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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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REVISED NOVEMBER 21, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30756

ST. JOSEPH ABBEY; MARK COUDRAIN

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

PAUL WES CASTILLE; BELVA M. PICHON; CRAIG G. GILL; ANDREW

HAYES; WALL V. MCKNEELY; MARGARET SHEHEE; KELLY RUSH

WILLIAMS; LOUIS CHARBORNNET, in their official capacities as Members

of the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors; PATRICK

H. SANDERS, in his official capacity in place of Oscar A. Rollins (deceased)

Defendants-Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

An Abbey of the Benedictine Order of the Catholic Church challenges as

unconstitutional rules issued by the Louisiana Board of Funeral Directors

granting funeral homes an exclusive right to sell caskets. The district court

enjoined their enforcement, finding that they deny equal protection and due

process of law. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 23, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

The thirty-eight monks of St. Joseph Abbey earn their way in a pastoral

setting. In years past, the Abbey’s timberland provided a source of income. 

After Hurricane Katrina destroyed its timber, the Abbey began looking for other

revenue sources. For generations the Abbey has made simple wooden caskets

to bury its monks. Public interest in the Abbey’s caskets increased after two

bishops were buried in Abbey caskets in the 1990s. Seeing potential in this

demand, the Abbey invested $200,000 in “St. Joseph Woodworks,” managed by

Mark Coudrain, a deacon of the Church and an employee of the Abbey. The

business plan was simple. St. Joseph Woodworks offered one product – caskets

in two models, “monastic” and “traditional,” priced at $1,500 and $2,000

respectively, significantly lower than those offered by funeral homes. The Abbey

offers no funeral services. It does not prepare a deceased for burial and its

monks do not participate in funerals, except as pastors. 

To be sure, Louisiana does not regulate the use of a casket, container, or

other enclosure for the burial remains; has no requirements for the construction

or design of caskets; and does not require that caskets be sealed. Individuals

may construct their own caskets for funerals in Louisiana or purchase caskets

from out-of-state suppliers via the internet. Indeed, no Louisiana law even

requires a person to be buried in a casket. 

Nonetheless, the Abbey’s plan for casket sales faced significant regulatory

burdens. The Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors

(“State Board”) argues that, under state law, intrastate sales of caskets to the

public may be made only by a state-licensed funeral director and only at a statelicensed funeral home. This stricture has two layers. First, a prospective 1

See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 37:831(37)-(39), :848.

1

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casket retailer must become a licensed funeral establishment. This requires 2

building a layout parlor for thirty people, a display room for six caskets, an

arrangement room, and embalming facilities. Second, the establishment must 3

employ a full-time funeral director. A funeral director must have a high school 4

diploma or GED, pass thirty credit hours at an accredited college, and complete

a one-time apprenticeship. The apprenticeship must consist of full-time 5

employment and be the apprentice’s “principal occupation.” None of this

mandatory training relates to caskets or grief counseling. A funeral director

must also pass a test administered by the International Conference of Funeral

Examining Boards. The exam does not test Louisiana law or burial practices. 6

In Louisiana, funeral directors are the only individuals authorized by law to

provide funeral services. In sum, the State Board’s sole regulation of caskets

presently is to restrict their intrastate sales to funeral homes. There are no

other strictures over their quality or use. The district court found the State’s

scheme to be the last of its kind in the nation. The State Board had never

succeeded in any enforcement actions against a third party seller prior to its

effort to halt the Abbey’s consumer sales.

II.

Louisiana’s restriction on the sales of caskets exist against the background

of substantial federal regulation of the funeral industry. Beginning in the early

1980s, theFTC promulgated regulations, known as the Funeral Rule, to mitigate

See id. §§ 37:831(37), (39), :842(D). 

2

See id. § 37:842(D)(3). 3

Id. § 37:842(D)(1). 4

Id. § 37:842(A). 

5

Id. § § 37:842(A)(6), :831(38).

6

3

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unfair or deceptive practices of funeral providers. These practices included 7

failing to disclose price information and “bundling” of products and services. 

