Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07189/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07189-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 19, 2015 Decided August 4, 2015

No. 13-7189

KRISTOPHER BAUMANN, CHAIRMAN OF THE FRATERNAL

ORDER OF POLICE, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

LABOR COMMITTEE,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01189)

Anthony M. Conti argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Daniel J. McCartin. Gregory T. Lawrence

entered an appearance.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellees. With her on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan,

Attorney General at the time the brief was filed, Todd S. Kim,

Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor

General.

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Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, andROGERS and PILLARD,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”) General Order 204.01, Part VI-C-1, the

Chief of Police sanctioned Kristopher Baumann for releasing to

the media a recording of Emergency Response Team (“ERT”)

radio communications that occurred during an incident in which

a suspect exchanged gunfire with the police and barricaded

himself inside a private home. The General Order does not

prevent members of the MPD from speaking publicly about

events like the barricade incident. Part VI-C-1, however,

prohibits the public disclosure of confidential MPD information

whose release may jeopardize ongoing law enforcement

investigations, and two such criminal investigations related to

the barricade were pending when Baumann gave the recording

to reporters shortly after the incident. Baumann sued the

District of Columbia and MPD officials on the ground that he

was being punished for protected speech in violation of the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the District of

Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (“DCWPA”), and now

appeals the grants of summary judgment to the defendants on his

First Amendment and DCWPA claims and dismissal of his

DCWPA claim against the individual defendants.

Baumann has conceded that an MPD Order requiring

officers to notify MPD before releasing confidential MPD

information that may jeopardize ongoing law enforcement

investigations would be constitutional, as would a sanction for

failing to do so. His only contention under the First Amendment

is that his punishment was unconstitutional because the MPD

has not shown that release of the ERT recording could or did

impede any law enforcement investigation or otherwise

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disrupted the MPD’s operations. We hold that Part VI-C-1 as

applied to Baumann is sufficiently tailored temporally and in

scope to enable law enforcement better to investigate criminal

activity and police operations implicating police safety, and that

the MPD’s interests in non-disclosure outweigh Baumann’s and

the public’s interests in releasing the recording at the time he

did. Part VI-C-1 bars disclosure of confidential information

only during ongoing investigations and does not otherwise bar

speech about police activity, including the barricade incident. 

And releasing the confidential ERT recording could have

harmed pending criminal investigations because it contained

potentially critical information about the barricade and, only if

kept confidential, could it provide a means to gauge other

evidence offered by witnesses and persons involved in the

incident. Baumann’s statutory challenge under the pre-2010

DCWPA is unavailing for failure to identify a “protected

disclosure,” D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6) (2001). Accordingly,

we affirm. 

I.

MPD General Order 204.01 states that it is the policy of the

MPD that officers “shall make available to the news media

timely information pertaining to matters within the scope of the

[MPD], except in those rare instances where the law

enforcement process or fair administration of justice might be

hampered by premature disclosure of such information.” Gen.

Order 204.01, Part II. Consistent with that policy, officers “may

provide the basic facts, unless otherwise restricted by this

General Order, concerning an event or incident of which they

have sufficient knowledge, in conjunction with a Unit Official’s

approval, the rank of lieutenant or above.” Id. Part VI-A-1. 

And they may, for example, generally disclose to the public

“[f]actual information concerning an individual involved in an

incident” and the “[c]ircumstances surrounding an incident.” Id.

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Part VI-B-1 & 2. But the Order specifies in Part VI-C that

certain information cannot be released to the public on an

officer’s own initiative. In particular, Part VI-C-1 prohibits the

disclosure of “[c]onfidential information that may jeopardize the

successful conclusion of an investigation.” Likewise, Part

VI-C-7 states that “[a]ll documents not listed as releasable shall

be closed to public inspection.” 

Kristopher Baumann is an MPD police officer who was

serving full time as Chairman of the Fraternal Order of Police

Metropolitan Labor Committee (“union”) on May 30, 2009,

when the ERT was called to the scene of a barricade incident

during which gunfire had been exchanged with the police.

