Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01806/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01806-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Although the Placer County defendants’ motion is also captioned as a motion for 1

judgment on the pleadings, the motion was not brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and does not seek judgment on the pleadings.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN G. DUNMORE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1806 LKK DAD PS

v.

COUNTY OF PLACER, et al. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

This matter came before the court on October 27, 2006, for hearing on separate

motions for summary judgment filed by defendant ChoicePoint Government Services Inc.

(defendant ChoicePoint) and defendants Placer County, Harris, Hudson, Bonner, D’Arcy, and

Addoms (Placer County defendants). Steven G. Dunmore, proceeding pro se, appeared on his 1

own behalf. Attorney James W. Poindexter appeared for defendant ChoicePoint. Attorney Brian

R. Wirtz appeared for the Placer County defendants. Defendants’ motions were taken under

submission. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motions

for summary judgment be granted. 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 8, 2005, by filing a fee-paid

complaint against the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff’s Lieutenant Valerie Harris,

Detective James Hudson, Sheriff Edward N. Bonner, and Undersheriff Stephen L. D’Arcy. 

These five defendants filed their answer to plaintiff’s original complaint on October 11, 2005. 

With the defendants’ consent, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on December 20, 2005,

and the defendants filed their answer on December 27, 2005.

At a status conference held on January 13, 2006, the court granted plaintiff’s

unopposed request to further amend his complaint. In the second amended complaint filed

February 13, 2006, plaintiff added three new defendants: ChoicePoint Government Services, Inc.

(AKA or DBA ChoicePoint Online), CDB Infotek (Intelligent Information), and JFA. On

February 23, 2006, the Placer County defendants answered the second amended complaint on

their behalf and on behalf of Sheriff’s Lieutenant John Addoms, sued as JFA. On March 3,

2006, an answer was filed by defendant ChoicePoint Government Services Inc., sued by plaintiff

as ChoicePoint Government Services, Inc. (AKA or DBA ChoicePoint Online) and CDB Infotek

(Intelligent Information).

Pursuant to the court’s January 26, 2006 scheduling order, discovery closed on

September 8, 2006. Pretrial law and motion practice closed on October 27, 2006,with the

hearing on defendants’ dispositive motions. By order filed December 19, 2006, the pretrial

conference was continued to June 4, 2007, and trial was re-set for September 5, 2007.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s claims arise from an application he submitted to the Placer County

Sheriff’s Office in June 2004 for a license to carry concealed weapons. The application was

denied in August 2004. Plaintiff alleges that the Placer County defendants unlawfully

investigated him in connection with his application and obtained access to and data from a file or

files maintained by credit reporting agencies.

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In his 80-page second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair

Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(a)(3) and (f)(1) - (2), 1681e(a), 1681f, 1681m(a)(1) -

(3), 1681n, 1681o, and 1681q; the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(A)

and (C); the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(a)(2) and 2707(a) - (c);

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(8); the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,

1985(a)(2) - (3), 1986, and 1988(a); and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies

Act, California Civil Code §§ 1785.11(a)(3), 1785.12, 1785.19(a), 1785.20(a)(1) - (4), and

1785.31(a)(1) - (3). Plaintiff alleges violations of other criminal statutes as well as state tort

claims. Plaintiff asserts thirteen claims for relief and seeks extensive damages. Plaintiff also

seeks injunctive relief in the form of the removal of some of the Placer County defendants from

their jobs.

STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the

proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Summary

judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. 

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Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. Summary judgment

should be granted “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). See also First

Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los

Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979). The party opposing summary judgment must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., may affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

In attempting to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the party opposing

summary judgment may not rely on the allegations or denials of its pleadings but must tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or admissible discovery material in

support of any contention that a dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

586 n.11. Although the party opposing summary judgment need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor, “the claimed factual dispute [must] be shown to require a jury or

judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at

631.

