Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00580/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00580-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXIS YANCY and JAYDEN

YANCY, by and through their

Guardian Ad Litem, KATHERINE

HAWK,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 15cv0580 JM(PCL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL;

CITY OF IMPERIAL; CITY OF

IMPERIAL POLICE DEPARTMENT;

COUNTY OF IMPERIAL; COUNTY

OF IMPERIAL SHERIFF’S OFFICE;

JOSEPH A. FARROW; RAYMOND

LOERA; MIGUEL COLON, JR.;

GILBERT CALDERA; HERCILIO

CARDENAS; and ROBERT

GONZALES,

Defendants.

Defendant City of Imperial (“City”), erroneously sued as City of Imperial and

City of Imperial Police Department, moves to dismiss the Monell claim filed by

Plaintiffs Alexis Yancy and Jaden Yancy, by and through their guardian ad litem

Katherine Hawk (collectively “Plaintiffs”), for failure to state a claim. Neither party 1

On or about July 31, 2015, the court granted the joint motion of the parties to 1

dismiss Defendants Miguel Colon, Jr. and Joseph Farrow as parties to this action

without prejudice.

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requested oral argument and, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the

matters presented appropriate for decision. For the reasons set forth below, the court

grants City’s motion to dismiss the federal claims, declines to address the state law

claims, and grants Plaintiffs 15 days leave to amend fromthe date of entry of this order.

BACKGROUND

The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed on May 26, 2015, alleges 13

causes of action: six federal claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and seven state

law claims for violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act, assault, battery, false arrest,

negligence, negligent hiring, and wrongful death. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the

following generally described conduct.

Plaintiffs Alexis and Jayden Yancy (“Minors”) are the minor children of Tommy

Yancy, Jr. (“Decedent” or “Mr. Yancy”), a deceased 32 year old veteran of the United

States Army. The FAC alleges that Katherine Hawk (“Hawk”) seeks to serve as the

guardian ad litem for Minors and to represent the Decedent’s Estate. (FAC ¶10). 

Hawk has been appointed to serve as guardian ad litem for the Minors. (Ct. Dkt. 6). 

Hawk is not a party, and has not been appointed to serve as a representative of the

Yancy estate. 

On May 11, 2014, at approximately 1:30 p.m., the California Highway Patrol

(“CHP”) “pulled over Decedent Tommy Yancy, Jr. in what appeared to be a routine

traffic stop.” (FAC ¶42). Shortly thereafter, several officers with the Imperial County

Sheriff’s Office and City arrived at the scene. Decedent then allegedly stepped out of

the car with his hands raised and stood next to his car facing the officers. One officer

then released the animal from its leash and the dog “jumped towards Yancy’s face and

torso.” (FAC ¶44). The officers “began striking, hitting, and kicking” Decedent. Even

while on the ground, the dog continued to attack Decedent and the officers continued

to strike Decedent. The officers restrained Decedent using an arm bar hold, and, “in

the process, breaking the hyoid bone in his neck.” (FAC ¶48). Decedent “later died

after attacks from a K9 dog, strikes by the officers, shots from a taser, and the improper

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restraint, improper arm and/or improper, excessive force/weight on Mr. Yancy’s back,

which broke Mr. Yancy’s hyoid bone.” (FAC ¶51).

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

General Pleading Requirements

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a mere possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed,

116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept astrue all material allegations

in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

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Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

Pleading Civil Rights Claims

Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, “a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more

than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir.2007). In

addressing the impact of Iqbal and Twombly on the pleading standards for civil rights

cases, the Ninth Circuit recently stated:

we can at least state the following two principles common to all of them.

First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action,

but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.

Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly

suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued

litigation.

AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631,637 (9 Cir. 2012) (quoting th

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir.2011)). 

