Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04470/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04470-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The facts of this matter are set out in more detail in the Court’s August 22, 2005 summary judgment

order.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL KEEGAN and BETH KEEGAN,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

IRENE S. KIVITZ,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-04470 SI

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In an August 22, 2005, Order, the Court issued itsfindings on plaintiffs’ numerous claims forsummary

judgment and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the question of violation of San Francisco

Health Code § 581(b). The Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment for nuisance so far as it

relied on a violation of California Health & Safety Code § 17920.10. The parties were permitted to provide

supplemental briefing on the issue ofthe relationship between the San Francisco ordinance and the California

statute. Having considered the supplemental briefing submitted by both plaintiffs and defendant, the Court

GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion with respect to violation ofthe San Francisco ordinance, and DENIES plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment on the issue of violation of state law.

BACKGROUND1

In 2003, plaintiffs Dan and Elizabeth Keegan entered into a one-year lease agreement with defendant

Irene Kivitz. This action arises as a result of a dispute between the Keegans and Ms. Kivitz concerning alleged

lead contamination at the premises. Plaintiffs claim that the lead contamination constituted a lead hazard under

Case 3:04-cv-04470-SI Document 50 Filed 11/01/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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both state and federallaw. On June 24, 2005, they brought a motion seeking summary judgment on this issue,

among others.

The Court granted plaintiffs’motionin part, finding that they had established that the lead contamination

constituted a violationofthe SanFrancisco municipalordinance. The Court denied plaintiffs’ motion, however,

with respect to their claims that the lead contamination violated California Health & Safety Code § 17920.10.

Specifically, the Court found thatsection 17920.10 required both “lead contaminated dust levels [above] the

amounts established by law,” and that “the lead contaminated dust ‘is likely to endanger the health of the . . .

occupants.’” August 22, 2005 Order, at 11. Because plaintiffs had provided no evidence that the lead

contamination endangered the health of the occupants, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment on the state law claim.

Given the appearance of possible preemption issues, the Court invited further briefing on the

relationship between the San Francisco ordinance and the California statute. Both plaintiffs and defendant

submitted supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs claim that the ordinance and the statute have exactly the same

requirements, while defendant claims that the statute preempts the ordinance.

LEGAL STANDARD

California has a policy against preemption. Thus, before finding a municipal ordinance to be

preempted, courts should carefully ensure that a genuine conflict exists between the competing claims of the

municipal and state governments. See S.D. Myers v. City and County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174,

1177 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16-17

(1991)). “A conflict exists [only] if the local legislation [1] duplicates, [2] contradicts, or [3] enters an area fully

occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.” Id. (quoting Sherwin-Williams Co.

v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 4th 893, 897 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

In their supplemental briefing, plaintiffs argue, as they did in their original summary judgment papers,

that the statute and the ordinance are coextensive. Plaintiffs claim that the Court misinterpreted California

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For the Northern District of California

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Health & Safety Code § 17920.10 when it ruled that the statute requires proof of endangerment of the health

of the occupants, in addition to lead levels above a certain amount. According to plaintiffs’ reading of the

statute, the focus of the inquiry is on “proximity,” indicating that the law presumes endangerment when an

individual is actually exposed to lead contaminated dust.

The Court continues to abide by its original interpretation of the statute; plaintiffs’ strained reading

would render an entire clause ofthe statutory text meaningless. The statute clearly requires “lead-contaminated

dust . . . in amounts that are equal to or exceed the amount of lead established [by California Regulations] . .

. and that are likely to endanger the health of the public or the occupants thereof as a result of their proximity

to the public or occupants thereof.” As the plain text of the statute makes clear, endangerment is the second

element of the statute, not exposure.

Having determined that the San Francisco ordinance and the California statute are not coextensive, the

Court must now turn to defendant’s argument that the statute preempts the ordinance. Defendant claims that

the statute preempts the ordinance because California Health & Safety Code § 17920.10 is a section of the

State Housing Law. With the State Housing Law, California courts have found that the California Legislature

intended to fully occupy the field ofbuilding standards. See Leslie v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1042,

1048 (Cal. App. 1999); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Livermore, 45 Cal. App.4th 719, 724 (Cal. App.

1996) (“[O]ur state legislature has clearly expressed the intent to fully occupy the field ofbuilding standards.”).

When the legislature has intended to fully occupy the field, municipal legislation on the same subject matter is

preempted. Leslie, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 1048.

This case, however, does not involve building standards. Rather, the San Francisco ordinance is public

health measure that classifies a public nuisance. Thus, the San Francisco ordinance is very different from the

ordinance at issue in Building Industry Ass’n, which involved a municipality’s amendments to the Uniform

Building Code to require automatic fire-extinguishing systems in all new constructions. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 45

Cal. App.4th at 722. Unlike the ordinance in that case, the San Francisco ordinance does not purport to alter

the building standards established by California law. The state’s occupation of the field of building standards

thus does not invalidate the localordinance. See id. at 724 (“[A] local government is precluded fromenacting

building standards that differ from state standards . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

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Although San Francisco’s ordinance is not a “building standard” it may nonetheless be preempted if

it contradicts the California statute. See City of Watsonville v. State Dept. of Health Serv., -- Cal. Rptr.

3d --, 2005 WL 2769514, at *2 (Cal. App. 2005). The Court finds that compliance with § 581(b) does not

prevent compliance with California Health & Safety Code § 17920.10; the statutes are entirely consistent.

Moreover, San Francisco’s ordinance, which only involves the exposure of children up to 72 months of age,

is very narrowly tailored to protect a limited population. Given that it is completely possible to comply with

both the San Francisco ordinance and the California Statute, the Court finds that the San Francisco ordinance

is not preempted. Compare City of Watsonville, 2005 WL 2769514, at *4 (finding city ordinance thatmade

the addition of any substance into the public water supply a public nuisance to be preempted, where ordinance

directly conflicted with state statute requiring fluoridation of water).

Finally, the Court finds it unlikely that the California legislature would intend to preempt a narrowly

drawn municipal ordinance directed at preventing childhood lead poisoning such as the San Francisco

ordinance. Indeed, the California legislature has declared that “childhood lead exposure represents the most

significant childhood environmental health problem in the state today.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 124125.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby maintains its prior decision to

GRANT summary judgment with respect to violation of San Francisco Health Code § 581(b), and DENY

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment based upon California Health & Safety Code § 17920.10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-04470-SI Document 50 Filed 11/01/05 Page 4 of 4