Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01552/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01552-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP M.,

1

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-01552-TSH 

ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 23, 27

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Phillip M. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial 

review of a final decision of Nancy Berryhill, then-Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits.2 Pending before the Court are the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 23 (Pl.’s Mot.), 27 (Def.’s Mot.). Pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 16-5, the motions have been submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having 

reviewed the parties’ positions, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and relevant legal authority, 

the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for the 

following reasons.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Age, Education and Work Experience

Plaintiff is 44 years old. AR 63. During school he had a learning disability and was 

placed in special education. AR 244, 374. Plaintiff completed 11 years of school but did not 

 

1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the 

recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial 

Conference of the United States.

2 This action was originally brought against Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill. Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 25(d), Andrew M. Saul was automatically substituted as the Defendant.

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receive a high school diploma or GED. AR 244, 363. He has worked in construction, painting, 

furniture delivery, and security. Id. (both).

B. Medical Evidence

The medical evidence of record consists of Exhibits 1F through 10F, including emergency 

department records from Highland Hospital; treatment records from Alameda Behavioral Health 

Care Services dated May 8, 2014 to November 14, 2014; treatment records from Lifelong Medical 

Care dated January 13, 2014 to February 18, 2015; a psychological evaluation from Dr. Lesleigh 

Franklin, PhD. conducted July 22, 2015 and dated August 28, 2015; a psychological consultative 

examination performed by Dr. Paul Martin, PhD. dated January 20, 2016; a physical internist 

exam conducted by Dr. Robert Tang dated January 25, 2016; treatment records from Lifelong 

Trust Clinic from January 21, 2016 to February 24, 2016; treatment records from Highland 

Hospital covering November 11, 2015 to July 17, 2017; Lifelong treatment notes from February 4, 

2016 to August 1, 2017; and a questionnaire submitted by Dr. Jeffrey Seal from Lifelong Medical 

Care dated August 17, 2017. AR 266-438.

Plaintiff attended Lifelong Trust Clinic for primary care on September 5, 2013. AR 346. 

He was treated for asthma, chronic right knee pain, and depression. AR 336, 343. Nurse 

Practitioner Douglas Frey prescribed 30 mg of Remeron and 20 mg of buspirone per day starting 

on April 9, 2014. AR 335. Records from Lifelong Trust Clinic also indicate that in March, 

possibly of 2016, he was admitted to Summit Hospital with a closed skull fracture. AR 474.

In August and September of 2014, Plaintiff made visits to the emergency department at 

Highland Hospital to address a variety physical issues, including injuries suffered from being 

assaulted with a knife by his roommate, resulting in multiple lacerations to his face, right shoulder 

and left wrist, and injuries suffered during a fight with the police. AR 266-93. He reported to the 

emergency department on August 23, 2014 with multiple lacerations to his face, right shoulder 

and left wrist that he reported were a result of his roommate attacking him with a knife. AR 291. 

Plaintiff was assisted by Behavioral Health Care Services (“BHCS”) between May and 

October of 2014. AR 304-29. Staff at BHCS acquired housing for him at the Lakehurst Hotel on 

May 21, 2014. AR 306. Lakehurst’s manager complained to BHCS staff about Plaintiff’s “poor 

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lack of boundaries,” including showing the landlord a naked picture of his girlfriend on his cell 

phone less than a month after acquiring housing. AR 308. On August 5, 2014, BHCS notes show 

they assisted Plaintiff with his move into permanent housing with a program called FACT. AR 

316. The notes show he repeatedly broke the rules of his housing program, got in physical 

altercations with his roommate and was removed from his placement by September 22, 2014. AR 

321, 323, 325. 

1. Dr. Franklin

On July 22, 2015 Plaintiff saw Dr. Lesleigh Franklin, PhD. for a psychiatric evaluation. 

AR 362-68. During his interview, Plaintiff told Dr. Franklin the he used to deliver furniture but 

stopped due to physical injuries and that his depression makes it difficult to be around people. AR 

363. Plaintiff also reported he has a history of drinking too much alcohol and still drinks, although

not as much as in the past. Id. He reported falling off a balcony in 2010 and being beaten by the 

police in 2013. Id. He also reported severe depression since the death of his wife in 1998 and 

stated that it gets in the way of daily functioning. Id. He told Dr. Franklin that at around the age 

of thirteen he saw aliens in his room and that they may have inserted a chip into his chest. Id. 

Plaintiff advised he still hears voices and that they encourage him to hurt himself or others. Id.

In her Mental Status Exam, Dr. Franklin noted that Plaintiff walked with a cane, that he 

worked at a slow rate and was unable to sustain attention well enough to remember short strings of 

information. AR 364. Dr. Franklin noted he “displayed a childlike quality” and was tearful at 

times. Id. Plaintiff scored a full scale IQ of 48, a score below the .1 percentile of scores for peers 

in his age group. AR 365, 367-68. He received a score of 20 on the vocabulary subtest, which 

tests language development, word knowledge, and general verbal intelligence, a result in the 

extremely low range as compared to his peers. AR 365. He received a T score of 29 on the Block 

Design subtest, which tests non-verbal problem-solving skills, spatial visualization and the ability 

to analyze a whole and component parts, a result in the extremely low range as compared to his 

peers. Id. Plaintiff received a score of 20 on the Matrix Reasoning subtest, which tests one’s 

ability to process visual information and abstract reasoning without requiring verbalization, a 

result in the extremely low range as compared to his peers. Id.

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Dr. Franklin also performed the Repeatable Battery for Assessment of Neuropsychological 

Status, which evaluates an individual’s current neuropsychological status. Id. Plaintiff received a 

score of 44 on the Language Index, 60 on the Visuospatial/Constructional Index, 40 on the 

Immediate Memory Index, 46 on the Attention Index, and an overall score of 43. AR 365-66. All 

of these scores were in the extremely low range as compared to his peers. Id. 

Dr. Franklin noted that Plaintiff reported symptoms including depressed mood, loss of 

interest, sleep disturbance, psychomotor disturbance, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness/guilt, poor 

concentration, and suicidal ideation. AR 366. She also noted his experience of a traumatic event 

involving fear of death or serious injury, re-experience of the event, avoidance of associated 

stimuli and a sense of a foreshortened future, hypervigilance, and exaggerated startle response. Id. 

She noted that during the interview it was clear that he was experiencing a high level of stress and 

that he became tearful upon remembering his psychotic experiences. Id. 

Dr. Franklin diagnosed Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder, depressive type, PTSD, and 

borderline intellectual functioning. AR 367. She concluded that Plaintiff suffered a marked 

impairment to his ability to: understand, remember and carry out instructions; maintain attention 

and concentration for two hour segments; perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable 

number of breaks; respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting and deal with work 

stress; and complete a normal workday/workweek without interruption from psychological 

symptoms. AR 368. She also concluded that Plaintiff suffered a moderate impairment to his 

ability to: understand, remember and carry out very short and simple instructions, and get 

along/work with others. Id. He suffeedr mild impairment in his ability to interact appropriately 

with the general public; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors; and maintain regular attendance and be punctual with customary, usually strict 

tolerances. Id.

2. Dr. Martin

Plaintiff attended a psychological evaluation with Dr. Paul Martin, Ph.D. on January 20, 

2016, who conducted a mental status exam, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (“WAIS-IV”), and 

Wechsler Memory Scale (“WMS-IV”). AR 372-80. Dr. Martin did not review any records but 

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noted that Plaintiff reported a history of head injury, problems with memory, concentration, 

headaches and dizziness, and low energy, poor motivation, social withdrawal, sleep disturbance, 

anhedonia, crying spells, anger, irritability, and visual hallucinations involving spaceships. AR 

372-73. Plaintiff’s mental status exam showed a weak and dreamy mood, poor attention 

demonstrated by only being able to name four digits forward and three in reverse, fair fund of 

knowledge demonstrated by naming three out of the last five presidents, poor memory 

demonstrated by inability to recall any of three words after a brief delay, the ability to calculate 

how much money was in seven quarters, the ability to identify a similarity between an orange and 

banana, and the ability to understand a proverb. AR 375. 

