Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00917/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00917-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO VALENTINO,

Petitioner,

Case No. 12-cv-00917-LAB (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION 

RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

W.J. SULLIVAN, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of California. 

II. FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Antonio Valentino (“Petitioner”), a California state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his conviction in San Diego

Superior Court Case No. SCD 207640 for robbery, two attempted

robberies, special circumstance murder, and enhanced firearm charges. 

(ECF No. 1 at 1.) 

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The Petition asserts four grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner claims his

federal constitutional rights were violated when evidence of a previous

robbery conviction was improperly introduced at trial; (2) Petitioner

claims that digitally enhanced photographs were improperly introduced

as evidence at trial; (3) Petitioner claims the combined and cumulative

effect of these and other errors unfairly prejudiced the trial; and (4)

Petitioner incorporates by reference all beneficial arguments raised by

his co-defendant, Sadiq Saibu, in Saibu’s petition for habeas relief.1

(ECF No. 1 at 6, 15, 22, 23.)

On July 18, 2012, Respondent answered the Petition and lodged

portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) Respondent

contends habeas relief is not appropriate because the California Court of

Appeal properly rejected petitioner’s evidentiary arguments and acted in

accordance with clearly established federal law. (ECF No. 12 at 11-12,

19-20, 26-27.) On October 15, 2012, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (ECF

No. 21.) 

III. STATE PROCEEDINGS

On June 23, 2008, Valentino was charged by information with

special circumstance murder; attempted murder; attempted robbery;

theft; and two counts of robbery. (Lodg. No. 11 at 17.) The information

further alleged that Valentino personally discharged a handgun during

the commission of the alleged crimes. (Id. at 18.)

Valentino was tried by a jury with co-defendant Saibu. The jury

found Valentino guilty on all counts, and found the firearm enhancement

allegations to be true. (Id.) On May 8, 2009, Valentino was sentenced to

a life sentence without possibility of parole and an additional 31-year

1

Sadiq Saibu filed a separate federal habeas petition in the Southern District of California on June 25, 2012. See Case No. 12-cv-01564 (ECF No. 1). 

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sentence to be served consecutively. (Id. at 19.)

Valentino appealed his conviction and on January 4, 2011, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded for further proceedings. (Lodg. No. 11.) The Court of Appeal

affirmed the trial court’s admission of the bank robbery conviction, the

admission of the digitally enhanced photographs, and rejected the

cumulative error claims. (Id.) The Court of Appeal reversed Saibu’s

conviction for special circumstance murder finding fault with a jury

instruction, and remanded Saibu’s case for further proceedings consistent

with that finding. (Id.) The Court of Appeal also ordered the trial court

to correct administrative errors on Valentino’s record. (Id.) The Court of

Appeal’s opinion was certified for partial publication on January 11,

2011. (Lodg. No. 12.) On February 18, 2011, Petitioner appealed to the

California Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 13.) The California Supreme

Court denied review. (Lodg. No. 15.)

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This Court must be

“particularly deferential to [its] state court colleagues.” Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The following facts from the

California Court of Appeal’s opinion are presumed correct:

 Factual Background

During the summer of 2005, Saibu and Valentino

spent time with Raheem Judd, Keith Coleman, Coleman’s

girlfriend Rachel Kinsel, Dewayne Cummings and Ken

Buckley at Judd’s mother’s home on Clay Street in

southeast San Diego. 

 

1. The July 7, 2005 Hollywood Video store robbery

 At approximately 9:45 p.m. on July 7, 2005, two

African-American men wearing hooded sweatshirts entered

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a Hollywood Video store on El Cajon Boulevard. One man

was wearing a gray sweatshirt, and the other was wearing

a black sweatshirt. Both men covered the lower portions of

their faces with black bandanas. Shift leader Toni Oliver

was working near the entrance of the store that night. As

the two men entered the store, Oliver turned to greet them. 

After she turned away, she heard one of the men shout,

“Everyone get down. This is a robbery.”

The man who was wearing the gray hooded

sweatshirt had darker skin than the other man and was

carrying a shotgun. The man with the shotgun said

something like, “I don’t want to have to kill someone

tonight,” or “Am I going to have to kill anybody today?” 

The man in the black sweatshirt had a pistol and a black

duffel bag. The man in the black sweatshirt went to the

register and told Oliver to “[h]urry up” and “[g]ive [him] the

money.” Oliver gave the man approximately $75 from the

register. Another employee, June Collins, emptied another

register and put the money in the duffel bag that the man

in the black sweatshirt was carrying. 

Mathew Gillie worked at the Hollywood Video store in

an area of the store called Game Crazy. Game Crazy closed

at 10:00 p.m., although the rest of the store remained open

until midnight. Gillie was preparing to close Game Crazy

when he heard someone yelling. Gillie saw a man wearing

a gray hooded sweatshirt and holding a shotgun inside the

store. That man told Gillie not to play around or mess with

him. Based on the man’s voice, Gillie believed the man was

African-American. Gillie gave the man approximately

$650, which was the money for the night deposit from the

Game Crazy register. 

Alejandro Rivera and Stephanie Jenkins lived in an

apartment located across the alley behind the Hollywood

Video store. On the night of the robbery, they were moving

out of their apartment. Rivera was driving a U-Haul truck

down the alley intending to back the truck into the

driveway of the apartment when he saw two individuals

who were wearing baggy clothes – including hooded

sweatshirts – looking into the Hollywood Video store. As

Rivera was watching the men, they turned the corner and

disappeared. 

Jenkins, who had just driven her car through the

parking lot of the Hollywood Video store, drove into the

alley and parked her car across the alley from the U-Haul

truck. She heard someone yelling and then saw two men

holding guns, running down the alley. The men had their

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hoods pulled up over their heads, partially concealing their

faces. However, the lighting in the alley was good, and

Jenkins could see the top portions of the men’s faces. She

believed that both men were African-American.

Rivera also saw the men running through the alley.

The men were wearing bandanas and holding guns. The

men ran “full speed” toward the U-Haul truck, and then

ran through the small space between the truck and the

apartment building. The men continued running to the

end of the alley and turned right at the street. Rivera and

Jenkins ran into their apartment and did not go back

outside until they saw that police officers had arrived. 

