Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00037/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00037-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GLEN I. TAYLOR, #127 254, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-CV-37-TMH 

) [WO]

CYNTHIA DILLARD, )

)

Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Glen Taylor, an inmate incarcerated at the Fountain Correctional Facility

located in Atmore, Alabama, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on December 29, 2011. In 1 2

this complaint, Plaintiff mounts a challenge to the constitutionality of Alabama's parole

process. Seeking declaratory relief, Plaintiff brings this action against Cynthia Dillard, the

Plaintiff submitted his complaint on a form for use in filing an action under the provisions of 42 1

U.S.C. § 1983. While he requests that the instant matter be allowed to proceed as a declaratory action

pursuant to Rule 57, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201), the proper avenue is a

§ 1983 action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (prisoner may bring § 1983 action for declaratory

and injunctive relief challenging constitutionality of state parole procedures).

Although the Clerk of this court stamped the complaint and request to proceed as a pauper 2

“received” on January 12, 2012, the inmate account statement in support of Plaintiff's in forma pauperis

motion was signed by a notary on December 29, 2011. Doc. No. 3 at 3. Thus, it is clear that Plaintiff had

these documents within his possession at such time and, therefore, could not have submitted them to prison

officials for mailing prior to December 29, 2011. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s complaint is

deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272

(1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, th

780 (11 Cir. 1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this th

court] must assume that [the instant complaint and ifp request] w[ere] delivered to prison authorities the day

[Taylor] signed [them] ....” Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11 Cir. 2001). In light of th

the foregoing, the court considers December 29, 2011, as the date of filing. 

Case 2:12-cv-00037-TMH-SRW Document 23 Filed 03/27/14 Page 1 of 21
Executive Director for the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles.3

 Defendant filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing

Plaintiff's claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it

appropriate to treat Defendant's report as a motion for summary judgment. This case is now

pending on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion,

the evidentiarymaterials filed in support thereof, and Plaintiff's response in opposition to the

motion, the court concludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be

granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. th

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 4

In accordance with the prior proceedings, orders, and opinions of the court, Plaintiff's complaint 3

against the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles was dismissed. See Doc. Nos. 12, 13.

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and 4

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,

“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c),

changing only one word -- genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of

a summary-judgment determination.“ Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary

judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and,

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for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of

material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-324.

 Defendant has met her evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims properly before this court. Thus,

the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings,

that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604,

608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to th

properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of

fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other

materials] the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials --

including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A

genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that

therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at

1263. 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive Defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is required

to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting

his claim(s) for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule

56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party

relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be

granted.” Id. at 249-250. 

A plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient evidence to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11 Cir. 1995); Fullman v. th

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11 Cir. 1984). Consequently, when a party fails to make th

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes v. Southwest

Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607 (11 Cir. 1987). Where all the materials before the th

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court indicate that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for

summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11 Cir. 1987). th

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro

se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine dispute of material fact.

Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, th

Plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of elementary

principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate

a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. 

Matsushita, supra. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Parole Outside the Two-Year Period of Limitation

Plaintiff complains that false information was used to denyhimparole at his July 2009

parole hearing. Doc. No. 1 at 18. It is clear from the face of the complaint that any claim

relative to Plaintiff's denial of parole in July 2009 is barred by the statute of limitations

applicable to actions filed by an inmate in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

All constitutional claims brought [by an inmate] under § 1983 are tort actions,

subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the

state where the § 1983 action has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.

261, 275-76, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). [The

plaintiff’s] claim was brought in Alabama where the governing limitations

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period is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d

1480, 1483 (11 Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order to have his claim th

heard, [the plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the date the

limitations period began to run. 

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11 Cir. 2008). th

In the complaint, Plaintiffreferences a parole consideration proceeding and an adverse

decision that transpired prior to December 29, 2009. The tolling provision of Ala. Code §

6-2-8(a) is inapplicable. Thus, the statute of limitations with respect to actions which 5

occurred on or before December 29, 2009, expired prior to Plaintiff's filing the instant

complaint. 

Unquestionably, the statute of limitations is usually a matter which may be raised as

an affirmative defense. The court notes, however, that in an action proceeding under section

1983, it may consider, sua sponte, affirmative defenses that are apparent from the face of the

complaint. Clark v. Georgia Pardons and Parole Board, 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11 Cir. th

1990); see also Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438 (5 Cir. 1990). “[I]f the district court sees that an th

affirmative defense would defeat the action, a section 1915[(e)(2)(B)(I)] dismissal is

allowed.” Clark, 915 F.2d at 640. “The expiration of the statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense the existence of which warrants dismissal as frivolous. See Franklin [v.

