Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00527/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00527-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FREDDIE CRUZ, )

) CV 07-00527-PHX-DGC [CRP]

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) 

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

IVIAN BARTOUS, Warden, )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

)

Respondents. )

________________________________ )

Freddie Cruz, presently an inmate in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence,

Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody

Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereafter “Petition”). (Doc 1). Two grounds are asserted:

a Blakely violation for not having a jury determine aggravating factors and a due process

violation for not severing into separate trials the two incidents that went to a jury trial. The

State opposes the Petition. (Doc 11).

The Court finds that a least one aggravating factor was determined by the jury at trial

and therefore the Blakely claim fails. This Court also finds that Cruz did not present the

severance argument as a federal claim to the state courts, and he is now barred from doing

so. Therefore, the Court recommends that District Judge Campbell enter an order denying

relief on the Petition.

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1

Cruz was actually charged in the indictment with several counts related to an armed

home invasion and robbery on May 15, 2002, and assaulting an officer trying to arrest him

on June 8, 2002. These counts were severed from the thirteen counts involving the car

jackings and sexual assaults, and ultimately resulted in a plea bargain. (Doc 11-1, Exhibit

A, p 14). Cruz did not appeal in state court anything other than Counts 1-5 and 8-15. 

2

 In this Report and Recommendation the page numbers are cited as they appear on

the Court’s CM/ECF electronic records system.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The case Cruz seeks relief from arose from two violent car jackings and sexual

assaults in the Phoenix Metropolitan area on May 13, 2002, and June 8, 2002.1

 In both cases,

Cruz forced the female victim at gunpoint to drive him to a remote location where he

repeatedly raped each woman. In each case, a child or children were present. In addition to

the violent and depraved sexual assaults in the presence of the children, Cruz threatened to

shoot the children in the head. A detailed description of the facts of these two incidents

appears in the State’s Answer and the Arizona Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision

(Doc 11; Doc 11-6, Exhibit N p 942

). 

Cruz was ultimately charged in a 21 count indictment. Only Counts 1-5 and 8-15 are

relevant to the determination of the Petition. Counts 1-5 involved the June 8, 2002 incident

and included:

Count One - Aggravated Assault 

Count Two - Kidnapping

Count Three - Sexual Assault

Count Four - Sexual Assault

Count Five - Armed Robbery

(Doc 11-1, Exhibit A, pp 14-22). Counts 8-15 involved the May 13, 2002 incident and

charged Cruz with:

Count Eight - Aggravated Assault

Count Nine - Armed Robbery

Count Ten - Kidnapping

Count Eleven - Sexual Assault

Count Twelve - Sexual Assault

Count Thirteen - Second Degree Burglary

Count Fourteen - Kidnapping

Count Fifteen - Endangering of the Victim’s Baby Daughter

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 The counts were amended for trial so that the thirteen counts involving the car

jackings and sexual assaults were consecutively numbered Counts 1-13. After trial, the State

of Arizona filed an Amended Indictment to conform with the re-numbering. Counts 1-5

pertained to the June 8, 2002 incident and Counts 6-13 pertained to the May 13, 2002

incident. (Doc 11-2, Exhibit A, pp 4, 6-14).

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Id.

Cruz moved to sever the twenty-one (21) counts into three separate trials. The trial

court granted the motion in part by separating the counts related to the armed home invasion

and assault on an officer but he denied the motion for the counts involving the two separate

car jackings and sexual assaults. He determined these counts (1-5 and 8-15) were properly

joined. (Doc 11-2, Exhibit B, Minute Entries (“M.E.”) p 41). 

The State presented Counts 1-5 and 8-15 in a jury trial and Cruz was convicted on all

13 counts.3

 (Doc 11-2, Exhibit B, M.E. pp 61-65). In Counts One and Six, charging Cruz

with aggravated assault, the indictment specifically alleged the assault was committed with

a “silver BB handgun, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” (Doc 11-1, Exhibit A, pp

14-22; Doc 11-2, Exhibit A, pp 7, 9). In twelve of the thirteen couunts, the indictment

asserted that each offense was a dangerous felony because the offense involved the use of

the silver BB handgun “and/or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury

upon” the victim. Id. The jury unanimously found that each of those twelve counts was a

dangerous felony. (Doc 11-1, Exhibit A, pp 160-172). Subsequently, in the course of

entering a plea agreement to resolve the remaining nine counts in the indictment, the

Government agreed to dismiss the designation of the offense as a dangerous felony in all

thirteen counts. (Doc 11-2, Exhibit A, pp 2-3). This does not negate the fact that a jury did

determine dangerousness on all counts based on the use of the BB gun. 

