Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56310/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56310-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARGALIT CORBER; RENE CARO;

STEVE DANTZLER; LINDA SOWARDS;

LORI HUISMAN; JOHNNY GEORGE,

SR.; TERRY PERRY; WILLIAM

RACKLEY; ANGELA YOUNG; PAMELA

RODRIGUEZ; STEVEN SYVERSON;

OLGA CAICOYA; JANET CARROLL;

ROSE CASH; ULAD CELENTANO;

VIRGINIA COSTANZO; KIMBERLY

FILLIGIM; ARMELDIA SMITH; CARLA

WEST; JOANNE BIERZYNSKI,

individually and as next of kin to

Eleanor Wojcik; SHARLEY MORRIS;

WYOMIA TIMMONS; DEAN

REINKING; DANIEL THORNE;

WENDELEN ASHBY; CARMEN

BEDFORD; CLAUDE COMMODORE;

JAMES HENSON; NANCY LOCKE;

MILDRED SCOTT; BILLIE BURNETT;

SHEENA HALL; BRENDA ROBERGE,

individually and as next of kin to

Ernest Roberge; DEBORAH

WOODSUM; RICHARD PASCUITO,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-56306

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-09986-

PSG-E

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2 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

JUDITH ROMO; VINCENT TALDONE;

ROBIN TAYLER; MARGARET

TAYLOR; RANDY TAYLOR; RAY

TEETS; LAWRENCE TELLS; KATHRYN

TEMCHACK; CHARLES TERRY;

VERONICA TERRY; ROBERTA

THORNE; MARGARET TIVIS; LINDA

TODD; DELORES TOOHEY; DEBRA

TOURVILLE; DENA TSOUALS; ALLEN

TURNER; CAROLYN TURNER;

WANDA TURNER; STARLET TYRONE;

GLORIA UNDERWOOD; HENRY

UNDERWOOD; JANICE VANISON;

WILLIAM VERHEYEN; CHARLES

VILDIBILL; SHARON WALLGREN;

PAM WALSH; SHARON WALSH;

KEESHA WARRIOR; LATANGA

WASHINGTON; DARLENE WATT;

JAMES WEISS; WESLEY WELBORNE,

III; DEBRA WHEELER; MARSHA

WHITT; CAROLYN WHYNO; CECILIA

WILCKENS; SANDRA WILEMON;

STELLA WILKERSON-CLARK; JOANN

WILLIAMS; JOYCE WILLIAMS; ROSE

WILLIAMS; SHANTAS WILLIAMS;

MARY WILSON; ROSE WILSON;

PATSY WINZEY; JIMMIE WISE; RUTH

WOLFSON; JUANITA WOODSON;

LYNNE WYSOCKY, single

individuals,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

No. 13-56310

D.C. No.

5:12-cv-02036-

PSG-E

OPINION

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 3

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

June 19, 2014—Seattle, Washington

Filed November 18, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, and Barry G.

Silverman, Susan P. Graber, Ronald M. Gould, Marsha S.

Berzon, Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Richard R. Clifton, Mary H. Murguia, Morgan Christen,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

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4 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

SUMMARY*

Class Action Fairness Act

The en banc court reversed the district court’s orders

granting motions to remand to state court based on the en

banc court’s conclusion that all of the Class Action Fairness

Act requirements for a removable mass action were met

under the totality of the circumstances.

The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) extends federal

removal jurisdiction for certain class actions and for mass

actions in which “monetary relief claims of 100 or more

persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the

plaintiffs’ claims involve common laws of law or fact.” 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 

These cases were two of twenty-six pending before the

district court alleging injuries related to the ingestion of

proxoxyphene, an ingredient found in pain reliever drugs. 

The plaintiffs moved for coordination in the state trial court

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 404. 

The en banc court held that plaintiffs’ petitions to

coordinate actions under Section 404 constituted proposals

for these actions to be tried jointly, making the actions a

“mass action” subject to removal and federal jurisdiction

under CAFA.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 5

Judge Rawlinson, joined by Judge Berzon, dissented

because she would not conclude that the plaintiffs implicitly

requested a joint trial, and she would not find that the cases

fit within the parameters for removal under CAFA.

COUNSEL

Jay Lefkowitz (argued), Daniel A. Bress, and Danielle R.

Sassoon, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, New York;

Ginger Pigott, Amy B. Alderfer, and Karin L. Bohmholdt,

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Los Angeles, California; Lori G.

Cohen & Victoria D. Lockard, Greenberg Traurig, LLP,

Atlanta, Georgia; Elliot H. Scherker, Greenberg Traurig, PA,

Miami, Florida, for Defendant-Appellant Teva

Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc.

