Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02362/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02362-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD W. SINGSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. MARRERO, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 10CV2362-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PORTIONS OF

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[ECF No. 34]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge William Q.

Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff, Ronald W. Singson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed this civil rights suit against Defendants Scott Kernan, George Neotti, D.R. Morris, E. Marrero,

Brandt, W. Norman, Ivy Choo, Arnold Schwarzenegger, W. Suglich, L. Romero, J. Clark Kelso,

and Seeley. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by the Court with leave to amend

on January 12, 2011 for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. ECF No. 4. On

March 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6 ("FAC")] against the same

Defendants and on April 11, 2011, the Court dismissed every Defendant but E. Marrero and W.

Suglich ("Defendants"). ECF No. 7. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the FAC on December 14,

2011. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 1, 2012. [ECF No. 29] and, in an order

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dated August 6, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend and denied Defendants'

motion to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to refile pending Plaintiff's response to the

order. ECF No. 32. On November 14, 2012, the Court issued an order noting that Plaintiff failed

to file a second amended complaint and deeming the FAC to be the operative pleading in this

matter. ECF No. 33. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC on November 26, 2012

[ECF No. 34-1 ("MTD")] and Plaintiff opposed the motion on January 8, 2013 [ECF No. 37

("Oppo.")]. Defendants filed a reply on January 15, 2013. ECF No. 38 ("Reply"). Plaintiff filed

a request for judicial notice on January 25, 2013. ECF No. 39.

 This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 (d)(1). ECF No. 35. The Court has considered

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition,

Defendants’ Reply, Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, and all supporting documents submitted

by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical care claim and request

for injunctive relief be GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and

unusual punishment continue. 

BACKGROUND

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

as true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson

v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). According to the complaint, Plaintiff was housed in

lower tier cell housing in unit 12 until May 7, 2009, when Defendant Marrero moved Plaintiff to

an upper tier cell in unit 13. FAC at 3. Plaintiff objected to being moved but was told by

Defendant Marrero that he would be placed in AD-SEG "if [he] continued to disobey a direct

order and would likely be placed on the top tier in AD-SEG." Id. Plaintiff was moved to the top

tier where he struggled with his "mobility and visual impairments while navigating the stairs

daily." Id. 

On May 25, 2009, after the evening meal release, Plaintiff fell on the stairs and injured

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himself. Id. Despite the fact that Correctional Officer M. Rosales called an emergency transport

vehicle, Plaintiff was not permitted to go to the hospital. Id. When he attempted to walk to the

TTA (the prison emergency room, see MTD at 3.), after being ordered to do so, Plaintiff was

stopped by Officer W. Norman. Id. Plaintiff was not seen by a doctor until the following day. 

Id. After seeing the doctor, Plaintiff was issued another lower tier order which was communicated to the prison staff. Id. Despite this, Plaintiff was forced to remain in the upper tier. 

Plaintiff reached out to Defendant Suglich for assistance in getting moved to the lower tier, but

Defendant Suglich "refused to honor the doctors [sic] orders and also threatened to place

[Plaintiff] in AD-SEG if [he] refused to remain on the upper tier." Id. Plaintiff was prescribed

morphine as a result of his fall and anticipates that he "will likely suffer from [his] injuries for the

rest of [his] life." Id.

On June 23, 2009, Plaintiff again fell on the stairs in housing unit 13 "and severely injured

[himself]." Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied immediate medical treatment "to keep

captain W. Suglich from causing a major disturbance." Id. Plaintiff again was prevented from

going to the TTA, but he was seen by Registered Nurse Mallory in the facility clinic. Id. That

evening Plaintiff was returned to his cell and moved to the lower tier. Id. On July 2, 2009,

