Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04534/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04534-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAREN HEATHERLY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PANINI, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04534-JSC

REFERRAL FOR REASSIGNMENT; 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Plaintiffs Daren Heatherly (“Heatherly”) and Irma Ramirez (“Ramirez,” and together, 

“Plaintiffs”) bring this action alleging that Panini (the “Business”), in San Francisco, California, is 

operating with architectural access barriers in violation of their civil rights under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California state law. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Default was entered 

against Defendants Lada Group, Inc. dba Panini (“Lada Group”), and Thomas P. Wiseau, 

individually and as Trustee of the Thomas P. Wiseau Revocable Trust dated 12/10/1992 

(“Wiseau” and all together, “Defendants”).1 Plaintiffs now move for default judgment against 

Defendants, seeking: $16,000 in statutory damages, an injunction requiring Defendants to remove 

the architectural barriers impeding Plaintiffs’ access and to meet the requirements of California 

law and the ADA, and attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert fees. (Dkt. No. 15.) Because the 

Court finds this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7-1(b), the Court VACATES the hearing previously set for October 8, 2015. As Defendants have 

not consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge, the Court orders that this 

 

1

Plaintiffs were told by Lada Group’s registered agent for service that West Coast Management is 

the management company controlling and managing the property on which the Business is 

located. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2.) Although Plaintiffs indicated in a Status Update that they would be 

amending their complaint to include West Coast Management, they have not done so. (Id.)

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matter be REFERRED to a District Judge and RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ motion be 

GRANTED as set forth below. 

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are physically disabled persons who use a wheel chair to travel in public: 

Heatherly has Multiple Sclerosis and a left hip replacement, and Ramirez has Post-Polio 

syndrome. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs are married and live in Santa Rosa, California, 

approximately 55.3 miles from the Business. (Id. ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 5.) The 

Business is a restaurant in San Francisco, California. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.) Defendants are the owners 

of the property and operators of the Business, which they organized as a joint venture. (Id. ¶¶ 7-

9.) The Business is a place of public accommodation subject to the requirements of the California 

Civil Code, the California Health and Safety Code, and the ADA. (Id. ¶ 9.)

On three occasions—December 13, 2012, February 28, 2013, and May 23, 2013—

Plaintiffs visited the Business to enjoy its food and beverage. (Id. ¶ 15.) During those visits, the 

following state and federal law violations impeded Plaintiffs’ access to the Business: (1) the 

Business entrance and restroom doors had excessive door pressure; (2) the Business entrance 

lacked strike side clearance2in which wheelchair users could navigate and open the door, so 

Plaintiffs would have struggled to enter the Business if the door were not propped open or patrons 

did not assist them; (3) the service counter was too high, so Ramirez had to sign her credit card in 

her lap or thigh; (4) the table arrangements impeded access to the unisex bathroom, so Heatherly

had to ask for chairs to be moved and for other patrons to shift before he had room to navigate; (5) 

the restroom door handle used a door knob instead of levered hardware, so Heatherly had to ask 

for assistance to enter; (6) the unisex restroom lacked adequate clear space, so Plaintiffs needed to 

use “multiple wheelchair movements” to navigate out of the restroom and, in doing so, they struck 

the toilet multiple times; (7) the locking mechanism in the bathroom required a turning, twisting,

 

2

The strike side of a door is the edge that swings (i.e., the side that is not hinged): strike side 

clearance refers to space on the side of a door in which someone could angle their wheelchair. 

(See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 21.); see also Peter A. Singler, ADA Accessibility Guide, Singler Law (last 

updated 2004), http://www.singler-law.com/guides/adaclist.html.

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and grasping movement to activate, so Heatherly could not lock it; (8) the bathroom soap 

dispenser was placed too high, so Ramirez had difficulty reaching it; (9) the hand dryer was also 

placed too high; and (10) the entrance and restroom lacked any International Symbol of 

Accessibility Signage. (Id. ¶¶ 16-19, 24; Dkt. No. 26 ¶¶ A-H.) 

Ramirez sent identical letters to the owner of the building and the manager of the Business 

on February 4, 2013, almost two months after Plaintiffs’ first visit. The letters described the 

difficulties Plaintiffs experienced and recommended resources to help the Business become 

compliant with state and federal access laws. The letters also requested that the recipient confirm 

receipt of the letters. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 15, 20; id. at 39-40.)3

On March 7, 2013, following Plaintiffs’ second visit to the Business, Ramirez wrote 

another letter repeating the same information, this time to the manager of the Business alone. 

(Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 21; id. at 41.) Defendants neither confirmed receipt of the letters nor responded to 

Ramirez. (Id. ¶ 21.)

During Plaintiffs’ last visit in May 2013, Heatherly did not encounter the same problems 

on his route to the unisex restroom, as the table and chairs had been moved further away from the 

restroom door. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

On February 26, 2013, Rick Sarantschin, a Certified Accessibility Inspector/Plans 

Examiner, inspected the Business at Plaintiffs’ lawyer’s request. (Dkt. No. 26 ¶¶ 2, 4.) Mr. 

Sarantschin observed several of the violations that Plaintiffs had reported. (Id. ¶¶ A-H.) Mr. 

Sarantschin last visited the Business on August 25, 2015, and noted that “the only remedial repair 

completed was that a new service counter at a complying height of 34” had been installed.” (Id. ¶

7 (emphasis in original).)

As a result of these difficulties, Plaintiffs were deprived of their civil rights and the full and 

equal opportunities afforded to non-disabled persons to independently enjoy and participate in the 

opportunities, goods and services. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 26, 28, 35-36.) Plaintiffs also suffered an array 

of physical and emotional discomforts from the experience. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 27-29, 37, 49.) Plaintiffs 

 

3

Page numbers throughout refer to those that the Court’s electronic filing system automatically 

assigns.

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found it would be a futile gesture to try and overcome the Business’s architectural barriers and 

were deterred from returning after May 23, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants operated the Business with knowledge that the barriers 

described above effectively denied full and equal access to persons with disabilities and that their 

refusal to respond to or correct complaints about their denial of handicap access constitutes 

negligence per se or neglect, as well as actual and implied malice toward each plaintiff and a 

willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of similarly situated persons. (Id. ¶¶ 30-

33, 46.) Simple modifications to construct barrier-free handicapped access will eliminate the 

disparate and discriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities. (Id. ¶ 56.) 

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this action on October 1, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.) In the Complaint, 

Plaintiffs bring claims for violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12101, 12181-12183, 12201;

California Health and Safety Code Sections 19955-19956; California’s Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. 

Code §§ 54, 54.1, and 54.3; and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, 51.5. 

The Complaint seeks money damages, including no less than $4,000 in statutory damages for 

three occasions of denied access and each occasion of deterrence, and treble damages pursuant to 

the ADA, California Civil Codes, and California Health and Safety Code, as well as injunctive 

relief, attorneys’ fees and costs, and expert costs.

As discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiffs properly delivered the summons and 

Complaint to Defendants. Defendants never made an appearance in this matter and failed to 

answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint within the time prescribed by the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, so the Clerk of Court entered Defendants’ default on April 8, 2014, as to Lada 

Group, and March 9, 2015, as to Wiseau. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 12.)

On July 31, 2015, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment within 

30 days or face dismissal of the case. (Dkt. No. 13.) Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for default 

judgment on August 27, 2015. (Dkt. No. 15.) The same day, Plaintiffs filed a stipulation to limit 

their statutory damages to $8,000 each for one occasion of denied access—instead of three 

occasions—and one deterrence occasion. (Dkt. No. 16 at 32; Dkt. No. 27 at 2.) Plaintiffs also 

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seek attorney’s fees and costs, including expert’s fees, as well as injunctive relief to require the 

Business to remove the remaining architectural barriers and to make its facilities readily accessible 

and usable by individuals with disabilities. (Id.; id. at 24.) To date, Defendants have failed to 

appear, respond to the motion, or otherwise defend themselves in this action .

