Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17062/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17062-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY J. SEEBOTH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CLIFF ALLENBY, Director D.M.H.;

AUDREY KING,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-17062

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-02875-

MCE-TJB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 14, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed June 18, 2015

Before: Alex Kozinski and Susan P. Graber, Circuit

Judges, and Michael A. Ponsor,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber

* The Honorable Michael A. Ponsor, Senior United States District Judge

for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

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2 SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas

corpus petition asserting that the absence of a provision in

California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) setting

forth a time within which to hold a trial extending the term of

commitment is facially unconstitutional.

The petitioner claimed that the lack of a timing provision

for sexually violent predators (SVPs) violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because,

under California law, other civilly committed persons –

mentally disordered offenders and individuals found not

guilty by reason of insanity – have a statutory right to a

recommitment trial within a specified period. The state

courts held that SVPs are not similarly situated to mentally

disordered offenders and individuals found not guilty by

reason of insanity for the purpose of challenging the lack of

a timing provision in the SVPA.

Reviewing under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, the panel did not need to resolve the

question of whether a citation by the California Supreme

Court to People v. Duvall (In re Duvall), 886 P.2d 1252 (Cal.

1995), constitutes a reasoned decision, and in turn did not

need to decide which state court issued the last reasoned

decision, because the California Supreme Court and Superior

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 3

Court decisions in this case share common reasoning that

does not apply federal law unreasonably.

The panel held that state courts may reasonably apply the

rational basis test when considering equal protection

challenges to civil commitment laws.

The panel held that with respect to the procedural steps in

the civil commitment process that are at issue here, the state

courts reasonably concluded that the state legislature had a

rational reason to distinguish between individuals who have

been found to be mentally ill and dangerous and individuals

who have been found to be mentally ill and sexually

dangerous. The panel therefore concluded that it was not

objectively unreasonable for the state courts to hold that the

lack of a timing provision in the SVPA does not deprive

SVPs of equal protection of the laws, and that the California

courts did not contravene clearly established federal law.

COUNSEL

Michael B. Bigelow (argued), Sacramento, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Tami M. Krenzin (argued), DeputyAttorneyGeneral, Kamala

D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Michael P. Farrell,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Brian G. Smiley,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento,

California, for Respondents-Appellees.

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OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

In this habeas case, Petitioner Timothy Seeboth claims

that California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”),

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600–6609.3, is unconstitutional

on its face. Specifically, he asserts that the absence of a

provision setting forth a time within which to hold a trial

extending the term of his commitment denies him equal

protection of the laws because, under California law, other

civilly committed persons have a statutory right to a

recommitment trial within a specified period. The state

courts and the district court denied relief. Because the

California state courts reasonably held that this aspect of the

SVPA does not deprive Petitioner of equal protection of the

laws, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The SVPA and Other California Civil Commitment

Laws

California has enacted a set of civil commitment statutes

that are triggered only after criminal charges have been filed. 

Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 587 (Cal. 1999). 

The SVPA, which is one such statute, reflects the California

legislature’s “concern over a select group of criminal

offenders who are extremely dangerous as the result of

mental impairment, and who are likely to continue

committing acts of sexual violence even after they have been

punished for such crimes.” Id. The state may file a petition

to civilly commit a person as a sexually violent predator

(“SVP”) if that individual (1) has been convicted of a

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SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 5

sexually violent offense against one or more victims and

(2) suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder that makes it

likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal

behavior in the future.1 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). 

The SVPA then provides for a probable cause hearing and a

jury trial, at which the state must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the individual meets those criteria. Id.

§§ 6602–6603; People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 574–75 (Cal.

2010).

In its original form, the SVPA provided for commitment

for two-year terms. Orozco v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr.

3d 573, 578 (Ct. App. 2004). At the end of each term, and

after a new trial, the individual could be recommitted. Id. at

578–79. In November 2006, California adopted Proposition

83, which “changed the commitment term for SVPs from

renewable two-year periods to an indeterminate period.” 

Seeboth v. Mayberg, 659 F.3d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Thus, for individuals committed or recommitted after 2006,

there is no need for future recommitment proceedings. See

Bourquez v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 144 (Ct.

App. 2007) (holding that pending petitions for two-year

extensions would be considered petitions for indefinite

terms). Proposition 83 also changed the substantive

requirements for civil commitment under the SVPA. Before

2006, the SVPA authorized civil commitment only if the

person had been convicted of sexually violent offenses

against two or more victims. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

 

1

 The state may file a commitment petition under the SVPA only while

the individual is in custody pursuant to a determinate prison term, as a

result of a parole revocation term, or under a special SVPA “hold” that

temporarily extends a term of imprisonment or parole. Cal. Welf. & Inst.

Code § 6601(a)(2).

