Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35030/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIM MILLESS RUIZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUBLIC

UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1, a local

government entity; JIM LITTLE,

individually and in his official

capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-35030

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-01702-TSZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 5, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed June 8, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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SUMMARY*

Civil Rights / Res Judicata

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of an action

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging sex

discrimination. 

Plaintiff sued her former employer in 2011, alleging sex

discrimination for acts that occurred in 2008. The district

court dismissed that action “with prejudice” on two grounds: 

lack of personal jurisdiction and untimeliness. In 2013,

plaintiff brought the present action, alleging sex

discrimination claims, under state and federal law, stemming

in part from her termination in 2010. The district court held

that the earlier dismissal was res judicata and that,

accordingly, it barred the present action. 

The panel held that – consistent with the Restatement

(Second) of Judgments and at least three sister circuits – an

earlier dismissal on alternative grounds, where one ground is

a lack of jurisdiction, is not res judicata. The panel therefore

held that res judicata did not bar this action. The panel

determined, however, that dismissal of some of plaintiff’s

claims was proper on other grounds, and therefore the panel

affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further

proceedings.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RUIZ V. SNOHOMISH CTY. PUD 3

COUNSEL

Michael A. Jacobson (argued), Michael A. Jacobson, PS Inc.,

Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher M. Huck (argued), Michael A. Goldfarb, and R.

Omar Riojas, Kelley, Goldfarb, Huck & Roth, PLLC, Seattle,

Washington, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Kim Milless Ruiz worked for Defendant

Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1 (“the

District”) from 1998 until her termination in 2010. In 2011,

she sued Defendant Jim Little, the Executive Director of

Employee Relations at the District, alleging sex

discrimination for acts that had occurred in 2008. But, as

Plaintiff conceded, she failed to effect service on Little. The

district court dismissed that action “with prejudice” on two

grounds: lack of personal jurisdiction and untimeliness.

In 2013, Plaintiff brought the present action against both

Defendants, alleging sex discrimination claims, under state

and federal law, stemming in part from her termination in

2010. The district court held that the earlier dismissal was res

judicata and that, accordingly, it barred this action. Plaintiff

timely appeals. Reviewing de novo, Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp,

297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), we hold—consistent with

the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and at least three

sister circuits—that an earlier dismissal on alternative

grounds, where one ground is a lack of jurisdiction, is not res

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judicata. Res judicata therefore does not bar this action. 

Because dismissal of some of Plaintiff’s claims nevertheless

was proper on other grounds, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because this appeal challenges the grant of a motion to

dismiss, we accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint. 

Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th

Cir. 2010). Plaintiff worked for the District from 1998 to

2010. The District fired her on June 10, 2010, acting on false

assertions made against Plaintiff by Defendant Little. Male

co-workers who engaged in conduct similar to Plaintiff’s

purported conduct were not disciplined.

In 2011, acting pro se, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against

Defendant Little in state court. Plaintiff alleged that, in 2008,

Defendant Little filed a false disciplinary report against her. 

The complaint did not mention the 2010 firing.

Defendant Little removed the case to federal court in

2012, expressly noting that he did not waive any defenses,

including sufficiency of service. He then filed a motion to

dismiss that asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction, because

Plaintiff failed to serve him properly, and untimeliness. In

the timeliness section, Defendant Little explained that, had

Plaintiff served him properly, the claim would have been

timely because it was filed within three years of the 2008

false disciplinary report. But the complaint was untimely

under Washington law, according to Defendant Little,

because Plaintiff’s service was deficient, and an improperly

served complaint neither constitutes the commencement of an

action nor tolls the statute of limitations.

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Plaintiff then filed two motions: (1) a motion for

extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss and

(2) a motion for voluntary dismissal. The motion for an

extension of time stated that “Plaintiff cannot answer the

issues of the defendant[’s] motion to dismiss without hiring

a counsel” because Defendant’s motion “is complex and

plaintiff is not legally trained for civil rights law.” The

motion for voluntary dismissal stated that Plaintiff “did not

serve [Defendant] with the lawsuit papers within 120 days of

filing suit. There is a lack of jurisdiction over the person.”

Defendant Little filed a response to both motions, each

stating that Defendant did not oppose dismissal but arguing

that the dismissal should be with prejudice because of the

untimeliness of the action. Three weeks later, the district

court dismissed the action with prejudice, stating in full:

This matter comes before the Court on

Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal. 

(Dkt. No. 9.) Defendant does not oppose

dismissal, and requests that the dismissal be

with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 12.) Plaintiff does

not object. The motion is GRANTED. 

Because Plaintiff concedes that the Court

lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant and

that the claims are barred by the statute of

limitations, this matter is DISMISSED with

prejudice.

