Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02855/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02855-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALANY JEAN HELMANTOLER et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF CONCORD et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02855-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 33

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Alany Jean Helmantoler (“Alany”) and her minor children T.H., K.H., and M.H. 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against the City of Concord (“Concord”) and individual 

officers O’Brien, Donnelly, Golinveaux, and Elsberry (collectively “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and California common law. Plaintiffs assert five causes of action based on a warrantless 

entry of Plaintiffs’ home on August 12, 2013: (1) civil rights claims for unreasonable search and 

excessive force against O’Brien and Donnelly; (2) a Monell claim against Concord; (3) a battery 

claim against O’Brien and Donnelly; (4) a false imprisonment claim against all Defendants; and 

(5) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all Defendants. On September 23, 

2014, the Court bifurcated the Monell claims and related proceedings. Dkt. No. 24. Defendants 

bring this motion for partial summary judgment on the first, third, fourth and fifth causes of action 

only. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on May 7, 2015. Having carefully considered 

the parties’ written and oral arguments, and the entire record, the Court GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “the court shall grant summary judgment if 

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the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Only genuine disputes over material facts will preclude 

summary judgment; “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Material facts are those that may 

affect the outcome of the case. A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such 

that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[I]n ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of 

the substantive evidentiary burden.” Id. at 254. The question is “whether a jury could reasonably 

find either that the [moving party] proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required 

by the governing law or that he did not.” Id. “[A]ll justifiable inferences must be drawn in [the 

nonmovant’s] favor.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 

(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citation omitted). This is true where the underlying facts are undisputed 

as well as where they are in controversy. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 

504 U.S. 541 (1992); McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The moving party must inform the district court of the basis for its motion and identify 

those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits, if 

any, that it contends demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not 

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Liberty Lobby, 

477 U.S. at 250. The opposing party need not show the issue will be resolved conclusively in its 

favor. Liberty Lobby, 577 U.S. at 248-49. All that is necessary is submission of sufficient 

evidence to create a material factual dispute, thereby requiring a jury or judge to resolve the 

parties’ differing versions at trial. Id.

III. FACTS

The relevant facts giving rise to the instant lawsuit are undisputed, except where noted. On 

August 12, 2013, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Defendants O’Brien and Donnelly were dispatched 

to the Helmantoler residence at 3724 Edmonton Way in Concord, California, in response to a 911

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telephone call received by the Concord Police Department (“CPD”). Blechman Decl. Ex. B 

(Incident Detail Report); Ex. C ¶ 4 (Donnelly Decl.); Ex. F (911 Dispatch Transcript). The 911 

caller, who asked to remain anonymous, claimed to be a neighbor who had overheard what 

sounded like yelling coming from the backyard of the Helmantoler residence. See 911 Dispatch 

Tr. at 2:16-3:21. Specifically, the caller claimed she heard a high–pitched voice yell “Get off of 

me. Don’t touch me.” Id. at 2:18-19. The caller stated that “[she didn’t] know if it [was] just kids 

screaming like obnoxiously . . . or what.” Id. at 2:22-24. She further stated that there were three 

children living in the home, one of whom was a teenager and another who was hearing impaired 

and sometimes screamed. The caller did not believe that the screaming she heard on that day

sounded like the hearing impaired child. Id. at 3:8-10. 

Officers Donnelly and O’Brien received the information regarding children yelling at the 

Helmantoler residence from the 911 dispatcher and responded to the call. While en route to the 

residence, the officers received updates from the 911 dispatcher giving them further details about 

the Helmantoler family. The dispatcher informed the officers that there were three children in the 

home, one of whom was hearing impaired, and that it was unknown whether the parents were in 

the home. Incident Detail Rep., 1. The officers also received information about Michael 

Helmantoler, Alany Helmantoler’s estranged husband, who no longer lived in the residence. Id. 

Michael, the officers learned, had been arrested in 2013 for criminal threats, was reportedly

schizophrenic, and had a domestic violence restraining order against him. 911 Dispatch Tr. at 

20:11-13; Incident Detail Rep., 1. 

The Helmantoler residence is a typical single–story, single–family home with an attached 

garage. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 1, CPD-0002 (Offense Report); Ex. 5 at 10:14-24 (O’Brien Dep.). On 

the day of the incident, the garage door was closed. Offense Rep., CPD-0002; 911 Dispatch Tr. 

3:19-20. The three children were at home, but their mother, Alany Helmantoler, was not, having 

left the house about half an hour earlier. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 36:3-10, 43:8-16 (T.H. Dep.).

