Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00720/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00720-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR PABLO MOLINA,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-CV-720 JLS (MDD)

ORDER: (1) OVERRULING 

PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS; (2) 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; AND (3) 

DENYING PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

(ECF Nos. 6, 26, 28)

Presently before the Court are: (1) Petitioner Hector Pablo Molina’s First Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (“FAP”, ECF No. 6); (2) Magistrate Judge Mitchell D.

Dembin’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) advising that the Court deny Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 26); and (3) Petitioner’s Objections to the 

R&R (“Objs. to R&R”, ECF No. 28). Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner’s 

Objections. Having considered the facts and the law, the Court (1) OVERRULES

Petitioner’s Objections, (2) ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and (3) DENIES Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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BACKGROUND

Judge Dembin’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the factual and 

procedural histories underlying the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas corpus. (See R&R 

2–8,

1 ECF No. 26.) This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth 

therein.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Review of Report and Recommendation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection, 

however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

II. Review of Habeas Corpus Petitions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the 

merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7–8 (2002).

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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Under § 2254(d)(1), federal law must be “clearly established” in order to support a 

habeas claim. Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . .” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 412 (2000). A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Id. at 406. A state court decision does not have to 

demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, provided

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradict such precedent.

Early, 537 U.S. at 8.

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court 

precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s 

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An unreasonable application may also be found “if the state

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a 

new context where it should apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Clark 

v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and 

only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that 

there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.

Ct. 1697, 1706–07 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). An

unreasonable application of federal law requires the state court decision to be more than 

incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). Instead, the state 

court’s application must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id.; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003). Even if a petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), the petitioner must still

demonstrate a constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–22 (2007).

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Federal courts review the last reasoned decision from the state courts. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805–06 (1991); Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 

(9th Cir. 2012). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called 

upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court

applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s 

decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); 

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). The petitioner must establish that 

“the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (citation omitted). It is not within 

a federal habeas court’s province “to reexamine state court determinations on state-law 

questions.” Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 517 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing and quoting Estelle 

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)).

Finally, § 2254 authorizes habeas relief where the state court’s adjudication of a 

claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This provision 

requires the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the factual 

findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively 

unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

ANALYSIS

I. Summary of the R&R Conclusion

Judge Dembin recommends that the Court deny the Petition in its entirety. (R&R 1, 

ECF No. 26.) The Petition contains two claims for relief. (Id. at 9 (citing FAP 6–7, ECF 

No. 6).) First, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by failing to disclose the full 

substance of Melvin Breaux’s investigation, which also violated the prosecutor’s Brady 

obligations. (Id.) Second, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying 

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, which claimed that the arresting officers should have 

preserved his blood alcohol level (“BAC”) by taking a blood sample at the time of his 

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arrest. (Id.) Judge Dembin ultimately concludes that the Petition should be denied because

the appellate court’s decision was neither unreasonable nor contrary to clearly established 

federal law. (Id. at 25, 32.)

Petitioner first argues that the Court of Appeal’s decision finding no error in failing 

to disclose the information Detective McNamara revealed in camera and no Brady 

violation by the prosecutor were incorrect because Breaux was the key witness in the 

prosecution’s case. (Id. at 18; see also FAP 6, ECF No. 6; Traverse 4, ECF No. 18.)

Petitioner argues that Breaux’s credibility was “key to the case” because he was the only 

witness to the murder and identified Petitioner as the killer. (Id. at 18–19 (citing Traverse 

4, ECF No. 18).) Petitioner argues that the following testimony presented at the in camera 

hearing would have weakened Breaux’s credibility and strengthened his defense that he 

did not kill David Craig:

I know that Mr. Breaux used to be a New Orleans police office[r] 

and he was involved in an on-duty accident. He got addicted –

this is coming from the victim – he got addicted to the pain 

meds.[ ]They moved out of New Orleans, actually came to 

California.[ ]He tried to . . .[]become a CHP officer, but he was 

turned down during the psychological for some anger issues. [p] 

In my opinion,[]Mr. Breaux’s got a great amount of street sense.”