 The Hollywood Video store had five surveillance

cameras. San Diego police officers arrived at the store a

few minutes after the robbery. Oliver provided the

surveillance video of the robbery to Detective Ronald Hall. 

The video was played for the jury at trial. Oliver testified

that the surveillance video accurately depicted the 

robbery.

 2. The July 12, 2005 T&M Liquor store attempted robbery

 At approximately 11:15 p.m. on July 12, 2005, Farouq

Mikho was counting money and preparing the register

receipts at the front counter of the T&M Liquor store,

which is located on El Cajon Boulevard in the City Heights

area of San Diego. Mikho’s girlfriend, Paula Vargas, was

standing at the counter talking to Mikho, waiting for him

to close the store. 

Mikho saw a man wearing a black hooded sweatshirt

with the hood over his head and a bandana covering his

nose and mouth. The man pointed a shotgun at Mikho’s

face and yelled for Mikho to “give him the money.” The

man also pointed the gun at Vargas and directed her to “get

down” and not to move. Vargas could see the man’s face

and could tell that he was a dark-skinned AfricanAmerican. 

Mikho grabbed the money out of the register and

threw it on the counter. The man told Mikho to put the

money in a bag. As Mikho reached for a bag, he pressed

the silent alarm button.

Augustine Garcia was in the cooler at the back of the

store when he heard a man yelling. Garcia heard the man

say, “Put the money in the bag or I’m going to blow your

head off,” or something similar to that, and he concluded

that “it was like a holdup.” Garcia started running toward

the front of the store and saw a man pointing a shotgun at

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Mikho.

Garcia, who is in his 50's and is five-feet-four inches

tall, came up behind the man and grabbed the man’s

elbows. The man was stiff and holding the gun high and

close to his body. Garcia was able to lift the man about

three or four inches off the ground and turn the man’s

body, and the gun, away from Mikho and Vargas. Garcia

and the man both fell to the floor, and Garcia landed on top

of the man. The force of hitting the floor knocked the

shotgun out of the man’s hands and it slid away from both

of them. The man struggled to get out from underneath

Garcia, who was attempting to hold him down. The man

eventually was able to get up and run out the door. 

Garcia retrieved the shotgun and ran after the man. 

When the man was approximately two or three feet away

from the alley, Garcia pointed the gun at him and pulled

the trigger. The gun did not fire, and a shell was ejected

from the chamber. Garcia watched the man run into the

alley, but decided not to follow him and instead ran back

into the liquor store.

Officers patrolling the area received a call about the

robbery at 11:17 p.m. and arrived on the scene at 11:20

p.m. Garcia showed officers the shotgun, which at this

point was on the floor behind the front counter. Garcia also

directed the officers to the shotgun shell that was ejected

when he attempted to fire the gun at the robber. Officer

David Yu collected the rifle, the six shells inside the rifle,

and the shell that had been ejected outside the store. 

Detective Eugene Bojorquez collected surveillance

video of the attempted robbery from the liquor store’s

security camera. The video was played for the jury at trial. 

Vargas testified that the video accurately reflected the

incident. 

On April 4, 2007, Mikho attended a live lineup. Each

of the men in the lineup held a shotgun and said, “Give me

the ‘F’ money.” Mikho identified the men in positions three

and four as sharing some similarities with the suspect from

the July 12, 2005 incident. However, Mikho said that the

man in position number four did not have the dark skin

tone of the suspect, while the skin tone of the person in

position three matched the skin tone of the robber. That

man’s eyes and nose also looked familiar to Mikho. The

man in position number 3 was Saibu. 

The shotgun and shotgun shells that police recovered

from the scene were tested for DNA. The lab technician

determined that Saibu was a major contributor of the DNA

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that was found on the textured areas and on the trigger of

the shotgun.

 3. The July 13, 2005 T&M Liquor store murder, attempted

murder and attempted robbery. 

 At approximately 8:00 a.m. on July 13, 2005, Lap

Tran drove his Mercedes Benz to the auto repair shop that

he owns in Lemon Grove. Tran parked the car in front of

the shop and left the keys in the car. At around 11:00 a.m.,

Tran noticed that his car was gone. 

Tran had seen Valentino with another customer at

the repair shop the day before his car was stolen. The auto

repair shop was located approximately a block and a half

from the Value Inn Hotel, where Valentino had been

staying.2

That day, Ayesha Majid was sleeping on the couch of

an apartment that she shared with her brother, Naz

Almajid, when Saibu, who is her cousin, came to the

apartment. Saibu was being very loud and woke her up. 

Between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., Majid telephoned Almajid

to tell him that Saibu had come over to the apartment and

that he had gone into Almajid’s bedroom. 

Later that afternoon, Tran’s white Mercedes was used

in an attempted robbery at the T&M Liquor store. Store

manager Waleed Yakou was sitting behind the counter at

the cash register talking with his friend and candy, cigar

and cigarette vendor, Doraid Toma, who was standing on

the customer side of the counter near the entrance to the

store. At approximately 3:40 p.m., a man wearing dark

clothing, a bandana on his face, and a hooded sweatshirt

with the hood over his head walked into the liquor store. 

The man pointed a silver revolver at Yakou and said, “Give

me the money.” Yokou could see the man’s face from the

middle of his nose to his eyes. Based on the portion of the

man’s face that he could see, as well as the tone of the

man’s voice, Yakou thought that the man was AfricanAmerican and about 19 to 21 years old. 

Yakou told the man to calm down and tried to open

the cash register. The man said, “Give me the money”

several times, and Toma turned in reaction to the man’s

loud voice. The man then shot Toma in the chest from less

2

 While in jail, Valentino talked on the telephone with his

mother, who said to him, “They said that your prints were in that Mercedes . . . that was stolen from across the street from

the motel you were staying at.”

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than five feet away. Toma appeared surprised and tried to

back away from the man. The man walked toward Toma

and, as Toma fell to the floor, shot him again. 

While the man was shooting Toma, Yakou pressed

the silent alarm button. The man then walked toward

Yakou, who was ducking behind the counter. The man

looked over the counter and fired two shots in Yakou’s

direction. Neither bullet hit Yakou. The man then ran out

of the store without taking any money. 

Yakou grabbed a gun that was in a drawer behind the

counter and went to check on Toma. Toma was bleeding

from his mouth and indicated to Yakou that he could not

breathe. 