Karin Bohmholdt (argued), Greenberg & Traurig LLP, Los

Angeles, California; Karen Woodward, Hall R. Marston, and

Christopher P. Norton, Sedgwick LLP, Los Angeles,

California; Linda E. Maichl, Michael J. Suffern (argued),

Ulmer & Berne LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for DefendantAppellant Xanodyne Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Louis M. Bograd (argued) & Andre M. Mura, Center for

Constitutional Litigation, Washington, D.C.; Matthew J. Sill,

Sill Law Group LLP, Edmond, Oklahoma; Andrew N. Chang

and Stuart B. Esner (argued), Esner, Chang & Boyer,

Pasadena,California; Elise R. Sanguinetti, Khorrami Boucher

Sumner LLP, Oakland, California; James P. Sizemore, The

Sizemore Law Firm, El Segundo, California, for PlaintiffsAppellees Romo, Corber, et al.

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6 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

Jeremy B. Rosen, Horvitz & Levy LLP, Encino, California,

for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States

of America and PhRMA.

Richard Abbott Samp, Washington Legal Foundation,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal

Foundation.

David M. Arbogast, ARBOGAST LAW, A.P.C., Los

Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae American

Association for Justice.

John Beisner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Product Liability

Advisory Council. 

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 7

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether removal is proper under the

“mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act of

2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), when

plaintiffs in several actions1 moved for coordination in the

state trial court pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure section 404 “for all purposes” and justified their

request in part by asserting a need to avoid inconsistent

judgments. CAFA extends federal removal jurisdiction for

certain class actions and for mass actions in which “monetary

relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried

jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve

common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). Because we conclude that all of the

CAFA requirements for a removable mass action are met

under the totality of the circumstances in these cases, we

reverse the district court’s remand orders.

I

Defendants-Appellants Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

(“Teva”) and Xanodyne Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Xanodyne”)

appeal from the district court’s orders remanding these cases

to state court. These cases were two of twenty-six pending

before the district court alleging injuries related to the

ingestion of propoxyphene, an ingredient found in the

Darvocet and Darvon pain relief drugs, as well as in generic

pain relievers. There are additional propoxyphene cases

1 Each of these actions has fewer than 100 plaintiffs, but the actions have

far more than 100 plaintiffs when considered together.

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8 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

pending in multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of

Kentucky. See In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene

Prods. Liab. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2011).

Propoxyphene is a pain reliever that was used in the

United States to treat mild to moderate pain from 1957

through November 2010, when drugs containing

propoxyphene were taken off the market because of safety

concerns. Teva held the rights to the generic form of

Darvocet and Darvon, and Plaintiffs allege that Teva was

involved in all aspects of the creation, distribution, and sale

of generic propoxyphene products. Xanodyne acquired the

rights to Darvocet and Darvon in 2007.

To date, more than forty actions have been filed in

California state courts regardingpropoxyphene pain relievers. 

On October 23, 2012, a group of attorneys responsible for

many of the propoxyphene actions against Teva, Xanodyne,

and other defendants filed petitions asking the California

Judicial Council to establish a coordinated proceeding for all

California propoxyphene actions under section 404 of the

California Code of Civil Procedure.2 California Code of Civil

2 Under section 404, petitions for coordination are handled by the

Chairperson of the Judicial Council, who “may assign a judge to

determine whether the actions are complex, and if so, whether

coordination of the actions is appropriate.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 404. 

The extent of coordination and the purposes for which cases are

coordinated,including pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings, arewithin

the sole discretion ofthe Judicial Council and any judge assigned pursuant

to section 404. See id. §§ 404.1–.9; Abelson v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

of Pittsburgh, PA., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 18 (Ct. App. 1994) (“As a general

matter the rules implementing our coordination statutes vest the

coordinating judge with flexible procedures and whatever great breadth of

discretion may be necessary and appropriate . . . .” (internal quotation

marks and footnote omitted)).

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 9

Procedure section 404.1, which sets out the standards for

coordination, states:

Coordination of civil actions sharing a

common question of fact or law is appropriate

if one judge hearing all of the actions for all

purposes in a selected site or sites will

promote the ends of justice taking into

account whether the common question of fact

or law is predominating and significant to the

litigation; the convenience of parties,

witnesses, and counsel; the relative

development of the actions and the work

product of counsel; the efficient utilization of

judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar

of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative

and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments;

and, the likelihood of settlement of the actions

without further litigation should coordination

be denied.

