Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01505/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01505-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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09CV1505 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL DENHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ARANDA, 

et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 09-CV-1505-JLS(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Doc. No. 39)

On July 30, 2010, Paul Denham (“Plaintiff”), an inmate

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that

his civil rights were violated in August 2007, when he was housed at

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). He sued all

Defendants in their individual capacities, and seeks compensatory

damages, punitive damages and reimbursement of the costs he incurred

in pursuing this litigation. Defendants have filed a Motion to

Dismiss. The undersigned, having reviewed the Complaint, First

Amended Complaint, Opposition, Reply, and for good cause appearing,

hereby RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.

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1/ The Court notes that Defendants’ Motion is not brought on behalf of

Garcia, Aranda, and Benvin, who have not been served in this action.

2/ Plaintiff alleges that Aranda was having an affair with Benvin.

Benvin worked at the prison medical clinic.

09CV1505 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Correctional

Officer Aranda; Nurse Benvin; Captain Marrero; E.A. Contreras;

Silvia Garcia; P. Cortez; Mr. Hernandez, Director of Corrections;

Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California Department of Correction

and Rehabilitation; and Mr. K. Smith.1/

Plaintiff is an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison. He

alleges that, while he was incarcerated at RJD, he worked in the

prison medical clinic, where he became aware of misconduct by

inmates and staff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that inmate

Barno committed wrongdoings when he was assigned to work at the

clinic. Plaintiff confidentially provided the information regarding

the misconduct to Correctional Officer Diaz. 

On August 8, 2007, Plaintiff was questioned by a correctional

officer, who Plaintiff identifies as “J. Doe,” to protect his

identity. Doe told Plaintiff that he (Doe) feared physical harm

should Aranda2/ discover his identity and that Aranda had the

reputation for violence. Doe’s identity is known to Sgt. Strickland

and Lt. Garza. Plaintiff described Barno’s wrongdoings to Doe and

also reported that Benvin was providing contraband to inmates.

Plaintiff alleged that Benvin could be a source of syringes for

inmates, and that she was having an affair with Aranda.

On August 12, 2007, inmate Barno questioned and threatened

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09CV1505 3

Plaintiff. Barno told Plaintiff that Benvin said Plaintiff provided

confidential information to prison authorities to get Barno fired

from his medical clinic job and, further, that Benvin planned to

retaliate against Plaintiff by falsely accusing Plaintiff of

threatening her. Plaintiff denied that he was the confidential

informant, and said that Benvin was trying to have him assaulted

because she suspected Plaintiff was the confidential informant.

Plaintiff told Barno to report the foregoing to the Office of

Internal Affairs.

On August 14, 2007, Plaintiff sent a written statement to Doe

that described the information provided to him by Barno. On August

15, 2007, Doe informed Plaintiff that he (Doe) had made copies of

the written statement and forwarded the original statement to Sgt.

Bravado in the Office of Internal Affairs.

On September 4, 2007, Benvin informed the authorities at RJD

that Plaintiff had threatened her. The threat was contained in two

notes.

Thereafter, Strickland told Plaintiff that he was ordered to

move to Administrative Segregation (“Ad Seg”) because he was accused

of threatening staff. Plaintiff told Strickland about his allegations regarding Barno and Benvin. Strickland, and later Garza,

concluded that there was no reason to put Plaintiff in Ad Seg. They

also concluded that the threatening notes to Benvin were attributed

to another inmate. Also, Doe stated that Benvin had been starting

false rumors about Plaintiff in an attempt to get Plaintiff fired

from his job in the prison’s medical clinic.

Nevertheless, Marrero refused to rescind the order moving

Plaintiff to Ad Seg because he thought Plaintiff was a possible

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09CV1505 4

threat to a staff member. Plaintiff’s move to Ad Seg was slightly

delayed due to a riot.

On September 5, 2007, at about 12:30 a.m., Aranda told

Correctional Officers Cluck, Sandoval and Barnhardt (who controlled

the opening and closing of Plaintiff’s cell door), that he needed to

see Plaintiff for official business, and ordered Barnhardt to open

Plaintiff’s cell door. Barnhardt did so. Aranda entered Plaintiff’s cell, asked Plaintiff why he was talking about Aranda’s

personal business, grabbed Plaintiff’s throat, and pinned him down

to the bed. Aranda demanded to know to whom Plaintiff had provided

the confidential information. Plaintiff denied providing any

information to anyone. Thereafter, Aranda released his grip on

Plaintiff’s throat and sat on a table in Plaintiff’s cell.

