Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00079/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 07cv0079 J(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER CORDELL, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON; MARK

QUINTANILLA; SANTOS SANCHEZ;

RONALD TRUJILLO,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 07cv0079 J(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS [DOC. NO. 8] AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

LEAVE OF COURT TO AMEND

COMPLAINT [DOC. NO. 11]

Plaintiff Walter Cordell, III filed a civil rights Complaint

[doc. no. 1] on January 11, 2007, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Cordell asserts that Defendants imposed and enforced

unconstitutional conditions of parole that effectively banished

Plaintiff from his home. (Compl. 2-3.) Cordell also claims his

right to due process was violated when Defendants extended his

period of parole beyond the term he agreed to under a plea bargain. 

(Id. at 4.) Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants deprived

him of freedom of association by banishing him from Orange County

because the banishment prevented him from attending his Alcoholics

Anonymous (“AA”) group meetings and his church. (Id. at 4-5.) 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 1 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 07cv0079 J(RBB)

Cordell seeks to recover monetary damages in excess of twenty-one

million dollars, an injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing

the conditions of his parole, an order that he be immediately

released from parole, and “oversight of the [California Department

of Corrections] to prevent future violations of individuals[’]

constitutional rights.” (Id. at 7.)

On February 1, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss

[doc. no. 8]. Defendants claim the Complaint should be dismissed

for the following reasons: (1) Cordell is precluded from

litigating this case under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine;

(2) Defendants are absolutely immune from liability for damages;

(3) Plaintiff’s claims are not properly brought in a civil rights

action; (4) Cordell’s claims are without merit; and (5) Defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. 6-14.) 

Plaintiff submitted an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss [doc.

no. 13], which was filed nunc pro tunc to March 5, 2007. Cordell

also filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Complaint [doc. no.

11]. Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to assert claims

against the Defendants in their individual capacities rather than

their official capacities. (Mot. to Amend 1.) On March 9, 2007,

Defendants filed a Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss [doc.

no. 9]. The Court found Defendants’ Motion suitable for decision

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) [doc.

no. 14]. 

For the reasons set forth below, the district court should

GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave of Court to Amend Complaint. 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 2 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 07cv0079 J(RBB)

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with attempted murder and

assault with a deadly weapon after he severely beat a female victim

with a wooden dowel; the victim suffered a broken finger and needed

over fifty stitches in her head. (Compl. Ex. A at 1, Ex. M at 2,

Ex. N at 2.) On July 13, 2001, Cordell entered an agreement to

plead guilty to assault with a deadly weapon inflicting great

bodily injury in exchange for a three-year prison term followed by

three years of parole. (Compl. Ex. N at 1-2.) 

Plaintiff filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus,

alleging that the three-year parole period to follow his

incarceration constituted an unlawful extension of his sentence,

resulting in double jeopardy, a denial of due process, and an ex

post facto violation. (Compl. Ex. M at 3.) The petition was

denied. (See id. at 15.) 

After serving thirty months of his three-year sentence,

Cordell was paroled on July 9, 2003, to San Diego County, and

Defendant Santos Sanchez was assigned to be his parole agent. 

(Compl. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 1; Compl. Ex. A at 1.) As a

special condition of his parole, Plaintiff was not allowed to

return to Orange County. (Compl. Ex. A at 1.) This condition was

based on the victim’s request and on the concern for her safety due

to the violent nature of Cordell’s offense. (Id.) Defendant Mark

Quintanilla is the Parole Supervisor who approved Plaintiff’s

special conditions of parole. (Id. at 5.) 

Four months after he was released, Cordell violated his parole

by returning to Orange County. (Compl. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 3 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 07cv0079 J(RBB)

A. at 14; Compl. Ex. B at 1.) He was sentenced to eight months in

custody. (Compl. Ex. B at 1.) During the hearing to determine his

sentence for the parole violation, the hearing officer directed the

California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) to re-evaluate the

special condition of Petitioner’s parole forbidding entry into

Orange County as possibly being too restrictive. (Id.) 

While serving his sentence for the parole violation, Cordell

filed an inmate appeal (known as a “CDC form 602”) requesting that

his parole conditions be revised to remove the provision forbidding

him from entering Orange County and to eliminate a 7:00 p.m.

curfew. (Compl. Ex. C at 5.) The appeal was denied at the

informal level. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was interviewed by

Defendant Quintanilla on March 30, 2004, after which his appeal was

denied at the first formal level of review. (Id. at 2-4.) Cordell

also filed an appeal with the Board of Prison Terms, again

complaining that his parole conditions were illegal and should be

modified. (Compl. Ex. D at 1.)

Plaintiff was released on July 3, 2004. (Compl. Ex. A at 1.) 

He violated his parole a second time by again returning to Orange

County and violating other special conditions of his parole

including drinking and possessing alcohol. (Compl. Pl.’s Mem. of

P. & A. at 2; Compl. Ex. A at 1.) He was sentenced to ten months

incarceration. (Compl. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 2.)

