Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01400/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01400-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS DUANE TURNER,

Petitioner,

v.

MACK JENKINS/JOEL MARTIN PROB.

DEPT; VISTA CALIFORNIA ADULT

PROBATION DEPT.; THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondents. 

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Civil No. 12cv01400 JLS (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING SECOND AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS [ECF NO. 21]

Petitioner Marcus Duane Turner, a probationer proceeding pro

se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on June 8, 2012,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1]. He filed a [First

Amended] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 20, 2012,

and a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

February 4, 2013 [ECF Nos. 11, 21]. In his Second Amended

Petition, Turner claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated when the trial court denied his motion to suppress. 

(Second Am. Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 21.)1 He also alleges that he

1 The Court will cite to all case documents using the page

numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney

failed to raise an argument in that motion to suppress. (Id. at

8.)

An Answer was filed on behalf of "Joel Martin et al." on

March 27, 2013, with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF

No. 26] and a Notice of Lodgment [ECF No. 27].2 In their Answer,

Respondents argue that Turner's Fourth Amendment claim is barred

by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494 (1976). (Answer

Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 8-11, ECF No. 26.) Respondents also

maintain that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim

is unexhausted and meritless. (Id. at 11-14.) No traverse was

filed. 

As noted, Turner is currently on probation. "A petitioner is

'in custody' for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction while he

remains on probation." Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Because Turner is in custody

under a state court judgment, the respondent is the state officer

who has custody of Petitioner. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2006);

see Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. §

2254 (West 2006). "Where the petitioner is on probation or

2

 It is unclear whether the Answer was filed on behalf of

Respondent Martin or for Respondents Martin, Jenkins, and the

Attorney General of California. (Compare Answer 1, ECF No. 26

(stating that the Answer was filed on behalf of Joel Martin et

al.), with id. at 1-2, and id. Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 6, 10

(offering argument on behalf of only one Respondent).) To

determine who actually answered, the Court ordered Jenkins to

"notify the Court whether he intends to file a separate answer or

proceed in an alternative manner." (Mins. 1, June 12, 2013, ECF

No. 28.) Respondent explained on June 21, 2013, that "the Answer

filed on March 27, 2013, was filed on behalf of all named

Respondents in this matter." (Resp. June 12, 2013 Order 2, ECF

No. 29.) 

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parole, he may name his probation or parole officer 'and the

official in charge of the parole or probation agency, or the state

correctional agency, as appropriate.'" Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez,

81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, Rule 2(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). 

In addition to Probation Officer Joel Martin and Chief

Probation Officer Mack Jenkins, Turner also named the California

Attorney General as a Respondent in this case. "A state's

attorney general is a proper party only if the petitioner is not

then confined, but expects to be taken into custody." Hogan v.

Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Cruz v. Warden,

907 F.2d 665, 665 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990); Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, Rules 2(a), 2(b), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254). Because

Turner is already "in custody," the only proper respondents are

the probation officers. See Sherman v. Yolo Cnty. Chief Prob.

Officer, No. CIV S-07-2055-WBS-CMK-P, 2007 WL 4536107, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Dec. 19, 2007) (noting that the proper respondent was the

Yolo County Chief Probation Officer, not the Attorney General of

the State of California).

The Court has reviewed the Second Amended Petition,

Respondent's Answer, and the lodgments. For the reasons stated

below, the Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF

No. 21] should be DENIED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On the evening of April 1, 2011, Oceanside Police Officer

Larry Weber stopped Turner for driving with a defective brake

light. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Turner, D061353, slip op. at 3

(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012).) Soon after, Officer Weber

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determined that Turner exhibited objective signs of drug

intoxication, including rapid speech, constricted pupils, no pupil

reaction to light, and body and eyelid tremors. (Id.) Officer

Weber also conducted a Romberg field sobriety test, where he asked

Petitioner to tilt his head back, close his eyes, and estimate

when thirty seconds had elapsed. (Id.) When Turner estimated

that thirty seconds had passed, only twenty five had. (Id.) The

officer determined that Petitioner was under the influence of a

controlled substance and arrested him. (Id.)

At the police station, Officer Weber instructed Turner to

take off his shoes. (Id.) While doing so, a small package of

methamphetamine fell out of one of the shoes. (Id.) Petitioner

was subsequently released on bond; a friend picked him up, and

they drove to Turner's vehicle in Oceanside. (Id. at 4.) The two

inspected Turner's brake lights and determined that both were

functioning. (Id.) They concluded, however, that one light was

dimmer than the other. (Id.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2011, Petitioner was charged with possession of a

controlled substance and being under the influence of a controlled

substance. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 1-2, Jun. 14, 2011.) 

The latter charge was dismissed the same day. (See id.) Prior to

trial, Turner filed a motion to suppress "1) any observations by

law enforcement personnel; 2) any and all statements made by the

defendant; [and] 3) any other evidence, tangible or intangible,

seized as a result of the detention and arrest." (Id. at 4.) The

motion was denied. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 34,

Oct. 7, 2011.) On October 20, 2011, a jury convicted Petitioner

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of possession of a controlled substance; he was subsequently

sentenced to three years of probation. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's

Tr. 179, 185, Oct. 20, 2011.) 

