Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-05190/USCOURTS-ca10-04-05190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 

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FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

September 24, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

P U B LIS H

UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS

TEN TH C I RC U I T

THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN

AND SANTA FE RAILWAY

C OM PANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant and 

Cross-Appellee,

v. No. 04-5182, 04-5190 & 05-5137

(Consolidated)

C HA RLES B. GRA N T ; CHA RLES

B . GRA N T REVO CA BLE TRUST,

 Defendants-Appellees and

 Cross-App ellants,

and

STA TE OF OKLAHOMA;

OKLAHOMA DEPA RTM EN T OF

ENVIR ON M EN TA L QUALITY ;

OKLAHOMA DEPA RTM EN T OF

AGRIC ULTU RE, FOOD AND

FO RESTR Y,

 Amici Curiae.

A PPE AL FROM THE UNIT ED ST AT ES DIST RIC T COURT

FOR THE NOR THER N D ISTRIC T OF OKLAHOM A

(D .C . N o . 03-CV -162-J HP-S A J )

Alok Ahuja, Lathrop & Gage, L.C., Kansas City, M issouri (Hugh D. Rice,

Ra iney, Ross, Rice & Binns, PLLC, Oklah oma City, Oklah oma , an d David

E. Cowen, McLeod, Alex ande r, Powe l & Apff e l, Ga lve ston, Texa s, with him

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 Th e Honorable Julie A. Robinson, United States District Judge for the *

District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

 Unless otherwise noted, “Grant” includes both Grant the individual and 1

the Cha rle s Grant Revoc able Trust. For ea se of re f e renc e , the pronoun “he ” is

used to de sc ribe the inc lusive form of “Grant.”

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on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee .

Linda C. M artin, (Sam P. Dan iel an d Young H. Pei with her on the b riefs),

Doerner, Saunders, Daniel and Anderson, L.L.P., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for

Defendan ts-App ellees and Cross-App ellants.

John Trevor Hammons, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental

Protec tion Unit, Oklah oma City, Oklah oma , filed an amicu s b rie f on beha lf

of the State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Department of Environmental

Qua lity, and the Oklahoma Depa rtment of Agriculture , Food and Fore stry,

Amici Curiae.

Before HENRY and BR ISCOE, Circuit Judges, and ROBIN SON , District

Judge. *

BR ISC OE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Burlington Northe rn & Santa Fe Ra ilway Co. (BNSF) appe a ls

(Case No. 04-5182) the final judgment of the district court and additional

interlocutory orders preceding final judgment. BNSF also appeals an order

directing it to pay Defendants Charles Grant and the Charles Grant

Revocable Trust (Grant) attorney fees (Case No. 04-5190). Grant, in turn, 1

c ro ss-appe a ls the dismissa l of his spolia tion de f ense (Ca se No. 05-5 137). 

We exercise jurisdiction pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. § 129 1. In case

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numbers 04-5182 and 04-5190, we REVERSE and REM AND for further

proc e edings. In c a se num be r 05-5137, we AFFIR M .

I

A. Factual Background

This disp ute c en te rs a ro un d a ta r-lik e mate ria l (TLM ) th a t BN S F

a llege s moved onto its pro pe rty from adja c ent pro pe rty owned by Grant. 

The prope rty BNSF and Grant now own wa s o nc e the loc a tion of an oil

refinery which operated from 1917 until 1932. TLM was a waste by-product

of the re fine ry’s ope ra tion. 

BNSF’s p rope rty is loc a ted immediate ly e a st, and a llegedly downhill,

from Grant’s property. BNSF alleges that in the early 1970s Grant

personally directed, or had reason to know of, substantial earth moving and

construction on his property which BNSF alleges precipitated the migration

of TLM onto its property. BNSF contends the migration of TLM has

continued over a period of decades as a result of repeated heat expansion

occurring each summer. BNSF investigated the TLM and methods for

removing it from its prope rty and unde rtook the remova l an d off-site

disposa l of the ma terial in Ju ly 2001, expending a total o f $469,000 on this

project. BNSF also constructed a 2-3 foot berm on the property line to stop

the a lleged continued migra tion of TLM onto its pro pe rty. 

B. Procedural Background

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BNSF brought suit against Grant seeking damages and injunctive

relief asserting various legal theories, including claims under the citizensuit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42

U.S.C. § 6972. BNSF a lso a lleged the TLM wa s a public and priva te

nuisance, and sought injunctive relief against Grant in the form of

abatement, and damages for unjust enrichment as a result of BNSF’s cleanup activities.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Grant on

seve ra l of BNSF’s c laims. First, it found tha t BNSF had f a iled to pre sent a

genuine issue of material fact on the “imminent and substantial

endange rment” e lement of its RCRA c la im. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a )(1)(B). 

Next, the district court concluded that BNSF could not proceed under Okla.

Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-10 5(A), an Oklahoma pu blic nu isance statute, becau se

the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) had not issued

a prior c lean-up orde r. Third, the distric t co urt he ld tha t BNSF f a iled to

pre sent a triable issu e to obtain injunc tive re lief on its aba tement cla im

bec au se there was n o present TLM migration, an d bec au se the court

excluded as unreliable the testimony of BNSF’s expert regarding the

like lihood of future migra tion. 

BNSF proceeded to trial on its private nuisance and unjust enrichment

claims. At the clos e of BNSF’s case-in-chief, the district court entered

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judgment a s a ma tte r of law for Grant on a ll rema ining c la ims. Spe c ific a lly,

the district court held that Grant’s role in the construction activities of the

1970s did not subject him to personal liability becaus e he was protected by

the corporate shield. The district court also held that Grant could not be

held personally liable as a successor landowner becaus e BNSF never

deman ded that Grant aba te the a lleg ed TLM migration. As fo r BNSF’s

c laim of unjust enrichment, the distric t co urt he ld tha t BNSF f a iled to

establish that it had discharged an affirmative duty for which Grant was

re sponsible . 

Alternatively, the district court dismissed all of BNSF’s remaining

c la ims on the gro und tha t it h ad f a iled to se t forth evidenc e of its damage s. 

Specifically, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor

of Grant becaus e it found that BNSF failed to prove the diminution in value

tha t its pro pe rty suff e red a s the re sult of the a lleged TLM migra tion. 

Further, the district court held that BNSF’s proof of damages was deficient

be c ause it fa iled to identify wha t co sts it had expended within the applicable

sta tute of limita tions. 

The district court also made various evidentiary rulings which limited

the eviden ce BNSF co uld introduce at trial. Spec ifica lly, the d istrict court

ex clud ed the expert op inion of BNSF’s expert Robert Brow nlee (Brow nlee),

who would testify that TLM migrated from Grant’s prop erty onto BNSF’s

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prope rty. The distric t co urt a lso exc luded va rious p hotographs and visua l 

de sc riptions which BNSF pro ff e red to addre ss the a lleged TLM migra tion. 

