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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 7, 2024*

Decided December 5, 2024 

Before

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1730 

ALI R. MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LONE STAR FUNDS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:23-cv-05060 

Mary M. Rowland,

Judge. 

O R D E R

Ali Muhammad appeals the judgment dismissing his claims of federal 

constitutional violations in connection with a state-court eviction proceeding. See 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm, though in part on a different ground. 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1730 Page 2 

The case reflects several procedural oddities. First, Muhammad brought the case 

to federal court with a Notice of Removal that attempted to remove a long-pending 

state-court action against him seeking first foreclosure of the mortgage on his home and 

ultimately eviction from the property. The Notice of Removal had at least two fatal 

problems: (1) it was filed after the 30-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); and (2) the 

state-court plaintiffs did not assert any claims arising under federal law that might have 

permitted a timely removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

Before the district court could remand, however, Muhammad filed what he 

called an “Amended Answer and Verified Complaint.” Dkt. 6. The district court treated 

that document as in effect a civil complaint in a new case in which Muhammad was the 

plaintiff and was suing nearly 40 defendants—including corporations, attorneys, 

state-court judges, the governor of Illinois, and other elected officials—alleging that 

they deprived him of property without due process or just compensation. 

The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the complaint appeared to 

be attacking a state-court judgment, which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). That doctrine prevents district courts from 

exercising jurisdiction over claims by parties who claim they were injured by state-court 

judgments and who ask a federal court to review and reject state-court decisions. Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The district court gave 

Muhammad an opportunity to amend his complaint. 

Muhammad did amend his complaint, but he essentially repeated the allegations 

in the original complaint. The amended complaint alluded to his contractual dispute 

with Caliber Home Loans, Inc. over the right to possess real property, the state-court 

eviction proceedings, and the defendants’ alleged attempt to remove him unlawfully 

from his home. Muhammad later filed an emergency motion seeking to set aside the 

state-court judgment in his eviction proceeding.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, entering final judgment of dismissal. The 

court explained that the amended complaint contained the same flaw as the original 

complaint: It sought to challenge the state-court judgment in his eviction proceeding. At 

the time the district court acted, its application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was 

correct under controlling circuit precedents. Under those precedents, it did not matter 

that Muhammad was seeking damages for alleged violations of his federal 

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No. 24-1730 Page 3 

constitutional rights in the state-court proceedings. His federal complaint alleged that 

the state-court’s orders had violated his federal rights, and his case asked the federal 

court to review and reject the state court’s judgments. See, e.g., Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 

863, 866 (7th Cir. 2020) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claim for damages to remedy 

injuries inflicted by state-court foreclosure judgment); Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

908 F.3d 1050, 1062 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). 

On appeal, Muhammad argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply 

because one of his claims—that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to remove him 

unlawfully from his property—is independent of the state court’s judgment. But we 

agree with the district court that this theory does not avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Notably, Muhammad has not contended—either in the district court or on appeal—that 

he experienced any injury before or separate from the state-court judgment in his 

eviction proceeding. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. 

There is still a problem, however. Several months after the district court 

dismissal here, this court issued an en banc decision overruling in part the Bauer/Moore

line of cases and holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine no longer applies to a 

plaintiff’s federal claims for money damages for injuries inflicted by a state-court 

judgment. Gilbank v. Wood County Dep’t of Human Services, 111 F.4th 754 (7th Cir. 2024) 

(en banc) (holding on damage claims set forth in Part I of opinion by Kirsch, J., joined in 

relevant part by Easterbrook, J.), petition for cert. filed, No. 24-470 (Oct. 28, 2024). In this 

case, plaintiff Muhammad asks for hundreds of millions of dollars in damages for the 

injuries he says were inflicted by the state court’s judgments. Amended Cplt. ¶ 25. All 

of his other claims for relief seek to set aside the state court’s judgments and thus are 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but under Gilbank, the damages claims are not 

barred on that basis. 

The Amended Complaint, however, fails to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted, so it is subject to dismissal on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). The Amended Complaint identifies the parties, and it demands 

various forms of declaratory relief, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars in 

damages. The Amended Complaint does not, however, satisfy Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2) by actually identifying any wrongful conduct by the defendants, other 

than with conclusory labels. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (courts 

should focus on factual allegations, disregard legal conclusions, and draw on their 

judicial experience and common sense); Taylor v. Salvation Army Nat’l Corp., 110 F.4th 

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1017, 1028 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming dismissal for failure to state claim). The Amended 

Complaint quite literally fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Finally, Muhammad also argues for the first time on appeal that Illinois’s 

eviction statute, as applied to him, is unconstitutional. But he waived that argument by 

not raising it in the district court. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 

897 (7th Cir. 2023). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction is modified to dismiss plaintiff Muhammad’s claims for 

damages for failure to state a claim for relief and, as modified, is AFFIRMED. 

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