Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00943/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00943-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Salvador Sanchez Macias,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-0943-PHX-SRB (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on May 6, 2013 (Doc. 1). On September 26, 2013 Respondents filed their 

Response (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a Reply/Traverse on October 7, 2013 (Doc. 13).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On April 5, 2010, Petitioner was indicted on two counts of sexual conduct with a 

minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children. (Exhibit B, Indictment.) 

(Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 12, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) The 

indictment alleged that on March 26, 2010, Petitioner engaged in sexual intercourse or 

oral sexual contact with a minor under the age of 15 years, to wit: digital penetration of 

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the minor’s vagina (Count 1) and anal contact (Count 2). (Id.)

Counsel was appointed, and on September 21, 2010, Petitioner entered into a 

written Plea Agreement (Exhibit C), wherein he agreed to plead guilty to Count One, 

sexual conduct with a minor, and an amended Count Two, attempted molestation of a 

child. In exchange, the parties stipulated to a sentence of 20 to 27 years flat on Count 

One, and successive lifetime probation on Count Two. Petitioner entered his plea on the 

same date, and the plea was accepted. (Exhibit D, R.T. 9/21/10.) 

On February 22, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to a presumptive term of 20 years 

on Count One and lifetime probation on Count Two. (Exhibit E, R.T. 2/22/11 at 24-25; 

Exhibit F, Cond. of Probation.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

As a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to a direct appeal. (Exhibit G, 

Notice of Rts. of Rev. (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033, etc.).) Petitioner did not file a 

direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner commenced his first post conviction relief proceedings by filing an 

untimely Notice of Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit H) on July 26, 2011, some five 

months after sentencing. Counsel was appointed. (Exhibit I, M.E. 7/29/11.) Counsel 

filed a Petition (Exhibit J) to permit late filing of a PCR petition, which was granted. 

(Exhibit A, Docket at items 52, 54.) Ultimately, counsel filed a Notice of Completion of 

Review (Exhibit N), evidencing an inability to find a tenable issue for review. Petitioner 

was granted leave to file a pro per petition. (Exhibit A, Docket at item 63.) 

Petitioner filed his pro per PCR petition on November 26, 2012 (Exhibit P), 

arguing newly discovered evidence that the victim suffered no injury to her vagina, 

justifying a lower, mitigated sentence. The PCR Court summarily dismissed the petition, 

finding no colorable claim was presented because the evidence was not newly 

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discovered, was provided at the time of sentencing, was cumulative to other evidence at 

sentencing, and thus would not have changed the sentence. (Exhibit S, M.E. 2/12/13.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit T) by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, arguing that the prosecution had failed to disclose the absence of injury, as 

required under Arizona law and Brady v. Maryland, 400 U.S. 841. The state responded 

(Exhibit U), but no ruling has yet been issued by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 6, 2013 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserted two grounds for relief: 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated when the trial court changed the 

plea agreement without Petitioner’s knowledge or permission, by 

the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of Arizona statutes in the plea 

agreement, and because Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective by not 

objecting to changes to the plea agreement. In Ground Two, 

Petitioner asks whether Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3 

(A.R.S. § 13-4233) is unconstitutional because “it innates the 

suspension of a writ of habeas corpus to Arizona state prisoners.”

(Order 8/23/13 at 2.) In the Service Order, the Court dismissed Ground Two as failing to 

assert a cognizable violation of the Constitution, laws of treaties of the United States.

Response - On September 26, 2013, Respondents filed their Response 

(“Answer”) (Doc. 12). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim was not fairly 

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, that his state remedies are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue that a stay to allow exhaustion is not 

appropriate because the claim is not meritorious and Petitioner has failed to show good 

cause for his failure to properly exhaust. Alternatively, Respondents argue that if the 

claim is merely unexhausted, this Court should deny the claim on its merits.

