Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02701/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02701-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURA A. BERRY; JOSHUA N.

BERRY, a Minor, by and through

his Guardian ad Litem, LAURA A.

BERRY; and NEIL W. BERRY, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

OSHKOSH TRUCK CORPORATION;

MCNEILUS TRUCK AND

MANUFACTURING, INC.; and DOES 1

through 20, Inclusive,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-04-2701 DFL/PAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

The surviving heirs of Christopher Berry (collectively

“Berry”) filed this wrongful death action against McNeilus Truck

and Manufacturing. Berry, a mechanic, was asphyxiated after

becoming trapped in a refuse packer while attempting to replace

one of its hydraulic cylinders. Both parties now move for

summary judgment. For the following reasons, the court DENIES

both parties’ motions as to all design and warning claims but

GRANTS McNeilus’ motion to establish that Berry’s conduct while

repairing the packer was negligent as a matter of law. 

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I.

Christopher Berry began work as a mechanic for Waste

Connections in September 2000. Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed and

Disputed Facts (“SUDF”) ¶ 1. The parties agree that Berry was a

highly skilled mechanic trained in OSHA safety requirements,

including “lock out/tag out” procedures. Id. ¶ 2. Lock out/tag

out procedures, commonly used for heavy machinery, involve “deenergizing equipment before performing maintenance in order to

remove any source of power that might activate moving parts and

cause injury.” Def.’s SUDF ¶ 17. The procedures typically

require workers to shut off a machine’s engine, put the machine’s

keys in a pocket, lock off any battery switches, chock the

wheels, and place warning tags on the machine to warn others that

it is in lock out mode. Id. At the time of the accident, Waste

Connections required its employees to comply with lock out/tag

out rules in all circumstances. Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 6. Federal OSHA

standards require lock out/tag out procedures when engaging in

“the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which

the unexpected energization or start up of the machines or

equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to

employees.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(a)(1)(I). California OSHA

standards require the procedures when “cleaning, repairing,

servicing, setting-up and adjusting . . . machines and equipment

in which the unexpected energization or start up of the machines

or equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to

employees.” 8 C.C.R. § 3314(a)(1); see also 8 C.C.R.

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§ 4355(c)(5).

On September 5 and 6, 2003, Berry attempted to change a

cylinder on a McNeilus Century II refuse packer. Pl.’s SUDF

¶ 12. The McNeilus Century II is a side-loader refuse truck. 

Def.’s SUF ¶ 5. Refuse is dumped into the packer, where a panel

extends to compact it. Id. The panel, moved by two hydraulic

cylinders, extends and retracts across the packer in a movement

called the “pack and sweep cycle.” Id. The cylinders are

attached to the packer body and panel by pins, allowing for

rotation, and are arranged in the packer body so they cross each

other, allowing for nearly complete retraction to the wall of the

packer. Id. A replacement cylinder weighs roughly 300 pounds

and is shipped with its piston completely retracted. Id. ¶ 7. 

The replacement cylinder’s piston must be extended before it can

be bolted to the back of the panel. Id. ¶ 7. The piston may be

extended before installation by using the packer’s own power

supply, although other means are available that do not require

the packer’s power. Id. ¶ 7. 

Jarrod Calder, a twenty year-old driver at Waste

Connections, was not trained as a mechanic but agreed to assist

Berry with packer maintenance, as he had done over the prior four

months. Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 5. On September 5, Berry and Calder

removed the old cylinder and placed the new cylinder in the

packer body. Id. ¶ 10. At some point, either on September 5 or

6, the replacement cylinder was connected to the packer’s

unenergized hydraulic system. On September 6, Calder and Berry

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agreed that Berry would enter the packer body on the cylinder

side of the packer panel to finish the replacement cylinder’s

installation using the packer’s hydraulic system while Calder

would remain outside to operate the packer’s controls. Id.

¶¶ 12-13. 

The packer’s controls are located in the cab and on the

outside of the packer body. Def.’s SUDF ¶ 5. To actuate the

pack and sweep cycle, an operator presses either the “pack”

button inside the cab or the “packer extend” button on the

external control panel. Id. The packer controls include a

“packer retract button,” described by the manual as

“control[ling] the retraction of the panel.” Smith Decl., Exh. B

at 8. The manual states that to reverse the packer panel’s

movement, operators should “[d]uring panel extend - depress the

retract button” and “[d]uring panel retract - depress the extend

button.” Id. The packer controls also include an “E-stop,” or

emergency stop button, which immediately shuts off the packer’s

electric and hydraulic systems. Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 18.

