Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05025/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05025-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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1 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction,

including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c) for all proceedings.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLORIA GRENING WOLK,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

PHILIP R. GREEN,

Defendant(s).

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No. C 06-5025 BZ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO

STRIKE

Before me is defendant Philip R. Green’s Amended Motion

to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f) [Docket No. 50].1

 Having read and

considered the arguments presented by the parties in the

papers submitted to the Court, I find this matter appropriate

for resolution without a hearing and GRANT IN PART and DENY IN

PART defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and GRANT IN PART and DENY

IN PART defendant’s Motion to Strike.

The present action arises from defendant’s representation

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2 This case was reassigned to me by Order dated April

27, 2007. By that time, defendant’s motion was fully briefed,

but several related motions remained pending. In particular,

plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint,

and her motion for leave to file a surreply, were undecided. On

June 6, 2007, I denied plaintiff’s original motion to file an

amended complaint, but granted plaintiff leave to file a new

amended complaint. Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on

June 18, 2007. Because leave was never granted for plaintiff

to file her “First Amended Complaint,” her “Second Amended

Complaint” shall hereinafter be referred to as “Amended

Complaint”(or “Am. Compl.”). I also granted defendant leave to

re-file his motion to dismiss; he re-filed it on July 5, 2007. 

On July 25, 2007, plaintiff filed a Supplement to her

Opposition to defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss

(“Supplemental Opposition”) which incorporated, by reference,

her previously filed Opposition and Surreply. On July 30,

2007, without permission from the Court, defendant submitted an

additional reply (“Supplemental Reply”). 

3 Viatical brokers purchase life insurance policies

from terminally ill people, allowing the viators (the

terminally ill people) to obtain needed cash, while allowing

the brokers to collect the full death benefits of the policies

upon the viators’ deaths. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. 

2

of plaintiff Gloria G. Wolk in a defamation suit for several

months in 2005. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-29.2

 The complaint

alleges that plaintiff is a consumer advocate and author who

was sued for defamation after criticizing a “viatical broker”3

on her website. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 16-18. After changing attorneys

several times, plaintiff hired defendant to represent her in

the defamation action. Id. at ¶¶ 18-21. 

Plaintiff retained defendant on May 2, 2005, and

defendant asked plaintiff to advance $10,000 for his fees and

litigation costs. Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff signed an

employment contract with defendant on May 4, 2005. Id. at ¶

22. On May 8, 2005, defendant notified her that he would not

be available for the scheduled trial date, but agreed to

request a continuance of the trial date. Id. at ¶ 23. 

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Thereafter, defendant failed to properly represent her by: (1)

failing to file a form substituting himself as attorney for

plaintiff; (2) demanding more money from plaintiff; (3)

threatening to cease representation of plaintiff if additional

money was not provided; (4) refusing to refund monies so that

plaintiff could hire another lawyer; (5) failing to prepare

for trial and failing to schedule an important deposition in a

timely fashion; and (6) threatening to cancel an important

deposition unless more money was provided. Id. at ¶ 25. 

Ultimately, plaintiff and her opposing party in the defamation

suit agreed to a “walk away” settlement, in which plaintiff

paid nothing in exchange for removing her comments about the

viatical broker from her website. Mot. to Dismiss at 5. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges legal malpractice,

extortion, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty,

willful misconduct, breach of contract, negligent infliction

of emotional distress, infliction of emotional distress, elder

fraud abuse and unjust enrichment. Defendant seeks to dismiss

all of plaintiff’s causes of action or, in the alternative,

strike plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief, attorney’s

fees, punitive damages, and consequential damages.

I. Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the

basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the statute of

limitations, and failure to state a claim. 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Under

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Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted only if

plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth facts sufficient to

establish a plausible right of recovery. See Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). For purposes

of such a motion, the complaint is construed in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded factual

allegations are taken as true. Everest & Jennings, Inc. v.

American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994);

see also Mitan v. Feeney, 2007 WL 2068106, at *9 (C.D. Cal.)

(discussing the post-Twombly standard). 

