Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05306/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 The facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed 1

Material Facts (“UMF”) unless otherwise noted.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRWIN FOSTER, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

CITY OF FRESNO, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-03-5306 REC SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT.

(Doc. 68)

On April 4, 2005, the Court heard Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication

of certain issues. Upon due consideration of the written and

oral arguments of the parties and the record herein, Defendants’

motion is GRANTED as set forth below.

I. Factual Background1

This case centers around the death of Eric Daniel Foster

(“Foster”), who was shot and killed by Fresno Police Department

Officer Russell Cornelison. Plaintiffs are Foster’s parents,

Irwin Foster and Anna Valles, and Foster’s minor children and

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 Defendants submitted a detailed factual background that set 2

forth the specifics of the robberies. Plaintiffs do not dispute

these facts but argue that, for purposes of summary judgment, they

are immaterial and prejudicial because there is no indication that

Officer Cornelison knew these facts at the time of the shooting. 

The Court agrees and has thus omitted these details. Plaintiffs’

objection is sustained.

2

surviving heirs at law, Eric Daniel Foster, Jr. and Gloria Emonie

Foster, appearing by and through their guardian ad litem. 

On August 15, 2002, Foster was shot and killed by Officer

Cornelison. In the hours immediately preceding the shooting,

there were four separate armed robberies in Fresno. All four

victims indicated that the perpetrator was a black man with a gun

who was in a white Chevrolet pick-up truck. Two of the four

victims subsequently identified Foster from a photo line-up, and

another victim’s wallet was found in Foster’s vehicle. The

robberies were reported to the police shortly after they

occurred.2

At approximately 2:40 a.m. on August 15, police broadcasts

over the radio informed patrol officers the suspect of the armed

robberies was a black male, wearing a dark, hooded sweatshirt and

driving a white truck. Officer Mike Roberts was traveling in his

patrol unit when he saw a white truck matching the description of

the suspect’s vehicle. The truck did not have its lights on and

the officer was able to observe that the driver appeared to be a

black male in a hooded sweatshirt. 

The officer followed the truck but did not turn on his siren

lights. The suspect’s vehicle ran through a red light and

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collided with a red car carrying two passengers. The suspect’s

vehicle flipped over and landed on its roof. 

The suspect, later identified as Foster, climbed out of the

overturned truck and began to run. Officer Roberts shined his

spotlight on Foster and ordered him to stop. Foster ran towards

a bush on the side of the street and Officer Roberts heard the

sound of a chain link fence rattling as he continued to order

Foster to surrender.

Foster came out from behind the bush for a brief period,

during which his hands were on his waist with the tips of his

fingers toward his pockets. Officer Roberts thought Foster was

reaching for a gun, but did not fire on him because he felt

Foster was too far away to hit. Foster climbed the fence and ran

into an orchard. Officer Roberts broadcast over the radio that

Foster had fled on foot.

Officer Roberts returned to the overturned truck and looked

through an open window into the interior of the cab, looking with

a flashlight for the gun that had been reportedly used in the

robberies. Seeing none, Officer Roberts then broadcast over the

radio that he was unable to find the gun and that the suspect

might still be armed. Assisting units arrived on the seen and

Officer Ryan Engum conducted a second visual inspection of the

truck, also using a flashlight. He was unable to locate a gun

and also announced his search results over the radio. Later,

when the truck was turned over and more thoroughly searched, a

handgun was found.

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Officers Russell Cornelison, Skye Leibee and Ezequiel

Suarez, who had been monitoring the radio frequency and learned

of the armed robberies, arrived at the scene to offer assistance. 

They were informed that the robbery suspect had fled on foot into

the orchard and that he had possibly removed and discarded the

sweatshirt he was wearing.

The officers divided into two teams to search the orchard. 

Officer Cornelison with his canine partner, a Belgian Malinois

named Saxon, as well as Officer Suarez and Officer Leibee formed

one team. The officers were all aware that the suspect in the

series of robberies had been armed with a handgun and that a

search of the vehicle did not reveal a gun.

As the three officers proceeded into the orchard they

traveled north along a dirt road with orchard trees to the left

and a six foot fence covered with ivy to their right. Officer

Cornelison led the team with Saxon in front. Officer Leibee was

directly behind him providing cover and Officer Suarez was behind

Officer Leibee, also providing cover.

Shortly after the search of the orchard began, Saxon alerted

Officer Cornelison to the northeastern corner of the orchard

where they located the suspect hiding in the bushes along the

fence. Because it was dark, Officer Cornelison shined his

flashlight on the suspect, who had his back towards the officers. 

Officers Cornelison and Leibee identified themselves as police

and commanded several times that the suspect show his hands. The

suspect, Foster, refused to comply. Officer Cornelison warned

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The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this information is 3

irrelevant to the extent it was unknown to Officer Cornelison. 

5

Foster that if he did not comply, the dog would be released.

Canine Saxon began to bark and Foster still refused to

comply. Believing the suspect was armed with a gun allegedly

used in the preceding robberies, Officer Cornelison released

Saxon with two commands, to bite the suspect and to bring him to

Officer Cornelison. Officer Cornelison then retrieved his

department handgun, held it with both hands and pointed it at

Foster. Officers Leibee and Suarez maintained cover behind

Cornelison.

Saxon bit Foster on his lower back and initially Foster did

not move or react to the dog biting him. Officer Cornelison

continued to give Foster commands to show his hands and come out

but Foster did not respond, even after being bitten. 

The parties do not dispute the facts to this point. There

is, however, a dispute as to what transpired immediately prior to

the shooting. These facts will be discussed in more detail

below. What is undisputed is that Officer Cornelison discharged

his weapon and shot Foster four times. Foster, who was unarmed,

died as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds. 

An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Gopal of the coroner’s

office. The toxicology report indicated that Foster’s blood

tested positive for PCP and cannibinoids and that the urine test

confirmed those results and revealed the presence of a cocaine

metabolite. 

3

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 The SAC includes allegations regarding violations of the 4

First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, however these allegations were

voluntarily withdrawn per stipulation. See Doc. 36.