Plaintiff’s WAIS-IV testing revealed a full scale IQ of 59, processing speed subtest score 

of 56, working memory of 63, and perceptual reasoning of 67, which were all in the extremely low 

range. He received a score of 70 on the verbal comprehension index, which was in the borderline 

range. AR 376-77. His WMS-IV results revealed scores in the extremely low range in all subtests, 

including visual, auditory, immediate and delayed memory, which Dr. Martin noted indicated a 

severe impairment with new learning and memory. AR 377-78.

Dr. Martin diagnosed Plaintiff with depression, with a need to rule out cognitive disorder, 

pain disorder that involves both physical and psychological factors, and cannabis abuse. AR 378. 

He concluded that Plaintiff suffered a moderate impairment in his ability to: perform detailed and 

complex tasks; maintain regular attendance; perform work activities on a consistent basis; work 

without special supervision; complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from 

psychological symptoms; accept instructions from supervisors; interact with coworkers and the 

public; and deal with usual stressors related to competitive work. AR 379. He is mildly limited in 

his ability to perform simple and repetitive tasks. AR 378.

3. Dr. Tang

On January 25, 2016, Plaintiff attended a physical evaluation with Robert Tang, M.D. that 

had been ordered by the agency. AR 383-86. Plaintiff advised he had not worked for five years 

due to a right knee fracture that required six pins/screws, he had chronic pain and ambulates using 

a cane, and he completed personal needs slowly while using a cane. AR 383. Plaintiff was unable 

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to perform the tandem walk or toe-heel stand due to right knee pain and Dr. Tang noted that his 

cane was medically necessary. AR 384. Plaintiff’s knee had a slow range of motion and could 

only flex 110 degrees, as compared with 150 degrees in his left knee. Id. Dr. Tang noted that his 

right knee had a surgical scar and was no more than 50% weightbearing. AR 385.

Dr. Tang concluded that if Plaintiff were granted the “maximum allowable breaks,” he 

would be able to/would be limited to: stand and walk up to six hours; sit without limitations; lift 

and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; occasionally balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch, and crawl; and without limitations reach, handle, finger and feel. Id. He concluded 

Plaintiff would have limitations working around heavy machinery but no limitations working 

around dust, fumes, gases, loud noise, or chemicals. AR 385.

4. Dr. Seal

Plaintiff was seen at the Lifelong Trust clinic at least nine times between February 4, 2016 

and August 1, 2017. AR 447-93. He saw Jeffrey Seal, M.D. at the Lifelong Trust Clinic on 

February 4, 2016. AR 400-03. Dr. Seal performed a psychological evaluation, diagnosing PTSD 

and depression. AR 402. He prescribed 100 mg sertraline daily with a brief built-in week at 50 

mg. Id. Dr. Seal noted that Plaintiff presented with depressed mood with sad tearful affect, mild 

psychomotor agitation, frequent staring at the floor, and slowed speech. Id. He noted that while 

Plaintiff used substances, his use appeared to be secondary to homelessness, lack of resources, and 

self-medication of symptoms as they worsen. Id. Plaintiff appeared to have a low functional 

status that was potentially related to a developmental delay. Id. Dr. Seal noted that his physical 

and mental conditions have contributed to his inability to find gainful employment. Id. 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Seal again on May 26, 2016, at which time he presented with depressed 

mood, appeared sleepy, and complained about struggles with memory. AR 482-84. Dr. Seal 

noted that an IQ test in 2010 showed an IQ of 79, in the low average, and a verbal IQ of 70, and 

concluded based on this and his observations and record review that Plaintiff had low cognitive 

function and would need “more support than our clinic can provide.” AR 483-84.

On August 17, 2017, Dr. Seal filled out and signed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff’s 

mental health and how it would impact his ability to work. AR 495-99. He noted significant 

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deficits in complex attention, executive function, learning and memory, language and perceptual 

motor or social cognition. AR 496. He also noted symptoms of sleep disturbance, decreased 

energy, difficulty concentrating, easy or frequent distractibility, easy fatigue, detachment from 

social relationships, depressed mood, appetite disturbance, thoughts of death or suicide, 

irritability, distrust or suspiciousness of others, difficulty organizing tasks, difficulties learning and 

using academic skills, avoidance of external reminders of a traumatic event, increase in arousal 

and reactivity, instability of interpersonal relationships, exposure to actual or threatened death or 

violence, and involuntarily re-experience of a traumatic event. Id. 

Dr. Seal concluded that Plaintiff suffered from a marked impairment to his overall ability 

to understand remember and apply information. AR 497. In subcategories related to 

understanding, memory and application, he found a marked impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to 

describe work activity to someone else, ask and answer questions including explanations, identify 

and solve problems, sequence multi-step activities, and use reason and judgment to make work 

related decisions. Id. Dr. Seal found a moderate impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to understand 

and learn instructions, follow one or two step instructions to carry out a task, and recognize 

mistakes. Id. He concluded that Plaintiff suffered from a moderate impairment to his overall 

ability to interact with others, finding moderate impairments in all related subcategories except for 

asking for help when needed, for which he found a marked impairment. Id. He also concluded 

that Plaintiff suffered from a marked impairment in his overall ability to concentrate, persist or 

maintain pace, and marked impairment in every subcategory of concentration, except his ability to 

initiate and perform a known task and working close to others without creating distractions—

where he found a moderate impairment. Id. Dr. Seal concluded that Plaintiff suffered from a 

moderate impairment in his overall ability to adapt or manage himself and a marked impairment in

his ability to adapt to changes and manage psychologically based symptoms. AR 498. Dr. Seal 

reported that on average he expected that Plaintiff’s combined impairments would cause him to be 

absent from work four days or more in an average month and be off task over 30% of the average 

eight-hour workday. Id. He opined that Plaintiff’s condition could improve if his social 

circumstances greatly improved, but it would likely get worse in times of acute stress. AR 499. In 

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his statement, Dr. Seal noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms of depression and PTSD had been resistant 

to treatment and that multiple psychological evaluations have shown he likely suffers from a 

cognitive disorder that severely limits his ability to regularly engage in medical care and maintain 

a personal routine. Id. 

III. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

On June 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging 

disability beginning October 16, 2010. AR 159-64. On November 13, 2015, the agency denied 

Plaintiff’s claim, finding he did not qualify for benefits. AR 79-82. Plaintiff subsequently filed a 

request for reconsideration, which was denied on February 23, 2016. AR 86-91. On March 29, 

2016, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 92-93. 

Although ALJ E. Alis conducted a hearing on August 29, 2017, Plaintiff did not appear and his 

counsel, Alla Barkan, stated he did not know where he was because he is “chronically homeless 

and missing a phone.” AR 47-49. The ALJ proceeded with the hearing and heard testimony from 

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Robert Cottle. AR 53-60.

A. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ asked the VE, based on his review of Plaintiff’s file, whether Plaintiff had 

performed any past relevant work. AR 53. The VE testified that there was no past work that he 

could see. AR 54. The ALJ then asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual with the same 

age and education as Plaintiff, with no past work, who is able to lift and carry twenty pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and is able to walk, stand or sit for six hours out of an 

eight-hour workday. AR 54-55. He further added that this individual would be able to push or 

pull only occasionally with the right lower extremity and would need a cane for ambulation. AR 

55. Additionally, this individual would be limited to occasional climbing of ramps, stairs, ladders, 

ropes and scaffolds, and would not be able to work around moving mechanical parts or at 

unprotected heights. Id. He added mental limitations including simple, routine tasks and making 

simple decisions, but with the ability to frequently interact with coworkers, supervisors and the 

general public “but only on a superficial level such as greeting customers or directing a customer 

to the nearest restroom.” Id. He asked if there were any jobs that this hypothetical individual 

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would be able to perform. Id.

The VE testified that this hypothetical individual would be able to work as a Marker II 

under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)3920.687-126 with a Specific Vocational 

Preparation (“SVP”)4of 2, requiring light strength with 251,670 jobs nationwide; a hand packer 

DOT 559.687-074 with an SVP of 2, requiring light strength having 518,950 nationwide jobs; and 

bottle packager DOT 920.685-026 with an SVP of 2, requiring light strength and with 386,500 

jobs nationally. AR 55. The VE verified that his testimony was based on the DOT. AR 55-56.

