Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07081/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2001 Decided September 28, 2001

No. 00-7081

Delta Foods Ltd.,

Appellee

v.

Republic of Ghana, et al.,

Appellants

Consolidated with

00-7248

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00044)

Michael Steven Cole argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants.

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Robert D. Balin argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was Richard L. Cys.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Chief Judge: The government of the Republic of

Ghana appeals two orders of the district court denying its

motions to reopen judgment under Rule 60(b). Those motions seek relief from a judgment enforcing against Ghana a

consent decree entered by that country's High Court of

Justice. Ghana argues, first, that it never waived sovereign

immunity before judgment and therefore may raise it after

judgment and, alternatively, that the parties reached a postjudgment settlement. We hold that Ghana may not, after

having voluntarily withdrawn its direct appeal, assert sovereign immunity in a collateral attack, and that the parties did

not enter into a post-judgment settlement agreement.

Therefore, we affirm the orders of the district court denying

Ghana's Rule 60(b) motions.

I. Background

The government of Ghana contracted to buy corn from

Delta Foods, a Ghanaian corporation. After Delta purchased

the corn in the United States and tried to deliver it, the

government refused to take it or to pay for it. Delta sued

Ghana in the High Court of Justice, after which the two

parties negotiated a settlement agreement, the terms of

which were then embodied in a consent decree. Ghana was

to pay Delta 20.3 billion Ghanaian cedis for: the corn, the cost

of pre-judgment storage, and pre-judgment interest. In addition, Ghana was to reimburse Delta for any post-judgment

cost of storage, and to pay Delta post-judgment interest in an

amount to be negotiated by the parties.

In January, 1999, still not having been paid any money,

Delta sued Ghana in the district court here to enforce the

decree of the High Court. Ghana moved to dismiss or for

summary judgment on the grounds of forum non conveniens,

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comity, and ripeness, but it did not assert sovereign immunity. Delta opposed Ghana's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. Ghana then filed a reply in which it stated:

Also confused in the opposition papers are the principles

of Sovereign Immunity and "Act of State" with that of

Comity. The first two are doctrines of jurisdictional

immunity. Comity on the other hand, like the doctrine

of forum non-conveniens, concerns discretionary jurisdiction. Neither Sovereign Immunity nor Act of State is

relevant since immunity to jurisdiction is not claimed.

In October, 1999 the district court granted Delta's motion

for summary judgment and ordered Ghana to pay Delta the

20.3 billion cedis due under the Ghanaian consent decree, plus

interest. Converting the 20.3 billion cedis to dollars using the

rate of exchange at the time Delta filed suit in the United

States, the court awarded Delta $8,526,000 plus interest from

the entry of the consent decree to the entry of judgment in

the district court, for a total of $9,174,005, plus post-judgment

interest on that sum.

Ghana timely appealed to this court "each and every part of

the said judgment" but still did not assert sovereign immunity. In December, 1999, however, Ghana moved voluntarily to

dismiss its appeal--which motion we granted--so it could file

in the district court a motion under Rule 60(b) seeking relief

from that court's judgment.

Meanwhile, on November 24, 1999 Ghana had deposited

20.3 billion cedis into the Ghanaian court, pursuant to the

consent decree, but Delta had rejected the payment, no doubt

because by that time the cedis were worth millions of dollars

less than the $9,174,005 to which it was entitled under the

judgment of the district court. (Ghana also had tendered

some 2.282 billion cedis it owed under the consent decree for

warehouse costs; Delta accepted that money.) In its Rule

60(b) motion Ghana quoted a letter Delta's counsel had sent

the government in March, 1999 stating that "[i]f the judgment

debt is satisfied in Ghana, the proceedings in the U.S. cannot

continue since satisfaction of the judgment in Ghana will be a

complete answer to proceedings for execution in the U.S."

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The district court denied Ghana's motion to vacate the

judgment. The court ruled that neither Delta's letter nor its

acceptance of payment for post-consent decree warehouse

costs--a part of the Ghanaian judgment Delta had not sought

to enforce in the United States--"establishes that the parties

ever entered into a post-judgment settlement."

In March, 2000 Ghana moved again under Rule 60(b) to

vacate the judgment of the district court, this time on the

ground of sovereign immunity. Ghana explained its belated

assertion of immunity as follows: "[T]here has been a substantive change in the law which affects the judgment of this

Court. This change is affected by virtue of a most recent

decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals," here referring to Transatlantic Shiffahrtskontor GmbH v. Shanghai

Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384 (2000).

The district court denied Ghana's second motion to vacate,

holding that Ghana had, by the earlier-quoted passage in

Ghana's opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment, "explicitly waived any claim to sovereign immunity." Therefore, the court did not reach the question whether

Ghana was precluded from raising sovereign immunity in a

post-judgment motion.

Ghana now appeals the district court's dismissal of its two

Rule 60(b) motions. The time for appeal of the underlying

judgment has long passed, of course.

II. Analysis

Ghana contends initially that it has not waived sovereign

immunity and may raise it for the first time in a postjudgment motion. In the alternative, Ghana argues that it

satisfied the judgment of the district court when it paid into

the High Court of Ghana 20.3 billion cedis for the benefit of

Delta.

