Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01627/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01627-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 05:7703 Discrimination - Review of Agency Act

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

COURTNEY CROWE,

NO. CIV. 05-01627 FCD EFB

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EVERGOOD ASSOCIATES, LLC, dba

Arby’s Restaurant,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Evergood

Associates, LLC’s (“Evergood”) motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff Courtney Crowe’s (“plaintiff”) claims for (1)

discrimination in violation of Title VII; (2) constructive

discharge under California law; (3) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional

distress. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set

forth below,1 defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 

Case 2:05-cv-01627-FCD-EFB Document 49 Filed 03/21/07 Page 1 of 18
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2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“UF”),

filed Mar. 3, 2007). Where the facts are in dispute, the court

recounts plaintiffs’ version of the facts. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of

Disp. Facts (“DF”)). 

2

BACKGROUND2

Defendant Evergood, formerly doing business as an Arby’s

Restaurant (“Arby’s”), is a limited liability corporation

conducting business in Solano County, California. (UF ¶ 2). On

or about July 7, 2003, plaintiff, a 17 year-old African Amercian,

walked into Evergood’s Arby’s Restaurant and filled out an

application for employment. (UF ¶ 3). Plaintiff was interviewed

and hired the following day by Mr. Joseph Su (“Su”), one of

Evergood’s owners, and Ms. Ellie Smith (“Smith”), Arby’s manager. 

(UF ¶ 4). Plaintiff was hired as a cashier and his starting

hourly wage was $6.75. (Id.) 

Plaintiff indicated on his application and during his

interview that he had several scheduling limitations. (UF ¶ 5).

Specifically, plaintiff was a student and his hours had to be

limited when school started the following month. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also communicated that he was not available to work on

Sunday mornings. (Id.) Additionally, plaintiff disclosed that

he was concurrently working at KFC. (Id.)

Smith was in charge of scheduling employee’s hours during

plaintiff’s employment at Arby’s. (UF ¶ 6). Many Arby’s

employees, including plaintiff, asked Smith to be scheduled for

more hours during plaintiff’s tenure. (UF ¶ 7). Plaintiff

alleges that Wang “Ricky” Saechao (“Saecho”) was hired after

plaintiff and was immediately given more hours than plaintiff. 

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(DF ¶ 7). Plaintiff claims that throughout the time that

plaintiff and Saecho worked concurrently at Arby’s, Saechao

received many more hours of work than plaintiff did. (DF ¶ 7). 

Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that when Saechao was hired at

Arby’s, there were hours available but Smith refused to give the

available hours to plaintiff. (DF ¶ 8). Plaintiff claims Smith

could not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why Saechao

received more hours than plaintiff. (DF ¶ 8). Conversely, Smith

and Song Saecho, an Arby’s crew led, assert that they had

concerns about Plaintiff’s ability to perform his job duties

quickly and accurately. (UF ¶ 21). Smith eventually offered

plaintiff an additional two-hour shift, which plaintiff refused. 

(UF ¶ 8). 

Plaintiff received an increase in his hourly wage to $6.90

in February 2004, approximately six months after starting at

Arby’s. (UF ¶ 9). The time frame and amount of plaintiff’s

raise was similar to raises received by other Arby’s employees. 

(UF ¶ 19). 

Plaintiff claims his working conditions at Arby’s were so

stressful that they caused him to vomit and suffer headaches. 

(UF ¶¶ 22-23). After working at Arby’s for ten months, plaintiff

quit his job at Arby’s. (UF ¶ 10). Plaintiff’s resignation took

place less than three weeks after his eighteenth birthday. (UF ¶

10). 

 STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

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that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. In resolving the summary

judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677

F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing

party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may

be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

A. Discrimination in Violation of Title VII

Plaintiff alleges defendant’s actions violated Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

(“Title VII”). (Complaint for Damages (“Compl.”), filed Aug. 12,

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2005, ¶ 9). Plaintiff claims Smith reduced plaintiff’s assigned

hours and gave him unsuitable work shifts because he was African

American. (Id. ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that an Asian worker,

Saechao, was given better and longer hours than plaintiff, even

though plaintiff was more qualified to work those hours. (Id. ¶

5). Plaintiff asserts that the favortism Smith showed for the

other workers “caused plaintiff to be the subject of ridicule and

scorn.” (Id.) Further, he maintains that “the owners, managers

and supervisors were aware of the discriminatory treatment

suffered by [p]laintiff, but they chose to do nothing about

it....” (Id.)

