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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

____________________ 

No. 16-3147 

JOHN ERICKSON COAHUILA HERNANDEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

IRMA BENITEZ CARDOSO, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:15-cv-11460 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 22, 2016 

____________________ 

Before BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and SHADID, Chief 

District Court Judge.

*

SHADID, Chief District Court Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant John 

Erickson Coahuila Hernandez (“Hernandez”) and 

Defendant-Appellee Irma Benitez Cardoso (“Cardoso”) are 

both citizens of Mexico. They met sometime in 2001 and 

 

*

 Of the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 16-3147 

began cohabitating sometime later that year. They resided in 

Mexico until December 15, 2014. They are the biological 

parents of two children: A.E., born in 2008, and M.S., born in 

2002. 

Cardoso claims to have left Mexico with A.E. and M.S. in 

December of 2014 to escape abuse from Hernandez and 

protect the children. Subsequently, Hernandez learned of 

Cardoso’s location in Chicago, Illinois, and on July 17, 2015, 

filed an application with the Mexican Central Authority for 

the return of A.E. pursuant to the Hague Convention on the 

Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter, 

“the Convention”). The Mexican Central Authority 

transmitted Hernandez’s Application to the United States. 

In August of 2015, Cardoso agreed to return M.S. to 

Hernandez. Hernandez also requested the return of A.E. but 

Cardoso refused. 

On December 18, 2015, Hernandez filed a Verified Petition 

for Return of Minor Child to Mexico and Issuance of a Show 

Cause Order. On February 29, 2016, the District Court held an 

evidentiary hearing, at which Hernandez, Cardoso and Alma 

Cardoso, Cardoso’s sister, testified. Following the testimony 

of all witnesses, the Court sua sponte, and without objection 

from either party, took testimony from the child, in chambers, 

and outside the presence of counsel or the parties. After 

questioning of the child, the District Court allowed both 

parties until March 14, 2016, to file objections to any questions 

posed to the child. Neither party filed any such objections. 

Following the evidentiary hearing, the District Court 

allowed briefing and then entered its Order on July 13, 2016. 

In its Order, the District Court found that Cardoso testified 

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No. 16-3147 3 

credibly that Hernandez would hit her in the presence of A.E. 

with the intention of having A.E. witness the abuse of his 

mother. The District Court also specifically noted it observed 

a significant change in the demeanor of A.E. when the child 

discussed Hernandez, the domestic violence and the possible 

return to Hernandez’s custody. The District Court found that 

Cardoso and AE’s testimony about the domestic violence, 

taken as true, provides clear and convincing evidence that 

there is a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to A.E. 

if he is returned to Hernandez’s custody. This appeal 

followed. 

The Hague Convention “was adopted in 1980 in response 

to the problem of international child abduction during 

domestic disputes.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010). “The 

United States is a contracting state to the Convention, and 

Congress has implemented its provisions through the 

International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) ... 42 

U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.” 560 U.S. at 5. As the Court noted in 

Abbott, “[t]he Convention provides that a child abducted in 

violation of ‘rights of custody’ must be returned to the child’s 

country of habitual residence, unless certain exceptions 

apply. Art. 1 S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, at 7.” 560 U.S. at 5. The 

intention of the Hague Convention is “to secure the prompt 

return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 

Contracting State ... to ensure that rights of custody and of 

access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively 

respected in the other Contracting States. Art. 1, Treaty Doc. 

at 7.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 7. 

ICARA instructs a person who seeks a child’s return to file 

a petition in state or federal court and further instructs the 

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court hearing the case to decide it in accordance with the 

Hague Convention. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11603(a), (b), (d). The 

elements to the prima facie cause of action for return are: the 

child was wrongfully removed or retained; the child was 

removed from his or her habitual residence; there was a 

breach of the rights of custody under the law of the child’s 

habitual residence; the left-behind parent was exercising 

those custody rights; and the child is under the age of sixteen. 

If the child in question has been wrongfully removed or 

retained within the meaning of the Convention, the child shall 

be promptly returned unless an exception is applicable. See 42 

U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). 

The Hague Convention sets forth several affirmative 

defenses. The affirmative defense relevant to this proceeding 

is a grave risk of exposure to serious physical or psychological 

harm. Article 13(b) provides that “when there is a grave risk 

that the child’s return would expose the child to physical or 

psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 

intolerable situation, the automatic return required by the 

Convention should not go forward.” Norinder v. Fuentes, 657 

F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, Cardoso admits that 

Hernandez did not agree that she could permanently relocate 

the United States with the children. 

Because Cardoso did not dispute that Hernandez 

established a prima facie case for wrongful removal, the 

District Court correctly limited its findings to the “grave risk 

of harm” exception raised by Cardoso. 

