Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02286/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ruben Nevarez,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-2286-PHX-DLR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on 

November 7, 2013 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed a Limited Response (Doc. 13) on April 

1, 2014, a Supplement to the Record (Doc. 15) on April 17, 2014, and a Supplemental 

Response (Doc. 21) on October 2, 2014. Petitioner filed a Reply on April 21, 2014 

(Doc. 16) and a Supplemental Reply (Doc. 22) on October 23, 2014.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals described 

the factual background as follows:

Nevarez's convictions stem from two armed robberies committed on 

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the same day. Nevarez was one of three suspects apprehended by 

the police shortly after the second robbery. The police brought the 

victims individually to where the suspects were in custody to 

determine whether they were the robbers. One of the victims, J. L., 

identified Nevarez as having participated in the robbery.

(Exhibit BB, Mem. Dec. at 2.) (Exhibits to the Supplemental Response, Doc. 21, are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to the Limited Response, Doc. 13, are 

referenced herein as Exhibit LR-___.”)

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B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on five counts of 

armed robbery, and five counts of aggravated assault. (Exhibit X, Indictment.)

Counsel filed a request for a hearing to determine the suggestiveness of the pretrial identification procedures (a “Dessureault hearing”),2 which was held on November 

6, 2009. (Exhibit LR-O, Motion; Exhibit A, R.T. 11/6/09.) “Although Nevarez's 

Dessureault motion focused on the out-of-court show-up identifications in general, the 

testimony at the hearing focused solely on J.L.’s identification of Nevarez.” (Exhibit 

BB, Mem. Dec. at 3, n. 1.) The trial court found that the identification was not unduly 

suggestive. (Id. at 3; Exhibit A, R.T., 11/6/096 at 28.) 

Trial proceeded, and during the direct ·examination of J. L., 

the prosecutor showed him three pictures: one of Nevarez and one 

of each of the other co-defendants. On cross examination, when J. 

L. was asked whether the prosecutor had spoken to him before his 

testimony about the pictures., J . L. answered affirmatively. J.L. 

testified that the prosecutor had asked whether he remembered the 

faces of the people who robbed him. J. L. was then asked "Did [the 

prosecutor] tell you that these were the people that robbed you?" to 

which J.L. responded, “[y]es.” The prosecutor clarified there may 

have been an issue with the phrasing or interpretation of the 

question.

(Exhibit BB, Mem. Dec. at 4.) Petitioner moved to strike the in-court identification, but 

 

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The exhibits to the Limited Response (Doc. 13) were provided in an indeterminable 

order. Most of the exhibits to that document and the Supplement to the Record (Doc. 15) 

have been replicated in the Supplemental Response (Doc. 21). Accordingly, only limited 

reference is made to the record provided earlier.

2

The name derives from the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. 

Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969), directing a pretrial hearing when the 

suggestiveness of identification procedures is challenged.

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he trial court denied the motion. (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner proceeded through the jury trial, and was convicted on four of the five 

counts of armed robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. (Exhibit BB, Mem. Dec. 

at 2.) On February 26, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to a combined total of 11 years in 

prison. (Exhibit LR-I, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, challenging the pre-trial identification procedure, 

the in-court identification, and the amount of pretrial incarceration credit. (Exhibit Y, 

Opening Brief.) The Arizona Court of Appeals modified the amount of pretrial 

incarceration credit, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Exhibit BB, 

Mem. Dec. at 13.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit 

CC). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on September 27, 2011. (Exhibit BB, 

Mandate.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On October 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 

DD). Counsel was appointed, but filed a “Notice of Completion” (Exhibit EE) 

evidencing an inability to find a claim for review, and seeking leave and extension for 

Petitioner to file a pro per petition. On January 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro per

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit FF), asserting claims of: (1) unconstitutional 

search and seizure; (2) unconstitutional use of perjured testimony; (3) improper sentence 

and sentencing procedures; (4) unduly prejudicial evidence; (5) false testimony to the 

grand jury; (6) failure of the victim to testify in violation of the Confrontation Clause; 

and (7) improper conviction of two offenses based on same conduct with a weapon. In 

addition, Petitioner asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon: (1) 

failure to adequately investigate; (2) failure to file a motion to suppress; and (3) failure to 

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permit Petitioner to testify at trial. 

The PCR court found that the first seven claims were precluded under Arizona 

law because they “either were, or could have been previously litigated.” (Exhibit II, 

M.E. 4/8/12 at 2.)3 The PCR court rejected the claims of ineffective assistance on their 

merits, and summarily dismissed them with the remainder of the Petition. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit LL), rearguing his claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and asserting that his claims were improperly 

precluded because he had asserted them as instances of ineffective assistance of appellate 

and PCR counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Exhibit 

NN, Order 10/3/13.)

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 7, 2013 (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following eight grounds for relief, based on his Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights::

(1) The “one-on-one” identification, apparently of Petitioner by a 

victim, was “inherently suggestive,” and the state failed to meet its 

burden that the identification was reliable;

(2) Prosecutorial misconduct resulted in a victim’s in-court 

identification of Petitioner, and the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying a defense motion to strike the identification;

(3) Evidence from an unconstitutional search and seizure of 

Petitioner’s vehicle was introduced at trial;

(4) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct a 

pre-trial investigation and appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing “to litigate claims that would better help Petitioner on 

appellate level”;

(5) Petitioner’s indictment was based on “false and misleading 

testimony” by an officer;

(6) “Unduly prejudicial evidence was admitted in violation of 

Evidence Rule 403”;

(7) Petitioner was improperly convicted of armed robbery and 

aggravated assault “based on the same conduct with a weapon”;

(8) Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated 

 

3

The same minute entry is attached to the Answer as part of Exhibit DD.

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when a victim failed to show up in court to testify and to be cross 

examined by the defense attorney.

(Order 1/2/14, Doc. 4 at 2.) 

Response - On April 1, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc. 

13). Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his state remedies on 

the claims in: (1) Grounds 2(a) (prosecutorial misconduct re in-court identification) (id.

at 15-16); (2) Ground 4(b) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel re failure to 

litigate claims) (id. at 16-17); (3) Ground 3 (unconstitutional search and seizure); (4) 

Ground 5 (false testimony at grand jury); (5) Ground Six (unduly prejudicial evidence); 

(6) Ground 7 (dual convictions on same weapons conduct); (7) Ground 8 (Confrontation 

Clause) (id. at 17-19). Respondents further argue that the following grounds are without 

merit: (1) Ground 1 (pretrial identification) (id. at 22-31); (2) Ground 2(b) (in-court 

identification) (id. at 31-36); (3) Ground 4(a) (ineffective assistance of trial counsel) (id.

at 36-40).

Supplement to Record – In an Order filed April 3, 2014 (Doc. 14), the Court 

directed Respondents to supplement the record with briefs in the appellate and PCR 

proceeding. On April 17, 2014, Respondents complied, and submitted Exhibts SE-A 

through SE-D (Doc. 15).

