Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_19-cv-00160/USCOURTS-akd-3_19-cv-00160-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 

OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, 

LOCAL 1547, AFL-CIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC., 

Defendant.

Case No. 3:19-cv-00160-SLG

ORDER RE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court at Docket 11 is Plaintiff International Brotherhood of 

Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 1547’s (“IBEW 1547”) Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Defendant Alaska Communications Systems Holdings, Inc. (“Alaska 

Communications”) responded in opposition at Docket 16. IBEW 1547 replied at 

Docket 19. Also before the Court, at Docket 14, is Alaska Communications’ Motion 

for Summary Judgment. IBEW 1547 responded in opposition at Docket 17, and 

filed an amended opposition at Docket 18-1. Alaska Communications replied at 

Docket 20. Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the Court’s 

determination.

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BACKGROUND

IBEW 1547 and Alaska Communications are parties to a Collective 

Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).1 Alaska Communications is a telecommunications 

service provider and IBEW 1547 is the Alaskan affiliate of the International 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.2IBEW 1547 is the “certified bargaining agent 

for all [Alaska Communications’] employees within the job classifications included 

in the designated bargaining unit” and the CBA “sets forth wages, hours, and other 

terms and conditions of employment of all of [Alaska Communications’] employees 

in the Bargaining Unit.”3

A. Provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 

The following provisions of the CBA are relevant to the parties’ dispute: 

Article I – Purpose, Scope, Duration, and General Provisions 

Section 1.3 Scope of Agreement: 

This Agreement is applicable, within the State of Alaska, to all work 

within the scope of those job descriptions listed in the wage schedule 

in Appendix 1 and will be applicable to other positions or job 

classifications as agreed between the Union and Company.4

 

1 Docket 1-1 at 7, § 1.1. The term of the CBA is from January 1, 2018 through 

December 31, 2023. Docket 1-1 at 8, § 1.2. 

2 Docket 1-1 at 7, § 1.1.

3 Docket 1-1 at 7, § 1.1.

4 Docket 1-1 at 8, § 1.3.

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Section 1.9 Recognition: 

The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent 

for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours 

and other terms and conditions of employment for all employees in 

the bargaining unit consisting of the job classifications in this 

Agreement. 

. . . 

(B) If the Company purchases or acquired the assets of an entity not 

signatory to the IBEW, or the Company creates an Alaskan 

subsidiary, or obtains controlling interest in an Alaska-based joint 

venture or other business, the Company agrees to extend voluntary 

recognition to the IBEW upon an appropriate showing of IBEW’s 

majority support among any group of employees employed by such 

entities eligible for representation. Thereafter, such employees shall 

be integrated by the Parties into appropriate classifications covered 

by this Agreement. Voluntary recognition also will be granted if IBEW 

demonstrates majority support among any employees of the 

Company eligible for representation who are not currently in the 

Bargaining Unit.5

Article IV – Grievance and Arbitration Process 

Section 4.1 Purpose:

The purpose of this procedure is to provide a means whereby 

complaints and grievances may be adjusted or resolved promptly and 

fairly.6

Section 4.3 Definitions and Presentation of Grievances:

“Grievances” shall mean, and be limited to, disputes or differences 

arising under the term of this Agreement between the Company and 

the Union, or employees so represented, with respect to the 

 

5 Docket 1-1 at 9–10, § 1.9.

6 Docket 1-1 at 19, § 4.1.

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interpretation or application of any specific provision of this 

Agreement. . . . 

The grievance shall be processed in accordance with the following 

steps: 

Step 1 

Within five working days after the grievance is presented at Step 1, a

meeting shall be held with the grievant, the department head of the 

activity, or designated representative, and the appropriate Shop 

Steward, or designated representative. The department head shall 

make a reply in writing not later than five working days after the 

meeting. If this reply is unsatisfactory, the grievance may be appealed 

to Step 2 provided such appeal is made within five working days 

following the receipt of the reply. 