While serving his sentence for the second parole violation,

Cordell filed an inmate appeal complaining that he was informed he

would be paroled to San Francisco and requesting that upon his

release he instead be allowed to return to San Diego. (Compl. Ex.

E at 1-2.) The appeal was denied as untimely. (Id. at 3.) 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 4 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 07cv0079 J(RBB)

Plaintiff then sent a 602 form directly to the CDC headquarters in

Sacramento, California, without first going through the lower

levels of review, but the form was returned to him for failure to

properly follow the appeal process. (Compl. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A.

at 15-16; Compl. Ex. F.)

Plaintiff then filed a state habeas petition in the Orange

County Superior Court alleging that he was told by his parole agent

he would be required to spend one extra year on parole based on his

violations, which Plaintiff alleged would violate his plea

agreement. (Compl. Ex. S at 3.) That petition was denied. 

(Compl. Ex. T at 4.) Cordell subsequently filed another habeas

corpus petition in the Orange County Superior Court claiming that

if he were paroled to San Francisco rather than San Diego it would

constitute unconstitutional banishment from his home. (Compl. Ex.

H at 2.) This petition was also denied. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff was released from custody on May 24, 2006. (Compl.

Ex. I at 1.) He was paroled to Moreno Valley, California, which is

located in Riverside County. (Id.) Defendant Ronald Trujillo was

assigned to be his parole agent. (Id.) Cordell violated his

parole a third time by traveling beyond fifty miles of his home.

(Compl. Ex. J at 1-2.) He was sentenced to four months

imprisonment. (Id. at 2.) 

After serving his sentence for the violation, Plaintiff was

paroled a fourth time. (Defs.’ Mem. 3.) Cordell has now absconded

from his parole, and there is a parolee-at-large warrant currently

pending against him, which was issued by Defendant Trujillo. (See

id.; Compl. 3; Civil Cover Sheet.)

//

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 5 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 07cv0079 J(RBB)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A claim can only be

dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n.7 (1980) (quotations and

citations omitted). The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The question is not whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where

there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 6 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 07cv0079 J(RBB)

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))

(stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court may not generally consider materials

outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 12.34[2], at 12-72 (3d ed. 1997) (“The court may not

. . . take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum

opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not

constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 7 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 07cv0079 J(RBB)

But “[w]hen a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

The Court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell,

14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002);

Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14

(9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the Court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 8 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 07cv0079 J(RBB)

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment

of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave

to amend is appropriate. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show two things: (1) A person acting “under color of

state law” committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct

deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity

protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42

U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797

F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss Cordell’s Complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to allege facts

sufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(Defs.’ Mem. 5.) Specifically, they claim the Complaint fails to

state a claim because Cordell is precluded from litigating this

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 9 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 07cv0079 J(RBB)

case under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. (Id. at 6.) 

These individual Defendants also allege that Plaintiff’s claims for

damages should be dismissed because Defendants are absolutely

immune from liability for damages and are entitled to qualified

immunity for their official actions. (Id. at 7, 11.) 

Additionally, they assert that Plaintiff’s claims are not properly

brought in a civil rights action because they challenge the

duration and conditions of Cordell’s sentence and, accordingly,

must be raised in a habeas corpus action. (Id. at 8.) Finally,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s first and third causes of

action fail to state a claim because Cordell’s parole conditions

are rationally related to his offense, and Plaintiff’s second cause

of action fails to state a claim because exhibits N and O to the

Complaint show that there has been no violation of the plea

agreement. (Id. at 10-11.)

A. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed Under the Fugitive

Disentitlement Doctrine.

Defendants first allege that Cordell’s Complaint should be

dismissed because he is a fugitive from justice. (Id. at 6.) 

The fugitive disentitlement doctrine provides that, “an individual

who seeks to invoke the processes of the law while flouting them

has no entitlement ‘to call upon the resources of the Court for

determination of his claims.’” Conforte v. Comm’r., 692 F.2d 587,

589 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365,

366 (1970)). Courts have regularly applied the doctrine to dismiss

both criminal appeals and related civil proceedings instituted by

fugitives. See, e.g., Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366 (appeal from

criminal conviction); United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency,

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 10 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 07cv0079 J(RBB)

769 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1985) (civil forfeiture proceeding);

Conforte, 692 F.2d at 589-90 (appeal from decision of tax court

arising from criminal conviction for tax fraud); Doyle v. Dept. of

Justice, 668 F.2d 1365, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (suit brought

under the Freedom of Information Act for records relating to

plaintiff’s criminal sentence); Griffin v. New York Corr. Comm’r,

882 F. Supp. 295, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (§ 1983 civil rights case);

Clark v. Dalsheim, 663 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)

(habeas corpus petition).

But application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is

discretionary. United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048,

1054-55 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d

610, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1990); Hussein v. I.N.S., 817 F.2d 63, 63

(9th Cir. 1986)). It does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to

hear a plaintiff’s claims, but rather it authorizes their dismissal

based on equitable considerations. Id. (citations omitted). It is

inequitable to allow fugitives “to press those cases where they

expect to receive some benefit, while refusing to accept decisions

imposing some burden . . . .” Clark, 663 F. Supp. at 1096

(citations omitted). 

