Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02022/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREVOR McDONALD BIRD,

Petitioner, No. CIV S 03-2022 MCE EFB P

vs.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner, without counsel, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has answered and petitioner has filed a traverse.

On January 21, 1999, the state filed an information charging petitioner with murder of

Lloyd Lee Brown by personal use of deadly and dangerous weapons, namely, a tire, a gallon jug

of water and a board. CT. at 12 - 13. A jury found petitioner guilty as charged. CT. at 192. 

The court sentenced petitioner to 25 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. CT. at

290.

On appeal the judgment was affirmed in a reasoned decision. Answer, Exhibit D. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Exhibit E. That 

court summarily denied review. Answer, Exhibit F. 

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The following facts are taken from the state appellate court’s opinion:

On the evening of November 5, 1998, several offensive linemen

from the Butte College football team went out for pizza with their

coach. Among the players were Brett Portner, Bodie Dressler, 

Corey Fipps and Dereck Phillips. After pizza, these players went

back to Phillips's room, where defendant joined them. Dressler.

Phillips and defendant were drinking hard alcohol. They all

decided to go look for a party. Joined by two girls who were his

friends, Fipps drove them to downtown Chico. 

They first went to a fraternity house. The man outside stopped

them, telling them they could not enter because it was a private

social between the fraternity and a sorority. Phillips, who got

hostile when drunk, became verbally abusive. Portner, Fipps and

maybe defendant stepped in to stop him. As they walked down the

street, Phillips got into another altercation with someone they

passed. Fipps broke it up. 

Portner, Phillips and Fipps went into an alley to urinate. A man in

a sleeping bag said “hey, don't pee over here" or "hey, you jerks,

I'm sleeping here." Portner apologized and rejoined the others.

Phillips said, "what did you say, you bum" and "why don't you get.

a fucking job?" The man, later identified as Lloyd Brown,

answered, " I'm trying." Phillips kicked Brown; Fipps grabbed

Phillips and they left. 

Phillips told defendant there was a bum back there and defendant

said, "[l]et's go back." Fipps ran ahead and picked up Brown,

telling him, "these guys are drunk. Why don't you just get out of

here. They're going to mess with you.'' Fipps told Phillips the guy

was homeless and not to mess with him. Just then defendant went

by and struck Brown in the head, knocking him down. Defendant

began messing with Brown's backpack and Fipps grabbed him. 

Then Phillips messed with the backpack and Fipps grabbed him. 

Fipps then announced he was leaving. 

Scared, Fipps ran back to the others and said they were beating up

the homeless man. Portner and Dressler told Fipps they did not

need to get involved; the police would come. 

Shannon G. lived nearby with Nicky W. She heard yelling and

looked out her window; she saw two men yelling at a man on the

ground, "why did you call me a punk ass?" They began to kick the

man on the ground; she could hear the kicks landing. Phillips said

stand him up and defendant lifted Brown; as he let go, Brown fell

to the ground. Brown did not throw any punches. While Phillips

and defendant were still kicking Brown, Nicky called 911. 

Shannon thought defendant was leaving, but he returned with a

board; lifting it over his head, he beat Brown at least 10 times.

Brown was not moving. Phillips dropped a five gallon water bottle

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on Brown, making a thud. Then Phillips got a spare tire from a

truck and dropped it on Brown.

Nicky described the fight over the phone to the 911 operator: 

"there are three males kicking the crap out of some guy, and he's

totally down on the ground. They just keep beating him up. Like,

he's, the guy is on the ground and they can't get him up, and

they're, they're kicking him." She described the kicking, and then

the hitting with the water bottle, the board and the tire. She

described two assailants.

Brian F. lived next door and heard metal clanging against concrete

and yelling. He saw two men brutally beating a man on the

ground. The man on the ground did not move. The assailants

picked him up and dropped him, hit him with a fence board, a pipe

or bat, a spare tire and a five-gallon water jug. They yelled, "why

did you call me a bitch?"

When police sirens sounded, Phillips and defendant ran away. The

police followed Phillips; a police car got in front of him and he

dropped to his knees. Defendant ran and climbed onto a roof. The

police set up a perimeter and told defendant to keep his hands

where they could see them. Defendant put his hands out and rolled

off the roof.

A criminalist examined the water bottle and found hair, tissue,

bloodstains and two dents. There were bloodstains and tissue on

the tire. He pieced together five pieces of board that had originally

been one piece. There were bloodstained smears or splatters on

the board, some had been deposited after the board broke. There

were bloodstains on defendant's shoes and his pants.