Bundling forced consumers to buy a range of funeral goods and services –

whether or not they needed or wanted the whole bundle. The FTC determined

that it could not rely on state funeral licensing boards to curb such practices

because the state boards were “dominated by funeral directors.” The funeral 8

directors had organized themselves into industry groups, which lobbied state

legislatures and made practices such as a refusal to disclose prices part of their

professional “ethics” code. The Funeral Rule required funeral directors to

provide consumers with itemized price lists and allow consumers to purchase

only those goods and services they actually wanted. A principal objective of the

Funeral Rule was to “encourage entry into the funeral market of new

competitors seeking to attract business by offering lower prices.”9

After the Funeral Rule forced funeral homes to disclose casket prices, the

significant mark-ups charged by the funeral homes became apparent, and a

market for third-party casket sales emerged. Funeral directors responded to this

growing competition by refusing to use third-party caskets unless consumers

paid large “casket-handling” fees. The FTC responded by amending the Funeral

Rule to ban casket-handling fees. In its comments on that rulemaking, the 10

FTC explained that “casket handling fees are unfair conditions on a consumer’s

right to decline unwanted items he or she may wish to purchase elsewhere.”11

Trade Regulation Rule; Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42260 (Sept. 24, 7

1982); see 16 C.F.R. § 453.1 et seq.

Id. at 44289. 8

Id. at 42293. 9

Funeral Industry Practices Trade Regulation Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592, 1593 (Jan. 11, 10

1994).

Id. at 1604. 11

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In 2008, the FTC not only decided to retain the Funeral Rule but also

expressly declined to subject third-party casket vendors to the rule because, in

contrast to state-licensed funeral directors, “[t]he record [was] bereft of evidence

indicating significant consumer injury caused by third-party sellers.” Because 12

oftheFTC’s interventions,Louisiana funeral homes cannot discourage consumer

choice by applying casket-handling fees or by forcing consumers to purchase

bundled goods and services, and Louisiana consumers can now buy caskets from 

third-party retailers – unless those retailers reside in Louisiana. 

As the district court found, a funeral director may charge a non-declinable

service fee ranging from $3,000 to $4,000 in addition to charges for individually

priced goods and services. This non-declinable service fee includes advice 13

about casket selection, and the funeral director is contractually bound to assist

the consumer if a problem arises. Thus, whenever a consumer retains a funeral

director in Louisiana, the consumer pays the funeral director thousands of 14

dollars to provide advice on every aspect of funeral planning, including casket

purchase – whether the consumer is buying a casket from the funeral home or

using a homemade casket or one purchased from an out-of-state third-party

retailer. 

III.

In December 2007, the State Board ordered the Abbey not to sell caskets

to the public, and the next month, Boyd Mothe, Sr., the chair of the Legislative

Committee for the Louisiana Funeral Directors Association and a state-licensed

 73 Fed. Reg. 13740, 13745 (Mar. 14, 2008). 12

See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices,

13

16 C.F.R. § 453.2(b)(4)(iii)(C).

 Indeed, it appears that all persons seeking to dispose of a deceased are obligated to 14

engage a Louisiana funeral establishment. See La. Rev. Stat. § 37:848(D)(5).

5

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funeral director who owns several funeral homes, initiated a formal complaint

against the Abbey. By law, the nine-member State Board must consist of four

licensed funeral directors, four licensed embalmers, and just one representative

not affiliated with the funeral industry. In 2008 and 2010, the Abbey 15

petitioned the legislature to change the law to allow non-profit charitable groups

such as the Abbey to sell caskets. Although two bills to amend the law were

drafted, it appears neither made it out of committee. No member of the public

opposed the bills.

Facing these hurdles, the Abbey and Deacon Mark Coudrain filed this suit

in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Abbey and Coudrain sought

declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Louisiana

Embalming and Funeral Directors Act by the nine members of the State Board. 

These defendants are charged with the Act’s enforcement under state law and

are sued in their official capacity. The complaint asserted that the licensure

requirements confine intrastate sales of caskets to sales by funeral directors at

funeral homes, denying the Abbey and Coudrain equal protection and due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment because they bear no rational

relationship to any valid governmental interest. The State Board responded

that the challenged rules, insulating funeral directors from competition, are

rationally related to the State’s legitimate interest in regulating the funeral

profession. In the alternative, citing the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers v.

Harris, the State Board maintained that economic protection of a particular 16

industry is a legitimate state interest. After conducting a bench trial, the

district court issued judgment for the Abbey, reaffirming its earlier finding that

this brand of economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest and

Id. § 37:832(A)(2), (B)(1), (B)(d)(2). 15

 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). 

16

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finding no rational relationship between the challenged law and Louisiana’s

interests in consumer protection, public health, and public safety. 

IV.