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a

claim, “leave to amend should be granted unless the court

determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with

the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the

deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Leave to amend is

properly denied “where the amendment would be futile.” DeSoto

v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.

1992).

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to meet the

amount in controversy requirement needed for diversity

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (requiring that the amount in

controversy exceed $75,000). Contrary to defendant’s

assertion, plaintiff alleges damages in an amount greater than

$75,000 in her complaint and in her prayer for relief,

presumably based on the legal fees expended, lost income, and

damages from emotional distress. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 41,

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5

47, 55, 65, 68, 72, 76, 86, Prayer for Rel. 

The allegations of the complaint determine the amount in

controversy if made in good faith. St. Paul Mercury Indem.

Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-289 (1938). To justify

dismissal for lack of a jurisdictional amount, it must appear

to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than

the jurisdictional amount. Id. Moreover, the jurisdictional

minimum may be satisfied by claims of general and specific

damages, attorney’s fees, and by punitive damages. Simmons v.

PCR Technology, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 

The Court cannot say to a legal certainty that the claim is

really for less than the jurisdictional amount. Federal

jurisdiction is properly invoked in this case. 

B. Statute of Limitations

Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s claims are barred

by a statute of limitations. California Code of Civil

Procedure section 340.6 provides:

An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or

omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in

the performance of professional services shall be

commenced within one year of when the plaintiff

discovers, or through the use of reasonable

diligence should have discovered, the facts

constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four

years from the date of the wrongful act or omission,

whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time

for commencement of legal action exceed four years

except that the period shall be tolled during the

time that: 

. . . 

(2) the attorney continues to represent the

plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in

which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred.

Defendant argues the attorney-client relationship ended

on August 19, 2005, when the dismissal of the underlying

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4 Typically, evidence outside the pleadings is not

considered on a motion to dismiss. When evidence outside the

pleadings is relied on, the motion should be converted to one

for summary judgment. See Jacobsen v. AEG Capital Corp., 50

F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995). Because I have considered

some evidence outside the pleadings in resolving the statute of

limitations argument, and because both parties have had an

opportunity to submit evidence, I will apply the summary

judgment standard. Summary judgment is appropriate when it is

demonstrated that there exists “no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

6

action was filed. Mot. to Dismiss at 7. Plaintiff filed the

instant action on August 21, 2006. Thus, defendant concludes

“[a]ll the claims must be dismissed as Plaintiff failed to

file this action within one year of when she knew of the facts

on which she now bases this action for malpractice.” Id. at

9. Defendant further contends “none of the factors allowing

for any tolling of the statute are present.” Id. Defendant

attempts to characterize contact after August 19, 2005 as a

“ministerial task”, arguing such contact does not amount to

representation without citing any legal authority defining

what constitutes a “ministerial task” or explaining why such a

ministerial task does not amount to representation. Reply at

2. 

Evidence submitted by the parties demonstrates that after

August 19, 2005, plaintiff and defendant continued to

communicate with each other about the defamation case in

furtherance of finalizing the settlement. Pl.’s Decl. in

Opp’n to Supplementary Mot. to Dismiss / Mot. to Strike

(“Pl.’s Supplemental Decl”) ¶ 3-10. Moreover, defendant

billed plaintiff for time spent on this communication. 

Supplemental Reply Ex. A.4 

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5 Defendant’s reliance on Shapero v. Fliegel, 191 Cal.

App. 3d 842 (1987), is also misplaced. Shapero merely held

that “failure [to formally withdraw as counsel of record],

standing alone, does not satisfy the continued representation

provision of section 340.6 for the purpose of tolling the

running of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 849. 

7

Defendant’s reliance on Gurkewitz v. Haberman, 137 Cal.