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§ 6600(a) (1996). After Proposition 83, only one victim was

required. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83 (West).

An individual also may be committed as a mentally

disordered offender (“MDO”). To be committed as an MDO,

a person must (1) stand convicted of a crime involving force,

violence, or serious bodily injury; and (2) have a severe

mental disorder that was a cause of, or an aggravating factor

in, the commission of that crime. Cal. Penal Code § 2962;

People v. Collins, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 770 (Ct. App. 1992).

Finally, California law authorizes the civil commitment

of an individual who has been found not guilty by reason of

insanity (“NGI”). In California, the question of sanity is

determined separately, after a conviction. Cal. Penal Code

§ 1026(a); In re Moye, 584 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Cal. 1978). If

the individual was insane at the time of the offense and has

not regained sanity, the court may commit the person for up

to the maximum term of the sentence that could have been

imposed for the crime. Moye, 584 P.2d at 1100. Civil

commitment may extend beyond the period of that maximum

sentence if (1) the person was convicted of a felony and

(2) the person represents a substantial danger of physical

harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or

disorder. Cal. Penal Code § 1026(b)(1).

B. Facts and Procedural History in This Case

Over the course of more than 30 years,

[Petitioner] was convicted nine times for

crimes involving deviant sexual acts with

children. Based on his convictions,

[Petitioner] was first determined to be a

sexually violent predator (“SVP”) in 1997 in

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SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 7

a civil jury trial proceeding. He was held for

consecutive two-year terms from 1997 until

2005 . . . . While [Petitioner] was still in

custody for the 2003–05 term, the California

District Attorney filed a petition in May 2005

to extend [Petitioner]’s commitment from the

end of that 2003–05 term.

Seeboth, 659 F.3d at 946 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

Petitioner’s trial for the 2005 recommitment petition did not

take place until September 2010. He currently is in custody

because that proceeding resulted in an order committing him

for an indefinite term. Id. at 947.

In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the SVPA is facially

unconstitutional because it fails to establish a time period

within which a recommitment trial must occur.2 Petitioner

claims that the lack of a timing provision violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because

there is a timing provision in the civil commitment laws that

apply to MDOs and NGIs. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 1026.5(b)(4) (providing that an NGI has a right to a trial

that commences “no later than 30 calendar days prior to the

time the person would otherwise have been released, unless

that time is waived by the person or unless good cause is

shown”); id. § 2972(a) (same for MDOs).

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Sacramento

County Superior Court (“Superior Court”) asserting, among

other claims, that the absence of a timing provision in the

SVPA violated his equal protection rights under the federal

and state constitutions. The Superior Court denied his equal

 

2

 For simplicity, we refer to such a provision as a “timing provision.”

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protection claim on the merits, holding in part: “Petitioner

has not shown that he is similarly situated to the other types

of long-term civil commitments.” Petitioner next filed a state

habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which

denied the petition without an opinion. Finally, after filing

further petitions in Superior Court and the Court of Appeal,

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the

petition, citing People v. Duvall (In re Duvall), 886 P.2d

1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995), without a narrative explanation.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition,

holding that the state courts’ rejection of the equal protection

claim “cannot be said to have been an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.” Petitioner

timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas

relief. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1269 n.7 (9th Cir.

2005). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we may not grant habeas relief

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 9

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, we may

grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “objectively

unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).

A. Identifying the State Court Decision Under Review

Our recent decision in Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201,

1203–04 (9th Cir. 2015), causes us to question which state

court decision is the “last reasoned decision” that we must

review. Curiel suggests that a citation to Duvall alone might

not constitute sufficient “reasoning” to make the California

Supreme Court’s order more than a summary denial. See id.

at 1204–05. We have held that, when a state’s highest court

summarily denies a habeas petition, we “look through” that

denial to the “last reasoned state-court decision,” Cannedy v.

Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial

of rehearing, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,

134 S. Ct. 1001 (2014), which in this case is the California

Superior Court’s order. But we need not resolve the question

whether a citation to Duvall constitutes a reasoned decision

because the California Supreme Court and Superior Court

decisions share common reasoning that does not applyfederal

law unreasonably.

It is undisputed that the Superior Court reached the merits

of Petitioner’s claim, which the court discussed at some

length. Petitioner argues, however, that the California

Supreme Court dismissed on a procedural ground. If that

were so, then we would review Petitioner’s claims de novo,

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in light of the state’s failure to raise procedural default. But,

in the particular context of this case, we hold that the

California Supreme Court’s citation to Duvall signals that it,

too, reached the merits. The page of Duvall cited by the

California Supreme Court discusses both procedural and

substantive requirements for habeas petitioners, including the

requirement to plead facts sufficient to state a claim. 

