Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05894/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05894-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MING CHING JIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-CV-5894-REC-LJO-P

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR

RELIEF FROM DISCOVERY DEADLINE AS

UNNECESSARY IN LIGHT OF ORDER OF

NOVEMBER 22, 2005, AND DISREGARDING

MOTION TO COMPEL SET FORTH IN

REPLY (Docs. 104 and 107)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS FORTYFIVE DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO FILE

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, AND DEEMING

DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST RESOLVED IN

LIGHT OF THIS ORDER (Doc. 110)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND

STAYING DISCOVERY (Doc. 95)

I. Order

Plaintiff Ming Ching Jin (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding against Defendants Rodriguez and

Aguirre (“Defendants”) on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Pursuant to the Court’s order of March 15,

2006, Defendants have been granted leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment

addressing the issue of whether or not Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the habeas exhaustion rule. 

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Case 1:04-cv-05894-AWI-LJO Document 112 Filed 03/28/06 Page 1 of 5
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 Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel set forth in his reply filed on March 15, 2006, is

disregarded because the request is duplicative of the instant, previously filed motion. Further, it is improper for a

party to move for new and/or different relief in a reply.

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A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

On March 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel.1

Defendants did not file a response.

As Plaintiff has previously been advised, the Court cannot require an attorney to represent

Plaintiff. Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296,

298 (1989). (Docs. 59, 70.) In certain exceptional circumstances, the Court may request the

voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel,

the Court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. “A finding of

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both ‘the likelihood of success of the merits and

the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues

involved.’” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 (citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if

it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This Court is faced with

similar cases almost daily. Further, the Court is unable to make a determination that Plaintiff is

likely to succeed on the merits, particularly in light of the need to resolve the issue of whether or not

the habeas exhaustion rule applies to Plaintiff’s claim. In addition, based on a review of the record

in this case, the Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Terrell,

935 F.2d at 1017. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of voluntary counsel, filed

March 1, 2006, shall be denied.

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Relief from Discovery Deadline

On February 23, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking relief from the discovery deadline.

Defendants filed an opposition on February 28, 2006, and Plaintiff filed a reply on March 15, 2006.

On November 22, 2005, pursuant to a motion filed by Plaintiff on September 28, 2005, the Court

Case 1:04-cv-05894-AWI-LJO Document 112 Filed 03/28/06 Page 2 of 5
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vacated the discovery deadline set forth in the scheduling order, and stated that the deadline would

be reset once the parties’ motions for summary judgment were resolved. Because Plaintiff’s motion

for relief from the discovery deadline is unnecessary in light of the Court’s order of November 22,

2005, Plaintiff’s request shall be denied. A new discovery deadline will be set in the event that

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim survives Defendants’ supplemental motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel, set forth in his reply, is disregarded. It is improper for a party

to move for new and/or different relief in a reply, as Plaintiff has done in this instance. A reply is

limited to addressing issues raised in the opposition. Because Plaintiff’s original motion did not

include a motion to compel, Plaintiff may not request such relief in his reply. 

C. Deadline to File Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment

On March 15, 2006, the Honorable Robert E. Coyle issued an order granting Defendants

leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment addressing the application of the habeas

exhaustion rule to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and remanding the matter back to the undersigned for

further proceedings. In accordance with Judge Coyle’s order, Defendants have forty-five days from

the date of service of this order within which to file a supplemental motion. Defendants’ request for

leave to file a motion on or before May 2, 2006, filed March 16, 2006, is deemed resolved in light

of the issuance of this order.

D. Defendants’ Request to Stay Discovery

On January 4, 2006, Defendants filed a request to stay depositions and other discovery

pending resolution of the parties’ motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not respond to the

request. The parties’ motions were resolved by the Court in an order filed on March 15, 2006.

However, Defendants have been granted leave to file a supplemental motion addressing the

application of the habeas exhaustion rule to Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Defendants

Rodriguez and Aguirre.

“Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought . . . , and for good

cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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26(c). The Court enjoys “wide discretion in controlling discovery.” Little v. City of Seattle, 863

F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In this instance, Defendants have been given leave of court to file a supplemental motion for

summary judgment raising the issue of whether or not Plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claim is

barred by the habeas exhaustion rule. Both parties previously moved for summary judgment and

based on the review of Plaintiff’s motion and Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ cross-motion, the

Court cannot envision what further discovery Plaintiff would need to oppose Defendants’

supplemental motion on the limited issue of whether or not the habeas termination rule applies to

bar Plaintiff’s section 1983 action for retaliation. In the event that Plaintiff does need further

discovery to respond to the motion, Plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the standard for which Plaintiff was provided in an order filed on

January 5, 2006. Further, in the event that Defendants’ motion is denied, the Court will set a new

discovery deadline. Thus, there is no prejudice to Plaintiff in staying discovery at this juncture

pending resolution of Defendants’ supplemental motion for summary judgment. 

The Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to shield Defendants from the expense and

burden responding to any discovery requests pending resolution of their motion. In as much as the

Court can foresee no prejudice to Plaintiff in light of the availability of Rule 56(f) and in light of the

fact that discovery will be reopened should Defendants fail to prevail on their supplemental motion,

Defendants’ request shall be granted and discovery shall be stayed by this order.

E. Conclusion and Order

In light of the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, filed March 1, 2006, is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion seeking relief from the discovery deadline, filedFebruary23, 2006,

is DENIED as unnecessary in light of the Court’s order of November 22, 2005; 

3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel, set forth in his reply filed on March 15, 2006, is

DISREGARDED;

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4. Defendants have forty-five (45) days from the date of service of this order within

which to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment in accordance with Judge

Coyle’s order of March 15, 2006;

5. Defendants’ request for leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment

on or before May 2, 2006, filed March 16, 2006, is deemed resolved in light of this

order;

6. Defendants’ request to stay discovery, filed January 4, 2006, is GRANTED; and

7. No further discovery shall be conducted until Defendants’ supplemental motion for

summary judgment is resolved, absent leave of court pursuant to Rule 56(f).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05894-AWI-LJO Document 112 Filed 03/28/06 Page 5 of 5