Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01595/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01595-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY WILLMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 12cv01595 IEG(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 29],

DENYING DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NO. 30], AND REMANDING

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

On June 27, 2012, Plaintiff Michael Anthony Willman filed a

Complaint against Defendant Michael J. Astrue, the thenCommissioner of Social Security [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff challenges

the denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits. (Compl.

2-3, ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed an Answer on September 13, 2012,

along with the Administrative Record [ECF Nos. 9, 11]. On April

18, 2013, Willman's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed [ECF No.

29].

Since the initiation of this lawsuit, Carolyn W. Colvin has

replaced Astrue as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. 

Colvin is therefore substituted for her predecessor pursuant to

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Defendant filed a CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment on May 23, 2013, with a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities [ECF No. 30]. Willman filed his Reply, with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, on May 30, 2013 [ECF No. 31]. 

On June 17, 2013, Colvin filed a "Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition

[ECF No. 33]." The Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment [ECF Nos. 29, 30] were referred to the

undersigned on June 12, 2013 [ECF No. 32].

This matter is suitable for decision without oral argument. 

See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below,

the Court recommends that the district court GRANT in part and DENY

in part Willman's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 29], DENY

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 30], and

remand the case for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 On February 20, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for

supplemental security income benefits alleging a disability onset

of September 12, 2007. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 23, ECF No. 11.)1

The Social Security Administration denied his claim on June 10,

2009, and again upon reconsideration on September 10, 2009. (Id.) 

On November 10, 2009, Willman filed a written request for a

hearing. (Id.)

A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")

Joseph D. Schloss on October 21, 2010. (Id. at 34.) Willman, his

1 The administrative record appears on the Court’s docket and

is filed as multiple attachments. The Court, however, cites the

administrative record using the page references contained on the

original document rather than the page numbers designated by the

Court’s ECF system.

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former attorney Daniel Keenan, a vocational expert, and a medical

expert were present. (Id.) Judge Schloss heard testimony from

Plaintiff and the vocational and medical experts. (Id. at 35.) 

Dr. Landau, the medical expert, testified that Willman had

been diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, obstructive sleep

apnea, and morbid obesity. (Id. at 36-38.) He noted that the

claimant also likely had diabetes. (Id. at 38.) To treat his

sleep apnea, Willman was placed on a CPAP machine, but he did not

comply with the treatment. (Id. at 39.) Based on Plaintiff's

medical condition, the expert opined that Willman could walk for

two hours in an eight-hour work day and lift or carry ten pounds

frequently and twenty pounds occasionally. (Id.) Dr. Landau also

determined that Plaintiff could balance, climb stairs but not

ladders, and occasionally stoop and bend. (Id. at 40.) He noted

that Willman's work environment should be air-conditioned. (Id.)

Plaintiff later took the stand and stated that he had not

worked since September of 2007. (Id. at 45.) Although he

subsequently attempted to find work, he was unsuccessful. (Id. at

45-46.) Willman maintained that he was able lift up to ten pounds,

sit for up to two hours at a time, and stand for twenty minutes. 

(Id. at 47.) He testified that he was a smoker and suffered from

chest pain, pain in his legs, fatigue, and difficulty breathing. 

(Id. at 49-50, 51-52.) According to Willman, he attempted to

comply with the recommended CPAP treatment, but the CPAP machine

did not function properly. (Id. at 50.)

The vocational expert also testified. (Id. at 41.) He

maintained that Plaintiff's previous work experience as a truck

driver was classified as semi-skilled medium work. (Id. at 42.) 

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He also opined that Willman's past relevant work as an assistant

manager at a convenience store was semi-skilled light work. (Id.)

The ALJ asked the vocational expert whether a fifty-two-yearold man with a high school education and past work experience as a

truck driver and assistant manager at a convenience store could

perform Willman's past relevant work if he (1) could stand and walk

for two hours in an eight-hour day and sit for up to eight hours

with normal breaks; (2) was limited to lifting twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (3) could occasionally

stoop and bend; (4) could not balance, work at heights, or use

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and (5) had to work in an airconditioned environment. (Id. at 43.) The expert said no. (Id.) 