Plaintiff went to the TTA where he had his left wrist x-rayed and received Tylenol to alleviate his

pain. Id. On January 25, 2011, Plaintiff underwent surgery on his right shoulder "to attempt to

repair the damage [he] suffered falling on the stairs." Id. Since Plaintiff's first fall in May 2009,

he has been on Morphine, Neurotin, Elavil and Ibuprofen to manage his pain and he "will likely

remain on some type of pain management regiment for the remainder of [his] life." Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "acted under color of the law, committing the neglectful

and malicious actions towards [Plaintiff] depriving [him] of his right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment." Id. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00, punitive

damages in the amount of $100,000.00 per Defendant, money for "any and all related medical

care," and injunctive relief preventing "retaliation, reprisals, and harassment from all staff,

officers, and administrative persons employed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, such as:

verbal harassment; retaliatory transfer; placement in administrative segregation on bogus

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charges or investigations retaliatory cell searches; confiscation of personal property; tampering

of mail." Id. at 6. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that portions of Plaintiff's FAC should be dismissed because Plaintiff

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD at 1. Specifically, Defendants

explain that Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical care claim should be dismissed because

Plaintiff "does not allege Defendants personally participated in the alleged deprivation." Id. at

2. Defendants also "seek to dismiss Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief because he seeks to

enjoin tangential, speculative conduct by everyone at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility." Id.

Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ arguments and claims he has cured all of the defects in his original

complaint and that since his complaint was screened by the Court, he has made a prima facie

case that should survive the motion to dismiss. Oppo. at 1. Additionally, Plaintiff states that the

injunctive relief is necessary because his "mail and correspondence with this court are regularly

interrupted and the destruction of his Second Amended Complaint demonstrates that they will

stop at nothing to frustrate [Plaintiff's] attempt to prosecute this action." Id. at 1-3.

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to medical care claim and

request for injunctive relief under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. MTD at 6. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does

not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether

he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d

750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must set forth

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"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’" Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the facts alleged in the complaint are

"merely consistent with" the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied the plausibility

standard. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, "[a] claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007);

Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. This rule of liberal construction is “particularly important” in civil

rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007) (citing

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and

Twombly did not alter the Court’s treatment of pro se filings; accordingly we continue to construe

pro se filings liberally.” This is particularly important where the Petitioner is a pro se prisoner

litigant in a civil rights matter). When giving liberal construction to a pro se civil rights complaint,

however, the court is not permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Easter v. CDC, 694 F. Supp.2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. March 9, 2010) (quoting Ivey

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268).

The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint "unless the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "before dismissing a pro

se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his

complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Wayne

v. Leal, 2009 WL 2406299, *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (quoting Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261).

///

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B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT - DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Plaintiff’s complaint lists two counts (one against each Defendant) of cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment stemming from his claim that despite being

aware that Plantiff needed to be housed in a lower tier cell due to his medical conditions,

Defendants moved him to an upper tier cell, resulting in multiple falls by Plaintiff that caused

serious injury. FAC at 3-4. In addition to the cruel and unusual punishment claims, the

sufficiency of which Defendants do not challenge1

, Defendants read Plaintiff’s complaint as

containing an additional claim against each defendant for deliberate indifference to the medical

care Plaintiff received after each fall. MTD at 7. Defendants base this additional claim on the

portions of Plantiff’s complaint which state that (1) Defendants “set[] in motion ‘a series of acts

by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury,” (2) Plantiff’s treatment was delayed “in an attempt to keep [C]aptain W.

Suglich from causing a major disturbance,” and (3) Plaintiff suffered a “lengthy and painful” oneand-a-half year wait for shoulder surgery. Id.

Even with liberal construal, the Court does not read the complaint as alleging a claim for

deliberate indifference to medical care based upon the care Plaintiff received after his falls. The

Court notes that Plaintiff did clearly raise this claim in his original complaint where he described

his claims as "[d]enial of medical care and the right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment" and named various nurses and doctors as defendants. In contrast, in the FAC,

Plaintiff describes his claims as "freedom from cruel and unusual punishment" and does not

explicitly state or even imply that he was denied adequate medical care by either Defendant

Marrero or Defendant Suglich, the only two defendants left in the case. ECF No. 1 at 5-10 and

FAC at 3-4. However, to the extent Defendants are correct and Plaintiff is making a claim of

deliberate indifference to the medical care provided after his falls,2

 Plaintiff fails to sufficiently

1Defendants refer to this claim as an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to humane

conditions of confinement. MTD at 7.

