Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08077/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08077-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Keith Goss,

Plaintiff,

v. 

United States of America,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-08077-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

Plaintiff Keith Goss initially alleged eight claims related to his employment and 

resignation from Tuba City Regional Health Care Corporation (“THC”). Doc. 1. The 

parties stipulated that the United States is the sole defendant for Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Docs. 24, ¶ 3, 34 at 3.1 The Court 

dismissed the remaining claims. Doc. 34 at 16-17. Plaintiff has filed a motion in limine 

to exclude key evidence, and Defendant moves to dismiss and for summary judgment on 

the remaining counts in the case. Docs. 75, 76. No party requests oral argument. The 

Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion in limine and grant Defendant’s motion.

I. Background.

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff worked as a 

podiatrist for THC from July 1, 2008 until he resigned on September 20, 2017. Docs. 1 

1 Citations are to page numbers attached to the top of pages by the Court’s electronic 

filing system.

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at 4, 17-1 at 3. During his employment, Plaintiff complained about inappropriate 

expenditures of hospital money and inadequate medical care offered to tribal members. 

Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff spoke to a reporter at the Navajo Times newspaper and with 

members of the Navajo Nation government about his concerns. Doc. 77 ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

also had significant disagreements with THC’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Lynette 

Bonar, and believed that other physicians unfairly received overtime and compensation

benefits he did not. Id. ¶¶ 8-9; Doc. 80 ¶ 36. Dr. John Wright, head anesthesiologist, 

shared Plaintiff’s concerns. Doc. 80 ¶¶ 40-42. Other employees accused Plaintiff of 

various misdeeds, including prescribing excessive antibiotics, performing unnecessary 

surgeries, receiving financial kickbacks from another medical center, and operating outside 

his privileges. Doc. 77 ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff disputes these accusations. Id. ¶ 7. 

THC has a number of policies regarding workplace conduct, including a violencefree workplace policy, which provides that an offending employee “may be placed on 

Administrative Leave with pay during the course of [an] investigation.” Docs. 77 ¶ 13, 

77-2 at 258. Behavior that violates the policy includes intimidation, verbal abuse, offensive 

jokes or comments regarding violence, actions causing fear, or “any other act, which in 

management’s opinion, is inappropriate.” Docs. 77 ¶ 14, 77-2 at 257. THC also, in its 

discretion, “may elect not to proceed through progressive discipline but may immediately 

initiate a more serious discipline, including termination . . . even if the conduct is a first 

violation.” Docs. 77 ¶ 15, 77-2 at 262.

While on duty in July 2017, Plaintiff met with a THC physician’s assistant, Jason 

Watabe, who secretly recorded their conversation. Doc. 77 ¶ 17-18. Plaintiff used highly 

vulgar language aimed at Bonar and other THC employees. Doc. 77 ¶ 21. Plaintiff stated 

that he was going to cut Bonar’s head off, that he was from a “mafia family,” and that 

“[Bonar is] going to see everything I ever learned from my family.” Id. Defendant 

interpreted these words asspecific threats against Bonar. Id. Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s 

characterization of the exchange as threatening. Doc. 80 ¶ 21

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Watabe informed Bonar of their conversation and turned the recording over to 

THC’s human resources department. Doc. 77 ¶ 26. On July 20, 2017, THC placed Plaintiff 

on administrative leave and hired an attorney to investigate Plaintiff and the statements he 

made to Watabe. Id. ¶¶ 27, 29. Plaintiff was never terminated and continued to receive 

full pay and benefits while on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff subsequently 

resigned and now contends that THC placed him on administrative leave in retaliation for 

his complaints about THC. Id. ¶ 31. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine.

Plaintiff moves to exclude the contents of Watabe’s recording of their conversation, 

claiming that the conversation was private and that Watabe violated the Federal Wiretap 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (“the Act”). Doc. 75. The Act “is designed to prohibit ‘all 

wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law 

enforcement officials engaged in investigation of specified types of major crimes.’” 

