Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-18-02816/USCOURTS-ca2-18-02816-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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18‐2816‐cv

Costabile v. NYCHHC, et al. 

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2019

No. 18‐2816‐cv

ROCCO COSTABILE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION; MALICK

BYRNE; DOLORES M. LEITE; AND SHOBA JOSEPH,

Defendants‐Appellees.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

   

ARGUED: JANUARY 30, 2020

DECIDED: FEBRUARY 25, 2020

   

Before: CABRANES, SACK, AND LOHIER,Circuit Judges.

   

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Plaintiff‐Appellant Rocco Costabile (“Plaintiff”) appeals from

an August 21, 2018 judgment of the District Court (Robert W. Sweet,

Judge) granting the motion to dismiss of Defendants‐Appellees New

York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Malick Byrne, Dolores

Leite, and Shoba Joseph, in an action alleging violations of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and related state and municipal laws.

Plaintiff also sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the same alleged

violations of the Rehabilitation Act. The main questions presented in

this appeal are (1) whether an employee alleging a failure‐to‐

accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act has carried his initial

burden to make a prima facie case where the employer allegedly has

notice that the employee is on extended disability leave, but the

employee never requests an accommodation; and (2) whether rights

established by the Rehabilitation Act are enforceable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

We conclude that an employee cannot make a prima facie case

against his employer for failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation under the circumstances presented here. We also

conclude that the rights established by the Rehabilitation Act are not

enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the

District Court’s judgment.

   

         MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman &

Associates, Goshen, NY, for Plaintiff‐

Appellant.

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MACKENZIE FILLOW, Assistant Corporation

Counsel (Richard P. Dearing and Scott

Shorr, Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the

brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation

Counsel of the City of New York, New

York, NY, for Defendants‐Appellees.  

   

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff‐Appellant Rocco Costabile (“Plaintiff”) appeals from

an August 21, 2018 judgment of the District Court (Robert W. Sweet,

Judge) granting the motion to dismiss of Defendants‐Appellees New

York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (“NYCHHC”), Malick

Byrne, Dolores Leite, and Shoba Joseph (jointly, “Defendants”), in an

action alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and related

state and municipal laws. Plaintiff also sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

the same alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act.  

There are two main questions presented in this appeal. First, we

consider whether an employee alleging a failure‐to‐accommodate

claim under the Rehabilitation Act has carried his initial burden to

make a prima facie case where the employer allegedly has notice that

the employee is on extended disability leave, but the employee never

requests an accommodation. On de novo review, we conclude that an

employee cannot make a prima facie case against his employer for

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failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the

circumstances presented in this appeal. Second, we consider whether

rights established by the Rehabilitation Act are enforceable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. We conclude that they are not. Accordingly, we

AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims

brought under the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked as a carpenter for NYCHHC from

approximately July 2001 to September 2015. During that period, he

suffered several work‐related injuries for which he took multiple

leaves of absence before returning to full‐time employment. Plaintiff

also has multiple sclerosis, which primarily impairs his vision. Plaintiff

has alleged that his on‐the‐job injuries and multiple sclerosis

substantially limit his major life activities.

After sustaining a work‐related injury in May 2014, Plaintiff

remained on a leave of absence from his position as a permanent

carpenter for over a year. During his leave, pursuant to NYCHHC

policy, Plaintiff “provided NYCHHC with regular updates from his

doctor as to his condition and ability to work.”1  

On August 10, 2015, Jeff Smodish, Associate Director of Human

Resources at NYCHHC, sent Plaintiff a letterregarding his leave status

(the “Notice”). The Notice explained that his leave period was

1 Joint Appendix (“JA”) at 19.

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expiring, and that Plaintiff would be fired from his job on September

10, 2015, unless he “submit[s] medical documentation prior to that

date stating that [he is] fit to return to full duty.”2 The Notice did not

define “full duty” and did not offer Plaintiff any specific

accommodation in returning to work. The Notice referenced and

attached a copy of Section 7.3.4 of the New York City Health and

Hospitals Corporation Personnel Rules and Regulations, which sets

forth Plaintiff’s rights concerning requests for reinstatement following

“termination” at the expiration of disability leave.3 The attachment

indicates that permanent employees may take up to one year of leave

because of a job‐related disability but may be fired thereafter. It further

provides that:

If, upon appeal to the Personal Review Board [(“PRB”)]

within one year following termination of the disability or

disease the PRB medial officer certifies that such person is

physically, medically, and mentally fit to perform the

essential duties of his/her former title with or without a

reasonable accommodation, he/she shall be reinstated to

his/her former title if there is a vacancy or to a similar or

lower tittle in the same occupational field or to a vacant

position for which he/she is eligible for transfer.4

Plaintiff avers that he interpreted the letterto mean that he could

only return to “full duty” if he could complete all functions of his job

2 Id. at 28.

3 Id. at 30.

4 Id. (emphasis in original).  

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without accommodation. He alleges that, although he could perform

the job’s essential functions with or without accommodations, he

could no longer perform certain functions, like climbing and

descending ladders, that were “marginal functions” of the carpenter

job, even with an accommodation. Plaintiff did not respond to the

Notice and was therefore fired in September 2015. At no point did

Plaintiff request any accommodation from Defendants. Plaintiff

alleges that his disability is ongoing. He did not appeal to the PRB for

reinstatement.

