Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03665/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03665-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shawn Turner, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-18-03665-PHX-ROS-JZB 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Shawn Turner has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. Summary of Conclusion. 

 Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in his timely Petition. Petitioner’s claims are 

either not cognizable, procedurally defaulted, or meritless. Therefore, the Court will 

recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. In his Reply, 

Petitioner requests the Court dismiss the Petition without prejudice so that he may exhaust 

claims in a second post-conviction relief proceeding. Petitioner’s request should be denied 

because his claims are meritless and returning to the state courts will not affect the outcome 

of his claims here. 

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II. Background. 

 a. Facts of the Crimes. 

In the Memorandum of Points and Authorities accompanying his Petition for PostConviction Relief in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Petitioner included a summary 

of the underlying facts of his crimes: 

On October 22, 2014 the defendant was contacted by detectives at Sky Harbor Airport after it was discovered that the defendant was flying between New York and California on a one way ticket without any checked luggage. Police were suspicious that the defendant may be involved in illegal activity. The defendant’s carry on bag was searched by police and police found 46 

World Series Baseball tickets valued at $12,000. The defendant Admitted 

[sic] that he had been in trouble in the past for fraudulent tickets, but the 

tickets in question he said were legitimate. Further investigations showed the 

tickets had identical seat rows numbers [sic] and poor quality printing and was [sic] missing a standard security feature of ligitimate [sic] Major League Baseball Tickets. The defendant told police that he was brokering the tickets for another person but would not provide the persons [sic] name. The 

defendant said he would have been paid $500 for the tickets to be delivered 

to Sacramento. 

(Doc. 9-2, Ex. M, at 127-28.) 

 b. Plea Proceedings. 

 On April 22, 2016, Turner was indicted on 16 counts of forgery, each a class 4 

felony, in Maricopa County Superior Court case number CR-2016-001918. (Doc. 9-1, 

Ex. A, at 4.) On May 1, 2017, Turner pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment 

with a stipulation to imprisonment between three and six years and a consecutive term of 

probation. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. D, at 1-2.) On June 14, 2017, the plea agreement was amended 

to change the date of offense for Count 1. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. G, at 52; Doc. 9-1, Ex. H, at 61.) 

On the same date, the trial court sentenced Turner to three years of imprisonment on 

Count 1 and placed him on four years of probation on Count 2. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. I, at 79.) 

 c. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding. 

 On July 12, 2017, Turner filed a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) notice. (Doc. 9-1, 

Ex. J, at 87.) On October 19, 2017, Turner’s court-appointed counsel filed a notice of 

completion indicating that she could not find any colorable claims to raise in a PCR 

petition. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. K, at 91.) On November 15, 2017, Turner filed a pro se PCR 

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petition1. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. M, at 4.) On January 8, 2018, the State filed a response (doc. 9-2, 

Ex. N, at 19), and on February 6, 2018, Turner filed a reply. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. O, at 30.) After 

reviewing supplemental briefing, on April 13, 2018, the trial court dismissed the PCR 

petition. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. T, at 75.) On April 24, 2018, Turner filed a request for extension 

of time to file a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals (doc. 9-2, Ex. U, at 79), 

which the court granted (doc. 9-2, Ex. V, at 82). On May 17, 2018, Turner filed a pro se 

petition for review2

. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. W, at 84.) After briefing, on September 26, 2018, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied Turner relief. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. Z, at 127.) 

 d. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On June 22, 2018, Turner filed a second PCR notice to challenge the assistance of 

his PCR counsel in the previous petition. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. AA, at 134.) On December 7, 

2018, Turner’s newly-appointed counsel filed a notice of post-conviction relief indicating 

that she could not find any colorable claims to raise in a PCR petition. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. BB, 

at 160.) On December 15, 2018, the trial court provided Turner additional time, until 

January 29, 2019 to file a pro se PCR petition. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. CC, at 171.) On December 20, 

2018, Petitioner filed a second PCR petition. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. EE, at 3.) On March 26, 2019, 

the trial court denied the petition. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. HH, at 54.) 

 e. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition

 On October 31, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner raises four ground for relief in his Petition: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 

(2) vindictive prosecution; (3) the Arizona Court of Appeals abused its discretion; and (4) 

a Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at 6-9.) On December 28, 2018, Respondents filed a 

Response. (Doc. 9.) 

 

1

 In his pro per PCR in the Arizona Superior Court, Petitioner raised two grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel (for failing to mount a defense that the crimes should have 

been charged as misdemeanors rather than felonies and for failing to file a motion to dismiss based on a prejudicial pre-indictment delay). 