Finally, after the entry of judgmen t as a matter of law, the d istrict court

awa rd ed Grant $411,218.99 in a ttorn ey f e e s. 

II

BNSF appe a ls the distric t co urt’s g rant of summa ry judgment on its

RCRA, abatement and public nuisance claims. BNSF also appeals the

district court’s judgment as a matter of law on its private nuisance and

unjust enrichment claims, several of the district cou rt’s evidentiary ruling s,

and the district court’s order awarding Grant attorney fees. Grant, in turn,

c ross-appe a ls the distric t court’s dism issa l of its spolia tion c la im .

A. Summar y Judgment

We review the distric t co urt’s g rant of summa ry judgment de novo,

viewing the evidenc e in the light most f avorable to the non-moving pa rty. 

See Roberts v. Printup, 422 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10 th Cir. 2005). Summary

judgment is appropria te o nly “ if the pleadings, depositions, answe rs to

inte rroga torie s, and admissions on file , toge the r with the a ffidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

movin g party is en titled to a ju dgment a s a matte r of law.” Fed . R. Civ . P.

56(c).

1. RCRA

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 BNSF sought relief under RCRA, a comprehensive environmental

statute designed to make certain that solid and hazardous wastes are not

disposed of in a manne r h a rmful to the public he a lth or the environment. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a). To meet these objectives, RCRA regulates the

generation, handling, treatment, storage, transportation, and dispos al of

solid an d haz ardous wastes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-25 . To en sure

enforcement of these provisions, Congress conferred enforcement power

upon affected United States citizens. RCRA’s citizen-suit provision, 42

U.S.C. § 6 97 2(a), provides:

[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any

person may commence a civil action on his own behalf– 

[1](B) against any person, including the United States and any

other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent

permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and

including any past or present generator, past or present

transp orte r, or pa st or pre sent owne r or ope ra tor of a tre a tment,

storage , or disposa l f a c ility, who ha s contributed or who is

contributing to the pa st or pre sent handling, storage , trea tment,

transp orta tion, or disposa l of any so lid or ha z a rdous wa ste

which may present an imminent and su bstantial en dange rment to

he a lth or the environment[.]

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a )(1)(B) ( empha sis added). 

Section 6972(a)(1)(B), requires: (1) the defendant must be a person,

including, though not limited to, one who was or is a generator or

transporter of solid or hazardous waste, or one who was or is an owner or

operator of a solid or hazardous waste treatment, storage, or dispos al

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facility; (2) that this defendant contributed to, or is contributing to, the

handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dispos al of solid or

hazardous waste; and (3) that such waste may present an imminent and

substantial endangerment to health or the environment. See, e.g., Cox v.

City of D allas, Tex ., 256 F.3d 281, 292-93 (5th Cir. 2001).

In this case, our focus is upon the “may present an imminent and

substantial endangerment to health or the environment” language of §

6972(a)(1)(B). As a threshold matter, it is well established that the

ope ra tive word in § 6972(a )(1)(B) is “may” ; thus, BNSF must demonstra te

TLM “may present” such a danger. See Interfaith Community Organization

v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 2005); Cox, 256 F.3d at

299; Dag ue v . City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d

in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992). This “expansive language”

is “‘intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative

equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic

wastes.’” Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355 (quoting United States v. Price, 688

F.2d 204, 213-1 4 (3 d Cir. 1982)) (empha sis in origina l). 

The Supreme Court ha s a lso he ld tha t the phra se “may pre sent”

communica tes an additiona l ide a , tha t is, it “quite c lea rly exc lude s wa ste

tha t no longe r pre sents ” the ha rm contempla ted by § 6972(a )(1)(B). 

M eghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1996). As such,

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“‘under an imminent hazard citizen suit, the endangerment must be ongoing,

but the conduct that created the endangerment need not be.’” Cox, 256 F.3d

a t 299 (q uoting Conn. Coa sta l Fishe rmen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co.,

989 F.2d 1305, 1316 (2d Cir.1993)); see also Price v. United States Navy, 39

F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that RCRA does not require actual

harm, but threa tened or po tential harm will suffice ).

Se cond, the term “ endange rment” h a s b e en interpre ted by courts to

mean a th re a ten ed or poten tia l harm , th us, it is not nec e ssa ry th a t BN S F

show proof of actual harm to health or the environment. See Dague, 935

F.2d at 13 55 -56; United States v. Price, 688 F.2d at 211. In other words,

injunctive relief is authorized when there may be a risk of harm. This gives

effect to Congress’ intent “to confer upon the courts the authority to grant

affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk

posed by toxic wastes.” Dag ue, 93 5 F.2d at 13 55 (emphasis in original).

Third, the term “imminent” is not defined by RCRA, however, the

Supreme Court ha s h e ld tha t “[ a ]n endange rment can only be ‘imminent’ if

it threatens to occur immediately[.]” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485 (quotations

omitted). Nonetheless, a finding of “imminency” does not require a

showing that actual harm will occur immediately as long as the risk of

threatened harm is present. Id. at 485-86 (holding that “there must be a

thre a t which is pre sent now, although the impa c t of the thre a t may not be f e lt

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until later”) (quotations omitted). In other words, “‘[a]n ‘imminent hazard’

may be de c lar ed a t an y point in a cha in of events which may ultima tely

re su lt in ha rm to the public.’” Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 610 (6th

Cir. 1998) (quoting Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355-56); see also United States

Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019. Imminence, thus, refers “to the nature of the threat

ra the r than identific a tion of the time when the endange rment initia lly

arose.” United States N av y, 39 F.3d at 10 19 (citation omitted).

Fina lly, the word “ su bstantial” is not de fined in RCRA or its

legislative history. Nonetheless, relevant case law has held that an

endangerment is “substantial” under RCRA when it is “serious.” Interfaith,

399 F.3d at 259; Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1015

(11th Cir. 2004); Cox, 256 F.3d a t 300. This doe s n ot ne c e ssitate

quan tifica tion of endan germen t, as an en dan germen t is substantial where

there is reasonable caus e for concern that someone or something may be

exposed to risk of harm by release, or threatened release, of hazardous

substances in the event remedial action is not taken. See Calif. Dept. of

Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d

930, 980 (E.D. Cal. 2003). As such, given RCRA’s language and purpos e,

“‘if an error is to be made in applying the endangerment standard, the error

must be made in favor of protecting public health, welfare and the

environment.’” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 259 (quoting United States v.

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Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 194 (W.D. M o.1985)).