The State timely appealed. We review the district court’s findings of fact

for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. After examining the record, 17

we have doubts about the constitutionality of the State Board’s regulation of

intrastate casket sales.

A. 

The State Board maintains that the regulation of intrastate casket sales

enjoys the deference due classic economic regulation. Alternatively, the State

Board contends that it is a rational draw upon the State’s police powers in

protection of consumers and public health. The Abbey responds that no rational

basis can or has been articulated that it has not negated.

Chief Justice Stone’s footnote 4 in Carolene Products, etched in the brains

of several generations of law students, both described and prescribed a

fundamental dichotomy of judicial review; it retreated from the aggressive

review of state regulation of business in the Lochner period while proceeding in

the opposite direction in matters of personal liberty. Justice Douglas’s opinion 18

in Williamson v. Lee Optical is generally seen as a zenith of this judicial 19

deference to state economic regulation and the State Board invokes its

protections, including its willingness to accept post hoc hypotheses for economic

regulation. But even Williamson offers the State Board little succor. In

See One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.

17

2011). 

 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 18

 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 19

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Williamson, the Oklahoma legislature forbade opticians to fit or replace eyeglass

lenses in frames without a lens prescription from an ophthalmologist or

optometrist, even when the replaced lens could easily be duplicated by an

optician. Despite the coloration of wealth transfer to ophthalmologists and 20

optometrists, the Court accepted the suggestion that the legislature might have

concluded that some persons would benefit from seeing a doctor when replacing

a lens and refused to strike down the legislation, in turn rejecting the opticians’

due process and equal protection claims. It placed emphasis on the “evil at hand

for correction” to which the law was aimed, concluding that the measure was a

rational, if not “in every respect logically consistent,” means of addressing the

perceived ill. The Supreme Court took the same approach in City of New 21

Orleans v. Dukes. It upheld a New Orleans ordinance that permitted only 22

pushcart food vendors with eight or more years of experience in the French

Quarter to continue to operate in the neighborhood. It reasoned that reducing

the number of pushcart vendors, and limiting their ranks to those most likely to

have the deepest ties to the area, advanced the City’s legitimate objective of

maintaining the French Quarter’s historic character and tourist appeal.23

As a threshold argument, the State Board urges that pure economic

protection of a discrete industry is an exercise of a valid state interest. It points

to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers v. Harris, a case in which two members

of the panel said as much in turning back an attack on an Oklahoma scheme

Id. at 485. The law was also challenged for exempting sellers of ready-to-wear 20

glasses from the prescription requirement, barring advertising of lenses and frames, and

prohibiting retailers from sharing commercial space with certain eye care professionals. Id.

at 488-89.

Id. at 487-88. 21

 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 22

Id. 23

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similar to Louisiana’s. Judge Tymkovich, the third member of the panel, 24

refused to join the majority opinion’s broad approbation of “economic

protectionism” as a valid governmental interest. Rather, he concurred in the 25

judgment, persuaded that the State had otherwise identified a sufficient public

purpose. The Abbey in turn points to Craigmiles v. Giles, in which the Sixth 26

Circuit rejected “economic protectionism” as a rational basis for similar casket

regulations, striking down those regulations as a denial of due process and equal

protection.27

These two courts gave differing answers to the question of whether the

legislation before them, both statutory schemes quite similar to that now before

us, drew upon a legitimate state interest. Craigmiles found that “protecting a

discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate

governmental purpose.” The Powers court saw the statutory scheme before it 28

as logrolling by the Oklahoma legislature, its standard fare, and in its mind

simple economic protectionism was a permissible basis for regulation. In turn,

it rejected the challenge to the regulations that limited the sale of caskets to

funeral directors.29

The Powers court claimed that only three courts have held that“‘protecting

a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate

governmental purpose,’” and criticized those courts’ holdings as having no 30

 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004).

24

Id. at 1225-27 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 25

Id. 26

 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).

27

Id. at 224.

28

Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225. 29

Id. at 1218 (quoting Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224). 

30

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direct support in Supreme Court precedents. It then stated: “In contrast, the

Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or favoring one particular

intrastate industry, absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory violation,

is a legitimate state interest.” However, none of the Supreme Court cases 31

Powers cites stands for that proposition. Rather, the cases indicate that

protecting or favoring a particular intrastate industry is not an illegitimate

interest when protection of the industry can be linked to advancement of the

public interest or general welfare. Craigmiles and Powers rest on their different

implicit answers to the question of whether the state legislation was supportable

by rational basis. Craigmiles looked for rationality and found none. Powers

found economic protection to be a traditional wielding of state power and

rational by definition.