2

 In his petition at the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner raised five grounds for relief: (1) abuse of judicial discretion, (2) vindictive prosecution, (3) ineffective assistance of counsel, (4) pre-indictment delay, and (5) ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. 

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On January 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply and requested that his petition be 

dismissed “without prejudice in order to return at a later date,” or, in the alternative, an 

extension of time to “argue the mixed petition.” (Doc. 10.) 

III. The Petition. 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § § 2241 (c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

The Petition is timely. 

 a. Procedural Default.

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless 

a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state 

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits 

of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“To provide 

the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in 

each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the 

claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. 

A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read 

beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order 

to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, 

“a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying 

the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . (2) through 

the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

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 The court may review the merits of an argument in the interest of judicial economy. 

See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-525 (1997) (explaining that the court may 

bypass the procedural default issue in the interest of judicial economy when the merits are 

clear but the procedural default issues are not). 

 b. Merits Review.

 The court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision 

which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis 

v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the “last reasoned decision” 

from the state court, “which means that when the final state court decision contains no 

reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state court that provides a reasoned 

explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as 

a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded 

disagreement. 

White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal 

habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. 

AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—”that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 S. Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal 

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habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S. Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting the 

governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of 

facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches 

a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it 

extends, or fails to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s determination 

of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under 

clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] 

governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should have controlled.” 

Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state court’s decision is an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it can be considered 

objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 

(2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 

130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is 

an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court 

might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. 

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

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opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant to 

section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014)). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, the 

Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the state’s 

ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the AEDPA 

otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 

953-54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not harmless: “For 

reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas 

relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” 

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). 

IV. Ground One – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

Petitioner raises two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which stem from 

his belief that he should have been charged under a misdemeanor statute instead of a felony 

statute and that he should have been charged in only one count. (Doc. 1 at 6.) First, he 

contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him that A.R.S. § 13-2011, 

a class one misdemeanor statute, was a “lessor [sic] included offense” of A.R.S. § 13-2002, 

a class four felony statute and that, “absent the error the outcome would have been 

different.” (Id.) He claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to “quash the indictment 

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for redetermination to convert evidence to a proper charge,” which he asserts would have 

“allow[ed] the Grand Jury to convict a charged offense of a lesser charge in the event that 

the Prosecutor did not establish enough evidence to prove the Greater statute.” (Id.) 

Second, he asserts that counsel “failed to challenge multiplicitous charges that occur on a 

single event.” (Id.) Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective because she “failed to 

preserve the lessor [sic] charged offense rules and multiplicitous issues for appeal, failed 

to inform her client of cognizable rule 32 issues and the procedure on how to proceed,” and 

that he was unfairly charged for multiple crimes arising from a single transaction. (Id.) 

To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must satisfy 

the two-pronged test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, he 

must demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness,” with reasonableness being judged under professional norms at the time 

assistance was rendered. Id. at 688. Second, he must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s error the result would have been different.” Id. at 687-

96. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. Id. at 688. The petitioner has the burden of proving his claim of ineffective 

assistance and must overcome a “strong presumption that the representation was 

professionally reasonable.” Id. at 689. 

 a. Lesser-Included Offense. 

 Petitioner argues that counsel should have advised him of “affirmative defenses” of 

lesser-included offenses to the felony charges that were filed in his case. He asserts that if 

counsel had told him that A.R.S. § 13-2011 (a misdemeanor) was a lesser-included offense 

of A.R.S. § 13-2002 (a class four felony), then the “outcome would have been different.” 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner raised this claim in his first PCR proceeding, and the trial court 

ruled: 

Defendant is correct insofar as he believes that his conduct violated these 

misdemeanor provisions. In fact, Section 13-2011 makes it a crime for a 

person, with the intent to defraud, to possess a paper “designed for admission 

to or for the rendering of services by any sports ... facility that offers services 

to the general public.” Clearly, that misdemeanor statute captures 

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Defendant’s conduct. 

Defendant, however, is incorrect insofar as he believes that his conduct did 

not also violate the felony provisions of Arizona’s forgery statute under Title 

13, Section 2002. That felony statute is violated when a person, with the 

intent to defraud, knowingly possesses a written instrument. See Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 13-2002. The possession of the forged MLB baseball tickets 

with the intent to commit fraud plainly violates Arizona’s forgery statute. 

To the extent Defendant concedes that both statutory provisions capture his conduct, he seems to claim that the State is required to charge him with misdemeanors. Defendant has proffered no authority to support the 

proposition. In fact, Arizona law provides the State the discretion to have 

charged Defendant’s offenses under the felony forgery statute notwithstanding that that the charges could have been charged as 

misdemeanors. See State v. Hankins, 686 P.2d 740 (Ariz. S. Ct. 1984). 