At sentencing, the judge imposed presumptive terms as to all except five counts. (Doc

11-2, Exhibit B, pp 73-78). Aggravated terms of 22 years each were imposed on each of the

four sexual assault charges. Id. By statute, the sentences for the sexual assault charges had

to run consecutive to each other. That is how the cumulative 88 year sentence was

determined.

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An aggravated term of twenty years was imposed on Count Twelve, kidnapping,

which involved restraining the victim with wires from her headphones after she was

assaulted. Id. In determining that an aggravated sentence should be imposed, the Court

noted:

The aggravated factor in that case was the purely gratuitous

nature of that offense. The defendant had driven her back and

then re-victimized her.

(Doc 11-5, Exhibit J p 80, ll. 8-10). The sentence in Count Twelve runs concurrent with

Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 13. Because Count Twelve runs concurrent with the 22 year term

imposed in Count 9, it will not impact defendant’s length of confinement.

Regarding aggravated and mitigating factors, the Court said generally as follows:

The fact he was on parole status at the time of the offense, the

emotional trauma to the victims, the cruelty and depravity of

coercing compliance for sex by threatening the lives of the

victims’ children and child who were present in the zone of

immediate physical danger...[also] [w]hether the gun was

operational or not, the victims believed that they were

operational, and they were compliant to save themselves and to

save their children. ...During the acts themselves, the cruelty and

heinous nature of reasonably forcing the victims to drive with

the defendant and their child and children to a remote location,

not knowing whether they or their children would be harmed

physically or ever returned. That said, the Court does note and

acknowledged that in each instance, the defendant did drive the

victims back to civilization and no physical harm was done to

any of the children. The Court also notes the defendant’s age

and his family background.

(Doc 11-5, Exhibit J p 77). As to Count Three, sexual assault, the court specifically said:

The aggravated factor being the defendant taking the victim and

her children to a remote location, requiring compliance by

threatening the lives of the child — in Ms. Romero’s case, the

children.

(Doc 11-5, Exhibit J p 78, ll. 6-9). As to Counts 4, 9, and 10, the court stated the aggravated

sentence was “for the same aggravated factors, balancing the mitigating factors previously

found.” (Doc 11-5, Exhibit J p 78-79).

B. STATEMENT OF CASE

Cruz filed a timely notice of appeal. On direct appeal, Cruz raised one issue: that the

failure to grant the motion to sever was error. (Doc 11-2, Exhibit A p 27; Doc 11-5, Exhibit

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K p 91). On June 29, 2004, in a memorandum decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed the conviction. (Doc 11-6, Exhibit N pp 94-122). The appellate court ruled that the

evidence of each of the two incidents was cross-admissible against the other under Arizona

Rule of Evidence 404(b) because Cruz challenged identity for one incident and argued it was

a consensual sexual encounter in the other. Id.

On July 13, 2004, Cruz moved for reconsideration relying on the recent Supreme

Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). (Doc 11-7,

Exhibit O). On November 4, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted the motion for

reconsideration in part, vacating the five aggravated prison terms and remanding to the trial

court for resentencing. (Doc 11-7, Exhibit R p 45). After unsuccessfully filing a motion for

reconsideration with the state court of appeals, the State filed a Petition For Review to the

Arizona Supreme Court of the order vacating the sentence in counts 3, 4, 9, 10, and 12. (Doc

11-8, Exhibit U). Cruz cross-appealed asserting error for upholding the denial of the motion

to sever. (Doc 11-9, Exhibit W p 14).

On September 28, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court granted the State’s Petition For

Review and denied Cruz’s cross-petition. (Doc 11-9, Exhibit Y p 110). Specifically, the

Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case to the Arizona Court of Appeals for

reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions, State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115

P.3d 618 (2005), and State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005).

On January 5, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in another memorandum decision,

affirmed the aggravated sentenced in Counts 3, 4, 9, 10, and 12. (Doc 11-9, Exhibit Z p 113).

