Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03981/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03981-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Docket No. 10. Although pro se Plaintiff filed her opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss one day late, the

Court, in its discretion, chooses to address the motion on its merits. Additionally, on September 17, 2007, the day prior to

the scheduled hearing on this Motion, Plaintiff filed an unauthorized surreply. The Court considered Plaintiff’s surreply and

finds that it fails to change the Court’s disposition.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE H. CHANG,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MCKESSON HBOC, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C07-03981 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND IN PART

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss.1 For the following reasons, the Court

GRANTS the Motion WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The material allegations of Plaintiff Christine Chang’s complaint (“Complaint”) are as

follows.

Plaintiff began working for Defendant McKesson HBOC Inc. on October 16, 1995. 

Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on March 30, 1999. Plaintiff learned that her

employment was terminated during a meeting between herself and one of Defendant’s vice

presidents. On Plaintiff’s last day of employment for Defendant, March 30, 1999, all severance,

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Plaintiff has referred to equitable tolling in the Complaint as though that concept constitutes a sixth cause of action.

The Court understands equitable tolling not as a claim, but as a justification for untimely filing, and it will therefore be so

construed.

2

vacation, disability, and back pay became due. 

In April 1999, Plaintiff consulted with an attorney regarding the circumstances surrounding

her termination. As a result, Plaintiff became the named representative in a class action suit against

Defendant. That class action was filed on November 24, 1999.

On June 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the present case against Defendant in the

San Francisco Superior Court. The six causes of action pleaded in the Complaint are (1) breach of

implied contract; (2) wrongful termination; (3) fraud; (4) negligent or intentional infliction of

emotional distress; (5) a violation of constitutional rights; and (6) equitable tolling.2

 

On August 2, 2007, Defendant filed a notice of removal from the San Francisco Superior

Court. Defendant now seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety because Plaintiff failed

to allege state action in regards to the fifth cause of action, and because the relevant statutes of

limitations corresponding to the non-constitutional causes of action have expired. Plaintiff does not

dispute that Defendant is not a state actor, nor that the statutes of limitations have run, but does

argue that the statutory periods should be tolled. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v.

Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Cir. 1984). In pleading sufficient facts, however, a plaintiff must suggest his or her right to relief is

more than merely conceivable, but plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

If a court finds a plaintiff’s claims barred by the statute of limitations, and grants a motion to

dismiss on that ground, it is then proper for a district court to grant leave to amend to allow a

plaintiff to state any claims that are not time-barred. See Udom v. Fonseca, 846 F.2d 1236, 1237

(9th Cir. 1988). Before a district court can dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint, the court must

provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies and an opportunity to amend the complaint

effectively. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claim is Not Adequately Pleaded.

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Equal Protection

and Due Process rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against

governmental deprivations of “life, liberty or property,” as those words have been interpreted and

given meaning over the life of our republic, without due process of law. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1995).

The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

government, whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness (i.e., denial of

procedural due process guarantees) or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification

in the service of a legitimate governmental objective (i.e., denial of substantive due process

guarantees). See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998). 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “commands that no State shall

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1995) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to allege state action in the Complaint, as is required to

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

bring a claim alleging a violation of Plaintiff’s due process or equal protection. Lugar v. Edmonson

Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). The Court agrees, and therefore GRANTS Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim of a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of

the United States Constitution WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

B. Plaintiff has Failed to Adequately Plead the Remaining Claims because the

Relevant Statutes of Limitations have Expired.

Defendant asserts that because the applicable statutes of limitations have expired for each of

Plaintiff’s claims, the Complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiff does not contest that the statutory

periods have expired. 

“If the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, the defense may be

raised by a motion to dismiss.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). A

motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations may be properly granted so long

as the complaint does not raise an issue as to whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that the statute

of limitations had been tolled. Id.

The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s first cause of action, breach of implied contract, is

four years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337(1). In the present case, this statutory period began to run

when Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. See Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th

479, 488-89 (1996). Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on March 30, 1999. (Complaint ¶ 30.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of breach of implied contract began to run on March 30, 1999, and

expired on March 30, 2003. 

The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s second cause of action, wrongful termination, is two

years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1. Under California law, a claim for wrongful termination is a

tort claim which accrues when employment is terminated. Romano, 14 Cal.4th at 500-01. Plaintiff’s

employment was terminated on March 30, 1999. (Complaint ¶ 36.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of

wrongful termination began to run on March 30, 1999, and expired on March 30, 2001.

The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s third cause of action, fraud, is three years. CAL. CIV.

PROC. CODE § 338(d). “Under the California statute of limitations for fraud, the three-year period

does not begin to run until the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the facts constituting the

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

fraud.” Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682. Plaintiff’s claim of fraud arises out of the events on the day her

employment was terminated, March 30, 1999. (Complaint ¶ 43.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of

fraud began to run on March 30, 1999, and expired on March 30, 2002. 

