Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00397/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00397-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROGELIO CUEVAS ESPINOZA,

Petitioner,

v.

SHAWN HATTON, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 10cv397-WQH-BGS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS POST

REMAND AND EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING

I. INTRODUCTION

Rogelio Cuevas Espinoza (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding in forma 

pauperis,

1

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(“Petition”) on February 18, 2010 seeking relief from his March 2006 convictions of 

 

1 Petitioner was initially proceeding pro se, but was appointed counsel on appeal by the 

Ninth Circuit. (See ECF No. 55.) 

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mayhem and assault with a semi-automatic firearm in San Diego County Superior Court,

Case No. SCS158094. He is serving a sentence of 29 years to life for those convictions.2 

As is relevant to this proceeding, the Petition included an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim against Petitioner’s trial attorney for failing to interview two witnesses, 

Miguel R. Rubio (“Rubio”) and Silvia Escamilla (“Escamilla”), whose sworn declarations 

were submitted with the Petition. On September 10, 2013, United States District Judge 

William Q. Hayes adopted in part a Report and Recommendation issued by the undersigned 

judge, denying the Petition and granting a certificate of appealability as to the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim discussed above. (ECF No. 47.) On December 19, 2016, the 

Ninth Circuit issued a 2 to 1 decision remanding this action back to this Court “for an 

evidentiary hearing on counsel’s failure to interview the two witnesses.” (Memorandum 

Disposition, ECF No. 64 at 5.)3 Following remand, Judge Hayes referred the matter to the 

undersigned judge to hold the evidentiary hearing (“Hearing”) and issue a report and 

recommendation. (ECF No. 65.) 

This case is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Southern District 

of California Civil Local Rule 72.1(d) for a report and recommendation. The Court submits 

this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge William Q. Hayes 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule HC.2 of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California.

Upon consideration of the evidence and testimony adduced at the Hearing, the 

parties’ post-Hearing briefing and controlling authority and for the reasons discussed 

 

2 Petitioner was sentenced to a four-year term for mayhem and a 25-year to life term for 

personally discharging a firearm and causing great bodily injury during the mayhem. (Cal. 

Pen. Code § 12022.53(d)).

3 ECF citations reference the CM/ECF pagination system. Citations to Lodgments 

reference the Lodgment’s pagination. “EHRT” refers to the to the Reporter’s Transcript 

for the Evidentiary Hearing and “Ex.” refers to an exhibit admitted at the Hearing. Unless 

otherwise indicated throughout this order, page references for the EHRT and Exhibits 

proffered by the parties at the Hearing refer to internal pagination. 

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below, it is RECOMMENDED that Judge Hayes find: (1) Miguel Rubio and Sylvia 

Escamilla are not credible witnesses; (2) trial counsel was not deficient in not interviewing

them and presenting their testimony at trial; (3) trial counsel’s actions did not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel; and accordingly, (4) the Petition should be DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following summary of the events at issue is taken from the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision:

On March 10, 2001, Espinoza attended a relative’s party at a convention hall

in celebration of a baptism. At the party, a fight erupted between Espinoza 

and two brothers, Arturo Rivera (Arturo) and Adan Rivera (Adan). Espinoza 

was wounded during the fight, and then retreated. Espinoza’s uncle handed 

him a semi-automatic handgun and showed him how to use it.

Shortly thereafter, a second confrontation occurred outside the party. 

Espinoza fired the gun several times at the ground, in the air, and in Arturo’s 

general direction to keep Arturo and Adan at bay. A crowd quickly gathered, 

and a struggle ensued to wrest the gun away from Espinoza. Espinoza fired 

the gun during this struggle several times in various directions, by his account, 

“because people were ‘yanking’ at his hand.” Arturo was shot in the right 

eye, which he consequently lost. Forensic evidence suggested that Arturo was 

shot from a distance of more than three or four feet. Eight cartridge casings 

and a bullet fragment were recovered. Forensics showed the bullets had all 

been fired from the same gun, while the shooter was moving. 

Espinoza was charged with attempted murder, mayhem, and assault with a 

semi-automatic weapon. Espinoza was the only defense witness at his trial, 

testifying that the shooting was accidental, that he did not intend to actually 

shoot Arturo. The jury deliberated for three days and requested the taped 

interviews during deliberations. Ultimately, the jury deadlocked on the 

attempted murder charge, but convicted Espinoza on the assault and mayhem 

charges. He was sentenced to four years for mayhem and a consecutive term 

of 25 years to life in prison for the assault conviction. 

(Mem. Disp. at 2–4.) Additional summaries of the underlying facts of this case are 

provided in this Court’s September 4, 2012 Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 40) 

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and District Judge William Q. Hayes’ September 10, 2013 Order (ECF No. 47). (See ECF 

Nos. 40 at 2–4; 47 at 1–3.) 

B. Procedural Background

In March of 2006, roughly five years after the shooting, a jury convicted Petitioner

of mayhem involving the intentional and personal discharge of a firearm that caused great 

bodily injury, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 203, 12022.53(d), and assault with a semi-automatic 

firearm involving the personal use of the firearm and personal infliction of great bodily 

injury. Id. §§ 245(b), 12022.5(a)(1); 12022.7(a). The jury deadlocked on a count of 

attempted murder and the court declared a mistrial on that count. The court sentenced 

Petitioner to a four-year middle term for mayhem and a consecutive term of 25 years to life 

for personally discharging a firearm and causing great bodily injury during the mayhem. 

Id. § 12022.53(d). The court stayed the remaining terms for the other counts and 

enhancements. Id. § 654. (Lodgment 6.) 

Petitioner then appealed the convictions in the Fourth District of the California Court 

of Appeal. (Lodgments 3–5.) On direct appeal, he raised no ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims. (Lodgment 3 at 18, 38, 50; Lodgment 6 at 2.) The state appellate court 

unanimously affirmed the trial court’s decision. (Lodgment 6 at 16.) Next, Petitioner 

sought review of the appellate court decision before the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment 7.) The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state petition without 

comment. (Lodgment 8.) 

On August 31, 2009, Espinoza filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 9.) The state habeas petition raised claims alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The California Supreme Court denied 

the state petition without comment.4(Lodgment 10.) 

 

4 Petitioner also attached an October 23, 2009 Motion for Discovery And Interrogatories 

with his habeas petition to the California Supreme Court, Case No. S175936 (Petition.\

Appendix B at 27–37, 39–45, ECF No. 1-1) seeking, among other things, evidence to 

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On February 18, 2010, Espinoza filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the 

“Petition”) in this Court asserting three grounds for review, including Petitioner’s Sixth 

Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding trial counsel’s purported 

failure to interview witnesses. (“Petition”, ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an answer on 

Mary 28, 2010. (ECF No. 16.) 

On September 4, 2012, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending the Petition be denied. (ECF No. 40.) On September 10, 2013, United 

States District Judge William Q. Hayes adopted the Report and Recommendation in part, 

denying the Petition and granting a certificate of appealability as to the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim discussed above. (ECF No. 47.) Petitioner appealed. (ECF 

No. 49.) 

On December 19, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued a 2 to 1 decision reversing the 

Petition’s denial and remanding this action back to this Court “for an evidentiary hearing 

on counsel’s failure to interview the two witnesses.” (Mem. Disp. at 5.) Following remand, 

Judge Hayes referred the matter to the undersigned judge to hold an evidentiary hearing 

(“Hearing”) and issue a Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 65.)

The Hearing took place over four days: February 28, 2018; March 2, 2018;5 March 

9, 2018; and September 14, 2018.6 (ECF Nos. 110, 111, 112, 136.) Following numerous 

 

substantiate his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. His post-trial pro se discovery 

motion failed twice in the superior court (see Petition Ex. 3, ECF No. 1-2, at 2, 6), and he 

received no evidentiary hearing or other response to that Motion when the supreme court 

summarily denied his habeas petition on February 10, 2010. (Petition at 4; Petition 

Appendix A, at 24, ECF No. 1-1.)

5 Due to the last-minute unavailability of trial counsel Jan Ronis, no witnesses were called 

on March 2, 2018. The Court discussed the evidence with counsel for both parties and 

entered some exhibits into evidence.

6 After the Hearing, the parties submitted briefing on the admissibility of Petitioner’s 

proposed Strickland expert’s testimony. On March 29, 2019, this Court excluded 

Petitioner’s Strickland expert’s testimony, finding that an expert would not assist the Court 

in its analysis of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (ECF No. 140.) On 

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extensions, Respondent’s post-Hearing brief was filed on August 15, 2019 (ECF No. 152) 

and Petitioner’s post-Hearing brief was filed on September 12, 2019 (ECF No. 157).7 

III. SCOPE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON REMAND

In their post-Hearing briefs, Petitioner and Respondent take differing views of the 

scope of the Ninth Circuit’s remand. Consistent with prior filings, Petitioner argues for a 

more expansive view of the Ninth Circuit’s remand. He argues now that the Ninth Circuit’s 

order requires the Court to address whether trial counsel was deficient for (1) failing to 

interview witnesses other than Miguel Rubio and Sylvia Escamilla who provided 

statements in police reports purportedly identifying a shooter whose description did not 

match that of Petitioner and thus (2) selecting the “weak and inconsistent defenses” of selfdefense and accidental shooting. (ECF No. 157 at 13–16, 26–29; see ECF No. 138 at 2.) 

Respondent argues the rule of mandate limits the issues to be decided in this proceeding to 

whether (1) Rubio and Escamilla are credible witnesses and (2) if trial counsel was 

deficient for failing to investigate and present their testimony at trial. (ECF No. 152 at 5–

6.) In keeping with its prior ruling, this Court disagrees with Petitioner’s framing of the 

scope of the remand. (See ECF No. 140 at 4–5.) 

The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held, in both civil and criminal cases, that a district 

court is limited by this court’s remand in situations where the scope of the remand is clear.” 

United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting MendezGutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)) (holding the district court did 

 

April 23, 2019, Judge Hayes granted Petitioner’s unopposed motion (ECF No. 141) to file 

written objections to this Court’s order excluding the Strickland expert’s testimony in his 

post-evidentiary hearing brief or in his final objections to the instant Report and 

Recommendation. (ECF No. 143.) Petitioner makes no such objection in his postevidentiary hearing brief. (See ECF No. 157.) 

7 Briefing was to be fully submitted on May 31, 2019, but was extended until September 

16, 2019 based on requests by the parties. Petitioner’s counsel requested four 

continuances. (ECF Nos. 144, 146, 148, 155.) Respondent’s counsel requested one 

continuance. (ECF No. 150.) 

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not err in refusing to consider the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel argument 

based on new evidence presented during a post-appeal evidentiary hearing, as the case was 

“remanded for a single purpose”, a hearing to resolve a critical disputed fact, and thus “the

plain language of the disposition precluded the district court from considering any other 

arguments concerning [counsel’s] effectiveness”); see Holmes v. Miller, 768 F. App’x 781, 

782–83 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming the district court “correctly understood the scope of [it’s] 

remand”, which did not include taking evidence concerning an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim regarding counsel’s trial strategy that had not been raised in her petition); 

see also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 883 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“There is nothing in our prior decision that indicates that we issued an open remand. 

Rather, in remanding to the district court, our opinion contemplates a trial to resolve the 

only remaining genuine issue of material fact.”), abrogated on other grounds by Rimini St., 

Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019); Moormann v. Schriro, 426 

F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (when ineffective assistance of counsel claim is remanded 

for evidentiary hearing, petitioner may not add “unrelated alleged instances of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness” but may “develop additional facts supporting that particular claim”

(emphasis added)). 

Under the rule of mandate, “[a] district court that has received the mandate of an 

appellate court cannot vary or examine that mandate for any purpose other than executing 

it. At the same time, the rule of mandate allows a lower court to decide anything not 

foreclosed by the mandate.” Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citations omitted). “[I]n construing a mandate, the lower court may consider the 

opinion the mandate purports to enforce as well as the procedural posture and substantive 

law from which it arises.” United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“‘[T]he ultimate task is to distinguish matters that have been decided on appeal and are 

therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court, from matters that have 

not . . . .’” United States v Perez, 475 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007). A violation of the 

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rule of mandate is jurisdictional error. Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067 (citing Thrasher, 483 F.3d 

at 982). 

Here, the scope of the remand is clear: the Ninth Circuit “REVERSE[D] and 

REMAND[ED] for an evidentiary hearing before the district court on Espinoza’s 

Strickland claim to consider whether trial counsel was deficient as well as Escamilla and 

Rubio’s credibility.” (Mem. Disp. at 12.) Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to interview declarants Rubio and Escamilla was the 

only claim certified for appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 47 at 24 n.11 [“In light of 

the sworn declarations submitted by Rubio and Escamilla, the Court will grant a certificate 

of appealability as to claim three of the Petition.”]; see Mem. Disp. at 5 [“The district court

denied Espinoza’s claims, but certified for appeal Espinoza’s Strickland claim regarding 

his counsel’s failure to interview Escamilla and Rubio. Espinoza’s failure to interview 

claim is the only claim before this court on appeal.”].) 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims involve a two-part inquiry. First, under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Petitioner must show that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient, that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

466 U.S. at 688. In representing his client, trial counsel “has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.” Id. at 691. Second, Petitioner must show that “the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. To make this showing, he must prove that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would 

have been different.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995).

Because there was no evidence in the state court record to explain trial counsel’s 

behavior regarding Escamilla and Rubio, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the California 

Supreme Court decided Petitioner’s case on prejudice grounds. (Mem. Disp. at 7.) It 

proceeded to find that based on the contents of Escamilla and Rubio’s declarations, 

Petitioner had satisfied Strickland’s prejudice prong. (Id. at 7–8.) The Ninth Circuit 

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recounted exactly what Escamilla and Rubio would have testified to: “that Espinoza fired 

several shots in [the victim’s] direction before a struggle ensued”; “[d]uring this struggle, 

numerous people tried to get control of the gun and several more shots were fired in all 

directions”; and “someone got the gun away from Espinoza and fired it at [the victim].” 

(Id. at 8.) Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit was “convinced that Escamilla and Rubio’s 

testimony creates ‘a reasonable probability’ that ‘the fact-finder would have had a 

reasonable doubt as to Espinoza’s guilt,’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (other citation 

omitted).” (Id. at 9.) Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that Strickland’s prejudice prong was 

satisfied provided Escamilla and Rubio are found credible. 

Because of this determination, the Ninth Circuit specifically framed its remand in 

the context of Strickland’s deficiency prong and the two declarants, Escamilla and Rubio. 

The order states, “[w]e reverse the district court’s denial of Espinoza’s petition and remand 

to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s failure to interview the two 

witnesses.” (Id. at 5 [emphasis added].) The Court further elaborated that “[b]ecause there 

is no record about trial counsel’s failure to investigate Escamilla and Rubio, there is an 

issue as to whether an evidentiary hearing on the matter is appropriate.” (Id. at 9 [emphasis

added].) It found, “Espinoza is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because ‘his 

allegations,[

8

] if proved, would entitle him to relief.’” (Id. at 11 [citation omitted].)

 

8 As set forth in his Petition, Petitioner’s allegations are made in reference to counsel’s 

failure to investigate and interview Rubio and Escamilla. (ECF No. 1-11 at 44–46.) In his 

original Petition, Petitioner references “Nine (9) potential known witnesses” that were not 

investigated, consulted, or called to testify for the defense. (ECF No. 1-11 at 46.) Including 

Sandy Espinoza herself, there are eight witness names provided in Sandy Espinoza’s 

declaration: Silvia Escamilla, Miguel Rubio, Julieta Sillas, Rosafe Cuevas, Adolfo Cuevas, 

Leticia Hernandez, and Antonio Hernandez. (ECF No. 1-7 at 7.) Escamilla and Rubio 

were the only individuals who allegedly witnessed the shooting and provided declarations 

in support of the Petition. (See ECF No. 1-7 at 1–5 [Escamilla and Rubio declarations].) 

Despite Petitioner naming these additional “known witnesses” in his failure to interview 

claim, the Ninth Circuit only addressed Escamilla and Rubio. This fact underscores the 

limited scope of the Ninth Circuit’s remand. Further, of the remaining “known witnesses”, 

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Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded “for an evidentiary hearing to 

consider whether trial counsel was deficient as well as Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility.” 

(Id. at 12.) Given that the Ninth Circuit has already found Petitioner satisfied Strickland’s 

prejudice prong based on the contents of Escamilla and Rubio’s sworn declarations, the

scope of the evidentiary hearing on remand requires this Court to assess Strickland’s 

deficiency prong, and whether trial counsel was deficient in light of the Court’s assessment 

of Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility. (See id. at 9 [“Because there is no record about trial 

counsel’s failure to investigate Escamilla and Rubio, there is an issue as to whether an 

evidentiary hearing on the matter is appropriate.”].) 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the scope of the remand regarding Strickland’s

deficiency prong is clear: the district court must conduct “an evidentiary hearing on 

counsel’s failure to interview the two witnesses”, Escamilla and Rubio. (Id. at 5 [emphasis 

added].) See Thrasher, 483 F.3d at 982 (district court did not err in refusing to consider 

the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel argument based on new evidence 

presented during a post-appeal evidentiary hearing, as “the plain language of the [Ninth 

Circuit’s] disposition precluded the district court from considering any other arguments 

concerning [counsel’s] effectiveness”); see Holmes, 768 F. App’x at 782–83 (affirming the 

district court “correctly understood the scope of [it’s] remand”, which did not include 

taking evidence concerning an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s 

trial strategy that had not been raised in her petition); Love v. Scribner, 691 F. Supp. 2d 

1215, 1232–33 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the Ninth Circuit’s remand to district court 

was limited to holding an evidentiary hearing to decide if respondent struck juror because 

she was African-America), aff’d sub nom. Love v. Cate, 449 F. App’x 570 (9th Cir. 2011); 

 

Julieta Silas, Rosafe Cuevas, and Adolfo Cuevas provided police statements following the 

shooting saying they did not see the shooting and did not know who the shooter was. (See

Ex. M at 3, 6, 78–79.) Other than Sandy Espinoza and Silvia Escamilla, none of the other 

“known witnesses” testified at the Hearing. (See EHRT vol 1 at 2; EHRT vol 3 at 2; EHRT 

vol 4 at 2.) 

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Love v. Scribner, 278 F. App’x 714, 718 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We therefore REVERSE and 

REMAND for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prosecution struck Ms. M. 

from the jury because of her race.”); Olivas v. Whitford, No. 14-CV-1434-WQH-BLM, 

2019 WL 3974086, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019); Lane v. McGrew, No. CV 13-8448-

GW (PLA), 2016 WL 8737522, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016) (“clear remand order 

prohibits the Court from addressing the issues that petitioner has asserted for the first time 

on remand” as the remand order “prohibit[ed] this Court from examining any issue other 

than the sole issue set forth in the remand order”), report and recommendation adopted, 

No. CV 13-8448-GW(PLA), 2017 WL 1395602 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017), aff’d sub nom. 

Lane v. Swain, 910 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 2018). This requires assessing the credibility of 

the declarants and whether trial counsel was deficient in not calling them to testify. 

Notwithstanding, this Court addresses Petitioner’s additional claims regarding trial 

counsel’s deficiency in the body of this Report and Recommendation.

IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Over the course of the four-day Hearing, Petitioner and Respondent offered 

extensive evidence on the issues of trial counsel Jan Ronis’ purported deficiency and the 

credibility of the two declarants Silvia Escamilla and Miguel Rubio in the forms of live 

testimony and numerous exhibits.9 The following witnesses testified: Daniel Alatorre, 

Silvia Escamilla, Sergeant Steve Shephard, Sergeant Estella Cordero, Jan Ronis, Esq., Juan 

Antonio Lopez, Sandy Barajas10 and Barbara Ann Smith, Esq. Despite Petitioner’s 

attempts to contact Miguel Rubio, he did not present at the Hearing. 

A. Daniel Alatorre 

a. Hearing Testimony 

 

9 Rulings on evidentiary issues are addressed below. See Section VII. 

10 Sandy Barajas is Petitioner’s ex-wife with whom he has two children. While they were 

married and at the time the shooting took place, her name was Sandy Barajas-Espinoza. In 

various documents, she is referred to as Sandi. The Court uses Sandy for consistency. 

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Daniel Alatorre,

11 the first witness called by Petitioner, testified via video conference 

from Las Vegas, Nevada on February 28, 2018. (Evidentiary Hearing Reporter’s 

Transcript “EHRT”, vol. 1 at 10–25.) Alatorre was around twelve years old at the time of 

the shooting. (Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 437:7–14 [trial testimony from Alatorre’s mother 

Olivia Addison].) Alatorre testified that he resided in National City in 2001 and recalled

the “frightening” incident that took place in front of KP Hall on March 10, 2001. (Id. at

12.) The exact sequence of events that took place is unclear from Alatorre’s testimony. 

At the outset of direct examination, Alatorre gave a high-level description of his 

recollection of the events: 

I remember it was very, very frightening. My mother and I and my brother 

were just minding our own business in our home and we heard gunshots. We 

went outside, and I remember there was a man wearing a cowboy hat. And he 

was wearing a white shirt. All I remember is my mother telling me and my 

brother to drop down to the ground, and I mean, I heard shots at the house, 

but we didn’t know until later, about some gunshots. But other than that, that’s 

what happened. 

(Id. at 12–13.) In keeping with his initial summary of events, Alatorre at first testified 

when he first heard gunshots, he was in his living room with his mother and brother: 

Q: Mr. Alatorre, when you first heard gunshots, where were you?

A: We were in the living room.

(Id. at 13.) However, Mr. Alatorre then testified that when he heard the initial gunshots, 

he was outside: 

Q: Mr. Alatorre, just to clarify were you outside when you heard the initial shots? 

A: No we weren’t we went outside. I’m getting echos and I can’t hear. 

Q: Sure, I can ask you again, Mr. Alatorre. When you first heard the initial gunshots, 

where were you?

 

11 Petitioner’s Closing Brief incorrectly refers to Daniel Alatorre as Danielle Alatorre. 

(ECF No. 157 at 12.) 

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A: We were outside. 

(Id. at 14.) Alatorre then stated he was outside in the porch area, he heard gunshots, and 

his mother told his brother and him to go inside and drop to the ground. (Id. at 14–15.) He 

remembers hearing more gunshots after that but does not remember how long he was on 

the floor. (Id. at 15, 17.) After he got up from the ground, he did not see a person shooting 

more shots. (Id. at 15.) But, he reiterated that he did initially see a man with a hat and 

white shirt. (Id. at 16.) He heard more shots after the police arrived. (Id.)

Alatorre testified he heard a second round of gunshots in the living room and that 

there was an open window that allowed him to see “the whole commotion that was going 

on.” (Id. at 18.) He remembers just standing there after the second round of gunshots and 

all he can recall “from his memory is a man with a white hat, white shirt.” (Id. at 18–19.) 

Alatorre does not remember the man’s face. (Id. at 19.) 

Alatorre stated that while on the front porch, he saw the “man with a white hat 

initiating the whole, the whole thing by reaching over a vehicle and then shooting 

somebody else . . . .” (Id.) Alatorre does not know who the victim was. (Id.) He only saw 

one person with a gun and he only saw one gun, a handgun. (Id.) While Alatorre was on 

the porch, the man with the gun was 25 to 30 feet away from him. (Id. at 20.) 

Initially, Alatorre said it was a correct statement that “the man [he] saw shooting 

after [he] got up from the floor, the man that [he] saw shooting had a cowboy hat on and a 

white shirt[.]” (Id. at 22.) However, upon questioning from the Court, Alatorre stated that 

he was outside when he observed the individual shooting the gun. (Id. at 23.) He was still 

“able to see the man with the cowboy hat before and after [he] dropped to the ground.” 

(Id.) Alatorre testified the man with the cowboy hat was running away from “the situation” 

before the police arrived. He then claimed police took him into custody at the scene:

Q: Where was he at the scene when the police arrived?

A: Well, they had him in custody. They had to have him in custody. 

Q: Well, did you see the police have him in custody?

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A: That (pause) – Well, your Honor, it’s a little blurry. I can’t really recall.

(Id. at 24.) Alatorre’s mother called the police the night of the incident.12 (Id. at 20.) He

was interviewed by a police officer that night (id.), but was not contacted by any attorney 

or investigator regarding his statements. (Id. at 16.) He reviewed his police report, which 

was provided by Petitioner’s counsel, in preparation for his testimony. (Id. at 21.) He 

stated that he would have had a better memory if they had found “the guy before”, but 

many years passed. (Id. at 20.) 

The Court questioned Alatorre as to why he kept looking down throughout his 

testimony, and Alatorre explained he needed to look down to hear and that his throat was 

rough from sinuses. (Id. at 21–22.) Alatorre was never asked to identify Petitioner as the 

shooter. (See id. at 10–25.) 

b. Police Report Statement 

Reporting Officer M. Remmers authored a March 14, 2001 Police Report in which 

he summarized Alatorre’s statement to police following the March 10, 2001 incident at KP 

Hall. Relevant portions of the report reads: 

Daniel Alatorre (Witness) was inside his residence, located at 207 E. Plaza 

Blvd., watching television. He stepped outside to the front porch area, which 

faces south toward E. Plaza Blvd. to see his mother (Olivia Addison) and 

younger brother (Jesse Addison). Alatorre’s mother told him to get inside the 

house. At that moment, Alatorre heard people screaming and cussing across 

the street from the house. He then saw a Hispanic male (Suspect) firing a gun 

at a man while standing about “a car length away” from him. Alatorre heard 

approximately seven gunshots. Several people ran toward a white colored car.

Alatorre, his brother, and mother all ran into the house and closed the front 

door. They dropped to the living room floor while Alatorre’s mother called 

9-1-1. 

Alatorre said he heard what sounded like a car speeding away from the area. 

 

12 Alatorre’s mother, Olivia Addison, testified at Petitioner’s trial. (Lodgment 2, vol. 3, at 

435–60, ECF No. 16-7 at 165–90.) She also gave a statement to police the night of the 

shooting that was included in a police report. (Ex. 2.) 

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He did not see the car or its occupants.

Alatorre said when the police arrived he heard more gunshots.

One bullet was discovered in his mother’s bedroom.

Alatorre described the suspect as being a Hispanic male adult, late twenties, 

unknown height, wearing a white short and a cowboy hat. Alatorre said he 

could identify the suspect if seen again.

(Ex. 1.) 

B. Silvia Escamilla

a. Declaration Submitted with Petition

Counsel for the parties stipulated to the admission of Silvia Escamilla’s sworn 

declaration submitted with the Petition. (Joint Exhibit List, ECF No. 116 at 7.) The 

declaration states it was executed under penalty of perjury on May 5, 2009, but was signed 

by Escamilla on June 5, 2009, and was notarized on June 5, 2009 by Sandy Barajas 

Espinoza, Escamilla’s daughter and Petitioner’s ex-wife. (Ex. K.)

