Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02396/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable FERNANDO J. GAITAN, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2396

___________

Crissy Simpson, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Tim Thomure, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 15, 2006

 Filed: May 7, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Crissy Simpson’s right hand was severely injured in an accident at work while

she was operating a power press machine. Simpson filed suit in Missouri state court

against the out-of-state power press manufacturer and Tim Thomure, her supervisor,

a fellow Missouri resident. The manufacturer defendants removed. The district court1

denied Simpson’s motion to remand to state court and dismissed her claim against

Thomure, concluding that he was fraudulently joined and therefore the court had

diversity jurisdiction over the action. After resolving her claims against the out-ofAppellate Case: 06-2396 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/07/2007 Entry ID: 3306535
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state manufacturer defendants, Simpson appealed the order denying her motion to

remand and dismissing her claim against non-diverse defendant Thomure. Reviewing

that order de novo, we affirm.

I. The Procedural Setting

Simpson’s complaint alleged that the power press machine could be operated

in two control modes: with palm buttons that ensure the operator’s hands are outside

the die spaces when the press is operating, or with a foot pedal that allows the press

to operate when the operator’s hands are in danger. Simpson alleged that supervisor

Thomure “knew that the machine should not have been operated with a foot pedal,”

that he controlled a key that turned the machine from foot pedal mode to palm button

mode, and that he “affirmatively set the machine up so that it could be activated by

foot pedals and then had [Simpson] operate the machine in this dangerous condition”

without giving her adequate safety instructions. Simpson alleged that Thomure was

liable in damages because his affirmative negligence created a hazardous condition

and breached a personal duty to Simpson.

There is no federal diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff and any defendant are

citizens of the same State. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). However, the right of an out-of-state

defendant to remove a diversity suit to federal court “cannot be defeated by a

fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant.” Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257

U.S. 92, 97 (1921). Invoking this principle, the out-of-state defendants filed a timely

notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), asserting that defendant Thomure was

fraudulently joined because, as Simpson’s co-worker, he was immune from suit under

the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.120.2. Simpson

responded with a timely motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447, arguing that

Thomure was not fraudulently joined because there was a “reasonable basis in fact and

law” supporting the claim against him and therefore the district court lacked diversity

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We doubt this is a sound principle for deciding fraudulent joinder issues that

turn on the non-diverse defendant’s alleged immunity from suit. We also note that the

Filla opinion discussed the merits of the fraudulent joinder issue before dismissing,

for lack of appellate jurisdiction, an appeal from the grant of a remand motion. See

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). This discussion was of no precedential force because we lacked

jurisdiction to review the merits of the remand order “whether erroneous or not and

whether review [was] sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ.” Thermtron Prods.,

Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976). 

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jurisdiction. Menz v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 440 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2006),

quoting Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2002).

The district court denied the motion to remand and dismissed Simpson’s claim

against Thomure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After dismissing Thomure, the court had diversity

jurisdiction to proceed with Simpson’s claims against the manufacturer defendants.

See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996). Four months later, the

remaining parties filed stipulations of dismissal, and the court entered final judgment.

Simpson then appealed the order denying her remand motion and dismissing her claim

against Thomure. 

On appeal, Simpson argues that the district court erred in denying her motion

to remand because a Missouri court might impose co-worker liability on Thomure

based on the facts alleged in her complaint. She argues that Missouri law of coworker liability is fact intensive and ambiguous; therefore, the district court was

obligated to “resolve all facts and ambiguities in the current controlling substantive

law in the plaintiff’s favor” and remand. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806,

811 (8th Cir. 2003).2

 

In our view, Simpson attacks the wrong half of the district court’s order.

Caterpillar v. Lewis teaches that, because Thomure, the non-diverse party, was

dismissed from the case, we must decide this appeal based upon the present procedural

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posture of the case. Compare Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S.

567, 572-73 (2004). At this time, final judgment has been entered, so there is nothing

to remand to state court unless the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of

Simpson’s claim against Thomure is reversed. If that claim is revived, remand will

follow automatically because Simpson and Thomure, the only remaining defendant,

are citizens of the same State. Thus, the significant issue on appeal is whether the

district court erred in dismissing the claim against Thomure on the merits. Our review

is still de novo, but we may not grant Simpson relief simply because Missouri law

may be unclear or hard to apply. Rather, we must review under state law the

correctness of the district court’s decision to dismiss, just as we would if Simpson and

Thomure were citizens of different States and the district court granted Thomure’s

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

II. The Merits

The Supreme Court of Missouri has succinctly stated the principle governing

whether supervisor Thomure is immune from employee Simpson’s negligence claim:

The [Missouri] Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive

remedy against employers for injuries covered by its provisions. This

immunity from suit extends to employees of the exempt employer, albeit

in a more limited fashion. Suits against employees personally for breach

of the duty to maintain a safe working environment are preempted by the

workers’ compensation remedy: “However, an employee may sue a

fellow employee for affirmative negligent acts outside the scope of an

employer’s responsibility to provide a safe workplace.”

State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 621-22 (Mo. banc 2002), quoting

Kelley v. DeKalb Energy Co., 865 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 1993). In Taylor,

plaintiff’s claim was based on alleged negligent driving by a co-worker. The Court

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concluded that the co-worker was entitled to immunity from suit because the claim

simply alleged breach of the employer’s duty to maintain a safe work environment.

