Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-00467/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-00467-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

HEATH JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CITY OF HEFLIN,

ALABAMA,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:14-CV-467-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Heath Jones (“Mr. Jones”) initiated this retaliatory discharge case

arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Defendant City of

Heflin (the “City”) on March 17, 2014. (Doc. 1). Mr. Jones claims in his lawsuit that

the City fired him as a police officer in retaliation for: (i) refusing to falsely report

to the husband of a female police officer who had sued the City for gender

discrimination that his wife was having an affair; and (ii) supporting that female

police officer’s allegations of gender discrimination, including offering to be a

witness in her case. The rather bizarre set of facts further reveal that Mr. Jones has,

for a number of years, been living with a convicted felon and his refusal to end that

FILED

 2016 Sep-19 PM 03:35

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 1 of 55
relationship isthe reason the City has given for hisfiring. The retaliatory twist isthat,

according to Mr. Jones, his supervisor was aware of the relationship he and his excon fiancée had at the time of his hiring and it had never been a job-ending issue until

Mr. Jones refused to make the false-affair report sought by the same supervisor. 

Pending before the court isthe City’s Motion for Summary Judgment(Doc. 18)

(the “Motion”) filed on December 10, 2015. The parties have briefed and filed

evidence relating to the Motion, including additional briefing that was ordered (Doc.

29) by the court on July 19, 2016. (Docs. 19, 24-25, 32, 33). The Motion is now under

submission and, for those reasons explained below, the Motion is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R . CIV. P.

56(a). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved

in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th

Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). “Once the moving party

2

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 2 of 55
has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to ‘come forward with specific factsshowing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” International Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270,

1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). Finally “[i]f the

movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, because, as a defendant, it is asserting

an affirmative defense, it must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact

as to any element of that defense.” International Stamp, 456 F.3d at 1274 (citing

Martin v. Alamo Community College Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

B. Title VII Retaliation

Title VII prohibits “[r]etaliation against an employee who engagesin statutorily

protected activity.” Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1257

(11th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court originally established the basic allocation of

burdens and order of proof in a Title VII disparate treatment case in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).

When relying upon circumstantial evidence1 “[a] plaintiff establishes a prima facie

1 As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could

be nothing other than to discriminate [or retaliate] . . . constitute direct evidence of discrimination.”

Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 610-11 (11th Cir. 1987)). In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Jones

does not contend that direct evidence of retaliation exists in this case. 

3

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 3 of 55
case of retaliation by showing that: (1) []he ‘engaged in statutorily protected

activity’; (2) []he ‘suffered a materially adverse action’; and (3) ‘there was a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.’” Gate, 683 F.3d

at 1258 (quoting Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010));

see Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S. Ct.

2405, 2409, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006) (broadening the scope of actionable Title VII

retaliation to include not only job-related adverse actions, but also materially adverse

conduct taking place outside of work); see also id. (defining material adversity to

mean “that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination”). 

Statutorily protected activity triggering coverage under Title VII’s

antiretaliation provision comesin two forms–opposition-based or participation-based

conduct.

2 More specifically, “[a]n employee is protected from discrimination if (1)

‘he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter’ (the opposition clause) or (2) ‘he has made a charge, testified, assisted,

or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter’ (the participation clause).” Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d

2

 Mr. Jones’s complaint suggests that he engaged in both types of protected activity.

4

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 4 of 55
1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (on petition for rehearing) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-(3)(a)). 

Under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent:

[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the

opposition clause of Title VII if he shows that he had a good faith,

reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful

employment practices. See Rollins v. State of Fla. Dept. of Law

Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989). It is critical to

emphasize that a plaintiff’s burden under this standard has both a

subjective and an objective component. A plaintiff must not only show

that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that his employer

was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief

was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented. It

thus is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that his belief in this regard

was honest and bona fide; the allegations and record must also indicate

that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable.

A plaintiff, therefore, need not prove the underlying

discriminatory conduct that he opposed was actually unlawful in order

to establish a prima facie case and overcome a motion for summary

judgment; such a requirement “[w]ould not only chill the legitimate

assertion of employee rights under Title VII but would tend to force

employees to file formal charges rather than seek conciliation of

informal adjustment of grievances.” Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,

588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Payne v. McLemore’s

Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.

1981) (“To effectuate the policies of Title VII and to avoid the chilling

effect that would otherwise arise, we are compelled to conclude that a

plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under

the opposition clause of [Title VII] if he shows that he had a reasonable

belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment

practices.”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S. Ct. 1630, 71 L. Ed. 2d

866 (1982).

5

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 5 of 55
Little v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis by

underlining added). 

Concerning the broad coverage afforded under the participation clause the

Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Congress chose to protect employees who “participate[ ]in any manner”

in an EEOC investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).

The words “participate in any manner” express Congress’ intent to

confer “exceptionally broad protection” upon employees covered by

Title VII. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998,

1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969). As we pointed out in Merritt v. Dillard Paper

Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997), “the adjective ‘any’ is not

ambiguous.... [It] has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some

indiscriminately of whatever kind.... [A]ny means all.” (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Because participation in an

employer’s investigation conducted in response to a notice of charge of

discrimination is a form of participation, indirect as it is, in an EEOC

investigation, such participation is sufficient to bring the employee

within the protection of the participation clause.

Clover, 176 F.3d at 1353.

Finally, as a divided Supreme Court held, Title VII retaliation requires proof

of customary but-for causation, rather than the less burdensome motivating-factor

standard applicable to Title VII discrimination claims:

Based on these textual and structural indications, the Court now

concludes as follows: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved

according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened

causation test stated in § 2000e-2(m). This requires proof that the

unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the

alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.

6

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 6 of 55
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533, 186

L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013) (emphasis added); cf. id., 133 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (“An employee

who allegesstatus-based discrimination under Title VII need notshow that the causal

link between injury and wrong isso close that the injury would not have occurred but

for the act.”); id. at 2523 (“It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate

was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful

motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”).

C. Evidentiary Rulings

“All evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”

See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.

Ed. 2d. 508 (1997). “An abuse of discretion can occur where the district court applies

the wrong law, follows the wrong procedure, bases its decision on clearly erroneous

facts, or commits a clear error in judgment.” United States v. Estelan, 156 F. App’x

185, 196 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th

Cir. 2005)). 

Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit has made clear, not every incorrect

evidentiary ruling constitutes reversible error:

Auto-Owners’ second argument is that it is entitled to a new trial

on the basis of what it describes as a number of erroneous evidentiary

rulings by the district court. Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed under

7

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 7 of 55
an abuse of discretion standard. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497,

1504 (11th Cir. 1989). Moreover, even if Auto-Owners can show that

certain errors were committed, the errorsmust have affected “substantial

rights” in order to provide the basis for a new trial. See FED. R. EVID.

103(a). “Error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless if

it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Perry, 734 F.2d

at 1446. See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. James, 845 F.2d 315, 319

(11th Cir. 1988).

Haygood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1993). Therefore,

even the existence of many evidentiary errors does not guarantee an appealing party

relief from an adverse final judgment. Instead, such erroneous rulings by a district

court must “affect the substantial rights of the parties” in order for reversible error to

occur.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

In February of 2010, Mr. Jones, began a relationship with Constance Scott

(“Ms. Scott”) while he was working as a law enforcement officer for the Alabama

State Alcohol Beverage Control (“ABC”) Board. AF No. 2.1.

4 Ms. Scott’s criminal

3 This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. See In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d

1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007) (observing that “a summary judgment proceeding . . . by definition

involves no findings of fact . . . .”). Instead, the court has provided this statement simply to place the

court’s legal analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy.

4 The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered by the moving

party that Mr. Jones has admitted in his written submissions on summaryjudgment, in his deposition

testimony, or by virtue of any other evidence offered in support of his case. Under Appendix II of

the court’s uniform initial order (Doc. 3) entered on March 18, 2014, “[a]ll statements of fact must

be supported by specific reference to evidentiary submissions.” (Id. at 16). Further, this means that

“[a]ny statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving party must be followed by a specific

reference to those portions of the evidentiary record upon which the dispute is based.” (Id. at 17).

8

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 8 of 55
history for the time period between 2003 and 2008 consisted of six felonies, nine

misdemeanors, and numerous traffic offenses. AF No. 1.1. More specifically, Ms.

Scott’sfelony convictions, more specifically, included two counts of first degree theft

(five years apart), second degree theft, second degree forgery, fraudulent use of a

credit card, and possession of a forged instrument. AF No. 1.2. After the ABC Board

discovered Mr. Jones was living with a convicted felon, it decided it would transfer

himto Mobile. AF No. 2.2. Mr. Jonesresigned from the ABC Board instead of giving

up his relationship with Ms. Scott. AF No. 2.3.

