Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02037/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LACI DANIELLE EILTS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

1

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-2037 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2 

Plaintiff’s motion argues that the Administrative Law Judge’s treatment of the medical opinion 

evidence, witness testimony, and step five finding were erroneous. 

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1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on June 17, 2019. 

See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on July 30, 2019). 

Accordingly, Andrew Saul is substituted in as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding 

the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 6 & 8.)

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For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted in part, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on 

September 10, 2012. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 20, 196-99.) Plaintiff’s alleged impairments included 

neck and back injury, migraines, and anxiety. (Id. at 217.) Plaintiff’s application was denied 

initially, (id. at 111-15), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 117-121.) On October 26, 2015, 

plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the 

Act. (Id. at 207-11.) This application was joined with the application for DIB. (Id. at 20.) 

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing and a hearing was held before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on February 17, 2016. (Id. at 40-75.) Plaintiff was 

represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 40-42.) In a 

decision issued on May 12, 2016, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 31.) The 

ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2017. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since September 10, 2012, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 

et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease; mood disorder; post-traumatic stress 

disorder; and adjustment disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 

and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work 

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except for 

occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling and climb stairs; 

avoid hazards such as unprotected heights and moving machinery; 

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no overhead reaching; and occasional interaction with the public, coworkers and supervisors. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born [in] 1985 and was 27 years old, which is 

defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability 

onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of 

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-

41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 

CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from September 10, 2012, through the date of 

this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

(Id. at 22-31.)

On March 6, 2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s

May 12, 2016 decision. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on July 26, 2018. (ECF. No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

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1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 

disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

Plaintiff’s pending motion asserts the following four principal claims: (1) the ALJ’s 

treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error; (2) the ALJ improperly rejected 

plaintiff’s testimony; (3) the ALJ improperly rejected lay witness testimony; and (4) the ALJ’s 

erred at step five of the sequential evaluation. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 10-18.

3

) 

3 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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I. Medical Opinion Evidence

The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in 

part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining health 

professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a 

general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion 

of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a 

treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 

as an individual. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Sullivan, 894 

F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990).

The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 

clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is 

controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” (Id. at 831.) Finally, although a 

treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to significant weight, “‘[t]he ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.’” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 

671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 

2009)). 

A. Dr. Donna Holscher

Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion offered by Dr. Donna 

Holscher, a treating physician. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 10-13.) The ALJ discussed Dr. 

Holscher’s opinion, stating: 

On February 11, 2016 Dr. Holscher submitted a medical opinion 

reflecting a less than sedentary functional capacity, to include 

restrictions against lifting and carrying less than 10 pounds, standing 

and walking for less than 2 hours a day, and sitting for less than 2 

hours a day (Ex 16F). Such an extremely restricted functional 

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capacity is excessive, when compared to the examination findings of 

record which do not describe the claimant as an additional surgical 

candidate relative to spine complaints, the normal neurological 

findings of motor strength, sensation and reflexes, and the treatment 

notes which include the claimant’s reporting as to doing well on her 

medications (Ex 14F pg 2, 29). In light of this evidence, Dr. 

Holscher’s opinion is entitled to little weight.

(Tr. at 27.) 

First, it must be acknowledged that 

[t]o say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient 

objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions 

mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of 

specificity our prior cases have required, even when the objective 

factors are listed seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his 

conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain 

why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 

1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ALJ must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary 

support for his interpretation of the medical evidence.”); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

602 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Broad and vague” reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion do 

not suffice).

And, when an ALJ elects to afford the opinion of a treating physician less than controlling 

weight, the opinion must be “weighted according to factors such as the length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization of the physician.” Trevizo v. 

Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)). The ALJ’s 

failure to discuss these factors “alone constitutes reversible legal error.” (Id. at 676.)

Moreover, the ALJ’s reference here to “findings of record which do not describe the 

claimant as an additional surgical candidate,” is misleading. (Id.) Although the ALJ did not cite 

to evidence in support of this specific finding, it appears the ALJ is referring to a January 7, 2016 

letter from Dr. Tarun Arora to Dr. Elizabeth Hernandez, in response to Dr. Arora’s examination 

of plaintiff. Therein, Dr. Arora states, “I advised [plaintiff] that there are no surgical lesions that I 

could address that would help her symptoms.” (Id. at 703.) 

