Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01059/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01059-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kory Dean Krieger, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 

Defendant.

No. CV11-01059-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Kory Dean Krieger has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s 

March 27, 2012 order (Doc. 65) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant 

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and denying Plaintiff’s motion to strike, motion 

for preliminary injunction, and motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Doc. 67. 

The Court ordered a response to the motion (Doc. 68), and Defendant has complied 

(Doc. 72). The Court will deny the motion.1

 Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only rarely. See 

Stetter v. Blackpool, No. CV 09-1071-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3348522, at *1 (D. Ariz. 

Oct. 15, 2009). Courts in this district have identified four circumstances where a motion 

for reconsideration will be granted: (1) the moving party has discovered material 

differences in fact or law from those presented to the Court at the time of its initial 

decision, and the party could not previously have known of the factual or legal 

 

1

 Plaintiff has filed supplemental exhibits to his motion for reconsideration. 

Doc. 73. 

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differences through the exercise of reasonable diligence, (2) new material factual events 

have occurred after the Court’s initial decision, (3) there has been a material change in 

the law after the Court’s initial decision, or (4) the moving party makes a convincing 

showing that the Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court 

at the time of its initial decision. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. 

Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). 

 This case relates to Defendant’s February 28, 2011 termination of Plaintiff’s long 

term disability benefits due to a 24-month limitation that applied under the terms of the 

relevant benefits plan (“the Plan”). Doc. 1, ¶ 13. On March 27, 2012, the Court denied 

Plaintiff’s benefits claim as moot because Plaintiff’s benefits had been reinstated 

retroactive to February 28, 2011. See Doc. 65, at 5-6. 

 Plaintiff now comes forward with evidence that his long term disability benefits 

have been terminated a second time, as of February 29, 2012.2

 See Doc. 67, at 10-14. 

The Plan provides that “[a]ny [long term disability] that results from a substantial change 

in condition due to an Illness that occurs after the date Long-Term Disability Income 

Benefits begin is not considered an Eligible Disability, unless determined by the Plan 

Administrator to be medically related to an Eligible Disability.” Doc. 67, at 13. 

Plaintiff’s benefits were terminated on February 29, 2012 because of “inadequate 

objective medical documentation that proves a causal relationship between the approved 

LTD diagnoses and the information reflected in radiological reports[.]” Id.

 Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider its denial of Plaintiff’s benefits claim due to 

the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. That exception, 

however, cannot be interpreted to include the risk of benefits termination under any 

provision of the Plan. See Doc. 72, at 3-4 (“Because a long-term disability benefit claim 

can last for decades, courts should not allow a single, perpetually active, lawsuit to 

 

2

 Plaintiff was notified of this second termination in a letter dated February 22, 2012 (Doc. 67, at 10), yet did not inform the Court of the second termination before the 

Court issued its March 27, 2012 order (Doc. 65). 

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remain open for the presentation of separate disputes.”). Furthermore, the second 

termination of benefits is based on a different Plan provision and different underlying 

reasons than the initial termination that the Court considered in its March 27 order. 

Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the second 

termination. See Diaz v. United Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan & Trust, 50 F.3d 1478, 1483 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he general rule governing ERISA claims [is] that a claimant must 

avail himself or herself of a plan’s own internal review procedures before bringing suit in 

federal court.”). 

 Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to file an amended complaint based on 

Defendant’s February 29, 2012 denial of his long term disability benefits. Doc. 67, at 5. 

Plaintiff previously filed a motion for leave to amend on January 10, 2012. Doc. 50. 

That motion provided no clear indication of the claim Plaintiff wished to assert, and the 

Court denied the motion as untimely given the parties’ agreement that the case required 

no discovery and should be resolved by summary judgment. See Doc. 65, at 14-16. 

Allowing Plaintiff to revive this lawsuit by pursuing a new and different claim would 

further prejudice Defendant. Such amendment would also be futile because, as noted 

above, Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his new 

claim. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (leave to amend may be denied as 

futile). Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is therefore denied. If Plaintiff is to pursue 

a claim based on the recent termination of benefits, it must be in a new action filed after 

Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 67) is denied. 

 Dated this 7th day of May, 2012. 

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