Mostly through the efforts of his childhood friend, Captain A.J. Benefield

(“Captain Benefield”), the City of Heflin Police Department (the “HPD”) hired Mr.

Jones as a police officer. AF No. 3.1. Mr. Jones was eventually promoted to

lieutenant and Captain Benefield was made acting chief of the HPD. AF No. 3.2.

During the events made the basis of this lawsuit, Mr. Jones was one of the highest

Consequently, whenever Mr. Jones has inadequately asserted a dispute over a fact that the moving

party has otherwise substantiated with an evidentiary citation, the court has reviewed the cited

evidence and, if it in fact fairly supports the factual assertion made by the moving party, has accepted

that fact. On the other hand, whenever Mr. Jones has adequately disputed a fact offered by the

moving party, the court has reviewed the evidence cited by Mr. Jones and, if it in fact fairly supports

Mr. Jones’s factual assertion, has accepted Mr. Jones’s version. The court’s numbering of admitted

facts (e.g., AF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of the moving party’s undisputed statement of

facts as set forth in Doc. 19 and responded to by Mr. Jones in Doc. 24. Similarly, the designation

“AAF”stands for additional admitted fact and corresponds to Mr. Jones statement of additional facts

contained in Doc. 24 and responded to by the moving party in Doc. 28. A number following a

decimal point corresponds to the particular sentence within the numbered statement of facts. For

example, (AF No. 2.1) would indicate the first sentence of paragraph number 2 of the moving party’s

statement of facts is the subject of the court’s citation to the record. 

9

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 9 of 55
supervisory officers of the HPD, second only to Captain Benefield. AF No. 3.3.

HPD policy (that was never formally passed by the City Council, but

nonetheless followed as personnel policy according to former police chief Robert

Pittman’s (“Mr. Pittman”) and Mayor Rudy Rooks’s (“Mayor Rooks”) testimony at

Mr. Jones’s termination hearing (Doc. 18-19 at 13-14 at 48-49; id. at 15 at 54))5

required officers to “conduct themselves at all times, both on and off duty, in such a

manner as to reflect most favorably on the [HPD]” and that “[u]nbecoming conduct

shall include that which tends to bring the [HPD] into disrepute or reflects discredit

upon the person as a member of the [HPD].” AF No. 4.1. The policy also stated

officers “shall avoid regular or continuous associations or dealings with persons

whom they know are ... suspected felons.” AF No. 4.2. Finally, all officers are

required to swear upon graduation from the academy they will keep their private life

“unsullied as an example to all and will behave in a manner that does not bring

discredit to [the officer] or [his/her] agency. AF No. 4.3.

Mr. Jones wasthe superior officer of Susan Young (“Officer Young”). AF No.

5.1. In a March 8, 2011, response to a critical evaluation by Mr. Jones, Officer Young

indicated thatshe believed (i) thatshe suffered injustice at the hands of Mr. Jones and

5 All first page references to Doc. 18-19 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering

system.

10

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 10 of 55
the HPD, (ii) that “Jones is over zealous 99% of the time,” (iii) that Mr. Jones set her

up for failure, (iv) that Mr. Jones was deceitful and mean to her, (v) that “the whole

time [she] worked with Jones he was just trying to gather dirt on [her],”and (vi) that

“not being able to find any dirt, [Jones] settled for making [her] look and sound like

an incompetent police officer.” AF No. 5.2.

On February 28, 2012, Officer Young filed a federal lawsuit against the City,

alleging Title VII gender discrimination and other claims. AF No. 6.1. Officer Young

asserted in her lawsuit thatshe wastreated lessfavorably than one of the HPD’s male

officers–Josh Horn (“Officer Horn”). On May 16, 2012, Officer Young amended her

initial disclosures to identify Mr. Jones as an adverse witness. AF No. 6.2.

Specifically, her disclosure stated that Mr. Jones “made untrue statements about

[Officer Young’s] training and performance” in his capacity as her superior officer.

AF No. 6.3. 

When being questioned by Captain Benefield about the merits of Officer

Young’s lawsuit, Mr. Jones claims that he corroborated her contention that Captain

Benefield treated Officer Horn better than her “with respect to substantially similar

conduct.” (Doc. 25-3 at 3).6 The date on which this conversation took place is not

evidentfromthe record. CaptainBenefield was deposed on December 5, 2012, as part

6 All page references to Doc. 25-3 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

11

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 11 of 55
of Officer Young’s Title VII lawsuit. AAF No. 15. 

Mr. Jones claims that a few days after Captain Benefield gave his deposition,

while working school traffic at Cleburne County High School in early December

2012,

7 Captain Benefield, angry about the gender-discrimination lawsuit brought by

Officer Young, instructed Mr. Jonesto call Officer Young’s husband and tell himthat

Officer Young was having an affair. AAF No. 16.8 According to Mr. Jones, Captain

Benefield complained that Officer Young had caused him and his family a lot of pain

and that she needed to feel some pain herself. AAF No. 16. During this exchange,

CaptainBenefield became upset because Mr. Jones would not do as he wasinstructed

and brought up Mr. Jones’srelationship with Ms. Scott,saying, “I’ve covered you on

the Connie thing.” AAF No. 16.

On December 7, 2012, Ms. Scott rode in Mr. Jones’s patrol car during the City

Christmas parade. AF No. 11.1. In the days following, Captain Benefield received

more than one anonymous call criticizing the City for allowing officers to live with

7 The record does not reflect the specific day in December on which this occurred. The court

takes judicial notice that December 5, 2012, fell on a Wednesday. Consequently, a reasonable jury

could find that Captain Benefield made this demand to Mr. Jones on or around Friday, December

7, 2012, or Monday, December 10, 2012. 

8 The City has responded to several additional facts (¶¶ 11-14, 16-18) offered by Mr. Jones

that “[Captain] Benefield testified that these conversations about [Officer] Young did not occur.”

(Doc. 28 at 5). This type of credibility determination cannot be resolved in favor of the City on

summary judgment and the court accepts Mr. Jones’s version of what occurred. See also the court’s

evidentiary rulings discussed infra.

12

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 12 of 55
felons and allowing felons to ride in patrol cars during the Christmas parade. AF No.

11.2. Captain Benefield deduced that the felon being referred to in these calls might

be Ms. Scott. AF No. 11.3.

Captain Benefield confronted Mr. Jones about the anonymous calls. AF No.

12.1. Mr. Jones told Captain Benefield that Ms. Scott had only been in criminal

trouble from an incident with her ex-husband’s girlfriend at a football game, that the

charges were dismissed, and that someone from the HPD was probably just trying to

cause trouble. AF No. 12.1. Captain Benefield took Mr. Jones at his word. AF No.

12.2.

On Friday,December 18, 2012, Officer Eric Winslett(“Officer Winslett”), who

was in charge of doing warrant checks on the criminal computer database, returned

to work after a two week absence. AF No. 14.1. Officer Winslett performed a criminal

background check on a social security number left in the area for warrant checks,

determined the identify of the number was for Ms. Scott, and discovered her

numerousfelony andmisdemeanor convictions. AF No. 14.2. OnMonday, December

31, 2012,CaptainBenefield provided the criminal information about Ms. Scott to Mr.

Jones and told him that, in his opinion, Ms. Scott’s continuing to live in Mr. Jones’s

home constituted conduct unbecoming of an officer under the above HPD policy. AF

No. 15. Mr. Jones responded that he needed two weeks to end his relationship with

13

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 13 of 55
Ms. Scott. AF No. 16.1. Captain Benefield agreed to give Mr. Jones untilJanuary 14,

2013, to do that. AF No. 16.2.

On 3:20 p.m. the following Monday, January 7, 2013, Captain Benefield sent

Mr. Jones a text message, asking “what’s the status on what we talked about last

Monday?” AF No. 17.1. Mr. Jones responded that the situation was “in the process

of being handled ... on schedule as we talked about for the coming Monday,” which

was January 14, 2013. AF No. 17.2. On January 8, 2013, at 6:49 p.m., Mr. Jones

texted Captain Benefield, stating that Ms. Scott had left that night and taken some of

her stuff to her mother’s house. AF No. 18.1. He also texted Captain Benefield,

“thank you for standing up for me.” AF No. 18.2.

On January 9, 2013, Ms. Scott scheduled a meeting with Mayor Rooks to try

to get Mayor Rooks to get Captain Benefield to change his mind. AF No. 19.1. The

meeting started at 3:37 p.m. with Mr. Jones, Ms. Scott, Mayor Rooks, and Captain

Benefield present. AF No. 19.2. Unbeknownst to Mayor Rooks or Captain Benefield,

Mr. Jones and Ms. Scott were recording the meeting. AF No. 20.1.

