Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-04057/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-04057-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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NO. C 09-04057 RS

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

BARRITA, INC., dba LA VICTORIA 

TAQUERIA; NICANDRO BARRITA; 

ENS ASSOCIATES INVESTMENTS, 

LLC; MASOUD SHAHIDI; NICANDRO 

BARRITA; and DOES 1 through 10, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

No. C 09-04057 RS 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

I. INTRODUCTION 

In September 2009, plaintiff Armando Rodriguez, an individual who requires a wheelchair 

for mobility, filed this action against defendants Barrita Inc., Nicandro Barrita, ENS Associates 

Investments LLC, and Masoud Shahidi. In his First Amended Complaint (FAC), Rodriguez alleges 

that defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), the California 

Disabled Persons Act, and the Unruh Act. In particular, he claims defendants discriminated against 

him by failing to remove architectural barriers to access at La Victoria Taqueria, a restaurant in San 

Jose, California. Rodriguez seeks injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees and costs. 

A bench trial was held in October 2013. This order, which is based upon the evidence 

presented at trial, the oral arguments of counsel, and the parties’ briefs, comprises the findings of 

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fact and conclusions of law required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).1 As set forth below, 

Rodriguez prevails on some, but not all, of his allegations. As an initial matter, several alleged 

barriers are not actionable. Defendants are liable, however, with respect to all sixteen actionable 

barriers. While some of these barriers violate both federal and California law, others violate only 

state law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT 

A. Parties 

1. Plaintiff Armando Rodriguez has been physically disabled since 2006, when a car 

accident left him paralyzed from the waist down. Due to his paraplegia, Rodriguez uses 

a wheelchair for mobility. 

2. Defendant Barrita Inc., an entity incorporated in 2005, is the owner of the La Victoria 

Taqueria located at 140 East San Carlos Street in San Jose, California (“La Victoria” or 

“the restaurant”). It has two officers, including co-defendant Nicandro Barrita.2 Barrita 

Inc. does not have by-laws or an independent board. It holds corporate meetings “as 

needed” every three or four months. No notes or minutes are taken during those 

meetings. At trial, Nicandro testified that Barrita Inc. has never issued stock, nor does it 

have any plans to do so. 

3. Defendant Nicandro Barrita is the president of Barrita Inc. In 1998, before Barrita Inc. 

was formed, Nicandro signed a lease for the building that now houses La Victoria (“the 

building”). Barrita Inc. assumed the lease in 2008. As president of Barrita Inc., 

Nicandro is a signatory on the lease for the corporation. 

4. Defendant Masoud Shahidi purchased the building in 1999. 

5. Defendant ENS Associates Investments LLC is a real estate investment company owned 

in equal shares by Masoud Shahidi and Hamid Emarlou. ENS holds corporate meetings 

 

1

 To the extent that any conclusions of law are inadvertently labeled as findings of fact (or vice 

versa), the findings and conclusions shall be considered “in [their] true light, regardless of the label 

that the . . . court may have placed on [them].” Tri–Tron International v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 435–

36 (9th Cir. 1975). 

2

 As there are both entities and persons bearing the Barrita name relevant to this action, to avoid 

confusion this order will refer to Nicandro Barrita by use of his first name. 

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from time to time, but Shahidi and Emarlou do not keep minutes of the meetings. ENS 

has owned the building since 2004, when Shahidi transferred ownership to ENS. 

Shahidi, who has invested his own personal funds in ENS, is the signatory on the lease 

between ENS and Barrita. 

B. Non-Party Witnesses 

1. Carlos Tovar is Rodriguez’s brother-in-law. He accompanied Rodriguez during his 2008 

visit to La Victoria. 

2. Marcelino Barrita, Nicandro’s father, works at La Victoria. He was on the premises in 

2007 when firefighters extinguished a fire that had started in the restaurant’s kitchen. 

Following the fire, he oversaw repairs to the facility. 

3. Abdullah Mojaddidi is a wheelchair-bound individual with paraplegia. He testified 

regarding his experiences as a disabled patron of La Victoria. 

4. Jonathan Adler, a general contractor and disability access consultant, testified as an 

expert for Rodriguez. 

5. Karl Danz, a contractor with experience designing and implementing disabled access 

construction projects, testified as an expert for Rodriguez. 

6. Dawn Anderson, an architect, testified as an expert for defendants. 

C. Rodriguez’s Visit to La Victoria 

1. In November 2008, Rodriguez visited La Victoria after attending a doctor’s appointment 

in San Jose. Because Rodriguez was unable to operate a car at the time, his brother-inlaw, Carlos Tovar, drove him. At trial, Rodriguez testified that he wanted to visit La 

Victoria because he remembered enjoying the restaurant prior to his accident.

2. When Rodriguez and Tovar pulled up to the restaurant, Rodriguez noticed that there was 

a stairway leading up to the front entrance. He further observed that there was no lift or 

ramp for persons in wheelchairs. Tovar went inside to see if there was an alternate 

entrance. At trial, Tovar testified that he used La Victoria’s restroom, which he observed 

to be too small for an individual in a wheelchair.

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3. Tovar returned to the car, where he informed Rodriguez that there was no alternate 

entrance. He also told Rodriguez that even if he could get inside, the restroom would be 

too small for him to use. Based on this information, Rodriguez decided to go home. He 

was deterred by the restaurant’s barriers to access. Rodriguez persuasively testified that 

the experience made him feel sad, angry, and frustrated. 

D. The Subject Property 

1. The building was constructed in 1908 as a residence. It remained a residence until 1985, 

when the San Jose Building Department reclassified it as an office space. 

2. The building was then remodeled in 1986. While the precise extent of the 1986 

renovations is unknown, records maintained by the Building Department indicate that the 

building underwent significant modifications pursuant to the 1985 change in occupancy. 

Upon examining the records, plaintiff’s expert Jonathan Adler opined that the first-floor 

restroom was altered, rendering it smaller. He also concluded that the kitchen was 

enlarged and converted into a commercial cooking space. Adler further opined that new 

stairs were added to the entrance of the building. The records also indicate that a singlestory addition was constructed in the rear of the building. While the parties dispute the 

extent of the 1986 remodeling, experts for both plaintiff and defendants opined that some 

degree of alteration occurred in 1986.

3. Despite the 1985 change in occupancy and the 1986 remodeling, both of which 

Rodriguez contends triggered heightened accessibility obligations under California 

disability law, the building was not made accessible to persons in wheelchairs. 

According to San Jose Building Department records, the prior owners, citing 

unreasonable hardship, requested an exception from compliance with handicapped 

accessibility law. The City apparently granted the owners’ request with respect to the 

1985 change in occupancy and the 1986 remodeling. 

4. Shahidi was unaware of the 1986 Department records until this lawsuit was filed. 

Similarly, Nicandro never made an attempt to discern if the restaurant was compliant 

with federal and state disability access obligations.

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5. Nicandro testified that at least three different restaurants had operated within the building 

before La Victoria opened in 1998. 

6. In 2007, a fire broke out in the La Victoria kitchen. Defendants closed the restaurant to 

repair the resulting damage. The repairs cost between $100,000 and $110,000.

7. The parties dispute the extent of the repairs. Defendants contend the fire damage was 

limited to the kitchen, the second floor, and the duct leading to the roof. 

8. According to defendants, the following repairs were made after the fire: repair to walls 

and ceiling in the kitchen; repair to the shaft enclosing the grease duct; repair to the 

kitchen’s tile floor; repair to the side of the building and overhang; repair to the wall and 

ceiling in the basement, including a storage area; repair to the walls and ceiling in the 

second floor; and superficial repairs to the portion of the roof and building structure 

covering the duct and stove hood. Interior and exterior elements of the building were also 

painted to match repaired portions of walls and siding. Most of these repairs, defendants 

assert, were undertaken to return the stove (including its hood and duct) to working 

condition.

9. Rodriguez contends that the post-fire repairs were more extensive than defendants are 

willing to admit. In addition to the aforementioned repairs acknowledged by defendants, 

Rodriguez claims that a new full-height stud wall was installed to support the stove hood 

in the kitchen. He also contends that a new stove hood was installed. He further 

emphasizes the testimony of Marcelino Barrita, a percipient witness and father of 

Nicandro, who observed firefighters knocking down portions of second-floor stud walls 

encasing the hood duct. Rodriguez contends that because stud walls were partially 

removed, the resulting repairs constituted significant reconstruction.

