Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01938/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01938-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-1- 05cv1938

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MENDOZA, Civil No. 05-1938 L (NLS)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

vs. OF HABEAS CORPUS

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Robert Mendoza (“Mendoza”) is a California prisoner serving a sentence of fifteen years to life,

with the possibility of parole, for second degree murder. He has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the November 9, 2004 decision by California

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to deny his request for parole. This Court has reviewed the Petition,

Respondents’ Answer, the Traverse, and all supporting documents. After a thorough review of the

record, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that

the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of May 20, 1981, Mendoza argued with and slapped his girlfriend in the presence

of her ex-boyfriend, Jose Palacio. (See Lodgment Nos. 4 at 7-8.) Palacio and Mendoza then argued

with one another and Mendoza pulled a knife on Palacio, which Palacio managed to wrestle away from

him. (Id. at 8.) Mendoza’s girlfriend persuaded him to leave, however Mendoza vowed to return to the

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Board of Prison Terms is now called the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”).

2

 Mendoza has notified the Court that since the filing of his petition, he has again been found suitable

for parole and that Governor Schwarzenegger has again reversed the BPH’s finding on the same grounds as

before, the third reversal by the Governor of a BPH grant of parole. (See Pet’rs Notice of Parole Status and

Newly Published Controlling Authorities [Doc. No. 18] at 1.)

-2- 05cv1938

location. He did so twenty minutes later, armed with a .22 caliber pistol. (Id.) After firing one shot into

the ground, Mendoza shot Palacio several times in the chest and then fled. Palacio was pronounced dead

upon arrival at the hospital. (Id.) Police later learned that Mendoza had left California and was living

in Albuquerque, New Mexico. (Id. at 9-10.) The Albuquerque police department arrested Mendoza

eleven months after the crime, and on June 17, 1982, Mendoza waived extradition and was transported

back to California. (Id. at 10.) 

On August 31, 1982, Mendoza entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the state. Mendoza

pleaded guilty to unpremeditated second degree murder, and on September 29, 1982, was sentenced to

15 years to life with the possibility of parole. (See Lodgment No. 1; see also Lodgment No. 2 at 2.)

Mendoza was committed to prison on October 8, 1982. (See Lodgment No. 3.) His minimum eligible

parole date was August 21, 1990. (Id.)

In 1990, 1991, and 1994, the Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”)1

 found Mendoza unsuitable for

parole and refused to set his prison term or a parole date. In 1995, a unanimous BPT panel found

Mendoza suitable for parole and set his term and a parole date. However, BPT’s review unit

“disapproved” the decision. In 1998, a unanimous BPT panel again found Mendoza suitable for parole

and set his term and a parole date. Later that year, Governor Gray Davis reversed the decision. In 1999,

2001, and 2002, BPT panels found Mendoza unsuitable for parole. (Pet. at 4.) On June 23, 2004, at his

ninth hearing for parole suitability, fourteen years afer his minimum eligible parole date and seven years

after he completed his minimum term, a unanimous BPT panel found Mendoza suitable for parole. (See

Lodgment No. 5 at 80-85.) On November 9, 2004, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed the

panel’s decision. (Pet’rs Ex. “B.”)2

Mendoza filed a habeas petition with the Los Angeles County Superior Court challenging the

Governor’s decision, which the court denied on June 27, 2005. (Pet’rs Ex. “C.”) Mendoza then filed

a habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on July 14, 2005. (Pet’rs. Ex.

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-3- 05cv1938

“D.”) The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review on September 28, 2005. (Pet’rs Ex.

“E.”) On October 11, 2005, Mendoza, proceeding through counsel, filed the instant federal habeas

petition [Doc. No. 1] arguing that (1) Governor Schwarzenegger’s November 9, 2004 reversal of

Mendoza’s parole grant lacked any evidentiary support, was inapposite to the record, and relied upon

unchanging offense factors and therefore violated Mendoza’s due process rights; (2) the reversal, which

re-characterized Petitioner’s offense as first degree murder, violated Mendoza’s due process rights

because it vitiated the express terms of Mendoza’s plea agreement; and (3) the additional level of

gubernatorial review now required by California for parole grants for convicted murderers violates

Mendoza’s due process rights as well as the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. (Pet. at 9-

24.) Subsequent to filing an unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 5], Respondents answered the

