Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05362/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 12, 1999 Decided February 16, 1999

No. 97-5300

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al.,

Appellants/Cross-Appellees

v.

Alexis M. Herman, Secretary of Labor, and

Anthony Swoope, Director,

Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training,

U.S. Department of Labor,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Consolidated with

97-5327, 97-5362

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02625)

Maurice Baskin argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants/cross-appellees Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al. John C. Hardwick, Jr., entered an appearance.

William W. Osborne, Jr., argued the cause for appellant

Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 669, U.A., AFL-CIO.

With him on the briefs was Marc D. Keffer.

Paul S. Padda, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees/cross-appellants U.S. Department of Labor.

With him on the briefs were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney,

and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Gregory

W. Addington, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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William W. Osborne, Jr., Marc D. Keffer and Terry R.

Yellig were on the joint brief for amici curiae Building and

Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and Road

Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 669, U.A., AFL-CIO.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Grinnell Fire Protection Systems

Co. ("Grinnell") has for some time now been engaged in a

labor dispute with employees represented by the Road

Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 699 ("Union"). The Union

has filed unfair labor practice charges with the National

Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") claiming that Grinnell unlawfully instituted changes in the terms and conditions of

employment (including modifying a joint apprenticeship training program) without first bargaining in good faith to impasse. Because its unionized employees are currently on

strike, Grinnell sought permission from the Department of

Labor's ("DOL") Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training

("BAT") to train striker replacements under some form of

BAT-approved apprenticeship program--either a new program to be administered by Grinnell, or an existing, lawfully

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registered program administered by another employer. In

response to Grinnell's request, BAT deferred judgment on

whether to allow Grinnell to implement a new apprenticeship

program and it refused to allow other employers to train

Grinnell employees under their apprenticeship programs,

pending a decision by the NLRB on the yet unresolved unfair

labor practice charges. Grinnell sought relief in the District

Court, alleging that BAT's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District

Court held that it was reasonable for BAT to defer judgment

on Grinnell's proposal for a new program, but that it was

arbitrary and capricious for BAT to preclude Grinnell employees from enrolling in already approved programs. Subsequently, the Union moved to intervene and this motion was

denied by the District Court. Both Grinnell and DOL have

appealed the District Court's judgment to this court. In a

consolidated case, the Union appeals the District Court's

denial of its motion to intervene.

We affirm the judgment of the District Court only insofar

as it ordered BAT to permit Grinnell employees to enroll in

ongoing and lawfully registered apprenticeship programs of

other employers. BAT acted without any statutory or regulatory authority in blocking the enrollment of Grinnell employees in these programs. We reverse the District Court,

however, insofar as it endorsed BAT's decision to defer

consideration of Grinnell's request to register a new apprenticeship program for striker replacements. BAT's decision

inexplicably ignored the plain language in the governing

regulations that dispenses with any need to defer to the

NLRB. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of BAT's decision and remand to the District Court with instructions to

remand the case to the agency for prompt disposition of

Grinnell's request for registration of a new apprenticeship

program. Finally, because the Union has offered no justification for its failure to intervene prior to judgment in the

District Court, we affirm the District Court's denial of its

motion to intervene.

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I. Background

A.Regulatory Background

In accordance with the National Apprenticeship Act

("NAA"), 29 U.S.C. ss 50-50b, DOL has promulgated and

implemented regulations related to the administration of the

nation's apprenticeship programs, which offer training to

apprentices in certain skilled trades. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 29

(1998). These programs are registered and monitored either

through BAT or through a BAT-approved State Apprenticeship Agency or Council ("SAC"). See id. ss 29.2(o), 29.12.

Under DOL regulations implemented pursuant to the DavisBacon Act, 40 U.S.C. ss 276a-276a-5, an employer may pay

apprentices wages below the prevailing wage rate "when [the

apprentices] are employed pursuant to and individually registered in a bona fide apprenticeship program registered with

[BAT], or with a [SAC] recognized by [BAT]." 29 C.F.R.

s 5.5(a)(4) (1998).

