Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01785/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01785-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNATHAN EDWARD FLOWERS, Civil No. 07cv1785 WQH (BLM)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Johnathan Edward Flowers, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 challenging his San Diego County Superior Court convictions in

case number SCD175957 for one count of attempted murder, one count of

robbery, two counts of attempted robbery, and one count of assault

with a semi-automatic firearm. (Lodgment No. 1 at 0058-63.) The jury

also found he was a principal in the commission of the attempted

murder, robberies and attempted robbery and was vicariously armed with

a firearm. (Id.) 

Flowers contends his federal constitutional rights were violated

for the following reasons: (1) the prosecutor argued false and

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 The state court noted that the facts were taken from their opinion

in the appeal of Grady Harris, Flowers’ codefendant. (Lodgment No. 6 at 3.)

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inadmissible evidence to the jury; (2) there was insufficient evidence

to support his conviction for attempted robbery of Danielle Soto; and

(3) the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on the

crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter. (Pet. at 6-8; Pet’rs Mem.

of P. & A. [doc. no. 1-2] at 17-24; Pet’rs. Ex. B [doc. no. 1-6];

Pet’rs Ex. C [doc. no. 1-5].)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, the Lodgments submitted by Respondent, and all

the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the

documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set

forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of

correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(e)(1)(West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption

of correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are

as follows1

:

“On July 23, 2000, Danielle Soto, Francisco Lopez and

Ivan Rubio traveled to San Diego from Yuma, Arizona with

several other friends to visit another friend in San Diego,

Soto’s father and to buy higher quality marijuana than was

available in Yuma. While visiting her father in Mission

Beach, Soto, along with Lopez and Rubio walked to Belmont

Park to look for a connection as Soto had heard people walk

around that area offering to sell marijuana. At some point

Soto talked with a man wearing an orange-colored shirt,

later identified as Harris, telling him they wanted to buy

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some weed. Harris, who was in the area with a man wearing

a maroon shirt and braided hair, later identified as

Johnathan Flowers, and another man, gave Soto his pager

number, which one of them wrote on her arm.

“Several hours later Soto called the pager number from

a friend’s house in the Rolando area of San Diego. One of

the men she had met called her back and she talked about

getting some “weed” before giving the phone to Lopez, who

arranged to meet the men at Woodstock Pizza in 10 minutes.

When the men failed to show up to meet Soto, Lopez and

Rubio, they returned to the friend’s house and called the

pager number again. This time, Lopez made arrangements to

meet the men at a near-by 7-Eleven convenience store. When

the three drove to the pre-arranged location, Harris was

waiting for them, wearing the same orange shirt as he had

been wearing at Mission Beach. Harris had brought along

some marijuana which he rolled into a cigar after buying

cigar paper in the 7-Eleven store and sat in the car with

Soto and her friends to share it as they drove around the

area. As they cruised, Harris talked with them about

“trust” regarding the drug transaction. When Soto, and

Rubio told Harris the marijuana they were smoking was not

the quality they wanted, Harris told them they would go

some place else to obtain the higher grade marijuana.

“The group went back to the 7-Eleven where Harris’s

friends, Flowers and the other man from Mission Beach, were

waiting in an older model red Mustang. Harris rode with

Soto, Rubio and Lopez and directed them to an alley near

some apartments about 15 minutes away while following

Flowers and the other man in the Mustang. When Harris

asked Rubio whether he or any of his friends were “cops” or

had a gun during the trip, Rubio told him no, they only

wanted to buy marijuana. Flowers and the other man were

already in the alley, standing outside the Mustang, when

Lopez parked the car there and everyone got out. Soto got

back into the driver’s side of the car, while Rubio and

Lopez waited outside the car as Harris walked over to speak

with [Flowers and his other friend].

“When Harris[, Flowers and the other man] returned to

talk with the Arizona group, Lopez told Harris to give them

whatever he could of good quality marijuana. The group

basically wanted high quality marijuana from Canada known

as ‘Chronic’ which costs about four or five hundred dollars

an ounce. In response to Harris’s question about who had

the money, Lopez said it was not him. Although they had

not yet agreed upon a price, Harris told Lopez to have the

money ready when he returned. [Harris stopped briefly to

talk with Flowers and the other man.] Because [Lopez] had

a bad feeling about what was happening, [he] gave his

wallet containing $400 or $500 to Rubio when Harris left to

go to one of the apartments to obtain better marijuana.

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“When Harris, Flowers and the third man again

approached Lopez and Rubio standing in front of Soto in the

car, Harris pulled out a gun from his pocket or waist,

pointed it toward Lopez and Rubio, and demanded all their

money. When Lopez said he did not have any money, Harris

pointed the gun near Rubio’s head, saying “I’m gonna quit

bull shitting. Give me your mother-fucking money.” As

Rubio tried to leave while moving Harris’s hand and the

barrel of the gun away from his head, Harris shot him,

g[r]azing his head. Rubio then began running down the

alley. As he was chased by the third man, Rubio flipped

Lopez’s wallet out of his back pocket and heard two or

three more gunshots.

“Meanwhile, Flowers ‘rushed’ Lopez, demanding his

money, and they started fighting. When Lopez was on the

ground near the car, four or five gunshots were fired at

him. Scared, Lopez slipped out of his shirt which Flowers

held and began running away with Flowers and Harris in

pursuit. Soto had taken off running after she witnessed

Harris demand money, point the gun at Rubio’s head, heard

the first shot, and saw Rubio running as Lopez was getting

beat up and shot at.

“Soto, Lopez and Rubio were each able to make their

way to various nearby houses or apartments where the

occupants called police. Responding police officers found

Lopez shaken and in pain. Both he and Rubio were

separately taken by ambulance to Mercy Hospital where they

were treated for their wounds. Lopez told the police

officer who accompanied him to the hospital about meeting

Harris, Flowers and the third man at Mission Beach and the

events that followed. Lopez was treated for two gunshot

wounds, one to his left thigh and the other to his left

buttock, a large scrape on the side of his belly, bruises

on his lips and left cheek, and a laceration on his

forehead. Rubio was admitted to the intensive care unit

where he was treated for a gunshot wound across the right

scalp and a laceration and bleeding around the brain.

