Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00948/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00948-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

AARON EDWARD PETTIJOHN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-00948 PCT NVW (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On May 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on November 22, 2006. Docket No. 15.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. On December 6, 2006, Petitioner

filed a traverse to the answer to his petition for federal

habeas relief. See Docket No. 16.

I Procedural History

On February 1, 2001, Petitioner was charged with firstdegree murder by the State of Arizona. Answer, Exh. A. On May

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22, 2002, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement providing he

would plead guilty to second-degree murder and receive a

sentence of 10 to 22 years imprisonment for this crime. Id.,

Exh. B. The plea agreement noted the minimum sentence of 10

years, the presumptive sentence of 16 years, and a maximum

sentence of 22 years. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner was represented

by counsel during his plea negotiations and at his change of

plea hearing. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. At a hearing conducted May

22, 2002, the Arizona trial court concluded Petitioner

understood the rights he was waiving by entering into a plea

agreement, concluded the plea agreement and plea were knowingly

and voluntarily made, and entered Petitioner’s plea of guilty.

Id., Exh. C. On June 25, 2002, after a hearing at which

Petitioner and his counsel were heard, Petitioner was sentenced

to a term of 22 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on

the charge of second-degree murder. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. The

Superior Court found the aggravating circumstance of emotional

and financial harm to the victim’s family and the mitigating

circumstances of Petitioner’s “mental health issue” and

Petitioner’s remorse. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, on

August 23, 2004, asserting he was entitled to relief from his

sentence pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s holding

in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 s. Ct. 2531 (2004).

Petitioner argued to the Arizona state courts that Blakely

constituted a significant change in the law pursuant to Rule

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32.1(g), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permits the

otherwise-untimely filing of an action for post-conviction

relief if the petition is based on a significant change in the

law. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner asserted: “this Court’s

imposition of the sentence for use, possession of a deadly

weapon or dangerous instrument as an aggravating factor was

illegal.” Id., Exh. F.

The petition for post-conviction relief was summarily

denied on August 26, 2004. Id., Exh. G (“The Court did not find

any aggravating factors regarding the use of a gun, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED summarily denying the Defendant’s Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief.”). Petitioner sought review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on

August 2, 2005. Id., Exh. I. The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review of the petition on March 9, 2006. Id., Exh. K.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief pursuant to the holding in Blakely because the trial

judge determined facts which increased his sentence, rather than

a jury.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Because Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to Arizona law

he had no right to a direct appeal and his conviction arguably

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became “final” for the purpose of federal habeas relief on the

date judgment was entered and he was sentenced by the state

trial court, i.e., June 25, 2002. See Montgomery v. Sheldon,

181 Ariz. 256, 258 (1995); Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383

F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). Cf. Hernandez-Almanza v.

United States Dep’t of Justice, INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir.

1976) (holding, for purposes of immigration proceeding, that a

criminal conviction was final when the defendant entered a

guilty plea and waived direct appeal). Therefore, Petitioner’s

conviction became final after the effective date of the AEDPA

and is subject to its one-year statute of limitations.

The AEDPA requires state prisoners to file any petition

for federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the date

that their state court conviction becomes “final.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2006) (“A 1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”). 

This section provides:

The limitation period shall run from the

latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

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newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(emphasis added). 

The running of this one-year statute of limitations is

tolled during any period when “a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in any state court.

See id. § 2244(d)(2); see also Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling

during the time a “properly filed” state

court petition is pending. “Properly filed”

means the petition’s “delivery and acceptance

are in compliance with the applicable laws

and rules governing filings” in that state.

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the United States

Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a

postconviction petition is untimely under

state law, that [is] the end of the matter

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”

Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005).

Respondents argue the petition is not timely filed

because Petitioner did not file his habeas action within one

year of the date his conviction became final, absent any tolling

of the limitations period during the pendency of Petitioner’s

first state action for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner’s conviction became final, for purposes of

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, on June 25, 2002.