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It is unclear why Dr. Arora’s finding of an absence of surgical lesions would serve as a 

reason for rejecting Dr. Holscher’s treating opinion. Dr. Arora also stated, “I’m concerned that 

[plaintiff] has a chronic pain syndrome and/or a diffuse inflammatory disorder[.]” (Id.) Dr. 

Arora recommended that plaintiff be evaluated by “neurology and possibly rheumatology.” (Id.)

The ALJ also supported the rejection of Dr. Holscher’s opinion based on “treatment notes 

which include the claimant’s reporting as to doing well on her medications.” (Id. at 27.) But 

[c]ycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a common 

occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick 

out a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months 

or years and to treat them as a basis for concluding a claimant is 

capable of working.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ supported this finding by 

citing to only two treatment notes. (Tr. at 27.) Those notes simply reflect that plaintiff reported

“doing well with pain meds,” and “doing well with her current dosing of Percocet.” (Id. at 530, 

557.) It is entirely unclear why two instances of plaintiff reporting “doing well” with pain 

medication undermines Dr. Holscher’s treating opinion with respect to plaintiff’s work-related

functional abilities. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ failed to offer a specific and legitimate, let alone 

clear and convincing, reason for rejecting Dr. Holscher’s treating opinion.

B. Helene Stovall, LCSW

Plaintiff’s treating licensed clinical social worker, Helene Stovall, provided two treating 

opinions. (Id. at 639-41, 772.) The ALJ discussed these opinions, stating:

Of record is a mental impairment questionnaire submitted by Helene 

Stovall, LCSW, expressing the opinion that the claimant was 

incapable of performing a full-time job on a regular work schedule, 

and as having predominately moderate to extreme limits in 

functioning. I agree with Ms. Stoval as to the claimant having only 

slight limits with regard to her ability to understand, remember and 

carry out simple instructions, and as having moderate restrictions in 

terms of her ability to interact appropriately with the general public, 

to accept instructions and respond appropriately to supervisors and 

to get along with coworkers. However, while the record supports 

that the claimant is preoccupied with pain, there is no indication in 

the record supporting the reporting that the claimant would only be 

able to focus for more than 5 to 7 minutes before becoming distracted 

or any reason as to why she would be unable to perform simple 

instructions even when in pain. This is not consistent or otherwise 

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supported by the treatment notes which reflect a favorable response 

to medications. Hence, Ms. Stoval’s opinion overall is afforded 

partial, but not full weight.

On March 16, 2016 Ms. Stoval expressed the opinion that the 

claimant was unable to hold down a job, or anything that would 

require her to focus and not be distracted by pain, anxiety and 

depression. I give the opinion little weight because it is based on the 

assumption that a job requires no distraction, and does not address 

simple work that can be performed despite the claimant being 

depressed, anxious and in pain.

(Id. at 28.)

In support of this finding the ALJ simply cited to the same two treatment notes showing 

plaintiff “doing well” on medication, discussed above. Again, it is error to rely on two such 

isolated instances. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. Moreover, the ALJ made no attempt to 

discuss several of the specific limitations opined by LCSW Stoval. 

For example, LCSW Stoval opined that plaintiff suffered from PTSD, major depression, 

and acute anxiety. (Tr. at 640.) That the side effects of plaintiff’s medications caused 

sleeplessness, lethargy, and short term memory deficits. (Tr. at 640.) That plaintiff had extreme 

limitation in the ability to maintain attention and concentration. (Id.) That plaintiff had marked 

limitations in the ability to remember locations and work-like procedures, maintain regular 

attendance, make simple work-related decision, and maintain socially appropriate behavior. (Id.

at 640-41.) LCSW Stoval also opined that plaintiff would miss work more than three times a 

month. (Id. at 641.) 

