Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01481/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD MARC VIGIL,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1481 FCD PAN (JFM) P

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, et al., FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a 1998 jury conviction in

Sacramento County Superior Court of causing the death of a child under age eight years in his

care or custody, in violation of Penal Code § 273ab. Petitioner claims that: (1) his confession

was involuntary and should not have been admitted as evidence; (2) the trial court’s comments to

the jury violated his rights to due process and a fair trial; (3) the trial court’s failure to conduct a

hearing on jury misconduct violated his right to a fair trial by an unbiased jury; (4) the prosecutor

committed misconduct by urging the jury to consider sympathy for the victim; (5) Penal Code §

273ab unconstitutionally permits a homicide conviction and first degree murder sentence absent

proof that the defendant acted with a culpable mental state; (6) his sentence is grossly

disproportionate to his crime; and (7) the court’s instruction on propensity evidence undermined

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 Section 273ab provides, “Any person who, having the care or custody of a child who is 1

under eight years of age, assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would

be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child’s death, shall be punished by

imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” 

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the jury’s obligation to find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon careful

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged in Count I with second degree murder and in Count II with

violation of California Penal Code 273ab. The jury convicted petitioner of Count II but was 1

unable to reach a verdict on Count I. 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his conviction. The California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District affirmed petitioner’s conviction in a reasoned decision. The

court summarized the relevant facts as follows: 

Tiernie Parsons, Leah’s mother, testified Leah was born July 3, 1995. She

met [petitioner] that month and moved into his aunt Kerry Manolakas’s

Sacramento house in July 1996. About one week later they found an

apartment in Carmichael. In December 1996, she saw bruises on Leah’s

older sister’s bottom, and [petitioner] admitted causing them. On the day

Leah died, March 14, 1997, Tiernie left for work. When she later saw

[petitioner] that day at the hospital he did not admit doing anything wrong,

nor did he say he had tried to save [Leah’s] life. [Petitioner] was the father

figure and caretaker for the children.

Fire captain Brian Rice testified he got a call at about 3:06 reporting

“difficulty breathing in an 18-month-old infant child.” When he arrived at

the apartment, Leah looked like she was dying, with waxy yellow skin and

bluish-gray lips, but she had a pulse. He put her and [petitioner] in an

ambulance. When a paramedic cut off Leah’s shirt and diaper, Rice saw

bruises on her arms and chest and knew “that we had something bad.” 

When they arrived at Mercy American River Hospital . . . he put

[petitioner] in a room and directed somebody to have a security guard

“stand by that room.” During the ride, [petitioner] did not ask questions

and “I didn’t feel like his concern was on her at that point in time.” 

The paramedic testified [petitioner] initially said he was not going with

Leah in the ambulance “and walked in the opposite direction. [¶] And we

were just starting the exam, and we noticed the bruising, and we asked the

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fire fighter to get Mr. Vigil and place him in the front of the ambulance.”

[Petitioner] showed “no emotional reaction toward this at all. It didn’t

seem to bother him.” Had the paramedic been told what actually happened

to Leah, he would have arranged for an immediate helicopter flight from

the apartment to the U.C. Davis Medical Center (which has a trauma

center), rather than taking Leah by ambulance to the nearest hospital.

Deputy Sheriff Richard Auleb spoke with [petitioner] at Mercy American

River Hospital at about 4:25 p.m. [Petitioner] told him he woke up to find

the older child sitting on top of Leah. Later, Leah spit up some food on

her clothing, but it was a minor incident. When relatives arrived around

2:15 p.m., Leah looked pale, but he was not too concerned. About 45

minutes later, the aunt found Leah limp with blue lips and they called 911. 

When [petitioner] was told Leah was going to be life-flighted to UCD,

“There was no real reaction to it.” [Petitioner] did not ask whether the

deputy had any news about Leah’s condition. 

