Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05118/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 25, 2014 Decided June 13, 2014

No. 13-5118

REYMUNDO ZACARIAS MENDOZA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

ALFREDO CONOVILCA MATAMOROS,

APPELLEE

v.

THOMAS E. PEREZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY 

OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01790)

Julie A. Murray argued the cause for appellants. With 

her on the briefs were Michael T. Kirkpatrick and Edward J. 

Tuddenham.

Michelle R. LaPointe was on the brief for amici curiae 

The Southern Poverty Law Center, et al. in support of 

appellants.

Craig A. Defoe, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief 

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 1 of 38
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were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, and David 

J. Kline, Director. Geoffrey Forney, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, entered an appearance.

Edwin B. Swan, pro hac vice, argued the cause for 

intervenors. On the brief was Carl W. Hampe.

Before: TATEL, BROWN, and MILLETT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: The Immigration and Nationality 

Act creates a temporary foreign worker visa program that 

allows employers to hire foreign workers when there are not 

enough qualified and available American workers to fill open 

jobs. The Department of Labor is tasked with administering 

the visa program to protect the wages and working conditions 

of U.S. workers. In August 2011, the Department updated the 

special procedures that establish the minimum wages and 

working conditions employers must offer U.S. sheepherders, 

goatherders, and open-range (cattle) herders before hiring

foreign herders.

The plaintiffs in this action are U.S. workers experienced 

in herding. Although the plaintiffs would prefer to work as 

herders, they have been forced out of the industry by the 

substandard wages and working conditions they attribute to 

the easy availability of foreign herders. The plaintiffs paint a 

portrait of agency capture, suggesting the Department has, 

without giving herders or their representatives an opportunity 

to be heard, administered the temporary worker visa program 

in a way that gives herding operations access to inexpensive 

foreign labor without protecting U.S. workers.

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The plaintiffs, all of whom had left their herding jobs 

sometime prior to August 2011, filed this action alleging the 

Department of Labor violated the Administrative Procedure 

Act by issuing the special procedures without notice and 

comment. The Mountain Plains Agricultural Services and the 

Western Range Association—two groups representing 

employers in the herding industry—intervened on the side of 

the government. The intervenors filed a motion to dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction and all the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment in the district court. The district court 

granted the motion to dismiss, holding the plaintiffs lacked 

Article III and prudential standing. We reverse the judgment 

of the district court.

I

The H-2A visa program—created by the Immigration and 

Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) and amended by the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986—permits 

employers to hire foreign workers to perform temporary 

agricultural work in the United States. An employer seeking 

to hire H-2A foreign workers must first seek certification 

from the Department of Labor that (1) there are not sufficient 

qualified and willing U.S. workers to fill open positions and 

(2) hiring foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages 

and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. 

8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1). Only after obtaining the Department 

of Labor certification may the employer petition United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services to classify a specific 

foreign worker as an H-2A temporary worker.

The Department of Labor has adopted regulations by 

notice-and-comment rulemaking that govern the H-2A

certification process. The regulations were most recently 

amended, again through notice-and-comment procedures, in 

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2010. Through those regulations, the Department sets 

minimum terms and conditions employers must offer workers 

to determine the availability of American workers to fill 

employers’ jobs. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.120–655.122. The 

regulations also establish procedures for employers seeking 

H-2A certification to advertise open positions. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 655.150–655.158. Qualified U.S. workers responding to 

these job offers must be given priority over foreign workers. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(d). Even after an employer’s H-2A 

application is approved and the employer hires foreign

laborers, the employer must continue to provide its American 

and foreign workers the minimum wages and working 

conditions laid out in the regulations to ensure the 

employment of foreign workers does not adversely affect the 

terms of employment of similarly employed American 

workers. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(a).

Employers seeking H-2A certification are required to pay 

the higher of the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), the 

prevailing wage, or the legal minimum wage. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 655.120(a). The AEWR is a specially calculated wage 

based on the Department of Agriculture’s Farm Labor Survey, 

which approximates what the prevailing wage would be if not 

for the hiring of foreign workers. See Temporary Agricultural 

Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 75 Fed. 

Reg. 6884, 6891–93 (Feb. 12, 2010). Any employer-provided 

housing must meet standards set by the Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(d).

Although the same requirements generally apply to 

employers seeking H-2A certification for workers in any 

agricultural occupation, the H-2A regulations allow the 

Administrator of the Office of Foreign Labor Certification to 

create special procedures for processing certain H-2A 

applications. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.102, 655.120(a). This 

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“special procedures” exception predated, and was continued 

in, the 2010 version of the H-2A regulations.

In 2011, the Department of Labor issued two Training 

and Employment Guidance Letters (TEGLs) providing special 

procedures for certain H-2A certifications. It published the 

TEGLs in the Federal Register without having gone through

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) notice and comment 

procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. TEGL No. 15-06 establishes

special procedures for the certification process for 

cattleherders. TEGL No. 15-06, Change 1, Special 

Procedures: Labor Certification Process for Occupations 

Involved in the Open Range Production of Livestock Under 

the H-2A Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 47,243 (Aug. 4, 2011). 

TEGL No. 32-10 outlines special procedures for employers 

engaged in sheepherding and goatherding operations. TEGL 

No. 32-10, Special Procedures: Labor Certification Process 

for Employers Engaged in Sheepherding and Goatherding 

Occupations Under the H-2A Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 47,256 

(Aug. 4, 2011). The 2011 TEGLs update special 

procedures—also issued without notice and comment—that

had long been in place for employers seeking H-2A 

certification in these occupations.1

 The TEGLs reflect the 

Department of Labor’s belief that the unique occupational 

characteristics of herding—including spending extended 

periods in isolated areas and being on call twenty-four hours a 

day, seven days a week to protect livestock—make special H2A procedures necessary. See TEGL No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 47,256.

 1 Although the 2011 TEGLs continued many of the policies in 

effect under the prior special procedures, they also made a number 

of changes to those procedures, which we discuss in Part III below.

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Compared to the general H-2A regulations applicable to 

most agricultural employers, the TEGLs establish 

significantly different procedures for herder employers 

seeking H-2A certification. Among other differences, the 

TEGLs impose different minimum wage requirements and 

provide lower standards for employer-provided housing. 

Compare 20 C.F.R. § 655.120(a), with TEGL No. 15-06, 76 

Fed. Reg. at 47,244–45, and TEGL No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 47,257–58; 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(d)(1)(i), and 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1910.142, with TEGL No. 15-06, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,246–

47.

The plaintiffs in this action have substantial herding 

experience.2

 Each originally came to the United States as an 

H-2A herder, but left his job due to poor or abusive working 

conditions. The plaintiffs currently have a lawful 

immigration status and are authorized to work in the United 

States, thus qualifying as U.S. workers under the INA and H2A regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b). The plaintiffs 

have all submitted affidavits declaring they are qualified and 

available to work as herders. See J.A. 45–57. However, the

plaintiffs state they are deterred from accepting herding jobs 

because of poor wages and working conditions, which they 

attribute to the lax standards established by the TEGLs and 

prior special procedures. They claim the Department of 

Labor has, without protecting U.S. workers, allowed 

employers easy access to a large supply of foreign herders. 

