Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01796/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01796-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA J. WOLCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-1796-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the court 

will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion 

for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born March 30, 1964, applied for SSI benefits on June 30, 2012, alleging 

disability beginning January 31, 2008. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 56, 135. Plaintiff 

alleged she was unable to work due to restless leg syndrome, depression, arthritis, and anxiety. 

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AT 154. In a decision dated March 7, 2014, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 

AT 14-25. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since June 30, 2012, the application date.

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the spine, obesity, migraine 

headaches, and a bipolar disorder.

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the 

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)

except the claimant can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 

pounds frequently, and sit, stand and walk for six hours in an eight 

hour day. The claimant can occasionally balance, frequently climb 

ramps and stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She 

should avoid extreme cold, pulmonary irritants, and hazards. She 

can perform simple one-two step tasks.

5. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as 

a cashier (211.462.010) light with an SVP of 2. This work does not 

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity.

6. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in 

the Social Security Act, since June 30, 2012, the date the 

application was filed.

AT 16-25.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 

disabled: (1) improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence in the record when determining 

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), (2) improperly relied on vocational expert 

(“VE”) testimony that conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles when rendering his 

determination that plaintiff could perform her past work as a cashier at step four; and (3) 

improperly found plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of her pain and symptoms to be less 

than fully credible.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

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“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ did not err in Considering the Medical Opinion Evidence

First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to specifically address and weigh the

opinion of plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Nguyen. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ 

improperly accorded “significant weight” to the non-examining opinions of Dr. Campbell and Dr. 

Caruso-Radin because he did not also incorporate into his RFC determination some of the 

“moderate” work-related limitations assessed by those physicians.

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

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any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical 

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

With regard to Dr. Nguyen, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to address and 

weigh his opinion that plaintiff had a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)2score of 45, 

which indicated that plaintiff had “serious” symptoms stemming from her mental impairments. 

However, “a GAF score is merely a rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, or 

occupational functioning used to reflect an individual’s need for treatment, but it does not have 

any direct correlative work-related or functional limitations.” Hughes v. Colvin, 599 F. App’x 

765, 766 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to consider and weigh the GAF score assessed by Dr. 

Nguyen as if it were that physician’s opinion regarding the claimant’s work-related functional 

limitations. See id. (holding that the ALJ did not err in failing to address a GAF score from the 

plaintiff’s treating psychiatric nurse practitioner when determining the plaintiff’s RFC). 

Outside of the GAF score provided in Dr. Nguyen’s August 12, 2012 treatment notes, 

which did not constitute an opinion the ALJ was required to weigh, plaintiff fails to point to any 

other aspect of Dr. Nguyen’s treatment records that could be construed as providing an opinion 

on the specific work-related functional limitations caused by plaintiff’s impairments. As the ALJ 

noted, Dr. Nguyen’s treatment notes “did not identify any functional mental limitations” and the 

record contains no opinions from any of plaintiff’s treating physicians regarding her mental 

impairments. AT 24-25. In short, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the ALJ ignored any 

functional opinion provided by Dr. Nguyen when determining plaintiff’s RFC.

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2 GAF is a scale reflecting “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical 

continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 

(4th ed. 2000).

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Furthermore, although plaintiff makes much of the fact that Dr. Nguyen at the August 12, 

2012 appointment assessed a GAF score of 45, GAF scores are not dispositive in social security 

cases. Trinchere v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4395283, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). A low GAF score 

does not alone determine disability, but is a piece of evidence to be considered with the rest of the 

record. Olds v. Astrue, 2008 WL 339757, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2008) (citation omitted). An 

ALJ is permitted to discredit a GAF score where it is unsupported by objective evidence. Clark v. 

Astrue, 2009 WL 542166, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009). Here, the ALJ specifically considered