Step 2 

Within ten working days after the grievance is appealed to Step 2, a 

meeting shall be held between the appropriate Vice President of the 

Company, or designated representative and the Chief Shop Steward 

or designated representative. Written documentation explaining 

reason for disagreement along with any supporting information must 

be included with the grievance appeal. The Vice President shall make 

a reply in writing not later than five working days after meeting with 

the Union’s representative. If this reply is unsatisfactory, the Union 

will provide written notice to the Vice President of Human Resources 

within ten working days following receipt of the Step 2 reply. The 

Union will have up to 20 working days to complete its internal review 

process. If after its review process is completed the Union wishes to 

advance the grievance further, the Union shall submit a written 

request to the Vice President of Human Resources for a meeting of 

the Grievance Review Committee (GRC). The GRC will be convened 

within ten working days of receipt of the written request from the 

Union. If the grievance is not resolved by the GRC, the grievance 

may be appealed to arbitration provided written notice of such appeal 

is given to the Vice President of Human Resources within ten working 

days following meeting of the GRC.7

 

7 Docket 1-1 at 19–20, § 4.3. 

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Section 4.4 Arbitration 

. . . 

The Parties agree that the decision or award of the arbitrator shall be 

final and binding on each of the Parties and that they will abide 

thereby, subject to such laws, rules and regulations as may be 

applicable. The authority of the arbitrator shall be limited to 

determining questions directly involving the interpretation or 

application of specific provisions of this Agreement, and no other 

matter shall be subject to arbitration hereunder. The arbitrator shall 

have no authority to add to, subtract from, or to change any of the 

terms of this Agreement, to change an existing wage rate, or to 

establish a new wage rate. In no event shall the same question be 

the subject of arbitration more than once.8

B. The Parties’ Dispute

The parties’ dispute centers around a group of Alaska Communications’ 

employees, the majority of whom work and reside in Oregon. IBEW 1547 seeks

their inclusion under the terms of the CBA but Alaska Communications maintains 

that the CBA does not apply outside of the State of Alaska, and thus, does not 

apply to the employees in question. The events between the parties unfolded as 

follows: 

On or about August 3, 2018, IBEW 1547 requested that Alaska 

Communications participate in a card check and voluntary recognition process for 

a group of employees in Oregon.9 On August 22, 2018, Alaska Communications 

 

8 Docket 1-1 at 21, § 4.4. 

9 Docket 7 at 8–9, ¶ 9 (Answer) and Docket 9 at 3, ¶ 9 (Complaint). 

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denied the request.10 Shortly thereafter, IBEW 1547 filed a petition for a selfdetermination election with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) on behalf 

of the group of employees.

11 The parties had a hearing before the NLRB beginning 

on September 18, 2018.

12

 On December 18, 2018, a regional director of the NLRB 

issued a ruling finding that the defined group of employees13 “constitute[s] an 

appropriate voting group for the purpose of collective bargaining as part of the 

existing Alaska Unit” and that a “self-determination election will be ordered for 

these employees.”

14 The group in question was made up of the twelve employees 

in Oregon, as well as two employees in Alaska added by the regional director.

15

 

10 Docket 7 at 9, ¶ 11 (Answer) and Docket 9 at 3, ¶ 11 (Answer to Counterclaim).

11 Docket 7 at 9, ¶ 12 (Answer) and Docket 9 at 3–4, ¶¶ 12–13 (Answer to 

Counterclaim).

12 Docket 7 at 9, ¶¶ 12–14 (Answer) and Docket 9 at 3–4, ¶¶ 12–14 (Answer to 

Counterclaim).

13 The group of employees was defined as “[a]ll full-time and regular part-time Network 

Operations Specialists, Senior Network Operations Specialists, Senior Team Leads, and 

Senior Administrative Assistants employed by Alaska Communications Systems 

Holdings, Inc. in Cable Systems Group at its facilities throughout the State of Oregon 

and the Diamond D facility in Alaska; but excluding all Cable Network Operations 

Supervisors and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.” Docket 7 at 9–10, ¶ 15 

(Answer) and Docket 9 at 4, ¶ 15 (Answer to Counterclaim).

14 Docket 1 at 5, ¶ 18 (Complaint) and Docket 7 at 4, ¶ 18 (Answer); Docket 11-4 at 2. 

15 Docket 7 at 10, ¶ 16 (Answer) and Docket 9 at 4, ¶ 16 (Answer to Counterclaim). 

See also Docket 11-4 at 2 (“I find that the Voting Group sought by the Petitioner is 

appropriate as an eligible voter group for the inclusion in the Alaska Unit, with a 

modification to include two additional employees, a Senior Network Operations 

Specialist and Senior Team Lead, whose primary duty station is in Anchorage, Alaska.”). 

