Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-56/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 Following various grants of extensions of time to

respond, petitioner filed his objections on November 2, 2007

(Docket #827), and respondent filed his response thereto on

December 21, 2007 (Docket #838). The court set the matter for

hearing on February 22, 2008; however, finding that oral argument

would not be of material assistance, the court ordered the matter

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH DP

Petitioner,

v. DEATH PENALTY CASE

ROBERT S. AYERS, Acting Warden MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

of San Quentin State Prison,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the parties’ objections1

to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations (“F&R”) of

August 29, 2007 (Docket #817), adjudicating petitioner’s guilt

/////

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2 The court’s previous order of July 24, 2007 (Docket

#816), adopted the magistrate judge’s recommended procedure to

enter partial judgment as to the competency trial juror

misconduct claim and to stay all other competency and penalty

phase claims, following the court’s review of these guilt phase

claims. As this order finally adjudicates all of petitioner’s

guilt phase claims, entry of partial judgment is made as

contemplated by the court’s July 24, 2007 order.

3 In some limited respects noted below, the court

declines to adopt certain rationales for the magistrate judge’s

conclusions. That decision, however, does not impact the court’s

ultimate holding to adopt in full the magistrate judge’s

recommendation to deny petitioner’s guilt phase claims in their

entirety.

4 Respondent does not oppose the F&R except as to the

entry of partial judgment under Rule 54(b). (See Resp’t’s

Combined Non-Opp’n & Opp’n to Pet’r’s Objections, filed Dec. 21,

2007 (Docket #838).)

2

phase habeas claims.2 In accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(C) and Eastern District Local Rule 72-

304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this mater. 

Having reviewed the entire file, the court finds the F&R to be

supported by the record and by proper analysis. It therefore

adopts the magistrate judge’s conclusions as stated in the F&R of

August 29, 2007.3 The court writes briefly below only to clarify

the issues that are properly before the court and consider

petitioner’s central objections.4

A. Application of Rule 54(b)

 As they did previously, both petitioner and respondent urge

the court to forego entering partial judgment under Rule 54(b)

and direct the magistrate judge to consider all remaining

competency and guilt phase claims prior to any remand to the

state court for a retrospective competency hearing. For the

reasons discussed in the court’s order of July 24, 2007 (Docket

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#816), the court considers only petitioner’s objection. 

Petitioner contends the court’s previous order, filed July

24, 2007, adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation that

partial judgment be entered upon resolution of the guilt phase

claims, is not supported by “specific findings” setting forth the

reasons for certifying partial judgment. The court does not

agree that its prior order was inadequate in this regard but

writes herein to emphasize the propriety of its earlier ruling.

There are two factors to consider in ordering a Rule 54(b)

certification. Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S.

1, 10 (1980). First, the court must consider the overlap of

factual and legal issues between those claims disposed of under

Rule 54(b) and those still pending before the trial court. Id.

Second, the court must assess the equities that weigh in favor

and against certification. Id. The Ninth Circuit has elaborated

on these inquiries to require “specific findings” setting forth

the reasons for certifying judgment under Rule 54(b). MorrisonKnudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981).

With regard to the first factor, petitioner asserts there is

significant overlap between the issues disposed of by the instant

F&R and those still pending before this court precluding

certification under Rule 54(b). The court acknowledges that many

of the deferred claims overlap with the disposed claims in some

respects. However, there is no requirement that Rule 54(b)

claims be separate from and independent of other claims. See

Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Carlsberg Financial Corp., 689 F.2d 815,

817 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Cold Metal Process Co. v. United

Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1965)); see also

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4

Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing

to hold that Rule 54(b) cannot apply to habeas cases). As the

Ninth Circuit has noted, 

Both the Supreme Court and our court have upheld

certification on one or more claims despite the

presence of facts that overlap remaining claims when,

for example, counterclaims are involved that arise out

of the same transaction or occurrence as the certified

claim, or the case is complex and there is an important

controlling legal issue that cuts across (and cuts out

or at least curtails) a number of claims. 

Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 882 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing cases). The court is therefore not persuaded the

presence of overlapping facts and issues alone is dispositive of

a Rule 54(b) certification.

Considering the second factor, the court concludes the

equities in this case weigh in favor of partial certification. 

Certifying the guilt phase claims, along with Claim 21(a) as to

the competency phase claims, could prove dispositive. On remand,

a state court determination that petitioner was incompetent at

the time of trial, or that a retrospective competency hearing is

infeasible, would mandate overturning petitioner’s death penalty

conviction, effectively disposing of petitioner’s remaining

claims. Petitioner’s deferred claims will require resolution

only if the state court determines petitioner was competent at

the time of trial. The state court’s determination could

therefore save this court scarce resources and result in final

adjudication of the matter for the parties. 

Moreover, there is a pressing need to remand these

proceedings immediately to the state court for a determination of

the feasibility of a competency hearing. Cf. Curtis-Wright, 446

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5 Nevertheless, the court notes that to the extent the

magistrate judge suggested Claim 1(3)(d) is procedurally barred

under Dixon, this contradicts a prior court order. (See Order

Regarding Evidentiary Hr’g Issues (Docket #524), filed Sept. 2,

2005, at 6 n.5.) This inconsistency may simply be the result of

a clerical error. The magistrate judge previously found Claim

1(3)(c) and 1(3)(d) were not procedurally barred. (Id.) The F&R

reflects as much with respect to Claim 1(3)(c). (F&R at 10:1-4.)

5

U.S. at 6-7 (reversing denial of Rule 54(b) certification where

defendant would lose a significant amount of money unless the

appeal was heard immediately rather than at the end of trial). 

The court sympathizes with petitioner’s and respondent’s desire

to resolve all the issues raised in the petition. However, it

has been more than twenty years since petitioner’s trial and the

lapse of even a few months more could further jeopardize a

retroactive competency determination. Accordingly, the court

agrees with the magistrate judge that certification under Rule

54(b) is appropriate in this case. 

B. Procedural Default

Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s findings that

Claims 1(3)(d) and 1(3)(g) are procedurally barred under In re

Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). However, as these claims relate to

other competency phase issues, the magistrate judge deferred

briefing and adjudication of these claims pending the outcome of

the competency proceedings in state court. (F&R at 10:8, 18-19.) 

The court thus declines to address petitioner’s objections at

this time.5

C. Trial Incompetence

1. Denial of Due Process

Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s finding with

respect to Claim 22, regarding the trial court’s failure to hold

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a competency hearing earlier in the proceedings. Generally, a

trial court errs in failing to recognize sua sponte that a

competency hearing is necessary if the record before the trial

court indicates the judge should have had a bona fide doubt about

the competency of the defendant. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,

385 (1966); see Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)

(defining “competent” as whether a defendant “has sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as

well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”). 

Petitioner argues there were numerous indications before the

trial judge that a competency hearing was necessary. The court

agrees there were numerous incidents that, if before the trial

court, would have collectively raised a bona fide doubt as to

petitioner’s competency. The problem with petitioner’s argument

is that many, if not most, of these incidents were never brought

to the attention of the trial court. 

It appears from the record petitioner’s potential

incompetence was raised only two or three times before the trial

judge, when petitioner’s counsel remarked in passing that he had

considered requesting a “1368 hearing.” (F&R at 19:14-20, 20:2-

15 (quoting record).) Each time the court pressed counsel about

the matter, counsel unequivocally stated petitioner was

competent. (F&R at 20:2-11 (quoting record).) The only other

incident in the record is a conversation between counsel and the

judge regarding petitioner’s anxiety medication. However, this

conversation concerned petitioner’s emotional well-being, not his

mental health. (See F&R at 20:2-11 (quoting record).) Details

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about petitioner’s history of problems, stay at a medical

facility, and alleged inability to assist counsel were never

raised. The vague references to petitioner’s incompetency at

trial and need for anxiety medication, without more, was not

enough to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial judge

as to petitioner’s competency. Indeed, the trial judge noted on

the record that he had not observed any behavior on the part of

petitioner that would lead him to doubt petitioner’s competency. 