The ALJ failed to discuss these limitations and provide a reason as for why they should be 

rejected.4 Moreover, with respect to the March 15, 2016 opinion, LCSW Stoval’s opinion is not 

based on the assumption that a job requires no distraction and does in fact address why plaintiff 

cannot perform simple work despite anxiety, depression, and pain. In this regard, LCSW Stoval 

4 The parties discuss LCSW Stoval’s opinion as part of the medical opinion evidence. (Pl.’s MSJ 

(ECF No. 14) at 11-12; Def.’s MSJ (ECF No. 23) at 6.) Opinions offered by LCSWs are 

considered opinions of “other sources.” Thomas v. Astrue, No. CV 07-8040-PLA, 2009 WL 

151488, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009). “An ALJ may discount the opinion of an ‘other source,’ 

. . . if she provides ‘reasons germane to each witness for doing so.’” Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 

901, 906 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, 

the ALJ failed to offer even a germane reason for rejecting LCSW Stoval’s opinion. 

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explains that, as a result of plaintiff’s depression becoming “profound” and anxiety developing 

“into a full blown anxiety disorder,” plaintiff’s “depression became almost catatonic,” and “made 

it impossible for her to present for a job interview, let alone keep and attend a work situation.” 

(Tr. at 772.)

Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ’s treatment of LCSW Stoval’s opinion 

constituted error. 

C. Dr. Miles White, Psy. D.

On August 19, 2013, Dr. Miles White performed a Complete Mental Evaluation. (Tr. at 

405-12.) The ALJ discussed Dr. White’s opinion, stating:

The consultative examiner, Dr. White, assigned the claimant with no 

more than mild limitations in key areas of mental functioning except 

for a moderate restriction for detailed and complex instructions. I 

give little weight to the opinions of the State agency consultants as 

they were given with the benefit of only a partial review of the 

medical records. As for Dr. White, he made no mention as to the 

claimant having more than a mild impairment in relating and 

interacting with co- workers, supervisors and the public. I find from 

the evidence as whole, including the claimant’s testimony, that the 

claimant would reasonably be expected to have some problems with 

social interaction. Thus, the opinion of Dr. White is afforded partial, 

but not full weight.

(Id. at 27-28.)

As noted by the ALJ, Dr. White opined that plaintiff would have a moderate restriction for 

detailed and complex instructions. (Id. at 411.) However, neither the ALJ’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) determination nor the ALJ’s questioning to the Vocational Expert (“VE”)

accounted for that restriction. (Id. at 24, 61-74.) Nor did the ALJ give a reason for rejecting this 

opined limitation. 

A claimant’s RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(1); see also Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, n.5 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he can still do despite his 

physical, mental, nonexertional, and other limitations.”). In conducting an RFC assessment, the 

ALJ must consider the combined effects of an applicant’s medically determinable impairments on 

the applicant’s ability to perform sustainable work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); Macri v. Chater, 

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93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must consider all of the relevant medical opinions as 

well as the combined effects of all of the plaintiff’s impairments, even those that are not “severe.” 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a); 416.945(a); Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“[A]n RFC that fails to take into account a claimant’s limitations is defective.” Valentine v. 

Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ must determine a 

claimant’s limitations on the basis of “all relevant evidence in the record.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, while an ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a vocational expert 

(“VE”) based on alternate interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical question that 

ultimately serves as the basis for the ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical question that is 

predicated on the ALJ’s final residual functional capacity assessment, must account for all of the 

limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 

F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of the claimant’s 

limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the 

claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); 

see also Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“Because neither the hypothetical nor the answer properly set forth all of Taylor’s impairments, 

the vocational expert’s testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s 

findings.”). 

Additionally, it is unclear how Dr. White’s opined limitation with respect to detailed and 

complex instructions reconciles with the ALJ determination that plaintiff could perform two jobs

that require Level 2 reasoning. Tr. at 31; see DICOT 208.685-010; DICOT 729.687-010. “Level 

Two reasoning . . . requires a person to apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed 

but uninvolved written or oral instructions.’” Rounds v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 807 

F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. White’s 

opinion constituted error. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the claim 

that the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error.