10. After the fire, citing unreasonable hardship, Barrita Inc. applied for a formal exception 

from disabled access requirements. The City of San Jose Building Division granted the 

exception. In its hardship application, Barrita Inc. represented that the total cost of 

repairs was only $6,269. (Pl’s Exh. 14). This figure is significantly lower than the 

actual cost, which was somewhere between $100,000 and $110,000. In a separate permit 

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application, defendants represented to the City that the repairs only cost $40,118. 

Furthermore, although Barrita Inc. represented in its hardship application that it would 

conduct a number of access upgrades, it made no such improvements during the 2007 

repairs. Emphasizing these significant discrepancies, Rodriguez questions the credibility 

of defendants’ representations about the extent of the fire damage. 

E. Barriers to Access 

1. The parties stipulate that more than twenty distinct barriers to access existed at the time 

of Rodriguez’s 2008 visit to La Victoria. (Pl’s Exh. 56). Many of the stipulated barriers 

are alleged in Rodriguez’s FAC. Some, however, were not identified until April 2013, 

when plaintiff’s expert Jonathan Adler filed a supplemental expert report following an 

on-site inspection of the premises. 

2. Adler’s April 2013 report also purports to identify additional barriers that were created 

by subsequent modifications to the subject property. Rodriguez seeks to hold defendants 

liable for these late-arising barriers, including insufficient disabled seating in the La 

Victoria dining room and excessive ramping on the path below the entrance steps. 

3. The following barriers existed at the time of Rodriguez’s 2008 visit and were properly 

identified in Rodriguez’s FAC: 

a. the restaurant had no accessible public entrance for wheelchair users, 

b. the stair risers were excessively high, 

c. the stair risers were not uniform, 

d. the stair handrails were incomplete, 

e. the stair handrails lacked sufficient gripping surface, 

f. the stairs lacked caution striping, 

g. the restroom lacked geometric signage, 

h. the restroom’s tactile signage was improperly located, 

i. the restroom door threshold was raised too high, 

j. the restroom door was too narrow, 

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k. there was not enough space for a wheelchair to turn around inside the 

restroom, 

l. the restroom door lacked sufficient strike-edge clearance, thereby making it 

difficult for a wheelchair user to enter and exit the restroom, 

m. the restroom lacked sufficient space for a wheelchair user to transfer 

himself or herself to the toilet, 

n. the side grab bar was improperly located, 

o. the lavatory counter surface was too high, 

p. the mirror was too high, 

q. the paper towel dispenser was too high, 

r. the sink was too high, 

s.the hot-water pipe beneath the sink was not insulated, thereby posing a burn 

threat to a wheelchair user, and 

t. the dining room “order counter” was too high. Id.

4. Since Rodriguez’s visit, several of the aforementioned barriers have been remediated. 

Id.

F. Availability of Accessibility Improvements and Alternatives 

1. The interior structure of the building precludes defendants from bringing the restroom 

door into full compliance with federal and state accessibility standards. To make the 

restroom fully compliant, defendants would need to reconstruct a significant portion of 

the building. 

2. Experts for both plaintiff and defendants testified that a power door opener is a potential 

solution to the strike-edge problems on the restroom door. Adler testified that when site 

conditions do not provide sufficient room to create strike-edge clearance in the doorway 

of an existing building, installing a power door opener is a preferred solution for disabled 

access. 

3. Nicandro testified that installing a power door opener was “a possibility.” Vol. III, 

328:23. 

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4. Plaintiff’s experts provided several proposals for wheelchair lifts at the entrance of the 

building. The first plan proposes an incline lift at the left side of the stairs (“Lift A”). 

The second plan proposes an incline lift at the right side of the stairs (“Lift B”). The 

third plan proposes a vertical platform lift situated at the right side of the building (“Lift 

C”). Defendants contend that all three lifts would require the closing of the restaurant 

during construction. Danz, by contrast, testified that the restaurant could remain open 

for the installation of each lift. He further opined that none of the proposals would 

require unusual or difficult construction work. 

5. Lift A: According to Danz, Lift A would take between seven and twelve days to 

construct, including permitting and inspection. He further testified that ramping would 

need to be installed in order to allow a wheelchair user to access the lift’s entrance. After 

proceeding up the ramping to the lift’s entrance, the wheelchair user would board the lift, 

which would proceed to turn around the base of the entrance steps and move at an incline 

up the stairway. Adler testified that the stairs would require structural modifications to 

support the proposed lift. Anderson testified that a concrete foundation would need to be 

poured and the stair wall reconstructed in order to provide adequate support. 

6. Lift B: Like Lift A, Lift B would require structural support and alterations to the path of 

travel leading to the lift’s entrance. Danz testified that, as proposed, Lift B would extend 

at least twenty inches into the adjacent property when deployed. It would also require an 

encroachment into the city sidewalk, which would need to be raised and altered. 

Because both Lift A and Lift B would move at an incline up the steps, they would block 

some space for customer ingress and egress when deployed. Testimony for experts for 

each side established that, for at least a brief period of time while deployed, an incline lift 

would provide fewer than thirty-six inches of stair width for patrons using the entrance 

steps. 

7. Lift C: Unlike Lifts A and B, which would move at an incline along the entrance steps, 

Lift C would rise vertically up the right side of the building. Due to its proposed location 

on the right side of the restaurant, Lift C could not fit within the subject property. 

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Accordingly, it would require a several-foot easement from the adjacent property, which 

is also owned by ENS. ENS granted such an easement after the commencement of this 

action. Shahidi ultimately revoked the easement, claiming that the lift would interfere 

with the City’s waste collection services. Nicandro, too, testified that the lift would 

interfere with garbage collection. Defendants, however, offered no corroborating 

evidence in support of this contention. Like Lifts A and B, Lift C would require 

defendants to remediate an excessive slope on the path of travel to the lift’s proposed 

entrance. 

8. Danz testified that, excluding additional costs for site work, a vertical incline lift would 

cost $36,400 to install. His testimony further established that, depending on the location 

of the incline lift, the site work and other costs would add somewhere between $10,100 

and $22,100 to the project. 

9. Defendants contend that La Victoria provides curbside take-out for disabled patrons. 

Nicandro testified, however, that the policy is not advertised on the premises or on the 

restaurant’s website. Moreover, Abdullah Mojaddidi testified that he was unable to 

place a curbside take-out order during a 2007 visit to the restaurant. 

10. While the building has many barriers to access, and while defendants were aware of the 

presence of those barriers, no admissible facts reflected that defendants intended to 

discriminate against Rodriguez or other individuals with disabilities. 

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

A. Legal Standards 

i. Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act

Congress passed the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 

addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). Title III 

prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals by public accommodations. Id. at § 12182(a). 

Although restaurants are places of public accommodation, see id. § 12181(7), the law also 

recognizes that in “‘mixed-use’ facilities, where only part of the facility is open to the public, the 

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portion that is closed to the public is not a place of public accommodation and thus is not subject to 

Title III of the ADA.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). 

To recover on a claim for discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove (1) he or she 

is disabled within the meaning of the statute, (2) defendants are private entities that own, lease (or 

lease to), or operate a place of public accommodation, and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 

accommodations by the defendant because of his or her disability. Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. 

Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010).3 The third element is satisfied 

when there is a violation of applicable accessibility standards. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), 

Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). The Title III accessibility standards come in three broad 

categories: the “new construction” provisions, which apply to public accommodations constructed 

after January 26, 1992; the “alteration” provisions, which apply to post-January 26, 1992 alterations 

to buildings that existed as of that date; and the “readily achievable” provisions, which apply to 

unaltered portions of buildings constructed before January 26, 1992. See Moeller v. Taco Bell 

Corp., 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Because the La Victoria building was 

constructed long before January 26, 1992, rendering it an “existing” facility under the ADA, the 

“new construction” provisions are inapplicable here. 

a. “Alteration” Provisions 

The altered portion of any existing building altered after January 26, 1992 is required, “to the 

maximum extent feasible,” to be “readily accessible to and useable by” individuals with disabilities. 

42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). To satisfy this standard, alterations must comply with the ADA 

Architectural Guidelines (ADAAG).4

 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.406. These guidelines, which are 

promulgated by the Attorney General to carry out the provisions of the ADA, “lay out the technical 

structural requirements of places of public accommodation.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. 

b. “Readily Achievable” Provisions. 

 

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 The first and second elements are not in dispute. Rodriguez is disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA. Defendants each own, operate, and/or lease a place of public accommodation. 

4

 The ADAAG applied to the building during the 2007 fire repairs and during Rodriguez’s 2008 

visit. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.406. The Standards for Accessible Design (ADAS) govern alterations 

made after March 15, 2012. Id.