Dr. Nguyen’s August 12, 2012 treatment notes, including the assessed GAF score of 45, when 

determining plaintiff’s RFC. AT 20-21. Moreover, the ALJ determined that the evidence in the 

record, including the opinions of plaintiff’s examining and non-examining physicians, the 

minimal findings in plaintiff’s treatment records, including those provided by Dr. Nguyen, and 

the lack of treatment plaintiff received for impairments, supported the ALJ’s RFC findings that 

were less severe than what Dr. Nguyen’s GAF score may have suggested. AT 24-25. Plaintiff 

fails to show how the ALJ’s RFC determination in light of that evidence was in error.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by assigning “significant weight” to the opinions 

of Dr. Campbell and Dr. Caruso-Radin but not adopting some of the “moderate” mental 

limitations those physicians opined as part of the ALJ’s overall RFC determination. Plaintiff 

contends that the sole mental limitation contained within the ALJ’s RFC determination—that 

plaintiff could perform only simple one-two step tasks—does not adequately reflect the moderate 

mental limitations opined by these two physicians. Accordingly, plaintiff asserts, the ALJ tacitly 

rejected the moderate work-related mental limitations opined by Dr. Campbell and Dr. CarusoRadin without providing any reasons for doing so, thus resulting in prejudicial error.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that an ALJ may synthesize and translate 

assessed limitations into an RFC assessment without repeating each functional limitation 

verbatim in the RFC assessment. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 

2008); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (defining RFC as “the most you can still do despite your 

limitations”). In this case, plaintiff’s RFC appears to adequately capture the functional limitations 

assessed by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Caruso-Radin. 

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With regard to plaintiff’s mental impairments, Dr. Campbell opined that plaintiff was 

“moderately limited” in her abilities to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods;

perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within 

customary tolerances; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions; and 

perform at a consistent pace. AT 82. Dr. Campbell opined further that plaintiff was not 

significantly limited in any other aspect of mental functioning. Id. Dr. Campbell also clarified 

that plaintiff’s moderate mental limitations would translate into an ability to “learn and remember 

basic work instructions and tasks of 1-2 steps”; “follow a schedule, make decisions and complete 

basic work tasks on a consistent basis”; “work around others”; and “adapt to changes and handle 

the normal stressors of full time employment.” Id. Finally, he opined that plaintiff “can meet the 

expectations of full time employment doing basic work tasks” given the mental limitations he 

assessed. Id.

Similar to Dr. Campbell, Dr. Caruso-Radin opined that plaintiff was “moderately limited” 

in her abilities to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, complete a normal 

workday and workweek without interruptions, and perform at a consistent pace. AT 68. Unlike 

Dr. Campbell, Dr. Caruso-Radin also opined that plaintiff was “moderately limited” in her ability 

to carry out detailed instructions, but that she was not significantly limited with regard to her 

ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual 

within customary tolerances. Id. Furthermore, Dr. Caruso-Radin clarified that the moderate 

concentration and persistence limitations she opined demonstrate that plaintiff “can understand, 

remember, and carry out a two-step command involving simple instructions and maintain 

[concentration, persistence, or pace] for such.” Id. She also clarified that “[a]lthough [plaintiff] 

might have difficulty sustaining attention over extended periods, [plaintiff] could sustain 

[concentration, persistence, or pace] up to 4 h[ou]r increments with customary work breaks and is 

able to complete usual workday/week.” Id.

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Based on the above findings by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Caruso-Radin, it is clear that the 

ALJ’s determination that plaintiff is limited to “simple one-two step tasks” adequately 

encompassed those physicians’ opinions regarding plaintiff’s mental limitations. Despite finding 

that plaintiff was moderately limited in several areas of workplace mental functioning, both Dr. 

Campbell and Dr. Caruso-Radin ultimately opined that plaintiff was limited only to carrying out

simple one-to-two step tasks. AT 68, 82. Indeed, both physicians specifically found that plaintiff 

could still perform basic work tasks on a consistent basis and meet the expectations of full time 

employment on a consistent day-to-day and week-to-week basis. Id. The ALJ’s RFC 

determination limiting plaintiff to simple one-two step tasks reflected exactly these physicians’ 

opinions regarding the impact plaintiff’s mental impairments would have on her ability to 

perform work-related tasks. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in weighing the opinions of these 

two physicians in the manner he did when determining plaintiff’s RFC.

B. The ALJ did not err in Relying on the VE’s Testimony to Determine that Plaintiff 

Could Perform her Past Work as a Cashier at Step Four

Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the VE’s testimony to support his 

step four determination that plaintiff could perform her prior work as a cashier in light of her RFC 

because the VE’s testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”).3 

More specifically, plaintiff contends that the VE’s statement that a person with the same 

limitations as those contained within plaintiff’s RFC could perform plaintiff’s past work as a 

cashier was in direct conflict with the DOT’s Level 3 Reasoning4requirement for that occupation 

 

3

The United States Dept. of Labor, Employment & Training Admin., Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles (4th ed. 1991), (“DOT”) is routinely relied on by the Social Security Administration “in 

determining the skill level of a claimant’s past work, and in evaluating whether the claimant is 

able to perform other work in the national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 

(9th Cir. 1990). The DOT classifies jobs by their exertional and skill requirements. The DOT is 

a primary source of reliable job information for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d)(1), 

416.966(d)(1).

