Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00242/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00242-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JONATHAN LOUIS RUTLEDGE )

AIS, #242515, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-242-TMH

) [WO]

)

ROBERT NEILSEN, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Jonathan Louis Rutledge [“Rutledge”], a state inmate, on March 16, 2010. In this

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petition and amendmentsthereto,Rutledge challenges a conviction forsecond degree arson

imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama on August 4, 2005.

The trial court sentenced Rutledge to twenty years’ imprisonment on August 17, 2005.

Rutledge appealed his arson conviction, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Although the Clerk stamped the petition “received” on March 17, 2010, the law is well settled that a pro 1

se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.

266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d

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776, 780 (11 Cir. 1993). Rutledge executed the petition on March 16, 2010. Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief -

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Doc. No. 1 at 9. “Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] must assume

that [the instant petition] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Rutledge] signed it....” Washington v. United

States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11 Cir. 2001). In light of the foregoing and as conceded by the parties, the court th

considers March 16, 2010 as the date of filing.

Case 2:10-cv-00242-TMH-SRW Document 110 Filed 07/30/12 Page 1 of 27
affirmed this conviction by memorandum opinion on May 19, 2006. This opinion, in

pertinent part, reads as follows:

Rutledge contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction because, he says, the State failed to prove that he intentionally set

the fire that formed the basis for the arson charge. Rutledge challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence in his motions for a judgment of acquittal made

at the close of the State’s case and at the close of all the evidence.

The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. Rutledge

owned a large commercial building known asthe “Quick Freeze” in Clayton.

On the evening of February 23rd, Ken Killingsworth, the Fire Chief of the

Clayton Fire Department, was contacted regarding a fire at this location.

Chief Killingsworth testified that when he arrived at the scene the whole

building was involved in heavy fire and smoke; that the fire seemed

suspicious; and that he contacted the Alabama State Fire Marshall’s Office

regarding the suspicious nature of the fire.

Scott Pilgreen, an employee at the Alabama State Fire Marshall’s

Office, testified that he assisted in the investigation of the fire at the Quick

Freeze; that the building was a large concrete-block commercial structure

with a combination roof made of metal, wood, and other materials, and a

concrete slab floor; and that it contained very little combustible contents.

Pilgreen testified that the concrete slab on which the building sat had a lot of

deep, unusual spalling or breaks in the concrete that sometimes indicates the

presence of an accelerant, and that debris and soil samples were taken from

the areas where the spalling occurred. Pilgreen stated that he requested a dog

trained to detect accelerants to sniff the scene; that the dog alerted in a

couple of areas; and that debris samples were taken from those areas.

Pilgreen said that one sample tested positive for gasoline and a second

sample tested positive for a heavy petroleum product. Pilgreen testified that

he ruled out accidental or electrical causesfor the fire and concluded that the

fire was the result of arson.

Todd Register, an employee at the Alabama State Fire Marshall’s

Office, testified that he also found deep spalling in the concrete that formed

some type of ... “pour patterns” and that there was not anything in the

building that contained any kind of flammable liquid. Register stated that he

had a conversation with Rutledge during whichRutledge was very vague and

seemed to not want him at the scene. He testified that Rutledge stated that he

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did not understand why they were there, and that he said “he just didn’t want

to say anything that he felt like could incriminate him down the road.”

Register also testified that he ruled out accidental, electrical, or natural

causes for the fire.

Gerald Carroll, who is self-employed in the construction and real

estate business, testified that Rutledge asked him to list the Quick Freeze

building on the market for $60,000; that it did not sell; that he loaned

Rutledge $52,000; and that the loans were secured by several mortgages on

the Quick Freeze property. The loans were to be repaid when the building

was sold.

Jason O’Rear, a commercial insurance agent for Nesbutt and

Associates, testified that he wrote an insurance policy for the Quick Freeze

property with a building limit amount of $355,000 and with a

business/personal property amount of $20,000.