Here , the d istrict court fo und that the TLM removed from BNSF’s

prop erty an d remaining on Grant’s prop erty fa iled to sa tisfy the RCRA’s

imminency requirement. The district court concluded imminency had not

been established because (1) BNSF failed to point to any person who had

be en injured by TLM or to any study e stablishing the ma terial thre a ten ed to

“immediately” caus e harm to a person or the environment, (2) neither the

ODEQ or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had ever ordered the

TLM removed, and (3) BNS F monitored the a lleged migra tion of the TLM

onto its property for years without acting.

BNSF claims the district court’s rationale for entering summary

judgment on this claim is erroneous. We agree. BNSF correctly points out

tha t it is irre lev ant when the TLM wa s d eposited on the prope rty and equa lly

irrelevan t how long BNSF monitored the TLM before a cting. See Parker,

386 F.3d at 1014 (“Th e section app lies retroactively to past violation s, so

long a s those viola tions a re a pre sent thre a t to he a lth or the environment.” ). 

Also, the distric t co urt e rred by limiting its conside ra tion to only injury to

persons when § 6972(a)(1)(B) also requires consideration of imminent and

substantial endan germen t to the environmen t. Sec tion 6972(a)(1)(B)’s

phra sing in the disjunc tive indica tes proof of ha rm to a living population is

unnecessary to succeed on the merits. See Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 259.

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M oreover, such a h olding would remove from co nside ration TLM ’s

potential harm to health or the environment. See United States Navy, 39

F.3d at 1019 (holding that RCRA does not require actual harm, but

threatened or potential harm). Likewise, a finding of “imminency” does not

require a showing that actual harm will occur immediately, as long as the

risk of thre a tened ha rm exists. Se e M eghrig, 516 U.S. a t 485-86. Fina lly,

prior administrative action on the part of the ODEQ or the EPA is simply not

a prerequisite to a citizen suit. In fact, “no citizen suit can proceed if either

the EPA or the Sta te ha s commenc ed, and is dilig ently pro se cuting, a

separate enforcement action.” Id. at 486. In short, the district court read

too narrowly the “ imminent an d su bstantial endange rment” prong of 42

U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).

We a lso conc lude tha t the re a re genuine issue s o f ma terial f a c t as to

whether TLM “may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to

health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). By way of example,

variou s organizations, including the EPA, hav e g en era ted reports over a

number of years which have analyzed TLM s amples taken from both on and

near Grant’s property. M any of these reports indicate that TLM contains

carcinogens in quantities greater than thos e suggested by the EPA. Perhaps

the most pertinen t of these studies is a 200 3 report con du cted at the b ehest

of BNSF (the “ERM Report”) which analyzed samples of TLM removed

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from Grant’s prope rty. The ERM Report states that the TLM s ampled

reveals the presence of certain contaminants which BNSF’s expert, Diane

DeLillio, testified we re pre sent in lev e ls exc e eding EPA human he a lth

screening levels for industrial outdoor workers. DeLillio testified further

that these contaminants were a cancer risk. Likewise, Brownlee testified

tha t this TLM :

contain[s] elevated levels of known carcinogens in excess of

current EPA Region 6 human he a lth sc re ening lev e ls spe c ific to

industria l outdoor worke rs – so il co nc entra tions. The ma terials

a lso pose a thre a t to pe ts and wildlife a s they a re complete ly

exposed. The pre senc e of this ma te ria l on the Grant prope rty,

which is threatening to recontaminate the BNSF property[,] is an

imminent and substantial health risk and endangerment to human

health and the environment. The presence of this exposed

ma terial and its e ruptive na ture constitutes a poten tial thre a t to

stormwater run off and waters of the United States.

Appx. a t 230. 

Although Grant vigorously a rgue s tha t Brownlee late r re tra c ted this

te stimony, we conc lude tha t the re cord doe s not support such a re ading. We

also reject Grant’s arguments asking us to weigh the credibility of

Brownlee’s testimony. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986) (holding that “[c]redibility determination, the weighing of the

ev iden ce , an d the d rawing of legitimate inf erence s from the f ac ts are jury

functions, not thos e of a judge”). Therefore, based on this and additional

evidence in the record, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material

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fact as to whether the TLM on Grant’s property “may present an imminent

and substantial endangerment to he a lth or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. §

6972(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand

BNSF’s RCRA claim for further proceedings.

2. Abatement

 BNSF next argue s tha t the distric t co urt e rred in dismissing its c laim

for injunc tive re lief se eking remova l of the TLM from Grant’s p rope rty to

prevent its future migration. As a threshold matter, we resolve two issues

ra ised by Grant. First we conc lude tha t this issue ha s b e en prope rly

preserved for appeal. Second, it is well-established that we review the

district court’s dismissal of BNSF’s claim at the summary judgment stage de

novo and not, as Grant suggests, for clear error. See Roberts, 422 F.3d at

1214 (review ing distric t co urt’s g rant of summa ry judgment de novo). 

We conc lude tha t the distric t co urt e rred in dismissing BNSF’s c laim

for injunc tive re lief. To the exten t the distric t co urt re ad Oklah oma law to

require an on-go ing TLM migration as a prereq uisite to a p laintiff’s

obta ining injunc tive re lie f, it e rred a s a ma tte r of law . Unde r Oklahom a

law , injunc tive re lief is prope r upon a sh owing tha t the re is a re a so nable

probability that the injury sought to be prevented will occur if no injunction

is issued; a mere fear or apprehension of injury is insufficient. See Sharp v.

251st Street Lan dfill, Inc ., 925 P.2d 546, 549 (Okla. 1996). M oreover,

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insofa r as the d istrict cou rt discou nted the testimon y of BNSF’s witness,

Jennifer Hurley, as unreliable, becaus e it was based upon a visual inspection

of the TLM in re lation to the be rm, rathe r than a more sc ien tific

examination, the district court erred. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at

255; see a lso Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10 th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t

is axioma tic tha t a judge may not ev a lua te the c redibility of witne ss e s in

de c iding a motion for summa ry judgment.” ). 

We also agree with BNSF that there are genuine issues of material fact

remaining. In Oklahoma, entitlement to injunctive relief must be

established b y clear and co nv incing eviden ce and the injury alleged must

not be spe cula tive . Thoma s v. Hampton, 583 P.2d 506, 507 (O kla . 1978). 

The Supreme Court has held that “the inquiry involved in a ruling on a

motion for summa ry judgment or for a dire c ted ve rdict ne c e ss a rily

implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at

the trial on the merits.” Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252. Therefore,

becaus e Oklahoma law requires clear and convincing proof before a

nuisance can be enjoined, we review the grant of summary judgment on the

issue of injunctive relief in light of that standard. “Clear and convincing

evidence is that measure or degree of proof . . . produc[ing] in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegation

sought to be established.” Matter of C.G., 637 P.2d 66, 71, n.12 (Okla.

