Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01208/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01208-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS PYARA on behalf of 

himself, all others similarly 

situated, and on behalf of 

the general public,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SYSCO CORPORATION; SYSCO 

SACRAMENTO, INC., A 

California Corporation; and 

DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-01208-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS

This is a wage and hour case brought by plaintiff Chris 

Pyara (“Pyara”) on behalf of similarly situated employees of 

defendants Sysco Corporation and Sysco Sacramento, Inc. 

(collectively “Defendants”). Pyara alleges ten causes of action 

for violations of various provisions of the California Labor Code

(“CLC”), associated regulations, and common law. Defendants now 

move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) for each of the ten causes of 

action raised by Pyara (Doc. #9). For the reasons stated below, 

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the Court denies in part and grants in part the motion.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pyara was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt industrial 

truck driver from October 31, 2011 to November 27, 2013. Compl. 

¶ 18; Tzintun Decl. (Doc. #1-5) ¶¶ 2-3. During this period, 

there was a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) in place 

between Sysco Sacramento and the International Brotherhood of 

Teamsters, Local 137, which represented Sysco Sacramento 

employees. Tzintun Decl. ¶ 8; Defendants’ First Request for 

Judicial Notice (“D RJN 1”) (Doc. #10), Exh. A. 

On April 13, 2015, Pyara, on behalf of himself and “all nonexempt employees, including . . . hourly industrial truck 

workers, truck drivers, drivers, or similar job designations and 

titles who are presently or formerly employed” by Defendants, 

filed a complaint against Defendants in Sacramento Superior Court 

alleging that Defendants violated the common law and various 

provisions of the CLC and associated regulations. Pyara’s first 

cause of action for “wage theft / time shaving” is based on 

Defendants’ alleged practice of clocking out Pyara for meal and 

rest periods even when he remained working. Pyara’s second cause 

of action for failure to pay overtime is based on Defendants’ 

alleged failure to provide meal and rest periods and therefore 

not correctly classifying certain hours as overtime work. 

Pyara’s third cause of action for failure to provide meal periods 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for June 14, 2016.

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is based on Defendants’ alleged policy of requiring Pyara to work 

through meal periods and to work at least five hours without a 

meal period and failing to provide a second meal period when 

Pyara worked shifts of ten hours or more. Pyara’s fourth cause 

of action for failure to permit rest periods is similarly based 

on Defendants’ alleged policy of requiring Pyara to work through 

rest periods and work four hours without a rest period. Based on 

these alleged practices (wage theft, failure to pay overtime, and 

failure to provide meal and rest breaks), Pyara alleges that 

Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements 

(fifth cause of action); failed to pay all wages due upon 

termination (sixth cause of action); were unjustly enriched 

(seventh cause of action); converted Pyara’s wages (eighth cause 

of action); defrauded Pyara (ninth cause of action); and violated 

the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (tenth cause of 

action). Defendants removed the case to this Court based on 

federal question jurisdiction and pursuant to the Class Action 

Fairness Act (“CAFA”) (Doc. #1). Pyara did not oppose removal. 

Jurisdiction is indeed proper based on CAFA because the parties 

are minimally diverse, there are over 100 potential class 

members, and the aggregate amount in controversy is greater than 

$5 million. Removal at 6-13.

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings of all ten of

the causes of action (Doc. #9). Defendants allege that the first 

four causes of action are either statutorily barred or preempted 

by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 185(a). Pyara opposed the motion (Doc. #14).

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II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Defendants bring their motion for judgment on the pleadings 

pursuant to Rule 12(c), which states that “[a]fter the pleadings 

are closed—but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move 

for judgment on the pleadings.” For the purposes of Rule 12(c), 

the pleadings are closed once an answer has been filed. Doe v. 

United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Since 

Defendants filed their answer (Doc. #1-2) and the motion will 

not delay trial, a Rule 12(c) motion is appropriate at this 

time.

Rule 12(c) motions are “functionally identical” to Rule 

12(b) motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 

1192 (9th Cir. 1989). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when 

the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the 

pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved 

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal 

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 

(9th Cir. 1989). Just as in Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss, 

courts must accept as true the allegations of the non-moving 

party. Id.

