Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00176/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00176-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GREGORY SMITH, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

R. COBB et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15-CV-176-GPC(WVG) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE 

ANSWER 

[Doc. No. 50.] 

In this prisoner civil rights action under 18 U.S.C. section 1983, Plaintiff moves to 

strike all twenty affirmative defenses in Defendants’ Answer. As detailed herein, this 

Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion to strike be GRANTED in part, 

DENIED in part, and that 11 of Defendants’ affirmative defenses be STRICKEN. The 

Court further recommends that Defendants be granted leave to amend 7 of these stricken 

affirmative defenses. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is an inmate at Folsom State Prison, in Folsom, California. At all times 

relevant to this action, however, he was housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. (Doc. No. 4 ¶ 3.) Defendant Cobb was the 

appeal coordinator. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant Perez was a correctional sergeant in the mental 

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health department at Donovan. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant Daroglou was a clinical psychiatrist. 

(Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Beduhi was a correctional officer. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Sharpe was a 

correctional counselor. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

 On September 29, 2010, Plaintiff reported to Perez, Daroglou, and Beduhi that his 

cellmate was displaying “bizarre behavior.” (Id. ¶ 39.) This included walking around the 

cell naked and talking about sex with men, rape, and wanting to watch Plaintiff use the 

toilet. (Id.) Perez, Daroglou, and Beduhi told Plaintiff that they would “take care of the 

problem.” (Id. ¶ 40.) The following day, Plaintiff’s cellmate attacked him. (Id.) Plaintiff 

suffered second degree burns on his right arm, neck and back, a broken left shoulder, left 

eye damage, two stab wounds, and a fractured disc in his back. (Id.) He was hospitalized 

for ten days and claims to suffer from continuing mental and physical trauma. (Id.) 

After the attack, officials placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation but returned 

him to general population housing after two weeks. (Id. ¶ 12.) On October 29, 2010, he 

submitted an appeal regarding the September 30, 2010 attack to Appeal Coordinator Cobb. 

(Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff requested continuation of his single cell status, compensation for his 

injuries, and copies of all reports related to the assault. (Id.) Cobb rejected and “screened 

back” Plaintiff’s appeal for failure to seek informal review with his counselor. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff gave his appeal to Correctional Counselor Sharpe for informal 

review. (Id. ¶ 17.) Sharpe told Plaintiff that he was unable to provide the relief requested 

and that Plaintiff’s appeal was inappropriate for informal review. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Sharpe 

told Plaintiff that he (Sharpe) “would take the appeal back to [the] appeal coordinator” so 

that Plaintiff would not be faulted for the appeal being late. (Id. ¶ 20.) 

Several months passed. In March and May of 2011, Plaintiff sent two requests to 

Appeal Coordinator Cobb seeking a status update of his appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Cobb 

responded in writing, stating that Plaintiff’s “appeal [is] not in [the appeals] office.” (Id.

¶ 22.) On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Chief of the Office of Appeals 

in Sacramento seeking assistance in getting responses to his appeals. (Id. ¶ 23.) The Office 

of Appeals rejected Plaintiff’s request on the ground that he had bypassed the lower levels 

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of appeal. (Id. ¶ 24.) After receiving the Appeals Office’s response, Plaintiff sent the 

rejection to Cobb, hoping to restart the appeal process. (Id. ¶ 26.) However, he was 

“again[] met with opposition.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint on March 23, 2015, alleging 

that Appeal Coordinator Robert Cobb and Correctional Counselor Frank Sharpe obstructed 

his access to the courts in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that prison clinical psychiatrist Daroglou, Correctional Sergeant Perez, and 

Correctional Officer Buduhi failed to protect him from assault by his cellmate in violation 

of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 57-59.) 

 Defendants thereafter filed their Answer, asserting twenty affirmative defenses. 

(Doc. No. 47.) In response, Plaintiff moved to strike all twenty defenses (Doc. No. 50), 

and Defendants opposed the motion while also conceding that some of the defenses should 

be stricken (Doc. No. 53). Defendants sought leave to amend some, but not all, of the 

defenses they conceded were not sufficiently pled. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court may strike “an insufficient 

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous” matter from the 

pleadings. The purpose of Rule 12(f) is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that 

must arise from litigating spurious issues by disposing of those issues prior to trial.” 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor because 

striking is such a drastic remedy. Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 919, 

923 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The Court must view the pleadings in the light most favorable to 

the pleading party when ruling upon a motion to strike. In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. 

Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citation omitted). If a claim is stricken, 

leave to amend should be freely given when doing so would not cause prejudice to the 

opposing party. Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 440 (C.D. 

Cal. 2013) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979)). 

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In the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an 

affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Simmons v. 

Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wyshak v. City Nat’l 

Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Fair notice generally requires that the defendant 

state the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense.” Roe v. City of San Diego, 289 

F.R.D. 604, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2013). “The defendant must articulate the affirmative defense 

clearly enough that the plaintiff is not a victim of unfair surprise. It does not, however, 

require a detailed statement of facts.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted); see 

also Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘fair notice’ 

required by the pleading standards only require[s] describing [an affirmative] defense in 

general terms.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Affirmative Defenses That Defendants Concede are Insufficient (Nos. 1, 2, 8, 9, 

10, 16, 17, 18, and 20) 

Defendants concede that eight of their affirmative defenses are in insufficient or 

invalid and request leave to amend four of those defenses. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion 

should be granted as to the first, second, eighth, ninth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, 

and twentieth defenses. The only question that remains is whether leave should be granted 

to amend the eighth, ninth, sixteenth, seventeenth defenses.1

 The undersigned respectfully 

recommends that leave to amend be granted. 

Defendants concede they have failed to plead a sufficient factual basis to provide 

Plaintiff fair notice of the basis for his failure to mitigate his claims or damages (eighth 

affirmative defense); to allege damages (ninth affirmative defense); that Defendants acted 

                                               

1

 Defendants do not seek to amend the first, second, eighteenth, and twentieth affirmative 

defenses for good reason. As they concede, these defenses are either inapplicable or are 

not legally-valid affirmative defenses. Accordingly, leave to amend would be futile. 

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reasonably under the circumstances (sixteenth affirmative defense); and that the alleged 

harm Plaintiff suffered was not foreseeable to Defendants (seventeenth affirmative 

defense). For each of these four defenses, they seek leave to amend in order to provide 

additional factual support. Leave to amend is proper here given that Defendants have not 

previously been granted leave to amend. Moreover, Plaintiff has not argued that prejudice 

would result if the Court were to grant Defendants leave to amend for the first time, and it 

is not evident how Plaintiff would be prejudiced. Additionally, given that the deficiency 

in each of these defenses is in their lack of detail, it is not readily apparently that leave to 

amend to add details would be futile. 

Accordingly, this Court respectfully recommends that the first, second, eighteenth, 

and twentieth affirmative defenses be stricken without leave to amend, and that the eighth, 

ninth, sixteenth,2

 and seventeenth affirmative defenses be stricken with leave to amend. 

B. Appropriate Affirmative Defenses (Nos. 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 19) 

1. Third Affirmative Defense: Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

Citing Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003), Plaintiff contends the third 

affirmative defense asserting that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies should 

be stricken because Defendants failed to raise this defense in an “unenumerated Rule 12(b) 

motion rather than in a motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. No. 50 at 4.)3

 However, as 

                                               

2

 However, the Court notes that the sixteenth affirmative defense stating that “Defendants 

acted reasonably under the circumstances” teeters on being a redundant defense that 

strongly resembles other defenses. See Sliger v. Prospect Motg., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 

1212, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“Redundant matter is defined as allegations that constitute a 

needless repetition of other averments . . . .”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

For example, the sixteenth affirmative defense is similar to the sixth (“Justification”) and 

seventh (“Good Faith”) affirmative defenses. Although this Court recommends granting 

leave to amend, Defendants should consider whether this defense is necessary and should

be amended in light of the sixth and seventh affirmative defenses. 

3

 Page numbers in record citations refer to the numbers stamped on documents by the 

CM/ECF system. 

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Defendants note, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly 

overruled Wyatt and held that failure to exhaust is a defense that may be plead and proven 

in the regular course of litigation or by a summary judgment motion, if appropriate. Albino 

v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Accordingly, the third affirmative 

defense is properly pled and should not be stricken. 

2. Fourth Affirmative Defense: Qualified Immunity4

Plaintiff next contends the fourth affirmative defense of qualified immunity should 

be stricken because Defendants did not bring it in a motion to dismiss or summary 

judgment and because they have not explained the “legal or factual basis for it.” (Doc. No. 

50 at 5.) This Court disagrees. 