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1981).

When applying this standard to the record presented, we conclude that

BNSF’s eviden ce was su fficien t to cre ate a triable issue a s to whethe r there

is a re a so nable p robability tha t TLM on Grant’s prope rty will migra te o nto

the property of BNSF. First, BNSF’s experts, Hurley and Brownlee,

unambiguously assert that the TLM has continued to move towards the

berm, and against it, and that, absent intervention, it threatens to overtop the

berm. Next, BNSF points to co nsiderable evidence in the record of past

TLM migra tion onto BNSF’s p rope rty, an issue which the distric t co urt did

not resolve and abo ut which there is vigo rous dispute. Third, BNSF also

points to studie s of soil borings which show substantia l rem a ining TLM

deposits n e a r the be rm. Fina lly, both BNSF’s and Grant’s expe rts s e t forth

the mechan ics of TLM migration: heat, exp ansion , and settling to the lowest

elevation . Taken tog ether, we agree that this evidence – sugg esting past

TLM migration, current TLM migration against the berm, ample quantities

of TLM nex t to the berm, and the mechan ics of TLM migration – p resents a

triable issue as to whether there is a reasonable probability that the TLM on

Grant’s land will o ve rtop the be rm and contamina te BNSF’s land. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand this issue for further

pro c e edings on the aba tement issue . 

3. Public Nuisance

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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Grant on

BNSF’s public nuisance claim brought pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-

6-105 of the Oklahoma Environmental Qua lity Code ba sed upon its

conclusion that an ODEQ enforcement action was a precondition to the

existence of a public nuisance. On appeal, BNSF argues that the district

court misre ad § 2-6 -1 05 in re a ching this conc lusion. We agre e . 

Se c tion 2-6-105 sta tes: 

A. It shall be unlawful for any person to cause pollution of any

wa ters o f the sta te o r to plac e or c ause to be plac ed any wa ste s in

a loc ation where they are likely to cause p ollution of any air,

lan d or wa ters o f the sta te. Any su ch a c tion is he reby de c lar ed to

be a public nuisance.

B. If the Executive Director finds that any of the air, land or

waters of the state have been, or are being, polluted, the

Executive Director shall make an order requiring such pollution

to cease within a reasonable time, or requiring such manner of

treatment or of disposition of the sewage or other polluting

material as may in his judgment be necessary to prevent further

pollution. It shall be the duty of the person to whom such order

is directed to fully comply with the order of the Executive

Direc tor.

Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-105.

We review a district court’s statutory interpretation under a de novo

standard. Ward v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 F.3d 353, 354 (10 th Cir.1994). The

primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and follow

legisla tive intent. Head v. M cC ra cken, 102 P.3d 670, 680 (Okla . 2004). To

determine legislative intent, we look at the whole act in light of its general

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purpose and objective. Rout v. Crescent Pub. Works Auth., 878 P.2d 1045,

1050 (Okla. 1994). When interpre ting any sta tute, we begin with the plain

and ordina ry me aning of the language employed in the text. George E.

Failing Co. v. Watkins, 14 P.3d 52, 56 (Okla. 2000).

We conc lude tha t the distric t court e rred in holding tha t OD E Q

enforc ement a c tion wa s a pre conditio n to the existenc e of a public nuis anc e . 

To begin with, the lan guage of Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-105 is

unambiguous. Nothing in the plain language of Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-

105 requires an order by the Executive Director of the ODEQ before an act

c an be de c lar ed a public n uisanc e . Nothing in su bse c tion B purports to limit

the scope of subs ection A’s definition of the term “public nuisance.” See

Cox v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 87 P.3d 607, 617 (Okla.

2004). (“This Court doe s not re ad exc eptions into a sta tute nor may we

impose requirements not mandated by the Legislature.”). In fact, a reading

of su bse c tions A and B indica tes su bse c tion B wa s n ot inten ded to limit

subse c tion A. 

Subsection A states, in part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person

to cause pollution of any waters of the state or to place or cause to be placed

any wastes in a location where they are likely to ca use pollution . . . .” Okla.

Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-10 5(A) (emph asis added ). We view subsection A as a

declaration of the type of conduct that constitutes a public nuisance under

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Oklahoma law, and it is clear that the intent of subsection A is to deem as a

public nu isance cond uct that either has caused or is likely to cau se

pollution. Accordingly, pollution need not hav e a lready occurred before

conduc t “ like ly to c ause ” pollution c an be de emed a public nuis anc e . 

Subsec tion B, on the o ther h an d, demonstrates tha t the Executive Direc tor’s

authority under this s ection is more limited. It states, in part, that “[i]f the

Executive Director finds that any of the air, land or waters of the state have

been, or are being polluted, the Executive Director shall make an order

requiring such pollution to c e a se . . . .” Okla . Sta t. tit. 27A , § 2-6-105(B )

(emphasis added). The function of subs ection B, therefore, is to direct the

Executive Director of ODEQ to order abatement of pollution where it has

already occurred.

The distric t co urt’s r e ading of su bse c tion B to e ff e c tive ly limit

subsection A would mean that the placement of “any wastes in a location

where they are likely to cause pollution” could never be a public nuisance

becaus e subs ection B requires the pollution to have occurred before the

Executive Director of the ODEQ can act to abate the nuisance. This reading

contradicts the plain language of Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-105. See

Villines v. Szczepanksi, 122 P.3d 466, 470 (Okla. 2005) (“It is presumed

that the law-making body has expressed its intent in a statute’s language and

tha t it in tended wha t it so expre ssed.” ). 

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 Okla. Stat. tit. 82, § 926.4(A) (West 1990) read: “It shall be unlawful 2

for any person to cause pollution as defined in Sectio n 1 of this act of any

waters of the state o r to place or cause to be placed any wastes in a location

where they are likely to cause pollution of any waters of the state. An y such

action is hereby declared to be a public nuisance.” 

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Furthermore, the district court’s reading also belies the legislative

intent beh ind Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-105. The Oklahoma Leg islature ’s

intent that conduct that causes or is likely to cause pollution be declared a

public nuisance is longstanding, and predates the enactment of the present

su bse c tion B. In f a c t, Okla. Stat. tit. 82, § 926(A), from which Okla. Stat.

tit. 27A, § 2-6-105(A) was derived, had almost identical language.

2

Notab ly, Okla. Stat. tit. 82, § 926.4 did not co ntain a pa ra llel to Okla. Stat.

tit. 27A, § 2-6-105(B). We agree with the amici that to conclude, upon

adoption of § 926.4 and its re loc a tion to § 2-6-105, tha t the Oklahom a

Legislature intended to depart from its prior position, and to now require an

ODEQ orde r be fore conduc t co uld be de c lar ed a public n uisanc e , would c a ll

for a c le a re r linguistic signa l than me re silenc e . 

