Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_19-cv-01399/USCOURTS-alnd-6_19-cv-01399-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

7:19-cv-01314-LSC

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7:19-cv-01392-LSC

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STACEY BRIDGES,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J.C. POE, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

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7:19-cv-00529-LSC

CHARITY TESSENER,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J.C. POE, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

JESSICA RAINER,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J.C. POE, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

FILED

 2020 Jan-23 AM 11:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court are Defendant Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation’s 

(“AMIC”) Motions to Dismissfor Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in four of the 

above-referenced actions (doc. 21 in Tessener v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01314-LSC; doc. 

20 in Rainer v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01392-LSC; doc. 6 in Goodson v. Poe et al., 6:19-cv6:19-cv-01399-LSC

7:19-cv-01571-LSC

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7:19-cv-01961-LSC

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WHITLEY GOODSON,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J.C. POE, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

MEGAN DUNN,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J.C. POE, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

ALLISON MANN,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J.C. POE, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

Case 6:19-cv-01399-LSC Document 21 Filed 01/23/20 Page 2 of 13
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01399-LSC; and doc. 18 in Dunn v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01571-LSC). The motions are

fully briefed and ripe for decision. For the reasons stated below, the motions are due 

to be granted.

I. BACKGROUND1

This consolidated matter comprises six separate actions brought by six 

individual plaintiffs against similar defendants and involving similar factual 

allegations and legal theories, all of which center on alleged systemic sexual 

harassment, abuse, and rape of female pretrial detainees at the Jasper City Jail. 

AMIC is an insurance company that has issued policies providing coverage for the 

City of Jasper and individual municipal employees named in this action.

The first case filed in federal court was Bridges v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-00529-LSC 

(“Bridges”), brought by Stacey Bridges (“Bridges”) against the City of Jasper, Chief 

of Police J.C. Poe, Jr. (“Poe”), Jail Supervisor Deborah Johnson (“Johnson”), and 

Jailor Dennis Buzbee (“Buzbee”)2

. Bridges brings multiple claims under 42 U.S.C. 

 1

 The following facts are taken from the Plaintiffs’ complaints and AMIC’s motions to 

dismiss, and the Court makes no ruling on their veracity.

2 Bridges’s complaint and amended complaint list this Defendant’s name as “Dennis 

Busby.” However, this Court recently granted Bridges’s motion to amend her complaint to 

correct the spelling to “Dennis Buzbee.” As explained below, “Dennis Buzbee” is also the 

spelling reflected in a pending state court action involving these parties. Thus, this Court will refer 

to this Defendant as “Dennis Buzbee” without endorsing any view as to the correct spelling of his 

name.

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§ 1983 and Alabama tort law regarding the alleged sexual harassment, abuse, and 

rape she experienced at the Jasper City Jail. After Bridges was filed, AMIC 

commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Walker County, 

Alabama, Case Number CV-2019-900233.00 (the “state court action”),

3 naming as 

Defendants Poe, Johnson, Buzbee, and Bridges. In the state court action, AMIC 

seeks a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the City of Jasper or its 

employees in Bridges. AMIC alleges that it issued an insurance policy to the City of 

Jasper providing coverage for, among other things, claims or suits for damages 

against City employees who were engaged in law enforcement activities. The policy 

excludes from coverage intentional conduct and claims or suits for damages arising 

out of sexual abuse or molestation. AMIC’s position is that every theory of liability 

and claim for damages in Bridges is specifically excluded from coverage.

After the filing of Bridges and the state court action, the other Plaintiffs—

Tessener, Rainer, Goodson, Dunn, and Mann—filed their respective actions in 

 3 This Court takes judicial notice of the state court action and the filings therein. “A district 

court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is both ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ 

and either (1) ‘generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction’ or (2) ‘can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.’” Grayson v. Warden, Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 869 F.3d 1204, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 

2017) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). 

Further, it appears to the Court that a motion to transfer venue to the Circuit Court of 

Tuscaloosa County was filed in the state court action, but it has not yet been ruled on.