Reply - On April 21, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 16). Petitioner argues: 

(1) that the allegations of the petition should be taken as true for purposes of summary 

dismissal (id. at 2-3); (2) he fairly presented on direct appeal his claims concerning the 

pretrial identification (Ground One) and the in-court identification (Ground Two) (id. at 

4-6); (3) he failed to presented his claims in his PCR proceeding (id. at 6-7); (4) the 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel is cause to excuse his procedural defaults, citing 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. - - - (2012) (Reply, Doc, 16 at 7); and (5) his claim in 

Ground 5 (unduly prejudicial evidence) affects “a number of due process and other 

federal constitutional rules” (id. at 7-8). 

Supplemental Answer – On August 12, 2014, the Court advised the parties that a 

tentative conclusion had been reached that Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 3, 5, 6, 7, and 

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8 were not procedurally barred as argued by Respondents, and directed a supplemental 

response on the merits of those claims. (Order, Doc. 18.) 

On October 2, 2014, Respondents filed their Supplemental Response (Doc. 21). 

Respondents argue that: (1) the claim in Ground Three was waived at trial, is noncognizable, and is without merit (id. at 6-10); (2) the claim in Ground Five is without 

merit (id. at 10-13); (3) the claim in Ground Six is too vague to be of merit and asserts 

only a state law violation (id. at 13-14); (4) the claim in Ground Seven is without merit 

(id. at 14-16); and (5) the claim in Ground Eight is too vague, and without merit (id. at 

16-17).

Supplemental Reply – On October 23, 2014, Petitioner filed his Supplemental 

Reply (“Response to Supplemental Response”) (Doc. 22). Petitioner “acquiesce[s] to 

grounds 3-8 for the purpose” of his Supplemental Reply, and instead addresses Grounds 

“1, 2, and 2A.” (Id. at 1.) Although the Court only granted Petitioner leave to reply to 

the supplemental response (Order 8/12/14, Doc. 18 at 2) and this Supplemental Reply 

does not address any of the arguments in the Supplemental Response, because it does not 

affect the outcome, the Court will nonetheless consider the Supplemental Reply.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s state remedies on a number of his claims are 

either procedurally defaulted or were procedurally barred on an independent and 

adequate state ground, and thus are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

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the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

13 at 12-13.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

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provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 

2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme 

Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, 

and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as 

among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 

1071. Claims based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at 

“the nature of the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

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the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

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application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

/ /

/ /

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4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his state remedies or 

been procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, on the claims in 

Grounds 2(a), 4(b), 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 15-19.)

a. Ground 2(a) - Prosecutorial Misconduct re In-Court Identification - In 

Ground Two of his Petition, Petitioner argues that: (a) prosecutorial misconduct resulted 

in a victim’s in-court identification of Petitioner, and (b) the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying a defense motion to strike the identification. Petitioner alleges that 

the misconduct was the prosecution showing the victim photographs of Petitioner and his 

co-defendants just prior to trial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Respondents argue that the first part of this claim, pertaining to the prosecutorial 

misconduct, is procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue that the remainder of the 

claim was presented on direct appeal, but the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was not 

raised on direct appeal or in his post-conviction relief proceedings. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 

15-16.) 

Petitioner argues that he fairly presented on direct appeal his claims concerning 

the in-court identification (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7; Reply, Doc. 16 at 4-6) and that he fairly 

presented his claims in his PCR proceeding (id. at 6-7). 

Indeed, on direct appeal, Petitioner did argue that showing the photo-lineup with 

just photos of the defendants was unduly suggestive and that the in-court identification 

should have been excluded. (Exhibit Y, Opening Brief at 14-24.) However, Petitioner 

never asserted that the photo-lineup was prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.) 

In his PCR petition, Petitioner did not challenge the in-court identification at all. 

(Exhibit FF, PCR Pet.) In his Petition for Review in the PCR proceeding, Petitioner did 

recount the arguments asserted on direct appeal concerning the in-court identification 

(Exhibit LL at 4), but he did not assert any argument of prosecutorial misconduct based 

on the photographic line-up (id., generally). 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner never fairly presented his 

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Ground 2(a), asserting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the undersigned concludes that 

Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim are now procedurally defaulted.

b. Ground 4(b) - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel –

In Ground 4 of his Petition, Petitioner argues that (a) trial counsel was ineffective 

by failing to conduct a pre-trial investigation, and (b) appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing “to litigate claims that would better help Petitioner on appellate level.” 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.)

Respondents argue that Petitioner never presented part (b) of this claim, 

concerning the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, to the PCR court. Thus, 

Respondents argue, it was not properly presented at all levels, and it is procedurally 

defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 16-17.) 

Petitioner argues he presented this (and his other claims) in his PCR proceeding. 

(Reply, Doc. 16 at 6-7; Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.)

4

In his PCR proceeding, Petitioner argued to the Arizona Court of Appeals that 

appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the claims which the PCR court had 

rejected as waived by failure to raise them below. (Exhibit LL, Pet. Rev. at 8.) 

Petitioner specifically argued that he had raised this argument at page 2 of his PCR 

petition. (Id.) 

The referenced page is unclear. Petitioner’s PCR Petition consisted of four pages 

of a form petition, two pages of “Exhibit #1,” four pages of “Attachment A,” and a 

certificate of service. On the second page of the form petition, Petitioner had marked the 

box to assert a claim of “[t]he denial of the constitutional right to representation by a 

competent lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding.” However, no facts were 

alleged to clarify that this pertained to appellate counsel, nor what failings of appellate 

 

4

Such a claim could not have been presented on direct appeal, any prejudice having not 

accrued until culmination of that proceeding. 

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counsel might amount to deficient performance. Such a naked, generic reference to 

ineffective assistance would not be a fair presentation of the facts underlying a claim of 

ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, nor any counsel. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S> 

27, 33 (2004) (fair presentation of ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim did not carryover 

to fair presentation of claim regarding appellate counsel); and Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 239, 187 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2013) (“a 

general allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient to alert a state 

court to separate specific instances of ineffective assistance”).

The second page of “Exhibit #1” makes no reference to ineffective assistance, or 

appellate counsel.

The second page of “Attachment A” plainly deals with a claim that “Petitioner’s 

counsel was ineffective,” but refers only to a failure of counsel to investigate the license 

plate of the vehicle he was driving when he was apprehended. Those references to 

investigative work, uniquely in the province of trial counsel, is not fair presentation of 

any claim against appellate counsel.

Thus, it appears that Petitioner first presented his claims of ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel to the Arizona Court of Appeals, without first presenting them to the 

PCR Court. 

To fairly exhaust his state remedies, a Petitioner must fairly present at every level. 

Presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals for the first time is not sufficient to exhaust 

an Arizona state prisoner’s remedies. "Submitting a new claim to the state's highest 

court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special 

circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 

38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). In Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to properly exhaust a 

claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review." Id. at 916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas 

corpus states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion 

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire 

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direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b 

(4th ed. 1998) (emphasis added)).

In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clarifies 

that review is available for “issues which were decided by the trial court.” Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 

(Ariz.App., 1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial 

court not subject to review).