We reach a similar conclusion when considering the purpos e of the

entire code . Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-3-506(A) sta tes, in p e rtinent pa rt, tha t:

[i]t is the purpos e of this Code to provide additional and

cumula tive remedie s to prevent, aba te and control pollution. 

Nothing contained in this Code shall be construed to abridge or

alter rights of action or remedies under the common law or

sta tutory law , crimina l or c ivil; nor sha ll an y provision of this

Code, or any act done by virtue thereof, be construed as

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estop ping the state, or any mun icipality or person in the exercise

of the ir rights unde r the common law to su ppre ss nuisanc e s o r to

abate pollution. Nothing in this Code shall in any way impair or

a ff e c t a pe rson’s right to re cove r d amage s for p ollution. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-3-506(A). To require an order of abatement from

the Exe cutive Dire c tor of the ODEQ a s a pre condition to a ss e rting a public

nuisance claim under Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, § 2-6-105, not only undercuts the

“additional and cumulative remedies” the code is intended to provide, but

a lso pre c lude s an a c tion to “prevent” p ollution unde r this s e c tion and would

“ impa ir or a ff e c t a pe rson’s right to re cove r d amage s for p ollution,”

contra ry to the expre ss intent of the Legisla ture . Se e Okla . Sta t. tit. 2 7A, §

2-3-506(A). This result would violate the maxim of statutory construction

tha t “[w]hen possible, diff e rent provisions must be construed toge the r to

effect an harmonious whole.” Villines, 122 P.3d at 471.

B. Judgment as a M atter of Law

BNSF nex t challeng es the d istrict cou rt’s entry of judgment as a

ma tte r of law on its priva te nuisanc e and unjust enrichment c la ims. We

review a distric t court’s judgm ent a s a matte r of law de novo, applying the

same legal stand ards used by the d istrict cou rt. Knowlton v. Teltrust

Phone s, In c ., 189 F.3d 1177, 1186 (1 0th Cir. 1999). 

1. Pe rsonal Liability

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BNSF first argues that Grant, the individual, may be held liable to the

extent he was responsible for the maintenance of a nuisance that was under

his posse ssion or control. This is an a c cura te sta tement of Oklahoma law. 

See Branch v. M obil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 531, 533 (W.D. Okla. 1991);

Duncan v. Flagler, 132 P.2d 939, 941 (Okla. 1942). However, we disagree

that there are genuine issues of material fact in the record that Grant

pe rsona lly dire c ted, pa rtic ipa ted in or controlled the commission of a tort. 

While Grant’s forme r employe e , Bill Rothe r, sta ted tha t Grant pe rso na lly

stopped by the construction site regularly while the property in question was

being converted to a pipeyard, one cannot reasonably infer from this that

Grant personally managed the construction, and thereby directed,

sanctioned, or actively participated or cooperated in, a positively wrongful

ac t. Additionally, while the record contains an invoice sign ed by Grant for a

substantial amount of dirt to be used as filler during the conversion of the

property to a pipeyard, we conclude that this cannot reasonably be viewed as

evidence of Grant’s management of the how, when, and where of the

construc tion. 

Neve rthe less, BNSF’s n ext argument, tha t Grant may be he ld

pe rso na lly liable a s a su c c e ssive owne r, is more convinc ing. Okla. Stat. tit.

50, § 5 provide s “ [ e ]ve ry su c c e ssive owne r of prope rty who neglec ts to

abate a continuing nuisance upon, or in the use of such property, created by

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a former owner, is liable therefor in the same mann er as the o ne who first

created it.” This s ection provides for liability of successor owners who have

or sh ould have knowled ge of the existenc e of the nuisanc e and of its liability

to cause injury. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson, 909 P.2d 131, 141

(Okla. Civ. App. 1995). Despite Grant’s arguments to the contrary, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court held long ago that an injured landowner need not

reque st aba tement from the tortf e a so r re sp onsible f or a nuisanc e prior to

bringing a nuisanc e a c tion in instanc e s whe re the tortf e a so r knew or sh ould

have known of the nuisance. See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. M orton, 157

P. 917, 920 (O kla . 1916). 

We conc lude tha t the re is sufficient ev idenc e in this re cord to su bmit

to a jury the question of whether Grant, as an individual, had constructive or

a c tua l knowled ge tha t the TLM on his prope rty constituted a nuisanc e to

BNSF. This evidence ranges from Grant’s stipulation that he was aware of

the existence of TLM on his property when he took title to it, to evidence

that TLM incu rsions were open an d notorious, in tha t there is sworn

testimony that TLM emerging from Grant’s land pushed down a fence

between the properties in question and caused a utility pole to list. Thu s,

while there is not sufficient eviden ce in the present record to establish

Grant’s personal liability as a corporate officer, there is sufficient evidence

to put before a trier of fact the question of whether Grant was on actual or

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construc tive notice tha t the TLM on his prope rty constituted a nuisanc e to

B N SF.

2. Damages

BNSF next challenges the district court’s determination that it failed

to su bm it a triab le issu e on th e que stio n of damages. Spec if ic a lly, BN S F

disputes the district court’s holding that damages for a continuing

tempora ry nuisanc e a re limited to the diminution in va lue of the prope rty in

question. However, assuming that diminution in value is indeed the limit on

damage s re cove rable, BNSF next argue s tha t the distric t co urt e rred in

requiring BNSF to c a rry the burd en of pro ving the amount of tha t lost va lue . 

Finally, BNSF contends that the district court erred in concluding BNSF had

failed to prove that its damages were incurred within the applicable twoyear limitations period.

a. M easur e of Damages

First, BNSF asserts that the amount of damages it may recover for

nuisanc e is the total of the re a so nable costs it incurred in a ttempting to

minimize the loss with which it was threatened. We disagree.

 “Damage” or “injury,” as typically us ed in nuisance cases, is the

damage or injury re su lting from the nuisanc e . Pe rmanent damage s, a s we ll

as temporary damages, may be recovered for the maintenance of a

tempora ry nuisance. Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33, 36 (Okla.

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1985). In n uisance ca ses, damag es a re determined by whethe r the injury

suff ered is pe rman en t or temporary, rathe r than whethe r the c au se o f injury

is permanent or tempora ry. Id. Accordingly, damages awarded in an action

predicated on a nuisance theory may include temporary and permanent

injury to lan d. Id. An injury is de emed tempora ry, an d not pe rmanent, if it

is reasonably abatable, that is, capable of being corrected by a reasonable 

expenditure of money within a reasonable period of time. M oneypenney v.

