Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00072/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00072-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 05CV0072

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF SAN

DIEGO; JOANN REED; and MILTON

RODGERS, JAMEL RODGERS and

ANTWAN RAMSEY, minors, by their

guardian ad litem, JOANN REED,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05CV0072-LAB (CAB)

ORDER:

(1) OVERRULING OBJECTIONS

TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE FEES

AND COSTS AWARD TO

PLAINTIFF REED;

(2) ADOPTING

RECOMMENDATION RE FEES

AND COSTS AWARD TO

PLAINTIFF REED;

(3) OVERRULING IN PART AND

SUSTAINING IN PART

OBJECTIONS TO

RECOMMENDATION RE

DENIAL OF FEES AND COSTS

AWARD TO PLAINTIFF FAIR

HOUSING COUNCIL; AND

(3) AWARDING PORTION OF

CLAIMED COSTS TO PLAINTIFF

FAIR HOUSING COUNSEL

[Dkt Nos. 114, 115, 124, 125, 126]

vs.

PEÑASQUITOS CASABLANCA

OWNER’S ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

Following jury verdicts for plaintiffs in this fair housing civil rights action, the undersigned

district judge referred the Applications for attorneys' fees and costs of plaintiff Joann Reed ("Reed")

and of plaintiff Fair Housing Council of San Diego ("FHCSD") to Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann

Bencivengo for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). Dkt Nos. 114, 115. Judge Bencivengo

received briefing from the parties on both Applications and filed R&Rs on August 31, 2007 and

September 4, 2007. Reed had requested an award of $347,198.75 in attorneys' fees -- a figure

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Reed had obtained a restraining order in June 2004, prohibiting MacDonald from contacting her,

and MacDonald was arrested then returned to prison in part for his sexual battery of Reed after a September

2004 parole revocation hearing. Compl. ¶¶ 14-16.

2

 Reed also alleged the PCOA retaliated against the Reed plaintiffs because of Reed's complaints

about MacDonald's conduct, such as the imposition of different rules or conditions on the use and enjoyment

of facilities by minor children like those living with Reed. None of those contentions was tried to a verdict.

- 2 - 05CV0072

including a 25% contingent fee risk multiplier applied to a lodestar figure of $277,759.00 in claimed

fees – and $16,001.51 in litigation costs and expenses. Judge Bencivengo recommends Reed's

Application be granted, but without any contingent fee multiplier and with additional downward

adjustments, in an award amount of $161,000 in attorneys' fees and $7,673.83 in costs and expenses,

for a total award of $168,673.83. Dkt No. 122. She recommends the FHCSD's Application requesting

an award of $64,809.69 in combined fees and costs be denied in its entirety. Dkt No. 123. 

Defendant Penasquitos Casablanca Owner's Association ("PCOA") filed Objections to the

recommended fee award to Reed. Dkt No. 124. Reed filed a Reply to the PCOA Objections (Dkt No.

131) and also filed her own objections to the R&R. Dkt No. 125. The PCOA filed a Reply to Reed's

Objections. Dkt No. 127. The FHCSD filed Objections to the R&R regarding its fee Application.

Dkt No. 126. The PCOA filed a Reply to the FHCSD's Objections. Dkt Nos. 128, 130 (duplicate

filing). For the reasons discussed below, all objections to the Reed Application R&R are

OVERRULED, and that R&R is ADOPTED. The Objections to the FHCSD's Application R&R are

OVERRULED IN PART and SUSTAINED IN PART, and that R&R is ADOPTED IN PART and

REJECTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2004, while she was a resident of the Casablanca condominiums, Reed complained of

housing discrimination to the FHCSD, a non-profit organization with the mission to promote fair

housing in San Diego County. She reported Kent MacDonald, a security guard PCOA employed, had

sexually harassed her between February 2004 and July 2004, and her complaints to the PCOA had not

resulted in corrective action.1 Compl. ¶¶ 17, 13. The FHCSD investigated and concluded the sexual

harassment allegations had merit. It also purportedly discovered the PCOA had rules and regulations

that discriminated against families with children because of their familial status.2 Compl. ¶ 18. 

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 2 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 05CV0072

Reed, three of her minor children or grandchildren who lived with her in 2004, and the FHCSD

initiated this litigation in January 2005, naming only the PCOA as a defendant. They alleged nine

causes of action : First, discriminatory housing practices in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act,

42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.; Second, unlawful business practices in violation of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 12927, 12955, et seq.; Third, unlawful business

practices in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE0 § 51, et seq.; Fourth, violation

of the Bane Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1, et seq.; Fifth, unfair business practices under

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et seq. in the form of a pattern or practice of unlawful housing

practices in connection with the operation of the PCOA; Sixth, assault and battery through its agent

MacDonald, in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 227, 242, 245; Seventh, wrongful entry through its

agent MacDonald, in violation of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954; Eighth, breach of the covenant of quiet

enjoyment, in violation of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1927; and Ninth, negligence causing injury through its

agent MacDonald in breach of its duty to operate the Casablanca condominiums in a safe and lawful

manner in that it negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained MacDonald as its security guard

employee. The FHCSD joined in three of the nine causes of action alleged in the Complaint: the First,

Second, and Ninth claims. 

Plaintiffs sought monetary (compensatory and statutory) damages,declaratoryrelief,injunctive

relief, and punitive damages Compl. pp. 9-10. More than half the claims initially pled were

abandoned or eliminated voluntarily or by court order before trial or jury deliberations, notably all the

familial status discrimination claims. The case was tried solely on plaintiffs' civil rights and housing

discrimination theories for the PCOA's conduct or omissions contributing to the sexual harassment of

Reed. The three minors and their claims were dismissed from the case after receipt of trial evidence.

The jury deliberated only on the federal fair housing and the state civil rights and fair housing

claims. The January 11, 2007 verdict found the PCOA liable under the fair housing claims, both state

and federal, the Unruh Act (CAL.CIV.CODE § 51.9. Sexual Harassment), and the Bane Act (CAL.CIV.

CODE § 52.1, interference by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the exercise or enjoyment of

individual rights secured by federal or state Constitutions or laws). The pleading was conformed to

the findings after trial on plaintiffs' motion to substitute the Ralph Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(a)) for

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 3 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 05CV0072

the Bane Act mistakenly relied on in the Complaint, to preserve the statutory award component of the

verdict. See Post-Trial Motions Order, Dkt No. 110. Although a "pattern and practice" was alleged

and noted in the Pre-Trial Order as an issue to be tried, this court found no basis upon which to enter

an injunction. As the court noted in the Order denying any equitable relief:

[T]he court has expressed reservations throughout this litigation that the

unique circumstances of the conduct giving rise to this lawsuit make it

a close call whether the case even falls within fair housing policies and

statues, including the federal fair housing law upon which federal

jurisdiction was predicated. The circumstances certainly fall outside

the arena of the usual fair housing cases. The facts of this case reveal

no endemic or even isolated discriminatory practice rectifiable by a

mandatory injunction of the kind plaintiffs seek. The PCOA does not

engage in offering housing, conditioning tenancies on any criteria, or

perpetuating particular tenancies. The court is unable to articulate any

purpose related to the substance of this case to be served by granting

any of the aspects of the injunctions requested. Finally, "[i]n each case,

a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider

the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested

relief." Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S.

531, 542 (1987). The PCOA board is a voluntary group whose service

should not be unnecessarily burdened with requirements remote from

their responsibilities predicated on an isolated instance of sexual

harassment by a now-former employee unrelated to any condition of

housing targeted by traditional fair housing concerns. 

Dkt No. 110, 3:5-18.

As prevailing plaintiffs, both Reed and the FHCSD now move to recover their claimed

attorneys' fees and costs to prosecute this civil rights action. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Reports And Recommendations

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further

evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions" on a dispositive matter

prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the parties for all purposes. Rule

72(b);see 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). A party objecting to the recommended disposition of the matter may

"serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations," and "a party may

respond to another party's objections." Rule 72(b). "[T]he court shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 4 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 05CV0072

is made." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (when objections

are made, the court must make a de novo determination of the factual findings to which there are

objections). The court also reviews de novo the magistrate judge's conclusions of law. Gates v.

Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1995). The statutory provision does not require that the district

court conduct some lesser review when no objections are filed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50

(1985); but seeRobbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (the magistrate's conclusions

of law are reviewed de novo, regardless of whether any party has filed objections thereto). "If neither

party contests the magistrate's proposed findings of fact, the court may assume their correctness and

decide the motion on the applicable law." Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979).

2. Attorneys' Fees And Costs Awards To Prevailing Parties

Under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fees and costs." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2).

The Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") similarly provides: "the court may, in its discretion,

award the prevailing party, other than the state, reasonable attorney's fees and costs." CAL.GOV.CODE

§ 12989.2. The only material difference between the state and federal fee-shifting statutes pertinent

here concerns the availability under the state statutes of a multiplier to enhance an attorneys' fees award

for exceptional representation or other public purpose incentive or to compensate for contingent fee

risk. Under the state fee-shifting statute, "a trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional

representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that

would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate

used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be

unreasonable. Nor should a fee enhancement be imposed for the purpose of punishing the losing

party." Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139, 1136 (2001) ("every fee shifting statute must be

construed on its own merits"). The same factors already encompassed in the lodestar should not be

considered when determining an appropriate enhancement. Id. at 1138. Reed's counsel seek a

multiplier to enhance their claimed lodestar award by 25%. 

"[A] trial court . . . has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable

fee altogether." Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1138. "[T]he definition of what is a reasonable fee applies

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 5 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 "Among the subsumed factors presumably taken into account in either the reasonable hours

component or the reasonable rate component of the lodestar calculation are: '(1) the novelty and complexity

of the issues, (2) the special skill and expertise of counsel, (3) the quality of representation, . . . (4) the results

obtained, . . . and (5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement." Morales, 96 F.3d at 364, n. 9 (citations

omitted).

- 6 - 05CV0072

uniformly to all federal fee-shifting statutes." Anderson v. Director, Office Workers Compensation

Programs, 91 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). When a party prevails under both federal and state law,

the district court may apply the more generous provisions of state law in calculating a fee award, such

as including a multiplier for contingent fee risk. See Mangold v. PUC, 67 F.3d 1470, 1479 (9th Cir.

1995). Although the district court has discretion in determining attorneys' fees awards, it must provide

"some indication or explanation as to how it arrived at the amount of fees awarded." Fair Housing of

Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 The lodestar approach to calculating attorneys' fee, pursuant to guidelines articulated in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), is presumed to result in a reasonable fee award. See

Rivera, 477 U.S. 561.

The "lodestar" is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the

prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable

hourly rate. . . . After making that computation, the district court then

assesses whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable

lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr factors that are not already

subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.[3]

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and footnote omitted)

(identifying twelve factors bearing on the reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award articulated in Kerr

v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975); but see Yahoo Inc. v. Net Games, Inc.,

329 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1182 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (discussing the Kerr factors subsequently deemed

"subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation," numbering at least five of the twelve), citing Morales,

96 F.3d at 363-64. 

In civil rights cases, "Congress intended that statutory fee awards be 'adequate to attract

competent counsel, but . . . not produce windfalls to attorneys.' " City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.

561, 580 (1986) (citation omitted). The amount of an attorneys' fees award need not be proportionate

to the amount of damages the plaintiffs actually recovered. See Id. at 580-85. Congress elected not

to impose a rule restricting attorneys' fees to a sum "proportionate to the amount of damages a civil

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 6 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 05CV0072

rights plaintiff might recover" to avoid windfalls. Id. at 580; see also Combs, 285 F.3d at 908.

However, the amount of damages recovered is a one of several relevant factors the court should

consider in calculating the award. 

"[T]he number of hoursreasonablyexpended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate," supported by evidence submitted by the party seeking the fee award, is the "starting point" for

the analysis. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. From that "objective basis" establishing "an initial estimate

of the value of a lawyer's services," the court may reduce the award in consideration of inadequate

documentation of hours and should "exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not

'reasonably expended.'" Id. at 433-34. The court properly considers such factors as whether the case

was overstaffed and the skill and experience of the lawyers. Id. at 434. The prevailing party's counsel

has a duty to exclude from a fee request "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary." Id. at 434. 

The Hensley Court addressed the issue "whether a partially prevailing plaintiff may recover an

attorney's fees for legal services on unsuccessful claims" and sought "to clarify the proper relationship

of the results obtained to an award of attorney's fees." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426, 432. "The product

of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry." Id., at 434. Other considerations

that may lead the court to adjust the fee up or down "includ[e] the important factor of the 'results

obtained.'" Id. "This factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed 'prevailing' even though

he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief," in which case the court must address two

questions: "First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which

he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably

expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?" Id.

 "The extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an

award of attorneys' fees." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. "A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief,

however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole." Id. at 439-

40 (emphasis added) (declining to affirm a fee award, despite acknowledging the awarding court's

"commendable effort in explaining the fee award," because a finding the significant extent of the relief

plaintiffs obtained "clearly justifies the award of a reasonable attorney's fee" does not "answer the

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 7 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 05CV0072

question of what is 'reasonable' in light of that level of success"). "[T]he inquiry does not end with a

finding that the plaintiff obtained significant relief." Id.

In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992), the Supreme Court identified an exception,

applicable in "nominal damages" or "de minimis relief" cases, to the general requirements that govern

attorneys' fees award calculations, including the requirement that a lodestar first be calculated. Farrar,

506 U.S. at 116-18; see Morales, 96 F.3d at 362-63 ("The Farrar exception, which would allow the

court to dispense with the calculation of a lodestar and simply establish a low fee or no fee at all, is

limited to cases in which the civil rights plaintiff 'prevailed' but received only nominal damages and

achieved only 'technical' success"). "'Nominal damages' is not limited to an award in the amount of

$1, but includes an award that may properly be classified as 'de minimis.'" Morales, 96 F.3d at 363.

Whether the plaintiff's "success is purely technical or de minimis" . . .

is determined by examining other factors in addition to the amount of

money damages awarded. Primary among such other considerations is

"the significance of the legal issues on which the plaintiff claims to

have prevailed" and the "publicpurpose" the plaintiff's litigation served.

Morales, 96 F.3d at 363, quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 117, 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The

difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought is not the only consideration").

 A prevailing party may also recover as part of a fee award out-of-pocket expenses counsel

normally charge fee-paying clients. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 2005). However, like

an attorneys' fees award, the expenses requested must be substantiated and reasonable in amount.

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Reed Application

1. R&R Fees And Costs Award Recommendation

Reed requests a costs award of $16,001.51 and actual attorneys' fees in the voluntarily-adjusted

amount of $254,799.00 (exclusive of the 25% state law multiplier Reed also requests), broken down

as charted in the R&R, for the services of two attorneys (Christopher Brancart, Esq. and Elizabeth

Brancart, Esq., billing at the rate of $350.00 per hour), two paralegals, and two litigation support

persons, supported by time records and the Declarations of both attorneys. R&R 4:19-5:12. The

PCOA does not challenge the reasonableness of any of the hourly rate, and this court adopts the R&R

recommendation to find the hourly rates are reasonable. 

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 8 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 05CV0072

Only four of Reed's nine causes of action were litigated to jury verdicts, resulting in a

$47,000.00 money damages recovery. Of that award, $10,000.00 was compensatory, the balance

statutory. In opposing Reed's Application, the PCOA characterizes Reed's recovery as "extremely

limited," warranting an award of no fees or low fees under the Farrar exception to the lodestar

approach. Judge Bencivengo found Reed, as a prevailing party in civil rights litigation, is entitled to

recover reasonable attorneys' fees, concluded her recovery was not so limited under the Farrar

exception as to warrant abandonment of the lodestar approach, and properly considered the "degree

of the plaintiff's overall success" as informing the question of "the reasonableness of a fee award."