Upon arriving at the Helmantoler residence, Officers Donnelly and O’Brien, who were in 

uniform, walked up to the front door. Blechman Decl. Ex. C ¶ 4; Ex. D at 14:13-23. The house 

was quiet at that point. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 6 at 15:4-14, 64:2-15 (Donnelly Dep.); Ex. 5 at 10:6-

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13, 31:20-32:12. Donnelly and O’Brien found that the front door to the house was open, with the 

metal screen door in front of the main wooden door closed but unlocked. Offense Rep., CPD0002; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 5 at 10:14-24. O’Brien opened the screen door. Offense Rep., CPD00013; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 46:4-10; Blechman Decl. Ex. E at 10:25-11:13 (O’Brien Dep.).

Realizing the police were on the front porch, T.H., the oldest child, came to the door. 

Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 43:13-20. The officers believe that T.H. was on the phone at the time. 

Incident Rep., CPD-0002; Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 16:3-5; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 43:13-20. 

T.H. acknowledges that she had been on the phone with her mother, but does not recall whether

she had ended the call before encountering the officers. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 43:18-23, 44:7-13. 

Both parties agree that T.H. had been in contact with her mother and that her mother thus knew the 

police were at the home. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 44:10-19; Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 22:3-6. In 

response to T.H. telling Alany that the police were there, Alany told T.H. that she was on her way 

home. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 44:17-19. 

When T.H. came to the front door to meet the officers, she attempted to close the already–

open screen door, but was prevented from doing so by O’Brien, who had wedged his foot in front 

of the door to keep it from closing. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 5 at 14:2-21; Offense Rep., CPD-00013; 

Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 24:4-15. As T.H. attempted to close the screen door, one of the officers 

told her not to do so. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 56:18-21, 57:1-3; Offense Rep. CPD-0002; 

Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 24:13-15. Donnelly and O’Brien observed that T.H. appeared upset and 

recently had been crying. Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 16:3-5; Offense Rep., CPD-0002; Vanegas 

Decl. Ex. 2 at 45:9-18. Before the officers arrived, T.H. had been in an argument with her sister, 

though there is no indication in the record that she explained this to the officers. Vanegas Decl. 

Ex. 2 at 36:7-16; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 7 at 12:4-9 (M.H. Dep.); Blechman Decl. Ex. G at 50:14-19 

(T.H. Dep.). By the time the officers arrived, according to T.H., she had just finished crying and

she and her sisters were starting to calm down. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 45:13-18, 50:6-16. When 

Donnelly inquired if everything was okay, T.H. responded with words to the effect that everything 

was “okay now.” Id. at 50:6-16; Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 18:19-22.

Before explaining why they were there, Donnelly asked T.H. if he and his partner could 

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enter the house. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 51:13-18. T.H. replied that the officers could not do so

because they did not have a warrant. Id. at 51:13-16. Though T.H. disputes that the officers ever 

told her they were specifically concerned with an intruder in the house, she thinks that at some 

point one of the officers explained that they needed to enter the home to verify that everyone was 

safe. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 57:18-20.

1

The record is unclear as to exactly when these statements 

were made. 

During the course of the initial conversation with Donnelly and O’Brien, T.H. informed 

the officers that her mother was on her way home. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 60:8-14; Blechman 

Decl. Ex. D at 22:3-6. According to T.H., despite being told that her mother was on the way 

home, Donnelly proceeded to question her in an apparent attempt to enter the home without a 

warrant. T.H. answered some of Donnelly’s questions but declined to answer others. Vanegas

Decl. Ex. 2 at 54:19-55:16. T.H. remembers telling the officers that her little sisters, M.H. and 

K.H., were in the home, and she believes she told them her age. Id. at 55:7-25. According to 

T.H., when she informed the officers that she was not going to answer their questions or let them 

into the house, they threatened to arrest her. Id. at 53:24-54:11. Nonetheless, T.H. refused to 

allow the officers to enter the house without a warrant and informed them that she would not 

answer any questions until her mother returned. Id. at 57:21-25.

While T.H. was talking with the officers, her younger sister, K.H., appeared behind her. 

Id. at 58:12-15; Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 25:19-26:3; Ex. I at 66:8-14 (Donnelly Testimony). 

Donnelly asked K.H. if she was okay, but he could not understand K.H.’s response and presumed 

that K.H. had some kind of disability. Offense Rep., CPD-0002; Blechman Decl. Ex. I at 66:8-14.

In fact, K.H. has a hearing disability, a speech impediment, mild cerebral palsy, and mild mental 

retardation. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 8 at ¶ 5 (Alany Helmantoler Decl.). Donnelly and O’Brien 

observed that K.H. appeared frightened. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 6 at 26:3-14. According to Donnelly, 

T.H. then told K.H. not to speak to him. Offense Rep., CPD-0002; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 6 at 26:11-

16. T.H. does not remember whether she said this. Blechman Decl. Ex. I at 58:16-24. Around 

 

1

 T.H.’s younger sister M.H. heard the officers say that they were there “to check on us . . .[t]o 

make sure everybody in the house is all right.” Blechman Decl. Ex. H at 21:14-21 (M.H. Dep.). 