  On November 2, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the

instant suit before the District Court. Plaintiff’s amended complaint

alleges that Defendants failed to provide him with a reasonable

accommodation for his alleged disability in violation of Section 504 the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701, et seq., and in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 The District Court read the pro se

complaint as alleging a failure‐to‐accommodate claim based on the

factual allegations relating to Plaintiff’s September 2015 firing. Relying

on the general proposition that “no one is entitled to judicial relief for

a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative

remedy has been exhausted,”6 the District Court concluded that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissed

5 The amended complaint also alleges violations of the New York State

Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law, but these claims are

not raised on appeal.  

6 Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1993).

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the claim because Plaintiff did not file medical documentation with his

employer or appeal his firing to the PRB. The District Court also

dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff

failed to state a claim against NYCHHC under Monell v. Department of

Social Services of City of New York,

7 and against the individual

defendants for failure to plausibly allege their “personal involvement”

under Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, N.Y.8   

Plaintiff, represented by counsel on appeal, now challenges the

dismissal of his Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 claims.9 For the reasons

stated below, we find Plaintiff’s arguments to be without merit and

affirm the judgment of the District Court dismissing the complaint.  

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the dismissal of his complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We review that

dismissal de novo.

10 Specifically, we accept the complaint’s factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

7 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

8 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).

9 Plaintiff also appears to argue violations of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (the “ADA”) in his opening brief. Plaintiff now concedes that those references

were inadvertent, as they are not addressed in his reply brief. Accordingly, we do

not consider Plaintiff’s references to the ADA.

10 Harris v. Mills, 572 F. 3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).

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non‐movant.11 We also construe Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally to

raise the strongest arguments that it suggests.12 To survive dismissal,

however, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face,”13 and that “allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”14 “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”15 Finally,

“though we are obligated to draw the most favorable inferences that

[plaintiff’s] complaint supports, we cannot invent factual allegations

that he has not pled.”16

A.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Defendants failed to

provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his alleged

disability in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. To

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation

Act based on an employer’s failure to accommodate a disability, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the plaintiff is a person with a

11 Id.

12 Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2002).  

13 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

15 Harris, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

16 Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010).

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disability underthe meaning of the statute in question; (2) an employer

covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable

accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the

job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such

accommodations.”17  

Our focus here relates to the second and fourth elements.

“[G]enerally, it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability

to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.”18 We held

in Brady v. Walmart,

19 however, that where “the disability is obvious—

which is to say, if the employer knew or reasonably should have

known that the employee was disabled,” the employer is obligated to

engage in “an interactive process with their employees and in that way

work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be

reasonably accommodated.”20 To trigger the duty to engage the

interactive accommodations process, the employer must have known,

or have had sufficient notice such that the employerreasonably should

17 Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 352 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

18 Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

19 531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008).

20 Id. at 135; accord McElwee v. Cty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 2012)

(“[U]nder certain circumstances, an employer is required to act proactively and

engage in an interactive process to accommodate the disability of an employee even

if the employee does not request accommodation.”).

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have known, that the employee has a disability within the meaning of

the Act, as opposed to a mere impairment.21   

The District Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a

reasonable accommodation claim because, by not responding to the

Notice or appealing to the PRB, Plaintiff failed to exhaust NYCHHC’s

administrative remedies.  But we have never held that a Rehabilitation

Act claim against a non‐federal employer is subject to an

administrative exhaustion requirement, nor is there any statutory

basis for imposing one.22 Accordingly, we reject the District Court’s

conclusion that Plaintiff failed to state a reasonable accommodation

claim because, by not responding to the Notice or appealing to the

PRB, Plaintiff failed to exhaust NYCHHC’s administrative remedies.   

The question on appeal, therefore, is whether Plaintiff

sufficiently alleged that Defendants had knowledge of his disability

and were therefore obligated under Brady to initiate an interactive

21 Brady, 531 F.3d at 134; see also Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y., 748 F.3d 471,

475 (2d Cir. 2014).