DISCUSSION

A. Service and Jurisdiction

1. Service

“Courts must determine the adequacy of service of process on a motion for default 

judgment.” Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citation 

omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides that service in accordance with California 

law is proper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (allowing for service “following state law for serving a 

summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court 

is located or where service is made”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A) (authorizing service of 

process on corporations “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual”). 

Under California law, “[a] summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the 

summons and of the complaint to the person to be served.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.10. A 

summons can be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and of the 

complaint to the person designated as agent for service of process. Id. § 416.10(a). A summons 

can also be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the 

president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation. Id. § 416.10(b). 

Here, rather than personally serving Defendants, Plaintiffs resorted to substitute service 

pursuant to Section 415.20. The rules on substitute service differ depending on whether the 

defendant being served is an individual or an entity. Compare id. § 415.20(a) (substitute service 

on entity and corporate defendants), with id. § 415.20(b) (substitute service on individuals).

a. Substitute Service on Corporate Defendant Lada Group

In California, a summons can be served on a corporate defendant by delivering copies of 

the summons and complaint to the designated agent for service of process. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 

§ 416.10(a). In lieu of personal delivery, substitute service may be made on a corporation by: (1) 

leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours at the service agent’s 

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office with a person apparently in charge of the office and at least 18 years old; (2) informing the 

recipient of the contents of the documents; and (3) later sending via first-class mail a copy of the 

summons and complaint to the service agent at the location where the summons and complaint 

were left. Id. § 415.20(a). Such service is deemed complete on the tenth day after mailing. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs’ process servers made three visits to the address for Lada Group’s agent for 

service, Michael Musleh, in order to affect personal service of the Summons and Complaint. (Dkt. 

No. 5-2 at 3.) On the fourth visit, substitute service was made with “Jane Doe,” described as a 

“Competent Member of the Household.” (Dkt. No. 5-2 at 4.). Plaintiffs mailed copies of the 

documents three days later. (Id.) 

Although the process server’s documents designated the agent’s address as a Business, 

substitute service was made to a “Competent Member of the Household”—normally the recipient 

for service on an individual, not a business. (Id. (emphasis added).) Despite this discrepancy, it is 

clear that Mr. Musleh actually received the notice, as he subsequently spoke with Defendants 

regarding Wiseau’s whereabouts and settlement. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2; Dkt. No. 34-6 at 4.) Because 

actual notice was received, Plaintiffs’ substitute service on the Lada Group’s agent was proper. 

See Pasadena Medi-Ctr. Assocs. v. Sup. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 9 Cal. 3d 773, 778 (1973) (noting 

statutory provisions of service “should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the 

jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has been received by the defendant”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Produce v. Cal. Harvest Healthy Foods Ranch Mkt., No. C-11-04814 

DMR, 2012 WL 259575, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (same). 

b. Substitute Service on Individual Defendant Wiseau

With respect to service on Wiseau, an individual, a party must first use “reasonable 

diligence” to personally serve an individual with a copy of the summons and complaint before 

resorting to substitute service. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b). Having done so, substitute 

service can be made by: (1) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s usual 

place of business, among others, with a person at least 18 years of age and apparently in charge of 

the place of business; (2) informing the recipient of the contents of the documents; and (3) later 

sending via first-class mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the location where the 

summons and complaint were left. Id. As with substitute service for corporate entities, substitute 

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service is deemed complete on the tenth day after mailing. Id. Substitute service in accordance 

with the requirements of section 415.20(b) “satisfies the constitutional requirements of service 

reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the proceedings and an 

opportunity to be heard.” Korea Exch. Bank v. Yang, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1471, 1474(1988) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ process servers first attempted to serve Wiseau by making four visits to an 

unnamed San Francisco business; however, both an employee and the business owner’s brother 

informed the process servers that they did not know Wiseau. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 2.) Plaintiffs’ 

process servers then made more than fifteen unsuccessful visits to Wiseau’s home4before learning 

he might now be found in Los Angeles. (See Dkt. Nos. 9, 9-1.) These efforts spanned six months, 

from October 2013 to April 2014. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiffs’ process servers then began to look for 

Wiseau in Los Angeles and as of September 2014—nearly a year after the complaint was filed—

they still had not located him. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2.) Then, in early November 2014, process servers 

made two visits to a business located at 5566 West Pico Boulevard to no avail. (Dkt. No. 11-2 at 

3.) On the third visit, “the person in charge of the business” told the process server that Wiseau 

was not in. (Dkt. No. 11-2 at 3.) Plaintiffs’ process server then made substitute service on Byron 

Smith, a “[p]erson in charge at least 18 years of age apparently in charge of the office.” (Id. at 3-

4.) Copies of the documents were mailed two days later. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiffs subsequently 

indicated their belief that after service, Wiseau vacated the premises. (Dkt. No. 16 at 2.) 

“Ordinarily, . . . two or three attempts at personal service at a proper place should fully 

satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence and allow substituted service to be made.”) See 

Espindola v. Nunez, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1389, 1392 (1988). “Reasonable diligence may [also] 

include any other method ‘reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with actual notice of the 

action.’” G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Saddeldin, No. 1:10-cv-00062-AWI-SKO, 2014 WL 

631613, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2014). Plaintiffs have exerted more than reasonable diligence in their 

efforts to serve Wiseau, searching for more than a year across three properties. Although the 

 

4 During the process server’s last visit, a tenant in the building indicated that the process server 

had the wrong address. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 14.) However, “Wiseau” was the name on the intercom 

outside the building. (Id. at 11.) Further, the home address where service was attempted 

corresponds to the address listed for Wiseau on his ownership documents for the Business. (Dkt. 

No. 26 at 11.)

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documents do not define Wiseau’s relationship to the business in Los Angeles, the person in 

charge of the business recognized Wiseau when asked by the process server whether Wiseau was 

there that day. (See Dkt. No. 11-2 at 3.) Under the circumstances presented, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiffs’ substitute service at that business address was sufficient. Cf. Saddeldin, 2014 WL 

631613, at *3 (granting motion to vacate default judgment against defendant where plaintiff was 

not “reasonably diligent” in effort to personally serve defendant before undertaking substituted 

service at what it believed to be defendant’s “usual place of business”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that service of process was proper in this case as to both 

Defendants.

2. Jurisdiction

On a motion for default judgment, the court also has “an affirmative duty to look into its 

jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 

1999). Although defects in personal jurisdiction are a defense “that must [generally] be asserted 

or waived by a party,” a court considering a motion for default judgment “may dismiss the action 

or a party sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdiction[.]” McComb v. Vejar, No. 2:14-CV-00941-

RSWL-E, 2014 WL 5494017, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014). Here, the Court is satisfied that it 

has jurisdiction over Defendants. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 as Plaintiffs’ claims arise in part from violations of federal law; specifically, the ADA. As 

to Plaintiffs’ state law claims under the Unruh Act and request for injunctive relief under 

California Health and Safety Code Section 19995, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

With respect to personal jurisdiction over the Lada Group, “[t]here is general personal 

jurisdiction over a party who is physically present in the state whether or not such presence is 

related to the claim asserted. In general, a corporation is deemed to be present in a state in which 

it is incorporated or in which it has its principal place of business.” Murphy v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. 

Co., No. ED CV14-00486 JAK, 2015 WL 4379834, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) (internal 

citations omitted). Lada Group’s location and principal place of business is 1457 Haight Street, 

San Francisco, California. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.) The Court may therefore exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the Lada Group. 

