Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03570/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03570-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Theresa M. Cordaro

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-03570-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

Substituted Plaintiff Jessica Hundley is the surviving child and entitled beneficiary 

of claimant Theresa Cordaro (Cordaro), who died on October 18, 2019. (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff 

challenges the denial of Cordaro’s Application for Disability Insurance Benefits by the 

Social Security Administration under the Social Security Act (the Act). Plaintiff filed a 

Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court 

now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 14, Pl. Br.), Defendant Social Security 

Administration Commissioner’s Response Brief (Doc. 15, Def. Br.), and Plaintiff’s Reply 

(Doc. 16, Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 11, 

R.) and now reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision (R. at 129–51).

I. BACKGROUND

Cordaro filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on September 29, 

2014 for a period of disability beginning on March 24, 2014. (R. at 132.) Her claim was 

denied initially on April 2, 2015, and upon reconsideration on July 2, 2015. (R. at 132.) 

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Cordaro appeared before the ALJ on March 30, 2017 for a hearing regarding her claim. (R. 

at 132.) On September 20, 2017, the ALJ denied Cordaro’s claim, and on August 30, 2018, 

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 

117–23, 129–51.)

The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and finds it unnecessary 

to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in 

addressing the issues raised by the parties. Upon considering the medical records and 

opinions, the ALJ evaluated Cordaro’s disability based on the following severe 

impairments: (1) lumbar spine degenerative disc disease/spondylosis with sciatica, (2) 

post-laminectomy syndrome, (3) chronic pain syndrome, and (4) obesity. (R. at 135.) The 

ALJ also found that Cordaro had the following medically determinable mental 

impairments: (1) bipolar disorder, in partial remission, (2) generalized anxiety disorder, (3) 

mood disorder, not otherwise specified, (4) panic disorder without agoraphobia, (5) 

somatic symptom disorder, and (6) borderline personality disorder. (R. at 135.) However, 

the ALJ also found that they were not severe because “they do not cause more than minimal 

limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities.” (R. at 135.) 

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 143.) He

determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 138.) Additionally, he determined that Cordaro has the 

residual functional capacity (RFC) to “perform light work . . . except claimant could 

frequently climb ramps, stairs and could frequently balance, stoop, kneel and crouch. 

Claimant could occasionally climb ladders, rope and scaffolds and could occasionally 

crawl.” (R. at 139.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Cordaro could perform her past work 

as a preschool teacher. (R. at 142.)

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 

those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 

determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based 

on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is 

relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion 

considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports 

a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe”

medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At 

step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 

found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines 

whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At the fifth and final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id.

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises several arguments for the Court’s consideration. Plaintiff argues the 

ALJ erred by: (1) finding Cordaro’s mental impairments non-severe; (2) rejecting the 

opinions of the examining physicians, Dr. Kenneth Littlefield and Dr. Cecilia Drake; (3) 

rejecting Cordaro’s symptom testimony; (4) rejecting the testimony of three lay witnesses; 

and (5) providing an incomplete hypothetical question to the vocational expert at Cordaro’s 

hearing. The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s first three arguments; her remaining arguments 

are superfluous.1

A. The ALJ errantly analyzed Cordaro’s mental impairments because he 

incorrectly rejected the examining physicians’ opinions and Cordaro’s 

testimony. 

Cordaro had several mental impairments that were documented in her medical 

records. (R. at 135.) Her medical records reflect severe symptoms related to her mental 

impairments, including panic attacks, self-harm, insomnia, mood swings, and anger. (R. at 

738–879.) Cordaro testified regarding her mental limitations, including episodes of selfharm, crying spells, and mania. (R. at 191.) Cordaro’s mother, father, and friend stated that 

Cordaro had issues dealing with stress, mania, mood swings, panic attacks, and anxiety. 

(R. at 466, 468, 521, 525, 528.) 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis of these impairments was error. (Pl. Br. at 

1.) The ALJ determined that Cordaro’s mental impairments were nonsevere and did not 

include any mental limitations in her RFC. (R. at 138–39.) The ALJ based these 

conclusions on his analysis of Cordaro’s activities and the medical evidence. Since these 

underlying analyses were incorrect, the ALJ’s ultimate conclusions regarding Cordaro’s 

mental impairments were incorrect. 

1 The ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of three lay witnesses for the same 

reasons he rejected Cordaro’s testimony. (R. at 142.) Thus the Court’s analysis of the ALJ’s 

treatment of Cordaro’s testimony applies to the lay witness opinions. Further, Plaintiff’s 

final argument is inessential because it impliedly flows from the ALJ’s other errors. 

Because the ALJ improperly rejected certain evidence, he necessarily miscalculated 

Cordaro’s RFC and, consequently, presented an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational 

expert. 

