Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05255/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05255-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 25, 1998 Decided November 24, 1998

No. 97-5255

Building Industry Association of Superior California, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Environmental Defense Center, et al.,

Intervenors

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00726)

Lawrence R. Liebesman argued the cause for appellants.

With him on the briefs was Rafe Petersen. Duane J. Desiderio entered an appearance.

Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the

brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and

David C. Shilton, Attorney. Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Neil Levine argued the cause for intervenors Environmental Defense Center and Butte Environmental Council. With

him on the brief was Anne Spielberg.

James B. Dougherty was on the brief for amicus curiae

National Wildlife Federation.

Robin L. Rivett and Anne M. Hayes were on the brief for

amici curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, et al.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Sentelle,

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Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellants, Building Industry

Association of Superior California, et al. (collectively "BIA")

appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia upholding a decision of the

United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") to list as

endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species

Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 1531 et seq. ("ESA"), four different species

of "fairy shrimp." The district court certified the listing

claim under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but provided no reason for its certification. While in

some applications Rule 54(b) requires merely entry of a final

order and an "express determination" that there is no just

reason for delay, we hold that, in cases such as this where it

is not evident that certification is appropriate, further explanation by the district court may be necessary. Having concluded that the district court's certification is inadequate

under this standard of review, we dismiss the appeal as

outside our jurisdiction.

I. Background

A. Statutory Framework

Under Section 4(a) of the ESA, the Secretary of the

Department of the Interior determines whether to list a

species as "endangered" or "threatened." 16 U.S.C.

s 1533(a). An "endangered species" is "any species which is

in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion

of its range." 16 U.S.C. s 1532(6). A "threatened species" is

"any species which is likely to become an endangered species

within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant

portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. s 1532(20). "To the maximum extent practicable," within 90 days after receiving a

petition of an interested person to list a species, the Secretary

is charged with making a finding concerning whether listing

is warranted. 16 U.S.C. s 1533(b)(3)(A). If the listing may

be warranted, the Secretary must make a determination

either that the petitioned action is not warranted, warranted,

or warranted but precluded within 12 months of receiving the

petition. 16 U.S.C. s 1533(b)(3)(B). The Secretary determines whether a given species is an "endangered species"

under a number of statutorily specified factors found in 16

U.S.C. s 1533(a)(1), "solely on the basis of the best scientific

and commercial data available." 16 U.S.C. s 1533(b)(1)(A).

The ESA states that at the same time the Secretary is

making this listing decision, the Secretary must, "to the

maximum extent prudent and determinable," designate a

"critical habitat" for the listed species. 16 U.S.C.

s 1533(a)(3). Nevertheless, there are circumstances under

which a critical habitat designation need not be made concurrently with the listing decision. Where such designation is

not prudent or critical habitat is not determinable, FWS

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regulations require that "the reasons for not designating

critical habitat ... be stated in the publication of proposed

and final rules listing a species." 50 C.F.R. s 424.12(a).

B. Procedural Background

Fairy shrimp are tiny crustaceans found in California's

Central Valley region. They inhabit vernal pools-seasonally

wet, isolated water bodies. On May 8, 1992, FWS published

a rule proposing to list five species of fairy shrimp as endangered pursuant to Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act

and solicited public comment. 57 Fed. Reg. 19,856-862.

After receiving comments from the public on the proposed

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listing, on September 19, 1994, FWS published its final rule

listing three of the five species of fairy shrimp as "endangered" and one of the five species as "threatened." 59 Fed.

Reg. 48,136-153. However, FWS did not designate a critical

habitat for the fairy shrimp species it had listed, concluding

that "the publication of precise maps and descriptions of

critical habitat in the Federal Register would make these

species more vulnerable to incidents of vandalism." Id. at

48,151.

BIA brought suit in the district court, challenging both

FWS's final listing decision and its failure to designate a

critical habitat. On July 25, 1997, the district court ruled on

motions for summary judgment, upholding FWS's decision to

list the fairy shrimp and remanding to FWS for the limited

purpose of clarifying or reconsidering its decision to forego

designating a critical habitat. Building Indus. Ass'n of Superior California v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 906 (D.D.C.