B. Judicial Notice

In support of its motion, Defendants ask this court to take 

judicial notice of the CBA between Sysco Sacramento and the 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137 (Doc. #10). D 

RJN 1, Exh. A. Pyara asks this Court to take judicial notice of 

(1) the California Legislative Counsel’s Digest for Assembly 

Bill 569 dated February 25, 2009; (2) the California Assembly 

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Committee on Labor and Employment file for Assembly Bill 569; 

and (3) the California Assembly Committee on Appropriations file 

for Assembly Bill 569 (Doc. #14-1). Plaintiff’s RJN, Exhs. 1-3. 

In support of its reply, Defendants request that this Court take 

judicial notice of the order denying the motion to remand in the 

case Gerardo Ayala v. Destination Shuttle Services LLC, et al., 

CV 1306141 GAF (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) and the Bill 

Analysis of Senate Bill 1255 by the California Assembly 

Committee on Labor and Employment from the hearing held on June 

20, 2012 (Doc. #16). Defendants’ Second RJN, Exhs. A, B. 

Neither party objects to the opposing party’s requests for 

judicial notice.

A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not 

reasonably disputed if it “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). CBAs are properly 

considered materials that are not subject to reasonable dispute 

and are therefore proper for judicial notice. Densmore v. 

Mission Linen Supply, 2016 WL 696503, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 

2016). The Court grants Defendants’ first RJN (Doc. #10). 

Courts may also judicially notice legislative facts such as 

“facts of which courts take particular notice when interpreting a 

statute.” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1414 

(N.D. Cal. 1984). Moreover, if the legislature’s intent is not 

clear from its language, a court may take judicial notice of 

legislative history, including committee reports. Ass’n des 

Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 

945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and 

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Defendants’ Exhibit B from Defendants’ second RJN are all 

legislative history and are therefore proper for judicial notice.

Finally, courts are allowed to consider “matters of public 

record.” Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 

779 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants’ Exhibit A from 

Defendants’ second RJN is a matter of public record and proper 

for judicial notice. For these reasons, the Court will take

judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and 

Defendants’ Exhibit A from Defendants’ first RJN and Exhibits A 

and B from Defendants’ second RJN. 

C. Analysis

Defendants’ motion argues that the first four causes of 

action are preempted by the LMRA and that the second and third 

causes of action are statutorily exempted. If either the second 

or third cause of action is statutorily exempted, the preemption 

analysis for that claim is moot. For that reason, the Court 

will first address the issue of whether the second and third 

causes of action are exempted before proceeding to the 

preemption issue. 

1. Second Cause of Action

Pyara’s second cause of action alleges that Defendants 

failed to pay overtime as required by CLC section 510. 

Defendants make two arguments in support of their motion for

judgment on the pleadings on this claim. First, Defendants argue 

that the second cause of action is preempted by the LMRA. Mot. 

at 10. Second, Defendants argue that the second cause of action 

is statutorily barred under CLC section 514. Mot. at 11. In 

opposition, Pyara contests Defendants’ argument that the second 

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cause of action is preempted by the LMRA but concedes that the 

claim is statutorily barred by Section 514. Opp. at 3 n.1. 

Overtime claims may not be brought by an employee who is 

covered by a CBA that “expressly provides for the wages, hours of 

work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the 

agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours 

worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of 

not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Cal. 

Lab. Code § 514. Here, Plaintiff is covered by a CBA that 

complies with the Section 514 requirements. The terms of the CBA 

expressly provide for wages (Art. VIII), working hours (Art. VI), 

working employee conditions (Arts. V-VIII), and premium wage 

rates for overtime worked (Art. VIII). D RJN 1, Exh. A. In 

light of those CBA provisions, Pyara concedes that this claim 

fails as a matter of law and the Court therefore grants the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the second 

cause of action for failure to pay overtime. Because the second 

cause of action is statutorily barred, the Court need not address 

whether the cause of action is also preempted by the LMRA. 

2. Third Cause of Action

In his third cause of action, Pyara alleges that Defendants’ 

policies and practices failed to provide employees with a meal 

period after employees worked five continuous hours or a second 

meal period when an employee worked in excess of ten hours. By 

failing to provide such meal periods, Defendants allegedly 

violated CLC section 512(a). Defendants moved for judgment on 

the pleadings, arguing that the third cause of action is 

preempted by the LMRA and statutorily barred under CLC section 

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512(e). Mot. at 11. In opposition, Pyara argues that the claim 

is not statutorily barred because the CBA “does not provide for 

more than one meal period, as the express language of § 512(e)

requires before the exemption will lie.” Opp. at 9.

