Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08094/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Margaret Browning, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-8094-PCT-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Margaret Browning’s appeal of the Social

Security Administration’s (the “Administration”) decision to deny benefits. (Dkt. # 1.) For

the following reasons, the Court affirms the decision in part and vacates and remands it in

part.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The evidence contained in the administrative record includes the following.

Browning, who was born in November 1958, alleges that she has been disabled since

September 25, 2005. (R. at 29.) Prior to the alleged disability date, Browning’s had relevant

work experience as an administrative assistant, a legal assistant, and other jobs. (R. at 115.)

In late 2004, Browning, began complaining of chest pain and fatigue. (R. at 276–81.)

In September 2005, Browning had normal coronary arteries, but a cardiac catherization

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showed reduced ventricular function with an ejection fraction of twenty percent, indicating

reduced functionality of the left ventricle of the heart. (R. at 226.) Browning was admitted

to the hospital for acute respiratory failure secondary to acute interstitial edema, and she was

also diagnosed with morbid obesity, hypertension, and gastroesophageal reflux. (R. at

133–37.) Tests also revealed a patent foramen ovale (a small hole in the atrial septum of the

heart), which required surgery to close, an enlarged left atrium and wall motion abnormalities

in the heart, and scarring on the lungs. (R. at 136, 197, 212, 218–19, 254, 311.)

From November 2004 to February 2006, Browning sought treatment from Kevin

Earlywine, a physician’s assistant. (R. at 278–98.) Earlywine expressed concern for

Browning’s cardiac health and noted that she suffered from fatigue, anxiety, insomnia,

depression, and generalized pain. (R. at 279, 285.) Although some of Earlywine’s exams

showed both positive straight leg tests, which indicate back pain, and decreased range of

motion in Browning’s back and neck, most of the examinations revealed normal results. (R.

at 278–98.) Still, Earlywine prescribed medications for Browning’s pain. (R. at 287–89.) 

In April 2006, Dr. Brent Layton, a non-treating physician, examined Browning and

diagnosed her with morbid obesity, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, gastroesophageal reflux

disease, continuing low back pain for which she had received previous treatment, bilateral

carpal tunnel, memory problems and sleep apnea. (R. at 260–61.) The examination,

however, was relatively normal, and Browning was able to dress and undress, get up from

a chair, get on the examining table, walk, walk on her heels and toes, bend at the hips to

seventy or eighty degrees, do a half squat, hop on each leg, and perform a negative straight

raising test. (R. at 260.) Based on these findings, Dr. Layton concluded that Plaintiff could

perform light work. (R. at 262–63.)

A couple months later, a state agency physician reviewed Browning’s medical records

and concluded that Browning could perform light work, but could only occasionally climb,

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and that she needed to avoid concentrated exposure to

hazards. (R. at 269–72.) The physician also noted that Browning’s subjective complaints

were incredible because she could not objectively verify her complaints and because the

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medical evidence he found made it difficult to attribute her alleged limitations to her medical

condition. (R. at 273.)

Later that year, Dr. Steven Helland examined Browning and diagnosed lumbar

degenerative disc disorder, lumbar radiculopathy, lumbar spondylosis, and a lateral

protruding disc. (R. at 396.) Other than some limitation in range of motion, however, the

examination revealed otherwise normal results. (Id.)

In September 2007, Browning sought treatment from Dr. Sean Wilson. (R. at 380.)

Six months later, Dr. Wilson opined that, in an eight-hour work day, Browning needed to

lie or recline for all eight hours, could never lift, and required frequent unscheduled breaks;

Dr. Wilson also concluded that Browning could stand or walk for fifteen minutes at one time

and for a total of one hour per day, sit for two hours at a time and for a total of five hours per

day. Additionally, Dr. Wilson found that Browning’s pain killers caused sedation. (R. at

378.) Based on these findings, Dr. Wilson concluded that Browning’s symptoms would

frequently interfere with work-related activities. (R. at 378.)

