Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01905/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01905-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Michael Schunn, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. Civ. 04-1905-PHX-NVW (MS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On September 13, 2004, while confined at the Arizona State Prison ComplexEyman in Florence Arizona, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. [Doc. 1]. Respondents filed an Answer

on January 25, 2005. [Doc. 14]. Petitioner's Reply was filed on April 15, 2005.

[Doc. 29]. The Court now Reports and Recommends as follows:

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of burglary, armed robbery, sexual assault, and

three counts of kidnapping. [Doc. 15, Exh. A]. The charges stemmed from an

incident that occurred on January 18, 1993, when two men entered the Foxy Ladies

Mens Club and committed the alleged offenses. [Doc. 15, Exh. C]. One of the men,

Jon Robertson, was arrested on that date, but the second man was not found. [Id.].

Robertson was convicted pursuant to a no contest plea, and served five years of a

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seven and one-half year term of imprisonment. [Id.]. Six years later, Petitioner was

charged as the second perpetrator. [Id.]. Robertson identified Petitioner as the

second assailant at Petitioner's trial, and testified about the underlying events. [Id.].

The trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a verdict. [Id.]. The

State was unable to locate Robertson for Petitioner's retrial, and in light of his

unavailability, sought to introduce Robertson's testimony from the first trial into

evidence. [Id.]. Over objection, the trial court permitted the State to read

Robertson's prior testimony. [Id.]. Petitioner was found guilty. [Id.].

Petitioner filed an appeal, raising a single issue: whether the introduction of

Robertson's testimony, which was predicated on an erroneous finding of

unavailability, violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed on March 13, 2001. [Doc. 15, Exh. C]. The

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on April 17, 2001. [Doc. 15, Exh.

E].

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 1, 2002, raising

several issues, including: whether "his constitutional rights were violated by the

introduction of coerced and tampered evidence"; whether evidence relating to his

prior criminal record was improperly introduced during trial; whether counsel's

request for a sur-rebuttal witness was improperly denied; whether conversations

Petitioner had in jail "were illegally taped and used during the trial"; whether triplehearsay testimony was improperly introduced; whether perjured testimony was

allowed; whether "the State failed to preserve crucial physical evidence"; whether

the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and whether trial counsel was

ineffective. [Doc. 15, Exh. F, G]. The Superior Court found several of Petitioner's

claims either waived or precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2), (3) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. [Doc. 15, Exh. G]. The Court dismissed Defendant's

claim that Robertson's testimony was coerced pursuant to Rule 32.5 of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, and dismissed Petitioner's claim of prosecutorial

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misconduct as unsupported. [Id.]. Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel was denied on the merits. [Id.] The Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona

Supreme Court summarily denied review. [Doc. 15, Exhs. I, K].

Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 13,

2004, raising eight grounds for relief. In Ground 1, Petitioner claims that the

introduction of Jon Robertson's prior testimony violated Petitioner's right to

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. [Doc. 1]. In Ground 2, he asserts that

his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise sufficient issues. [Id.]. In

Ground 3, he asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated when the prosecution introduced known perjured and coerced testimony.

[Id.]. In Ground 4, he asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

was violated when evidence of his prior bad acts and prior criminal history were

introduced. [Id.]. In Ground 5, he asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to

compulsory process was violated when the trial court denied his request to call a

sur-rebuttal witness. [Id.]. In Ground 6, he claims ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. [Id.]. In Ground 7, he asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process was violated when the prosecutor made reference to excluded evidence.

[Id.]. In Ground 8, he claims that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

was violated when the state failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. [Id.].

Respondents' oppose the Petition, asserting that all Petitioner's claims are

procedurally defaulted with the exception of his claim that his right to confrontation

was violated when the trial court permitted the admission of Jon Robertson's prior

testimony over objection. [Doc. 14].

II. Motion for Notice of Intent to Strike Ground Six

On February 24, 2005, Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus was filed in this Court. [Doc. 22]. In his motion, Petitioner requested that the

Court strike ground six of his habeas petition, stating that he purposely omitted

ground six from the Petition for Review he filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals.