Petition, arguing that Mendoza has failed to establish that he is entitled to federal habeas relief on any

of his claims [Doc. No. 16]. Mendoza filed a Traverse [Doc. No. 17], as well as a supplemental

document entitled “Notice by Robert Mendoza of Parole Status & Newly Published Controlling

Authority” [Doc. No. 18]. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1080 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (provisions of AEDPA apply when state prisoner challenges

constitutionality of state administrative decision, such as denial of parole); Sass v. California Board of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be

granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not

called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an

extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4- 05cv1938

unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th

Cir. 2004). Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and Mendoza

carries the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(e)(1) (West 2007). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied

a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case

differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application”

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief,

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]”

id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly

established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-5- 05cv1938

B. Whether the Governor’s Reversal of Mendoza’s Parole Grant Violated Due Process

(claims one through five)

Claims one through five of the petition attack the reasons set forth by the Governor for

overturning the BPT’s grant of parole as violating Mendoza’s due process rights because they are not

supported by “some evidence” in the record. (Pet. at 9-19.) Under clearly established federal law,

Mendoza’s due process claim is analyzed in two parts. First, the Court must determine whether

Mendoza has a liberty interest of which he has been deprived. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). If so, the Court must determine whether the procedure used to deprive him

of that liberty interest was constitutionally sufficient. Id.

California’s parole scheme, codified in California Penal Code section 3041, vests all “prisoners

whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest

in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of

the Due Process Clause.” Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Sass v. Calif. Bd.

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir.

2003); McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200

F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Ninth Circuit “cases may be persuasive authority for

purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of

Supreme Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established’”). Having

determined that Mendoza does have a protected liberty interest in a parole date, the Court must proceed

to the second, more contentious prong of the due process analysis, whether the procedure afforded

Mendoza was adequate. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. 

Respondent argues that this Court is not bound by Sass because it is neither clearly established

Supreme Court law nor did the Ninth Circuit base its decision on clearly established Supreme Court law.

(Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 6.) The Court recommends rejecting this argument. In Sass,

the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), which held that “revocation of good time [credits] does not comport with

‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the prison disciplinary

board are supported by some evidence in the record,” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454, applies with equal force to

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6- 05cv1938

the denial of parole “because both directly affect the duration of the prison term.’” See Sass, 461 F.3d

at 1128-29 (quoting Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.3d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Indeed, the

Court concluded that the “some evidence” standard was clearly established Supreme Court law for

AEDPA purposes. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; see also Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 600. Accordingly, the

Court will conduct the due process analysis under the “some evidence” standard as delineated by Sass:

To determine whether the some evidence standard is met, “does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing

of evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached by [the parole board or the governor] . . . .

Hill’s some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that “the record is not so devoid

of evidence that the findings of the [parole board or governor] were without support or

otherwise arbitrary.”

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-57.); see also Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th

Cir. 2007).

When determining whether “some evidence” supports a denial of parole, “[the] analysis is

framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state.”

Irons, 479 F.3d at 662. Thus, the Court “must look to California law to determine the findings that are

necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole.” Id. The Court must then “determine whether the

state court decision holding that these findings were supported by ‘some evidence’ . . . constituted an

unreasonable application of the ‘some evidence’ principle articulated in Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 [citation

omitted].” Id.

California prescribes indeterminate sentences for non-capital murders: twenty-five years to life

for first degree murder and fifteen years to life for second degree murder. Cal.Penal Code § 190. One

year prior to the expiration of a prisoner’s minimum sentence, a BPT panel meets with the inmate and

“set(s) a release date unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or offenses, or

the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code § 3401(a). Regardless of the

length of time served, “a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment

of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.”

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). California’s parole scheme requires that both the Governor and the BPT

have “some evidence” that the inmate will be a continuing threat to society in order to deny parole. See

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 General Equivalency Degree, equivalent to completing high school.

4

 “AA” refers to Alcoholics Anonymous, “NA” refers to Narcotics Anonymous.

5

 “CAT X” and “CAT T” refer to prison therapy programs.

6

 Form 128 is used to report minor acts of non-conformance to rules.

7

 Form 115 is used to report rules violations.

-7- 05cv1938

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1095 (2005).