State of Oregon], 563 F.Supp. [1310] at 1330, 1332.” Id. at n.2. 

If an individual who seeks to commence a civil action “is, at the time the right accrues ... insane” the running 5

of the limitation period is tolled until “termination of the disability....” not to exceed “20 years from the time the claim

or right accrued.” Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a). 

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In analyzing § 1983 cases, “the court is authorized to test the proceeding for

frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of the

answer.” Ali, 892 F.2d at 440. “It necessarily follows that in the absence of ... defendants 

the ... court must evaluate the merit of the claim sua sponte.” Id.

An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a

significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce

resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free

them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners

(because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give meritorious

claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take advantage of

every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179,

182 (5th Cir. 1985)].

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5 Cir. 1986). th

Based on the facts presented in the complaint, Plaintiff has no legal basis on which

to proceed with respect to the parole decision issued prior to December 29, 2009, as he filed

this cause of action two or more years after any such decision. As previously determined,

the statutory tolling provision provides no basis for relief. In light of the foregoing, the court

concludes that Plaintiff’s challenge to the parole consideration process and/or denial of

parole which occurred on or before December 29, 2009, is barred by the applicable statute

of limitations. 

B. The Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff, who received a life sentence in 1980 upon his conviction for carnal

knowledge of a victim under twelve years of age, maintains that the Board discriminates

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against inmates with respect to the grant or denial of parole based on the nature of the

offense. He asserts that, "upon information and belief," the Board has granted parole to 6

individuals convicted of sex offenses at a substantially lower rate over the past several years

than to individuals convicted of non-sex related offenses, i.e., "at a ratio of some 5 to 1 of all

other offenders." Doc. No. 1 at 8. Plaintiff further claims that parole is granted at a

substantially disproportionate lower rate to white-surnamed prisoners than to comparable

black-surnamed prisoners. Id. at 9. These claims provide no basis for relief. 

In order to present a claim of discrimination cognizable under the Equal Protection

Clause, “a prisoner must [at a minimum] demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other

prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious

discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other

constitutionally protected basis. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001); th

Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986).” th

Sweet v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006) th

(emphasis added). “[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it

results in a ... disproportionate impact.... [An allegation] of ... discriminatory intent or

purpose [related to a constitutionally protected interest] is required to [set forth] a violation

of the Equal Protection Clause.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

The Board granted Plaintiff parole in 1996. The Board revoked his parole in 2007 following his 6

guilty plea at parole court for "public intoxication" and "use of alcohol against parole officer's direction."

Plaintiff was denied parole in 2009 and reset for parole consideration in June 2012. See Doc. No. 18 at 6.

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Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies

more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the

decision maker ... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not

merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator

of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted); see

also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). In a case such as this one, where

Plaintiff challenges actions of parole officials, exceptionally clear proof of discrimination is

required. Fuller v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11 Cir. th

1988). The mere differential treatment of similarly situated inmates, without more, fails to

allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. E & T Realty Company v. Strickland, 830

F.2d 1107 (11 Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. th

279, 292 (1987) (claims of mere disparity of treatment or even arbitrary administration of

state power are insufficient to establish discrimination violative of equal protection).

Plaintiff's contention that he has been discriminated against in the parole consideration

process because, as a convicted sex offender, he is less likely to be paroled than an inmate

convicted of a non-sex related offense is meritless. Neither inmates nor sex offenders 

constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitling such persons to “strict scrutiny” of

disparate government treatment. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to identify any similarly situated

prisoners who received more favorable treatment from the Board and, thus, his equal

protection claim necessarily fails because he has not alleged that he was treated differently

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from other, similarly situated inmates. See Sweet , 467 F.3d at 1318-1319. 

Plaintiff speculates that "the number of white-surnamed prisoners as [a] percentage

of the total prison population are disproportionately denied parole by a substantial margin 

than the number of black-surnamed prisoners," and that the median time served bywhite surnamed prisoners prior to being paroled is substantially greater than the median time served

prior to parole by black-surnamed prisoners with "comparable sentences." Doc. No. 1 at 9-

10. As with his nature-of-conviction challenge, Plaintiff's race-based challenge fails to

identify any similarly situated prisoners who received more favorable treatment from the

Board. See Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1318-1319. Further, Plaintiff has generally alleged

discrimination, but has not identified any non-speculative, specific facts tending to suggest

that any of the treatment he allegedly received from the Board was based on invidious racial

discrimination. Plaintiff’s bald suspicions of discrimination are unsupported by specific

factual allegations, and they are, therefore, insufficient to state a claim for a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause. See Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[T]he tenet that

a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported bymere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); see also Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014,

1036 n. 16 (11 Cir. 2001) (“[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law th

have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”); see also Smith v.