[Petitioner’s] aunt, Kerry Manolakas, testified that in December 1996 she

saw marks on Leah’s sister’s bottom and counseled [petitioner] about

other ways of handling children, and offered to help with child care. On

the day Leah was killed, Manolakas arrived at [petitioner’s] apartment

with her mother and two of her daughters around 2:15 p.m. [Petitioner]

told her Leah was “taking a nap, but I’m concerned that she’s not feeling

well. She’s having a difficult time sleeping.” Manolakas found Leah to be

cool, and she moaned when she was touched, however, she appeared to be

breathing normally and seemed to be asleep. She suggested [petitioner]

put a shirt on Leah and he promptly did so. At about 2:30 p.m. Manolakas

rechecked Leah, asked [petitioner] to look at her, and again saw no cause

for alarm. When [petitioner] left to do laundry, Manolakas spoke with

Leah’s sister, who told her Leah had spilled cereal. Later, Manolakas

checked Leah and found her eyes open and “just black.” She asked her

mother about this and then called for [petitioner], who said he did not

know what was wrong. [Petitioner] seemed very upset and confused, and

called 911. In the hospital, Manolakas asked [petitioner] “You didn’t get

upset with Leah for spilling the cereal, did you?,” to which [petitioner]

said “I wouldn’t have done that. I could never have done that.” 

The emergency physician testified Leah came in at about 3:21 p.m. and he

felt she could not be saved. He arranged that she be moved to the trauma

center.

Dr. Robert Anthony, the pathologist, autopsied Leah’s corpse the next day,

March 15, 1997. It weighed 27 pounds and measured 33 inches tall. 

There was blood in the abdomen, the layer of tissue which covers the

intestines was penetrated and the pancreas had been split in two. “[T]here

was multiple blunt trauma involving the face, abdomen, right back, left

and right legs and left arm.” Leah bled to death internally, due to the

injuries. The injuries were very unusual and he and colleagues he

consulted had not seen them before. “[I]f you could place a roll of nickels,

representing the force and put it in that part of the abdomen, going straight

down, that’s how big an area that we’re talking about.” “The force had to

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be applied over a very small area on the child’s abdomen. The child

would have to be somewhat immobile so that it wouldn’t be moving. And

what would happen was there would be a rapid application of force in a

small area on the abdomen that could be explained, as the detective

suggested, by squeezing the abdomen with an adult hand. [Para.] This

would be a pattern where the fingers would be on the back--on the child’s

back. The hand would curve around the abdomen, and the thumb would

be in the front, and then by squeezing rapidly and burying the thumb in the

abdomen, it would cause the application of force over a very small area. 

[Para.] It would cause tearing of the omentum. It would cause ripping of

the pancreas, and it would not cause injury in any of the surrounding areas

or tissues.” When asked if a three-year-old could have inflicted the

injuries, he said he could envision “A three-year-old carrying a one-yearold and dropping them [sic] down a set of stairs.” A reasonable person

knowing what had happened to Leah, who observed “the constellation of

symptoms that this child shows,” would have obtained help sooner.

Mark Gernandt, a detective with the Child Abuse Bureau of the

sheriff’s department, asked [petitioner] to talk with him and

[petitioner]agreed. The interview room was equipped with a

videotape. The jury watched the videotape and a transcript of the

interview was placed into evidence. [Petitioner] at first sticks to the

story that Leah and her sister were wrestling and Leah cried out. 

When Gernandt told [petitioner] information about Leah’s

condition might help in treating her, he persisted in his denial of

knowledge. When Gernandt told [petitioner] Leah’s sister had said

defendant spanked Leah for spilling cereal, [petitioner] admitted

getting mad and spanking and squeezing Leah with his hand. He

hit her on the back “pretty damn hard for a baby” in his words. 

Although she whimpered, he put her down for a nap and told her to

stop crying. After he put her down for a nap, “I started seeing

some signs of her not being well,” but it was not until after his aunt

arrived that he called 911. “[W]hile it was happening in my own

mind, I knew it was wrong.” He thought he grabbed her at about

11:30 in the morning (or over three hours before he called 911). 