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Alaska Communications filed a request for review of the decision, but the 

NLRB denied the request finding “no substantial issues warranting review.”16 

While the request for review was pending, as well as after it was denied, IBEW 

1547 requested that Alaska Communications negotiate terms for the newly 

integrated employees.17 Each time, Alaska Communications refused to negotiate 

or declined to answer.

18

 On January 30, 2019, the NLRB conducted a ballot count 

and the voting group elected to be represented by the Union and be integrated into 

the existing bargaining unit.19 

In the interim, IBEW 1547 hired a neutral third party to conduct a card count 

for the voting group, which took place on January 11, 2019.20 The card count

confirmed that there was majority support for representation among the

employees.21 On January 28, 2019, with that confirmation in hand, IBEW 1547

 

16 Docket 11-10 at 1 and Docket 11-12 at 1. 

17 Docket 11-13. 

18 Docket 11-13 at 1–2; Docket 12 at 6. 

19 Docket 11-9 at 1. 

20 Docket 1-3 at 3. 

21 Docket 1-3 at 3.

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requested voluntary recognition for the group of employees under Section 1.9(B)

of the CBA.

22 Alaska Communications denied voluntary recognition.23

 

On February 7, 2019, IBEW 1547 filed a grievance pursuant to Article IV of

the CBA.

24 The parties engaged in the stepwise process laid out therein: they

held Step I and a Step II grievance meetings, Alaska Communications provided

responses,

25 and the parties held a Grievance Review Committee meeting.26

 The 

process culminated on April 10, 2019, when IBEW 1547 notified Alaska 

Communications that it was submitting the grievance to arbitration.27 On April 17, 

2019, Alaska Communications responded: “[a]s the work in question is not within 

the State of Alaska it does not fall under the scope of the collective bargaining 

agreement . . . and is therefore not subject to the grievance and arbitration process 

of the CBA.”28 On May 17, 2019, after IBEW 1547 had requested and received a 

list of arbitrators from the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”),

29 Alaska 

 

22 Docket 1 at 6, ¶ 19 (Complaint) and Docket 7 at 4, ¶ 19 (Answer); Docket 11-6 at 1 

(“IBEW Local 1547 is seeking voluntary recognition under Section 1.9 B of the CBA for 

the employees the NLRB recently recognized as an appropriate voting group.”). 

23 Docket 1 at 6, ¶ 20 (Complaint) and Docket 7 at 4, ¶ 20 (Answer).

24 Docket 1-4 at 1. 

25 Docket 11-16; Docket 11-17; Docket 11-18. 

26 Docket 11-19. 

27 Docket 1 at 6, ¶¶ 21–22 (Complaint); see also Docket 1-5 at 1. 

28 Docket 1-6 at 1. 

29 Docket 11-21 at 1; Docket 11-23 at 1. 

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Communications reiterated to IBEW 1547 that it “will not arbitrate this issue [as it] 

. . . is both substantively and procedurally inarbitrable.”30 On May 20, 2019, IBEW 

1547 notified Alaska Communications that, absent agreement to arbitrate by the 

end of that week, it would file suit to compel arbitration.31 

On June 5, 2019, IBEW 1547 commenced this action seeking an order “to 

select an arbitrator without delay and arbitrate [the grievance] . . . as provided in 

Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement.”32 On July 3, 2019, Alaska 

Communications answered and brought a counterclaim for declaratory judgment 

that “an arbitrator does not have the authority to extend the terms of the [CBA] 

outside the state of Alaska, and that Plaintiff may not compel Defendant to arbitrate 

any claims by Plaintiff to represent any employees outside the state of Alaska.”

33

 

Alaska Communications also seeks an injunction barring IBEW 1547 from seeking 

to arbitrate this dispute.34 On July 30, 2019, IBEW 1547 filed the instant motion

for summary judgment. On August 19, 2019, Alaska Communications filed its

cross-motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim. 

 

30 Docket 1-7 at 1. 

31 Docket 1 at 6, ¶ 25 (Complaint) and Docket 7 at 4, ¶ 25 (Answer); see also Docket 1-

8 at 1. 