6

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 12, 2003. A first

amended complaint was filed on July 23, 2003 and a Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”) was filed by stipulation of the parties on

November 6, 2003. The SAC names as Defendants the City of

Fresno; City of Fresno Police Chief Jerry Dyer in his individual

capacity; and City of Fresno Police Officer Russell Cornelison,

also in his individual capacity. 

The SAC states nine causes of action. The first three 4

arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Claim one is by all Plaintiffs 

except Valles on behalf of Foster against Officer Cornelison and

is based on violations of Foster’s Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Claim two is by all Plaintiffs on their own

behalf against Cornelison and is based on violations of their

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, including a

Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of governmental influence

with familial relationships. Claim three is by all Plaintiffs on

their own behalf and on behalf of Foster and is against

Defendants City and Dyer. It is based on the policies and

customs of the City and Dyer to use, promote, or tolerate

excessive force; ignoring and failing to investigate alleged

abuses; and failure to adequately discipline and train. 

Claim four is under state law and is brought by all

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Plaintiffs except Valles against all Defendants. It asserts a

violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the California Constitution

and alleges that Defendants acted in concert to do so. The

remaining causes of action also arise under California law and

are brought by all Plaintiffs except Valles on behalf of

themselves and Foster. The fifth and sixth claims are against

Defendant Cornelison only and are for intentional and negligent

wrongful death, respectively. Claim seven is against Defendant

Cornelison and the City and is for violation of Foster’s civil

rights under California law, Civil Code section 52.1. Claim

eight is against Defendant Cornelison and is for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Claim nine is against

Defendant Dyer and the City and is for negligent hiring,

retention, training supervision and discipline. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment. Defendants argue

that Plaintiffs Irwin Foster and Anna Valles lack standing to

assert a survival action, that Plaintiffs’ lack sufficient

evidence to demonstrate an unconstitutional policy or practice on

the part of the City or Defendant Dyer, that Defendant

Cornelison’s use of force was objectively reasonable and that he

is entitled to qualified immunity.

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

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element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)). 

Materiality is determined by the substantive law governing a

claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all inferences drawn

from it must be construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91

L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to defeat summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809

F.2d at 630. 

The nonmoving party “may not rely on the mere allegations in

the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment,” but must

set forth by affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party may not simply state

that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence at trial; it

must produce at least some “significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank

v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569,88 S.

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Ct. 1575 (1968)). 

The question for the Court is not whether the “evidence

unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

evidence presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). This requires

more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position;” there must be “evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. Id. 

IV. Unopposed Issues

A. Standing of Plaintiffs Irwin Foster & Anna Valles

The survivors of an individual who is killed as a result of

the application of excessive force may assert a Fourth Amendment

claim on that individual’s behalf if the relevant state’s law

authorizes a survival action. Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). Section 377.60

of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a

wrongful death action may be asserted by a the children of a

decedent. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.60(a). A parent may only

assert a wrongful death claim if there are no children or issue

or if he or she is “dependent on the decedent.” Id. at §

377.60(b). “Dependence” refers to financial rather than

emotional dependency. Perry v. Medina,, 192 Cal. App. 3d 603,

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 Plaintiffs correctly point out in their opposition that the 5

Ninth Circuit has recognized that a parent who claims loss of

companionship as the result of the application of excessive force

can bring a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Curnow v.

Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325, (9th Cir. 1991) cert. denied

506 U.S. 972 (1992); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744,

748 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this does not address Defendants’

point that, as parents, Valles and Irwin Foster cannot assert

claims on behalf of Foster.

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608-09 (1987). To demonstrate financial dependence, a parent

“must show that they were actually dependent, to some extent,

upon the decedent for the necessaries of life.” Id. at 610.

Plaintiffs do not attempt to refute Defendants’ evidence

establishing that Foster did not provide any financial support

for Irwin Foster. Defs.’ UMF Nos. 90-97. At oral argument on

the motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the standing issue with

respect to claims on behalf of Foster. 

5

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence

that either Valles or Irwin Foster were financially dependent on

Foster, neither of them has standing to assert claims on behalf

of Foster. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants as

to this issue. This eliminates Plaintiff Irwin Foster from all

claims except the second and the fourth and eliminates Plaintiff

Valles from all claims except the second. 

B. Liability of Defendants Dyer & the City of Fresno

1. The Section 1983 Claim (Claim Three)

“Plaintiffs do not contest defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the third cause of action.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 31. This

is the section 1983 claim. Summary judgment as to this claim is

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 Defendants’ citation to Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewhich, 92 6

F.3d 831, 840 (9th Cir. 1996), is inapposite. Van Ort supports the

theory that if a public employee is acting outside the scope of his

employment, which cannot be argued here, there can be no negligent

supervision claim against the employing entity.

 At any rate, failure of a party to address a claim in an 7

opposition to a motion for summary judgment may constitute a waiver

of that claim. See Coufal Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932,

937 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Benicia Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.

Supp. 2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2002).

11

GRANTED in favor of Defendants Dyer and the City of Fresno.

2. Negligent Hiring, Retention, Training, Supervision 

 & Discipline (Claim Nine)

A claim for failure to train requires a legal duty to use

due care, breach of that duty and that the breach be a proximate

or legal cause of the injury. Stewart v. United States, 797 F.

Supp. 800, 804 (C.D. Cal. 1992). Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that supports this claim. 

6

Plaintiffs do not address claim nine in their opposition,

and at oral argument on the motion, counsel for Plaintiffs

acknowledged Plaintiffs’ non-opposition. Accordingly, summary 7

judgment as to claim nine is GRANTED in favor of Defendants Dyer

and the City of Fresno.

C. Liability Based on Violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment Rights (Claim Four)

Claim four asserts a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to be

free of excessive force and unreasonable seizure under Article 1,

section 13 of the California Constitution, the state law

equivalent of the Fourth Amendment. Compl. ¶50. Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs lack evidence to support a violation of

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 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the 8

portion of Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim on behalf of Foster that

is based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held

that excessive force cases are to be evaluated under the Fourth

Amendment rather than the Fourteenth. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394-95, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). 

12

their own, personal Fourth Amendment rights. 