13 It states the following:

I Silvia Escamilla, attended a baptismal celebration on March 10, 2001. I am 

the grandmother of the child who was baptized. The baptismal celebration 

was held in K-P Hall in the city of National City, California. On March 10, 

2001, I witnessed the shooting and struggle for the gun outside of this hall 

where the event took place. I was standing in front of the building K-P Hall 

front door smoking a cigarette when the Rivera brothers were walking out 

with other people. Both Rivera brothers (Adan and Arturo) and their friends 

were all yelling, screaming and seem to be mad, excited and they all had an 

aggressive attitude. They immediately headed towards Rogelio Espinoza, 

yelling “There he is, get that puto”. They immediately surrounded Rogelio 

Espinoza and began to kick him, punch him and beat him down to hurt 

Rogelio. Rogelio tried to get away from the kicks and punches of his 

attackers. I remember Rogelio telling the Adan and Arturo (Rivera brothers) 

 

13 Escamilla’s declaration (Ex. K) was also entered into evidence at the Hearing on

February 28, 2018. (EHRT vol. 1 at 193–94.) The Court notes that there was a month gap 

between when the declaration was typed up and when Escamilla signed off on it. (See Ex. 

K.) 

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pleading them to stop, that he did not want to fight and that he (Rogelio) had 

a gun. Rogelio continued warn them about the gun, and one of the brothers 

said to him that he did not have the balls to shoot anyone. They kept kicking 

him and attacking him. Then Rogelio, shot one or two shots into the ground 

and the brothers began to struggle and more shots were fired in the air, while 

someone in the crowd at the same time was trying to struggle for the weapon. 

That is when I believe the shots began to go in all directions. I then remember 

hearing someone saying police, and I saw someone else grab the gun and tried 

to shoot Rogelio as he ran across the street. I believe from what I witnessed 

the guy who had the gun was the one who shot Arturo and not Rogelio because 

he had already ran off and no one was hurt at that moment. I can identify all 

involved even the person who shot the gun at the end of the struggle. I 

summon to testify; I will attest and testify in favor of Rogelio Espinoza. I also 

contacted the Law Firm of Jan Ronis and Ronis and spoke with one of his 

investigators Juan Lopez along with Jan Ronis in regards to my testimony. I 

told the investigator that Rogelio had not shot the victim, and that I would 

testify to my testimony. However I was never contacted again and I contacted 

them a few times and left messages. I was never asked to appear in trial or 

submit my testimony in front of a judge. I declare under the penalty of perjury 

under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and that this 

affidavit was executed on May 5, 2009, at San Diego, California.

Sylvia Escamilla 

06/05/09 

(Ex. K.) 

b. Hearing Testimony

Escamilla testified on February 28, 2018 that Petitioner was her daughter’s husband. 

(EHRT, vol. 1 at 26:15–19.) On March 10, 2001, Escamilla attended a baptism party for 

her grandchild at KP Hall in National City. Her daughter, Rocio Barajas, hosted the party. 

(Id. at 26:20–25, 27:1–3.) She was outside of the party smoking a cigarette when she 

observed a group of people approaching and attack Petitioner. (Id. at 27:12–15.) She heard 

and saw two gunshots “shot up” and did not know who shot the gun because “there were a 

lot of hands.” “It was like they were struggling to try to take the gun, something like that.” 

(Id. at 27:20–25, 28:1.) The shooting occurred around 7:00 or 7:30 p.m. (Id. at 29:3–6.)

After she heard the gunshots, she saw Petitioner cross the street and run away. She 

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observed another young man shoot the gun. (Id. at 28:2–6.) The man she saw shooting 

was dressed in black, wearing a black hat “like a Texan cowboy” and “his eyes were, like, 

a little slanted.” (Id. at 28:7–12, 54:1–5.) 

Escamilla was interviewed by the police at the police station in National City that 

night, and said she was nervous and frightened during the interview. (Id. at 28:17–25, 

29:1–2, 14–18.) She testified that she gave the police the following description of the 

shooter that night – a short person, dressed in a black shirt, dressed in black and wearing a 

hat. (Id. at 30:19–25.) However, she later testified that she could not remember whether 

she gave a description of this man, the “second shooter” to the police. (Id. at 41:21–25, 

42:1, 46:3–7, 47:18–21, 56:10–19.) 

Escamilla saw the Petitioner’s lawyer once and he told her that they would speak but 

he never reached out to her. She tried to contact him by telephone three or four times, but 

he never got back to her. (Id. at 33:7–18.) She stated on direct examination that she also 

tried contacting the lawyer’s “detective” but no one ever picked up. (Id. at 33:19–22.) At 

the prompting of Petitioner’s counsel, Escamilla identified this man as Juan Lopez, who 

she mentioned in her declaration. (Id. at 52:15–23.) However, upon further questioning 

by this Court, she changed her testimony and said that she never actually called the 

detective or investigator. (Id. at 51:23–52:1.) Escamilla testified that she wanted to “make 

clear whatever they might have needed” from her. (Id. at 33:23–34:2.) She further stated 

that the Petitioner’s defense attorney’s “detective” came to her house to ask her to give a 

statement, but she never heard from him again. (Id. at 35:4–19.) She did not give him a 

statement. He asked her whether she knew Petitioner and what relationship they had and 

she told him that he was her son-in-law. Lopez then left her his business card and said he 

would reach out to her but he never did. (Id. at 50:16–23.) She did not tell the investigator 

about the man with the hat and the black clothing that she saw. (Id. at 50:24–51:1.) 

Escamilla could not remember the name of Petitioner’s defense attorney. (Id. at 

34:23– 35:3.) She was asked to be a witness for Petitioner’s trial, but “they never had me 

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take the bench.” The Court asked Escamilla to clarify who “they” are, and she responded 

“when the attorney went to see me, he’s the one who told me that, he’s the one who told 

me that I had to show up in court.” (Id. at 34:12–21.) When asked on cross-examination 

when Escamilla reached out to Petitioner’s attorney, she said it was not during the trial but 

she could not remember when it was. (Id. at 48:25–49:6.) She testified that she would call 

the attorney and leave messages on his voicemail asking him to return her call, but she did 

not give a reason for the call. (Id. at 51:7–22.) She tried to call him three or four times. 

(Id. at 57:4–9.) 

In 2009, Escamilla wrote a declaration for Petitioner. While being questioned about 

the creation of her declaration, the Court commented that she seemed “to be very 

suggestable” given that she kept changing her testimony. (Id. at 38:23–39:3.) She first 

testified that the declaration was in Spanish (id. at 32:10–15), but later changed her 

testimony and said she had stated the declaration orally in Spanish and her daughter, Sandy 

Barajas, translated it and wrote it out in English. (Id. at 36:13–18, 37:1–4, 15–18.) Upon 

further direct examination, Escamilla conceded that she did not remember whether she 

actually wrote out the declaration or stated it orally. (Id. at 40:9–12.) On crossexamination, Escamilla acknowledged that the declaration was in English and that she had 

not read that version because she does not speak or read English, but she supposed that her 

daughter would have written down what she told her. (Id. at 48:1–9.) She then testified 

that her declaration was translated into Spanish for her by her daughter, and that she had a 

written copy of the Spanish translation at her house. (Id. at 48:10–19.) She reiterated she 

could not remember whether she wrote the declaration herself or told it to her daughter 

orally. (Id. at 48:20–24.) 

Escamilla testified that she executed this declaration “to preserve [it] in case 

[Petitioner] needed it in the future, [s]ince neither the attorney nor the ‘detective’ decided 

to reach out to [her].” (Id. at 37:19–24.) She stated that the declaration accurately reflects 

what she remembered of the incident. (Id. at 40:15–20.) However, she also testified that 

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during the interview at the police station, she told the truth about what she saw. (Id. at 

47:22–24, 58:17–19.) Escamilla denied that Petitioner or anyone else asked her to prepare 

the declaration (id. at 49:13–14, 51:5–6), and that she prepared the declaration and gave it 

to her daughter just in case there was ever a trial. (Id. at 49:17–24.) 

On cross-examination, Escamilla testified that she heard two gunshots when she was 

standing outside of KP Hall but she did not know who fired the shots. (Id. at 42:10–16.) 

She saw the shots fired into the air, but she did not see who fired them or the gun because 

“there were a lot of hands that were in the struggle.” (Id. at 42:14–22.) The shots were 

fired from a group of people that included Petitioner, who she saw running away after the 

shooting. (Id. at 23–25, 44:1–7.) Escamilla testified that after Petitioner ran away, she saw 

another man — the man with slanted eyes who was wearing black clothing and a hat —

fire more shots; he was “shooting all over the place.” (Id. at 43:8–15.) Escamilla had seen 

this man a couple of times before and would be able to identify him if she saw him again.

(Id. at 43:16-19.) As stated above, she then said she could not remember whether she gave 

a description of this man, the “second shooter” to the police. (Id. at 41:21–42:1, 46:3–7, 

47:18–21, 56:10–19.) 

As stated above, Escamilla testified that during the interview at the police station 

she told the truth about what she saw, but she could not remember what she said during the 

interview. (Id. at 47:20–24, 58:17–19.) She further testified that the facts were freshest in 

her mind when the incident took place in 2001. (Id. at 59:2–4.) 

Escamilla could not remember if she was interviewed by the police at KP Hall after 

the incident, but if she had been, she would have given an accurate statement of what she 

saw. (Id. at 44:1–25, 45:1–2.) She could not remember telling a police officer at the scene 

that she saw Petitioner shoot a handgun into the air. (Id. at 46:8–10.) She also could not 

remember telling a police officer at the scene that her husband grabbed Petitioner and tried 

to hold him and that Petitioner yelled to her husband, “let me go!” because she could not 

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examination that she did not see Petitioner fire any shots because there were a lot of hands 

up in the air and she could not see who had the gun. (Id. at 47:5–9.) 

Escamilla stated she was certain she saw someone other than Petitioner fire a gun on 

March 10, 2001 in front of KP Hall. (Id. at 56:24–57:3.) The Court confirmed with her 

that she was truthful and accurate during her police interview and that facts were freshest 

in her mind when the incident took place. (Id. at 58:17–19; 59:2–4.) When asked if she 

would have told the police of the other shooter during the interview, she stated she thinks 

so but does not remember. (Id. at 58:20–23.) But, she remembers 17 years later that she 

knows the shooter was not Petitioner. (Id. at 58:24–59:1.) 

c. Prior Police Report Statement and Interview 

Escamilla gave two statements to police following the shooting on March 10, 2001. 

The first was an on-scene interview conducted by Sergeant Steve Shephard that was both 

recorded (Exs. L, O [transcript]) and summarized by Sergeant Shephard in his Officer’s 

Report (Ex. A.). The second was an interview conducted by Sergeant Estella Cordero at 

the National City police station at approximately 12:57 a.m. following the shooting. The 

interview was recorded (Ex. C) and transcripts in English (Ex. E) and Spanish (Ex. D) were 

provided to the Court. Sergeant Cordero also authored a Detective Follow-Up Report 

regarding her March 11, 2011 interview of Escamilla (Ex. B). 

1. Sergeant Shephard’s Officer’s Report and Recording of Interview 

In Sergeant Shephard’s Officer’s Report (Ex. A) dated March 12, 2001, then-Officer 

Shephard provided a narrative of his investigation of the shooting at the crime scene on 

March 10, 2001. He interviewed several witnesses that evening, including Escamilla and 

Rubio, both of which he recorded (Ex. L). He included a summary of each witness’ account 

in his Report. His summary of Escamilla’s statement is as follows:

Silvia Dominguez Escamilla is the mother-in-law of the suspect, Roger 

Espinoza. Escamilla was inside the building at 200 E. Plaza Blvd. when she 

saw Espinoza and Rivera get into an argument. Escamilla saw security escort 

both Espinoza and Rivera to the front of the building. Escamilla went to the 

front to make sure that Rivera was ok. 

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As Escamilla exited the building, she saw Espinoza firing a handgun straight 

up into the air. Escamilla’s husband grabbed Espinoza with both arms and 

tried to hold him. Espinoza yelled, “Let me go.” Escamilla’s husband let go 

of Espinoza. Espinoza left in a small dark vehicle.

Escamilla never saw Espinoza shoot at any person. Escamilla only saw 

Espinoza shoot the handgun above his head into the air. Escamilla can 

positively identify Espinoza.

(Ex. A.) 

During the interview, an unidentified witness translated for Escamilla. (Exs. L, O.) 

Via the witness’ translation, Escamilla stated that she saw “the guy with the weapon was 

just shooting up on the air, she didn’t see that he pointed the gun and he started shooting at 

the other, victim.” (Ex. O at 2.) When asked “Who was it that was shooting the gun?” 

Escamilla replied it was her son-in-law and specifically named Petitioner. (Id. at 2–3 

[naming Rogelio].) She told Sergeant Shephard that her son-in-law Rogelio “started 

shooting up.” (Id. at 3.) She did not see Rogelio shoot “this other guy.” (Id.) 

The parties stipulated to the admission of the recording (Ex. L) and transcript (Ex. 

O) of Sergeant Shephard’s interview of Escamilla for the limited purpose of impeachment. 

(ECF No. 116 at 7.) They stipulated to the admission of the summary included in Sergeant 

Shephard’s Officer’s Report (Ex. A) for the limited purposes of (1) impeachment and 

(2) the effect of the report on Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis. (Id. at 5.) 

2. Sergeant Cordero’s Interview

Sergeant Cordero interviewed Escamilla on March 11, 2001 at approximately 12:57 

a.m. after the incident took place. (Exs. C, D, E.) During the interview, Escamilla said 

that she arrived at the baptism party on March 10, 2001 at 4:00 in the afternoon with her 

“husband” and son. (Ex. E at 5.) She believes her daughter, Sandy Espinoza, and her 

husband at the time, Petitioner, “Roger” Espinoza, “more or less” arrived around 5:30 or 

6:00 p.m. (Id. at 2–3, 6–7). She did not see if they arrived together. (Id. at 7.) 

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Later that night, Escamilla was standing outside smoking a cigarette and talking with 

security when she saw a commotion outside. (Id. at 11.) She observed a group of 

“people/boys” and she heard gunshots. She did not see who had the gun, she just saw gun 

shots “fired up.” (Id. at 8.) When asked “Did you see that Roger had the gun?” she 

responded “No, not at all.” (Id. at 9, 14 [“I did not see who who shot/was shooting.”].) 

Escamilla admitted Petitioner was among the group of boys that was fighting, pulling and 

shooting, but she “did not exactly see him with the gun.” (Id. at 10–11.) After she heard 

the two gunshots, she went back inside and was “fainting from the shock.” (Id. at 12.) She 

denied that she had told another lady that she saw that Petitioner had the gun and was 

shooting it up. (Id. at 9–10.) She later said she saw the group fighting inside the hall before 

running through the back door and going outside. (Id. at 15.) She assumed it was the same 

group of people she saw fighting outside, but could not see them in the dark outside. (Id.) 

Escamilla made several statements indicating there was only one gun involved in the 

shooting during her interview with Sergeant Cordero. She stated that she “did not exactly 

see [Petitioner] with the gun” and that she “did not see that he had it.” (Id. at 12 [emphasis 

added].) When asked “what type of gun was it?” she replied “No, no I don’t know what 

type it was, I didn’t see it.” (Id. at 13 [emphasis added].) 

Escamilla denied knowing of any problems between Petitioner and Adan Rivera. (Id.

at 16.) She admitted that her daughter Sandy knows Adan and Arturo Rivera. (Id. at 16–

17 [“Yes. Because I, that family, we are like, like one in the same family/one big family.”].) 

She stated she did not know why her daughter Sandy had told police that she did not know 

Adan and Arturo. (Id. at 17.) She denied that anyone had told her Petitioner would hit her 

daughter. (Id. at 13.) She stated the following about Petitioner:

Well for me, I’ve always loved him a lot, as a matter of fact, even his mom 

says, she always would say, I see that you love him a lot, because as far as I 

go, I don’t have anything to say about [Petitioner], nothing because with me 

ever since I have known him he has gotten along well with me. He and I have

never had any problems. 

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(Id. at 13.) The parties stipulated to the admission of the recording (Ex. C) and transcripts 

(Exs. D, E) of Sergeant Cordero’s interview of Escamilla for the limited purpose of 

impeachment. (ECF No. 116 at 5.)

3. Sergeant Cordero’s Detective Follow-Up Report

In Sergeant Cordero’s Detective Follow-Up Report dated March 14, 2001 (Ex. B), 

Sergeant Cordero provided the following synopsis of her interview of Escamilla, which 

was obtained in Spanish and recorded:

Silvia Dominquez Escamilla lives at 834 30th Street San Diego, with her 

daughter Rosea “Rocio” Barajas.

On 031001, at about 1600 hours, Silvia Dominguez Escamilla arrived at the 

baptism party with her live in boyfriend, Jose Juan Bolanos and her son, Jose 

Juan Bolanos, Jr.

Silvia Dominguez Escamilla believes that Sandi Espinosa Barajas arrived 

between 1730 to 1800 hours. Silvia Dominguez Escamilla does not know if 

Sandi Espinosa Barajas and Roger Espinosa arrived at the same time; 

however, she first saw Sandi Espinosa Barajas and then later saw Roger 

Espinosa sitting at a table with his mother and uncle.

Sometime later, Silvia Dominguez Escamilla was smoking a cigarette outside 

and saw a group of unknown males fighting in the middle of the street. Silvia 

Dominguez Escamilla then saw someone (unknown) who fired several shots 

in the air. Silvia Dominguez Escamilla later admitted that Roger was with-in 

the group of males fighting in the street; however she denied seeing him with 

a handgun. After hearing two shots fired, Silvia Dominguez Escamilla went 

inside the dance hall.

Silvia Dominguez Escamilla could not provide a description of the handgun 

or the shooter.

Silvia Dominguez Escamilla then stated she saw several people fighting inside 

the dance hall. The fight was taken outside and then the shots were fired. 

 

(Ex. B.) The parties stipulated to the admission of the summary included in Sergeant 

Cordero’s Detective Follow-up Report (Ex. B) for the limited purposes of (1) impeachment 

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and (2) the effect of the report on Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis. (Id. at 5.) 

C. Miguel Rubio

Miguel Rubio did not present at the Hearing. Petitioner’s counsel attempted to locate 

Rubio to no avail by contacting him via his listed phone number and consulting with an 

investigator. (ECF No. 78 at 2; see ECF No. 82 at 10 [listing Rubio as a witness at the 

evidentiary hearing]; ECF No. 92 at 2–3 [no longer listing Rubio as a witness at the 

evidentiary hearing].) Rubio is the brother-in-law of Sandy Barajas and son-in-law of 

Sylvia Escamilla. He was the father of the baby whose baptism was being celebrated at 

KP Hall when the shooting occurred. (See Ex. N.) 

a. Declaration Submitted with Petition 

Counsel for the parties stipulated to the admission of Rubio’s sworn declaration 

submitted with the Petition. (Joint Exhibit List, ECF No. 116 at 5.) The Court addresses 

the admissibility of the declaration below. See Section VI.B.b. The declaration, which 

states it was executed under penalty of perjury on May 30, 2009, and was signed by Rubio

and notarized on June 2, 2009. 

My name is Miguel R. Rubio, and I want to state what I witnessed on 3/10/01 

in my son’s Baptism, an event we had at KP Hall in National City, CA. 

I was inside the KP Hall location greeting incoming guest, and friends who 

had previously arrived when I herd (sic) an argument or what sounded like a 

fight in the opposite room where I was in. I was told about a fight in the 

dancing room area and I immediately ran towards the individuals, but 

whatever it was it had been stopped. The individual Roger Espinoza was 

bleeding from different areas in his face, and I looked to see who had been 

involved, and noticed my friends Adan and Arturo the brothers were being 

held back by a few people they had arrived with. I was a little upset since 

they were ruining my celebration for my son, and they had arrived with lots 

of friends who I had never known or invited to the celebration. I was also 

concern (sic) with Roger bleeding heavily from the face and looked really 

injured, I guess Adan, Arturo and the friends along with family were still very 

angry because names were being yelled to Roger. By this time everyone was 

making there (sic) way towards the front entrance, once outside the either 

Adan or Arturo yelled there is that puto let’s get him, and I turned to see who 

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it was and it was Roger once surrounded by at least 4-5 people another fight 

began, but this time Roger was being jumped, there was someone screaming 

to leave me alone, I have a gun and I don’t want to hurt anyone I saw it was 

Roger trying to warn or scare people, the fight continued that’s when I heard 

and saw a gun being shot in the air. A struggle for the gun began and everyone 

was trying to take control of it, while at the same time kicking was going on 

and Roger stumble[d] to the floor and a lot of gun shots were fired towards all 

directions, someone yelled hey Police people ran all directions. Once 

everyone ran 2 shots were fired towards Arturo from another short male in the 

group. I had always told this story to the attorney’s helper a Juan, and I was 

told I would need to tell this to the courts, but I never received a call or a time 

to appear and tell my side. I also recall leaving 2–3 messages for a Ronis 

Lawyer. I was never asked to come to courts to tell them I was a witness to 

this fight.

I Miguel Rubio Declare under penalty, of perjury under laws of the United 

States of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this declaration 

was executed on May 30, 2009 in San Diego, CA. 

Miguel Rubio 

6/2/09 

(Ex. 28.) 

b. Prior Police Reports and Interviews 

Rubio gave an on-scene interview conducted by Sergeant Steve Shephard that was 

recorded (Exs. L, N [transcript]) and summarized by Sergeant Shephard in his Officer’s 

Report (Ex. A). Sergeant Shephard’s summary of Rubio’s statement is as follows:

Miguel Rodriguez Rubio was the host of the party taking place at 200 E. Plaza Blvd. 

Rubio is acquainted with both the victim and the suspect.

Rubio was inside dancing when he saw two guys fighting. Rubio did not realize that 

the two were fighting until security escorted the two outside. A short time later 

Rubio saw a crowd of people run back inside the building. Rubio went outside to 

see what was going on and saw Arturo lying on the sidewalk bleeding from the face. 

Police arrived and told Rubio to go back inside. 

Rubio did not see or hear a gun. Rubio did not see who shot Arturo.” 

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(Ex. A.) During the interview, Rubio said that he was inside dancing and he saw people 

fighting but at first he thought they were wrestling. He then ran outside because he saw 

“everybody c[o]me outside running” and he saw Arturo Rivera bleeding from his face. 

Rubio told Sergeant Shephard that he did not see or hear anything and did not see anyone 

with a gun. (Ex. N.) When asked if he saw the “guy that shot em”, Rubio replied “I didn’t 

see nothing.” (Id.) 

The parties stipulated to the admission of the transcript of Sergeant Shephard’s 

interview of Rubio (Ex. N) for the limited purpose of impeachment. (ECF No. 116 at 7.) 

They stipulated to them admission of the summary included in Sergeant Shephard’s 

Officer’s Report (Ex. A) for the limited purposes of (1) impeachment and (2) the effect of 

the report on Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis. (Id. at 5.) 

D. Sergeant Steve Shephard Hearing Testimony

Sergeant Shephard testified on February 28, 2018. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 63–87.) He 

was working as a patrol officer for the National City Police Department on March 10, 2001 

when he was called to respond to an incident at KP Hall in which it was reported that shots 

had been fired and a person had been shot in the face. It was a high-priority call to which 

multiple officers responded. (Id. at 63:21–64:14.) 

Sergeant Shephard testified that when he arrived, he saw a large crowd of people. 

He intended to find the victim and get medical aid for them, but someone first grabbed his 

attention and directed him to a vehicle that was fleeing the scene. (Id. at 64:16–24.) He 

received information that the suspect was in that vehicle, so he advised dispatch that he 

was going to attempt a stop on the vehicle. He did stop the vehicle but did not find the 

suspect. After stopping the vehicle, he returned to the scene and was assigned to start 

taking witness statements. (Id. at 65:1–9.) He interviewed several witnesses, including 

Escamilla. (Id. at 65:15–20.) Sergeant Shephard reviewed his Officer’s Report (Ex. A) 

and stated that he prepared it and had seen it before. (Id. at 66:11–22.) He recorded his 

interview of Escamilla, as well as several other witnesses. (Id. at 67:3–14.) Escamilla 

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identified the shooter as her son-in-law, Roger Espinoza. (Id. at 69:18–70:19.) If she had 

given Shephard a description of an additional shooter or someone other than the Petitioner, 

he would have noted it in his report. (Id. at 70:11–14.)

On cross-examination, Petitioner’s counsel asked Sergeant Shephard if he conducted 

Escamilla’s interview in English. (Id. at 71:19–21.) Sergeant Shephard responded that he 

believed so, and that from what he recalled, he understood everything she was telling him 

and she understood his questions, and did not recall whether he had any assistance from a 

translator. He said he would have documented if someone was translating their interview. 

(Id. at 71:22–72:5.) On cross-examination, Sergeant Shephard said he was not onehundred percent certain that Escamilla spoke to him in English when she gave him her 

statement, but since he does not understand Spanish he would likely not have interviewed 

someone who only spoke Spanish and instead he would have had a Spanish-speaking 

officer conduct the interview. (Id. at 80:11–81:2.) 

Sergeant Shephard testified that he arrived at the scene within minutes after the 

shooting. (Id. at 72:11–20.) He did not hear gunshots when he arrived. (Id. at 72:21–

73:1.) He further stated that his standard practice was to review the recording of the 

interview and write the synopsis of the statement at the same time. (Id. at 73:5–13) When 

questioned about the standard practice of investigating at the scene of a crime with large 

numbers of people present, Sergeant Shephard testified that they do not detain people if 

they are not suspected of committing a crime but they try to obtain cooperation from 

witnesses so they can take their information so detectives can follow up later. (Id. at 77:10–

78:2.) When asked by Petitioner’s counsel if there is a possibility that people could have 

fled the scene without giving a statement to police, Sergeant Shephard said it could have 

happened. (Id. at 78:3–9.)

Sergeant Shephard testified that he prepared his police report at or around the time 

the incident occurred, the report was kept in the ordinary course of business, and it was his 

regular practice to write police reports regarding incidents. (Id. at 85:12–20.) He further 

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testified that to the extent he did not recall, after reviewing the report his recollection was 

refreshed as to the witness interviews of Escamilla and Rubio. (Id. at 85:21–86:9.) 

Sergeant Shephard also stated that he accurately described what Rubio told him in the 

report. (Id. at 86:7–9.)

E. Sergeant Estella Cordero Hearing Testimony

Sergeant Cordero, now retired, testified on February 28, 2018 that she worked for 

National City police department for twenty-six years. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 90–118.) In March 

2001, she was assigned to crimes of violence as a detective. (Id. at 90:11–12, 23–24.) On 

March 10, 2001, she was called out to respond to a report of a shooting at KP Hall. (Id. at 

90:25, 91:1–7.) She arrived at the scene around 9:00 p.m. (Id. at 91:8–12.) Later that 

night, she interviewed Escamilla at the police station because she was a witness to the 

shooting at KP Hall. (Id. at 91:19–92:5.) Sergeant Cordero recorded the interview with 

an audio tape recorder and entered the tape into evidence. (Id. at 92:6–23.) The entire 

interview of Escamilla was recorded; there were no additional conversations before or after 

recording. (Id. at 96:20–25.) Sergeant Cordero prepared a report of her interview, which 

she identified at the Hearing (Ex. B). She testified that she prepared the report, which was 

a synopsis of her interview with Escamilla. The report was prepared in the ordinary course 

of business, and it is compatible with her recollection of the interview. (Id. at 92:24–94:4.) 