R&R 3:7-25. Judge Bencivengo ascertained the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, in consideration of certain factors

appropriate at either the "reasonable hours" determination or the "reasonable rate" determination: "(1)

the novelty and complexity of the issues; (2) the special skill and experience of counsel; (3) the quality

of representation; (4) the results obtained; and (5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement." R&R

4:4-8, quoting Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 and citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Judge Bencivengo took the second step to apply equitable discretion to adjust the lodestar

amount "on the basis of other considerations." R&R 4:8-9, citing Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 988 (9th

Cir. 2004). The R&R substantiates the Brancart & Brancart firm itself deducted from its fees request

52.4 hours ($3,826.00) of the paralegal and litigation support time from the total hours expended on

the litigation. With that deduction, as charted in the R&R, for the 29-months duration of this litigation,

up to and including the filing of Reed's reply brief in support of the fee Application "on behalf of all

four plaintiffs for all nine causes of action," counsel identified a total of 1,026.9 hours expended by

the attorneys and their support staff. From that total, counsel also eliminated from the Reed fee

Application 36.8 hours of time attributed to "(1) the representation of the three minor children who

were not prevailing parties, (2) the dismissal of the retaliation claim, (3) the time spent solely on the

issue of punitive damages, and (4) time spent on jury instructions and verdict forms." R&R 6:15-17,

citing E. Brancart Decl. at ¶¶ 22-27. "Ms. Brancart then made a 5% across-the-board reduction of the

hours spent by counsel and staff in order to take into account any time that was spent in 'an

unnecessary, inefficient, or duplicative manner.'" R&R 6:17-19, citing E. Brancart Decl. at ¶ 28.

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 9 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 05CV0072

In opposition to the Reed fee request, the PCOA objected, among other things, plaintiffs'

retention of counsel from Pescadero, California was unnecessary because qualified attorneys in San

Diego could have handled this case, arguing the time and expenses incurred for travel should be

deducted from the Application amount. In response, Reed's counsel deducted an additional 74.6 hours

attributed to Christopher Brancart's travel time from Northern California to prosecute this case in San

Diego, leaving a total of 866,5 hours in claimed time, for a total adjusted actual fees request of

$254,799.00. R&R 6:21-27.

The R&R recommends the court sustain the PCOA's objections to compensation for additional

blocks of attorney time claimed in the Reed Application. The PCOA argues their time spent for

preparation and argument of post-trial motions should not be taxed to the defendant because Reed did

not prevail on the injunctive relief motions, and the motion to substitute the Ralph Act for the Bane

Act was necessitated solely by plaintiffs' own pleading error. Judge Bencivengo recommends a

deduction of 41.4 hours at $350.00 per hour for those activities, reducing the fee claim by an additional

$14,490.00, to $240,309.00. R&R 7:12-19. Finally, in a well-reasoned discussion, in consideration

of "the circumstances of this litigation and the results obtained," the magistrate judge recommends the

court concur with the PCOA's challenge to the overall reasonableness of the hours claimed by

plaintiffs' law firm, even after the foregoing deductions, on grounds those hours cannot be reasonably

attributed to the representation of Ms. Reed on the four causes of action on which she prevailed,

observing those claimed hours are nearly double the total time spent by defense counsel, and are

"excessive and unreasonable." R&R pp. 7- 9. She recommends "the [adjusted] fee award be reduced

[additionally] by approximately one-third, to account for the time spent by counsel in pursuit of

abandoned claims and on behalf of non-prevailing parties, and in light of the award plaintiff received

on the remaining claims in the litigation, for a total fee award of $161,000.00." R&R 9:14-17.

The Reed Application also seeks costs and expenses in the amount of $16,001.51, supported

by counsel's detailed report. The R&R recommends the court deduct $7,615.68 in costs associated

with counsel's travel to San Diego from Pescadero, comprised of air fair, lodging, car rental, airport

parking, meals and the like, for the same reasons as Reed's counsel withdrew his travel time from the

fees Application when challenged as not fairly taxed to the defendant. R&R 9:22-27. Finally, the

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 10 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 05CV0072

R&R recommends reducing the $2,155.38 in copying and scanning expenses by one-third to account

for work done on behalf of the minors and on abandoned claims, as the Reed Application does not

reflect such deductions were made before those charges were totaled and submitted for recovery from

the PCOA. The R&R thus recommends a total costs award in the amount of $7,673.83, for a

recommended combined fees and costs award to Reed of $168,673.83.

2. Defendant PCOA's Objections To R&R

Defendant PCOA states: "If the 'lodestar' method of calculating fees is to be utilized, this party

has no objection to the Report," commending the R&R's "thorough analysis" applying that

methodology. PCOA Obj. 2:2. However, the PCOA contends the lodestar method should not be used

on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. Despite the R&R discussion of the Farrar exception,

the PCOA interprets the R&R as having proceeded as if the lodestar method is the sole and mandatory

standard for assessing the reasonableness of fees claimed by prevailing parties and urges the court

instead to exercise its discretion to disregard the lodestar method in order "to reach an award more

commensurate with the recovery, the reasonable position taken by the defendant and the lack of

success by the plaintiff on so many causes of action abandoned or dismissed." PCOA Obj. 3:23-26.

The PCOA observes attorneys' fees awards are discretionary and limited, not mandatory, when a

plaintiff only partially prevails on her causes of action: the court "in its discretion," "may allow" a

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs award to the prevailing private party in a civil action asserting

discriminatory housing practices. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a), (c)(2). 

Although a plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party under the "generous formulation" of

civil rights fee statutes, such a designation "brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold."

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 432 ("It remains for the district court to determine what fee is 'reasonable'").

Plaintiffs in Farrar sought an award of their attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Farrar Court

held that a civil rights plaintiff who wins even nominal damages is a prevailing party for purposes of

an attorneys' fees award. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 573-74 (nominal damages, no less than compensatory

damages, effect a "material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties" as the plaintiff

becomes "entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant" to force

the defendant to pay an amount of money not otherwise owed). There is no dispute Reed is a

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 11 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The R&R expressly disregarded settlement demands as improper considerations in valuing a case

for these purposes. R&R p. 3 n.1. The PCOA acknowledges the R&R correctly does not consider confidential

discussions occurring in settlement conferences, but argues Reed herself made those discussions "public"

through her counsel's demand letters to defense counsel: "The numbers mentioned as to the settlement demand

in [PCOA's] opposition to the motion for fees were taken from the recitation of the settlement conference

discussions as recounted by correspondence from plaintiff's counsel to counsel for the defendant." PCOA Obj.

2:6-11. To the extent PCOA seeks to have the court consider the amounts plaintiffs communicated to

defendant in connection with settlement negotiations as a measure of the value of their claims for purposes of

comparing their much lower recovery at trial as a rationale for abandoning the lodestar calculation

methodology, this court rejects the proposal.

5

 By its terms, Rule 408 makes inadmissible evidence of offers to compromise "when offered to prove

liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach

through prior inconsistent statement or contradiction. . . ." Rule 408(a).

- 12 - 05CV0072

"prevailing party." However, the PCOA argues Reed's recovery was quite limited in comparison to

her multiple claims and settlement demands, notwithstanding the absence of any damages figure

alleged in the pleadings.4 

In her Reply to the PCOA's R&R Objections, Reed first asks the court to overrule the

Objections on grounds the magistrate judge correctly selected the lodestar methodology for purposes

of calculating a reasonable fee award, contending the results she obtained were neither minimal nor

de minimis so as to justify an award of low or no fees. Reed Reply 1:27-2:4. Second, she asks the

court to find the R&R refusal to consider settlement demands in setting a reasonable fee award should

extend to statements made in settlement negotiations, as FED.R.EVID. ("Rule") 408 applies to both.5

She also argues even if those negotiations may be relied on in setting a reasonable fee award,

"defendant mischaracterizes those negotiations. . . ." Reed Reply 2:5-13. This court considers no

settlement-related communications in reaching its decision.

3. Reed's Objections To R&R

Reed filed her own Objections to the R&R, asking this court to award lodestar attorneys' fees

and costs for Brancart and Brancart in the full amount of the Application: $277,759.00, despite

counsel's prior acquiescence in certain deductions during the R&R process. Reed asserts the

magistrate judge committed five errors. First, she contends the magistrate judge failed to engage in

the appropriate analysis for determining "limited success" under Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Second,

she objects the magistrate judge mistakenly concluded her limited success justified a one-third

reduction in the adjusted lodestar, arguing the magistrate judge: erroneously considered her

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 12 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 05CV0072

$47,000.00 jury award and denial of injunctive relief to be "limited success;" erroneously considered

dismissal of the minor plaintiffs' claims as a factor justifying a significant reduction in the lodestar;

erroneously considered dismissal of five of the nine causes of action as a factor justifying a lodestar

reduction; erroneously considered plaintiffs' abandonment of the retaliation claims supports a finding

of "limited success;" and had no reasoned basis for recommending the one-third reduction in the

adjusted lodestar. Third, Reed objects the magistrate judge erred by eliminating counsel's travel time

from the lodestar fees award. Fourth, she objects the magistrate judge erred by eliminating time spent

by plaintiff's counsel in post-trial motions. Fifth, she objects the magistrate judge erred by refusing

to grant the multiplier for contingent risk under state law.

