Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01938/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01938-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff’s opposition does not comply with Local Rule 56-260. Plaintiff did not 1

reproduce and admit or deny each fact itemized in defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. 

Nor did plaintiff present his own concise statement of disputed facts, as permitted, or the

statement of undisputed facts required for a counter-motion for summary judgment. 

Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, the court has read and considered plaintiff’s opposition.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMAESHI NWOZUZU,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1938 MCE DAD P

vs.

DAVE L. RUNNELS, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner confined at Folsom State Prison, is proceeding pro se

with a civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is before the court on

defendants’ motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has filed a timely opposition to the motion.1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 26, 2005, plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint concerning events

that allegedly occurred at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). The undersigned determined that

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plaintiff’s complaint appeared to state cognizable claims for relief against eight defendants. In

due course, the United States Marshal served plaintiff’s complaint on HDSP Warden D.L.

Runnels; Correctional Lieutenant K. Clement; Correctional Officer N. Correa; Correctional

Officer Coleman; Correctional Officer E. Rausch; Correctional Officer Loiler; Correctional

Officer Kingstrom; and Correctional Officer Lamberton. 

On February 6, 2006, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that

plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing suit. Plaintiff filed a

timely opposition to defendants’ motion, and defendants filed a reply. On July 11, 2006, the

undersigned issued findings and recommendations, recommending that the motion to dismiss be

granted in part, and on August 21, 2006, the assigned district judge adopted the findings and

recommendations in full. On August 22, 2006, this court issued a discovery order. On October

3, 2006, defendants filed an answer. 

On May 2, 2007, defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the

grounds that plaintiff’s claims have been rendered moot. As noted, plaintiff has filed a timely

opposition. Defendants have not filed a reply.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff claims that defendants (1) harassed him and retaliated against him for

exercising his right to seek redress through the prison administrative appeal procedure, (2)

conspired to use institutional procedures to retaliate against him by inciting other inmates to

harm him, and (3) confiscated and destroyed administrative appeals submitted by plaintiff

concerning staff misconduct. 

Plaintiff attached to his form complaint a typed document titled “Affidavit in

Support of Complaint.” In this 39-page document, plaintiff alleges in chronological order

various events that allegedly took place over a three-year period at HDSP. Plaintiff’s allegations

include the following: In July 2002, plaintiff notified staff that his cellmate, inmate Baskin, was

delusional and was threatening him but that defendant Correa took no action resulting in plaintiff

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being forced to defend himself against an attack by inmate Baskin; plaintiff was injured when

staff intervened in the attack; defendant Correa charged plaintiff with battery on an inmate with a

weapon; plaintiff was found not guilty of the charge but defendant Correa thereafter threatened

plaintiff and engaged in unprofessional conduct toward him including delaying or denying

plaintiff food, removing from the mail staff complaints plaintiff had submitted concerning the

events of the previous day, searching plaintiff’s cell, confiscating plaintiff’s personal property

without justification, spreading rumors blaming plaintiff and his cellmate for cell searches to

incite inmates to harm plaintiff and interfering with plaintiff’s subsequent inmate appeals;

beginning in October 2004, and continuing for months thereafter, plaintiff was subjected to

threats, harassment, retaliatory cell searches, and confiscation of property and legal materials

because he refused to withdraw his own inmate appeals and helped other inmates prepare

appeals; eventually, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for several months pending

an investigation that never took place; while in administrative segregation, plaintiff’s efforts to

file inmate appeals were thwarted, he was deprived of adequate clothing and was denied periodic

retention reviews; after plaintiff was released from administrative segregation, defendants

resumed their harassment and retaliation by denying him use of the shower for disabled inmates

on March 15, 2005; on March 18, 2005, one defendant dropped plaintiff’s apple on the floor

during delivery of meal trays, and another defendant deliberately squashed the apple with his foot

and kicked it under plaintiff’s cell door; in March 2005, plaintiff’s cell was searched twice, his

only pen was confiscated, defendants refused to process his confidential legal mail, and he was

denied use of the shower for disabled inmates a second time; in May 2005, staff announced a

policy of permitting Muslim inmates to wear their religious caps only when going to and from

religious services, while other head coverings, religious medallions, and wedding rings were

permitted to be worn by other inmates at all times; in June 2005, when plaintiff became so ill that

it was necessary to transport him to an outside hospital, one of the defendants kept plaintiff 

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in waist and ankle restraints during the entire 12-hour transport in violation of state regulations,

causing plaintiff to endure pain and suffering as well as physical injury.

