Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05049/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05049-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2011 Decided May 15, 2012

No. 11-5049

TIMBISHA SHOSHONE TRIBE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00968)

Robert T. Coulter argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the briefs were Philomena Kebec and David M. 

Kairys. 

Brian C. Toth, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the briefs were Maureen E. 

Rudolph and Aaron P. Avila. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, GRIFFITH and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Individuals claiming to be the 

Tribal Council of the Timbisha Shoshone appeal the district 

court’s dismissal of their case for failure to state a claim, but 

we do not reach that issue because we conclude the plaintiffs 

lack standing. We vacate the judgment of the district court

and remand with instructions to dismiss their complaint for 

lack of jurisdiction.

I

In 1951, certain members of the Shoshone tribes sued the 

United States over the loss of their lands. See United States v. 

Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 41 (1985). In proceedings stretching over 

twenty-six years, the Indian Claims Commission, a nowdefunct independent agency created in 1946 to assess claims 

brought by Indians against the United States, awarded the 

Western Shoshone approximately $26 million in 

compensation, concluding that its members had been 

“deprived of their lands” by the “gradual encroachment by 

whites, settlers and others” and the “acquisition, disposition or 

taking of their lands by the United States.” Shoshone Tribe v. 

United States, 11 Ind. Cl. Comm. 387, 416 (1962); see also

W. Shoshone Identifiable Grp. v. United States, 40 Ind. Cl. 

Comm. 318 (1977). Pending distribution, the funds were 

placed in an interest-bearing trust account in the United States 

Treasury. Dann, 470 U.S. at 42. The Western Shoshone did

not seek the funds, but instead demanded partial return of the 

lands. Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Salazar, 766 F. Supp. 2d 

175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011). The United States rejected this 

demand, and the money remained in trust for two more 

decades, awaiting congressional legislation creating a 

disbursement scheme. See 25 U.S.C. § 1402(d) (“In cases 

where the Secretary has to submit a plan dividing judgment 

funds between two or more beneficiary entities, he shall 

obtain the consent of the tribal governments involved to the 

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proposed division. If the Secretary cannot obtain such 

consent . . . he shall submit proposed legislation to the 

Congress.”).

In 2004, Congress passed the Western Shoshone Claims 

Distribution Act (Distribution Act), directing the Secretary of 

the Interior to distribute the funds on a per capita basis to all 

living U.S. citizens who were at least “1/4 degree of Western 

Shoshone blood” and who were not receiving other Indian 

Claims Commission awards. Pub. L. No. 108-270, § 3, 118 

Stat. 805, 806. Individuals claiming to be the Tribal Council 

of the Timbisha Shoshone, a tribe of the Western Shoshone, 

sued, arguing that the Distribution Act was an 

unconstitutional taking of tribal property. The district court 

granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the 

Distribution Act was constitutional. Timbisha Shoshone Tribe,

766 F. Supp. 2d 175. The plaintiffs now appeal that decision. 

II

Before we assess the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we 

must first determine whether they have standing to sue on 

behalf of the Tribe. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 

Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal appellate 

court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its 

own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause 

under review . . . .’” (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 

237, 244 (1934))); Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 

663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating that standing is a 

necessary “predicate to any exercise of our jurisdiction”). The 

Plaintiffs concede they lack standing to bring suit as 

individuals, but allege they are the Tribal Council acting in its 

official capacity to protect the interests of the Tribe. See 

Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n.3 (“All of 

the individual Plaintiffs sue only on behalf of the Tribe, not 

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on their own behalf as individual members of the Tribe.” 

(quoting Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 7) 

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). But whether 

they are has been called into question by circumstances

arising after their appeal was taken. 

The Government recognized the Timbisha Shoshone 

Tribe in 1983. For years, however, the Tribe has been 

embroiled in an internal leadership dispute, with two factions 

claiming to be the Tribal Council. One faction, plaintiffs here,

is led by Joe Kennedy, the other by George Gholson. At the 

time the Kennedy faction filed this suit, the Government did 

not recognize a Tribal Council. The Kennedy faction claimed 

it was the Tribal Council authorized to bring suit on behalf of 

the Tribe. The Gholson faction countered with an amicus brief 

in the district court opposing the suit and arguing the Kennedy 

faction could not sue on the Tribe’s behalf. According to the 

Gholson faction, “currently the Tribe has two elected 

Councils, neither of which is recognized by the [United States 

Government],” and therefore “there is no Tribal government 

for outside purposes.” Br. Amicus Curiae of George Gholson 

in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 1, Timbisha Shoshone 

Tribe, 766 F. Supp. 2d 175 (No. 1:10-cv-00968-GK), ECF 

No. 16. The Government adopted the Gholson argument. 

Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 182-83 (citing 

Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Prelim. Inj. Mot. 9). 

On March 1, 2011, the district court concluded that the 

failure of the Government to recognize any Tribal Council did 

not bar a group from suing on behalf of the Tribe. Id. at 183-

84 (citing Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 

39 F.3d 51, 58-61 (2d Cir. 1994)). The district court then took 

as true the factual allegations of the Kennedy faction “that 

they are members of the governing Tribal Council of the 

Timbisha Shoshone,” but rejected their claims as a matter of 

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law, holding the Distribution Act constitutional. Id. at 184,

187, 189. The plaintiffs appealed to us on March 8, 2011. 

