Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00769/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00769-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pedro Chairez, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-0769 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus on April 19, 2011. Respondents filed a

Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)

(Doc. 17) on January 30, 2012. As of March 23, 2012, Petitioner

had not filed a reply to the answer to his petition.

I Procedural History

On February 18, 1994, a Maricopa County grand jury

returned an indictment charging Petitioner with one count of

second-degree murder and one count of attempted second-degree

murder. See Answer, Exh. A. On November 10, 1994, Petitioner

entered into a written plea agreement. The plea agreement

provided Petitioner would plead guilty to Count I of the

indictment, second-degree murder, and amended Count II of the

indictment, aggravated assault. Id., Exhs. B & C. The parties

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stipulated that the sentences imposed for these crimes would be

served concurrently and that the sentence imposed for the top

count of the indictment, second-degree murder, would not exceed

17 years imprisonment. See id., Exhs. B & C.

On January 20, 1995, the state trial court held a

sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial

court found the existence of several aggravating factors,

concluding that Petitioner “may indeed be a violent person and

a risk to re-offend.” Id., Exh. D at 31-33. Based on the

evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to the maximum aggravated term of twenty years

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for second-degree murder

and to the presumptive term of 7.5 years imprisonment pursuant

to his conviction for aggravated assault. Id., Exh. D at 33.

The court further ordered that the sentences be served

consecutively. Id., Exh. D at 34. 

Because the state trial court had rejected the plea

agreement in imposing these sentences, Petitioner withdrew his

guilty plea. Id., Exh. D at 34-35. Accordingly, the trial

court vacated the sentences and reinstated Petitioner’s notguilty plea. The case was transferred to a different trial

court judge. Id., Exh. E & F. 

Petitioner’s trial began on May 16, 1996. Id., Exh. G.

On May 28, 1996, after deliberating for less than one hour, the

jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder and guilty

of aggravated assault. Id., Exh. M at 75. 

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On July 30, 1996, the trial court sentenced Petitioner

to an aggravated term of 20 years of imprisonment pursuant to

his conviction for second-degree murder and to a consecutive,

presumptive term of 7.5 years of imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for aggravated assault. Id., Exh. N.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. On February 12, 1997, counsel for

Petitioner filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 385 U.S. 738 (1967), and Arizona v. Leon, 104 Ariz.

297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), indicating that counsel could find no

meritorious claims to raise on appeal. Id., Exh. P. On April

17, 1997, the Arizona Court of Appeals, having reviewed the

record for reversible error, affirmed Petitioner’s convictions

and sentences. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner did not seek review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. R.

On August 14, 1996, prior to the date his conviction

became final, Petitioner initiated a state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. S. On February 12, 1997, the trial court

terminated Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings

because he had not filed a petition briefing his claims for

post-conviction relief. Id. at 8; Petition at 16.

More than six years after the trial court dismissed his

Rule 32 action and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his

convictions and sentences, Petitioner initiated a second action

for state post-conviction relief on February 12, 2004, alleging

that he should be permitted to file an untimely action due to a

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misunderstanding of the law. See Answer, Exh. T. On March 4,

2004, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second Rule

32 action, concluding:

Defendant filed on February 12, 2004, a

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in this case

where the appellate mandate on direct appeal

was issued on June 4, 1997. Defendant claims

that pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, he should be allowed

to file this untimely notice because he

misunderstood the Rule 32 process and the

status of his first Rule 32 proceeding. Rule

32.1(f) allows an untimely “notice of

post-conviction relief of-right or notice of

appeal” to be filed if a defendant shows that

the failure to timely file was “without fault

on the defendant’s part.” Defendant’s notice

is not “of right” because he has had his

direct appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Defendant is not entitled to any relief under

Rule 32.1(f). See Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192

Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998).

Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner filed a third petition for state

post-conviction relief. On January 28, 2009, the action was

assigned to the original trial judge for review and ruling.

Id., Exh. U. On February 2, 2009, the trial court dismissed the

action:

 Defendant’s untimely petition claims

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

However, Defendant cannot raise this claim in

an untimely Rule 32 proceeding because an

untimely notice may only raise claims

pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or

(h). Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. In addition, defendant is

precluded from relief on these claims

pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) because these claims

either were or could have been raised on

appeal or in a prior Rule 32 proceeding.

Finally, Rule 32.1(f) allows relief when the

failure to timely file the notice was without

fault on the defendant’s part. However,

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because defendant’s Rule 32 proceeding is not

of-right, he is not entitled to Rule 32.1(f)

relief. Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131,

962 P.2d 205 (1998).

Id., Exh. V.

