Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01412/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01412-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRRELL TAYLOR,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1412 GEB KJM P

vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants failed to protect him after a broadcast of the

program “America’s Most Wanted” said that he provided information about his co-perpetrator to

authorities and that, as a result, he was attacked by a razor-wielding inmate on July 12, 2004.

Defendants and plaintiff have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

I. Standards For Summary Judgment Motions

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be

entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so

long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

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1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On January 10, 2006, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing

a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland,

154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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1

 For ease of reference, the court will describe the declarations by the name of the

declarant, rather than by their exhibit letter. 

2

 This is hearsay, but defendants have not objected to it or otherwise contested the

contention that the broadcast labeled plaintiff a “snitch.” 

4

II. Factual Background

A. Defendants’ Version of the Facts

In 2004, plaintiff was housed in the Enhanced Outpatient (EOP) unit in A-Facility

of California State Prison, Sacramento. Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (DMSJ),

Declaration of J. Johnson1

 (Johnson Decl.) ¶¶ 3, 5; Declaration of Michael Sichler (Sichler

Decl.) ¶ 5. A-Facility is a protective custody unit, housing inmates with “sensitive needs,” such

as gang drop outs, mental health patients, or others who might be targeted in general population. 

Declaration of Michael Vasquez (Vasquez Decl.) ¶ 8. The EOP unit in A-Facility is a mental

health unit, where the inmates are given regular contact with counselors and psychiatrists. 

Johnson Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant Gaerlan, a psychologist, was plaintiff’s case manager, who met

weekly with plaintiff and coordinated plaintiff’s treatment. Declaration of Alvin Gaerlan

(Gaerlan Decl.) ¶¶ 4-5. 

On or about March 20, 2004, the television show “America’s Most Wanted” aired

an episode that included information about plaintiff’s crime and suggested that plaintiff had

identified his crime partner to the police. The next day, other inmates told plaintiff about the

broadcast. Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment (PMSJ), Declaration of Kirell Taylor

(Taylor Decl.) ¶¶ 2-3.2

On March 22, 2004, plaintiff had a routine appointment with defendant Frishman,

a staff psychiatrist in the EOP program. Declaration of Richard Frishman (Frishman Decl.) ¶¶ 6-

7. Plaintiff told Frishman he was concerned because the America’s Most Wanted broadcast had

claimed plaintiff had informed against his crime partner and said, “I don’t know who I’m going

to have to stab . . . I’m worried someone is coming after me . . . This is no light matter . . . I can’t

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3

 The declaration gives the date as March 30, 2006, an apparent typographical error. The

court deems the correct date to be March 30, 2004, based on other information in the record.

4

 Attachment 1 to the Johnson Declaration is a memorialization of the interview of

March 30. It notes that plaintiff had approached defendant Kennedy about obtaining a letter

from the District Attorney. Defendant Kennedy, however, describes her meeting with plaintiff

5

sleep.” Id. ¶ 7 & Attach. 2 (Progress Notes). Defendant Frishman’s notes describe plaintiff as

“paranoid he will be focus of an attack.” Id. Defendant Frishman avers that plaintiff suffers

from a delusional disorder and often described incidents with no basis in reality. In the past,

plaintiff had told Frishman he had millions of dollars buried in Southern California and he had

personally attempted to stop the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Id. ¶ 8. Frishman initially

believed that this account of America’s Most Wanted was another delusion. Id. Frishman

concedes that plaintiff “expressed concern with the airing of the . . . program” but was “unable to

point to a specific safety threat.” Id. 

Plaintiff had a regular weekly meeting with defendant Gaerlan on March 24,

2004. Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff said that other inmates and guards told him the broadcast

characterized him as an informant. Gaerlan describes plaintiff’s demeanor as “upset” and “angry

and embarrassed” but said plaintiff did not express any safety concerns. Id. ¶ 7 & Attach. 2

(Progress Notes). Defendant Gaerlan confirmed plaintiff’s account by talking to correctional

officers who had seen the show, which in fact had claimed plaintiff had turned against his coperpetrator. Id. ¶ 8 & Attach. 2. 

