Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03923/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03923-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff objects to nearly all the evidence submitted by the County on the grounds that it is

irrelevant, contradictory, not based on personal knowledge, or lacks foundation. The vast majority

of these are argument couched as evidentiary objections. Certain objections are discussed more

fully below; the remaining objections are OVERRULED. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY GANLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO,

Defendant.

 NO. C06-3923 TEH 

 ORDER GRANTING 

 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

 DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

 MOTION FOR SUMMARY

 JUDGMENT 

This matter came before the Court on December 20, 2007, on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. Plaintiff alleges she was denied due process of law when

she was “separated from her position” as a correctional officer for San Mateo County, placed

on involuntary medical leave, and forced to exhaust her accumulative vacation and sick

leave. She also raises state law causes of action. For the reasons set out below, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Mary Ganley was hired as a correctional officer for the County of San Mateo in the

1980’s. She had permanent classified status as an employee under the County’s Civil

Service Commission Rules. For part of that time, she served as president of the Deputy

Sheriff’s Association (the union representing deputy sheriffs and correctional officers). Over

the course of her employment, she submitted multiple Workers’ Compensation claims, was

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on extended sick leave for nearly a year, and had several temporary modified duty

assignments. Her last temporary modified duty assignment began on January 12, 2005.

As part of the Worker’s Compensation claims process, Edward Katz, Plaintiff’s

treating physician, and Dr. James Stark, the County’s Qualified Medical Examiner, examined

Plaintiff and submitted reports to the County in January and February of 2005. Both agreed

that Plaintiff could do only light duty work that would not involve altercations or “take

downs.” Both gave her a permanent disability rating.

On June 6, 2005, Janine Keller, the Human Resources Risk Manager for San Mateo

County, and Yvonne Alvidrez, then the ADA Coordinator for the County, met with Plaintiff. 

Keller explained the doctors’ conclusions. She also explained that the ability to perform take

downs and become involved in inmate altercations was an essential function of the

correctional officer position, and that the job could not be modified to eliminate those

functions. At the meeting, Alvidrez informed Plaintiff verbally and in writing of her right to

request reasonable accommodation of her permanent restrictions and gave her information on

the interactive process. Keller offered Plaintiff help in finding other work within the County

that would not conflict with her permanent restrictions. Keller informed Plaintiff that

Victoria O’Brien, the Sheriff’s Services Lieutenant, would discuss with her when her last day

in the temporary modified position would be. 

On June 21, 2005, O’Brien explained to Plaintiff that her temporary modified

assignment was being discontinued because the physicians’ reports indicated she was unable

to perform essential functions of the job. O’Brien told her that this was her “last day” as a

correctional officer. Ganley Decl. ¶ 3. O’Brien told Plaintiff to “go home” at the end of her

shift that day and not to return for her next scheduled shift. County Response to Request for

Admission No. 7. The same day, O’Brien sent an email to various County employees

stating, “I met with Mary Ganley this morning. Today will be her last day as a Correctional

Officer. She will be contacting retirement tomorrow to begin the process.” Clisham Decl.

Exh. 2. 

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 Plaintiff claims that her entire disability retirement application is inadmissible under the

“collateral source rule,” and that the Court should not consider it for any issue of damages, whether

the County terminated the Plaintiff, or for any other issue. The collateral source rule holds only that

if a plaintiff receives payments to compensate him for his injury from some source other than the

wrongdoer, those should not be offset against the damages awarded. United States v. Price, 288

F.2d 448, 449 (4th Cir. 1961), Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir.

1962). It has nothing to do with admitting evidence relating to disability compensation for other

purposes, such as a determinations of liability, or with whether the court can consider statements

made in disability applications or the fact that the application was made. The objection is

OVERRULED. 

3

After June 21, 2005, Plaintiff was paid using her accumulated vacation credits and

sick leave. Plaintiff’s pay status was switched from “regular” to “sick with pay.” Plaintiff’s

sick leave and accrued vacation time were exhausted by the end of the pay period ending

November 19, 2005. She remained on the payroll, with her time coded as “leave without

pay.” She continued to receive health benefits, and credit toward her retirement through

January, 2006. On January 14, 2006, Plaintiff received her final paycheck for $825, for her

uniform allowance.

Plaintiff declares that as of June, 2005, she had no desire to retire and wanted to

remain in her light duty position. Ganley Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. But she did not dispute the doctors’

conclusions that she was disabled when she met Janine Keller and Yvonne Alvidrez on June

6. Alvidrez Decl. ¶¶ 9, Keller Decl. ¶ 13. Moreover, she did not protest when Ms. O’Brien

told her the light duty assignment was ending, and instead said she was applying for

disability retirement. O’Brien Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff did, in fact, file for disability retirement

benefits on August 1, 2005, stating under penalty of perjury that she was unable to perform

the duties of a correctional officer.2

 Between July and September, 2005, Plaintiff received

several notices about rehabilitative services, but responded only in October, saying she

wanted rehabilitative services but was not ready for them.