At oral argument on the motion, Plaintiffs conceded that

there is no evidence to support a Fourth Amendment cause of

action based on the rights of Plaintiffs. However, as discussed,

Plaintiffs Eric Foster, Jr. and Gloria Foster, Foster’s surviving

children, may assert claims on behalf of Foster for the alleged

violation of Foster’s rights. Accordingly, summary judgment as

to claim four is GRANTED in favor of Defendants.

V. Liability of Officer Cornelison8

The parties divide their arguments regarding Officer

Cornelison into two questions, a constitutional question and a

qualified immunity question. These two questions both fall under

the rubric of qualified immunity. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity promotes public service

by eliminating the risk of personal liability for official

decisions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 73 L. Ed. 2d

396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). It “provides ample protection to

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271,

106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986). Qualified immunity is not a defense on

the merits; it is an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the

burdens of litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–02,

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 Although the term “alleged” is used, the Ninth Circuit 9

recently upheld a grant of summary judgment based on the

determination of the constitutional violation question. Blanford

v. Sacramento Co., 406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding officers’

actions not objectively unreasonable). 

13

150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001). It may be overcome

only by a showing that (1) a constitutional right was in fact

violated and (2) no reasonable officer could believe the

defendant’s actions were lawful in the context of fact-specific,

analogous precedents. Id. 

There is some contradiction with respect to the policies at

issue in an excessive force case involving qualified immunity. 

On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit has stated that, due to the

fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, summary judgment “in

excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Santos v.

Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). On the other hand, the

Supreme Court has stressed the importance of immunity being

resolved at an early stage in the litigation. Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 200-201. 

A. Were Foster’s Constitutional Rights Violated?

1. Legal Standard

The threshold question in determining the question of

qualified immunity is this: “Taken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier, 9

533 U.S. at 201. In the case of disputed facts, their resolution

and any credibility determinations “are manifestly the province

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of a jury.” Santos, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“[C]laims of excessive force are to be judged under the

Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” 

Brosseau v. Haugen, U.S. , 160 L. Ed. 2d 583, 589, 125 S.

Ct. 596. This question “is governed by the principles enunciated

in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct.

1694 (1985), and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 104 L. Ed. 2d

443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).” Id. at 588-89.

With respect to deadly force, the Court has explained that

“it is unreasonable for an officer to ‘seize an unarmed,

nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.’ But ‘[w]here the

officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a

threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others,

it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by

using deadly force.’” Id. (citations omitted). The “broad

discretion that must be afforded to police officers who face a

tense situation,” must be extended to mistakes of fact concerning

“the existence of probable cause” as well as to mistakes as to

what the law requires under particular circumstances. Jeffers v.

Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001).

Reasonableness is an objective analysis and “must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at

396. The “question is whether the officers’ actions are

‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

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motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted).

Graham set forth factors that should be considered in

determining reasonableness: “the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of

the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citing

Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9 (“the question is whether the totality of

the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . .

seizure”) (quotations omitted)); see also Billington v. Smith,

292 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). The most important of these

factors is the threat posed by the suspect. Smith v. City of

Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Ninth Circuit has admonished courts to use caution in

cases such as this:

Deadly force cases pose a particularly difficult

problem under this regime because the officer defendant

is often the only surviving eyewitness. Therefore, the

judge must ensure that the officer is not taking

advantage of the fact that the witness most likely to

contradict his story–the person shot dead–is unable to

testify. The judge must carefully examine all the

evidence in the record, such as medical reports,

contemporaneous statements by the officer and the

available physical evidence, as well as any expert

testimony proffered by the plaintiff, to determine

whether the officer’s story is internally consistent

and consistent with other known facts. In other words,

the court may not simply accept what may be a selfserving account by the police officer. It must also

look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed,

would tend to discredit the police officer’s story, and

consider whether this evidence could convince a

rational factfinder that the officer acted

unreasonably.

Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations

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omitted).

On a motion for summary judgment, the question is thus

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether Officer Cornelison’s conduct was objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and circumstances with which he was

confronted. If there is not, then no constitutional right was

violated and Officer Cornelison is immune from suit. If there is

a genuine issue of material fact, the constitutional violation is

assumed and the next question is whether the right was clearly

established at the time. 

2. The Graham Factors

The force used by Officer Cornelison consisted of the use of

the canine Saxon and the use of his firearm. Defendants argue

that Officer Cornelision’s actions were objectively reasonable

based on the information he had at the time and that it was

proper for him to release Saxon and use deadly force. 

Plaintiffs do not argue that the use of Saxon was

unreasonable. Plaintiffs argue that on their version of the

facts, Officer Cornelison’s use of deadly force was not

objectively reasonable. To summarize, Plaintiffs argue that

Foster had emerged from the bushes and had turned such that

Officer Cornelison should have seen that Foster was unarmed. 

Plaintiffs also assert that there are disputes as to the motion

made by Foster and the positions of either Officer Cornelison or

Foster at the time of and during the shooting. 

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a. Severity of the Crime

It is undisputed that four armed robberies occurred on the

night in question, that Foster was identified by two of the

victims and that physical evidence connected him to a third. 

Defs.’ UMF Nos. 10, 16, 26. It is also undisputed that Officer

Cornelison was aware that at least a couple of robberies had

occurred and that the officers were pursuing the suspect in those

cases. Defs.’ UMF Nos. 64-65. It is also undisputed that Foster

ran a red light and crashed his truck into another vehicle. 

Defs.’ UMF No. 46. Reckless driving can be a dangerous crime,

and armed robbery is unarguably a serious and dangerous crime;

the severity of the crime here is significant.

b. Attempting to Evade Arrest

It is undisputed that Foster fled from the scene of the car

accident into the orchard. Defs.’ UMF No. 57. It is likewise

undisputed that when the officers located Foster he was crouched

near a foliage-covered fence in the orchard. Defs.’ UMF Nos. 70,

72. Foster had been attempting to evade arrest at the time of

the shooting.

c. Resisting Arrest

Foster did not respond to the repeated commands of the

officers to come out and raise his hands. Defs.’ UMF No. 73.

