Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01985/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01985-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID L. DEW, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SHAWN HATTON, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

Case No.: 16cv1985-MMA (MDD)

ORDER: 

ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION 

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE; 

[Doc. No. 11] 

GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 7] 

DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 1] 

AND DECLINING TO ISSUE 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner David L. Dew (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus (“petition”) pursuant to Tile 28 of the United States Code, Section 2254, 

challenging the constitutionality of his conviction for second-degree felony murder in 

San Diego County Superior Court in light of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in 

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Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). See Doc. No. 1.1

 Respondents filed a 

motion to dismiss the petition, to which Petitioner responded. See Doc. Nos. 7, 9. 

 The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Dembin for preparation 

of a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Civil Local 

Rule HC.2. On March 7, 2017, Judge Dembin issued a thorough and well-reasoned 

Report recommending that the Court grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss. See Doc. 

No. 11. Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on March 27, 

2017. See Doc. No. 12. For the reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES

Petitioner’s objections in substantial part2

 and ADOPTS the Recommendation that the 

petition be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review 

Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1), the Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . 

. . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 

                                               

1

 All citations refer to the CM/ECF pagination. 

 

2

 The Court incorporates the factual background as set forth in the Report and Recommendation, 

and adopts that portion of the Report in all respects, except as to footnote 3 on page 8. See Doc. No. 11 

at 8 n.3 (finding the petition untimely even if Johnson applies retroactively to collateral vagueness 

attacks on California’s second-degree felony murder rule because the deadline to file such a petition was 

June 26, 2016—one year after the Supreme Court announced the Johnson decision). Petitioner objects 

to this finding, asserting that if Johnson applies retroactively to this case, his petition is timely. Doc. 

No. 12 at 4. On May 9, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, raising for the first time his argument that Johnson rendered California’s second-degree 

felony murder rule invalid. See Doc. No. 1-2 at 42. The California Supreme Court denied the petition 

on June 22, 2016, tolling Petitioner’s AEDPA statute of limitations for 44 days, or until August 5, 2016. 

See id. at 44; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner filed the instant petition on August 5, 2016. 

See Doc. No. 1. Thus, if Johnson did apply retroactively to this case, the petition is timely. 

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Petitioner’s objection and declines to adopt the magistrate judge’s 

finding as set forth on page 8, footnote 3 of the Report and Recommendation. However, because the 

Court concludes Johnson does not provide the basis for a new constitutional right applicable to 

Petitioner for the reasons stated below, the Court’s ruling on Petitioner’s objection does not impact the 

Court’s ultimate conclusion that the petition is untimely. 

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the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 

2. Analysis 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on two grounds. First, 

Petitioner contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson constitutes a new rule of 

constitutional law which applies retroactively to Petitioner. Second, Petitioner asserts he 

is entitled to a later statute of limitations start date under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) in light of the new rule of 

constitutional law announced in Johnson. See Doc. No. 12. 

AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations period for a state prisoner to file 

a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the judgment of the State court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period runs from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner argues Johnson renders California’s second-degree felony murder rule 

invalid, thereby creating a new rule of constitutional law which applies retroactively to 

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Petitioner pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(C). Doc. No. 12 at 3. “In order for a constitutional 

right newly recognized by the Supreme Court to delay the statute of limitations the right 

must not only be newly recognized, but must also be retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review.” Davis v. C.C.I. Tehachapi Warden, 2017 WL 901884, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 6, 2017) (citing Packnett v. Ayers, 2008 WL 4951230, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 

12, 2008)). The one-year limitations period “runs from the date the right was initially 

recognized, even if the [Supreme] Court does not declare that right to be retroactive until 

later.” Johnson v. Robert, 431 F.3d 992, 992 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Dodd v. United 

States, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2481 (2005)). 

The Supreme Court in Johnson found unconstitutionally vague the residual clause 

of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), a federal 

criminal statute. The residual clause of the ACCA defined a “violent felony” as any 

felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2257. The Supreme Court indicated that the residual 

clause “both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” 

and “denies due process of law.” Id. In Welch v. United States, the Supreme Court held 

that Johnson is a new, substantive decision that has retroactive effect in cases on 

collateral review. 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016). 

Here, Petitioner argues California’s second-degree felony murder rule is 

unconstitutionally vague. California law defines second-degree felony murder as “an 

unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous 

to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in [California Penal 

Code] section 189. . . .” People v. Sarun Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 430 (Cal. 2009) (emphasis 

added). Petitioner asserts just as the phrase “a serious potential risk of physical injury” is 

unconstitutionally vague, so is the phrase “inherently dangerous to life.” See Doc. No. 12 

at 2 (“California’s second-degree felony-murder rule—which covers felonies ‘inherently 

dangerous to life’—relies on precisely the same kind of hypothetical fact-based analysis 

that the Supreme Court found constitutionally impermissible in Johnson.”). Moreover, 

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Petitioner claims both the ACCA residual clause and California’s second-degree felony 

murder rule “use a categorical approach to assess risk,” considering crimes in the abstract 

and not according to how the crimes were actually committed. Doc. No. 12 at 2. 