In order to register an apprenticeship program with BAT

or a SAC, a "sponsor," i.e., a person or entity operating an

apprenticeship training program, see id. s 29.2(g), must designate an "apprenticeship committee" to administer the program. See id. s 29.2(i). The committee may be "joint"--in

which case it is comprised of an equal number of company

and employee representatives--or it may be "unilateral"--in

which case employee representatives do not participate in its

operation. See id. When a sponsor seeks to register an

apprenticeship program, it must meet certain eligibility requirements. See id. s 29.3. Once approved, the program

must conform to certain regulatory standards. See id. s 29.5.

B.Factual Background

Prior to April 1994, Grinnell and the Union had agreed to,

and participated in, a collectively bargained joint apprenticeship program. See Agreement Between National Fire

Sprinkler Ass'n, Inc. and Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 699 ("agreement") at 33, reprinted in Appendix to

Brief of Local 699 ("Union App.") 85. The program was

administered by a Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee ("JATC"), which was comprised of an equal number of

Grinnell officials and Union agents. See id. at 34, reprinted

in Union App. 86.

In April 1994, the Union organized a strike against Grinnell. Grinnell subsequently hired replacement workers. Following contract negotiations, the Union rejected Grinnell's

purported "final" contract offer. Grinnell then informed the

Union that the terms of its final offer would be implemented

on April 14, 1994. The Union responded by filing unfair labor

practice charges against Grinnell, alleging that, in violation of

the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the company

had unilaterally instituted changes in the terms and conditions of employment without first bargaining in good faith to

impasse. See 29 U.S.C. s 158(a)(5) (1994); NLRB v. Katz,

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369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). After a hearing, an Administrative

Law Judge ("ALJ") agreed with the Union that Grinnell had

violated the NLRA by "implementing the terms of its last

contract offer in the absence of a lawful impasse." Grinnell

Fire Protection Sys. Co., 5-CA-24521, 5-CA-25227,

5-CA-25406, at 32 (Jan. 16, 1997), reprinted in Appendix

("Grinnell App.") 159. The ALJ proposed that Grinnell be

"ordered to restore the terms and conditions of employment

of unit employees as they existed prior to April 14, 1994, [and

to] continue them in effect until the parties reach an agreement or a good-faith impasse." Id. Grinnell appealed the

ALJ's ruling to the full NLRB. The NLRB has yet to render

a judgment in the case.

As the proceeding before the NLRB has progressed, Grinnell has continued to hire striker replacements and it has

sought to train these workers through some form of BAT- or

SAC-approved apprenticeship program. Grinnell first tried

to use the program that was jointly administered by the

JATC. John Walsh, the Director of the JATC--and one of

the Union's agents on the committee--responded to the company's request by refusing to approve new individuals into the

joint program until Grinnell resumed paying hourly contributions required by the agreement. See Letter from John J.

Walsh, Director, Local 699 JATC, to Grinnell Fire Protection

(June 6, 1994), reprinted in Union App. 49. Grinnell's President, Jerry Boggess, responded by asserting that Grinnell

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was, in fact, continuing to make the hourly contributions to

the JATC. See Letter from Jerry R. Boggess to Walsh (July

15, 1994), reprinted in Union App. 50-51. The final correspondence in this brief exchange was a letter from Walsh to

Boggess, essentially asking for documentation of Grinnell's

contributions to the JATC. See Letter from Walsh to Boggess (July 25, 1994), reprinted in Union App. 52. The JATC

has yet to approve the enrollment of any of Grinnell's striker

replacements. It is also undisputed that neither Grinnell nor

the Union is currently participating in the apprenticeship

program administered by the JATC.