By far, Ms. Scott did most of the talking during the meeting. AF No. 21.1. She

admitted to the felony convictions, but claimed that they should not matter because

she was no longer involved in criminal activity and she was not a bad person. AF No.

21.2 Ms. Scott also admitted to calling Mr. Jones at work and telling him she would

14

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 14 of 55
blow her brains out if he did not come home. AF No. 22.

After listening to Ms. Scott and Mr. Jones for some time, Captain Benefield

stated that it was inappropriate for an officer to be living with a felon, that it was an

embarrassment to the HPD, that hisstance was grounded in hisinterpretation of HPD

policy, that he had to look out for the whole HPD and not just Mr. Jones, and that he

was not going to change his mind. AF No. 24.1. Captain Benefield further stated that

Mr. Jones’s options were either for Ms. Scott to move out and not date Mr. Jones, for

Mr. Jones to leave the HPD, or for Mr. Jones to be terminated from the HPD. AF No.

24.2.

Mayor Rooks stated that he was not going to override Captain Benefield’s

decision, that he had to maintain the integrity of the HPD, that the HPD had to be

looked at as professionals, and that Ms. Scott’s living with Mr. Jones would cause a

hardship on the HPD. AF No. 25. After Ms. Scott was repeatedly told that Captain

Benefield and Mayor Rooks would not change their minds, Ms. Scott stated that she

would move out to protect Mr. Jones’s career. AF No. 26. Mr. Jones and Ms. Scott

asked for more time for Ms. Scott to move out, and Mayor Rooks and Captain

Benefield agreed to extend the deadline two-and-a-half more weeks until February

1, 2013. AF No. 27. However, Captain Benefield told Mr. Jones that if he did not

abide by the new deadline that he would be terminated. AF No. 28.1. Not once during

15

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 15 of 55
this lengthy meeting did Ms. Scott or Mr. Jones insinuate, much less state, that

CaptainBenefield wasretaliating against Mr. Jonesfor supporting OfficerYoung and

refusing to retaliate against her. AF No. 29.

On January 24, 2013, Mayor Rooks attended a mediation in Officer Young’s

case and was told by Officer Young’s attorney that an unnamed HPD officer had

approached her, wanting to testify on behalf of Officer Young. AF No. 31. 

On February 1, 2013, Captain Benefield saw Ms. Scott’s vehicle parked at Mr.

Jones’s house on his way into work. AF No. 32.1. After not reaching Mr. Jones by

phone, he sent text messages at 9:41 a.m. for Mr. Jones to call him. AF No. 32.2. Mr.

Jones called Captain Benefield back within a few minutes. AF No. 33.1. Captain

Benefield reminded Mr. Jones of the deadline and asked Mr. Jones to meet with him

at Mayor Rooks’s office later in the day to tell them what he was going to do. AF No.

34.1. Mr. Jones asked if they could meet on February 4, 2013, and Captain Benefield

said “no” because that was the day everyone agreed upon. AF No. 34.2. Mr. Jones

asked whether his attorney could be present, and Captain Benefield said “yes.” AF

No. 34.3.

By 1:36 p.m. on February 1, 2013, Mr. Jones still had not called Captain

Benefield, so Captain Benefield called him again. AF No. 35.1. Mr. Jones indicated

to Captain Benefield that he had not yetspoken with his attorney and could notspeak

16

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 16 of 55
for him as for a meeting time. AF No. 35.2. Captain Benefield then asked Mr. Jones

whether Ms. Scott was moving out. AF No. 35.3. Mr. Jones stated that Ms. Scott was

not moving out and that he was not resigning. AF No. 35.4. Captain Benefield told

Mr. Jones that they needed to meet on the following Monday, February 4, 2013, and

that he needed to know what time Mr. Jones’s attorney could meet. AF No. 35.5. Mr.

Jones asked Captain Benefield if he had read Mr. Jones’s attorney’s letter, and

Captain Benefield stated that he had not seen any letter. AF No. 35.6.

Starting at 3:25 p.m. on February 1, 2013, Mr. Jones began sending Captain

Benefield a total of eighty-five text messages, which appeared to Captain Benefield

to be parts of a letter from Mr. Jones’s lawyer. AF No. 36. Captain Benefield called

Mayor Rooks and asked if he had received a letter from Mr. Jones’s attorney, and

Mayor Rookstold him he had received an electronic copy of a letter from Mr. Jones’s

lawyer dated January 31, 2013. AF No. 37.

The two-page letter dated January 31, 2013, addressed to Mayor Rooks and

Patrick Casey, Esq. states in part that:

In early December 2012, just a few days after Benefield’s

deposition wasscheduled (and partially taken) in the Young case, while

working school traffic at the Cleburne County High School, Benefield

ranted to Lt. Jones that Ms. Young had caused him and his family a lot

of pain and said she needed to feel some pain herself. Benefield then

instructed Lt. Jones to take retaliatory action against Ms. Young by

calling her husband and telling him she was having an affair. Lt. Jones

17

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 17 of 55
immediately made it clear that he would not be involved in such conduct

and that, to his knowledge, such an accusation was false.

Almost immediately thereafter, Benefield began to repeatedly

threaten Lt. Jones’ job which he has continued to do as recently as

January 9th when he explicitly stated he planned to recommend Lt.

Jones’ termination. Notably, this last threat was made in the presence of

not only Lt. Jones but also Ms. Scott and Mayor Rooks.

(Doc. 18-15 at 2-3)

9

Mr. Jones testified regarding his recollection of this exchange with Captain

Benefield concerning Officer Young:

Q. So, at what point in time did you feel like your job was in

jeopardy?

A. Whenever I wouldn’t -- the day that we were at the school doing

school traffic, when he asked me to make that anonymous phone call to

Susan Young’s husband and I told him, no. And then I hem-hawed like

I might, just to try to buy time. And he -- he told me, he says, I have

covered for you on Connie[, i.e., Ms. Scott]. 

(Doc. 18-2 at 42 at 161).10

On February 4, 2013, Mayor Rooks and Captain Benefield met with the City’s

Personnel Committee and they recommended Mr. Jones’s dismissal fromthe HPD on

account of his living with a convicted felon, but the Committee did not make a

decision at that time. AF No. 40. There is no evidence in the record that the Personnel

9 All page references to Doc. 18-15 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

10 Any first page references to Doc. 18-2 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering

system.

18

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 18 of 55
Committee was made aware of Mr. Jones’s claim of retaliatory conduct when Mayor

Rooks and Captain Benefield made this joint recommendation.

On February 6, 2013, at 6:34 p.m., Mr. Jones called Mayor Rooks in response

to an earlier voice mail message left by Mayor Rooks. AF No. 41. Mayor Rooks told

Mr. Jones that the Personnel Committee was in session and they wanted to hear his

side of the story. AF No. 42.1. Although Mayor Rooks told Mr. Jones that it was not

a due process hearing, Mr. Jones refused to meet with the Personnel Committee

without his attorney present, even though Mayor Rooks begged him to come in and

talk. AF No. 42.2.

Although he would not talk to the Personnel Committee, Mr. Jones agreed to

meet Mayor Rooks and City Clerk Shane Smith a few minutes later at City Hall. AF

No. 43.1. Mayor Rooks again begged Mr. Jones to meet with the Personnel

Committee, which was still in session, they could hear his story, and Mr. Jones again

refused. AF No. 43.2. At the end of their meeting, Mayor Rooks handed Mr. Jones

a letter that placed him on administrative leave with pay, pending suspension or

termination, and that informed him he would be terminated if he did not request a

hearing before the City Council in ten days. AF No. 44; (see also Doc. 18-16 at 2

19

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 19 of 55
(“Notice of Suspension/Termination – Lamar Heath Jones”)).11 The letter listed two

reasons for the adverse action:

• Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer

• Not following Law Enforcement Code of Conduct

(Doc. 18-16 at 2).

On February 7, 2013, Officer Young served a third supplement to her initial

disclosures that completely changed Mr. Jones’s adverse witness status; now Mr.

Jones and Ms. Scott were disclosed as supporting witnesses for Officer Young. AF

No. 45. In this disclosure, Officer Young’slawyer certified thatshe had “only become

aware of the above referenced subjects of knowledge within the last 30 days.” AF No.

47. While Mr. Jones never talked directly to Officer Young about his anticipated

testimony, he testified that he shared with her lawyer in December 2012 his belief that

Officer Young had been treated unfairly. AF No. 46.1.

Mr. Jones admitted in his deposition that he never told any City employee or

official that he called Officer Young’s attorney, that Captain Benefield allegedly told

him to call Officer Young’s husband, that he supported Officer Young, or that he

allegedly felt he was being retaliated against before his attorney’s January 31, 2013,

11 All page references to Doc. 18-16 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF page numbering

system.