None of the plaintiffs has worked as a herder since, at least, 

May 2011. They aver they would prefer to work as herders, 

but they have not heard of any herding jobs offering decent 

wages and working conditions. See id.

 2 Only three plaintiffs are party to this appeal. A fourth plaintiff, 

Alfredo Matamoros, participated in the district court proceedings 

but did not appeal.

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The plaintiffs brought this action in October 2011. They 

allege the TEGLs constituted “rule making” within the 

meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, 

the TEGLs were subject to notice and comment requirements, 

and the Department of Labor violated the APA by issuing the 

TEGLs without those procedures. They ask the court to set 

aside the rules until they are adopted through notice-andcomment rulemaking.

The Mountain Plains Agricultural Services and the 

Western Range Association intervened in the action. 

Together, the intervenors’ member herding operations are 

responsible for approximately sixty percent of the lamb and 

wool production in the United States. Their members employ 

1,500 to 2,000 foreign sheepherders at any given time, and 

additional foreign cattle herders. In their brief, the 

intervenors state that virtually all of their members’ herder 

employees are foreign workers admitted to the United States 

under the H-2A program.

The intervenors filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction in the district court. All parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court granted the 

intervenors’ motion to dismiss. The court concluded the 

plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they have not 

established a personal injury traceable to the disputed 

regulations. Alternatively, the district court held the plaintiffs 

lack prudential standing because they are not within the zone 

of interests protected by the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

Having granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 

the court did not reach the cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The plaintiffs appealed.

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We begin our analysis by assuring ourselves of our own 

jurisdiction.

II

We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a 

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. 

Def. Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). In evaluating plaintiffs’ standing at the motion to 

dismiss stage “we must assume that the plaintiff[s] state[] a 

valid legal claim and must accept the factual allegations in the 

complaint as true.” Holistic Candlers and Consumers Ass’n 

v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012). To establish 

jurisdiction, the court need only find one plaintiff who has 

standing. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 

2009).

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of 

federal courts to “actual cases or controversies between 

proper litigants.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 

658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1996). To establish constitutional 

standing, plaintiffs “must have suffered or be imminently 

threatened with a concrete and particularized injury in fact 

that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014); see also Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

The requirements for standing differ where, as here, 

plaintiffs seek to enforce procedural (rather than substantive) 

rights. When plaintiffs challenge an action taken without 

required procedural safeguards, they must establish the 

agency action threatens their concrete interest. Fla. Audubon 

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Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 664. It is not enough to assert “a mere 

general interest in the alleged procedural violation common to 

all members of the public.” Id. Once that threshold is 

satisfied, the normal standards for immediacy and 

redressability are relaxed. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 

Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that but for the procedural 

violation the agency action would have been different. Ctr. 

for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1160 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Nor need they establish that correcting the 

procedural violation would necessarily alter the final effect of 

the agency’s action on the plaintiffs’ interest. Id. Rather, if 

the plaintiffs can “demonstrate a causal relationship between 

the final agency action and the alleged injuries,” the court will 

“assume[] the causal relationship between the procedural 

defect and the final agency action.” Id.3

In challenging the Department of Labor’s 2011 TEGLs, 

the plaintiffs assert procedural rights under the APA. To 

establish standing, they must demonstrate the guidelines 

contained in the TEGLs cause them some personal injury—

such as increased competition or lost opportunity.

The competitor standing doctrine recognizes “parties 

suffer constitutional injury in fact when agencies lift 

regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow 

increased competition.” La. Energy and Power Auth. v. 

FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Sherley 

 3 In Lujan, the Supreme Court gave the example that “one living 

adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed 

dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to 

prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot 

establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license 

to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be 

completed for many years.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 

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v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In an

analogous case involving foreign labor, the Ninth Circuit held 

an American workers’ union had standing to challenge an 

Immigration and Naturalization Service decision permitting

Canadian crane operators to work in the United States without 

completing the usual foreign labor certification procedure. 

Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Meese, 

891 F.2d 1374, 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1989). The court held 

the union suffered injury in fact because the agency’s action 

caused union members increased competition for jobs in their 

industry. Id. at 1379. See also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & 

Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 802–03 (D.C. Cir. 

1985) (“In this instance, the injury of which appellants 

complain is not abstract. On the contrary, they allege . . . the 

INS is allowing aliens into the country to perform work which 

would otherwise likely go to union members. They charge 

that those alien workers represent competition which 

appellants would not face if the Government followed the 

procedures required by law.”); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. 

Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).

Thus, an individual in the labor market for open-range 

herding jobs would have standing to challenge Department of 

Labor rules that lead to an increased supply of labor—and 

thus competition—in that market. But the intervenors argue 

the 2011 TEGLs do not depress wages or worsen working 

conditions for U.S. herders. Rather, they claim the TEGLs 

fulfill the Department’s statutory responsibility to create H2A certification procedures that ensure foreign herders are 

only admitted to the country if there are not sufficient U.S. 

workers to perform the labor required, and establish standards

to prevent the admission of foreign herders from “adversely 

affect[ing] the wages and working conditions of workers in 

the United States similarly employed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1). 

Essentially, the intervenors argue the TEGLs are substantively

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correct insofar as they comply with the relevant provisions of 

the INA. But, particularly in a procedural rights case,

whether the TEGLs would withstand a substantive challenge 

is not the relevant question for the purpose of determining 

whether they cause injury to the plaintiffs’ concrete interests. 

Rather, an examination of the alternatives to the TEGLs 

demonstrates the issuance of those rules injured American 

herders.

Without the special procedures contained in the TEGLs, 

open-range employers would be bound by the general H-2A 

regulations. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.120 (establishing the 

wage rate employers seeking to hire foreign labor must offer, 

“except where a special procedure is approved for an 

occupation or specific class of agricultural employment”); 

TEGL No. 15-06, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,244 (describing TEGL 

as outlining special procedures that preempt the regular H-2A 

regulations contained in 20 C.F.R. part 655); id. (“The 

Department is continuing a special variance to the offered 

wage rate requirements contained at 20 CFR 655.120(a).”); 

TEGL No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. 47,256, 47,257 (Aug. 4, 2011) 

(same). Under the general H-2A regulations, employers 

wishing to hire foreign laborers would be required to pay 

herders the Adverse Effect Wage Rate, which in 2011 ranged

from $8.97 per hour to $12.01 per hour, depending on the 

state. 2011 Adverse Effect Wage Rates, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,286, 

11,286 (Mar. 1, 2011). Under the special procedures set forth

in the TEGLs, however, employers need only pay herders the 

prevailing wage rate, which in 2011 was $875 per month plus 

room and board for cattleherders and from $750 to $1,422.52 

per month plus room and board for sheepherders and

goatherders, depending on the state. See Agricultural Online 

Wage Library, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., 

http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/aowl.cfm (last visited 

June 3, 2014). A sheepherder in Colorado paid the prevailing 

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wage and working a 40-hour week would make less than 

$4.69 per hour plus room and board—well below the $10.48 

AEWR in Colorado.4

 The TEGLs also permit lower 

standards for herder housing than the general H-2A 

regulations authorize for employer-provided housing to other 

agricultural workers. Compare, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(d) 

(housing provided by H-2A employers generally must meet 

OSHA standards set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142), and 29 

C.F.R. § 1910.142(b) (sleeping rooms must have at least 50 

square feet of floor space per occupant and seven-foot 

ceilings; living quarters must include windows “the total of 

which may not be less than one-tenth of the floor area”; wood 

floors must be elevated at least one foot above ground level to 

prevent dampness), with TEGL No. 15-06, 76 Fed. Reg. at 

47,246–47 (lacking similar requirements for housing provided 

to open-range herders), and TEGL No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. at

47,261–62 (same regarding sheepherders and goatherders).

