Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02174/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02174-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAMMIE LAMPHERE, Personal

Representative of the ESTATE OF

KRISTOPHOR JOHN LAMPHERE,

deceased, TAMMIE LAMPHERE,

individually, MARISSA CHACON,

individually, by and thru her mother,

TAMMIE LAMPHERE, BRIANA

CHACON, individually, by and through

her mother, TAMMIE LAMPHERE,

LINDA KOLM, Personal Representative

of the ESTATE OF KARL KOLB,

deceased, LINDA KOLB, individually,

BRETT KOLB, individually, DONALD L.

WOMBLE, SR., Personal Representative

of the ESTATE OF DONALD L.

WOMBLE, JR., deceased, DONALD L.

WOMBLE, SR., individually, JEANNE

WOMBLE, individually, KRISTIN

WOMBLE, individually, by and through

her mother, STACEY L. GARDNER,

AMBER WOMBLE, individually,

DONALD L. WOMBLE, III, by and

through his mother, STACEY L.

GARDNER,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06CV2174-LAB (JMA)

(Consol. w/06cv2192)

(Consol. w/06cv2175)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS' LOSS OF

CONSORTIUM CLAIMS

[Dkt Nos. 47, 49, 51, 53]

vs.

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case 3:06-cv-02174-LAB-JMA Document 83 Filed 03/24/08 Page 1 of 30
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This consolidated Federal Tort Claims Act case arising out of an airplane accident is

before the court on four Motions For Summary Judgment defendant the United States of

America ("Defendant") has filed for adjudication of the loss of consortium claims advanced

by certain sets of plaintiffs ("Motions"). Each set of plaintiffs filed an Opposition, and the

government filed separate Replies. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the

issues presented appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral argument. For the

reasons discussed below, the Motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' decedents are four of five passengers or crew on a New Mexico-based air

ambulance service plane which crashed shortly after takeoff from Brown Field Municipal

Airport in San Diego, California on October 24, 2004. Plaintiffs allege air traffic controllers,

employed by the Federal Aviation Administration, were negligent and caused the accident.

Defendant denies those allegations. The First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), consolidating

the claims in one pleading, presents multiple survival actions and claims for damages for

wrongful death and loss of consortium. Dkt No. 33. By Order entered May 10, 2007, this

court decided the choice of law issues, concluding the measure of damages will be decided

under the law of New Mexico, and liability issues will be decided under California law.

Dkt No. 23. The Motions seek summary adjudication of only the loss of consortium and loss

of guidance and counseling claims of only certain of the plaintiffs, on grounds those plaintiffs

cannot establish elements essential to recovery of damages under those theories.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Adjudication Of Issues

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56(c) empowers the court to enter summary

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby "secure the just, speedy

and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325,

327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

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as a matter of law. Rule 56(c); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261

F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit

under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A court

considering summary adjudication of issues does not make credibility determinations or

weigh conflicting evidence, as those determinations are for the trier of fact and are

inappropriate in summary proceedings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The court considers the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255. However, the court

is not required to accept conclusory allegations nor does the court assume the truth of legal

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Warren v. Fox

Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim

which that party "believes demonstrates absence of a genuine issue of material fact."

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The burden

then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a triable

issue. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Arpin, 261 F.3d at 919. Where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment for the defendant is appropriate if there is an absence of evidence to support the

claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 807

(9th Cir. 1998). To successfully rebut a properly supported motion, a plaintiff "must point

to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all

reasonable inference made in the plaintiffs' favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find

for the plaintiffs." Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir.

2000), citing, inter alia, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the party opposing the motion fails to

make a sufficient showing on an element of his or her case, the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-251

(summary judgment must be entered "if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict"); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

\\

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Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (there is no genuine issue for trial if, on the record

as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find in favor of the party opposing the motion).

B. Cognizable Claims For Loss Of Consortium Damages

In deciding these Motions, the court addresses only those tort claims seeking

recovery of damages for loss of consortium and related lost guidance and counseling

challenged by the Motions. The court expresses no opinion on the targeted Plaintiffs' ability

to prove liability or damages under their Wrongful Death Act causes of action or otherwise.

Loss of consortium is a limited claim cognizable under New Mexico common law.

That theory of recovery is available only to certain categories of claimants in their individual

capacities when the nature of their relationship with the injured or deceased person satisfies

certain intimacy criteria, and when a legal duty predicated on forseeability to the tortfeasor

of the loss to the claimant can be imputed. See, e.g., Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 847,

843 (N.M. 1994) (recognizing a loss of consortium cause of action in a spousal relationship,

defining the claim as "the emotional distress suffered by one spouse who loses the normal

company of his or her mate when the mate is physically injured due to the tortious conduct

of another," finding the duty of a potential tortfeasor to the spouse arises form the

foreseeability of damage to the close relationship typically shared by husband and wife). 

The duty analysis was framed by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Solon v. WEK

Drilling Co., Inc., 829 P.2d 645, 648, 650 (N.M. 1992) (holding any injuries to the parents of

an adult child who lived with them and provided them household services were not

foreseeable, and could therefore not support the parents' claims for loss of consortium and

loss of economic support associated with their son's death in a work-related accident); see

Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 783-84 (N.M. 1998) (tracing "a series

of New Mexico cases culminating in" the Solon "test for determining whether a duty is owed

to a plaintiff" in tort cases, and holding that test should be applied to loss of consortium

claims), citing Romero, 872 P.2d 840. The injury will be found foreseeable, and a plaintiff

may recover for loss of consortium, only in circumstances where the plaintiff had an "intimate

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1

 "The courts have variously phrased this intangible loss to a parent or child as the loss of

'aid, comfort, society, and companionship,' the loss of 'pleasure, society, comfort and

companionship,' or simply the loss 'of the family relationship.'" It has been observed that today the

term consortium 'is useful as a reference to benefits derived from any family member' and may be

used 'in the broader sense to describe the love, care and companionship of a parent, spouse, or

child.'" 27 AmJurPOF 2d 393, § 1 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

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familial relationship" with the decedent.1 Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 957 (N.M. 2003).

As traced by Defendant, the New Mexico courts appear to recognize two types of

"intimate familial relationships" warranting the availability of damages recovery for loss of

consortium: (1) the relationship between spouses or an equivalent relationship (Lozoya, 66

P.3d at 957, 961, 958) and (2) the relationship between a familial caretaker and a minor child

or an equivalent relationship (Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 784). Addressing the first relationship,

the Lozoya court held the district court should have permitted a loss of consortium damages

claim to go to the jury, even though the accident that injured the consortium claimant's

spouse occurred prior to the time they were married, based on a factual demonstration

establishing an intimate familial relationship: the consortium claimant and the injured person

had "been together" for over 30 years, had three children, had lived for fifteen years in a

house they had purchased, used the same last name, and filed joint tax returns. That court

rejected arguments that a loss of consortium claim cognizable in relationships other than that

of married couples would "create an impractical and unworkable cause of action." Lozoya,

66 P.3d at 957. "This would only be true if this Court does not do its duty of providing

sufficient guidance to lower courts when determining when the claim should be allowed," and

adopting as "greatly helpful" the criteria articulated in Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377

(N.J. 1994). Id. While acknowledging "a myriad of factors should be considered to

determine whether the relationship was significant enough to recover" (Id.), the Lozoya court

articulated several factors comprising the "intimate familial relationship" standard for

purposes of establishing a cognizable claim:

That standard must take into account the duration of the

relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of

common contributions to a life together, the extent and

quality of shared experience, and ... whether the plaintiff and

the injured person were members of the same household,

their emotional reliance on each other, the particulars of their

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day to day relationship, and the manner in which they related

to each other in attending to life's mundane requirements.

Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 957 (emphasis added) (holding while "not everyone who is engaged to

be married, living together, or assuming the roles of husband and wife (common law or not)

will be entitled to recover" for loss of consortium, the facts of the relationship convinced that

court to recognize the right of that particular cohabitant to present a claim for loss of

consortium to a jury associated with the tort victim's demise, and identifying a "presumption

. . . in favor of [finding] a close familial relationship when the claimant can prove the

elements . . . of mutual consent to be married followed by a mutual assumption of marital

rights, duties or obligations," with consent to be "implied from the parties' acts or conduct,

and the usual civil burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence should apply"), quoting

Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.

As for the second type of relationship, the Fernandez court held a particular

grandmother, upon proof of her unique position as the family caretaker and provider of

parental affection to her twenty-two month old grandchild, could recover for loss of

consortium when the child died as a result of taking a negligently filled prescription

medication. That court identified four factors that must be present before a compensable

relationship will be recognized between a familial caretaker and a child for purposes of

recovery of damages for loss of consortium:

We hold that such foreseeability can exist where: (1) the victim

was a minor; (2) the plaintiff was a familial care-taker, such as

a parent or grandparent, who lived with and cared for the

child for a significant period of time prior to the injury or

death; (3) the child was seriously physically injured or killed; and

(4) the plaintiff suffered emotional injury as a result of the loss

of the child's companionship, society, comfort, aid, and

protection. 

 

Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 784 (emphasis added).

Other New Mexico authority elaborates the Solon test for finding an "intimate familial

relationship" adequate to satisfy the standard in other factual circumstances. For example,

in Fitzjerrell v. City of Gallup, 79 P.3d 836, 840 (N.M. App. 2003), the Court of Appeals

traced the development of the cause of action and clarified its scope (citing, inter alia,

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Romero, Fernandez, and Lozoya), to emphasize "the loss of consortium is a claim to recover

compensation for damage to a relational interest with a person, not a legal interest."

Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d at 840. "Loss of consortium is thus derivative of other injuries and not an

injury in and of itself." Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d at 840. "Accordingly, a duty to a prospective

plaintiff springs only from the foreseeability of injury to that close and intimate bond." Id.,

citing, inter alia, Solon, 829 P.2d at 648. "The legal availability of relief depends on the

factual determination of whether a plaintiff has a significant enough relational bond with the

victim of a tort to recover for loss of consortium," characterized as one "sufficiently close and

intimate" with the victim. Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d at 840, citing Lozoya, 66 P.3d 948. 

The Fitzjerrell court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the loss of consortium

claims by parents and siblings, as a matter of law from the face of the pleading, holding

dismissal was premature in the absence of any factual record. Such family members are

not necessarily legally barred from asserting loss of consortium, if they can produce

evidence to show "that their relationships with Decedent was [sic] sufficiently close

financially, socially, or both, and if it was foreseeable that the injury to Decedent would harm

the relationships." Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d at 841 (emphasis added). The Fitzjerrell court

succinctly summarizes the nature of a compensable loss of consortium claim and

substantiates the existence of a manageable standard against which to measure the unique

factual circumstances of consortium claimants:

In order to determine whether a claimant has a sufficiently close

and intimate relationship with the victim, this Court should

consider several factors, including but not limited to: duration

of the relationship; mutual dependence; common contributions

to a life together; shared experience; living in the same

household; financial support and dependence; emotional

reliance on each other; qualities of their day to day

relationship; and the manner in which they related to each

other in attending to life's mundane requirements. . . . Lozoya's

"mutual dependence" factors include[], in our view, emotional,

physical, and financial support and dependence. Lozoya

makes clear that a relationship that creates a compensable

interest is one that is intimate, protective, interdependent, and

intertwined in functional (the way the people in the relationship

meet day-to-day situations together), financially interdependent,

and temporal ways (spending time together at least to the

extent of living together in the same household). . . . When

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added to the elements of the cause of action enunciated in

Fernandez, these factors form a cogent picture of the legal

requirements that are necessary to maintain a claim for loss

of consortium. It is clear that the purpose of this cause of

action is not to compensate claimants for grief they suffer

as a result of their own upset, but to compensate an injury

to a relationship they shared with the injured or deceased

person. Loss of consortium is thus derivative of other injuries

and not an injury in and of itself. . . . Accordingly, a duty to a

prospective plaintiff springs from the foreseeability of injury to

that close and intimate bond.

Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d 836, 840-41 (emphasis added) ("The elements consisting of the qualities

of the relationship that give rise to the claim are flexible in scope," so that the "legal

availability of relief depends on the factual determination of whether a plaintiff has a

significant enough relational bond with the victim of a tort to recover for loss of consortium").

The issue before this court is in a procedural posture different from that in the

Fitzjerrell case. Plaintiffs here have had the opportunity to present an evidentiary record

from which a reasonable jury could find the requisite "intimate familial relationship" and a

duty imputable to the alleged tortfeasor adequate to warrant an award of damages. Applying

Rule 56 standards to the evidentiary record presented, this court may determine whether

Plaintiffs have carried their shifted burden to identify triable issues of material fact associated

with the standard New Mexico applies to authorize loss of consortium damages recoveries

and whether, on the record as a whole, a rational trier of fact could find in favor of the parties

opposing summary judgment of those claims. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; see also

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-251. If the facts of the particular relationship upon which the

plaintiff sues reveal it was not sufficiently interdependent in functional, financial, and

temporal ways to qualify as an "intimate familial relationship," this court is not persuaded it

may not make that finding as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs and Defendant dispute whether the court may make a pre-trial determination

as a matter of law whether a loss of consortium claim is compensable. That divergence

appears to arise from observations in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Luebbers, 119 P.3d

169 (N.M. App. 2005), cert. quashed, 146 P.3d 810 (2006) (construing an automobile

insurance policy and holding a child's status as a four-week-old fetus at the time of his

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2

 The Luebbers court found "the viability of the fetus is not dispositive in cases of prenatal

injury when the infant is born alive," and should also "not be dispositive in cases, such as the present

one, where the alleged injury occurred after birth" [i.e., loss of ability to develop a parental

relationship]. Luebbers, 119 P. 3d at 178 ("Thus, viability of the fetus at the time of injury to the

parent should not be the dispositive issue in separating those children who may recover for loss of

consortium form those who may not") (citation omitted).

3

 "We acknowledge that fetuses pose a particular problem in the context of loss of parental

consortium since the emotional aspect of the parent-child relationship is not allowed to be created

if the parent dies before the child's birth. . . . The injury here is the inability to form any parental

relationship rather than the loss of an established bond. We do not see this as fatal to the claim.