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this time, Donnelly asked to speak to T.H.’s mother, Alany, on the phone. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 

62:7-13. T.H. called her mother again, but did not give Donnelly or O’Brien the opportunity to 

speak to her. T.H. told the officers that her mother was on Olivera Road (a nearby street) and that 

she would be home soon. Id. at 62:20-63:11. According to T.H., she did not pass the phone to 

Donnelly or O’Brien because her mother was on a motorcycle and it would have been impossible

for them to have a conversation with her. Id. at 63:12-17.

When Alany returned home on her motorcycle, she parked it in the driveway before 

proceeding to the home’s back entrance. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 49:14-22 (Alany Helmantoler 

Dep.). Though Alany turned off her motorcycle engine before entering her driveway, she believes 

that the officers heard her approach since the “motorcycle’s extremely loud and you can hear it 

coming from almost a mile away.” Id. at 115:1-2. O’Brien admitted hearing something “coming 

from the driveway area,” but did not know what the sound was. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 5 at 16:4-13. 

Donnelly, on the other hand, claimed not to have heard the motorcycle, and said that he went to 

inspect the driveway after O’Brien reported that he “heard something from the driveway.” 

Blechman Decl. Ex. I at 31:6-20 (Donnelly Testimony). Donnelly found a motorcycle in the 

driveway that had not been there previously. Id. at 31:10-16. Donnelly explained that he 

associated the motorcycle’s quiet arrival with a purposeful attempt to make a noiseless approach 

behind the officers’ backs, an interpretation Alany vigorously disputes. Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 

76:24-77:18; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 114:23-115:18.

Shortly after Donnelly observed the motorcycle in the driveway, Alany entered her home 

through the back sliding door. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 51:17-19. She did so in order to check on 

her children. Id at 49:14-24. When she entered the house, Alany first went to speak with her 

disabled child, K.H. K.H. appeared frightened but otherwise unharmed, and informed her mother

that the police were at the house. Id. at 74:3-19. Alany then put down her motorcycle helmet and

approached the front door, where T.H. and the officers were talking. Id. at 77:11-19. She told 

T.H. “I have this,” and tried to address the officers. Id. at 77:11-19, 119:2-5. At this point, 

according to Alany and T.H., at least one of the officers was already fully inside of the house. 

Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 65:13-66:6; Ex. 4 at 119:10-120:1. As Alany attempted to ask the officers 

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what they were doing in her house, Donnelly pushed T.H. aside, and then both officers grabbed 

Alany and forcibly removed her from the house. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 77:18-22, 120:2-10; Ex. 

2 at 66:7-12. O’Brien then handcuffed Alany and placed her on the front lawn. Offense Rep., 

CPD-0003; Blechman Decl. Ex. J at 154:12-17 (Alany Helmantoler Dep.).

As her mother was being removed from the house, T.H. closed the wooden door and 

locked the handle. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 67:8-24. In response, Donnelly kicked the door open, 

and it hit T.H. in the shoulder. Offense Rep., CPD-0003; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 69:22-70:1, 

89:24-90:1. At this point, a pushing match ensued between Donnelly and T.H. on opposite sides

of the closed wooden door. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 71:1-24. Donnelly wedged his baton in the 

door to keep it open. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 72:9-16; Ex. 6 at 42:5-10. Donnelly eventually 

passed the baton over to O’Brien to keep the door from closing, though the record is unclear as to 

when this happened. Blechman Decl. Ex D at 43:23-25. During the time that T.H. was behind the 

door, the officers continued to urge her to open the door, telling her that Alany was cooperating 

and that she could “just open the door.” Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 73:10-23. T.H. didn’t believe 

them and called the officers liars. Id. at 73:7-8; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 5 at 23:22-25; Ex. 6 at 43:17-

20. Both O’Brien and Donnelly were wearing a standard duty belt which includes a firearm, 

baton, taser, and pepper spray. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 5 at 12:3-8; Ex. 6 at 18:4-10. According to 

T.H., when she looked through the door opening, she saw an officer holding what looked like a 

can of pepper spray. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 9 ¶ 3 (T.H. Decl.). She pleaded with the officer not to 

spray her. Id. 

After hearing her mother being pulled out of the door, M.H., the youngest child, ran out of 

her room to check on her sister. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 7 at 29:25-30:4. M.H. saw T.H. at the front 

door attempting to keep the door closed and then went to check on K.H. Id. at 30:3-4, 16-22. She 

grabbed K.H., ran into the garage, and got into the family car. Id. at 30:1-4; Blechman Decl. Ex. 

