Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01421/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01421-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1255 Immigration: Failure USCIS To Adjudicate Permanent Residency Petition

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERESA CEDILLO MARTINEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFFERSON B. 

SESSIONS, III, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 17cv1421-LAB (MDD)

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND 

[Dkt. 13];

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH 

PREJUDICE

This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff Teresa Cedillo’s Complaint, finding that 

the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the immigration decisions she challenges. Dkt. 12. 

The Court told Cedillo that if she believed she could fix the deficiencies identified, she 

could file a motion for leave to amend, which she has now done. Dkt. 13. Because the 

Court finds that her proposed amendment would be futile, her motion is denied and the 

case is dismissed with prejudice.

Leave to amend is granted liberally, but not automatically. In re Western States 

Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013). When 

considering a motion for leave to amend, a district court must consider whether 

amendment would be futile. In re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 685, 701 (9th Cir. 

2011). An amendment is considered futile when it would not survive a motion to dismiss. 

Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).

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The underlying facts are not in dispute: After living in the country illegally for ten 

years, Cedillo traveled to Mexico to escort her sick father back to the United States. When 

she attempted to reenter illegally, the Department of Homeland Security stopped her and 

ordered her expedited removal. Cedillo reentered ostensibly because she needed to care 

for her father and her children—all U.S. citizens. When she applied for status adjustment 

ten years later, Homeland Security denied her application, reinstated her removal order, 

but granted her deferred action for two years. After a series of deferrals, Homeland 

Security ultimately denied Cedillo further deferred action and reinstated her removal. 

Cedillo then brought this suit to block that removal.

In her First Amended Complaint, Cedillo pares down her claims to just two. First, 

she argues Defendants have deprived her of her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights 

because they have “deprived [her] of the opportunity to present her case effectively” by 

not permitting her to proceed to immigration court to seek cancellation of removal or to 

renew her application for adjustment of status. Dkt. 13-1 at ¶81. Second, she pleads a 

violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, alleging that the decision by USCIS to 

deny her application for adjustment and motion to reconsider were an abuse of discretion.

The Court is not unsympathetic to Cedillo’s situation, but for the same reasons 

articulated when the Court granted Defendants’ previous motion to dismiss, the Court is 

without jurisdiction to grant the relief she seeks. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i) and 

(e)(5); § 1231(a)(5); Dkt. 12. In her reply, Plaintiff essentially concedes that the 

jurisdictional bars apply, but argues that these bars do not preclude this Court from 

making a finding of “necessity” that might permit her to seek a status adjustment. She is 

incorrect. Making a finding of necessity requires the court to review the circumstances 

underlying her 15-year-old expedited removal order. The Court is prohibited from 

conducting this inquiry by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which affirmatively strips this Court 

of jurisdiction to review expedited removal determinations. The limited exceptions 

provided in § 1252(e) do not include the ability for the Court to second guess whether 

proper procedures were followed or whether the alien is entitled to relief from removal. 

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8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5) (“There shall be no review of whether the alien is actually 

inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal.”); see also Garcia de Rincon v. Dep't 

of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2008) (no jurisdiction where

Homeland Security denied adjustment and reinstated expedited removal order after 

mother with citizen children illegally reentered following visit to sick parent in Mexico).

Even assuming this Court had jurisdiction to hear Cedillo’s claims under § 1252 

(it does not), her claims would barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). That statute strips 

federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over “any cause or claim by or on behalf of 

any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute

removal orders against any alien.” All of Plaintiff’s claims arise from discretionary 

removal actions by the Attorney General, which § 1252(g) specifically precludes this 

Court from considering.

For these reasons and the reasons set out in the Court’s previous Order, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED as futile. Dkt. 13. Given that her 

claims cannot be saved through amendment, this case is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 24, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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