Mack Houston, a deputy sheriff with Barbour County, testified that he

saw Rutledge in front of the Quick Freeze on the morning of the day of the

fire. David Gulledge, a forestry specialist for the Alabama Forestry

Commission, testified that he lives close to the Quick Freeze; that he drove

past the Quick Freeze three or four times a day; that he had not seen activity

at the building for several months; but that on the night of the fire, he noticed

that one of the outside flood lights was on.

The evidence also indicated that Rutledge talked to people about

burning down the Quick Freeze on multiple occasions. Edward F. Caldwell,

an employee of Brown’s Heating and Cooling, gave a telephone deposition

that was read into the record. Caldwell testified that he met Rutledge when

he was sent to the Quick Freeze to pick up some restaurant equipment that

his company had purchased; that during another encounter, Rutledge asked

Caldwell to rent the Quick Freeze from him; that Rutledge proposed that

“[Caldwell] move [the pool tables and video machines] in there, and [he will]

leave the back door open, and we will burn down the building and get rid of

this stuff, and we will collect some insurance money.” Caldwell stated that

after the building burned down, Rutledge came into the bar where Caldwell

was employed, and said “you open your mouth, and I’m gonna kill your

family”. There was also evidence that Rutledge spoke with others about

burning the Quick Freeze building, including Roy Glenn, Johnny Gordon,

Priscilla Jones, and Timothy Anderson.

MartyBarbaree, a dirt mover/contractor, testified that the day after the

fire he had a conversation with Rutledge about tearing down the burned-out

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remains of the building and hauling it off.

Sharee Wells, an employee of the Alabama Department of Forensic

Sciences, testified that she examined all of the fire debris and that in one of

the samples she detected the presence of a heavy petroleum product that

could have been charcoal starter, lamp oil, or kerosene. She also stated that

she detected the presence of gasoline in one of the samples.

“‘In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all

evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all

legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution.’” Ballenger v. State,

720 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting

Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d 485, 488 (Ala. Crim. App.

1984), aff’d, 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985). “‘The test used in

determining the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction

is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Nunn v State,

697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), quoting O’Neal

v State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). “‘When

there is legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair

inference, find the defendant guilty, the trial court should

submit [the case] to the jury, and, in such a case, this court will

not disturb the trial court’s decision.’” Farrior v. State, 728

So. 2d 691, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting Ward v State,

557 So. 2d 848, 850 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). “The role of

appellate courts is not to say what the facts are. Our role ... is

to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to allow

submission of an issue for decision [by] the jury.” Ex parte

Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978).

“In reviewing a conviction based on

circumstantial evidence, this court must view

that evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution. The test to be applied is whether the

jury might reasonably find that the evidence

excluded everyreasonable hypothesis except that

of guilt; not whether such evidence excludes

every reasonable hypothesis but guilt, but

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whether a jury might reasonably so conclude.

United States v. Black, 497 F.2d 1039 (5 Cir.

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1974); United States v. McGlamory, 441 F.2d

130 (5 Cir. 1971); Clark v. United States, 293

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F.2d 445 (5 Cir. 1961).

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* * *

“‘The sanctity of the jury function demands that

this court never substitute its decision for that of

the jury. Our obligation is [to] examine the

welter of evidence to determine if there exists

any reasonable theory from which the jury might

have concluded that the defendant was guilty of

the crime charged.’ McGlamory, 441 F.2d at 135

and 136.”

Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871, 874-75 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).

Rutledge appears to challenge on appeal both the sufficiency

of the evidence and the weight of the evidence. To the extent that he

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, suffice it to say that the

evidence, albeit circumstantial, was more than sufficient to allow the

jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Rutledge intentionally

burned the Quick Freeze building. To the extent that Rutledge

challenges the weight of the evidence, we note that this issue was not

raised in a motion for a new trial and, therefore, is not properly before

this Court. In any event, all credibility determinations were for the

jury. This Court will not reweigh the evidence.

* * *

Respondent’s Exhibit C - Doc. No. 22-3 at 1-6 (citations to record omitted).

Rutledge filed an application for rehearing which the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals initially denied on June 16, 2006. Respondents’ Exhibit D - Doc. No. 22-4.