32 Docket 1 at 7, ¶ 32. 

33 Docket 7 at 13, ¶ 36. 

34 Docket 7 at 13, ¶ 38. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion for Summary Judgment 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to grant summary 

judgment if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” An issue is 

“genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder 

could find for the non-moving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law.35 When considering a motion for 

summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”36 

II. Arbitrability 

The question of whether the parties have “submitted a particular dispute to 

arbitration . . . is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and 

unmistakably provide otherwise.”37 The “function of the court is . . . confined to 

ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its 

 

35 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

36 Moldex-Metric, Inc. v. McKeon Prods., Inc., 891 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

37 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (alteration in original) 

(quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).

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face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a 

question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator.”38 

Thus, “in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular 

grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the 

underlying claims.”39 In so deciding, a court should determine whether there is an 

arbitration provision in the agreement, and whether the disputed issue is 

arbitrable.40 The Ninth Circuit has “stressed that [the court] look only to the 

contract’s arbitration clause, rather than to the substantive provisions of the 

agreement, to determine whether a dispute is arbitrable.”41 

“In disputes involving a collective bargaining agreement with arbitration 

provisions, the arbitrability inquiry begins with a presumption of arbitrability”42 and

“[a]rbitration is to be ordered ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that 

the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 

dispute.’”

43

 The presumption in favor of arbitrability is “particularly applicable 

 

38 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960).

39 AT&T Techs, 475 U.S. at 649. 

40 See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567–68. 

41 Dennis L. Christensen Gen. Bldg. Contractor, Inc. v. Gen. Bldg. Contractor, Inc., 952 

F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1991). 

42 Local Joint Exec. Brd. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, Inc., 911 F.3d 588, 596 (9th Cir. 2018). 

43 Haig Berberian, Inc., v. Cannery Warehousemen, 535 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1976) 

(emphasis in original) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf 

Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)).

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where the clause is . . . broad,”

44 and “doubts should be resolved in favor of 

coverage.”

45

Then, “once it is determined . . . that the parties are obligated to submit the 

subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of 

the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.”46 

DISCUSSION

The question before the Court is whether the parties’ dispute over selfrecognition of a group of employees working and residing in Oregon is arbitrable. 

The Court must determine first whether the parties have an agreement to arbitrate, 

and next, whether the particular dispute is arbitrable.47 

The parties undisputedly have an agreement to arbitrate: Article IV of the 

CBA sets forth the stepwise process for resolving grievances that culminates in 

arbitration.

48

 Grievances are defined as “disputes or differences arising during the 

term of this Agreement between the Company and the Union, or employees so 

represented, with respect to the interpretation or application of any specific 

 

44 AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (referring to a clause providing for arbitration for “any 

difference arising with respect to the interpretation of the contract or the performance of 

any obligation hereunder.”). 

45 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 583. 

46 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964). 

47 See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 

(1960).

48 Docket 1-1 at 19–22. 

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provision of this Agreement.”49 The arbitration clause provides, among other 

things, that the “Parties agree that the decision or award of the arbitrator shall be 

final and binding” and that “[t]he authority of the arbitrator shall be limited to 

determining questions directly involving the interpretation or application of specific 

provisions of [the] Agreement, and no other matter shall be subject to arbitration.”50

Thus, the question remaining for the Court is whether the particular dispute

between the parties is arbitrable. The parties agree that the Court’s role is limited 

to interpretation of the arbitration provision; they differ only in how it should be 

interpreted.51 However, both parties also presented arguments in the alternative

with respect to the proper interpretation of the CBA’s substantive provisions. 

Finally, the parties dispute the implication of the parallel proceedings initiated by 

IBEW 1547 for self-determination before the NLRB. The Court addresses each 

issue in turn. 

I. Arbitrability of the Grievance

IBEW 1547 contends that because the arbitration clause of the CBA is broad 

and does not expressly exclude any grievances from arbitration, that a dispute 

over the meaning of Section 1.9(B) is a grievance subject to arbitration.52 It

 

49 Docket 1-1 at 19, § 4.3. 

50 Docket 1-1 at 21, § 4.4. 

51 Docket 16 at 5; Docket 19 at 2. 

52 Docket 12 at 17. 

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maintains that in evaluating arbitrability, the Court may not consider Section 1.3 of 

the CBA governing scope, as doing so would require the Court to interpret the 

substance of the contract’s provisions.53 IBEW 1547 reasons that Section 1.3 is 

substantive and can only be understood in the context of the CBA as a whole, 

including undisputedly substantive provisions such as Section 1.9(B), which allows 

for expansion of the scope of the CBA.