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[Id.]. On March 3, 2005, this Court ordered Petitioner to either file a notice of intent

to strike ground six and have his remaining claims considered by this Court, or to file

a motion for stay and abeyance if he wished to return to state court to exhaust his

claim. [Doc. 23]. Petitioner's Motion for Notice of Intent to Strike Ground Six was

filed on March 21, 2005. [Doc. 25]. Based on Petitioner's admission that he did not

attempt to properly exhaust his sixth ground for relief in state court and his Notice

of Intent, it is recommended that Petitioner's sixth ground for habeas relief be

dismissed. 

III. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

No writ may be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in state courts. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). Under the exhaustion

doctrine, a petitioner must present his claims to the state courts on direct appeal or

through collateral proceedings before a federal court will consider a habeas corpus

petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876,

877 (9th Cir. 1985). Specifically, exhaustion requires that a petitioner either fairly

present his or her claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that “except in habeas petitions in capital

cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”), or show that no

state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982). A petitioner must

fairly present the “substance of federal claims to the state courts in order to give the

State the opportunity to pass upon and to correct alleged violations of its prisoners’

federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). See also Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir.

2004). 

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A habeas court will not review a question of federal law if that question has been

decided by a state court and the court’s decision "rests on a state law ground that

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1151 (9th Cir. 2000). The state law ground may be substantive or procedural.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30 (recognizing that the “independent and adequate state

ground” doctrine bars federal habeas corpus review where a state court “declined

to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a

state procedural requirement”). To be independent, "the state law basis for the

decision must not be interwoven with federal law." LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d

702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002)(stating that "[I]f the state court's decision rested primarily on a ruling on the

merits . . ., its decision would not be independent of federal law."). "To be deemed

adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and

consistently applied." Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999)("A state procedural rule

constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was 'firmly established and

regularly followed' at the time it was applied by the state court")(quoting Ford v.

Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). Moreover, "[A] federal claimant's procedural

default precludes federal habeas review...only if the last state court rendering a

judgment in the case rests its judgment on the procedural default." Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). When a petitioner procedurally defaults his federal claims

in state court "pursuant to an independent and adequate state rule," federal habeas

review of the claims is barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the

default and actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law, or that failing

to review the claims "will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman,

501 U.S. at 750.

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1 Petitioner's fourth ground fourth habeas relief was presented in his

state post-conviction relief petition as ground B; Petitioner's fifth habeas

ground was state ground C; Petitioner's seventh habeas ground was

state ground E; and Petitioner's eighth habeas ground was ground H.

[Doc. 15, Exh. F]. 

2

 Rule 32.2(a) provides:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this

rule based upon any ground:

(1) Raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion

under Rule 24;

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), (3).

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In this case, Respondents contend that all of Petitioner's claims for relief, except

his first claim, are procedurally defaulted. Specifically, Respondents contend that

Petitioner's fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth claims were found precluded in state

court. Respondents assert that Petitioner did not present his second claim in a

petition for post-conviction relief, and did not fairly present his third claim as a federal

claim. The Court will address each of Respondents' arguments separately.

A. Preclusion (Grounds 4, 5, 7, 8)

Petitioner's fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth claims were each presented to the

Superior Court in his Petition for post-conviction relief.1

 [Doc. 15, Exh. F]. In ruling

on Petitioner's petition, the Superior Court found each of these claims to be

precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2), (3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure.2

 [Doc. 15, Exh. G]. The Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme

Court denied review. [Doc. 15, Exhs. I, K].

Because the state courts held that Petitioner's failure to comply with a state

procedural rule precluded consideration of the foregoing claims, review by this Court

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3 An exception to this rule may exist under Rule 32.2(b) for a defendant

who raises claims under Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h). None of the

claims at issue here were raised under those subsections of Rule 32.1.

4 In Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit

recognized that preclusion may not always be clear under Rule

32.2(a)(3) in cases of technical exhaustion and procedural default.