There is no dispute that the County terminated Plaintiff’s modified duty assignment

because doctors’ reports said she needed light duty and could not be involved in take downs

and altercations, not for performance reasons or any other reason. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a single claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: that she was

deprived of her property interest in her permanent public employment as a correctional

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officer without due process of law, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff also alleges claims for benefits under California Government Code § 31721 and

California Labor Code § 4850.

ANALYSIS

I. Procedural Due Process Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The government cannot deprive individuals of a “property interest” within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without procedural due

process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). A section 1983 procedural due

process claim has three elements: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the

Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” 

Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). 

A. Plaintiff Has Property Rights At Stake

1. Plaintiff Has A Property Interest In Her Job.

A government employee has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued

employment when the employee has an individual entitlement to the job grounded in state

law or some other independent source, which cannot be removed except for cause. Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d

778, 780 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194, 207-208

(1975).

Plaintiff was a permanent classified employee of San Mateo County. The San Mateo

County Civil Service Commission Rules, Section XIII.4, provides that such an employee can

be dismissed, suspended, reduced in step or demoted “for cause only.” Those causes include

“[p]ermanent or chronic physical or mental disability which incapacitates the employee from

properly performing assigned duties.” Id. § 4.D. Moreover, the Memorandum of

Understanding between the Plaintiff’s union and the County provides that a “permanent

classified employee may be dismissed, suspended or demoted for cause only.” 

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The County contends, bizarrely, that Plaintiff did not have a property interest in the

correctional officer position because she could not perform the essential functions of the job

– “it is axiomatic that if you cannot do the job, you no longer have a right to it.” Defendant’s

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“DReply”) at 8:13-14. This

inverted reasoning assumes that there is “cause” to terminate Plaintiff – the same fact of

which she seeks a procedurally adequate determination prior to her removal. Under this

logic, no disabled employee would be entitled to procedural due process, and a determination

by human resources personnel that an employee is permanently disabled would divest an

employee of her property interest in her job. Whether the County has cause to terminate an

employee is not the same question as whether the employee has a property interest. 

The County offers no authority that even remotely supports its reasoning. The 

“legitimate claim of entitlement” required for property interest purposes comes from laws,

rules, or agreements that provide a continued expectation of employment (see e.g., Roth, 408

U.S. at 577) – not from the employee’s actual fitness or qualifications for the job, or absence

of cause to terminate the employee. Although some disability cases provide that an employer

can discharge or refuse to hire an employee with a disability who is unable to perform the

essential duties of the job, see, e.g., Green v. State, 42 Cal.4th 254, 262 (2007), not one of the

cases the County cites relates at all to procedural due process requirements. Plaintiff

unquestionably has a property interest in her job.

2. Plaintiff Has A Property Interest In Pay/Accrued benefits 

Plaintiff also argues that she was placed on an “involuntary illness leave of absence,”

which was a deprivation of property rights for which she was entitled to due process. 

The California case Bostean v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 63 Cal.App.4th

95 (1998) squarely holds that involuntary illness leave constitutes a deprivation of a property

interest that triggers due process requirements. Bostean complained that certain work

conditions aggravated his medical problems. His supervisor asked his physician to clarify

Bostean’s medical restrictions, and on the basis of the doctor’s response, placed Bostean on

involuntary medical leave without pay. Id. at 102. He was given no notice of the allegations

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pursuant to which he was placed on leave and no opportunity for a hearing before the leave

began, although he was given a right to appeal. Id. Through his union representative,

Bostean requested a hearing and argued he had been deprived of due process of law. The

District’s Personnel Commission considered a further medical examination and, seven

months after Bostean was placed on leave, determined he could return to work. Id. at 104-

05. Bostean claimed that he was deprived of a property right in his permanent employment

because he was placed on involuntary illness leave without prior notice and an opportunity to

respond, and that as a result, he lost wages, seniority credit, sick leave and vacation pay. Id.

at 105. 

The Court held that Bostean had been deprived of a property interest within the

meaning of the due process clause. “[I]nvoluntary illness leave of absence without pay

deprived Bostean of seven months’ salary, and was tantamount to a suspension without pay.” 

Id. at 110. The court reasoned that just as forced disability retirement constitutes a

deprivation of a property right, id. at 111, citing Barberic v. City of Hawthorne, 669 F.Supp.