It is well-settled that “[q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be 

pleaded in the answer.” Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010). That 

being said, Defendants need not necessarily raise this defense in a motion to dismiss and, 

under certain circumstances, may raise it for the first time in a summary judgment motion 

even when they have failed to assert the defense in the Answer. Id. Because the dispositive 

motion filing deadline in this case is August 1, 2017 (Doc. No. 48 ¶ 8), Defendants may 

still move for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Accordingly, the fact 

that they have not yet done so is not an appropriate basis to strike the fourth affirmative 

defense. 

With respect to the sufficiency of the defense as pled, the level of specificity required 

to assert an affirmative defense merely requires Defendants to “articulate the affirmative 

                                               

4

 The fourth affirmative defense states: “Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 

because there can be no constitutional violation based on the facts alleged or presented, 

and because Defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law. At all relevant 

times, Defendants acted within their scope of discretion, with due care, with a good-faith 

fulfillment of responsibilities pursuant to applicable statutes, rules, regulations, and 

practices, and with the good-faith belief that their actions comported with all applicable 

federal and state laws.” 

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defense clearly enough that the plaintiff is not a victim of unfair surprise. It does not, 

however, require a detailed statement of facts.” Roe v. City of San Diego, 289 F.R.D. 604, 

608 (S.D. Cal. 2013); see also Schwarz v. Meinberg, No. 13-CV-356-BRO(PLAx), 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99737, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (“Under the fair notice standard, 

even defenses that are pled in a conclusory manner may provide fair notice so long as they 

are potentially viable affirmative defenses, the nature of the defenses is well known, and 

Plaintiff can seek discovery regarding the purported factual basis for these defenses.”) 

(citation and internal quotations omitted) (unpublished). Here, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants’ conduct violated his civil rights. The fourth affirmative defense puts him on 

notice that Defendants will argue that their alleged wrongful conduct—as outlined in the 

Complaint—constituted an exercise of discretion, was carried out in good faith, or was 

under the protection of qualified immunity. Defendants have provided Plaintiff more than 

merely a conclusory recitation of a qualified immunity defense. They have provided 

several specific bases for the defense. Accordingly, the fourth affirmative defense provides 

Plaintiff fair notice, is properly pled, and should not be stricken. 

3. Seventh Affirmative Defense: Good Faith

The seventh affirmative defense asserts that Defendants’ “actions were at all times 

performed in a good faith effort to comply with established California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitations policies and procedures.” (Doc. No. 27 ¶ 84.) Plaintiff 

seeks to strike this defense because “under 11 U.S.C. [§] 548(c) [a, ‘c]onclusory assertion’ 

[is an] insubstantial defense.” (Doc. No. 50 at 6.) As pled, this defense is appropriate and 

provides Plaintiff fair notice. 

As an initial matter, 11 U.S.C. section 548 is a provision that governs the fraudulent 

transfers and obligations of debtors in bankruptcy estates. Accordingly, that statute has no 

bearing on any issue in this case or Plaintiff’s motion to strike. 

Next, in asserting the good faith defense, Defendants also provide the sources upon 

which they claim to have relied in good faith: “established California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitations policies and procedures.” Although they do not identify 

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the precise policies and procedures by number, they nonetheless provide fair notice of the 

basis for this defense. As a result, Plaintiff may craft discovery to determine which specific 

policies and procedures Defendants claim to have relied on in good faith. Accord Kohler 

v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 569 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that as long as an 

affirmative defense provides sufficient direction for a plaintiff to craft discovery, fair notice 

of the defense has been provided). Accordingly, the seventh affirmative defense is properly 

pled and should not be stricken. 

4. Tenth Affirmative Defense: Rights, Privileges, and Immunities 

The tenth affirmative defense is a general denial that “Plaintiff has been deprived of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the laws of the United States of 

America or by the laws of the State of California.” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 87.) In other words, 

Defendants assert that they have complied with every law and deny they have done 

anything wrong under any law. Plaintiff seeks to strike this defense on the basis that his 

rights are “[g]uaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment [of the] United States 

Constitution.” (Doc. No. 50 at 7.) Thus, in response to Defendants’ assertion that they 

have done nothing wrong under any law, he counters and identifies a specific right he 

alleges Defendants violated. In making this argument, Plaintiff demonstrates his 

understanding of the basis for this defense. Regardless of whether Plaintiff’s contention is 

ultimately correct, he nonetheless understands—and has thus received fair notice of—the 

nature of the tenth affirmative defense. Accordingly, this defense is sufficiently-pled and 

should not be stricken. 