. . . 

Related to this claim is Defendant’s argument his attorney was ineffective 

because she did not tell him that the misdemeanors were lesser-included 

offenses of the forgery. He argues that had he been so advised, he would have 

risked going to trial and would have rejected the plea offer. 

This claim would be colorable were it not for the fact that the misdemeanor 

offenses are not lesser-included offenses. The State correctly points out that that an offense is a “lesser included” offense of another only when “the 

greater offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing the lesser offense.” See, e.g., State v. Wall, 126 P.3d 148, 151 (Ariz. S. Ct. 2006). Because one may commit forgery (the greater offense) without ever 

committing the possessing a forged ticket for sports admission (the lesser offense), possessing a forged ticked is not a lesser-included offense of 

forgery. 

(Doc. 9-2, Ex. T, at 77-78.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the decision finding that “the court’s ruling 

with respect to prosecutorial discretion was not inconsistent with Arizona law.” (Doc. 9-2, 

Ex. Z, at 131.) 

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The misdemeanor offense of possessing a forged sports ticket is not a lesserincluded offense of the felony forgery offense. Petitioner argues that counsel should have 

asked for a grand jury to redetermine the correct charge in this case. But the Arizona court 

concluded that the prosecutor had charging discretion under Hankins, 686 P.2d 740. This 

decision was not unreasonable. “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe 

that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 

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prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in 

his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). See also State v. Reed, 

2017 WL 1325647 at ¶ 22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (“Statutes clearly can be related in that 

they address similar conduct, and whether violations are charged is a matter of 

prosecutorial discretion.”). The Arizona courts’ ruling that counsel did not provide 

ineffective assistance was not unreasonable. 

 b. Multiplicity.

Petitioner argues that counsel should have advised him that multiple felony charges 

for possessing forged tickets resulted in a multiplicitous indictment. (Doc. 1 at 16.) 

Petitioner did not raise this claim in his first PCR proceeding. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. T, at 75.) In 

Petitioner’s second PCR proceedings, the trial court found that Petitioner waived this claim 

when he pleaded guilty, the claim was untimely, and the claim was not colorable. (Doc. 13-

1, at 55-56.) 

 1. Waiver. 

 The Court elects to bypass the question of whether Petitioner has waived this claim 

by pleading guilty. Typically, independent claims relating to the deprivation of 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea are waived. Tollett v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (finding that a petitioner who has pled guilty may 

only contest the voluntariness of the plea and may not allege other violations of antecedent 

constitutional rights). But a multiplicity claim implicates the Due Process Clause and is 

likely an exception to that rule. A “‘plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that 

judged on its face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.’ Id.

Multiplicity may be such a claim. However, because the multiplicity claim would fail on 

its merits (see below), the Court need not decide whether it is waived.” Valenzuela v. Ryan, 

No. CV-15-01895-PHX-ROS 2016 WL 5683989, at *2, (D. Ariz. 2016) (citing Menna v. 

New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 (1975); United States v. Chilaca, 909 F.3d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against multiple 

criminal punishments for the same offense.”); State v. Powers, 23 P.3d 668, 670, ¶ 5 (Ariz. 

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Ct. App. 2001) (“Multiplicity occurs when an indictment charges a single offense in 

multiple counts . . . rais[ing] the potential for multiple punishments, which implicates 

double jeopardy.”). 

 2. Procedural Default. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this multiplicity claim 

because he did not raise the claim in a timely manner in the state courts. (Doc. 9 at 13.) In 

Petitioner’s second PCR proceedings, the trial court found that Petitioner’s claim was “well 

past” his 90-day filing deadline and that he failed to present any “newly discovered 

evidence” to excuse the untimeliness. (Doc. 12 at 13.) In supplemental briefing, Petitioner 

requests a stay and argues in part that “prior PCR counsel and trial counsel were ineffective 

in assistance by not raising the meritorious points of the 4th Amendment and multiplicity 

claims, by intentionally stonewalling these claims.” (Doc. 12 at 6.) The Court elects to 

bypass a procedural default analysis and discussion under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 

17 (2016) because, regardless, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s performance. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-525 (1997) 

(explaining that the court may bypass the procedural default issue in the interest of judicial 

economy when the merits are clear but the procedural default issues are not).3

 3. Lack of Prejudice.

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate his counsel provided ineffective assistance because 

Petitioner has never established that he would have rejected the prosecutions’ plea offer 

and proceeded to trial if counsel had advised him of this multiplicity argument. In his 

second PCR Petition, Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing and argued competent 

counsel “would have notified his client the charges” were multiplicitous. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. 