985, 989-90 (C.D. Cal. 1987), so does forced illness leave. The Court noted that the leave

had “an adverse effect on at least some of his benefits, and his receipt of salary.” Id. at 110. 

It also cited to other cases finding that employees had a property interest in their employment

that was impaired when they were placed on unpaid medical leaves of absence. Id. at 111,

citing Ceko v. Martin, 753 F.Supp. 1418, 1422-23 (N.D. Ill. 1990) and Goldbeck v. City of

Chicago, 782 F.Supp. 381, 385 n.8. 

The court treated time that Bostean received pay during his involuntary leave of

absence because he was being paid from sick and vacation time as conceptually

indistinguishable from unpaid leave. Bostean alleged he exhausted his sick leave and lost

“vacation and other rights” in addition to wages. 63 Cal.App.4th at 103. The Court treated

this as the equivalent of lost pay, stating he had been “deprived of seven months’ salary”

between November 23, 1993 and June 22, 1994. Id. at 110, 105. The court focused on the

financial loss to the plaintiff, without differentiating whether that loss came from exhausting

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sick leave or the failure to pay him. Once it concluded that he had been deprived of due

process, the court observed that 

to the extent that Bostean was paid a salary during the time of his involuntary leave of

absence because he used sick or vacation time, he would be entitled to mandamus

relief directing that [the defendant] credit him with that time, which he would have

lost as a result of the wrongful deprivation...”

63 Cal.App.4th at 118.

This analysis is supported by the fact that Plaintiff’s vacation and sick time had vested

under applicable rules. Ordinarily, a public employee in California is entitled to take

accumulated vacation leave as a lump sum when he or she retires, and an employer cannot

force an employee to forego the lump sum and take vacation before retirement. Bonn v.

California State University, Chico, 88 Cal.App.3d 985 (1979); Kistler v. Redwoods

Community College Dist., 15 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1332-33 (1993). Here, it is undisputed that

Plaintiff would have been entitled to have any accrued vacation allowance added to her final

paycheck. MOU § 18.3.

The MOU between Plaintiffs’ union and the County also provides that the County

shall reimburse retiring employees for each 8 hours’ accumulated sick time by paying for

one month’s retirement health benefits. MOU § 21.3. Thus, as Plaintiff argues, when the

County pays an employee from accumulated sick leave, it eliminates that employee’s

retirement medical benefits – a property right.

Forcing an employee to use such accumulated vacation and sick time, then, is not the

same as paid leave. If the employee stops receiving regular pay and instead the amount that

he or she would have received in a lump sum or as health benefits is doled out in biweekly

checks, the employee is in the same position financially as he or she would have been

without pay. Whether this process is viewed as forcing an employee to take accumulated

vacation time, or taking away vested vacation pay, it involves a property right.

In response, the County incorrectly asserts that Bostean did not even discuss the

“concept” of vacation and sick leave. It also argues that Ventura County Deputy Sheriff’s

Association v. Board of Retirement, 16 Cal.4th 483, 497 (1997) shows that annual leave is

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 Specifically, San Mateo County Civil Service Commission Rules, Section XIII..1 gives the

appointing authority the right to dismiss employees, provided they can appeal. Section XIII.4

provides employees can be dismissed only for cause, and lists the causes, including disability. 

XIII.4.D. Section XIII.2 provides that the employee shall receive at least five days’ notice before an

action described in Section 1 (e.g., dismissal) is to be effective. 

8

“regular salary or wages.” But the passage from Ventura cited by the County is taken out of

context. Ventura considers what payments to a county employee other than base pay are part

of the employee’s final “compensation” for the purposes of calculating retirement benefits. 

If anything, Ventura weighs in Plaintiff’s favor – it holds that if an employee elects to receive

cash in lieu of accrued vacation, “the cash, like the vacation pay the employee would

otherwise receive, is part of the employee's ‘remuneration’ for past services.” Id. at 497-98. 

Plaintiff clearly has a property interest in not forfeiting this remuneration.

The County also argues that Cal. Gov. Code § 31724 shows that being paid from sick

leave does not deprive an employee of compensation. That statute provides that if a county

employee has accumulated sick leave, the employee’s disability retirement is only effective

as of the date the sick leave is expired (unless the employee consents to an earlier

retirement). But when Plaintiff’s disability retirement starts under California law does not

affect whether the employee has a property right to accumulated sick leave, or analytically

make the sick pay “regular pay.” 

 Plaintiff has a property interest both in her job in general and in not being placed on

unpaid leave or forced to use accrued benefits.

