Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02743/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02743-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.K., a minor by and through his Guardian ad

Litem, L.K., L.K., and W.K.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BURLINGAME SCHOOL DISTRICT, and

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARINGS,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 08-02743 JSW

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AND DISMISSING FOR

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION

INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order

filed by Plaintiffs, L.K., a minor, L.K., his guardian ad litem, and W.K (collectively

“Plaintiffs”). Having considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in

this case, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court HEREBY DENIES Plaintiffs’

ex parte application and DISMISSES this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. L.K. is seven years old and

attends school within the Burlingame School District (“the District”). (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 18;

Declaration of L.K. (“Mother’s Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-4.) L.K. is eligible for services under the

Individuals With Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (“IDEIA”). On or about

March 21, 2008, Plaintiffs initiated a due process hearing pursuant to the IDEIA to resolve a 

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1 Section 1415(i)(3)(D) is entitled “Prohibition of attorneys’ fees and related

costs for certain services.” It provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ttorneys’ fees may not be

awarded and related costs may not be reimbursed in any action or proceeding under this

section for services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a

parent if– (I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any time more than 10

days before the proceeding begins; (II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and (III) the

court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is

not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).

2

dispute with the District over L.K.’s educational needs. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 19; Mother’s Decl. ¶¶ 1,

6.) That proceeding, L.K. v. Burlingame School District and San Mateo County of Education,

OAH Case No. 2008030820 is pending before the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”)

(hereinafter “the Due Process proceedings”). (Compl. ¶¶ 18-26; Declaration of Susan J. Bardet

(“Bardet Decl.”), ¶ 24.)

On May 2, 2008, the District sent a letter to Plaintiffs which set forth “a written offer of

settlement ... pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(D)” (hereinafter “the ten-day offer”).1

(Compl., Ex. A; Bardet Decl., ¶ 4.) The letter further states that the

offer supersedes any prior settlement offers with regard to [OAH] Case

No. 2008030820 and is limited to settlement of all of [L.K.’s] educational

claims in OAH Case No. N2007100455 [sic]. If you accept this offer, the

above referenced matter will be resolved. In consideration for a complete

dismissal of OAH Case No. 2008030820 with prejudice, and release and

waiver of all claims therein, the District offers the following: 1. The

District will continue to implement L.’s current IEP. 2. The District will

provide an additional ten hours per week, during the school year and

extended school year, of speech and language services through a

mutually agreeable non-public agency. 3. The District will pay the sum

of $5,000 to L.’s parents.

...

Petitioner may accept this offer by signing below and transmitting the

signed document via facsimile to [the District’s counsel] or by e-mail to

[the District’s counsel] and regular mail to: [the District’s counsel.]

If you accept this offer, the District will draft a settlement agreement

memorializing the parties’ agreement. 

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2 Lourdes Desai, the District’s Director of Special Education, was copied on the

letter. (Id.; Bardet Decl., ¶¶ 4, 8-9.) 

3 Again, the record demonstrates that Ms. Desai was copied on some of the

written correspondence addressing these clarifications. (Bardet Decl., ¶¶ 5-7, 9; TRO Ex.

B.)

4 As supplemental authority, the District cited J.C. v. Vacaville Unified Sch.

Dist., 2007 WL 112138 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2007) as support for its position that the ten-day

offer was not a binding settlement agreement.

3

(Compl., Ex. A.)2

 According to Plaintiffs, the parties engaged in some discussions to clarify

one aspect of the ten-day offer. On May 9, 2008, 3

 Plaintiffs assert that they accepted the

District’s ten-day offer. Plaintiffs’ counsel also sent a cover letter with Plaintiffs’ acceptance,

in which she enclosed a proposed draft settlement agreement. (Compl., Ex. A; Bardet Decl., ¶¶

13-14.) On May 12, 2008, the District sent a letter to the OAH, in which it advised the

presiding judge that the Plaintiffs had accepted the District’s ten-day offer and in which it

requested that the hearing dates be vacated. (Bardet Decl., ¶16; TRO Ex. E.) The OAH vacated

the hearing dates and set the matter down for a status hearing. (Bardet Decl., ¶ 17.)