The PCOA filed a Reply to Reed's Objections, contending her characterization of the R&R is

misleading in that she "isolate[s] an element, cite[s] some authority on that isolated element, and

claim[s] an error occurred," whereas the magistrate judge actually "evaluated all of the elements" and

the "overall result." PCOA Reply 5:23-28. In consideration of the second prong of the Hensley

analysis, the PCOA correctly contends: "All of these factors -- the failure to obtain injunctive relief,

the dismissal of the claims of the minor Plaintiffs, the dismissal of five of the nine claims prior to trial,

the abandonment of another claim prior to trial -- are part of the analysis of the overall relief obtained

by the Plaintiff as compared to the time spent." PCOA Reply 3:15-28. 

With respect to Reed's first objection, the PCOA disputes Reed's characterization the R&R

fails to properly apply the Hensley approach. Portions of the R&R address the separate and distinct

nature of certain of the claims and outline the reasons for the recommended reduction in the number

of compensable hours. PCOA Reply 1:26-2:8. The PCOA argues: nothing in Hensley prohibits the

recommended one-third reduction in the lodestar hours; Judge Bencivengo properly evaluated the

significance of the overall relief Reed obtained in relation to the number of hours expended as part of

the "reasonable hours" determination; the court is under no obligation to rely first and primarily on a

Hensley analysis to arrive at a fee award figure; and Hensley in fact supports the exercise of the judge's

discretion to reduce the number of compensable hours from the gross lodestar calculation to a

reasonable total in light of the plaintiff's overall recovery. PCOA Reply 2:9-21.

\\

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 13 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 The court disregards the PCOA's argument the reasonableness of the manner of its defense is an

appropriate factor in the evaluation of an attorneys' fees award to prevailing plaintiffs. Its reliance on

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) for the proposition the district court has discretion

to deny fees to a prevailing party when the court believes the opposing party was not unreasonable or presented

a meritless case is misplaced. PCOA Reply 2:19-3:4. That case addressed circumstances under which an

award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant may be appropriate, an analysis predicated on different

- 14 - 05CV0072

The PCOA contends Reed second objection to the R&R is premised on a flawed analysis of

the evidence. In particular, the PCOA challenges Reed's reliance on illustrative recoveries in other

cases, arguing the examples are not binding on this court and are distinguishable in consideration,

among other things, of the equitable relief denied in this case but awarded in Reed's cited authority.

The PCOA disputes that any "evidence" beyond the four corners of this case need be considered in the

court's exercise of its discretion to calculate the reasonableness of a fee award to Reed. The PCOA

argues: "in light of the relief obtained, it would be reasonable to deny fees altogether or award a

contingent fee percentage of the award as reasonable fees." PCOA Reply 4:4-6, 3:16. 

With respect to Reed's third Objection, the PCOA argues many competent attorneys within the

County of San Diego could have handled this case, and Reed cites no authority to support a right "to

retain counsel from out of the area at a greater cost and to compel the Defendant to pay those

additional costs." PCOA Reply 4:9-17. With respect to Reed's fourth Objection, the PCOA argues

elimination of the time spent on post-trial motions "is wholly consistent with the determination the

Plaintiff did not prevail on injunctive relief, and the other post-trial motion was necessitated by

counsel's error." PCOA Reply 4:20-23. With respect to Reed's fifth Objection, the PCOA argues a

multiplier is always discretionary, and Reed fails to make the case a multiplier is warranted in this

case, particularly as the R&R recommends a reduction in the claimed fees in consideration of the

overall relief obtained. PCOA Reply 3:16. Although the PCOA argues the court is not compelled to

follow the traditional lodestar approach in calculating fees -- urging this court to abandon that

methodology in favor of considering "the reasonableness with which the case was defended, the

limited success of the Plaintiff, and award either no fee or one representative of a contingent fee

percentage of the recovery" (PCOA Reply 6:9-12) -- the PCOA does not quarrel with the manner in

which the magistrate judge conducted the lodestar analysis, nor with the result of the lodestar analysis,

if that method is ultimately applied to the Application.6 PCOA Reply 5:21-6:12. 

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 14 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

policies and "quite different equitable considerations." Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418-19. 

- 15 - 05CV0072

4. Disposition Of Reed's Fee Application

Reed is a prevailing plaintiff, but she succeeded on only some of her claims for relief. The

court accordingly must address the two questions posited in Hensley: "First, did the plaintiff fail to

prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff

achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making

a fee award?" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. As discussed below, the court answers the first question in

the affirmative: Reed failed to prevail, among other things, on any of her claims related to familial

status discrimination and punitive damages and was denied any injunctive relief. In answer to the

second question, hours expended on the litigation is not an entirely satisfactory basis for the fee award,

where the only alleged misconduct underlying any PCOA liability sustainable through trial emanated

from isolated sexual harassment by one PCOA employee. No invidious policy or practice of the

homeowners' association was actually identified, all requested injunctive relief was denied, no punitive

damages was colorably triable, none of the independent claims alleged by the minor plaintiffs made

it to the jury, and the compensatory damages recoveries reflect the jury's apparent assessment the scope

of the harm was narrow and the nature of the underlying wrongdoing isolated.

. The Special Verdict recorded the jury's findings the PCOA is liable "for violation of the federal

Fair Housing Act or California Fair Employment And Housing Act" with respect to both plaintiffs, and

the PCOA is liable for violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Bane Act

with respect to Reed. Dkt No. 94. The jury awarded Reed $10,000.00 in compensatory damages,

$12,000.00 in statutory damages under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and $25,000.00 in statutory

damages under the Bane (Ralph) Act. Dkt No. 94. The jury awarded the FHCSD $500.00 in

compensatory damages. Dkt No. 94. 

The "Reed plaintiffs'"claims abandoned or dismissed in their entirety before trial were: the

Fifth Cause of Action for California unfair business practices; the Sixth Claim for assault and battery;

the Seventh Cause of Action for wrongful entry; the Eight Cause of Action for breach of the covenant

of quiet enjoyment; and the Ninth Cause of Action for negligence. Dkt No. 1. In addition, the court

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 15 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 - 05CV0072

did not permit the children's claims to reach the jury, and Reed did not pursue through trial any claim

of familial status discrimination. 

Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all

respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful

claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.

Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won

substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply

because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But

where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court

should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to

the results obtained. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.

Some apportionment of the fee award on the basis of the plaintiff's success or failure on

particular discrete issues or claims, and based on the elimination of the three minor co-plaintiffs as

litigants is appropriate, as reasonably attempted in the R&R. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437-38, 440

("[a] reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the

scope of the litigation as a whole"). The result here, however, does not warrant abandoning the

lodestar approach entirely. Reed's compensatory recovery is neither "nominal" nor "de minimis" in

amount, and the court can devise no principled manner in which to calculate an alternative "low fee"

award in place of the lodestar methodology, as urged by the PCOA. Any fixing of an attorneys' fees

award outside that lodestar structure would be wholly arbitrary, despite this court's perception the case

was overly broad in its charges and excessive in the theories of recovery pled in consideration of the

facts, and despite the court's concern plaintiff could and should have scaled the case back much earlier

in the process to avoid escalation of fees. The court finds the R&R properly selected and applied the

lodestar method for calculating Reed's attorneys' fees award.