The issue is fundamentally one of factual proof. Plaintiffs such as Brian Jr. have the burden of

proving the nature and quality of the relationship lost. Proof will necessarily be different for different

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father's death was not fatal to a claim for loss of parental consortium, on grounds the injury

in those circumstances was the inability to form any parental relationship, rather than the

loss of an established bond, and the difficulty of proving what type of parent his father was

likely to be affected only the potential value of the claim).2 The Luebbers court observed "[i]t

is better to allow the fact finder to assess the relative strength of the claims after a full factual

hearing" rather than for the court to create a "bright line rule" with respect to the timing when

a child's loss of consortium claim may become cognizable among very young infants or a

parent's pre-birth death. Luebbers,199 P.3d at 180.

This approach mirrors the approach adopted by the [New

Mexico] Supreme Court in Lozoya, in that it allows inquiry into

the nature and quality of the relationship to determine whether

a claim is compensable rather than relying on the existence of

a particular legal relationship as a dividing point. The

distinction is that in this case we start with a recognized

legal relationship and allow the parties to litigate the value of

the claims based on the likely nature of the relationship which

was not allowed to come into existence.

Luebbers,199 P.3d at 180-81, 178 (an approach devised to accommodate "a classic

example of a temporal disconnect between a wrongful act and the injury it ultimately

causes"), citing Crumpton v. Gates, 9947 F.2d 1418, 1420-24 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim by a son for the loss of his liberty interest in familial relations arising

out of the police killing of his father when he was a two-month-old fetus, construed by the

Luebbers court as analogous to a loss of consortium claim, because the loss "can only be

felt after birth when the plaintiff was unquestionably a 'person,'" noting "Crumpton held that

the child was permitted to recover and his cause of action did not accrue until his birth").3

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children. It could be that Brian Jr. will not be able to muster much admissible evidence as to the type

of parent Father was likely to be," although "such a difficulty should not defeat the claim as a matter

of law," but rather "only affect the potential value of the claim." Luebbers, 119 P.3d at 180, citing,

inter alia, Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d 836.

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However, this court finds the Luebbers authority to be applicable to the unique

circumstance examined by that court, not implicated in any of the challenged loss of

consortium claims in these Motions. The Luebbers authority informs decisions related to that

unique circumstance: i.e., the injury was not the loss of an established relationship, but

rather the loss of an ability to form any parental relationship. None of the challenged loss

of consortium claims in these Motions falls outside the scope of existing relationship analysis

examined from the perspective of the time of their decedents' deaths. Unlike in Luebbers,

the recognition of a "legal relationship" is not presumed, but rather is the consortium

claimant's burden to prove before any damages valuation can legitimately proceed. 

The Luebbers authority nevertheless does support the proposition a child's loss of

consortium of a parent is a cognizable cause of action separate from a wrongful death claim,

upon a proper factual showing of the requisite intimate familial relationship with that

parent at the time of the loss. See Luebbers, 119 P.3d at 179 ("Given the development of

loss of consortium law in New Mexico," citing, inter alia, Romero, Fernandez, Lozoya, and

Fitzjerrell, the court held "upon the death of a parent, a minor child may pursue a separate

claim for loss of parental consortium outside of a wrongful death action") (emphasis added).

The Lubbers court clarified: "Brien Jr. may bring his loss of consortium claim separately, but

his damages are limited to the value to him of the loss of Father's love, care, society,

companionship, and the like," agreeing "with other jurisdictions that have 'awarded damages

for lost guidance and counseling independent of damages for loss of consortium or other

losses.'") Luebbers, 119 P.3d at 180 (citation omitted). Defendant does not dispute loss of

parental consortium claims "have a place in [New Mexico's] tort jurisprudence," but only that

these plaintiffs cannot recover damages under that theory with respect to their particular

decedent parents or step parents. 

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Unlike the Luebbers infant, all these plaintiffs had existingrelationships the nature and

quality of which they must prove through evidence in support of facts to be measured against

the "intimate familial relationship" factors evolved by the New Mexico courts to gauge

whether the impact of the loss should be compensable in tort at all. Loss of consortium

damages are not intended to "compensate claimants for grief they suffer as a result of their

own upset," such as their sorrow, lost future hopes, bittersweet memories, mental distress,

regrets or remorse the death forecloses for amendment, however foreseeable. Fitzjerrell,

79 P.3d at 840-41. Rather, entitlement to recovery depends on a demonstration of the

requisite actual relationships the claimants shared with their decedents at the time of death.

Plaintiffs argue the quality of their relationships with their decedents "must be

established by evidence at trial" (Lamphere Opp. P&A 4:17-18), and those claims

necessarily involve "peculiar and unique facts . . . not amenable to any set formula nor can

the claim be subject to a fixed set of factors" for evaluating the relationships (Lamphere Opp.

P&A 9:1-4). The court does not find facts in deciding whether an issue must be summarily

adjudicated for failure of an opposing party to carry its burden. Defendant here adequately

shifted the burden to plaintiffs to produce evidence creating a triable issue of material fact

on the requisite relationship based on which a reasonable jury could award them damages

for loss of consortium. While not required to prove their case at this stage in the

proceedings, plaintiffs must nevertheless produce some evidence to persuade the court a

rational trier of fact could find in their favor on the issue under controlling law. 

In consideration of the authority discussed above, the courtrejectsPlaintiffs' argument

New Mexico has no legal test for relationships which may give rise to a right to recover for

loss of consortium. See, e.g., Lamphere Opp. pp. 4-10. Plaintiffs appear to dispute New

Mexico decisional law would ever permit the court to summarily adjudicate the issue due to

the variety and "fact driven" nature of loss of consortium claims, arguing: "[t]here is no set

rule that applies across the board; the factors for consideration by a trial Court are based

upon the unique facts and relationships of the loss of consortium claimants with the victim."

Opp. 20:16-18. However, the "fact-driven" nature of the analysis is accommodated by

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Rule 56 standards, describing the respective evidentiary burdens of the parties moving for

and opposing summary adjudication as a matter of law and instructing the court to summarily

adjudicate factually unsupported claims or defenses. The "relationship[] of the loss of

consortium claimant[] with the victim" is precisely the showing necessary to raise a triable

issue of material fact on the required element of an "intimate familial relationship," as

differentiated from other close family relationships. When objective behavior substantiated

in the evidentiary record establishes on its face the interactions and conduct of the

consortium claimant and the decedent fall short of the indicia of "intimate familial

relationship," as elaborated in the case law defining that tort for purposes of recovery of

damages for a parent's, child's, or sibling's loss of the decedent's society or support essential

to a finding of liability, this court concludes the quality of the relationship need not be tried

to a jury because the claimant cannot recover damages under that theory as a matter of law.

The jury's job is to value the loss to consortium claimants of those "intimate familial

relationships" recognized as compensable losses. Absent a showing of triable issues of

material fact whether the requisite relationship existed to support a potential recovery of

damages, the court may find as a matter of law the legal standard cannot be met. 