The United States Supreme Court set forth a three-step

burden-shifting test to evaluate discrimination claims under

Title VII. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Thereunder, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. In doing so, plaintiff may produce

indirect evidence that gives rise to an inference of

discriminatory motive. See Transworld Airlines, Inc. v.

Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 

Once plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action. See EEOC v. Hacienda

Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989). The ultimate burden

of persuasion, however, remains with the plaintiff. Texas Dep’t.

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 

If the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. The

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plaintiff may demonstrate pretext in one of two ways: “(1)

indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation

is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or

otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that

unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” 

Chuang v. Univ. of Calif. Davis, Board of Trustees, 225 F.3d

1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The factual inquiry regarding

pretext requires a new level of specificity. Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 255. Plaintiff must produce specific and substantial evidence

that the defendant’s reasons are really a pretext for

discrimination. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc.,

292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Failure to Promote

To set forth a prima facie case of discrimination on the

basis of race under a failure to promote theory, plaintiff must

establish that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he

applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) he was

rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the employer sought

other applicants or filled the position with someone whose

qualifications were comparable to plaintiff’s after rejecting

him. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

Plaintiff has satisfied the first element required to set

forth a prima facie case. Neither plaintiff nor defendant

dispute that plaintiff was a member of a protected class. Both

parties agree that plaintiff is an African American. (UF ¶ 11). 

Second, plaintiff must demonstrate that he applied for and

was qualified for the open position. Although plaintiff does not

allege that he formally applied for a different position at

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Arby’s, plaintiff attests that he continuously asked Smith for

more hours and was repeatedly denied. (Decl. of Courteney Crow

in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (“Crowe Decl.”), filed Mar. 3,

2007, ¶ 3). Moreover, plaintiff states that he could competently

perform his job duties and therefore was qualified to receive

more hours. (Id. ¶ 4). Defendant argues that plaintiff was not

meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations and was

consequently, not qualified to receive additional hours. (Mem.

of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s MSJ”), filed

Jan. 30, 2007, at 7). Smith testified at her deposition that

Plaintiff was slower than the other employees in completing his

tasks and did not show initiative. (Dep. of Eleanor Smith

(“Smith Dep.”), Ex. D to Decl. of Susan E. Bishop in Supp. of

Mot. for Summ. J., filed Jan. 30, 2007, at 56:8-14.) Further,

Smith asserted that she had a conversation with Song Saechao in

which he let Smith know that he did not want to work with

plaintiff because plaintiff is slow, does not want to work,

stands around and talks to other employees, stands around and

does nothing, forgets to complete tasks, and has a negative

attitude. (Smith Dep. at 57:1-8). Additionally, on July 21,

2003, Plaintiff was given a “strong verbal warning” because he

had a money shortage in his cash register and he took food

without manager permission. (Smith Dep., Ex. A). Plaintiff

offers no response to contradict this evidence. At best, it is

disputed that plaintiff was qualified for the hours he requested. 

 However, even if plaintiff was qualified to work additional

hours, he must provide evidence that his application was rejected

despite his qualifications. Plaintiff declares that in February

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2004, Saechao began working at Arby’s and his requests for more

hours were consistently denied. (Crowe Decl. ¶ 4). Plaintiff

admits he was offered an additional one or two hour increase,

which he declined because he felt it was insulting. (DF ¶ 9). 

Plaintiff has not proved he applied for a new position and was

denied. He has merely shown that he requested a change to his

current schedule and did not receive as many additional hours as

he wanted. 

Finally, even if plaintiff’s denied request for more hours

satisfies the third element, plaintiff fails on the fourth

element required for a prima facie case. Plaintiff must prove

that defendant filled the position with someone not of

plaintiff’s class whose qualifications were similar to

plaintiff’s. Plaintiff asserts that additional hours were given

to Saechao, who was a student like plaintiff. (Crowe Decl. ¶ 4). 