H at 51:22-52:18; Offense Rep., CPD-0006. From the front window of the house, Donnelly saw 

the two girls run into the garage screaming. Offense Rep., CPD-0003. Throughout this time, 

Alany was detained, in handcuffs, either in front of the house or in the back of a patrol car.

While Alany was in the back of the patrol car, she sent text messages to her babysitter 

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Kaylie Woods, her estranged husband Michael Helmantoler, and two other people requesting help. 

Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 30:23-31:10, 155:5-17. 

At about the same time that K.H. and M.H. ran into the garage and locked themselves 

inside the car, CPD Officers Elsberry and Golinveaux arrived at the house. Offense Rep., CPD0003. The garage was still closed when they arrived. Offense Rep., CPD-0002, CPD-0006. 

Donnelly then instructed Golinveaux to check the home’s perimeter. Offense Rep., CPD0006. Golinveaux did so, and after finding the perimeter of the home secure, he requested the 

garage door opener from Alany. Id.; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 176:1-11. Alany told Golinveaux

that the opener was on her keychain. Using the opener, Golinveaux opened the garage. Offense 

Rep., CPD-0006; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 176:1-11. Golinveaux entered the garage and found 

K.H. and M.H. crying and holding hands in the backseat of the locked car. Offense Rep., CPD0006; Blechman Decl. Ex. H at 54:10-14 (M.H. Dep.); Ex. K ¶ 3 (Golinveaux Decl.). According 

to Alany, when Golinveaux opened the garage door, he had his gun out for a few seconds and 

pointed it in the direction of K.H. and M.H. before re-holstering it as he approached the car. 

Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 172:1-22, 174:12-21, 176:12-15. Golinveaux attempted to get the children 

to talk to him. Offense Rep., CPD-0006; Blechman Decl. Ex. K. ¶ 3. An officer asked M.H. if 

she was scared of something, to which she replied, “You.” Vanegas Decl. Ex. 7 at 50:15-18, 

50:22-51:1. After he observed that the children in the car were not injured, and that there were no 

criminal suspects in the garage, Golinveaux left the garage to talk to the children’s babysitter, 

Kaylie Woods, who had arrived in response to Alany’s text messages. Offense Rep., CPD-0006;

Blechman Decl. Ex. K ¶ 3. 

At this point, after the officers had been at the house for approximately 20 minutes,

Michael Helmantoler called the police to request a “welfare check” on his wife and children. 911 

Dispatch Tr. at 29:8-15.

Overhearing that the officers were going to attempt to force entry into the home by cutting 

a window, Alany called Elsberry, who she knew, over to the police car where she was detained. 

Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 228:15-229:10. Elsberry asked Alany if she knew why the officers were 

there and she responded that she did not. Id. at 159:12-23. Elsberry told Alany that the officers 

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wanted to conduct a welfare check on the children. Id. at 159:24. After a brief discussion with 

Elsberry, Alany agreed to allow the officers to perform a welfare check of the home provided that 

they left her children alone. Id. at 159:25-160:17; Blechman Decl. Ex. J at 164:14-24. The 

officers removed Alany from the patrol car and escorted her to the front door while she was still in 

handcuffs. Offense Rep., CPD-003. She then told T.H. to open the door and allow the officers 

into the house. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 230:10-14; Blechman Decl. Ex. J at 165:4-9. Alany 

allowed Elsberry and Donnelly to enter the house so they could assure themselves that no one was 

hiding or injured inside. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 230:4-24; Blechman Decl. Ex. J at 165:23-

167:25. Alany escorted the officers on the search of the house and backyard. Id. During the 

welfare check the officers did not open any drawers or cabinets. Blechman Decl. Ex. J at 166:19-

167:3. The search was brief, lasting approximately three minutes, and was limited to areas where

a person could have been hiding. Id. at 166:19-167:10. The officers did not find anyone in the 

home, garage, or backyard apart from Alany and her children.

After conducting the brief search, the officers arrested Alany for resisting arrest. Offense 

Rep., CPD-0004. Kaylie Woods and Jim Woods remained behind to take care of the children. Id.

at CPD-0003.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights in two ways: (1) 

by entering the Helmantoler home without a warrant, and (2) by using excessive force in the 

course of the warrantless search. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment 

on these claims based on qualified immunity, in addition to denying that they committed any 

constitutional violation. 

1. Qualified Immunity 

Qualified immunity is an entitlement, provided to government officials in the exercise of 

their duties, not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

200 (2001). The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to balance two important and sometimes 

competing interests — “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

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irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The doctrine thus intends to take into account the real–world 

demands on officials such as police officers in order to allow them to act “swiftly and firmly” in 

situations where the rules governing their actions are often “voluminous, ambiguous, and 

contradictory.” Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). “The purpose of this 

doctrine is to recognize that holding officials liable for reasonable mistakes might unnecessarily 

paralyze their ability to make difficult decisions in challenging situations, thus disrupting the 

effective performance of their public duties.” Id. 