The vocational expert did say, however, that such a person could

perform unskilled work as a small parts assembly person, production

assembler, or surveillance system monitor. (Id.) He stated that,

respectively, 213,000, 211,000, and 128,000 of those jobs existed

in the national economy. (Id.)

II. THE ALJ'S DECISION

The ALJ issued a written decision on December 10, 2010,

finding that Plaintiff was impaired with a "cardiac condition,

morbid obesity, tobacco addiction, type II diabetes mellitus, and

obstructive sleep apnea." (Id. at 20, 25.) The claimant, however,

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or equaled a listed impairment that would make him eligible for

benefits. (Id. at 26.) During the alleged disability period,

Plaintiff was initially classified as a "younger individual" but

later progressed to the category of "closely approaching advanced

age." (Id. at 28.) Willman's testimony was deemed "credible only

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to the extent that [it was] consistent with the residual functional

capacity assessed herein." (Id.)

ALJ Schloss concluded that Willman could "perform less than

the full range of light work" and could lift or carry twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently. (Id. at 26.) He also

opined that Willman could stand and walk two hours in an eight-hour

work day and sit without limitation if given normal breaks. (Id.) 

According to the ALJ, Plaintiff could occasionally bend, stoop, and

climb stairs, but should not balance, climb ladders, or work at

heights. (Id.) Willman was not, Judge Schloss decided, able to

perform his past relevant work as a truck driver or convenience

store assistant manager. (Id. at 28.) Relying on the testimony of

the vocational expert, the ALJ held that Willman could work as a

small parts assembler, production assembler, and surveillance

system monitor. (Id. at 29.) He stated that these jobs existed in

"significant numbers in the national economy." (Id.)

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Generally

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she suffers from

a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last

for a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would result

in death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of

performing the work that he or she previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national

economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West 2011). An

applicant must meet both requirements to be classified as

"disabled." Id.

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Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied by the Social

Security Administration to seek judicial review of the

Commissioner's final agency decision. Id. §§ 405(g); 42 U.S.C.A.

1383(c)(3) (West 2012). The district court may affirm, modify, or

reverse the Commissioner's decision. Id. § 405(g). The court

should affirm the decision unless "it is based upon legal error or

is not supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss v. Barnhart,

427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel,

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998)). The district court may also

remand the matter to the Social Security Administration for further

proceedings. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).

B. Remand for Further Proceedings

A district court may remand a Social Security disability

matter to the Commissioner of Social Security under sentence four

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 605

(9th Cir. 2007). That provision states, "The court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). "A sentence-four

remand is essentially a determination that the Commissioner erred

in denying benefits." Havrylovich v. Astrue, No. 09-1113-HA, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, at *19 (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2011) (citing Hoa

Hong Van, 483 F.3d at 605). If a case is remanded for a rehearing,

the Commissioner may modify or affirm the original findings of fact

or the decision. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).

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A remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or to

award benefits is within the court's discretion. McAllister v.

Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). "'If additional

proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative

proceedings, a social security case should be remanded. Where,

however, a rehearing would simply delay receipt of benefits,

reversal [and an award of benefits] is appropriate.'" Id. (quoting

Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). "[T]he

proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to [an

administrative] agency for additional investigation or

explanation." INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (discussing remand to Board

of Immigration Appeals).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff contends that

the ALJ should have limited Willman to sedentary work because the

base of light-work jobs available to Plaintiff was significantly

eroded. (Mot. Summ. J. 5-7, ECF No. 29.) The claimant also

insists that the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for

rejecting his testimony. (Id. at 9.) In her Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, Colvin argues that the administrative law judge

properly relied on the vocational expert's opinion in finding that

Plaintiff could perform light work. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp'n

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 30.) She also maintains that

the ALJ properly rejected Willman's testimony. (Id. at 5.)