Petitioner relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, wherein the 

Ninth Circuit applied Johnson to strike down similarly vague language in the 

Immigration and Nationality Act. 803 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015). Petitioner argues 

“the Supreme Court’s analysis in Johnson is not limited to the ACCA, and can be applied 

equally to similar statutes that require a categorical approach to define crime of 

violence[.]” Doc. No. 1 at 22-23; see also Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1115 (noting that the 

Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson “applies with equal force to the similar statutory 

language and identical mode of analysis used to define a crime of violence for purposes 

of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].”). Petitioner urges the Court to “reach the 

same result” as the Ninth Circuit did in the Dimaya case. Importantly, Dimaya is 

currently on appeal before the Supreme Court. 3 

That the Ninth Circuit extended the holding of Johnson, however, is not 

determinative in this case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), the one-year 

limitations period set forth under AEDPA begins to run from the “date on which the 

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right 

has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The 

constitutional right acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Johnson is inapposite to the 

case at bar. Neither California’s second-degree murder statute nor the second-degree 

felony murder rule contains the problematic phrase “otherwise involves conduct that 

                                               

3

 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Attorney General, filed a petition for writ of certiorari 

with the Supreme Court in light of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Dimaya. On September 29, 2016, the 

Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on January 17, 2017. On 

June 26, 2017, the case was restored to the Court’s calendar for reargument for the October 2017 term. 

Additional information pertaining to this case can be found on the Supreme Court’s official website: 

https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15-1498.htm. 

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presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” As one court from the 

Central District, considering the same challenge Petitioner raises here, noted: 

Johnson is inapposite because Petitioner’s sentence was not enhanced under 

ACCA’s ‘residual clause’ or any other similar statute. Indeed, Petitioner 

challenges: (1) a state statute; that (2) does not discuss any sentencing 

enhancements; and (3) does not require a wide-ranging inquiry into whether 

Petitioner’s crimes posed any serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another [as in Johnson]. Therefore, because Petitioner was not sentenced 

under ACCA’s residual clause, or even any state law equivalent, Johnson

created no new Due Process right applicable to Petitioner, and the 

limitations period prescribed in [28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)] does not apply. 

Johnson v. Fox, 2016 WL 8738264, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016) (emphasis in 

original), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1395512 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 

2017). 

Further, numerous district courts have rejected the argument that Johnson creates a 

new due process right upon which habeas petitioners may base vagueness challenges to 

California state laws. See Keller v. Hatton, 2017 WL 2771529, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 

2017) (holding Johnson does not provide the basis for a new constitutional right 

applicable to a petitioner challenging California’s second-degree felony murder rule), 

Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2766433 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2017); 

Huber v. Lizarraga, 2017 WL 2495175, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2017) (noting 

“Petitioner has not shown, and Johnson does not suggest, that under the circumstances of 

Petitioner’s case California’s felony murder rule is void for vagueness.”), Report and 

Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2495173 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2017); Renteria v. 

Asunsion, 2016 WL 7336558, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that “Johnson

cannot be read so broadly as to have also found California’s second-degree felonymurder elements also unconstitutionally vague.”); Birdwell v. California, 2016 WL 

5897780, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (finding “the Johnson decision is irrelevant here 

because Petitioner’s state prison sentence was not enhanced under ACCA’s ‘residual 

clause’ nor was his conviction based on any state analogue of that federal criminal 

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statute.”). 

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Johnson does not constitute a 

new rule of constitutional law applicable to Petitioner and OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

objection on this basis.4

 In the event the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dimaya announces a 

new rule of constitutional law applicable to Petitioner, Petitioner can move for an order 

from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing the district court to consider a 

second or successive habeas corpus application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(3). 

Moreover, because Johnson does not constitute a new rule of law applicable to Petitioner, 

Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Judge 

Dembin correctly determined the statute of limitations expired in April 1997, and that 

statutory and equitable tolling do not make the petition timely. 

Accordingly, upon due consideration and after conducting a de novo review of the 

pertinent portions of the record, the Court ADOPTS the Recommendation that the 

petition be dismissed. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a 

district court that dismisses or denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of 

appealability in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has not shown “that reasonable jurists 

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 

ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 743, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

                                               

4

 The Supreme Court recently considered a vagueness challenge to another federal law—a 

provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines containing the same language held 

unconstitutional in Johnson. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). In Beckles, the Court 

held that the Guidelines were not subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge because “[u]nlike the 

ACCA, . . . the advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they 

merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory 

range.” Id. at 892. Thus, Beckles does not affect this Court’s conclusion that Johnson did not announce 

a new rule of constitutional law applicable to Petitioner. 

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections in 

substantial part, ADOPTS the Recommendation that the petition be dismissed, and 

DISMISSES the petition with prejudice. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of 

appealability. The Clerk of Court is instructed to terminate this case and enter judgment 

in favor of Respondents. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 21, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

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