At 4:45 p.m., San Diego Police Officers Jason Scott

and Thomas Seiver separately responded to a call

regarding the shooting at the liquor store. Scott arrived to

find Yakou with blood on his hands, arms, and shirt,

saying, “He shot him.” Someone told Scott that the suspect

had run out of the store and had turned southbound in the

alley. 

Both of the police officers attempted to aid Toma by

administering CPR. Toma was not breathing and did not

have a pulse. Emergency medical personnel arrived at the

liquor store and determined that Toma was dead. Toma

died from gunshot wounds to his shoulder and torso. A

bullet was recovered from his body during an autopsy. 

Officers also recovered two other bullets from the scene of

the shooting. 

Officer Scott viewed surveillance video from the liquor

store and broadcast a description of the shooting suspect to

police officers in the area. The surveillance video was

played for the jury. Yakou testified that the video

accurately reflected the events that he witnessed that day.

Maria Morales lived in an apartment located about

two blocks from the T&M Liquor store. Morales was

standing in the alley behind her apartment waiting for her

mother when she saw a white Mercedes Benz in the alley. 

The driver of the Mercedes drove toward her and parked. 

Two African-American men got out of the car and started to

change clothes, which Morales thought was suspicious. 

The passenger had lighter skin than the driver. The

passenger removed what looked like black tights from his

head. When he removed the tights, Morales could see that

he had curly hair. Both men walked away from the car in

the alley wearing dark clothes. Police later lifted

Valentino’s left palm print and right palm print from the

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trunk of the Mercedes. 

That day, Morales attended two live lineups, but was

unable to identify anyone. However, in court, Morales

identified Valentino as the passenger of the white

Mercedes. Although his hair was shorter and in braids at

trial, she recognized his build, height, and the portion of his

face that she had seen on the day of the shooting. 

Naz Almajid testified that he clocked out from his job

at a Longs Drug store on July 13, 2005 at 10:30 p.m. He

went home and saw the news on the television. Almajid

saw a video clip about the shooting at the T&M Liquor

store and Toma’s murder.3

 Almajid knew Toma, and was

familiar with the liquor store, which was located two blocks

from his apartment. 

Almajid testified that he thought it was possible that

a .38-caliber pistol that he had purchased from a coworker

had been used in the shooting. Almajid explained that he

thought the gun might be his because his sister had called

him and told him that Saibu had visited their apartment

and gone into Almajid’s bedroom, where Almajid kept the

gun, the gun in the video was the same caliber as his gun,

and the number of shots that had been fired at the liquor

store was the same as the number of bullets that were in

the gun. Almajid looked on the internet for video of the

shooting, and then looked for his .38-caliber pistol in his

bedroom. He was unable to find the gun. 

That night, Almajid had a telephone conversation

with Saibu during which he asked Saibu, “That wasn’t you

right?” Saibu answered, “No, it wasn’t me but. . . .” 

Almajid asked Saibu, “Were you famous[?]” Saibu

responded, “Maybe.” “Why are you asking?”

In late December 2005, the coworker from whom

Almajid had bought the pistol received a telephone call

from Almajid. Almajid asked the man if he was watching

the television program “America’s Most Wanted.” The

coworker replied that he was not. Almajid then told the

man that the gun the man had sold to Almajid had been

used in a robbery. Almajid said that his cousin had come to

his house to get the gun, and that the gun had been used to

kill someone. The coworker told detectives that Almajid

3

 The San Diego police department did not provide a copy of the surveillance videotape of the T&M Liquor store shooting to television stations until the following day. 

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had told him that after the robbery his cousin had taken

the gun to Florida and that everything was “okay.”

 4. The uncharged August 29, 2005 Wells Fargo Bank

robbery

 On August 29, 2005, at approximately 9:40 a.m.,

three African-American men wearing hooded sweatshirts

and bandanas over their faces entered the Wells Fargo

Bank on Black Mountain Road in San Diego. Witnesses

saw three weapons – a shotgun, an assault rifle, and a

machine gun pistol. Photographs taken from surveillance

video at the bank showed one man holding a black duffel

bag and wearing black clothing and black gloves, and

another man pointing a weapon.

The men yelled that it was a robbery and ordered the

customers and bank employees to the ground. Two of the

men jumped over the counter and demanded money from

the bank employees. The men grabbed money from two

teller drawers, and then ordered several employees into the

vault area in the back of the bank. One of the men pointed

a gun at an employee and demanded that she open the

vault. After the employee opened the vault, the men took

money from inside the vault and put it into the black duffel

bag. After the men got the money from the vault and the

teller drawers, they ran out of the bank. 

 The men ran to a waiting silver vehicle that was

parked in front of the bank. That vehicle had been

reported stolen the day before by the owner, who had left

the key in the ignition while he went into a store. The

location where the vehicle had been stolen was a few blocks

away from where Coleman and Judd lived, i.e., the home

where Saibu and Valentino had been hanging out that

summer. Police officers eventually recovered the vehicle

about three or four blocks away from the bank.

A witness who was driving on Ricker Road noticed

two men, dressed all in black, running from a silver vehicle

and getting into a red vehicle. Police traced ownership of

the red vehicle to Rachel Kinsel, who was Coleman’s

girlfriend.

Police interviewed Kinsel, and subsequently

conducted a search of Dewayne Cumming’s home, where

they recovered weapons.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent David

Eaton testified that Saibu and Valentino had been

identified as two of the three men who robbed the Wells

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Fargo Bank, and that both had been tried and convicted for

that robbery. Ken Buckley was also considered a person of

interest in the Wells Fargo Bank robbery. 

 5. Buckley’s plea agreement and testimony

 Buckley was arrested on September 8, 2005, along

with Valentino, and was charged with bank robbery. 

Buckley was a friend of Valentino’s and knew Saibu. 

Buckley testified for the prosecution in this case, pursuant

to plea agreement. He identified both Saibu and Valentino

in court. 

According to Buckley, Valentino often stayed at the

Value Inn in Lemon Grove. Buckley worked at an adult

bookstore located near the Value Inn. Valentino would

visit Buckley at the bookstore. 

