Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02191/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332fc Diversity - Foreclosure

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JAN 22 2016 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

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11 CHERYL STEWART, Case No.: 15-cv-2191-BEN (BGS) 

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13 v. 

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

14 J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 

15 Defendant. 

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18 Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase 

19 Bank, N.A. (Docket No.4.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED. 

20 BACKGROUND! 

21 Plaintiff Cheryl Stewart, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in California 

22 Superior Court. Defendant removed the action on October 1, 2015. (Docket No.1.) 

23 Plaintiff claims she owns 25% of the title to the subject property located at 14925 

24 Encendido Avenue in San Diego. (Notice of Removal [Docket No. I], Ex. A ~ 4 

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1 Unless otherwise noted, the following background is drawn from the allegations of 

27 Plaintiffs Complaint. The Court is not making any factual findings, but rather only 

28 summarizing the relevant facts alleged for purposes of evaluating Defendant's motion to 

dismiss. 

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Case 3:15-cv-02191-BEN-BGS Document 9 Filed 01/22/16 Page 1 of 4
1 [hereinafter "Compl."].) Plaintiff contends that Defendant is unlawfully attempting to 

2 foreclose on the subject property by filing an Assignment and Notice of Default. (Compl. 

3 ~~ 2,20.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant is an unknown entity to her, and has no 

4 right to foreclose on the property. (Compl. ~~ 5, 10, 19.) 

5 On August 1,2015, Plaintiff received a 25% ownership in the title to the subject 

6 property from Encendido Trust dtd 3.1.14. (Compl. ~ 4, Ex. 4.) The Encendido Trust dtd 

7 3.1.14 gained ownership of the property by grant deed from R-C Business Trust on 

8 March 1, 2014. (Compl. ~ 4, Ex. 3.) Finally, the R-C Business Trust obtained the 

9 property by grant deed from the Goncalves Family Trust on an indecipherable date, but 

10 was recorded on October 15,2010. (Compl. ~ 4, Ex. 2.) 

11 According to Plaintiff, the property was originally owned by Mr. and Mrs. 

12 Goncalves. (Compl. ~~ 4,6.) The Goncalves took out a loan from Washington Mutual 

13 Bank on December 28, 2007, which was secured by a deed oftrust. (Compl. ~ 6.) 

14 Defendant assumed the assets of Washington Mutual in 2008. (Compl. ~ 15.) An 

15 Assignment of the deed of trust to the subject property was recorded in April 2014, 

16 naming Defendant as the assignee. (Compl. Ex.!.) 

17 Plaintiff raises two causes of action against Defendant: (1) unfair business 

18 practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; 

19 and (2) Cancellation ofInstruments pursuant to California Civil Code section 3412. On 

20 October 7,2015, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff 

21 lacks standing and fails to state claims for relief. (Docket No.4.) Plaintiff filed a 

22 general, brief opposition. (Docket No.6.) 

23 LEGAL STANDARD 

24 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(6), a court may dismiss a complaint 

25 if, taking all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for 

26 relief on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

27 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,556-57 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to 

28 state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

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Case 3:15-cv-02191-BEN-BGS Document 9 Filed 01/22/16 Page 2 of 4
1 the matter complained of, or if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which 

2 relief may be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. "Threadbare recitals of the elements 

3 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 

4 556 U.S. at 678. 

5 DISCUSSION 

6 The Court need not address whether Plaintiffs individual claims are sufficient 

7 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the Court agrees that Plaintiff 

8 lacks standing. 

9 The plaintiff bringing an action in the federal court has the burden to show that 

10 Article III standing exists. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); 

11 Snake River Farmers' Ass 'n, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab. , 9 F.3d 792,795 (9th Cir. 1993). 

12 Specifically, the plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact; (2) traceable to the challenged 

13 action of the defendant; and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 

14 U.S. at 560. 

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It is longstanding California law that: 

a deed of trust transfers for the purpose of the trust all possible claims of the 

trustors in the property conveyed ... and vests in the trustee the absolute 

legal title to the entire estate held by the trustors at the time ofthe execution 

of the trust deed, and that the title must remain in the trustee for that purpose 

until the trust is either executed through a sale upon default in the payment 

of the debt secured by the deed of trust, or is terminated by the payment of 

such debt or other method provided by law. 

Bryant v. Hobart, 44 Cal. App. 315,317 (1st Dist. 1919) (citing Athearn v. Ryan, 154 

22 Cal. 554 (1908); MacLeod v. Moran, 153 Cal. 97 (1908); and Weber v. McCleverty, 149 

23 Cal. 316 (1906)); see also Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA., 216 Cal. App. 4th 

24 497,508 (4th Dist. 2013). 

25 In order for Plaintiff to have standing to assert a claim relating to the deed of trust, 

26 Plaintiff must trace her title to the property back to a date preceding the execution of the 

27 deed of trust. According to the Complaint, that date is December 28,2007. Plaintiff 

28 asserts that she obtained title to the property on August 1, 2015-well after the deed of 

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Case 3:15-cv-02191-BEN-BGS Document 9 Filed 01/22/16 Page 3 of 4
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1 trust had been executed. Further, she only alleges her chain of title begins in October 

2 2010. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would allow her to take title to the property 

3 free of Defendant's deed of trust. Accordingly, she cannot show that she suffered an 

4 injury in fact. P1aintifftherefore has no standing to bring a claim challenging the deed of 

5 trust. Defendant's Motion is therefore GRANTED. 

6 Plaintiff is granted leave to file an Amended Complaint on or before February 5, 

7 2016, which cures the deficiencies noted in this Order. The Clerk may close the case. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January ~ 

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