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The ADAAG addresses whether an architectural element prohibits full and equal access to 

individuals with disabilities. See Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 848. In existing but unaltered 

buildings, architectural barriers must be removed where it is “readily achievable” to do so. 42 

U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The removal of barriers is “readily achievable” when it is “easily 

accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” Id. § 12181(9). If 

an entity demonstrates that the removal of an architectural barrier is not readily achievable, it 

nonetheless discriminates against persons with disabilities if it fails “to make such goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods if such 

methods are readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). 

ii. Unruh Act and California Disabled Persons Act

Long before Congress passed the ADA, California enacted several statutes to prohibit 

disability discrimination at the state level. See Jankey v. Song Koo Lee, 290 P.3d 187, 194-95 

(2012). Two overlapping laws, the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act 

(CDPA), are presently “the principal sources of state disability access protection.” Id. at 195. Both 

statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and equal access to the services, 

facilities, and advantages of public accommodation.” Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 848. Although 

the Unruh Act and CDPA overlap substantially with the ADA, see Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 

P.3d 623, 632 (2009), the California legislature has sought to afford disabled persons additional 

protections and remedies not provided under federal law. See Jankey, 290 P.3d at 195 (“[S]hortly 

after passage of the ADA, the Legislature amended the state's disability protections to strengthen 

California law in areas where it is weaker than the ADA and to retain California law when it 

provides more protection for individuals with disabilities than the ADA.”) (quotation marks, 

citations, and alterations omitted). Unlike the ADA, which only provides for injunctive relief and 

attorney fees, the CDPA and the Unruh Act allow plaintiffs to recover damages. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 

52(a), 54.3.5

 Moreover, because California disability access standards long predate the ADA and 

ADAAG, the CDPA and the Unruh Act can sometimes operate to remedy barriers that would not 

otherwise fall within the ambit of the ADA. See Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 264 F.R.D. 557, 

 

5

 The CDPA also provides for injunctive relief and attorney fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 55. 

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561 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“It may be possible, however, for an accessibility barrier to violate the 

California statutes without violating the ADA.”). 

There are several avenues by which a plaintiff can prevail on a disability discrimination 

claim under the CDPA or the Unruh Act. First, he or she can prove that defendants violated 

California accessibility requirements. Public accommodations constructed or altered after July 1, 

1970, are subject to California Health & Safety Code and Government Code requirements for 

disabled access. Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 847. Since 1981, Title 24 of the California Code of 

Regulations, also known as the California Building Code, has set forth accessibility requirements for 

public accommodations. Id. A violation of Title 24 standards constitutes a violation of both the 

Unruh Act and the CDPA. See Arnold v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 433, 439 

(N.D. Cal. 1994). To receive damages under the Unruh Act, however, the plaintiff also “must plead 

and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.” 

Munson, 208 P.3d at 690 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The CDPA has no such 

requirement. See Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3. If a plaintiff prevails on a damages claim under both 

statutes, double recovery is not permitted. Munson, 208 P.3d at 632. 

A plaintiff can also prevail under these California statutes by proving that defendants 

violated federal disability law. Moeller, 816 F. Supp 2d at 848. Following passage of the ADA, the 

California legislature amended the CDPA and the Unruh Act to provide that a violation of the ADA 

constitutes a violation of both state statutes. See id.; Cal. Civ.Code §§ 51(f), 54(c). Because the 

ADA itself contains no intent requirement, the California Supreme Court has held that where an 

Unruh Act claim is premised on a violation of the ADA, the plaintiff need not demonstrate 

intentional discrimination to recover. Munson, 208 P.3d 623. 

B. Actionable Barriers 

As a threshold matter, the parties dispute which of the alleged barriers are actionable. 

Defendants argue that Rodriguez lacks standing to challenge several barriers pertaining to the safety 

of the restaurant’s front stairway. They further contend that he lacks standing under the CDPA or 

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the Unruh Act to seek monetary damages for certain barriers inside the restaurant. Finally, 

defendants assert that claims relating to certain barriers are barred as a result of being raised too late 

in this litigation. 

i. Standing to Remediate Stairway Barriers 

The United States Constitution restricts federal judicial power to the adjudication of “cases” 

or “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate their grievances in 

federal court must first demonstrate that they have standing to sue— “an essential and unchanging 

part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560 (1992). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered or is 

threatened with an injury that is both “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical;” that there is a causal link between the injury and the conduct of which 

the plaintiff complains—that is, that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged conduct; and 

that the injury is “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., 

Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 

“The Supreme Court has instructed us to take a broad view of constitutional standing in civil 

rights cases, especially where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits ‘are the primary method 

of obtaining compliance with the Act.’” Doran, 524 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. 

Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). The ADA provides that a plaintiff is entitled to bring an 

action to correct both barriers he actually encountered and those he was actually deterred from 

encountering. 42 U.S.C. §12188(a)(1). A barrier will only satisfy Lujan’s “injury-in-fact” 

requirement, however, if it relates to the plaintiff’s particular disability. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947; 

see also id. at 947, n. 4 (“We recognize that an encountered barrier must interfere with the particular 

plaintiff's full and equal enjoyment of the facility, making his use of the facility more difficult than a 

nondisabled individual's, to constitute an injury-in-fact, and that he is required to allege and prove 

that injury.”). 

Rodriguez seeks to remediate several barriers pertaining to the construction and safety of La 

Victoria’s front steps: excessive riser height at the bottom of the steps; the lack of uniform stair 

risers; incomplete handrails on the stairs; noncompliant grip on the handrails; and an absence of 

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caution striping on each step (“stairway safety barriers”). Assuming these architectural elements 

violate the ADAAG, they nonetheless do not relate to Rodriguez’s particular disability. See 

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947. The stairway safety barriers did not make Rodriguez’s “use of the 

facility more difficult than a nondisabled individual’s[.]” Id. at 947, n. 4.6

 By contrast, the absence

of a wheelchair-accessible entrance (i.e., the lack of an ADA-complaint wheelchair ramp, lift, or 

other means of entering the facility in a wheelchair) plainly interfered with Rodriguez’s full and 

equal enjoyment of the facility, thereby causing an injury-in-fact that could be redressed by a 

decision in his favor. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 

Although federal courts must maintain a broad view of constitutional standing in ADA 

cases, see Doran, 524 F.3d at 1039, the ADA “does not permit private plaintiffs to bring claims as 

private attorneys general to vindicate other people's injuries.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 960 (quoting 

McInnis–Misenor v. Maine Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted)).7

 

Because Rodriguez cannot demonstrate that the stairway safety barriers relate to his particular 

disability, he cannot demonstrate an “injury-in-fact” that can be redressed by court order. 

Accordingly, Rodriguez does not have standing to challenge these architectural elements. 

ii. Availability of Damages Under State Law 

Standing to pursue monetary relief under the CDPA or the Unruh Act is different from 

standing to seek injunctive relief under federal or state law. See Reycraft v. Lee, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

746, 756. Both state statutes restrict damages recovery to situations where “the plaintiff personally 

encountered the violation on a particular occasion, or the plaintiff was deterred from accessing a 

 

6

 Abdullah Mojaddidi testified that his friends carried him up the steps on several occasions. This 

testimony, according to Rodriguez, demonstrates that wheelchair-bound persons can encounter the 

stairway safety barriers. Tovar testified, however, that Rodriguez was not interested in being carried 

up the steps. More crucially, even if Rodriguez were to be carried up the steps, he does not 

demonstrate that these specific architectural elements would make his use of La Victoria more 

difficult than for a nondisabled person. While there is no question that La Victoria’s inaccessible 

entrance makes Rodriguez’s use of the restaurant more difficult, Rodriguez fails to demonstrate that 

his injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged stairway elements. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

7 See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (“[W]e must put aside the natural urge to 

proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience 

and efficiency. Instead, we must carefully inquire as to whether appellees have met their burden of 

establishing that their claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially 

cognizable.”). 

