Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-24-05205/USCOURTS-caDC-24-05205-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2024 Decided October 2, 2024

No. 24-5205

KALSHIEX LLC,

APPELLEE

v.

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,

APPELLANT

On Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and 

Immediate Interim Relief

(No. 1:23-cv-03257)

Robert A. Schwartz, General Counsel, U.S. Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission, argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the emergency motion for stay pending appeal and 

immediate interim relief and the reply was Anne W. Stukes, 

Deputy General Counsel.

Yaakov M. Roth argued the cause for appellee. With him 

on the opposition to the emergency motion for stay pending 

appeal and immediate interim relief were Joshua B. Sterling, 

John Henry Thompson, and Amanda K. Rice.

Before: MILLETT, PILLARD, and PAN, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #24-5205 Document #2077790 Filed: 10/02/2024 Page 1 of 15
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT. 

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: KalshiEx LLC, a commodities

exchange regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission, seeks to offer “Congressional Control Contracts” 

that would allow persons within the United States to place 

money on the outcome of the November 2024 congressional 

elections. The Commission prohibited Kalshi from listing the

Congressional Control Contracts on its regulated exchange on 

the ground that they amount to gaming or election gambling, 

which many States outlaw. Kalshi challenged that 

determination in federal court under the Administrative 

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). The district court 

found that the Commission erred in categorizing the 

Congressional Control Contracts as involving either gaming or 

gambling and vacated its decision. The Commission now seeks 

a stay of the district court’s judgment while it pursues an

appeal. Because the Commission has failed at this time to 

demonstrate that it or the public will be irreparably injured 

absent a stay, we deny its motion without prejudice to renewal 

should more concrete evidence of irreparable harm develop

during the pendency of this appeal. 

I

A

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission

(“Commission” or “CFTC”) is an independent federal agency 

charged under the Commodity Exchange Act with regulating 

derivative markets. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a).1

 This case concerns a 

1

 A derivative is a “financial instrument” or contract, such as a 

future, option, or swap, the price of which is “directly dependent 

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subset of derivative contracts known as “event contracts.” An 

event contract is a derivative contract for which the “payoff is 

based on a specified event, occurrence, or value”—for 

example, the level of snowfall from a certain storm or the dollar 

amount of hurricane damage. CFTC, Contracts & Products: 

Event Contracts, https://perma.cc/4FPT-L2SN. Businesses 

and individuals can use event contracts to hedge against 

economic risk. KalshiEX LLC v. Commodity Futures Trading 

Comm’n, No. 23-cv-3257 (JMC), 2024 WL 4164694, at *2 

(D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2024). For example, a beachfront property 

owner might purchase an event contract predicting that a 

hurricane will reach landfall in her area to offset the risk of 

losing rental income from the storm. Id.

Under the Commodity Exchange Act, only federally 

regulated exchanges, known as “Designated Contract Markets”

(“Designated Markets”), can offer event contracts. 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 2(e), 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(iv). 

Designated Markets can self-certify to the Commission that the 

contracts comply with the Commodity Exchange Act and the 

Commission’s regulations and start trading the contracts the 

following business day. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. 

§ 40.2. 

However, the Commodity Exchange Act includes a 

“Special Rule” under which the Commission can review and 

prohibit specific types of event contracts if it determines those 

contracts are “contrary to the public interest.” 7 U.S.C. § 7a2(c)(5)(C)(i). The Special Rule provides: 

upon (i.e. derived from) the value of one or more underlying 

securities, equity indices, debt instruments, commodities, other 

derivative instruments, or any agreed upon pricing index or 

arrangement[.]” CFTC, Futures Glossary: A Guide to the Language 

of the Futures Industry, https://perma.cc/4V5S-8P5H. 

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In connection with the listing of agreements, contracts, 

transactions, or swaps in excluded commodities that are 

based upon the occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or 

contingency * * * by a designated contract market * * *, 

the Commission may determine that such agreements, 

contracts, or transactions are contrary to the public interest 

if the agreements, contracts, or transactions involve—

(I) activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State 

law;

(II) terrorism;

(III) assassination;

(IV) war;

(V) gaming; or

(VI) other similar activity determined by the 

Commission, by rule or regulation, to be contrary to 

the public interest.

Id.

By regulation, the Commission has 90 days to determine 

whether to prohibit a Designated Market’s proposed event 

contract under the Special Rule. 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(c). During

this review, the Designated Market cannot list or trade the 

contract. 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(c)(1).