Plaintiff ran out of his cell through the cell’s partially open door

and placed his hands on the wall in the “arrest position.” Aranda

exited the cell and told Plaintiff to return to his cell. After

Plaintiff returned to his cell, Aranda stepped inside the cell and

punched Plaintiff on the left side of his jaw. Aranda ordered

Plaintiff not to report the incident and threatened that he could

return to Plaintiff’s cell if Plaintiff did report the incident.

After Aranda left, Plaintiff was taken to the prison’s Program

Office, where he reported to Sgt. Dawson the incident involving

Aranda.

Thereafter, Correctional Officer Diaz escorted Plaintiff to

the medical clinic. At the clinic, Plaintiff gave a statement to

Nurse Estoesia regarding the incident involving Aranda. Officer

Diaz noted that Plaintiff had a swollen jaw and hand marks around

his neck.

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09CV1505 5

Plaintiff returned to the Program Office where he gave a

video and written statement to Sgt. Dawson and Smith. While

Plaintiff was waiting in the Program Office, and after Aranda

discovered that Plaintiff had reported the incident involving him,

Aranda entered the Program Office and called Plaintiff “a fucking

liar,” and slammed his fist down on a counter near Plaintiff.

Plaintiff believes that on September 8, 2007, Aranda told Correctional Officers Sandoval, Cluck, Diaz and Barnhardt that he had

entered Plaintiff’s cell, “got angry,” “lost it,” and “put hands on

(Plaintiff).”

Plaintiff believes that after Aranda made the statement to

the Correctional Officers, Aranda was removed from the prison.

Plaintiff also believes that Benvin was restricted from entering the

facility in which Plaintiff was housed.

On September 6, 2007, Plaintiff was placed in Ad Seg because

it was alleged that he was a suspect in a threat against a staff

member, and he was deemed a threat to the safety and security of the

prison as a result. On the same day, Marrero reviewed Plaintiff’s

placement in Ad Seg and kept him there pending a decision of the

Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”).

On September 19, 2007, the ICC indicated that a “threat

assessment” was underway, but added that Plaintiff would not be

issued a Rules Violation Report. Thereafter, the ICC stated that

the reason for Plaintiff’s placement in Ad Seg was due to an ongoing

inquiry about Plaintiff’s staff misconduct report.

Plaintiff told the ICC that he wanted to stay in San Diego

because he was awaiting surgery and so his family could easily visit

him. Nonetheless, the ICC referred Plaintiff for transfer to

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3/ Defendants filed their first motion on December 4, 2009, and argued

that Plaintiff (1) failed to state a claim for retaliation, (2)

failed to state a claim for Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual

punishment, (3) failed to state a claim for violation of due

process, and (4) that Defendants were entitled to immunity. The

undersigned submitted an R&R on May 3, 2010, and recommended that

(1) the Eighth Amendment claims be dismissed without prejudice, (2)

the retaliation claim be dismissed without prejudice, (3) the due

process claim be dismissed with prejudice, (4) all claims for

damages against Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed

with prejudice, (5) claims for damages against Defendants in their

individual capacities be dismissed without prejudice, and (6) that

Plaintiff be given reasonable time to amend his Complaint.

Plaintiff did not file objections, and the undersigned’s R&R was

adopted in full.

09CV1505 6

another prison. Plaintiff appealed the referral. On October 11,

2007, an ICC representative rescinded Plaintiff’s transfer because

Plaintiff was awaiting surgery and because Plaintiff did not want

the transfer.

On November 15, 2007, at an ICC meeting, Marrero stated that

the investigation into staff misconduct prevented Plaintiff’s return

to general population because he could endanger the safety and

security of the prison. Plaintiff alleges that there was no

evidence to support this finding.

Plaintiff again informed the ICC that he wanted to stay in

San Diego, but Cortez incorrectly recorded the ICC minutes to

reflect that Plaintiff “wanted to transfer.” Plaintiff believes

that Cortez deliberately misreported the minutes to meet the ICC’s

requirements for Plaintiff’s transfer. On December 1, 2007,

Plaintiff was cleared to return to the general population of the

prison. At some point thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to

another prison.

B. The Results of Defendants’ First Motion to Dismiss3/

The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino’s adoption of the undersigned’s first Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) resulted in the

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 Plaintiff has apparently abandoned this claim.

09CV1505 7

following:

(1) As to the claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment:

(a) Dismissed with prejudice against Cortez and Contreras; and

(b) Dismissed without prejudice against Hernandez, Cate, Marrero,

 and Smith;

(2) Dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation

against all Defendants;

(3) Dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim for violation of

due process;4/ and

(4) Dismissed with prejudice all claims against all Defendants in

their official capacities (but not in their individual capacities).

