Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02209/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Matthew Alan Clack, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Ronald Credio, et. al, 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-2209-PHX-FJM (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Matthew Alan Clack has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally defaulted and that he waived habeas review of Grounds One, Two, and Four 

by entering a guilty plea. (Doc. 13 at 2.) In his reply, Petitioner opposes Respondents’ 

assertions and argues that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims. (Doc. 14.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds habeas review of Petitioner’s claims 

procedurally barred and does not address Respondents’ alternative arguments. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Guilty Plea and Sentencing 

 On July 13, 2009, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the Arizona Superior Court, Pinal 

County (trial court), to one count of kidnapping a child under fifteen with sexual 

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motivation (Count 1), and one count of attempted molestation of a child under fifteen 

(Count 4, as amended by the plea agreement). (Respondents’ Ex. I.)1

 

 Petitioner subsequently wrote a letter to the trial court asking to withdraw from the 

plea agreement. (Ex. M.) Petitioner’s trial counsel, Gillespie, was permitted to withdraw 

and substitute counsel, Ritter, moved to vacate Petitioner’s plea for “manifest injustice.” 

(Ex. N.) Petitioner argued that after he entered the plea agreement, he “became 

convinced that he had made a mistake by signing” it. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner asserted that 

he “felt pressured by his attorney,” Gillespie, to sign the agreement. (Id. at 4.) 

 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion on January 21, 

2010, at which Petitioner and Gillespie testified. (Ex. P at 5, 8-63.) Petitioner admitted 

that he told the trial court at his change-of-plea hearing that he had read and understood 

the plea agreement, that he understood the rights that he was giving up under the plea 

agreement, and that he wanted to enter that agreement. (Id. at 25-27.) He also admitted 

that he had confirmed during the change-of-plea hearing that no one had forced or 

threatened him to enter the plea agreement. (Id. at 28.) Petitioner admitted that he only 

had second thoughts about the plea agreement after talking with other inmates after he 

had entered his guilty plea. (Id. at 29-30.) After taking the matter under advisement, on 

January 29, 2010, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw from the plea 

agreement. (Respondents’ Ex. Q.) 

 On February 22, 2010, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. 

(Respondents’ Ex. S at 3-10, Ex. T.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court did not 

find any mitigating or aggravating factors. (Respondents’ Ex. S at 7.) Additionally, on 

Count 1, the court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive term of seventeen years’ 

imprisonment, with credit for 698 days of presentence incarceration. On amended Count 

4, the court placed Petitioner on lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Ex. S at 7.) 

 1

 Citations to “Respondents’ Ex.” are to exhibits to Respondents’ Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13). Exhibits A-U are located at docket 13-

1, exhibits V-FF are located at docket 13-2, and exhibits GG-II are located at docket 13-

3. 

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 B. Rule 32 “Of-Right” Proceeding (First Post-Conviction Proceeding) 

On May 5, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, and the trial court appointed counsel.2

 

(Respondents’ Exs. U, Y at 2.) After reviewing the record, counsel filed a notice 

advising the court that she could find no meritorious claims to raise on Petitioner’s 

behalf. (Respondents’ Ex. Y at 2.) The court granted Petitioner leave to file a pro per

petition, and on April 5, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition raising the following nine 

claims: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to develop an insanity defense; (2) the 

Arizona statute regarding dangerous crimes against children is unconstitutional; 

(3) Petitioner was wrongly charged under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1304(A) without the 

benefit of subsection B of that statute, which specifies a lower-class felony for 

kidnapping under certain circumstances; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by failing 

to consider mitigating evidence at sentencing; (5) the State should have charged 

Petitioner with unlawful imprisonment rather than kidnapping; (6) Petitioner’s Sixth 

Amendment due process rights were violated; (7) Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights 

were violated; (8) the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under State v. Donald, 10 

P.3d 1193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); and (9) the imposition of probation following 

Petitioner’s prison sentence constitutes double punishment in violation of the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Arizona Constitution. (Respondents’ 

Ex. V at 4-13.) 

 On June 30, 2011, the trial court denied post-conviction relief finding that 

Petitioner’s guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional defects, including Petitioner’s claim 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop an insanity defense and 

 

2

 Pursuant to his plea, Petitioner’s only avenue of direct review was a Rule 32 

“of-right” proceeding. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B) ([I]n noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . . 

shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding”). 

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Petitioner’s claims that he was wrongly charged. (Respondents’ Ex. Y at 3.) The court 

further found that Petitioner’s remaining claims lacked merit. (Id.) 

 Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Respondents’ Ex. Z.) The appellate court denied review on November 29, 

2011. (Respondents’ Ex. AA.) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue regarding Petitioner’s mental 

competency because there was no indication in the record that Petitioner was incompetent 

or unable assist his attorney. (Id. at 4.) The appellate court further found that the record 

supported the trial court’s finding that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

entered the plea agreement, and that his counsel had fully, timely, and properly advised 

him of the terms of the agreement and the potential sentences. (Id. at 3.) 

 The appellate court further held that, by pleading guilty, Petitioner had waived his 

claim that he was improperly charged with kidnapping. (Id. at 4.) The appellate court 

also held that, under Arizona law, Petitioner was precluded from challenging the 

sufficiency of the charging document for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding. 

(Id. at 4-5.) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim explaining 

that he had “stipulated to the sentence set forth in the plea agreement,” which was the 

sentence he received. (Id. at 5.) The appellate court explained that, by entering a guilty 

plea, Petitioner had waived his double jeopardy claim and his claim that the sentencing 

statute is unconstitutional. (Id.) In addition, the appellate court held that it would not 

consider Petitioner’s claim that he was improperly sentenced under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

705 because Petitioner had raised that claim for the first time on appeal. (Id.) Finally, 

the appellate court found that the trial court properly determined that that Petitioner had 

not raised any claims warranting post-conviction relief. (Id.) 

 Petitioner petitioned for review in the Arizona Supreme Court on January 19, 

2012. (Respondents’ Ex. BB.) That court denied review on May 23, 2012. 

(Respondents’ Ex. CC.) On August 15, 2012, Petitioner sought review in the United 

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States Supreme Court and, on October 29, 2012, the Court denied review. (Respondents’ 

Ex. DD.) 

C. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On October 29, 2012, Petitioner filed a “petition for writ of habeas corpus and for 

declaratory judgment” in the trial court. (Respondents’ Ex. FF.) Petitioner raised the 

following claims: (1) the trial court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence because there 

was no evidence that Petitioner had used a dangerous instrument; (2) the court should 

have sentenced him to three-and-one-half years’ imprisonment for attempted molestation 

and five years’ imprisonment for kidnapping, to run concurrently; (3) trial counsel was 

ineffective because he lacked sufficient knowledge of Arizona’s sentencing statutes; and 

(4) the trial court erred in imposing a sentence that did not comply with the applicable 

sentencing statutes, which resulted in judicial amendment of those statutes in violation of 

the separation of powers. (Id. at 4-6.) The trial court denied the petition on November 

19, 2012. (Respondents’ Ex. GG.) The court ruled that Petitioner was serving a 

lawfully-imposed sentence, that he had not alleged facts showing he was entitled to 

release, and therefore, he was “not entitled to habeas corpus relief.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner sought appellate review. On March 29, 2013, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision finding that the trial court neither erred nor 

abused its discretion in denying relief. (Respondents’ Ex. II at 5.) The appellate court 

also affirmed on the ground that Petitioner’s claims were precluded under Arizona Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3). (Respondents’ Ex. II at 8.) The appellate court stated 

that “the trial court should have treated [Petitioner’s] petition as a petition for postconviction relief and summarily dismissed the new claims [Petitioner] raises here as 

precluded by his failure to raise them at trial or in his first Rule 32 petition.” (Id.) The 

appellate court “specifically affirm[ed] the court’s denial of relief on the ground that 

[Petitioner’s] claims are precluded.” (Id. at 8-9.) 

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D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On October 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court raising the following grounds for relief: (1) his sentence of seventeen years’ 

imprisonment violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because he 

“did not admit and the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt” either that he 

committed the “offense with the use, discharge or threatening exhibition of a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument, or the knowing or intentional infliction of serious 

physical injury upon another”; (2) the Arizona sentencing statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

604.01, refers to a maximum penalty for a charged offense, but does not require a 

mandatory penalty under the sentencing provisions; (3) trial counsel was ineffective 

during plea negotiations because he lacked sufficient knowledge of Arizona’s criminal 

statutes, which resulted in Petitioner waiving his constitutional rights “under the guise of 

plea bargain stipulations”; and (4) the trial court imposed sentences that violated Arizona 

statutes and resulted in a “violation of separation of powers and [Petitioner’s] protected 

rights under” the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) 

 Respondents argue that the Court should deny relief because each of Petitioner’s 

claims is procedurally barred. In the alternative, Respondents argue that Petitioner 

waived habeas corpus review of Grounds One, Two, and Four by entering a guilty plea. 

