Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03130/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03130-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alex Ramsey, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendant. 

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No. 05-3130-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #61). For

the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Alex Ramsey was accused of molesting his daughter Eden. Eden was

subjected to numerous interviews by law enforcement personnel regarding the abuse that

allegedly occurred when she was four-years-old. As a result of the investigation, Plaintiff

was arrested and imprisoned in Yavapai County Jail on September 23, 2003. Ultimately, the

charges against Plaintiff were dismissed on October 7, 2004, and he was released on October

8, 2004. Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 6, 2005. (Doc. #1). Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint on January 12, 2006 (Doc. #5).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint names the following Defendants: the State of Arizona;

Yavapai County; Clyde Bentley; Stacey Ann Bentley; Mario Gabaldon; Donna Gabaldon;

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Steven Young; Wendy Arlene Young; Yavapai Family Advocacy Center; Larayne Ness;

John Doe Ness; Brenda Sheets; John Doe Sheets; Yavapai Community Hospital Association

(“Hospital”); Judy Denton; John Doe Denton; Cappriella McQuiston; John Doe McQuiston;

Autumn Renee Sechez; and Michael Sechez. The Amended Complaint alleges Eleven

Counts against all Defendants: (1) negligence and/or gross negligence; (2) malicious

prosecution; (3) abuse of process; (4) false light invasion of privacy; (5) wrongful intrusion

upon private affairs; (6) false arrest and imprisonment; (7) intentional infliction of emotional

distress; (8) aiding and abetting tortious conduct; (9) violations of the Civil Rights Act of

1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (10) defamation and defamation per se; and (11) loss of consortium.

The following Defendants moved to dismiss all Eleven Counts of the Amended

Complaint on various legal theories: the State of Arizona (doc. #16); Hospital, Judy Denton

and John Doe Denton (doc. #19); Mario Gabaldon (doc. #22); Larayne Ness and John Doe

Ness (doc. #42); and Donna Gabaldon (doc. #46). The Court issued an Order (doc. #57) that

dismissed Defendant State of Arizona and Defendant Mario Gabaldon with prejudice. As

to remaining Defendants, the Order dismissed Count Nine with prejudice and it dismissed

all remaining state law claims without prejudice to Plaintiff to re-file in state court if

applicable. Plaintiff then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court denied.

(Doc. #63). On September 28, 2006, however, the Court sua sponte issued an Order vacating

the Court’s Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. #64). With this

Order, the Court also vacates its previous Order of August 25, 2006 (doc. #57).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The State of Arizona

A. Qualified Immunity

The State argues that the Court should dismiss it because it is immune from suit in

federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The

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Eleventh Amendment therefore bars federal jurisdiction over suits against a non-consenting

state. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62-65 (1996) (reaffirming

strength of Eleventh Amendment and fundamental importance of each state’s sovereign

immunity). In other words, the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen of a state from suing that

state in federal court. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Franchesci v.

Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1994).

Two exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity exist: (1) state conduct waiving

immunity and (2) Congressional abrogation of immunity. Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273

F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2001). As to the first exception, a state may waive its immunity by

either voluntarily invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court or by making a “clear

declaration” that it intends to submit itself to federal jurisdiction. College Sav. Bank v.

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-76 (1999).

Alternatively, Congress may abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity through

federal legislation. Evidence of Congressional abrogation of immunity must be “both

unequivocal and textual.” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).

Absolutely no evidence exists here of Congressional abrogation of immunity or of

consent to suit by the State. Moreover, Plaintiff has conceded that Defendant State of

Arizona should be dismissed. The Court finds Defendant State of Arizona immune from suit.

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63. The claims against Defendant State of Arizona therefore must

be dismissed.

Mario Gabaldon

Plaintiff alleges that on September 23, 2003, Defendant Mario Gabaldon, an

investigator with the State of Arizona Child Protective Services, conducted a lengthy and

suggestive interview of Eden. Plaintiff further alleges that all Defendants’ actions

contributed to his arrest and imprisonment. Defendant Mario Gabaldon argues that Plaintiff

failed to comply with the applicable state and federal statutes of limitations.