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner never fairly presented his 

Ground 4(b), asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim are now procedurally defaulted.

c. Ground 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Grounds 3 (search and seizure), 5 (false 

testimony), 6 (unduly prejudicial evidence), 7 (double jeopardy) and 8 (confrontation 

clause) were presented in his state Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, but the PCR court 

applied an independent and adequate state ground when it found the claims precluded.5 

(Answer, Doc. 13 at 17.) 

Petitioner also raised these arguments in his Petition for Review, in parts (C)(1) 

(Ground 3), (C)(2) (Ground 5), C(3) (Ground 7), C(4) (Ground 6), and C(5) (Ground 8). 

(Exhibit LL, PFR at 9.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. 

(Exhibit NN, Order 10/3/13.) To determine whether a state procedural ruling bars 

federal review, the habeas court must look to the "last reasoned opinion on the claim." 

 

5

 Because Respondents do not dispute that the claims raised in Grounds 3, 5, 6, 7, 

and 8 of this Petition were fairly presented to the PCR court and in the Petition for 

Review thereof,, the undersigned presumes, for purposes of this Report and 

Recommendation that they were fairly presented. 

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Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). Thus, a summary denial following a 

reasoned decision is presumed to be based on the same grounds as the reasoned decision, 

and the habeas court should "look through" the summary denial to the rationale given in 

the reasoned decision. Id.

Here, in rejecting Petitioner’s “precluded claims”, the PCR court opined that 

(other than his claims of ineffective assistance) Petitioner’s claims “either were, or could 

have been previously litigated.” (Exhibit II, M.E. 4/18/12.) 

A finding of preclusion, i.e. that the claims have been raised before, “does not 

provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 

1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996).6 Where an Arizona Court asserts both conditions apply to a 

group of claims without delineating which applied to which, it “did not clearly base its 

decision on independent and adequate state law grounds.” Id. See also Calderon v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of California (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 

1996); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2002) (“By failing to 

specify which claims were barred for which reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not 

clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.’”); and Koerner 

v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2003). To avoid habeas review, a state 

court decision must “clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state 

ground.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).

Moreover, where a state court, even erroneously, rejects a claim on the basis that 

it has been previously presented, then federal habeas review is not precluded. Cone v. 

Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 468-469 (2009). ““When a state court declines to review the merits 

of a petitioner's claim on the ground that it has done so already, it creates no bar to 

federal habeas review.” Wellons v. Hall, 558 U.S. 220, 222 (2010) (per curiam). 

 

6

The Arizona courts reference both its waiver bar (e.g. that the claims were not 

raised earlier, when they could have been) and its preclusion bar (i.e. that the claims 

actually were raised earlier and adjudicated on the merits) as resulting in the claims 

being “precluded”. This likely results from the pronouncement in Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) that with both types, the “defendant shall be precluded from 

relief under this rule.”

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Here, the PCR court did not clarify which claims it deemed “were” previously 

litigated, and those which only “could have been.” Thus, Petitioner’s state remedies on 

the claims in Grounds 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 must be deemed properly exhausted.

e. Summary Re Exhaustion – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner properly exhausted his remedies as to the following grounds on 

which Respondents assert no failure to exhaust: (1) Ground 1 (pretrial identification); (2) 

Ground 2(b) (in-court identification); (3) Ground 4(a) (ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel). The undersigned further concludes that Petitioner properly exhausted his 

remedies as to the following grounds on which the PCR court ruled the claims had been 

litigated: (4) Ground 3 (search and seizure); (5) Ground 5 (false testimony), (6) Ground 6

(unduly prejudicial evidence); (7) Ground 7 (double jeopardy); and (8) Ground 8 

(confrontation clause).

Finally, based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted on: (1) Grounds 2(a) (prosecutorial misconduct re in-court 

identification); and (2) Ground 4(b) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel re failure 

to litigate claims).

4. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

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should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner asserts that the ineffective assistance of his PCR counsel 

constitutes cause to excuse the presentation of his procedurally defaulted claims, citing 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. ___ (2012). (Reply, Doc. 16 at 7.) 

Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the 

ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent constitutional violation. 

Id. Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists (e.g. in a PCR 

proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural 

default. Id. 

The Courts have long rejected claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. 

"There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations 

omitted). The Coleman Court thus held that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel also 

could not establish cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state remedies and 

procedural default on a claim.

However, the Supreme Court has recently recognized two exceptions to the 

Coleman rule, in Maples and Martinez. 

In Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), the Supreme Court held that cause 

could be shown when post-conviction counsel was not merely negligent (and under the 

law of agency, that negligence being chargeable to the petitioner) but had abandoned the 

representation without notice to the petitioner, resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

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Here, PCR counsel did not abandon Petitioner, but fulfilled his obligations in the face of 

his inability to find an issue for review.

 In Martinez, the Court recognized that because courts increasingly reserve 

review of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to post-conviction relief 

proceedings, the ineffectiveness of counsel in such PCR proceedings could effectively 

defeat any review of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the Court recognized a 

narrow exception to Coleman’s ruling on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to 

excuse a procedural default on such a claim.

In Nguyen v. Curry, the Ninth Circuit held that Martinez applied equally to 

unpresented claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 736 F.3d 1287 (2013).

The procedurally defaulted Ground 2(a) does not assert a claim of ineffective 

assistance, but instead asserts a claim of prosecutorial misconduct regarding the in-court 

identification. Accordingly, the Martinez exception would not apply to this claim.

The procedurally defaulted Ground 4(b) asserts a claim of ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel. Therefore this claim comes within the ambit of the Martinez

exception. 

For Petitioner to rely upon Martinez, Petitioner must “demonstrate[e] two things: 

(1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318).

Here, Petitioner simply asserts that “appellate counsel failed to litigate claims that 

would better help Petitioner on appellate level.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) Despite the fact 

that Respondents argued that this claim was conclusory (Answer, Doc. 13 at 39), 

Petitioner’s Reply simply relates that he asserted a claim of ineffective assistance to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, admits his PCR petition was deficient, and argues that PCR 

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counsel was ineffective. (Reply, Doc. 16 at 7.) In his Supplemental Reply (Doc. 22), 

Petitioner simply addresses the merits of other claims without making any reference to 

appellate counsel’s performance. In sum, Petitioner has not identified any particular 

claims that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise. 

It is true that in his PCR proceeding, Petitioner argued to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the claims which the 

PCR court had rejected as waived by failure to raise them below. (Exhibit CC, Pet. Rev. 

at 8.) However, Petitioner makes no reference to this brief in Ground 4 of the Petition 

(Doc. 1 at 9), and only a passing observation in his Reply that such a claim had been 

raised, but without any indication that he now asserts the same claim (Doc. 16 at 7).

While reviewing the claims presented in the state court is necessary to resolving the 

exhaustion status of claims, Petitioner’s state court briefs are not read into his habeas 

petition. Cf. Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005) (finding claim adequately presented 

where “petition made clear and repeated references to an appended supporting brief”). 

Nor does this Court’s obligation to construe Petitioner’s pro se briefs liberally permit 

this Court to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

As stated in the Petition, this claim is so vague that it would not qualify as having 

“some merit.” “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must 

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of 

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Without identifying the 

specific claims that Petitioner contends should have been raised on direct appeal, 

Petitioner leaves this Court with nothing more than conclusory allegations. Conclusory 

allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient to maintain such a claim. Jones v. 

