Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01521/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01521-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL B. PRYOR,

Petitioner,

v.

M. SPEARMAN, WARDEN,

Respondent.

No. 2:14-cv-1521 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a former state prisoner proceeding through counsel. The parties consented to 

proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On April 15, 2015, 

respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted, and this action was dismissed without prejudice. 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On May 27, 2015, petitioner filed a motion to vacate 

the judgment based on an alleged clerical error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Petitioner contends that there 

was a mistake in docketing the documents filed on June 26, 2014. Respondent filed no 

opposition. After careful review of the pending motion and petitioner’s initial submission, the 

court grants petitioner’s motion, and vacates the order dismissing this action. 

II. Background

By order filed April 15, 2015, the undersigned found that petitioner had until July 11, 

2014, to file a timely federal petition, and that because he filed his federal petition on July 23, 

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2014, the petition is time-barred. (ECF No. 30.) Despite petitioner’s argument that his initial 

filing, signed June 5, 2014, was his original federal petition, and that the subsequent petition, 

signed on July 23, 2014, was his amended petition, the court found that the initial filing was a 

request for stay and abeyance, which did not meet the requirements of Rule 2, Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. (ECF No. 30 at 7-8.) 

In denying petitioner’s requests for equitable tolling, the court found that:

a. The court’s August 5, 2014 order did not provide petitioner with equitable tolling, and 

warned petitioner of the one year statute of limitations period. (ECF No. 30 at 9.)

b. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the lack of trial transcripts was the actual “but for”

cause of his untimeliness because petitioner was aware of the factual basis of his claims at the 

time of the 2011 trial. (ECF No. 30 at 9-10.)

c. Petitioner was not required to file his initial filing on the federal form, but the first 

twelve pages of petitioner’s initial filing did not contain the information required to be construed 

as a petition (ECF No. 1 at 1-12), and the “MC-275 form provided was a copy of the petition for 

writ of habeas corpus signed by petitioner on March 13, 2014, and filed in the California Supreme 

Court, and clearly appended as an exhibit to petitioner’s initial filing.” (ECF No. 30 at 11, citing 

ECF No. 1 at 20-26).

d. Petitioner received statutory tolling for the entire period during which his state court 

habeas petitions were pending; thus, he was not entitled to additional equitable tolling for the 

fourteen day period of delay within such period that was caused by the prison law librarian 

providing petitioner with the incorrect address for the state appellate court. (ECF No. 30 at 11-

12.)

Finally, the court found that petitioner failed to present reliable new evidence to 

demonstrate a credible claim of actual innocence. (ECF No. 30 at 12-13.)

On April 15, 2015, judgment was entered, and on May 1, 2015, petitioner filed a notice of 

appeal. On May 5, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit opened a docket and 

assigned Case No. 15-15904.

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III. Governing Standards

Rule 60(a) provides as follows:

Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights and Omissions. 

The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from 

oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, 

or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its 

own, with or without notice. But after an appeal has been docketed 

in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may 

be corrected only with the appellate court’s leave.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). In Anderson v. Runnels, 2007 WL 1703651 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2007), the 

petition was sent via Federal Express and delivered to the clerk’s office on December 23, 2003, at 

11:50 a.m., and forwarded to the pro se unit for processing, but the petition was not processed and 

stamped filed until January 13, 2004. The district court found that had the petition been datestamped on December 23, 2003, or within a few days of receipt, the motion to dismiss on statute 

of limitations grounds “probably would not have been brought and certainly would not have been 

granted.” Id. at *1. In an earlier case, the Ninth Circuit found that the prisoner was entitled to 

equitable tolling of limitation period where the delay was caused by the clerk’s office erroneously 

refusing to accept the petition for filing based on technical deficiency in the cover sheet. Corjasso 

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). 

IV. Discussion

In his motion, petitioner contends that his state court petition should have been filed and 

separately docketed as petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner contends that this 

petition was not submitted as an exhibit, but merely followed petitioner’s request for stay and 

abeyance, and that all of his initial filing was submitted as separate documents. Petitioner 

contends that the subsequently-filed petition on the federal form was identical to the state petition, 

and the points and authorities submitted therewith were almost identical. Thus, petitioner 

contends that his initial filing substantially complied with Rule 2; therefore, his state court 

petition should have been filed as his federal petition, and he should have been granted leave to 

refile his petition on the proper form. (ECF No. 3 at 5, citing Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 

1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1983), relying on Rules 2(e), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.)

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Petitioner states that although this is “virtually the remedy provided” by the July 1, 2014 order, 

petitioner maintains the initial petition should have been accepted for filing on June 26, 2014. 