The court views the R&R lodestar analysis as conscientious, well-reasoned, with the

determination of recommended reductions in claimed fees and costs amply supported. The PCOA's

Objections to the R&R expressly endorse Judge Bencivengo's analysis and result, if the lodestar

methodology is to be applied, as this court finds it should be. With respect to Reed's Objections, the

court finds this action cannot be characterized as a "complex civil rights litigation involving numerous

challenges to institutional practices or conditions," the type of case the Hensley court observed can

have a vast range of possible success, so that a determination the plaintiff is a "prevailing party" may

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 16 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 - 05CV0072

"say little about whether the expenditure of counsel's time was reasonable in relation to the success

achieved" when the plaintiff succeeds in identifying only some unlawful practices or conditions.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. The R&R reasonably justifies each recommended adjustment to Reed's

claimed attorneys' fees. The court rejects the requested contingent fee risk multiplier requested in

Reed's Application for the reasons cumulatively incorporated in this Order. See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th

at 1138 ("[t]he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for

contingent risk," and "the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof"). In

consideration of the procedural history of this case and the circumstances of the underlying misconduct

giving rise to the jury's finding the PCOA liable on fair housing and civil rights theories, for all the

foregoing reasons, the court OVERRULES the PCOA's Objections to the R&R, OVERRULES

Reed's Objections to the R&R, and ADOPTS the R&R reasoning and result with respect to Reed's

Application for fees and costs as a prevailing party in this civil rights action. 

C. FHCSD Application

1. R&R Fees And Costs Award Recommendation

The FHCSD's Application seeks $59,600.00 in attorney's fees compensation for 388.25 hours

expended from a November 15, 2004 consultation with Reed regarding the Complaint through trial,

post-trial motions, and preparation of the fee Application. Dkt No. 115, Exh. 3. The FHCSD

submitted a costs bill in the amount of $5,209.69 for mileage reimbursement, deposition transcripts,

deposition copies, postage, taking of depositions, equipment at trial, a $1,500.00 consultant's fee, a

certified copy of MacDonald's criminal records, and FedEx costs. Dkt No. 115, Exh. 4. The FHCSD's

total request is for $64,809.69 in fees and costs. 

Through the Complaint, the FHCSD sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and

punitive damages for having had to investigate and "counteract" PCOA's allegedly discriminatory

conduct, joining in three of the nine causes of action pled in the Complaint: the First Cause of Action

for violation of the federal Fair Housing Act; the Second Cause of Action for violation of the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act; and the Ninth Cause of Action for Negligence.

Through the time the Pre-Trial Order was entered, the plaintiffs continued to assert the PCOA

discriminated based on both familial status and sex. As discussed above, the familial status

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 17 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 "Organizational Plaintiff. Plaintiff Fair Housing Council of San Diego . . . is a non-profit

organization permitted to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act and California Fair Employment and Housing

Act on its own behalf for injury in its ability to carry out its efforts to assure equal access to housing and to

eliminate unlawful housing discrimination." Jury Instruction No. 12.

8

 "Damages: Fair Housing Council. In the case of plaintiff Fair Housing Council of San Diego,

damages may include compensation for: (1) the effect of diverting its resources away from its other programs

and activities in order to identify, investigate and counter-act the defendants' unlawful conduct; and (2) the

frustration to its mission and purpose to promote equal opportunity in housing and the elimination of all forms

of illegal housing discrimination. In determining the amount to award the Fair Housing Council, you may

consider the amount necessary to counter-act defendants' wrongdoing." Jury Instruction No. 23.

- 18 - 05CV0072

discrimination claims and the punitive damages claims were not submitted to the jury, the trial

proceeded only on the sex discrimination allegations predicated on MacDonald's harassment of Reed,

and the court dismissed all claims for equitable relief thereafter. 

As summarized by the FHCSD in seeking an award of its fees and costs, the "basis of FHCSD's

claim against the [PCOA] is based on two theories of relief described in jury instructions 12[7] and

23[8]." Dkt No. 115 (Joinder And Separate Brief Regarding Fees) 2:2-7. The FHCSD argues its tried

claims required it "to first prove the discriminatory housing practice (sexual harassment of Joann

Reed), and then it had to prove that either it diverted resources to the investigation of the complaint,

or that its mission was frustrated by the discriminatory act, or both." Dkt No. 115, 2:2-7; FHCSD

Appl. 2:18-19 ("Not only did FHCSD had [sic] to prove up its own case (the diversion of resources

and/or frustration of mission) but it also had to prove Joann Reed's case"). "Specifically, FHCSD

sought damages for its investigation expenses and for the cost of its anti-discrimination advertising

to the residents of PCOA." Dkt No. 115, 2:8-9. The jury's $500.00 total damages award to the

FHCSD was, by the FHCSD's own reckoning, "most likely for FHCSD's anti-discrimination

advertising to the residents of PCOA," compensation amounting to about half its out-of-pocket

expenses in that endeavor. Dkt No. 115, 2:10-11. 

A civil rights plaintiff who recovers damages in any amount, whether compensatory or

nominal, associated with success on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the

benefit that plaintiff sought in bringing suit, is a "prevailing party" for purposes of the attorneys' fees

provision in federal statutes such as the one relied on here. Farrar, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). The R&R

acknowledges the FHCSD is a prevailing party in this action, and pursuant to Hensley, 461 U.S. at

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 18 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 Based on the testimony of plaintiff's witness Mary Scott Knoll, the magistrate judge concluded a

"damage award to fully compensate this plaintiff for its expenses was $1,000.00 at a minimum, yet the jury

only awarded half that amount and the court awarded no equitable relief." R&R 3:17-21.

10

 By way of justification, the Application represents: "FHCSD's counsel acted as Christopher

Brancart's primary contact in San Diego." FHCSD Appl. 4:10-11. However, the PCOA's objection that Reed

could have hired local counsel and avoided the travel time and costs associated with her retention of the out-oftown Brancart & Brancart firm persuaded the magistrate judge to recommend Reed's fees and costs recovery

be reduced by those amounts, as it does this court. Moreover, this court extends that observation to the

otherwise unnecessary need for a "local contact" for Reed and "liaison" for the Brancart firm, finding it would

be unjust to shift liability to the defendant for associated fees and costs avoidable but for the geographic

obstacles voluntarily assumed by Reed in retaining the Brancart firm. The extent to which FHCSD's counsel

acted as "second chair to Christopher Brancart"(FHCSD Appl. 4:11-12) similarly strikes this court as an

instance of "overstaffing" this case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.. That overstaffing is similarly reflected in the

double attendance of counsel for both Reed and the FHCSD at four depositions identified in the FHCSD

Application and for which both seek recovery of fees. FHCSD Appl. 2:24-27.

- 19 - 05CV0072

429, a prevailing plaintiff in a federal civil rights case should recover attorneys' fees unless special

circumstances would make an award of fees unjust. R&R 2:2-4. Nevertheless, the R&R recommends

the FCHSD's Application be denied in its entirety on grounds: it received none of the injunctive relief

or punitive damages it sought; the jury's compensatory damage award "did not even cover the expenses

the FHCSD claimed it incurred in this matter;"9 and the result it obtained "is a technical victory at best

in comparison to the relief sought." R&R 3:14-22. 

Judge Bencivengo noted, among other criticisms, the FHCSD failed to meet the "prevailing

attorneys' burden of establishing entitlement to an award and [to] document the appropriate hours

expended," citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. R&R p. 4, n.1. The R&R also observes the Application

"incorporates time spent by [the FHCSD's counsel] working for co-plaintiff Reed, such as preparing

her for trial. . . . The FHCSD cannot recover for attorney time or expenses incurred to litigate the coplaintiff's separate claims."10 R&R p. 4, n.1. The R&R is also critical of the Application for failure

to eliminate time spent on abandoned claims. This court notes the FHCSD's counsel does represent

he removed from his fee statement "considerable time" he spent preparing witness Cynthia Blaine

because plaintiffs ultimately determined her testimony would not be necessary. FHCSD Appl. 4:1-4.

However, line items included in FHCSD's fee statement still refer to "Cynthia Blaine" in connection

with contacting and preparing witnesses. See FHCSD Appl. Exhibit 3, pp. 2, 4. The court presumes

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 19 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

 "Mr. Treglio also consulted with various other members of Brancart & Brancart by email and phone

over various matters as they came up. In particular, Mr. Treglio was in regular contact with Ms. Elizabeth

Brancart regarding the post-trial motions." FHCSD Appl. 3:24-27.

