Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-04720/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-04720-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LEE ROBINS, JR., 

Plaintiff,

 v.

A.A. LAMARQUE, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. C 02-4720 JF (PR)

PARTIAL DISMISSAL

ORDER; ORDER OF

SERVICE 

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written order.

The Court initially ordered Plaintiff to file a notice of his current address and whether he wished

to continue to pursue the claims set forth in his complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a notice of

intent to prosecute. The Court will review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, dismiss

one of Plaintiff’s claims and order service of the complaint as to the remaining claims on the

named Defendants. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) prison employees refused to

allow him to attend religious services. Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim and was only allowed to

attend religious services once between August 1, 2001 and October 14, 2001. Plaintiff contends

**Original filed 4/27/07**

Case 5:02-cv-04720-JF Document 17 Filed 04/27/07 Page 1 of 11
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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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that he was denied religious services through April 17, 2002, when he was placed in

administrative segregation in retaliation for his filing administrative grievances against the

prison. See Complaint at 3-3(B). 

On September 21, 2001, the SVSP Facility D yard was placed on lockdown status after a

“white on white” inmate incident. All inmate cells were searched after this incident. On

October 6, 2001, a retaliatory and discriminatory strip search of only Muslim inmates occurred

after the “white on white” inmate incident. Correctional Officers Melendez and Sergeant

Traynham stated that they were only strip searching Muslim inmates by order of Lieutenant

Wilson and supervising staff, including Warden Lamarque. Plaintiff contends that the strip

searches amounted to harassment for the Muslim inmates, who have a mandated right to modesty

based upon their Muslim faith. Plaintiff states that no other religious group was subjected to this

willful misconduct. See Complaint at 3(B). 

On October 11, 2001, a third unreasonable search was conducted on Muslim inmates

only. Plaintiff was shackled on his way to and from the prison library, medical appointments,

and the showers, solely based on his Muslim faith. After the Facility D yard lookdown status

was removed, Plaintiff remained under lockdown and confined with no yard time for over six

weeks. Plaintiff contends that Muslim inmates at SVSP were placed on twenty-four hour

lockdown status without notice or a hearing, deprived of all liberty interests, rights and

privileges, based upon their faith. See Complaint at 3(B)-3(C). 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise

of religion, his Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches, his Eighth

Amendment right forbidding cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process and equal protection under the law. Plaintiff names Defendants A.A.

Lamarque, SVSP Warden; W.J. Wilson, SVSP Correctional Lieutenant; K. Traynham, SVSP

Correctional Officer; and M. Melendez, SVSP Correctional Officer in his complaint. Plaintiff

seeks compensatory and punitive monetary damages. See Complaint at 2-3, 4. 

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To state a claim a plaintiff must show a specific

constitutional or federal guarantee safeguarding the interests that have been invaded. Paul v.

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 

1. Free Exercise of Religion

In order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant burdened

the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith,

without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). To reach the level of a constitutional violation, “the

interference with one’s practice of religion ‘must be more than an inconvenience; the burden

must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious

doctrine.’” Id. at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Plaintiff claims that he was prohibited from attending Muslim religious services. From

August 1, 2001 through April 17, 2002, Plaintiff alleges that he was allowed to attend only one

religious service. Liberally construed, this claim states a cognizable claim for the violation of

his free exercise of religion. The Court will order service of this claim on the named Defendants. 

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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2. Fourth Amendment 

There is no legitimate subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his

prison cell and, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches

does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-

26 (1984). The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot

be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions. 

See id. at 526. However, this does not mean that a prisoner is without remedy for maliciously

motivated searches or calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. The Eighth Amendment

always stands as a protection against cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 528-30.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that he was subject to unreasonable cell searches in

violation of the Fourth Amendment is not cognizable under § 1983. The Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim based upon unreasonable cell searches without leave to

amend. The Court will address Plaintiff’s claim concerning cell searches and strip searches of

Muslim inmates, as set forth below. 

3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993). In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment places

restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. 

See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The Amendment also imposes duties on these

officials, who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989);

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

sufficiently serious, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, see id. (citing

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997); Rutledge v. Arizona

Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S.

719 (1983). However, harassment coupled with conduct implicating the Eighth Amendment’s

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment may indeed present a claim cognizable under

§ 1983. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528-30 (1984) (malicious cell searches and

calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs may implicate Eighth Amendment’s protection

against cruel and unusual punishment).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants strip searched Muslim inmates and subjected only 

Muslim inmates to two additional cell searches. Plaintiff states that Correctional Officers

Melendez and Sergeant Traynham stated that they were only strip searching Muslim inmates by

order of Lieutenant Wilson and supervising staff, including Warden Lamarque. Plaintiff claims

that he was shackled when transported throughout the prison. Plaintiff maintains that he and

other Muslim inmates were detained in lockdown and confined for over six months without any

notice or hearing. Liberally construed, Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable Eighth Amendment

claim of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court will order service of this claim on the named

Defendants.