 Berry instructed Calder, on his signal, to press the

“packer extend” button to extend the cylinder into position. Id.

¶ 13. Berry stood on the cylinder side of the panel, in position

to bolt the replacement cylinder into place. Def.’s SUDF ¶ 32. 

Calder re-energized the packer and pressed the packer extend

button. Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 13. The packer panel, rather than

extending, immediately retracted towards its home position,

trapping Berry. Def.’s SUDF ¶ 33. Although the record is not

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entirely clear on this point, retraction in these circumstances

was according to the design of the packer, which required it to

retract when re-energized, overriding the controls. Calder

attempted to use the controls to extend the panel and free Berry

but was unable to do so. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. Paramedics

pronounced Berry dead at the scene from compressional asphyxia. 

Def.’s SUDF ¶ 34. 

The parties agree that OSHA regulations regarding confined

spaces required Berry to follow lock out/tag out procedures when

working in the packer body. Pl.’s SUDF ¶¶ 28-29. Moreover, they

agree that the packer and its manual included numerous warnings

instructing those engaged in “any work” on the packer to abide by

lock out/tag out procedures. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. It is undisputed

that Berry did not comply with these procedures on the day of the

accident. Id. ¶ 28. The parties agree that the accident would

not have occurred if Berry had complied with lock out/tag out

procedures. Id. ¶ 31. 

Berry seeks recovery based upon strict liability design

defect, negligent design, strict liability warning defect, and

negligent failure-to-warn causes of action. McNeilus disputes

all alleged theories of liability and argues that Berry’s actions

were per se negligent. The arguments are addressed in sequence

below. 

II. Design Defect

California law recognizes two theories under which a

plaintiff may demonstrate a design defect. Under the consumer

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expectations test, a product is defective “if the plaintiff shows

that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary

consumer would expect when using the product in an intended or

reasonably foreseeable manner.” Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 140

Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1208 (2006). Under the risk-benefit test, a

plaintiff seeking to demonstrate a defect must “balance the risk

of danger inherent in the challenged design versus the

feasibility of a safer design, the gravity of the danger, and the

adverse consequences to the product of a safer design.” Id. 

Berry raises arguments under both defect theories. 

A. Consumer Expectations Test

“[T]he consumer expectations test is properly applied in

cases in which the everyday experience of the product’s users

permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated minimum

safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert

opinion about the merits of the design.” Jones v. John Crane,

Inc., 132 Cal. App. 4th 990, 1001 (2005). The test, however,

should not be used in cases in which “a complex product . . .

cause[s] injury in a way that does not engage its ordinary

consumers’ reasonable minimum assumptions about safe

performance.” Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548,

566-67 (1994); see e.g. Bates v. John Deere Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d

40, 52 (1983) (refusing to apply consumer expectations test to

design of a commercial cotton picker). In Soule, the California

Supreme Court rejected application of the consumer expectations

test when “ordinary experience and understanding” would not

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inform “a consumer how safely an automobile’s design should

perform under the esoteric circumstances of the collision at

issue here.” 8 Cal. 4th at 570. Rather, the court held that

“expert testimony was necessary to illuminate these matters” and

applied the risk-benefit test. Id. 

The consumer expectations test is similarly inapplicable to

Berry’s accident. The accident occurred under unusual, uncommon

circumstances. Since “[t]he refuse packer spends about 99% of

its time on routes versus 1% of its time in the maintenance

shop,” Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 21, a refuse packer consumer’s ordinary

experience is unlikely to extend to maintenance and repair

matters such as those encountered by Berry. See Barker v. Lull

Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 (1978) (“[I]n many situations

. . . the consumer would not know what to expect, because he

would have no idea how safe the product could be made.” (citation

omitted)). As in Soule, “[p]laintiff’s theory of design defect

was one of technical and mechanical detail” and “sought to

examine the precise behavior of several obscure components . . .

under the complex circumstances of a particular accident.” 8

Cal. 4th at 570. The court, therefore, considers Berry’s design

defect claim only under the risk-benefit test.

