Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00391/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00391-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PHILIP D. EVANS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY 

OF BENICIA a.k.a. BENICIA 

HOUSING AUTHORITY, JULIE 

PETERSON and DOES 1-50, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

No. Civ. S-07-0391 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

 Plaintiff Philip D. Evans (“Evans”) filed a state action 

against Benicia Housing Authority (“BHA”) and Julie Peterson 

(“Peterson”) alleging civil rights violations and state law 

claims arising out of his termination as a bookkeeper for BHA. 

BHA and Peterson (collectively “Defendants”) removed the case on 

the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Defendants now move 

for partial dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) 

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the 

court GRANTS the motion.1 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Defendant BHA was a public corporation created to provide 

low-cost housing to the city of Benicia and exercised its powers 

through a commission consisting of members appointed by the 

Mayor of Benicia. TAC ¶ 5. Defendant Peterson is a former 

manager and Executive Director of BHA. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff 

Evans is a former employee of BHA hired on or about October 21, 

2002 as a bookkeeper. Id. ¶ 10. 

 From October 21, 2002, to August 16, 2004, Evans’ 

supervisor was Mike Flo, the Executive Director of BHA. TAC ¶¶ 

10, 12. During that time, Evans observed that Peterson, then 

Assistant Director of BHA, was working reduced hours even though 

she was a full-time employee. Id. ¶ 11. On or about August 16, 

2004, Peterson was promoted to Acting Executive Director of BHA 

and became Evans’ immediate supervisor. Id. ¶ 12. After 

Peterson assumed her new position, Evans continued to observe 

 

1

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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her working reduced hours. Id. ¶ 13. Evans also observed that 

certain tenant rent accounts of relatives and/or acquaintances 

of BHA board members had outstanding balances. Id. Evans 

became concerned about this when he discovered that no late fees 

had been assessed to these accounts and that there appeared to 

be an inadequate/ineffective effort being made to collect on 

these accounts. Id. Evans expressed this concern to Peterson 

but never received any acknowledgment that it was being 

addressed. Id. 

 In or about late autumn 2004, a grand jury investigation 

was commenced into the activities of BHA. TAC ¶ 16. Evans was 

called before the grand jury and testified about Peterson’s 

reduced work hours and the tenant rent account irregularities. 

Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Evans also communicated this information to BHA’s 

president of the Board of Directors Phyllis McKeever2

 and to 

Special Agent Eric Huhtala3 of the Inspector General’s office for 

the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(“HUD”). Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. 

 From late 2004 to early 2005, Evans alleges that he began 

receiving increased and unjustified criticism and/or harassment 

 

2

 Evans communicated his concerns to Ms. Mckeever on or 

about November 12, 2004. 

3

 Evans communicated his concerns to Special Agent Huhtala 

on or about early January 2005.

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from Peterson, including formal “write-ups.” TAC ¶ 19. Evans 

alleges that Peterson’s conduct was motivated by her discovery 

that he had expressed his concerns about her reduced hours and 

the tenant rent account irregularities to the grand jury, BHA’s 

president and HUD. Id. 

On or about June 2, 2005, Peterson observed Evans 

attempting to remove BHA files from the workplace and directed 

him to leave the files in his office. TAC ¶ 24. On or about 

June 3, 2005, Evans received a memo from Peterson stating that 

he was being placed on administrative leave pending an 

investigation into the propriety of his actions regarding his 

attempt to remove BHA files from the workplace. Id. ¶ 25. On 

or about June 7, 2005, Evans received a Notice of Proposed 

Action (“Notice”) advising him that Peterson intended to 

terminate his employment effective June 15, 2005, and that he 

would be placed on paid administrative leave until that time. 