Buckley was tried with Saibu and Valentino on

charges related to the Wells Fargo Bank robbery. During

that trial, Buckley participated in a “free talk” that was

attended by the prosecutor, Detective Anthony Johnson

(who was investigating the T&M Liquor store murder), and

Buckley’s defense counsel. Buckley disclosed information

that he knew about the T&M Liquor store murder, with the

understanding that the information would not be used

unless Buckley agreed to cooperate with the prosecutor. 

Buckley originally decided not to cooperate, and did not

testify against Saibu or Valentino in the trial of the Wells

Fargo robbery. At the conclusion of that trial, the jury

convicted Saibu and Valentino, but was unable to reach a

unanimous verdict as to Buckley. Buckley was ordered to

return for retrial.

In March 2007, Buckley reached an agreement with

the prosecutor to testify in this case. Buckley pled guilty to

robbery with the use of a firearm for his role in the Wells

Fargo robbery. After Buckley provided testimony at the

preliminary hearing in this case, he was sentenced to three

years in state prison. 

Buckley testified about a conversation that he had

with Valentino regarding the T&M Liquor store shooting. 

Valentino had picked up Buckley from Judd’s house and

the two went to a car wash. Valentino asked Buckley if he

had heard anything about robberies that had taken place in

the area. Valentino told Buckley that Buckley could not

tell anyone what Valentino was going to say. 

Valentino proceeded to tell Buckley that he had

robbed a store and just “shot the guy’s head off with the

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gauge.” Valentino said that the shooting had taken place

on El Cajon Boulevard. Valentino was angry because they

were supposed to get $50,000 from the robbery, but ended

up not getting any money. 

Approximately a week after this conversation,

Buckley went to Judd’s house to talk with Saibu and

Valentino about participating in a robbery with them. 

Saibu was planning the robbery, and Buckley was going to

be the driver. Buckley heard Saibu say to Valentino, “Man,

. . . I just told you to rob the place. I didn’t know you [were]

going there to shoot the guy[’s] head off.” Valentino

responded, “Man, don’t talk about that,” and then walked

out of the room. 

While awaiting trial in the Wells Fargo Bank robbery

case, Buckley spoke with Saibu while they were being

detained together in the same jail cell. Buckley told Saibu

that his lawyer had allowed him to see videotapes of the

robberies and the shooting at the T&M Liquor store. 

Buckley mentioned that he had seen the gray BMW, and

Saibu responded that the car that was used was not a gray

BMW, but rather, a white Mercedes.

At the trial in the present case, Buckley viewed the

surveillance video of the Hollywood Video robbery. Buckley

had seen this video during his initial “free talk,” and had

told the detective that the man wearing the gray hooded

sweatshirt was built like Saibu. Buckley believed the other

man was Valentino. According to Buckley, at the time of

the robbery of the Hollywood Video store, Valentino had

long, black curly hair, which was pushing up the hood of

Valentino’s sweatshirt.

Buckley also viewed video of the July 12 attempted

robbery of the T&M Liquor store. Prior to trial, Buckley

had told detectives that the robber could have been either

Saibu or Valentino, but said that the man had the same

body type as Saibu and was wearing clothing that Buckley

had previously seen Saibu wearing. 

Buckley viewed video of the July 13 shooting, as well. 

Buckley testified that he had told the detective, during his

“free talk” interview, that the man in that video had lighter

skin than the man who attempted to rob the same store the

day before, and that the man’s skin tone and complexion

matched Valentino’s. 

6. Kinsel’s plea agreement and testimony

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 Rachel Kinsel agreed to cooperate with the

prosecution in the bank robbery case, and agreed to provide

testimony in the T&M Liquor store shooting case. Kinsel

received a four-year prison sentence in exchange for her

cooperation. 

Kinsel met Saibu and Valentino through her exboyfriend, Coleman. Coleman lived at Judd’s mother’s

house during the summer of 2005. Kinsel and a group of

people including Judd, Coleman, Cummings, Buckley,

Valentino, and Saibu would hang out at that house, watch

television, play video games, drink alcohol, and smoke

marijuana. 

Kinsel agreed to be the getaway driver for the Wells

Fargo Bank robbery. That day, she drove her car to an

apartment complex to pick up Saibu. Saibu was carrying a

bag with guns in it, which he placed in the trunk. Kinsel

and Saibu then drove to Cummings’s house, where

Valentino eventually arrived in a stolen car. The men then

got into the stolen car, and Kinsel followed them to the

bank. Kinsel parked her car and waited for the men to rob

the bank. About 10 to 15 minutes later, the men returned

and took off their bandanas before getting into Kinsel’s car. 

 (Lodg. No. 11 at 3-17 (minor edits made for clarity)).

 V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which provides the

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 

 As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) provides:

(d) [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

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unless the adjudication of the claim– 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 When determining what constitute s “clearly established federal

law” under section 2254(d)(1), federal courts look to United States

Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court’s decision. Lockyer

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court’s decision is

“contrary” to “clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent” if (1) the state court applies a rule different from the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, but still reaches a different result. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-06, 412 (2000); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. A state

court decision does not have to demonstrate an awareness of clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, so long as neither the reasoning

nor the result of the state court decision contradicts such precedent.

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of

Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal rule from the Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

407-08. Alternatively, an unreasonable application may be found “if the

state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

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unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it

should apply.” Id. An unreasonable application of federal law requires

the state court decision to be incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

76. Petitioner bears the burden of proving the state court acted in a

manner contrary to clearly established federal law. Woodford v. Viscotti,

537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that “[w]here there has

been one reasoned state judgement rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim

rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803

(1991). “We think that a presumption which gives them no effect – which

simply ‘looks through’ them to the last reasoned decision – most nearly

reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.” Id. at 804. When a

state court does not supply reasoning for a decision, an independent

review of the record is required to determine if the court clearly erred in

applying controlling federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982

(9th Cir. 2000). This independent review is not de novo, but merely

provides the basis for determining whether the state court decision was

objectively reasonable. Id.

A habeas petitioner “bears a heavy burden in showing a due process

violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d

1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate that a state court’s

admission of evidence violated his federal due process rights, a petitioner

must show that admitted evidence “so fatally infected the proceedings as

to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926

F.2d 918, 918 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has made few rulings

regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Holley

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v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Where “it has not

yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial

evidence constitutes a due process violation . . . we cannot conclude that

the state court’s ruling was an ‘unreasonable application’ [of clearly

established federal law].” Id.

