Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00630/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00630-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Emma Flippen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Ashland Arms, LLC, an Arizona limited

liability company, dba Friendship Inn

Motel, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV08-630-PHX-NVW

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff Emma Flippen brought suit against Ashland Arms LLC (“Ashland Arms”)

alleging race discrimination in an employment contract and unlawful retaliation under 42

U.S.C. § 1981. (Doc. # 38.) Ashland Arms moved for dismissal as a sanction for discovery

abuses by Flippen. (Doc. # 53). An evidentiary hearing on this motion took place on April

22, 2009. For the reasons explained in the following findings of fact and conclusions of law,

the motion will be granted and the complaint dismissed.

I. Findings of Fact

A. The Allegations

According to the allegations, Ashland Arms owns and operates a motel in downtown

Phoenix called the Friendship Inn Motel (“Friendship Inn”). Emma Flippen was hired by

Ashland Arms to work at the Friendship Inn as a desk clerk. Her immediate supervisor was

Chris Burkhead, a white male who worked as a local motel manager for Ashland.

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In her complaint, Flippen describes reprehensible behavior on the part of Burkhead.

Flippen alleges that Burkhead abused her with racial slurs, physical aggression, and

discriminatory working conditions. Burkhead fired Flippen in 2004, allegedly in retaliation

for her complaints. According to Flippen, she was the only black motel employee at virtually

all relevant times and she was the only victim of the abusive policies and behaviors. Flippen

claims that she reported these problems to two other supervisors and no action was taken.

Ashland Arms disputes these instances of alleged discrimination. In opposition to

Flippen’s motion for summary judgment, various Ashland Arms employees submitted

affidavits in which they deny Flippen’s specific allegations of race discrimination. William

Dudley, a coworker who regularly observed interactions between Burkhead and Flippen,

states in his declaration that he never observed any of the alleged abuse. He denied that there

was anything unique about Flippen’s working conditions; a restriction on using the

manager’s kitchen applied to all employees alike. Other declarations indicate that Flippen

never reported problems to her supervisors. A police report relating to a physical altercation

between Flippen and Burkhead indicates nothing about racial bias. According to the

affidavits, Flippen was terminated for excessive personal use of the phone, interfering with

the work of other employees, and hosting personal visitors at work, all of which violated

company rules.

Flippen then brought this action alleging unlawful employment discrimination and

retaliation. After the commencement of discovery, Ashland Arms moved for dismissal with

prejudice on grounds of alleged misconduct by Flippen. Specifically, Ashland Arms

contends that Flippen brought her case under an assumed name and gave misleading sworn

responses to an interrogatory and deposition question relating to her criminal history and

identity. 

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B. The Answer to Interrogatories

During discovery, Ashland Arms submitted a set of written interrogatories to Flippen.

First among these interrogatories appeared the following question: “Have you ever been

arrested, charged with, or convicted of a crime?” Flippen answered, “No.” This answer was

verified under penalty of perjury, bearing both the signature of Flippen and her attorney. It

was dated August 12, 2008. 

 Subsequently, Ashland Arms discovered that this answer was false. Almost two

years before, on October 31, 2006, a warrant had issued for the arrest of “Elmira Jones aka

Emma Flippen” to answer an indictment for theft of government property. The charge arose

out of the wrongful collection of social security disability benefits. Flippen had received

benefits after suffering a stroke in 1997, claiming that she was confined to a wheelchair,

unable to work. She continued to receive benefits without informing the Social Security

Administration that she had returned to work under a different name and social security

number. Flippen was arrested and pled guilty to the charge. She was sentenced to probation

and ordered to pay restitution on July 7, 2008. Her plea agreement contained a standard

acknowledgment of guilt. The presentence report states, “Ms. Flippen is remorseful for

having committed this offense and does not wish to make excuses for the theft. She used the

disability checks to supplement her low income. She knew that it was wrong and is ashamed

of her conduct.” The report also states that Flippen was hysterical following her arrest and

consequently hospitalized for an evaluation. Flippen was represented by an attorney in the

criminal proceeding.

At the time she was sentenced, Flippen was 63 years old. She had a third- or fourthgrade education and had begun attending literacy classes. During testimony in this case, she

expressed confusion regarding the meaning of legal terms such as “interrogatory” and

“misdemeanor.” According to the 2008 presentence report, Flippen’s only other criminal

history was an unspecified misdemeanor conviction without any sentence of probation or

incarceration. That conviction had taken place 24 years before.