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II. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s subjective testimony. (Pl.’s 

MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 13-16.) The Ninth Circuit has summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to 

assessing a claimant’s credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the 

symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the ALJ 

may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply because 

there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the 

degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so[.]

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking[.]” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.”5 Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 

599 (9th Cir. 1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other 

5

In March 2016, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p went into effect. “This ruling makes 

clear what our precedent already required: that assessments of an individual’s testimony by an 

ALJ are designed to ‘evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms after the ALJ finds that 

the individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to 

produce those symptoms,’ and not to delve into wide-ranging scrutiny of the claimant’s character 

and apparent truthfulness.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting SSR 

16-3p) (alterations omitted). 

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things, the “[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] 

testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work 

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect 

of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 

(9th Cir. 1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, the court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause the symptoms alleged, but that plaintiff’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were “not entirely consistent with 

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reason explained in [the] decision.” 

(Tr. at 25.) After a general overview of the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded:

After considering the record in its entirety, I find the above residual 

functional capacity assessment for light work with occasional 

postural limitations[] is appropriate in addressing the claimant’s 

spine disorders. To the extent that the claimant alleges a more 

restrictive functional capacity, such allegations are not consistent 

with the objective and clinical evidence found in the medical records. 

Though the evidence confirms a back disorder, the allegations of 

disabling pain are inconsistent with the clinical examination findings, 

which reflect tenderness and limited range in motion in her spine, but 

with otherwise normal motor, sensory and reflex functions, and the 

normal EMG and nerve conduction studies to her upper extremities. 

An overview of the record further shows that the claimant is not 

deemed to be an additional surgical candidate relative to her back 

complaints, and that she has had a favorable response to other 

treatment modalities, which have included epidural lumbar injections 

and pain medications. Her allegations of disabling pain and mental 

symptomology are inconsistent with the claimant’s reporting in the 

record as to doing well and being anxiety free, that she was sleeping 

well and enjoying activities of painting and walking, and that she was 

more functional than she had ever been. In addition, examiners have 

commented as to the claimant showing evidence for symptom 

magnification. Based on the cervical spine disorder, the preclusion 

from overhead reaching is also included. As exposure to hazards 

such as heights and moving machinery could be problematic because 

of her medications, the inclusion of these restrictions into the residual 

functional capacity assessment serve as a prophylactic precaution. 

The record additionally shows that the claimant has mood and posttraumatic stress disorders, but that she has attained a good response 

to treatment. The record overall supports no more than moderate 

deficits in social functioning because of her mental disorders, and is 

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accommodated by restricting the claimant to occasional interaction 

with the public, co-workers and supervisors.

(Tr. at 29.)

Although plaintiff challenges many of the ALJ’s findings, in rejecting plaintiff’s 

testimony the ALJ relied, in part, on “evidence for symptom magnification.” (Tr. at 29.) 

Symptom magnification can also be characterized as “exaggeration.” Buck v. Barnhart, 238 

F.Supp.2d 1255, 1263 (D. Kan. 2002). Or, “less politely, faking.” McGahey v. Harvard 

University Flexible Benefits Plan, 260 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 2009). 

In support of this finding the ALJ cited to a February 28, 2014 treatment note from Dr. 

Robert Hansen, who found “[s]ymtpom amplification possibly present.” (Tr. at 457.) Although 

the ALJ cited to only one such record, Dr. Amy Maher also made this finding repeatedly in

plaintiff’s treatment notes. (Id. at 463, 468, 473.) 

“An ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony based on a physician’s observation that 

there is reason to suspect exaggeration of symptoms.” Delarosa v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-cv-0423 

AC, 2018 WL 4611362, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2018) (citing Williamson v. Commissioner Of 

Social Security, 438 Fed. Appx. 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although not every reason given by 

the ALJ met this standard, it was nonetheless proper for the ALJ to discount Williamson’s 

testimony based on Dr. Eckstein’s observation that there was reason to suspect that Williamson 

exaggerated her symptoms.”)). 

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ offered a clear and convincing 

reason for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony. Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to summary 

judgment on the claim that the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s subjective testimony constituted 

error. 

III. Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected lay witness testimony. (Pl.’s MSJ 

(ECF No. 14) at 16-17.) The testimony of lay witnesses, including family members and friends, 

reflecting their own observations of how the claimant’s impairments affect her activities must be 

considered and discussed by the ALJ. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 

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2006); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. Persons who see the claimant on a daily basis are competent to 

testify as to their observations. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 

918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). If the ALJ chooses to reject or discount the testimony of a lay witness, he 

or she must give reasons germane to each particular witness in doing so. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 

1298; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. The mere fact that a lay witness is a relative of the claimant cannot 

be a ground for rejecting the witness’s testimony. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Smolen, 80 

F.3d at 1289. Nor does the fact that medical records do not corroborate the testimony provide a 

proper basis for rejecting such testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1289. It is especially important for 

the ALJ to consider lay witness testimony from third parties where a claimant alleges symptoms 

not supported by medical evidence in the file and the third parties have knowledge of the 

claimant’s daily activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e)(2); SSR 88-13. 

Here, the ALJ acknowledged the lay witness statement offered by plaintiff’s mother. (Tr. 

at 30.) The ALJ afforded the statement “only partial weight” because the statement was “mostly 

a reflection of the subjective complaints already testified to and reported by the claimant.” (Id.) 

An ALJ may cite the same reasons for a rejecting plaintiff’s statements to reject third-party 

statements where the statements are similar. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“if the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need 

only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness”); Valentine, 

574 F.3d at 694 (approving rejection of a third-party family member’s testimony, which was 

similar to the claimant’s, for the same reasons given for rejection of the claimant’s complaints). .

Because the ALJ provided a clear and convincing reason for rejecting plaintiff’s 

testimony, that same reason constitutes a germane reason to reject the lay witness testimony. See

Bennett v. Colvin, 202 F.Supp.3d 1119, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“In such a situation, the ALJ also 

gives germane reasons for rejecting other lay witness testimony where it is found to be similar to 

the claimant’s.”). 

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary 

judgment on the claim that the ALJ’s treatment of the lay witness testimony constituted error.

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IV. Step Five Finding

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding as step five of the sequential evaluation was 

not supported by substantial evidence due to the ALJ’s errors with respect to the opinions of Dr. 

Holscher, LCSW Stoval, and Dr. White. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 17-18.) 

At step five of the sequential evaluation, “the Commissioner has the burden ‘to identify 

specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that a claimant can perform 

despite his identified limitations.’” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alterations omitted). The ALJ can meet 

her burden by either taking the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) or by referring to the 

grids. See Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a VE. (Tr. at 32.) However, as noted above, 

while an ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a vocational expert (“VE”) based on 

alternate interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical question that ultimately serves as the 

basis for the ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical question that is predicated on the ALJ’s 

final residual functional capacity assessment, must account for all of the limitations and 

restrictions of the particular claimant. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not 

reflect all of the claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to 

support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Taylor, 659 F.3d at 1235 (“Because neither the hypothetical 

nor the answer properly set forth all of Taylor’s impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony 

cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings.”).

Here, given the ALJ’s erroneous treatment of the opinions offered by Dr. Holscher, 

LCSW Stoval, and Dr. White the ALJ’s questioning of the VE did not account for all of 

plaintiff’s limitations. Accordingly, plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment on the claim 

that the ALJ committed an error at step five of the sequential evaluation. 

CONCLUSION

After having found error, “‘[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional 

evidence, or simply to award benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.’” Trevizo, 871 F.3d

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at 682 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). A case may be 

remanded under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. 

Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains 

“flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as 

to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 

1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court 

concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not 

remand with a direction to provide benefits.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 

775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is 

uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

Here, the court cannot say that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose, particularly given the varying outcomes of plaintiff’s claims of error. This matter, 

therefore, will be remanded for further proceedings. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is granted in part and denied in 

part;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) is granted in part and 

denied in part;

3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed; 

4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and

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5. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff, and close this case.

Dated: March 10, 2020

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\eilts2037.ord

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