Regional Director of Florida Dept. of Corrections, 368 Fed.Appx. 9, 12, (11 Cir. 2010). th

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C. The Due Process Claim

Plaintiff makes various broad arguments concerning Ala. Code § 15-22-26 (1975),

which governs the authority of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant parole to

inmates. The pertinent portion of this statute reads as follows:

No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good

conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the

Board of Pardons and Paroles is of the opinion that there is reasonable

probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty

without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the

welfare of society.... 

Ala. Code § 15-22-26. 

Plaintiff argues that § 15-22-26 is unconstitutionally vague, fails to give paroleeligible inmates sufficient notice of the requirements ofsuitability for parole, and creates the

insurmountable task of requiring the Board to possess the requisite personal knowledge of

each parole-eligible inmate's suitability for parole. Plaintiff also argues that this code

provision fails to define the parameters of the statute; requires the Board to predict future

behavior, a "task that is humanly impossible"; and is so nebulous as to grant uncontrolled

power and unlimited discretion to the Board in making its parole decisions. These

deficiencies, Plaintiff claims, "necessarily lead[] to decision-making on an ad hoc and

subjective basis with the attendant danger of arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory

application." See Doc. No. 1 at 5-7.

The statute challenged by Plaintiff does not address constitutional freedoms or 

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identify unlawful conduct but merely sets forth the standards members of the Board must

follow prior to granting an inmate parole. Upon its application of the void-for-vagueness

doctrine, the court concludes that the challenged code section is not unconstitutionallyvague.

“A rule that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct is void for vagueness only if

it is impermissibly vague in all its applications. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The test is

whether the enactment is substantially incomprehensible. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d

1030, 1033 (5 Cir. May 1981), cert. den., Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Assn. of Petroleum th

Retailers, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S.Ct. 430, 70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981).” Woodruff v. United States

Dept. of Labor, Office of Workers Compensation Program, 954 F.2d 634, 643, rehearing

denied, 961 F.2d 224 (11 Cir. 1992). The statute at issue is substantially comprehensible th

with respect to establishing the standards for release of inmates on parole. The guidelines

set forth in § 15-22-26 “provide explicit standards for those who apply them” and “give the

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is [required].” 

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222

(1972). The mere fact the statute provides for use of discretion and reliance on personal

opinion does not render it impermissibly vague or arbitrary. As the Alabama Supreme Court

correctly determined:

[The inmate] contends that § 15-22-26 is unconstitutionally vague on

its face or as it is administered by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. “A statute

that does not concern First Amendment freedoms or the definition of criminal

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conduct may be declared unconstitutionally vague ‘onlyif a person of ordinary

intelligence, exercising common sense, can derive no rule or standard at all

from the statute's language.’ Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So.2d 208, 213

(Ala.1988).” State v. Blake, 642 So.2d 959, 962 (Ala.1994). Section 15-22-26

is a typical parole statute that gives the parole board total discretion in the

granting of paroles. Tedder v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 677 So.2d

1261, 1263 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1008, 116 S.Ct. 2531, 135

L.Ed.2d 1054 (1996); see also Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 488-89 (11th

Cir. 1982). Because the statute provides that parole may be granted at the

board’s discretion, it does not confer a liberty interest in parole that is

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. E.g., Tedder, 677 So.2d at 1263. The discretion

granted to the parole board by § 15-22-26 does not, however, make the statute

vague; rather, it gives the board the authority to consider each parole

application individually.

Section 15-22-26 ... is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as it

is administered by the board; [the inmate’s] contentions are meritless.

Thompson v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 806 So.2d 374, 375 (Ala. 2001). 

The Alabama parole statute governing standards for parole of inmates is a typical

parole statute which vests discretion in the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. Ellard

v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 942 (11 Cir. 1987); Thomas, 691

th

F.2d at 489. There is nothing unconstitutionally vague about the statute. Moreover, the

Alabama parole scheme has been reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on

numerous occasions; that court has acknowledged the constitutionality of the discretion

accorded the Board and continuously stressed “that absent flagrant or unauthorized action

by a parole board the discretionary power vested in a parole board will not be interfered with

by the Federal courts.” Id. Based on the foregoing, Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.

