Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02478/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02478-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL M. SOARES,

CDCR #F-39579,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BONNIE DUMANIS; JESUS 

RODRIQUEZ; RICK CLABBY; 

SUMMER STEPHAN

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-2478-CAB-RBB

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 12]

AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

Manuel M. Soares (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and incarcerated at the 

California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”) located in Stockton, California, has filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff did not prepay the 

$400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but instead, filed a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2).

/ / /

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the Plaintiff is a prisoner2at the 

time of filing, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the 

entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. 

Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and 

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & 

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

2

 For purposes of the IFP statute, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in 

any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 

violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions or parole, probation, pretrial 

release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). 

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custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has also submitted a copy of his CDCR 

Inmate Statement Report showing his available balance and trust account activity at 

CHCF. See ECF No. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d 

at 1119. This statement shows that Plaintiff had an available balance of zero at the time 

of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 7. Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner 

be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 

partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his 

designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

If a prisoner’s complaint “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity,” the Court “shall review” the pleading “as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” and “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, 

if [it] . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2014). 

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Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his Complaint is subject to a sua sponte 

review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune 

from such relief,” regardless of whether he seeks redress from a “governmental entity.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) 

(pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the 

court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or 

appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 

complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

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allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On August 18, 2016, Plaintiff claims that he wrote a letter to then San Diego 

District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis “regarding evidence of criminal tampering and fraud 

in Plaintiff’s criminal conviction.” (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff admits that he is not “actually 

innocent” but appears to allege that there was fraud during his criminal proceedings that 

led to a longer sentence imposed on him. (Id.) In this letter Plaintiff wrote “I did what I 

did but did not do the excessive damage that was depicted to the jury at trial.” (Id., Ex. 1, 

correspondence dated Aug. 18, 2016).

On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiff received a “response back from the Office of the 

District Attorney’s Conviction Review Unit” indicating that they had received his 

application. (Id. at 7.) On April 23, 2017, Plaintiff wrote to “Defendant Jesus 

Rodriquez” providing “additional information and evidence.” (Id.) 

On June 15, 2017, Plaintiff received a response from the “Conviction Review 

Unit” indicating that they “decline[d] to further investigate your claim of innocence at 

this time.” (Id., Ex. 3, correspondence dated June 15, 2017). Plaintiff was informed that 

his application did not qualify for “conviction review by our unit.” (Id.) Plaintiff wrote a 

response to the “Conviction Review Unit” on June 21, 2017 disputing the findings made 

in the June 15, 2017 letter. (Id., Ex. 3, correspondence dated June 21, 2017.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff wrote “I am imprisoned based on a conviction secured by false 

evidence within which a crime scene was compromised and ‘tampered’.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

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wrote an additional letter on October 24, 2017 notifying the District Attorney’s office that 

he was intending to “seek civil action against you and your offices if this issue is not 

properly addressed and investigated.” (Id., Ex. 5, correspondence dated Oct. 24, 2017.)

On November 15, 2017, the “Conviction Review Unit” wrote to Plaintiff indicating 

that they had “completed its review of [Plaintiff’s] letter dated October 24, 2017” and 

informed him that they “still decline any further investigation of your claim.” (Id., Ex. 5, 

correspondence dated Nov. 15, 2017.) Again, they found that Plaintiff did not “provide 

credible and verifiable evidence of innocence.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the “Conviction Review Unit had constructive knowledge of 

evidence in their possession that fraud was committed and through their custom, policy or 

practice did nothing to properly investigate or address any of the information or questions 

presented and submitted for review.” (Id. at 10.) 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order compelling the “Conviction 

Review Unit to investigate and address this evidence,” as well as compensatory and 

punitive damages.” (Id. at 18.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 

789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of any “right secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States” whatsoever. See West, 487 U.S. at 48

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). He may not rely on § 1983 as an independent, substantive 

claim. See Cholla v. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“[O]ne cannot go into court and claim a ‘violation of § 1983’--for § 1983 by itself does 

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not protect anyone against anything.” Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 

U.S. 600, 617 (1979). “Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the 

vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental officials.” Henderson 

v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit fails if 

he does not allege a plausible violation of his federal constitutional or statutory rights. 