Foster initially did not move or react to being bitten by Saxon,

Defs.’ UMF No. 79, and he did not respond to Officer Cornelison’s

continued commands to show his hands and come out. Defs.’ UMF

Nos. 80-81. Foster was resisting arrest in that he was being

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non-compliant with the officers’ orders to surrender.

d. Immediate Threat Posed by Foster

As mentioned, this is the most important of the Graham

factors. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 702. 

(1) Officer Cornelison Reasonably Believed

Foster Was Armed 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that “[a]ll the officers were

aware through radio traffic that the suspect in a series of

preceding robberies was armed with a handgun and that a search of

the vehicle revealed no gun.” Defs.’ UMF No. 69. Plaintiffs

also do not dispute that Officer Cornelison released Saxon

“[b]elieving the suspect was armed with the gun he used in the

preceding robberies . . ..” Defs.’ UMF No. 76. Accordingly, the

undisputed facts establish that, at the time of the shooting,

Officer Cornelison believed Foster was armed. 

Plaintiffs’ police procedures expert, Frank Saunders,

concluded that the officers’ actions were inconsistent with the

tactics to be used in confronting an armed and dangerous suspect,

and thus the actions undermine Officer Cornelison’s assertion

that he believed Foster was armed and dangerous. Pls.’ Opp’n at

16-17. Two of the five reasons given by Mr. Saunders relate

solely to the actions of Officers Suarez and Leibee and are not

relevant to the question of whether Officer Cornelison’s actions

were objectively reasonable. The other three points are

unsupported by the evidence and are addressed in turn below. 

Mr. Saunders asserts that Officer Cornelison’s “seems to

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have acted with total disregard for the safety of Saxon,” and

that Officer Cornelison’s use of the canine was contrary to

national police procedure standards. Defendants argue properly

that this conclusion lacks foundation. Mr. Saunders has never

been a canine officer and has no training with respect to

handling canines. Saunders Depo. 27: 4-18. Nor does Mr.

Saunders specify what the “national police standards” are for use

of a canine. Further, it is undisputed that Mr. Saunders

received a copy of the Fresno Police Department’s canine policies

and has no criticisms thereof. Defs.’ UMF NO. 108. That Saxon

may have been put at risk is immaterial to whether Officer

Cornelison believed Foster was armed. Moreover, Officer

Cornelison explained that a canine may be used in a situation in

which it would be inappropriate to use a human officer. 

Cornelison Depo. 40:17-24.

Mr. Saunders’ second assertion is that Officer Cornelison

acted inconsistently with “national officer safety police

procedures” because he failed to establish that his fellow

officers were covering him when he approached Foster. Saunders

Decl. ¶ 9B. Again, Defendants properly object because the

national police standards are unspecified. Also, it is

undisputed that Officers Leibee and Suarez were providing cover

throughout the operation. Defs.’ UMF Nos. 71, 78. 

Mr. Saunders’ third assertion is that Officer Cornelison

acted inconsistently with “national standard police procedures”

as well as “(law enforcement) common sense” when Officer

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Cornelison approached Foster without attempting to take cover. 

Defendants again properly object to the unspecified national

standards. Defendants also argue that Officer Cornelison

explained that he “did not want to take [his] eyes off the

suspect or put [his] back to [the suspect].” Additionally,

Officer Cornelison testified that he believed Foster was “giving

up” when Foster raised his hand but that he, Officer Cornelison

still believed Foster was armed. Cornelison Depo. 82:7-10. 

Even if Mr. Saunders’ conclusions were not lacking in

foundation, it remains undisputed that the officers were aware

via radio communications that Foster had been armed with a gun

and that a search of his vehicle did not reveal a gun. Moreover,

the Ninth Circuit has held that, “even for summary judgment

purposes, ‘the fact that an expert disagrees with the officer’s

actions does not render the officer’s actions unreasonable.’” 

Billington, supra 292 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Reynolds v. County of

San Diego, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

(2) Foster’s Position Prior to the Shooting

According to Officer Cornelison, after Saxon began biting

Foster the next thing Foster did was look back over his right

shoulder toward the officers and raise his right hand. 

Cornelison Decl. ¶ 27; Leibee Decl. ¶ 24; Suarez Decl. ¶ 22. 

Officer Cornelison then took “at least a couple” of steps toward

Foster such that he was approximately 10-15 feet away from

Foster. Defs.’ UMF No. 83. Officer Cornelison testified that

Saxon was not able to pull Foster from the foliage and that there

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was “[j]ust a little [movement] from the shaking from the dog

maybe, but no major movement.” Cornelison Depo. 77:4-5. 

In contrast, Plaintiffs assert that Saxon was successful in

extracting Foster from the bushes, Suarez Depo. 46:4-11, and

argue that this undermines Officer Cornelison’s claim that he

could not see Foster’s hands. Officer Suarez, who was providing

cover for his fellow officers and monitoring the orchard during

the incident, testified as follows:

Q. Okay. And did you see Mr. Foster move at all after

the dog bit him? 

A. Initially, no. I believe a little later. I don’t

know if the dog may have brought the subject out

slightly from the foliage, I’m not sure how much, but

movement was very little.

Q. So before the shots were fired, you think the dog

pulled Mr. Foster out from the foliage?

A. To the best of my recollection, yes, I believe so.

Q. How far away from the foliage did the dog pull Mr.

Foster out before the shots were fired?

A. I don’t remember.

Suarez Depo. 46:2-14.

Defendants, citing only the first question and answer,

assert that Plaintiffs have taken Officer Suarez’s testimony out

of context and that it “in no way indicates that Saxon was

successful in removing Foster from the bushes.” Defs.’ Reply at

4. When read in its totality, Officer Suarez’s testimony that he

believed Saxon pulled Foster from the foliage is inconsistent

with Officer Cornelison’s testimony that Saxon was not able to

pull Foster from the foliage. This fact is disputed and will be

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viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. However, even

assuming Saxon was able to pull Foster from the bushes, this

evidence does not indicate that Foster turned toward the officers

so that his hands were visible. Indeed, Officer Suarez indicated

that immediately after he thought Foster had been pulled from the

bushes, he could not see Foster’s hands. Suarez Depo. 46:22-23. 