Sergeant Cordero speaks Spanish fluently so she conducted Escamilla’s interview in 

Spanish. (Id. at 95:3–10.) She got the impression based on Escamilla’s demeanor and 

statement that she did not want to get involved. (Id. at 95:15–20.) 

Sergeant Cordero could not recall if she was provided with the name of a suspect 

during the initial briefing she received upon arriving at the crime scene. (Id. at 98:1–15.) 

She denied that she had already made up her mind that Roger Espinoza was the shooter 

when she interviewed Escamilla. (Id. at 102:8–11.) Before interviewing Escamilla, 

Sergeant Cordero interviewed Escamilla’s daughter, Sandy Espinoza-Barajas. (Id. at 99:5–

14.) When asked on cross-examination why she mentioned in her interview that a lot of 

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people had identified the Petitioner as the shooter, Sergeant Cordero explained that she 

probably received that information from other officers during a briefing at the police 

station. (Id. at 99:15–100:4.) Sergeant Cordero explained that there are multiple briefings 

throughout an investigation because they have different people interviewing different 

individuals, so as they get information they share it with the other detectives. (Id. at 100:5–

9.). Sergeant Cordero testified that during the interview, at first Escamilla denied seeing 

anyone shoot the gun, and then later she said she saw another male shoot the gun. (Id. at 

100:22–101:5.) Escamilla told Sergeant Cordero in her interview that she did not see the 

Petitioner with a gun that night, but she did see him involved in a “scuffle” with a large 

number of “boys.” (Id. at 101:10–20.) Upon further questioning by the Court and 

rehabilitation by Respondent’s counsel, Sergeant Cordero reviewed the transcript of the 

interview to refresh her recollection with respect to what Escamilla said she saw on the 

night of the shooting. (Id. at 106:3–107:110.) After reviewing the transcript, Sergeant 

Cordero said that “the males were the ones fighting and someone, obviously, in the group 

was the one that shot the gun.” (Id. at 110:10–11.) Sergeant Cordero clarified that when 

she said Escamilla claimed an “unknown male” shot the gun, that was based on the totality 

of the interview and that Escamilla said she did not witness a gun or see who shot the gun.

(Id. at 110:19–111:2.) 

Sergeant Cordero was further questioned on cross-examination whether Escamilla 

seemed as if she was being truthful during the interview. (Id. at 104:13–14.) Sergeant 

Cordero said that at first, it seemed like Escamilla was not being truthful because she denied 

ever seeing anything. However, she later “admitted” that she did witness a fight in which 

the Petitioner was involved, so Sergeant Cordero believed that Escamilla was being honest 

toward the end of the interview. (Id. at 104:15–105:5.) 

Sergeant Cordero did not ask Escamilla for a description of the shooter because she 

said she could not identify the shooter. (Id. at 112:6–10, 113:17–18 [“If she told me she 

didn’t see the shooter and couldn’t identify him, I would not ask her what she observed.”].) 

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Escamilla did not provide a description of what the males in the group were wearing and 

Sergeant Cordero did not ask for one. (Id. at 114:2–12.) 

F. Jan Ronis

Jan Ronis served as Petitioner’s trial counsel in the underlying state court criminal 

case. In addition to testifying at the Hearing, Ronis was also deposed November 13, 2017. 

(Ex. I.) The parties stipulated to the admission of the deposition transcript into evidence. 

(ECF No. 116 at 7.) 

a. Deposition Testimony

At his deposition, Ronis testified he is a criminal defense attorney with 45 years of 

experience who has tried over 350 jury trials. (Ex. I at 5:13–6:3.) He was retained to 

represent Petitioner and did so through judgment but not on appeal. (Id. at 7:24–8:14.) 

The trial took place in 2005 and Petitioner was arrested in 2004. (Id. at 7:15–21.) 

Ronis recalled his theory of defense in the case was self-defense, as that is what the 

evidence pointed to. He recalled Petitioner was in a fight, was beaten up badly, felt his life 

was threatened and used a weapon to defend himself. (Id. at 8:15–9:3.) Ronis was certain 

that at the time he made his decision to proceed on a self-defense theory and “conducted 

an investigation”, but could not remember which investigator he used. (Id. at 9:9–22.)

Specifically, he could not remember whether he used Juan Lopez as his investigator in this 

case although Lopez worked on his cases during that time period. (Id. at 10:5–18) 

Ronis did not have any recollection of being contacted by Miguel Rubio during his 

representation of Petitioner. (Id. at 10:22–25.) Upon reviewing Rubio’s declaration (Ex. 

28), Ronis stated that he had “absolutely no recollection of ever seeing a message or getting 

a call from that individual.” (Id. at 11:6–14.) He does not have any independent 

recollection of Lopez contacting him about Rubio. (Id. at 18–21.) 

Ronis also did not recall the name Silvia Escamilla or having been contacted by her 

during his representation of Petitioner. (Id. at 11:25–12:4.) Upon reviewing Escamilla’s 

declaration (Ex. K) at the deposition, Ronis testified that he had no independent 

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recollection of any communication with her. (Id. at 12:6–18.) He further stated if someone 

called him and asserted the claims made in Escamilla’s declaration, he “can’t believe that 

[he] wouldn’t remember that.” (Id. at 12:18–13:1.) He also did not recall Lopez 

communicating with him about Escamilla. (Id. at 13:2–4.) If either Lopez or Escamilla 

had said in the police reports they did not see anything regarding the shooting and then 

called his office and gave a different description, Ronis testified that he would have 

interviewed them. (Id. at 54:11–21.) 

Ronis testified that he received and reviewed discovery from the prosecution in the 

case, including police reports. (Id. at 13:8–14.) He did not recall seeing reports from either 

Rubio or Escamilla or have an independent recollection of reading the reports. (Id. at 

13:15–18, 14:13–15:17.) However, upon reviewing police reports with statements from 

Rubio and Escamilla, they refreshed his memory and seemed to be consistent with what 

“everybody, you know, said that they witnessed.” (Id.) 

During his representation of Petitioner, Ronis was not aware of any facts that would 

lead him to believe that there was another shooter at the scene of the incident. (Id. at 15:18–

22, 28:20–23.) Ronis testified that if he had information that there were witnesses who 

were prepared to testify that someone other than Petitioner committed the crime, he would 

have pursued it. (Id. at 17:25, 18:1–5, 28:1–15.) He would not have proffered a selfdefense theory without investigating all other possible defenses. (Id. at 17:15–24.) If there 

were witnesses who indicated a willingness to testify that someone else had committed the 

offense but they had made prior inconsistent statements to the police, Ronis testified he 

would still have interviewed those witnesses. (Id. at 19:1–18.) He explained, however: 

“[T]he witnesses have to fit the facts. So if the witnesses don’t fit the facts, you undermine 

your credibility by putting them on, if you have other facts to go with that are credible, the 

jury might believe.” (Id. at 19:14–18.) His belief that there was only one shooter was 

based on the investigative reports, his conversations with the Petitioner, the defense they 

chose and the absence of any other credible evidence pointing to another shooter. (Id. at 

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28:23–29:6, 42:3–17.) 

Ronis testified that it was decided that self-defense would be Petitioner’s defense. 

(Id. at 27:10–12.) He did not recall that he also argued an accidental defense at trial, but 

said that it sounds like the two defenses could have gone hand-in-hand in this case based 

on the reports of shots being fired into the air and into the ground. (Id. at 27:13–24) 

Ronis did not recall the police reports indicating that any witnesses said the shooter 

was of Asian or Chinese descent, and he would be surprised to hear that they did. (Id. at 

30:25–31:7.) He further testified that if there were reports to that effect and they appeared 

to be credible and stronger than the other defense that was offered, he would have pursued 

it. (Id. at 31:14–32:6.) Ronis was asked if he remembered the evidence indicating that the 

shell casings were spread around in different areas of the street. (Id. at 33:23–34:1.) He 

did not recall (id. at 34:2), but he recalled there were reports saying that the person with 

the gun, who was identified as Petitioner, was at one point chasing the person who turned 

around and then got shot in the eye. (Id. at 35:2–14.) He later testified that he recalled 

“ample reports and witness statements that [Petitioner] . . . chased the victim and 

continued to fire.” (Id. at 46:10–13.) 

When asked whether he would have chosen a different defense if he had information 

indicating that the description of the shooter was different than that of Petitioner, Ronis

said he would have if it was “really credible evidence that outweighed the other defense,” 

but that his recollection is that the credible defense is the one that was asserted. (Id. at 

37:1–9.) Ronis conceded no witness testified that they saw the Petitioner actually shoot 

the victim, but that he recalled witness statements that Petitioner was seen firing a gun into 

the air. (Id. at 47:11–48:4.) Given that gang members were involved, Ronis explained 

“there was a lot of the rule of the streets . . . applying to what people were willing to come 

to court and testify to . . . .” (Id. at 26:21–27:9, 46:14–25, 56:4–12.) 

When asked to justify his decision to utilize a self-defense theory rather than a 

second shooter theory, Ronis explained that “I think the evidence was that he – I think the 

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credible evidence was that he – there was a gun in his hand. People described the gun in 

his hand. People described him, you know, taking shots, as I recall. And you know, it 

seemed to me that was a far more credible defense than somebody else did it.” (Id. at 

48:20–49:7.) 

Ronis did not recall the circumstances surrounding the Petitioner’s decision to take 

the stand and testify but he knows there were discussions about it. (Id. at 39:15–21.) On 

redirect, Ronis testified that he had a great interest in the outcome of this case and was 

highly motivated to do the best job that he was capable of because he liked Petitioner and 

loathed the prosecutor. (Id. at 57:8–17.) 

When describing his practice when he gets on a case, Ronis explained that police 

reports are “always the thing you are most anxious to get, because they really tell you what 

– it tells you more a complete picture than what you just get from interviewing a 

defendant.” (Id. at 26:6–10.) Also, Ronis testified it is his practice to pull the relevant jury 

instructions when he gets a case as part of his preparation for the preliminary examination 

or discussions with a client. (Id. at 58:18–22.) He would have researched relevant legal 

issues during his representation of Petitioner. (Id. at 58:10–13.) 

Ronis searched his office pursuant to a subpoena and does not have any records of 

this case. His practice is to send the entire box of case materials to the appellate attorney 

once he is contacted by him or her. (Id. at 20:1–10.) He no longer has hard copy records 

stored with Iron Mountain. (Id. at 22:11–12.) He was also unable to find any electronic 

records relating to the case. (Id. at 21:5–11.) However, he remembers interviewing 

witnesses, although not specifically which ones, and there being investigative reports of 

witness statements. (Id. at 37:20–38:24.) 

b. Hearing Testimony

Ronis testified at the Evidentiary Hearing on February 28, 2018 (EHRT, vol. 1 at 

120–48) and March 9, 2018 (EHRT, vol. 3 at 3–47.) 

During his first day of testimony, Ronis stated that since the time of his deposition, 

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he had not located his case file. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 120:21–25). He also had no further 

recollection about having had a conversation with Escamilla, and stated, “I find it 

incredible that I would not have remembered a conversation of the nature that’s alleged.” 

(Id. at 121:3–12.) Ronis testified that his practice was and currently is to prepare his client 

to testify and thus he is sure he knew the substance of what Petitioner was going to testify 

to at trial. (Id. at 121:16–122:4.) Ronis recalled having many conversations with Petitioner 

and Petitioner did not mention a second shooter. (Id. at 122:10–14.) If the Petitioner had 

told him about a second shooter, that likely would have entered his decision-making 

process as to the choice of defense. (Id. at 122:15–18.) Petitioner told Ronis that he fired 

a gun. (Id. at 122:19–20.) He did not tell Ronis that someone took the gun away from him, 

nor did he tell him that there was someone else with a different gun. (Id. at 122:21–123:1.)

Ronis testified on cross-examination that in the course of his investigation he 

reviewed all of the police reports, and his investigator interviewed the witnesses that were 

at the scene. (Id. at 126:20–127:1.) He did not recall coming across witness statements 

regarding the suspect wearing a cowboy hat. (Id. at 126:4–14.) He was asked to review 

police reports summarizing witness statements (Exs. 1–3) from Daniel Alatorre, Olivia 

Addison, and Antoinette Gonzalez that described the suspect as wearing a cowboy hat. He 

stated that these were the kinds of witnesses he would have interviewed or would have 

wanted to interview. (Id. at 127:4–129:10.) He could not recall if he interviewed Addison 

or Gonzalez. (Id.) Ronis had no recollection of the subject of a cowboy hat coming up at

trial. (Id. at 129:11–14.) Ronis was asked to review a portion of the trial transcript in 

which the prosecutor was questioning Petitioner and asked if Petitioner was wearing a 

cowboy hat. (Ex. 23 at 3.) Ronis admitted that the transcript made it appear as though the 

prosecutor thought Petitioner was the shooter with a cowboy hat on. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 

133:10–17, 134:1–10.) 

When asked if he had interviewed the above witnesses and they described someone 

with a cowboy hat, would he still have gone with his chosen defense, Ronis said yes. (Id.

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at 130:1–6.) Ronis explained that it was his belief and understanding that there were no 

other shooters, because “it would have occurred among other ways in conversations with 

my client.” (Id. at 130:7–9.) Ronis further stated “there’s no question in my mind that I 

read every report and I was familiar with it at the time.” (Id. at 131:20–23), and that 

because the Petitioner told him that he “was the guy with the gun” he assumed that to be 

the truth. (Id. at 131:10–14.) Ronis said that although he did nott have any independent 

recollection of much of the case at the time of the Hearing, he did recall that any witness 

he felt was important to interview would have been interviewed. (Id. at 132:5–8). 

Ronis also reviewed a portion of a transcript (Ex. 14 at 8) from a 2007 post-trial 

status conference. (Id. at 141:16–21.) Petitioner requested on the record that new counsel

be appointed for him and accused Ronis of not presenting all the evidence and testimony 

available to him at trial. (Ex. 14 at 8 [“Your Honor, I didn’t shoot this man and there is 

proof that there is another shooter.”].) Ronis did not recall if he asked Petitioner about his 

comments to the judge as they “could have been at cross-purposes with one another.” 

Ronis stated that “If that’s what he told the judge, it’s different than what I knew at the 

time of trial and what I had known before the trial, and I don’t want to get, you know, into 

an argument with my client at that point.” (EHRT, vol. 1 at 141:19–142:5.) Ronis testified

that his memory was refreshed that he had read all of the reports and even though some 

witnesses testified to someone wearing a cowboy hat, he still felt that he had chosen the 

most credible defense. (Id. at 144:9–16.)

During his second day of testimony, Ronis stated that if thought that the person with 

the cowboy hat was the shooter, he would interview witnesses who had identified a shooter 

with a cowboy hat. (EHRT vol 3. at 4:13–20.) He had no independent recollection if he 

had done so in this case. (Id. at 5:1–8.) Generally, Ronis would have an investigator 

conduct the interviews. (Id. at 5:11.) Ronis did not recall if he personally interviewed 

anyone in this case, but that did not exclude the likelihood that reports were presented to 

him by investigators that he read at the time. (Id. at 9:18–20, 11:24–25, 12:1–4.) 

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Ronis testified he always reads police reports in preparation for trial and did so in 

preparation for this trial. (Id. at 6:6–8; 7:2–4.) When pressed further about witness Daniel 

Alatorre, Ronis said if someone asked him whether he would have interviewed him in a 

vacuum, he would say yes; however, depending on who he knew the shooter to be at that 

time he saw the report, it may not have caused him to interview anyone else because he

had another defense. (Id. at 7:5–8:2.) He does not have an independent recollection of 

whether he interviewed anyone for this case. (Id. at 8:3–14.) He recalls conversations with 

Petitioner’s ex-wife and other family members but otherwise does not recall. (Id. at 11:15–

22.) 

Ronis does not remember who his investigator was in this case, however he assumes 

it was Juan Lopez given that he was subpoenaed as a witness for the Hearing. (Id. at 12:16–

25.) Typically, an investigator would interview witnesses at Ronis’ direction and then 

Ronis would be provided a report. (Id. at 13:1–16.) “If there was a need for a report, 

[Ronis] would have expected one.” (Id. at 14:4–7.) Ronis testified that if he thought 

somebody other than his client was the shooter, he would have directed his investigator to 

interview a witness who described the shooter as wearing a cowboy hat, but that “wasn’t 

the premise of [his] defense based upon [his] conversations with Mr. Espinoza.” (Id. at 

15:10–22.) 

Petitioner told Ronis that Petitioner was the lone shooter:

Q: Well let’s talk about that. How did you come to a conclusion that [Petitioner] 

was, in fact the lone shooter?

A: Because that’s what he told me. 

Q: [Petitioner], in fact, told you that he’s the guy who shot [the victim]?

A: Yes

Q: He told you that?

A: Yes.

(Id. at 15:23–16:5.) Ronis saw his client several times in jail. (Id. at 16:18–25.) They 

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discussed the events and felt Petitioner had a good self-defense argument. Ronis explained

an attorney cannot “proffer a self-defense argument unless the person [they] are 

representing was truly the mechanism of injury and [Petitioner] told [him] the 

circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the weapon and the shooting.” (Id. at 17:1–5.) 

Ronis did not recall what Petitioner testified to at trial but did recall what his client told 

him. (Id. at 17:7–9.) He “certainly” did not remember Petitioner telling him there was 

another shooter. (Id. at 17:17–18.) Ronis could not recall that he had any reason to believe 

Petitioner was uncertain about the fact that he was the shooter, nor any reason to believe 

he was lying. (Id. at 27:5–15.) Ronis further testified that forensic evidence involved a 

trail of shell casings that were all from the same weapon, which was consistent with 

Petitioner’s statement to him. (Id. at 18:14–20.)

Ronis had no independent recollection of anyone calling his office and leaving 

messages for him saying there was another shooter. (Id. at 24:8–11.) He stated, “I can just 

tell you what my practice as a lawyer would have been had somebody come to me at the 

time of these events and made a statement such as that, I certainly would have moved on it 

and it wouldn’t have been something that would have been overlooked.” (Id. at 19:25–

20:4.) 

When asked if someone always answers the phone at his office or if there is only 

voicemail, Ronis said he has always had staff in his office answering telephones. Messages 

are written down on a carbon copy form and placed in the attorney’s file. (Id. at 24:12–

20.) Ronis was confident that no one ever left a message about another shooter, “because 

it was such a profound issue that we’re talking about.” (Id. at 24:22–25:1) 

Ronis said it is not uncommon for defendants after a conviction to change their view 

of the case, but that does not change his belief and opinion that what Petitioner told him at 

the time fit with all the facts that he knew, was a truthful statement and it was probably the 

best defense. (Id. at 35:19–25.) As Ronis explained, “I felt it was a very good self-defense 

case and based upon what [Petitioner] told me about the assault on him and the shooting 

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that that was the most viable, credible defense to pursue and that’s what was pursued.” (Id. 

at 36:22–37:2.) When asked about how Petitioner testified to there being no chase, despite 

the forensic evidence indicating there was a chase, Ronis stated “I can’t control exactly 

what he testified to. I thought that the facts that [Petitioner] testified to fit the facts as I

knew them and that’s my belief here today.” (Id. at 38:2–20.) Ronis does not believe there 

was any credible evidence or reports of another shooter based upon the reports he had at 

the time he represented Petitioner up to and including the trial. (Id. at 38:21–39:2 [“I don’t 

think there were any reports that would credibly indicate another shooter involved.”) 

Ronis was asked hypothetically if a police report indicated that the shooter was 

wearing a white cowboy hat or another report indicated that the shooter was of Asian 

descent, would that cause him to believe there was another shooter. He answered that if 

that was all he knew then he could have had a reasonable belief that there was another 

shooter, however that was not all he knew at the time. (Id. at 39:3–11.) Ronis had no 

reason to disbelieve that Petitioner was the shooter and that there were no other shooters 

based on everything he knew about the case and the fact that Petitioner told him he was the 

shooter. (Id. at 42:17–24.) 

Ronis does not have any independent recollection of interviewing Escamilla. (Id. at 

43: 9–14.) When asked whether he would have put on the same defense of self-defense if 

Escamilla had called him and told him there was another shooter, Ronis said that it would 

have to fit the facts and it would not be advisable to put on perjured, fabricated, or 

testimony that is inconsistent with all other reports and facts of the case. (Id. at 43:21–

44:14.) Ronis said if Escamilla had called his office and left a message that there was 

another shooter, he “absolutely” would have interviewed her. (Id. at 44:18–20.) With 

respect to any other witnesses who may have reported another shooter, he said it “possibly” 

would have been a good idea to interview them, but that it “just didn’t fit the facts as [he] 

understood them.” (Id. at 44:21–45:14.) When questioned about whether he would have 

interviewed other witnesses who gave a description of a shooter that did not match 

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Petitioner, Ronis said, “It’s not uncommon for people to misidentify and to attribute 

clothing and facial hair and things that other witnesses contradict. So I can’t reconcile 

inconsistent statements in-between witnesses but based upon everything I knew about the 

case I proffered the evidence, I proffered the defense which I thought was credible.” (Id. at 

45:15–21.) 

G. Juan Lopez

Juan Antonio Lopez routinely served as Ronis’ investigator during the time period 

of Petitioner’s trial. In addition to testifying at the Hearing, Lopez was also deposed on 

November 13, 2017. (Ex. J.) Counsel stipulated to the admission of the deposition 

transcript into evidence.14 (ECF No. 116 at 7.) 

a. Hearing Testimony

Lopez testified at the Hearing on February 28, 2018. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 149–73.) 

Lopez was a licensed private investigator. When interviewing a witness, he would show 

his investigator’s license and I.D., as well as provide the witness with a business card. (Id.

at 151:2–152:5.) Lopez has no records pertaining to Petitioner’s case. (Id. at 150:5–11.) 

He has no recollection of the case at all. He does not recall going to the home of Sylvia 

Escamilla. (Id. at 150:12–24.) 

On cross-examination, Lopez reiterated that while possible he spoke to Escamilla 

and Rubio, he had “no memory of it at all whatsoever.” (Id. at 152:13–20.) He also 

reiterated that he had no memory of Petitioner’s case. (Id. at 152:21–25.) Typically, he 

would interview a witness by himself and does not recall going to interview someone with 

Ronis. (Id. at 153:17–25.) Lopez testified as to his general practice of taking notes from 

witness interviews, and if the witness was going to be called at trial or was an important 

witness, he would write a report. (Id. at 156:2–23, 157:3–13, 158:14–23, 159:21–160:7.) 

He would interview a witness, takes notes, and then give the notes or read the notes to 

 

14 Exhibit J was entered into evidence at the Hearing on March 2, 2018. (EHRT, vol. 2 at 

24:4–7.)

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Ronis. Ronis would then decide which if any of those witnesses were going to be used at 

trial because there is a legal obligation to provide a report to the prosecution. (Id. at 

159:21–160:8.) Lopez stated that in general, his obligations as an investigator on a case 

are to take down a statement, forward that statement to the attorney and the attorney has 

the primary responsibility to determine what to do with that information. (Id. at 162:4–

10.) 

If a witness gave him a description of a shooter that was different than the defendant, 

he would “obviously write a report” and follow up on it. (Id. at 163:13–25.) However, he 

would not follow up on his own and try to develop the case without instructions from the 

attorney, even if a witness contacted him after their initial statement. (Id. at 166:15–23.) 

On redirect examination, Lopez was asked what he would do if someone he 

interviewed and given his business card to later called and told him that “they’ve got the 

wrong guy, there’s another shooter.” He said he would talk to them, and take notes, and 

then communicate that to the attorney. Lopez said that information would never have 

stopped with him. (Id. at 167:19–168:7.) When asked whether Lopez recalled ever 

interviewing a witness along with Ronis, as Escamilla’s declaration indicates, he said it is 

possible that a witness came to the office but he did not recall ever going out in the field 

with Ronis to interview anyone. (Id. at 172:10–19.) 

b. Deposition Testimony

During his deposition, Lopez testified he has been employed as a private investigator 

for 40 years and worked with Ronis in that capacity in 2005. (Ex. J at 5:16–20.) Lopez 

had no independent recollection of Petitioner’s case, but said it was possible he worked on 

it. (Id. at 5:21–6:5.) Typically, while working on a case with Ronis he would review all of 

the discovery, which included police reports and witness interviews, and discuss with 

Ronis who he should locate or interview. (Id. at 6:6–24.) After reviewing Miguel Rubio’s 

declaration, Lopez stated he could not place the case and that “it doesn’t really come back 

to me.” (Id. at 7:1–14.) He did not recall Rubio or ever speaking to him. (Id. at 7:15–17.) 

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Lopez also reviewed Silvia Escamilla’s declaration at his deposition and could not recall 

the case or ever talking to Escamilla. (Id. at 8:1–11.) 

Lopez stated that if he were to work on a case with Ronis in which the client was 

accused of shooting someone and a witness were to contact Lopez claiming to have seen 

someone else commit the shooting, he would have relayed the information to Ronis and 

prepared a written report if Ronis requested. (Id. at 8:15–24.) Lopez testified that he would 

not have ignored that information in the hypothetical scenario. (Id. at 8:25–9:1.) Lopez

testified that typically, when he prepares investigative reports for an attorney, he turns them 

over to the attorney and he would “probably” keep it in his file, although he “looked all 

over” and could not find any records from this case. (Id. at 9:2–11.) Lopez testified that 

at the time Petitioner’s case was pending, he kept files in a filing cabinet; his practice is to 

keep files for five years and then purge them. (Id. at 9:12–21.) If he wrote reports in a 

case, they would have been turned over to the attorney during the case. (Id. at 10:6–9.) 

Lopez used a computer in 2005, but has since obtained new computers and did not keep 

the old one. Whatever information he had in a case, he would turn it over to the attorney 

and he does not really keep anything on the computer. (Id. at 10:10–11:10) 

On cross-examination, Lopez confirmed he could not recall anything about the case. 

(Id. at 11:20–23.) He said some of it looked familiar, but that he had many cases involving 

shootings in National City. (Id. at 11:23–12:1.) Lopez further stated that in certain cases 

Ronis would hire him to perform a specific task rather than being assigned throughout the 

entirety of the case. (Id. at 14:9–13.) Lopez worked with Ronis on mainly federal cases, 

and if he needed something on a state case, he would call Lopez; they were collaborative. 

(Id. at 17:1–22.) Lopez was asked if he has ever been contacted by a witness in a case in 

which he was not involved. He said it has happened, but that he always refers them to

Ronis because he does not talk to his client unless Ronis wants him to. (Id. at 17:25–

18:22.) Lopez testified that Ronis worked with many other investigators, but in 2005, he 

was Ronis’s “go-to guy.” (Id. at 18:23–19:8.) 

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Lopez did not recall speaking to Sandy Espinoza, Antoinette Gonzales, Daniel 

Alatorre, Jessie Addison, Olivia Addison, Lupe Barrera, Jose Sanchez, or Petitioner. (Id.

at 21:2–20.) Lopez also did not recall an incident at KP Hall. (Id. at 21:23–24.) 

H. Sandy Barajas15

Sandy Barajas is Petitioner’s ex-wife with whom he has two children. (EHRT, vol. 

1 at 174:12–20.) She notarized Escamilla’s sworn declaration submitted with the Petition. 