B. Plaintiff Raised A Triable Issue Of Fact As To Whether She Suffered

Involuntary Deprivation of Accrued Benefits/ Forced Unpaid Leave

The nature of the deprivation Plaintiff suffered determines how much process she is

due. If Plaintiff was dismissed or terminated from her position, long-settled law and civil

service rules entitle her to at least notice and a right to appeal3

 if not a Skelly hearing. See

Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d 195 (1975). If she suffered some lesser

deprivation, then the Court must determine what process she is due under the balancing test

set out in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

1. Plaintiff Was Not Terminated

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Even though Plaintiff repeatedly argues that she “lost her job,” Memorandum of

Points and Authorities In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“PMSJ”) at

8:3, 8:26, and seeks procedural protections appropriate for termination, she never squarely

argues that she was terminated or dismissed. Instead, she uses phrases like “separated from

her permanent status as a correctional officer,” Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Summary

Judgment (“PReply”) at 5:20-21, or “forced to seek a disability retirement in lieu of regular

employment.” Id. at 5:17. 

 The County argues that the Court should look to a line of California cases interpreting

a state statute relating to disability retirement, Cal. Gov. Code § 31725, to determine

whether Plaintiff was terminated. Gov. Code § 31725 provides that when a county employee

is “dismissed” from his or her job for permanent disability, but then the employee's

application for disability retirement is denied on the ground he or she is not permanently

disabled, the employer must reinstate the employee and provide back pay. Several cases

analyze what it means for an employee to be “dismissed” within the meaning of § 31725,

under factual circumstances nearly parallel to those here. 

In Stephens v. County of Tulare, 38 Cal.4th 793 (2006), the plaintiff injured his thumb

and was placed on a light-duty job. When a supervisor asked how he was doing, he said that

his thumb still hurt and he needed frequent breaks. Id. at 798. His superior then sent him a

letter explaining that “because of your statements we believe that we will not be able to

provide a modified work assignment at this time.” Id. The letter told Stephens he was “not

to return to work until further notice.” When his condition improved, he was to submit time

sheets reflecting that he used sick and personal leave. Id.

The Court considered whether Stephens was “dismissed” within the meaning of

Government Code § 31725. The court observed that “dismissed,” “terminated,” and

“released” all have common meaning: that the employment relationship has ended at the

employer’s election, that the employer no longer has an obligation to pay salary or other

compensation, and that the employee has no expectation that a position is available or will be

made available. Id. at 802. Stephens was “plainly” not dismissed because his superior’s

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letter directed him to leave work temporarily and required him to report his absence as sick

or personal leave. Id. at 803. He was “not faced with loss of income” because he could use

sick leave. Id. at 806.

Soon thereafter, the California Court of Appeal held in Kelly v. County of Los

Angeles, 141 Cal.App.4th 910 (2006) that an employee is not “dismissed” when

her local government employer (1) advises her it currently has no available position to

accommodate her work restrictions imposed following her industrial injury, (2) places

the employee on unpaid industrial-injury leave, but (3) offers the employee vocational

rehabilitation (including a vocational rehabilitation maintenance allowance) to train

the employee for another position.... [u]nless the employer evinces an intent to sever

the employment relationship...

Id. at 913. Like Plaintiff here, Kelly had been told her work restrictions were incompatible

with her assignment and had been removed from the regular payroll. Id. at 923. The Court

noted that “the term ‘dismissed’ does not simply mean the absence of salary.” Id. at 925. Its

holding that Kelly had not been “dismissed” turned on the fact that she had been offered

vocational rehabilitation services for a different position, which shows that the county did not

have an intent to terminate her. Id. The Court reiterated the California Supreme Court’s

admonition in Stephens that “it is the employee’s obligation to seek clarification in the event

he or she is uncertain as to the continuing existence of the employment relationship.” Id. at

926, quoting Stephens, 38 Cal.4th at 802; see also id. at 922 (same). 

These cases speak directly to the factual situation here: whether an employee has been

dismissed when she is sent home because of a disability. Plaintiff argues that they are “not

relevant” simply because they construe Government Code § 31725, and do not discuss due

process claims. PReply at 4:21-5:5. But Plaintiff offers no alternative legal standard other

than common sense by which to determine whether Plaintiff was dismissed. 

While not binding, Stephens and Kelly are relevant and provide a useful guide to the

Court’s analysis. In light of that guidance, the undisputed facts show that plaintiff was not

dismissed. 

Lieutenant O’Brien told Plaintiff to “go home,” and that June 21, 2005 was her “last

day” as a corrections officer. The County does not dispute that it had no expectation that

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 Although Plaintiff argued for the first time at oral argument that she did so because she

thought she would be receiving Labor Code § 4850 benefits which would replace the use of sick and

vacation time clearly reflected in her pay stubs. That belief is not set out either in her papers or her

declarations. 