App. 3d 328 (1982) is misplaced. Gurkewitz held that “so long

as there are unsettled matters tangential to a case, and the

attorney assists the client with these matters, he is acting

as his representative.” Id. at 333. Here, there were

“unsettled matters tangential to” the underlying action, as

evidenced by email exchanges between August 19 and September

8, 2005, relating to post-settlement issues. Pl.’s

Supplemental Decl” ¶ 3-10, Exh.’s A-F. Defendant assisted

plaintiff in finalizing the settlement, contacted opposing

counsel regarding the same, and billed plaintiff for these

activities, up through September 8, 2005. Supplemental Opp’n

at 4; Supplemental Reply Ex. A. Under Gurkewitz, defendant’s

finalization of the settlement agreement may constitute

continuous representation. Certainly, I cannot say that there

is no genuine issue of fact as to the time-bar issue.5

In addition to asserted procedural defects, defendant

seeks to dismiss all of plaintiff’s causes of action. I

address each in turn. 

C. Legal Malpractice

Defendant argues that plaintiff fails to state a claim

for legal malpractice. In civil malpractice cases, the

plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the duty of the attorney to

use such skill, prudence and diligence as members of the

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6 Defendant disputes several of plaintiff’s factual

allegations related to the malpractice claim. Defendant did

not, however, file a declaration or other admissible evidence

in support of his factual contentions. I therefore limit my

analysis to the pleadings. 

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profession commonly possess; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a

proximate causal connection between the breach and the

resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Wiley v.

County of San Diego, 19 Cal. 4th 532, 536 (1998) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges defendant breached the duty of care by

failing to schedule necessary depositions, failing to make

himself plaintiff’s attorney of record, and failing to proceed

with the litigation in a timely manner, all of which directly

and proximately caused plaintiff to suffer damages in excess

of $75,000. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-37. If true, these allegations

meet each element of legal malpractice.

Defendant argues that plaintiff “bases her cause of

action for legal malpractice on what she asserts was Green’s

failure to file a substitution of attorney,” when in fact he

“did file a substitution of attorney.” Mot. to Dismiss at 9-

10. Defendant mischaracterizes plaintiff’s position. 

Plaintiff does not base her cause of action for legal

malpractice on defendant’s failure to file a substitution of

attorney, but on defendant’s failure to file a timely

substitution of attorney, which deprived plaintiff of counsel

during her deposition. Am. Compl. ¶ 33. The claim is

sufficiently pleaded.6 

D. Extortion

Defendant also argues that plaintiff fails to state a

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7 California Penal Code section 519 states that fear,

such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat .

. . to do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the

individual threatened.”

8 Although California Business & Professions Code

sections 17200 and 17204, may provide in limited circumstances

for a private right of action under criminal law, plaintiff’s

complaint neither alleges a violation of section 17200 nor

states a claim for extortion. See Haskell v. Time, Inc., 965

F. Supp. 1398, 1402-03 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (citations omitted);

see also Walker v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2006 WL

2642535, at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (noting that the plaintiff alleging

a section 17200 claim must identify some law as the predicate

for recovery).

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claim for extortion. California Penal Code section 518

defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from another,

with his consent, . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or

fear, or under color of official right.”7

 Plaintiff does not

provide any authority for her bringing a private extortion

claim, nor does she state a claim for extortion.8 Plaintiff

does not allege anything more than a threat by defendant to

cease representation of plaintiff unless more funds were

provided. If extortion encompassed such circumstances, then

virtually every business dispute where one party demands more

money for continued service would also constitute extortion. 

I know of no authority for such an extension of the law. 

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for

extortion, and the claim will be dismissed, absent amendment. 

E. Misrepresentation

Defendant also argues that plaintiff fails to state a

claim for misrepresentation. He reads plaintiff’s complaint

as alleging intentional misrepresentation, or actual fraud,

see Anderson v. Deloitte & Touche, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1468, 1474

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(1997), and cites Girard v. Ball, 125 Cal. App. 3d 772 (1981),

for the proposition that to state a cause of action for

misrepresentation, plaintiff must allege (1)

misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to

defraud, i.e., induced reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and