 4 Of course, sheepherders are actually on call twenty-four hours per 

day, seven days per week. TEGL No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 

47,259. Even after accounting for room and board, herders making 

the prevailing wage earn far less than other agricultural workers 

being paid the AEWR. Although not all employers are required to 

provide their agricultural workers room and board under the H-2A 

program, employers are required to provide housing at no cost if the 

workers are not reasonably able to return to their residence within 

the same day—as would ordinarily be the case for herders who 

often work far from their home and may need to be on call to tend 

to livestock at all hours. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122 (d). The general H2A regulations require employers to provide their employees either 

kitchen facilities to enable the workers to prepare their own meals, 

or three meals a day. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(g). If an employer 

chooses to provide its workers with meals, it may charge its 

workers $10.73 per day for the meals. 20 C.F.R. § 655.173(a); 76

Fed. Reg. 11,286, 11,287 (Mar. 1, 2011).

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The 2011 TEGLs also differ in significant and adverse 

ways from the prior special procedures governing herding 

employers. See infra Part III. Thus, the TEGLs adversely 

affect herders by lowering wages and worsening working 

conditions, whether they are compared to the alternative of 

eliminating special procedures for herders altogether or 

retaining the pre-2011 special procedures.5

It does not matter if defendants are correct in suggesting 

the TEGLs comply with the INA’s requirement that use of 

foreign labor not adversely affect American workers’ wages 

and working conditions. We may ignore the merits of the 

TEGLs’ guidance. Plaintiffs asserting a procedural rights 

challenge need not show the agency action would have been 

different had it been consummated in a procedurally valid 

manner—the courts will assume this portion of the causal 

link. Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1160. Rather, 

plaintiffs simply need to show the agency action affects their 

concrete interests in a personal way. In other words, the 

intervenors’ argument that the agency action was lawful or 

correct on the merits—and therefore that it did not injure the 

plaintiffs—is substantially the same as arguing the omitted 

procedure would not have affected the agency’s decision. 

This is precisely the argument a defendant cannot make in a 

procedural rights challenge. Cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) 

 5 The intervenors point to a list of available jobs they claim pay 

significantly higher wages than required under the standards 

contained in the 2011 TEGLs. See J.A. 58–60. But even if there 

are job opportunities for herders that pay above the minimum wage 

required by the TEGLs, that says nothing about the working 

conditions of those jobs. Moreover, it gives no indication of what 

the offered wage rate might be if it were not for the Department’s 

allegedly lax guidelines for the admission of foreign labor.

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(“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III 

standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the 

plaintiff. To insist upon the former rather than the latter as 

part of the standing inquiry . . . is to raise the standing hurdle 

higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in 

an action alleging noncompliance with a[] [discharge] 

permit.”).

Having concluded individuals competing in the herder 

labor market have standing to challenge the TEGLs, we need 

only determine whether any of the plaintiffs in this action is a 

member of that market. A party seeking to establish standing 

on the basis of the competitor standing doctrine “must 

demonstrate that it is a direct and current competitor whose 

bottom line may be adversely affected by the challenged 

government action.” KERM, Inc. v. FCC, 353 F.3d 57, 60 

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The district court concluded “none of [the 

plaintiffs] has been a competitor in the open-range herding 

industry since May 2011.” Mendoza v. Solis, 924 F. Supp. 2d 

307, 319 (D.D.C. 2013). We believe the district court took 

too narrow a view of what qualifies as participating in the 

herding labor market.

The plaintiffs have averred they are experienced and 

qualified herders. See Mendoza Aff. ¶ 5, J.A. 46 (worked as a 

sheepherder for about 14 months); Castro Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3, J.A. 

51; Catalan Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3, J.A. 55–56. They state they are 

interested in working as herders and herding is their preferred 

occupation. See Mendoza Aff. ¶¶ 9, 10, J.A. 47 (“Herding is 

my preferred occupation. In the city I get board [sic] when I 

am not working and I miss working with animals.”); Castro 

Aff. ¶¶ 7, 9, J.A. 52; Catalan Aff. ¶¶ 8, 9, J.A. 56–57. 

Although the plaintiffs have not averred they have applied for 

specific herding jobs since the 2011 TEGLs went into effect, 

their affidavits suggest they have monitored the labor market

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for acceptable positions. See Castro Aff. ¶ 8, J.A. 52 (“After 

leaving the ranch, I did find out about another job as a 

sheepherder in Washington. But after talking to one of the 

former workers, I found out that the conditions were the same 

as the ranch I left, so I did not pursue the job.”); Catalan Aff. 

¶ 10, J.A. 57 (“I have met sheepherders here in Washington 

and they have the same bad conditions that I had when I 

worked as an H-2A herder with cattle. . . .”). At least one of 

the plaintiffs, Mendoza, has been repeatedly offered a job as a 

herder, which he declined due to the poor wages and working 

conditions. Mendoza Aff. ¶ 13, J.A. 48 (“My employer from 

Henefer, UT calls me every once in a while to ask if I will 

return to work for him but he doesn’t offer better pay so I 

don’t take his offer.”).

Even though the plaintiffs have not worked as herders 

since 2011 and may not have applied for specific herder jobs 

since that time, they have affirmed their desire to work as 

herders and stated their intention to do so if wages and 

working conditions improve. See Mendoza Aff. ¶ 10, J.A. 47 

(“I want to work as a herder again.”); id. ¶ 11, J.A. 47 (“I 

would be willing to work as a herder if the employer 

paid . . . .”); Castro Aff. ¶¶ 7, 9, J.A. 52; Catalan Aff. ¶¶ 8, 9, 

J.A. 56–57 (“I would take an open range herding job.”). The 

plaintiffs are not removed from the herder labor market 

simply because they do not currently work as herders and 

have not filled out formal job applications. A person can 

involve himself in a job market by means other than 

submitting formal applications. Job searches are not such 

rigid processes. The plaintiffs continue to monitor the herder 

job market with the intention of applying for work in the 

industry if conditions improve. Mendoza, in particular, has 

demonstrated a substantial likelihood he would be able to find 

a job as a herder since he has been repeatedly offered jobs by 

a former employer. The plaintiffs’ affidavits thus 

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demonstrate their informal involvement in the labor market. 