This Court reviews the District Court’s findings of fact for 

clear error. Norinder, 657 F.3d at 533. Rule 52(a)(1) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the judge to “find 

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No. 16-3147 5 

the facts specially and state conclusions of law separately” 

when (s)he is the trier of fact. 

The issue presented for review is whether the District 

Court erred in concluding that Cardoso proved, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that there is a grave risk of physical or 

psychological harm to A.E. if he is returned to Mexico. Not 

surprisingly, the parties provide different factual 

backgrounds. 

Hernandez claims error occurred by the District Court’s 

reliance on (1) incidents of Coahuila’s corporal punishment of 

A.E. with a belt when Cardoso admitted she has done the 

same thing; (2) incidents of alleged spousal abuse by Coahuila 

when the only specific incident alleged occurred in 2004; and 

(3) A.E.’s “changed demeanor” in discussing these issues ex 

parte with the Court. In addition, Hernandez argues that 

Cardoso admitted she voluntarily returned M.S. to 

Hernandez’s care and presented no evidence that he posed a 

danger to their daughter. 

Cardoso claims a continuous pattern of abuse at the hands 

of Hernandez, beginning shortly after the birth of M.S. in 

2002, when Cardoso claims she learned that Hernandez was 

already married. Cardoso claims that in March of 2004 

Hernandez slapped, kicked and beat her with a wooden 

board in front of M.S., after which he proceeded to rape her. 

She testified that he would “always do that [rape her] when 

he would hit” her because “to him it was like make me 

happy.” 

She further testified that Hernandez would engage in the 

abuse in the presence of the children. If Cardoso tried to 

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ensure the children not witness the violence, Hernandez 

would insist that the children remain and observe the abuse. 

The District Court found that both Hernandez and 

Cardoso used physical discipline of the children, but the 

parties’ dispute whose discipline was more forceful. 

Hernandez testified that he would spank the children with an 

open hand and described Cardoso’s physical discipline as 

“more harsh” because she would pull her daughter’s hair and 

“really fight with her.” Cardoso testified that she would 

spank the children with her hand or with a shoe. She objected 

to the way Hernandez disciplined the children, because it was 

“too much” and he would “hit them very hard” with a belt. 

Hernandez denied ever using a belt to discipline the children. 

The District Court questioned A.E. in camera during the 

evidentiary hearing held on February 29, 2016. A.E. testified 

that Hernandez would hit him with a belt if he misbehaved 

“really bad.” He further testified that he saw Hernandez hit 

Cardoso with a belt and with his hands and saw him give 

Cardoso a black eye. A.E. said he was “a little bit” afraid of 

Hernandez. 

The District Judge was in the best position to observe the 

demeanor of the witnesses and determine credibility, and her 

credibility determinations are entitled to deference unless 

they are clearly erroneous. “Under the clear error standard, 

we will not overturn the district court’s factual findings 

unless, after reviewing all the evidence, we are ‘left with [a] 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been [made].’” 

Ortiz v. Martinez, 789 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2015). “In other 

words, a district court’s credibility findings are ‘binding on 

appeal unless the [court] has chosen to credit exceedingly

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No. 16-3147 7 

improbable testimony.’” Id. at 729. Furthermore, 

“[d]iscrepancies arising from impeachment, inconsistent 

prior statements, or the existence of a motive do not render 

witness testimony legally incredible.” Id.

The District Judge determined that Cardoso’s testimony 

that Hernandez abused her repeatedly and in the presence of 

the children was credible, despite the fact that she allowed her 

daughter to return to Mexico to live with Hernandez and 

provided inconsistent testimony about whether Hernandez 

knew she would leave Mexico with the children. Cardoso’s 

testimony about the abuse was corroborated by A.E., who 

testified of Hernandez’s physical abuse toward Cardoso and 

himself. With the deference given to the District Court, the 

Court finds there was no error in the lower court’s credibility 

determination. 

Moreover, the District Court’s application of the facts in 

this case to the Article 13(b) “grave risk” standard was 

appropriate. We have previously held that “repeated physical 

and psychological abuse of a child’s mother by the child’s 

father, in the presence of the child (especially a very young 

child, as in this case), is likely to create a risk of psychological 

harm to the child.” Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 

2012). The District Court recognized it had to consider “risk 

in the father's behavior toward the mother in the child's 

presence” in its analysis. Id. This Court having found the 

District Court’s credibility determination was sound, finds 

that the factual findings made by the lower court support the 

conclusion that there was a “grave risk” of physical or 

psychological harm to A.E. if he was returned to Hernandez’s 

custody. 

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The District Judge’s opinion indicates that she considered 

all the evidence, which included the facts and credibility of 

the witnesses, before concluding that the risk of harm to the 

child was grave. 

AFFIRMED

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