(5) resulting damage. Mot. to Dismiss at 10. Defendant

alleges plaintiff “has not and cannot plead that there was any

misrepresentation at the outset” and plaintiff “has not and

cannot plead reliance as she was informed at the outset that a

motion for a continuance was going to be sought based on the

proximity of the action to trial, and of pre-scheduled

vacation plans of Green at the time he agreed to take the

case.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint contradicts defendant’s

assertion. Plaintiff alleges defendant used “fraudulent

assurances” to induce plaintiff to hire him, and “failed to

disclose, when he agreed to take the case to trial, that he

had neither the time (due to his planned vacation) nor the

experience as a trial attorney.” Am. Compl. ¶ 43. An

intentional failure to disclose is an actionable fraud in the

presence of a fiduciary duty to disclose. See Renaissance

Realty Inc. v. Soriano, 120 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 13, 16 (1981). 

Moreover, plaintiff alleges that she entered into an agreement

for the purpose of taking the case to trial, thus showing

reliance. Opp’n at 5; Am. Compl. ¶ 67. The claim is

sufficiently plead. 

F. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state

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a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Breach of fiduciary

duty is a concept that is “separate and distinct from

traditional professional negligence but which still comprises

legal malpractice.” Mosier v. S. Cal. Physicians Ins. Exch.,

63 Cal. App. 4th 1022, 1044 (1998). The elements of a cause

of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) the existence

of a fiduciary duty; (2) the breach of that duty; and (3)

damage proximately caused by that breach. Id. Fiduciary duty

arises in an attorney-client context. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges defendant breached his fiduciary duty

by “charging for services he never intended to provide, and in

fact, did not provide,” and by “demanding increasing sums and

failing to take any useful action on her behalf.” Am. Compl.

¶¶ 50-51. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant’s breach

forced her to continue pro se, making it “impossible for her

to devote time and energy to income-producing work.” Id. at ¶

53. An attorney’s “wilful failure to render the service for

which he was retained and his assumption of a position

contrary to his client's interests” violates his duty of

fidelity to his client. Academy of California Optometrists,

Inc. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1006 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1975). Plaintiff’s allegations, if proven, may show such

a willful failure by defendant. Plaintiff has sufficiently

pleaded a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

G. Willful Misconduct

Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to state a

claim for willful misconduct. Willful misconduct means

intentional wrongful conduct, done either with knowledge that

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serious injury probably will result or with a wanton and

reckless disregard of the possible results. Reuther v. Viall,

62 Cal. 2d 470, 475 (1965). Three elements are necessary to

raise a negligent act to the level of willful misconduct:

actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be

apprehended; actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a

probable as opposed to a possible result of the danger; and a

conscious failure to act to avert that peril. Colich & Sons

v. Pacific Bell, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 1242 (1988). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s “refusal to become

attorney of record would cause direct injury” to plaintiff,

and this injury was made known to defendant by both plaintiff

and an elder law attorney assisting plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶

58, 60. Plaintiff further alleges that throughout the three

months of their association, defendant demonstrated “a wanton

and reckless disregard of the possible result of his behavior

toward Wolk.” Id. at ¶ 64. Defendant’s response is

conclusory and unpersuasive. He states, without sufficient

explanation, that “the cause of action is . . . not supported

in its maintenance by the facts Plaintiff pleads in support.” 

Mot. to Dismiss at 11. Plaintiff, however, alleges facts that

meet the requirements of a willful misconduct claim.

H. Breach of Contract

Defendant argues that breach of contract is “not a cause

of action separate and distinct of [sic] the general claim for

legal malpractice.” Mot. to Dismiss at 12. Therefore,

“[t]his cause of action is subsumed into the cause of action

for legal malpractice in any event and as previously asserted

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9 Defendant’s conclusory assertion that plaintiff has

“failed to plead the terms or intendment of the contract of

which she referenced to be able to determine the existence of

any breach thereof” has no merit. Mot. to Dismiss at 12. 

Plaintiff has alleged that a contract was entered with

defendant on May 2, 2005, when defendant agreed to take

plaintiff’s case to trial and required a retainer of $10,000. 

Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that defendant

breached the contract by failing to add himself as her attorney

of record, failing to prepare for trial, and coercing plaintiff

into settling on terms less favorable than she had previously

rejected. Am. Compl. ¶ 67. 