Browning further described her impairment as follows. She stated that she suffered

from cardiac problems, stroke, and back pain. (R. at 519–26.) She also alleged that she

suffered from memory and concentration problems, but she had never been treated by a

mental-health professional or received any prescriptions for mental-health medication. (R.

at 526–27.) Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that she had difficulty performing daily tasks. (R.

at 527–33.) For instance, she stated that she stayed home most of the day, had a friend help

with household chores, and did not engage in many social activities. (R. at 527–28.) She

likewise estimated that she could not lift ten pounds, could stand for only fifteen minutes at

one time, and could sit for only an hour at a time. (R. at 529.) On the other hand, Plaintiff

also testified that she occasionally went shopping and left her home several times per week

to go to the library or to run errands. (R. at 528.) Prior to the hearing, both Browning and her

husband echoed many of the same statements about her impairments, and Browning also

mentioned that her pain medication makes her drowsy and gives her stomach problems. (R.

at 62–67.)

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1

 Plaintiff points out that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) does not

identify an administrative assistant job that she might have performed at SVP six. There is,

however, a job listed as “Administrative Assistant - Any Industry,” which has an SVP of

seven.

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Sandra Richter, a vocational expert, further described how Browning’s impairments

affected her ability to work. She testified that one of Browning’s past jobs was as an

administrative assistant, which was skilled work with a specific vocational preparation

(“SVP”) of six that required sedentary exertion.1

 (R. at 536–37.) After answering a series

of hypothetical questions, Richter stated that, given Browning’s impairments, she could

perform her past work as an administrative assistant. (R. at 537–38.) The ALJ did not ask

Richter whether her opinions were consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

(See R. at 536–43.)

II. Procedural Background

On October 21, 2005, Browning applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging a

disability onset date of September 25, 2005 based on cardiac impairments, degenerative disc

disease, obesity, and mental impairments. (R. at 14, 29.) Browning’s application was denied

both initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 38, 49.) Browning then timely requested a

hearing, and Administrative Law Judge John W. Wojciechowski (“ALJ”) held a hearing in

February 2008. (R. at 510.) On May 15, 2008, the ALJ concluded that Browning was not

disabled, and the Appeals Council denied Browning’s request for review on March 27, 2009,

leaving the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision. (R. at 3,

11.) Browning then filed suit in this Court. (Dkt. # 1.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of record, a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A

reviewing federal court addresses only the issues raised by the claimant in the appeal from

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the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). A federal

court may “set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence

or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

“‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e.,

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)).

The Court may not “substitute [its] own judgment for that of the ALJ.” Id. The ALJ

is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining credibility, and resolving

ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). “When the

evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, [the Court] must

defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198

(9th Cir. 2004). At the same time, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and

may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id. (citing

Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Court also may not “affirm the

ALJ’s . . . decision based on evidence that the ALJ did not discuss.” Connett v. Barnhart,

340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)

(emphasizing the fundamental rule of administrative law that a reviewing court “must judge

the propriety of [administrative] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency” and

stating that if “those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the

administrative action”). Even if the ALJ erred, however, “[a] decision of the ALJ will not

be reversed for errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.

2005).

II. Analysis

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. A

claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she is not presently engaged in a

substantial gainful activity, (2) that her disability is severe, and either (3) that her impairment

meets or equals one of the specific impairments provided in the Listing of Impairments found

at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app’x 1, or (4) that her residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

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precludes her from performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2009). Once the

claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five

to demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant number of other jobs in the

national economy. Id. “This step-five determination is made on the basis of four factors: the

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience and education.” Hoopai v.

Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

At step one, the ALJ found that Browning has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since September 25, 2005. (R. at 16.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Browning

has the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, status postcardiovascular accident, hypertension, and obesity. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that

Browning does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals

one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app’x. 1. (R. at 17.) After

determining Browning’s RFC, the ALJ concluded at step four that Browning was capable of

performing her past relevant work as an administrative assistant. (R. at 17–20.) The ALJ did

not proceed to step five because the ALJ concluded that Browning did not meet the first four

steps. 

