Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03105/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03105-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TIFFANY WAGNER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF PLUMAS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:18-cv-03105-KJM-DB 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Tiffany Wagner moves for an order amending the scheduling order and 

for leave to amend her complaint. Mot., ECF No. 17. Defendant Brandon Compton opposes, 

Compton Opp’n, ECF No. 20, as does defendant County of Plumas, Plumas Opp’n, ECF No. 21. 

Plaintiff has replied. Reply, ECF No. 23. The motion was submitted without oral argument. See 

ECF No. 24. Having considered the moving papers and the record before it, the court GRANTS 

plaintiff’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

 This case arises from plaintiff’s employment as a correctional officer with the 

Plumas County Sheriff’s Office (“PCSO”). Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 5. She alleges Plumas County 

Sheriff Gregory Hagwood engaged in sex discrimination, passing her over for a promotion in 

favor of defendant Brandon Compton, who was promoted to Correctional Sergeant, a supervisory 

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role over her. Id. ¶ 32. Hagwood allegedly created and maintained a sexually hostile work 

environment in which women who reported sexual harassment were retaliated against. Id. ¶¶ 22–

24. Hagwood also allegedly failed to prevent sex discrimination and sexual harassment by his 

subordinates. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges she was repeatedly sexually harassed and assaulted by 

Compton. Id. ¶¶ 7, 34, 35. Plaintiff brings state and federal law claims arising from these 

allegations for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent 

discrimination, violations of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, the Bane Civil Rights Act, Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1983 claims sounding in equal protection and the First 

Amendment, and the Public Safety Officer’s Procedural Bill of Rights Act. See generally id. 

 As relevant to this motion, Plumas County Sheriff’s Department terminated 

plaintiff’s employment since the filing of the original complaint. Mot. at 3. Plaintiff filed her 

complaint on November 30, 2018; Plumas County terminated her on October 7, 2019. Id. She 

alleges Undersheriff Dean J. Canalia and Sergeant April C. Gott conspired with the defendants 

currently named in her complaint to violate her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.; Proposed 

First Am. Compl. (“PFAC”) ¶¶ 185–194, ECF No. 17, Ex. A. Compton was placed on 

administrative leave following plaintiff’s complaint about his alleged harassment. PFAC ¶ 58. In 

her proposed first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on the day after Compton was placed 

on administrative leave, 

Sergeant Compton called the Jail and asked to speak to Sergeant April Gott 

to ask her about the Internal Affairs (‘IA’), and asking her what everyone 

was talking about. Sergeant Gott is friends with Sergeant Compton and his 

wife. Yet County permitted Sergeant Gott to participate in actions against 

Plaintiff. 

Id. ¶ 60. Gott then allegedly suborned a false inmate grievance against plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 66–68. 

 As to Canalia, the complaint alleges he knew Compton lied in a criminal 

investigative interview regarding plaintiff’s sexual harassment and assault complaint, yet Canalia 

authored a Notice of Intent to Discipline plaintiff that included the allegation that plaintiff “filed a 

false criminal complaint alleging that Sergeant Brandon Compton sexually assaulted [her].” Id. 

¶¶ 75, 78. Based on this disciplinary notice, plaintiff says she was constructively terminated from 

her employment. Id. ¶ 79. 

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 The acts alleged above constitute the basis of plaintiff’s proposed new conspiracy 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) and (2). 

B. Procedural Background 

 The court set the fact discovery deadline in the case as December 15, 2019. 

Pretrial Scheduling Order, ECF No. 15 at 2. The pretrial scheduling order also cautioned the 

parties that “[n]o further joinder of parties or amendments to pleadings is permitted without leave 

of court, good cause having been shown.” Id. Plaintiff commenced written discovery at the 

outset of the case. Reply at 2. In July 2019, after defendants’ administrative and criminal 

investigations of the plaintiff concluded, plaintiff began to notice defendants’ depositions. Id.; 

Declaration of Calvin Chang (“Chang Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 23 at 8–9. Plaintiff’s counsel 

repeatedly rescheduled the depositions to account for the rescheduling of a mediation involving 

the parties to the operative complaint; the mediation concluded on November 2, 2019, without the 

case settling. Id. ¶ 8. At the time she filed the instant motion on November 20, 2019, plaintiff 

had taken or scheduled ten depositions before the December 15, 2019 close of discovery. Id. ¶ 9. 

