Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01733/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01733-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN LAMARR ANDRES, Civil

No.

13-CV-01733-DMS (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION: TO GRANT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

v.

C.O. MARSHALL, ET AL.,

Defendant.

I. Introduction

On July 24, 2013, Kevin Lamarr Andres (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations for an event occurring on January 20,

2013. (Doc. No. 1.) The alleged event took place during Plaintiff’s incarceration at the

Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California. (Id.) The complaint names

Correctional Officer L. Marshall, along with Appeals Coordinators R. Olson and J.

Ramirez, as Defendants. (Id.) Initially Defendants filed a Fed. R. Civ. Pro 12(b) motion

to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Doc. No. 9.) The

motion was filed prior to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals April 2014 decision in

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014). Subsequent to the Albino decision,

Defendants withdrew the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 18.) In accordance with the

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directive set forth in Albino, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. 

(Doc. No. 25.) 

II. Factual Background 

Plaintiff alleges that on January 20, 2013, Correctional Officer Marshall used

physical brutality and excessive amounts of force against him, violating his Eighth

Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that at the time of

the alleged incident, guards were attempting to break up a fight between himself and

another inmate. (Doc. No. 1 at 3; Doc. No. 11 at 30-35.) As a result, Plaintiff was proned

[sic] out on the floor, having been shot by a block gun, and wheezing and choking from

pepper spray used by the guards. (Id.) While laying in a nonaggressive position, Plaintiff

alleges that Marshall struck him with her expandable baton on the back of his head,

neck, and left shoulder until he felt like he wanted to faint. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) After

Marshall stopped beating Plaintiff with her baton, he told her he could not breathe, he

was feeling faint, and he needed a doctor. In response, Plaintiff states Marshall told him

to “shut up,” that he was not going to get a doctor and she would continue to beat him if

he said anything else. (Doc. No. 11 at 35.) Plaintiff also alleges that after the event

occurred, Marshall was heard saying, “I got him, I finally got him.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Appeals Coordinators R. Olson and J. Ramirez

retaliated against him for filing grievances against Defendant Marshall. (Doc. No. 1 at

4.) Plaintiff contends Olson and Ramirez routinely blocked his grievances from being

effectively filed by holding them long past the time limit for Plaintiff to receive a

response to the grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Olson’s and Ramirez’s

actions constitute a violation of his right to procedural due process and access to courts.

(Id. at 4-5.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges Olson and Ramirez conspired to retaliate

against him by enabling the theft of his personal property. (Id.)

III. Relevant Procedural Background

The Motion for Summary Judgment is based entirely on Plaintiff’s alleged failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 25.) On April 4, 2013, before Plaintiff

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filed this lawsuit, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) in state court

regarding his attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies on his claim alleging

Defendant Marshall’s use of excessive force. (Piazza Decl., Ex. 1; Doc. No. 46-1; Doc.

No. 47, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff’s Petition dealt with the same issue Defendant Marshall raises in

the instant Motion for Summary Judgment—exhaustion of administrative remedies. (See

Doc. Nos. 25, 46.)

 On August 22, 2014, the San Diego Superior Court conducted an evidentiary

hearing with respect to Plaintiff’s Petition. (Piazza Decl., Ex. 1; Doc. No. 46-1.) The

state court rendered a decision finding that Plaintiff timely filed his administrative

grievance and further ordered the prison to process the grievance at the first level of

review. (Order Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. No. 47, Ex. 1; Order

Denying Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. No. 48 at 9.) The court,

however, did not deem the grievance exhausted, but rather ordered the prison to accept

and process the grievance as if it was timely filed on August 22, 2014. (Id.) 

