Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-03920/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-03920-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARIE A. ARNOLD,

Plaintiff,

v.

METLIFE AUTO & HOME INSURANCE 

AGENCY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-03920-VKD 

ORDER GRANTING METLIFE AUTO 

& HOME INSURANCE AGENCY, 

INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 24

Defendant MetLife Auto & Home Insurance Agency, Inc. (“MAHIA”) moves to dismiss 

all claims asserted against it by plaintiff Marie A. Arnold. Dkt. No. 24. The Court held a hearing 

on the motion on November 12, 2019. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, 

as well as the oral arguments presented, the Court grants the motion to dismiss, and gives Ms. 

Arnold leave to file a second amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Arnold, proceeding pro se, originally filed this action against defendants MAHIA and 

MetLife Group, Inc. (“MetLife Group”), asserting claims for negligence and negligent 

misrepresentation, as well as a claim under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for 

alleged invasion of privacy. Ms. Arnold says that, at defendants’ suggestion and with their

agreement, she subsequently amended her complaint to include an additional defendant, 

Brighthouse Life Insurance Company (“Brighthouse”).1 Dkt. No. 13.

 

1 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 

adjudicated by a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

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Ms. Arnold’s operative amended complaint (Dkt. No. 19) asserts claims for fraudulent

concealment, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Fourth Amendment 

(invasion of privacy). Although the allegations of the amended complaint are not stated clearly, 

Ms. Arnold seems to allege that she obtained some sort of insurance coverage through her prior 

employment with Kaiser Permanente (“Kaiser”). Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 2. Ms. Arnold says that she

voluntarily terminated her employment with Kaiser on May 13, 2012, and was experiencing 

emotional distress and financial hardship. Id. She further alleges that she was given “an option[]

to continue Metlife life [i]nsurance” through an “arrangement with [an] Insurance Agent,” and 

either Ms. Arnold or the insurance agent “insisted [o]n [a] ‘Promise Whole Life’ Plan.” Id. 

Appended as Exhibit A to the amended complaint is a letter that appears to summarize a “Promise 

Whole Life” plan Policy Number 21216479 UT, issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 

Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 11. The identified insured is “Marie A. Dantes,” which Ms. Arnold represents 

was her (former) married name. Id.; Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 3. That letter identifies a June 14, 2012 

“Policy Issue Date of Original Policy” and a “Face Amount of Insurance” of $50,000. Id. The 

letter also states that “[f]urther details about the policy and benefits will be furnished upon 

request.”2 Id. Elsewhere in the amended complaint, Ms. Arnold alleges that “Brighthouse and 

Metlife are stated to be Plaintiff’s individual plan with same policy number.” Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 

3. Appended to the amended complaint as Exhibit B is what appears to be a brochure providing 

an overview of a Kaiser benefits package. Id. at ECF 13-20.

Ms. Arnold says she “informed Metlife about her hardship,” and seems to claim that, due 

to a chronic illness or disability, she was entitled to “withdraw” money under her policy. Id. at 

ECF 4, 5. According to the amended complaint, defendants failed to disclose, and made false 

representations about, Ms. Arnold’s alleged entitlement to payment of a “whole life policy 

amount.” Id. As a result, Ms. Arnold says that she suffered humiliation and mental anguish, and 

became homeless. Id. at ECF 3. She seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, plus $1,000,000 

in punitive damages. Id. at ECF 9.

 

2

It is unclear whether Ms. Arnold made any subsequent requests to obtain a copy of the subject 

Promise Whole Life policy.

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The amended complaint seems to acknowledge that Ms. Arnold’s claims may be timebarred. Nonetheless, Ms. Arnold alleges that she is entitled to tolling, noting “[t]he general rule

[that] the statu[t]es of limitation begins to run when Plaintiff discovers that a fraud occurred or 

exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id. at 3.

Defendant MAHIA moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim for 

relief, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In sum, MAHIA argues 

that the amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that MAHIA had any 

involvement in the matters on which Ms. Arnold bases her claims.3 Ms. Arnold opposes the 

motion, and has separately requested that she be permitted to file a second amended complaint to 

include venue and intra-district assignment allegations that she says she inadvertently omitted 

from her amended complaint.

4

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts 

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In such a motion, all material allegations in the complaint must be 

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Id.