Dawso n, 141 P.3d 549, 553 (Okla. 2006). “D amage s re a so nably inc apable

of aba tement a re pe rmanent.” Briscoe , 702 P.2d a t 36. 

As for tempora ry injury to lan d, the me a su re of damage s is we llestablished. Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847, 852 (Okla. 1994)

(“Oklahoma case law from statehood to the present . . . ha[s] interpreted the

proper measure of damages to be diminution in value.”). “[T]he measure of

damage s is the cost of re storing the lan d to its forme r condition, with

compensation for loss of use of it, if this altogether is less than the

diminution in va lue with the injurie s le ft standing.” Houck v. Hold Oil

Corp., 867 P.2d 451, 460 (Okla. 1993); see also Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen,

515 P.2d 1391, 1395-97 (Okla. 1973) (holding that nuisance damages

include “clean up” costs in addition to temporary injuries to land). When

the cost of repairing the injury is grea ter than the d iminution in the land ’s

va lue , the la tte r is the true me a sure of damage s. Houck, 867 P.2d a t 460. 

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Underlying this rule is the principle of avoidable consequences, which

require s pla intiffs to mitig a te the ir damage s. Id . 

The district court was correct in holding that BNSF can only recover

the costs of removing the TLM if its restoration costs do not exceed the

diminished value of the land. BNSF, in effect, is requesting that we carve

out an exception and hold that where restoration costs have been expended

prior to the institution of su it, the me a su re of damage s should be the full

 cost of restoration. BNSF cites no authority from this circuit or from

Oklah oma c a se law which su pports its v iew . Inste ad, it a ttempts to

distinguish existing precedent by arguing that the cases relied upon by the

district court, Schneberger, 890 P.2d at 852 and Peevyhous e v. Garland

Coa l & M ining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla. 1963), hold tha t estimated

repair costs are not recoverable if they are “grossly disproportionate” to the

diminution in va lue of a plaintiff’s land, be c ause any contra ry ruling would

overcompensa te the plaintiff. BNSF argues further that both Schneberger

and Peevyhouse involved plaintiffs s eeking recovery of estimated costs for

work they had not performed, and which the court found would likely never

be pe rform ed. Wh ile BNSF’s a rgum ents a re not entire ly without merit, we

see no need to depart from the well-established Oklahoma law that when

the cost of repairing the injury is grea ter than the d iminution in the land ’s

value, the latter is the true measure of damages. Houck, 867 P.2d at 460;

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Cf. Schneberger, 890 P.2d at 852 (“Whatever the rationale, the essence of .

. . Pe evyhouse . . . ha s b e en consisten tly adhe red to in c a se s g iving rise to

temporary an d perman en t injuries to prop erty.”).

b. Burden of Proof

Next, BNSF argues that even if the diminution in market value is the

uppe r limit fo r tempora ry damage to prope rty, the distric t co urt imprope rly

a lloc a ted the burd en of pro of to BNSF. We agre e . 

While it is true a pla intiff must prove a ll e lem ents of a c la im ,

including damages, Wilcox Oil Co. v. Walters, 284 P.2d 726, 730 (Okla.

1955), it is equally true that in applying the diminution in value rule,

numerous courts have expressly held that any limit on recoverable damages

is a ma tter tha t must be pleaded by the de f endant, as it grows o ut of the rule

of avoidable consequences. See, e.g., M cFarland v. Brier, 769 A.2d 605,

610 (R.I. 2001); Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, 765 P.2d 680, 681

(Idaho 1988). This follows from the recognition that the doctrine of

avoidable consequences is an affirmative defense. See McFarland, 769

A.2d at 610; Davis, 765 P.2d a t 681. Oklahoma c a se law sugge sts a s much. 

It is well-established under Oklahoma law that with regard to similar issues

in tort and contract actions, the burden of proving that damages should have

been reduced or minimized is on the defendant. See Cities Serv. Co. v.

Gu lf Oil Corp ., 980 P.2 d 116 , 134 (Ok la . 199 9); Sa ck e tt v. Ros e , 154 P.

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1177, 1181 (Okla. 1916) (“The burden of proving c ircumstanc e s in

mitigation of damages is upon the party guilty of the tortious act or breach

of contract.”). We conclude that Oklahoma case law requires a defendant

to shoulder the burden of establishing diminution in value to set the upper

limit of re cove rable damage s for a tempora ry injury to land. 

c. Statute of Limitations

BNSF next argues that the district court erred in holding that it failed

to prove its damages were incurred within the applicable limitations period

as regards its state law claims. On this issue, we conclud e p art of BNSF’s

damage s we re incurred within the applicable p e riod, but some we re not.

Under Oklahoma law, the damages recoverable for a continuing

tempora ry nuisance – alleged here by BNSF – are limited to injuries

incurred within the two years immediately preceding the filing of the

lawsuit. Branch, 788 F. Supp. at 536; City of Bethany v. M unicipal

Se curities Co., 274 P.2d 363, 367 (Okla. 1954); Ha enchen v. Sand Produc ts

Co., 626 P.2d 332, 334 (Okla. App. 1981). BNSF filed its lawsuit in M arch

of 2003. Thus, BNSF can recover damages for injuries sustained between

M a rch of 2001 and M a rch of 2003. 

The statute of limitations for the filing of a nuisance action begins

when the injury is complete. Id. (citing Elk City v. Rice, 286 P.2d 275,

278-79 (Okla. 1955)). For a continuing temporary nuisance, such as the

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nuisance alleged by BNSF, the injury is complete upon each alleged

invasion, which “gives rise over and over to [new] causes of action for

damages sustained within the limitations period immediately prior to suit.” 

Branch, 788 F. Supp. at 536; s ee also Haenchen, 626 P.2d at 334. Injuries

which occur outside the two-year look-back period are outside of the

statute of limitations. Fischer v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 774 F. Supp. 616,

619 (W.D. Okla. 1989). He re , the last alleged inva sion of TLM onto

BNSF’s property occurred in June or July of 2001, immediately prior to the

e re c tion of the be rm by BNSF. 

As noted above, on e a spec t of damag es the “victim” o f a temporary

nuisance can recover “is the cost of restoring the land to its former

condition . . . if this altogether is less than the diminution in value with the

injuries left standing.” Houck, 867 P.2d at 460; see also Haenchen, 626

P.2d at 33 6 n.2 (holding that “the measure of damages [is] the v alue o f lost

or damaged c rops o r the va lue of lost rental for the pe riod two ye a rs p rior to

suit being filed and thereafter until trial, plus the permanent damage to the

lan d (be fore and a fter) or the cost of removing the obstruc tion, which eve r is

less” ). He re , BNSF enter ed into evidenc e a sp re adsh e e t itemizing its costs

of remediation. This included both the cost of building the berm to stop the

a lleged migra tion of TLM , the cost of moving a ga s pipe to build the be rm ,

and the cost of removing a substantia l amount of TLM from its pro pe rty. 