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is time barred by the one year state of limitation.” Id.

A legal malpractice action is a blend of tort and

contract actions. Cal. Jur. 3d Att’ys at Law § 559. 

California courts have held that “since in the usual case, the

attorney undertakes to perform his duties pursuant to a

contract with a client, the attorney’s failure to exercise the

requisite skill and care is also a breach of an express or

implied term of that contract.” Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy,

Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 181 (1971). Where a case

sounds in both tort and contract, the plaintiff may elect

between the two actions. Id. at 182. A plaintiff may bring

suit on both contract and tort theories simultaneously, though

he or she must ultimately elect which remedy to pursue. See

Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp. v. Nixen, 119 Cal.

App. 3d 417, 435 (1981), overruled on other grounds in Laird

v. Blacker, 2 Cal.4th 606, 617 (1992).9

I. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. To

properly allege a negligent infliction claim, a plaintiff must

plead either one of two accepted theories of recovery: the

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“bystander” theory or the “direct victim” theory. Burgess v.

Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1071 (1992). Plaintiff

clearly intends to proceed under a direct victim theory,

because she alone has suffered the alleged harm. Because the

direct victim theory does not provide for tort recovery

separate from the tort of negligence, the claim must be

analyzed as sounding in negligence. See id. at 1072; see also

Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984

(1993). Thus, the traditional elements of duty, breach,

causation, and damages apply. Id.

Defendant cites Smith v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 4th

1033 (1992), for the proposition that “a cause of action for

negligent infliction of emotional distress is not allowed when

the harm to plaintiff arises from the attorney’s negligent

conduct and is solely economic.” Mot. to Dismiss at 12. 

However, plaintiff has alleged more than just economic harm. 

In an action for legal malpractice, damages for emotional

distress arising out of acts which invade an interest

protected by established tort law are recoverable if the

claimed emotional distress naturally ensues from the acts

complained of. Smith, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1038. Plaintiff

adequately alleges that defendant’s conduct “caused Plaintiff

to suffer serious emotional distress and financial loss.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 71 (emphasis added). She has also pleaded the

remaining elements of a negligence claim. 

J. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

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Under California law, a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress requires a plaintiff to show: (1) extreme

and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (3) and actual and proximate causation of the emotional

distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Pardi v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 389 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir.

2004). “Outrageous conduct” is that which exceeds all bounds

usually tolerated by a decent society, and is of a nature

which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause,

mental distress. McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 372

(1991). “[T]he extreme and outrageous character of the

conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or

a relation with the other, that gives him actual or apparent

authority over the other, or power to affect his interest.” 

Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges almost no facts in support of her claim

of intentional infliction of emotional distress. She alleges

merely that she had to “terminate telephone conversations”

because of defendants’ actions, and that defendant “persisted

in conduct that he knew inflicted emotional distress.” Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 74-75. These allegations do not meet the

requirements of an intentional infliction of emotion distress

claim. Plaintiff does not allege any conduct by defendant

that was extreme or outrageous, nor does she allege that she

suffered any severe emotional trauma. The claim therefore

fails, absent amendment.

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10 Plaintiff styles her claim as “Elder Fraud Abuse.”

Am. Compl. ¶ 77. There is no such cause of action. As

plaintiff cites to the statutory provisions for elder abuse in

support of this claim, the court interprets this cause of

action as one for elder abuse.

11 Neglect includes either “[t]he negligent failure of

any person having the care or custody of an elder or a

dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a

reasonable person in a like position would exercise,” or “[t]he

negligent failure of an elder or dependent adult to exercise

that degree of self care that a reasonable person in a like

position would exercise.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.57. 

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K. Elder Abuse10

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for elder abuse. A civil cause of action under the

Elder Abuse statute is governed by the California Welfare and

Institutions Code section 15657, which requires that a

plaintiff demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that a

defendant is liable for physical abuse as defined in Section

15610.63, or neglect as defined in Section 15610.57, and that

the defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression,

fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse . . . .” See

also Benun v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 4th 113, 119

(2004) (relying on section 15657 as establishing the

requirements for a civil cause of action).