Id. ¶ 26. On or about June 14, 2005, Evans responded in writing 

to the Notice explaining in detail his version of the events and 

challenging the action to be taken. Id. ¶ 27. On or about 

June 16, 2005, Evans received a letter from Peterson terminating 

his employment effective June 16, 2005. Id. ¶ 28. Among the 

reasons cited for Evans’ termination was his attempt to remove 

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BHA files from the workplace and his attempt to recover 

compensation for unauthorized overtime. Id.4 

Following his termination, Evans engaged in both informal 

and formal grievance procedures protesting his termination. TAC 

¶¶ 29-31.5

 On July 27, 2005, following the denial of both his 

informal and formal grievances, Evans appealed his formal 

grievance. Id. ¶ 31. On August 12, 2005, Evans received 

written correspondence from BHA’s legal counsel advising him 

that the appeal proceeding would be limited to whether he 

committed misconduct, not whether he was entitled to 

reinstatement. Id. ¶ 31. The correspondence further stated 

that the proceeding would be an opportunity for him to “clear 

his name.” Id.6

 

4

 Evans was reprimanded for seeking overtime compensation 

for time spent working before 8:00 a.m. on April 1, 2005, to 

prepare for a meeting with an auditor. TAC ¶ 22. Evans was 

also reprimanded for seeking overtime compensation for time spent 

working past 5:00 p.m. on May 13, 2005, to meet a deadline on a 

report. Id. ¶ 23. 

5

 On or about June 24, 2005, Evans initiated an informal 

grievance to protest the decision to terminate him. TAC ¶ 29. 

On July 7, 2005, Evans met with Peterson regarding his informal 

grievance. Id. On July 12, 2005, Evans received written 

correspondence advising him that the decision to terminate him 

remained unchanged. Id. On or about July 15, 2005, Evans 

initiated a formal grievance to protest his termination. Id. ¶ 

30. On July 21, 2005, Evans’ received written correspondence 

denying his formal grievance. Id. 

 

6

 On or about July 1, 2005, Evans received a notice from the 

State of California Development Department stating that his 

claim for unemployment benefits was denied because he was 

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On December 28, 2006, Evans filed the instant action in 

Solano County Superior Court against Defendants alleging civil 

rights violations under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. 

Compl. On February 26, 2007, Defendants removed the action on 

the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Defendants now move 

for partial dismissal of the TAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Defendants argue that dismissal of Evans’ first, second, 

third, fourth, eighth and ninth claims for relief is appropriate 

because Evans’ employment was governed by statute, not contract. 

Additionally, Defendants argue that dismissal of Evans’ fifth 

claim for relief is appropriate because the TAC does not allege 

sufficient facts to state a cognizable due process claim. 

Finally, Defendants argue that dismissal of Evans’ seventh claim 

for relief is appropriate because public entities are not 

subject to lawsuits pursuant to the California False Claims Act, 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12653. These arguments are discussed 

individually below. 

 

terminated for misconduct. TAC ¶ 32. On or about July 8, 2005, 

Evans appealed this decision. Id. On January 19, 2006, an 

administrative law judge determined that Evans had not committed 

any misconduct and reversed the underlying denial of 

unemployment benefits. Id.

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A. Rule 12(b)(6) 

 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a 

claim. A claim may be dismissed only if ‘it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Navarro v. Block, 

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal 

theory or there is an absence of sufficient facts alleged to 

support a cognizable legal theory. Id. The issue is not 

whether a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits but 

rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed beyond the 

threshold in attempting to establish his or her claims. De La 

Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in 

the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995), and the court accepts all 

material allegations as true, as well as all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from them. Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732; 

Pareto v. FDIC., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The court, 

however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor do courts assume the truth 

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of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 

factual allegations, Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 

618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981), or that a plaintiff can prove facts 

different from those it has alleged. Associated Gen. 

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 

Carpenters, Inc., 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, 

leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines 

that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 

Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 

F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Thinket Ink Information 

Resources, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 

(9th Cir. 2004) (leave to amend should be granted unless 

amendment would be futile, i.e., the complaint can not be saved 

by amendment). 

B. First Claim: Breach of Contract/Breach of the Implied 

 Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

 Evans seeks to state a claim for breach of contract/breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

However, because Evans was employed by BHA, a governmental 

entity, he cannot state a cognizable claim for breach of 

contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. “In California, the terms and conditions of 

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public employment are determined by law, not contract.” Hill v. 

