Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00687/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00687-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS BOVARIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON, et al.

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 06cv687 BEN (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ENTRY

OF DEFAULT 

[Doc. Nos. 40, 46]

Marcus Bovarie (Plaintiff), a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Second Amended

Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on December 7, 2006. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended

Complaint (SAC) against several defendants who are currently officials at Centinela State Prison

(Defendants). In his SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have denied and continue to deny him his

constitutional right of access to the courts. Before the Court is (1) Plaintiff’s SAC [Doc. No. 16], (2)

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC [Doc. No. 40] (Mem. P. & A.), (3) Plaintiff’s Opposition [Doc.

No. 41] (Opp’n), and (4) Defendants’ reply brief [Doc. No. 44] (Reply). For the reasons outlined below,

this Court RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 28, 2006. Judge Benitez dismissed Plaintiff’s

complaint without prejudice for failing to pay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). (See

June 28, 2006 Order by Dist. Judge Roger T. Benitez at 3:3-4 [Doc. No. 3].) Plaintiff filed his first

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amended complaint adding two new defendants on July 20, 2006. [Doc. No. 7.] Judge Benitez granted

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint to add two additional defendants. (See

Nov. 9, 2006 Order by Dist. Judge Roger T. Benitez at 15:4-5 [Doc. No. 15].) Plaintiff filed his second

amended complaint on December 7, 2006. [Doc. No. 16.] Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss

on April 4, 2007. [Doc. No. 40.]

Background

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true

all material allegations in the amended complaint and must construe the amended complaint, and all

reasonable inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Law Library

Plaintiff is an inmate committed to the custody of the California Department of Corrections

(CDC). Plaintiff is currently housed at the Centinela State Prison (Centinela) in Imperial, California. In

his SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Centinela and CDC authorities, operations, and procedures, have denied

him his constitutional right of access to the courts on a “substantial and continuous basis since 2002."

(SAC p. 10.) According to Plaintiff, access to the law library is extremely limited for several reasons.

First, two prison facilities consisting of twenty-four hundred inmates share one low-capacity, fifteenperson law library. (Id. at 10.) If the law library opens, it opens only for two, two-hour sessions per day.

(Id.) Further, the law library is negligently supervised. (Id.) Finally, even during “normal program” or

prison operations, access is inadequate even with an “approved deadline,” or one that a court issues and

the law library approves. (Id.)

During “lockdowns” or “modified programs,” access to the law library may not exist. (SAC p.

10.) These conditions are frequent, if not more common, than normal program conditions existing at the

prison. (Id.) During these times, a prisoner may not gain access to the law library at all unless he has an

approved court deadline. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Court Actions

Plaintiff says he has been a habeas petitioner since 2003. (SAC p. 11.) While he only generally

alludes to his habeas petition in the lower state courts, he provided documentation that he filed a habeas

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petition with the California Supreme Court on February 3, 2004. (SAC Ex. B.) 

Plaintiff alleges he did not have time to file a habeas petition in federal court because prison

officials failed to recognize the one-year statute of limitations under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and severely limited his time to access the law library while the statute of

limitations was pending. (SAC p. 11, Ex. C pp.40-41.)

Separate from this action, Plaintiff filed another section 1983 civil rights complaint in this Court,

case no. 04cv2385 JM (WMC). After granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the Court dismissed the

complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. (Id.) Next Plaintiff filed

a first amended complaint (FAC), which the Court dismissed without prejudice on March 1, 2006, for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Judge Miller dismissed the FAC without leave to amend and

terminated the case. Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint on June 16, 2006. On July 27,

2007, Judge Miller dismissed Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and confirmed that the case had

been terminated.

Access to the Law Library

Plaintiff alleges that his law library access consisted of nine, two-hour sessions in all of 2005, for

a total of eighteen hours. (SAC p. 14.) He says that even when prison officials recognize an approved

deadline, they often still deny Plaintiff access to the law library. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff also alleges that

when he is allowed access to the law library, it is usually on the weekends and thus he must choose

between using the law library and receiving visitors. (Id. at 11-12.)

Plaintiff specifies time blocks during which he was not permitted access even though he was

under the AEDPA statute of limitations. These periods include: (1) five months ending 11/13/04; (2)

three months between 4/16/05 and 7/9/05; (3) three months between 7/9/05 and 10/13/05; and (4) two

months between 10/20/05 and 12/15/05. (Id. at 14-15.) Plaintiff alleges he submitted a 602 inmate

appeal regarding these issues that several CDC defendants denied at all levels. (SAC Exs. A2, A3, A4.)