And because the plaintiffs retained ties to the industry, it was 

reasonable for them to conclude that formally applying for 

jobs would be futile when they would not accept a job 

offering the prevailing wage and working conditions. See

Castro Aff. ¶ 8, J.A. 52 (stating he found out about a 

sheepherder position in Washington but did not pursue the job 

after finding out the conditions were the same as the ranch he 

had previously left).

The standing inquiry here is similar to that in Friends of 

the Earth. In that case, an environmental group asserted 

standing to sue under the Clean Water Act a company 

allegedly discharging pollutants into the North Tyger River. 

Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 175–79. The Supreme 

Court held members of the plaintiff organizations had 

demonstrated sufficient injury to establish standing. Id. at 

180–86. One of the plaintiffs’ members had averred “he 

would like to fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near the 

river . . . as he did when he was a teenager, but would not do 

so because he was concerned that the water was polluted by 

Laidlaw’s discharges.” Id. at 181–82. Other members stated 

they used to picnic, camp, hike, birdwatch, boat, and wade 

along the river but they no longer engaged in these activities 

because of concern about harmful effects from discharged 

pollutants. Id. at 182–83. The Court held these sworn 

statements adequately documented injury in fact. Id. at 183.

Like the affidavits discussed in Friends of the Earth, the 

plaintiffs’ affidavits regarding their interest in working as 

herders present more than “general averments” and 

“conclusory allegations.” Id. at 184. The plaintiffs have 

attested to specific experience that qualifies them to work as 

herders; the particular working conditions that led them to 

leave the industry; the specific wages and conditions they 

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would require to accept new employment as workers; the 

manner in which they have kept abreast of conditions in the 

industry; and, at least with regard to Mendoza, a specific 

possible avenue for obtaining reemployment as a herder.6

Finally with regard to plaintiffs’ constitutional standing, 

the intervenors argue the plaintiffs do not have standing 

because their injury was not caused by the 2011 TEGLs, but 

by policies that pre-existed those guidelines. But the fact that 

previous policies may have caused the plaintiffs similar harm 

does not mean the 2011 TEGLs do not cause the plaintiffs

injury in fact. Transportation Workers Union of America, 

AFL-CIO v. Transportation Security Administration, 492 F.3d 

 6 The plaintiffs do not need to apply for and be offered positions 

they have a reasonable basis for knowing will provide substandard 

compensation and conditions just to maintain standing to bring this 

suit. To create such a standard would require plaintiffs “to engage 

in a futile act.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 

1102 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiff had standing to challenge a 

Parole Commission rule preventing him from having a 

representative at his parole hearing despite the fact he had not 

obtained a representative who would have been ready and able to 

appear on his behalf). The plaintiffs’ members in Friends of the 

Earth had standing even though they did not continue to hike, 

swim, and boat along the North Tyger River despite the pollution. 

See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 182–83 (holding 

members wished to engage in recreational activities but refrained 

from doing so because of the pollution). Cf. Sporhase v. Neb. ex 

rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 944 & n.2 (1982) (holding appellants 

had standing to challenge Nebraska law requiring them to obtain 

permit before transferring water across the state border even though 

they had never applied for a permit because, under the challenged 

law, the permit would not have been granted). We do not generally 

require plaintiffs to engage in a futile act to prove the sincerity of 

their injury.

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 17 of 38
18

471 (D.C. Cir. 2007)—the case on which the intervenors rely 

for this argument—is inapposite. In Transportation Workers

Union, we considered a procedural challenge to TSA’s Legal 

Guidance defining the term “conviction.” Id. at 472. 

Employees “convicted” of listed crimes were prohibited from 

working in sensitive areas of an airport. Id. at 473. In 2003, 

TSA published a Legal Guidance defining the term, and in 

2004 the agency updated the guidance, making slight changes. 

Id. After a union worker was suspended from his job, the

union filed an action challenging the issuance of the 2004 

Guidance—specifically, the procedural wrong of switching 

from the 2003 to the 2004 guidance without notice and 

comment. Id. at 474–75. The plaintiff conceded the 2003 

Guidance was properly issued, and we determined the worker

would have been ineligible for his job under either the 2003 

or 2004 guidance. Id. at 475–77. Therefore, we held the 

union lacked standing because of “the particular claim” it 

advanced—the union was challenging the change from the 

2003 to 2004 guidance and this change did not cause the 

suspension. Id.

This case presents a different type of claim. Plaintiffs are 

not challenging the 2011 TEGLs on the basis that they 

impermissibly changed a valid previous policy. Rather, 

plaintiffs are arguing the 2011 TEGLs, like all prior 

Department of Labor guidance on the matter, were

implemented without the required notice and comment 

procedures. In the type of case now before us, where the 

plaintiffs do not concede that prior procedures were validly 

promulgated, the fact that previous rules may also have 

caused the plaintiffs injury does not break the causal link 

between the rules they now challenge and the asserted injury. 

The only relevant inquiry is whether the 2011 TEGLs cause 

injury—and we have concluded they do. Put another way, the 

Department of Labor’s previous failure to comply with the 

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19

notice and comment requirements of the APA cannot excuse 

its later violation of those requirements, nor render the latter 

violation unreviewable.

7

To conclude, we are satisfied the plaintiffs have Article 

III standing to challenge the Department’s failure to engage in 

the notice and comment procedures required by the APA. 

Under the competitor standing doctrine, the TEGLs affect the 

concrete interests of individuals seeking work as herders. The 

plaintiffs have established they are seeking work as herders 

and would accept such work if provided the wages and 

working conditions they contend the law requires.

8

 Finally, 

because the plaintiffs assert a procedural violation, we can 

assume the causal link between that procedural violation and 

the substantive outcome of the agency action.9

 7 This discussion assumes the existence of the previous rules does 

not result in the plaintiffs’ claims being barred by the statute of 

limitations, an issue we discuss below.

8 Because we find the plaintiffs are willing and available to work as 

herders, we need not consider plaintiffs’ alternative argument that 

plaintiff Catalan has standing because the wages he receives in his 

current job as a ranch hand are depressed by the influx of foreign 

herders.

9 Having concluded plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated standing 

under the standards applicable at the motion to dismiss stage, we 

have no trouble concluding they also meet their burden under the 

applicable standard at the summary judgment stage. See Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 561 (plaintiff must establish the elements of standing in a 

different manner depending on the stage of litigation). The relevant 

facts—including, for instance, plaintiffs’ experience working as 

open-range herders and that Mendoza has received job offers to 

return to herding—are undisputed. Rather, defendants challenge 

the sufficiency of those facts to meet the legal standard for injury in 

fact, causation, and redressability. The standard for resolution of 

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20

III

Our conclusion that the plaintiffs meet the constitutional 

requirements for standing does not end our discussion of the 

plaintiffs’ right to pursue this action. We must also inquire 

whether the plaintiffs fall within the class of persons whom 

Congress has authorized to sue under the Administrative 

Procedure Act. To do so, we ask whether “a plaintiff’s 

grievance . . . arguably fall[s] within the zone of interests 

protected or regulated by the statutory provision or 

constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit.” Bennett v. 

