Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_02-cv-02822/USCOURTS-alnd-1_02-cv-02822-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Repo

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

FAMILIES CONCERNED ABOUT

NERVE GAS INCINERATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE ARMY, et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

CASE NO. 1:02-CV-2822-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The court has before it the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants

United States Department of the Army, Anniston Army Depot, Army Chemical Materials Agency

(provisional), and the United States Department of Defense (collectively “Federal Defendants”)

(Doc. # 55) and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendant Westinghouse

Government Environmental Services Co., Inc. (“Westinghouse”) (Doc. # 63). The motions have

been fully briefed, and the court heard oral argument on February 15, 2005. 

This case concerns the operations of the chemical weapons incinerator in Anniston, Alabama

formally designated as the Anniston Chemical Demilitarization Facility (“ANCDF”). Plaintiffs

contend in this case that the Federal Defendants and their co-permittee and outside contractor,

Westinghouse, are currently violating certain portions of Alabama’s hazardous waste laws in their

operation of the incinerator. Plaintiffs seek, among other relief, an injunction to shut the incinerator

down entirely.

FILED

 2005 Mar-18 PM 04:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 1 of 48
2

For the reasons outlined below, the court finds that Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment are due to be granted because there are no disputed issues of material fact and Defendants

have demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

I. Legal Standards for Evaluating a Summary Judgment Motion

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking

for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for

its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323. Once the moving party has met his

burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answersto interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts

and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

See id. 249.

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 2 of 48
 

1

If facts are in dispute, they are stated in the manner most favorable to the Plaintiffs.

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

3

II. Relevant Undisputed Facts1

Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 

6901-6992k, to address problems associated with the management and disposal of wastes. RCRA

establishes a “cradle-to-grave system” for regulating the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.

United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir.1993). RCRA contemplates a federalstate partnership to implement its provisions wherein a state may receive authorization from the

United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for its hazardous waste management

program. 42 U.S.C. §§6921-6939b. A state’s EPA-approved program under RCRA operates “in

lieu of the federal program,” and the state may issue and enforce permits, which in turn have the

same effect as RCRA permits issued by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).

A. Alabama’s Hazardous Waste Management Program

In 1978, the Alabama legislature enacted the Alabama Hazardous Waste Management and

Minimization Act (“AHWMMA”), Ala. Code §§ 22-30-1 to -24. Under that authority, the state

promulgated a hazardous waste management regulatory program designed to ensure that hazardous

wastes are managed in a manner that protects human health and the environment and minimizes the

generation and land disposal of these wastes. In 1987, EPA authorized Alabama’s hazardous waste

management program, thereby authorizing Alabama to issue and enforce permits for the storage

treatment and disposal of hazardous waste. Each owner and operator of a hazardous waste treatment,

storage, or disposal facility must obtain a permit. In Alabama, this is referred to as a hazardous

waste operation plan and these activities are administered by the Alabama Department of

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 3 of 48
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Environmental Management (“ADEM”). Alabama’s RCRA regulatory requirements establish

specific performance standards, operating requirements, waste identification and analysis standards,

and monitoring and inspection requirements. (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.15(4)). 

ADEM has established a lengthy and detailed process that must be followed for an owner or

operator to obtain a RCRA permit. A facility seeking to obtain approval of a permit must submit

a permit application prior to construction. (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.02). ADEM

evaluates the application (prior to construction) to ensure that there will be compliance with

applicable technical standards. (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.08). If ADEM determines, upon

receipt of a complete application, that a facility permit is due to be approved, ADEM then prepares

a draft approval and accompanying statement of basis (i.e., a fact sheet), publishes the draft approval,

and provides for a public hearing. (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.08). At the conclusion of the

public comment period, ADEM issues a decision approving or denying the permit. (ADEM Admin.

Code R. 335-14-8-.08(12)). 

Hazardous waste incinerators must meet general requirements applicable to all hazardous

waste treatment, storage or disposal facilities, as well as certain specific requirements and permitting

procedures. All of these requirements are intended to ensure that the operation of the incinerator will

protect human health and the environment. (Ala. Code § 22-30-6 and ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-

14-8-.03(a) & (b)). 

The Alabama Administrative Code provides an opportunity for individuals to raise concerns

at any time about the operation of a facility. Specifically, the Code provides that “[p]ermits may be

modified, revoked and reissued, or terminated either at the request of an interested party (including

the permittee) or upon [ADEM’s] initiative.” (ADEMAdmin. Code R. 335-14-8-.08(3)(a)). Among

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 4 of 48
5

the appropriate reasons for modification or revocation of a permit is that ADEM has received

information that “was not available at the time of permit issuance . . . and would have justified the

application of different permit conditions.” (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.04(2)(a)(2)).

Additionally, ADEM decisions approving an operation plan or modifications to a plan are

subject to review before the AlabamaEnvironmentalManagementCommission (“theCommission”).

(ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-2-1-.01 to .30). Any individual who is “aggrieved” by the issuance,

modification, denial, or repeal of a permit can request a hearing before the Commission. (ADEM

Admin. Code R. 335-2-1-.03). Challenges to plan approvals are designated as contested case

proceedings under the Alabama Administrative Procedures Act (“APAA”). Ala. Code § 41-22-3(3).

Such proceedings provide the opportunity to present expert and fact witness testimony, to crossexamine witnesses, and to present written briefs and oral argument. (E.g., ADEM Admin. Code R.

335-2-1-.10). A party wishing to challenge ADEM’s approval order entered after a contested case

proceeding before the Commission may file an appeal with the Alabama circuit court in the

appropriate county. Ala. Code § 42-22-20(b). The circuit court reviews the Commission’s decision

on the administrative record to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Ala. Code § 42-22-20(k).

B. ANCDF’s Permit 

The chemical weapons stored at the Anniston Army Depot are regulated as characteristic

wastes, and residues from the management of chemical weapons are regulated as hazardous waste

if the residues exhibit a hazardous waste characteristic. (ADEM Admin Code R. 335-14-2-.04;

Hardy Depo. at 57-58; Doc. # 57, Ex. 1). Accordingly, the operator of ANCDF was required to

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 5 of 48
 

2 ANCDF’s purpose is to destroy the 4.5 million pounds of chemical weapons stored at the

Anniston Army Depot in Anniston, Alabama. ANCDF consists of three separate incinerators: a

liquid incinerator to incinerate liquid agent that has been drained from munitions and bulk

containers; a deactivation furnace to incinerate munitions containing propellants and explosives

(collectively “energetics”) after they have been drained of as much agent as possible; and a metal

parts furnace to decontaminate thermally and destroy chemical agents in metal parts, such as

projectile and mortar casings and bulk containers, after they have been drained of as much agent as

possible. (Garrett Dec. at ¶ 8). 

 

3 Despite these undisputed differences in TOCDF and ANCDF, many of Plaintiffs’ alleged

material facts relate to events that occurred at TOCDF. The fact that an incident may have occurred

at TOCDF is not evidence that Defendants are in violation of their permit or regulatory obligations

at ANCDF. Although this opinion addresses the merits of Plaintiffs’ TOCDF arguments, the court

finds that most of the events that occurred at TOCDF are immaterial to the allegations in this case.

6

obtain a hazardous waste facility permit from ADEM prior to commencing operation.2

On June 19, 1997, after a lengthy permit process which involved numerous exchanges and

meetings between the permittees and ADEM and a public notice and comment period, (Hardy Depo.

at 9-22), ADEM issued a hazardous waste facility permit to Defendants for operation of ANCDF.

That permit contains provisions specifying the inspection, monitoring, contingency plan, and waste

sampling requirements applicable to the facility. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1). ADEM used the permit

conditions established for the Army’s Tooele, Utah Chemical Demilitarization Facility (“TOCDF”)

as a model to develop the permit conditions for ANCDF. (Hardy Depo. at 15). Although ANCDF

is broadly based on the design of TOCDF, numerous changes were made in the design of ANCDF

to reflect the experience gained in operation of TOCDF and other facilities. (Doc. # 64, Ex. 22 at

28, 29, 32, 122-25, 129-30, 223-25, 234-35). Moreover, the mix of materials to be processed at the

TOCDF and ANCDF is different and the facilities have different managers and operators. (Id.).3

 

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 6 of 48
 

4 The surrogate is a mixture of chemical compounds that the permitting authority has

scientifically determined to be more difficult to destroy than the chemical agents. (Garrett Decl.

¶ 32). 

7

Before it began agent operations, ANCDF also had to undergo a series of trial burns. The

first set of trial burns did not involve chemical agents, but rather surrogate compounds4 that tested

the facility’s ability to operate properly and to destroy chemical agents. (Hardy Depo. at 27-29).

During these surrogate trial burns, the facility’s emissions were monitored to determine that

emissions from the facility do not pose a threat to human health or the environment. (Garrett Decl.

¶ 32). Before the facility could move to the next stage, which is a trial burn involving actual

chemical agent containing munitions, ADEM had to approve ANCDF’s report on the surrogate trial

burns and ANCDF’s agent trial burn plan. (Hardy Depo. at 29-39). Surrogate trial burns were

completed in 2002, and ANCDF submitted the results to ADEM. (Garrett Decl. ¶ 33). ANCDF also

submitted an agent trial burn plan to ADEM as a modification of the permit. ADEM approved the

agent trial burn plan as a major modification of the permit on July 30, 2003. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 4). As

of December 2003, ANCDF was processing munitions containing the nerve agent GB. (Garrett Dec.

¶ 39).

Gerald Hardy is Chief of the Land Division, the ADEM division responsible for the ANCDF

permit. (Hardy Depo. at 8) Hardy is the person at ADEM who is most knowledgeable about the

permitting process for the incinerator. (Hardy Depo. at 49-50). Although Hardy is somewhat

removed from the day-to-day oversight of ANCDF and the permit, (Hardy Depo. at 10), he

supervises the staff that has done the detail review of ANCDF from 1990 to the present. (Doc. # 62,

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 7 of 48
 

5 Defendants’ summary judgment submissions rely, in part, on the testimony of Hardy.

Plaintiffs claim that Hardy lacks personal knowledge of whether ANCDF has or is violating the

permit. (Doc. # 65, at 2). The court disagrees. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that ADEM

has two inspectors at ANCDF twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. (Love Depo. at 126).

Hardy, as Chief of the Land Division, is responsible for regulating ANCDF. Hardy’s deposition

testimony makes clear that he testified on the basis of personal knowledge regarding the

development of specific permit conditions for ANCDF and ANCDF’s compliance with the permit.