A. Statute of Limitations

“[T]he statute of limitations defense . . . may be raised by a motion to dismiss . . . [i]f

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the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean Witter

& Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.

1979)). But even if the relevant dates alleged in the complaint are beyond the statutory

period, the “‘complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.’” Hernandez v.

City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United

States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). Indeed, “[d]ismissal on statute of limitations

grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) only if the assertions of the

complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the

statute was tolled.” Two Rivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). “Because the

applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine often depends on matters outside the pleadings,

it is not generally amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hernandez, 138 F.3d

at 402.

The statute of limitations period in Arizona for personal injury actions is two years.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-542 (2006). The two-year limitations period also applies to all

actions in Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476,

478 (9th Cir. 1991) (because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations we

borrow the state law statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the forum

state). All of Plaintiff’s other state claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitation.

A.R.S. § 12-821 provides that “[a]ll actions against any public entity or public employee

shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-821 (2006). Arizona Revised Statute § 12-541 states that “[t]here shall

be commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action accrues, and not

afterward, the following actions: 1) For malicious prosecution, or for false imprisonment,

or for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander . . . .” Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-541 (2006). All of Plaintiff’s claims therefore are subject to either a

one-year limitation or a two-year limitation.

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Even though the federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claims, “federal, not state law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.”

TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows

or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. at 991. Similarly,

under Arizona law, a cause of action accrues when the party knows or should have known

through the exercise of reasonable diligence the facts underlying the cause. Gust, Rosenfeld

& Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 898 P.2d 964, 966 (1995).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains no allegations that the statute of limitations

should be tolled. Defendants therefore are entitled to urge the statute of limitations defense

because the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the Amended

Complaint. Notably, Plaintiff has conceded that his claimed injury is his arrest and

imprisonment, which occurred as a result of allegations of molestation by Plaintiff's daughter

Eden. Plaintiff’s cause or causes of action against Defendant Mario Gabaldon therefore

accrued at least as early as September 23, 2003, the day he was arrested and imprisoned. On

or before September 23, 2003, Plaintiff knew he had been wronged by one or more parties.

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not suggest that Defendants were unknown to him or that they

could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence. Thus, as to Defendant Mario

Gabaldon, the one-year statute of limitations expired on September 23, 2004, and the twoyear statute of limitations expired on September 23, 2005. Plaintiff did not file his complaint

until October 6, 2005. (Doc. #1). Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mario

Gabaldon are barred by the statute of limitations.

Additionally, Plaintiff gives no explanation as to how he knew enough to file his

complaint on October 6, 2005, but not enough to file it two weeks earlier. There is no

indication that he discovered new evidence during those two weeks. Plaintiff has made no

showing that what he knew on October 6, 2005, was not known or knowable two weeks

earlier. It seems that Plaintiff mistakenly believed the statute of limitations did not begin to

run until he was released from prison on October 8, 2004.

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B. Tolling

Where the federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims, they also borrow the forum state’s tolling rules. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992.

Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations could have been tolled under four theories: 1)

equitable estoppel, 2) unsound mind, 3) the discovery rule, and 4) preclusion from effective

access to the legal system.

First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants induced Plaintiff to delay filing suit by holding

him in jail where he would be beaten and afraid to take action, giving rise to an equitable

estoppel claim. The case Plaintiff cites for this theory does stand for the general proposition

that “[e]stoppel means that a party is prevented by [its] own acts from claiming a right to the

detriment of the other party who is entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted

accordingly.” Certainteed Corporation v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 762 P.2d 560,

564 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). Certainteed Corporation, however, is distinguishable on its facts.

Defendants are not estopped because Plaintiff has not set forth facts to show that Defendants

induced him to forego litigation.

