Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01647/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01647-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHARLES B. JONES, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

MATTHEW L. CATE, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:12-cv-1647-TLN-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a 2010 judgment of conviction entered against him 

pursuant to his plea of no contest in the Solano County Superior Court. He seeks federal habeas 

relief on the alleged grounds that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

and that his plea of no contest was involuntary. Upon careful consideration of the record and the 

applicable law, it is recommended that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

I. Background

 In a pre-sentence report, petitioner’s probation officer described the facts underlying the 

charges as follows: 

Count 1: The following is summarized from Fairfield Police 

Department crime report #08-08216, dated 02 June 2008. The 

victim observed a subject, later identified as the defendant, walking 

out of her garage holding her husband’s DeWalt drill case in his 

hand. She told the defendant, “You better put that back.” The 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 1 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

defendant ran to a vehicle and drove off with the drill case. The 

victim was able to describe the vehicle, a blue Cherokee Jeep, and 

provided the license plate number to the police. 

Police responded to the address linked to the license plate. The 

suspect vehicle and defendant were located at the residence. The 

defendant was in the threshold of the driveway and garage area 

when he was instructed to sit on the curb in front of the residence. 

The defendant initially walked into the garage and stood between 

the front of the suspect vehicle and a workbench, but was 

subsequently detained. The victim was brought to this residence for 

a field identification. She was able to identify the defendant as the 

person who was carrying the drill case from her garage. 

The defendant advised officers he was on parole. Inside the garage, 

a DeWalt drill case was located. The drill and a battery were 

located in the case. The serial number of the battery in the case 

matched a serial number of another battery at the victim’s home. 

The property was subsequently returned to the victim. 

At the Fairfield Police Department, the defendant was given his 

Miranda admonishment. He stated he did not take the drill or case. 

He stated they belonged to him and were not stolen. A parole hold 

was subsequently placed on the defendant. 

Count 2/Dismissed with Harvey Waiver: The following is 

summarized from Fairfield Police Department crime report #08-

17120, dated 03 December 2008. The victim was sleeping in his 

residence when he heard his dog barking, which suggested someone 

was near his home. He looked out his window and saw a white 

Chevrolet pickup truck parked on the street. When he exited his 

front door, he saw an individual, later identified as the defendant, 

attempting to remove an air compressor from his backyard into his 

front yard. The air compressor was stored in a latched shed in his 

backyard. 

The victim confronted the defendant. The defendant dropped the 

air compressor and fled to the truck and drove off. The victim was 

able to obtain the license plate of the vehicle. Less than a minute 

later, the defendant returned and offered the victim money to not 

report this incident to the police. The victim did not accept the 

money and advised the defendant he was going to call the police. 

The victim also noticed a chainsaw was missing, but did not know 

if the defendant took it. 

As the police responded to the address that was linked to the truck, 

the truck was seen in the area and a traffic stop was initiated. A 

record check revealed the defendant was on parole, which he 

confirmed. The defendant was detained and a parole search was 

conducted. The search did not reveal any contraband material. 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 2 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

The victim was able to identify the defendant during an in-field 

identification even though the defendant changed his clothing. The 

defendant was taken into custody and given his Miranda

admonishment. The defendant stated, “It wasn’t me. I don’t got no 

statement.” A parole hold was also placed on the defendant. 

Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 6 at 174-75. 

 On October 23, 2009, the Solano County District Attorney charged petitioner with two 

counts of burglary and alleged that petitioner had served four prior prison terms, had suffered one 

prior strike conviction and two prior serious felony convictions, and was on bail when he 

committed one of the burglaries. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 5 at 126-29. On December 9, 2009, 

petitioner pled no contest to one count of burglary and admitted the prior strike and three prior 

prison term allegations. Id. at 141-46. On June 30, 2010, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a 

stipulated sentence of 11 years in state prison and ordered the payment of several restitution fines. 

Id. at 187-89, 193. 

 Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the 

First Appellate District, claiming that the abstract of judgment should be modified to accurately 

reflect the restitution fines orally imposed by the trial court at sentencing. Resp’t’s Ex. 1. The 

Court of Appeal modified the abstract of judgment to correct the amount of the restitution fines 

and affirmed the judgment as modified. Id. 

 Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Superior 

Court, claiming that his plea was involuntary and that his trial and appellate counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. ECF No. 14-13. The Superior Court denied that petition in a reasoned 

decision dated November 4, 2011. Id.

 Petitioner raised the same claims in petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the 

California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Docs. 2, 3. Those 

petitions were summarily denied. ECF No. 14-14; Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 3. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 3 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding. 