“Another responding police officer took Soto for a

ride through some alleys in the area. At the 4600 block of

33rd Street she identified a parked red Mustang as the car

driven by two of the group’s assailants. She was later

interviewed at the hospital by San Diego Police Detective

Thomas Boerum who was in charge of the shooting

investigation. He also separately interviewed Lopez and

Rubio, obtaining further descriptions of the suspects and

versions of the events. Boerum obtained the Mustang’s

license plate number from responding officers and a 7-

Eleven surveillance tape showing Harris in the orange shirt

with two other men, one of whom was Flowers wearing a

maroon outfit. A San Diego State University police officer

who overheard the police radio dispatch describing the

clothing worn by the suspects involved in the shooting had

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contacted the San Diego police officers to tell them about

seeing the suspects at the 7-Eleven earlier that evening

and the surveillance tape.

“Boerum identified the man in the orange shirt on the

surveillance tape as Harris and determined the Mustang was

registered to Harris and his girlfriend. [Flowers was

identified as the man in the burgundy jumpsuit. Boerum]

also determined the pager number Soto had been given on

July 23, 2000 belonged to Harris’s pager. When he later

visited the north alley at 3400 Monroe, he found a watch

near some bushes and recovered three .380 shell casings,

which are rounds fired from a semiautomatic gun, in the

alley.

“In a subsequent search of the apartment Harris had

shared with his girlfriend at 4627 33rd Street, other

police officers found an orange shirt matching the one

Harris wore during the shooting, $260 in a bedroom drawer,

and a large maroon shirt and matching pair of maroon pants.

A red Mustang was found parked at that address. DNA

testing of a blood stain on the shoulder of the orange

shirt revealed it was very likely to be Rubio’s blood and

that a stain on the shirt’s inner collar indicated Harris

had worn the shirt. A blood stain on the middle right side

of the maroon shirt was determined to very likely belong to

Lopez and a stain on the inside collar of the shirt

indicated Flowers had worn it.

“Harris was subsequently arrested in Michigan [on]

October 2002 and returned to San Diego for trial with

Flowers as his codefendant. In addition to the above

evidence being presented at trial, Rubio identified Harris

in court as the person wearing the orange shirt on June 23,

2000, and Flowers as the man in the dark outfit. Lopez

also identified Harris as one of the men who talked with

Soto at Mission Beach that day and identified photographs

of Harris, Flowers and the Mustang as being involved in the

incident. Soto identified Harris in court as the man in

the orange shirt who gave her the marijuana cigar and shot

Rubio and Lopez. She thought Flowers’s hairline was

similar to the man who had been wearing the burgundy suit

that day.

“Soto also testified she never saw an exchange of

marijuana for money while she was in the alley, never saw

a weapon in Flowers’s or the third man’s hands, and never

heard any arguing between anyone in her group and Harris

before he shot Rubio. Neither Lopez or Soto ever saw

Harris with a gun at his waistband and Rubio did not see

Harris lift his shirt to show him the gun at his waistband

before pointing it at him. Although he may have touched

Harris’s forearm while trying to move the gun away from his

head, Rubio testified he never grabbed the gun or struggled

with Harris over it.

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“[Neither Soto nor Lopez saw Harris or Flowers

drinking or carrying a bottle of liquor that night.

Neither codefendant appeared to Rubio to be drunk or

drinking that night.]

“[Although Flowers did not testify or present any

evidence,] Harris testified in his own defense. He

admitted that on July 23, 2000 he was at Mission Beach with

Flowers and another friend, whom he identified as Raymond

Barnes. He also admitted he had met Soto, Lopez and Rubio

there, and he had given Soto his pager number after she

told him she wanted to buy marijuana and was willing to

spend $500. [Harris and his friends had been drinking

cognac in Harris’s car on the way to Mission Beach.

Although he was a bit ‘tipsy,’ he was in control and not

drunk.] A few hours later, Soto paged him and he called

back, making a deal to sell her some marijuana for $560 and

arranging to meet her and her two friends at a 7-Eleven to

consummate the deal. Harris had located the marijuana for

$460 and was going to make $100 profit on the transaction.

[Flowers and Barnes were not with Harris when he made these

calls.]

“After meeting the group at the 7-Eleven, Harris

directed them to a location near a friend’s home where he

was going to pick up the marijuana and also meet Flowers.

On the way there, Harris shared a marijuana cigar with Soto

and Rubio. They did not complain about the quality of the

marijuana. When they arrived at the alley near some

apartments, Harris left the group to collect the marijuana

from his contact. At that point, Harris was not armed with

a gun and had no plans to rob Soto, Lopez and Rubio.

“After obtaining the marijuana, Harris talked with

Flowers, who was accompanied by Barnes, telling them to

watch Soto, Lopez and Rubio because he did not trust them.

When Barnes responded by pulling out a gun, Harris took it

from him and placed it in his waistband to avoid any

trouble. [At that point, Harris was still feeling some

effects of his earlier drinking of the alcohol and thought

Flowers seemed ‘a little more tipsier than [either he or

Barnes, and Flowers did not] seem to be all there.’ Harris

then gave Rubio the marijuana and Rubio gave him $300.

When Harris calmly asked for the other $260 for the deal,

Rubio said the marijuana was only worth $300. As Harris

pocketed the $300, he calmly said, “You know, I’m not bullshitting with you. Give me the rest of my money or give me

the weed back.”

“Harris testified he became angry when Rubio would not

either pay him the additional money or return the

marijuana. Harris then lifted his shirt to display the gun

in his waistband to convince the Arizona group he was not

playing and he wanted the rest of the money or the

marijuana back. Rubio lunged and grabbed at the gun.