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). Following the lead of the 

Supreme Court, see, e.g., id. at 163, we have previously 

referred to this requirement as one of “prudential standing”—

and so the district court did in its opinion. Recently, however, 

the Supreme Court has clarified that “‘prudential standing’ is 

a misnomer” because the zone-of-interests analysis does not 

rest on prudential considerations, but rather asks the statutory 

question of whether “a legislatively conferred cause of action 

encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Lexmark Int’l, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1386–88 (quoting Ass’n of Battery 

Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) (Silberman, J., concurring)).

10

 

these legal arguments is the same at the motion to dismiss stage as 

it is on a motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, as is evident 

from our discussion, both we and the district court have considered 

relevant facts found outside of the complaint, as we are permitted to 

do on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

Coal. For Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 

(D.C. Cir. 2003).

10 Lexmark International was decided subsequent to oral argument 

in this case. Because it calls for us to reframe what the district 

court described as a “prudential standing” inquiry, the case would 

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21

Although the plaintiffs here assert a cause of action under 

the APA, in considering whether plaintiffs are authorized to 

sue under that law we look to whether they fall within the 

zone of interests sought to be protected by the substantive 

statute pursuant to which the Department of Labor acted: the 

INA. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345–

48 (1984). Nevertheless, we apply the zone-of-interests test 

in a manner consistent with “Congress’s evident intent when 

enacting the APA to make agency action presumptively 

reviewable.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 

Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 

(2012). “We do not require any indication of congressional 

purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Id. Rather, a 

plaintiff falls outside the group to whom Congress granted a 

cause of action only when its interests “are so marginally 

related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the 

statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress 

intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 

U.S. 388, 399 (1987). The zone-of-interests test is not a 

demanding one. Id.

The interests protected by the relevant provision of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act are plain. The INA requires 

a petition to admit aliens as H-2A workers only be approved 

if the petitioner has received certification from the Secretary 

of Labor that:

(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, 

and qualified, and who will be available at the time and 

 

have been the proper subject of a letter from the parties pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j). We urge counsel to 

diligently keep us apprised of relevant legal developments that 

occur even after oral argument.

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 21 of 38
22

place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in 

the petition, and

(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or services 

will not adversely affect the wages and working 

conditions of workers in the United States similarly 

employed.

8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1). The clear intent of this provision is to 

protect American workers from the deleterious effects the 

employment of foreign labor might have on domestic wages 

and working conditions. In particular, Congress was 

concerned about (1) the American workers who would 

otherwise perform the labor that might be given to foreign 

workers, and (2) American workers in similar employment

whose wages and working conditions could be adversely

affected by the employment of foreign laborers. See Int’l 

Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, 761 F.2d at 804–05 

(“The legislative history of [the INA] (as initially passed) 

clearly evinces a congressional purpose to keep American 

labor stalwart in the face of foreign competition in the United 

States . . . .”); Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s 

Union, 891 F.2d at 1379 (“A primary purpose of the 

immigration laws, with their quotas and certification 

procedures, is to protect American laborers.”).

The district court found the plaintiffs did not fall within 

the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

for the same reasons it found the plaintiffs lacked Article III 

standing—the plaintiffs were not willing and available to 

work as herders. But for the same reasons we hold the 

plaintiffs have established Article III standing, we also hold 

they do fall within the zone of interests of the INA—the 

plaintiffs are American workers who would work as herders. 

They allege the Department of Labor’s lax certification 

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 22 of 38
23

standards for H-2A visas for herders make it more difficult for 

them to find herding jobs with decent wages and working 

conditions. The plaintiffs’ interests are squarely “within the 

zone of interests protected . . . by the statutory 

provision . . . invoked in the suit.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.

The district court held that because the plaintiffs were 

unwilling to work at current herder wages they are not 

“willing” and “available” workers within the meaning of 8 

U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A). See Mendoza, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 

322–23. But such a standard would force would-be plaintiffs 

to accept substandard wages and working conditions—

precisely the situation the INA seeks to prevent—to prove 

their “willingness” and “availability,” and to establish 

themselves as within the Act’s zone of interests. This cannot 

be the result Congress intended. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.0(a)(2) 

(“U.S. workers cannot be expected to accept employment 

under conditions below the established minimum levels.”); id.

(“Before any factual determination can be made concerning 

the availability of U.S. workers to perform particular job 

opportunities . . . the minimum level of wages . . . and 

conditions for the particular job opportunities, below which 

similarly employed U.S. workers would be adversely affected, 

must be established.”). Rather, workers displaced by lax visa 

policies from jobs they otherwise would hold fall within the 

class of individuals whom the INA seeks to protect. For the 

reasons explained above, the plaintiffs’ affidavits establish 

they are “able, willing, . . . qualified, and . . . available” to 

work as herders. 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A). The plaintiffs fall 

within the zone of interests of the INA and have a 

legislatively conferred cause of action to raise their claim 

regarding the Department of Labor’s administration of the H2A program as it regards herders.

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IV

Although we have concluded the plaintiffs have Article 

III standing and statutory authorization to raise their claims, 

we cannot yet proceed to the merits of this case. Subject 

matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and federal courts have 

“an independent obligation to assure [them]selves of 

jurisdiction, even where the parties fail to challenge it.” 

Floyd v. District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 155 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). After oral argument, we asked the parties to submit 

supplemental briefing on the question of whether the 

plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We 

conclude they are not.

Unless another statute provides otherwise, civil claims 

against the United States—including those brought pursuant 

to the APA—are subject to the statute of limitations contained 

in 28 U.S.C. § 2401, which allows for civil actions against the 

United States so long as “the complaint is filed within six 

years after the right of action first accrues.” See Harris v. 

FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Congress has 

not adopted a special statute of limitations for the type of 

claim the plaintiffs bring, so § 2401(a) is relevant here. 

Although the defendants had not asserted the statute of 

limitations defense until our request for supplemental 

briefing, the statute of limitations contained in § 2401(a) is 

not subject to waiver like the normal statute of limitations 

affirmative defense is. We have long held § 2401(a) “creates 

a jurisdictional condition attached to the government’s waiver 

of sovereign immunity.” P & V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2008).11 A 

 11 We have recently questioned the continuing viability of this 

holding in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. See P & V 

Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1027 & n.2 

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 24 of 38
25

jurisdictional statute of limitations cannot be waived by the 

parties. We must determine when the plaintiffs’ right of 

action first accrued.

The APA makes reviewable “final agency action.” 5 

U.S.C. § 704. A final agency action is “one by which rights 

or obligations have been determined or from which legal 

consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. Because 

an agency’s renewal of an earlier decision does not alter the 

status quo, it does not restart the statute of limitations. See 

Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 850 & n.9 (D.C. 