1. The BPT Decision, the Governor’s Reversal and the Superior Court’s Decision

Following an extensive hearing during which the BPT Commissioners reviewed Mendoza’s

commitment offense, his prior convictions, his prior drug and alcohol abuse, his prison behavior, the

therapy he underwent in prison, the vocational training he obtained in prison, prison psychiatric reports,

recommendations, the district attorney’s statement in opposition to parole, his attorney’s statement and

Mendoza’s own statement, the BPT awarded Mendoza parole:

And Mr. Mendoza, the Panel reviewed all information received from the public

and relied on the following circumstances in concluding that you are suitable for parole

and would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released from prison. Let’s start with this. The issues that we looked at were that

while he’s been in prison, he has certainly enhanced his ability to function within the law

upon release. He’s participated in educational programs. He’s gotten his GED.3

 He has

become a certified welder. He has participated in self-help that includes Hands of Peace,

which he’s done since the last BPT hearing. He’s been involved in AA/NA4 since 1991.

He was in CAT X.5 He was in CAT T Substance Abuse Program, which included drugs,

signs of abuse, short and long-term effects, addictive family systems, personality traits,

chemical dependency and relapse prevention and recovery strategies. He’s been working

with Joint Ventures for the past eight years as a welder, and has a savings of $9,000. He

has realistic parole plans, which include lots of family support. And I went back through

the letters and he actually has four offers of residence.

. . . .

He has maintained positive institutional behavior, which indicates significant

improvement and self-control. And I want to note that he has had only three 128's.6

Those were between the years of 1986 and 1989. And he only has two 115's7; neither

of them serious and both of them were back in 1984. He certainly has shown signs of

remorse, and I think a real clear insight into the magnitude of the offense and I believe

that he does accept responsibility for not only this offense, but his criminal behavior that

led up to the offense. So I think that he has a real clear understanding of what he needs

to do in order to avoid having anything like this happening in his future. The psychiatric

report dated 10/7/02, authored by Doctor Mura has a lot to say. And I’m going to read

from it more extensively. It says that regarding the inmate’s parole plans. It says given

Mr. Mendoza’s plans for the future, along with family and community support, his plans

are certainly viable and there are no problem areas that this writer can foresee that would

prevent him from being successful on parole. She says under observations and

recommendations, Mr. Mendoza exhibits a deep and sincere sense of remorse for the

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-8- 05cv1938

demise of the victim as well as the impact that this has had upon not only the victim’s

family, but on his own family as well. He is truly cognizant of the impact of his actions

and the suffering that it has caused among members from both sets of families. She also

says Mr. Mendoza has matured and become more responsible and has become truly

focused upon his goal of being released and in helping others. He has been able to

refrain from getting caught up in other activities, which would have diverted him from

his purpose and goals. What is further remarkable about this young man is that even in

the midst of disappointments and frustrations, he’s maintained the belief and faith that

he will get out and be of assistance to his family. He’s not spent time wallowing in

misery, but has remained true to his purpose. He’s not blamed others for his situation

or the denial of parole, given the fact that he indeed placed himself in this situation. In

summation, Mr. Mendoza has the inner strength, internal resources, and skills necessary,

I believe to become a productive and law abiding citizen and member of society. He

displays the ability to look beyond himself, to be self-reflective, and to evaluate the

motivations behind his behavior and take the proper course of action. He’s definitely

learned from the actions that he has previously taken. He would in essence be, I believe,

successful on integrating back into society should he be provided another opportunity

for parole. Additionally, in a psychiatric evaluation dated 10/19/98, by Doctor

Pesavento – that’s P-E-S-A-V-E-N-T-O. He states back in ‘98, indeed Mr. Mendoza

expresses not only an intellectual understanding of himself, but is also more effectively

able to – available to look within himself and to acknowledge his own feelings about his

actions and the consequences of those actions. He’s been and continues to be a man who

is in touch with himself. Mr. Mendoza’s violence potential outside of a controlled

setting in the past is considered to be – to have been average, and at present – and that’s

in 1998, it is estimated to be greatly decreased, if not insignificant. He has the internal

resources as well as the motivation and commitment to make something of his life and

to assist others. He further has the external support that would enable him to do this until

such time that he could be – he could truly be financially on his own. There are no

significant risk factors or precursors to violence that this writer can think of at this time.

And I apologize, that wasn’t ‘98, it was ‘99. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 80-85.) 