20

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 20 of 55
letter was sent to the City. AF No. 48.

On February 15, 2013, Mr. Jones hand-delivered to Mayor Rooks his written

request for a hearing before the City Council. AF No. 49.1. Mr. Jones told Mayor

Rooksthat CaptainBenefield wasretaliating against him. AF No. 49.3. Mayor Rooks

responded by stating that Mr. Jones never told him that before he received his

attorney’s letter. AF No. 49.3.

On February 22, 2013, Mr. Jones was served with a notice of hearing. AF No.

50. On March 19, 2013, a termination hearing was held before the City Council. AF

No. 51.1. Mr. Jones’s attorney appeared and defended Mr. Jones, who was present.

AF No. 51.3. After the City presented evidence supporting its grounds for

termination, Mr. Jones’s attorney cross-examined Captain Benefield. AF No. 52.1.

Captain Benefield conceded that Mr. Jones had the best arrest statistics in the HPD

and was a good officer; however, he testified that Mr. Jones had the worst emotional

state of all his officers. AF No. 52.2.

Mr. Jones’s attorney called Mr. Pittman as a witness. AF No. 53. Mr. Pittman

testified that he “would be concerned” about a ranking officer’s association with a

convicted felon having a criminal background comparable to Ms. Scott. (Doc. 18-19

at 19 at 72). Mr. Pittman further indicated that he would focus on whether that person

would be “in a position of having or being currently involved in any type of criminal

21

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 21 of 55
activity, ongoing criminal activity or involvement with people with criminal

backgrounds.” (Doc. 18-19 at 20 at 73). Mr. Pittman additionally opined that, “[i]f

there was nothing there to give indication that this was an ongoing criminal activity

or criminal involvement on that person’s part, then I would really have to balance that

information with a right to association, which every officer has[.]” (Id. at 74). The

City has characterized Mr. Pittman’s testimony to mean that the decision to enforce

this association-based HPD policy is a subjective one. (See Doc. 19 at 13 ¶ 53 (“[I]t

is a judgment call whether an officer living with a felon is grounds for

termination.”)).

The focus of the hearing was largely limited to the validity of the charges

brought against Mr. Jones for violating HPD policy. (See generally Doc. 18-19

(transcript of termination hearing)). While Mr. Jones’s counsel attempted to ask some

questions about his client’s retaliation allegations, those efforts were essentially

stymied. (See generally Doc. 18-19 at 11-13 at 38-45). At the end of the hearing, the

City Council stated that they wanted to hear from Mr. Jones, but Mr. Jones declined

to speak, on the advice of his attorney. AF No. 54. The City Council voted 5-1 to

terminate Mr. Jones on the charges asserted. AF No. 55. The minutes summarizing

the City Council’s meeting held on March 19, 2013, makes no mention of, much less

22

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 22 of 55
a finding about, Mr. Jones’s claim of retaliation. (Doc. 32-1 at 2).12

Mayor Rookstestified that he andCaptain Benefield were the decision-makers

who recommended Mr. Jones’s termination. AAF No. 39. The City does not contest

that Mr. Jones’s employment was terminated on March 19, 2013, as a result of the

recommendation that Captain Benefield made to Mayor Rooks.

13

 AAF No. 38.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Mr. Jones Has Established a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation.

1. Mr. Jones Has Shown Sufficient Protected

Activity in Opposing Retaliation Against Officer

Young.

COH contends that Mr. Jones’s retaliation claim is facially deficient for two

reasons–he cannot show cognizable protected conduct in the form of opposition or

participation and he cannot demonstrate causation. (Doc. 19 at 14). The court

addresses the sufficiency of Mr. Jones’s protected activity evidence first.

In its initial brief, the City contends that “[i]t is undisputed that Jones never

opposed any of the City’s employment practices . . . until 1/31/13, the date his

attorney sent his letter to the City.” (Doc. 19 at 15). However, reading the record in

12 All page references to Doc. 32-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

13

See also discussion of final decision-making authority under Ala. Code § 11-43-81, infra.

23

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 23 of 55
the light most favorable to Mr. Jones, which the court must do on summary judgment,

a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Jones’s negative reaction to and decision

to disregard Captain Benefield’s directive in or around December 7, 2012, to

anonymously contact Officer Young’s husband and report that she was having an

affair because of all the pain she had caused him with her gender-discrimination

lawsuit, are sufficient to satisfy the opposition clause.

The court reaches this conclusion after studying the cases relied upon by the

partiesin their briefs. In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &Davidson Cty., 555

U.S. 271, 277, 129 S. Ct. 846, 851, 172 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2009), the Supreme Court

declined to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s more narrow view on the scope of cognizable

Title VII opposition:

The Sixth Circuit thought answering questions fell short of

opposition, taking the view that the clause “ ‘demands active, consistent

“opposing” activities to warrant ... protection against retaliation,’ ” 211

Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell, supra, at 610), and that an employee

must “instigat[e] or initiat[e]” a complaint to be covered, 211 Fed.

Appx., at 376. But though these requirements obviously exemplify

opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it.

“Oppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary

discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone

who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing

it. Countless people were known to “oppose” slavery before

Emancipation, or are said to “oppose” capital punishment today, without

writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government.

And we would call it “opposition” if an employee took a stand against

24

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 24 of 55
an employer’s discriminatory practices not by “instigating” action, but

by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a

junior worker for discriminatory [or retaliatory]reasons. Cf.McDonnell,

supra, at 262 (finding employee covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 where his employer retaliated against him for failing to

prevent his subordinate from filing an EEOC charge). There is, then, no

reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone

else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and

nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee

who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports

the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a

question.

Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78, 129 S. Ct. at 851 (emphasis added).

Additionally, the Supreme Court clarified in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519

U.S. 337, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997), “that former employees [like

Officer Young] are included within [Title VII’s] coverage [prohibiting retaliation].”

Id. at 346, 117 S. Ct. at 849. Further, Mr. Jones could have had an objective

reasonable belief that what Captain Benefield instructed him to do was an unlawful

employment practice, i.e., retaliatory against Officer Young under Burlington

Northern’s material adversity standard. See id., 548 U.S. at 63, 126 S. Ct. at 2412

(“An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not

directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”

(emphasis in original) (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986

(10th Cir. 1996) (“finding actionable retaliation where employer filed false criminal

25

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 25 of 55
charges against former employee who complained about discrimination”))).

The City relies upon Brush v. Sears, 466 F. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2012), and

contends that Mr. Jones’s opposition-based retaliation claimfalls within the “manager

rule.” “In essence, the ‘manager rule’ holds that a management employee that, in the

course of her normal job performance, disagrees with or opposes the actions of an

employer does not engage in ‘protected activity.’” Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787 (citing

McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996)); id. (concluding

differently from other courts that Crawford did not foreclose applicability of the

“manager rule” because “[i]t did not address whether a disinterested party to a

harassment claim could use that harassment claim as its own basis for a Title VII

action”).

To the extent that the Eleventh Circuit decides to apply the “manager rule” in

a binding decision, the facts of this case are significantly distinguishable. In

particular, Brush involved a plaintiff claiming retaliatory discharge on the basis that

she had “disagree[d] with the way in which Sears conducted itsinternal investigation

into [another employee’s] allegations [about sexual harassment and rape].” 466 F.

App’x at 786. Thus, “Ms. Brush was neither the aggrieved nor the accused party in

the underlying allegations. Instead, she was one of the Sears employees tasked with

conducting the internal investigation.” Id.

26

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 26 of 55
Unlike the Brush plaintiff, what Captain Benefield asked Mr. Jones to

do–anonymously reporting an affair to Officer Young’s husband–was not part of an

investigation into Officer Young’s claims or within the scope of any other ordinary

managerial action. Instead, Captain Benefield’s instruction to Mr. Jones was purely

driven by a desire to give Officer Young some painful payback for filing her Title VII

lawsuit. Further, Mr. Jones was far from a disinterested party to the retaliatory

scenario proposed by Captain Benefield. Thus the manager rule, if ever formally

adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, would not apply to the facts of this case and, Mr.

Jones has satisfied the first prima facie element of his opposition-based retaliation

claim.

Because the courtfindsthat Mr.Jones’s falsely-reporting-an-affair factssatisfy

protected activity under the opposition clause, it does not reach the more doubtful

issue of whether Mr. Jones has additionally shown cognizable protected conduct

“when he told [Captain] Benefield that [Officer] Young’s claims were factual

regarding [her] being treated lessfavorably than [Officer] Horn”, assuggested in Mr.

Jones’s opposition brief. (Doc. 24 at 27). Also, to the extent that Mr. Jones’s

complaint contains a participation-based retaliation claim premised upon his support

of Officer Young’s lawsuit in the form of agreeing to be listed as a favorable witness

in her case, the court finds that he has abandoned that claim on summary judgment. 

