Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00119/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOYCE EVANS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 06-0119-C

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, :

Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying her claims for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income. The parties have consented to the exercise of

jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all

proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 21 (“In accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a

United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case .

. . and order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment

proceedings.”); see also Doc. 22 (order of reference)) Upon consideration of

Case 1:06-cv-00119-C Document 23 Filed 11/08/06 Page 1 of 10
1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 21 (“An appeal from a judgment

entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for

this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district

court.”))

2

the administrative record, plaintiff's proposed report and recommendation, the

Commissioner's proposed report and recommendation, and the parties'

arguments at the October 25, 2006 hearing before the Court, it is determined

that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits should be reversed and

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.1

Plaintiff alleges disability due to residuals of multiple knee surgeries

and severe arthritis. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following

relevant findings:

3. The claimant’s degenerative joint disease of the right

knee secondary to four surgical procedures and degenerative

joint disease of the left knee are “severe” impairments, based

upon the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§ 404.1520

and 416.920).

4. This medically determinable impairment does not meet

or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulation No. 4.

5. The undersigned finds the claimant’s allegations

regarding her limitations are not totally credible for the reasons

set forth in the body of the decision.

6. The claimant retains the residual functional capacity for

work activity that involves the ability to lift 10 pounds at a time

Case 1:06-cv-00119-C Document 23 Filed 11/08/06 Page 2 of 10
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and occasionally lift and/or carry articles like docket files,

ledgers, and small tools, sit for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday, stand and/or walk for a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour

workday and push and/or pull as much as she can lift and/or

carry. However, the work must allow the use of a cane; must

allow the claimant to sit/stand when desired; must not involve

the use of foot/leg mechanical controls with the right lower

extremity or more than occasional use of foot/leg mechanical

controls with the left lower extremity; must not involve

kneeling, crouching, squatting, crawling, or climbing stairs,

ropes, ladders or scaffolding; must not require more than

occasional exposure to extreme cold; must not require more than

occasional concentrated exposure to water/liquids; must not

involve the use of vibrating objects/moving parts with the right

lower extremity or more than occasional use of the left lower

extremity; must not involve working in high exposed places or

around fast moving machinery on the ground.

7. The claimant is unable to perform any of her past

relevant work (20 CFR §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).

8. The claimant is a “younger individual" (20 CFR §§

404.1563 and 416.963).

9. The claimant has a “high school (or high school

equivalent) education” (20 CFR §§ 404.1564 and 416.964).

10. The claimant has no transferable skills from any past

relevant work and/or transferability of skills is not an issue in

this case (20 CFR §§ 404.1568 and 416.968).

11. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform a significant range of sedentary work (20 CFR §§

404.1567 and 416.967).

12. Although the claimant’s exertional limitations do not

allow her to perform the full range of sedentary work, using

Medical-Vocational Rule 201.21 as a framework for decisionCase 1:06-cv-00119-C Document 23 Filed 11/08/06 Page 3 of 10
4

making, there are a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that she could perform. Examples of such jobs include

work as a plastic design applier with 70 jobs in the region[,] 840

jobs in several regions and 43,700 jobs in the nation; and as a

call out operator with 510 jobs in the region, 6,100 jobs in

several regions and 318,250 jobs in the nation.

13. The claimant was not under a “disability,” as defined in

the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this

decision (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 19-20) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision (Tr. 4-6) and

thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving

that she is unable to perform her previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d

1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,

the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical

facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence

of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history. Id. at 1005.

Once the claimant meets this burden, as here, it becomes the Commissioner's

burden to prove that the claimant is capable, given her age, education and work

history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which

exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th

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Cir. 1985).

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can

perform a reduced range of sedentary work, is supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28

L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we

must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as

well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792

F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

In this case, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to weigh

all available medical evidence pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) and that

she also erred in failing to assess all impairments pursuant to Social Security

Rulings 96-9p and 83-12 by posing an incomplete hypothetical question to the

vocational expert. Because it is clear to the undersigned that the ALJ erred in

failing to weigh all available evidence in this case, specifically the medical

records from Dr. David Nazarian, this Court need not address the remaining

issue raised by plaintiff. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th

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Cir. 1985) (“Because the ‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone warrants a

reversal,’ we do not consider the appellant’s other claims.”).

The Commissioner’s regulations define medical opinions as “statements

from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that

reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]

impairment(s), including [a claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,

what [the claimant] can still do despite [the] impairment(s), and [the

claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (2006)

(emphasis supplied). The regulations provide that regardless of the source of

the medical opinion, the Commissioner will evaluate every opinion it receives.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). In general, the Commissioner will give more weight

to the opinion of a medical source who has examined the claimant than the

opinion of a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); see Syrock,

supra, 764 F.2d at 835 (“‘The law is clear that, although the opinion of an

examining physician is generally entitled to more weight than the opinion of

a non-examining physician, the ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any

physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.’”). 