5. Eleventh Affirmative Defense: Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata 

Collateral estoppel and res judicata are both valid affirmative defenses specifically 

listed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1). Such affirmative defenses may be 

raised by a motion for summary judgment. See Magana v. N. Mar. I., 107 F.3d 1436, 1446 

(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that an affirmative defense may be raised for the first time in 

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a summary judgment motion if the delay does not prejudice the plaintiff); Camarillo v. 

McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff seeks to strike the eleventh affirmative defense and refers only to the 

Court’s Order adopting the undersigned’s previous Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 

No. 50 at 7.) In that Order, the Court found that collateral estoppel and res judicata did not 

bar Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Complaint. (Doc. No. 46 at 13-15.) However, the Court 

made no such finding as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Because Defendants 

potentially may still file a summary judgment motion on or before August 1, 2017 (Doc. 

No. 46 at ¶ 8), they will continue to have the opportunity to raise the collateral estoppel 

and res judicata defenses to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim if it applies. Accordingly, 

the eleventh affirmative defense should not be stricken. 

6. Twelfth Affirmative Defense: Legitimate Penological Goals 

The twelfth affirmative defense asserts that “Defendants’ actions were reasonably 

related to legitimate penological goals.” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 89.) Plaintiff contends this defense 

is vague, ambiguous, and redundant. (Doc. 50 at 7.) This Court disagrees for several 

reasons. 

As an initial matter, this defense is generally valid and may be pled in an Answer. 

Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 9.28 expressly instructs jurors to “give 

deference to prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in 

their judgment are needed to preserve discipline and to maintain internal security in a 

prison.” In other words, this instruction instructs jurors to consider the legitimate 

penological goals of the prison in rendering their verdict. The twelfth affirmative defense 

appears to incorporate this jury instruction. 

Second, this defense is not redundant. While other defenses may touch on the 

reasonableness of Defendants’ actions, this defense specifies “penological goals” as 

potential justifications for their conduct. This added level of specificity thus differentiates 

this defense from others in the Answer. 

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Finally, this defense is not pled in a vague or ambiguous manner. Defendants’ 

reference to “legitimate penological goals” provides Plaintiff the opportunity to propound 

discovery to identify the specific goals with which Defendants contend their actions 

comported. See Kohler, 280 F.R.D. at 569. As a result, the twelfth affirmative defense as 

pled has provided sufficient notice of the nature of the defense and should not be stricken. 

7. Thirteenth Affirmative Defense: No Vicarious Liability 

The thirteenth affirmative defense asserts that, “[t]o the extent Defendants’ alleged 

liability is based on their supervisory capacities, they are not liable for damages under any 

doctrine of vicarious liability.” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 90.) Plaintiff asserts this defense is vague, 

ambiguous, and does not provide him fair notice. (Doc. No. 50.) This Court disagrees. 

It is black letter law that “vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits . . . .” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 385 (1989); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing Iqbal and 

explaining that “when a supervisor is found liable based on deliberate indifference, the 

supervisor is being held liable for his or her own culpable action or inaction, not held 

vicariously liable for the culpable action or inaction of his or her subordinates.”). 

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff pursues any defendant in this case based on his 

or her vicarious liability for others’ actions rather than “culpable action, or inaction, [that] 

is directly attributed to them,” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205, such claims are barred as a matter 

of law. In this Court’s view, Defendants need not plead anything beyond this clear legal 

principle to satisfy the fair notice pleading standard because the nature of this defense is 

well-known and well-defined. Accordingly, Defendants have properly pled the thirteenth 

affirmative defense, and it should not be stricken. 

8. Fourteenth Affirmative Defense: No Recovery for Mental or Emotional 

Injury 

The fourteenth affirmative defense states that “Plaintiff is barred by 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(e) from recovering damages for mental or emotional injury.” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 47.) 

Plaintiff moves to strike this defense on the basis that his physical injuries are evidenced 

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by photographs, medical reports, and mental health records in “violation of 18 U.S.C. 

[§] 2246(4).” (Doc. No. 50 at 8.) As explained below, the fourteenth affirmative defense 

is proper. 