Plaintiff did not appeal that 2012 dismissal.

On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action in state court

against Little and the District, asserting sex-discrimination

claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination

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and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants removed the case to

federal court. Defendants then moved to dismiss the action

on three grounds: (1) res judicata or claim preclusion;

(2) untimeliness; and (3) failure to state a claim. The district

court held that res judicata bars the action, dismissed the case

for that reason, and expressly declined to reach Defendants’

other two arguments. Plaintiff timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

“The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is

determined by federal common law.” Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008). “Res judicata applies when there

is: (1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the

merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Stewart,

297 F.3d at 956 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

consider whether the 2012 dismissal was “a final judgment on

the merits.”

The 2012 dismissal rested on two grounds: lack of

personal jurisdiction and untimeliness. Considered

separately, those reasons have opposite claim-preclusive

effects. A “dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is a

judgment on the merits” that operates as res judicata. TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,

322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003). By contrast, a dismissal

for want of personal jurisdiction is not a judgment “on the

merits” for the purpose of res judicata. See, e.g., Phillips

Petro. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985) (“[A]judgment

issued without proper personal jurisdiction over an absent

party is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere and thus

has no res judicata effect as to that party.”); Martin v. N.Y.

State Dep’t of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 373 n.3 (2d Cir.

1978) (per curiam) (“A dismissal for failure of service of

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process, of course, has no Res judicata effect.”); Restatement

(Second) of Judgments (“Restatement”) § 20(1) (1982) (“A

personal judgment for the defendant, although valid and final,

does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the same claim: 

(a) When the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction . . . .”); accord 18A Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction (“Federal

Practice”) § 4436, at 154, 168–70 (2d ed. 2002).

We have not decided the res judicata effect of an

order—like the one at issue here—that contains two holdings,

one “on the merits” and the other not “on the merits.” But the

Restatement and at least one sister circuit have concluded

that, in those circumstances, the earlier judgment is not res

judicata because it was not “on the merits.” See Restatement

§ 20 cmt. e (“A dismissal may be based on two or more

determinations, at least one of which, standing alone, would

not render the judgment a bar to another action on the same

claim. In such a case, . . . it should not operate as a bar . . .

[e]ven if another of the determinations, standing alone, would

render the judgment a bar . . . .”); Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 884 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1989) (“When a dismissal

is based on two determinations, one of which would not

render the judgment a bar to another action on the same

claim, the dismissal should not operate as a bar.”).

Two related reasons are commonly given for the rule. 

First, the “on the merits” determination “may not have been

as carefully or rigorously considered as it would have if it had

been necessary to the result, and in that sense it has some of

the characteristics of dicta.” Restatement § 20 cmt. e. 

Second, “of critical importance, the losing party, although

entitled to appeal from both determination[s], may be

dissuaded from doing so as to the determination going to the

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‘merits’ because the alternative determination[], which in

itself does not preclude a second action, is clearly correct. 

The rules of res judicata should not encourage or foster

appeals in such instances.” Id.

This case nicely illustrates both points. Plaintiff declined

to brief the timeliness issue because of its complexity and,

instead, requested additional time to hire a lawyer with “civil

rights law expertise.” The district court’s order provided no

analysis on the timeliness issue, and the court apparently

never ruled on the request for additional time. The court’s

determination on the timeliness issue “may not have been as

carefully or rigorously considered as it would have if it had

been necessary to the result.”1 Restatement § 20 cmt. e.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff could have appealed the

2012 dismissal to challenge the timeliness ruling. But we

agree with the Restatement that “[t]he rules of res judicata

should not encourage or foster appeals” in these

circumstances. Id. It would be an inefficient use of judicial

resources to encourage litigants to appeal judgments for the

sole purpose of preserving their ability to potentially bring the

same claims again, in a hypothetical future action. That

concern would be heightened where the “on the merits”

determination involved complicated legal or factual

questions: the appeal would require substantial expenditure

of resources premised only on a hypothetical future action. 

See, e.g., Pizlo, 884 F.2d at 119 (stating that “needless

appeals, wasted judicial resources and increased legal

1 Contrary to the district court’s order in 2012, nothing in the record

suggests that Plaintiff “conceded” that her complaint was untimely. She

simply said nothing on that point.

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expenses to the parties would necessarily result” from

requiring appeals in these circumstances).

We nevertheless need not decide whether to adopt a

general rule for all judgments resting on alternative grounds

where one alternative is not “on the merits.” Here, the court’s

non-merits ruling was for lack of personal jurisdiction,

depriving the court of the authority to rule on the merits. See,

e.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285 (1961)

(noting the “fundamental jurisdictional defects which render

a judgment void . . . such as lack of jurisdiction over the

person or subject matter”); Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v.

Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d

1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980) (“It is well-established that a

judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over the

parties is void.”). We therefore hold, consistent with

decisions by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, that res judicata

does not apply to a judgment that rests on both a lack of

jurisdiction and a merits determination. See Remus Joint

Venture v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997)

(“[T]he state court correctly recognized that when a district

court’s ruling rests on alternative grounds, at least one of

which is based on the inability of the court to reach the

merits, the judgment should not act as a bar in a future

action.”);2 Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc.,

713 F.2d 1272, 1279 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Once a court expresses

the view that it lacks jurisdiction, the court thereafter does not

2 A much earlier decision by the Sixth Circuit applied the opposite rule. 

Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119, 121–22 (6th Cir. 1964). But the Sixth

Circuit implicitly declined to follow that case in Remus, likely because

Crawford’s analysis did not account for the jurisdictional nature of the

alternative holding; it rested solely on the rule that two alternative merits

holdings bind later courts. One treatise has described Crawford as

“clearly wrong.” 18 Federal Practice § 4421, at 578 n.39.

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have the power to rule on any other matter. Any finding

made by a court when the court has determined that it does

not have subject matter jurisdiction carries no res judicata

consequences.” (citations omitted)); see also 18 Federal

Practice § 4421, at 575–78 (“If a first decision is supported

both by findings that deny the power of the court to decide

the case on the merits and by findings that go to the merits,

preclusion is inappropriate as to the findings on the merits. 

A court that admits its own lack of power to decide should

not undertake to bind a court that does have power to decide.”

(footnote omitted)).3

We acknowledge that we have held that a “district court

may decide that a complaint fails to state a claim even when

it does not have personal jurisdiction.” Milton H. Greene

Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 990 n.6

(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230,

1233–35 (9th Cir. 1990) (announcing the rule). We strongly

question the vitality of that rule in light of post-Wages

Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co.

v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31

(2007) (“Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83 (1998), clarified that a federal court generally

may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining

that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit

(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal

jurisdiction). See id. at 93–102. ‘Without jurisdiction the

court cannot proceed at all in any cause’; it may not assume

jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits of the case. 

3 Federal Practice discusses the effect of alternative dismissals in a

section devoted to issue preclusion, not claim preclusion. But both the

quoted text and some of the cases cited in the footnote concern claim

preclusion.

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Id. at 94.”). In any event, whatever discretion a district court

may have to announce decisions pursuant to the Wages rule,

it is a separate matter to give res judicata effect to judgments

pronounced without personal jurisdiction. Even assuming

that the district court properly opined on the merits in 2012,

its judgment on the merits had no res judicata effect because

the court lacked personal jurisdiction.4

Defendants argue that, even if we adopt the rule that an

alternative dismissal grounded in part on personal jurisdiction

is not res judicata, the district court’s order here was not, in

fact, a dismissal on alternative grounds. We disagree. As

noted above, the order states: “Because Plaintiff concedes

that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant and

that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations, this

matter is DISMISSED with prejudice.” (Emphasis added.) 

Notwithstanding the text of the order, Defendants argue that

the order was a dismissal solely on the timeliness ground; if

the lack of service were the only problem, then a dismissal

“without prejudice” ordinarily would be proper. 

Accordingly, Defendants argue, the court must have reached

4 Personal jurisdiction differs from subject matter jurisdiction in some

important ways. For example, a defendant may waive the lack of personal

jurisdiction, but the parties may not waive the lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. But, where the lack of personal jurisdiction is not waived,

those differences are immaterial for the purpose of res judicata. The

Supreme Court has made no distinction between the two types of

jurisdiction when considering the effect of a judgment. See e.g., Costello,

365 U.S. at 285 (noting the “fundamental jurisdictional defects which

render a judgment void . . . such as lack of jurisdiction over the person or

subject matter”). And the underlying logic applies equally to both types

of jurisdiction: if the court lacks power to act, then it may not pronounce

a binding judgment on the merits—regardless of the reason for the court’s

lack of authority to act.

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the issue of untimeliness because the action was dismissed

“with prejudice.”

We see no ambiguity in the judgment. A natural reading

of its text is that the court rested its conclusion on both lack

of jurisdiction and untimeliness. If the court wanted to

ground its decision only on untimeliness, it could have

mentioned the statute of limitations only. The fact that the

dismissal was “with prejudice” means most naturally that the

court’s conclusion rested on both grounds, not that the court

somehow skipped the jurisdictional ground or disagreed with

the parties’ concession that the court lacked jurisdiction.

