Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00632/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00632-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHET PRUITT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MANJULA BOBBALA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:20-cv-0632 KJM AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 

29, 30, and Plaintiff’s motion to amend, ECF No. 33. 

I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 23, 2020. ECF No. 1. The complaint 

named four defendants—Manjula Bobbala, M.D.; S. Gates, Chief of Health Care Appeals for 

California Correctional Health Care Services; Jeff Lynch, Acting Warden of California State 

Prison – Sacramento; and the State Compensation Insurance Fund—and alleged five grounds for 

relief. Id. The complaint was screened, and the undersigned recommended that Defendant State 

Compensation Insurance Fund and Claims 2 through 5, which alleged claims against the State 

Compensation Insurance Fund only, be dismissed without prejudice. ECF No. 7. The findings 

//// 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 1 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

and recommendations were adopted in full and the case proceeded on Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims against Defendants Bobbala, Gates, and Lynch. ECF No. 27. 

In response to the complaint, Defendants Lynch and Gates filed a motion to dismiss on the 

ground that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief. ECF No. 29. Defendant Bobbala also filed 

a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff opposed the motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 34, 

35, and filed a motion to amend the complaint, ECF No. 33. The motion to amend seeks to add 

additional claims and an additional defendant, id., and is opposed by Defendants, ECF Nos. 39, 

40. 

II. Allegations of the Original Complaint 

On December 7, 2018, Plaintiff suffered a torn ligament in his right foot. ECF No. 1 at 6, 

¶ 20. On February 22, 2019, he underwent an MRI of the ankle, which revealed “tendinosis of 

the peroneus tendons with a partial tear of the peroneus brevis.” Id., ¶ 21. Between the date of 

the injury and May 2019, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a serious medical issue that required he be 

seen by a doctor at a private hospital. Id., ¶ 22. He was seen by Dr. Harf, an outside medical 

provider, via telemed, and on May 31, 2019, Dr. Harf recommended that for a three-month period 

Plaintiff utilize an ankle/foot brace to stabilize the foot and allow it to heal. Id. Per Dr. Harf, if 

that failed to fix the issue then Plaintiff might need to undergo surgery, but it was “unreasonable 

to just take this individual to surgery for the procedures” and he should be reevaluated for surgery 

depending upon his improvement. Id. at 6-7, ¶ 22. 

Plaintiff initiated a 602 institutional healthcare grievance on the handling of his ankle 

injury, and on August 23, 2019, Dr. Bobbala signed the institutional-level response 

recommending “no intervention” in response to Plaintiff’s appeal. Id. at 2, 4, 29-30. The 

response stated that Plaintiff had a “confirmed telemed orthopedic surgery specialist referral 

made on a routine basis.” Id. at 30. Plaintiff then sought a review of the institutional-level 

decision. Id. at 4, ¶ 12. On November 25, 2019, Defendant Gates signed the headquarters-level 

response to the appeal, recommending “no intervention.” Id. at 3-5, 32-33. The response stated 

that plaintiff had been seen by his primary care provider on November 8, 2019, and that a plan of 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 2 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

care had been developed that included “orthopedic surgeon consultations . . . and orthopedic 

surgeon reevaluation.” Id. at 33. On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Harf, who 

recommended surgery. Id. at 7, ¶ 24. 

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants allowed medical staff to delay proper review from the 

period December 7, 2018 [date of incident], to May 31, 2019.” Id. at 8, ¶ 28 (brackets in 

original). He further alleges that between May 31, 2019, and the filing of the complaint 

Defendants violated his rights “by not timely-implementing [sic] Dr. Harf’s treatment plan of 

May 31, 2019.” Id. at 9, ¶ 30. Defendant Lynch is named in his official capacity as warden for 

the purposes of obtaining injunctive relief, id. at 3, ¶ 7, and in his individual capacity for 

damages, id. at 5, 23, ¶¶ 17, 1. 

III. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss 

A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss an action for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a dismissal motion 

brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must be plausible on its face, meaning that it provides 

sufficient factual detail that it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citation omitted). “Dismissal is proper when the complaint does not make out a cognizable legal 

theory or does not allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Cervantes v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). However, the court 

need not accept “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences.” Adams v. Johnson, 

355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6), the court is generally confined by the facts contained in the four corners of the 

complaint and must normally convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56 if it 

considers evidence outside the pleadings. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 3 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

2003). Documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference may be considered 

without converting the motion. Id. 

B. Legal Standard for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “First, the plaintiff 

must show a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”’ 

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“Indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with 

medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical 

care.’” Id. (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). “Mere indifference, negligence, or medical 

malpractice” will not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)). A difference of opinion between 

inmate and prison medical personnel—or between medical professionals—regarding appropriate 

medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). To establish that a difference of opinion rises 

to the level of deliberate indifference, plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the 

doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 

F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

C. Defendants Lynch and Gates’ Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants Lynch and Gates move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them for failure to 

state a claim. ECF No. 29. They argue that Plaintiff failed to allege that Warden Lynch had any 

involvement in the review of Plaintiff’s healthcare grievances or that he had any authority to 

overrule the decisions of medical staff. ECF No. 29-1 at 4-5. They contend that Plaintiff has 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 4 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

failed to show that Lynch is an appropriate defendant for purposes of injunctive relief because 

healthcare decision are made solely by healthcare staff and supervisors. Id. With respect to 

Defendant Gates, the Chief of Healthcare Appeals for CDCR, they argue that Plaintiff failed to 

demonstrate that Gates would have been aware of an ongoing constitutional violation based on 

the record before her. Id. at 5-6. 

Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because the allegations in the original 

complaint are sufficient to state claims for relief against Lynch and Gates. ECF No. 34 at 5-10. 

However, he concedes that he does not have a claim for damages against Lynch and instead 

argues that Lynch is named solely for the purpose of obtaining injunctive relief and that he has 

removed the request for damages in the proposed first amended complaint.1

 ECF No. 34 at 5-8. 

He argues that Lynch is an appropriate defendant for injunctive relief because the delay in access 

to his surgery was caused by denials based on budgetary reasons, rather than medical concerns. 

Id. at 8. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that 

a corrections department secretary and prison warden were proper 

defendants in a § 1983 case because “[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive 

relief against the State is not required to allege a named official’s 

personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged 

constitutional violation. Rather, a plaintiff need only identify the law 

or policy challenged as a constitutional violation and name the 

official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive 

relief.” 

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)). To the extent 

Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in the form of medical care, Defendants have cited statutory 

authority showing the warden has no control over medical decisions. ECF No. 29-1 at 4 (citing 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3999.132(a), 3999.200(a), 3999.225(x)(2)). Defendant Lynch’s lack 

1

 Plaintiff requests that the court first rule on his motion to amend because the motions to dismiss 

will be moot if the motion to amend is granted. ECF No. 34 at 10-11; ECF No. 35 at 11. Given 

the substantial similarities between the original and proposed amended complaint, and because it 

is being recommend that the motion to amend be denied as to the proposed amended complaint, 

the motions to dismiss will be addressed first. 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 5 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

of control over medical decisions and the allocation of medical resources shows that Lynch 

cannot “appropriately respond to injunctive relief” requests. Accordingly, Lynch is not a proper 

defendant from whom Plaintiff can obtain the injunctive relief he seeks. 

Plaintiff’s allegation against Gates is that she denied his healthcare grievance at the final 

level of review on November 25, 2019. Even if the court assumes that Plaintiff was suffering 

from delays in treatment up to that point, there are no allegations showing that Gates had any 

involvement in or awareness of Plaintiff’s treatment prior to her review of the grievance. 

