Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02303/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

University of Phoenix, Inc., an Arizona

corporation, and Apollo Group, Inc., an

Arizona corporation, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-06-2303-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court are four motions to intervene, (Dkt. #43, 44, 46,

60), and two motions to strike claims. (Dkt. #81, 85). Counsel for the interveners has

withdrawn all non-religious claims for intervention, (Dkt. #105), and so the Court’s inquiry

is limited to the religious discrimination-based claims for intervention and the motions to

strike. After considering the parties’ briefs and the applicable case law, the Court issues the

following omnibus order.

I. Background

The First Amended Complaint was filed in this case on 4/26/2007. (Dkt. #23). The

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) asserted religious discrimination

claims against the University of Phoenix and its corporate parent, Apollo Group (collectively

“the University”), on behalf of four charging parties and a class of individuals who were

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

adversely affected by the University’s alleged policies. Several members of the proposed

class have moved to intervene, which the University opposes. 

In addition, the University has moved to strike the claims of all of the previouslyunnamed class members on the grounds that (1) the claims were not administratively

exhausted, and (2) the identification of class members through a disclosure statement is

improper. The University has also moved to strike the claims of two individuals who did

exhaust their claims, but who failed to bring suit within 90 days afterward as required for

them to challenge the University on an individual basis. (Dkt. #85). 

II. Analysis

A. Intervention

Eight individuals have sought to intervene in the EEOC’s action: Darry Thornton,

Falonia Edenburgs, Francine Muscianisi, Alyssa Polk, Jennifer Hallman, Morseller Ector,

Mark Ector, and Shelly Chambers Thompson. Counsel for the putative interveners has

argued that they are entitled to intervene as a matter of right, and that these individuals do

not seek permissive intervention. (Dkt. #43 p. 8-9; 44 p.8). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) allows a party, upon timely application, a right

to intervene in an action “(1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional

right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability

to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.”

Title VII provides aggrieved parties an unconditional right to intervene in an EEOC

enforcement action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2007). Therefore, each aggrieved party has

a right to intervene in this enforcement action if the Court considers their applications timely.

1. Thornton

a. Right to Intervene

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Darry Thornton is one of the charging parties in this mater. (Dkt. #43). The charge

he filed with the EEOC led to the current enforcement action. As a charging party, Title VII

gives him an unconditional right to intervene. Id.; EEOC v. GMRI, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 562,

563 (D. Kan. 2004). 

b. Timeliness

The Court acknowledges that timeliness is determined by considering the totality of

the circumstances. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-66 (1973). The University

points to various factors that should inform the Court’s assessment of timeliness, including

(1) the stage of the current proceedings, (2) prejudice that the resultant delay might cause,

and (3) the reason for the delay. (Dkt. #48). 

In light of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds the motion to intervene

timely. Discovery in the case has not yet closed, and allowing Thornton to intervene is

unlikely to require it to be extended. Because his claims gave rise to the enforcement action,

much of the discovery related to his claims has likely already occurred, or can be completed

before the discovery deadline in the case. Allowing him to intervene is unlikely to prejudice

the parties. 

2. Muscianisi and Chambers Thompson

a. Right to Intervene

Muscianisi and Chambers Thompson also brought claims of religious discrimination

to the EEOC. The EEOC did not make any determination as to the merit of either claim. For

Muscianisi’s claim, it determined that it was unlikely to complete its administrative

processing within 180 days, and so terminated its investigation. (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 1). For

Chambers Thompson’s claim, the EEOC terminated the processing of the charge after more

than 180 days, issuing Chambers Thompson a Notice of Right to Sue. (Dkt. #125). The

Court finds that Muscianisi and Chambers Thompson consequently are aggrieved persons

who have a right to intervene. GMRI, 221 F.R.D. at 563 n.4 (“‘an aggrieved person is

defined as a person who has filed a charge with the EEOC’”) (quoting EEOC v. Rappaport,

Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 273 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

b. Timeliness

 In light of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the motions to

intervene by Muscianisi and Chambers Thompson are also timely. Discovery has not yet

closed, and allowing them to intervene should cause little or no delay to the discovery

deadlines. Counsel for the interveners has informed the Court that Chambers Thompson’s

deposition is currently scheduled for May, 2008. Particularly in light of the Court’s

disposition of the other motions to intervene in the case, the parties are unlikely to be

prejudiced.