Rutledge did not timely file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme

Court and the appellate court issued a certificate of judgment on July 6, 2006.

Respondents’ Exhibit E - Doc. No. 22-5. However, on August 8, 2007, Rutledge submitted

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a motion for out of time petition for writ of certiorari. Respondents’ Exhibit F - Doc. No.

22-6. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied this motion on October 2, 2006.

Respondents’ Exhibit G - Doc. No. 22-7. On October 13, 2006, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals issued an order “that the appellant’s motion to vacate conviction and

sentence is DENIED. This case is placed on rehearing ex mero motu and the certificate

of judgment is hereby recalled. The application for rehearing is hereby overruled.”

Respondents’ Exhibit H - Doc. No. 22-8. Rutledge did not seek certiorari from this order

and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appealsissued the certificate of judgment constituting

finality of judgment on November 6, 2006. Respondents’ Exhibit I - Doc. No. 22-9.

 Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed an answer, supplemental

answers and supporting evidentiarymaterialsin which theyargue the instantfederal habeas

petition, as amended, is barred by the one-year period of limitation applicable to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The respondents contend that because

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Rutledge’s second degree arson conviction became final after the effective date of the

statute of limitations Rutledge must have filed his § 2254 petition within a year of this

conviction becoming final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed state postconviction action related to the conviction remained pending in the state courts. The

respondents concede that Rutledge filed a state post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule

Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”). 2

This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

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32, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, on February 8, 2007 which tolled the limitation

period. However, the respondents maintain that even allowing tolling of the federal

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limitation period during the pendency of this Rule 32 petition the limitation period expired

prior to Rutledge filing this federal habeas petition. Respondents’ Answer - Doc. No. 22

at 19-21; Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11 Cir. 2003) (statutory tolling allowed

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only for the time during which a properly filed state post-conviction action is pending).

The respondents further argue and well settled federal law directs that the writ to vacate

conviction filed in the Circuit Court of Barbour County on February 5, 2010, a writ the

parties agree state law requires be treated as a Rule 32 petition, see Rule 32.4, Alabama

Rules of Criminal Procedure, had no affect on the running of the limitation period as

Rutledge failed to file this writ/petition within the one-year period of limitation prescribed

by Rule 32.2(c), Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Respondents’ July 12, 2010

Response - Doc. No. 56 at 3-4 (Rutledge’s second degree arson “conviction became final

The Rule 32 petition establishes that Rutledge executed the petition on February 8, 2007, and this date is 3

therefore the earliest date on which Rutledge could have submitted the petition to prison officials for mailing. 

Respondents’ Initial Exhibit O - Doc. No. 26-1 at 37. As previously noted, a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed

in federal cases the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-272. “Alabama

courts have [adopted the mailbox rule and] held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have

‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to

prison officials for mailing.” Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002); Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 373, 375

(Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (“[A] pro se incarcerated petitioner ‘files’ a Rule 32 petition when he hands the petition over

to prison authorities for mailing.”). Consequently, the prison mailbox rule applies to pro se Rule 32 petitions filed

in the state courts of Alabama and February 8, 2007 is therefore the appropriate date of filing for Rutledge’s initial

Rule 32 petition. In addition, the court applies the mailbox rule to the subsequent post-conviction action filed by

Rutledge on February 5, 2010, i.e. writ to vacate conviction, challenging his arson conviction. Respondents’ Second

Exhibit O - Doc. No. 87-1 at 1-4. 

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on November 6, 2006, when the Court of Criminal Appeals reissued the Certificate of

Judgment. This ‘writ’ filed by Rutledge on February [5], 2010, was filed more than oneyear after the date his conviction became final, and was untimely ... and, therefore, not

properly filed for purposes of statutory tolling of the federal limitation period under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).”); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814

(2005) (“For purposes of determining what are ‘filing’ conditions, there is an obvious

distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s

ability to consider that petition, and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars at issue

in Artuz [v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000)], which go to the

ability to obtain relief.... [I]t must be the case that a petition that cannot even be initiated

or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not ‘properly filed.’... For these

reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions. [A state

post-conviction action which is] untimely, ... was not ‘properly filed,’ and [petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling of the limitation period] under § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. Siebert,