Plaintiff has not, however, provided evidence that demonstrates

plaintiff and Saechao had similar qualifications. During the

course of plaintiff’s employment at Arby’s from July 2003 to May

2004, on two separate occasions, he missed work and did not call

to give a reason for his absence and on seven different assigned

work shifts he called in sick. (Decl. of George Su in Supp. of

Mot. for Summ. J. (“George Su Decl.”), filed Jan. 30, 2007, Ex.

E). Defendant’s scheduling records indicate Saechao did not miss

a scheduled shift during the period in which plaintiff and

Saechao were concurrently employed at Arby’s. (George Su Decl.,

Ex. D). The scheduling records indicate that Saechao was a more

reliable employee than plaintiff. Furthermore, in contrast to

Smith’s assessment of plaintiff, Saechao was described by Smith

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3 Defendant filed an objection to the EEOC letter. 

(Objection to Evidence, filed Mar. 9, 2007). The court declines

to rule on defendant’s objection to plaintiff’s evidence because

for the reasons stated herein, even considering this evidence, it

fails to raise a triable issue of fact sufficient for plaintiff

to withstand summary judgment. 

10

as a very good employee who was ambitious and tried to keep

himself busy. (Smith Dep. At 55:6-8). 

In an effort to support his claims, plaintiff cites a letter

from George Su to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) in which George Su stated plaintiff is “a valuable

employee and his service remains greatly appreciated.”3

 (DF ¶ 2;

Pl.’s Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed Mar. 3, 2007,

Ex. 2). This letter does not prove plaintiff and Saechao had

similar qualifications. In fact, George Su stated that all of

Evergood’s employees are valued and that Evergood appreciates the

service provided by all of its employees. (Decl. of George Su in

Supp. of Reply (“George Su Reply Decl.”), filed Mar. 9, 2007, ¶

2). Furthermore, George Su also explained that he did not

believe plaintiff was a top performer at Arby’s and his statement

that plaintiff was a valued employee was not intended to imply

that plaintiff was a top performer. (Id.) As such, plaintiff

has not presented evidence sufficient to substantiate the fourth

element of a prima facie case.

Notwithstanding the above, even if plaintiff had set forth a

prima facie case of discrimination, defendant has provided

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not allocating

additional hours to plaintiff. Smith attested that she created

the work schedule for Arby’s employees based on what the business

needed, the availability of the employees and job performance of

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4 Although not argued by plaintiff in his opposition,

plaintiff stated in his deposition that he thought he saw Smith

(continued...)

11

the employees. (Smith Decl. at 49:15-18). During the period in

which plaintiff requested additional hours, there were many other

employees requesting additional hours. (UF ¶ 7). Smith stated

that she attempted to accommodate requests for additional hours

but had to consider the budgeting requirements of the business

when making the schedule and could not grant all such requests. 

(Smith Dep. at 38:24-25; 39:1-3). During the majority of his

employment at Arby’s, plaintiff was a student who was only

available to work on evenings and weekends due to his school

schedule. (Dep. of Courtney Crowe (“Crowe Dep.”), Ex. C to Decl.

of Susan E. Bishop in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., filed Jan. 30,

2007, at 45:8-9). Further, defendant believed plaintiff’s

potential hours were restricted because he was not available on

Sundays until after 3 pm and because he was also employed at KFC. 

(Crowe Dep. at 49:16-25; DF ¶ 1). Defendant argues plaintiff’s

work schedules were created based on budgeting constraints, the

limited nature of plaintiff’s availability, and plaintiff’s

unreliability discussed above, not on the fact that plaintiff is

African American. 

Because defendant has met its burden with respect to the

reasons for denying plaintiff’s request for more hours, the

burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate the proffered reasons

are pretextual. Plaintiff has offered no specific and

substantial evidence to support a conclusion that defendant’s

reasons are mere pretext.4 In his opposition to defendant’s

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4(...continued)

throw away job applications filled out by African Americans. 