 VII. DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief: 

Ground One: Petitioner claims his right to due process was

violated by the improper admission of a previous conviction. 

Ground Two: Petitioner claims his right to due process was

violated by the improper admission of digitally enhanced photographs as

evidence. 

Ground Three: Petitioner claims his right to due process was

violated by the cumulative effect of the evidentiary errors asserted in

grounds one and two, and other errors at trial. 

Ground Four: Petitioner joins in all arguments raised by codefendant, Saibu.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the state court’s

holdings on Petitioner’s grounds for relief one, two, and three are

objectively reasonable, and that ground four is not properly before this

Court. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be

DENIED.

 A. Ground One: Admission of Previous Conviction for

Bank Robbery.

 In Ground One, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s decision

allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Petitioner’s previous

conviction for bank robbery. (ECF No. 1 at 6-14.) California Evidence

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Code section 1101(a) generally prohibits the introduction of “evidence of

a person’s character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of

reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) . . .

when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” 

California Evidence Code § 1101(b), however, allows for “the admission

of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act

when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident,

or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or

attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith

believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to

commit such an act.” 

The trial court allowed the admission of Petitioner’s prior

conviction for bank robbery finding it relevant to show identity and

intent.

1. Trial Court Proceedings

Before trial commenced, the prosecution moved in limine to

introduce as evidence three of Petitioner’s previous convictions for bank

robbery. (Lodg. No. 11 at 20.) Petitioner’s counsel sought to exclude this

evidence, arguing that the convictions did not meet the criteria for

admissibility under California Evidence Code § 1101(b) and should be

excluded under California Evidence Code § 352 as more prejudicial than

probative.4

 (Id. at 20-21.) The trial court admitted one conviction, for

the August 29, 2005 armed robbery of Wells Fargo Bank, finding it 

4

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probative as to Petitioner’s identity and intent. (Id. at 21-23.) 

The trial court explained as follows:

“Let me begin by acknowledging that there are a host of

factors in there that [defense counsel] can and effectively

did distinguish as not being the same, and a host of factors

that [the prosecutor] points out are the same. But there

are some that I think are particularly important.

 African-American males, generally generic same kind of

clothing and hoodies, hiding the face, the take-down nature

or take-over nature of the robbery, the use of the guns,

those are general take-down robbery factors. But they are

common to the bank robbery in count 9 and the offenses in

counts 1, 2 and 3 involving T&M Liquor on July 13th. 

 The factors that I think are persuasive are the use of a

stolen car to get to the scene. [Defense counsel] has done a

lot of federal cases, knows a lot about bank robberies, refers

to it as a cold car and, in that fashion, as an advocate,

wants me to find that that is a real general characteristic. 

It’s certainly not a signature by itself, but I think it’s an

important one.

 The car was stolen from a location near a significant

location in this case. It was stolen the same day or the day

before. The reasonable inference is that the robbers

arrived in that stolen car. They fled in that car. They fled

a short distance, a matter of less than a mile, I think, in

both cases. They abandoned the car. And what makes this

different from any of the others is there were witnesses

who said, ‘These two guys abandoned this car and then ran

into a waiting car that was real close by and took off’

 Another factor that I think is significant, and it is one that

really does add a signature-type uniqueness to this case,

[the prosecutor] alluded to, and that is the same two guys,

looks like to me anyway – if I didn’t think it was the same

two guys, I wouldn’t be letting it in – but it was, we know

in the bank robbery, Mr. Saibu and Mr. Valentino and I

think maybe a third person. Also this offense is proximate

in time. It’s close in time. It’s a month later, month and a

half later than the T&M robbery murder.

 I find and conclude that this uncharged act, and this one

alone, will be admissible in this trial. So that I can be very

clear, the uncharged act that formed the basis of count 9 in

the bank robbery case – this was the Wells Fargo Bank

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robbery on August 29th – is admissible as an uncharged

act. I find it admissible against both defendants, and I find

it can be used to show identity and intent to aid and abet

with respect to counts 1 and 3 in this case. It’s identity as

to counts 1 and 3, and I will appropriately limit the jury

instructions upon the request of counsel that that occur.

 But I think this act meets the Hovarter/Ewoldt degree of

similarity required to prove identity. Not common plan or

scheme. Identity. This goes beyond common plan and

scheme. This is identity. And I think it’s also admissible to

show their joint action and intent to aid and abet, which

also goes to identity on those counts. The other uncharged

acts are not admissible.” 

 (Id. (as quoted by the Court of Appeal).)

During trial, when this evidence was introduced, the trial judge

again overruled objections raised by defense counsel and found the

evidence admissible to prove both identity and intent. (Id. at 23.)

2. The State Court Decision on Appeal

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in admitting

evidence of the prior bank robbery conviction because the evidence was

unduly prejudicial. (Lodg. No. 5 at 26-48.) The California Court of

Appeal observed that under California law evidence of uncharged crimes

is admissible to prove identity and intent in the prosecution of charged

crimes as long as the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently

similar to support a rational inference. (Lodg. No. 11 at 21-26.) The

degree of similarity required depends on the purpose for which the

evidence is introduced. A lesser degree of similarity is required to prove

intent, while evidence of identity requires the highest degree of

similarity. (Id. at 23-24.) “For identity to be established . . . the pattern

and characteristics of the crime must be so unusual and distinctive as to

be like a signature.” (Id. at 24 (quoting People v. Lynch, 50 Cal. 4th 693,

736 (2010).) However, evidence of identity “need not depend on one or

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more unique or nearly unique common features; features of substantial

but lesser distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when

considered together.” (Id.) 

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court: 

noted a number of marks of similarity between the Wells

Fargo robbery and the charged offenses . . . [that] when

combined with a number of unique characteristics . . . were

sufficient . . . to permit the introduction of evidence

regarding the uncharged offense for the purpose of

establishing not only intent with respect to the T&M

Liquor store attempted robbery/shooting, but also the

identities of the perpetrators of the charged crimes. 

(Id. at 24-25.) 

Basing their decision on the trial court’s observations the Court of

Appeal found that “[i]n the aggregate, the similarities among the

uncharged and charged crimes become more meaningful, and lead to the

reasonable inference that Saibu and Valentino were the persons who

committed the crimes, and that they intended to rob the T&M Liquor

store.” (Id. at 25-26 (citation omitted).) Thus, the Court of Appeal

concluded, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

evidence of the Wells Fargo Bank robbery at the trial in this case.” (Id.)