Allowing a fugitive to litigate his claims may also tend to

encourage prison escapes and parole violations in cases where

individuals believe their confinement or parole conditions are

illegal or unreasonable. Id. (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S.

534, 541-42 (1975); Lewis v. Delaware State Hosp., 490 F. Supp.

177, 182 (D. Del. 1980)). “Disentitlement punishes those who evade

the reach of the law and thus discourages recourse to flight.” 

Antonio-Martinez v. I.N.S., 317 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002)

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 11 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint and his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss both

state that Cordell has asked the Court to issue an injunction preventing his

arrest during the pendency of this case. (Compl. 3; Opp’n 1.) Although

Plaintiff attempted to file a motion for preliminary injunction on March 5,

2007, the motion was rejected by the Court because Cordell did not provide proof

that the motion was served on Defendants. (Discrepancy Order Rejecting Doc.

[doc. no. 15] at 1.) Thus, no motion for preliminary injunction is pending at

this time.

12 07cv0079 J(RBB)

(citing Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 510 (9th Cir.

1998)).

For application of the disentitlement doctrine to be

appropriate, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiff is

actually a fugitive. See United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048,

1051 (9th Cir. 2002). “The doctrine does not apply to [a party]

just because he has not reported as directed to the probation

office, in the absence of a showing that he has fled or hidden

himself from the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. 

Plaintiff admits he is a fugitive who is actively evading

arrest. Cordell has indicated that a warrant was issued for his

arrest for violating his parole conditions, and he is a “PAL”

(parolee-at-large). (Compl. Attach. Civil Cover Sheet 1.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint requests that the Court issue an injunction

preventing the CDC from taking any action on the warrant so that

Cordell can attend hearings in this case without fear of arrest.1

(Compl. 3.) 

Plaintiff claims that although he is a parolee-at-large, he

should be permitted to litigate the claims in his Complaint because

he is challenging the legality of his parole. (Notice of Opp’n 1-

2.) This argument fails. Courts consistently dismiss challenges

to the legality of convictions and sentences due to the litigants’

fugitive status. See, e.g., Parretti, 143 F.3d at 510-11

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 12 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 07cv0079 J(RBB)

(dismissing appeal from denial of habeas petition when petitioner

skipped bail and fled the country); Clark, 663 F. Supp. at 1096-97

(dismissing habeas petition where petitioner challenging conviction

absconded from parole after serving his sentence).

It would be inequitable to allow Plaintiff to litigate his

claims while he remains a fugitive. Cordell cannot both flout the

law and at the same time call upon it for relief. The district

court should GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. If, however, Cordell

is either recaptured or surrenders, and he loses his fugitive

status, the disentitlement doctrine will no longer apply. Cf.

Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 249-51 (1993)

(holding that when a criminal defendant’s flight and recapture

occur before an appeal, the defendant’s “former fugitive status”

does not warrant dismissal).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Should Be Dismissed Because They Are Not

Cognizable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants also allege that all three of Cordell’s claims for

relief should be dismissed because they are not properly raised in

a civil rights action. (Defs.’ Mem. 8-9.) Defendants state,

“Because Plaintiff is challenging . . . custody, his claims are not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, but must be brought by

petition for writ of habeas corpus.” (Reply 3.) Plaintiff’s

Opposition does not address this argument.

A civil rights suit under § 1983 is not the appropriate

mechanism for a person in state custody to challenge the legality

of a criminal conviction or sentence. Rather, the validity of a

conviction or sentence should be raised in a petition for habeas

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 13 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 07cv0079 J(RBB)

corpus. “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state

prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and

seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may

come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

488-90 (1973)); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78

(2005). 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized “the need to

ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus . . . remedies

when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement --

either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release

or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily

implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544

U.S. at 81. A prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred, regardless of

whether the complaint seeks damages or equitable relief, if the

prisoner must demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement before

he is entitled to relief. Id. at 81-82; Heck, 411 U.S. at 487;

Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997)

(discussing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)). 

It is well-settled that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy

for a prisoner or parolee to challenge the duration of his sentence

or the fact of his conviction. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78; Heck,

512 U.S. at 481. It remains unsettled, however, whether a parolee

who challenges the conditions of his parole may raise such a claim

in a § 1983 case, or whether it must be raised in a habeas

petition. 

The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236

(1963), that a parolee could proceed with a habeas corpus petition

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 14 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 07cv0079 J(RBB)

to challenge his underlying sentence because he was still “in

custody” within the meaning of the habeas statute. Jones, 371 U.S.

at 243. Since that decision, courts have regularly found that

parolees and probationers, who are subject to restraints on their

freedom that are not felt by the common public, are “in custody”

and can seek habeas relief. See, e.g., Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 F.3d

1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180,

1182-83 (9th Cir. 1998). While deciding that habeas actions may be

brought by parolees, Jones and its progeny left open the question

of whether habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy available for a

parolee who seeks to challenge the conditions of his “custody.” 

