Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03249/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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t I 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM C. RENFRO; ALAN R. METCHLEY; ) 

WILLIAM L. OLSON; TIMOTHY L. WEBB ) 

ALAN R. MECHTLEY; RICK A. CLARK; GARY ) 

W. BRAMMER; LYLE G. ARMITAGE, IV; ) 

LARRY D. BESS; KELLY K. RIGGS; BOBBY W.) 

FANCHER; STEVEN F. KUHLMAN CHARLES A. ) 

SMITH; JESSE C. SHAVER; GILBERT ) 

HERRERA; KEITH L. PERES; DAVID V. ) 

KELLY; TERENCE L. KRAMER; WILLIAM C. ) 

RENFRO; JAMES L. WELLS; WILLIAM L. ) 

OLSON; THOMAS A. ANDREWS; JEFFREY D. ) 

HUTCHERSON; E. GENE BRYANT; JERRY ) 

SCHROCK; CLEO C. STRASSEY, JR.; ) 

MAXWELL A. SIELERT; RICHARD L. ) 

BRICKELL; LARRY D. HOWARD; DONALD D. ) 

COOK, JR.; DAVIDE. COX; RICHARD M. ) 

SCHLUP, JR.; ROBERT BINDER; JAMES A. ) 

SCHUHARDT; THOMAS L. ALEXANDER; JAMES ) 

L. COMPTON, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

NOV 13 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

No. 90-3249 

CITY OF EMPORIA, KANSAS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

------ ) 

) 

THE LEAGUE OF KANSAS MUNICIPALITIES, ) 

) 

Amicus Curiae. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 87-4038) 

Thomas A. Woodley (Gregory K. McGillivary with him on the brief) 

of Mulholland & Hickey, Washington, D.C., attorney for PlaintiffsAppellees. 

Appellate Case: 90-3249 Document: 010110096922 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 1 
,' 'I 

Stanley E. Craven (Dale w. Bell of Helbert, Bell & Smith, Emporia, 

Kansas with him on the briefs) of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, 

Kansas City, Missouri, attorney for Defendant-Appellee. 

James M. Kaup and David L. Corliss, Topeka, Kansas, on the brief 

for Amicus Curiae. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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f J 

The City of Emporia, Kansas (hereinafter "City") appeals from 

the orders of the district court granting summary judgment in 

favor of thirty-three plaintiffs, all of whom are or were 

firefighters employed by City (hereinafter "firefighters"), 

denying City's motion for summary judgment, and assessing damages. 

Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 729 F. Supp. 747 (D. Kan. 1990). 

(See also Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 732 F. Supp. 1116 (D. 

Kan. 1990); Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 741 F. Supp. 887 (D. 

Kan. 1990); Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 1990 WL 95087 (D. 

Kan . 19 9 0 ) ) • 

The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 u.s.c. § 201, 

et. ~ (hereinafter "FLSA") requires that employers pay their 

employees overtime for additional hours worked over forty hours 

per week. Section 207 addresses the maximum work hours allowed 

under FSLA, and§ 207(k) specifically applies to law enforcement 

and fire protection agencies. 

Background 

In April, 1986, City became subject to the requirements of 

FLSA when Congress adopted the FLSA Amendments of 1985, P.L. 99-

150. Upon their enactment, City created a task force to assess 

the impact the requirements would have on the fire department. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 29 at p. 2). Firefighters were allowed to 

discuss with the task force the issue of compensation for on-call 

time. (R., Vol. I, Tab 29 at p. 9). 

Firefighters employed with City were regularly scheduled to 

work six shifts of twenty-four hours each in a 19-day cycle, for a 

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total of 144 hours. Each firefighter also appeared on a mandatory 

callback list for each 24-hour period following a regularly 

scheduled tour of duty. During this on-call period, the 

firefighters were not required to remain on the stationhouse 

premises. However, they were required to carry pagers and return 

to work within twenty minutes if called or be subject to 

discipline. Firefighters who were late or missed a callback 

received a "white slip11 •

1 (R., Vol. I, Tab 29 at pp. 7-8). 

Firefighters were paid overtime for on-call time only when 

actually called back to work. Firefighters called back to work 

were paid a minimum of an hour of overtime. (R., Vol. I, Tab 29 at 

p. 6). 

City has two fire stations and each station maintains a 

separate on-call list. Five firefighters were normally on the 

list at one station and three at the other. The callbacks were 

made in the order the firefighters appeared on the list, and the 

order was rotated for each 24-hour on-call period. 2 Firefighters 

were called in when the on duty staff at the stations fell below 

the required minimum. (R., Vol. I, Tab 29 at p. 5). 

In January, 1987, firefighters filed this action for 

declaratory judgment under 28 u.s.c. §§ 2201 and 2202, and for 

compensation and other relief under FLSA. (R., Vol. I, Tab 1). 