27

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 27 of 55
More specifically, in opposing the City’s argument that he lacked cognizable

protected activity, Mr. Jones identifies only two examples of protected conduct–(i)

his refusal to contact Officer Young’s husband and falsely report to him that she was

having an affair and (ii) his opinion expressed to Captain Benefield that Officer

Young’s claims of gender discrimination had factual merit. (Doc. 24 at 26, 27). See,

e.g., Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding

claim abandoned when argument not presented in initial response to motion for

summary judgment); Bute v. Schuller Int’l, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga.

1998) (finding unaddressed claim abandoned); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We decline to exercise our

discretion to entertain this argument which was not fairly presented to the district

court.”); Coal. forthe Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d

1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to brief and argue issue at the district court is

sufficient to find the issue has been abandoned); Hudson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 209

F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“When a party fails to respond to an

argument or otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim

abandoned.”); cf. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler

Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a district court “could

properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but not even raised as

28

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 28 of 55
a ground for summary judgment”); McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940-41

(11thCir. 1999) (claimmay be considered abandoned when district court is presented

with no argument concerning a claim included in the plaintiff’s complaint). Thus, the

City’s Motion isGRANTED asto any claimof retaliation premised upon Mr. Jones’s

willingness to participate as a witness for Officer Young in her Title VII lawsuit. 

2. Mr. Jones Has Shown Sufficient Causation.

Mr. Jones also has adequate proof of causation. “To establish that causal

connection, a plaintiff need only show ‘that the protected activity and the adverse

action were not wholly unrelated.’” Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Educ., 757

F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d

1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999)). “[A] plaintiff satisfies this element if he provides

sufficient evidence that the decision-maker became aware of the protected conduct,

and that there was close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse

employment action.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citing Clover v. Total System Services, 176 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir.

1999)). In its brief, the City contends that “it is undisputed Jones’s protected activity

did not become known until 1/31/13.” (Doc. 19 at 20).

In opposition, Mr. Jones points to Captain Benefield as the person within the

decision-making process who was first aware of his protected conduct–opposing

29

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 29 of 55
reasonably perceived retaliatory conduct–in or around December 7, 2012, when he

resisted Captain Benefield’s demand to contact Officer Young’s husband and falsely

report to him that she was having an affair. Mr. Jones testified that he was concerned

about his job after having that exchange with Captain Benefield. AAF No. 16; (see

also 18-2 at 41 at 160 (Mr. Jones’s responding that he first feared retaliation “when

he[, i.e., Captain Benefield] started talking to [him] about how he had covered for

[him] with [Ms. Scott], and he asked [him] that about [Officer] Young”)). Further,

there is no evidence to show that Captain Benefield was contemplating a

recommendation that Mr. Jonesshould be fired if he did not end hisrelationship with

Ms. Scott before December 7, 2012. 

This differing factual pattern means that the causation holding in Jackson v.

City of Homewood, No. 2:13-CV-00737-AKK, 2015 WL 5011230 (N.D. Ala. Aug.

24, 2015) and the other similar cases upon which the City relies (Doc. 19 at 18-20)

are inapplicable. Cf. Jackson, 2015 WL 5011230, at *9 (“Jackson wants the court to

allow him to create causation based on his decision to file a charge after learning

about his pending discipline and his voluntary decision to inform Chief Roberson

about this charge.”) (emphasis added); id. (“The court declines to do so because it

would result in Jackson having veto power over HPD’s personnel decisions.”); cf.

also Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We hold that, in a

30

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 30 of 55
retaliation case, when an employer contemplates an adverse employment action

before an employee engages in protected activity, temporal proximity between the

protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action does not suffice to

show causation.” (emphasis added) (citing Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country

Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006))); Saffold v. Special Counsel, Inc.,

147 F. App’x 949, 950 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Here, the evidence shows that Saffold’s

supervisor contemplated terminating Saffold prior to receiving the EEOC charge.”)

(emphasis added); Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.

2001), as amended (June 6, 2001) (“Where timing is the only basis for a claim of

retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever

engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.”)

(emphasis added). Therefore,Mr.Jones has cleared the initial causation hurdle argued

by the City.

However, the City also contendsthatCaptainBenefield was without any power

to fire Mr. Jones and that any chain of causation was broken by Mayor Rooks’s

independent role in the process. As substantiated by the City in the parties’

supplemental briefing, Mayor Rooks, pursuant to Ala. Code § 11-43-81,

14 was the

14

 Ala. Code. § 11-43-81 provides:

The mayorshall be the chief executive officer, and shall have general supervision and

31

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 31 of 55
person with the legal authority to fire Mr. Jones. (See Doc. 32 at 8 (“The City of

Heflin is a Class 8 municipality, and, as such, the Mayor [Rooks] has the authority

to terminate Jones’[s] employment, [Captain] Benefield does not.” (citing Ala. Code

§ 11-43-81))). When Mayor Rooks first became involved in the decision-making

process and met with Mr. Jones, Ms. Scott, and Captain Benefield, on January 9,

2013, the record does not show that he possessed any knowledge about Mr. Jones’s

opposition-based retaliation claim: (i) that he had engaged in protected conduct in

early December 2012 when dealing with Captain Benefield and (ii) that Captain

Benefield’s recent recommendation to discharge him from the force unless he ended

his relationship with Ms. Scott was a retaliatory act connected to that protected

activity. Mayor Rooks did, however, become aware that Mr. Jones was claiming

retaliation on the part of Captain Benefield when he received a copy of the January

31, 2016, letter from Mr. Jones’s lawyer on February 1, 2013. 

control of all other officers and the affairs of the city or town, except as otherwise

provided in this title. He shall have the power to appoint all officers whose

appointment is not otherwise provided for by law. He may remove any officer for

good cause, except those elected by the people, and fill the vacancy caused thereby,

permanently, if the appointment of such officer is made by the mayor, and

temporarily, if such officer was elected by the council or appointed with its consent,

in either of which last two cases he must report such removal and his reasons therefor

to the council at its next regular meeting, when, if the council shall sustain the act of

removal by the mayor by a majority vote of those elected to the council, the vacancy

shall be filled as provided in this title.

Id.

32

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 32 of 55
Three days later, on February 4, 2013, Mayor Rooks andCaptainBenefieldmet

with the City’s Personnel Committee to jointly recommend Mr. Jones’s dismissal.

There is no indication in the record that either Mayor Rooks or Captain Benefield

made the Personnel Committee aware that Mr. Jones was claiming that the

recommendation to end his employment was allegedly tainted with a retaliatory

animus. Further, five days later, Mr. Jones was formally placed on administrative

leave by Mayor Rooks on February 6, 2013, and ultimately discharged on March 19,

2013, after the City Council held a termination hearing. A review of the transcript

from the termination hearing confirms that the focus of the hearing was whether Mr.

Jones had violated HDP policy.

Based upon these facts, the City contends that Mr. Jones’s efforts to show

cognizable causation by virtue of Captain Benefield’s retaliatory recommendation

implicitly invokes the cat’s paw theory. (Doc. 28 at 9).15 Sometimes “also referred to

as ‘subordinate bias theory,’ [the doctrine] . . . seek[s] to hold an employer liable for

the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate

employment decision.” Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1335 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013)

(citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 415, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190, 179 L.

Ed. 2d 144 (2011)). “This theory provides that causation may be established if the

15 All page references to Doc. 28 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

33

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 33 of 55
plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation without

independently investigating the complaint against the employee. In such a case, the

recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat’s paw’ to give

effect to the recommender’s discriminatory [or retaliatory] animus.” Stimpson v. City

of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999). 

“When the biased recommender and the actual decisionmaker are not the same

person or persons, a plaintiff may not benefit from the inference of causation that

would arise from their common identity. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the

discriminatory [or retaliatory] animus behind the recommendation, and not the

underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual

cause of the other party’s decision to terminate the employee.” Stimpson, 186 F.3d

at 1331 (citing Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11thCir.

1998)).

In Sims, supra, the Eleventh Circuit explained in a discrimination case arising

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), which like Title VII

retaliation uses a but-for standard of causation, that a plaintiff relying upon a

discriminatory recommender must have sufficient evidence to show that the

recommender’s animus was a but-for cause of, or a determinative influence on the

adverse action. See Sims, 704 F.3d at 1337 (“[A]n ADEA plaintiff must prove

34

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 34 of 55
‘but-for’ causation—not mere proximate causation[;] [t]hus, to prevail, Sims must

prove that Davis’s animus was a ‘but-for’ cause of, or a determinative influence on,

Perkins’ ultimate decision.”); id. (“Assuming arguendo that a reasonable juror could

find, as set forth in the Staub analysis, that Davis was motivated by discriminatory

animus that wasintended to cause Sims’lay off, we hold that a reasonable juror could

not conclude that Davis’s [age-related] animus was a ‘but-for’ cause of Sims’

termination.”) (footnote omitted). 

