Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02317/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The proceedings were assigned to this Court, but all post-service matters have been referred

to Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major by Local Rule 72.3(e), “Assignment of § 1983 Prisoner Civil

Cases to United States Magistrate Judges,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

K:\COMMO N\EVERYO NE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\06-2317-g&d.wpd, 1286 -1- 06cv2317

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC WILLIAMS,

CDC #H-98792,

Civil No. 06-2317 LAB (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2]; and

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES PURSUANT TO 42

U.S.C. § 1997e

vs.

ROBERT HERNANDEZ,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Eric Williams, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State

Prison located in Soledad, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while he was

incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, prison officials exposed him to

unsafe prison conditions in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff

has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No 2].

Case 3:06-cv-02317-LAB-BLM Document 4 Filed 12/01/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMO N\EVERYO NE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\06-2317-g&d.wpd, 1286 -2- 06cv2317

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave

to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of

whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit sufficient to show that he has no

funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n

no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay

the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts

as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay

. . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

////

////

Case 3:06-cv-02317-LAB-BLM Document 4 Filed 12/01/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMO N\EVERYO NE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\06-2317-g&d.wpd, 1286 -3- 06cv2317

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner and all other IFP complaints, or any

portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages

from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d

443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th

Cir. 1998) (discussing § 1915A). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a

court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In his Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he filed an initial administrative grievance but

he admits he has not completed the grievance process. (Compl. at 6.) The PLRA amended 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once

within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now

mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). “The ‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be

‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may be entertained,” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

Case 3:06-cv-02317-LAB-BLM Document 4 Filed 12/01/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMO N\EVERYO NE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\06-2317-g&d.wpd, 1286 -4- 06cv2317

731, 738 (2001), and “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Id.

at 741. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently held in Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct.

2378 (2006) that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other

critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without

imposing some orderly structure on the court of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386. The Court further

held that “[proper exhaustion] means ... a prisoner must complete the administrative review

process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules . . . as a precondition to bring suit in

federal court.” Id.

The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no § 1983 action “shall be

brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002) holds that prisoners who are incarcerated at the time they file a civil action

which challenges the conditions of their confinement are required to exhaust “all administrative

remedies as are available” as a mandatory precondition to suit. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1198;

see also Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Congress

could have written a statute making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The

actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to suit.”) (emphasis original). Section 1997e(a)

“clearly contemplates exhaustion prior to the commencement of the action as an indispensable

requirement. Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of the suit will not suffice.” McKinney, 311

F.3d at 1198 (quoting Medina-Claudio v. Rodriquez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)). 

Thus, because it appears that Plaintiff may not have exhausted his available administrative

remedies prior to bringing this action, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint, without

prejudice, for failing to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so

long as no exception to exhaustion applies.”). 

////

////

////

Case 3:06-cv-02317-LAB-BLM Document 4 Filed 12/01/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMO N\EVERYO NE\_EFILE-PROSE\LAB\06-2317-g&d.wpd, 1286 -5- 06cv2317

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing

fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal

to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on James Tilton,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to exhaust his

administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED

forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in which to file a First

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.

See S. D. CAL. CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the

Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 1, 2006

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02317-LAB-BLM Document 4 Filed 12/01/06 Page 5 of 5