Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02518/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02518-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL J. HELLER,

Petitioner,

NO. CIV. S-05-2518 LKK EFB P

v.

K. POWERS-MENDOZA,

O R D E R

Respondent. 

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order

No. 262. On March 7, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and

recommendations which were served on all parties and which

contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings

and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen days.

Petitioner has filed objections to the findings and

recommendations.

The matter is before the court on respondent’s motion to

dismiss. The court adopts the findings and recommendations with

Case 2:05-cv-02518-JKS Document 29 Filed 03/29/07 Page 1 of 4
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 The only post-Garner decision cited to by respondent is In 1

re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002). There, the California

Supreme Court applied Garner to the same statute challenged here

and found that “this type of change in procedure [i.e., providing

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respect to the due process claim but declines to adopt them with

respect to the ex post facto claim. Respondent’s latter claim is

that the governor’s reversal of the parole board’s determination

granting parole under a law passed after petitioner committed his

crime violates the ex post facto clause. The court finds that the

claim is inappropriate for dismissal at this stage of the

proceedings.

First, the court may only dismiss a claim in the petition when

it “plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases. Summary dismissal is subject to a high standard, and is

appropriate when the allegations are vague, conclusory, palpably

incredible, or patently frivolous. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d

490 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, however, it is not “plain” that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief.

Second, the question of whether there has been an ex post

facto violation potentially turns on issues of fact. As the

Supreme Court recognized in Garner v. Jones, when a law does not

facially increase punishment, “the [petitioner] must demonstrate,

by evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the

[entity] charged with exercising discretion that its retroactive

application will result in a longer period of incarceration than

under the earlier rule.” 529 U.S. 244, 245 (2000). This is a 1

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for gubernatorial review] is not the type of change addressed by

the ex post facto clause.” Id. at 651 (emphasis omitted). It

based this categorical rejection of any ex post facto challenge to

the statute on the grounds that “an individual who commits a crime

has no reasonable expectation that his or her suitability for

parole will be determined by the particular individuals who happen

to exercise authority over parole decisions at the time the

individual commits the crime.” Id. at 651-52. The court

respectfully disagrees, because how an entity exercises discretion

-- whether that entity is the parole board or the governor -- is

critical to determining whether there has been an ex post facto

violation. This is the possibility that Garner recognized, and why

it remanded rather than dismissed the ex post facto challenge.

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heavy burden, see id., at 255 (“[petitioner] must show that as

applied to his own sentence the law created a significant risk of

increasing his punishment”), but it is one that petitioner is

entitled to attempt to discharge. As the magistrate judge

recognized, “[t]here must be evidence about how the governor

exercised his discretion.” F&R at 6.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations filed March 7, 2007,

are adopted in part and rejected in part; 

2. Respondent's March 9, 2006, motion to dismiss is

denied.

3. Respondent is directed to file and serve within 30

days a response, and to include with the answer any and all

transcripts or other documents relevant to the determination of the

issues presented in the application. See Rule 5, Fed. R. Governing

§ 2254 Cases; and 

4. Petitioner is granted 30 days thereafter to file a

reply. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2007.

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