1 A white slip is a form of discipline 

employee evaluations and which may result 

including possible termination, if four or 

received in a four-month period. 

which is considered in 

in disciplinary action, 

more white slips are 

2 For example, a firefighter who is second on the list one oncall time period will move to first on the list the next time 

period while the firefighter who is first will rotate to last on 

the list. 

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In their Complaint, firefighters alleged that: the on-call policy 

was so restrictive they were unable to effectively use the time 

for personal activities; the on-call duty was time spent working 

for City in excess of the hourly levels set forth in FSLA and 

therefore compensable under FLSA; and, City's "actions and 

omissions were done in a knowing, willful, purposeful, intentional 

and bad faith manner." (R., Vol. I, Tab 1 at p. 3). 

City answered, denying firefighters' allegations of bad faith 

and contending it had acted in good faith when implementing the 

on-call policy in that firefighters had been paid any overtime to 

which they were entitled. (R., Vol I, Tab 6 at pp. 4-5). City 

stated the on-call policy was designed to be "non-restrictive so 

as to allow the firefighters to effectively engage in their own 

personal pursuits. " ( R., Vol. I, Tab 6 at p. 3) • 

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In its 

motion, City included statements of uncontroverted facts 

specifically "for the purpose of their motion." (R., Vol. I, Tab 

29 at p. 3). These statements included, among others, that the 

number of callbacks firefighters received ranged from zero to 

thirteen per day, but averaged approximately four to five per day. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 29 at p. 6). City also acknowledged that: 

firefighters uniformly estimated the callbacks to average three to 

five per day; the average duration of a callback was one hour; 

and, the issuance of "white slips" was a disciplinary method. 

City stated, however, that the slips were received for various 

reasons and not simply for missing or being late to a call. (R., 

Vol. I, Tab 29 at p. 7). 

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I , ! ) 

City contended that at the time of this lawsuit: eleven of 

the firefighters had secondary employment; firefighters were not 

required to remain on the stationhouse premises during their oncall duty but were to report within twenty minutes from the time 

they were called back; firefighters had traded their on-call 

duties with other firefighters; and that while on on-call duty, 

firefighters had "participated in sports activities, socialized 

with friends and relatives, attended business meetings, gone 

shopping, gone out to eat, babysitted, and performed maintenance 

or other activities around their home". (R., Vol. I, Tab 29, at 

pp. 11-12). 

City further asserted that Carol King, an administrative 

assistant for the City, "contacted the Department of Labor, 

described the City['s] procedures regarding the on-call policy, 

and received an oral opinion that the City's procedures were not 

in violation of the ... Act." (R. Vol. I, Tab 29 at p. 10). 

In their motion for partial summary judgment, firefighters 

set forth a "statement of material facts to which there existed no 

genuine issue," (R. Vol. I, Tab 33 at p. 2), including statements 

that firefighters were required to return to the stationhouse 

within twenty minutes after receiving a callback; white slips were 

a form of discipline used when a firefighter missed or was late to 

a call; and firefighters were paid overtime only when they were 

actually called back to duty and not for the time spent on-call. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 33 at pp. 5-7). Firefighters further stated that 

on occasion a firefighter must answer 12-13 calls in one day; and 

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I ·• I } 

that 

day. 

on the average, on-call firefighters receive 3-5 calls per 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 33 at p. 10). 

Firefighters argued in their motion that the on-call policy 

greatly restricted their personal activities: that due to the 

twenty minute time constraint and the large number of callbacks, 

they could not go out of town; they could not do simple things 

such as change their oil or work on their cars; they could not go 

to a movie or go out to dinner for fear of being called back; they 

could not be alone with their children unless they had a 

babysitter "on-call;" they could not drive anywhere with anyone 

when on-call (i.e., they must take separate cars in case of a 

callback); and, they were reluctant to participate in group 

activities for fear of being called away. (R., Vol. I, Tab 33 at 

pp. 9-10). 

Firefighters further contended the disciplinary "white slips" 

were logged by the fire chief and that a firefighter who received 

four or more within a four-month period could be terminated. (R., 

Vol. I, Tab 33 at pp. 5-7). Firefighters asserted that trading 

the mandatory on-call shifts was very difficult because there was 

no economic incentive to trade and the on-call duty was so 

restrictive that the other firefighters would rather not trade. 

District Court's Order 

In denying City's motion for summary judgment and granting 

firefighters' motion for partial summary judgment, the district 

court found that the relevant facts were largely undisputed and 

concluded that the on-call time was compensable time under FLSA. 

