Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01115/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01115-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SENGNUEN KOULAVONGSA, 

Petitioner,

v. 

W. SMITH, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 16cv1115 JLS (NLS) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Dkt. No. 6] 

Sengnuen Koulavongsa (“Petitioner”) pleaded guilty in a California trial court to 

five criminal counts. Lodgment 2 Vol. 2 at 5-6. More than two years later, Petitioner, an 

inmate proceeding pro se, filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. First Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus [FAP]. Petitioner seeks federal 

habeas relief on the ground that he was coerced into pleading guilty because his counsel 

failed to challenge the allegedly tampered-with DNA evidence. Id. at 6, 15. Respondent 

filed an answer to this Petition, and argues that Petitioner fails to demonstrate how his 

guilty plea was involuntary through ineffective assistance of counsel. Resp’t Mem. of P. 

& A at 3. The traverse was due October 12 but as of the date of this order, no traverse has 

been filed. 

/ / / 

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This Court reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s answer, and all supporting 

documents. After a thorough review, this Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the 

relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. The Conviction 

The San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed an information with five counts 

against Petitioner for these crimes: (1) evading an officer with reckless driving; (2) 

unlawful driving of a vehicle; (3) receiving a stolen vehicle; (4) receiving stolen property; 

and (5) possession of a blank check with intent to defraud. Lodgment 1 at 6-8. 

On June 19, 2014, Petitioner appeared before the trial court at the plea hearing. 

Lodgment 2 Vol. 2. Petitioner had signed a written plea agreement that indicated he read 

and understood the consequences of his guilty plea. Lodgment 1 at 28, ¶16. Above 

Petitioner’s signature on the plea agreement, Petitioner initialed a box that read, “I am 

entering my plea freely and voluntarily, without fear or threat to me or anyone closely 

related to me.” Id. at 26, ¶ 3. The court even asked Petitioner whether he was “entering 

this plea freely and voluntarily.” Lodgment 2 Vol. 2 at 9-10. Petitioner stated on the 

record, “[y]es, your Honor.” Id. at 9. 

During the plea hearing, the court recounted the events that gave rise to the charges 

against Petitioner and inquired whether he was satisfied with his attorney’s 

representation. Id. at 9-11. Petitioner responded with a “yeah,” and indicated on his plea 

agreement that his attorney explained to him the consequences of pleading guilty. Id.; 

Lodgment 1 at 27, ¶7f. The court accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea. Lodgment 2 Vol. 2 at 

13-14. 

At the sentencing hearing on August 21, 2014, Petitioner told the court he had 

“been framed.” Lodgment 2 Vol. 3 at 16-17. Petitioner wrote the court a letter saying that 

he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. Id. at 16. The court conducted 

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a Marsden hearing,1

 and denied his request for new counsel. See id. at 34-35. The court 

sentenced Petitioner to seven years and four months in state prison. Id. at 38-40. 

On October 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Lodgment 3 at 7. 

Petitioner argued that his felony forgery conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor 

under Proposition 47. Id. at 9. The California Court of Appeal advised Petitioner to seek 

relief on his forgery conviction in the state superior court. Lodgment 5. Petitioner did not 

seek review. Resp’t Mem. of P. & A at 2. 

B. Petitions for Collateral Review 

On June 9, 2015, while Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, he constructively 

filed a habeas petition in the San Diego Superior Court. Lodgment 6. Petitioner raised the 

same claim presented in this Petition for ineffective assistance of counsel on the failure to 

challenge DNA evidence. Id. at 3. The trial court denied the petition because it lacked 

jurisdiction to enter a decision while his criminal appeal was still pending. Lodgment at 

2. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to allege his claim with sufficient particularity and the 

petition was unintelligible. Id. 

Petitioner then filed a habeas petition with the same claim in the California Court 

of Appeal. Lodgment 8 at 3. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the 

petition based on procedural grounds. See Lodgment 9. Petitioner filed another habeas 

petition with the California Supreme Court. Lodgment 10. As in his two previous 

petitions, Petitioner raised the same claim. Id. at 3. The California Supreme Court denied 

the petition as meritless. Lodgment 11. 