Here, the circumstancessurrounding Mayor Rooks’s decision to discharge Mr.

Jones based upon Captain Benefield’s recommendation is much different than the

facts facing the Eleventh Circuit in Sims. Importantly, in Sims, the evidence of

independence from the biased recommender’s influence over the decision to fire the

plaintiff included the decisionmaker’s “own five-month long [reduction-in-force]

evaluations,” his “own independent judgment that Sims was at the bottom of the list

on performance,” and “the unanimous opinion of all persons consulted (except for

Sims himself)” that he should be fired. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1337.

In an effort to prevail on the cat’s paw issue, the City states that “Mayor Rooks

met with Jones onmultiple occasions, and independently investigated the information

supporting [Captain] Benefield’s recommendation.” (Doc. 32 at 8). However, the

City’s position is conclusory–it gives no concrete examples of Mayor Rooks’s

35

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 35 of 55
independent actions. Further, several facts support a reasonable inference otherwise.

At the onset of his involvement, Mayor Rooks stated that he was not going to

override Captain Benefield’s requested employment action. Mayor Rooks never met

with Mr. Jones without Captain Benefield present. Additionally, Mayor Rooks never

personally investigated or asked the Personnel Committee to consider the legitimacy

of Mr. Jones’s retaliation allegations against Captain Benefield.

16

Importantly, even after Mayor Rooks became aware on February 1, 2013, that

Mr. Jones was claiming retaliation with respect to Captain Benefield’s

recommendation to fire him if he did not end his relationship with Ms. Scott, Mayor

Rooks, without any hesitation, continued to support Captain Benefield’s plan by (i)

meeting with the Personnel Committee on February 4, 2013, about the recommended

discharge of Mr. Jones for violating HPD policy (and without mentioning anything

about the possibility of retaliation) and (ii) formally placing Mr. Jones on

administrative leave on February 6, 2013.

17 Based upon these facts, a reasonable jury

16 The City takes great issue with the fact that Mr. Jones was unwilling to meet with the

Personnel Committee without his attorney also present. However, even if Mr. Jones had agreed to

meet without his counsel there, nothing in the record suggests that the purpose of such a meeting

would have been to discuss Mr. Jones’s retaliation allegations. 

17 Thus, Mr. Jones’s case does not mirror the conventional cat’s paw construct when the

person possessing final decision-making authority has no knowledge of the recommender’s

purported discriminatoryor retaliatorymotive at the time of the adverse action. Neither side has cited

to any case authority that contains the unusual factual pattern presented here. 

36

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 36 of 55
could find that Mayor Rooks’s merely rubber-stamped Captain Benefield’s

recommendation when he formally initiated the termination process against Mr. Jones

in February without ever exploring the merits of Mr. Jones’s retaliation claim even

though he had prior written notice of a potential retaliatory reason for the

recommendation. Cf. Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1250 (“Thus, Kaylie [i.e., the

decisionmaker] was not ‘on notice’ that Blanch [i.e., the co-employee with a

discriminatory motive] could be scheming against Llampallas[to get her fired] based

on Llampallas’ sex.”) (emphasis added). 

Further, the court acknowledges but is not persuaded by the City’s strained

characterization of the Personnel Committee’s involvement and the City Council’s

5 to 1 post-hearing vote approving Mayor Rooks’s decision to fire Mr. Jones as

independent intervening acts sufficient to sever any retaliatory causation as a matter

of law. (Doc. 32 at 8-10). Importantly, there is no indication that either body ever

considered the merits of Mr. Jones’s retaliation allegations and/or had the authority

to set aside the decision to discharge Mr. Jones. Instead, the narrower inquiry for both

was limited to whether Mr. Jones had violated HPD policy as charged. The City

Council’s lack of independence is further reflected by Mayor Rooks’s active control

over how the hearing was conducted and his participation in the post-hearing voting

process. (See Doc. 32 at 5 ¶ 22 (“The following council members voted in favor of

37

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 37 of 55
termination: TravisCrowe, Elvin Henson, ShannonRobert[s],Rhonda Green, Mayor

RudyRooks.”));18see also Doc. 32-1 at 2 (minutes dated March 19, 2013, fromCity’s

Special Called Meeting)).

In making this particular lack of causation argument, the City acknowledges

the comparable constitutional retaliation case of Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240 (5th

Cir. 2002), in which the Fifth Circuit discussed and distinguished the scope of

Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Stimpson, supra. The City maintains that this court

should not be persuasively guided by the reasoning and outcome in Hitt.

The plaintiff in Hitt “alleged, and a jury found, that his employment [as a

constable] was terminated because [his supervisor, constable] Connell disapproved

of Hitt’s involvement with two affiliated labor unions . . . .” Hitt, 301 F.3d at 244.

Further background to the plaintiff’s firing by Connell included a supposed “bomb

threat” made by the plaintiff to another officer over the telephone. 301 F.3d at 245.

After learning about this incident, “Connell delivered a proposed notice of

termination to Hitt” writing that “such ‘unprofessionalism . . . cannot and will not be

tolerated.’” Id. Subsequently, “Connell informed Hitt that his employment was

terminated. Hitt appealed his dismissal to the Bexar County Civil Service

18 The City’s letterhead (Doc. 18-16 at 2) and official municipal website– 

http://www.cityofheflin.org/council.html–reflects “Roberts” instead of “Robert” as the correct

spelling.

38

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 38 of 55
Commission, but the commissioners who heard the appeal voted to uphold Constable

Connell’s decision.” Id.

After losing at trial on the plaintiff’s federal claim, Connell contended that the

vote by the commission to uphold the plaintiff’s discharge meant that “the causal

connection between Hitt’s constitutionality protected activity and the adverse

employment action [wa]s broken . . . .” Id. at 247-48; see also id. at 246 (5th Cir.

2002) (“[Connell] contends that Hitt’s participation in union activity was not a

motivating factor in his discharge because the county civil service commissioners

(who had no retaliatory animus) actually made the decision or, alternatively, Connell

fired Hitt because of the bomb threat.”).

As the Fifth Circuit framed the causation issue before it:

It is beyond dispute that the commissioners conducted an independent

inquiry into Hitt’s discharge and were not motivated by any improper

motive. Consequently, if the commission is the final decision-maker,

then the causal connection between Hitt’s constitutionally protected

activity and the adverse employment action is broken, and Connell may

not be held liable.

In most “causal connection” cases, the determinative question is

whether the discriminatory or retaliatory motive of a subordinate

employee may be imputed to the titular decision-maker. Id. A

decision-maker may serve as the conduit of the subordinate’s improper

motive, for example, if he merely “rubber-stamps” the recommendation

of a subordinate. This case, however, poses the logically antecedent

question how to identify the official decision-maker . . . .

39

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 39 of 55
Id. at 247-48 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The court then explained why the “Commission’s decision upholding Hitt’s

termination did not break the causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action[.]” Id. at 243.

Under its governing rules, the commission is authorized to review

and approve, reverse or modify an adverse employment decision if an

employee elects to appeal it. But the mere authority to review an

employment decision is not decisive. The commission became involved

as an adjudicative tribunal after Hitt chose to appeal his notice of

termination. Its task was to review Constable Connell’s decision for

conformitywith applicable law and regulations, not to initiate Connell’s

action or generally superintend Connell’s employment practices.

In light of these procedures, Connell’s reliance on the Eleventh

Circuit’s decision in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328

(11th Cir. 1999), is misplaced. In that Title VII retaliation case,

Stimpson, a police officer, alleged that the City of Tuscaloosa was

motivated unlawfully when it fired her. The Eleventh Circuit

emphasized three times in its brief opinion that Alabama law

unequivocally deprives the city of power to discharge a police officer

and that the authority to terminate employment rests solely with a

statutorily-created civil service board. Id. at 1330, 1331, 1332. Stimpson

thus held that the City of Tuscaloosa could not be liable for retaliation

because the civil service board was, as a matter of law, the actual

decision-maker, and there was no evidence that the board was a mere

conduit for the city’s supposed discriminatory motive.

Just as clearly, the Bexar County Civil Service Commission did

not assume final decisionmaking authority. The commission did not

finalize a decision that Constable Connell had merely recommended or

proposed.Although the commission did conduct its own review of Hitt’s

termination, it did so in a quasi-judicial capacity.