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' ' 

Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 748. The district court found that while 

firefighters were not required to remain on the stationhouse 

premises, the conditions of the on-call duty were such that 

firefighters' personal pursuits were restricted. Id. at 751. The 

court set forth the conditions it believed restricted the 

firefighters, including: "the firefighter must be able to hear the 

pager at all times; that the firefighter must be able to report to 

the stationhouse within twenty minutes of being paged or be 

subject to discipline; that the on-call periods [were] 24-hours in 

length; and primarily, that the calls [were] frequent a 

firefighter may receive as many as 13 calls during an on-call 

period, with a stated average frequency of 3-5 calls per on-call 

period". Id. 

The district court determined that, based on these 

conditions, the firefighters were "engaged to wait," and therefore 

entitled to compensation under FSLA, Id. at 752, and that the 

frequency with which firefighters were subject to callbacks 

distinguished this case from other cases which have held on-call 

time as noncompensable. Id. 

In assessing actual damages, the district court found sleep 

and meal times were compensable under 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.222-23 

(1990) since the on-call shifts were 24-hours in length. The 

district court also determined the proper calculation of actual 

damages was the number of hours each firefighter was subject to 

on-call duty, multiplied by 1.5 times each firefighters' hourly 

rate of pay at that time. The amount of overtime pay actually 

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received by each firefighter was to 

figure. Renfro, 1990 WL 95087 at 3. 

The district court determined it 

liquidated damages together with the 

be subtracted from that 

was required to award 

actual damages under 29 

u.s.c. § 216(b), unless City demonstrated its actions were in good 

faith and City had reasonable grounds for believing its on-call 

policy was not in violation of FSLA. Id. The court found that 

City had not met its burden, and found that City's alleged attempt 

to consult the Department of Labor regarding the legality of its 

on-call policy was insufficient. Id. at 4. 

Appellate Contentions 

On appeal, City contends that the district court erred: (1) 

in granting summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of 

the firefighters by finding there were no triable issues of 

material fact and by misapplying the law to the facts; (2) in 

failing to grant City's motion for summary judgment; (3) in its 

method of calculation of damages by (a) awarding overtime pay for 

mealtime, sleeping time, time spent working for other employers 

and other personal time, (b) by not granting the City a hearing on 

the issue of the amount of damages, and (c) by awarding liquidated 

damages; and (4) by not finding the application of the FSLA to 

municipalities to be unconstitutional. 

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Discussion - Conclusion 

We hold the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment in favor of firefighters or in its assessment of damages. 

Therefore, we affirm. 

I. 

City contends the district court erred by entering summary 

judgment against them on the issue of City's liability for 

overtime pay. 

We review summary judgment orders de novo, applying the same 

standard used by the district court. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Under Fed. R. 

Civ. P., 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted if it 

is shown there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We have held 

that "[s]ummary judgment may be granted only where there is no 

doubt from the evidence, with all inferences drawn in favor of the 

nonmoving party, that no genuine issue of material fact remains 

for trial and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 

1984). On appeal, we examine the facts in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson v. 

Department of Health & Human Services, 907 F.2d 936, 947 (10th 

Cir. 1990). If we determine there is no genuine issue of material 

fact, we then determine whether the substantive law was correctly 

applied to the facts. Osgood, 848 F.2d at 143. 

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l ' 

The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between 

the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion 

for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine 

issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

u.s. 242, 247-248 (1986). 

When a motion for summary judgment is made and 

supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 

party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the 

adverse party's response, by affidavits or as 

otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so 

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 

entered against the adverse party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

City contends on appeal the district court erred in finding 

firefighters were called back to work from on-call status on 

average 3-5 times per on-call period; it was difficult, if not 

impossible for firefighters to work in other employment while oncall; and that firefighters could not effectively use their oncall time for personal pursuits. City further contends the 

district court erred in failing to consider that firefighters were 

permitted to trade, and did trade, on-call shifts; and in failing 

to draw all inferences from the underlying facts in favor of City. 

City also alleges the district court erred by making factual 

findings while ruling on firefighters' motion 

judgment. 

a. 

for summary 

City states there was and always has been an issue of 

material fact regarding the number of callbacks. 

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(Appellant's 

Appellate Case: 90-3249 Document: 010110096922 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 11 
Brief, pp. 5, 7). However, in its motion for summary judgment, 

City set forth the following as "statements of uncontroverted 

facts," 

21. Call-ins range from zero to thirteen (13) per 

day, but average approximately four (4) or five (5) 

per day (Turner Depo., p. 22; Lang depo., p. 26). 

22. Plaintiffs uniformly estimate call=ins average 

three (3) to five (5) per day (Def.'s Interr. to 

Pl. 's No. 16) . 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 29, p. 6). 

On appeal, City argues that these statements were set forth 

for purposes of its motion for summary judgment only. City 

contends the concession "arguendo" in its motion does not 

establish that they have stipulated to the facts for purposes of 

firefighter's motion for summary judgment. (Appellant's Reply 

Brief, p. 1). City argues, citing Nafco Oil and Gas, Inc., v. 