1997). FWS filed an additional report on September 26, 1997,

providing additional support from the administrative record

and articulating additional factual and legal bases for its

decision not to designate a critical habitat. On October 13,

1997, the Environmental Defense Center filed a response,

criticizing the FWS finding as insufficiently supported in the

record. On October 27, 1997, FWS filed a response to BIA's

motion, defending its decision not to designate critical habitat.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), on January 6, 1998, the district court

certified for appellate review those issues relating to FWS's

decision to list the fairy shrimp.

II. Discussion

A. The Jurisdictional Question

United States circuit courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See generally U.S. Const. Art. III, ss 1, 3. We do not

have appellate jurisdiction over every decision of a district

court, but only "final decisions," subject to some exceptions

for appealable interlocutory decisions not applicable here. 28

U.S.C. ss 1290, 1291. The determination of what constitutes

a final decision is not normally a difficult one. Generally, a

court may assume that for a judgment to be appealable it

must be final " 'as to all the parties, [and] as to the whole

subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved.' "

Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963) (quoting

Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920)). However, such

an absolute rule of total finality poorly serves the real world

of complex litigation. Our rules of civil procedure accommodate reality in Rule 54(b), which provides that in the case of

litigation involving joined claims or parties, "the court may

direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but

fewer than all of the claims or parties...." However, the

court may do so "only upon an express determination that

there is no just reason for delay and upon an express

direction for the entry of judgment." Our jurisdiction over

the present controversy arises under that provision, if we

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have jurisdiction at all.

Therefore, before we approach the merits of appellants'

claim, we must first determine whether the order of the

district court allowing the partial summary judgment as to

the listing claim is final and appealable under Rule 54(b).

The question is jurisdictional. Haynesworth v. Miller, 820

F.2d 1245, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1987). If we have no jurisdiction

over a cause purportedly before us, then it is our duty to

dismiss the cause. Id. Having considered the question in

this case, and examined the briefs and the supporting record,

we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction and therefore

must dismiss this appeal.

B. Review of the District Court's Rule 54(b) Certification

Determination of the exceptional cases qualifying for Rule

54(b) certification is initially the province of the district court,

which "function[s] as a 'dispatcher,' " deciding which lessthan-totally final dispositions meet the standard for finality

set forth in the Rule and therefore qualify for certification.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the placement

of this decision in the discretion of the district court is a wise

one, as that court is "the one most likely to be familiar with

the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay." Sears,

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Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956). Therefore, the law affords considerable discretion to the district

courts in making the certification decision under Rule 54(b).

However, "with equally good reason, any abuse of that discretion remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals." Id.

In Sears, the Supreme Court offered initial guidance for

our review of the district court's exercise of that discretion.

Under Sears, we should consider as legitimate grounds for

the dismissal of such an appeal as outside our jurisdiction any

of the following:

(1) that the judgment of the District Court was not a

decision upon a "claim for relief,"

(2) that the decision was not a "final decision" in the

sense of an ultimate disposition of an individual claim

entered in the course of a multiple claims action, or

(3) that the District Court abused its discretion in certifying the order.

Id. at 436. The first two of these grounds appear to be

questions of law, which presumably we would review for error

on the record, making a de novo decision as to the question of

law. Cf. Summers v. Department of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077,

1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (setting forth the standard of review

for summary judgments); Herbert v. National Academy of

Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing

standard of review applicable to issues of fact and law in

appeal from dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

The third question, by its terms, sets forth an abuse of

discretion standard of review.

In applying the abstract standards of Sears to the concrete

district court decision before us, we will first consider how

much on-the-record decisionmaking we can require of the

district judge in a Rule 54(b) certification review. The Rule

itself sets a basic minimum standard. Before we can acquire

appellate jurisdiction, Rule 54(b) requires that the district

court must have entered an "express determination that there

is no just reason for delay and ... an express direction for

the entry of judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The express

direction and determination is a bright-line requirement. We

will not imply a Rule 54(b) determination. " 'Absent an

express direction for entry of judgment, an order that disposes of less than all the claims--no matter with what firmness

and apparent finality--is not appealable.' " Everett v. US

Airways Group, Inc., 132 F.3d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(quoting with approval 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure s 3914.7, at 544 (2d ed. 1992)). This presents no

problem on the present record as the district court complied

with the requirements of Rule 54(b) for an express determination and direction. Our difficulty is that the court's reasoning behind the declaration is not express and is not apparent

from the record.

