Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01125/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joyce Brown, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-01125-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the Administrative Law 

Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Plaintiff’s Title II application for disability benefits. 

 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On February 20, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits, 

asserting she had been disabled since September 1, 2008. (TR 112). Plaintiff’s 

application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (TR 72, 77-78). On November 

16, 2009, Plaintiff requested a hearing. (TR 81). On December 21, 2010, a hearing was 

held before an ALJ. (TR 39-66). On February 15, 2011, the ALJ issued an unfavorable 

decision. (TR 12-20). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

hearing decision on April 26, 2012. (TR 1-3). 

 On May 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Complaint for Judicial Review of the 

Administrative Determination of Claim, which is the subject of this appeal. (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the Administrative Law Decision because: 

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(1) the ALJ did not properly consider the medical evidence and opinions when 

determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) and substantial evidence 

does not support the ALJ’s RFC assessment; (2) the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints; and (3) the ALJ did not provide substantial evidence to support his 

finding that Plaintiff can perform her past work as a rental car driver and courier. 

 II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is more 

than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 

720 (9th Cir. 1998). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the 

administrative law judge’s conclusions and the evidence that detracts from the 

administrative law judge’s conclusions. Id. If there is sufficient evidence to support the 

Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination for that 

of the ALJ. Id. Additionally, the administrative law judge is responsible for resolving 

conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record 

before this Court, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, this Court 

must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g).

 A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show, among other things, that he is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The 

Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

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which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is 

“under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such 

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his 

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 

which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

 B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721 

(describing the sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the 

sequential process will end the ALJ’s inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant 

bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the ALJ at the 

final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 The five steps are as follows: 

 1. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether 

the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the 

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(c). Basic work activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either be expected “to result in 

death” or “to last for a continuous period of twelve months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 

(incorporated by reference in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a 

de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 3. Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments specifically listed in the 

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regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without 

considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. at § 

404.1520(d). 

 4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the 

claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To 

make this determination, the ALJ compares the “residual functional capacity assessment . 

. . with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work the claimant 

previously did, the claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final 

step. 

 5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an 

adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, together with vocational factors (age, education, and work 

experience). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to 

other work, then he is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, he will be 

found disabled. As previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can 

perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 

F.3d at 721. 

 III. ANALYSIS 

 In this case, the ALJ found, at each step respectively, that Plaintiff: (1) had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2008; (2) had the following 

severe impairments considered in combination: fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, multi-level 

degenerative disc disease, cervicalgia, depression, an anxiety disorder, and dependent 

personality disorder; (3) does not have an impairment, individually or in combination, 

that meets or medically equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations; (4) had 

the RFC to perform the exertional requirements of light work (with restrictions of light 

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and was further limited by no crouching, 

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stooping, kneeling, crawling, bending, and climbing; (5) is able to perform the mental 

demands of semi-skilled work; (6) is capable of performing her past relevant work as a 

courier and a rental car driver. As a result of this analysis, the ALJ found that that 

Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. 

 As noted above, Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the Administrative 

Law Decision because: (1) the ALJ did not properly consider the medical evidence and 

opinions when determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) and 

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC assessment; (2) the ALJ erred in 

rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; and (3) the ALJ did not provide substantial 

evidence to support his finding that Plaintiff can perform her past work as a rental car 

driver and courier. 

 The ALJ determines RFC based upon medical records, physicians’ opinions, and 

the claimant’s description of her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a)(3). 

Plaintiff argues that the RFC the ALJ determined is not supported by substantial evidence 

because the ALJ: (1) improperly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; (2) improperly 

rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Bennett; and (3) failed to accept 

or reject the opinions of state agency doctors and a consulting examiner. (Doc. 14 at 24). 

 A. Whether the ALJ erred in Rejecting Plaintiff’s Subjective 

 Complaints 

 Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment that is 

reasonably likely to be the cause of some pain, the ALJ “‘may not discredit a claimant’s 

testimony of pain and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged 

by the claimant is not supported by objective medical evidence.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 

F.3d 748, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 

(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). The ALJ must make specific findings based on the record for 

discounting a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Savage v. Astrue, No. CV-11-2103-

PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 551461, at *7 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2013). Once that evidence is 

produced, the adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely 

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on a lack of objective medical evidence fully corroborating the alleged severity of the 

pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 941, 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Cotton, 799 F.2d 

at 1407). The claimant does not have to produce objective medical evidence of the 

subjective symptoms, their severity, or their causal relationship to the medicallydeterminable impairment. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345, 347-

48). 

