Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-02040/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-02040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

CHANDRA NICHELE MOSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITYADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 7:14-CV-2040-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Chandra Nichele Moss (“Moss”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. She seeks review of a final adverse

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”),

who denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Moss timely

pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies available before the Commissioner.

The case is thus ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the following reasons, the

court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

II. Statement of the Case

Moss was 38 years old at the time of her hearing before the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 50–51). She has completed the 12th grade. (Tr. 50). Her past work

FILED

 2016 Mar-16 PM 05:26

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-02040-VEH Document 12 Filed 03/16/16 Page 1 of 14
experience includes employment as a mental health resident aide and a mental health

service supervisor. (Tr. 69–70). She claims she became disabled on April 30, 2012, due

to diabetes, high blood pressure, degenerative disc disease, sleep apnea, and arthritis. (Tr.

190). She last worked on April 30, 2012. (Tr. 160).

On April 18, 2012, Moss protectively filed a Title II application for a period of

disability and DIB. (Tr. 160). On May 23, 2012 the Commissioner initially denied these

claims. (Tr. 90). Moss timely filed a written request for a hearing on November 13,

2013. (Tr. 21). The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on July 24, 2013. (Tr. 46). On

November 6, 2013, he issued his opinion concluding Moss was not disabled and denying

her benefits. (Tr. 23–39). She timely petitioned the Appeals Council to review the

decision. (Tr. 20–21). The Appeals Council issued a denial of review on her claim. (Tr.

1).

Moss filed a Complaint with this court on October 23, 2014, seeking review of

the Commissioner’s determination. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner answered on February

3, 2015. (Doc. 8). Moss filed a supporting brief, doc. 10, on March 19, 2015, and the

Commissioner responded with her own, doc. 11, on April 17, 2015.

III. Standard of Review

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.

The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is

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supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine

if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.

This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence.

However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of

validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied.

Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the

ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient

reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must

reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir.

1991).

IV. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits and establish her entitlement for a period of

disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the

Regulations promulgated thereunder. The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability

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to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must

provide evidence about a “physical or mental impairment” that “must result from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1508.

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed by

the Commissioner;

(4) whether the claimant can performhis or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable C.F.R.

section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th

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Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). The

sequential analysis goes as follows:

Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be

found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not

have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the

[Commissioner] to show that the claimant can performsome other job.

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in

significant numbers. Id.

V. ALJ Findings

After consideration ofthe entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2016.

2. The claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 18,

2012, the alleged disability onset date.

3. The claimant had the following severe impairments: obesity, degenerative

disc disease (DDD) of the lumbar spine, rheumatoid arthritis (RA), and

diabetes mellitus (DM) (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c)).

4. The claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. The claimant had the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to perform

unskilled sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404. 1567(a) that requires

no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only occasional climbing

of ramps and stairs; no more than occasional balancing, stooping,

crouching, kneeling, and crawling; no more than occasional exposure to

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pulmonary irritants, extreme heat or cold, excessive vibration, and

humidity/wetness; no operational control of hazardous or moving

machinery; and no work at unprotected heights.

6. The claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R.

404.1565).

7. The claimant was born on [redacted], 1975 and was 36 years old, which is

defined as a younger individual age 18–44, on the alleged disability date.

(20 C.F.R. 404.1563).

8. The claimant had at least a high school education and was able to

communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills was not material to the determination of

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework

supported a finding that she was “not disabled,” whether or not she had

transferable job skills.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in

the national economy that she could perform.

11. The claimant had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social

Security Act, fromApril 18, 2012, through the date ofthis decision.

(Tr. 28–38).

VI. Analysis

The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its

responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial

evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d

835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir.

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1980)).

1 However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its

own judgment for that ofthe [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).

Moss urges this court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny her

benefits on two grounds: First, that the ALJ failed to give controlling weight to the

opinion of Moss’s treating physician, Dr. Shamblin, and second, that the ALJ improperly

applied the pain standard to determine the disabling effect of a claimant’s alleged pain.

(Doc. 10). The court will consider these alternative grounds in turn, although neither

rationale is persuasive. The Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.