Reply - On October 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc.13). Petitioner argues: 

(1) the Arizona Court of Appeals’ failure to timely resolve his petition for review creates 

an absence of state corrective process, eliminating any failure to properly exhaust state 

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remedies (id. at 4); (2) any process is ineffective because the Arizona Attorney General 

has undertaken representation of Respondents (id.); (3) this court has discretion to 

bypass the exhaustion issue (id. at 5); (4) any procedural default should be excused to 

avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice (id.); (5) he filed the instant petition to avoid 

the expiration of the statute of limitations (id.); (6) he is alleging jurisdiction defects and 

constitutional violations based upon the judge’s alteration of the plea agreement, and the 

prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the potential sentence (id. at 5-6); and (7) he has 

established cause and prejudice and a fundamental miscarriage of justice (id. at 7-9).

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

Respondents argue this Court should either dismiss the Petition on the basis of a 

procedural default, or find it simply unexhausted and deny it on the merits. Petitioner 

argues that there is an absence of state corrective process, thereby resulting in 

exhaustion, or that any procedural default should be excused on the basis of cause and 

prejudice, or to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Here, however, there is a pending state proceeding. Accordingly, the undersigned 

will recommend dismissal as a matter of abstention.

Petition Wholly Unexhausted - “Habeas petitioners have long been required to 

adjudicate their claims in state court-that is, ‘exhaust’ them-before seeking relief in 

federal court. This requirement is ‘grounded in principles of comity[,] as it gives states 

the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal 

rights.’” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009). 

"A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, 

(2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for 

the claim." Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005).

Therefore, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

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first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, none of the claims asserted by Petitioner in his habeas Petition have been 

fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. His only foray to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals is his now pending petition for review, which is founded upon a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct in failing to make disclosures. His claims in this Petition are 

based upon the trial court’s change of the plea agreement, and ineffective assistance of 

counsel in failing to challenge those changes. 

Accordingly, this Court is faced with a Petition composed solely of claims for 

which Petitioner’s state remedies are unexhausted. 

Respondents suggest that the state remedies are not merely unexhausted, but now 

procedurally defaulted. Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has 

failed to properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those 

remedies are now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has 

"procedurally defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal 

with prejudice of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a 

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 

(1984).

In support of their assertion that the claims are procedurally defaulted, 

Respondents argue that a return to state court for a new proceeding is not possible. 

(Answer, Doc. 12 at 12.) However, Respondents proffer no state law precluding 

Petitioner from revising his claims in the currently pending proceeding before the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (See Order 9/10/13, Doc. 11 at 2 (“any allegations of 

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procedural default or application of an independent and adequate state ground shall 

include an indication of the specific state rule(s) and/or authorities alleged to bar the 

affected claim(s)”).) Further, it seems particularly unseemly, in light of the comity due 

in our federal system (and which underlies the Younger abstention doctrine addressed 

hereinafter), for this federal court to prognosticate what the Arizona Court of Appeals 

might or might not do in a matter actually pending before it. Accordingly, Respondents 

have failed to establish that there is now no state remedy available to Petitioner.1

Respondents suggest as an alternative a stay of the current petition pending 

completion of the state court proceedings. Respondents argue, however, that Petitioner 

has failed to show good cause for his failure to exhaust, and the claims are not 

meritorious. (See Answer, Doc, 12 at 7, quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 

(2005).) However, such a stay is only appropriate for “mixed petitions,” containing both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. See also Jackson v. Roe, 

425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Rhines applies to stays of mixed petitions”). 

Accordingly, a stay is not appropriate.2

Finally, Respondents suggest that this Court exercise its discretion to deny the 

claims on their merits, notwithstanding a failure to exhaust state remedies.3“An 

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 

U.S.C. § 22545(b)(2). Such an approach would be appropriate if Petitioner had no state 

proceedings pending. In light of the pendency of his state petition for review, abstention 

is the more appropriate course.

Abstention Appropriate - The principles of absention in Younger v. Harris, 401 

 

1 Because the undersigned does not find a procedural default, Petitioner’s assertions of 

cause and prejudice and miscarriage of justice to excuse the default need not be 

addressed.

2

The Ninth Circuit has also approved a process for staying fully exhausted petitions to 

permit the exhaustion of other claims. Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. Petitioner’s petition, on 

the other hand, is fully unexhausted.

3

Petitioner suggests the Court take the same approach to grant the Petition. Section 

2254(b)(2) only permits a bypass to deny the claim.