Defendant Johnson was a correctional lieutenant in charge of the EOP in AFacility during March and April 2004. Johnson Decl. ¶ 3. On March 30, 2004,3

 Johnson

interviewed plaintiff in order “to evaluate Taylor’s status following a televised program of

Americas Most Wanted (AMW) that featured him and his commitment offense.” Id. ¶ 8 &

Attach. 1. Plaintiff told Johnson that the show had “inaccurately portrayed him as an informant

against his crime partner,” but that he felt safe in A-Facility because it “does not play politics.”

Id. ¶¶ 9-10 & Attach. 1.4

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as occurring on March 31, after plaintiff met with Johnson. Declaration of Patricia Kennedy

(Kennedy Decl.) ¶ 5.

5

 See note 4 supra.

6

 In his declaration, Gaerlan claims that plaintiff expressed no concerns about his safety

on the EOP unit; this is not reflected in the progress notes. Compare Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 9 & Attach.

3.

6

Defendant Gaerlan had another meeting with plaintiff on March 30. Plaintiff

reported he had spoken with the facility captain and counselor5

 about the broadcast. Plaintiff

wanted to ensure that the information was documented. Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 9 & Attach. 3.6

On March 31, 2004, plaintiff asked to see defendant Kennedy, who was a

correctional counselor for the A-Facility EOP unit until May 3, 2004. Declaration of Patricia

Kennedy (Kennedy Decl.) ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff asked Kennedy to contact the District Attorney’s

office and secure a letter affirming that he had not been an informant in the co-perpetrator’s case. 

Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff said he would need the letter if he were moved to B or C Facility, but agreed

that general population inmates might not consider such a letter credible. Id. ¶ 6. He also told

her that he did not have safety concerns in A-Facility, but thought he would be in danger if he

were transferred to B or C Facility. Id. ¶ 7. Kennedy confirmed that defendant Johnson had

interviewed plaintiff the night before and that plaintiff had not expressed any safety concerns to

Johnson. Accordingly, Kennedy took no steps to move plaintiff to another facility. Id. ¶ 8.

On April 1, 2004, plaintiff had a Unit Classification/Interdisciplinary Treatment

Team (UCC/IDTT) meeting to consider whether he should remain in EOP or transfer to another

unit or prison. Kennedy Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff agreed with the recommendation that he remain in

EOP. Id., Attach. 1; Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 11 & Attach. 4. Gaerlaen’s notes reflect, however, that

Captain Vance had assigned someone “to address the issue of possible safety concern” as a result

of the broadcast. Gaerlan Decl., Attach. 4 (notes of 4/1/04). 

Plaintiff continued to meet with defendant Gaerlan and occasionally said he was

depressed about the broadcast. Id. ¶ 12 & Attach. 5. According to Gaerlan’s declaration,

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plaintiff never said he was in any danger. According to the progress notes of April 5, 2004,

however, plaintiff told Gaerlan, “Someone is after me and wants me to die”; also on April 19,

2004, plaintiff told Gaerlan that “he believes there is someone who wants him dead, but he

doesn’t know who,” though this person might have been a correctional officer. Compare

Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 12 & Attach. 5 (notes of 4/5/04 & 4/19/04). In addition, plaintiff met with

defendant Frishman on three other occasions before July 12, but did not express any concerns for

his safety. Frishman Decl. ¶ 9 & Attach. 3. 

Defendant Sichler replaced defendant Kennedy as correctional counselor in the

EOP unit on May 3, 2004. Sichler Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff did not tell Sichler he had any concerns

about his safety. Sichler learned of the America’s Most Wanted broadcast only after plaintiff

was attacked on July 12. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.

On June 21, 2004, staff determined that plaintiff’s level of care was to be lowered

from EOP to Correctional Clinic Case Management System (CCCMS), which would result in

plaintiff’s being moved from the EOP unit to the general population. Plaintiff told Gaerlan that

he would prefer to go into protective custody. Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 13 & Attach. 5 (notes of 6/14/04). 

