Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-05425/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-05425-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALONZO LEE TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

 MR. ALAMEDA,

Respondent.

______________________________

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No. C 02-5425 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE

(Docket No. 27)

Alonzo Lee Taylor, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the

constitutionality of efforts by prison officials to collect DNA samples from him. Because the

collection of such samples did not appear to affect the fact or duration of his custody, the

Court initially dismissed the action without prejudice to petitioner’s filing his claims in a

civil rights complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

vacated the dismissal and remanded, finding the petition also challenges the discipline

petitioner received for refusing to cooperate in that collection, which discipline assertedly

resulted in a loss of 60 days of good time credits. The Ninth Circuit concluded such

additional claim is properly brought in a habeas action, because it sufficiently alleges the

requisite effect on petitioner’s period of confinement.

On remand this Court directed respondent to show cause why the petition should not

be granted. On October 11, 2005, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, in which he argues

Case 3:02-cv-05425-MMC Document 33 Filed 09/08/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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This is the second motion to dismiss filed by respondent after the case was remanded. In the

first motion, respondent argued the petition is moot because petitioner, approximately one month

after the filing of the instant petition, provided blood and saliva samples for DNA analysis. The

Court denied the motion because there remained the issue of whether the discipline petitioner

received for his initial refusal to provide the samples was constitutional. 

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the discipline alleged by petitioner cannot have any effect on the duration of his

confinement.1

 On January 23, 2006, petitioner filed an opposition. Respondent has not filed

a reply. 

BACKGROUND

In 1981, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, and was sentenced to a

term of 15 years to life in state prison. On August 1, 2002, petitioner was directed by prison

authorities to provide a sample of his blood and saliva for inclusion in a national DNA

database, pursuant to the 1998 Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act. 

Petitioner refused to supply the samples and, as a consequence, was found guilty of violating

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3005(a). Part of the disciplinary sanction petitioner received was a 60-

day forfeiture of good time credits pursuant to 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3323(g)(6). 

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends the petition should be dismissed on the ground the 60-day good

time credit forfeiture has no effect on the duration of petitioner’s confinement. 

In particular, respondent argues that the loss of time credits will not result in an actual

increase in the period of petitioner’s confinement because petitioner is serving an

indeterminate life sentence. In support thereof, respondent cites to 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§ 3323(a), which provides that for an inmate serving a determinate sentence, the forfeiture of

good time credits results in a loss of credits against the term of the sentence, whereas for an

inmate serving an indeterminate life sentence, such as petitioner, the forfeiture of good time

credits merely postpones the inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Respondent notes that

petitioner’s minimum eligible parole date was October 26, 1990, which date had passed long

before petitioner was assessed the 60-day credit forfeiture in 2002. Under such

circumstances, respondent concludes, petitioner’s minimum eligible parole cannot have been

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Respondent points to petitioner’s “Chronological History,” which contains entries dating

back to 1981, and observes that such document contains no entry regarding a loss of credits in 2002. 

(See Resp.’s Ex. D). The prison Rules Violation Report attached to the petition, however, indicates

a 60-day credit forfeiture was in fact assessed against petitioner. Respondent has provided no

affidavit from a prison official, or any other evidence, to the effect that an absence of an entry in a

prisoner’s “Chronological History” indicates to the contrary.

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Petitioner also contends his discipline has extended his confinement by causing his 2004

parole hearing, at which he was denied parole, to be postponed from “June/July 2004" to September

28, 2004, and by causing him to be denied four months of “annual” time credits which he would

otherwise have received pursuant to 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2410(a). It is unclear, and petitioner does

not explain, precisely how the alleged delay in his parole hearing and the loss of “annual” credits

affect the duration of his confinement. The Court need not address this question at this time,

however, in light of the denial of respondent’s motion on other grounds. If respondent chooses to

argue in his answer that the success of petitioner’s claim would not shorten the duration of

petitioner’s confinement, he shall address whether the delay in the parole hearing and the denial of

“annual” credits were a result of petitioner’s discipline and, if so, whether they have affected the

duration of petitioner’s confinement. 

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postponed by the credit forfeiture, and thus the credit forfeiture had no effect on the duration

of petitioner’s confinement. 

The regulation cited by respondent is silent, however, as to what effect a credit

forfeiture has upon a prisoner in petitioner’s position, namely, one who is serving an

indeterminate life sentence and whose minimum eligible parole date already has passed. See

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3323. Respondent points to no provision in any regulation, prison rule,

state statute, or other authority indicating the effect of a credit forfeiture under such

circumstances.2

 

Moreover, petitioner states in his opposition that, in fact, he has suffered adverse

consequences from the discipline he received, consequences which, he argues, have affected

the duration of his confinement. Specifically, he states that the discipline caused him to be

denied parole at a September 2004 parole hearing. If true, the discipline at issue had a

legally cognizable effect on the duration of petitioner’s confinement. See Butterfield v. Bail,

120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding denial of parole necessarily implicates length

of prisoner’s confinement).3

 Respondent cites no authority precluding prison officials from

denying parole, or imposing other sanction not expressly addressed in the relevant

regulations and statutes, when prisoners such as petitioner receive discipline for violating

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prison rules. Indeed, respondent has not disputed that petitioner was denied parole in

September 2004 based on the discipline he received. Given the state of the record presented

before the Court, respondent’s motion to dismiss will be denied. If respondent wishes to

present evidence refuting petitioner’s factual assertions as to the repercussions of the

discipline he received and/or the legal significance thereof, he may do so in connection with

his answer addressing the merits of petitioner’s claim. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

 2. Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on petitioner, within 60 days of

the date this order is filed, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted based on the cognizable claim in the petition. Respondent shall file with the answer

and serve on petitioner a copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been

transcribed previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the

petition. 

3. If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse

with the Court and serving it on respondent within 30 days of his receipt of the answer.

This order terminates Docket No. 27.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 8, 2006 ____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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