Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00067/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00067-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. LONDON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0067 GEB GGH P

vs.

EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by

defendant Dr. Sogge on April 5, 2006, and by defendants Dr. Williams, Nurse Williams and Dr.

Douglas on April 28, 2006. 

This action is proceeding on the amended complaint filed January 13, 2004. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants provided him with inadequate medical care for hepatitis C in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because plaintiff’s claims against all defendants concern

their treatment of his hepatitis C, the court will address both motions in one section below.

Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied medical care in retaliation for filing

administrative grievances. Plaintiff’s amended complaint also suggests a claim for failure to

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process administrative appeals in violation of the right to due process.

Defendants move for summary judgment only as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim. After carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends that defendants be granted

summary judgment. Because plaintiff has had an adequate opportunity to ventilate his retaliation

and due process claims, and because these claims are intertwined with the Eighth Amendment

claims, the court sua sponte recommends that defendants be granted summary judgment as to

these claims as well. See Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.3d 309 (9 Cir. 1982). th

II. Summary Judgment Standards Under Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

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2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct.

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at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

On April 30, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir.

1988).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants concern their refusal to treat him with

pegylated interferon or pegylated interferon combined with ribavarin. Plaintiff also alleges that

in 2003 defendant Nurse Williams made a false entry in his medical records that his drug abuse

screen was positive, thereby precluding plaintiff from further interferon treatment. 

A. Eighth Amendment

Legal Standard

In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on

inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct.

285, 292 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively

serious, and that defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.

1992) (on remand). The requisite state of mind for a medical claim is “deliberate indifference.” 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998 (1992). 

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A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Indications

that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment are the following: the existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900

F. 2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01

(9th Cir. 1989). McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) the Supreme Court

defined a very strict standard which a plaintiff must meet in order to establish “deliberate

indifference.” Of course, negligence is insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. 

However, even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm

which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient. Id. at 836-37, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. 

Neither is it sufficient that a reasonable person would have known of the risk or that a defendant

should have known of the risk. Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.

It is nothing less than recklessness in the criminal sense))a subjective standard))

disregard of a risk of harm of which the actor is actually aware. Id. at 838-842, 114 S. Ct. at

1979-1981. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837,

114 S. Ct. at 1979. Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at

847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981. If the risk was

obvious, the trier of fact may infer that a defendant knew of the risk. Id. at 840-42, 114 S. Ct. at

1981. However, obviousness per se will not impart knowledge as a matter of law. 

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Also significant to the analysis is the well established principle that mere

differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon,

662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

Moreover, a physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate

that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is

prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id.

Additionally, mere delay in medical treatment without more is insufficient to state

a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com’rs, 766

F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the delay in medical treatment must be harmful, there is

no requirement that the delay cause “substantial” harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, citing

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1339-1340 (9th Cir. 1990) and Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998-

1000. A finding that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or inaction tends

to provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference; however, it does not end the

inquiry. McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). In summary, “the more serious the

medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those

needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established deliberate indifference on the part of

the defendant.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1061. 

Superimposed on these Eighth Amendment standards is the fact that in cases

involving complex medical issues where plaintiff contests the type of treatment he received,

expert opinion will almost always be necessary to establish the necessary level of deliberate

indifference. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, although there

may be subsidiary issues of fact in dispute, unless plaintiff can provide expert evidence that the

treatment he received equated with deliberate indifference thereby creating a material issue of

fact, summary judgment should be entered for defendants. The dispositive question on this

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summary judgment motion is ultimately not what was the most appropriate course of treatment

for plaintiff, but whether the failure to timely give a certain type of treatment was, in essence,

criminally reckless.

Undisputed Facts

During the times relevant to the complaint, defendant Soggge independently

contracted with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to provide

gastroenterology consultations and services to corrections inmates such as plaintiff. As part of

his contractual duties, defendant Sogge provided gastroenterology care and treatment to plaintiff

from November 29, 1999, to April 22, 2002.