Second, if a person is of “unsound mind” at the time his cause of action accrues, then

the statute of limitations period is tolled until removal of the disability. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 12-541 (2006). In Arizona, there are “two separate inquiries that may evince an unsound

mind: 1) inability to manage daily affairs, and 2) inability to understand legal rights and

liabilities.” Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (Ariz. 1998). But, “it is insufficient to summarily

claim ‘inability to bring the action.’” Id. at 951 (citing Florez v. Sargeant, 917 P.2d 250, 255

(Ariz. 1996)). “The policy of protecting defendants against stale and fraudulent claims

cannot be overcome by conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable to

manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities.” Id. “The Plaintiff instead

must set forth specific facts-hard evidence-supporting the conclusion of unsound mind.” Id.

Plaintiff here has not set forth specific facts that support the conclusion that he was

of “unsound mind”; Plaintiff has only made general allegations. In an untimely attempt to

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Even if the Court were to treat it as timely, the self-serving affidavit does not create

a tolling issue. The affidavit does not allege specific facts and hard evidence, but instead

contains bald conclusions like the following: "I had absolutely no mental ability to take care

of myself or my daily affairs, and was truly mentally incapacitated from any ability to

proceed on a civil suit while incarcerated." The court notes that a prisoner's ability to

conduct his normal daily affairs is necessarily limited. And further notes that the question of

Plaintiff's mental competence is a subject better suited for an expert's affidavit.

2

Plaintiff's untimely affidavit, which the Court has noted it need not consider, states,

" . . . I did not know [Gabaldon] had . . . conducted suggestive, inappropriate, improper,

interviews with my daughter until shortly before my release from incarceration." Plaintiff

does not dispute knowing Gabaldon conducted an interview of Eden that, in part, led to

Plaintiff's arrest and imprisonment. The affidavit at most suggests that Plaintiff did not know

the details of the interview until shortly before his release. Merely stating that he did not

know the specifics of the allegedly improper interview does not save Plaintiff's claim from

the statute of limitations defense.

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create a tolling issue, the Plaintiff filed an affidavit after the hearing on the motion for

reconsideration. The Plaintiff had knowledge of everything in the affidavit at the time he

filed his Complaint, his Opposition to the motions to dismiss, and his motion for

reconsideration. The Court need not consider this late affidavit. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J v.

AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).1

Third, for the previously mentioned reasons, the discovery rule does not toll the statute

of limitations because Plaintiff reasonably had knowledge of his alleged injury and knew the

identity of the Defendants on the date of his arrest and imprisonment. Morever, Plaintiff

does not state that he was unaware of the identity of Defendant Mario Gabaldon at the time

of his arrest.2

Fourth, Plaintiff cites Barrio v. San Miguel, 692 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 1984), for the

proposition that the physical limitations placed on him precluded him from effective access

to the legal system, preventing him from pursuing his rights. Barrio held that “a statute

which requires a minor injured when below the age of seven to bring the action by the time

he reaches the age of ten-regardless of his ability to do so, and without concern for the nature

of his adult caretakers-does not provide reasonable alternatives.” Id. at 286. The Barrio

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3

In dismissing the claims against Defendant Donna Gabaldon, the Court has not

reached the merits of her claim that Plaintiff failed to serve her with a summons.

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court found the statute before it unconstitutional because it abolished the action before it

reasonably could be brought. Id. In this case, Plaintiff has come forth with no evidence to

show that he was prevented from pursuing his rights. Plaintiff was not a minor; he was in

jail. The statutes of limitations in question regulate the time to bring the action, they do not

abrogate it.

Last, in responding to the Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff simply makes, through his

lawyer, unsworn assertions of what might be shown if only discovery could be pursued. This

is pure speculation; Plaintiff is raising that which any other plaintiff in this situation might

raise. Plaintiff cannot maintain his action based on mere speculation that some conduct he

has not alleged might have occurred. Plaintiff’s plea for discovery is without any showing

that he has reason to believe it will uncover grounds for tolling. Thus, the statute of

limitations was not tolled. Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Mario Gabaldon must

be dismissed.