(F&R at 20:12-14 (quoting record).) Therefore, the magistrate

judge properly denied Claim 22. 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges the magistrate judge incorrectly denied

relief on Claim 1(3)(b) relating to ineffective assistance of

counsel. In order to establish a claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel, petitioner must show (1) the performance

of counsel was deficient, i.e., counsel’s performance was

unreasonable under the circumstances; and (2) a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the

proceedings would have been different. Stickland v. United

States, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 688, 694 (1984). Petitioner objects

to the magistrate judge’s determination trial counsel made a

“tactical” decision not to request a competency hearing earlier. 

However, there is ample evidence in the record to support the

magistrate judge’s conclusion. Lead trial counsel, Mr. Neill,

himself indicated at the state competency trial that he did not

want to present petitioner to the jury as incompetent. (F&R at

28:15-21 (quoting record).) Mr. Peterson, petitioner’s trial cocounsel, further testified petitioner had “pride” and did not

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want to be presented as incompetent. (Pet.’s Closing Brief,

filed Dec. 14, 2006, at 29:21-22 (citing record).) Thus, the

record supports the conclusion counsel made a conscious decision

to present petitioner to the court as competent.

While counsel is permitted to make tactical decisions, such

decisions must be reasonable to overcome an ineffective

assistance claim. Here, the court cannot say counsel acted

unreasonably by deciding not to request a competency hearing

earlier in the proceedings. Dr. Axelrad, petitioner’s primary

expert, told counsel at the time of trial that petitioner was

competent and could maintain competency through the efforts of

counsel. (F&R at 30:18-26 (quoting record).) Although counsel’s

and petitioner’s viewpoints increasingly diverged during the

proceedings, they were always able to “work it out.” (F&R at

31:9-20 (quoting record).) Further, there were sound reasons for

wanting to present petitioner as competent until serious doubts

about his competency arose. As the magistrate noted, there is a

certain stigma associated with a finding of incompetence. 

Further, the jury could have inferred guilt if counsel moved to

determine petitioner was incompetent, which would have undermined

petitioner’s “the other guy did it” defense. Accordingly, the

magistrate judge properly concluded the decision not to request a

competency hearing earlier in the litigation was “tactical” and

not manifestly unreasonable given the circumstances.

Even assuming trial counsel’s decision was unreasonable,

petitioner has failed to proffer sufficient evidence of prejudice

to his case. Petitioner acknowledges that neither Dr. Reus, the

state’s post-conviction expert, nor Dr. Woods, petitioner’s postCase 2:95-cv-01500-JAM-CKD Document 842 Filed 03/17/08 Page 8 of 15
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conviction expert, could make a determination of petitioner’s

competency during trial. Also, Dr. Axelrad testified, at

petitioner’s trial, he told counsel petitioner was competent,

although he cautioned significant effort on the part of counsel

was required to maintain competency. (F&R at 30:18-26 (quoting

record).) It was not until the evidentiary hearing before the

magistrate judge that Dr. Axelrad concluded, for the first time,

petitioner was incompetent as of 1981. (F&R at 30:7-15 (citing

record).) The magistrate judge properly rejected this testimony

as incredible in light of the expressed contrary opinions of Dr.

Axelrad at the time of trial.

Petitioner attempts to bolster Dr. Axelrad’s recent opinion

with evidence of childhood abuse, family history of mental

illness, and incidents of odd behavior on the part of petitioner

during the trial. The facts regarding childhood abuse and family

history of mental illness speak to petitioner’s susceptibility to

mental illness, not a reasonable probability he was incompetent

at the time of trial. Also, the fact trial counsel found it

difficult to deal with petitioner at times or petitioner acted

strangely during proceedings is not so unusual as to indicate

incompetency. As the magistrate judge noted, many defendants are

difficult and display odd behavior, particularly as the

proceedings progress and a judgment becomes imminent. In the

end, the court recognizes, as did the magistrate judge, that

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a close

call. However, the court agrees with the magistrate judge the

evidence is not sufficient to establish Claim 1(3)(b).