City of Long Beach, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1684, 1690 (1995). No 

person has a contractual right to enter into or to continue in 

public employment except in accordance with express terms and 

conditions fixed by law. Kim v. Regents of University of 

California, 80 Cal. App. 4th 160, 164 (2000). “It is well 

settled in California that public employment is not held by 

contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of 

such employment is concerned, no employee has a vested 

contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or 

contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law.” Shoemaker 

v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 23-24 (1990) (citing Miller v. State of 

California, 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813-14 (1973)); Hill, 33 Cal. App. 

4th at 1690. A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing fails for the same reasons. Shoemaker, 

52 Cal. 3d at 24; see Kim, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 164 (“Since the 

good faith covenant is an implied term of a contract, the 

existence of a contractual relationship is thus a prerequisite 

for any action for breach of the covenant.”). Accordingly, 

because Evans was a public employee, he cannot state a 

cognizable claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Scott v. Solano 

County Health and Social Services Dept., 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 

967 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (In California, because public employment 

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is held by statute, not by contract, civil service employees 

cannot state a cause of action for breach of contract or breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 

 For this reason, Evans’ breach of contract/breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is 

dismissed. Because amendment would be futile, this claim is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

C. Second Claim: Promissory Estoppel 

 Defendants argue that dismissal of this claim is 

appropriate because it is premised upon the existence of a 

contractual relationship between BHA and Evans. 

 “In California, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 

[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 

induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a 

third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is 

binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 

promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as 

justice requires. Promissory estoppel is a doctrine which 

employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that 

consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought 

to be enforced.” Poway Royal Mobilehome Owners Ass’n v. City of 

Poway, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1460, 1470-71 (quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority, 23 Cal. 4th 305, 310 (2000)). “The 

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elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a clear promise, (2) 

reliance, (3) substantial detriment, and (4) damages measured by 

the extent of the obligation assumed and not performed.” Poway 

Royal, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 1471 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Toscano v. Greene Music, 124 Cal. App. 4th 685, 

692 (2004)). In California, courts have been careful to apply 

the rules of estoppel against a public agency only in those 

special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. 

Poway Royal, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 1471. 

 In the instant case, the TAC alleges that BHA made a clear 

promise to Evans that he was permitted to remove BHA files from 

the workplace, via the express or implied consent to such 

conduct by BHA’s former Executive Director Mr. Flo, and that he 

relied upon this promise to his detriment when he was 

terminated, in part, for attempting to take these files home. 

Such pleading is insufficient to state a cognizable promissory 

estoppel claim. Because Evans’ is a public employee, his 

employment is governed by statute, not contract, hence he cannot 

state a cognizable promissory estoppel claim as such a claim is 

aimed solely at allowing recovery in equity where a contractual 

claim fails for a lack of consideration. See U.S. Ecology, Inc. 

v. State, 129 Cal. App. 4th 887, 903-04 (2005) (observing that a 

promissory estoppel claim is akin to one for breach of contract, 

i.e., it is an “informal contract” claim). 

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 For this reason, Evans’ promissory estoppel claim is 

dismissed. Because amendment would be futile, this claim is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

D. Third Claim: Breach of Express/Implied Contract 

 Evans seeks to state a claim for breach of express/implied 

contract premised upon BHA’s purported breach of an employment 

agreement between the parties permitting Evans to take BHA files 

home. However, because public employment in California is 

governed by statute, not contract, Evans’ remedies as a public 

employee against BHA are limited to those provided by statute or 

ordinance, not by contract. See Portman v. County of Santa 

Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) 

(“Under California law, the terms of public employment are 

governed entirely by statute, not by contract, and hence ‘as a 

matter of law, there can be no express or implied-in-fact 

contract between . . . which restricts the manner or reasons for 

termination of his employment.’ ”). 

 For this reason, Evans’ breach of express/implied contract 

claim is dismissed. Because amendment would be futile, this 

claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

E. Fourth Claim: Breach of Contract – Express Agreement 

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 Evans seeks to state a claim for breach of contract 

premised upon BHA’s purported breach of the personnel rules 

governing his employment.7 Specifically, Evans alleges that BHA 

breached the personnel rules by failing to provide him an 

opportunity to seek reinstatement and/or compensation for 

wrongful termination through an administrative proceeding. 