Several ERT members expressed concern to Wendell

Cunningham, an ERT member and vice-chairman of the union,

that higher-ranking officials, including the Mayor, had

demanded that tear gas be used during the barricade,

notwithstanding the recognized hazards of, and their lack of

training for, its use in such situations. Cunningham and other

police officers informed Baumann, who was not at the barricade,

of the tear-gas issue and shared with him other safety concerns

about how the incident had been handled. During a union

leadership meeting on June 1, Baumann told Cunningham to

initiate a union safety committee investigation into the incident. 

The following day, a reporter told Baumann that he had

received conflicting information from MPD officials about

whether there had been an order to use tear gas at the barricade

and suggested that Baumann should review the recording of the

ERT’s communications during the incident. Baumann told

Cunningham to get the ERT recording, and Cunningham sent an

email to the MPD’s Office of Unified Communications

(“OUC”) requesting the recording for “incident review”

purposes. On June 5, the OUC gave Cunningham a copy of the

recording upon his signing a receipt stating “[i]t is understood

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[that] the following recording[] [is] for internal investigation

only . . . , there are no public requests for . . . the[] incident[],”

and “the recording [] will not be released to the public without

prior, written approval from the [OUC].” The same day,

Baumann listened to the recording and released a portion of it to

two reporters. 

On June 11, Baumann emailed Assistant Chief Alfred

Durham and others, forwarding and commenting on a chain of

emails among MPD officials regarding officers’ safety concerns

at the barricade. Baumann wrote that the email chain revealed

that Assistant Chief Patrick Burke had violated the Collective

Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the MPD and the

union — by, for example, failing to recognize the legitimacy of

the request of the union safety committee to meet with him and

Assistant Chief Durham and stating that the committee is subject

to the chain of command — and the D.C. Code. 

In early June, Chief of Police Cathy Lanier ordered the

Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) to investigate the barricade

incident, including, in particular, how the media had obtained

the ERT recording. The IAD interviewed Baumann twice. On

June 19, Baumann explained it was his understanding that the

IAD investigation related to certain information that had been

given to the union safety committee to determine “whether or

not there were any violations or threats to Public Safety.” 

Baumann told the IAD that his interview responses constituted

a protected disclosure. Noting that he was not present at the

barricade, Baumann otherwise declined to answer questions that

he claimed impermissibly related to his duties as union

chairman. On July 14, after being told he would be charged

with failing to obey orders and directives if he did not respond

to the IAD’s questions, Baumann admitted that he had given the

ERT recording to two reporters. 

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The IAD recommended that Baumann be disciplined for

releasing the ERT recording to the media without prior

authorization, and he was served with a Notice of Proposed

Adverse Action on October 9, 2009. The Final Notice of

Adverse Action, dated December 29, 2009, ordered Baumann

suspended for five working days because he had violated (1)

Part VI-C-1 and Part VI-C-7 of General Order 204.01 by

releasing the ERT recording to the media without prior written

approval from the OUC or the MPD, and (2) General Order

120.21, Part A-25, which, as relevant, prohibits “[a]ny conduct

not specifically set forth in this order, which is prejudicial to the

reputation and good order of the police force.” Baumann

appealed to Chief Lanier. On February 5, 2010, the Chief

affirmed the first charge under Part VI-C-1, noting that “[t]he

recording [Baumann released] was related to two separate

ongoing criminal investigations” involving the barricade, one

within the MPD and another by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, but

she dismissed the second, prejudicial-conduct charge and

reduced Baumann’s suspension to three days. The Chief’s

appeal decision did not discuss Part VI-C-7 (the residual

confidentiality clause) of General Order 204.01, and the MPD

does not rely upon it on appeal, so our decision rests only on

Part VI-C-1. 

