Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07207/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1 The defendants-appellants are the District of Columbia and the present and former directors

of the Department of Corrections, Margaret A. Moore and Walter B. Ridley, sued in their official

capacities. For ease of reference, we refer to the defendants-appellants as "the District." 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 1996 Decided August 23, 1996

No. 95-7207

SHARON BONDS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND

MARGARET A. MOORE,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv02420)

Lutz A. Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellants, with whom

Charles F. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were

on the briefs. Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Jeffrey F. Liss and Joseph M. Sellers argued the cause for appellees, with whom Mary E. Gately and

Warren K. Kaplan were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves a class-action suit brought by employees of the

District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("Department"), alleging a pattern or practice of

sexual harassment against women employees, both by creating a hostile working environment and by

conditioning job benefits on the granting of sexual favors, and a pattern or practice of retaliation

against employees opposing such sexual harassment. After sequential trials before a jury on liability

and damages, the district court entered judgments against the District of Columbia ("District")1on

behalf of the plaintiff class and of all the named plaintiffs but one. The district court also awarded

equitable reliefto the prevailing named plaintiffs and entered an order directing class-wide injunctive

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2 By order of January 12, 1996, this court stayed implementation of the class-wide injunctive

relief. 

3

In its Memorandum Opinion I, of August 9, 1995, the district court described its sanction as

precluding the District "from calling non-party fact witnesses." The qualification of the order to

non-party witnesses does not appear in the November 7, 1994 order, the court's statements at the

November 17, 1994 discovery hearing, the court's November 18, 1994 order, the court's

statements at the January 25, 1995, status conference, or the court's order on the motion for

reconsideration of January 25, 1995, all of which refer to "all witnesses." 

4 Although in the absence of findings as to the potential effectiveness of a lesser sanction we

could have reviewed the record independently, see Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d

1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1101 (1991), we concluded that in light of the

deferential standard of review a statement of reasons from the district court was advisable. See

Weisberg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Von der Heydt v. Rogers, 251 F.2d 17

(D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). 

5

In light of our disposition, we do not reach the District's challenges to the dismissals of two

jurors and the scope of the class-wide injunctive relief. 

relief.2

The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding

the District from offering any fact witnesses at trial as a discovery sanction under Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(b)(2) and (d).3 The District's sanctionable conduct was in failing to respond in a timely

manner to an interrogatory requesting the names of all persons with knowledge of relevant events

regarding the class action and then providing an inadequate response. In recognition of the fact that

the choice of an appropriate sanction is necessarily a highly fact-based determination based on the

course of the discovery process leading up to the sanction, we remanded the record after oral

argument for the district court to explain why it did not adopt a lesser measure, such as precluding

the District from calling any fact witnesses whom the plaintiffs had not deposed at the time of the

discovery violation.4 On remand, the district court explained that its more severe sanction was

necessary not only for the purpose of deterrence but to avoid prejudice to the plaintiff's case and to

the court's calendar, as well as to prevent a benefit to the District from its discovery violation. The

record does not support these findings, however; nor does it show that the District acted in flagrant

or egregious bad faith. Because the preclusion order denied the District its right to a trial on the

merits, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion.5 We reach this conclusion reluctantly

because sexual harassment is a long-standing problem at the Department of Corrections, see Bundy

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6 The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on November 24, 1993. 

v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which the current director acknowledges and which the

district court found persists, and because the plaintiffs, who will bear the brunt of our decision,

themselves suggested a more measured sanction to the district court.

I.

Consistent with the deference due to the district court in reviewing a discovery sanction

imposed under Rule 37, our obligation is "not just to scrutinize the conclusion but to examine with

care and respect the processthat led up to it." Founding Church of Scientology v. Webster, 802 F.2d

1448, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). Hence, we set forth the pretrial

proceedings in some detail.

The plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed January 5, 1994,6 was in the form of a

class-action suit for sexual harassment of current and former women employees at the D.C.

Department of Corrections, as well as for retaliation against employees who opposed such

harassment. The counts were for: (1) quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of § 703 of the

CivilRights Act of 1964; (2) hostile-environment sexual harassment in violation of § 703 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964; (3) retaliation against the exercise of protected activities under § 704(a) of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (4) violation of plaintiffs' constitutional equal protection rights,

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shortly before trial, the district court granted the plaintiffs'

request to add a fifth count, a reprisal claim for violation of First Amendment rights, also brought

under § 1983.