In general, the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment is to be

believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

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is to be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences will not be drawn out of the air, however, and the

party opposing summary judgment is obligated to produce a factual predicate from which an

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45

(E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). “A scintilla

of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a

genuine issue of material fact” precluding summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198

F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150,

1152 (9th Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Local Rule 78-230 and this court’s scheduling order, plaintiff was

required to file and serve his opposition to defendants’ properly noticed motions on or before

October 13, 2006. On October 11, 2006, plaintiff requested an extension of time to November

10, 2006, to file opposition and an unspecified related or counter-motion. The request was

denied on the grounds that October 27, 2006 was the final day on which pretrial motions could

be heard, plaintiff had delayed his request until two days before his opposition was due, and

plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for modification of the entire scheduling order. The

court ordered that “any untimely opposition to the pending motions which plaintiff may wish to

file prior to the October 27, 2006 hearing shall be accompanied by a request to permit late

filing.” (Order filed October 18, 2006, at 2.) 

On October 26, 2006, plaintiff filed opposition to defendants’ motions along with

a request to late-file the opposition. At 9:49 p.m. on October 26, 2006, plaintiff e-mailed his

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opposition to counsel for defendants and to the courtroom deputy to the undersigned. At the

hearing on October 27, 2006, the court accepted plaintiff’s opposition for filing and permitted

plaintiff to participate in oral argument.

To the extent that plaintiff’s opposition purports to present a counter-motion for

summary judgment, the motion was filed out of time, without leave of court, and without making

a showing of good cause to modify the scheduling order. The court did not accept plaintiff’s

counter-motion for filing, and the untimely motion will be disregarded.

In his opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment, plaintiff attempts

to “waive and withdraw” certain claims. At this stage of the litigation, plaintiff is precluded from

voluntarily dismissing any claim except by the stipulation of all parties or by court order. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(a). Plaintiff did not obtain defendants’ stipulation to dismissal of any claims and did

not move for dismissal of any claims. Moreover, plaintiff’s intentions are not entirely clear. His

references to certain “counts” and specific pages of his second amended complaint render it

virtually impossible to determine whether plaintiff wishes to abandon all, or only some, of his

claims under the California Credit Reporting Agencies Act. The court has determined, however,

that plaintiff has abandoned all claims under the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 and

2707, as well as state law claims of unlawful search and trespass. Those claims should be

dismissed as abandoned. All remaining claims alleged in the second amended complaint are

addressed below.

II. Plaintiff’s FCRA and CCRAA Claims

The Placer County defendants have moved for summary judgment in their favor

on the grounds that (1) plaintiff’s consent to a background investigation with respect to his

application for a concealed weapons permit is a bar to his claims, (2) no Placer County defendant

accessed plaintiff’s credit reports, (3) defendant Hudson obtained permission, from a person with

authority to grant permission, to enter the property where plaintiff lived, (4) plaintiff’s claims of

failure to train and supervise and failure to perform ministerial duties fail because there were no

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underlying wrongful acts, and (5) plaintiff’s claims of civil conspiracy fail because the report

provided by ChoicePoint was not a consumer credit report for purposes of the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., or the California Credit Reporting Agencies

Act (CCRAA), California Civil Code § 1785, et seq.

Defendant ChoicePoint Government Services Inc. seeks judgment in its favor on

plaintiff’s second amended complaint generally and on plaintiff’s thirteenth claim for relief in

particular. Claim 13 contains plaintiff’s allegation that defendant ChoicePoint “willfully

conspired or negligently aided and abetted” the Placer County defendants in accessing public

records regarding plaintiff in violation of FCRA and CCRAA.

The defendants have supported their separate motions for summary judgment with

a joint statement of undisputed facts, filed as document # 44 on the court’s docket. The

defendants’ motions are also supported by exhibits, declarations, and deposition testimony.

Defendants’ evidence establishes that in 2004 the Placer County Sheriff’s Office

subscribed to a database service known as ChoicePoint Online. (Def’t ChoicePoint’s Mot. for

Summ. J., Decl. of Jennifer L. Vowels ¶¶ 2, 4 & 6.) Law enforcement agencies used the

ChoicePoint Online system to obtain public records and identification information for law

enforcement purposes. (Id. ¶¶ 3 & 4.) A subscriber to ChoicePoint Online could log on to the

system with a user code and password, enter information, such as a social security number or a

name, regarding the person for whom information was sought, and the system would retrieve

responsive information, including identification information, such as names and aliases, and

public records data, such as information about tax liens, bankruptcies, and judgments. (Id. ¶¶ 2,

5 & 8.) ChoicePoint Online afforded its subscribers a quick and cost-effective means of

obtaining identification and public records information. (Id. ¶ 2.)