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6 The court agrees with petitioner that, contrary to the

magistrate judge’s finding, the defense of diminished capacity

would be available in the event of a retrial. See People v.

Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312, 395 n.6 (1997) (abolition of defense

of diminished capacity does not apply retroactively); In re

Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1241 (1991) (diminished capacity

defense still available for crimes occurring prior to January 1,

1982).

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D. Mental Health Defenses

Petitioner also challenges the magistrate judge’s findings

as to Claim 24, specifically that portion of Claim 24 relating to

whether mental health issues constituted a complete defense to

the charges. The magistrate judge disposed of this claim

primarily on the ground that petitioner failed to produce

sufficient evidence to support the claim at the evidentiary

hearing.6 However, petitioner correctly notes the magistrate

judge previously denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this

claim. Based on that ruling, petitioner did not proffer evidence

on this issue. While the magistrate judge overstated his

conclusions, it remains that petitioner failed to proffer enough

evidence to support holding an evidentiary hearing in the first

instance. Petitioner was given an opportunity to brief his

entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on this claim, and a

hearing was held on petitioner’s motion. (See Pet’r’s Mot. for

Evidentiary Hr’g (Docket #502), filed Apr. 8, 2005, at 56:3-6;

Mins. for Mot. Hr’g (Docket #519), filed Aug. 15, 2005.) The

magistrate judge denied an evidentiary hearing, finding:

“Petitioner collectively asserts herein that petitioner’s mental

deficits indicates that he is ‘not guilty,’ i.e., actually

innocent . . . . [That] claim is not actionable on latter day

expert opinion, Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d at 1168.” (See Order

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Regarding Evidentiary Hr’g Issues (Docket #524), filed Sept. 2,

2005, at 27:8-11.) Thus, this claim is properly denied on law of

the case grounds and, accordingly, this court adopts the

magistrate judge’s conclusion denying this claim.

E. Fourth Amendment Violation

1. Full & Fair Opportunity

Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s analysis

of Claims 4 and 5, regarding whether petitioner had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. As

found by the magistrate judge, petitioner’s argument is

unavailing.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), bars consideration of

Fourth Amendment claims on collateral review if the state courts

considered the claims fully and fairly. Petitioner does not deny

he received full and fair consideration of his claims in the

trial court and on writ to the court of appeal. Rather,

petitioner argues the state supreme court denied meaningful

direct review by applying the doctrine of law of the case. 

Petitioner fails to acknowledge, however, the California Supreme

Court applied law of the case after reviewing the court of

appeal’s decision for “manifest misapplication of existing

principles resulting in substantial prejudice.” People v.

Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th 764, 787 (1995). Applying this standard,

the court concluded the court of appeal correctly rejected

petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims. Id. at 788-89. Thus,

although “by definition” law of the case does not provide

meaningful review, in substance, the state court considered and

rejected petitioner’s objections to the suppression analysis of

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petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims. The magistrate judge

therefore did not err in barring review of Claims 4 and 5.

2. Judicial Bias

Petitioner takes issue with the magistrate judge’s rejection

of a subpart of Claim 4, relating to judicial bias. 

Specifically, petitioner claims he was denied an evidentiary

hearing on his allegations. Petitioner is correct that the

magistrate judge denied an evidentiary hearing. This denial was

based on petitioner’s failure to present a “colorable” claim to

justify such a hearing. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

81-82 (1977) (district judge can employ various measures to avoid

an evidentiary hearing, including testing whether facially

adequate allegations have sufficient basis in fact to warrant

presentation of evidence). Petitioner cannot complain about the

lack of an evidentiary hearing when he failed to produce evidence

to support holding such a hearing.