5

 Although the County states that Plaintiff continued receiving medical and dental benefits

until her final paycheck on January 14, 2006, neither the Gorman Declaration to which the County

cites nor the pay stubs she relies on seem to support that proposition. At best, this is an unsettled

question of fact. 

11

Plaintiff would recover or return to work as a corrections officer. But numerous factors

show she was not terminated from County employment. First, although Plaintiff no longer

received “regular” pay, she was paid from accrued sick leave and vacation time until the start

of November, 2005. During that time, she remained on the payroll on “leave with pay”

status. She continued to accrue vacation time and sick time. She continued to receive health

and dental benefits and had contributions made to her retirement account. In fact, as

Defendants point out, she herself thought she was on “leave with pay.” Her disability

retirement application, which she filed August 1, 2005, asked her to identify her “current

employment status” and gave her several options to choose from, including “On Leave of

Absence With Pay,” “On Leave of Absence Without Pay,” “Dismissed Due to Inability to

Perform my Job,” and “I am not sure.” Plaintiff checked “On Leave of Absence With Pay,”

and signed the application under penalty of perjury. Cf. Kelly, 141 Cal.App.4th at 925

(viewing the fact that Kelly herself stated she had not been terminated in her retirement

application as a factor in favor of finding she was not dismissed).4

Once Plaintiff’s sick, vacation, and other leave expired, early in the pay period ending

November 19, 2005, she was switched to “leave without pay” status. She no longer

accumulated vacation or sick time, and her other benefits ceased as well.5

Nonetheless, San Mateo County’s Ordinance Code provides that if a disability

retirement application has been filed and a leave of absence has been granted, 

granting of a leave of absence also grants to the employee the right to return to a

position in the same classification, or equivalent classification, in the same

department, as held at the time the leave was granted, provided such position remains.

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 The County’s unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

7

 As of June 22, 2005, she had 365.60 hours of accrued sick leave, 171.65 hours of accrued

vacation leave, 66.3 hours of accrued holiday leave, and 12.8 hours of accrued compensatory time. 

Gorman Decl. ¶ 5.

12

San Mateo County Ordinance Code § 2.71.140.6

 Moreover, like the plaintiff in Kelly,

Plaintiff was offered the opportunity to request reasonable accommodations under the ADA,

was offered vocational rehabilitation services and help finding another job within the County,

and received $4,200 in vocational rehabilitation benefits. O’Brien Decl. ¶ 6; Imrie Decl. ¶¶

5-14 and Exhs. B-G; Keller Decl. ¶ 16. Both common sense and Kelly teach that Plaintiff

was not terminated if the County was offering her alternative employment. See Kelly, 141

Cal.App.4th at 924. Plaintiff herself argues that she had a “property interest in her continued

employment with the County of San Mateo,” PMSJ at 5:19-20, and makes no claim that she

had a property interest in her light duty assignment. 

Plaintiff was not terminated or dismissed from her employment. 

2. Plaintiff Has Raised A Triable Issue Of Fact As To Whether She

Was Placed On Involuntary Leave And Forced To Use Accrued

Sick And Vacation Time

There is no dispute that the County did not pay Plaintiff her regular pay after June,

2005, and instead exhausted her accumulated sick and vacation time7

 to pay her after

November, 2005. There is also no dispute that once her leave time was exhausted by early

November, 2005, her pay stubs showed she was on “LV W/O PAY,” and she received no

monthly checks.

Plaintiff --just barely-- raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the above

deprivations were involuntary. Plaintiff submitted a declaration that she wanted to continue

working. Ganley Decl. ¶ 3. However, the various County employees who met with her

uniformly state that she never contradicted the doctors’ assessments or said she wanted to

protest or appeal the County’s placing her on leave. Alvidrez Decl. ¶ 9, Keller Decl. ¶ 13,

O’Brien Decl. ¶¶ 6- 7 (O’Brien explained that Plaintiff could no longer keep the light duty

position because her injuries were permanent and “Ms. Ganley indicated to me that she

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examination that an employee is not capable of properly performing his/her duties, he/she

may require the employee to absent himself/herself from work until the incapacity is

remedied. During such absence the employee may utilize any accumulated sick leave,

vacation, holiday and compensatory time.”

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understood and did not protest the decision. She told me that she would be applying for

disability retirement.”).