552 U.S. 3, 128 S.Ct. 7, 4 (2007) (“When a postconviction petition [or equivalent writ] is

untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of [statutory tolling

of the limitation period under] § 2244(d)(2).”); Sweet v. Secretary, Department of

Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11 Cir. 2006) (An untimely collateral motion “was

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not ‘properly filed’ under § 2244(d), and it could not toll the federal one-year period of

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limitation.”). Hence, the respondents maintain Rutledge failed to file the instant § 2254

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petition prior to expiration of the one-year period of limitation.

Based on the foregoing, the court entered orders advising Rutledge that he failed to

file his federal habeas petition within the one-year limitation period established by 28

U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1) and provided Rutledge opportunities to show cause why his habeas

petition should not be barred from review by this court as untimely filed. Order of May 18,

2010 - Doc. No. 27; Order of July 13, 2010 - Doc. No. 59. In his numerous responses to

these orders, Rutledge maintainsthat he is actually innocent of arson because he presented

an alibi defense indicating he was not present at the scene of the fire directly preceding the

time witnesses initially observed the fire nor at the time authorities first received calls

reporting the fire. Rutledge argues that purported “911 tapes of the calls that reported the

fire ... could have and would have supported the alibi defense [presented at trial through

testimony of Rutledge, Will Grubbs and Rita Wilson] that when the fire was called in or

reported to 911 Rutledge was, in fact, at home with 2 witnesses and therefore could not

have started or maintained any fire.” Respondents’ Exhibit J (Rule 32 Brief on Appeal) -

Doc. No. 22-10 at 9, adopted by petitioner as amendment to argument in support of actual

innocence argument (Doc. No. 40); Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 43 (alleged 911 tapes

Even if the court construed the writ to vacate as a motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 24.2 of the

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Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the writ remains untimely and not properly filed as Rutledge did not file the

writ within thirty days after pronouncement ofsentence. Rule 24.2(b), Alabama Rules ofCriminal Procedure (motion

in arrest of judgment must “be filed within thirty (30) days after sentence is pronounced.”). 

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would have supported testimony from alibi witnesses that Rutledge was home with them

at the time the fire was reported). In addition, Rutledge asserts that the State failed to

presentsufficient evidence showing that he “damaged a building by starting or maintaining

a fire ... [and] failed to prove ... that there was intent to commit arson by the Petitioner....”

Petitioner’s Response (Objection) - Doc. No. 98 at 1. Rutledge likewise alleges that a

photograph of an intact container located in the area of the fire, a container he assertsisthe

gas can for his lawn mower, demonstrates a possible innocuous source for the presence of

the gasoline accelerant and seems to impeach the testimony from the fire marshal that he

did not find a gas can within the remains of the building upon his initial inspection of the

fire. Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 42 at 1.

In response to the respondent’s argument that his petition is barred by the one-year

period of limitation, Rutledge contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitation period as he had no knowledge of the federal period of limitation until issuance

of the order of procedure in this case and the Camden Work Release Facility, his place of

incarceration from June of 2007 until April 17, 2010, did not maintain a written copy of

the AEDPA or federal rules. Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 49 at 1. Rutledge also

maintains that he should be allowed equitable tolling during his incarceration at the

Camden Work Release Facility asthisfacility did not have a law library and officialsfailed

to download the necessary program onto the computer system to create an electronic law

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library for use by prisoners. Id. at 3. Finally, Rutledge asserts that he should be allowed

equitable tolling from February 22, 2010, until March 16, 2010, because during this period

of time he submitted inmate request slips seeking information from correctional officials

regarding the balance of hisinmate account, the weight of his habeas documents and notary

service to which he received no responses. Petitioner’s Response (Objection) - Doc. No

95 at 1-2.