To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider

whether (1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly 

established at the time of the incident. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Courts are not required to 

address the two qualified immunity issues in any particular order, and instead may “exercise their 

sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 243.

With respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme Court 

has recently held that “[a]n officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless 

the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have 

understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S. 

Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is an “exacting 

standard” which “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 

judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court must 

determine whether the pre-existing law provided defendants with “fair warning that their conduct 

was unlawful.” Elliot-Park v. Mangola, 592 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In order to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Donnelly and 

O’Brien are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court thus considers the state of the law at the time 

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of the alleged violation, as well as the information possessed by the officers at the time of search

and the officers’ actions viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 

S.Ct. 1861, 1866-68 (2014). 

The Court finds it appropriate to address the second prong of the qualified immunity test 

first. For the reasons set forth below, and resolving all factual disputes in Plaintiffs’ favor, as it 

must at the summary judgment stage, the Court finds that the doctrine shields Defendants from 

liability as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.

2. Warrantless Entry and the Emergency Exception

 Searches and seizures inside a home and its curtilage without a warrant are presumptively 

unreasonable. United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 2010). This presumption is 

rebuttable. Id. at 737-38. “There are two general exceptions to the warrant requirement for home 

searches: exigency and emergency.” United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.

2005). 

Here, Defendants rely on the “emergency” exception to the warrant requirement to justify 

their entry into the Helmantoler home. The emergency exception applies when “(1) in considering 

the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for 

concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; 

and (2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need.” United States v. Snipe, 

515 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). This exception is “narrow,” and its boundaries are “rigorously 

guarded” to prevent any expansion that would unduly interfere with the sanctity of the home. 

Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2009). 

3. Clearly Established Law in August 2013 Did Not Establish that Any 

Reasonable Officer in Donnelly and O’Brien’s Shoes Would Have Known 

that the Actions Taken in this Case Were Illegal

a. Warrantless Search Claim 

Plaintiffs base their Fourth Amendment claim on two warrantless entries by CPD officers: 

(1) Donnelly and O’Brien’s entry into the entryway of the house prior to Alany’s arrest;

2

and (2) 

 

2 Defendants have not moved for summary judgment regarding Alany’s arrest itself. Reply at 2.

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the eventual welfare check conducted in Alany’s presence after she agreed to allow the officers 

into the house. Opp. at 8-13. While the Court is not entirely convinced that an objectively 

reasonable basis to make the first entry existed within the meaning of the emergency exception, it

finds that the contours of the law in August of 2013 did not establish “beyond debate” that these 

two entries were unlawful.

In a number of cases prior to August 2013 in which officers relied upon the emergency 

exception to the warrant requirement based on 911 calls or other information reporting a potential 

emergency, the Ninth Circuit upheld the officers’ entry as objectively reasonable in light of the 

factual circumstances presented at the time. See United States v. Brown, 392 Fed. App’x. 515 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (finding officers’ warrantless entry into an apartment lawful under the emergency 

exception; two 911 calls and a crying victim found at the scene provided sufficient basis for the 

officers to enter the apartment in order to ensure that no one inside was seriously injured or posed

a potential danger); United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding 

constitutionality of a warrantless search under the emergency exception where police officers 

received a 911 call from a hotel guest who reported a loud domestic argument in the room next to 

hers); United States v. Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding officers’ warrantless 

entry into home justified under the emergency doctrine; recently-arrested woman reported that her 

child was at home with a friend, but no one answered the door when officers knocked on the door, 

and child ultimately was found in the house alone). Similarly, in United States v. Martinez, 406 

F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2005), cited in Plaintiffs’ Opposition, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s finding that the emergency exception applied where officers responding to a 911 call 

concerning a domestic disturbance found a crying woman at the scene, and heard angry yelling 

from the interior of a house. Though these cases necessarily involved facts that are not identical to 

the ones here, the Court finds that they share enough common elements to preclude a conclusion 

that it was “beyond debate” that the officers’ entries in this case were necessarily unlawful under 

the Fourth Amendment. 

Plaintiffs do not appear to contend that the manner in which the consented-to welfare 

check search was conducted was unreasonable in itself. Instead, they argue that Alany’s consent 

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was “insufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry of her home so as to remove the taint of the 

Fourth Amendment violation.” Opp. at 13. But Defendants do not base their argument solely on 

consent: they argue that all of the entries were lawful (or at a minimum not clearly illegal) under 

the emergency exception. As explained above, the Court agrees that it was not “beyond debate” 

that the first entry was illegal, and thus need not address Plaintiffs’ “attenuation” argument 

regarding the welfare check. Moreover, the Court cannot conclude that any reasonable officer 

would know that a welfare check search conducted in this manner (three minutes long and limited 

to places where a person might be found) and under these circumstances (Alany agreed to the 

search, let the officers into the home, and accompanied them on the search) was inherently 

unlawful.

