Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06168/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

FERNANDO MIGUEL SORIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06168-LB

ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT

Re: ECF No. 31

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff — after initially trying to serve the defendant (and former Alameda County 

deputy sheriff) Justin Linn through the internal-affairs front-desk officer — ultimately served him 

personally on January 6, 2019.1 He did not appear, and on January 29, 2019, the plaintiff moved 

for entry of default, which the clerk entered on February 1, 2019.2 Mr. Linn now moves to set 

aside the entry of default.3 The court can decide the motion without oral argument, see Civ. L. R. 

7-1(b), and for good cause, sets aside the default.

 

1 Proofs of Service – ECF No. 11 and 20. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File 

(“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. The court 

ordered personal service because the defendant was a former employee. Clerk’s Notice – ECF No. 19.

2 Mot. – ECF No. 27; Clerk’s Entry of Default – ECF No. 30.

3 Mot. – ECF No. 31.

Case 3:18-cv-06168-LB Document 51 Filed 03/12/19 Page 1 of 5
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 2

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STATEMENT

The following additional facts are relevant to the motion. 

Mr. Linn gave a copy of the complaint to his criminal-defense attorney, who tendered Mr. 

Linn’s defense to the County of Alameda on January 10, 2019.

4 The County accepted the tender 

on January 15, 2019 with a reservation of rights and sent notice to Mr. Linn at his former address 

in Tracy, California.

5 On January 16, 2019, the County informed Mark Berry that he had been 

selected to represent Mr. Linn, and Mr. Berry sent Mr. Linn a letter on January 17, 2019, also to 

the Tracy address.

6

On January 29, 2019, the plaintiff asked for entry of default, and the County informed Mr. 

Berry.7 That day, Mr. Linn contacted Mr. Berry, accepted his representation, and told him he no 

longer lived in Tracy and had relocated to Southern California.8 Mr. Berry then asked the 

plaintiff’s counsel to stipulate to set aside the default, and he refused.9 Mr. Linn then moved to set 

aside the entry of default.10

GOVERNING LAW

The district court has discretion to set aside a default or a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(c), 60(b); Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2011). More 

specifically, under Rule 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of default for “good cause.” See 

United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 2010). To determine whether a defendant has shown good cause to justify vacating entry of 

default, a court considers three factors: (1) whether the defendant engaged in culpable conduct that 

led to the default; (2) whether the defendant lacked a meritorious defense; and (3) whether 

 

4 Berry Decl. – ECF No. 31-1 at 2 (¶ 8).

5

Id. (¶¶ 9–10).

6

Id. (¶¶ 11, 13).

7

Id. (¶ 15). 

8

Id. (¶ 17). 

9

Id. (¶¶ 18–19).

10 Mot. – ECF No. 31.

Case 3:18-cv-06168-LB Document 51 Filed 03/12/19 Page 2 of 5
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 3

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reopening the default would prejudice the plaintiff. See id. (citing Franchise Holding II, LLC v. 

Huntington Rests. Group., Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2004)). This standard is disjunctive, 

meaning the court may deny the request to vacate default if any of the three factors is true. See id.

(citing Franchise Holding II, 375 F.3d at 925). “Crucially, however, ‘judgment by default is a 

drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever possible, be 

decided on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)).

The standard is the same standard used to determine whether a default judgment should be set 

aside under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except that in the Rule 55(c) context, courts 

have greater discretion and can apply the standard more liberally to grant relief from entry of 

judgment because there is no interest in the finality of the judgment. See id. at 1092 n.1 (citations 

omitted); TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001); Hawaii 

Carpenters’ Trust Fund v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986); Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard 

Mgmt,783 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1986). When considering whether to vacate entry of default 

under Rule 55(c), the court’s “underlying concern . . . is to determine whether there is some 

possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved by 

the default.” Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Fund, 794 F.2d at 513 (9th Cir. 1986). The inquiry “is at 

bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s 

omission.” Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Ass’n Ltd., 507 

U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The decision ultimately lies in the discretion of the court. Brandt, 653 F.3d 

at 1111-12.

As the party seeking to set aside entry of default, a defendant bears the burden of showing 

good cause under this test. Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Fund, 794 F.2d at 513-14. To ensure that 

cases are decided on the merits whenever possible, the court resolves any doubt regarding whether 

to grant relief in favor of vacating default. O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994).

Case 3:18-cv-06168-LB Document 51 Filed 03/12/19 Page 3 of 5
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 4

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ANALYSIS

1. Culpability

“‘A defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice of the 

filing of an action and intentionally failed to answer.’” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092 (quoting TCI, 244 

F.3d at 697) (emphasis in the original). “Intentionally” means that a movant is not culpable merely 

for making a conscious choice not to answer. Id. (quoting TCI, 244 F.3d at 697). Instead, to treat a 

failure to answer as culpable, the movant must act with bad faith, such as with “‘an intention to 

take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decision[-]making, or otherwise 

manipulate the legal process.’” Id. (quoting TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 697). For that reason, the 

Ninth Circuit has “‘typically held that a defendant’s conduct was culpable for purposes of the 

[good cause] factors where there is no explanation of the default inconsistent with a devious, 

deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure to respond.’” Id. (quoting TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 698). By 

contrast, a defendant’s mere negligent failure to file an answer is insufficient to establish 

culpability under this factor. TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 697.

The plaintiff’s main argument is that the new address was on the proof of service.

11 While that 

observation is correct, the conduct here was unintentional and is not devious, deliberate, willful, or 

in bad faith. The conduct is not culpable. 

2. Meritorious Defense

A defendant must allege “specific facts” that, if true, would constitute a defense. See Mesle, 

615 F.3d at 1094 (citing TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700). The burden on the defendant is “not 

extraordinarily heavy,” but “[a] ‘mere general denial without facts to support it’ is not enough to 

justify vacating a default or default judgment.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094 (citing TCI Group, 244 

F.3d at 700); Franchise Holding II, 375 F.3d at 926.

A plain reading of the complaint and the record show that there are fact challenges to the 

plaintiff’s claims. 

 

11 Opp. – ECF No. 40 at 4.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06168-LB 5

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3. Unfair Prejudice

The final factor is whether setting aside the default prejudices the plaintiff. Prejudice is more 

than “simply delaying the resolution of the case” and instead is whether the plaintiff’s “ability to 

pursue his claims will be hindered.” TCI, 244 F.3d at 701 (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he 

delay must result in tangible harm such as a loss of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or 

greater opportunity for fraud or collusion.” Id. By contrast, merely requiring a plaintiff to litigate 

the merits of a case is not prejudice under the third prong. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has held, “A 

default judgment gives the plaintiff somewhat of a windfall by sparing her from litigating the 

merits of her claim because of her opponent’s failure to respond; vacating the default merely 

restores the parties to an even footing in the litigation.” Id.

The record here does not establish that the brief delay here causes the plaintiff any prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

The court sets aside the entry of default. This disposes of ECF No. 31.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2019

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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