(Id. at 19 (citing Traverse 5, ECF No. 18).) Respondent argues that the Court of Appeal 

reasonably concluded that there was no Brady violation because the prosecution did not 

have the information, the information was not material, and the prosecutor properly alerted 

the court and defense that Breaux was under investigation by another government agency. 

(Id. (citing ECF No. 13-1, at 2).)

Judge Dembin examined the appellate court’s opinion and found that this withheld 

information did not amount to a Brady violation. (See R&R 20, ECF No. 26 (“There are 

three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the 

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must 

have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must 

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have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)).) As to the first 

component, Judge Dembin found that “[w]hile this information would bear on the 

credibility of a significant witness for the prosecution, Breaux’s reliability was not 

determinative of Petitioner’s guilt or innocence”; rather, there was overwhelming evidence 

permitting the jury to determine Petitioner’s guilt. (Id. at 22; see also id. at 22–23

(recounting evidence).) Judge Dembin found that the second component of a Brady

violation was met as applied to the Court, since the Court held an in camera hearing and 

did not disclose that information to Petitioner at trial, but not as to the prosecutor, since the 

prosecutor was not at the in camera hearing and thus could not have withheld this 

information. (Id. at 23–24.) Finally, Judge Dembin found that the third component of a 

Brady violation was not satisfied because, as discussed, the jury had overwhelming 

evidence to determine Petitioner’s guilt even absent Breaux’s testimony, so there was no 

resulting prejudice to Petitioner. (Id. at 23.) Thus Judge Dembin concluded that the “state 

court objectively and reasonably concluded that neither the trial court nor the prosecution 

erred in failing to disclose information about Breaux’s past.” (Id. at 25.) 

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on 

the grounds that arresting police officers should have preserved his BAC by taking a blood 

sample when they arrested him. (R&R 25–26, ECF No. 26.) Specifically, Petitioner argues 

that police officers should have taken his blood sample because they knew Petitioner was 

under arrest for murder and that intoxication was a defense to murder. (Id. at 29 (citing 

FAP 7, ECF No. 6).) Respondent argues that the state court reasonably concluded that the 

police had no duty to obtain a blood sample from Petitioner because (a) Petitioner’s defense 

at trial was that he did not kill Craig, not that he was intoxicated; (b) there was no clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent on an affirmative duty to collect evidence; and (c) 

even if there were such precedent, Petitioner’s claim fails because he cannot show either 

the exculpatory value of his blood sample or the police officers’ bad faith in failing to take 

a blood sample. (Id. at 29 (citing ECF No. 13-1, at 27–31).)

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Judge Dembin examined the appellate court’s opinion and found that even assuming 

the police officers had a duty to collect Petitioner’s blood sample under clear precedent, 

“Petitioner’s blood sample, which purportedly would have shown that Petitioner was 

intoxicated, would not have had exculpatory value that was apparent at the time of 

Petitioner’s arrest[, and] Petitioner also has not shown that police acted with bad faith in 

failing to take Petitioner’s blood sample.” (R&R 31, ECF No. 26; see also id. at 31–32

(recounting evidence to support this conclusion).) Thus, Judge Dembin concluded that the 

appellate court’s decision to affirm the conviction “did not result in a decision contrary to 

federal law and was not an unreasonable application of federal law.” (Id. at 32.)

II. Summary of Petitioner’s Objections

Petitioner outlines two objections to Judge Dembin’s R&R, which track his two 

grounds for relief. While not entirely clear, Petitioner appears to object to the entirety of 

Judge Dembin’s R&R. (See generally Objs. to R&R, ECF No. 28.) 