In this case, each of the consortium claimants had a pre-existing relationship with their

decedents, and an evidentiary record exists as to their actual connections and interactions

with their decedents against which the elements of the "intimate familial relationship"

showing can be compared. If that threshold is not met, in this court's view an essential

element of a compensable loss under that legal theory is absent, precluding litigation of the

value of the claim. The "likely nature of the relationship" question in the Luebbers-type case,

supporting a presumption of a potentially compensable claim, is replaced here by actual

relationships the nature of which plaintiffs must substantiate. While Plaintiffs are correct a

court applying Rule 56 standards may not find facts, the court must grant summary judgment

where parties with the burden of truth at trial fail to identify facts from which a trier of fact

could find in their favor on the issue. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on all the loss of

consortium claims. Unless they demonstrate trial of the claims is warranted, the issue of

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valuation of damages predicated on the existence of a viable claim does not arise. The court

finds it can decide these Motions as a matter of law in consideration of all the facts

supported by the relevant evidence presented, applying New Mexico law defining the factors

controlling potential recovery for loss of consortium. Merely because loss of consortium

claims are of a "fluid and fact-dependent nature" (Lamphere Opp. 10:2) does not remove

them from the scope of Rule 56 review before trial. 

III. MERITS

The material facts are essentially undisputed. The motion papers elaborate the

parties' differing constructions of how the facts should be characterized in consideration of

factors New Mexico common law has evolved to inform the question whether the nature of

the relationship of each consortium claimant with his or her decedent rises to the requisite

level of interdependent intimacy to warrant submitting the claim to a jury for recovery of

damages. The court decides each Motion in consideration of the essential elements for

recovery of damages for loss of consortium: (1) a factual demonstration of a sufficiently

intimate familial relationship between the particular claimant and the decedent existing at the

time of the death; and (2) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, to

be determined as a matter of law. See e.g., Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 957. While in no way

intending to minimize their grief and bereavement, for the reasons discussed below, the

court finds none of the plaintiffs targeted by Defendant's Motions has demonstrated the

degree of "intimate familial relationship" with his or her decedent from which a reasonable

jury could award them tort damages for loss of consortium. 

In reviewing the evidence under Rule 56 standards, the court draws the reasonable

inferences from the evidence presented each of the loss of consortium plaintiffs cared very

much for their decedent, and experienced sincere grief, sorrow, and bereavement at his loss.

Nevertheless, the court must winnow the Opposition facts relevant to the factors required to

establish the requisite "intimate familial relationship" at the time their decedent died from

facts describing historical relationships or projections of future circumstances in which the

decedent's presence will be missed. The court evaluates the extent of mutual support,

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interdependence, and the like as they existed at the time of death in each claimant's

individual relationship to his or her decedent as informing the determination whether each

lost a relationship potentially compensable under a loss of consortium theory. 

A. Lamphere Plaintiffs

The Lamphere plaintiffs are Tammie Lamphere, the wife and personal representative

of the estate of decedent Kristopher John Lamphere, a 30-year-old professional pilot at the

time of his death, and his heirs, identified in addition to his wife as his two stepchildren, his

brother, his three sisters, his father, and his mother. FAC ¶ 11. Defendant seeks summary

adjudication of the loss of consortium claims only as to the individual claims of: Mr.

Lamphere's parents, Richard and Lavonne Lamphere; his sisters Kristin Ferris and Kathleen

A. Attia-Alla; and his stepdaughters, Brianna Chacon and Marissa Chacon. Dkt No. 49.

Defendant argues the undisputed facts show the requisite relationship did not exist between

the decedent and any of those plaintiffs, so that their individual claims must fail as a matter

of law. Those plaintiffs oppose the Motion, contending they have adequate factual support

to sustain their loss of consortium claims and genuine issues of disputed material fact

preclude summary adjudication. Opp. 3:11-13. 

 Many of the facts provided to oppose summary adjudication furnish only context,

narrative descriptions of plaintiffs' personal histories, or character traits of their decedent,

frequently pre-dating by many years the pertinent time period of Mr. Lamphere's October

2004 death from which the court (applying Rule 56 standards) or any eventual factfinder

(applying preponderance of the evidence standards) must judge the adequacy of the

evidentiary showing. Likewise, representations regarding the naturally distressing emotional

effects of the loss of their decedent do not advance the required showing. Opp. pp. 13-19.

1. Parents

The undisputed evidentiary record before the court substantiates that in October

2004, Mr. Lamphere's parents resided in Albuquerque, New Mexico, but lived separately

from their son. Mr. Lamphere, aged 30 years at the time of his death, had moved to

Albuquerque in 2002 for a job opportunity after serving in the Air Force. He had not lived

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with his parents since 1992, with the exception of the month prior to his June 2004 marriage,

before moving in with his wife and her young daughters. His parents had lived in North

Dakota, Nebraska, and Colorado in the years since their son left the family home after high

school, while he had lived primarily in other states. Until 1997, he had shared an annual trip

with his father, enjoying fishing, hunting, skiiing, snow mobiling, and flying together. 

Mr. Lamphere saw his parents several times a week when they all resided in

Albuquerque, including with his new wife after their marriage. The two couples went to

church together. Mr. Lamphere helped his parents make decisions and assisted around

their house due to his father's heart condition, which prevented him from engaging in any

strenuous activity. They spoke on the telephone almost daily. Mr. Lamphere's

companionship was a source of comfort and emotional support for both his parents. Mr. and

Mrs. Lamphere received no financial support from their son nor he from them. Since his

death, his parents suffer from depression, anxiety, insomnia, loss of appetite, and weight

loss. They regret their son never had his own child, something he badly wanted. As loving

parents of a loving son, their lives are naturally forever changed by his loss.

In consideration of the evidentiary record presented, the court finds no genuine issue

of material fact emerges to support the requisite interdependence essential to establish the

"intimate familial relationship" prerequisite to recovery by parents of a decedent for loss of

consortium foreseeable by a tortfeasor. Mr. Lamphere was an adult, not a minor child. He

had not shared a household with his parents for any significant duration in the twelve years

preceding his death. He did not contribute to their financial support. The nature of the

interdependence as it emerges from undisputed facts cannot reasonably be construed as

other than that typically shared by fond family members who reside in the same vicinity. The

Lampheres have identified no unique circumstance from which a reasonable factfinder could

differentiate their relationship with their adult son at the time of his death from that of any

other similarly situated family. The Motion for summary adjudication of the loss of

consortium claim in Defendant's favor is accordingly GRANTED with respect to Richard and

Lavonne Lamphere.

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2. Siblings

Kristin Ferris is Mr. Lamphere's older sister, but closest to him in age of all the

siblings. They both lived in the family home until she moved out to attend college locally in

1988, but they maintained daily contact until he graduated from high school in 1992 and

moved away to serve in the military. Thereafter, she and he spoke on the phone at least

once a month and exchanged cards. Ms. Ferris wishes she could have seen her brother

more, but the geographical distance and financial burden of traveling limited such visits. She

saw Mr. Lamphere three times in the five years preceding his death. She has since had

trouble sleeping and has nightmares about the air crash.