Shortly after the district court’s decision, circumstances 

changed. First, the Government recognized the Gholson 

faction for “a limited time and for the limited purpose of 

conducting government-to-government relations necessary for 

holding a special election” to determine who constituted the 

Tribal Council. Appellees’ 28(j) Ltr. Attach. 1, at 2. An 

election was held on April 29, 2011, and the Tribe’s Election 

Committee issued a preliminary vote count that day showing 

that the Gholson faction had soundly defeated the Kennedy 

faction. Id. At least one member of the Kennedy faction filed 

an appeal with the Tribe’s Election Committee, which ruled 

against him and then certified the results. Id. The newlyelected Gholson faction then requested recognition as the 

Tribal Council from the Government. On July 29, 2011, 

Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Larry Echo Hawk,

“exercising by delegation the Secretary’s authority over the 

relations between Indian tribes and the United States,” id. at 

3, recognized the Gholson-led Tribal Council in a letter 

stating: 

The April 29 election . . . constituted the resolution of an 

internal tribal dispute in a valid tribal forum. The 

Timbisha Shoshone people embraced a tribal government 

by means of an election compliant with their 

Constitution. The Federal Government may not ignore or 

reject the results of a tribal election that clearly states the 

will of a sovereign Indian nation. Therefore, the 

Department should recognize the Timbisha Shoshone 

Tribal government consisting of the five people identified 

in the Election Committee’s report as having received the 

most votes in the April 29 election. . . . [T]his letter 

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provides the Bureau with an expeditious recognition of 

the Tribe’s leadership.

Id. The Kennedy faction challenged Echo Hawk’s decision in 

an action filed and still pending in the Eastern District of 

California. Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 

2:11-cv-00995 (E.D. Cal. filed Apr. 13, 2011). 

We were first made aware of these developments on 

November 9, 2011, when the Government filed a letter 

informing us of this pursuant to Rule 28(j). FED. R. APP. P.

28(j). We ordered supplemental briefing on whether the 

Kennedy faction still had standing to bring this suit on behalf 

of the Tribe and heard oral argument on the same. We now 

conclude they lack standing. 

It is a “bedrock principle of federal Indian law that every 

tribe is ‘capable of managing its own affairs and governing 

itself.’” Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 

1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. 

Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831)); see also Santa Clara 

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978) (discussing the 

“well-established federal policy of furthering Indian selfgovernment” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 

(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Echo Hawk 

letter acknowledges that the Timbisha Shoshone resolved 

their own leadership dispute through a valid internal tribal 

process. See Appellees’ 28(j) Ltr. Attach. 1, at 3 (“The April 

29 election — not my March 1 Order — constituted the 

resolution of an internal tribal dispute in a valid tribal 

forum.”). 

The Second Circuit has noted that “[t]he [Government’s]

determination that [a certain member] does not 

represent . . . [a tribe] may well moot plaintiffs’ claims.” 

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Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 713 (2d 

Cir. 1998). We agree. In these circumstances, we owe 

deference to the judgment of the Executive Branch as to who 

represents a tribe. See Miwok, 515 F.3d at 1267 (“Although 

the sovereign nature of Indian tribes cautions the Secretary 

not to exercise freestanding authority to interfere with a 

tribe’s internal governance, the Secretary has the power to 

manage ‘all Indian affairs and . . . all matters arising out of 

Indian relations.’” (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2)); see also United 

States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866) (“In 

reference to [matters of tribal recognition], it is the rule of this 

court to follow the action of the executive and other political 

departments of the government, whose more special duty it is 

to determine such affairs.”). There is no dispute here that 

Assistant Secretary Echo Hawk’s letter is authentic and 

constitutes final agency action. See United States v. Chemical 

Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) (“The presumption of 

regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in 

the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume 

that they have properly discharged their official duties. Under 

that presumption, it will be taken that [officials have] acted 

upon knowledge of the material facts.” (internal citations 

omitted)).

The Kennedy faction is unhappy with how the election 

was run, who voted, and the results, but ours is not the forum 

for that debate. Both parties agreed at oral argument that we 

have all the necessary facts to decide whether the plaintiffs 

have standing to bring this suit, and we need not remand to 

the district court. Oral Arg. Tr. 14, 17. The fact is that we 

have a letter from the Executive Branch recognizing the 

Gholson faction, and we must not turn a blind eye to facts in 

assessing jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 

n.4 (1947) (“In passing on a motion to dismiss because the 

complaint fails to state a cause of action, the facts set forth in 

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the complaint are assumed to be true . . . . But when a

question of the District Court’s jurisdiction is raised, . . . the 

court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as

they exist.”). As John Adams famously observed, “Facts are 

stubborn things,” DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 68

(2001), and the facts here are stubbornly clear. 

Our decision has no impact on the litigation in the 

Eastern District of California or, if that litigation is successful, 

on the plaintiffs’ ability to re-file this lawsuit. See Kasap v. 

Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1248 

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[D]ismissals for lack of jurisdiction are not 

decisions on the merits and therefore have no res judicata

effect on subsequent attempts to bring suit in a court of 

competent jurisdiction.”). We only consider standing, and we 

conclude that the Kennedy faction has none.

III

The district court’s order dismissing the case for failure 

to state a claim is vacated and the case is remanded with 

instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

So ordered.

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