Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08246/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Chateauneuf, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-08246-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 On April 26, 2013, James Chateauneuf (“Plaintiff” or “the claimant”) filed an 

opening brief challenging the Commissioner’s denial of his application for Social 

Security benefits. Doc. 14. The Commissioner filed a response on May 15, 2013. 

Doc. 15. Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief. For the reasons that follow the Court will 

deny Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner’s determination. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income in July 2009, alleging a disability onset date of May 30, 2007. On 

December 20, 2011, Plaintiff amended his disability onset date to November 2, 2009. 

Tr. at 250. After his initial claims were denied a hearing was held before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on January 9, 2012. On February 7, 2012, the ALJ 

issued a decision in which he concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the 

meaning of the Act prior to December 1, 2011, but became disabled on that date. The 

ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when Plaintiff’s request for 

Case 3:12-cv-08246-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/19/13 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

review was denied by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is sufficient evidence 

to support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. Analysis. 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is 

the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. 

 Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a sequential five-step 

evaluation. The claimant must show (1) he is not currently engaged in substantial gainful 

employment, (2) he has a severe physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment 

meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

precludes him from performing his past work. If at any step the Commission determines 

that a claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis ends; otherwise it proceeds to the next 

step. If the claimant establishes his burden through step four, the Commissioner bears the 

burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that 

exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-

(v). 

Case 3:12-cv-08246-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/19/13 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 

employment since the amended disability onset date of November 2, 2009. Tr. at 15. In 

satisfaction of step two, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff suffers from the following severe 

impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, neuropathy, hypertension, 

and thrombosis of the lower extremity. Tr. at 15. At step three, the ALJ considered the 

record evidence and concluded that the claimant does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one of the impairments 

listed in the regulations. Tr. at 16. The ALJ then considered the relevant evidence and 

determined that before December 1, 2011, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). Tr. at 16. After December 1, 2011, 

the ALJ concluded, Plaintiff’s conditioned had worsened and he had the RFC to perform 

only sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) with several 

additional limitations. At step five, the ALJ concluded that prior to December 1, 2011, 

Plaintiff had an RFC that would have permitted him to perform his past relevant work as 

a deli clerk, cashier, and dining room manager as actually performed, but Plaintiff’s RFC 

prevented him from performing his past relevant work after December 1, 2011. Tr. at 20-

21. Finally, the ALJ concluded that after December 1, 2011, there were no jobs that exist 

in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Tr. at 21. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ misinterpreted evidence and improperly discounted 

the opinion of a treating physician, and that he improperly discounted Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints. Doc. 14 at 2. 

 A. Medical Source Opinion.

 Plaintiff takes exception to the ALJ’s statement that the opinion of his treating 

nurse practitioner, Michele Peters, “remain[ed] without support.” Doc. 14 at 4 (citing 

Tr. at 20). Plaintiff believes that the objective tests performed on his back in 2009 

provide adequate support for Peters’ conclusion that he was disabled prior to 

December 1, 2011. He also claims that the conservative course of treatment was a result 

of his indigence and should not be used as evidence that his condition was not severe. 

Case 3:12-cv-08246-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/19/13 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The opinion of a nurse practitioner is not an “acceptable medical source,” but it 

can be considered as an opinion from “other sources.” Gomez v. Chater, 74 F. 3d 967, 

970-71 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a) and (d). The regulations permit the 

Commissioner to “accord opinions from other sources less weight than opinions from 

acceptable medical sources.” Gomez, 74 F.3d at 970-71. 

 The ALJ did not ignore or misinterpret the objective evidence from the tests 

performed in 2009. The ALJ detailed the results of the tests and concluded that while 

they might suggest functional limitations, they were not sufficient evidence to conclude 

that Plaintiff could not perform light work. Tr. at 17 (citing Exs. 1F, 4F). Furthermore, 

the ALJ’s rejection of Peters’ assessment was based on more than a mere lack of 

objective support. The ALJ reviewed and cited treatment notes that suggested few if any 

limitations (Exs. 2F, 5F, 8F), a report from Plaintiff that his pain was under control 

(Ex. 8F), and a report of successful physical therapy (Ex. 7F). Tr. at 17-18. He also cited 

the opinions of an examining physician, Dr. Robert Baker, and two reviewing physicians 

whose opinions uniformly contradicted Peters’. Tr. at 18. Finally, the ALJ noted that 

Peters’ opinions were “rather extreme and without support from her treatment notes.” 

Tr. at 19. While the ALJ noted the conservative course of treatment, it is clear that there 

was substantial evidence to discount Peters’ assessment even without that factor. 

B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony. 

 The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a 

claimant’s subjective testimony. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). If the claimant meets this first test, and there is no 

evidence of malingering, then the ALJ “can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). AThe ALJ may 

Case 3:12-cv-08246-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/19/13 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility: 

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in claimant’s testimony or 

between her testimony and her conduct, claimant’s daily activities, her work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of 

the symptoms of which claimant complains.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (citing Light 

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,792 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

 Here, the ALJ considered the evidence and found that “the claimant’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; 

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of these symptoms are not credible prior to December 1, 2011, to the extent they 

are not inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment.” Tr. at 17. In 

support of this finding, the ALJ reviewed the results from objective tests, including the 

November 2009 CT scan, and concluded that there was “no objective evidence to support 

the claimant’s allegations of debilitating symptoms and limitations.” Tr. at 17. 

Additionally, the same evidence that was used to discount Peters’ opinion is also 

applicable to an assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility, particularly the report from Plaintiff 

that his pain was under control (Ex. 8F) and the report of a successful stint in physical 

therapy (Ex. 7F). Although he did not credit them in full, the ALJ also found the 

opinions of the examining physician and two consulting physicians undermined 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because the “treating professionals consistently observed 

that he appears in no acute distress.” Tr. at 18-19 (citing Exs. 2F, 5F, 8F). 

 Finally, the ALJ noted inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony. Tr. at 19. 

Particularly, he stated that Plaintiff claimed to have stopped working as a result of his 

disability when records indicated that he had been laid off, and that Plaintiff claimed that 

he was unable to drive, but later admitted that he could. Tr. at 19 (citing Exs. 2F, 3F). 

Plaintiff argues that these inconsistencies do not undermine his credibility because he 

amended his disability onset date to several months after he left his place of employment 

and because he had not driven for several years. Doc. 14 at 7-8. Despite Plaintiff’s 

Case 3:12-cv-08246-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/19/13 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

attempt to resolve the issues, the ALJ may consider “inconsistencies either in claimant=s 

testimony or between [his] testimony and [his] conduct” when evaluating Plaintiff’s 

credibility. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 

789,792 (9th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, even without these inconsistencies the ALJ has 

offered other “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting Plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner’s decision 

(Doc. 14) is denied.

 Dated this 17th day of June, 2013. 

Case 3:12-cv-08246-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/19/13 Page 6 of 6