Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01003/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01003-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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28 District Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill reassigned the case for all purposes to the undersigned Magistrate 1

Judge on August 7, 2007.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA E. McKENZIE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:07-cv-01003-SMS

DECISION AND ORDER ON SOCIAL

SECURITY COMPLAINT (DOC. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING REMAND PURSUANT

TO SENTENCE FOUR of 42 U.S.C. §

405(g)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF

PAMELA E. McKENZIE AND AGAINST

DEFENDANT MICHAEL J. ASTRUE

Plaintiff is represented by counsel and is proceeding with

an action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying

Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (DIB)

and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Titles II

and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the

Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this matter,

including ordering the entry of final judgment. The matter is 1

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currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which have

been submitted without oral argument to the Honorable Sandra M.

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Procedural History

On April 10, 2002, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI,

alleging disability since February 15, 2002. (A.R. 97-97, 257-60,

18.) Plaintiff alleged that she had a slipped and deteriorated

disk and bad nerves. (A.R. 95.) After Plaintiff’s claim was

denied initially and on reconsideration, a hearing was held, a

decision issued from an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on August

25, 2005, and the Appeals Council eventually remanded the case

for further proceedings. (A.R. 70-75, 411-12.) Plaintiff appeared

with an attorney and testified at a supplemental video hearing

held on April 16, 2007. (A.R. 18, 622.) On May 1, 2007, the ALJ

denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits. (Id. at 18-26.)

After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review

on June 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on

July 12, 2007. (Id. at 11-13.) Briefing commenced on April 10,

2008, and was completed with the filing on July 12, 2008, of

Plaintiff’s reply to Defendant’s opposition.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of

the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits under the Act. In

reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla,"

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a

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preponderance, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10

(9th Cir. 1975). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion; it may

not simply isolate a portion of evidence that supports the

decision. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9 Cir. th

2006); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

It is immaterial that the evidence would support a finding

contrary to that reached by the Commissioner; the determination

of the Commissioner as to a factual matter will stand if

supported by substantial evidence because it is the

Commissioner’s job, and not the Court’s, to resolve conflicts in

the evidence. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 (9th

Cir. 1975).

In weighing the evidence and making findings, the

Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. Burkhart v.

Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must

review the whole record and uphold the Commissioner's

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

See, Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d at 995. If

the Court concludes that the ALJ did not use the proper legal

standard, the matter will be remanded to permit application of

the appropriate standard. Cooper v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

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28 All references are to the 2007 version of the Code of Federal Regulations unless otherwise noted. 2

4

Cir. 1987).

III. Disability

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish

that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due

to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 1382c(a)(3)(A).

A claimant must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do the

claimant’s previous work, but cannot, considering age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

1382c(a)(3)(B); Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1989). The burden of establishing a disability is initially

on the claimant, who must prove that the claimant is unable to

return to his or her former type of work; the burden then shifts

to the Commissioner to identify other jobs that the claimant is

capable of performing considering the claimant's residual

functional capacity, as well as her age, education and last

fifteen years of work experience. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1273, 1275 (9 Cir. 1990). th

The regulations provide that the ALJ must make specific

sequential determinations in the process of evaluating a

disability: 1) whether the applicant engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged date of the onset of the

impairment, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2007); 2) whether solely on the 2

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basis of the medical evidence the claimed impairment is severe,

that is, of a magnitude sufficient to limit significantly the

individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 3) whether solely on the

basis of medical evidence the impairment equals or exceeds in

severity certain impairments described in Appendix I of the

regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 4) whether the applicant

has sufficient residual functional capacity, defined as what an

individual can still do despite limitations, to perform the

applicant’s past work, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a); and

5) whether on the basis of the applicant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, the applicant can

perform any other gainful and substantial work within the

economy, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). 

With respect to SSI, the five-step evaluation process is

essentially the same. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.

Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s severe impairments

of degenerative disk disease, left ulnar nerve injury, and

dysthymia did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment;

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to lift and

carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sit,

stand, and/or walk six hours each in an eight-hour work day with

only occasional stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, climbing

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, balancing, handling, feeling, and

reaching overhead. She could perform simple, repetitive tasks,

relate to and interact with others, maintain attention,

concentration, persistence and pace, adhere to safety rules, and

adapt to usual changes in work settings. (A.R. 21.) Plaintiff was

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unable to perform her past relevant work, but as a younger

individual born on May 3, 1959, with a limited education and

ability to communicate in English, Plaintiff could perform jobs

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.

(A.R. 25.) 