Defendant Sogge first saw plaintiff via the telemedicine gastroenterology (GI)

clinic on November 29, 1999, after plaintiff was referred by neurologist Dr. Capozzoli for

treatment for hepatitis C. Based upon his initial consultation with plaintiff via this video

conferencing system defendant Sogge recommended that plaintiff undergo a liver biopsy to

determine the degree of damage to the liver caused by the hepatitis C virus.

Plaintiff was transported to the California Medical Facility (CMF) on January 7,

2000, where defendant Sogge performed the liver biopsy in person. The tissue sample was then

sent to pathologist, Dr. Barnes, who diagnosed plaintiff’s liver condition as chronic hepatitis C,

grade 2, stage 2. 

After receiving the pathologist’s report, defendant Sogge ordered interferon

therapy with a first generation form of interferon known by the grade name infergen. This

therapy was continued until the full 48 week course had been completed on February 2, 2001. As

a result of this treatment, plaintiff obtained a complete response, or in other words elimination of

the detectable hepatitis C virus. Defendant Sogge therefore discontinued the interferon therapy

and recommended follow-up in six months.

Prior to completion of the treatment, defendant Sogge noted that plaintiff had

been experiencing ongoing peripheral neuropathy that was potentially related to his hepatitis C. 

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Defendant Sogge, therefore, referred plaintiff back to neurologist Dr. Capozzoli for his opinion

as to the advisability of continuing the interferon therapy beyond the 48 week course as a means

of controlling the neuropathic symptoms.

On December 14, 2000, Dr. Capozzoli recommended against continuing the

infergen treatment for plaintiff’s neuropathic symptoms. The neurologist noted that plaintiff

reported significant side effects with interferon and that, after nine months of interferon

treatment, the interferon had no impact on the neuropathic symptoms. In his opinion,

interferon’s significant incidence of causing paresthesia and neuropathic symptoms along with

other side effects outweighed any argument for continuing it solely for the treatment of

neuropathic symptoms.

In view of Dr. Capozolli’s recommendation, defendant Sogge formed the

impression that further treatment with interferon was not medically indicated. 

Plaintiff next saw defendant Sogge via telemedicine on October 15, 2001, for the

scheduled six month follow-up exam. Defendant Sogge noted that plaintiff’s viral load had

rebounded (or returned to a detectable level) and reminded plaintiff that this was a known risk of

treatment. When plaintiff sought further interferon treatment, defendant Sogge reviewed Dr.

Capozzoli’s opinion that any side effects of a second course of interferon outweighed any benefit

for plaintiff’s symptoms. When plaintiff persisted in his request for further interferon treatment,

defendant Sogge agreed to a second neurology opinion from a different neurologist to assess

whether re-institution of interferon would cause further nerve damage.

On February 2, 2002, plaintiff was seen by a neurologist, Dr. Hevor, for further

evaluation regarding management of his neuropathy. In his consultation report, Dr. Hevor stated

that he would not recommend continued use of interferon.

Plaintiff saw defendant Sogge for the final time on April 22, 2002. At this

meeting, plaintiff requested therapy with a second generation form of interferon called Pegylated

Interferon and also known by the trade name of Pegasys. Defendant Sogge reviewed the

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February 7, 2002, note of Dr. Hevor and explained that Dr. Hevor recommended against a second

course of interferon treatment. Plaintiff disagreed with defendant Sogge’s interpretation of Dr.

Hevor’s note and stated that Dr. Hevor had verbally authorized the second generation Pegylated

Interferon. Defendant Sogge therefore recommended that plaintiff meet with Dr. Hever again.

Plaintiff met with Dr. Hevor for their second neurology consultation on June 13,

2002. As a result of this meeting, Dr. Hevor wrote a note stating that plaintiff “describes to me a

new interferon program which apparently is free of side effects. I would recommend a trial of

this preparation of interferon.” 

Plaintiff has not received any form of interferon treatment since February 2, 2001. 

A second liver biopsy was performed on May 13, 2005, five years after the first biopsy. This

biopsy diagnoses plaintiff’s current liver condition as Grade 2, Stage 1. 

In support of his motion, defendant Sogge has presented the declaration of Dr.