However, Cassett did not involve an actual finding of preclusion by the

state court. Here, because the Superior Court clearly found preclusion,

Petitioner's claims are procedurally barred. 

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is barred if the state court decisions rested on independent and adequate state

grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729; Park, 202 F.3d at 1151. Here, the state court

ruling rested on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(a). This rule

precludes post-conviction relief for any claim that could have been raised in a

previous collateral proceeding or on direct review, except under limited

circumstances.3

 The preclusive effect of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule

32.2(a)(3) is both independent and adequate.4

 Smith, 536 U.S. at 860 (finding Rule

32.2(a)(3) determinations independent of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and adequate);

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(rejecting argument that Arizona's

reliance on Rule 32.2(c) as a basis for procedural default was "so unpredictable and

irregular that it does not provide an adequate ground" for disposal of claims). The

proper application of the rule by the state courts in this case therefore precludes

review by this Court absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of

justice.

B. Failure to Present Claim in a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

(Ground 2)

In his second ground for relief, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Specifically, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing

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5 Petitioner claims to have communicated these issues through

correspondence with his appellate counsel. Petitioner does not

indicate the substance of these issues in his habeas Petition. In his

Reply, he asserts that he asked counsel to raise grounds one, three,

four, five, six, seven and eight.

6 The trial judge ruled as follows:

"The Court has received and reviewed Defendant John Michael

Schunn's (hereinafter "Petitioner") Pro-Per Petition for Re-Hearing for

Post-Conviction Relief.

The Court has reviewed the Court's file and more specifically the

pleadings filed related to Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

The Court's minute entry of September 16, 2002 lists all issues raised

by the Petitioner in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and reflects

that the Petitioner did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Since Petitioner's Petitioner for Re-Hearing of the

Court's September 16, 2002 rulings are based on ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, the Court finds that this issue cannot

be raised through a Petition for Re-Hearing. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED denying Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing on

Post-Conviction Relief."

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to raise all the "specific issues he desired to be appealed". [Doc. 1].5 Petitioner

asserts that, as a result of counsel's failure, he was forced to try to present his

issues pro se during post-conviction proceedings.

Petitioner challenged appellate counsel's effectiveness twice in state court: in a

Petition for Rehearing filed with the trial court, and in the Petition for Review filed

after his Petition for Post-conviction Relief was denied. He did not, however, present

his claim in a post-conviction relief petition. The Superior Court denied Petitioner's

Petition for Rehearing on grounds that the claim was improperly raised. [Doc. 15,

Exh. N].6

 Petitioner then sought to raise the claim in a Petition for Review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals summarily denied relief. 

The Court finds that Petitioner's claim was not fairly presented. Although

Petitioner attempted to raise his claim in his Petition for Rehearing, the Court did not

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7 In addition, there is no indication that the state court decision was

inadequate or interwoven with federal law.

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reach the merits of the claim because it was not presented in a procedurally correct

manner. A state court may decline to consider, on procedural grounds, an issue that

a petitioner improperly attempts to present. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (1991)(“Just

as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas

petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting

his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those

claims in the first instance”). Presenting a claim in a procedural context in which the

merits would not ordinarily be considered does not constitute fair presentation.

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1980); see also Roettgen v. Copeland, 33

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994)(claims presented through improper procedures are

deemed unexhausted); Kellotat, 719 F.2d at 1030 (invocation of abnormal procedure

does not amount to fair presentation).7 Therefore, the state courts did not have an

opportunity to pass upon Petitioner's federal claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66.

The fact that Petitioner attempted to present his claim in the Arizona Court of

Appeals does not require a different conclusion. The United States Supreme Court

has held that, "[W]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same

claim rest upon the same ground." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).

In accordance with the presumption established in Ylst, this Court presumes that the

Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's second claim on the procedural ground cited

by the trial court.

Under state law, Petitioner may not now return to state court and re-assert his

unexhausted federal claims. Rule 32 proceedings must be initiated within ninety

days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days of the order and

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8 An exception to this rule may exist under Rule 32.2(b) for a defendant

who raises claims under Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h). None of the

claims at issue here were raised under those subsections of Rule 32.1.