The ALJ then asked if the DOT addressed the level of interaction he had described in his 

hypothetical. AR 56. The VE testified that the DOT does not address this, but his testimony was 

based on his experience. Id. The ALJ then asked the VE why he believed an individual with the 

limitations he described in his hypothetical would be mentally capable of doing the job. Id. The 

VE testified that a Marker II involved “simply stamping a label or attaching a sticker” and a hand 

packer is “simply inserting plastic bottle caps or caps that are defective and replacing them with 

non-defective parts and pressing it into a box.” Id. He testified that bottle packaging is a similarly 

consistent job. Id. The VE added that the DOT does not address the need to use a cane to 

ambulate, “[b]ut these jobs would be performed at a workstation instead [of] the need to be 

ambulating.” AR 57.

The ALJ then added further limitations to the hypothetical, including limiting interactions 

with supervisors and co-workers to only occasionally, no working as a group or as part of a team, 

and only superficial interactions with the general public. Id. When asked if that individual would 

 

3 The Dictionary of Occupational Titles by the United States Department of Labor, Employment & 

Training Administration, may be relied upon “in evaluating whether the claimant is able to 

perform work in the national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1990). 

The DOT classifies jobs by their exertional and skill requirements and may be a primary source of 

information for the ALJ or Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d) (1). The “best source for how 

a job is generally performed is usually the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2001).

4 “The Dictionary of Occupational Titles lists an SVP time for each described occupation. Using 

the skill level definitions in 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1568 and 416.968, unskilled work corresponds to an 

SVP of 1-2; semi-skilled work corresponds to an SVP of 3-4; and skilled work corresponds to an 

SVP of 5-9 in the DOT.” Social Security Ruling 00-4p.

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be able to perform the same work, the VE testified that marker II would still be performed without 

tandem work but that he would erode the number of nationwide available jobs by 40 percent. Id. 

He eliminated bottle packer because that job requires teams and testified that the nationally 

available jobs would be reduced by 30 percent. AR 57-58. The VE stated that his testimony was 

based upon his experience as a vocational rehabilitation counselor and having worked in those 

occupations and “placing people.” AR 58.

When asked if there was a third occupation that this hypothetical individual would be able 

to perform, the VE answered that this individual would be able to perform the work of a Garment 

Sorter, DOT 222.687-014 with an SVP of 2, requiring light strength with 251,670 jobs nationwide, 

that he would erode by 40 percent due to the inability of the hypothetical individual to work in 

tandem with others. Id. The ALJ then added the additional limitation that the individual would 

require “a few reminders from supervisors throughout the day to stay on task or how to complete 

work,” would need these reminders four times per day, and asked if this limitation would erode 

the occupational base any further. Id. The VE testified that this would not affect the job pool. Id. 

When Plaintiff’s attorney asked how long these reminders would take, the VE testified that his 

answer was based on very brief reminders or instructions. AR 59. 

When the ALJ asked how long an individual could be off task and remain employable, the 

VE testified that an individual would be unemployable if they were off task more than 15 percent 

of the day. Id. When asked how many absences would be acceptable, the VE testified that an 

individual could be absent no more than one day per month. Id. The ALJ then asked if these 

answers were based on the DOT. AR 60. The VE answered they were based on his professional 

experience, not the DOT. Id. 

The ALJ ended the hearing stating that he would issue a notice to Plaintiff to show good 

cause for failure to appear at the hearing and would issue a decision once he received that 

response. Id. 

B. ALJ’s Decision and Plaintiff’s Appeal

On January 10, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not 

disabled. AR 26-42. This decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to review it 

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on January 28, 2019. AR 1-8. Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Plaintiff

commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On September 4, 2019, 

Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 11, 2019, Defendant filed a 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). An ALJ’s decision to deny benefits must be set aside only when it is “based on 

legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 

664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek 

v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). It requires 

“more than a mere scintilla” but “less than a preponderance” of the evidence. Id.; Trevizo, 871 

F.3d at 674. 

The court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). However, “[w]here evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the harmless error rule applies where substantial evidence otherwise supports 

the ALJ’s decision. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n error is 

harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error 

does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). A court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision because of a harmless error. Id. at 1111

(citation omitted). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party 

attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Framework for Determining Whether a Claimant Is Disabled

A claimant is considered “disabled” under the Social Security Act if he meets two 

requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the 

claimant must demonstrate “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the impairment or impairments must be severe enough that he is 

unable to do his previous work and cannot, based on his age, education, and work experience “engage 

in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(2)(A).

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Social Security provide for a fivestep sequential analysis to determine whether a Social Security claimant is disabled.5

 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520. The sequential inquiry is terminated when “a question is answered affirmatively or 

negatively in such a way that a decision can be made that a claimant is or is not disabled.” Pitzer 

v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). During the first four steps of this sequential 

inquiry, the claimant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate disability. Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). At step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner “to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work.” Id. (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is performing “substantial gainful 

activity,” which would mandate that the claimant be found not disabled regardless of medical

condition, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). Here, the ALJ 

determined Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity since May 21, 2015. AR 31.

At step two, the ALJ must determine, based on medical findings, whether the claimant has 

 

5 Disability is “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” because of a medical 

impairment which can result in death or “which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

affective disorder, drug addiction and alcoholism, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), major 

depressive disorder, and history of knee fracture with open reduction internal fixation. AR 31.

If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a severe impairment, the process proceeds to 

the third step, where the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meet or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. 

P, App. 1 (the “Listing of Impairments”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If a claimant’s 

impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent to the 

criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering age, 

education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets the listings. AR 32.

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual Function 

Capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). RFC refers to what an individual can do in a work 

setting, despite mental or physical limitations caused by impairments or related symptoms. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including the medically determinable 

impairments that are nonsevere. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). 

In the RFC assessment, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s physical and mental abilities, as 

well as other abilities affected by the claimant’s impairments. Id. §§ 404.1545(b)-(d), 416.945(b)-

(d). With respect to a claimant’s physical abilities, “[a] limited ability to perform certain physical 

demands of work activity, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or 

other physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, 

stooping or crouching), may reduce [a claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work.” Id. §§ 

404.1545(b), 416.945(b). With respect to a claimant’s mental abilities, “[a] limited ability to carry 

out certain mental activities, such as limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out 

instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a 

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work setting, may reduce [the claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work.” Id. §§ 

404.1545(c), 416.945(c). Additionally, “[s]ome medically determinable impairment(s), such as 

skin impairment(s), epilepsy, impairment(s) of vision, hearing or other senses, and impairment(s) 

which impose environmental restrictions, may cause limitations and restrictions which affect other 

work-related abilities.” Id. §§ 404.1545(d), 416.945(d).

Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work6as follows:

[B]eing able to lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 

pounds frequently. He can stand, walk, or sit for 6 hours of an 8-hour 

workday. He can push and/or pull occasionally with the right lower 

extremity. He would need to use a cane for ambulation. He can 

occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He 

can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He cannot 

work around dangerous moving mechanical parts or unprotected 

heights. He would be limited to simple and routine tasks and making 

simple work-related decisions. He could frequently interact with 

supervisors and co-workers. He could also frequently interact with 

the public, but only on a superficial level, such as greeting customers 

or directing a customer to the nearest restroom.

AR 34.

The fourth step of the evaluation process requires that the ALJ determine whether the 

claimant’s RFC is sufficient to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 

404.1520(f). Past relevant work is work performed within the past 15 years that was substantial 

gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to do his past relevant work, the claimant is not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (iv). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had no past 

relevant work. AR 41. 

In the fifth step of the analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there 

are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can 

 

6 Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a 

time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the 

weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or 

standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg 

controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must 

have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we 

determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors 

such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.”

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perform consistent with the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(g); 404.1560(c). The Commissioner can meet this burden by relying on the testimony of 

a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 2. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).7 Here, the ALJ 

determined Plaintiff is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in 

significant numbers, citing the VE’s testimony as to the marker II, inspector and hand packager, 

and bottle packer positions. AR 41-42. The ALJ noted the VE’s testimony is inconsistent with 

the information contained in the DOT, given that it does not address ambulating with a cane or the 

level of interaction as addressed in the hearing hypothetical, but accepted the VE’s testimony 

based on his 35 years as a vocational counselor. Id. 

B. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in: (1) weighing the medical opinion evidence; (2) 

determining that his statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his 

symptoms are not consistent with the medical evidence; (3) determining that he does not meet 

Listing 1.02, 12.04 or 12.15; and (4) determining his RFC.

C. Medical Opinions

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by granting partial weight to the opinions of his treating

doctor, Jeffrey Seal, and examining doctor, Lesleigh Franklin.

1. Legal Standard8

When determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider each medical 

opinion in the record together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); King 

v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4586726, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018). In deciding how much weight 

to give to any medical opinion, the ALJ considers the extent to which the medical source presents 

 

7 The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are commonly known as “the grids.” Lounsburry, 468 F.3d 

at 1114.

8 Rules regarding the evaluation of medical opinion evidence were recently updated, but the 

updates were made effective only for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 82 Fed. Reg. 

5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). As Plaintiff’s claim was filed before 2017, the Court evaluates the medical 

opinion evidence in his case under the older framework as set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) and in Social Security Ruling 96-2p.

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relevant evidence to support the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3). Generally, more weight will 

be given to an opinion that is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings, and the degree 

to which the opinion provides supporting explanations and is consistent with the record as a 

whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3)-(4).

In conjunction with the relevant regulations, the Ninth Circuit “developed standards that

guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Courts “distinguish among the 

opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 

those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither 

examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). “By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the opinion of a treating 

physician over non-treating physicians.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). 

If a claimant has a treatment relationship with a provider, and clinical evidence supports 

that provider’s opinion and is consistent with the record, the provider will be given controlling 

weight. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). “The opinion of a treating physician is given deference 

because ‘he is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as 

an individual.’” Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987)). “If a treating physician’s 

opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ because it is not ‘well-supported’ or because it is 

inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the [SSA] considers specified factors in 

determining the weight it will be given.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. “Those factors include the 

‘[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination’ by the treating physician; 

and the ‘nature and extent of the treatment relationship’ between the patient and the treating 

physician.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii)). 

Additional factors relevant to evaluating any medical opinion, not limited to the 

opinion of the treating physician, include the amount of relevant evidence that 

supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided; the consistency of 

the medical opinion with the record as a whole; the specialty of the physician 

providing the opinion; and ‘[o]ther factors’ such as the degree of understanding a 

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physician has of the [Social Security] Administration’s ‘disability programs and their 

evidentiary requirements’ and the degree of his or her familiarity with other 

information in the case record.

Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)-(6)). Nonetheless, even if the treating physician’s opinion 

is not entitled to controlling weight, it is still entitled to deference. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632

(citing SSR 96–2p,

9

1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996)). “In many cases, a treating source’s medical 

opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the 

test for controlling weight.” SSR 96-2p at 4.

Where an examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another opinion, an ALJ may 

reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Analysis

a. Dr. Seal

Dr. Seal opined in August 2017 that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in interacting with 

others and marked limitations in understanding, remembering, applying information, and 

concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace. AR 497. Additionally, he opined Plaintiff has mild 

limitations in distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable work performance and 

maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to the work setting. AR 498. Overall, Dr. 

Seal opined Plaintiff had moderate limitations in adapting or managing oneself and that he would 

be absent from work four days or more and would be “off task” more than 30% of the workday. 

Id. The ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Seal’s opinion because “[e]ven though the claimant has 

been treated by Dr. Seal since February 2016, he was only seen approximately 2-3 times” and 

“even though the claimant does have some deficits in memory and attention, he also has admitted 

to slowly completing his personal needs and preparing his own simple meals[.]” AR 40. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and consistent reasons for rejecting Dr. 

 

9

“[Social Security Rulings] do not carry the force of law, but they are binding on ALJs 

nonetheless.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009); see 20 

C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit defers to the rulings unless they are “plainly erroneous 

or inconsistent with the Act or regulations.” Chavez v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv., 103 

F.3d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Seal’s opinion because, although he noted Plaintiff was only seen approximately 2-3 times, there 

are no opinions from any other treating doctor. Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Plaintiff further argues that the 

fact that he “admitted” to slow completion of personal needs supports rather than contradicts Dr. 

Seal’s opinion that he suffers from a marked impairment to his ability to concentrate and maintain 

pace at work and “the slow preparation of one’s own simple meals does not show that one would 

be able to maintain concentration sufficiently to perform unskilled work at the competitive level, 

in which according to vocational expert Robert Cottle, an individual off task over 15 percent of the 

day would be unemployable.” Id. (citing AR 59). Plaintiff maintains Dr. Seal’s opinion is 

supported by his own treatment notes, in which he diagnosed Plaintiff with PTSD and depression. 

Id. at 5 (citing AR 400-02). He also argues Dr. Seal’s opinion is consistent with the record as a 

whole, including: notes from Behavioral Health Care Services between May and October of 2014,

which note Plaintiff suffering from depression, lapses in memory, concentration and awareness, 

and insomnia, id. at 6 (citing AR 304, 308, 311, 323, 328); Dr. Franklin, who diagnosed Plaintiff 

with depression, PTSD, and borderline intellectual functioning while finding a marked impairment 

to his ability to concentrate, persist and maintain pace, and understand, remember and apply 

detailed instructions, id. (citing AR 367-68, 498); and Dr. Martin, who noted that Plaintiff showed 

a weak and dreamy mood, poor attention demonstrated by only being able to name four digits 

forward and three in reverse, fair fund of knowledge demonstrated by naming three out of the last 

five presidents, poor memory demonstrated by inability to recall any of three words after a brief 

delay, and he scored a full scale IQ of 59, in the extremely low range of test takers in his peer 

group, id. (citing AR 375, 376-77). Plaintiff contends the ALJ relied “on a cherry-picked series of 

factual instances that are not consistent with the record as a whole.” Id. at 4.

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ set forth specific reasons for partially discounting 

Dr. Seal’s opinion and the Court must therefore uphold the decision even if the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Def.’s Mot. at 7. He notes the ALJ did not 

reject Dr. Seal’s opinion in its entirety “but carefully parsed his findings and conclusions as to 

Plaintiff’s limitations showing where the findings were either consistent or inconsistent with the 

evidence in the record.” Id. at 6-7. 

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The Court finds the ALJ’s decision regarding Dr. Seal’s opinion must be upheld. First, it 

is undisputed that Dr. Seal saw Plaintiff “approximately 2-3 times.” The frequency of treatment 

and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship are relevant when weighing treating 

opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)(i), (ii); Larkins v. Colvin, 674 F. App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 

2017) (ALJ properly rejected treating doctor’s opinion because the doctor “had limited contact 

with the claimant”). Thus, the limited treatment time Dr. Seal provided Plaintiff was a valid 

reason to discount the opinion. Further, although Dr. Seal indicated Plaintiff had marked 

limitations in understanding, remembering, applying information, and concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace, the ALJ noted that, “[o]n examination, [Plaintiff] was also ‘100 Intelligible’, 

demonstrated fair fund of knowledge, and was able to name 3 of the last 5 presidents (Exhibit 

5F/4).” AR 40. Further, his “insight and judgment was fair, with organized, coherent, linear, and 

goal directed thought process (Id/4).” Id. (citing AR 372-80). The ALJ noted earlier in his 

decision that Dr. Seal had indicated that Plaintiff “was also was not able to sustain his attention 

well enough to remember short strings of information,” that “there were notable problems with 

attention and concentration” and that he was “easily distracted.” AR 33. Dr. Seal’s findings were 

inconsistent with other examination findings, where Plaintiff was observed to have “been able to 

maintain a conversational exchange with examiners,” and that by way of example “he was 

engaged with his interviewer, open to conveying his perception, and shared his experiences[.]” 

AR 33. Such inconsistencies between Dr. Seal’s opinion expressed on a check-box form and other 

clinical findings in the medical record were valid reasons to discount the opinion. Magallanes v. 

