Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00841/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00841-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Minh Trieu Doan,

Plaintiff,

v.

Nancy Berryhill,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-0841-BAS-AGS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 16, 22)

In a disability hearing, may a judge cut off cross-examination after just one question?

Perhaps. But not under these circumstances. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge 

halted the cross-examination of the key adverse expert after one response—right as he was 

about to be confronted with a report that undermined his opinion. That report, which the 

expert had never seen, might have changed his opinion altogether. Due process demanded

more.

BACKGROUND

A. The Missing Lessner Report

This is the case of the incredible vanishing report. On August 21, 2010, Milton 

Lessner, Ph.D., wrote a report about five objective psychological tests he conducted on 

plaintiff Minh Trieu Doan. Based on these tests, Dr. Lessner concluded that Doan suffered 

from major depression with psychotic features, dementia due to head trauma, and postCase 3:16-cv-00841-BAS-AGS Document 38 Filed 08/04/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
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traumatic stress disorder, all of which made him “appear[] to be unemployable.” (ECF

No. 16-2, at 5, 10.) Based in part on this report, Doan requested a hearing on his Social 

Security disability-benefits application.

After a 2011 hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered further medical 

development because the only medical evidence in the record was “a psychological report 

dated August 21, 2010 from Dr. Lessner (Exhibit 15).” (AR 90.) By the next hearing in 

2013, however, that report went missing and the same ALJ—apparently forgetting he 

previously reviewed it—concluded that the report might not exist. (AR 22.)

We may never learn how the Lessner report pulled this disappearing act, but Doan’s 

attorney suggested in oral argument to this Court that it was lost in the transition to a new 

system. It seems that between the 2011 and 2013 hearings, the agency converted Doan’s 

case from paper to an electronic file. Doan’s attorney received two discs containing the 

digital record—one on the morning of the 2013 hearing and one months beforehand—and 

she swears both included the Lessner report. But that report was absent from the ALJ’s 

copy of the digital record.

B. The Short-Lived Cross-Examination of Dr. McDevitt

This discrepancy was laid bare during the cross-examination of independent medical 

expert Robert McDevitt, M.D., who appeared by telephone. (AR 31.) The second question 

by Doan’s attorney concerned the Lessner report, but the ALJ cut her off, saying that report 

was not in their electronic files. (AR 60-62.) Counsel then tried to present a paper copy, 

but the ALJ refused and instead said that “we’ll continue the hearing.”1(AR 64.)

 

1 The ALJ was understandably perturbed. He began the proceedings by reciting the 

exhibits to be admitted. Although that list omitted the Lessner report, Doan’s attorney did 

not object. (AR 22, 32.) Ultimately, Doan’s attorney moved to introduce three exhibits that 

she realized were not on the ALJ’s evidence disc. (AR 39, 60-64.) At oral argument before 

this Court, Doan’s attorney recalled that she tried to physically hand the last of these—the 

Lessner report—to the ALJ, but the judge declined.

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But that continued hearing never occurred. Instead, a few weeks later the ALJ simply 

ruled that Doan suffered from depression that was not disabling. (AR 16, 24.) He gave no 

weight to the five medical experts who supported Doan’s disability claim. He disregarded 

“Dr. Lessner’s alleged medical report,” because it was not in evidence and because he—

incorrectly—presumed that it contained only “subjective complaints . . . without objective 

testing.” (AR 22.) And he rejected the opinions of Doan’s other four medical experts on 

the ground that there were “no objective psychological tests” to “support [their] conclusory 

statements,” although Doan’s treating psychiatrist in fact relied on Dr. Lessner’s testing. 

(AR 22.) Instead, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. McDevitt, who never 

saw the Lessner report. According to Dr. McDevitt, “without supporting medical records,” 

he “could not determine if the claimant was impaired at all.” (AR 23.) The ALJ found this 

conclusion compelling, in part, because Dr. McDevitt was able to review “the claimant’s 

entire medical record” and “was subject to cross examination by the claimant’s counsel.” 

(Id.)

DISCUSSION

“[U]nder the Fifth Amendment, procedural due process requires disability claimants 

to be afforded a full and fair hearing.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 921-22 (8th Cir. 

2011) (citation omitted). Doan’s primary argument is that he was denied this right in 

several ways: (1) he had almost no opportunity to cross-examine the main adverse witness; 

(2) the ALJ never considered the keystone to his case, the Lessner report; and (3) he had 

no opportunity to cross-examine a vocational expert. In addition, he contends that several 

of the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence, including: (4) rejecting 

the opinions of his five medical experts, including at least two treating doctors; and 

(5) rejecting his own testimony as well as his mother’s.

A. Restricted Cross-Examination

“A claimant in a disability hearing is not entitled to unlimited cross-examination, but 

is entitled to such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of 

the facts.” Copeland v. Brown, 861 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see

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5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (same). An ALJ’s decision about whether and to what extent 

“cross-examination is warranted” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Copeland, 861 

F.2d at 539. In Solis v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit held that 

it was an abuse of discretion to deny a claimant the opportunity to cross-examine a medical 

expert—even with written interrogatories as a substitute—“where the physician is a crucial 

witness whose findings substantially contradict the other medical testimony[.]” Id. at 301.