4. Due Process

Allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in connection with the decision

to administratively segregate him present a constitutionally cognizable claim if: (1) prison

officials are narrowly restricted by state statutes or regulations to impose the specific deprivation

at play, for example, an indeterminate term of segregation in the SHU, and (2) the liberty in

question is one of “real substance.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-487 (1995). A liberty

interest of “real substance” generally will be limited to freedom from (1) restraint that imposes

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life,” id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at

487. The hardship associated with administrative segregation, such as loss of recreational and

rehabilitative programs or confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of time, is not so severe

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 1While a hearing held within 72 hours of segregation constitutes a “reasonable time,” it is

unsettled whether due process would tolerate a more lengthy delay. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at

1100 n.20. 

 2

While a prisoner’s attendance at an administrative segregation hearing is potentially “more

useful,” it is not constitutionally required. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983). 

 3

The official charged with deciding to place an inmate in administrative segregation must be

the official to whom the inmate presents his views. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800,

803 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 874 (1991).

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as to violate the Due Process Clause itself. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92

(9th Cir. 1986) (applying Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069

(1987).

California statutes and prison regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to

administratively segregate prisoners. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1098. In Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 223-25 (2005), the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s indefinite placement in a

“supermax” facility, where they are not eligible for parole consideration, imposes an “atypical

and significant hardship within the correctional context.” Because indefinite placement in

California’s SHU generally renders inmates ineligible for parole consideration, it appears that

California prisoners also have a liberty interest in not being placed indefinitely in the SHU. 

Accord id. at 224-25 (necessity of harsh conditions in light of danger that high-risk inmates pose

to prison officials and other inmates does not diminish conclusion that conditions rise to a liberty

interest in their avoidance).

In Toussaint v. McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit held that when prison officials initially

determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for administrative reasons due process requires

that they comply with the following procedures: (1) they must hold an informal nonadversary

hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated,1

 (2) the prisoner must be

informed of the charges against him or the reasons segregation is being considered, and (3) the

prisoner must be allowed to present his views. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100.2 3

 Due process

does not require detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counselsubstitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, a written decision describing the reasons for

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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placing the prisoner in administrative segregation or disclosure of the identity of any person

providing information leading to placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation. See id.

at 1100-01. Accord Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228-29 (determining that prisoners are

constitutionally entitled only to the informal, non-adversary procedures set forth in Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460 (1983), prior to assignment to “supermax” facility).

Plaintiff alleges that he and other Muslim inmates were held for over six months in

twenty-four hour confinement without notice or a hearing. The Muslim inmates were deprived

of liberty interests, rights and privileges based on their faith. Liberally construed, plaintiff has

alleged a cognizable due process claim for Defendants’ actions in not complying with the

procedural protections due based upon Plaintiff’s placement and detention in administrative

confinement. The Court will order service of this claim on the named Defendants. 

5. Equal Protection

When challenging his treatment with regard to other prisoners, courts have held that in

order to present an equal protection claim a prisoner must allege that his treatment is invidiously

dissimilar to that received by other inmates. More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir.

1993) (absent evidence of invidious discrimination, federal courts should defer to judgment of

prison officials); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that an inmate who is an adherent of a minority

religion be afforded a “reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the

opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts,” Cruz v.

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (Buddhist prisoners must be given opportunity to pursue faith

comparable to that given Christian prisoners), as long as the inmate’s religious needs are

balanced against the reasonable penological goals of the prison, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,

482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). See Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff claims that he was prevented from attending Muslim religious services by SVSP

prison officials. Plaintiff also alleges that he and other Muslim inmates were subject to strip

searches, cell searches, shackling, and twenty-four hour confinement. 

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Liberally construed, Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable equal protection claim for Defendants’

failure to allow him to attend religious services and for subjecting him to dissimilar treatment in

comparison with non-Muslim inmates. The Court will order service of this claim on the named

Defendants. 

 CONCLUSION 

1. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, copies of the complaint in this matter (docket no. 1), all attachments

thereto, and copies of this order on Defendants A.A. Lamarque, SVSP Warden; W.J. Wilson,

SVSP Correctional Lieutenant; K. Traynham, SVSP Correctional Officer; and M. Melendez,

SVSP Correctional Officer. The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, Defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or shall notify the Court that

Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion. The motion

shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendants are of the opinion that this

case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the

date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date Defendants’ motion

is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if

granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show

that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding party opposing

summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the

granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff is also advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end his case, albeit without prejudice. 

Plaintiff must “develop a record” and present it in his opposition in order to dispute any “factual

record” presented by the defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants,

or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

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document to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel.

4. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

and the parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16-1 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

4/27/07

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A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following:

Robert Lee Robins, Jr.

42837 Alep Street

Lancaster, CA 93536

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