Gwen Hall, a forensic pathologist, testified to 27 distinct injuries to

Brown. There were at least five blows to the head, which would

be fatal. Her primary diagnosis was severe cranial cerebral

trauma; trauma to the skull and brain, consistent with a heavy

object being dropped. There were injuries to the chest, consistent

with being hit by a board. The fatty tissue and liver were lacerated

and there were rib fractures. These injuries could be fatal over the

long term. Dr. Hall found approximately five fatal injuries, two to

the head and three to the chest. The injuries to the chest

contributed to the cause of death by producing further injury and

impairing Brown's breathing. Brown was beaten to death.

In defense Deidra T., one of the girls present that night, testified

defendant helped break up Phillips's first two altercations. She had

told the officer Phillips and defendant were "way beyond drunk,"

but she did not think they were. She saw defendant fall down that

night while kicking cans.

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Raymond Deutsch, a doctor specializing in addiction medicine,

testified about the fight or flight reaction. The old brain,

unchanged from the time of the dinosaurs, was responsible for

instinctual behavior and survival. The new brain is responsible for

judging the pros and cons of behavior. One of the wired-in

instinctual behaviors is the fear response or fight or flight

response. It occurs when an animal is subjected to a frightening

stimulus, responding with an increase in heart rate, hair standing

up, dilated pupils, freezing and then a trigger. Once the trigger

goes, the reaction continues until completion.

Based on the stipulation that defendant had a blood alcohol level

of .165 at 12:31 a.m., Dr. Deutsch opined defendant's blood

alcohol level was .18 during the fight. That level was moderate to

high impairment. Alcohol impairs judgment and lowers the

threshold for a reaction.

In Dr. Deutsch's opinion, the incident was compatible with a fight

reaction. It was a single event fight in which it was not necessary

to invoke cortical thinking process and judgment. The fight

reaction tends to be initiated by various triggers and tends to occur

because of the lower threshold. It proceeds in an all-or-none

fashion until completion.

Answer, Exhibit D.

Habeas Corpus Standards

This court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication resulted in a

decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as clearly established

by the United States Supreme Court or in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

When a petitioner “challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record,” a federal court must first determine whether the adjudication resulted in a decision

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th

Cir. 2004). A state court’s determination is unreasonable if the court failed to make a factual

finding when it should have, the state court’s factual finding is made under an incorrect legal

standard or when the fact-finding process is defective. Taylor, 366 F.3d 992. If a federal court

finds the state court’s determination is reasonable, the court must presume it is correct, although

the determination may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 999; 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(e)(1). 

When a petitioner challenges a state court’s legal determinations, the court must

determine whether it is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state

court applies incorrect legal authority, or if it applies correct authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different

result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but

applies it to the facts of the prisoner’s case in a manner that is “objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “Clearly established federal law” is defined as the

holdings of the United States Supreme Court existing when the state court issued its decision. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Circuit law is “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

The court examines the last reasoned decision of a state court as the basis of the state

court’s judgment. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). When no state court has

explained its decision, a federal court determines whether the decision contravenes or

unreasonably applies clearly established federal law without independently deciding the

contested legal question. Wilson v. Czerniak, 355 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).

Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner claims that instructing the jury on the law of principals violated due process by

permitting the jury to find him guilty on an aiding and abetting theory without requiring the jury

to find that petitioner intended to aid and abet the murder. The appellate court determined that

the trial court did not give an aiding and abetting instruction but it did instruct the jury not to

speculate about the other person involved. Answer, Exhibit E, 11-12. The appellate court

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concluded that nothing in the jury instructions permitted the jury to find petitioner guilty based

solely on his co-defendant’s actions, and so there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury

found petitioner guilty of aiding and abetting first degree murder without the intent necessary for

aiding and abetting. Answer, Exhibit E. 

Due process requires the state to prove an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In

re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970). To return a verdict of guilty, a jury must find that

every element of the crime with which the defendant is charged is proved beyond a reasonable

doubt and the jury instructions must give effect to this requirement. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508

U.S. 275, 277-278 (1993); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1979). Therefore, the

failure to instruct on an essential element of the crime charged violates due process. See Neder

v. United States, 527 U.S. 9, 8 (1999); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997). 

In California, murder perpetrated by “torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,

and premeditated killing,” is first degree murder. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187, 189 (West 1988). For

the jury to convict petitioner of murder by torture, the prosecution had to prove that petitioner

committed a series of violent acts intended to cause extreme pain and suffering for the purpose

of revenge, extortion or any sadistic purpose. People v. Proctor, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 356 (Cal.

1992); People v. Baker, 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1223 (Cal. 2002). The prosecution did not have to

prove that any single act, itself, caused death or that petitioner intended to kill. Proctor, 15

Cal.Rptr.2d at 356; People v. Demond, 130 Cal.Rptr. 590, 595 (Cal. App. 1976). For the jury to

find petitioner guilty of premeditated murder, the prosecution had to prove that before acting,

petitioner considered a course of action, weighed the considerations for and against it, and then

acted so as to cause the victim’s death. People v. Mayfield, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 59 (Cal. 1997). 

