Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00086/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00086-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONINO SANFILIPPO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv0086 BTM (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

I. BACKGROUND

In this action, Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of her

application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. In an

order dated August 14, 2006, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

granted Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not commit legal error because substantial evidence

supported his decision to deny Plaintiff benefits. 

Plaintiff appealed the Court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an

order filed on April 18, 2008, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ALJ failed to identify

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“specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion and

applied the wrong standard to Plaintiff’s treating chiropractor’s opinion. Accordingly, the

Ninth Circuit reversed the Court’s decision and ordered that the case be remanded to the

Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. On November 3, 2008,

the Court filed an order remanding the case to the Commissioner pursuant to Sentence Four

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On October 11, 2008, Plaintiff brought the instant Motion for

Attorney’s Fees [Docket No. 22]. 

II. DISCUSSION

The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) entitles a prevailing party, other than the

United States, to attorney’s fees unless the government’s position was substantially justified

or special circumstances exist that render the award of fees unjust. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the “prevailing party,” nor does

Defendant contend that the Government’s position was substantially justified. Rather,

Defendant argues that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s petition as untimely. In the

alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiff counsel’s claimed hours are excessive and

unreasonable.

A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Petition

A prevailing party seeking attorney’s fees under the EAJA must submit an application

to the court within thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). A

final judgment is one that is no longer appealable. Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854

(9th Cir. 2002). Defendant contends that the judgment in this case became final120 days

after the Ninth Circuit filed its decision and entered judgment remanding the case for further

proceedings to the District Court on April 18, 2008. This time period includes the 90 days

during which Defendant could petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court and the

30 days allowed under the EAJA. Defendant cites Al-Harbi v. I.N.S, 284 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir.

2004) to support its position.

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The Court disagrees that Al-Harbi is on point here. In Al-Harbi, Plaintiff prevailed on

a petition for review to the Ninth Circuit from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). When

the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA and granted the petition for review, it

remanded the case directly to the BIA for further proceedings. See Al-Harbi v. I.N.S., 242

F.3d 882, 894 (9th 2001). In contrast, here the Ninth Circuit remanded not to an

administrative agency, but to the District Court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was not

the final judgment because it did not terminate the judicial phase of the proceeding. See

Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that Seventh Circuit’s decision

was not a final judgment since rather than terminating the case it remanded it to the district

court with further directions to remand the case to the Social Security Administration).

Rather, judgment was final here after the District Court entered judgment and the time to

appeal expired, making the judgment final and no longer appealable. See Melkonyan v.

Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991); Akopyan, 296 F.3d at 854 (holding that a sentence four

remand becomes a final judgment upon expiration of the time for appeal). 

In a civil case where the Government is a party, a notice of appeal must be filed within

60 days from entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Judgment is considered entered

for purposes of Rule 4(a) if it has been entered in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 58. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); see also Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302–303

(1993). For the purpose of Rule 58, judgment is entered when it is entered in the civil docket

and is set out in a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c). 

Here, the District Court entered judgment on the civil docket and set out the judgment

in a separate document on November 3, 2008 [Docket Nos. 26, 27]. Thus, Plaintiff had 120

days following November 3, 2008 to file an EAJA application. Plaintiff filed his Motion for

Attorney’s Fees on October 11, 2008, well before his time expired. The Court therefore finds

that Plaintiff timely filed his application and is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA.

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B. Reasonableness of Plaintiff Counsel’s Claimed Hours

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 The EAJA provides that attorneys fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per

hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor

justifies a higher fee. The hourly rate claimed by Plaintiff fairly reflects the cost of living

adjustment for the time period in question.

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The award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable

fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Hours that are excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded form an award of fees. Id. at 434.

“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s

adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Id. (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880,

891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)). 

Plaintiff seeks fees based on an hourly rate of $166.46 for work performed in 2007

and $169.46 for worked performed in 2008. Defendant does not challenge the

reasonableness of this hourly rate. The Court finds that the hourly rate is reasonable and

fairly takes into account the relevant cost of living adjustment.1

Plaintiff’s counsel billed 75.90 hours in connection with the litigation of this action and

the preparation of the EAJA fee motion. Upon review of the itemization of the billed hours,

the papers filed in connection with the EAJA fee motion, and the appellate briefs, the Court

finds that certain of the hours billed by Plaintiff were excessive. Specifically, the Court finds

that the time Plaintiff spent reviewing her records and preparing her itemization of hours on

7/18/08 and 7/25/08 was excessive. The Court therefore disallows 3.75 hours, but will allow

3 hours related to this task. Plaintiff Counsel’s requested fee is thereby reduced by $635.48.

The Court also disallows EAJA fees for Plaintiff Counsel’s time spent reviewing

Defendant’s Opposition to the EAJA petition and preparing a Reply brief. Plaintiff’s Counsel

untimely filed her Reply thirty-three days after the hearing date. Plaintiff’s reply was due five

court days prior to the hearing date. CivLR 7.1(e)(3). Because the Court performed

substantial research on its own prior to Plaintiff’s Reply, it was of little assistance.

Other than the hours specifically disallowed by the Court, the Court finds the hours

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billed by Plaintiff’s counsel to be reasonable. Taking into account the reductions detailed

above, the Court allows the recovery of 72.15 hours, calculated at the rate of $166.46 for the

hours billed in 2007 and $169.46 for the hours billed in 2008, for a total award of $12,048.30.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court awards Plaintiff $12,048.30 in attorney’s fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2009

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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