Ghana initially must show that it may assert sovereign

immunity in a motion under Rule 60(b). Because we hold

that it may not, we need not reach the question whether

Ghana waived sovereign immunity.

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A. Sovereign Immunity

Ghana points out that it never answered Delta's complaint;

it merely moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on

various preliminary grounds, such as forum non conveniens.

When the district court denied that motion, Ghana filed an

appeal, which it later withdrew. There being no doubt it

could move to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens

(etc.) without thereby waiving sovereign immunity, Ghana

argues that it could likewise withdraw its appeal of the forum

non conveniens motion without losing its right to assert

sovereign immunity.

Delta counters that Ghana lost its right to assert sovereign

immunity when it withdrew its direct appeal. According to

Delta, a party may not challenge a court's subject-matter

jurisdiction in a collateral attack if the party initially appeared in its own defense; the question of jurisdiction is res

judicata.

We cannot but agree with Delta. The problem with Ghana's argument is that Ghana never timely asserted sovereign

immunity in any forum. Its failure to assert sovereign

immunity in the district court is not by itself fatal because, as

Ghana points out, it did not answer the complaint and sovereign immunity is not necessarily waived by the tactical choice

to raise other preliminary objections first. Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 727

F.2d 274, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1984). Therefore, when the district

court entered summary judgment for Delta, Ghana arguably

could have asserted sovereign immunity for the first time in

the court of appeals because the objection goes to the subject

matter jurisdiction of the court. See Bazuaye v. United

States, 83 F.3d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Challenges to

subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on

appeal"). There is a limit, however, to the timeliness of even

a jurisdictional objection, and that limit was reached when the

time to appeal ran out; with no appeal pending, the judgment

of the district court then became final. For, as the Supreme

Court has stated:

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A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the

question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not ... reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse

judgment. It has long been the rule that principles of

res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations--both

subject matter and personal.

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites

de GuinEe, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982).

Ghana now seeks to raise the issue of sovereign immunity

because it believes that Transatlantic, which the Second

Circuit decided two months after the last day for Ghana to

appeal, works a "substantive change in the law" from which

Ghana might benefit. According to Ghana, that case holds

that in a suit to enforce a foreign judgment, the immunity of a

foreign sovereign is not subject to the commercial activity

exception unless the foreign judgment arises out of commercial activity in the United States.

Whether Ghana would benefit from the Transatlantic case

is irrelevant to the proper disposition of its motion to vacate

the judgment. The Supreme Court has been clear, in terms

that might as well have been crafted with this case in mind,

that "reopening a judgment under Rule 60(b) [is precluded]

where the movant has voluntarily abandoned his appeal, and

the only ground for the motion to reopen is an asserted later

change in the judicial view of applicable law." Polites v.

United States, 364 U.S. 426, 431 (1960). Enough said.

B. Settlement

Ghana argues in the alternative that it satisfied the judgment of the district court when it tried to pay Delta 20.3

billion cedis, plus 2.82 billion cedis for post-consent decree

warehouse costs, both as required by the Ghanaian consent

decree, and Delta in fact accepted payment for the warehouse

costs. According to Ghana, Delta agreed that if Ghana paid

the Ghanaian judgment, then Delta would not pursue payment of the U.S. judgment. Ghana here relies upon the

letter it received in March, 1999 from Delta's counsel: "If the

judgment debt is satisfied in Ghana, the proceedings in the

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U.S. cannot continue since satisfaction of the judgment in

Ghana will be a complete answer to proceedings for execution

in the U.S."

Delta counters that counsel sent that letter before the

district court had entered judgment; in that procedural context the letter meant only that, if Ghana paid the Ghanaian

judgment for 20.3 billion cedis, then there would be no

unsatisfied judgment of which Delta could seek enforcement

in the United States. Once the district court entered judgment, however, everything changed: Ghana owed Delta not

20.3 billion cedis but $9,174,005. See Competex, S.A. v.

Labow, 783 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1986). Ghana has not attempted to pay that amount, nor has Delta agreed to accept less.

In reply, Ghana does not argue that it could satisfy the

judgment of the district court by paying the less valuable

Ghanaian judgment; such an argument would be squarely at

odds with the holding in Competex. Instead Ghana maintains

that Delta agreed to accept less than the U.S. judgment.

Ghana first points to counsel's letter, but the letter manifests

no such agreement. Although the letter informed Ghana that

Delta's "proceedings in the U.S. [could not] continue" if

Ghana paid the Ghanaian judgment, it in no way suggested

that Delta would accept payment of the Ghanaian judgment

as satisfaction of any judgment that might later be issued in

the United States.

Ghana also emphasizes that Delta accepted payment of the

warehouse costs in cedis, the suggestion apparently being,

because the cedis had lost value, that such acceptance is

evidence that Delta agreed not to demand the full payment

provided by the judgment of the district court if only Ghana

satisfied the decree of the High Court. The warehouse costs,

however, were not a part of the U.S. judgment. Delta had to

accept payment in cedis for those costs because it was not

owed payment in dollars. Delta is, by contrast, owed dollars

under the U.S. judgment, and it has consistently demanded

full payment of the amount it is owed. We therefore reject

Ghana's claim that it is entitled to relief from the judgment

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because the parties entered into a post-judgment settlement

agreement.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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