Plaintiffs asked for coordination of their lawsuits for

reasons consistent with the above factors, including concerns

that there could be potential “duplicate and inconsistent

rulings, orders, or judgments,” and that without coordination,

“two or more separate courts . . . may render different rulings

on liability and other issues.” Plaintiffs argued in their

petitions and the supporting memoranda that the cases should

be coordinated before one judge “hearing all of the actions for

all purposes,” to address “the same or substantially similar”

causes of action, issues of law, and issues of material fact. 

After these petitions for coordination were filed, Teva and

Xanodyne removed the cases to federal district court under

CAFA’s mass action provision.

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10 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

CAFA provides federal district courts with original

jurisdiction over “mass actions” if the actions meet all of the

statutory requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). CAFA defines

a mass action as:

[A]ny civil action . . . in which monetary

relief claims of 100 or more persons are

proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that

the plaintiffs’ claims involve common

questions of law or fact, except that

jurisdiction shall exist only over those

plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action

satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements

under subsection (a).

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The parties dispute only

whether Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination constitute

proposals for the cases “to be tried jointly” under CAFA.

The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under

CAFA because Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination were not

proposals to try the cases jointly, and it remanded the cases

back to state court. The district court distinguished these

cases from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Abbott

Laboratories, Inc., 698 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2012), and held

that Plaintiffs’ petitions were sufficiently different from

Abbott’s consolidation request because the petitions filed in

this case focused on pre-trial purposes, while the petition

filed in Abbott explicitly sought consolidation “through trial.”

Defendants sought permission to appeal the district

court’s remand orders, which we granted. A three-judge

panel affirmed. See Romo v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,

731 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2872

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 11

(2014). A majority of nonrecused judges voted to rehear the

case en banc. 742 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2014) (order). We

review the district court’s remand order de novo. See Abrego

Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006)

(per curiam).

II

The controlling issue before us is whether Plaintiffs’

petitions to coordinate actions under California Code of Civil

Procedure section 404 constitute proposals for these actions

to be tried jointly, making the actions a “mass action” subject

to federal jurisdiction under CAFA. To answer that question,

we turn to the language and purpose of CAFA. Mississippi

ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 741–44

(2014). The statutory issue for us is whether the petitions

filed in this case, seeking coordination of the California

propoxyphene actions, were in legal effect proposals for those

actions to be tried jointly. This is a question of first

impression in the Ninth Circuit.

Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to “curb perceived

abuses of the class action device which, in the view of

CAFA’s proponents, had often been used to litigate multistate or even national class actions in state courts.” Tanoh v.

Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009). CAFA

further extends federal jurisdiction over “mass action” cases

when several requirements are met, although only the

“proposed to be tried jointly” requirement is at issue here. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6), (11)(A).

We have said that CAFA’s mass action provision is

“fairly narrow,” Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953, given that it applies

only if there is an aggregate amount in controversy of $5

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12 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

million or more, at least one plaintiff who is a citizen of a

state or foreign state different from that of any defendant, and

when “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are

proposed to be tried jointly,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i);

see Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 952–53. Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co.

holds, consistent with the plain language of CAFA, that the

proposal to try claims jointly must come from the plaintiffs,

not from the defendants. 561 F.3d at 953. Further, Tanoh

correctly holds that if the mass action provision’s

requirements are not met, we cannot ignore its terms based on

general statements in CAFA’s legislative history or the theory

that plaintiffs should not be able to “game” jurisdictional

statutes to remain in state court. Id. at 954.

Tanoh also holds that plaintiffs are the “masters of their

complaint” and do not propose a joint trial simply by

structuring their complaints so as to avoid the 100-plaintiff

threshold. Id. at 953, 956; see Parson v. Johnson & Johnson,

749 F.3d 879, 886 (10th Cir. 2014); Scimone v. Carnival

Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2013); Anderson v.

Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 2010). Under this

view, plaintiffs can structure actions in cases involving more

than 100 potential claimants so as to avoid federal jurisdiction

under CAFA. That is not surprising, and it is analogous to

the fact that individuals and corporations can structure

transactions so as to avoid statutory prohibitions or terms. 

Amici Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America and PhRMA urge us to conclude that the Supreme

Court’s decision in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,

133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), fatally “undermines Tanoh’s

reasoning and holding.” We reject this interpretation of

Knowles, which itself reiterates that plaintiffs are the “masters

of their complaints” who may structure those complaints to

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 13

avoid federal jurisdiction in some circumstances. See id. at

1350.3

But while plaintiffs are the masters of their complaints,

they are also the masters of their petitions for coordination. 