After he was arrested he said “Just like I said, I mean, after she

vomited from eating the cereal, I got upset with her, and I picked

her up and squeezed her, swatted her on her back a couple two

times.”

Gernandt told [petitioner] he would be charged with murder if

Leah died, then left the room. While [petitioner] was alone, he

said “oh, man. It’s over. It’s over. It’s over. . . . Fuck. It’s over. 

I won’t have a job. I won’t have nothin’. It’s over. Oh, shit.” 

Later he told Gernandt “Oh, man. I can’t believe this. My life is

over.” He then asked if he was still considered a minor, but

Gernandt said no. 

The jury heard audio tapes of the 911 call, during which

[petitioner’s] voice is calm.

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The defense called friends and a neighbor who testified [petitioner]

was good with children and did not hurt them. On crossexamination one friend indicated an “ordinary, caring parent”

would get help right away if “you saw a child begin to vomit, lose

consciousness, grow pale, have blue lips,” and would “expect an

ordinary caring parent to put that child’s needs above any desire to

protect yourself.” [Petitioner] tried to have a defense pathologist

corroborate a theory Leah hurt herself on the handlebars of a

tricycle, but the pathologist thought it was unlikely because of the

force needed. He also testified the symptoms of shock might not

be apparent right away, that they would increase as more blood was

lost in the body.

[Petitioner] testified and gave a version radically inconsistent with

his story to the police. We assume the jury disbelieved him. 

[Petitioner] testified that after Tiernie went to work he fell asleep,

only to be wakened by the sound of Leah screaming; he found

Leah’s sister on top of her, bouncing on her stomach. He claimed

Leah seemed like she was not feeling well and looked a little pale. 

He gave them some food around 11:15 and after a while Leah’s

sister reported Leah was choking. He saw Leah’s lips were a little

blue, picked her up “and I turned her around [] with my right arm. 

I applied pressure to the bottom of her abdomen, and with my left

hand I slapped the lower part of her back.” He claimed this was an

effort to save her life, however he did not mention it to the police,

the paramedics nor the doctors that day, because he was “in a state

of shock.” He did not mention it on the videotape because “all I

could think about was Leah,” although when asked on cross

examination why he made comments about not having a job and so

forth, but did not make comments expressing concern for Leah,

[petitioner] could not answer. In any event, this supposed act of

heroism caused Leah to spit up a piece of food. She then threw up

more food. He put her down for a nap. This was about 11:30 a.m.

or 12:00 noon. His aunt and other relatives arrived around 2:00

p.m. His aunt (Manolakas) checked on Leah and asked [petitioner]

to dress her in a shirt, which he did. The family socialized until

close to 3:00 p.m., when the aunt found Leah very pale and

[petitioner] called 911. He claimed he was initially prevented from

entering the back of the ambulance, but was allowed to sit up front. 

He left the ambulance to find out about the delay, then reentered it. 

At the hospital he was put in a room and prevented from leaving.

(People v. Vigil, slip op. at 2-9 (Pet., Ex. A at 2-9)).

In affirming petitioner’s conviction, the state appellate court addressed each of the

claims contained in the instant petition. The California Supreme Court denied review without

comment. Petitioner did not seek habeas relief in state court.

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ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

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 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held “the prosecution may not use statements . . . 1

stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of

procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Statements

that are taken without Miranda warnings can be used to impeach a defendant if he testifies;

involuntary statements cannot be introduced for any purpose. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344,

354-55 (1990); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2002); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999). A confession is involuntary if the police used coercive means

to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, taking into consideration the effect on

the defendant of the officer’s entire course of conduct. Henry, 197 F.3d at 1026. Calculated

police misconduct to obtain a confession is a factor in determining its voluntariness. Id. at 1024.