Turner appealed the conviction on July 2, 2012, arguing that

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, People v. Turner,

No. D061353 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012).) On November 15, 2012,

Division One of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, held that Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights had not

been violated. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Turner, D061353, slip

op. at 4-7.) Turner petitioned the California Supreme Court for

review on December 21, 2012. (Lodgment No. 6, Petition for

Review, People v. Turner, [No. S207519] (Cal. filed Dec. 21,

2012).) On January 30, 2013, the California Supreme Court denied

the petition without comment. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Turner,

S207519, order at 1 (Cal. Jan. 30, 2013).)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

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Cir. 1991). Because Turner's Second Amended Petition was filed on

February 4, 2013 [Sec. Am. Pet. 1, ECF No. 21], AEDPA applies to

this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997), abrogated on other grounds, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362 (2000). As amended, section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained "in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d

at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990);

Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

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court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors

of state law "unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation"). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court

to adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law." Id. at 71. In other words, a federal

court is not required to review the state court decision de novo. 

Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The "novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to

'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'" Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas review, for example,

because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. "[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,' an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." 

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Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1224-26 (5th Cir.

1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996);

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective because

she "miss[ed] the opportunity to show that the pulse taking during

the initial contact with defendant was an exploitation" of his

Fourth Amendment rights. (Second Am. Pet. 8, ECF No. 21.) Turner

contends that counsel's error was "fatal" to his case and "cost

[him] the right to challenge this issue on appeal." (Id.) 

In their Answer, Respondents submit that Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is unexhausted and

meritless. (Answer Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 11, ECF No. 26.) 

According to Martin and Jenkins, the court of appeal rejected

Turner's Fourth Amendment claim because probable cause existed to

arrest him based on the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at

13.) Had Petitioner's trial counsel moved to suppress evidence of

Turner's pulse rate, Respondents contend the argument "would have

been rejected given the overall context of the officer's

observations." (Id. at 13-14.) "Moreover, the record suggests

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that Turner volunteered his arm to the officer during the stop." 

(Id. at 14 (citing Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 12).) 

As a result, Martin and Jenkins maintain that Turner's counsel was

not ineffective, and Petitioner did not suffer any prejudice from

the allegedly deficient representation. (Id.)

Turner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not

presented to any state court for review. (See Lodgment No. 3,

Appellant's Opening Brief at i-ii, People v. Turner, No. D061353;

Lodgment No. 6, Petition for Review at i-ii, People v. Turner,

[No. S207519].) "An application for a writ of habeas corpus may

be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State." 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(b)(2). Courts may only deny 

unexhausted claims on the merits if it is "perfectly clear" that

the claim is not a "colorable federal claim." See Cassett v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). Unexhausted claims

are reviewed de novo where there is no reasoned state court

decision addressing that claim. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002). This Court therefore reviews Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo. 

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for

federal habeas relief, Turner must satisfy the two-part test

outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

First, Petitioner must show that his counsel's performance was

deficient. Id. Second, he must establish that counsel's

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. To satisfy the

prejudice prong, Turner need only demonstrate a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been

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different absent the error. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406;

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is "a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The United States Supreme Court

noted that "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy

task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). In the

context of federal habeas review, "[t]he standards created by

Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when

the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so[.]" Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations

omitted). "When § 2254 applies, the question is not whether

counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there

is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's

deferential standard." Id.

Trial counsel is presumed to be competent. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689. "To rebut this presumption, [Petitioner] must

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was unreasonable under

prevailing professional norms and was not the product of sound

strategy." Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 815 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). Counsel's representation

is deficient if "it falls outside the range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases." Id.

In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374-75, 380-82

(1986), the Supreme Court applied Strickland in the context of

counsel's alleged failure to competently litigate a motion to

suppress. To prove deficient performance under Strickland and

Kimmelman, "a petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel's

failure to file such a motion 'fell below an objective standard of

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reasonableness.'" Clarke v. Wilson, No. 2:12–cv–801–MCE–EFB P,

2013 WL 4012860, at *41 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). To show prejudice under

Strickland and Kimmelman, Turner must prove "that his Fourth

Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable

probability that the verdict would have been different absent the

excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." 

Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. 

At the suppression motion hearing, Petitioner's trial counsel

argued that "it was unreasonable for the police officer to reach

into the window and take [Turner's] pulse, that that [sic] was an

unreasonable detention." (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 1,

32.) Petitioner's contention that trial counsel did not challenge

the taking of Turner's pulse is therefore inaccurate.3 In denying

the motion to suppress, the trial court implicitly rejected the

argument that the taking of Petitioner's pulse was unreasonable. 