EE, at 24.) Assuming arguendo that counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding his 

 

3 See also May v. Ryan, 2019 WL 1376034, at *1 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (finding insufficient proof “that trial counsel’s failure to object to the constitutionality of the statute placing the burden of proving lack of intent on the defendant” fell ‘below an 

objective standard of reasonableness’”); United States v. Chilaca, 909 F.3d 289, 295 (9th Cir. 2018) (simultaneous possession of pornography images on the separate media resulted in multiplicitous charges). 

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multiplicity claim, Petitioner fails to prove Strickland prejudice. In its ruling dismissing 

Petitioner’s second PCR petition, the trial court found: 

One problem with the Defendant’s claim is that he does not clearly allege that he would have rejected the plea offer – had he known of the legal issues—which is a legal predicate to relief. Id. Instead, he asks for a new 

sentence or that evidence be suppressed. See Petition, p.3. Thus, the claim is not colorable. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 56.) 

Petitioner has not offered any objective evidence to demonstrate that he would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have instead insisted on going to trial but for his attorney’s 

alleged deficiencies. “In the context of pleas, a defendant must show the outcome of the 

plea process would have been different with competent advice.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 

156, 163 (2012). “In order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985). In a supplemental Reply, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s ruling “was the 

most ridiculous ruling I have ever heard. . . .” (Doc. 12 at 8.) He states that “[w]hen a 

person states whether to ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ a plea. To ‘reject’ is a clear statement he would 

have intended to go to trial had he known of the legal issues.” (Id.) But Petitioner has not 

argued that he would have proceeded to trial in this case. Here, Petitioner asks the Court to 

“[d]ismiss the case or remand for evidentiary hearing for new grand jury determination and 

multiplicitous indictment.” (Doc. 1 at 11.)4

 

4

 Petitioner’s filings reflect a belief that all but one of his counts would be dismissed 

and he would merely finish his current three-year prison sentence. In his second PCR 

Petition, Petitioner argued that the remedy would be “dismissing all but one of the charges by vacating the multiple conviction and the concurrent sentence.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. EE, at 23.) In the Reply, he asserted the “egregious multiplicitous violation should result in one 

of the charged being vacated. The remaining charge should be reversed.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. GG, at 51.) But this is not what would happen to Petitioner because he pleaded guilty pursuant to plea stipulations. If Petitioner prevailed on a multiplicity claim, Petitioner’s plea and plea agreement would likely be vacated, he would face a single Forgery charge, and Petitioner would then face a trial or renewed plea negotiations. See Gunn v. Ignacio, 263 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding to the state court for “such other relief as the 

state court deems appropriate”). 

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Petitioner had at least two prior felony convictions5 (doc. 9-1, Ex. D, at 23), 

committed on two separate dates (doc. 9-1, Ex. H, at 64), and faced a presumptive term of 

imprisonment of ten years for just one count of Forgery if sentenced with two prior felony 

convictions. A.R.S. § 13–703(J). Petitioner has failed to address whether he would have 

rejected the plea offer and instead proceeded to trial (with the potential of facing numerous 

additional years of imprisonment). Petitioner’s plea agreement provided for a sentence of 

three to six years imprisonment for Count One, with consecutive probation for Count Two. 

(Doc. 9-1, Ex. D, at 23.) Petitioner could have received a term more than three times the 

length of his current sentence had he not pleaded guilty, so he has not shown that “but for” 

counsel’s alleged deficiency the outcome of the plea process would have been different. 

See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (“Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily 

influenced by . . . the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be 

offered and accepted.”). The trial court found that Petitioner failed to argue prejudice 

regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus found his claim was not colorable. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 56.) Petitioner’s claim would fail under a deferential or de novo standard. See 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (reviewing de novo the question of Strickland 

prejudice in the absence of a state court ruling). 

V. Ground Two – Vindictive Prosecution. 

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues the prosecutor “was vindictive” when she filed 

the 16-count indictment and “she previously convicted the defendant and was targeting 

him.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) He argues that the prosecutor chose to charge him with multiple counts 

of forgery for a single transaction and opted to charge the offenses as class four felonies 

rather than class one misdemeanors out of a desire to “harshly punish the defendant because 

 

5

 Petitioner’s plea agreement reflects the two prior, Arizona felony convictions. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. G, at 53.) During sentencing, the prosecution advised the court that “one of 

the reasons we reset this is because there is a federal prior that the defendant has . . . .” 