Cir. 1983) (holding agency’s renewal of earlier decision—

periodic redistribution of reprints of articles allegedly 

containing false information—did not restart statute of 

limitations). Therefore, we must determine whether the 2011 

TEGLs or their predecessors enacted a substantive change 

that restarted the statute of limitations clock within the six 

years prior to October 7, 2011 when the complaint was 

filed.12

 

(D.C. Cir. 2008); Felter v. Kempthorne, 473 F.3d 1255, 1260 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007); Harris, 353 F.3d at 1013 n.7. However, because we 

hold the plaintiffs filed this action within six years from the date 

their claims accrued, we need not resolve this issue now.

12 Alternatively, the reopener doctrine permits a plaintiff to bring an 

otherwise-stale challenge where the agency “has undertaken a 

serious, substantive reconsideration of the existing rule.” P & V 

Enters., 516 F.3d at 1023–24. The reopener doctrine is employed 

when an agency has considered substantively changing a rule but 

ultimately declined to do so. We do not employ the doctrine here 

because we find there was new agency action substantively 

changing the special procedures within the six years prior to the 

filing of the complaint.

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26

The policies contained in the 2011 TEGLs the plaintiffs 

challenge were substantively changed in the six years prior to 

the filing of the complaint. Although there had long existed 

special procedures for handling H-2A visas for sheepherders

and goatherders, similar special procedures were only 

implemented for open-range (cattle) herders in 2007. See 

Foreign Labor Certification; Training and Employment 

Guidance Letter No. 15-06, at 1 (Feb. 9, 2007), available at

http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL/TEGL15-06.pdf 

(“establish[ing] special procedures as part of the H-2A labor 

certification process for employers who desire to employ 

temporary foreign workers in the United States for 

occupations involved in the open range production of 

livestock” (emphasis added)). The 2007 TEGL No. 15-06 

had significant legal consequences for open-range herders and 

their employers. We need not decide whether the 2011 TEGL 

No. 15-06 substantively altered the policies of the 2007 TEGL 

because the plaintiffs’ 2011 challenge to the agency action—

whether concluded in 2007 or 2011—was brought within the 

six-year statute of limitations.

The special procedures for H-2A certification for 

sheepherders have a longer lineage. The 2011 TEGL No. 32-

10 rescinds and replaces procedures contained in the 2001 

Field Memorandum No. 24-01.13 Because the period for 

challenges to the 2001 Field Memorandum has long passed, 

we examine whether the 2011 sheepherder TEGL 

substantively altered the 2001 policies, and thus constituted 

final agency action sparking a new period for review.

 13 The 2001 Field Memorandum itself rescinded and replaced 

procedures set out in a 1989 Field Memorandum.

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27

We conclude the 2011 TEGL contains substantive 

changes to the 2001 procedures. Most notably, the 2001 Field 

Memorandum required employers to offer sheepherders the 

highest of the prevailing wage rate, a special monthly AEWR 

set by the Department of Labor, or the legal minimum wage 

rate. See Field Memorandum No. 24-01, Special Procedures: 

Labor Certification for Sheepherders and Goatherders Under 

the H-2A Program (Aug. 1, 2001), available at

http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/fm/fm_24-01.htm

(“2001 Field Memorandum”); Special Procedures attached to 

2001 Field Memorandum 3, available at

http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/fm/fm_24-01a.pdf 

(“2001 Special Procedures”). The 2011 TEGL removes the 

option for the Department to establish a special monthly 

AEWR, thus allowing employers to pay the higher of only the 

prevailing wage rate or the legal minimum wage rate. TEGL 

No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,257–58. As another example, 

the 2011 TEGL exempts individual employers and employer 

associations from the requirement—which is generally 

applicable to other H-2A employers, see 20 C.F.R. § 655.151, 

and which was applicable to herding associations under the 

2001 Field Memorandum, see 2001 Special Procedures 8–9—

of placing job advertisements in newspapers. TEGL No. 32-

10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,260.

The numerous alterations to the H-2A visa process and 

minimum standards for sheepherders, at least in the aggregate,

are substantive changes constituting new agency action. The 

2011 TEGLs altered the wages and working conditions H-2A 

employers are required to offer American sheepherders, as 

well as the availability of such jobs. Furthermore, the 

contents of the sheepherder TEGL must stand or fall together; 

they outline a single compensation package and set of 

procedures to protect American workers. We cannot separate 

policies untouched by the 2011 update from those 

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 27 of 38
28

substantially altered by the TEGL. Cf. MD/DC/DE 

Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(“Whether the offending portion of a regulation is severable 

depends upon the intent of the agency and upon whether the 

remainder of the regulation could function sensibly without 

the stricken provision.”).

Because the open-range herder TEGL reflects special 

procedures first introduced within the statute of limitations, 

and because the sheepherder and goatherder TEGL 

substantively alters the procedures previously in place, both 

TEGLs are the product of final agency action. The TEGLs 

meaningfully altered the rights and obligations of herders and 

their employers. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. The plaintiffs 

properly filed their claims within six years of the final agency 

action. The claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.

V

Having concluded we have jurisdiction to hear this 

action, we can finally turn to the merits of the plaintiffs’ 

claim. We do this even though the district court, dismissing 

the action for lack of jurisdiction, never reached the merits. 

Although our general practice in such a case is to remand to 

the district court, we think it appropriate to resolve the issue 

now. See WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 308 

n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 

F.3d 428, 434 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs and the 

government fully briefed the issue before this court and 

requested that, if we find the plaintiffs have standing, we 

reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. We have considered the 

full briefing the intervenors submitted to the district court 

regarding the motions for summary judgment. The district 

court has no comparative advantage in reviewing the agency 

action for compliance with the notice and comment 

USCA Case #13-5118 Document #1497417 Filed: 06/13/2014 Page 28 of 38
29

requirements. An appeal from any district court decision after 

remand is likely, and our review of the district court’s 

decision would be de novo. See Roberts v. United States, 741 

F.3d 152, 157–58 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“We review the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, which is to say 

we review the administrative action directly, according no 

particular deference to the judgment of the District Court.”). 

As even the intervenors—who ask us to remand to the district 

court—acknowledge, the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim 

involve purely legal questions. Def.-Intervenors’ Mem. Supp. 

Mot. Summ. J., Mendoza v. Solis, ECF No. 29-2, No. 1:11-cv1790 (D.D.C.). Moreover, the merits of this case are clear. A 

remand to the district court would be a waste of judicial 

resources.

An agency is generally required by the APA to publish 

notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and to 

accept and consider public comments on its proposal. 5 

U.S.C. § 553. The APA exempts from these procedural 

requirements: (1) interpretative rules; (2) general statements 

of policy; and (3) rules of agency organization, procedure, or 

practice. Id.14 This court has generally referred to the 

category of rules to which the notice and comment 

requirements do apply as “legislative rules” or, sometimes, 

“substantive rules.” Cent. Tex. Tel. Co-op, Inc. v. FCC, 402 

F.3d 205, 210 (D.C. Cir. 2005); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 

400 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

 14 Defendants do not argue the TEGLs constitute general statements 

of policy, so we do not address this exemption.