Plaintiffs point to no authority, from the Supreme Court or any Court of Appeals, in 

support of a contrary conclusion. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011), cited in Plaintiffs’ 

Opposition, lends no support to Plaintiffs’ position for at least two reasons. First, it involved the 

exigent circumstances exception based on the need to prevent destruction of evidence, rather than 

the emergency exception. Id. at 1856-58. Second, King expressly rejected Plaintiffs’ position that 

the exigency exception does not apply if “the police . . . manufacture or contribute to the 

exigency.” Compare Opp. at 11 with King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858-59 (rejecting as “unsound” the 

position that “police may not rely on an exigency if it was reasonably foreseeable that the 

investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances”) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012), is 

similarly inapt. In that case, the defendants relied on the so-called “knock and talk” exception to 

justify entering a carport without a warrant to talk with a suspect, and did not argue on appeal that 

exigent circumstances existed. Id. at 1187-89. In that context, the Ninth Circuit found that “once 

an attempt to initiate a consensual encounter with the occupants of a home fails, the officers 

should end the knock and talk and change their strategy by retreating cautiously, seeking a search 

warrant, or conducting further surveillance.” Id. at 1188 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Perea-Rey did not address the emergency exception at all, and did not, as Plaintiffs 

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suggest, create a general rule that officers acting in their community caretaking capacity have a 

duty to retreat under circumstances that could lead a reasonable officer to believe an emergency 

was occurring. The Court declines to adopt such a rule in this case.

In response to the Court’s questions at oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel cited Chew v. 

Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994), and Espinoza v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 

528 (9th Cir. 2010), as the cases she believed clearly established that the officers’ conduct here 

violated the law. Neither case does so. In Chew, a case involving an excessive force claim based 

on the deployment of a police dog, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified 

immunity to the individual officers. 27 F.3d at 1450. Espinoza did involve the application of the 

emergency exception, but the only evidence cited there to support application of the exception 

was: (1) a neighbor’s report that the front door had been swinging open and that the house 

“might” be a “drug house”; (2) the officer’s report that he saw several “unknown items” through a 

window; and (3) a security officer’s statement that the unit was supposed to be vacant and that the 

front door lock was not an approved model installed by the landlord. 598 F.3d at 534. Those facts 

differ markedly from those here, as explained in detail above. Accordingly, neither of these cases 

comes close to establishing that it was “beyond debate” in August of 2013 that any reasonable 

officer would know that Donnelly and O’Brien’s actions were unlawful in the situation they 

confronted.

In sum, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and applying the 

“exacting” qualified immunity standard, the Court finds no triable issue of fact necessary to 

determine whether any reasonable official in Donnelly and O’Brien’s position would have 

understood his actions to violate clearly established law. As a result, the Court finds that Donnelly 

and O’Brien are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful 

search claim in the First Cause of Action, and GRANTS summary judgment as to that claim. 

b. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiffs also allege that Donnelly and O’Brien violated T.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights

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by using excessive force when attempting to enter the home. 3 Plaintiffs assert that Donnelly’s 

“detaining” T.H. at the front door for approximately fifteen minutes, pressuring her to allow him 

in the house to conduct a welfare check, and kicking the front door in order to keep it open 

constituted excessive force. Opp. at 15-17. Defendants contend that Donnelly’s force was 

“objectively reasonable” to meet the officers’ need at the time, and that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity on this claim. Mot. at 19. 

“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011). Whether the officers used 

reasonable force depends on the “facts and circumstances” of the particular case. C.B. v. Sonora, 

769 F.3d 1005, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court judges the “reasonableness of the use of force 

from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene.” Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metropolitan 

Police Dept., 756 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). In assessing whether an officer’s use of force 

violated the Fourth Amendment, courts are counseled to “allow for the fact that police officers are 

often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Jackson v. 

City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Court must balance the force used against the need, to determine whether the force 

used was “greater than is reasonable under the circumstances.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 

854 (9th Cir. 2002). 

For purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court need not resolve the 

 

3

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs only address Donnelly’s actions and do not mention O’Brien. 

Opp. 14-18. Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make 

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Liberty Lobby, 

477 U.S. at 250 (to survive summary judgment, non-moving party “must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”). Because Plaintiffs have set forth no facts 

regarding O’Brien’s use of force, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

excessive force claim as to O’Brien.