Kathleen Attia-Alla is another older sister, sixteen years her brother's senior, and the

eldest child at home during his early childhood. She lived in the Lamphere family home until

she moved away to attend college in 1980, but saw her brother on her visits home from

college almost every weekend, as well as on holidays or at family gatherings until he moved

away in 1992. She would talk with him about his career goals, and they exchanged news

of each other's lives and interests after both were grown and out of the house, talking on the

phone at least once a week and exchanging e-mail. Ms. Attia-Alla visited her brother in

California for ten days in 2002. She saw him two times in the five years preceding his death.

Both these consortium claimants lived in North Dakota at the time of the accident.

Neither shared a household with Mr. Lamphere. Neither received financial support from him.

Both attest to an emptiness created in their lives by the death of their brother, and their

sadness at holidays and birthdays without him. Nevertheless, the court finds by no

reasonable inference from the evidence presented could it be found Mr. Lamphere and

either sister shared uniquely intertwined lives of a quality or nature adequate to support

recovery under a loss of consortium theory. They evince none of the factors found by New

Mexico courts to warrant recognition of a separate tort theory of recovery and attribution of

a duty to a tortfeasor to compensate either of them for the loss of the relationship. Their

evidence describes no more than a fond relationship between independent adult siblings.

The evidence identifies no particular circumstance from which a reasonable factfinder could

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differentiate their relationships with their brother at the time of his death from that in any

other similarly situated family. The Motion for summary adjudication of the loss of

consortium claim in Defendant's favor is accordingly GRANTED with respect to Kristin Ferris

and Kathleen Attia-Alla.

3. Step-Children

The undisputed facts establish Briana Chacon and Marissa Chacon met Mr.

Lamphere in February 2003, before he began dating their mother. They lived with him and

their mother for four months, from the time of their marriage in June 2004 until the October

2004 accident. Briana was born in May 1993, and Marissa was born in May 1991. Their

parents had divorced in 2001, with both natural parents maintaining joint custody.

Briana's and Marissa's declarations substantiate adjustment problems not unusual

from stepparent/stepchild frictions, but which were being resolved as the girls resolved their

initial fears Mr. Lamphere might be trying to take their father's place. They participated in

blended family counseling to help them overcome their anger at their parents' divorce and

to help them understand their growing relationship with Mr. Lamphere in his role as

stepfather. They took vacations together. He was very kind to them and was fun to be with.

They appreciated his love for their mother. He helped them with homework and did things

with them such as cooking and swimming and gave them emotional support, despite their

early antagonism toward him. After Mr. Lamphere's parents moved to Albuquerque in the

summer of 2003, the girls also spent a lot of time with their step-grandparents. 

Briana experienced shock at the news of the air crash. She feels her relationship with

her stepfather was cut short, with a big part of her life just beginning then suddenly taken

away. Marissa feels bad for not spending more time getting closer to her stepfather and for

not always treating him as nicely as he treated her. She regrets the time she wasted being

stubborn, and feels a big hole in her life without him. 

The court finds, by any frame of reference, the four-month duration of the shared

household relationship allegedly giving rise to a loss of consortium claim by Mr. Lamphere's

stepchildren was too short to persuade any reasonable factfinder the requisite intimate and

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interdependent relationship had been established. Rather, undisputed facts demonstrate

the girls' primary caretakers and objects of their emotional dependency continued to be

mother and their biological father, who shared joint custody of them and to whom the girls

looked for companionship, society, comfort, aid, and protection rather then to their

stepfather, to whom they were admittedly slow to warm. There is no evidence of any plans

to alter that arrangement or for Mr. Lamphere to adopt his wife's daughters. 

Plaintiffs do not refute "no reported case in New Mexico has ever dealt with a claim

for loss of consortium by a stepchild." Mot. P&A 5:10-11. Defendant identifies Luebbers as

the one reported case in New Mexico to recognize a claim for loss of consortium by a

biological child. The court distinguishes that case above as predicated on a unique

circumstance in the loss of consortium context requiring a modified recovery theory, because

it dealt with the loss of an opportunity to have any relationship with a parent killed before the

child's birth rather than applying the analysis to characterize an existing relationship under

the legal standard for finding an "intimate familial relationship." That court presumed the

existence of an "intimate familial relationship," whereas here the court must determine

whether these consortium claimants have any evidence from which such a finding could be

made. The Luebbers court fashioned a remedy in reliance on the legal relationship between

a child unborn at the time of his father's death, rather than performing the usual analysis to

identify the presence or absence of factors suggesting the requisite relationship existed

between the consortium claimant and the decedent. The court is unpersuaded by plaintiffs'

attempt to save this claim in reliance on Luebbers. No legal relationship through formal

custody or adoption existed between the Mr. Lamphere and his stepdaughters. With respect

to the intimacy and caretaker factors, the evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue of

fact these minor children looked primarily to Mr. Lamphere for such support. Their mother

worked, and the children were not financially dependent on him rather than on their biological

parents.

In addition to Mr. Lamphere's step-daughters' loss of consortium claim, the FAC also

asserts a claim for "lost guidance and counseling" on their behalf. A minor's lost guidance

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4

 Defendant also argues the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act requires that a decedent have

adopted the minor children, statutorily or equitably, in order for them to be able to state any damages

claim. N.M. STAT. § 41-2-1. No statutory claims are before the court on these Motions, and the court

expresses no opinion on that issue.

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and counseling "is a pecuniary injury under the [Wrongful Death] Act," and such damages

are to be included as part of the value of the decedent's survivors under the Act. Romero,

872 P.2d at 847. The Romero court recognized a cause of action by a minor child for loss

of parental guidance and counseling as part of a claim for loss of spousal consortium, noting

"the cause of action by a minor child for loss of guidance and counseling has not been

considered by this Court, because the basis for the action was seen as rooted in loss of

consortium." Id., at 842. However, the Luebbers court acknowledged Romero did not limit

children to a remedy under the Wrongful Death Act and "did not bar an independent cause

of action for loss of parental consortium as such." Luebbers, 119 P.3d at 180 (distinguishing

the type of damages a minor child can pursue outside a true wrongful death action,

eliminating any pecuniary damages under a loss of consortium/loss of guidance theory for

the parent's medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost earnings, or the value of the parent's

life), quoting Romero, 872 P.2d at 846. 

Plaintiffs do not refute Defendant's contention New Mexico has not dealt with a claim

by a stepchild for lost guidance and counseling, coming closest in Otero v. City of

Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354 (N.M. App. 1998). The Otero, court made recovery under that

theory contingent upon proof of legal or equitable adoption.4 Mr. Lamphere's stepchildren

attempt no such showing, nor can any reasonable inference be drawn they could

conceivably prove the requisite relationship with him in consideration of their on-going

relationship with their biological father. The Motion for summary adjudication of the loss of

consortium and loss of guidance and counseling claims in Defendant's favor is accordingly

GRANTED with respect to Briana and Marissa Chacon.

