Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00704/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00704-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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1 At the final pretrial conference, held on October 6,

2006, the court agreed to hear the instant motion on its regular

law and motion calendar on December 15, 2006. Trial of this

action is set to begin January 9, 2007.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

YELLOW CAB CO. OF SACRAMENTO,

a California Corporation,

NO. CIV. S-02-0704 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YELLOW CAB CO. OF ELK GROVE,

INC., a California

Corporation; and MICHAEL P.

STEINER, an individual,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Yellow Cab

Company of Sacramento’s (“plaintiff”) motion in limine to exclude

the expert testimony of Patrick Farrell, Ph.D.1

 Dr. Farrell, a

theoretical linguist specializing in the Engligh language,

lexical semantics and grammar, is defendants Yellow Cab Company

of Elk Grove and Michael Steiner’s (“defendants”) retained expert

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2 Plaintiff alleges claims against defendants for

violations of the Lanham Act, common law trademark infringement

and unfair competition, statutory unfair competition, false

advertising, and intentional interference with prospective

business advantage. 

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h). 

2

in this trademark action2

 on the issue of whether the phrase

“yellow cab” is a generic term.

Plaintiff moves to exclude Dr. Farrell’s testimony on

several, alternative grounds: (1) his testimony, based on a

“national market,” is inadmissible pursuant to the Ninth

Circuit’s remand order in this case; (2) his testimony does not

meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (“Rule

702") and is thus inadmissible; (3) his testimony is inadmissible

under “Daubert” because his methodology is unreliable; and (4)

his testimony will prejudice the jury and is thus excludable. 

For the following reasons, the court does not find any of

plaintiff’s arguments availing, and therefore DENIES plaintiff’s

motion.3

As to plaintiff’s first argument, plaintiff mischaracterizes

Dr. Farrell’s testimony. While he does provide testimony

regarding use of the term “yellow cab” in other communities,

including New York City, his opinions are not based solely on

that use in other communities. Indeed, his testimony regarding

New York City, to which plaintiff specifically objects, is only a

fractional basis of his expert report (consisting of two

paragraphs on page 13 of his 16-page report). To a much greater

extent, Dr. Farrell’s opinions are based on research regarding

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the local Sacramento community. (Expert Rpt. at 87, 88, 90-91.) 

In its remand order, the Ninth Circuit directed this court to

consider in deciding the relevance of certain evidence, the

“territorial” or local scope of the term “yellow cab” in the

specific geographic area. Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow

Cab Co. of Elk Grove, 419 F.3d 925, 930 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Dr. Farrell performed this analysis.

Moreover, Dr. Farrell’s testimony is not otherwise rendered

inadmissible by any findings of the Ninth Circuit. In its

decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected defendants’ “specific

argument . . . that the use of the term ‘yellow cab’ in the New

York City metropolitan area is dispositive in determining the

distinctiveness of the mark . . .” and found that “the unique New

York City government regulation of taxicabs is irrelevant to the

trademark issues presented in this case.” Id. Neither of these

findings, however, require exclusion of Dr. Farrell’s testimony. 

First, Dr. Farrell does not opine that the circumstances in New

York City are dispositive of any issue in this case; rather, he

uses New York City’s use of the phrase “yellow cab” as one

example supporting his ultimate opinion that “yellow cab” is a

generic term of the English language which is essentially

synonymous with taxicab. (Expert Rpt. at 98.) Second, Dr.

Farrell correctly states that New York City’s governmentregulated “medallion system,” requiring all taxicabs to be

painted yellow, does not exist in California, and he explains how

the term “yellow cab” is specifically used in California and the

Sacramento region in particular. 

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion does not

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require exclusion of Dr. Farrell’s testimony.

Regarding plaintiff’s second argument, that Dr. Farrell’s

testimony does not meet the requirements of Rule 702, the court

disagrees. The question of whether a mark is generic is a

question of fact for the jury. Id. at 419 F.2d at 929. Here,

Dr. Farrell offers testimony as a linguist on the issue of

whether “yellow cab” is a generic term in the English language. 

Courts have routinely held in trademark actions that such expert

testimony provides “helpful guidance” as to how people use a

certain term and the “roots” of the term. Steak n Shake Co. v.

Burger King Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 983, 993 (E.D. Mo. 2004); see

also WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984)

(upholding district court’s reliance on expert testimony from

linguist in regional English testifying that the word “opry” was

a generic term); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. New York Air Lines,

Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) (finding the term

“air-shuttle” generic in part based on lexicography expert’s

opinions setting forth history and present meaning of the words

“shuttle” and “air-shuttle”). 

Plaintiff’s cases, cited to the contrary, are inapposite. 

In Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetite, 669 F. Supp. 786, 791

(W.D. Ky. 1987), the expert testifying was an attorney,

attempting to testify as to trademark law; the court excluded the

testimony under Rule 702 since expert testimony on the

controlling law does not assist the trier of fact in determining

a fact in issue. Id. In Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto

Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 205, 208 (N.D. Ga. 1967), the court did not

exclude the expert linguist’s testimony but rather found that the

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testimony was “insufficient in itself” to establish that

“Acrilan” was generic. Unlike Dr. Farrell, in Thomas Pride, the

expert linguist focused only on the entomology of the word. Id.

Next, plaintiff’s third argument for exclusion of Dr.

Farrell’s testimony is likewise unpersuasive as plaintiff fails

to raise a proper challenge under Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Plaintiff proffers

no evidence to challenge Dr. Farrell’s methodology or the

reliability of his opinions. Instead, plaintiff’s counsel makes

a variety of arguments based upon her beliefs regarding the bases

for Dr. Farrell’s testimony. Attorney argument is not adequate

to raise a Daubert issue, and thus, there is no basis for

exclusion of Dr. Farrell’s testimony under Daubert.

Finally, there is also no basis for plaintiff’s contention

that admission of Dr. Farrell’s testimony will “prejudice the

jury.” One of the jury’s roles in this case is to determine,

from the facts and evidence presented to them, whether the

relevant consuming public uses the term “yellow cab” in a generic

sense. The jury is not, as suggested by plaintiff, to use their

own “general knowledge” to determine the issues in this case. 

Dr. Farrell’s testimony is admissible as it is relevant to

the issues presented in this case, and it could assist the jury

in understanding the evidence and determining the factual issues. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion in limine to 

exclude his testimony is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 11, 2006.

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