(Doc. # 62, Ex. 3 at 50-59). Thus, the court will consider Hardy’s testimony that, in the opinion of

ADEM, ANCDF has not violated the permit or Alabama RCRA regulations relating to waste

characterization and the Contingency Plan. (Doc. # 62, Ex. 3 at 50-59). 

8

Ex. 4, at 50).5

 Timothy K. Garrett is the Army’s Site Project Manager for ANCDF. (Garrett Depo.

at 7).

C. Administrative Hearing Challenging ADEM’s Issuance of the Permit 

As noted earlier, applicable Alabama law allows ADEM’s permit decisions, including

modifications to permits, to be challenged by any person or association in an evidentiary

administrative hearing before a Hearing Officer designated by the Commission. (Ala. Code §22-

22A-7). On July 2, 1997, two of the Plaintiffs in the current case, Families Concerned About Nerve

Gas Incineration (“Families”) and Serving Alabama’s Future Environment, Inc., (“SAFE”) filed a

request with the Commission challenging ADEM’s issuance of the original permit. After the longest

hearing proceedings in the history of the Commission, including the taking of extensive testimony

from both sides, the Hearing Officer submitted to the Commission 662 pages of findings of fact and

conclusions of law, along with the recommendation that the permit be approved as issued. On June

20, 2000, the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer’s 662-page report in full. 

The Hearing Officer concluded that, in compliancewith regulatory requirements, Defendants

appropriately identified all of the various hazardous wastes that the munitions could contain

including the products from incineration, decontamination, and age -- and that this information was

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 8 of 48
9

specified in the lists of hazardous wastes that were included in the permit application at Tables C-1-

13, -14 and -15. (Doc. # 62, Ex. 1, Recommendation of Hearing Officer at 537, 619 Finding 7). The

Hearing Officer also concluded that the identification of hazardous wastes which would be, or are

likely to be, present for treatment at the facility could be conducted in compliance with Alabama’s

RCRA rules either by sampling and analysis or by applying the generator’s knowledge of the

materials for the processes that generated the wastes. (Doc. # 62, Ex. 1, Recommendation of

Hearing Officer at 621, Conclusion of Law 1, citing ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-

.02(1)(a)2.(ii)).

The Army conducted a studyof chemical agent degradation compounds, and this information

was included in the permit application. (Recommendation of Hearing Officer at 538). The Hearing

Officer found that the permit application properly identified the following individual hazardous

wastes: (1) arsenic (Doc. # 62, Ex. 2, Transcript of Administrative Hearing at 2140; see also ADEM

Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-.03(5) Table 1); (2) mercury (Transcript of Administrative Hearing at

2140; see also ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-.03(5) Table 1); (3) Low pH (highly acidic)

wastes (Transcript of Administrative Hearing at 2140; see also ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-

.03(5) Table 1); and (4) Lewisite (an arsenic based agent) (Recommendation of Hearing Officer at

507-08).

In issuing the hazardous waste permit for ANCDF, ADEM had determined that the

Defendants had used generator knowledge to adequately characterize the chemical weapon agents

and chemical weapon-containing munitions to be processed in the facility. (Hardy Depo. at 39-40;

Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 2-3). At the administrative hearing, evidence was presented to show that the

nature of the chemical weapons would make the sampling of each container too dangerous for the

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 9 of 48
10

benefit that might be derived, particularly given that the generator had knowledge of the materials

likely to be present in the chemical weapons. (Transcript of Administrative Hearing at 3928). Based

on that testimony, the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer’s determination that ADEM has the

discretion under ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.02(1)(c) to approve the Army’s use of

“generator knowledge” and relevant information to characterize the waste without sampling each

individual weapon or munition. (Recommendation of Hearing Officer at 539; at 619-20 ¶¶ 6-10; at

621-22, Conclusions of Law 1, 4 & 5).

The Hearing Officer and the Commission also concluded that Defendants properly

characterized their hazardous waste according to the applicable regulations and also properly

disclosed this characterization in the permit application. (Recommendation of Hearing Officer at

539-40; at 617-20; at 622, Conclusions of Law 2-5). The Commission, through its Hearing Officer,

determined that the facts presented during the hearing supported a decision by ADEM that the initial

permit application was complete as required by ADEM Admin. Code Ch. 335-14-8.

(Recommendation of Hearing Officer at 622, Conclusions of Law 2-5).

D. State Court Appeal of Administrative Findings

Families and SAFE, the Petitioners in the Administrative Hearing, appealed the

Commission’s June 20, 2000 decision to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. The

Circuit Court affirmed the issuance of the permit, and those Plaintiffs appealed to the Alabama Court

of Civil Appeals. In a lengthy opinion that discussed the evidence in the Hearing Officer’s

Recommendation supporting the Commission’s decision, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the

permit in its entirety. Families Concerned about Nerve Gas Incineration v. ADEM, 826 So. 2d 857

(Ala. Civ. App. 2002). The Court of Civil Appeals quoted the Hearing Officer’s findings that the

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 10 of 48
11

contingency plan submitted in the permit application met all applicable requirements and concluded

that those findings were fully supported by the record. Families, 826 So.2d at 872.

At the same time that the Montgomery County Circuit Court considered the permit appeal,

it also considered a separate declaratory judgment action filed by Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc.

(“CRBI”), another of the Plaintiffs in the present case. The Circuit Court issued an opinion in CRBI

that conflicted with the court’s opinion in the permit appeal. The separate CRBI decision was

appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, primarily over the Circuit Court’s holding that one

provision of the permit constituted a rule and, thus, violated the rule-making procedures required by

Alabama’s Administrative Procedures Act. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court. Noting

that the identical issue had been thoroughly analyzed by the Court of Civil Appeals in Families, the

Supreme Court found that the holding in Families as to that issue was dispositive and that the

permit’s provision was not a “rule” requiring notice and comment. Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v.

Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc., 826 So. 2d 111, 116 (2002).

III. This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Claims

By order dated February 17, 2005, the court ordered the parties to address whether or not this

court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ alleged violations of state law, taking into

account the following comments by the Eleventh Circuit in Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc.,

386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2004): 

In so concluding, we note that the RCRA’s citizen-suit provision contains language

very similar to that contained in the CWA’s citizen-suit provision. See 42 U.S.C. §

6972(a)(1)(A) (conferring jurisdiction over citizen suits alleging a “violation of any

permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has

become effective pursuant to this chapter”). We express no opinion as to whether

the language in the RCRA grants federal courts jurisdiction over citizen suits

alleging a violation of an EPA-approved state law under the RCRA. The issue

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 11 of 48
 

6 The courts who have considered the issue have distinguished between citizen suits alleging

a violation of a federal RCRA requirement that has been superceded by a state program and those

suits that allege a violation of a state RCRA requirement that operates in lieu of the federal program.

With respect to the former, courts have generally concluded that there is no federal jurisdiction over

suits to enforce the federal regulations in a delegated state because the federal regulations are no

longer effective. See Chemical Weapons Working Group v. United States Dept. of the Army, 990 F.

Supp. 1316, 1319 (D. Utah 1997); City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 980 (S.D.

12

under the RCRA is more complicated than under the CWA because a state’s

EPA-approved program under the RCRA operates “in lieu of the federal

program.” 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b); compare Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 411

(9th Cir.1997) (holding that the RCRA authorizes jurisdiction over citizen suits based

on the federal minimum standards, but not over state standards that exceed the

federal minimums), with City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F.Supp. 971, 979

(S.D.Ohio 1993) (determining that a “citizen suit is not available in an authorized

state for an alleged violation of a federal provision superseded by state law” and

noting that “there is a clear position among several courts that an (sic) RCRA citizen

suit is not available to enforce a state authorized program”), and Chemical Weapons

Working, Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 990 F.Supp. 1316, 1319

(D.Utah 1997) (holding that once the EPA authorized Utah to administer the

provisions of the RCRA, “the federal statute was no longer applicable,” and allowing

suit only for alleged violations of state law). EPA-approved state programs under the

CWA do not operate “in lieu” of the federal CWA program.

Parker, 386 F.3d at 1006 n.13 (emphasis added). The court notes that the EPA, the federal agency

primarily responsible for implementing RCRA, has articulated its view that citizen suit jurisdiction

under RCRA is available to address violations of state RCRA requirements in authorized states. 49

Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,304 (Dec. 12, 1984); 45 Fed. Reg. 85,016, 85,020-85,021 (Dec. 24, 1980); see

Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 258, 261-62 (M.D. Pa. 1989). 

Although the Eleventh Circuit has raised a substantial question regarding whether this court

has jurisdiction over citizen suits alleging a violation of an EPA-approved state law under RCRA,

the parties believe that the court has jurisdiction in this case, and the court concludes that is the better

view. Nonetheless, it is a close call given that a state’s EPA-approved program under RCRA

operates “in lieu of the federal program.”6

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 12 of 48
Ohio 1993). With respect to the latter, courts have reached different conclusions. Compare Glazer

v. American Ecology Environmental Services Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1040 (E.D. Texas 1995)

(finding that a RCRA citizen suit may be brought in federal court to enforce state requirements);

Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33, 43 (D. Maine 1994) (same); and Sierra Club v.

Chemical Handling Corp., 824 F. Supp. 195, 197 (D. Col. 1993)(same); with Dague v. City of

Burlington, 732 F. Supp. 458, 465 (D. Vermont 1989) (“The regulatory requirements under RCRA

are superseded by state regulations in those states having EPA authorization . . . . Therefore, a

plaintiff seeking to challenge the operation of a hazardous waste site in an EPA authorized state may

bring an action under state law, not federal law, or may seek revocation of the EPA’s authorization;

a direct action to enforce the RCRA permit requirement under § 6925(a) is not available.”).

 

7 Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on November 19, 2002, naming seven Defendants

and presenting claims in six counts, one brought under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (“NEPA”), four brought under RCRA, and one claiming a violation of the

Equal Protection provisions of the United States Constitution. On February 14, 2003, Plaintiffs filed

their First Amended Complaint, containing six revised Counts and deleting two of the original

Defendants: ADEM and its Director. The Amended Complaint brought claims against only the

Federal Defendants and Westinghouse. 

By Order dated July 8, 2003, Judge Karon O. Bowdre (then presiding over this case)

dismissed two of the RCRA claims (Counts 4 and 5) as impermissible collateral attacks on elements

of the Alabama RCRA permit, and the equal protection claim (Count 6). Judge Bowdre declined to

dismiss Counts 2 and 3 because, on the face of the pleading, those counts alleged current violations

of RCRA and thus, could (if supported by substantial evidence) be actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

6972(a)(1)(A). 