Stated another way, when we assess whether there has been

a proposal for joint trial, we hold plaintiffs responsible for

what they have said and done. California Code of Civil

Procedure section 404 allows the coordination of “all of the

actions for all purposes” and presents a factor-based test to

determine whether coordination is appropriate. Plaintiffs

voluntarily asked for coordination under section 404, and

they submitted memoranda in support of their petitions for

coordination. We will carefully assess the language of the

petitions for coordination to see whether, in language or

substance, they proposed a joint trial.

We conclude that Plaintiffs’ petitions for coordination are

proposals for joint trial. First, the petitions say that Plaintiffs

seek coordination “for all purposes.” “All purposes” must

3

In Knowles, the Supreme Court rejected a proposed class action

plaintiff’s attempt to stipulate that damages would not exceed $5 million. 

133 S. Ct. at 1350 (“[T]he stipulation at issue here can tie Knowles’

hands, but it does not resolve the amount-in-controversy question in light

of his inability to bind the rest of the class.”). It is possible to read

Knowles narrowly to mean only that named plaintiffs cannot stipulate to

limit the damages claims of unnamed class members prior to class

certification. Yet, the Court did limit in at least one way the strategies a

plaintiff may use to avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA when it

declined to “exalt form over substance” for “CAFA jurisdictional

purposes.” Id.

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14 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

include the purposes of trial. So reading the petitions

literally, Plaintiffs, who in total number far more than 100,

were seeking a joint trial. Second, the specific reasons given

for coordination also support the conclusion that a joint trial

was requested. For example, Plaintiffs listed potential issues

in support of their petitions that would be addressed only

through some form of joint trial, such as the danger of

inconsistent judgments and conflicting determinations of

liability.

Our conclusions here are consistent with Tanoh, where

we held that “the decision to try claims jointly and thus

qualify as a ‘mass action’ under CAFA should remain . . .

with plaintiffs.” 561 F.3d at 954. Unlike the plaintiffs in

Tanoh, who merely filed separate actions that the defendant

sought to try jointly, Plaintiffs’ filing of the petitions for

coordination was a voluntary and affirmative act that we

conclude was a proposal to try the cases jointly. See id. at

953–54.

Plaintiffs contend that they were simply reciting the

section 404.1 factors, but we find this argument unpersuasive

given the language of the petitions and the supporting

memoranda. Plaintiffs did not simply recite the factors for

coordination. They asserted that “[t]he inevitability of

realizing the inconsistency and duplication factor of

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 404.1[] weighs

heavily in favor of coordination.” Plaintiffs further asserted

that “issues pertaining to liability, allocation of fault and

contribution, as well as the same wrongful conduct of

defendants,” would require coordination. None of these

particular arguments is listed in the section 404 factors, and

achieving consistency in these areas would almost certainly

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 15

require a joint trial.4 Plaintiffs’ petitions requested more than

pre-trial coordination. Plaintiffs repeatedly stated that the

factors catalogued in section 404.1 all supported

coordination, including the fact that “[o]ne judge hearing all

of the actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will

promote the ends of justice.” In the application of a

jurisdictional rule, as well as in its establishment, we agree

with the Supreme Court’s observation that “simplicity is a

virtue.” Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 744 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Looking at the plain language of Plaintiffs’

petitions and memoranda, we must conclude that Plaintiffs

proposed a joint trial in asking that “all of the actions” be

coordinated “for all purposes.”

This is not to say that all petitions for coordination under

section 404 are per se proposals to try cases jointly for the

purposes of CAFA’s mass action provision.5 We can

envision a section 404 petition that expressly seeks to limit its

request for coordination to pre-trial matters, and therebyalign

with the mass action provision’s exception for “any civil

4 Although some of these purposes could theoretically be addressed

without a joint trial, through default judgment or summary judgment, it is

not realistic to think that all of the concerns listed in Plaintiffs’ petitions

for coordination could be achieved in pre-trial procedures. Those

concerns were joined with requests to coordinate the actions “for all

purposes.” The petitions did not limit their scope to pre-trial procedures.

5 Plaintiffs also argue that their petitions were not proposals to try the

cases jointly because section 404 petitionsfor coordination need notresult

in coordination for all purposes under McGhan MedicalCorp. v. Superior

Court, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264 (Ct. App. 1992). However, this argument is

misplaced because under the plain language of CAFA, we must determine

whether Plaintiffs proposed a joint trial, not whether one will occur at

some future date. That a judge has discretion to limit coordination to pretrial matters does not weigh on whether Plaintiffs proposed a joint trial.