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Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court record

and applicable federal law, the court determines that no evidentiary hearing is required,

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and

concludes that the present habeas petition is due to be denied as Rutledge failed to file the

petition within the applicable one-year period of limitation.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence - Independent Claim

To the extent that Rutledge argues he is entitled to federal habeas relief because he

is actually innocent of second degree arson, the law is well settled “that ‘[c]laims of actual

innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for

The respondents deny Rutledge submitted the request slips to correctional officials as these documents are 5

not contained in his prison file. Respondents’ Supplemental Response - Doc. No. 102-1 and Doc. No. 102-2 (Exhibits

P and Q); Respondents’ Supplemental Response - Doc. No. 108-1 (Exhibit R). Because Rutledge did not make this

particular argument regarding equitable tolling in his numerous responses seeking tolling of the limitation period but,

instead, raised this argument in an Objection to a previous Recommendation that this petition be denied as time

barred, the court finds the credibility of this assertion tenuous at best. Nevertheless, for purposes of this

Recommendation, the court assumes Rutledge submitted the request slips to correctional officials. 

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federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the

underlying state criminal proceeding.’ Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct.

853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). It is not our role to make an independent determination

of a petitioner’s guilt or innocence based on evidence [presented at trial or] that has

emerged since the trial. ‘This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts

sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution--not to

correct errors of fact.’ Id.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11 Cir. 2002);

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Jordan v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11 Cir. 2007) (federal

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habeasrelief not available forfree-standing, non-capital claims of actual innocence). Thus,

Rutledge is entitled to no relief from this court with respect to any independent claim of

actual innocence.

B. Actual Innocence - Gateway to Excuse Time Bar

Throughout his pleadings, Rutledge maintains that he is innocent of second degree

arson and his innocence serves as a “gateway” through which this court may consider his

claims that are otherwise barred by the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. In support

of this claim, Rutledge relies on the alibi defense set forth at trial – i.e., that he could not

have started or maintained the fire as he was with friends during the relevant period of

time. Rutledge further argues that a photograph showing an intact container located with

some debris in the area of the fire, which he identifies as the gas can for his lawn mower,

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provides evidence of a potential innocuous source for the gasoline accelerant found at the

scene and contradicts testimony of the fire marshal that the marshal did not see a gas can

within the frame of the building when he initially inspected the scene. In addition,

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Rutledge asserts that he is innocent because the evidence presented by the State failed to

prove a prima facie case of arson asit not clearly establish that he started or maintained the

fire and failed to demonstrate his intent to commit arson.

This court must determine whether Rutledge has made a showing of actual

innocence before addressing whether the claims for federal habeas relief are barred by the

statute oflimitations. Wyzykowski v. Department ofCorrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11

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Cir. 2000). “To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that ...

‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable [trier of fact] would have convicted him.’ 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding

and permits review only in the ‘“extraordinary’” case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538,

126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). Thus, “[i]n the usual case the presumed guilt of a prisoner

convicted in state court counsels against federal review of [untimely] claims.” Id. at 537.

“It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not

mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-

It is clear to the court that if the gasoline can identified by Rutledge had been in the fire at the point where 6

the gasoline accelerant was detected, the can would not have been intact after the fire. 

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2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-624; Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d

147, 162 (2 Cir. 2004) (“As Schlup makes clear, the issue before [a federal district] court

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is not legal innocence but factual innocence.”). Schlup observes that “a substantial claim

that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely

rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence -- whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence -- that was not

presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” 513 U.S. at 324; Rozzelle v.

Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 672 F.3d 1000, 1011 (11 Cir. 2012) (“[T]he

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alleged exception for AEDPA untimeliness would require the petitioner (1) to present‘new

reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial,’ Arthur [v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1245

(11 Cir.), modified, 459 F.3d 1310 (2006)] (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct.

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at 865), and (2) to show ‘that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ in light of the new evidence. Johnson

[v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 513 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11 Cir. 2008)] (quoting Schlup,

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513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S.Ct.

2064, 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).”).