Various County employees contacted Plaintiff about vocational retraining and ADA

accommodations, but Plaintiff never responded or requested either. She did, however,

discuss retirement options with a County “retirement analyst” three times in person before

June 21, 2005, and by telephone “approximately once every 10 days from the date she was

sent home until she filed her disability retirement application.” Lamica Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. Instead

of choosing a service retirement, which would have been effective immediately and would

pay her until her disability retirement was processed, Plaintiff chose an option that allowed

her to continue to accrue service credit toward retirement, so that her retirement payments

were $232 more per month than they would have been had she retired immediately in June,

2005. Lamica Decl. ¶ 3, Hood Decl. ¶ 6-7.

Finally, as set out more fully below, even though Plaintiff was the past president of

her union and undoubtedly knew how to protest a decision she didn’t like, she did not use

MOU or Civil Service Commission grievance procedures to challenge the County’s acts.

It is a close call whether Plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact as to whether she was

placed on leave involuntarily, or, with full knowledge, chose to use up her sick and vacation

leave (as MOU § 19.6 allowed her to do)8

 and then take disability retirement. Although it

seems highly unlikely that any reasonable jury would find the deprivation involuntary, the 

Court cannot ignore Plaintiff’s declaration about her subjective intent. S.E.C. v. Phan, 500

F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)(court can disregard a self-serving declaration for summary

judgment purposes only when the declaration “state[s] only conclusions, and not such facts

as would be admissible in evidence”). Moreover, the County did not challenge Plaintiff’s

claim that the deprivation was involuntary. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

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raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she was involuntarily deprived of vacation, sick

time and other benefits, or placed on unpaid illness leave.

C. Plaintiff Received Procedural Due Process

1. Standard

A tenured public employee facing dismissal is “entitled to oral or written notice of the

charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present

his side of the story,” and “a very limited hearing prior to his termination, to be followed by a

more comprehensive post-termination hearing.” Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources,

273 F.3d 844, 873 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). 

But deprivations short of termination do not always require the full panoply of

procedural protections. Unlike some legal rules, due process “is not a technical conception

with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Brewster v. Board of Educ.

of Lynwood Unified School Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 983 (9th Cir. 1998)(citations omitted). 

“(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation

demands.” Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). In Matthews, the Supreme

Court set out three factors that the Court should balance to determine if procedures are

constitutionally sufficient:

first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of

an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,

the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would

entail. 

Id. at 335. “[P]rocedural due process analysis essentially boils down to an ad hoc balancing

inquiry.” Brewster, 149 F.3d at 983. The Court should first use the balancing test to

determine whether the employee is entitled to a predeprivation (as opposed to

postdeprivation) hearing. Id.; see also Bostean, 63 Cal.App.4th at 113, citing Gilbert v.

Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997)(postdeprivation hearing can suffice in some situations). 

Then, the court should determine what specific procedures that hearing should entail, and, if

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a formal adversarial hearing is required, what standard of proof the government should meet. 

Brewster, 149 F.3d at 984.

2. Plaintiff Received All The Process Required By The Constitution

On The Facts Of Her Case

Plaintiff argues that a deprivation of benefits or involuntary unpaid leave is a

“deprivation of employment.” She then conflates that deprivation with termination to argue

she is entitled to the same pre-termination procedural protections she would receive if she

were fired. PMSJ at 9, PReply at 7. But she was not fired. The County was not necessarily

required to give her all the procedural protections afforded an employee being dismissed.

Accordingly, this Court must balance the Matthews factors to determine what process

Plaintiff was due. 

Plaintiff has a “significant private interest in the uninterrupted receipt of [her]

paycheck.” Bostean, 63 Cal.App.4th at 113, quoting Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932. Moreover, the

County has not shown it had a significant interest in removing Plaintiff immediately from her

light duty position (i.e., before she could be heard) – it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not

removed from her position because of an immediate threat to anyone’s health or safety. 

But the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case is slight. Bostean is again

instructive. There, the court determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation – of

“miscommunication, misinterpretation, and factual error” – was great, 63 Cal.App.4th at 115, 

because 

• Bostean had no prior notice that his supervisor’s inquiries to his physician were

“preliminary to an involuntary illness leave of absence,” rather than to efforts to

accommodate his restrictions or change his work conditions, id. at 114; and

• Bostean had no predeprivation opportunity to be heard because he was told that his

employer would be relying on the medical information to place him on leave on the

last workday before the leave started, id. at 115.

The procedures the employer used were not reliable for “developing reasonable grounds to

support the imposition of an involuntary illness leave of absence without prior notice and

hearing.” 

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 The County also argues that Plaintiff received due process because § 19.6 of the MOU

authorized the County to send her home without formal notice or right to appeal. But the MOU does

not abrogate Plaintiff's due process rights, and so does not affect the analysis under Matthews. 

