Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01043/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY JOHN LITTLE, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

D. K. SISTO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 08cv1043 JTM (PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON

MOTION FOR STAY AND

ABEYANCE 

(Doc. No. 10)

I.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Larry Little (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) 

On August 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance in order to return to state

court to exhaust five of the claims set forth in his original Petition. (Doc. No. 10.) On

September 26, 2008, Respondent filed an Opposition. (Doc. No. 12.) Petitioner replied to this

Opposition on October 27, 2008. (Doc. No. 14.) After a review of the moving papers, the

opposition and all supporting documents, the Court recommends that the Motion for Stay and

Abeyance be DENIED.

/ /

/ /

/ /

/ / 

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II.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted on May 3, 2000 and sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life. 

(Doc. No. 1 Pet. at 1.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on October 10,

2001. (Doc. No. 1 Pet. at 20.) On December 19, 2001, the California Supreme Court denied his

Petition for Review. (Doc. No. 12 Opp. at 3.) 

On December 27, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Superior Court. (Id.) Following a hearing on an Order to Show Cause, the Superior

Court denied the petition on August 26, 2004. (Id.) Petitioner then filed his Petition in the Court

of Appeal on November 3, 2005. (Doc. No. 1 Pet. at 21.) The court ordered Petitioner to file a

supplemental petition and also ordered appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 12 Opp. at 3.) On

January 16, 2008, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition in a reasoned opinion. (Id.) 

Shortly thereafter, on January 24, 2008, Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel filed a

Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 1 Pet. at 22.) That Petition

contained a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. (Doc. No. 12 Opp. at 3.) 

However, on February 15, 2008, Petitioner submitted a “Supplement to Petition” in an attempt to

add an additional five claims to his pending petition. (Doc. No. 10 Motion at 2.) The California

Supreme Court returned this “Supplement” to Petitioner, unfiled, via letter dated February 21,

2008. (Doc. No. 14 Ex. C.) The California Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition on

March 12, 2008. (Lodgment 2.) 

Three months later, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition on June 12, 2008. (Doc.

No. 1.) On June 27, 2008, the Court issued an Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice for

failure to pay the filing fee. (Doc. No. 5.) In this Order, the Court noted Petitioner did not allege

exhaustion of claims 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in his Petition and outlined four options available to

Petitioner. (Id. at 1-4.) Petitioner was ordered to respond to the Court’s Order by August 25,

2008. (Id. at 4.) In response, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Stay and Abeyance While Petitioner

Seeks Exhaustion of Unexhausted Claims.” (Doc. No. 10.) Respondent filed an Opposition on

September 26, 2008 (Doc. No 12.), and Petitioner replied on October 27, 2008. (Doc. No. 14.) 

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1. The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s

consideration of claims presented in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b) (West

2008); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court held “a

district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”

Id. A preliminary review of Petitioner’s claims reveals that although Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus filed in the California Supreme Court (Lodgment 3) details only one claim, that

claim is based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel and in the current Petition, claims one

through three are based on varying facets of this claim. Therefore, Claims one, two and three of the

instant petition are considered exhausted.

2. As amended by section 101 of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 now provides in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

08 cv 1043 JTM (PCL)

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Petitioner concedes, and this Court acknowledges, only five of eight claims are currently

unexhausted.1/

 Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are based on ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel (Claim 4); improper shifting of the burden of proof in jury instructions (Claim

5); and improper lightening of the burden of proof, conviction on less than proof beyond a

reasonable doubt, and the failure to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter or the effect of

his physical impairment (Claims 6, 7 & 8). (Doc. No. 1 Pet. at 7-9.) 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a state

prisoner seeking habeas relief from a federal court must comply with the one-year statute of

limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period begins to run

from the latest of four possible dates outlined in sections 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D).2/ In this

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case, the facts presented indicate section 2244(d)(1)(A) applies, meaning the one-year limitations

period began to run against Petitioner from “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). On October 10, 2001, the California

Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. (Doc. No. 1 Pet. at 2.) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court which was denied

on December 19, 2001. (Id.) Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999), the one-year limitation period began to run ninety days later on

March 19, 2002, when the judgment became final. Unless tolled, the limitations period would

have then expired one year later on March 19, 2003. However, Petitioner then filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in state court on December 27, 2002. (Lodgment 1.) Petitioner is

entitled to statutory tolling for the period of time while a properly filed application for postconviction or other collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The conclusion of

