Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05263/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05263-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Alfredo Rivera,

Petitioner,

v.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-5263-PHX-ROS (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Jose Alfredo Rivera (“Petitioner”), who is confined in the Arizona State 

Prison in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1).1

The Petition was filed and docketed by the Clerk of Court on September 25, 2019 (Id.).

The Petition was not signed and the Petition’s certificate of service was blank (Id. at 18). 

Thus, the date the Petition was placed in the prison mailing system was not provided. See

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A petition is considered to be filed 

on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.”).

On November 8, 2019, Judge Silver ordered that unless Petitioner signed the 

Petition under penalty of perjury as required by applicable law and procedural rules, the 

1 Citation to the record indicates documents as displayed in the official Court electronic 

document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No. CV-19-5263-

PHX-ROS (DMF).

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Petition would be dismissed without prejudice (Doc. 7). On November 13, 2019, Petitioner 

timely filed a signed certificate affirming the Petition under penalty of perjury (Doc. 8). 

Given the procedural history, that timeliness is the subject of this Report and 

Recommendation, and that it would not matter for the timeliness issue whether September 

25, 2019, or an earlier date in September 2019, was used for the timeliness analysis, the 

undersigned will use September 25, 2019, as the filing date of the Petition.

Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition on February 18, 2020, but 

without the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings (Docs. 12, 12-1). The 

Court ordered that Respondents file such transcripts, and Respondents complied (Docs. 13, 

14, 14-1). Petitioner did not file a reply in support of the Petition, and the time for filing a 

reply has passed.

This matter is ripe for decision. This matter is on referral pursuant to Rules 72.1 

and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report and 

recommendation (Doc. 9 at 4). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned Magistrate 

Judge recommends that this Court dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice as untimely 

and deny a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Convictions and Sentences

On January 6, 2012, in Maricopa County Superior Court case # CR 2012-100073-

001, a Maricopa County grand jury indicted Petitioner with one count of sexual conduct 

with a minor and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor (Doc. 12-1 at 3-5). 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the charged 

count of sexual conduct with a minor and two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a 

minor (Id. at 7-10). On May 16, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea 

agreement (Id. at 12-13; Doc. 14-1 at 2-23). On June 15, 2012, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to 20 years in prison for the sexual conduct with a minor count and sentenced 

Petitioner to lifetime probation for the two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a 

minor (Doc. 12-1 at 15-20; Doc. 14-1 at 25-48).

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B. First Post-Conviction Relief Action

Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR notice”) pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (Doc. 12-1 at 22-29). The superior court appointed 

counsel for Petitioner (Id. at 31-32). On October 31, 2012, Petitioner’s counsel filed a 

motion to dismiss, attaching a signed statement by Petitioner that he wanted to dismiss the 

post-conviction (“PCR”) proceedings (Id. at 34-36). In the motion to dismiss, Petitioner’s 

counsel reported that he had conducted a legal call with Petitioner and confirmed that 

Petitioner desired dismissal of his PCR proceedings (Id. at 34). On November 5, 2012, the

superior court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the PCR proceedings (Id. at 

38).

2

 Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Id. at

50-54).

C. Second Post-Conviction Relief Action

On September 5, 2019, Petitioner initiated a successive PCR proceeding on alleged 

grounds as follows: infringement of the right against self-incrimination; suppression of 

evidence by the state; an unlawfully induced guilty plea; abridgment of constitutional 

rights; lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to enter the conviction or sentence; ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel; and “a significant history” of “factors” under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11 (Doc. 12-1 at 40-43). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 

controls competency proceedings in state trial courts to determine if a defendant is 

competent to stand trial. Petitioner was not specific regarding Rule 11 factors (Id.).

On September 18, 2019, the superior court found that Petitioner’s successive PCR

proceedings were untimely and that Petitioner had not established reasonably diligent

pursuit of alleged newly discovered material facts, including regarding unspecified Rule 

11 factors (Id. at 45-48). Petitioner did not file a petition for review to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals (Id. at 50-54).

. . .

2 The trial court’s order is dated November 2, 2012, but it was filed on November 5, 2012, 

which is the operative date of the dismissal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(c).