- 20 - 05CV0072

the R&R's rejection of the portion of claimed fees for time the FHCSD spent on post-trial motions11

tacitly incorporates the same rationale as for the portion of time spent in that activity correspondingly

rejected in Reed's fee Application. Judge Bencivengo found "the recovery does not justify the award

of fees" to this plaintiff, and recommends the FHCSD's Application be denied in its entirety. The R&R

makes no separate analysis of claimed costs.

2. FHCSD's Objections To R&R And PCOA's Reply

The FHCSD raises four Objections to the R&R. First, it contends the R&R "misstates the basis

of FHCSD's claim." FHCSD Obj. 1:24. "While it is true that FHCSD pled familial status

discrimination, and sought to change rules, policies, practices or procedures that had a discriminatory

effect on families with children, FHCSD's damages were the result of [PCOA's] failure to prevent and

protect Plaintiff Joann REED from sexual harassment suffered at the hands [of] Kent MacDonald, its

employee." FHCSD Obj. 1:24-28. That description is indistinguishable from Reed's personal claims.

It also deviates from the Complaint allegation that the FHCSD's damages arising from the PCOA's

alleged "discriminatory housing practices" were associated with the PCOA's "promulgat[ing] and

enforc[ing] rules and regulations that discriminate against families with children because of their

familial status," and "the Fair Housing council designed and implemented an education and outreach

project, providing Casablanca residents with information regarding their fair housing rights." Compl.

¶¶ 18-19. 

In support of its Application, the FHCSD characterizes its claimed time and expenses "acting

as REED's co-counsel" as "time spent on FHCSD's claims," contending it had to establish the

discriminatory acts, i.e. "the sexual harassment by Kent MacDonald, and the failure of PCOA to

respond to REED's complaints," in order to "establish a basis for which it would recover" damages,

an essential component of its Article III standing to sue. FHCSD Obj. 2:3-7. However, Reed was

separately represented by two attorneys in the Brancart and Brancart firm, and it does not appear from

anything before the court the FHCSD' assistance in the preparation of Reed's case was pursuant to any

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 20 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 - 05CV0072

formal co-counsel relationship for billing or fee award purposes. The court calculates fee recoveries

based on counsel's work on behalf of its own client, alleged to be a separately injured party. 

The FHCSD disputes it received only a nominal award. Judge Bencivengo acknowledged a

damages award adequate to fully compensate it for its expenses was "$1,000 at a minimum," so the

jury's award of $500.00 represents half the FHCSD's actual damages. On that basis, the FHCSD

distinguishes Farrar, 506 U.S. 103 , where a civil rights plaintiff "prevailed" but received only nominal

damages and achieved only "technical" success. See Morales, 96 F.3d at 362 (limiting invocation of

the Farrar rule to such cases). The Farrar Court defines as "purely technical" or "de minimis" a victory

evidencing: (1) a substantial difference between the damages sought and the damages awarded, (2)

the legal issue on which plaintiff prevails is relatively unimportant, and (3) the litigation serves no

discernible public purpose. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The FHCSD argues

"nominal" damages are those in name only, "a mere token or 'trifling,'" which highlights the plaintiff's

failure to prove actual, compensable injury. FHCSD Obj. 2:19-22, distinguishing its recovery of 50%

of its claimed actual damages. The FHCSD argues the magistrate judge erred in denying recovery of

any of its fees and costs as distinguishable from those principles. 

However, the FHCSD fails to factor in the effect on the award analysis of its failure to prevail

on its additional claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages. The court appropriately considers

those unsuccessful claims associated with its exercise of discretion under fee-shifting statutes when

evaluating the results of the litigation as a whole. The FHCSD's compensatory damages in this

litigation were the relatively modest outlay of "advertising" funds, only half of which the jury awarded,

with no other recovery of any kind on any of the legal theories advanced. Moreover, the legal issue

on which it prevailed was "relatively unimportant" for that institution or the public, given the isolated

nature of MacDonald's sexual harassment of Reed, and prevailing on the issue advanced no public

purpose in any broader remedial sense inasmuch as the PCOA was not found to have discriminatory

policies or practices this litigation could redress. 

Second, the FHCSD objects its costs are taxable under FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d): "Except when

express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other

than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court directs

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 21 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 - 05CV0072

otherwise." It argues the R&R lacks sufficient justification to recommend denial of the FHCSD's

claimed costs. FHCSD Obj. 3:2-13. 

Third, the FHCSD disputes as error the R&R finding it failed to meet its burden of proof to

establish hours reasonably expended in pursuit of claims on which it prevailed, arguing the R&R

overstates the amount of time spent on familial status issues. FHCSD Obj. 4:10-11. It represents its

initial investigation made two findings: that the PCOA had allowed MacDonald to harass Reed on the

basis of her sex, and that the "PCOA had a few rules that appeared to place an unreasonable burden

on families with children." FHCSD Obj. 3:22-25. It further represents the FHCSD deemed the sexual

harassment "to be the most serious and lead [sic] to FHCSD's decision to litigate," and the flyers it sent

to PCOA residents "to counteract the discriminatory effect of the PCOA's failure to take action only

discussed sexual harassment issues, not familial status discrimination." FHCSD Obj. 3:26-4:2. It

characterizes its claim for familial status discrimination as "secondary" to the sexual harassment claim,

and it "withdrew its claim for familial status discrimination" when it was "clear that PCOA would not

seek settlement," a representation enigmatically contrary to plaintiffs' continued pursuit of those other

pled claims to the time of trial. FHCSD Obj. 4:3-7. 

The FHCSD also contends the R&R erred in finding it failed to limit the fees claimed for work

done to claims on which it prevailed. In support of that contention, the FHCSD represents its counsel

"did, in fact, redact the time spent on the familial status discrimination," and a review of attorney

James M. Treglio's Fee Statement reveals it "makes no mention of any time spent on familial status

claims." FHCSD Obj. 4:10-15. However, nor does it make any mention of particular time spent on

any discrete claim other than a small amount of time specifically identified as spent reviewing records

or timeline for "post complaint harassment of Reed." See Dkt No. 115, Ex. 3. In addition, the FHCSD

argues "[if] the Magistrate Judge wished to deny fees to the FHCSD for time spent on [the issue of

equitable relief], that would have been easily accomplished by reviewing the billing statement . . . and

cutting all post-judgment time." FHCSD Obj. 4:17-20. The latter suggestion, however, takes no

account of the time presumably spent in the process of evaluating whether to bring such claims in the

Complaint, discovery in support of those claims, and other activity necessarily undertaken to prepare

to try the equitable relief allegations beyond mere post-trial motion preparation time.

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 22 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 - 05CV0072

Fourth, the FHCSD objects the R&R "leads to a grossly inequitable result." FHCSD Obj. 4:23.

It relies on statements in both its own and Reed's Fee Applications to insist "FHCSD's counsel, James

Treglio, acted as Christopher Brancart's co-counsel," and "[t]o that end, James Treglio spent a great

deal of time preparing Plaintiffs' witnesses for trial . . . [and] was the only attorney for Plaintiffs

present during the depositions of" six named witnesses. FHCSD Obj. 4:23-28. The FHCSD makes

the observation (alarming to this court): "Without FHCSD's assistance, Joann REED's costs and fees

[sought through the Reed Application in the amount of $347,198.75, including Reed's claimed

25% multiplier for contingent fee risk] would have risen dramatically," as Reed's counsel is "more

experienced than James Treglio" and has a correspondingly higher hourly fee. FHCSD Obj. 4:28-5:2

(emphasis added). "This appointment of co-counsel was designed specifically to reduce costs," so that

a denial of any recovery of FHCSD's fees allegedly causes "PCOA [to] gain[] the benefit of a reduction

of costs by Plaintiff REED without the cost of paying for FHCSD's fees." FHCSD Obj. 5:3-6.

However, neither plaintiff presents evidence of the FHCSD's "appointment as co-counsel" to Reed,

and Mr. Treglio presents his fees request solely on behalf of his client, the FHCSD (other than styling

the request as also a "joinder" in the Reed Application, purporting to incorporate her Application by

reference and emphasizing the "FHCSD has an identical position regarding the facts and law" as does

Reed). Dkt No. 115, p. 1. 