The appellate court affirmed the trial court because it relied on the use of a gun as an

aggravating factor. The appellate court held that the jury necessarily found that Cruz

threatened to use a gun during the offenses because the jury convicted Cruz of two counts

of armed robbery, which requires a perpetrator to be armed; the jury convicted Cruz of

aggravated assault against both victims, with the “aggravated” aspect of the assaults based

on the allegation that Cruz had a gun and threatened to use it; and the jury found the offenses

charged in Counts 1 through 10 plus 12 and 13 to be “dangerous” based on the State’s

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argument that Cruz pointed a gun at the victims and threatened to use it. (Doc 11-9, Exhibit

Z pp 118-119). 

On February 27, 2006, Cruz acting pro se, filed a petition for review with the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Doc 11-10, Exhibit AA). On August 8, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review. (Doc 11-11, Exhibit CC). On September 11, 2006, the Arizona Court of

Appeals issued its mandate. (Doc 11-11, Exhibit DD p 4).

Cruz timely filed the instant Petition on March 12, 2007. (Doc 1).

C. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

In Ground I, Cruz complains that the trial judge used aggravating factors not

determined by the jury to enhance his sentence. The State argues that at least one

aggravating factor was found by the jury or admitted by defendant, thus the court could

consider all aggravating factors to support an aggravated sentence. The State argues that

Arizona case law on this point, State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005), is not

an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law.

In Ground II, Petitioner asserts his “6th amendment due process rights were violated.”

(Doc 1, p 6). Specifically, Cruz argues that it was a violation of due process to not sever

Counts 1-5 and Counts 6-13 into two separate trials. The State argues this claim was not

exhausted before the state courts as a federal claim and is now procedurally barred from

being raised in the state court. Therefore, the State argues, this claim must be dismissed

without being considered on the merits.

II. ANALYSIS

A. GROUND I - THE BLAKELY VIOLATION

The trial court imposed aggravated sentences on five counts, counts 3, 4, 9, 10, and

12. In particular, the aggravated sentences on counts 3, 4, 9, and 10 account for his

cumulative 88 year sentence. On those four counts, the trial court found the following

aggravating factors: the defendant taking the victims and their children to remote locations

and requiring compliance by threatening the lives of the children. (Doc 11-5, Exhibit J p 78,

ll. 6-9). Prior to sentencing on specific counts, the trial court generally stated that the

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following were aggravating factors: Cruz was on parole status at the time of the offense; the

victims were emotionally traumatized; the cruelty and depravity of coercing compliance for

sex by threatening the lives of the victims’ children who were present in the zone of

immediate physical danger; the victims’ belief that Cruz’s gun was operational and that their

compliance was required to save themselves and to save their children; and the cruelty and

heinous nature of reasonably forcing the victims to drive with the defendant and their

children to a remote location, not knowing whether they or their children would be harmed

physically or ever returned. (Doc 11-5, Exhibit J p 77).

The State argues that the Arizona Supreme Court decision to remand the case in light

of the State v. Martinez, supra., was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court

decisions in Blakely and Apprendi. Specifically, the Martinez decision holds that once a jury

finds beyond a reasonable doubt or a defendant admits, any fact, other than a prior

conviction, that establishes the range in which a judge can sentence a defendant, additional

facts relevant to the judge’s discretion within the statutory sentencing range only need to be

determined by the judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard. 115 P.3d 618, 625.

Thus, “once a jury finds or a defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth

Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to

the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.” Id. 

In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case to the Arizona Court of

Appeals for reconsideration in light of Martinez. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the five aggravated sentences based on the jury finding of the use of the gun, one of the

aggravating factors relied on by the sentencing judge, implicit in the guilty verdicts for

aggravated assault and armed robbery.

The issue before this Court is whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s reliance on its

decision in Martinez was contrary to clearly establishing constitutional law as interpreted by

the U.S. Supreme Court. Secondarily, was the Arizona Court of Appeals decision on remand

an unreasonable determination of the facts at issue.

Respondent’s answer reviews the first of these two issues at extraordinary length.

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(Doc 11, pp 40-56). Respondent’s analysis is correct. United State Supreme Court precedent

has consistently authorized judicial reliance on facts not proven to a jury to determine a

sentence within a sentencing range supported by a jury determination of at least one

aggravating fact.

A state habeas petition shall not be granted, unless the adjudication of the claim in

state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000).

At issue are the four aggravated sentences of 22 years for sexual assault, instead of

the presumptive sentence of 10 years. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 124 S.Ct.

2531, 2537 (2004), the Court reiterated from Apprendi that the statutory maximum sentence

is the one a judge may impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by defendant.

In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the

maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional

facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional

findings.

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-304, 124 S.Ct. At 2537 (emphasis is original).