C. Plaintiff’s Current Claims

Plaintiff claims the following: 

(1) His Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment was violated when he was placed and kept in Ad Seg and

transferred to another prison in retaliation for making complaints

about prison staff; and

(2) He was retaliated against for the exercise of his First

Amendment right to free speech (making complaints about prison

staff).

D. Defendants’ Current Grounds for Dismissal

Defendants’ Motion asserts:

(1) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment against

Hernandez, Contreras, Marrero, Cortez, Smith, and Cate;

(2) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for retaliation for

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09CV1505 8

exercise of his First Amendment rights against Hernandez, Contreras,

Marrero, Cortez, Smith, and Cate; and 

(3) Hernandez, Contreras, Marrero, Cortez, Smith, and Cate are

entitled to qualified immunity.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motions To Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency

of the claims in the complaint. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

93 (2007). Dismissal of a claim is appropriate only where the

complaint lacks a cognizable theory. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55.

The test, as authoritatively formulated by Twombly, is whether the

complaint alleges “enough fact[] to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” id. at 570, which is to say, “‘enough fact

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of illegal[ity],’” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d

110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (alteration in Arista Records).

The Court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,

and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

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09CV1505 9

1986); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9th Cir. 1995). “It is well settled that when a federal court 

reviews the grant of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, ‘its task is

necessarily a limited one.’” Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,

579 F.3d 943, 960 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). That limited task “is not [to determine]

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail,” id., but instead only

whether the complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can be

granted,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197

n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, when resolving a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, a court generally may not consider

materials outside the pleadings. Id. This precludes consideration

of new allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to

a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993).

B. Pleading Requirements Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff

must show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a

person acting under color of state law, and (2) that the conduct

deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Broam v. Bogan,

320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Vicarious liability does

not exist under Section 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1948 (2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted). To hold a person “liable under section 1983

there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged

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09CV1505 10

rights deprivation.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. A supervisory

official may be liable only if he or she was personally involved in

the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942

F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Causation may be established only

by showing that the supervisor set in motion a series of acts by

others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known

would cause others to inflict the injury. Watkins v. City of

Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Special Considerations For Pro Se Plaintiffs

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil

rights case, the Court must also be careful to construe the

pleadings liberally and afford him any benefit of the doubt. See

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th

Cir. 1988); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)

(en banc). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448

(9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se

litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the

person who benefits from the representation of counsel.”),

superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). In giving liberal

interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a court

may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of

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09CV1505 11

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Sherman v. Yakahi,

549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Conclusory allegations,

unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to state a

claim under the Civil Rights Act.”). Thus, at a minimum, even the

pro se plaintiff “must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support [his]

claim.” Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Continues To Fail To State A Claim For Cruel And

Unusual Punishment Against Hernandez, Cortez, Marrero, Smith,

And Cate

By order on June 21, 2010, the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

adopted the undersigned’s R&R, which recommended that the Complaint’s first claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment be

dismissed without prejudice. Judge Sammartino granted Plaintiff

leave to amend to cure “the deficiencies stated” in the R&R.

However, Plaintiff’s FAC contains nearly identical allegations in

support of this claim. Plaintiff made the following two changes:

(1) Added “and we departed in good terms” to the last

paragraph on page 4, and

(2) Added the last two paragraphs on page 8, which state

that he has exhausted his claims and request that the

United States Marshal effect service onto Officer Aranda

and Nurse Benvin.

The FAC remains otherwise unchanged. Neither of these additions

cure the defects set forth on pages 11 through 16 of the undersigned’s previous R&R. Rather than repeat that analysis here, the

undersigned incorporates it by reference and again recommends that

the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim

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09CV1505 12

be dismissed against Hernandez, Cortez, Marrero, Smith, and Cate as

indicated below.

1. Hernandez and Cate: Dismiss With Prejudice

In the first R&R, the undersigned noted the absence of any

allegations regarding Hernandez’s and Cate’s personal involvement.

The undersigned previously recommended dismissing this claim against

Hernandez and Cate without prejudice. Since Plaintiff’s FAC

continues to be devoid of allegations of personal involvement

against Hernandez and Cate, the undersigned recommends the Eighth

Amendment claim against them be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Cortez: Dismiss With Prejudice

Plaintiff again fails to allege any additional acts by Cortez

beyond his incorrectly recording minutes of the ICC meeting.