Like Solis, this case involves a crucial witness whose adverse testimony contradicted 

other medical evidence. That witness was Dr. McDevitt—the sole doctor among six 

medical experts who thought that Doan might be able to work. The only relevant difference 

between Solis and this case is the nature of the court-imposed questioning constraints. In 

Solis, the claimant submitted written questions, but was not allowed to cross-examine, 

whereas Doan was permitted no interrogatories and only the most cursory crossexamination: one question and answer.

Doan’s plight is worse. It is not merely a matter of quantity, but of quality. The

disrupted cross-examination of Dr. McDevitt—set forth in its entirety below—amounts to 

one prefatory question and an incomprehensible (and sometimes inaudible) answer:

Q[:] Doctor, the date that he applied for disability is July 2010. So you 

can opine from that period forward?

A[:] I don’t t[hi]nk any—without—there’s available 1998 through that 

period—[psychiatrist Dr. Harry] Henderson about in—Henderson was only 

relying on—just told him and had records—really that doesn’t document very 

clearly what he has done to help this man. If he is actually impaired every two 

months is not very helpful and they have that he goes out with friends and 

claims [INAUDIBLE] so it contradicts the fact that he’s fairly adept.

Q[:] Well, I am referring you to the evaluation of the Lesner Office 

[phonetic]—

ALJ: He doesn’t have that, Ms. Manbeck. . . .

(AR 60.) Doan’s attorney never got to question Dr. McDevitt about the all-important 

Lessner report. After confirming that no one else had a copy of that report, the judge

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stopped the examination, saying, “[W]e’ll continue the hearing.” (AR 62, 64.) But he never 

did.

If Doan were given an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, he could have 

confronted Dr. McDevitt with the Lessner report—which might have changed his opinion. 

Or at least he could have posed hypothetical questions, such as: “Doctor, you testified that 

Mr. Doan is not disabled because no medical tests support any impairment. If you learned 

that Mr. Doan took the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 and had an 

‘unusually high F scale score in the Validity profile,’ suggesting serious psychopathology, 

would that have any effect on your opinion?” (See ECF No. 16-2, at 6.) At a minimum, 

though, Doan was entitled to elicit more than a solitary answer from this key witness. 

Furthermore, as in Solis, the cross-examination’s insufficiency “was compounded . . . by 

[the witness’s] cursory and unilluminating response[].” 719 F.2d at 302. Restricting Doan 

to such a meager inquiry was reversible error.

B. Missing Evidence and Remaining Claims

The Court need not address Doan’s remaining arguments. But since it sheds some 

light on the dispositive cross-examination issue, the Court will briefly address the 

missing-evidence question. First, the Commissioner correctly points out that the claimant 

has the burden of furnishing medical evidence of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 

20 C.F.R. § 416.912. Doan could have done more to satisfy that burden. For instance, he 

could have raised the missing Lessner report at the beginning of the hearing when the ALJ 

failed to mention it while reviewing the exhibit list.2(AR 32.)

 

2 Doan may have had good reasons for failing to submit the Lessner report 

immediately after the hearing—because he thought it was already in the record and the 

ALJ was “figur[ing] out what to do” to get it, or because he was waiting for the continued 

hearing to be scheduled, or because the ALJ had already rejected his attempt to offer a

paper copy. (AR 64.) After the ALJ stated in his decision that the Lessner report was “not 

in evidence,” however, Doan was remiss in not making it part of the record before the 

Appeals Council. (AR 22; see AR 1-8.) But by that time, Doan had long lost his opportunity 

for a meaningful cross-examination of Dr. McDevitt.

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But the ALJ has a shared burden to develop the record. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 

683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In Social Security cases the ALJ has a special duty to fully and 

fairly develop the record and to assure the claimant’s interests are considered.” (citation 

omitted)). The Lessner report was simply too important for the ALJ to proceed without it. 

The ALJ reviewed it in 2011; the treating psychiatrist referred to it in his opinion; and 

Doan’s attorney showed the ALJ a paper copy of it, with a court stamp and exhibit number. 

(AR 22, 64, 90.) Thus, the ALJ should have accepted the proffered paper copy at the 

hearing, or at least sought it out afterwards. The agency’s two attempts a year earlier to 

obtain Dr. Lessner’s records—including one in which the doctor curiously signed the 

response form, attached no records, yet did not check the blank for “WE DO NOT HAVE 

THE INFORMATION REQUESTED”—were simply insufficient, given that the report

was in the 2011 record and Doan’s counsel had a paper copy of it. (AR 64, 90, 280-81.)

CONCLUSION

Because Doan was denied due process, the Court recommends that Doan’s summary 

judgment motion (ECF No. 16) be GRANTED, defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment (ECF No. 22) be DENIED, and the case be remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. The parties must file any objections to this report by 

August 18, 2017. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party may respond to any such objection 

within 14 days of being served with it. See id.

Dated: August 4, 2017

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