"Administrative law judges are responsible for reviewing the

evidence and making findings of fact and conclusions of law." 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (2012). Generally, conflicts in the

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evidence should be resolved by the Commissioner, not the courts. 

See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987); Laffoon

v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977). The ALJ is the

final arbiter of ambiguities in the medical evidence. Tommasetti

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2008). The

Commissioner's decision must be upheld when the evidence would

support more than one rational interpretation. Havrylovich, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, at *4 (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff requests that this matter be remanded for the

payment of benefits or, in the alternative, remanded to the

Commissioner "for the proper consideration of the evidence." (Mot.

Summ. J. 14, ECF No. 29.) The Ninth Circuit has articulated the

standard district courts must apply when deciding whether to remand

a matter for further proceedings:

Remand for further administrative proceedings is

appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful. 

Conversely, where the record has been developed fully and

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose, the district court should remand for an

immediate award of benefits. More specifically, the

district court should credit evidence that was rejected

during the administrative process and remand for an

immediate award of benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the

evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must

be resolved before a determination of disability can be

made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ

would be required to find the claimant disabled were such

evidence credited.

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted); see Strauss v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d

1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the standard outlined in

Benecke). "A claimant is not entitled to benefits under the

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statute unless the claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter how

egregious the ALJ's errors may be." Strauss, 635 F.3d at 1138.

A. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered the Erosion of the Light

Occupational Base for an Individual Closely Approaching

Advanced Age

First, Plaintiff argues that the base of light-work jobs

available to him was significantly eroded; thus, ALJ Schloss should

have determined that Willman was capable of only sedentary work. 

(Mot. Summ. J. 5-6, ECF No. 29.) Specifically, the claimant

asserts that the administrative law judge determined that Willman

could stand or walk for two hours in a work day. (Id. at 6.) The

ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff could perform "less than the full

range of light work." (Id.) Willman submits that the light

occupational base was significantly eroded due to these

limitations. (Id. at 6-7.) 

The claimant argues that when an occupational base is

"significant[ly]" eroded, the Social Security Administration's

Program Operations Manual System ("POMS") directs an ALJ to use a

lower exertional rule in Appendix Two of the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines (the "grids") to make a disability determination. (Id.

at 6 (citing SSA, POMS § DI 2501.001.B.72).) Thus, Plaintiff

asserts that ALJ Schloss should have applied the sedentary work

rule (Rule 201.14), as opposed to the rules governing light work

(Rules 202.21 and 202.14). (Id. at 7.) Willman alleges that he is

a "person closely approaching advanced age," but does not expand on

the argument. (See id. at 5.) 

Defendant insists that the ALJ properly relied on the

vocational expert in determining that Plaintiff could perform light

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work. (See Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp'n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3,

ECF No. 30.) She urges that an ALJ is not obligated to apply POMS. 

(Id.) Moreover, POMS only suggests that an ALJ use the sedentary

guidelines if there is "'considerable reduction in the available

occupations at a particular exertional level.'" (Id. (quoting SSA,

POMS § DI 25001.001.B.71).) 

Rather, Colvin claims that the ALJ did what was required of

him –- consulting with a vocational expert –- when a claimant's

limitations cause him to fall between two sets of guidelines. 

(Id. at 4 (citing SSR 83-12(2)(c), 1983 WL 31253, at *3 (1983)).) 

Relying on the vocational expert's opinion, ALJ Schloss determined

that Willman could perform some, but not all light-work

occupations. (Id.) On this basis, the Commissioner contends that

the ALJ did not err. (Id. at 5.)

In his Reply, Plaintiff argues that Social Security Ruling

83-12(2)(c) does not state that when a claimant falls between two

sets of guidelines the ALJ "must" consult with a vocational expert. 