Soon after the complaint was filed, the district court was confronted with the problem of

retaliatory conduct by Department employees against the named plaintiffs. On March 28, 1994, the

court issued a temporary restraining order, followed on April 26 by a preliminary injunction, to

prevent a retaliatory demotion of plaintiff Bessye Neal. On June 7, the court issued a second

preliminary injunction barring proposed retaliatory disciplinary action against plaintiff Tyrone Posey

and against Dennis Brummell, plaintiff Vera Brummell's husband and also a Department employee,

and barring all future retaliation against any named plaintiff. After the issuance of the June 7 order,

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7 The district court stated:

Well, that's why the government is going to end up losing this case, isn't it? 

If the government doesn't listen to one thing I tell them in this case, they're headed

down a rocky road, I'll tell you, and I don't know how I can make it any plainer. I

know I've made it plain to you. I don't know if you[r] superiors aren't listening to

anything you're saying or what's happening over there. The dates [plaintiffs'

counsel] notes for the deposition, you either show or don't show, but no protective

order is going to be granted.

Department employees engaged in three further acts of retaliatory conduct: a retaliatory demotion

of plaintiffEssie Jones; the failure to investigate a complaint of retaliatory harassment against plaintiff

Shivawn Newsome; and a renewed retaliatory disciplinary action against plaintiff Tyrone Posey.

After three days of hearings, the district court on December 16 held the District of Columbia and the

Department director in civil contempt of court. Specifically, the court found that the director had

failed to advise Department employees of the court's anti-retaliation injunction. On December 21,

1994, after finding that the director was unable to ensure compliance with the June 7 preliminary

injunction, the court appointed a special master to oversee any personnel actions relating to the

named plaintiffs and Dennis Brummell. Finally, on April 5, 1995, having found that two Department

employees had engaged in retaliatory conduct against one ofthe plaintiffs' witnesses at trial, the court

held both employees in criminal contempt of court and sentenced them to ten days' imprisonment

each.

The plaintiffs began discovery on January 25, 1994, by requesting the production of a vast

array of documents. The District timely sought a number of continuances, which the district court

granted, in order to comply with the discovery request and other aspects of the litigation. As early

as April 8, 1994, plaintiffs' counsel informed the court of difficulties with the production of

documents, and filed a motion to compel. By June 30, plaintiffs' counsel informed the court of

difficulties in scheduling depositions on the issue of class certification because the Assistant

Corporation Counsel assigned to the case was occupied with other matters. The court, which had

previously expressed concern, on March 28 and April 26, that the case was not being adequately

staffed by the District, admonished the Assistant Corporation Counsel about the understaffing of the

case.7 Problems with the document production continued, and on September 15 the court ordered

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You just note your dates, Mr. Kaplan [plaintiffs' counsel]. If they [the

District's counsel] don't show, you proceed without them. If the witnesses don't

show, I'll hold them in contempt. That's the only way I can deal with the District

of Columbia Government these days. 

8 The court certified the plaintiff class on December 23, 1994. 

9

Interrogatory No. 13 requested the District to identify each person who received a job benefit

in preference to one of the named plaintiffs. 

the District to complete the production.

The plaintiffs scheduled a large number of depositions from September through early

December 1994. According to the plaintiffs, they took 66 total depositions, of which 49 were

conducted by November 10, 1994 (32 relating to the merits and 17 relating to the incidents of

retaliation); depositions were held on most days in October and early November. During this time,

the District also moved to extend the time to respond to the plaintiffs' motion for class certification

from September 6, 1994, to October 3, 1994, and, over the plaintiffs' opposition, the court granted

the continuance.8

On September 29, 1994, the plaintiffs submitted their First Set of Interrogatories.