Section 15610.63 lists a series of physical invasions,

none of which is relevant to plaintiff’s claims. Section

15610.57. Likewise, section 15610.57 defines neglect in such

a way as to preclude application of the cause of action to

defendant.11 In particular, because defendant is not alleged

as “having the care or custody of” plaintiff, id., the statute

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12 While the statute contemplates that the definition of

elder abuse will include financial abuse, see Cal. Welf. &

Inst. Code §§ 15610.07 and 15610.30, the plain text of sections

15657 and 15610.57 preclude a plaintiff from bringing a civil

action premised on financial abuse unless the abuser has care

or custody of the elder. Indeed, a 2004 amendment to section

15657 deleted section 15610.30 from the list of qualifying

abuses. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15657, Amendments. 

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does not appear applicable.12

For these reasons, plaintiff’s claim for elder abuse

fails. Because the failure is legal in nature, thereby

rendering amendment futile, this claim is dismissed without

leave to amend.

L. Unjust Enrichment

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for unjust enrichment. An individual is required to

make restitution if he or she is unjustly enriched at the

expense of another. First Nationwide Savings v. Perry, 11

Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1662 (1992). Benefit means any type of

advantage. Id. 

Defendant conclusorily asserts that plaintiff has failed

to plead how defendant was unjustly enriched by performing

legal services she requested. Mot. to Dismiss at 13. 

Plaintiff, however, alleges defendant was “unjustly enriched

by the sums paid by Plaintiff, which conferred upon him and

his law firm benefits that were not earned and caused

plaintiff to suffer corresponding injuries.” Am. Compl. ¶ 85. 

Plaintiff’s complaint adequately sets forth a claim for unjust

enrichment.

II. Motion to Strike

Defendant seeks to strike plaintiff’s prayers for

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injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and

speculative consequential damages. Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike a pleading or any

portion of a pleading that is “redundant, impertinent, or

scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are

disfavored, and the remedy of striking a pleading should

generally be granted only to avoid prejudice to the moving

party or when “it is clear that the matter sought to be

stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter

of the litigation.” Smith v. Wal-mart Stores, 2006 WL

2711468, at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

A. Injunctive Relief

Defendant moves to strike plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief. Plaintiff seeks an injunction to “prevent

the Defendant from continuing to use these tactics with other

clients, and in particular, with clients who are over the age

of sixty-five.” Prayer for Relief, Am. Compl. at 26. 

Plaintiff also seeks an injunction to “order the Defendant to

withdraw his complaint with the collection agency and with

credit reporting agencies”. Id. Defendant seeks to strike

this injunctive relief, arguing plaintiff has “failed to state

grounds to act as a private attorney general and second cannot

enjoin Defendant from utilizing lawful methods of receiving

payment for services rendered.” Mot. to Dismiss at 13-14.

My dismissal of plaintiff’s elder abuse claim will

preclude plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief aimed at

prohibiting defendant from engaging in elder abuse. Moreover,

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13 Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that a

plaintiff in federal court must allege an injury that is actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Hangarter v.

Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th

Cir. 2004). In the context of injunctive relief, a plaintiff

must demonstrate a real or immediate threat of an irreparable

injury. Id. And while California Business & Professions Code

sections 17200, 17203 and 17204 may provide plaintiff standing

to seek this type of injunctive relief, she has not alleged a

cause of action under these statutes. See, e.g., VonGrabe v.

Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1323 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (to

establish standing in federal court to bring a section 17204

claim, plaintiff must allege that she has “personally suffered

an injury as a result of Defendant’s conduct allegedly

experienced by other citizens unknown to Plaintiff.”). 

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plaintiff fails to plead causes of action supportive of her

prayer for injunctive relief on behalf of the public at

large.13 Nevertheless, plaintiff does allege that she is

suffering on-going injury relating to defendant’s reporting of

her to a collection agency and credit reporting bureaus. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 63, Prayer for Relief at 26. Thus, while

plaintiff may request an injunction to order defendant to

withdraw his collection credit agency complaints, she may not

seek an injunction in federal court on behalf of the general

public or elderly clients. This portion of plaintiff’s prayer

for relief will be stricken, absent amendment. 