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995).

Moreover, for the same reason, any effort by PCR counsel to assert the claim now 

asserted by Petitioner would have been futile. “The failure to raise a meritless legal 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United 

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States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). Failure to take futile action can never be 

deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996). 

Even if this Court were to read Petitioner’s state Petition for Review version of an 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim into Ground 4(b), the claim would be 

without merit. As discussed above, the undersigned has deemed the claims treated as 

waived to have been properly exhausted and addresses them hereinafter. The 

undersigned concludes that each of those claims is without merit.

It is true that the undersigned’s conclusion that Ground 5 is without merit is based 

upon the absence of a federal right to a grand jury indictment in state proceedings. To 

the extent that Petitioner references Arizona state law for the source of a right to a grand 

jury indictment, the analysis on Ground 5 would not foreclose a claim based upon 

counsel’s failure to assert a state law claim based on the use of perjured testimony at the 

grand jury. Indeed, although Arizona permits only limited challenges to grand jury 

proceedings, it does recognize the right to challenge a grand jury proceeding based upon 

the use of false or misleading testimony in that proceeding. See Nelson v. Royston, 137 

Ariz. 272, 669 P.2d 1249 (1983). However, like the federal courts (as discussed 

hereinafter in connection with Ground 5) Arizona holds that “[a]n error—even one with 

the potential to affect a grand jury's charging decision—is rendered harmless by the trial 

jury's subsequent guilty verdict.” State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 601, 832 P.2d 593, 618 

(1992), disapproved of other grounds by State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 

(2001) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986)). Accordingly, any 

challenge to the grand jury brought by appellate counsel on state law grounds would 

have been without merit. Indeed, in Atwood, the Arizona Supreme Court found that 

prejudice from trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to challenge grand jury 

proceedings could not be shown given the defendant’s conviction at trial. Therefore, 

even a state law version of the claim in Ground 5 would have been without merit. 

With regard to Ground 7, the undersigned concludes hereinafter that Petitioner 

has failed to make out a federal claim of a double jeopardy violation under Blockburger 

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v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). To the extent that Petitioner intended a claim 

founded upon Arizona law as well as federal law, Arizona also has a state double 

jeopardy protection upon which appellate counsel could have relied. See Ariz. Const. 

Art. II, § 10. However, ‘[t]he state and federal double jeopardy clauses generally 

provide the same protection to criminal defendants.” State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, 515, 

47 P.3d 1150, 1153 (App. 2002). In particular, Arizona applies the federal Blockberger

test for determining whether multiple offenses are distinct for double jeopardy clauses. 

Id. at 516, 47 P.3d at 1154. But see State v. Ortega, 220 Ariz. 320, 324-325, 206 P.3d 

769, 773-774 (App. 2008) (declining to apply in a double jeopardy context a “same 

conduct” standard applied by In re Jerry C., 214 Ariz. 270, 151 P.3d 553 (App.2007) in 

the context of deciding whether an indictment provided adequate notice). Accordingly, 

any state law claim would have also been without merit.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet the Martinez standard, and the failure to 

properly exhaust his state remedies on his Ground 4(b) cannot be excused.

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

5. Actual Innocence as Cause

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

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constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show that no reasonable juror would have 

found him guilty. Accordingly his procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred 

claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

6. Summary re Exhaustion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Grounds 2(a) 

(prosecutorial misconduct re in-court identification) and Ground 4(b) (ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel) must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MERITS REVIEW

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, not every error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law – Ordinarily, in a habeas petition challenging a state criminal 

conviction, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

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concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] 

incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To justify 

habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

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merits). Here, Petitioner’s Grounds 3 through 8 were not addressed on their merits, but 

were disposed of in his PCR proceeding on the basis that they were precluded. 

Accordingly, this Court must evaluate those claims de novo. 

C. GROUND 1: PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION

In his Ground 1, Petitioner asserts that the pretrial identification procedure was 

inherently suggestive and that the state failed to meets its burden of proving its 

reliability. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Respondents argue that the state court’s rejection of 

this claims was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

(Answer, Doc. 13 at 22-31.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed this claim on Petitioner’s direct appeal. 

The state court concluded that the one-on-one identification procedure utilized was 

inherently suggestive, but applied the standards under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 

(1972) to conclude that he identification was nonetheless reliable. (Exhibit BB, Mem. 

Dec. 3/29/11 at 5-9.) 

In his Petition, Petitioner points to no specific deficiency in the state court’s 

determination of the facts or the law. His Reply simply summarily restates the claim. 

(Reply, Doc. 16 at 4.) In his Supplemental Reply, Petitioner does not address the merits 

of Ground 1.7

Applicable Law – Due process precludes the introduction of a pre-indictment 

identification if the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, unless the 

indicators of the witness’s reliability outweigh the corrupting effect of the 

suggestiveness. Perry v. New Hampshire, 181 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012). The purpose of 

this principle is to “to deter police from rigging identification procedures, for example, at 

a lineup, showup, or photograph array.” Id.at 721.

The premise of such an analysis is the determination of whether the identification 

 

7

In his Supplemental Reply, Petitioner does reference “Ground 1” (Doc. 22 at 2), 

but then proceeds to discuss the claim in Ground 2 concerning the in-court identification, 

and the discourse between the prosecution and the victim prior thereto.

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procedure utilized was "unnecessarily suggestive." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 

377, 384-385 (1968)(determining whether a photo lineup was "necessary" and whether it 

was "suggestive"). If it was not, the inquiry necessarily ends.

If the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the central question is “whether 

under the ‘totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the 

confrontation procedure was suggestive.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. “[T]he factors to be 

considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of 

the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, 

the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 

demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the 

crime and the confrontation.” Id. at 199-200.

Application to State Decision - Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals evaluated 

whether the identification procedure was suggestive, and concluded it was. In doing so, 

the State Court applied a state presumption that “ ‘Single person identifications are 

inherently suggestive.’” (Exhibit BB, Mem. Dec. at 6 (quoting State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 

133, 150, 42 P.3d 564, 581 (2002)). Arguably, if that was all that was required, the state 

court deviated from federal law by not requiring Petitioner to also show that the 

procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. Such a deviation would, however, have 

benefitted Petitioner, and thus was harmless. Harmless error provides no basis for 

habeas relief. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Moreover, the state court went on to evaluate the circumstances mitigating the 

suggestiveness of the identification procedure, including that the witness was asked to 

view three suspects, not just one person, and an advisement from the officer to the 

witness that the person being viewed might not be involved in any crime. (Exhibit BB, 

Mem.Dec. at 7.) 

The state court then evaluated the Biggers criteria, including the witness’s 

opportunity to view Petitioner (id. at 7), the degree of attention paid by the witness (id. at 

7-8), the lack of a prior description (id. at 8), and the certainty of the identification and 

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limited intervening time (id.).

The state court then considered the totality of the circumstances and concluded 

that the identification was sufficiently reliable to have been admissible. (Id. at 8-9.) 

Petitioner does not point to any specific impropriety in the state court’s decision. 