2To clarify, the Court finds that Defendants have not challenged the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegation that

his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants’ individual failures to provide Plaintiff with a lower tier

assignment. This claim, whether it is called a condition of confinement, deliberate indifference, or cruel and unusual

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plead the claim for the reasons discussed below.

A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Clement, 298

F.3d at 904. There is both an objective and a subjective component to an Eighth Amendment

violation. Id. The objective component generally is satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges facts

to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to treat [the]

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.” Id.; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The subjective component requires the prisoner to allege facts showing a culpable mental

state, specifically, “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The indifference must be

substantial, and inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

Indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” 

Tracey v. Sacramento County Sheriff, 2008 WL 154607, *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) (quoting

Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“Mere delay of medical treatment, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of

deliberate medical indifference.” Robinson v. Catlett, 725 F. Supp.2d 1203, 1208 (S.D. Cal. July

19, 2012) (quoting Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985)). To state a claim for deliberate indifference arising from a delay in treatment, a prisoner

must allege that the delay was harmful, although an allegation of substantial harm is not

punishment, is not being challenged at this time and will proceed forward. The rest of this Report and

Recommendation addresses only the potential allegation that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants Marrero and Suglich

unconstitutionally interfered with the medical care Plaintiff received after his falls.

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required. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds

by, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). Factual allegations indicating that

the official “sat idly by as [the prisoner] was seriously injured despite the defendant’s ability to

prevent the injury” or that the official “repeatedly failed to treat an inmate properly ... strongly

suggests that the defendant’s actions were motivated by ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s

medical needs.” Id. at 1060-61. “In sum, the more serious the medical needs of the prisoner,

and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those needs, the more likely it is

that a plaintiff has established “deliberate indifference” on the part of the defendant.” Id. at

1061. Isolated incidents relative to a plaintiff's overall treatment suggest no deliberate

indifference. Id. at 1060.

1. Objective Requirement

Plaintiff satisfies the objective prong of the test for an Eighth Amendment violation. A

"serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Nawabi v. Wyatt, 2009 WL

3514849, *7 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 2009) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 at 104). In considering the

seriousness of an alleged medical need, courts should consider whether (1) a reasonable doctor

would think that the condition is worthy of comment or treatment; (2) the condition significantly

affects the prisoner's daily activities; and (3) the condition is chronic and accompanied by

substantial pain. Id. (citing Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 at 546 n. 3) (9th Cir. 1994). 

Here, the Court must accept as true that Plaintiff fell down the stairs on two separate

occasions and suffered serious injuries that will require him to remain on a pain management

regiment of Morphine, Ibuprofen, Neurotin, and Elavil for the remainder of his life. FAC at 3-4. 

In addition, as a result of the falls, Plaintiff had to endure intense pain for over a year until

surgery was performed on his right shoulder. Id. A reasonable doctor is likely to think that pain

sustained after falling down a set of stairs and that results in the need for shoulder surgery is

worthy of comment or treatment. Plaintiff does not allege that his daily activities were affected

by the falls, but he does allege that the injuries have resulted in chronic and substantial pain. 

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Id. Under these facts, Plaintiff states a plausible allegation of a “serious illness or injury.”3

Brown v. Cassim, 2008 WL 1990864, *9 (C.D. Cal. March 25, 2008) (finding that plaintiff

adequately alleged the existence of a “serious medical need” where plaintiff had an order for a

lower tier bunk and was an insulin dependant diabetic who suffered from deteriorating vision,

degenerative disc disease and was under the influence of psychotropic medication and fell down

the stairs after being assigned to an upper bunk. And, where because of the fall, plaintiff

suffered injuries to his lower back, hip, shoulder, left arm and a broken thumb); see also West

v. Pettigrew, 2013 WL 85380, * 2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (stating “Plaintiff's allegations that a

medical doctor issued a chrono for plaintiff to be housed in a lower bunk due to a back condition,

and that he was instead housed on an upper bunk, are sufficient to meet the first prong of his

Eighth Amendment claim”).