III. Court’s Analysis

Because Petitioner appears to object to the entirety of Judge Dembin’s R&R, the 

Court will review, de novo, Judge Dembin’s R&R and Petitioner’s underlying Petition. The 

Court organizes its analysis, as both Judge Dembin and Petitioner have, by Petitioner’s 

claims for relief.

A. Claim 1: Failure to Disclose Breaux’s Background Information Learned at an 

In Camera Hearing 

Petitioner first appears to object to the fact that the Court of Appeal applied the 

incorrect legal standard to this issue because, according to Petitioner, this is an issue of first 

impression. (Objs. to R&R 3, ECF No. 28; see also Lodg. No. 6, at 14, ECF No. 14-18 

(“Assuming without deciding that analogizing to the Pitchess framework is appropriate, 

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Breaux’s status as a 

former police officer, his workplace injury and resulting addiction to pain medications, and 

his alleged anger management issues immaterial to this case.”).) But Petitioner cites no 

authority demonstrating that the Court of Appeal applied the incorrect legal standard or 

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that its analysis under this framework was erroneous. Nevertheless, even assuming that 

was the case, Judge Dembin analyzed this issue under Brady, finding, contrary to 

Respondent’s argument, that Petitioner’s claim could be cognizable under the Due Process 

Clause and thus is an appropriate claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus:

If Petitioner were to argue that the trial court erred in denying a 

Pitchess motion, Respondent would be correct that Petitioner’s 

Pitchess claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68 (“[I]t is not the province of a federal 

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on statelaw questions.”). That is not what Petitioner argues. (See ECF 

Nos. 6, 18). Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing 

to disclose to Petitioner information, similar to Pitchess 

information, that was revealed in an in camera hearing. (ECF 

Nos. 6 at 6, 18 at 4-6). Denial of access to an investigative report 

on a key witness could present a cognizable claim to the extent it 

affects Petitioner’s right to receive necessary exculpatory or 

impeachment evidence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 

154 (1972) (finding that impeaching evidence is exculpatory 

evidence within the meaning of Brady). 

(R&R 19–20, ECF No. 26.) The Court agrees with Judge Dembin that Petitioner’s 

evidentiary issue can be properly analyzed under Brady and its progeny. 

The Due Process Clause requires the government to produce to the defense favorable 

evidence material to a criminal defendant’s guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The California Supreme Court has stated that Pitchess procedures 

parallel the prosecution’s obligations under Brady. Williams v. Malfi, No. CV 06-4367-

DOC (JTL), 2008 WL 618895, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008) (citing City of L.A. v. 

Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 1, 14 (2002)). 

Under Brady, evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (quoting U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 

667, 682 (1985)). “There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at 

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 

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impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–

82 (1999).

“Brady/Giglio information includes ‘material . . . that bears on the credibility of a 

significant witness in the case.’” United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

Impeachment evidence is favorable to the accused “when the reliability of the witness may 

be determinative of a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted).

Petitioner objects to Judge Dembin’s conclusion that failure to disclose Breaux’s 

background information learned at an in camera hearing was not a Brady violation. (Objs. 

to R&R 4–5, ECF No. 28.)

The Court disagrees. As to the first component of a Brady violation, Judge Dembin 

properly determined that Breaux’s reliability was not determinative of Petitioner’s guilt or 

innocence. In particular Judge Dembin found there was overwhelming evidence that 

permitted the jury to determine Petitioner’s guilt, such as: 

Macagno testified that Petitioner became “agitated,” “rough,” 

“mad” and violent. (Lodg. No 2 at 356, 357, 359, 361). Macagno 

also testified that Petitioner was making stabbing demonstrations 

and saying he wanted to “kill the guy.” (See id. at 359-64, 374). 

When shown a picture of the hunting knife used to kill Craig, 

Macagno testified that it was his knife and he gave it to Petitioner 

the day before Craig’s murder. (Id. at 378-79). 