Interrogatory No. 2 asked the District to "[i]dentify all persons who have knowledge of or evidence

that concerns the matters set forth in paragraphs 23 through 251 of the First Amended Complaint

and, for each such person, describe the matters concerning which such person has knowledge or

evidence." The term "identify" was defined to "mean[ ] to give, to the extent known, the person's full

name, present or last known address, and the present or last known place of employment." At a

status conference on October 6, 1994, after the plaintiffs gave notice of a deposition to ask for the

identityof persons with knowledge ofthe allegationsin the complaint, the Districtstated that it would

respond to interrogatory No. 2 by October 24. On October 24, however, the District moved for a

two-week enlargement of time to respond, to November 7, 1994. The District singled out

interrogatories No. 2 and No. 13 as "particularly time consuming."9 The plaintiffs opposed the

motion for enlargement of time, and in the alternative "request[ed] that the Court further order that

the defendants be barred from calling at trial any witnesses whom they fail to identify in response to

Interrogatory Number 2 on or before November 7, 1994, and who could have reasonably have been

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10 At the status conference on November 17, 1994, the district court announced:

Well, under the order I entered, then the defendant[s] cannot call any

witnesses with that response; isn't that right?

...

And if they want to change my order, they're going to have to move to

identified by that date." On November 2, 1994, the court granted the District's motion for a

continuance and ordered that:

defendants shall have up to and including November 7, 1994 to file their answers to

plaintiffs' set of interrogatories; provided, however, any witness not identified in

response to Inter[rogatory] 2 who could reasonably be identified by Nov. 7, 1994,

may not be called at trial.

The District failed to replyto the plaintiffs' interrogatories bythe November 7, 1994, deadline.

Three days later, on November 10, the District submitted its answers, which included the following

response to interrogatory No. 2:

The identities of all persons known to defendants having knowledge of or

evidence that concerns the matters set forth in paragraphs 23 through 251 are

contained inthe complaint itself, documents produced indiscovery, and the deposition

testimony ofthe numerous witnesses given in deposition or scheduled for deposition.

Defendants will supplement this response if individuals, not identified in discovery

documents or depositions become known to them.

The plaintiffs, in a status report filed November 15, 1994, objected that the District's response was

"wholly inadequate" because it failed to identify any witness.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs request that, absent good cause shown, the

defendants be limited at trial to call only witnesses whom the plaintiffs have deposed

and to be limited in their examination to topics the plaintiffs have covered in

deposition.

The District, in a status report filed on November 16, and at a discovery hearing on November 17,

maintained that itsresponse to interrogatory No. 2 complied with Rule 33(d) (then classified as Rule

33(c)), which allows a party served with an interrogatory to produce business records for the

requesting party to examine. However, the district court found, by order of November 21, 1994, that

the District had failed to comply with the interrogatory and ruled that the "failure to identify any

witnesses, byname, in response to plaintiffs'Interrogatory2, indicatesthat no witnessesmaybe called

at trial unless defendants successfully move for reconsideration of the November 2, 1994 order."10

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reconsider.

...

So this trial will be without any witnesses for the defendant[s] unless I

modify or reconsider that order.

...

You don't need to compel anything there.

...

You've already won your whole case right there.

In its Statement of Reasons on Remand, the district court explained that its reference to "your

whole case," viewed in context, was intended to refer only to plaintiffs' motion to compel, not the

case on the merits. 

On December 12, 1994, the District moved for reconsideration. Accompanying the motion

was a "supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 2," which consisted of 27 pages containing over

1,000 names with brief identifications. The supplemental response was prepared by having two

paralegals, who each spent two full weeks, go through all the documents and deposition testimony

and pull out the names of every person mentioned. The District asserted in its motion, filed by an

Assistant Corporation Counsel, who had been assigned to replace the second Assistant who had

resigned in November, that the good-faith production of over 1,000 names showed that the District

had not violated the court's order willfully. At a discovery hearing on December 21, 1994, counsel

also contended that the Assistant originally assigned to the case had not received the order of

November 2, perhaps because a secretary accidentally stapled two documents together. Counsel

further explained that the first Assistant had not been at the November 17, 1994, discovery hearing

because of illness and that the second Assistant (who had since resigned) had had little knowledge

of the discovery issues.