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30

A

The defendants argue the TEGLs are interpretative rules 

exempt from notice and comment procedures. “An 

‘interpretative rule’ describes the agency’s view of the 

meaning of an existing statute or regulation.” Batterton v. 

Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The 

court’s inquiry in distinguishing legislative rules from 

interpretative rules “is whether the new rule effects a 

substantive regulatory change to the statutory or regulatory 

regime.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec. (EPIC), 653 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Interpretative 

rules are those that clarify a statutory or regulatory term, 

remind parties of existing statutory or regulatory duties, or 

“merely track[]” preexisting requirements and explain

something the statute or regulation already required. Nat’l 

Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 

979 F.2d 227, 236–37 (D.C. Cir. 1992). To be interpretative, 

a rule “must derive a proposition from an existing document 

whose meaning compels or logically justifies the 

proposition.” Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 

490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

A legislative rule, on the other hand, “is one that does 

more than simply clarify or explain a regulatory term, or 

confirm a regulatory requirement, or maintain a consistent 

agency policy.” Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health 

Ass’n, Inc., 979 F.2d at 237. A rule is legislative if it 

supplements a statute, adopts a new position inconsistent with 

existing regulations, or otherwise effects a substantive change 

in existing law or policy. Id.; see also Shalala v. Guernsey 

Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995).

The defendants point to four statutory and regulatory 

provisions the TEGLs purportedly interpret. First, the 

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31

defendants argue the TEGLs are interpretations of the 

Department’s mandate, found at 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1), to 

certify the admission of H-2A workers only if there are not 

sufficient American workers and if admitting the foreign 

workers would not adversely affect the wages and working 

conditions of American workers similarly employed. 

According to the defendants, the TEGLs interpret this 

statutory requirement by providing guidelines to determine 

whether there are sufficient American workers for herding 

occupations. If the defendants are correct, it is difficult to 

imagine what regulations would require notice and comment 

procedures. Section 1188(a)(1) establishes the INA’s general 

mission; Congress left it to the Department of Labor to 

implement that mission through the creation of specific 

substantive provisions. To take just one example, the statute 

does not provide adequate guidance with regard to how an 

employer must attempt to recruit American workers before it 

can obtain certification that there is a shortage of American 

workers—an issue the TEGLs clarify in some detail. The 

statute explicitly envisions implementing regulations that will 

clarify the meaning and application of its provisions. See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1188(b)(1), (c)(3)(B)(i), (c)(3)(B)(iii), (c)(4); cf. 

AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 

(“[T]he [statute] does not define ‘adverse effect.’ Nor does 

the Act specify how adverse effect is to be measured. The 

Department is entrusted with these tasks.”). The TEGLs do 

more than clarify or remind parties of preexisting duties under 

§ 1188. Rather, they supplement the statute by imposing 

specific duties on employers seeking certification under the 

statute. Cf. EPIC, 653 F.3d at 7 (agency’s formulation of 

strict and specific obligations to implement a broad statutory 

command—“to detect weapons”—was not an interpretative 

rule).15

 15 If the TEGLs and general H-2A regulations were both merely 

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32

Second, the Department of Labor argues the TEGLs 

interpret the statutory directive “[t]hat the Secretary of Labor 

shall issue regulations which address the specific 

requirements of housing for employees principally engaged in 

the range production of livestock.” 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c)(4). 

But rather than setting out a substantive standard the TEGLs 

might interpret, the statute delegates authority for the 

Secretary of Labor to create the substantive standard. Where 

Congress has specifically declined to create a standard, the 

Department cannot claim its implementing rule is an 

interpretation of the statute. As the Seventh Circuit has 

stated, a binding rule promulgated pursuant to a delegation of 

legislative authority is “the clearest possible example of a 

legislative rule, as to which the notice and comment 

procedure not followed here is mandatory, as distinct from an 

interpretive rule; for there [is] nothing to interpret.” Hoctor v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169–70 (7th Cir. 1996).

Third, the intervenors argue the TEGLs interpret 20 

C.F.R. § 655.102, which grants the Office of Foreign Labor 

Certification Administrator the authority to establish special 

procedures for processing certain H-2A applications—

including those for herders. This argument fails for the same 

reason the previous argument fails. In issuing the TEGLs, the 

Department cannot possibly be interpreting a grant of 

unconstrained and undefined authority. See EPIC, 653 F.3d 

at 7 (“[T]he purpose of the APA would be disserved if an 

agency with a broad statutory command . . . could avoid 

notice-and-comment rulemaking simply by promulgating a 

 

interpreting the same language of § 1188, it is difficult to imagine 

how those rules could produce such different schemes, for instance 

with regard to whether employers must offer workers an Adverse 

Effect Wage Rate.

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33

comparably broad regulation . . . and then invoking its power 

to interpret that statute and regulation in binding the public to 

a strict and specific set of obligations.”). Furthermore, 

§ 655.102 states the Administrator may establish an AEWR 

for herding occupations. It would be preposterous for the 

defendants to argue the Department’s decision not to establish 

an AEWR for herders is only an interpretation of a provision 

granting it the authority to establish such a wage rate. 

Fourth, the Department argues that, in setting wage 

requirements for H-2A employers, the TEGLs interpret the 

term “offered wage rate” found in 20 C.F.R. § 655.120. 

Section 655.120—which is titled “Offered wage rate”—

requires employers to offer and pay workers “a wage that is 

the highest of the AEWR, the prevailing hourly wage or piece 

rate, the agreed-upon collective bargaining wage, or the 

Federal or State minimum wage, except where a special 

procedure is approved for an occupation or specific class of 

agricultural employment.” The TEGLs cannot be interpreting 

the “offered wage rate” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 655.120 

because they ignore that regulation’s general rule and, instead, 

take advantage of its standardless exception. In fact, the 

TEGLs state they “continu[e] a special variance to the offered 

wage rate requirements contained at 20 CFR 655.120(a).” 

TEGL No. 15-06, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,244; TEGL No. 32-10, 

76 Fed. Reg. at 47,257. The Department cannot claim to be 

interpreting the very regulatory provision from which its own 

rules declare it departs. Cf. United States v. Picciotto, 875 

F.2d 345, 313–14 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“In essence, the Park 

Service is claiming that an agency can grant itself a valid 

exemption to the APA for all future regulations, and be free of 

APA’s troublesome rulemaking procedures forever after, 

simply by announcing its independence in a general rule. 

That is not the law. Such agency-generated exemptions

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would frustrate Congress’ underlying policy in enacting the 

APA by rendering compliance optional.”).

The defendants cannot successfully point to any statute or 

regulation that creates substantive standards the TEGLs 

interpret. Rather than interpreting an existing statute or 

regulation, the TEGLs “endeavor[] to implement the statute, 

the effect of a legislative rule.” Chamber of Commerce of 

U.S. v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980). They 

“provide[] the policy decision Congress omitted” in § 1188—

namely, how to ensure the admission of foreign herders does 

not adversely affect American workers. Id.