In filing their Second Amended Complaint,Plaintiffs voluntarilydismissed their NEPA claim

because it is duplicative of a claim brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

While the Second Amended Complaint originally contained the three Counts dismissed in the July

8 Opinion, the court granted leave to amend only as to Counts 1 and 2 (which correspond to Counts

2 and 3 of the original Complaint and First Amended Complaint). Thus, the only claims remaining

in the litigation are Counts 1 and 2 of the Second Amended Complaint.

13

IV. Summary Judgment Is Due to Be Granted Because Plaintiffs Have Not Presented

Sufficient Evidence of a Violation under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)

The remaining counts of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint allege that Defendants are

in violation of various provisions of Alabama hazardous waste regulations.7

 These claims are

asserted pursuant to RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), which provides that

a citizen suit may be brought against any person who is alleged to be “in violation” of any permit,

standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition or order which has become effective

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 13 of 48
 

8 Plaintiffs admitted at oral argument, and reiterate in their supplemental brief in opposition

to summary judgment, that all of their remaining claims are alleged under § 6972(a)(1)(A). (Doc.

# 88, at 4). The allegations contained in ¶¶ 32, 34, 35, 36, 37 of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint allege potential, rather than existing, conditions. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to

assert future claims based upon potential violations that have not yet occurred, those claims are not

ripe for consideration by this court. They are merely speculative and do not comply with the RCRA

requirement that violations alleged be “current” violations. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). 

14

pursuant to RCRA.8

 

In Count 1, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are in violation of Alabama regulations that

require the operator of a hazardous waste treatment facility to have a contingency plan (Ala. Admin.

Code R. 335-14-5-.04), to inspect the facility in accordance with a written schedule (Ala. Admin.

Code R. 335-14-5-.02(6)), and to design, construct, operate and maintain the facility to minimize the

possibility of fire, explosion, or any unplanned release of hazardous waste to the environment (Ala.

Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.03(2)). In Count 2, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are in violation of

Alabama regulations that require the operator of a hazardous waste facility to obtain an analysis of

a representative sample of the wastes before they are treated (Ala. Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.02(4))

and to provide an analysis of the waste in the permit application or trial burn plan (Ala. Admin. Code

R. 335-14-5-.15(2)).

It is undisputed that ANCDF has been issued a RCRA permit by the State of Alabama that

specifically implements the inspection, monitoring, contingency plan, and sampling provisions of

the Alabama regulations that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ remaining allegations. In essence, the

permit contains specific conditions (hereinafter “permit conditions”) that address the general

requirements of the Alabama regulations on which Plaintiffs rely. Plaintiffs do not dispute that all

of the regulatory provisions on which their claims are based were addressed in the permitting process

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 14 of 48
 

9 Plaintiffs admit: “It is true that the permit issuance and appeal process addressed the

requirements at issue in the instant complaint to some extent because the permit in fact imposes

requirements for waste characterization, prevention and minimization of releases, and identification

and quantification of releases – and does so by inter alia incorporating the regulations sought to be

enforced by Plaintiffs here.” (Doc. # 88, at 3).

15

and are implemented by specific permit conditions.9

 (Hardy Depo. at 44-49).

It is important to note that Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges only that

Defendants have violated Alabama regulatory provisions. The Second Amended Complaint does

not allege that Defendants are in violation of the permit itself. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ claims have

“morphed” through the summary judgment process to include that allegation, which they approach

from two angles. First, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have violated the permit by failing to comply

with the regulations because the general mandates of the Alabama regulations have been

incorporated into the permit by reference and/or by restating the substantive requirements. As

explained below, the court finds that this argument is contrary to Alabama’s “permit shield”

provision. 

Plaintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment also articulates an alternative basis for their

claim that Defendants are in violation of their permit. Plaintiffs now claim that “new facts,” which

arose after the permitting process was complete, demonstrate ongoing permit violations by

Defendants. Even assuming that this claim is properly in the case, the court finds this argument

equally unpersuasive, as outlined in Section IV.D., infra. First, however, the court will discuss the

permit shield and its effect on Plaintiffs’ arguments. 

 A. The Permit Shield Narrows the Relevant Question Before the Court 

Alabama RCRA regulations contain a “permit shield” provision which provides that

compliance with a state hazardous waste permit constitutes compliance with the requirements of

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 15 of 48
 

10 Although the regulation does provide some exceptions to this general rule, it is undisputed

that those exceptions do not apply in this case.

 

11 This Alabama regulation reflects an analogous federal regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 270.4(a); see

Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 761-65 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding federal “permit shield”

provision). ADEM’s representative echoes the opinion that compliance with the terms of the permit

constitutes compliance with RCRA regulatory provisions. (Hardy Depo. at 44-46, 48-49). 

16

RCRA.10 Ala. Admin. Code R. 335-14-8.01(4)(a).11 Under the permit shield, if all of Defendants’

ANCDF activities are authorized by, and in compliance with, the permit, Defendants are in full

compliance with RCRA as a matter of law and are entitled to summary judgment. 

As noted earlier, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Alabama regulations on which their claims

are based are addressed and implemented through the permit conditions set forth in ANCDF’s

permit. Rather, Plaintiffs maintain that they can enforce the underlying regulations directly, even

if the permitting authority has determined that the permittee is in compliance with the permit.

Plaintiffs’ argument is dependent upon a finding that the Alabama permit shield provision is

ineffective, and they offer the following reasons why this court should not apply the permit shield:

(1) the holding in Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1992), renders permit shield

provisions applicable only to EPA and state enforcement actions, not citizen suits; and (2) the

Alabama permit shield conflicts with, and therefore is trumped by, federal law because it serves to

bar federal RCRA citizen suits. 

The court finds that both of Plaintiffs’ arguments are fundamentally flawed. Plaintiffs’

reliance on Shell Oil for the proposition that the applicability of permit shield provisions is limited

to enforcement actions is misplaced. The D.C. Circuit specifically noted that the federal permit

shield provision is applicable to citizen suits and does effectively “narrow the opportunities for

citizen suits.” Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 761-65; see also Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v.

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 16 of 48
 

12 In light of the permit shield provision, Plaintiffs’ first approach to their claim that Defendants

are violating the permit is nonsensical. As noted earlier, Plaintiffs argue that because the regulations

are incorporated into the permit, Defendants are in violation of the permit if they fail to comply

generally with the regulations. In fact, the correct analysis is exactly the opposite. Under the permit

shield provision, if Defendants comply with the permit, they comply with the regulations. 

17

United States Dept. of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1492 & n. 5 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claims made

by some of the Plaintiffs in this case that the citizen suit provision authorizes suits for permitted

activity). Nonetheless, that “narrowing” of citizen suit availability is not a complete bar to citizen

suits, as Plaintiffs allege. Rather, RCRA creates the cause of action for citizens to remedy violations,

while the permit shield regulation defines what constitutes a RCRA violation. Even under the permit

shield, citizen suits are certainly readily available to remedy violations of a permit and other such

scenarios. However, when a permittee is acting in compliance with a permit, which was duly crafted

by the authorized state entity to ensure compliance with RCRA requirements, the permit shield

provision protects that permittee from allegations that it is still violating RCRA. Such an

interpretation of the permit shield provision is consistent with RCRA’s intent for a federal-state

partnership to regulate the disposal of solid and hazardous waste. Accordingly, the court finds that

the Alabama permit shield does not conflict with RCRA and therefore operates in full force in this

case.

Having determined that Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by the Alabama permit shield

provision (that provides that compliance with a permit constitutes compliance with the regulations),

the only relevant question for the court to determine is whether the hazardous waste activities being

conducted at ANCDF are authorized by, and in compliance with, the permit.12 As explained below,

the court finds the answer to be in the affirmative and therefore grants summary judgment for

Defendants. 

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 17 of 48
18

B. All of the Alleged Regulatory Violations of Count I Are Addressed and/or

Authorized by the Permit 

In Count 1, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated three general provisions of

Alabama’s regulations regarding contingency plans, facility inspections and design of the facility.

(Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 29-31). As outlined below, each of these provisions is addressed

in detail in the ANCDF permit. 

1. Contingency plan

Ala. Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.04 requires that each hazardous waste facility have a

contingency plan that describes how the facility operator will respond to an emergency situation such

as fire, explosion, or unplanned release of hazardous waste. This requirement is implemented in

condition II.H of the permit which requires the facility to follow the procedures contained in the

Contingency Plan submitted to ADEM as part of the application and incorporated by ADEM into

the permit. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 27). The permit also requires the facility to perform a staged

shutdown of the facility in the event of fire or unplanned release and prohibits the facility from

resuming operations until ADEM has been notified of the event and ADEM has given the facility

approval to resume operations. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 27 (Permit conditions II.H.2, II.H.3); Ex. 6 at

2).

2. Facility inspection

Ala. Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.02(6) requires that the operator of a hazardous waste facility

inspect the facility in accordance with a written schedule. This provision is implemented by section

II.E of the permit, which provides that the facility will comply with the relevant provisions of the

Alabama regulations and with the specific Inspection Procedures and Schedules incorporated into

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 18 of 48
 

13 For example, Plaintiffs assert that, at TOCDF, chemical agent has migrated to category C

areas where agent is not supposed to be, where unprotected workers may be present, and which are

often areas adjacent to the outside environment. (Doc. # 64, Ex. 7 at 92-93, 122-23; Ex. 8 at 25-26;

19

the permit. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 25-26 (Permit condition II.E.1)). 

3. Design of Facility

Ala. Admin. Code 335-14-5-.03(2) requires that the facility be designed, constructed,

operated, and maintained to minimize the possibility of fire, explosion, or any unplanned release of

hazardous waste to the environment. This provision is incorporated into the permit through permit

condition II.A.1, and the permit also requires that the facility be constructed in accordance with the

drawings approved by ADEM. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 24 (Permit condition II.A.2)). Moreover, the

permit contains extensive provisions detailing how the facility must be operated and maintained in

order to minimize the possibility of fire, explosion or unplanned release. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 26,

96-152 (Permit conditions II.F (Training Plan) and II.G (Preparedness and Prevention), Permit

Module VI (General Conditions for the Incinerators))). 