2. Subjective Requirement

a. Defendant Marrero

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Marrero was deliberately indifferent to

a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff resulting from his medical care after his falls. While

Plaintiff alleges that he was not permitted to go to the hospital after falling on the stairs in May

2009, and that he was not seen by a doctor until the following day, he does not allege that it was

Defendant Marrero who prevented him from going to the hospital or that Defendant Marrero was

in any way involved in that decision. FAC at 3. Along those same lines, Plaintiff alleges that he

was stopped from visiting the TTA by Officer Norman, but does not allege that Defendant

Merrero had anything to do with this alleged denial of medical care. Id. In fact, Plaintiff does

not allege that Defendant Marrero had any involvement in his medical care.4

 Id. at 3-4. Even

viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, these allegations do not establish that Defendant

Marrero was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety with regard to

3Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff's injuries constitute a serious medical need. MTD & Reply.

4In contrast, Plaintiff does allege that Defendant Marrero was responsible for the decision not to permit

Plaintiff to reside on a lower tier. FAC at 3.

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Plaintiff’s medical care or that Defendant Marrero interfered with or delayed Plaintiff’s medical

care in any way. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to medical care against Defendant Marrero be

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

5

b. Defendant Suglich

Plaintiff also has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Suglich was deliberately indifferent

to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff with regard to Plaintiff’s medical care. Again,

Plaintiff does allege that Defendant Suglich refused to honor the doctors’ orders and threatened

to place him in the AD-SEG unit “if [he] refused to remain on the upper tier in housing unit 13,”

but does not allege that Defedant Suglich interfered in any way with the quality of Plaintiff’s

medical care. Id. at 3. With regard to his medical care, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered another

fall on June 23, 2009 “after seeking relief [of a lower tier assignment] from [C]aptain W. Suglich”

 and that he was “denied immediate medical treatment in an attempt to keep [Defendant] W.

Suglich from causing a major disturbance.” Id. at 4. However, Plaintiff does not provide any

support or explanation for this second statement. Id. As a result, it is unclear whether Plaintiff

is alleging that Defendant Suglich denied the medical treatment or that another person made the

decision, allegedly in order to avoid a disturbance from Defendant Suglich. As with his first fall,

Plaintiff again alleges that he was not permitted to visit the TTA after his June fall, but he does

not allege that Defendant Suglich prohibited the visit or was involved in the denial decision in any

way. Id. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to endure an approximately year-and-ahalf long “lengthy and painful wait” to receive surgery on his right shoulder in January 2011. Id.

However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Suglich played any part in determining when

his surgery took place. Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that Defendant Suglich was aware of and

5The Court recommends that the dismissal be without leave to amend because the Court does not believe

that Plaintiff is alleging in the FAC that the Defendants are responsible for any failures in Plaintiff’s medical care after

the falls. To the extent Plaintiff is making such an allegation, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because this is

Plaintiff’s second attempt to allege the violation and there do not appear to be any facts that would support this claim. 

See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861; Wayne, 2009 WL 2406299, *3.

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disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety with regard to his medical care after the falls

or interfered in any with Plaintiff’s medical care after the falls. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to medical

care against Defendant Suglich be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

6

C. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief to prevent "retaliation, reprisals, and harassment from

all staff, officers, and administrative persons employed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, such

as: verbal harassment; retaliatory transfer; placement in administrative segregation on bogus

charges or investigations retaliatory cell searches; confiscation of personal property; tampering

of mail." FAC at 6. Defendants respond that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief should be

dismissed "because he seeks to enjoin tangential, speculative conduct by everyone at R.J.

Donovan Correctional Facility." MTD at 2.