On November 9, 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger reversed the BPT’s decision in a written

statement. The Governor began by detailing the circumstances of the crime, Mendoza’s prior

convictions, and his history of drug and alcohol abuse. (Lodgment No. 7 at 1-2.) The Governor then

went on to discuss the progress Mendoza had made during his twenty-two years in prison, including

vocational training and drug and alcohol abuse therapy, the positive evaluations he had received from

prison staff and mental health professionals and the solid family ties he had maintained in prison. (Id.

at 2.) The Governor then stated that Mendoza “does not, however, have an employment offer at this

time nor any job prospects upon parole,” noting that “it is critical to Mr. Mendoza’s success on parole

and to the public’s safety – particularly given Mr. Mendoza’s history of violent theft crimes – that he

have the structure and security provided by a legitimate job.” (Id.) The Governor then went on to

recount Mendoza’s version of the events and the fact that Mendoza “accepts responsibility and is

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 Respondent argues that the California Court of Appeal’s decision is the last reasoned state court

decision. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 4-5.) However, the state appellate court’s citation to two cases

without a written opinion does not constitute a reasoned decision to which this Court can defer. See Luna v.

Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960-61, as amended, 311 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court will “look

through” to the Los Angeles Superior Court decision as the basis for its analysis. In any event, both the Superior

Court and the state appellate court cited to Rosencrantz’s “some evidence” standard in deciding that the

Governor’s decision was supported by the record. (See Lodgment Nos. 9, 11.) 

-9- 05cv1938

remorseful for murdering Mr. Palacio.” (Id.) Despite this overwhelmingly positive assessment of

Mendoza, the Governor concluded that parole would present an unreasonable risk to public safety:

Mr. Mendoza’s conduct went beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for second-degree murder because there is evidence in the record before me

that this killing was intentional, deliberate, and premeditated. Mr. Mendoza fought with

Mr. Palacio and tried unsuccessfully to stab him. He then left the residence, announcing

that he would return. After retrieving a gun, he returned 20 minutes later and shot Mr.

Palacio twice in the chest. And after Mr. Palacio had already fallen to the ground, Mr.

Mendoza deliberately turned, walked back to the body, and shot him a third time. This

was an especially grave second-degree murder – and this factor alone is a sufficient basis

on which to conclude that Mr. Mendoza’s release from prison would pose an

unreasonable public-safety risk at this time.

Mr. Mendoza has been in prison a long time, and he has matured and made some

creditable gains. But after carefully considering each of the factors the Board is required

to consider, I find the particularly heinous offense he committed presently outweighs the

positive factors tending to support his parole. Accordingly, because I believe his release

from prison would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public at this time, I

REVERSE the Board of Prison Terms’ 2004 decision to grant parole to Mr. Mendoza.

(Id. at 203.)

Mendoza appealed the Governor’s decision to the Los Angeles Superior Court, which issued a

written decision denying the petition. (Lodgment No. 9.) He then raised the claim in a habeas corpus

petition he filed in the California Court of Appeal, which denied it with citations to In re Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th 616, 667 (2002) and In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2002). (See Lodgment No. 11.)

Finally, he raised it in a habeas corpus petition filed in the California Supreme Court, which denied it

without citation of authority. (See Lodgment No. 13.) Because the California Supreme issued a

summary denial, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision which

addressed the claim on the merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In this case, that is the Superior Court’s

denial.8

 That court upheld the Governor’s decision:

The Governor’s reversal acknowledges petitioner’s progress since his

incarceration, including his involvement in self-help and vocational programming and

substantial family support. However, the Governor concluded the factors tending to

favor suitability do not outweigh the circumstances of the commitment offense. It is

irrelevant that a court might disagree with the way in which the Governor has balanced

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-10- 05cv1938

suitability and unsuitability factors. (Rosencrantz, supra, at 677.) Here, there is some

evidence in the record that the commitment offense was deliberate and premeditated.

Even if it were not, petitioner shot the victim four times. That fact alone is enough to

establish more than the minimum necessary for a second-degree murder conviction. (Id.

at 683.) Thus, there is “some evidence” petitioner is unsuitable because of the

circumstances of the commitment offense.

(Lodgment No. 9 at 2.)

