Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02979/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02979-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANDREA JARREAU-GRIFFIN, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-CV-02979-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

Defendants City of Vallejo (“the City”) and Kent Tribble move for judgment on 

the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings 

(“Mot.”) at 3–4, ECF No. 38. The court submitted the matter without argument and, for the 

reasons below, DENIES the motion without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On December 11, 2010, defendant Tribble, a Vallejo police officer, shot and 

killed Guy J. Jarreau, Jr. (“the decedent”). First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 15. 

Thereafter, plaintiff Jarreau-Griffin (“plaintiff”),1 the decedent’s mother and successor in 

interest, submitted a claim-for-damages form, which was received and filed by the City on 

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 The plaintiffs in the case are the decedent’s successor in interest and estate. For 

clarity and ease of reference, the court refers to the successor in interest as the only plaintiff but 

notes that she acts on behalf of both herself and the estate. 

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May 17, 2011. Faruqui Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 24-1. Plaintiff eventually filed suit in this court 

on December 10, 2012, alleging several claims stemming from the shooting. FAC ¶¶ 25–39, 

ECF No. 1. When filing the claim-for-damages form, plaintiff was represented by John Burris, 

Faruqui Decl., Ex. A; however, the instant action was filed by new counsel, Corey Evans. 

The shooting and subsequent claim for damages occurred during the pendency 

of the City’s bankruptcy petition, filed on May 23, 2008. Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), 

Ex. 1, ECF No. 39-1. However, despite receiving and filing the claim for damages, the City 

did not notify plaintiff of the bankruptcy proceedings, and plaintiff never filed a proof of claim. 

The bankruptcy court ultimately confirmed the City’s plan for adjustment of debts on August 4, 

2011, id., Ex. 4, ECF No. 39-4, and fixed an effective date of November 1, 2011, id., Ex. 5, 

ECF No. 39-5. 

II. STANDARD 

 A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(c) is “functionally identical” to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Dworkin v. 

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). It is properly granted where “the 

moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact 

remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” George v. 

Pacific-C.S.C. Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996). In both instances, the 

inquiry focuses on the interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the 

dispositive issues of law in the action, see Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), 

and courts “must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 

561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule does not, however, apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), or to “allegations that contradict matters properly subject 

to judicial notice,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are 

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary 

judgment under Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). “The court may, however, consider certain 

materials without converting the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for 

summary judgment. Such materials include . . . matters of judicial notice.” Tumlinson Group, 

Inc. v. Johannessen, No. 2:09-cv-1089 JFM, 2010 WL 4366284, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) 

(citing Lloyd v. Powell, No. C09-5734 BHS/KLS, 2010 WL 2560652, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 

18, 2010); Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2000); Baron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 

1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(holding court may properly take judicial notice of “matters of public record” on 12(b)(6) 

motion without converting to summary judgment motion). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendants argue judgment on the pleadings is proper. Mot. at 4. They insist 

plaintiff’s failure to file a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings precludes the instant action 

because any potential liability arose at the time of the shooting, well before the bankruptcy 

court confirmed the plan or fixed the effective date, and plaintiff had imputed notice of the 

proceedings through her then-counsel. Id. at 5–8. Thus, defendants conclude, even assuming a 

valid debt existed at one time, it was discharged as of the plan’s effective date. Id. at 5–10. 

Plaintiff responds that debtors owe a continuing obligation throughout 

bankruptcy proceedings to list all creditors and that it was thus incumbent upon the City to 

provide her with the required notice. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”) at 5–6, ECF No. 29. 

Further, she continues, the instant circumstances do not constitute imputed notice because 

plaintiff’s then-counsel did not simultaneously represent other parties involved in the 

bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 10–13. She also argues that defendants improperly rely on 

extrinsic evidence in their motion and that the court should either disregard such evidence or 

convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Id. at 15. 