 The court of appeal found the manner of questioning was not hostile and petitioner 2

answered questions without hesitation and laughed a few times. (Pet. Ex. A at 16.) No weapons

were displayed and the only physical touching occurred when the officer put his hand on

petitioner’s shoulder and rubbed it. Id. At another point Gernarndt patted petitioner on the

shoulder, without petitioner’s protest. Id. The tactics employed were not abusive and there is no

evidence they undermined petitioner’s free will. Id. Although petitioner was relatively young,

20, he was mature, held a job, and had assumed the role of husband and father in an existing

family. Id. at 17. While petitioner may have lacked experience with police, he knew enough to

inquire whether he still was considered a minor under the law. Id. Petitioner described himself

as “upset” but in “pretty good health,” but claimed to be “sick to his stomach” because he “had

not eaten.” Id. He was not disabled by pain. Id. 

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reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Miranda Claim

Petitioner claims the introduction of his videotaped confession violated his

constitutional rights because the confession was involuntary and taken without the warnings

required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).1

The prosecutor submitted petitioner’s confession as evidence in its case in chief,

before he testified. Constitutional error would lie either if petitioner’s statements were made in

violation of Miranda or if his statements were involuntary. 

The court of appeal reviewed petitioner’s videotaped confession and determined it

was voluntary. Petitioner offers no evidence outside the confession itself bearing on the issue. 2

The court of appeal reasonably interpreted the facts, based on a fact-finding process that was

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 “The sine qua non of Miranda is custody. “By custodial interrogation, we mean

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questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” U.S. v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1098

(9th Cir. 2001), quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 

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sufficient in context. This state court factual determination is entitled to a presumption of

correctness, which petitioner offers nothing to overcome. His confession was voluntary. 

Concerning Miranda, the court of appeal found petitioner was not “in custody”

because he was free to go during his interview with Gernarndt. (Pet., Ex. A at 16; CT 103-04.) 3

This determination also is entitled to a presumption of correctness which petitioner offers

nothing to overcome. There was no federal constitutional error in the state’s use of petitioner’s

confession.

B. Trial Court’s Improper Comments

Petitioner claims comments by the trial court violated his right to due process. 

The jury was sworn May 5, 1998, and the prosecutor called four witnesses: the victim’s mother,

firefighter and emergency response technician Brian Rice, paramedic Thor Crain and sheriff

deputy Auleb. 

The morning of May 6, the trial court made the following comment to the jury

before the prosecutor called her first witness: 

Did all of you keep up with the news today? I think you can only

conclude that you should be very careful what you say and to

whom you say it, and that the first opportunity you should confess

your transgressions. And in that light, I want to tell you that I’ve

lied to my grandchildren. I told them that if my mother had not

kissed my father I would have been a normal frog.

(RT 140:19-25.)

The prosecutor then called four more witnesses: petitioner’s aunt, emergency

physician Dr. Lance, pediatric intensivist Dr. Eldridge and forensic pathologist Dr. Anthony.

The morning of May 7 the defense moved for a mistrial based on the court’s

comment the preceding morning. (RT 332-35.) Defense counsel acknowledged the judge had

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not intended his comment to relate to the trial. Id. The prosecutor pointed out that testimony by

doctors that Leah might have lived had petitioner sought immediate care came out after the

judge’s comment, which touched on matters in the news and was not intended to relate to the

case. Id. The court denied the motion for mistrial. Id. 

The jury was called in and the judge admonished them:

It was reported that the king was so disgusted with the attempt at

humor of the court jester that he warned him to not persist in stale

and unhumorous jokes, but the jester could not help himself. And

that the king ordered that he be executed, and a [sic] execution was

about to take place. But the king had second thoughts, and thought

if he were to promise not to tell another joke, I will spare his life. 

So the word was sent through the executioner to the jester in which

the executioner asked the jester, or told the jester, if he promised

never again to tell another joke that his life would be spared. The

jester said, “No noose is good news.” I did such a thing yesterday. 

It was stupid, unexcusable and foolish. I attempted humor in a

case in which there is no humor. It is serious to both sides, and

that alone is serious departure on my behalf from what I perceive

myself to be, correct conduct on the part of a judge. Not only that,

the attempt at humor was a statement that should not have been

made in any respect because in some way it would be associated

with some feeling on my part with respect to this case or with

respect to the law. And such is not the case. If it created any

impression that what I said had anything to do with this case, or

with what you should find to be the facts or my feelings concerning

the seriousness of this case, you should disregard it and form your

own opinions. I did not intend in any way to detract or interfere

with what you should find to be the facts. It was stupid on my part,

untimely, inconsiderate, and I apologize for it. 