Further, petitioner contends that despite the filing of an appeal, his motion is not 

precluded by the appeal because no appeal has been docketed for lack of a Certificate of 

Appealability.

The undersigned agrees with petitioner that the court should not elevate form over 

substance in such critical matters. District courts review the petition and any exhibits and 

construe the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner. See Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 

890 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing district courts’ obligation liberally to construe petitioner for 

writs of habeas corpus). Accordingly, the undersigned has reviewed the documents contained in 

petitioner’s first filing in light of the pending motion. 

Initially, the court notes that the twelve page document addressed to this court, filed 

without benefit of counsel, is not a model of clarity. Petitioner’s typewritten document does not 

expressly state that he wants the court to construe his state court petition as his federal petition

because the statute of limitations period is about to expire. Even if all of petitioner’s documents 

were separately submitted, the petition for writ of habeas corpus, bearing the State of California, 

Supreme Court heading, and Case No. S 217813, signed by petitioner on March 13, 2014, was 

presented with a cover sheet on which is typewritten, “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Submitted to California Supreme Court.” (ECF No. 1 at 19). It is not unusual for habeas 

petitioners to submit copies of their state court petitions along with their federal petitions. If 

petitioner intended the state court petition to serve as his federal petition, he could have crossed 

out the caption and handwritten “Eastern District of California,” and crossed out his earlier 

signature and date and added a more current signature and date. But petitioner also could have 

simply asked the court to accept his state court petition as his federal petition because his statute 

of limitations deadline was fast approaching. Petitioner did not. 

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Rather, in his filing clearly titled “Request for Stay and Abeyance -- Protective Order with 

Leave to [sic]1and Resubmit Perfected Federal Habeas Corpus Petition. . .,” petitioner stated that 

he requested the court’s “permission to file a ‘protective petition,’” (ECF No. 1 at 3), suggesting 

he would do so in the future if the court granted him permission. Such reading is also supported 

by the absence of a federal petition. Petitioner then argues that Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 655 U.S. 

408, 416 (2005), “provides strong support for the argument that a habeas petitioner’s reasonable 

confusion about a State Court ruling provides ‘good cause’ for allowing stay and abeyance.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 3.) After explaining his lack of legal knowledge and difficulties obtaining law 

library access, petitioner asks the court, inter alia, for a “stay and abeyance protective order with 

leave to amend and resubmit perfected federal habeas corpus petition following receipt of 

reporter’s transcript.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner states he seeks to preserve time to develop 

facts underlying his claims, and then “requests leave to amend the petition submitted to the 

California Supreme Court following receipt of requested Reporters’ Transcript.” (ECF No. 1 at 

6.) Petitioner adds that the state courts did not give petitioner’s claims a proper review, and states 

that he “requires assistance from the federal courts in order to properly file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Petitioner states that “[a]ttached to this notice of intention to 

appeal to the Federal Judiciary is a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 10.) “As soon as the State Created Impediments of unlawfully denying this 

petitioner access to his Transcripts and Discovery are removed, petitioner will have no further 

need for Equitable Tolling of time and the one year clock to file a perfected petition can restart.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 10.)

Thus, because the initial filing was not a federal petition, and did not contain a federal 

petition, the initial filing could be construed as a request “to file” a federal petition in the future. 

Alternatively, now reading the submission taking into account petitioner’s current position, and 

with benefit of petitioner’s subsequent federal petition that raised no new claims that would 

require stay and abeyance, petitioner’s initial filing could be liberally construed as petitioner 

 

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 In retrospect, it appears petitioner meant to type in the word “amend” here, but there is no word 

typewritten here.

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asking the court to accept his state court petition as the federal petition, under Pace, which he 

would seek to amend once he received copies of the transcripts. What tips this construction in 

petitioner’s favor is his critical sentence, midway through his filing, that he “requests leave to 

amend the petition submitted to the California Supreme Court following receipt of requested 

Reporters’ Transcript.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) In retrospect, and liberally construed, petitioner’s 

filing could be read as requesting the court to allow petitioner to file the state court petition as a 

protective petition under Pace, and allow him additional time to amend once he received the 

reporter’s transcripts. Such a reading would also support petitioner’s request that the state court 

petition should have been filed as petitioner’s initial federal petition because the information 

contained within the state court petition meets the requirements of Rule 2.

In finding that petitioner’s typewritten submission directed to this court (ECF No. 1 at 1-

12) did not constitute a petition, the undersigned cited numerous cases.2 (ECF No. 30 at 8.) 