Gaerlan passed this information on to the correctional counselor. Id. ¶ 14. 

Plaintiff attended another UCC/IDTT meeting on June 23, 2004; the chairperson

was defendant Vasquez, the senior staff psychologist. Before the meeting, defendant Vasquez

talked to the staff psychologists and it was only then that he learned that plaintiff was concerned

about his safety as a result of the America’s Most Wanted broadcast. Vasquez Decl. ¶ 7. The

committee decided to retain plaintiff in the EOP unit for thirty days, until the next committee

meeting. Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 14. Vasquez believed that retaining plaintiff in the EOP unit was

appropriate because plaintiff had said he felt safe in EOP and he could receive the necessary

mental health treatment in the unit. Vasquez Decl. ¶ 9. 

Gaerlan saw plaintiff again on July 9. Plaintiff said he was ready to go to

CCCMS, but wanted to be transferred to a sensitive needs yard. Gaerlan intended to present this

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request to the next committee meeting, scheduled for July 22. Gaerlan Decl. ¶ 15 & Attach. 5

(notes of 7/9/04) .

Defendant Ventimiglia was the lieutenant for psychiatric services in the EOP unit

of A-Facility during March and April 2004. Declaration of Thomas Ventimiglia (Ventimiglia

Decl.) ¶ 3. Plaintiff did not tell defendant Ventimiglia of any safety concerns between March

and July 2004. Although defendant Ventimiglia reviewed a report of the July 12, 2004 attack on

plaintiff, the report contained nothing about the motive for the attack. Id. ¶ 7. He did not learn

of the motive for the attack until he chaired the UCC/IDTT meeting on August 19, when the

committee decided to transfer plaintiff to a special needs yard at a different prison. Id. ¶ 8. 

Defendant Nelson was the correctional sergeant in the EOP unit of A-Facility

during March and April 2004. Plaintiff did not tell defendant Nelson that he had any concerns

about his safety as a result of the America’s Most Wanted broadcast. Declaration of Jeffrey

Nelson (Nelson Decl.) ¶¶ 3, 6. Defendant Nelson was on duty on July 12, 2004 when inmate

Crossley attacked plaintiff, but Nelson did not know the motive behind the attack. Id. ¶ 7. 

Nelson saw plaintiff a few days later and plaintiff said he was adding Nelson to his lawsuit

because Nelson had been the sergeant on duty at the time of the attack. Id. ¶ 9. 

B. Plaintiff’s Version of the Facts

Plaintiff avers that he told “every defendant” that his life was in danger and he

needed to be isolated because he had been labeled a “snitch” on national television. Taylor Decl.

¶¶ 5, 7, 8. He did not tell defendant Frishman or Gaerlan or any other CDC employee that he felt

safe in A-Facility. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff avers, however, that he does not know defendant Johnson

and did not speak to him on or about March 30, 2004. Id. ¶ 9. 

Inmate Crossley, plaintiff’s alleged assailant, has submitted a statement, which

was attached to the complaint. The statement is not executed under the penalty of perjury,

however, and although it appears to qualify as a statement against interest, plaintiff has not

demonstrated Crossley’s unavailability such that the statement can be considered. Indeed,

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plaintiff represents that Crossley “is prepared to testify in this matter in whatever way this Court

deems suitable.” Taylor Decl. ¶ 16; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3); Pfingston v. Ronan Engineering

Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). The court will not consider the statement in resolving

the motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, defendants do not dispute plaintiff’s claim that

the attack was motivated by his being identified as an informant. 

II. The Eighth Amendment And Inmate Safety

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), the Supreme Court confirmed

what the Courts of Appeal had “uniformly held”: “‘prison officials have a duty . . . to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners’” under the Eighth Amendment. A prison

official is not liable, however, “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

at 837. The Court continued: 

Under the test we adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant

need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing

that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the

official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial

risk of harm. 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nor may a prison official escape liability for deliberate

indifference by showing that, while he was aware of the obvious,

substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the

complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific

prisoner who eventually committed the assault. The question

under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting

with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently

substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health, and it does

not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple

sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an

excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all

prisoners in his situation face such a risk.