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With respect to Wiseau, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over individual 

parties based on in-state service of process. Burnham v. Super. Ct. Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) 

(plurality opinion) (finding Due Process did “not prohibit California courts from exercising 

jurisdiction over [a party] based on in-state service of process”); see also McComb, 2014 WL 

5494017, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (finding personal jurisdiction over individual 

defendant served via substitute service at his business in California). Plaintiffs have not alleged 

the residence, domicile, or citizenship of Wiseau. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have 

met the requirements for proper substituted service, as discussed above, and the Court may 

exercise personal jurisdiction over Wiseau on that basis. Having found this basis for jurisdiction, 

the Court need not address alternative means. 

B. Default Judgment

After entry of default, a court may grant default judgment on the merits of the case. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. “The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 

discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Courts consider the 

following factors in determining whether to enter default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Upon entry of default, the factual 

allegations of the complaint related to liability are deemed to have been admitted by the nondefaulting party. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Allegations regarding damages, however, are not deemed admitted; to that end, the Court has the 

discretion to consider competent evidence and other papers submitted with a motion for default

judgment to determine damages. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co.. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 

995, 1000, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (citing TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917).

The majority of the Eitel factors support default judgment in this case.

1. Possibility of Prejudice

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The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a default 

judgment is not entered. Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. 

Cal. 2010). Here, Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if default judgment were not entered because 

they would be left without any other course of action to recover the value of their loss. “Denying 

a plaintiff a means of recourse is by itself sufficient to meet the burden posed by this factor.” 

Willamette Green Innovation Ctr. v. Quartis Capital Partners, No. 13-cv-00848-JCS, 2014 WL 

5281039, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (citations omitted). Other courts have found that the 

possibility of prejudice weighs in favor of default in situations where, as here, plaintiffs seek relief 

under the ADA and state law based on access barriers at a place of public accommodation and the 

defendants have been unwilling to cooperate with requests to remove the barriers or to defend in 

the action. See, e.g., Heatherly v. GD Liquor & Food, No. 14-cv-03458-RS, 2015 WL 4967255, 

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015); Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 

2014). Mr. Sarantschin avers that as of August 2015 the Business had repaired one of the 

violations complained of in Ramirez’s letters and the instant Complaint—specifically, the service 

counter now complies with height requirements. (Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 7.) While this indicates some

effort by the Business to remove a complained-of barrier, Plaintiffs’ prejudice persists given that 

Defendants appear to have taken no effort to correct the lion’s share of the violations.

2. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors consider the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims 

and the sufficiency of the pleadings to support those claims. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d

1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, although the filings indicate that some contact occurred 

between Lada Group’s registered agent and Plaintiffs, Defendants neither answered the Complaint

nor made an appearance in this case. Accordingly, the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs’ wellpleaded allegations regarding liability. See TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917; Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(b)(6). Nevertheless, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are 

legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 

1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). For that reason, default does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to 

judgment. Instead, default may be inappropriate under this second Eitel factor where the court 

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determines that no justifiable claim has been alleged. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th 

Cir. 1986).

As mentioned, Plaintiffs’ Complaint pleads causes of action for violation of the ADA, the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California Disabled Persons Act, and the California Health and Safety 

Code. Their motion for default judgment addresses only the claims for violation of the ADA, the 

Unruh Act, and the California Health and Safety Code; accordingly, the Court evaluates only these 

three claims.

a. Discrimination under Title III of the ADA

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. It provides that 

“[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 

place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place 

of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants own and 

operate the Business as a joint venture. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 7-9.) Defendants are therefore jointly 

liable for violating the ADA if Plaintiffs show that they suffered discrimination at the location due 

to their disability. See Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding 

defendants, landlords and tenants, jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs’ fees and costs in ADA 

violation case). Discrimination under Title III includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . 

. . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The term “readily achievable” means “easily accomplishable and able to be 

carried out without much difficulty or expense.” Id. § 12181(9).

To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiffs must show that (1) they are

disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendants are private entities that own, lease, or 

operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiffs were denied public 

accommodations by the defendants because of their disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 

F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). In addition, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination on 

account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the 

existing facility at the defendant’s place of business or property presents an architectural barrier 

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prohibited under the ADA and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Vogel, 992 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1008 (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Beahm, No. 2:11-cv-0294-MCE, 2011 

WL 5508893, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).

i. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring Their ADA Claim

As with all other causes of action, a plaintiff must have Article III standing to bring a claim 

under the ADA. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has 

suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct, and 

that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 

2d 1150, 1162 (S.D. Cal. 2006). Plaintiffs have Article III standing because they allege that they 

were denied full and equal access to the services of the Business and deterred from seeking those 

services in the future5; this allegation is accepted as true by virtue of Defendants’ default. The 

Business’s architectural barriers were purportedly the cause of the denial of access, and 

Defendants are alleged to have known of the barriers. Finally, an award of statutory damages and 

an injunction would redress Plaintiffs’ known injuries.

Where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he must also demonstrate a significant possibility 

of future harm. See San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

In the ADA context, in determining the likelihood that a plaintiff 

will return to defendant’s facility, courts have examined such factors 

as (1) the proximity of the place of public accommodation to 

plaintiff’s residence, (2) plaintiff’s past patronage of defendant’s 

business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) 

the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near defendant.

Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-63. 

Here, although the restaurant is nearly 60 miles from Plaintiffs’ home, Plaintiffs visited the 

 

5 Although the Plaintiffs were never actually prevented from entering the building because of the 

entrance door’s excessive pressure or lack of strike side clearance, they still have standing for 

injunctive relief under the ADA. The Ninth Circuit has held that “once a plaintiff establishes that 

he encountered a barrier which deterred him from use and enjoyment of the facility . . . the 

plaintiff was then deemed to have standing to challenge all discovered violations affecting his or 

her disability.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 959 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Doran v. 7-Eleven, 524 F.3d 1034, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs personally encountered 

other barriers; this gives them standing to challenge the door as well.

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premises three times prior to filing the Complaint. Plaintiffs have not indicated that they travel 

frequently to San Francisco or that they intend to patronize the business at a certain date. 

However, Plaintiffs assert that the architectural barriers they faced at the Business have deterred 

them from returning, and that they “would, could and will return” once it is made accessible. 

(Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 27, 49.) This unambiguous intention to return combined with the actual injury 

suffered by their deterrence is sufficient to establish Plaintiffs’ standing. See Pickern v. Holiday 

Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding actual or imminent harm

sufficiently established when plaintiff had “actual knowledge of the barriers to access” and stated

he would patronize the defendant business in the future if it were accessible); see also Chapman v. 

Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A disabled individual also suffers a 

cognizable injury if he is deterred from visiting a noncompliant public accommodation because he 

has encountered barriers related to his disability there.”). Plaintiffs have therefore satisfied the 

requirements for Article III standing and can seek injunctive relief under the ADA.

ii. Plaintiffs Have Alleged They are Disabled Within the Meaning of 

 the ADA

The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 

one or more major life activities . . . [,] a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as 

having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Major life activities as defined by the ADA 

include walking or standing. Id. § 12102(2)(A). Plaintiffs allege that they both use wheelchairs to 

move about in public as a result of current or past illness. Accepting these allegations as true, they

have established physical impairments that substantially limit the major life activities of walking 

and standing. Plaintiffs are therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA and have satisfied 

the first element of his Title III discrimination claim.

iii. Plaintiffs have Shown that the Business is a Place of Public 

 Accommodation

Plaintiffs assert that the Business is a “restaurant” and “a place of public accommodation”

that is “open to the general public.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2, 9.) Plaintiffs further allege that Wiseau 

owns the property on which the Business is located and that he owns and operates the Business as 

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a joint venture with the Lada Group. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) The Business, a “restaurant, bar, or other 

establishment serving food or drink,” is a public accommodation under the ADA. (Dkt. No. 1 

¶ 9.). Such facts are sufficient to show that Defendants are individuals who own or operate a place 

of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B); Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.

iv. Plaintiffs have Shown that the Business’s Architectural Barriers Denied 

 Them Public Accommodations Due to Their Disability

“The next two elements of an ADA architectural barriers claim evaluate whether 

architectural barriers worked to discriminate against the plaintiff on account of his physical 

disability.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. Taking the facts alleged as true, Plaintiffs visited the 

Business on three occasions. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 15.) They encountered numerous barriers at the 

Business for which Plaintiffs seek default judgment and injunctive relief “compelling defendants 

to remove the architectural barriers” and “to make [the Business] accessible and usable by persons 

with disabilities.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 3, 24.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs have shown 

that only some of the Business’s architectural barriers denied them public accommodations due to 

their disability. 

