Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01264/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01264-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP SANDERS. CASE NO. CV F 06-1264 OWW LJO

Plaintiff, ORDER TO DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND

vs.

FRESNO CITY POLICE DEPT., 

Defendant.

 /

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Phillip Sanders (“plaintiff”) proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this apparent

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983"). On September 14, 2006, plaintiff filed his complaint

against the Fresno City Police Dept. (“defendant”) apparently to take issue with his arrests and to claim

that “police just came and arrested me, when Iwas doing nothing at all.” The complaint makes reference

to “false arrest, harrassment and intentional tort.”

DISCUSSION

Standards For Screening

“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal

may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service,

Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9 Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9 Cir. 1981). Sua th th

sponte dismissal may be made before process is served on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

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319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy,

745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9 Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte th

prior to service of process on defendants). 

Since plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, this Court, notwithstanding any filing fee that may

have been paid, shall dismiss a case at any time iftheCourt determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 2 Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide:

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2006) Attacking the Pleadings, para. 9:226.1, pp. 9-69. A court

need not accept as true factual allegations in in forma pauperis complaints and may reject “completely

baseless” allegations, including those which are “fanciful,” “fantastic” or “delusional.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-1228 (9 Cir. 1984). A th

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a fanciful factual allegation. Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 324. A federal court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

The test for maliciousness is a subjective one and requires the court to “determine the . . . good

faith of the applicant.” Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v.

Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968, n. 1 (11 Cir. 1986). A lack of good faith is found most commonly in th

repetitive suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity

of suits. A complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or abuse the judicial process

by relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981);

Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10 Cir. 1981); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F.Supp. 627, 628-629 th

(N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7 Cir. 1986) (court has inherent power to

th

dismiss case demonstrating “clear pattern of abuse of judicial process”). A lack of good faith or malice

also can be inferred from a complaint containing untrue material allegations of fact or false statements

made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

A complaint, or portion thereof, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond

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doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. th

1981). “[W]hen a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). th

The complaint reflects pleading deficiencies to prevent plaintiff from offering evidence to

support claims raised in the complaint.

Pleading Deficiencies

F.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes general pleading rules and provides in pertinent part:

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall

contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction

depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds

of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader

seeks.

. . .

(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 

(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct.

A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The

underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the “grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957); Yamaguchi v.

United States Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Although a complaint need

th

not outline all elements of a claim, “[i]t must be possible . . . for an inference to be drawn that these

elements exist.” Walker v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis th

v. ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-406 (6 Cir. 1998). Despite the flexible pleading th

policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. th

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1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts which defendant

engaged in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. 

F.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires a short plain statement of plaintiff’s claim. The complaint does not

adequately identify grounds for relief against defendant to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint

merely alleges a wrong has been committed and demands relief. The complaint fails to provide

defendant fair notice and to state elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. Pleading deficiencies

prevent this Court from proceeding on plaintiff’s complaint. Nonetheless, this Court grants plaintiff an

opportunity to attempt to cure the complaint’s deficiencies.

Section 1983 Deficiencies

Plaintiff presumably seeks to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983") which provides:

Every person who, under the color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) defendant acted under color of state

law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendant deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. 1986). The complaint fails to state colorable claims (or any claims th

for that matter) by plaintiff against defendant. The complaint fails to allege that a defendant acted under

color of state law. The complaint points to no constitutional right of which defendants deprived

plaintiff.

Moreover, section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of defendant and deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[a]

person ‘subjects’ another to deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983,

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). The complaint fails to satisfy the linking requirement as to defendant th

and to articulate how defendant deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights and resulting harm. 

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Deficiencies In Monell Claims

The complaint names the Fresno City Police Department as a defendant but asserts no claims

against it. This Court advices plaintiff that a local government unit may not be held liable for the acts

of its employees under a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Davis v.

Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct. 275 (1991); th

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). Because liability of a local th

governmental unit must rest on its actions, not the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must go beyond

the respondeat superior theory and demonstrate the alleged constitutional violation was the product of

a policy or custom of the local governmental unit. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385,

109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).

A “rule or regulation promulgated, adopted, or ratified by a local governmental entity’s

legislative body unquestionably satisfies Monell’s policy requirements.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443.

Official policy may derive from “a decision properly made by a local governmental entity’s authorized

decisionmaker – i.e., an official who ‘possesses final authority to establish [local government] policy

with respect to the [challenged] action.’” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at

481, 106 S.Ct. at 1299 (plurality opinion)). “Only if a plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from a

‘permanent and well-settled’ practice may liability attach for injury resulting from a local government

custom.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444.

“[O]fficial policy must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish

the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct.

445 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018); see Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-377, 96 S.Ct.

598 (general allegation of administrative negligence fails to state a constitutional claim cognizable under

section 1983).

The complaint lacks allegations of a policy or custom and resulting constitutional violation to

set forth a Monell claim and to further warrant dismissal of the complaint.

Malice

This Court is concerned that plaintiff has brought this action in absence of good faith and

attempts to take advantage of cost-free filing to vex defendant. Attachments to the complaint suggest

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that plaintiff has addressed unsuccessfully his concerns by other means. Such attempt to vex provides

further grounds to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint.

Attempt At Amendment

Plaintiff is admonished that this Court’s Local Rule 15-220 requires an amended complaint to

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. 1967). After the filing th

of an amended complaint, the original pleadings serves no further function. Thus, in an amended

complaint, each claim and involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint, filed September 14, 2006, with leave to amend; and

2. ORDERS plaintiff, no later than October 10, 2006, to file an amended complaint in

compliance with this order.

This Court admonishes plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint in compliance

with this order will result in recommendation to dismiss this action for failure to obey a court

order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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