3. Hallman

a. Right to Intervene

Hallman brought an EEOC claim of discrimination on the basis of her religion and

national origin in March, 2007. The EEOC closed its file in September of 2007, determining

that, based on its investigation, it was unable to conclude that the information established a

violation of the statutes. (Dkt. #54 Exhibit 3). 

The Court does not find that Hallman is an aggrieved person within the meaning of

the statute, particularly in light of the fact that this class action litigation had commenced at

least five months prior to processing of Hallman’s charge. If the EEOC could not determine

that Hallman was a victim of discrimination, the Court cannot conclude that she is an

aggrieved person such that she should be permitted to intervene.

The second basis for intervention as of right is also unavailing. Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(a)(2). The Court concludes that Hallman’s interest is “adequately represented by existing

parties,” and that she is therefore not “so situated that the disposition of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede [her] ability to protect that interest.” Id. Accordingly,

Hallman’s motion to intervene is denied. 

4. Edenburgs, Polk, Morseller Ector, and Mark Ector

a. Right to Intervene

Because none of these individuals brought religious discrimination claims with the

EEOC, the Court cannot conclude that they are aggrieved persons within the meaning of the

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

statute. Similarly, their interest is adequately represented by the charging parties and the

class, and so the Court will deny their motions to intervene. Id.

B. Motion to Strike Claims

The University has moved to strike the claims of various class members disclosed to

it through disclosure statements produced in the litigation, or alternatively, for the Court to

grant declaratory judgment in its favor. (Dkt. #81, 85). 

1. Failure to Exhaust and Failure to Satisfy Pleading Requirements

a. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The EEOC has asserted claims on behalf of the four charging parties, as well as a class

of individuals — many of whom have never filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC.

The University asserts that the claims of many of these class members should be stricken

because they were not properly exhausted through the administrative process provided for

under Title VII. 

The University admits that the EEOC has been permitted in the past to bring

unexhausted claims on behalf of a class, but asserts that the “practice is no longer permissible

in light of the holding by the United States Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and

Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 167 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2007).” (Dkt. #81). 

In Ledbetter, the Plaintiff attempted to sue her employer for gender discrimination on

the basis that she received poor evaluations because she was female. Id. at 2166. Because

pay decisions were made on the basis of her discriminatory evaluations, she was denied pay

raises. Id. These pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her

employment, and toward the end of her employ, she was earning significantly less than her

male colleagues. Id. The disparate pay decisions occurred outside the statutory limitations

period, but the disparate pay continued to be received within the limitations period. Id. The

defendants argued that she could not challenge the discrimination in court because she had

failed to bring an EEOC charge with respect to the actual acts of discrimination — the

discriminatory evaluations and pay decisions — within the limitations period. Id.

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

The Court, citing the language of the statute, held that “[a]n individual wishing to

challenge an employment practice under this provision must first file a charge with the

EEOC . . . Such a charge must be filed within a specified period . . . after the alleged

unlawful employment practice occurred . . . and if the employee does not submit a timely

EEOC charge, the employee may not challenge that practice in court.” Id. at 2166-67

(emphasis added). 

The University asserts that the language and holding in Ledbetter overrules the

previous cases that have permitted the EEOC to bring class actions that include unexhausted

claims. The Court finds that it does not.

At a minimum, Ledbetter is not directly on point. It involves an individual with

unexhausted claims, and does not address the ability of the EEOC to bring unexhausted

claims on behalf of a class.

In addition, the Ledbetter Court bases its holding on the language of the statute itself,

and quotes directly from it. Id. It does not provide any reasoning that would support a

reading that it intended to overrule the cases that had previously allowed the EEOC to assert

unexhausted claims on behalf of a class. It fails to discuss those cases whatsoever, including

cases that it had cited to favorably just a few years prior. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 122

S. Ct. 754, 761 (2002) (recognizing the distinction between an individual employee’s private

cause of action and the EEOC’s enforcement role in securing relief for a group of

individuals, citing to Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), and

General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980)). 

