Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-00479/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-00479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MAGGIE MYERS, INC., d/b/a 

MAGGIE MYERS IRISH PUB, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:19-cv-0479-LCB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This copyright infringement action is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’1

motion for default judgment. (Doc. 14). One of the plaintiffs in this case, Broadcast 

Music, Inc. (“BMI”), is a performing rights society and has acquired from the other 

plaintiffs non-exclusive public performance rights of certain musical compositions 

and millions of other compositions, collectively known as the BMI Repertoire. BMI 

grants to music users such as the owners and operators of concert halls, restaurants, 

nightclubs, and hotels the right to publicly perform any of the works in BMI’s 

Repertoire by means of a blanket license agreement. The Defendants in this case, 

 1 The Plaintiffs in this case are: Broadcast Music, Inc.; Less Than Zero Music; Southfield Road 

Music; Fake and Jaded Music; Paul Simon Music; Embassy Music Corporation; Screen GemsEMI Music Inc; Universal-Songs of Polygram International Inc.; Tokeco Tunes; Songs of 

Universal Inc.; Escatawpa Songs LLC; Warner-Tamberlane Publishing Corp.; Mad Mother 

Music; Sony/ATV Songs LLC; R and R Nomad Publishing Company, a division of R & R 

Nomad Publishing Co. LLC; and 4U2asky Entertainment Inc.

FILED

 2020 Feb-05 AM 09:17

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:19-cv-00479-LCB Document 21 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 8
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Maggie Myers, Inc., d/b/a Maggie Myers Irish Pub, and Cassandra Lynne Smith, a 

director of Maggie Myers, Inc., allegedly played eight songs from the BMI 

Repertoire without obtaining a license to do so from BMI or any of the other 

plaintiffs.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), as 

the action arises under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et 

seq. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), because the 

defendant business at which the infringement is alleged to have occurred is located 

in this judicial district. (Doc. 1, at 4).

I. Background

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 24, 2019, and served an alias 

summons on all defendants via certified mail on May 18, 2019. (Doc. 9). Pursuant 

to Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i), Fed. R. Civ. P., the Defendants were required to serve an 

answer on or before June 10, 2019. After the Defendants failed to answer or 

otherwise defend the claims, the Plaintiffs moved for a Clerk’s entry of default on 

July 1, 2019. (Doc. 12). The Clerk entered default against Maggie Myers and its 

Director, Cassandra Lynne Smith, on July 2, 2019. (Doc. 13). On July 17, 2019, 

the Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., 

seeking statutory damages in the amount of $12,000; a permanent injunction; 

attorney’s fees and costs; and interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. This Court 

Case 5:19-cv-00479-LCB Document 21 Filed 02/05/20 Page 2 of 8
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entered an order on November 5, 2019, ordering the Defendants to show cause as to 

why default judgment should not be entered. The Defendants did not respond.

II. Discussion

Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P., establishes a two-step procedure for obtaining a 

default judgment. First, when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend a 

lawsuit, the Clerk must enter the party’s default. Rule 55(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Second, 

after entry of the Clerk’s default, if the defendant is not an infant or an incompetent 

person, the Court reviews the sufficiency of the complaint and its underlying 

substantive merits to determine whether a moving party is entitled to default 

judgment. Rule 55(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 

F.3d 1353, 1370 n. 41 (11th Cir. 1997). As noted, the Clerk already entered default. 

Therefore, the Court must decide whether Plaintiffs' complaint and other evidence 

establishes liability.

A defaulting defendant “admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of 

fact” for purposes of liability. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 

1987)(quotation marks omitted). In resolving a motion for default judgment, the 

Court also may consider evidence presented in the form of an affidavit or 

declaration. Frazier v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1362 

(N.D. Ga. 2011).

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To prevail on a copyright infringement claim based on unauthorized public 

performances of a copyrighted musical composition, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) the originality and authorship of the compositions involved; (2) 

compliance with all formalities required to secure a copyright under 

Title 17, United States Code; (3) that plaintiffs are the proprietors of the 

copyrights of the compositions involved in the action; (4) that the 

compositions were performed publicly by the defendant; and (5) that 

the defendant had not receive permission from any of the plaintiffs or 

their representatives for such performance.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Evie's Tavern Ellenton, Inc., 772 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th 

Cir. 2014). The Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts in their complaint and 

accompanying affidavits to satisfy all of these elements. Incorporated into the 

Plaintiffs’ complaint is a “Schedule” that lists the title of the musical composition, 

the writer of that composition alleged to have been infringed, the publisher of the 

composition, the copyright registration number, and the date on which the copyright 

was obtained. The Schedule also lists the date of the alleged infringement as well 

as the location of that infringement, i.e., Maggie Myers Irish Pub. (Doc. 1, at 8-11). 