(Doc. 13.) Petitioner opposes these assertions and argues that he is entitled to relief on 

the merits of his claims. (Doc. 14.) As discussed below, the Court finds Petitioner’s 

claims procedurally defaulted and barred from habeas corpus review. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends that the Petition be denied and does not reach Respondents’ 

alternative arguments. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by fairly presenting them to the state’s highest court 

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in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o 

provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present her 

claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of 

the claim”); see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. 

“A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to a state court if that court must read 

beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in 

order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-

32. Thus, a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claim to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be futile because the state court’s procedural rules, such as 

waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

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 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raises a claim in 

state court, but the state court finds the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 130 S. Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner 

who has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal 

claim has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first 

instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review 

is precluded if the state court opinion relies on a procedural ground “that is both 

independent of the merits of the federal claim and an adequate basis for the court’s 

decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is independent if the application of the bar does not 

depend on consideration of the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural rule is adequate if it is strictly or regularly followed. See

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

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claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 2254(b)(2) 

as “plainly meritless”). 

III. Analysis 

A. Grounds One, Two, and Four 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment 

because he “did not admit and the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] 

accomplished the offense with the use, discharge, or threatening exhibition of a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument or the knowing or intentional infliction of serious 

physical injury upon another.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that “the 

phrase ‘punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01’ as used in Arizona criminal statutes refers to 

the statutory maximum penalty that could be imposed for the offense charged and does 

not constitute a mandatory penalty capable of satisfying the [Ariz. Rev. Stat.] § 13-

702(A) ‘specific sentence is otherwise provided’ exception for first time offenders.”3

 

(Doc. 1 at 7.) In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s “misapplication of 

the statutory sentencing language is the functional equivalent of amending one or more 

statutes in violation of [the] separation of powers and [Petitioner’s] rights under” the 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 9.) 

 3

 Ground Two refers to “Due Process” and “Equal Protection,” but does not 

identify any particular federal claim. (Id.) A state prisoner can obtain federal habeas 

relief only if his conviction violates the Constitution or the laws and treaties of the United 

States. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982). Federal habeas corpus relief is not 

available for alleged violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation of 

state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Petitioner’s claim based on 

Arizona sentencing statutes appears to challenge the application of Arizona law, and 

therefore, it is not subject to this Court’s review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 67-68 (explaining that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determinations on state-law questions”). Accordingly, to the extent that 

Ground Two is based on state law, it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

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 Petitioner did not raise these claims in his first post-conviction proceeding. 

(Respondents’ Exs. V, Z.) Rather, he raised them for the first time in his second postconviction proceeding. (Respondents’ Exs. FF, HH.) The appellate court found these 

claims precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because Petitioner failed to raise them at trial or 

in his first Rule 32 proceeding. (Respondents’ Ex. II at 5, 8-9); see Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (providing that a defendant is precluded from relief under Rule 32 

based on any ground “[t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous 

collateral proceeding”). 

 This determination was independent of federal law. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 

n.10 (“[p]reclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier proceeding under 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent of federal law because they do not depend 

upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits’”). Additionally, Arizona courts have 

consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further review of claims that were 

waived at trial, on direct appeal, or in prior post-conviction proceedings. See Stewart v. 

Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Rule 32.2(a) is an adequate and 

independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008); Ortiz 

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts 

have not “strictly or regularly” followed Rule 32). 

 Accordingly, Grounds One, Two, and Four are procedurally barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 537; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 97 

(federal court is barred from considering a claim that state court denied on an adequate 

state-law ground independent of the merits of the federal claim). To the extent that the 

state court considered the merits of Petitioner’s claims, that alternative ruling does not 

vitiate the procedural bar. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10. As discussed below in 

Section III(C), Petitioner has not established any basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

B. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel’s “incompetence regarding 

Arizona’s sentencing statutes” resulted in Petitioner waiving his constitutional rights 

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“under the guise of plea bargain stipulations.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Ground Three does not 

identify any particular federal claim. (Id.) Although Petitioner asserts that counsel was 

incompetent, he does not cite the Sixth Amendment. (Id.) 

 A state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief only if his conviction violates the 

Constitution or the laws and treaties of the United States. Engle, 456 U.S. at 119. 

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for alleged violations of state law. Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 67-68. Because Ground Three is not based on a violation of federal law, the 

Court lacks habeas jurisdiction over that claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 67-68. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief based on Ground 

Three should be denied. 

 Moreover, Petitioner did not fairly present this particular claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel to the state courts, and it is now technically exhausted and 

procedurally barred. In his first post-conviction proceeding, Petitioner argued that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Petitioner’s competency with the trial court. 