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16 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

action in which . . . the claims have been consolidated or

coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV). It is not clear whether the

California Judicial Council would grant coordination for less

than “all purposes.” However, if Plaintiffs had qualified their

coordination request by saying that it was intended to be

solely for pre-trial purposes, then it would be difficult to

suggest that Plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial.6 But where,

as here, plaintiffs petition for coordination by arguing that

“hearing all of the actions” together “for all purposes” would

promote the ends of justice, they propose a joint trial,

triggering federal jurisdiction as a mass action under CAFA.

We reject the rule urged by Plaintiffs that a petition to

evoke CAFA must expressly request a “joint trial” in order to

be a proposal to try the cases jointly. Although such a rule

would be easy to administer, it would ignore the real

substance of Plaintiffs’ petitions. See Abbott, 698 F.3d at 572

(“[A] proposal for a joint trial can be implicit.”); see also

Atwell v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.

2013) (holding that proposals for joint trial may be made

implicitly); Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry., 535 F.3d

759, 762 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).

Two of our sister circuits have reached similar

conclusions when examining petitions for consolidation. In

Abbott, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs’

petition for consolidation “through trial” and “not solely for

pretrial proceedings” was a proposal to try jointly their

6 The parties have argued about whether invoking section 404 in and of

itself, even in a petition that expressly sought only pre-trial coordination,

would constitute a proposal to try cases jointly, but that issue is not now

before us.

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 17

separately filed cases. 698 F.3d at 573. The Seventh Circuit

concluded that, contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion that they

did not specifically ask for a joint trial, the language of the

plaintiffs’ petition for consolidation could be construed only

as an implicit proposal for joint trial. Id. Plaintiffs here seek

to distinguish their own “for all purposes” language from the

“through trial” language present in Abbott, but the differences

between the two phrasings are superficial, and we are not

persuaded.

The Eighth Circuit adopted Abbott’s reasoning,

concluding that plaintiffs proposed a joint trial when they

filed motions asking for special assignment “to a single judge

for both pretrial and trial matters,” and then argued at the

motions hearing that the special assignment made sense “for

consistencyof rulings, judicial economy,[and] administration

of justice.” Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1164 (alteration in original). 

The Eighth Circuit decided that “the motions for assignment

to a single judge . . ., combined with plaintiffs’ candid

explanation of their objectives, required denial of the motions

to remand” the cases to state court. Id. at 1166. Plaintiffs

further attempt to distinguish their own petitions for

coordination from Atwell on the basis that “[t]here is no such

explicit language in Plaintiffs’ petition,” but again we find

this distinction unpersuasive given the language of Plaintiffs’

memoranda in support of their petitions, which both sought

coordination “for all purposes” and gave reasons that likely

would be satisfied only by a joint trial of some sort.

Asking for coordination or consolidation “for all

purposes” or “through trial” to address common issues of law

or fact is a proposal to try the cases jointly and creates federal

jurisdiction under CAFA’s mass action provision. To hold

otherwise would ignore the plain language, as well as the

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18 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

substance, of Plaintiffs’ section 404 petitions and supporting

memoranda.

III

Because we conclude that Plaintiffs’ petitions for

coordination each constitute a proposal to try the cases

jointly, we REVERSE the district court’s orders granting

Plaintiffs’ motions to remand.7

REVERSED.8

7

In light of our decision, we do not reach Defendants-Appellants’

alternative argument that federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists on other

grounds.

8 We disagree with our dissenting colleague for the reasonsstated in this

opinion. First, the dissent relies on parts of plaintiffs’ memorandum

supporting the petition for coordination that urged benefits of coordinating

discovery, but nowhere in the petition or supporting memorandum was it

suggested that coordination would be solely for pre-trial discovery. 

Second, the dissent gives inadequate consideration to the fact that the

petition itself recites that it seeks coordination of all the actions “for all

purposes.” Because coordinating “for all purposes” includes for the

purposes of trial, the petition for a coordinating state court was implicitly

a request for joint trial. Third, the position urged by the dissent would

create conflict with decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, which

have recognized that there can be implicit requests for joint trial evoking

CAFA jurisdiction. Fourth, the principles of ambiguity not favoring

federal jurisdiction and of strict construction of jurisdictional statutes are

not offended here because there is nothing ambiguous about asking for

coordination “for all purposes.” Fifth, the district court cases cited by the

dissent in its footnote 1 are not persuasive to us, because these cases do

not interpret CAFA, do not involve a petition for consolidation or

coordination for all purposes, and do not address the persuasive authority

of Seventh and Eighth Circuits on such issues.