Browning contends that the ALJ erred (1) at step three by failing to properly evaluate

whether Browning’s impairments met or equaled a listed impairment, (2) by improperly

rejecting Browning’s testimony regarding her pain and medication side effects, (3) at step

four by finding that Browning could return to her previous work as an administrative

assistant, (4) by rendering a decision that is inconsistent with the Commissioner’s later

decision that Browning is disabled.

A. Listed Impairments

If a claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals

an impairment found in the Listing of Impairments, then the ALJ must find the claimant

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). For a claimant’s impairment to match a listing, it must,

for a period of twelve continuous months, “meet all of the specified medical criteria. An

impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not

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qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d)

(“To meet the requirements of a listing, [the claimant] must have a medically determinable

impairment(s) that satisfies all of the criteria in the listing.”); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

app’x. 1 (stating the twelve-month rule). Similarly, for a claimant to show that an

impairment is “equivalent” to a listed impairment, she “must present medical findings equal

in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,

531 (1990) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926). In making this determination at step three, because

more than a “boilerplate finding” is required, Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir.

2001), the ALJ “must adequately explain his [or her] evaluation of alternative tests and the

combined effect of the impairments,” Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1990).

The ALJ is required, however, only “to discuss and evaluate the evidence that supports his

or her conclusion[,]” but not necessarily “under the heading ‘Findings.’” Lewis, 236 F.3d at

513. Therefore, even if not in the section expressly addressing step three, an ALJ does not

err if he or she, for example, adequately discusses relevant “subjective symptoms, medical

and treatment history, impressions and diagnosis from . . . physicians, as well as information

about [the claimant’s] daily activities and living situation.”Harris v. Astrue, 2009 WL

801347 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009). At the same time, where the record contains

evidence that both supports and undercuts a finding that an impairment did not meet or equal

a listed impairment, the ALJ’s failure to address the discrepancy constitutes error. See Espejo

v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1330799 at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2009) (remanding the case where the

record included conflicting evidence regarding whether the claimant’s impairment met

Listing 1.04A because the ALJ did not address the issue).

The ALJ concluded that Browning’s impairments did not meet or equal any listed

impairment, specifically considering Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine or spinal cord) and

4.02 (chronic heart failure while on a regimen of prescribed treatment). (R. at 17.) The

section of the ALJ’s opinion addressing step three is two sentences long and contains no

analysis. The ALJ, however, adequately explained his finding elsewhere in the opinion. See

Harris, 2009 WL 801347 at *7. 

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Listing 1.04 requires that the claimant have a spinal disorder “resulting in compromise

of a nerve root . . . or the spinal cord[,]” along with 

A. Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic

distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with

associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or

reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg

raising test (sitting and supine);

or

B. Spinal arachnoiditis, confirmed by an operative note or pathology report of

tissue biopsy, or by appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by

severe burning or painful dysesthesia, resulting in the need for changes in

position or posture more than once every 2 hours;

or

C. Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication, established by

findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by chronic

nonradicular pain and weakness, and resulting in inability to ambulate

effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b.

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app’x 1, § 1.04. Although Browning has a spinal disorder,

degenerative disc disease, the ALJ made factual findings that negate a finding that Browning

met or equaled “all” of the elements of Listing 1.04. See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530, 531. For

instance, Plaintiff does not appear to allege that she meets Listing 1.04B or Listing 1.04C,

nor has Plaintiff identified any part of the record that would support either a finding of spinal

arachnoiditis (painful inflammation of the arachnoid lining in the spine) under Listing 1.04B

or lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication (narrowing of the spinal canal

causing pressure on the spinal root nerves) under Listing 1.04C.