4. The Lamphere Plaintiffs Have Not Carried Their Rule 56 Burden

In summary, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, the court finds none of

the Lamphere consortium claimants targeted in Defendant's Motion has carried his or her

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burden to defeat summary adjudication of that tort claim under New Mexico law. Defendant

demonstrates, as a matter of law on undisputed facts, at the time of the accident none of

them had a sufficiently intimate familial relationship with their decedent to recover damages

under that theory. Moreover, the court is not persuaded by any of the showings Defendant

reasonably can be found to have had a foreseeable, actionable duty towards the parents of

a 30-year-old man with whom he had not shared a household for more than a decade prior

to his death, or to geographically distant adult siblings, or to his stepchildren of four months

duration who remained emotionally, financially, and legally dependent upon their biological

father and mother. Plaintiffs produce no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find

the social interactions or the financial support Mr. Lamphere provided to any of them either

existed or surpassed the normal familial interactions to be expected in any similar family

units among themselves. Under this court's reading of New Mexico authority, it is insufficient

to sustain a loss of consortium claim based solely on an allegedly "strong, caring, emotional

bond." See Opp. 20:3-5. In the absence of evidence of at least some of the factors used

to demarcate a loss of consortium claim actionable as a tort from emotional distress and

grief associated with the death of a loved one, the court finds Defendant's Motion must be

GRANTED with respect to the targeted claims of these Lamphere plaintiffs. The court of

course expresses no opinion on the issues associated with these plaintiffs' Wrongful Death

theories nor their potential for recovery of damages under any other FAC theory.

B. Womble Plaintiffs

The applicable law and reasoning the court applied in deciding the Lamphere Motion

apply equally to the loss of consortium claims of the parents and stepchild of decedent

Donald Womble, Jr., who was 45 years old when he perished in the plane crash. The

necessarily idiosyncratic factual underpinnigs of each individual claimant's relationship to his

or her decedent, including those of Mr. Womble's own children, are addressed separately

below to support the result. The court again perceives from the factual record presented

each of the Womble plaintiffs targeted by the Motion cared very much for their decedent, and

experiences sincere grief, sorrow, and bereavement at his loss. 

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1. Parents

Consortium claimants Donald Womble, Sr. and Jeanne Womble are the parents of

Donald Womble, Jr., their decedent. As pertinent here, it is undisputed he resided in

Edgewood, New Mexico, a suburb of Albuquerque, from 1995 until the 2004 accident. His

parents lived in Albuquerque. He had lunch with his father at least once a month. Mr. and

Mrs. Womble testified they taught their son to be independent, and he moved out of their

house to focus on his career when he became an adult. They characterize their relationship

with him at the time of his death as "loving and supportive." Decl. D. Womble, Gilman Exh.3;

Decl. J. Womble, Gilman Exh. 2. They describe their responses to his death as causing

grief, anxiety, insomnia, depression, worsening medical conditions, and loss of the comfort

of having him there for their elderly years, as well as loss of the opportunity to fully repair

their relationship with him. 

Mrs. Womble describes their relationship with their son as "in a state of repair" at the

time of his death, due to some tension that had developed during a period of his involvement

with an ex-girlfriend before he married Laura Womble, his second wife. J. Womble Decl.,

Gilman Decl. Exh. 2 p. 3. Mr. Womble, Jr. apparently did not invite his parents to his small

second wedding, and they did not attend. Defendant relies on Mrs. Womble's deposition in

support of the facts: she had never met Laura Womble; her son never visited his mother,

and spoke with her only a few times a year; she could not remember the last time she visited

with him nor how long it took to drive from her house to his. J. Womble Depo. pp. 20-26,

Fowler Decl. Exh. I. Defendant highlights the absence of any financial interdependence

between the Wombles and their decedent, the infrequency of personal visits despite living

in the same area, and the absence of a shared household and daily experiences as

defeating a threshold showing of "intimate familial relationship" required for recovery of

damages under a loss of consortium theory. Defendant argues the absence of cohabitation,

absence of dependence on their son for material or personal assistance, lack of mutual

dependence or common contribution to a life together with him eliminates the foundation for

any compensable loss of consortium claim.

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 The court assumes the Kristin Womble Declaration contains an error where it states: "I

never had any desire to meet my biological father. Donald Womble, Jr. was my dad. No one else

could or ever can replace him. He even talked about legally adopting me." K. Womble Decl. p. 3,

Gilman Decl. Exh. 7. 

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Leaving aside the details about their relationship during Mr. Womble, Jr.'s childhood

and young adulthood as not informative of the nature or quality of the relationship at the

relevant time period, the court finds Mr. and Mrs. Womble fail to carry their shifted burden

on summary judgment to create a genuine issue of disputed material fact to save the claim.

They advance the same argument as the other consortium claimants in their Motions, i.e.

"the fact that Plaintiffs lost their [decedent] is subject to ruling as a matter of law. However,

the quality of the relationship between the Plaintiffs and [their decedent] must be established

by evidence at trial." Opp. 4:18-21, citing Luebbers, 119 P.3d 169. The court has construed

that case as distinguishable from the loss of consortium claims at issue in these Motions.

In addition, as discussed elsewhere in this ruling, summary judgment standards do not

preclude a decision on the bare ground that particularized facts must be considered in

deciding the Motions. The Motion for summary adjudication of the loss of consortium claim

in Defendant's favor is accordingly GRANTED with respect to Donald Womble, Sr. and

Jeanne Womble.

2. Natural Children

Consortium claimants Donald Womble, III and Kristin Womble are the biological

children of the decedent from his first marriage, to Stacey Gardener.5 Undisputed Fact Nos.

12, 13. Donald III was born in January 1989. Kristin was born in December 1986. Mr.

Womble, Jr. and Ms. Gardener divorced in July 1995. Their parents shared legal custody

after the divorce. The undisputed facts establish Donald III and Kristin lived with their father

full time in New Mexico from July 1995 until December 1999, the three and one-half years

after their parents' divorce. They visited their mother and half-sister, Amber Straubing (the

decedent's stepdaughter during his marriage to Ms. Gardener) every weekend while they

lived in Amarillo, Texas. Donald III and Kirstin moved in with their mother full-time in 1999

when their father started paramedic school and began sharing an apartment with a family

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friend to save money. They never lived with their father again. Their mother remarried.

Donald III and Kristin lived with their mother and their stepfather, Robert Gardener, after

1999. Kristin characterizes the relationship with their stepfather as good. He paid the

household bills and gave them emotional support. K. Womble Depo. p. 18, Gilman Decl.

Exh. 6. They moved to Illinois with their mother and stepfather. They visited their father

thereafter during school vacations and for holidays, three or four times a year. Depo. D.

Womble, III, Fowler Decl. Exh. K and Gilman Exh. 4; Decl. D. Womble, III, Gilman Decl. Exh.

5; Depo. K. Womble, Fowler Decl. Exh. L and Gillman Exh. 6; Decl. K. Womble, Gilman

Decl. Exh. 6. 

Mr. Womble, Jr. invited his children to move back to Albuquerque in 2002, when he

married his second wife, Laura, but the teenagers preferred to stay in Chicago where they

had become involved, although they characterize their relationship with their father as very

good despite the distance. He discussed with them how much money they needed for

school and clothes, and would reimburse their mother for half their expenses. He also sent

money to the children for birthdays and holidays. Gardener Decl., Gilman Decl. Exh. 10. 