However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, 

“the court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those 

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness 

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

3 MAHIA also argues that Ms. Arnold’s claims are time-barred and that the discovery rule does 

not save her claims. Insofar as these arguments were raised for the first time in MAHIA’s reply 

brief, the Court will not consider them here.

4 MAHIA correctly notes that exhibits and a declaration submitted by Ms. Arnold with her 

opposition papers cannot properly be considered on the present motion. Nevertheless, MAHIA 

argues that even if those exhibits and Ms. Arnold’s declaration were considered, they do not save 

Ms. Arnold’s claims from dismissal. The Court agrees.

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Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” This means that the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted). However, only plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to 

dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A claim is plausible if its factual content permits the court to 

draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. A plaintiff 

does not have to provide detailed facts, but the pleading must include “more than an unadorned, 

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678.

Documents appended to or incorporated into the complaint or which properly are the

subject of judicial notice may be considered along with the complaint when deciding a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fraudulent Concealment and Misrepresentation

Ms. Arnold’s first two claims for relief are both based on fraud.5 To state a claim for fraud 

under California law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, 

concealment, or non-disclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., 

to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. Lazar v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. 

4th 631, 638 (1996). Additionally, a claim for fraud “must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). However, “[m]alice, intent, 

knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Id. “A pleading is 

sufficient under [R]ule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that a defendant 

can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations. While statements of the time, place and 

nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud are 

insufficient.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). “To 

 

5 The amended complaint indicates that Ms. Arnold’s misrepresentation claim is based on 33 

U.S.C. § 931, which concerns penalties for “knowing[] and willful[]” misrepresentation under the 

Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. That statute has no apparent bearing on the 

present action. Accordingly, the Court construes Ms. Arnold’s misrepresentation claim as one 

based on common law fraud.

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comply with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of 

the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend 

against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Bly-Magee v. 

California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

With respect to Ms. Arnold’s concealment claim, the amended complaint alleges that 

“Metlife and Brighthouse committed concealment and cover-up, falsifying to [sic] Plaintiff’s 

entitlement to withdraw in her policy,” and that a “[d]efendant employee was concealing 

information and material[] facts” and “made false statement of deny” regarding Ms. Arnold’s 

insurance claim. Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 3-4. As for the misrepresentation claim, the amended 

complaint alleges that a “Defendant Agent” made misrepresentations and “concealed facts about 

whole life [i]nsurance protects employee in the events of early accident, chronic illness or 

disability and take loan before age[] 65 and provide cash value with penalties surrender charges.” 

Id. at 5. Ms. Arnold further alleges that “Defendant and Brighthouse failed to pay pension 

benefits to tens of thousand[s] of employee[s] covered by its group annuit[y] contracts.” Id.

Broadly construing the allegations of Ms. Arnold’s amended complaint, and viewing those 

allegations in a light most favorable to Ms. Arnold, she seems to claim that she was wrongfully 

denied payment under a whole life insurance policy. Nevertheless, Ms. Arnold’s allegations are 

vague and conclusory as to “the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged” 

required for fraud claims. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, the amended complaint groups all defendants 

together, and it is unclear what involvement, if any, MAHIA had in the events underlying Ms. 

Arnold’s claims. Accordingly, MAHIA’s motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

The Court will give Ms. Arnold leave to file a second amended complaint. In addition to 

the venue and intra-district assignment allegations she wishes to assert, Ms. Arnold should include 

allegations clearly stating what insurance policy is at issue. If it is the “Promise Whole Life” plan, 

Policy Number 21216479 UT, referenced in Exhibit A to her complaint (Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 11), 

Ms. Arnold should clearly say so. To the extent she has a copy of that policy, Ms. Arnold may 

wish to append a copy of that policy to her second amended complaint. If there is a different or 

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additional policy at issue, then Ms. Arnold should clearly say so in her second amended complaint 

and append a copy of the policy (if she has one) and provide the information she has about that 

policy, including the policy number, name of the insured, and date the policy was issued. As for 

the alleged fraud, to the extent she can truthfully do so, Ms. Arnold must also state, in as much 

detail as possible: (1) which defendant(s) concealed information or made false or misleading 

statements, (2) what specific information was concealed, (3) what specific statements were made, 

(4) why those statements were false or misleading, and (5) how she has been harmed by the false 

or misleading statements or by the concealment of information.