(Doc. 9-1, Ex. H, at 59.) An Eastern District of Missouri conviction for a “Shawn Turner” 

for Produce, Use, or Traffic in Counterfeit Access Devices was entered on March 08, 2012. 

(See Appendix A.) The Indictment alleges possession of fraudulent World Series tickets 

with intent to defraud. (See Appendix B.) 

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she prosecuted him previously and knew he could get away with it.” (Id.) 

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not present this 

claim in his PCR Petition.6

 In his PCR Petition, Petitioner raised two claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. M, at 4.) Since Petitioner did not “fairly present” these 

claims and is now time-barred from doing so, he has procedurally defaulted them here as 

well. Petitioner provides no cause to excuse the procedural default of this claim. 

VI. Ground Three – Abuse of Discretion by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief because the Arizona Court of Appeals 

abused its discretion by failing to “review the case close enough to establish all the errors 

that took place and rectify them.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Specifically, he argues that the court of 

appeals “should have discovered this was an issue with Double Jeopardy Clause by 

‘multiplicitous’ charges and remanded the case to correct the error.” (Id.) 

Claims alleging procedural errors arising during post-conviction relief proceedings 

are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “[F]ederal habeas 

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law,” Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780, and “it is not the 

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 72; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “[A] petition alleging errors 

in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable through habeas corpus 

proceedings.” Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 331 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). See also Ochoa v. John Ontiveros, 

2009 WL 1125320, at *19 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding denial of evidentiary hearing in PCR 

proceedings was not cognizable on habeas review). This Court is therefore barred from 

considering Ground Three. 

VII. Ground Four – Unreasonable Search and Seizure. 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges his rights against unreasonable search and seizure 

 

6

 Petitioner raised a claim of vindictive prosecution, including a claim of racially motivated discrimination, in his petition for review from the dismissal of his first PCR 

proceeding (doc. 9-2, Ex. W, at 84), but not when he filed his pro se PCR petition in the trial court. Petitioner was required to fairly present his claim in both courts. 

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under the Fourth Amendment were violated when officers “devised a plan of surprise [sic] 

attack to intimidate [him]” and “used psychological manipulation to search [his] bag 

unlawfully. (Doc. 1 at 9.) He claims that his consent to the search was coerced and that he 

was not told he was free to leave. (Doc. 1 at 32.) 

 This claim is barred by Stone v. Powell, 429 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone bars a federal 

court from granting habeas relief on a Fourth Amendment claim unless a petitioner has 

been denied a “full and fair litigation” of the claim. Id. at 482. Petitioner had the 

opportunity to litigate this claim previously, and does not argue otherwise. 

 Also, Petitioner pleaded guilty, so he may not challenge the merits of the police 

search. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. See also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983) 

(“[W]hen a defendant is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a trial, the validity 

of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged Fourth Amendment violation because 

the conviction does not rest in any way on the evidence that may have been improperly 

seized.”); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 136-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (petitioner’s guilty plea 

barred habeas consideration of claims, which included claim of an unlawful search). 

VIII. Request for a Stay. 

 On January 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a “Reply to Answer for Dismissal of Writ of 

Habeas Corpus Without Prejudice.” (Doc. 10.) Petitioner requests the Court dismiss the 

Petition “in order to return at a later date.” (Id. at 2.) Petitioner argues that his second PCR 

Petitioner “should resolve the 4th Amendment and multiplicitous errors of law shortly.” 

(Id.) 

 The Court recommends that the request to dismiss the Petition without prejudice be 

denied. Petitioner’s claims are sufficiently presented that the Court can rule on them. In the 

alternative, Petitioner states that “if the Court here denied the dismissal without prejudice 

we would still argue the mixed petition, requesting an extension of time to be granted to 

do so.” (Id.) Petitioner requests a stay “pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005).” 

(Doc. 12.) 

 Generally, the Court has authority to stay consideration of a case. Rhines, 544 U.S. 

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at 276 (“District courts do ordinarily have authority to issue stays, where such a stay would 

be a proper exercise of discretion.”). But a stay is appropriate “only in limited 

circumstances” where “there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his 

claims first in state court.” Id. at 277. Here, Petitioner presents no good cause for his failure 

to exhaust his multiplicity claim. The trial court found that Petitioner made “no showing” 

that his claim was newly discovered. (Doc. 12 at 14.) Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim 

is barred from review. The Court recommends the request for a stay be denied. 

IX. Conclusion. 

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims 

are timely, but vague and meritless. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

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 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 6th day of May, 2019. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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