(See Ex. K.) 

a. Hearing Testimony

Sandy Barajas testified at the Hearing on February 28, 2018. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 173–

93.) She is the Petitioner’s ex-wife and mother of his two children. (Id. at 174:12–20.) 

The two were married at the time of the shooting at KP Hall. (Id.) She is the daughter of 

Escamilla and helped prepare her mother’s declaration. (Id. at 174:21–77:12.) 

Barajas testified that Escamilla’s dictated what had happened and then Barajas wrote 

down that information on a piece of paper. Barajas then wrote her notes on a computer. 

She then translated her notes into English and put it into Escamilla’s declaration. Escamilla 

dictated the statement on May 5, 2009. Barajas testified that she and Escamilla were having 

a conversation about the situation, and when Barajas mentioned that Petitioner was “going 

to fight his case”, her mother wanted to “make sure that her information, what she knew, 

was in writing if it was ever needed by anybody.” (Id. at 176:22–177:12.) Barajas is not 

a certified translator but did the best she could with English being her second language. 

(Id. at 177:17–24.) 

Barajas stated she did not ask her mother to provide the declaration. Escamilla 

wanted to preserve what she remembered happening if it was ever needed in the future. 

(Id. at 178:4–24.) Barajas further elaborated about the details of her conversation with 

 

15 Sandy Barajas is Petitioner’s ex-wife with whom he has two children. While they were 

married, her name was Sandy Barajas-Espinoza. In various documents, she is referred to 

as Sandi as well. 

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Escamilla. Barajas informed her mother that Petitioner was going to file an appeal and the 

two discussed how they were never contacted. (Id. at 179:10–13.) Barajas clarified that 

Escamilla never wrote a statement in Spanish that Barajas translated. It was given orally. 

(Id. at 180:5–21.) When asked if it was a verbatim translation, Barajas responded that it 

was. (Id. at 180:22–24.) 

Barajas is a certified notary public and believes she got her license in 2009, the same 

year Escamilla’s declaration was notarized. (Id. at 182:7–19.) It was her idea to notarize 

Escamilla’s declaration. (Id. at 182:20–24.) She stated Escamilla’s declaration accurately 

reflects her recollection of what her mother told her. (Id. at 183:7–25.) She testified that 

there were no mistakes or errors that she saw. (Id. at 183:21–25.) 

Upon redirect examination by Petitioner’s counsel, Barajas stated she did not tape 

record her mother’s statement. (Id. at 184:6–10.) She testified that due to English being 

her second language it is possible that she mistranslated certain words. (Id. at 184:11–23, 

186:9–13.) She stressed repeatedly that English is her second language and while she has 

improved, her “English is not the best.” (Id. at 184:13–16; 186:9–13.) She stated her 

“knowledge of English back then is not what it is today . . . .”16 (Id. at 192:5–7.) 

Petitioner’s counsel directed her to the portion of Escamilla’s declaration which 

refers to someone grabbing “the gun” from Petitioner, and asked her if that could possibly 

mean “a gun.” (Id. at 185:11–18, 190:15–22.) She stated it “could be one or the other” 

and that “in our language, in Spanish, certain words can be translated into English, but it 

doesn’t have the same significance or value . . . .” (Id. at 190:23–191:14.) The Court 

clarified by stating that “a gun” in Spanish is “un pistola” and “the gun” is “la” and that 

Barajas just testified to there being a mistake in Escamilla’s declaration. Barajas then 

 

16 At the Hearing, Barajas spoke English fluently. Given the Court’s impression, it 

requested the recording of her interview with Sergeant Cordero following the shooting to 

assess her ability to communicate in English at the time of the drafting of Escamilla’s 

declaration. (See Ex. G.) 

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clarified, “No, I’m not, I’m not saying that it’s a mistake . . . .” (Id. at 191:15–192:7.) 

When asked if she recalls making an error, she stated “to the best of my ability at that time, 

this is what I understand to be what she had given me.” (Id. at 192:8–12.) 

The Court asked Barajas if she translated the declaration back to her mother before 

she signed it. (Id. at 186:29–21.) After much back and forth, she said she did. (Id. at 

186:22–188:5.) She confirmed that she translated the statement “I saw someone else grab 

the gun and tried to shoot Rogelio as he ran across the street” to Escamilla, and Escamilla 

concurred that was the way it happened. (Id. at 188:8–14.) 

Barajas testified that the first time Escamilla told her that someone else grabbed the 

gun from Rogelio and shot at him was while preparing Escamilla’s 2009 declaration. (Id.

at 188:15–25.) She testified she was there when Escamilla tried to call Ronis, but she was 

unable to speak with someone and left a message. When asked why Barajas tried to speak 

with Ronis, Barajas said she “wanted to know what was going on.” (Id. at 189:1–22.) She 

stated that she was interviewed and said she saw Petitioner with a gun:

The Court: But in terms of being a witness, you were interviewed and you said you 

saw [Petitioner] with a gun.

The Witness: Correct.

(Id. at 189:23–25.)17 She did not remember her own declaration in which she listed the 

names of witnesses, but she remembers giving names of witnesses to Ronis. (Id. at 190:2–

11.) 

b. Declaration Submitted with Petition

Petitioner’s ex-wife Sandy Barajas submitted a sworn declaration with the Petition. 

(ECF No 1-7 at 7–8.) The declaration is signed by Barajas using her former married name, 

 

17 This is not accurate. Barajas maintained in her interview with Sergeant Cordero that she 

did not see Petitioner at the party. (Ex. H at 28.) Further, she stated she “never saw anybody 

with a gun”, “never saw any fights”, and “didn’t see anything going on.” (Id. at 21.) Thus, 

her admission at the Hearing, that she told authorities she saw Petitioner with a gun, brings 

into question the veracity of her previous statements to authorities. 

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dated May 25, 2009, and was notarized by M.G. Cordova. (Id.) 

I Sandy B Espinoza, want to declare under penalty of perjury that on March 

10, 2001 I attended the baptismal celebration in K-P Hall, in the city of 

National City, California. I contacted the Law Firm of Jan Ronis & Ronis on 

numerous times to ask Rogelio Espinoza’s legal counsel (Jan Ronis) why 

weren’t any of Rogelio Espinoza’s witnesses being called to testify. He 

explained to me that they were going too and also advised me that I would be 

called to testify therefore, I could not be present or attend any of the trial 

hearings. I was never called or contacted to be subpoena to the trial nor any 

of the witnesses on his behalf. To this day, I have no knowledge of why any 

of use were never contacted. I provided the Jan Ronis Law Firm with several 

witnesses that were there on that day and never contacted for their statements. 

I will provide a list of witnesses names at the end of this statement. I believe 

Rogelio Espinoza, was unjustly sentenced and deprived from his freedom 

without given the opportunity to present the evidence on his behalf. This

statement might not have any weight of any kind but I feel it’s my duty as a 

citizen to present my statement to inform the courts of the injustice the Judicial 

System and how these negligent acts deprive the citizens of this country their 

freedom unjustly. Name of witnesses provided to the firm.

Sandy Espinoza 5/25/09

Silvia Escamilla

Miguel Rubio

Julieta Sillas

Rosafe Cuevas

Adolfo Cuevas

Leticia Hernandez

Antonio Hernández 

c. Prior Police Reports and Interviews

Barajas was interviewed by Sergeant Cordero on March 10, 2001, the night of the 

shooting at KP Hall. There is a Detective Follow-Up Report written by Sergeant Cordero 

summarizing the interview (Ex. F), as well as a two-part recording of the interview (Ex. G) 

and accompanying transcripts (Ex. H). 

1. Detective Follow Up Report:

Sergeant Cordero drafted the Detective Follow Up Report dated March 14, 2001 

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summarizing her interview of Barajas:

On March 10th 2001, at about 2010 hours, I interviewed Sandi Espinosa

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Barajas. Espinoza-Barajas is the wife of the suspect, Rogelio Quevas 

Espinosa. Detective D. Grande was present during the interview. The 

interview with Sandi Espinoza Barajas was captured on audiotape. The 

audiotape containing Sandi Espinoza Barajas’ statement was later impounded 

at NCPD. Following is a synopsis of Espinoza Barajas’ statement. 

Sandi Espinosa-Barajas lives at 3682 Logan Ave., San Diego with her 

husband Rogelio “Roger” Quevas Espinosa, their two children, Rogelio 

Espinosa Jr. (11 years old) and Adolfo Espinosa (6 years old.) Roger’s 

mother, uncle, and two nephews (Jorge Marin, 8 or 9 years old and 

Eduardo Morales 3 years old) also live at 3682 Logan Ave., San Diego.

On March 10th, 2001, Sandi Espinosa Barajas’ sister, Rosella Rubio 

Barajas baptized her son Angel Miguel Rubio. The Baptism took place 

at 1100 hours and the party was to begin at 1600 hours. Sandi Espinosa 

Barajas remained at the party for about thirty minutes and then went 

home. Sandi Espinosa Barajas arrived home at about 1700 hours. 

Roger Quevas Espinosa was not home at the time. 

At about 1900 hours, Sandi Espinosa Barajas returned to the party with 

her children, two nephews, uncle, mother-in-law, and the mother-inlaw’s brother. Sandi Espinosa Barajas had been at the party for about 

half an hour before hearing several people screaming, “Get in there, get 

in there, somebody is shooting, somebody is shooting.” Sandi Espinosa 

Barajas began to panic and started looking for her children. Sandi 

Espinoza Barajas gather her children, mother-in-law and uncle, got in 

her car and was driving off when she was stopped at gun point by the 

police. 

Sandi Espinosa Barajas did not witness the fight before the shooting, 

nor did she witness the shooting. Sandi Espinosa Barajas denied seeing 

Roger Quevas Espinosa at the party nor did she know his whereabouts. 

Sandi Espinosa Barajas last saw Roger Quevas Espinosa at about 1300 

hours when he and the kids left to get their haircuts. 

(Ex. F.) 

 

18 Espinoza and Cuevas are intermittently misspelled throughout the Report.

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2. March 10, 2001 Interview

Sergeant Cordero’s interview with Barajas was conducted in English. (Exs. G

[recording], H [transcript].) During the interview, Barajas stated that she did not go to the 

baptism with Petitioner and had not seen him since 1:00 PM earlier that day. (Ex. H at 16–

17.) She stressed she did not see Petitioner at the party. (Id. at 28.) She “didn’t see 

anything happen.” She was “inside, and [she did not] know exactly what happened . . . .” 

She “never saw anybody with a gun”, “never saw any fights”, and “didn’t see anything 

going on.” (Id. at 21.) She denied knowing anyone named Adam Rivera. (Id. at 29.) 

I. Barbara Ann Smith

Petitioner’s state court appellate attorney, Barbara Ann Smith testified on the final 

day of the Hearing, September 14, 2018, via videoconference. (EHRT, vol. 4 at 7–51.) At 

the outset of her testimony, the Court held that Petitioner had expressly waived any 

attorney-client privilege that may exist as to the unredacted portions of Smith’s letters to 

Petitioner during the course of her representation of him (Ex. P). (EHRT, vol. 4 at 6:9–

18.) 

Smith is an appellate attorney who does criminal appeals in the courts of appeal in 

California. (Id. at 7:19–25.) She represented Petitioner during his direct appeal in 2008. 

(Id. at 8:4–10.) During her representation of Petitioner, she had the opportunity to review 

Ronis’ file, which she received from Ronis in 2007. (Id. at 8:11–25.) Smith testified she 

reviewed every page in Ronis’ file and considered matters that she discussed with 

Petitioner. (Id. at 9:1–5.) After reviewing the file for ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, Smith returned the file to Ronis. (Id. at 9:6–11.) She did not retain a copy of the 

file. (Id. at 9:12–14.) 

Smith recalled discussing with Petitioner and Barajas their statements that they gave

the names of exonerating witnesses to Ronis and Petitioner’s initial attorney, David 

Bartick. Smith talked with Bartick and “what he had said, and what matched with what I 

had seen in the file, that there was this person, Sylvia Escamilla who was said to be an 

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exonerating witness but didn’t exonerate him from my review of the police and 

investigation reports.” (Id. at 9:17–10:7.) There were no documents in the file indicating 

that Escamilla saw someone other than Petitioner fire the weapon that Smith can recall. 

(Id. at 10:8–15.) She went over “dozens of witness statements” in the file, and there 

“wasn’t anyone saying that someone else did the shooting.” (Id. at 10:15–17.) She did not 

recall seeing any documents indicating that Miguel Rubio made statements that someone 

other than Petitioner fired a weapon. (Id. at 11:10–19.) Her recollection of the contents of 

the file was much better in 2008 than it is today, as she “was very specific and went over 

each statement and looked at it and compare it with things that the client had said to [her] 

and check[ed] for the evidence of third-party culpability.” (Id. at 11:4–9.) 

Smith was questioned about letters she wrote to Petitioner while representing him 

(Ex. P)19. (Id. at 14:7–15:5.) Smith had conversations with Barajas regarding witnesses 

who could exonerate Petitioner. (Id. at 16:20–19:10.) Barajas promised to give Smith a 

list of names, but then would not name anyone. Eventually, Barajas made reference to 

Sylvia Escamilla. 

Smith was questioned about the following portion of a letter she wrote to the 

Petitioner on June 15, 2007:

I went over all of your letters again, and went over the trial attorney’s file 

repeatedly. I do not see where you tell me the names or general substance of 

the testimony of the five to eight witnesses, whom you say would have proved 

you were not the shooter. You only say that unidentified witnesses in an 

unknown situation would have said the victim had a gun, you were not the 

shooter, and/or someone grabbed the gun after you fired in the air and then 

someone else shot the victim. That is extremely vague, and I see nothing in 

the file or record of appeal to support this. According to the trial attorney 

notes there was nothing like this in interviews of you or your wife Sandi. Nor 

is there any area in which there is a ‘hole’ in the record, which would suggest 

to me that there was a major exculpatory witness whose statements of 

information was purged from the file.

 

19 These letters were originally appended as Exhibit “B” to the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus filed on February 18, 2010 (ECF No. 1-7).

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The letter goes on to say:

The file has dozens and dozens of witness statements, not one of which 

suggests there were two shooters, or puts a gun in the victim’s possession at 

any time. Per all of them one man shot a gun during the events, so if you shot 

the gun then you put out the victim’s eye, as he himself said. . . . . Moreover, 

at this juncture, you have to do more than hint to me that there were 

exculpatory witnesses not presented at trial to raise a third party culpability 

error, particularly as an [ineffective assistance of counsel] issue. 

(Ex. P at 38.) Following review of these excerpts, Smith explained her recollections of her 

conversations with Petitioner about the existence of exonerating witnesses. (EHRT vol 4. 

at 18:3–24.) Generally, Petitioner said he or Barajas gave Bartick a physical list of eight 

exonerating witnesses who would say someone else did the shooting. Smith repeatedly 

asked them for this information and did not find anything in the attorney file. Smith further 

testified that Petitioner and his wife gave her varying accounts that Petitioner was not the 

shooter, or someone grabbed the gun after he fired it, or “someone else shot the victim or 

even that the victim had the gun and then someone took it from him and shot, but not 

[Petitioner].” (Id. at 18:15–19.) They never provided any names except they might have 

mentioned Escamilla. Smith spoke with Bartick and “looked through every single sheet of 

paper in the trial attorney files . . . and there was not such a note.” (Id. at 18:3–24.) 

On cross-examination, Smith answered questions about her description of 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims to Petitioner. (Id. at 20–23:11.) She testified that 

she did not recall the exact amount of time she spent reviewing the file, but on average it

can take six or eight hours to review a file. (Id. at 25:8–12.) In preparation for her 

testimony, she reviewed Exhibit P, flipped through the file, and reviewed notes she had 

from talking with Bartick and Ronis. (Id. at 26:2–7.) She remembers reviewing 

investigation reports and police reports in the file. Her best recollection is that the 

investigation reports were from Bartick. She cannot recall seeing any that she could 

attribute to Ronis. (Id. at 26:10–20.) 

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Regarding her review of Ronis’ file, Smith recalled there were police reports and

investigation reports. (Id. at 27:13–18.) She recalled seeing investigative reports from 

Bartick, but did not recall seeing any case notes from Ronis. (Id. at 27:20– 28:1.) She later 

clarified, “I’m not saying that I can say I looked through the file and saw none. I do recall 

some notes from Mr. Bartick from his investigator, like investigator reports, but those are 

the only ones I specifically recall, and I don’t recall any from Mr. Ronis.” (Id. at 47:13–

20.) Smith testified that since representing Petitioner some ten or eleven years prior to the 

Hearing in this case, she has reviewed approximately 20 case files in that time, and her 

memory of the file was much more accurate at the time she wrote the letters to Petitioner 

in 2007 and 2008. (Id. at 48:11–21.) 

Smith did not interview Escamilla during her representation of Petitioner. (Id. at 

29:15–16.) When asked how she determined Escamilla would not be a good witness, Smith 

said she made that decision based on her review of her statements in the file, either from 

police reports or investigative reports. (Id. at 29:17–22.) Smith recalled that Escamilla’s 

statements did not exonerate Petitioner. (Id. at 29:23–30:2.) 

Smith recalled that out of the dozens of witness accounts in the file there were a few 

descriptions of “a Chinese guy in a cowboy hat who obviously wasn’t [Petitioner],” but her 

recollection was that “no one was saying that the Chinese guy in a cowboy hat shot in place 

of [Petitioner].” (Id. at 32:1–8.) Smith was asked to review the following letter excerpt:

I did not say I was unaware of witness statements that you were not the 

shooter, to investigators for attorneys Bartick and Ronis. I said there weren’t 

any in the file I, which I reviewed in depth, and repeatedly. I have been over 

my analysis of various witnesses and nothing you or Sandy has said has been 

able to be verified by anything in the file.

(Ex. P at 42.) She explained that in this letter, she was summarizing things she had 

discussed previously with Petitioner, “because there were references to the Chinese guy 

with the cowboy hat; there were people who weren’t sure if [Petitioner] was the shooter, 

but they weren’t saying that somebody else did it...There were a couple witnesses, one or 

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two, who didn’t say [Petitioner] did it, but they weren’t sure, and they weren’t identifying 

a third-party culprit. That’s my view of the file.” (EHRT, vol 4 at 39:12–23.) 

Smith was the final witness called and the Hearing closed on September 14, 2018. 

J. Police Reports 

Respondent introduced the police reports Ronis received from the District 

Attorney’s office in connection with Petitioner’s case as Exhibit M.20 More than ninety 

potential witnesses amongst party-goers and residents surrounding KP Hall were 

interviewed about the shooting. Their responses are documented in various police reports. 

(See Ex. M.) Of the total potential witnesses, over seventy did not see the shooting and/or 

only heard shots fired. (Id.) These witnesses include those closest to Petitioner, his exwife Sandy Barajas-Espinoza, his mother Rosa Fe Cuevas, and his uncle Adolfo Cuevas 

(Id. at 3, 46–47, 50, 78–79 [“Rosa at times was reluctant and evasive to give any 

information about her son Rogelio [and] implied she was protecting her son”].) Two of

the witnesses to the shooting, Jose Sanchez and Joaquina Soltero expressly stated they only 

saw one individual with a gun. (Id. at 4, 53 [“At no time did Joaquina Soltero see anyone 

else other than Roger Espinosa armed with a handgun.”].) Critically, no witnesses to the 

shooting described a second shooter or anyone else brandishing or using a gun during the 

altercation. (See Ex. M.) 

Eight witnesses stated Petitioner (“Roger Espinoza”, “Roger”, or “Rogelio 

Espinoza”) was shooting the gun and provided detailed statements to the police: Eva 

Gallegos (id. at 8, 62); 21 Roman Rodriguez Rubio (id. at 47–48, 69–70); Joaquina Soltero

 

20 Exhibit M includes Petitioner’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, which are police reports in which 

witnesses state the shooter was wearing a cowboy hat or sombrero. (See Exs. 1, 2, 3.) 

21 Eva Gallegos saw Petitioner holding a gun in his hand and saw him shoot the gun two 

times in the air at an upward angle while Roman Rubio and Juan Bolanos grabbed him in 

an effort to keep him from shooting. She then ran inside the hall for protection and heard 

additional gunshots. She did not return outside until the shooting was stopped. She stated 

although she “did not see [Petitioner] shoot [the victim], [Petitioner] was the only person 

who was outside shooting a gun.” (Id. at 62.) Gallegos positively identified Petitioner as 

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(id. at 24, 37, 52–53); the victim Pedro Arturo Rivera (id. at 24, 26, 75–77); Norma Soltero

(id. at 27, 72–73); Adan Rivera (id. at 56–58, 64–66);

22 Juan Bolanos (id. at 79–80);23 and 

Herman Lopez (id. at 80).

24 Additionally, as detailed above Sylvia Escamilla initially 

stated she saw Petitioner fire the gun up into the air. (Id. at 37; Ex. A.) 

Pedro Arturo Rivera, the victim, provided a detailed account of Petitioner shooting 

him in the eye. He:

turned around and saw [Petitioner] shoot at him. Pedro saw the muzzle flash 

from the gun. As he saw the muzzle flash, Pedro felt a pain in his head and 

described it as feeling like he had run his hear into a metal pole. After being 

shot, Pedro believed [Petitioner] was going to continue to shoot him. Pedro 

continued to walk for about “five yards” and collapsed. 

(Ex. M at 77.) Further, Joaquina Soltero witnessed Petitioner approach the victim, 

Petitioner shoot at the victim, and then the victim fall to the ground as Petitioner “chased 

him and shot him.” She stated Petitioner shot at the victim about ten times. (Id. at 53.) 

Norma Soltero saw Petitioner shooting at the victim’s feet area, the victim running away, 

and then Petitioner shooting at the victim. She looked away for “maybe two seconds” to 

 

the same person who got in a fight at the party, was in possession of a gun and shooting a 

gun outside the party. (Id. at 8, 59.) 

22 Adan Rivera saw Petitioner run up from behind when he and his brother, the victim, left 

KP Hall. Petitioner was holding a semi-automatic gun in his hand. Petitioner fired one or 

two shots into the air and then pointed the gun at Adan and the crowd. Adan ran to hide 

and looked back to see Petitioner shooting numerous times in the direction of the crowd in 

front of the hall. He heard a total of ten to fifteen gunshots (Ex M at 57, 65.) His girlfriend 

Eliza Marez ran to a parked car with Adan. (Id. at 57.) She is described in police reports 

as witness to the shooting (id. at 59), but it is noted she met Petitioner for the first time the 

night of the shooting and did not know if she could identify him if she were to see him 

again. (Id. at 60.) 

23 Bolanos, the boyfriend of Sylvia Escamilla, stated he was “concerned of retaliation” by 

Petitioner. (Ex. M at 80.) 

24 Lopez heard seven to eight gunshots coming from outside KP Hall, stood up and saw 

Petitioner holding a handgun. He saw Petitioner run from the hall and get into the 

passenger’s side of a blue Mazda. (Ex. M. at 80.) 

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gather her children and looked back and saw the victim fall to the ground. (Id. at 73.) 

Roman Rodriguez Rubio was with the victim when Petitioner ran at them with a gun in his 

hand. Rubio stood between Petitioner and the victim and was trying to push them apart, 

but Roger pointed his gun up in the air and fired. He was able to push the victim away 

from Petitioner, and then he ran toward KP Hall. He looked back and saw Petitioner 

standing still aiming his gun in the direction that the victim was running and saw him fire 

three rounds in that direction.25 (Id. at 48.) Finally, Juan Bolanos, Sylvia Escamilla’s 

boyfriend, saw Petitioner firing a handgun recklessly in different directions. He was five 

feet from Petitioner and close enough to see the muzzle flash from the gun. He ran for 

safety into KP Hall. While he did not see Petitioner shoot anyone, he saw the victim injured

and bleeding afterwards. (Id. at 79–80.) 

Joaquina Soltero, who had known Petitioner for ten years at the time of the shooting, 

described him as “light skinned medium build Hispanic male adult, 5’7”, about 29 years 

old with short black hair and a mustache.” (Id. at 53.) Adan Rivera, who also had known 

Petitioner for ten years at that time, described Petitioner as a “Hispanic, male adult, about 

28 years old”, “5’7”–5’8” tall, about 160 pounds, with a thin build”, “black hair on top 

with the side of his head shaved”, a “light complexion, a trimmed mustache” and silver 

braces on his teeth. He was wearing “a black long sleeve shirt and black slacks.” (Id. at 

57; see also Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 688, 699–700 [Petitioner testifying he was around 155 

to 156 pounds in 2001 and around five foot seven or eight inches tall].) 

In light of this description of Petitioner, five witnesses to the shooting who did not 

know Petitioner’s name, Jose Sanchez, Antoinette Gonzalez, Daniel Alatorre, Beginia 

Carillo, and Olivia Addison, described the shooter as a thin Hispanic male (Ex. M at 4

 

25 Roman Rodriguez Rubio also stated that Sandy Barajas-Espinoza said out loud in 

Spanish to a group of witnesses waiting to be interviewed by the police, “Everything should 

be O.K. as long as nobody ‘RATS’.” (Ex. M at 48.) Per Rubio, “[e]verybody at the party 

knew that [Petitioner] was the shooter, and she was just trying to keep them from telling 

the truth about her husband.” (Id.) 

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[“Hispanic male adult with short dark hair and wearing a dark colored, untucked shirt with 

a white stripe down the front”]; id. at 9 [“Hispanic male adult in his twenties, medium 

height, skinny build, unknown facial hair wearing a black shirt and a white undershirt” who 

“possibly threw down a cowboy style hat during the incident”) and 21 [“suspect was 

wearing a beige colored cowboy hat and it either fell off his hear or he threw it down”]; id.

at 10 [“Hispanic male adult, late twenties, unknown hat, wearing a white shirt and a cowboy 

hat”]; id. at 11–12 [“Hispanic male, late twenties, with a skinny physical build]; id. at 20 

[“Hispanic male adult of unknown age, about 5’6”–5’7”, about 140 lbs, wearing long black 

pants, a light colored shirt, and a white cowboy hat”], and 71 [“Hispanic male unknown 

age, 5’6”–5’7” tall, 170lbs, normal build, with short dark hair, wearing a cowboy hat, a 

long sleeve shirt, possible a button down, and dark pants”].)26 A nine-year old boy, Jesse 

Addison, said the suspect looked “similar to a White male, wearing a sombrero and a white 

shirt,” but that he could not identify him again. (Id. at 11; see Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 437:7–

14 [trial testimony from Alatorre’s mother Olivia Addison regarding her sons’ ages].) 

Of the five witnesses who described the shooter as possibly Asian and/or wearing a 

hat of some kind, three were ages nine, ten, and twelve. (Ex. M at 40, Lodgment 2, vol. 3 

at 437:7–14.) A ten-year-old girl, Guadalupe “Lupe” Barrera, was the only witness to 

describe the shooter as possibly of Asian descent. In one report she stated the shooter 

looked angry, was squinting his eyes and possibly Chinese. (Ex. M at 40.) In a second 

report, Barrera stated the shooter was a “Hispanic or Asian male adult, 25 years old, 5’9” 

tall, normal to chubby build with chubby cheeks, with short, slicked back, black hair, 

wearing a black puffy jacket, and blue or black pants.” (Id. at 67–69.) 