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federal court, each of which names AMIC as a Defendant.4

 Other Defendants 

include the City, Poe, Johnson, and individual members of the Jasper Civil Service 

Board. Like in Bridges, each Plaintiff brings multiple claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

as well as Alabama tort law regarding the alleged sexual harassment, abuse, and rape 

they experienced at the Jasper City Jail. In addition, each Plaintiff alleges that AMIC 

is a shell corporation with no real employees, and that AMIC is merely the alter ego 

of the Alabama League of Municipalities and a “fronting” company for AMIC’s 

“so-called reinsurers.” (See, e.g., doc. 1 at 34 in Goodson v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01399-

LSC.) Each Plaintiff brings two claims against AMIC: (1) an action for declaratory 

judgment, seeking a declaration that AMIC has a duty to defend and indemnify the 

other Defendants in this matter (Count IX); and (2) a “Contingent Claim for Money 

Damages” (Count X), where each Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to a money 

judgment against AMIC upon proof that she is entitled to damages from any of the 

other Defendants. (See, e.g., id. at 52.) Each Plaintiff further alleges in Count X that 

AMIC is “a shell or sham corporation without employees and under the control of 

the City [of Jasper] and other members of the Alabama League of Municipalities,” 

and she therefore requests a declaration that she is an “assignee of AMIC’s rights 

 4 AMIC has not filed a motion to dismiss in Mann v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01961-LSC. It appears 

to the Court that Mann has not yet obtained service over any of the Defendants, including AMIC.

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under AMIC’s reinsurance agreements or treaties, such that Plaintiff may have a 

recovery on a cut-through basis.” (See, e.g., id. at 52–53.) At a hearing in this matter 

on January 16, 2020, AMIC represented to the Court through counsel that it intends 

to add the other Plaintiffs—Tessener, Rainer, Goodson, Dunn, and Mann—as 

parties to the state court action if AMIC is dismissed from this federal action.

AMIC moved this Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss the claims 

against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Responses were filed in the Tessener

and Rainer matters, arguing that this Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over the claims.

II. STANDARD

This Court, like all federal courts, is a court of “limited jurisdiction.”

Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1134 (11th Cir. 2013). It is 

authorized to hear only those cases falling within “one of three types of subject 

matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal 

question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 1299, 

1305 (11th Cir. 2016). A federal court with subject matter jurisdiction over a claim 

also has “supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims that are “so related to 

claims . . . within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

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controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The state and federal claims 

must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of Am.

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

“[W]hen a defendant properly challenges subject matter jurisdiction under 

Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is free to independently weigh facts, and . . . [must] 

satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Morrison v. Amway 

Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 

1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). The Court may consider matters outside the pleadings in 

ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 

1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 1991). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the 

party averring jurisdiction. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942). 

III. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiffs’ claims against AMIC are state law claims between Alabama 

citizens.5

 Therefore, neither federal question jurisdiction nor diversity jurisdiction 

exists over the claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32. Accordingly, federal jurisdiction 

would only be proper if the claims meet the criteria for supplemental jurisdiction set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiffs cited no binding authority for the proposition 

 5 Plaintiffs are Alabama citizens, and AMIC is an Alabama corporation and, therefore, an 

Alabama citizen.

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that supplemental jurisdiction does or does not exist in these circumstances, and this 

Court’s independent research revealed none. The claims against AMIC arguably 

share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, in that 

they all concern the alleged intentional or negligent acts and omissions of the 

individual Defendants. It is less certain, however, whether all of the claims would be 

expected to be tried together in a single proceeding. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. The 

claims against AMIC center on issues of insurance coverage and AMIC’s status as 

an insurer for a municipality, all of which is separate and distinct from the underlying 

tort claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction. This fact suggests that the 

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction may not be appropriate.

Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” 

Id. at 726. Thus, even assuming that the requirements of § 1367(a) are satisfied, this 

Court may nonetheless decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims 

against AMIC if:

(1) the claim[s] raise[] a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim[s] 

substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district 

court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims 

over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, 

there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “Any one of the section 1367(c) factors is sufficient to give the 

district court discretion to dismiss a case’s supplemental state law claims.” Parker 

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v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743 (11th Cir. 2006). To determine 

whether to dismiss the state law claims, this Court must weigh the factors outlined

by the Supreme Court in Gibbs: “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity.” See Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Labs., Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 537 (11th Cir. 

2015).

Section 1367(c) provides a basis for this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’

supplemental claims against AMIC. First, the claims raise novel and complex issues 

of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Each Plaintiff brings a “Contingent Claim 

for Money Damages” (Count X) against AMIC where she alleges that AMIC is a 

shell or “fronting company,” and she therefore requests a money judgment against 

AMIC and a declaration that she is an “assignee of AMIC’s rights under AMIC’s 

reinsurance agreements or treaties, such that [she] may have a recovery on a cutthrough basis.” Although state tort claims are generally not considered novel or 

complex, see Parker, 468 F.3d at 743, Count X is a far cry from a typical tort claim 

such as assault or battery. It is also complex in that it hinges on whether AMIC, an 

insurer that provides coverage to municipalities, is a shell corporation whose 

existence is merely a front for private reinsurers, a determination that implicates

matters of local municipal policy. Resolving the claim would require the Court to 

unnecessarily make decisions of state law, which the Supreme Court has admonished 

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courts to avoid “both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the 

parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Gibbs, 383 

U.S. at 726. In sum, this Court concludes that an Alabama state court would be 

better suited to hear and decide this novel and complex state law claim. 