The undersigned discerns none. Thus, the undersigned concludes that the factual and 

legal determinations by the state court were correct and Ground 1 is without merit.

D. GROUND 2(b): IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION

In his Ground 2(b), Petitioner argues that the in-court identification was tainted 

by the prosecutor showing a photograph of Petitioner and co-defendants to the victim, 

and telling him Petitioner was the person that robbed him, and his due process rights 

were violated as a result. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

On cross-examination, the victim J.L. testified:

Q. At some point before you took the witness stand to testify 

today, [the prosecutor] had showed you these three photographs, 

right, Exhibits 192, 193, and 194?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he ask you any questions about them at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. What questions did he ask you?

A. He asked about the defendants.

Q. And what did he ask you about the defendants?

A. If I remember the faces of the people that robbed us.

Q. Okay. Did he tell you that these were the people that 

robbed you?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit G, R.T. 1/12/10 PM at 63.) On re-direct, the victim testified:

Q. Now, prior to trial, defense counsel -- or I guess, in crossexamination, defense counsel asked you if I had ever taken pictures 

to you and told you that those individuals were the ones who robbed 

you.

Do you remember that question?

A. To my house, no, you didn't.

Q. No. No.

A. Here.

Q. Right here.

A. Just when you asked me if I knew them, and if they were 

the guilty parties.

Q. Did I ever tell you that they're guilty?

A. No.

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Q. Did you look at some pictures and then tell me what you 

saw?

A. Yes.

Q. And your testimony here that this defendant - -

A. In the picture. He was in one picture.

Q. So your statements here, though, today, forgetting about 

any other identification, do you recognize him as he sits here today?

A. Yes.

Q. And has anybody ever told you that this is the guy who 

robbed you?

A. If somebody told me? No. I just saw when he robbed me. 

I just saw when he did it.

Q. So you remember him robbing you from back at the time 

that he robbed you?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit H, RT 1/14/10 AM at 15-16.)

At trial, defense counsel made a motion to strike the in-court identification based 

upon the pre-trial display of the Petitioner’s picture. (Exhibit H, R.T. 1/14/10 AM at 6.) 

Trial counsel acknowledged the inability to resolve the factual dispute over the 

conversation between the victim and the prosecutor, and repeatedly disavowed relying 

upon the prosecutor’s purported identification of the defendant to the victim. (Id. at 6-7, 

11.)

Nonetheless, in response, the prosecutor addressed the conversation between him 

and the victim.

The only way that we got to this other issue of me

preparing the witness prior to trial was when the defense brought it 

up on cross, and they're allowed to. In trial preparation, they can 

ask, what did I ask you, or what did I ask the victim, or what did I 

tell the victim?

I believe there was a couple questions that were 

inappropriate because I didn't think it was a good faith basis for 

asking them, and the answer came out, I think, misconstrued 

because the interpreter's -- it wasn't the interpreter who did it. It was 

just the way the victim understood the interpretation came across as 

being different than what it was.

That aside --

THE COURT: Wait. Are you saying that the interpreter --

there's something wrong with the interpretation, or are you saying --

MR. VOYLES: Actually--

THE COURT: I understand you speak Spanish; is that right?

MR. VOYLES: Right, and no, I have no beef with what the

interpretation was with regard to identification. The way that it was 

understood by the victim and the way that I heard it and that I 

believe I would of understood it, I would of understood it the way 

that it was answered, but that's irrelevant. That's a whole other issue.

That was with regard to when defense counsel asked, did Mr. 

Voyles tell you that these individuals were the ones who robbed 

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you, and the way it was asked, it sounded like Mr. Gadow had a 

good faith basis to believe I had actually gone out there and said, 

here, these are the three people that robbed you, right? That never 

happened, but that's the way it came across.

(Exhibit H, R.T 1/14/10 AM at 8-9.)

Petitioner asserted his argument in Ground 2(b) on direct appeal. (Exhibit Y, 

Opening Brief at 20.) The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s challenged 

to the viewing of the photograph, but described the argument as asserting that “because

the prosecutor showed [the victim] a photo of Nevarez and the two co-defendants prior 

to his testimony, [the victim’s] in-court identification was tainted.” (Exhibit BB, Mem. 

Dec. at 9.) In summarizing the facts, the Arizona Court of Appeals discussed the 

victim’s testimony that the prosecutor had told him the people in the photographs were 

the robbers, and quoted the redirect examination by the prosecution on the point. (Id. at 

4-5.) In its discussion of the claim the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts 

and concluded that “[o]n redirect, the prosecutor clarified with [the victim] what took 

place prior to his testimony.” (Id. at 9.) The state court concluded that under the totality 

of the circumstances, the in-court identification was reliable based upon the victim’s 

testimony and his pretrial identification of Petitioner. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Respondents argue that the claim is controlled by Biggers and, based upon the 

application of the Biggers factors, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Respondents further argue 

that any error was harmless given the other evidence against Petitioner, including 

testimony by an accomplice identifying Petitioner as a participant, Petitioner’s 

possession of the victim’s wallet and identification at the time of his arrest, and the 

victim’s pretrial identification of Petitioner. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 31-36.) 

In his Reply, Petitioner argues that the prejudicial effect of an unreliable 

identification procedure is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. 

(Doc. 16 at 5-6.) In his supplemental Reply, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s 

comments to the victim were prejudicial, and that the explanation asserted by the 

prosecutor of a misunderstanding based on the victim’s primary language being Spanish 

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was not credible given the victim’s testimony that he understood English perfectly and 

did not require a translator. (Doc. 22 at 2-3.) 

Petitioner points to nothing in the Arizona court’s decision that was contrary to or 

an unreasonable determination of federal law. Rather, Petitioner simply argues that the 

ultimate determination should have been different.

Suggestiveness of Photo Display - Petitioner properly contends that a state court 

evaluation of identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact, and that the 

presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only applies to the factual 

determinations, and “the federal court may give different weight to the facts as found by 

the state court and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard.” 

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982). 

However, the only factual discrepancy referenced by Petitioner is the failure of 

the Court to evaluate the assertion of the lack of a language barrier. 

Petitioner fails to establish the absence of a language barrier, let alone to establish 

that the victim “understood English perfectly and [ ] in no way did he need a translator.” 

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 22 at 3.)8 

On cross-examination, the victim testified as follows:

Q. And Mr. [JL], I can't help but notice that occasionally 

when the prosecutor or I would ask you a question, you seem to 

understand it a little bit in English.

Do you speak a little English?

A. Very little.

Q. You're obviously more comfortable with the assistance of 

an interpreter, right?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit G, R.T. 1/12/10 PM at 62.) 

Nonetheless, the conversation between the prosecutor and the victim would have 

affected the suggestiveness of the procedure, which the Arizona Court of Appeals did not 

dispute.

 

8 Another victim, DF, testified through an interpreter, that he understood a “little bit of 

English” but was more comfortable speaking in Spanish. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/14/10 PM at 

72-73.) On cross examination he again admitted to speaking “a little English” and 

admitted that he had conversed with the police in English. (Id. at 84.)