Beginning with Moss’s first assignment of error, medical opinion evidence must

be considered by the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). If the opinion comes from a

treating source and is otherwise supported by the medical evidence, then that opinion is

given controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The Eleventh Circuit has explained

that an opinion is not otherwise supported by the medical evidence when 1) there is

insufficient evidence to support a physician’s conclusion; 2) the evidence undermines the

physician’s conclusion; 3) the physician’s opinion is conclusory; or 4) the physician’s

own treatment records do not support his position. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,

1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v . Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.

1 This authority is controlling in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,

Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).

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1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Opinions from medical sources that purport to establish whether a claimant is

disabled, unable to work, whether the impairments meet the listings, or the claimant’s

RFC are not “medical opinions,” although the Commissioner considers them. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d). Thus, such opinions are entitled to no particular weight, 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(3), although it is “imprecise,” Bjornson v . Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th

Cir. 2012), to say that the Commissioner may ignore them. They are not like the

conclusory allegations (treating them as such is a common error) due to be ignored under

the Twiqbal regime; rather, the opinions are merely not dispositive.

This is a somewhat nuanced framework, although the real question at the end of the

day is always whether there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision; the

rules—especially the caselaw—are window dressing.

2 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson and

Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA . L. REV. 597, 604 & 605 n. 28

(2009) (citing Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1296 (1997)) (considering whether the second step of

2 The best example of window dressing is actually found when evaluating subjective pain.

Compare Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1986) (may not discount subjective

complaints of pain on the basis of lack of objective support and clinical findings) with Holt v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1991) (may discount subjective complaints of pain on the basis of

lack of objective support and clinical findings). The lesson here, of course, is that neither discounting

nor failing to discount such complaints is error per se; either outcome is sustainable as long as it is

based on substantial evidence.

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Chevron

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is merely arbitrary and capricious review under 5 U.S.C. § 706).

Unfortunately, the window dressing can obscure the window, and when the topic

is medical opinions, the command to give controlling or substantial weight to these

opinions has been at times warped by counsel into what I call the permission slip theory

of medical opinions. Under this theory, a treating physician writes a conclusory opinion

unsupported by any evidence, hoping to secure disability benefits in much the way he

might produce a slip excusing a student’s absence. Thus, what formerly was an example

of a means of satisfying the substantial evidence requirement is corrupted into a method

of avoiding it. This court has criticized the permission slip theory before, see, e.g.,

Pounds v. Colv in, No. 2:14-cv-1785-VEH, (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2016); Springer v.

Colvin, No. 5:14-1827-VEH (N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2015), but it is worth noting that

presence of a “permission slip” in the record does not mean that the opinion should be

ignored. Instead, it should simply be treated like any other evidence.

With these principles in mind, I turn to Dr. Shamblin’s opinions. First up is a

disability claim form completed by Dr. Shamblin on May 8, 2012, which indicates that

Moss has impairments of diabetes mellitus (“DM”), rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”), anemia,

and hypertension (“HTN”). (Tr. 554). Dr. Shamblin expressed the opinion that she would

be able to return to work within one to three months. (Id.). On March 19, 2012, Dr.

3 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984).

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Shamblin indicated that Moss was totally and permanently incapacitated, because she had

DM, RA, HTN, and anemia. (Tr. 488). He explained his conclusion by saying:

[Patient’s] RA will cause flare-ups rendering the pt from any

type of physical activity. RA also causes daily pain of the

joints especially in the hands. Pt also has uncontrolled DM.

High blood sugar levels will cause dizziness. Hypertension

will also cause dizziness if BP is too high. Pt’s anemia will

also cause weakness fatigue and dizziness.

Due to Pt’s RA, she is not able to lift heavy objects.

Pt’s DM, hypertension, and anemia [limit] the patient because

of the dizziness and fatigue that the pt will experience. Flareups caused by RA will render the patient from any daily

activities.

(Tr. 488–89). On July 27, 2012, Dr. Shamblin completed the same form and indicated

that he was unsure when Moss would be able to return to work. (Tr. 456). On September

13, 2012, Dr. Shamblin completed a form indicating that Moss had DM, RA, anemia, and

HTN, and he checked a box indicating that Moss can never return to work. (Tr. 434).

The ALJ credited all the diagnoses in Dr. Shamblin’s opinions. The opinion

information about when Moss can return to work is not subject to any particular weight,

so it may be freely weighed by the ALJ against the other evidence in the record. As to the

the March 19 opinion—by far the most substantial one—the ALJ credited the portions

ofthe opinion discussing Moss’s DM, HTN, and anemia (Tr. 36–37).