In addition to seeking to amend her complaint, plaintiff also requests an extension of fact 

discovery until May 15, 2020.1

 Id. ¶ 12. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A party seeking leave to amend pleadings after a deadline specified in the 

scheduling order must first satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)’s “good cause” standard. 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1992). Motions for leave 

to amend pleadings after the court’s issuance of a pretrial scheduling order under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 16 are deemed as motions to modify the scheduling order even when no formal 

request has been made. Id. Under Rule 16(b), “[a] schedule may be modified only for good 

cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Distinct from Rule 15(a)’s liberal 

amendment policy, Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard focuses primarily on the diligence of the 

moving party, and its reasons for seeking modification. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

 

1

 The Chang Declaration lists this date as May 15, 2019, but this is an obvious typographical 

error. 

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 If good cause exists, the movant next must satisfy Rule 15(a). Cf. id. at 608 (citing 

approvingly Forstmann v. Culp, 114 F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1987), for its explication of this 

order of operations). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides, “[t]he court should 

freely give leave [to amend the pleadings] when justice so requires” and the Ninth Circuit has 

“stressed Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments.” Ascon Props, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 

F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). “In exercising its discretion ‘a court must be guided by the 

underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.’” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, et al., 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)). Courts consider five factors 

in determining whether justice requires allowing amendment under Rule 15(a): “bad faith, undue 

delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has 

previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citation omitted); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Western Shoshone 

Nat’l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Rule 16(b): Good Cause 

 Plaintiff bears the burden of showing good cause exists to modify the scheduling 

order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). If a party moves to amend its complaint and reopen discovery, 

the court must consider the following factors: 

1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) 

whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the 

moving party was diligent in obtaining discovery within the 

guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the need 

for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by 

the district court, and 6) the likelihood that the discovery will lead to 

relevant evidence. 

City of Pomona v. SQM North Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff has shown good cause. There is no trial date set, and any potential date is 

still months away. The request to amend and modify the scheduling order is opposed, but for 

reasons discussed below, an opposition does not, standing alone, negate good cause. Compton 

characterizes the prejudice he would suffer as a “significant[] expan[sion] [of] the cost and burden 

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of this litigation.” Compton Opp’n at 5. Sheriff Hagwood and Plumas County argue “any 

extension would be unjust to Defendants, who have diligently followed the scheduling order and 

prepared for the close of discovery,” and say they “would be prejudiced by the delay” without 

identifying the source or nature of any prejudice. Plumas Opp’n at 3, 6. “Although the existence 

or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to 

deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (citation omitted). 

 The diligence of the party seeking amendment and extension of discovery is the 

focus of the good cause inquiry under Rule 16. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 

(E.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). While defendants argue plaintiff’s decision to 

not begin depositions until November 15, 2019, was “a failed strategical decision by plaintiff,” 

the court disagrees. See Plumas Opp’n at 3. Unlike in Johnson and similar cases, the facts 

underlying the proposed amended complaint, which support the request for more time for 

discovery, had not occurred until shortly before the close of discovery. 

 While parties have an “unflagging obligation” to alert the scheduling judge of the 

nature and timing of anticipated amendments in their status reports so the judge can consider 

whether such amendments may properly be brought solely under the Rule 15(a) standard, 

Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v. Western Sur. Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1371 (1st Cir. 1991), 

that obligation does not impose a requirement that a plaintiff anticipate future adverse 

employment actions solely in the control of defendants. Here, when the complaint was filed, 

plaintiff remained employed with PCSO and had not yet been subject to the allegedly retaliatory 

investigation and discharge that is the subject of the proposed new conspiracy cause of action. 

Plumas County and Sheriff Hagwood may be correct that “Plaintiff’s ultimate termination was 

certainly no surprise.” Plumas Opp’n at 5. But a likely future course of events foreshadowed by 

plaintiff’s being placed on administrative leave “as early as August 2, 2018,” id., is not grounds to 

amend a complaint before its claims are ripe, nor could plaintiff be expected to depose witnesses 

about events yet to happen. 

