Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00136/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mary Ellen Heisser, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-15-00136-PHX-NVW 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Mary Ellen Heisser seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her 

disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. 

Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by 

substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be 

affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was born in January 1955. She graduated from Northern Arizona 

University with a bachelor’s degree in 1977. She worked for the Arizona Child 

Protective Service from September 1988 until May 2007, when she stopped working to 

care for her then-90 year old father. On August 8, 2011, Plaintiff applied for disability 

insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2010. On the application 

Plaintiff also indicated that although she stopped working for other reasons, she believed 

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that as of January 1, 2008, her conditions became severe enough to keep her from 

working. She alleged numerous impairments, including back injury, left ankle and foot 

injuries, fibromyalgia, diabetes, obstructive sleep apnea, two episodes of renal failure, 

ulcerative colitis, and chronic low iron. At the time of her application, Plaintiff reported 

her height as 5’6” and weight as 210 pounds. 

On October 7, 2011, Plaintiff reported that she was able to prepare meals, do 

laundry, care for her 94-year-old father, care for her dog and birds, drive, use a computer, 

crochet, do needlework, watch television, and shop for food, clothes, and gifts. She 

reported having no problems with personal care. She also reported that she went to 

church at least once a week, played bingo once a week, and attended church meetings 

two to five times a month. She said that she fully participated in all activities. Plaintiff 

said that she did not sleep well because of obstructive sleep apnea and took naps almost 

every day. She also reported that she often woke up feeling stiff and sore because of her 

fibromyalgia, and two or three times a week she needed to take a pain pill as soon as she 

woke up. On other days, she usually took at least one pain pill later in the day. She 

reported having suffered multiple injuries and surgeries to her left ankle and foot, 

including breaking the fifth metatarsal on her left foot three times in 2009. She also 

reported she had lumbar spondylosis causing difficulty walking, back pain that prevented 

sitting more than 30 minutes, and constant pain in her left hip and thigh area, which 

affected sitting, standing, walking, and laying down. Plaintiff said she drove 250 miles 

for a day trip to the mountains, and the next day her back hurt so much she could barely 

move. She said she had trouble lifting anything weighing more than about a pound. 

When she shopped at several stores in a mall, she had to stop several times to rest; if she 

had several packages, she took them to her car before finishing shopping because she 

could not carry much. 

From April 2009 through January 2012, Plaintiff received physical therapy for 

lower back, hip, ankle, and/or foot pain. She usually reported chronic pain, but the 

severity varied. In November 2011, Plaintiff reported foot, back, and fibromyalgia pain, 

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but said that the day before she had gone to the grocery store and then stood in the 

kitchen for three hours baking. In January 2012, Plaintiff reported her back began 

hurting more after going to a movie and that she used to work out at the gym three or four 

days a week, but had not gone in several months. 

In January 2012, Plaintiff told the State agency psychological examiner that she 

enjoyed reading three or four books a month, doing needlework, and playing bingo. She 

went out to dinner one to three times a week and took her father out to breakfast on 

Sundays after church. She attended physical therapy three times a week. She had just 

completed a seven-week dog training course and enjoyed taking her dog on walks several 

times a week. She played with her birds and cleaned the bird cage weekly. She played 

computer games frequently and took her father to the movies one to three times a month. 

She went to church meetings two or three evenings a month. Plaintiff reported that her 

memory and concentration were good, and she denied having comprehension problems. 

The psychologist noted she had good recall of dates and events, and questions did not 

need to be repeated or explained. The psychologist did not observe any pain behavior or 

difficulty moving from sitting to standing and vice versa. 

On April 8, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing 

before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. Plaintiff’s attorney told the ALJ that 

the primary reason for Plaintiff’s disability claim “is the chronic problem she’s had with 

her left ankle/left foot.” Plaintiff’s attorney also told the ALJ that Plaintiff’s alleged 

disability onset date should be January 1, 2008, because she reported that as the date on 

which her medical conditions became severe enough to keep her from working. The ALJ 

stated that Plaintiff’s application said January 1, 2010, and asked whether Plaintiff 

wanted to amend the alleged onset date to January 1, 2008. Plaintiff’s counsel 

responded, “Correct,” and said he had explained to Plaintiff that it would not affect any 

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back benefits because she did not apply until 2011, but “it would potentially fill in a 

couple of extra years of . . . zero earnings.” 1 

During the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she quit working to care 

for her father in July 2007, and in November 2007 she initially hurt her ankle. Until 

September 2012, when her father began to receive assistance from care givers, Plaintiff 

regularly prepared all of her father’s meals and did his laundry and grocery shopping, but 

he was able to bathe and dress himself. She said she used a scooter at the grocery store 

after her surgeries and “a few other times.” Plaintiff testified that she was in charge of 

funeral brunches for her parish, so she set things up, served food, and cleaned up at “a 

dozen plus” funeral brunches in the two years before the April 2013 hearing. Sometimes 

she was responsible for putting together meat and cheese trays, which involved shopping, 

putting the food on trays, and making sure the rolls were cut and put on serving trays. 