2. Factors Related to the Commitment Offense (claims one, two(b), three and four)

Mendoza argues that the reversal of his parole grant on the basis of factors related to his

commitment offense violated his federal due process rights. He points to three errors in the Governor’s

decision: (1) the Governor’s claim that Mendoza’s crime was “intentional, deliberate and

premeditated,” or “particularly heinous”; (2) the Governor’s failure to articulate a connection between

the unsuitability factors and the risk to public safety posed by his release, and (3) the Governor’s use

of the gravity of his offense to deny parole. (Pet. at 10-17.) Respondent argues the state court’s denial

of Mendoza’s due process claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 6-8.)

As previously noted, when determining whether “some evidence” supports a denial of parole,

“[the] analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole suitability determinations in

the relevant state.” Irons, 479 F.3d at 662. California law permits the Governor to consider the facts

surrounding the commitment offense in determining whether a prisoner is too dangerous to parole.

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071. However, as the Ninth Circuit has noted:

[T]he denial of parole may be predicated on a prisoner’s commitment offense only where

the [Governor] can ‘point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for

which the inmate was committed’ that demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the

suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at

1071 [citations omitted]. Factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime include,

inter alia, that ‘[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,’

that “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering,” and that “[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15

§ 2402(c)(1)(B), (D)-(E).

Irons, 479 F.3d at 663; see also Rosencrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 678-79.

The Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta, however, that while the BPT can look at immutable

events, such as the nature of the commitment offense, to predict that a prisoner is not currently suitable

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions may be cited commencing with decisions issued in 2007. (See

Ninth Cir. Rule 36-3.) Although still not binding precedent, unpublished decisions have persuasive value and

indicate how the Ninth Circuit applies binding authority.

-11- 05cv1938

for parole, in order to comply with federal due process guarantees the weight to be attributed to such

events should decrease over time and as the prisoner demonstrates good behavior in prison. See Biggs,

334 F.3d 910; Sass, 461 F.3d 1123; Irons, 479 F.3d 658. Indeed, the Court has noted that “in some

cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of

his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows

from the relevant California statutes.” Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. 

Despite the Ninth Circuit’s suggestions, however, “[t]here is no ‘clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ that limits the number of times a parole board

may deny parole to a murderer based on the brutality and viciousness of the commitment offense.”

Culverson v. Davison, No. 06-56827, slip op. at 2, 2007 WL 1663682 (9th Cir. June 8, 2007) (quoting

28 U.S.C. 2254(d)); see also Kunkler v. Muntz, No. 06-55555, slip op. at 4-5 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2007).9

Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude that the use of Mendoza’s commitment offense alone to deny

parole entitles him to relief. See Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “[i]f

no Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas

petitioner raised in state court, the state court's decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.”) Rather, this Court is limited to determining “whether

the state court decision holding that the [Governor’s] findings were supported by ‘some evidence’ . . .

constituted an unreasonable application of the ‘some evidence’ principle articulated in Hill.” Irons, 479

F.3d at 662. As previous noted, “Hill’s some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record

is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the parole board or governor] were without support or

otherwise arbitrary.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29. 

In Mendoza’s case, there was “some evidence” to support the Governor’s reversal of the BPT’s

parole grant: the fact that “Mendoza’s conduct went beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for second-degree murder because there is evidence in the record . . . that [the] killing was

intentional, deliberate, and premeditated.” (Lodgment No. 7 at 2; see also Kunkler, No 06-55555, slip

op. at 4-5 (Governor’s decision to reverse parole grant upheld as supported by “some evidence” where

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-12- 05cv1938

reversal based on the gravity of Kunkler’s offense, namely that it was a second degree murder

committed under aggravated circumstances.) Indeed, the record reflects that after fighting with the

victim and attempting to stab him, Mendoza threatened to return. Twenty minutes later, he did return

with a gun, shot the victim three times in the chest, started to leave, then turned back and shot the victim

again while he was laying on the ground. (Lodgment No. 5 at 11-12.) These facts demonstrate there

was time and opportunity for Mendoza to reflect upon his actions and the consequences of those actions

(deliberation and premeditation), and thus that “[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner.” See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)(1)(B), (D)-(E); see also, e.g., In re Deluna,

126 Cal. App. 4th 585 (2005) (denial of parole based on a determination that the petitioner’s conduct

exhibited premeditation and deliberation upheld where the petitioner, who was convicted of second

degree murder, “[confronted the] victim in a bar, left the bar, retrieved a rifle, shot the victim in the

mouth and, as the victim bled and walked around the parking lot, followed him and continued firing

until he died.”)