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 Sergeant Compton argues the facts alleged in the proposed amended complaint 

were known to plaintiff at the outset of the case. Compton Opp’n at 4. It is true plaintiff knew of 

the phone call between Sergeants Compton and Gott, which was recited in the original complaint, 

but that does not mean the call did not acquire new significance after subsequent events. The 

same is true of the allegations about Gott and Canalia in the operative complaint; later events tend 

to support an inference of knowing cooperation between these proposed defendants, when such an 

inference could not have been plausibly drawn at the time of the initial complaint. 

 Plaintiff’s counsel avers he noticed or proposed several depositions in August, 

September and November, before plaintiff was terminated. See Chang Decl. ¶ 8. As noted, he 

rescheduled several depositions due to scheduling conflicts. The court notes plaintiff’s counsel 

noticed only Sheriff Hagwood’s deposition on August 22, 2019. Plaintiff’s counsel suggested the 

balance of the depositions prior to the November 4, 2019 mediation, as opposed to actually 

noticing them. See Reply at 4. However, on these facts, this does not indicate plaintiff lacked 

diligence in complying with the court’s discovery order. 

 As to the last factors, it was likely foreseeable by the time Plumas County issued 

its Notice of Intent to Discipline on July 15, 2019, that plaintiff would be fired, necessitating 

discovery regarding the reasons for the termination. As discussed above, foreseeability is not 

sufficient to make claims ripe for a proposed complaint, but it does militate in favor of plaintiff’s 

notifying the court of the need to extend the discovery cutoff earlier than she did. Given the 

diligence discussed above, however, this factor does not outweigh the other factors in a finding of 

good cause. 

 The likelihood of further discovery yielding relevant evidence also weighs in favor 

of plaintiff. Further depositions will likely shed light on the decision to terminate plaintiff, which 

is relevant to claims in both the operative complaint and the proposed amended complaint, which 

the court allows as explained further below. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court finds good cause to amend the scheduling 

order as required by Rule 16. 

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B. Rule 15: Undue Delay, Prejudice and Futility 

1. Undue Delay 

 Defendants argue undue delay, prejudice and futility support denying plaintiff’s 

motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15. In light of Rule 15’s policy of favoring 

amendments, defendants have the burden to show amendment is not in the interests of justice. 

DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. An unjustified delay is “undue” under the Rule 15 analysis. 

Western Shoshone, 951 F.2d at 204. It is within the court’s discretion to deny leave to amend 

when the amendment proposes adding new claims that movants knew or should have known 

about when the earlier pleading was filed. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 

F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether there has been ‘undue delay’ should be considered in the 

context of (1) the length of the delay measured from the time the moving party obtained relevant 

facts; (2) whether discovery has closed; and (3) proximity to the trial date.” Wizards of the Coast 

LLC v. Cryptozoic Entertainment LLC, 309 F.R.D. 645, 652 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (citing Texaco, 

Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798–99 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

 As discussed above, some facts underlying the proposed amendment were known 

to plaintiff at the outset of the case. However, those facts alone did not support the proposed 

amendment; rather, the new claims ripened only after her recent termination at the hands of 

defendants’ alleged conspiracy. The effect of the close of discovery is discussed above. There is 

no trial date currently set. The court finds no undue delay. 

2. Prejudice 

 “In the context of a motion to amend, prejudice means ‘undue difficulty in 

prosecuting a lawsuit as a result of change in tactics or theories on the part of the other party.’” 

Bennett v. Forbes, No. 17-cv-464-MMA (KSC), 2017 WL 4557215, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 

2017) (quoting Deakyne v. Comm’rs of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 1969)). Prejudice to 

the opposing party carries the greatest weight in the Rule 15 analysis. Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). The opposing party “must do more than 

merely claim prejudice; ‘it must show that it was unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the 

opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had the ... amendment been 

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timely.’” Shuey v. County of Ventura, No. 2:14-cv-09520-ODW (SHx), 2016 WL 4367224, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 

(3d Cir. 1989)). 

 Defendants have not met their burden of showing prejudice if the proposed 

amendment is allowed. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. The proposed amendment adds an 

additional theory of recovery, but it does not constitute a “change in tactics or theories on the part 

of the other party” that creates undue difficulty for the defendants. Nor do defendants specifically 

identify any unfair disadvantage or deprivation of the opportunity to present facts or evidence 

from the proposed amendment. The proposed amendment contains no revelation unforeseen to 

defendants; it adds a theory of recovery based on a more complete and current understanding of 

the same transaction or occurrence. 