F. Special Circumstance Finding

Petitioner next argues the magistrate judge erred in finding

the California Supreme Court procedurally barred Claim 13,

concerning severance of the guilt phase trial and the witness

killing special circumstance trial, based on an adequate and

independent state law ground. 

The California Supreme Court declined to sever petitioner’s

trial for two reasons. First, the court reasoned:

[I]n this case defendant did not base his severance

motion on the grounds he now advances. Rather, he

sought severance to prevent the introduction of

evidence concerning the nature of the charges brought

by [the victim] against him and witnessed by her[.] . .

. At no time did the defense suggest severance was

necessary to permit defendant to present the

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inconsistent defenses of alibi to the murder charge and

of “I killed her for love, not because she was a

witness” to the special circumstance allegation.

Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th at 798-99. Petitioner argues there is

“simply no statement, plain or otherwise, indicating that the

state court refused to address the merits of Petitioner’s claim”

in the above passage. 

However, petitioner ignores the second basis of the Court’s

decision that clearly satisfies the plain statement requirement. 

The California Supreme Court also rejected Claim 13 because

“section 190.1 [of the California Penal Code] provides for a

unitary trial of guilt and special circumstance issues, except as

therein provided.” Id. at 799. The court went on to find none

of the exceptions applied to petitioner’s case. Id. The

magistrate judge was therefore justified in refusing to consider

Claim 13, disposed of on an adequate and independent state law

ground.

G. Malice Instruction

Finally, petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s

analysis concerning Claim 20, regarding the state trial court’s

jury instruction for malice. Petitioner argues the magistrate

judge failed to review this claim under In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358 (1970) (holding all elements of a crime must be proven beyond

a reasonable doubt). Petitioner is incorrect. The magistrate

judge expressly stated “the federal requirement to prove all

elements of a crime, as defined by state law, beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (F&R at 46:5-7.) The magistrate judge then properly

agreed with the California Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue,

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finding the jury instruction did not violate In re Winship. 

Petitioner argues the trial court’s jury instruction on

malice permitted the jury to erroneously find malice merely upon

a showing of specific intent to kill. At the time of

petitioner’s offense, “[a]n awareness of the obligation to act

within the general body of laws regulating society” was included

in the definition of malice. Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th at 796 (citing

People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322 (1966)); see In re

Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 775 (1994) (noting the California

Legislature later amended Penal Code section 188 so that “an

awareness to act within the general body of laws governing

society” was not included in the definition of malice). The jury

was instructed that express malice included “an intention

unlawfully to kill a human being.” Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th at 796

(emphasis added). The California Supreme Court concluded the

jury instruction did not permit the jury to equate intent to kill

with malice because it required consideration of petitioner’s

duty to conform his conduct to the law. Id. The Court further

found no amplifying instruction was necessary because petitioner

failed to present evidence that his mental state precluded his

ability to understand this duty. Id. at 797. As the malice

instruction did not erroneously permit the jury to find malice if

petitioner manifested a specific intent to kill, the magistrate

judge properly denied Claim 20.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the court adopts the

magistrate judge’s conclusions as stated in the F&R of August 29,

2007, thereby denying the entirety of petitioner’s guilt phase

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habeas claims. As recommended therein, this court orders as

follows: 

All guilt phase claims, including competency to stand trial

at the guilt phase, are decided in favor of respondent. The

court hereby enters partial judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of respondent as to Claims 1(a),

1(b), 4, 5, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, and 26, as those claims in

whole or in part relate to the guilt phase. For the reasons

previously stated by the court (see Docket #816), partial

judgment in favor of petitioner is entered as to Claim 21(a)

regarding juror misconduct during the competency trial. The

remainder of the competency and penalty phase claims are stayed

pending a determination of the competency phase proceedings in

state court. Respondent is hereby ordered to commence state

court proceedings on the issue of whether to hold a retrospective

competency hearing within thirty days after judgment is entered.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: March 17, 2008

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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