(Crowe Dep. at 91: 3-11). Smith denied that she ever threw away

a job application. (Smith Dep. at 48: 12-24). Even if the court

considers plaintiff’s statement as evidence, this fact does not

support plaintiff’s assertion that he was denied additional hours

because he was African American. 

12

motion, plaintiff states “Ms. Smith always treated Plaintiff

differently because of his race.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ.

J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), filed Mar. 2, 2007, at 5). Such a statement

is unsupported and conclusory. Conclusory statements without

factual support are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. National Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagles Ins. Corp., 121

F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997). Even if plaintiff has established

a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff has not met his

burden of demonstrating that defendant’s reasons are pretextual.

2. Constructive Discharge

To set forth a prima facie case of Title VII race

discrimination under a constructive discharge theory, plaintiff

must prove, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that a

reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have felt he had

no choice but to quit due to the “intolerable and discriminatory

working conditions”. Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d

360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d

1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984)). The standard is an objective one

which focuses on a reasonable person’s reaction to the working

conditions and not the subjective intent of the employer. Id.

To establish that he was constructively discharged, a plaintiff

must demonstrate the presence of “‘aggravating factors’, such as

a ‘continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.’” Id.

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(emphasis added in original) (quoting Satterwhite, 744 F.2d at

1382). The plaintiff’s working conditions must be sufficiently

extraordinary or egregious to amount to a constructive discharge. 

See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238,

1246).

Plaintiff alleges that Smith’s discriminatory conduct

created a work environment so hostile that he was constructively

discharged from his position. Specifically, plaintiff claims

Smith reduced his work hours and gave him unsuitable work shifts

and that her actions caused him to be the subject of ridicule and

scorn. (Compl. ¶ 4-5). Plaintiff has provided no evidence to

support these claims. Defendant proffered Arby’s scheduling

records, which demonstrate plaintiff’s weekly hours remained

consistent after his initial training sessions were completed. 

(George Su Decl., Ex. E). In addition, plaintiff admitted in his

deposition that his hours remained largely the same after Saechao

was hired. (Crowe Dep. at 98:2-4). Furthermore, plaintiff has

not explained or provided evidence to support his allegation that

his work shifts were unsuitable. In his deposition, plaintiff

stated his shifts were unsuitable because he was repeatedly put

on the night crew and often had to close the restaurant. (Crowe

Dep. at 104:18-20). Nevertheless, because of plaintiff’s school

schedule and Sunday commitment, he was not available to work an

early shift on any day but Saturday. (UF ¶ 5). Moreover,

plaintiff’s evidence that he was the subject of ridicule and

scorn is supported only by his vague and conclusory statements.

(See Crowe Decl. ¶ 5; Crowe Dep. at 105:19-25). In plaintiff’s

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deposition, he asserts that the other employees laughed at him

because he had the least amount of hours. (Crowe Dep. at 105:

19-25). Plaintiff’s vague statement that he was laughed at by

his fellow employees is insufficient evidence for the court to

find his work environment was so extraordinary and egregious that

a reasonable person would have had no alternative but to leave

Arby’s. See Summar v. Potter, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1057 (D.

Alaska 2005) (holding that defendants’ alleged snubbing,

reprimanding and calling plaintiff an undesirable employee, as

well as subjecting her to schedule changes are not egregious

events demonstrating discriminatory working conditions); see also

Li Li Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798 (holding that racial jokes,

ridicule of plaintiff’s accent, and act of pulling eyes back to

imitate or mock the appearance of Asians were insufficient to

alter the condition of plaintiff’s employment); Vasquez v. County

of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no

altered work conditions where employee was told that he had “a

typical Hispanic macho attitude,” that he should work in the

field because “Hispanics do good in the field” and where he was

yelled at in front of others); Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217

F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no altered work

environment where the supervisor referred to females as

“castrating bitches,” “Madonnas,” or Regina, and referred to

plaintiff as “Medea”); King v. AC & R Advertising, 65 F.3d 764,

768-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a change of employment

status to at-will, a reduction in managerial responsibilities, a

reduction in base salary and change to potentially lucrative

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5 Further, it is unclear that plaintiff quit Arby’s

because of the intolerable conditions. It is undisputed that

plaintiff resigned from his position at Arby’s less than three

weeks after his eighteenth birthday. (UF ¶ 10). Plaintiff

testified that he began training for a new, higher paying

position with another employer while he was still working at

Arby’s. (Crowe Dep. at 76: 8-13; 20: 5-17). Plaintiff has

provided any evidence that he sought a position with a different

employer because of the discriminatory conditions at Arby’s and

not because there were higher paying positions open to him after

he turned eighteen.