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U.S. 37 (1971) call for dismissal of Petitioner’s Petition without prejudice. “The 

Younger abstention doctrine generally provides that when: (1) the underlying hearings at 

issue constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceedings implicate 

important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings for 

the federal plaintiff to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the federal action would 

enjoin the state proceedings or have the practical effect of doing so, federal courts should 

abstain.” Knight v. Ahlin, 709 F.3d 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the state proceedings are ongoing.4 Petitioner’s petition for review remains 

pending before the Arizona Court of Appeals. These criminal review proceedings 

implicate important state interests, namely “the important and necessary task of 

enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 51-52. 

Arizona routinely provides opportunity for the consideration of the kinds of claims that 

Petitioner asserts in his Petition. 

Finally, a ruling in this Court on the merits of Petitioner’s claims would have the 

practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings, at least insofar as the Arizona court 

might decide to take up the claims raised in this proceeding. 

Petitioner complains that the Arizona Court of Appeals is simply taking too long. 

That does not establish that the state proceeding is an inadequate opportunity to present 

his claims. The matter has only been at issue in that court for six months. While that 

may seem an eternity for a prisoner, it would be a routine delay in the vast majority of 

appellate courts, state and federal. For example, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals reports a 4-5 month delay between briefing and oral argument, and 3 months to 

a year from then to a decision. See http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/ faq.php, last 

accessed 12/11/13. 

Nor does it show the kinds of extraordinary circumstances under which a federal 

 

4

In the event that the state proceedings are concluded prior to the ruling on this Report 

and Recommendation, then the undersigned would suggest the matter be referred again 

to address the procedural default issues.

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court may interfere with ongoing state proceedings. “[W]hen absolutely necessary for 

protection of constitutional rights, courts of the United States have power to enjoin state 

officers from instituting criminal actions. But this may not be done, except under 

extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and 

immediate.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. An ordinary delay in appellate review does not 

establish such extraordinary circumstances. See Roberts v. Dicarlo, 296 F. Supp. 2d 

1182 (C.D.Calif. 2003) (no extraordinary circumstances to avoid Younger abstention 

from 17 month delay in direct appeal). 

“When, as in the present case, an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, 

a would-be habeas corpus petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his 

state remedies are exhausted, even where the issue to be challenged in the writ of habeas 

corpus has been finally settled in the state courts.” Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632 

(9th Cir. 1983). 

Dismissal Without Prejudice Appropriate - Dismissal is the appropriate means 

to abstain in this case. While a stay is permitted in cases merely involving a claim at law 

for damages, see Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (2004), in a case seek equitable 

relief such as a habeas proceeding, dismissal is the appropriate response.

There is no apparent prejudice to Petitioner from a dismissal. Often, federal 

habeas courts are faced with the potential of a dismissal without prejudice becoming one 

with practical prejudice as a result of the intervening expiration of the one year habeas 

statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In this instance, Petitioner’s sentence 

was entered on February 22, 2011. (See Exhibit E, R.T. 2/22/11.) His PCR notice was 

filed less than six months later on July 26, 2011. (See Exhibit H, PCR Notice.) That 

proceeding remains pending. Accordingly, Petitioner would have at least sixth months 

of his one year limitations period remaining upon conclusion of his state court 

proceedings.5

 

5

It is unclear whether Petitioner’s pending PCR proceeding should be considered an “ofright” proceeding, and thus part of his direct review. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

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Moreover, a dismissal of the instant petition would not raise concerns of a 

“second or successive” petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). “A habeas petition is second 

or successive only if it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on the 

merits...A prior petition that has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 

state remedies leaves open the possibility for future litigation and has not, therefore, been 

adjudicated on the merits.” McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citations omitted).

Accordingly, the instant petition should be dismissed without prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner=s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(ACOA”) is whether the applicant has Amade a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.”28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). AWhere a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court=s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

 

710, 716-717 (9th Cir. 2007). If so, then Petitioner’s one year limitations period would 

arguably not begin running until the conclusion of that proceeding.

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds as to Ground One. 

Under the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would 

not “find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling” on 

that ground.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

As for Ground Two, the undersigned did not participate in the dismissal of that 

claim, and out of deference to the district judge, makes no recommendation as to the 

appealability of that order.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed May 6, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED as to 

Ground One.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 18, 2013

13-0943r RR 13 12 10 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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