Baumann sued the District of Columbia and several MPD

officials. As relevant, he alleged that they violated the DCWPA

by retaliating against him for his request that Cunningham

initiate a safety committee investigation of the barricade, his

June 11, 2009 email to MPD officials, and answers he gave

during his two IAD interviews, and that they violated the First

Amendment by investigating and disciplining him for releasing

the ERT recording. The defendants moved to dismiss, and both

parties filed motions for summary judgment. 

The district court dismissed Baumann’s DCWPA claim

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against the individual defendants because the statute in effect at

the time of the underlying events provided a cause of action only

against the District of Columbia, and the later amendment

allowing suits against individuals was not retroactive. Baumann

v. District of Columbia (“Baumann I”), 775 F. Supp. 2d 191,

194–96 (D.D.C. 2011). The court also granted summary

judgment to the defendants because no reasonable jury could

conclude that Baumann made a “protected disclosure” under the

DCWPA. Baumann v. District of Columbia (“Baumann II”),

933 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2013). In addition, the court

granted summary judgment to the defendants on Baumann’s

First Amendment claim. The court ruled that no reasonable jury

could conclude his allegedly protected activity was a substantial

or motivating factor in the purportedly retaliatory acts. Id. at

36–41. The court further concluded that General Order 204.01

was not an unlawful prior restraint on his speech because the

MPD’s strong interest in regulating the release of the narrow

category of information that would affect the confidentiality and

effectiveness of ongoing criminal investigations outweighed

Baumann’s and the public’s interest in releasing such

information when he did, especially considering that the General

Order did not restrict his ability to express his personal view on

safety concerns related to the barricade incident and was timelimited to only when the disclosure might harm an ongoing

investigation. Baumann v. District of Columbia (“Baumann

III”), 987 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77–82 (D.D.C. 2013).

Baumann appeals the grants of summary judgment on his

First Amendment and DCWPA claims and the dismissal of his

DCWPA claim against the individual defendants. Our review

is de novo. Calhoun v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir.

2011); Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 160 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.

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P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247

(1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable

inferences in his favor, and eschew making credibility

determinations or weighing the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Calhoun, 632

F.3d at 1261.

II.

Baumann contends that the defendants (hereafter

“appellees”) violated the First Amendment by punishing him for

criticizing the MPD through the protected speech of releasing

the ERT recording and communicating with the media. In

particular, he maintains that the MPD unlawfully undertook the

2009 IAD investigation and disciplined him in response to his

release of the ERT recording. On appeal, it does not matter

whether Baumann’s First Amendment claim is styled as one

alleging unlawful retaliation or prior restraint. Compare

O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998), with

Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). He

acknowledged during oral argument that the MPD could create

a constitutional policy under which individual officers who want

to release documents must alert the MPD in advance. Oral Arg.

Rec. 7:14–8:28 (Mar. 19, 2015). He also acknowledged that

there may be situations in which the MPD, as employer, could

punish its officers for disclosing confidential information whose

release did, in fact, undermine an ongoing investigation. Id. He

contends only that the MPD could not constitutionally

investigate and punish him for releasing this ERT recording

because the MPD has not shown that its release plausibly could

or did impede any investigation, or otherwise disrupted the

MPD’s operations, and the balancing of interests under

Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School

District 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), tips in his favor. 

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As a general matter, “Pickering and its progeny continue to

be the meter by which the First Amendment rights of public

employees are measured.” Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279,

1282 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct.

2369, 2377–78 (2014). First, a court must determine whether

the employee spoke as a private citizen, addressing matters of

public concern. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418

(2006); Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1272

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Appellees do not contest that this prerequisite

is satisfied. As the district court found, Baumann III, 987 F.

Supp. 2d at 75–76, Baumann spoke as a union official, not as a

police officer, when he disclosed the ERT recording, see Fuerst

v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006). Further, his speech

— releasing an ERT recording that he considered to reveal

security risks to the public and MPD officers arising from the

MPD’s handling of barricade situations — was of public

concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983);

O’Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1133–34; Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 91. 