In June 1995, counsel for Grinnell asked an official at DOL

how the ongoing strike would affect Grinnell's ability to enroll

its employees either in a new, unilateral apprenticeship program, or in an already approved program that is currently

being administered by another employer. See Letter from

Donald L. Rosenthal, Counsel for Grinnell, to Charles D.

Raymond, Associate Solicitor of Labor (June 2, 1995), reprinted in Grinnell App. 22-24. Anthony Swoope, Director of

BAT, responded by stating that BAT would not approve the

registration of a new program, nor would it allow Grinnell's

replacement workers to enroll in existing programs. See

Letter from Swoope to Rosenthal (July 12, 1995), reprinted in

Grinnell App. 26-27; see also Letter from Claire Louder,

Executive Director, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.,

South Texas Chapter, to Dwight Green, Grinnell Fire Protections Systems (Aug. 31, 1995), reprinted in Grinnell App. 29

(administrator of already approved program explaining to

Grinnell executive that the local branch of BAT "has refused

to register any apprentices employed by [Grinnell] in ABCSouth Texas Chapter's registered apprenticeship program").

Swoope's letter--which the parties treated as a policy statement--relied heavily upon an interpretation of BAT Circular

95-06. The District Court, however, subsequently vacated

the policy statement and the circular upon which it was

based, because the circular had not been drafted pursuant to

notice and comment rule making. See Associated Builders &

Contractors, Inc. v. Reich, 922 F. Supp. 676, 681-82 (D.D.C.

1996) ("ABC I"). The parties have not contested this action.

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Grinnell again petitioned BAT to register a new, unilateral

program to train striker replacements. BAT again refused to

approve registration of a new program, this time citing only

the Union's objection to the proposed program and the pending NLRB complaint. See Letter from Isadore H. Gross, Jr.,

Regional Director, BAT, to Kenneth L. Bitner, Grinnell District General Manager (Aug. 30, 1995), reprinted in Grinnell

App. 28. It is undisputed that BAT also actively blocked the

enrollment of Grinnell's striker replacements in established,

lawfully registered programs. It did so by directing other

employers not to train Grinnell employees under their approved programs. See, e.g., Affidavit of Michael J. Friedman,

Grinnell Consultant, at 8 (Jan. 9., 1996), reprinted in Grinnell

App. 39 (stating that "all efforts ... to register Grinnell

employees as apprentices in existing third party programs[ ]

have been denied by Defendant BAT"). As a result of BAT's

refusal to allow other employers to train Grinnell employees

under their approved programs, Grinnell was forced to formally request permission from BAT for its replacement workers to enroll in the existing programs.

BAT rejected this request in the ad hoc decision under

review in this case, asserting that Grinnell must defer registering a new program and decline from enrolling employees

in existing programs, until the NLRB renders a judgment as

to whether Grinnell bargained to impasse before implementing the terms of its final contract offer. The ad hoc decision

was issued through a series of virtually identical letters from

BAT to various Grinnell executives and other employers who

sought to train Grinnell employees. See, e.g., Letter from

Gross to Bitner (May 30, 1996) ("Ad Hoc Decision"), reprinted in Grinnell App. 82I-82K (amended June 10, 1996). In the

ad hoc decision, BAT acknowledged that it was not relying

upon any BAT circulars, and that "the applicable statute,

regulations, and policies do not specifically address" Grinnell's

requests. Ad Hoc Decision at 1, reprinted in Grinnell App.

82I. Nevertheless, BAT purported to justify its decision to

"defer" by reference to 29 C.F.R. s 29.3(h).

Section 29.3(h), in its entirety, reads as follows:

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Under a program proposed for registration by an

employer or employers' association, where the standards,

collective bargaining agreement or other instrument,

provides for participation by a union in any manner in

the operation of the substantive matters of the apprenticeship program, and such participation is exercised,

written acknowledgment of union agreement or no objection to the registration is required. Where no such

participation is evidenced and practiced, the employer or

employers' association shall simultaneously furnish to the

union, if any, which is the collective bargaining agent of

the employees to be trained, a copy of its appplication

[sic] for registration and of the apprenticeship program.

