Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-02835/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-02835-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KENNETH DENWOODY STEED, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02835 PCT PGR (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On November 27, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 14) on July 6,

2007. Petitioner filed a reply to the answer on or about August

7, 2007. See Docket No. 15.

I Procedural History

On December 18, 2002, in Mohave County Superior Court

docket number CR2002-1418, Petitioner was charged by means of a

“felony information” with six class 4 felony counts involving

DUI, including a charge that the offenses were Petitioner’s

third offense for DUI within the preceding 5 years. Answer,

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1 Petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time he was

arrested on November 6, 2002, was .226. Additionally, Petitioner’s

driver’s license had been suspended or revoked prior to the time of

his arrest on November 6, 2002. Answer, Exh. J at 2.

2

 Exhibit E attached to the Answer indicates Petitioner had

two prior non-DUI felony convictions, including one for theft.

-2-

Exh. A.1 On or about February 14, 2003, an “Addendum to the

Information” was filed, alleging Petitioner had committed the

offenses while on probation for a felony conviction. Id., Exh.

B. 

Two of the counts charged in the information were

dismissed pursuant to Petitioner’s motion prior to his trial.

Id., Exh. C. On or about June 25, 2003, after deliberating for

approximately two hours, a jury found Petitioner guilty on the

remaining four counts, i.e., aggravated driving under the

influence of alcohol, aggravated driving under the influence of

alcohol with two prior DUI convictions, aggravated driving under

the extreme influence of alcohol, and aggravated driving under

the extreme influence of alcohol with two prior DUI convictions.

Id., Exh. D. 

On August 11, 2003, the trial court, having found

Petitioner was on probation at the time of the charged offenses

and that Petitioner had two prior felony convictions, sentenced

Petitioner to concurrent aggravated sentences of 12 years

imprisonment on each of the four counts of conviction. Id.,

Exh. E & Exh. F.2 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal of his

convictions and sentences on August 21, 2003. Id., Exh. G.

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Petitioner asserted in his direct appeal that the trial court

had abused its discretion by limiting voir dire of the jury

veniremen, depriving Petitioner of his right to a trial by an

impartial jury and his right to due process of law. Id., Exh.

H. Petitioner also argued the trial court abused its discretion

by denying Petitioner’s motion to strike one of the jurors for

cause. Id., Exh. H. In a supplemental pleading filed on or

about July 23, 2004, Petitioner asserted he was entitled to

relief from his sentence pursuant to the United States Supreme

Court’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. I.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence in a memorandum decision entered March

31, 2005. Id., Exh. J. With regard to Petitioner’s Blakely

claim, the appellate court stated:

After Steed filed his Reply Brief, the United

states Supreme Court issued its decision in

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531. In

Blakely, the Court held that, except for

prior convictions, “the prosecutor [must]

prove to a jury all facts legally essential

to the punishment.” ...

In light of Blakely, we granted the parties

the opportunity to file supplemental briefs

addressing Blakely sentencing issues.

Additionally, after the parties filed their

supplemental briefs, we issued an order

staying this appeal so the trial court could

settle the record regarding the precise

aggravating factor or factors it found and

relied on in imposing aggravated sentences.

... the trial court settled the record

regarding its decision to sentence Steed to

aggravated terms.

Id., Exh. J at 10-11. 

The Court of Appeals then noted the trial court had

averred Petitioner’s sentences were aggravated solely because of

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Petitioner’s prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. J at 11. The

Court of Appeals also recited that Petitioner was on supervised

release for a felony conviction at the time he committed the

offenses in question. Id., Exh. J at 12. Because Petitioner’s

sentences were aggravated based on an explicit exception to the

rule stated in Blakely, i.e., Petitioner’s prior convictions,

the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner was not

entitled to relief on a Blakely claim. 

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

in the Arizona Superior Court on April 21, 2005. Id., Exh. L.

Petitioner asserted his right to the effective assistance of

counsel was violated because his trial counsel “failed to

investigate and employ expert testimony regarding the breath

test results.” Id., Exh. M. In a decision filed December 8,

2005, the state trial court concluded Petitioner had failed to

establish that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency in

his trial counsel’s performance and, accordingly, that

Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Id.,

Exh. N. Although Petitioner was allowed an extension of time to

seek review of this decision, he never filed a petition for

review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. at 4 & Exh. P. 

In his petition for federal habeas relief Petitioner

alleges his right to due process was violated because he was

charged and convicted pursuant to Arizona’s traffic code and

sentenced pursuant to Arizona’s criminal statutes. See Docket

No. 1. Petitioner also asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel because he was not told he could

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be sentenced pursuant to the criminal code and because his

counsel failed to object to his sentence on that basis. Id.