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Nonetheless, “circuit court precedent may be persuasive in 

determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law 

unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 

2010)). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.1

 Lockyer v. 

 1

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 4 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; accord Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 5 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

 1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

 In his first ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in his handling of a pretrial motion to suppress and in failing to obtain a ruling 

prohibiting “in-court identification.” ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 1-1 at 6-7; ECF No. 21-1 at 12-

14. Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in the California Superior Court, which denied it 

on the grounds that “[a]fter a criminal defendant has entered a plea, he may only attack the 

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea.” ECF No. 14-13 at 3. This court agrees with the 

reasoning of the Superior Court. 

///// 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 6 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

 Trial counsel’s performance on the motion to suppress, including any failure to obtain a 

ruling precluding in-court identification of petitioner took place prior to the entry of petitioner’s 

plea of no contest. The law is clear that petitioner may not raise claims of deprivation of his 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to his plea. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly 

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not 

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 

700 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As a general rule, one who voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge 

may not subsequently seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional 

violations”), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); 

Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992) (“petitioner’s nolo contendere plea 

precludes him from challenging alleged constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry 

of that plea”); Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (voluntary and 

intelligent guilty plea precludes federal habeas relief based upon “independent claims” of pre-plea 

constitutional violations); United States v. DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A 

guilty plea waives all defenses except those that go to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and 

the narrow class of constitutional claims involving the right not to be haled into court.”). 

 To the extent that petitioner is claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

premised on his attorney’s allegedly faulty advice, he may do so only based upon that advice as it 

related to the decision to enter his no contest plea. Any ineffective assistance claims relating to 

other, earlier actions by his counsel are barred by Tollett v. Henderson. See Moran, 57 F.3d at 

700. See also Givens v. Sisto, No. C 08-05231 JW (PR), 2010 WL 1875766, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

May 7, 2010) (“the only challenges left open in federal habeas corpus after a guilty plea is the 

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to plead.”). 

Petitioner does not challenge the advice of trial counsel as it related to his decision to plead no 

contest. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 7 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

 2. Involuntary Plea 

 Petitioner’s next ground for relief is a claim that his plea of no contest was involuntary. 

ECF No. 1-1 at 10-17. He argues that the record does not “affirmatively show” that he waived 

his constitutional rights before pleading no contest to the burglary and admitting the prior 

conviction allegations. He states that he agreed to enter that plea only because he was “in 

disbelief” that the trial court had denied his motion for new trial counsel. Id. at 10-11. 

 The California Superior Court denied this claim on the procedural ground that it should 

have been raised on direct appeal. ECF No. 14-13 at 2. The California Court of Appeal and 

California Supreme Court adopted this reasoning when each of those courts summarily denied the 

habeas petitions. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859. Because the California courts denied petitioner’s 

claim on procedural grounds and not on the merits of the claim, AEDPA’s deferential standard 

does not apply and this court must review the claim de novo. See Miranda v. Bennett, 322 F.3d 

171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) (§ 2254(d) requires deference only to state court adjudication on the 

merits and not to a disposition on procedural or other grounds); Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 

235 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (defining “adjudication on the merits” to be a substantive, rather 

than a procedural, decision); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1999) (court declined to 

apply deferential AEDPA standard because of state court’s awareness of, and explicit reliance on, 

a procedural ground to dismiss petitioner’s claim).2

 

 a. Background

 The state court record reflects that petitioner filed a pre-trial motion for substitute counsel 

(Marsden motion). Resp’t’s Ex. 7 at 91-92. Petitioner planned that if his Marsden motion was 

 2

 In the part of its opinion rejecting petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the California Superior Court made the following statement: “Petitioner’s underlying 

criminal file (FCR261338) includes a plea form that indicates that Petitioner voluntarily and 

intelligently entered his plea.” ECF No. 14-13 at 3. The Superior Court also stated that petitioner 

had failed to set forth “facts or evidence to support that he did not voluntarily and intelligently 

enter the plea.” Id. at 3-4. Assuming arguendo that these statements constitute a decision on the 

merits of petitioner’s claim that his plea of no contest was involuntary, he is still not entitled to 

federal habeas relief under AEDPA. As discussed below, the state court’s rejection of this claim 

is consistent with relevant federal law and is based on a reasonable interpretation of the facts of 

this case. 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 8 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

denied he would enter a plea of no contest to some of the charges against him. Id. at 91-92, 95. 

