Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-00497/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-00497-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 47:227 Restrictions of Use of Telephone Equipment

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRACE ELLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

RENEWABLE ENERGY CENTER, LLC, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.17-cv-00497-HRL 

ORDER SETTING ASIDE ENTRY OF 

DEFAULT 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 26

Pro se plaintiff Terrace Ellis (“Ellis”) sues defendants Renewable Energy Center, LLC, 

d/b/a National Renewable Energy Center and Energy Enterprise USA, Inc., d/b/a National 

Renewable Energy Center (“Energy Enterprise USA”) for violations of the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”). Ellis requested, and the clerk entered, default as to 

Energy Enterprise USA. Dkt. Nos. 23, 25. Now, Ellis moves the Court for an entry of default 

judgment as to Energy Enterprise USA. 

The Court determined that the matter was fit for determination without oral argument. 

Civil L.R. 7-2(b). The Court hereby sets aside the entry of default as to Energy Enterprise USA. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). There being no valid entry of default, the Court terminates the motion for 

default judgment as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ellis filed her initial complaint in January 2017, naming “National Renewable Energy 

Center” (“NREC”) as the defendant. In the months that followed, Ellis encountered a “confusing 

array of information” about a group of business entities that all seemed to operate under the NREC 

name. See Dkt. No. 17 ¶ 18. Ultimately, in June, Ellis filed a second amended complaint (SAC) 

naming two defendants, one of which was Energy Enterprise USA. Dkt. No. 17. Ellis alleged that 

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Energy Enterprise USA is a California corporation, and that its president is Ofir Attal. Dkt. No. 

17 ¶ 7. Ellis further alleged that Energy Enterprise USA’s principal place of business is at 5632 

Van Nuys Blvd., Suite 36, Van Nuys, California. 

According to a proof of service document filed by Ellis, she had the summons and 

complaint mailed to a person named “Ori Bytton,” whom she identified as the president of Energy 

Enterprise USA.1 Dkt. No. 22. The process server separately averred that he mailed the summons 

and complaint to Energy Enterprise USA, care of “Ori Byrron.” Id. Ellis also had the summons 

and complaint left with Robert Landrum, the person in charge at the 5632 Van Nuys Blvd.

location, which apparently is a personal mailbox rental store. Id. Neither the SAC, nor the proof 

of service document, nor the motion for default judgment provide any indication as to who Ori 

Bytton/Byrron is, or why that person, rather than Ofir Attal, was served in his or her capacity as 

president of Energy Enterprise USA.2 

Ellis later requested, and the Clerk entered, default as to Energy Enterprise USA. Dkt. 

Nos. 23, 25. Ellis then moved for default judgment.. Dkt. No. 26. 

II. DISCUSSION

Before entering a default judgment, a district court must first review whether subject 

matter and personal jurisdiction exist. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). A party must 

be properly served before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over it. See Jackson v. 

Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1334, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Ellis’ claim because her TCPA claim 

arises under federal law. Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012) (TCPA 

private right of action arises under federal law). As to personal jurisdiction, however, the 

undersigned is not satisfied that Energy Enterprise USA was properly served. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for service of process via mail. See

 

1

The proof of service document identifies the party served as “ENERGY ENTERPRISW USA 

INC., dba National Renewable Energy Center.”

2

Ellis later had the summons and complaint, and the request for entry of default, mailed to an 

alternative address for Energy Enterprise USA at 6736 Vesper Ave., Van Nuys, California. Dkt. 

No. 26 at 7.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). However, the Federal Rules allow a defendant corporation to be served by 

any method authorized by the law of the state in which the district court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(e)(1), (h)(1)(A). California Civil Procedure Code section 415.30 sets out the requirements for 

serving a defendant by mail. Section 416.10(b) states that a corporation can be served by 

delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to, among others, the corporation’s president. 

In the SAC, Ellis alleged that Energy Enterprise USA is a “California company.” Dkt. 

No. 17 ¶ 7. In the default judgment motion, Ellis confusingly states that “Defendant is 

incorporated, and is not registered with California’s Secretary of State.” Dkt. No. 26 at 11. 

Assuming that Energy Enterprise USA is a California corporation, service would be valid if Ellis 

served the company’s president. 

Here, however, it is not clear who Energy Enterprise USA’s president is, or who Ellis 

served with the summons and complaint. In her default judgment motion, Ellis alleges that Afir 

Ottal is Energy Enterprise USA’s president, and that service was proper because the summons and 

complaint were served upon him (or her). Dkt. No. 26 at 11. These allegations might be 

sufficient to form the basis of a default judgment were it not for the contradictory statements in the 

proof of service document. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 

1987) (“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except 

those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”) (citation omitted). The 

discrepancies here, however, are too serious to ignore. Ellis does not account for why, according 

to the proof of service document, the summons and complaint were served on someone named Ori 

Bytton/Byrron, and she fails to explain who that person is or what his or her relationship is to Afir 

Ottal and Energy Enterprise USA. Further, leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with 

Robert Landrum, the person who worked at the mailbox rental shop, is not adequate to complete 

service on Energy Enterprise USA, as there is no evidence that Landrum has any direct 

relationship to the defendant. 

III. CONCLUSION

The Court is not satisfied that Energy Enterprise USA was properly served with the 

summons and complaint. Accordingly, the Court sets aside the entry of default as to Energy 

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Enterprise USA. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). There being no valid entry of default, the Court terminates 

Ellis’ motion for default judgment as moot. 

This order is issued without prejudice to Ellis moving for default judgment in the future. If 

Ellis properly serves Energy Enterprise USA pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code sections

415.30 and 416.10(b), or pursuant to any other method authorized by the Federal Rules, and the 

defendant defaults, Ellis may again request that the Court enter a default judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 27, 2017

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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