Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-01118/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-01118-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ARTURO VALENCIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FRENCH CONNECTION BAKERY, INC.,

et al., 

Defendants.

___________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: C 07-1118 PVT

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF

CESAR SANTACRUZ’ OBJECTION,

AND DISMISSING THE CLAIMS OF

PLAINTIFFS ARTURO VALENCIA,

JAVIER SANTACRUZ, EDGAR

SANTACRUZ, AND FREDDY GOMEZ

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 30, 2007, this court issued an order that, among other things, directed those

Plaintiffs who wished to continue litigating their claims to file a “Consent to Be Party Plaintiff” no

later than December 14, 2007. Only Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz filed a “Consent to Be Party Plaintiff.” 

Thus, on December 18, 2007, this court issued an Order to Show Cause Why the Claims of All

Plaintiffs Other than Cesar Santacruz Should Not Be Dismissed Without Prejudice (“Order to Show

Cause”). Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz has filed an objection to the claims of the other Plaintiffs being

dismissed without prejudice. No other party responded to the Order to Show Cause. Based on the

file herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz’ objection is OVERRULED, and

the claims of Arturo Valencia, Javier Santacruz, Edgar Santacruz, and Freddy Gomez (the

Case 5:07-cv-01118-PVT Document 32 Filed 01/15/08 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

1

underlying the present motion.

While Section 216(b) appears on its face to require all plaintiffs in FLSA unpaid overtime 2

cases to file written consent to be party plaintiffs with the court, the Department of Labor and at least

one circuit court of appeals have interpreted the statute as requiring such consents be filed only in

collective actions. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.20 (“With respect to these [collective] actions, the amendment

provides that no employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in

writing to become such a party and such consent is filed with the court in which such action is

brought.”); see also, Allen v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (5 Cir. 1984) (“It is clear th

that a plaintiff does not need to file a written consent if an individual action is maintained.”)

Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz does not have standing to assert objections on the other 3

Plaintiffs’ behalf.

ORDER, page 2

“Dismissed Plaintiffs”) are DISMISSED, without prejudice. Although it appears Plaintiff Cesar 1

Santacruz is correct in his assertion that the “filed written consent” requirement of Section 26(b)

applies only to collective actions, dismissal of these four Plaintiffs’ claims is nonetheless warranted

2

because: 1) these four Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute their claims; 2) dismissal without prejudice

will not constitute an impermissible waiver of their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA” or “Act”); and 3) Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz is not authorized to prosecute these four

Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims without their participation, and he lacks standing to prosecute their nonFLSA claims. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (court may dismiss case sua

sponte, even without notice, “when circumstances make such action appropriate”). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. DISMISSAL OF THE DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS IS WARRANTED

BASED ON THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS,

PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE AND PROSECUTE THEIR CLAIMS

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for involuntary dismissal of

claims where a plaintiff either fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order. See FED. R. CIV.

PRO. 41(b); see also, Link, 370 U.S. at 630-33. In the present case, the Dismissed Plaintiffs failed to,

among other things: 1) comply with this court’s July 31, 2007 order directing the parties to

participate in court-sponsored mediation; 2) file a response (even if only an objection) on their own

behalf to this court’s requirement that they file a Consent to be Party Plaintiff; and 3) file a response 3

to the Order to Show Cause. Moreover, numerous statements in the record indicate that the

Dismissed Plaintiffs no longer wish to participate in this lawsuit, and that they are no longer in

Case 5:07-cv-01118-PVT Document 32 Filed 01/15/08 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The court is aware that most Ninth Circuit cases assessing the propriety of sua sponte 4

dismissal focus primarily on unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Henderson, 779 F.2d 1421. However, the

court has found no case that addresses the propriety of sua sponte dismissal where, as here, it appears

from the record that a plaintiff has abandoned his claims and only his attorney seeks to continue

litigating those claims.

ORDER, page 3

communication with their attorney. (See, e.g. Defendants’ Case Management Conference statement,

filed herein on 9/25/07, and Plaintiffs’ Case Management Conference statement, filed herein on

10/1/07.) 

In determining whether to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution, courts weigh several

factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage

its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. See Henderson v. Duncan,

779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9 Cir. 1986). th 4

In this case, the first three factors weigh in favor of dismissal. It is not in the public’s interest

to continue expending court time and resources on claims which a plaintiff has abandoned. The

court would not be well-served maintaining such abandoned claims on its docket. And the risk of

prejudice to the Defendants is high, given the likely difficulty they would encounter in trying to

obtain discovery from the missing Plaintiffs. 