B

On June 12, 2023, Kalshi submitted to the Commission a 

self-certification for event contracts it termed “Congressional 

Control Contracts.” Kalshi Opp. at 6; see J.A. 26. These 

contracts allow buyers to put down money based on a 

prediction as to which political party will control the U.S. 

House of Representatives or Senate on a future specified date. 

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They are “yes/no” contracts that pose the question: “Will 

<chamber of Congress> be controlled by <party> for <term>?” 

J.A. 26. 

Kalshi is not the first company to invite individuals and 

entities to lay down money based on electoral prognostications. 

In 1993 and again in 2014, the Commission issued “No Action” 

letters to two non-profit exchanges run by academic 

institutions—the Iowa Electronic Markets operated by the 

University of Iowa and PredictIt operated by the Victoria 

University of Wellington—that offer contracts tied, among 

other things, to election outcomes in the United States. Letter 

from Vincent McGonagle, Dir., Div. of Market Oversight, U.S. 

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, to Neil Quigley, Deputy 

Vice-Chancellor, Rsch., Victoria Univ. of Wellington (Oct. 29, 

2014), https://perma.cc/YD43-UPX4. These exchanges limit 

the number of users in each election market to 2,000 (Iowa 

Electronic Markets) and 5,000 (PredictIt) and cap individual 

investments at $500 (Iowa Electronic Markets) and $850 

(PredictIt). Id.; J.A. 164, 505. A third exchange, Polymarket, 

which became operational in 2020, also offers political 

contracts, but it never registered as a Designated Market with 

the Commission. J.A. 506. In a settlement the Commission 

announced in January 2022, Polymarket agreed to pay a civil 

penalty of $1.4 million and to restrict its contracts to non-U.S. 

investors. J.A. 506. Whether Polymarket has complied with 

the latter limitation is in question. Kalshi Opp. at 3; 

Commission Reply at 12–13. 

On the record before us, Kalshi’s Congressional Control 

Contracts would be materially different in multiple ways. To 

start, Kalshi’s contracts would be the first election-event 

contracts offered on a licensed commodities exchange, subject 

to the regulatory supervision of the Commission. In addition, 

while Kalshi says it would allow only United States persons to 

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invest, the Commission worries that the contracts could be used 

by foreign persons or governments directly or indirectly to 

manipulate the election-contract market. Commission Mot. at 

21; Kalshi Opp. at 21. Lastly, while PredictIt and Iowa 

Electronic Markets limit both the number of investors and the 

amount they can spend, Kalshi places no cap on the number of 

investors and would allow individuals and entities to invest, in 

some cases, up to $100 million per contract. J.A. 33–35.

On June 23, 2023, the Commission commenced a 90-day 

review of the Congressional Control Contracts and requested 

that Kalshi suspend trading on the contracts during that period. 

J.A. 145. That same day, the Commission opened a 30-day 

public comment period on the proposed contracts. J.A. 146–

149. On September 22, 2023, the Commission issued a final 

order prohibiting Kalshi from listing the contracts. J.A. 23.

The Commission grounded its decision on four findings. 

First, it determined that, by using the word “involve” in the

Special Rule, Congress intended to capture both contracts 

whose underlying event is one of the enumerated categories 

(i.e., terrorism, assassination, or war) and contracts with a 

“different connection” to the enumerated activities “because, 

for example, they ‘relate closely’ to, ‘entail,’ or ‘have as an 

essential feature or consequence’ one of the enumerated 

activities.” J.A. 7. Second, the Commission determined the 

Congressional Control Contracts involved “gaming,” within 

the meaning of the Special Rule, because that term “includes 

betting or wagering on elections[.]” J.A. 8. Third, the 

Commission found the contracts were unlawful under state law 

because many States prohibit betting or wagering on elections. 

J.A. 11–12. Finally, the Commission determined the contracts 

were not in the public interest for two reasons. One, they were 

unlikely to be used for commercial-risk “hedging” or “price 

basing”—the “public interest[s] that transactions subject to the 

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C[ommodity] E[xchange] A[ct] are intended to serve.” J.A. 14. 

Two, the contracts could threaten election integrity by, for 

example, creating monetary incentives for voters to support 

particular candidates or incentivizing the spread of 

misinformation. J.A. 20.

C

In November 2023, Kalshi filed suit in federal court 

challenging the Commission’s final order as arbitrary and 

capricious, contrary to law, and in excess of the Commission’s 

authority under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A), (C). See KalshiEx, 2024 WL 4164694, at *6. 

Kalshi objected to the Commission’s reading of the words 

“involve,” “gaming,” and “activity that is unlawful under any 

* * * State law” in the Special Rule and alleged that the 

Commission’s public interest determination was unreasonable. 