Cholla, 382 F.3d at 978; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] [§1983] plaintiff must plead that 

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.”).

Second, while Plaintiff claims that he is not seeking relief in the form of a 

determination of “actual innocence,” he is seeking monetary damages against Defendants 

based on claims that he is “imprisoned based on a conviction secured by false evidence.” 

(Compl., Ex. 3.) Plaintiff further claims the “Defendant City of San Diego3 under color 

of law created and maintains an official practice and/or custom of failing to adequately 

investigate, address, train, monitor and supervise employees.” (Id. at 16.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted 

because he has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a plausible claim of municipal 

liability on behalf of the City or County of San Diego, and because he seeks monetary 

damages based on criminal convictions which he does not further allege have already 

been invalidated. 

While the City or County of San Diego may be considered a “person” properly 

subject to suit under § 1983, see Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978); Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016), local 

governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-83). They are not vicariously liable 

 

3

 While Plaintiff refers to the “City of San Diego” as a Defendant, there are no other factual allegations 

pertaining to the City of San Diego found in his Complaint. Rather, Plaintiff is seeking monetary 

damages against various individuals who are alleged to be employed by the Office of the District 

Attorney for the County of San Diego.

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under § 1983 for their employees’ actions. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“A municipality 

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”); Board of Comm’rs of 

Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (collecting cases); Miranda v. Clark 

County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[R]espondeat superior and 

vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.”).

Therefore, Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under 

§ 1983 must allege that “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury. 

Monell, 436 U.S., at 691, 694; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61 (2011). To state 

a claim under Monell, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right 

of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 

‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the 

policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By & Through 

Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 389-91(1989)). A policy is “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action 

... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for 

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. at 1477 

(quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481).

As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which 

“might plausibly suggest” that the City or County of San Diego was responsible for his 

imprisonment “based on a conviction secured by false evidence,” that it did so pursuant 

to a municipal custom, policy, or practice implemented or promulgated with deliberate 

indifference to his constitutional rights, or that any custom, policy, or practice was the 

“moving force” or cause of any injury he claims to have suffered. See Hernandez v. 

County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards 

to Monell claims); Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff 

merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality . . . [t]he plaintiff 

must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the 

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‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal 

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a causal 

link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”).

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against the City or County based 

on his prolonged current term of incarceration, he may not pursue those claims in a civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has 

already been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that 

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so 

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Id. at 486-87. 

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 

not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 

2003), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of 

habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on what he claims was false evidence

presented during his criminal proceedings, his claims amount to an attack on the validity 

of his underlying criminal conviction, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless 

that conviction has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 

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F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted 

available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. 

at 489.4

If Plaintiff were to succeed in showing that he was wrongfully convicted or his 

sentence was lengthened based on false evidence, an award of damages would 

“necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction and/or sentence. Id.; see also 

Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding § 1983 action stemming 

from allegations of wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and a general conspiracy of 

“bad behavior” among officials in connection with the plaintiff’s arrest, prosecution, and 

incarceration were barred by Heck).

Finally, as prosecutors Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. 

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Where a prosecutor acts as an 

advocate ‘in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case,’ absolute 

immunity applies.” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)); see also

Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Prosecutors performing 

their official prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute immunity against 

constitutional torts.”).

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief against 

immune defendants, and that it therefore must be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 

/ / /

/ / /

 

4 The Court notes that “while California statutory law gives a county some authority to 

oversee a district attorney’s conduct, it expressly excludes conduct related to the 

investigation and prosecution of crimes, giving that authority instead to the [State] Attorney 

General.” Weiner v. San Diego Cty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing CAL.

GOV’T CODE §§ 26303 & 12550).

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III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 22).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted and for seeking monetary damages from immune defendants 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and DENIES leave to amend as futile. See 

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend is not required if 

it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous, and 

therefore not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2018

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