With respect to the design of ANCDF, Plaintiffs contend that “the chemical warfare agent

monitoring systems in use at the Army chemical weapons incineration sites are unreliable and have

known defects.” (Doc. # 65). Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants should have altered the design or

operation of ANCDF so as to prevent the following problems that TOCDF has experienced: (1)

incinerator ACAMS agent monitor stack alarms; (2) releases to the environment of chemical agent

and agent incineration wastes from non-stack locations (fugitive releases); (3) chemical agent

releases to the environment from the incinerator stack; (4) gelling and gumming of agent in the agent

feed guns; and (5) incidents in which workers have been exposed to chemical warfare agent at levels

causing signs and symptoms of exposure.13

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 19 of 48
Ex. 10 at 78-9; Ex. 11 at 81-82). 

20

Defendants point out that the TOCDF operational history was fully considered by ADEM in

making its decision on the ANCDF permit. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 7, Department of the Army

Memorandum October 12, 2000, Enclosure 4 to Minutes of December 7, 2000 ANCDF/ADEM

meeting). Moreover, while the facility at TOCDF is similar to ANCDF, there are also significant

differences in the design, construction, and operation of the two facilities, reflecting the fact that they

were constructed at different times, are operated by different people, and have different mixes of

munitions and other materials to be processed. (Doc. # 64, Ex. 22 at 28, 29, 32, 122-25, 129-30,

223-25, 234-35). Therefore, as noted by the court in footnote 3, supra, the fact that an incident may

have occurred at TOCDF is simply not evidence that Defendants are in violation of their permit or

regulatory obligations at ANCDF. 

4. Monitoring of Emissions

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants are not adequately monitoring emissions from the

facility that might be released, but that have not been identified. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 37).

Plaintiffs claim that the fact that these unidentified compounds are not monitored means that the

facility poses a threat to human health or the environment. (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 32-38).

The issue of what compounds should be monitored in the facility’s emissions (and when) and what

action should be taken as a result of any exceedances has been specifically addressed in the permit.

(Hardy Depo. at 32-37, 46-48). The permit contains specific emission limitations and monitoring

requirements for each of the facility’s incineration units during the shakedown, trial burn and posttrial burn periods as well as during normal operation. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 102-79 (Permit

conditions VI.B.1.ii-vii and VII.B.2.ii-vii (emission standards for the Liquid Incinerator), VI.B.4 and

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 20 of 48
 

14 Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants do not adequately monitor the incinerator stack to assess

whether they are in compliance with permit standards for mercury, lead, dioxins, or other hazardous

wastes is not supported by the evidence. (Doc. # 75, at 4). In support of this claim, Plaintiffs point

to a February 4, 2004 incident when ANCDF workers who were involved in maintenance activities

in a toxic area set off ACAMS alarms outside the toxic area. (Garrett Depo. at 61-64, 94-117, 126-

29; Love Depo. at 35-45). The undisputed evidence shows that the permit requires the use of

ACAMS devices for stack monitoring. There is no evidence that Defendants have not used the

ACAMS equipment for monitoring. Rather, Plaintiffs believe that the ACAMS equipment is

unreliable. This is simply an impermissible collateral attack on the adequacy of the permit, as

discussed in Section V, infra.

21

VII.B.5 (monitoring requirements for Liquid Incinerator), VI.C.1.ii-vii and VII.C.2.ii-vii (emission

standards for the Metal Parts Furnace), VI.C.4 and VII.C.5 (monitoring requirements for the Metal

Parts Furnace), VI.D.1.ii-vii and VII.D.2.ii-vii (emission standards for the Deactivation Furnace),

VI.D.4 and VII.D.5 (monitoring requirements for the Deactivation Furnace))). 

Moreover, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs’ monitoring concerns were raised and

specifically addressed in the permitting process. Once again, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on events

that occurred at TOCDF, e.g.., ACAMS monitor alarms at TOCDF have been triggered by

substances other than chemical agent. (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 32-33). Information

concerning the alarms at TOCDF was submitted to ADEM during the permitting process. (Doc. #

57, Ex. 7). Among the information submitted to ADEM was an analysis of the false alarms at

TOCDF, which determined that the alarms were caused by various interfering substances (many of

which were identified) and that the problem was exacerbated by the sensitivity of the monitors. (Doc.

# 57, Ex. 7, at 14-16, 18). Thus, at the time the ANCDF permit was issued and then modified to

allow agent operations, ADEM was fully aware that agent alarms had occurred at TOCDF, and that

not all of the interfering substances had been identified.14 Armed with that information, ADEM

constructed ANCDF’s permit accordingly.

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 21 of 48
 

15 Plaintiffs claim that certain determinations – based on results from TOCDF, not on actual

chemical analyses of ANCDF waste – violate Alabama characterization requirements. For example,

Plaintiffs point out that higher than anticipated levels of mercury and other toxic metals were

discovered in the agent GB waste at TOCDF. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 2-3; Doc. # 64, Ex. 8 at 6-7, 9,

13-15, 57, 63; Ex 11 at 71-73; Ex. 14 at 6). However, based on results from TOCDF, ADEM has

determined that those higher levels will not be present in ANCDF waste. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 2-3).

In fact, ANCDF does not have any GB bulk containers. (Doc. # 64, Ex. 22 at 209-10; Doc. # 57, Ex.

8 at 2-3). 

22

The court finds that the determination of which contingency plans, facility inspections,

facility design, and emissions monitoring are required to protect human health and the environment

is delegated to ADEM, was specifically addressed in the permitting process, is governed by specific

provisions in the facility’s permit, and has been affirmed by the Alabama courts. 

C. All of the Alleged Regulatory Violations of Count II Are Addressed and/or

Authorized by the Permit

In Count 2, Plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of Defendants’ analysis of the materials to be

processed in the ANCDF. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are in violation of Ala.

Admin Code R. 335-14-5-.15(2), which requires that a person seeking a permit for a hazardous waste

incinerator submit a trial burn plan that includes an analysis of the wastes to be burned, and Ala.

Admin Code R. 335-14-5-.02(4), which requires the permittee to obtain an analysis of a

representative sample of the wastes before they are treated. The Alabama regulations provide that

the sampling requirement of Ala. Admin Code R. 335-14-5-02(4)(a) is satisfied by following a waste

sampling plan incorporated into the permit. Ala. Admin Code R. 335-14-5-02(4)(b). 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are violating the above regulations because neither ADEM

nor Defendants have performed actual chemical analyses of the chemical agent and weapons waste

to be incinerated at ANCDF, but have relied instead on the analysis done at TOCDF and the Army’s

knowledge as waste generator of the chemical warfare agent manufacturing process.15 To the

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 22 of 48
 

16 Alabamaregulations provide that the characteristics of hazardous waste may be “[r]easonably

detected by generators of solid waste through their knowledge of their waste.” Alabama Admin.

Code R. 335-14-2-.02(1)(a)2(ii). The regulations further provide that the analysis of a representative

sample of waste may include “existing published or documented data on the hazardous waste or on

hazardous waste generated from similar processes.” Alabama Admin. Code R. 355-14-5-

.02(4)(a)(1); 355-14-5-.02(4)(a)(2). The waste analysis plan applicable in this case provides that

“Chemical agents will not be sampled because sufficient information is available from chemical

agent manufacture, manufacturing specifications, and previous studies conducted to date.” (Doc. #

57, Ex. 1, at page 2 of Attachment 2). 

23

contrary, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Alabama’s characterization requirements were

specifically addressed in the ANCDF permit and that ADEM was fully aware of the Army’s reliance

on results from TOCDF. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the undisputed fact that regulations

expressly permit a generator to use its knowledge of its waste to characterize it in lieu of testing.

(Doc. # 57, Ex. 2 at 39-40).16

1. General Characterization and Sampling

In its permit application, the Army explained that the chemical agent-containing materials

to be processed at ANCDF were products that had been manufactured to the Army’s specifications

and carefully controlled since manufacture. (Hardy Depo. at 39-40; Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at Att. 2 at 1-

2). The Army has extensive documentation of the manufacturing process for the materials to be

processed at ANCDF. (Id.). The Army also has information from the sampling of munitions that

occurred at TOCDF and the facility at Johnson Atoll. (Id.). Thus, the Army represented to ADEM

that the materials to be incinerated at ANCDF have been well-characterized and that no further

physical or chemical analysis was necessary. (Id.). The permit contains a waste analysis plan that

specifies how the facility is to sample and analyze residues and other wastes to be generated during

operation of the facility. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at Att. 2).

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 23 of 48
 

17 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants have no knowledge of the level of mercury, lead,

dioxins, and other materials being emitted from ANCDF is contrary to the undisputed evidence.

(Doc. # 75, at 3-5). As noted above, potential emissions from ANCDF were thoroughly examined

in the permitting process and actual emissions were measured during the trial burns. Because real

time monitoring of dioxins, mercury, lead and other compounds is not practical, ADEM established

final permit conditions in the form of feed rate limitations and incinerator operating conditions,

based on the results of the trial burns and risk assessment, to ensure that the emission levels found

acceptable in the risk assessment would not be exceeded during operation of the facility. 

24

Based on that information, ADEM developed estimates of the maximum amounts of metals

and other constituents likely to be present in the munitions at ANCDF, and the emissions from

incineration of materials containing these maximum amounts were tested during the required trial

burns. (Hardy Depo. at 32-38; Doc. # 57, Ex. 8, at 2-7, 19, 21-24). The resulting emissions were

then analyzed through a risk assessment to determine if they presented a risk to human health and

the environment. (Id.).17

Accordingly, in issuing the permit, ADEM determined that the Army’s characterization of

the agent-containing materials was adequate. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 8, at 2-3). Plaintiffs challenged that

determination administratively, and their claim was rejected by the Hearing Officer and the

determination upheld by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Families Concerned About Nerve Gas

Incineration v. Alabama Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt, Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n Docket No. 97-17,

Administrative Hearing Officer Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLawandRecommendations, at 270;

Alabama Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., et al., v. Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc., 826 So. 2d 111 (Ala.

2002). As noted above, ADEM also specifically included in the permit a waste analysis plan to

characterize the residues from the incineration process and other wastes that will be generated during

the incineration process.

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 24 of 48
 

18 The Federal Defendants also point out that, even if ADEM were to determine that the permit

conditions were not adequate to protect human health or the environment or to otherwise comply

with the Alabama regulations, ADEM can – and has– modified the permit to address new concerns.

(Hardy Depo. at 44-46, 48-49). 

25

 There is no basis for Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants do not know what levels of

constituents are present in the munitions at ANCDF. 