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D. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief, claiming that: 1) Petitioner was 

incompetent to be sentenced; 2) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

his incompetency in the state court proceedings; 3) Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment 

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when his cellphone was 

seized without a search warrant; and 4) Petitioner should not be required to exhaust state 

court remedies because doing so would be futile (Doc. 1).

Respondents assert the Petition was untimely filed and should be dismissed (Doc. 

12). Further, Respondents argue that the Petition grounds are exhausted and procedurally 

defaulted without excuse (Id.). Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s third claim for 

relief is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings (Id.).

II. AEDPA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Start Date of AEDPA Limitations Period

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). For timeliness analysis herein, the Court 

uses September 25, 2019, for AEDPA statute of limitations purposes. See Mayle v. Felix, 

545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005).

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Also, AEDPA expressly provides for tolling of 

the limitations period when a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral relief with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 

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2244(d)(2). A collateral review petition is “properly filed” when its delivery and 

acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 

4, 8 (2000). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. A state post-conviction relief 

petition not filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed,” and the 

petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling during those proceedings. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. 

Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely state post-conviction petition 

was not “properly filed” under AEDPA’s tolling provision, and reiterating its holding in 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 414).

After Petitioner’s guilty plea and sentence, Petitioner “initiated a timely of-right 

PCR proceeding.” See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 & 32.4. A Rule 32 “of right” proceeding is 

a form of direct review within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A); thus, such a proceeding 

tolls AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th

Cir. 2007). “AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the 

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id. at 711.

Because the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s “of right” PCR proceeding on 

November 5, 2012, Petitioner had until December 10, 2012, 35 days after the trial court’s 

dismissal of his PCR proceeding, in which to file a petition for review in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a)(5), 32.9(c)(1)(A); State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388, 

1389 (Ariz. 1978) (holding Rule 1.3 applies to petitions for review in PCR proceedings). 

While Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings tolled AEDPA’s statute of limitations through 

December 10, 2012, Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding did not toll time under AEDPA

because the second PCR proceeding was untimely filed.

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to run on December 11, 2012, the 

day after statutory tolling ended, and expired on December 10, 2013. The Petition was 

filed on September 25, 2019, more than five years after the one-year limitations period of 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) had expired on December 10, 2013. Therefore, unless equitable 

tolling or the actual innocence gateway applies to render the September 25, 2019, filing of 

the Petition timely, these proceedings should be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.

B. Equitable Tolling

The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). AEDPA’s limitations 

period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 

Id. at 645-46. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted. Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent 

permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions, but the 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 

limitations period “only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting 

with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 600 

(9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Put another way, for equitable tolling to apply, Petitioner must 

show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not 

maximum feasible diligence.” Id. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In 

determining whether reasonable diligence was exercised or not, courts should “consider 

the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in light of his or her particular 

circumstances.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011). Whether to apply the 

doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that equitable tolling is 

“unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under 

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AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations and internal 

emphasis omitted).

A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, 

or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154 (“[A] pro 

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling.”); see also Ballesteros v. Schriro, CV 06-675-PHX-EHC 

(MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, 

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and 

temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). A prisoner’s 

“proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of 

those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000).

Regarding timeliness, the Petition does not state any reason for untimeliness, but 

rather states that the “[j]udgment became final on 9-17-2019” (Doc. 1 at 18). The Petition’s 

grounds state that Petitioner “was incompetent” when arrested and had an extensive history 

of mental illness (Id. at 6, 7, 11). Petitioner’s affidavit attached to the Petition states that 

his “attorney never motioned the court for a rule 11 hearing, nor did he look at my health 

records that shows that I was incompetent” (Id. at 20). Petitioner states that he was 

“incompetent” and asks the reader to “see other convictions in 1994” (Id. at 21). No 

documents from any other case was presented by Petitioner. No specifics as to Petitioner’s 

mental illness were asserted, let alone documented.

