Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00535/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00535-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0535 FCD GGH PS

vs.

ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

INTRODUCTION

This action, in which plaintiff is proceeding pro se, has been referred to the

undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 72-302(c)(21). This action is proceeding on the

complaint filed March 19, 2007, against defendants Elk Grove Unified School District

(“District”), Stephen Ladd, Xavier de la Torre, Annette Buckmaster, Richard Odegard, Claudia

Sherrill, Linda Sutter, Kim Thomas, Lisa Emigh, and Jill Gayaldo. Defendants’ previous motion

to dismiss, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed April 5, 2007,

was granted on May 22, 2007, with leave to amend. Plaintiff was advised in that order that

failure to file an amended complaint would result in a recommendation that his action be

dismissed. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint but instead filed a motion for

appointment of counsel on June 13, 2007. On June 29, 2007, defendants filed an amended

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motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), for failure to file an amended complaint and

failure to oppose defendants’ motions. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel and

defendants’ motion to dismiss were heard on August 23, 2007. Plaintiff appeared in pro se. 

Lynn Garcia appeared for defendants. Having reviewed the filings and heard oral argument, the

court now issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former school bus driver instructor of the District, alleges that

defendants tried to retaliate against him for filing two complaints of sexual harassment. He

claims that his supervisor, Kim Thomas, created a hostile work environment, coworker Lisa

Emigh participated in it, and director Claudia Sherrill did nothing to stop it. After plaintiff

complained of the harassment, defendants tried to demote and terminate him. The attempted

demotion was for insubordination for his refusal to sign a document approving Lisa Emigh to

drive because she did not have the required training. When plaintiff tried to clarify the law on

this issue which involved additional incidents of incomplete training, the Director of Human

Resources, Annette Buckmaster, finally scheduled meetings, but continually cancelled them. 

Plaintiff claims that as a result of the harassment, his reputation, career and retirement have been

harmed. He asserts that if he has to return to this employment, he will be further subjected to a

hostile work environment and limited potential for promotion. He seeks $500,000 in damages. 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff’s June 13, 2007 request for appointment of counsel sets forth his

attempts to obtain counsel. He was originally represented by the Carroll law firm but his attorney

bills were over $19,000 and he could not afford to continue. He also outlines consultations with

other firms, but they were either too busy or could not do his case on a contingency basis. In

addition to the four attorneys named, he states he contacted at least another dozen firms. This

motion includes numerous exhibits, including a letter, dated October 3, 2006, from the Carroll

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firm to opposing counsel on his behalf, which outlines his demands. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A.

A review of this letter, along with the complaint of record, indicates that

plaintiff’s allegations do not state a federal cause of action.

Any successful application for appointment of counsel must comply with criteria

set forth in Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981). Before

appointing counsel to plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bradshaw requires the court to

consider (1) plaintiff’s financial resources, (2) the efforts already made by plaintiff to secure

counsel, and (3) plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 1318. Appointment of

counsel is not a matter of right. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F. 2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982).

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the first factor, which relates to

his financial condition, is a fortiori resolved in his favor. It is also clear that plaintiff has made a

valiant effort to obtain counsel. Nevertheless, based on a review of the current record, plaintiff is

not likely to succeed on the merits. As explained at the hearing and set forth in the next section,

the allegations, if true, do not state a federal cause of action. Therefore, plaintiff’s request for

appointment of counsel is denied.

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The District’s first motion to dismiss was based on lack of federal jurisdiction,

Eleventh Amendment immunity, and failure to plead a cause of action. The instant motion to

dismiss is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to file an amended complaint in

compliance with the court’s order, and failure to oppose defendants’ motions. Because it is

apparent that the court presently has no subject matter jurisdiction, it will make its

recommendation on this basis alone. 

A district court has an independent duty to examine its own jurisdiction, which is

ordinarily determined from the face of the complaint. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n. of

Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9 Cir. 1998), quoting Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg th

Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 43, 118 S. Ct. 956, 966 (1998), and Ultramar

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America Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9 Cir. 1990). th

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

On a Rule12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

plaintiff bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Sopcak v. Northern

Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir.1995); Thornhill Pub. Co. v. General Tel.

& Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979). Different standards apply to a 12(b)(1)

motion, depending on the manner in which it is made. See, e.g., Crisp v. U.S., 966 F. Supp. 970,

971-72 (E.D. Cal. 1997). 

First, if the motion attacks the complaint on its face, often referred to as a “facial

attack,” the court considers the complaint’s allegations to be true, and plaintiff enjoys

“safeguards akin to those applied when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made.” Doe v. Schachter, 804

F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D.Cal. 1992). Presuming its factual allegations to be true, the complaint must

demonstrate that the court has either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. For

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, plaintiff and defendants must be residents of

different states. For federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the complaint

must either (1) arise under a federal law or the United States Constitution, (2) allege a “case or

controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2, or (3) be authorized by a jurisdiction statute. 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S. Ct. 691, 699-700, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). 

