Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01628/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01628-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PASTOR ISABEL VELA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATT,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01628-JLT-SKO

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

THAT THE CASE BE DISMISSED FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(Docs. 5 & 6)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Pastor Isabel Vela, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action, filed a 

civil complaint on November 20, 2023. (Doc. 1). On January 16, 2024, the undersigned screened 

the complaint, found that it failed to state any cognizable claims, and granted Plaintiff thirty days 

leave to file an amended complaint curing the pleading deficiencies identified in the order. (Doc. 

5.)

On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which is before the Court for 

screening. (Doc. 6.) After screening Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court finds that despite 

the explicit recitation of the deficiencies of the original complaint, Plaintiff has failed to plead any 

cognizable claims. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

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each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty 

is untrue, or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district 

court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 

(9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). If the Court determines 

that a complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the 

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A 

complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim based on (1) the lack of 

a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri 

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff must allege a minimum 

factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what 

the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept 

as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007). The Court, however, need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it 

stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “ATT,” which the Court construes as the 

telecommunications company AT&T, engaged in “civil rights violations and improper business 

practices.” (Doc. 6 at 7.) She claims that when she signed a service contract with Defendant in 

2018, she was not notified of Defendant’s participation in the “Stellar Wind Program.” (Id. at 8.) 

Plaintiff alleges that program “involved warrantless surveillance of communications and the 

collection of metadata.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant made “unauthorized changes”

to her account resulting in “excessive fees,” and that she was “locked and forced into [a] contract”

that “led to [her] account being past due and unable to pay.” (Id. at 9, 10.) Plaintiff purports to 

bring claims for violations of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 

the Clayton Act, “bait and switch,” and the “Freedom of Religion.” (Id. at 3, 8–10.)

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Cognizable Claim

1. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Civil Rights Violation

Plaintiff alleges violations of the First (which encompasses the “Freedom of Religion”), 

Fourth, and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. A litigant who complains of a violation 

of a constitutional right does not have a cause of action directly under the United States 

Constitution. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (affirming that it is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

that provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation of rights secured by the United States 

Constitution); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) (explaining that 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted to create a private cause of action for violations of the United States 

Constitution); Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(“Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution.”).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), a plaintiff must allege that the 

defendant (1) acted under color of state law, and (2) deprived them of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color 

of state law”). With regard to the first element, private parties are not generally acting under color 

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of state law for the purposes of Section 1983. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 

1991) (“Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom 

by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, 

its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”) 

(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982)). There exist, however, some 

circumstances in which the actions of a private actor may render that actor liable under section 

1983. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

Specifically, a plaintiff must show that “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal 

right [was] fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.

Here, Defendant AT&T is a private party, and Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a 

finding that Defendant has acted such that their conduct is fairly attributable to the government. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim.

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2. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim Under the Clayton Act

The Clayton Act authorizes a private individual to bring suit under the antitrust laws if that 

individual has been “injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 

antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 15. Only individuals who possess antitrust standing by virtue of having 

suffered such injury may sue to redress an antitrust violation. Associated General Contractors of 

California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–535 (1983); see also 

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 103, 113 (1986) (“a private plaintiff must allege 

threatened loss or damage ‘of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows 

from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.’”) (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 497 (1977)).

1 As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief for violation of the Ninth Amendment, which provides that 

“[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 

the people.” U.S. Const., amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment does not provide a basis upon which Plaintiff may impose 

liability under § 1983 because it does not “independently [secure] any constitutional rights. . . .” Strandberg v. City of 

Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 

1029 (9th Cir. 2002) (Ninth Amendment claim properly dismissed because plaintiffs may not “ ‘double up’

constitutional claims), aff’d sub nom. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 

483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991) (Ninth Amendment “not interpreted as independently securing any constitutional rights for 

purposes of making out a constitutional claim.”). Accordingly, a Section 1983 claim predicated on a violation of the

Ninth Amendment is not cognizable.

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To show antitrust injury,

a plaintiff must prove that his loss flows from an anticompetitive aspect or effect 

of the defendant’s behavior, since it is inimical to the antitrust laws to award 

damages for losses stemming from acts that do not hurt competition. If the injury 

flows from aspects of the defendant’s conduct that are beneficial or neutral to 

competition, there is no antitrust injury, even if the defendant’s conduct is illegal 

per se.

Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. 

USA Petroleum, Inc., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990)) (private suit brought under Section 4 of the 

Clayton Act). The losses alleged by Plaintiff are (1) excessive fees and (2) mental and emotional 

duress. These alleged losses do not hurt competition and are not antitrust injuries. Plaintiff does 

not state a claim under the Clayton Act.

3. The Amended Complaint Does Not Comply With Rule 9(b)

Plaintiff purports to allege a claim for “bait and switch,” which the Court construes as a 

claim sounding in fraud. (See Doc. 6 at 10.) Under California law, the “elements of fraud are: (1) 

a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity 

(or scienter); (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting 

damages. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal.4th 979, 990 (2004). Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that, when a plaintiff alleges fraud, the circumstances constituting 

the alleged fraud must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct . 

. . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

Although the substantive elements of fraud are established by state law, a plaintiff must plead the 

elements in accordance with the requirements of Rule 9(b). See Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp., USA, 

317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). Allegations of fraud should specifically include “an account 

of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the 

parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). “The 

plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Vess, 

317 F.3d at 1106. In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing “the who, what, when, 

where, and how” of the fraud. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Like her prior complaint, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not meet this heightened pleading 

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standard.

C. Leave to Amend is Not Recommended

When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “leave to amend should be 

granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Bly–Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. (9th Cir. 1996). However, 

once the court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, the court’s discretion in 

determining whether to allow additional opportunities to amend is particularly broad. Sateriale v. 

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 794 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire 

Corp., 358 F.3d 616,622 (9th Cir.2 004)); Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Further amendment is not appropriate in this case. When dismissing the initial complaint, 

the undersigned advised Plaintiff could file an amended complaint if she believed that she could 

set forth a basis for subject matter jurisdiction and allege cognizable claims. (See Doc. 5 at 4.) 

Plaintiff has repeatedly demonstrated that she is unable to marshal facts sufficient to constitute a 

cognizable claim and that the addition of more detailed factual allegations or revision of Plaintiff’s 

claims will not cure the defects of her amended complaint. Thus, the undersigned declines to give 

any further leave to amend and recommends that the action be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 

6) be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen 

(14) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings 

and recommendation with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The district judge 

will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

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result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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