She also helped serve food at the women’s group meetings two or three times a year. 

When Plaintiff’s attorney asked her why she was not able to work full-time if she was 

able to do these things, she responded, “I have a very high tolerance for pain, and I have 

had a lot of pain through my life, and I try not to whine about it, and I work through it.” 

Plaintiff said that after a big funeral brunch, she may not be able to move for a couple 

days. Plaintiff also testified that she played bingo weekly for about four to four and a 

half hours with a ten-minute intermission. 

On May 7, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 

decision. On January 26, 2015, Plaintiff sought review by this Court. 

 1

 Plaintiff’s Opening Brief includes benefit calculations based on her earnings 

history for 2002-2006, the five years before the January 1, 2008 date of alleged onset of 

disability. During 2002-2006, Plaintiff earned an average of $39,022.68 per year. If 

Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date was January 1, 2010, her five-year earnings 

history would include 2007, during which she earned $15,106.86, and 2008, during 

which she earned $0.00. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. As a general rule, 

“[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); accord Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more 

than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported 

by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). “Overall, the standard of review is 

highly deferential.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 

2015). 

III. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at 

step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ 

considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or 

medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 

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404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, 

the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity and determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing 

past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the 

inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines 

whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements 

of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012, and that she did not engage in 

substantial gainful activity from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2012. At step 

two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia, 

lumbar degenerative disc disease, history of left ankle fixation surgery, history of right 

foot fixation, hip bursitis, and obesity. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 

the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

At step four, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff: 

had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant is able to operate foot controls 

occasionally with her left lower extremity, but never with her right lower 

extremity. The claimant is also able to frequently balance and stoop, as 

well as occasionally crouch, kneel, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs. The 

claimant should never be required to climb ladders, ropes o[r] scaffolds. 

The claimant [sh]ould also avoid concentrated exposure to nonweather 

related extremes in temperatures, humid work places, dangerous with 

moving mechanical parts except motor vehicles, and unprotected that are 

high, exposed. 

The ALJ further found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff was capable of 

performing past relevant work as a “Child Support Program Director” and “Telephone 

Interceptor.” 

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IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Harmless Error 

Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context. Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not affect the 

ultimate nondisability determination. Id. The claimant usually bears the burden of 

showing that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111. 

The ALJ’s hearing decision states that during the hearing Plaintiff chose to amend 

the alleged onset day of disability to January 1, 2008, and that her attorney said she was 

aware that the amendment would have no effect on her Title II back benefit. The 

decision states, “[T]he following discussion will assume the claimant’s amended onset 

date of January 1, 2008.” The ALJ’s decision also states, “The claimant did not engage 

in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of January 1, 

2010 through her date last insured of December 31, 2012.” Plaintiff has not shown that 

this single reference to the incorrect alleged onset date had any effect on the ultimate 

nondisability determination. As Plaintiff’s attorney explained during the hearing, the 

purpose of amending the alleged onset date was to increase the earnings history used to 

calculate disability benefits. 

The ALJ’s hearing decision also refers to the fracture of Plaintiff’s “left 5th toe” 

instead of the fracture of Plaintiff’s left fifth metatarsal. Plaintiff contends this shows the 

ALJ’s fundamental misunderstanding of Plaintiff’s medical conditions and records. 

Plaintiff has not shown that this incorrect reference—even if the ALJ actually confused a 

metatarsal fracture with a toe fracture—had any effect on the ultimate nondisability 

determination. 

Therefore, both incorrect references are found to be harmless error. 

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B. The ALJ Provided Clear and Convincing Reasons for Discrediting 

Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony. 

If a claimant’s statements about pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by 

objective medical evidence, the ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the case record, 

including any statement by the claimant and other persons, concerning the claimant’s 

symptoms. SSR 96-7p. Then the ALJ must make a finding on the credibility of the 

claimant’s statements about symptoms and their functional effects. Id. 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and, if so with no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the 

rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). “This is not an easy 

requirement to meet: ‘The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required 

in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

To ensure meaningful review, the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony 

from a claimant the ALJ finds not to be credible and explain what evidence undermines 

the testimony. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2014). “General findings are insufficient.” Id. The ALJ must make findings 

“sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002); 

accord Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In making a credibility determination, an ALJ “may not reject a claimant’s 

subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the claimant’s allegations.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 

1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But “an ALJ 

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may weigh inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, 

daily activities, and work record, among other factors.” Id. Further, the claimant is not 

required to produce objective medical evidence of the symptom or its severity. Garrison, 

759 F.3d at 1014. The ALJ must consider all of the evidence presented, including the 

claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain or 

other symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; effectiveness and 

side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment other 

than medication; any measures other than treatment the claimant uses to relieve pain or 

other symptoms; and any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations 

and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. SSR 96-7p. 

