Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05370/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD W. LAWLEY, SR., )

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

GAIL LEWIS, )

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Respondent. )

 )

CV F 03 5370 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Document 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 14, 1998, Petitioner was found guilty in counts I, III and IV of robbery pursuant

to California Penal Code Section 212.5(c). The jury also found true personal firearm use

enhancements pursuant to Sections 12022(a)(1) and 12022.53. In addition, the court found true

the allegations that Petitioner had suffered eight prior strike convictions (Sections 667(c) through

(j), and 1170.1(a) through (e)), three serious felony convictions (Section 667(a)), and four prison

priors (Section 667.5(a)). The court sentenced Petitioner to serve an indeterminate term of 143

years to life, as follows: three consecutive terms of 32 years to life for counts I, III, and IV, plus

Case 1:03-cv-05370-AWI-WMW Document 19 Filed 09/27/05 Page 1 of 6
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three consecutive ten-year terms for the firearm use enhancements (Sections 12022.53) for

counts 1, III, and IV; three five-year terms for the prior serious felony convictions (Section

667(a)); and two years for the Section 667.5(b) prior convictions. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. On November 21, 2000,

the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”) affirmed the

judgment in an unpublished opinion. Unpublished Opinion in Case No. F033302.

On December 22, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. On January 24, 2001, the court denied the petition without comment.

On April 24, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Kern

County Superior Court, case number HC7512A. On May 24, 2002, the court denied the petition.

On June 6, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of

Appeal, case number F040726. On June 13, 2002, the Court of Appeal denied the petition.

On July 17, 2002, Petition filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court, case number S108379. On March 19, 2003, the court denied the petition.

Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 26, 2003. On

February 6, 2004, District Judge Anthony W. Ishii adopted the findings and recommendations

recommending that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be denied. On February 23, 2004, this court

ordered Respondent to file a further response to Petitioner’s petition. Respondent filed her

answer on April 8, 2004. Respondent concedes in her answer that Petitioner has exhausted his 

state judicial remedies. Petitioner did not file a traverse to Respondent’s answer.

LEGAL STANDARDS

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his

rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged

arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this

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court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed on March 26, 2003, after the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is governed by

its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003)

(disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.

2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue

the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at

1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id.

(citations omitted). 

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1As Respondent notes, Petitioner appears to present additional arguments in his declaration attached to his

petition. The only arguments before this court are those presented in the petition. 

4

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process

and effective assistance of counsel and his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment in his prior 1989 conviction in case number SCR49003. Primarily, Petitioner

claims that he was not informed by trial counsel, the court, or the prosecutor that this conviction

could be used to enhance future convictions, or that he had a right to appeal. Petitioner argues 

his 1989 conviction cannot be used to enhance his 1998 conviction. Petitioner concludes that his

sentence enhancements for his prior convictions in the current case must be stricken. Petitioner

previously presented this claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for writ of habeas

corpus which was denied on the merits.1

In Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Cross, 532 U.S. 394, 403-404 (2001), 

the Court held that 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 does not provide a remedy when a state prisoner 

challenges a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an allegedly 

unconstitutional prior conviction for which the petitioner is no longer in custody. Basing its

decision on the need for finality of convictions and ease of administration, the Court held that if

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a conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right, but is later used to

enhance a criminal sentence, a defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence

through a petition under Section 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was

unconstitutionally obtained . Id. at 402 - 404. Two exceptions to this general rule exist. The

first exception is for when the first conviction was obtained without appointment of counsel, in

violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 403. This exception does not apply in the present

case, as counsel was appointed in the case that resulted in Petitioner’s 1989 conviction. 

The second exception exists for cases in which Petitioner cannot be faulted for failing to

obtain timely review of a constitutional claim regarding his first conviction. Id. at 405. 

Circumstances include those in which a state court has erroneously refused to rule on a properly

presented Constitutional claim, or in which a defendant has obtains compelling evidence that he

is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, which he could not have uncovered

in a timely manner. Id. This second exception also does not exist in the present case. 

Petitioner has made no allegation that a state court has erroneously refused to rule on his claim,

and although he states briefly that he “comes before this court on grounds of actual innocence,” 

he provides no factual explanation of how he is actually innocent. Rather, this statement is

simply inserted into the middle of his argument that he was not informed of the possibility of the

use of the conviction for future enhancement purposes. The court finds that Petitioner has not

made an identifiable, substantive claim of actual innocence.

In light of the above, the court concludes that under Lackawanna, 28 U.S.C. Section

2254 does not provide a remedy for Petitioner’s challenge to his 1998 conviction on the ground

that it was enhanced based on his allegedly unconstitutional 1989. Accordingly, this petition

must be denied.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of

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habeas corpus be DENIED and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for

Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2005 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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