Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01436/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01436-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Gregory G. McGill and Jane Doe McGill,

Defendants.

_________________________________

Gregory G. McGill and Jane Doe McGill,

Counterclaimants,

v.

M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank,

Counterdefendants. 

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No. 10-CV-1436-PHX-ECV

ORDER

In an order dated June 16, 2011, Magistrate Judge Voss denied Defendants’

“Objection Re: (1) Lack of Consent to Magistrate Appointment after Magistrate Recusal, and

(2) Judicial Cover Up Impairing a Fair Trial and Civil Rights.” (Doc. 174.) The order also

referred the matter to a District Court Judge, and this Court was randomly assigned to

consider the following issues:

Defendants’ allegations of bias against Magistrate Judge Voss as set forth in

Defendants’ Motion for Magistrate Recusal and Assignment to a District Court

Judge in Phoenix (Doc. 143) and in their Objection Re: (1) Lack of Consent

to Magistrate Appointment after Magistrate Recusal, and (2) Judicial Cover Up

Case 2:10-cv-01436-ECV Document 180 Filed 06/21/11 Page 1 of 4
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Impairing a Fair Trial and Civil Rights (Doc. 169); and whether Defendants’

allegations show “extraordinary circumstances” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4)

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(3) such that the parties’ consent to magistrate judge

jurisdiction should be vacated.

(Id. at 3.)

As set forth below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s resolution of these

issues.

1. Judicial bias

Magistrate Judge Voss referred the matter to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §144.

Under §144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal is required if a judge’s “impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Because issues regarding a judge’s impartiality must generally

arise from “extrajudicial” factors, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis

for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994). Similarly,

“opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the

course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias

or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. Defendants’ allegations of bias are based on the

Magistrate Judge’s rulings and cite no extra-judicial factors. (See Doc. 143.) The allegations

are also conclusory and offer no support for a finding of bias or partiality under § 455 and

Liteky.

2. “Extraordinary circumstances” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) and Rule 73(b)(3)

Once a civil case is referred to a magistrate judge under § 636(c), the reference can

be withdrawn by the court only “for good cause shown on its own motion, or under

extraordinary circumstances shown by any party.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4). “There is no

absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other proceedings before a

magistrate judge.” Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993).

This case was originally assigned to a District Court Judge, John W. Sedwick. In

November 2010, the parties consented “to have a United States magistrate judge conduct all

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proceedings in this case including trial, the entry of final judgment, and all post-trial

proceedings.” (Doc. 30.) Magistrate Judge Aspey was randomly assigned to the case but

recused himself on April 11, 2011. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Voss.

Defendants contended that they did not agree to have a magistrate judge replace Judge

Aspey. They moved that Magistrate Judge Voss recuse himself and reassign the matter to a

District Court Judge. Magistrate Judge Voss ruled that “Defendants’ consent to magistrate

judge jurisdiction was not limited to Judge Aspey” and that “Defendants’ contention that

reassignment is required based on a lack of consent is without merit.” (Doc. 150 at 1–2.)

The Court agrees. Defendants offer no authority for the proposition that their consent

needed to be renewed when the matter was assigned to a second magistrate judge.

Defendants never withdrew their consent, and may do so now only upon a showing of

extraordinary circumstances, a showing they have failed to make.

Pertinent factors in considering a request to withdraw consent are the timeliness of the

request, whether granting the request would unduly interfere with or delay the proceedings,

particularly relative to the burdens and costs to the litigants, and whether the party’s consent

was voluntary and uncoerced. United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 1993).

In Carter v. Sea Land Services, Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit

noted an additional factor in assessing a motion to withdraw consent: “whether the motion

is made in good faith or is dilatory and contrived.” 

Dissatisfaction with the magistrate judge’s rulings does not constitute an extraordinary

circumstance. There is no suggestion that Defendants’ consent to have the matter heard by

a magistrate judge was involuntary or coerced. Having considered the remaining factors,

including whether the motion is made in good faith, this Court agrees with the ruling in

Neville, which explained that there is: 

nothing in the statute or the legislative history that requires continuing

expressions of consent before a magistrate can exercise authority under a valid

reference. Nor will we accept the slippery-slope invitation to read into the

statute a rule that would allow a party to express conditional consent to a

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reference, thereby obtaining what amounts to a free shot at a favorable

outcome or a veto of an unfavorable outcome. Any such rule would allow the

party to hold the power of consent over the magistrate like a sword of

Damocles, ready to strike the reference should the magistrate issue a ruling not

quite to the party’s liking. We will not countenance such fast and loose toying

with the judicial system.

Neville, 985 F.2d at 999–1000 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Carter 816 F.2d at 1020).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED finding that Defendants’ allegations of bias against Magistrate

Judge Voss (Docs. 143, 169) are without merit.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED finding that Defendants have not shown extraordinary

circumstances permitting withdrawal of their consent to have the matter heard by a

magistrate judge. 

DATED this 21st day of June, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-01436-ECV Document 180 Filed 06/21/11 Page 4 of 4