Plaintiff contends that the record includes evidence that she meets or equals Listing

1.04A, but the ALJ’s factual findings reject Plaintiff’s arguments. While a July 2006 MRI

showed a bulging disc that effaces the thecal sac and extends into the foramina, the ALJ

found that Browning’s back pain was successfully treated with steroid injunctions in October

2006 and that the record included no additional significant findings since that time. (R. at 19,

383.) Similarly, the ALJ noted Dr. Layton’s examination, which took place seven months

after the alleged disability date. (R. at 19, 260.) Dr. Layton’s examination revealed no

tenderness upon palpation of the spine and showed Plaintiff’s ability to hop on each leg, walk

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2

 Browning, in passing, contends that she either met or equaled a listed impairment.

To the extent Browning contends she equaled a listed impairment, this argument fails

because she has not explained how any of her impairments equal the severity of all the

elements of a listed impairment. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514 (affirming where the ALJ did not

discuss the claimant’s impairments or compare them to any listing, but where the claimant

“offered no theory” and “pointed to no evidence” supporting a finding that he met or equaled

a listed impairment).

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without difficulty, get up from a chair, get on to the examining table, do a half squat, and sit,

stand, walk, and carry without difficulty. (R. at 19.) Although the record includes positive

straight leg tests, the ALJ found persuasive the fact that at least one straight leg test was

negative. (R. at 19.); see Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039 (noting the ALJ’s responsibility for

resolving conflicts in evidence); Batson,359 F.3d at 1198 (requiring that a reviewing court

defer to the ALJ’s conclusion where evidence allows multiple interpretations). Plaintiff

raises evidence from Dr. Wilson and physician assistant Earlywine, but the ALJ explained

why their testimony was unpersuasive. (R. at 20.) Dr. Wilson had treated Browning for only

a limited time and failed to cite any specific evidence to support his medical opinions. (R.

at 20.); see Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing an ALJ to reject a

treating physician’s opinion that is contradicted by the opinion of another physician, where

the ALJ gives specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(I) (explaining that the ALJ may consider the

length of treatment in weighing medical opinion); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (rejecting

physician’s opinion where it was in the form of a checklist, lacked substantive medical

findings to support the conclusion, and was contradicted by other evidence). Likewise, the

ALJ concluded that Earlywine, as a physician assistant, was not an acceptable medical source

and offered opinions that were not supported by the medical evidence. (R. at 20.); see SSR

06-03, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining the importance of “acceptable

medical sources” vis-a-vis “other sources,” such as opinions from physician assistants).2

In addition to Listing 1.04, Browning’s impairments do not meet Listing 4.02, which

requires the following: 

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[c]hronic heart failure while on a regimen of prescribed treatment,” with

medically-documented systolic failure or diastolic failure, and either (1) very

serious limitations in daily activities, (2) three or more episodes of congestive

heart failure within a consecutive twelve-month period, with evidence of fluid

retention requiring acute extended physician intervention for periods of twelve

hours or more, separated by periods of stabilization, or (3) an inability to

perform an exercise tolerance test at a workload equivalent to 5 METs or less

due to several enumerated factors. 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app’x 1, § 1.04. Although the record indicates heart-based

impairments, Browning does not argue that Listing 4.02 applies. And the record does not

clearly include any evidence indicating that her impairments meet or equal “all” of the

requirements of Listing 4.02. See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530, 531 (requiring that a claimant meet

all of the listing requirements); see also Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514 (affirming where claimant

offered no legal theory or persuasive evidence supporting a finding that an impairment

equaled a listed impairment).

Furthermore, even if the ALJ’s discussion at step three was insufficient as it relates

to either the heart or spinal impairments, this error was harmless because, as discussed above,

the record is devoid of evidence establishing that Browning’s impairments met or equaled

any listed impairment, and Browning points the Court to none. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400

F.3d at 679 (holding that harmless errors do not warrant reversal).

B. Subjective Complaint Testimony

“Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment,

an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on [the] lack of

objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of [those symptoms].”

Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, the ALJ must determine

whether the impairment or combination of impairments “could reasonably be expected to

produce [the] pain or other symptoms.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196 (quotation omitted).

“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he

or she may only find [the claimant] not credible by making specific findings as to credibility

and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. The ALJ may

consider “at least” the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility:

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3

 The ALJ gave this opinion significant weight, but still gave Browning the “full

benefit of doubt” by concluding that her exertional capacity was sedentary, rather than light.

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[the] claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies

either in [the] claimant’s testimony or between her testimony

and her conduct, [the] claimant’s daily activities, her work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of

which [the] claimant complains.

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (internal quotations omitted).

Browning contends the ALJ erred by rejecting her subjective complaint testimony, but

the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s testimony less persuasive. Browning testified that she has

difficulty performing basic household chores, that she needs to lie down six to eight hours

per day and sit in a recliner for up to three hours per day, that she suffers from various mental

ailments, and that her medication causes her to be drowsy and to have stomach problems.

The ALJ concluded that the claimant’s impairments could reasonably be expected to produce

the alleged symptoms, but that Browning’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of these symptoms were “not credible to the extent that they are

inconsistent with the [RFC] assessment.” (R. at 19.)

Aside from the medication side-effects issue, as discussed below, the ALJ gave clear

and convincing reasons why the “inconsistent” evidence in the record negated Browning’s

subjective complaint testimony and did not, as Plaintiff contends, reject Plaintiff’s assertions

solely because they lacked corroborating medical evidence. (R. at 19.) For example, the ALJ

weighed the evidence of the state agency medical consultant, who concluded that Browning

could perform light work with additional environmental and postural limitations.3

 (R. at 19,

269–72.) The same state medical consultant also made findings supporting the ALJ’s

adverse credibility determination, finding Browning’s subjective complaints unreliable

because her complaints did not conform to the available medical evidence. (R. at 273.) In

addition, the ALJ described how Browning’s daily activities were not as debilitating as she

asserted, based on Dr. Layton’s exam, which took place seven months after the alleged onset

date of disability. (R. at 19, 260.) The ALJ explained that, during Dr. Layton’s examination,

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4

 No allegation of malingering was offered by either the ALJ or the Commissioner in

this case.

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Browning was able to dress and undress, get up from a chair, get on the examining table, sit,

stand, walk, walk on her heels and toes, bend at the hips to seventy or eighty degrees, do a

half squat, hop on each leg, and perform a negative straight raising test. (R. at 19, 260.)

Regarding Browning’s back pain, the ALJ concluded that the treatment she received in

October 2006 solved the problem because the record included no additional findings since

that time. (R. at 19.) Likewise, the ALJ noted that Browning had only one significant

cardiovascular accident, which, together with the diagnostic tests performed in concert with

it, did not support Browning’s contention that she had coronary artery disease. (R. at 19.)

Browning also testified that she suffered from various mental symptoms, but the ALJ

explained that this was inconsistent with her conduct and the type of symptoms she was

claiming because she had never sought mental health treatment. (R. at 19, 526–27); see Fair

v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that “an unexplained, or inadequately

explained, failure to seek treatment . . . can cast doubt on the sincerity of the claimant’s pain

testimony”). 

On the other hand, the ALJ erred by rejecting Browning’s statements that her

medication caused dizziness, pain, and drowsiness. The ALJ stated only that “[t]here is

nothing in the record to support the claimant’s alleged side effects with her medication

regimen[.]” (R. at 19.) Because the ALJ had previously determined that the Browning’s

medically-determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce her alleged

symptoms, the ALJ could reject Browning’s testimony about her side effects only by stating

clear and convincing reasons.4 Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. It appears that the ALJ rejected

Browning’s statement based “solely on [the] lack of objective medical evidence to fully

corroborate the alleged severity of” her symptoms, Moisa, 367 F.3d at 885, i.e. solely

because “[t]here [was] nothing in the record to support” Browning’s assertions, (R. at 19).