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Bec au se the cost of ab ating a n uisance is one f ac et of damag es for a

continuing tempora ry nuisanc e , BNSF me t its b urden of se tting forth

damages of its cost of restoration within the two-year limitations period.

None the less, Grant is corre c t to point out tha t BNSF is not en titled to

the costs of removing all TLM on its land simply by performing that

removal within a two-year period prior to filing suit, regardless of whether

such a clean-up addresses injuries that occurred outside the limitations

period. In other words, BNSF can only recover removal costs for the

approximately four months of TLM migration between March and July of

2001, becaus e that is the only time period falling within the two-year

statute of limitations. To permit BNSF to recover for the removal of all the

TLM on its property would, in effect, negate the statute of limitations, as

BNSF would then be able to re cove r for d e c ade s of TLM migra tion. 

However, becaus e Oklahoma law allows a plaintiff to recover its costs of

aba tement in a tempora ry nuisanc e a c tion, the distric t co urt e rred in

holding tha t BNSF f a iled to s e t forth me a surable evidenc e of damage s. 

See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co, 515 P.2d at 1395-97 (holding that nuisance

damag es includ e “ clean up” costs in ad dition to temporary injuries to land).

In short, while the district court identified the correct measure of

damages, it erred in placing the burden on BNSF to prove the limit of

damag es re co verable. The d istrict court fu rther e rred in dismissing BNSF’s

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 We reject as untenable Grant’s argument that this issue is subject to a 3

clearly erroneous standard of review becaus e the district court, in dismissing

this claim pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was

someh ow mak ing sub rosa findings of f ac t under Rule 52 (b).

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remaining claims as falling outside o f the statute of limitation s. W e

reverse the district court’s dismissal of BNSF’s private nuisance claim and

we remand for further proceedings.

3. Unjust Enrichment

The district court dismissed BNSF’s unjust enrichment claim, holding

that it had failed to establish an affirmative duty on the part of Grant which

he would have been required to perform but for BNSF’s performance of the

same . BNSF a rgue s tha t our reve rsa l of the distric t co urt’s rulings o n its 3

public o r priva te n uisanc e c laims would ne c e ssitate a re insta tement of its

unjust enrichment claim. We agree.

In N.C. Corff P’ship, Ltd. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla.

Civ. App. 1996), the court de fined unjust enrichment:

[A] right of re cove ry unde r the doc trine of unjust enrichment is

e ss entially equitable, its ba sis be ing tha t in a given situa tion it

is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a

bene fit which ha s come to him a t the expense of anothe r . . . . 

[It] a rise s n ot only whe re an expenditure by one pe rso n adds to

the property of another, but also where the expenditure saves

the o ther from exp ense or loss.

(quoting Am.Jur.2d Re stitution and Implied Contra c ts § 3 (1973)). To

recover for unjust enrichment “there must be enrichment to another coupled

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with a resulting injustice.” Teel v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 767 P.2d 391,

3 98 (Ok la .1 98 5) (su pe rsed ed by sta tu te on oth e r gro un ds). He re , BN S F

essentially alleges a theory of negative unjust enrichment by alleging that

the remediation it undertoo k saved Grant an ex pen se it wou ld otherwise

have had to incur. Becaus e we reverse the district court and reinstate all of

BNSF’s c la ims, it may now be able to prove its unjust enrichment theory.

Grant, in turn, argues that becaus e BNSF already has legal claims that

will cove r the re lief so ught, its additiona l cla im for unjust enrichment is

prohibited. Howeve r, Oklah oma courts have sq ua re ly re jec ted this

argumen t. N.C. Corff P’ship, Ltd, 929 P.2d at 29 5 (“Oklahoma p roc ed ure

clearly permits pleading alternative remedies, just as it allows alternative

theories of recovery, as long as plaintiffs are not given double recovery for

the same injury.”). The re fore , while BNSF is not en titled to a double

recovery for the same injuries, it is entitled to pursue its unjust enrichment

claim as an alternative claim. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of

BNSF’s unjust enrichment claim and remand this issue for further

proceeding s.

C. Evidentiar y Rulings

BNSF a lso a rgue s tha t the distric t co urt e rred in exc luding c e rta in

testimonial an d documen tary ev iden ce . Spec ifica lly, the d istrict court

granted, without exp lana tion, Grant’s motion to ex clud e Brow nlee’s ex pert

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opinion that the TLM BNSF had removed was TLM that had migrated from

Grant’s property. The district court also excluded Brownlee’s testimony

rega rd ing TLM he had pe rsona lly viewed on the pro pe rtie s in que stion. 

BNSF wa s a lso prohibited from pre senting photographs it a ss e rts illustra te

TLM migra tion. 

1. Exclusion of Brownlee ’s Testimony

As fo r the d istrict court’s de cision to ex clud e Brow nlee’s ex pert

opinion, we note th a t when “ [f]a c ed with a proff e r of expe rt sc ien tific

testimony . . . the trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the

exp ert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific kn owledg e that (2) will assist

the trie r o f f a c t to unde rstand or d e te rmine a f a c t in issue .” Daube rt v. 

M errell Dow Pharmac eu tica ls, Inc ., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (19 93). In

performing this gatekeeper role, the judge must assess the reasoning and

me thodology unde rlying the expe rt’s o pinion, then de termine whe the r it is

scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts. See id. at

592-93. We review de novo the issue of whether the district court applied

the legal test properly, Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R., 215

F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000), an d review the distric t co urt’s d e c ision to

admit or deny the testimony under an abuse of discretion standard, General

Ele c . Co. v. Joine r, 5 22 U.S. 136, 143 (1 997). 

The trial court ha s the disc re tion to de termine how to pe rform its

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gatekeeping function. See Kumho Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,

152 (1999). Gene ra lly, the distric t co urt pe rforms this func tion a t a

Daubert hearing, although such a hearing is not specifically required. See

Hyne s v. Ene rg y We st, Inc ., 211 F.3d 1193, 1203-0 4 (1 0th Cir. 2000). 

Although the distric t co urt ha s d isc re tion in the manne r in which it

conduc ts a Daube rt ana lysis, in o rde r to provide for me aningful appe llate

review the distric t co urt must c re a te “ a su fficiently deve loped re cord in

order to allow a determination of whether the district court properly applied

the re levant law.” Dodge v . Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10 th Cir.