The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court of appeals that has

definitively answered the question.

In Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977), the

Seventh Circuit found that habeas corpus was the exclusive means

for a probationer to challenge the terms of her probation. 

Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1225. The court stated:

Because probation is by its nature less confining than

incarceration, the distinction between the fact of

confinement and the conditions thereof is necessarily

blurred. The elimination or substitution, for example,

of one of the conditions of Rosanna’s probation would

free her substantially from her confinement; figuratively

speaking, one of the “bars” would be removed from her

cell.

Id. Because the parole conditions themselves keep a parolee “in

custody,” any challenge to those conditions must be brought in a

habeas petition.

The Seventh Circuit again confronted the question in Williams

v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003). There, Williams filed

a civil rights action challenging a condition of his parole that

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 15 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 07cv0079 J(RBB)

restricted him from international travel. Williams, 336 F.3d at

579. Relying on Drollinger, the court found Williams was

challenging a term of his custody, and accordingly, he should have

brought a habeas petition rather than a civil rights case. Id. at

580. The court explained the nature of a claim by a parolee

challenging his parole conditions: 

For parolees, the [difference between a civil rights

action and a collateral attack] is more metaphysical

[than for prisoners], because the “conditions” of parole

are the confinement. Requirements that parolees stay in

touch with their parole officer, hold down a job, steer

clear of criminals, or (as in Williams’s case) obtain

permission for any proposed travel outside the

jurisdiction, are what distinguish parole from freedom. 

It is because of these restrictions that parolees remain

“in custody” on their unexpired sentences and thus may

initiate a collateral attack while on parole.

Id. at 579.

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether these claims are

exclusively the province of habeas corpus petitions or whether they

can also be raised in a § 1983 complaint. In an unpublished

decision, the Eighth Circuit approved of and followed the Seventh

Circuit’s analysis, finding that conditions of parole can only be

challenged by means of a habeas petition. Bass v. Mitchell, No.

93-1414, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9663, at *3 (8th Cir. Apr. 28, 1995)

(citing Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1224-25). No other circuit court

of appeals has addressed the issue, and the district courts have

come to differing conclusions. Compare Yahweh v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (finding parole

conditions may be challenged under either § 2254 or § 1983), with

Moreno v. California, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1998)

(finding parole conditions are not cognizable under § 1983).

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 16 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 07cv0079 J(RBB)

The Court finds that the Seventh Circuit has provided the more

persuasive analysis. Without the conditions of his parole, there

would be nothing keeping Plaintiff “in custody.” The Supreme Court

has clearly found that parolees are in custody, and habeas corpus

petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are the appropriate vehicle for

challenging state custody.

Cordell’s first and third causes of action challenge the

conditions of his parole. Plaintiff argues that the condition

prohibiting him from entering Orange County is unconstitutional

because it constitutes banishment and denies him freedom of

association. (Compl. 3, 5; Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 4-7, 11-13.) 

These claims force the Court to rule on the validity of the

restrictions placed on Cordell by the CDC as a part of his

sentence, which can only properly be done in a habeas proceeding. 

Cf. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487)

(finding claims to be cognizable under § 1983 because a favorable

judgment would not “necessarily imply the invalidity” of

plaintiff’s conviction). Cordell asks the Court to invalidate the

conditions of his parole, vacate the state court’s judgment, and

allow Plaintiff to complete his term of parole with different

conditions. (Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 13.) This is the type of

immediate release from confinement that the Supreme Court has found

to be at “the core of habeas corpus” and not cognizable under §

1983. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 79 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at

489). Accordingly, these claims cannot be raised in a § 1983 civil

rights action and should be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action should also be dismissed;

the claim alleges that Cordell’s parole term has been extended

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 17 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 07cv0079 J(RBB)

beyond his sentence. (Compl. 4.) He requests that the Court order

his immediate release from parole, because the three-year term of

parole included in his plea bargain should have already expired. 

(Id. at 7.) Plaintiff is directly challenging the duration of his

sentence, which can only be done in a habeas petition. Wilkinson,

544 U.S. at 81; Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Accordingly, the district

court should DISMISS the claims in Cordell’s Complaint for failure

to state a claim. See Butterfield, 120 F.3d at 1025 (affirming

dismissal for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6) when

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was barred by Heck). 

C. Plaintiff’s Damage Claims Against Defendants Tilton and 

Quintanilla Should Be Dismissed Because They Are Entitled to 

Absolute Immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Henry v. County of Shasta, 132

F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.

1998). This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under

§ 1983, so an inmate cannot recover damages from the state under §

1983 unless the state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A federal court only has

jurisdiction over a suit against a state when the relief sought is

“prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing

violation of federal law.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,

1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials

sued in their official capacities. “[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 18 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19 07cv0079 J(RBB)

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471

(1985)). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the

State itself.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)).