The Placer County Sheriff’s Office originally subscribed to ChoicePoint Online

through ChoicePoint’s predecessor company, CDB Infotek, pursuant to a written agreement

dated June 22, 1999. (Id. ¶ 4.) ChoicePoint Government Services Inc. assumed the service

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agreement with Placer County Sheriff’s Office after CDB Infotek was acquired by ChoicePoint. 

(Id.) Placer County Sheriff’s Office renewed the service agreement each year by written

purchase order, including a purchase order dated June 2, 2004, for the fiscal year July 1, 2004,

through June 30, 2005. (Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. A.)

Placer County Sheriff’s Office used the ChoicePoint Online database only for law

enforcement purposes. (Placer County Def’ts’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Brian R. Wirtz, Ex. F

(Dep. of Jim Hudson at 15-16).) The County of Placer contracted separately with another

database service, Fidelity National Credit Services, for information governed by credit reporting

laws, and that database service was used for pre-employment screening and investigative

consumer purposes. (Id., Ex. G.)

On June 15, 2004, plaintiff applied to the Placer County Sheriff’s Office for a

concealed weapons permit. He completed and submitted a “Standard Application for CCW

License” requesting a permit to carry three concealed handguns. (Id., Ex. A.) The form required

plaintiff to (1) provide proof of residency in Placer County, (2) provide proof of weapons training

at a course approved by the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, (3) demonstrate good moral

character, and (4) establish good cause to support the request for a permit to carry concealed

weapons. (Id. at 5.) The form includes the following two provisions concerning a background

investigation:

The licensee authorizes the licensing agency to investigate, as they

deem necessary, the licensee’s record and character to ascertain any

and all information which may concern his/her qualifications and

justification to be issued a license to carry a concealed weapon and

release said agency of any and all liability arising out of such

investigation.

. . . .

I hereby give permission to the agency to which this application is

made to conduct a background investigation of me and to contact

any person or agency who may add to or aid in this investigation. I

further authorize persons, firms, agencies and institutions listed on

this application to release or confirm information about me and

statements I have made as contained in this application.

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(Id. at 6 & 14.) By signing the form, plaintiff authorized a background investigation for use in

deciding whether to grant his application. (Id.)

Defendant Valerie Harris was employed by the Placer County Sheriff’s Office

between June and August 2004 and was at that time assigned the duty of processing applications

for concealed weapons permits. (Placer County Deft’s’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Valerie

Harris ¶¶ 1 & 4.) Defendant Harris was the principal officer charged with investigating

plaintiff’s application. (Id. ¶ 5.) As part of the routine processing of plaintiff’s application, she

reviewed the application, ran a criminal history through local records and the National Crime

Information Center, and obtained a DMV report. (Id. ¶ 6.) She was concerned about some of the

entries on plaintiff’s application, including a family law stay away order, two lawsuits filed in

federal court, two state criminal charges that were dismissed, plaintiff’s application for concealed

weapon permits in other counties and other states, and plaintiff’s lack of weapons training at an

approved course. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant Harris was also concerned about plaintiff’s failure to

provide written evidence, such as a copy of a utility bill or tax assessor bill, verifying that he

resided in Placer County at the address given in the application. (Id. & Ex. A at 2.)

At defendant Harris’s request, defendant Hudson, a Placer County Sheriff’s Office

detective, obtained a ChoicePoint Online report in an attempt to verify plaintiff’s residence

address. (Placer County Def’ts’ Mot. for Summ. J., Wirtz Decl., Exs. F (Hudson Dep. at 12-16

& 18) & H.) The report was obtained by entering user identification information, indicating that

the report was for law enforcement purposes, and entering the social security number provided by

plaintiff in his application. (Id.) The report did not disclose a Placer County address for plaintiff

but identified several tax liens, a prior bankruptcy, and other public records information

regarding plaintiff, including the fact that he had previously changed his name. (Id., Wirtz Decl.,

Ex. H.) Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of the information in the report obtained from

ChoicePoint Online and has in fact stipulated that the information was correct. (Id., Wirtz Decl.,

Ex. I (Dep. of John Addoms, Vol. II at 5).)