Based on these allegations, plaintiff contends that defendants violated his rights

under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as under state law. In terms of

relief, plaintiff seeks only an order from the court protecting him from further harassment and

retaliation. (Compl. at 5.) 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

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produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On December 22, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th

Cir. 1988).

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants are willing to assume solely for purposes of this motion for summary

judgment that all of the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint are true. Defendants also contend that

it cannot be disputed that: (1) at all times mentioned in his complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at

HDSP, defendant Runnels is the warden at HDSP and the remaining defendants are correctional

officers at HDSP; (2) on March 12, 2007, plaintiff filed a change of address form indicating that

he had been transferred from HDSP to California State Prison (CSP), Folsom where he remains

incarcerated; and (3) in findings and recommendations filed July 11, 2006, the undersigned found

that the payer for relief in plaintiff’s complaint seeks only injunctive relief in the form of an order

protecting him from further harassment and retaliation. 

Defendants argue that given these undisputed facts, summary judgment should be

granted in their favor on the grounds that plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is now moot in

light of his transfer from HDSP to CSP-Folsom. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) Defendants

contend that in order for plaintiff to maintain this action, there must be an actual case or

controversy and that this requirement applies through all stages of the case. (Defs.’ Mot. for

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Summ. J. at 3-4.) Defendants assert that if at anytime a party ceases to have a personal stake in

the outcome of the suit, the matter is rendered moot. (Id. at 4.) 

Here, because plaintiff’s complaint seeks only injunctive relief and plaintiff has

since been transferred from the prison where the alleged civil rights violations took place,

defendants contend that the court should dismiss the action as moot. (Id. at 3.) Defendants

maintain that plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the exception to the mootness doctrine because

they are not “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” (Id.) In this regard, they note that

plaintiff has not shown a reasonable likelihood that he will be transferred back to HDSP, that he

will be exposed to the same correctional officers who are defendants in this matter if he is

transferred back to HDSP, or that if he is transferred back and the alleged pattern of civil rights

violations were to resume, they would be too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to

cessation. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, defendants conclude the court should grant their motion for

summary judgment because the action is now moot.

II. Plaintiff’s Arguments

In opposition, plaintiff argues that he has “the full intention of amending both his

complaint and [request for] injunctive relief, to include the amount of monetary award he is

seeking.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) Plaintiff maintains that he has made it

clear in every filing that he intended to sue for monetary damages against defendants in their

individual and official capacity and that defendants and defendants’ counsel were well aware of

his intentions. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also maintains that his claims are not moot simply because he

has been transferred. (Id. at 3.) In particular, plaintiff notes that there is no order ensuring that

he will not be transferred back to HDSP or that he will not suffer further or future harassment. 

Accordingly, plaintiff concludes that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be

denied.

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 Notwithstanding plaintiff’s alleged intentions to amend his complaint, plaintiff’s only 2

pending request for relief is one for injunctive relief. Moreover, pursuant to this court’s April 20,

2007 scheduling order all pretrial motions, including any motion by plaintiff to amend his

complaint, should have been filed on or before October 12, 2007. 

8

ANALYSIS

Mootness is a facet of justiciability. See Smith v. Univ. of Washington Law

School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). “Mootness is like standing, in that if it turns out

that resolution of the issue presented cannot really affect the plaintiff's rights, there is, generally

speaking, no case or controversy for the courts to adjudicate; no real relief can be awarded.” Id. 

See also Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a suit for injunctive relief

is normally moot upon the termination of the conduct at issue”); David v. Giurbino, 488 F. Supp.

2d 1048, 1056-57 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief with respect to

grooming regulations found to be moot in light of amendments to the applicable regulations and

the restoration of status and time credits).