Second, if the motion makes a “factual attack” on subject matter jurisdiction,

often referred to as a “speaking motion,” the court does not presume the factual allegations of the

complaint to be true. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. In a factual attack, defendant challenges the

truth of the jurisdictional facts underlying the complaint. “Faced with a factual attack on subject

matter jurisdiction, the trial court may proceed as it never could under Rule 12(b)(6). . . . No

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material

facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

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claims.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). The court may hear evidence such as declarations

or testimony to resolve factual disputes. Id.; McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th

Cir. 1988).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972). Unless it is clear that no

amendment can cure its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend

the complaint before dismissal. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition to the motion to dismiss. In any event, this

court has reviewed the record under the more liberal standards granted to pro se litigants, and

pursuant to its own ongoing duty to examine its jurisdiction. 

A federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only those

cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co,

511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction statutes, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively,

while statutes regulating specific subject matter may also confer federal jurisdiction. See

generally, W.W. Schwarzer, A.W. Tashima & J. Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial

§ 2:5. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is so fundamental that it may be raised at any time by 

any party or by the court. See Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d

593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“A party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the

actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th

Cir. 1996). Unless a complaint presents a plausible assertion of a substantial federal right, a

federal court does not have jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776

(1945). A federal claim which is so insubstantial as to be patently without merit cannot serve as

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the basis for federal jurisdiction. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 587-38, 94 S. Ct. 1372,

1379-80 (1974). 

This court is unable to ascertain a federal jurisdictional basis of plaintiff’s

complaint. Plaintiff states that he has filed a complaint with FEHA and the EEOC, but alleges

only in the most conclusory form that he has been retaliated against for having filed sexual

harassment claims. The court has also reviewed plaintiff’s case from the standpoint of the letter

by plaintiff’s former counsel to the District’s counsel. 

The most detailed summary of Mr. Sanchez’ problems is set forth in the October

3, 2006 letter of his then counsel Sheila Lamb Carroll. See Exhibit A to Motion for Appointment

of Counsel filed June 13, 2007. The letter focuses entirely on a potential state law whistleblower

retaliation violation. The undersigned cannot discern any federal law based claim within the

facts alleged which would survive Bell v. Hood. Plaintiff’s administrative filing with the

EEOC/FEHA made factless references to sexual harassment or retaliation from sexual

harassment.

Even if plaintiff could amend his complaint to allege all the facts outlined in his

former counsel’s letter, he would not be able to state a federal cause of action.

A suit for retaliation may be brought under Title VII which provides in part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by

this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

This section protects an employee or former employee from retaliation as a result

of engaging in activity protected by Title VII. Arnold v. U.S., 816 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir.

1987); Richardson v. Restaurant Marketing Associates, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 690, 695 (N.D. Cal.

1981). In a retaliation case, this circuit follows the general rule regarding proof as set forth in

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McDonnell Douglas. Thus: (1) plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (2) defendant must

then come forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the action; and (3) plaintiff has

the final burden to show that the action was a pretext for retaliation. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson,

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.1998); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464-65

(9th Cir. 1994). 

 Here, plaintiff alleges only that defendants retaliated against him for bringing to

light alleged violations in bus driver training. To state a Title VII claim against the District,

plaintiff must specify how this defendant made an adverse employment decision as a direct result

of specified protected activity. Plaintiff must specify what federal constitutional or statutory

interest is at stake, and demonstrate its violation; or, if plaintiff maintains a violation of state law,

he must explain how this gives rise to the violation of a federal right. Plaintiff bears the burden

of demonstrating this court’s jurisdiction, i.e., that a federal claim actually exists and he has not

done so. Therefore, plaintiff’s action must be dismissed.

Once before, the court directed plaintiff to amend the complaint. Plaintiff did not

do so. However, given the court’s perception that plaintiff desired to participate in this litigation,

plaintiff will be afforded one more opportunity to amend his complaint. Unless allied with a

bona fide federal claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, allegations of state law violation are not

actionable in federal court. In amending the complaint, plaintiff shall heed the admonition of the

Supreme Court in drafting of the amended complaint’s allegations:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Sanjuan v.

American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251

(C.A.7 1994), a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106

S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts

“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation”). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d

ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he pleading must

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contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)....

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-1965 (2007).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel, filed June 13, 2007, is

denied.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed June 26, 2007, is granted for the reasons

stated in this decision.

3. This action is dismissed with leave to amend.

4. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before November 23, 2007. No

extensions of time will be granted. If the amended complaint is not filed by November 23, the

court will sua sponte recommend that the action be dismissed.

DATED: 11/6/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

___________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076/Sanchez0535.fr.wpd

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