The Missouri courts treat this issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction.

Taylor, 73 S.W.3d at 623. Therefore, a motion to dismiss is the proper way to raise

the issue, and the trial court then has the option of deciding the motion on the

pleadings or receiving evidence addressing disputed jurisdictional facts. See Risher

v. Golden, 182 S.W.3d 583, 586-87 (Mo. App. 2005). In this case, although

defendants submitted an affidavit by Thomure in opposition to Simpson’s motion to

remand, the district court relied solely on Simpson’s complaint in dismissing her claim

against Thomure for failure to state a claim. 

The question whether a co-worker committed the kind of “affirmative negligent

act” that creates an exception to workers’ compensation immunity is decided “on a

case-by-case basis with close reference to the facts in each individual case.” Taylor,

73 S.W.3d at 622. The Supreme Court of Missouri has addressed the issue in three

cases. In 1993, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of a

supervisor, holding that evidence he personally arranged a “make-shift” hoist system

that failed, causing an employee’s injuries, “may constitute an affirmative negligent

act outside the scope of his responsibility to provide a safe workplace . . . . Such acts

constitute a breach of personal duty of care owed to plaintiff.” Tauchert v. Boatmen’s

Nat’l Bank, 849 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Mo. banc 1993). However, eight months later, the

Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of five co-workers who

designed and constructed a “corn flamer” that exploded, severely burning a fellow

employee. The Court concluded that “the condition of the corn flamer was part of the

employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace,” distinguishing Tauchert

because there was no evidence the corn flamer was “make-shift” or “jerry-rigged.”

Kelley, 865 S.W.2d at 672. 

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In subsequent decisions applying Tauchert and Kelley, the Missouri Court of

Appeals noted two considerations important in determining whether a co-worker is

not entitled to workers’ compensation immunity because his alleged conduct

constituted the kind of affirmative negligent act that breached a personal duty of care.

First, immunity is likely to attach if the co-employee’s negligence occurred while he

was regularly carrying out ordinary duties for the employer. See Collier v. Moore, 21

S.W.3d 858, 862 (Mo. App. 2000); Felling v. Ritter, 876 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Mo. App.

1994). On the other hand, a supervisor is not entitled to his employer’s immunity if

he directed the plaintiff employee “to engage in dangerous conditions that a

reasonable person would recognize as hazardous beyond the usual requirements of

employment.” Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. App. 2000); see

Logsdon v. Killinger, 69 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Mo. App. 2002); Hedglin v. Stahl

Specialty Co., 903 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Mo. App. 1995).

The Missouri Supreme Court returned to the co-employee immunity issue in

Taylor, holding that a co-worker was entitled to immunity from a suit alleging that his

negligent driving of the employer’s truck in the course of his regular duties injured his

passenger, a fellow employee. “This is not the kind of purposeful, affirmatively

dangerous conduct that Missouri courts have recognized as moving a fellow employee

outside the protection of the Workers’ Compensation Law’s exclusive remedy

provisions.” 73 S.W.3d at 622. 

A large majority of the Missouri Court of Appeals decisions since the decision

in Taylor have held co-worker defendants immune from suit. In several cases, the

defendant supervisors had instructed the plaintiffs to engage in conduct which put

them at risk, but the conduct was within the usual requirements of their jobs. See

Risher, 182 S.W.3d at 587-89; Nowlin ex rel. Carter v. Nichols, 163 S.W.3d 575, 578-

79 (Mo. App. 2005); State ex rel. Larkin v. Oxenhandler, 159 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Mo.

App. 2005); Graham v. Geisz, 149 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Mo. App. 2004). In the one case

where dismissal of a co-worker was reversed on the merits, plaintiff complained that

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her machine was malfunctioning dangerously. Her supervisor replied, “quit whining,”

and instructed plaintiff to keep using the machine without correcting the malfunction

or even inspecting the machine’s condition, which “effectively created the dangerous

condition resulting in the injuries sustained.” Groh v. Kohler, 148 S.W.3d 11, 16

(Mo. App. 2004).

In this case, Simpson alleges that she was injured while performing her normal

duty of operating the power press machine. The machine was not “make shift” or

“jerry-rigged,” nor did her injury result from a malfunction of which Thomure was

aware and ignored. Rather, Thomure was allegedly negligent for setting the machine

to operate in the more dangerous of its two control modes and for allowing Simpson

to operate the machine in that control mode without adequate safety instruction. Like

the corn flamer in Kelley, the condition of the power press machine “was part of the

employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.” 865 S.W.2d at 672.

Failing to install a recommended safety device relates to the employer’s general duty

to provide a safe work environment. Felling, 876 S.W.2d at 3, 5. And allegations of

inadequate training or inadequate safety warnings also relate to the employer’s general

duty. See Crow v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 174 S.W.3d 523, 529-30 (Mo.

App. 2005). 

There is no allegation in Simpson’s complaint of the kind of “purposeful,

affirmatively dangerous conduct” that the Supreme Court of Missouri required in

Taylor, nor was Thomure alleged to have directed Simpson to engage in conditions

that a reasonable person would recognize as hazardous beyond the usual requirements

of her job. In these circumstances, the district court correctly concluded that Thomure

was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity and dismissed Simpson’s negligence

claim.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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