4

The DOT breaks jobs into six GED Reasoning Levels that range from Level 1 (simplest) to 

Level 6 (most complex). DOT (4th ed. 1991), App. C, § III, 1991 WL 688702. Level 3 

Reasoning requires a worker to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions 

furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form [and d]eal with problems involving several 

concrete variables in or from standardized situations.”

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in light of plaintiff’s RFC limitation to “simple one-two step tasks.” In support of her argument, 

plaintiff cites to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842 

(9th Cir. 2015), wherein the Court held that “that there is an apparent conflict between the 

residual functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 

Reasoning.” Id. at 847. In that case, the Court determined that the ALJ was required to reconcile 

this apparent conflict before the ALJ could rely on VE testimony that the claimant could work in 

occupations requiring Level 3 Reasoning skills to support a step five determination that the 

claimant could perform such work as it appears in the national economy. Id. at 843-44. Plaintiff 

asserts that the ALJ never properly reconciled the conflict between the VE’s testimony indicating 

that plaintiff could perform her past work as a cashier, which the DOT states has a Level 3 

Reasoning requirement, and plaintiff’s limitation to simple one-two step tasks before using the 

VE’s testimony in support of his step four determination that plaintiff could perform her prior 

work as a cashier.

Plaintiff’s argument is not well taken, however, because the ALJ here utilized the VE’s 

testimony to support his step four determination that plaintiff could perform her past work as a 

cashier as she actually performed it, unlike the ALJ in Zavalin, who used the VE’s testimony to 

support a step five determination that the plaintiff could perform other work as it is generally 

performed in the national economy. This distinction is crucial because different standards govern 

an ALJ’s step four determination than those that govern a determination at step five. While an 

ALJ at step four may determine that the claimant can perform his or her past work as it is 

generally performed within the national economy—which is similar to step five’s requirement 

that the ALJ find the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy—the ALJ may alternatively find the claimant not disabled on the basis that he 

or she could perform his or her past work as it was actually performed. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.960(b)(2). Furthermore, the claimant has the burden of showing that he or she cannot 

perform his or her prior work at step four, while the ALJ has the burden to prove that there exists 

other work in sufficient numbers within the national economy that the claimant can perform given 

his or her limitations. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146, n.5. These differences indicate that the Ninth 

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Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Zavalin does not necessarily require the ALJ to reconcile an 

apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT in order to rely on the VE’s testimony 

in support of a step four determination that the claimant can perform his or her past work under 

circumstances similar to those presented in this action.

Here, the ALJ evaluated whether plaintiff could perform her past work as a cashier as she 

had actually performed it and as it was generally performed in the national economy. AT 25. 

Even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ erred by determining that plaintiff could perform 

her past work as a cashier as it was performed in the national economy, such an error was

harmless in light of the ALJ’s alternative determination that plaintiff could still perform such 

work as she actually had performed it.5 When determining that a claimant can perform his or her 

prior work as it was actually performed, an ALJ is not required to consult the DOT because that 

source addresses an occupation as it is generally performed, not as it is specifically performed by 

the claimant. See Pruitt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 612 F. App’x 891, 894 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)) (“[I]t is irrelevant that the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles states that receptionists must frequently reach but the ALJ found that Pruitt 

could only occasionally reach. The ALJ was evaluating whether Pruitt could perform her work as 

she actually performed it—with only occasional reaching—and not as it is generally 

performed.”); Johnson v. Colvin, 623 F. App’x 326, 327 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting SSR 82-61) 

(holding that an ALJ did not err by not consulting the DOT to determine whether the claimant 

could perform his past relevant work at step four because “[a]n ALJ can find the claimant not 

disabled at step four by finding either that the claimant retains the capacity ‘to perform the 

particular functional demands and job duties peculiar to an individual job as he or she actually 

 

5 While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed whether an ALJ is required to 

resolve an apparent conflict between a VE’s testimony and the DOT with regard to the step four 

inquiry into whether a claimant can perform his or past work as it is generally performed in the 

national economy, it appears that the Court’s reasoning in Zavalin would also apply to such a 

scenario. However, the court does not address this issue at this time because, even assuming, 

without deciding, that the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s testimony that plaintiff could perform 

her past work as it was generally performed, such an error was harmless, because the ALJ 

properly determined that plaintiff could still perform her past work as she actually performed it

for the reasons discussed below.