Accordingly, she would have had no opportunity to intervene. Without a role in causing the 

alleged constitutional violation, either directly or by failing to intervene in a known and ongoing 

violation, there can be no liability. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Furthermore, as Defendants point out, Gates’ response indicates that by the time Gates 

reviewed Plaintiff’s records, he had been seen on November 8, 2019, and a plan of care had been 

established that included “orthopedic surgeon consultations, magnetic resonance imaging scans, 

and an ankle/foot orthoses, and orthopedic surgeon reevaluation.” ECF No. 1 at 33. This 

demonstrates that when Gates reviewed Plaintiff’s records there was already a plan in place to 

send Plaintiff back to the orthopedic surgeon for a reevaluation, and thus no need to intervene at 

that time. There are no allegations demonstrating that Gates remained involved in Plaintiff’s care 

or was obligated to ensure that plaintiff was in fact seen by the orthopedic surgeon. 

For these reasons, Defendants Lynch and Gates’ motion to dismiss should be granted. 

D. Defendant Bobbala’s Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant Bobbala moves to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to 

state a claim and that he has not alleged proper exhaustion of his administrative remedies. ECF 

No. 30. Dr. Bobbala argues that denying Plaintiff’s grievance, the sole allegation against her, 

cannot rise to the level of deliberate indifference because there are no facts showing that she was 

subjectively aware of any facts which would indicate that Plaintiff was suffering from an issue 

that was objectively serious within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 30 at 5-6. 

Defendant Bobbala also argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 6 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

his grievance was filed too early to properly grieve any of the conduct upon which he bases his 

complaint. Id. at 7. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that he has sufficiently stated a claim for 

relief and that he has sufficiently pled exhaustion. ECF No. 35 at 5-11. 

1. Failure to State a Claim 

Plaintiff’s only allegation against Dr. Bobbala is that she denied his institutional-level 

healthcare grievance on August 23, 2019. As with Gates, there are no allegations showing that 

Bobbala had any involvement or awareness of Plaintiff’s treatment prior to her response to the 

appeal such that she had an opportunity to intervene. Nor are there allegations that she was 

involved or obligated to be involved in his treatment after she responded to the grievance. 

Furthermore, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, at the time Dr. Bobbala responded to his appeal he 

was still within the ninety-day period for trying a brace, and Dr. Bobbala’s response indicates that 

at the time she reviewed Plaintiff’s records he had “a confirmed telemed orthopedic surgery 

specialist referral made on a routine basis.” ECF No. 1 at 29-30. As Dr. Bobbala argues, the 

facts demonstrate what is, at most, a disagreement as to the appropriate timeline for Plaintiff’s 

medical care. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (difference of opinion as to treatment insufficient 

to support deliberate indifference claim). Dr. Harf’s recommendation was that Plaintiff be 

reevaluated for surgery after wearing a brace for ninety days, and there are no facts showing that 

Dr. Bobbala’s refusal to send Plaintiff for surgery before that time had passed and without 

reevaluation by an orthopedic surgeon was medically unacceptable. 

Defendant Bobbala’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should therefore be 

granted. 

2. Failure to Exhaust 

Because plaintiff is a prisoner suing over the conditions of his confinement, his claims are 

subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Under the PLRA, a 

prisoner must fully exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing an action under 

§ 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the 

PLRA, and . . . inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 7 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8 

complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust 

is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” 

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Defendant Bobbala contends that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative 

remedies because his grievance was filed and ruled upon before any affirmative surgical 

recommendation was made by Dr. Harf. As to the alleged delay in having Plaintiff seen by an 

outside specialist from December 2018 to May 2019, Defendant argues that the administrative 

appeal cannot have exhausted the issue because it is alleged in the complaint to have involved 

other issues. As to allegedly unconstitutional care from May 2019 to present, Defendant argues 

that Plaintiff’s appeal cannot have exhausted the issues because it was filed at the beginning of 

that time period. ECF No. 30 at 7. 

