Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00758/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00758-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WALTER WEBER, MARY WEBER, and

DOES I through X, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00758-GEB-CMK

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

REMAND MOTION AND DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR COSTS 

AND ATTORNEY’S FEES*

Plaintiff moves “for an order remanding this case to 

the state court whence it originated,” arguing, inter alia:

Defendants’ removal of this case is improper 

because there is no legal basis supporting 

removal. Plaintiff’s complaint is one cause 

of action, unlawful possession of real 

property located in Shasta County, 

California, which is clearly based on state 

law. Defendants’ notice of removal asserts 

removal is based upon the presence of an 

issue of federal law. 

(Pl.’s Remand Mot. (“Mot.”) 1:28-2:1, 4:3-6, ECF No. 4.) 

Plaintiff further requests under 28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c) “reasonable 

costs and attorney’s fees associated with th[e] motion.” (Id. at 

3:5-7.) 

Defendants did not file a response to the motion. 

 

* The undersigned judge revokes referral to the assigned Magistrate Judge 

for the purposes of Findings and Recommendations in this case.

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A. Remand Motion 

“There is a ‘strong presumption against removal 

jurisdiction,’ and the removing party has the burden of 

establishing that removal is proper.” Lindley Contours, LLC v. 

AABB Fitness Holdings, Inc., 414 F. App’x 62, 64 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall 

be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

Defendants assert in the Notice of Removal (“NOR”) that

federal question removal jurisdiction exists. (NOR & 3, ECF No. 

1.) Essentially, Defendants contend the Notice to Vacate the 

Premises they received following the foreclosure sale of their 

home “expressly references and incorporates the ‘Protecting 

Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009,’ 12 U.S.C. ' 5201” and 

indicate this statute will be a defense and/or counterclaim to 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Id. at & 7.)

However, review of the Complaint reveals Plaintiff 

alleges a single claim for unlawful detainer under California 

law, and “[a]s a general rule, . . . a case will not be removable 

if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim.”

Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). Under 

the “well-pleaded complaint rule[,] . . . ‘a case may not be 

removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . 

even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s 

complaint . . . .’” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of 

Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)). 

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Similarly, “federal [question] jurisdiction [cannot] rest upon an 

actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 

U.S. 49, 50 (2009). Therefore, Defendants’ reliance on the 90–day 

notice provision in Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act is an 

impermissible basis for removal. 

Since Defendants have not shown the existence of 

federal question removal jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s remand motion 

is GRANTED, and this case is remanded to the Superior Court of 

California for the County of Shasta from which it was removed.

B. Request for Costs and Attorney’s Fees 

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs arguing: 

“Given the circumstances [concerning the timing of removal], the 

removal appears to be an attempt to delay the eviction.” (Mot. 

2:27.) 

“An order remanding [a] case may require payment of 

just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, 

incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c). “[T]he 

standard for awarding fees should turn on the reasonableness of 

the removal. Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award 

attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party 

lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).

Plaintiff has neither addressed this fee standard with 

sufficient argument nor the situation here where each Defendant

is pro se and did not oppose the remand motion. See Baldini Real 

Estate, Inc. v. Cruz, No. 15-CV-2932 YGR, 2015 WL 4760510, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) (denying the plaintiff’s request for 

attorney’s fees upon remand of unlawful detainer action, 

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indicating the defendant’s pro se status and lack of opposition 

to the remand motion are relevant to the decision of whether to 

award attorney’s fees); accord Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Mobley, 

No. CV15-2910 CAS (AJWx), 2015 WL 3649578, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 

10, 2015) (“The Court cannot conclude that it [wa]s objectively 

unreasonable for a pro se party, lacking basic legal knowledge, 

to attempt to remove [the] action to federal court.”); Colline v. 

Alexander, No. 2:14-cv-1245-TLD-KJN PS, 2014 WL 2527213, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (“[T]he Court, in light of Defendant’s 

pro se status, . . . declines to order the payment of costs and 

expenses . . . .”). 

Further, Plaintiff did not submit evidence on the 

amount of costs and fees it “incurred as a result of the 

removal.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1447(c); see generally Jordan v. Multnomah 

Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The fee applicant 

has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence . . . that the 

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill and reputation.”).

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s request for costs 

and attorney’s fees is DENIED. 

Dated: September 1, 2015

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