To that end, petitioner had already filled out and signed a negotiated plea agreement, including a 

waiver of rights form, which his counsel brought to court on the day of the hearing on the 

Marsden motion. ECF No. 1-9 at 2. When the Marsden motion was denied, petitioner’s trial 

counsel immediately informed the court that petitioner would enter a plea. Id. The following 

colloquy then occurred: 

THE COURT: I didn’t anticipate that. Which case is he pleading 

to, the 269832? 

MR. BARRETT (petitioner’s counsel): Your Honor, he’ll plead to 

Count One. He’s going to admit the strike prior, to the middle term 

the admit [sic] the strike prior doubled, plus the three prison priors. 

Since we discussed this case on Friday, the People have offered 11 

years instead of 13. 

THE COURT: Well, I think that’s fair. 

MS. ANDERSON (the prosecutor): It’s in 261338. 

(Documents proffered to the court.) 

Mr. Jones, in case 261338, I have your Waiver of Rights form. It’s 

dated. It’s signed, and it is initialed. 

Did you sign and initial this document? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 

THE COURT: Did you go over the contents with your lawyer? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 

MR. BARRETT: He is just wanting to request to waive time for 

sentencing. 

THE COURT: Understood. 

And the factual basis is being submitted on the preliminary hearing 

transcript, and the Court would find there is a factual basis for a 

change of plea to Count Two [sic].3

 3

 It appears that the trial judge meant to reference Count One, to which petitioner was 

pleading no contest, and not Count Two. 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 9 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

And, Mr. Jones, what is your plea to Count One, a violation of 

Penal Code Section 459, first degree burglary, with a person 

present? 

THE DEFENDANT: No contest. 

THE COURT: I’ll accept your no-contest plea. 

And, additionally, do you admit that you suffered three prior prison 

terms, pursuant to Penal Code Section 667.5 b, and those are 

alleged on the second amended consolidated information from 1998 

here out of Solano County, as well as 2004 in Solano County, and 

also 1990 out of San Bernardino County. 

Do you admit all three of those prior prison terms? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 

THE COURT: And additionally your client is admitting one strike? 

MR. BARRETT: Yes. 

THE COURT: And, sir, do you admit that you suffered three prior 

prison terms, pursuant to Penal Code Section 667 b through i on 

1170.12 a, specifically that as of July 15th, 1993, a burglary 

conviction out of Solano County? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: All right, you admit that as well. I’ll accept your 

plea. 

Are the remaining counts allegations being dismissed in 261338? 

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, your Honor. I would dismiss with a 

Harvey waiver Count Two. I would strike the 667 a one allegations 

There’s two of them. 

Resp’t’s Ex. 7 at 83-84. 

 b. Applicable Legal Standards

 It is clearly established federal law that a guilty plea must be voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently entered. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 

U.S. 238, 242 (1969). The record must reflect that a criminal defendant pleading guilty 

understands, and is voluntarily waiving, his rights to the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. However, 

“beyond these essentials, the Constitution ‘does not impose strict requirements on the mechanics 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 10 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

of plea proceedings.’” Loftis v. Almager, 704 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United 

States v. Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 

S.Ct. 101 (2012)). See also Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974) (specific 

articulation of the Boykin rights “is not the sine qua non of a valid guilty plea.”). Rather, if the 

record demonstrates that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, “no particular ritual or showing 

on the record is required.” United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The long-standing test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “’whether the plea 

represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 

defendant.”’ Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 

(1970)). “The voluntariness of [a petitioner’s] guilty plea can be determined only by considering 

all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady, 397 F.2d at 749. 

 In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court addressed the 

presumption of verity to be given the record of plea proceeding when the plea is subsequently 

subject to a collateral challenge. While noting that the defendant’s representations at the time of 

his guilty plea are not “invariably insurmountable” when challenging the voluntariness of his 

plea, the court stated that, nonetheless, the defendant’s representations, as well as any findings 

made by the judge accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 

proceedings” and that “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” 

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. A guilty plea is presumed valid in habeas proceeding when the 

pleading defendant was represented by counsel. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 437 

(1983). 

 c. Plea of No Contest to Burglary

 The state court record in this case includes petitioner’s signed “Waiver of Constitutional 

Rights and Declaration in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Change Plea (waiver of rights 

form),” which he tendered to the trial court when he pled no contest. Resp’t’s Ex. 5 at 141-44. 