As we see it, neither precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere

economic protection of a pet industry is a legitimate governmental purpose, but 32

economic protection, that is favortism, may well be supported by a post hoc

perceived rationale as in Williamson – without which it is aptly described as a

naked transfer of wealth. Recently, we upheld against similar challenge a

33

Houston taxi cab permitting scheme that disfavored small cab companies.34

Notably, we approved of the Craigmiles court’s reasoning, as it “confirm[ed] that

Id. at 1220. 31

See, e.g., Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude 32

that mere economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irrational with

respect to determining if a classification survives rational basis review. . . . [E]conomic

protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to the common good, cannot be said

to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest.”). 

See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.

33

1689 (1984).

Greater Houston Small Taxicab Co. Owners Ass’n v. City of Houston, 660 F.3d 235, 34

(5th Cir. 2011).

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naked economic preferences are impermissible to the extent that they harm

consumers.” However, we found that even if Houston had been “motivated in 35

part by economic protectionism, there is no real dispute that promoting fullservice taxi operations is a legitimate government purpose under the rational

basis test.” We thus sustained the City’s measure. It follows that the State 36

Board cannot escape the pivotal inquiry of whether there is such a rational basis,

one that can now be articulated and is not plainly refuted by the Abbey on the

record compiled by the district court at trial. We turn then to the State Board’s

alternative argument – that the challenged restrictions are rationally related to

protection of public health, safety, and consumer welfare, beginning with some

settled guiding principles.

B.

As the Abbey points out, although rational basis review places no

affirmative evidentiary burden on the government, plaintiffs may nonetheless

negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of

irrationality. And of course, as we earlier observed, Williamson insists upon 37

a rational basis, which it found. Mindful that a hypothetical rationale, even post

hoc, cannot be fantasy, and that the State Board’s chosen means must rationally

relate to the state interests it articulates, we turn to the State Board’s proffered

rational bases for the challenged law. Our analysis does not proceed with

abstraction for hypothesized ends and means do not include post hoc

hypothesized facts. Thus, we will examine the State Board’s rationale informed

by the setting and history of the challenged rule.

 

Id. at 240.

35

Id. 36

See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993).

37

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1. Consumer Protection

The State Board argues that the challenged law is rationally related to

consumer protection because it restricts predatory sales practices by third-party

sellers and protects consumers from purchasing a casket that is not suitable for

the given burial space. Of course, this is a perfectly rational statement of

hypothesized footings for the challenged law. But we question whether it is

betrayed by the undisputed facts as pretextual. 

For one, the State Board’s argument obscures the actual structure of the

challenged law. No provision mandates licensure requirements for casket

retailers or insists that a casket retailer employ someone trained in the business

of funeral direction. Rather, the licensure requirements and other restrictions

imposed on prospective casket retailers create funeral industry control over

intrastate casket sales. The scheme is built on the statute’s interlocking

definitions of “funeral establishment” and “funeral directing”: 

“Funeral establishment” means any place or premises duly

licensed by the board and devoted to or used in the care and

preparation for burial of the body of a deceased person or

maintained or held out to the public by advertising or otherwise as

the office or place for the practice of funeral directing.

38

“Funeral directing” means the operation of a funeral home, or, by

way of illustration and not limitation, any service whatsoever

connected with the management of funerals, or the supervision of

hearses or funeral cars, the purchase of caskets or other funeral

merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof,the cleaning or

dressing of dead human bodies for burial, and the performance or

supervision of any service or act connected with the management of

funerals from time of death until the body or bodies are delivered to

the cemetery, crematory, or other agent for the purpose of

disposition.39

 LA. REV. STAT. § 37:831(39) (emphasis added). 

38

 Id. § 37:831(37) (emphasis added). 

39

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In other words, because a funeral establishment includes any “office or place for

the practice of funeral directing,” and “funeral directing” includes “the purchase

of caskets or other funeral merchandise and the retail and display thereof,” a

casket retailer must comply with all the statutory requirements for funeral

directors and funeral establishments. No rule addresses casket retailers or

imposes requirements for the sale of caskets beyond confining intrastate sales

to funeral homes. But, it is urged, this exclusivity will assure purchasers of

caskets informed counsel.