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constitutionality of Donnelly’s use of force. Rather, the Court considers whether, based on the 

facts known to Donnelly at the time he kicked the door, any reasonable officer would have been 

on notice that using this amount of force to keep a door open in an effort to conduct a welfare 

check was unlawful under clearly established law. As discussed above, the Court has concluded 

that the warrantless entry did not violate clearly established law under these circumstances. 

Given that finding, the Court further finds that no clearly established law in August 2013 

established “beyond debate” that using the limited amount of force at issue here was unlawful. 

Plaintiffs do not cite any relevant law to the contrary: instead, they cite Espinoza again for the 

exigency standard, and argue that because there was “no exigency” here, any application of force 

was excessive. Opp. at 17-18. Espinoza is inapposite, and adds nothing on the relevant question. 

Accordingly, Donnelly is entitled to qualified immunity as to T.H.’s excessive force claim (First 

Cause of Action), and the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim as to both Donnelly and O’Brien.

B. Battery Claim

Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action alleges that Donnelly committed a battery against T.H. 

by using unreasonable force when he kicked the front door, causing an injury to T.H.’s shoulder.4 

See Offense Rep., CPD-0003; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 69:22-70:1, 89:24-90:1. The elements of 

battery are: “(1) the defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted in a harmful or 

offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the 

harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiff.” Brown v. 

Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Plaintiffs must show 

unreasonable force when alleging battery against a police officer. See Edson v. City of Anaheim,

63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (1998); see also Irvine v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-00-

01293 EDL, 2001 WL 967524, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2001) (applying California law and 

 

4 Again, while the Complaint names O’Brien, the Opposition does not mention him. Because no 

facts are presented regarding O’Brien’s purported battery, summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

battery claim is GRANTED as to him. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 (1986); Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 250. Moreover, Plaintiffs concede in their Opposition that “they cannot sustain any battery 

claim against any Officer Defendants on behalf of K.H. or M.H.” Opp. at 18-19. Accordingly, 

summary judgment for Defendants is GRANTED on those claims.

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defining unreasonableness as additional element of battery when alleged against a police officer). 

Because an officer is privileged to use reasonable force while exercising his duties, a “California–

law battery claim is a counterpart to a federal excessive force claim under section 1983.” Harding 

v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 13-15156, 2015 WL 795603, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In deciding Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 excessive force claim above, the Court found that 

Donnelly is entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law did not establish 

“beyond debate” that his application of force was unlawful. As a result, the Court did not

substantively analyze whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. However, 

the qualified immunity doctrine does not apply to California torts against police officers. Venegas 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1243 (2007) (“The doctrine of qualified 

governmental immunity is a federal doctrine that does not extend to state tort claims against 

government employees.”). Therefore, the Court must determine whether there is any disputed 

material fact relating to the reasonableness of Donnelly’s door kick based on which a jury could 

find that it was not the result of “due care” in the enforcement or execution of the law. Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 820.4 (“A public employee is not liable for his act or omission, exercising due care, in the 

execution or enforcement of any law.”) 

The undisputed facts show that Donnelly kicked the front door, hard enough to splinter and 

crack it, with knowledge that T.H. was close to it on the other side. Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 

42:12-24; Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 87:1-7. Donnelly’s kick caused the door to hit T.H., injuring her 

shoulder. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 69:20-70:25, 89:20-25. T.H. did not consent to the kick and 

Donnelly intentionally kicked the door. What remains to be determined is whether Donnelly’s 

actions in kicking the door were “reasonable” or the result of “due care.” The resolution of these 

reasonableness questions turns on issues of fact that are best reserved for a jury, and reviewing the 

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court cannot decide this question in Defendants’ 

favor as a matter of law. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

on Plaintiffs’ battery claim as to Donnelly. 

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C. False Imprisonment Claim

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action alleges that Defendants’ actions “forcibly restrained 

Plaintiffs’ liberty of movement against their will, without their consent and against their protests 

for an appreciable length of time.” Compl. ¶ 51. 

The tort of false imprisonment requires: (1) nonconsensual intentional confinement of a 

person (2) without lawful privilege (3) for an appreciable period of time however brief. Lyons v. 