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place of public accommodation on a particular occasion.” Munson, 208 P.3d at 633; Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 55.56. Unlike the ADA, these statutes require “something more than mere awareness of or a 

reasonable belief about the existence of a discriminatory condition.” Reycraft, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 

756. Defendants assert that Rodriguez lacks standing to seek monetary damages for the barriers that 

existed inside the restaurant at the time of his 2008 visit. They argue that because Rodriguez 

remained in his vehicle during his visit to La Victoria and departed upon learning that there was no 

alternative entrance, he never came close to encountering any barriers on the premises. This 

argument is premised on the assumption that the restaurant entrance does not violate the ADA or 

state law in the first instance. By maintaining that the only noncompliant barriers were inside the 

restaurant, defendants argue that Rodriguez did not encounter any barriers to access. As discussed 

infra, however, the restaurant entrance violates the CDPA. Accordingly, there is no question that he 

was “deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion.” Munson, 

208 P.3d at 633. 

Although Rodriguez has standing to pursue monetary damages under state law, California 

Civil Code § 55.56 imposes a significant restriction on his potential recovery. That statute provides, 

in pertinent part: 

Statutory damages may be assessed [for construction-related accessibility claims 

under the CDPA or Unruh Act] based on each particular occasion that the plaintiff 

was denied full and equal access, and not upon the number of violations of 

construction-related accessibility standards identified at the place of public 

accommodation where the denial of full and equal access occurred. If the place of 

public accommodation consists of distinct facilities that offer distinct services, 

statutory damages may be assessed based on each denial of full and equal access to 

the distinct facility, and not upon the number of violations of construction-related 

accessibility standards identified at the place of public accommodation where the 

denial of full and equal access occurred. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(e) (2009).8

 Accordingly, Rodriguez cannot recover separate minimum 

statutory damages for each barrier that was present at the time of his 2008 visit. The statute does 

not, however, affect his ability to recover actual damages.9

 

8

 Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56 was amended in 2012. Because Rodriguez filed his claim prior to the 

amendment, his claim is governed by the prior version of § 55.56. See § 55.56(f)(5) (2012). 

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iii. April 2013 Barriers 

Defendants further contend that several alleged barriers are not actionable because 

Rodriguez failed to incorporate them into his complaint. When Rodriguez filed this action in 2009, 

his initial complaint identified five barriers. An expert report, disclosed during the initial discovery 

period, identified ten additional barriers. The Ninth Circuit then decided Oliver v. Ralph’s Grocery, 

654 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2011), holding that a plaintiff claiming discrimination under the ADA due to 

architectural barriers in a place of public accommodation must allege each barrier in his or her 

complaint. Otherwise, the court held, defendants do not have fair notice of the claims against them 

as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Id. at 908; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. “In general, only 

disclosure of barriers in a properly pleaded complaint can provide [fair] notice; a disclosure made 

during discovery, including an expert report, would rarely be an adequate substitute.” 654 F.3d at 

909. 

In light of Oliver, Rodriguez was granted leave to amend his complaint in January 2013 so 

that he could incorporate the additional barriers identified during discovery. (Docket No. 164). The 

order granting leave to amend provided that discovery would be reopened, limited to the ten 

additional barriers identified in the FAC, until March 14, 2013. In April 2013, after discovery 

closed, plaintiff’s expert Jonathan Adler identified several additional barriers at the subject property 

(“April 2013 barriers”). 10 Some of these newly-identified barriers allegedly arose as a result of 

alterations made to the subject property after this action commenced. Rodriguez did not amend his 

complaint to incorporate the April 2013 barriers. Nonetheless, he contends that defendants should 

be held liable for them. 

At trial, Rodriguez claimed that Oliver should not govern this case, arguing that defendants 

had fair notice that their alterations to the subject property would create new barriers for wheelchairbound patrons. The court in Oliver left open the possibility that in some circumstances Rule 8 

 9

 Both the CDPA and the Unruh Act provide that plaintiffs can recover “actual” damages in excess 

of minimum statutory damages. See §§ 52(a), 54.3(a). The text of 55.56(e) makes clear that the 

provision applies only to statutory damages. See § 55.56(e). 

10 These newly identified barriers included an inaccessible, newly constructed “patio” outside the 

restaurant, unsafe slopes near the entrance to the front steps, inadequate handicapped seating inside 

the restaurant, and inadequate maneuvering space at the top of the front steps. 

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might require less, noting that “a disclosure made during discovery . . . would rarely be an adequate 

substitute” for a barrier alleged in a complaint. 654 F.3d at 909 (emphasis added). Here, however, 

Adler’s disclosure was made after discovery had closed. Further, the order reopening discovery 

specifically restricted discoverable subject matter to the additional barriers identified in the FAC. 

To the extent that Oliver allows for rare circumstances where discovery disclosures suffice to 

provide fair notice of alleged architectural barriers, Adler’s 2013 report presents no such 

circumstance. Accordingly, the April 2013 barriers are not actionable.11 See Paulick v. Starwood 

Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 2012 WL 2990760 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Oliver court makes 

clear . . . that it is only the complaint that should be considered in determining whether the fair 

notice requirement has been met.”). 

iv. Remediated Barriers 

“Where . . . a private plaintiff brings an ADA claim seeking to enjoin a defendant to remove 

an architectural barrier, removal of the barrier before final judgment moots the ADA claim based on 

that barrier.” Hernandez v. Polanco Enterprises, Inc., 2013 WL 4520253 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing 

Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905). Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that several barriers have been 

remediated since the commencement of this action. (Pl. Exh. 56). Accordingly, Rodriguez’s ADA 

claim is moot with respect to these barriers. The remediated barriers are still actionable, however, to 

the extent Rodriguez can establish he is entitled to damages under the CDPA or the Unruh Act due 

to the presence of these barriers during his visit. Cf. Hernandez v. Polanco Enterprises, Inc., 2013 

WL 4520253 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (granting motion for summary judgment against plaintiff’s CDPA 

and Unruh Act claims because plaintiff “made no showing that those barriers could support statelaw claims independent of the alleged [mooted] ADA violations”). 

v. Summary of Actionable Barriers 

 Rodriguez has an actionable ADA claim with respect to the following barriers, which were 

properly identified in the FAC and have not been remediated: 

i. the restaurant had no accessible public entrance for wheelchair users, 

 

11 Furthermore, it is far from clear that Rodriguez would have standing to remediate barriers not in 

existence at the time of his 2008 visit to La Victoria. 

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ii. the restroom door lacked sufficient strike-edge clearance on the “push” side, 

thereby making it difficult for a wheelchair user to enter the restroom 

unassisted, and 

iii. the restroom lacked sufficient strike-edge clearance on the “pull” side, 

thereby making it difficult for a wheelchair user to exit the restroom. 

 Rodriguez has an actionable claim for damages under state law with respect to the following 

barriers that were present during his 2008 visit and properly identified in the FAC: 

i. the restaurant had no accessible public entrance for wheelchair users, 

ii. the restroom door lacked sufficient strike-edge clearance on the “push” side, 

thereby making it difficult for a wheelchair user to enter the restroom 

unassisted, 

iii. the restroom lacked sufficient strike-edge clearance on the “pull” side, 

thereby making it difficult for a wheelchair user to exit the restroom, 

iv. the restroom lacked geometric signage, 

v. the restroom’s tactile signage was improperly located, 

vi. the restroom door threshold was raised too high, 

vii. the restroom door was too narrow, 

viii. there was not enough space for a wheelchair to turn around inside the 

restroom, 

ix. the restroom lacked sufficient space for a wheelchair user to transfer 

himself or herself to the toilet, 

x. the side grab bar was improperly located, 

xi. the lavatory counter surface was too high, 

xii. the mirror was too high, 

xiii. the paper towel dispenser was too high, 

xiv. the sink was too high, 

xv. the hot-water pipe beneath the sink was not insulated, thereby posing a burn 

threat to a wheelchair user, and 

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xvi. the dining room “order counter” was too high. 

C. Rodriguez’s ADA Claim 

Rodriguez asserts a claim under the ADA, alleging defendants discriminated against him 

during his 2008 visit to La Victoria. The parties do not dispute that Rodriguez is disabled within the 

meaning of the statute, nor do they contest whether defendants must comply with the ADA. Instead, 

they focus on whether Rodriguez suffered discrimination within the meaning of the statute – an 

inquiry that hinges on which accessibility standards were applicable at the time of Rodriguez’s visit. 

i. Applicable Standards: Was There an “Alteration”? 

After the 2007 kitchen fire, defendants undertook a variety of repairs. Rodriguez claims that 

these repairs constituted an “alteration” within the meaning of the ADA, thereby triggering a 

heightened obligation to ensure that “altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and 

usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.” See 42 U.S.C. § 

12183(a)(2).12 Defendants maintain that the post-fire repairs did not amount to an alteration. 