Because the R&R previously concluded that this allegation was

insufficient to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, the undersigned

now recommends that the Eighth Amendment claim against Cortez be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Marrero: Dismiss With Prejudice

Plaintiff alleges no additional facts against Marrero that

establish that he “deprived Plaintiff of the ‘minimal civilized

measures of life’s necessities,’” that he “acted ‘with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” or “that Marerro ‘knew and

disregarded an excessive risk to (Plaintiff’s) health or safety.’”

(R&R at 13-14.) The undersigned therefore recommends that the

Eighth Amendment claim against Marrero be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. Smith: Dismiss With Prejudice

As with Marrero, Plaintiff alleges no additional facts

against Smith to establish the requirements quoted immediately

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above. (R&R at 14-15.) The undersigned therefore recommends that

the Eighth Amendment claim against Smith be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Retaliation For Exercise of First Amendment Rights

1. Plaintiff States a Claim For Retaliation Against

Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for

reporting the misconduct of Benvin and Aranda. Plaintiff contends

that the retaliation took the form of being placed and retained in

Ad Seg and being transferred to another prison. Defendants contend

that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim for retaliation.

Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for

exercising a constitutional right. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,

532 (9th Cir. 1985). In Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir.

2005), the Ninth Circuit established a standard for claiming

retaliation under the First Amendment. Under this standard, a

viable claim of First Amendment retaliation in the prison context is

met if five elements are satisfied: (1) an assertion that a state

actor took some adverse action against an inmate; (2) because of;

(3) that inmates’s protected conduct; (4) that such action chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights; and (5) the

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Id. at 567-68.

In contrast to the original Complaint, the FAC sufficiently

alleges a retaliation claim. First, Plaintiff alleges adverse

action was taken against him when he was locked in Ad Seg, suffered

serious limitations on various freedoms he enjoyed in general

population as a result, and transferred to a different prison, away

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from his family and attorney. (FAC at 10, ¶ 2 (explaining various

freedom limitations).) Second, Plaintiff alleges he was placed in

Ad Seg “because of” his reporting prison staff misconduct. (FAC at

11 (“[T]he Defendants made this false claim to prevent me from

returning because I filed my complaints.”) (emphasis added).) 

Third, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that the alleged adverse action

was in response to Plaintiff’s exercise of protected conduct–-i.e.,

his complaints to prison officials. (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiff

sufficiently pleads a chilling effect. (Id. at 10 (“Defendants’

action has a chilling effect on First Amendment rights because it

would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from filing

similar complaints.”).) For this element, the undersigned notes

that Plaintiff does not have to allege that his First Amendment

right was totally chilled. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69. Finally,

Plaintiff alleges there was no valid penological goal for his

continued presence in Ad Seg or prison transfer because Aranda and

Benvin had been either fired or prohibited from entering his housing

unit, and Plaintiff’s alleged staff threats had been proven forged

before he requested release to general population and his prison

transfer. (FAC at 5 (“Aranda had been permanently removed from the

prison yard. As such, there was no legitimate penological interest

to retain me in [Ad Seg] pending the investigation because nurse

Benvin had already been permanently removed, and investigative staff

had concluded that the staff threat was attributed to another inmate

and c/o Aranda had confessed to his misconduct.”).) Liberally

construing Plaintiff’s allegations and drawing all reasonable

inference therefrom, as the Court must do at the motion to dismiss

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stage, the FAC sufficiently pleads a cognizable theory in support of

the retaliation claim.

Nonetheless, Defendants seem to argue the merits of the

retaliation claim, in particular whether their actions reasonably

advanced a legitimate correctional goal. Indeed, the undersigned

notes that the sole case Defendants cite in support of their

argument was an appeal from a summary judgment motion. See Barnett

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 814 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California state

prisoner Lee Max Barnett, a death row inmate, appeals pro se the

district court’s summary judgment in favor of corrections officials

in Barnett’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.”) However, Defendants must

keep in mind that a motion to dismiss is a challenge to a claim’s

facial validity, not an adjudication on the merits. At this stage,

the Court’s focus is on the sufficiency of the FAC. In other words,

does Plaintiff allege a cognizable theory that could support his

claims? Plaintiff merely has to allege facts that support his claim

to survive a motion to dismiss. Even if the retaliation claim is

presently ripe for summary judgment, Defendants’ analysis ignores

the standard by which the Court is bound at the motion to dismiss

stage.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s amended

retaliation claim survives facial review. The undersigned therefore

recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the retaliation claim

against Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras be DENIED.