To that extent, the testimony of the two officers is consistent

and does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 

(3) Foster’s Movement Prior to the Shooting

Defendants argue that the following is an undisputed

material fact:

84. After looking at the officers, Foster immediately

turned, put his head down and jammed his hand back down

to his waist or crotch area, began fumbling around,

jerking his arm as if he was trying to grab something.

[Evidence] 84. Declaration of Russell Cornelison at

¶29; Declaration of Skye Leibee at ¶24.

Defs.’ UMF No. 84. Plaintiffs argue that this fact is disputed

as follows:

Neither Officer Leibee nor Officer Suarez, both of whom

had clear, unobstructed views of Mr. Foster, saw Mr.

Foster fumble around or jerk his arm as if he was

trying to grab something.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Mr. Foster was

unarmed at the time of the shooting. Accordingly,

there would have been no reason for him to fumble

around or jerk his arm.

[Evidence] Deposition of Skye Leibee, Exh. B to Pyle

Decl., at 41:5-7; 42:3-13; 45:13-16; 50:13-22;

Deposition of Ezequiel Suarez, Exh. C to Pyle Decl., at

49:2-22.

Officer Suarez, who, as mentioned, was dividing his

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attention between monitoring the orchard for threats and the

scene involving Foster, testified in his deposition as follows:

Q. How did Mr. Foster move?

A. I don’t know if he moved his arm - it appeared that

he moved his arm forward and he kind of moved his body

in a forward motion.

Q. Which arm did Mr. Foster move forward?

A. I believe it was the right, right one. He started

moving it, and I [sic] that’s when I had immediately

turned around.

. . . 

Q. Did Mr. Foster put his right arm out away from him

as though he was trying to steady himself or catch his

balance?

A. It did not appear to me that he did. It looked

like he was moving his hand forward.

Q. And did it look to you like Mr. Foster was trying

to retrieve a weapon of some kind?

A. I’m not sure what he was trying to do, because I

immediately turned around to look at the orchard.

Suarez Depo. 47:24-25, 48:1-6, 48:22-25, 49:1-6. This evidence

is not inconsistent with Officer Cornelison’s testimony and does

not, without more, constitute an issue of fact. 

Officer Leibee, who was providing cover for Officer

Cornelison, testified in his deposition as follows:

Q. Did Mr. Foster move any part of his body that you

could see?

A. Yes.

Q. What part of his body did he move?

A. It was his right hand.

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Q. And what did Mr. Foster do with his right hand?

A. It momentarily came out from where it was concealed

at, and it appeared to me like he was trying to rebalance himself, and then it went back down.

Q. And could you see what Mr. Foster was doing with

his right hand after he brought it back down?

A. No.

. . . 

Q. And was there anything about his motion that made

you think he was trying to keep his balance?

A. Just the motion that he made, it appeared to me

like he was trying to regain his balance. It wasn’t -

he didn’t put his hands up in the air like he was

giving up. Like I said, it was just something that

looked like he was trying to regain his balance.

Leibee Depo. 40:20-25, 41:1-7, 42:23-25, 43:1-4 (emphasis added). 

It is undisputed that Foster moved his arm up and then moved

it back down, although there is a dispute as to why Foster raised

his arm. Officer Leibee interpreted the motion as an attempt by

Foster to regain his balance, Leibee Depo. 43:1-4, while Officer

Cornelison believed that Foster was complying with the commands

to raise his hands. Cornelison Depo. 77:13-15. This dispute is

immaterial. Neither officer indicated that they thought the

raising motion was threatening; it was the downward motion that

caused Officer Cornelison to fire. 

Accordingly, although there is some dispute as to whether

Foster “jammed” his hands toward his crotch area, which will be

addressed in the next section, it is undisputed that Foster

raised his right arm up and then lowered it again.

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(4) Foster’s Putting His Arm Back Down

Defendants argue that the movement of Foster’s arm was

threatening and that Officer Cornelison reasonably believed that

Foster was reaching for a weapon and applied deadly force in

response. Defendants argue that Officer Cornelison felt he was

under immediate threat and shot Foster to stop the threat. 

Defs.’ UMF No. 85 (disputed by Plaintiffs). Officer Leibee also

testified that Foster’s “[p]utting his hand back down into his

waistband or near his waistband area” was “threatening.” Leibee

Depo. 44:18-24. 

Plaintiffs assert that there is a dispute as to whether

Officer Cornelison saw Foster fumbling around as though for a

weapon. Plaintiffs make three points with respect to this. 

Plaintiffs argue first that Officer Suarez’s actions

undermine both Officer Cornelison’s and Officer Leibee’s

descriptions of Foster’s movement as threatening. Plaintiffs

assert that the movements were “so non-threatening that Officer

Suarez, after seeing them, diverted his attention to the orchard

to look for other signs of danger.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 18. 

Plaintiffs misconstrue Officer Suarez’s actions and testimony. 

Officer Suarez explained that he turned to look at the orchard,

which he was responsible for covering, because he thought he

heard a noise, not because the movement was non-threatening. 

Suarez Depo. 47:17-23. Notably, Officer Suarez testified that he

turned around “while I was advising dispatch that it appeared the

subject was reaching for something.” Id. at 47:21-23. 

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Accordingly, the testimony of Officer Suarez, if anything,

supports Officer Cornelison’s determination that Foster was

reaching for something and does not create an issue of material

fact.

Plaintiffs argue second that neither Officer Leibee nor

Officer Suarez saw Foster “jam” his hand down or fumble around

for anything. Plaintiffs are correct that neither officer

described Foster’s movement in this way although, as mentioned,

Officer Leibee described the movement as “threatening” and

Officer Suarez testified that he advised dispatch that Foster was

reaching for something. The descriptions of Officers Leibee and

Suarez are not entirely consistent with that of Officer

Cornelison. 

Plaintiffs argue third that it is implausible that Foster

was fumbling around for something because Foster was actually

unarmed and that there was no reason for him to fumble around. 