The ADA does not define “alteration.” In the absence of a statutory definition, courts have 

looked for guidance to the Department of Justice, which is charged with promulgating 

administrative regulations to implement Title III’s public accommodation provisions (§ 12186(b)), 

rendering technical assistance letters explaining the law’s requirements (§ 12206(c)), and enforcing 

Title III in court (§ 12188(b)). The DOJ’s ADA Architectural Guidelines provide: 

[A]n alteration is a change to a place of public accommodation or a commercial 

facility that affects or could affect the usability of the building or facility or any part 

thereof. 

(1) Alterations include, but are not limited to, remodeling, renovation, 

rehabilitation, reconstruction, historic restoration, changes or rearrangement 

in structural parts or elements, and changes or rearrangement in the plan 

configuration of walls and full-height partitions. Normal maintenance, 

reroofing, painting or wallpapering, asbestos removal, or changes to 

mechanical and electrical systems are not alterations unless they affect the 

usability of the building or facility. 

 

12 Rodriguez further contends that the purported alterations affected a “primary function area,” 

thereby requiring defendants to create access to the paths of travel and sanitary facilities serving the 

areas of alteration. See 28 C.F.C. §§ 36.402(b), 36.403(b). 

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(Appendix A to 28 C.F.R. § 36.402).13 Rodriguez argues that because the kitchen could not 

function and the restaurant could not serve its customers during the 2007 fire repairs, the temporary 

closure of La Victoria affected the usability of the restaurant, thereby constituting an “alteration” 

under the ADA. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(b). 

Although the concept of “usability” is central to determining whether an alteration has been 

made, neither the statute nor the DOJ’s implementing regulations define the term. See Roberts v. 

Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 369 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, few courts in the Ninth Circuit have 

interpreted “usability.” The DOJ has stated, however, that it “remains convinced that the [ADA] 

requires the concept of ‘usability’ to be read broadly to include any change that affects the usability 

of the facility, not simply changes that relate directly to access by individuals with disabilities.” 

Final Rule, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in 

Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35544, 35581 (July 26, 1991).14 

In arguing that the post-fire repairs affected the “usability” of La Victoria, Rodriguez relies 

on a 1998 DOJ opinion letter wherein the Acting Assistant Attorney General opines that 

“[r]econstruction after a fire is considered an ‘alteration.’” DOJ Topic Opinion Letter 772, August 

26, 1998 (ECF No. 232-3, Exh. 2).15 This letter was sent to a member of Congress who had 

apparently requested guidance on behalf of a constituent who was preparing for reconstruction after 

 

13 Because the ADAAG was promulgated in exercise of the DOJ’s statutory authority to issue 

regulations implementing Title III’s public accommodation provisions, the DOJ’s views reflected in 

the ADAAG are due deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837 (1984). See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that an 

administrative regulation “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated 

authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 

interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). 

14 This DOJ remark accompanies the final federal rule implementing 28 C.F.C. § 36.402, the 

provision defining “alteration.” By analyzing and commenting upon how “usability” should be 

construed under § 36.402, the DOJ was offering an interpretation of its own regulations. As such, 

these comments are accorded “substantial” deference. See Miller v. California Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Justice Department's interpretation of its own regulations 

. . . must . . . be given substantial deference and will be disregarded only if plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation.”) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).

15 This correspondence was issued pursuant to the DOJ’s authority to furnish technical assistance to 

individuals and entities concerning their obligations under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206. To 

the extent this letter interprets DOJ regulations, it is entitled to substantial deference. See Miller, 536 F.3d at 1028. 

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a fire destroyed a portion of the interior of his restaurant. After summarizing the definition of 

“alteration” under § 36.402, the Acting Attorney General further explained: 

[I]f the damage caused by the fire is minor and can be corrected by cleaning, repainting, or re-wallpapering, the ADA would not apply. If walls are being 

reconstructed or new toilet fixtures or other elements are provided, the ADA 

requirements would apply. 

Id. These comments are not particularly instructive where, as here, the repairs include more 

than minor “cleaning, re-painting, or re-wallpapering” but less than the installation of new

fixtures or the reconstruction of walls.16 Similarly, the La Victoria repairs fall somewhere 

between the illustrations bookending § 36.402’s definition of “alteration.” While the postfire work was somewhat more involved than “[n]ormal maintenance, reroofing, painting or 

wallpapering, asbestos removal, or changes to mechanical and electrical systems,” the 

repairs were less extensive than the “remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, 

historic restoration, resurfacing of circulation paths or vehicular ways, changes or 

rearrangement in the structural parts or elements, and changes or rearrangement in the plan 

configuration of walls and full-height partitions” described in the ADAAG. See 28 C.F.R. § 

36.402. 

Standing alone, the DOJ’s guidance does not suffice to resolve whether the La 

Victoria repairs could or did affect usability, thereby constituting an “alteration” for 

purposes of the ADA. Moreover, few courts in the Ninth Circuit have interpreted “usability” 

when assessing if an alteration has occurred. Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have 

tended to take an expansive view of alterations that affect usability. See Disabled in Action 

of Penn. v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Authority, 635 F.3d 87, 91-94 (3d Cir. 2011) (under 

ADAAG guidelines, complete replacement of stairway or inoperative escalator is considered 

“remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation [or] reconstruction” that affects “usability,” even 

 

16 Although the kitchen stove was replaced, this does not amount to the installation of a “new” 

fixture or element that might constitute an “alteration.” See Appendix A to 28 C.F.R. § 36.402. 

(“[C]hanges to mechanical and electrical systems are not alterations unless they affect the usability 

of the building or facility.”) Moreover, to the extent that repairs to the second-floor wall 

surrounding the exhaust hood could be characterized as “reconstruction,” the second floor is not a 

primary function area. As such, alterations confined to the second floor duct wall would not trigger 

“path of travel” obligations. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.403. 

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absent “major structural alterations”); Regents of Mercersburg College v. Republic Franklin 

Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 159, 162-64 (3d Cir. 2006) (repairs following “fire that caused extensive 

damage to the roof and fourth floor of the building, as well as smoke and water damage to 

the first, second, and third floors” constituted alteration); Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 

1073 (3d Cir. 1993) (“if an alteration [such as resurfacing] renders a street more ‘usable’ to 

those presently using it, such increased utility must also be made fully accessible to the 

disabled through the installation of curb ramps”). In all cases, however, “alteration seems 

generally to exclude from ‘alterations’ those modifications that essentially preserve the 

status and condition of a facility, rather than rendering it materially ‘new’ in some sense.” 

Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 2008). 

 The evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that the post-fire repairs did 

not render La Victoria materially “new” in any sense. See id. Instead, it tends to show that 

the repairs essentially preserved the status and condition of the building. The repairs around 

the kitchen, second floor, and roof served to return the restaurant’s stove and its attendant 

systems to their working condition. See Appendix A to 28 C.F.R. § 36.402. (“[C] hanges to 

mechanical and electrical systems are not alterations unless they affect the usability of the 

building or facility.”). The remaining changes appear to have been mostly superficial in 

nature. While the precise extent of the post-fire repairs remains unclear, the evidence leads 

to the conclusion that the post-fire repairs did not constitute an “alteration” for purposes of 

the ADA.17

 

17 Neither the ADA nor the ADAAG makes clear which party has the burden to prove that an 

“alteration” did or did not occur, nor has the Ninth Circuit clarified the issue. In Roberts v. Royal 

Atl. Corp., the Second Circuit adopted a burden-shifting scheme for establishing whether a public 

accommodation experienced a qualifying alteration: 

To establish the existence of an alteration, a plaintiff fulfills his or her initial burden 

of production by identifying a modification to a facility and by making a facially 

plausible demonstration that the modification is an alteration under the ADA. The 

defendant then bears the burden of persuasion to establish that the modification is in 

fact not an alteration. 

542 F.3d 363, 371 (2d Cir. 2008). The court in Roberts reasoned that while plaintiffs should 

generally be capable of pointing to an initial modification potentially constituting an alteration, 

defendants “can be expected to have superior access to information with which to refute assertions 

that their facilities have been altered within the meaning of the statute and the applicable regulations 

and commentary.” Id. Here, ascertaining where the burden rests is not critical in that the conclusion 

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ii. Is Removal of the Barriers “Readily Achievable”? 

In the absence of an “alteration” after January 26, 1992, the “readily achievable” 

standards applied at the time of Rodriguez’s visit to La Victoria. Therefore, defendants 

remained under a general, ongoing obligation to remove any architectural barriers where it 

was “readily achievable” to do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The removal of 

barriers is “readily achievable” when it is “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out 

without much difficulty or expense.” Id. § 12181(9). As the statute makes clear, that 

standard encompasses a number of context-specific considerations: 

In determining whether an action is readily achievable, factors to be considered 

include-- 

(A) the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter; 

(B) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the 

action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on 

expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon the 

operation of the facility; 

(C) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the 

business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 

number, type, and location of its facilities; and 

(D) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 

composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the 

geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or 

facilities in question to the covered entity. 