Finally, the FHCSD argues the R&R "places too much value on the amount of the recovery,"

whereas the jury's verdict purportedly "clearly" found "(1) FHCSD was injured by PCOA's practices"

and "(2) FHCSD was awarded compensation for those injuries." FHCSD Obj. 5:7-15 (emphasis

added), citing, inter alia, Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574 and Combs, 285 F.3d at 908 for the proposition

attorneys' fees in civil rights cases need not be proportionate to the amount of damages a plaintiff

recovers. For all those reasons, the FHCSD requests the court reject the R&R and award its fees and

costs as claimed in its Application.

The PCOA filed a Reply to the FHCSD's Objections to the R&R, again emphasizing any award

of attorneys' fees is wholly discretionary. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (affirming denial of any attorneys'

fee award under the civil rights statute where plaintiffs sought millions in compensatory damages and

recovered nominal damages of one dollar, confirming the court has discretion to award no fees without

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 23 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

 "FHCSD was proceeding after [sic] injunctive relief. They were attempting to obtain some form

of relief which would benefit 500 other members of the PCOA condominium complex. They received none

of that. While the 'damages' of a monetary nature were minimal at best, the pursuit of injunctive relief was

paramount. Furthermore, FHCSD was pursuing punitive damages, which were not awarded." PCOA Reply

3:13-19.

- 24 - 05CV0072

reciting the several factors bearing on reasonableness); see also Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d

1115, 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (an Americans With Disabilities Act case confirming the court

can award "low fees or no fees" without reciting the twelve Kerr factors, but concluding in that case

the plaintiff obtained more than a "technical victory," and so was entitled to a fee award the court

should have computed as a lodestar figure).

 First, the PCOA represents the FHCSD effectively acknowledges it "learned in their

investigation there was no issue of housing discrimination in PCOA, once Kent McDonald, the sexual

harasser, was terminated and once Joann Reed, the victim, moved out of the condominium complex"

at the end of 2004, and "[t]here was no continuing course of conduct to enjoin or prohibit," with the

"end result of this case demonstrat[ing] there was no basis for injunctive relief whatsoever." PCOA

Reply 2:3-9. That characterization is borne out by the proceedings before, during, and after trial, and

undermines the FHCSD'srepresentation the PCOA's "practices" were the cause of the FHCSD's injury.

The PCOA describes the continued presence of the FHCSD in this litigation as a "tag-along"

undertaking. PCOA Reply 2:10-11. The PCOA disputes the FHCSD is entitled to recover any fees

for "time spent acting as Reed's co-counsel" in the absence of any authority approving such a recovery

by counsel for one party who merely represents it was also acting informally as co-counsel for another

party. PCOA Reply 2:12-16. The PCOA also contends the Farrar factors are present in this case: (1)

there was a substantial difference between the damages sought and those awarded; (2) the legal issue

on which the FHCSD prevailed was unimportant; and (3) the litigation served no discernable public

purpose.12 PCOA Reply 3:9-13. The PCOA acknowledges although the legal issue "arising out of a

homeowners association employee's actions may not be unimportant, that issue was not dependent

upon anything FHCSD did in this case," and the "issue was pursued and briefed by Reed's counsel,"

rendering "the legal issue pursued by FHCSD . . . nonexistent." PCOA Reply 3:20-25.

\\

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 24 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

 The PCOA also contends, in reliance on Christiansburg, denial of a fees and costs award to FHCSD

is proper and within the discretion of the court because the "PCOA's defense of this case as to FHCSD was

meritorious." PCOA Reply 5:18-19. However, the court distinguishes Christiansberg. See fn 7, above.

- 25 - 05CV0072

Second, the PCOA urges the court to adopt the R&R recommendation, contending: "This is

a perfect example of a situation in which FHCSD should never have been involved. Certainly, their

role was essentially nothing more than a tag-along role with Joann Reed." PCOA Reply 4:11-14.

While such an argument can be made given the claims made and results obtained, this court assesses

the costs issue differently and separately from the attorneys' fees issue, as discussed below.

Third, the PCOA suggests the FHCSD's objection regarding treatment of time spent on the

familial status issues is misplaced because the R&R recommends no fees be awarded, without

discussing any apportionment of time among issues. As part of its Hensley analysis in reaching that

conclusion, the R&R merely alludes to the fact the Complaint states familial status discrimination

allegations abandoned without jury deliberation on the issues. PCOA Reply 4:17-5:2.

The PCOA characterizes the FHCSD's fourth objection as "demonstrat[ing] the fallacy of the

request for fees," illustrating the "FHCSD was riding the coattails of Reed's counsel," and devoid of

any authority for the proposition one attorney is entitled to recover fees "for acting as 'co-counsel' to

another attorney" representing a different party. PCOA Reply 5:5-9. The PCOA contends the only

"inequity" associated with the FHCSD's fees and costs requests would be to grant the Application.

"They absolutely established by their own investigation there was no basis for FHCSD to sue PCOA

for discrimination," but "they were not satisfied with their own investigation and determined to pursue

a lawsuit seeking damages, injunctive relief, and punitive damages," then "lost on all counts except

for a very minor amount of damages."13 PCOA Reply 5:12-17. 

3. Disposition Of FHCSD Application

The court finds the PCOA's summary of the FHCSD's relationship to Reed's Complaint and

its assessment of the FHCSD's participation through trial and post-trial proceedings to be pertinent to

the decision whether to adopt the R&R recommendation the FHCSD be denied an award of any of its

claimed attorneys' fees:

[T]his litigation from the standpoint of FHCSD served no purpose

whatsoever, discernable or otherwise. This was purely an isolated

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 25 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 - 05CV0072

situation in which a homeowners association hired a property patrol

individual who ended up sexually harassing one of the occupants of a

condominium in the complex. Once that individual was terminated and

the victim moved from the complex, there was absolutely no

discernable purpose for this litigation outside any compensation to Ms.

Reed. FHCSD proved by its own investigation there was no insidious

[sic] discrimination.

PCOA Reply 3:26-4:6.

The court finds Reed had her own counsel to prove up her case, and the "diversion of

resources" or "frustration of mission" damages peculiar to the entity plaintiff's was found by the jury

to be compensable in the amount of just $500.00, half its claimed expenses to prepare and distribute

anti-discrimination materials at the condominium complex. To the extent the FHCSD suggests the

court should fold its attorneys' fees claimed for advancing Reed's trial preparation into the "diversion

of resources" portion of "its own case," the court notes authority prohibits a party's escalation of

expenditures recovery of which may then constitute a "windfall" if awarded post-trial as fees and costs

taxed against the losing party. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 580-85. As noted above, this court perceives

the case appears to have been overstaffed. See FHCSD Appl. 4:5-7 ("Except for the separate discovery

responses, and the preparation of Mary Scott Knoll, counsel for FHCSD acted, in all intents and

purposes, as second chair to Christopher Brancart, who was lead counsel in this case," observations

silent on the role of the second attorney in the Brancart and Brancart firm who also claims fees in

prosecuting Reed's case as co-counsel).

In evaluating an award of a plaintiff's attorneys' fees in a civil rights case, the court must

consider the significance of the legal issues on which the party prevailed and the public purpose served

by litigation of its claims. See Morales, 96 F.3d at 362-63. This case did not involve a defendant's

institutional policy or a pattern and practice that only a lawsuit could stop. By all evidence elicited at

trial, the only housing discrimination imputable to the PCOA was its employment of MacDonald as

a security guard and delay in acting on Reed's complaints. The sexual harassment misconduct was

personal to him. He was not implementing any identified PCOA policy. Plaintiffs established no

intentional conduct or improper motive of the PCOA, distinguishing this action from civil rights cases

exposing widespread or inveterate discrimination. See, e.g., Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (Chicano plaintiffs

successfully sued city's police force and individual officers alleging civil rights violations arising from

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 26 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 - 05CV0072

the racially discriminatory manner of defendants' conduct and recovered their attorneys' fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988); Combs, 285 F.3d 899 (awarding attorneys' fees to nonprofit fair housing organization

in its successful suit against an apartment complex owner who engaged in intentional and repeated

racially discriminatory housing practices as proven by the organization's "testers").

The FHCSD disputes the R&R's characterization of its recovery as only a "technical" victory,"

arguing the 50% recovery of the $1,000.00 in damages sought cannot be construed as "so insignificant"

that attorneys' fees should be denied in their entirety on that basis. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113-114

(holding "the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained" in

response to the question "whether a nominal damages award is the sort of 'technical,' 'insignificant'

victory that cannot confer prevailing party status"). Once prevailing party status is conferred, the

required inquiry for the proper exercise of the court's discretion in awarding attorneys' fees is triggered.