The Monell Claim

City claims that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for municipal liability. Under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person” who acts under color of state law may be sued. The

term “person” has been interpreted broadly, even to include cities, counties, and other

local government entities. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658 (1978). Municipalities, their agencies and their supervisory personnel cannot

be held liable under section 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability. They can, however, be held liable for deprivations of constitutional rights

resulting from their formal policies or customs. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-693;

Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001); Shaw v. California

Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality “is held liable only for those

deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of

those officials whose acts may be fairly said to be those of the municipality.” Board

of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04

(1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a

“custom” which has not been “formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may

fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so

widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691); see

also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (holding that municipal

liability under § 1983 may be shown if Plaintiff proves that employee committed

alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a “longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity.”). 

In Board of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397 (1997) the Supreme Court made the causal prerequisite clear: “it is not

enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the

municipality . . . [t]he plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is,

a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of

culpability and must demonstrate a causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.” Id. at 404 (italics in original).

“To bring a § 1983 claimagainst a local government entity, a plaintiff must plead

that a ‘municipality’s policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's

constitutional rights.” Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

648 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff must show (1) he possessed a

constitutional right of which he was deprived, (2) the municipality had a policy, (3) the

policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right, and (4)

the policy is the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Anderson v.

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). “For a policy to be the moving force

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behind the deprivation of a constitutional right, the identified deficiency in the policy

must be closely related to the ultimate injury,” and the plaintiff must establish “that the

injury would have been avoided had proper policies been implemented.” Long v. Cnty.

of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, the FAC’s allegations are too generalized and conclusory to state a claim

for municipal liability. Plaintiffs do nothing more than parrot the requirements for

municipal liability. Plaintiffs allege that the beating and death of Decedent was

pursuant to “the customs and practices for the above-referenced law enforcement

agencies that resulted in the use of excessive force against” Decedent, (FAC ¶25),

including the failure to adequately train and supervise the officers. The FAC similarly

alleges that Defendants acted “pursuant to the actual customs, policies, practices and

procedures of the[] . . . City.” (FAC ¶27). Stated another way, City

had an officially adopted or promulgated policy, or in the alternative,

long-standing, pervasive custom or practice that has the force of law of

using excessive force against members of the public during traffic stops

and during attempted arrests, of improperly and inappropriately using K

-nine police dogs to attempt to subdue members of the public, and of

misusing tasers (in violation of the standard set forth in Bryan v.

Macpherson, 630 F .3d 805 (9t Cir. 2010) against members of the general

public during traffic stops and attempted arrests.

(FAC ¶70).

These allegations fail to establish a claim beyond the speculative level. 

“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Iqbal, 56 U.S. at 662. The

boilerplatemunicipal liability allegations are insufficient to state a claimand to provide

notice to City of official conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. The court notes the

circularity of the allegations. For example, in large part Plaintiffs allege that City had

a policy, custom, or practice to use excessive force (or failure to train or supervise

City’s employees) because Decedent was the recipient of the alleged application of

excessive force (or failure to train or supervise City’s employees). Such circular

allegations do not survive after Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiffs do not allege the identity

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of any official policymaker who adopted the challenged “policies” or how City wasthe

moving force behind allegations of unconstitutional conduct. Further, Plaintiffs fail

to allege that City acted with the requisite degree of culpability or to identify the casual

link between the City’s actions and the constitutional deprivations (excessive force,

failure to train, failure to supervise, and wrongful death). Finally, the court rejects

Plaintiffs’ argument that the existence of “multiple” civil rights lawsuits alleging

excessive force against City establishes the official policy of City to use excessive

force against the public. (FAC ¶71).

2

The court concludes that Plaintiffs fail to establish the threshold for Monell

liability and therefore does not address Plaintiffs’ theories of liability for each of the

six 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims. Similarly, until Plaintiffs state a federal claim, the court

declines to reach the state law claims. Plaintiffs may elect to further amend the Monell

claim at this time or defer such amendment until, and if, discovery reveals material

facts constituting a foundation for the pleading of a Monell claimwith the particularity

required by Iqbal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 12, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

 Plaintiffs assert that four excessive force lawsuits are pending against City. 2

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