Thereafter, on May 15, 2008, the District sent a letter to Plaintiffs in which it stated that

it did “not recognize the attempt to accept its May 2, 2008 10-day offer received after business

hours on May 9, 2008.” (TRO Ex. F.) The District’s counsel also advised Plaintiffs that the

District had not authorized certain terms of the ten-day offer and stated that it could no longer

agree to the terms set forth in the May 2, 2008 ten-day offer. The District then set forth a

“revised” offer pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D). (Bardet Decl., ¶ 18; TRO Ex. F.) At the

hearing on this matter, the District made clear that it does not dispute this sequence of events. It

asserts, however, that the parties were engaging in settlement negotiations. (See Declaration of

Damara Moore, ¶ 8.) The District also asserts that the ten-day offer was not binding until

memorialized in writing and approved by the Board.4

On May 22, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion before the OAH to either enforce the ten-day

offer or enter judgment or decision by settlement. The OAH denied the motion and concluded

that “[a]uthority to enforce a settlement agreement in special education proceedings has been

vested with the California Department of Education. ... Thus, OAH lacks the authority to grant

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4

the relief” sought by Plaintiffs. (See Bardet Decl., ¶ 19; TRO Ex. G.) The OAH also denied

subsequent motions to stay the Due Process proceedings, while Plaintiffs sought to enforce the

settlement agreement in this Court. A telephonic trial setting conference is set for June 24,

2008, at which point the OAH is set to schedule trial dates on the merits of the Due Process

proceedings. (Bardet Decl., ¶¶ 20-24; TRO Exs. I, J).

ANALYSIS

A. Applicable Legal Standards.

To prevail on a motion for temporary restraining order or to receive preliminary

injunctive relief, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating either (1) a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) the existence of

serious questions as to success on the merits and irreparable injury along with a sharp tipping of 

the balance of hardships in favor of the moving party. Stahlbarg International Sales Co. v.

John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2001). These alternative standards are

“not separate tests but the outer reaches of a single continuum.” International Jensen, Inc. v.

Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993). “Because injunctive relief prior to trial is a

harsh and extraordinary remedy, it is to be granted sparingly and only in cases where the issues

are clear and well defined and the plaintiff has established a reasonable certainty of prevailing

at trial.” Watermark, Inc. v. United Stations, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 31, 32-33 (C.D. Cal. 1982)

(citing Dymo Industries, Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1964)). Moreover, “on

application for preliminary injunction the court is not bound to decide doubtful and difficult

questions of law or disputed questions of fact.” Dymo Industries, 326 F.2d at 143; see also

Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 480 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1973) (reversing grant of preliminary

injunction based on existence of disputed factual issues).

Under either formulation of the test, a party seeking a preliminary injunction always

must show that a significant threat of irreparable harm exists. American Passage Media Corp.

v. Cass Communications, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, if the moving party

cannot show irreparable harm, a court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the

merits. Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).

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5

In addition, within the Ninth Circuit, the Court must also consider the public interest

when it assesses the propriety of issuing an injunction. Sammartano v. First Judicial District

Court, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Met Their Burden to Show A TRO Should Issue or that the

Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Matter.

Plaintiffs ask the Court to stay the Due Process proceedings until this Court has resolved

whether the District’s ten-day offer can and should be enforced. The District and the OAH

oppose and argue that, because Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies, the

Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. Each Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have failed

to demonstrate irreparable harm. 

1. Plaintiffs Have Not Exhausted Their Claims and Have Not Demonstrated

That Exhaustion Should Be Excused.

When a plaintiff alleges “injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the” IDEIA’s

administrative procedures and remedies, “exhaustion of those remedies is required.” Robb v.

Bethel Sch. Dist. # 403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the IDEIA’s exhaustion

requirement is not rigid, and a plaintiff may establish that exhaustion should be excused if it

would be futile or that administrative procedures would be inadequate. Kutasi v. Las Virgenes

Unified School Dist., 494 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). In determining whether exhaustion is

required, 

the dispositive question generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged

injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the [IDEIA’s]

administrative procedures and remedies. If so, exhaustion of those

remedies is required. If not, the claim necessarily falls outside the

[IDEIA’s] scope, and exhaustion is unnecessary. Where the [IDEIA’s]

ability to remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be

required to give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain

and alleviate the alleged problem. 