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Here, in contrast, Plaintiff was “informed of the true issues at stake and the purposes

for, and consequences of, the medical reports.” Id. at 116. Although she had no formal

“fitness for duty” examination, she was examined both by her own personal physician and

the County’s physician to determine the extent of her disability. The County’s physician

reviewed the Correctional Officer Job Analysis, and opined in January, 2005 that “[B]ut for

light duty work, Ms. Ganley would require medical retirement.” Keller Decl. Exh. A, 1/16/05

Stark Report, at 2, 4. Dr. Katz, Plaintiff’s own physician, found in February, 2005, that

Plaintiff was “physically capable of performing light duty work where altercations and

takedowns will not occur.” Id. Exh. B, 2/9/05 Katz Report at 2. Dr. Katz’s May 23, 2005

report states she has “permanent restrictions of no altercations or takedowns.” Id. Exh. D,

5/23/05 Katz Report at 1. Even though these examinations were for the purposes of

establishing her workers’ compensation benefits, and not specifically to evaluate her ability

to perform the essential functions of the job, Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that there is

no reason to believe a “fitness for duty” examination would have been any more reliable than

those of Drs. Katz and Stark to determine whether Plaintiff could perform the essential

functions of the job. Moreover, the evaluations were, apparently, accurate, because Plaintiff

stated under oath just over two months later in her disability retirement application that she

could not perform her job duties.

 Plaintiff received clear notice of the doctors’ conclusions and that the County was

planning to remove her from the light duty position on the basis of those conclusions at the

June 6, 2005 meeting. After this meeting, she had 15 days in which to protest the decision

before the June 21, 2005 meeting with Lieutenant O’Brien. At that meeting, she was again

informed of the reasons she was being removed, and she again made no protest.9

 Cf.

Barberic v. City of Hawthorne, 669 F.Supp. 985, 991 (C.D.Cal. 1987)(single meeting with

supervisor at which employee is told he will be forced to retire for mental disability does not

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meet due process requirements, where employee had no idea that her mental stability was

going to be discussed at all). 

These predeprivation procedures were constitutionally adequate. Plaintiff was

accorded “oral or written notice of the charges against [her], an explanation of the employer's

evidence, and an opportunity to present [her] side of the story.” Brewster, 149 F.3d at 985

(citation omitted). Plaintiff protests that the June 6 meeting could not have satisfied due

process because it was directed at ADA and workers’ compensation processes, and because

Ms. Keller had no involvement in the decision to remove Plaintiff from her job. But

although the meeting may not have provided the procedural protections required by

Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), or Skelly, supra, those cases

involved termination, not an involuntary leave or denial of benefits. The meeting certainly

gave Plaintiff notice of her impending removal from the light duty assignment and an

explanation of the evidence on which the decision was based. Although the County would

be well-advised to inform similarly situated employees of their grievance or appeal rights,

and let them know how their compensation will be handled, on the facts of this case, Plaintiff

received the process to which she was entitled. 

D. Postdeprivation Appeal and Grievance Procedures Would Have Provided

Plaintiff Due Process, And She Waived Her Due Process Claim By Failing

To Use Them 

Even if Plaintiff was denied due process before the County began draining her

benefits, Plaintiff chose not to use the various procedurally adequate appeal and grievance

procedures to which she had access, and therefore waived her procedural due process claim. 

Pursuant to Civil Service Rule XIV, an employee is entitled to appeal a dismissal

under Civil Service Rule XIII.4.D (incapacity because of permanent disability) to the Civil

Service Commission. Alternately, an employee can challenge dismissal by using the 4-step

grievance process culminating in arbitration set out in § 33 of the MOU – the likes of which

meet a public employer’s obligation to provide due process. See Armstrong v. Meyers, 964

F.2d 948, 950-51 (9th Cir. 1992). Any employee can use the same MOU grievance

procedure to challenge not only dismissal, but the County’s application of any provision of

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10 Plaintiff objects that because the Court struck the County’s affirmative defense of Failure

to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, the County cannot offer evidence of appeal and grievance

procedures. But the County does not argue that Plaintiff’s failure to avail herself of these remedies

is a failure to exhaust; rather, the County claims that binding authority holds that an employee’s

failure to use constitutionally adequate procedures acts as a waiver and bars her cause of action. 

Accordingly, this objection is OVERRULED.

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the MOU, including § 19.6 (the part allowing the County to require the employee to absent

herself from work if its has received a doctor’s report that the employee is not capable of

performing her duties). MOU § 33.1 (misnumbered 34.1). Moreover, Civil Service Rule

XIV provides an appeal procedure, under which any employee adversely affected by a

decision under the rules can appeal the decision to the Civil Service Commission. The

appeal procedure would apply to a dismissal under Rule XIII.D.4, which addresses dismissal

on the basis of incapacity.