The district court found that the extensive training the law requires of

budding funeral directors does not include instruction on caskets, or how to

counsel grieving customers. Given that Louisiana does not require a person to

be buried in a casket, restrict casket purchases in any way by Louisianans over

the internet or from other sources out of state, nor imposes requirements on any

intrastate seller of caskets directly to consumers, including funeral directors,

regarding casket size, design, material, or price, whatever special expertise a

funeral director may have in casket selection is irrelevant to it being the sole

seller of caskets. This is because customers pay funeral directors a nondeclinable service fee, which contractually binds a funeral director to assist the

customer with funeral and burial logistics, including, for example, casket

selection, even if the customer does not purchase the casket from the funeral

director. As a consequence, the customer should receive the benefit of the

funeral director’s experience in matters of casket selection, including

complexities that arise from burial conditions in any given area. Indeed the FTC

has found that “[b]y allowing a basic services fee, the Rule ensures that

consumers get the benefit of choosing goods and services among a variety of

options – including the option to purchase goods from the funeral provider’s

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competitors . . . .” A customer of a funeral home receives the same service 40

whether or not he purchases the casket from the funeral home, and because only

funeral homes can sell funeral services, and all disposing of dead bodies must be

“through a funeral establishment,” he must engage their service.41

Moreover, like the district court and consistent with its findings, we find

it doubtful that the challenged law is rationally related to policing deceptive

sales tactics. In declining to expand the Funeral Rule’s scope to cover thirdparty sellers of caskets and urns, the FTC found “there is insufficient evidence

that . . . third-party sellers of funeral goods are engaged in widespread unfair or

deceptive acts or practices.” In fact, the Commission found the record “bereft 42

of evidence indicating significant consumer injury caused by third-party

sellers” and recognized that third-party sellers do not have the same incentive 43

as funeral home sellers to engage in deceptive sales tactics.44

But, even if independent third-party sellers pose a risk of engaging in

deceptive sales practices, and assuming arguendo that the state legislature could

so conclude, there is a disconnect between restricting casket sales to funeral

homes and preventing consumer fraud and abuse. Putting aside the fact that

funeral homes, not independent sellers, have been the problem for consumers

with their bundling of product and 400% markups of caskets, Louisiana’s Unfair

Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law already polices inappropriate

sales tactics by all sellers of caskets. Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and

 73 Fed. Reg. at 13747. 40

See LA. REV. STAT. § 37:848(D)(5). 41

 73 Fed. Reg. at 13742. 42

Id. at 13745. 43

Id. (“Indeed, third-party retailers have a strong economic incentive to display their

44

prices to the public at large because offering a lower price is the primary way they compete

against funeral providers for sales of funeral goods, such as caskets.”).

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Consumer Protection Law declares that “[u]nfair methods of competition and

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are

. . . unlawful” and empowers the state attorney general to make “rules and

regulations” to interpret the provisions of the Chapter. Under the section of 45

Louisiana’s administrative code implementing the law, the state attorney

general is authorized to regulate unfair trade practices in casket sales, whether

or not those sales are made by state-licensed funeral homes, but must do so

consistent with rules promulgated by the FTC and court decisions interpreting

those rules. In short, Louisiana’s consumer protection regime reaches the sales 46

practices of all intrastate sellers of caskets and can strike at any unfair practices

but interestingly only in a way complementary and consistent with the Federal

Trade Commission Act.

To be clear, the FTC’s Funeral Rule has not preempted Louisiana from

making its own independent assessment of consumer abuse by third-party

intrastate sellers. But, were the attorney general to promulgate a rule that, as

the State Board’s enforcement action here aims to do, shut out third-party

sellers, implementing Louisiana’s ability to create a consumer protection scheme

 LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1405. 45

See LA. ADMIN. CODE 16, § 501 (2012). Section 501 provides:

46

These rules and regulations shall be consistent with Section 5(a)(1) of the

Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)], as from time to time

amended, any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, and any finally

adjudicated court decision interpreting the provisions of said act, rules, and

regulations. This consistency shall be, therefore, the same as the Federal Trade

Commission’s responsibility over both:

1. anti-trust or other restraint of trade types of activities; and

2. unfair or deceptive types of activities relating to trade and commerce as it

affects consumer and business interests.

Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act is the provision under which the FTC

enacted the Funeral Rule, and under which it declined to extend the Funeral Rule to thirdparty sellers of caskets and urns. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 13742 & nn. 1-2, 13745.