 

26 Several other witnesses from residences near KP Hall described seeing a Hispanic male 

run across the street or flee in a vehicle following hearing the sound of gun shots. (Ex. M 

at 39–40 [Hispanic male “about 25 years of age, 5’8”, 160 pounds, with short slicked back 

brown hair, wearing dark clothing.”]; at 19 [witness was awakened by the sound of three 

gun shots, went outside, and saw Hispanic male adult run from KP Hall to a dark car and 

get in].)

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Four witnesses said the shooter may have been wearing a cowboy hat or sombrero. 

Antoinette Gonzalez was parked nearby and said the suspect “possibly threw down a 

cowboy style hat during the incident,” and said it either fell off his head or he threw it 

down. (Id. at 9–20, 21, 32.) She described it as a beige colored cowboy hat. (Id. at 21.) 

She did not think she would recognize the suspect if seen again. (Id. at 21.) Olivia Addison 

and her two sons, Daniel Alatorre and Jesse Addison who were twelve and nine at the time 

of the shooting, said that the shooter was wearing a cowboy hat or sombrero. (Id. at 10–

11, 20, 31, 70–7; see Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 437:7–14 [trial testimony from Alatorre’s 

mother Olivia Addison regarding her sons’ ages].) Jesse Addison stated he could not 

identify the shooter if seen again. (Ex. M at 11.) Olivia Addison described the shooter as 

wearing a white cowboy hat. (Id. at 20, 31.) She needs glasses to drive and was not wearing 

the night of the shooting. She was not certain she would recognize the suspect if seen 

again. (Id. at 31.) At no time did any witness state that the shooter was wearing a black 

cowboy hat or sombrero. (See Ex. M.) 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 confers upon a federal district court the jurisdiction to 

consider a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a state court conviction. 

“Petitioner carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 

entitled to habeas relief.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).

In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the 

merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) is a threshold requirement, and even if it is satisfied, 

or does not apply, a petitioner must still show a federal constitutional violation occurred in 

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order to obtain relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–22 (2007). 

Section 2254(d) is a gateway. If a petitioner satisfies either subsection (1) or (2) for 

a claim, then the federal court considers that claim de novo. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 

551 U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007) (When section 2254(d) is satisfied, “[a] federal court must 

then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”); Frantz v. 

Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). While in many cases, the section 

2254(d) analysis and direct merits analysis will substantially overlap, there are cases in 

which a petitioner’s entitlement to relief will turn on legal or factual questions beyond the 

scope of the section 2254(d) analysis. When such is the case, the substantive claim must 

be evaluated under a de novo standard and if facts are in dispute or the existence of 

constitutional error depends on facts outside the existing record, then an evidentiary 

hearing may be necessary. Frantz, 533 F.3d at 737, 745; see also Earp v. Ornoski, 431 

F.3d 1158, 1185 (9th Cir. 2005) (remanding for evidentiary hearing after finding section 

2254(d) satisfied). 

In this case, the Ninth Circuit found that “the state court decision constituted an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)”. (Mem. 

Disp. at 5–6.) Because there was “no evidence in the state court record to explain trial 

counsel’s behavior” in failing to investigate Escamilla and Rubio, the Ninth Circuit 

assumed that “the California Supreme Court decided [Petitioner’s] case on prejudice 

grounds.” (Id. at 7.) Applying the doubly-deferential standards of AEDPA and Strickland, 

and based largely on the sworn declarations provided by Escamilla and Rubio, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that “trial counsel’s decision not to call Escamilla and Rubio to testify 

at trial prejudiced [Petitioner].” (Id. at 7–9.) In finding the state court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland, the Ninth Circuit 

considered the same record that was before the state court. (Id. at 11.) Accordingly, 

Petitioner has overcome the hurdle posed by section 2254(d)(1) by showing that the state 

court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition constituted an unreasonable application of 

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Strickland in regards to his ineffective assistance of counsel failure to interview claim. (See 

id.) Because Petitioner has demonstrated that the decision of the state court on his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s failure to interview Escamilla 

and Rubio was based on an unreasonable application of Strickland, this Court will address 

that claim de novo. See Frantz, 533 F.3d at 737 (“where the analysis on federal habeas, in 

whatever order conducted, results in the conclusion that § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied, then 

federal habeas courts must review the substantive constitutionality of the state custody de 

novo.”). As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing pursuant to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), overruled on 

other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), to “consider whether trial 

counsel was deficient as well as Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility.” (Mem. Disp. at 12.)

judges 

As stated above, the Ninth Circuit held that if Escamilla and Rubio were found 

credible, trial counsel’s decision not to call them as witnesses at trial prejudiced Petitioner. 

It therefore appears that, the Ninth Circuit has already found that the prejudice prong is 

satisfied so long as this Court finds the two declarants credible. The Ninth Circuit has 

expressly limited the inquiry of the Strickland’s deficiency prong to whether trial counsel 

was deficient in not interviewing declarants Rubio and Escamilla. Thus, this Court is 

tasked with assessing the credibility of Rubio and Escamilla on remand. Accordingly, the 

Ninth Circuit on remand limited the evidentiary hearing for the Court to ascertain:

(1) whether there was deficient performance of Petitioner’s trial counsel with respect to his 

alleged failure to interview Escamilla and Rubio and (2) whether this Court finds Escamilla 

and Rubio credible, thereby prejudicing Petitioner by counsel’s failure to interview them. 

The Court now turns to that analysis. 

VI. DISCUSSION 

As discussed above in the context of the scope of this proceeding, Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding trial counsel Jan Ronis’ failure to 

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investigate Sylvia Escamilla and Miguel Rubio is currently before the Court. Accordingly, 

this Court is tasked with conducting “an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s failure to 

interview the two witnesses” Escamilla and Rubio. (Mem. Disp. at 5 [emphasis added].) 

This requires assessing (1) the credibility of the declarants and (2) whether trial counsel 

was deficient in not calling them to testify. See Section III. Petitioner’s additional claims 

regarding trial counsel’s purported deficiencies are addressed below as well. 

A. Parties’ Contentions

The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the parties’ post-Hearing briefs. 

(ECF Nos. 152, 157.) Briefly, Respondent argues that the rule of mandate limits the issues 

to be decided at the Hearing to (1) whether Sylvia Escamilla and Miguel Rubio are credible 

witnesses and (2) whether trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present 

their testimony at trial. (ECF No. 152 at 5–6.) Respondent contends that Petitioner has 

not met his burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at 

5–6.) Respondent further argues that Petitioner’s own testimony at trial is credible and 

demonstrates that there was only one shooter. (Id. at 6–7.) Additionally, Respondent 

asserts that Escamilla is not a credible witness because (1) she did not see someone other 

than Petitioner shoot the victim and (2) she did not communicate to trial counsel that she 

did as she claims in her declaration. (Id. at 7–11.) 

Respondent further argues that Rubio is not a credible witness as he did not testify 

at the Hearing, denied seeing the shooting or anyone with a gun in his statement to police 

following the shooting, and did not communicate to Ronis that he purportedly saw someone 

other than Petitioner shoot the victim as claimed in his declaration. (Id. at 12–13.) Lastly, 

Respondent argues that because Escamilla and Rubio are not credible witnesses, trial 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate their claims and calling them as 

witnesses at the Hearing. (Id. at 13.) Respondent raises no new objections to the testimony 

and exhibits presented. (Id. at 6.) 

As discussed above, Petitioner argues for a more expansive view of the Ninth 

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Circuit’s remand. (ECF No. 157 at 18–19.) Petitioner does not address the credibility of 

Escamilla and/or Rubio, or even the fact that Rubio did not testify at the Hearing in support 

of his sworn declaration under penalty of perjury. Instead, Petitioner argues that because 

Ronis failed to interview witnesses identified in police reports who stated the shooter was 

“Asian” and/or wearing a “cowboy hat” or a “sombrero”, Ronis failed to select and present 

the correct defense. (Id. at 22–30.) Petitioner argues that if Ronis had interviewed 

witnesses such as Daniel Alatorre who told police that the shooter was wearing a cowboy 

hat, “Escamilla and Rubio’s statements would have been supported by other witnesses on 

the second shooter theory and made their testimony more viable.” (Id. at 22–24.) 

Petitioner proceeds to attack Ronis’ proffered defenses of self-defense and 

accidental shooting, claiming that due to Ronis’ failure to investigate, Ronis had an 

“inadequate understanding of . . . . the availability of another defense [the second shooter 

theory] that would have significantly minimized [Petitioner’s] exposure by challenging the 

firearms/injury allegations.” (Id. at 27–28.) He claims that then Ronis could have properly 

advised Petitioner not to testify. (Id. at 29.) Specifically, he argues that “had Ronis 

investigated and developed alternative defense theories, and consulted with [Petitioner] 

about them, [Petitioner] might have elected not to testify . . . .” (Id.) Critically, Petitioner 

did not take the stand at the Hearing to attest to the fact that he would not have testified at 

his trial under these circumstances. 

B. Credibility of Declarants 

As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit remanded Petitioner’s case for the District 

Court to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility as well as 

to determine whether trial counsel was deficient. (Mem. Disp. at 12.) The Court first 

assesses the credibility of Escamilla and Rubio. 

“There can be no doubt that seeing a witness testify live assists the finder of fact in 

evaluating the witness’s credibility.” United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 315 (9th Cir. 

1995). “[O]nly the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice 

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that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.” Anderson 

v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). “[O]ne of the purposes of an 

evidentiary hearing is to enable the finder of fact to evaluate the credibility of witnesses by 

seeing ‘the witness’s physical reactions to questions, to assess the witness’s demeanor, and 

to hear the tone of the witness’s voice . . . .’” Vickers v. Smith, No. 115CV00129SABPC, 

2019 WL 1367784, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (quoting Mejia, 69 F.3d at 315);

Conservation Cong. v. United States Forest Serv., No. CV 2:15-00249 WBS AC, 2016 WL 

3126116, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2016) (evidentiary hearings “enable the court to listen to 

the witnesses’ testimony, observe their demeanor, assess their credibility, and resolve the 

disputed issues of fact regarding defendant’s motivations based on the totality of the 

evidence”). Further, “factors other than demeanor and inflection go into the decision 

whether or not to believe a witness. Documents or objective evidence may contradict the 

witness’ story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its 

face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. 

The Court applies the Ninth Circuit’s factors for assessing the credibility of a 

witness: “(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things 

testified to; (2) the witness’s memory; (3) the witness’s manner while testifying; (4) the 

witness’s interest in the outcome of the case, if any; (5) the witness’s bias or prejudice, if 

any; (6) whether other evidence contradicted the witness’s testimony; (7) the 

reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the evidence; and (8) any other 

factors that bear on believability.” Ninth Circuit Manuel of Model Civil Jury Instructions

1.14 (2017 ed.). 

a. Escamilla’s Declaration is Not Credible

Central to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this matter is the 

credibility of Sylvia Escamilla. For the reasons discussed below, the Court does not find 

Escamilla to be credible. Her accounts of the shooting are inconsistent, her accounts of 

contacting trial counsel Jan Ronis and/or his investigator Juan Lopez are inconsistent, and 

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the circumstances surrounding the creation of her declaration are suspect. 

1. Inconsistent Accounts of the Shooting

In remanding this case for an evidentiary hearing, the Ninth Circuit relied upon 

Escamilla’s declaration and her version of events surrounding the March 10, 2001 

shooting. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit stated: 

Espinoza indeed “shot one or two shots into the ground” to warn off Arturo 

and Adan before a struggle ensued, and “more shots were [then] fired in the 

air.” “[S]omeone in the crowd” was trying to get the gun and at that point 

“shots began to go in all directions.” Someone yelled that the police were 

coming, and Escamilla then saw “someone else grab the gun.” She believed 

this person then shot Arturo, and was willing to testify as such. She felt

confident she could identify the person. 

(Mem. Disp. at 3.) Based on review of Escamilla’s declaration, the Ninth Circuit stated, 

“Escamilla and Rubio both would have testified that someone got the gun away from 

[Petitioner] and fired it at [the victim].” (Id. at 8 [emphasis added].) Based on the 

information contained in Escamilla and Rubio’s declarations, the Ninth Circuit was 

“convinced that Escamilla and Rubio’s testimony creates ‘a reasonable probability’ that 

‘the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt as to [Espinoza’s] guilt...’” (Id.) As 

such, this Court must assess Escamilla’s credibility with respect to what she claims to have 

observed on the night of the shooting as set forth in her declaration and relied upon by the 

Ninth Circuit.

Importantly, Escamilla’s Hearing testimony was not consistent with the version of 

events presented to the Ninth Circuit via her declaration. See Model Civil Jury Instruction 

1.14(6) (whether other evidence contradicts the witness’s testimony). Further, both her 

Hearing testimony and her declaration were inconsistent with the two police statements she 

gave within hours of the shooting, when the facts were freshest in her mind. Even 

Escamilla’s two statements to police, given within hours of each other, were inconsistent

with each other. She has provided a different version of events each time she has proffered 

information about the shooting. 

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In her declaration, Escamilla claims that: 

I remember Rogelio telling the Adan and Arturo (Rivera brothers) pleading 

them to stop, that he did not want to fight and that he (Rogelio) had a gun. 

Rogelio continued warn them about the gun, and one of the brothers said to 

him that he did not have the balls to shoot anyone. They kept kicking him and 

attacking him. Then Rogelio, shot one or two shots into the ground and the 

brothers began to struggle and more shots were fired in the air, while someone 

in the crowd at the same time was trying to struggle for the weapon. That is 

when I believe the shots began to go in all directions. I then remember 

hearing someone saying police, and I saw someone else grab the gun and tried 

to shoot Rogelio as he ran across the street. I believe from what I witnessed 

the guy who had the gun was the one who shot Arturo and not Rogelio because 

he had already ran off and no one was hurt at that moment. I can identify all 

involved even the person who shot the gun at the end of the struggle. 

(Ex. K [emphasis added].) Based on this, Escamilla is asserting that she observed 

Petitioner initially in possession of the gun, and he was the first person shooting the gun. 

Then, someone in the group grabbed the gun from Petitioner and supposedly shot at 

Petitioner as he ran across the street and then also shot the victim. (See id.) However, this 

is not the same version of events that Escamilla testified to at the Hearing. 

At the Hearing, she testified that she was outside of the party smoking a cigarette 

when she observed a group of people approaching and attack Petitioner, her son-in-law. 

(EHRT, vol. 1 at 27:12–15.) She heard and saw two gunshots “shot up” and did not know 

who shot the gun because “there were a lot of hands.” “It was like they were struggling to 

try to take the gun, something like that.” (Id. at 27:20–28:1; 42:10–22.) The shots were 

fired from a group of people that included Petitioner. (Id. at 23–25, 44:1–7.) The shooting 

occurred around 7:00 or 7:30 p.m. (Id. at 29:3–6.) After she heard the gunshots, she saw 

Petitioner cross the street and run away. Then she observed another young man shoot. (Id.

at 28:2–6.) This man was dressed in black, wearing a black hat “like a Texan cowboy” and 

“his eyes were, like, a little slanted.” (Id. at 28:7–12, 54:1–5.) He was “shooting all over 

the place.” (Id. at 43:8–15.) In this version of events, it is unclear how the second shooter 

obtained a gun. 

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Thus, in stark contrast to her declaration, Escamilla testified at the Hearing not only 

that she did not observe Petitioner with the gun, but also that she never observed anyone 

take the gun out of his hand. In fact, she averred that a man dressed in black, wearing a 

black cowboy hat with slanted eyes fired shots “all over the place” after Petitioner fled the 

scene. Instead of corroborating the version of events presented to the Ninth Circuit via her 

declaration, she contradicted it. Moreover, it was not until the Hearing that Escamilla 

described this purported second shooter as having “slanted” eyes and wearing a black 

cowboy hat, which comports with Petitioner’s new theory that the shooter was an Asian 

man wearing a cowboy hat.27 Escamilla had not previously given any such description of 

this second shooter shooter in any of the police reports or her declaration. Such an 

omission further calls her veracity into question. 

Escamilla’s declaration and Hearing testimony also conflict with the statement she 

gave to Sergeant Shephard at KP Hall on the night of the shooting. That interview was 

recorded (Ex. L), transcribed (Ex. O), and summarized in Sergeant Shephard’s police 

report (Ex. A at 2–3). During that on-scene interview, Escamilla identified the shooter as 

her son-in-law, Petitioner. (Ex L; Ex. A at 2–3; Ex. O at 2–3.) She stated that she observed 

Petitioner shoot the gun up in the air. (Ex L; Ex. A at 3; Ex. O at 2–3.) She identified 

Petitioner and only Petitioner as a shooter of the gun. (Ex. L; Ex. O at 1–4.) She made no 

mention of a second shooter, let alone provide a description of a second shooter with 

slanted eyes and wearing a black cowboy hat. (See id.) Critically, this interview took place 

at KP Hall immediately following the shooting when the events were freshest in her mind 

and perhaps before she fully realized the impact her statements could have upon her thenson-in-law. 

 

27 It is important to note that other witnesses who reported the shooter was wearing a 

cowboy hat or sombrero either made no mention of the color of the hat or referred to it as 

white or beige. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 18–19 [Hearing testimony of Daniel Alatorre]; Ex. M. at 

20–21 [witness statements of Olivia Addison and Antoinette Gonzalez].) No other 

witnesses reported the shooter to be wearing a black or dark colored hat. (See Ex. M.) 

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Later that night, Escamilla was interviewed at the police station by Sergeant

Cordero. The interview was recorded (Ex. C), transcribed and translated (Ex. E), and 

summarized in a police report (Ex. B). In this second interview, Escamilla changed her 

story yet again. In this account of the shooting, she stated she saw “someone (unknown) 

who fired several shots in the air” and “could not provide a description of the handgun or 

the shooter.” (Ex. B.) She told Sergeant Cordero that she did not see who fired the shots 

or had the gun and did not see Petitioner with the gun. (Ex. E at 9–15.) She saw two shots 

“fired up” from a group of boys that included Petitioner, but she was not able to see who 

was shooting the gunshots up “because there were too many [people] because they were 

all together.” (Id. at 9–12 [Petitioner “was among all of them but I did not exactly see him 

with the gun, I saw gunshots but I did not see that he had it.”) She explicitly stated that 

she never saw Petitioner with the gun. (Id. at 10.) She denied that she had previously 

stated Petitioner shot the gun. (Id. at 10–11.) Once again, she failed to mention seeing a 

man with slanted eyes and a black cowboy hat shoot the victim. (See Ex. E.) 

The gross inconsistencies between her prior statements to police and her declaration 

and Hearing testimony impeach Escamilla’s credibility. It is a “basic rule of evidence” 

that “prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness” 

regardless of whether the prior statements are oral and unsworn. United States v. Monroe,

943 F.2d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 613.

28

 

Apart from Escamilla’s inconsistent and contradictory accounts of what she 

observed of the shooting, the Court applied additional Ninth Circuit factors for assessing 

the credibility of a witness to her testimony. See Model Civil Jury Instruction 1.14. First, 

 

28 Federal Rule of Evidence 613 provides that “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior 

inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain 

or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness 

about it, or if justice so requires.” Fed. R. Evid. 613(b). Escamilla was both given that 

opportunity at the Hearing and the parties stipulated to the admission of her prior 

statements for purposes of impeachment. (See ECF No. 116 at 5,7.) 

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Escamilla testified at the Hearing that her memory was most accurate right after the 

incident. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 59:2–4); see Model Civil Jury Instruction 1.14(2) (the witness’s 

memory).29 If such is the case, then logically and reasonably her first accounts to the police 

are the most accurate, and therefore most reliable. As noted above, these interviews are 

completely inconsistent with both her declaration to the Ninth Circuit as well as her 

testimony at the Hearing. 

Secondly, Escamilla effectively testified under oath she did not tell the truth in her 

declaration and Hearing testimony about the “second shooter” version of events. At the 

Hearing, Escamilla testified that during the interview at the police station, she told the truth 

about what she saw.30 (EHRT, vol. 1 at 47:22–24, 58:17–19.) Further, although she could 

not remember if she was interviewed by the police at KP Hall after the incident, Escamilla 

testified she would have given the police officer an accurate statement of what she saw. 

(Id. at 44:1–45:2.) However, these versions of events are inconsistent with the “second 

shooter” versions in her declaration and Hearing testimony. She cannot be telling the truth 

as to four different versions of events. Accordingly, Escamilla’s own Hearing testimony 

confirms that her first two versions of events to the police are the more accurate ones. And 

the Court notes that these two accounts are at least consistent with Petitioner’s testimony 

at trial in which he conceded to being the sole shooter. See Model Civil Jury Instruction 

1.14(7) (the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the other evidence);

(Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 751–52 [“Q: But you still were the only person with a gun; right? 

A: That night? Yes.”). 

 

29 Escamilla incorrectly testified that she gave the police the following description of the 

shooter that night – a short person, dressed in a black shirt, dressed in black and wearing a 

hat. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 30:19–25.) Additionally, over the course of Petitioner’s counsel’s 

direct examination of Escamilla, it became apparent that she was very “suggestable.” (Id.

at 38–39); see Model Civil Jury Instruction 1.14 (3) (the witness’s manner while testifying).

30 She could not remember telling a police officer at the scene that she saw Petitioner shoot 

a handgun into the air. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 46:8–10.) 

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Third, her declaration came years after Petitioner’s conviction. Further, Escamilla 

did not make any claims about a second shooter until she signed the declaration some eight 

years after the shooting itself. (See Ex. K.) This was corroborated by her daughter, Sandy 

Barajas, when she testified that her mother did not tell her about a second shooter until 

2009 when they prepared the declaration. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 188:15–21.) This late in the 

day declaration raises suspicions to the Court of Escamilla’s desire to help Petitioner get 

relief. See Model Civil Jury Instruction 1.14(4) (the witness’s interest in the outcome of 

the case), 1.14(5) (the witness’s bias or prejudice); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413–

14 (1988) (“[I]t is . . . reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a 

defense witness who is not identified until after the 11th hour has passed.”). Further, 

Escamilla did not give a satisfactory explanation as to why she waited years before telling 

anyone about this second shooter. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417–18 (1993) 

(“The affidavits filed in this habeas proceeding were given over eight years after 

petitioner’s trial. No satisfactory explanation has been given as to why the affiants waited 

until the 11th hour—and, indeed, until after the alleged perpetrator of the murders himself 

was dead—to make their statements.”) She testified that she executed this declaration “to

preserve [it] in case Mr. Espinoza needed it in the future, [s]ince neither the attorney nor 

the ‘detective’ decided to reach out to [her].” (EHRT, vol. 1 at 37:19–24.) It strains 

credibility that Escamilla would not have told her daughter, Petitioner’s wife, that she 

witnessed another person shoot the victim, especially since she supposedly wanted to 

testify for Petitioner at his 2006 trial. See Section IV.B.b. It is also illogical to wait years 

after trial to preserve her account of the shooting when her purported desire was to present 

it at trial. 

Finally, the version of events that Escamilla attested to in her declaration and the 

version of events she testified to at the Hearing, in light of other evidence, are improbable

if not implausible. See Model Civil Jury Instructions 1.14(6) (whether other evidence 

contradicted the witness’s testimony), 1.14(7) (reasonableness of the witness’s testimony 

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in light of all the evidence). Critically, Petitioner testified at trial that he fled the scene with 

the gun still in his possession.

31 (Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 712, 715, 745 [emphasis added].)

Petitioner also testified that “there was only one gun involved” in the shooting during his 

trial. (Id. at 751–52.) Thus, in order for the purported second shooter to have been able 

to shoot the victim after Petitioner fled the scene, Escamilla’s version of events presented 

at the Hearing requires there to have been a second gun. However, Escamilla herself 

repeatedly referred to the weapon involved in the shooting as “the” gun in both her 

declaration and her interview with Sergeant Cordero. 32 (Ex. K; Ex. E at 12–13.) She stated 

that she “did not exactly see [Petitioner] with the gun” and that she “did not see that he had 

it.” (Ex. E at 12 [emphasis added].) When asked “what type of gun was it?” she replied 

“No, no I don’t know what type it was, I didn’t see it.” (Id. at 13 [emphasis added].) Again, 

she made no mention of having seen a second shooter or even having witnessed the victim 

be shot. 

In the version of events contained in Escamilla’s declaration, she saw Petitioner in 

possession of the gun, fire shots, and then “saw someone else grab the gun and tr[y] to 

shoot [Petitioner] as he ran across the street” who then proceeded to also shoot the victim. 

(Ex. K [emphasis added].) As previously noted, Petitioner testified at trial that he fled the 

scene with the gun still in his possession. (Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 712, 715, 745.) These 

 

31 The inculpatory nature of Petitioner’s trial testimony on this point is particularly credible, 

as he had no motive to fabricate evidence to show he was the sole shooter in possession of 

the sole gun used in the shooting. 

32 In light of Petitioner’s counsel’s questioning of Sandy Barajas at the Hearing, it is 

apparent that he is aware of this inconsistency as well. As recounted in the Court’s 

summary of Hearing testimony, counsel questioned Barajas about whether Escamilla said 

“a gun” or “the gun” when providing her account of the shooting that Barajas went on to 

memorialize in Escamilla’s declaration. See Section IV.H. Barajas stated that because 

English is her second language, she could have confused the definite and indefinite articles. 

(EHRT, vol. 1 at 185:11–188:14; 190:15–192:12.) Ultimately, Barajas admitted that 

Escamilla concurred that it was “the gun.” (Id. at 188:9–14, 191:18–192:11 [denying she 

made a mistake in her translation].) 

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two statements cannot be reconciled unless Petitioner somehow was able to wrestle the gun 

back from the purported second shooter afterthe second shooter had already shot the victim 

in the eye. Escamilla’s versions of events are simply implausible given her prior statements 

and Petitioner’s own testimony. 

In sum, based on the above Court’s findings, Escamilla’s statements in her 

declaration about what she observed of the shooting as well as her testimony at the Hearing 

are not credible. The Court finds what she initially told the Sergeant Shephard to be closer 

to what she was able to observe outside of KP Hall the evening of the shooting. (See Exs. 

L, O.) It is also consistent with the version of events Petitioner testified to at his trial. (See

Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 709–10.) 

2. Inconsistent Accounts of Contact with Jan Ronis and Juan Lopez

The Ninth Circuit relied upon Escamilla’s claims in her declaration that she

contacted Jan Ronis, Petitioner’s trial counsel, and Juan Lopez, Ronis’ investigator, and 

told them her version of events exculpating Petitioner. The Ninth Circuit stated that 

“Escamilla told Espinoza’s defense investigator her account, left messages at the law firm, 

but was ‘never contacted’ about the matter any further.” (Mem. Disp. at 3.) Escamilla’s 

declaration provides:

I also contacted the Law Firm of Jan Ronis and Ronis and spoke with one of 

his investigators Juan Lopez along with Jan Ronis in regards to my testimony. 

I told the investigator that Rogelio had not shot the victim, and that I would 

testify to my testimony. However I was never contacted again and I contacted 

them a few times and left messages. I was never asked to appear in trial or 

submit my testimony in front of a judge. I declare under the penalty of perjury 

under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and that this 

affidavit was executed on May 5, 2009, at San Diego, California.