Second, if the “private citizen/public concern” requirement is

met and Pickering applies, then the court “must ‘arrive at a

balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in

commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of

the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency

of the public services it performs through its employees.’” 

United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union (“NTEU”), 513

U.S. 454, 465–66 (1995) (first alteration in original) (quoting

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). In performing that balancing,

“courts must consider whether the challenged statute or

regulation is tailored to address the harm that the government

allegedly aims to protect.” Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 97; see NTEU,

513 U.S. at 474–75; Weaver v. U.S. Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429,

1439 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “[T]he government bears the burden of

justifying its adverse employment action . . . .” NTEU, 513 U.S.

at 466. In particular, “when the [g]overnment defends a

regulation on speech as a means to . . . prevent anticipated

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harms, it . . . must demonstrate that the recited harms are real,

not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact

alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” Id. at 475

(internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that appellees

have met their burden for the following reasons.

It cannot be gainsaid that the MPD has a weighty interest in

preserving confidential information that, if released publicly,

could jeopardize the successful conclusion of a criminal

investigation. See Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1297

(10th Cir. 2009); Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 239

(3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.); Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750,

754 (7th Cir. 1976). Congress and the judiciary have recognized

this and related interests in other contexts. In Boehner v.

McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the en banc

court noted that “[t]here are many federal provisions that forbid

individuals from disclosing information they have lawfully

obtained,” and “[t]he validity of these provisions has long been

assumed.” Id. “Grand jurors, court reporters, and prosecutors,

for instance, may ‘not disclose a matter occurring before the

grand jury.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)). 

“Judicial employees may not reveal confidential information

received in the course of their official duties.” Id. (citing CODE

OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES CANON 3D). And the

Freedom of Information Act protects from disclosure records

relating to law enforcement investigations and proceedings. 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).

Appellees have not argued that Boehner is dispositive here,

or that Baumann’s First Amendment challenge should be

resolved without looking to his and the public’s interests in

disclosure. And it is unnecessary to decide whether Baumann’s

disclosure of confidential material relevant to pending

investigations may be barred without consideration of those

interests in disclosure. See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 579. Even

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accepting the district court’s determination that the disclosure

addressed a matter of public concern, the MPD’s interest in

preventing the potential jeopardizing of ongoing investigations

is strong enough to outweigh Baumann’s and the public’s prodisclosure interests in immediate release of the ERT recording

under Pickering. Baumann, as a police officer and union

official, and the public have a strong interest in his speaking to

the public about safety issues related to the MPD’s management

of barricade situations, see Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 94; Baumann III,

987 F. Supp. 2d at 77, and, aside from releasing the recording,

Baumann and other officers were free to do so. But the MPD’s

“interest in protecting the integrity of [the] investigation[s]” by

preventing the premature and unauthorized disclosure of the

ERT’s communications “clearly outweighed whatever interest

[Baumann and the public] had in [his] disclosing [the ERT

recording itself]” at the particular time he did. Orange, 59 F.3d

at 1273; see also Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1306–09. That is, the

public was not denied information about the barricade incident,

as those who were present or otherwise informed of it were free

to discuss it publicly, as they did, with the exception here that

the recording of the ERT’s communications was confidential

during the pendency of related criminal investigations. 

The ERT recording of the barricade incident falls squarely

within the definition of confidential information that may

jeopardize the successful conclusion of an investigation. As the

name “Emergency Response Team” indicates, the ERT is a

specialized tactical unit that responds to ongoing, highly

dangerous, emergency law enforcement situations, and, as here,

the ERT’s recordings are often of communications among ERT

members who are observing a violent crime in progress. Such

recordings can reveal information about the location, nature, and

timing of actions by the suspect and the police as well as of

other individuals — including confederates and witnesses — at

the scene. Premature release of such information can, among

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other things, tip off potential suspects and others that the MPD

has a contemporaneous recording of the events and thereby

jeopardize the MPD’s ability to use that recording to verify the

accuracy and credibility of eyewitness testimony untainted by

those witnesses having learned what is contained in the

recordings. Cf. Orange, 59 F.3d at 1273. Also, of particular

interest to Baumann, premature release of this ERT recording

could have interfered with the MPD’s efforts to resolve whether

an order to use tear gas had been given, and if so, under what

circumstances, as well as to find out whether high-ranking

officials outside the chain of command had improperly

interfered with the ERT’s handling of the incident. 