Petitioner’s collateral review in state court is the California Supreme Court’s denial of the

Petition on March 12, 2008. (Lodgment 2.) 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed his federal Petition on June 12, 2008. It should be noted that

278 days elapsed between the date the judgment became final in state court and the date

Petitioner filed his Petition in state court. Moreover, a further 90 days elapsed between the

conclusion of the collateral review in state court and the filing of Petitioner’s federal petition in

this Court. In other words, the information before the Court suggests petitioner essentially has

no time, if any, remaining under the one-year statute of limitations period imposed by section

2244(d), unless he is entitled to tolling. In sum, petitioner is seeking a stay because he could be

barred from having his claims considered on the merits if his Petition is dismissed pursuant to

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).

B. Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey

There are two approaches for analyzing a “stay and abeyance” motion, depending on

whether the petition is mixed or fully exhausted. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir.

2005). If the petition currently on file is fully exhausted, and what petitioner seeks is a “stay and

abeyance” order to exhaust claims not raised in the current federal petition, the approach set out

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in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), applies. See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. If,

however, the petitioner seeks a “stay and abeyance” order as to a mixed petition containing both

exhausted and unexhausted claims, the request is analyzed under the standard announced by the

Supreme Court in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. If a

district court is presented with a mixed petition and determines that the stay-and-abeyance

procedure is inappropriate, the court should allow the petitioner to delete the unexhausted claims

if dismissal of the entire petition would unreasonably impair the petitioner’s right to obtain

federal relief. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. Under the stay-and-abeyance procedure, rather than

dismiss the mixed petition pursuant to Lundy, a district court may stay the petition and hold it in

abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust the previously unexhausted claims.

See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. Once the petitioner exhausts his state remedies, the district court

will lift the stay and allow the petitioner to proceed in federal court. See id. Because the Petition

in this case is a mixed Petition, Rhines applies.

In Rhines v. Weber, the Supreme Court held that district courts have limited discretion to

hold in abeyance a mixed habeas petition, that is, one containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, in order to permit a petitioner to return to state court to exhaust additional

claims while the federal proceedings are stayed. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. The Supreme Court

concluded that the “stay and abeyance” procedure should only be available in limited

circumstances, when the district court determines: 1) there is good cause for the petitioner’s

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court; 2) the unexhausted claims are not meritless; and

3) the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence to exhaust the unexhausted claims. Id. at

277-78.

The Supreme Court in Rhines did not define “good cause.” Id. at 276. The Ninth Circuit

has endorsed a lenient standard in Jackson v. Roe, holding the “good cause” standard to be less

stringent than the “extraordinary circumstances” standard applied to equitable tolling of

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (2005).

However, the Ninth Circuit has not provided additional clarification as to the meaning of “good

cause.” District courts have taken varying approaches. One such district court concluded that the

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good cause standard for failure to exhaust “should not be so strict a standard as to require a

showing of some extreme and unusual event beyond the control of the defendant.” Riner v.

Crawford, 415 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1210 (D. Nev. 2006). The Riner court held that the petitioner

must show that he was “prevented from raising the claim, either by his own ignorance or

confusion about the law or the status of his case, or by circumstances over which he had little or

no control . . . ” Id. at 1211. Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have analogized “good

cause” to the cause required to overcome a procedural bar. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 2006 WL

37037 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In this context, “cause” would mean some objective factor external to

the petitioner which gave rise to the default. See id. at 3.

Petitioner states the unexhausted claims were “part of the original writ of habeas corpus

filed in the superior court and the state appellate court.” (Doc. No. 14 Reply at 5.) Petitioner’s

main reason for the delay in filing his unexhausted claims in state court is the fact that his courtappointed appellate counsel failed to include all claims in his Petition in the California Supreme

Court and instead included only one claim. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner also submits that “with a

minimum of time Petitioner had to put the original habeas petition in the format of a supplement

to petition and mail it to the California Supreme Court.” (Id.) In essence, Petitioner is arguing

that he was diligent in his attempt to file a “supplement” to the pending habeas petition himself

in order to fully exhaust his claims.