(Ex. K.) In his post-Hearing brief, Petitioner states that, “Escamilla and Rubio have also 

attested that they were willing to testify that someone other than [Petitioner] shot [the 

victim], but that they were never contacted by Ronis despite leaving several messages at 

his office.” (ECF No. 157 at 23 [citing ECF No. 131 at 33, 40, 41, 57; Pet. Ex. 28].) 

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While it is true that Escamilla stated she attempted to contact Ronis by calling his 

office during the Hearing, she further testified that (1) she did not tell Lopez about the 

purported second shooter and (2) she provided no reason in the messages she left at Ronis’ 

office for her call. Accordingly, the Court finds that Escamilla’s Hearing testimony was 

inconsistent with her declaration and thus her declaration is incredible as it relates to her 

communications with Ronis and his investigator, Juan Lopez. Notably, Escamilla admitted 

at the Hearing that she did not tell Lopez about the purported second shooter. (EHRT, vol. 

1 at 50:24–25, 51:1.) She later conceded that despite her prior statements, she never even 

called Lopez. (Id. at 51:23–52:1.) This contradicts her claim in her declaration that she 

told Lopez that Petitioner had not shot the victim and further explains Lopez’s lack of 

memory about the case in his testimony. (See Ex. K.) 

While in her declaration she vaguely claimed to have “contacted the Law Firm of 

Jan Ronis and spoke[n] with one of his investigators Juan Lopez along with Jan Ronis in 

regards to [her] testimony” (Ex. K), at the Hearing she testified that she saw Petitioner’s 

defense counsel once and he told her they would speak but he never got back to her.

(EHRT, vol. 1 at 33:7–18.) However, she could not remember Ronis’ name or when she 

called his office but said that it was not during the trial. (Id. at 34:23–35:3, 48:25–49:6.) 

Moreover, she testified that while she left messages for Ronis on his voicemail, she 

provided no reason for the call. (Id. at 51:7–22.) Additionally, Ronis testified that he has 

always had staff in his office answering telephone calls, calling into question whether 

Escamilla did in fact contact Ronis’ law firm. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 24:12–20.)

Despite the vague claim in her declaration that she spoke to Ronis regarding her 

purported second shooter testimony, Escamilla did not testify at the Hearing that she 

actually told Ronis about a second shooter or that the Petitioner did not shoot the victim. 

See Section IV.B.b. As such, Escamilla’s testimony, even if true, supports Ronis’ own 

testimony and recollection that he was never told about a purported second shooter. (See

Ex I at 12:18–13:1 [if someone called and asserted the claims made in Escamilla’s 

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declaration, he “can’t believe that [he] wouldn’t remember that”]; EHRT, vol 1 at 121:3–

12 [“I find it incredible that I would not have remembered a conversation of the nature 

that’s alleged.”]; EHRT, vol. 3 at 19:25–20:4 [“I can just tell you what my practice as a 

lawyer would have been had somebody come to me at the time of these events and made a 

statement such as that, I certainly would have moved on it and it wouldn’t have been 

something that would have been overlooked.”].) This also aligns with the letters that 

Petitioner’s appellate attorney Barbara Smith wrote to Petitioner in which she states that 

there was no mention of a second gunman during her review of Ronis’ case file. (See Ex. 

P at 36, 38–40, 42.) 

Escamilla’s Hearing testimony that she never actually told Ronis about a second 

shooter is further corroborated by Barajas’s testimony that she witnessed her mother leave 

a message for Ronis on one occasion, and that her mother did not tell her about the “second 

shooter” until several years later, in 2009. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 188:15–189:9.) If Escamilla 

had left a detailed message for Ronis in her daughter’s presence regarding a second shooter 

around the time of the Petitioner’s trial, 2005 to 2006, then Barajas would have known 

about the content of Escamilla’s supposedly exonerating testimony several years earlier 

than 2009. And it is simply incredible that Escamilla would not have told her daughter, 

Petitioner’s wife at the time of the shooting, about her account of a second shooter if in fact 

she had really observed it. 

Given the foregoing testimony and evidence, the Court finds that Escamilla never 

informed Lopez or Ronis about a purported second shooter. Her declaration on this point 

is not credible. 

3. Origins of Escamilla’s Declaration 

As set forth above, the Ninth Circuit heavily relied on Escamilla and Rubio’s 

declarations when it remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing. However, these 

declarations were not prepared until 2009, three years after Petitioner’s trial. (Compare

Exs. K and 28 [dated June 5, 2009 and May 30, 2009], with ECF No. 16-4 at 33 [verdict 

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form dated March 2, 2006].) As previously noted, and despite the shooting taking place in 

March of 2001, Escamilla allegedly told no one about the purported second shooter until 

2009. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 188:15–189:9.) 

The timing of the declarations must first be viewed in the context of Petitioner’s exwife Sandy Barajas desperately trying to produce a list of exonerating witnesses to 

Petitioner’s appellate attorney, Barbara Smith. (See Ex. P at 38 [“[A]t this juncture, you 

have to do more than hint to me that there were exculpatory witnesses not presented at trial 

to raise a third party culpability issue, particularly as an [ineffective assistance of counsel]

issue.”].) Smith’s Hearing testimony and her letters to Petitioner in 2007 and 2008 

demonstrate that Barajas continued to promise Smith that she would provide her with a list 

of witnesses who could exonerate the Petitioner; however, the only name Barajas ever 

mentioned was her mother Escamilla. Smith felt Escamilla could not exonerate Petitioner

based on the police and investigative reports in the file. (Ex. P at 36, 38–40; EHRT, vol. 4

at 9:17–10:11, 16:20–17:5, 18:9–24.) Correspondence from Smith in 2007 and 2008 

reveals that Barajas never produced a list of exonerating witnesses despite her promises to 

do so. (See Ex. P.) Smith further recalled that Petitioner told her that he and/or Barajas 

had given his first attorney, David Bartick, a list of exonerating witnesses who would say 

someone else did the shooting. She asked them repeatedly for the list and searched 

Bartick’s file and did not find any such list.

33 (EHRT, vol. 4 at 18:9–15; see 9:17–10:7.) 

If there were such exonerating witnesses, surely Barajas would have presented a list of 

their names to Smith at the time of Petitioner’s appeal. The fact that Barajas failed to do 

so indicates that these purportedly exonerating witnesses did not actually exist.34 

 

33 Smith did see investigative reports she believes from Bartick in Petitioner’s case file. 

(EHRT, vol. 4 at 26:10–20, 27:13–28:1.) Nothing in the file indicated that Petitioner “was 

not the shooter, and/or someone grabbed the gun after [Petitioner] fired in the air and then 

someone else shot the victim.” (Ex. P at 38.) 

34 Further, the Court notes that Barajas served as a notary for Escamilla’s declaration. (See

Exs. K.) She became a notary public within the six months prior to Escamilla executing 

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The Court finds that Escamilla’s testimony surrounding how the declaration was 

prepared was inconsistent and that she was a very “suggestable” witness. (EHRT, vol. 1 

at 38:23–39:3.) At first, she said the declaration was written in Spanish. (Id. at 32:10–15.) 

She later testified that she said it orally in Spanish and her daughter translated and wrote it 

in English. (Id. at 36:13–18, 37:1–4, 15–18.) She then said she did not remember whether 

she actually wrote out the declaration or stated it orally. (Id. at 40:9–12.) She conceded 

that the declaration is written in English, but since she does not speak or read English, she 

supposed that her daughter would have written down what she told her. (Id. at 48:1–9.) 

She then said it was written out in Spanish by her daughter, and that she had a copy in 

Spanish at home. (Id. at 48:10–19.) In contrast, Barajas herself testified that she read the 

declaration back to her mother in Spanish before her mother signed it under the penalty of 

perjury. (Id. at 187:2–188:5.) Barajas did not testify that she wrote out the declaration in 

Spanish for her mother. 

It is also unclear what prompted Escamilla to prepare her declaration after years had 

passed since Petitioner’s trial and his direct appeal had concluded. Escamilla testified that 

she executed this declaration “to preserve [it] in case [Petitioner] needed it in the future, 

[s]ince neither the attorney nor the ‘detective’ decided to reach out to [her].” (Id. at 37:19–

24.) Barajas denied asking her mother to prepare the declaration, but said she mentioned 

to her mother that “something had to be done because Mr. Espinoza was going to be 

fighting an appeal” and that it was not proper that they were never called to testify. (Id. at 

178:4–18.) She further testified that her mother indicated to her that she wanted to put in 

writing what she remembered happened and preserve it for the future. (Id. at 178:21–24.) 

As discussed above, this lack of a substantive reason for Escamilla’s delay in providing her

declaration renders it suspect. 

Finally, Barajas’ role in translating, drafting and notarizing Escamilla’s declaration 

 

the declaration, so in addition to translating and drafting the declaration, Barajas 

conveniently was able to notarize it as well for her mother. (See EHRT, vol. 1 at 36–37.) 

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calls its credibility into question. In an attempt to explain why Escamilla’s declaration 

referred to “the” gun instead of “a” gun, Barajas stressed how English is her second 

language, how she was not as proficient in English in 2009 as she is now, and how it is 

possible she mistranslated what her mother said. (Id. at 184:11–23, 185:11–18, 186:9–13, 

190:15–191:14, 192:5–7.) However, upon the Court’s review of Barajas’ recorded 

interview the night of the shooting, which was conducted entirely in English, it is apparent 

that she spoke English very well as far back as 2001. (See Exs. G, H.) The fact that she 

was willing to make statements to the contrary in an effort to prop up her mother’s 

declaration and Petitioner’s second shooter theory (1) casts doubt on the declaration’s

credibility as Barajas is the individual who translated, transcribed, and notarized it and 

(2) underscores the lengths Barajas is willing to go to help Petitioner obtain relief.35

The foregoing leads the Court to conclude that Escamilla’s declaration was not 

truthful and was prepared at the behest of her daughter and Petitioner’s ex-wife Sandy

Barajas in an attempt to present an exonerating witness in support of Petitioner’s habeas 

corpus petition. 

4. Conclusion 

Despite Escamilla testifying that the information contained in her declaration was 

accurate (EHRT, vol. 1 at 40:15–20), her testimony at the Hearing contradicted the 

declaration in numerous ways as set forth above. Further, the circumstances surrounding 

the creation of the declaration are questionable at best. The Court has considered, among 

other things, the manner in which she testified, her interest in the outcome of the case, and 

the reasonableness of her testimony in light of all of the evidence. Accordingly, 

 

35 Additionally, during her recorded police interview following the shooting, and while 

authorities were trying to find Petitioner, Barajas stated that Petitioner did not have a cell 

phone. (Ex. H at 32–33.) During Petitioner’s testimony at his trial, however, he stated that 

both he and Sandy had cell phones, they always carried them, and they frequently used 

them to communicate. (Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 735.) Such behavior demonstrates Barajas’ 

bias. See Model Civil Jury Instruction 1.14(5) (a witness’s bias impacts their credibility). 

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Escamilla’s account of events in her declaration (Ex. K) relied upon by the Ninth Circuit 

is not credible given the above circumstances. The Court does not find Escamilla to be a 

credible witness. 

b. Rubio’s Declaration is Inadmissible and Impeachable

In remanding this case for an evidentiary hearing, the Ninth Circuit also relied upon 

Rubio’s declaration which it described as follows: 

Rubio similarly saw several people surround Espinoza and “saw a gun being shot in 

the air.” “[E]veryone was trying to take control of [the gun]” and during the struggle, 

“a lot of gun shots were fired towards all directions.” Someone yelled that the police 

were coming, and everyone began to scramble. At that point, Rubio claimed that a 

“short male in the group” fired two shots “towards Arturo.” Rubio similarly told the 

defense investigator his story, “was told [he] would need to tell this to the courts,” 

but “never received a call or a time to appear.”

(Mem. Disp. at 4.) The Ninth Circuit later wrote that “Escamilla and Rubio both 

would have testified that someone got the gun away from Espinoza and fired it at 

Arturo . . . .”, and, “[w]e are convinced that Escamilla and Rubio’s testimony creates ‘a 

reasonable probability’ that ‘the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt as to 

[Petitioner’s] guilt...’” (Id. at 7–8.) As such, this Court was tasked with assessing Rubio’s 

credibility with respect to what he claims to have observed the night of the shooting and 

his communications with Ronis and/or Lopez as set forth in his declaration and relied upon 

by the Ninth Circuit. (See Ex. 28.) However, Rubio failed to present at the Hearing and 

the claims in his declaration have never been challenged by cross-examination. 

As discussed above, Petitioner’s counsel attempted to locate Rubio, the brother-inlaw to Sandy Barajas and son-in-law of Escamilla, to no avail. See Section IV.C. Without 

his testimony, his declaration is inadmissible to prove the truth of the statements asserted 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 802. Rules 801 and 802 provide that 

hearsay statements, i.e. those made outside of court that are offered into evidence to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted, are inadmissible unless they fall within a hearsay exception. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802. Accordingly, Rubio’s declaration is admissible only if it falls 

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within a hearsay exception. See Rule 803 (exceptions to hearsay rule regardless of whether 

declarant is available as witness); Rule 804 (exceptions to hearsay rule when declarant is 

unavailable as a witness). The parties have not provided and the Court does not find any 

of the hearsay exceptions to be present here. 

Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner bases his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

on the allegations set forth Rubio’s declaration, he cannot establish that counsel was 

ineffective or that he suffered any prejudice from counsel’s failure to call Rubio. See 

Pickens v. Chrones, No. CV 06-5297-JFW JC, 2010 WL 5392809, at *15 & n.17 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 14, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 06-5297 JFW JC, 2010 

WL 5423713 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010). Rubio’s declaration was not presented or 

discussed at the Hearing. Petitioner cannot use Rubio’s declaration to establish the facts 

asserted therein. “Issues of fact presented in habeas corpus proceedings may not be 

established by ex parte affidavits.” Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir.1964) 

(quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347, 349 n.4 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 

U.S. 832, (1963)), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1012 (1967). Affidavits may “only serve to make 

the issues which must be resolved by evidence taken in the usual way. They can have no 

other office. The witnesses who made them must be subjected to examination ore tenus or 

by deposition as are all other witnesses.” Wright, 336 F.2d at 882–83 (quoting Walker v. 

Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101 advisory committee’s 

note to subsection (d) (applying the federal rules of evidence to habeas corpus proceedings 

to the extent not inconsistent with the statute and citing Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 

(1941) and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963), which emphasizes “demeanor 

evidence as a significant factor . . . . in applications by state prisoners aggrieved by 

unconstitutional detentions”). Accordingly, Rubio’s declaration is inadmissible hearsay. 

However, given the Ninth Circuit’s heavy reliance on Rubio’s declaration, it is 

important to note it is plagued by many of the same issues as Escamilla’s declaration. 

Rubio’s declaration is thoroughly impeached by his prior inconsistent statement to 

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Sergeant Shephard at KP Hall immediately following the shooting on March 10, 2001. 

(Exs. A, N, L; EHRT, vol. 1 at 85:4–86:9.) Rubio told Sergeant Shephard right after the 

shooting the he was inside the hall and did not witness the shooting. (Exs. A [Officer’s 

Report of interview with Rubio and Escamilla], N [transcript of Sergeant Shephard’s 

March 10, 2001 interview with Rubio], L [recording of Sergeant Shephard’s March 10, 

2001 interview with Rubio]. Specifically, he did not see the guy that shot the victim, did 

not hear anything, and did not see anybody with a gun as he just came outside after the 

victim was already bleeding. (Ex. N.) More than eight years later, Rubio purportedly 

executed a declaration which told a completely contradictory account: that he saw a short 

male in the group fire two shots toward the victim. (Ex. 28). His declaration fails to 

address the stark discrepancy between the version of events therein and his police 

interview, and it fails to address the eight-year delay in telling this version. See Herrera, 

506 U.S. at 417–18 (“No satisfactory explanation has been given as to why the affiants 

waited until the 11th hour . . . .”); Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413–14 (“[I]t is . . . reasonable to 

presume that there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until 

after the 11th hour has passed.”). If Ronis called Rubio as a witness at trial, and assuming 

Rubio would have testified consistent with his declaration, such testimony would have been 

impeached by his prior inconsistent statement to the police at the time of the incident when 

the facts were freshest in his mind. 

The Court also notes that Rubio’s declaration was signed on June 2, 2009, three 

years after the trial and three days before Escamilla’s declaration was signed.

36

 (See Exs. 

K, 28.) And as stated above, if Rubio was a potential exonerating witness, surely Barajas 

would have provided his name to Attorney Smith, which she never did. (See Ex. P; EHRT, 

vol. 4 at 18:3–24.) Additionally, given Lopez’s statement that he had no recollection of a 

conversation with Rubio about a second shooter and would have followed up on 

 

36 Petitioner filed his initial petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme 

Court on August 31, 2009. (Lodgment 9.) 

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information about a second shooter, Rubio’s claim that he told Lopez about the supposed 

second gunman is not credible. (See Ex. J at 6–8.)

Finally, Rubio failed to attend the hearing and testify. (See EHRT, vols. 1–4.) 

Petitioner at no point has addressed this fact or attempted to explain why Rubio failed to 

appear. This leads the Court to reasonably infer that what Rubio purportedly signed off on 

in his declaration was not reliable. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Rubio’s 

declaration is not only inadmissible hearsay, but also is not credible. 

C. Deficiency of Trial Counsel 

In addition to remanding this case for an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the 

credibility of Rubio and Escamilla, the Ninth Circuit also remanded “for an evidentiary 

hearing on counsel’s failure to interview the two witnesses.” (Mem. Disp. at 5.) As 

discussed above (see Section III), this requires the Court to assess Strickland’s deficiency 

prong, and whether trial counsel was deficient in light of this Court’s assessment of 

Escamilla and Rubio’s credibility. (See id. at 9 [“Because there is no record about trial

counsel’s failure to investigate Escamilla and Rubio, there is an issue as to whether an 

evidentiary hearing on the matter is appropriate.”]; 12 [reversing and remanding “for an 

evidentiary hearing to consider whether trial counsel was deficient as well as Escamilla 

and Rubio’s credibility.”) Trial counsel’s additional purported deficiencies raised by

Petitioner are addressed below as well.

37

 

a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard

To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must prove that (1) his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and (2) he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 

 

37 While this Court does not view Petitioner’s claims regarding the “cowboy hat” witnesses 

and the defenses proffered at Petitioner’s trial to be within the scope of the Ninth Circuit’s 

remand, the arguments are addresses below for purposes of this Report and

Recommendation. 

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521 (2003). “Surmounting Strickland 's high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. 

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing both 

components. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259, 285–86 (2000).

To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was deficient, which “requires showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Review of counsel's 

performance is “highly deferential” and there is a “strong presumption” that counsel 

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment.” United 

States v. Ferreira–Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987); see Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 690. Strickland’s deficiency prong requires a showing that counsel’s performance was 

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690. A petitioner “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (citation omitted).

“‘The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124 (2009)

(citation omitted). Critically, the relevant inquiry under Strickland is not what defense 

counsel could have done, but whether counsel’s choices were reasonable. See Babbitt v. 

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1159 (1999).

Additionally, to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant has the burden of proving that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 

2000). Petitioner must show that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [petitioner] 

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Due to the difficulties inherent in making the above-described evaluation, there is a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

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professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 

610 (9th Cir.2004) (there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance 

and exercised reasonable professional judgment), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 934 (2005) 

(citation omitted). A habeas petitioner bears the burden to overcome the presumption that, 

under the circumstances, the challenged action constituted competent representation. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a failure to 

investigate and interview witnesses, “[c]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521–22. He must “at a 

minimum conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed decisions 

about how to best represent his client.” Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.

1994); Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 893 (9th Cir. 2010). This includes a duty to follow up 

on exculpatory evidence. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384–85 (1986) (counsel 

deficient for failing to conduct any pretrial discovery); see also Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 

1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (defense counsel’s duties include “a duty to investigate the 

defendant’s ‘most important defense,’ and a duty adequately to investigate and introduce 

into evidence records that demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on 

that question to undermine confidence in the verdict” (citations omitted)), amended by 253 

F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

However, “‘the duty to investigate and prepare a defense is not limitless,’ and . . . .‘it 

does not necessarily require that every conceivable witness be interviewed or that counsel 

must pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.’” Hamilton 

v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Stankewitz v. Woodford, 

365 F.3d 706, 719 (9th Cir. 2004). “To determine the reasonableness of a decision not to 

investigate, the court must apply ‘a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” 

Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“a particular decision not to 

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investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying 

a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”). “[S]trategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A disagreement with counsel’s tactical 

decisions does not prove that the representation was constitutionally deficient. United 

States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

“Few decisions a lawyer makes draw so heavily on professional judgment as whether 

or not to proffer a witness at trial. A witness’s testimony consists not only of the words he 

speaks or the story he tells, but also of his demeanor and reputation. A witness who appears 

shifty or biased and testifies to X may persuade the jury that not-X is true, and along the 

way cast doubt on every other piece of evidence proffered by the lawyer who puts him on 

the stand.” Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that excluding 

three alibi witnesses who would have testified to seeing the murder victim alive after 

defendant was alleged to have killed her, based solely on a vague and incorrect impression 

that police did not find them credible, was outside the “wide range of professionally 

competent assistance”). Critically, “[c]ounsel is not obligated to interview every witness 

personally in order to be adjudged to have performed effectively.” Id. at 1095 n.8 (citing

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1274 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998)

and Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Further, “the reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially 

influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions” because counsel’s actions are 

normally based on “informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information 

supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. As outlined in Strickland: 

In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically 

on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain 

potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the 

defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably 

diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel 

reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or 

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even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later

be challenged as unreasonable.

Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, a decision not to investigate, when a petitioner has 

provided counsel with information that such investigation is unnecessary, is not outside the 

range of reasonable trial decisions and does not amount to prejudice. Cf. Cox v. Del Papa, 

542 F.3d 669, 681–83 (9th Cir. 2008) (counsel’s decision not to investigate or present 

additional evidence regarding defendant’s drug use not deficient where defendant had 

continuously and strenuously protested any suggestions that his behavior was the result of 

his drug use).

Counsel need not put on an unpersuasive defense. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 610–

11 (holding that because mental-health expert’s evaluations did not support mental-state 

defense, counsel’s decision to not investigate further or pursue that defense was a 

reasonable strategic choice). Once counsel reasonably selects a defense theory, his duty to 

investigate a defense that directly conflicts with that theory ends. Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 

1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997); see Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(holding that once counsel “made the reasonable strategic decision” not to elicit testimony 

from a witness, “there was no need to investigate evidence corroborating that testimony”), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111 (1996); see also Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 18–20 (2009)

(suggesting that counsel’s decision to forego a defense because it would prompt the 

introduction of damaging evidence was not deficient). Critically, “the viability of the 

defense selected bears on the reasonableness of counsel’s actions.” Bohana v. Vaughn, 

389 Fed. App’x 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Turk, 116 F.3d at 1267). 

b. Ronis Was Not Deficient in Failing to Interview and Present the 

Testimony of Escamilla and Rubio 

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Applying de novo review, the Court finds that Ronis was not deficient in failing to 

interview Escamilla and Rubio38 as witnesses or to call them to testify. 

First, based on the evidence presented at the Hearing, Ronis had no reason to 

interview these two witnesses: their statements given to police at the time of the shooting 

did not point to a second shooter. Rubio told the police that he did not even witness the 

shooting. Escamilla first told the police that she saw Petitioner shoot the gun, and later 

told the police that she saw shots fired from a group of boys that included Petitioner. 

During these interviews, she never gave any indication she observed a second shooter. The 

Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that counsel is not deficient for failing to investigate 

matters to which they were never put on notice. See Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1174 (holding 

counsel’s failure to uncover defendant’s alleged family history of mental illness was not 

unreasonable and that defendant improperly focused on showing “what defense counsel 

could have presented, rather than upon whether counsel’s actions were reasonable”); 

Langford v Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1386–87 (9th Cir. 1996) (the “reasonableness of counsel’s 

actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements 

or actions”); Hensley v Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 186 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding failure to investigate 

insanity defense was not objectively unreasonable because a single police report in 

defendant’s record was not enough to put counsel on notice that such a defense may be 

appropriate).

Second, no evidence was presented at the Hearing that either Rubio or Escamilla 

ever told Ronis about a purported second shooter. 39 Ronis testified credibly that he was 

 

38 Petitioner presented no evidence at the Hearing that Ronis did not interview Rubio. As 

discussed above, Rubio did not present at the Hearing and his declaration is inadmissible 

hearsay. See Section VI.B.b. Further Ronis testified that any witness he felt was important 

to interview would have been interviewed. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 132:5–8.) 

39 This conclusion is supported by Petitioner’s appellate attorney Barbara Smith’s Hearing 

testimony that she thoroughly reviewed the contents of Ronis’ file and did not come across 

anything that would tend to corroborate Petitioner’s belated claims of another shooter. 

(EHRT, vol. 4 at 10:8–11:19, 15–17, 18:19–24, 29:23–25, 30:1–2.) Smith’s letters to 

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never contacted by Escamilla or Rubio about a second shooter and that if he was, he would 

have acted on that information because it was so different from his understanding of the 

evidence. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 121:3–12; EHRT, vol. 3 at 19:25–20:4; Ex. I at 12:18–13:1, 

17:25–18:5, 28:1–15.) He stated that even if there were witnesses willingness to testify 

that someone else had committed the offense but they had made prior inconsistent 

statements to the police, Ronis testified he would still have interviewed those witnesses. 

(Ex. I at 19:1–18.) As discussed above, Rubio’s declaration is not admissible for the truth 

of the matter asserted and is impeached by his prior inconsistent statements to the police 

on the night of the shooting. Even so, in his declaration Rubio claims that he told the 

version of events contained in his declaration to Ronis’ “helper,” Juan. (Ex. 28.) While 

he could not recall Rubio or Escamilla, investigator Juan Lopez testified that that type of

information would never have stopped with him.40 (EHRT, vol. 1 at 167:19–168:7.) Rubio 

never claimed to have told the story directly to Ronis. (Ex. 28.) As regards Escamilla, her 

own testimony at the Hearing demonstrates she did not actually inform Ronis about a 

second shooter. She claims to have called Ronis several times and left messages, but she 

admitted that she did not leave any details on those messages.41 (EHRT, vol. 1 at 51:7–

22.) While Escamilla claims in her declaration that she told Lopez that Petitioner did not 

shoot the victim, she admitted at the hearing that she did not tell Lopez about the other man 

she claims to have seen shoot the gun. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 50:24–51:1, 51:23–52:1.) As such, 

 

Petitioner during his direct appeal repeatedly informed him that his claims of another 

shooter were not borne out by the evidence in the file, and that in her opinion and review 

of the file, Ronis had not failed to follow up on any exculpatory leads. (See Ex. P.)

40 Lopez further testified that if he was working on a case with Ronis and a witness 

contacted him claiming to have seen someone other than Ronis’ client do the shooting, he 

would not have ignored that information and would have relayed it to Ronis and prepared 

a report if Ronis asked him to.

41 Escamilla’s declaration is vague in this regard and does not assert that she told Ronis 

about a second shooter. (See Ex. K.) 

