Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01511/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01511-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Anti-trust

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE ABBOTT LABORATORIES NORVIR

ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION

 /

No. C 04-1511 CW

(Consolidated Case)

No. C 04-4203 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND

MOTION FOR

PERMISSION TO FILE

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Defendant Abbott Laboratories seeks leave to file a motion for

reconsideration of the Court's July 6, 2006 order, denying its

renewed motion for summary judgment. If the Court denies its

motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, Defendant

seeks permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b). Plaintiffs John Doe 1, John Doe 2 and the

Service Employees International Union Health and Welfare Fund

oppose Defendant's motion for certification under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b). The matter is decided on the papers; the September 15,

2006 hearing is vacated. Having considered the parties' papers,

Case 4:04-cv-01511-CW Document 270 Filed 09/12/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the Court DENIES Defendant's motions.

DISCUSSION

I. Leave to file a motion for reconsideration

Civil Local Rule 7-9(a) states as follows: "No party may

notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining leave

of Court to file the motion." A motion for leave to file a motion

for reconsideration may only be granted if the moving party shows: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material

difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented

to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which

reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in

the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for

reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of

the interlocutory order; or (2) The emergence of new material

facts or change of law occurring after the time of such order;

or (3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material

facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to

the Court before such interlocutory order.

Civil L.R. 7-9(b). 

Defendant fails to show any of the three. It argues that the

Court inadvertently failed to resolve a dispositive issue: whether

Plaintiffs' current one-market theory is sufficient to maintain a

cause of action for monopoly leveraging. Defendant argues that

Plaintiffs abandoned their original two-market theory, approved by

the Ninth Circuit in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman

Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), in their opposition to

Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment. That is not an

argument that the Court manifestly failed to consider. Rather, the

Court was not, and continues not to be, persuaded by Defendant's

argument that, by submitting an expert report which accounts for

both Kaletra and Norvir in the boosted market, Plaintiffs, as a

matter of law, combined the boosted market and the booster market

Case 4:04-cv-01511-CW Document 270 Filed 09/12/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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into a single market. Thus, the Court denies Defendant's motion

for leave to file a motion for reconsideration.

II. Certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the district court may

certify appeal of an interlocutory order if (1) the order involves

a controlling question of law, (2) appealing the order may

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and

(3) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the

question of law. The Court should construe the requirements for

certification strictly, and grant a motion for certification only

when exceptional circumstances warrant such action. Coopers &

Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). 

Defendant requests that, if the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs have asserted a cognizable cause of action under a onemarket theory, the Court grant it permission to file an

interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b). But, as Plaintiffs

note, the Court did not rule that Plaintiffs brought a cognizable

cause of action under a one-market theory, nor does that Court now

find that Plaintiffs are proceeding under a one-market theory. 

Instead, the Court found that Plaintiffs alleged that there are two

markets and that there is a dispute of material fact concerning the

correct method of calculating Defendant's share in the boosted

market. The Court did not, as Defendant asserts, tacitly approve

Plaintiffs' one-market theory of monopoly leveraging. Therefore,

there is no "controlling question of law" that could materially

advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. The Court

will not certify an interlocutory appeal of its July 6, 2006 order.

Case 4:04-cv-01511-CW Document 270 Filed 09/12/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Leave to

File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Permission to File

Interlocutory Appeal (Docket No. 259) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/12/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-01511-CW Document 270 Filed 09/12/06 Page 4 of 4