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Reliability of In-Court ID Despite Suggestiveness of Display- More 

importantly, Petitioner fails to show any error in the conclusion that the identification was 

reliable despite the pretrial photo display and alleged comments.

In resolving the matter, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited without criticism the 

trial court’s determination that the display of the pictures to the victim was “unduly 

suggestive.” (Exhibit BB, Mem. Dec. at 1.) Thus, the court went on to determine 

whether the in-court identification was nonetheless reliable. Petitioner suggests nothing 

about the prosecutor having purportedly identified the photos as being the perpetrators 

that would have altered the suggestiveness of the display in such a way that the analysis 

would have been different on the remaining reliability of the in-court identification. 

As noted by the state court, and discussed hereinabove, the pre-indictment 

identification was sufficiently reliable in light of the Biggers factors to avoid due process 

concerns. Much of the same analysis would carry over to the in-court identification, 

including the victim’s opportunity to view the perpetrators at the time of the crime, his 

degree of attention, and the level of certainty. 

Petitioner points to no factor which the state court failed to consider which would 

have called for a different conclusion on reliability. Nor does Petitioner proffer any 

reason why the state court’s ultimate weighing of the reliability question was erroneous. 

The undersigned discerns none.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that the admission of the in-court 

identification amounted to a denial of due process, and Ground 2(b) is without merit.

E. GROUND 3: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In his Ground 3, Petitioner asserts that the search of his vehicle was not supported 

by probable cause because: (1) when officers arrived the vehicle was parked and 

Petitioner was already outside the vehicle (presumably to establish the search was not 

incident to his arrest); (2) his vehicle did not fit the description of the involved vehicle, 

and the license plates did not match (presumably to show that lack of probable cause); 

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and (3) no permission to search was given. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.)

Respondents argue the claim is without merit because: (1) the claim was waived 

by failure to move to suppress the evidence at trial; (2) in the face of a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim at trial, Stone v. Powell, 482 U.S. 465 

(1976) precludes such a claim on habeas; (3) officers had reasonable cause to believe the 

vehicle contained evidence of the crime for which Petitioner was arrested despite the 

discrepancy on the license plate (in part because of evidence the license plate had 

recently been switched); and (4) discovery of the evidence would inevitably have 

occurred upon a search of the vehicle upon impound. (Supp. Answer, Doc. 21 at 8-10.) 

Petitioner does not reply.

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court established the limits 

of the “exclusionary rule” in relation to federal habeas proceedings. “We conclude that 

where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on 

the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced 

at his trial.” Id. at 494. The Court noted that the exclusionary rule was merely “a 

judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.” 

Id. at 482. Accordingly, they adopted this limitation on its application in federal habeas 

corpus actions after “weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of 

extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.” Id. at 489.

The Stone rule only applies, however, where there was an “opportunity for full 

and fair consideration of [the defendant’s] reliance upon the exclusionary rule with 

respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial and on direct review.” Id. "The 

relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not 

whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided." OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that he did not have an opportunity for 

consideration of the instant claims. There appears no reason why Petitioner could not 

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have brought this claim at trial or on direct appeal. 

To be sure, Petitioner has asserted ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel. However, such ineffectiveness is attributed to Petitioner for purposes of the 

Stone analysis, and does not render the opportunity to litigate unavailable, just unused. 

LaFave, et al., The Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation, 7 Crim. Proc. § 28.3(d) (3d 

ed.)

It might be argued that because the PCR court declined to reach this claim on the 

ambiguous basis that it “was or could have been” raised on direct appeal, Petitioner was 

denied the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate this claim. That argument would fail. 

Despite the requirement that this Court treat that ambivalent ruling as establishing 

exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies, the underlying reality is that Petitioner had the 

opportunity to but did not raise this claim on direct appeal, and it could have been 

properly deemed waived when he attempted to bring it in his PCR proceeding. “[T]he 

Stone “opportunity for full and fair consideration” requirement is satisfied where the 

state court is squarely faced with Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim, but chooses to 

resolve that claim on an independent, adequate, non-federal state ground.” O'Berry v. 

Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1216 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, despite the PCR court’s 

ambivalent ruling, Petitioner had opportunities to assert his Fourth Amendment claim at 

trial and on direct appeal.

Accordingly, Ground 3 is barred from consideration by Stone. 

Even if this Court could consider the merits of this claim, Petitioner has failed to 

counter Respondents’ contention that the claim is without merit because the evidence 

would have inevitably been discovered in the search incident to the impoundment of the 

vehicle. “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means...then 

the deterrence rationale [for the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence 

should be received.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Impound inventories, 

i.e. “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good 

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faith” are a lawful means of discovering evidence and “satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” 

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987). See State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 169 

P.3d 651 (App. 2007) (applying inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence discovered in 

illegeal search of vehicle that would have been discovered upon impoundment). 

F. GROUND 4(a): INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

In Ground 4(a), Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

“conduct a pretrial investigation in discrepancies of case.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that this claim is conclusory, and thus without merit. 

(Answer, Doc, 13 at 38-39.)

Petitioner does not elaborate on this claim in his Reply (Doc. 16) or his 

Supplemental Reply (Doc. 22). 

A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). However, a habeas petitioner 

may not leave a court to speculate what evidence the deficient investigation would have 

discovered. In order to prevail on an allegation that defense counsel conducted an 

insufficient investigation resulting in ineffective assistance, the petitioner must show 

specifically what that investigation would have produced. A petitioner may not simply 

speculate about what a witness’ testimony, but must adduce evidence to show what it 

would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Petitioner fails to identify the discrepancies to which he refers, what any 

additional investigation would have disclosed, or how such additional information would 

have resulted in a different outcome at trial. 

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner referenced counsel’s failure to investigate whether 

the license plate reported to have been on the vehicle used by the perpetrators (which 

was different from that on Petitioner’s vehicle when he was arrested) was assigned to 

some vehicle other than a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle and/or 

Petitioner’s vehicle, and whether and by whom the plate was submitted for a refund on 

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the tag at a later date. (Exhibit FF, PCR Pet., Attachment A at 2.) However, Petitioner 

did not proffer anything to show what that investigation would have revealed.

Accordingly, Ground 4(a) is without merit.

G. GROUND 5: FALSE TESTIMONY

In his Ground 5, Petitioner argues that his indictment was secured by the use of 

false and misleading testimony from officers regarding Petitioner’s admission of 

committing the crime. (Petition, Doc. 1 at physical page 10.) 

Respondents argue that there is no federal constitutional right to a grand jury 

indictment and thus this claim is not cognizable on habeas review, the claim is 

unsupported by the record, and any error was rendered harmless by his ultimate 

conviction.

Petitioner does not reply.

Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss on this basis prior to trial. (Exhibit U, 

Mot. Dismiss.) The motion was denied.9

The Fourteenth Amendment does not impose the requirement of indictment by 

grand jury upon the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), recently 

reaffirmed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 n.3 & 500 (2000). Thus, any 

defect or misconduct in the grand jury proceeding would not result in a federal 

constitutional violation. 

To the extent that state law may have provide a petitioner with such a right, the 

violation of that right is generally not a claim cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. 