Plaintiffs initially asserted that the service counter at the Business exceeded the maximum 

height of 34 inches permitted under the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”). (Dkt. No. 1 

¶ 24.) Plaintiffs’ expert has since averred that as of August 2015, the Business had lowered the 

service counter, bringing it into compliance with the ADA. (Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 7.) This moots 

Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief under the ADA as to the service counter.6 See Oliver v. 

Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because a private plaintiff can sue only 

for injunctive relief (i.e., for removal of the barrier) under the ADA . . . a defendant’s voluntary 

removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.”) 

(collecting cases). 

Plaintiffs also alleged that the doors to the Business’s entrance and the unisex restroom 

both exerted excessive door pressure and lacked any International Accessibility Signage. (Dkt. 

 

6 As Plaintiffs encountered the counter as a barrier during each of their visits, the counter will still 

be considered for purposes of statutory damages. 

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No. 1 ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs do not cite to any provisions of the ADAAG that indicate these omissions 

violate applicable law. Further, Plaintiffs’ expert does not list or address these violations in his 

report. (See Dkt. No. 26.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden 

to show these barriers violate the ADA. 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint and expert declaration describe the following other architectural 

barriers: (1) the front entrance lacks the strike side clearance required by ADAAG § 4.13.6; (2) 

the dining tables block entrance to the unisex restroom in violation of ADAAG § 4.3 and 4.3.2; (3)

and (4) the restroom door’s knob and lock require grasping and twisting of the wrist in violation of 

ADAAG § 4.13.9 and 4.27.4; and (5) the restroom door opens into the clear floor space of the 

water closet, violating ADAAG § 4.23.2. (Dkt. No. 26 ¶¶ A-H.) Plaintiffs allege that these 

barriers caused them “one, all, or a combination” of emotions, including anxiety, disappointment, 

and embarrassment, as they endeavored to overcome the barriers during their visits, and that as a 

result they were denied full and equal access to the accommodation and deterred from visiting the 

Business again. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 24-32.) Accepting these allegations as true, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiffs have satisfied the third and fourth elements of a Title III discrimination claim by 

showing that they encountered the above-mentioned barriers prohibited by the ADA, and that 

those barriers denied them full and equal access to the Business because of their disability.

v. Plaintiffs Have Shown the Removal of These Barriers is Readily

 Achievable

The applicable DOJ regulations and the ADAAG limit available injunctive relief to 

removal of barriers only to the extent that removal is readily achievable. See 28 C.F.R. 

§ 36.304(a). Whether the removal of a barrier is readily achievable involves consideration of four 

factors:

A) the nature and cost of the action needed . . . ; B) the overall 

financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the action; 

the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on 

expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon 

the operation of the facility; C) the overall financial resources of the 

covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity 

with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and 

location of its facilities; and D) the type of operation or operations 

of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and 

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functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic 

separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or 

facilities in question to the covered entity.

Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)). 

“The Ninth Circuit has yet to decide who has the burden of proving that removal of an 

architectural barrier is readily achievable. Various district courts throughout the circuit, however, 

have applied the Tenth Circuit’s burden-shifting framework, as articulated in Colorado Cross 

Disability v. Hermanson Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001).” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 

1010. There, the court held that the “plaintiff bears the initial burden of production to present 

evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable[,]” and if the plaintiff 

makes that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant who “bears the ultimate burden of 

persuasion regarding his affirmative defense that a suggested method of barrier removal is not 

readily achievable.” Id. at 1010-11 (collecting cases in the Ninth Circuit following the Tenth 

Circuit’s burden-shifting framework until the Ninth Circuit addresses this issue); Vesecky v. 

Garick, Inc., No. 07-1173-PHX, 2008 WL 4446714, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (“[U]ntil the 

Ninth Circuit provides . . . specific instruction to the lower courts . . . . [the plaintiff] has the initial 

burden to produce evidence that removal of the barriers . . . [is] readily achievable.”).

Plaintiffs provide little information about the factors relevant to whether the changes they

seek are readily achievable and allege no information about the Defendants’ financial status or 

their means and ability to make the changes, which is generally found sufficient to meet this 

burden of production. See. e.g., McComb, 2014 WL 5494017, at *7 (“Plaintiff alleges . . . that 

‘failure to remove these barriers was intentional because had the defendants intended any other 

configuration, they had the means and ability to make the change. This allegation is sufficient to 

meet Plaintiff’s burden of production.” (citation and emphasis omitted)); Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d 

1011 (finding that plaintiff met its burden of production by alleging that defendant knew about the 

architectural barriers and had the financial resources to remove them without difficulty or 

expense). 

However, Plaintiffs do allege that removal of the barriers complained about is “readily 

achievable” and that the Defendants knew of the architectural barriers. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7.) The

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Sarantschin Declaration provides further support for the readily achievable nature of the barriers’ 

removal and Defendants’ ability to make certain repairs. For example, Mr. Sarantschin avers that

installation of an automatic door to avoid the strike side clearance requirement, rearranging the 

dining room tables for improved access, changing the restroom door’s lock, and changing the 

direction of the door swing are all readily achievable. (Dkt. No. 26 ¶¶ A, C, E-F.). Though 

minimal, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint coupled with the Sarantschin Declaration are 

sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden of production. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hall, No. 2:11-cv-2817-

GEB, 2012 WL 1604715, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that 

architectural barriers “are readily removable” and that he sought injunctive relief to remove all 

readily achievable barriers satisfied his burden); Johnson v. Beahm, No. 2:11-cv-294-MCE, 2011

WL 5508893, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (holding same because plaintiff’s allegations were 

taken as true on default); see also Sceper v. Trucks Plus, No. CIV S-09-0801-GEB, 2009 WL 

3763823, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009) (granting default judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim 

even though plaintiff did not specifically allege that removal of barriers was readily achievable , 

but instead alleged that defendants were required to remove architectural barriers). Defendants, 

for their part, have failed to meet their burden of proving otherwise because they failed to appear 

and defend. 