Both Plaintiff and Defendants ask this Court to take judicial notice of the state

court habeas proceeding. (Doc. Nos. 45-48.) This Court chooses to take judicial notice

of the San Diego Superior Court records because those proceedings have a direct relation

to matters at issue in this case. United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Counsel v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

IV. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no

genuine issues of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). At the

summary judgment stage, the Court “does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence,

but simply determines whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell,

547 U.S. 518, 559–60 (2006). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

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sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “If the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the

burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party, but on an issue for which the

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary

judgment need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325; accord Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d

978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving

party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

V. Discussion

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

1. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner may not bring a

federal action concerning prison conditions “until such available administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a). Among the purposes of the

PLRA is to allow prison officials a chance to resolve disputes regarding the exercise of

their responsibilities before being haled into court; to reduce the number of prisoner

suits; and to improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful

administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). To satisfy the

requirements of the PLRA, exhaustion must be “proper.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

93 (2006). This means that a prisoner must use all steps the prison offers, enabling the

prison to reach the merits of the issue. Id. at 90. Prisoners need only comply with the

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prison’s own grievance procedures to properly exhaust. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. In the

Ninth Circuit, a prisoner’s grievance contains the appropriate standard of factual

specificity “if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). It is axiomatic that “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison

to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Id. To

that end, a grievance need not include legal terminology or legal theories, or contain

every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual claim. Id.

Procedurally, failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense. Bock,

549 U.S. at 216. In the Ninth Circuit, a motion for summary judgment is the proper

vehicle to decide whether a prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies pursuant to

the PLRA. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170. A defendant has the burden to prove that there was

an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Id. at1172. If

a motion for summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to

exhaustion are decided by the court. Id. at 1170-71. To the extent the court makes any

factual findings that are relevant to both exhaustion and the merits, the court’s findings

made in the course of deciding exhaustion are not binding on a jury deciding the merits

of the suit. Id. at 1171.

If a prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his federal

suit, the court must dismiss the action without prejudice to the prisoner filing a new

action after he has completed his administrative remedies. See McKinney v. Carey, 311

F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002). Finally, a prisoner “must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules, including

deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Ngo, 548 U.S. at 88. 

2. California Prisons’ Grievance Procedures

CDCR regulations allow a prisoner to appeal any action or decision by a prison

official that adversely affects the prisoner’s welfare. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.1(a). The

CDCR’s administrative exhaustion procedure was modified by amendment on December

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13, 2010, becoming effective on January 28, 2011. See Manning v. Bunnell, No.

2:12-CV-2440, 2014 WL 1338312, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) . In order to exhaust

available administrative remedies within the current system, a prisoner must submit his

complaint on a CDCR Form 602 and proceed up to a third formal level of appeal filed

with the CDCR director or designee. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1-3084.7.

Third-level, or “Director’s level,” of review satisfies the administrative remedies

exhaustion requirement under Section 1997e(a). Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235,

1237 (S.D. Cal.1997); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.1(b). CDCR regulations require a

prisoner to describe “the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Cal.Code

Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.2(a). The prisoner is also required to list “all staff member(s)

involved and ... their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3).

If the prisoner does not know all staff members involved, the prisoner “shall provide any

other available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making a

reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question.” Id.

3. Plaintiff’s Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as to Defendant Marshall

Defendant Marshall moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff did

not exhaust administrative remedies on the excessive force claim prior to filing suit. 

(Defs.’Mem. P’s & A’s ISO MSJ; Doc. No. 25-1 at 19.) Notably, after Defendant filed

the motion for summary judgment, the San Diego Superior Court conducted an

evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiff’s attempts to utilize the prison administrative

appeals process to redress his grievance against Defendant Marshall. (Order Granting 1

Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. No. 47, Ex. 1.) The state court rendered a decision

finding that Plaintiff “credibly testified he timely filed administrative appeals and that he

used an authorized method when submitting his appeals,” and further ordered the prison

to process the appeals Plaintiff attempted to file on January 25 and February 19, 2013. 

 As mentioned above, both Plaintiff and Defendant ask this Court to take judicial notice 1

of the state court habeas proceeding and this Court chooses to take judicial notice of the San

Diego Superior Court records because those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue

in this case.