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Harris had also grabbed for the gun and Rubio’s hand was on

his hand gripping the gun. Harris pulled the gun out of

his shirt to protect himself. As he struggled for the gun

with Rubio, it fired two shots. When Rubio released the

gun and ran past him, Harris dropped the gun and it went

off a third time as it hit the ground. Harris was

surprised when the gun fired because he did not intend to

pull the trigger or try to shoot Rubio, he was merely

defending himself. Harris also did not see where Lopez was

during the struggle for the gun or see him do anything

after the gun was discharged. Harris denied chasing after

Rubio or Lopez. Rather he immediately returned to the

Mustang with Flowers and Barnes after the gun fired and

drove home. Harris noticed his watch was missing when he

got home and testified it was the watch recovered by

Detective Boerum in the alley behind 3400 Monroe in July

2000.

“On cross-examination, Harris conceded he had not been

threatened by Rubio or Lopez during the incident and that

he had not been afraid [for] his life when he lifted his

shirt to display the gun. Harris also acknowledged he was

not trying to protect either Flowers [sic] Barnes’s life

during the event. Harris claimed only to go for the gun

because Rubio had reached for it.

“A San Diego Police Department supervising criminalist

testified in rebuttal regarding the operation of a

semiautomatic firearm like the one used in this case. He

testified the trigger of the gun must be pulled backwards

each time before it will fire, that if the slide of the gun

were held tightly by two people it would not fire more than

once, and that there is generally not enough force applied

when there is a struggle for a gun for it to discharge.

The criminalist also stated that a .380 semiautomatic as

used here was not “drop sensitive” unless something was

wrong with the gun. He noted that the fact there were

three .380 shell casings found in the alley where the

shooting occurred indicated the gun was properly

functioning.”

(Lodgment No. 6 at 3-11.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 18, 2003, the San Diego County District Attorney

charged Nathan Edward Flowers and Grady Obi Harris with two counts of

attempted murder in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”)

sections 187(a) and 664 (counts one and two), one count of robbery in

violation of Penal Code section 211 (count three), two counts of

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attempted robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 211 and 664

(counts four and five), and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm in violation of Penal Code section 245(b) (counts

six and seven). (Lodgment No. 1 at 0022-29.) The District Attorney

also alleged in the consolidated information that Flowers was

vicariously armed with a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code

section 12022(a)(1), during the commission of the attempted murders,

robbery, and attempted robberies. ( Id.) She also alleged that

Flowers had four prior felony convictions for which he had been denied

probation, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203(e)(4), a

prior conviction for which he served a prison sentence, within the

meaning of Penal Code sections 667(b) and 668, a prior conviction

which was a serious felony, within the meaning of Penal Code sections

667(a)(1), 668 and 1192.7(c), and a prior conviction which constituted

a “strike” under California’s three strikes law, within the meaning

of Penal Code sections 667(b) through (i), 1170.12 and 668. (Id.)

Following a jury trial, Flowers was convicted of all counts

except for the attempted murder charged in count one (victim Ivan

Rubio). (Id. at 0058-66). The jury also found true the allegations

that Flowers had been vicariously armed. (Id.) After a bench trial

following the verdicts, the trial judge found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Flowers had suffered the prior convictions alleged in the

consolidated information. (Id. at 0186.) The judge sentenced Flowers

to twenty-five years and four months in custody. (Id. at 0139-40.)

Flowers appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal

for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment No. 3.)

In an unpublished opinion filed August 26, 2005, the state appellate

court affirmed Flowers’ conviction but, for a variety of reasons,

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reduced his sentence to nineteen years. (Lodgment Nos. 6, 9.)

Flowers filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court,

which that court denied without citation of authority. (Lodgment No.

8.) 

Flowers then filed a habeas corpus petition in the San Diego

Superior Court, which was denied in an unpublished written opinion

on July 24, 2006. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 11.) Thereafter he filed a

habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal, which the

court denied in an unpublished written opinion filed on September 7,

2006. (Lodgment Nos. 12, 13.) Finally, Flowers filed a habeas corpus

petition in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 14.) The

court denied the petition, citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953).

(Lodgment No. 15.)

Flowers filed a habeas corpus Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 in this Court on September 10, 2007 [doc. no. 1]. Respondent

filed an Answer and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of the Answer to the First Amended Petition on April 4, 2008 [doc. no.

13], and Flowers filed a Traverse on May 15, 2008 [doc. no. 16]. 

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,

or a district court shall entertain an application for a

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). As amended, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

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 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

“[The Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] establishes

a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Woodford v. Viscotti , 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). To obtain

federal habeas relief, Flowers must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or

§ 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The

Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003).

In order for a petitioner to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), he or she must

demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state court’s

adjudication rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.

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333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds reviewing the

record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively

unreasonable). This Court will presume that the state court’s factual

findings are correct, and Petitioner may overcome that presumption

only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). A state

court, however, need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving

a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court

decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law.

Id.

B. Analysis

Flowers alleges the following claims in his petition. In claim

one, he argues that his federal due process rights were violated when

the prosecutor knowingly argued false and inadmissible evidence to the

jury. In claim two, he contends his federal due process rights were

violated when insufficient evidence was presented to support his

conviction for the attempted robbery of one of the victims, Danielle

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Soto. Finally, in claim three, he argues that the trial court’s

failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of

attempted voluntary manslaughter violated his Sixth Amendment right

have the jury determine every element of the offense. (See Pet. at

6-9; Pet’rs Ex. B, C.) 

Respondent contends that claim one is procedurally defaulted

because the California Supreme Court invoked the Dixon bar in response

to Flowers’ habeas corpus petition, or, in the alternative, that the

state appellate court’s resolution of the claim was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. ( See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer to Pet. 12-14.) As to

claim two, Respondent argues that the state court’s resolution of the

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. ( Id. at 14-17.) Finally,

Respondent alleges that in claim three, Flowers fails to state a

federal question and, in the alternative, the state court’s resolution

of an “identical claim” was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 17-

19.) 