Even if one views the judgment as ambiguous,

Defendants’ argument still fails. “When interpreting an

ambiguous prior judgment, the reviewing court should

construe a judgment so as to give effect to the intention of the

issuing court. Where the judgment is ambiguous or fails to

express the rulings with clarity, the entire record before the

issuing court and the findings of fact may be referenced in

determiningwhat was decided.” Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi

Indian Tribe, 141 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation,

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

For Defendants’ argument to prevail, one must conclude

that the district court either skipped the jurisdictional ground

or silently concluded that it had personal jurisdiction. As

noted above, it would have violated clear Supreme Court

precedent for the district court to have assumed jurisdiction

and skipped to the statute-of-limitations ground. Sinochem,

549 U.S. at 430–31. Moreover, there is no indication

anywhere in the record that the district court disagreed with

the parties’ mutual concession that the court lacked personal

jurisdiction. Indeed, to the contrary, the court logically could

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not reach that conclusion. Plaintiff’s original complaint

would, in fact, have been timely, had she properly served

process on Defendant Little. Only defective service rendered

the complaint untimely. In other words, Defendant Little had

argued that the action was untimely for precisely the same

reason that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Viewed in

that context, the district court almost certainly did not

conclude, without saying so, that it had personal jurisdiction. 

In sum, the district court meant what it said: the dismissal

was on both jurisdictional and timeliness grounds.

Finally, Defendants argue that, even if an alternative

dismissal premised in part on personal jurisdiction ordinarily

is not res judicata, the court’s order here is res judicata for

reasons specific to this case. We categorically reject those

arguments: when one alternative ground for dismissal is

jurisdictional, the original judgment is not res judicata

regardless of other circumstances. Accordingly, we need not

examine any specific circumstances of the original action.

We nevertheless find it appropriate, because the district

court misapprehended the law in this regard, to comment on

Defendants’ circumstance-specific arguments. Citing Owens

v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714

(9th Cir. 2001), the district court held that, because the 2012

dismissal was labeled “with prejudice,” the order necessarily

had res judicata effect. Owens concerned a dismissal with

prejudice for failure to prosecute, which is, as a matter of

black letter law, a dismissal “on the merits.” Id. Owens did

not concern a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and it did not

create a bright-line rule that the label “with prejudice” is

dispositive. See id. (“Thus, involuntary dismissal generally

acts as a judgment on the merits . . . .” (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Relatedly, Defendants point out that none of the

authorities cited by Plaintiff concerned voluntary dismissals

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and that the

district court exercised its discretion in 2012 to describe the

dismissal as one “with prejudice.” Rule 41 generally gives

district courts wide discretion to determine whether the

dismissal is with prejudice or without prejudice. E.g., Hargis

v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 412 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover,

Defendants correctly cite Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956, for the

proposition that “[t]he phrase ‘final judgment on the merits’

is often used interchangeably with ‘dismissal with

prejudice.’” Defendants argue that, accordingly, the

judgment was intended to be “on the merits.”

Those arguments fail for at least two reasons. First, to the

extent that Defendants argue that the district court may

predetermine the res judicata effect of its judgment, they are

mistaken as a matter of law. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.

491, 513 n.9 (2008) (“A court adjudicating a dispute may not

be able to predetermine the res judicata effect of its own

judgment.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Shutts, 472 U.S. at

805)); id. (“The first court does not get to dictate to other

courts the preclusion consequences of its own judgment.”

(quoting 18 Federal Practice § 4405, at 82)); see also

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396

(1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (“A court conducting an action cannot predetermine the

res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested

only in a subsequent action.”). Second, although Stewart

stated that a “dismissal with prejudice” “often” means that the

dismissal is “on the merits,” the opinion then expressly noted

the exception for “a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.” 

297 F.3d at 956 (emphasis in original). In other words, the

“with prejudice” label is not always conclusive for the

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purpose of res judicata and, indeed, does not equate to an

adjudication on the merits when the dismissal is for lack of

jurisdiction.

In sum, the district court erred by holding that the 2012

dismissal was res judicata. Accordingly, we reverse the

dismissal in part. We nevertheless affirm in part, on

alternative grounds. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d

889, 893 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We may affirm the district court

on any ground supported by the record.”). At oral argument,

Plaintiff’s lawyer clearly and expressly abandoned Plaintiff’s

federal claim. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s

federal claim. We also affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s

state-law claims to the extent that they rely solely on events

that occurred more than three years before the filing of the

complaint in this case. For purposes of the motion to dismiss,

at least two claims are timely: (1) her claim alleging

discriminatory firing in 2010; and (2) a hostile work

environment claim founded in part on actions occurring

within the limitations period. Antonius v. King County,

103 P.3d 729, 737 (Wash. 2005). We express no view on any

issue other than res judicata and timeliness.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED. Costs on appeal awarded to Plaintiff.

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