Kalshi Complaint ¶¶ 88–91. 

The district court subsequently granted Kalshi’s motion 

for summary judgment. KalshiEx, 2024 WL 4164694, at *13. 

The court reasoned that, within the meaning of the Special 

Rule, “gaming” must refer to the “act of playing a game” or 

“playing games for stakes.” Id. at *8, 10. Because elections 

are not games, the court concluded that the category does not 

apply to election contracts. Id. at *8–10. The district court also 

ruled that the term “involve” refers to the “event being offered 

and traded” under a contract, not the contract itself. Id. at *13. 

Thus, because the underlying events in the Congressional 

Control Contracts—“elections, politics, Congress, and party 

control”—are not themselves unlawful under state law, the 

contracts did not “involve” “illegal or unlawful activity.” Id.

The district court entered a brief administrative stay, and 

then denied the Commission’s motion for a stay pending appeal 

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on September 12, 2024. The Commission promptly appealed 

to this court. That same day, Kalshi listed its Congressional 

Control Contracts, and they traded for approximately eight 

hours, Kalshi Opp. at 8, until this court granted an 

administrative stay to consider the Commission’s motion for a 

stay pending appeal. 

II

A stay pending appeal is an “extraordinary” remedy. 

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election 

Comm’n, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 

To obtain such exceptional relief, the stay applicant must (1) 

make a “strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the 

merits”; (2) demonstrate that it will be “irreparably injured”

before the appeal concludes; (3) show that issuing a stay will 

not “substantially injure the other parties interested in the 

proceeding”; and (4) establish that “the public interest” favors 

a stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting 

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).

III

While the question on the merits is close and difficult, the 

Commission cannot obtain a stay at this time because it has not 

demonstrated that it or the public will be irreparably harmed 

while its appeal is heard. That failure is fatal to the 

Commission’s stay request because a showing of irreparable 

harm is a necessary prerequisite for a stay. See Wisconsin Gas 

Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“We believe 

that analysis of the second factor disposes of the[] [stay] 

motions and, therefore, address only whether the petitioners 

have demonstrated that in the absence of a stay, they will suffer 

irreparable harm.”); cf. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. 

England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“A movant’s 

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failure to show any irreparable harm is [] grounds for refusing 

to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors 

entering the calculus merit such relief.”). 

The Commission broadly claims that irreparable harm will 

occur because Congressional Control Contracts “could 

potentially be used in ways that would have an adverse effect 

on the integrity of elections, or the perception of integrity of 

elections[.]” J.A. 20; see also Commission Mot. at 19. The 

Commission marshals five more specific harms it anticipates, 

but none amounts to irreparable injury at this time. Several are 

not cognizable harms. The other concerns, if realized, certainly 

could hurt the public interest. But the Commission has failed 

to demonstrate that those harms are likely to occur. That falls 

short of the mark because “[i]rreparable harm must be ‘both 

certain and great[,]’ and ‘actual and not theoretical.’” Citizens 

for Resp. & Ethics in Washington, 904 F.3d at 1019 (quoting 

Wisconsin Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674).

First, according to the Commission, Congressional 

Control Contracts would “create monetary incentives to vote 

(including as an organized collective) for particular 

candidates,” Commission Mot. at 19, “even when such votes 

may be contrary to a voter’s * * * preferences[,]” J.A. 20. 

Paying someone to vote is, of course, illegal. See, e.g., 18 

U.S.C. § 597. But the Commission’s concern is different—it 

worries that voters might develop a financial motivation to 

vote. Yet voters already commonly consider their own 

financial interests when voting, whether based on business 

interests or family economics. The Commission has made no 

showing that allowing voters to hedge against an electoral 

outcome that they believe would be contrary to their financial 

interests would have any untoward impact on voting decisions. 

Nor has the Commission explained why it lacks such evidence, 

even though unregistered markets like Iowa Electronic 

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Markets, PredictIt, and Polymarket have allowed individuals to 

place money on election outcomes for decades.

Second, the Commission claims that markets for 

Congressional Control Contracts could “incentivize the spread 

of misinformation by individuals or groups seeking to 

influence perceptions of a political party or a party candidate’s 

success.” J.A. 20. In particular, the Commission points to the 

phenomenon of “fake poll[s].” Commission Reply at 10. The 

Commission then offers a single example: In July 2017, the 

firm Delphi Analytica created an apparently fake poll that

showed the musician Kid Rock leading Senator Debbie 

Stabenow 30 percent to 26 percent in the November 2018 U.S. 

