Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00909/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00909-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dennis Shamar Gooden, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Pima County Jail, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-00909-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

On October 8, 2014, Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco issued a Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 29) in which he recommended that the Pro Se Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner 

filing a Petition and action after he has exhausted his state court remedies. The Report 

and Recommendation notified the parties that they had fourteen days to file any 

objections. No objections have been filed. 

The Court has reviewed and considered the Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Answer to the Petition, with exhibits; the Reply and 

exhibits; and the Report and Recommendation. 

 The Court has also reviewed the Pima County Superior Court file for case number 

CR20052741. As noted in the Report and Recommendation, on June 27, 2013, 

Petitioner, acting on his own behalf, filed a “Post Conviction Relief Rule 32” in Pima 

County Superior Court. That petition has not been ruled on. In addition, on January 6, 

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2014, Petitioner filed in state court a Second Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Although the petition was docketed in the State 

Court record, it is actually a federal form and is designated as a “Petition Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254.” In fact, it is the same document that was filed with this Court on 

December 18, 2013. (Docs. 12, 13.) The petition has not been ruled on by the State 

Court. 

 The Report and Recommendation considered whether “inordinate delay” should 

excuse the exhaustion requirement in this case, or shift the burden to the state to 

demonstrate why exhaustion should still be required. See Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 

530-33 (9th Cir. 1990). However, it appears to have considered delay only as to the 

Second Amended Petition; the petition filed in June 2013 has also not been ruled on. 

(Doc. 29 at 5.) 

 As the Report and Recommendation states, if “there is either an absence of 

available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such 

process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner,” exhaustion is not required. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). Excessive delay in the appellate process may render a state 

corrective process ineffective and thus waive the requirement for exhaustion of remedies 

at the state level. Coe, 922 F.2d at 530–531. The Report and Recommendation observes 

that Petitioner did not allege that the State had unduly delayed disposition of his appeal 

and thus the exhaustion requirement should be excused; in fact he asserts that he has 

essentially abandoned his state court proceedings by not filing anything in the state 

appellate courts. (Doc. 29 at 5.) Moreover, he filed no objections to the Report and 

Recommendation. 

 The Ninth Circuit has stated that there is “no talismanic number of years or 

months” constituting unacceptable delay. Coe, 922 F.2d at 531. The court found a fouryear delay to be “alarming,” Coe, id., but it has also observed that a two-year delay is not 

“extreme.” Hamilton v. Calderon, 134 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2008). This Court finds 

that a seventeen-month delay is not unusual or unacceptable and does not meet the 

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threshold requirement of establishing undue delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.514, 

530 (1972) (“Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no 

necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”). Moreover, 

Petitioner was released from custody in June 2014. (Doc. 28.) 

Accordingly, after an independent review, IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 29) is ADOPTED; 

2. The Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 13) is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

 Dated this 5th day of December, 2014. 

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