Furthermore, the language of the statute — on which the Ledbetter decision is based

— does not address the ability of the EEOC to assert claims on behalf of a class, whether

exhausted or not. The statute specifically discusses the inability of an “individual” to bring

claims if “the employee does not submit a timely EEOC charge.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The University, in arguing that the class members’ claims must be exhausted,

repeatedly highlights the importance of the conciliation process in employment

discrimination claims. The University asserts that informal methods of conference,

conciliation and persuasion are preferable to resolution in the federal courts. The Court notes

that the charging parties’ exhausted claims, presumably arising out of similar circumstances

to the unexhausted claims, were subject to this mandatory conciliation process without

success. Furthermore, conciliation is not foreclosed on behalf of the class members’ claims

merely because litigation has commenced; the parties are free, and in fact encouraged, to

resolve these claims cooperatively. 

- 7 -

There are important policy reasons to make a distinction between an individual and the

EEOC when considering the ability to bring unexhausted claims in court.1

 

Finally, a requirement that all claims be exhausted completely defeats the purpose of

the EEOC bringing a class action. If the claims were exhausted, the EEOC would have either

determined that they had merit, and pursued them individually, or not have made such a

determination (making class disposition of the claims highly unlikely). Logic dictates that

the Supreme Court would have given a little more discussion to a decision that would have

the practical effect of nullifying the EEOC’s ability to bring class actions.

The Court finds that the decision in Ledbetter did not address, and therefore could not

affect, the EEOC’s ability to bring unexhausted claims on behalf of a class. Because the

University relies on Ledbetter to support its argument that the EEOC is no longer permitted

to bring unexhausted claims on behalf of a class, the Court holds that these claims should not

be stricken. 

b. Failure to Satisfy Pleading Requirements

The University argues that even if the EEOC is permitted to pursue claims on behalf

of the newly disclosed class members, the mere inclusion of their names in a supplemental

disclosure statement does not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. (Dkt. #81). The

University cites to the recently decided Supreme Court case of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,

127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), for support for its position. 

In Twombly, the Court announced that the standard needed to meet Rule 8

requirements was one of “plausibility,” rather than merely “possibility.” Id. at 1974. The

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Court required the plaintiff to assert enough facts in the complaint to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery would reveal evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 1966.

The University argues that here, the claims of the class members whose identities were

revealed through disclosure statements are “woefully deficient” as measured against the

plausibility standard announced in Twombly. (Dkt. #81). The University asserts that the

“factual predicates with respect to these individuals’ claims are not simply vague, they are

entirely absent.” (Id.) 

 The Court disagrees that the inclusion of class members’ names in a disclosure 

statement is deficient under the standard announced in Twombly. Without determining

whether the Twombly pleading standard in fact applies outside of the context of antitrust

cases, the Court finds that the First Amended Complaint in this case, in any event, satisfies

the “plausibility” requirement. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. 

The First Amended Complaint in this case sets forth the factual predicates for the

Plaintiffs’ claims, and indicates that the claims are being asserted on behalf of a class whose

membership had not been entirely determined. (Dkt. #23). The later fleshing-out of the

claims through disclosure of class members as they became known to counsel is sufficient

to bring those claims into the realm of “plausibility.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the claims of the class members should not be

stricken on the basis that they do not comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2. Failure to Bring Suit Within 90 Days of Notice of Right to Sue

The University has also moved to strike the claims of two class members — Wesley

Jueckstock and Phyllis Stewart — who filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC but

did not timely file a lawsuit on their own behalf. (Dkt. #85). The EEOC was unable to

conclude that the information in the charges established a violation of Title VII, and issued

notices that opened up a 90-day period in which they could have pursued a private Title VII

enforcement action. Because neither Jueckstock nor Stewart exercised this right, the

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

University argues that their claims are forever time-barred and cannot now be brought by the

EEOC. (Id.) 

Further, Jueckstock entered into an unrelated settlement agreement with the

University, in which he released all potential claims against the University. The EEOC, the

University argues, is therefore precluded from recovering “any additional relief on his

behalf.” (Id.) 