As an initial matter, 18 U.S.C. section 2246(6) is not relevant to any claim or defense 

in this case. Section 2246 defines various terms used in statutes that govern sexual abuse 

criminal offenses. It merely provides the definition of “serious bodily injury” in the 

specific context of sexual abuse crimes covered by 18 U.S.C. sections 2241 et seq. Thus, 

section 2246 and its definition of “serious bodily injury” are inapplicable in this case, as 

Plaintiff does not lodge any allegation of sexual abuse.5

The fourteenth affirmative defense provides Plaintiff fair notice of its contours. Title 

42, United States Code, section 1997e expressly limits recovery “for mental or emotional 

injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(e). Thus, this statute first requires a showing of physical injury before Plaintiff 

may recover for mental or emotional injuries. If Plaintiff fails to first make such a showing, 

he will be, as the fourteenth affirmative defense asserts, barred from recovering damages 

for mental or emotional injuries. 

Through the instant motion to strike, Plaintiff disputes this defense’s claim of his 

ineligibility for mental or emotional injuries when he argues that the documentary evidence 

does support his physical injuries and, by extension, any claim for mental or emotional 

damages. His argument for striking this defense actually demonstrates a firm 

understanding for the basis of this defense. Without Defendants’ mention of physical 

injuries, Plaintiff understood such injuries were prerequisite to mental and emotional 

damages and responded that he has satisfied the physical injury requirement. Thus, 

Plaintiff has received fair notice of this defense. 

                                               

5

 Although the First Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiff’s cellmate made references to 

rape the day before the attack, Plaintiff does not allege that his cellmate sexually assaulted 

him. 

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Plaintiff’s argument here is not a proper basis to strike this defense. The existence 

of evidence that supports claims or injuries is a matter of factual proof for future 

determination as this case progresses—not an issue that bears on the sufficiency of an 

answer at this stage of the litigation. Thus, the existence or non-existence of documents 

that support any claimed injuries is simply not a valid reason to strike this defense. 

Accordingly, the fourteenth affirmative defense is a valid defense, is properly pled, and 

should not be stricken. 

9. Nineteenth Affirmative Defense: Statute of Limitations 

The nineteenth affirmative defense asserts that the “statute of limitations applies to 

invalidate one or more of Plaintiff’s claims.” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 96.) Plaintiff does not identify 

a specific basis for striking this defense and instead states: “See Order adopting Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation on statute of limitations.” (Doc. No. 50 at 9.) 

A statute of limitations defense is generally a valid defense specifically listed under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1). Additionally, this enumerated defense may be 

raised “by a motion for dismissal or by summary judgment motion.” Jablon v. Dean Witter 

& Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). On its face, then, the nineteenth affirmative 

defense is properly pled. 

In the Court’s prior Order adopting the undersigned’s Report and Recommendation, 

the Court found that the statute of limitations did not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. 

(Doc. No. 46 at 17-18.) However, the Court did not rule on a statute of limitation bar of 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, because this defense continues to potentially 

apply to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and Defendants may still raise it by summary 

judgment motion if it applies, it remains a potentially viable defense that should not be 

stricken. 

C. Inappropriate Affirmative Defenses (Nos. 5, 6, and 15) 

This Court respectfully recommends striking the fifth, sixth, and fifteenth 

affirmative defenses. However, because it does not readily appear that amendment would 

be futile, this Court also recommends granting Defendants leave to amend. 

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1. Fifth Affirmative Defense: Privilege 

Plaintiff contends that the fifth affirmative defense, which, in full, states that 

“Plaintiff’s claims are barred because Defendants’ actions were privileged under the 

circumstances,” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 82), is vague and ambiguous. This Court agrees. 

Without substantive argument, Defendants cite Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 

F.R.D. 560, 570 (S.D. Cal. 2012) in support of this defense. However, the language of 

Defendants’ defense is markedly more vague than the privilege defense that the court in 

Kohler found was pled sufficiently. There, the defendant had asserted that “its ‘conduct 

was privileged because it was undertaken pursuant to the terms of the applicable laws, 

regulations, orders and approvals relating to building construction and/or fire safety and 

public safety.’” Id. The court concluded that the defense was proper, finding that the 

defendant had provided “sufficient notice of the types of sources it relied on in its allegedly 

privileged conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Kohler is distinguishable and does not support the sufficiency of Defendants’ fifth 

affirmative defense. In contrast to the specific sources of privilege the Kohler defendant 

cited, Defendants vaguely state that their conduct was privileged “under the 

circumstances,” but do not identify any source of this claimed privilege. As a result, the 

fifth affirmative defense fails to provide Plaintiff fair notice and should be stricken. 