15

bonus program did not constitute a constructive discharge).5

Therefore, plaintiff has not established that he was

subjected to an adverse employment action under either a failure

to promote theory or a constructive discharge theory. 

Consequently, defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s

Title VII claims.

B. Constructive Discharge under California Law

Plaintiff alleges defendant’s conduct described above

amounts to constructive discharge under California law. (Compl.

¶ 15). 

The standard for establishing a constructive discharge under

California law is largely similar to the constructive discharge

standard under Title VII. In California, the doctrine of

constructive discharge seeks to address the situation where,

“[i]n an attempt to avoid liability for wrongfully discharging an

employee, an employer may refrain from actually firing an

employee, preferring instead to engage in conduct causing him or

her to quit.” Colores v. Bd. of Trs., 105 Cal. App. 4th 1293,

1305 (2003) (quoting Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th

1238, 1244-45 (1994)). As a result, in order to prevent “endruns” around claims requiring employer-initiated terminations of

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employment, “a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a

firing rather than a resignation.” See id. (quoting Turner, 7

Cal. 4th at 1244-45). The standard by which a constructive

discharge is determined is “whether a reasonable person faced

with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of

employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.” 

Id. (quoting Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1248). In order to establish

a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that “the

employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted

working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the

time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer

would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position

would be compelled to resign.” Id. at 1305 (quoting Turner, 7

Cal. 4th at 1251). For purposes of constituting constructive

discharge, the “adverse working conditions must be unusually

‘aggravated’ or amount to a ‘continuous pattern’ before the

situation will be deemed intolerable.” Id. at 1306.

For the reasons set forth in the court’s discussion of

plaintiff’s Title VII claim, plaintiff cannot establish that he

was subjected to an adverse employment action under a

constructive discharge theory under California law. Therefore,

defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 

C. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff contends that defendant’s conduct was “extreme and

outrageous and [was] done with the intent of causing plaintiff

severe emotional distress.” (Compl. ¶ 18). Defendant argues

that plaintiff’s emotional distress claims are barred by the

California Workers’ Compensation Act (“CWCA”). (Def.’s MSJ, at

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18-19). 

The CWCA provides the exclusive remedy for injuries

sustained under the normal conditions of employment. Cal. Lab.

Code § 3601. Where an employee falls within the protection of

the Workers’ Compensation scheme, as laid out in Labor Code §

3600, the code precludes a cause of action against the employer. 

Id. This prohibition extends to emotional injuries such as

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire

Protection District, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160 (1987). 

The California Supreme Court warned that exceptions to the

exclusive remedy provision risk undermining the legislative

compromise of the Workers’ Compensation Act by permitting the

employee to pursue a cause of action merely by tailoring the

claim to fall within the scope of the exception. Id. at 160. 

The doctrine therefore requires emotional injuries to fall within

the exclusive remedy provision of § 3601, so long as the basic

conditions of § 3600 are met and the employer’s conduct does not

contravene fundamental public policy or exceed the risks inherent

in the employment relationship. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2

Cal. 4th 744, 815 (1992). As such, “a claim for emotional and

psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred

where the distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal

discriminatory practices.” Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.

App. 4th 341, 352 (1993). 

In the instant case, plaintiff has not established that

defendant engaged in illegal discriminatory practices. 

Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII and state law claim for

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constructive discharge have been dismissed; therefore, there is

no basis for this court fo find that the employer’s conduct

violates public policy or exceeds the risks inherent in the

employment relationship. Consequently, plaintiff’s claims for

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent

infliction of emotional distress are barred by the Workers’

Compensation Act. Therefore, defendant’s motion is GRANTED with

respect to these claims.

 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close

this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2007

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