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have established the fifth and final element of 

their Title III discrimination claim, but would limit injunctive relief to only those repairs alleged 

or shown to be readily achievable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated a meritorious claim under 

the ADA as to the following barriers: (1) the lack of strike side clearance for the entrance door; (2) 

the arrangement of the dining tables, which block entrance to the unisex restroom; (3) the restroom 

door’s knob; (4) the restroom door’s lock; and (5) the restroom door, which opens into the clear 

floor space of the water closet.

b. Discrimination Under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act

The Unruh Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 

equal, and no matter what their . . . disability, [or] medical condition . . . are entitled to the full and 

equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments 

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of any kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act permits the 

recovery of monetary damages, in the form of actual and treble damages or statutory damages of 

$4,000 per violation. See Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (citing Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52(a)); see also Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (same). A violation of the ADA necessarily 

violates the Unruh Act, see Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), and, although required if not based on an ADA 

violation, “no showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is 

premised on an ADA violation.” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 

(9th Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges a cognizable ADA claim, it also properly 

pleads that Defendants violated the Unruh Act.

c. Violations of California Health and Safety Code § 19955

Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief under California Health and Safety Code Section 

19955. (Dkt. No. 33 at 17.) Section 19955 insures that privately funded public accommodations 

in California comply with Government Code Section 4450’s requirement that “all buildings, 

structures, sidewalks, curbs, and related facilities” constructed with government funding “ be 

accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955; Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 4450. Section 19959 extends Section 4450’s requirements to every non-exempt

public accommodation built prior to July 1, 1970, “when any alterations, structural repairs or 

additions are made to such public accommodation.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19959. A 

private right of action exists under Part 5.5 of the California Health and Safety Code to seek 

injunctive relief for violations of these provisions. See Donald v. Café Royale, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 

3d 168, 183 n.7(1990) (“[A]n individual aggrieved or potentially aggrieved by a violation of 

Government Code section 4450 and Health and Safety Code section 19955 may bring an 

injunction action under Civil Code section 55.”); see also Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., No. C02-

05849 MJJ, 2007 WL 2301778, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007). 

Mr. Sarantschin’s report identifies two features of the Business that violate the 2013 

California Building Code (“CBC”) with no corresponding violation of the ADAAG: the height of 

the hand dryer and the soap dispenser in the Business’s unisex restroom. Plaintiffs alleged the 

hand dryer height violation for the first time in their motion for default. (Compare Dkt. No. 33 at 

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32, with Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 24 (listing six problems with the Business’s restrooms, but not hand dryer 

height).) Neither Plaintiff encountered the barrier. (See Dkt. Nos. 28, 29 (making no reference to 

the hand dryer).) Also, Plaintiffs never moved to amend their Complaint to include this violation. 

It is well established that, in the context of motions for summary judgment, the Court does not 

consider additional architectural barriers listed in the plaintiff’s expert report for the first time and 

not alleged in the Complaint. See Oliver, 654 F.3d at 906; see also Moeller, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 

904 (referencing the Oliver decision as an “unambiguous . . . rule of pleading” in ADA cases). 

Thus, “a plaintiff must identify the barriers that constitute the grounds for a claim of 

discrimination under the ADA in the complaint itself; a defendant is not deemed to have fair 

notice of barriers identified elsewhere.” Id. at 909. This reasoning applies here where, nearly two 

years into the litigation, Plaintiffs have raised the violation for the first time in a motion for default 

judgment. Accordingly, the Court will only address the claim regarding the soap dispenser height 

and not the claim regarding the hand dryer height.

Mr. Sarantschin avers that the soap dispenser’s distance from the floor exceeds that 

allowed under § 11B-603.5 of the 2013 California Business Code, and that the ADA defers to 

state building codes that require greater accessibility than the ADA. (Dkt. No. 26 ¶ H.) Plaintiffs 

incorporate their other allegations regarding the Business and assert that “portions of the 

[Business] and/or of the building(s) were constructed and/or altered after July 1, 1970, and 

substantial portions of the [Business] and/or the building(s) had alterations, structural repairs, 

and/or additions made to such public accommodations after July 1, 1970, thereby requiring said 

restaurant and/or building to be subject to the requirements of Part 5.5, § 19955 . . . of the Health 

& Safety Code upon such alteration, structural repairs or additions per Health & Safety Code § 

19959.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 73, 75.) While this allegation is largely boilerplate, courts within the 

Ninth Circuit have found such allegations sufficient to plead a violation of Section 19959 for the 

purposes of default judgment. See Moore v. E-Z-N-Quick, No. 1:13-cv-01522-LJO, 2014 WL 

1665034, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2014) (finding “largely boilerplate” claim as to violation of 

Section 19955 nonetheless sufficiently pled for motion for default judgment); Moore v. Ruiz, No. 

1:11-cv-2159 LJO, 2012 WL 3778874, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (same). Accordingly, 

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Plaintiffs have asserted a violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 19955 as to the 

height of the soap dispenser. 

d. Conclusion Regarding the Second and Third Eitel Factors

Taking the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have

stated a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, the Unruh Act, and Health and Safety 

Code Section 19955. The second and third Eitel factors therefore favor entry of default judgment 

on these claims as to (1) the lack of strike side clearance for the entrance door; (2) the arrangement 

of the dining tables; (3) the restroom door’s knob; (4) the restroom door’s lock; (5) the restroom 

door, which opens into the clear floor space of the water closet; and (6) the soap dispenser’s 

distance from the floor. These factors do not favor entry of default judgment as to Plaintiffs’ 

ADA, Unruh Act, and Health and Safety Code Section 19955 claims regarding (1) the hand 

dryer’s height; (2) the lack of accessibility signage; (3) the excessive door pressure at the entrance 

and restroom door; and (4) the height of the service counter.

3. Sum of Money at Stake

The third Eitel factor balances the amount of money at stake in the matter against the 

seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Default judgment is disfavored 

where the sum of money is disproportionately large or unreasonable compared to the defendant’s 

conduct. See Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. 06-03594 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, 

at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs seek a total monetary judgment of $35,477.06: $8,000 in statutory damages

per Plaintiff—the statutory minimum under the Unruh Act for each visit that each Plaintiff made 

to the Business—for a total of $16,000, plus $19,447.06 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Dkt. No. 33

at 3.) In addition, the requested judgment necessarily includes the cost that Defendants would 

incur to comply with the injunction. “Although not a form of monetary recovery, the injunction 

will undoubtedly require that [Defendants] spend money to remove barriers” at the Business. 

Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. However, as discussed above, the ADA limits a defendant’s 

liability only to readily achievable removal of barriers, which “caps a defendant’s liability.” Id. 

Thus, any additional expense associated with compliance with the injunction is reasonable in light 

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of Defendants’ conduct. 

Other courts have awarded financial liabilities on defendants in disability discrimination 

cases on default judgment. Plaintiffs’ request is on the high end of ADA access barrier cases. 

See, e.g., Johnson v. McMahan Kays, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-1111-KJM, KJN, 2015 WL 966244, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (finding $11,990.00 not “so large or excessive as to militate against the 

entry of default judgment”); Moore, 2014 WL 1665034, at *4 (noting that $10,227.50 in statutory 

damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees “is not a large amount of money, nor does it seem 

unreasonable in light of the allegations” of ADA architectural-barrier discrimination); Vogel, 992 

F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (noting that a $13,739.20 award of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees is 

“neither too large nor to[o] unreasonable”); Moore v. Cisneros, No. 1:12-cv-00188 LJO SKO, 

2012 WL 6523017, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012) (noting that a $10,119.70 default judgment 

damages award was “not a relatively large sum of money, nor does it appear unreasonable in light 

of the allegations in the complaint”); Sceper Trucks, 2009 WL 3763823, at *7-9 (reducing fees 

from $14,475 to $12,550, which it still deemed to be on the high end, though not unreasonable); 

Chapman, 2007 WL 2462084 at *2-6 (reducing fees from $70,608.80 to $47,912.04); Sanford v. 

GMRI, Inc., No. CV.S 04 1535 DFL, 2005 WL 4782697, at *1-5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2005) 

(reducing fees from $18,268.09 to $8,132.67). One court in this District recently found 

$33,873.60 to be reasonable for an ADA access barrier case involving two plaintiffs, finding it 

“fair to assess the requested judgment amount on a per-plaintiff basis.” GD Liquor & Food, 2015 

WL 4967255, at *4. Thus, that court determined that the requested $16,936.80 per plaintiff was 

reasonable especially given that the plaintiffs stipulated to forego $4,000 each, “a third of the 

amount in statutory damages to which they could otherwise lay claim.” Id. So it is here. The 

requested judgment yields $17,738.53 per plaintiff. While this is on the higher end of ADA access 

barrier cases, courts have found similar amounts reasonable. See, e.g., id. And the deviation here 

is largely due to the requested attorneys’ fees and costs, which the Court will more closely 

scrutinize in detail below.