Id. at § 12181(9). 

Defendants bear the initial burden of production as well as the ultimate burden of 

persuasion in establishing that remediation is not readily achievable. See Rodriguez v. 

Barrita, Inc., 2012 WL 3538014 (N.D. Cal. 2012); ECF No. 138. “Further, defendants must 

carry their burden with respect to each identified barrier to access in the facility.” Id. Three 

barriers remain at issue for purposes of Rodriguez’s ADA claim: inadequate push-side 

clearance on the restroom door, inadequate pull-side clearance on the restroom door, and the 

inaccessible restaurant entrance. 

 

of “no alteration” arises under either formulation. Even if, consistent with Roberts, defendants in 

the Ninth Circuit must shoulder the burden of persuasion, defendants here have successfully 

established that the fire repairs did not constitute an alteration. 

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1. Restroom Door Barriers 

La Victoria’s restroom entrance poses two actionable barriers: inadequate strike-edge 

clearance on both the “push” and “pull” sides of the restroom door.18 As a result of these related 

barriers, individuals in wheelchairs are left with insufficient maneuvering space to open and close 

the door when exiting or entering the bathroom. The building, however, lacks sufficient physical 

space to permit defendants to bring the door’s strike-edge clearance into full compliance with the 

ADAAG. Due to the layout of the restaurant’s interior walls and the placement of a stairway 

leading to the second floor, defendants cannot feasibly create adequate maneuvering space on either 

side of the restroom door. 

Recognizing that full compliance is unworkable, Rodriguez contends that defendants must 

instead install an automatic door opener. Defendants reject this suggestion, claiming that no federal 

statute or regulation explicitly requires the installation of an automatic door opener. This argument 

pays short shrift to the sometimes imperfect realities of disability access law compliance. If entities 

were required to provide disabled access only where they could do so in a manner fully and wholly 

compliant with federal regulations, the ADA’s scope would be unduly circumscribed.19 While 

literal removal of the restroom barriers (i.e., reconstructing the building so as to allow for proper 

strike-edge clearance on the restroom door) is not readily achievable, installation of an automatic 

door opener may nonetheless be easily accomplished and can be carried out with minimal difficulty 

or expense. See § 12181(9). While such a device would not change the actual strike-edge clearance 

on the bathroom door, experts for both plaintiff and defendants agree that it would directly 

remediate the problems posed by those barriers.20

 

18 The “push” side requires twelve inches of space beyond the latching edge of the door. On the 

“pull” side, eighteen inches of clear space is required beyond the strike-edge (latch side) of the door. 

See ADAAG § 4.13.6. 

19 The DOJ plainly does not require all-or-nothing compliance with its regulations. See, e.g., Title 

III Technical Assistance Manual (“TAM”) § 4.4300 (where full compliance with federal 

accessibility standards is not readily achievable, “barrier removal measures may be taken that do not 

fully comply with the standards, so long as the measures do not pose a significant risk to the health 

or safety of individuals with disabilities or others.”). 

20 Alternately, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(A)(v) provides a separate framework for addressing this 

imperfect, but apparently effective, method of remediating the restroom door barriers. That 

subsection provides what even where an entity can prove that removal of a barrier is not readily 

achievable, it nonetheless violates the ADA if it fails to “make such . . . facilities . . . available 

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Defendants failed to prove that installation of an automatic door opener, a device that would 

effectively remediate the barriers posed by the bathroom door, was not readily achievable. 

Accordingly, defendants violated the ADA by failing to address the two restroom entrance barriers. 

See id.

2. Inaccessible Entrance 

La Victoria lacks an accessible entrance for individuals in wheelchairs. Rodriguez argues 

that removal of this significant barrier is readily achievable. Specifically, he contends that 

defendants could readily install a wheelchair lift at the restaurant’s entrance. In support, plaintiff’s 

experts furnished three alternate proposals detailing wheelchair lifts that could be constructed on the 

premises. At trial, defendants presented minimal evidence to rebut plaintiffs’ argument. Relying 

primarily on the cross-examination of plaintiff’s experts, during which defendants’ counsel elicited 

information regarding the scope of construction work required to execute plaintiffs’ proposals, 

defendants maintain that installing any lift at the entrance would simply be too burdensome and 

extensive of an undertaking to qualify as “readily achievable.” See § 12181(9). 

Defendants concede that installing a wheelchair lift would not necessarily be cost 

prohibitive. At trial, they elected not to present evidence concerning their ability to pay for any of 

Rodriguez’s proposals. Accordingly, to the extent that a fact-intensive, context-specific “readily 

achievable” inquiry hinges in part on defendants’ financial resources, these factors do not cut in 

defendants’ favor. See id. (factors relevant to a “readily achievable” analysis include “the overall 

financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the action,” the “effect on expenses and 

resources,” and “the overall financial resources of the covered entity”). Seizing upon this 

concession and further emphasizing that defendants submitted no evidence on the actual cost of 

remediating the barriers, Rodriguez argues that defendants failed to carry their burden to show that 

installing a wheelchair lift is not readily achievable. 

 

through alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable.” Id. Here, installation of an 

automatic door opener is readily achievable. Whether or not installing the door opener constitutes 

“remov[al]” of an “architectural barrier” under subsection (iv) or an “alternate method” under 

subsection (v), the same result unfolds: defendants are obligated under the ADA to remediate the 

problems posed by barriers (ii) and (iii). 

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Despite the paucity of defendants’ affirmative evidence on the matter, applicable law 

compels the conclusion that installation of a wheelchair lift at La Victoria is not readily achievable. 

As the ADA makes clear, existing, non-altered facilities only need to remove barriers where 

removal can be carried out without much difficulty or expense. § 12181(9). Elaborating upon the 

statutory standard, the ADAAG provides a list of “modest measures that may be taken to remove 

barriers and that are likely to be readily achievable.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B at 647 (2000). The 

regulations provide: 

Examples of steps to remove barriers include, but are not limited to, the following 

actions--(1) Installing ramps; (2) Making curb cuts in sidewalks and entrances; (3) 

Repositioning shelves; (4) Rearranging tables, chairs, vending machines, display 

racks, and other furniture; (5) Repositioning telephones; (6) Adding raised markings 

on elevator control buttons; (7) Installing flashing alarm lights; (8) Widening doors; 

(9) Installing offset hinges to widen doorways; (10) Eliminating a turnstile or 

providing an alternative accessible path; (11) Installing accessible door hardware; 

(12) Installing grab bars in toilet stalls; (13) Rearranging toilet partitions to increase 

maneuvering space; (14) Insulating lavatory pipes under sinks to prevent burns; (15) 

Installing a raised toilet seat; (16) Installing a full-length bathroom mirror; (17) 

Repositioning the paper towel dispenser in a bathroom; (18) Creating designated 

accessible parking spaces; (19) Installing an accessible paper cup dispenser at an 

existing inaccessible water fountain; (20) Removing high pile, low density carpeting; 

or (21) Installing vehicle hand controls. 

28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b). While this list is plainly non-exhaustive, none of its examples come close to 

the extensive construction required to build, and provide an accessible path to, a wheelchair lift at 

the entrance to La Victoria.21 Cf. TAM § 4.4200 (“A public accommodation generally would not be 

required to remove a barrier to physical access posed by a flight of steps, if removal would require 

extensive ramping or an elevator . . . . [W] here it is not readily achievable to do, the ADA would 

not require a public accommodation to provide access to an area reachable only by a flight of 

stairs.”).22 Moreover, while defendants concede that they could afford to build a wheelchair lift if 

required to do so, their admission does not alter the ADA’s fundamental command that barrier 

removal is readily achievable only where it is “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out 

 

21 Moreover, the DOJ has explained that, in some circumstances, the aforementioned measures 

might not be readily achievable in the first place. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B (1991) (“[T]he 

inclusion of a measure on this list does not mean that it is readily achievable in all cases.”). 

22 The TAM is entitled to substantial deference. Miller, 536 F.3d at 1028.

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without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (emphasis added). The evidence makes 

clear that the proposed wheelchair lifts do not meet this standard.23 Accordingly, under the ADA 

defendants are not required to remove the barrier posed by the restaurant’s inaccessible entrance. 