Plaintiff’s fourth claim, negligent intentional infliction of emotional distress, can be

understood as either a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress or intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Both causes of action have a two year statute of limitations period. CAL. CIV.

PROC. CODE § 335.1. Plaintiff alleges that the injurious conduct supporting this claim occurred

between April 1996 and March 1999. (Complaint ¶ 54.) The last applicable day of this injurious

conduct was in March 1999. Therefore, this claim, even if based on the most recent alleged events,

expired in March 2001. 

Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s asserted statutes of limitations pertaining to the claims

alleged in the Complaint, nor does Plaintiff argue that the relevant statutory periods have not

expired. Therefore, this Court agrees that on the face of the Complaint, the statutes of limitations for

all of Plaintiff’s non-constitutional causes of action have expired. 

B. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling.

Plaintiff asserts that equitable tolling of each of the applicable statutes of limitations justifies

her delay in bringing the present suit. (Complaint ¶¶ 56-57.) Defendant contends that facts alleged

in the Complaint bar equitable tolling. 

The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a plaintiff to avoid a statute of limitations. See

Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995). “Because the applicability of the

equitable tolling doctrine often depends on matters outside the pleadings, it ‘is not generally

amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Id. at 1206 (citing Cervantes v. City of San

Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). If equitable tolling depends on a factual question not

clearly resolved in the pleadings, a dismissal is not appropriate. See Supermail Cargo, Inc., 68 F.3d

at 1207; Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1277. The Ninth Circuit has “upheld dismissals in a handful of cases

despite a claim of equitable tolling. However, in each of these unusual cases, some fact, evident

from the face of the complaint, supported the conclusion that the plaintiff could not prevail, as a

matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.” Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1276. To dismiss under Rule

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Plaintiff’s opposition references FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), and asserts that further proceedings should be ordered in

this case. However, this Court can decide the merits of the present motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) on the face of

the Complaint. Therefore, further proceedings, and a transformation of the motion into one for summary judgment, are not

appropriate. 

6

12(b)(6) despite an equitable tolling claim, a court must find that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts

which would allow that plaintiff to prevail. See Supermail Cargo, Inc., 68 F.3d at 1208; Jablon, 614

F.2d at 682. 

 A court may equitably toll a statute of limitations if (1) plaintiff's failure to comply with the

statute of limitations was the result of excusable ignorance and (2) the defendant will not suffer

prejudice. Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling will extend the

statute of limitations where a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a

possible claim until a later date. Id. “Equitable tolling requires that [the plaintiff] was excusably

ignorant of the limitations period.” Stallcop v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 820 F.2d 1044, 1050

(9th Cir. 1987). See also Supermail Cargo, Inc., 68 F.3d at 1207. In Stallcop, the Ninth Circuit

found that “the district court correctly held that there was no factual basis for applying equitable

modification to the limitations period.” 820 F.2d at 1050. In Stallcop, the plaintiff consulted with

an attorney regarding her claims before the statute of limitations had run. The court held that

plaintiff’s legal consultation negated excusable ignorance because the plaintiff “gained the ‘means of

knowledge’ of her rights and can be charged with constructive knowledge of the law’s

requirements.” Stallcop, 820 F.2d at 1050. 

In the present case, the face of the Complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff is not entitled to

equitable tolling.3

 The Complaint states that Plaintiff sought, and consulted with, an attorney

pertaining to her alleged injury in April 1999. (Complaint ¶¶ 60-61.) The Complaint explains that

this attorney worked with Plaintiff on a class action suit against Defendant, but was unwilling to

provide additional representation regarding Plaintiff’s potential individual claims. (Complaint ¶ 62.)

 The Court finds that this case constitutes an unusual case which presents facts on the face of

the Complaint demonstrating not only that the statutes of limitations have run, but also that Plaintiff

is not entitled to tolling of the statutory periods. Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling because,

during the relevant period of time, Plaintiff consulted with an attorney regarding her individual

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

claims stemming from the termination of employment that the present suit arises out of. As a result,

Plaintiff gained the means of knowledge of her rights in 1999 and can therefore be charged with

constructive knowledge of the law’s requirements. As a matter of law, the face of the complaint

describes an event that negates an equitable tolling argument. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the applicable statutes of limitations. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on

Plaintiff’s first, second, third, and fourth causes of action. Although pro se Plaintiff cannot plead

equitable tolling with the facts alleged, Plaintiff may be able to allege facts sufficient to support

equitable estoppel. (See Complaint ¶¶ 56-57.) The Court, therefore, grants Plaintiff leave to amend

her first through fourth causes of action accordingly. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint not

later than thirty days from the entry of this Order. Additionally, the Court GRANTS the Motion

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND on Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleging a violation of due

process and equal protection.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-03981-MJJ Document 25 Filed 09/20/07 Page 7 of 7