Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00463/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

MELINDA KAY PRENTICE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

5:13-0463-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Melinda Kay Prentice (“Prentice”) brings this action pursuant to Section

205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the

final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision - which

has become the decision of the Commissioner - is supported by substantial evidence. 

Therefore, for the reasons elaborated herein, the court will affirm the decision denying

benefits.

I. Procedural History

Prentice, whose past relevant experience includes work as motel manager, filed an

application for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security

Income on June 11, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of December 5, 2008, due to

back problems, diabetes, depression, eye problems and lung problems. (R. 10, 145). 

FILED

 2014 Aug-28 PM 02:49

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-00463-AKK Document 13 Filed 08/28/14 Page 1 of 9
After the SSA denied Prentice’s claim, she requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 96-

97). The ALJ subsequently denied Prentice’s claim, (R. 7-15), which became the final

decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused to grant review. (R.

1-4). Prentice then filed this action for judicial review pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1.

II. Standard of Review

 The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker,

672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen,

792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) mandates that the

Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not

reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision as a whole and determine if the

decision is “reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). Substantial evidence

falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other

citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm the

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Commissioner’s factual findings even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the

Commissioner’s findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges

that judicial review of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review

“does not yield automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairments which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment

that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are

demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4) whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

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(5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national

economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative answer to

any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps three and five, to

a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than step three, leads to

a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once

a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to prior work the burden shifts to the

Secretary to show other work the claimant can do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559

(11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

In performing the five step analysis, the ALJ found that Prentice had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since December 5, 2008, and, therefore, met Step One. (R.

12). Next, the ALJ found that Prentice satisfied Step Two because she suffered from the

severe impairments of “asthma; Type II diabetes with diabetic neuropathy; carpal tunnel

syndrome bilaterally; bilateral ankle edema; [and] chronic back pain.” Id. The ALJ then

proceeded to the next step and found that Prentice failed to satisfy Step Three because

she “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals one of the listed impairments.” (R. 13). Although the ALJ answered Step Three

in the negative, consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, the ALJ

proceeded to Step Four where she determined that Prentice has the residual functional

capacity (RFC) to perform

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light work (lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently;

sit/stand/walk up to 6 hours each in an 8 hour day) as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) when afforded the option to sit or stand at

will. However, the claimant can have no concentrated exposure to fumes

and dust. She can perform only frequent, as opposed to constant repetitive,

bilateral handling and fingering. 

Id. In light of her RFC, the ALJ held that Prentice “is capable of performing past

relevant work as a motel manager.” (R. 15). Therefore, the ALJ found that Prentice “has

not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 5,

2008, through the date of this decision.” (R. 15).

V. Analysis

Prentice’s sole issue on appeal is her contention that the ALJ committed an error

of law by failing to find her depressive disorder as a severe impairment at Step Two. 

Doc. 9 at 2. According to Prentice, the ALJ failed to consider that “the mental health

center made a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate,” which “is a

severe impairment within the regulatory criteria.” Id. at 6-7. 

As Prentice acknowledges, “there is not a great deal in the way of medical

evidence concerning [Prentice’s] depression.” Id. at 6. In fact, the medical records show

Prentice was treated on four occasions at the Mental Health Center of Madison County

(“MHC”). Prentice first visited the MHC on February 3, 2010, and her counselor, Karin

Flores, completed a psychosocial assessment noting that Prentice reported that she

isolates herself, is not motivated to do anything, stays in bed most of the time, has poor

sleep, is stressed out, tearful, and feels worthless and hopeless. (R. 446). Ms. Flores also

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prepared a treatment plan listing Prentice’s diagnosis as Major Depressive Disorder,

Recurrent, Moderate. (R. 450). When Prentice returned to the MHC for a psychiatric

assessment on February 23, 2010, Dr. Alan Piha noted that Prentice “looks depressed,”

and prescribed medications. (R. 444-45). These medications proved effective, and on

April 6, 2010, Prentice denied problems with mood or anxiety, and reported to Dr. Piha

that the medication “helped her to feel better and she is engaging more.” (R. 440). 