 They are not, however, off the hook with respect to this barrier. When an entity 

demonstrates that the removal of an architectural barrier is not readily achievable, it nonetheless 

discriminates against persons with disabilities if it fails “to make such goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods if such methods 

are readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). Defendants claim that La Victoria makes its 

goods and services available to disabled patrons by (i) offering a fully accessible La Victoria 

restaurant approximately one-half mile from the subject property and (ii) providing curbside service 

at the subject property. As an initial matter, the offer of a fully accessible restaurant at another 

location simply is not a viable alternative. If a wheelchair-bound patron arrives at La Victoria on 

San Carlos Street with the intent of ordering, for example, a carne asada burrito with a side of the 

restaurant’s famous “orange sauce,” she can hardly be expected then to travel an additional one-half 

mile to place her order at a different establishment. While the patron may, upon seeing the front 

steps, choose to take such a course of action, the mere existence of a separate La Victoria location 

does not suffice to make the subject property’s goods and services “available through alternative 

methods.” See id. 

By contrast, the DOJ has explicitly recognized that offering curbside service is the sort of 

measure that can satisfy an existing facility’s “alternative method” obligations under the statute. See 

28 C.F.R. § 36.305(b) (“Examples of alternatives to barrier removal include, but are not limited to 

. . . [p]roviding curb service or home delivery[.]”). Here, however, the evidence does not 

demonstrate that La Victoria actually offers such a service.24 While Nicandro testified La Victoria 

 

23 Between the required site work, potential weeks of construction, a possible dialogue with the City 

to approve an encroachment into the sidewalk for a right-side incline lift, finalization of an easement 

from the neighboring property for Lifts B and C, and potential closure of the restaurant during 

installation, none of the proposed lifts are “easily accomplishable” or able to be carried out “without 

much difficulty.” See id. 

24 As with their burden to prove that removal of a barrier is not readily achievable, defendants are 

obligated to prove that they made their goods and services available through alternative methods 

where it was readily achievable to do so. 

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provides curbside service to its patrons, his testimony did not indicate that the restaurant offers the 

service in a manner that is sufficiently consistent and reliable to constitute an “alternative method” 

under the statute. Nicandro acknowledged that La Victoria does little to advertise the service at the 

restaurant or on its website. Further, the restaurant’s phone number is not displayed near the 

sidewalk for wheelchair-bound patrons to see. Moreover, Abdullah Mojaddidi persuasively testified 

that he was unable to place an order successfully for curbside service during a visit in 2007. 

In sum, while installation of a wheelchair lift is not “readily achievable” under the terms of 

the ADA, defendants nonetheless violated that statute by failing to make La Victoria’s cuisine 

available through the readily achievable alternative method of providing curbside service. 

Accordingly, Rodriguez is entitled to injunctive relief to ensure that defendants make their goods 

and services available to disabled patrons. 

D. Rodriguez’s State Law Claims 

Rodriguez also seeks injunctive and monetary relief under the CDPA and the Unruh Act. 

Having proven that three barriers violate the ADA, Rodriguez has therefore established that those 

same barriers violate both state statutes as well. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(f), 54(c); see also

Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 848. Even given these automatic CDPA and Unruh Act violations, 

defendants’ compliance with California disability access standards warrants additional discussion 

for several reasons. First, with respect to the entrance stairway, Rodriguez can obtain a more 

significant form of injunctive relief if he can prove that defendants were obligated to provide an 

accessible entrance under state law. Second, unlike his ADA claim, which is actionable only with 

respect to existing barriers, Rodriguez’s claim for damages under state law is actionable for each 

barrier that existed during his 2008 visit. 

i. Injunctive Relief under the CDPA 

As discussed above, barriers (i)-(iii) violate the ADA, thereby entitling Rodriguez to 

injunctive relief. With respect to the two bathroom barriers, an injunction under state law would 

mirror the scope of an injunction under the ADA. Accordingly, for purposes of injunctive relief 

under the CDPA, the aforementioned restroom barriers warrant no further discussion. The 

inaccessible entrance, however, presents a different scenario. Under the ADA, the restaurant 

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entrance violates the law only because defendants fail to establish that they actually provide 

curbside service. Accordingly, an injunction under the ADA can do no more than address this 

particular violation. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996) (“The scope of injunctive relief 

is dictated by the extent of the violation established.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Rodriguez seeks much more than curbside service: he wants the barrier removed. While federal law 

does not provide such a remedy here, California law does. 

1. Title 24 Obligations 

Unlike the ADA, which only regulates alterations made after January 26, 1992, Title 24 of 

the California regulatory code governs all alterations made in public accommodations after January 

31, 1981. It requires that any “altered” portions of public accommodations, including entranceways, 

paths of travel, and public restrooms, be brought into compliance with the then-applicable 

accessibility standards. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, § 2–105(b); Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 848. 

Although the subject building far predates California’s disability statutes, Rodriguez contends that 

the 1985 change in occupancy and the 1986 modifications constituted “alterations” under California 

law, thereby triggering an obligation to bring the building into compliance with the 1984 version of 

Title 24, which was applicable at that time.25

The 1979 Uniform Building Code, which was in effect in California in both 1985 and 1986, 

provides that an “alteration” is “any change, addition or modification in construction or occupancy.” 

Unif. Bldg. Code § 402 (1979). In 1985, the City of San Jose granted the prior owner a municipal 

permit to change the building’s occupancy from a residence to a deli and office space. This event 

plainly constituted an “alteration” under the Code. See id. The following year, the prior owners 

modified the building pursuant to the aforementioned change in occupancy. Defendants contend 

that the 1986 repairs were limited to the interior of the building. By contrast, plaintiff’s expert 

Jonathan Adler, after reviewing City records, opined that the prior owners made significant 

 

25 Rodriguez also claims that the 2007 fire repairs constituted an “alteration” under state law. For 

the same reasons that the post-fire modifications do not constitute an “alteration” under the ADA, 

they do not qualify as an “alteration” under then-applicable California regulations. See Bldg. C. 24-

2 § 202-A (2001) (“Alter or alteration is any change, addition or modification in construction or 

occupancy or structural repair or change in primary function to an existing structure other than 

repair or addition.”) (emphasis added). 

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modifications to the first and second floors of the building, including a new structural addition at the 

rear of the building and a new stairwell at the entrance. 

Although the parties dispute the extent of the 1986 modifications, both sides’ experts agree, 

based on the City’s records, that the modifications constituted an “alteration” for purposes of thenapplicable California law. While these experts’ legal conclusions lack relevance, their testimony is 

nonetheless probative to the extent that it reflects their expert architectural opinions, based on 

available records from the City, that the 1986 construction work was not minor or limited in scope. 

While defendants do not admit that the City’s records accurately reflect the scope and nature of the 

1986 construction, they fail to provide any persuasive basis for concluding that the actual extent of 

the 1986 modifications was different than the records indicate. Moreover, evidence suggests that 

defendants’ conception of the 1986 modifications is unduly narrow. For example, while defendants 

apparently contend that the prior owners modified only the interior of the building, inspection notes 

from a City building inspector reflect that the prior owners built a new addition at the back of the 

structure. (Pl.’s Exh. 12). Regardless of whether this particular modification, which was apparently 

added for the purpose of providing a private office space, would by itself trigger an obligation to 

make the front entrance accessible, the discrepancy between defendants’ position and the 

documentary evidence suggests that defendants’ conception of the 1986 modifications is 

incomplete. By contrast, plaintiff’s evidence was persuasive as to the extent of the 1986 

construction work. Accordingly, the 1986 modifications served to “alter” the subject property. See 

id.

 Given that both the 1985 change in occupancy and the 1986 modifications constituted an 

“alteration,” the building’s owners were obligated to comply with then-applicable disabled access 

standards. The 1984 version of Title 24 was in effect when each alteration occurred. As an initial 

matter, § 2-105(b)(11B)(4) of that title provides that when “alterations, structural repairs, or 

additions” are made to existing privately-funded facilities, the modifications must be made in 

compliance with subsections 11A(5)-(7), which govern alterations to publicly funded facilities.26 

 

26 The Title 24 Interpretive Manual, prepared by the Office of the State Architect and the 

Department of Rehabilitation, further provides: “Very Important! The requirements for existing 

privately funded buildings that are to be remodeled are the same as for publicly funded. So you are 

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Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24 § 2-105(b)(11B)(4) (1984). Subsection 11A(5), in turn, provides that state 

disability compliance regulations apply to: 

All existing public funded buildings and facilities when alterations, structural repairs 

or additions are made to such buildings or facilities. This requirement shall only 

apply to area [sic] of specific alteration, structural repair or addition and shall not be 

construed to mean that the entire structure or facility is subject to this Code. 