54

 

Alaska Communications disagrees, and contends that the Court cannot 

compel arbitration of a dispute that the parties did not agree to arbitrate.55 It insists

that IBEW 1547’s grievance involves employees who do not live or work in Alaska

and that Section 1.3 of the CBA “confirms that neither the Agreement itself nor the 

grievance procedure contained therein apply outside the state of Alaska.”

56 Thus, 

Alaska Communications concludes, “[t]he Agreement is simply not applicable to 

these employees” and “the grievance and arbitration provisions cannot apply.”57 

Moreover, Alaska Communications maintains that Section 1.3 “defines the 

applicability of the contract as a whole, including the arbitration clause,”

58 and that 

 

53 Docket 12 at 19. 

54 Docket 12 at 19. 

55 Docket 16 at 4. 

56 Docket 16 at 5–6. 

57 Docket 16 at 6. 

58 Docket 16 at 7. 

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disregarding that section’s import would require that “the arbitration provision’s 

scope somehow exceeds the scope of the contract itself!”59 Indeed, Alaska 

Communications contends that compelling arbitration, as IBEW 1547 requests, 

would require the Court to “impose a substantive bargaining outcome on the 

parties” by applying “the entire existing CBA to the unrepresented group.”

60

 

Alaska Communications further maintains that IBEW 1547 is asking the 

Court to compel arbitration on the basis of conclusory “magic words”—i.e. that the 

dispute is arbitrable.

61

 Alaska Communications contends that if it were enough to 

render a dispute arbitrable to simply claim it is so, the result would be “absurd” 

because it would allow a party to force arbitration “over anything.”62 It queries

“whether a union may force an employer to submit a matter to arbitration purely 

through semantics by placing a label on an event to disguise a non-arbitrable claim 

as an arbitrable one.”63 Alaska Communications cites two cases in support: Local 

Union No. 787, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers AFLCIO v. Collins Radio Co.64 and Construction Industry Employers Association v. 

 

59 Docket 20 at 9 (emphasis in original). 

60 Docket 16 at 13. 

61 Docket 15 at 14. 

62 Docket 15 at 14. 

63 Docket 15 at 12. 

64 317 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963). 

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Local Union No. 210, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO.

65

 

In Collins Radio, a union sought to arbitrate a dispute over discriminatory denial of 

seniority rights, a grievable issue.66 However, the Fifth Circuit found that the 

dispute was not arbitrable because it was actually a dispute about the company’s

refusal to rehire employees, which was not a grievable issue because it was

expressly excluded from the grievance process.67 Similarly, in Construction 

Industry, a union sought to arbitrate a grievance about whether its members should 

have been assigned work, but the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 

determination that the underlying dispute was jurisdictional and non-arbitrable, 

despite the union’s characterization otherwise.68 IBEW 1547 seeks to distinguish 

these cases on the basis that in both, the controlling agreement expressly 

excluded the disputed issue from the grievance process.69 

 

65 580 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2009).

66 Local Union No. 787, Int’l Union of Electrical, Radio and Mach. Workers AFL-CIO v. 

Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 214, 218–19 (5th Cir. 1963). 

67 Collins Radio, 317 F.2d at 220.

68 Constr. Indus. Emp’rs Ass’n v. Local Union No. 210, Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 

580 F.3d 89, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2009). 

69 Docket 18-1 at 8–9. IBEW 1547 relies on the language in the agreement in Collins 

Radio that excluded grievances arising out of pre-contract occurrence or controversies 

about whether individuals had been permanently replaced prior to its effective date. 

Docket 18-1 at 9 (quoting Collins Radio, 317 F.2d at 217 n.7). Moreover, IBEW 1547 

points to the language in the CBA in Construction Industry that provided that “[d]isputes 

of jurisdictional nature shall not be subject to this grievance and arbitration procedure.” 

Docket 18-1 at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting Constr. Indus., 580 F.3d at 92). 

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Finally, Alaska Communications asks the court for declaratory judgment and 

a permanent injunction barring IBEW 1547 from seeking arbitration of this 

grievance.70 IBEW 1547 disputes that declaratory judgment is appropriate, noting 

that it would require addressing the merits of the dispute.

71

 It also disputes that 

Alaska Communications would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive 

relief.72

At its core, the parties’ dispute centers on the interpretation of Section 

1.9(B): IBEW 1547 interprets the provision as extending to the group of employees 

in Oregon, whereas Alaska Communications interprets it as limited to employees 

in Alaska. Thus, the dispute is about “the interpretation or application of [a] specific 

provision of [the] Agreement,” namely Section 1.9(B), and is therefore a grievance 

as defined in the CBA.