(RT 337:14 - 338:15.) 

The prosecutor laid the foundation and played the 911 tapes and petitioner’s

videotaped confession. (RT 340-44.) The court further admonished the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, now that you’ve heard the tape, I want to

again admonish you that the statements I made and the inadvertent

attempt at humor has nothing whatsoever to do with this case or

with the evidence that you just heard. Is there anybody here who

feels he cannot completely disregard my remarks? Feel free to let

me know if you feel you cannot. Once again, I apologize for such

remarks. There is no excuse for attempt at humor. 

(RT 344:28 - 345:7.)

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The court of appeal found the judge’s comment about the benefit of confessing

one’s transgressions “at the earliest opportunity” did not warrant a mistrial. (Pet., Ex. A at 28-

32.) The judge’s reference to lying and admitting transgressions did not relate to the trial, but

rather concerned a front-page story in the Sacramento Bee stating a federal court had denied

President Clinton’s assertion of executive privilege during investigation of the Monica Lewinsky

affair. Id. Apparently, the trial judge was insinuating that President Clinton should have

confessed his transgressions earlier. The appellate court noted the judge had informed the jury

the comment was not associated with his opinion about the case, nor was it intended to interfere

with the jury’s factual findings. Id. After the confession was played the judge reiterated that his

comment had nothing whatsoever to do with that evidence. Id. 

On direct appeal, the standard for reversal based on general judicial misconduct is

stringent – there must be an “extremely high level of interference by the trial judge which creates

a pervasive climate of partiality and unfairness.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.

1995) (internal quotations omitted). On habeas, the standard is even more stringent: reversal is

warranted only if “the state trial judge’s behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to

violate federal due process. . .” Id.

The court of appeal determined the judge’s comment did not express his opinion

of the evidence, and this finding is entitled to deference. Nevertheless, due process was violated

if the jury’s interpretation of the comment rendered petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. The

sole disputed element of the § 273ab charge was whether petitioner used a degree of force on

Leah that a reasonable person would have known was likely to produce great bodily injury. 

Whether petitioner should have confessed sooner bore little or no relation to that factual issue. 

The court admonished the jury its comments bore no relation to the jury’s fact finding. That the

jury remained impartial and cognizant of its duties is illustrated by the split verdict - petitioner

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 Even if the judge had expressed his opinion on the facts, it would have been 4

permissible because he made it clear all matters of fact were submitted for the jury’s

determination. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470-72 (1933); United States v. James,

576 F.2d 223, 228 (9th Cir. 1978).

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was not found guilty of Count I. Petitioner’s claim that judicial misconduct violated his right to

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due process fails. 

C. Juror Misconduct

Petitioner next argues the trial court violated due process by failing to conduct a

hearing concerning possible juror misconduct. The juror in question approached Rice in the

hallway after Rice testified about his response to the 911 call and attempts to save Leah. The

juror patted Rice on the knee and said, “good job.” (RT 371-72.) 

“Any unauthorized communication between a juror and a witness or interested

party is presumptively prejudicial, but the government may overcome the presumption by making

a strong contrary showing.” Caliendo v. Warden of California men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 694

(9th Cir. 2004), citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892); Remmer v. United

States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954). “[I]f an unauthorized communication with a juror is de

minimus, the defendant must show that the communication could have influenced the verdict

before the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution . . . [and] must offer sufficient evidence to

trigger the presumption of prejudice.” Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 696 (internal quotations omitted). 

If a communication is not de minimus, prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a

new trial “unless the prosecution shows that there is no reasonable possibility that the

communication will influence the verdict.” Id. 

