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Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 7, 2016*

Decided September 12, 2016

Before

 DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

 RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 16-2181

MARVIN DAVENPORT and 

JUDITH DAVENPORT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING 

CORP., et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 10947

Virginia M. Kendall,

Judge.

O R D E R

Marvin and Judith Davenport defaulted on their mortgage, and their lender 

brought a foreclosure action against them in state court. The Davenports contested the 

action, alleging that foreclosure was improper because their lender and loan servicer 

 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because 

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 16-2181 Document: 15 Filed: 09/12/2016 Pages: 2
No. 16-2181 Page 2

had engaged in various unfair business practices. The court issued a judgment of 

foreclosure and eventually approved the judicial sale of the property. The very next 

day, the Davenports filed this lawsuit in federal court—purportedly on the basis of 

diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332—in which they reiterated that the mortgage 

“was based on fraud therefore the foreclosure as well as the mortgage was null and 

voided.” In addition to damages, the Davenports sought “clear title to their property.”

The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice, reasoning that the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine, see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 

263 U.S. 413 (1923), precluded the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction because 

the Davenports are not permitted to use the district court “as an appellate tribunal to 

review the state court foreclosure.”

The Davenports continue to insist, as they did to the district court, that the 

federal case is “irrelevant to the foreclosure case.” But the federal lawsuit sought to 

“clear title” to the foreclosed property and thus represented an improper collateral 

challenge to the state-court judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 645 

(7th Cir. 2011); Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2004).

To the extent the Davenports hint that they seek damages for extrajudicial injuries that 

wouldn’t be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 

(7th Cir. 2015), they do not develop any meaningful argument that we can review. 

See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Rahn v. Bd. of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 295 

(7th Cir. 2015). They do not explain the significance, for example, of their scattershot 

references to statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act and the USA Patriot Act.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 16-2181 Document: 15 Filed: 09/12/2016 Pages: 2