Defendants argue in response that Foster was not aware that he

had lost the gun that he had previously possess and was therefore

searching for it. This particular question - whether to believe

that, in the time between Foster’s fleeing the scene of the car

accident and his discovery by the officers Foster realized he did

not have his weapon, and thus Plaintiffs’ version of the facts is

the credible one; or whether Foster, who was under the influence

of controlled substances, did not realize that he had lost his

weapon and was reaching for it, thus supporting Defendants’

version of the facts- would be a question of fact for a jury.

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Again, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ second and third points indicate a

dispute as to whether Foster jammed his hand down and fumbled

around as if reaching for a weapon or whether he simply moved his

hand down without fumbling. The Court will assume for the

purposes of this motion that no fumbling or jamming occurred. 

(5) Failure of Officer Leibee to Fire 

It was immediately after Foster moved his arm that Officer

Cornelison fired his weapon. As he did so, Officer Cornelison

stepped into Officer Leibee’s line of fire. Leibee Depo. 46:24-

25; 47:1-2. Officer Leibee testified that he immediately moved

to his right and regained a clear view of Foster. Leibee Depo.

47:11-16. Plaintiffs argue that because Officer Leibee did not

fire at that time, it was unreasonable for Officer Cornelison to

have fired his weapon. Plaintiffs support this with the

following testimony of Officer Leibee:

Q. So what did you do when Officer Cornelison moved

into your line of fire?

A. I moved to my right.

Q. How far did you move to your right?

A. Maybe one or two steps.

Q. And did you at that point have a clear view of the

suspect?

A. I did then.

Q. And at that time why didn’t you fire your weapon?

A. Because I felt the threat had not presented itself

at that time. The shots had already been fired, [I]

wanted to reassess to see what the next plan of action

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would be.

Leibee Depo. 47:9-22. Plaintiffs argue based on the last answer

that Officer Leibee did not believe deadly force was necessary

and thus Officer Cornelison was objectively unreasonable in

applying it. 

When read in its totality, Officer Leibee’s testimony does

not support Plaintiffs’ position. Officer Leibee testified that

if Officer Cornelison had not moved into his line of fire, he

would have fired his weapon. Leibee Depo. 47:3-5. The language

on which Plaintiff relies relates to the time immediately after

Officer Cornelison fired his weapon, i.e. Officer Leibee

considered firing on Foster after Officer Leibee regained his

clear view but did not because Officer Cornelison had already

fired his weapon and Officer Leibee wanted to reassess the

situation. Leibee Depo. 47:19-22; 48:3-8. Officer Leibee’s

failure to fire his weapon does not create a genuine issue of

material fact. 

(6) Officer Cornelison’s Position & Actions

Plaintiffs base much of their opposition to summary judgment

on the conclusions of Dr. James Cooper, who performed a second

look autopsy on Foster approximately two weeks after the

shooting. Plaintiffs argue in sum that Officer Cornelison was

“closing in” on Foster as he fired his weapon and that Foster was

turned toward Officer Cornelison such that Officer Cornelison

must have been able to see that Foster was unarmed. In order to

address Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the positioning of Foster

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These summaries are taken in part from the declaration of 10

Dr. Cooper and in part from the original autopsy report prepared by

Dr. Gopal, which was attached as part of Exhibit 3 to Dr. Cooper’s

deposition. Dr. Cooper does not dispute the findings of Dr. Gopal

as to the entry wounds, Cooper Depo. 57:12-14, or the trajectories,

Id. at 58:11-17.

 Dr. Cooper’s declaration indicates that it is “difficult to 11

be very specific as to the original trajectory of the round,” but,

again, Dr. Cooper testified at his deposition that he agreed with

Dr. Gopal’s findings regarding the trajectories. Supra, n.10.

29

and Officer Cornelison, the four gunshot wounds must be

summarized. Dr. Cooper acknowledged that it was impossible to 10

determine which wound was inflicted first, but opined that Wound

D was the first shot to hit Foster. Cooper Depo. 43:7-14.

Wound A was a gunshot wound to the back of the right

shoulder. Gopal Rep. at 3; Cooper Decl. ¶ 7A. It caused soft

tissue injury only and was not life threatening. “The trajectory

was predominantly downward, with minor back to front and right to

left components.” Cooper Decl. ¶ 7A.

Wound B was a gunshot wound to the back of the right

shoulder. Gopal Rep. at 3; Cooper Decl. ¶ 7B. It damaged the

axillary vein and was life threatening. Cooper Decl. ¶ 7B. The

trajectory was similar to Wound A, downward with minor back to

front and right to left components. Id. 

Wound C was a gunshot wound to the back of the arm. Gopal

Rep. at 4; Cooper Decl. ¶ 7C. This shot entered the back of the

right arm, exited the arm with approximately an inch of skin in

between, and reentered the chest cavity. Id. This wound injured

the lungs and was life threatening. Cooper Decl. ¶ 7C. The

trajectory was from back to front and very slightly downwards.11

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Gopal Rep. at 4. 

Wound D was a gunshot wound to the right side of the back. 

Gopal Rep. at 5; Cooper Decl. ¶ 7D. This wound was lower and

closer to the midline than the other three. Cooper Decl. ¶ 7D. 

It damaged the liver and was life threatening. The trajectory

was from back to front and slightly right to left. Id. Unlike

the other three wounds, there was no downward component to this

wound’s trajectory. Id. 

The final wound was a dog bite wound to the right side of

the lower back. Gopal Rep. at 6; Cooper Decl. ¶ 7E.

Plaintiffs argue that these wounds and trajectories

discredit Officer Cornelison’s version of the facts because,

according to Dr. Cooper, “the impact points and trajectories of

gunshot wounds A, B and C would require a significant position

change in either the shooter or the victim, or both.” Cooper

Decl. ¶ 10. 

Officer Cornelison testified that he was approximately ten

to fifteen feet away from Foster at the time of the shooting. 

Cornelison Depo. 82:2-4. As to Foster’s position, Officer

Cornelison testified that he did not see what happened to

Foster’s body as each shot hit him because the shots were fired

in rapid succession, but that he did not recall any major

position change, like throwing his hands up or falling down, as

the shots impacted Foster. Cornelison Depo. 84:1-18. Officer

Cornelison testified that, after all the shots were fired Foster

“[i]t looked like [Foster] slumped a little bit, but he was still

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mostly in the same position.” Cornelison Depo. 84:21-23.