The Defendants

Plaintiff filed his SAC against defendants employed by the CDC. Defendant J. Tilton, Secretary

of the CDC, is responsible “for all operations and policies . . . .” (SAC p. 2.) Defendants J. Woodford, J.

Dovey, Broderick, and R. Hickman, Directors of the CDC, are “responsible for all operations and

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policies . . . .” (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants J. Burleson, V. Alamager, J. Salazar, G. Giurbino, and J.

Gonzalez, Wardens of Centinela, are “responsible for all operations and policies . . . .” (Id. at 4-5.)

Defendants J. Denault, R. Darr and N. Grannis, Lieutenants of Centinela, are “responsible for operations

and policies for facility D including law library access . . . .” (Id. at 5.) Defendants A. Hernandez, J.

Cortez, J. Napolitano, and P. Kuzil-Buan, Facility D Captains, are “responsib[le] for policies and

operations on Facility D . . . .” (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant Z. Stienhaus is the Supervisor of Vocational

Instruction. Defendants M. Cullors, Head of Education, R. Pitones, Senior Law Librarian, and P.

Anchondo, Law Librarian, are “responsibl[e] for the law library . . . .” (Id. at 7, 8.)

Defendants filed the motion to dismiss on behalf of Tilton, Woodford, Dovey, Hickman,

Alamager, Salazar, Giurbino, J. Gonzalez, Denault, Grannis, Hernandez, Cortez, Napolitano, KuzilBuan, Stienhaus, Cullors and Pitones. They did not file on behalf of named defendants Broderick,

Burleson or Darr.

Plaintiff’s Damages

Plaintiff alleges that the almost complete denial of access to the law library has destroyed his

ability to “achieve any semblance of a full and fair litigation.” (SAC p. 15.) He says he has been forced

to submit legal work that is “flawed, partial, barely researched, and ineffective.” (Id.) His legal work,

including his direct appeal, petition for writ of habeas corpus, and this civil rights complaint have been

compromised due to inadequate access to the law library. (Id.) For example, by the time Plaintiff was

able to identify issues for direct appeal, the appeal had already been denied. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff

alleges that he was forced to abandon many issues for his petition for review to the Supreme Court of

California due to lack of access to the law library. (Id.) Plaintiff says his state habeas petition was

denied throughout the state courts because of insufficient access to the law library. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that this civil rights complaint was dismissed twice – once for failure to state a

claim and once for failure to exhaust administrative remedies – because of lack of access to the law

library. (Id. at 16-17.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that due to his lack of access to the law library, he has

not been able to pursue additional causes of action such as those concerning confinement. (Id. at 17.)

Plaintiff states that the “stress, frustration, despair, and emotional distress” from not being able to

“present [his] case properly . . . has caused [him] to suffer from severe migraine headaches . . . a very

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Unless otherwise noted, all future references to “Rule(s)” reference the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

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irregular heartbeat, . . . extreme anxiety, a sense of constant immense pressure, and an inability to sleep

most nights.” (Id. at 18.)

Discussion

I. Standards of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants move to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)1. A motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding such a motion, all material

factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn

from them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is proper only

where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a

cognizable legal theory. Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citation omitted).

B. Pro Se Litigants

When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (2002) (citation omitted).

This rule of liberal construction is “particularly important” in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint,

however, the court is not permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). At a minimum,

the pro se plaintiff “must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

engaged in that support [his] claim.” Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984).

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)

(quotation omitted). A section 1983 claim must allege: (1) a violation of rights protected by the

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Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting

under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To prevail, a

claimant must prove that: (1) a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue,

and (2) the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535

(1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v.

Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

II. Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s SAC on the grounds that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment

bars Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiff’s

allegations are insufficient to state a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s right of access to the court; and (3)

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Eleventh Amendment

Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (SAC p. 2-8.)

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars section 1983 suits for damages against state

officials sued in their official capacities. (Mem. P. & A. p. 3.) 