Additionally, Petitioner contends his right to be free of cruel

and unusual punishment has been violated by a sentence of 12

years imprisonment for violation of a state traffic law. Id. at

7.

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims for relief

must be denied because Petitioner did not properly exhaust these

claims in the state court and because Petitioner has not shown

cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of

the claims. 

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must exhaust a federal habeas claim in

the state courts before the District Court may grant relief on

the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the

state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in

a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.

Ct. 2971 (2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the

“highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied

if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona

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Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement regarding a federal habeas claim, the

petitioner must present both the operative facts and the legal

principles controlling the claim to the state courts. See

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). The

Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose of exhaustion is

to give the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged federal constitutional errors. See Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if

the petitioner did not present the claim to the state court as

asserting the violation of a specific federal constitutional

right, as opposed to the violation of a state constitutional

right, state rule, or state law, the federal habeas claim was

not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541

U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

B. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2007). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

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their claim in the state courts. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351,

109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See id.,

489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862

F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). “If a prisoner has defaulted

a state claim by ‘violating a state procedural rule which would

constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review

... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v.

Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v.

Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and preclusion bar Petitioner from

now returning to the state courts to exhaust any unexhausted

federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claims not previously fairly

presented to the state courts. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Federal courts hearing habeas petitions may

not review state convictions, even for

federal constitutional claims, if the state

court judgment procedurally barring the

petitioner’s claims rests on an independent

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and adequate state law ground. []. Procedural

default, a particular type of adequate and

independent state ground, applies to bar

federal habeas review when the state court

has declined to address the petitioner’s

federal claims because he failed to meet

state procedural requirements...

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

C. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse

his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111

S. Ct. at 2555-56. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the

petitioner’s procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that the alleged error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires

Petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

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1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review

of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, Petitioner would have to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could have found

him guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at

393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-

43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not exhaust any of his claims for habeas

relief in the state courts. Petitioner alleges his right to due

process was violated because he was charged and convicted

pursuant to Arizona’s traffic code and sentenced pursuant to

Arizona’s criminal statutes. Petitioner did not raise this

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claim in the state courts in either his direct appeal or in his

action for post-conviction relief. Because Petitioner is now

precluded by the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure from

returning to state court to assert this claim, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted the claim. 

Petitioner also asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel because he was not told he could

be sentenced pursuant to the criminal code and because his

counsel failed to object to his sentence on that basis.

Although he raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in

the Arizona Superior Court in his action for post-conviction

relief, Petitioner did not argue this factual basis for his

Sixth Amendment claim. Additionally, Petitioner did not present

this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally

correct manner, but instead abandoned the claim in his action

for post-conviction relief by failing to seek review of the

trial court’s denial of relief. Accordingly, Petitioner did not

properly exhaust this claim in the state courts and the claim

has been procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner also contends his right to be free of cruel

and unusual punishment has been violated by a sentence of 12

years imprisonment for violation of the state traffic code.

Petitioner never raised an Eighth Amendment claim in the Arizona

state courts. Petitioner did not raise this claim in the state

courts in either his direct appeal or in his action for postconviction relief. Because Petitioner is now precluded by the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure from returning to state

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court to assert this claim, Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted the claim. 

In response to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts his sentence was unconstitutional.

Petitioner seeks “federal intervention” in the form of his

release from prison. Petitioner contends that his rights were

violated because he was sentenced pursuant to the criminal code

for a traffic violation. Petitioner further asserts that

Arizona’s procedural rules are not an adequate and independent

basis for affirming his convictions and sentences. Petitioner

contends he should have been sentenced to two years pursuant to

Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 28-1383.

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claims stated in his

petitioner for federal habeas relief. Petitioner does not

assert that he is factually innocent of the crimes of

conviction, but instead asserts his sentences are excessive.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to consideration of the

merits of his claim based on a showing of cause and prejudice or

that an actual miscarriage of justice will occur. Additionally,

the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals have held that Arizona’s state rules regarding the

waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on

criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds

for affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on

the grounds of a procedural bar. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149

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F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992).

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his federal habeas

claims by presenting them to the Arizona state courts. Because

Arizona’s rules of procedure governing timeliness, waiver, and

preclusion bar Petitioner from now seeking to exhaust these

claims in the state courts, Petitioner has technically

exhausted, but procedurally faulted, his federal habeas claims.

Because Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claims, and because

Petitioner does not assert he is factually innocent, the Court

may not award relief on the merits of Petitioner’s claims for

federal habeas relief.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Steed’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

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specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 21st day of August, 2007.

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