In his traverse, Flowers contends that claim one is not

procedurally defaulted because the state appellate court addressed the

merits of his claims. (Traverse at 2.) Further, Flowers argues that

the state court’s denial of claim two was based upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts. (Id. at 7-9.) 

1. Improper Argument to the Jury (Claim One)

Flowers claims his due process rights were violated when the

prosecutor referred to false and inadmissible evidence in his closing

argument, namely testimony by a police officer regarding the source

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of money found in Harris’ apartment. Specifically, Flowers claims the

judge sustained an objection to this testimony, directed the jury to

disregard it, and directed the prosecutor not to refer to it in his

closing argument. (Pet. at 6; Pet’rs Ex. C.) 

The facts surrounding this claim are as follows. Officer Donald

Williams, an officer involved in the initial investigation of the

shooting, testified he received a description of a red Mustang thought

to have been involved in the shooting. He discovered a Mustang

matching the description and went to the address listed for the

registered owner, Jamila Carey. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 674-75.)

He spoke to Carey, Harris’ common law wife, and an individual named

Ronald Harris and searched the apartment. (Id. at 676-77.) 

During the search, Williams located clothing which matched the

description of the clothes worn by two of the assailants and two

hundred and sixty dollars in cash. (Id. at 677-84.) The prosecutor

then asked Williams, “Without telling me what [Carey] said, did she

tell you where the money came from,” to which Williams replied, “Grady

Harris.” ( Id. at 686.) Defense counsel objected, and the judge

sustained the objection, struck the testimony from the record and

instructed the jury to disregard it. (Id.) 

In a discussion held outside the presence of the jury during

which defense counsel asked for a mistrial, the judge offered to

admonish the jury again not to consider the testimony and give another

limiting instruction. (Id. at 692-695, 699-706.) Counsel agreed to

write the instruction and the judge agreed to give it. (Id. at 705.)

The judge permitted the prosecutor to argue the “neutral fact that

there was some money found . . . in a drawer, period.” (Id. at 706.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor, referring to the evidence

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supporting Flowers’ guilt, stated that “[t]here was money in Mr.

Grady Harris’ home in close proximity to the clothes that he left

behind when he left San Diego.” (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 7 at 1045.)

In his rebuttal, he also referred to the “$260 in Jamila’s drawer,”

stating that “the guy that stole the wallet and ran with it from the

alley knows how much money was in it because he had it counted later

to divvy it up amongst the three robbers and leave some for his common

law wife Jamila . . . .” (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 7 at 1141.)

Flowers exhausted this claim by raising it in a habeas corpus

petition he filed in the California Supreme Court. (See Lodgment No.

14.) That court denied the claim, citing to In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d

756 (1953). (See Lodgment No. 15; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Answer at

12-13.) 

a. Procedural Default

A habeas petition is procedurally defaulted when the last

reviewing state court dismissed it for failure to comply with a state

rule of procedure. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997); Lambright v.

Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). When the procedural

rule is independent of federal law and adequate to support the

judgment, federal review of the claims is barred unless the petitioner

can demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice

resulting from the alleged constitutional violations, or that failure

to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). Procedural

default is an affirmative defense, and once the respondent has

adequately pled the existence of independent and adequate state

procedural grounds, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts

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to the petitioner. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir

2003). The ultimate burden of proving procedural default, however,

belongs to the respondent. Id.

Respondent asserts that because the California Supreme Court

rejected this claim citing Dixon, the claim is procedurally barred.

(See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Answer at 12-13.) The Dixon bar

prohibits the use of habeas corpus as a substitute for the appeal

process and explains that “in the absence of special circumstances

constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ

will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not,

raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.” Dixon,

41 Cal. 2d at 759. Here, Flowers did not assert this prosecutorial

misconduct argument in his direct appeal (Lodgment Nos. 3, 7), but

merely raised it in his state habeas petition (Lodgment 14).

Respondent argues that the Dixon bar is an adequate and

independent state ground to bar federal review. Mem. of P. & A. in

Supp. Answer at 12-13. “To be deemed adequate, the state law ground

for decision must be ‘well-established and consistently applied.’”

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583; see also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573,

585 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424

(1991)) (“A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to

federal court review if it was ‘firmly established and regularly

followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court”). “For a

state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the

decision must not be interwoven with federal law.” La Crosse v.

Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). “A state law ground is so interwoven

if ‘the state has made application of the procedural bar depend on an

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antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the determination of

whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” Park, 202

F.3d at 1152 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)).

In Bennett, 322 F.3d at 582-83, the Ninth Circuit held that the

Dixon bar was not interwoven with federal law, and as such, is

independent. Moreover, the Court previously has found the Dixon bar

to be adequate. See Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014

(S.D. Cal. 2004); see also Gerardo v. Scribner, 2007 WL 628014, *10

(S.D. Cal. 2007) (finding Dixon rule to be adequate where petitioner

failed to satisfy burden of placing the defense “in issue” after the

state affirmatively pled Dixon procedural bar). Because Respondent

has pled that the state court imposed an adequate and independent

state procedural bar to deny claim one, this Court may not review the

claim unless Flowers demonstrates that the Dixon bar is not an

adequate and independent state ground, or that this Court may somehow

excuse his default. See Wells v. Maas, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.

1994). 

In his Traverse, Flowers states as follows:

Ground One of the petition is not procedurally defaulted as

the California Court of [A]ppeal denied the claim on its

merits in a reasoned denial. This constituted the last

reasoned decision of the state courts. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 803-04 (1991) (unexplained denials by state courts

are not entitled to deference, but are presumed to adopt

the last “reasoned” decision of the lower state court).

The court’s determination that Petitioner’s counsel did not

object and that not argue facts outside of evidence [sic]

constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

(Traverse at 1-2.) While Flowers is correct that Ylst directs federal

courts to “look through” a silent denial to the last reasoned state

court decision as the basis for its analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

the Supreme Court’s decision in this case was not silent. (Lodgment

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No. 15.) The Supreme Court decision cited to Dixon and this citation

must be considered for procedural default allegations. Carter, 385

F.3d at 1197 (one-sentence summary denial of petition incorporating

unelaborated case citation sufficient for procedural default).