886 P.2d at 1258. Petitioner brought a facial challenge to the

SVPA, which did not require him to allege any facts about his

situation beyond the undisputed and properly pleaded fact

that he had been civilly committed as an SVP. Thus, in

context, a procedural ruling would not have made sense. 

Accordingly, we interpret the citation to Duvall to mean that

the California Supreme Court understood Petitioner’s equal

protection claim, but determined that it lacked merit. See

Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that, “unless a court expressly (not implicitly) states

that it is relying upon a procedural bar, we must construe an

ambiguous state court response as acting on the merits of a

claim, if such a construction is plausible”).3

3 Petitioner contends that we previously have held that an otherwise

unexplained citation to Duvall signifies that the state court denied relief

on a procedural ground. But the cases that Petitioner cites did not

interpret a freestanding citation to Duvall; they interpreted a citation to

Duvall alongside a citation to Ex Parte Swain, 209 P.2d 793, 796 (Cal.

1949). We have held that citation to Duvall and Swain together

constitutes “dismissal without prejudice, with leave to amend to plead

required facts with particularity.” Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th

Cir. 2012); accord Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir.

2005); King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam),

abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized in Waldrip v. Hall,

548 F.3d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 2008). The citations to Swain carry particular

weight because the Swain court discussed the pleading standard and then

dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice. 209 P.2d at 796; Cross,

676 F.3d at 1176. We are not required to interpret a citation to Duvall

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SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 11

The Superior Court held that Petitioner had failed to show

that SVPs are “similarly situated” to MDOs and NGIs. The

California Supreme Court’s broader determination that there

was no merit to Petitioner’s equal protection challenge

encompasses that ruling. Because we hold that the state

courts reasonably reached that common conclusion, we need

not and do not decide which state court issued the “last

reasoned decision.” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091. The result is

the same whichever decision we review.

B. Equal Protection Analysis

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from

“deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The

Equal Protection Clause does not require identical treatment;

rather, it “guarantees that the government will not classify

individuals on the basis of impermissible criteria.” Coal. for

Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Because “legislative classifications as a general rule are

presumptively valid under the Equal Protection Clause,” we

ordinarily must uphold a legislative classification if it is

“‘rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’” Id.

(quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.

432, 440 (1985)).

Certain exceptions to that general rule trigger heightened

judicial scrutiny. If the classification targets a suspect class

or burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, we apply strict

scrutiny and ask whether the statute is narrowly tailored to

serve a compelling governmental interest. Wright v. Incline

alone in the same way that we would interpret citations to both Duvall and

Swain.

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Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1141 (9th Cir.

2011). If a law discriminates against a quasi-suspect class, it

is subject to intermediate scrutiny; to survive a constitutional

challenge, such discrimination must substantially relate to an

important governmental objective. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d

456, 479–80 (9th Cir. 2014), petitions for cert. filed,

83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-765), (U.S.

Jan. 2, 2015) (No. 14-788), and (U.S. Apr. 9, 2015) (No. 14-

1214).

Petitioner concedes that the SVPA does not discriminate

against a suspect or quasi-suspect class. He contends

nevertheless that the state courts were bound to employ

heightened scrutiny because civil commitment burdens a

fundamental right. It is true that we have suggested, without

deciding, that “the rational basis test with a sharper focus”

may apply to civil commitment laws. Hickey v. Morris,

722 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks

omitted). But because we are reviewing the state courts’

decision under AEDPA, the question is not what test we

would use were we reviewing de novo, but what “clearly

established” United States Supreme Court precedent the state

courts were bound to apply. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Although the Supreme Court has characterized civil

commitment as a “significant deprivation of liberty,”

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), it also has

examined challenges to civil commitment statutes using

rational basis review, see Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107,

111–12 (1966) (holding that the petitioner was deprived of

equal protection of the laws because “there [was] no

conceivable basis” for the statutory distinction between two

different groups of mentally ill individuals). The Court has

never specified clearly what standard of review applies. 

United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990);

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SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 13

cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 116 (1992) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s analysis of a due

process challenge to a civil commitment statute because,

“[f]irst, the Court never explains whether we are dealing here

with a fundamental right, and . . . [s]econd, the Court never

discloses what standard of review applies”). Accordingly,

state courts reasonablymay apply the rational basis test when

considering equal protection challenges to civil commitment

laws.4

The state courts held that SVPs are not similarly situated

to MDOs and NGIs for the purpose of challenging the lack of

a timing provision in the SVPA. That holding amounts to a

determination that the state has a constitutionally sufficient

reason for treating the groups differently. See City of

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (“The Equal Protection Clause . . .

essentially . . . direct[s] that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.”). The state courts did not specify

which level of scrutiny they applied in adjudicating

Petitioner’s claim.5 But because the courts reasonably could

4

Indeed, most federal appellate courts that have addressed the

appropriate standard of review for equal protection challenges to civil

commitment statutes have held that rational basis review applies. United

States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 446–47 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.

Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2010); Varner v. Monohan, 460 F.3d 861,

865 (7thCir. 2006); United States v. Weed, 389 F.3d 1060, 1071 (10thCir.

2004). But see Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2000)

(concluding that “[s]ome form of intermediate level scrutiny” applies).

5 Petitioner argues that the state courts had to apply strict scrutiny

because the California Supreme Court has held that procedural provisions

of the SVPA are subject to strict scrutiny. People v. McKee, 223 P.3d

566, 588 (Cal. 2010). But the California Supreme Court’s decision in

McKee does not change our evaluation on habeas review, for two reasons. 

First, our inquiry is whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly

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14 SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY

have used the rational basis standard, we cannot grant habeas

relief unless Petitioner shows that it was objectively

unreasonable to conclude, Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, that

there was a rational relationship between the differential

treatment and a legitimate governmental purpose, Coal. for

Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702. He cannot carry that heavy

burden.

The state’s interest in preventing violent crime is more

than legitimate; it is compelling. United States v. Salerno,

481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). The narrower question is whether

it was objectively unreasonable for the state courts to hold

that the state legislature had a rational reason to distinguish

between individuals who have been found to be mentally ill

and dangerous (MDOs and NGIs) and individuals who have

been found to be mentally ill and sexually dangerous (SVPs). 

With respect to the procedural steps in the civil

recommitment process that are at issue here, the state court

reasonably concluded that California may make such a

distinction. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 485 (7th

Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is not unreasonable for the State to believe

that a person with a mental disorder of a sexual nature is

qualitativelymore dangerousthan another mental patient who

nonetheless threatens danger to himself or others.”); see also

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364–65 (1997)

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court decision

cannot change the content ofthat law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Second,

McKee could not have bound the state court to apply a particular level of

scrutiny here, even ifits holding were otherwise relevant, because it issued

nine months after the California Supreme Court denied relief in

Petitioner’s case. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390 (stating that, under

AEDPA, a habeas petitioner may challenge a state court’s application of

a rule of law only if that rule was “clearly established at the time [the]

state-court conviction became final”).

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(upholding Kansas’ civil commitment law for sexually

violent predators against a due process challenge, in part

because the law applied to a “narrow class of particularly

dangerous individuals”).

Petitioner argues that the state’s sole justification for

treating SVPs differently from other violent offenders who

are civilly committed is that sexually violent offenders have

a higher recividism rate than do other violent offenders. He

claims that insufficient data support that assertion. But even

assuming equal rates of recidivism, it is not unreasonable to

conclude, as the Seventh Circuit has, that a state rationally

may decide that sexually violent crime is qualitatively more

dangerous than other kinds of violent crime. Thielman,

282 F.3d at 485; cf. ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046,

1057 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that, even in the absence of

evidence of a higher recidivism rate for sex offenders, there

is a “legitimate public safety interest in monitoring sexoffender presence in the community”).

Moreover, the nature of the crime is not the only

difference between SVPs, on the one hand, and MDOs and

NGIs, on the other. Unlike the MDO statute or the NGI

statute, the version of the SVPA in effect when Petitioner’s

recommitment was initiated required that the particular

offender already had been convicted of sexually violent

offenses against at least two victims. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6600(a) (2000). It was not unreasonable for the state courts

to conclude that a state legislature rationally may decide that

a person who has committed sexually violent offenses against

more than one victim is more likely to recidivate than is a

person who has been convicted of a single crime against a

single victim or a single felony that need not involve a direct

victim.

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Petitioner also argues that the state courts’ denial of relief

is an unreasonable application of Baxstrom, 383 U.S. 107. 

According to Petitioner, Baxstrom established that, in the

arena of involuntary civil commitment, a state may not deny

a right to one group of committed persons that it confers on

another group of committed persons. Baxstrom did not sweep

so broadly. The civil commitment law at issue in Baxstrom

afforded the right to have a trial and a jury determination of

sanity before a person could be civilly committed. Id. at 111. 

But a person nearing the end of a penal sentence had no such

right and could be civilly committed without a jury trial. Id.

at 110. The Supreme Court held that the state could not deny

those nearing the end of a prison term “the jury review

available to all other persons civilly committed” in the state. 

Id. Baxstrom did not address whether state laws could

differentiate between sexually violent offenders and other

violent offenders, nor did the Court consider less drastic

procedural distinctions between groups. Here, all the

allegedly similar groups receive trials before being civilly

committed. The state court did not apply Baxstrom

unreasonably.

It was not objectively unreasonable for the state courts to

hold that the lack of a timing provision in the SVPA does not

deprive SVPs of equal protection of the laws. We cannot say

that the California courts contravened clearly established

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

AFFIRMED.

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