Plaintiff’s failure to utilize the post-deprivation grievance procedures set out in the

MOU and Civil Service Rules prevents her from claiming she was denied due process of law. 

If Plaintiff was aware she was entitled to a post-deprivation hearings under Civil Service

Rule XIII and the MOU, yet knowingly waived them, then she cannot state a claim for

violation of her due process rights. Ostlund v. Bobb 825 F.2d 1371, 1373-1374 (9th Cir.

1987), citing Correa v. Nampa School Dist., 645 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.1981) (Petitioner

waived her due process right to a hearing based on the fact that she knew of, and chose to

forego, the administrative procedures); see also Barberic, 669 F.Supp. at 991 (“a due process

right to a hearing, like any constitutional right, can be waived, and ... failure to take

advantage of available procedures can constitute such a waiver”); Zografos v. City and

County of San Francisco, 2006 WL 3699552, *9-*10 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (because deficiencies

in pre-deprivation procedures could have been cured by post-deprivation hearing, plaintiff

abandoned his claim he was deprived of pre-deprivation procedural due process when he

abandoned the post-deprivation hearing).10 

Plaintiff counters that there is no record evidence that she “was told or knew at the

time that pre-removal due process was available to her” or that she “knew her rights.” 

Plaintiff’s Opposition at 17:6-10. But although Plaintiff argues that no one ever gave her a

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copy of the rules used to remove her from her position, or informed her of her appeal rights,

she does not state she was unaware of her appeal rights. In fact, “[b]etween 1998 and 2004,”

Plaintiff “was elected and served on the executive board and later as president of the San

Mateo County Deputy Sheriff’s Association.” Ganley Decl. ¶ 1. 

Even though there is a strong presumption against finding a waiver of a constitutional

right, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), it is simply inconceivable that Plaintiff was

unaware of her right to appeal if she was dismissed or denied benefits. It is precisely for that

reason that Barberic, 669 F.Supp. at 992, a case which finds no waiver, is distinguishable –

there, there was no preexisting procedure for a hearing set forth in an employee manual or

commonly known in the department that the employee "knew or had reason to know" about. 

Here, Plaintiff, as a former president of her union, unquestionably had “reason to know” of

her appeal rights, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise. By failing to use

constitutionally adequate appeal and grievance procedures, Plaintiff waived her due process

rights. 

II. Procedural Due Process Monell Claim

Plaintiff argues that the County has a policy and practice of denying individuals in

Plaintiff’s situation constitutionally required due process. However, because Plaintiff herself

was not denied due process, she does not have standing to challenge any such the policy. 

III. County’s Liability Under Government Code § 31721 For Failure To Apply For

Plaintiff’s Disability Retirement 

Government Code § 31721 provides, in relevant part, that “... an employer may not

separate because of disability a member otherwise eligible to retire for disability but shall

apply for disability retirement of any eligible member believed to be disabled.” Plaintiff

argues that the County had a “ministerial” duty to apply for a disability retirement for her. 

This argument fails for two reasons. First, as set out in section I.B.1, supra, Plaintiff

was not “separated” within the meaning of the disability retirement provisions of County

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11 The County’s unopposed request that the Court judicially notice documents relating to

the the legislative history of § 31721 is GRANTED.

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Employees’ Retirement Act of 1937, Gov. Code § 31721, so the County’s duty to apply for a

disability retirement for her was not triggered.11 Second, California law gives the County

four months to file a disability retirement application after employee’s service ends. Gov.

Code § 31722. Since Plaintiff filed her own application barely two months after her last day

on the job, the County can scarcely be liable for failure to do it for her within the four month

limit. 

IV. Workers’ Compensation Benefits Under Cal. Labor Code § 4850

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the County was required to provide her disability

benefits under Labor Code § 4850 after it removed her from her position, but did not. 

Complaint ¶ 7. Labor Code § 4850 entitles a sheriff’s employee who becomes disabled

from work-related illness to a leave of absence without loss of salary, for the period of

disability up to a year, or until the date he or she retires on permanent disability and is

actually receiving pension payments.

 At the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that she asserts denial of these benefits as a separate

cause of action (and not as a form of damages stemming from a denial of due process). 

However, Plaintiff released all of her workers’ compensation claims after this action was

filed. Neach Decl. Exh. A (Nov. 6, 2006 stipulation settling claims for “all injuries, whether

cumulative or specific, to the body parts on page 1, while in the employ of San Mateo

County”). The fact that the case number for one of her fifteen workers’ compensation claims

was not listed on the release does not raise a triable issue of fact. The language of the release

was clear and unambiguous: she released claims for all injuries. 

//

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/20/07 THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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