Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01986/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01986-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

T.A.,

Plaintiff,

v.

McSWAIN UNION ELEMENTARY

SCHOOL, et al;,

Defendants.

1:08-cv-01986-OWW-DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 46)

I. INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiff T.A. (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding with an action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants McSwain Union

Elementary School, Terrie Rohrer, C.W. Smith, and Martha Henandez

(“Defendants”). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgement on

May 14, 2010. (Doc. 46). Defendants filed opposition to the

motion for summary judgement on June 7, 2010. (Doc. 57).

Plaintiff filed a reply on June 14, 2010. (Doc. 72).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

In April of 2008, Plaintiff was enrolled as a sixth-grade

student at McSwain Union Elementary School (“the School”). 

(Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Fact 1 )(“Plaintiff’s SUF”).

The School is kindergarten through eighth-grade public school.

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(Plaintiff’s SUF 2). The School enforces a Dress Code Policy

that provides: 

Personal articles, clothing, or manner of dress shall

make no suggestion of tobacco, drug, or alcohol use,

sexual promiscuity, profanity, vulgarity, or other

inappropriate subject matter.

(Plaintiff’s SUF 7). The School has adopted a “Dress and

Grooming” Policy that provides:

The governing board believes that appropriate dress and

grooming contribute to a productive learning

environment. The board expects students to give proper

attention to personal cleanliness and to wear clothes

that are suitable for the school activities in which

they participate. Students’ clothing must not present a

health or safety hazard or a distraction which would

interfere with the educational process. 

(Plaintiff’s SUF 8).

The School has also adopted a “Freedom of Speech/Expression”

Policy that provides:

free inquiry and exchange of ideas are essential parts

of the democratic education. The board respects

students’ rights to express ideas and opinions, take

stands on issues, and support causes, even when such

speech is controversial or unpopular.

(Plaintiff’s SUF UF 10). The Freedom of Speech/Expression Policy

further provides:

Students are prohibited from making any expressions or

distributing or posting any materials that are obscene,

libelous, or slanderous. Students also are prohibited

from making any expressions that’s so incites (sic)

students as to create a clear and present danger of the

commission of unlawful acts on school premises, the

violation of school rules, or substantial disruption of

the school’s orderly operation. (Education Code 48907). 

(Plaintiff’s SUF 13).

///

///

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28 California’s Standardized Testing and Reporting Program. 1

3

On April 29, 2008, during STAR testing week, Plaintiff wore 1

a shirt to school that expressed her opposition to abortion. 

(Defendant’s SUF 10). The shirt featured the word “ABORTION” in

white with black-bordered block letters on the front side.

(Plaintiff’s SUF 4). Below the word “ABORTION” are three squares

approximately three inches in height. The first two squares

contain color picture images of what appear to be human fetuses

in two stages of prenatal development. (Plaintiff’s SUF 4). The

third square – containing no image – is filled in with black.

Below the three squares appears the caption “growing, growing ...

gone.” (Plaintiff’s SUF 4). The back of the shirt features the

words:

American Life League’s

Sixth Annual

NATIONAL

PRO-LIFE

T-SHIRT-DAY

April 29, 2008 www.ALL.org.

(Plaintiff’s SUF 6). Plaintiff obtained the shirt from her

church. (T.A. Dec. at 28). Plaintiff’s mother signed a document

giving Plaintiff permission to wear the shirt to school when

Plaintiff signed up for the shirt at her church. (T.A. Dec. at

28-30).

Upon arriving at school on April 29, Plaintiff proceeded to

the cafeteria for breakfast. (T.A. Dec. at 38). As Plaintiff

was eating her breakfast, a school official, Linda Newman,

approached Plaintiff and told her she needed to report to the

office. (T.A. Dec. at 49). On her way to the office, Plaintiff

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encountered Martha Hernandez. (T.A. Dec. at 49). According to

Plaintiff, Ms. Hernandez grabbed Plaintiff’s arm and led her to

the office. (T.A. Dec. at 59). Terrie Rohrer, the School’s

principal, and C.W. Smith, the School’s assistant principal, were

inside the office when Plaintiff arrived. (T.A. Dec. at 59). 

Mr. Smith determined that the shirt violated the Dress Code

Policy, specifically Item 7 of the Parent-Student Handbook,

because the pictures depicted on the shirt constituted

“inappropriate subject matter.” Mr. Smith determined that the

pictures were “too graphic for the younger students that we have

at our school site.” (Plaintiff’s SUF 22). Mr. Smith also feared

that the pictures would distract students during the time in

which they should have been taking the STAR test. (Plaintiff’s

SUF 23). Mr. Smith gave Plaintiff three options with respect to

her shirt: (1) maintain possession of the shirt, but wear it

inside out; (2) have Plaintiff’s mother come pick the shirt up

and provide a replacement; or (3) turn the shirt over to the

school for the remainder of the school day, and receive a

temporary replacement shirt. (T.A. Dec. at 66). Plaintiff opted

to receive the temporary replacement and was given a replacement

shirt that depicted children jump-roping and contained the words

“American Cancer Society” and “Jump for Heart.” (Plaintiff’s SUF

27). Plaintiff retrieved her shirt at the end of the day. (T.A.