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1. The ALJ incorrectly determined that Cordaro’s mental 

impairments were nonsevere, but this determination was 

harmless error. 

An ALJ can find that an impairment or combination of impairments is nonsevere 

only if it has “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). Only one severe impairment is required for a 

claimant to survive the step-two severe impairment analysis. Id. The ALJ must consider all 

a claimant’s medically determinable impairments when calculating her RFC, regardless of 

whether they are severe. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Consequently, an ALJ’s errant failure 

to treat an impairment as severe is typically harmless if the claimant survives step-two and 

the ALJ considers all the severe impairments, severe or otherwise. See Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005).

Because the ALJ concluded that Cordaro had some severe impairments and survived 

step-two, his failure to find that her mental impairments were severe is harmless error.

Regardless of whether the ALJ characterized Cordaro’s mental impairments as severe, he 

still was required to account for all of Cordaro’s limitations in formulating her RFC. 

2. The ALJ errantly rejected the opinions of Cordaro’s examining 

physicians regarding her mental limitations. 

Examining physician Dr. Littlefield completed a psychological report and medical 

source statement on Cordaro’s behalf. (R. at 635–40.) Dr. Littlefield diagnosed Cordaro 

with bipolar disorder I, generalized anxiety disorder, somatic symptom disorder, and 

borderline personality disorder. (R. at 638.) He described Plaintiff’s history of mental 

impairments and psychological treatment, including her history of suicidal threats and selfmutilation. (R. at 639.) Furthermore, he opined that Cordaro would be unable to sustain 

normal and appropriate interactions with others in a workplace. (R. at 640.) 

Dr. Drake also evaluated Cordaro and completed a mental RFC evaluation on her 

behalf. (R. at. 952.) She diagnosed Cordaro with bipolar disorder, anxiety, and borderline 

personality disorder. (R. at 957.) Further, she opined that Cordaro would have moderate to 

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moderately-severe limitations in (1) sustaining concentration and persistence, (2) social 

interaction, and (3) adaptation. (R. at 959–60.) These limitations corresponded to Cordaro 

being off task for over ten percent of each workday. (R. at 959.) 

An examining physician’s opinion is generally entitled to greater weight than the 

opinion of a nonexamining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). 

An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion 

of an examining physician. Id. Even if the opinion of an examining physician is contradicted 

by the opinion of another doctor, the examining physician’s opinion can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Andrews v. Shalala, 

53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995).

The ALJ rejected both examining physicians’ opinions for three reasons: (1) the 

opinions were contradicted by the medical evidence, (2) the opinions were inconsistent 

with Cordaro’s daily activities, and (3) the opinions were based on one-time evaluations. 

(R. at 138.) None of these reasons were sufficient. 

First, the medical evidence does not contradict the examining physicians’ opinions. 

The ALJ cited to hundreds of medical records to support his conclusion that “the entirety 

of the record documents mental status examinations that showed normal affect and normal 

mood.” (R. at 135.) Most of these records are from Cordaro’s visits to pain management 

and physical therapy providers, which were primarily concerned with treating her physical 

impairments. Moreover, even some of the records the ALJ cited belie his conclusion. For 

example, an April 2015 record in which Cordaro was described as stable on her medication 

also included reports of “highs and lows” and “panic attacks.” (R. at 649–51.) Overall, the 

record does not contradict the examining physicians’ conclusions; instead, it 

overwhelmingly supports their conclusions. 

Second, the examining physicians’ opinions were not inconsistent with Cordaro’s 

daily activities. The ALJ found that Cordaro’s reports that she did “nothing” during the day 

contradicted the physicians’ opinions because she, in fact, did more than “nothing.” 

(R. 138.) This reasoning is insufficient. Cordaro’s testimony acknowledged that she did 

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not literally do “nothing”. (R. at 173–95.) Instead, she acknowledged that her activities 

were limited because of her impairments—both physical and mental. (R. at 186, 192.)

Dr. Drake and Dr. Littlefield both opined that Cordaro was functionally limited, though 

not completely incapacitated, because of her mental and physical impairments. Thus, 

neither opinion is contradicted by Cordaro’s activities.

Finally, the ALJ could not reject the opinions simply because they were based on a 

single examination. Examining physician opinions are generally entitled to greater weight 

than non-examining physician opinions precisely because the opportunity for examination, 

even a single examination, tends to lend an opinion increased probative value. Thus, the 

opinions are worthy of consideration because they were based on a single examination of 

Cordaro. Therefore, every reason the ALJ gave for rejecting the examining physicians’ 

opinions was insufficient. 

3. The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Cordaro’s symptom testimony 

were unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Cordaro testified regarding her various physical and mental impairments. She 

testified to widespread functional limitations that these impairments caused her, and that 

she tried to maintain some normal daily activities but that her physical impairments limited 

her ability to perform or sustain many activities. She also testified about her mental 

limitations including instances of self-harm, crying spells, and mania. (R. at 190–91.) 