Compliance shall require: 

 (a) That a primary entrance to the building or facility and the primary path of 

 travel to the specific area shall be accessible to and usable by handicapped 

 persons. 

 (b) That sanitary facilities, drinking fountains, and public telephones serving 

 the remodeled area shall be accessible to and usable by handicapped persons. 

Id. § 2-105(b)(11A). While this provision, when read in light of subsection 11B(5), makes clear that 

the regulations apply only to areas of “specific alteration, structural repair, or addition,” it is equally 

plain that when any such modification occurs in an existing privately-funded place of public 

accommodation, the building’s primary entrance “shall be accessible to and usable by handicapped 

persons.” Id. The text of Title 24 therefore compels the conclusion that the building’s prior owners 

were, in both 1985 and 1986, required to make the building’s primary entrance accessible to and 

usable by disabled individuals. Because the La Victoria entrance was inaccessible in November 

2008, defendants denied Rodriguez equal access to the restaurant. 

2. “Reliance” Defense 

Defendants contend they cannot be held liable for the prior owners’ failure to remediate the 

inaccessible front entrance. In particular, defendants claim they relied upon the City of San Jose’s 

1986 approval of the prior owners’ application for an unreasonable hardship exception from 

disability access requirements. In support, they invoke Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc., wherein the 

California Court of Appeal held that CDPA’s damages provision contains no intent requirement. 

218 Cal. App. 3d 168, 180, 266 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Ct. App. 1990). The court then stated, in apparent 

dicta: 

Our interpretation that section 54.3 contains no intent element does not preclude the 

possibility that in some instances denial of access under the statute may be excused, 

 

referred to the publicly funded sections to get this information.” Disabled Access Regulations: Title 

24 Interpretive Manual (August 16, 1984), available at ECF No. 232-3. 

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e.g., where the violator has been affirmatively directed, or given formal approval, by 

an enforcing agency to construct premises in a certain way, or maintain a 

configuration, which does not comply with the code requirements. 

Id.; see also D'Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, 2001 WL 1825832 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“A defendant's 

good faith reliance on an agency's erroneous legal opinion may in some instances preclude 

liability.”) (citing Donald, supra).27 Relying upon the aforementioned authorities, defendants 

maintain that the undue hardship exception, even if improvidently granted, operates to preclude 

liability under the CDPA. 

 Rodriguez asserts that defendants’ argument fails for several reasons. First, because 

defendants did not raise the “reliance” defense in their answer or amended answer, Rodriguez 

contends he was not on notice of the issue and therefore could not conduct adequate discovery into 

the circumstances underlying the prior owners’ hardship application. Second, he disputes whether, 

as a matter of law, a “reliance” defense can preclude liability under the CDPA. Finally, Rodriguez 

argues that even assuming such a defense is available, defendants cannot demonstrate that they 

actually relied upon the City’s 1986 approval of the hardship application. 

 Without considering whether Rodriguez was on notice of the reliance argument, and 

regardless of whether an occupant or owner of a building subject to Title 24 disabled access 

regulations can avoid CDPA liability by relying upon a municipal building department’s approval of 

a prior owner’s undue hardship application, no facts arise to support such an argument here. The 

evidence at trial established that no defendant actually relied on the City of San Jose Building 

Department’s 1986 approval. To the contrary, it appears defendants were not aware of the hardship 

exception until after Rodriguez filed this action. Defendants instead premise their reliance argument 

on the fact that from 1986 to 1998, when La Victoria opened, the Department continually permitted 

prior occupants to operate several different restaurants within the building. As such, when La 

 

27 But cf. D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge, 2004 WL 3685756 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting defendants’ 

argument that a municipal building department’s issuance of building permits later estopped 

plaintiff’s claims against the subject property under federal and state disability law) (“Essentially, 

this argument attempts to equate a building permit with a declaratory judgment that the subject 

property adheres to all applicable laws. None of the cases cited by Defendants, or any others found 

by this Court, indicate that the issuance of a building permit compels any conclusion in the context 

of litigation between the property owner and a private party suing under state and federal 

accessibility laws.”). 

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Victoria began leasing the space in 1998, and when Shahidi purchased the building in 1999, 

defendants were purportedly operating under the assumption that the building was not saddled with 

extant access obligations. This is not enough to excuse compliance. Cf. Hodges v. El Torito 

Restaurants, Inc., 1998 WL 95398 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding current owner liable for prior owner’s 

failure to remediate barriers to access) (“It is therefore clear that the best way to effectuate the goals 

of California's accessibility laws is to hold the current owners of buildings liable for existing 

violations.”). 

 In sum, to the extent that a “reliance” exception to Title 24 compliance exists, defendants fail 

to establish it here. See N.L.R.B. v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001) 

(noting “the general rule of statutory construction that the burden of proving justification or 

exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who 

claims its benefits”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, pursuant to defendants’ 

Title 24 obligations as triggered by the 1985 and 1986 alterations, La Victoria’s entrance must be 

made accessible to persons with disabilities. 

ii. Monetary Damages Under State Law 

 Rodriguez seeks monetary relief under the CDPA and the Unruh Act. As discussed above, 

barriers (i), (ii), and (iii) automatically trigger liability under both laws as a result of also violating 

the ADA. Additionally, barriers (iv) through (xvi) violated applicable California regulations. 28 

With respect to these barriers, defendants are liable under the CDPA. They are not, however, liable 

for barriers (iv) through (xvi) under the Unruh Act because absent an ADA violation, Rodriguez 

must demonstrate that defendants intentionally discriminated against persons with disabilities. 

While defendants should have been in compliance with federal and state disability access 

 

28 The parties stipulate that these barriers existed at the time of Rodriguez’s visit. In so stipulating, 

the parties include citations to a recent version of the California Building Code. ECF No. 214, Exh. 

B (providing corresponding CBC provisions for each stipulated barrier); see also Pl’s Exh. 56 

(updated barrier list lacking corresponding citations). As discussed supra, the 1985 and 1986 

alterations triggered an obligation to comply with then-applicable California accessibility standards. 

It is less than clear, though, that these architectural elements were also barriers under earlier 

versions of the code. Defendants do not, however, contend that any of these barriers were 

permissible under the 1984 version of Title 24. If any such argument exists, it has been waived. 

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requirements at the time of Rodriguez’s visit, the evidence falls far short of demonstrating that they 

intentionally discriminated against persons with disabilities. 

E. Summary 

The evidence presented at trial establishes that barriers (i), (ii), and (iii) constitute violations 

of the ADA, the Unruh Act, and the CDPA. Further, defendants violated the CDPA by maintaining 

barriers (iv) through (xvi) at the time of Rodriguez’s visit. 

Defendants, who are jointly and severally liable, are hereby ordered to provide the following 

relief: 

1. Pursuant to their obligations under Title 24, defendants shall make the building’s primary 

entrance accessible to and usable by disabled individuals. 

2. Until the entrance is made accessible, defendants shall make La Victoria’s cuisine 

available to disabled patrons through the readily achievable alternative method of 

providing curbside take-out service. 

3. Defendants shall install an automatic door opener on the restroom door so that disabled 

patrons can safely enter and exit the restroom without assistance. 

4. Defendants shall pay Rodriguez $12,000 in actual damages.29

The parties are directed to meet and confer and jointly submit a proposed judgment 

consistent with this order within thirty days. A motion on attorney fees shall be filed within sixty 

days if the parties are unable to agree on the amount. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/3/14 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

29 As noted above, defendants’ cumulative violations of the CDPA and the Unruh Act do not 

compound Rodriguez’s statutory minimum damages. See Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(e); Org. for 

Advancement of Minorities with Disabilities v. Pac. Heights Inn, 2006 WL 2560754 (N.D. Cal. 

2006) (summarizing authorities as holding that statutory damages for disability discrimination “are 

limited to each time that a plaintiff visits (or is deterred from visiting) a non-compliant 

establishment even if the establishment contains numerous architectural barriers”); see also Munson, 208 P.3d at 632 (no double recovery between the CDPA and the Unruh Act). In any event, as actual 

damages of $12,000 are being awarded due to the significant emotional distress Rodriguez suffered 

as a result of being denied equal access to La Victoria, statutory damages are not directly implicated.

Case 5:09-cv-04057-RS Document 250 Filed 01/03/14 Page 34 of 34