The Court of Appeal also found that even if the bank robbery

conviction was admitted improperly for the purpose of identity, the error

would be harmless. (Id. at 26-28.) The Court reasoned as follows:

 Error involving the admission of other crimes

evidence is subject to the prejudice standard announced in

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Welch

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 702, 749-750.) Under this standard, we

determine whether it is reasonably probable that the

defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome if

the error had not occurred. (Watson at p. 836.)

The trial court did not rely on identity alone as the

basis for admitting evidence of the Wells Fargo robbery. 

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Rather, the court concluded that this evidence was also

relevant to demonstrate the ‘joint action’ of the appellants,

as well as Saibu’s intent to aid and abet Valentino in the

attempted robbery of the T&M Liquor store. The degree of

similarity that is required between evidence of uncharged

acts and the charged offense, for the purpose of proving

intent, is significantly less than that required to establish

identity (see Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 736). The trial

court could have reasonably concluded that evidence of the

Wells Fargo robbery was more probative than prejudicial

with respect to the issue of intent, and, therefore, could

have properly admitted evidence of the Wells Fargo robbery

for the purpose of proving that the perpetrators intended to

rob the liquor store on the day of the shooting.5

 Thus, the

error that we are presuming, for purposes of argument, is

the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that it

could consider the evidence of the Wells Fargo robbery only

to determine the defendants’ intent. 

We conclude that it is not reasonably probable that

either defendant would have obtained a more favorable

outcome if the trial court had admitted the evidence for the

purpose of proving the defendant’s intent, and had provided

a limiting instruction prohibiting the jury from considering

the evidence for the purpose of determining identity. The

jury viewed videotape evidence from all of the crimes and

saw still photos created from those videotapes. With

respect to the Hollywood Video store robbery, Saibu’s DNA

was found on a shotgun used during the robbery, Valentino

told Buckley that he had robbed a Hollywood Video store,

5 The defendants’ intent with respect to the July 13, 2005

incident was at issue at trial, since Valentino shot at the victims

almost immediately after yelling “Give me the money.” During closing, in arguing that the video evidence of Yakou reaching his hand toward the register demonstrated that the perpetrator’s

intent was to rob the liquor store, the prosecutor stated: “Mr.

Yakou is at the register. His hand is on the register. Why

would he be doing that if he had not, in fact, heard the words,

‘Give me the money’; if that were not, in fact, the intent of the perpetrator?” Because the evidence left open the possibility that

the shooting was done in retaliation for the thwarted robbery

attempt the day before, evidence that Valentino and Saibu had

previously committed other armed robberies together tended to show that they intended to rob the liquor store on July 13, 2005, as well.

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and Buckley identified Saibu and Valentino from the

Hollywood Video store security videotape. With respect to

the July 12, 2005 T&M Liquor store attempted robbery,

during a live lineup, victim Mikho identified Saibu as

resembling the perpetrator, Almajid identified Saibu from

the surveillance videotape, and Saibu’s DNA was found on

the shotgun and the shells that police recovered from the

scene. 

With respect to the July 13, 2005 attempted robbery

and murder at the T&M Liquor store, there was evidence

from which the jury could reasonably infer that Saibu had

taken a .38 caliber silver-colored revolver from Almajid’s

apartment. A witness saw a man wearing baggy clothing a

carrying a silver revolver running away from the liquor

store after the shooting. Another witness spotted the

stolen white Mercedes Benz in an alley and identified

Valentino as one of the men who got out of that car. A

third witness noticed that one of the men standing next to

the Mercedes Benz had darker skin that the other man. 

Valentino’s prints were lifted from the trunk of the

Mercedes Benz, and Valentino admitted to Buckley that he

had shot a man while robbing a liquor store on El Cajon

Boulevard. Buckley also heard Saibu say to Valentino, a

couple of weeks after the shooting, “Man, I just told you to

rob the place. I didn’t know you were going to shoot the

guy’s head off.” During another conversation, when

Buckley referred to the car that was used during that

attempted robbery as a gray BMW, Saibu corrected him

and said that in fact the car was a white Mercedes Benz. 

In addition, Saibu told Almajid that he was waiting in the

car during the shooting. 

Based on the state of the evidence, it is not

reasonably probable that either Saibu or Valentino would

have obtained a more favorable outcome if the trial court

had instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of

the Wells Fargo robbery only for the purpose of

determining the defendant’s intent, and not to determine

identity. 

 (Id. at 26-29.)

//

//

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3. Analysis

Petitioner argues that the potential prejudice of admitting the

previous conviction so outweighed its probative value as to constitute a

violation of his federal due process rights. (ECF No. 1 at 6-14.)

The issue for this Court is whether the Court of Appeal’s ruling

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A legal principle is “clearly

established” withing the meaning of §2254(d)(1) if “it is embodied in a

holding of [the Supreme] Court.” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74

(2010). Although the Supreme Court has said that the writ should issue

“when constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair,” the Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of

irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process

violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley, 568 F.3d at

1101.

Here, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the

conviction was admissible as to intent and identity. Even assuming that

the conviction was improperly admitted as to identity, it would still have

been admissible as to intent. On that basis, the Court of Appeal

conducted an error analysis based on the failure to provide a proper

limiting instruction. (Lodg. 11 at 26.) The Court determined that any

resulting error would be harmless error. (Id.) 

For purposes of federal habeas review, it is “irrelevant” whether an

evidentiary ruling is correct or not under state law; the only question is

whether the ruling rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process. Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir.

2008). In order for an evidentiary ruling to be so fundamentally unfair

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as to allow issuance of the writ, clearly established federal law must

have been violated. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 74; Holley, 568 F.3d at

1101. Clearly established federal law is established as such by the

Supreme Court. See Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). 

This Court accepts the Court of Appeal’s analysis as a state’s

interpretation of its own laws, and finds no federal constitutional

violation because the Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Accordingly, the Court recommends Ground One be DENIED.

 Ground Two: Admission of Electronically Enhanced

Photographs.

 In Ground Two, Petitioner challenges the admission of

electronically enhanced photographs as evidence of identity in his trial. 

