Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00481/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00481-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL SAPIEN LOPEZ, SR., )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

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ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:05-cv-00481-LJO-TAG HC

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

ABEYANCE AND STAY OF

PROCEEDINGS ON PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Doc. 27)

ORDER LIFTING STAY OF

DECEMBER 29, 2005 (Doc. 13)

ORDER FOR PETITIONER TO FILE

AMENDED PETITION WITH NEWLY

EXHAUSTED CLAIM WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On April 11, 2005, Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition, including eight grounds for

relief that challenge his convictions for multiple violations of California’s Penal Code and Health &

Safety Code, as well as the resulting sentence of 201 years, eight months. (Doc. 1). On August 17,

2005, Petitioner filed a motion for an abeyance, requesting that this Court stay proceedings on the

petition to permit Petitioner to exhaust a “newly discovered” claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel in state court. (Doc. 12). The Court granted that motion on December 29, 2005. (Doc. 13). 

Thereafter, Petitioner regularly filed Status Reports until March 30, 2007, when he advised the Court

that the California Supreme Court had denied his petition and that his claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel was fully exhausted in state court. (Doc. 26).

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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d). 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

That same date, Petitioner filed a second motion for stay, indicating that he wished to exhaust

a claim in state court related to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in California v.

Cunningham, ___ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007). (Doc. 27). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will deny Petitioner’s motion to stay proceedings while he exhausts the Cunningham claim

and, since his other claim has been fully exhausted, will lift the stay and order Petitioner to file an

amended petition containing the newly exhausted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

DISCUSSION

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988

(9 Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the Ninth th

Circuit has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts carte blanche to stay even fully

exhausted habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. Granting a stay is appropriate where

there is no intention on the part of the Petitioner to delay or harass and in order to avoid piecemeal

litigation. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is proper for a district court, in its

discretion, to hold a petition containing only exhausted claims in abeyance in order to permit the

petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his state remedies. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070

(9th Cir. 2004), overruled in part by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 114801149 (9th Cir.

2007)(overruling Kelly as to whether a district court is required sua sponte to consider whether to

stay and abey a “mixed” habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims); Ford v.

Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 882-883 (9th Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9th

Cir. 2002); Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require that the

Court dismiss mixed habeas petitions. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). However, in on March

30, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 

Recognizing that “[a]s a result of the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations and 1

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

Lundy’s dismissal requirement, petitioners who come to federal court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the

risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims,” the

Supreme Court held that federal courts may now issue “stay and abey” orders under appropriate

circumstances to permit petitioners to exhaust unexhausted claims before proceeding with their

federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275-276. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that, while

the procedure should be “available only in limited circumstances,” it “likely would be an abuse of

discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good

cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no

indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278. When a

petitioner has met these requirements, his interest in obtaining federal review of his claims

outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal petitions. Id. 

Here, Petitioner filed a petition that contains only exhausted claims. However, after seeking

leave of Court to stay proceedings to exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner

recently completed the process of exhausting that claim in state court. The Court’s prior order

granting a stay of proceedings contemplated that when this event occurred, Petitioner would file an

amended petition within thirty days that included the newly exhausted claim and that thereafter the

case would proceed forward. (Doc. 13). 

However, Petitioner has now filed a second stay request, this time indicating his intent to

exhaust a “new” claim based on Cunningham. (Doc. 27). In that case, the United States Supreme

Court invalidated California’s determinate sentencing law to the extent that it violated the Court’s

prior rulings that the Federal Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee “proscribes a sentencing scheme that

allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior

conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.” Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 860, citing

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Thus, while

Petitioner contends in his motion for stay that the Cunningham decision articulated a “newly created

right” (Doc. 27, p. 2), the claim he wishes to raise pursuant to Cunningham is in fact ultimately

derived from the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Apprendi. Although the Cunningham decision

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

may be characterized as “new” in the sense that it was decided recently, it is in fact based squarely

upon Apprendi, which was decided on June 26, 2000, two months after Petitioner was convicted on

April 12, 2000, but several years before Petitioner’s original direct state appeals were concluded on

November 24, 2003. Certainly, the principle established by Apprendi and subsequent cases was

well-established by the time Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on April 11, 2005. 

From the foregoing, it does not appear to the Court that Petitioner is attempting to exhaust his

“newly discovered” claim in a timely and expeditious manner. To the contrary, this particular issue

was first highlighted in 2000 in Apprendi and reaffirmed almost annually by the Supreme Court in

the cases cited above. Indeed, there is virtually a direct line connecting those cases that points to the

decision in Cunningham, which was widely anticipated by legal scholars familiar with the Apprendi

line of cases. As such, Petitioner cannot credibly maintain, as he does in his motion for stay, that

this is a “newly created” right or that the claim could not have been raised previously. Accordingly,

the Court finds that this motion for stay and abeyance has not been supported by good cause and

should be denied. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

Moreover, although the Court is not prepared at this time to make an assessment of the merits

of the claims currently contained within the petition, it clearly appears that raising a new claim

regarding Cunningham would be futile because neither Apprendi nor its progeny have been given

retrospective effect in collateral proceedings. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002)

[“No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that Apprendi has retroactive effect.” (quoting

Thomas, J. dissenting)]; United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir.2002) (the

ruling in Apprendi does not apply retroactively to initial petitions for collateral review); Humphress

v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir.2005) (Booker is not retroactive); McReynolds v.

United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 845

(10th Cir.2005) (same); Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam)

(same); Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 144 (2nd Cir.2005) (same). No court has yet given

Cunningham such effect in collateral proceedings. In other words, Apprendi, Booker, Blakely, Ring,

and Cunningham are simply unavailable to petitioners in federal habeas proceedings under present

United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. 

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U.S. District Court

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While it does not appear to the Court that Petitioner is acting in actual bad faith by seeking a

second stay, having already permitted Petitioner a delay of almost one and one-half years to exhaust

his other claim, the Court sees no legitimate reason to continue to delay the proceedings, especially

in light of the foregoing discussion of Cunningham. 

Therefore, the Court finds that because Petitioner has not established good cause for his

motion to stay proceedings, the Court will deny the motion. Because Petitioner has indicated that his

ineffective assistance claim is fully exhausted, the Court will, accordingly, lift the abeyance staying

the proceedings and by this order grant Petitioner thirty days in which to file a completed amended

petition, including the newly exhausted claim. Petitioner is advised that because an amended

pleading supersedes the original pleading, an amended pleading must be complete in itself without

reference to any prior pleading. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967); E.D. Cal. R. 15-220.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The abeyance issued on December 29, 2005 staying the proceedings (Doc. 13), is

LIFTED;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order Petitioner shall file a

completed amended petition which includes the newly exhausted claim; and,

3. Petitioner’s motion for stay filed March 30, 2007 (Doc. 27), is DENIED .

Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that the action be

dismissed for failure to comply with a court order. E.D. Cal. R. 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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