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even if the Court accepts Escamilla’s testimony as true, there is no evidence that Ronis was 

ever actually informed about a purported second shooter.42 

Moreover, even if Ronis had been made aware of Escamilla and Rubio’s claims of 

a second shooter, deciding to call them as trial witnesses would have opened them up to 

impeachment by their prior inconsistent statements to the police. See Fed. R. Evid. 613. 

Further, their testimony would have contradicted Petitioner’s testimony of having acted 

accidentally and in self-defense. And as confirmed by Ronis at the Hearing, it would not 

have been advisable to put on testimony that is perjured or fabricated or inconsistent with 

all the other reports and facts of the case.43 (ECF No. 122 at 43:21–44:14); see Restatement 

(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 120(1) (2000) (“A lawyer may not: (a) knowingly 

counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely or otherwise to offer false evidence; (b) 

knowingly make a false statement of fact to the tribunal; (c) offer testimony or other 

evidence as to an issue of fact known by the lawyer to be false.”); id. § 120(3) (“A lawyer 

may refuse to offer testimony or other evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false, 

even if the lawyer does not know it to be false.”). Here, such testimony could have 

prejudiced Petitioner in that the jurors may have viewed it as having been fabricated in 

order to help the Petitioner. Such testimony would have also created confusion since 

Petitioner testified to a completely different version of what had occurred. 

 

42 See Section VI.B.a.1. wherein the Court finds Escamilla never informed Lopez or Ronis 

about a purported second shooter and that her declaration on this point is not credible. This 

conclusion is further bolstered by Barajas’ testimony that Escamilla did not inform her of 

the second shooter until 2009. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 188:15–25.) It also aligns with the fact 

that Petitioner’s appellate attorney observed investigative reports in Ronis’ case file, none 

of which produced any exonerating witnesses. (EHRT, vol. 4 at 10:8–17, 11:10–19 26:10–

20, 27:13–28:1; Ex. P at 38.) 

43 See Exhibit M. Additionally, the Court notes that a forensic specialist testified for the 

prosecution at trial that eight nine-millimeter shell casings and a bullet fragment were 

recovered from the crime scene, and a criminologist specializing in firearms testified that 

they were all fired from the same nine-millimeter gun. (See Lodgment 2, vol. 4 at 542–43, 

565–78.) 

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Indeed, Strickland provides that:

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made 

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 

from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in 

making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy.

466 U.S. at 689. Applying the Strickland presumption, this Court finds given the risks 

detailed above, the decision not to call Escamilla and Rubio to testify, even if counsel had 

been made aware of their claims that they witnessed a second shooter injure the victim,

was sound trial strategy on the part of Ronis. Ronis reasonably relied on Escamilla and 

Rubio’s statements to police which in no way exculpated Petitioner. See (Exs. A, B, M.) 

Failure to interview a witness is not incompetent where defense counsel knows the witness’

account. Eggleston, 798 F.2d at 376 (failure to interview not ineffective where counsel 

had access to witness’ statements taken by government, supporting documents, and FBI 

reports); Anderson v. Ducart, No. 11-CV-02636-JST (PR), 2015 WL 694767, at *13 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb. 18, 2015) (holding defense counsel reasonably relied on detective’s report and 

taped interview with potential witness whose DNA from a bloodstain linked him to car 

involved in commission of murder), aff’d, 708 F. App’x 905 (9th Cir. 2017). Ronis stated 

numerous times he reviewed all reports. (Ex I at 13:8–14; EHRT, vol. 1 at 126:20–127:1, 

131:20–23 [“there’s no question in my mind that I read every report and I was familiar 

with it at the time”]; EHRT, vol. 3 at 6:6–8, 7:2–4.) Thus the Court finds that Ronis 

reasonably relied on Rubio’s statement in Sergeant Shephard’s report that he was inside 

during the shooting and did not see who shot the victim. (Ex. A.) Further, he reasonably 

relied on Escamilla’s statement documented in Sergeant Shephard’s report that she saw 

Petitioner shoot the gun and her subsequent statements memorialized in Sergeant Cordero’s 

report. (Exs. A, B.) Additionally, as testified to by Petitioner’s appellate attorney Smith, 

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there were investigate reports attributable to Petitioner’s former trial counsel Bartick; to 

the extent they involved statements from Escamilla and Rubio the Court can reasonably 

infer, Ronis reasonably relied upon those reports as well. (See EHRT, vol. 4 at 26:10–20, 

27:13–28:1.) Accordingly, Ronis’ decision to not interview Escamilla and Rubio to present 

their second shooter testimony at trial was reasonable. 

c. Ronis’ Decision to Not Further Investigate and Present the Testimony 

of the “Cowboy Hat” Witnesses44 at Trial was Reasonable

Petitioner also alleges that Ronis was deficient in failing to interview and proffer 

testimony from the small subset of witnesses who described the shooter as wearing a 

cowboy hat or sombrero the night of the shooting and the one witness who described the 

shooter as possibly of Asian descent (collectively, the “cowboy hat” witnesses). Petitioner 

argues that the investigation of these witnesses would have resulted in Ronis being able to 

proffer a “second shooter” defense, a claim which is discussed below. He argues that Ronis 

conducted no investigation and interviewed no witnesses regarding Petitioner’s case. 

First, the Court disagrees with Petitioner’s characterization of trial counsel Jan 

Ronis’ testimony at the Hearing. Throughout his post-trial brief, Petitioner states that 

“Ronis himself admitted he did not interview any witnesses. (ECF No. 122, at 8, 11–12, 

43.)” (ECF No. 157 at 23, 26 [“Ronis investigation was incomplete – he failed to interview 

any witnesses . . . .”].) Petitioner attempts to paint a picture that Ronis failed to conduct 

any investigation in this matter at all. (ECF No. 157 at 22.) That is not correct. See Section 

IV.F. As recounted in the Court’s summary of Ronis’ testimony, he testified that over the 

course of his investigation he reviewed all police reports and his investigator interviewed 

witnesses that were at the scene. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 126:20–127:1.) He stated numerous 

 

44Daniel Alatorre was the only “cowboy hat” witness who testified at the Hearing that he 

was not interviewed by Ronis. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the other 

“cowboy hat” witnesses were not interviewed. Further, Ronis testified that any witness he 

felt was important to interview would have been interviewed. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 132:5–8.) 

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times that he does not have an independent recollection of interviewing witnesses before 

Petitioner’s trial. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 9 [“Well, my memory is that I don’t have any 

independent recollection, myself, having personally interviewed somebody. That doesn’t 

mean I didn’t. It’s been a long time.”]; 11–12 [But I just don’t have any independent 

recollection of myself having, as part of pretrial investigation, interviewed anybody. That 

certainly doesn’t exclude the likelihood that reports were presented to me by investigator -

- investigator or investigators and that I certainly read at the time.”].) However, that does 

not negate the possibility that his investigator interviewed them or that he himself did not 

personally interview someone. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 4–5; 9, 11–12.) And he testified that any 

witness he felt was important to interview would have been interviewed. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 

132:5–8.) Additionally, “there’s no question in [his] mind that [he] read every report and

[he] was familiar with it at the time.” (EHRT, vol. 1 at 131:20–23.) Further, he testified 

that had many conversations with Petitioner about the events and he never mentioned that 

there was a second shooter; he in fact told Ronis that he shot the victim. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 

122:10–14; EHRT, vol. 3 at 15:23–16:25.) 

Second, Petitioner argues that Ronis “failed to even speak to the witnesses who had 

seen, and were willing to testify, that someone other than [Petitioner] shot [the 

victim] . . . .” (ECF No. 157 at 29.) Once again, this is an inaccurate characterization of 

the evidence before the Court.45 The “cowboy hat” witnesses, three of whom were young 

children at the time of the shooting, did not tell police that they saw multiple shooters. 

None of these individuals made statements to police indicating they would testify to the 

fact that someone other than Petitioner was the shooter, as is evidenced by the fact that 

Olivia Addison was called to testify by the prosecution at trial. (See Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 

 

45 To the extent Petitioner is referring to Escamilla and Rubio, they never informed Ronis 

that they witnessed someone other than Petitioner shooting a gun and were willing to testify 

as such.

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435–60.)46 Instead, their descriptions of the individual they saw shooting, other than the 

mention of him wearing a hat, are consistent with Petitioner’s overall appearance that night 

based on statements made to police by those who knew Petitioner and based on Petitioner’s 

own trial testimony. Further, Olivia Addison testified during Petitioner’s trial that “there 

was only one person with a gun.” (Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 448:22–24 [emphasis added].) 

Thus, she would not have testified to the fact that there was a second shooter to corroborate 

the version of events contained in Escamilla and Rubio’s declarations as Petitioner would 

have the Court believe. 

Additionally, as is evidenced by the parties October 2, 2017 Joint Pre-Hearing Brief, 

Petitioner anticipated calling all the “cowboy hat” witnesses at the Hearing. (ECF No. 82 

at 10 [Petitioner’s witness list, which includes Guadalupe “Lupe” Barrera twice].) The 

Court continued the Hearing and extended the discovery period so as to allow Petitioner’s 

counsel to contact this group of witnesses. (See ECF No. 84–86.) However, Daniel 

Alatorre was the sole witness from this group willing to testify, via videoconference, at the 

Hearing.47 To say now that these witnesses “were willing to testify, that someone other 

than [Petitioner] shot [the victim] . . . .” is an overstatement at best. (See ECF No. 157 at 

29.) 

Petitioner argues that “[t]he failure to investigate is especially egregious when a 

defense attorney fails to consider potentially exculpatory evidence”, quoting Rios v. Rocha, 

299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002), but again that is not what occurred here. As Ronis 

described during the Hearing, “[i]t’s not uncommon for people to misidentify and to 

attribute clothing and facial hair and things that other witnesses contradict.” (EHRT, vol. 

 

46 Olivia Addison testified during Petitioner’s trial that there was only one person with a 

gun. (Lodgment. 2, vol. 3 at 448:22–24.) She did not provide a description of the shooter 

at trial. (Id. at 435–60.) 

47 Given that Alatorre is the son and brother of two of the other “cowboy hat” witnesses, it

seems unlikely the Petitioner’s counsel was unable to contact Olivia and Jesse Addison to 

ask them to testify at the Hearing. 

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3 at 45:15–21.) When the statements of the “cowboy hat” witnesses are read within the 

context of Exhibit M, the Court finds it apparent that this is what happened here – a small 

group of witnesses, many of whom were children, provided information slightly different 

than other witnesses. Their statements do not lend credence to the existence of a second 

shooter; they merely show witness misattribution or misidentification. 

This is not an instance where “trial counsel had at [his] fingertips information that 

could have undermined the prosecution’s case, yet he chose not to develop this evidence 

and use it at trial.”

48 Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999). Ronis testified at 

the Hearing that he does not believe there was any credible evidence or reports of another 

shooter based upon the reports he had at the time he represented Petitioner. (EHRT vol. 3

at 38:21–39:2 [“I don’t think there were any reports that would credibly indicate another 

shooter involved.”) This would necessarily include his review of the “cowboy hat” witness 

statements. After reviewing the witness statements contained in Exhibit M, and in light of

appellate counsel’s review of Ronis’ case file in which she found no witness statements 

indicating that there was a second shooter, the Court finds that the objective evidence 

supports Ronis’ conclusion that the “cowboy hat” witnesses would not have provided 

credible evidence of another shooter. 

Petitioner points to the few “cowboy hat” witnesses, highlighting Daniel Alatorre, 

in an attempt to cast doubt on the theory that Petitioner was the only shooter. (ECF No. 

157 at 17–19.) With respect to Alatorre, in addition to being only twelve years old at the 

time of the shooting, the Court notes that he observed the shooting in the dark from his 

 

48 Ronis was in no way put on notice about Escamilla and Rubio’s change to the version of 

events they witnessed during the shooting. Further, this is not an instance where counsel 

“offered no persuasive justification” for his strategic choices. Lord, 184 F.3d at 1096. The 

basis for Ronis’ decision to not interview Escamilla and Rubio regarding the second 

shooter and present their testimony at trial was clear: they never informed him that they 

witnessed a second shooter and their prior police statements did not support that version of 

events.

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front porch and then from his living room, approximately 25 to 30 feet away from the 

incident. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 18, 19:22–20:4.)

49

 Alatorre said the shooter was wearing a 

white cowboy hat and a white shirt, but he could not remember what his face looked like. 

(EHRT, vol. 1 at 19:1–2, 22:17–20.) He also mistakenly testified that he saw the shooter 

in custody; when questioned further about that assertion, he said “it’s a little blurry” and 

that he “can’t really recall.” (Id. at 24:12–16.) The Court finds that the foregoing calls 

into question Alatorre’s credibility regarding his perception of events the night of the 

shooting.

Petitioner cites to a string of cases including Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th 

Cir. 2003) and Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 2003) to argue that counsel was 

deficient for failing to interview Escamilla, Rubio, and the “cowboy hat” witnesses. 

However, in these cases there was no evidence in the record to explain why potential 

defense witnesses were not contacted. See Alcala, 334 F.3d at 870–71; Riley, 352 F.3d at

1317. As discussed above, Ronis was never made aware of the fact that Escamilla and 

Rubio claimed to witness a second shooter. Further, he was in possession of and reviewed 

police reports in which Escamilla gave varying accounts of what she witnessed, at first 

placing the gun in Petitioners hands and then subsequently claiming to not know who shot 

the gun, and Rubio claimed to see nothing. Thus, this is unlike cases such as Lord v. Wood, 

184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) in which counsel’s stated reason for disputing purported 

witnesses’ credibility was not supported by objective evidence. Here, Ronis’ decision to 

not put Escamilla or Rubio on the stand to claim someone else shot the victim is reasonable 

 

49 The shooting occurred at approximately 7:30 p.m. on March 10, 2001. According to the 

websites timeanddate.com, on Saturday, March 10, 2001, the sun set in National City at 

5:52 p.m. See https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/@5376200?month=3&year=2001 

(updated Jan. 20, 2020). The Court takes judicial notice that it was dark outside at that 

time. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Futi v. United States, No. 08-00403JMS/LEK, 2010 WL 

2900328, at 23, n. 12 (D. Haw. July 22, 2010) (“The court may take judicial notice of the 

time of sunrise for a particular day.”).

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given their contradictory prior police statements, which would have left them susceptible 

to impeachment. 

While the Court finds that Petitioner’s arguments about the witnesses who observed 

the shooter wearing a cowboy hat or being of Asian descent are outside the scope of the

remand, those outlying statements are far overshadowed by the multiple witnesses who 

were present at the party, knew the Petitioner and specifically named him as the shooter.

50

 

Further the only witness who told police that the shooter may have been of Asian descent

was a ten-year-old girl playing outside who said the shooter looked angry and like he was 

squinting his eyes. (See Ex. M, at 40, 69.) Every other witness statement described the 

suspect as a Hispanic male, except one other witness, Daniel Alatorre’s nine-year old 

brother who said the suspect looked “similar to a White male.” (See generally Ex. M; id.

at 11.) 

As Ronis stated at the Hearing, “[i]t’s not uncommon for people to misidentify and 

to attribute clothing and facial hair and things that other witnesses contradict. So I can’t 

reconcile inconsistent statements in-between witnesses but based upon everything I knew 

about the case I proffered the evidence, I proffered the defense which I thought was 

credible.” 51 (ECF No. 122 at 45:15–21); see Parker v Tilton, 255 Fed. App’x 252 (9th Cir. 

2007) (“a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness 

in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”; 

noting “the defense played the hand as well as it could be played”). Accordingly, the Court 

 

50 The witness statements are discussed above in Section IV.J. and below in Section 

VI.C.d. 

51 Escamilla testified at the hearing that the shooter wore black clothing and a black Texas 

cowboy type hat. Assuming Escamilla if called at trial would have testified to this 

description, such testimony would have directly contradicted Alatorre. Such a 

contradiction at a minimum demonstrates the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications. It 

would have been another sound tactical reason for Ronis not to have pursued a second 

shooter defense based upon such apparent inaccuracies. 

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finds Ronis’ decision to not further investigate this string of “cowboy hat” witnesses 

regarding a potential second shooter defense to be reasonable. 

d. Ronis Was Not Deficient for Presenting Defenses of Self-Defense and 

Accident at Trial 

Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s remand to apply the deficiency prong to trial 

counsel Ronis’ alleged failure to interview declarants Rubio and Escamilla, this Court also 

finds that Ronis’ actions in not presenting a second shooter defense were reasonable, the 

decision was based on sound trial strategy, and it does not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. This is not a case where counsel selected a defense without an adequate 

investigation of an alternative available defense. All the evidence available to Ronis at the 

time of trial overwhelmingly pointed to Petitioner as the shooter—Ronis stressed 

repeatedly, as did Petitioner’s appellate counsel, that there was no factual basis for a second 

shooter defense to be presented at trial. (See EHRT, vol. 3 at 38:21–39:2; EHRT, vol 4 at 

39:12–23; Ex. P at 38.) 

Petitioner cites to several Ninth Circuit cases which found counsel ineffective for 

failing to investigate and present alternative defenses. However, in those instances, the 

defenses selected were not viable and there were multiple witnesses that counsel failed to 

investigate who would have easily yielded contradictory evidence to the selected defenses. 

See Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 

966, 978 (9th Cir. 2001); Rios, 299 F.3d at 806; Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1455. Such is not the 

case here. As discussed above, the second shooter accounts provided by Escamilla and 

Rubio are not credible, and the “cowboy hat” witness descriptions of the shooter are 

seemingly instances of witness misattribution or misidentification. 

Given the information provided by Petitioner to Ronis and the eye-witness accounts 

discussed below, the Court finds that Ronis reasonably chose the self-defense and accident 

theories of the case and was justified in not pursuing an entirely different defense of a 

second shooter. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (counsel need not pursue investigation 

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after making “a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary”); see 

also Williams, 384 F.3d at 611 (“Having reasonably selected an alibi defense as the primary 

defense theory, [counsel] no longer had a duty to investigate a conflicting mental-state

defense”); Turk, 116 F.3d at 1267 (once counsel “reasonably selected the self-defense 

theory, his duty to investigate the competency defense, which directly conflicted with the 

self-defense theory, ended”).

A second shooter defense not only was contradicted by the bulk of the evidence (see

Exhibit M), but also contradicted Petitioner’s own statements to Ronis. Petitioner told 

Ronis that he “was the guy with the gun” and that he was the sole shooter; critically, he 

never told Ronis that there was a second shooter. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 131:10–14, 122:12–14;

EHRT vol. 3, 15:23–16:5,); see Langford, 110 F.3d at 1387 (no ineffective assistance for 

failure to investigate where client failed to tell attorney about relevant facts). As held by 

the Ninth Circuit in Turk v White, “[a]s Strickland suggests, once [Ronis] reasonably 

selected the self-defense theory, his duty to investigate the [second shooter] defense, which 

directly conflicted with the self-defense theory, ended.” 116 F.3d at 1267. Indeed, 

“[c]ounsel’s performance . . . is not deficient if [he] reasonably decides to limit the 

investigation. Counsel may reasonably base investigation decisions on information 

supplied by the defendant.” Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91). 

Petitioner cites Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) to argue that counsel 

cannot rely on a defendant to provide information and a duty to investigate exists 

“regardless of the accused admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting 

guilt . . . .”

52

 (ECF No. 157 at 21–22.) However, Rompilla does not support such a broad 

proposition in this context. In Rompilla, the Court stated that “the duty to investigate does 

 

52 Note, this language is quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice guidelines. See

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (quoting 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4.1 (2d ed. 

1982 Supp.)). 

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not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; 

reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further 

investigation would be a waste.” 545 U.S. at 383. The case in Rompilla turned on 

counsel’s failure to examine the court file from the defendant’s prior conviction, which the 

prosecution itself twice had brought to the attorney’s attention and which was readily 

obtainable. Id. at 383–84. Here, assuming arguendo that there was a second shooter, 

Petitioner chose to deliberately misinform Ronis that he was the sole individual with a gun 

and he shot the victim. Given that information, and in light of the evidence discussed 

below, Ronis’ presentation of self-defense and accident theories and curbing his 

investigation of a possible second shooter defense was reasonable. See Burger v. Kemp,

483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (limited investigation reasonable because witnesses brought to 

counsel’s attention provided predominantly harmful information); Rodelas v. Arnold, No. 

14-CV-05017-JST, 2016 WL 4073307, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (finding Rompilla

inapplicable as “Petitioner deliberately failed to inform his counsel that he learned of the 

restraining order” at issue in failure to investigate claim.) 

In addition to Petitioner’s own statements to Ronis in which he admitted to shooting 

the victim, nine other witnesses specifically named “Roger Espinoza,” “Roger,” or 

“Rogelio Espinoza” as the person they saw shoot the gun and/or they positively identified 

him as the person they saw shoot the gun in statements given to police.53 Those witnesses 

were: Roman Rodriguez Rubio, Eva Gallegos, Joaquina Soltero, the victim Pedro Arturo 

Rivera, Norma Soltero, Silvia Escamilla (in her first police interview), Adan Rivera, Juan 

Bolanos, and Herman Lopez. (See Ex. M.) 

Roman Rodriguez Rubio told police that he was standing in between Petitioner and 

Arturo Rivera trying to push them apart. He said the shots were fired by Petitioner right 

next to Rubio’s head; his ears were ringing as a result. Rubio said Petitioner pointed the 

 

53 This is notwithstanding the fact that during Petitioner’s trial testimony, he admitted to 

shooting the gun accidentally and in self-defense. (Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 701:13–712:20.) 

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gun up in the air while Rubio was standing right next to him and fired about five rounds. 

Rubio ran away and looked back and saw Espinoza standing still and aiming his gun in the 

direction Arturo had run – he fired about three rounds in that same direction. (See Ex. M, 

at 47–48, 69–70.) 

Eva Gallegos saw Petitioner holding a small silver or chrome gun in his right hand 

and saw him fire the gun twice into the air. She also positively identified him from a 1995 

booking photo. (Ex. M at 36, 62.)

Joaquina Soltero said she saw Petitionershooting directly at the victim and following 

him with the gun. She said he shot the gun approximately ten times. (Id. at 24–25, 37, 52–

53.)

The victim, Pedro Arturo Rivera, told police that Petitioner came running toward 

them with a gun in his hand and heard him “click it.” He then fired one round into the 

ground. He then fired two to three more rounds into the air while looking at Pedro and 

saying “yeah! Yeah! What now?! What now?!” Pedro put one of Petitioner’s friends in 

between Petitioner and himself to use the friend as a shield. Petitioner chased him around 

the friend in circles a few times. Pedro then ran away and Petitioner chased him, shooting 

at him. He shot and missed. Pedro ran behind a car but people were already hiding there. 

He kept running and looked back to see Petitioner chasing him with the gun in his right 

hand. He ran and turned around to see Petitioner shoot at him again. He saw the muzzle 

flash, and felt a pain in his head like he had run into a metal pole. He continued to walk 

for five yards and then collapsed. (Id. at 26, 75–77.)

Norma Soltero told police that she came outside of the hall and saw Petitioner

holding a silver gun in his right hand. At first he had it pointed down, he was holding onto 

someone going in circles and Espinoza shot the gun in the air three to four times. She saw 

Petitioner shoot at the victim’s feet area once, then the victim was running away and 

Petitioner shot at him. She looked away to gather her kids and looked back and saw the 

victim fall to the ground. (Id. at 25 27, 72–74.)

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As discussed above, Silvia Escamilla told Sgt. Shephard in an interview at the scene 

that she saw Petitioner shoot the gun into the air. (Ex. A.)

Adan Rivera told police that Petitioner had a full-size semi-automatic gun in his 

hand. He initially had it up in the air – he fired one or two shots into the air and then 

pointed it at Adan and then the crowd. Adan Rivera ran and turned to see Petitioner firing 

the gun numerous times in the direction of the crowd, about ten to fifteen times. (Ex. M at

56–58, 64–66.)

Juan Bolanos told police that he was at the party standing outside the hall when he 

heard several sounds of gunshots. He saw “Sandy’s husband, [Petitioner] firing a 

handgun,” holding the gun in his right hand. He said Petitioner was recklessly firing the 

gun in different directions. Bolanos was five feet away from Petitioner during the shooting. 

He saw the muzzle flash. He estimated hearing five or more shots fired. He ran back into 

the hall for safety and did not see Petitioner shoot anyone. He did see the victim injured. 

He told police he was afraid of retaliation from Petitioner. (Id. at 79–80.)

Herman Lopez told police that he heard seven to eight gunshots come from outside. 

He stood up and saw Petitioner holding a handgun in his right hand. He saw Petitioner

running from the hall and get into the passenger side of a blue Mazda that made a U-turn 

and drove away. (Id. at 80.)

Further, five witnesses to the shooting who did not know Petitioner’s name, Jose 

Sanchez, Antoinette Gonzalez, Daniel Alatorre, Beginia Carillo, and Olivia Addison, 

described the shooter as a thin Hispanic male in keeping with Petitioner’s then-physical 

description. See Section IV.J. 

The Ninth Circuit did not have the benefit of knowing these witness statements were 

contained in the police reports Ronis reviewed prior to Petitioner’s trial. Ronis testified 

repeatedly during his deposition and at the Hearing that he believed self-defense was the 

best defense available to Petitioner and all evidence available to Ronis pointed to those 

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facts, including the police reports. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 17:1–5, Ex. I at 8:15–9:3.) 54 Further, 

Ronis stated that he would not have proffered a self-defense theory without investigating 

all other possible defenses. (Ex. I at 17:15–24.) 

His belief that there was only one shooter was based on the investigative reports, his 

conversations with Petitioner, the defense they chose, and the absence of any other credible 

evidence pointing to another shooter. (Id. at 28:23–29:6, 42:3–17.) Critically, Petitioner 

told him that he was the lone shooter who shot the victim. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 15:23–16:5.) 

He saw Petitioner several times in jail, discussed the shooting, and both felt Petitioner had 

a good self-defense argument. (Id. at 16:18–17:5.) When asked to justify his self-defense 

theory, Ronis stated that “the credible evidence was that he – there was a gun in his hand. 

People described the gun in his hand. People described him, you know, taking shots, as I 

recall. And you know, it seemed to me that was a far more credible defense than somebody 

else did it.” (Ex. I at 48:20–49:7.) For these reasons, a second shooter defense was simply 

not credible and if presented could have resulted in backlash from the jury regarding 

Petitioner’s attempted murder charge, which the jury hung on. See Bohana, 389 F. App’x 

at 602 (“the viability of the defense selected bears on the reasonableness of counsel’s 

actions.”); (see Ex. I at 31:14–32:6 [Ronis explaining that if there were reports stating that 

witnesses said the shooter was Asian, and they appeared to be credible and stronger than 

the defenses he eventually offered, he would have pursued it]). 

When asked whether he would have chosen a different defense if he had information 

indicating that the description of the shooter was different than that of Petitioner, Ronis 

said he would have if it was “really credible evidence that outweighed the other defense,” 

but that his recollection was that the credible defense is the one that was asserted. (Ex. I at 

37:1–9.) He stated that even if he had interviewed witnesses and they had described 

 

54 The Court finds Ronis credibly testified that he reviewed all of the police reports and 

was familiar with them at the time of the trial. (EHRT, vol. 1 at 131:20–23; Ex. I at 13:8–

14.) 