B. Risk-Benefit Test

The risk-benefit test allocates the burden of proof between

plaintiffs and defendants. “[O]nce the plaintiff makes a prima

facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the

product’s design, the burden should appropriately shift to the

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defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the

product is not defective.” Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431. The

relevant factors for determining whether a product is defective

include “the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged

design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the

mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the

financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse

consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result

from an alternative design.” Id. A factfinder also may consider

product warnings, but the presence or absence of a warning is not

dispositive in finding liability. See Hansen v. Sunnyside

Prods., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 4th 1497, 1516-17 (1997)

(distinguishing the role of warnings in risk-benefit design

defect claims from their role in failure to warn strict liability

claims). Finally, when weighing risks and benefits, “the issue

of a defective design is to be determined with respect to the

product as a whole.” Id. at 1513 (citation omitted). 

“In the context of products liability actions, the plaintiff

must prove that the defective products supplied by the defendant

were a substantial factor in bringing about his or her injury.” 

Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 117 Cal. App. 4th 635, 696

(2004) (citations omitted). “A plaintiff need not establish that

a defendant’s product was the sole potential proximate cause of

injury, but only that the defendant’s conduct substantially

contributed to the injury and the circumstances make it just to

hold the defendant responsible for the consequences of the

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accident.” Bunch v. Hoffinger Indus. Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th

1278, 1302 (2004). Uncontroverted evidence establishes that (1)

Calder pressed the “packer extend” button, causing the packer

panel to retract and pinning Berry and (2) Calder attempted to

reverse the retraction by using the extend control but he was

unable change the panel’s direction. In both events, the packer

control system substantially contributed to Berry’s injury, so as

to establish the packer’s design as a proximate cause of the

accident. Despite such evidence, McNeilus argues that the

packer’s design was not a substantial cause of Berry’s injury

because he would not have been injured if he had followed lock

out/tag out procedures. This argument conflates the concepts of

“substantial factor” and “superseding cause.” Soule, 8 Cal. 4th

at 573 n. 9 (stating that superseding cause “absolves a

tortfeasor, even though his conduct was a substantial

contributing factor, when an independent event intervenes in the

chain of causation, producing a harm of a kind and degree so far

beyond the risk the original tortfeasor should have seen that the

law deems it unfair to hold him responsible.”). Even if the

court construes McNeilus’ argument to be a superseding cause

defense, summary adjudication of the issue is not appropriate. 

Application of the defense requires findings as to the

foreseeability of Berry’s method of repair and failure to follow

safety instructions, an issue disputed by the parties and their

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 The court denies McNeilus’ evidentiary objections to 1

Albert Ferrari’s declaration. The record contains sufficient

evidence of Ferrari’s qualifications and case-specific research

to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702's requirements. Although

Ferrari does not claim to have tested or drawn up plans for his

suggested alternate designs, the court finds that he engaged in

sufficient research of the accident and inspection of the packer

at issue to elevate his opinions beyond conceptualized

possibilities. Ferrari does not claim design experience with

refuse packers, but lists extensive experience in applicable

areas such as safety engineering, forensic engineering, and

machine manufacturing. He is qualified to render an opinion on

potential safety feature additions to the packer mechanism. 

The court also denies Berry’s Rule 702 objections to

statements in the Bartlett and Smith Declarations. The

objections challenge the substance of the declarants’ opinions

but do not cast sufficient doubt upon the methods used in

reaching the conclusions to justify barring the evidence. 

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experts. See Def.’s SUDF ¶ 28. 1

Having established the packer’s design as a potential

proximate cause of the accident, the court’s focus shifts to

whether McNeilus has demonstrated that the design’s benefits

outweigh any alleged risks. Uncontested facts establish, first,

that the control system’s design allowed the extend button to

trigger a retraction of the panel following re-energization and,

second, that the design prevented an operator from using the

controls to change the panel’s direction once it began to

retract. Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 13; Pl.’s Mot. at 12. Relying extensively

on conflicting expert opinions, however, the parties vigorously

contest material facts regarding issues such as user’s

expectations for the control system’s operation, the design’s

benefits to field operators, and the feasibility of alternative

designs allegedly safer for mechanics. See Def.’s SUDF ¶¶ 19-29. 

