Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04060/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Citations to "Respondents' Exh." are to the corrected exhibits in docket # 20. 

2

 The Honorable Ruth H. Hilliard presided. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Willie Crockett, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Warden Frigo, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV-05-4060-PHX-JAT (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in

State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket #1) On July 3, 2006, Respondents filed

an Answer to the Petition (docket # 17) to which Petitioner has not replied and the time in which

to do so has passed. 

BACKGROUND

On December 19, 1997, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner with

aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony. (Respondents' Exh. A1

) After a jury trial,2 on

August 19, 1998, Petitioner was convicted as charged. (Respondents' Exhs. B-J) On October

19, 1998, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated prison term of 12 years and

ordered him to pay restitution to the victim. (Respondents' Exhs. K, L)

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 In their Answer, Respondents calculate the filing date of Petitioner's pro se pleadings by

applying the prison mailbox rule pursuant to which the document is deemed filed on the date on which

the inmate signed and delivered the document to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988). The prison mail box rule favors Petitioner. The Court will likewise use the

mailbox rule in this Report and Recommendation for the sake of consistency.

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On October 26, 1998, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents' Exh. M3

) The trial court appointed counsel who moved to

withdraw the notice of post-conviction relief "without prejudice to filing at a later date" because

Petitioner mistakenly thought he needed to file the notice before his direct appeal concluded.

(Respondents' Exhs. N, O) The trial court granted counsel's motion. (Respondents' Exh. P)

Petitioner sought direct review of his conviction in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

On September 16, 1999, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief. (Respondents' Exh. T)

Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court which was denied on March 3, 2000.

(Respondents' Exh. W-Y) There is no evidence that Petitioner petitioned the United States

Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

In the meantime, on November 10, 1999, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction

relief. (Respondents' Exh. Z) The trial court appointed counsel who notified the court that he

was "unable to find any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction relief proceedings." 

(Respondents' Exh. AA-CC) Counsel did not file a petition and neither did Petitioner even

though the Court had granted him permission to do so. 

On May 24, 2000, Petitioner filed a pleading in the Maricopa County Superior Court

entitled "Special Action Petition or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" which the court

construed as a petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents' Exhs. DD, EE) On June 4,

2001, the trial court denied relief on procedural and substantive grounds. (Respondents' Exh.

GG) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. RR)

On November 9, 2001, Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification of Restitution

Order with the trial court. (Respondents' Exh. HH) The Superior Court docket reflects that the

court has not yet ruled on that motion. 

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 It is not clear whether Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals of the trial

court's dismissal of his November 12, 2003 notice of post-conviction review. Respondents advise the

Court that while they could not locate a petition for review, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued an

order directing the trial court's clerk to transmit the record on appeal (Respondents' Exh. KK) and

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for status (Respondents' Exh. NN) in the appellate court

inquiring about his petition for review. As discussed below, this ambiguity in the record does not

affect the Court's analysis regarding the timeliness of Petitioner's § 2254 petition because Petitioner's

second notice of post-conviction relief was filed with the trial court after the expiration of the one-year

limitations period for filing a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the dates regarding

any appellate rulings on the second notice of post-conviction relief are irrelevant. 

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On November 12, 2003, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief.

(Respondents' Exh. II) On December 15, 2003, the trial court dismissed the notice pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) because Petitioner's claims "either were or should have been raised in

the direct appeal or the first Rule 32 proceeding." (Respondents' Exh. JJ4

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On September 20, 2004, Petitioner filed two pleadings in the Arizona Court of

Appeals asserting claims under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Respondents'

Exh. LL) The Arizona court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claim. (Respondents' Exh. MM)

On September 19, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action in the Arizona

Court of Appeals. On September 28, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept

jurisdiction over the special action. (Respondents' Exhs. OO-RR) 

On December 2, 2005, Petitioner filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents assert the Court should dismiss the petition as

untimely. Petitioner has not responded and the time in which to do so has expired. 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) limits the time

period for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

I. Commencement of Statute of Limitations

State prisoners must file their federal habeas petitions within one year of the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review, or other dates not pertinent to this matter. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A),

(D); Day v. McDonough, ___ U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 1677(2006); Evans v. Chavis,

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___U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 846, 848-49 (2006). Here, Petitioner's judgment of guilt became final

on or about June 3, 2000— ninety days after March 3, 2000 — the date on which the Arizona

Supreme Court denied direct review. (Respondents' Exh. Y); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(stating

that the limitations period runs from the expiration of the time for seeking review); Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)(period of "direct review" in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court.); United States Supreme Court Rule 13.1 (establishing that a

certiorari petition seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court is timely when it is filed

within 90 days of the entry of the order denying discretionary review); Clay v. United States,

537 U.S. 522, 527-28 n. 3 (2003)(reaffirming that, in the post-conviction context, a judgment

of conviction is final when "this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or

denies a petition for writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.")