The Eleventh Amendment does permit "suits for prospective injunctive relief against state

officials acting in violation of federal law." Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437

(2004). However, injunctive relief is available if there is a "real or immediate threat that the

plaintiff will be wronged again." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). 

Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate only when "irreparable injury" is threatened. Id. To

establish irreparable injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate a "real or immediate threat that the[y]

will be wronged again-a 'likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury." Id. "A state

law enforcement agency may be enjoined from committing constitutional violations where there

is proof that officers within the agency have engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct." 

Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Thomas v. County of Los

Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)); and Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1048 (9th Cir.

1998) ("Injunctive relief is appropriate in cases involving challenges to government policies

resulting in a pattern of constitutional violations").

The standard for injunctive relief must be considered in conjunction with the Prison

6The Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend for the same reasons as the Defendant Marrero

recommendation. See fn 5.

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Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). Under the PLRA, the court must find that the prospective relief

is "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,"

before granting injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1); see also Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1128-9. 

Additionally, the court must give "substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or

the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief." Id. at 1129 (citing Oluwa v.

Gomez, 133 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)) (holding that

Congress explicitly prescribed section 3626's reach to include pending cases).7

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants threatened to retaliate against him by placing

him in AD-SEG if he refused to remain in the upper tier. FAC at 3. Plaintiff also claims that

members of the prison staff have retaliated against him by regularly interrupting his mail and

correspondence and by destroying his Second Amended Complaint "to frustrate his attempts to

prosecute this action." Oppo at 3. However, Plaintiff has not alleged that there is a “real or

immediate threat that [he] will be wronged again.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111; see Jones v. Dovery,

2008 WL 733468, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008) (adopting the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief after finding

that “Plaintiff has not alleged that an irreparable injury is threatened, or provided any proof that

Defendants have engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct.”). Plaintiff is no longer housed

in the upper tier [FAC at 4] so there is no immediate threat with respect to being moved to

AD-SEG for failing to stay in upper tier housing, and while Plaintiff states that his mail is being

tampered with, he does not provide any support for his statement or claim that he has had any

problems receiving the Court's orders or Defendant's briefing in this case. Second, Plaintiff has

not alleged facts establishing a pattern, plan or policy to harass, threaten, punish or retaliate

against Plaintiff in connection with his requests for relief. Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978

7The PLRA provides, in relevant part: Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions

shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.

The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,

extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact

on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 

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F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[P]laintiff’s eventual burden in obtaining a permanent

injunction...is to establish more than repeated incidents of misconduct...[Plantiff must establish]

not merely misconduct, but a pervasive pattern of misconduct reflecting departmental policy.”);

see also Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court is

not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”). 

In addition, Plaintiff must establish standing for his claim for relief which includes showing

that "he is under threat of suffering an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized [and that]

the threat [is] actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical [and] fairly traceable to

challenged conduct of the defendant. Lopez v. Cate, 2013 WL 239097, *13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22,

2013) (citing Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) and Mayfield v. United

States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff has not demonstrated how his request for

an injunction against retaliatory cell searches and confiscation of personal property relates to the

challenged conduct of the Defendants where Plaintiff has not alleged or made any reference to

having his cell searched or property confiscated in retaliation for his desire for lower tier housing

or his lawsuit. Also, the alleged wrongs - refusal to grant Plaintiff a cell with an available lower

bunk and denial of medical care - have already taken place and were remedied more than three

years ago. FAC at 4 and MTD at 8. Plaintiff does not allege that he has had any problems with

being house in the lower tier since he was moved there on June 23, 2009 or been threatened

with being moved. Moreover, applicable law already prohibits Defendants from retaliating

against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment right to court access. See Lytle v. Wondrash,

182 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (confirming that individuals have clearly established right

to be free from retaliation for exercising First Amendment right of access to the courts).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

request for injunctive relief be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2)

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GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical care

claim and request for injunctive relief for failure to state a claim. Only Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment against both defendants remains. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than March 29, 2013. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than April 12, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: March 8, 2013

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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