On June 17, 2016, Petitioner filed the Petition now before this court. Petitioner 

seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that he was coerced into pleading guilty after 

his attorney failed to challenge the DNA evidence. FAP at 6, 15. Respondent filed an 

answer, arguing the Petition is barred due to Petitioner’s guilty plea, and that Petitioner 

                                               

1 See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). 

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fails to show how his guilty plea was involuntary through ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Resp’t Mem. of P. & A. at 3. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996 governs 

this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court 

will not grant a habeas petition with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in 

state court, unless that adjudication was (1) contrary to or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). 

To determine whether a state court “unreasonably applied” Supreme Court law or 

“unreasonably determined” the facts, this Court reviews the last reasoned state court 

decision on the merits. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). When 

no state court provides a reasoned decision on the merits, this Court must independently 

review the record. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Himes v. 

Thomspon, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that an independent review of 

the record is the only basis to see whether a silent state court decision is objectively 

reasonable). 

A summary denial of petitioner’s claim is presumed to be a denial on the merits. 

See Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1126 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a petition for 

failure to state a prima facie case constitutes a denial on the merits (citing In re Clark, 5 

Cal. 4th 750, 769 (1993))). While conducting an independent review of the record, the 

federal court cannot analyze just what the state court did when it issued a summary 

denial; it must review the state court record to determine whether there was any 

“reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Ritcher, 562 U.S. 86, 

98 (2011). 

Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s claim as meritless. See

Lodgment 11. No state court gave a reasoned opinion in denying Petitioner’s claim, as 

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the California Court of Appeal summarily denied it as untimely and on procedural 

grounds. Lodgment 9 at 1. Therefore, this Court will conduct an independent review. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner argues that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 

on two grounds: (1) failure to object to DNA evidence; and (2) coercion to take the guilty 

plea. FAP at 6, 15. 

A. Counsel’s Failure to Object to DNA Evidence 

Here, Petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to “challenge the fabrication of 

criminal liability [from the] San Diego County Sheriff Department.” FAP at 36. 

Petitioner asserts that he was unable “to be assisted effectively in the pursuit of an 

evidentiary hearing regarding fraud-wise obtained evidence to provoke conviction.” Id.

Respondent however, argues that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for 

failure to challenge the DNA evidence is barred under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 

(1973). Resp’t Mem. of P. & A at 3. 

In Tollett, the Court held that a guilty plea forfeits an accused’s right to raise 

claims of constitutional deprivation that occurred prior to the entry of a guilty plea. 

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. The Court reasoned that a “guilty plea represents a break in the 

chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Id. In other words, a 

defendant who pleads guilty cannot attack the plea based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel that arose before the plea bargain. See id. at 269. Accordingly, Petitioner may 

only challenge the voluntariness and intelligent nature behind the guilty plea. See id.; see 

also Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 131 (2011) (finding claims alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea creates uncertainty when there is no 

extended formal record and no actual history to show how the charges would have played 

out because hindsight and second-guesses are inappropriate). 

As described above, Petitioner’s claim is based on counsel’s failure to challenge 

the DNA evidence. But it challenges counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance that arose 

before the plea bargain. Such a claim is barred under Tollett. 

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Further, even if this claim was not barred under Tollett, Petitioner’s claim is vague 

and conclusory. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[i]t is wellsettled that ‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific 

facts do not warrant habeas relief.” (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 

1994))). Petitioner says his trial counsel failed to “challenge the fabrication of criminal 

liability [from the] San Diego County Sheriff Department” when they “forcefully 

obtained my DNA in order to place at crime scene.” FAP at 35-36. Yet, Petitioner fails to 

explain what favorable evidence would have been discovered or how challenging the 

DNA evidence would have resulted in a different outcome. Petitioner does not allege 

where he was at the time that the crime allegedly occurred. He fails to disclose an alibi or 

identify specific locations that his trial counsel should have investigated to show that the 

DNA evidence was in fact tampered with. Without showing what additional evidence 

would have been discovered, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any probability that he would 

have insisted on going to trial rather than plead guilty. Such conclusory allegations are 

insufficient to show how there was ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Because Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to 

challenge the DNA evidence is barred under Tollett, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

this claim be DENIED. 