In this case, plaintiff’s complaint seeks only an order protecting him from further

harassment and retaliation at HDSP. When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief 2

concerning the prison where he is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he

is no longer subjected to those conditions. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)

(prisoner’s full release from supervision rendered his challenge to Parole Board procedures moot

where there was no demonstrated probability that he would again find himself subject to the

Board’s jurisdiction); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). On March 12,

2007, plaintiff filed a notice of change of address with this court upon his transfer from HDSP to

CSP-Folsom, where he remains incarcerated. (Docket Entry #54.) Accordingly, plaintiff is no

longer subject to the conditions he complains of and his request for injunctive relief is now moot

unless it falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine. 

The exception to the mootness doctrine applies when “(1) the challenged action

was too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a

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reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action

again.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978). See also Dilley, 64

F.3d at 1368-69 (prisoner’s claim was moot upon transfer and did not fall under this two-prong

exception to mootness doctrine); Wiggins v. Rushen 760 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1985) (where

prisoner was no longer subjected to prison officials’ allegedly unconstitutional activity, the

complaint for injunctive relief was rendered moot); Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136, 143 (9th

Cir. 1977) (“A mere speculative possibility of repetition is not sufficient. There must be a

cognizable danger, a reasonable expectation, of recurrence for the repetition branch of the

mootness exception to be satisfied.”); 1A C.J.S. Controversies Capable of Repetition Yet

Evading Review § 82 (2007) (cases satisfying the mootness exception include those actions

involving issues such as abortion, elections, residency requirements, benefits, and

preadjudication detention). 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his claims fall into the category of cases that

satisfy the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. Under

the first prong of that exception, a prisoner’s claims against prison officials for harassment,

retaliation, conspiracy, and confiscation and destruction of administrative grievances concerning

staff misconduct are not claims that will evade review. The scores of civil rights actions alleging

unconstitutional conditions of confinement that are properly filed, reviewed by this court for

cognizable claims and ultimately decided by the federal courts demonstrates that such cases do

not generally evade review. As to the second prong, plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable

expectation that he will be transferred back to HDSP. Rather, plaintiff has only been able to

offer speculation as to what may occur in the future. 

Because plaintiff’s sole claim is one seeking injunctive relief and that claim has

now been rendered moot by his transfer to CSP-Folsom, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment should be granted.

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OTHER MATTERS

The parties have filed several other motions and requests pending before the court. 

First, pursuant to Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, defendants request that the court

take judicial notice of the following: (1) on March 12, 2007, plaintiff filed a change of address

form in this matter indicating that he had been transferred from HDSP to California State Prison,

Folsom; and (2) on July 11, 2006, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations in

response to defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint that included a finding that the

complaint’s prayer for relief sought only an order protecting plaintiff from further harassment

and retaliation. These are matters of record in this very case and are not the appropriate subject

of judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Accordingly, defendants’ request for judicial notice

will be denied as unnecessary. 

Second, while this motion was pending, defendants filed three requests for an

extension of time to file additional dispositive motions. In light of the recommendation set forth

herein, the defendants’ requests will be denied as unnecessary. 

Finally, plaintiff has filed several motions, including a motion for a temporary

restraining order, a motion for discovery, a motion for a court ordered appointment of an

investigator, a motion for extension of time to declare the status of witnesses, a motion for an

order related to attendance of witnesses at trial and an untimely motion to compel. In light of the

recommendation set forth herein the court will deny each of plaintiff’s motions. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ May 2, 2007 request for judicial notice is denied; 

2. Defendants’ October 12, 2007, November 9, 2007 and December 12, 2007

requests for an extension of time to file an additional dispositive motion are denied; and

3. Plaintiff’s August 21, 2007 motion for a temporary restraining order, August

21, 2007 motion for discovery, August 21, 2007 motion for a court ordered appointment of an

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investigator, August 21, 2007 motion for extension of time to declare the status of witnesses,

August 21, 2007 motion for an order related to attendance of witnesses, and November 20, 2007

motion to compel are denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ May 2, 2007 motion for

summary judgment be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 13, 2007.

DAD:9

nwoz1938.57

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