Flowers does not provide any other challenge to the adequacy or

independence of the Dixon bar and this Court’s review of the record

and the relevant authorities fails to provide any such support. See

Protsman, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1008, 1014 (finding Dixon bar independent

and adequate). Accordingly, this Court finds that the Dixon bar is

an adequate and independent state procedure barring federal review of

Flower’s first claim. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

b. Cause and Prejudice

In light of Flower’s procedural default, this Court may only

reach the merits of claim one if Flowers can demonstrate either cause

and prejudice, or actual innocence. See Wells, 28 F.3d at 1009.

“‘Cause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be something external

to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to

him....” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (emphasis in original); see also

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991) (explaining that “cause”

requires a showing of some external impediment such as “government

interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for

the claim”). 

Flowers offers nothing in his Petition or Traverse to suggest

there was cause for the default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Nor has

he demonstrated actual prejudice he may have suffered as a result of

the alleged violation of federal law. Id. Indeed, it appears to this

Court that no due process violation occurred because the prosecutor

did not argue false or inadmissible evidence to the jury. The trial

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2

 Respondent also argues the claim fails on the merits because the

California appellate court’s denial of the claim, which Flowers also raised

in a habeas corpus petition he filed in that court, was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

(Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Answer at 13-14.) For the reasons discussed in

this section of the Report and Recommendation (Section IV(B)(1)(b)-(c)), the

Court agrees the claim fails on the merits. Moreover, for the same reasons,

the Court concludes that, contrary to Flowers’ assertion, the state court’s

denial of the claim was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

-18- 07cv1785

court ruled Officer Williams’ testimony that Carey told him Harris was

the source of the money found in Harris’ apartment was inadmissible,

but concluded the simple fact that money was found at Harris’

apartment in close proximity to clothes worn by Harris and Flowers was

relevant and admissible. He also permitted the prosecutor to argue

these facts and the reasonable inferences which could be drawn from

them. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 686, 701, 705-06.) The prosecutor

complied with the court’s ruling, stating in closing argument “[t]here

was money in Mr. Grady Harris’ home in close proximity to the clothes

that he left behind when he left San Diego” and asked the jury on

rebuttal to draw the reasonable inference that the two hundred and

sixty dollars in Carey’s drawer was from Harris. (Lodgment No. 2,

vol. 7 at 1045, 1141.) He did not refer to Williams’ stricken

testimony that Carey told him the money came from Harris.2

c. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Flowers also has failed to demonstrate that failure to consider

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The Supreme Court has limited the

“miscarriage of justice” exception to petitioners who can show that

“a constitutional violation has probably resulted in one who is

actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

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“Actual innocence” means factual innocence, not merely legal

insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable doubt is not enough. See

Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). As discussed above,

the Court concludes that the prosecutor did not commit constitutional

error in his closing argument. Moreover, Flowers has not demonstrated

that he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he has been

convicted.

Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes

that claim one should be DISMISSED as procedurally barred. See

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

2. Sufficiency of Evidence (Claim Two)

Flowers argues that there was insufficient evidence presented

to support his conviction for the attempted robbery of Danielle Soto

because there was no evidence that any demand for money was made of

her and none of the necessary acts to support an attempted robbery

conviction were directed at Soto. (Pet. at 7; Pet’rs Ex. C at 30-46.)

Respondent counters that the state court’s denial of this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 14-17.)

Flowers raised this claim in his petition for review filed in the

California Supreme Court on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 7.) That

court denied the claim without citation of authority. (Lodgment No.

8.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” the state supreme

court’s denial to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for

its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In analyzing this claim, the state appellate court first outlined

the standard of review under California law for a sufficiency of the

evidence claim, stating that the court must determine “whether from

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the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn

therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each

element of the offense charged.” (Lodgment No. at 20, quoting People

v. Crittenden, 9 Cal. 4th 83, 139, fn. 13 (1994)) (internal quotation

marks omitted.) The state court noted that its duty was not to

“reweigh the evidence,” but rather to “simply consider[] whether ‘any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [the

charged offense] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Id., quoting People v.

Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1081 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis in original.) Applying this standard, the court stated as

follows:

With regard to the crime of attempted robbery, we note

that “[r]obbery is the felonious taking of personal

property in the possession of another, from his person or

immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by

means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) An attempt connotes the

intent to accomplish its object. (People v. Smith (1997)

57 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1481.) “The intent or intention is

manifested by the circumstances connected with the

offense.” (§ 21, subd. (a).) In other words, an attempt

to commit the crime of robbery occurs when there is a

specific intent to commit a robbery and a direct but

ineffectual act is done toward its commission. (See § 21,

subd. (a); CALJIC Nos. 9.40, 6.00; People v. Dillon (1983)

34 Cal.3d 441, 452-452.) Although the act required must be

more than mere preparation, showing that the perpetrator is

putting his or her plan into action, it “need not be the

last proximate or ultimate step toward commission of the

[robbery]. [Citation.]” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th

349, 376.) Where the intent to commit the crime is clearly

shown, an act done toward the commission of such crime may

be sufficient for an attempt even though it would be

insufficient if the intent is not as clearly shown.

(People v. Staples (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 61, 68.) An intent

to rob may be proved by inferences from all of the

circumstances of the case. (People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110

Cal.App.3d 858, 863 (Vizcarra).)

Here, the record before the jury, viewed in accordance

with the above rules, showed Soto was the person who

initiated the drug transaction by first contacting Harris

who was with Flowers and another man at Mission Beach,

obtaining Harris’s pager number, having it written on her

arm, and then later paging Harris from her friend’s house.

When the first attempt to meet failed, Soto, together with

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Lopez and Rubio, again paged Harris to arrange a different

meeting place. When Harris did meet the group, Flowers and

the other man were nearby in a separate car which they

drove to an alley where Harris directed the Arizona group

to drive to after being assured they were not “cops” and

they did not have any guns. On the way, Soto smoked a

marijuana cigar with Harris.