The state appellate court concluded that the juror’s contact with Rice did not

result in prejudice to petitioner, stating as follows:

Appellate counsel tries to make a mountain of this molehill. A

juror made a friendly comment to a man who had testified to heroic

efforts to save a baby’s life. The trial court handled the matter in a 

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conscientious and efficient way. This incident does not raise a

presumption a juror prejudged the case.

* * *

Even if a presumption of prejudice was triggered, the presumption

was dispelled because there is no substantial likelihood the juror

was biased against [petitioner].

(Answer, Ex. 1 at 24, 26-27.)

After a review of the record, this court concludes that the contact that occurred

here between the juror and Rice was de minimus and could not have influenced the verdict. 

Factors relevant to this inquiry include “the length and nature of the contact, the identity and role

at trial of the parties involved, evidence of actual impact on the juror, and the possibility of

eliminating prejudice through a limiting instruction.” Caliendo, 365 F.3d at 697-98. The contact

that occurred in this case was momentary and did not involve matters crucial to the verdict. As

noted by the trial court, Rice’s testimony largely involved the circumstances under which Leah

received aid; the “the only controverted part of Rice’s testimony was whether it was Rice or

someone else who directed [petitioner] to ride in the ambulance.” (Answer, Ex. 1 at 22.) There

is no evidence that the juror’s brief comment to Rice had any actual impact on any juror. Indeed,

it appears that Rice said nothing in response to the juror’s comment and there is no evidence the

other jurors even noticed the event. Further, the trial court gave the jurors an instruction in

response to these events which reminded them of their obligation not to be influenced by

anything outside of the evidence in the case. (Id. At 22-23; Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal at

374-78.) 

Even assuming arguendo that the contact between the juror and Rice was more

than de minimus and triggered a presumption of prejudice, this court concludes that there is no

reasonable possibility the contact influenced the verdict. For all of the reasons expressed above,

the incident between the juror and Rice was simply too inconsequential to rise to the level of a

federal constitutional violation. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

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D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Next, petitioner claims his right to due process was abridged because the

prosecutor’s closing argument urged the jury to convict based on sympathy for Leah. (RT 626,

632, 633, 641, 678, 680, 683.) In such a claim, the only relevant question is whether the

prosecutor’s comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); see also Drayden v.

White, 232 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2000) (prosecutor speaking in the imagined voice of the

victim as a “witness” was improper but did not violate due process because prosecutor did not

manipulate or misstate the evidence). 

The court of appeal found this claim defaulted based on trial counsel’s failure to

object during trial. Alternatively, it concluded that petitioner failed to show prejudice because

there was compelling evidence of guilt. This court agrees with the latter conclusion. Evidence

of petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming and prosecutorial comment, which did not misstate the

evidence, did not subvert petitioner’s fair trial rights. 

E. Whether Penal Code § 273ab is Unconstitutional

Petitioner claims that imposition of a life sentence for violation of Penal Code §

273ab impermissibly abridges his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by permitting conviction for

homicide and a first degree murder sentence in the absence of proof of a culpable mental state. 

Petitioner invokes California’s “Ireland Rule” which prohibits murder liability premised on a

theory of felony murder when the underlying felony offense is an assault which caused the

homicide. See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522 (1969). The court in Ireland relied only on its

interpretation of state and common law, making no reference to the federal constitution or its

provisions. 70 Cal. 2d at 538-40. Petitioner’s challenge to § 273ab under Ireland is a state law

claim that does not state a claim for relief in this federal habeas corpus action. His claim should

be denied.

/////

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F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner claims his sentence violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 

Outside capital cases, which are different, the Eighth Amendment requires no strict

proportionality between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are

“grossly disproportionate” to the crime. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). What indicates gross disproportionality remains unclear; all that

can be said is that it should be informed by objective factors (the most important of which is the

type of punishment as opposed to the length of a term of imprisonment for years) and will be

found only in the “exceedingly rare” and “extreme” case. The solitary example in Supreme