"'[T]he degree of the plaintiff's success' does not affect 'eligibility for a fee award.'" Id at 114 (citation

omitted);see Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Although the size of the

relief may impact the size of the eventual fee award, it 'does not affect "eligibility for a fee

award. . . ." ' ") (citations omitted). Based on that authority, under the Fair Housing Act statutory fee

award provision, the FHCSD is "eligible" for a fee award. 

However, applying the Hensley guidelines, to determine whether the court should exercise its

discretion to order an award to an "eligible" plaintiff and, if so, what fee amount would be

"reasonable," "the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness' of a fee award."

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (citation omitted) ("the degree of success obtained" is "the most critical factor"

in the reasonableness analysis). "In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally 'prevails' . . .

should receive no attorney's fees at all." Id. at 115. If "a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited

success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable

hourly rate may be an excessive amount." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 463; see Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114.

Although the court concurs with the FHCSD the $500.00 the jury awarded should be construed as

"compensatory" rather than "nominal" damages, the admonition that a lodestar approach is not always

appropriate seems applicable here. The court's discretion in the fixing of fees in such circumstances

must be exercised giving "primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 27 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 - 05CV0072

the amount sought." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, quoting Rivera, 477 U.S. at 585. The nature of the

damages awarded to the FHCSD similarly informs the exercise of that discretion: "the court may

lawfully award low fees or no fees without reciting the 12 factors bearing on reasonableness. . . or

multiplying 'the number of hours reasonably expended . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Id. at 115,

citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430, n.3, 433. The court acknowledges the presumption in civil rights

cases a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances

would render such an award unjust, but the court retains discretion to deny attorneys' fees. See

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429; see also Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119, n.2. The court finds special

circumstances militate against shifting the burden of FHCSD's attorneys' fees, in addition to those of

Reed's counsel, to this defendant, in particular but not exclusively the overlap and overstaffing in the

preparation of this case, the very belated paring down of the scope of the issues to be tried predicated

on one PCOA employee's sexual harassment of Reed, and the results obtained compared to the

litigation as a whole.

As noted in the R&R, the prevailing attorneys bear the burden of establishing entitlement to

an award and must document the reasonableness of hours expended. R&R p. 4, n.1, citing Hensley,

461 U.S. at 437. The FHCSD's Application seeks "fees in an amount more than 100 times greater than

its recovery, makes no reductions for time spent on dismissed and unsuccessful claims," and

"incorporates time spent by [FHCSD's counsel] working for co-plaintiff Reed" on her separate claims.

R&R p. 4, n.1. The "[A]pplication does not even attempt to meet its burden to establish hours

reasonably expended in pursuit of claims upon which it prevailed." Id. While compensation for

attorneys' fees is not strictly limited to those incurred solely on matters on which the prevailing party

succeeded, nevertheless whether an award is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to make the award,

depends upon a comparison of "the scope of the litigation as a whole" to the relief obtained.. Hensley,

461 U.S. at 439-40, 429.

The court adopts the R&R finding an award of the FHCSD's claimed attorneys' fees would be

"unjust," and exercises its discretion to deny the FHCSD any recovery of fees. The FHCSD's pursuit

of this litigation accomplished little for itself or its mission. Reed's damages recovery was predicated

on her personal claims of sexual harassment by a PCOA employee. MacDonald was no longer

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 28 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 - 05CV0072

employed by the PCOA, and she had moved from the Penasquitos Casablanca condominium complex

years before this case was tried. The FHCSD's counsel may have assisted Reed in obtaining her

damages recovery, but she recovered on claims peculiar to herself. No result for either plaintiff in this

litigation appears to this court to have vindicated any broader concern than that of compensation and

a statutory award to an individual whose civil rights the jury found were violated by the conduct of a

single employee of the homeowner's association. Neither plaintiff ultimately pursued the punitive

damages claims, and neither was successful on claims for equitable relief. Unlike in Morales, the

results of the FHCSD's participation in this litigation furthered no public purpose to protect Reed or

others from similar exposure to the type of isolated harassment she endured from one PCOA

employee, and sent no particular message of broader significance to homeowners' associations. The

results obtained by the FHCSD's counsel for his actual client is the pertinent consideration. In this

court's view, the extent of success the FHCSD achieved in this litigation, while not measured solely

by the amount of damages recovered, must include some measure of benefit within the scope of its

mission conferred on others by winning a civil rights case to render an attorneys' fee recovery just here.

The fee Application contains no such demonstration. 

 For all the foregoing reasons, the court OVERRULES the FHCSD's Objections to the

recommended result on the fees portion of its Application and ADOPTS the R&R recommendation

the FHCSD be denied an award of attorneys fees. 

The R&R performed no separate costs award analysis in recommending the FHCSD take

nothing under its Application. The court SUSTAINS the FHCSD's Objections to the R&R on the

issue of costs, and REJECTS the summary recommendation the FHCSD recover none of its litigation

costs. Under FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d), costs are allowed "as of course to the prevailing party" absent an

instruction from the court otherwise or when express provision regarding costs appears in a statute

or federal rules. 

The PCOA does not specifically challenge any of the line item claimed costs. The FHCSD

represents it "paid for most transcript costs in this litigation," it "purchased equipment for litigation

purposes," it "found and contracted with Mr. David Kline, Esq., who provided consultation on case

strategy, assisted on plaintiff's motion on jurisdiction, and acted as reader of the depositions during the

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 29 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 - 05CV0072

first day of trial." FHCSD Appl. 4:13-17. Its itemized list of costs totals $5,209.69. FHCSD Appl.

Exh. 4. The court deducts from that total the $59.99 cost item claimed for a "projector table" as a

reusable itemof furniture. No information about any special qualifications, need for, or reasonableness

of the $150.00 hourly rate of David Kline, Esq. is provided to support the $1,500.00 line item cost for

ten hours of his "consultation" services "on case strategy" and his additional services to "assist[] on

plaintiffs' motion on jurisdiction," particularly when three counsel of record also billed time on the

plaintiffs' side of this litigation. FHCSD Appl. 4-17, Exh. 4. Moreover, the court is not persuaded the

cost to have the consultant "act as reader of the depositions during the first day of trial" is reasonably

taxable to defendant. Id. Accordingly, the court also deducts the $1,500.00 line item for Mr. Kline's

costs. In addition, local FHCSD counsel provides no authority to support the claim for travel to the

courthouse for seven days of trial at $.35 per mile, in the total amount of $140.63, and the court

deducts that line item.

The court has verified the costs claimed in the FHCSD's Application for six "deposition

transcripts" (totaling $1,643.14) are not duplicated in Reeds Application. Two additional line item

costs are identified as for "depositions." The court assumes those costs (totaling an additional

$1,194.10) were for the noticed taking of one and for a transcript of the other, because "copying of

depositions" in the claimed amount of $128.57 is listed as a separate line item. FHCSD Appl. Exh. 4.

Accordingly, the court REJECTS the R&R recommendation that no costs be awarded to prevailing

party the FHCSD, but deducts $1,700.62 from the claimed costs, for a total costs award of $3,509.07.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Both sides' Objections to the R&R on prevailing plaintiff Reed's fees and costs

Application are OVERRULED. 

2. The R&R recommendation Reed be awarded reduced attorneys fees in the amount of

$161,000.00 and reduced litigation costs and expenses in the amount of $7,673.83, for a total award

of $168,673.83, is ADOPTED.

3. Prevailing plaintiff the FHCSD's Objections to the R&R on its fees and costs

Application are SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART, 

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 30 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 - 05CV0072

4. The R&R recommendation the FHCSD be denied any award of attorneys' fees or costs

is ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN PART.

5. The FHCSD shall recover no attorneys' fees on its Application, but shall recover

$3,509.07 in litigation costs.

6. Within ten (10) days of the date this Order is entered, the parties shall jointly prepare

and e-mail to the chambers of the undersigned District Judge a [Proposed] Final Judgment to terminate

this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 26, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-00072-LAB-CAB Document 132 Filed 11/26/07 Page 31 of 31