B

The Department of Labor alternatively argues the TEGLs 

are exempt from notice and comment procedures because they 

are “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 

U.S.C. § 553(b). “Procedural rules,” the general label for 

rules falling under this exemption, are “primarily directed 

toward improving the efficient and effective operations of an 

agency, not toward a determination of the rights [or] interests 

of affected parties.” Batterton, 648 F.2d at 702 n.34. 

Congress provided this exemption from the normal 

rulemaking procedures “to ensure that agencies retain latitude 

in organizing their internal operations.” Id. at 707. 

Procedural rules “do not themselves alter the rights or 

interests of parties, although [they] may alter the manner in 

which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the 

agency.” Id. “[T]he distinction between substantive and 

procedural rules is one of degree depending upon whether the 

substantive effect is sufficiently grave so that notice and 

comment are needed to safeguard the policies underlying the 

APA.” EPIC, 653 F.3d at 5–6. Those policies are “to serve 

the need for public participation in agency decisionmaking 

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and to ensure the agency has all pertinent information before 

it when making a decision.” Id. at 6. The exception for 

procedural rules is narrowly construed, id., and cannot be 

applied “where the agency action trenches on substantial 

private rights and interests,” Batterton, 648 F.2d at 708.

Our decision in EPIC is instructive. In that case, this 

court confronted a Transportation Security Administration 

decision to screen airline passengers using advanced imaging 

technology rather than magnetometers. EPIC, 653 F.3d at 2–

3. TSA, attempting to defend its adoption of the rule without 

notice and comment, argued the decision merely affected the 

procedures TSA would use in processing passengers through 

the checkpoint. Id. at 6. We stated this was an “overly 

abstract account of the change in procedure at the 

checkpoint[,] elid[ing] the privacy interests at the heart of the 

petitioners’ concern.” Id. Even though the checkpoint 

protocols might be termed “procedural,” the change 

“substantively affect[ed] the public to a degree sufficient to 

implicate the policy interests animating notice-and-comment 

rulemaking.” Id. Thus, we held the rule had “the hallmark of 

a substantive rule” and was not entitled to the APA’s 

exception for procedural rules. Id.

Similarly, the TEGLs promulgated by the Department of 

Labor substantively affect the regulated public. Perhaps 

“stated at a high enough level of generality,” id., the TEGLs 

seem procedural—they set forth the agency’s enforcement 

plan for determining employer compliance with the 

requirements of the INA and describe how employers seeking 

H-2A certification should present themselves to the agency. 

But a more practical account of the rules makes it clear the 

TEGLs create substantive requirements by, inter alia, setting 

the minimum wage an employer must offer American workers 

before it can obtain H-2A certification. The TEGLs do not 

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merely describe how the Department will evaluate H-2A 

applications, but they set the bar for what employers must do 

to obtain approval. In doing so, they substantially affect the 

rights and interests of both herders and employers.

The Department’s attempt to compare the TEGLs to the 

Peer Review Organizations (PRO) Manual—which this court 

found to constitute a procedural rule not subject to the notice 

and comment requirement—in American Hospital Ass’n v. 

Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987), is unavailing. The 

Manual at issue in that case set forth an enforcement plan for 

the Department of Health and Human Service’s agents in 

monitoring the activities of Medicare providers. Id. at 1050. 

The regulations established areas of focus for PRO review but 

did not impose any new burdens on hospitals that would 

warrant notice and comment. Id. at 1050–51. But, as we 

noted, had HHS “inserted a new standard of review” or a 

“presumption of invalidity” applicable to certain operations, 

“its measures would surely require notice and comment, as 

well as close scrutiny to insure that it was consistent with the 

agency’s statutory mandate.” Id. at 1051.

The TEGLs at issue here are nothing like the Peer 

Review Organizations Manual we examined in American 

Hospital Ass’n. The TEGLs do not merely instruct 

Department of Labor agents to give extra scrutiny to H-2A 

applications from herder operations. Rather, they alter the 

standards imposed on herding employers seeking H-2A 

certification. They are not procedural, but substantive rules.

C

Beyond our conclusion that the TEGLs do not fall within 

the APA’s exceptions, we are convinced the TEGLs were 

subject to the notice and comment requirements because they 

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possess all the hallmarks of a legislative rule. The TEGLs are 

necessarily legislative rules because they “effect[] a 

[substantive] change in existing law or policy,” Nat’l Family 

Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc., 979 F.2d at 237, and 

“effectively amend[] a prior legislative rule,” Am. Mining 

Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 

(D.C. Cir. 1993).

16 In the absence of the TEGLs, petitions for 

certification of H-2A herders would be subject to the 

standards found in 20 C.F.R. part 655, which would, to take 

only a few examples, require employers to pay herders the

higher of the AEWR, the prevailing wage, or the minimum 

wage, keep track of herders’ hours, and pay herders at least 

twice a month. The TEGLs, on the other hand, require 

employers to pay only the higher of the prevailing wage rate

or minimum wage, exempt employers from recording herders’ 

hours actually worked, and allow employers to pay employees 

once monthly upon mutual agreement between employer and 

worker. TEGL No. 15-06, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,244–46; TEGL 

No. 32-10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 47,257–59. Because the TEGLs 

change the regulatory scheme for herding operations, they are 

legislative rules. Cf. City of Idaho Falls v. FERC, 629 F.3d 

222, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The APA required the Department 

of Labor to give the public notice and an opportunity to 

comment before it promulgated the TEGLs.

* * *

 16 The intervenors, citing prior TEGLs and Field Memoranda, argue 

the 2011 TEGLs restate the Department’s consistent practice 

regarding herders. But in deciding whether a rule is interpretative, 

we do not look to whether it interprets or restates prior rules 

similarly published without notice and comment. Rather, we look 

to whether the TEGLs interpret legislative documents—statutes 

passed by Congress or regulations promulgated pursuant to the 

procedural requirements of the APA. 

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The plaintiffs have asked us to remand to the district 

court to craft a remedy to the APA violation. The district 

court will have to consider various factors including whether 

vacating the TEGLs would have a disruptive effect on the 

herding industry and how quickly the Department of Labor 

might be able to promulgate, pursuant to the procedural 

requirements of the APA, new H-2A regulations for herding 

operations. Cf. EPIC, 653 F.3d at 8. We leave these 

questions for the district court in the first instance.

The district court erred in holding the plaintiffs lack both 

Article III and prudential standing to bring this action. As 

participants in the labor market for herders, the plaintiffs were 

injured by the Department of Labor’s promulgation of the 

TEGLs and fall within the zone of interests protected by the 

INA. On the merits of their claim, the plaintiffs are entitled to 

entry of summary judgment in their favor. The TEGLs are 

legislative rules and the Department of Labor violated the 

Administrative Procedure Act by promulgating them without 

providing public notice and an opportunity for comment. We 

reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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