In sum, the Court does not find that the overall sum of money at stake in this litigation is 

so large or excessive as to militate against entry of default judgment. Thus, this factor favors entry 

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of default judgment as well.

4. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The next Eitel factor considers the possibility of disputes concerning material facts. Eitel, 

782 F.2d at 1471-72. As discussed, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged disability discrimination in 

violation of the ADA and the Unruh Act and Health & Safety Code by identifying architectural 

barriers that are readily removable, and Defendants’ failure to appear effectively deems admitted 

these facts. See TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18. On these pleadings, there appears to be no 

potential dispute concerning material facts. In short, since Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are 

presumed true and Defendants have not opposed their motion, no factual disputes exist that would 

preclude entry of default judgment. Thus, this factor also favors entry of default against 

Defendants.

5. Excusable Neglect

The next Eitel factor considers whether the defendant’s default is due to excusable neglect. 

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, there is no indication that excusable neglect is to blame for 

Defendants’ failure to appear and defend themselves. To the contrary, the record indicates that 

Defendants were properly served with the Summons and Complaint, were aware of the claims, and 

their agent for service of process, Mr. Musleh, even discussed the possibility of settlement with 

Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 11; Dkt. No. 34-6 at 4.) Courts in this District find that where 

preliminary settlement discussions occur following service of the complaint, there is no indication 

that the defendant’s default is due to excusable neglect. See, e.g., Heidorn v. BDD Mktg. & Mgmt. 

Co., No. C-13-00229 JCS, 2013 WL 6571629, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013) (finding no 

excusable neglect where the defendant received the complaint and contacted plaintiff to discuss 

the possibility of settlement); Ortega v. Griggs & Assocs. LLC, No. 5:11-CV-02235-EJD, 2012

WL 2913202, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012) (finding no excusable neglect where the defendant 

was properly served and participated in preliminary settlement discussions but “cut off contact 

once a settlement could not be reached” and failed to appear and defend). So it is here. Thus, the 

record before the Court does not suggest that Defendants’ default was due to excusable neglect, 

which weighs in favor of entry of default judgment.

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6. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits

Finally, the last Eitel factor reflects the policy that generally disfavors default judgment 

because “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. Despite this general policy, “because a discretionary standard is applied, default 

judgments are more often granted than denied.” Webb v. Indigenous Global Dev. Corp., C-04-

3174 MJJ, 2005 WL 1200203, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2005) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Although this factor weighs against default, it is not alone dispositive nor does 

it weigh substantially against granting default judgment given the impossibility of deciding a case 

on its merits when the defendant fails to answer. See Willamette Green Innovation Ctr., 2014 WL 

5281039, at *13 (citation omitted).

* * *

The great majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ ADA, Unruh Act and Health & Safety Code architectural-barrier discrimination claims 

regarding the architectural access barriers at the entry, inside the restaurant, and in the unisex 

bathroom. The Court therefore recommends that default judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs 

and against Defendants regarding (1) the lack of strike side clearance for the entrance door; (2) the 

arrangement of the dining tables; (3) the restroom door’s lock (4) the restroom door’s knob; (5) 

the restroom door, which opens into the clear floor space of the water closet; and (6) the soap 

dispenser’s distance from the floor. 

C. Relief

Having determined that the motion should be granted, the Court turns to the matter of the 

relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled. In their motion for default judgment, Plaintiffs seek 

monetary relief—in the form of statutory damages on their Unruh Act claim—as well as equitable 

relief—in the form of an injunction. In addition, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant 

to the ADA and the Unruh Act. (See Dkt. No. 33 at 3, 27.) Upon entry of default, defaulting 

defendants are not deemed to have admitted facts alleged in the complaint concerning damages.. 

TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18. To the contrary, the plaintiff is required to prove up the 

amount of damages sought. Id.

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1. Statutory Damages

Plaintiffs seek $8,000 in statutory damages each under the Unruh Act: one $4,000 award 

each for denial of access and another $4,000 award each for a single deterrence occasion. (Dkt. 

No. 33 at 24-26.) The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides for, among other things, a minimum 

statutory damages amount of $4,000 for each occasion on which a person was denied equal access. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (the Unruh Act “provides 

for statutory damages up to a maximum of three times the actual damages but no less than 

$4[,]000 for each instance of discrimination”). “To recover statutory damages, a plaintiff need 

only show that he was denied full and equal access, not that he was wholly excluded from 

enjoying defendant’s services.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (citations omitted). This can 

include incidents of deterred access. See Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(b) (“A plaintiff is denied full and 

equal access only if the plaintiff personally encountered the violation on a particular occasion, or 

the plaintiff was deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular 

occasion.”); see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Barrita, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 

(“Both [the California Disabled Persons Act and the Unruh Act] restrict damages recovery to 

situations where the plaintiff personally encountered the violation on a particular occasion, or the 

plaintiff was deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion.”) 

(internal quotations omitted); Yates v. Vishal Corp., 2013 WL 6073516, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 

2013) (“Under section 55.56, multiple awards may accrue to plaintiffs . . . . for each time a 

plaintiff visits (or is deterred from visiting) a non-complaint establishment[.]”).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they visited the Business on December 13, 2012, February 28, 

2013, and May 23, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.) They state that they encountered access barriers on 

each of these occasions that not only interfered with their access to and enjoyment of the 

Business’s services, but led to physical and emotional discomfort. (Id.) They also allege that on 

May 23, 2013, they were deterred from returning to the Business, but would have returned had the 

barriers been removed. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27; Dkt. No. 33 at 12.) These allegations show four separate 

violations of the Unruh Act, which would result in $16,000 in statutory damages per plaintiff. 

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Although Plaintiffs have established that they suffered four violations of the Unruh Act, Plaintiffs 

have stipulated to an award of only $8,000 each for one incident of denied access and one incident 

of deterrence. (Dkt. No. 27.) Thus, Plaintiffs forgo claims of $8,000 each for the second and third 

incidents of denied access. 

The Court must consider whether to reduce the award because “[t]he California Supreme 

Court has stated in dicta that there may be a point at which statutory damages for each offense will 

be so high that equity and constitutional constraints cabin a defendant’s liability under the Unruh 

Act.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (citing Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 41 Cal. 4th 160, 

179-80 (2007)). Plaintiffs’ stipulation to reduce damages compels the opposite conclusion—that 

the statutory damages are appropriate. Indeed, courts frequently award damages of even greater 

magnitude. See, e.g., Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (awarding the plaintiff $12,000 in statutory 

damages for three visits to the business); Feezor v. Del Taco, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 

(S.D. Cal. 2005) (“[T]he Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory minimum of $12,000—

$4,000 for each time he patronized the Restaurant.”); Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (“The 

Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to statutory damages of $4,000 under Section 52 for 

these three visits for an award of $12,000 to each Plaintiff totaling $24,000.”). The Court 

therefore recommends awarding Plaintiffs $8,000 each in statutory damages.

2. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief under the ADA, Unruh Act, and Health and Safety 

Code § 19955 compelling Defendants to remove the entrance and restroom-related architectural 

barriers at the Business. (Dkt. No. 33 at 24-26.) A court may grant injunctive relief for violations 

of the Unruh Act under Section 52.1(b). To be entitled to injunctive relief under the ADA, 

Plaintiffs must show that Defendants violated the ADA Accessibility Guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12188(a)(2). “In the case of violations [of the accessibility provisions] of this title, injunctive 

relief shall include an order to alter facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 

disabilities[.]” Id.; see also Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (citations omitted). Notably, a 

plaintiff need not satisfy the prerequisites generally needed for injunctive relief since “the standard 

requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied when an injunction is sought to prevent the 

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violation of a federal statute which specifically provides for injunctive relief.” Moeller, 816 F. 