Senate election in Michigan. Id.; see also Tyler Yeargain, Fake 

Polls, Real Consequences: The Rise of Fake Polls and the 

Case for Criminal Liability, 85 MO. L. REV. 129, 133 (2020). 

The day the poll issued, Senator Stabenow’s “stock” price on 

PredictIt dropped from 78 cents to 63 cents, and ended at 70 

cents. Yeargain, supra, at 133–134. This, the Commission 

claims, shows that “market manipulation” is “not mere 

speculation[.]” Commission Reply at 10. 

But that example does not hold up to scrutiny. For starters, 

“falsified polling is nothing new.” Yeargain, supra, at 140. In 

2009 and 2010, companies released what experts considered to 

be fraudulent polls, but neither the article nor the Commission 

suggests those companies did so to manipulate election-betting

markets. Id. Furthermore, “the long-term effect of the 

Michigan poll was virtually undetectable” because Kid Rock 

opted not to run and Senator Stabenow won reelection. Id. at 

134. Perhaps the Commission will amass more evidence 

substantiating its fears about election outcomes, but, on the 

evidence provided to this court, those fears—as yet—“fail to 

rise beyond the speculative level.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics 

in Washington, 904 F.3d at 1019; see also Committee in 

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Solidarity With People of El Salvador v. Sessions, 929 F.2d 

742, 745–46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Injunctions * * * will not issue 

to prevent injuries neither extant nor presently threatened, but 

only merely feared.”) (formatting modified).

In that regard, if the Commission felt the risks of election 

contracts were as concrete and pressing as it argues here, it has 

long had—and still has—the power to forbid them on the 

exchanges it regulates. Specifically, the Special Rule 

empowers the Commission to find through a formal rule or 

notice-and-comment rulemaking that certain types of event 

contracts—such as election contracts—are “contrary to the 

public interest” and to forbid them. 7 U.S.C. § 7a2(c)(5)(C)(i)(VI).2 Yet in the seven years since the fake Kid 

Rock poll was used, the Commission has not invoked the very 

tool Congress gave it to head off such harms. 

Third, and relatedly, the Commission claims that the 

absence of reliable benchmarks for election-contract markets 

“may increase the risk of manipulative [market] activity.” J.A.

21. According to the Commission, the “vast majority of 

commodities underlying Commission-regulated derivatives 

contracts” have reliable informational sources—for example, 

“government issued crop forecasts, weather forecasts, federal 

government economic data * * * [and] market-based interest 

rate curves[.]” J.A. 21. By contrast, the Commission argues, 

“unregulated” and “opaque” information sources like polls and 

voter surveys will supply the relevant information sources for

Congressional Control Contracts. J.A. 21. The lack of reliable 

forecasts, the Commission claims, may make election-contract 

markets more susceptible to bad actors’ manipulation with fake 

2

 “[T]he Commission may determine * * * by rule or regulation” 

that activities “similar” to the other listed categories are “contrary to 

the public interest.” 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)(VI).

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polls or misinformation, while simultaneously decreasing the 

Commission’s ability to detect such manipulation. J.A. 21. 

The Commission does not spell out this conclusion, but its 

theory seems to be that, while profit may be the primary goal

of these election-contract purchasers, a byproduct will be 

misinformation about the upcoming elections. The 

Commission might be right. But Kalshi insists just the 

opposite. According to Kalshi, election-contract markets

provide “real-time and accurate data that traditional polls often 

cannot replicate.” Kalshi Opp. at 4; see also J.A. 233 

(“[I]nformational models that require contributors to have ‘skin 

in the game’ when opining or contributing to public discussion 

[are] a great way to disincentivize the propagation of 

misinformation.”). Whatever the case, “simply showing some 

‘possibility of irreparable injury’”—that it “may” occur, J.A. 

21—is not enough. Nken, 556 U.S at 434 (citation omitted).

More to the point, the Commission has not explained why 

traditional tools for regulating market manipulation will not 

work in the election-contract context. For example, the 

Commission can serve subpoenas, call witnesses, and hold 

hearings to investigate whether someone is manipulating an 

event contract. 7 U.S.C. § 9. And manipulating or attempting 

to manipulate the price of a commodity is a felony under 

federal law. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a). In addition, the Commission

does not point to any pattern of unregulated market 

manipulation in the existing markets for election contracts. 

Plus Kalshi has introduced evidence that other political 

topics—such as the prospect of particular legislation passing or 

the federal government shutting down—have been the subject 

of event contracts on licensed exchanges. J.A. 245. Those 

events also lack established benchmarks for predictions, and 

yet the Commission has not shown they have proven more 

susceptible to market abuse. 