It is true, as Baumann emphasizes on appeal, that a

government employer “must demonstrate that the recited harms

are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in

fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” NTEU,

513 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 98. But this does not require the

government to “allow events to unfold to the extent that the

disruption . . . is manifest before taking action.” Connick, 461

U.S. at 152. That is, “a showing of actual disruptiveness is not

required; a government employer is allowed to consider the

potential disruptiveness of the employee’s speech.” Lalowski v.

City of Des Plaines, — F.3d — , No. 12-3604, 2015 WL

3756412, at *6 (7th Cir. June 17, 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted). A recording of the ERT’s communications

during an incident involving MPD officers’ exchanging gunfire

with a suspect who barricaded himself inside a private home is

manifestly the kind of information that would be significant in

follow-up investigations, regardless of whether it ultimately

proved to be decisive in resolving a critical issue or evaluating

received evidence. Premature disclosure of the ERT recording

“carrie[d] the clear potential for undermining” the ongoing

investigations, Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, and thus endangered

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the MPD’s effective operations. See id. at 152–53. “We think

it is sufficient in this case that . . . [appellees] established that

the [recording’s release] could very well have an unfavorable

impact on the [ongoing investigations].” Zook v. Brown, 865

F.2d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1989); see Lalowski, 2015 WL 3756412,

at *6; Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1306–07. 

Baumann’s suggestion that there is a material dispute about

whether disclosure of the ERT recording might be harmful to the

ongoing investigations lacks merit. He relies on Officer Charles

Yarbaugh’s testimony that release of the ERT recording would

not be detrimental to any of the ERT’s operations. This

overlooks that Yarbaugh spoke only to whether the safety of the

ERT officers would be jeopardized by release of the recording

(e.g., by disclosing non-public tactical techniques or codes); he

did not comment about whether such disclosure would affect the

ongoing investigations of the barricade incident by tipping off

potential witnesses about the content of the MPD’s evidence. 

And ERT recordings like the one at issue are likely to be useful

during related investigations because they frequently include

officers’ radio chatter describing the scene and the location of

the suspect and confirm whether the police discharged their

weapons before or after a suspect fired at them. Such

information also can be used to gauge the credibility of

testimony provided by the suspect, officers, and witnesses about

the emergency situations the recordings memorialize, and may

be of use in investigations relating to whether officers were

justified in using force. 

The General Order’s restriction on Baumann’s disclosure of

the ERT recording is narrow and time-limited, with an obvious

“‘fit’ between the government’s purported interest” and the

restriction. See Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 95. The Order lists many

other kinds of information that may be publicly disclosed. See

Gen. Order 204.01, Part VI-A & VI-B. Indeed, the MPD has

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acknowledged that Baumann was only prohibited from releasing

the ERT recording on his own initiative at the time he did and

was free to talk with anyone in or outside of the MPD about the

barricade situation even though the investigations were ongoing. 

See Appellees’ Br. 46. The record makes clear he did so, when

he told the safety committee to investigate, when he sent an

email to Assistant Chiefs Durham and Burke, and when he

spoke with a reporter about the barricade incident. Moreover,

the restriction under Part VI-C-1 applies only to “[c]onfidential

information that may jeopardize the successful conclusion of an

investigation,” which the MPD interprets to mean that it applies

only while an investigation is ongoing. See Appellees’ Br. 47. 