Greenfield v. Kootenai Cty., 752 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. Rep. 

No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.). The Act makes it unlawful for a person to “intentionally 

intercept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511.2

But the Act also provides that:

It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color 

of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such 

person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the 

communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such 

communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or 

tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of 

any State.

Id. § 2511(2)(d).

2 The Act defines the term “intercept” as the “aural or other acquisition of the 

contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, 

mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). 

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The Supreme Court has interpreted the Act’s phrase “under ‘color’ of law” to mean 

“under ‘pretense’ of law.” Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). A public 

employee’s actions are under pretense of law only if they are “in some way ‘related to the 

performance of his official duties.’” Huffman v. Cty. of L.A., 147 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 

1998) (citations omitted). A public employee who is “pursuing his own goals and [i]s not 

in any way subject to control by [his public employer]” does not act under pretense of law 

unless he “purport[s] or pretend[s]” to do so. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

Watabe testified that nobody told him to record his conversation with Plaintiff. 

Doc. 77-2 at 127. He decided to make the recording out of concern for the hospital and its 

employees arising from two conversation Watabe had with Plaintiff earlier the same day. 

Id. at 128. Watabe described the earlier conversations as outlandish, extreme, and 

threatening. Id. When Plaintiff called to talk with Watabe a third time, Watabe decided to 

record the conversation. Id. The conversation occurred in a small room at the hospital, 

and Watabe recorded it on a hospital iPhone and later uploaded the recording to his 

personal account. Id. at 130. Watabe testified that he could not recall ever recording 

another conversation, and that he was not aware of any other THC employee ever recording 

conversations. Id. Bonar testified that she was not aware of employees recording 

conversations and that she did not know of anyone telling Watabe to record his

conversation with Plaintiff. Id. at 100. 

Plaintiff appears to make three arguments in support of his claim that the recording 

violated the Act and therefore should be excluded from evidence.

First, Plaintiff asserts that Watabe was a federal employee who met with Plaintiff 

on federal property. Doc. 75 at 1. As noted above, however, a public employee’s actions 

occur are under “pretense of law” only if they are “in some way ‘related to the performance 

of his official duties.’” Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1058. Plaintiff presents no evidence that the 

recording was somehow related to Watabe’s duties as a physician’s assistant.

Second, Plaintiff suggests that Watabe recorded the conversation at the behest of 

his supervisor, Dr. Kelley. But Plaintiff’s evidence does not support this conclusion. 

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Plaintiff cites testimony by Dr. Wright that he heard Dr. Kelley state that the hospital had 

gotten rid of a “big evil” when Plaintiff departed. Doc. 75-1 at 2. And he cites evidence 

that Watabe, after turning the recording over the human resources, told Dr. Kelley about 

the recording. Doc. 75-1 at 14. But Plaintiff provides no evidence that Dr. Kelley’s views 

about Plaintiff or his departure were ever communicated to Watabe, and no evidence that 

Dr. Kelley in any way directed or asked Watabe to make the recording. Watabe’s

testimony about why he made the recording is unrebutted.

Third, Plaintiff suggests that Watabe committed the tort of invasion of privacy or 

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights when he recorded the conversation. The 

Court does not agree.

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “the focus is not upon whether the interception 

itself violated another law; it is upon whether the purpose for the interception – its intended 

use – was criminal or tortious.” Sussman v. Am. Broad. Cos., 186 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Plaintiff presents no evidence that Watabe intended to use 

the recording to commit the tort of invasion of privacy. The only evidence of Watabe’s 

intention – his own testimony – shows that he made the recording because of concern for 

the hospital and its employees. Furthermore, although Arizona recognizes the tort of false 

light invasion of privacy, that tort “protects against the conduct of knowingly or recklessly 

publishing false information or innuendo that a reasonable person would find highly 

offensive.” Godbehere v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 786, 788 (1989). The 

publicity must involve a “major misrepresentation of the plaintiff’s character, history or 

beliefs[.]” Id. at 787. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Watabe intended to portray 

Plaintiff in a false light, or that publication of the recording would have done so.3

3 Plaintiff does not specify the form of invasion of privacy he asserts. The 

Restatement recognizes several. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A et seq. (1977). 