3. Futility 

 Defendants’ primary argument against amendment is futility. Futility can, by 

itself, justify denial of a motion for leave to amend. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845. The Ninth Circuit has 

recently stated the test for futility as when “no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to 

the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Barahona v. Union 

Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 

1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997)).2 The Compton and Plumas oppositions each present two futility 

arguments. First, each argues plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint would fail to state a claim 

for conspiracy. Second, each asserts the proposed § 1985 claim would be barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. 

 

2 Barahona draws this quote from Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 

1988), through its citation of Sweaney. Rykoff-Sexton characterizes the test for futility as 

“identical to the one used when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 

12(b)(6)” and thus borrows the “no set of facts” standard from the now-overruled Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Although the court believes the “plausibility” standard of Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) is the appropriate overarching standard, the Ninth Circuit 

continues to cite the “no set of facts” standard for futility, e.g. in Barahona, and this court is thus 

bound to it. See also Aldan v. World Corp., 267 F.R.D. 346, 360–61 (N. Mar. I. 2010) 

(discussing divergence of symmetry between Rules 12(b)(6) and Rule 15 futility post-Iqbal). In 

any event, applying the “no set of facts” standard in this instance does not yield a different 

outcome than the “plausibility” standard. 

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a. Pleading Conspiracy 

 The touchstone of adequate pleading of conspiracy is the pleading of facts that, if 

true, create a plausible statement of the claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim for conspiracy, plaintiff must show 

“an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate [her] constitutional rights.” Woodrum v. 

Woodward Cty., Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “A conspiracy can be inferred from 

conduct and need not be proven by evidence of an express agreement.” Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 

1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998). “For example, a showing that the alleged conspirators have 

committed acts that are unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement may allow a jury 

to infer the existence of a conspiracy.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 

1301 (9th Cir. 1999). However, to state a claim, the plaintiff must do more than plead 

independent parallel conduct on the part of the defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 

 Defendants assert plaintiff’s proposed amendment does not plausibly show 

agreement between the alleged conspirators. Sergeant Compton objects that there is no 

agreement pled between himself and Sergeant Gott in the following allegation: 

On July 21, 2018, Sergeant Compton called the Jail and asked to speak to 

Sergeant April Gott to ask her about the Internal Affairs (“IA”), and asking 

her what everyone was talking about. Sergeant Gott is friends with Sergeant 

Compton and his wife. Yet County permitted Sergeant Gott to participate 

in actions against Plaintiff. 

PFAC ¶ 60. 

 The Plumas opposition also notes the absence of a direct allegation of agreement 

between either Sheriff Hagwood or Undersheriff Canalia and any other alleged coconspirator. 

Defendants argue “[t]hat both Hagwood and Canalia may have known of circumstances involving 

the veracity of Compton does not illustrate any agreement.” Plumas Opp’n at 6. The proposed 

amended complaint states only that “Defendant Canalia included knowingly false material facts,” 

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in his Notice of Intent to Discipline and that “Defendant Hagwood conspired with and ratified the 

false statements[.]” PFAC ¶ 78. 

 As to Compton and Gott, the allegation of the July 21, 2018 phone call and 

subsequent subornation of a false inmate grievance plausibly creates the inference that Compton 

and Gott agreed either implicitly or explicitly to retaliate against plaintiff. However, as to 

Hagwood and Canalia, the lack of any particularized allegation that they communicated with 

Compton, Gott or each other about the events does not adequately support the inference of an 

agreement. For them, the proposed amended complaint shows the parallelism proscribed by 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, not agreement. Nonetheless, because the proposed amendment is 

properly pled as to Compton and Gott, amendment is not futile as to them. 

b. Intra-Corporate Conspiracy 

 Defendants also argue the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine bars the proposed 

§ 1985 claim as a matter of law, making it futile. The intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine holds 

that because corporate entities are singular legal entities, their agents and officers acting on their 

behalf cannot be liable for conspiracy, as there is no agreement between or among discrete legal 

actors. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (establishing 

doctrine in application to Sherman Act claims). The Supreme Court has never addressed whether 

a public entity can be liable for a § 1985 conspiracy carried out by or with its employees. See 

Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 n.11 (1979) (declining to 

address applicability of doctrine to § 1985 claims against public entities); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. 