 In this case, the ALJ found there was medical evidence of underlying impairments 

that would be reasonably likely to cause pain, but found that Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints were not fully credible. (TR at 18). The question then is whether the ALJ 

discredited Plaintiff’s testimony of pain solely because such pain was not supported by 

objective medical evidence. 

In evaluating the credibility of subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider the 

claimant’s work record, observations by treating and examining physicians about the 

nature, onset, duration, and frequency of symptoms; triggering and aggravating factors, 

and functional restrictions and symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The ALJ also may 

consider the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness, any of her prior 

inconsistent or less than candid statements, any of her unexplained or inadequately 

explained failure to seek or follow a course of treatment, and her daily activities. Id. 

“[I]f the claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be 

transferred to the workplace, an adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon 

making specific findings relating to the claimant’s daily activities.” Id. (citing Fair, 885 

F.2d at 603). 

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ ignored her testimony that she performs daily activities on 

good days only. (Doc. 14 at 22; TR 56-57). She contends a claimant does not have to be 

bedridden in order to qualify for benefits. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ ignored 

her testimony that her ability to work is limited by work absences. (Doc. 14 at 22). 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ cites to no evidence that work activity, which she says is less 

than substantial gainful activity proves her ability to work more. (Id.). Plaintiff also 

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argues that working to the best of her ability, together with her excellent work record, 

speaks to her credibility. (Id.). Finally, she argues the Defendant’s statement that 

Plaintiff’s work activity shows she is not disabled conflicts with the Social Security 

Regulations, which encourage a disabled person to work. (Doc. 18 at 7-8). 

 However, the ALJ provided specific findings supported by the record to show 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about her daily activities are not fully credible. (TR 18). 

The ALJ pointed to evidence in the record that Plaintiff is able, despite her impairments, 

to engage in numerous daily activities including: laundry, dishes, light housekeeping, 

shopping, driving, attending church, and caring for her husband and cat. (Id.). Further, 

the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s husband’s Third Party Function Report dated March 3, 

2009. (TR 18, 165). The ALJ found Mr. Brown provided little support for his wife’s 

alleged disability by reporting her able to perform most activities of daily living. (Id.). 

The ALJ noted also noted that Plaintiff was working during much of the adjudicatory 

period, at a level surpassing or closely approaching the presumptive monthly level for 

substantial gainful activity, and that this work level attested to her physical and mental 

impairments being not as severe as alleged. (TR 14, 18). 

 Based on the foregoing, the ALJ made specific findings based on the record for 

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

 B. Whether the ALJ Erred in Rejecting the Opinions of Dr. 

 Bennett 

 “The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical record.” Carmickle 

v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). Such conflicts may 

arise between a treating physician’s medical opinion and other evidence in the claimant’s 

record. A treating physician’s opinion is usually entitled to “substantial weight.” Bray v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A treating physician’s opinion is given 

controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically accepted clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial 

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evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). On the other 

hand, if a treating physician’s opinion “is not well-supported” or “is inconsistent with 

other substantial evidence in the record,” then it should not be given controlling weight. 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Substantial evidence that contradicts a treating physician’s opinion may consist of 

either (1) an examining physician’s opinion or (2) a nonexamining physician’s opinion 

combined with other evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). In 

the case of an examining physician, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same 

clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the 

conclusions of the examining physician are not substantial evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 

632 (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1984)). To constitute 

substantial evidence, the examining physician must provide “independent clinical 

findings that differ from the findings of the treating physician.” Id. (citing Miller v. 

Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985)). Independent clinical findings can be either 

“diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are supported by 

substantial evidence, . . . or findings based on objective medical tests that the treating 

physician has not herself considered.” Id. (citing Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 

(9th Cir. 1984); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

 “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Such an opinion is only substantial evidence 

if supported by “substantial record evidence.” Id.