2003) (quotations omitted). Abs ent specific findings or discussion on the

record, it is impossible to determine o n ap pea l whethe r the d istrict court

“‘carefully and meticulously’ review[ed] the proffered scientific evidence”

or instead mad e an “o ff-the-cuff ” d ec ision to admit or deny the expert

testimony. Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088 (quoting United States v. Call, 129

F.3d 1402, 1405 (10 th Cir. 1997)).

He re , the distric t co urt f a iled to make any findings o n the re cord in

support of its exclusion of Brownlee’s expert testimony. However, Grant

a rgue s tha t a r eview of the re cord of the two-day Daube rt he a ring reve a ls

flaws in Brownlee’s methodology and expert opinion that are so patent and

obvious that we may have a sufficient record upon which to review the

district court’s decision to exclude Brownlee’s opinion testimony regarding

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 Brownlee’s credentials were stipulated to and are not at issue. 4

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the migration of the TLM . We disagree. What Grant is essentially asking 4

us to do is to infer that the district court properly performed its gatekeeping

function based on the few statements it made and questions it asked during

the Daubert hearing. This we are unwilling to do. In the absence of

findings by the district court to support its ruling to exclude this evidence,

we c annot de termine whe the r it ap plied the re lev ant law and prope rly

performed its gatekeeping function. Accordingly, we reverse the district

cou rt’s ruling on this issue and remand for further proceedings.

As regards the district court’s exclusion of Brownlee’s testimony

conc e rning his pe rso na l obse rva tion of the TLM on the prope rties in

que stion, we a ffirm. Although the exc lusion of Brownlee ’s lay testimony is

listed among the issues BNSF seeks to appeal, it has failed to provide

arguments or authorities in support of this issue. We will not review an

issue in the absenc e of re a so ned a rguments advanc ed by the appe llant as to

the grounds for its appeal. Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177,

1184 (10th Cir. 2006). The re fore , absent re a soned a rgum enta tion, we

affirm the district court on this issue.

2. Photographs

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As for th e distric t co urt’s dec isio n to ex c lu de pho to grap hs BN S F

sought to offer as evidence, we are unable to address this issue on the

record provided because the copies of the photographs in question are of

such poor quality they are impossible to scrutinize in any meaningful

m anne r. Bec ause we c annot review this issue on the re cord be fore us, we

affirm the d istrict court. See Sco tt v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 912 (10 th Cir.

2000) (affirming district court, where the evidentiary record before the

court is insufficient to permit an assessment of an appellant’s claims of

error).

D. Spoliation

After receiving extensive briefing, and after holding a two day

hearing, the district court entered an order, without analysis, denying

Grant’s motion for spolia tion s anc tions. Grant appeals this ruling in the

event the district court’s judgments appealed by BNSF are reversed,

a rguing tha t the distric t co urt e rred both f a c tua lly and leg a lly in denying its

motion for spolia tion sanc tions. 

As a threshold matter, BNSF argues that this cross-appeal is improper

becaus e cross-appeals are to be dismissed where they merely present an

alternate grounds for affirmance, but do not ask that the judgment be

altered in any way. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Serv. Co., 985

F.2d 1419, 1426 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993 ) (ho lding that dismissal of crossAppellate Case: 04-5190 Document: 010137879 Date Filed: 09/24/2007 Page: 36 
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appeal is proper where a party presents alternate grounds to affirm, but

doe s not “ a sk[] tha t the judgm ent itse lf be a lte red” ). None the le ss, we

conclude that the spoliation issue is not an alternate grounds for affirming

the judgment on the me rits. Ra the r, re so lution of this issue could re su lt in

a possible dismissal of BNSF’s action as a sanction, and for reasons having

nothing to do with the a c tua l me rits of BNSF’s c laims. We the re fore turn to

the spolia tion issue its e lf. 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for spoliation

sanc tions for an abuse of dis c re tion. 103 In ve stors I, L.P. v. Squa re D Co.,

470 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 2006). In doing so, we accept the district

court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Allstate Ins. Co.

v. Hamilto n Be a ch/Pro c tor Silex, 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2 nd Cir. 2007). A

spoliation sanction is proper where (1) a party has a duty to preserve

evidence becaus e it knew, or should have known, that litigation was

imminent, and (2) the adverse party was prejudiced by the destruction of

the evidenc e . 103 In ve stors I, L.P., 470 F.3d a t 989. 

Grant’s arguments are fourfold. First, Grant argues that the district

court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the spoliation doctrine

doe s not apply in c a se s involving the de struc tion of an a lleged nuis anc e . 

Second, Grant argues that the district court erred insofar as it concluded

that a finding of bad faith was a necessary prerequisite to a finding that

Appellate Case: 04-5190 Document: 010137879 Date Filed: 09/24/2007 Page: 37 
 We therefore decline to address the remainder of Grant’s arguments on 5

this issue . 

 We also find unconvincing Grant’s argument that it was prejudiced 6

bec au se its ap praisal ex pert was un ab le to observe the TLM site, due to BNSF’s

remedia tion, and e stablish how much BNSF’s land wa s a llegedly de v a lu e d. 

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spoliation occurred. Third, Grant claims that the district court clearly erred

by failing to find that BNSF breached a duty to preserve evidence gathered

in an ticipa tion of litigation. Finally, Grant claims tha t the d istrict court

clearly erred by failing to find that this alleged destruction of evidence was

pre judic ia l to his de f ense . 

Upon review of the record, and upon con sideration of the parties’

briefs, we conclude that no reasonable finder of fact could determine that

Grant was meaningfully prejudiced by BNSF’s removal and destruction of

portions of the TLM on its property. The gravamen of Grant’s argument 5

regarding prejud ice is that he cannot def en d this lawsuit bec au se BNSF’s

c lean-up a ltered the topography and slope of the lan d, an d prevented him

from having the alleged TLM migration measured scientifically. We reject 6

this claim. BNSF generated extensive documentation of the condition of

the land before and during remediation, and the factual dispute regarding

any change in elevation of the remediation site amounts to, at most, one and

a quarter inches. In light of this, and absent meaningful evidence that

G rant ha s be en a c tua lly, ra the r than mere ly theore tic a lly, pre judic ed, we

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a ffirm the distric t court’s denia l of Grant’s motion for spolia tion sanc tions. 

III

In sum, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing

BNSF’s RCRA, public n uisance , an d ab atemen t claims at the summary

judgment stage . We furthe r conc lude tha t the distric t co urt e rred in

entering judgment as a matter of law as to BNSF’s private nuisance and

unjust enrichment claims. In light of these holdings, we vacate the district

court’s order awarding Grant attorney fees. We also affirm the district

cou rt’s den ial of G rant’s motion for spoliation sanction s.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s rulings in 04-5182

and 04-5190 and REM AND for further proceedings. As for case number

05-5137, we AFFIRM the distric t co urt.

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