The district court denied the motion for reconsideration of the discovery sanction on January

25, 1995. The court explained:

I repeatedly stressed to the defendants the importance of the defendants'

proper staffing of this case because of the need for a prompt trial date. I want to cut

off the repeated need for preliminary injunction hearings, and I want to stop the

defendants' ongoing misconduct which I have repeatedly found through preliminary

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11 Proceedings for the absent class members continued in the district court. 

injunction hearings in this case, and it is not my intention to allow the defendants to

escape the consequences of their dilatory actions in discovery by getting out from

under myNovember 2nd veryclear order that they identifythose people byNovember

7th or suffer the pain of not being able to call fact witnesses at trial.

Their action five weeks later in giving a thousand names was a perfect

demonstration of how not to complywith my order, and I have no reason and will not

reconsider my original order, and the defendants will not be able to call any fact

witnesses at trial.

Following a pretrial conference on February 22, 1995, the court denied the District's request

for a trial continuance of four to six weeks, and the trial began on March 1, 1995, asscheduled. The

District submitted, for the record, proffers on more than fifty witnesses that it would have called at

trial, were it not for the preclusion order. On August 9, 1995, the district court entered final

judgment on the verdicts for the plaintiff class and all but one of the named plaintiffs, awarded

equitable relief(backpay and reinstatement) to all the prevailing named plaintiffs, and issued an order

for class-wide injunctive relief. The District appeals these three orders.11

II.

Under Rule 37, the district court has broad discretion to impose sanctions for discovery

violations. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43

(1976) (per curiam). The District concedes that its failure to make an adequate response to

interrogatory No. 2 was a violation of a discovery order and subject to sanctions under Rule 37. It

protests only the extreme nature of the sanction imposed, which it contends was tantamount to a

default judgment.

A.

Rule 37 authorizesthe district court, in response to a "failure ... to serve answers or objections

to interrogatories," to "make such orders in regard to the failure as are just," including "prohibiting

that party from introducing designated matters into evidence." FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B), (d). In

reviewing the discovery sanction imposed by the district court, we " "may reverse the trial court only

if ... its actions were clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.' " Hull v. Eaton, 825 F.2d 448, 452

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395,

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12The plaintiffs rely on Founding Church of Scientology, 802 F.2d at 1459 n.15, in which the

court emphasized the importance of a prior warning of the sanction to be imposed. Founding

Church of Scientology is distinguishable because the court concluded that no lesser sanction "held

out any realistic promise" of inducing compliance with the court order. Id. at 1459. 

399 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Although we bear in mind that the district court was closer to the course of

the litigation, Founding Church of Scientology, 802 F.2d at 1457, we exercise appellate review to

ensure that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing too severe a discovery sanction.

See Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dismissal under Rule

41(b)). We accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. FED.R.CIV.

P. 52(a).

The central requirement of Rule 37 is that "any sanction must be "just,' " Insurance Corp. v.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982), which requires in cases involving

severe sanctions that the district court consider whether lesser sanctions would be more appropriate

for the particular violation. See 8A WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2284, at 623 (2d ed. 1994) ("[J]ustice requires that the most drastic sanctions be

reserved for flagrant cases."). The choice of sanction should be guided by the "concept of

proportionality" between offense and sanction. See Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071,

1077 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. Lorenzen v.

Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1990). Particularly in the context of

litigation-ending sanctions, we have insisted that " "[s]ince oursystemfavorsthe disposition of cases

on the merits, dismissal is a sanction of last resort to be applied only after less dire alternatives have

been explored without success' or would obviously prove futile."12 Shea, 795 F.2d at 1075 (quoting

Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc., 759 F.2d 185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see also Automated

Datatron, Inc. v. Woodcock, 659 F.2d 1168, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

In determining whether a severe sanction is justified, the district court may consider the

resulting prejudice to the other party, any prejudice to the judicial system, and the need to deter

similar misconduct in the future. See Shea, 795 F.2d at 1074. Thus, we have stated that

"[c]onsiderations relevant to ascertaining when dismissal, rather than a milder disciplinary measure,

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is warranted include the effect of a plaintiff's contumacious conduct on the court's docket, whether

the plaintiff's behavior has prejudiced the defendant, and whether deterrence is necessary to protect

the integrity of the judicialsystem." Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir.