The two remaining factors cited by Mendoza as violating his federal due process rights, the

failure of the Governor to articulate a connection between the unsuitability factors and the risk to public

safety posed by his release and the use of the gravity of his offense to deny parole, are also resolved by

the standard of review this Court must apply to Mendoza’s claim. Mendoza is correct when he argues

that that, taken together, Biggs, Sass and Irons suggest that although the BPT can consider immutable

events, such as the nature of the conviction offense, when deciding whether to parole an individual, the

weight to be attributed to such events should decrease over time and as a predictor of future

dangerousness. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. This is

particularly true when a prisoner, like Mendoza, demonstrates virtually discipline-free behavior in

prison, extensive participation in therapy, acquisition of marketable skills, acceptance of responsibility,

demonstration of remorse and realistic parole plans. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17; Irons, 479 F.3d at 665.

Indeed, California courts have begun to apply the principles set forth in Biggs, Sass and Irons to grant

habeas petitions challenging the Governor’s reversals of BPT parole grants. See, e.g., In re Gray, No.

B197193, __ Cal. App. 4th __, 2007 WL 1502288 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2007); In re Lawrence, __

Cal. App. 4th __, No. B190874, 2007 WL 1475283 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2007); In re Weider, 145

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-13- 05cv1938

Cal. App. 4th 570 (2006) In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573 (2005); In re Elkins, 144 Cal. App. 4th 475

(2006); In re Smith, 109 Cal. App. 4th 489 (2003). The Northern and Central Districts have also applied

Biggs, Sass and Irons to reverse both BPT denials of parole and Governor’s reversals of BPT’s decisions

granting parole. See Brown v. Kane, No. C 05-5188, 2007 WL 1288448 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007); Willis

v. Kane, No. C 05-3153, 2007 WL 1232060 (N.D. Cal. April 26, 2007); Martin v. Marshall, 431 F.

Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006); Rosencrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 1, 2006). 

Nevertheless, this Court’s review is restricted by AEDPA, and, in the final analysis, whether this

Court agrees or disagrees with the Governor’s reversal of the BPT’s parole grant or whether this Court,

in its independent judgment, concludes that Mendoza should be granted parole, is irrelevant. This Court

is only charged with determining whether the state court’s affirmance of the Governor’s decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). As previously stated, because “[t]here is no ‘clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ that limits the number of times

a parole board may deny parole to a murderer based on the brutality and viciousness of the commitment

offense,” this Court cannot conclude that the state court’s denial of Mendoza’s two remaining due

process claims was an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” standard of Hill. SeeCulverson,

No. 06-56827, slip op. at 2, 2007 WL 1663682; see also Kunkler, No. 06-55555, slip op. at 4-5; Brewer,

378 F.3d at 955.

3. Lack of Employment Offer (claim two(a))

Mendoza also claims that the Governor improperly based his parole reversal in part on the fact

that Mendoza does not have a job offer or “any job prospects upon parole.” (Pet. at 10; Lodgment 7 at

2.) Mendoza argues that the applicable regulations do not require a prisoner to have a job offer. They

only require the prisoner to make “realistic plans for release” or have “developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon parole.” 15 Cal. Code Reg. § 2402(d)(8) (Barclays 2007). Respondent argues

that the state court’s denial of this claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 6-8.)

In its denial of Mendoza’s claim, the Los Angeles Superior Court stated that although the

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-14- 05cv1938

Governor noted in his decision that Mendoza did not have a job offer, had a lengthy criminal history as

a juvenile, and appeared to lack insight into his offense, “the lone reason the Governor reversed the

Board of Prison Term’s (“Board”) decision to grant petition parole, is because the circumstances of the

commitment offense are beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for second degree

murder.” (Lodgment No. 9 at 1-2 & n.1.) In his reversal of the BPT’s decision, the Governor stated that

Mendoza did not “have an employment offer at this time nor any job prospects upon parole.”