The registration agency shall provide a reasonable time

period of not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days for

receipt of union comments, if any, before final action on

the application for registration and/or approval.

BAT held that the outcome of the case currently pending

before the NLRB will be determinative of BAT's decision

whether to grant Grinnell's requests. According to BAT,

where a collective bargaining agreement provides for union

participation in the operation of an apprenticeship program,

s 29.3(h) requires the consent of the union before an employer may register an apprenticeship program. Whether the

agreement between Grinnell and the Union is still in effect is

a matter that must be determined by the NLRB. If the

NLRB affirms the ruling of the ALJ, the terms of the

agreement will continue to be in effect, and BAT cannot

register a new program without the Union's consent. But if

the NLRB holds that Grinnell indeed bargained to impasse,

the terms of the last offer would be operative and a unilateral

program would be permissible. "[B]ecause ... BAT was

unable to act upon [Grinnell's requests] without effectively

determining the merits of the unfair labor practice charge," it

deferred approval of any of Grinnell's requests. Brief for

Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 9.

As for Grinnell's request to enroll its employees in existing

programs, BAT acknowledged that "[s] 29.3(h) is only applicable to the situation where an employer seeks to register a

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new apprenticeship program." Ad Hoc Decision at 2, reprinted in Grinnell App. 82J. This notwithstanding, BAT

held that the "intent" of s 29.3(h)--which, according to BAT,

is "to protect the union's right to participate in the existing

joint apprenticeship programs"--applies "with equal force" to

an employer's request to register its employees in existing

programs. Id. Accordingly, BAT refused to allow Grinnell

employees to enroll in these programs until the NLRB determined whether the agreement was still in effect.

In November 1996, Grinnell filed the instant lawsuit in

District Court, alleging that BAT's ad hoc decision was

arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. On September 19,

1997, upon consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that it was reasonable and

lawful for BAT to defer consideration of Grinnell's request to

register a new, unilateral program. See Associated Builders

& Contractors, Inc. v. Reich, 978 F. Supp. 338, 341-42

(D.D.C. 1997) ("ABC II"). However, the court held that to

the extent that the ad hoc decision prevented Grinnell's

employees from entering existing programs, it went "much

too far." Id. at 342. The court asserted that this part of the

ad hoc decision violated the intent and purpose of the NAA--

which is, according to the court, "to further the interest of

apprentices and this Nation by ensuring that men and women

entering a particular labor market receive appropriate and

needed apprenticeship training"--and it "certainly gives the

appearance that [BAT is] taking sides in the labor dispute."

Id. Accordingly, it vacated that portion of BAT's decision

and ordered BAT to "permit Grinnell employees to participate in existing external approved apprenticeship programs."

Id.

On October 3, 1997, the Union filed a motion to intervene in

the District Court, which was opposed by Grinnell. Before

the District Court had ruled on the Union's motion, both

Grinnell and DOL filed appeals to this court. Subsequently,

on December 19, 1997, the District Court denied the Union's

motion to intervene. See Associated Builders & Contractors,

Inc. v. Reich, No. 96-2625 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1997) (order),

reprinted in Union App. 26-27. The court held that it could

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no longer exercise jurisdiction over the case, because the

parties had already appealed to this court. See id. On

December 29, 1997, the Union moved in this court to intervene on appeal. In March 1998, a motions panel of this court

denied the Union's motion to intervene on appeal, allowed the

Union to participate as amicus curiae, and consolidated the

Union's appeal of the District Court's denial of the motion to

intervene with Grinnell's and DOL's appeals of the District

Court's decision on the merits in ABC II.

