Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01619/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01619-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC MARK WATKINS,

Petitioner,

v.

M. KNOWLES, Warden

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-1619 AWI DLB HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS TIME

BARRED; RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SERVICE

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed the instant petition on November 13, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it

plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).

A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears

that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440

F.2d 13, 14 (9 Cir. 1971). th

B. Statute of Limitations

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may raise the statute of limitations sua

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sponte and dismiss the petition on those grounds. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (9th

Cir.2001)(indicating that once a petitioner is given adequate notice and opportunity to respond to

allegations that his petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to AEDPA's statute of limitations,

petitioner has the burden of providing an adequate response). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted February 24, 1986. Although Petitioner

provided a copy of the appellate briefs filed in the California Supreme Court and Court of

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 Cal.R.Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a decision 1

of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. 

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 2

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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Appeal, Petitioner did not provide a copy of the state court decisions. The brief filed in the

California Supreme Court is dated October 21, 1987, nearly twenty years ago. The Supreme

Court has clearly issued its decision in that case; however, Petitioner has not provided a copy of

the decision or indicated the date of the decision. The statute of limitations begins to run when

the ninety (90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court has expired.1

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999) th

(concluding period of "direct review" includes the period within which one can file a petition for

a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347

(8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year from that date, absent applicable tolling, in which

th

to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See, Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the th

calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations period.) Because Petitioner

was convicted over twenty (20) years ago and the brief was filed in the California Supreme Court

in October 1987, the Court presumes direct review concluded long before the instant petition was

filed. 

1. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

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Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Petitioner does not provide any information or documents indicating that collateral review

was sought; therefore, the Court presumes that Petitioner only sought direct review in 1987. 

2. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert th th

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. th

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner does not provide any basis to equitable toll the limitations period. Thus, in the

absence of statutory or equitable tolling, the Court is left to conclude that the instant petition is

untimely and should be summarily dismissed. If Petitioner believes that the instant petition is not

time-barred, Petitioner must provide the Court with sufficient information to make that

determination. More specifically, Petitioner must provide the name of the courts to which review

was sought, the specific dates of such review, the claims raised at each court, and if available, a

copy of each appellate brief or petition filed in the state courts, along with a copy of any decision. 

Without such information, the Court has no alternative but to conclude that the instant action is

time-barred.

///

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ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Petitioner is ORDERED

to SHOW CAUSE why the instant petition should not be dismissed for violating the

limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); and

2. Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order will result in the

dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule 11-110. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 15, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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