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Defendant Harris asked defendant Hudson to attempt to contact plaintiff at the

address given in his application for a concealed weapons permit. (Placer County Def’ts’ Mot. for

Summ. J., Harris Decl., Ex. A at 3.) On July 16, 2004, defendant Hudson went to the address,

was unable to enter the property through the gate, and called a telephone number given in

plaintiff’s application. (Id., Decl. of James Hudson ¶¶ 4-7 and Attach. 2.) Plaintiff answered the

telephone but denied being Steven Dunmore. (Id.) A woman who grazed her horses on the

property gave defendant Hudson permission to enter the property after Hudson identified himself 

as a detective, and she opened the gate for him as she left the property. (Id.) Defendant Hudson

drove up to the house and knocked at the front door, but nobody answered. (Id.)

On July 21, 2004, defendants Harris and Hudson met with plaintiff to discuss his

permit application. (Id., Harris Decl., Ex. A at 3-4.) They asked plaintiff about his failure to

identify himself when defendant Hudson called on July 16, 2004, and about the tax liens. 

Defendants explained that the Placer County Sheriff’s Office had concerns about plaintiff’s tax

liens, his attempts to conceal his residence because of debts, his name change, his pursuit of

concealed weapon permits in various states, and the prior restraining orders. (Id.) During the

meeting, plaintiff voluntarily admitted that the concealed weapons permit issued to him by Napa

County had been revoked, a fact he had omitted from his Placer County application for a

concealed weapons permit. (Id.) Later that day, plaintiff left defendant Harris a voice mail

message instructing her to contact the person he had given as a reference and whom she had been

trying to reach, but instructing her to discontinue additional efforts to verify other information

about his background. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendant Harris was unable to speak to the person plaintiff

had given as a reference and discontinued further background investigation at plaintiff’s request. 

(Id. at 5.) Defendant Harris recommended that defendant D’Arcy, the undersheriff, deny

plaintiff’s permit application. (Id.) Defendant D’Arcy sent plaintiff a letter dated August 5,

2004, denying plaintiff’s application for a concealed weapons permit. (Id. & Wirtz Decl., Ex. K.)

/////

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On August 17, 2004, plaintiff obtained a consumer credit report regarding

himself. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at 9.) One page of the report obtained by plaintiff is titled

“Creditor Information” and lists names of “all creditors that appear on your credit report,”

including “companies that have made an inquiry into your credit history.” (Placer County Def’ts’

Mot. for Summ. J., Wirtz Decl., Ex. B; Pl.’s Original Compl., Ex. A.) The Creditor Information

page includes an entry for “Placer County Court RD,” telephone number 916-889-7088. (Id.) 

The page contains no entry for or any reference to Placer County Sheriff’s Office or any

defendant in this case. (Id.) The telephone number give for “Placer County Court RD” was not a

telephone number for any Placer County office at that time. (Placer County Def’ts’ Mot. for

Summ. J., Decl. of Jerry Gamaz ¶ 3.) Defendant Harris did not obtain or order anyone to obtain

a credit history regarding plaintiff from any credit bureau in connection with plaintiff’s

application for a concealed weapons permit or for any other purpose. (Id., Harris Decl. ¶ 7.)

Defendants note that plaintiff’s claims are not grounded on the denial of his

application for a concealed weapons permit but instead arise from his contention that the Placer

County defendants improperly obtained his credit history and unlawfully entered onto his

property. Defendants contend that neither the actions of the Placer County defendants in

ordering a ChoicePoint report nor the actions of ChoicePoint in providing a report violated any

federal or state law. Defendants argue that the report was not a consumer report for purposes of

either the FCRA or the CCRAA. The Placer County defendants argue further that plaintiff

authorized the Placer County Sheriff’s Office to conduct the background investigation that was

conducted.

