Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01590/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01590-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERNON LEE JONES,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

JAMES HARTLEY, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA-PC

 

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

A CLAIM, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 10.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Vernon Lee Jones (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se with this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this 

action on October 3, 2013. (Doc. 1.) The court screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A and entered an order on May 8, 2014, requiring Plaintiff to either file an amended 

complaint or notify the court of his willingness to proceed only with the claims found 

cognizable by the court. (Doc. 9.) On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed the First Amended 

Complaint, which is now before the court for screening. (Doc. 10.)

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 1 of 8
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 

(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at Avenal State 

Prison (ASP) in Avenal, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff names as

defendants Warden James Hartley and Doe Defendants #1-10. Plaintiff‟s factual allegations 

follow, in their entirety.

“On 3/12/08, Plaintiff, who is black, was transferred to ASP. Since 

2006, ASP has known that segments of the inmate population were at greater 

risk for contracting valley fever. Prisoners are dying because they are in a toxic 

environment, which causes serious illness and death on a regular basis; and the 

defendants had done virtually nothing until the federal court ordered them to get 

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 2 of 8
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the black inmates out of ASP and Pleasant Valley prisons. Both prisons pose a 

public health emergency. Defendant Hartley knew about the risks of Plaintiff 

contracting valley fever at the time he ordered the watering of the grass at ASP 

to cease. Only after Plaintiff and others contracted valley fever did Defendant 

Hartley resume watering the grass. Defendant Hartley knew that watering the 

lawns helped to alleviate the dust problem, and it would help to minimize the 

risks of contracting valley fever for inmates and staff.

Defendant Warden Hartley and Does 1-10 demonstrated deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff‟s health by increasing the risk of exposure to valley 

fever when he ordered the watering of the lawns to cease. As a result, 

Defendant Hartley failed to protect. Plaintiff has indeed suffered injury, as 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with valley fever in March 1009 at a level (titer) of 1:8. 

(Also see Fresno Bee, Tuesday, April 30, 2013, re article on Valley Fever, 

Public Health Emergency.)”

(First Amended Complaint, Doc. 10 at 3-4 ¶IV.) Plaintiff requests monetary damages, 

costs of suit, and attorney‟s fees.

IV. PLAINTIFF=S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). 

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment, 

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner‟s claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth 

Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the „minimal 

civilized measure of life‟s necessities,‟” and (2) “the prison official „acted with deliberate 

indifference in doing so.‟” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)(quoting 

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted)). A prison official does 

not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards and 

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 3 of 8
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Courts have yet to find that exposure to valley fever spores presents an excessive risk to inmate 

health. King v. Avenal State Prison, 1:07-cv-01283-AWI-GSA-PC, 2009 WL 546212, *4 

(E.D. Cal. Mar 4, 2009); see also Tholmer v. Yates, 1:06-cv-01403-LJO-GSA-PC, 2009 WL 

174162, *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) (“To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise an Eighth 

Amendment challenge to the general conditions of confinement at PVSP, Plaintiff fails to come 

forward with evidence that Yates is responsible for the conditions of which Plaintiff 

complains.”) Therefore, exposure to, and contraction of valley fever, without more, has not 

been found to rise to the level of a cognizable constitutional violation.

Recently, in addressing a claim that CDCR officials are responsible for the contraction 

of Valley Fever by knowingly housing an African-American inmate with a history of asthma in 

an endemic area, it has been held that “unless there is something about a prisoner‟s conditions 

of confinement that raises the risk of exposure substantially above the risk experienced by the 

surrounding communities, it cannot be reasoned that the prisoner is involuntarily exposed to a 

risk that society would not tolerate.” Hines v. Yousseff, No. 1:13-cv-00357-AWI-JLT, 2015 

WL 164215, *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015).