Appleman, 380 F.2d 323 (10th Cir., 1967), that "the filing of 

cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily concede 

the absence of a material issue of fact." This Court has held, 

however, that "cross motions for summary judgments do authorize 

the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be 

considered other than that which has been filed by the parties." 

Harrison Western Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th 

Cir., 1981). 

City further contends it disputed the average callback figure 

of 3-5 per day in its response to firefighters' motion for summary 

judgment. (Appellant's Brief at p. 7). The contentions set for 

in the response, and relied upon by City, do not dispute the 

t specific statement made in City's motion for summary judgment that 

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j ' 

( 

the average callback figure for a 24-hour period was 3-5 

callbacks. City merely stated 12-13 callbacks in one 24-hour 

period was extremely rare. City also briefly mentioned that the 

average time a firefighter spent on call during a 24-hour period 

was 1.15 hours. 3 (R., Vol. II, Tab 35, p. 9). The record 

indicates City did not specifically dispute the average number of 

callbacks cited by firefighters. We hold the district court did 

not err in its determination that the 3-5 callbacks per 24-hour 

period was an undisputed fact. 

b. 

City argues the district court erred by finding it was 

difficult, if not impossible, for firefighters to work in other 

employment while on-call. 

Firefighters contended in their memorandum in opposition to 

City's motion for summary judgment. that maintaining secondary 

employment while on-call was difficult or impossible. (R., Vol. 

I, Tab 34 at pp. 3-4). City's only statement regarding this issue 

was that City was waiting for the further documentation concerning 

secondary employment it had requested from firefighters. (R., 

Vol. II, Tab 36 at p. 3). 

While City stated that eleven of the firefighters had 

secondary employment, it did not address the specific issue 

firefighters set forth in their argument, i.e., the difficulty 

firefighters experienced in obtaining or maintaining secondary 

3city did not provide evidence showing whether the 1.15 hour 

figure constituted one callback or five callbacks. 

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employment. The record is void of any rebuttal from City 

regarding the secondary employment issue. The mere statement by 

City that some of the firefighters have secondary employment does 

not refute the contention that obtaining and maintaining secondary 

employment is difficult. Absent any specific rebuttal from City, 

we hold the district court did not err in determining it was 

difficult, if not impossible, for firefighters to obtain secondary 

employment. 

c. 

City contends the district court erred by finding 

firefighters could not effectively use their time on-call for 

personal pursuits. 

The Department of Labor (DOL) promulgated regulations 

applicable to on-call time for public employees to determine 

whether such hours were compensable under FLSA. These regulations 

state in part, 

§ 785.17 On-call Time: 

An employee who is required to remain on call on 

the employer's premises or so close thereto that he 

cannot use the time effectively for his own 

purposes is working while 'on call'. An employee 

who is not required to remain on the employer's 

premises but is merely required to leave word at 

his home or with company officials where he may be 

reached is not working while on call. 

29 C.F.R. § 785.17 

§ 553.221 Compensable Hours of Work: 

(c) Time spent away from the employer's premises 

under conditions that are so circumscribed that 

they restrict the employee from effectively using 

the time for personal pursuits also constitutes 

compensable hours of work. 

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(d) An employee who is not required to remain on 

the employer's premises but is merely required to 

leave word ... where he or she may be reached is 

not working while on call. Time spent at home on 

call may or may not be compensable depending on 

whether the restrictions placed on the employee 

preclude using the time for personal pursuits. 

29 C.F.R. § 553.221 

The district court found the on-call time was compensable 

under the above regulations based upon specific undisputed facts 

set forth by both parties. The undisputed facts included "the 

firefighter must be able to report to the stationhouse within 

twenty minutes of being paged or be subject to discipline; that 

the on-call periods are 24-hours in length; and primarily that the 

calls are frequent -- a firefighter may receive as many as 13 

calls during an on-call period, with a stated average frequency of 

3-5 calls per on-call period." Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 751. Based 

on the undisputed facts and the applicable law, we hold the 

district court did not err in determining the on-call time was 

compensable under FLSA. 

d. 

City contends the district court erred in denying its motion 

for summary judgment by failing to take into account that 

firefighters were permitted to trade, and did trade, on-call 

shifts. 

Firefighters set forth a specific issue regarding the 

difficulty experienced with trading on-call shifts, (R., Vol. I, 

Tab 33 at p. 11; see also, R., Vol. I, Tab 34 at p. 2), to which 

City responded that it was the personal decision of a firefighter 

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whether or not to trade shifts. City also stated firefighters had 

in fact traded shifts. (R., Vol. II, Tab 35 at pp. 9-10). City 

did not address the specific issue of the difficulty the 

firefighters encountered in trading their on-call shifts. The 

statement that the firefighters were able to trade their shifts 

did not rebut the contention by firefighters that it was difficult 

to trade on-call shifts. We hold that without specific rebuttal 

of the contentions set forth by firefighters, the district court 

did not err in finding the trading of on-call shifts was difficult 

if not impossible. 

e. 