On appeal, Grinnell challenges the District Court's determination that the ad hoc decision was reasonable with respect to

its request to register the unilateral program, but urges

affirmance of the District Court's determination that DOL's

application of the ad hoc decision to existing programs went

"too far." DOL challenges the latter ruling, but urges affirmance of the former. The Union has filed an amicus brief in

support of DOL's position, and also challenges the District

Court's denial of its motion to intervene.

II. Analysis

A.Standard of Review

In a case like the instant one, in which the District Court

reviewed an agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), we review the administrative action directly. See Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir.

1997); Gas Appliance Mfrs. v. Department of Energy, 998

F.2d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In other words, we accord

no particular deference to the judgment of the District Court.

See Gas Appliance Mfrs., 998 F.2d at 1045. Rather, on an

independent review of the record, we will uphold BAT's ad

hoc decision unless we find it to be "arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A) (1994). In determining whether the

action is "in accordance with law," we must "give an agency's

interpretation of its own regulation 'controlling weight unless

it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' "

Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir.

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1998) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45

(1993)).

B.BAT's Refusal to Allow Grinnell Employees to Enroll in

Existing Programs

BAT has conceded throughout this litigation that it has

directed other employers with already approved apprenticeship programs not to enroll Grinnell employees in those

programs. See, e.g., ABC II, 978 F. Supp. at 342. We agree

with the District Court that BAT had no statutory or regulatory authority to block Grinnell employees from participating

in existing apprenticeship programs at other companies.

The ad hoc decision itself cites only s 29.3(h) for authority,

but acknowledges, as it must, that "[s] 29.3(h) is only applicable to the situation where an employer seeks to register a

new apprenticeship program with BAT." Ad Hoc Decision at

2, reprinted in Grinnell App. 82J. Section 29.3 is entitled,

"Eligibility and procedure for Bureau registration of a program." 29 C.F.R. s 29.3 (emphasis added). Nothing in

s 29.3--indeed, nothing in Part 29 of the applicable regulations--grants BAT the authority to block one company's

employees from enrolling in already registered apprenticeship programs of another company. Thus, to the extent that

BAT was relying upon its interpretation of s 29.3(h) for its

authority to block such enrollments, that interpretation was

plainly erroneous.

DOL's brief to this court cited no authority--other than

s 29.3(h)--in support of BAT's position, and counsel gave no

basis for the authority when questioned at oral argument.

The only justification even mentioned at oral argument--that

BAT might have been motivated by a desire to give the Union

an advantage in the ongoing labor dispute--is certainly not a

valid one, as counsel for DOL had to concede. See Chamber

of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Therefore, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of Grinnell on this point, although we do so

for slightly different reasons than those articulated by the

District Court. The District Court held that BAT's refusal to

allow Grinnell employees to enroll in existing programs violated the NAA because it "effectively punish[es] innocent workers." ABC II, 978 F. Supp. at 342. However, we see no need

to interpret the NAA here. Instead, we affirm the District

Court's decision and order on this point because BAT simply

had no lawful authority to do what it did. See University of

the Dist. of Columbia Faculty Ass'n/NEA v. District of

Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Auth., 163

F.3d 616, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Railway Labor Executives'

Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 659 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (en banc).

C.BAT's Deferral of Grinnell's Request to Register a New,

Unilateral Program

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Grinnell's request to register a new, unilateral apprenticeship program, separate and distinct from the program previously established pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, does implicate s 29.3(h), because Grinnell is seeking to

register a program with BAT. BAT deferred ruling on

Grinnell's request, on the assumption that there is an issue

under s 29.3(h), namely, whether the Union's consent was

required before BAT could approve the request. If the

Union's consent was not required, BAT agreed that Grinnell's

request for registration should be approved. See Brief for

Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 20. However, BAT's interpretation of s 29.3(h) apparently led it to believe that it could not

determine whether the Union's consent was required until

after the NLRB decided whether the parties' agreement was

still in effect. Therefore, BAT chose to stay its hand, pending the outcome of the case before the NLRB.