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 19

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge BERZON

joins, dissenting:

This is admittedly a fairly close case but, upon reflection,

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of my esteemed

colleagues that this case fits within the parameters for

removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005

(CAFA).

I start from the well-established premise that removal is

disfavored when determining federal jurisdiction, and that

any doubt that exists when considering removal statutes

should be construed against removal. See Tanoh v. Dow

Chemical Corp., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009); see also

State of Hawaii v. HSBC Bank Nev. N.A., No. 13-15611, —

F.3d —, 2014 WL 3765697 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2014). As we

also recognized in Tanoh, CAFA’s mass action provision is

“fairly narrow.” 561 F.3d at 953.

With those principles firmly in mind, I reach a different

conclusion than that of the majority. The plain language of

the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i),

confers jurisdiction upon federal district courts to try a “mass

action.” A mass action is defined as:

any civil action . . . in which monetary relief

claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to

be tried jointly on the ground that the

plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions

of law or fact . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

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20 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

The majority concludes that the Plaintiffs proposed their

cases “to be tried jointly” by filing a petition for coordination

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 404.1. That

section provides:

Coordination of civil actions sharing a

common question of fact or law is appropriate

if one judge hearing all of the actions for all

purposes in selected site or sites will promote

the ends of justice taking into account whether

the common question of fact or law is

predominating and significant to the litigation;

the convenience of parties, witnesses, and

counsel; the relative development of the

actions and the work product of counsel; the

efficient utilization of judicial facilities and

manpower; the calendar of the courts; the

disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent

rulings, orders, or judgments; and the

likelihood of settlement of the actions without

further litigation should coordination be

denied.

CCCP § 404.1.

The plaintiffs’ petition for coordination stopped short of

requesting a joint trial as contemplated by the plain language

of the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (defining a

mass action as one in which claims of 100 or more persons

“are proposed to be tried jointly”).

On page 6 of the Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in support of the petition, plaintiffs gave the following

explanation for seeking coordination:

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 21

Petitioners’ counsel anticipates that the

actions will . . . involve duplicative requests

for the same defendant witness depositions

and the same documents related to

development, manufacturing, testing,

marketing, and sale of the Darvocet Product. 

Absent coordination of these actions by a

single judge, there is a significant likelihood

of duplicative discovery, waste of judicial

resources and possible inconsistent judicial

rulings on legal issues.

(Emphases added).

It is a stretch to parse a proposal for a joint trial from this

language. Rather, the obvious focus was on pretrial

proceedings, i.e., discovery matters.

On page 7 of the memorandum, plaintiffs informed the

court that coordination was also sought because “[u]se of

committees and standardized discovery in a coordinated

setting will expedite resolutions of these cases, avoid

inconsistent results, and assist in alleviating onerous burdens

on the courts as well as the parties.” (Emphases added). 

Again, we see a focus on pretrial proceedings, with no

mention of a joint trial.

On page 8, the plaintiffs urged coordination on the

following bases:

One judge hearing all of the actions for all

purposes in a selected site or sites will

promote the ends of justice; Common

questions of fact or law are predominating and

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22 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

significant to the litigation; Coordination may

serve the convenience of parties, witnesses

and counsel the relative development of the

actions and the work product of counsel;

Coordination may facilitate the efficient

utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;

Coordination may enhance the orderly

calendar of the courts; Without coordination,

the parties may suffer from disadvantages

caused byduplicative and inconsistent rulings,

orders or judgments . . .

Plaintiffs also stated: “[I]n light of the similarity of the

actions, there will be duplicate discovery obligations upon the

common defendants unless coordination is ordered. 

Coordination before initiation of discovery in any of the cases

will eliminate waste of resources and will facilitate

economy. . . .” (Emphases added). Unlike the cases from the

Seventh and Eighth Circuits cited in the majority opinion, not

once does the Petition For Coordination mention “joint trial”

or even “trial.” Rather, the continued focus is on pretrial

matters.

The majority opinion isolates the phrases “duplicate and

inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments,” “two or more

separate courts . . . may render different rulings on liability

and other issues,” and “hearing all of the actions for all

purposes” to support its conclusion that the plaintiffs sought

a joint trial. Majority Opinion, p. 9. In doing so, the majority

completely ignores all references to discovery, including on

the same page containing the reference to liability, where

Plaintiffs stated: “[I]n light of the similarity of the actions,

there will be duplicate discovery obligations upon the

common defendants unless coordination is ordered. 