Defendant asserts that this error was harmless because the ALJ gave other reasons for

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discounting Plaintiff’s subjective statements, but those other reasons (as discussed above)

relate not to the statements about medication side-effects, but instead to other subjective

complaints; thus, the errors are not harmless.

The next issue, therefore, is whether to remand for benefits by crediting-as-true

Browning’s statements about her side-effects, or whether to remand for further findings.

Generally, if an “ALJ fails to articulate sufficient reasons for refusing to credit” a claimant’s

subjective complaint testimony, “the Commissioner must accept, as a matter of law,” that

testimony under the “credit-as-true” rule. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir.

2009). But Ninth Circuit law is unclear as to whether the credit-as-true rule is mandatory and

in what circumstances it applies. See id. (discussing the within-circuit conflict); compare

Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (holding that the credit-as-true rule is mandatory only where a

claimant would be disabled if the testimony were credited) with Connett, 340 F.3d at 876

(discussing the conflict and holding that the doctrine is not mandatory because the court has

“some flexibility” in applying the theory). This District, however, has held that, in some

cases, remand for further findings is appropriate and an “ALJ will not be required to creditas-true plaintiff’s pain allegations.” Santiago v. Astrue, 2010 WL 466052, at *23–24 (D.

Ariz. Feb. 10, 2010). Such a situation may include, for example, where it is “not ‘clear from

the record that the ALJ would be required to find [plaintiff] disabled were such evidence

credited[]’” or where the record is unclear as to “‘whether the ALJ would still find [the

plaintiff] not credible without relying on the improper reasons addressed.’” Id. (quoting

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); Green v. Astrue, 2009 WL 310284,

at *6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2009)).

Here, remand for further findings is appropriate because, even if the ALJ credit-astrue Browning’s statements about the medication’s side effects, the record is unclear as to

whether the ALJ would be required to find Browning disabled. See Santiago, 2010 WL

466052, at *23. And while Browning stated that she suffers from dizziness, pain, and

drowsiness, the record does not establish exactly how severe these symptoms were; nor does

the record have an explanation of the degree to which these symptoms might affect

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 “SVP . . . is defined in the D.O.T. as ‘the amount of lapsed time required by a typical

worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for

average performance in a specific job-worker situation.’” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1230 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing D.O.T., app’x C at 1009). SVP 6

means “over 1 year up to and including 2 years,” and SVP 7 means “over two years up to and

including 4 years.” Id. (citing D.O.T., app’x C at 1009).

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Browning’s ability to work. Moreover, remand for further findings is appropriate because

it is not clear whether the ALJ would still find Browning not credible, such as if other

evidence in the record supported an adverse credibility finding. See id. at *24.

C. Ability to Return to Previous Work

At step four, a “claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing that

[her] impairments prevent [her] from doing [her] previous job.” DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924

F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). “Although the burden of proof lies with the claimant at step

four, the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to support his conclusion.”

Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not receiving specific and accurate Dictionary

of Occupational Titles (“D.O.T”) numbers for the positions that Richter testified would

represent Browning’s past relevant work. While the ALJ identified a sedentary position of

“administrative assistant” with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”)5

 level of six, the

D.O.T. does not list such a position. Defendant admits that the D.O.T. includes no such

position, but instead includes a similar position entitled “administrative assistant - any

industry,” which has an SVP of seven, rather than six. D.O.T. 169.167-010, 1991 WL

647424 (1991). This error, however, is harmless because Plaintiff does not explain how a

one-level difference in SVP changes her ability to physically perform certain jobs. See Burch,

400 F.3d at 679 (holding that harmless errors do not justify reversal). The SVP difference

is irrelevant because Browning complains of physical ailments, not of an inability to learn

particular job skills.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred by stating that “the vocational expert’s

testimony is consistent with the information contained in the [D.O.T.]” even though the ALJ

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did not ask Richter whether her opinion was consistent with the D.O.T. (R. at 20, 535–39.)