The fourth factor, the merit of the claims, is of less importance where a plaintiff has himself

abandoned his claims and the court dismisses the action without prejudice.

The fifth factor is immaterial in this situation because the dismissal is not being imposed as a

“sanction,” but rather as an acknowledgment that the four Dismissed Plaintiffs have abandoned this

action.

Having weighed the relevant factors, under all the circumstances of this case, the court finds

that dismissal of these Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to prosecute is warranted.

B. DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN

IMPERMISSIBLE WAIVER OF THE DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ FLSA

CLAIMS

The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees time and one-half for work exceeding

forty hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). If an employer violates that requirement, the

Case 5:07-cv-01118-PVT Document 32 Filed 01/15/08 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER, page 4

employer is liable to the affected employee(s) in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation

along with liquidated damages in an equal amount. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (hereinafter “Section

216(b)”). The Act authorizes employees to sue their employer to recover that liability. Id.

An employee’s claims under the FLSA are non-waivable, and thus may not be settled without

supervision of either the Secretary of Labor or a district court. See Yue Zhou v. Wang's Restaurant,

2007 WL 172308 at * 1 (N.D.Cal. 2007); see also, Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, et al.,

679 F. 2d 1350, 1352-53 (11 Cir. 1982). Where parties do not make any showing of fairness, th

dismissing FLSA claims with prejudice would be tantamount to allowing the employee to waive his

claims without the supervision of either the Secretary of Labor or the court. However, as discussed

above, dismissal is warranted when a plaintiff fails to prosecute his case. See FED.R.CIV.PRO. 41(b),

see also Link, 370 U.S. at 630-33. Thus, the court finds it appropriate to dismiss the Dismissed

Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.

Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz argues that dismissal, even if it is without prejudice, constitutes an

impermissible waiver of the Dismissed Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims because their claims for any hours

worked more than two years ago will be barred by the FLSA’s statute of limitations. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 255 (prescribing a two-year limitation for FLSA violations generally, and a three-year limitation

for willful violations). However, deeming the operation of the statute of limitations to be an

“impermissible” waiver would be inconsistent with the fact that the FLSA has a statute of limitations

at all. Further, federal law recognizes equitable tolling of the FLSA’s statute of limitations in certain

instances. See Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of Southern California, Inc., 645 F.2d 757, 760

(9 Cir. 1981), abrogated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 165 (1989). Thus, it is not even certain that the th

statute of limitations would operate to bar the Dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims should they later choose

to re-file their complaint. In any event, to the extent such claims would be barred, the operation of

the statute of limitations is a permissible “waiver” of the claims by virtue of the fact Congress chose

to impose a statute of limitations on an employees’ FLSA claims.

C. PLAINTIFF CESAR SANTACRUZ CANNOT CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE

THE DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS WITHOUT THEIR

PARTICIPATION

Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz also argues that it would be “practical” to allow him to continue to

Case 5:07-cv-01118-PVT Document 32 Filed 01/15/08 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Such a procedure would also unfairly prejudice Defendants’ ability to take discovery from 5

the missing Plaintiffs.

ORDER, page 5

prosecute the Dismissed Plaintiffs’ individual claims. He cites no legal authority for such a

procedure. The FLSA does provide for collective actions. However, in a collective action all party

plaintiffs and all other claimants must file with the court a written consent to be parties. See 29

U.S.C. §§ 216(b) & 256. Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz cannot make an end run around that requirement

by improperly trying to prosecute the Dismissed Plaintiffs’ individual claims without their

participation.5

As to the Dismissed Plaintiffs’ non-FLSA claims, Plaintiff Cesar Santacruz has not

established that he has standing to prosecute those claims. See, e.g., Shah v. Wilco Sys., Inc., 2001

WL 1006722, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“to the extent plaintiffs intend to assert these [discrimination]

claims as individuals, they are clearly inadequate because plaintiffs have suffered no injury on behalf

of such other employees, and accordingly lack standing to assert such claims”).

III. CONCLUSION

The four Dismissed Plaintiffs have apparently abandoned this lawsuit. Under the

circumstances of this case, and the requirements of the FLSA, dismissal of those Plaintiffs’ claims

without prejudice is warranted.

Dated: 1/15/08

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:07-cv-01118-PVT Document 32 Filed 01/15/08 Page 5 of 5