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 23

Coordination before initiation of discovery in any of the cases

will eliminate waste of resources and will facilitate

economy. . . .” (Emphases added). A fair reading of the

entire petition for coordination reflects a decided focus on

pretrial matters.

Reliance by the majority on the quoted portions of the

petition to the exclusion of all else is inconsistent with the

command that any doubt about federal jurisdiction be

resolved in favor of remand. This is especially true where

most of the quoted words have little to do with trial. I am not

persuaded that a reference to “rulings and orders” evokes the

concept of trial rather than pretrial matters. Indeed, the

opposite may be true:

An order is the mandate or determination of

the court upon some subsidiary or collateral

matter arising in an action, not disposing of

the merits, but adjudicating a preliminary

point or directing some step in the

proceedings.

Black’s Law Dictionary 1270 (10th ed. 2009) (citing 1 Henry

Campbell Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments, § 1, at

5 (2d ed. 1902)).

In turn “[r]ulings on motions are ordinarily orders . . .” 

Id. (citing 1 A.C. Freeman, A Treatise on the Law of

Judgments, § 19, at 28 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925)). 

Consequently, at best, Plaintiffs’ reference to rulings and

orders is ambiguous, and ambiguity defeats removal. See

Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953.

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24 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

The majority is also on shaky ground when relying on the

plaintiffs’ reference to inconsistent judgments, because

judgments may be rendered outside the confines of a trial. 

Default judgments and summary judgments come readily to

mind. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55 and 56

(providing for entry of judgment prior to trial). Indeed, it is

not at all uncommon for similar cases to be resolved short of

trial. See, e.g.,Navarrette v. Armite Labs. Inc., No. B203997,

2009 WL 1040304 at *1 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., April 20, 2009)

(“Plaintiffs filed a tort action against 78 manufacturers and

suppliers of products used for metal fabrication at a nowdefunct foundry, where plaintiffs once worked. Plaintiffs

allege that they were injured by their workplace exposure to

defendants’ products. The trial court dismissed the case after

sustaining demurrers to the plaintiffs’ fourth amended

complaint, without leave to amend.”). Judgment in favor of

defendants was affirmed; see also Baycol Cases I and II, No.

B20493, 2009 WL 3353536 at *3 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., Oct. 20,

2009) (“Several hundred cases involving Baycol, including a

number of class actions, which had been filed in California

were consolidated in a Judicial Council Coordinated

Proceeding (JCCP) in Los Angeles Superior Court. . . . 

During the next approximately two years many of the cases

in the JCCP were dismissed or resolved in [defendant’s]

favor on summary judgment. . . .”) (emphases added).

Plaintiffs’ reference to rulings on liability also fit readily

within the concept of resolving cases short of trial. See id.

(resolving cases in defendant’s favor on summary judgment). 

Unsurprisingly, the majority’s contrarynotion that a joint trial

is “almost certainly require[d]” to determine liability,

Majority Opinion, p. 14–15, is not supported by citation to

any California authority. The district court judges who

rendered decisions remanding these cases to state court are all

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 25

seasoned California practitioners, and not one of them

interpreted the Petition For Coordination as requesting a joint

trial. See Freitas v. McKesson, No. 12-5948 SC, 2013 WL

685200 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (declining to “[i]nfer[

] a request for a joint trial from Plaintiffs’ Petition, which

does not expressly request such a trial”); see also Rice v.

McKesson Corp., No. C12-05949 WHA, 2013 WL 97738 at

*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013) (rejecting the argument that

Plaintiffs “implicitly proposed a removable mass action in

their coordination petition by using the ambiguous language

‘for all purposes’ and ‘by raising the possibility of

inconsistent judgments’”); Rentz v. McKesson Corp., No. CV

12-9945 PSG, 2013 WL 645634 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20,

2013) (noting that the language in the petition for

coordination “focuses on coordination for pretrial purposes”

and “the complete lack of any mention of joint trial”); Posey

v. McKesson Corp., No. C 12-05939 RS, 2013 WL 361168 at

*3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that “[c]onstruing

plaintiffs’ petition for coordination as the functional

equivalent of an express request for a joint trial would

conflict with both the guidance provided by our court of

appeals in Tanoh, as well as with the general canon of strict

construction of removal statutes) (citation and alteration

omitted).

The cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuit relied

upon by the majority are easily distinguishable. In this case,

the Plaintiffs requested coordination of the cases “for all

purposes.” The majority reads that phrase as implicitly

requesting a joint trial, citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision

in In re Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 698 F.3d 568 (7th Cir.

