Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02479/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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1

 Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), State of Arizona

(“State”), Charles Ryan, and Robert Nyswaner filed the present motion to dismiss. All

remaining Defendants have filed joinders in the motion to dismiss.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elise Porter, individually and on behalf of

the estate of Earl Ray Lappe, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-2479-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6).1

 For

the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff Elise Porter is the surviving mother of Earl Ray Lappe, who was murdered

while in ADOC’s custody on November 13, 2008. On this date, the inmates in D-pod were

being released for recreation. Certain of the inmates gained entry to Lappe’s cell. The

audible alert that sounds when a cell door is not secured was either malfunctioning or turned

off. Lappe was found in his cell, lying on the floor and suffering from multiple stab wounds.

Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants, upon finding Lappe, unreasonably delayed in

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providing medical care to Lappe. Eventually, a nurse arrived on the scene as well as the

Buckeye Fire Department. Lappe was pronounced dead at 1:22 PM.

Plaintiff Elise Porter, individually and on the part of the estate of Lappe, filed the

present action in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging five causes of action: 1)

negligence against all Defendants; 2) gross negligence against all Defendants; 3) violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional policies, customs, and a failure to train against

Defendant Ryan, White, Curran, Conn, ADOC, and the State; 4) violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for deliberate indifference to safety requirements against all ADOC employee

Defendants; and 5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for loss of consortium against all

Defendants. Defendants timely removed to this Court and now seek to dismiss certain of

Plaintiffs’ claims.

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts

alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the

Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States,

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234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986).

B. ADOC as a Named Party

Defendants argue that ADOC cannot be sued because it is a non-jural entity. Citing

“settled” Arizona case law and contrasting it with governmental agencies that are expressly

authorized to sue and be sued, Defendants argue that the ADOC cannot be sued because it

has not received express authority to sue or be sued. Plaintiffs apparently concede that

ADOC is not a proper party to this lawsuit because Plaintiffs fail to respond to Defendants’

argument. The Court has reviewed the case law and does not find a basis for suggesting that

ADOC is a jural entity. For this reason, coupled with Plaintiffs’ failure to respond on this

point, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion as it pertains to ADOC.

C. Hinojosa as a Named Party

Defendants argue that “Defendant Hinojosa is not specifically mentioned in any

paragraph of the Complaint. It is therefore impossible to ascertain why he has been named

as a Defendant and what actions Plaintiff claims he took or failed to take.” (Doc. # 9 at p.

2.) Plaintiffs do not address this argument, but state only that “Officer Hin[o]josa was

assigned the Accountability Movement Officer on the day Mr. Lappe was killed, and he

admits that he permitted decedent inmate Earl Lappe and his brother to be housed in the same

yard, in violation of Department Order 801.” (Doc. # 19 at p. 3.) It is not clear how

Defendant Hinojosa’s assignment of Accountability Movement Officer or the permitting of

Lappe and his brother to be housed in the same yard pertain to Plaintiffs’ claims. In any

event, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any unlawful act on the part of Defendant Hinojosa.

Merely listing Defendant Hinojosa as a named defendant does not give Defendant Hinojosa

“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555. The Court therefore dismisses Defendant Hinojosa without prejudice.

D. Counts I & II

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs have properly alleged negligence and gross

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negligence claims against the State. However, Defendants argue that state law precludes a

tort action against all ADOC employees.

The Arizona legislature provided the following direction concerning who may be sued

in tort for actions caused by ADOC employees: “Any and all causes of action which may

arise out of tort caused by the director, prison officers or employees of [ADOC], within the

scope of their legal duty, shall run only against the state.” A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F). It is clear

that the allegations that form the basis for Plaintiffs’ Counts I and II involve conduct by

ADOC employees, acting within the scope of their legal duty, that caused the alleged torts.