Plaintiff alleges repeatedly in his second amended complaint that the Placer

County Sheriff’s Office unlawfully accessed his consumer data with Trans Union or Equifax or

Experian Credit Reporting Agencies. (See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 63, 88, 104, 118, 132, 145

& 161.) He alleges that the Placer County Sheriff’s Office “obtained access to and data from a

‘file’ . . . maintained by Trans Union and possibly other credit reporting agencies (CRAs), via 

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co-defendant [ChoicePoint].” (Id. ¶ 26.) In opposition to defendants’ motions, plaintiff admits

that these allegations are incorrect, but he still maintains that defendant ChoicePoint “acted or

undertook to act as a ‘consumer reporting agency’ or a third party ‘reseller’ of consumer

information.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.)

Plaintiff has neither offered nor cited evidence that any Placer County defendant

ever ordered plaintiff’s credit history or any consumer credit information about plaintiff from any

credit bureau while conducting a background investigation pursuant to plaintiff’s application for

a concealed weapons permit. Nor has plaintiff offered or pointed to any evidence that supports a

dispute of fact on this allegation. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Placer County Sheriff’s

Office is the same entity as the Placer County Court or that the entity identified on the credit

report obtained by plaintiff as “Placer County Court RD” was in fact the Placer County Sheriff’s

Office. The record before the court contains no evidence from which it can be inferred that any

Placer County defendant ordered a credit report concerning plaintiff or that ChoicePoint provided

any Placer County defendant with such a report. There is no evidence that gives rise to a dispute

in this regard.

FCRA regulates the dissemination of information contained in consumer reports. 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n & 1681o. “Consumer report” is defined as follows:

The term “consumer report” means any written, oral, or other

communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency

bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit

capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or

mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in

whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in 

establishing the consumer’s eligibility for – 

(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or

household purposes;

(B) employment purposes, or

(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). The “other purposes” authorized under § 1681b are disclosure in

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response to a court order or a subpoena issued in connection with federal grand jury proceedings,

disclosure at the request of a government child support agency, disclosure pursuant to the

consumer’s own written instructions, disclosure in connection with the consumer’s eligibility for

a license where the licensing agency is required by law to consider the licensee’s financial

responsibility or status, and disclosure where there is a legitimate business need in connection

with a business transaction initiated by the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a).

Here, the ChoicePoint report obtained by the Placer County defendants does not

include consumer credit information, does not contain information collected in whole or in part

for a reason specified in § 1681a(d)(1) or § 1681b(a), and does not contain information that was

used for a reason specified in § 1681a(d)(1) or § 1681b(a). Plaintiff has neither cited nor offered

evidence that supports the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in this regard. On this

record, all defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s FCRA claims.

Similarly, state law predicates liability on disclosure of a “consumer credit

report.” Cal. Civil Code §§ 1785.11 & 1785.14. “[T]he definition of ‘consumer credit report’ in

CCRAA is not as broad as the definition under FCRA.” Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 39 Cal.

App. 4th 548, 559 (1995). The statute defines “consumer credit report” as

any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a

consumer credit reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit

worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or is

expected to be used, or collected in whole or in part, for the

purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s

eligibility for: (1) credit to be used primarily for personal, family,

or household purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) hiring

of a dwelling unit . . ., or (4) other purposes authorized in Section

1785.11.

Cal. Civil Code § 1785.3(c). The “other purposes” authorized in § 1785.11 are as follows: 

disclosure related to insurance, disclosure pursuant to court order, disclosure at the request of a

government child support agency, disclosure pursuant to the consumer’s own written

instructions, disclosure in connection with eligibility for a government license or benefit where

the agency is required by law to consider the applicant’s financial responsibility or status, and

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disclosure for business purposes in connection with a business transaction involving the

consumer. Cal. Civil Code § 1785.11.

The ChoicePoint report obtained by the Placer County Sheriff’s Office does not

include any consumer credit information, and plaintiff has not offered or cited evidence that the

information in the report was collected in whole or in part for a reason specified in § 1785.3(c) or

§ 1785.11. Nor has plaintiff offered or pointed to evidence that supports the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact in this regard. On this record, all defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on plaintiff’s CCRAA claims.

