Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04873/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04873-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE SONOMA

COUNTY FIRE CHIEF’S APPLICATION

FOR AN INSPECTION WARRANT RE:

SONOMA COUNTY’S ASSESSOR’S

PARCEL NUMBER 131-040-001 OR 3250

HIGHWAY 128, GEYSERVILLE

 /

No. C 02-04873 JSW

ORDER GRANTING TRIBE’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

Now before the Court is the motion of the Dry Creek Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians

(“Tribe”) for summary judgment. Having carefully read the parties’ papers and considered the

arguments and the relevant legal authority, and having the benefit of oral argument on April 22,

2005, the Court hereby GRANTS the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment

 The prior rulings in this matter have significantly narrowed the issues remaining in this

case. The only remaining question is whether the Court should permit the County to assert

jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members because of the existence of

sufficient “exceptional circumstances” to warrant the assertion. See California v. Cabazon

Band, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1987) (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 

Case 3:02-cv-04873-JSW Document 109 Filed 04/29/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

324, 331-32 (1983)). 

ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence

for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case.

Id. at 248. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The

party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Id. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for

the moving party. Id. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party

must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party must “identify

with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan,

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251

(7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that it is not a district court’s task to “scour the record in search of a

genuine issue of triable fact”). If the non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Case 3:02-cv-04873-JSW Document 109 Filed 04/29/05 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

B. Exceptional Circumstances Test.

Local and state laws do not generally apply to Indian tribal governments on their

reservation. “[I]n demarcating the respective spheres of State and tribal authority over Indian

reservations, we have continued to stress that ‘Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing

attributes of sovereignty over ... their territory. Because of their sovereign status, tribes and

their reservation lands are insulated in some respects by an historic immunity from state and

local control, and tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not inconsistent with the

overriding interests of the National Government.’” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,

462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983). 

Only in “exceptional circumstances” may a State assert jurisdiction over the onreservation activities of tribal members notwithstanding the lack of express congressional intent

to do so. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-15. The asserted exceptional circumstances are weighed

against traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of encouraging

tribal self-determination, self-sufficiency, and economic development. Id. at 216. The burden

is on the County to explain why the interests it seeks to protect are exceptional, in order to

overcome the overwhelming interests of the Tribe. See, e.g., Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304

F.3d 909, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The County of Sonoma contends that exceptional circumstances exist because of health

and safety concerns. Specifically, the County argues that because the casino is a large

commercial business catering to non-tribal members, lacks its own fire department and relies on

the Geyserville Fire Department in case of fire emergency, exceptional circumstances exist

sufficient to overcome Indian sovereignty. However, the court in Gobin determined at

summary judgment that the County’s interests, which included but were not limited to local

public health and safety concerns, were insufficient to outweigh the Tribe’s sovereign interests. 

In Gobin, the tribe’s zoning ordinance established land use regulations throughout the

reservation that differed from the county’s regulations. The tribe sought a declaration that the

county lacked land use jurisdiction over the reservation land and could not impose County

zoning, subdivision and building code regulations on the individual tribe member’s proposed

Case 3:02-cv-04873-JSW Document 109 Filed 04/29/05 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

development. Id. at 912. The County argued that “exceptional circumstances” existed that

warranted the County’s jurisdiction over the reservation land. The County argued a broad array

of interests, “including protecting endangered species, regulating County-maintained roads and

storm sewers, providing a continuum of land use enforcement for all fee lands, and complying

with applicable health and safety codes, to counterbalance the Tribe’s strong interests in selfdetermination.” Id. at 917. The Ninth Circuit held that the mere existence of the County’s

interests in assuring the health and safety of County citizens, in addition to the other

circumstances present in land use regulation, was “an important interest, but an unexceptional

one.” Id. at 918. The Court found that even adding into the calculus the other interests of the

County, “they do not outweigh the Tribes’s interest in self-determination.” Id. 

In this matter, the County’s sole contention is that the imposition of its health and safety

regulations is at stake. The enumerated list of concerns relate only to the County’s enforcement

of its health and safety codes. Without more, those circumstances are insufficient as a matter of

law to overcome the high burden of Indian sovereignty, tribal self-determination, selfsufficiency, and economic development. See id. Thus, no “exceptional circumstances” exist to

warrant an exception to the general preclusion of the County from jurisdiction to enforce its

health and safety regulations.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey S. White 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:02-cv-04873-JSW Document 109 Filed 04/29/05 Page 4 of 4