Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00780/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00780-45/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

This case arises out of an encounter between incarcerated Plaintiff Gina Caruso (“Caruso”) 

and Defendant prison guards G. Solorio (“Solorio”), C. Lopez (“Lopez”), D. Martinez 

(“Martinez”), and Sgt. G. Ingram (“Ingram”) (collectively “Defendants”). Currently pending 

before the Court is Caruso’s motion for partial summary judgment on an affirmative defense and 

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.1 For the reasons that 

follow, Caruso’s motion will be granted, and Defendants’ motion will be denied. 

Rule 56 Framework

Summary judgment is proper when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as 

to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. American MultiCinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking summary judgment bears 

the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions 

 

1 Also pending is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. That motion will be resolved in a separate order.

GINA CARUSO,

Plaintiff

v.

OFFICER G. SOLORIO, OFFICER C. 

LOPEZ, SGT. G. INGRAM, and 

OFFICER D. MARTINEZ,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-780 AWI EPG

ORDER PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

STRIKE

(Doc. Nos. 193, 198)

Case 1:15-cv-00780-AWI-EPG Document 233 Filed 03/25/20 Page 1 of 6
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of the declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Where the non-moving party will have the 

burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an 

essential element of the non-moving party's claim or by merely pointing out that there is an 

absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See James 

River Ins. Co. v. Herbert Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2008); Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 

984. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 

210 F.3d 1099, 11002-3 (9th Cir. 2000). If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence 

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary 

judgment. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. The same standards apply to both motions for summary 

judgment and motions for partial summary judgment. See Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 824 F.3d 

890, 897 (9th Cir. 2016); Valentich v. United States, 194 F.Supp.3d 1033, 1035 (E.D. Cal. 2016).

Factual Background

2

At all times relevant to the issues raised in this case, Caruso was imprisoned at the Central 

California Women’s Facility (“CCWF”). See Doc. No. 187-3 at 1:22-25. On August 9, 2013, 

Caruso submitted an inmate 602 appeal to the CCWF, challenging staff misconduct and misuse of 

force against her on July 22, 2013. PUMF 1. Caruso’s appeal was accepted at the first level of 

review on August 21, 2013. PUMF 2. The appeal was bypassed at the first level of review. 

PUMF 3.

On August 22, 2013, Caruso’s appeal was accepted at the second level of review. PUMF 

4. The appeal was referred to the hiring authority to determine whether the evidence warranted an 

investigation or an inquiry. PUMF 5. 

On September 5, 3013, Caruso submitted an appeal of the second level response. See

PUMF 6. 

 

2

“PUMF” refers to Plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Facts. 

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On September 7, 2013, Caruso submitted an appeal of the second level response to her 602 

appeal. PUMF 7.

On October 21, 2013, the Office of Appeals in Sacramento directed the Appeals 

Coordinator at CCWF to amend the second level response to Caruso’s 602 appeal. PUMF 8.

On February 19, 2014, CCWF issued another second level response, again partially 

granting Caruso’s 602 appeal. PUMF 9. The new second level response stated that an allegation 

inquiry had been conducted and it was determined that CCWF staff did not violate policy. See

PUMF 10.

On March 21, 2014, Caruso submitted another appeal of the new second level response to 

her 602 appeal for third level review. See PUMF’s 11, 12; Caruso Dec. ¶¶ 8, 9. 

On June 18, 2014, Caruso’s appeal was denied at the third level of review. PUMF 13. The 

third level response confirmed that Caruso had administratively exhausted the available 

administrative remedies. See PUMF 14.

Plaintiff’s Argument

Caruso argues that she has exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to the 

misconduct that forms the basis of this lawsuit. Defendants have had ample opportunity to 

conduct discovery and litigate the issue of administrative exhaustion. However, the undisputed 

facts show that Caruso timely and fully complied with the existing administrative process both 

when the second level decision referred the matter for investigation and when Caruso obtained a 

decision at the third level of review. Therefore, partial summary judgment on Defendants’ 

affirmative defense should be granted.

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants argue that under Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), a 

defendant has the burden to prove that an inmate exhausted her administrative remedies. Caruso 

moves for summary judgment even though Defendants have not attempted to meet their 

burden/initial threshold showing under Albino. Caruso’s motion has the effect of obtaining relief 

that proof of exhaustion would afford. This is improper, and Caruso’s motion should be stricken 

under Rule 12(f).