Donna Gabaldon

Defendant Donna Gabaldon is the spouse of Defendant Mario Gabaldon. Defendant

Donna Gabaldon argues in her Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff failed to serve her with a

summons. Defendant Donna Gabaldon further argues that if Plaintiff is able to establish that

he served a proper summons on her, then she joins in her husband’s Motion to Dismiss.

The Court dismisses the claims against Defendant Donna Gabaldon for the same

reasons that they were dismissed as to Defendant Mario Gabaldon; i.e., failure to comply

with the applicable statutes of limitations.3

Larayne Ness

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Larayne Ness was employed by Defendant Yavapai

Family Advocacy Center. Plaintiff alleges that on September 23, 2003, Defendant Larayne

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Ness conducted a lengthy and suggestive interview of Eden during a forensic physical

examination. Defendant Ness allegedly reported that Eden’s hymen was almost entirely

missing, which Ness claimed was conclusive physical evidence that Plaintiff had sexually

abused Eden. Plaintiff, however, alleges that later examinations demonstrated that Eden’s

hymen was not only present, but that it fully blocked her vaginal opening. Plaintiff alleges

that he discovered this new information shortly before the charges against him were

dismissed. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Larayne Ness is a state actor under color

of state law as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendant Larayne Ness argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted for the following reasons: 1) she is immune from liability

because she is a mandatory reporter under A.R.S. § 13-3620; 2) all claims are barred by

limitations; 3) she is not a “state actor” as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim; and 4) it failed to

properly allege any claim as to her. Plaintiff counters that: 1) Defendant Larayne Ness is

not immune, for both legal and factual reasons, under the mandatory reporting statute; 2) all

claims are not barred because this suit was timely filed; 3) she is a state actor because she

acted in concert with and for the benefit of law enforcement for pay; and 4) the Amended

Complaint adequately alleged common law claims against her.

A. Immunity under A.R.S. § 13-3620

First, under A.R.S. § 13-3620, Defendant Ness is immune from liability unless she

“acted with malice.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620 (2006). In the Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Larayne Ness’s conduct was the product of malicious acts.

Plaintiff therefore has sufficiently alleged that Defendant Larayne Ness acted with malice.

B. Statute of Limitations

Second, Plaintiff argues that his cause of action did not accrue, and hence the statute

of limitations did not commence until sometime before October 8, 2004, when he discovered

that Defendant Larayne Ness used false evidence against him. On these facts, application

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of the diligence-discovery rule might be appropriate. “The diligence-discovery rule is not

often applied outside the medical malpractice area, but it has been recognized that a plaintiff

who is ‘blamelessly ignorant of the existence or cause of his injury should be accorded the

benefits of the more liberal accrual standard.’” Hedges v. Arizona Department of Public

Safety, 893 F.2d 1338, 1990 WL 3134, *1 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Swine Flu Products

Liability, Sanborn v. United States, 764 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1985)). “[I]t would be

appropriate to apply the diligence-discovery rule ‘where a plaintiff demonstrates that his

injury was inherently unknowable at the time he was injured.’” Id. (quoting Barrett v. United

States, 689 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied Cattell v. Barrett, 465 U.S. 1131

(1983)).

Plaintiff reasonably had knowledge of his alleged injury when he was arrested and

imprisoned, yet it was “inherently unknowable” at that time that Defendant Larayne Ness had

used false evidence against him. Plaintiff did not discover this latent evidence until shortly

before the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. On these facts, the Court cannot say that

Plaintiff will not be able to demonstrate that the statute of limitations was tolled.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Larayne Ness are not barred by the statute

of limitations. This ruling is without prejudice to Defendant Ness's re-urging the statute of

limitations defense on summary judgment 

C. Joint Action

Third, a bare allegation of joint action between private persons and state officials will

not overcome a motion to dismiss. DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir.