City contends the district court erred by making factual 

findings 

judgment. 

while ruling on firefighters' motion for summary 

City's assertion of the district court's "factual 

findings" include: the conditions of. on-call status restricted 

firefighters' personal pursuits even though they were not required 

to remain on stationhouse premises; the callbacks were frequent 

with a stated average of 3-5 callbacks per on-call period; 

firefighters were subject to discipline for late or missed calls; 

secondary employment was difficult due to the restrictive nature 

of the on-call status; City is the primary beneficiary of the oncall program; and, firefighters presented evidence that they were 

effectively precluded from engaging in group activities or from 

activities requiring the expenditure of money because they must 

report within 20 minutes of being called. The record reflects 

that the above "factual findings" were in fact undisputed facts 

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and conclusions made by the district court based upon the 

undisputed facts. We have carefully reviewed the record and hold 

that the district court did not make factual findings, but rather 

relied on undisputed facts set forth by the parties in granting 

summary judgment in favor of firefighters. 

f. 

City argues the district court erred by failing to draw all 

inferences from the underlying facts in its favor. "[E]vidence 

offered by a nonmovant must create a genuine issue for trial; 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, 

it is not enough that the evidence be merely colorable or anything 

short of significantly probative." Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "This is because when the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." 

Id. quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 

289 (1968). 

The record shows that 

incorporated the material facts 

City did not dispute, but instead 

upon which the district court 

relied in granting summary judgment in favor of firefighters. The 

facts cited by City in its brief were all facts that the district 

court correctly determined to be undisputed. (Appellant's Brief at 

pp. 18-19). The inferences drawn from these undisputed facts 

clearly indicate there were no material issues of fact warranting 

trial. 

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We therefore hold that the district court did not err in its 

findings of undisputed facts. 

II. 

City contends the district court erred by misapplying the 

applicable law to the facts under consideration. 

While FLSA does not provide a definition for "work," the 

courts have interpreted the meaning of the word to be "physical or 

mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required 

by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 

benefit of the employer and his business." Tennessee Coal Co. v. 

Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). See also Armour & Co. v. 

Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132 (1944). The courts have further 

developed this definition into a method for testing whether oncall time is compensable under FLSA. 

The United States Supreme Court has stated "an employer. 

may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for 

something to happen. Readiness to serve may be hired, 

quite as much as service itself, and time spent lying in wait for 

threats to the safety of the employer's property may be treated by 

the parties as a benefit to the employer." Armour at 133. The 

Court further observed that whether time is spent predominantly 

for the employer's benefit or for the employee's is a question 

dependent on the the circumstances of the case. Id. 

In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court held: 

that no principle of law found either in the 

statute· or in Court decisions precludes waiting 

time from also being working time. We have not 

attempted to, and we cannot, lay down a legal 

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formula to resolve cases so varied in their facts. 

Whether ... such time falls within or without the 

Act is a question of fact to be resolved by 

appropriate finding of the trial court. 

323 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1944). 

To aid in the determination of whether on-call time is 

compensable, the DOL promulgated the regulations set forth, supra, 

which indicate on-call time is compensable if the employee is 

required to remain on the employer's premises, 29 C.F.R. § 

785.17, or if the employee, although not required to remain on the 

employer's premises, finds his time on-call away from the 

employer's premises is so restricted that it interferes with 

personal pursuits. 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(d). An agency's 

construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial 

deference. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555-56 

(1980). See also, United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 

828-29 (10th Cir. 1986). 

We have stated the test to determine whether on-call time is 

compensable "requires consideration of the agreement between the 

parties, the nature and extent of the restrictions, the 

relationship between the services rendered and the on-call time 

and all surrounding circumstances." Boehm v. Kansas City Power & 

Light Company, 868 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1989). See also 

Skidmore at 137. We have further stated that the facts and 

circumstances of each case should determine whether periods of 

waiting for work should be compensable under FLSA. Norton v. 

Worthen Van Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, we stated the "resolution of the matter involve[s] 

determining the degree to which the employee could engage in 

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personal activity while subject to being called." Id. at 655. 

The Supreme Court has stated the "facts may show that the employee 

was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be 

engaged." Skidmore at 137. 

City contends that Norton and Boehm are the controlling cases 

in this Circuit on the issue of compensability of on=call time. 

(Appellant's Brief at p. 20). The fact-bound nature of these cases 

is such that, in our view, they are easily distinguishable from 

the instant case, as determined by the district court. 