A state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held in 

custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Federal 

habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state 

 

9 Arizona authorizes “special action” petitions to challenge grand jury proceedings prior 

to the completion of trial. See e.g. Crimmins v. Superior Court, In & For Maricopa 

Cnty., 137 Ariz. 39, 668 P.2d 882 (1983). Nothing in the record suggest that Petitioner 

pursued such an action.

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law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). 

Moreover, even in the context of a federal prosecution where there is a 

constitutional right to a grand jury indictment, the ultimate conviction of the crime 

renders any defect in the grand jury proceeding harmless. U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 

66, 70 (1986); Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006). Except in a 

case involving “structural error,” habeas relief is not available for harmless errors. Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) Presentation of perjured testimony to the 

grand jury is not structural error. United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 954 (9th 

Cir.1992), abrogated on other grounds by Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96–100 

(1996).

It is true that where a constitutional violation has been found based upon the 

presentation of perjured testimony to the trial jury, no further showing of harmfulness 

need be shown because finding such a violation requires a determination that the 

testimony was “material,” which in turn requires its own showing of an effect on the trial 

jury’s decision to convict. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984-985 (9th Cir. 2005). 

But here, Petitioner’s claim is not that the perjured testimony was presented to the trial 

jury, but to the grand jury. Thus, the perjured testimony of which Petitioner complains 

would not have had any effect on the trial jury, would not qualify as “material,” and a 

separate showing of harm would apply.

Accordingly, Ground 5 is without merit.

H. GROUND 6: UNDULY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE

In his Ground 6, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process when “unduly 

prejudicial evidence was admitted in violation of Rule of Evidence 403 [when the] 

victim denie[d] making impeachment statement to officer...different from police officers 

during cross examination.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at physical page 11.) 

Respondents argue that this claim is conclusory, noting that Petitioner fails to 

identify the purported evidence, and any purported violation of the Arizona rules of 

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evidence would not be a cognizable claim on habeas review.

Petitioner does not reply.

To the extent that Petitioner simply relies upon a purported violation of Arizona 

Rule of Evidence 403, his claim is without merit. “[F]ailure to comply with the state's 

rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas relief.” 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Nonetheless, evidence which “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render 

them fundamentally unfair” does result in a cognizable denial of due process. Id. 

However, Petitioner’s conclusory allegations fail to support such a claim. This Court is 

left to guess which victim Petitioner references, and which statement he contends was 

“different.”10 Moreover, Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that any violation was not 

harmless in light of the other evidence available. “Conclusory allegations which are not 

supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (petitioner failed to identify specific evidence disputed). 

Finally, Petitioner fails to suggest how a mere inconsistency among witnesses or 

even between a witness and his prior statements would render evidence unduly 

prejudicial. Such conflicting statements are the stuff of which virtually every trial is 

made. “By design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice 

which must be avoided.” United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st 

Cir. 1989). Cf. State v. Allred, 134 Ariz. 274, 277, 655 P.2d 1326, 1329 (1982)

(discussing factors relevant to determination that use of prior inconsistent statement used 

for substantive purposes is unduly prejudicial). 

Accordingly, Ground 6 is without merit and must be denied.

 

10 Petitioner raised a similar claim in his PCR Petition which was arguably equally 

conclusory. (See Exhibit FF, PCR Pet., Exhibit 1 at 1, ¶ III 2.) In his PCR Reply and 

Petition for Review, he referenced testimony by victim DF about his ability to identify 

the driver of the vehicle which purportedly contradicted DF’s statements to police. (See 

Exhibit HH, PCR Reply at and Exhibits 5-10; Exhibit LL, Pet. Rev. at 3.) Even then, 

Petitioner failed to suggest the nature of the undue prejudice.

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I. GROUND 7: DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In his Ground 7, Petitioner argues that his double jeopardy rights were violated 

when he was conviction of armed robbery and aggravated assault based on the same 

conduct with a weapon. (Petition, Doc. 1 at physical page 12.) 

Respondents argue that the two offenses required different elements. (Supp. 

Answer, Doc. 21 at 14-15.) 

Petitioner does not reply.

The claim is without merit.

In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, 

this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the 

defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the “same-elements” 

test, the double jeopardy bar applies. The same-elements test, 

sometimes referred to as the “Blockburger” test, inquires whether 

each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, 

they are the “same offence” and double jeopardy bars additional 

punishment and successive prosecution.

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 

(1993) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals has described the elements of the two offenses as 

follows:

A person commits aggravated assault by using a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument while:

1. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any 

physical injury to another person; or

2. Intentionally placing another person in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury; or

3. Knowingly touching another person with the intent 

to injure, insult or provoke such person.

A.R.S. § 13–1203(A); see also A.R.S. § 13–1204(A)(2). A person 

commits armed robbery by, while armed with or threatening with a 

deadly weapon, dangerous instrument, or simulated deadly weapon, 

threatening or using force against another person “with intent either 

to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such 

person taking or retaining property.” A.R.S. § 13–1902(A); see also

A.R.S. § 13–1904(A).

State v. Price, 218 Ariz. 311, 313, 183 P.3d 1279, 1281 (App. 2008). 

Petitioner points to the commonality of the use of a weapon in the commission of 

each offense. Indeed, both require a weapon. However, there is no requirement that 

every element be unique to only one offense, only that there be “at least one unique 

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element.” Wilson v. Czerniak, 355 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Under the Arizona statutes, the armed robbery offense does not require a physical 

injury, apprehension of injury, or touching. One of those three is required for an 

aggravated assault. Conversely, armed robbery requires taking/retention of (or at least 

the intent to take/retain) property. Aggravated assault need have no connection to such 

actions or motives. See Price, supra. Thus, each offense requires proof of an additional 

fact that the other does not, and for Double Jeopardy purposes, they are not the same 

offense and multiple punishments from the same course of conduct are permitted.

Therefore, Ground 7 must be denied.

J. GROUND 8: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

In his Ground 8, Petitioner argues that his rights under the “Confrontation Clause”

were denied when a victim failed to appear in court and testify. Petitioner relies upon 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). (Petition, Doc. 1 at physical page 13.) 

Respondents argue that the claim fails to identify the witness and thus is vague, 

and that if construed as referring to the victim M.M., the claim is without merit because 

the prosecution’s failure to call a witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 

(Supp. Answer, Doc. 21 at 16-17.)

Petitioner does not reply.

The claim as framed in the Petition is conclusory and thus without merit.

It is true that in his PCR proceedings, Petitioner argued that his confrontation 

rights were violated when the victim M.M. “did not show at trial for cross-examination.” 

(Exhibit HH, PCR Reply at 4.) Petitioner made no allegation that the defense called 

M.M. to testify. Assuming Petitioner intended to assert the same claim in this 

proceeding, the claim is without merit.

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court discussed the interplay 

between the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause:

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right “to be 

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confronted with the witnesses against him.” (Emphasis added.) 

...While the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right 

to be confronted with the witnesses “against him,” the Compulsory 

Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses “in 

his favor.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 6. The text of the Amendment 

contemplates two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant 

and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the 

defendant may call the latter. 