Fire Ins. Exch., 161 Cal.App.4th 880, 888 (2008). Relying on Shanafelt v. Seabord Fin. Co., 

Plaintiffs argue that “a person is falsely imprisoned if he is wrongfully deprived of his freedom to 

leave a particular place by the conduct of another.” 108 Cal. App. 2d 420, 422-23 (1951)

(upholding a verdict for damages on a false imprisonment claim where plaintiff was unable to 

leave her house but was able to move freely within the home). Nominal harm is sufficient to 

establish the tort of false imprisonment. Scofield v. Critical Air Med., Inc., 45 Cal. App. 4th 990, 

1007 (1996). The length of time needed to “wrongfully deprive” a person of his freedom and 

satisfy the requirements of the tort of false imprisonment need not be lengthy. Fermino v. Fedco, 

Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994) (“As we recently formulated it, the tort consists of the 

nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable 

length of time, however short.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Typically, false imprisonment allegations against police officers arise in the criminal 

context. In that context, California courts have held that defendant officers were operating with 

“lawful privilege” where there was a “good faith suspicion” to justify the detention or 

investigation of a suspect. See Dawkins v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 126, 133 (1978) (“A 

police officer may detain a suspect for questioning when the circumstances indicate to a 

reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge 

of the officer’s duties.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, the lawful 

privilege to detain a suspect for questioning does not extend to “mere witnesses.” Baines v. 

Brady, 122 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 957, 960 (1953) (“A citizen who is not charged with, or suspected 

of, a crime, cannot be arrested or detained by a policeman in the course of his duties, and any 

alleged inconvenience caused to the investigating authorities by this principle is far outweighed by 

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the rights of citizens to be protected in their personal liberty.”).

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs cannot meet the standard for false imprisonment, arguing 

that because no arrest was involved, they must prove that Defendants intentionally deprived them

of their freedom of movement “by use of physical barriers, force, threats of force, menace, fraud, 

deceit or unreasonable duress.” Reply at 13 (citing Judicial Council of California Civil Jury 

Instruction 1400 (2003)).

Accepting all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor as the Court must at the summary judgment 

stage, all three of the children (T.H., M.H., and K.H.) have satisfied their burden of showing a 

triable issue of material fact on their false imprisonment claim. Once they arrived at the home, the 

officers specifically told T.H. not to close the front door. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 56:18-57:3; 

Blechman Decl. Ex. D at 24:13-14. T.H. was told if she didn’t let the officers in or answer their 

questions she would be “arrested.” Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 53:24-54:11. After the officers 

removed their mother from the home, T.H. saw what looked like a can of pepper spray on one of 

the officers, and pleaded with the officer not to spray her. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 9 ¶ 3 (T.H. Decl.). 

A jury could find that an officer’s threat to arrest T.H., combined with the officers’ use of a baton 

and their feet to wedge the door open and T.H.’s observation of pepper spray, prevented T.H. from 

moving away from the door and prevented any of the girls from leaving via the front door. 

Vanegas Decl. Ex. 2 at 72:9-16; Ex. 5 at 14:4-7. The encounter appears to have lasted at least 

fifteen minutes, and the officers do not dispute that they blocked access to the outside via the front 

door the entire time. Additionally, after the other two children, K.H. and M.H., moved to the car 

parked in the garage, an officer interacted with them with his gun drawn for at least a short period 

of time. Vanegas Decl. Ex. 4 at 172:1-176:15.

These facts are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the officers’ actions 

amounted to false imprisonment of the three Helmantoler girls, and preclude entry of judgment as 

a matter of law for Defendants. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims as to T.H., M.H., and K.H.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action alleges that the officers acted with reckless disregard for 

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any concern that Plaintiffs would suffer emotional distress during the course of the incident. The 

elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous 

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and 

(3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous 

conduct.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982). 

Viewing the record as a whole, and accepting all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, there is no 

genuine issue of fact on the question of whether Defendants acted with the required intent or 

reckless disregard. “Outrageous conduct” has been defined as conduct so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. Cole v. City of Sunnyvale, No. C-08-05017 

RMW, 2011 WL 4346510, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) (applying California law). Though 

Plaintiffs contend Defendants acted “unreasonably” when they wedged open the door, kicked the 

door to facilitate the eventual search, and prevented T.H. from leaving the door, unreasonable 

conduct does not amount to intentional or reckless conduct. As proffered by Plaintiffs, the 

officers’ conduct does not rise to the level of intentional or reckless outrageousness. As a result, 

the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of 

Action.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is:

1. GRANTED on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims of unreasonable search and 

seizure against O’Brien and Donnelly (First Cause of Action);

2. GRANTED on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force against 

O’Brien and Donnelly as to K.H., M.H., and T.H. (First Cause of Action);

3. DENIED on Plaintiffs’ battery claims against Donnelly as to T.H., and GRANTED 

on Plaintiffs’ battery claims against O’Brien as to T.H. (Third Cause of Action);

4. GRANTED on Plaintiffs’ battery claims against Donnelly and O’Brien as to K.H. 

and M.H. (Third Cause of Action);

5. DENIED on Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claims against all Defendants as to 

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K.H., M.H., and T.H. (Fourth Cause of Action); and

6. GRANTED on Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress as to K.H., 

M.H., and T.H. (Fifth Cause of Action).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2015

________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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