 If the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with 

substantial evidence and is not to be given controlling weight, the opinion remains 

entitled to deference and should be weighed according to the factors provided in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; SSR 96–2p at 4. These factors include: (1) 

the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which the opinion is supported 

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by relevant medical evidence; (4) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; 

and (5) whether the physician is a specialist giving an opinion within his specialty. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 

 If a treating physician’s opinion is not sufficiently supported by medical evidence 

and other substantial evidence in the case, however, the ALJ need not give the opinion 

controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. Furthermore, if the treating doctor’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may reject the treating doctor’s opinion by 

giving specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. Id. at 632. Inconsistencies and 

ambiguities within the treating physicians’ own opinion create such “specific and 

legitimate” reasons for rejecting the opinion. Matney on behalf of Matney v. Sullivan, 

981 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992). 

 Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bennett’s opinions on the “ultimate 

issue of disability,” regarding (1) her physical ability to function; and (2) her mental 

ability to function. 

 The ALJ specifically rejected Dr. Bennett’s opinion about Plaintiff’s physical 

ability to function. (TR 18). Regarding physical ability to function, Dr. Bennett’s 

opinion is that Plaintiff has significant impairments. (TR 372-77). Dr. Bennett found 

that Plaintiff: is likely to have good and bad days, could occasionally lift up to twenty 

pounds, requires five to ten minutes of rest every forty-five minutes, needs to shift 

positions, must walk five minutes every forty-five minutes, can sit forty-five minutes, can 

stand thirty minutes, can sit a total of about four hours out of eight hours, can stand/walk 

a total of about two hours out of eight hours, is incapable of even a low stress job, takes 

medications that will frequently interfere with her attention and concentration (Klonopin 

and Cymbalta), has pain that will frequently interfere with her attention and 

concentration, and would miss work more than four days per month due to her 

impairments. (Id.). 

 A state agency medical consultant contradicted Dr. Bennett’s opinion. On May 

29, 2009, Jonathan Nordlicht, M.D., assessed Plaintiff’s physical ability to function. (TR 

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339-44). Dr. Nordlicht found Plaintiff able to frequently lift/carry ten pounds, 

occasionally carry twenty pounds, stand/walk at least two hours in an eight hour work 

day, and sit for six hours in a work day. (TR 340). Dr. Nordlicht found no limitation in 

any other area, and found Plaintiff’s allegations about her physical ability to function 

only partially credible. (TR 341-44). On September 15, 2009, another provider reviewed 

and affirmed Dr. Nordlicht’s opinion. (TR 348). The ALJ noted he gave these opinions 

weight to the extent they were consistent with the medical evidence and findings in the 

record. (TR 19). 

 The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s 

contradicted opinion. (TR 19). First, while Dr. Bennett’s RFC assessment1

 limits 

Plaintiff to less than sedentary work, the ALJ found Dr. Bennett’s notes (in exhibits 5F, 

13F and l5F) 2 in conflict with such severe functional limitations. (TR 19). Second, the 

ALJ stated that the record showed that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia pain has generally been 

well controlled by medication. (TR 19). Third, the ALJ noted that, on September 17, 

2009, Plaintiff rated her pain level at 4/10 (in exhibit 13F/12). (TR 19). Finally, the ALJ 

provided the reason that, on May 20, 2010, Dr. Bennett described the claimant's 

fibromyalgia course as “decreasing,” with pain that is “moderate,” and Plaintiff rated her 

pain level at 5/10 (in exhibit l5F/1). (TR 19). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “cherrypick[ed]” record notations to support his 

desired RFC finding. (Id. at 17). In applying the substantial evidence test, the Court is 

required “to look at the record as a whole and not merely at the evidence tending to 

support a finding.” Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation 

omitted). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “cherrypicked” because he cited treatment notes 

written when Plaintiff was doing well, but failed to address the entirety of Dr. Bennett’s 

 1

 Dr. Bennett completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Form on August 

27, 2010. (TR 372-77). 

2

 These exhibits referenced by the ALJ refer to Dr. Bennett’s office treatment 

records of January 12, 2009, September 9-17 2009, and February 18-May 20, 2010. (TR 

312-14, 349-62, 364-71). 

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notes that show something different. (Doc. 14 at 16). Specifically, Plaintiff refers to Dr. 

Bennett’s records of: September 17, 2009, when her pain level was 4/10, but also 

showing fatigue at 8/10, and one to two hours morning stiffness, neck stiffness, 

weakness, depression, and anxiety (TR 360), and May 20, 2010 showing decreasing 

fibromyalgia and moderate pain, but also showing sleep issues, fatigue at 8/10, flat affect, 

18/18 positive tender points, and Plaintiff’s report of good and bad days (TR 364-66). 