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” Second, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s “statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these 

symptoms not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s claim that she is unable to perform her past work or 

any other work because of her severe symptoms is not substantiated by objective medical 

evidence and is inconsistent with her conduct, daily activities, and conservative 

treatment. Plaintiff’s symptoms are fatigue and lower back, hip, ankle, and/or foot pain. 

The ALJ made findings about the severity of each of these. Regarding Plaintiff’s hip, the 

ALJ noted that an MRI of her hip revealed only mild findings, and subsequent x-rays 

showed even less degeneration. Regarding her lumbar back, the ALJ noted MRI and xray evidence revealed only mild and stable degenerative disc disease. The ALJ further 

noted that examination at the Arizona Center for Neurosurgery showed normal range of 

motion and motor strength and that aerobic exercise and stretching exercises were 

recommended. Regarding Plaintiff’s foot and ankle problems, the ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff had sought only conservative treatment. Regarding fibromyalgia, the ALJ noted 

that Plaintiff reported at the hearing she had been dealing with this condition for more 

than 20 years, but had not seen her rheumatologist for more than a year. The ALJ also 

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stated that Plaintiff had not reported or sought treatment for fibromyalgia-related 

symptoms of cognitive or memory problems, depression, anxiety, or irritable bowel 

syndrome. The ALJ further observed that Plaintiff had been repeatedly advised to 

exercise to improve her condition, but she had not followed the advice. 

The ALJ stated that although Plaintiff had been noted to use an assistive device, a 

treating orthopedist observed that she ambulates without a limp without any assistive 

devices, “suggesting her impairment is not as severe as she alleges, but also was 

exaggeration.” The ALJ stated that Plaintiff said she left work in order to take care of her 

father, not due to a medically determinable impairment. The ALJ further stated: 

The claimant also provided that she is able to recreationally read, utilize a 

computer, sit for an hour before needing to get up, and complete light 

household chores including her own laundry, straighten her kitchen, sweep 

the floor, as well as shop independently, drive a vehicle, attend church 

twice per week, play bingo at gambling halls for 4-41⁄2 hours, and engage in 

community service activities serving food and planning funeral brunches 

for patrons. . . . The undersigned did note also that the claimant reported 

while playing bingo, she can sit for 2 hours, but then will need to get up for 

10 minutes to relieve her back pain. [] Not only is this inconsistent with 

the claimant’s testimony provided just 10 minutes earlier, but this is 

sufficient sitting and concentration capacity to support substantial gainful 

activity. 

The ALJ also “noted that in addition to the claimant’s handwritten notes, the claimant 

was able to produce a rather lengthy statement regarding her limitations, suggesting an 

ability to engage and maintain activities and projects.” 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination is based on 

misunderstanding her medical records, such as referring to “toe” instead of “metatarsal” 

and saying “no evidence has been offered to show that any trigger point analysis has ever 

been completed to support a formal diagnosis of fibromyalgia.” Plaintiff contends the 

ALJ was incorrect because her rheumatologist’s treatment notes include multiple 

notations of “T” referring to “tenderness” at certain locations. However, the notes do not 

show that the rheumatologist tested 18 points and found tenderness at least 11 of them. 

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Moreover, Plaintiff did not provide a medical source statement from her rheumatologist, 

Plaintiff did not testify that fibromyalgia prevented her from performing her past work, 

and Plaintiff’s attorney told the ALJ the primary reason for her disability claim is her 

chronic problem with her left ankle and foot. 

The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Plaintiff testified that she could not 

perform her past work because she cannot sit for more than 30 minutes because of back 

and hip pain. She also testified that she plays bingo weekly for about four to four and a 

half hours with a ten-minute intermission. She testified that she is capable of performing 

a wide range of activities because she has learned to work through the pain. The ALJ did 

not err in finding Plaintiff’s testimony about her functional limitations not fully credible. 