B. Coercion to Plead Guilty 

Here, Petitioner raises a related claim that his guilty plea was invalid because his 

trial attorney had “no interest of finality of judgment infringing upon his 6th Amendment 

[right].” FAP at 6. Petitioner asserts that there was “coercion to plead guilty before 

exercising [his] 6th Amendment right to a fair trial, preparing with the approach to view 

the validity of the evidentiary process.” Id.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to effective assistance of counsel. See 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To establish an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must show: (1) counsel’s performance fell below 

an “objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) the 

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deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel’s error must be so 

serious that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart 

v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). In assessing counsel’s performance, the court 

employs a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised 

reasonable professional judgment. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The court’s review of counsel’s performance is “doubly 

deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas.” Yarborough, 540 

U.S. at 6. 

Plea negotiations are a “critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 

373 (2010). A guilty plea obtained through coercion is involuntary. See Brady v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970); but see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 

(1977) (holding that a defendant’s representation at a plea hearing, as well as any 

findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constituted a “formidable barrier in any 

subsequent collateral proceedings”); see Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 437 

(1983) (holding that a plea is presumed valid in habeas proceeding when the pleading 

defendant was represented by counsel). 

When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during a plea process, 

the two-part test in Strickland applies. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 (2008). 

The prejudice requirement “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 

performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985). Therefore, Petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 

trial.” Id.; see also Blackledge at 73-74 (finding “solemn declarations in open court carry 

a strong presumption of verity.”); Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(finding petitioner’s statements at the “plea colloquy carr[ied] a strong presumption of the 

truth.”). 

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As described in the facts, there was a full and complete colloquy between the trial 

court and Petitioner at the time he entered his guilty plea. See Lodgment 2 Vol. 2. 

Petitioner stated that he wished to plead guilty to the charges against him. Id. at 9. By 

pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial, right to confront his accusers, 

and right against self-incrimination. Lodgment 1 at 26, ¶6a-6e. Petitioner specifically 

confirmed to the judge that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Lodgment 

2 Vol. 2 at 9. Petitioner had also initialed each relevant section of the plea form, 

including the paragraph that indicated he was offering his plea “freely and voluntarily, 

without fear or threat to me or anyone closely related to me.” Lodgment 1 at 26, ¶3. 

Based on Petitioner’s representation in open court, the trial court found Petitioner made a 

“knowing, intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, knowing the ramifications of the 

plea.” Lodgment 2 Vol. 2 at 13. 

The record reveals nothing to support Petitioner’s claim that his attorney coerced 

him to plead guilty. Petitioner’s statements on the record unequivocally demonstrate the 

intelligent and voluntary nature behind his plea. Furthermore, aside from failing to show 

how his guilty plea was involuntary, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how counsel’s 

allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his case. Petitioner fails to show that he might 

have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot show or 

even explain how there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s actions, he 

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 

 Therefore, after a review of the entire record, especially in light of the transcript at 

the plea hearing, this Court concludes that Petitioner has not met his burden to show how 

his guilty plea was coerced. Even if Petitioner insisted on going to trial, it is unlikely that 

Petitioner would have been acquitted, or if convicted, he would have received a lesser 

sentence. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60 (holding that there is no prejudice in cases where 

assuming the defendant had not taken the advice to plead guilty, the likelihood remains 

low that the trial or sentencing outcome would have changed). 

/ / / 

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For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim and this Court RECOMMENDS that the district judge DENY it. 

IV. Conclusion 

For these reasons, this court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED in its 

entirety. This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is 

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 17, 2016, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections must be filed with 

the court and served on all parties no later than November 30, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 27, 2016 

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