In Boehm, power-company linemen were obligated to work 

overtime when storms and other emergencies occurred. The linemen 

were only required to be reachable and accept call-outs 

approximately one-third of the time they were on-call, and the 

company did not count more than one call-out per calendar day, no 

matter how many attempts were made to reach the lineman during 

4 that day. Boehm at 1183. The plaintiffs in Norton were van 

drivers who transported railroad crews to and from their trains. 

The drivers generally worked shifts of eight to twelve hours a day 

and during that time they were required to be near enough to the 

employer's premises to be able to respond to calls within fifteen 

to twenty minutes. The drivers were, however, compensated for this 

waiting time if they received a call within two hours of their 

last call. Id. at 654. Neither Boehm nor Norton indicate the 

4 Call-outs were not counted on days when the employee was excused 

from overtime work, such as days of vacation, restricted duty, 

jury duty, or when deaths in the family had occurred. Call-outs 

were also not counted when the employee was ill or injured, and 

only one call-out was counted during a weekend and adjacent 

holidays. 

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frequency with which their plaintiffs were called back. 

Firefighters in this case were required to report to a 

callback within twenty minutes, and to answer each callback or be 

subject to discipline (they were subject to discipline also if 

they were late to a callback); and they were not compensated for 

any of the waiting time. The on-call shifts were 24 hours in 

length and the average number of callbacks was 3-5 times per 24-

hour period. 

The district court found the frequency of callbacks to be an 

important distinction. Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 752. This 

determination by the district court is supported by two recent 

"Letter Rulings" issued by the DOL. In a Letter Ruling dated 

March 11, 1986 (no number assigned), the DOL determined that 

firefighters who were on call between 5:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. 

during each scheduled workday must be compensated. The DOL 

determined the employer established such restrictive conditions on 

the firefighters that the employer effectively controlled the 

firefighters' time. The conditions established by the employer 

included, "the firefighters must be dressed and waiting for a 

call, they must report to the nearest fire station within ten 

minutes from the receipt of the call and are subject to discipline 

if they are late or fail to respond." (R., Vol. I, Tab 33, 

Exhibit H, pp. 144-45). 

A second Letter Ruling from the DOL dated March 12, 1987 (no 

number assigned) concluded that firefighters who were required to 

wear electronic paging devices with a reception distance of 30 

miles, and who were required to respond to at least one-half of 

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the calls, were not eligible for compensation. The letter further 

stated, however, if the callbacks were "so frequent that the 

[firefighter] is not really free to use the off-duty time 

effectively for [his] own benefit, the intervening periods as well 

as the time spent in responding to calls would be counted as 

compensable hours of work." (R., Vol. I, Tab 33, Exhibit Hat p. 

146). See also Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 752 n. 1. 

The district court also found the nature of the firefighters' 

employment a relevant factor in determining that the on-call time 

was compensable. Id. at 753. Firefighters must be alert and 

ready to protect the community, and the time firefighters spend 

lying in wait for emergencies could be considered a benefit to the 

employer and thus compensable under FLSA. Armour at 133. 

Therefore, based upon the factual distinctions between 

Norton, Boehm, and the instant case, we hold the district court 

did not err in its application of the law to the facts under 

consideration. 

III. 

In view of our determination that the district court properly 

distinguished Norton and Boehm when granting summary judgment in 

favor of firefighters, we hold that the district court did not err 

in denying City's motion for summary judgment. 

IV. 

City contends the district court erred in its assessment of 

damages. Specifically, City contends (a) firefighters should not 

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receive damages for periods when they were at the bottom of the 

call list and not likely to be called in for duty; (b) 

firefighters should not receive pay for meal and sleeping time 

while on the "on-call" list but not on a regular "tour of duty;" 

(c) firefighters should not receive pay for periods when they did 

not restrict their normal personal activities or when they worked 

for other employers while on-call; (d) firefighters should not be 

entitled to damages for occasions when they volunteered for oncall duty; and (e) the district court erred by awarding 

Firefighter Binder $122,131.80 in backpay and liquidated damages. 

a. 

City contends the firefighters on the bottom of the list 

would not be called in as frequently as a firefighter on the top 

of the list. While the district court acknowledged this, it found 

there was an undisputed average of 3-5 callbacks per 24-hours. 

(R., Vol. II, Tab 47 at p. 3). We agree. Accordingly, we hold 

that the district court correctly applied this 3-5 callback figure 

to all firefighters. 

b. 

City contends firefighters should not receive pay for meal 

and sleeping time while on the "on-call" list but not on a regular 

"tour of duty." The district court found the meal and sleep time 

compensable under federal regulations 29 C.F.R. § 553.222-23. The 

regulations state in part, 

§ 553.222 Sleep time. 