Supp. 2d at 859 (quoting Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 (9th 

Cir. 2010)). Injunctive relief is therefore proper whenever architectural barriers at a defendant’s 

establishment violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is readily achievable. See, e.g., 

Moreno v. La Curacao, 463 F. App’x 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2011); Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 

(citations omitted); Sceper, 2009 WL 3763823, at *4.

As discussed above, Plaintiffs have stated certain viable Title III discrimination claims. 

There are various access-related barriers at the Business that violate the ADAAG Guidelines and 

state regulations, and the removal of these barriers is “readily achievable” so long as Defendants 

have the ability to make the physical changes necessary to remove the specific barriers about 

which Plaintiffs complain. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). Injunctive relief compelling Defendants to 

modify the Business’s entrance, the arrangement of its chairs, the restroom’s locks and handles, 

and the height of its soap dispensers—to the extent each Defendant has the legal right to do so 

under the joint venture agreement and state law—so that the Business is readily accessible to and 

usable by individuals with disabilities is therefore appropriate. The undersigned therefore 

recommends enjoining Defendants to remove the architectural barriers for which Plaintiffs are 

entitled to default judgment. Specifically, Defendants must install an automatic door opener, 

rearrange the dining tables, install compliant door hardware and locking mechanisms on the unisex 

restroom door, change the direction of the door swing, and lower the soap dispenser’s height in the 

unisex restroom—again, only to the extent that Defendants have control over these aspects of the 

property under the joint venture agreement and state law and their removal is readily achievable.

3. Attorneys’ Fees

a. Legal Standard

Plaintiffs request $16,700 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to both the ADA and the Unruh Act. 

(Dkt. No. 33 at 3.) Both the ADA and the Unruh Act entitle prevailing plaintiffs to attorneys’ 

fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). The ADA provides that a court “in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and 

costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.505. “A ‘prevailing’ party who may recover 

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attorneys[’] fees [and costs] under the ADA is one who secures an enforceable judgment on the 

merits or a court-ordered consent decree, or who has been rewarded some relief by the Court.” 

Sceper, 2009 WL 3763823, at *6 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). As the Court has determined that Plaintiffs are

entitled to default judgment in their favor on the ADA claim, they are therefore a prevailing party 

eligible for attorneys’ fees under that statute.

7

 See, e.g., Sceper, 2009 WL 3763823, at *6-7.

Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the ADA using the “lodestar” measure, 

which is obtained by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation by a 

reasonable hourly rate. See Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262, 1262 n.5 (9th Cir. 

1987) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)); see also, e.g., Doran v. Corte Madera 

Inn Best Western, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060-63 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (using the lodestar calculation 

to determine attorneys’ fees in an ADA case). “Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may 

increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into 

account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and 

complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” Thayer v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 833 (2001) (citation omitted).

b. Analysis

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees for all of the work done on this case, from initial 

investigation of claims through drafting the instant motion for default judgment. (See Dkt. No. 33

at 3.) In total, Plaintiffs seek $16,700.00 in attorneys’ fees.

i. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The first step in the lodestar analysis requires the court to determine a reasonable hourly 

rate for the fee applicant’s services. This determination involves examining the prevailing market 

rates in the community charged for similar services by lawyers of reasonably “comparable skill, 

experience, and reputation.” Cotton v. City of Eureka, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 

 

7 Because fees may be awarded under the ADA, the Court will not address Plaintiffs’ alternative 

request for fees under the Unruh Act, which are also within the court’s discretion. See Cal. Code 

Civ. Proc. § 52(a) (providing that individuals liable for violating the Unruh Act are liable for 

actual damages and “any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court”).

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2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. The 

“relevant community” for the purposes of the lodestar calculation is the district in which the 

lawsuit proceeds. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). “The fee applicant has the 

burden of producing satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those 

prevailing in the community[.]” Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1263. In addition to affidavits from the fee 

applicant himself, other evidence of the prevailing market rate may include affidavits from other 

area attorneys or examples of rates awarded to counsel in previous cases. See Cotton, 889 F.

Supp. 2d at 1167 (citation omitted). However, the actual rate that the fee applicant charged is not 

evidence of the prevailing market rate. Id. (citing Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 

F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted)).

Plaintiffs assert that the fee award in this case should be based on a rate of $500 per hour. 

(Dkt. No. 33 at 31.) Plaintiffs contend that this billing rate is appropriate based on Plaintiffs’

counsel’s “education, knowledge and thirty-eight (38) years of experience as a litigation strategist 

and trial lawyer[.]” (Id.) In a sworn declaration in support of the motion for default, Plaintiffs’ 

attorney, Thomas E. Frankovich, elaborates on his record of more than “twenty-five (25) jury 

trials, fifteen (15) bench trials and hundreds of arbitrations and mediations” and emphasizes that 

the last twenty-one years of his practice have “nearly exclusively focused on protecting the civil 

rights of persons” to access to public accommodations. (Dkt. No. 24 at 4-5.) Mr. Frankovich has 

also published two articles in his field, given lectures to several disability groups, and been 

profiled several times relating to his work in the field of disability access. (Dkt. No. 24 ¶¶ A-C.) 

In further support of his rate, Mr. Frankovich asserts that his usual billing rate is $575 an hour, but 

that he has decreased that charge to $500 for this case. (Dkt. No. 24 at 7.) Mr. Frankovich does 

not point to the hourly rate awarded other attorneys in the Northern District; instead, he points to 

previous cases where his request for $500 an hour was found to be reasonable. (Id.) See Order 

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Yates v. Vishal Corp.,

No. 3:11-cv-00643-JSC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2014), ECF No. 46 (hereinafter “Yates Order”) (finding 

Mr. Frankovich’s rate of $500 per hour “reasonable based on his expertise and the fact that he has 

been practicing law since 1977”); Order for Reassignment; Report & Recommendation to Grant 

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Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, Ascencio v. Adru Corp., No. 3:12-cv-04884-WHA (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 19, 2013), ECF No. 15 (finding Mr. Frankovich’s $500 hourly rate reasonable “[b]ased 

on [his] declaration and the court’s knowledge of billing rates in the San Francisco area”).

The Court has conducted its own review of hourly rate determinations in other ADA 

access-barrier discrimination cases and found that other courts in this District have determined that 

rates as high as $500 are appropriate in disability access cases for attorneys with similar length of 

experience. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Taqueria El Grullense, No. 12-cv-03257-WHO, 2014 WL 

1724356, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2014) (awarding fees at hourly rates ranging from $425 to 

$645 for attorneys with over 20 to 38 years of experience who exclusively try disability access 

cases); Ascenscio v. ADRU Corp., No. C 12-04884 WHA, 2014 WL 204212, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 6, 2014) (awarding Mr. Frankovich $500 per hour rate in disability access case upon default 

judgment); Moralez v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. C 12-01072 CRB, 2013 WL 3967639, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) (awarding fees at hourly rates ranging from $425 to $645). Based on the 

fees regularly awarded in comparable actions in this District, and the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel 

has significant experience in this particular field of law, the Court concludes that the $500 

requested rate is reasonable.

ii. Reasonableness of Time Spent

Plaintiffs’ counsel avers that he has spent 33.4 hours working on this case over the past 

two years. (Dkt. No. 24 at 7.) At the outset, the Court addresses an inexplicable 7.6 hours that 

appear at the end of Mr. Frankovich’s timesheets. Unlike all other entries in the time sheet, the 7.6 

hours is not paired with a date or accompanying description of work performed. Instead, it hovers 

alone between the final descriptive entry and the total hours billed. (Dkt. No. 34-6 at 7.) This 

time will be struck from the hours requested. 