2. Formulation of a Plan to Combat Potential Analysis Problems

Experienced at TOCDF

The undisputed evidence indicates that ADEM did not blindly adopt the protocol used at

TOCDF, as Plaintiffs seem to suggest. In fact, ADEM not only carefully considered any analysis

problems encountered by TOCDF when formulating ANCDF’s permit, but it also approved specific

plans to deal with those potential issues. For example, after Defendants informed ADEM that certain

manufacturing lots of the nerve agent GB had been stabilized at TOCDF with a material that made

the agent prone to gelling over time (Doc. # 57, Ex. 8, at Att. 1 at 3, Att. 2 at 3), a specific plan was

developed and approved by ADEM to safely process munitions containing gelled agent at ANCDF.

(Hardy Depo. at 40-43; Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 1-2, 17). 

The court finds that ADEM has determined that the conditions contained in ANCDF’s permit

are adequate to protect human health and the environment. Ala. Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.03(a),

(b); Doc. # 57, Ex. 8, at 22-23.18 Plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to challenge ADEM’s action

on the permit through the state administrative and judicial process, including review by the highest

state courts in Alabama. This court will not revisit that issue. Accordingly, the court finds that the

question of whether the munitions to be processed at ANCDF have been adequately characterized

and analyzed was thoroughly addressed in the permitting process and sanctioned by ADEM.

 

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 25 of 48
 

19 Moreover, the permit has been modified several times since hazardous waste operations

began to reflect the experience that has been gained through operation of the facility. (E.g., Permit

Modification No. 20, December 9, 2004). Each time the permit has undergone a major modification,

the public has been given notice and an opportunity to comment prior to approval of the modification

by ADEM.

26

D. Plaintiffs’ Alleged “New Evidence” Is Not Sufficient to Show That Defendants

Have Failed to Comply with the Permit 

In response to the Defendants’ argument that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were considered by

ADEM during the permitting process and addressed by the permit, Plaintiffs argue that “new” facts,

which arose after the permitting process was complete, demonstrate ongoing permit violations at

ANCDF. As noted earlier, this claim was not pled by Plaintiffs in the Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs have alleged only violations of Alabama regulations, not violations of the permit itself.

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reliance on “new evidence” is fundamentally flawed because any fact that

occurred too late to be considered in the permitting process also occurred too late to form the basis

for the claims articulated in Plaintiffs’ July 10, 2003 Second Amended Complaint. Although the

ANCDF permit was initially granted in 1997, that permit only allowed construction of the facility.

Hazardous waste operations at the facility did not, and could not, begin until the permit was modified

to approve the facility’s agent trial burn plan. That final approval of the permit did not occur until

July 30, 2003. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 4).19 Thus, any new facts that arose after the July 30, 2003 approval

of the permit for hazardous waste operations occurred at least 20 days after Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint was filed and cannot form the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims in this case.

 Ironically, although Plaintiffs’ complaint warns of the “imminent harm” that could result

from Defendants’ activities at ANCDF, not a single one of the Plaintiffs challenged the most recent

permit decision by ADEM in July-August 2003 – the modification which allowed trial burns of

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 26 of 48
 

20 At his deposition, Hardy testified that Defendants are in compliance with all applicable

Alabama RCRA requirements alleged by Plaintiffs in this case: (1) Defendants have not violated the

applicable regulatory requirements of ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.04 related to contingency

planning and emergency procedures (Hardy Depo. pp 53-54); (2) Defendants have changed and

added procedures as requested by ADEM, and are not currently in violation of the applicable

regulatory requirements of ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.02(6) related to conducting regular

inspections (Hardy Depo. pp 54-57); (3) Defendants have not violated the applicable regulatory

requirements of ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-.03(2) related to preparedness and prevention,

or design and operation of the incinerator (Hardy Depo. at 57); (4) Defendants have not violated any

applicable Alabama RCRA regulatory requirements that they act to prevent and minimize emissions

of hazardous wastes and their constituents (Id.); and (5) Defendants have not violated any applicable

Alabama RCRA regulatory requirements to establish a plan to identify and quantify chemical

releases, assess the hazards posed, and mitigate those hazards (Hardy Depo. at 58). 

27

actual agent (and which is the modification under which current operations are governed). A

decision by ADEM to modify a permit is subject to challenge by any affected person in the same

manner as the initial permit decision. Ala. Code § 22-22A-7(c) (1975). Each time the permit has

undergone a major modification, the public has been given notice and an opportunity to comment

prior to ADEM approval of the modification. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs did not pursue administrative

review, nor bring to ADEM’s attention, any of their “new” evidence concerns. 

At oral argument, Plaintiffs indicated that they chose to pursue a citizen suit against

Defendants rather than approaching ADEM about the most recent “evidence” of potential violations.

Plaintiffs characterized the issue of violations at ANCDF as an enforcement decision by ADEM (Tr.

at 145), suggesting at least by inference that ADEM has simply chosen not to pursue recent

violations at ANCDF. Hardy’s deposition testimony refutes Plaintiffs’ effort to make this appear

to be an exercise of enforcement discretion involving actual violations that ADEM has ignored.

Hardy testified that there were no violations of the regulatory provisions that Plaintiffs seek to

enforce in this case,20 not that ADEM had decided not to pursue possible violations. Moreover, the

fact that ADEM recently issued a “Notice of Violation” to ANCDF – albeit unrelated to Plaintiffs’

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 27 of 48
 

21 Plaintiffs’ claim in this case is that Defendants have failed to characterize potential emissions

of chemicals, other than chemical warfare agent (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 37), from ANCDF’s

stack. (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 32-37). Plaintiffs now allege that an emission of chemical

28

claims in this case, as outlined in Section IV.E., infra – deflates Plaintiffs’ inference of nonenforcement by ADEM.

In any event, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence to establish that

Defendants are violating the ANCDF permit. At the February 15, 2005 oral argument, Plaintiffs

articulated the following “new” evidence which they allege demonstrates a permit violation: (1) there

have been, or will be, agent releases from the heated discharge conveyor bin area (Tr. at 93-98; 102-

104; 107-124); (2) combustion of agent on the DFS feed chute has occurred and that agent material

builds up on the chute (Tr. at 28); (3) Defendants failed to anticipate high levels of mercury and other

metals in the waste, and failed to sample or test the munitions (Tr. at 16-18; 21-25; 71-78; 80-82;

126-38; 141-47); and (4) Defendants have failed to anticipate the presence of gelled or solidified

agent wastes in some of the munitions and did not test the munitions or waste to determine the extent

of the problem (Tr. at16-18; 21-25; 28; 138-47). The court will address each claim in turn. 

1. Agent Releases from the Heated Discharge Conveyor Bin Area

Plaintiffs allege that the detection of low levels of agent in the heated discharge conveyer bin

enclosure demonstrates that Defendants are not taking sufficient action to prevent the release of

hazardous waste. (Doc. # 75, at 4 (relying on Garrett Depo. at 164 - 165; Love Depo. at 82-101);

Tr. at 89-90). Plaintiffs have inferred that agent detection in the DFS heated discharge conveyor bin

enclosure area means that chemical agent has been released into the environment. (Doc. # 65, at 2-

3). Plaintiffs’ argument fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint does

not contain this claim.21 Second, Plaintiffs’ only “evidence” of a release is their belief that, because

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 28 of 48
warfare agent with fugitive dust has occurred from the DFS bin enclosure at TOCDF and that

chemical agent has been detected on two occasions in the DFS bin enclosure at ANCDF. These facts

are completely unrelated to Plaintiffs’ claim that ANCDF has not adequately characterized potential

emissions of non-agent chemicals from the facility’s stack.

 

22 Plaintiffs also asserted that dust in the bin contains agent and is released in a plume every

time the door is opened. (Tr. at 102). 

 

23 Approximately, ten to fifteen agent alarms have been triggered in heated discharge conveyor

bin enclosure, but none were confirmed for the detection of agent. (Garrett Depo. at 166-67).

29

chemical agent has been detected twice in an enclosed room that is part of the protected area

inspected daily, a release can or has occurred every time the door to the bin is opened for daily

inspection. (Tr. at 95, 97).22 

Detection of agent in the bin enclosure is not a permit violation. Rather, the permit requires

that ANCDF monitor the area and adhere to its procedures to minimize the risk of a release which

could threaten human health or the environment. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, at 24 of 241 (Permit Condition

II.A.1)). The evidence indicates that the heated discharge conveyer bin is in an area where air flow

is controlled and constantly monitored for the presence of agent. (Garrett Depo. at 162-64; Love

Depo., at 76-89). Plaintiffs specifically admitted to the Court that the Plaintiffs do not know of any

release of agent from this bin at ANCDF “to date” (Tr. at 96, 102, 104),23 and there is no evidence

that the presence of agent in the bin enclosure caused a release of agent into a non-controlled area

or resulted in a permit violation or Alabama RCRA violation related to waste characterization and

the Contingency Plan. 

To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that Defendants are complying with the permit

and that the detection of chemical agent in the bin enclosure was investigated and addressed. (Doc.

# 64, Ex. 23 at 82-91; Ex. 22 at 171-75, 223-24). In May 2004, ADEM modified the permit to

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 29 of 48
30

implement specific procedures for ANCDF to follow when chemical agent is detected in the DFS

bin enclosure during both future agent trial burns and normal operations. (Permit Modification 17,

conditions VI.D.3.x - xi (revised pages 28-29 of Module VI), conditions VII.D.4.ix - x (revised pages

25-26 of Module VII)). The permit modification also required that the facility be modified so that

agent feed to the DFS is immediately stopped if the alarm in the DFS bin enclosure area is triggered.

(Permit Modification 2 to 3 (noting modifications to Module VI, Table 6-11 and Module VII, Table

7-6)).

The fact that agent was detected on two occasions in the conveyer bin enclosure area at levels

below the allowable discharge provides no basis to question ADEM’s determination that ANCDF’s

permit is adequate to satisfy regulatory requirements. 

2. Combustion of Agent on the DFS Feed Chute

Plaintiffs next allege the following regarding the deactivation furnace system (“DFS”) feed

chute (the location at which munitions are fed into the furnace): (1) a recent jamming of the feed

chute at ANCDF signals a potential problem because the jamming of the feed chute at TOCDF was

one of the contributing factors to the TOCDF May 2000 agent stack release (Doc. # 64, Ex. 16 at 2-4,

Ex. 20); (2) “ANCDF is prematurely incinerating munitions in the DFS feed chute. . . . Emissions

from this process are not controlled or properly regulated” (Doc. # 65, at 2, relying on Garrett Depo.

at 37); and (3) ANCDF has experienced accumulations of ash, fiberglass pieces and pieces of

munition bodies in the DFS feed chute kicker plate area (Garrett Depo. at 33 - 34), which Plaintiffs

claim is a regulatory or permit violation. (Tr. at 28). Plaintiffs’ arguments are not relevant to their

claims in this case that ANCDF is not adequately monitoring for compounds other than chemical

agent and that wastes were not adequately characterized. Plaintiffs provide no explanation of how

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 30 of 48
 

24 Despite an extension of the discovery period to allow Plaintiffs to pursue discovery on this

issue (among others), Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence to suggest that there have been

releases of chemical agent. (Garrett Depo., at 162-75; Love Depo., at 76-106, 161-64).