73

 Article IV of the CBA provides a procedure for resolving 

 

70 Docket 15 at 20. Alaska Communications maintains that there is an actual 

controversy because IBEW 1547 “seeks to force the Company to give up its rights 

under the [NLRA] to set the initial bargaining position for these newly organized 

employees through negotiations.” Docket 15 at 17. Alaska Communications adds that 

the dispute is justiciable because the “Union has filed suit in this court to compel 

arbitration of the matter.” Docket 15 at 18. Finally, it maintains that an injunction would 

be proper because the “Union seeks to cripple the Company’s bargaining leverage by 

forcing them to assume the wage classifications of a contract” and there is “no adequate 

remedy to compensate the Company if arbitration of this matter ensues.” Docket 15 at 

19. 

71 Docket 18-1 at 15. 

72 Docket 18-1 at 15. 

73 Docket 1-1 at 19, § 4.3. 

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grievances, which culminates in arbitration.74 Indeed, Alaska Communications 

followed all the other steps of the grievance process, refusing only to participate in

arbitration.75 Because the parties’ dispute over the scope and application of 

Section 1.9(B) is a grievance as defined by the CBA, arbitration is appropriate. 

In determining arbitrability, the Court is to “look only to the contract’s 

arbitration clause,”

76 and nothing in the arbitration clause excludes a dispute about 

the scope or effect of Section 1.9(B). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has previously 

characterized similar arbitration and grievances provisions as “very broad.”77

Thus, the presumption of arbitrability is particularly strong and “[d]oubts should be 

resolved in favor of coverage.”78

Unlike the arbitration provisions in the agreements in Collins Radio and 

Construction Industry, Article IV of the CBA does not carve out the disputed 

 

74 Docket 1-1 at 19–22. 

75 Docket 11-17; Docket 11-18; Docket 11-19; Docket 11-20.

76 Dennis L. Christensen Gen. Bldg. Contractor, Inc. v. Gen. Bldg. Contractor, Inc., 952 

F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1991).

77 Id. (commenting on arbitration provision that covered “all disputes concerning the 

interpretation or application of this Agreement and the Master Labor Agreement”); cf. 

Docket 1-1 at 19, § 4.3 (arbitration clause covers “disputes or differences arising during

the term of this Agreement between the Company and the Union, or employees so 

represented, with respect to the interpretation or application of any specific provision of 

this Agreement.”). 

78 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 

(1960). 

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issue.79 Although Alaska Communications contends that Section 1.3 

unambiguously excludes from arbitration under Article IV any disputes involving 

out-of-state employees by limiting the agreement to the State of Alaska, the Court 

disagrees. Section 1.3 does not carve out from arbitration disputes between the 

parties over the meaning of the Agreement’s provisions; indeed, it does not 

mention arbitration or grievances at all. To the extent that Section 1.3 bears on 

the meaning or application of Section 1.9(B), governing voluntary recognition, that 

remains a question for the arbitrator and not for this Court. 

The Ninth Circuit decision’s in Dennis L. Christensen General Building 

Contractor, Inc. v. General Building Contractor, Inc. is informative.

80

 There, the 

parties—Dennis L. Christensen Building Contractor (“Christensen”) and the 

Southern California Conference of Carpenters (“SCCC”)—had signed a short form 

agreement that adopted the terms of a master labor agreement negotiated by the 

 

79 See Local Union No. 787, Int’l Union of Electrical, Radio and Mach. Workers AFL-CIO 

v. Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1963) (“[T]he ‘Grievance Procedure’ it 

defined the controversies as those ‘between the employees and the Company’ and 

expressly excluded those arising out of pre-contract occurrences and any controversy as 

to whether an individual had been permanently replaced prior to its effective date.”); 

Constr. Indus. Emp’rs Ass’n v. Local Union No. 210, Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 580 

F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Article XII, Section 7 of the CBA . . . provided that “[d]isputes 

of a jurisdictional nature shall not be subject to this grievance and arbitration procedure.”) 

(emphasis in original). 

80 952 F.2d at 1078. See also Haig Berberian, Inc., v. Cannery Warehousemen, 535 

F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that dispute about whether employees in new 

facility were brought into CBA by recognition and work-covered provisions was a dispute 

“arising out of the application or interpretation” of the CBA such that arbitration was 

proper). 