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (“the ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion 

which is ‘brief and conclusionary in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] 

conclusion’”) (citation omitted); Matney on Behalf of Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 

(9th Cir. 1992) (an “ALJ need not accept an opinion of a physician–even a treating physician–if it 

is conclusionary and brief and is unsupported by clinical findings; here, the objective finding 

revealed “no significant motor loss, muscle weakness or sensory or reflex loss, with the exception 

of loss of the right achilles reflex”). 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ “cherry-picked series of factual instances” is without 

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merit. The ALJ only partially discounted Dr. Seal’s opinion, noting that while the medical 

evidence in the record demonstrated that Plaintiff had “some deficits in memory and attention,” he 

admitted to “slowly completing his personal needs and preparing his own simple meals (Exhibits 

5F/3-4 and 6F/1),” which was consistent with Dr. Seal’s conclusion that Plaintiff had “mild 

limitations in distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable work performance and 

maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to the work setting (Id/5).” AR 40. Thus, the 

ALJ did not reject Dr. Seal’s opinion in its entirety but parsed his findings and conclusions as to 

Plaintiff’s limitations, showing where the findings were either consistent or inconsistent with the 

evidence in the record. Further, although Plaintiff argues there was other evidence in the record 

that was consistent with Dr. Seal’s conclusions, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision even 

“where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Magallanes, 881 

F.2d at 750 (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)). It is 

the ALJ, not the Court, that must resolve determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in 

medical testimony, and all other ambiguities. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 

1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Accordingly, because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for his evaluation 

of Dr. Seal’s opinion, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, the decision must be 

affirmed.

b. Dr. Franklin

With respect to Dr. Franklin, the ALJ agreed with the psychologist’s indication that 

Plaintiff had “moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short and 

simple instructions and getting along with others,” and that “he had problems with immediate and 

delayed memory.” AR 39 (citing AR 364). However, with respect to Dr. Franklin’s indication 

that Plaintiff had “marked limitations in: understanding remembering, and carrying out detailed 

instructions, maintaining attention and concentration for 2-hour segments, performing at a 

consistent pace, responding appropriately to changes in a routine work setting and dealing with 

normal work stressors, and completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions 

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from psychologically based symptoms,” the ALJ noted that “though [Plaintiff] worked a slower 

rate than his peers did, he was able to maintain a conversational exchange with his examiners” and 

“was able to verbalize an understanding his medication and discharge instructions[.]” Id. (citing 

AR 364, 413, 421, 431, 438).

Plaintiff again argues the ALJ “cherry picked” facts in his consideration of Dr. Franklin’s 

opinion and that “[e]ven if the court were to accept that the facts cited by the ALJ to discredit Dr. 

Franklin’s report, these facts are not clear or convincing reasons to reject a report based on testing, 

a thorough interview, and a review of available records.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8. However,

inconsistencies between an opinion and the medical evidence in the record are valid reasons to 

discount the opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (holding that an ALJ need not accept the opinion 

of a doctor that is inadequately supported by clinical findings); Creech v. Colvin, 612 F. App’x 

480, 481 (9th Cir. 2015) (“ALJ permissibly discounted the contradicted opinion of [claimant’s] 

treating physician,” noting that his “opinion was not supported by other medical evidence, 

especially the physical consultative examiner’s report finding that Plaintiff had a wide range of 

pain-free motion”) (citing Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014)). In addition to 

the evidence above, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff “experienced some difficulty maintaining 

housing,” but he “was able to appear at his examinations dressed appropriately and manage his 

funds by himself.” AR 39. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff stated he was able to “ride a bike for 

exercise,” spent time “walking more than riding his bike,” and did “light household chores with 

limitations.” AR 38. Plaintiff’s ability to do daily activities and take care of his personal needs 

provides an additional, valid reason for partially discounting Dr. Franklin’s opinion. Hensley v. 

Colvin, 600 F. App’x 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2015) (when rejecting treating psychologist’s opinion, the 

ALJ properly found that the “opinion was inconsistent with [claimant’s] reported daily activities, 

which included attending to personal care, cooking, cleaning, shopping for groceries, taking the 

bus and swimming for exercise”); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(concluding that claimant’s testimony about her daily activities may be seen as inconsistent with 

the presence of a disabling condition).

Plaintiff notes that Dr. Franklin rated his IQ score at 48. Pl.’s Mot. at 8. However, the 

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ALJ noted that Dr. Martin scored Plaintiff’s IQ at 59. AR 37 (citing AR 377). The medical 

record also reflects that Dr. Seal noted that in 2010 Plaintiff had an IQ score of 79. AR 483. The 

ALJ further noted that Dr. Martin “believed that motivational factors might have contributed to the 

claimant’s work performance” and that “the results were considered a ‘questionable representation 

of the claimant’s cognitive abilities.’” AR 37, 376-77. These inconsistencies were valid reasons 

to discount the scores. Sampson v. Colvin, 2015 WL 3970415, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) 

(“Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s IQ scores were invalid due to 

Plaintiff’s over-reporting and poor effort and motivation during the administration of the two IQ 

tests.”). 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ committed error by affording greater weight to the opinions 

of Dr. Morris and Dr. Martin over Dr. Franklin’s. Pl.’s Mot. at 7-8. However, the ALJ set out 

valid reasons based on evidence in the record for relying on these opinions over those of Dr. Seal 

and Dr. Franklin. With respect to Dr. Martin, the ALJ noted:

I give this opinion great weight because it is consistent with the record 

as a whole. Dr. Martin supported his opinion with a thorough

explanation, including the claimant's full-scale IQ score of 59 

(Exhibit 5F/6). In addition, he noted that there were possible 

motivational factors that contributed to the claimant's work 

performance (Id). During this evaluation, the claimant was ruled out 

for cognitive disorder, diagnosed with depressive disorder, pain 

disorder due to psychological factors and general medical condition, 

and cannabis abuse (Id/7). In addition, the claimant demonstrated 

poor attention and memory (Id/4). However, he was able to count 

change, name 3 of the last 5 presidents, and demonstrated fair insight, 

judgment, and fund of knowledge (Id). Finally, the limitations in 

interacting with others is supported by the claimant's history of 

paranoid ideation (Id/5).

AR 40. Though Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Martin’s and Dr. Franklin’s opinions “reinforce” each 

other, Pl.’s Mot. at 12, the difference between Dr. Martin’s finding of “moderate” limitations 

reflects that the mental impairment is not sufficiently severe as to have a significant impact on 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform work activity. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“We have not previously held mild or moderate depression to be a sufficiently severe nonexertional limitation that significantly limits a claimant’s ability to do work beyond the exertional 

limitation”); Graham v. Colvin, 2015 WL 433022, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2015) (“Contrary to 

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plaintiff’s argument, a ‘moderate’ impairment in one area is not inconsistent with the ALJ’s 

finding that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment that significantly limited her ability 

to work”). The Social Security regulations do not provide a standard definition of the term 

“moderate.” Serna v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5179033, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.902a(c)(4)); Stenson v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1154400, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012). 

However, the record itself notes that the difference between “moderate” and “marked” limitations 

as a moderate limitation allows that the “ability to function is fair,” while a marked limitation 

indicates the “ability to function seriously limited.” AR 497. Further, courts have held that a 

plaintiff “found to have a moderate limitation in her ability to respond appropriately to work 

pressures in a usual work setting would still be able to satisfactorily function in this area.” Serna, 

2008 WL 5179033 at *3 (citing Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 888 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also 

Holland v. Colvin, 2016 WL 928665, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2016) (affirming ALJ’s decision 

where the ALJ interpreted doctor’s use of “moderate” to mean that plaintiff could still function 

satisfactorily in the work-setting); Arriola v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4926961, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 

2008) (noting that “moderate” is “more than a slight limitation in this area but the individual is 

still able to function satisfactorily”). Moreover, courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that 

“[m]oderate mental functional limitations—specifically limitations in social functioning and 

adaptation—are not per se disabling, nor do they preclude the performance of jobs that involve 

simple, repetitive tasks.” McLain v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2174895, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2011); 

Koehler v. Astrue, 283 F. App’x 443, 445 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that ALJ’s finding that plaintiff 

lacked a severe mental impairment was proper despite “diagnosis of a ‘moderate’ degree of 

limitation in one’s ability to respond to changes in the workplace setting”); Rogers v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 445047, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (finding that ALJ’s limitation to 

simple, repetitive work captured moderate limitations in social functioning). 