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someone wearing a cowboy hat, he would still have gone with his chosen defenses. 

(EHRT, vol. 1 at 130:1–6, 144:9–16.) Even though some witnesses testified to someone 

wearing a cowboy hat, he still felt that he had chosen the most credible defense. (Id. at 

144:9–16.) 

Petitioner argues that Ronis “chose and utilized weak and inconsistent defenses, selfdefense and accidental shooting – and overtly conceded that the firearm that inflicted the 

injury to the victim was in [Petitioner]’s hand . . . .” (ECF No. 157 at 27.) Ronis stated 

during his deposition that it is his practice to pull the relevant jury instructions when he 

gets a case as part of his preparations for discussions with his client. (Ex. I at 58:18–22.) 

He would have researched relevant legal issues during his representation of Petitioner. (Id.

at 58:10–13.) Thus, he would have been fully aware of the nature of the charges against 

Petitioner and the relationship between his proffered defenses of self-defense and accident. 

Despite this information Ronis had before him, Petitioner claims that Ronis’ 

proffered theories of self-defense and the accidental shooting would have had no impact

on the mayhem charge and the attendant personal use of a firearm enhancement under 

Penal Code § 12022.53(d), as they put the gun causing the injury in Petitioner’s hand and 

foreclosed that any other person inflicted the injury.55 (ECF No. 157 at 28.) He proceeds 

to argue that “the most serious charge here was the firearm enhancement under Penal Code

§ 12022.53(d)” because it required the imposition of a mandatory 25-year-to-life 

sentence.56 (ECF No. 157 at 23 n.9.) Left unstated by Petitioner, the firearm enhancement 

 

55 Petitioner also argues that “according to the prosecution’s theory, [Petitioner] was 

running after the victim and shooting as the victim was running away” making “it virtually 

impossible to support a perfect self-defense.” (ECF No. 157 at 28.) However, such logic 

assumes that the jury would automatically believe the prosecution’s theory of events. 

Petitioner testified to another version of events, in which he stated that he did not intend to 

shoot anyone in alignment with accident and self defense theories. The jury was properly 

instructed as to these defenses, they just did not find Petitioner’s version of events credible. 

56 California law has since changed to permit courts to strike or dismiss an enhancement 

otherwise required to be imposed by this section at sentencing or resentencing. Cal. Penal 

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under Penal Code § 12022.53(d) was charged as an enhancement to both the Count 1 

attempted murder and the Count 2 mayhem charges. 

Critically, before considering the firearm enhancement, jurors would have first had 

to find Petitioner guilty of either one of the underlying offenses, attempted murder or 

mayhem. If the jurors accepted Petitioner’s version of events and found the defenses of 

accident and/or self defense credible, they never would have even addressed the 

applicability of the firearm enhancement under Penal Code § 12022.53(d). As the jurors 

were instructed, accident and self defense were complete defenses to both mayhem and 

attempted murder.57 The trial court judge clarified with counsel prior to instructing the 

jury that actual self-defense and accident applied to all three charges, with imperfect selfdefense applying only to the attempted murder charge. (Lodgment 2, vol. 6 RT at 788:5–

13.) This is in keeping with the instructions charged to the jury. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 

173–75 [stating defendant not guilty of mayhem or attempted murder, amongst other

charges, if he acted accidentally or used force against another person in self-defense].) 

Further, the jury was instructed that attempted murder, mayhem, and the firearm 

enhancement under Penal Code § 12022.53(d)58 all had a heightened intent requirement of 

 

Code § 12022.53(h) (as effective Jan. 1, 2019). This authority “applies to any resentencing 

that may occur pursuant to any other law.” Id.

57 Further, imperfect self-defense would have reduced attempted murder to attempted 

voluntary manslaughter as the jury was instructed. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 169.)

58 The enhancement for intentionally and personally discharging a firearm under Penal 

Code § 12022.53(d) requires showing that the “defendant intended to discharge the 

firearm”. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 171 [Instruction 3149. Personally Used Firearm: 

Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death].) As acknowledged by the trial court judge 

with regard to the enhancement under Penal Code § 12022.53(d)), “because a gun was fired 

at someone if it was done accidentally, it would not meet the elements of that offense.” 

(Lodgment 2, vol. 6 at 744:17–22, 775:8–28. 778:7–19 [discussing the mental state 

required for section 12022.53 and adding into the instruction that the individual must intend 

for the gun to go off].) This is a lesser intent requirement than mayhem, which requires 

more than just intent to pull the trigger of the gun. (See Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 170 

[Instruction 801. Mayhem].) 

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“specific intent or mental state” and that to be guilty of these offenses “a person must not 

only intentionally commit the prohibited act, but must do so with a specific intent or mental 

state.” (Lodgment 1 vol. 2 at 163 [Instruction 252. Union of Act and Intent: General and 

Specific Intent Together].) Jurors were further instructed that mayhem required the 

defendant to have acted “unlawfully and maliciously”, with maliciously defined as when 

someone “intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent 

to annoy or injure someone.” (Id. at 170 [Instruction 801. Mayhem].) 

Thus, there is nothing to support Petitioner’s statement that accident (and selfdefense) was not a complete defense to mayhem because the jury was instructed as to the 

heightened intent requirement. If jurors had believed Petitioner’s version of events, selfdefense and/or accident were complete defenses to the charged crimes. As Ronis 

acknowledged, the two defenses could have gone hand-in-hand based on the reports of 

shots being fired into the air and into the ground. (Ex. I at 27:13–24.) This is an instance 

in which Ronis “made an informed decision to present an imperfect, but well-prepared 

[self-defense/accident defense], rather than a weak alternative defense [i.e., second shooter 

defense] (or no defense) . . . .” Contra Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1165–66 (9th 

Cir. 2015).

Petitioner avers that had counsel “investigated and developed alternative defense 

theories” he might have not elected to testify. (ECF No. 157 at 29.) Petitioner did not take 

the stand during the Hearing to attest to the fact that he would have elected to pursue a 

second shooter theory and would not have testified.59 Regardless, he argues that had he 

 

59 Ronis did not recall the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s decision to take the stand 

and testify but he knows there were discussions about it. (Ex. I at 39:15–21.) Ronis saw 

Petitioner several times in jail. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 16:18–25.) They discussed the events 

and felt Petitioner had a good self-defense argument. Ronis explained an attorney cannot 

“proffer a self-defense argument unless the person [they] are representing was truly the 

mechanism of injury and [Petitioner] told [him] the circumstances surrounding the 

obtaining of the weapon and the shooting.” (Id. at 17:1–5.) 

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conducted further investigation, Ronis “could have made an appropriate strategic choice 

and then competently advised [Petitioner] as to whether to take the stand, given the 

available alternatives.” (ECF No. 157 [quoting Bemore, 788 F.3d at 1665].) However, 

Petitioner provided no evidence that Ronis did not competently advise him about his ability 

to take the witness stand and the availability of alternative defenses. In fact, Ronis testified 

he reviewed all the police reports and met various times with Petitioner. The most 

reasonable inference is they discussed the content of the police reports and Petitioner’s 

ability to testify about these defenses. 

Looking at the charges and fleshing out the facts before Ronis at the time of trial, 

the Court has determined that accident and self-defense were the most credible defense

theories he could have proffered. First, the witnesses discussed above who knew Petitioner 

identified him by name as the shooter who injured the victim. Second, the group of 

witnesses who did not know Petitioner by name provided a description matching his 

immediately following the shooting to police. Third, Petitioner fled to Mexico for several 

years following the shooting, which permits an inference of his knowledge of his guilt. See

California Criminal Jury Instruction No. 372. Fourth, there were no reports of an additional 

shooter contained in the police reports. At best, there were a few witnesses, three of whom 

were children, who misattributed a cowboy hat to the shooter. Fifth, and most importantly, 

Petitioner told Ronis that he was the only shooter and the individual who shot the victim. 

With this information, and given the charges against Petitioner, the only viable defenses 

were self-defense and accident. See Bohana, 389 Fed. App’x at 602 (viability of a defense 

informs reasonableness of counsel’s actions). Additionally, the forensic evidence involved 

a trail of shell casings that were all from the same weapon, which was consistent with 

Petitioner’s statement to Ronis. (EHRT, vol. 3 at 18:14–20.) As acknowledged by Ronis, 

an attorney cannot “proffer a self-defense argument unless the person [they] are 

representing was truly the mechanism of injury and [Petitioner] told [him] the 

circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the weapon and the shooting.” (EHRT, vol. 3

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at 17:1–5.) Such was the case here, and Ronis’ decision to pursue self-defense and accident 

defense theories was reasonable given the aforementioned circumstances. 

Finally, Petitioner chose to take the stand at trial and testify in his own defense that 

he shot the gun albeit in self-defense and accidentally. (Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 709:24–28, 

710–11). There is nothing in the record to indicate his decision to testify was not made 

knowingly and voluntarily.

60 Had Ronis called Rubio, Escamilla and/or any other 

witnesses to testify that there was a second shooter who shot the victim, such testimony 

would have conflicted directly with Petitioner’s testimony that he shot the gun in selfdefense. Such a trial strategy would have raised a colorable claim of a violation of 

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment “autonomy” right. See McCoy v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. 

____, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018). 

The Supreme Court in McCoy affirmed the defendant’s autonomy to determine the 

“objectives” of his defense. The Sixth Amendment “‘contemplat[es] a norm in which the 

accused, and not a lawyer, is master of his own defense.’ Trial management is the lawyer’s 

province: Counsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as ‘what 

arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude 

regarding the admission of evidence. Some decisions, however, are reserved for the client 

– notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf,

and forgo an appeal.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508 (internal citations omitted) (citing

 

60 During a January 12, 2007 post-trial status conference before the trial court judge, 

Petitioner stated he had requested that Ronis subpoena percipient witnesses to testify on 

his behalf at trial, which Ronis did not do. He claimed that “it was another suspect who 

[shot the victim’s eye] after grabbing the gun from me.” (Lodgment 2, vol. 1 at 2:21–4:15.) 

These statements were not under oath and directly contracted the facts he testified to at 

trial. (See Lodgment 2, vol. 5 at 709:24–28, 710–11.) Further, Petitioner was presented 

ample opportunity during the Hearing to take the stand and testify under oath regarding the 

circumstances surrounding his chosen defenses and his decision to take the witness stand. 

He chose not to do so. (See EHRT, vol. 3 at 48:12–49:4; EHRT, vol. 4 at 54:4–9, 65:5–

21.)

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Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382, n.10 (1979), Gonzalez v. United States, 

553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008), and Jones v Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)); see, e.g., United 

States v. Read, 918 F.3d 712, 720 (9th Cir. 2019). As the Court explained in McCoy, the 

latter category of decisions “are not strategic choices about how best to achieve a client’s 

objectives; they are choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are.” McCoy, 138 S.

Ct. at 1508–09. With these principles in mind, McCoy held that the decision of whether to 

admit guilt remains with the client. Id. at 1510–11. 

In McCoy, defense counsel wanted the defendant to concede that he was the cause 

of the individuals’ death in order to try to avoid the death penalty. Defendant clearly 

instructed his counsel not to do so, but his counsel nonetheless told the jury that defendant

committed the killings. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of 

the right of the assistance of counsel precluded his lawyer from admitting the defendant’s

guilt of the acts alleged as the actus reus of a charge crime over his objections. Id. at 1509. 

It was the client’s role, not the lawyer’s, to determine the objective of the client’s defense, 

and defendant had a right to insist that he did not kill the victims. He was thus entitled to 

a lawyer who would represent and attempt to further the object of the defense that 

defendant had established. Defense counsel’s actions amounted to structural error 

requiring a new trial, as the “[v]iolation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment-secured 

autonomy ranks as error of the kind our decisions have called ‘structural’; when present, 

such an error is not subject to harmless error review.” Id. at 1511. 

Similarly, in United States v. Read counsel was allowed to present an insanity 

defense over defendant’s objection and citing McCoy, the Ninth Circuit held that the 

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated. 918 F.3d at 720. The Court reasoned 

that an insanity defense is tantamount to a concession of guilt. Since the defendant had a 

Sixth Amendment right to choose his defense, not so allowing him to do so was a structural 

error, and the proper remedy is a new trial. Id. at 721; see, e.g., United States v. Audette, 

923 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 2019) (had counsel presented an insanity defense over 

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defendant’s objection, defendant would have a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel);

People v. Flores, 34 Cal. App. 5th 270 (2019) (counsel’s concession of the actus reus over 

defendant’s objection was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and constituted 

structural error requiring reversal). 

In the instant case, Petitioner exercised his Sixth Amendment secured-autonomy 

rights as defined by McCoy. First, he chose to testify on his own behalf at trial. There is 

no evidence in the record that Petitioner’s choice to testify on his own behalf was not made 

knowingly and voluntarily. Secondly, in exercising this autonomy right to testify on his 

own behalf, he chose to concede the actus reus of the crimes charged, i.e., the shooting of 

the gun, injuring the victim, in order to claim self-defense. Once Petitioner chose this 

objective, to concede guilt on the actus reus, he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment 

to a lawyer who would represent and attempt to further the object of that defense, namely 

self-defense and accident. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511.61 Were Ronis not to further 

Petitioner’s goal of self-defense and accident, but rather present evidence that another 

person committed the actus reus, such conduct by Ronis would have been a violation of 

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right and constituted structural error. The same respect for 

the individual to decide whether to refuse to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming 

evidence, or even reject the assistance of legal counsel altogether, also allows criminal 

defendants the right to set the fundamental objective of their own defense. Id. at 1508. 

Therefore, regardless of the reasonableness of Ronis’ conduct in presenting the defense of 

self-defense and accident at trial, he was obligated under the Sixth Amendment to present 

this defense since this was the objective and choice of the Petitioner, as evidenced by his 

decision to testify that he acted in self-defense.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has not overcome the presumption that Ronis’ 

 

61 The defendant in McCoy testified at trial that he did not commit the murders. The Court 

held that even if he disagreed with the defendant, counsel could not interfere with his 

defendant telling the jury he was not the murderer. 138 S. Ct. at 1509. 

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proffered defenses of self-defense and accident were “sound trial strategy” and constituted 

competent representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Neither has Petitioner offered 

any evidence to show he did not concur with or choose these defenses. Accordingly, 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

he is entitled to habeas relief as he has failed to satisfy Strickland’s deficiency prong. See 

Davis, 384 F.3d at 638 (“Petitioner carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief.”).

VII. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

On March 30, 2018, the parties filed a Joint Exhibit List in which they stipulated to 

the admission of many proffered exhibits and set forth their arguments regarding contested

exhibits. (ECF No. 116.) The parties were ordered to include any further evidentiary

objections they had in their post-Hearing briefs. (ECF No. 140 at 9.) Both parties raised 

no objections to the testimony or exhibits presented other than those raised in their Joint 

Exhibit List and as outlined in their Joint Statement regarding Exhibit M (ECF No. 154). 

(See ECF No. 152 at 6; ECF No. 157 at 25.) 

A. Stipulated Exhibits 

The parties stipulated to a number of exhibits, as set forth below. The following 

Petitioner’s Exhibits are deemed ADMITTED:

(1)Exhibit 1: Police Report of Daniel Alatorre’s Statement is admitted for the limited 

purposes of the effect of the report on trial defense counsel Jan Ronis and for 

impeachment. 

(2)Exhibit 2: Police Report of Olivia Addison’s Statement is admitted for the limited 

purposes of the effect of the report on trial defense counsel Jan Ronis and for 

impeachment. 

(3)Exhibit 3: Police Report of Antoinette Gonzalez’s Statement is admitted for the 

limited purposes of the effect of the report on trial defense counsel Jan Ronis and 

for impeachment. 

(4)Exhibit 4: Petitioner’s October 23, 2009 Discovery Motion to the California 

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Supreme Court is admitted.

(5)Exhibit 5: Petitioner’s July 19, 2009 Motion for Interrogatories in the California 

Superior Court is admitted. 

(6)Exhibit 6: April 17, 2015 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment. 

(7)Exhibit 7: April 28, 2015 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(8)Exhibit 8: May 21, 2015 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(9)Exhibit 9: May 21, 2015 email from Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis to 

Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(10) Exhibit 10: May 26, 2015 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(11) Exhibit 11: June 5, 2015 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(12) Exhibit 12: September 4, 2007 letter from Petitioner’s appellate counsel 

Barbara Smith to Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted.

(13) Exhibit 13: Declaration of Petitioner’s appellate counsel Barbara Smith signed 

January 23, 2018 is admitted. 

(14) Exhibit 14: Reporter’s Transcript of Petitioner’s January 12, 2007 state court 

Status Conference Hearing is admitted. 

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(15) Exhibit 15: April 10, 2017 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(16) Exhibit 16: April 25, 2017 email from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(17) Exhibit 17: April 25, 2017 letter from Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani to 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment.

(18) Exhibit 18: June 26, 2017 email from Respondent’s counsel Assistant 

Attorney General Daniel Rogers to Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis is 

admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(19) Exhibit 19: October 12, 2017 email from Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis 

to Petitioner’s counsel Tony Farmani is admitted for the limited purpose of 

impeachment. 

(20) Exhibit 20: Reporter’s Transcript of Prosecution’s Rebuttal Argument at 

Petitioner’s trial is admitted. 

(21) Exhibit 21: Reporter’s Transcript of Defense’s Closing Argument at 

Petitioner’s trial is admitted.

(22) Exhibit 22: Reporter’s Transcript of Prosecution’s Closing Argument at 

Petitioner’s trial is admitted.

(23) Exhibit 23: Excerpts of Reporter’s Transcript are admitted. 

(24) Exhibit 24: The Ninth Circuit’s Memorandum Decision is admitted. 

(25) Exhibit 25: Fonseca v. Hall, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal 2008) is 

admitted. 

(26) Exhibit 26: Because of the inconsistent labeling and numbering between the 

parties’ Joint Exhibit List and Petitioner’s exhibits provided to the Court, the 

parties did not stipulate to the admission of what is marked as Exhibit 26, which 

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is a portion of the Reporter’s Transcript of the February 16, 2006 motions in 

limine hearing prior to Petitioner’s state court trial. Regardless, the Transcript of 

the February 16, 2006 motions in limine hearing is ADMITTED as Exhibit 26.

See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a trial 

transcript is admissible under the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)).

(27) Exhibit 27: December 14, 2017 Declaration of Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan

Ronis is admitted.62

Further, the following Respondent’s Exhibits are deemed ADMITTED:

(A) Exhibit A: March 12, 2001 Officer’s Report of Interview of Miguel Rubio and 

Silvia Escamilla by Sergeant Shephard is admitted for the limited purposes of 

effect of the report on Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis and for impeachment. 

(B)Exhibit B: March 14, 2001 Detective Follow-up Report by Sergeant Cordero of 

March 11, 2001 interview of Sylvia Escamilla is admitted for the limited

purposes of effect of the of the report on Petitioner’s trial counsel Jan Ronis and 

for impeachment. 

(C)Exhibit C: Recording of March 11, 2001 interview of Silvia Escamilla by 

Sergeant Cordero is admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(D)Exhibit D: Transcript (Spanish) of March 11, 2001 interview of Silvia Escamilla 

by Sergeant Cordero is admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(E)Exhibit E: Transcript (English) of March 11, 2001 interview of Silvia Escamilla 

by Sergeant Cordero is admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(I) Exhibit I: Transcript of November 30, 2017 Deposition of Jan Ronis is admitted.

 

62 On the parties’ Joint Exhibit List (ECF No. 116), Petitioner’s Exhibit 27 is listed as a 

search warrant. (Id. at 5.) However, the Court was not presented with a copy of a search 

warrant and it does not appear to have been entered as an exhibit during the Hearing. The 

declaration of Jan Ronis was marked and admitted during the Evidentiary Hearing as 

Exhibit 27. (EHRT, vol. 4 at 29:8–31:5.) On the Joint Exhibit List, Ronis’ declaration is 

listed as Exhibit 26. (ECF No. 116 at 5.) 

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(J) Exhibit J: Transcript of November 30, 2017 Deposition of Juan Lopez is 

admitted. 

(K) Exhibit K: June 5, 2009 Declaration of Silvia Escamilla is admitted. 

(L) Exhibit L: Recording of March 10, 2001 interviews of Miguel Rubio and Sylvia 

Escamilla by Sergeant Shephard is admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(N) Exhibit N: Transcript of March 10, 2001 interview of Miguel Rubio by Sergeant 

Shephard is admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(O) Exhibit O: Transcript of March 10, 2001 interview of Sylvia Escamilla by 

Sergeant Shephard is admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment.

(P): Exhibit P: Letters from Petitioner’s appellate counsel Barbara Smith to 

Petitioner, as redacted by the parties and updated by the Court during the Hearing

(see EHRT, vol. 4 at 4:12–5:14), are admitted for the limited purposes of establishing 

what Smith saw in Ronis’ file regarding another shooter and what Petitioner and 

Sandy Barajas communicated to her identifying another shooter. 

B. Contested Exhibits

In addition to the Exhibits the parties stipulated to, Petitioner objects to the 

admission of Respondent’s Exhibits F, G, H, and M. (ECF No. 116 at 6–7.) 

a. Exhibits F, G, and H

Exhibits F, G, and H are the detective follow up report, recording, and transcript of 

Sandy Barajas’ March 10, 2001 interview with Sergeant Cordero. Respondent asserts that 

these exhibits are admissible for purposes of impeachment to the extent that Barajas’

statement are inconsistent with Barajas’ testimony at the Hearing. Petitioner objects to the

admission of these exhibits. He argues that Barajas never testified at the Hearing to 

anything contrary to her police statement. (ECF No. 116 at 6.) 

During Barajas’ testimony, she made statements calling into question her ability to 

speak English at the time she translated and drafted her mother Sylvia Escamilla’s 2009

declaration. She stressed repeatedly that English is her second language and while she has 

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improved, her “English is not the best.” (EHRT vol. 1, at 184:11–23, 186:9–13.) She 

stated her “knowledge of English back then is not what it is today . . . .” (Id. at 192:5–7.) 

Further, in an attempt to overcome the fact that the declaration referred to only a single 

gun, Barajas stated that it is possible she mistranslated her mother’s statements and she 

intended to say “a” gun instead of “the” gun. (Id. at 185:11–18, 190:15–191:14.)

Barajas’ interview with Sergeant Cordero shows that Barajas was proficient in 

English at the time of the shooting, on March 10, 2001, in contradiction to these statements. 

(See Exs. F, G, H.) Accordingly, the Court ADMITS Exhibits F, G, and H for the limited 

purposes of impeachment regarding Barajas’ ability to speak English at the time she 

prepared Escamilla’s declaration. 

b. Exhibit M

Respondent introduced all the police reports that Respondent’s counsel received 

from the District Attorney’s office in connection with this case as Exhibit M. As set forth 

in the Joint Exhibit List (ECF 116), the parties did not stipulate to the admission of these 

reports. Respondent’s position is that the reports should be admitted not for their truth, but 

for the limited purposes of the effect of the reports on Jan Ronis and for impeachment. 

Petitioner’s position is that except for the police reports contained in Petitioner’s Exhibits 

1, 2 and 3, and Respondent’s Exhibits A and B, Ronis was not questioned about other 

police reports and therefore there is no proof that he reviewed the reports in Exhibit M. 

(ECF No. 116 at 7.) 

On the final day of the hearing, September 14, 2018, a discussion was held regarding 

these reports. This Court ruled that the reports in Exhibit M would be admitted, subject to 

a showing that they were turned over to trial counsel. (EHRT, vol. 4 at 62:12–20.) 

Respondent’s counsel agreed to procure a declaration from the District Attorney’s office 

regarding a discovery log or some proof that the file was turned over to trial counsel and 

Petitioner’s counsel said that if the declaration was satisfactory, he would stipulate that 

what is contained in Exhibit M was the District Attorney’s file that was turned over to trial 

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counsel. (Id. at 64:4-25–65:4.)

In the parties Joint Statement Regarding Exhibit M, the parties attach a declaration 

from James E. Atkins, a Retiree Deputy District Attorney from the San Diego County 

District Attorney’s Office who reviewed the Officer’s Case Management System for 

Petitioner’s case. (ECF No. 154 at 6–8.) The Case Management System discovery record 

shows that “all Bates stamped pages numbered 1 through 333 were made available to, and 

received by the defense.” (Id. at 7.) Petitioner argues that because Ronis was not 

Petitioner’s counsel of record until March 10, 2005, there is nothing to show that Ronis 

took possession of the police reports bates stamped 1 through 288 from prior counsel, as 

they were received by the defense on February 9, 2005. (Id. at 2.) 

However, as noted by Respondent, Petitioner’s prior counsel was required to return 

all client papers and property on termination of his representation and upon the request of 

the client. See Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California Rule 3-

700(D)(1) (in effect from 1992 to 2018). Ronis testified numerous times to the fact that he 

reviewed all police reports in this action. (See Ex. I at 13:8–14; EHRT, vol 1 at 126:20–

127:1, 131:20–23, 144:9–16; EHRT, vol 3 at 6:6–8, 7:2–4, 26:6–10.) Additionally, 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel testified that based on her review of the police and 

investigative reports, Escamilla’s statements did not exonerate Petitioner. This necessarily 

shows that Ronis was in possession of Escamilla’s statements to police if they were 

provided to Petitioner’s appellate attorney as part of Ronis’ case file. (See EHRT, vol. 4 

at 9:17–10:17.) Escamilla’s statements to police are bates stamped 186–187 and 232. (Ex. 

M at 36–37, 51.) Thus, they were part of the police reports bates stamped 1 through 288

that Petitioner argues Ronis did not receive. 

The Court finds that the declaration from James E. Atkins coupled with the 

information discussed above establishes that the reports contained in Exhibit M were 

turned over to Ronis. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) (requiring only “evidence sufficient to 

support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition” to establish conditional relevancy). 

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Accordingly, the Court ADMITS Exhibit M into evidence not for the truth of the matters 

asserted, but for purposes of impeachment and for the effect of these reports on Jan Ronis 

in his preparation of Petitioner’s defense at trial. 

C. Miguel Rubio’s Declaration

As discussed above in Section VI.B.b., Rubio’s declaration (Ex. 28) is inadmissible 

for the truth of the matters asserted and the parties have failed to proffer an applicable

hearsay exception. Rubio did not testify at the Hearing and his statements contained in his 

declaration were not subject to cross-examination.63 Accordingly, Rubio’s declaration (Ex. 

28) is EXCLUDED and Petitioner cannot use Rubio’s declaration to establish the facts 

asserted therein. 

VIII. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue 

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) finding 

Miguel Rubio and Sylvia Escamilla are not credible witnesses; (3) finding trial counsel was 

not deficient in not interviewing them and not presenting their testimony at trial; (4) finding 

trial counsel’s actions did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; and accordingly, 

(5) denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 11, 2020 any party to his action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties by February 18, 2020. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 

158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

63 It is also important to note that the declaration is thoroughly impeached by Rubio’s prior 

statement to police, as discussed above. (See Exs. L, N.)

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 28, 2020

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