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performed it’ or ‘the job as ordinarily required by employers throughout the national economy.’”

(emphasis in original)). 

The existence of an apparent conflict between a VE’s testimony that the claimant can 

perform his or her prior occupation and that occupation’s DOT listing may be irrelevant to the 

issue of whether the claimant can still perform work as he or she actually performed it because 

the DOT’s requirements may not match what the claimant actually did while working in that 

position. Accordingly, the fact that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found an apparent 

conflict between an ability to perform only simple one-two step tasks and occupations requiring 

Level 3 Reasoning does not necessarily mean that the ALJ here erred in relying on the VE’s 

testimony to determine that plaintiff could perform her prior work as a cashier as she actually 

performed it. See AT 25, 52-53. An ALJ may consult a VE to aid in making a step four 

determination and use a VE’s testimony as evidence of whether the claimant can perform his or 

her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(2). Therefore, the ALJ’s use of such evidence in support 

of his step four determination was proper.6 See id. 

Moreover, in addition to relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ also took into 

consideration plaintiff’s own reports regarding how she performed her past work as a cashier. AT 

25. A review of plaintiff’s own description of her past work as a cashier provides substantial 

support for the VE’s testimony and the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff could perform such 

work given her RFC limitation to simple one-two step tasks. See AT 192-93, 195. In short, the 

ALJ relied on substantial evidence in the record in rendering his step four determination that 

plaintiff could perform her past work as a cashier as she actually had performed that occupation. 

Thus, plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred at step four is without merit.

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Furthermore, while the ALJ was not required to consult the DOT in making his step four 

determination, he also asked the VE during the hearing whether there was any conflict between 

the DOT’s requirements and the VE’s testimony, to which the VE responded that such a conflict 

did not exist. AT 54.

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C. The ALJ’s Adverse Credibility Determination was Proper and Supported by 

Substantial Evidence from the Record

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found plaintiff’s testimony regarding the 

extent of her symptoms arising from her mental impairments to be less than fully credible.7

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 

explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be 

supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”). 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7p; SSR 95-5p; SSR 88-13. Work records, 

physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and effect of symptoms, and 

 

7

Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s testimony all center on the 

ALJ’s decision to discount plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of her symptoms arising 

specifically from her mental impairments. Plaintiff does not appear to contest the ALJ’s 

treatment of her testimony regarding the extent of her pain and symptoms caused by her physical 

impairments. Accordingly, the court does not address in detail the ALJ’s reasons used to support 

his decision to discount plaintiff’s pain and symptom testimony arising from her physical 

impairments. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (the court need 

not address an issue where the claimant “failed to argue [the] issue with any specificity in [his or 

her] briefing.”). Nevertheless, a review of the ALJ’s reasoning and the rest of the record shows 

that the ALJ’s reasoning in support of his adverse credibility determination regarding plaintiff’s 

pain and symptom testimony concerning her physical impairments were clear and convincing 

reasons supported by substantial evidence.

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inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. Light v. Social Security 

Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek treatment for an allegedly 

debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ in determining whether the 

alleged associated pain is not a significant non-exertional impairment. See Flaten v. Secretary of 

HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, on his or her own 

observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989), which cannot 

substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s 

reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” Morgan v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of the symptoms 

arising from her mental impairments for the following reasons: 

Turning now to her mental complaints, the undersigned could not 

find them entirely credible as the SA determined she could perform 

simple routine tasks (unskilled work), and the overall record failed 

to support that her ability to perform the basic mental demands of 

unskilled work had been substantially eroded.