The Placer County defendants appear to be entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff’s FCRA and CCRAA claims on the additional ground that plaintiff expressly authorized

the Placer County Sheriff’s Office to conduct a background investigation in connection with his

application for a concealed weapons permit. At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that the Placer

County Sheriff’s Office was entitled to conduct a background investigation and had broad

discretion to deny his application for a concealed weapons permit. The application signed by

plaintiff gave the Placer County Sheriff’s Office authority “to investigate, as they deem

necessary, the licensee’s record and character to ascertain any and all information which may

concern his/her qualifications and justification to be issued a license to carry a concealed weapon

and release said agency of any and all liability arising out of such investigation.” The signed

application also gave the Placer County Sheriff’s Office authority to conduct a background

investigation “and to contact any person or agency who may add to or aid in this investigation.” 

Defendants’ evidence demonstrates that the public records information included in the

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 Plaintiff asserted at oral argument on October 27, 2006, that he did not consent to

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defendants’ use of his social security number to conduct the background investigation he had

authorized. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that he refused to provide his social security

number, that he provided his social security number under protest, that he stated any objection to

providing his social security number, that he attempted to limit the use of his social security

number, or that, having provided his social security number, he had any basis for believing

defendants would not use it in conducting their background investigation. Defendants’ evidence

shows that the number was used solely for the purpose of obtain identification and public records

information.

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ChoicePoint report concerned plaintiff’s identification, address, record, and character, all of

which were matters within the scope of the investigation authorized by plaintiff.2

III. Other Claims Alleged in the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges civil and criminal violations of the

Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Social Security

Act, and state law. Each alleged violation is predicated on defendants’ having violated the

FCRA or the CCRAA. In the absence of evidence demonstrating the existence of at least a

disputed issue of material fact with regard to the alleged FCRA and CCRAA violations, there is

no factual or legal basis for plaintiff’s claims under federal and state statutes that predicate

liability on the violation of other statutes.

Similarly, in the absence of at least a disputed issue of material fact with regard to

the alleged violation of the FCRA or the CCRAA, there is no factual basis for plaintiff’s claims

that supervisory defendants failed to adequately train and supervise subordinate defendants or

that supervisory defendants acquiesced in, approved of, or ratified allegedly unlawful actions of

subordinate defendants with regard to consumer credit information.

Finally, the evidence shows that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claims of criminal and civil conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985,

1986, and 1988.

“A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons who,

by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful

objective for the purpose of harming another which results in

damage.” Vieux v. East Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330,

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1343 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). To prove a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must show that

the conspiring parties “reached a unity of purpose or a common

design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful

arrangement.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). The record contains no

evidence from which it can be inferred that two or more of the defendants reached a unity of

purpose, a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful

arrangement to violate plaintiff’s rights. The record also contains no evidence that two or more

of the defendants engaged in a concerted action that resulted in damage to plaintiff.

Having carefully considered plaintiff’s pleadings, all written materials submitted

in connection with defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and the parties’ arguments in

open court, the undersigned finds that all defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all

claims alleged in the second amended complaint. After multiple amendments to his pleading and

adequate time for discovery, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact on elements essential to his claims and on which he will bear the burden of proof at

trial. The undersigned will therefore recommend that summary judgment be granted in favor of

all defendants on all claims.

IV. Privacy Act

In plaintiff’s belated opposition to defendants’ motions, plaintiff asserts that

the PCSO defendants also violated several federal civil and

criminal laws, and thus plaintiff’s right to privacy and other

statutory rights, by willfully and intentionally requesting or

requiring, disclosing and using plaintiff’s Social Security Number

(SSN) (Plaintiff’s SUF ##1), in violation of Section 7(b) of the

federal Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896,

1909 (1974) and Title 28 C.F.R. § 25.7(b), infra, and also violated

and deprived plaintiff’s statutory rights under Title 42 U.S.C. §

408(a)(8) (a federal felony to disclose and/or use any person’s SSN

in violation of other laws of the United States).

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 9 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).)

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Section 7(b) of the Privacy Act provides that “[a]ny Federal, State, or local

government agency which requests an individual to disclose his social security number shall

inform that individual whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or

other authority such number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it.” Privacy Act of 1974,

Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909 (1974), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note. Section

7 of the Privacy Act is not codified and appears only in the “Historical and Statutory Note”

following 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

Plaintiff argues that the Placer County Sheriff’s Office violated § 7(b) by

obtaining and using his social security number without his informed and voluntary consent and

thereby committed a felony under 42 U.S.C.§ 408(a)(8). Citing Stollenwerk v. Miller, No. Civ.