 

25 Furthermore, the permit has been modified several times since hazardous waste operations

began, and several of those modifications have occurred since the build-up of material on the DFS

feed chute was observed at ANCDF. Thus, even if this build-up was not anticipated when the permit

was originally issued, it was known when the permit was modified.

31

the operation of the DFS is related to those claims. 

Moreover, even assuming these events are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, they do not

demonstrate that ANCDF is in violation of its permit. The design, performance standards, and

operating requirements for the DFS are set forth in the permit. The permit specifically allows

combustion to incur in the DFS (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1 at 153), and the feed chute is part of that system.

(Garrett Depo., at 48-53). ANCDF was designed so that any gases generated during combustion in

the feed chute are directed into the furnace and the air pollution control system. (Doc. # 64, Ex. 22

at 45-46). Ash accumulates at the point where munitions are fed into the DFS incinerator because

there is a great change in temperature. (Garrett Depo., at 37- 39). There is no evidence that this

causes emissions from ANCDF,24 or that it results in any violation of the permit or regulations

alleged in this case. Moreover, both the design of the feed chute and adjustments to that design made

in response to problems that had occurred at TOCDF were specifically addressed in the permitting

process. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 34).25

3. High Levels of Mercury and Other Metals in the Waste and Failure to

Sample or Test Munitions

Plaintiffs also argue that there is a “problem with mercury emissions” from ANCDF, because

Defendants do not continually sample for mercury emissions. (Doc. # 65, at 3; Doc. # 75, at 2).

Plaintiffs point out that mercury has been detected in GB and mustard agent at ANCDF (Garrett

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 31 of 48
 

26 With respect to possible contamination by Lewisite (Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 44),

ADEM considered the issue and determined that, because there are no bulk containers of GB in the

inventory at ANCDF, the problem encountered at TOCDF is unlikely to arise at ANCDF. (Doc. #

57, Ex. 8, at 2-3).

32

Depo. at 182, 185), and they allege that Defendants “don’t know how much mercury is in the waste,

they don’t know how much mercury comes out of the stack, and they don’t have any reliable method

of capturing the mercury.” (Doc. # 75, at 2). 

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, mercury was specifically identified as a waste expected to

be present in incineration through the listing of waste Code D009 in the permit application. (Doc.

# 62, Ex. 1, at 2140; ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-.03(5) Table 1). Moreover, the permit does

not require ANCDF to conduct continual sampling for mercury. (Hardy Depo., at 62-70). Rather,

the permit required ANCDF to sample waste for mercury in the surrogate trial burns and to operate

the facility within the established parameters. (Love Depo., at 150-51). There is no dispute that

potential metal emissions from the facility, including mercury, were tested during the surrogate trial

burn and analyzed through risk assessment. (Hardy Depo. at 43-44; Doc. # 57, Ex. 8, at 5; Love

Depo., at 150-51). Plaintiffs offer no evidence that mercury or other metal emissions exceed what

is allowed by the permit.26

 

Although Plaintiffs point out that no regulation prevents Defendants from sampling for

mercury, this argument carries no weight. That sampling is not prohibited does not meant that

Defendants have an obligation to sample. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the option to use

generator knowledge (rather than sampling) – an option that the Hearing Officer ultimately

recommended in view of the danger presented if each munition were tested:

Regarding waste sampling, no regulation mandates sampling as the sole means of

waste identification and determination. (Although the Plaintiffs’ allege that the

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 32 of 48
 

27 As noted earlier, the evidence at the administrative hearing showed that the nature of the

chemical weapons would make the sampling of each container or individual munition too dangerous

for the benefit that might be derived, particularly when the generator has knowledge of the materials

likely to be present in the chemical weapons. (Doc. # 62, Ex. 2, at 3928). Based on that testimony,

the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer’s determination that ADEM has the discretion under

ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-8-.02(1)(c) to approve the Army’s use of “generator knowledge”

and relevant information to characterize the waste without sampling each individual weapon or

munition. (Doc. # 62, Ex. 1 at 539; at 619-20 ¶¶ 6-10; at 621-22, Conclusions of Law 1, 4 & 5).

33

Army and Westinghouse have not sampled and analyzed all wastes, they cite no

regulation requiring such action). In the administrative proceeding, it was established

that sampling is one of two methods a generator of hazardous waste may use in

making a waste determination, with the alternative being that the generator (here the

Army) can apply its knowledge of the materials or the processes that generated the

wastes.

(Doc. # 62, Ex. 1 at 621, Conclusion of Law 1, citing ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-

.02(1)(a)2.(ii)).27 ADEM approved not tapping and sampling the munitions to avoid the risk to

workers and the public. (Hardy Depo., at 39-40). Plaintiffs simply disagree with the permit

provisions and the decision of the Commission to adopt the Hearing Officer’s Recommendations in

this regard. But Plaintiffs’ disagreement does not even hint at a permit violation and further, their

mere disagreement cuts no ice at all in light of the permit shield provision. 

4. Failure to anticipate gelled or solidified agent wastes in munitions

Finally, Plaintiffs point out that, during operations at TOCDF, some of the munitions

contained gelled agent while bulk agent lots contained higher levels of contaminants than initially

projected. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 41). As noted before, this information was provided to

ADEM during the permitting process and ADEM specifically determined that the munitions to be

processed at ANCDF had been adequately characterized. (Hardy Depo. at 39-40; Doc. # 57, Ex. 8,

at 2-3, 8-17).

 

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 33 of 48
 

28 At the hearing, Plaintiffs stated they felt an “obligation” to raise the issue of the NOV (Tr.

at 86), although Plaintiffs did not speak with conviction about its application to the claims in this

case (Tr. at 86-88). The parties were given an opportunity to address the NOV and its potential

application to this case in their supplemental briefs filed one week after the February 15, 2005

hearing. 

34

 ADEM was informed in October 2000 that the munitions to be processed at ANCDF could

contain gelled or crystalline agent. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 8, at 8). This fact was considered in detail by

ADEM before it allowed both the surrogate trial burn and the agent trial burn. (Doc. # 57,. Ex. 6 at

Att. at 3, Att. 2 at. 2, 12; Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 1-2, 8-21). In fact, ANCDF was required to conduct

a separate trial burn specifically tailored to address the issue of weapons that could not be drained

because of the presence of gelled or crystallized agent. (Doc. # 64, Ex. 22 at 276-78; Garrett Dec.,

at ¶¶ 38, 39; Doc. # 57, Ex. 8 at 6). Furthermore, the waste analysis plan submitted to ADEM, and

incorporated into the permit, stated that “[t]he ANAD inventory of munitions contains chemical

agents in three forms (liquid, gelled, or crystallized), due to stabilization chemicals added to specific

lots during production or storage.” (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1, Attachment 2, at 1-2). The undisputed

evidence shows that ADEM, with knowledge that the munitions to be processed at ANCDF could

contain gelled or crystalline agent, specifically determined that any additional information that might

be gained from physical testing of the munitions at ANCDF would not be worth the risk of a release

associated with sampling these weapons. (Hardy Depo. at 39-40). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not

shown that Defendants are in violation of the permit by failing to anticipate or manage gelled or

solidified agent wastes. 

E. The August 26, 2004 Notice of Violation Is Not Probative of Plaintiffs’ Claims

At the February 15 hearing, Plaintiffs also referred to an August 26, 2004 Notice of Violation

(“NOV”) issued by ADEM to ANCDF. (Doc. # 87, Ex. 3).28 The NOV identified nine violations

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 34 of 48
 

29 Plaintiffs’s supplemental brief in opposition to summary judgment references “two or three”

notices of violation and now claims that Plaintiffs “have had no opportunity for discovery regarding

these documents.” (Doc. # 88). Plaintiffs did not file a Rule 56(f) affidavit, nor do they appear to

seek additional discovery of these items in lieu of a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, only

the August 26, 2004 Notice of Violation is part of the summary judgment record. 

35

of the ANCDF permit that were either observed by ADEM inspectors or reported to ADEM by

ANCDF during the period April 4, 2004 to June 22, 2004. Defendants have offered the NOV as

summary judgment evidence and do not object to the admission of the NOV. (Doc. # 87, Ex. 3).

Therefore the court will consider it as part of the summary judgment record.29

 

Defendants argue that the NOV is not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case because

events that occurred in 2004 cannot establish that ANCDF was in violation of the permit when the

complaint was filed in 2002 or amended in 2003. Defendants also maintain that the issues raised

in the NOV are in the process of being resolved by an administrative order on consent that currently

is being considered for public comment. (Doc. # 87, Ex. 4; see also http://www.adem.state.al.us/

PublicNotice/Jan/AO/ 1USArmy.htm). 

Plaintiffs argue that the NOV proves that ADEM has concluded that Defendants are not in

full compliance with either the permit requirements or the applicable regulations. Nonetheless,

Plaintiffs admit that the August 2004 NOV “does not address most of the violations alleged in the

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint . . . . Item 9 concerns Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the regulatory

and permit violation of failure to prevent and minimize releases from the DFS HDC bin in substance,

although it cites only to one specific permit requirement regarding the waste feed cut off procedure.”

(Doc.. # 88). 

The court finds that the August 2004 NOV is not relevant to, nor probative of, Plaintiffs’

claims in this case. Plaintiffs admit that only one of the items identified in the NOV bears any

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 35 of 48
 

30 Items 1 and 2 concern how long the confirmatory DAAMS tubes should be run before they

are sampled. Item 3 concerns ADEM’s finding that a bin that was being managed as empty had not

been completely empty. Item 4 concerns an event when incompatible acidic and caustic wastes were

present on the same pallet. Items 5, 6, and 7 are related to the management of the liquid from the

air pollution control system. Item 8 concerns two events in which the calibration process for

monitoring instruments had not been fully completed before hazardous waste operations began.

None of these items are related in any way to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case.