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(Id.; see also Order Denying Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. No. 48 at

9.) Thus, as of August 22, 2014, administrative remedies remained available to Plaintiff

on his claim against Defendant Marshall. 

Therefore, at the time Plaintiff filed his complaint in July 2013, he had yet to

receive a final decision from the Director’s level of review such to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement under § 1997e(a). See Booth, 532 U.S. at 739-41; see also McKinney, 311

F.3d at 1200-01 (holding a prisoner must wait to file suit until the exhaustion

requirement is met, and may not exhaust while the federal action is pending). Because

the court is required to dismiss the federal action without prejudice if exhaustion is not

complete at the time the inmate files suit, the Court recommends that Defendant

Marshall’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. The claim should be

dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend in order for Plaintiff to re-file his

complaint when exhaustion is complete. 

4. Plaintiff’s Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as to Defendants Olson and

Ramirez

Defendants also move for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies as to the claims alleged against Olson and Ramirez. (Defs.’ Mem. P’s & A’s

ISO MSJ; Doc. No. 25-1 at 18.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff only submitted a

grievance pertaining to Olson and Ramirez directly to the third level of review and that

the grievance was properly rejected for bypassing the first two levels of review. (Id.,

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see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Doc. No. 33 at 69-72.) On this record, the Court finds that

Defendants Olson and Ramirez have met their initial burden to prove “that there was an

available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available

 Although the inmate grievance does not identify either Defendant Olson or Ramirez by 2

name, the grievance does allege that Plaintiff’s inmate appeal regarding the incident with

Defendant Marshall “was ignored.” (Pl.’s Opp’n, Doc. No. 33 at 71.) This statement sufficiently

alerted prison officials that Plaintiff was complaining about Defendants Olson and Ramirez

because they were the appeals coordinators responsible for processing inmate grievances at the

relevant time. Regardless, Defendants do not challenge the grievance on the basis that it fails to

specifically name Olson and Ramirez. Defendants move for summary judgment solely on the

basis that Plaintiff’s grievance was rejected for attempting to bypass the lower levels of review. 

(Defs.’ Mem. P’s & A’s ISO MSJ; Doc. No. 25-1 at 18.)

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remedy” as to the claims against them. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The burden then shifts

to Plaintiff to “come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies

effectively unavailable to him.” Id. 

When viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record

nevertheless establishes that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust administrative remedies

prior to filing suit. Plaintiff’s own exhibit supports Defendants’ contention that he

improperly submitted his grievance directly to the third level of review without ever

submitting his appeal for processing at either the first or second levels of review. (Pl.’s

Opp’n, Doc. No. 33 at 69-72.) Plaintiff sent his CDCR 602 appeal alleging “exhaustion

denial on excessive force complaint” directly to the Inmate Appeals branch in

Sacramento. (Id. at 71.) Further, the section of the appeal form reserved for

documenting the first level response is not completed. (Id.) In fact, Plaintiff specifically

mentions that he is seeking a “response from [the Director’s level] as it is the last level

ultimately.” (Id.) Defendants correctly argue that because Plaintiff failed to properly

submit his appeal to the first and second levels prior to appealing at the Director’s level,

Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies. California’s relevant regulations

provide that an appeal may be rejected if the appeal is submitted to the third level prior

to lower level review. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(15) (“The inmate or parolee

has submitted the appeal for processing at an inappropriate level bypassing required

lower level(s) of review, e.g., submitting an appeal at the third level prior to lower level

review.”). Accordingly, it is clear from the record that Plaintiff failed to properly

exhaust his administrative remedies as it pertains to the claims against Defendants Olson

and Ramirez.

 The Court therefore recommends that the motion for summary judgment be

GRANTED. The claims against Defendants Olsen and Ramirez should be dismissed

without prejudice and with leave to amend.

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VI. Conclusion

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint

should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend so long as Plaintiff fully

and properly exhausts his administrative grievances prior to filing his amended

complaint. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

sec. 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than, January 9, 2015, after receiving a

copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties by January 26, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 10, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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