IV. Other Positions

In concluding at step five that Plaintiff could perform

other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national

economy, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert

(VE), Mr. Jose Chaparro, to whose qualifications Plaintiff

stipulated. (A.R. 646.) The VE testified that a person with

Plaintiff’s RFC could perform the requirements of a scaling

machine operator, of which there were “probably about 100"

positions in California and “perhaps” 1,000 nationally. (A.R. 26,

650-51.) The position was encountered in the canning and

preserving industry. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that the scaling machine operator positions

did not exist in significant numbers in the region where

Plaintiff lived, or in several other regions of the country;

rather, the jobs were isolated jobs that existed in only very

limited number in relatively few locations. 

If a claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the

Commissioner has the burden of showing that there are jobs in

significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant

can perform consistent with the claimant’s medically determinable

impairments, functional limitations, age, education, and work

experience. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2) (disability), 1382c(a)(3)

(SSI); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 773 (9 Cir. 1987). th

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“Work which exists in the national economy” within the meaning of

the statute denotes work which exists in significant numbers

either in the region where the person lives or in several regions

of the country, and one is disabled if significant work exists

regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in

which the person lives, whether a specific job vacancy exists for

the person, or whether the person would be hired if he applied

for work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2), 1382c(3); 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1566(b), 416.966(b). The regulations provide:

Work exists in the national economy when there is

a significant number of jobs (in one or more 

occupations) having requirements which you are able

to meet with your physical or mental abilities and

vocational qualifications. Isolated jobs that exist

only in very limited numbers in relatively few locations

outside of the region where you live are not considered

work which exists in the national economy. We will

not deny you disability benefits on the basis

of the existence of these kinds of jobs. If work that 

you can do does not exist in the national economy, 

we will determine that you are disabled. However, if

work that you can do does exist in the national economy,

we will determine that you are not disabled. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b).

It is the existence, and not the availability, of the jobs

that is significant. Martinez, 807 F.2d at 774-75 (3,750 to 4,250

positions held sufficient).

Whether there are a significant number of jobs a claimant is

able to perform with his limitations is a question of fact to be

determined by a judicial officer. Martinez, 807 F.2d at 775.

In Barker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 882

F.2d 1474, 1478-79 (9 Cir. 1989), it was held that a vocational th

expert’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform about one-third

of 1,000 hospital laundry worker jobs and 900 garment sorter jobs

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in the local economy, amounting to about 2,466 jobs with none

excluded by the claimant’s limitations, was sufficient evidence

to support the finding that significant positions existed. The

court noted that the Eighth Circuit had held that as few as 500

jobs were significant in Jenkins v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 1083, 1987

(9 Cir. 1988), and other courts, including this Court, had th

rendered consistent decisions holding sufficient 600 positions,

Salazar v. Califano, Unemp. Ins. Rep. (CCH para. 15, 835)

(E.D.Cal. 1978), and thirty to forty per cent of 500 to 600

relevant positions, Uravitch v. Heckler, CIV-84-1619-PHX-PGR,

slip op. (D.Az. May 2, 1986); however, the Ninth Circuit had

never clearly established any particular minimum number of jobs

necessary to constitute a “significant number.” Barker, 882 F.2d

at 1478-79. It is not necessary to consider the number of jobs in

the context of the geographical area at issue or light of the

population of the area; the fact that the number of jobs is a

small percentage of the total jobs is immaterial. Barker, 882

F.2d at 1479. It has been held that very rare, scarce positions

involving stenciling and machine packaging were insufficient

because they represented only isolated jobs. Walker v. Mathews,

546 F.2d 814, 820 (9 Cir. 1976). Four of five taxicab dispatcher th

positions in the area where the claimant lived and four to five

thousand in the national economy, all of which would have been

very difficult for the claimant to perform, along with hundreds

of cashier jobs locally and hundreds of thousands nationally, of

which the claimant could perform only a few positions, were held

to be rare in DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 851 (9 Cir. th

1991), and greater detail with respect to the effective

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limitations imposed by impairments on performing the positions

was to be elicited on remand.

Deference has been accorded to the administrative finder of

fact in cases involving low numbers in other circuits, including

Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1330 (10 Cir. 1992) (650 to th

900 unskilled positions of escort driver, recreational facility

attendant, and telephone solicitor in the state held sufficient),

and Jenkins v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8 Cir. 1988) th

(testimony by a VE that 500 sedentary security guard jobs would

be available in the region held sufficient to establish a

significant number of jobs).

Here, the VE was not certain that 100 positions in the

entire state of California, or 1000 jobs nationally, even

existed; rather, the VE testified only in terms of probabilities

and possibilities. (A.R. 650-51.) The bare possibility of jobs

does not constitute substantial evidence.