22 Mary Jo C. v. NY State & Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 170 n.11 (2d

Cir. 2013) (“Courts have construed [29 U.S.C. § 794a, the applicable procedures and

remedies] section of the Rehabilitation Act[,] as not imposing any exhaustion

requirement as to claims against a recipient of federal funding, but as imposing one

as to claims against a federal employer.”); Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352

F.3d 565, 579 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that, to state a reasonable accommodation claim

under Title II, which incorporates 29 U.S.C. § 794a, “a plaintiff must first use the

procedures available to notify the governmental entity that it seeks an exception or

variance from [a] facially neutral law,” but distinguishing that notice requirement

from an exhaustion requirement).   

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accommodation process “to assess whether an employee’s disability

can be reasonably accommodated.”23 On review of the record before

us, we hold that he has not.

Plaintiff does not allege that he ever requested an

accommodation from Defendants, either formally or informally. It is

undisputed that Defendants knew Plaintiff was on an extended

disability leave from work‐related injuries. But this alone is

insufficient to plausibly allege notice that those injuries constituted a

disability under the Act. As Plaintiff alleged, he took work‐related

disability leave on multiple prior occasions for conditions that did not

prevent him from returning to work without any accommodations.  

Similarly, while Plaintiff alleged that Defendants received notice of his

multiple sclerosis diagnosis in April 2010, his multiple sclerosis was

not a qualifying disability at that time, as he continued working

without any accommodations until his 2014 leave.   

Finally, although Plaintiff alleged that Defendants received

“regular updates from his doctor on his condition and ability to

work,”24 he alleged no facts about the content of those updates from

which it could plausibly be inferred that Plaintiff’s disability was

“obvious” to Defendants.25  In Brady, the employer directly observed

the plaintiff in the workplace, and the plaintiff’s supervisor effectively

23 Id. at 135.

24 JA 19.

25 Brady, 531 F.3d at 135.

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admitted that she perceived him to be disabled.26 Here, by contrast,

Plaintiff at most alleged that his doctor informed Defendants that his

condition required leave. We cannot reasonably infer from that

general allegation that the updates adequately informed Defendants

about the nature of Plaintiff’s condition such that Defendants should

have known he was disabled27 and that Plaintiff was thereby excused

from the requirement that he request an accommodation.

Because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that Defendants knew

or should reasonably have known he was disabled, Defendants were

under no obligation to initiate the interactive process, and Plaintiff’s

failure to affirmatively request an accommodation is a sound basis for

dismissal of his claim.    

B.

Finally, we also affirm the judgment of the District Court

dismissing Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. That claim merely restates the

alleged violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The question of whether

rights established in the Rehabilitation Act may be enforced under

§ 1983 presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit. Several of

our Sister Circuits have addressed the issue, and all have concluded

that § 1983 cannot be used to alter the categories of persons potentially

26 Id. at 134.   

27 Even for a pro se complaint, “we cannot invent factual allegations that [the

plaintiff] has not pled.” Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170.

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liable in private actions under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.28 The

Third Circuit’s decision in A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools,

29 holding

that § 1983 may not be used to enforce the rights provided in the  

Rehabilitation Act, is particularly relevant in this appeal. We find that

decision persuasive.  

We conclude that the comprehensive remedial scheme of the

Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress  did not intend that  § 1983

be an available remedy.30 Because nothing has been directed to our

attention to challenge the “ordinary inference that the remedy

provided in the statute is exclusive,”31 we hold that the rights

28 Tri–Corp Hous. Inc. v. Bauman, 826 F.3d 446, 448–49 (7th Cir. 2016) (ADA

and Rehabilitation Act); Ramirez–Senda v. Puerto Rico, 528 F.3d 9, 13 n.3 (1st Cir.

2008) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803–

06 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Rehabilitation Act); Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 608–10

(5th Cir. 1999) (Rehabilitation Act); Alsbrook v. Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010–12 (8th

Cir. 1999) (en banc) (ADA); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2002)

(ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1530–31

(11th Cir. 1997) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act).

29 486 F.3d at 803–06.  

30 The Rehabilitation Act adopts the scheme of “remedies, procedures, and

rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., to

remedy alleged violations of . . . Section 504 by recipients of federal funding. 29

U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). The “remedies for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

are coextensive with the remedies available in a private cause of action brought

under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185

(2002).

31 City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 122 (2005).

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established in the Rehabilitation Act may not be enforced through

§ 1983.32

III. CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Plaintiff on

appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons,

we AFFIRM the August 21, 2018 judgment of the District Court.

32 See Morris‐Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist., 423 F.3d 153,

161 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff could not enforce, through a § 1983 action,

protections provided by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment

Rights Act where plaintiff was unable to point to any indication, express orimplicit,

that the remedy provided in the Act is to complement, rather than   

supplant, § 1983).                                        

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