B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under California law, a plaintiff must plead 

facts establishing “‘the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately 

caused by that breach.’” Abbit v. ING USA Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1019 

(S.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Pierce v. Lyman, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1101 (1991). “‘[B]efore a 

person can be charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on 

behalf and for the benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship which imposes that 

undertaking as a matter of law.’” Id. at 1022 (quoting City of Hope Nat. Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, 

Inc., 43 Cal. 4th 375, 386 (2008)).

Here, Ms. Arnold alleges that a fiduciary relationship exists based on an insurer-insured 

relationship with defendants. Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 6. As discussed above, however, the amended 

complaint does not allege sufficient facts establishing that MAHIA was the insurer on any policy 

issued to Ms. Arnold. Moreover, courts have held that, “as a matter of California law, no true 

fiduciary duty arises from the insurer-insured relationship and an insured therefore cannot 

maintain a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based solely on the insurer-insured relationship.” In 

re Conseco Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. C-05-04726 RMW, 2007 WL 

486367, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007); see also Abbitt, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 1020-21 (same)

(citing Vu v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 26 Cal. 4th 1142, 1150-51 (2001)). Accordingly, 

Ms. Arnold’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is dismissed as to defendant MAHIA. Ms. Arnold 

is given leave to amend to the extent she can truthfully allege facts, beyond the mere existence of 

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an insurer-insured relationship, establishing that MAHIA knowingly undertook to act on her 

behalf and for her benefit, and then breached that obligation. Abbitt, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. 

C. Fourth Amendment Claim for Invasion of Privacy

Ms. Arnold alleges that defendants violated her constitutional right to privacy by “us[ing] 

video surveillance to watch insured for investigations and employments” and “intercepti[ng] radio 

frequency” to eavesdrop on her private affairs. Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 7. “The Fourth Amendment 

limits searches conducted by the government, not by a private party, unless the private party acts 

as an instrument or agent of the government.” United States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Whether a search is governmental or 

private depends on: (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; 

and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or 

further the party’s own ends.” Id.

Ms. Arnold’s amended complaint alleges no facts establishing that any of the defendants, 

all of whom are private entities, acted as an instrument or agent of the government. In her 

opposition, Ms. Arnold asserts that MAHIA “contracts with Private Investigator and law 

enforcement to monitor[] employees who purchased their Group Insurance policy with Insurance 

company with the Government Agency.” Dkt. No. 27 at ECF 9-10. However, there are no such 

facts alleged in the amended complaint. Moreover, as discussed above, there are no facts 

demonstrating that MAHIA issued any policy to Ms. Arnold or otherwise had any involvement in 

the matters underlying her claims. At the hearing, the Court inquired whether Ms. Arnold could 

allege facts supporting her assertion that MAHIA conducted a search or surveillance of her in 

conjunction with or at the direction of any government agency. In response, she posited that 

insurance companies work with law enforcement for surveillance purposes, but offered nothing 

more than speculative assertions that anything of that nature occurred in this case. As it appears 

that Ms. Arnold cannot plausibly allege facts to support a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 

Court dismisses Ms. Arnold’s claim for invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment without 

leave to amend.

Ms. Arnold’s Fourth Amendment claim was the sole basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 

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U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, to the extent Ms. Arnold contends that there is another basis for this 

Court’s jurisdiction over this matter, she must clearly allege facts establishing such jurisdiction in 

her second amended complaint. For example, federal courts also have original jurisdiction over 

civil actions between citizens of different States and where the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, defendant MAHIA’s motion to dismiss is granted, with leave to 

amend as to her claims for concealment, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. To the 

extent Ms. Arnold has a plausible basis to believe that an entity other than the named defendants is 

responsible for the conduct alleged, she may amend her complaint to name the responsible entity 

or entities. If Ms. Arnold chooses to amend, her amended pleading should be titled “Second 

Amended Complaint.” That amended pleading should also state the basis for federal jurisdiction. 

The Second Amended Complaint must be filed no later than November 29, 2019.

Ms. Arnold is encouraged to contact the Federal Pro Se Program for assistance. The Pro 

Se Program is located on the Second Floor of the Federal Courthouse in San Jose. Help is 

provided by appointment and on a drop-in basis Monday to Thursday, 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 

Appointments may be made by signing up in person at the Program’s office (Room 2070) at the 

San Jose Federal Courthouse, or by calling 408-297-1480. Additionally, if she has not already 

done so, Ms. Arnold is encouraged to obtain a copy of the Court’s Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, 

available on the Court’s website (https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook) or from the 

Clerk’s Office.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2019

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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