However, this Court recommends that leave to amend should be granted because it is not 

readily evident that Defendants would not be able to sufficiently plead a viable privilege 

defense. 

2. Sixth Affirmative Defense: Justification 

Plaintiff contends that the sixth affirmative defense which, in full, states that 

“Plaintiff’s claims are barred because Defendants’ actions were reasonable and justified 

under the circumstances,” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 83), is vague and ambiguous. This Court agrees. 

The defense of justification can excuse a defendant’s alleged unconstitutional 

conduct if specific factors or circumstances surrounding the conduct demonstrably justify 

it. See, e.g., Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (warden’s deferment of 

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inmate’s marriage resulting from visitation restrictions justified by penological interests); 

Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F. Supp. 3d 305, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (officers following plausible 

instructions from a superior or fellow officer could enjoy qualified immunity “where, 

viewed objectively in light of the surrounding circumstances, they could lead a reasonable 

officer to conclude that the necessary legal justification for his actions exists.”) (internal 

quotations, alteration, and citations omitted). 

Here, the sixth affirmative defense as pled is vague, conclusory, and fails to provide 

Plaintiff any rationale or basis for Defendants’ claim that their conduct was justified. 

Without more, Defendants’ barebones assertion of justified conduct “under the 

circumstances” fails to satisfy even the low fair notice standard. Accord Mayfield v. Cnty. 

of Merced, No. 13-CV-1619-LJO(BAM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22760, at *12-13 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 24, 2015) (applying fair notice standard and striking justification defense as 

insufficient) (unpublished). 

Defendants rely on the same pin-citation from Kohler discussed above and assert, 

without substantive argument, that the sixth affirmative defense as currently pled provides 

Plaintiff fair notice. However, much like the fifth affirmative defense, the sixth defense 

suffers from a lack of any basis for the claimed justification. Thus, the sixth affirmative 

defense is insufficient for the same reasons discussed immediately above. Indeed, Kohler

provides even less support for the sufficiency of the sixth defense than the fifth defense 

because the court in that case never analyzed any justification defense or determined its 

sufficiency.6

 Thus, ultimately, Kohler does not support the sufficiency of this defense. 

The sixth affirmative defense should be stricken, and leave to amend should be 

granted to assert some basis for the claimed defense. 

                                               

6

 In fact, the defendant in Kohler withdrew its “legitimate business justification” defense. 

Kohler, 280 F.R.D. at 563 n.1. 

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3. Fifteenth Affirmative Defense: Liability for Contributory Conduct 

The fifteenth affirmative defense asserts that “Plaintiff’s injuries or damages were 

the result of his own negligent or deliberate actions.” (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 92.) Plaintiff objects 

that this defense is pled in a vague and ambiguous manner and fails to provide him fair 

notice of the nature of his contributory negligence. (Doc. No. 50 at 8.) This Court agrees. 

Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense listed in Rule 8(c)(1). However, 

“[a] bare assertion of negligence or contributory fault without ‘any indication of the 

conduct supporting the defense’ does not pass muster, even under the fair notice standard.” 

Devermont v. City of San Diego, No. 12-CV-1823-BEN(KSC), 2013 WL 2898342, 2013 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83495, at *16-17 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) (unpublished) (quoting Roe 

v. City of San Diego, 289 F.R.D. 604, 611-12 (S.D. Cal. 2013)). This is particularly true 

given that, in this Court’s analysis, it is unclear how Plaintiff’s conduct contributed to his 

attack. Without any details, the fifteenth affirmative is as vague as the fifth and sixth 

defenses and suffers from the same failure to provide fair notice of the basis for the defense. 

This Court respectfully recommends that the fifteenth affirmative defense be 

stricken with leave to amend to provide some basis for Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff’s 

conduct contributed to his injuries and damages. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike be GRANTED in part, DENIED in part as follows: 

1. That Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED as to affirmative defenses 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 

12, 13, 14, and 19; 

2. That affirmative defenses 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17 be STRICKEN with leave to 

amend; and 

3. That affirmative defenses 1, 2, 18, and 20 be STRICKEN without leave to 

amend. 

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This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(1988) 

and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 30, 2017, any party to this action may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than July 13, 2017. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 30, 2017 

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