1990). The district court's interest in deterrence is a legitimate one, "not merely to penalize those

whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted

to such conduct in the absence ofsuch a deterrent." National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643; see

also Weisberg, 749 F.2d at 871. Yet, unlike sanctions "that are geared to remedying some

prejudice," sanctions based only on principles of deterrence "callfor careful evaluation to ensure that

the proper individuals are being sanctioned (or deterred) and that the sanctions or deterrent measures

are not overly harsh." Shea, 795 F.2d at 1077. Because "a sound discretion hardly comprehends a

pointless exaction of retribution," Jackson v. Washington Monthly, 569 F.2d at 123, a discovery

sanction imposed for its deterrent effect must be calibrated to the gravity of the misconduct. Cf.

Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1478-79.

The broad preclusion order under review approaches a default judgment in its severity.

Although the plaintiffs retained the burden of persuasion at trial, see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993), resolution of the plaintiffs' sexual harassment and retaliation claims was

likely to depend on the credibility of conflicting witnesses and the jury's evaluation of Department

employees' motives. In a case so likely to turn on the testimony of fact witnesses, the district court's

order precluding the District from calling any fact witnesses left the District with little ability to

contest the plaintiff's claims. It is true that the District could still introduce documentary evidence

and expert testimony, counter-designate portions of deposition testimony introduced at trial,

cross-examine the plaintiffs' witnesses, and make opening and closing arguments. Moreover, the jury

found against one named plaintiff on both her claims, and two named plaintiffs prevailed on their Title

VII claim but not on their § 1983 claim. Hence, the preclusion order did not operate with such

assured effect as a default judgment. Nonetheless, the other evidentiary means open to the District

lacked the force of live testimony by Department employees whom the named plaintiffs and other

witnesses had accused of sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct. See Christie v. Foremost Ins.

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13 Indeed, the district court did expressly consider the Bristol Petroleum factors in its

Memorandum Opinion I of August 9, 1995, at 19-20. 

14 The Grochal opinion was later vacated as moot, 812 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1987), so it lacks

precedential effect. 

15 The district court would also have been authorized to award the plaintiffs "reasonable

expenses, including attorneys' fees, caused by" the District's discovery violation. FED. R. CIV. P.

37(b)(2). 

Co., 785 F.2d 584, 586 (7thCir. 1986) ("Employment discrimination casesin particular often involve

"sensitive and difficult' issues of fact.... The credibility of witnesses is often crucial."); Weahkee v.

Perry, 587 F.2d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Accordingly, a discovery sanction that results in a

one-sided trial, as the preclusion order under review did, is a severe one.

Before imposing a discovery sanction assevere asthat under review, the district court should

consider a less drastic sanction in light of the three factors set forth in Bristol Petroleum.13 See

Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Before the extreme sanction of

preclusion may be used by the district court, a judge ... must consider less drastic responses."). When

a discovery sanction denies the defendant the right to a trial on the merits, the district court must

either make a finding supported by the record that the more severe sanction is necessary to avoid

prejudice to the plaintiffs or to the court's calendar or to prevent a benefit to the defendant, orifthe

sanction is based only on deterring future discovery misconductthe more severe sanction must be

supported by a finding of flagrant or egregious misconduct by the defendant. In somewhat similar

circumstances, this circuit has previously set aside an excessive discovery sanction when lesser

measures were not considered. Grochal v. Aeration Processes, Inc., 797 F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (D.C.

Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff's responses to several interrogatories concerning damages were

not "so inadequate as to warrant exclusion of [plaintiff's] evidence of damages and, as a necessary

consequence ofsuch exclusion, dismissal of [plaintiff's] complaint").14 The requirement to consider

a lesser sanction was manifest in the instant case, given that the plaintiffs themselves in their status

report of November 15, 1994, requested a lesser sanction, whereby the District would have been

precluded fromcalling anywitnesses at trialwhomthe plaintiffs had not alreadydeposed orscheduled

for deposition as of November 7, 1994.15 Thus, the district court was obliged to consider whether

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the more severe sanction was necessary to further interests other than deterrence, or if not, whether

a less severe sanction would have been more proportionate to the nature of the District's discovery

violation and its effects on the litigation.

B.