Dr. Cooper avers that either Officer Cornelison was standing

over Foster or, if Officer Cornelison’s position remained the

same, Foster “would need to be prone, or approaching a prone

position, with his head toward the shooter rather than away from

him.” Id. Dr. Cooper concludes that “[t]hese discrepancies

indicate that the sequence of events in this case could not have

happened the way that Officer Cornelison describes them in the

police report and in his deposition testimony.” Cooper Decl. ¶12. 

Plaintiffs, apparently interpreting Dr. Cooper’s findings,

argue with respect to Wound C that it “is undisputed that this

bullet entered the front of Mr. Foster’s shoulder first . .

indicat[ing] that at the time of the shot, Mr. Foster was facing

Officer Cornelison.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 20. Neither Dr. Gopals’ nor

Dr. Cooper’s report supports the contention that Foster was

facing Officer Cornelison when Wound C was inflicted. Both

reports indicate that the bullet entered the back of the right

arm, went through the arm, and entered the chest cavity. There

is no evidence to support the claim that Wound C entered the

front of Foster’s shoulder first. 

Plaintiffs also argue that there is a dispute as to whether

Officer Cornelison was moving based on the location of the

expended shells from Officer Cornelison’s weapon. Plaintiffs’

expert, Mr. Saunders, concluded from the location of these

shells, as depicted in the map of the scene made by the police,

that Officer Cornelison must have been moving as he fired his

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weapon such that Officer Cornelison was between three and six

feet of Foster when Officer Cornelison fired the final round. 

Saunders Decl. ¶¶ 12-13. 

Putting aside for a moment that Dr. Cooper, Plaintiffs’

other expert, agreed that Officer Cornelison’s testimony that he

was 10-15 feet away from Foster was consistent with his (Dr.

Cooper’s) opinion, Cooper Depo. 90:2-5, and that Plaintiffs did

not dispute Defendants’ UMF No. 83, which states that Officer

Cornelison was 10-15 feet from Foster at the time he fired,

Defendants correctly argue that Mr. Saunders’ is not qualified to

render such an opinion. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence allows admission of testimony by “a witness qualified as

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. In his curriculum vitae Mr.

Saunders purports to be an expert in the fields of police

procedures, training, deadly and non-deadly force, officer

safety, and pursuits and security. Saunders Decl. Ex. 1. Mr.

Saunders is not an expert in ballistics or crime scene

reconstruction. Moreover, he has never owned or shot a .40

caliber Beretta, the gun used by Officer Cornelison. Saunders

Depo. 59:03-06. There is no indication that Mr. Saunders is

qualified to render an opinion based on a the location of the

shell casings. Even if Mr. Saunders were qualified to render

such opinions, his conclusions with respect to this issue are

unreliable. See Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 299 F.3d 1053,

1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial court has obligation to determine

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 None of the officers testified that Officer Cornelison was, 12

at any time, standing directly above Foster and firing into him. 

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reliability of expert testimony and broad latitude in so doing). 

Mr. Saunders’ conclusion is based on a discussion with a range

master, whose name and affiliation Mr. Saunders could not recall,

and is not based on any further research or testing by Mr.

Saunders. Mr. Saunders has presented no reliable basis for his

conclusions. 

Mr. Saunders also concludes that Officer Cornelison’s

description of the scene is implausible because “if Saxon had

been biting Mr. Foster when Russell Cornelison fired his weapon,

as the officer claims, the dog would have been in the direct

line-of-fire and would more than likely have been hit by one or

more of those bullets. Obviously, according to the police

report, that did not happen.” Saunders Decl. ¶ 14. Again, Mr.

Saunders is not an expert in handling and training of canines or

canine officers. Also, his conclusion is unsupported by any

physical evidence and is speculation. Moreover, as Officer

Cornelison testified, police canines are trained to be neutral

to, i.e. ignore, gunfire. Cornelison Depo. 94:1-4. Even if

Officer Cornelison did disregard the safety of Saxon, this is a

tactical error that does not create a genuine issue of material

fact as to the respective positions of Foster and Officer

Cornelison. 

Assuming, arguendo, as Dr. Cooper opines, that Foster’s

position changed or that Officer Cornelison approached Foster,12

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 The trajectories for Wounds A, B, and D were described by 13

Dr. Gopal as being slightly right to left, Gopal Rep. at 3-5, which

indicates that, at most, Foster was in the process of turning and

further undermines Plaintiffs’ argument that Foster turned around

and faced Officer Cornelison.

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it nonetheless remains that all of the entry wounds are on the

back of Foster’s body and all of the trajectories are from back

to front. This physical evidence is consistent with Officer

Cornelison’s testimony that at no time could he see Foster’s

hands. There is no physical evidence to support Plaintiffs’

contention that Foster turned around and faced Officer

Cornelison. It will be assumed for purposes of this motion 13

that Foster was approaching a prone or semi-prone position, but

that he did not turn around. 

(7) The Shots Were Fired in Rapid Succession

Plaintiffs argue that there is a dispute as to the timing of

the shots. Plaintiffs assert that “[t]here was a pause between

the first shot and the second round of shots.” Pls.’ Opp’n at

18. Defendants argue that all three officers indicated that the

four shots were fired in rapid succession. See Cornelison Decl.

¶ 30; Leibee Decl. ¶ 25; Suarez Decl. ¶ 23. 

Plaintiffs argue that a statement made by Officer Suarez in

an interview the morning following the shooting undermines this. 

Pyle Decl. Ex. D. Officer Suarez described the shots to

Detective Garcia as follows: “I heard a shot or two. I can’t

remember how many shots were fired.” Id. (emphasis added). In

his deposition, Officer Suarez testified as follows: “Q. And

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were the shots fired, did they come right after one another, bam,

bam, bam, bam, like that . . . ? A. To me it appeared that they

did.” Suarez Depo. 50:20-23. Officer Suarez’s earlier assertion

that he hear one or two shots is not inconsistent with his later

sworn testimony that he heard shots fired in rapid succession. 