36

relationship at all to their claims – Item No. 9 which addresses ANCDF’s report to ADEM that, as

of July 29, 2004, the ACAMS monitoring device in the deactivation furnace system heated discharge

conveyer bin enclosure was not being managed as an automatic waste feed cutoff as required by the

permit modification of May 25, 2004.30 This item is not probative of Plaintiffs’ claim that

Defendants are in violation of their permit obligation to prevent and minimize releases from the DFS

heated discharge conveyor bin. That the ACAMS monitoring device in the DFS was not being

managed as an automatic waste feed cutoff does not prove that Defendants have released, or failed

to prevent the release of, hazardous waste into the environment. The permit imposes specific

operational requirements to minimize releases from the bin enclosure, including a requirement to

cease waste feed if there is an alarm from the ACAMS. (Doc. # 87, Ex. 2, at 28-29 of Module VI,

25-26 of Module VII). There is no evidence that Defendants have not complied with those

requirements. The August 2004 NOV is not sufficient to demonstrate a permit violation related to

Plaintiffs’ claims in this case.

Accordingly, for all of the reasons articulated above, the court finds that summary judgment

for Defendants is due to be granted on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. The undisputed evidence

demonstrates that all of the regulatory provisions on which Plaintiffs rely, and the concerns which

Plaintiffs have articulated, were addressed by the permitting process. Moreover, there is no evidence

that Defendants have violated the permit conditions as set forth by ADEM. Because Plaintiffs’

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 36 of 48
37

claims are governed by the Alabama permit shield provision (that provides that compliance with a

permit constitutes compliance with the regulations), summary judgment is due to be granted because

all of the hazardous waste activities being conducted at ANCDF are authorized by, and in

compliance with, the permit.

V. Summary Judgment Is Due to Be Granted Because Plaintiffs’ Claims Are

Impermissible Collateral Challenges to the Permit

Alternatively, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted because Plaintiffs’

claims constitute a collateral challenge to the permit, which falls outside of the court’s jurisdiction

and regardless, is subject to res judicata. 

It is clear from Plaintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment that Plaintiffs seek to collaterally

attack ADEM’s decisions about how to implement Alabama’s regulations through specific

conditions in the permit. As noted throughout this opinion, ANCDF’s permit addresses all of the

regulatory provisions that Plaintiffs allege have been violated and sets forth specific conditions to

ensure ANCDF complies with those regulations. All of the Plaintiffs’ evidence concerning events

or potential events they deem objectionable have been addressed by the permit – Plaintiffs simply

disagree with the adequacy of the permit to prevent or manage those events. 

The timing of Plaintiffs’ complaint likewise indicates that it is nothing more than a collateral

attack on the adequacy of the permit. Although Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed in November 2002

and amended for the second time in July 2003 (Docs. # 1, 41, 47), hazardous waste operations at

ANCDF did not begin until August 2003, at least one month after the last complaint amendment.

(Doc. # 57, Ex. 3 at ¶ 39). Thus, the Second Amended Complaint – which alleged in July 2003 that

Defendants were currently violating Alabama regulations – was filed before hazardous waste

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 37 of 48
38

operations began at ANCDF. Therefore, Plaintiffs can only be asserting that, even if Defendants

operate ANCDF in full compliance with the permit conditions, Defendants will still fail to comply

with the Alabama regulatory provisions cited by Plaintiffs. This is a collateral attack on the

adequacy of the permit to address the regulatory requirements.

Notwithstanding this tautological reasoning, Plaintiffs maintain that their remaining claims

are not a collateral attack on the permit conditions, but rather an attempt to enforce the regulatory

provisions which are incorporated by reference into the permit. Plaintiffs point out that, consistent

with the citizen suit provision, they have alleged a violation of a statute, regulation, or permit

requirement and seek to enforce the violation by the operator of the hazardous waste facility – they

have not alleged that the permit is inadequate nor brought an action against the permitting authority.

(Doc. # 88, at 2). The court finds this semantic difference unpersuasive. The essence of Plaintiffs’

claims in this case is that, even if ANCDF were operated in full compliance with the permit

conditions established by ADEM, Defendants would still be in violation of the regulations. The only

explanation for such a scenario is that the permit is inadequate to fulfill the regulation requirements.

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Consider Collateral Permit Challenges

Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs have asked this court to review ADEM’s findings that

the permit adequately implements Alabama regulations, such a claim falls outside this court’s

jurisdiction. Challenges to the adequacy of the state-issued permit are committed to the state

administrative and judicial process, and, as noted in Judge Bowdre’s July 8, 2003 Memorandum

Opinion (Doc. # 39), this court has no jurisdiction to hear collateral challenges to the facility’s

permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(D); Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dept.

of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997); Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 38 of 48
39

F.3d 1188, 1192-93 (6thCir. 1995); Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 160-61

(4th Cir. 1993); Greenpeace Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (6th Cir.

1993). 

RCRA’s regulatory scheme delegates implementation of the RCRA permit program,

including judicial review of the issuance of those permits, to the states. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926(b) (state

program operates in lieu of federal program), 6926(d) (permit issued by state has same force and

effect as one issued by EPA). Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to seek judicial review of the ADEM

permit, and its modifications, in the Alabama state courts. To the extent they availed themselves of

that opportunity, they were unsuccessful. 

The process of obtaining the ANCDF permit was a lengthy one, involving numerous

exchanges and meetings between the permittees and ADEM. (Hardy Depo. at 9-22). After a public

notice and comment period, ANCDF received a hazardous waste permit from ADEM on June 19,

1997. (Hardy Depo. at 9-22). As outlined in detail in Section II.C-D supra, the permit was

challenged in state administrative and judicial fora by several of the Plaintiffs, and was ultimately

affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. See Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration

v.Alabama Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt, Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n Docket No. 97-17, Administrative Hearing

Officer Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations; Alabama Dep’t of Envtl.

Mgmt., et al., v. Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc., 826 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 2002). The permit has

subsequently been amended several times by ADEM. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1 at vi; Hardy Depo. at 25-28).

The permit, as amended, contains an inspection plan, a contingency plan, a waste analysis plan, and

extensive air emissions monitoring requirements. (Doc. # 57, Ex. 1 at 25-27, 96-217).

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 39 of 48
40

Moreover, before it began agent operations, ANCDF also had to undergo a series of trial

burns, the first of which involved surrogate compounds that tested the facility’s ability to operate

properly and to destroy chemical agents. (Hardy Depo. at 27-29). Before the facility could move

to the next stage, which is a trial burn involving actual chemical agent containing munitions, ADEM

had to approve ANCDF’s report on the surrogate trial burns and ANCDF’s agent trial burn plan.

(Hardy Depo. at 29-39). Surrogate trial burns were completed in 2002, and ANCDF submitted the

results to ADEM in addition to agent trial burn plan to ADEM as a modification of the permit.

ADEM approved the agent trial burn plan as a major modification of the permit on July 30, 2003.

(Doc. # 57, Ex. 4). 

Aside from the initial challenge to the permit, Plaintiffs have not sought either administrative

or state judicial review of ADEM’s recent permit modification, which is the modification under

which current operations are governed. Although Plaintiffs did seek a temporary restraining order

from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in the context of litigation pending in that

court concerning the Army’s compliance with NEPA, that request was denied on August 8, 2003.

Agent operations began at the facility on August 9, 2003, with the startup of the shakedown process

for M55 rockets containing the nerve agent GB. (Garrett Decl. ¶ 39). 

Because the question of whether ANCDF’s permit properly implements Alabama RCRA

regulations has already been determined by ADEM and the Alabama courts and is not subject to

review in the context of this RCRA citizen suit, this court cannot -- and will not -- second-guess

ADEM’s chosen application of the Alabama regulations to ANCDF’s permit. Accordingly,

summary judgment is due to be granted for this reason alone.

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 40 of 48
41

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata

“[T]he doctrine of res judicata prohibits the relitigation of all matter which was or could have

been litigated in the prior action.” Century 21 Properties, Inc. v. Alabama Real Estate Comm’n, 401

So. 2d 764, 768 (Ala. 1981). In determining whether a judgment from Alabama will have preclusive

effect in an action pending in another state or federal court, the other court must apply the res

judicata and collateral estoppel rules of Alabama. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,

474 U.S. 518, 520 (1986). “Under Alabama law, the essential elements of res judicata are: ‘(1) a

prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial

identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action presented in both suits.’” National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990)

(citations omitted). Elements one and two clearly are satisfied by the findings of the Commission

Hearing Officer and the state court judgments affirming those findings. (Doc. # 62, Ex. 1,

Recommendation of Hearing Officer); Families Concerned about Nerve Gas Incineration v. ADEM,

826 So. 2d 857 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Coosa River Basin Initiative,

Inc., 826 So. 2d 111, 116 (2002). Accordingly, the court limits its discussion to the third and fourth

elements enumerated above. 

1. Identity of the Parties is Satisfied in this Case

Element number three, the “identity of the parties” requirement, is also satisfied in this case.

“Identity of the parties concerns two sets of persons. The first set is compromised of those persons

who were actual parties in the original action...The second set...is composed of those persons who

are or were in privity with the parties to the original suit.” NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1560 (11th Cir.

1990) (citations omitted). 

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 41 of 48
 

31 In NAACP, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for the defendants, holding

that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata. NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1561. In previous

litigation, a state legislator brought several claims against the manner in which flags were flown at

the Alabama State Capitol. NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1559-60. In the subsequent litigation, the

NAACP brought claims against the same conduct. NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1559-60. The plaintiff in

the original litigation was also a member of the NAACP. NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1561. Reasoning that

the plaintiff in the original litigation “was so closely aligned to the NAACP’s interests in the original

suit that he was their virtual representative” and that subtle distinctions in the requested relief were

“tenuous at best,” the court held that their interests were deemed to be sufficiently aligned for res

judicata purposes. NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1561. 