A. 04-5510, 2006 WL 463393 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2006), plaintiff contends that he has a private

right of action under § 7(b).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges in great detail numerous statutes,

both federal and state, violated by the defendants. The pleading does not allege a violation of the

Privacy Act. Plaintiff, apparently anticipating defendants’ objection that the alleged Privacy Act

violation is a new claim, asserts that he “is not required by law to allege every possible fact or

scenario in his Complaint, as amended, to support his Claims for Relief.” He argues that he

ascertained “additional supporting facts” post-complaint and is entitled to rely on such facts and

pertinent law. (Pl’s Opp’n at 3.) At oral argument, when defendants’ counsel indicated that they

were hearing plaintiff’s privacy claim for the first time, plaintiff suggested that counsel should

have deposed him.

Plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive. His assertion of a Privacy Act violation

is a new claim rather than a mere factual allegation offered in support of claims alleged in the

second amended complaint. The undersigned has therefore considered whether plaintiff should

be granted leave to amend his complaint a third time to allege a claim under the Privacy Act. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (once a responsive pleading has been filed, the plaintiff may amend his

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complaint “only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party”). “Valid reasons

for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California

Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Prejudice to opposing parties is the most important factor in considering whether to grant leave

to amend. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 & 1988 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, leave to amend should be denied for numerous reasons. Discovery and

motion practice are closed, and the defendants have demonstrated their entitlement to summary

judgment on all claims alleged in plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In addition to undue

delay and prejudice to defendants, amendment would be futile.

Section 7 of the Privacy Act contains no remedy provision of its own, and the

private right of civil action created by the Privacy Act and codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) “is

specifically limited to actions against agencies of the United States Government.” Unt v.

Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1981). “The civil remedy provisions of the

statute do not apply against private individuals, state agencies, private entities, or state and local

officials.” Id. See also Cell Assocs., Inc. v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 579 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (9th

Cir. 1978) (affirming the district court’s denial of injunctive relief in a suit brought under the

Privacy Act on the ground that “Congress did not intend to authorize the issuance of injunctions

prohibiting disclosures of protected materials.”).

The Ninth Circuit has also determined that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a

private right of action for violations of § 7 of the Privacy Act. See Dittman v. California, 191

F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999). Section 1983 provides a private right of action for a violation

of a federal statute “‘only if the statute creates enforceable rights and if Congress has not

foreclosed such enforcement in the statute itself.’” 191 F.3d at 1027-28 (quoting Legal Servs. v.

Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1997)). A remedy under § 1983 may be foreclosed by

Congress either “‘expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly,

by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual

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enforcement under § 1983.’” Id. at 1028 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341

(1997)). “[B]y limiting the scope of the Privacy Act’s civil remedy provision, 5 U.S.C. §

552a(g), Congress clearly intended to ‘foreclose private enforcement’ against any entity other

than federal agencies.” Id. at 1029 (emphasis in original).

In the absence of a means of enforcing the provisions of § 7 of the Privacy Act, it

would be futile to permit plaintiff to file a third amended complaint alleging a Privacy Act

violation. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s federal claims under the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701

and 2707 and state claims of unlawful search and trespass be dismissed with prejudice;

2. The September 26, 2006 motion for summary judgment filed by defendants

Placer County, Valerie Harris, James Hudson, Edward N. Bonner, Stephen L. D’Arcy, and John

Addoms (sued as JFA) be granted as to all remaining claims;

3. The September 26, 2006 motion for summary judgment filed by defendant

ChoicePoint Government Services Inc., sued as ChoicePoint Government Services, Inc. (AKA or

DBA ChoicePoint Online) and CDB Infotek (Intelligent Information), be granted as to all claims;

4. The September 26, 2006 motion in the alternative for judgment on the

pleadings filed by the Placer County defendants be denied; and 

5. Judgment be entered for defendants and this action be closed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

twenty (20) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

and serve written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections shall be filed and

served within ten (10) days after the objections are served. The parties are advised that failure to

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file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 24, 2007.

DAD:kw

ddad1\orders.prose\dunmore1806.oahf&r

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