Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01590/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01590-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD KUYKENDALL, II,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-1590 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These 

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payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

Screening Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

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Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff states he is innocent until proven guilty and no medical testing for Covid-19 is 

being done. He contends that the Center for Disease Control recommendations are not being met 

for Covid-19. He contends such failures violate the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

the California Constitution, and subject plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff seeks 

money damages and release from custody. 

Discussion

Named Defendants

Plaintiff names three defendants: Superior Court of California; Rio Cosumnes 

Correctional Center, and County of Sacramento. First, the superior court is not a proper 

defendant. The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . 

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Superior Court of California is not a “person” and therefore cannot be 

sued. 

Second, defendants County of Sacramento and the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center 

(which is operated by Sacramento County), together constitute a single defendant: Sacramento 

County. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical 

Reform v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (suit against 

county sheriff equivalent to suit against county).

To state a claim against a local governmental entity (i.e. Sacramento County), a plaintiff 

must allege that a specific “policy or custom” of the agency was the “moving force” causing the 

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alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A 

local governmental entity may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory premised on 

the individual conduct of its subordinates. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Civil Rights v. Habeas Relief

Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint under § 1983 seeks release from custody. However, 

when a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is the 

determination of his entitlement to an earlier or immediate release, his sole federal remedy is a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 

(1973). A federal habeas corpus action is only available if plaintiff has been convicted and has 

exhausted his state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

Fourteenth Amendment1

Governing Standards

Where a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of confinement, however, such claims 

“arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 

1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard under the Fourteenth 

Amendment for a pretrial detainee “differs significantly from the standard relevant to convicted 

prisoners, who may be subject to punishment so long as it does not violate the Eighth 

Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment.” Olivier v. Baca, 913 F.3d 852, 858 

(9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that 

implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, . . . the 

proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979);2see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583-85 (1984). 

1

 Although plaintiff mentions the Sixth Amendment, he raises no facts implicating the Sixth 

Amendment.

2

 In Bell, the Court considered a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

However, the same standards apply to due process claims brought under the Fourteenth 

Amendments. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 n.3 (1976) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 

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“Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the 

constitutional sense[.]” Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. “Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are 

inherent incidents of confinement,” and the fact that detention “interferes with the detainee’s 

understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible 

during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 

‘punishment.’” Id.

Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish by jail officials, “if a particular 

condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 

objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. at 539. Thus, “[r]estraints that 

are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without 

more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting[.]” Id. at 540.

Prison and jail administrators are “accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and 

execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 

discipline and to maintain institutional security,” id. at 547, “unless the record contains 

substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to 

problems of jail security,” Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 

318, 322-23 (2012). “[I]n the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the 

officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to 

their expert judgment in such matters.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

A pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement claim is governed by a purely objective 

standard. See Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124-25.3 A pretrial detainee must therefore show that: (1) a 

imposes no more stringent requirements upon state officials than does the fifth upon their federal 

counterparts.”)

3

 The Ninth Circuit has extended the objective deliberate indifference standard to pretrial 

detainee conditions of confinement claims addressing the denial of medical care, failure to 

protect, and excessive force claims, and Gordon suggests the circuit will extend the standard to all 

pretrial detainee conditions of confinement claims. See Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1120, 1124 & n.2

(citation omitted).

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particular defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 

pretrial detainee was confined; (2) those conditions put him at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though

a reasonable officer in similar circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk --

making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such 

measures, the defendant caused the detainee’s injuries. Id.

With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively

unreasonable, a test that “turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Kingsley 

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court must 

make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what 

the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.

Here, Covid-19 “poses a substantial risk of serious harm” to prisoners. Plata v. Newsome, 

2020 WL 1908776, at *1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70271 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2020). Nonetheless, 

state and county officials are taking steps to reduce such risk. See id. at *1 (noting measures 

implemented to reduce infection and transmission of Covid-19 among state prisoners, including 

through increased sanitation, testing and social distancing). Such efforts must be considered in 

determining whether a defendant’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic is objectively 

unreasonable. 

In the instant complaint, plaintiff alleges generalized concerns that he may be exposed to 

Covid-19 while housed at the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center. He alleges that CDC 

recommendations are not being met, and he is not being tested. But such general allegations are 

insufficient to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. In order to state a cognizable 

claim, plaintiff must specifically identify a defendant’s challenged conduct, explain how such 

conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances, and describe how such conduct harmed 

plaintiff. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (“A person ‘subjects’ another to 

the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is leally required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”) Plaintiff alleges no facts against a 

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properly named defendant that suggest the defendant acted with reckless disregard to plaintiff’s 

conditions of confinement or that such conditions put plaintiff at substantial risk of harm. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. 

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Finally, plaintiff cannot pursue a claim in this court that he has not exhausted through an 

inmate appeal procedures that is available at his place of incarceration. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 

(“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any 

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). Although exhaustion is not 

required “when circumstances render administrative remedies ‘effectively unavailable,’ ” Sapp v. 

Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit requires “a 

good-faith effort on the part of inmates to exhaust a prison's administrative remedies as a 

prerequisite to finding remedies effectively unavailable,” Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2012). The exhaustion requirement accords prisoners the possibility of obtaining more 

immediate and effective relief. The requirement provides an opportunity for correctional officials 

to address complaints internally, thereby deterring frivolous lawsuits and creating an 

administrative record should the matter later proceed to court. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 

516, 525 (2002). “The primary purpose of a grievance . . . is to alert the [jail] to a problem and 

facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2009).

Leave to Amend

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so generalized, vague and 

conclusory that it is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a 

claim for relief, and the complaint must be dismissed. The court, however, grants leave to file an 

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 

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each named defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no 

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 

defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 

F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez 

v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint 

supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation 

omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Failure to timely file an amended complaint will result in a recommendation that this 

action be dismissed without prejudice.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Sheriff of Sacramento County filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original of the Amended Complaint.

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the 

dismissal of this action.

Dated: November 10, 2020

/kuyk1590.14n.cvd

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD KUYKENDALL, II,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-1590 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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