Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01122/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner was cited for possessing two pills of Neurontin, a non-narcotic drug 1

prescribed and taken “as needed” to control his back pain. At Solano State Prison, medications

are dispensed from a single location under supervision by prison authorities. Prisoners are not

permitted to remove medications from this location, and prison authorities interpret petitioner’s

“as needed” prescription to allow him to either take or not take the medication at the designated

time and place medicine is dispensed. This differs from the policy at Folsom State Prison, where

petitioner was previously housed. At Folsom, petitioner was permitted to take his pills with him,

and it was his common practice to place them in his coffee cup, take them to his work

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES DANIEL CARL,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-1122 MCE KJM P

vs.

ROBERT HOREL, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is an inmate serving a term of twenty-five years to life with

enhancements at the Solano State Prison in California. Pet. at 1. It is undisputed that he became

eligible for parole on January 17, 2003. Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A (Legal Status Sheet). 

More than two years after petitioner became eligible for parole, he was disciplined by prison

authorities for the unauthorized possession of a controlled substance. Pet., Ex. C (Director’s

Level Appeal Decision). Initially, petitioner was denied 130 days of worktime credit and a 1

Case 2:07-cv-01122-MCE -KJM Document 9 Filed 04/18/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

assignment, and take them after he had finished his morning coffee. Solano prison authorities

cited petitioner when they found two pills in his coffee cup, which petitioner did not attempt to

conceal. Pet., Ex. C (Director’s Level Appeal Decision).

2

variety of privileges. Id. After a series of administrative appeals, his offense was reclassified

and his credit loss reduced to 30 days. Pet., Ex. D (Modification Order). The petitioner seeks

habeas relief under several theories, arguing his administrative sanction was improper. 

Respondents move to dismiss the petition as moot, because petitioner already is eligible for

parole and thus the revocation of work time credits cannot affect the length of his incarceration.

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases

or controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.

This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of

federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. . . . The parties

must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the

lawsuit. This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff 

must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury

traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quotations and citations omitted). In Spencer, the

Court held moot a habeas corpus petition challenging parole revocation because the petitioner

had been released from custody during the pendency of the petition. Id. at 18. Because the

petitioner had been released, vitiating the parole revocation could not affect his term of

confinement. Thus a favorable decision could not appreciably affect the rights of the petitioner. 

The Court refused to apply the presumption of collateral consequences, which assumes a

cognizable, redressable injury when a party challenges a criminal conviction. Id. at 13.

It was not enough that the parole violations found by the

revocation decision would enable the parole board to deny

respondents parole in the future. For such violations did not render

an individual ineligible for parole . . . [but were] simply one factor,

among many, that may be considered by the parole authority. 

Id. (citing Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633 n.13, 639-40 (1982) (citations and quotations

omitted)). 

Case 2:07-cv-01122-MCE -KJM Document 9 Filed 04/18/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

The Ninth Circuit has explicitly applied the Court’s holding in Spencer in the

context of reviewing decisions to grant or deny parole. Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 481

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Because the decision whether to grant parole is left to the judgment of the

Board of Prison Terms, the likelihood of delayed or denied parole is a type of nonstatutory

consequence dependant on discretionary decisions that is insufficient to apply the presumption of

collateral consequences.”).

In the petition before the court, petitioner already is eligible for parole. The

revocation of worktime credits cannot give rise to standing because, even if the credits were

restored by this court, his rights would be unaffected. Worktime credits are counted alongside

time served when determining when a prisoner is eligible for parole. Because petitioner is

already eligible for parole, any credits restored to petitioner would be superfluous. Cf. In re

Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 188-189 (1991); Williams v. Schwarzenneger, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 62649*, 26 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“[I]f a prisoner’s incarceration time passes his [minimum

eligible parole date], and he has yet to be found eligible for parole, computation of time credits is

meaningless--he will be released if and when found eligible.” (emphasis in original)), adopted by

Williams v. Schwarzenegger, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71271 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Petitioner seeks

relief because “it is common practice for the Board of Prison Hearings to find Life-Term inmates

unsuitable for parole for even the most basic of infractions.” Pet. for Habeas Corpus to the Cal.

Supreme Ct. 10 (incorporated by reference into the current petition). As in both Spencer and

Wilson, this future injury is too speculative to give this court standing directly, and it is a

“consequence that is insufficient to apply the presumption of collateral consequences.” Wilson

319 F.3d at 481; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 13-14, 18. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondents’ motion to

dismiss be granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

Case 2:07-cv-01122-MCE -KJM Document 9 Filed 04/18/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 17, 2008. 

Case 2:07-cv-01122-MCE -KJM Document 9 Filed 04/18/08 Page 4 of 4