(Pl.'s Reply Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 31.) Rather, the

ruling indicates that it is "advisable" to do so. (Id.) Willman

contends that the doctrine of deference demands that POMS be

applied. (Id. at 4.) In her Reply, the Commissioner asserts that

Plaintiff failed to provide authority supporting his contention

that the administrative law judge erred by using the grids as a

framework for his decision. (Def.'s Reply 2, ECF No. 33.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that "POMS may be 'entitled to

respect' . . . to the extent it provides a persuasive

interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, but it 'does not impose

judicially enforceable duties on either this court or the ALJ." 

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Carillo-Yeras v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2011)

(internal citations omitted) (quoting Lockwood v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Hermes

v. Sec'y Health & Human Servs, 926 F.2d 789, 791 n.1 (9th Cir.

1991) (holding that POMS does not have the force or effect of law);

Staggs v. Astrue, No. 1:11cv804 DLB, 2012 WL 1158865, at *9 (E.D.

Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (same).

Even if the ALJ was required to abide by POMS, it "does not

mandate the ALJ to use a lower exertional rule level. Instead, it

merely suggests using a lower exertional rule as a framework if

there is a 'considerable reduction in the available occupations at

a particular exertional level.'" Williams v. Colvin, No. CV 12-

3974 FFM, 2013 WL 2147856, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2013) (quoting

SSA, POMS § DI 25001.001.B.71); see also Durden v. Astrue, CV 11-

1211-SP, 2012 WL 682880, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (same);

White v. Astrue, No. CV 10-8048-SP, 2011 WL 5570237, at *6 (C.D.

Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (same). Accordingly, ALJ Schloss was not

required to follow the suggestions outlined in POMS. 

When a claimant's limitations cause him to fall in between

sedentary and light work, an ALJ must consult with a vocational

expert. See Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d

573, 580 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d

1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006); Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 870-71

(9th Cir. 2000). Here, the vocational expert testified that a

person with Plaintiff's background and limitations could work as a

small parts assembly person (14,000 in California and 213,000 in

the national economy), production assembler (13,400 in California

and 211,000 in the national economy), or surveillance system

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monitor (10,100 in California and 128,000 in the national economy). 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 43, ECF No. 11.) The ALJ subsequently

relied on this testimony and determined that Willman was "capable

of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in

significant numbers in the national economy." (Id. at 29.) 

Accordingly, ALJ Schloss did not err. See Williams, 2013 WL

2147856, at *4 (finding that ALJ properly consulted with a

vocational expert when a claimant could perform a limited range of

light work); Durden, 2012 WL 682880, at *3 (same); White, 2011 WL

5570237, at *6 (same).

B. Whether the ALJ Properly Determined that Plaintiff was Not

Credible

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear

and convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony. (Mot. Summ. J.

9, ECF No. 29.) Willman continues, "If [he] has a combination of

impairments that cause pain and fatigue that subjectively preclude

him from full-time work activity and no contrary medical evidence

exists in the record to contradict that testimony, then [he] meets

the statutory test [for disability status]." (Id. at 11-12.)

Plaintiff contends that his testimony regarding his inability to

work is consistent with the medical evidence as a whole. (Id. at

12.) Yet, the ALJ did not provide any specific reasons supporting

his finding that Willman was not credible. (Id.) If the Defendant

provides a post hoc rationale for the ALJ's ruling, Plaintiff

asserts, this would prove that the credibility determination was

inadequate. (Id.) 

Colvin maintains that the administrative law judge properly

explained his credibility finding. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp'n

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Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 30.) In light of the ALJ's

specific findings and a review of the record, Defendant submits

that the ALJ's findings were "clear and specific enough." (Id.

(citations omitted).) 

The Commissioner alleges that the ALJ provided a number of

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. (Id. at 6.) 

Specifically, the ALJ properly relied on Willman's failure to

follow his doctors' advice to quit smoking and start using the CPAP

machine correctly. (Id. (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 26-27, ECF

No. 11; id. Attach. #7, 194, 233, 235, 249; id. Attach. #8, 459,

461, 466).) Judge Schloss also correctly relied on the fact that

Plaintiff's cardiac condition was responsive to treatment and that

doctors opined that Willman could work. (Id. (citing Admin. R.