40

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 40 of 55
Hitt, 301 F.3d at 248-49 (emphasis by underlining added); see also Stimpson, 186

F.3d at 1332 (“We need not announce a bright line at which an independent

investigation becomes a rubber stamp to resolve this case, because the record before

us does not contain any hint of a cat’s paw arrangement.”); Quinn v. Monroe Cty.,

330 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Stimpson thus held that the city [of

Tuscaloosa] could not be held liable for retaliation because the civil service board

was, as a matter of law, the actual decisionmaker, and there was no evidence that the

board was a mere conduit for the city’ssupposed discriminatory motive.”) (emphasis

added).

Here, this court finds that the City Council’s termination hearing is more akin

to the quasi-judicial review done by the civilservice commission in Hitt than the civil

service board’s three-day comprehensive hearing in Stimpson. In the City’s

supplemental briefing, for example, it does not claim to be organized like the City of

Tuscaloosa with a free-standing civil service board that has “the sole power and

discretion to terminate police officers[.]” Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1332. Instead, the

City refers to Ala. Code § 11-43-81 as the statutory basis giving Mayor Rooks the

sole authority to fire Mr. Jones. Additionally, the City does not reference any

promulgated “rule [providing] that no employment decision becomes final until

approved by the [City Council].” Hitt, 301 F.3d at 248. Further, as the hearing

41

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 41 of 55
transcript confirms,Mr.Jones’s counsel encountered resistance and commentary from

Mayor Rooks when he tried to ask some questions that related to retaliation during

the termination hearing before the City Council. (See, e.g., Doc. 18-19 at 12 at 43

(“MAYOR ROOKS: The retaliation, that’s what he seems to think that brought all

this on, and I fail to see that. You know, you could put any police chief in that chair

there and the facts are what they are.”)); cf. Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1332 n.2 (“We

curiously note that Stimpson apparently never mentioned any discriminatory motive

behind the charges at her hearing before the Civil Service Board.”); id.(“Itseemslike

that would have been an ideal time and place to do so.”).

The only appreciable way that the City distinguishes Mr. Jones’s case fromHitt

is in the applicable causation standard. As the City states, “the plaintiff [in Hitt] was

required only to show that his protected activity was a ‘substantial or motivating

factor’ in the adverse employment action, a standard which is far less strenuous than

the ‘but-for’standard in the case at hand.” (Doc. 32 at 9-10). While the City is correct

about this statement of law, Hitt does not reflect that a less demanding causation

standard made a difference when deciding whether the plaintiff’s evidence was

sufficient to show discriminatory causation–the civilservice commission’sreview in

Hitt did not break the chain of causation because the motivating-factor standard

applied, but rather because that body lacked any indicia of actual final decision42

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 42 of 55
making authority. The same is true of the City Council here. Moreover, under Sims,

supra, a plaintiff is not precluded from invoking the cat’s paw theory under but-for

causation cases within the Eleventh Circuit even though the determinative influence

standard is a more demanding one to prove. In sum, the court adheresto the cat’s paw

permission granted in Sims, disregards the causation reasoning in Stimpson as

inapplicable on these facts, adopts Hitt as persuasive authority, and concludes that

Mr. Jones has adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether Captain

Benefield’s retaliatory animus had a determinative influence on Mayor Rooks’s

decision to fire Mr. Jones.

B. Mr. Jones Has Shown Sufficient Evidence of Pretext.

The City has undoubtedly articulated a legitimate reason for firing Mr.

Jones–his refusal to end his relationship with Ms. Scott, a convicted felon, in

violation of HPD policy. Given this non-retaliatory reason for Mr. Jones’s firing, the

City alternatively argues that his case fails at the pretext stage.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that “[a] plaintiff’s prima facie case,

combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification

is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully

discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120

S. Ct. 2097, 2109, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000); id. at 140, 120 S. Ct. at 2105 (granting

43

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 43 of 55
certiorari “to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal” that Hicks held a

plaintiff must show not only the falsity of the employer’s explanation, but also “that

discrimination [or retaliation] was the real reason” (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993))).19 Thus,

the City’s insistence that this court apply the pre-Reeves approach as the proper

standard for evaluating pretext is simply wrong and has been so for over sixteen

years. (Doc. 19 at 21-22); (Doc. 28 at 10).

Instead, “[t]o survive summary judgment, the employee must come forward

with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the

legitimate reasons given by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext

for discrimination [or retaliation].” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763,

771 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106). A plaintiff

can prove pretext by showing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its

actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Vessels,

408 F.3d at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co.,

390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson

Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457, 126 S. Ct. 1195, 1197, 163 L. Ed.2d 1053 (2006)).

19

 Sometimes referred to as the “pretext-plus” standard.

44

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 44 of 55
Mr. Jones’s evidence of pretext includes his testimony that Captain Benefield

was aware of and did not have any problems with Mr. Jones’s relationship with Ms.

Scott, despite her criminal record, when Mr. Jones was hired. As Mr. Jones testified

about the information that he shared with Captain Benefield during the summer of

2010:

I explained to him[, i.e., Captain Benefield] the issues of leaving the

ABC Board. And I wanted to be sure that that wasn't going to be an

issue, and he and I, with our history, we had no secrets from each other,

and he assured me that it would not. . . .

[B]efore he ever did my background -- he went to ABC and did my

background in person.

When we were on the way to get my uniforms, about a week or

two weeks before I actually started to work -- I can't remember the exact

time -- I know exactly where we were -- I was -- I told him the extent of

her history, thatshe had been arrested for theft first, and I told him about

the check on the car. We were on Highway 78, right where 431 comes

in.

(Doc. 18-2 at 18 at 66-67). In another part of his deposition, Mr. Jones similarly

testified:

[W]hen I got my uniforms, I told him[, i.e., Captain Benefield] about

her[, i.e., Ms. Scott] theft first charge with the stolen ve- -- (witness

demonstrating) -- stolen vehicle, the bad check/vehicle, we -- we talked

about that. And I -- he asked me, specifically, that day, he said, is she in

any trouble now or under investigation. I said, no. And she’s not, nor has

she been. 

(Doc. 18-2 at 37 at 143-44).

45

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 45 of 55
While Captain Benefield disputes that this conversation about Ms. Scott’s

criminal history ever took place or that he otherwise ever had any prior knowledge

of Ms. Scott’s felony convictions, Mr. Jones has offered a non-party witness that

corroborates Captain Benefield’s awareness of this fact in 2010. More particularly,

Tim Gossage (“Mr. Gossage”), a retired Chief Deputy of the Cleburne County

Sheriff’s Department, has provided an affidavit indicating that he “was present at a

meeting” in 2010 with Captain Benefield, Mr. Jones, and the City’s then chief of

police. (Doc. 25-1 at 2). Mr. Gossage brought up at the meeting that Mr. Jones “was

living with a convicted felon, Connie Scott, and [in his opinion] this did not appear

well with the public.” Id. In response, Mr. Gossage recalls that Captain Benefield

stated “he did not know about this but he would investigate” and that “this would not

be tolerated at the Heflin Police Department.” Id.

Oftentimes sufficient pretext is shown by comparing how a supervisor has

treated similarly situated subordinates (i.e., who violated the same rule or policy, but

who did not oppose discriminatory or retaliatory practices) more favorably than the

plaintiff. See, e.g., Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets Of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354,

1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he ‘work rule’ defense is arguably pretextual when a

plaintiff submits evidence . . . that if []he did violate the rule, other employees outside

the protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not similarly treated.”). Mr.

46

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 46 of 55
Jones lacks this type of evidence.

At the same time, and if his evidence is believed, Mr. Jones has presented an

example of dissimilar treatment that is analogous to the customary comparatorevidence construct–his ongoing and known violation of HPD policy because of his

relationship with Ms. Scott was a non-issue for Captain Benefield until he refused to

engage in a retaliatory act against Officer Young.

20 Further, only then did Captain

Benefield recommend to Mayor Brooksthat Mr. Jones be fired for violating that HPD

policy unless he broke up with Ms. Scott. While the court has endeavored to find a

case that has either embraced or rejected this type of individualized inconsistent

treatment by a supervisor as adequate evidence of pretext in a retaliation case, it has

not been able to locate one. The authorities cited by the parties offer no helpful

insight either. 

At the same time, this peculiar selective-enforcement evidence

straightforwardly discredits or makes implausible the City’s stated reason for

discharging Mr. Jones–if the City truly had a “zero-tolerance” approach when dealing

20

In its reply brief, the City cites to several decisions that reflect the Eleventh Circuit’s

willingness to “afford police departments . . . greater latitude to burden an employee’s rights that

impact discipline, morale, harmony, uniformity, and trust in the ranks.” (Doc. 28 at 10-11; id. at 10

n.15). The court does not disagree with the City’s observation about the import of those various

Eleventh Circuit holdings. However, the issue in this lawsuit is not whether the HPD policy is

legitimate or constitutional, but rather whether Mr. Jones has sufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to decide that the HPD policy was enforced against him in a retaliatory manner. 