San Diego Police Officer Katrina Young testified that when her 

partner went to detain Petitioner, she immediately noticed blood 

on Petitioner’s shoes and pants and when she looked in 

Petitioner’s car she immediately saw a knife in between the 

driver’s and passenger’s seat. (Id. at 493-94). Chula Vista Police 

Officers Johnathon Deering and Michael Varga also testified that 

Petitioner had dried blood on his pants and blood spatter on his 

shoes. (Id. at 502-03, 533-34). Additionally, Officer Varga 

testified that he saw a knife in Petitioner’s car. (Id. at 537-38). 

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Chula Vista Detective David Beatty testified that the shoes 

Petitioner wore at the time of the arrest had a tread pattern that 

was “very similar” to the dirt impression of tread patterns at the 

scene of the crime. (Id. at 669-71). DNA analyst Monica 

Ammann testified that the blood on Petitioner’s car’s steering 

wheel, Petitioner’s shoes and the knife found in Petitioner’s car 

matched the victim’s DNA. (Id. at 862-75).

(R&R 22–23, ECF No. 26.)

Additionally, Judge Dembin properly found that the second component of a Brady

violation is met as applied to the Court because it held an in camera hearing and withheld 

information from that hearing from Petitioner.2(Id. at 23 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–

282 (1999) (stating that the second component of a true Brady violation is that the state 

withheld evidence)).) Judge Dembin also properly found that the second component of a 

Brady violation is not met as to the prosecutor because she was not present at the in camera

hearing and otherwise did not know the information revealed therein. (Id. at 23–24.)

Finally, Judge Dembin properly found that the third Brady component is not satisfied 

because the withholding of this evidence did not prejudice Petitioner’s case. (Id. at 24.) As 

discussed above, there was overwhelming evidence for the jury to find Petitioner guilty of 

murder despite not having this additional evidence that would ostensibly be used to attack 

Breaux’s character. (Id.) Furthermore, the defense vigorously impeached Breaux’s 

character at trial highlighting, among other things, that Breaux was homeless, “excluded” 

from his former marital residence, and denied using drugs but later admitted to using drugs. 

(Id. at 24–25 (collecting citations and additional evidence).) Thus, the Court agrees with 

Judge Dembin that “[i]t is unlikely that the comparatively neutral fact that Breaux used to 

be a police officer who became addicted to pain medications and could not obtain 

employment as a CHP officer due to anger issues would have altered the jury’s 

determination of his credibility.” (Id. at 25 (citing, e.g., Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 989–

 

2 But, of course, this is insufficient because all three components are required for a Brady violation.

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90 (9th Cir. 2005) (undisclosed evidence of witness’s competency issues was material for 

its “potency” and ability to raise “new and more powerful doubts about the reliability of 

[the witness’s] testimony”)).)

In sum, the Court agrees with Judge Dembin’s conclusion that the “state court 

objectively and reasonably concluded that neither the trial court nor the prosecution erred 

in failing to disclose information about Breaux’s past.” (Id. at 25.) Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Petitioner’s first objection.

B. Claim 2: Error in Denying Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss

While not particularly clear, Petitioner’s second objection appears to be that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that the officers who arrested 

him should have preserved his BAC level by taking a blood sample at the time of arrest. 

(See Objs. to R&R 6–9, ECF No. 28.)

In general, law enforcement officials have a duty to preserve “evidence that might 

be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” California v. Trombetta, 

467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the duty to 

collect evidence, some courts have held that Trombetta includes the duty to collect 

evidence. Miller v Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the failure 

to collect potentially exculpatory evidence could be a due process violation). This duty 

applies only to “material evidence, i.e., evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent 

before its destruction and that is of such nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable 

evidence from other sources.” Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489). Additionally, the failure to preserve potentially 

exculpatory evidence amounts to a due process violation only when the petitioner “can 

show bad faith.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Miller, 868 F.2d at 1120 

(“Since, in the absence of bad faith, the police’s failure to preserve evidence that is only 

potentially exculpatory does not violate due process, then a fortiori neither does the good 

faith failure to collect such evidence violate due process.” (emphasis in original)). Bad faith 

“turns on the government’s knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of the evidence 

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at the time it was lost or destroyed.” Martinez v. Barnes, No. 2:12-cv-2975 KJM GGH P, 

2013 WL 5773108, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56–57; 

United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993)).