Ct. 1843, 1868 (2017) (same). Most, but not all, circuit courts have applied the doctrine to bar 

claims against public entities. Webb v. Cty. of El Dorado, No. 2:15-cv-01189-KJM-EFB, 2016 

WL 4001922 at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2016) (collecting circuit court cases). The Ninth Circuit 

has noted the split but declined to address the issue. Portman v. City of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 

898, 910 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 The Ninth Circuit has stated that application of the doctrine outside the antitrust 

context may be limited depending on the public interest the particular prohibition on conspiracy is 

intended to protect. See Webster v. Omninitrition Intern., Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 786–87 (9th Cir. 

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1996) (holding intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine inapplicable to RICO conspiracy). In Webster, 

the court cited with approval the following observation of the Seventh Circuit: 

 

Since a subsidiary and its parent theoretically have a community of interest, 

a conspiracy “in restraint of trade” between them poses no threat to the goals 

of antitrust law—protecting competition. In contrast, intracorporate 

conspiracies do threaten RICO's goals of preventing the infiltration of 

legitimate businesses by racketeers and separating racketeers from their 

profits. 

Id. at 787 (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989)). In Rashdan v. 

Geissberger, in analogizing to Webster, the court held the public policy of preventing civil rights 

discrimination underlying § 1985(3) foreclosed application of the intra-corporate conspiracy 

doctrine. No. C 10-00634 SBA, 2011 WL 197957, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Jan 14, 2011). 

 This court considered this question in Webb v. County of El Dorado, supra. There, 

this court cited Rabkin v. Dean, a Northern District case, for the proposition that the doctrine bars 

a § 1985 claim “where the conspiratorial conduct challenged is essentially a single act by a single 

governmental body acting exclusively through its own officers, each acting within the scope of 

his or her official capacity.” 2016 WL 4001922, at *7 (quoting Rabkin, 856 F. Supp. 543, 552 

(N.D. Cal. 1994)). In Webb, this court distinguished the facts of that case from those in Rabkin

and found them more analogous to a First Circuit case in which the doctrine did not apply. Id. at 

* 8 (citing Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1984)). In both Stathos and Webb, the 

defendants “took a series of actions . . . these actions involved discussions between them, which 

was necessary for their actions to be effective; and [] they intended the results.” Id. at *7 (quoting 

Stathos, 728 F.2d at 20). Where the acts complained of went “beyond the ministerial acts of 

several executives needed to carry out a single discretionary decision,” the intra-corporate 

conspiracy doctrine did not bar § 1985 claims. Id. (quoting Stathos, 728 F.2d at 21). 

 As in Webb, the court must undertake a “close examination of the factual 

allegations of [the] case . . . to make an informed decision regarding application of the 

intracorporate conspiracy bar.” Id. As in Webb and Stathos, the allegations in this case go 

beyond a single discretionary act squarely within the official functions of the defendants. The 

alleged conspiracy appears to involve a series of independent acts, some of them outside of the 

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scope of the actors’ capacity as agents of the Plumas County Sheriff’s Office. Examples include 

Compton’s alleged contact with Gott in contravention of his administrative leave status and Gott’s 

alleged subornation of a false inmate grievance against plaintiff. At least on their face, these acts 

do not appear to be part of the kind of unified internal decision-making process the intra-corporate 

conspiracy doctrine is intended to address. 

 On these facts, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine does not bar the proposed 

amendment as a matter of law, and thus amendment would not be futile on these grounds. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint and 

for an extension of the fact discovery cutoff is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file an amended 

complaint consistent with this order within fourteen days. The scheduling order is hereby 

amended for fact discovery to close May 15, 2020. The parties are directed to file a joint status 

report within fourteen days of this order addressing any further adjustments to the scheduling 

order necessitated by this change.3

 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 18, 2020. 

 

3

 On February 12, 2020, the parties stipulated to extend the cutoff for dispositive motions. That 

stipulation is denied without prejudice to a new stipulation in light of this order. 

Case 2:18-cv-03105-KJM-DB Document 26 Filed 02/19/20 Page 12 of 12