Once in the alley, Harris told Lopez, as Rubio and

Soto waited next to Lopez at their car, to have the money

ready when he returned with the marijuana. Although Soto

was sitting in the car when Harris returned and approached

the group with Flowers and the other man, he had no

marijuana. Rather he announced he was “gonna quit

bullshitting,” pulled out a gun, pointed it toward Lopez

and Rubio who were standing in front of the car, and

demanded all their money. Hearing and seeing this, Soto

became frightened, and when the events began to quickly

unfold with Harris shooting at Rubio and Flowers attacking

Lopez and also demanding money, she managed to run from the

area.

Based on these facts, the jury could reasonably find

that Flowers, as well as Harris, intended to rob the group

from Arizona, including Soto. In addition to being

instructed on robbery (CALJIC No. 9.40), aiding and

abetting robbery (CALJIC No. 9.40.1) and the specific

intent and fear necessary for a robbery (CALJIC Nos.

9.40.2, 9.41), the jury was also instructed with CALJIC No.

6.00, which told it that:

“An attempt to commit a crime consists of two

elements, namely a specific intent to commit the

crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done

toward its commission. In determining whether

this act was done, it is necessary to distinguish

between mere preparation, on the one hand, and

the actual commencement of the doing of the

criminal deed, on the other. Mere preparation,

which may consist of planning the offenses or of

devising, obtaining or arranging the means for

its commission, is not sufficient to constitute

an attempt. However, acts of a person who

intends to commit a crime will constitute an

attempt where those act[s] clearly indicate a

certain, unambiguous intent to commit that

specific crime. These acts must be an immediate

step in the present execution of the criminal

design, the progress of which would be completed

unless interrupted by some circumstance not

intended in the original design.”

Applying these instructions to the facts, the jury could

have reasonably inferred that but for Soto’s escape,

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because she had been lured to the alley along with Rubio

and Lopez by the prospect of buying marijuana from Harris

and his friends and was in close proximity to them when

Harris, Flowers, and the other man forcibly took money from

Rubio then attempted to do so from Lopez, that Flowers

along with Harris and the other man also intended to

forcefully take money or property from Soto.

Contrary to Flowers’s argument there was no evidence

Soto was a victim of an attempted robbery because she was

not chased and there was no testimony of any direct acts by

him, Harris or the other man to take property from her, it

is not necessary that the gun be directly pointed at her or

that a demand for her money or property be made because the

circumstances here showed the attempted robbery of Soto had

not yet progressed to that point. (See Vizcarra, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 863.) Because the evidence revealed

Flowers, Harris and the other man clearly intended to rob

the group of its money and committed more than mere

preparation in doing so when they confronted Rubio and

Lopez directly in front of the car in which Soto was

sitting, a jury could reasonably find that a robbery of

Soto would have taken place but for her escape, an event

which interrupted Harris’s original plan in which Flowers

and the other man aided and abetted. Thus the trial court

properly denied Flowers’s section 1118.1 motion with regard

to the attempted robbery of Soto and the evidence is

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 20-24.)

In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Supreme

Court has stated that “‘the relevant question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979)). In determining whether sufficient evidence has been

presented, the Court must accept the elements of the crime as defined

by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n. 16.

The standard by which the state court adjudicated Flowers’

sufficiency of the evidence claim is essentially the same as that

stated in Jackson. Accordingly, the state court’s denial was not

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“contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams,

529 U.S. at 412; Early, 537 U.S. at 8. 

The state court’s denial of the claim also was not an

unreasonable application of Juan H. and Jackson. As the state court

noted, robbery is defined in California as “the felonious taking of

personal property in the possession of another, from his person or

immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of

force or fear.” (Cal. Penal Code § 211) (West 2008). Further, “[a]n

attempt to commit a crime is comprised of ‘two elements: a specific

intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done

toward its commission.’” People v. Medina, 41 Cal. 4th 685, 681 (2007)

(quoting Cal. Penal Code §§ 21a, 664.) “Other than forming the

requisite criminal intent, a defendant need not commit an element of

the underlying offense.” Id. at 682 (citing People v. Superior Court

(Docker), 41 Cal. 4th 1 (2007); People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 453-

54 (1983); People v. Jones, 75 Cal. App. 4th 616, 627 (1999).)

The leading California case on the question whether a defendant

can be convicted of attempted robbery when he does not actually come

in contact with the victim is People v. Bonner, 80 Cal. App. 4th 759

(2000). In Bonner, the defendant, a former employee of a hotel, knew

the manager and assistant manager took cash and checks from the week’s

business to the bank and walked a particular route through the hotel’s

garage. Using this information, Bonner planned to rob the manager and

assistant, but was interrupted by other employees while waiting in the

garage for the manager and assistant manager to pass by. Id. at 761-

62. Bonner was convicted of attempted robbery of both the manager and

assistant manager. On appeal, he argued he could only be convicted

of one count of attempted robbery because until he was in the actual

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presence of the victims, it was impossible to determine how many

people he would have attempted to rob. Id. at 764-65. 

The California court rejected the notion that Bonner could not

be convicted of two counts of attempted robbery because he was not in

proximity to either of the victims. The court concluded there was

sufficient evidence that Bonner planned to rob two victims and took

steps beyond mere preparation to accomplish those robberies. The fact

that some intervening event prevented him from accessing his victims

did not change those facts. “Multiple counts of attempt can arise

from a single act which goes beyond mere preparation” so long as there

is sufficient evidence the defendant had multiple purposes. Id. at

766-67. 