Dec., Ex. 7). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD.

Summary judgment/adjudication is appropriate when "the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

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fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant "always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Where the movant will have the burden of proof on an issue at

trial, it must "affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier

of fact could find other than for the moving party." Soremekun v.

Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). With

respect to an issue as to which the non-moving party will have the

burden of proof, the movant "can prevail merely by pointing out

that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party's case." Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984.

When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and

supported, the non-movant cannot defeat the motion by resting upon

the allegations or denials of its own pleading, rather the

"non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise

provided in Rule 56, 'specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.'" Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). "A non-movant's bald assertions or

a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor are both insufficient to

withstand summary judgment." FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929

(9th Cir. 2009). "[A] non-movant must show a genuine issue of

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material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury

could find in his favor." Id. (emphasis in original). "[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if [a] dispute about a material fact is

'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine dispute exists, a

district court does not make credibility determinations; rather,

the "evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

IV. DISCUSSION.

A. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim

Students enjoy considerable First Amendment protection within

the school setting. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.

Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However, “the constitutional

rights of students in public school are not automatically

coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” and

students’ First Amendment rights must be applied in light of the

special characteristics of the school environment. Tinker, 393

U.S. at 506. Although Tinker continues to provide the appropriate

framework for evaluating the constitutionality of most viewpointbased censorship of student speech, the Supreme Court’s subsequent

student speech jurisprudence has consistently “set the [Tinker]

standard aside on an ad hoc basis.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.

393, 417 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 

Pursuant to current Supreme Court precedent, school officials

may not impose view-point based restrictions on student speech

unless (1) the expression leads school officials to reasonably

forecast a substantial disruption or material interference with

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school activities, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; (2) the student’s

expression might reasonably be perceived by the public as bearing

the imprimatur of the school, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier,

484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); or (3) the student’s expression can be

reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use, Morse v.

Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). Schools may impose viewpointneutral, content-based restrictions on student expression that is

“vulgar”, lewd”, “obscene”, or “plainly offensive.” Bethel Sch.

Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 

No published Ninth Circuit precedent establishes the

appropriate standard of review for dress code policies that are

content-based, yet viewpoint-neutral. Although there is

considerable persuasive authority to support Tinker’s application

to content-based school dress code policies, e.g. Barr v. Lafon,

538 F.3d 554, 572 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a school’s ban on

clothing bearing the confederate flag was a content-based,

viewpoint-neutral regulation and applying Tinker), the Ninth

Circuit has recognized that Tinker does not provide the exclusive

standard for evaluating certain content-based restrictions on

student speech. Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419,

431 n.27 (9th Cir. 2008) accord Morse, 551 U.S.at 494-405 (noting

that “mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute” and

holding that certain content-based restrictions need not satisfy

Tinker standard). 

At least two factual disputes preclude summary judgement on

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. First, whether the restriction

imposed on Plaintiff was viewpoint-based is subject to a factual

dispute. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants censored Plaintiff’s

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expression due to the fact that her t-shirt advanced a pro-life

message, and there is some evidence on the record sufficient to

support such an inference. (FAC at 5; MSJ at 6, 10-12; T.A. Dec.

at 71). Defendants have presented evidence that the restriction

imposed on Plaintiff was not based on the viewpoint expressed by

Plaintiff’s shirt, but rather on the graphic pictures contained on

it. (Smith Dec. at 75). Whether or not the restriction imposed on

Plaintiff was viewpoint-neutral is a material issue, as it

implicates the standard of review. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 494-

405; Jacobs, 526 at 431 n.27.

Assuming arguendo that the restriction imposed on Plaintiff

was viewpoint-based, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants

did not have a basis to reasonably forecast a substantial

disruption of or a material interference with school activities.

Although there is evidence on the record that one student who saw

Plaintiff’s shirt thought it was “cute” and did not appear to be

disturbed by it, (T.A. Dec. at 43), Defendants have presented

evidence that based on their experience and judgment, they believed

the shirt would have created a substantial disruption of or a

material interference with school activities, especially in the

context of the standardized testing being administered at the

school on the day in question, (Smith Dec. At 73-74). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her First

Amendment claim is DENIED.

B. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff cites Connaly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.

385, 391 (1926), Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S.

610, 620 (1976), and National Association for the Advancement of

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 Although Fraser concerned a procedural due process claim, it is instructive in 2

that it provides a framework for evaluating the concepts of due process and

vagueness in the context of the school environment. 