Rutledge’s alleged alibi isthe same argument which Rutledge presented at trial and

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which the jury rejected. It is likewise clear that the alleged 911 tapes, if available, would

not prove Rutledge’s actual innocence of arson; rather, the tapes, at best, could only

establish the time at which authoritiesreceived notice of the fire, when Rutledge maintains

that he was at home with friends. In addition, the presence of a gas can belonging to

Rutledge at the scene of the fire failsto show his actual innocence of arson. Moreover, the

allegations regarding the State’s failure to prove essential elements of the offense merely

go to the sufficiency of and/or the weight afforded the evidence presented, issues decided

adversely to Rutledge by the jury, and clearly fail to establish Rutledge’s actual innocence

of second degree arson. Consequently, these assertions do not constitute “new reliable

evidence” of Rutledge’s actual innocence and Rutledge fails to demonstrate any such

evidence exists to establish his actual innocence so as to meet the standard set forth by

Schlup. The instant petition for federal habeas corpus relief is therefore properly analyzed

under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

C. The Federal Period of Limitation

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 became effective on

April 24, 1996 and amended the habeas corpus statute to include a one-year period of

limitation on petitionsfiled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thislimitation period is codified

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

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court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newlyrecognized bythe Supreme Court andmade retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

The statute clearly directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the time for

seeking direct review, whichever is later. Where a petitioner preserves his right to file a

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the statute of limitations

is tolled during the ninety-day period in which such action may be undertaken. Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the

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conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the

case or the time for seeking review has expired.”). Accordingly, a state court judgment of

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conviction becomesfinal under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the Supreme Court denies certiorari

or the time to apply for certiorari expires. Id.

Pursuant to the verdict of a duly impaneled jury, the Circuit Court of Barbour

County, Alabama convicted Rutledge of second degree arson on August 4, 2005. The trial

court thereafter imposed sentence for this conviction. Rutledge filed a direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. On May 19, 2006, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appealsissued

a memorandum opinion affirming Rutledge’s conviction for second degree arson.

Respondents’ Exhibit C - Doc. No. 22-3. Rutledge sought rehearing and the appellate court

entered the relevant order overruling his application for rehearing on October 13, 2006.

Respondents’ Exhibit H- Doc. No. 22-8. Rutledge failed to file a petition for writ of

certiorari after issuance of this order and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered

the certificate of judgment on November 6, 2006. Respondents’ Exhibit I - Doc. No. 22-9.

Since Rutledge failed to pursue the direct appeal process fully, he relinquished his

right to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Coates v. Byrd,

211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129 (2001); see

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also Rule 13.1, Rules of the United States Supreme Court (a petition for writ of certiorari

to the United States Supreme Court may only be filed to review a judgment or order

entered by a state court of last resort and must be filed within ninety (90) days of the action

undertaken by the aforementioned state court). Thus, Rutledge’s conviction for second

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degree arson became final on November 6, 2006, upon entry of the certificate of judgment,

and the one-year period of limitation contained in section 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run on

November 7, 2006.

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1. Statutory Tolling. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) providesthat “[t]he time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any

period of limitation under this section.” The court finds that the limitation period ran for

93 days after Rutledge’s arson conviction became final until the filing of a Rule 32 petition

in the Circuit Court of Barbour County on February 8, 2007. Respondents’ Initial Exhibit

O - Doc. No. 26-1 at 38. This state post-conviction petition remained pending in the state

courts until issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on June 3, 2009. Respondents' Exhibit N - Court Doc. No. 22-14. At this time,

Rutledge had 272 daysremaining within which to timely file a federal habeas petition. The

record demonstratesthat on February 5, 2010 Rutledge filed a second state post-conviction

action challenging his arson conviction in the Circuit Court of Barbour County.

Respondents’ Second Exhibit O - Court Doc. No. 87-1 at 1-4. However, as previously

determined, infra at 7-9, the aforementioned second post-conviction challenge to the arson

conviction did not toll the one-year period of limitation relevant to the filing of a federal

In computing the federal period of limitation, “exclude the day of the event that triggersthe period[.]” Rule

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6(a)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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habeas petition, as Rutledge filed this state action after expiration of the limitation period

mandated by state law. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417, 125 S.Ct. at 1814; Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1317.