9 As explained below, Petitioner has not established either cause and

prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

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mandate affirming the judgment and sentence on direct appeal.8 See Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.4(a). If Petitioner were now to return to state court, his claims would be timebarred. Because Petitioner would be precluded under Arizona law from returning to

state court to properly present his claims, the claims are procedurally defaulted. See

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).9

Moreover, even were Petitioner's presentation of his claims to the Arizona Court

of Appeals sufficient for purposes of exhaustion, this Court would deny the claims

as meritless. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, a

federal Petitioner must show both that counsel's performance was constitutionally

deficient, and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-688 (1984). To establish that counsel's performance was deficient, a

petitioner is required to show that, "counsel's representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. In the appellate

context, prejudice is established by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but

for his counsel's errors, the result of the appeal would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1992);

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1999). A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. Under the prejudice prong, the question is whether "counsel's errors

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable." Id. at 687.

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Here, §2254(d) does not mandate reversal of the state court decision. Counsel's

failure to raise all the issues Petitioner himself would have chosen to raise does not

establish ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 ("[I]n many instances,

appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or no

likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is

widely recognized as one of the hall marks of effective appellate advocacy"). See

also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-90 (recognizing that mere criticism of counsel's

tactics is not sufficient to support a charge of ineffective assistance of counsel);

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (counsel's tactical decisions

about how to present a defense are not subject to an ineffective assistance of

counsel attack); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Mere

criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of

inadequate representation"). Counsel acted within the spectrum of reasonable

representation. Therefore, even if the Court finds that Petitioner's claim was not

procedurally defaulted, the Court recommends that the claim be denied.

C. Failure to Present as a Federal Issue (Ground 3)

In his third claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process was violated when the prosecutor introduced "known perjured and

coerced testimony." [Doc. 1 at 7]. Respondents assert that Petitioner's claim was

never fairly presented to the state courts as a federal claim. The Court agrees with

Respondents.

To fairly present a claim, a federal habeas petitioner must provide the state courts

with a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

the federal constitutional claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-

66. The state prisoner must describe in the state proceedings both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Anderson, 459 U.S.

at 6 (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 276-77); see also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2000), amended at

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10 Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner's third ground for relief could be

deemed fairly presented, it may be procedurally barred. The Superior

Court dismissed Plaintiff's state court claim for failure to comply with

Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides

in part that a Petitioner must file a statement under oath and file other

available affidavits, records or evidence with his Petition. Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.5 ("The defendant shall include every ground known to him or her

for vacating, reducing, correcting or otherwise changing all judgments

or sentences imposed upon him or her, and certify that he or she has

done so. Facts within the defendant's personal knowledge shall be

noted separately from other allegations of fact and shall be under oath.

Affidavits, records, or other evidence currently available to the

defendant supporting the allegations of the petition shall be attached to

it. . . .").

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247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that a petitioner must characterize the claims

raised in state proceedings "specifically as federal claims"). Generally, the petitioner

must reference specific provisions of the federal constitution, federal statute, or

federal case law. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670. General appeals to broad constitutional

principles such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial are

insufficient to establish exhaustion. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163

(1996); Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Petitioner made only broad a reference to the "unconstitutional use" of

testimony and a blanket assertion that the introduction of the testimony violated his

"constitutional right to due process and a fair trial." [Doc. 15, Exh. F at 7, 10, 11, 18].

Petitioner cited only Arizona statutory provisions in support of his claim. He did not

cite any federal cases or state cases that would alert the state courts fo the federal

nature of his claim. Petitioner's broad appeals to constitutional notions do not satisfy

the exhaustion requirement. Gray, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996); Hivala, 195 F.3d

at1106.10

Like Petitioner's second claim, Petitioner's third claim would be time-barred were

he to return to state court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). Thus, Petitioner's third claim

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is procedurally defaulted and may be considered on habeas only upon a showing of

cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. See also

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2003). 