However, the initial filings in such cases did not include documents that could be construed as a 

federal petition, and did not include a request under Pace, or a request for leave to file an 

amended petition. (ECF No. 30 at 8.) Here, petitioner not only referenced Pace and requested 

leave to amend the state court petition, but also submitted documents demonstrating he had 

exhausted his state court remedies. (ECF No. 1.) 

In Williams, the Eighth Circuit stated that “due to the pro se petitioner’s general lack of 

expertise, courts should review habeas petitions with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to 

proceed.” Id., 722 F.3d at 1050. Certainly the Ninth Circuit would agree. Here, petitioner was 

 

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 Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (request for counsel in capital case is not 

equivalent to an actual habeas petition for purpose of determining whether AEDPA applies -- “a 

case does not become ‘pending’ until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in 

federal court.”); see also Braggs v. Walker, 2011 WL 2709847, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (although the 

filing of a letter and request for an extension of time commenced the federal action, the filing did 

not constitute a “pending” habeas petition, and thus the limitations period was not tolled); Miles 

v. Grounds, 2013 WL 2337912, **4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2013) (petitioner’s correspondence 

with court and motions for extensions of time “cannot be considered petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus” for purposes of tolling limitations period); Alexander v. Uribe, 2012 WL 2872809, **2 

(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (petitioner’s motion for extension of time commenced action, but it did 

not challenge the merits of his conviction, thus district court considered whether action is timely 

based on date petitioner filed his petition rather than the motion); Scott v. Swarthout, 2012 WL 

2839804, *22 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2012) (“motion to toll time” did not toll limitations period).

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more than upfront about his lack of knowledge concerning such filings. Had the undersigned

understood that petitioner, proceeding pro se, intended for the court to consider his state court 

petition as his federal petition, filed as a protective petition under Pace, the undersigned would 

have directed the Clerk of the Court to file the state court petition as the federal petition and 

granted petitioner leave to file an amended petition, as he subsequently did. Moreover, had the 

court been aware of such intention during the pendency of the motion to dismiss, the undersigned 

would have granted equitable tolling for the twelve day period based on the court’s 

misunderstanding of petitioner’s pro se filing. See Corjasso, 278 F.3d at 878. 

For all of these reasons, petitioner’s motion for relief is granted. The Clerk of the Court is 

directed to refile the June 26, 2014 filing (ECF No. 1) as follows:

Pages 20-49 should be refiled as ECF No. 1, petition for writ of habeas corpus; 

Pages 50-179 should be refiled as ECF No. 1-1, exhibits to petition;

Pages 1-12 should be refiled as ECF No. 1-2, request to file state court petition as a 

protective federal petition; and

Pages 13-19 should be filed as ECF No. 1-3, exhibits. 

In addition, the Clerk of the Court shall revise the July 28, 2014 entry (ECF No. 10) to 

read “Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” 

In light of this corrected record, the initial filing was timely because it was received before 

July 11, 2014, the date the limitations period expired. (ECF No. 30 at 8.) Thus, the April 15, 

2015 order and judgment are vacated, and the Clerk shall reopen this action. It is unclear whether 

counsel intends to proceed as counsel for petitioner on habeas review or whether counsel 

appeared strictly for appellate purposes. Therefore, counsel for petitioner shall inform the court 

whether he intends to continue representing petitioner and, if so, whether he contemplates seeking 

further leave to amend the petition. Upon receipt of counsel’s response, the court will address 

further briefing in this action. 

The court has reviewed the docket for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 15-15904, and no appeal 

has been docketed. However, in light of this order, it is anticipated that petitioner might withdraw 

his appeal.

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V. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment (ECF No. 37) is granted. 

2. The April 15, 2015 order and judgment (ECF Nos. 30, 31) are vacated;

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to:

a. Refile ECF No. 1, Pages 20-49 as ECF No. 1, “petition for writ of habeas 

corpus”; 

b. Refile ECF No. 1, Pages 50-179 as ECF No. 1-1, “exhibits to petition”;

c. Refile ECF No. 1, Pages 1-12 as ECF No. 1-2, “request to file state court 

petition as a protective federal petition”; and

d. Refile ECF No. 1, Pages 13-19 should be filed as ECF No. 1-3, exhibits. 

e. Revise ECF No. 10 to read “Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus”; and

f. Reopen this action; and

4. Within fourteen days from the date of this order, counsel for petitioner shall inform the 

court whether he intends to continue representing petitioner on habeas review, and, if so, whether 

he contemplates seeking further leave to amend the petition.

Dated: August 11, 2015

/pryo1521.fb

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