Grinnell, however, contends that it must be permitted to

train striker replacements under apprenticeship programs,

and that s 29.3(h) should not be read to provide the Union

with veto power over any attempt on Grinnell's part to offer

apprenticeship training. In support of its position, Grinnell

raises an issue that BAT, in the decisions at issue here, and

DOL, in its arguments to the District Court and this court,

mostly ignore.

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As Grinnell points out, s 29.3(h) requires a union's consent

to registration of a new program only where the "collective

bargaining agreement or other instrument, provides for participation by [the] union in any manner in the operation of the

substantive matters of the apprenticeship program, and such

participation is exercised." (emphasis added). Grinnell argues that since the Union is not currently participating in the

operation of the JATC (because it is on strike), its consent is

not required before BAT may approve Grinnell's unilateral

program--regardless of whether the agreement is still in

effect. Grinnell claims that s 29.3(h) was drafted to account

for precisely this situation; it points out that the provision

goes on to state that "[w]here no such participation is evidenced and practiced,"--i.e., for example, when the union is

on strike--the union's consent is not required. Such an

interpretation comports with common sense, according to

Grinnell, because a contrary reading of the section would

mean that "a union is able to block an employer's effort to

obtain certified training for replacement apprentices during a

strike, even as the Union refuses to participate in a joint

program." Brief of Appellants at 27-28.

BAT never addressed the meaning of the phrases "and

such participation is exercised" and "where no such participation is evidenced and practiced" in its ad hoc decision, and

DOL inexplicably failed to respond to Grinnell's interpretation in its brief to this court. What little is offered by the

agency is blatantly disingenuous. Throughout this litigation,

BAT and counsel for DOL have consistently misrepresented

the language of s 29.3(h). In Swoope's affidavit submitted to

the District Court, he summarized s 29.3(h) as requiring

union consent where the collective bargaining agreement

provides for union participation in the apprenticeship program, "and that participation has been exercised." Declaration of Anthony Swoope, Director, BAT, at 3 (Dec. 18, 1996),

reprinted in Grinnell App. 123 (emphasis added). In other

words, Swoope substituted "has been exercised" for "is exercised." BAT made precisely the same misrepresentation in

its ad hoc decision. See Ad Hoc Decision at 2, reprinted in

Grinnell App. 82J. To complete the circle, counsel for DOL

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also used the "has been exercised" language in its brief to this

court. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 17.

These misstatements hardly can be viewed as simple oversights.

Obviously, "is exercised" does not mean the same thing as

"has been exercised." There is no doubt that the Union's

participation in the JATC program "has been exercised." If

that were the language of s 29.3(h), it would clearly support

BAT's position, because the Union and Grinnell both actively

participated in the JATC program prior to the commencement of the strike in April 1994. But that is not the language

of the regulation. We do not see how BAT can require the

Union's consent to the establishment of a new apprenticeship

program under s 29.3(h) in the face of the "and such participation is exercised" and "where no such participation is

evidenced and practiced" language in the regulation. BAT

may have an answer, but it has failed to provide it.

Because the agreement has expired, the JATC program

may or may not exist, depending upon whether Grinnell had

bargained in good faith to impasse before implementing the

terms of its final offer. There is no question, however, that

the Union is not currently participating in the JATC program. The Union represented at oral argument that it will

certainly participate in the JATC program if the NLRB finds

that Grinnell did not bargain in good faith to impasse, in

which case the agreement is still in effect. Section 29.3(h),

however, requires that the Union participation "is exercised,"

not that it might be exercised pending the outcome of a case

before the NLRB, nor, as BAT and DOL would have it, that

it has been exercised at some point in the past. Section

29.3(h) is quite clear that "[w]here no such participation is

evidenced and practiced," union consent is not required.

It is true that this court must defer to a "reasonable"

agency interpretation of its own regulation, even if that

interpretation is not "the one that the court would have

adopted in the first instance." Belco Petroleum Corp. v.