Id. at 842-43. In a footnote, the Court added that a prison official “would not escape liability if

the evidence showed he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to

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be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist (as when a

prison official is aware of a high probability of facts indicating that one prisoner has planned an

attack on another but resists opportunities to obtain final confirmation) . . .” Id. at 843 n.8. 

However, a negligent failure to protect does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Davidson v.

Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986). The ultimate test is whether the prison official acted

reasonably in light of his knowledge; if he did, he is not liable under the Eighth Amendment

even if the prisoner is harmed. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

The Ninth Circuit explored the nature of the duty to protect in Berg v. Kincheloe,

794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1986). Berg claimed he had been placed in protective custody because

his life was in danger and that he told Marsh, a prison official, he would be in even greater

danger if he went to his job as a tier porter. Marsh ignored his protest and sent him to work,

where he was beaten and raped. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment because the pro se complaint, read liberally, stated a prima facie cause of action. The

court observed:

The standard does not require that the guard or official believe to a

moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given

place at a time certain before that officer is obligated to take steps

to prevent such an assault. But, on the other hand, he must have

more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.

Id. at 459 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

In Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff was placed in

protective custody because he had enemies in the general population. When those inmates were

transferred, Davis attended a classification committee meeting to determine whether he could

return to general population. Davis asked to stay in protective custody but was unable to name

specific enemies in that population. His claims about the friends of his enemies who remained in

general population “were . . . vague and unsubstantiated.” Id. at 447. He was removed from

protective custody and later assaulted by an inmate. 

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The Eighth Circuit held:

[T]here being no solid evidence here of an identifiable serious risk

to Davis’s safety, the prison officials were not deliberately

indifferent in returning him to the general prison population, and

they were entitled to summary judgment.

Id. at 447.

In some cases, however, an inmate’s generalized fear, based on his status, may

give rise to a duty to protect, whether or not he can or will provide specific information about

threats. For example, in Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981), the court recognized a

prison official who is aware that “snitches” are in danger in general population may have a duty

to protect a “snitch,” whether or not the inmate provides a “list of potential enemies.” Id. at

1013. And in Hamilton v. Leavy, the court recognized 

since Lewis [defendant] should be charged with Hamilton’s known

cooperation with prison officials and the subsequent branding of

Hamilton as a “snitch, . . ., a factfinder could infer that Lewis knew

that the threat to Hamilton’s safety was imminent.

117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir. 1997). In addition, in Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th Cir.

1995), the court recognized the “pervasive risk” to an inmate who was known to have testified

for the prosecution in a murder case. Finally, in David v. Hill, the court observed:

Courts have long recognized that being labeled a “snitch” in the

prison environment can indeed pose a threat to an inmate’s health

and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

401 F.Supp.2d 749, 756-57 (S.D. Tex. 2005).

Defendants do not dispute the notion that a prisoner who is known or believed to

be a “snitch” may be in danger or the claim that the broadcast of America’s Most Wanted

suggested that plaintiff had identified his crime partner for the police or prosecution. One group

of defendants -- Sichler, Ventimiglia and Nelson -- contends that plaintiff never told them of his

safety concerns and they were not otherwise aware that plaintiff had been identified as an

informant. DMSJ at 9-10. A second group – Johnson, Vasquez, Gaerlan, Kennedy and

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Frishman – contends that plaintiff either did not express any safety concerns or said he felt safe

in A-Facility even after the America’s Most Wanted segment had aired. Id. at 6-9. In addition,

Vasquez describes A-Facility as a place where inmates are “kept in a protected environment and

do not experience the same hostile interactions that inmates in general population would

experience” and as a place where plaintiff could “receive all appropriate mental health care,”

which made the determination to leave plaintiff on A-Facility “the best decision for him at the

time.” Vasquez Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. None of the defendants aver that informants were not or had never

been targeted in A-Facility or the EOP unit.

