Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01955/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01955-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Diana C. Lopez, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-09-01955-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fee under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 35) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees under 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 38). The Court now rules on the Motions. 

 On January 12, 1998, Plaintiff filed an Application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits alleging a disability onset date of August 12, 1997. The Social Security 

Administration denied Plaintiff’s application. In an appeal from that decision, the 

District Court remanded for further proceedings. After additional hearings, the ALJ 

issued a decision finding Plaintiff disabled from February 2000 to August 9, 2001. In an 

appeal from that decision, the District Court remanded for further proceedings. After 

another hearing, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits. 

This Court affirmed that decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then reversed that 

decision and remanded for an award of benefits. Plaintiff now moves for attorneys’ fees 

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 

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I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fee under the EAJA 

On a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA, a prevailing party 

is entitled to attorneys’ fees unless the government’s position was substantially justified 

or special circumstances would make an award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); 

Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the EAJA, the 

government’s position includes both its litigating position and the action or failure to act 

by the agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined “substantially justified” as “justified to a 

degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 

(1988) (affirming Ninth Circuit’s holding that substantially justified means having a 

reasonable basis both in law and fact); see Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“The Commissioner is substantially justified if his position met the traditional 

reasonableness standard—that is justified in substance or in the main, or to a degree that 

could satisfy a reasonable person.”). The government bears the burden of showing that 

its position was substantially justified. Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 

618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Here, Defendant argues that a reasonable person could have found the ALJ’s 

decision substantially justified and could have found the Commissioner’s defense of that 

position to be substantially justified. This Court previously affirmed the ALJ’s decision 

and explained that affirmance. (Doc. 27). While the Court recognizes that the Ninth 

Circuit reversed that decision; the Court nonetheless finds the reasoning in that decision 

shows that a reasonable person could have found both the ALJ’s decision and the 

Commissioner’s defense of that decision to be substantially justified.1

 As a result, the 

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 Plaintiff argues that the Court cannot itself make Defendant’s position 

substantially justified through its prior ruling in this case. The Court does not suggest 

that its prior ruling does render Defendant’s decision substantially justified. Rather, in 

this case, the Court of Appeals found that the ALJ failed to provide “sufficiently specific 

findings supported by the record,” did not give legitimate and specific reasons for 

rejecting testimony, and for giving “little weight” to the medical opinions of Dr. Parkin, 

and failed to consider the testimony of Lopez’s daughter, and thus, the ALJ’s conclusion 

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Court will deny fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 

 II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 

 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $24,478.25 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

406(b). Section 406(b) provides that whenever the Court renders a favorable judgment to 

a social security claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorneys’ fees for 

representation of the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The reasonable fee cannot 

exceed twenty-five percent of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. Id. 

The fee is payable out of, and not in addition to, the amount of the past-due benefits. Id.

 Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means 

by which fees are set for successfully representing” social security claimants in court. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 

 Plaintiff and her counsel had a contingent-fee agreement in this case typical of fee 

agreements in disability benefits cases. The contingent-fee agreement provides that 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s fee shall equal twenty-five percent of all past-due benefits awarded 

to Plaintiff and any other individuals entitled to benefits by reason of the award to 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 38-1). Twenty-five percent of the total amount of past-due benefits 

awarded to Plaintiff and others as a result of the Judgment in her favor is $24,478.25. 

Plaintiff’s counsel therefore seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 

 

that Plaintiff could perform her past work was “legally insufficient.” (Doc. 34-1). The 

Court of Appeals did not determine that Plaintiff could not perform her past work, but 

determined that the ALJ’s conclusion was legally insufficient. The substantially justified 

standard does not require that the government be the prevailing party, but requires that its 

position was substantially justified. See Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“The government’s failure to prevail does not raise a presumption that its position was 

not substantially justified.”). 

 As detailed in Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and, 

in this Court’s prior Order, there was evidence from which a reasonable person could find 

that the ALJ’s decision and the Commissioner’s defense of that decision to be 

substantially justified, and that the position had a reasonable basis in law and fact, even 

though it was ultimately not a prevailing position. Because this Court’s prior Order 

carefully examines the Commissioner’s factual and legal basis supporting its position, the 

Court sees no reason to rehash the reasons that the position was reasonable. (Doc. 27). 

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$24,478.25. The Commissioner does not object to this amount. 

 Because the Court finds the contingent fee in this case is reasonable, the Court will 

award Plaintiff’s counsel attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,478.25 pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b). 

III. Conclusion 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fee under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (Doc. 35) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees under 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 38) is granted in the amount of $24,478.25.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, consistent with the mandate of the Court of 

Appeals (Doc. 34), the Clerk of the Court shall remand this case to the Social Security 

Administration. 

 Dated this 2nd day of April, 2013. 

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