Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02039/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Frances Garcia, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV 09-02039-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (Doc. 31). 

I. BACKGROUND 

Garcia has diabetes mellitus, knee pain, depression, and back pain. In May 2007, 

she suffered a stroke, which caused residual weakness on her left side. She was born in 

May 1959. 

Garcia first applied for disability insurance benefits in January 2000. In 2005, 

after a fourth administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied her 

application for the fourth time, and for the first time, the Appeals Council denied her 

request for review. Garcia then sought review in the district court and in 2006 was 

granted remand for further consideration of whether she could perform work other than 

her past relevant work. She appealed the district court’s decision, which the Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2008. After further administrative proceedings, 

the ALJ denied Garcia disability insurance benefits on June 29, 2009. 

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On November 18, 2010, the Court found that the ALJ had failed to elicit a 

reasonable explanation for the conflict between the occupational evidence provided by a 

vocational expert and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and failed to explain why he 

rejected a different vocational expert’s consultation report. The Court therefore vacated 

the denial of disability insurance benefits and remanded for further administrative 

proceedings. On January 14, 2011, Garcia filed a notice of appeal from the district court 

decision. On March 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the 

mandate issued on May 14, 2012. 

On June 5, 2012, Garcia filed an Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, which sought an award of $33,577.97 for fees incurred from 2005 

through 2012. In her reply supporting the application, Plaintiff amended her fee petition 

to request only fees incurred after June 29, 2009, in the amount of $18, 506.22: 3.9 hours 

at $172.24 per hour for work performed in 2009 ($671.73), 30.8 hours at $175.06 per 

hour for work performed in 2010 ($5,391.84), and 68.9 hours at $180.59 per hour for 

work performed in 2011 and 2012 ($12,442.65). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

On a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice 

Act (“EAJA”), a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees “unless th[is] court finds 

that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, the 

government’s “position” includes both its litigating position and the action or failure to 

act by the agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 

The Supreme Court has defined “substantially justified” as “justified to a degree 

that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 

The government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. 

Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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III. ANALYSIS 

The Commissioner contends that its position in defending the ALJ’s June 29, 2009 

decision was substantially justified because Garcia did not challenge the ALJ’s findings 

at the first four steps of the five-step evaluation determination and because: 

[T]his is not a case where the Commissioner’s administrative 

decision was overturned immediately upon Plaintiff’s request 

for judicial review. Rather, this Court, after considering 

briefing by the parties, apparently disagreed only with a 

portion of the Commissioner’s administrative decision and 

remanded the case for further administrative proceedings to 

further consider Plaintiff’s ability to perform a significant 

number of jobs prior to May 11, 2009. This demonstrates that 

there was a genuine dispute as to Plaintiff’s entitlement to 

benefits. This also demonstrates that reasonable persons not 

only could disagree as to the outcome, but in fact did disagree 

as to the outcome. 

This argument makes no sense at all. The Court disagreed with the Commissioner’s 

administrative decision on the only portion challenged by Garcia. No other portions of 

the decision were presented for review. Further, the Court always considers briefing by 

the parties. It is impossible for the Commissioner’s administrative decision to be 

“overturned immediately upon Plaintiff’s request for judicial review.” These 

circumstances in no way indicate that reasonable persons could disagree as to the 

outcome. 

The errors found by the Court in the ALJ’s June 29, 2009 decision were not close 

calls. The decision improperly relied on the opinion of impartial vocational expert 

Kathleen McAlpine, who testified both on December 10, 2008, and May 7, 2009. She 

contradicted herself and provided vague and confusing testimony. (See Doc. 22 at 6-8.) 

The ALJ acknowledged inconsistency between her testimony and the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles, but failed to elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict as 

required by Social Security Ruling 00-4p. Further, the ALJ rejected without explanation 

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the opinion of vocational expert George J. Bluth, Ph.D., which was not controverted by 

substantial reliable evidence. 

The Commissioner has not identified any special circumstances that would make a 

fee award unjust, does not contend that any specific line items of the fee application were 

unreasonably incurred, and does not dispute the hourly rates requested. Therefore, the 

Commissioner was not substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s June 29, 2009 

unfavorable decision, special circumstances do not make a fee award unjust, and the 

EAJA requires the Court to award Garcia attorneys’ fees and other expenses. 

However, Garcia is not entitled to a fee award for attorneys’ fees incurred related 

to her appeal because she was not a prevailing party on the appeal. She will be awarded 

$671.73 for fees incurred in 2009 (3.9 hours at $172.24 per hour), $4,761.63 for fees 

incurred in 2010 (27.2 hours at $175.06 per hour), and $361.18 for fees incurred in 2012 

(2.0 hours at $180.59 per hour), for a total of $5,794.54. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees 

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 31) is granted, as amended in her Reply 

(Doc. 39), except for fees incurred on appeal. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the 

amount of $5,794.54. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in 

the amount of $5,794.54 for attorneys’ fees against Defendant. 

Dated this 21st day of August, 2012. 

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