(Lodgment No. 7 at 2.) The Governor then concluded that “it is critical to Mr. Mendoza’s success on

parole and to the public’s safety– particularly given Mr. Mendoza’s history of violent theft crimes – that

he have the structure and security provided by a legitimate job.” (Id.) The Governor ultimately reversed

the BPT’s decision on two grounds: that Mendoza’s release would pose an unreasonable public safety

risk and because “the particularly heinous offense [Mendoza] committed presently outweighs the

positive factors tending to support his parole.” (Id. at 3.) Thus, it is not entirely clear whether

Mendoza’s lack of employment offer played any role in the Governor’s decision. 

As Mendoza points out, the regulations governing parole suitability do not require that Mendoza

have a job offer, only that Mendoza have made “realistic plans for release” or have “developed

marketable skills that can be put to use upon parole.” See 15 Cal. Code Reg. § 2402(d)(8). That

Mendoza has “realistic plans for release” or has “developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon

release” is not seriously open to debate. Four of Mendoza’s family members offered him a stable place

to live. (Lodgment No. 81.) These family members pledged to support Mendoza by making sure he

attends Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) upon release and at least one of those individuals promised to

attend AA meetings themselves in order to support Mendoza. (Id. at 29-34.) Mendoza has a letter of

recommendation from Pete Silva, his former employer and manager of Pub Brewing Company, praising

his knowledge, work ethic, and the high level of responsibility he has been able to give Mendoza.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 29, 81.) Mendoza acquired extensive experience in welding, building, finishing,

and inspecting brewing tanks while working for Silva, and in his letter Silva noted that Mendoza will

be able to secure employment based on his welding skill alone. (Id. at 28-29.) In addition, Mendoza

has accumulated a savings of $9000.00 to bridge the gap between his release and getting a job. (Id. at

37.) 

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Article V, Section 8(b) of the California Constitution states:

No decision of the parole authority of this State with respect to the granting, denial,

revocation, or suspension of parole of a person sentenced to an indeterminate term upon

conviction of murder shall become effective for a period of 30 days, during which the Governor

may review the decision subject to procedures provided by statute. The Governor may only

affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the parole authority on the basis of the same factors

which the parole authority is required to consider. The Governor shall report to the Legislature

each parole decision affirmed, modified, or reversed, stating the pertinent facts and reasons for

the action.

-15- 05cv1938

Even if the Governor erroneously relied on Mendoza’s lack of a job offer to reverse the BPT’s

decision, however, Mendoza is not entitled to relief. Any error in the denial of this claim based on the

lack of an employment offer was harmless because it did not play a substantial role in the Governor’s

reversal or the Superior Court’s affirmance of the Governor’s decision. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Rather, the Governor based his decision on the fact that Mendoza’s commitment

offense was an “especially grave second-degree murder” and a “particularly heinous offense.”

(Lodgment No. 7 at 3.)

4. Individualized Consideration of Mendoza’s Case (claim four)

Mendoza also argues that the Governor failed to conduct an individualized assessment of his

parole suitability, instead relying on boilerplate language and a blanket policy of denying parole to all

individuals convicted of murder. (Pet. at 17-19.) Respondent does not address the claim in the Answer.

Article V, section 8(b) of the California Constitution, provides the Governor with authority to

review a decision of the parole authority pursuant to “procedures provided by statute.” (Cal. Const., art.

V, § 8(b).)10 Penal Code section 3041.2 implements this provision, and states that “if the Governor

decides to reverse or modify a parole decision . . .he or she shall send a written decision to the inmate

specifying the reasons for his or her decision.” (Penal Code § 3041.2.) The Governor is to consider the

same factors as the parole authority. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8(b).) Because Mendoza has a liberty

interest in parole, a decision to deny parole must not be arbitrary and must be “free from bias or

prejudice.” O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 422-23 (9th Cir. 1990). When parole is denied, due

process requires that the prisoner be given “notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and if

parole is denied, a statement of the reasons for the denial.” Rosencrantz, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 

There is no evidence in the record to support Mendoza’s contention that the Governor did not

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-16- 05cv1938

give individualized consideration to the facts of his case when deciding to overturn the BPT’s decision.