Attach. #2, 27-28, 39-40, ECF No. 11; id. Attach. #7, 237, 240-46,

253-54).) Additionally, Colvin argues that the ALJ properly relied

on the objective medical evidence, which was consistent with his

determination regarding Plaintiff's residual functional capacity

("RFC") and inconsistent with a finding of disability. (Id.

(citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 25-28, ECF No. 11; id. Attach. #8,

235-36).) Further, Defendant alleges that Willman's statements

were deemed credible to the extent they were consistent with the

ALJ's RFC assessment. (Id. (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 28, ECF

No. 11).) The Commissioner states that the ALJ gave Plaintiff the

benefit of the doubt and found that Plaintiff could only perform a

modest range of light work." (Id.) 

In his Reply, Willman insists that the Defendant provides a

post hoc analysis not done by Judge Schloss. (Pl.'s Reply Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff responds to the alleged

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reasons for rejecting his credibility by contending that he did not

comply with medical advice to stop smoking because it "triggered a

separate drug addiction and alcohol analysis, which the ALJ did not

perform." (Id. at 6.) Moreover, Plaintiff maintains that the fact

that he responded to treatment does not mean that he is able to

work. (Id. at 7 (citations omitted).) Willman submits that he was

not required to provide objective medical evidence proving the

severity of his pain or fatigue. (Id.) Finally, he asserts that

none of his physicians stated that he could work. (Id.) Willman

alleges that none of these reasons satisfy the clear and convincing

standard. (Id. at 8.) In her Reply, Colvin reiterates that the

administrative law judge made adequate findings to support his

credibility determination. (Def.'s Reply 2, ECF No. 33.) 

"In order for the ALJ to find [claimant's] testimony

unreliable, the ALJ must make 'a credibility determination with

findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that

the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant's testimony.'"

Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958). In evaluating the

credibility of a plaintiff's testimony regarding subjective pain,

the adjudicator must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v.

Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lingenfelter v.

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)); see Batson v.

Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.

2004). "'First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged.'" Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (quoting

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Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). Second, if the claimant satisfies

the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may

reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms

if he gives "'specific, clear and convincing reasons'" for doing

so. Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036); Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Judge Schloss initially determined that Willman's

impairments "could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms . . . ." (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 28, ECF No. 11.) No one

challenges this conclusion. The first prong of the ALJ's inquiry

regarding Willman's credibility is therefore satisfied. See

Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. Next, the Court determines whether Judge

Schloss provided clear reasons for the adverse credibility finding

that are supported by the evidence in the record. 

The Commissioner's reasons for rejecting a claimant's

testimony must be "clear and convincing." Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). To support a finding that the plaintiff

was not credible, the ALJ must "'point to specific facts in the

record which demonstrate that [the plaintiff] is in less pain than

she claims.'" Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 592 (quoting Dodrill v.

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993)). The ALJ must make

specific findings "stat[ing] which pain testimony is not credible

and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." 

Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918. A reviewing court should not be forced to

speculate as to the grounds for an administrative law judge's

rejection of a plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain. Bunnell

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Murray v.

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Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Steele v.

Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the

ALJ must build an accurate and logical connection between the

evidence and the decision).

In general, questions of credibility are for the ALJ to

resolve. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Courts should not "second-guess" an ALJ's credibility

determinations. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir.

1984). If the evidence is conflicting and could be rationally

interpreted more than one way, the court must uphold the ALJ's

decision. Id. at 579. 

Social Security Ruling 96-7p provides the relevant standard: 

4. In determining the credibility of the individual's

statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case

record, including the objective medical evidence, the

individual's own statements about symptoms, statements

and other information provided by treating or examining

physicians or psychologists and other persons about the

symptoms and how they affect the individual, and any

other relevant evidence in the case record. An

individual's statements about the intensity and

persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the effect

the symptoms have on his or her ability to work may not

be disregarded solely because they are not substantiated

by objective medical evidence.