(Id. at 16). Plaintiff also cites to Dr. Bennett’s notes showing: increasing fibromyalgia 

(severe, aching all over; constant low back pain aggravated by exertion and relieved by 

rest; leg pain worse with walking; numbness progressing with walking; and balance 

issues), fatigue 8/10, headaches, neck pain and stiffness, weakness, depression, anxiety, 

and good and bad days (Id. at 16; Doc. 18 at 5; TR 312, 353-55, 360, 364-71). 

 In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Bennett’s 

opinion for several reasons. (Doc. 17 at 11). First, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s pain 

rating of 5/10 should be accorded weight because consistent medical signs are to be given 

such weight. (Id.). Second, Defendant argues a physician’s opinion can be discounted 

when it is inconsistent with other notes from that physician. (Id.). Third, Defendant 

argues the ALJ can discount a treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the 

claimant’s activity level and Plaintiff admits to working twenty to thirty hours per week 

as a rental car driver, doing housework and laundry, preparing meals, caring for pets, 

visiting with friends, playing games, using a computer, going for walks, shopping, and 

going swimming. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to give weight to objective information 

in Dr. Bennett’s records. First, she contends that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to 

Dr. Bennett’s status as Plaintiff’s treating physician for many years, and status as a board 

certified rheumatology specialist. (Doc. 18 at 4-5). Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ 

failed to consider objective tests Dr. Bennett relied upon including 18/18 positive tender 

points on repeated examinations and diagnostic studies. (Doc. 14 at 16-17). The 

diagnostic studies included: lumbar back x-rays in October 2008 showing osteopenia, 

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moderate degenerative disk disease, facet joint arthrosis, and minimal narrowing of the 

left hip joint space (TR 310); lumbar MRI in January 2009 showing multi-level mild-tomarked degenerative changes and disc desiccation (with flattened undersurface of the 

left-sided nerve roots and mild-to-moderate bilateral stenosis) (TR 361); and cervical 

neck x-ray in January 2009 showing moderate-to-severe spondylosis, and osteophytes 

(TR 362). (Doc. 14 at 5, 16-17; Doc. 18 at 2, 5). 

 The ALJ’s specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s opinion are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. While the notations that Plaintiff was 

doing well are less than the number of notations of abnormal findings, most of the 

abnormal findings are based on subjective reports. Pain level, fatigue, morning stiffness, 

neck stiffness, weakness, depression, sleep issues, anxiety, level of fibromyalgia 

symptoms, positive tender points, and good and bad days all depend upon subjective 

reports from Plaintiff. As discussed above, the ALJ provided specific findings based on 

the record for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the overwhelming weight 

of the record depends upon those subjective complaints. As such, the ALJ’s specific and 

legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s opinion about Plaintiff’s physical ability to 

function are supported by substantial evidence from the record. Thus, the ALJ provided 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record regarding 

Plaintiff’s physical ability to function. The ALJ further pointed out that Plaintiff worked 

during much of the adjudicatory period at a level surpassing or closely approaching the 

presumptive monthly level for substantial gainful activity, and that this work attests to her 

physical and mental impairments being not as severe as alleged. (TR 14, 18). 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Bennett’s opinion about Plaintiff’s 

physical ability to function. 

 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Bennett’s opinion about Plaintiff’s mental ability to 

function. (TR 18). Dr. Bennett found significant limitations to Plaintiff mental ability to 

function.3

 Dr. Bennett found Plaintiff has: good to fair abilities in eighteen work-related 

 3

 Dr. Bennett completed the Mental Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related 

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areas of mental functioning; reduced cognition and stress increases due to pain from 

fibromyalgia; depression leading to poor attention span and decreased social interaction; 

and fatigue that may be overwhelming or preclude attention span and social interaction. 

(TR 378-79). 

 Two mental health providers contradicted Dr. Bennett’s opinion. Michael Rabara, 

Psy.D., a clinical psychologist and consulting disability examiner, and Patrice Solomon, 

Ph.D., the state agency’s psychological consultant, examined Plaintiff and concluded she 

is not significantly limited in any significant area of mental activity. (TR 19, 325-38, 

315-21). Dr. Rabara found Plaintiff has: goal-directed and logical thinking; fair mood 

and appropriate affect; and no unusual perceptual disturbances. (TR 317). Dr. Rabara 

found Plaintiff fully oriented and able to recite two current events, with memory, 

concentration, and ability to do simple calculations intact. (TR 317). Dr. Rabara 

estimated Plaintiff to be of average intelligence, with fair attention span and short-term 

memory. (TR 318). Dr. Rabara found no work-related restrictions or limitations in 

Plaintiff’s mental ability to function and noted this was especially true because Plaintiff 

reported that staying active helped her. (TR 319). 