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313-14 (2009). Here, (except in relation 

to the hearsay discussed hereinafter) Petitioner makes no allegation that the victim M.M. 

was a witness against him, although he was a victim under counts of the indictment for 

which Petitioner was convicted. 

To the extent that M.M. was simply a victim, the prosecution was not obligated to 

call him. “The confrontation clause does not come into play where a potential witness 

neither testifies nor provides evidence at trial.” United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 9 

(1st Cir. 1985) (summarizing cases from other circuits). See Cooper v. California, 386 

U.S. 58, 62 n. 2 (1967) (finding the petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his 

right to confront a witness because the “State did not produce the informant to testify 

against him” to be “absolutely devoid of merit”).

If, perhaps, Petitioner could show that he requested and was denied a subpoena 

for M.M. to testify “in his favor,” then he might have a Compulsory Process Claim, but 

that is not the claim Petitioner makes in Ground 8. 

Of course, the Confrontation Clause would generally prohibit the prosecution 

from offering hearsay evidence about out of court statements from M.M.. Respondents 

contend that “the prosecution did not seek to offer any out–of–court testimonial evidence 

from M.M.” (Supp. Resp. Doc. 21 at 16.) To be sure, the prosecution did elicit 

testimony about statements made by M.M. from both the victim J.L. and Officer Campos

Hearsay from J.L. - On direct examination by the prosecutor, the victim J.R.

testified:

Q. Now, you recall [M.M.] and his cousin being there, 

correct?

A. Uh-huh. Yes.

Q. Do you recall -- do you recall them having to give up 

items to these individuals?

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A. Well, I didn't see because, I mean, this guy had the gun on 

me, and then the other guy had a gun on him, so I couldn't see 

because I was -- I was scared.

Q. So you don't recall him taking anything from those 

individuals?

A. He just told me that he had taken some jewelry and 

bracelet from him.

(Exhibit G, R.T. 1/12/10 PM at 51-52.) However, defense counsel objected to the 

testimony as hearsay and the Court sustained the objection and directed the jurors to 

“disregard that particular statement.” (Id. at 52.) “A jury is presumed to follow its 

instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). 

Shortly thereafter, still on direct, M.R. testified as follows:

Q. Right after this happened, is that when – while you're still 

shaken up from this incident, is that when Martin Macias told you 

what had been stolen from him?

A. Like $80.00.

Q. I'm sorry. Just my question is, when? Was it immediately 

right -- I mean, immediately after this happened that he told you 

what had been stolen from him?

A. Oh, yes.

***

Q. Again, I'm sorry. I don't mean to be confusing. The time 

that Martin Macias told you what had been stolen from him, at that 

moment, was he still shocked that he had been robbed?

A. Yes.

Q. What was it that he told you that had been robbed from 

him in that moment when he's still shocked?

A. Well, just -- he just said, well, I was robbed, I was robbed, 

and then later on when he started to calm down, that's when he told 

me like how much he had been robbed and what they had taken.

Q. Were you still under the stress of this moment?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was it that he said that they robbed?

A. Martin?

Q. Yes.

A. Um, just like money because he didn't have jewelry. He 

didn't have anything.

(Id. at 53-54.) This time defense counsel did not object.

Obtaining relief based on a Confrontation Clause claim requires a showing of 

prejudice. “A Confrontation Clause violation is harmless, and so does not justify habeas 

relief, unless it ‘ ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.’ ’ ” Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). “In general, 

the inquiry into whether the constitutionally erroneous introduction of a piece of 

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evidence had a substantial and injurious effect is guided by several factors: “the 

importance of the testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 

absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony, the extent of crossexamination permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case.” Ocampo v. 

Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Here, the testimony about M.M’s statements concerning what was stolen from 

him were not prejudicial. The defenses’ theory of the case turned not upon whether a 

robbery had occurred, nor whether M.M. had been robbed, nor what specifically had 

been taken, but upon whether Petitioner was the perpetrator. In challenging J.L.’s incourt identification, defense counsel had argued to the Court “the whole case revolves 

around whether or not these people properly identified my client.” (Exhibit H, R.T. 

1/14/10 at 5.) 

Moreover, in Arizona neither armed robbery nor aggravated assault require proof 

of what was taken. As discussed in connection with Ground 7 (double jeopardy) 

hereinabove, aggravated assault requires no proof of a taking. In armed robbery, it is the 

taking of “any property of another” which must be shown. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1902(A). Thus it was irrelevant whether Petitioner took $80, a watch, or a toothpick 

from the victim. Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802(G) (setting different offenses for theft, 

dependent upon the value of the property stolen). 

Accordingly, Petitioner would be unable to show any prejudice from the 

admission of testimony on these limited out of court statements by M.M.

Hearsay from Campos - On direct examination, Officer Campos testified that he 

“assisted M.M,” as well as the victims J.L. and C.P., in translating at the one-on-one 

identifications. (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/19/10 PM at 48.) Defense counsel objected on the 

basis of hearsay, but the Court made no explicit ruling, referring instead to discussions 

concerning the identification of missing victims, and concluding that the reference to the 

unidentified victim, C.P. was better left unaddressed rather than calling the jury’s 

attention to it. (Id. at 48-50.) Subsequently, defense counsel cross-examined Officer 

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Campos on M.M’s identification of the suspects and confirmed that M.M. did not 

identify Petitioner as a participant. (Id. at 59-60.)11

Hear, there arguably was no out-of-court statement offered. Campos simply 

testified that M.M. was present at the identifications, and that Campos translated for 

M.M. At most, this implies that M.M. spoke, but did not present the content of his 

statements. As such, Campos’ testimony could not have been offered to prove the truth 

of whatever M.M. had said. “[T]he Confrontation Clause applies only to out-of-court 

statements that are “use[d]” to “establis[h] the truth of the matter asserted.” Williams v. 

Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012) (quoting Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59–60, n. 9 (2004). 

Even if some statement by M.M. were implied from Campos’ testimony (i.e. tht 

he had identified the perpetrators), there was no prejudice because Officer’ Campos’ 

unchallenged testimony on cross-examination was that M.M. had not identified 

Petitioner as a perpetrator, making any such implicit statement beneficial to Petitioner 

rather than harmful.

Based upon the foregoing, even if Petitioner’s Ground 8 were deemed to relate to 

hearsay from M.M., the claim would be without merit.

Accordingly, Ground 8 must be denied.

C. SUMMARY

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned has concluded that Petitioner’s state 

remedies on Grounds 2(a) (prosecutorial misconduct re in-court identification) and 

Ground 4(b) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel) were procedurally defaulted, 

and these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

Further, all of Petitioner’s other claims are without merit and thus the Petition

must be denied.

 

11 The hearsay introduced by defense counsel would not be subject to a Confrontation 

Clause claim because it was not used against Petitioner.

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds and in part

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, with regard to the grounds disposed 

of on procedural grounds, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

procedural rulings are correct. With regard to the grounds disposed of on the merits, 

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reasonable jurists would not find the conclusions debatable or wrong.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds 2(a) (prosecutorial 

misconduct re in-court identification) and Ground 4(b) (ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel) of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 7, 

2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 7, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

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to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 5, 2014

13-2286r RR 14 08 05 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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