In its Memorandum Opinion I, of August 9, 1995, the district court found the District's

contention that it had not received the November 2, 1994, order containing the threatened sanction

factually unsupported and found that the District had no excuse for its failure to comply by the

November 7, 1994, deadline. The court ruled that the District's non-specific response to

interrogatory No. 2 on November 10, 1994, was inadequate and that the supplemental response of

December 12, 1994, remained inadequate and thus was "further evidence of bad faith." The court

also ruled that the preclusion order "was not tantamount to the entry of a default judgment" because

the "[p]laintiffs were still required to prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence, their

witnesseswere subject to cross-examination, and defendantswere permitted to call expert witnesses."

Even if the factors relevant for a default judgment were considered, the district court found that the

delay would have "jeopardiz[ed] the schedule of a seven-week-long trial" and "would have

substantially prejudiced plaintiffs."

In its Statement of Reasons on Remand, the district court addressed the possibility of a lesser

sanction, while emphasizing that its preclusion order should be viewed in the context of the District's

repeated delays in discovery and the contumacious conduct of Department employees. The district

court succinctly explained that "the purpose of the sanction in this case went beyond deterrence to

include avoiding prejudice to plaintiffs, preventing defendantsfrombenefitting fromtheirmisconduct,

and avoiding burdensome changes to this Court's schedule." We examine the court's stated reasons

with respect to these three concerns.

(1) Prejudice to the court. By November 1994, when the district court imposed the

preclusion sanction, most of the discovery had been completed, with final depositionsto be taken by

December 16, 1994. The trial was scheduled to begin on March 1, 1995. There is nothing in the

initial or supplemental findings to indicate that the lesser sanction proposed by the plaintiffs would

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16 The district court's finding that its calendar would have been jeopardized because the

plaintiffs "would have been required to take numerous depositions" of persons listed in the

District's supplemental response of December 12, 1994, is premised on the false understanding

that the plaintiffs sought to identify potential plaintiffs' witnesses with interrogatory No. 2. See

infra.

17 When the plaintiffs attempted to point out a specific instance of prejudice in their proposed

findings submitted to the district court following the remand of the record, the District's reply

noted that the plaintiffs had in fact received the information about the particular witness months

earlier. The district court's Statement of Reasons on Remand dropped any reference to the

plaintiffs' asserted example of prejudice, and noted no other example. 

have interfered with maintaining the firm trial date or otherwise interfered with the district court's

docket.16 The trial date of March 1, 1995, was not set until mid-October 1994, and with plaintiffs'

lesser sanction there would have been no need to change it.

(2) Prejudice to the plaintiffs. The district court's Statement of Reasons on Remand states

that the lesser sanction would have prejudiced plaintiffs in the following manner: "While barring

defendantsfromcalling witnesses not deposedwould have addressed the prejudice to plaintiffs' ability

to effectively cross-examine those witnesses, it would not have redressed in any way the prejudice

caused plaintiffs by their own inability to call witnesses who may have been helpful to their case, but

whose identities were not revealed by defendants." This finding of prejudice to the plaintiffs was not

previously asserted by the plaintiffs, who stated at the November 17, 1994, status conference that

interrogatory No. 2 sought "to have the District ... identify those persons on whom [it] relied in

denying the allegations of the complaint," so that the plaintiffs could "assess whether our discovery

program can draw to a close with some confidence that we've covered the bulk of the people whom

the District might call as witnesses." In their brief to this court, the plaintiffs similarly state that their

purpose in propounding interrogatory No. 2 was to be able to prepare cross-examination of the

witnesses whom the District most likely would call at trial. Appellees' Brief at 5, 17. The plaintiffs'

proposed lesser sanction would have protected them from prejudice to their interest in preparing

cross-examination of the District's witnesses just as well. Moreover, the new theory of prejudice to

the plaintiffsis not supported by the record. The plaintiffs have not identified any potential witnesses

of whom they were unaware as of November 7, 1994.17 For these reasons, the district court has not

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18 Although prejudice to the opposite party may be presumed when the discovery offense

causes unreasonable delay, Shea, 795 F.2d at 1075, we have already concluded that the District's

discovery violation did not delay the trial date. See supra.