As to the portions of the March 19 opinion relating to Moss’s RA, there are

essentially three pieces of information contained in that opinion: that Moss’s RA renders

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her incapable of performing daily activities, that the RA causes pain, and that the RA

prevents her from lifting heavy loads. The first is undermined by Moss’s reported daily

activities, which will be discussed more fully in the pain section. The other two

statements are entitled to substantial deference, and the ALJ agreed Moss cannot lift

heavy weights. (Tr. 37). As to Moss’s pain, the ALJ gave due credit to the physician’s

opinion that the Moss was in pain because the ALJ agreed Moss was likely in pain, tr. 37,

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but an unadorned announcement that a claimant is in pain is insufficient to establish that

the pain is disabling. The ALJ properly considered Dr. Shamblin’s opinions.

Moss argues that under SSR 96-5p, the ALJ was under a duty to recontact Dr.

Shamblin. This is no longer the law; SSR 96-5p has been superseded, see How We

Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,651, 10,655–57 (Feb. 23,

2012) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b & 416.920b), and the decision to recontact

a physician is now within the ALJ’s discretion.

Turning to the pain analysis, there is no doubt the ALJ applied the right test.

Compare Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)

(pain standard requires evidence of an underlying medical condition; and that the

objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the

4 Technically, the ALJ stated that Moss was likely in pain when discussing the opinion

evidence of Moss’s mother, but the point remains that the ALJ believed she was in pain. To the

extent that Moss argues that Moss’s RA caused a separate pain that the ALJ failed to adequately

discuss, I discuss it with the pain standard generally below.

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claimed pain) with tr. 31–32 (applying pain standard). Moss spends almost the entirety

of her pain standard argument explaining that she has presented enough evidence to

satisfy the first prong of the standard, and the ALJ agreed. (See Tr. 32 (“[T]he [ALJ] finds

that the claimant has medically determinable impairments that could reasonably be

expected to cause symptoms such as those alleged.”)).

A very small part of her argument is devoted to the disabling effect of her pain, and

all Moss has to say is that Dr. Shamblin said she was in so much pain as to be disabled.

There are two responses: First, the use of Dr. Shamblin’s opinion in this way comes

dangerously close to being an evidentiarily worthless permission slip. Second, Dr.

Shamblin’s opinion does not say that Moss’s pain is disabling, the mere fact of pain is not

ipso facto disabling, and there is no requirement that the ALJ read the evidence in the

light most favorable to the claimant. So, Dr. Shamblin’s opinion is insufficient to

establish Moss’s disability by pain.

Moss’s lack of argument on the issue aside, the court will consider whether the

ALJ correctly concluded that Moss’s subjective claims of pain should be disregarded

because Moss’s daily activities were inconsistent with disabling pain. I begin with the

governing law: “[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ.” Moore v.

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). It is axiomatic that participation in

activities inconsistent with the existence of an alleged health condition may properly be

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considered as bearing on the credibility of the allegation. Moss, in her activity

description, explained that she performed light housekeeping, folded clothes, drove her

daughter to school, went outside to walk, shopped for an hour at a time, and attended a

water aerobics class. (Tr. 173–177). The ALJ noted these activities. (Tr. 34–35).

Because these activities are inconsistent with Moss’s testimony that she is in disabling

pain, and that she must spend all day lying down and “elevat[ing] [her] everything,” tr. 67,

the ALJ’s decision to discount her subjective testimony was based on substantial

evidence.

The same reasoning applies to Dr. Shamblin’s opinion that Moss’s RA prevents her

from doing daily activities. Further, the ALJ pointed out that there was little evidence in

the record of RA (except for a lab result at tr. 401 which does not measure pain), Moss

did not complain about it much in the record at a level to establish the pain is disabling,

and Moss showed 5/5 strength in her hands (Tr. 274; 392). Additionally, Moss did not

show swelling in her fingers, although they were sometimes tender. (Tr. 274). The

evidence did not demonstrate that Moss is or was disabled.

VII. Conclusion

Based upon the court’s evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties’

submissions, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by

substantial evidence and that she applied proper legal standards in arriving at it.

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Accordingly, the decision will be affirmed by separate order.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 2016.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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