Therein, petitioner acknowledged in writing that he had “fully discussed the facts, merits, and 

possible defenses of this case with my attorney.” Id. at 141. He also waived his rights to a 

speedy trial and to a trial by jury, the right to confront his accusers, the right to offer evidence on 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 11 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

his behalf at a trial, and his right against self-incrimination. Id. The form advised petitioner of 

his maximum possible sentence. Id. Petitioner acknowledged that he was not under the influence 

of alcohol or narcotics, that he was “of sound mind,” and that he understood the nature of the 

proceedings. Id. Petitioner also had notice of the nature of the charges against him. Id. at 141-

42. See Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 436 (in order for a plea to be voluntary, an accused must receive 

notice of the nature of the charge against him, “the first and most universally recognized 

requirement of due process”) (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). 

 Petitioner also affirmed in the waiver of rights form that his attorney had explained the 

document to him and that he “hereby freely and voluntarily, having full knowledge and 

understanding of the rights that I am giving up and the possible consequences which may result 

from my plea, do hereby request the Court to accept my new and different plea.” Resp’t’s Ex. 5 

at 143. Petitioner’s trial counsel declared that he had read and explained the waiver of rights 

form to petitioner, that he was satisfied that petitioner understood the consequences of his plea, 

that his plea was freely and voluntarily made, and that petitioner’s decision to enter a plea was 

made “only after a full discussion with me of the facts and the law of this case.” Id. In open 

court, as set forth above, petitioner informed the trial judge that he had signed and initialed the 

waiver of rights form, that he had discussed its contents with his attorney, and that he had no 

questions about the document. This is sufficient for purposes of federal habeas review. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 436. 

 In the petition before this court, petitioner argues that he agreed to plead no contest only 

because he was “in disbelief” that his Marsden motion had been denied. ECF No. 1-1 at 10. 

However, the fact that petitioner signed the waiver of rights form prior to his Marsden hearing, 

and that he had agreed to plead no contest before the Marsden motion was ruled on, belies this 

contention. Petitioner clearly understood there was a chance his Marsden motion could be 

denied. Under these circumstances, petitioner’s assertion that he pled guilty because he was 

surprised at the trial court’s ruling is insufficient to demonstrate that his plea was involuntary. 

 Petitioner also asserts that the trial judge improperly failed to ask him directly “about 

waiving any of his constitutional rights.” Id. Petitioner is apparently arguing that the judge 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 12 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13

should have asked him on the record whether he agreed to waive each of his federal constitutional 

rights instead of simply asking him whether he understood the form he had signed waiving those 

rights. This argument lacks merit and should be rejected. Petitioner cites no case holding that a 

state trial court must discuss a criminal defendant’s waiver of his constitutional rights on the 

record in open court when the defendant has already waived his rights in writing and orally 

confirms that he understood the rights that he was waiving through the form that he signed. As 

noted above, the Constitution “does not impose strict requirements on the mechanics of plea 

proceedings.” Loftis, 704 F.3d at 648. Rather, the record must affirmatively show that a criminal 

defendant’s guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43. The record in 

this case makes that showing. 

 Petitioner also argues that his plea of nolo contendere was invalid because the trial court 

failed to ensure that it was supported by an adequate factual basis. ECF No. 1-1 at 11-12. 

However, absent special circumstances not present here, there is no federal constitutional 

requirement that a no contest plea in state court be supported by a factual basis. See Loftis, 704 

F.3d at 648 (claim of insufficient factual basis to support petitioner’s no contest plea, 

unaccompanied by protestations of innocence, not cognizable on federal habeas); Rodriguez v. 

Ricketts, 777 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985) (same with respect to guilty plea). Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on any such claim. 

 In sum, there is nothing in the record before this court to overcome the presumption that 

petitioner pled guilty voluntarily and intelligently. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this 

claim. 

 d. Admission of Prior Conviction 

 Petitioner also claims that his admission of the prior conviction allegations was 

involuntary because the trial court failed to advise him he was entitled to a trial on those 

allegations when it accepted his no contest plea. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. 

 In 1972, the Ninth Circuit held that under then-extant California law, an admission of a 

prior conviction in state court which subjects the accused to an enhanced sentence is the 

functional equivalent of a guilty plea to a separate charge. Wright v. Craven, 461 F.2d 1109, 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 13 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14

1109 (9th Cir. 1972). Accordingly, the admission is not valid unless the defendant understood the 

consequences flowing therefrom. Id. at 1110. However, the Ninth Circuit subsequently 

interpreted the holding in Wright to require only that the trial court determine whether the 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the stipulation of the fact of a prior conviction. 

Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 841 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992). Several courts have questioned 

whether Wright is still good law. See United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 928 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Sou Hang Saephan v. Schomig, No. C 09-4658 SI (PR), 2011 WL 5834944 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 

2011). Further, the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Boykin and Brady 

apply to prior conviction allegations and other Circuit Courts have not held that the Boykin

requirements apply to admissions of prior convictions. See e.g., Adams, 968 F.2d at 841 n.4 

(recognizing that this is an issue on which Circuit courts are split). 

 However, the question as to Wright need not be decided here. Assuming arguendo that 

Boykin and Brady apply to admissions of prior convictions, for the reasons set forth above the 

record reflects that petitioner understood and waived his right to a jury trial when he signed the 

waiver of rights form. Petitioner has cited no case holding that a defendant must be twice 

advised, at the same proceeding, that he is entitled to a jury trial on the underlying offense and 

also on the truth of the prior conviction allegation. See Washington v. Kramer, No. CV 09-5078-

DOC (PJW), 2010 WL 1947001 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) (petitioner’s waiver of right to jury 

trial applied to both substantive charge and to prior “strike” allegation); Tribble v. Hernandez, 

No. CV 06-3992 PSG (PLA), 2009 WL 2969480 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) ((“Petitioner, 

however, has cited no Supreme Court case holding that a defendant must be twice advised, at the 

same proceeding, of his federal rights: first, in connection with his plea on the substantive charges 

and, second, in connection with the admission of a prior conviction allegation.”); Chan v. A.A. 

Lamarque, Warden, No. 03-1156MMC, 2004 WL 834694, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. April 9, 2004) 

(finding that waiver of constitutional rights applied to prior conviction allegation as well as 

underlying charge). In California, such separate advisements are not required. See, e.g., People v. 

Forrest, 221 Cal.App.3d 675, 677-81 (1990) (separate advisements are not required in a single 

///// 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 14 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15

plea proceeding where the defendant pleads guilty to a current offense and also admits a prior 

conviction). 

 The court also notes that petitioner and his attorney were aware of the validity of his prior 

convictions and petitioner chose not to litigate this issue in order to obtain a reduced sentence. 

There is no evidence in the record that petitioner’s prior convictions were invalid. There is also 

no evidence in the record that petitioner would have insisted on a jury trial on the prior conviction 

allegations if he had been separately informed that he had that right. Further, petitioner had 

extensive experience with the criminal justice system, including three prior convictions, from 

which it could reasonably be inferred that he was aware of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences of his admission. See Park v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 (1992) ( “A defendant's prior 

experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question of whether he knowingly 

waived his constitutional rights.”). It simply appears that petitioner weighed the costs and 

benefits of stipulating to his prior conviction and made a rational decision to pursue that route in 

exchange for a stipulated sentence significantly lower than he could have received if he was 

found guilty after a jury trial. “‘It may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense 

counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of 

what he is being asked to admit.’” United States v. Bigman, 906 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir.1990) 

(quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976)). 

 Moreover, even assuming further that petitioner’s admission of his prior conviction 

violated his federal constitutional right to due process, habeas relief still would not be warranted 

with respect to this claim because petitioner does not challenge the legitimacy of his prior 

convictions or provide any evidence that they were invalid, and he does not state that he would 

not have entered the no contest plea if he had been advised of the right to a jury trial on the prior 

convictions. See, e.g., Lowell v. Prunty, 91 F.3d 1358, 1359 (9th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (holding 

that state trial court's failure to advise petitioner that his admission to prior convictions would add 

six years to his sentence was harmless error and did not warrant certificate of probable cause to 

appeal because petitioner did not dispute the validity of his priors) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 628–30 (1993); Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 15 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

16

no prejudice from trial court’s failure to advise petitioner of sentencing consequences of plea 

where petitioner did not state directly that he would not have entered plea had he known of them); 

Yellowwolf v. Morris, 536 F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir.1976) (same). 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that his 

admission of the prior conviction allegations was involuntary. 

 3. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

 Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on July 7, 2010, and requested a certificate of 

probable cause from the California Superior Court. Resp’t’s Ex. 4 at 195. On July 26, 2010, the 

Superior Court granted a certificate of probable cause on the following claims: “ineffective 

waiver of constitutional rights;” “inadequate advisement of rights when admitting prior 

conviction;” and “denial of Marsden hearing.”4

 Id. at 195. Before this court, petitioner claims 

that in light of the fact that he sought and received a certificate of probable cause from the 

///// 

 4

 Cal. Penal Code § 1237.5 provides that: 

No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of 

conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation 

of probation following an admission of violation, except where both 

of the following are met: 

(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, 

executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable 

constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality 

of the proceedings. 