19 The district court further stated that if the District was correct that the plaintiffs already

knew who the District's witnesses would be, then the proposed lesser sanction "would have been

no sanction whatsoever." This statement reveals the essentially punitive nature, unrelated to any

effects from the discovery violation, of the decision to impose the more severe sanction. 

shown that the lesser sanction would have failed to protect against prejudice to the plaintiffs.18

(3) Benefit to the defendants. The district court stated that a lesser sanction would have

allowed the District to benefit from its discovery violation "by permitting [the District] to conceal the

identities of witnesses whose knowledge or testimony could have been helpful to the plaintiffs."19 As

noted, this was never the plaintiffs' claim, and even at this late date there is nothing to indicate that

anywitness was concealed fromthe plaintiffs. The record does not show how the District could have

benefitted from its discovery violation if it had been precluded from calling any witnesses at trial

whom the plaintiffs had not already deposed or scheduled for deposition.

C.

Deterrence. Having concluded that the district court's findings of prejudice to the court and

to the plaintiffs, as well as benefit to the District, are unsupported by the record, we are left with only

the rationale of deterrence. The district court emphasized on remand that "[i]mposition of a lesser

sanction on defendants than the sanction adopted by the court on November 17, 1994, would have

failed to protect the integrity of this Court's authority." Referring to its November 2, 1994, order,

the court explained that "[w]hen, as in this case, a party has been apprised that further

non-compliance with discovery rules will be met with a specific sanction, it is incumbent upon the

court to carry out that sanction."

Because a Rule 37 sanction resting on principles of deterrence alone must be proportional to

the gravity of the misconduct, see supra Part II.A, we conclude upon reviewing the district court's

findings concerning the discovery violation that the District's discovery violation was not flagrant or

egregious. The district court found that the District's invocation of Rule 33(d) to authorize its vague

response to interrogatory No. 2 on November 10, 1994, was evidence of "bad faith." Although an

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advisory committee note offers support for the ruling that the District's reliance on Rule 33(d) was

misplaced, see FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c) advisory committee's note (1980 amendment) (stating that a

reference to business records without specifying particular documents is "an abuse of the option"),

the District'slegal argument was not frivolous, given the absence of case law in this circuit, and hence

does not necessarily show bad faith. The district court also found that the District's "shifting

explanations" for the failure to respond in a timely manner were evidence of bad faith. Yet the

District explained to the district court that the discrepanciesin its position arose from the absence of

the Assistant Corporation Counsel assigned to the discovery issues at the November 17, 1994,

discovery hearing due to illness. Therefore, we are unconvinced that the District's contention at the

December 21, 1994, discovery hearing that counsel had not received the November 2, 1994,

orderwhichthe district court found wasfactuallyunsupportedwasmade in bad faith. The district

court found further that the supplementalresponse of December 12, 1994, which contained over one

thousand names, was "not compiled in good faith." Again, the supplemental response may have been

over-broad, but it does not follow that the District was not attempting in good faith to comply with

an interrogatory requesting it to identify "all persons" with knowledge of the allegations in the

multi-count class-action complaint.

The district court emphasized the context of "defendants['] conduct throughout 1994" as a

backdrop to the imposition of the preclusion order. Certainly, the district court did not hesitate to

exercise its contempt powersto halt the disobedience of court orders byDepartment employees. The

Rule 37, sanction, however, is designed to be used against discovery misconduct; the findings of

contempt are themselves the appropriate sanction for the retaliatory conduct by Department

employees. Finally, the district court was concerned about the "defendants' prior pattern of delay,

repeated requestsfor extensions, and tardyproductionofdocuments." The District's dilatory conduct

of prior stages of the discovery process is indeed directly relevant to the choice of an appropriate

sanction. Yet there is nothing in itself sanctionable about the District's requests for extensions of

time, which the district court granted, to produce documents and to file papers opposing class

certification, and there are no findings in the record as to the cause of the problems with document

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20 According to the plaintiffs' brief, the District had produced over thirteen feet of documents

by the time that the discovery violation occurred. Appellee's Brief at 6. 