Next, while the Court appreciates that Mr. Frankovich voluntarily reduced his time for

certain tasks, it nonetheless must reduce entries that appear excessive or enigmatic. Hensley, 461 

U.S. at 433-34. On April 8, 2014, Mr. Frankovich billed 0.3 hours for reviewing the clerk’s entry 

of Default against the Lada Group—a one sentence, one page document—and “advising staff to 

mail copy to each defendant.” (Dkt. No. 34-6 at 4.) This time is reduced to 0.1. Also, on August 

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17, 2015, Mr. Frankovich billed 0.4 hours for “[r]eview[ing] status of Prove Up.” (Dkt. No. 34-6 

at 6.) The Prove Up appears to refer to Mr. Frankovich’s own declaration, and it is unclear why 

0.4 hours are needed to update oneself as to the status of his own work. The Court also reduces 

this time to 0.1 hours. 

Further, the Court finds that some tasks in the time sheet include work that could and 

should have been performed by a non-attorney, not the senior and sole attorney on the matter, and 

are therefore not billable.

8

 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[i]t simply is not reasonable 

for a lawyer to bill, at her regular hourly rate, for tasks that a non-attorney employed by her could 

perform at a much lower cost.” Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th 

Cir. 1992), opinion vacated in part on denial of reh’g on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 

1993) (“[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal [or lawyer’s] rate, 

regardless of who performs them[.]”) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 

(1989)). As other courts in this District have already reminded Plaintiffs’ counsel in other cases,

such work includes compiling or attaching exhibits. See Yates Order at 6 (noting that Mr. 

Frankovich’s time entry for “‘attach[ing] the . . . expert report’” could have easily been 

accomplished by a non-attorney”); see also Doran, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (noting some of Mr. 

Frankovich’s billed tasks “could easily be accomplished by paralegals”). Accordingly, the Court 

reduces time billed for the following entries to remove time billed for attaching or compiling 

exhibits: on October 1, 2013, from 0.5 hours to 0.4 hours; on March 28, 2014, from 0.8 to 0.7; on 

February 25, 2015, from 1.8 to 1.6 hours; and on March 3, 2015, from 1.2 hours to 1 hour. (See 

Dkt. No. 34-6 at 2-6.) This subtracts an additional 0.6 hours from the total time billed.

After subtracting a total of 8.7 hours, the new total is 24.7 hours. This total falls within the 

hours found reasonable by courts in similar cases. See, e.g., Gd. Liquor & Food, 2015 WL 

 

8 Mr. Frankovich describes the timesheet as an “Itemization of Attorney and Legal Assistant 

Time” and “Itemization of Attorneys & Paraprofessional Time.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 8; Dkt. No. 34-6 

at 2-7.) However, the sub-heading indicates that the time is for Mr. Frankovich alone. Further,

the document does not separate out time or work by his employees as opposed to himself. And 

finally, he later bills separately for the work of his Legal Assistants and Word Processors: 4.2 

hours for P. Maupin and 9.8 hours for A. Cooper. (Dkt. No. 34-5 at 2.) The Court therefore 

assumes the clerical tasks in the timesheet are attributable to Mr. Frankovich.

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4967255, at *5 (finding 30.2 hours reasonable for attorneys’ fees in motion for default judgment in 

ADA case regarding access barriers with two plaintiffs); Org. for the Advancement of Minorities 

with Disabilities v. Pac. Heights Inn, No. C-04-03368 JSW, 2006 WL 2560754, at *9-10 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 20, 2006) (finding 33 hours reasonable). Also, while the total number of hours is 

significant, Mr. Frankovich appears to have worked efficiently and billed minimally on the case, 

billing just 1.8 hours to draft the complaint and waiving fees for various tasks. In particular, the 

Court notes that Mr. Frankovich reduced the hours billed for drafting the motion for default 

judgment from 3.9 to 1.8 hours. Especially in view of these examples, and with the reductions set 

forth above, the total time Mr. Frankovich billed in this case is reasonable.

In sum, the Court finds the total of 24.7 hours worked reasonable and will award fees for 

this adjusted amount.

iii. Total Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs have not sought an adjustment to the lodestar amount, nor does the Court find a 

multiplier appropriate here. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 

U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (noting that a “strong presumption” exists that the lodestar figure represents 

a “reasonable fee” and therefore it should only be enhanced or reduced in “rare or exceptional 

cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Absent a multiplier, the Court concludes that the 

lodestar calculation in this case is a total of 24.7 hours of work billed at a rate of $500 per hour for 

a total of $12,350. This amount is well within awards in other ADA access barrier cases on 

default judgment. See, e.g., GD Liquor & Food, 2015 WL 4967255, at *5 (awarding attorneys’ 

fees in the amount of $15,696); Org. for Advancement of Minorities with Disabilities, 2006 WL 

2560754, at *4 (awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount of $12,375). The Court therefore 

recommends awarding Plaintiffs’ counsel $12,350 in attorneys’ fees.

iv. Reasonableness of Costs

Plaintiffs seek $749.31 for costs and litigation expenses and $1,437.75 in expert’s fees.9 

 

9

Plaintiffs initially sought $1,309.31 for costs, including a request for an additional $560 in fees 

for the work of his legal assistants/word processors; however, Plaintiffs later withdrew the request. 

(See Dkt. No. 36.)

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(Dkt. No. 16 at 32.) As part of the reasonable attorneys’ fee, the ADA also allows a prevailing 

plaintiff to recover “litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205; see also Lovell v. 

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “litigation expenses include items such as 

expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc.” (citation omitted)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.505 (outlining 

available costs). Plaintiffs seek $749.31 in costs to cover: the $400.00 court filing fee;,$9.50 for 

the location of Ownership Information for the Business, $201 for service of process, $115.50 for 

copies, $4 for faxes, and $19.31 for postage. (Dkt. No. 34-5 at 2.). Such costs are reasonable and 

regularly awarded, and as such the Court recommends awarding the requested costs in their 

entirety.

Plaintiffs also seek $1,437.75 in expert’s fees. Expert fees are recoverable litigation 

expenses under the ADA. See Gutierrez v. Leng, No. 1:14-cv-01027-WBS, 2015 WL 1498813, at 

*11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (noting ADA’s statutory provisions “provide direct authority for the 

award of expert witness fees as litigation expenses” before granting $603.75 for site inspection 

and report) (citing Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1058). The Court similarly concludes that Plaintiffs are 

entitled to an award to reimburse Mr. Sarantschin’s inspection of the Business. Mr. Sarantschin 

spent a total of 5.75 hours, at $250 an hour, traveling to and from the Business, inspecting the 

Business, preparing his report, and communicating with Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 2.) 

The fees are not excessive in relation to fees granted in other cases. See, e.g., Moore v. E-Z-NQuick, 2014 WL 1665034 (granting $1,315 in costs that includes expert site inspection); Yates, 

2014 WL 572528, at *7 (granting $5,498 in costs that include expert’s fees; Doran, 360 F. Supp. 

2d at 1060, 1062 (granting $3,070 in expert fees alone).

In sum, the Court recommends awarding $2,187.06 for costs and the expert’s fee.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion for

default judgment on their ADA and Unruh Act architectural-barrier disability discrimination 

claims as to (1) the lack of strike side clearance for the entrance door; (2) the arrangement of the 

dining tables; (3) the restroom door’s lock (4) the restroom door’s knob; (5) the restroom door, 

which opens into the clear floor space of the water closet; and (6) the soap dispenser’s distance 

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from the floor. The Court further recommends that Plaintiffs be awarded $8,000 each in statutory 

damages and $14,537.06 in attorneys’ fees and costs. In addition, the Court recommends that an 

injunction be issued requiring Defendants to remove the above-described barriers associated with 

the Business to the extent removal is “readily achievable” and insofar as Defendants have legal 

right and authority to make such changes to the property. A proposed judgment is attached.

Plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on Defendants within 

three business days from the filing date of this report and recommendation and shall file a proof of 

service with the Court. Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the 

district court judge within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the district court’s ultimate Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 6, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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