Miles Adler, an internist and gastroenterologist. This declaration is attached to defendant Sogge’s

summary judgment motion. 

In relevant part, Dr. Adler states, 

7. It is my opinion that:

a. All known forms of interferon therapy, including Pegylated Interferon (also

known as “Pegasys”), are known to carry a risk of severe side effects such that

physicians must use their clinical judgment to determine when the risks of

Hepatitis C outweigh the risk of treatment. The risks of Hepatitis C include

cirrhosis of the liver and liver cancer. However, these diseases generally take 25

to 30 years to develop after contraction of the Hepatitis C virus and only 30% of

people with the virus actually develop those conditions. Therefore, treatment with

Interferon is generally not recommended for Hepatitis C patients until their liver

condition has advanced to at least Grade 2 Stage 2.

****

e. The recent biopsy indicating plaintiff’s current liver condition as Grade 2 Stage

1 represents an improvement in the condition of plaintiff’s liver. The change from

Stage 2 to Stage 1 indicates a reduction of the amount of fibrosis found in the

liver. The only known cause for this reduction is Interferon therapy. Therefore,

this improvement is more likely than not the result of Dr. Sogge’s 2000-2001

Infergen therapy.

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f. Because plaintiff’s liver condition has improved to Grade 2 Stage 1, further

Interferon therapy of any form, including Pegylated Interferon such as Pegasys, is

not medically indicated. The disease is not advanced to the point where the

adverse risks of the disease outweigh the risks of treatment.

g. Furthermore, patients whose viral loads relapse after initial Interferon therapy,

such as plaintiff, experience a decreased chance of successful treatment with

further therapy, such that the chance of successful further treatment for plaintiff

with any currently known form of Interferon therapy is less than 25 percent. 

h. The recommended treatment for Hepatitis C patients, such as Mr. London,

with a diagnosed liver condition of Grade 2, Stage 1 is a repeat liver biopsy in five

(5) years.

i. Dr. Sogge, as a gastroenterologist, appropriately referred plaintiff to

neurologists, Dr. Capozzoli and Dr. Hevor, for treatment of plaintiff’s peripheral

neuropathy.

j. Although Dr. Hevor’s June 13, 2002, neurology note indicates that plaintiff

described to him a side effect free form of Interferon, no currently known form of

Interferon therapy, including Pegylated Interferon such as Pegasys, is side effect

free.

k. Furthermore, Pegylated Interferon, including the brand specifically demanded

by plaintiff in the complaint, Pegasys, is not medically indicated for treatment of

peripheral neuropathy.

Adler declaration, attached to Sogge summary judgment motion. 

Defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Douglas and Nurse Williams adopt Dr. Adler’s

declaration in their summary judgment motion. 

In his June 1, 2006, opposition to the summary judgment motion filed by

defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Douglas and Nurse Williams, plaintiff argues that further interferon

treatment is appropriate. In other words, plaintiff disputes Dr. Adler’s expert opinion. In support

of this claim, plaintiff cites exhibit 7 attached to the opposition, which is a report prepared by the

National Institute of Health (NIH) following a conference in 2002 regarding the management of

hepatitis C. According to plaintiff, this report states that treatment with pegylated interferon is

warranted for persons who had an initial end treatment response from interferon, but for whom

this response was not sustained over time. Plaintiff also argues that page 8 of the report indicates

that interferon treatment is appropriate for persons with Grade 2, Stage 1 hepatitis. Finally,

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plaintiff argues that the five criteria set forth in the report for determining who should be retreated with pegylated interferon support his re-treatment.

The Supreme Court has held that the party opposing summary judgment need not

produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary

judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Rather, the questions are 1) whether the

evidence could be submitted in admissible form and 2) “if reduced to admissible evidence would

it be sufficient to carry the party’s burden at trial.” Id. at 327, 106 S. Ct. at 2555. 

There are two problems with plaintiff’s NIH report. First, after reviewing this

report, the court finds that some medical expertise is required for its interpretation. Plaintiff may

not interpret this document because he is not a medical expert. Second, plaintiff’s interpretation

of the report is not supported by the court’s reading of this document. 