According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants did not have permission to publicly 

exhibit their works. The Plaintiffs also alleged that they sent 74 letters to the 

Defendants explaining the licensing requirements and offering to enter into a blanket 

license agreement. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, would 

establish copyright infringement on the part of the Defendants.

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The Court must next determine the amount of damages it will award. “A 

default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is 

demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The Court may enter a default 

judgment without a hearing only if “the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one 

capable of mathematical calculation.” United States Artist Corp. v. Freeman, 605 

F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted);2 see also Rule 55(b)(1) Fed. R. 

Civ. P. Unlike a finding of liability, the Court may award damages only if the record 

adequately reflects the basis for such an award through “a hearing or a demonstration 

by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.” Adolph Coors Co. v. 

Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(quotation marks omitted).

Under the Copyright Act, plaintiffs may elect statutory damages per infringed

work instead of actual damages and profits. A prevailing party in a copyright 

infringement action is entitled to “not less than $750.00 or more than $30,000” per 

infringement “as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). In their complaint, 

Plaintiffs seek to recover statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). In their 

motion for default judgment, the Plaintiffs seek a total award of $12,000 in statutory 

damages. That amounts to an award of $1,500 per infringement and would be 

 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down 

before October 1, 1981.

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approximately three times the amount the Plaintiffs would have received to date had 

the Defendants properly paid the licensing fees. The Court does not find that a 

hearing is necessary to determine the amount of damages. Furthermore, the Court 

finds this amount of damages to be just and appropriate under the circumstances 

presented in this case.

The Copyright Act also permits the court to grant “final injunctions on such 

terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 

17 U.S.C. § 502(a). In their complaint, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin Defendants 

from infringing the copyrighted musical compositions licensed by BMI. (Doc. 1 at 

7). To be entitled to a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs must show:

(1) that [the plaintiffs have] suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 

remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate 

to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 

hardships between the plaintiff[s] and defendant[s], a remedy in equity 

is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by 

a permanent injunction.

Evie’s Tavern, 772 F.3d at 1261, quoting eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 

U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (alterations in Evie’s Tavern).

The record demonstrates that Defendants' conduct has caused, and unless 

restrained by the Court, will continue to cause Plaintiffs irreparable injury that 

cannot be fully compensated by money damages. Balancing the hardships between 

the parties, an equitable remedy is appropriate, and the Court finds that the public 

interest is not disserved by a permanent injunction under the circumstances. See 

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Pacific and So. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[P]ast 

infringement and a substantial likelihood of future infringements [ ] normally 

entitle[s] the copyright holder to a permanent injunction.”). Accordingly, the Court 

finds that a permanent injunction is appropriate in this case.

Finally, the Copyright Act permits the Court to award full costs, which may 

include reasonable attorney’s fees, to the prevailing party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. 

Plaintiffs ask the court to award $4,095 in costs and fees. (Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 10 at 2). 

In support of this request, Plaintiffs submit a declaration from their attorney, who 

attests that he performed at least 11.7 hours on this matter, and his usual and 

customary rate is $350.00 per hour. (Doc. 14-6, p. 4-5). Based on counsel’s 

expertise, the time expended in this case, and the amount of statutory damages 

awarded, the court finds that the attorney’s fees and costs requested are reasonable

and due to be awarded.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ motion for 

default judgment (Doc. 14) is due to be GRANTED. The Court will enter default 

judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants, jointly and severally, 

in the following amounts: (1) $12,000 in statutory damages; (2) $4,095 in attorney’s 

fees and costs; and (3) post-judgment interest at the statutory rate in accordance with 

28 U.S.C. § 1961. The Court will also enter a permanent injunction enjoining and 

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restraining Defendants from infringing the copyrighted musical compositions 

licensed by BMI.

The Court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum 

opinion. 

DONE and ORDERED this February 5, 2020.

 _________________________________

 LILES C. BURKE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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