B. Attorneys’ Fees

Defendant also moves to strike plaintiff’s request for

attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees

and costs for bringing this action, despite the fact that she

is representing herself pro se. Plaintiff has indicated that

she may hire an attorney to represent her in stages of this

litigation. Surreply at 5-6. If plaintiff does not hire an

attorney by the point of trial, her request for attorneys’

fees may be stricken at that time. Defendant’s motion to

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14 Defendant’s citation to Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cal.

App. 4th 1350 (1992), is misplaced. In Jackson, the court held

that punitive damages were not allowed in a legal malpractice

verdict when no actual damages were found. 5 Cal. App. 4th at

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strike is denied, without prejudice to defendant’s re-raising

this issue at an appropriate time. 

C. Punitive Damages

Defendant also moves to strike plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages. Where it is proven by clear and convincing

evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,

fraud, or malice, plaintiff may recover damages in addition to

the actual damages. Cal. Civil Code § 3294; Judicial Council

of California, Civil Jury Instructions No. 3940. 

Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts

are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law

or policy. Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 25 Cal. App.

4th 1269, 1287 (1994). The mere carelessness or ignorance of

the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive

damages. Id. Punitive damages are proper only when the

tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to

the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should

not have to tolerate. Id.

Plaintiff alleges at least seven viable causes of action,

supported by specific factual allegations. I cannot say as a

matter of law that defendant’s alleged conduct, such as his

failure to timely substitute as attorney of record,

misrepresentations concerning his time commitments and

experience, and his demands for additional funds, if proven,

could not support an award of punitive damages.14 At this

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1351. Here, plaintiff claims that she suffered actual damages.

15 Plaintiff requests consequential damages for her

“forfeiture of economic opportunities,” “injury to her credit

rating”, and for her “losses due to the need to refinance her

home at a high rate of interest in order to acquire sufficient

funds to relocate out of state, and the expense of relocation.” 

Prayer for Relief, Am. Compl. at 27. 

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stage, plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is

permissible. 

D. Consequential Damages

Defendant also seeks to strike plaintiff’s “consequential

damages that cannot be reasonably calculated as connected to

any of the acts complained of and, therefore, are at best

speculative and subject to being stricken as not recoverable

in an action for legal malpractice.” Mot. to Dismiss at 14. 

Defendant, however, does not provide any support for striking

plaintiff’s request for consequential damages, nor does he

specify which consequential damages request he opposes. 

Plaintiff makes several specific requests for consequential

damages, and none are overly speculative.15 Moreover, if

plaintiff’s consequential damages “cannot be reasonably

calculated as connected to any of the acts complained of,”

then such damages will not be awarded to plaintiff at trial. 

Plaintiff’s request for consequential damages is permissible. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT

defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. The causes of action for extortion and intentional

infliction of emotional distress are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE TO AMENDMENT. The cause of action for elder abuse

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is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion to dismiss is DENIED

with respect to the remaining causes of action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT defendant’s motion to strike

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion to strike

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to plaintiff’s prayer for

injunctive relief on behalf of the general public. The motion

to strike is otherwise DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff is granted leave to

filed an amended complaint by Thursday, September 13, 2007

only if she can allege, in good faith, an adequate factual

basis for her allegations and can allege specific facts

supporting all of the required elements of her causes of

action. While successful amendment of her claims may be

conceivable, plaintiff should weigh the benefits of amendment

against the detriment of prolonging uncertainty in her

pleadings as the trial date approaches. If plaintiff amends

her complaint, defendant’s response will be filed by Tuesday,

October 9, 2007. If plaintiff does not amend her complaint,

defendant’s answer will be filed by Monday, September 24,

2007. 

Dated: August 22, 2007 

 Bernard Zimmerman

 United States Magistrate Judge

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