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A. Consideration of Matters Outside the Pleadings 

As an initial matter, the court must determine whether it may properly consider 

facts surrounding the City’s bankruptcy proceedings in deciding the instant motion. As noted, 

the court may consider “matters of judicial notice,” Tumlinson Group, 2010 WL 4366284, at 

*3, and “matters of public record,” Lee, 250 F.3d at 688–89, without converting the motion to 

one for summary judgment. Matters properly subject to judicial notice include “fact[s] . . . not 

subject to reasonable dispute because . . . [they] can be accurately and readily determined from 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 

Here, in arguing imputed notice, defendants rely on a number of facts not 

reflected in the parties’ pleadings: (1) that Burris represented plaintiff in May 2011; (2) that 

Burris represented several claimants in the City’s bankruptcy proceedings, beginning in August 

2010; and (3) that Burris had notice of the City’s bankruptcy proceedings in May 2011. Mot. at 

3. The first fact can be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned,” namely the claim-for-damages form signed by Burris 

himself. Faruqui Decl., Ex. A. The court thus takes judicial notice of the fact that Burris 

represented plaintiff in May 2011. 

Regarding the second and third facts, however, the court declines to take such 

notice. The only document defendants provide to verify the second fact — a claims register 

taken from the bankruptcy court docket — is insufficient to “accurately and readily” make the 

required determination. FED. R. EVID. 201(b). The document alternately lists “John L. Burris” 

and the “Law Offices of John L. Burris” as representing certain claimants as of August 2010, 

but it is neither prepared nor signed by counsel. RJN, Exs. 6-1, 6-2. Although a subsequent 

bankruptcy filing lists John L. Burris and his California state bar number in the caption on the 

cover sheet, that document was filed June 11, 2012. Claimants’ Opp’n to Debtor’s Objection to 

Claims, Bankruptcy Case No. 2008-26813, ECF No. 1333. Together, these documents show 

only that either John L. Burris or his firm was involved in the bankruptcy proceedings in 

August 2010 and John L. Burris was himself active in the bankruptcy case in June 2012. 

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In light of the procedural posture of this case, the court must draw inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party. Thus, defendants must show beyond “reasonable dispute,” on 

the basis of “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” FED. R. EVID. 201(b), 

that Burris’s personal involvement in the bankruptcy began in August 2010, such that he had 

notice of the personal bankruptcy when he filed plaintiff’s claim with the City in 2011, In re 

Perle, 725 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding individual lawyer must represent party in 

bankruptcy proceedings while simultaneously representing client in other case for notice or 

knowledge of bankruptcy to be imputed to other client). Defendants have not done so. 

Because the court declines to take judicial notice of the second fact, it necessarily declines to 

take notice of the third as well. 

B. Notice or Actual Knowledge 

11 U.S.C. § 944 provides in pertinent part: “[T]he debtor [municipality] is 

discharged from all debts as of the time . . . the plan [for adjustment of debts] is confirmed,” 

except “any debt . . . owed to an entity [a creditor] that, before confirmation of the plan, had 

neither notice nor actual knowledge of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 944(b)–(c). 

Here, the City’s plan for adjustment of debts was confirmed on August 4, 2011. 

RJN, Ex. 4. The shooting that killed Jarreau occurred on December 11, 2010, FAC ¶ 7, and 

was thus an extant debt “as of the time . . . the plan [was] confirmed.” O’Loghlin v. Cnty. of 

Orange, 229 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] claim arises, for purposes of discharge in 

bankruptcy, at the time of the events giving rise to the claim . . . .”). Unless an exception 

applies, the City’s debt to Jarreau’s estate and heirs was discharged upon confirmation. Id. at 

873 (“[T]he [municipal debtor]’s reorganization plan was confirmed in June 1996, [thereby] 

discharging its pre-confirmation debts.”). 

An exception does apply where a creditor had neither “notice nor actual 

knowledge of the” bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 944(c). The City relies on its imputed 

notice argument here as well, and also argues “it is more than likely” plaintiff “had actual 

knowledge” of the bankruptcy proceedings. Mot. at 6–8. Plaintiff contends notice may 

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not be imputed under these circumstances because Burris learned of the bankruptcy while 

representing other clients at a later time. Opp’n at 10–13. 

For the same reasons set forth above, the City’s argument fails. 

On the instant record, the court is unable to find as a matter of law that plaintiff 

had either notice or actual knowledge of the City’s bankruptcy proceedings. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES the motion without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 14, 2014. 

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