Principals are all persons involved in a crime, whether they directly commit it or merely

aid and abet its commission. People v. Cook, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 188 (Cal. App. 1998). An

aider and abetter is a principal who “is present at the scene of the crime, but does not engage in

the criminal conduct; he merely assists the [other] principal . . . in committing the crime.” Cook,

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 This is the part of the skull that holds the brain. RT at 392.

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72 Cal.Rptr.2d at 188 (emphasis in original). Consequently, it must be proved that the aider and

abetter acts with “knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or

purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” Id. 

But if the defendant performed an element of the offense, the jury need not be instructed on

aiding and abetting, even if an accomplice performed other acts that completed the crime.” Id. at

187-88.

Through eye-witnesses, the prosecution adduced evidence that petitioner and his codefendant, Phillips, repeatedly kicked the victim in the head, shoulder and torso. The eyewitness testimony also adduced that petitioner: left the victim momentarily to get a board with

which he returned and then beat the victim; that Phillips momentarily left once to get a spare tire

from a nearby truck, with which he returned and dropped on the victim; and that he again left to

get a 5-gallon water jug, with which he also returned and used to beat the victim. RT. at 240-

254, 270-279. Petitioner and Phillips inflicted 27 separate injuries, including a fractured facial

bone which passed into the cranial wall,1

 broken bones around his left eye, a broken jawbone,

fractured ribs, bruising on his neck and face, brain hemorrhage and multiple skull fractures. RT.

at 390, 392, 394, 399, 402, 403, 405. At least five distinct injuries could have been fatal,

including the fractured ribs, likely caused by blows with the board, and two of the head injuries,

likely caused by kicking. RT. at 403-405, 407-08, 

The prosecution requested the aiding and abetting instruction over defense counsel’s

objection. RT. at 617, 661. The court said that the evidence did not warrant an aiding and

abetting instruction but the jury should be instructed on principals. RT. at 676. Therefore, in

addition to accurate premeditated murder and murder by torture instructions, the court gave an

instruction on the law of principals:

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 Petitioner submitted notices of supplemental authority to draw the court’s attention to

Martinez v. Garcia, 379 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) and Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir.

2004). Gibson addresses the problem of an instruction that diluted the state’s burden of proof

through permissible inferences. Gibson, 387 F.3d at 822. Martinez addresses the problem of a

transferred intent instruction and confusing verdict form leading to the possibility that the

defendant was convicted on a ground that cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Martinez,

379 F.3d at 1035-36, 1039. Here, despite petitioner’s insistence to the contrary, no faulty

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Persons who are involved in committing a crime are referred to as principals in

that crime. Each principal regardless of the extent or manner of participation is

equally guilty.

RT. at 676, 744.

The evidence demonstrated that petitioner actively participated in the beating and the

court did not instruct the jury on aiding and abetting. Indeed, from the facts as recited in the

state appellate court’s opinion, it was defendant who said "[l]et's go back.” Answer, Exhibit D. 

It was defendant who, shortly after Fipps told Phillips the guy was homeless and not to mess

with him, “struck Brown in the head, knocking him down.” Id. It was defendant who “began

messing with Brown's backpack and Fipps grabbed him.” Id. It was defendant who “lifted

Brown; as he let go, Brown fell to the ground.” Id. The facts as found by the state court also

show that “[w]hile Phillips and defendant were still kicking Brown, Nicky [an eye witness]

called 911.” Id. It was defendant who “returned with a board; lifting it over his head, he beat

Brown at least 10 times.” Id. The evidence further adduced that: “five pieces of board that had

originally been one piece. There were bloodstained smears or splatters on the board, some had

been deposited after the board broke. There were bloodstains on defendant's shoes and his

pants.” Id. Although the prosecutor once stated that when petitioner was not participating he

was “standing right there,” aiding and abetting was not the foundation of the prosecution’s

argument. RT. at 736. Defense counsel conceded that defendant participated in the beating, but

argued that petitioner lacked the requisite intent for murder. RT. at 661, 704-711, 712-728. 

Therefore, there was no basis for the jury to convict petitioner on an aiding and abetting theory,

much less an aiding and abetting theory for which it had an incomplete instruction.2

 The state

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court’s fact findings were not unreasonable and its legal determination was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

this claim.

Petitioner also claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

by instructing the jury on aiding and abetting after the parties finished their closing arguments. 

The state court determined that the modified principals instruction did not introduce the theory of

aiding and abetting. Answer, Exhibit B at 15.

The right to counsel encompasses the right to make a closing argument based on all

theories supported by the evidence. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975); U.S. v.

Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 100-1001 (9th Cir. 2003). Trial counsel did not want an aiding and

abetting instruction and the trial court did not give one. The state court’s determination is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 13, 2006.

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