In the present case, as the state court found, the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient

to lead a “‘rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements

of [the attempted robbery of Soto] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Juan

H., 408 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Harris lured

all three victims into the alley where Flowers and another man were

waiting. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 4 at 350-55.) Harris had a

conversation with Flowers and the other man just before Harris

returned, pointed a gun at Rubio and Lopez them and demanded their

money. (Id. at 364-69.) After Harris shot Rubio, Flowers began

hitting Lopez, and Harris later shot him. (Id. at 372.) Lopez began

to run away and Flowers chased him. (Id. at 375.) Soto witnessed

these events from the driver’s seat where she was sitting. (Lodgment

No. 2, vol. 3 at 226.) When she saw the flashes from the gun muzzle,

she got out of the car and ran. (Id. at 235.)

A jury could reasonably infer from these facts that Harris and

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 The jury acquitted Flowers of the attempted murder of Rubio. ( See

Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0058.)

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Flowers had the multiple purpose of robbing Rubio, Lopez and Soto but

that, like the defendant in Bonner, the plan with respect to Soto was

thwarted when she ran away. As evidenced by their attack on both

Rubio and Lopez and their demand of money from both, neither Harris

nor Flowers was sure who had the drug money. (See Lodgment No. 2,

vol. 4 at 363-64; vol. 4 at 537.) They also did not know that Soto,

as she testified, did not have any money. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 3 at

249.) Since the obvious purpose of Harris’ and Flowers’ attack was

to obtain money and/or valuables, there is no logical reason why they

would rob Rubio and Lopez but would not rob Soto of any money or

valuable she possessed had she not run away.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the state

court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Flowers is not entitled to relief as

to this claim.

3. Jury Instruction Error (Claim Three)

Finally, Flowers alleges the trial court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to have a jury determine every element of an offense

when it failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included

offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter of Lopez.3 (Pet. at 8;

Pet’rs Ex. B at 19-40.) Respondent argues Flowers has not stated a

cognizable federal claim and, in the alternative, the state court’s

denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 17-

29.)

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a. Failure to Present a Cognizable Federal Claim 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim under § 2254,

a state prisoner must allege both that he is in custody pursuant to

a “judgment of a State court,” and that he is in custody in “violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Moreover, district courts have a duty to

liberally construe pro se filings. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015,

1020 (9th Cir. 2001). Flowers is in custody and he clearly alleges

that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s

actions. Accordingly, Respondent’s claim that Flowers does not state

a cognizable federal claim is without merit.

b. Merits

Flowers raised this claim in his petition for review filed in the

California Supreme Court, which that court denied without citation to

authority. (See Lodgment Nos. 7, 8.) Accordingly, this Court must

“look through” to the California appellate court’s opinion denying the

claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

Stating that under both California and United States Supreme Court law

the trial court must sua sponte instruct on a lesser included offense

“only if there is substantial evidence to raise a question as to

whether all of the elements of the charged offense are present,” the

state court concluded that Flowers was not entitled to an instruction

on attempted voluntary manslaughter of Lopez. (Lodgment No. 6 at 12-

14, citing Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982).) According to

the state court, in California, voluntary manslaughter may arise from

either an act of unreasonable self-defense or a killing during a

sudden quarrel or a heat of passion. (See Lodgment No. 6 at 14-15.)

Flowers contended in state court, as he does here, that the trial

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court should have instructed the jury on attempted voluntary

manslaughter of Lopez under either theory. (See Pet. at 8; Pet’rs.

Ex. B at 18-40.) In analyzing Flowers’ claim, the state court wrote:

A. Heat of Passion

Flowers argues he was entitled to an instruction on

the heat of passion and sudden quarrel theory of attempted

voluntary manslaughter because there was ample evidence his

codefendant Harris’s passions were aroused by a sudden

quarrel over the marijuana transaction and Rubio’s

aggressive and provocative act of reaching for the gun at

Harris’s waistband. We disagree.

“An intentional, unlawful [attempted] homicide is

‘upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion’ [citation], and

thus is [attempted] voluntary manslaughter [citation], if

the [attempted] killer’s reason was actually obscured as a

result of a strong passion aroused by a ‘provocation’

sufficient to cause an ‘“ordinary [person] of average

disposition . . . to act rashly or without due deliberation

and reflection, and from this passion rather than from

judgment.”’ [Citations.]” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at

p. 163.) To satisfy the objective or reasonable person

element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the

accused’s heat of passion must be due to sufficient

provocation by the victim. (People v. Steele (2002) 27

Cal.4th 1230, 1253.) Slight provocation is not sufficient

to reduce an attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

(People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1732.)

In this case there was no evidence of provocation by

Lopez, and Flowers does not allege any provocative act by

him. Rather, Flowers claims Rubio provided the provocative

act by grabbing for the gun in Harris’s waistband when it

was displayed to him after the group refused to either pay

Harris more money or return the marijuana. Although the

testimony of one witness can constitute substantial

evidence requiring the court to instruct on its own

initiative (Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 646), we cannot

find on this record that Harris’s testimony provided such

substantial evidence. Even under Harris’s version of the

events which are relied upon by Flowers, there was no

sudden quarrel when Harris “calmly” asked the group for the

extra money or marijuana back. Moreover, Harris was the

initial aggressor, threatening Rubio and Lopez with the

gun. The only evidence that there was a struggle for the

gun was Harris’s statements that Rubio reached for the gun

and had his hand on Harris’s hand when Harris pulled out

the gun. We do not believe Rubio’s act of attempting to

avoid injury from the gun meets the standard required of a

provocative act by the victim Lopez which would reduce an

attempted murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter. Nor

does the fact that Lopez fought back when attacked by

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Flowers as he demanded money provide the provocation.

Accordingly, no substantial evidence supported a voluntary

manslaughter instruction based on heat of passion or sudden

quarrel with regard to the count 2 attempted murder of

Lopez.

B. Imperfect or Unreasonable Self-Defense

Relying on Viramontes, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1256,

Flowers additionally argues that as a matter of law the

record contains substantial evidence to support an

attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction based on

imperfect or unreasonable self-defense because it contained

evidence sufficient to warrant instructions on selfdefense. His argument is similar to the one made by the

defendant in People v. Rodriguez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250

which was rejected because it was purely a legal one, no

request for the instruction had been made, and there was no

evidence to support “a theory of an honest but unreasonable

belief in the need to kill in self-defense.” (Id. at p.

