Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00582/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The proceedings were assigned to this Court, but have been referred to Magistrate Judge Nita

L. Stormes by Local Rule 72.3(e), “Assignment of § 1983 Prisoner Civil Cases to United States

Magistrate Judges,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD WALKER,

CDC #V-60211, Civil No. 06-0582 BEN (NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

G.J. GIURBINO, et al.,

Defendants.

On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison

located in Imperial, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously dismissed Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief could be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). See May 31, 2006 Order at 6. 

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Nonetheless, the Court granted Plaintiff forty five days to file a First Amended Complaint

correcting the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On July 11, 2006, Plaintiff

filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

 I. Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

As stated by the Court in its May 31, 2006 Order, notwithstanding payment of any filing

fee or portion thereof, the PLRA also requires courts to review complaints filed by prisoners, and

all persons proceeding IFP, and dismiss any action or complaint which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494,

496 (9th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1997) (“plain language

of the PLRA holds that . . . fees be assessed at the moment [of filing], regardless of whether

appeal [or complaint] is later dismissed”); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th

Cir. 1997) (“The dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A does not negate a

prisoner’s obligation to pay the filing fee in accordance with § 1915(b)(1)-(2).”).

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method

for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989) (internal citations omitted); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). As

such, § 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting

under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

A. Access to Courts

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials denied him access to the Courts

when they denied him access to the prison law library. See FAC at 6. Specifically, Plaintiff

claims that he suffered an “actual injury” when the § 1983 civil rights complaint he filed in

Walker v. Pierce, et al., E.D. Cal Civil Case No. 04-6369 was dismissed on April 25, 2006. Id.

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Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their

grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening,

82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995).

In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right

of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing

of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).

To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts

sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions

of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a

result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing

deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.

1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093

(9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to show that he has been

precluded from pursuing a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal

conviction or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355

(right to access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his]

sentence[], directly or collaterally, and . . . to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”);

see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in

the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the

litigation.”). 

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 A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel.

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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Plaintiff claims that his § 1983 Complaint filed in the Eastern District of California was

dismissed due to prison officials failure to allow him adequate access to the prison’s law library.

In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s § 1983 Complaint that he filed in the Eastern

District of California on October 6, 2004. See Walker v. Pierce, E.D. Cal. Civil Case No.

04cv6369.2

 This Court has reviewed the docket in that matter and finds no evidence that

Plaintiff’s Complaint was ever dismissed. In fact, that matter remains open. Thus, Plaintiff has

not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been actually injured by any specific Defendant’s

actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared

was dismissed,” or that he was “so stymied” by Defendants’ actions or grievance processing that

“he was unable to even file a complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access

claim[,] . . . the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test

and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore,

these claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can

be granted. 

B. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Tilton, Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, Giurbino, Warden of Centinela State Prison, Favila, Associate

Warden of Centinela State Prison, and Soukup, Associate Warden of Centinela State Prison

liable in their supervisory capacities. See Compl. at 1-2.

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v.

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

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 Plaintiff is also cautioned that he must identify each Defendant by name in the body of the

Complaint and allege specific factual allegations pertaining to their role in allegedly violating Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

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F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).3 In order

to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual

Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See

Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). As a supervisor, a Defendant may only be held liable for the allegedly

unconstitutional violations of his subordinates if Plaintiff alleges specific facts which show: (1)

how or to what extent this supervisor personally participated in or directed Defendants’ actions,

and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the supervisor was an actual and proximate cause of the

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in no way sets forth facts

which might be liberally construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against any

of the named Defendants. Therefore, the Court must also sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff’s

respondeat superior claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at

446.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with one

final opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned

that if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may

be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

II. Conclusion and Order

(1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in which to

file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted in this

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Order, as well as the Court’s February 16, 2006 Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

1996). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(2) The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail Plaintiff an approved form § 1983

Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 13, 2006

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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