Plaintiff’s account is different: he claims that he told all the defendants, except

defendant Johnson, that his life was in danger as a result of the broadcast, but that the defendants

accused him, in essence, of engaging in hyperbole in order to secure a transfer. 

Accordingly, there is a dispute over whether plaintiff informed the defendants that

he felt his safety was at risk in A-Facility and whether defendants failed to act until after plaintiff

had been stabbed, disputes that preclude summary judgment for either plaintiff or defendants. 

III. Qualified Immunity

Defendants urge that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted

reasonably by investigating plaintiff’s security concerns and holding two hearings, where

plaintiff expressed his agreement with the decision to leave him in the A-Facility EOP unit, a

safe yard apart from general population. 

Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In determining whether a governmental officer is immune

from suit based on the doctrine of qualified immunity, the court must answer two questions. The

first is, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged

show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

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(2001). A negative answer ends the analysis, with qualified immunity protecting defendant from

liability. Id. In this case, the court has found that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to plaintiff, there is a constitutional violation. 

If a constitutional violation occurred, a court must further inquire “whether the

right was clearly established.” Id. “If the law did not put the [defendant] on notice that [his]

conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate.” Id. at 202. The reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct is judged “against the

backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

In Brosseau, the Supreme Court emphasized that “the qualified immunity inquiry

must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Id. In that case, the defendant

police officer had shot a fleeing felon in the back. Id. at 194. The Court found that case law

clearly established that in a case involving excessive force “where the officer has probable cause

to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,” the outcome depends very

much on the specific facts of each case. Id. at 197-98, 201. Therefore, the Court held that

because the officer’s actions fell “in the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,’”

the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 201 (internal citation omitted). 

An inmate’s right to be protected from assault was clearly announced in Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), if not before. The Courts of Appeals had addressed an inmate’s

right to personal safety before the Supreme Court made the principle explicit. See, e.g., Berg,

794 F.2d at 459. In addition, the Courts of Appeals had examined prison officials’ responses to

an inmate who had been labeled an informant. In Reece v. Groose, the Eighth Circuit described

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the test for qualified immunity in a failure to protect case:

[T]he defendants in this case would have qualified immunity if, in

the light of all the facts known at the time, they reasonably

believed that they had taken proper measures to protect the

plaintiff.

60 F.3d at 490. In Reece, the court found that the defendants were not entitled to summary

judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity: the risk to Reece was obvious because of the

general knowledge that he had been a government witness; while his initial placement in

administrative segregation was reasonable, there were disputed questions whether defendants

had done enough to protect plaintiff from the inmate who ultimately assaulted him, an inmate

with a propensity for violence, “in light of the pervasive risk to Reece.” Id. at 491. 

Plaintiff has produced enough evidence to raise a question of material fact as to

whether defendants took appropriate steps to protect plaintiff given the law at the time of, and

shortly proceeding, the attack on plaintiff. There is no dispute that plaintiff was identified as an

informant on national television. Defendants’ own exhibits undercut their blanket assertions

regarding whether they were on notice of the risk to plaintiff, and plaintiff has sworn that he

informed the defendants that he was at risk unless he was transferred to protective custody. In

light of the “pervasive risk” to an inmate so publicly branded as an informant, the defendants’

refusal to respond to plaintiff’s expressed fear for his safety – sufficiently established for

summary judgment purposes – does not show that defendants’ took proper measures for his

safety in light of the law as announced in Farmer v. Brennan. Indeed, although defendants

Nelson and Ventimiglia assert that plaintiff did not tell them of any safety concerns, they

contend that had he done so, they would have placed him in Administrative Segregation until the

threat could be verified. Ventimiglia Decl. ¶ 6; Nelson Decl. ¶ 6. At this stage of litigation, the

declarations stand as some evidence that the other defendants’ responses were not reasonable, if

plaintiff’s sworn assertion that they were on notice is credited. They are not entitled to qualified

immunity. 

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s January 23, 2006 motion for summary judgment be denied; and

2. Defendants’ September 22, 2006 motion for summary judgment be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 10, 2007. 

2/tayl1412.157

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