At Petitioner’s change of plea hearing, Petitioner reported that he reads and 

understands English (Doc. 14-1 at 5). Petitioner stated that the last grade of school he had 

attended was fourth grade and that he had obtained a GED (Id.). Petitioner reported being 

on a medication named Vistaril, which his attorney described as a “psych med” (Id. at 5-

6). Petitioner reported that he was thinking clearly and understood the purposes of the 

court hearing (Id. at 6). Petitioner’s counsel stated he “met with [Petitioner] on numerous 

occasions including yesterday in the jail” and that he had “no concerns whatsoever 

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regarding [Petitioner’s] competency” (Id.). Petitioner reported to the judge that he had met 

with his attorney, that his attorney had read the plea agreement to him and had explained 

each part to him, and that he understood the plea agreement (Id. at 8-11). The trial judge’s 

plea colloquy was appropriate and thorough, and Petitioner affirmed that he understood the 

colloquy and the consequences of the plea agreement (Id. at 2-23).

In the Ninth Circuit, there is a two-part test to determine when a habeas petitioner 

is eligible for equitable tolling based upon a mental impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control, by demonstrating the 

impairment was so severe that either

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare 

a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims 

to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made 

it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original, internal 

citations and footnote omitted). This standard “reiterates the stringency of the overall 

equitable tolling test” and “the mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the butfor cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still 

demonstrate diligence” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014).

Petitioner’s vague and conclusory statements regarding his mental condition are 

insufficient to justify equitably tolling the limitations period. See Boulb v. United States, 

818 F.3d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 2016) (conclusory assertions regarding mental condition 

insufficient to warrant evidentiary hearing). In the present case, Petitioner has not 

demonstrated the existence of any severe mental impairment, and nothing in the record 

supports the conclusion that Petitioner suffered from a severe mental impairment 

preventing him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Nor does Petitioner even argue 

that a mental impairment prevented him from filing a timely petition.

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Evaluating the record before the Court, the Court cannot find at any point during the 

limitations period that Petitioner had a mental impairment that was so severe that he “was 

unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file” or that his 

“mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate 

its filing.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. Petitioner makes no argument that his mental condition

was different in kind or degree during the limitations period compared to when he filed the 

instant federal habeas petition. Further, Petitioner has not alleged or provided any 

documentation that supports an inference that Petitioner was unable to rationally or 

factually understand the need to timely file his habeas petition or to personally prepare one 

and effectuate its filing. Nor has Petitioner provided documentation or even averred that 

his mental illness made it impossible for him to meet AEDPA’s deadline. The record does 

not demonstrate that Petitioner had a mental impairment to a degree of severity that he was 

unable to file a timely habeas petition. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100.

In addition, Petitioner has not provided details of any specific action he took in 

pursuing his habeas claim before the late filing of the Petition. The Ninth Circuit recently 

stated that “for a litigant to demonstrate” that “he has been pursuing his rights diligently”

sufficient to satisfy “the first element required for equitable tolling, he must show that he 

has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to filing 

caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the 

time of filing his claim in federal court.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d at 598-99. Here, the

record does not reflect any efforts made by Petitioner to timely file a habeas petition, let 

alone efforts constituting reasonable diligence.

Because Petitioner has not met his burden of showing extraordinary circumstances 

which prevented the filing of a timely petition for habeas corpus and he has not shown 

reasonable diligence towards filing a timely petition, equitable tolling is unavailable.

C. Actual Innocence

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391-396 (2013), the Supreme Court held 

that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that applies to procedural 

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bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 

(petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the 

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). However, Petitioner does not argue, 

let alone meet, this excuse for the untimely filing of the Petition.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the undersigned finds the filing of the Petition was

untimely. Because of the untimeliness, undersigned did not reach the other affirmative 

defenses raised by Respondents. The undersigned recommends that the Petition (Docs. 1, 

8) be dismissed as untimely and with prejudice. Assuming the recommendations herein 

are followed in the District Judge’s judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on 

procedural grounds. Under the reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find 

it debatable whether the District Judge was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, 

to the extent the District Judge adopts this Report and Recommendation regarding the 

Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Docs. 1, 8) be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Docs. 1, 8) is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

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to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 15th day of May, 2020.

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