(Respondents’ Ex. V at 5-6, Ex. Z at 2, 4-5.) Petitioner’s assertion in the trial and 

appellate courts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of 

Petitioner’s competency did not exhaust an ineffective assistance claim based on 

assertions of other allegedly deficient conduct by counsel at sentencing. See Carriger v. 

Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (petitioner’s assertion that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to cross-examine a witness was not sufficient to exhaust claim that 

counsel was ineffective on another ground). 

 Petitioner did not exhaust available state remedies with respect to his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in Ground Three and, pursuant to Arizona 

procedural rules, a return to state court to present this claim would be futile. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) and (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (a 

state post-conviction action is futile when it is time barred); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 

1048 53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims waived 

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

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(establishing deadlines for filing notice of Rule 32 proceeding); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 

(petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). 

Accordingly, although this claim is technically exhausted, it is procedurally barred. See 

Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). 

C. Overcoming the Procedural Bar 

 Because Petitioner claims are procedurally barred, either because the Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied them based on an adequate and independent state law ground 

(Grounds One, Two, and Four), or because Petitioner failed to present his claim to the 

state courts and returning to state court to do so now would be futile (Ground Three), 

federal habeas corpus review is barred unless Petitioner can show “cause and prejudice” 

or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 749-50; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). 

 Rather than specifically arguing “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice,” Petitioner appears to argue that, because he could return to state 

court to present his claims in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, his claims are not 

precluded from habeas corpus review. (Doc. 14 at 3-6.) However, permitting Petitioner 

to return to state court to present any of the claims asserted in the pending Petition to the 

state court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus would be futile and would not preserve 

those claims for federal habeas corpus review. 

 Under Arizona law, Rule 32 procedures govern a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3. 

Although Rule 32 does not displace writs of habeas corpus in Arizona, it is designed “to 

provide a unified procedure for the various avenues of post-conviction relief.” Floyd v. 

Superior Court, 657 P.2d 885, 886-87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Rule 32 “provides Arizona 

criminal defendants with a different procedural vehicle for presenting certain claims, all 

of which relate to alleged irregularities and errors that occurred in connection with the 

criminal proceeding that resulted in a conviction and the sentence.” State v. Moraga, 

2012 WL 5873552, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2012) (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32 .1). 

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Rule 32.1 was intended to “‘encompass all the grounds presently available in Arizona 

under a writ of habeas corpus, Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 14; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13–2001 to 

13–2027 (1956).’” Moraga, 2012 WL 5873552, at *2 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

comment.) 

 Although Rule 32 does not displace writs of habeas corpus, “[i]n Arizona, the writ 

of habeas corpus may be used only to review matters affecting a court’s jurisdiction.” In 

re Oppenheimer, 389 P.2d 696, 700 (Ariz. 1964). Thus, “[t]he writ of habeas corpus is 

not the appropriate remedy to review irregularities or mistakes in a lower court unless 

they pertain to jurisdiction.” State v. Court of Appeals, 416 P.2d 599, 601 (Ariz. 1966). 

None of Petitioner’s claims pertain to the trial court’s jurisdiction. See State v. Bryant, 

200 P.3d 1011, 1014-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that, to the extent that State v. 

Vargas-Burgos,783 P.2d 264, 265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) suggested that a claim that a 

sentence was not statutorily authorized was jurisdictional in nature, Vargas-Burgos used 

the term “jurisdiction” imprecisely). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims would not properly 

be brought in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, and permitting Petitioner to return 

to state court to present his claims to the state court would be futile. Accordingly, federal 

habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred and his claims are not 

properly before the Court unless Petitioner establishes a basis to overcome the procedural 

bar. 

 1. Cause and Prejudice 

 Petitioner does not argue “cause or prejudice” to overcome the procedural bar. 

(Doc. 14.) Additionally, Petitioner’s status as an inmate and his limited access to legal 

resources do not constitute cause to excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State

Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of 

legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s mental health issues and 

reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). Because Petitioner offers no 

legitimate “cause” that precluded him from properly exhausting state remedies, the Court 

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need not reach the prejudice issue. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n. 43; Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (when petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural 

default, the court need not consider whether he has shown actual prejudice resulting from 

the alleged violation). 

 2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Finally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his procedurally barred 

claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” A federal court may review 

the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that 

failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of 

one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider his defaulted claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Because Petitioner has not demonstrated any basis to 

overcome the procedural bar, his claims are not properly before the Court and the Petition 

should be denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because his claims are 

procedurally barred and he has not established any ground to excuse that bar. 

Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds Two and Four are 

based on state law, those claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

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procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 12th day of November, 2013. 

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