Hence, Plaintiffs may only assert such tort claims against the State.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that A.R.S. § 12-820.02 provides an avenue for holding

the individual defendants liable in tort. Section 12-820.02 provides that “[u]nless a public

employee acting within the scope of the public employee’s employment intended to cause

injury or was grossly negligent, neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for .

. . [a]n injury caused by a prisoner to any other prisoner . . . .” The Court first notes that

Section 12-820.02 only applies to intentional injury and gross negligence claims, and, hence,

would not save Plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claim. In any event, the Court finds Plaintiffs’

argument unavailing.

Section 12-820.02 is under the heading of qualified immunity for all State employees.

However, Section 31-201.01(F) applies strictly and specifically to ADOC employees. It is

thus clear that the Arizona legislature intended to treat claims against ADOC employees

differently than claims against other State employees. With this understanding in mind, the

Arizona legislature mandated that Section 31-201.01(F) apply to “[a]ny and all causes of

action which may arise out of tort.” Negligence and gross negligence clearly arise out of tort.

Although Section 12-820.02 provides that a State employee may be sued for gross negligence

where a prisoner is injured by another prisoner, in the context of ADOC employees, Section

31-201.01(F) specifically limits such causes of action to run only against the State. Given

the limitation that “any and all” causes of action arising out of tort for the actions of ADOC

employees may only be brought against the State, Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Section 12-820.02

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2

 For the same reasons, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Wilson v. Maricopa County, 463

F.Supp.2d 987 (D. Ariz. 2006) is misplaced. Wilson involved an action against Maricopa

County, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and various Maricopa County Sheriffs.

Wilson did not involve ADOC employees nor the application of Section 31-201.01(F).

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fails.2

E. Counts III, IV, & V

In Counts III through V, Plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only a

person whose constitutional rights were violated may sue for such violations. See Smith v.

City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by

Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999). The allegations under Counts

III and IV pertain mostly to violations of Lappe’s constitutional rights. Given that Lappe is

deceased, Lappe’s estate may bring a cause of action for the alleged violations of his

constitutional rights to the extent Arizona law authorizes a survivor action. 42 U.S.C. §

1988(a); Smith, 818 F.2d at 1416-17. Arizona law provides that such causes of action may

only be brought by the personal representative of Lappe’s estate. A.R.S. § 14-3110; Gandy

v. U.S., 437 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1086-87 (D. Ariz. 2006). Plaintiff Elise Porter admits in her

response that she has yet to file for status as the personal representative of Lappe’s estate.

As such, to the extent Counts III and IV contain claims for violations of Lappe’s

constitutional rights, the Court dismisses such claims without prejudice and with leave to

amend once a personal representative of Lappe’s estate is appointed.

The Court will next address Plaintiff Elise Porter’s claims for unlawful deprivation

of continued association with Lappe. The Ninth Circuit has held that “parents can challenge

under section 1983 a state’s severance of a parent-child relationship as interfering with their

liberty interest in the companionship and society of their children.” Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418.

The same allegations that give rise to Lappe’s constitutional claims based on his loss of life

also give Plaintiff Elise Porter a constitutional claim based on her loss of his companionship.

Id. at 1420.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants seek to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against

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Defendants Ryan, Nyswaner, Larson, and Thompson. Defendant Ryan is the director of

ADOC; Defendants Larson and Thompson are the warden and deputy warden, respectively,

of the prison where Lappe was killed; and Defendant Nyswaner is a lieutenant in the ADOC

system. All such Defendants occupy supervisor status for Section 1983 purposes.

Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on

any theory of vicarious liability. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989).

Supervisory liability under Section 1983 exists, however, if the official implements a policy

so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving

force behind the constitutional violation. Id. at 646 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). Likewise, a supervisor may be liable for the actions of a subordinate if the

supervisor had knowledge of violations and failed to act to prevent them. Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). To state a claim for supervisory liability, a Section 1983

plaintiff must establish a causal connection between a supervisor’s act or omission and the

constitutional deprivation. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a Section 1983 claim against

Defendants Ryan, Larson, Thompson, and Nyswaner. Plaintiffs do not allege any personal

participation of any of these four Defendants in the events leading up to Lappe’s death.

However, Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient causal nexus between Defendants’ alleged

omissions and the untimely death of Lappe. Plaintiffs alleged that it was generally known

that inmates could gain entry to any cell by placing a broom handle under the cell door and

lifting up on the cell door. This is not a mere legal conclusion, but a factual allegation this

Court is required to assume the validity of in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding. As alleged, such

knowledge alone on the part of the Defendants constitutes an omission sufficient for Section

1983 liability. Moreover, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants have a policy or custom of not

properly operating the audible alarm. The audible alarm is designed to sound if a cell door

is not secured. However, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants either have the feature turned off,

or have allowed for its continuing malfunctioning. Further on this point, Plaintiffs allege that

one of the Defendant officers received on the job training without reference to the audible

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alarm. Such a factual allegation is supportive of Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants had a

policy of not using the audible alarm system. At this stage of the proceedings, given how the

Court must view Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff Elise

Porter’s constitutional claim.

Because the same allegations that give rise to Lappe’s constitutional claims also give

rise to Plaintiff Elise Porter’s constitutional claim based on her loss of Lappe’s

companionship, Smith, 818 F.2d at 1420, in the context of Plaintiff Elise Porter’s

constitutional claim, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a Section 1983

claim.

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert that Defendants Ryan And Nyswaner are entitled to qualified

immunity. “Government officials are given qualified immunity from civil liability under §

1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145

F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Plaintiffs allegations as discussed above–that Defendants were aware that inmates could gain

access to other cells and that the audible alarm was disabled or malfunctioning–invalidate

Defendants qualified immunity defense. Assuming the truthfulness of Plaintiffs’ allegations,

such knowledge and omissions on the part of Defendants violate clearly established

constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known. Such allegations pose

serious security risks and threats to inmate safety, and a reasonable person would have been

aware that such risks violated clearly established constitutional rights under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants asserted qualified immunity fails at this stage of the

proceedings.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants ADOC and Hinojosa are dismissed from

this action. Because of the mandates of A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F), Plaintiffs claims in Counts

I and II may only be brought against the State. To the extent Counts III and IV contain

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claims for violations of Lappe’s constitutional rights, the Court dismisses such claims

because no personal representative of Lappe’s estate has been appointed. Finally, with

respect to the remaining allegations in Plaintiffs Counts III through V that pertain to Plaintiff

Elise Porter’s constitutional violations, the Court denies Defendants’ motion.

The Court also notes that Rule 15 provides that a party may amend its pleading once

as a matter of course. FED R.CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (A). “A motion to dismiss is not a ‘responsive

pleading’ within the meaning of the Rule. Neither the filing nor granting of such a motion

before answer terminates the right to amend; an order of dismissal denying leave to amend

at that state is improper. . . .” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotations omitted). If a court dismisses a complaint for failure

to state a claim, “leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the

allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the

deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib., 806 F.2d at 1401. In this case, the Court finds that the

defects with respect to Hinojosa and the claims for violations of Lappe’s constitutional rights

could be cured as discussed above. As such, the Court will grant leave to amend on these

two points.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6) is granted

in part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Arizona Department of Corrections

is dismissed as a party to this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Raul Hinojosa is dismissed without

prejudice as a party to this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims in Counts I and II are dismissed

against all Defendants save the State of Arizona.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent Counts III, IV, and V contain claims

for violations of Earl Ray Lappe’s constitutional rights, the Court dismisses such claims

without prejudice as discussed above.

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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that to the extent Counts III, IV, and V pertain to

Plaintiff Elise Porter’s alleged constitutional violations, the Court denies Defendants’ motion

to dismiss.

DATED this 13th day of May, 2010.

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