Baumann was at most only prohibited from releasing the ERT

recording on his own initiative while the barricade-related

investigations were pending. And he makes no claim that he

alerted any MPD officials of his intention to disclose the ERT

recording to the media, much less sought permission to release

it only days after the barricade incident. Consequently, Part VIC-1 of General Order 204.01 as applied to Baumann by the

Chief of Police is tailored to the MPD’s justifications for nondisclosure and does not unnecessarily burden Baumann’s and

the public’s interests in speech about the barricade. See Farhat

v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 598 (6th Cir. 2004). 

For these reasons, we conclude that the ERT recording was

within the General Order’s ex ante bar against disclosure of

confidential information that may jeopardize ongoing

investigations and that Baumann’s sanction for disobeying that

rule did not violate his First Amendment rights.

III.

The DCWPA, D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq., provides that

“[a] supervisor shall not . . . retaliate against an employee

because of the employee’s protected disclosure.” Id.

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§ 1-615.53(a); see Wilburn v. District of Columbia, 957 A.2d

921, 924 (D.C. 2008). To prove a violation of the DCWPA, an

employee must demonstrate “by a preponderance of the

evidence [1] that [he] made a protected disclosure, [2] that a

supervisor retaliated or took or threatened to take a prohibited

personnel action against [him], and [3] that [his] protected

disclosure was a contributing factor to the retaliation or

prohibited personnel action.” Freeman v. District of Columbia,

60 A.3d 1131, 1141 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Pursuant to the DCWPA in effect at the time of the

events underlying Baumann’s lawsuit, the term “protected

disclosure” means

any disclosure of information, not specifically

prohibited by statute, by an employee to a supervisor or

a public body that the employee reasonably believes

evidences: (A) [g]ross mismanagement; (B) [g]ross

misuse or waste of public resources or funds; (C)

[a]buse of authority in connection with the

administration of a public program or the execution of

a public contract; (D) [a] violation of a federal, state, or

local law, rule, or regulation, or of a term of a contract

between the District government and a District

government contractor which is not of a merely

technical or minimal nature; or (E) [a] substantial and

specific danger to the public health and safety. 

D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6) (2001); see Payne v. D.C. Gov’t,

722 F.3d 345, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013). A “supervisor” is “an

individual employed by the District government,” D.C. Code

§ 1-615.52(a)(8) (2001), who has the authority “to hire, transfer,

suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or

discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or

to evaluate their performance, or to adjust their grievances, or

effectively to recommend such action, if . . . the exercise of

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[such] authority . . . requires the use of independent judgment,”

id. § 1-617.01(d); see id. § 1-615.52(a)(8), or who has the

authority “to effectively recommend or take remedial or

corrective action for the violation of a law, rule, regulation or

contract term, or the misuse of government resources that an

employee may allege or report pursuant to this section, including

without limitation an agency head, department director, or

manager,” id. § 1-615.52(a)(8). The term “[p]ublic body”

includes “[a]ny federal, District of Columbia, state, or local law

enforcement agency, prosecutorial office, or police or peace

officer,” as well as “[a]ny federal, District of Columbia, state, or

local regulatory, administrative, or public agency or authority or

instrumentality of one of these agencies or authorities.” Id.

§ 1-615.52(a)(7)(C)–(D). 

On appeal, Baumann points to three alleged protected

disclosures under the DCWPA: (1) his request that Cunningham

initiate a safety committee investigation of the barricade; (2) in

his June 11, 2009 email to MPD officials; and (3) his statements

during his two interviews with the IAD. Baumann II, 933 F.

Supp. 2d at 30. With respect to Baumann’s allegation that he

made a protected disclosure by relaying the dangerous actions

at the barricade to Cunningham and the safety committee and

ordering the initiation of a safety committee investigation,

Baumann did not disclose any safety issues to Cunningham; it

was Cunningham who alerted Baumann to the concerns related

to the barricade. Moreover, the union’s safety committee is not

a public body under the DCWPA because it consists entirely of

union officials, and it is not a “supervisor” because, even if it

had the “authority to effectively recommend . . . remedial or

corrective action” to the MPD, it is not “an individual employed

by the District government,” D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(8) (2001). 

