Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02222/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02222-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD M. GILMAN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-2222 GEB PAN P

vs.

TERESA A. SCHWARTZ, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a sentence of twenty-five years

to life in prison based on petitioner’s 1982 conviction of first degree murder, mayhem, assault

with a caustic chemical and conspiracy. In the instant petition petitioner challenges the parole

board’s finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole. This matter is before the court on

respondent’s motion to dismiss. Respondents contend that the petition is time-barred.

Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). 

When a habeas petitioner challenges an administrative decision such as the denial

of parole, the underlying action is not final for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations until

the denial of administrative review. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004);

Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921, 925

(1979) (state habeas petition challenging administrative determination not cognizable until the

conclusion of administrative proceedings). 

Moreover, once the statute begins to run, it is tolled during the pendency of any

“properly filed” state collateral attack on the judgment. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07

(9th Cir. 1999). 

For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this

case is as follows:

1. On March 13, 2002, the parole board found petitioner was unsuitable for

parole. That decision became effective on April 22, 2002. (Subsequent Parole Consideration

Hearing Transcript, dated March 13, 2002, at 39-45 (attached to Petition).) 

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2. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Solano County

Superior Court; it was denied on December 10, 2002. (Opp’n., Ex. A.)

3. Petitioner’s administrative appeal challenging the parole board’s decision was

received on May 24, 2002 (Opp’n., Ex. B), and denied on March 11, 2003. (Id., see

Respondent’s Request for Judicial Notice.)

4. Petitioner declares he did not receive a copy of the board’s denial until May 2,

2003. (Opp’n. at 2 & Ex. B.)

5. On November 25, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Marin County Superior Court. (Opp’n. at Ex. C.) On December 23, 2003, that petition was

transferred to the Solano County Superior Court. (Opp’n. at Ex. D.)

6. On January 2, 2004, Solano County acknowledged receipt of the transfer. 

(Opp’n. at Ex. E.) On January 29, 2004, the petition was denied. (Opp’n at Ex. F.) 

7. On May 3, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los

Angeles County Superior Court. (Opp’n at Ex. G.) That petition was denied by order filed May

7, 2004. (Id.)

8. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition challenging the board’s decision on June

4, 2004. (Pet. at 2; Ex. C; Opp’n. at Ex. H.) On July 15, 2004, the petition was held in abeyance

pending the filing of complete transcripts. (Pet., Ex. I.) The Los Angeles County Superior Court

denied the state petition on August 12, 2004. 

9. On September 15, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, which was denied on

September 28, 2004. (Pet. at 2; Ex. D.) The original petition to the California Supreme Court

was denied on September 21, 2005. (Pet. at 2-3; Ex. E.) 

10. Petitioner filed the instant action on November 3, 2005. 

It is undisputed that petitioner did not receive the Board’s denial until May 2,

2003 and is, therefore, the date on which petitioner discovered the factual predicate of his claims. 

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Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082 (statute of limitations began to run the next day after the undisputed date

on which Redd received notice of the Board’s decision); see also Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133,

1138 (limitations period began on the undisputed date Burger learned of the change in his parole

reconsideration date). Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on May 3,

2003 and would have expired on May 2, 2004, absent any tolling. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding

the day from which the period begins to run from the calculation of the time); Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 12 (same).

The court next determines whether the one-year period should be tolled under the

text of the statute which provides for tolling for the time period during which a properly filed

application for post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). The limitation period ran from May 3, 2003, until petitioner’s filed his first

collateral attack on November 25, 2003. On November 25, 2003, the limitation period had run

220 days. The period did not begin to run again until January 29, 2004, the date the petition was

denied. From January 30, 2004 until May 3, 2004, when petitioner filed his next petition for writ

of habeas corpus, a period of 92 days, the limitation period had run 312 days. The limitation

period was tolled from May 3, 2004 to May 7, 2004, but began to run again on May 8, 2004 until

June 4, 2004, a period of 27 days. By June 4, 2004, the limitation period had run 339 days.

Petitioner had 26 days left to file his petition in federal court. The limitation

period was again tolled from June 4, 2004 until August 12, 2004. The limitations period began

to run again on August 13, 2004 and ran out on September 7, 2004, before petitioner filed his

September 15, 2004 petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Although petitioner went on to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus on

September 15, 2004, and later in the California Supreme Court, these collateral actions were all

filed after expiration of the statute of limitations. Neither the filing of collateral actions nor the

operation of tolling revive the statute of limitations. Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327-28

(9th Cir. 2000). 

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Petitioner did not file the instant petition until November 3, 2005, over a year

beyond the expiration of the limitations period. This action is therefore barred by the statute of

limitations.

Because petitioner clearly exceeded the statute of limitations, and does not qualify

for statutory tolling, the court must determine whether petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

for any or all of the time between May 3, 2003, when the statute of limitations period began to

run, and September 7, 2004, when the limitations period expired.

Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is

available in this circuit, but only when "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time" and "the extraordinary circumstances were the

cause of his untimeliness." Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has held:

We will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period

only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

may be appropriate. 

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

It is a habeas petitioner’s burden to establish his entitlement to equitable tolling. Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002).

Here, petitioner raised no facts in support of equitable tolling. Petitioner claims

he has been diligent; however, he has provided no evidence of external forces that prevented him

from timely filing his federal petition. Accordingly, this court finds petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

respondent’s January 6, 2006 motion to dismiss the petition be granted and this action be

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 The court need not reach respondent’s alternative argument that the court lacks subject 1

matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims. 

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dismissed as time-barred.1

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 24, 2006.

001

gilm2222.mtd

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