2012). However, not only did the Seventh Circuit consider a

completely different procedure, consolidation as opposed to

coordination, see id., at 570, the plaintiffs’ request in that

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26 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

case explicitly and expressly referenced “consolidation of the

cases through trial and not solely for pretrial proceedings,”

thereby removing any question of the plaintiffs’ intent. Id. at

571 (footnote reference and internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphases added). In fact, there was really nothing implicit

about the Abbott plaintiffs’ request for a joint trial. Rather,

the request for a joint trial was open and notorious.

In a similar vein, the plaintiffs in Atwell v. Boston

Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160, 1161 (8th Cir. 2013)

requested that their cases be assigned “to a single judge for

purposes of discovery and trial . . .” (emphasis added); see

also Bullard v. Burlington Northern, 535 F.3d 759, 761–62

(7th Cir. 2008) (“A complaint identifying 144 plaintiffs . . .

implicitly proposes one trial. . . .”); Koral v. Boeing, 628 F.3d

945, 947 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Bullard, 535 F.3d at 762 for

the proposition that a proposal for a joint trial “can be

implicit, as where a single complaint joins more than 100

plaintiffs’ claims . . .”) (emphasis added). None of these

cases address the facts of this case, where there was not a

single Complaint joining over one hundred plaintiffs, and

there was no use of the word “trial” anywhere in the petition

seeking coordination.

The California district court judges who considered this

issue uniformly distinguished Abbott. See Freitas, 2013 WL

685200 at *4 (“Abbott concerned plaintiffs who had explicitly

asked for their cases to be consolidated ‘through trial’ and

‘not solely for pretrial proceedings.’ Abbott is therefore

distinguishable . . . ”) (citation omitted); Rice, 2013 WL

97738 at *2 (“Defendants’ reliance on . . . Abbott is

misplaced. . . .”); Rentz, 2013 WL 645634 at *3 (“The Court

is neither persuaded that it should follow Abbott nor that

Abbott applies to the facts of the present case. . . .”); Posey,

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CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS 27

2013 WL 361168 at *3 (“Abbott is easily distinguishable

from the present case on its facts. . . .”). I am persuaded to

the view of these able district court judges. See United States

v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (referencing

decisions from district courts within the circuit); see also In

re First Alliance Mort. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 1005 (same).

The conclusion that Plaintiffs implicitly requested a joint

trial is not supported by the language of CAFA or by the

cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits so heavily relied

upon by the majority. That conclusion is inconsistent with

precedent from the Supreme Court and this circuit that

Plaintiffs are the masters of their Complaints, that removal

statutes (including CAFA) are to be construed narrowly, that

any ambiguity is to be construed against removal1, and that

1

I disagree with the majority’s unsupported contention that “there is

nothing ambiguous about asking for coordination ‘for all purposes.’” 

Majority Opinion, p. 18 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). That

contention simply begs the question. Considering the petition for

coordination as a whole, the phrase “for all purposes” could easily be

interpreted as referring to all pretrial or discovery purposes, particularly

in view of the consistent explicit references to pretrial and discovery

matters, and not one mention of the word “trial.” See Far West Federal

Bank, S.B. v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supv., 746 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (D. Or.

1990), reversed on other grounds, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding

the phrase “for all purposes” ambiguous); see also Francis v. LaMarque,

No. C01-3957, 2002 WL 31414310 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding an

instruction containing the phrase “for all purposes” ambiguous when

considered in the context of another instruction). The majority criticizes

these cases as being distinguishable, but still offers no supporting

authority for its contention that the phrase “for all purposes” is not

ambiguous. The fact remains that the phrase “for all purposes” upon

which the majority so heavily relies has been found ambiguous by at least

two courts.

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28 CORBER V. XANODYNE PHARMACEUTICALS

the plain language of the statute controls. Finally, nothing

prevents Defendants from seeking removal if and when

Plaintiffs actually request a joint trial. See Tanoh, 561 F.3d

at 956. I respectfully dissent.

The majority also argues that the Plaintiffs’ petition for coordination

did not state that coordination was sought solely for pretrial purposes. But

neither does the petition state that a joint trial is requested. At least the

words “pretrial” and “discovery” were specifically and consistently

referenced in Plaintiffs’ petition, which is more than can be said for the

words “joint trial,” which were not mentioned at all. Finally, as discussed

in the text, affirming the district court’s remand would not create a circuit

split, because the cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits are readily

distinguishable, most notably by an explicit request from Plaintiffs for a

joint trial.

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