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Discussion

1. Defendants’ Rule 12(f) Motion

Under Rule 12(f), the Court may strike from “any pleading any insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The purpose of 

a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid the costs that arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing 

with those issues prior to trial. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir 

2010). Here, Defendants’ motion to strike is not well taken.

The failure of a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the “PLRA”) is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 2017). By the express 

language of Rule 56, a “party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense

[or part thereof] on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). 

There is no limitation in Rule 56(a) that prevents a plaintiff from moving for summary judgment 

on an affirmative defense. For over sixty years, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “summary 

judgment may be used effectively in the area of affirmative defenses . . . .” Dam v. General 

Electric Co., 265 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1958). Thus, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs to move 

for summary judgment on affirmative defenses and have their motions granted. E.g. United States 

v. Kernen Constr., 349 F.Supp.3d 988, 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2018); Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme 

Corp., 187 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2016); EEOC v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 954 

F.Supp.2d 1104, 1112-14 (D. Or. 2013); D.E. Shaw Laminar Portfolios, LLC v. Archon Corp., 

570 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1271 (D. Nev. 2008). Caruso motion for partial summary judgment on 

Defendants’ affirmative defense is consistent with Rule 56(a) and these cases.

Therefore, because Caruso’s motion is not “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous,” but is instead proper under Rule 56(a) and well-established case authority, 

Defendants’ Rule 12(f) will be denied.

2. Caruso’s Motion 

“Administrative exhaustion [the California prison system] requires the completion of the 

third level of administrative review.” Jackson, 870 F.3d at 933 (citing Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 

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681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010)). “[A] prisoner exhausts [available administrative remedies] under the 

PLRA despite failing to comply with a procedural rule if prison officials ignore the procedural 

problem and render a decision on the metis of the grievance at each available step of the 

administrative process.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, partial 

summary judgment is appropriate for two reasons.

First, the undisputed facts show that Caruso pursued her grievance/appeal concerning the 

events of July 22, 2013, through the third level of administrative review. The third level of review 

denied Caruso further relief and the decision expressly stated that “[t]his decision exhausts the 

administrative remedy available to the appellant within CDCR.” Doc. No. 194-4. No procedural 

problem or other defect with either Caruso’s 602 grievance or any of her appeals have been 

identified by Defendants. Therefore, Caruso has presented sufficient undisputed facts to 

demonstrate that she has exhausted her administrative remedies. See Jackson, 890 F.3d at 933; 

Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658. Caruso has successfully shifted the summary judgment burden to 

Defendants. See Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-03. Because Defendants have not addressed the 

substantive issue of exhaustion or presented any contrary facts, Defendants have not met their 

burden. See id. 

Second, as an affirmative defense, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be waived if 

not adequately raised by the defendant. See Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007); 

Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1171 

(9th Cir. 2005) (discussing Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 n.9 (9th Cir. 2003)3); see 

also Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170 (noting that a “defect in subject matter jurisdiction, unlike a failure 

to exhaust, is a nonwaivable defect.”). On November 30, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued a 

scheduling order in this case. See Doc. No. 43. In relevant part, the scheduling order read: 

The deadline for filing dispositive motions is September 21, 2018. Any challenge

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be raised only by filing a motion 

for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Failure to raise 

the exhaustion issue by this deadline will result in waiver of the defense. See

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (providing that the exhaustion 

question should be decided as early as feasible). 

 

3 Overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166.

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Id. at 5:18-22. By order, the dispositive motions deadlines was extended to November 15, 2019. 

See Doc. No. 141. On October 30, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. See

Doc. No. 187. The issue of administrative exhaustion was not included in Defendants’ summary 

judgment motion. See id. No relief from or objections to the scheduling orders have been made. 

Thus, pursuant to the scheduling orders of November 2017 and October 2019, Defendants have 

waived any challenge to Caruso’s efforts to exhaust administrative remedies and are now

precluded from raising the issue. 

In sum, because Defendants have failed to meet their summary judgment burden (as 

explained in Nissan Fire) and have also waived their exhaustion affirmative defense through 

application of the scheduling orders, partial summary judgment in favor of Caruso is appropriate.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. No. 198) is DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’ motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 193) is GRANTED with respect 

to Defendants’ affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2020 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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