Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02558/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227(b)(3) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JASON DAVID BODIE 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LYFT 

Defendant. 

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-02558-L-NLS 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS [ECF No. 41] 

Pending before this Court is Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s (“Lyft”) motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff Jason David Bodie’s (“Bodie”) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the 

Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. For the 

following reasons, the Court DENIES Lyft’s motion to dismiss. 

Factual Background 

The SAC alleges that Bodie received two unsolicited text messages back-to-back 

from a telephone number that belongs to or was used by Lyft on or about October 10, 2016 

at approximately 2:25 p.m. Pacific Standard Time. ECF No. 34 at ¶ 9. The SAC goes on 

alleging that the first message instructed him to download the Lyft app onto his cellular 

phone. Id. at ¶ 10. The second message included a link to download Lyft’s app from the 

Apple app store. Id. at ¶ 11. 

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The SAC also alleges that a commercial text messaging system, acting as an agent 

or vendor of Lyft, sent the text messages for Lyft’s financial benefit. ECF No. 34 at ¶ 14. 

It is alleged that Lyft uses the Twilio text messaging platform to send notifications en masse 

to a stored list of cellular telephone numbers without the need of individuals to dial the 

numbers. Id. at ¶¶ 18-22. The SAC also alleges the Twilio platform “has the capacity to 

automatically dial and send text messages” to cellular telephone numbers. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 25. 

The SAC alleges that Twilio customers, like Lyft, access the platform in order to: (1) create 

message content or portions of content, (2) upload and store content and/or telephone 

numbers, and (3) automatically send text messages to the stored list of cellular telephone 

numbers. Id. at ¶¶24-25, 29. The SAC alleges that the text messages were sent using “an 

automatic telephone dialing system (‘ATDS’) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).” Id. at 

30. It is further alleged that Plaintiff suffered an injury as the text messaging invaded his 

privacy interest and caused him frustration and distress. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. 

Legal Standard 

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. 

See N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). A complaint 

may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for 

insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 

F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume 

the truth of all factual allegations and “construe them in the light most favorable to [the 

nonmoving party].” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). “While a 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Instead, the allegations in the complaint 

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. 

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A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it 

stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It is not proper for a court to assume that “the 

[plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated 

the...laws in ways that have not been alleged[,]” regardless of the deference shown to 

plaintiff’s allegations. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Generally, a court is free to grant leave to amend a complaint that has been 

dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, when “the court determines that the 

allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure 

the deficiency[,]” leave may be denied. Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 

806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Discussion 

Lyft sets forth the following contentions as to why Plaintiff’s SAC is insufficient: 

(1) Plaintiff’s ATDS allegations are conclusory and (2) Plaintiff’s allegations of significant 

human intervention with the Twilio platform removes Twilio from ATDS consideration.1

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

                                               

1

 Lyft also challenged the constitutionality of the TCPA as a content-based restriction. ECF No. 

41-1 at 23-29. However, due to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 17675, at *24 (9th Cir. June 13, 2019) that the TCPA could be preserved once excising the debtcollection exception, this Court DENIES AS MOOT Lyft’s motion to dismiss the SAC on constitutional 

grounds and will not examine the constitutionality of the TCPA. Moreover, the Court DENIES AS MOOT 

Lyft’s request to stay the case pending the outcome of Duguid. 

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A. ATDS Allegations 

As both parties set forth, the Ninth Circuit provides the clearest guidance about what 

the statutory definition of ATDS includes in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 

1041 (9th Cir. 2018). The TCPA, as originally enacted, defined an ATDS as equipment 

which has the capacity to (1) “store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a 

random or sequential number generator;” and (2) “to dial such numbers.” Marks, 90 F.3d 

at 1044 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 227, 105 Stat. 2394, 2395); 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 

Since then, Congress has not changed the ATDS definition despite amended the TCPA in 

general several times. Id. at 1045. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the ATDS definition 

“naturally raises two questions: (i) when does a device have the ‘capacity’ to perform the 

two enumerated functions; and (ii) what precisely are those functions?” Marks, 904 F.3d 

at 1050 (quoting ACA Int’l v. Fed Commc’ns Comm’n 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). 

The circuit court identified two issues to be addressed: (1) “whether, in order to be an 

ATDS, a device must dial numbers generated by a random or sequential number generator 

or if a device can be an ATDS if it merely dials numbers from a stored list[;]” and (2) “to 

what extent the device must function without human intervention in order to qualify as an 

ATDS.” Id. at 1050. 

In addressing the first issue, the Ninth Circuit concluded the “statutory definition of 

ATDS is not limited to devices with the capacity to call numbers produced by a ‘random 

or sequential number generator,’ but also includes devices with the capacity to dial stored 

numbers automatically.” Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052. Consequently, the circuit court 

interpreted ATDS to mean “equipment which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be 

called or (2) produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number 

generator—and to dial such numbers.” Ibid. 

In addressing the second issue, the Ninth Circuit clarified that a total lack of human 

intervention was not required for a device to qualify as an ATDS. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052. 

The court reasoned that Congress clearly intended to target equipment with the capacity to 

automatically dial, rather than equipment that without any human oversight or control, 

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when referring to the device as an “automatic telephone dialing system.” Ibid. (Citing 47 

U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) ; (see citing ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 703); (emphasis in original). 

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held “the term [ATDS] means equipment which has the 

capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a 

random or sequential number generator—and to dial such numbers automatically (even if 

the system must be turned on or triggered by a person)[.]” 

Under Marks, the SAC clearly alleges that an ATDS was used in this case. The SAC 

alleges that Twilio customers, like Lyft, access the platform in order to: (1) create message 

content or portions of content, (2) upload and store content and/or telephone numbers, and 

(3) automatically send text messages to the stored list of cellular telephone numbers. Id.

at ¶¶24-25, 29. Additionally, it is alleged that Lyft uses the Twilio text messaging platform 

to send notifications en masse to a stored list of cellular telephone numbers without the 

need of individuals to dial the numbers. Id. at ¶¶ 18-22. As such, the Court finds that the 

Twilio platform has the capacity to meet each hallmark of an ATDS. Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES Lyft’s motion to dismiss for failure to sufficiently allege use of an ATDS. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Lyft’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 

41]. As such, Lyft must serve an answer or otherwise respond to the SAC within 21 days 

of service of this order. 

Dated: October 4, 2019 

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