2. Plaintiff Continues to Fail to State a Claim For

Retaliation Against Hernandez and Smith

Plaintiff’s FAC contains no allegations of retaliation

against Hernandez and Smith. This deficiency was specifically

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 The affirmative defense of qualified immunity does not extend to

claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Am. Fire, Theft & Collision

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pointed out to Plaintiff in the undersigned’s first R&R. (R&R at 

17:16-20.) The undersigned therefore recommends that the Motion be

GRANTED and the retaliation claim against Hernandez and Smith be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Marrero, Smith, Cortez, Contreras, Cate, and

Hernandez again assert that the qualified immunity doctrine shields

them from suit because their conduct did not violate any clearlyestablished right under the circumstances in which they acted. They

claim that they are entitled to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

as a result. The undersigned concludes that Defendants Hernandez,

Smith, and Cate are entitled to qualified immunity protection, while

Defendants Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras are not.

1. Qualified Immunity Legal Standard

The entitlement to qualified immunity “is an immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The defense of “qualified immunity”

protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). This standard “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by

protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per

curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986));

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2001).5/

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28 Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991). The

Court takes notice that Plaintiff is also seeking injunctive and

declaratory relief. 

09CV1505 17

The Supreme Court recently held that the test for qualified

immunity in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), is no longer a

rigid two step analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 192 S. Ct. 808 (2009)

However, the Saucier analysis is still pertinent for qualified

immunity purposes. Id. at 818. Pursuant to Saucier, the first step

in the analysis is: “[T]aken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the

allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity.” Id.; see also Haynie v. County of

Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). The second step

of the qualified immunity analysis is whether “it would be clear to

a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; see also Wilkins v. City

of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).

2. Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras Are Not Entitled To

Qualified Immunity

In the first R&R, the undersigned concluded that Defendants

were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not

satisfy the first prong of Saucier when the facts alleged in the

Complaint failed to allege that Defendants’ conduct violated a

constitutional right. (R&R at 16-17.) However, in the FAC,

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, as

explained above. Plaintiff thus satisfies Saucier’s first prong.

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Turning to the second prong, the Court must “inquir[e] into

the reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the legality of his

actions.” Wilkins, 350 F.3d at 955. Thus, “[e]ven if his actions

did violate the [Constitution], a reasonable but mistaken belief

that his conduct was lawful would result in the grant of qualified

immunity.” Id.

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, a reasonable officer

would have known that subjecting Plaintiff to Ad Seg confinement

without continuing justification, and then transferring him to

another prison even after the involved prison staff had been

disciplined for their misconduct, was in violation of the law if

done to silence or punish Plaintiff for his complaints, as Plaintiff

alleges. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (“Of fundamental import to

prisoners are their First Amendment ‘right[s] to file prison

grievances.’”) (quoting Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.

2003)); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1985), . . . we held that

prison officials could not transfer an inmate to another prison in

retaliation for the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment right

to pursue federal civil rights litigation.”); Bradley v. Hall, 64

F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A prisoner’s right to meaningful

access to the courts, along with his broader right to petition the

government for a redress of his grievances under the First Amendment, precludes prison authorities from penalizing a prisoner for

exercising those rights. . . . The right of meaningful access to

the courts extends to established prison grievance procedures.”)

(citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2009). In other words, any

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6/ The previous, adopted R&R recommended this claim be dismissed with

prejudice against Contreras. Garcia, Aranda, and Bevins have not

been served in this case.

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such conduct would have been in violation of established law, and 

thus a knowing violation of the law. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806

(“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment is “clearly

established law” in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity

purposes.”) (citing Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th

Cir. 1995)). As a result, Defendants Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras

are not entitled to qualified immunity and the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED in this regard.

3. Hernandez, Smith, and Cate Are Entitled to Immunity

Plaintiff’s FAC contains no allegations that vitiate the

qualified immunity claim by Hernandez, Smith, and Cate. The

undersigned therefore recommends that the Motion be GRANTED and the

entire case against Hernandez, Smith, and Cate be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS as

follows:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference

claims be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE against Hernandez, Cate, Cortez,

Marrero, and Smith.6/

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

retaliation against Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras be DENIED.

(3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

retaliation against Hernandez and Smith be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

(4) Based on the qualified immunity doctrine, that the Motion

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to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Marrero, Cortez, and Contreras

in their individual capacities be DENIED.

(5) Based on the qualified immunity doctrine, that the Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Hernandez, Smith, and Cate in

their individual capacities be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 28, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than February 25, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 30, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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