Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02266/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02266-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAUL GARCIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNKNOWN, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-2266 JAM AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner at Mule Creek State Prison, proceeds pro se in this civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is referred to the undersigned United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 302(c), and Local General 

Order No. 262. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants petitioner’s application to 

proceed in forma pauperis but dismisses plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. The court 

informs plaintiff of the requirements for stating cognizable claims against specifically identified 

defendants, and the factors for considering a request for appointment of counsel. 

I. In Forma Pauperis Application 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 6, will be 

granted. 

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 Plaintiff is still required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly 

payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust 

account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court 

each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

II. Request for Appointment of Counsel 

In various parts of the complaint, plaintiff appears to seek appointment of counsel. The 

exhibits to the complaint indicate that plaintiff is of advanced age with multiple health problems, 

including organic brain damage, lung tumors, diminished hearing and sight, and a learning 

disability. It appears that plaintiff had the assistance of another inmate in the preparation of his 

complaint. Although plaintiff has not formally requested appointment of counsel, he is presently 

informed of the factors considered by the court in reviewing such a request. As emphasized 

below, a threshold requirement for making such request is a complaint that states potentially 

cognizable claims for relief. 

District courts lack authority to require an attorney to represent an indigent prisoner in a 

Section 1983 case. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in 

exceptional circumstances, the court may request that an attorney voluntarily represent such a 

plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether 

“exceptional circumstances” exist in a given case, the court must consider plaintiff’s likelihood of 

success on the merits of his claims, as well as plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims pro se in 

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. 

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Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library 

access, do not establish exceptional circumstances warranting the voluntary assistance of counsel. 

 A request for appointment of counsel should be clearly made in a separate document filed 

with the court, together with an amended complaint that states potentially meritorious claims 

against specific defendants. Plaintiff must also demonstrate how his own circumstances in 

pursuing this litigation are unique, when compared to the circumstances of other prisoners 

pursuing their own civil rights claims, and how his unique circumstances render it necessary to 

obtain the assistance of counsel in this action. 

III. Screening of the Complaint 

 Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed September 29, 2014, makes various allegations but 

identifies no defendant by name. The following guidance informs plaintiff of the requirements 

for setting forth, in an amended complaint, all pertinent factual allegations and the specific legal 

claims asserted against specific defendants; the court also provides guidance concerning the 

elements underlying the legal claims that plaintiff appears to be pursuing. 

 A. Screening Requirements 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

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 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. 

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a 

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in 

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in plaintiff’s favor, 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Complaint 

 1. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 In his original complaint, plaintiff alleges that unidentified correctional staff at Pleasant 

Valley State Prison ( plaintiff’s prior place of incarceration) failed to protect plaintiff from 

excessive physical force by three correctional officers, by “failing to stop plaintiff being kicked 

punched and carried by . . . handcuffs behind plaintiff’s back, and dragging plaintiff breaking 

plaintiff’s arm and damaging his ribs.” (sic) ECF No. 1 at 3. Following this incident, the 

complaint alleges that unidentified medical and correctional staff at Mule Creek State Prison 

(plaintiff’s current place of incarceration) denied plaintiff medical treatment for his injuries and 

pain, and continue to deny plaintiff appropriate medical care. Id. at 3-4. The complaint also 

asserts that plaintiff “is being retaliated against for asserting his rights in this matter on a daily 

basis.” Id. at 4. 

 2. Screening 

 In general, the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the 

court is unable to identify any cognizable claim for relief. Although the Federal Rules adopt a 

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to all defendants of the legal claims 

against them, by plainly and succinctly identifying the factual allegations that support the 

elements of each legal claim against each defendant. Jones v. Community Redevelopment 

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Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Simply put, plaintiff must clearly identify the 

allegedly unconstitutional conduct of each defendant. 

 Plaintiff must specifically identify each defendant. The use of “Doe” defendants is not 

favored in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Because plaintiff has identified only Doe defendants, all defendants must be must be dismissed 

without prejudice. In an amended complaint, plaintiff must name at least one defendant. If 

plaintiff later learns the identity of a Doe defendant through discovery or other means, he may 

move to file a further amended complaint to add the newly-named defendant. Brass v. County of 

Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 When identifying the defendants in this action, plaintiff is informed that supervisory 

officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates on any theory of vicarious 

liability. A supervisor may be liable based only on “(1) his or her personal involvement in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987)). Thus, “[a]lthough there is no 

pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a supervisor is liable for the acts of his 

subordinates ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations 

[of subordinates] and failed to act to prevent them.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County School Bd. 

of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, “[s]upervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the 

constitutional violation.’” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (quoted with approval in Hansen, 

885 F.2d at 646). 

 Additional problems beset the complaint because it challenges matters at two different 

correctional institutions. Rule 18, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, precludes the inclusion of 

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unrelated claims against different defendants in a single pleading. Unrelated claims against 

different defendants must be pursued in multiple lawsuits. 