In a decision issued shortly after Rhines, the Supreme Court in dicta addressed one

circumstance which would qualify as “good cause” for failing to exhaust state court remedies

before a federal petition is filed. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1810-1811 (2005), the

Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits as to the application of section 2244(d)(2),

which tolls AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations while a “properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). In Pace, the

Supreme Court held an application for state post-conviction relief is not “properly filed” for

purposes of section 2244(d)(2) if it is considered untimely under state law. Pace, 125 S.Ct. at

1810. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court addressed a fairness argument by the

petitioner who claimed a “petitioner trying in good faith to exhaust state remedies may litigate in

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3. Although Petitioner filed the instant Petition in this Court on June 12, 2008, Petitioner

is not entitled to any tolling for the period of time during which a habeas petition is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144,

1145-46 (9th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to any “gap tolling”

for the period of time between the filing of his first habeas petition in the California Supreme Court

and the time he filed the second petition in August of 2008. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817,

820 (9th Cir. 2003). 

08 cv 1043 JTM (PCL)

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state court for years only to find out at the end that he was never ‘properly filed,’ and thus that

his federal habeas petition is time barred.” Id. at 1813 (quoting Brief for Pet’r, at 30). Citing its

prior decision in Rhines, the Supreme Court responded to the petitioner’s argument as follows:

“A prisoner seeking state post-conviction relief might avoid this predicament, however, by filing

a ‘protective' petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal

habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted. A petitioner’s reasonable confusion

about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to

file in federal court” before his state court remedies are completely exhausted. Id. 

Petitioner contends he received a letter from counsel dated January 23, 2008 and from

this letter he learned he had unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 14 Reply at 6.) He then attempted to

file a supplement to his pending habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. (Id.) The

letter from the Supreme Court of California rejecting his “supplement” is dated February 21,

2008. (Id. Ex. C.) Therefore, it can be assumed that Petitioner had knowledge of the fact that he

had unexhausted claims prior to the California Supreme Court’s decision date of March 12,

2008. However, in his motion, Petitioner offers no explanation for his failure to file a successive

Petition in the California Supreme Court within a reasonable amount of time following the

denial of his first habeas Petition. Petitioner knew that only his ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claim was exhausted and waited until August 12, 2008 to file a successive Petition in the

California Supreme Court in an attempt to exhaust the remaining claims.3/

 Petitioner does not

assert that his failure to exhaust was due to his own ignorance or confusion about the law, or

circumstances over which he had no control. The only circumstance Petitioner mentions for the

delay is an “institutional lock-down from March to June.” (Doc. No. 14 Reply at 6.) However,

Petitioner makes no specific allegations explaining how the conditions of this “lock-down”

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4. See Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 105 F. Supp. 2d 339, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

(holding that solitary confinement does not qualify as extraordinary circumstance justifying

equitable tolling), aff'd, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001). 

08 cv 1043 JTM (PCL)

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prohibited him from preparing his petition and effectively precluded him from filing it. 

Petitioner’s claim with respect to an institutional “lock-down” is only relevant to the extent it

prevented him from filing his Petition on time by, for example, limiting his access to legal

materials.4/

 For this reason, Petitioner falls short of meeting his burden of demonstrating that his

is an ordinary circumstance that merits a stay of the current proceedings. 

A review of current precedent affirms this reasoning. District courts interpreting the

Supreme Court’s “good cause” standard have taken markedly different approaches. Despite the

Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of a lenient standard in Jackson v. Roe, some district courts in the

Ninth Circuit have applied a more stringent standard, finding “it appropriate to look to

procedural default case law for guidance in determining whether petitioner has demonstrated the

requisite ‘good cause’ for failing to exhaust . . . unexhausted claims prior to filing [a federal]

habeas action.” Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005). For

example, in Johnson v. Sullivan, No. CV04-7923ABC(MLG), 2006 WL 37037 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4,

2006), petitioner argued he had “good cause” for his failure to exhaust because his appellate

counsel was ineffective on direct appeal and because he did not know the claim was unexhausted

when he filed his federal petition. Id. at 2. The district court concluded “the good cause

standard for failure to exhaust may be analogized to the ‘cause’ required to overcome a

procedural bar.” Id. at 3. In the procedural default context, “‘cause’ usually means some

objective factor external to the petitioner which gave rise to the default.” Id. at 3. Under this

more stringent standard, the district court concluded an error by appellate counsel on a

discretionary appeal was not enough to establish good cause because “counsel’s conduct did not

prevent petitioner from seeking state habeas relief on the unexhausted claim.” Id. The district

court also concluded the petitioner’s lack of knowledge was “not an objective factor external to

petitioner which prevented compliance with the exhaustion requirement.” Id. To justify its

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reliance on a more stringent standard than the one set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Jackson v.