During the hearing she stood and walked back and forth because of back pain. (R. at 173, 

186.) 

The ALJ rejected Cordaro’s testimony for two reasons.2(R. at 140.) First, he found 

that her testimony was contradicted by her “significant activity level.” (R. at 140.) These 

2 The ALJ also rejected Cordaro’s testimony because it was not fully corroborated 

by the objective medical evidence. (R. at 140.) This reason alone is insufficient to reject a 

claimant’s testimony. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (“In evaluating the credibility of pain 

testimony after a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a 

lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.”). Because the 

Court rejects the ALJ’s other reasons, the lack of objective support stands alone, and is

therefore insufficient. 

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activities included parenting her children, attending school meetings, occasionally driving, 

hosting a birthday party, doing chores, using electronic devices, going to Disneyland, and 

walking three times per week. (R. at 140.) Second, the ALJ found that Cordaro’s treatment

of her impairments was conservative and consisted of only pain medication and injection 

therapy. (R. at 141.) 

An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 

pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the ALJ 

evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an impairment 

“which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged.” 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

If the claimant presents such evidence then “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony 

about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15 (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). This is the 

most demanding standard in Social Security cases. Id. at 1015.

The ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Cordaro’s testimony—that her daily activities 

were inconsistent with her testimony—is unsupported by substantial evidence. The 

activities the ALJ cited as being inconsistent with Cordaro’s testimony were, in fact, 

congruent because Cordaro qualified all of the activities as being limited by her 

impairments. For example, the ALJ cited Cordaro’s report that she walked for exercise for 

three times per week. (R. at 140.) In fact, Cordaro testified that she had given up on exercise 

because it caused her so much pain. (R. at 189.) Similarly, the ALJ noted that Cordaro went 

on a family vacation to Disneyland. (R. at 140.) But Cordaro’s actual testimony revealed 

that the trip was difficult, she took extra pain medication, and she left the park early because 

of pain. (R. at 187.) The ALJ could not reject Cordaro’s testimony because of her daily

activities since they were not actually inconsistent with her testimony and did not 

demonstrate an ability to sustain employment. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th 

Cir. 1989). 

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Similarly, the ALJ’s finding that Cordaro’s medical treatment was conservative is 

not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff correctly notes that epidural steroid 

injections and medial branch block treatments for her physical impairments are not 

properly considered conservative. (R. at 18.) See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 n.20. 

Furthermore, the ALJ offered no evidence that Cordaro’s treatment of her mental 

impairments was conservative. Accordingly, the ALJ erred in rejecting her testimony. 

B. The appropriate remedy is to remand Plaintiff’s case for computation 

and payment of benefits. 

The credit-as-true rule, if applied here, would result in a remand of Plaintiff’s case 

for a calculation and payment of benefits. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. It applies if each 

part of a three-part test is satisfied. Id. First, the record must have been fully developed and 

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Id. Next, the ALJ must 

have failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting claimant’s testimony or medical 

opinions. Id. Finally, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, then the 

ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled. Id. The credit-as-true rule allows for 

some flexibility and balances efficiency and fairness with the requirement that a claimant 

actually be disabled in order to receive benefits. Id. at 1021. Thus, even if all the rule’s 

requirements are met, the Court may still decline to apply the rule if there is “serious doubt” 

that the claimant is, in fact, disabled. Id.

All of the elements of the credit-as-true rule are met. First, the record is fully 

developed and remand for additional proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Second, 

the ALJ made several errors in evaluating Cordaro’s claim. The ALJ improperly rejected 

the examining physicians’ opinions and improperly discredited Cordaro’s testimony. 

Consequently, the ALJ did not adequately incorporate Cordaro’s mental limitations into 

her RFC. Finally, if the improperly rejected opinions and testimony were credited as true, 

the ALJ would be required to find Cordaro was disabled. Dr. Littlefield and Dr. Drake 

opined to functional limitations that the vocational expert testified would be workpreclusive. (R. at 199, 635–39, 952–62.) Plaintiff also testified regarding limitations that 

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are work-preclusive. (R. at 194.) If these limitations are credited as true, then Cordaro was 

disabled. 

Finally, there is not serious doubt that Cordaro was disabled. The errors the ALJ 

made in analyzing her mental impairments were not ancillary to her disability claim. The 

record demonstrates that her mental impairments and limitations were well-documented 

and supported, and their validity is not seriously undermined by any of the evidence. Thus 

the Court remands this case for calculation and payment of benefits. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED reversing the September 15, 2017 decision of 

the Administrative Law Judge (R. at 129–51). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this case to the Social Security 

Administration for a calculation of benefits and payment of benefits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case.

Dated this 4th day of March, 2020.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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