An employers’ meal period obligations under Section 512(a)

are not applicable to commercial drivers who are covered by a CBA 

that “expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and 

working conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal 

periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of 

disputes concerning application of its meal period provisions, 

premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular 

hourly rate of pay of not less than 30 percent more than the 

state minimum wage rate.” Cal. Lab. Code §§ 512(e), (f). Here, 

the CBA satisfies all of the conditions set forth in Section 

512(e) and (f). It expressly provides for wages (Art. VIII), 

hours of work (Art. VI), working conditions (Arts. V-VIII), meal 

periods (Art.VI), final and binding arbitration procedures (Art. 

XIV, Sec. 1), premium wage rates for overtime (Art. VIII), and an 

hourly pay rate that is greater than 30 percent of the California 

minimum wage (Art. VIII). D RJN 1, Exh. A. Pyara’s Section 

512(a) claim is thus exempted by Section 512(e).

Pyara argues that the Section 512(e) exemption to Section 

512(a) only applies if the CBA provides more than one meal period 

for any employee who works over ten hours. Since the CBA in this 

case explicitly bars more than one meal period for employees 

working more than ten hours, Pyara argues that it does not meet 

the requirements for the Section 512(e) exemption. Pyara makes 

two arguments in support of his interpretation of Section 512(e). 

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First, Pyara points out that Section 512(e) employs the plural 

phrase “meal periods.” Second, Pyara argues that the legislative 

history of the statute indicates that the Legislature was 

concerned about public safety – a goal that would be furthered by 

requiring two meal breaks. 

With respect to Pyara’s textual argument, the ordinary 

meaning and underlying purpose of Section 512 do not compel 

Pyara’s proposed interpretation. The term “meal periods” is 

plural because the term “employees” is plural. “Meal periods,” 

as used in Section 512(e), is best construed as at least one meal 

period per employee. Moreover, the ability to bargain away a 

second meal period is written into the statute itself: “if the 

total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal 

period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the 

employee.” Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a). “It would make no sense to 

conclude that subdivision (a)’s requirements apply to an employee 

who is explicitly exempted from them.” Araquistain v. Pac. Gas & 

Elec. Co., 229 Cal. App. 4th 227, 236 (2014). Pyara’s textual 

argument carries no weight.

As for Pyara’s second argument regarding the legislative 

history of Section 512(e), nothing in the legislative history 

states that all commercial drivers must be given at least two 

meal periods if they work longer than ten hours. Certainly 

safety was a concern of the Legislature, but the legislative

history also demonstrates that the exemption was provided to 

afford commercial drivers and their employers with flexibility in 

scheduling meal periods. Plaintiff’s Exh. 2. The legislative 

history supports Defendants’ conclusion that Section 512(e) was 

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not intended to establish a non-negotiable right to two meal 

periods for drivers such as Pyara who are covered by a valid CBA 

that meets a strict set of labor protections.

Finally, Pyara has failed to cite to a single case in 

support of his proposed interpretation of Section 512(e). 

Pyara’s citation to Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prod., Inc., 40 Cal. 

4th 1094 (2007) does not assist him. Opp. at 12-13. Murphy

refers to safety concerns surrounding CLC section 226.7, not 

512(a). Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1113. The court in Murphy was 

concerned about the possible health hazards of not providing any

meal or rest periods, not the ability of parties to bargain away 

a second meal period. Id. The court in Murphy does not conclude 

that Section 512(e) requires employees to have two meal periods. 

For these reasons, Pyara’s third cause of action is 

statutorily barred by Section 512(e) and judgment on the pleading

as to this claim is granted. Given that the claim cannot 

proceed, the Court need not determine whether it is also

preempted by the LMRA.

3. Preemption

Defendants argue that the first and fourth causes of action 

are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. The LMRA is a 

jurisdictional statute stating that “suits for violation of 

contracts between an employer and a labor organization 

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . 

may be brought in any district court of the United States.” 29 

U.S.C. § 185(a). Federal law preempts claims directly founded 

upon rights established by a CBA and claims that are 

“substantially dependent” on analysis of a CBA. Caterpillar v. 