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would be in tension with the rules of the FTC – rules that compel funeral homes

both to accept caskets purchased from others and to not charge fees for doing so. 

Nor would such a rule square with FTC findings or rulemaking resting on the

conclusion that third-party sellers do not engage in consumer abuse. This

matrix of Louisiana law, while not dispositive of our inquiry, sheds much light

on the disconnect between the post hoc hypothesis of consumer protection and

the grant of an exclusive right of sale to funeral homes. That grant of an

exclusive right of sale adds nothing to protect consumers and puts them at a

greater risk of abuse including exploitative prices. 

2. Public Health and Safety

Relatedly, we doubt that a rational relationship exists between public

health and safety and restricting intrastate casket sales to funeral directors. 

Rather, this purported rationale for the challenged law elides the realties of

Louisiana’s regulation of caskets and burials and causes us to doubt its

rationality. That Louisiana does not even require a casket for burial, does not

impose requirements for their construction or design, does not require a casket

to be sealed before burial, and does not require funeral directors to have any

special expertise in caskets makes us doubt that a relationship exists between

public health and safety and limiting intrastate sales of caskets to funeral

establishments.47

V.

The great deference due state economic regulation does not demand

judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption

Cf. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he singling out of a

47

particular economic group, with no rational or logical reason for doing so, was strong evidence

of an economic animus with no relation to public health, morals or safety.”). 

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nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for naked transfers

of wealth. We insist that Louisiana’s rules not be irrational – the outer-most

limits of due process and equal protection – as Justice Harlan put it, the inquiry

is whether “[the] measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally

permissible objective.” Answering that question is well within Article III’s 48

confines of judicial review. That said, we should not undertake to strike down

a law when doing so can be avoided by resolution of uncertainty in the state

statutory scheme. Under well-settled precedent, this Court must avoid deciding

a constitutional issue “if there is also present some other ground upon which the

case may be disposed of.” 

49

It is not within our province to here decide state law. But in the discharge

of our duty to avoid constitutional decisions we are to inquire if state law can

reasonably be read to offer a state law footing for our judgment. As we read it,

such a state law ground may well exist. Specifically, to our eyes it is unclear

whether, under Louisiana law, the State Board has authority to regulate casket

sales in and of themselves when such sales are not incidental to the seller’s

provision of any other funeral services. Such a concern is rooted in the common 50

understanding that “[a]n administrative board or agency only has the power and

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).

48

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 298, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 49

concurring), reh’g denied 297 U.S. 728 (1936). See also County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,

422 U.S. 140, 154 (1979) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have the

authority to adjudicate specific controversies between adverse litigants over which and over

whom they have jurisdiction. In the exercise of that authority, they have a duty to decide

constitutional questions when necessary to dispose of the litigation before them. But they

have an equally strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order

to determine the rights of the parties to the case under consideration.”); Burton v. United

States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a

constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”).

 Our uncertainty is heightened by prior findings that the State Board had exceeded 50

its statutory authority. See, e.g., La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 09-0151, 2009 WL 3641003 (July 29,

2009); La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 02-0170, 2002 WL 1483928 (June 20, 2002).

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authority granted by the constitution or statutes” and in the Louisiana 51

Attorney General’s insistence that the State Board’s claimed authority be located

in specifically stated grants of power. One could interpret Title 37 Chapter 10, 52

the portion of the Louisiana code creating the State Board, as only vesting the

State Board with authority to regulate casket sales when made by someone who

operates a funeral establishment or provides funeral services. 

We see support for this reading of the State Board’s authority in the

language and structure of Chapter 10. Although Chapter 10 unquestionably

gives the State Board power to regulate funeral directors and funeral

establishments, the circularity in the structure adopted to regulate intrastate

sales of caskets – requiring intrastate sellers of caskets to be licensed as funeral

homes to bring their business within the State Board’s regulatory reach – 

suggests an unspoken awareness that the State Board only has authority to

regulate funeral establishments and funeral directors. In addition, the language

of Chapter 10 suggests that it may only vest the State Board with authority to

regulate casket sales by funeral establishments and funeral directors. For

example, the 2008 amendment to the statute’s pre-need provision defined “preneed funeral contract” primarily by reference to the selling entity, as opposed to

its activities, arguably indicating that the State Board has authority over

specific entities – funeral homes and funeral directors – not discrete activities

like the sale of caskets. Under this interpretation of the statute, the State

53

Board would only have authority to regulate the sale of caskets when made by

someone who operates a funeral establishment or provides funeral services. 