Court jurisprudence is Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) in which a government

disbursing officer convicted of making false entries of small sums in his account book was

sentenced to 15 years’ “hard and painful” labor with chains fastened to his wrists and ankles at

all times, permanent disqualification from holding any position of public trust, subjection to

government surveillance for life, and deprivation of any right of parental authority, guardianship

or participation in the family council. There simply are no objective factors to distinguish

between sentences to imprisonment for varying terms of years; the length of such sentences is

purely a matter of legislative prerogative (so long as a legislature does not make something as

trivial as overtime parking punishable by life imprisonment). Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,

274 (life imprisonment for three petty thefts involving less than $230 does not violate Eighth

Amendment). Here, petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault on Leah while she was in his

care, causing her death, and he points to no objective factors that so trivialize his offenses as to

make the legislative determination “grossly disproportionate” in the constitutional sense. This

claim fails. 

G. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner’s final claim is that the trial court violated due process by giving an

instruction that improperly permitted consideration of propensity evidence. 

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Petitioner’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.50, as follows:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant committed a crime other than that for which he is on

trial.

This evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove

that defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a

disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered by you only

for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show:

a clear connection between the other offense and the one of which

the defendant is accused so that it may be inferred that if defendant

committed the other offense defendant also committed the crime

charged in this case.

(Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 177.) (emphasis added). Petitioner’s jury was also 5

instructed with CALJIC No. 2.50.1, as follows:

Within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the prosecution

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

a defendant committed a crime other than those for which he is on

trial.

You must not consider this evidence for any purpose unless you

find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant

committed the other crime.

(Id. at 178.) Finally, petitioner’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.50.2, as follows:

“Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more

convincing force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is so

evenly balanced that you are unable to find that the evidence on

either side of an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue

must be against the party who had the burden of proving it.

You should consider all of the evidence bearing upon every issue

regardless of who produced it.

(Id.) Petitioner argues that these instructions, when read together, “misleadingly told the jurors

that a conviction could be based on proof by a preponderance of evidence of bad character or

uncharged offenses rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of charged crimes.” 

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(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(P&A) at 60.) 

A challenge to jury instructions generally does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to

warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction cannot be merely “undesirable,

erroneous, or even universally condemned, but must violate some due process right guaranteed

by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (internal quotations omitted). Petitioner must

demonstrate the instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.’” Id. quoting Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Evidence was introduced at trial that petitioner on occasion used marijuana. The

court of appeal found drug evidence had no connection with Leah’s death and it would be

“irrational to infer the jury found defendant guilty of child-homicide because he had marijuana in

the house.” (Pet., Ex. A at 21.) In light of the overwhelming evidence against petitioner, this

court cannot conclude the challenged instruction rendered his trial unfair. 

The state appellate court also rejected petitioner’s claim that his jury was allowed

to find him guilty on a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id.) This court agrees

with the state court’s conclusion in this regard. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the challenged

jury instructions did not tell the jurors that his conviction on the charges against him could be

based on proof by a preponderance of evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Rather, petitioner’s jurors were specifically informed that each element of the offenses against

petitioner must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that only the prior acts could be proved

by a preponderance of the evidence. (CT at 173, 174, 178, 180.) Cf. Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d

812, 821-825 (9th Cir. 2004) (trial court's use of the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01,

together with CALJIC No. 2.50.1 violated defendant’s right to due process by allowing the jury

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to find that the defendant had committed uncharged offenses by a preponderance of the evidence

and then to infer that he had committed the charged acts also by a preponderance of the

evidence). Petitioner’s jurors were also specifically informed that the prior crimes evidence

could not be considered to prove that petitioner had a disposition to commit crimes, but only to

show similar modus operandi. (CT at 177.) Cf. Gibson, 387 F.3d at 817 (jury was specifically

informed that if they found the defendant committed a prior offense they were allowed to also

infer that he had a disposition to commit the same or similar offenses, including the offense of

which he was accused). After a review of the jury instructions as a whole, this court concludes

that the state court’s decision that the challenged jury instructions did not violate petitioner’s

right to a fair trial is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly,

petitioner’s claim fails.

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 15, 2006.

008:vigil1481.hc

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