( b) Where the 

section 7(k) 

excluded from 

employer has elected to use the 

exemption, sleep time cannot be 

the compensable hours of work. 

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(2) Where the employee is on a tour of duty of 

exactly 24 hours ... 

29 C.F.R. § 553.222 

§ 553.223 Meal time. 

(c) ... Where the public agency elects to use the 

section 7 (k) exemption for firefighters, meal time 

cannot be excluded from the compensable hours of 

work ... (2) where the firefighter is on a tour 

of duty of exactly 24 hours ... 

29 C.F.R. § 553.223 

City argues that the firefighters were not on a "tour of 

duty" as required by the regulations, and therefore they are not 

entitled to compensation for sleep and meal times. The federal 

regulations define "tour of duty" as "the period of time during 

which an employee is considered to be on duty for purposes of 

determining compensable hours." 29 C.F.R. § 553.220 (b). The 

district court found the 24-hour on-call shifts were compensable 

hours under FLSA. Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 751. Further, the 

court found that since the on-call shifts were 24-hours in length, 

the sleep and meal times were compensable under 29 C.F.R. §§ 

553.222-223. Renfro, 1990 WL 95087 at 3. 

Having held that the district court properly found that the 

24-hour on-call shifts were compensable under FLSA, we also hold 

that the district court properly determined that sleep and meal 

time were compensable. 

c. 

City further contends the firefighters should not receive pay 

for periods when they did not restrict their normal personal 

activities or when they worked for other employers while on-call. 

The district court found the on-call time so restrictive of the 

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firefighters' personal time that the on-call time was compensable 

under FLSA. Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 751. This issue was properly 

addressed by the district court. Thus we hold that the district 

court did not err in finding that all of the on-call time was 

compensable under FLSA. 

d. 

City argues firefighters should not be entitled to damages 

for occasions when they volunteered for on-call duty. The record 

is devoid of any specific contentions that the firefighters 

volunteered for on-call duty. The district court addressed, 

however, the issue of trading on-call shifts and found it to be 

undisputed that it was difficult if not impossible to trade 

shifts. Id. at 748. This is an undisputed fact. In the absence 

of any contentions that the firefighters volunteered for on-call 

duty, the district court did not err in not addressing the issue. 

We hold that the district court did not err in finding traded oncall shifts compensable. 

e. 

City contends the district court erred by awarding 

Firefighter Binder $122,131.80 in backpay and liquidated damages. 

(See Renfro, 741 F. Supp. 887). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses be 

pleaded or they are deemed waived. See Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 

F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1976); Radio Corporation of America v. 

Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17 (10th Cir. 1970). "The 

general purpose of [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 8(c)is to provide particularized 

and specific notice of certain defenses." State Distributors, 

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Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 738 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Therefore, the courts must be "especially careful to scrutinize 

the record to insure that plaintiff had sufficient notice and 

opportunity to rebut an allegedly tardily raised affirmative 

defense." Id. 

City did not affirmatively plead the defense of Firefighter 

Binder's exemption from FLSA until it filed a motion to alter or 

amend. (R., Vol. II, Tab 63). Thus, the district court properly 

found that City's failure to affirmatively plead the defense prior 

to the grant of summary judgment in favor of firefighters was an 

effective waiver. Renfro, 741 F. Supp. at 888. 

The district court further stated that even if City had not 

effectively waived its right to plead the exemption defense, it 

had not met its burden of proof that Firefighter Binder was exempt 

from compensation under FLSA. Id. 

Section 213 (a)(l) of FLSA provides an exemption for 

employees employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or 

professional position. 29 C.F.R. § 213 (a)(l). "The employer 

bears the burden of showing that an employee is exempt under the 

Act." Firefighters Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, Va., 720 F. 

Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D. Va. 1989), "The employer who asserts the 

exemption has the burden of establishing [the] requirements by 

clear and affirmative evidence." Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 

725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984). The employer must show the 

employee is paid on a salaried basis and the job duties are 

administrative, managerial, or professional under the specific 

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( 

guidelines outlined in 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-3. Firefighters Local 

2141 at 1231. 

In its motion to alter or amend judgment, City did not 

affirmatively state any of the requirements set forth in the 

federal regulations. City merely stated Firefighter Binder had 

received a promotion and therefore was exempt from compensation 

under FLSA. (R., Vol. II, Tab 63). On the basis of the record, 

the district court correctly found that City had not met the 

burden established by the federal regulations. We hold, 

therefore, that the district court did not err in awarding 

compensation to Firefighter Binder. 

v. 

City contends the district court erred by awarding 

firefighters liquidated damages. 

Under 29 u.s.c. § 216(b), an employer who violates the FLSA 

shall be liable to the employee for overtime compensation and an 

additional equal amount as liquidated damages. The purpose for 

the award of liquidated damages is "the reality that the retention 

of a workman's pay may well result in damages too obscure and 

difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." 