Realty Mart, Inc. v. Louisiana Board of Tax, 336 So.2d 52, 54 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 51

See, e.g., La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 09-0151, 2009 WL 3641003 (July 29, 2009). 52

 LA. REV. STAT. § 37:831(63). 53

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This limitation gains more persuasive possibility when related statutory

provisions are considered. The State Board regulates the business of funeral

directing, and specifically here, Section 848 (“Unlawful practice”), states “[n]o

person, not certified and registered under the provisions of this Chapter, shall

. . . conduct the business of funeral directing . . . .” That prohibition, in turn, 54

raises the question of whether the monks, as carpenters making and then selling

caskets, are conducting the business of funeral directing. To answer that

question, we read Term 37 of Section 831 that explains that “‘[f]uneral directing’

means the operation of a funeral home . . . .” This, the monks may not be 55

doing, nor want to. As “illustration and not limitation,” Term 37 clarifies that

operating a funeral home encompasses: “any service whatsoever connected with

the management of funerals,” —not what the monks want to do; “any service 56

whatsoever connected with . . . the supervision of hearses or funeral

cars,” —still not; “any service whatsoever connected with . . . the purchase of 57

caskets or other funeral merchandise,” —still not, but telling, because the broad 58

interpretation of State Board authority, suggested by the State Board, would

give it not just a monopoly on selling but also on buying, which cannot be correct;

and “any service whatsoever connected with . . . the retail sale and display

thereof . . . .” This is it, but not exactly. The monks do not offer a funeral home 59

“service . . . connected with . . . retail sale and display . . . .” Indeed, with the 60

 LA. REV. STAT. § 37:848(A).

54

Id. § 37:831(37). 55

Id. 56

Id. 57

Id. 58

Id. 59

Id. (emphasis added).

60

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statute’s phraseology in mind, Term 37 defines funeral directing as “the

operation of a funeral home,” and then, only by illustration, lists supervisory and

management examples, plus “any service . . . connected” with such operations. 

This regulatory scope limitation is congruent with the acknowledgment that

State Board enforcement has never been completed against in-state retailers for

selling only, as distinct from in-state entities that offer funeral home services. 

In fact, the remainder of Term 37 then lists services that unquestionably, like

“hearses,” are part of the “operation of a funeral home,” such as “cleaning and

dressing of dead human bodies . . . .” From this standpoint, we perceive again 61

that the statute may not extend State Board authority to casket sales

unconnected to funeral services. The monks, as carpenters, would not be

regulated, nor would they, as vendors of their wares, doing nothing that equates

to operating a funeral home.

Moreover, in reading the statutory grant of authority, it would not be

surprising that the Louisiana legislature was cautious in granting regulatory

power to an agency tasked with self-regulation of its industry. Thus, our

uncertainty is further fueled by the reality that the legislature, in crafting the

statutory grant of authority in conformity with state law strictures imposed

upon delegation of legislative power, may have confined the authority of the 62

State Board to authority over its own industry – including funeral

establishments, funeral directors, and embalmers – instead of granting it broad

See id. 61

See State v. Alfonso, 753 So.2d 156, 161 (La. 1999) (“Guided by the principles set forth 62

in Schwegmann and inherent in the constitutional separation of powers, this court has

fashioned a three-prong test for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a statute

unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority, as opposed to administrative or ministerial

authority, to an administrative agency. Under this test, a delegation of authority to an

administrative agency is constitutionally valid if the enabling statute (1) contains a clear

expression of legislative policy; (2) prescribes sufficient standards to guide the agency in the

execution of that policy; and (3) is accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards to protect

against abuse of discretion by the agency.”).

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powers to reach into other markets and regulate industry competition. In short,

we question whether the State Board’s regulatory power extends beyond

authority to regulate the operations of certain actors – funeral establishments

and funeral directors. Because a ruling on the constitutionality of the

challenged regulation could be avoided by interpretation of Louisiana law, we

must give due consideration to this non-constitutional ground for decision.

Resolution of the statutory uncertainty surrounding the State Board’s

authority must come at the hand of the Louisiana Supreme Court, whose

determination of state law is supreme. When constitutional avoidance requires

interpretation of a state statute, federalism concerns mandate “that state courts

provide the authoritative adjudication of questions of state law” and thus “a

federal court should await a definitive construction by a state court.”63

Therefore, we conclude that this appeal presents a critical issue of Louisiana law

which is appropriate for resolution by certification to the Supreme Court of

Louisiana and, in the interest of federalism and constitutional avoidance, defer 

final decision in this matter to allow the Louisiana Supreme Court to rule on the

statutory uncertainty.