Moreover, the court of appeal held that "the [trial] court

correctly denied Turner's motion to suppress evidence." (Lodgment

No. 5, People v. Turner, D061353, slip op. at 7.) Counsel's

representation was not deficient because she did not overlook a

meritorious argument. Because Petitioner has not carried his

burden with respect to the first prong of the Strickland test,

3 The record also shows that Officer Weber testified that

Petitioner may have offered his arm for the pulse reading,

potentially waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. (Id. at 12); see

United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th

Cir. 1996)) ("'An individual may waive his Fourth Amendment rights

by giving voluntary and intelligent consent to a warrantless

search of his person. . . .'"). 

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this Court need not address the second. For these reasons,

Turner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be DENIED.

B. Fourth Amendment Claim

Petitioner also raises a Fourth Amendment claim. (Second Am.

Pet. 6, ECF No. 21.) The essence of this claim appears to be that

his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and

seizure was violated when Officer Weber checked Turner's pulse

rate and subsequently arrested him. (Id.; see also Lodgment No.

3, Appellant's Opening Brief at 8-28, People v. Turner, No.

D061353.) On this basis, Petitioner alleges that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress. (See generally Second

Am. Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 21; see also Lodgment No. 3, Appellant's

Opening Brief at 8-28, People v. Turner, No. D061353.)

In their Answer, Martin and Jenkins contend that Turner's

Fourth Amendment claim is barred by Stone v. Powell. (Answer

Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No. 26.) The Respondents argue

that even if the state court's ruling on the motion to suppress

was in error, Turner's claim is not cognizable on habeas review

because he had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" his claim

in state court. (Id. at 9 (citing Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Appeal

Tr. vol. 1, 1; Lodgment No. 3, Appellant's Opening Brief at 1,

People v. Turner, No. D016353).) Moreover, Respondents maintain

that "the trial court correctly analyzed the facts of the stop and

properly concluded there was probable cause for the arrest, and

that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred." (Id. at 11.) 

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court opinion as the basis of the

judgment. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-06 (1991). The

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last state court to address the merits of Petitioner's Fourth

Amendment claim was the California Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment

No. 5, People v. Turner, D061353, slip op. at 4-7.) This Court

reviews that decision. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. 

The California Court of Appeal held that in light of the

totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed to arrest

Turner for being under the influence of a controlled substance. 

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Turner, D01353, slip op at 6-7.) 

"Turner's physical symptoms and behavior were all consistent with

such conclusion." (Id.) Further, the court held that "[t]he fact

that there could have been possible innocent explanations for each

individual observation does not negate a finding of probable

cause." (Id. at 7.) On this basis, the court of appeal

determined that the trial court did not err in denying

Petitioner's motion to suppress. (Id.) 

"A Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in federal habeas

proceedings if a petitioner has had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the claim in state court." Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81

F.3d at 899 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82); see also Moormann

v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) ("If the state has

provided a state prisoner an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim, we cannot grant federal

habeas relief on the Fourth Amendment issue."). In Stone, the

Supreme Court acknowledged the utility of the trial court applying

the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation, but because

of marginal benefits, the Supreme Court barred these Fourth

Amendment claims from federal habeas review. See Stone, 428 U.S.

at 494-95. The Court reasoned that the "long-recognized costs of

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the [exclusionary] rule persist when a criminal conviction is

sought to be overturned on collateral review . . . ." Id. at 491. 

Therefore, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full

and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner

may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was

introduced at his trial." Id. at 494 (footnotes omitted). Stone

is a "categorical limitation on the applicability of [F]ourth

[A]mendment exclusionary rules in habeas corpus proceedings." 

Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993). 

"The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the

opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do

so or even whether the claim was correctly decided." OrtizSandoval, 81 F.3d at 899 (citing Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610,

613 (9th Cir. 1990)). "All Stone v. Powell requires is the

initial opportunity for a fair hearing." Caldwell v. Cupp, 781

F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 

Turner's Fourth Amendment claim was fully and fairly

litigated in state court. Petitioner, aided by counsel, filed a

motion to suppress in the trial court. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk's Tr. 4-9.) Turner received a hearing on the motion which

included extensive oral argument as well as examination of two

witnesses –- one for the People and one for the defense. (See

Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 5-34.) The trial court

conducted a meaningful inquiry and denied the motion. (Id. at 33-

34.) 

Petitioner's claim was also fully litigated on appeal.

Turner, again aided by counsel, argued to the California Court of

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Appeal that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, People v. Turner,

No. D061353.) The court thoroughly considered the issue, devoting

four pages of its reasoned opinion to this claim, and determined

that "the trial court correctly analyzed the facts of the stop and

subsequent arrest and properly concluded that there was probable

cause for the arrest." (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Turner,

D061353, slip op. at 7.) Petitioner, again aided by counsel, also

filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court. 

(See Lodgment No. 6, Petition for Review, People v. Turner,

[S207519].) Turner had a fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth

Amendment claim in state court; therefore, it is not cognizable in

federal habeas proceedings. Accordingly, the claim should be

DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Janis L. Sammartino under 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons

outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court

issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 4, 2013, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation."

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

October 18, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 5, 2013 __________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Sammartino

All Parties of Record

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