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D. The Attendance at Parole Hearings Claim

Plaintiff complains that Ala. Code § 15-22-23 is disadvantageous to inmates because

they are not permitted to attend parole hearings. The inability to be present at parole

hearings, Plaintiff claims, implicates an inmate's due process rights because incorrect

information that may be brought before the Board by persons who are notified pursuant to

Ala. Code § 15-22-23 that an inmate is being considered for parole cannot be "refuted and

challenged," and because the statute also allows "the judiciary" to be present at parole

hearings and to "re-litigate" the issues of an inmate's criminal case. Doc. No. 1 at 11-12. 

There is no constitutional right to confront a witness or evidence brought against a

prisoner in a parole hearing, and there is no corresponding right to cross examine members

of the Parole Board or persons who provide statements to members of the Board. See Tarlton

v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (denying alleged “right to cross examine

members of the parole board”). The State of Alabama provides only for the possibility of

parole. The law is well settled that “the mere possibility of parole provides simply ‘a hope

that is not protected by due process....’ ... [Moreover], the Alabama parole statute frames the

Parole Board’s authority in discretionary terms, and thus does not create for Alabama

prisoners a protected liberty interest in the expectation of parole. See Thomas v. Sellers, 691

F.2d 487 (11 Cir. 1983).” Ellard, 824 F.2d at 942; Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska th

Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (the protections of the Due Process

Clause do not attach to the procedures for granting parole). Absent the existence of a

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constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, “the procedures followed in making the

parole determination are not required to comport with the standards of fundamental fairness.” 

O’Kelley v. Snow, 53 F.3d 319, 321 (11 Cir. 1995); Slocum v. Georgia State Board of th

Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940, 942 (11 Cir. 1982). Because Plaintiff's challenge to th

his inability to attend parole hearings fails to implicate any constitutional right to which he

is entitled, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

E. The Parole Eligibility Date Claim

The minimumsentence to be served before a parole-eligible inmate can be considered

for parole is found in Ala. Code § 15-22-28(e). This section provides that "[t]he board shall

not grant a parole to any prisoner who has not served at least one third or 10 years of his

sentence, whichever is the lesser, except by a unanimous affirmative vote of the board." 

Plaintiff complains, however, that ninety percent of the time the hearing date is "some six (6)

months delinquent," in violation of the Due Process Clause. Doc. No. 1 at 15.

Plaintiff's contention that Ala. Code § 15-22-28(e) creates a protectable expectancy

in parole consideration at a specific time and, therefore, the consideration process must

comport with due process is foreclosed by Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941-942. In Slocum the

Eleventh Circuit deemed such a “unique theory ... without merit.” 678 F.2d at 942. The

relevant portion of the Court’s opinion reads as follows: 

Petitioner argues that even if there is no statutorily created liberty

interest in parole, particular [statutoryparole] provisions... create a protectable

entitlement to parole consideration. Specifically, petitioner cites the

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requirement ... that parole consideration “shall be automatic” upon the

expiration of a set period of confinement and language ... that the board

include in the parole file “as complete information as may be practically

available....” If these provisions create a protectable expectancy in parole

consideration, petitioner argues that the consideration must comport with due

process standards. Petitioner’s unique theory is without merit. Unless there

is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making the parole

determination are not required to comport with standards of fundamental

fairness. See Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 429 th

U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 308, 50 L.Ed.2d 283 (1976). In Staton v. Wainwright, 665

F.2d 686 (5 Cir. 1982) (former Fifth Circuit decision), the court concluded th

that no liberty interest in parole was created by the Florida statutes. The court,

therefore, rejected appellant’s claim that his due process rights were violated

when he did not receive an initial parole interview within the time required

under the parole laws. The analysis in Staton was adopted by the Eleventh

Circuit in Hunter v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 674 F.2d 847

(11 Cir. 1982), where the court held that no due process violation could be th

shown through an allegation that the Florida Parole and Probation Commission

improperly calculated a prisoner’s “presumptive parole release date.” 

Accordingly, in the instant case petitioner[’s] ... allegation that the ... parole

board has not accorded him adequate parole consideration does not entitle him

to [relief]. 

Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942.

As explained, Plaintiff does not possess a liberty interest in being granted parole that

is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Heard v. Georgia State Board

of Pardons and Paroles, 222 Fed. Appx. 838, 840 (11 Cir. 2007); Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 th

F.2d 1437, 1441 (11 Cir. 1991); Ellard, 824 F.2d at 941-942; Thomas, 691 F.2d at 488-489. th

Thus, the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply to

the determination of dates for parole consideration. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942 (failure to

provide parole review within time required under parole laws or properly calculate

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presumptive date of release on parole does not constitute a violation of due process). 