The Court also finds the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Martin’s opinion as his findings were 

based on his own clinical findings. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(examining physician’s opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence because it rests on his own 

independent examination of the claimant); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (When an examining physician 

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provides “independent clinical findings that differ from the findings of the treating physician,” 

such findings are “substantial evidence”; “Independent clinical findings can be either (1) 

diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are supported by substantial 

evidence” or “(2) findings based on objective medical tests that the treating physician has not 

herself considered”). Similarly, the ALJ set forth valid reasons for giving Dr. Morris’s opinion

great weight. AR 38-39; AR 72-74. After setting out the psychologist’s findings, the ALJ found 

the assessment “consistent with the medical evidence of record and the residual functional 

capacity.” AR 38-39. The ALJ’s RFC assessment and Dr. Morris’s assessment were consistent in 

finding that Plaintiff “would be limited to simple and routine tasks and making simple workrelated decisions,” “could frequently interact with supervisors and co-workers,” and could 

“frequently interact with the public, but only on a superficial level, such as greeting customers or 

directing a customer to the nearest restroom.” AR 34, 72-74. Because Dr. Morris’s findings were 

based on specific medical evidence in the record (see AR 67-68), the Court finds the ALJ properly 

relied on this opinion. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of 

non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the 

opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record”);

Hensley, 600 F. App’x at 527 (ALJ properly gave “little weight” to treating psychologist’s opinion 

and “more weight” to the contrary opinions of two non-examining doctors because their 

“conclusions were consistent with other independent evidence in the record”); Tonapetyan, 242 

F.3d at 1149 (finding that contrary opinion of a non-examining medical expert may constitute 

substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record); Bray v. 

Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly relied “in large part on the DDS 

physician’s assessment” in assessing the claimant’s RFC and rejecting treating doctor’s testimony 

regarding the claimant’s functional limitations). 

Accordingly, because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for his evaluation 

of Dr. Franklin’s opinion and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, the decision must 

be affirmed.

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D. Credibility

With respect to Plaintiff’s assertions that he was unable to perform work activity because 

of his pain and symptoms, the ALJ found his testimony inconsistent and not fully supported by the 

record. AR 38. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s condition is controlled or responsive to treatment, he 

demonstrated “mild” physical exams, and his activities of daily living do not substantiate the 

degree of severity alleged. Id.

Plaintiff argues the ALJ is incorrect because, even though the ALJ found treatment has 

helped in the past, his inability to regularly attend medical appointments “leaves him in chronic 

pain, in a way that is not helped by his aversion to any pills, leaving him without ibuprofen.” Pl.’s 

Mot. at 11 (citing AR 485, 490). He notes that, although he at one point told Dr. Seal that 

medication has helped him sleep, “multiple treating doctors have observed his sleepiness during 

their appointments, including an appointment at Lifelong that the ALJ cited only two paragraphs 

prior to this portion of his decision.” Id. (citing AR 37, 38, 454). Plaintiff also notes that, 

although the ALJ pointed out that he rides a bike, he finds riding a bike to be easier on his knees 

than walking and “riding a bike uses different muscles and puts stress on different joints than 

walking or standing up, which is obvious to anyone who has transitioned from riding a bike to 

begin walking and felt relief in their thighs.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues that a finding that 

compliance with recommended treatment may have improved his symptoms does not, on its own, 

show that he is not disabled or that he is not credible. Id. at 12. He notes that two examining 

doctors found he has an extremely low IQ and his treating doctor noted that he had low cognitive 

function. Id.

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s statements were 

inconsistent with the medical evidence because the evidence shows a positive response to 

medication and treatment, Plaintiff’s assertions of disabling pain and symptoms are not supported 

by objective medical evidence, and there are inconsistencies between his daily activities and 

assertions of disabling symptoms. Def.’s Mot. at 12-14.

1. Legal Standard

Congress expressly prohibits granting disability benefits based solely on a claimant’s 

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subjective complaints. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s statement as to pain or 

other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (an 

ALJ will consider all of a claimant’s statements about symptoms, including pain, but statements 

about pain or other symptoms “will not alone establish” the claimant's disability). “An ALJ 

cannot be required to believe every allegation of [disability], or else disability benefits would be 

available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to [the Social Security Act].” Fair v. Bowen, 885 

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). An ALJ is, however, required to make specific credibility findings. 

See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (the credibility finding “must be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight”).

A two-step analysis is used when determining whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 

their subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th 

Cir. 2007). First, it must be determined “whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 

1991) (en banc); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)). A claimant does not need to “show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; 

she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” 

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Second, if the claimant has met the first step and “there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the 

ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). “The 

ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record 

lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Courts must not engage in second-guessing, 

where the ALJ “has made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of 

excess pain, and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Fair, 885 

F.2d at 604. However, “a finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on 

a lack of medical support for the severity of his pain.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 

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792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 

1986) (per curiam) (“‘Excess pain’ is, by definition, pain that is unsupported by objective medical 

findings.”).

Factors an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility include: “[claimant’s] 

reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or between [his] 

testimony and [his] conduct, claimant’s daily activities, [his] work record, and testimony from 

physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which 

[claimant] complains.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (quoting Light, 119 F.3d at 792). An ALJ’s 

credibility finding must be properly supported by the record, and sufficiently specific to ensure a 

reviewing court he did not “arbitrarily discredit” a claimant’s subjective testimony. Id. at 958 

(citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46). 

2. Analysis

The ALJ articulated several reasons for finding that Plaintiff’s subjective allegations were 

not wholly reliable. AR 34-35. The ALJ discounted some of his statements as inconsistent with 

medical evidence showing that his “condition is controlled or responsive to treatment,” including 

that certain medications made his symptoms “better,” “helpful,” and improved his sleep, that his 

right leg pain was “improved,” and that physical therapy session seemed to help. AR 38 (citing 

AR 331, 400-01, 404, 451, 485, 490-91). A positive response to medication and treatment is a 

valid reason for discounting complaints of disabling pain and symptoms. Warre v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[i]mpairments that can be controlled 

effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for” social 

security benefits); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 (ALJ may infer that claimant’s “response to 

conservative treatment undermines [claimant’s] reports regarding the disabling nature of his 

pain.”). And, even if Plaintiff’s activities were not particularly extensive, the ALJ’s conclusion 

that he was not as limited as he claimed was a reasonable and valid basis for discounting his selfreported symptoms. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (“Even where those activities suggest some 

difficulty in functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the 

extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment”); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 

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(the ALJ properly determined that the claimant “demonstrated better abilities than he 

acknowledged in his written statements and testimony” and that his “non-work activities . . . are 

inconsistent with the degree of impairment he alleges”). 

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s assertions of disabling pain and symptoms were 

inconsistent with the medical record:

For example, Annie Khan, M.D. found the claimant’s right knee had 

“mild” joint line tenderness (Exhibit 9F/12). In addition, the doctor 

found no erythema, no swelling, no patellar tenderness, and negative 

anterior/posterior drawer (Id). In addition, an X-ray of his knee 

showed evidence of good healing of a previous tibial fracture with no 

abnormalities (Exhibit 1F/3 and 6). The claimant also admitted to 

being non-compliant with follow up care (Exhibit 3F/3). He also 

admitted to missing physical therapy appointments (Id). The claimant 

also admitted throughout the record that he felt signs of improvement. 

For example, the claimant admitted that though not fully gone, certain 

medications have made symptoms “better” (Exhibits 7F/13 and 

9F/45). In fact, he admitted to trying Valium and found it “helpful” 

(Id). The claimant’s sleep was poor, but medication has helped it 

improve (Exhibits 7F/12, 16, and 9F/44). The claimant’s small 

abscesses on his right knee were “getting better” (Exhibit 3F/1). 

Finally, the claimant admitted his right leg was in pain, but it was 

somewhat “improved” (Exhibit 9F/39). He complained in May 2017 

of right hip pain for the past 2 months that resulting from a lot of 

walking, but he had 5 physical therapy sessions a while ago that 

seemed to help (Id/5).

AR 38. Such inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical record are valid 

reasons to discount statements of disabling pain and symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2); Parra 

v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (“ALJ pointed to specific evidence in the record, 

including numerous medical reports, establishing that the claimant’s complaints were not 

credible”).