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). “The preemptive force of 

section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state 

claim.” Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 

997 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, “not every dispute 

concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of 

a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or 

other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers 

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985); see also Associated 

Builders & Contractors, Inc v. Local 302 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 

Workers, 1997 WL 236296, at *1 (9th Cir. March 27, 1997)

(holding that extending preemption to permit parties to immunize 

their conduct from state law by including it in a labor contract 

“clearly exceeds the scope of § 301 preemption intended by 

Congress”). 

Courts apply a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether 

claims are preempted by Section 301. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. 

Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007); Sciborski v. Pac. Bell 

Directory, 205 Cal.App.4th 1152 (2012). First, courts “determine 

whether a particular right inheres in state law or, instead, is 

grounded in a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. If the right 

exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is 

preempted. Id. When determining whether a case arises from 

state law or the CBA, courts are instructed to consider the 

“legal character of the claim . . . independent of rights under 

the collective-bargaining agreement.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 

U.S. 107, 123-24 (1994). The mere fact that the claim could have 

been pursued under the CBA does not establish preemption. Id. at 

124. And “reliance on the CBA as an aspect of a defense is not 

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enough to inject a federal question into an action that asserts 

what is plainly a state-law claim.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.

If the claim exists independently from the CBA because it 

arises under state law, the Court then applies the second prong 

of the Burnside analysis: “whether [the] state law right is 

substantially dependent on the terms of [the] CBA.” Burnside, 

491 F.3d at 1060. A state law claim substantially depends on the 

terms of a CBA if the Court must interpret the CBA. Id. The 

word “interpret” is to be construed narrowly: “it means something 

more than ‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” Balcorta v. 

Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 

2000). “If the claim requires interpretation of the CBA, the 

claim is preempted; if the claim merely requires looking to the 

CBA, it is not preempted.” Densmore, 2016 WL 696503, at *4.

a. First Cause of Action

Pyara’s first cause of action alleges that Defendants 

“breached the legal duty to pay full wages to Plaintiff by 

automatically deducting a portion of the wages earned when 

Plaintiff and the Class members’ actual time records indicated 

that a meal [or rest] period was not taken.” Compl. ¶ 90. 

Pyara also alleges that Defendants “failed to pay for the 

overtime that was due.” Id. Pyara labels this cause of action 

“wage theft/time shaving. Id. ¶¶ 87-94. Defendants argue that 

this claim is preempted by the LMRA because the right to meal 

breaks, rest breaks, and overtime “exist[] entirely as a result 

of the CBA.” Mot. at 10. In opposition, Pyara argues that 

“this cause of action is not premised on Defendants’ failure to 

provide meal and rest periods as required by California law.” 

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Opp. at 5. Instead, Pyara argues that the claim simply “seeks 

wages for time that he and the putative class members spent 

working off the clock.” Opp. at 5. 

“‘Time-shaving’ is the practice of doctoring hourly 

employees' time sheets to reduce their pay.” In re Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 616 (N.D. 

Cal. 2007). California employees who do not receive their full 

wages owed may bring an action to recover the unpaid balance. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a) (“[E]mployees receiving less than the 

legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable 

to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the 

unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage”); Cal. 

Lab. Code § 204(a) (“[a]ll wages . . . earned by any person in 

any employment are due and payable.”).

Defendants’ preemption argument fails. Defendants cite 

multiple CBA provisions that the Court will allegedly be 

required to interpret to adjudicate this claim. Reply at 2-4. 

But none of these clauses reference Defendants’ alleged policy 

of automatically clocking out Pyara regardless of whether he 

continued to work. Even if the Court assumed that the rights to 

overtime, meal periods, and rest periods “exist entirely as a 

result of the CBA,” the right to be paid for all of the hours 

one works exists independently of the CBA. See Cal. Lab. Code § 

1194(a). The Densmore case is instructive in this regard. Just 

as in this case, the plaintiff in Densmore alleges that 

defendants violated state law by failing to provide workers with 

all wages earned during a pay period. Densmore, 2016 WL 696503 

at *1. Here, just as in Densmore, the Court did not find “any 

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provision contained [in the CBA] that could pertain to this 

cause of action.” Id. at *10.