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Therefore, Petitioner had until June 26, 2003, to file his

habeas petition, absent any statutory or equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner did not have any state action for postconviction relief pending between June 25, 2002, and June 26,

2003. Petitioner did file a state action for post-conviction

relief on August 23, 2004, more than a year after the time for

filing his habeas petition expired. However, this action for

post-conviction relief could not and did not restart the

already-expired statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s

federal habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333

(11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000).

Neither does Blakely provide for an alternative date

for beginning the statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s

habeas action. Section 2244 provides the statute of limitations

regarding a federal habeas claim may begin to run on the “date

on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(1994 & Supp. 2006). This section is not applicable

to Petitioner’s Blakely claim because Petitioner’s conviction

was final prior to the time the Supreme Court issued Blakely and

the United States Supreme Court has not made Blakely retroactive

to cases on collateral review. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d

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1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-

9237 (Nov. 10, 2005). See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662,

121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001) (holding that a new rule is “made

retroactive to cases on collateral review” only if the Supreme

Court holds it to be retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review). 

 Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304

F.3d at 922 (concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling

for time period that the petitioner was denied access to his

legal files while being transferred); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d

951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas

petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’

were the but-for and proximate causes of his untimeliness.”

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding “at the

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1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely

addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace

“lowered” the standard for equitable tolling set in Spitsyn. See

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005). See also Astorga v. Terhune, 130 Fed. App. 181, 183 (9th Cir.

2005); Boudette v. Schriro, 2006 WL 664364, at *3 (D. Ariz.).

-8-

very least, the prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ were the but-for and proximate cause of his

untimeliness”).1

It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law,

lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and

temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Fisher

v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–16 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v.

Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that

petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and

the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable

tolling”). Additionally, at least one other federal court has

concluded “the difficulties attendant on prison life, such as

transfers between facilities, solitary confinement, lockdowns,

restricted access to the law library, and an inability to secure

court documents do not by themselves qualify as extraordinary

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circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Corrigan v.

Barbery, 371 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).

Petitioner contends his petition is timely filed

because it was filed within one year of the decision in Blakely.

Petitioner contends the rule stated in Blakely should be applied

retroactively to his sentence. Petitioner also argues the

Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely was compelled by the decision

in Apprendi v. New Jersey, decided in 2000. Petitioner further

implies the Court should refrain from deciding his habeas

petition without considering the merits of the petition until

the United States Supreme Court issues a decision in Burton v.

Waddington, a case arising from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, in which it is argued that Blakely should be applied

retroactively.

As determined supra, Blakely does not provide for

alternative date for the running of the one-year statute of

limitations because this case is not retroactive to cases which

became final prior to the date the decision was issued.

Additionally, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have

concluded the conclusion ultimately reached in Blakely was not

compelled by the holding of Apprendi, and that defendants who

pled guilty and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment within

the statutory range are not entitled to collateral relief from

their sentences. See, e.g., Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 773-

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2

[U]nlike Apprendi, which concerned the imposition

of a sentence beyond that provided for the

offense by statute, based on a wholly separate

fact or element that was not charged and not

submitted to the jury, here, defendant received

a sentence to which he was exposed by the

original charge. Apprendi does not require the

invalidation of the sentencing scheme adopted by

the [Colorado] General Assembly, which creates a

presumptive sentence range and permits the trial

court, in its discretion, to sentence in

aggravated or mitigated ranges based on

unspecified extraordinary aggravating or

mitigating factors or circumstances

particularized to the defendant or the offense.

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74 (10th Cir. 2005);2 Brown v. Greiner, 409 F.3d 523, 533-34 (2d

Cir. 2005) (“our appraisal of the reasonableness of the state

court interpretations of Apprendi may not be influenced by the

Supreme Court’s subsequent elucidation in such cases as Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 [] (2004), and

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 []

(2005).”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1566 (2006).

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action.

Therefore, the petition should be denied and dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Pettijohn’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 12th day of December, 2006.

 

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