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SCCC and a multi-employer bargaining association.81 The agreement required 

Christensen to employ union carpenters for its contracts.

82 Neither the short form 

nor the master agreement was applicable in San Diego county, but the short form 

agreement provided that “modifications of the master labor agreement would bind 

both signatories.”83 A few years after Christensen signed the short form 

agreement, the master agreement was amended to cover San Diego county.84 

Christensen refused to abide by the requirements of the agreement in its San 

Diego contracts, and the SCCC filed a grievance and sought arbitration.85 The 

arbitration clause in the master agreement covered “all disputes concerning the 

interpretation or application of this Agreement and the Master Labor Agreement.”86 

Christensen maintained that the arbitration clause in the agreement “could only be 

valid for disputes within the geographic jurisdiction contemplated by the parties”

and that a dispute about extending contracts to San Diego was therefore not 

arbitrable.87 Noting that the arbitration clause was “very broad,” the Ninth Circuit

 

81 Christensen, 952 F.3d at 1074. 

82 Id. 

83 Id. at 1075. 

84 Id. 

85 Id. 

86 Id. at 1077. 

87 Id. at 1076. 

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explained that “[i]n such cases, only an express exclusion of a particular grievance 

or ‘the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim’ from arbitration 

will avoid referral of a dispute to arbitration.”88 The Circuit concluded that because 

“[n]o provision of the short form removes disputes over the proper interpretation of 

the modification provision from arbitration’s reach[,] . . . arbitration of the dispute 

would appear to be mandated.”

89

 The Circuit acknowledged that “Christensen may

well be correct that the parties never intended the short form agreement to have 

any application in San Diego, and that they intended the modification clause to 

permit only changes necessary to preserve work opportunities for employees and 

individuals covered,” but concluded that “under a broad interpretation clause, these 

are matters for the arbitrator to decide.”90

The Court finds the reasoning in Christensen persuasive.91 IBEW 1547 and 

Alaska Communications agreed to arbitrate any grievance which, just as in 

 

88 Id. at 1077 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 

(1986)).

89 Id. 

90 Id. at 1078. 

91 Alaska Communications seeks to distinguish Christensen, emphasizing that the 

agreement had a modifications clause that was used to amend the Master Agreement, 

whereas the parties in this case have “not entered any agreement allowing the CBA to 

expand.” Docket 16 at 10. IBEW 1547 maintains that the Section 1.9(B) provision of 

the CBA is analogous to the modifications provision in Christensen. Docket 17 at 10.

The Court finds that Section 1.9(B) is analogous to the modifications provision at issue 

in Christensen only in that it is the substantive provision of the CBA that was invoked by 

one party to expand the reach of the parties’ agreement. In Christensen, the SCCC 

invoked the modification provision to expand the scope of the contract to San Diego, 

952 F.2d at 1077, just as here, IBEW 1547 maintains Section 1.9(B) expands the 

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Christensen, includes “disputes or differences . . . with respect to the interpretation 

or application of any specific provision.”92 Absent an express provision carving out 

“disputes over the proper interpretation of the [voluntary recognition] provision from 

arbitration’s reach,” the Court finds that arbitration is mandated.93 Although Alaska 

Communications maintains that the dispute is outside the geographical scope of 

the agreement, in the Court’s view it is more aptly described as a dispute about

the meaning and application of Section 1.9(B), which lands it squarely within the 

arbitration clause of the CBA. Here, as in Christensen, “[t]he controversy between 

[the parties] . . . is best characterized by its nature, rather than by reference to 

geography”94 and the arbitration clause is “susceptible of an interpretation that 

covers the asserted dispute.”95 

 

coverage of the agreement to employees in Oregon. Docket 17 at 10. In Christensen, 

the Ninth Circuit held that to resolve the parties’ dispute, “one must interpret the scope 

of the . . . modifications provision” and thus the dispute was arbitrable. 952 F.2d at 

1078. Here, the Court finds that to resolve the parties’ dispute, “one must interpret the 

scope of [Section 1.9(B)]” and thus that the dispute is arbitrable. Id. Beyond noting that 

Section 1.9(B) was invoked by IBEW 1547 as a modifying provision, the Court declines 

to consider any further analogies between Section 1.9(B) and the modification provision 

in the agreement in Christensen. 