Moreover, Pyara appears to allege that Defendants engaged 

in time shaving by not paying him for rest break periods, meal 

break periods, overtime periods, and even regular time he 

worked. As discussed above, Pyara’s claims for violations of 

right to overtime and meal periods are respectively exempted by 

CLC sections 514 and 512(e). But those exemptions do not apply 

to Pyara’s allegations that Defendants failed to provide him 

with rest periods and shaved time off of his regular time 

worked. In Kilbourne v. Coca-Cola Co., 2014 WL 11397891 (S.D. 

Cal. July 14, 2014), a case similar to this one, the court 

granted partial summary judgment on the plaintiff’s wage theft / 

time shaving cause of action. The Court reasoned that “it is 

unclear whether Plaintiff alleges a [wage theft / time shaving] 

claim for either regular time or overtime or both.” Kilbourne, 

2014 WL 11397891, at *8. The Court granted summary judgment on 

this claim insofar as it rested on overtime violations because 

the plaintiff’s overtime claims were statutorily exempted under 

CLC section 514. Id. But the Court permitted the case to move 

forward on the issue of whether the defendant had engaged in 

time shaving or wage theft with respect to the plaintiff’s 

regular time. Id.

Given that this cause of action does not inhere in the CBA 

but in state law, the LMRA does not preempt Pyara’s first cause 

of action for time shaving. However, to the extent this cause 

of action rests upon violations of overtime or meal periods, the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted because those 

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claims are statutorily barred. To the extent that the time 

shaving occurred on non-statutorily barred claims, the motion 

for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

b. Fourth Cause of Action

Pyara’s fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants 

failed to authorize rest periods by having a policy of not 

providing rest breaks and by assigning too much work for an 

employee to complete within the assigned time frames. Compl. ¶¶ 

121-135. As with the third claim, Defendants argue that this 

claim is preempted because it requires the Court to interpret 

the CBA. Mot. at 9. Specifically, Defendants argue that 

because Pyara challenges the manner and amount of work assigned, 

the Court will be required to interpret the CBA by “analyz[ing]

the ‘inextricably intertwined’ CBA terms on job bidding, route 

assignments, hours and overtime (Articles V, VII, and VIII), as 

well as meal and rest periods (Article VI) to determine if 

Defendants met their obligation to Plaintiff.” Id. In 

opposition, Pyara argues that the Court may need to reference 

but not interpret the CBA because the relevant terms are clear. 

Opp. at 8.

Applying the first step of the Burnside analysis, it is 

clear that the basis of this claim is state law, not the CBA. 

On the face of the complaint, Pyara alleges violations of CLC

section 226.7 and California Industrial Welfare Commission 

(“IWC”) Wage Order No. 9-2001. Compl. ¶¶ 133-134. Pyara does 

not allege any federal cause of action or any CBA violation. 

Id. ¶¶ 121-135. Therefore, preemption is not appropriate under 

the first prong of the Burnside inquiry. The Court must next

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determine whether this cause of action is preempted because it

substantially depends on the terms of the CBA, i.e. the Court 

must examine whether, in analyzing the merits of this claim, it

is required to interpret provisions in the CBA. Burnside, 491 

F.3d at 1060.

The Ninth Circuit has found that “’[s]ubstantial 

dependence’ on a CBA is an inexact concept, turning on the 

specific facts of each case, and the distinction between 

‘looking to’ a CBA and ‘interpreting’ it is not always clear or 

amenable to a bright-line test.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691. 

But in this case, the CBA’s rest break provisions are not 

especially complex. D RJN 1, Exh. A at 6-7. And preemption is 

not simply triggered by referencing unambiguous provisions in a 

CBA. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 (concluding that “when the 

meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the 

bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be 

consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not 

require the claim to be extinguished.”). Even if the Court was 

required to determine whether Pyara waived his rights to a rest 

period, the analysis would not rise to the level of 

“interpretation.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692 (“a court may look to 

the CBA to determine whether it contains a clear and 

unmistakable waiver of state law rights without triggering § 301 

preemption.”).

Additionally, “§ 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt 

nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a 

matter of state law.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123. Pyara alleges 

that Defendants failed to provide him with his state statutory 

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and regulatory rights regarding rest breaks. In their moving 

papers, Defendants do not argue that the right to rest breaks 

established by IWC Wage Orders and the CLC are negotiable 

rights. This is notably different that the right to meal 

periods, as discussed in section C(2) above. 