The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party 

asserting a claim . . . may join, [] as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims . . . as the party has against an opposing 

party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but 

Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated 

Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different 

defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of 

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but 

also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees – for the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous 

suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 

the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (joinder of 

defendants not permitted unless commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied). 

 For these reasons, plaintiff must consider whether his claims against correctional and/or 

medical staff at Pleasant Valley State Prison and Mule Creek State Prison should proceed in 

separate suits. This consideration should include an assessment whether plaintiff exhausted his 

administrative remedies at each institution against each defendant.1 

 More specifically, plaintiff is informed of the following requirements for stating 

cognizable claims for excessive force, failure to protect, deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs, and retaliation. Plaintiff may rely on these standards to challenge the specific conduct of 

specific defendants. 

 Excessive Force: “In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Eighth 

Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not ... use excessive physical force 

against prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1 (1992)). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force 

in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force was applied 

 

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 Plaintiff broadly alleges that he exhausted hi claims but that his administrative appeals were 

thrown away and stolen. See ECF No. 1 at 2. However, plaintiff should anticipate that 

defendants will move to dismiss any claim alleged in an amended complaint that plaintiff failed to 

exhaust through the prison grievance system. Plaintiff can obtain review of the documents in his 

Central File to determine which of his claims have been administratively exhausted. 

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in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)). When 

determining whether the force was excessive, we look to the “extent of the injury ..., the need for 

application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat 

‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity 

of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). While 

de minimis uses of physical force generally do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant 

injury need not be evident in the context of an excessive force claim, because “[w]hen prison 

officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency 

always are violated.” Hudson, at 9 (citing Whitley, at 327). 

 “The extent of injury may ... provide some indication of the amount of force applied.... 

[N]ot ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.’” 

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). “The Eighth 

Amendment's prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from 

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not 

of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ 

that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. [¶] 

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately 

counts.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-8 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Failure to Protect: A “failure to protect” claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a 

showing that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates 

the Eighth Amendment,” evidence must exist to show the defendant acted with a “sufficiently 

culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotation marks, 

emphasis and citations omitted). Under an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, 

“[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact 

subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, ... 

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and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact 

that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citations omitted). 

 Deliberate Indifference To Serious Medical Needs: The Ninth Circuit has provided the 

following summary of the standards for stating a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim premised 

on the alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs: 

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of 

two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by 

demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result 

in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This second 

prong . . . is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference. 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations, punctuation and quotation 

marks omitted); accord, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lemire v. 

CDCR, 726 F.3d 1062, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs, a prisoner must allege that a prison official “kn[ew] of and disregard [ed] 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

 Retaliation: “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 

(4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 

(9th Cir. 2005) (fn. and citations omitted). At the pleading stage, the “chilling” requirement is 

met if the “official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities.’” Id. at 568 (quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino 

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, direct and tangible harm will support a 

First Amendment retaliation claim even without demonstration of a chilling effect on the further 

exercise of a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. Rhodes, at 568 n.11. “[A] plaintiff who fails to 

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allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm” as a 

retaliatory adverse action. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Rhodes, 

408 F.3d at 568, n.11). 

The plaintiff need not prove that the alleged retaliatory action, in itself, violated a 

constitutional right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (1995) (to prevail on a retaliation claim, 

plaintiff need not “establish an independent constitutional interest” was violated); see also 

Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9th Cir.1997) (upholding jury determination of retaliation 

based on filing of a false rules violation report); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (transfer of 

prisoner to a different prison constituted adverse action for purposes of retaliation claim). Rather, 

the interest asserted in a retaliation claim is the right to be free of conditions that would not have 

been imposed but for the alleged retaliatory motive. Filing administrative grievances and 

initiating litigation are protected activities, and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate 

against prisoners for engaging in these activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. 

IV. Leave to File an Amended Complaint 

 For the reasons set forth above, this court finds that plaintiff’s complaint must be 

dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. However, plaintiff will be 

granted leave to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file a First Amended 

Complaint (FAC), the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant 

allegedly violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). 

There can be no liability under Section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection 

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 

167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without 

reference to any prior pleading. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 

Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Therefore, in an amended complaint, each claim 

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

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V. Conclusion 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 6, is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith. 

 3. Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. 

 4. Within thirty days after the filing date of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements set forth herein; the amended complaint must bear 

the docket number assigned this case and be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” 

 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff, together with service of this order, the 

following: (1) a blank form used by prisoners in this district for pursuing a civil rights action; and 

(2) in light of plaintiff’s allegations that all of this legal materials in this action have been seized, 

see ECF No. 7, a copy of plaintiff’s original complaint filed September 29, 2014, ECF No. 1. 

 6. Failure of plaintiff to timely file an amended complaint in accordance with this order 

will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

DATED: May 15, 2015. 

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