Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00541/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00541-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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Although this petition was date-stamped “received” in this court on July 9, 2008, it was

signed by Robinson on July 3, 2008. Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se inmate’s petition is

deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing, presumptively the date it is

signed by the petitioner. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams v. United States,

173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

OCIE ROBINSON, # 108238, )

 )

 Petitioner, )

 )

v ) Civil Action No. 2:08cv541-TMH

 ) (WO)

GRANT CULLIVER, et al., )

 )

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the court on a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 filed on July 3, 2008, by Alabama prisoner Ocie Robinson (“Robinson”).1

 Robinson

is currently serving a sentence of life without parole, imposed in 1986 by the Circuit Court

of Montgomery County, Alabama. At the time of his 1986 conviction, Robinson had three

prior felony convictions. Under the Alabama habitual offender law then in effect,

Robinson’s sentence of life without parole was mandatory, with the sentencing judge

permitted no discretion. See Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-5-9(c)(3).

The Alabama legislature subsequently amended § 13A-5-9, such that trial

judges were granted authority to retroactively consider early parole sentences

for non-violent, convicted offenders based on evaluations performed by the

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Alabama Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and approved by the Board of

Pardons, provided that such offenders had no prior Class A felony convictions.

The Alabama Supreme Court recently held in Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968,

971-72 (Ala. 2004), that Alabama trial courts now have authority to consider

prisoners’ motions for reduction of sentence under that statute....

Under the [amended] Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act

(“AHFOA”), in all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been

previously convicted of any three felonies, none of which are Class A felonies,

and after such convictions has committed another felony, which is a Class A

felony, such defendant must be punished by imprisonment for life or life

without the possibility of parole, in the discretion of the trial court. Ala. Code

1975 § 13A-5-9(c)(3). In 2001, the Alabama legislation adopted a statute

which provided as follows:

The provisions of Section 13A-5-9 [including §

13A-5-9(c)(3), described above,] shall be applied retroactively

by the sentencing judge or presiding judge for consideration of

early parole of each nonviolent convicted offender based on

evaluations performed by the Department of Corrections and

approved by the Board of Pardons and Paroles and submitted to

the court.

Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-5-9.1.

....

[In Kirby], the Alabama Supreme Court held that “§ 13A-5-9.1 provides that

an inmate may ask the sentencing judge or the presiding judge for relief from

a previous sentence imposed pursuant to the [A]HFOA and provides that the

court is to consider the evaluation of the DOC in considering the inmate’s

motion.” Kirby, 899 So.2d at 971. The court further held that § 13A-5-9

“confers jurisdiction on the sentencing judge or the presiding judge by giving

that judge the power to apply the provisions of §13A-5-9 retroactively to

‘nonviolent convicted offenders’.” Id. Thus, state trial judges have

jurisdiction to consider an Alabama prisoner’s motion to reconsider his

sentence and the authority under the statute to determine whether the prisoner

is a nonviolent offender based on factors brought before the judge in the

record of the case and information submitted by the DOC and the Parole

Board. Id. at 974.

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The exact date of that filing is not apparent from Robinson’s habeas petition.

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Curry v. Culliver, 141 Fed.Appx. 832, 833-834 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). 

Robinson filed a motion for reduction of sentence under § 13A-5-9.1 with the

Montgomery County Circuit Court.2

 After that court denied his motion, Robinson filed this

federal habeas petition. In his petition, Robinson claims that he qualifies for a sentence

reduction under § 13A-5-9.1 and that the trial court’s denial of his motion constituted a

denial of due process and equal protection of the law. See Attachment to Habeas Petition

(Doc. No. 1-2) at pp. 1-2. Upon review of the claims presented by Robinson and in light of

applicable federal law, the court concludes that Robinson is not entitled to federal habeas

relief.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Due Process

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” (Emphasis added). “‘A state’s interpretation of its own laws and rules

provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature

is involved.’ Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations

omitted).” Curry, 141 Fed.Appx. at 834. Robinson asserts that he has been denied due

process by the state court’s denial of his motion for reduction of sentence because he has

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“met the criteria” for a reduction under § 13A-5-9.1 laid down by the Alabama Supreme

Court in Kirby. Attachment to Habeas Petition (Doc. No. 1-2) at p. 2. “This is purely a

question of state law, and, as such, provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See

Carrizales, 699 F.2d at 1055.” Curry, 141 Fed.Appx. at 834. 

B. Equal Protection 

Robinson makes the conclusory assertion that the trial court acted in violation of his

equal protection rights in denying the motion for reduction of sentence, because “similar

situated and/or worse situated prisoners throughout the State of Alabama have been granted

a sentence reduction under § 13A-5-9.1” Attachment to Habeas Petition (Doc. No. 1-2) at

p. 2.

In order to set forth a claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, “a prisoner

must demonstrate that (1) ‘he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received’ more

favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally

protected interest such as race. Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929,

932-33 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-947 (11th Cir. 2001).

Additionally, to succeed on an equal protection challenge, the petitioner must demonstrate

the existence of discriminatory intent; arbitrary action without discriminatory intent is

insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Jones v. White, 992

F.2d 1548, 1573 (11th Cir. 1993); E & T Realty Company v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11th

Cir. 1987).

[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in

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a ... disproportionate impact.... Proof of ... discriminatory intent or purpose is

required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Discriminatory

purpose ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of

consequences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected ... a particular

course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its

adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation

omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). In a case such as this

one, where an inmate challenges actions of a state court judge, exceptionally clear proof of

discrimination is required. Cf. Fuller v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d

1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988). Moreover, mere differential treatment of convicted felons,

without more, fails to allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. E & T Realty,

supra.; McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (claims of mere disparity of treatment are

insufficient to establish discrimination).

Robinson fails to meet his pleading burden, as he does not contend that the state judge

subjected him to adverse treatment based on some constitutionally impermissible reason nor

has he identified any other similarly situated inmate who received more favorable treatment

from the state court. In short, Robinson sets forth no facts to support his allegation of an

equal protection violation; rather, he simply makes the purely conclusory legal assertion that

the denial of his motion for reduction of sentence deprived him of equal protection. This

assertion fails to set forth a viable equal protection claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned Magistrate Judge

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that:

1. The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Robinson be DENIED.

 2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before September 21, 2008. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court

and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 8th day of September, 2008.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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