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In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that the tolling provision set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) is unavailing with respect to the second state post-conviction

petition filed by Rutledge. Thus, the federal limitation period began to run again on June

4, 2009, and, absent equitable tolling, the time allowed Rutledge for filing a federal habeas

petition expired on March 2, 2010.

2. Equitable Tolling. Case law directs the limitation period “may be equitably

tolled” on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas statute “when a movant

untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and

unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir.

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1999); see also Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11 Cir. 2000); Knight v. Schofield,

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292 F.3d 709, 711 (11 Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases,

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as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States

District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9 Cir.1997). Equitable tolling applies only in truly

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extraordinary circumstances. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-1040 (11 Cir.

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2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). “The

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Contrary to Rutledge’s argument, the one-year period of limitation set forth in Rule 32.2(c) does not allow

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for tolling of this period during the pendency of a Rule 32 petition. 

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burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the

petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections,

259 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314 (11 Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965,

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152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002). The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed the

AEDPA’s one-year period of limitation “is subject to equitable tolling” but only when a

petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v.

Florida, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (quoting Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)).

To the extent Rutledge seeks equitable tolling due to (i) hislimited legal knowledge

and resulting lack of notice of the federal limitation period, (ii) lack of effective assistance

from inmate law clerks, (iii) purported denial of access to legal materials at the Camden

Work Release Facility, and (iv) alleged denials of requests for financial information and

notary service from February 22, 2010, until March 16, 2010, he is entitled to no relief

from this court as none of these arguments warrants equitable tolling of the one-year period

of limitation.

The law is well settled that an inmate’s lack of legal knowledge, his failure to

understand legal principles and/or the inability to recognize potential claims for relief at

an earlier juncture do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant

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equitable tolling of the limitation period. United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4 Cir.

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2004) (pro se status and ignorance of the law do not justify equitable tolling); Kreutzer v.

Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122 S.Ct. 145, 151

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L.Ed.2d 97 (2001) (lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, even in a case involving a

pro se inmate, does not warrant equitable tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220

(10 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1195, 149 L.Ed.2d 110 (2001)

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(petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law are insufficient to support equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5 Cir. 1999),

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cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 622, 148 L.Ed.2d 532 (2000) (ignorance of the law

and pro se status do not constitute “rare and exceptional” circumstances justifying

equitable tolling); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

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840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 63 (2000) (petitioner’s pro se status throughout majority

of limitation period does not merit equitable tolling); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392

(5 Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d 389 (1999)

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(unfamiliarity with the legal process during the applicable filing period did not merit

equitable tolling); Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d 967, 969 (11 Cir.

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1997) (ignorance of the law “is not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling.”).

Moreover, this court cannot permit equitable tolling based on Rutledge’s alleged lack of

knowledge of the federal limitation period, as he had ample opportunity to gain this

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knowledge prior to his incarceration since the AEDPA came into effect several years

before his arson conviction. In addition, Rutledge had ample opportunity to accessthe law

libraries at other correctional facilities prior to his transfer to the work release facility.

To the extent that Rutledge asserts lack of knowledgeable inmate assistance as a

basis for equitable tolling, this assertion fails to justify such tolling. A petitioner has no

right to legal assistance in a habeas action and, thus, neither the perceived need to rely nor

actualreliance on the assistance of an inmate clerk establishes extraordinary circumstances

necessary to excuse the untimely filing of a petition. See Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d

1266, 1267 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 834 (1990) (poor advice from inmate law

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clerks during collateral proceedings will not establish petitioner’s claim of cause for a

procedural default as there is no right to legal counsel in such proceedings); Marsh, 223

F.3d at 1220 (“The fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting [pleadings] does

not relieve [petitioner] from the personal responsibility of complying with the law.”). In

addition, the voluminous pleadings and documents filed by Rutledge demonstrate he is

more than capable of presenting the relevant facts, necessary elements and requisite

arguments regarding his claims to this court.