D. Cause, Prejudice and Miscarriage of Justice

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and

eighth claims are procedurally defaulted. Federal habeas review of the merits of

these procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless Petitioner can show cause for

the procedural default and actual prejudice, or that failure to consider his claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Griffin,

350 F.3d at 960. 

"'Cause' is a legitimate excuse for the default; 'prejudice' is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation." Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244

(9th Cir. 1984). If the petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the

court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from

the constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). To show

a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make the extraordinary

showing that the alleged constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction

of an innocent person. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The circumstances constituting a fundamental

miscarriage of justice apply in only a "narrow class of cases." Schlup, 513 U.S. at

321. To establish actual innocence, the petitioner must show that considering all the

evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

him." Id. at 327-28. 

Petitioner has not put forth any arguments sufficient to support a finding of cause

or prejudice that would excuse his default with respect to the precluded claims. The

only arguments he makes that can be construed as providing potential grounds for

cause and prejudice are his assertions that he lacked access to a lawyer and a law

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library while preparing his petitions and that his appellate counsel failed to raise

sufficient issues on direct appeal. 

Cause and prejudice are not established by Petitioner's assertion that his

appellate counsel should have identified and presented more claims. Although

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause for a

procedural default, "the mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal

basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not

constitute cause for a procedural default." Murray, 477 U.S. at 486. Ordinarily, a

prisoner must establish that counsel's assistance was so ineffective that it fell below

constitutional standards or show that an objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel's ability to comply with the state procedural rule. Id. The record

does not support such a conclusion here. For the reasons set forth above in

connection with the Court's discussion of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim, the Court finds that counsel was not constitutionally

ineffective. The Court also finds no impediment to raising the issues Petitioner now

alleges should have been raised. Rather, the arguments Petitioner puts forth are the

type of arguments found not to establish cause in Murray.

Similarly, Petitioner's claim that he lacked access to a lawyer or law library while

preparing his petitions does not establish cause. The claims found precluded in the

trial court were precluded because Petitioner waived or failed to raise them on direct

appeal or because his claims were adjudicated in connection with his motion for a

new trial. [Doc. 15, Exh. G]. Petitioner had the assistance of counsel on direct

appeal and in connection with his motion for a new trial. Moreover, Petitioner's pro

se status does not amount to cause sufficient to set aside a procedural default.

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Court is additionally satisfied that any failure to consider Petitioner's claims

will not amount to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner alleges that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him had the trial court not committed the

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various errors alleged in Petitioner's habeas petition. For the reasons set forth

throughout this Report and Recommendation, the Court finds no constitutional error.

Petitioner has not made the extraordinary showing that his case falls within the

"narrow class of cases" in which an innocent person was probably convicted

because of an alleged constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321; Murray, 477

U.S. at 496.

Federal habeas review of Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims is barred. The

Court therefore recommends that grounds two, three, four, five, seven and eight be

dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Analysis of Non-Precluded Claims

A. Standard of Review

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this

Court shall not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the decision by the state court was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) the decision

by the state court was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary

to clearly established precedent" if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or arrives at a different result than the

Supreme Court in a case involving facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003). "Under the

'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 75

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 413 (2000)).

State court rulings and factual findings are presumed to be correct where they are

supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioners “have the burden

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11 Petitioner asserts that he does not dispute the state courts' "findings of

historical fact." He disputes "only whether those facts support the legal

conclusions that the state put forth a good-faith effort to produce

Robertson and that his testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability

after admittedingly [sic.] being improperly threatened and coerced by

both the prosecutor and his detective." [Doc. 29 at 7].

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of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

Where the state court summarily denies relief without providing rationale, this court

"review[s] the record to determine whether the state court's decision contravened,

or unreasonably applied, clearly established law." Wilson v. Czerniak, 355 F.3d

1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir.

