; Pinnacle Museum, 55 Cal. 4th at 247.

“Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual 

terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. A contract 

term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; 

rather, the term must be so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” Pinnacle Museum, 

55 Cal. 4th at 246 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). An arbitration 

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agreement must call for arbitration that “meet[s] certain minimum requirements, including 

neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision that will 

permit a limited form of judicial review, and limitations on the costs of arbitration.” Craig 

v. Brown & Root, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 416, 422 (2000); accord Wherry v. Award, Inc.,

192 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1248 (2011) (“To be valid, at minimum the arbitration agreement 

must require a neutral arbitrator, sufficient discovery, and a written decision adequate 

enough to allow judicial review.”).

The court assumes without deciding that the Agreement was procedurally 

unconscionable. 

Regarding substantive unconscionability, plaintiff does not challenge the 

Agreement based on any defect in the arbitration process that it requires. Specifically, 

plaintiff does not argue that the mandatory arbitration does not have a neutral arbitrator, 

adequate discovery, a reviewable written decision, or limitations on costs. See Craig, 84 

Cal. App. 4th at 422. Instead, plaintiff raises four other challenges.

First, plaintiff argues that the Agreement eliminates the availability of public 

injunctive relief in any forum, in violation of the law. The Agreement does not do that, as 

discussed below. 

Second, plaintiff argues the Agreement is not mutual because it allows all parties 

to litigate in court—rather than arbitrate—intellectual property disputes. Plaintiff 

concedes that term is facially mutual. But he argues that defendant is more likely than its 

contracting partners to originate intellectual property disputes, so in practical effect the 

term is not mutual. Here, it is speculative whether Zumper or those who enter into this 

Agreement by creating an account (which include realtors and other professionals) are 

more likely to originate an intellectual property dispute and/or benefit from this provision. 

Moreover, Zumper has a legitimate interest in protecting its intellectual property, and it is 

“entitled to an extra ‘margin of safety’ based on legitimate business needs.” Tompkins v. 

23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016). As such, the intellectual property 

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carve-out is not substantively unconscionable.2

Third, plaintiff argues that the Agreement generally—separate from the arbitration 

provision—does not allow for punitive or special damages. Defendant responds that the 

same section of the Agreement provides that “SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW 

THE LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF WARRANTIES OR OF LIABILITY, SO SOME OF 

THE ABOVE LIMITATIONS OR EXCLUSIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.” See

Agreement §§ 11(f)–(g). Reading the section in its entirety, it provides for its own 

inapplicability in jurisdictions where it would limit statutorily-imposed damages and as a 

result be unconscionable. As such, this provision does not render the Agreement 

unconscionable. 

Fourth, plaintiff argues that given the above-argued substantive problems in 

combination, the entire Agreement should be deemed unenforceable rather than excise 

any offending provisions.

“Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a) provides that ‘[i]f the court as a matter 

of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the 

time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 

remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 

application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.’” 

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 121–22 (2000)

(quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 1670.5(a)). “Thus, the statute appears to give a trial 

court some discretion as to whether to sever or restrict the unconscionable provision or 

whether to refuse to enforce the entire agreement. But it also appears to contemplate the 

latter course only when an agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” Id. at 122. “If 

the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole 

cannot be enforced. If the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and 

the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or 

 

2 To the extent it is unconscionable, the provision could be deemed unenforceable with 

no effect on the present dispute.

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restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate.” Id. at 124.

Here, to the extent there are unconscionable provisions, they are discrete, easily 

excisable, and do not concern the central purpose of the Agreement. As such, even if 

any of the provisions plaintiff has identified were in fact unconscionable (none of which 

relate to arbitration of this non-intellectual-property-based dispute), the court would 

excise them rather than render the entire Agreement unenforceable.

For the foregoing reasons, the Agreement is not unconscionable.

3. Whether Claims for Public Injunctive Relief Can be Arbitrated

Plaintiff argues that he asserts claims for public injunctive relief, which the 

arbitration agreement does not allow to be arbitrated. Defendant argues that the 

Agreement allows the arbitrator to award public injunctive relief.

State contract defenses may invalidate arbitration clauses if those defenses apply 

to contracts generally. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687. Contracts that prevent all 

adjudication of public injunctive relief—in any forum—are impermissible under California 

law. McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 961 (“insofar as the arbitration provision here purports to waive 

McGill's right to request in any forum such public injunctive relief, it is invalid and 

unenforceable under California law”). That includes contracts that compel all claims to 

arbitration, yet only allow an arbitrator to award relief affecting the individual who brought 

the claim. See id.; Dornaus v. Best Buy Co., Case No. 18-cv-04085-PJH, 2019 WL 

632957, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) (arbitrator “may award relief only on an individual 

basis”); Blair v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., Case No. 17-cv-02335-WHA, 2017 WL 4805577, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017) (“the arbitrator was prohibited from ‘award[ing] relief that would 

affect RAC account holders other than [the customer]’”). However, a contract compelling 

arbitration of a claim seeking a remedy of public injunctive relief that allows the arbitrator 

to award such relief is valid and enforceable under McGill. See Magana v. DoorDash, 

Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

Here, the Agreement requires that “[a]ll disputes arising out of or relating to this 

Agreement, the Website or the Services shall be resolved exclusively by binding 

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arbitration before a single arbitrator[.]” Agreement § 14. That term unambiguously 

requires that all disputes be resolved exclusively in arbitration (except, as discussed 

above, intellectual property disputes).

Next, the Agreement provides that “The Arbitrator shall have authority to issue any 

and all remedies authorized by law.” Id. The Agreement also provides that “any claims 

shall be adjudicated on an individual basis only, and YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO 

BRING ANY CLAIM AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A PROPOSED CLASS, ON AN 

AGGREGATED OR MASS BASIS, OR AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OR TO 

CONSOLIDATE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ALL 

PARTIES THERETO.” Id. Read together, those terms provide that claims must be 

brought and arbitrated individually, and the arbitrator may award “any and all remedies

authorized by law”—including public injunctive relief—when adjudicating those 

individually-asserted claims. Although a plaintiff may not assert claims on behalf of a 

class in arbitration, the Agreement does not prohibit plaintiff from being awarded public 

injunctive relief as a remedy for his individually-asserted claims in arbitration. As such, 

the Agreement does not prevent plaintiff from obtaining public injunctive relief in any 

forum.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff is COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE HIS CLAIMS 

AGAINST ZUMPER in accordance with this order. The entire action is hereby STAYED 

until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, in 

accordance with 9 U.S.C. § 3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2019

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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