Robb, 308 F.3d at 1050 (emphasis added); see also Kutasi, 494 F.3d at 1168. “If a plaintiff is

required to exhaust administrative remedies but fails to, the federal courts do not have

jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claim.” Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 920-21

(9th Cir. 2005). 

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5 Indeed, Plaintiffs characterize the order as interlocutory in nature. (Compl., ¶

7.)

6 The Court also concludes that this case is distinguishable from Porter v.

Board of Trustees of Manhattan Beach, 307 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case, the

plaintiffs had obtained a decision in their favor in a hearing before the Special Education

Hearing Office, the OAH’s predecessor, with which the defendant did not comply. The

Porter court concluded that exhaustion would be futile in light of Wyner v. Manhattan Beach

6

Plaintiffs argue that they have exhausted their claims because the OAH has made a final

determination that it does not have jurisdiction to enforce the ten-day offer. In support of their

position, Plaintiffs rely heavily on C.T. v. Vacaville Unified School District, 2006 WL 2092613

(E.D. Cal. July 27, 2006). In the C.T. case, the parties reached a settlement agreement prior to

resolution of the due process hearing. Id., at *3. Alleging that the defendant violated the

agreement, the plaintiff filed compliance complaints with the California Department of

Education (“CDE”), “one of which was based on VUSD’s alleged breach of” the settlement. Id.

The CDE concluded that the defendant had not complied with the settlement and required the

defendant to take corrective actions. Following further disputes over compliance, the plaintiff

initiated a due process hearing to address the alleged denial of a FAPE for the plaintiff’s current

educational year and for years covered by the settlement. Id. The defendant moved to dismiss

two of the three issues presented by plaintiff, on the basis of the settlement. The hearing officer

granted the defendant’s motion on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed those issues

from the case. The plaintiff then dismissed the due process hearing. Id., at *3, *6 n.8. 

Addressing the exhaustion issue, the C.T. court noted that the plaintiff “requested a due

process hearing to address defendant VUSD’s alleged breach of the” settlement agreement, and

by dismissing those issues, the OAH fully resolved all the issues pending in the due process

proceeding. Therefore, on those facts, the court concluded that the plaintiff carried her burden

to exhaust “to the extent possible in the circumstances of [the] case.” Id. at *8. In contrast, in

this case, the OAH has not dismissed the Due Process proceedings.5

 Therefore, although the

OAH has determined that it will not, and cannot, enforce the ten-day offer, the OAH has not

denied Plaintiffs a due process hearing, and it is prepared to consider the parties’ positions on

what special education and services L.K. is entitled to receive under the IDEIA.6

 

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Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that

the SEHO lacked jurisdiction to enforce its own orders. Id. at 1069. Similarly, in Pedraza v.

Alameda Unif. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 949603 (N.D. Cal. March 27, 2007), the court concluded

that exhaustion would be futile because the OAH had dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and

because the California Department of Education also had refused to take any action to

enforce the defendant’s compliance with the IDEA. Id., at *6. Thus, in each of those cases,

the Due Process proceedings had been fully resolved, and the plaintiffs could not obtain

relief through administrative procedures. 

7 As this Court previously found in R.K. v. Hayward Unified School District, 2007 WL 2778702 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007), other courts have held that exhaustion is

required for claims concerning breaches of agreements to settle due process complaints,

where the alleged breach relates to a student’s receipt of a FAPE. Id., at * 7 (citing J.P. v.

Cherokee County Bd. of Educ., 218 Fed. Appx. 911, 913-14 (11th Cir. 2007); Sarah Z. v.

Menlo Park City Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 1574569, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2007); Pedraza v.

Alameda Unif. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 949603, at *6 (N.D. Cal. March 27, 2007); Banks ex rel.

Banks v. Modesto City Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 2233213, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005)).

7

[Those issues] are best resolved in the first instance by someone familiar with

the resources available to meet the needs of the disabled and the

responsibilities of the district to do so. School systems and education

departments should also be afforded the opportunity to correct their own

errors before interference from the courts. ... Failure to require exhaustion

would encourage parties to circumvent administrative review by entering

into, and then disregarding, settlement agreements in order to go directly to

federal court.