The only possible form besides false light would be instruction upon seclusion, but this tort 

requires that a person “intentionally intrude[], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 

seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns[.]” Restatement § 652B. Plaintiff 

makes no argument that Watabe intruded on his seclusion or private affairs. To the 

contrary, Plaintiff himself voluntarily chose to make the statements to Watabe that were 

recorded.

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Nor did the recording violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. There is no 

constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in information that a person voluntarily 

reveals to another. If one of the parties to the conversation consents to the recording, the 

Fourth Amendment is not violated. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749, 752

(1971) (citation omitted); see United States v. Puchi, 441 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1971). 

In short, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Watabe made the recording under 

pretense of law, at the direction of THC or any of its employees, or with the intent to 

commit a crime or tort. The undisputed evidence shows that Watabe was “pursuing his 

own goals” in documenting Plaintiff’s words – words he construed as threats to the hospital 

and its employees. Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1058. Because Plaintiff has not shown that 

Watabe’s recording violated the Act, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion in limine.

III. Legal Standards.

A. Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either a facial or factual attack on 

jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 

1979). A factual attack “disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would 

otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff’s allegations are not taken as true, the court may look 

beyond the pleadings, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Id. The 

plaintiff must “present affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden[.]” 

St. Clair v. City of Chino, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit 

will preclude summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the light most 

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favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and all justifiable inferences are drawn in that party’s favor because 

“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from 

the facts are jury functions,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

IV. Discussion.

Four claims remain in this case: negligence (Count 1), constructive 

discharge (Count 2), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 3), and negligent 

supervision (Count 6). 

A. Counts 1, 2, and 6.

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its 

agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The FTCA waives the 

federal government’s immunity:

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the 

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government 

while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable 

to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 

omission occurred. 

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA exempts any claims “based upon the exercise or 

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 

part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government[.]” § 2680(a). 

Defendant moves to dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 6 on the basis of this “discretionary 

function” exception. Doc. 76 at 2, 7. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s placement on 

administrative leave was discretionary, and the Court therefore lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. Doc. 76 at 4. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s actions were not discretionary 

and that its decision to place him on leave did not further public policy. Doc. 79 at 7, 10.4

4 Defendant’s motion makes a factual attack on jurisdiction. It looks past the 

allegations of the complaint and asserts that an exception to the FTCA applies and the 

Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In considering this argument, Plaintiff’s 

allegations are not taken as true, the Court may look beyond the pleadings, and Plaintiff 

has the burden of proving jurisdiction. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

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The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for determining when the 

discretionary function exception applies. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 

(1988). First, courts ask whether the challenged action involved an element of judgment.

Gonzalez v. United States, 814 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2016). This part of the test is not 

satisfied if a “federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action 

for any employee to follow.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. Second, if there is room for 

judgment, courts determine whether the judgment is of a kind that the exception was 

designed to protect. Id.

Defendant asserts that the first part of the discretionary function test is satisfied 

because Plaintiff can identify no policy or regulation specifying how THC should supervise 

its employees and THC’s policies regarding discipline are completely discretionary. 

Doc. 76 at 5-6. Plaintiff does not address this argument. Rather, Plaintiff appears to argue 

that the exception does not apply because Watabe acted in bad faith and “violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights to privacy” in recording their private 

conversation. Doc. 79 at 7-9. But as discussed above, Plaintiff has not shown that Watabe

violated Plaintiff’s rights in recording the conversation.