Plaintiff’s healthcare appeal is not attached to the complaint, nor is its language recited, so 

non-exhaustion is not apparent from the face of the complaint. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

Without examination of the grievance’s contents, the court cannot properly evaluate the question 

of exhaustion.2 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should be denied to the extent it relies on 

non-exhaustion, but without prejudice to renewal of the issue in a summary judgment motion 

pursuant to Albino, supra. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 

A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Amend 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a plaintiff may amend the complaint once as a 

matter of course within “(A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a 

responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after 

service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 

“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent 

or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Because Plaintiff is outside both windows for 

amending as a matter of right and Defendants have not consented to amendment of the complaint, 

2

 Generally, a grievance suffices to exhaust claims if it alerts the prison to the nature of the 

wrong for which redress is sought. See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 8 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9 

Plaintiff must obtain leave of the court. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to 

amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has construed this 

language broadly, requiring that leave to amend be granted with “extreme liberality.” Morongo 

Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). However, “[a] motion to 

amend should be denied if it is clear the amended pleading would not rectify the failure to state a 

claim.” In re Valley Health Sys., 697 F. App’x 522, 523 (9th Cir. 2017). 

B. Proposed Amended Complaint 

Despite the addition of another defendant and additional claims, the proposed amended 

complaint makes only minimal additions, and substantial portions are identical to the original 

complaint. Compare ECF No. 1 with ECF No. 33-1 at 10-44. With respect to Plaintiff’s 

proposed additions, he seeks to add Arya, a doctor who treated him at the prison, and extend the 

deliberate indifference claims to include his medical needs through the date of his surgery and 

beyond to his post-operative care. ECF No. 33-1 at 13, 20, 24 ¶¶ 9, 31, 41. 

1. Defendant Gates 

In his motion to amend, Plaintiff confirms that the proposed amended complaint does not 

make any additional allegations against Defendant Gates. ECF No. 33 at 14. Accordingly, the 

proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Gates for the same reasons 

discussed above with respect to the original complaint. The proposed amended complaint further 

supports finding that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Gates because it incorporates a 

timeline that shows he was seen by Dr. Harf again on October 4, 2019, at which time Dr. Harf 

noted as follows: 

The individual should have some accommodation for the footwear 

until he is able to use the ankle brace for approximately 3 months. 

At that time, I would like to see him for a face-to-face consultation 

. . . If he is not having any improvement at all, then debridement and 

stabilization of the peroneus brevis will need to be considered. 

ECF No. 33-1 at 43 (alteration in original). Therefore, at the time Plaintiff’s records were 

reviewed by Gates, it was still Dr. Harf’s recommendation that Plaintiff wear an ankle brace for a 

three-month period before being considered for surgery. 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 9 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10 

2. Defendant Lynch 

With respect to Defendant Lynch, Plaintiff clarifies that he is not seeking compensatory 

damages against Lynch, but only injunctive relief.3 Id. at 12, ¶ 8. However, the request for 

injunctive relief appears to be moot as the proposed amended complaint states that Plaintiff has 

received his surgery, id. at 24, ¶ 40, but does not amend the request for injunctive relief, id. at 28, 

¶ 56. To the extent Plaintiff seeks additional injunctive relief related to his medical care at the 

prison, as he indicated during oral argument, he fails to demonstrate that Lynch has the authority 

to provide the injunctive relief requested. Under California law, he does not. 

3. Defendant Bobbala and Proposed Defendant Arya 

As to Defendant Bobbala, Plaintiff adds allegations that she 

was directly and personally involved in Plaintiff’s treatment through 

the relevant period of time. Her name is all over Plaintiff’s medical 

records as the person directly involved with the treatment of 

Plaintiff’s foot/ankle. She also directly handled many orders for 

treatment that was not appropriate. She signed as having reviewed 

at least many of the Inmate Grievance forms submitted by Plaintiff. 

Id. at 12, ¶ 6. Plaintiff also seeks to add Arya, who was allegedly involved in the delay of his 

treatment and surgery and did not provide him with the appropriate orthopedic equipment such as 

a wheelchair or brace. Id. at 13, ¶ 9. However, as addressed below, Plaintiff fails to identify any 

specific instances of either individual’s conduct beyond Bobbala’s response to his grievance, 

which is insufficient to support a claim for the reasons previously explained. 