Steward v. Hillsboro Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 2001 WL 34047100, at *5 (D. Or. March 1, 2001)

(emphasis added) (holding that pursuant to the IDEIA, claims for breach of contract must first

be presented to the appropriate administrative body).7

 

While the Court appreciates Plaintiffs’ position, the Court does not find that exhaustion

of the administrative process would be futile or that the administrative process would be

inadequate. Although Plaintiffs frame the allegations in their Complaint and the claims for

relief in terms of enforcement of the ten-day offer, the relief they seek from this Court is to

obtain the services provided in that offer. As stated above, the focus of the Court’s inquiry is

“whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the

[IDEIA’s] administrative procedures and remedies.” Robb, 308 F.3d at 1050. Although

Plaintiffs may not obtain a remedy from the OAH in the specific form of relief sought in their

Complaint, i.e. specific performance of the ten-day offer, the OAH still “could alleviate the root

cause of their injury. For purposes of exhaustion, relief that is also available under the [IDEIA]

does not necessarily mean relief that fully satisfies the aggrieved party. Rather, it means relief

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8 The Court also notes that although the IDEIA permits settlement agreements

reached pursuant to mediation under sections 1415(e) or through a resolution session under

1415(f) to be enforceable in federal courts, Section 1415(i)(3)(D), does not contain similar

language. Several courts have concluded that, based on the plain language of the IDEIA,

federal courts do not have jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements reached outside the

auspices of mediation or a resolution session. See, e.g., M.J. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist.,

2007 WL 1033444, at *4-*8 (E.D. Cal. April 3, 2007) (holding that “[t]he district court does

not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s allegation that CUSD breached the settlement

agreement, entered into prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendments and outside the

framework of any alternative dispute resolution procedure previously or currently described

in § 1415); Bowman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2221703 at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006)

(holding that because plain language of the IDEIA limited the types of settlements which are

enforceable by federal courts, and because the settlement agreements at issue were not made

pursuant to Sections 1415(e) or 1415(f), court did not have jurisdiction to enforce them); cf.

Traverse Bay Area Intermediate School District v. Mich. Dept. of Educ., 2007 WL 2219352

at *6-*8 (W.D. Mich. July 27, 2007) (noting that “[h]ad Congress intended that all

settlement agreements reached during the course of the administrative process be enforceable

in federal court, it could have easily adopted a provision to that effect”) and finding that

exhaustion was required before districts could pursue breach of contract claims based on tenday offer). 

9 Plaintiffs have a third option, which is to proceed with the Due Process

proceedings and potentially obtain a more favorable outcome than that offered by the

District.

8

suitable to remedy the wrong done the plaintiff, which may not always be relief in the precise

form the plaintiff prefers.” Kutasi, 494 F.3d at 1163 (internal quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are required to exhaust their claims. Because

they have failed to do so, the Court does not have jurisdiction over their Complaint.8

2. Plaintiffs Have Not Established That They Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if

a Stay is Not Granted.

The Court also concludes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer

irreparable harm if the Court does not stay the Due Process proceedings. Plaintiffs argue that

they “will be faced with two bad options: either litigate the due process hearing at the same time

as the present action, or withdraw the due process hearing.” (Mot. at 9:10-12.)9

 The Plaintiffs’

argument focuses primarily on the cost of going forward with the Due Process proceedings, but

they also argue that to proceed before the OAH “will create a tremendous amount of hostility

between Plaintiffs and the District.” (Mot. at 9:24-10:1.) Plaintiffs might have been

inconvenienced by the possibility of litigating these issues in two fora, had they established

jurisdiction, but that would not constitute irreparable harm. In addition, although some hostility

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28 10 Plaintiffs submit no admissible evidence to suggest that going forward with

the hearing would be detrimental to L.K.’s well-being. 

9

between Plaintiffs and the District may result from going forward with the Due Process

proceedings, that is a risk inherent in any litigation.10 Accordingly, for this reason as well, the

Court concludes that the TRO must be denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a

temporary restraining order. The Court FURTHER ORDERS that this matter shall be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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