F. The Variance Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the disparity between Ala. Code § 15-22-54 and Ala. Code § 15-

22-32(a), with regard to the amount of time an inmate is returned to prison for technical

violations of probation in comparison with technical violations committed by a parolee,

amounts to a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due

process and his right to be free from excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7

As a parolee revoked for a technical violation, Plaintiff complains that the Board has

discretion to require him to serve his life sentence, but a probationer guilty of the same

technical violation may be returned to state custody for no more than 90 days. Doc. No. 1

at 15-16. 

Plaintiff seeks to have legislation governing different forms of conditional release to

be applied in a similar manner. The Equal Protection Clause, however, requires similar

treatment of persons in similar situations. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d at 946-47. Thus, in order

to invoke equal protection scrutiny with respect to his claim, Plaintiff must establish that the

challenged statutes treat similarly situated people unequally. Plaintiff fails to meet this

Ala. Code § 15-22-54(d)(1)(f) provides, in part: “If the probation violation is a technical violation, 7

defined as a violation of a condition of probation other than the commission of a new offense, an eligible

offender may be required to serve a term of not more than 90 days imprisonment....” Ala. Code § 15-22-

32(a) provides, in part: "Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a prisoner who has been paroled

has violated his or her parole, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, at its next meeting, shall declare the prisoner

to be delinquent, and time owed shall date from the delinquency. . ."

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burden, as he has offered no evidence identifying any other similarly situated inmate who

received more favorable treatment. Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 Fed.Appx. 771, 776 (11 Cir.

th

2005). The fact that the two statutes affect different people in different ways does not state

an equal protection claim. 

Plaintiff also argues that revocation of his parole for a technical violation subjects him

to a life sentence in violation of his right to be free of excessive punishment as compared

with a probationer revoked for a similar technical violation who is only required to remain

in custody for 90 days. The Eighth Amendment proscribes those conditions of confinement

which involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337 (1981). Only actions which deny an inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities” are grave enough to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment. Id. at 347; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). By

revoking Plaintiff's parole, the Board did not impose a new sentence. Rather, it did no more

then return him to prison to serve the remainder of a sentence previously imposed by the

court of conviction. This conduct does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. Instead, Plaintiff's claimin relation thereto reflects “merelya disappointment rather

than a punishment of cruel and unusual proportions.” Damiano, 785 F.2d 929, 933.

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

G. The False Information Claim

Plaintiff alleges that at his parole hearing in July 2009 the District Attorney for

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Jefferson County and the Attorney General presented false information. Plaintiff complains

that much of this "mis-information" is still in his prison file because the Board has failed to

correct it. Doc. No. 1 at 18. 

Plaintiff's attempt to challenge the veracity of information contained in his prison file

fails to state a claim against Defendant Dillard who not only exercises no authority in

decisions to grant or deny an inmate parole, but also has no responsibility for the contents

of Plaintiff's prison file. See Doc. No. 18 at 5-6. Even if Plaintiff presented this claim against

an appropriate defendant, he must do more than make vague and conclusory assertions of

constitutional violations in his complaint. See Jones, 279 F.3d 944, 946 (while use of false

information in a parole file can be a due process violation, prisoners cannot make a

conclusory allegation regarding the use of such information as the basis of a due process

claim); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ( to state a viable

claim, the pleader must provide “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”). Defendant Dillard is due to be granted summary

judgment on this claim. 

H. Class Action Request

Plaintiff requests in his complaint that this case be certified as a class action under

Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff, however, cannot adequately represent

the interests of the putative class. Among the requirements which litigants must meet in

order to maintain an action as a class action is that a class representative must “fairly and

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adequately protect the interests of the class.” Rule 23(a)(4), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. While a pro se litigant may bring his own claims to federal court, he may not

litigate the claims of others. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The competence of a layman is “clearly 8

too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.” Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405,

1407 (4th Cir.1975); see also Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 623 (4 Cir. 1981); Ethnic th

Awareness Organization v. Gagnon, 568 F.Supp. 1186, 1187 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Inmates,

Washington County Jail v. England, 516 F. Supp. 132, 144 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). Thus,

Plaintiff’s request to certify this case as a class action is due to be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Plaintiff's motion for class certification (Doc. No. 1) be DENIED;

2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18) be GRANTED; 

3. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff,

4. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; and

5. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against Plaintiff.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before April 9, 2014, the parties may file an objection to the

28 U.S.C. § 1654 provides:

8

In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases

personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted 

to manage and conduct causes therein.

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Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainright,

677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. th

1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc), th

adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 27th day of March, 2014.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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