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits damage actions against state officials acting in their official

capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). The Eleventh

Amendment, however, "does not bar actions against state officers in their official capacities if the

plaintiffs seek only a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief." Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 252

(9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted); see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). Nor

does it bar damage actions against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 31 (1991). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits only damage actions against the "official's

office” – actions that are in reality suits against the state itself – rather than against its individual

officials. See id. at 26; Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff did not expressly request injunctive relief in his original complaint, First Amended

Complaint, or SAC; he only requested compensatory and punitive damages. (SAC, p. 21.) In his

Opposition, however, Plaintiff says he is not pursuing money damages against Defendants in their

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official capacities. He states that naming Defendants in their official capacities “gives notice” that a jury

may impose injunctive relief against defendants in their official capacity. (Opp’n p. 5.) 

This Court finds that Plaintiff does not adequately allege that he seeks declaratory or injunctive

relief against Defendants in their official capacities. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Defendants in their official

capacities be GRANTED. As this is Plaintiff’s first notice that these claims are deficient, the Court

recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend to seek declaratory or injunctive relief against

Defendants in their official capacity.

B. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Access to Courts

a. Constitutional right.

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821

(1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison

grievance procedures); Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d

608, 609 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). This right “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the

preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or

adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; see also Madrid v.

Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 1999); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1996),

amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). The right, however, “guarantees no particular methodology

but rather the conferral of a capability – the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences

or conditions of confinement before the courts . . . . [It is this capability,] rather than the capability of

turning pages in a law library, that is the touchstone” of the right of access to the courts. Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 356-57. Prison officials may select what they judge is the best method to ensure that prisoners will

have the capability to file suit. See id. at 356. Prisons “might replace libraries with some minimal access

to legal advice and a system of court-provided forms . . . that asked inmates to provide only the facts and

not to attempt any legal analysis.” Id. at 352.

/ / /

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The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring complaints to the federal court and not a

right to discover such claims or to litigate them effectively once filed with a court. See Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 354-55; Madrid, 190 F.3d at 995; Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e

conclude the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the constitutional right of access requires a state to

provide a law library or legal assistance only during the pleading stage of a habeas or civil rights

action.”). The right of access to courts also applies to prison grievance proceedings. See Bradley, 64

F.3d at 1279. The right of access is only guaranteed for certain types of claims: (1) direct and collateral

attacks upon a conviction or sentence, and (2) civil rights actions challenging the conditions of

confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.

b. Pleading an access to courts claim.

Prison officials who deliberately deny an inmate access to a legitimate means to petition for

redress of grievances by hindering his litigation may violate the prisoner’s constitutionally protected

right to access to the courts. Lewis 518 U.S. at 351-55 (1996); Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th

Cir. 1994). To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, Plaintiff must allege a specific actual

injury involving a non-frivolous direct appeal, habeas corpus proceeding or section1983 action. See

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52, 353 n.3, 353-5; Madrid, 190 F.3d at 995.

An actual injury is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as

the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348 (internal quotations

omitted); see also Madrid, 190 F.3d at 996; Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094; Vandelft, 31 F.3d at 796; Sands v.

Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). To establish actual injury, a plaintiff "need not

show, ex post, that he would have been successful on the merits had his claim been considered." Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1994). Delays in providing legal materials or assistance that result in

actual injury, however, are “not of constitutional significance” if “they are the product of prison

regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362.

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrances of “a

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious

suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-415

(2002). For a backward-looking claim such as that at issue here, plaintiff “must show: (1) the loss of a

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‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and (3) a

remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” Phillips

v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007).

The first element requires that plaintiff show he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out of

court. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076. The second

element requires that plaintiff show defendant proximately caused the alleged violation of plaintiff’s

rights, “[t]he touchstone . . . [for which] is foreseeability.” Phillips at 1077. Finally, the third element

requires that plaintiff show he has no other remedy than the relief available via this suit for denial of

access to the courts. Id. at 1078-79.

2. Personal Involvement and Causation

a. Allegations of Defendants’ gross negligence.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff alleges no specific facts as to how each Defendant violated his

right to access the courts. A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within

the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation. Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Anyone who causes any

citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. Id. The requisite causal connection

can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by

setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id. 743-44.

Defendants, citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986), argue that Plaintiff’s

allegations of Defendants’ gross negligence in supervision and duty is insufficient to support a civil

rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court in Daniels reviewed a prisoner’s claim that prison

officials had violated his due process rights by negligently leaving pillows on prison stairs on which the

prisoner stumbled and injured himself. Id. at 331. The Court held that more than negligence is required

for due process violations to be actionable under section 1983. Id. The Court reasoned that the Due

Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of

government,” and “to prevent governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of oppression . . . ’”

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Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (quotations omitted). The Daniels Court, however, reserved the question of

whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, is enough to

trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 334 n.3.

Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants acted with gross negligence resulting in Plaintiff being

denied access to the courts. Defendant’s actions allegedly involve an element of abuse of power and

their conduct may be more than mere negligence. Therefore, Daniels does not bar Plaintiff’s claims. The

rationale underlying Daniels ' bar of negligence-based section 1983 claims is that mere lack of due care,

such as leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, is “quite remote” from the Fourteenth Amendment's

purpose of redressing abuses of power by state officials. 474 U.S. at 332. Here, the Court

RECOMMENDS finding that the facts Plaintiff put at issue – that Defendants made, enforced, and

allowed policies that resulted in Plaintiff being denied access to the courts – support a claim that may

amount to more than negligence.

b. Allegations against defendants involved in prison appeal system.

Defendants Stienhaus (Supervisor of Vocational Instruction), Gonzalez (Associate Warden),

Burleson (Appeals Examiner), and Salazar (Warden) move to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the

additional ground that there is no constitutional right to a prison inmate appeal system. (Mem. P. & A. p.

5.) Plaintiff, however, does not claim that he has a constitutional right to a prison inmate appeal system.

Plaintiff’s claim is that these Defendants contributed to Plaintiff’s denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff

states that these Defendants “were made aware of the blatant constitutional violations and the damage

being caused by said violations” and they did “nothing to remedy the situation.” (Opp’n p. 7.) The Court

RECOMMENDS finding that the allegations against Stienhaus, Gonzalez, Burleson and Salazar allege

conduct that is actionable under the Due Process Clause.

3. Plaintiff’s Injuries: Underlying Causes of Action

a. Plaintiff’s state habeas corpus petition.

Plaintiff filed a habeas petition in California Supreme Court on February, 3, 2004. (SAC Ex. B.)

On December 1, 2004, in an en banc hearing, that court denied Plaintiff’s habeas petition. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that he was forced to abandon many issues for his petition for review to the Supreme Court of

California due to lack of access to the law library. (SAC, p. 16.) He also alleges that his writ of habeas

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The Court takes judicial notice of the docket for this action, case no. 04cv2385 JM (WMC). See

Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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corpus was also denied throughout the state courts because of insufficient access to the law library. (Id.)

Plaintiff, however, does not allege the Defendant’s actions caused the specific results he received

in the state habeas proceedings. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that the state courts denied his

habeas petition for a reason such as untimeliness. Also, the record does not indicate why the state court

denied Plaintiff’s claims. Finally, Plaintiff does not allege that the claims he was forced to abandon at

the California Supreme Court level were non-frivolous. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to

allege that he suffered an actual injury from denial of the state habeas petition or indicate a clear causeand-effect between Defendants’ actions and his loss of opportunity to litigate. This Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED for Plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim for injury from the state habeas petition. As this is Plaintiff’s first notice of this deficiency, the

Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the SAC.

b. Plaintiff’s attempt to file a federal habeas petition.

In Exhibit C to the SAC, Plaintiff explains that the time limit to file his habeas petition had been

used up and that he had to file a civil rights complaint to obtain relief. (SAC, Ex. C, pp.40-41.) He opted

to file a civil rights complaint rather than file a federal habeas petition with almost no supporting federal

cases. (Id.)

Plaintiff does not allege that he was completely shut out of federal court; he says that he would

not have been able to include federal cases in his petition. Further, Plaintiff never alleges that his

proposed federal habeas claims were non-frivolous. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for injury from his

inability to file a federal habeas petition. As this is Plaintiff’s first notice of this deficiency, the Court

recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the SAC.

c. Plaintiff’s section 1983 complaint.

As previously stated, Plaintiff filed a different section 1983 complaint in this court – case no.

04cv2385 JM (WMC) – under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 24, 2004.2

 (SAC Ex. E.) On July 27,

2007, Judge Miller dismissed Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and confirmed that the case had

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been terminated. Plaintiff alleges that his complaint had been dismissed twice – once for failure to state

a claim and once for failure to exhaust administrative remedies – because of lack of access to the law

library. (Id. at 16-17.) 