Finally, while Defendants cite the CBA in defense of their

alleged practices and policies, “a defense based on the terms of 

a CBA is not enough to require preemption.” Cramer v. Consol. 

Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended 

(Aug. 27, 2001); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399 (“a defendant

cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action 

that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the 

action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the 

forum in which the claim shall be litigated”) (emphasis in 

original). 

In sum, the Court finds that Pyara’s fourth cause of action 

is not preempted because it rests on a right created by state 

law and is not substantially dependent on the terms of the CBA. 

Further, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the rights 

asserted in this claim are negotiable. Defendants also cannot 

inject a federal question into state law claims by citing the 

CBA as a defense. The Court therefore denies the motion for 

judgment as a matter of law on the fourth cause of action.

4. Fifth Cause of Action

Pyara’s fifth cause of action alleges that Defendants 

violated CLC section 226(a) by knowingly failing to provide wage 

statements that accurately reflected the total hours worked and 

total wages earned by Pyara. Compl. ¶ 137. Defendants argue 

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that this claim fails because courts do not permit Section 

226(a) claims “based on alleged meal and rest period 

violations.” Mot. at 12. In opposition, Pyara argues that this 

claim is “not entirely dependent on Defendants failure to 

provide compliant meal and rest periods,” but “[r]ather, they 

are in part predicated on Defendants’ failure to provide 

compliant meal and rest periods under Sections 226.7 and 512(a), 

and then failing to accurately reflect the time actually worked 

and the appropriate wages earned in Plaintiffs’ wage statements 

as a result.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Defendants are correct. As the court found in Jones v. 

Spherion Staffing LLC, 2012 WL 3264081, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 

2012), permitting a plaintiff to use violations of meal and rest 

period regulations to form the basis of a CLC section 226 claim 

“would result in an improper multiple recovery by the employee.” 

And multiple courts have found that permitting such claims to 

move forward would be directly contrary to the purpose of 

Section 226; namely, “to ensure that employers provide accurate 

wage statements to employees, not to govern employers’ 

obligations with respect to meal periods.” Nguyen v. Baxter 

Healthcare Corp., 2011 WL 6018284, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 

2011); Jones, 2012 WL 3264081, at *7 (“the legislative history 

shows that the purpose of Section 226 was for transparency, not 

for double recovery”). Moreover, Pyara’s argument that his 

claim is based on the failure to accurately reflect the actual 

time he worked is not a compelling distinction because he 

concedes that the inaccuracy is based on Defendants’ failure to 

provide compliant meal and rest periods. For these reasons, the 

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Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings on Pyara’s 

fifth cause of action.

5. Derivative Causes of Action—Sixth Through Tenth

Both parties agree that the sixth through tenth causes of 

action are derivative of causes of action one through four and 

therefore survive only insofar as causes of action one through 

four survive. Mot. at 13 (“Because these claims are dependent 

on the underlying claims, they fail to the extent they are 

derivative of any earlier-pleaded claim that is subject to 

dismissal.”); Opp. at 15 (“Plaintiff’s fifth through tenth 

causes of action are derivative of his other causes of 

action.”). Since the first and fourth causes of action survive 

the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the sixth through 

tenth causes of action survive as derivative actions. The 

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth through 

tenth causes of actions is denied. 

D. Sanctions

The Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements for Cases 

Assigned to Judge Mendez (“Order”) on June 5, 2015 (Doc. #2-2). 

The Order requires that reply memoranda in support of a motion 

to dismiss be limited to five pages. The Order further states 

that violations of the page limit will result in the imposition 

of monetary sanctions against counsel in the amount of $50.00 

per page. Defendants’ reply memorandum (Doc. #15) is ten pages 

long. As such, the Court imposes sanctions against counsel for 

Defendants in the amount of $250.00, and the Court has not 

considered any arguments made after page five of Defendants’ 

reply memorandum. 

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III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on 

Pyara’s second, third, and fifth causes of action. The Court 

DENIES Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on 

Pyara’s first cause of action, except to the extent this claim 

rests upon violations of overtime or meal periods; fourth cause 

of action; and sixth through tenth causes of action. Counsel for 

Defendants is ordered to pay $250.00 in sanctions to the Clerk of 

the Court within five days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2016

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