5. It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a

single, conclusory statement that "the individual's

allegations have been considered" or that "the

allegations are (or are not) credible." It is also not

enough for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors

that are described in the regulations for evaluating

symptoms. The determination or decision must contain

specific reasons for the finding on credibility,

supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be

sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and

to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator

gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for

that weight.

SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, at *2-4 (July 2, 1996). 

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The Ninth Circuit has articulated the grounds on which an ALJ

may properly discredit a claimant's testimony: 

In weighing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may

consider [claimant's] reputation for truthfulness,

inconsistencies either in his testimony or between his

testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the

symptoms of which he complains.

Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). Where the ALJ's credibility assessment is

supported by substantial evidence, it will not be disturbed even

where some of the reasons for discrediting a claimant's testimony

were improper. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d

1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, ALJ Schloss held that Plaintiff was, at least to a

certain extent, not credible:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the

undersigned finds that the claimant's medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are credible only to

the extent that they are consistent with the residual

functional capacity assessed herein. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 28, ECF No. 11.)

In assessing Willman's credibility, the ALJ did not explicitly

rely on Plaintiff's failure to follow his doctors' advice, his

responsiveness to treatment, or on the fact that the objective

medical evidence was inconsistent with a finding of disability, 

as argued by Colvin. (Compare id., with Cross-Mot. Summ. J. &

Opp'n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-6, ECF No. 30.) The grounds

suggested by the Commissioner were not specifically invoked by the

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ALJ when he made his credibility determination; thus, the Court

will not speculate as to whether they were used as a basis to

reject Willman's credibility. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346.

As discussed, Judge Schloss determined that Willman had the

RFC to lift or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently, stand or walk for two hours in an eight-hour day, and

sit without limitation. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 26, ECF No. 11.) 

In contrast, Plaintiff testified that he could lift up to ten

pounds, sit for up to two hours at a time, and stand for twenty

minutes. (See id. at 47.) Thus, the latter statements were

implicitly rejected as not credible. Yet, Judge Schloss did not

give any reasons, let alone specific and legitimate reasons, for

his credibility determination. (See id. at 25-29.) 

There may be evidence in the record that the ALJ can rely on

as "specific, clear and convincing reasons" for rejecting the

claimant's testimony. Indeed, the Defendant discusses multiple

bases that could have been relied upon to discount Plaintiff's

credibility. (See Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp'n Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 6, ECF No. 30.) The Commissioner made a similar argument in

Vasquez v. Colvin, No. ED CV 12-1302-E, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

86554, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2013), which the court rejected.

The ALJ's decision does not specifically identify any of

these considerations as the reason or reasons for the

ALJ's credibility determination. The ALJ's decision

mentions some of these considerations, but does not

expressly base the credibility determination on any of 

them. Consequently, the Court cannot affirm the

credibility determination on the basis of any of these

considerations.

Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter for further

administrative review. Id. at *8.

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The ALJ is in a better position to evaluate credibility than

this Court. See Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591; see also Gonzalez v.

Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We are wary of

speculating about the basis of the ALJ's conclusion . . . ."). The

Commissioner should address Willman's credibility before making a

decision as to disability. See Swims Under v. Astrue, 473 F. App'x

552, 553 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for further proceedings where

the ALJ failed to cite sufficient reasons for his adverse

credibility determination). A remand for further proceedings

rather than an award of benefits is appropriate. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

"The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standards." Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,

341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pagter v. Massanari,

250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the AlJ's decision is not

supported by substantial evidence, remand or reversal is

appropriate. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir.

1984).

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 29] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,

and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 30]

should be DENIED. The Court recommends a limited remand. On

remand to the Social Security Administration, the administrative

law judge should explain his reasons for determining that Willman

was not credible and the effect of this determination of his claim

for benefits.

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This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 30, 2013. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 9,

2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

Dated: August 15, 2013 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Gonzalez

 All Parties of Record

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