Finally, the ALJ properly considered inconsistencies between daily activities and 

Plaintiff’s assertions of disabling symptoms. The ALJ noted:

In addition, the claimant’s own admissions of activities of daily living 

do not substantiate the degree of severity alleged. The claimant 

alleged that he cannot even stand up (Exhibit 4F/2). However, even 

in August 2017, the claimant admitted that he is able to ride a bike for 

exercise and that he carries heavy things on his bike (Exhibit 9F/1 and 

13). In fact, he admitted to riding on his bike for days until he gets 

tired (Id/36). He also admitted to walking more than riding his bike 

(Id/23). Additionally, the claimant alleged that he does not do any 

household chores because of his pain and limited movement (Exhibit 

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6E/4), in other parts of the record, he also admitted to doing light 

household chores with limitations (Exhibit 5F/4).

AR 38. Although Plaintiff’s activities may have been limited by his impairments, it was proper 

for the ALJ to find they were not as limiting as he alleged them to be. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 

F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a claimant’s self-reported activities suggested a 

higher level of functionality than claimant alleged); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (ALJ may 

consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged 

symptoms”). Thus, even if Plaintiff’s activities were not particularly extensive, the ALJ’s 

conclusion that he was not as limited as he claimed was a reasonable and valid basis for 

discounting his self-reported symptoms. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (“Even where those 

activities suggest some difficulty in functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the 

claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

impairment”); Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (the ALJ properly determined that the claimant 

“demonstrated better abilities than he acknowledged in his written statements and testimony” and 

that his “non-work activities . . . are inconsistent with the degree of impairment he alleges”). 

Plaintiff’s contention that bicycle riding is “easier on the knees than walking” does not 

rebut the ALJ’s accurate observation that Plaintiff stated that he “is usually outside and admits he 

can walk and use public transportation,” that he “admitted to going to parks, the community 

center, and church on a regular basis,” and that he “stated that he walks more than he rides his 

bike” even though in August 2017 he “admitted that he is able to ride a bike for exercise and that 

he carries heavy things on his bike. (Exhibit 9F/1 and 13). In fact, he admitted to riding on his 

bike for days until he gets tired (Id/36).” AR 38; see AR 208, 225-26, 469. This evidence 

supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s self-description of his walking and bicycling were 

inconsistent with his other assertions of being totally disabled from pain and symptoms relating to 

his ability to walk beyond the limitations the ALJ incorporated into his RFC assessment.

Because the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

Plaintiff’s testimony, and his decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds the 

ALJ’s decision must be affirmed.

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E. Step Three – Listing of Impairments

The ALJ determined the combined clinical findings from each of Plaintiff’s impairments 

did not “reach the level of severity contemplated in the listings.” AR 32. Plaintiff argues the ALJ 

erred because he meets the requirements for listings 1.02, 12.04 and 12.05. Pl.’s Mot. at 12-14.

1. Legal Standard

At step three in the sequential process, an ALJ must consider whether a claimant’s 

conditions meet or equal any of the impairments outlined in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The listings describe 

impairments that “would prevent an adult, regardless of his age, education, or work experience, 

from performing any gainful activity.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) (emphasis in 

original). If a claimant’s “impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant 

is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 

disability under the listings. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

An impairment meets a listing when all the medical criteria required of that listing is 

satisfied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099 (“To meet a listed impairment, a 

claimant must establish that he or she meets each characteristic of a listed impairment relevant to 

his or her claim.”); Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530 (“For a claimant to show that his impairment matches 

a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only 

some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”). “To equal a listed impairment, 

a claimant must establish symptoms, signs and laboratory findings ‘at least equal in severity and 

duration’ to the characteristics of a relevant listed impairment. . . .” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). 

“If a claimant suffers from multiple impairments and none of them individually meets or 

equals a listed impairment, the collective symptoms, signs and laboratory findings of all of the 

claimant’s impairments will be evaluated to determine whether they meet or equal the 

characteristics of any relevant listed impairment.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). However, 

“‘[m]edical equivalence must be based on medical findings,” and “[a] generalized assertion of 

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functional problems is not enough to establish disability at step three.’” Id. at 1100 (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)). Further, an impairment does not meet the criteria of a listing based only on 

a diagnosis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d); Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530 (“For a claimant to show that his 

impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment 

that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”); Moncada v. 

Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). 

2. Analysis

a. Listing 1.02

Listing 1.02 refers to “Major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause).” It is

Characterized by gross anatomical deformity (e.g., subluxation, 

contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis, instability) and chronic joint 

pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal 

motion of the affected joint(s), and findings on appropriate medically 

acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or 

ankylosis of the affected joint(s). With:

A. Involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint (i.e., hip, 

knee, or ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, as 

defined in 1.00B2b;

or

B. Involvement of one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity 

(i.e., shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand), resulting in inability to perform 

fine and gross movements effectively, as defined in 1.00B2c.

20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.02. The ALJ found “[t]here is no evidence in the record 

which demonstrates this criteria,” noting that Plaintiff “demonstrated steady, normal gait with 

sensory and motor skills intact.” AR 32 (citing AR 266-76). 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed error because, in the records the ALJ cites, there is 

reference made to a compression plate in the proximal tibia. Pl.’s Mot. at 13 (citing AR 269). 

Plaintiff also notes that during an examination performed by Dr. Tang on January 25, 2016, he 

was unable to tandem walk or do a toe-heel stand due to right knee pain, and Dr. Tang noted that 

Plaintiff had a prescribed cane that was “medically necessary,” a limited range of motion in his 

right knee, and that “the claimant is not more than 50% weightbearing.” Id. (citing AR 384). 

Plaintiff notes that the ALJ brought this up in the portion of his decision granting great weight to 

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Dr. Tang’s opinion, yet it is absent from his analysis of listing 1.02. Id. (citing AR 40) (“The 

claimant does have a history of a right knee fracture for five years (Exhibit 6F/3). In fact a prior 

open reduction internal fixation was required and cannot be more than 50% weight bearing.”). 

Plaintiff argues: “Whether or not the presence of a compression plate in the tibia satisfies the letter 

of listing 1.02, the fact that there is extensive evidence that [he] uses a medically necessary cane to 

ambulate, and that his right knee is not more than 50% load bearing are substantial evidence that 

plaintiff’s symptoms functionally equal the listing.” Id. (citing AR 343, 364, 384, 389). 

In response, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s reliance on Dr. Tang’s January 2016 report fails 

to consider the other portions of that report which directly contradict his argument. Def.’s Mot. at 

16-17. 

To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he or she meets each 

characteristic of a listed impairment relevant to his or her claim. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099. 

Although Dr. Tang noted a limited range of motion in his right knee and that he was not more than 

50% weightbearing, he also noted that Plaintiff “did not have any acute muscle spasms and 

exhibited strength of 5/5 in all four extremities and grips”; could “stand and walk up to 6 hours,” 

“sit without limitations,” and lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently”; and was “capable of occasionally climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

and crawling,” and “capable of reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling without limitations.” 

AR 385. As such, while Plaintiff may meet some of criteria for listing 1.02, the Court finds 

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that he meets all the criteria. See Doney v. 

Berryhill, 728 F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The ALJ did not err by concluding, at step 

three of the sequential evaluation process, that Doney failed to meet or equal Listing 1.02 because 

the medical evidence did not demonstrate that she demonstrated an inability to ambulate 

effectively.”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed.

b. Listings 12.04 and 12.15

Listing 12.04 refers to depressive, bipolar and related disorders, which are

characterized by an irritable, depressed, elevated, or expansive mood, 

or by a loss of interest or pleasure in all or almost all activities, causing 

a clinically significant decline in functioning. Symptoms and signs 

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may include, but are not limited to, feelings of hopelessness or guilt, 

suicidal ideation, a clinically significant change in body weight or 

appetite, sleep disturbances, an increase or decrease in energy, 

psychomotor abnormalities, disturbed concentration, pressured 

speech, grandiosity, reduced impulse control, sadness, euphoria, and 

social withdrawal.

20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.04. 