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 463 (D.C. Cir. 

1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), citing Overnight Motor 

Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-4 (1942). Under 29 

U.S.C. § 260, if in any action to recover unpaid overtime 

compensation an employer "shows to the the satisfaction of the 

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court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in 

good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that 

his act or omission was not a violation of the FLSA," the court 

may refuse to award liquidated damages. 

All circuits that have considered the matter hold 

that the trial court may eliminate or reduce the 

award of liquidated damages only if the employer 

shows both that he acted in good faith and that he 

had reasonable grounds for believing that his 

actions did not violate the Act. 

Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 725 (10th Cir. 1984). See also 

Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling Corp., 798 F.2d 1345, 1351 (10th Cir. 

1986); Sinclair v. Automobile Club of Oklahoma, Inc., 733 F.2d 

726, 730 (10th Cir. 1984); Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 

(3rd Cir. 1982). 

The good faith requirement mandates the employer have "an 

honest intention to ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act." 

Id. "The additional requirement that the employer have reasonable 

grounds for believing that his conduct complies with the Act 

imposes an objective standard by which to judge the employer's 

behavior." Id. 

"The employer has the plain and substantial burden of 

persuading the court by proof that his failure to obey the statute 

was both in good faith and predicated upon such reasonable 

grounds ... [i]n the absence of such a showing the district court 

has no discretion to mitigate an employer's statutory liability 

for liquidated damages." Id. 

City states it should not be faulted for failing to establish 

"reasonable grounds" when it was denied the opportunity to do so 

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in a hearing. (Appellant's Brief at p. 35). In its statement of 

unresolved issues, City stated it was "unclear" whether 

firefighters would seek liquidated damages, but in the event 

firefighters did seek liquidated damages, the record established 

City had acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for 

believing its policy was not a violation of the FLSA. City 

requested a hearing in the event the district court did not 

determine the record established City had acted in good faith and 

had reasonable grounds for believing its policy was not in 

violation of the FLSA. (R., Vol. II, Tab 56 at p. 9). 

While the district court did not specifically address the 

issue of whether it was clear that firefighters would seek 

liquidated damages, the record reflects firefighters specifically 

prayed for liquidated damages in their complaint. (R., Vol. I, 

Tab 1 at p. 4). Therefore, City's contention that it was 

"unclear" whether firefighters would seek liquidated damages is 

without merit. 

It is necessary for City to meet both of the requirements in 

order to avoid liquidated damages. Marshall at 753. While the 

district court did not address the issue of whether City acted in 

good faith or not, it found City had not met the second 

requirement of "reasonable grounds", and thus the district court 

determined it was required to award liquidated damages. Renfro, 

1990 WL 95087 at 4. 

The district court indicated that the record reflected City's 

only attempt to determine if they were in compliance with the FLSA 

( was a phone-call made to a "Mrs. Spivey" at the DOL by Carol King, 

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an administrative assistant for City. Id. (See also, R., Vol. I, 

Tab 29 at p. 10, Exhibit 8). The district court found this 

attempt to be inadequate in that at the time of the deposition, 

King "could not recall Mrs. Spivey's position with the DOL or in 

what detail she described the on-call policy. King also did not 

recall telling Spivey the average number of calls received by 

firefighters during an on-call shift." Id. at 4-5. The district 

court found that City never requested a written opinion from the 

DOL. Id. at 5. The district court thus found that City had not 

met its burden of showing it had reasonable grounds to believe its 

on-call policy was not in violation of the FLSA. Id. 

We hold the district court properly determined City had not 

met its burden in showing it had reasonable grounds to believe the 

on-call policy was not in violation of the FLSA, and, therefore, 

we further hold the district court did not err in awarding 

liquidated damages. 

VI. 

City contends the application of the FLSA to municipalities 

is unconstitutional. 

In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 

(1985), the Supreme Court held the application of the FLSA to 

state and local governments does not violate the Tenth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution. In upholding the application 

of the FLSA to state and local governments, the Court expressly 

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overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 

(1976). 5 Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 750. 

City argued for the adoption of the dissent in Garcia and the 

reapplication of National League of Cities. City further argued 

firefighters were distinguishable from the mass transit employees 

in Garcia in that subjecting firefighters to the requirements of 

the FLSA would "impair local integrity". Renfro, 729 F. Supp. at 

750. The district court addressed City's arguments and determined 

the coverage of firefighters under FLSA was consistent with 

Garcia, and therefore concluded that City's argument was without 

merit. Id. We agree. 

WE AFFIRM. 

5National League of Cities held the application of the FLSA to 

state and local employees engaged in "traditional governmental 

functions" violated the Tenth Amendment. 

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