Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01037/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Steve Hutchinson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Marquee Fiduciary Advisors, LLC, a 

Minnesota limited liability company, 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01037-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Marquee Fiduciary Advisors’ Motion to 

File and Retroactively Accept Notice of Removal on May 17, 2013. (Doc. 6.) For the 

reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied. Plaintiff Steve Hutchinson’s Motion to 

Remand, (Doc. 10), is therefore granted and Marquee’s Motion for Expedited 

Consideration, (Doc. 7), is denied as moot. 

BACKGROUND 

 On April 12, 2013, Hutchinson filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior 

Court against Marquee. (Doc. 6 at 1.) Marquee was served via certified mail on April 18, 

2013. (Id.) On May 17, 2013, Marquee attempted to electronically file Notice of 

Removal. (Id.) Marquee submitted payment for the filing through the federal court 

system, (id. (Gonzales Aff.) ¶ 7), filed a Notice of Filing of Notice of Removal in state 

court, (id. ¶ 12), and mailed Hutchinson copies of the Removal Documents and Notice of 

Filing Notice of Removal, (id. ¶ 14). Although Marquee did attempt to e-file its Notice of 

Removal on May 17, it failed to successfully complete the filing, but only successfully 

accomplished paying the filing fee.1

 On May 21, Marquee received a voicemail from the 

 

1

 The record is unclear as to whether the filing was unsuccessful due to operator error or technological error. (Doc. 6 at 9.) 

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court clerk notifying her that her electronic filing had not been completed. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Marquee then re-uploaded the documents on May 21, 2013, one day after the Filing 

Deadline for removal. (Doc. 6 at 2.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), notice of removal “shall be filed within thirty days 

after the receipt by the defendant.” This time limit is strictly construed against removal. 

See U.S. ex rel. Walker v. Gunn, 511 F.2d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[time for 

removal] is imperative and mandatory, must be strictly complied with, and is to be 

narrowly construed”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 849. 

 In certain circumstances, however, a filing can be “constructively filed” before 

the statutory deadline even if actual filing occurs after the deadline. See Cintron v. Union 

Pacific R. Col., 813 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 1987) (accepting a complaint after the statute 

of limitations had run because the original timely complaint was denied by the clerk of 

the court for violating local rules). The Ninth Circuit has held that “a complaint is filed 

when it is placed in the actual or constructive custody of the clerk of the court, despite 

any subsequent rejection by the clerk of the pleading for noncompliance with a provision 

of the local rules.” United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 

1986). The allowance for constructive filing prevents local rules from acquiring 

jurisdictional significance. See Smith v. Frank, 923 F.2d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(recognizing that “[s]uch an interpretation would give the local rule an impermissible 

jurisdictional character”). 

The doctrine of constructive filing appeared in a removal setting in GBJ, Ltd. v. 

Redman, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (2007). There, the clerk of the court rejected physical 

filing of Notice of Removal because a local rule required electronic filing. Id. at 1000. 

The defendant then filed electronically the next day. Id. at 1000–01. The court held that 

defendant constructively filed the notice by placing it “in the actual or constructive 

custody of the clerk of the court, despite any subsequent rejection by the clerk” and 

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accepted it as timely. Id. at 1001 (citing Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d at 1395). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 A. Constructive Filing 

 Marquee had until Monday, May 20, 2013 to timely file Notice of Removal. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); (Doc. 6 (Gonzales Aff.) ¶ 6.) This filing deadline is mandatory 

and cannot be extended by the Court. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 

1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979) (observing that “[t]he removal jurisdiction of the federal 

courts is derived entirely from the statutory authorization of Congress”).

 The Notice of Removal was not filed, officially or otherwise, until May 21, 2013, 

after the deadline had passed. The Notice was never placed in the actual or constructive 

custody of the clerk of the court at any time before May 21. Constructive custody occurs 

when “a complaint . . . arrives in the custody of the clerk within the statutory period but 

fails to conform with formal requirements in local rules.” Loya v. Desert Sands Unified 

Sch. Dist., 721 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1983). Unlike Cintron and Redman, in which a 

filing was presented to the clerk of the court and subsequently rejected for violation of a 

local rule, Marquee’s Notice of Removal was never presented to, nor rejected by, the 

clerk of the court. No filing was ever received by the court. The Notice of Filing Notice 

of Removal that Marquee submitted in state court and its payment of the fee in this Court 

do not amount to a filing of the Notice with the clerk, a critical fact that distinguishes this 

case from Cintron and Redman. Moreover, Cintron and Redman rested on the notion that 

a mere local rule should not acquire jurisdictional significance. Had Marquee avowed 

that it had followed all necessary procedures and actually submitted the Notice of 

Removal, only to be thwarted by a fault in the Court’s electronic filing system, there may 

have been grounds to apply the constructive filing doctrine. The situation would look 

much closer to Cintron and Redman because the documents would, for all practical 

purposes, have been transmitted to the Court and the error would be attributable to the 

Court rather than to Marquee. But Marquee does not provide facts sufficient to make 

such a determination. There can be little doubt that Marquee intended to file the notice on 

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May 17 in light of Marquee’s other actions. But Marquee’s failure to see the filing 

through to its completion is not adequate grounds on which it can invoke the constructive 

filing doctrine. 

 B. Strict Construction in Favor of State Court Jurisdiction 

 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) states unequivocally that any Notice of Removal must be 

filed thirty days after receipt of initial pleading by the defendant. Any doubt arising from 

the interpretation of that time requirement must be strictly construed against removal. See 

U.S. ex rel. Walker, 511 F.2d at 1026. Accepting an untimely filing because of unusual 

circumstances in this instance runs afoul of the principle of strict construction. 

CONCLUSION 

 Marquee did not timely file its Notice of Removal. Because no such filing was 

ever timely submitted to the court, the doctrine of constructive filing is inapplicable. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Marquee’s Motion to File and 

Retroactively Accept Notice of Removal on May 17, 2013, (Doc. 6), is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hutchinson’s Motion to Remand, (Doc. 10), 

is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand this matter back to the Maricopa 

County Superior Court and terminate this action. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Marquee’s Motion for Expedited 

Consideration, (Doc. 7), is DENIED as moot. 

Dated this 29th day of July, 2013. 

 

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