42

As noted earlier, Families and SAFE were the only Plaintiffs who actually participated in the

state court litigation. However, under the doctrine of privity, the other Plaintiffs who have brought

this lawsuit may also be bound by the previous decision. Under Alabama law, “[j]udgments can bind

persons not party (or privy) to the litigation in question where the nonparties’ interests were

adequately represented by a party in the original suit.” See Century 21, 401 So.2d at 770. “Privity

is defined as ‘a relationship between one who is a party of record and a nonparty that is sufficiently

close so a judgment for or against the party should bind or protect the nonparty.” NAACP, 891 F.2d

at 1555. “Privity also exists where a party to the original suit is ‘so closely aligned to a nonparty’s

interest as to be his virtual representative.’” NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1555 (citations omitted).31 “The

question of whether sufficient privity exists to warrant application of res judicata is a question of

law.” NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1561 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The court finds that the remaining Plaintiffs in this case are all in privity with Families and

SAFE, who virtually represented those Plaintiffs in the previous litigation given their alignment of

interests. See Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1466 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he doctrine of ‘virtual

representation,’... supports a finding of privity ‘when the respective interests are closely aligned and

the party to the prior litigation adequately represented those interests.”); see also Century 21, 401

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 42 of 48
 

32 Indeed, language used to allege the threat of harm is virtually identical for every Plaintiff:

Each of the violations referenced in this Complaint in the counts that

follow will result in additional risk of release, and/or additional actual

releases, into the environment and work place of toxic pollutants

including nerve and blister agents, heavy metals, PCBs and DioxinLike compounds. These releases will harm Plaintiff[’s] members via

contamination of the air, water, land and food sources used by these

Plaintiffs.

(Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 5-16).

43

So.2d at 770 (“A person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the

parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative.”). 

In Families Concerned about Nerve Gas Incineration v. ADEM, 826 So. 2d 857 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2002), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated that Plaintiffs-Appellants “Families and

SAFE are public-interest citizen groups with members from Calhoun County and other locations in

the State organized to ensure that the incineration of the chemical agents at Anniston Army Depot

is accomplished in a manner that protects human health, safety, and the environment.” Families, 826

So.2d at 860. Likewise, all of the Plaintiffs in this case have an interest in enjoining the operation

of ANCDF because they are concerned that a release of harmful substances into the environment

could ultimately adversely affect their members. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 5-16).32 All

Plaintiffs in this case have members that live in an area subject to the allegedly adverse effects of

Defendants’ actions. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 5-16). It is clear that all of the Plaintiffs in

this litigation seek to protect the same interests that Families and SAFE sought to protect in the

permit appeals, and therefore, identity of the parties is satisfied. 

2. The “Same Cause of Action” Requirement Is Satisfied in this Case

“This Circuit has recognized that ‘the principal test for comparing causes of action is whether

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 43 of 48
 

33 Count 1 generally asserts violations of Alabama RCRA Rules concerning contingency

planning, emergency procedures (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 29), requirements for general

inspections for and remedy of any malfunctions, deteriorations or operator errors (Second Amended

Complaint, ¶ 30), and requirements that the facility be designed, constructed, maintained and

operated so as to minimize the possibility of unplanned sudden or non-sudden releases of hazardous

wastes (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 31). The Plaintiffs then allege that the Defendants have

violated these various requirements (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 33 - 38), and that the

Defendants cannot identify the types of wastes they will be expected to treat (Second Amended

Complaint, ¶ 32). 

44

the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each action.’ Res judicata applies not only to the

precise legal theory presented in the prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the

same nucleus of operative fact.” NAACP, 891 F.2d at 1561 (citations omitted); see also Century 21,

401 So.2d at 769 (“‘(T)he whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff to try his whole

cause of action and his whole case at one time.’” (citations omitted)). “Under both Alabama law and

federal law, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits the relitigation of all matter which was or could

have been litigated in the prior action.” Century 21, 401 So.2d at 768 (emphasis added). 

In this case, all of Plaintiffs’ claims, which are essentially challenges to the permit, were or

could have been brought in the earlier proceedings. With respect to issues raised by Count 1 of

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint,

33 the court finds that the administrative record addressed

all of the Plaintiffs’ concerns. With respect to the contingency planning issues raised in Paragraphs

29, 32, 33, and 36-38 of the Second Amended Complaint, the Commission’s Hearing Officer

reviewed all regulatory requirements for a contingency plan and found that the contingency plan of

the Army and Westinghouse “complies with the requirements of ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-5-

.04.” (Recommendation of the Hearing Officer at 502-03; at 596 Conclusion of Law 4).

Subsequently, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals found: “The hearing officer’s findings of fact are

fully supported by the record, and Families does not dispute them.” Families, 826 So. 2d at 872

Case 1:02-cv-02822-RDP Document 90 Filed 03/18/05 Page 44 of 48
45

(Ala. Civ. App. 2002). 

With respect to the Plaintiffs’ Count 1 allegations that the Defendants do not have an

adequate inspection program as required by Rule 335-14-5-.02(6), the Hearing Officer found that

Rule 335-14-8-.02 vests ADEM with the authority to determine that a permit application is

complete. (Recommendation of the Hearing Officer at 622 Conclusions of Law 3, 4 & 5). An

editorial notation in Rule 335-14-8-.02(5)(b)(5) specifically requires that the permit application

include the inspection schedule required by Rule 335-14-5-.02(6)(b) (the specific rule referenced by

the Plaintiffs here). The Hearing Officer determined the adequacy of the entire permit application

(including the sufficiency of the inspection schedule) as reviewed by ADEM. (Recommendation of

the Hearing Officer at 622 Conclusion of Law 6).

The Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Defendants cannot identify or quantify the chemicals

expected to be emitted (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 32), was also addressed by the Hearing

Officer’s Recommendation adopted by the Commission. (Recommendation of the Hearing Officer

at 537; Transcript of Administrative Hearing at 3933-34). The Hearing Officer specifically found

that “[t]he products from incineration, decontamination, and age . . . are included in the Permit

Application at Tables C-1-13, 14 and 15 . . . .” (Recommendation of the Hearing Officer at 619

Finding 7). Thus, this allegation was thoroughly considered in the Administrative Hearing, and the

evidence clearly showed that all wastes were identified in a manner that complies with the

requirements of the Alabama RCRA Regulations.

Finally, with respect to Plaintiffs’ Count 1 allegation that Defendants have not sampled and

analyzed all wastes prior to beginning treatment, the same issues were raised in the administrative

proceeding using the same allegation that the regulatory requirements can only be met by sampling

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34 In Count 2, Plaintiffs focus on the allegation that the Defendants have not properly or

completely characterized the hazardous wastes to be treated at the facility.

46

and analysis of all wastes. As explained earlier, the Hearing Officer determined that ADEM has the

discretion under Rule 335-14-8-.02(1)(c) to approve the Army’s use of knowledge and relevant

information to characterize the wastes without sampling each item. (Recommendation of the

Hearing Officer at 539; at 619-20 Findings 6-10; & at 621-22 Conclusions of Law 1, 4 & 5).

ADEM and the Administrative Hearing Officer concluded that this alternative was particularly

appropriate with respect to these chemical weapons, since the nature of the weapons makes sampling

too dangerous. (Transcript of Administrative Hearing at 3928).

The administrative record also addressed the various specific hazardous wastes and

constituents now raised again by the Plaintiffs in Count 2.34 The evidence demonstrated that the

permit application specifically listed hazardous wastes that are expected to be present and treated

at the ANCDF by using specific regulatory waste code numbers found in Alabama’s RCRA

Regulations. With the respect to the individual wastes identified by the Plaintiffs in Count 2 – that

is, arsenic, mercury, and low pH wastes – the Hearing Record contains evidence that the permit

application lists, inter alia, hazardous waste codes D004 through D011 (Transcript of Administrative

Hearing at 2140). Waste code D004 is arsenic. (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-.03(5) Table 1).

Likewise, mercury is identified in the permit application via the listing of Waste Code D009.

(Transcript of Administrative Hearing at 2140; ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-2-.03(5) Table 1).

Low pH (highly acidic) wastes, including waste containing hydrogen fluoride are considered to be

reactive under the hazardous waste regulations (ADEM Admin. Code R. 335-14-02-.03(4) (which

includes materials that react violently in water)), and are to use the hazardous waste code D003. (Id.)

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47

 The permit application includes the D003 waste code to identify one of the characteristics of the

wastes, and this characterization is supported by an EPA memorandum which states that chemical

weapons are reactive in nature. (Recommendation of the Hearing Officer at 536, citing Transcript

of Administrative Hearing at 3919, 3921-22).

Plaintiffs also challenged in the prior administrative proceeding the alleged failure to review

and disclose the history of the containers and weapons to be incinerated at the facility, including the

presence of the agent Lewisite. They raise that issue again in Count 2 of the Second Amended

Complaint. Yet the hearing record demonstrates that the permit application identified Lewisite

specifically, and ADEM imposed limitations for Lewisite in the permit. (Recommendation of the

Hearing Officer at 507-08).

Plaintiffs argue that their claims cannot be subject to res judicata because many “new” issues

that arose after the close of the administrative proceeding record form the basis of their claims in this

case. The court is not persuaded by this argument. In fact, Plaintiffs’ “new” evidence is not new at

all, given that Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint simply repeats the same concerns previously

articulated in the permitting process and addressed by ADEM and the permit. Moreover, none of

these new concerns are permit violations. For example, Plaintiffs’ issue regarding “revelations about

the unreliability of the ACAMS” was raised by Plaintiffs in the permitting process and addressed by

the permit, which requires ANCDF to use ACAMS devices for stack monitoring. (Doc. # 57, Ex.

1, at 187). Plaintiffs’ “new” issue regarding “agent releases from the DFS heated discharge conveyor

bin enclosure area” is likewise not a permit violation. As discussed at length by the court in Section

IV.D.1, supra, there is no evidence that agent has been released from the DFS bin enclosure area,

only evidence that agent has been detected in the area, which is not a permit violation. Plaintiffs’

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“new” issue about the accumulation of ash at the opening of the furnace is merely an objection to

the design and performance of the DFS, the requirements of which are set forth in the permit.

Plaintiffs’ “new” evidence regarding gelled or crystallized agent and higher levels of metals in

certainmunitions than originally anticipated was considered by ADEM in allowing ANCDF to begin

hazardous waste operations. Finally, Plaintiffs’ “new” evidence regarding “the extent of the mercury

emission problem” is without factual basis. 

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence (old or new) of permit violations by ANCDF from

mercury emissions, nor has ANCDF been cited for any permit violation concerning mercury

emissions. All of these challenges are simply repeat collateral attacks on the adequacy of the permit

to address these concerns. Accordingly, because all of the elements of res judicata are satisfied in

this case, summary judgment is due to be granted. 

VI. Conclusion

As outlined above, Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence of current, continuing

violations in order to sustain their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). The undisputed evidence

indicates that no violations have occurred and that, regardless of whether Plaintiffs assert violations

of the permit or of regulations, their claims have no merit. Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are nothing

more than a thinly veiled effort to collaterally challenge the conditions of the permit. The court finds

that no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial as to Plaintiffs’ claims and that Defendants

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A separate Final Judgment will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of March, 2005.

___________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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