Therefore, the court DENIES both motions for summary judgment as

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 Authorities cited by McNeilus do not support a complete 2

defense based upon Berry’s misuse of the packer. Oakes v. Du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645 (1969), and Martinez

v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng’g Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795 (1966),

were decided before the California Supreme Court applied

comparative fault principles to strict liability claims in Daly,

20 Cal. 3d at 742. The only post-Daly case cited by the

McNeilus, Schwoerer v. Union Oil Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 103, 111

(1993), addressed a warning defect, rather than design defect,

claim. Moreover, although the Schwoerer court held that the

defendant had a right to expect that consumers would follow

instructions, it did not hold that failure to do so is a complete

bar to recovery, instead choosing to weigh the degree of misuse

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to the risk-benefit theory of design defect strict liability. 

McNeilus argues that Berry’s intentional misuse of the

packer made his conduct unforeseeable as a matter of law,

precluding a finding of strict design defect liability. See

Def.’s Mot. at 13. California law, however, treats an injured

party’s failure to follow instructions or heed warnings in

product defect cases as a matter of comparative negligence rather

than a complete bar to recovery, absent additional factual

evidence regarding the foreseeability of a product’s use. See

Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 745-46 (1978). 

Lock out/tag out procedures aimed to protect users from the

danger posed by the alleged design defects: unexpected movement

within the packer body. “To the extent the user does elect to

use the product with knowledge of the danger posed by the defect,

the user’s actions are subsumed by comparative negligence. The

manufacturer is not relieved of its duty to make a product

without defect.” Bunch, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 1301. Berry’s

failure to follow lock out/tag out procedures does not preclude

Berry from pursuing a risk-benefit design defect claim.2

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against the adequacy of available warnings. Id. at 112. 

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Subsequent comparative fault analysis, however, may reduce or

eliminate any award based on the defect. The court need not

engage in such comparative fault analysis here since it denies

both motions as to design defects. 

III. Negligent Design

Berry alleges a negligent design claim in the complaint, but

fails to address the argument specifically in his motion despite

moving for summary judgment on all claims. Although McNeilus’

arguments against Berry’s negligence theory go unanswered, the

court denies both parties’ motions as to the claim. Negligent

design, as opposed to strict liability, focuses on “the

reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct” rather than the

“condition of the product itself.” Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 434. 

McNeilus concedes that William Pat Bartless, the designer of the

packer’s hydraulic system, was not aware that the panel would

retract upon Calder’s pressing of the extend button. Def.’s SUDF

¶ 13. This concession raises a question as to whether McNeilus

failed to take “reasonable precautions in an attempt to design a

safe product or otherwise act[] as a reasonably prudent

manufacturer would have under the circumstances.” Barker, 20

Cal. 3d at 434. Neither party presents arguments as to the

reasonableness of McNeilus’ design conduct. Therefore, the court

cannot decide the reasonableness of McNeilus’ design conduct at

this stage and DENIES both motions for summary judgment as to the

negligent design theory of liability. 

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IV. Warning Defect

“The rules of strict liability require a plaintiff to prove

only that the defendant did not adequately warn of a particular

risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally

recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge

available at the time of manufacturing and distribution.” Carlin

v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 1104, 1112 (1996); see also

Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 995

(1991). In determining whether the absence of a warning makes a

product defective, California courts consider: “the normal

expectations of the consumer as to how a product will perform,

degrees of simplicity or complication in its operation or use,

the nature and magnitude of the danger to which the user is

exposed, the likelihood of injury, and the feasibility and

beneficial effect of including a warning.” Jackson v. Deft, 223

Cal. App. 3d. 1305, 1320 (1990). California law “does not

require the manufacturer to warn against every conceivable health

problem associated with use of a product.” Schwoerer, 14 Cal.

App. 4th at 112. If the plaintiff used the product contrary to

instructions or warnings, “the degree of misuse which will

absolve a defendant is inextricably interwoven with the adequacy

of the warning provided.” Id. at 113. The adequacy of a warning

typically is a factual question for the jury. Jackson, 223 Cal.

App. 3d. at 1320. 

Although the parties agree that lock out/tag out procedures,

if followed, would have prevented Berry’s accident, Pl.’s SUDF

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¶ 31, material disputes of fact remain regarding the adequacy of

McNeilus’ warnings. Berry alleges that there was a known risk of

mechanic disobedience with lock out/tag out warnings given the

procedures’ time-consuming nature. Def.’s SUDF ¶ 19. McNeilus

also knew that packer cylinders needed to be replaced two to four

times over a packer’s operational life, Pl.’s SUDF ¶ 34, but

failed to provide specific instructions as to how to conduct the

maintenance procedure, Def.’s SUDF ¶ 4. Although specific

warnings are not required for every danger associated with a

product, these disputes preclude summary judgment as to whether a

generalized lock out/tag out warning was adequate for a cylinder

replacement procedure. 