5

Plaintiff does not dispute that THC’s disciplinary policies are discretionary, 

including decisions to place employees on administrative leave. As THC’s policy states:

at its sole discretion, [THC] may elect not to proceed through progressive 

discipline but may immediately initiate a more serious discipline, including 

termination, as the behavior/offense or repeated violation of policy may 

require. This may include terminating an employee, even if the conduct is a 

first violation.

Doc. 77-2 at 262 (emphasis added). The policy further states that an offending employee 

“may be placed on Administrative Leave with pay during the course of [an] investigation.” 

5 Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue is particularly muddled. Plaintiff contends that 

“Defendant confuses the applicability of various legal doctrines” without identifying which 

doctrines, and he does not explain how Defendant is incorrect. Doc. 79 at 6. Plaintiff also 

notes that THC was “not doing it through disciplinary procedures but instead, getting 

[Plaintiff] to confide in Watabe so he could record the private conversation.” Id. at 7. But 

Plaintiff does not make clear what he means by “it,” or how this argument relates 

Defendant’s decision to place him on administrative leave.

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Id. at 258 (emphasis added). Employees can be placed on administrative leave for a 

number of reasons, including “any [] act, which in management’s opinion, is 

inappropriate.” Docs. 77 ¶ 14, 77-2 at 257 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff does not address these policies, which clearly grant discretion to THC on 

how to discipline its employees. Aside from arguing that Watabe improperly recorded the 

conversation, Plaintiff presents no facts or case law to suggest that THC’s placement of 

Plaintiff on administrative leave was not discretionary. And “[e]ven if the decision is an 

abuse of the discretion granted, the exception will apply.” Terbush v. United States, 516 

F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

Defendant argues that the second part of the discretionary function exception is also 

satisfied because the hiring, training, and supervision of employees implicate policy 

considerations and are the types of judgments the exclusion was designed to protect. 

Doc. 76 at 6. The Court agrees. This Circuit has held that “the decision of whether and 

how to retain and supervise an employee . . . are the type of discretionary judgments that 

the [FTCA] exclusion was designed to protect.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1084 

(9th Cir. 2009); see Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This 

court and others have held that decisions relating to the hiring, training, and supervision of 

employees usually involve policy judgments of the type Congress intended the 

discretionary function exception to shield.”); Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff's claims of “negligent and reckless employment, 

supervision and training of” employees “fall squarely within the discretionary function 

exception”).

Plaintiff’s Counts 1, 2, and 6 fall within the discretionary function exception. The 

Court will dismiss them.

B. Constructive Discharge (Count 2).

Count 2 also fails for a second reason. Under the FTCA, a defendant can be liable 

only to the extent a private person would be liable in accordance with the law of the place 

where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Defendant argues that 

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Arizona does not recognize constructive discharge as a tort. Doc. 76 at 8. The Court 

agrees.

In Peterson v. City of Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018), a former 

employee sued the City of Surprise, alleged constructive discharge and breach of contract,

and argued that she was compelled to resign because the city failed to protect her from 

intolerable discriminatory conduct based on her gender and military status. 418 P.3d at 

1022. The court of appeals acknowledged that Arizona law allows an employee to claim 

constructive discharge based on an employer’s “outrageous conduct” or failure to remedy 

“objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions” that would compel a reasonable 

employee to resign. Id. at 1023; see A.R.S. § 23-1502(A). But the Court made clear that 

“although constructive discharge may transform a resignation into a discharge, by itself, it 

does not afford an employee a remedy.” Peterson, 418 P.3d at 1023; see Wood v. Univ. 

Phys. Healthcare, No. CV-13-00063-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 6170604, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 

21, 2013). Thus “[t]o prevail on a claim for constructive discharge, an employee also must 

prove a common-law or statutory claim for wrongful termination.” Peterson, 418 P.3d at

1023.

The Court has indicated that one possible claim would be breach of Plaintiff’s 

employment contract under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(a). See Doc. 34 at 4 n.2. But the 

remedies under this section are limited to the remedies for a breach of contract. This is 

clearly not a tort within the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); 25 C.F.R. § 900.183(a), (b). 