“[T]he presumption is that qualified rather than absolute

immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the

exercise of their duties.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87

(1991). To determine whether absolute immunity is appropriate, the

Court must look at the functions the officials perform rather than

the titles they hold. Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908 (9th

Cir. 1983) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978)). 

Parole officials are entitled to absolute immunity for actions

they take that are quasi-judicial in nature, such as the decision

to grant, deny, or revoke parole. Swift v. California, 384 F.3d

1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); Anderson, 714 F.2d at 908-09; Sellars

v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981). Because the

conditions imposed on a parolee are an integral part of the

decision to grant parole, their imposition is a quasi-judicial

function. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer,

408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972)). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to

absolute immunity for conduct relating to the imposition and

enforcement of Cordell’s parole conditions. See id. 

Defendants are also entitled to absolute immunity from

Plaintiff’s claim that they “allow[ed] him to be on parole for 6

months longer than [his] plea bargained length of 3 years” because

the decision to continue or to terminate parole is “functionally

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 19 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 07cv0079 J(RBB)

comparable” to the quasi-judicial decision to grant, deny or revoke

parole. See Swift, 384 F.3d at 1189; Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909;

Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303.

Defendants Sanchez and Trujillo, however, are not entitled to

absolute immunity for actions they took in a law enforcement

capacity. “Under California’s system of parole, a parole agent

acts as a law enforcement official when investigating parole

violations and executing parole holds.” Swift, 384 F.3d at 1191. 

When issuing an arrest warrant or investigating a possible parole

violation, a parole agent is functioning as a police officer. Id.

at 1191-92 (citing Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Bd. Members, 815

F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987)). The Ninth Circuit has held that parole

agents are not entitled to absolute immunity when acting in law

enforcement functions. Id.

Accordingly, the district court should DISMISS Cordell’s

claims for monetary damages asserted against Defendants Tilton and

Quintanilla because they are absolutely immune from civil liability

for actions taken in their official capacity concerning the

granting or revocation of parole and the imposition and enforcement

of parole conditions. Defendants Sanchez and Trujillo, however,

are not entitled to absolute immunity for law enforcement actions

taken in their capacity as parole agents, so Plaintiff’s claims

against them should not be dismissed on this ground.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims Should Be Dismissed Because Defendants Are

Entitled to Qualified Immunity.

“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions,

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 20 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 07cv0079 J(RBB)

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A

constitutional right is “clearly established” if it is

“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987)). This standard ensures that government officials are

on notice of the illegality of their conduct before they are

subjected to suit. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206

(2001)). Qualified immunity is immunity from suit for monetary

damages, but it is not immunity from suit for declaratory or

injunctive relief. Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir.

2006). It protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified

immunity analysis is whether plaintiff’s allegations, if true,

establish a constitutional violation.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 736; see

also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. If the allegations make out

a constitutional violation, the next step is to determine whether

the right alleged to have been violated is “clearly established.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In ruling on qualified immunity, the

court must decide the “‘purely legal’ issue of ‘whether facts

alleged by the plaintiff support a claim of violation of clearly

established law.’” Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9

(1985)). 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 21 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22 07cv0079 J(RBB)

1. First and Third Causes of Action: Legality of a Parole 

Condition Restricting Plaintiff from Orange County

Cordell alleges in his first and third causes of action that

Defendants are liable for violating his constitutional rights

because they enforced a parole condition that “banished” him from

Orange County, where he had lived for twenty years and had attended

church and AA meetings. (Compl. 3, 5; Opp’n 4-6, 11-13.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that the banishment deprived him of freedom

of association. (Compl. 5; Opp’n 11-13.)

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be paroled

to the location of his choice. Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924

(9th Cir. 1983); Zupan v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 2d 792, 804 (N.D. Cal.

1998); see also Alonzo v. Rozanski, 808 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir.

1986). Indeed, even being paroled to a state other than one’s home

state does not necessarily violate any constitutionally-protected

liberty interest. See Bagley, 718 F.2d at 925 (rejecting a claim

that parolee was unconstitutionally banished when he was paroled to

Iowa and forbidden from entering his home state of Washington). 

But under some circumstances, parole conditions that cause the

de facto banishment of a parolee can amount to an unconstitutional

infringement of liberty. See Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312

F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962) (finding unconstitutional banishment

based on a sentencing condition that required the foreign citizen

defendant to depart from the United States). Thus, Cordell’s claim

that he was banished from his home due to the imposition of an

unreasonable parole condition is based on a valid legal theory

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 22 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23 07cv0079 J(RBB)

that, under the correct factual situation, could entitle him to

relief. 

“[A] court granting probation [or parole] may impose

reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms

enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.” United States v. Knight, 534

U.S. 112, 119 (2001). Determining whether a parole condition is

constitutionally permissible is a fact-specific inquiry. A special

condition of parole will be upheld if it has a rational basis and

is reasonably related to the nature of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the offender. See United States v. T.M.,

330 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003); Bagley, 718 F.2d at 925; see

also Yahweh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1344 (S.D.