(b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable 

cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court. 

In ruling on an application for certificate of probable cause: 

[t]he trial court's sole objective is to eliminate those appeals ‘having 

no possible legal basis' by refusing to issue a certificate of probable 

cause. [Citations.] Section 1237.5 requires the trial court to certify 

any arguably meritorious appeal to the appellate courts. Thus, if the 

statement submitted by the defendant in accordance with section 

1237.5 presents any cognizable issue for appeal which is not clearly 

frivolous and vexatious, the trial court abuses its discretion if it fails 

to issue a certificate of probable cause. [Citations.] 

Lara v. Superior Court, 133 Cal.App.3d 436, 440 (1982) (quoting People v. Holland, 23 Cal.3d 

77, 84 (1978)). 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 16 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

17

Superior Court, his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the 

voluntariness of his plea. ECF No. 1-1 at 13, 16. 

 The California Superior Court denied petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel in a reasoned decision, as follows: 

Petitioner also argues that he suffered from ineffective assistance of 

counsel (IAC). Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to raise the following issues on 

appeal: the trial court did not advise Petitioner that he was giving 

up his right to contest the prior conviction allegations; the trial court 

never found a factual basis for count one when accepting the plea; 

and his prior convictions did not support the Penal Code section 

667.5 enhancements that he received. . . 

Petitioner fails to state a prima facie case for relief for IAC. 

(People v. Duvall, (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 475.) 

With regard to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel, the record is devoid of evidence that appellate 

counsel made unreasonable decisions in failing to raise the claims 

Petitioner believes should have been raised on appeal. (Strickland 

v. Washington, (1984) 466 U.S. 688, 691.) Petitioner does not 

provide any facts or reasonably available documentary evidence, 

such as affidavits from his appellate counsel, stating why these 

issues were not raised on appeal. (Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at p. 474.) 

Moreover, Petitioner provides no evidence to support the claims he 

believes should have been raised on appeal, or to show that these 

claims had any merit. As such, Petitioner has not shown prejudice. 

(See Chapman v. California, (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. 

Roldan, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 735.) 

ECF No. 14-13 at 2-3. 

 The clearly established federal law for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant 

must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and that (2) the “deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is constitutionally deficient if his or 

her representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside 

“the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88. (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687). 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 17 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18

 A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669; see Richter, 131 

S.Ct. at 789. Reviewing courts must also “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

This presumption of reasonableness means that the court must “give the attorneys the benefit of 

the doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel 

may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 

1407 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. 

 Under AEDPA, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Id. at 785. “[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a 

general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has 

not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 

 The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel 

to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 

judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 

Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the ability of 

counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation would be 

“seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(Counsel is not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and is not even 

particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise meritless 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 18 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

19

arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a showing of 

deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a 

weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to establish prejudice in this context, 

petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on 

appeal. Id. at 1434 n.9. 

 Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are conclusory, vague, 

and unsupported by any factual assertions. On this basis alone, this claim should be denied. See 

Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not 

supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”) (quoting James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 In any event, for the reasons set forth above, this court has concluded that petitioner’s 

claim that his plea was involuntary lacks merit. The failure of an attorney to raise a meritless 

claim is not prejudicial. See Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012). In addition, 

because California law does not require a separate advisement and waiver of rights where a 

defendant in a single proceeding pleads guilty to a current charge and also admits that he suffered 

prior convictions, Forrest, 221 Cal.App.3d at 575-76, petitioner’s appellate counsel would not 

have prevailed on any such claim. Nor would counsel have prevailed on a claim that the trial 

court improperly failed to find a factual basis for petitioner’s plea to the burglary charge. The 

state court record reflects that petitioner conceded that the facts upon which his plea was based 

were contained in the preliminary hearing transcript. Resp’t’s Ex. 5 at 143. Further, in California 

a plea of guilty or no contest forecloses an appellate claim that the plea lacks a factual basis. 

People v. Voit, 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1365-66 (2011) (“a plea of guilty or no contest forecloses 

an appellate challenge that the plea lacks a factual basis”). Appellate counsel’s decision not to 

include these claims in petitioner’s direct appeal in state court, but instead to focus on claims that 

counsel believed were more meritorious, was "within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 19 of 20
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

20

III. Conclusion 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: April 29, 2015. 

Case 2:12-cv-01647-TLN-EFB Document 25 Filed 04/30/15 Page 20 of 20