Treating mental health records did not fully support her mental 

complaints as she was not diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and 

the most common findings upon MSE were a depressed/irritable 

mood and restricted affect. Those records did not indicate she had 

to be hospitalized or had any 5150 mental health admissions, and 

did not contain evidence of individual or group therapy. There 

were no specific findings that she was forgetful, had problems 

concentrating, or had difficulty getting along with office or mental 

health professionals. Dr. Nguyen, treating psychiatrist, did not 

identify any functional mental limitations, and his records did not 

indicate he was treating her on a weekly or monthly basis. Rather 

his treatment was approximately every three months (the claimant 

testified to seeing her psychiatrist every three months) which is 

clearly not indicative of a disabling mental impairment, and he 

indicated that her bipolar disorder was of moderate severity.

The only mental abnormalities noted by Dr. Fernando during the 

CE was that she looked depressed and that she reported having 

some suicidal thoughts, but treating mental health and non-mental 

health treating sources contained no evidence she was suicidal or 

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reported being suicidal. The record was devoid of evidence that she 

sought emergency room treatment for her mental complaints or 

United Way organizations or psychiatrically hospitalized.

Lastly, no mental problems were perceived when she filed her 

application, and she indicated in her application that she did not 

need help with personal care, hygiene or upkeep of a home.

These factors led the undersigned to find her mental complaints 

partially credible.

AT 24 (citations omitted). For the reasons discussed below, this rationale was proper and 

supported by substantial evidence from the record.

First, the ALJ properly determined that the care plaintiff received for her mental 

impairments was not commensurate with the degree of symptoms she claimed. See Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); SSR 96-7p (“[T]he individual’s statements may be 

less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints . . . 

.”). As the ALJ noted, plaintiff received only minimal and relatively sporadic mental health 

treatment. Indeed, the record shows that plaintiff visited her primary psychiatric physician only 

roughly every three months and received mental health care only in the form of psychotropic 

medications, with no further recommendations for other forms of treatment. AT 263-69, 298-99, 

323-27. There is no indication that plaintiff’s physicians ever recommended that plaintiff 

undergo more advanced treatment for her mental impairments or that plaintiff ever sought 

additional treatment.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly focused on the fact that there was no evidence 

that plaintiff had a 5150 admission or had otherwise been hospitalized due to her mental 

impairments, attended mental therapy sessions, or contacted a mental health crisis center. 

Plaintiff contends that she was not required to show that she had met these criteria before her 

mental symptom testimony could be deemed credible. While plaintiff is correct that she did not 

need to provide evidence of such treatment before her testimony indicating that her impairments 

rendered her disabled could be deemed believable, her argument misses the point that the ALJ 

was permitted to rely on the fact that plaintiff received only minimal mental health treatment in 

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support of his adverse credibility determination. In listing the above forms of treatment, the ALJ 

merely illustrated that plaintiff did not receive a degree of mental health treatment that would 

support the level of symptom severity her testimony suggested.

Second, the ALJ determined that the objective evidence in the record undermined 

plaintiff’s claims that her mental impairments were as severe as she alleged. The medical 

opinions of Dr. Campbell, Dr. Caruso-Radin, and Dr. Fernando, an examining physician who 

opined on plaintiff’s physical limitations, all of which the ALJ accorded “significant weight,” 

directly conflicted with plaintiff’s claims of disabling symptoms and pain. AT 64-69, 78-82, 272-

79. Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony, it was nevertheless a relevant factor for the ALJ to consider. 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, in light of the other clear and 

convincing reasons set forth both above and below, the ALJ did not err in considering the fact 

that plaintiff’s testimony was not supported by the objective medical evidence in the record as an 

additional reason to discount plaintiff’s testimony.

Finally, the ALJ also reasoned that plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of her mental 

impairments was inconsistent with her prior statements regarding her impairments and symptoms. 

Such a rationale was a proper reason for discounting plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of 

her mental impairments. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (noting that an ALJ may consider “the 

claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid” in determining whether the claimant’s 

testimony is credible). Furthermore, the record here provides substantial evidence in support of 

the ALJ’s reasoning. As the ALJ noted, plaintiff noted in her initial application for SSI that she 

did not need help in personal care, hygiene, or upkeep of her home, AT 137, but later testified 

that she needed assistance performing many basic daily activities, such as preparing meals, 

showering, and cleaning, and could not perform personal hygiene tasks due to her depression, AT 

40, 43. Accordingly, the ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s inconsistent statements as a reason 

for discounting her testimony.

/////

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Because the ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of the symptoms stemming from her mental 

impairments, the ALJ did not err in rendering his adverse credibility determination.

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: June 30, 2016

11 wolcott1796.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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