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Can we, in our review of a Rule 54(b) certification, require

more of the district court than compliance with the express

determination and express direction set forth in the Rule? In

many, perhaps most, of the small number of cases we review

under this rubric, we might not even ask that question.

Where the district court's reasoning is apparent to us, or

discernible from other parts of the record, we would perhaps

find literal compliance with the Rule quite sufficient. However, this is not such a case. Fortunately, the Supreme Court

has provided further guidance.

In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1

(1980), the Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Third

Circuit dismissing an appeal brought on Rule 54(b) certification. Expanding on the reasoning from Sears, the Court

outlined the three steps we set forth above and made it

explicit that the district court should undertake the analysis

in the order set forth. That is, the district court should not

certify under Rule 54(b) until it has determined "that it is

dealing with a 'final judgment.' " Id. at 7. The decision for

certification must constitute "a 'judgment' in the sense that"

it determines a claim for relief. Id. Further, "it must be

'final' ... 'an ultimate disposition of an individual claim

entered in the course of a multiple claims action.' " Id.

(quoting Sears, 351 U.S. at 436). Neither of these steps

seems to present any insurmountable problem in the present

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controversy, and if our analysis ended there, we might well be

willing to accept the district court's certification.

But our analysis does not end there. Under the terms of

the Rule and the directions of Curtiss-Wright, once the

district court has found finality, it "must go on to determine

whether there is any just reason for delay." Id. at 8. The

Court in Curtiss-Wright explicitly declared that "[n]ot all final

judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the

remaining unresolved claims." Id. It is at that point that

the district court most explicitly performs that function which

the Sears Court described as "dispatcher"; that is, it is then

that the court must "determine the 'appropriate time' when

each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for

appeal." Id. (quoting Sears, 351 U.S. at 435). It is that

decision which rests in the discretion of the district court. In

making that decision, the court must exercise its discretion

" 'in the interest of sound judicial administration.' " Id. at 10

(quoting Sears, 351 U.S. at 437). Before departing from the

norm, that is, determining that there are "no just reasons to

delay" and entering a final judgment on one of multiple

claims, a district court "must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved." Id. at 8

(emphasis added). Thus, a district court should properly

consider "such factors as whether the claims under review

were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated

and whether the nature of the claims already determined was

such that no appellate court would have to decide the same

issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals." Id.

As the district court did not supply its reasoning on this

point, and as the record appears silent on the point, we are

unable to adequately perform the review prescribed under

Sears and Curtiss-Wright. True, the recitation of the "no

just reason for delay" language is sufficient for literal compliance with the Rule. Nonetheless, it is not in itself sufficient

to base an adequate review of the district court's exercise of

its discretion. Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 617

F.2d 1149, 1150 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]hen the case is of such a

nature that the reasons for the 54(b) certification are unclear,

it may be necessary for adequate appellate review to require

that the district court's reasons be stated."). As the Eleventh

Circuit has noted, in cases in which the district court does not

set forth its reasons for determining that there is no just

cause for allowing the normal delay, "we do not get the

benefit of its experience and reasoning." In re Southeast

Banking Corp. v. Bassett, 69 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995).

As the Bassett court further stated, in such cases "we do the

best we can without that assistance, but any deference we

might otherwise accord such a ruling will be nullified by the

absence of a meaningful explanation." Id. This is such a

case.

As we noted in the beginning of this opinion, the separable

claims involve the alleged errors of the Secretary in making a

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finding that listing is warranted, and in his determination of a

critical habitat for the listed species. It appears to us that

these two decisions under 16 U.S.C. s 1533 and 50 C.F.R.

s 424.12(a) arise from a nexus of fact and law so intertwined

that if we decide the one now, we may nonetheless face many

of the same questions in determining the other later. As the

Supreme Court expressly held in both Sears and CurtissWright, a district court certifying a claim under Rule 54(b)

must apply the proper considerations "to assure that application of the Rule effectively 'preserves the historic federal

policy against piecemeal appeals.' " Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S.

at 8 (quoting Sears, 351 U.S. at 438). As we cannot on the

record before us determine that the district court in this case

fulfilled that obligation, we conclude that the Rule 54(b)

certification before us is not proper.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that we do not

have appellate jurisdiction over this claim. This appeal is

therefore dismissed.

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