Though Plaintiff presents notations from his medical records in an apparent attempt to 

identify conduct by Bobbala and Arya, the excerpts fail to support a claim for deliberate 

indifference against either. Most of the notations fail to identify who made them or when they 

were made. Those notations that do include dates and Bobbala and Arya’s names are orders for 

evaluation to address Plaintiff’s inability to use his brace; they indicate that after surgery was 

recommended in January 2020, it “was delayed due to COVID-19 restrictions in movement and 

cancellation of elective surgeries.” Id. at 20-22, ¶ 31. The timeline of events Plaintiff provides 

3

 The court notes that the proposed amended complaint still states that Lynch is sued in his 

individual and personal capacity. ECF No. 33-1 at 15, ¶ 18. 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 10 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11 

also does not indicate what conduct each individual was responsible for, other than Bobbala’s 

denial of his grievance. Id. at 42-44. 

Plaintiff further alleges that based on Dr. Harf’s initial orders he should have had surgery 

if wearing a brace for ninety-days did not fix his ankle injury, that he did not get the surgery after 

ninety days, and that Bobbala and Arya were “[t]he people making the decision on that.” Id. at 

24, ¶ 39. He asserts that neither Bobbala nor Arya could have overridden Dr. Harf’s medical 

judgment because Dr. Harf was a specialist and they did not have any such specialists employed 

at the prison. Id. at 23, ¶ 36. However, the quoted language of Dr. Harf’s original 

recommendation states that Plaintiff should be re-evaluated and that surgical intervention would 

be “[d]epending upon his improvement.” Id. at 16, ¶ 23. After re-evaluating Plaintiff in October, 

Dr. Harf once again recommended three months with a brace and then consideration of surgery if 

there was still no improvement. Id. at 43. Therefore, there is no indication that the failure to 

provide Plaintiff with surgery after the original ninety-day period constituted deliberate 

indifference. 

Finally, though Plaintiff states that Defendants failed to implement Dr. Harf’s postsurgical orders, the only specific failure Plaintiff identifies is a failure to provide physical therapy. 

However, Plaintiff also alleges that he was scheduled for physical therapy but did not receive it 

because he was either not taken or, on the three occasions he did go, it was interfered with by 

correctional staff. Id. at 25-26, ¶¶ 44-47. It is therefore unclear how either Bobbala or Arya 

failed to provide Plaintiff with post-surgical care. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to allege the necessary personal involvement by 

either Arya or Bobbala, though he could potentially fix the identified deficiencies through further 

amendment. 

C. Conclusion 

The motion to amend should be denied as to the proposed first amended complaint. 

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the motions to dismiss should be granted and the motion 

to amend should be denied with respect to the proposed first amended complaint. Because it does 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 11 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12 

not appear that Plaintiff has any further allegations against Defendant Gates and he has failed to 

show that Defendant Lynch is an appropriate individual to provide the injunctive relief he seeks, 

the claims against them should be dismissed without leave to amend. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 

1041 (“district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would 

fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”). However, Plaintiff 

should be allowed leave to file a first amended complaint to name a proper defendant for 

injunctive relief and further amend his claims against Bobbala and Arya. 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he must allege facts showing how each named 

defendant is involved. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (the complaint must contain sufficient “factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged” (citation omitted)). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless 

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed 

deprivation. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants Lynch and Gates’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 29, be GRANTED. 

2. The claims against Defendants Lynch and Gates be DISMISSED without leave to 

amend. 

3. Defendant Bobbala’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 30, be GRANTED on the ground 

that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief and DENIED without prejudice on the ground 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

4. Plaintiff’s motion to amend, ECF No. 33, be DENIED as to the proposed first 

amended complaint. 

5. In the event these findings and recommendations are adopted, Plaintiff be GRANTED 

thirty days to file an amended complaint. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 12 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: September 22, 2021 

Case 2:20-cv-00632-DC-AC Document 43 Filed 09/23/21 Page 13 of 13