Donald III spoke with his father two to four times a month, using a webcam so they

could see each other. D. Womble, III Decl. 2:16-18. He declares they discussed his school

and future plans, and he received guidance and comfort from him. His father planned to

help him with college tuition and living expenses. They visited the military academy in New

Mexico in 2001 together, in preparation for his joining the Air Force. He describes an effect

of his father's death as his no longer having a father to turn to when making tough decisions.

D. Womble III Decl. pp. 3-4. 

On undisputed facts, the court finds neither of Mr. Womble, Jr.'s consortium claimant

children shared a daily interdependence with him, financially or socially, and he had not had

physical custody of his children nor had he served as their primary caregiver for many years

before the accident. Those circumstances foreclose a finding of duty based on foreseeability

of the type of injury to these plaintiffs contemplated by New Mexico's test for "intimate

familial relationship" on the part of a potential tortfeasor. See Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 784.

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The Motion for summary adjudication of the loss of consortium claim in Defendant's favor

is accordingly GRANTED with respect to Donald Womble, III and Kristin Womble.

3. Step Child

 Consortium claimant Amber Straubing is the child of the decedent's former wife,

Stacey Gardener. The discussion of stepchild status associated with the legal analysis of

the Chacon consortium claimants, above, applies equally to this plaintiff. She was about

three years old when Mr. Womble, Jr. married her mother. Sometime in 1992, when she

was about 10 years old, her mother and stepfather decided it would be best for her to live

with her grandmother in Amarillo, Texas to attend school. After her divorce from the

decedent, Ms. Gardener also moved to Amarillo and remarried. Mr. Womble, Jr. never

adopted Amber, but she testified she did not know he was not her biological father until she

was 8 or 9 years old when such discussions came up. Straubing Depo. p. 16, Decl. p. 2;

Gilman Exhs. 8, 9. She never knew her biological father and considered her stepfather to

be her dad. Straubing Decl. p. 2.

Amber had not lived with the decedent since 1992. From 1992 until 1995, she spent

school vacations in New Mexico with her family, including her stepfather, and they visited her

on weekends. She also saw him on weekends thereafter, until 1998 or 1999 when she

moved with her mother, stepfather, and siblings to Chicago. After the move to Chicago, she

did not accompany Donald III and Kristin when they visited their father in New Mexico. She

not seen him in the five years before his death. She declares she spoke with him two or

three times a week by phone and webcam and testified they discussed her moving back to

Albuquerque to live near him. He helped pay her expenses. They spoke of her future plans

and goals for her career, of which he was very supportive. He intended to help with her

college tuition and living expenses, and wanted her to finish college. Straubing Decl. pp. 3-4.

Amber was nearly twenty-two when her stepfather died, as calculated from her December

1982 birth date and the October 2004 plane crash. She describes the effects of his loss as

increased anxiety, interfering with her ability to go anywhere, including to work. After the

accident, she was not able to sleep and still dreams about him. Straubing Decl. p. 4. 

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This court finds, on undisputed facts, Amber cannot possibly prove the mutual

dependence or day-to-day relationship of the kind necessary for her to prevail under a loss

of consortium theory of recovery applying New Mexico law, leaving aside the absence of

adoption. The Motion for summary adjudication of the loss of consortium claim in

Defendant's favor is accordingly GRANTED with respect to Amber Straubing.

4. The Womble Plaintiffs Have Not Carried Their Rule 56 Burden

As noted by Defendant, the Womble Plaintiffs "do not allege any facts to show that

their relationships were any more intimate than the typical relationship between a parent and

an adult child, or a parent and child who live thousands of miles apart." Reply 2:25-28. The

court concurs with Defendant: to find genuine issues of material fact requiring resolution by

a fact-finder on this evidentiary record, the court would have to expand New Mexico

impermissibly to conclude that state's loss of consortium cause of action/theory of recovery

extends to anyone claiming "the loss of opportunity to develop the relationship which might

have been." Reply 3:1-4, quoting Opp. 9:9. The court must concur the relationships those

plaintiffs describe "were not intimate, protective, interdependent, or intertwined in functional,

financially interdependent and temporal ways." Mot. P&A 8:1-3. The absence of familial

caretaking associated with a minor child (see Fernandez), and the failure to satisfy any of

the criteria discussed in Lozoya or Fitzjerrell preclude as a matter of law the potential for

them to recover under a loss of consortium theory. None of these plaintiffs demonstrates

he or she was making "common contributions to a life together" with their decedent. Reply

10:4-9. Plaintiffs' proffered explanations for the status of their relationships with their

decedent at the time of his death (i.e., living in separate households, geographical distance,

in the process of repairing the relationship, and the like) cannot substitute for the existence

of a contemporaneous "intimate familial relationship," absent which, irrespective of the

reasons the relationships were insufficiently intimate, the claim cannot proceed.

C. Larson Plaintiffs

Raymond and Gladys Larson are the parents of Laura Womble, who perished in the

airplane accident at the age of 47 years along with her husband, Donald Womble, Jr. In

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 The Larson declarations offer such observations as: her father, a minister, married her

to her first husband; Ms. Larson and Ms. Womble were discussing the possibility Ms. Womble and

her family might relocate to Florida to be near her parents, and they were exploring housing and

employment options there; Ms. Womble had always been a "thoughtful child," remembering special

days with gifts; mother and daughter enjoyed spending time together when they visited and shared

interests; Ms Larson visited Ms. Womble to help out when her first child was born and shared a

bonding experience; and Ms. Womble was the sibling who organized vacations after the Larson's

children were grown to keep them all in touch.

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reviewing the evidence under Rule 56 standards, the court draws the reasonable inferences

each of them cared very much for their daughter, and experiences sincere grief, sorrow, and

bereavement at her loss. 

Defendant argues the Larsons can produce no evidence that their relationship with

Ms. Womble "rose to the level of intimacy and inter-dependence required by New Mexico law

to recover loss of consortium," warranting summary adjudication of that claim in its favor as

to those plaintiffs. Mot. P&A 2:20-23. Defendant argues certain fundamental factors

essential to the requisite "intimate familial relationship" showing did not exist between Ms.

Womble and her parents at the time she died. In particular: the Larsons did not share a

household or daily experiences with their adult daughter and, in fact, had lived in Florida for

the 24 years preceding this action, while Ms. Womble lived in Ohio and New Mexico; she

and her parents had no financial interdependency; Ms. Womble visited her parents in Florida

at least once a year for vacations after she married her first husband, and her children also

visited them; Mr. Larson had met his daughter's husband only twice in the two years they

were married before the accident, and Mrs. Larson had met him three times; and their

interactions with Ms. Womble were primarily telephonic, with no day-to-day interactions for

over two decades, although Ms. Larson spoke on the telephone with her daughter about

twice a week in conversations lasting an hour or more, sharing details of their lives. See G.

