Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02738/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02738-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD DALTON MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JENNIFER SHAFFER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02738-JD 

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

Re: Dkt. No. 8

Habeas petitioner Ronald Martin challenges the California Board of Parole Hearings for 

modifying his term of incarceration. Dkt. No. 1. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as 

moot and barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) one-year 

statute of limitations, among other grounds. Dkt. No. 8. The Court finds that the claims are not 

moot but the petition is untimely. 

Respondent incorrectly contends that Martin’s release from prison on parole renders this 

action moot. See Dkt. No. 8 at 3. Martin’s petition expressly asks the Court to credit the excess 

period of confinement caused by the California Board of Parole Hearings’ calculation against his 

statutory parole period. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Martin contends that his fixed, five-year period of parole 

under Cal. Penal Code § 3000(b)(1) would have expired by now if his term had been calculated 

properly. Dkt. No. 15 at 2-3. In similar circumstances, where a petitioner has been released on 

parole for a fixed term of years, federal courts have found that the case is not moot because the 

Court can still order credit for the period of improper confinement. See, e.g., Thomas v. Yates, 

637 F. Supp. 2d 837, 841-42 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1015 

(9th Cir. 2003)). In addition, because the request for equitable relief in the form of custody credits 

is part of petitioner’s underlying federal claim about his incarceration term, it did not need to be 

exhausted independently at the state courts. See Elster v. Wong, No. C 08-03279 WHA, 2009 WL 

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1604695, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2009). Consequently, a “live controversy exists because 

[petitioner] remains on parole and [the Court] may grant his immediate release from parole if [it] 

find[s] parole was improperly delayed.” Williams v. Schwarzenegger, 461 F. App’x 621, 623 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citing McQuillion, 342 F.3d at 1015).

Respondent’s limitation bar argument is better taken. AEDPA has a one-year statute of 

limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The parties agree that the limitations period here began to 

run “on the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); see Dkt. No. 8 at 3 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)); Dkt. No. 15 at 4-5 (same). Respondent says this began one 

day after December 31, 2009, the date that the terms of the Board’s September 2, 2009 parole 

grant became final. Dkt. No. 8 at 4-5. Martin says the decision did not become final until the 

Governor denied review of the Board’s second, January 5, 2011 decision on his parole grant on

September 2, 2011. Dkt. No. 15 at 6-7. 

Even assuming that the “factual predicate” for Martin’s claims did not arise before the 

Board’s second decision in 2011, Martin’s reliance on the September 2, 2011 date is problematic. 

The courts of this district have held that the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on the date 

the Board’s decision becomes final, 120 days after the decision is made. In re Gonzalez, No. C08-03916 RMW, 2012 WL 4483037, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012) aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. 

Brown, 586 F. App’x 423 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Martin’s petition and other filings also acknowledge the Board’s “action became final 

on May 5, 2011” when, in Martin’s view, the Board’s review of his time calculations closed. See, 

e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 4.

But even giving Martin the benefit of the doubt and accepting September 2, 2011 as the 

limitations trigger, the petition is still untimely. He did not file this action until June 12, 2014. 

Dkt. No. 1. As respondent acknowledges, the limitations period was tolled from November 17, 

2011 to June 12, 2013, while Martin pursued appeals in the California courts. Dkt. No. 8 at 7. 

Martin appears to contend that he is entitled to run the one-year limitations clock from June 12,

2013 to June 12, 2014, but that argument fails to account for the 76 days that ran from September 

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2 to November 17, 2011, when Martin filed his appeal in state court. See Dkt. No. 15 at 8-9. 

Martin proposes that the 76 days should be statutorily tolled because this delay was not 

“unreasonable.” Id. at 8. That is not persuasive because the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that

“the plain language of § 2244(d)(2) does not permit tolling during the pre-filing period [of a state 

habeas filing], as it requires that the state petition be both ‘properly filed’ and ‘pending.’” 

Ontiveros v. Subia, 365 F. App’x 848, 850 (9th Cir. 2010); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084-85 (“We do 

not think it unduly burdensome to require state prisoners challenging parole board decisions to file 

state habeas petitions expeditiously if they wish to preserve the option of federal habeas review. . . 

a prisoner who waits eight months before filing a state habeas petition will have four months after 

state habeas review to file his federal petition, whereas a prisoner who waits only two months 

before filing a state habeas petition will have 10 months’ leeway to file his federal petition.”) The 

cases Martin cites address intermediate delays -- between the denial of one state habeas petition 

and the filing of another in the next higher court -- and provide no basis for the Court to excuse 

Martin’s pre-filing delay. In addition, Martin also does not qualify for equitable tolling during this 

period. While he claims “reasonable delay” and “due diligence” in seeking gubernatorial review 

before making the state court filing, he makes no showing at all that any “‘extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.’” See Ontiveros, 365 F. App’x at 850 (quoting Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

Because neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies to the at least 76 days petitioner 

waited to make his state habeas filing, the additional full year he delayed in filing his federal 

habeas petition makes it untimely under AEDPA. The Court dismisses the petition as time-barred 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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