In considering Cruz’s Blakely argument, the state court of appeals was directed by the

Arizona Supreme Court to rely on State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005). In

Martinez, the Arizona Supreme Court held that:

. . . a jury finding of a single aggravating factor establishes the

facts legally essential to expose the defendant to the maximum

sentence prescribed in section 13-702.

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115 P.3d at 624.

In Martinez, the sentencing judge determined that eight aggravating factors were

shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez, 115 P.3d at 619. One of those factors

was the “severe injuries and death of the victim.” Id. The Arizona Supreme Court found that

the jury’s verdict of guilt on the first degree murder charge was an implicit jury

determination of the aggravated factor, “severe injuries and death of the victim.” Martinez,

115 P.3d at 620.

After the jury determined one aggravating factor, the judge’s consideration of the

other seven factors was permissible. The state court stated that the United States Supreme

Court has: 

repeatedly distinguished between those facts that are legally

essential to increase the punishment for a crime and must

therefore be found by a jury, and those facts that a sentencing

judge may in his or her discretion, consider in sentencing a

defendant within the range prescribed by statute and authorized

by the jury’s verdict.

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 621.

Was the Martinez holding contrary to established Supreme Court jurisprudence?

While the Blakely opinion is somewhat obtuse on this point, other Supreme Court authorities

show that at a minimum, Martinez is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the

Court’s decisions. In United States v. Harris, the Court stated that:

Judicial fact finding in the course of selecting a sentence within

the authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jurytrial, and reasonable components of the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments. 

United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545, 558, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2415 (2002) (emphasis added).

In Booker, the court stated:

“For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a

specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no

right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems

relevant.”

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223, 125 S.Ct. 738, 750 (2005). Finally, in

Cunningham v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court referenced favorably in a footnote

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Arizona’s determinate sentencing scheme, as an example of a scheme that provides for the

jury “to find any fact necessary to the imposition of an elevated sentence.” Cunningham v.

California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 n. 17, 127 S.Ct. 856, 871, n.17 (2007). The Court in

Cunningham stated:

Other states have chosen to permit judges genuinely to exercise

broad discretion within a statutory range, which “everyone

agrees” encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal.

Id.

Petitioner cannot establish that the Martinez holding relied upon by the state court of

appeals was contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

authority. He therefore fails to establish the substantive predicate to obtaining relief

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The second predicate, separated by the disjunctive “or,” is that the state court decision

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The decision in issue is the Arizona

Court of Appeals, Division One, Memorandum Decision filed January 5, 2006. (Doc 11-9,

Exhibit Z). There the court correctly noted that the trial judge relied on, among other

aggravating facts, Cruz’s use of a gun to coerce compliance in connection with the offenses.

The appellate court concluded that use of a gun was inherent in the jury’s convictions on two

counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. Moreover, the jury also found

all thirteen offenses to be “dangerous.” Because the indictment in charging those crimes and

the allegation of dangerousness specifically alleged the use of a “silver BB handgun,” the

appellate court correctly determined that there had been a jury determination of at least one

aggravating factor. The appellate court went on to note that Cruz, when subsequently

pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to charges severed from the initial trial, admitted

to two prior felony convictions, which would also support the aggravated sentences.

At the time of the offenses in issue, one of the statutory aggravating circumstances

was:

Use, threatened use or possession of a deadly weapon or

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4

The court also notes that the prior felony convictions which could aggravate the

sentence, former ARS § 13-702(c)(ii), are Blakely exempt factors. Therefore, Cruz cannot

show prejudice regardless of the Court’s determination concerning the jury determination of

the use of a deadly weapon.

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dangerous instrument during the commission of the crime,

except if this circumstance is an essential element of the offense

of conviction or has been utilized to enhance the range of

punishment under § 13-704.

A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(2). In this case, the relevant aggravated sentences were for sexual

assault. Use of the “silver BB handgun” is not an essential element of those offenses.

Therefore, use of the deadly weapon is an appropriate consideration to enhance the sentences

for sexual assault.