Fla. 2001) (applying the “reasonably related” test to parolee’s

challenge to parole conditions made on the basis of freedom of

association). A parole condition can impose no greater deprivation

of liberty than is reasonably necessary to advance the government

interest underlying the condition. See United States v. Rearden,

349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003).

Cordell pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon resulting

in great bodily injury. (Compl. Ex. N at 1-2.) He admitted, as a

basis for his guilty plea, “On 12/20/00 in [Orange County] I

willfully and unlawfully assaulted [the victim] with a deadly

weapon, a wooden dowel, and I personally inflicted great bodily

injury upon [her] in the form of a broken finger and 50+ stitches,

with the specific intent to do so.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff thus

admitted he was a violent offender. 

Cordell’s victim requested that Plaintiff not be returned to

Orange County upon his release from prison. (See Compl. Ex. A at

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 23 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24 07cv0079 J(RBB)

1.) As a result of the victim’s request and CDC’s concerns for her

safety, Cordell was paroled to San Diego rather than Orange County. 

(Id.) He was placed under “High Control” parole supervision

because of the violent nature of his offense. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s parole condition was rationally related to his

offense. The CDC’s decision to prevent Cordell from entering

Orange County while on parole was based on the concern that

Plaintiff would be a danger to his victim if paroled near her home,

and on the victim’s stated desire to keep Cordell away from her. 

This is a rational basis for restricting Plaintiff from Orange

County, and it is reasonably related to the violent nature of

Cordell’s offense. Cf. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. __, 126 S.

Ct. 2193, 2200 (2006) (discussing the state’s substantial interest

in supervising parolees because they are likely to reoffend).

The facts of the present case are similar to Bagley. In that

case, Bagley was paroled to Iowa, even though his home state was

Washington. Bagley, 718 F.2d at 923. He was given a special

condition of parole that prohibited him from returning to

Washington during the term of his parole. Id. Bagley contended

that the condition violated his right to choose the location of his

home and thus infringed his constitutional right to interstate

travel. Id. The court disagreed, finding that “a parolee does not

have a constitutional interest that entitles him to parole in any

particular district.” Id. at 924. The court upheld the condition,

which was reasonably related to Bagley’s history of threatening

witnesses in the Seattle, Washington area. Id.

Plaintiff’s case, however, differs from Bagley in one

important respect. Bagley’s parole condition was not absolute; he

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 24 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25 07cv0079 J(RBB)

could travel to Washington for purposes of litigation or child

visitation with the parole commissioner’s prior approval. Id. at

923. Here, Cordell is absolutely prohibited from entering Orange

County, with no possible exceptions. (See Compl. Ex. A at 1, Ex.

Ex. B at 1, Ex. C at 2 (stating the prohibition from entering

Orange County as an absolute).) The severity of this condition is

evidenced by the fact that two of Plaintiff’s parole violations

occurred when he was attempting to visit his family and his

children, who reside in Orange County. (Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at

1, 3.)

Taken in a light most favorable to Cordell, Plaintiff’s

Complaint sufficiently alleges the violation of a constitutional

right, because the parole condition that absolutely restricts

Cordell from entering Orange County for any reason may be

overbroad. The condition is reasonably related to the government’s

interest in protecting the safety of the victim, but it may involve

a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to accomplish

its purpose. 

Other cases that have upheld restrictive parole conditions

have done so explicitly because the conditions in those cases

provided an exception whereby the parole agent or another

supervisor could give express permission for the parolee to exceed

the condition. See, e.g., Rearden, 349 F.3d 608 (upholding parole

condition prohibiting use of the internet because it provided an

exception for access with prior consent of probation officer);

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cri. 2003) (same);

Bagley, 718 F.2d at 923-24 (upholding condition prohibiting parolee

from entering Washington unless he first received permission from

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 25 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26 07cv0079 J(RBB)

the parole commissioner for purposes of litigation or child

visitation). Here, Plaintiff’s conditions contain no exception. 

For the purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court

need only look at whether, taken in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, the Complaint sets forth factual allegations showing

that the Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. On the facts alleged, Cordell has

sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation because the

condition of his parole absolutely restricting him from entering

Orange County is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the

government’s goal of protecting the safety of the victim. 

b. Whether the Right Was Clearly Established 

Although Plaintiff’s claims of illegal banishment and denial

of freedom of association allege constitutional violations, the

qualified immunity analysis also requires this Court to determine

whether those rights were clearly established. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. at 201. “Whether the right at issue in a claim of

qualified immunity is clearly established is judged as of the date

of the incident alleged and is a pure question of law . . . .” 

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Act

Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993)). “The

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640; see also Saucier,

533 U.S. at 202.

“[W]hen a public official acts in reliance on a duly enacted

statute or ordinance, that official ordinarily is entitled to

qualified immunity.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1027

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 26 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27 07cv0079 J(RBB)

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200,

1210 (9th Cir. 1994)). But qualified immunity will not be granted

to a public official who enforces a statute that is “patently

violative of fundamental constitutional principles.” Grossman, 33

F.3d 1209.