Prentice also reported that she was “not having crying spells,” and that “[s]he is looking

for a part time job and is applying for disability.” Id. Dr. Piha found on mental status

examination that Prentice’s mood was euthymic, that she appeared alert, and that her

thought process was organized. Id. At her final visit to Dr. Piha on July 6, 2010,

Prentice reported “no complaints . . . other than stressors,” and that “she [was] not

depressed.” (R. 436). Dr. Piha commented that Prentice was “euthymic and talkative.” 

Id.

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Prentice’s depression caused “at most, mild,

limitations in activities of daily living, social functioning and concentration, persistence

or pace” and “[t]here are no episodes of decompensation.” (R. 12). The regulations

provide that in such circumstances, the ALJ “will generally conclude that your

impairment[] is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more

than a minimal limitation in your ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520a(d)(1). Accordingly, the ALJ found Prentice’s “depression has, at most, a

minimal effect upon [her] ability to perform work-related functions, and consequently, is

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‘non-severe’ within the regulatory definition.” (R. 12-13). The ALJ’s discussion of the

medical evidence shows the factual basis for his finding. In reviewing the MHC

treatment records, the ALJ recognized Prentice was diagnosed with “major depressive

disorder,” and began treatment at MHC in 2010, “when she reported stresses including

being on probation.” (R. 14). However, the ALJ correctly observed that after Prentice

began treatment, Dr. Piha noted that she “denied mood symptoms, anxiety,

hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, or suicidal or homicidal symptoms,” had “a good

appetite with normal orientation,” and that Prentice “was not depressed.” Id. Based on

this record, the court finds that the MHC treatment records provide substantial evidence

to support the ALJ’s reasonable conclusion that Prentice’s depression was not a severe

impairment because they shows that treatment relieved Prentice’s depressive symptoms. 

See Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267,1270 (11th Cir. 1980) (conditions adequately

controlled by treatment are not disabling).1

The court further finds that Prentice’s heavy reliance on the diagnosis of Major

Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Moderate to support her contention that the ALJ erred

by not including it as a severe impairment is misplaced because “the mere existence of

[this diagnosis] does not reveal the extent to which [it] limit[s] [Prentice’s] ability to

work or undermine the ALJ’s determination in that regard.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 1

the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.

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F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005). Significantly, the regulations require Prentice to

“provide evidence . . . showing how [her depression] affects [her] functioning,” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(c), 416.912(c); see also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276

(11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he claimant bears the burden of proving that [s]he is disabled, and,

consequently, [s]he is responsible for producing evidence in support of h[er] claim.”)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), (c)). Here, the treatment records do not support such

limitations and Prentice has not met her burden of showing that her depression caused

more than minimal limitations in her ability to do basic work activities.

Finally, because the ALJ found in Prentice’s favor at Step Two, the specific

impairments listed are irrelevant. After all, “[n]othing requires that the ALJ must

identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be considered severe,” provided

the ALJ considered the claimant’s impairments in combination. Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Delia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 433

F. App’x 885, 887 (11th Cir. 2011) (failure to find a claimant’s mental impairment severe

was harmless because the ALJ found other severe impairments and considered the

impairment in the rest of the decision). Moreover, the regulations state that the only

consequence of the analysis at Step Two is that if the ALJ finds no severe impairment or

impairments, he should reach a conclusion of no disability. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.920(c)a)(ii). There is no error here because the ALJ recognized that she must

consider Prentice’s nonsevere impairments in assessing Prentice’s RFC, (R. 11), and

discussed Prentice’s depression in making that assessment. (R. 14). This is sufficient to

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show the the ALJ considered Prentice’s impairments in combination. See Jones v. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir.1991) (ALJ’s consideration of

the claimant’s combined impairments at later steps in the sequential evaluation process is

sufficient to show the impairments were considered in combination). Accordingly, any

error resulting from the ALJ’s failure to identify Prentice’s depression as severe at Step

Two is harmless because it did not, in any way, change the ALJ’s decision. See

Caldwell v. Barnhart, 261 F. App’x 188, 190 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Diorio v. Heckler,

721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir.1983)).

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that

Prentice is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ applied

proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the Commissioner’s

final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance with the memorandum of

decision will be entered.

DONE this 28th day of August, 2014. 

________________________________

 ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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