Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01329/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARMIN ABAZARI,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv1329-GPC(JLB)

ORDER:

1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS; 

[Dkt. No. 2]

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION 

v.

ROSALIND FRANKLIN

UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND

SCIENCE,

Defendant.

On June 2, 2016, Plaintiff Armin Abazar (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed

a complaint against Defendant Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science,

located in North Chicago, Illinois. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff concurrently filed a motion

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.) Based on the reasoning below, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and sua sponte DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s complaint.

Discussion

A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee

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of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure 1

to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a).

See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook,

169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must submit an affidavit

demonstrating his inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit must include a

complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 

Here, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit reporting that he has not received any

income from employment during the past twelve months. (Dkt. No. 2 at 1-2.) Plaintiff

reports no real property, savings, or checking account and has $0 in cash. (Id. at 2-3.) 

He owns a 2003 GMC Yukon that he guesses to be valued around $3000. (Id. at 3.) 

He has expenses of around $40, and credit card debt in the amount of $170. (Id. at 4.) 

Based on the affidavit, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

It is well-established that a federal court cannot reach the merits of any dispute

until it confirms that it retains subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues

presented. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). 

Accordingly, federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional

power and are “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its]

existence . . . .” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278

(1977) (citations omitted). 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Unlike state courts, they have

no ‘inherent' or ‘general' subject matter jurisdiction. They can adjudicate only those

cases which the Constitution and Congress authorize them to adjudicate, i.e. those

involving diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or to which the United States is

a party. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Federal courts are

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee 1

of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee

Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions and the burden of establishing the

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

Plaintiff’s complaint is essentially styled a “motion to vacate state orders.” (Dkt.

No. 1 at 1, 5 .) Specifically, he seeks relief from the “State Appellate Order on June 2

29, 2015 (Ex. O), State Circuit Order August 27, 2014 (Ex. P) pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6).” (Id. at 5.) These orders were filed

in the Illinois state courts. He alleges that Defendant isselling “illegal and substandard

educationsto drive studentsinto large debts that these institutional know students can’t

repay.” (Id. at 7.) After graduating from Dr. William M. Scholl College of Podiatric

Medicine (“College”), Plaintiff was unable to be placed in a residency program. 

Relying on statements in the College’s catalog that he could be successful with a

degree in podiatric medicine, he applied and did not realize the shortage of available

residency placements. Plaintiff claims the College was improperly admitting more

students than the number of available residency placements. Therefore, he filed suit

in Illinois Circuit Court against the College. After the Circuit Court granted the

defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 29), Plaintiff appealed

to the Appellate Court of Illinois. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 16.) The Appellate Court of Illinois

affirmed the dismissal with prejudice as to all counts with a modification that the

dismissal of count II as to the fraudulent concealment of the fact that residencies in

podiatric medicine would not be available for all the graduates of the College podiatric

program be modified to be a dismissal without prejudice. (Id. at 23.) The case was

remanded for further proceedings on that claim only. (Id.) On May 24, 2016, it

appears that on remand, the Circuit Court, on motion, dismissed the case without

prejudice, and Plaintiff was granted until June 22, 2016 to file an amended complaint

with a status hearing set for June 29, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 64.) Plaintiff seeks relief

in this Court because he alleges that the courts in Illinois have consistently shown him

Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination. 

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direct animus. (Dkt. No. 1 at 59.)

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court is prohibited from

exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a case that is “a de facto appeal from a state

court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). A 

de facto appeal is when a federal plaintiff asserts “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly

erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based

on that decision” and is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 1140. 28 U.S.C. § 1257

grantsjurisdiction to review a state court judgment in the United States Supreme Court. 

See In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Direct federal

appellate review of state court decisions must occur, if at all, in the Supreme Court.”);

Maldando v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[F]ederal district court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of

a state court.”). 

First, it does not appear that a final judgment has been issued in the state court

as it appears the case is on remand and pending with the Circuit Court. (Dkt. No. 1-32

at 64.) Therefore, any relief Plaintiff seeks must be raised with the Illinois state court. 

See generally Illinois Supreme Court Rules 306, 307. 

Moreover, even if there was a final judgment, this Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over the case because Plaintiff is challenging the rulings of the

Illinois state trial and appellate courts by asking the Court to vacate both orders. He

argues that the two state court judges acted without authority, are not “authorized

independent judges”, and therefore their orders are void. Because Plaintiff is

challenging allegedly erroneous decisions by a state court, Plaintiff’s complaint would

be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and

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sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 23, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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