Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02621/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02621-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald Montgomery, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Krull, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-2621-PHX-RCB (ECV)

ORDER

On December 6, 2010, Plaintiff Donald Montgomery, who is confined in the Arizona

State Prison Complex-Tucson in Tucson, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

In a December 14, 2010 Order, the Court denied the deficient Application to Proceed and

gave Plaintiff 30 days to either pay the filing fee or file a complete Application to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis.

On January 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second Application to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (Doc. 5). The Court will grant the second Application to Proceed and will dismiss

the action.

I. Second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $13.59. The remainder of

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the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will

enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward

the fees according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, No. 07-17265, 2010 WL

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2947323, at *3 (9th Cir. Jul. 29, 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim, without leave to amend because the defects cannot be corrected.

III. Complaint

In his four-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues two attorneys at the Maricopa County

Public Defender’s Office—Attorney/Supervisor Charles Krull and Attorney Elmer Parker,

and two attorneys at the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office—Supervisor Andrew Thomas

and Attorney Jennifer Brockel. In each Count, Plaintiff alleges a violation of “U.S.C.A. 5,

6, 8, 14. Title 18 U.S.C. Title 28 U.S.C. ch. 85 § 1345(a)(1) and (a)(2) Civil Rights and

Elective Franchise Model Pinal Code § 5.03 Conspiracy.” 

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Krull, “by and through his agent”

Defendant Parker committed “fraud upon Plaintiff in open court” because Defendant Parker

violated the “attorney client privilege by [e]ntering into evidence as testimonial evidence.”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Krull failed to adequately supervise Defendant Parker. In

Count Two, Plaintiff claims Defendant Parker committed “fraud upon Plaintiff in open court”

because Defendant Parker violated the “attorney client privilege by [e]ntering into evidence

as testimonial evidence.” 

In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Thomas, “by and through” Defendant

Brock, “failed to object to illegal [e]ntry of evidence not set forth in formal charges . . . not

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heard by a jury concerning proof of guilty necessary to establish necessary facts to impose

sentence.” Count Four is identical.

In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Defendants Krull and Parker

A prerequisite for any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a showing that the defendant

has acted under the color of state law. A public defender or court-appointed attorney

representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law. See Polk County v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Szijarto v. Legeman, 466 F.2d 864, 864 (9th Cir.

1972) (per curiam) (“[A]n attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not act ‘under color

of’ state law.”). Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Krull and

Parker.

B. Defendants Thomas and Brockel

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for their

conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” insofar as that conduct

is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31

(1976)). Immunity even extends to prosecutors for “eliciting false or defamatory testimony

from witnesses or for making false or defamatory statements during, and related to, judicial

proceedings.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Thomas and Brockel.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5) is

granted.

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $13.59.

(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

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(4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(5) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 14th day of 2011.

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