9

Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) for the

proposition that Defendant’s dress code policy is

unconstitutionally vague. The authorities cited by Plaintiff are

inapposite, as none address vagueness claims in the unique context

of the school setting. Connaly concerned a penal statute, while

Hynes and Button concerned generally applicable municipal

ordinances. The degree of vagueness that the Constitution

tolerates -- as well as the relative importance of fair notice and

fair enforcement -- depends in part on the nature of the enactment.

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 998

(1982). The Supreme Court has expressed greater tolerance for

enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the

consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. Id. at

998. A more stringent vagueness test applies where a vague

restriction threatens to interfere with speech. Id. at 998-999.

The Supreme Court has recognized that "maintaining security

and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility

in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value

of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship."

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. Given the school's need to be able to 2

impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated

conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school

disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which

imposes criminal sanctions. Id.

///

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 Intermediate scrutiny does not generally apply to content-based restrictions 3

on speech. But see Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (applying reasonableness standard to

content based restriction). However, the fact that alternative methods of

communication limit the ability of school dress codes to silence students’

viewpoints is significant for the purposes of assessing the reasonableness, in

the due process context, of a school’s dress code. See, e.g, Flipside, 455 U.S.

at 498 (noting that, in due process context, constitutional requirements should

not be “mechanically applied” and directing courts to consider all the

circumstances in assessing whether due process requires more specificity)

10

The dress code at issue is vague, and does threaten to

infringe on students’ speech rights. Accordingly, the dress code

policy must be viewed with skepticism. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,

998. However, because First Amendment rights are circumscribed in

light of the special characteristics of the school environment,

the threat to speech posed by a school dress code policy is

inherently less severe than the threat posed by the types of vague

“laws” of general applicability contemplated by the Court in

Flipside, 455 U.S. at 998. The threat to speech entailed by school

dress codes is undercut further by students’ rights to express

their opinions orally and in writing. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (noting, in the context of

intermediate scrutiny review, that availability of alternative

channels of speech reduced threat to speech).3

In light of the minimal penalties imposed for violations of

the School’s dress code, the circumscribed First Amendment rights

of students in the school context, the availability of alternate

mediums of communication other than clothing, and the recognized

need for flexibility in school disciplinary policies, the School’s

dress code policy does not violate due process. See A.M. Cash, 585

F.3d at 224-225 (rejecting vagueness challenge to dress code policy

that prohibited “inappropriate symbolism” in light of school

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officials’ need for flexibility and light sanction entailed by

dress code violations); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686 (holding that

student’s contention that school disciplinary rule proscribing

"obscene" language was unconstitutionally vague was “wholly without

merit”). Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement on her due

process claim is DENIED. 

B. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff cites Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,

95-96 (1972) for the proposition that, pursuant to the Equal

Protection Clause, “government may not grant the use of a forum to

people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those

wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.” (MSJ

at 22). Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to summary

judgement because “Defendants [] permitted the expression of views

concerning heart disease, which it found to be an acceptable

message, but denied Plaintiff her right to express a less favored

or more controversial view concerning abortion.” (MSJ at 23). 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is premised on the notion

that Defendants’ actions were based on the viewpoint expressed in

Plaintiff’s shirt. (MSJ at 22-23). A factual dispute exists

regarding whether Defendants’ conduct was motivated by the pro-life

message on Plaintiff’s shirt or the graphic images on the shirt.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her equal protection

claim is DENIED.

C. Request for Permanent Injunction

A student's graduation generally moots claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief against a school. E.g. Flint v. Dennison,

488 F.3d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiff

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 The complaint’s request for inductive relief seeks an order “permanently 4

enjoin[ing] Defendants....from violating Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights...within McSwain Union Elementary School.” (Doc. 37 at 14) (emphasis

added).

12

does not contest Defendants’ assertion that her claims for

injunctive relief are now moot due to her graduation. (See Doc. 72

at 1-5). Rather, Plaintiff contends, correctly, that her claims

for nominal damages prevent the underlying causes of action from

becoming moot. (Id.). It is undisputed that Plaintiff is no longer

a student at McSwain Union Elementary School. Accordingly, her

claims for injunctive relief against McSwain Union Elementary

School are now moot.4

D. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff makes the conclusory assertion that “Plaintiff's

right to engage in her speech free from viewpoint and content

discrimination was clearly established.” (MSJ at 25). Plaintiff

points to no authority in support of her contention. Further,

whether Defendant’s engaged in viewpoint discrimination is subject

to a factual dispute, as is the reasonableness of Defendant’s

forecast of a disruption. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement

on the issue of qualified immunity is DENIED.

ORDER

For the reasons stated:

1) Plaintiff’s request for summary judgement on her First

Amendment claim is DENIED;

2) Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment on her equal

protection claim is DENIED;

3) Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment on her Due

Process claim is DENIED; 

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4) Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment on the issue of

qualified immunity is DENIED;

5) Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment on her claims

for injunctive relief is DENIED; and

5) Defendants shall submit a form of order consistent with

this Memorandum Decision within five (5) days following

electronic service of this decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

hkh80h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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