There are other “compelling reasons” for this Court to decline to exercise 

jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), one of which being the pending state court 

action. Although the state court action does not presently involve the exact same 

parties, it does seek to resolve a question common to all parties in this action: 

whether AMIC has a duty to defend or indemnify the Defendants from claims 

involving intentional conduct and sexual abuse. Therefore, given that parallel 

proceedings are underway in state court, adjudication of Plaintiffs’ declaratory 

judgment action in this Court would be a waste of judicial resources. Additionally, 

Plaintiffs are not parties to AMIC’s insurance policy covering the City of Jasper and 

thus are not insured under it. Therefore, another “compelling reason[]” to decline 

jurisdiction is that it is not clear that Plaintiffs, as tort claimants, have Article III 

standing to sue the tortfeasors’ insurer for a declaration of coverage prior to the entry 

of a judgment against the tortfeasors. It appears that the Eleventh Circuit has not 

addressed this question, but at least two federal courts have concluded that persons 

not insured by an insurance policy lack standing in these circumstances, at least with 

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respect to the duty to defend. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wayne Cty., 760 F.2d 689, 695

(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert insurance company’s 

duty to defend insured because plaintiffs would suffer no injury if insurance company 

was not required to defend);Canal Ins. Co. v. Cook, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (M.D. 

Ala. 2008) (holding that, “as a general rule, a person has no standing to assert, under 

an insurance policy to which he is not a party and thus under which he is not insured, 

the insurer has a duty to defend the insured”). While neither decision is binding on 

this Court, this Court mentions them to illustrate that the existence of Plaintiffs’ 

Article III standing should not be taken for granted.

Finally, the Gibbs factors—judicial economy, comity, convenience, and 

fairness—weigh in favor of dismissing the state law claims against AMIC. It is clear 

to the Court that exercising jurisdiction over these claims would require extensive 

litigation concerning issues of insurance coverage and the novel state law issue raised 

in Count X, both of which are substantially distinct from the tort claims over which 

this Court has original jurisdiction. As stated previously, there is a pending state 

court action concerning AMIC’s duty to defend and indemnify the City and its 

employees from claims of intentional conduct and sexual abuse. Therefore, 

dismissing the claims against AMIC would promote judicial economy by avoiding 

substantial duplication of this Court’s resources on a matter that is already pending 

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before a state court. Similarly, dismissal would serve comity by allowing a state court 

to decide claims brought by Alabama plaintiffs against an Alabama defendant

involving novel applications of Alabama state law. 

Considerations of convenience slightly favor retaining jurisdiction, in that it 

would be more convenient for the parties to try every claim in the same proceeding. 

Any inconvenience borne by the parties is relatively small, however, given that the 

state court action is pending in Walker County, Alabama, approximately one hour by 

car from this Court’s Tuscaloosa chambers. By contrast, considerations of fairness 

do not support the exercise of jurisdiction. No one forced the Plaintiffs to seek a 

declaration of AMIC’s coverage obligations or to bring their novel “Contingent 

Claim for Money Damages” in these federal lawsuits. Cf. Ameritox, 803 F.3d at 539 

(employing similar reasoning in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).

And “every litigant who brings supplemental claims in [federal] court knowingly 

risks the dismissal of those claims.” Id. This Court therefore concludes that the 

Gibbs factors weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction and in favor of dismissal.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, AMIC’s motions to dismiss are hereby 

GRANTED, and the claims against AMIC in cases Tessener v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv01314-LSC; Rainer v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01392-LSC; Goodson v. Poe et al., 6:19-cvCase 6:19-cv-01399-LSC Document 21 Filed 01/23/20 Page 12 of 13
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01399-LSC; and Dunn v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01571-LSC are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.6

 An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered 

contemporaneously herewith.

DONE and ORDERED on January 23, 2020.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

199335

 6 As this Court previously noted, AMIC has not yet been served in the latest member case, 

Mann v. Poe et al., 7:19-cv-01961-LSC. This Court assumes that AMIC will file a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Mann once it is served, and this motion would be due to be 

granted for the reasons explained herein. 

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