The parties have not requested certification, but pursuantto Rule 12 of the

Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court, this Court may certify upon its own

motion. And, because the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is rooted in basic 64

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 63

(“Although federal courts generally have a duty to adjudicate federal questions properly before

them, this Court has long recognized that concerns for comity and federalism may require

federal courts to abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that are entwined with

the interpretation of state law . . . . The doctrine of abstention acknowledges that federal

courts should avoid the unnecessary resolution of federal constitutional issues and that state

courts provide the authoritative adjudication of questions of state law. Attention to the

policies underlying abstention makes clear that in the circumstances of these cases, a federal

court should await a definitive construction by a state court rather than precipitously

indulging a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a state statute.”).

 SUP. CT. OF LA. R. XII. 64

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considerations of federalism, the Abbey’s failure to raise the statutory issue does

not preclude us if doing so will avoid the constitutional issue.65

VI.

CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE

OF LOUISIANA, PURSUANT TO LA. REV. STAT. § 13:72.1 AND RULE 12

OF THE RULES OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

It appears to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that

the above-styled case in this Court involves a question or proposition of the law

of the State of Louisiana, which will be determinative of all state law issues in

this cause, which is beyond the province of this Court to resolve, and for which 66

there appears to be no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the

Supreme Court of Louisiana. Should the Louisiana Supreme Court accept the

certification and find a lack of authority its ruling will resolve the case in its

entirety. Should it reach a contrary conclusion, this Court will no longer stay its

See, e.g., Neese v. Southern Railway Co., 350 U.S. 77, 78 (1955) (per curiam) (“[I]n 65

reversing on the above ground we follow the traditional practice of this Court of refusing to

decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other grounds of decision, whether

or not they have been properly raised before us by the parties.”); Alma Motor Co. v. TimkenDetroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 132 (1946) (“We find now, however, that the Circuit Court of

Appeals had before it, not only the constitutional question, which was decided, but also a

nonconstitutional question, which might properly have alone served as an adequate ground

on which to dispose of the appeal. This non-constitutional question was neither considered nor

decided by the court below, nor argued here. We have concluded,therefore,that we should not

pass on the constitutional question at this time, but should vacate the judgment of the Circuit

Court of Appeals, and remand the case to it for decision of any non-constitutional issues

material to the appeal.”).

See Murray v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 821 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1987), certification accepted 66

514 So.2d 21 (La. 1987) (accepting certification in a case in which the panel was left to

determine whether the damage award below was excessive after the Supreme Court of

Louisiana answered the certified question regarding assumption of risk).

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hand but will promptly proceed to judgment. This Court certifies the following

question of law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for rendition of a judgment

or opinion concerning such question of Louisiana law, such case being on appeal

to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Louisiana.

STYLE OF THE CASE

The style of the case in which this certification is made is St. Joseph

Abbey; Mark Coudrain, Plaintiffs-Appellees versus Paul Wes Castille; Belva M.

Pichon; Craig G. Gill; Andrew Hayes; Wall V. McKneely; Margaret Shehee; Kelly

Rush Williams; Louis Charbornnet, in their official capacities as Members of the

Louisiana State Board of Embalmers andFuneral Directors; Patrick H. Sanders,

in his official capacity in place of Oscar A. Rollins (deceased), DefendantsAppellants, case no. 11-30176, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Louisiana.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A complete statement of the facts in this case, the nature of the cause, and

the circumstances out of which the questions or propositions of law arise is set

forth in full above and will not be repeated in this certification.

QUESTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

For the above stated reasons, we hereby certify the following

determinative question of Louisiana law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana:

Whether Louisiana law furnishes the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and

Funeral Directors with authority to regulate casket sales when made by a

retailer who does not provide any other funeral services.

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HAYNES, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I fully concur in the judgment of the court certifying the question to the

Louisiana Supreme Court and in Sections I–III, V, and VI of the opinion. I

conclude that it is unnecessary to discuss the issues in Section IV of the opinion

at this point other than to note that there are substantial federal constitutional

questions presented which might be obviated depending upon the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s answer to our question. I agree with my colleagues that

concerns of federalism and state sovereignty strongly support certifying the

question.

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