2000). Plaintiff has not presented factual allegations of joint action as to Defendant Larayne

Ness. Thus, despite the liberal notice pleading standard, the Plaintiff’s claim of joint action

cannot stand. See id. Nevertheless, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend the

Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies of Count Nine as to Defendant Larayne Ness.

D. Rule 12(b)(6)

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A court may not dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him

to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994).. A motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim is disfavored and rarely granted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108

F.3d 246, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1997). “All that is required are sufficient allegations to put

defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795,

798 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, the Court must construe the facts alleged in the Complaint in

the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless,

Plaintiffs must still meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Under Rule 8, the claim must contain, “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(2). Finally, the Court must

assume that all general allegations “embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to

support them.” Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District, 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir.

1994).

The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint and finds that it does not appear

beyond doubt that Plaintiff cannot prove any facts in support of his claims that would entitle

him to relief. Because the rules require only allegations sufficient to put Defendants fairly

on notice of the claims against them, the Court finds that the allegations state a claim.

Accordingly, with respect to Defendant Larayne Ness, the motion is denied with respect to

the state law claims.

Yavapai Community Hospital Association and Judy Denton

Defendant Hospital is an Arizona non-profit corporation doing business as Yavapai

Regional Medical Center. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judy Denton was employed by

said Hospital. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judy Denton reviewed the photographs taken

by Defendant Larayne Ness and stated that she concurred with Ness’s diagnosis. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Hospital is vicariously responsible for the acts and omissions of

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Defendant Judy Denton under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Plaintiff further alleges

that Defendants Hospital and Judy Denton are state actors under color of state law as that

term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton, and John Doe Denton argue that they are not

proper parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are not state actors. Plaintiff counters

that a private person may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they willfully

participate in joint action with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.

As stated earlier in this Order, a bare allegation of joint action between private persons

and state officials will not overcome a motion to dismiss. DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207

F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff has not presented factual allegations of joint action

as to Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton and John Doe Denton. Thus, despite the liberal

notice pleading standard, the Plaintiff’s claim of joint action cannot stand. See id. This is

without prejudice to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint to cure

the deficiencies of Count Nine as to Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton and John Doe

Denton.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton and John Doe Denton argue that the Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim. The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint and finds

that it does not appear beyond doubt that Plaintiff cannot prove any facts in support of his

claims that would entitle him to relief. Because the rules require only allegations sufficient

to put Defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them, the Court finds that the

allegations state a claim. Accordingly, with respect to Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton and

John Doe Denton, the motion is denied with respect to the state law claims.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

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The Court's previous Order of August 25, 2006, dismissed defendants that had not

filed motions to dismiss. Because the Court is vacating the August 25, 2006 Order, those

Defendants remain in the case.

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (doc. #61) is 

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s previous Order of August 25, 

2006, (doc. #57) is VACATED.4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant State of Arizona’s Motion to 

Dismiss (doc. #16) is GRANTED without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Mario Gabaldon’s Motion to 

Dismiss (doc. #22) is GRANTED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Donna Gabaldon’s Motion to 

Dismiss (doc. #46) is GRANTED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Larayne Ness’s Motion to Dismiss

(doc. #42) is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. With respect to the state law

claims, the motion is denied without prejudice to re-urge the statute of limitations defense

on summary judgment. With respect to Count Nine of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,

Defendant Larayne Ness is dismissed, with leave to amend, and, accordingly,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff will be given 20 days to cure the

deficiencies of Count Nine of his Amended Complaint as to Defendant Larayne Ness.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton, and John

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Doe Denton’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. #19) is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN

PART. With respect to the state law claims, the motion is denied. With respect to Count

Nine of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Defendants Hospital, Judy Denton and John Doe

Denton are dismissed, with leave to amend, and, accordingly,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff will be given 20 days to cure the

deficiencies of Count Nine of his Amended Complaint as to Defendants Hospital, Judy

Denton, and John Doe Denton.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2006.

Case 3:05-cv-03130-JAT Document 75 Filed 12/07/06 Page 14 of 14