Indeed, the Governor’s written reversal cites specific facts about Mendoza’s case, both positive and

negative, as the basis for his decision. He recounted the facts of the crime, Mendoza’s juvenile record,

Mendoza’s history of drug and alcohol abuse and his lack of serious and/or violent rules violations while

in prison. (Lodgment No. 7 at 1-2.) He also detailed the positive steps Mendoza has taken in prison,

including the vocational skills he has attained, the drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs he has

completed, the positive evaluations he has garnered from staff and mental health professionals, and the

solid family ties he has maintained while in prison. (Id. at 2.) Finally, the Governor recounted

Mendoza’s acceptance of responsibility for the crime and remorse. (Id. at 2-3.) In the end, however,

the Governor concluded that the gravity of the crime, including the evidence of premeditation and

deliberation, outweighed the positive factors supporting the BPT’s decision. (Id. at 3.)

The record does not support Mendoza’s claim that the Governor’s denial was merely a “rote”

decision which did not take into consideration the specifics of Mendoza’s case. Accordingly, the state

court’s denial of this claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

C. Whether the Governor’s Reversal Violated the Express Terms of Mendoza’s Plea

Agreement (claim six)

 Mendoza claims the Governor’s reversal of his parole grant violates his due process rights by

breaching the terms of his plea agreement because it deprives him of the benefit of his plea bargain.

Specifically, Mendoza argues that the Governor has permanently “re-cast” his conviction as a first

degree murder, and that in entering into the plea bargain, he “understood and relied on the fact that he

would be eligible for parole around 1990 and that his parole suitability would be determined only the

by the BPT.” (Pet. at 20) (emphasis in original.) Respondent counters that Mendoza’s plea agreement

did not contain any specific promises related to his release on parole or the manner in which parole

suitability would be determined. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 9.)

The Superior Court, to which this Court must look under Ylst, denied this claim, stating that in

exchange for his guilty plea to second degree murder, Mendoza agreed to accept a sentence of fifteen

years to life. (Lodgment No. 9 at 2.) The court further stated that there were no promises made as part

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-17- 05cv1938

of the plea agreement that Mendoza would serve only the minimum term. (Id.) Finally, the court stated

that under California law, “[j]ust as the Governor may consider evidence a jury rejected in determining

suitability for parole, he may do so when an inmate is sentenced to a plea agreement.” (Id. at 2-3, citing

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 679.) 

“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law standards.” United

States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993). The Due Process Clause of the federal

Constitution confers on a defendant the right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement. Brown v. Poole,

337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or

agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Mendoza pleaded guilty

to second degree murder. In exchange, other charges were dropped and he received an indeterminate

term of fifteen years to life. (Lodgment Nos. 1, 2, 4.) Mendoza’s “understanding” notwithstanding,

there is no indication that the plea agreement included any promise that Mendoza would serve less than

the maximum life term, or that in the event that the BPT granted Mendoza parole, the determination

would not be subject to the Governor’s power of reversal. Consequently, the Governor’s reversal of

Mendoza’s parole grant cannot be characterized as a “breach” of Mendoza’s plea agreement, nor a

violation of Mendoza’s due process rights. The Superior Court’s decision was therefore neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412-13.

D. Whether the Imposition of More Onerous Parole Regulations Violates the Ex Post Facto

Clause (claim seven)

Finally, Mendoza argues that the imposition of the Governor’s power to reverse the BPT’s parole

grant violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution because such a power was not

in effect until California voters adopted Proposition 29 in 1988, six years after Mendoza pleaded guilty

to second degree murder. (Pet. at 24-27.) Respondent argues that because the addition of the

Governor’s power to review BPT decision did not retroactively alter the definition of or increase the

punishment for second degree murder, no ex post facto violation has occurred. (Mem. of P. & A. in

Supp. of Answer at 9.) The state court did not address this claim in their denial. (See Lodgment No.

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-18- 05cv1938

9.) Accordingly, the Court must conduct a de novo review of the claim. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d

1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits

of a properly raised issue, [the Court] must review it de novo.”)

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution prevents the government from

retroactively altering the definition of or increasing the punishment for a crime. California Dept. of

Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1995) (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41

(1990).) The Ninth Circuit has concluded that Proposition 29 and the changes it made to parole

procedures do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because “the law itself is neutral inasmuch as it gives

the governor power to either affirm or reverse a BPT’s decision,” and “the governor must use the same

criteria as the BPT.” Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964, 967-68. The law requires “simply removes final

parole decision making authority from the BPT and places it in the hands of the governor.” Id.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision denying this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This report and recommendation is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 20, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than August 1, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 27, 2007

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01938-L-NLS Document 20 Filed 06/27/07 Page 18 of 18