Listing 12.15 refers to trauma- and stressor-related disorders, which are

characterized by experiencing or witnessing a traumatic or stressful 

event, or learning of a traumatic event occurring to a close family 

member or close friend, and the psychological aftermath of clinically 

significant effects on functioning. Symptoms and signs may include, 

but are not limited to, distressing memories, dreams, and flashbacks 

related to the trauma or stressor; avoidant behavior; diminished 

interest or participation in significant activities; persistent negative 

emotional states (for example, fear, anger) or persistent inability to 

experience positive emotions (for example, satisfaction, affection); 

anxiety; irritability; aggression; exaggerated startle response; 

difficulty concentrating; and sleep disturbance.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15.

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria for these 

listings, which require that a claimant’s “mental impairments must result in at least one extreme or 

two marked limitations in a broad area of functioning which are: understanding, remembering, or 

applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or 

adapting or managing themselves.”10 AR 32. The ALJ found Plaintiff has only moderate 

limitation in understanding, remembering or applying information; moderate limitation in 

interacting with others, moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and 

moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself. AR 32-33. Because his mental impairments 

do not cause at least two marked limitations or one extreme limitation, the ALJ found Plaintiff did 

 

10 The listings typically have three sets of criteria: paragraphs A, B, and C. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A). The criteria in Paragraph A (except 12.05) “includes the medical 

criteria that must be present in [the] medical evidence,” paragraph B “(except 12.05) provides the 

functional criteria [assessed], in conjunction with a rating scale” to evaluate how the claimant’s 

mental disorder limits his or her functioning, and paragraph C provides criteria used to evaluate 

“serious and persistent mental disorders.” Id. Only some of the eleven diagnostic categories of 

mental disorders have paragraph C criteria and for those categories, the “mental disorder must 

satisfy the requirements of both paragraphs A and B, or the requirements of both paragraphs A and 

C.” Id. If the claimant satisfies the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph and the 

criteria of both paragraphs A and B (or A and C, when appropriate) are satisfied, the claimant has 

a listed impairment. Id. Intellectual disorder (12.05) “has two paragraphs, designated A and B, 

that apply only to intellectual disorder.” Id.

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not satisfy the listing requirements. AR 33. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed error for the same reason discussed in the medical 

opinions section above, namely that his rejection of portions of the reports of Dr. Seal and Dr. 

Franklin “was predicated on isolating specific instances of the record in order to ignore objective 

medical findings.” Pl.’s Mot. at 14. He maintains this can be seen in his discussion of the 

paragraph B criteria “where after noting that plaintiff’s objective testing showed that he has 

serious deficits to his fund of knowledge, intelligence, abstraction, as well as immediate and 

delayed memory, the ALJ relies on the fact that ‘claimant was able to converse in a manner 

sufficient for the evaluator to complete his interview,’ and that he verbalized understanding of 

discharge and prescription instructions to find only a moderate limitation to understanding, 

remembering and applying information.” Id. (quoting AR 32). Plaintiff notes the ALJ 

acknowledged “there were multiple objective tests performed by examining doctors that showed 

that [he] has an extremely low IQ and extremely impaired memory, and yet, attempted to call 

those findings into question by noting that the plaintiff did not behave so disruptively that his 

doctors could not even examine him and that he is capable of saying ‘yes.’” Id. He maintains that 

“[s]imilar tactics are used to find a moderate limitation to concentration, where the finding that 

‘the claimant has been able to maintain a conversational exchange with examiners,’ is given as a 

counter to all the other relevant evidence on the record.” Id. (quoting AR 33). He argues “[t]hese 

findings are not based on substantial evidence, but mere instances in which the plaintiff 

accomplished things that people with marked impairments to understanding, memory and 

concentration would be able to do.” Id.

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ properly addressed and partially discredited the 

opinions of Dr. Seal and Dr. Franklin, and Plaintiff’s contention that these opinions should be 

relied upon to establish that he satisfies the paragraph B criteria of the listings is without merit. 

Def.’s Mot. at 18. 

The Court finds the ALJ did not err by concluding Plaintiff failed to meet or equal listings 

12.04 and 12.15. As discussed above, the ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Dr. Seal and Dr. 

Franklin in part. And, because the ALJ properly considered listings 12.04 and 12.15 with respect 

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to this evidence, he did not err in finding that Plaintiff dos not meet the applicable criteria. See 

Littledeer v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5272812, at *11 (D. Or. Sept. 17, 2013) (“As discussed above, the 

ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Ms. Van Epps and Dr. Williams. The ALJ considered each 

Listing with respect to the credible evidence in the record and found that Littledeer did not meet 

the applicable criteria. Tr. 24. Because he did not err in his evaluation of the medical evidence, 

the ALJ did not err in finding that Littledeer did not meet a listed impairment.”); Huecias v. 

Colvin, 2015 WL 1005410, at *3 (C.D. Cal. March 6, 2015) (“The ALJ decision must be affirmed. 

The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence, properly rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician and properly concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal a 

listing.”). The ALJ considered the evidence in Dr. Seal’s and Dr. Franklin’s opinions that 

established limitations, but he found the record as a whole did not establish limitations that met the 

listings, including Plaintiff’s normal speech and disposition, his openness to conveying his 

perception and sharing his experiences, his ability to converse in a manner sufficient for the 

evaluator to complete his interview, to verbalize understanding of his prescription information and 

discharge instructions, his ability to manage funds, his ability to prepare meals by himself, and his 

stated goals to get his own apartment and a job. AR 32-33.

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ committed error because he failed to conduct an analysis of 

the paragraph A criteria for the listings. Pl.’s Mot. at 14. However, the criteria for both 

paragraphs A and B must be satisfied. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(A)(2); 

Dixon v. Saul, 2019 WL 4751896, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019). Thus, even if Plaintiff meets 

the criteria for paragraph A, the ALJ correctly found he does not meet the listings because he does 

not satisfy the criteria for paragraph B.

11

 

Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed.

F. RFC

As noted above, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with 

limitations. AR 33-34. Plaintiff argues “[t]his RFC is based on the improper foundation of 

 

11 Plaintiff does not address, and the Court therefore does not consider, whether he meets the 

requirements of paragraph C.

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dismissing the opinions of multiple doctors and the statements made by [Plaintiff] about his own 

symptoms. Had the ALJ considered the overall record, he would have determined that [Plaintiff’s] 

severe mental impairments prevent him from meeting the basic mental demands of unskilled work 

on a sustained basis in accordance with Social Security Ruling 85-15.” Pl.’s Mot. at 15. He 

maintains “[t]he extensive evidence of [his] extremely low IQ, poor concentration, and 

documented need for breaks in order to walk or stand for six hours all go unaddressed in the ALJ’s 

RFC,” any such limitations “prevent him from performing any work at SGA levels that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy.” Id. at 16. In response, Defendant argues the ALJ’s 

RFC assessment was based on substantial evidence and included established limitations. Def.’s 

Mot. at 19.

RFC is the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It 

is assessed by considering all the relevant evidence in a claimant’s case record. Id.; see also 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When a case is before an ALJ, it is the ALJ’s 

responsibility to assess a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 

260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the 

claimant's physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”). “Generally, the more consistent 

an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4).

The Court finds the ALJ did not err in his RFC assessment. While Plaintiff bases his 

argument on the ALJ’s “dismissing the opinions of multiple doctors and the statements made by 

[Plaintiff] about his own symptoms,” as discussed above, the ALJ’s findings were based upon 

substantial evidence in the record. Because the ALJ’s analysis on these issues was legally 

sufficient, the Court must find that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was correct. Batson, 359 F.3d at

1197 (In determining a plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ is not required to incorporate the claimant’s 

properly rejected testimony or statements nor is he “required to incorporate evidence from the 

opinions of [the claimant’s] treating physicians, which were permissibly discounted”); Chaudhry 

v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (“because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence to give less weight to [the examining physician’s] 

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opinion, we conclude that the ALJ did not err in basing the RFC on [the DDS non-examining 

physician’s] findings rather than [the examiner’s]”) (alterations in original). Further, the Court 

notes that RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical determination, and need not match any 

one physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from 

medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility 

for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner”); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“[i]t is 

clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual 

functional capacity”). The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s RFC based on the record 

as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 

Accordingly, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment, it is 

free of legal error, and the decision must be affirmed.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS 

Defendant’s cross-motion. The Court shall enter a separate judgment, after which the Clerk of 

Court shall terminate the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2019

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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