The commencement of the statute of limitations extended beyond June 3, 2000 (the

date on which Petitioner's conviction became final) in this case because before Petitioner's

judgment of conviction became final, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on May

24, 2000 which was still pending on June 3, 2000 and, therefore, tolled the limitations period.

Isley v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004)(holding that the

filing of a notice of post-conviction relief tolls the AEDPA's statute of limitations.) 

II. Tolling of the Limitations Period

A. Pendency of Petition for Review Pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32

Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that

a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(emphasis added); Stevens

v. Hickman, No. C99-4316-CW(PR), 2000 WL 1092242, * 1(N.D. Cal. 2000)(quoting Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that an application for collateral review is

pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through

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 Although Petitioner filed two other notices of post-conviction relief before he commenced

the May 24, 2000 post-conviction proceedings, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation only

the Court refers to the post-conviction proceedings commenced on May 24, 2000 as Petitioner's first

petition for post-conviction relief, because in the October 26, 1998 and November 10, 1999

proceedings, Petitioner only filed notices of post-conviction relief, but never filed supporting petitions

for review. 

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proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with regard to particular postconviction proceedings.”)

As previously stated, the statute of limitations was tolled until June 4, 2001, the date

on which the trial court dismissed Petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief.5

(Respondents' Exh. GG) Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the dismissal of his first

petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations commenced

on June 4, 2001 and expired on June 4, 2002. 

Petitioner, however, did not file his § 2254 petition until December 2, 2005, over

three years after the statute of limitations expired. Therefore, the § 2254 petition is untimely

and should be dismissed unless Petitioner establishes a basis for equitable tolling. 

The Court notes that before the limitations period expired, Petitioner filed a Motion

for Clarification of the trial court's restitution order. However, that motion does not constitute

a "properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" under §

2244(d)(2). Accordingly, that motion did not toll the limitations period which expired on June

4, 2002. 

After the limitations period expired, Petitioner filed a second notice of postconviction relief on November 12, 2003. Because the limitations period expired on June 4,

2002, Petitioner's November 12, 2003 notice of post-conviction relief did not toll the statute of

limitations. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, the filing of a petition for postconviction relief in state court does not restart the statute of limitations. Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Searcy v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2001)(stating

that state post-conviction relief action, filed after the statute of limitations had expired, "did not

cause the statute to begin running anew when the state court denied the motion."); Jackson v.

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Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 1999)(holding that § 2244(d)(2) did not apply where

petitioner whose conviction became final prior to the effective date of AEDPA, filed postconviction motion after the limitations period expired.). Thus, Petitioner’s pending petition is

untimely and the Court need not reach the merits of Petitioner’s claims unless he establishes a

basis for equitable tolling.

B. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that § 2244(d)'s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States

District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds

by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc).

Tolling is appropriate when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation omitted).

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable

tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814-14 (9th Cir. 2002).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Here, Petitioner fails to assert any

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that

he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll. Warren v. Garvin,

219 F.3d 111,113 (2nd Cir. 2000); Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94

(1990)(stating that principles of equitable tolling do not extend to what is at best a "garden

variety claim of excusable neglect.") 

Moreover, Petitioner's status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and lack of legal

assistance do not constitute cause to excuse his untimely filing. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006)(holding that a "pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not,

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling."); Marsh v. Soares, 223

F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)(stating that fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting does not

relieve petitioner from personal responsibility of complying with the law); Hughes v. Idaho

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State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that a pro se prisoner’s

illiteracy was insufficient to satisfy the standard of an objective, external factor amounting to

“cause” for purposes of avoiding the procedural bar on his habeas claim); Tacho v. Martinez,

862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)(finding that reliance upon allegedly incompetent jailhouse

lawyers did not constitute “cause”). In summary, equitable tolling is not appropriate in this

case. Because Petitioner’s § 2254 petition is untimely and he fails to establish either a statutory

or equitable basis for tolling the statute of limitations, the undersigned recommends dismissing

the Petition. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket # 1) be DISMISSED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which

to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation

by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s

recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2006.

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