Substantial testimony about Cruz’s use of the gun in both sexual assaults was

presented to the jury. (May 13, 2002 Assault: Doc 11-3, Exhibit E pp 165-169; June 8, 2002

Assault: Doc 11-3, Exhibit E, pp 249-252). The jury necessarily found the aggravating

circumstance of Cruz’s use of the gun because it returned guilty verdicts for the armed

robbery and aggravated assault charges as well as determined that all the charges, except the

burglary, were dangerous in nature. (Indictment at Doc 11-1, Exhibit A, pp 14-22; Guilty

Verdicts at (Doc 11-1, Exhibit A, pp 160-172). Argument was presented and the court

determined how to instruct the jury on the term “deadly weapon.” (Doc 11-4, Exhibit G p

293; Doc 11-5, Exhibit H p 10). Clearly the jury determined the obvious, that the threatened

use of a deadly weapon was involved in these crimes. Just as clearly, the sentencing judge

relied on that determination in sentencing Cruz. Cruz cannot show an unreasonable

application of the facts in the appellate court’s determination that at least one aggravating

factor was determined by the jury.4

As Cruz has failed on both prongs of the standard for granting relief in 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d), Ground One must be dismissed.

B. GROUND II - FAILING TO GRANT MOTION TO SEVER

Cruz repeatedly moved to sever the charges related to the May 13, 2002, incident to

be tried separately from the charges related to the June 8, 2002, incident. Cruz argues that

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the failure to separate these events into two separate trials violated his due process rights.

The State argues this claim was never raised in state court as a federal claim, and therefore

is unexhausted, procedurally barred and subject to dismissal. The State is correct.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted available

state-court remedies. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). A state prisoner in

a federal habeas action must exhaust his claims in the state courts “by invoking one complete

round of the State's established appellate review process” before he may submit those claims

in a federal habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Arizona,

it is sufficient for a state prisoner to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals;

he does not have to appeal those claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes v. Sublett,

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to give

the “State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal

rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal citations omitted).

A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific

provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is “selfevident.” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1999). A petitioner may also cite

state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim. Peterson v. Lampert,

319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “[I]t is not enough to make a general appeal

to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the ‘substance’ of such a

claim to a state court.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (internal citations

omitted).

Cruz’s direct appeal raised only one argument, that failing to grant the motion to sever

counts was an abuse of discretion and that inadequate findings were made to allow crossadmission of the sexual offense evidence under rule 404(b) and (c). (Doc 11-5, Exhibit K

p 91). There is only one federal citation in the Table of Citation, while 21 Arizona cases

were cited, and numerous Arizona statutes and rules of procedure. The federal citation,

McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993) was concerning the evidentiary

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ruling related to the admission of prior bad act evidence. (Doc 11-5, Exhibit K p 128). It did

not concern a federal due process argument. There was no citation to federal authority in the

Reply Brief. (Doc 11-5, Exhibit M p).

Because Cruz did not raise his argument that failing to grant the motion to sever was

an abuse of judicial discretion as a federal claim, Ground II is unexhausted. If a claim has

never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may determine whether state

remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9 (1989). When a

petitioner fails to exhaust his claims in state court but cannot now return to state court

because the state procedural rules bar Petitioner’s claims, the claims are procedurally

defaulted. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir.2002). In Arizona,

determining whether a petitioner’s unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted involves

consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 32

governs post-conviction relief proceedings and outlines the circumstances under which a

state prisoner may seek relief. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any

claim which could have been raised in a direct appeal under Rule 31or a prior Rule 32

petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain claims not applicable here.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. (For exceptions see Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h): State prisoners may

seek relief in successive PCR Appeals for: claims of incarceration beyond sentence

expiration, newly-discovered material facts, failure to timely file for relief not prisoner’s

fault, significant change in the law retroactively applicable, or actual innocence).

In the instant case, Cruz has no further state remedy on his due process claim. He did

not exhaust that claim as federal constitutional claim at the state court level because he did

not fairly present those claims to the state courts. Under Arizona law, Petitioner is now

procedurally barred from bringing those federal claims to the state court. Therefore, the

claim is procedurally barred. 

If a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not

review the claim unless the petitioner shows “cause and prejudice” for the failure to present

the constitutional issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence.

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See Gray, 518 U.S. at 162. Here, Cruz fails to show cause or prejudice for the default or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (9th Cir.1989).

When a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and the petitioner has not shown cause or

prejudice for the default, “the district court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has

no further recourse in state court.” Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231 (internal citations omitted).

Ground II must be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is the report and recommendation of this Court that District

Judge Campbell, after his independent review and consideration, enter an order dismissing

the Petition with prejudice.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any

objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV 07-00527-PHXDGC.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2010.

Case 2:07-cv-00527-DGC Document 17 Filed 03/26/10 Page 14 of 14