The trial court further stated:

Defendant also argues that he must be

resentenced based on a significant change in

law as stated in Danforth v. Minnesota, 129

S.C.t 1029 (2008), Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007), and State

v. Price, 217 Ariz. 182, 171 P.3d 1223

(2007). Defendant argues that Danforth allows

the Court to retroactively apply Cunningham

and Price. In Cunningham, the Supreme Court

applied its prior holdings in Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531

(2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000) to California’s

determinate sentencing laws, ruling the

California statutory scheme similarly infirm

because it allowed a trial judge rather than

a jury to find, by a preponderance of the

evidence, facts that exposed a defendant to

an enhanced range of sentencing beyond that

authorized by the verdict itself. In Price, the Court applied the holding in Cunningham

to determine that the trial court erred when

it increased the defendant’s sentence based

on the judge’s findings that the defendant

had committed an unrelated homicide and was

a danger to the community. 217 Ariz. at 185,

171 P.3d at 1226.

 Danforth does not change the retroactive

application of Blakely in Arizona. Blakely

does not apply retroactively to final

convictions in Arizona. State v. Towery, 204

Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (2003). Therefore,

this Court is not persuaded that Cunningham

and Price should be retroactively applied.

Defendant’s conviction was final prior to

Blakely, Cunningham and Price. Defendant has

failed to demonstrate that these cases

constitute a “significant change in law”

pursuant to Rule 32.1(g), Ariz. R. Crim. P.

Id., Exh. V. 

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On April 13, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied

review of the trial court’s third denial of post-conviction

relief. On January 4, 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court also

denied review.

On April 19, 2011, Petitioner filed his section 2254

petition. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Petitioner

alleges his trial counsel rested without presenting a defense to

the charges against Petitioner and that his appellate counsel

was unconstitutionally ineffective for defaulting the issue of

his trial counsel’s deficient performance in the state courts.

Petitioner also contends he has overcome any procedural default

of these claims.

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas action was

not filed within the one-year statute of limitations and that

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitation. 

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002).

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The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief and affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in Petitioner’s direct

appeal on April 17, 1997. Petitioner’s conviction became final

30 days later, on or about May 16, 1997, when the time for

seeking review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court

expired. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267, 128 S.

Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1

(9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner, therefore, had until May 16, 1998,

to file a federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A).

Petitioner did not file a federal habeas action prior

to May 16, 1998. Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to

statutory tolling of the statute of limitations based on the

pendency of a “properly filed” state action for post-conviction

relief.

Prior to the conclusion of his direct appeal, on August

14, 1996, Petitioner initiated a state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. On February 12, 1997, prior to the date the Arizona

Court of Appeals denied relief in Petitioner’s direct appeal,

the state trial court terminated Petitioner’s post-conviction

relief proceedings because he had not filed a petition briefing

his claims relief. Accordingly, these first Rule 32

proceedings, having terminated prior to the conclusion of

Petitioner’s direct appeal, did not affect the running of the

statute of limitations with regard to Petitioner’s federal

habeas action, which began to run on May 16, 1997.

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Additionally, Petitioner’s second action for state

post-conviction relief, filed February 12, 2004, more than five

years after the statute of limitations expired on or about May

16, 1998, could not and did not re-start the statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See, e.g.,

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent them from filing on time.

See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010);

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010). A

petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed

a “mechanical rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances,

while endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing

“upon decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.”

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v.

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Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely habeas action. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49;

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is also available

if the petitioner establishes their actual innocence of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34

(9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v.

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417

F.3d at 1034.

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A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of legal representation during the applicable filing period

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Equitable tolling may be available when a petitioner can

establish they are so mentally ill that they are incompetent.

Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Bills, 628 F.3d at 1098. However, the vicissitudes of

prison life are not “extraordinary” circumstances that make it

impossible to file a timely habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

Alleged errors by a petitioner’s appellate counsel do

not per se constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting

equitable tolling. See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1058

(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Randle v. Skolnik, 131 S. Ct.

474 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009).

It is not sufficient that counsel was negligent; only

representation that meets the extraordinary misconduct standard

can be a basis for applying equitable tolling. See Porter, 620

F.3d at 959. The United States Supreme Court concluded in

Holland that federal courts could equitably toll the statute of

limitations for filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

when a petitioner’s attorney failed to satisfy professional

standards of care. See 130 S. Ct. at 2563–64. The Supreme

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Court held that “at least sometimes, professional misconduct ...

[could] amount to egregious behavior and create an extraordinary

circumstance that warrants equitable tolling.” Id.

Additionally, a petitioner may be entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations if they are actually

innocent of the crimes of conviction and have acted with due

diligence in pursuing their claims. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934 &

n.6.

Petitioner has not filed any pleading in reply to the

answer to his petition asserting the petition is not timely or

that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations or that he is actually innocent of the crimes of

conviction. Additionally, with regard to whether Petitioner

exercised due diligence in pursuing his claims, the Court notes

Petitioner did not seek any form of post-conviction relief, in

state or federal court, from 1997 through 2004.

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Chairez’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

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appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

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and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 26th day of March, 2012.

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