As discussed above, supra Part I, Judge Dembin found that even assuming the police 

officers had a duty to collect Petitioner’s blood sample, “Petitioner’s blood sample, which 

purportedly would have shown that Petitioner was intoxicated, would not have had 

exculpatory value that was apparent at the time of Petitioner’s arrest[, and] Petitioner also 

has not shown that police acted with bad faith in failing to take Petitioner’s blood sample.” 

(R&R 31, ECF No. 26.)

The Court agrees with both of Judge Dembin’s findings. As to the first, various 

officers testified they were unaware of Petitioner’s allegedly intoxicated state at the time 

they arrested him:

San Diego Police Officer Jason Tsui testified he did not smell 

any alcohol on Petitioner at the time of the car accident and 

“didn’t think [any sobriety testing] was necessary” because 

Petitioner did not appear to be under the influence. (Lodg. No. 2 

at 475-77). San Diego Police Officer Katrina Young also testified 

that she did not notice the odor of alcohol on Petitioner when she 

was within a foot of him and he exhibited no objective symptoms 

of intoxication. (Id. at 489). Additionally, Chula Vista Police 

Officer Johnathon Deering testified that while he was enclosed 

in his patrol car with Petitioner for 20 minutes, he did not smell 

alcohol and Petitioner did not appear to be under the influence of 

either alcohol or a controlled substance. (Id. at 501-02). Chula 

Vista Police Officer Michael Varga also testified that he did not 

detect the odor of alcohol coming from Petitioner and did not 

notice objective symptoms of intoxication. (Id. at 535).

Chula Vista Police Officer Ricardo Cruz testified that after 

Macagno told him Petitioner drank bourbon, he paid particular 

attention to Petitioner’s mannerisms. (Id. at 619). Officer Cruz 

explained that Petitioner responded to commands immediately, 

“which struck [Officer Cruz] as odd. [He] thought if this man is 

inebriated he is going to take a while to respond, he is going to 

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stagger over . . . .” (Id.). Officer Cruz stated that Petitioner’s gait 

as he walked while handcuffed was “perfect,” which surprised 

Officer Cruz because “most people that are inebriated will have 

a stagger gait, would be off balance.” (Id. at 620). Officer Cruz 

explained that he was looking for the objective symptoms of 

intoxication and did not see any. (Id. at 621). After lengthy 

questioning regarding Petitioner’s level of intoxication, Officer 

Cruz testified: “Let me put it to you this way: If this contact had 

occurred out in the field and he was driving under the same 

circumstances, had he not been arrested, I would have handed 

him his keys back. That is how confident I was that he was not 

under the influence.” (Id. at 633).

(R&R 31–32, ECF No. 26.) While intoxication is a defense to murder and a blood sample 

could have exculpatory value, these officers’ testimony demonstrates that it was not 

apparent to them at the time of Petitioner’s arrest that he was intoxicated, and thus it was 

not apparent to them that Petitioner’s blood sample would have exculpatory value. Second, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated in his Petition, his Traverse, or his Objections that the 

police officers acted in bad faith in failing to take a blood sample to preserve his BAC. 

In sum, the Court agrees with Judge Dembin’s conclusion that the “state court’s 

adjudication did not result in a decision contrary to federal law and was not an unreasonable 

application of federal law.” (Id. at 32.) Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

second objection.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court (1) OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections, 

(2) ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and (3) DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability because the issues are 

not debatable among jurists of reason and there are no questions adequate to deserve 

encouragement. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. The Clerk of Court SHALL enter judgment 

denying the Petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2017

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