 Dr. Solomon also contradicted Dr. Bennett. Dr. Solomon found Plaintiff has only 

mild restrictions in her activities of daily living; no social function difficulty; and 

moderate concentration, persistence and pace. (TR 333). Dr. Solomon concluded 

Plaintiff—despite having affective and anxiety-related disorders with co-existing nonmental impairment—provides credible allegations, but not at the severity that would 

preclude adaptation to the employment setting. (TR 335). Dr. Solomon completed a 

Mental RFC form and found no significant limitations in any category. (TR 336-38). Dr. 

Solomon found Plaintiff: capable of understanding and performing simple and detailed 

tasks; capable of adequate concentration, persistence, and pace for the work week; 

unimpaired in social skills; and able to adapt to the work environment despite mild 

anxiety and depression. (TR 336-38). 

 

Activities Form on August 27, 2010. (TR 378-80). 

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 The Court must evaluate whether the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s contradicted 

opinion about Plaintiff’s mental ability to function. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

 The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s 

opinion, namely: (1) Dr. Bennett is not a mental health professional (he is a 

rheumatologist). (TR 18); (2) Dr. Bennett’s opinion is unsupported by the great weight 

of the evidence in the record on and after September 1, 2008 (Plaintiff’s reported date of 

onset of disability). (TR 18-19); and (3) both Dr. Rabara and Dr. Solomon concluded 

Plaintiff “is not significantly limited in any significant area of mental activity.” (TR 19). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s opinions are not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff argues that her treating 

physician’s opinion about her mental abilities constitutes competent psychiatric 

evidence—even though Dr. Bennett is not a psychiatrist—because his conclusions are 

based on clinical observations. In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to Dr. 

Bennett’s treatment of her depression by prescribing and monitoring anti-depressants. 

(Doc. 14 at 17). Plaintiff further argues that Dr. Bennett’s opinion includes mental 

limitations due not only to depression and anxiety, but also to fibromyalgia, which causes 

decreased cognition, stress, and fatigue. (Doc. 18 at 3-4). Plaintiff concludes that, as a 

board certified rheumatologist, Dr. Bennett evaluated Plaintiff’s mental ability to function 

as part of the whole of her condition, instead of in the isolation of depression and anxiety. 

(Id.). Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to address Dr. Bennett’s examination notes 

showing depressive symptoms. (Doc. 18 at 2-3). 

 In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ considered Dr. Bennett’s mental 

assessment and properly decided not to accord it controlling weight. (Doc. 17 at 9 

(relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5))). Defendant argues that the ALJ properly 

discounted Dr. Bennett’s opinion because the ALJ can consider Dr. Bennett’s specialty as 

his opinion is inconsistent with other objective medical evidence in the record as a whole, 

and because it is inconsistent with the opinion of Dr. Rabara, a mental health specialist. 

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(Id. (relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4); and Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th 

Cir. 2007)). Finally, Defendant argues Dr. Bennett’s opinion is inconsistent with his own 

examination findings. (Doc. 17 at 10). Defendant points to Dr. Bennett’s note in 

September 2008 in which he observed normal mental status despite Plaintiff’s somewhat 

flat affect. (Id.) Next, in February and May 2010, Dr. Bennett again observed a normal 

mental status and found Plaintiff fully alert and oriented, with no impairment of recent or 

remote memory. (Id.). Finally, Dr. Bennett never recommended any more aggressive 

treatment for disabling mental problems; rather, he merely continued to refill Plaintiff’s 

prescriptions for Cymbalta. (Id.). 

 These findings in the record, and noted by the Defendant, provide substantial 

evidence in support of the specific and legitimate reasons given by the ALJ for rejecting 

Dr. Bennett’s opinion. 

 C. Whether the ALJ Properly Found that Plaintiff can Perform her 

 Past Relevant Work as a Rental Car Driver and Courier. 

 The ALJ found Plaintiff able to perform full-time light work because: a) she is 

able to meet the mental demands of semi-skilled work; and b) she is able to meet the 

physical demands of light work with restrictions based upon the definition of light work 

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), and with the further limitations of no crouching, stooping, 

kneeling, crawling, bending, and climbing. ((Doc. 14 at 14, 23; TR 17). 