In particular, the report does not definitely state that retreatment with pegylated

interferon is warranted for relapsers, i.e. patients (like plaintiff) who achieved an initial end

treatment response with non-pegylated interferon but for whom the response was not sustained

over time. Rather, the report states that “[s]tudies are being conducted with pegylated interferon

and ribavarin therapy in patients who relapse after interferon monotherapy or standard interferon

and ribavarin therapy.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, NIH report, p. 16. 

Plaintiff cites the following statement at page 8 of the NIH report as supporting

his claim that patients with Grade 2, Stage 1 hepatitis C should be treated with interferon: “Liver

biopsy can provide direct histologic assessment of liver injury due to HCV but cannot be used to

diagnose HCV infection.” The court does not understand how this statement demonstrates that

persons with Grade 2, Stage 1 hepatitis C should be treated with interferon. Plaintiff’s nonexpert interpretation of this report cannot be reduced to admissible evidence. 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the five factors cited at page 16 of the NIH report for

determining whether a patient should be retreated with pegylated interferon support his claim for

retreatment. These factors include 1) previous type of response; 2) previous therapy and the

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difference in potency of the new therapy; 3) severity of the underlying liver disease; 4) viral

genotype and other predictive factors for response; and 5) tolerance of previous therapy and

adherence. Application of the five factors to plaintiff’s case require an expert opinion. Plaintiff

is not a medical expert. 

Because plaintiff has submitted no expert medical opinion to contradict the

statements made in Dr. Adler’s declaration, the court finds the statements made in his declaration

to be undisputed.

Analysis

Defendants have presented evidence from a qualified medical expert, i.e. Dr.

Adler, that plaintiff was appropriately treated with standard interferon and that treatment with

pegylated interferon or pegylated interferon combined with ribavarin is not medically warranted. 

Plaintiff has presented no expert evidence disputing defendants’ evidence. For these reasons, the

court does not find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference by failing to treat plaintiff’s

hepatitis C with pegylated interferon or pegylated interferon combined with ribavarin.

Plaintiff also argues that defendant Nurse Williams made a false entry in his

medical records that his drug abuse screen was positive, thereby precluding plaintiff from further

interferon treatment. In his June 1, 2006, declaration filed in support of his opposition, plaintiff

states that prior to filing his complaint, he saw this entry in his medical records. Plaintiff’s

Declaration, ¶ 11. Plaintiff concedes that this entry is no longer in his medical files. Id. Because

this claim against defendant Nurse Williams is not supported by the evidence, the court

recommends that defendant be granted summary judgment as to this claim.

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against him for filing administrative

grievances by denying his requests for pegylated interferon or pegylated interferon combined

with ribavarin.

/////

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In order to succeed on a claim of retaliation, plaintiff must demonstrate five

elements: 1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against him 2) because of 3)

the prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action, 4) chilled the inmates’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and 5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). If the prisoner does not allege a

chilling effect, allegations that he suffered more than minimal harm will almost always have a

chilling affect. Id., no. 11.

The adverse action alleged by plaintiff in support of his retaliation claim is the

denial of pegylated interferon or pegylated interferon combined with ribavarin. As discussed

above, plaintiff’s treatment with pegylated interferon was not medically warranted. Accordingly,

the court recommends that defendants be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s retaliation

claim because he has not demonstrated that defendants took an adverse action against him.

C. Due Process

Plaintiff argues that defendants violated his right to due process by not correctly

processing his administrative appeals. Because inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement

to a specific prison grievance procedure, defendants should be granted summary judgment as to

this claim. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9 Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, th

640 (9 Cir. 1988)(“[t]here is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.”).

th

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Sogge’s summary judgment motion filed April 5, 2006, be granted;

2. The summary judgment motion filed April 28, 2006, by defendants Dr.

Williams, Nurse Williams and Dr. Douglas be granted;

3. All defendants be granted summary judgment sua sponte as to plaintiff’s

retaliation and due process claims.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 2/13/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

lon67.sj

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