2000)). See also Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002), amended at

311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). In such cases, this Court does not independently

decide the contested legal question, but instead determines whether §2254(d)

mandates reversal of the state court decision. Greene, 288 F.3d at 1089; Delgado,

223 F.3d at 982.

B. Confrontation Clause (Ground 1)

Petitioner alleges that his right to confrontation was violated when the prior

testimony of Jon Robertson was admitted and used at trial despite the state's failure

to use due diligence to secure his presence at trial. [Docs. 1, 29]. Petitioner alleges

that had due diligence been exercised, Mr. Robertson would not have been able to

appear and would not have been found "unavailable".11 [Id.]. He further claims that,

Mr. Robertsons' testimony should not have been admitted because Mr. Robertson

was coerced by the prosecution and the testimony therefore did not bear sufficient

indicia of reliability. [Id.].

The right to confront witnesses is a fundamental right. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.

400, 403-04 (1965). It is one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. Pointer, 380

U.S. at 404, quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931); Douglas v.

Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965). "The central concern of the Confrontation

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12 The Ninth Circuit found Crawford to be retroactive in Bockting v. Bayer,

399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005)(applying Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989)). 

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Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by

subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the

trier of fact." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990).

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court

reconsidered its prior Confrontation Clause jurisprudence relating to the admission

of prior statements of unavailable witnesses. Prior to Crawford, the test for

determining whether an unavailable declarant's statement could be offered into

evidence was whether the statement bore "adequate indicia of reliability," either

because it fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or because it bore

"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66

(1980), overruled in part by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. In Crawford, the Court

distinguished between testimonial evidence offered against a criminal defendant and

other types of evidence. The Crawford Court held that testimonial evidence may not

be introduced against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and

the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford,

541 U.S. at 68. The Court concluded, "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue,

the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one

the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Id.; see also United States v.

Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868, 871-872 (9th Cir. 2004).12

Here, Robertsons' prior testimony from Petitioner's first trial was offered into

evidence. At the first trial, Petitioner was represented by counsel and Robertson

was subject to cross-examination in Petitioner's presence. Robertson's prior

testimony was clearly "testimonial" evidence. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("[W]hatever

else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary

hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations). Thus,

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28 13 This portion of Roberts was not overruled by the Court in Crawford.

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pursuant to Crawford, the critical inquiry is whether Robertson was properly found

to be "unavailable."

Rule 804(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 804(a)(5) of the Arizona

Rules of Evidence provide that a declarant may be found unavailable where he "is

absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to

procure the declarant's attendance . . . by process or other reasonable means."

Fed. R. Evid. 804 (a)(5); Ariz. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). The United States Supreme Court

has further recognized that, for confrontation clause purposes, a witness is not

"unavailable" unless the prosecutor makes a good faith effort to obtain the witness's

presence. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 100;13 see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,

724-25 (1968); U.S. v. Winn, 767 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985). "The lengths to

which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of

reasonableness." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.

149, 189 n. 22 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ).

The Arizona Court of Appeals properly considered the relevant factors in this

case. The Court explicitly recognized that the prosecution must make a good-faith,

diligent effort to secure a witness for trial. The Court then determined that the State

made such efforts by taking a variety of actions, including: 

telephone conversations with Robertson regarding the trial and the need to serve

him with a subpoena, numerous messages on Robertson's voice mail, none of

which were returned; personal contact with members of Robertson's family and

his former employers; attempts to locate him at the residences of other family

members; contact with persons in Alaska with whom Robertson had associated;

investigation of numerous construction sites where Robertson might be working;

and surveillance of the union hall where Robertson was a member, of his father's

residence and of his former employer's place of business.

[Doc. 15, Exh. C at 4]. The efforts that were undertaken by the prosecution and

relied on by the Arizona Court of Appeals were reasonable and in good faith. The

Court therefore finds the Arizona Court of Appeals' opinion was consistent with and

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a reasonable application of the principles governing Confrontation Clause cases,

and recommends that Petitioner's first claim for relief be denied.

V. Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that Petitioner's Sixth Ground for

Relief be dismissed pursuant to his Motion for Notice of Intent to Strike Ground Six,

filed on March 21, 2005. [Doc. 25]. The Court further recommends that Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s

judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

DATED this 25th day of January, 2006.

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