With respect to Rutledge’s claim challenging his access to legal materials while

confined at the Camden Work Release Facility, neither an allegedly inadequate prison law

library nor limited access thereto, standing alone, establishes extraordinary circumstances

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warranting equitable tolling of the limitation period. Felder, 204 F.3d at 171; Marsh, 223

F.3d at 1220. Furthermore, this argument provides no basis for equitable tolling as the

record demonstrates that during his confinement at the Camden Work Release Facility

Rutledge, while acting pro se, filed numerous pleadings in his Rule 32 proceedings which

contained lengthy and detailed arguments in support of his claims for relief. Rutledge

vigorously litigated his Rule 32 claims in both the trial court and the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals while confined at the Camden Work Release Facility. Rutledge also

prepared and filed this habeas petition while confined at this facility. Thus, this assertion

of equitable tolling is refuted by the pro se actions filed by Rutledge.

Rutledge next maintains he is entitled to equitable tolling while seeking financial

information and notary service from correctional officials from February 22, 2010, until

March 16, 2010. Rutlege contends that the filing of these requests demonstrates his

exercise of diligence and the absence of responses constitutes an extraordinary

circumstance denying him the opportunity to file a federal habeas petition during this 3-

week time period. Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, these allegations

do not warrant equitable tolling. It is undisputed that Rutledge, as early as February 5,

2010, had in his possession both an inmate account statement from December of 2009 and

a form affidavit of substantial hardship, documents which could have been used in filing

a federal habeas action. Respondents’ Second Exhibit O - Court Doc. No. 87-1 at 29-31.

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Despite accessto these documents, Rutledge did not file a federal habeas petition with this

court at that time; instead, Rutledge chose to file a second post-conviction action in the

Circuit Court of Barbour County, Alabama. Id. at 1-4. In addition, the record demonstrates

that Rutledge filed his federal habeas petition absent notarization with his own unilateral

declaration under penalty of perjury, Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief - Doc. No. 1 at 9,

and this court accepted the petition for filing without subscription by a notary in

accordance with well established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (“Whenever ... any

matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the

sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the

person making the same ..., such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported,

evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or

statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of

perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form ... If executed within the United

States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or

state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).

(Signature)’.”). It is also clear that Rutledge could have initiated a federal habeas action

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Although Rutledge asserts that his “habeas petition ... was sign[ed] by [him] in front of a D.O.C. notary ...

9

on March 16, 2010,” Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 107 at 2, this assertion is refuted by the record as the petition

does not contain the signature, seal or statement of a notary that execution of the petition was “sworn to a and

subscribed” before a notary. Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief - Doc. No. 1 at 9. A thorough review of the petition

and memorandum filed therewith likewise contain no evidence of notarization. Id. at 1-10; Memorandum in Support

of Petition - Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2. 

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by filing only his habeas petition and in forma pauperis application, a total of sixteen

pages, thereby negating the necessity of additional postage beyond that routinely provided

by prison officials for legal mail. The purported actions of Rutledge in submitting request

forms from February 22, 2010, until March 16, 2010, fail to establish diligence during the

several months prior to his initial request, nor do his actions demonstrate extraordinary

circumstances which prevented the filing of a federal habeas action prior to expiration of

the one-year period of limitation.

The record is devoid of any evidence indicating an “extraordinary circumstance”

which “prevented” Rutledge from filing a timely habeas action in this court. Instead, based

on the similarity of the claims raised herein and those presented in the initial Rule 32

petition – an action which concluded with 272 days of the federal limitation period

remaining – and the filing of a second state post-conviction action – an action filed over

three weeks prior to expiration of the federal period of limitation which demonstrated

Rutledge’s ability to file a petition challenging his arson conviction at that time – it is clear

thatRutledge, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed hisfederal habeas petition

prior to expiration of the one-year period of limitation.

3. Expiration of the Limitation Period. Under the circumstances of this case, the

one-year period of limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expired on March 2,

2010. Rutledge filed the instant petition for federal habeas relief on March 16, 2010.

Rutledge hasfailed to demonstrate that thisfederal habeas petition should not be dismissed

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as untimely filed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas relief filed by Jonathan Louis Rutledge be denied as it

was not filed within the one-year period of limitation mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before August 13, 2012, the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

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en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 30 day of July, 2012.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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