California Penal Code section 3003 provides that “an inmate

who is released on parole shall be returned to the county that was

the last legal residence of the inmate prior to his or her

incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code § 3003(a) (West Supp. 2007). But

“an inmate may be returned to another county if that would be in

the best interests of the public.” Cal. Penal Code § 3003(b). The

best interests of the public are determined, in part, by the need

to protect the safety of the victim, a witness, or any other

person, and the chance that a certain location will reduce the

inmate’s chance of successfully completing parole. Cal. Penal

Code. §§ 3003(b)(1)-(2). Additionally, “an inmate who is released

on parole shall not be returned to a location within 35 miles of

the actual residence of a victim of . . . a felony in which the

defendant inflicts great bodily injury[,]” if the victim requests

additional distance and the CDC finds there is a need to protect

the victim’s safety. Cal. Penal Code § 3003(f). 

In imposing the conditions of Cordell’s parole, the Defendants

relied on these statutes. Defendants determined that the interests

of the public were best served by releasing Plaintiff to a county

away from the victim’s home, which is authorized by California

Penal Code section 3003. These statutory provisions were duly

enacted by the California legislature, and the Court is not aware

of any case law in which their constitutionality was seriously

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 27 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 07cv0079 J(RBB)

questioned. For qualified immunity to be withheld, “in the light

of preexisting law the unlawfulness [of the officer’s conduct] must

be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The California parole

regulations are not obviously unconstitutional, and accordingly,

Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants have violated Cordell’s

clearly established constitutional rights by following them. 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for Cordell’s first

and third claims for relief.

2. Second Cause of Action: Legality of the Extension of

Plaintiff’s Parole Period Beyond Three Years

Plaintiff asserts in his second claim that Defendants violated

his right to due process by extending his term of parole beyond the

three-year period included in his plea agreement. (Compl. 4;

Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 7-11.) Cordell was informed during a

term of recommitment to prison following a parole violation that

the time during which he was incarcerated for the revocation would

be added onto his parole term. (Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 8.) He

complains that this constitutes an unconstitutional extension of

his sentence. (Id. at 8-9.)

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right

Under California law, the “[t]ime during which parole is

suspended because the prisoner has absconded or has been returned

to custody as a parole violator shall not be credited toward any

period of parole unless the prisoner is found not guilty of the

parole violation.” Cal. Penal Code § 3000(b)(5) (West Supp. 2007);

see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2515(a) (West 2007). 

Accordingly, the time that Plaintiff served for each of his parole

violations is not counted towards the three-year parole period. 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 28 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29 07cv0079 J(RBB)

The “extension” of Cordell’s parole for the periods that he was in

custody was done in compliance with California law. Plaintiff

contends, however, that this “extension” violated his due process

rights because it subjected him to punishment beyond the term he

agreed to, and “[t]he CDC has no constitutional or legal right to

change such an agreement.” (Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 10.)

A criminal defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for certain

promised actions is entitled to fulfillment of those promises. 

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Davis v.

Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2006). Due process

requires that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to

be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be

fulfilled.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Buckley v. Terhune, 441

F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006). One remedy for the government’s

breach of a plea agreement is resentencing. See Gunn v. Ignacio,

263 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting habeas petition and

remanding to state court for resentencing).

The interpretation of state plea agreements is governed by

state law. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1987); Buckley,

441 F.3d at 694-95. In California, all contracts, including plea

agreements, are deemed to incorporate existing state law even if

they do not contain an explicit provision to that effect. Davis,

446 F.3d at 962 (citing People v. Gipson, 117 Cal. App. 4th 1065,

1069-70, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 481 (Ct. App. 2004)). 

Plaintiff’s plea agreement did not expressly incorporate

California Penal Code section 3000. (See Compl. Ex. N.) 

Nevertheless, the agreement incorporated all existing California

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 29 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30 07cv0079 J(RBB)

law as well as any future amendments to the applicable California

statutes. Davis, 446 F.3d at 962 (citing Gipson, 117 Cal. App. 4th

at 1070, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 481). Existing California law

provided that periods when Cordell was in custody for parole

violations were not counted towards his three-year period of

parole; Plaintiff was to serve three years of parole, out of

custody. See Cal. Penal Code § 3000(b)(5). Consequently, the CDC

did not violate Cordell’s plea bargain by “extending” his agreedupon sentence. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his

constitutional rights to due process were violated. Cf. Wallace v.

Greer, 821 F.2d 1274, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) (granting summary

judgment for defendant in § 1983 case where plaintiff claimed his

sentence was illegally extended, because plaintiff’s term of

mandatory supervised release was tolled under state law during the

time he had absconded from parole supervision).

b. Whether the Right Was Clearly Established

As was the case with Cordell’s first and third causes of

action, the parole conditions Plaintiff complains of in his second

cause of action were set pursuant to duly-enacted statutes. See

Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. Thus, even if Plaintiff could make out

a due process claim, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

because the term of Cordell’s parole was calculated in accordance

with the applicable California statutes. A reasonable parole

officer or official would have believed that reliance on provisions

of the California Penal Code was appropriate and in compliance with

constitutional standards. 