In recognition of the Commissioner’s regulations, the Eleventh Circuit

requires an ALJ to “‘state specifically the weight accorded to each item of

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evidence and why [s]he reached that decision.’” Reese v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d

1395, 1397 (11th Cir. 1991), quoting Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735

(11th Cir. 1981). Stated differently, in assessing the medical evidence in a

particular case, an ALJ is “required to state with particularity the weight [s]he

gave the different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Sharfarz v.

Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see Wiggins v.

Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 & 1390 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he opinion of

the ALJ in the present case does not mention Dr. Mracek, let alone reveal what

weight, if any, the ALJ gave to the treating physician’s evidence. . . . The

ALJ’s opinion, thus, not only fails to mention the appellant’s treating physician

and the weight, if any, the ALJ gave to the treating physician’s evidence and

opinion, but also strongly suggests that the ALJ did not accord the opinion of

the appellant’s treating physician the weight required by law. At the very least,

we are unable to determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard

and gave the treating physician’s evidence substantial or considerable weight

or found good cause not to do so. If we are to provide the parties with any sort

of meaningful judicial review, we must be able to ascertain whether the ALJ

correctly followed the law. Unable to divine this from the ALJ’s opinion, we

must reverse the district court and remand the case for reconsideration by the

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2 However, the record contains no medical source statement from Dr. Nazarian

after the date of the hearing, the hearing having been conducted on June 1, 2005 (Tr. 263).

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ALJ, who should evaluate all the evidence according to the respective weight

required by law and should render a decision that will provide reviewing

courts with the basis for determining that he applied the correct legal

standards.”); cf. Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 880 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The

ALJ must articulate his reasons for not giving weight to the diagnoses

accompanying the test results.”). 

In this case, the ALJ wholly failed to state the weight she was affording

Dr. Nazarian’s medical opinions and evidence. (Tr. 12-20) In fact, the ALJ’s

hearing decision makes no mention of Dr. Nazarian (id.) despite the fact that

the ALJ recognized that Dr. Nazarian had examined Evans and that his

medical records needed to be obtained before she rendered her decision (Tr.

267-268; see also Tr. 290 (“I’m also going to be sending a medical source

statement to Dr. Nazarian. Long as we’re doing everything, we might as well

just hit them with everything.”);2 see Tr. 276-277 & 286 (in questioning

plaintiff, the ALJ learned that Evans had seen Dr. Nazarian on two occasions

and that during her last appointment, April 25, 2005, the orthopedic surgeon

Case 1:06-cv-00119-C Document 23 Filed 11/08/06 Page 8 of 10
3 Dr. Nazarion’s impression, or diagnosis, on April 25, 2005 was “[f]ailed right

knee” (Tr. 198); he recommended right total knee revision arthroplasty (id.).

4 The defendant contends that the ALJ’s failure to mention Dr. Nazarian’s findings

in her decision does not mean those findings were not considered and she thereafter cites to Dyer

v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206 (2005), a case in which the Eleventh Circuit determined that “there is

no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so

long as the ALJ’s decision, as was not the case here, is not a broad rejection which is ‘not

enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her

medical condition as a whole.’” Id. at 1211 (citation omitted). Needless to say, an ALJ’s failure

to mention and weigh the medical opinions and evidence submitted by an examining physician is

a far cry from an ALJ failing to mention one pain medication that a claimant is taking, as was the

case in Dyer. Because Dyer is factually inapposite to this case it cannot “save the day” for the

defendant.

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recommended further surgery on her right knee)).3 The ALJ’s failure to state

with particularity the weight she was affording Dr. Nazarian’s medical

opinions and evidence is reversible error under the Commissioner’s own

regulations and Eleventh Circuit case law.4

 This error is particularly egregious

in this case since Dr. Nazarian’s April 25, 2005 diagnosis of a failed right knee

and recommendation for further surgery (Tr. 198-199) arguably lend support

to Dr. Stephen Bosacco’s January 11, 2005 opinion that Evans was unable to

work (Tr. 217 (“She cannot work in any capacity as she can barely walk.”)),

an opinion which the ALJ rejected (Tr. 16). On remand, the ALJ “should

evaluate all the evidence according to the respective weight required by law

and should render a decision that will provide reviewing courts with the basis

for determining that [s]he applied the correct legal standards.” Wiggins, supra,

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679 F.2d at 1390. 

CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct.

2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff

a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239

(1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.

DONE this the 6th day of November, 2006.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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