92 Docket 1-1 at 19, § 4.3. 

93 Christensen, 952 F.2d at 1077. 

94 Id. at 1078. For this additional reason, the Court finds Collins Radio and Construction 

Industry inapposite. IBEW 1547 has not “plac[ed] a label on an event to disguise a nonarbitrable claim as an arbitrable one.” Docket 15 at 12. 

95 Haig Berberian, Inc., v. Cannery Warehousemen, 535 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1976), 

(quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 

582–83 (1976)).

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The Court also is not persuaded by Alaska Communications’ assertion that 

by compelling arbitration, the Court is imposing a substantive bargaining outcome 

on the parties; whether or not Section 1.9(B) applies to the group of employees 

including those in Oregon remains a question for the arbitrator.96 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that IBEW 1547 is entitled 

to summary judgment and the Court will order arbitration. 

II. Section 1.9(B)

The parties also present arguments on the proper interpretation of Section 

1.9(B). Specifically, IBEW 1547 contends that it is significant that “Section 1.9(B) 

contains Alaska-based restrictions in the case of subsidiaries and joint ventures,” 

but does not when it refers to voluntary recognition where there is “majority support 

among any employees of the Company.”97 In contrast, Alaska Communications 

contends that “Section 1.9(B) contains no language whatsoever that contradicts or 

supersedes Section 1.3” and that it actually reinforces the limited scope of the CBA

because it “repeatedly refer[s] to ‘Alaskan’ business entities.”98 

Because the Court’s role is confined to determining whether the dispute is 

arbitrable, it expresses no opinion on the meaning of Section 1.9(B). The proper 

 

96 Docket 16 at 13. 

97 Docket 19 at 9. 

98 Docket 16 at 8. 

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interpretation of the provision is a question of contract interpretation for the 

arbitrator. 

III. Self-Determination Under the NLRA 

Lastly, the parties dispute the implications of the proceedings initiated by 

IBEW 1547 under the National Labor Representation Act (“NLRA”). 

Alaska Communications contends that the NLRA is the “correct forum for 

resolution of this dispute.”

99 According to Alaska Communications, IBEW 1547’s 

delay in bringing the grievance is evidence that Section 1.9(B) does not apply to 

the group of employees. It maintains that it is significant that “[t]he Union now 

wants to arbitrate the ‘voluntary recognition’ clause of the existing contract after it 

previously determined it did not apply and instead participated in a selfdetermination election through the [NLRB].”100 It urges the Court to review the 

dispute in context, and to consider that IBEW 1547 waited until “after the selfdetermination election to file its grievance.”101

 Alaska Communications maintains 

that if IBEW 1547 actually believed that the CBA applied to the group of employees 

in question, including those in Oregon, it “could have sought arbitration of that 

issue before the self-determination election.”102

 

99 Docket 16 at 12. 

100 Docket 15 at 17.

101 Docket 15 at 11. 

102 Docket 15 at 11. 

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IBEW 1547 responds that it pursued both routes—resolution under the 

NLRA and a grievance under the CBA—because relief under the NLRA will not be 

immediate.103 It maintains that Section 1.9(B) provides that new employees “shall 

be integrated” immediately under the CBA,104 whereas the NLRA only requires 

parties to negotiate new terms for those employees for the CBA that would go into 

effect after the current one expires.

105

 IBEW 1547 posits that timeliness is a 

question for the arbitrator,

106 and adds that it waited to bring a grievance until 

Alaska Communications had refused “to grant voluntary recognition . . . after a 

showing of majority support.”107

The Court declines to address the implications of the parallel proceedings

and leaves the issue for the arbitrator. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED as follows: IBEW 1547’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment at Docket 11 is GRANTED and Alaska Communications’

Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 14 is DENIED.

Alaska Communications must select an arbitrator for grievance ACS 19-02 

 

103 Docket 12 at 24–25. 

104 Docket 1-1 at 10, § 1.9. 

105 Docket 12 at 25. 

106 Docket 18-1 at 10–11, 14. In its reply brief, Alaska Communications clarifies that it is 

not advancing a timeliness argument. See Docket 20 at 5 n.2.

107 Docket 181 at 12. 

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pursuant to the terms set out in Article IV of the CBA within 7 days of the date of 

this order. 

The Clerk of Court shall enter a final judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 11th day of December, 2019 at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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