Finally, although Baumann testified at a D.C. Public Employee

Relations Board (“PERB”) hearing that the union’s committee

is the de facto joint safety committee — a committee provided

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for by the CBA and comprised of three individuals appointed by

MPD management and three individuals appointed by the union

— he acknowledged that there were no MPD representatives on

the committee and that the MPD had never convened a joint

committee meeting. Baumann has not explained how a

committee comprised entirely of union officials is a District

agency or an “instrumentality” of the MPD. See Baumann II,

933 F. Supp. 2d at 31–32.

Baumann’s June 11, 2009 email to Assistant Chiefs Durham

and Burke was not a “protected disclosure” because Baumann

did not disclose any safety concerns but rather re-sent an email

to those who had already received it, without adding any

information about the barricade that was not, according to

Baumann, already known to the media. In opposing summary

judgment, Baumann acknowledged that he “started receiving

calls from the media on Sunday,” May 31, 2009, about the

barricade incident — specifically regarding “concerns about the

command structure there,” the involvement of hostage

negotiators even though their unit had recently been disbanded,

and a possible “order to deploy gas.” Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mem. in

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., PERB Hr’g Tr. 1471–73

(Feb. 23, 2010). As the D.C. Court of Appeals has held, the

disclosure of information about which there is “public

knowledge” and “vocalized public concern” is not protected

under the DCWPA in effect at the time of the underlying events

here. Williams v. District of Columbia, 9 A.3d 484, 489 (D.C.

2010). The now-amended statute, see Whistleblower Protection

Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Law 18-117 (Mar. 11, 2010), 57

D.C. Reg. 896 (Jan. 22, 2010); 57 D.C. Reg. 3,150 (Apr. 16,

2010), protects the disclosure of information without regard to

the “prior disclosure made to any person by an employee.” D.C.

Code § 1-615.52(a)(6) (2010). But even assuming it

encompasses Baumann’s disclosure, that amendment does not

apply retroactively, see Payne, 722 F.3d at 352–53. Moreover,

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Baumann does not maintain that violations of the CBA fall

within the scope of § 1-615.52(a)(6)(D) (2001), and his

comments in the email about violations of law are insufficient

to render the email a protected disclosure. His failure in the

email, in the district court, and in his briefs on appeal to point to

a specific law, rule, or regulation that was violated is fatal to his

claim. See District of Columbia v. Poindexter, 104 A.3d 848,

858 (D.C. 2014) (citing Langer v. Dep’t of Treasury, 265 F.3d

1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

Finally, in Baumann’s first IAD interview he refused to

answer questions about the barricade incident or the recording

and did not disclose anything, and with respect to the second

interview, he has not identified what previously undisclosed

safety concerns he revealed to the IAD. The issues Baumann

discussed in the second interview — namely, the role played by

a recently disbanded team of hostage negotiators and the alleged

order to use tear gas — were, as Baumann acknowledged, see,

e.g., Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.,

PERB Hr’g Tr. 1471–73 (Feb. 23, 2010), already known to the

media. So their alleged disclosure was not protected under the

then-extant DCWPA. See Williams, 9 A.3d at 489–90. And,

again, to the extent an amendment to the DCWPA might protect

them, see D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6) (2010), it is not

retroactive. See Payne, 722 F.3d at 352–53. 

Because Baumann did not show that he made a “protected

disclosure,” his DCWPA claim against the individual appellees

and the MPD fails, and we affirm the judgment for appellees on

Baumann’s statutory claim. Consequently, we do not reach the

questions whether individual supervisors were subject to suit

under the Act as originally enacted and whether the amendment

providing for such liability applies retroactively. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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