Moreover, McNeilus fails to establish that no warning was

needed regarding the potential retraction of the packer panel

following actuation of the “packer extend” button. Pl.’s Mot. at

15-16. Berry demonstrates that the hydraulic system’s designer

was unaware of the feature prior to this action. Def.’s SUDF

¶ 13. Factual disputes remain over whether McNeilus should have

been aware of the feature and, if so, whether it needed to

provide a specific warning. Furthermore, these issue are

inextricably linked to the above questions of design defects, for

which the court denies summary judgment. The adequacy of

McNeilus’ failure to provide a “packer extend” warning cannot be

adjudicated at this stage. 

Finally, if McNeilus’ warnings are found to be inadequate,

the responsibility of weighing Berry’s disregard for the warnings

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that were given against their potential inadequacy more

appropriately rests with the jury. See Schwoerer, 14 Cal. App.

4th at 113. The parties do not dispute that product warnings,

OSHA regulations, and industry practice required lock out/tag out

procedures during packer maintenance and applied to the work

resulting in Berry’s death. Pl.’s SUDF ¶¶ 6, 22-24, 29. Berry’s

disobedience, however, may be mitigated if the lock out/tag out

warnings are found to be inadequate in this situation. 

For these reasons, the court DENIES both parties’ motions as

to the warning defect strict liability claim.

V. Negligent Failure-to-Warn

“Negligence law in a failure-to-warn case requires a

plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer or distributor did not

warn of a particular risk for reasons which fell below the

acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent

manufacturer would have known and warned about.” Carlin, 13 Cal.

4th at 1112. Following the initial negligence allegations in

Berry’s complaint, the parties fail to develop the record

regarding the reasonableness of McNeilus’ decision not to provide

more specific warnings. Since the level of care exercised by

McNeilus remains an open question, summary judgment is

inappropriate. The court DENIES both parties’ motions as to the

negligent failure-to-warn claim. 

VI. Negligence Per Se

McNeilus argues that Berry’s undisputed failure to follow

lock out/tag out procedures constituted negligence per se under

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Cal-OSHA standards. Def.’s Mot. at 17-18. Berry fails to

respond to the argument. Berry’s conduct satisfies the

California requirements for a presumption of negligence per se

due to his violation of Cal-OSHA regulations 8 C.C.R. §§ 3314 and

4355: (1) he failed to follow lock out/tag out procedures during

repairs of a machine that posed a threat of injury in the case of

an unexpected start up, (2) this failure was a proximate cause of

his death, (3) the OSHA regulation was intended to prevent

accidents such as the one that killed him, and (4) Berry was

within the class of individuals that the OSHA regulation aimed to

protect. See Cal. Evid. Code § 669 (2006) (describing elements

of negligence per se). McNeilus may use Berry’s violation of

§§ 3314 and 4355 to establish Berry’s negligence if resolution of

the action requires comparative fault analysis. See Elner v.

Uveges, 34 Cal. 4th 915, 924 (2004). Berry could have rebutted

the presumption of negligence established by McNeilus’ argument,

but the failure to refute the argument or dispute the facts upon

which it rests constitutes a waiver of any challenge to the

presumption. Therefore, the court finds that Berry failed to

exercise due care in his repair of the packer, based upon his

violation of §§ 3314 and 4355. 

VI.

For the above stated reasons, the court:

(1) DENIES both parties’ motions as to strict liability

design defects;

(2) DENIES both parties’ motions as to negligent design;

Case 2:04-cv-02701-JAM-EFB Document 83 Filed 01/22/07 Page 16 of 17
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 Berry alleges warranty claims in the complaint but neither 3

party addresses them in the cross-motions for summary judgment. 

This order, therefore, does not address the warranty claims. The

parties shall file a joint statement within 14 days informing the

court of whether, in light of this order, the warranty claims

survive or should be dismissed. 

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(3) DENIES both parties’ motion as to strict liability

warning defects;

(4) DENIES both parties’ motions as to negligent failure to

warn; and

(5) GRANTS McNeilus’ motion as to Berry’s negligence per se

in repairing the packer. 

3

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/18/2007

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-02701-JAM-EFB Document 83 Filed 01/22/07 Page 17 of 17