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Some of the facts presented are insufficient to support a finding that Flippen wilfully

submitted a false answer to interrogatories. For example, the Court gives no weight to

Ashland Arms’s claim that Flippen has prosecuted this case under a false name. Flippen’s

given name as it appears on her birth certificate is Emma Elmira Flippen. She has used

various names over the years, including the last name Jones, primarily because of changes

in marital status. Her usage of the name “Emma Flippen” in this case is consistent with good

faith and does not suggest wrongdoing. Similarly, it is unsurprising that a woman of such

limited education would forget or misremember the events and significance of events that are

24 years in the past, particularly where she suffered a stroke in the intervening years. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Flippen did not wilfully misrepresent her criminal history with

respect to the 24 year-old misdemeanor conviction that resulted in no probation or

incarceration. The Court gives no weight to the showing that Ashland Arms has been unable

to locate some of the witnesses identified by Flippen. 

As to the more recent criminal proceedings, however, the Court finds that Flippen’s

failure to submit a correct answer to the interrogatory was willful and in bad faith. Only two

weeks before she answered the interrogatory, Flippen was sentenced to probation for theft

of more than $1,000 in government property, a crime punishable by up to ten years in prison

and a $250,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 641. The evidence also shows that Flippen was so

traumatized by her initial arrest that she required hospitalization. In her live testimony,

Flippen offered no persuasive explanation for her failure to recount these events, claiming

only that she thought the answer was “no” because she thought the word “convicted” referred

to incarceration. In isolation, it is very plausible to suppose that a woman with a third- or

fourth-grade education would confuse the meaning of “convicted” with “incarcerated.” In

the context of this case, however, there are significant indicia of willful bad faith besides.

Flippen may have little formal education, but she has over sixty years of life

experience. To people of all ages and education levels, the significance of an arrest is

unmistakable. The attending physical restraint and portent of criminal proceedings are not

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things lightly undergone; our Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures runs

directly to this human sensitivity. Flippen’s extreme emotional response to her arrest betrays

her awareness of the circumstances. As a direct result of the arrest, Flippen pled guilty to

theft charges in federal court and accepted responsibility for her actions. Whether or not she

was confused about the meaning of the word “convicted,” she offers no explanation as to

why she did not consider herself to have ever been “arrested” or “charged with a crime.”

Moreover, Flippen possessed a significant motive to falsify her response in this case.

Flippen’s evidence of discrimination consists almost entirely of her personal recollection.

Any proof of liability would require her to take the stand and relate her version of events.

At the same time, Ashland Arms plans to present witnesses who deny the essential points of

Flippen’s complaint: her mistreatment at the hands of Burkhead, her complaints to

management, and the reasons for discharge. In essence, Flippen’s case is a contest of

credibility. Impeachment evidence offered by either side could easily determine the

outcome. Flippen’s recent conviction for theft of government funds, resting as it did on a

stipulation to fraudulent conduct, would be admissible for impeachment under Fed. R. Evid.

609(a)(2). An affirmative answer to the interrogatory relating to the arrest or the criminal

charges would almost certainly have led to the discovery of the conviction. The Court

therefore finds that Flippen answered the interrogatory falsely in a willful and bad faith

attempt to avoid this outcome, which would have been all but fatal to her case.

II. Conclusions of Law

Ashland Arms’s motion invokes the Court’s inherent power to sanction parties for bad

faith conduct, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991), and its power to issue

discovery sanctions for failure to disclose under Rule 37(c)(1). Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464

F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006). Before imposing the “harsh sanction” of dismissal on either

basis, it is necessary to consider five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice

to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

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merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995)). A finding of willfulness, fault,

or bad faith is required for dismissal to be proper. Id.

In this case, and in light of the finding of willful bad faith, all five factors favor

dismissal of the suit. The enforcement of good faith in discovery serves judicial economy

and the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation because the willful

concealment of relevant evidence threatens the integrity and efficiency of every judicial

proceeding. The party seeking sanctions, in this case Ashland Arms, faced a substantial risk

of prejudice from Flippen’s conduct as already explained above. And although public policy

favors disposition of cases on their merits, the successful concealment of Flippen’s arrest and

conviction would have undermined the legitimacy of that very prospect. Finally, the Court

has determined that no less drastic sanction will suffice. To preclude Flippen’s own

testimony would doom her chances of success at trial and impose needless litigation costs

on Ashland Arms. As Flippen’s counsel conceded, monetary sanctions are unlikely to be

paid. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion for Discovery Sanctions

(doc. # 53) is granted. The complaint is dismissed as sanction for discovery misconduct.

The clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this action with prejudice and shall terminate the

case.

DATED this 14th day of May, 2009.

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