(ECF No. 1 at 15-21.) Petitioner argues that the photographs should

have been excluded because (1) they involved expert testimony of an

undisclosed expert constituting a discovery violation; (2) they were

admitted with insufficient foundation; and (3) they should have been

 subject to a Kelly hearing6

 as new scientific evidence. 

1. The Trial Court Proceedings

The facts as related by the Court of Appeal are as follows:

Nathan Cunningham, an investigative technician

with the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office,

created digital still images from VHS copies of surveillance

videotapes from the T&M Liquor store incidents. 

Cunningham used the still images to prepare photo boards

that the prosecutor ultimately used as courtroom exhibits

6

 A Kelly hearing is held where the evidence set forth at trial involves

a ‘new’ scientific technique or principle. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30 (1976). 

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at trial. 

Prior to Cunningham’s testimony, defense counsel

asked the trial court for a sidebar conference to discuss the

process that Cunningham had used to digitally enhance the

still photographs. The court ultimately held an Evidence

Code section 402 hearing, outside the presence of the jury,

to consider whether the photographic exhibits were

admissible. 

At the foundational hearing, Cunningham testified

that he specialized in graphics and 3-D animation. 

Cunningham is familiar with computer software programs

used to enhance or enlarge photographs, such as Adobe

Photoshop (Photoshop). Cunningham has used Photoshop

for eight years, and is knowledgeable about the latest

versions of the program. According to Cunningham,

Photoshop is frequently used by those who prepare

demonstrative exhibits and is considered an essential tool

that is widely used in that field. 

Cunningham made exhibit 146, photograph E, and

exhibit 171, photograph C, from a VHS videotape. 

Cunningham enlarged the still images, which is something

that he does on almost a daily basis in preparing exhibits. 

Cunningham explained how he created photograph C of

exhibit 146, which is an enlargement of a portion of

photograph E of exhibit 146. Cunningham also described

how he utilized a particular Photoshop enhancement tool to

make the color from the color video stand out more in the

still image. Specifically, Cunningham placed a digital copy

of the image on top of the original image, and changed the

blending mode to “Color Dodge.” Cunningham explained

that this process causes lighter colors in the image to

become brighter than darker colors, which ultimately

brightens the color overall. Cunningham used this same

process with respect to the photographs depicted in exhibit

171. 

Cunningham testified that the Color Dodge process

did not create the same amount of contrast in the photos in

exhibit 171 as in those in exhibit 146. He explained that

this is because the videotaped footage used to make the

still images in the two exhibits had been taken at different

times of day, under different lighting conditions, and from

different angles. 

According to Cunningham, using the Color Dodge

mode does not import new or different colors into an image. 

Rather, the Color Dodge mode allows one to overlap an

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exact copy of an image over the original image in such a

way that it provides additional contrast and makes colors

appear brighter. 

Cunningham also explained pixels, and how the

scaling of different images can sometimes affect the quality

of the image and/or require the computer software to use a

complicated equation to fill in pixels when an image is

enlarged. 

Cunningham said that he had not tried to enhance

the skin tone of the person depicted in exhibit 146,

photograph A, but that what he was trying to do was to

enhance the value and brightness of the entire photograph. 

Upon further questioning from the court, Cunningham

explained that the Color Dodge mode is like the brightness

and contrast settings on a television set. It is a mode that

affects lighter colors more, such that they become brighter,

but allows darker colors to remain the same. It does not

add color, but essentially brightens the entire image. 

After Cunningham testified at the foundational

hearing, the prosecutor noted that photographs in exhibits

146 and 171 had already been introduced at trial, with no

objection from defense counsel.

Counsel for Valentino argued that he was not aware

of the existence of exhibit 146 until Buckley testified at

trial.7

 Counsel asserted that if he had known that an

enhancement process had been used on the photographs, he

would have found an expert witness to explain that the

skin tone fo the individual depicted in exhibit 146,

photograph C, was not a fair and accurate depiction of the

subject’s skin tone. Counsel further argued that it was

clear that the process Cunningham had used was a

technical process that was outside the common

understanding of a juror. Valentino’s counsel requested

that the trial court exclude exhibit 146, as a remedy for the

prosecutor’s discovery violation in failing to inform him

about the digital enhancement, and also objected to the

exhibit on the ground that there was no foundation as to

how the exhibit had been enhanced. 

The trial court considered whether Cunningham’s

testimony involved a scientific process that implicated

expert opinion testimony and Kelly, and whether the

7

 Buckley had testified that he could tell that the person depicted in some of the surveillance was Valentino, based on that individual’s light skin.

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prosecutor’s failure to disclose the use of the Photoshop

enhancement constituted a discovery violation, or rather,

whether Cunningham’s testimony pertained to a commonly

accepted enhancement technique that someone could do on

a home computer. The court concluded that Cunningham’s

testimony about the images, and how he created them,

qualified as expert testimony under Evidence Code section

801, but that the technique that Cunningham used was not

new, and, therefore, that Kelly did not apply. The trial

court ruled that it would not exclude Cunningham’s

testimony or the exhibits as a sanction for the prosecutor’s

discovery violation in failing to disclose the digital

enhancement process, but agreed to allow defense counsel

the opportunity to try to find an expert who would cast

doubt on the reliability of the process that Cunningham

had used in creating the still images. 

Valentino’s counsel acknowledged that he “personally

believe[d] everything Mr. Cunningham did is what

everybody does with that software,” but indicated he was

more concerned with Cunningham potentially testifying

that the photographs accurately depicted the subjects’ skin

tone. The trial court observed that if the jury understood

the photographs as accurately depicting skin tone, this

would benefit Valentino, because the skin tone of the

individual in exhibit 146 was not similar to Valentino’s

skin tone. 

After this discussion, court adjourned for the

weekend. On the first day of court the following week,

Valentino’s counsel informed the court that he had

contacted an individual at a company that specializes in

preparing exhibits like the ones Cunningham had

prepared, but that the person he had contacted believed he

had a conflict because he knew Cunningham very well. 

Valentino’s counsel said that he had a list of other potential

experts whom he could call, but he did not know whether

he would be able to find an expert who would be available

to testify. The prosecutor noted that because of a mix-up

with witnesses for that day, there was some time for an

expert to “look at the process.” The court then moved on to

other business. 