Plaintiff argues that “Defendant accepted responsibility under the [FTCA] [and] 

thus cannot now claim it is not a tort.” Doc. 79 at 11. Plaintiff presents no legal support 

for this contention. He has the burden of showing that he has asserted a viable tort claim.

Plaintiff also argues that A.R.S. § 23-1501 provides that an employee “shall have 

the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy set 

forth in the statute.” Doc. 79 at 11 (quoting § 23-1501(A)(3)(b)). But this section provides 

that “[a]n employee has a claim against an employer for termination of employment” if 

“[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of [the] employee in violation 

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of a statute of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). Plaintiff does not identify a state 

statute that was violated by his alleged constructive discharge. Section (A)(3)(b) further 

provides that “[i]f the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the 

statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation of the statute are the exclusive 

remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy set forth in or arising out of the 

statute[.]” Id. Plaintiff does not identify a statutory remedy he seeks to obtain. The final 

sentence of the section – which Plaintiff quotes – states that “[i]f the statute does not 

provide a remedy to an employee for the violation of the statute, the employee shall have 

the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy set 

forth in the statute.” Id. But such a tort claim must still be based on violation of a state 

statute, and Plaintiff identifies none. Nor does he show that the violated statute does not 

provide a remedy, a showing required for him to assert a tort claim. See Doc. 79 at 11-12.

Plaintiff argues only that he “was targeted by Watabe who then used the tape to help 

his boss obtain the goal of getting rid of the ‘big evil,’” and that “after sitting on the tape 

which the Defendant claims was a threat and basis for discipline, Plaintiff was given 

inconsistent and troubling letters from Tuba City and then from their attorney about the 

reasons for the investigation.” Doc. 79 at 11. But these arguments do not overcome the 

fact that Arizona has no tort of constructive discharge (the claim asserted in Count 2) or 

that Plaintiff has failed to identify a statutory violation for which he can assert a tort claim 

under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). This additional reason supports summary judgment on 

Count 2.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count 3).

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of three 

elements: (1) the conduct must be “extreme and outrageous”; (2) the defendant must intend 

to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard that such distress will, with a near 

certainty, occur from his conduct; and (3) severe emotional distress must occur as a result 

of the defendant’s conduct. Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (2005) (citing 

Ford v. Revlon, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987)). To satisfy the “extreme and outrageous” 

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element, a defendant’s conduct must be “so outrageous in character and so extreme in 

degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and 

utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 

P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

Plaintiff alleges that THC employees intentionally inflicted emotional distress on 

him by “making false allegations” about him, “having [Watabe] illegally record a private 

conversation,” and placing him on administrative leave “without naming any reasons and 

under the guise that it was an investigation into the hospital.” Doc. 1 at 9. Defendant 

argues that the purported misconduct was not, as a matter of law, extreme and outrageous. 

Doc. 76 at 11. The Court agrees.

Aside from imprecisely arguing that several THC employees wanted Plaintiff out 

of his position and that Watabe’s recording was unlawful, Plaintiff has presented no 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the alleged conduct was “so 

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of 

decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 

Mintz, 905 P.2d at 563; see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Conduct “may be otherwise 

tortious, and even illegal, and not be outrageous.” Al-Asadi v. City of Phoenix, No. CV09-47-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 3419728, at * 7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2010) (citing Pankratz v. 

Willis, 744 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)). 

“‘It is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the 

level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress.’” Mintz, 905 P.2d at 563 (quoting Cox v. Keystone Carbon 

Co., 861 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1988)). This is especially true considering the discretionary 

nature of THC’s disciplinary policy, which gave it plenary authority to place employees on 

administrative leave. See Doc. 77-2 at 262. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 75) is denied.

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2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (Doc. 76) is 

granted.

3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and terminate this action.

Dated this 21st day of February, 2020.

Case 3:18-cv-08077-DGC Document 82 Filed 02/21/20 Page 13 of 13