The Ninth Circuit requires, at step five, that an ALJ “‘ask’ the vocational expert ‘if the

evidence he or she has provided’ is consistent with the [D.O.T.] and obtain a reasonable

explanation for any apparent conflict.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4 (Dec. 4, 2000)). In this case, the ALJ did

not ask Richter whether her opinion was consistent with the D.O.T. (See R. at 536–43.) This

is not dispositive, however, because the ALJ never explicitly made any step five findings.

Because the ALJ never reached step five, the ALJ’s superfluous statement that Richter’s

testimony was consistent with the D.O.T. is harmless error to the extent the ALJ’s opinion

is otherwise correct. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (holding that harmless errors do not justify

reversal). Plaintiff argues that this discrepancy makes it “impossible to tell if the ALJ

properly relied” on Richter’s testimony. (Dkt. # 14 at 14.) Plaintiff offers no authority,

however, holding that an ALJ’s refusal to ask the vocational expert about her testimony’s

consistency with the D.O.T. renders the ALJ’s step four analysis suspect.

Next, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s statement that her skills were transferable to the

jobs of office assistant and legal assistant; these jobs required a “light” workload, but the ALJ

concluded that Browning had skills transferable to these positions even though she could

perform only sedentary work. (R. at 20, 536.) The issue of transferable skills, however, is

irrelevant at step four, which examines whether a claimant can perform her past relevant

work, not whether she can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy.

Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) with id. § 404.1420(a)(4)(v). Plaintiff offers no

argument why this was not harmless error. 

D. Inconsistency With Commissioner’s Later Determination of Disability

Plaintiff offers a July 28, 2009 Notice of Award by the Commissioner finding

Browning disabled as of October 26, 2008. (Dkt. # 14, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff seeks remand to

“resolve this conflict” between the Commissioner’s decision and the ALJ’s prior decision.

Because evidence of this decision was not included in the administrative record, remand is

appropriate only if this new evidence is “material”and if there is “good cause for the late

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submission.” Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) (requiring that Commissioner “file a certified copy of the transcript of the record

including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based”)).

While a subsequent social security decision may constitute material evidence, the subsequent

decision is material only if it “‘bear[s] directly and substantially on the matter in dispute,’

and if there is a ‘reasonabl[e] possibility that the new evidence would have changed the

outcome of the . . . determination.’” Id. (quoting Booz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

734 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984)). The subsequent opinion is not material, however, if

it relies on different facts, such as new medical evidence, time periods, or age classifications.

See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to remand because

the second ALJ’s decision relied on different medical evidence, relevant time period, and age

classification than the first ALJ’s decision did).

Here, after the ALJ rejected Browning’s application, the Commissioner determined

that Browning was disabled as of October 26, 2008. The decision appealed here finds

Browning not disabled as of September 25, 2005—a difference of more than three years.

The Court cannot determine, therefore, whether there is a reasonable possibility that the new

decision would have changed the outcome determination. See Bruton, 268 F.3d at 827.

Plaintiff has not presented anything explaining what facts the Commissioner considered in

making the October 2008 determination, so Plaintiff has not demonstrated why this second

decision justifies reversal of the ALJ’s decision. It is not apparent that the two decisions in

this case relied on the same facts because the relevant time period differed in each case. Not

only was the Commissioner’s second decision issued more than one year after the ALJ’s

decision was issued, but also the second decision found Browning disabled as of October

2008, three years after the alleged September 2005 date of disability at issue before the ALJ.

This difference in time raises the likelihood that the two decisions relied on different medical

and subjective evidence, and the Court will not assume to the contrary where Plaintiff has

failed to provide the Court with a record sufficient to determine that the same evidence was

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the basis for both decisions. Accordingly, the Court finds that the second decision is not a

basis for reversal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED-IN-PART

and VACATED-IN-PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED for further findings as

set forth in this Order.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2010.

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