The following day, the trial court raised the

“Photoshop issue” with the attorneys. Valentino’s attorney

indicated that he did “not have any expert who can offer an

opinion as to whether the process of enlargement” “alters

the details of facial features to the point where it could no

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longer be viewed as a fair and accurate representation of

what is depicted.” Counsel stated that his concern was

“that any facial features may be distorted to the point

where you can’t look at it and say whether it’s a fair and

accurate representation of what the person looked like,

because it’s been enlarged by a computer process.” Counsel

requested that the court give a limiting instruction to the

effect that the jury could consider exhibit 146 only for the

“skin tone of the shooter,” and for “no other purpose.”

The court made three rulings with respect to

Cunningham’s testimony. The court first addressed the

Kelly issue, and determined that the enlargement of digital

images, even by computer software, is not new, and that

the process that Cunningham used “passes [Kelly] muster.” 

The court also determined that the process that

Cunningham used implicated expert opinion and “should

have been disclosed as such,” but found that the prosecutor

had not deliberately violated the discovery rules. The court

rejected defense counsel’s request that the court give a jury

instruction to the effect that the evidence had not been

timely disclosed, and also determined that the evidence,

including both photographic exhibits (146 and 171), as well

as Cunningham’s testimony regarding the process that he

used to create the exhibits, would be admitted. The court

noted that it had “grant[ed] a continuance of sorts to let the

defense have a chance to try to meet this testimony.”

Cunningham later testified at trial regarding the

Photoshop process that he used to create photo board

exhibits 146 and 171. 

 (Lodg. 11 at 29-35.)

 2. The State Court Decision on Appeal

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court should have

excluded both the challenged photographs and the testimony relating to

the photographs as a sanction for the prosecutor’s discovery violation. 

(Lodg. No. 11 at 35.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did

not abuse his discretion in admitting the photographs despite the

discovery violation. (Id. at 35-36.) The Court of Appeal noted that a

trial court has great discretion to choose from a range of sanctions in the

event of a discovery violation and that there is no requirement that a

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sanction be imposed. (Id.) The Court of Appeal noted that the

admission of digitally enhanced photographs is common practice and a

Kelly hearing was not required. (Id. at 36-37.) The Court of Appeal also

found that sufficient testimony was presented to lay a proper foundation

for the admission of the photographs. (Id. at 38.) Therefore, the Court

of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments, affirmed the trial judge’s

decision, and found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion

when he weighed the nature of the discovery violation and decided not to

impose a sanction. (Id. at 36) 

In sum, the Court of Appeal found that the admission of the

digitally enhanced photographs was not in error. (Id.) 

3. Analysis

Petitioner claims that the admission of digitally enhanced

photographs so prejudiced the trial as to constitute a violation of his

federal due process rights. (ECF No. 1 at 15-21.) 

This Court reviews the Court of Appeal to ensure its decision

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court of Appeal

reviewed the trial court for error and concluded the photographs were

not admitted erroneously. (Lodg. No. 11 at 35-38.) Specifically, the

Court found: (1) There was no requirement to impose a sanction for the

discovery violation, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion; (2)

The admission of the photographs without a Kelly hearing was proper as

it is common practice to admit enhanced photos; and (3) A proper

foundation was laid to admit the photographs. (Id.) 

This Court accepts the Court of Appeal’s analysis as a state’s

interpretation of its own laws, and finds no federal constitutional

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violation because the Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Therefore, the Court finds that the admission

of the digitally enhanced photographs did not violate Petitioner’s right to

due process. See Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends Ground Two be DENIED.

 Ground Three: Cumulative Effect of Errors at Trial.

 In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of

the evidentiary errors asserted in Grounds One and Two, and other

unspecified errors, violated his right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 23.) 

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s

cumulative error claim, stating: “[i]n the absence of any additional

errors,8 we conclude that there is no cumulative error on which to base a

reversal of the judgment against either defendant.” (Lodg. No. 11 at 50-

51.)

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined

effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process violation if it

renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered

individually would not require reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922,

928 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893 (9th

Cir. 2003); Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“[T]he fundamental question in determining whether the combined

effect of trial errors violated a defendant’s due process rights is whether

the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less persuasive,’... and

thereby had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury’s

8

 “Additional errors” referred to the administrative errors that the

Court of Appeals ordered corrected on Petitioner’s sentencing file for time served.

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verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 928 (internal citations omitted). 

The Court of Appeal addressed each of the alleged errors that

Petitioner contends together give rise to cumulative error and found no

error occurred. (Lodg. No. 11 at 50-51.) Thus, unlike in Parle, there is

nothing to cumulate. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir.

2011) (“Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude

occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible.”); Mancuso, 292 F.3d at

957 (“Because there is no single constitutional error in this case, there is

nothing to cumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.”) Therefore,

the California Court of Appeal reasonably rejected Petitioner’s

cumulative error claim. 

The Court of Appeal reviews the trial court for error. This Court

reviews the Court of Appeal’s error findings for constitutional error. 

Where there is no single constitutional error, there is no cumulative

prejudice that may result. See id. Because the Court of Appeal

reasonably did not find any error and reasonably rejected Petitioner’s

cumulative error claim, this Court does not find any constitutional error

to cumulate. Thus, Ground Three does not warrant federal habeas relief

and the Court recommends it be DENIED. 

 Ground Four: Petitioner joins in beneficial claims

presented by co-defendant Saibu.

In his final claim, Petitioner seeks to join in the claims made by

Saibu in his pending habeas action pursuant to Rule 8.200(a)(5) of the

California Rules of Court. (ECF No. 1 at 24; ECF No. 21 at 10-11.) 

However, the California Rules of Court are inapplicable to Petitioner’s

federal habeas action. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 207 (2006)

(holding the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

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District Courts (“Federal Habeas Rules”) are the procedural Rules

governing federal habeas petitions from state prisoners.) The rules

governing this action prohibit Petitioner from simply joining Saibu’s

claims. Rule 2(c) of the Federal Habeas Rules requires each habeas

petition to “(1) specify all grounds for relief available; (2) state the facts

supporting each ground; [and] (3) state the relief requested...” 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254, Rule 2(c). Here, because Petitioner fails to state any specific

ground for relief, the Court recommends Ground Four be DENIED.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation and (2) denying Petitioner’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than May 7, 2013. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 21,

2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 16, 2013

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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