Roe, the district court reasoned it would defeat the purpose of exhaustion if a petitioner’s “lack

of knowledge” could establish “good cause” because “any petitioner could claim lack of

knowledge” as a reason for failure to exhaust. Id. at 3.

However, other courts have applied a more lenient standard. For example, a magistrate

judge in Webb v. Pliler, No. SO50291D-FLG-GHP, 2006 WL 191944 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2006),

recommended a stay where a pro se petitioner made efforts to timely exhaust and erroneously

believed all of his claims were exhausted when he filed his federal petition. Id. at 4. In support

of its recommendation, the court stated as follows: “In the absence of patent facts which warrant

a dismissal of the unexhausted claim, the undersigned will not resolve the merits of the petition,

or a potential defense, in determining the threshold issue of good cause for an exhaustion stay. 

Rather, for a satisfactory showing of good cause, the court will simply require a prima facie

cause that a justifiable, legitimate reason exists which warrants the delay of federal proceedings

while exhaustion occurs. Id. (emphasis added.) See also Lugo v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0580 JF,

2006 WL 449130, at 3-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006); Briscoe v. Scribner, No. CIVS04-2175FCDG-GHP, 2005 WL 3500499, at 2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2005).

No such “satisfactory showing” of good cause has been made here. To distinguish,

Petitioner in Webb erroneously believed all of his claims were exhausted when he filed his

federal Petition. It is evident the Court in Webb concluded Petitioner’s erroneous belief was

merited if good cause was found on that basis. In the instant case, Petition was not proceeding

under such a belief when he filed his federal petition. He knew that five of the eight claims set

forth in his federal petition were unexhausted when he filed the petition in June of 2008. 

Moreover, he waited an additional 60 days to file a successive habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court when he had the intention of doing so before his federal petition was even filed. 

The intent to file a successive petition in state court is evidenced by his attempt to file a

“supplement to petition” in January of 2008. Without more, this Court cannot find good cause to

stay the proceedings.

In other contexts, the Ninth Circuit has held “good cause” requires a showing of

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diligence. Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087-1088 (9th Cir.

2002). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a

grant of relief." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992) citing

Engleson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.1992). Ignorance of

the law and inadvertent failure to calendar a deadline have also been found incompatible with

diligence and good cause. Townsel v. Contra Costa County, 820 F.2d 319, 320-321 (9th

Cir.1987); Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir.1985). 

As such, the “good cause” standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines

requires, at the very least, a showing of diligence in exhausting claims in state court. Here, as

respondent points out, petitioner does not explain why he did not file his second Petition

immediately after his first Petition was denied in March of 2008. Going back further, Petitioner

also does not explain why he waited over nine months after the conclusion of his direct appeal in

2002 to file his habeas petition in state court. Thus far, the information before the Court appears

to suggest a lack of diligence on the part of Petitioner prior to filing his federal Petition in this

court and even following the filing of the federal Petition. A review of the unexhausted claims

indicates they are based on information which was available to petitioner at the time his

conviction became final. Based on the information presented, it appears petitioner waited until

three months before the one-year statute of limitations period was about to run before he filed a

habeas petition in state court and then, following the termination of collateral review in state

court, waited an additional five months before he attempted to exhaust the remainder of his

claims in the state court system. 

Petitioner, through the record in its current state, has not established good cause for

failure to present the unexhausted claims to the California Supreme Court before filing this

habeas action. As a result, Petitioner has not fulfilled the requirements for staying these

proceedings as required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines. It is therefore

recommended the District Court deny Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey the pending Petition. 

/ /

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III.

CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge

Jeffrey T. Miller under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT

IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting

this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey Petition. If this Recommendation is adopted, IT IS ALSO

RECOMMENDED the District Court allow Petitioner to delete his unexhausted claims and to

proceed with his exhausted claims.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 19, 2009 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than March 5, 2009. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 29, 2009

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc: The Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller

All Parties and Counsel of Record

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