C. Past Relevant Work 

At step four, the claimant has the burden of showing she can no longer perform 

her past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ 

may conclude the claimant can perform past relevant work by finding she is able to 

perform the actual functional demands and duties of a particular past relevant job or she 

is able to perform the functional demands and duties of the occupation as generally 

required by employers throughout the national economy. Id. at 845. Thus, at step four, 

the claimant has the burden to prove she cannot perform her prior relevant work either as 

actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy. Carmickle v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008). Although the burden of 

proof rests with the claimant at step four, the ALJ must make specific factual findings 

regarding the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the physical and mental demands of 

the past relevant work, and the relation of the residual functional capacity to the past 

work. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. 

The ALJ may assess a claimant’s past relevant work as actually performed by 

considering a properly completed vocational expert’s report and/or the claimant’s own 

testimony. Id. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles usually is the best source for how a 

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job is generally performed. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. Here, however, Plaintiff provided 

testimony and extensive written descriptions of her prior relevant work as actually 

performed. 

In her Work History Report Plaintiff reported that from December 1988 to April 

2006 she worked for the Arizona Child Protective Service as a CPS Specialist III and 

from April 2006 through May 2007 as a CPS Program Specialist. She said that as a CPS 

Program Specialist, she was at the same level as a CPS Unit Supervisor, was in charge of 

Team Decision Making meetings, and looked to for guidance in areas of policy and 

procedure by CPS Specialists and Supervisors. She reported that she spent six hours or 

more a day sitting, two hours or more standing, and half an hour walking. She 

occasionally needed to drive to other offices. She said the heaviest weight she lifted was 

ten pounds, which involved lifting and carrying her laptop computer approximately 50 

feet. 

In a lengthy attachment to her Work History Report, Plaintiff described five jobs 

that she performed from December 1988 to April 2006, not just the CPS Specialist III 

position as she indicated in the report. She said she worked at the Child Abuse Hotline 

from November 1994 to April 2006. Plaintiff reported, “The job consisted of sitting at a 

desk probably 99% of the time, using the computer and telephone. No real lifting or 

carrying was done.” “The other 1% was using the copy machine, walking from point to 

point in the office, etc.” During the hearing, Plaintiff testified she “worked at the Child 

Abuse Hotline, and that was all sitting, all in the office.” She testified that she would not 

be able to do that job because she could not sit that long with her back and hip pain. 

The vocational expert categorized Plaintiff’s prior work as a Child Support 

Program Director, which is highly skilled sedentary work, and as a Telephone Interceptor 

Operator, which is semiskilled sedentary work. She said that Telephone Interceptor 

Operator was the closest job description she could find to Plaintiff’s work at the Child 

Abuse Hotline. The ALJ asked the vocational expert whether a hypothetical individual 

with Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, i.e., light work with certain postural and 

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environmental limitations, would be capable of performing either job. The vocational 

expert said such a hypothetical individual should be able to perform both of the 

occupations. Although the vocational expert described both occupations as sedentary, 

she further testified that if driving was required, an otherwise sedentary job would be 

considered light work. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was capable of 

performing past relevant work is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ 

did not ask a hypothetical question that involved sedentary work and the vocational 

expert incorrectly described Plaintiff’s past work as including “CPS unit supervisor” in 

addition to CPS program specialist and specialist III. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the 

vocational expert conceded she could not match either of Plaintiff’s past jobs with the 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In fact, the vocational expert said only that she could 

not find an exact match for the Child Abuse Hotline position and that the job Plaintiff 

performed probably had a higher skill level than Telephone Interceptor Operator. Skill 

level is irrelevant here because Plaintiff has no mental impairments. 

There is no error here. The ALJ’s hypothetical involved an individual who could 

perform light work, the vocational expert said the Child Support Program Director 

occupation was light work if it required driving, Plaintiff’s work at the Child Abuse 

Hotline was sedentary, and the vocational expert testified that an individual who could 

perform light work could perform either job. If someone can do light work, the 

individual can perform sedentary work unless there are additional limiting factors, such 

as inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). No medical source 

opined that Plaintiff is unable to sit for long periods of time, and Plaintiff testified she can 

sit for four hours or more with only a ten-minute break. Therefore, it was not necessary 

for the ALJ to ask the vocational expert whether someone with Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity could perform sedentary work. 

Moreover, the ALJ may assess a claimant’s past relevant work as actually 

performed by considering the claimant’s own testimony. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. 

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Plaintiff provided a great deal of information about how she actually performed her past 

work. She testified she could not perform the Child Abuse Hotline job because she 

would need to stand more frequently than during normal breaks. She testified that as a 

CPS Program Specialist she would be able to get up and walk around the room, but it 

would have been difficult during some meetings. Because the ALJ found her claim of 

inability to sit for more than 30 minutes as lacking credibility, the ALJ did not err by 

finding her capable of performing past relevant work. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall 

terminate this case 

Dated this 21st day of April, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00136-NVW Document 24 Filed 04/21/16 Page 14 of 14