Where a prisoner‟s Eighth Amendment claim is one of inadequate medical care, the 

prisoner must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Such a 

claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner‟s medical need and the nature of the 

defendant‟s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner‟s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the „unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.‟” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 

1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious 

medical need, he or she must then show that prison officials responded to the serious medical 

need with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[T]he officials‟ conduct must 

constitute „unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain‟ before it violates the Eighth 

Amendment.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Before it can be said 

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 4 of 8
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that a prisoner‟s civil rights have been abridged with regard to medical care, “the indifference 

to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere „indifference,‟ „negligence,‟ or „medical 

malpractice‟ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106). See also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at

1060. Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and 

“requires more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner‟s interests or safety.” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

Discussion

In the court‟s screening order of May 8, 2014 in this action, the court found that 

liberally construed, Plaintiff stated a cognizable claim in the original Complaint against 

defendant Warden Hartley because he alleged that Warden Hartley should have known of the 

danger to Plaintiff, yet disregarded that danger. (Doc. 9 at 3:1-3.) Plaintiff‟s allegations 

against Warden Harley have not materially changed in the First Amended Complaint. 

However, upon review of Plaintiff‟s allegations in light of recent case law discussed above, the 

court cannot find that Warden Hartley‟s actions rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his conditions of confinement at Avenal State Prison raised

the risk of his exposure to Valley Fever substantially above the risk experienced by the 

communities surrounding the prison.

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Hartley knew about the risks of Plaintiff contracting 

valley fever at the time he ordered the watering of the grass at ASP to cease.” (First Amended 

Complaint at 4 ¶IV.) However, these allegations do not demonstrate that defendant Hartley 

acted with deliberate indifference, even if he knew that watering the grass would reduce 

airborne dust possibly containing Valley Fever spores. Deliberate indifference requires 

knowledge of an “excessive risk” to an inmate‟s health, but no courts have found that exposure 

to Valley Fever spores at the level experienced by the community at large presents an 

“excessive risk” to inmate health. Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that defendant 

Hartley‟s actions raised Plaintiff‟s risks of contracting Valley Fever substantially above the 

risks in the surrounding community. 

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 5 of 8
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff‟s medical claim fails because he has not alleged any facts about his medical 

treatment. 

Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment 

claim in the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff shall be granted another opportunity to amend 

the complaint to cure the deficiencies in this claim found by the court.

B. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff names Doe defendants in this action. Unidentified, or "John Doe" defendants 

must be named or otherwise identified before service can go forward. AAs a general rule, the 

use of >John Doe= to identify a defendant is not favored.@ Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe or Jane Doe defendants cannot be served 

by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and 

amended his complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe. For service to be 

successful, the Marshal must be able to identify and locate defendants.

C. Claim for Attorney’s Fees

In addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks costs of suit and attorney‟s fees. AIn any 

action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] 1983 . . . , the court, in its discretion, 

may allow the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney=s fees . . . . @ 42 U.S.C. ' 1988(b). 

However, Plaintiff=s contention that he is entitled to attorney=s fees if he prevails in this case is 

without merit. Plaintiff is representing himself in this action. Because Plaintiff is not 

represented by an attorney, he is not entitled to recover attorney=s fees if he prevails. Gonzales 

v. Kangas, 814 F.2d 1411, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987). 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint 

fails to state any claims upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against any of the 

defendants. ARule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend >shall be freely given when justice 

so requires.=@ AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 445 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Plaintiff shall be granted another opportunity to amend 

the complaint. Plaintiff has leave to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies 

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 6 of 8
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

found by the court in this order, within thirty days. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

The amended complaint should be brief, but must state what each named defendant did 

that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Under § 

1983 there is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her 

own misconduct. Iqbal at 676. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a 

claim that is plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff 

must also demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). In order to hold an individual defendant 

liable, Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where that defendant is employed 

and in what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under color of state law. Plaintiff 

should state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each defendant‟s actions 

violated the particular right described by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of adding new claims arising after he filed the initial Complaint on October 3, 

2013. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints).

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Finally, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Second Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

///

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 7 of 8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint, filed on May 23, 2013, is DISMISSED for 

failure to state a claim, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in 

this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “Second Amended Complaint” 

and refer to the case number 1:13-cv-01590-GSA-PC; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA Document 13 Filed 03/19/15 Page 8 of 8