Larson Depo., Fowler Decl. Exh. N; R. Larson Depo., Fowler Decl. Exh. P; see also Joint

Statement of Undisputed Facts. Again, the court must winnow relevant facts from the

extensive narrative of historical examples and descriptions provided of Ms. Wombles' life and

the Larsons' natural feelings for their daughter and hers for them in order to determine

whether they carry their burden to raise a triable issue of material fact.6 

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In Opposition, the Larsons argue New Mexico has rejected any "bright line test based

upon the legal status of the parties to the relationship" in deciding loss of consortium claims,

in reliance on Lozoya, 66 P.3d 948. Opp. 7:26-28. This court's understanding of the

authority elaborating the elements required for recovery under a loss of consortium theory

under New Mexico common law appears above. The court declines to interpret that

authority as so fluid that a fact-finder must always decide the nature of the relationship. The

Larson's Rule 56 Opposition obligation was to produce evidence from which a reasonable

factfinder could determine the existence of at least one of the indicia essential to a finding

of an "intimate familial relationship" shared with their daughter at the time of her death. 

The Larsons have lost the comfort of knowing their daughter would be around as they

aged, and their grief at her lost has manifested in feelings of numbness, difficulty accepting

she is actually gone, a void and loneliness and fear of future loneliness without her, difficulty

sleeping, and the like. Opp. pp. 12-15. They summarize: "Gladys and Raymond Larson

may not have lived with Laura Womble, but they maintained a strong, caring, emotional bond

with their daughter, and the loss to these parents by the death of their daughter has been

extreme." Opp. 16:5-8. The natural indicia of grief and sorrow, no matter how sincerely and

profoundly felt, standing alone, are not compensable injuries under a loss of consortium

theory under New Mexico law. These plaintiff parents point to no evidence from which a

reasonable fact finder could conclude the nature of their relationship with their adult

decedent was one of daily financial or social interdependence, or otherwise rose to an

unusual level of intimacy distinct from any good relationship among grown children and their

affectionate but geographically distant parents.

The court finds, applying the factors summarized in the legal standards section above

necessary to sustain a loss of consortium claim by parents of adult children who share no

financial, domicile, or caregiving interdependence, neither of the Larson plaintiffs raises a

triable issue of material fact warranting fact-finding by a jury with respect to the "intimate

familial relationship" nature of their connections to Ms. Womble at the time of her death. As

\\

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 His Opposition also suggests an inchoate "guidance and counseling" claim may be

intended. See Opp. 12:20-13,14:3-4 ("Brett Kolb can no longer turn to his father for guidance when

he needs to make major decisions in his life"). However, he was not a minor at the time of his

father's death, and the loss of the "fatherly advice" when he would "call[] his Dad frequently to ask

him for guidance and counseling[,] Karl always gave him kind, fatherly advice which lifted Brett's

spirits" are insufficient as a matter of law to support a separate claim, even assuming "Brett Kolb and

his father were extremely close." Opp. 12:19-13:16 (using such examples as getting advice on car

questions, backpacking, shared memories about numerous trips they took together, relationship

advice, and finances). 

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a matter of law, these plaintiffs cannot prevail on the claim. Defendant's Motion is

accordingly GRANTED as to the Larsons' loss of consortium claim.

D. Kolb Plaintiff

Brett Kolb is the adult son of Karl Kolb, a professional pilot living in Albuquerque, New

Mexico at the time of the accident. Karl Kolb perished in the plane crash at the age of 56

years. The court does not doubt Brett Kolb, like the other consortium claimants, cared very

much for his father and experiences sincere grief, sorrow, and bereavement at his loss. 

Defendant argues Brett Kolb cannot establish his relationship with his father at the

time of his death rose to the level of intimacy required by New Mexico common law to

recover loss of consortium damages, warranting summary adjudication of that claim in its

favor. In particular, Defendant argues Brett Kolb "must prove he shared a household and

daily experiences with the decedent" in order to prevail on his loss of consortium claim, and

the undisputed facts demonstrate he cannot do so. Defendant relies on the deposition of

Linda Kolb, the decedent's wife and plaintiff's mother, for the facts: Brett Kolb was 22 years

old at the time his father died; he lived in a different state; when his parents moved to New

Mexico in 2002, he stayed behind and lived independently in Billings, Montana; and he had

not lived with his parents for about two years prior to the accident. L. Kolb Depo. pp. 15-16,

40, Fowler Decl. Exh. Q; Undisputed Facts 1-4.

In his Opposition, Brett Kolb substantiates other facts he contends preclude summary

adjudication of his loss of consortium claim.7 In particular, he declares: his parents sold

their Billings, Montana home and relocated to Santa Fe, New Mexico in June 2002, when

his father accepted a pilot's job there; Brett remained in Billings to attend Montana State

University as a full-time student, where he was a sophomore in fall 2002; he remained fully

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dependent on his parents for his educational and living expenses, tuition, books, room, and

board; he and his father spoke on the phone affectionately several times a week; he and his

parents would "frequently" visit back and forth between Billings and Santa Fe; he felt

"overwhelmed" when he heard of his father's death, it left "a big hole in Brett's life;" and he

thinks about his father every day and "still cannot accept the fact he will never see him

again." B. Kolb Decl. pp. 2-4. 

The court again rejects Plaintiffs' suggestion only a fact-finder "should be permitted

to assess the relative strength of the [loss of consortium] claims after a full factual hearing"

in purported "accordance with New Mexico law." Opp. 15:20-21. While it is true the

characterization of a consortium claimant's particularrelationship with the victim is a question

of fact, the decision whether the damages claim should proceed to trial can and should be

determined by the court applying Rule 56 standards after the party resisting the Motion has

had an opportunity to present evidence and the record as a matter of law is insufficient to

permit a reasonable finding in the plaintiff's favor. As discussed above, this court disagrees

there is no legal test under New Mexico common law for whether a plaintiff may recover

damages for loss of consortium and rejects the premise "there is no way meaningfully to

distinguish as a matter of law among the myriad scenarios that may present as a loss of

consortium claim." Opp. 15:16-17. The essential showing of an "intimate familial

relationship" does not appear flexible enough to encompass the claim of an adult child who

did not live with the decedent, where the claim is based solely on warm but only occasional

interactions and financial support during the college years. For all the foregoing reasons,

Defendant's Motion is GRANTED with respect to Brett Kolb's loss of consortium claim.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The court appreciates the lives of these consortium claimants are permanently

changed by the loss of their decedents, and acknowledges each experiences emotional pain,

sorrow, and grief. However, the court finds none has raised a triable issue of fact from which

a jury could reasonably conclude any of them had so intertwined a relationship with their

decedents that a jury must be permitted to reach the issue of damages, due to the unique

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quality of the relationship warranting construction as imposing a foreseeable duty on a

potential tortfeasor to compensate them for loss of the relationship. New Mexico common

law has identified factors pertinent to a finding a plaintiff should be permitted to pursue loss

of consortium damages. They are not indicated here. For the all the foregoing reasons,

expressing no opinion on any other cause of action or theory of recovery of these or any of

the other plaintiffs, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED all the loss of consortium claims challenged

in the Motions fail as a matter of law, and the Motions are GRANTED. Summary

adjudication of the loss of consortium tort and loss of guidance and counseling claims (only)

is accordingly decided in Defendant's favor as to Richard Lamphere, Lavonne Lamphere,

Kathleen Attia-Alla, Kristin Ferris, Briana Chacon, Marissa Chacon, Donald Womble, Sr.,

Jeanne Womble, Donald Womble III, Kristin Womble, Amber Straubing, Gladys Larson,

Raymond Larson, and Brett Kolb.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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