FERC, 589 F.2d 680, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978). However, BAT's

path from "is exercised" to "has been exercised" has yet to be

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explained and is, at best, incomprehensible. Accordingly, we

vacate this portion of BAT's ad hoc decision with instructions

to the District Court to remand to the agency for prompt

disposition of Grinnell's request for registration of a new,

unilateral program. If the agency cannot articulate a legitimate basis for denying registration--and BAT's desire to give

one side an advantage in an ongoing labor dispute is not a

legitimate basis--Grinnell's request should be granted.

There is no reason to defer a decision until the NLRB has

ruled. Even assuming that the agreement is still in effect,

there is no doubt that under s 29.3(h), it "provides for

participation by [the] union ... in the operation of the

substantive matters of the apprenticeship program." The

only issue is whether that participation "is exercised." Nothing that the NLRB decides will be dispositive with respect to

that issue. Moreover, insofar as the NLRA is concerned--

that is, insofar as Grinnell has committed an unfair labor

practice--the NLRB will provide the appropriate remedy if

one is warranted.

D.The Denial of the Union's Motion to Intervene

The Union did not move to intervene in the District Court

until October 3, 1997, several weeks after the District Court

issued its decision in ABC II. The District Court ruled that

it was constrained to deny the Union's motion for want of

jurisdiction, because both Grinnell and DOL had already

appealed to this court. We decline to decide whether the

District Court had jurisdiction to grant the Union's motion.

Compare Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d

298, 299 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that district court was

without jurisdiction to grant motion to intervene once appeal

had been filed), with Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp., 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (holding that

filing of appeal did not divest district court of jurisdiction to

grant motion to intervene). Instead, we affirm the denial of

the Union's motion on the ground that the motion was

untimely.

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that

any motion for intervention must be "timely." Fed R. Civ. P.

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24(a). The Supreme Court has said that "[t]imeliness is to be

determined from all the circumstances. And it is to be

determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court's ruling will

not be disturbed on review." NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S.

345, 366 (1973) (footnote omitted). If the motion was not

timely, there is no need for the court to address the other

factors that enter into an intervention analysis. See id. at

369. Where, as here, the District Court has not made any

factual findings with respect to the timeliness issue (because

it denied the motion on jurisdictional grounds), we "must

make our own determination." Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d

1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

A motion for "intervention after judgment will usually be

denied where a clear opportunity for pre-judgment intervention was not taken." Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792

F.2d 179, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Massachusetts Sch. of

Law v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 783 n.5. (D.C. Cir. 1997)

("[S]ome would-be intervenors may inexcusably neglect to try

to enter the proceedings before judgment, at a time when

notice of their arguments would have enabled the district

court to avert the alleged errors. Then, post-judgment intervention for the purpose of challenging those supposed defects

on appeal would rightly be denied as untimely."). Here, the

Union offers no reason whatsoever for its failure to intervene

prior to judgment.

The Union cites two cases that reversed denials of motions

to intervene, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385

(1977), and Dimond. In those cases, however, the necessity

of intervention did not arise until after judgment had been

entered. In United Airlines, the would-be intervenor found

out only after final judgment that the plaintiffs did not plan to

appeal the denial of class certification. See United Airlines,

432 U.S. at 393-94. In Dimond, "the potential inadequacy of

[the existing parties'] representation came into existence only

at the appellate stage." Dimond, 792 F.2d at 193. In this

case, the Union sought to intervene simply because it wished

to advance a particular argument on appeal that DOL had not

explicitly advanced in the District Court. The Union has

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offered no reason, and no reason is apparent from the record,

why it could not have sought intervention prior to judgment.

Accordingly, given the presumption that post-judgment motions to intervene will be denied, we affirm the District

Court's denial of the Union's motion. If the Union wishes to

intervene in further proceedings, i.e., on remand, it may raise

the issue at the appropriate time.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part and reverse

in part the judgment of the District Court, and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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