At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct

may withstand a motion to dismiss because the general allegations embrace the specific facts necessary

to support the claim. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citations omitted). The

Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he pleaded a nonfrivolous section 1983 action as

required by Lewis and that he has properly alleged he has suffered an actual injury. Therefore, in regards

to Plaintiff’s underlying section 1983 complaint, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss by DENIED.

C. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity entitles government officials to “an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted

to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). Qualified immunity

shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). Generally, the qualified immunity

doctrine must “‘give[] ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting ‘all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991).

“Therefore, regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the officer should prevail if the

right asserted by the plaintiff was not ‘clearly established’ or the officer could have reasonably believed

that his particular conduct was lawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

To analyze a qualified immunity claim, a court must first determine whether, taken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts show that the defendants violated the

claimant’s constitutional rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the answer is no, the

analysis ends. If the answer is yes, the court must then consider whether the defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. See id. at 201; Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

banc). If the Court finds that the facts taken in light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants did

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violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The “salient question” is whether the state of the law at the time

gives officials “fair warning” that their conduct is unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S.730, 740 (2002). The

relevant inquiry focuses on “what the officer reasonably understood his powers and responsibilities to

be, when he acted, under clearly established standards.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208. The plaintiff bears the

burden of proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the violation.

See Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged an access to courts claim based on his underlying section

1983 action. During the time Plaintiff was incarcerated in Centinela State Prison, an inmate's right to

law library access was clearly established by existing case law. The question, however, of whether any

or all of the Defendants could reasonably have believed that their conduct was lawful is more properly

resolved on a motion for summary judgment or at trial, when Defendants are entitled to present evidence

on their behalf and the Court may properly consider such evidence. Thus, for the purposes of the instant

motion, the Court cannot resolve the issue of whether any or all of the Defendants is entitled to qualified

immunity. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ claim that they are entitled to

qualified immunity be DENIED without prejudice.

E. Defendants Broderick, Burleson and Darr

Defendants did not respond on behalf of defendants Broderick, Burleson and Darr. Plaintiff filed

a request to enter default against all defendants who have not yet responded. [Doc. No. 46.]

According to the docket, Plaintiff never attempted to serve Broderick with the complaint. Also,

the waiver of service was never served on Burleson. [Doc. No. 19.] Therefore, neither Broderick nor

Burleson have been brought in to this action and were not obligated to respond to the complaint.

The complaint, however, was served on defendant Darr. Darr returned a waiver of service on

March 3, 2007. His response was due May 8, 2007. [Doc. No. 36.] Darr is the only served defendant

who has not responded to the SAC. Because the Court is dismissing the complaint against the other

similarly situated served defendants for failure to state a claim, the Court sua sponte under 42 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)ii), RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for default be DENIED, that the SAC be

DISMISSED against Darr as it is against the other Defendants, and ORDERS Darr to respond to any

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future pleading filed by plaintiff.

III. Motion to Strike Request for Punitive Damages

Finally, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. Under Rule 12(f), the

Court “may order stricken from any pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” A Rule 12(f) motion “avoid[s] the expenditure of time and money that must arise from

litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.

Supp. 1450, 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see also Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.

1993).

Punitive damages are available under section 1983. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499

U.S. 1, 17 (1991); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir. 1993). A jury may award them

even when the plaintiff cannot show compensable injury. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54, 55 n.21

(1983); Davis v. Mason Co., 927 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991). The jury must find either that the

defendant acted with an evil motive or intent or demonstrated reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. 

Here, Plaintiff fails to expressly allege that Defendants acted maliciously or with reckless

indifference. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer

for punitive damages be GRANTED. Because this is Plaintiff’s first notice of this deficiency, this Court

recommends granting Plaintiff leave to amend to properly allege his claim for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court recommends the following orders:

1. Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for damages be GRANTED as to all Defendants in 

their official capacities with leave to amend to seek declaratory or injunctive relief;

2. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on injury from denial of underlying

state habeas petition be GRANTED with leave to amend;

3. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on injury from inability to bring

federal habeas petition be GRANTED with leave to amend;

4. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on injury from underlying section

1983 complaint be DENIED;

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5. Assertion of qualified immunity defense is DENIED without prejudice;

6. Plaintiff’s request for default be DENIED and that the Second Amended Complaint be

DISMISSED against Darr as it is against the other Defendants; and

7. Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages be STRICKEN with leave to amend.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge submits this report and recommendation pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) to the United States District Judge assigned to this case.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 21, 2007 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than August 31, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 30, 2007

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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