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Fourth, on the Commission’s telling, individuals might

trade in Congressional Control Contracts or engage in activity 

that influences the election-contract market to “create the 

impression of likely electoral success or failure” for certain 

candidates. J.A. 22. The Commission hypothesizes several 

such examples. One, paid employees of political campaigns or 

polling organizations, though prohibited from trading in 

Congressional Control Contracts, may engage in outside 

“activity” intended to “artificially move” those markets. J.A.

22. Two, foreign investors may bypass Kalshi’s restrictions on 

foreign investment and use Congressional Control Contracts to 

influence elections. Commission Mot. at 21. Three, 

individuals or entities not excluded from trading—such as

congressional campaign volunteers, consultants, or donors—

might buy and sell contracts to change the perception of 

candidates’ likelihood of success. J.A. 22. In addition, the 

Commission points to comment letters it received during its 

review of Kalshi’s contract, including letters submitted by a 

number of U.S. Senators, that oppose the trading of electioncontracts on regulated exchanges. See J.A. 681–683. 

Ensuring the integrity of elections and avoiding improper 

interference and misinformation are undoubtedly paramount 

public interests, and a substantiated risk of distorting the 

electoral process would amount to irreparable harm. The 

problem is that the Commission has given this court no 

concrete basis to conclude that event contracts would likely be 

a vehicle for such harms. The Commission cites to only one 

example where a trader on an unregulated (and nowsuspended) exchange placed large bids on Mitt Romney to win

the 2012 presidential election. Commission Reply at 10. It is 

“conceivable” the trader did so to “manipulate beliefs about the 

odds of victory in an attempt to influence fundraising, 

campaign morale, voter preferences, and turnout.” David M. 

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Rothschild et al., Trading Strategies and Market 

Microstructure: Evidence from a Prediction Market, THE 

JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS, Nov. 22, 2015, at 22. But 

the trader fell short because the attempted manipulation was 

easily detected by market investors. Id. at 23. And the 

Commission’s speculation about that trader’s “conceivable” 

motivations is, at bottom, an “unsubstantiated and speculative”

theory. Wisconsin Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674. Notably, the 

Commission offers no other evidence that such market 

machinations have happened over the last 36 years in which 

unregulated markets have offered election contracts. 

Finally, the Commission claims that, as the “regulator of 

the markets in [Congressional Control] [C]ontracts, [it] would 

be required to investigate suspected manipulation in those 

markets”—a job it is ill-suited to perform and that 

“misalign[s]” with its “historic mission and mandate[.]” J.A.

22–23. Though the Commission would be authorized to 

investigate suspected manipulation, it could also draw on the 

expertise of other federal agencies or refer suspected violations 

to those agencies. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission, 

Enforcing Federal Campaign Finance Law (“[O]ther 

government agencies [may] refer possible violations to the 

FEC.”), https://perma.cc/K8NJ-TNPF. In any event, the 

Commission’s generalized worries about investigative 

challenges, without more, do not amount to irreparable harm. 

* * * * * 

In short, the concerns voiced by the Commission are 

understandable given the uncertain effects that Congressional 

Control Contracts will have on our elections, which are the 

very linchpin of our democracy. But whether the statutory text 

allows the Commission to bar such event contractsis debatable, 

and the Commission has not substantiated that risks to election 

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integrity are likely to materialize if Kalshi is allowed to operate 

its exchange during the pendency of this appeal. At this point, 

in other words, the Commission has failed to make the essential 

showing of irreparable harm. 

But such a showing is not out of reach. For example, 

political campaigns or their proxies encouraging supporters to 

purchase Congressional Control Contracts could constitute

evidence that the contracts harm election integrity or that 

manipulation is underway. Foreign investors bypassing

Kalshi’s restrictions on foreign traders, just as Kalshi claims 

U.S. investors are doing on Polymarket, could substantiate the 

Commission’s concerns about harmful interference. See

Kalshi Opp. at 20. Or evidence emerging that election-contract 

markets confuse American voters about the strength or viability 

of certain candidates might also satisfy the Commission’s 

burden. Other evidence of harms could also emerge. Because

the Commission may (or may not) identify cognizable harms

going forward, this ruling is without prejudice to the 

Commission’s renewal of its stay request during the pendency 

of this appeal.

IV

The Commission has failed to demonstrate that it or the 

public will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay pending 

appeal, and therefore its motion for a stay is denied without 

prejudice to renewal should substantiating evidence arise. The 

administrative stay is hereby dissolved.

So ordered.

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