1272.) Although Flowers’s codefendant Harris testified he

pulled the gun to protect himself from Rubio reaching for

it, his testimony does not provide any support for selfdefense or imperfect self-defense instructions as to Lopez.

Even if such testimony arguably showed Harris believed he

had a need to defend himself against Rubio, there was no

evidence either Harris or Flowers unreasonably believed in

the need to defend themselves against Lopez.

Flowers’s reliance on Viramontes is misplaced. The

court in Viramontes noted the subjective elements of selfdefense and imperfect self-defense are the same because a

defendant “must actually believe in the need to defend

himself against imminent peril to life or great bodily

injury” and concluded “if the evidence is sufficient to

support instruction on self-defense, it is also sufficient

to support an instruction on imperfect self-defense.

[Citations.]” (Viramontes, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp.

1262-1263.) However, the court also evaluated the evidence

in the record which showed there was sufficient evidence to

support the giving of both perfect and imperfect selfdefense instructions. (Id. at pp. 1263-1264.) Such is not

true in this case.

Neither Harris nor Flowers requested the jury be

instructed on unreasonable or imperfect self-defense. Nor

has Flowers cited any evidence in the record that would

support unreasonable self-defense as to Lopez. According

to his codefendant’s testimony, Harris was not threatened

by Lopez and did not see him or know what he was doing

during the struggle for the gun with Rubio. Nor was there

any evidence that Lopez made any threats or actions toward

Harris or Flowers before he was attacked by Flowers while

Harris was shooting at Rubio. As Rubio ran from the area,

Harris shot two or more times at Lopez whom Flowers had

wrestled to the ground. Lopez only acted defensively to

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escape without suffering further injury during the

encounter. The mere fact the trial court decided to give

the series of self-defense instructions over the

prosecutor’s objection, does not provide substantial

evidence to instruct sua sponte on unreasonable selfdefense with regard to the attempted murder of Lopez.

There was simply no evidence from which the jury could

infer that Flowers or his codefendant Harris unreasonably

believed they had to defend themselves against Lopez. No

instructional error is shown.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 16-19.)

There is no clearly established Supreme Court law which requires

a trial court to instruct on a lesser included offense in non-capital

cases. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000); Turner

v. Marshall, 63 Fl.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1995) (overruled on other

grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999) (en

banc)). Flowers cannot obtain federal habeas relief on this claim in

the absence of clearly established Supreme Court law. See Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, __, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006). 

In the context of a trial court’s failure to give an instruction

on a theory of the defense, however, the Ninth Circuit has noted that

“[u]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal

prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental

fairness . . . [which] require that criminal defendants be afforded

a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Bradley v.

Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mathews v.

United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) and California v. Trombetta, 467

U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Thus, a “‘[f]ailure to instruct on the defense

theory of the case is reversible error if the theory is legally sound

and evidence in the case makes it applicable.’” Clark v. Brown, 450

F.3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beardslee v. Woodford, 358

F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004)); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929

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(9th Cir. 2000); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984)

(stating that “[a] criminal defendant is entitled to adequate

instructions on his or her theory of defense”) (quoting James v.

Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976).) However, the Supreme Court

has recognized “that due process requires that a lesser included

offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an

instruction.” Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (emphasis in

original). 

The prosecution contended that Flowers was guilty of the

attempted murder of Lopez because Flowers aided and abetted Harris in

the robbery or attempted robbery of Lopez, the natural and probable

consequence of which was the attempted murder of Lopez. (See Lodgment

No. 1, Supp. Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1 at 0028-32.) Thus, the extent of

Flowers’ liability depended to a large degree on what the jury

concluded as to Harris’ liability. Harris testified he displayed the

gun to Rubio in an attempt to convince Rubio to pay Harris the correct

amount of money for the marijuana, Rubio grabbed the gun, and they

struggled over it. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 6 at 806-18.) Rubio was

shot accidentally during the struggle and Lopez was shot when the gun

hit the ground and went off. (Id. at 814-19.) Flowers’ defense was

threefold. First, he contended that he did not aid and abet a robbery

because he, like Harris, only intended to participate in a marijuana

sale. Second, Flowers claimed that even if Harris intended to rob the

victims, Flowers was too intoxicated to form the appropriate intent

to aid and abet. Third, Flowers contended that he did not know Harris

had the gun. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 7 at 1062-80.) 

Given Harris’ testimony, there was not sufficient evidence to

support an instruction on a heat of passion defense with regard to

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Lopez. Harris did not testify he shot Lopez as a result of a

provocation or sudden quarrel. Rather, he testified that Lopez was

shot accidentally when Rubio grabbed for the gun, they struggled, the

gun hit the ground and it discharged, hitting Lopez. (Lodgment No.

2, vol. 6 at 808-19.) Rubio’s alleged provocative act of reaching for

the gun cannot be imputed to Lopez. 

Similarly, although the jury was instructed on self defense,

Harris did not testify that he shot Lopez in a honest but unreasonable

belief in the need to defense himself or Flowers. Indeed, according

to Harris, Lopez was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time when

the gun dropped during his struggle with Rubio and accidentally shot

Lopez. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 6 at 806-18.) Moreover, as the state

court noted, there was no testimony establishing Lopez did anything

to Harris or Flowers which required them to defend themselves with

lethal force. (Id. at 819.) Only Rubio was alleged to have done so

when he reached for the gun in Harris’ waistband. As the state court

correctly found, this is not sufficient to support an attempted

voluntary manslaughter instruction. Accordingly, Flowers’ Sixth

Amendment right to have the jury decide every element of the offense

was not violated by the failure to give an attempted voluntary

manslaughter instruction. See Hopper, 456 U.S. at 611.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the state

court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Flowers is not entitled to relief as to

this claim. 

/ / /

/ / /

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting

this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be

entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 15, 2008, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than September

5, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 25, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO:

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND UNREPRESENTED PARTIES

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