The interview cited by Plaintiffs is not evidence from which a

jury could reasonably find that a pause occurred. It is thus

undisputed that Officer Cornelison shot Foster four times in

rapid succession. 

3. Analysis

The undisputed facts and the disputed facts that are viewed

in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs are summarized as

follows: Foster was a suspect in a series of armed robberies, a

dangerous felony; Foster had fled and had been attempting to

evade arrest; Officer Cornelison reasonably believed that Foster

was armed with a gun; Foster did not respond to the officers’

commands; Foster did not significantly respond to the application

of Saxon initially, but the dog was successful at extracting

Foster from the bushes; Foster raised his arm up; Foster moved

his arm down toward his waistband area, but did not “jam” his

hand down or fumble around; Officer Leibee characterized the

motion as “threatening” and would have fired but for Officer

Cornelison’s moving into his line of fire; Officer Cornelison

fired four shots in rapid succession; the shots hit Foster on his

back and the back of his right arm and shoulder; and as Officer

Cornelison fired, Foster changed position and became more prone

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or semi-prone. 

Bearing in mind the “broad discretion that must be afforded

to police officers who face a tense situation,” Jeffers, supra,

267 F.3d at 909, and that reasonableness “must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at

396, a reasonable officer in Officer Cornelison’s position would

have believed that Foster posed an immediate threat of serious

harm. Officer Cornelison’s application of deadly force was thus

objectively reasonable. 

Neither the physical evidence put forth by Plaintiffs nor

the minor inconsistencies in the officers’ versions of the

situation create a dispute as to the critical facts in this case:

that Officer Cornelison reasonably believed Foster was armed and

that all three officers saw Foster move his arm down. It is

these undisputed facts that provided Officer Cornelison with

probable cause to use deadly force. Whether Foster or Officer

Cornelison moved after the shots were fired is irrelevant to the

question of whether Foster posed an immediate threat immediately

before the shots were fired. Similarly, the tactical errors put

forth by Plaintiffs’ expert, Mr. Saunders, are “nothing but 20/20

hindsight that take[] no account of the need to act in emergency

situations.” Billington, supra, 292 F.3d at 1191.

This determination is consistent with the recent Ninth

Circuit decision of Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110

(9th Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld summary

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 The court decided the issue on the constitutional question, 14

but also upheld summary judgment in the alternative on the clearly

established question. Blanford, 406 F.3d at 

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judgment on the constitutional question. There, the plaintiff, 14

Blanford, was carrying an edged sword and was shot and severely

injured by police after he ignored commands to stop and drop the

sword and attempted to enter a house that, unbeknownst to the

officers, was actually his house. Id. at 1112. The court found

the officers’ shooting of Blanford objectively reasonable because

the officers had probable cause to believe that Blanford “posed a

threat of serious physical harm to [the officers], or to others,

because he was armed, refused to give up his weapon, was not

surrounded, and was trying to get inside a private residence or

in default of that, into the back yard, where his sword could

inflict injury that the deputies would not have been in a

position to prevent.” Id. at 1117-18 (emphasis added). The

court also found that a second and third round of shots were

objectively reasonable because “the deputies knew that Blanford

had committed a crime, albeit not a violent one, and was

continuing a course of conduct that objectively indicated he was

not giving up the sword that made him a threat to anyone in

charging range.” Id. at 1118-19.

Here, unlike in Blanford, Foster was suspected of committing

a violent crime, armed robbery, and had fled the scene of a car

accident in an attempt to evade arrest. Most important, here,

Foster made a move that Officer Cornelison reasonably believed

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posed an immediate threat because the officers believed Foster

was armed at the time. In contrast, in Blanford, the court found

no constitutional violation despite the fact that Blanford did

not actually make a threatening movement toward the officers. 

Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1120 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (“the

significant threat must also be immediate . . . [t]he officers

have not been able to name a single human being who was

significantly or immediately threatened by Matthew Blanford” ).

The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Officer

Cornelison’s actions were objectively reasonable. Accordingly,

no constitutional violation of Foster’s rights occurred and

summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ first claim is GRANTED. As a

result, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment as to

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for violation of their own due

process rights, and it is hereby GRANTED.

B. Was the Right Clearly Established at the Time?

The determination that no constitutional right was violated

obviates a need for discussion of the second prong of the Saucier

test. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Billington, 292 F.3d at

1191.

VI. Plaintiffs’ Remaining State Law Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

as to Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, claims five through

eight, because Officer Cornelison is immune from liability under

California law. 

Section 196 of the California Penal Code provides that a

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 Section 820.2 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 15

by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting

from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result

of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not

such discretion be abused.” Cal. Govt. Code § 820.2.

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homicide committed by an officer is justifiable if it was

“necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the

execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other

legal duty; or . . . when necessarily committed in arresting

persons charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or

resisting such arrest.” Cal. Pen. Code § 196. “There can be no

civil liability under California law as the result of a

justifiable homicide.” Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47

Cal. App. 4th 334, 349 (1996) (finding immunity pursuant to

section 820.2 of the California Government Code where force 15

used was determined reasonable).

Under California law, an officer may use deadly force to

effect an arrest “only if the felony for which the arrest is

sought is ‘a forcible, and atrocious one which threatens death or

serious bodily harm, or there are other circumstances which

reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm to the

officer or to another.’” Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504,

1514 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d

325, 333 (1977) (interpreting Cal. Pen. Code § 196)). 

Here, as discussed, Foster was the suspect in a series of

armed robberies, a dangerous felony. Also as discussed, Officer

Cornelison reasonably believed that Foster posed an immediate

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threat of death or serious bodily injury when Foster, who was

believed to be armed, refused to comply with the officers’ orders

and returned his hand to his waistband area. Accordingly,

Officer Cornelison is entitled to immunity under California law. 

See Martinez, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 349-350. 

Section 815.2 of the California Government Code provides

that a city cannot be liable for the acts of its employee if the

employee is immune from liability. Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2. 

Because Officer Cornelison is immune from liability, there can be

no liability on the part of Defendant Dyer or the City. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’

remaining state law claims.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is hereby GRANTED for the reasons set forth

above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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