47

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 47 of 55
with associational violations of the HPD policy (as Mr. Gossage’s affidavit indicates

Captain Benefield pronounced when reacting to the report in 2010 that Ms. Scott was

a felon), then Mr. Jones never should have been hired by the City in the first place,

or, alternatively, Mr. Jonesshould have been fired in 2010 after the meeting involving

Captain Benefield and Mr. Gossage occurred. Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d

766, 775 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Kohler’s lax enforcement of company policy and

disciplinary procedures provided additional evidence from which a jury could have

found retaliatory motive.”) (emphasis added).21

Additionally, the dissimilar treatment he received pre-opposition versus postopposition is not Mr. Jones’s sole source of pretext. Cf. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d

1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly

situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of

discrimination [or retaliation] is present.”) (emphasis omitted). He also has evidence

that circumstantially reflects Captain Benefield’s retaliatory animus, including his

desire to have Officer Young feel some pain because of the suffering she caused him

and his family from her Title VII lawsuit, his related command to have Mr. Jones lie

to her husband in order to cause her some pain, and his warning that he had been

21 Unlike Mr. Jones, the Kohler plaintiff had several comparator witnesses. 335 F.3d at 775-

76.

48

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 48 of 55
covering for Mr. Jones on his relationship with Ms. Scott. See Rojas v. Florida, 285

F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We have said, however, that such [indirect]

comments can contribute to a circumstantial case for pretext.”) (emphasisin original);

cf. Vessels, 408 F.3d at 771 (“Vessels’ evidence of pretext includes statements he

claimsthat AISS officials made regarding the desirability of having black employees

in a school system serving a predominantly black population.”); id. (“Even where

such evidence of race [or retaliatory] bias proves insufficient to prove an employee’s

case through direct evidence, it can be relevant in the circumstantial framework to

show that the employer’s proffered reasons were pretextual.” (citing Ross v. Rhodes

Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d 1286, 1291) (11th Cir. 1998)); cf. also Beaver v. Rayonier,

Inc., 200 F.3d 723, 729-30 (11th Cir. 1999) (“While Daniel’s [age-related] comment

does not rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination, and would not be

enough standing alone to show a discriminatory motive, a jury could infer from it

some age-bias on Daniel’s part when that comment is coupled with the other evidence

in this case.” (citing Burrell v. Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 125 F.3d

1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997))). 

Therefore, based on the combined weight of the foregoing pieces of evidence,

the court concludes that Mr. Jones has adduced sufficient evidence of pretext.

Alternatively, to the extent that the above evidence does not satisfy the conventional

49

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 49 of 55
McDonnell Douglas framework, the court finds that Mr. Jones has, nonetheless,

“present[ed] circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the [City’s

retaliatory] intent.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.

2011) (citing Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562); Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (“[E]stablishing

the elements of the McDonnell Douglasframework is not, and never was intended to

be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an

employment discrimination [or retaliation] case.”); see also Ortiz v. Werner

Enterprises, Inc., No. 15-2574, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 4411434, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug.

19, 2016) (“That legal standard, to repeat what we wrote in Achor and many later

cases, is simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor

caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.”) (emphasis added); Ortiz,

2016 WL 4411434, at *4 (overruling Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733

(7th Cir. 2011), and other cases “to the extent that they rely on ‘convincing mosaic’

as a governing legal standard”). 

“The only issue to be considered by the judge at summary judgment is whether

the plaintiff’s evidence has placed material facts at issue.” Hairston v. Gainesville

Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir. 1993); see also MacPherson v. University

of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (This court must determine

50

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 50 of 55
whether the record contains “‘evidence of such quality and weight thatreasonable and

fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different

conclusions.’” (quotingVerbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec.Corp., 881 F.2d 1041,1045

(11th Cir. 1998))). Here, “[t]he evidence presented by plaintiff[] issufficient to allow

a jury in the exercise of impartial judgment to conclude that [the City’s] proffered

explanations are unworthy of belief.” MacPherson, 922 F.2d at 776. Alternatively,

a reasonable jury could equally conclude that the City’s articulated reason for firing

Mr. Jones–because of his relationship with Ms. Scott that violated HPD policy–is

legitimate and not a pretext for retaliation under Title VII.

C. The Inchoate Evidentiary Issues Raised by the City in its

Reply Brief Do Not Change the Outcome on Summary

Judgment.

The court acknowledges that, within its reply brief the City, citing to

Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (“When

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by

the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007))), argues that the court “should strike all

of [Mr.] Jones’s deposition and affidavit testimony that he allegedly told [Captain]

51

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 51 of 55
Benefield about [Ms.] Scott’s felonies long before December 2012.” (Doc. 28 at 4).

The City also seeks to strike Mr. Gossage’s affidavit on the basis that Mr. Jones did

not timely disclose him as a witness and “the late tender of [him]” violates Rule

37(c)(1) and the parties’ scheduling order. Id.

Procedurally, the court is not obligated to take up either one of these buried and

undeveloped evidentiary issues, given the City’s failure to file a motion that would

have unambiguously put the court and opposing counsel on notice of a seriously

contested evidentiary dispute and that would have been briefed by both sides under

Appendix III to the court’s uniform initial order. Additionally, the court is not

persuaded by the merits of the City’s contentions under the framework of Rule

37(c)(1):

(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide

information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the

party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply

evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was

substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this

sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be

heard:

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses,

including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure;

(B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and

(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any

of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).

52

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 52 of 55
FED. R. CIV. P. 7(c)(1) (emphasis by underlining added). 

Turning to Mr. Gossage’s affidavit first, the City faults Mr. Jones for not

providing any justification for waiting to disclose Mr. Gossage as a material witness.

(Doc. 28 at 4). If the City had properly filed a motion, then Mr. Jones would have

been required to explain his position for tendering such a late witness under the

briefing requirements of Appendix III. However, the court is unwilling to simply

assume in the City’s favor that Mr. Jones lacks substantial justification without first

being given an opportunity to respond to the City’s claim on the record.

As for the “harmless” exception to Rule 37(c)(1), the City’s claim of harmful

error caused to it by not being able to depose Mr. Gossage is dubious–the City could

have sought to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of taking Mr. Gossage’s

deposition, but it never did. Instead, it chose to passively assert in a reply brief that

the court should simply ignore Mr. Gossage’s affidavit because the discovery

completion deadline had expired. Further, the City has not explained how by merely

taking his deposition, Mr. Gossage’s testimony would have been any different than

the contents of his affidavit. Therefore, because the City could have taken proactive

steps to undo any of the harm about which it now complains and the City has not

shown how taking Mr. Gossage’s deposition would have materially changed his

testimony, the court is not inclined to find that Mr. Jones, by failing to identify Mr.

53

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 53 of 55
Gossage earlier, violated Rule 37(c)(1) or the scheduling order to a degree that

exceeds harmless error. 

Finally, Rule 37(c)(1) allows a court to fashion a lesser sanction than

precluding a witness’s testimony even if the two exceptions do not apply. For

example, if the City had sought to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of taking

Mr. Gossage’s deposition, the court could have ordered Mr. Jonesto cover all the fees

and costs incurred on account of that deposition. For all these reasons, the City’s

requested relief under Rule 37(c)(1) is DENIED. 

Concerning Mr. Jones’s challenged testimony, the court findsthat the City has

not met Scott’s blatantly-contradicted standard. To the extent that the tape-recorded

conversations are in conflict with Mr. Jones’s testimony that Captain Benefield was

aware of Ms. Scott’s criminal history before he was hired, the jury will have to sort

out those credibility issues. Alternatively, even without Mr. Jones’s testimony about

Captain Benefield’s prior knowledge of Ms. Scott’s criminal history, Mr. Gossage’s

affidavit creates a material issue about this critical fact. In sum, for both procedural

and substantive reasons the evidentiary issues superficially presented in the City’s

reply brief are all DENIED. Alternatively, the evidentiary contention relating to Mr.

Jones’s testimony is TERMED as MOOT.

54

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 54 of 55
V. CONCLUSION

The City’s Motion is GRANTED as to any claim of retaliation premised upon

Mr. Jones’s willingness to participate as a witness for Officer Young in her Title VII

lawsuit and otherwise is DENIED. Further, the City’s evidentiary challenges raised

in its reply brief are DENIED. Alternatively, the evidentiary contention relating to

Mr. Jones’s testimony is TERMED as MOOT. By separate order, the court will set

this case for a final pretrial conference.

DONE and ORDERED this the 19th day of September, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

55

Case 1:14-cv-00467-VEH Document 34 Filed 09/19/16 Page 55 of 55