There is significant authority to suggest that the EEOC is not merely a proxy for

victims of discrimination; it can bring an action in its own name to terminate unlawful

employment practices and secure appropriate relief. See General Tel. Co. of the Northwest,

Inc. v. EEOC, 100 S. Ct. 1698, 1700, 1703 (1980). The EEOC’s claims are not merely

derivative of the claims of the individuals it represents, and it “does not stand in the

employee’s shoes.” EEOC. v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. 754, 766 (2002). In other words,

the EEOC is not barred from seeking relief on behalf of Jueckstock and Stewart by virtue of

the fact that they are now individually barred from initiating a private enforcement action.

The Ninth Circuit has specifically held the EEOC is not prohibited from suing on

behalf of a party who chooses not to sue in the allotted ninety days. EEOC v. Occidental

Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 535 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1976) (“should the person concerned choose

not to sue during the allotted 90 days, the EEOC is not prohibited from suing thereafter. The

statute in no way limits the time within which it must sue, so long as the charging party has

not done so.”). The fact that Jueckstock and Stewart did not bring claims within the ninety

day period does not now prevent the EEOC from raising claims on their behalf. The EEOC

is charged with vindication of the public interest, and is not merely concerned with the

enforcement of private rights. Id. at 542. 

The University also argues that the EEOC’s previous inability to conclude that a

violation had occurred now prevents them from asserting these claims. The Court finds that

it does not. The EEOC points out that it no longer conducts full investigations of each

charge, and consequently, the agency no longer issues “no cause” findings. (Dkt. #89). The

notices of dismissal “unequivocally reflect that the EEOC made no determination that Mr.

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Jueckstock’s or Ms. Stewart’s charges were unfounded.” (Id.) In any event, “the courts

retain remedial powers under Title VII despite a finding by the EEOC of no reasonable cause

to believe that Title VII has been violated.” General Tel. Co. of the Northwest , Inc. v.

EEOC, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1707 (1980). 

Finally, the University seeks to strike Jueckstock’s claim based upon his earlier

settlement and release of all potential claims against the University. The Court finds that this

is not a basis to strike his claim.

The Court reiterates that the EEOC, as vindicator of the public interest, is not merely

a representative of the individual claimants. EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d

1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1987). Its right to bring suit is independent of the employee’s private

action rights. Id. 

Instructive is EEOC v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002), holding that an

employee’s agreement to arbitrate, to which the EEOC was not a party, did not preclude the

EEOC from seeking victim-specific judicial relief for the employee. The Court cautioned,

however, that it was “an open question whether settlement or arbitration judgment would

affect the validity of the EEOC’s claim or the character of relief the EEOC [could] seek.”

Id. at 766. Similarly, “[t]he Fifth and Sixth Circuits have suggested that a prior settlement

may limit the scope of relief that the EEOC may seek on behalf of the settling employee.”

Goodyear, 813 F.2d at 1543 (citing cases). And it also “goes without saying that the courts

can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.” General Tel., 100 S. Ct. at 1708.

The Court does not view these concerns relating to remedies as a proper basis for

striking the claim altogether. The motion to strike Jueckstock’s claim on this basis is

therefore denied. 

III. Conclusion

The Court finds that Darry Thornton, a charging party in the case, Francine

Muscianisi, and Shelly Chambers Thompson should be permitted to intervene as of right, and

the other motions for intervention should be denied. The Court also finds that the University

has not presented sufficient evidence that the claims of the class members should be stricken.

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED granting the motion to intervene by Shelly Chambers Thompson

(Dkt. #60).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part the motions to

intervene by Darry Thornton and Falonia Edenburgs, (Dkt. # 43), and Francine Muscianisi

and Alyssa Polk (Dkt. #44). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the motion to intervene by Morseller Ector,

Mark Ector, and Jennifer Hallman, (Dkt. 46).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the motions to strike claims or alternatively

for declaratory judgment. (Dkt. #81, 85).

DATED this 1st day of May, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-02303-MHM Document 149 Filed 05/02/08 Page 11 of 11