Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06875/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06875-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ROSCOE HILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. BROMMEL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06875-OWW-DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM, WITH PREJUDICE, AND TO DIRECT

CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT

FOR DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST

PLAINTIFF

(Doc. 25)

I. Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Richard Roscoe Hill, Jr., (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding

on plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed August 31, 2006, against defendants Brommel and Clark

(“defendants”) for denial of access to the courts, based on their alleged search of plaintiff’s cell

and removal of plaintiff’s legal documents. On August 30, 2007, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On November 1, 2007, plaintiff

filed his objections to the motion to dismiss. The motion has been deemed submitted. Local

Rule 78-230(m).

B. Legal Standard

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. California

Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering a motion to dismiss for

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failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in

the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The federal

system is one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126

(2002). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and

summary judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of

unmeritorious claims.” Id. at 512. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail

but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear

on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not

be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

C. Discussion

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on January 25, 2002, defendants searched

his cell and removed his legal documents such that he was unable to timely comply with a

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deadline on an appeal (based on newly discovered evidence) which was pending in the Central

District Court.

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2177 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals,

habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354, 2181-82. Claims for denial of access to the

courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained”

(forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-

87 (2002). For backward-looking claims such as that at issue here, plaintiff “must show: 1) the

loss of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the

litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available

in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007).

This court initially found that the allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint were

sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 for denial of access to the courts. 

However, defendants now move for dismissal on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer any

injury as a result of the alleged taking of documents as he did not have an arguable claim on

appeal. In support of their motion, defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of a

number of documents from plaintiff’s previous habeas petitions and criminal appeals – all of

which were denied and/or dismissed. 

“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either

(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate

and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with

the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). The Court may take judicial notice of court

records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 645

F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). 

///

///

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The court takes judicial notice that: 

(1) on August 11, 1995, plaintiff was convicted of first degree murder with the

use of a deadly weapon – Doc. 26, Exh. D-1, pg. 3; 

(2) on July 30, 1997, the California Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition

for review of his direct appeal – Doc. 26, Exh. A;

(3) on October 29, 1997, the California Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s writ

of habeas corpus – Doc. 26, Exh. B; 

(4) on February 24, 1998, plaintiff filed his first federal writ of habeas corpus

– Doc. 26, Exh. C & D-1; 

(5) on October 7, 1998, plaintiff’s first federal writ of habeas corpus was

denied with prejudice – Doc. 26, Exh. D-3; 

(6) on October 26, 1998, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal contesting the denial

of his federal writ of habeas corpus and requesting a certificate of

appealability – Doc. 26, Exh. D-4; 

(7) on November 12, 1998, plaintiff’s request for a certificate of appealability

was denied – Doc. 26, Exh. D-5; 

(8) on January 22, 1999, plaintiff’s file was forwarded to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals – Doc. 26, Exh. D;

(9) on November 19, 1999, the Ninth Circuit denied plaintiff’s request for a

certificate of appealability – Doc. 26, Exh. F-1;

(10) on December 8, 1999, plaintiff petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to

reconsider its denial, which was denied on December 29, 1999 – Doc. 26,

Exh. F-2 & F-3;

(11) on February 1, 2000, plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing – Doc. 26,

Exh. F; 

(12) on June 12, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to hold the proceedings in

abeyance pending his federal habeas petition – Doc. 26, Exh. F; 

(13) the Ninth Circuit did not respond to either of the documents plaintiff filed

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in 2000 – Doc. 26, Exh. F; 

(14) on June 12, 2001, plaintiff filed a second federal writ of habeas corpus

challenging his first degree murder conviction – Doc. 26, Exh. G & G-1;

and

(15) on November 27, 2001 plaintiff’s second federal writ of habeas corpus

was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and judgment was

entered the same day – Doc. 26, Exh. G, G-2 & G-3.

In light of the fact that plaintiff’s prior filings on the issue on appeal were all denied

and/or summarily dismissed, and given that approximately one month prior to January 25, 2002,

plaintiff’s deadline to file an appeal to the dismissal of his second federal writ of habeas corpus

lapsed, plaintiff could not have suffered the “actual injury” of missing a deadline on his pending

appeal as a result of the alleged taking of his legal documents by defendants. 

On November 1, 2007, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Objections to Motion to

Dismiss.” Therein, plaintiff requested production of a number of documents and argued that he

“... had filed the motion under Teague on the grounds he had discovered the Falconer case during

his research during his direct appeal that had not been presented to the courts.” Doc. 29. 

Plaintiff’s belated discovery of legal authority does not qualify as newly discovered evidence nor

as a retroactive new rule of law that was previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)(A) &

(B). Further, plaintiff has failed to provide the cite to “the Falconer case” or any discussion as to

it’s applicability to the issues in this case.

Defendants are entitled to dismissal of this action, with prejudice.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this entire action be

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations,

plaintiff may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 24, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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