21 The District's motions to stay the proceedings while the parties engaged in mediation and for

a protective order against the taking of further depositions by the plaintiffs without leave of court

were denied by the district court. 

production. Accordingly, we conclude that the record does not demonstrate that the District's

discovery violation was flagrant or egregious.

The District's discovery violation must also be evaluated in the context of the demands that

the plaintiffs' discovery requests placed on defense counselwithin a strict pre-trialschedule set by the

district court. This is hardly a case that had dragged on for years, or a case in which there is evidence

that delays were sought for tactical advantage. Rather, there was a lot going on, often

simultaneously, in a relatively short period of time, whether it be discovery in the form of document

production20 or depositions, or contempt proceedings, mediation efforts, class certification, or trial

preparation. The plaintiffs' interrogatories were served on September 21, 1994, and due on October

24; the discovery period was scheduled to close on December 16, 1994, and trial was set for March

1, 1995. During the period between September 21 and October 24, 1994, counsel for the District

defended a Department employee in a contempt proceeding on September 30, and defended the

Department director in a contempt proceeding on October 20; filed the District's opposition to the

plaintiffs' motion for class certification on October 3; represented the District in court-ordered

mediation beginning October 13; and defended Department employees in the 32 depositions that the

plaintiffs scheduled for between October 12 and October 28.21 Hardly a case where a party ignored

an ongoing litigation, rather, the record reveals effortsto meet numerous deadlines within a tight time

period in a complex class-action suit. Although some of the competing demands on defense counsel's

time were occasioned by Department employees' contumacious conduct, as the district court found,

the district court addressed that conduct independently. The district court acknowledged, moreover,

that it was aware ofthe intense litigation demands generally imposed on the Office oftheCorporation

Counsel, in noting in its Memorandum Opinion I, at 14 n.3 (Aug. 9, 1995), the underfunding and

understaffing in that Office as set forth in the Declaration of Michael E. Zielinski of June 19, 1995.

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This acknowledgment by the district court, combined with the intensity of the litigation activity

related to thislawsuit alone, further support the conclusion that the District's discovery violation was

not flagrant or egregious.

We recognize that the plaintiffs and the district court were beset by the District's discovery

delays, and that while discoverywas ongoing Department employees engaged in retaliatory conduct.

These are serious matters, and we do not take themlightly. Indeed, the district court's frustration and

exasperation is evident both in its demands that the District assign additional counsel to this case,

notwithstanding the court's appreciation of other demands on the Corporation Counsel, and in its

declaration on remand that in the retaliatory conduct by Department employees and the discovery

delays by the Corporation Counsel, "this court has witnessed the most shocking example of

irresponsible conduct during [the judge's] tenure on the bench." Yet "nothing in the district court's

opinions or the record ... persuade[s] us that alternative sanctions, such as [the proposed lesser

sanction], would have been ineffective." Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1469. The discovery violation does

not reflect either an attack on the integrity of the court or an attempt by the District to gain an unfair

tactical advantage over its litigation opponent. There is no evidence that the District withheld

anything in discovery. Contrary to the district court's findings, the record provides no evidence of

prejudice to the plaintiffs or the court's calendar, nor of benefit to the District. It is true that the

discoveryviolation occurred at a time when discoverywas wellunderway, with document production

largely completed, most of the plaintiffs' depositions already scheduled, and a firm trial date set, and

these circumstances constrained the nature of a "just" sanction under Rule 37. Nevertheless, to be

punitive without regard to the substantial discovery that had occurred and was continuing,

particularly given the district court's acknowledgment of other litigation burdens, would run afoul of

the proportionality requirement and be overly harsh, and thus, unreasonable. In view of the nature

of the District's discovery violation, principles of deterrence alone cannot support the broad

preclusion order imposed. Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude, reluctantly, that the district

court abused its discretion in not imposing a less harsh sanction, and we reverse and remand the case

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22 Our disposition of this appeal does not disturb the district court's injunction barring

retaliation at the Department, which the District does not challenge on appeal. This order was

originally issued as a preliminary injunction barring retaliation against the named plaintiffs on June

7, 1994, which was extended to all the plaintiffs' witnesses on March 15, 1995, and issued as part

of paragraph 1 of the permanent injunction affecting all Department employees on August 9,

1995. 

to the district court.22

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