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 30 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31 07cv0079 J(RBB)

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

all three of Plaintiff’s claims. Cordell’s claims for damages

should be DISMISSED.

E. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Without Merit.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s claims should be 

dismissed because the facts alleged fail to state a constitutional

claim that would entitle him to relief. (Defs.’ Mem. 10-11; Reply

3-4.) Claims one and three, Defendants allege, will not entitle

Cordell to relief because Plaintiff’s parole conditions are

rationally related to his offense. (Defs.’ Mem. 10.) Defendants

claim that ground two fails to state a claim because they have not

violated Cordell’s plea agreement. (Id. at 11.)

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may grant a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim “only if it is clear that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The Court must assume the Plaintiff’s factual

allegations are true and resolve all reasonable inferences in his

favor. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, “[t]he issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). “Dismissal is proper

only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of

sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 31 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32 07cv0079 J(RBB)

1. Claims One and Three: Banishment

In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff asserts that the

parole condition prohibiting him from entering Orange County is

“illegal and unconstitutional.” (Compl. 3.) He contends that

Defendants are liable for this unconstitutional “banishment”

because they imposed and enforced the parole condition, which is

“unreasonable, not rehabilitative and too broad.” (Compl. Mem. of

P. & A. at 4.) Because he was not allowed to return to Orange

County, he says, his marriage was “strained . . . to the point of

divorce, costing him his house of 14 years, as well as child

support.” (Id.) He claims that he was again banished after his

second parole violation when he was paroled to Riverside County

rather than San Diego, where he had attempted to create a new life. 

(Compl. 3; Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 3.) Plaintiff complains that

he was “banished from his home, children, church and employment.” 

(Compl. Mem. of P. & A. at 2.) Defendants argue, on the other

hand, that Cordell is not entitled to relief because the parole

conditions imposed are rationally related to his violent offense,

so his claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Mem. 10.) 

As discussed above, the condition of Cordell’s parole that

prevented him from living in Orange County had a rational basis and

was reasonably related to his crime and the interests of public

safety. But the condition was overbroad because it was an absolute

prohibition and did not provide any exceptions. The government’s

desire to protect the safety of Plaintiff’s victim does not require

an absolute prohibition, under all circumstances, from entering

Orange County. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 32 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33 07cv0079 J(RBB)

Cordell, Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently alleges a

constitutional violation, and thus, dismissal under 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim is not warranted. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss claims one and three should be DENIED.

2. Claim Two: Violation of Plaintiff’s Plea Agreement

Cordell alleges in claim two of his Complaint that Defendants

have illegally violated his plea agreement by keeping him on parole

after the expiration of the three-year parole term contained in the

agreement. (Compl. 4; Compl. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 7-8.) As

discussed above, however, Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s

plea agreement. The agreement incorporated a California Penal Code

provision which provides that time during which a parolee is in

custody for a parole violation is not counted towards the parole

period. Cordell was subject to three years of parole, not

including the time that he served for each of his parole

violations. Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s plea agreement. 

Accordingly, Cordell’s second claim should be DISMISSED for the

additional reason that it fails to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6).

IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Amend Complaint [doc. no. 11],

in which he seeks to amend his Complaint to sue the Defendants in

their individual capacities rather than their official capacities. 

(Mot. to Amend 1.) The Motion was filed after Defendants filed

their Motion to Dismiss and appears to be an attempt to avoid the

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on the absolute or

qualified immunity of Defendants for actions taken in their

official capacities.

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 33 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34 07cv0079 J(RBB)

The Court must grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his

complaint “even if no request to amend the pleading was made,

unless [the Court] determines that the pleading could not possibly

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d at 1127 (quotations and citations omitted); Noll v. Carlson,

809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). “Failure to grant leave to

amend the complaint . . . ‘is improper unless it is clear . . .

that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.’” Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Thinket Ink

Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061

(9th Cir. 2004)). “‘[T]he rule favoring liberality in amendments

to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant.’” 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448). It is

only where a complaint lacks merit entirely or amendment of a pro

se litigant’s complaint would be futile that denial of leave to

amend is appropriate. Id. at 1129; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, granting Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint would be

futile. Even if Cordell were to amend his Complaint to assert

claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, the

Complaint is still defective. As discussed above, the Complaint

should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s claims can only be brought

in a habeas corpus petition, not in a § 1983 civil rights

complaint. Additionally, Cordell is currently a fugitive from

justice and is not entitled to proceed with the prosecution of this

action. Granting Plaintiff leave to amend would not cure either of

these defects. Thus, Cordell’s Motion to Amend should be DENIED.

//

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 34 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35 07cv0079 J(RBB)

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED, and this action should be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE in its entirety. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave of Court

to Amend Complaint should be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 31, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 13,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

DATED: August 8, 2007

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Jones

All Parties of Record

Case 3:07-cv-00079-J-RBB Document 16 Filed 08/09/07 Page 35 of 35