Further, there was no apparent consideration by the ALJ or

the VE of the distribution of the very few positions that were

thought to have been possible or probable; the only information

given was that the position was related to the canning and

preserving industry. (A.R. 650.) Given the pervasiveness of

agricultural processing activity in this state, it appears that

any probable 100 positions in California were isolated; further,

considering the relatively small number of positions that

“perhaps” existed nationally, it appears that any positions

available nationally were also isolated instances. The only

explanation of the limitations given by the VE was that they were

required due to the combination of manipulative restrictions and

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the need for simple, repetitive work. (A.R. 651-52.) 

Due to the conjectural nature of the VE’s testimony, the

lack of any circumstantial context with respect to the positions,

and the very low numbers both locally and nationally in the case

before the Court, it is concluded that the record lacks the

support of substantial evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that

jobs existed in sufficient numbers in the national economy. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Commissioner did

not carry its burden at step five. Because the VE testified that

no other jobs were available to one with Plaintiff’s RFC, it is

clear that Plaintiff was disabled. 

V. Mental Impairment

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions of

activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, moderate difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace, and one or two episodes of

decompensation. (A.R. 21.) However, the ALJ failed to include

these limitations in the hypothetical questions posed to the VE.

Plaintiff assigns this as error.

As Defendant notes, the ALJ is required to consider a

claimant’s mental impairments pursuant to a special technique set

forth in the regulations for judging the severity of impairments

and, ultimately, the medical equivalence of the impairment with a

listed impairment. This technique involves evaluating the degree

of functional limitations in four broad functional areas, namely,

activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration,

persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520a, 416.920a. However, it is not necessary for an ALJ

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28 It is assumed that the inaudible portion of the hypothetical question related to occasional handling and 3

feeling. (A.R. 649, 650-51.)

11

who finds limitations in these functional areas to include them

in the RFC ultimately determined for a claimant. The step-two

determination of whether or not an impairment is severe is merely

a threshold determination of whether the claimant is able to

perform past work; it only raises a prima facie case of

disability. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9 Cir. 2007). th

The criteria identified there are not used at steps 4 and 5 of

the sequential analysis relating to RFC, but rather are used to

rate the severity of mental impairments at the earlier analytical

steps 2 and 3. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a; Soc. Sec. Ruling

96-8p p. 4.

With respect to the limitations propounded to the VE here,

the ALJ propounded all the limitations contained in the RFC found

by the ALJ, namely, exertional capacity to lift twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand, walk, and sit six

hours each; occasionally climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds;

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach

overhead, and handle and feel; perform simple, repetitive tasks; 3

maintain concentration, persistence, and pace; adapt to usual

changes in the work schedule, engage in safety rules, and relate

to and interact with others; and, in the second hypothetical, to

interact with the general public only occasionally. (A.R. 648-50,

21.) It therefore appears that all necessary components of the

residual functional capacity were set forth in the hypothetical.

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not argue that the RFC

reached by the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence or

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was arrived at by the application of incorrect legal standards.

Plaintiff does not summarize the medical evidence or mount a

factually based argument concerning the insufficiency of the

evidence to support the RFC. Accordingly, the Court does not

undertake such an analysis and concludes that in addressing

Plaintiff’s arguments, it is sufficient to note the distinction

between the severity analysis, on the one hand, and the

components of the RFC determination and the propounding of those

to the VE, on the other. 

VI. Disposition

In summary, the based on the foregoing, the Court concludes

that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence

in the record as a whole and was not based on proper legal

standards.

It is the Plaintiff’s burden to prove the onset date of

disability. Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079, 1080 (9 Cir. th

1991) (disability insurance benefits). With respect to SSI,

because SSI payments are made beginning with the date of

application, the onset date in an SSI case is ordinarily

established as of the date of filing, provided that the claimant

was disabled on that date. Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-20. Exceptions are

where the evidence shows that the onset date was subsequent to

the date of filing, or where there is a problem requiring

ascertainment of duration. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff filed her application for DIB and SSI on

April 2002; the medical evidence summarized in the ALJ’s decision

covered the time period from 2002 through 2006. It is not clear

what the date of onset was. However, in all other respects, the

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tasks of the administrative fact finder are complete. See,

Regennitter v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

166 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1. Plaintiff’s social security complaint IS GRANTED, and

2. The matter IS REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings to consist of an award of

benefits, and for determination of the sole issue of when the

date of onset of Plaintiff’s disability was; and

3. Judgment BE ENTERED for Plaintiff Pamela E. McKenzie and

against Defendant Michael J. Astrue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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