 Plaintiff asserts she is unable to perform full-time work. (Doc. 14 at 23). She 

relies for this assertion upon Dr. Bennett’s opinions that she would not be able to work 

full time and upon the vocational expert’s answers to hypothetical questions at the 

hearing. (Doc. 14 at 23). At the hearing, and at the suggestion of the ALJ, Plaintiff’s 

attorney asked the vocational expert hypothetically: if Dr. Bennett’s opinion is accepted 

as true, would Plaintiff be able to perform work activity? (Tr. 64-65). The expert 

answered the question twice, once regarding Dr. Bennett’s opinion about Plaintiff’s 

physical ability to function and once regarding Dr. Bennett’s opinion about Plaintiff’s 

mental ability to function. (Id.). The vocational expert answered to both hypotheticals 

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that, if Dr. Bennett’s opinion is accepted as true, Plaintiff is unable to work. (Id.). Thus, 

the vocational expert’s opinion that Plaintiff is unable to work depends entirely on Dr. 

Bennett’s opinions about Plaintiff’s physical ability to function and mental ability to 

function. As discussed above, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Bennett’s opinions about 

those two areas of Plaintiff’s ability to function. Thus, Plaintiff’s arguments that she 

cannot work full time, based on Dr. Bennett’s opinions and the vocational expert’s 

testimony, both fail. 

The ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff has the RFC to return to her former work 

as a courier and as a rental car driver. (TR at 18-20). Plaintiff objects to this finding 

because (1) the ALJ said at the hearing he would consider Plaintiff’s work as a courier as 

a work attempt rather than past relevant work, and (2) her ability to perform past relevant 

work as a courier and as a rental car driver is not supported by the record. (Doc. 14 at 

23). 

 Plaintiff argues that, at the hearing, the ALJ said he would consider Plaintiff’s past 

jobs as file clerk, courier, and store greeter to be work attempts; and would consider only 

her work as a credit union teller and rental car driver as past relevant work. (Doc. 14 at 

12; Tr. 61-62). Plaintiff maintains that, as a result of this statement, she did not further 

address her inability to work as a courier. (Doc. 14 at 23). Nonetheless, at step four, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff capable of past relevant work as a courier and as a rental car driver, 

and found these jobs do not require work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff’s RFC. 

(TR at 19). Plaintiff contends that, by changing his mind after the hearing and without 

notice regarding whether courier was past relevant work, the ALJ deprived her of the 

opportunity to show why she could no longer perform courier work, and prejudiced her 

ability to show her disability. (Doc. 14 at 23). 

 Defendant responds this was a harmless error because the ALJ also found that 

Plaintiff could perform past relevant work as a rental car driver, which everyone agrees is 

properly considered past relevant work for Plaintiff. (Doc. 17 at 16; TR 61). 

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 The Court agrees that the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a 

courier is harmless error because the ALJ also found that Plaintiff could perform past 

relevant work as a rental car driver. The ALJ found Plaintiff able to perform past 

relevant work as a rental car driver. The ALJ’s additional inclusion of past relevant work 

as a courier in his opinion does not alter that finding. 

 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can perform past relevant 

work as a courier and as a rental car driver is not supported by the record. (Doc. 14 at 23-

24). Plaintiff notes the vocational expert’s testimony at the hearing that Plaintiff’s past 

relevant work included: teller, light and skilled; file clerk, light and semi-skilled; car 

rental driver, light and semi-skilled; and courier, light and unskilled. (Doc. 14 at 11; TR 

60-61). In answering hypothetical questions, Ms. Richter testified that, if limited to light 

work with postural restrictions, Plaintiff could do the rental car driving job. (Doc. 14 at 

11; TR 62). The ALJ found that the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with 

information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (TR 19). As noted 

above, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Bennett’s opinions and Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints that she cannot do light and semi-skilled work. (TR 17). The rental car driver 

job is consistent with the ALJ’s determined RFC that Plaintiff can perform light and 

semi-skilled work. (TR 19). Thus, there is support in the record for the ALJ’s 

determination that Plaintiff can perform the job of rental car driver.

 IV. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff is not disabled within the 

meaning the Social Security Act. 

/// 

// 

/ 

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 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is 

AFFIRMED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. The judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. 

 Dated this 29th day of July, 2013. 

 

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