However, because BHA’s personnel rules were created pursuant to 

statutory authorization, as BHA was established pursuant to, and 

was governed by, the provisions of the state Housing Authorities 

Law, California Health & Safety Code § 34200 et seq., Evans 

cannot state a cognizable breach of contract claim against BHA 

for breach of the personnel rules. The personnel rules do not 

establish a contractual relationship between the parties. See

Portman, 995 F.2d at 905. 

 For this reason, Evans’ breach of express contract claim 

(i.e., breach of the personnel rules) is dismissed. Because 

amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

F. Fifth Claim: Procedural Due Process 

 

7

 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 34278 (stating that a 

housing authority shall adopt personnel rules and regulations 

applying to all employees and that such rules shall contain 

procedures affecting conflicts of interest, use of funds, 

personnel procedures on hiring and firing including removal of 

personnel for inefficiency, neglect of duties, or misconduct in 

office). 

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 Evans seeks to state a procedural due process claim on the 

basis that California Health and Safety Code § 34278 creates a 

legitimate expectation that Evans employment was a property and 

liberty interest that could not be denied without due process of 

law. Defendants argue that dismissal of this claim is 

appropriate because Evans cannot establish that he had a 

property or liberty interest in his position since he was an atwill employee terminated for misconduct. 

 In order to state a cognizable procedural due process claim 

in a § 1983 action a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a liberty or 

property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of 

process.” Portman, 995 F.2d at 904. A government employee has 

a constitutionally protected property interest in continued 

employment when the employee has a legitimate claim of 

entitlement to the job. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Laws, rules or understandings 

derived from independent sources such as state law create such 

claims of entitlement. Portman, 995 F.2d at 904. However, a 

mere expectation that employment will continue does not create a 

property interest. Id. If under state law, employment is atwill, then the claimant has no property interest in the job. 

Id.; cf. Figueroa v. Housing Authority, 131 Cal.App.3d 528, 532 

(1982) (an employee subject to discharge only for cause has a 

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property interest which is entitled to constitutional 

protection). 

In the instant case, the TAC alleges that § 34278 created a 

protected liberty and property interest in continued employment 

and that BHA deprived Evans of this interest without due process 

by terminating him without providing an opportunity for 

reinstatement through the grievance process. Such allegations 

are insufficient to state a cognizable due process claim. 

Section 34278 mandates that BHA adopt personnel rules and 

regulations applying to all employees and that such rules must 

contain procedures on hiring and firing, including procedures 

for the removal of personnel for inefficiency, neglect of 

duties, or misconduct in office. See Cal. Health & Safety Code 

§ 34278. Here, it is undisputed that BHA complied with § 34278 

and adopted personnel policies,8

 which stated that BHA employees 

 

8

 Normally, when ruling on a motion to dismiss a court must 

disregard the facts that are not alleged on the face of the 

Complaint or contained in documents attached to the Complaint. 

Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1968, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995). However, 

an exception to this rule arises where the plaintiff’s claim 

depends on a document, the defendant attaches this document to 

its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the 

authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not 

explicitly allege the contents of that document in the 

Complaint. Id.; see also Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 

705 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[a] district court ruling on a motion to 

dismiss may consider documents ‘whose contents are alleged in a 

complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 

are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.’ ”) 

(superseded by statute on other grounds). Here, it is 

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were at-will employees that could be terminated with or without 

cause. Def.’s Req. for Judicial Notice, Exh. B, §§ 3.2(C), 

13.2, 14(G).9 Accordingly, because Evans was an at-will 

employee, he had no property interest in his job. See Brady v. 

Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1548 (9th Cir. 1988) (when state 

employees serve at the will of their employer they have no 

reasonable expectation of continued employment, and thus no 

property right). 

With respect to Evans’ “liberty” interest deprivation, the 

court concludes that the TAC fails to allege sufficient facts to 

establish a liberty interest that would entitle Evans to 

procedural due process. “The termination of a public employee 

which includes publication of stigmatizing charges triggers due 

process protections.” Mustafa v. Clark County School Dist., 157 

F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573); 

see also Brady, 859 F.2d at 1552 (“A liberty interest is 

 

appropriate to consider BHA’s personnel rules in ruling on the 

motion to dismiss because Evans procedural due process claim 

depends on this document, it was filed in support of BHA’s 

motion to dismiss, it is referenced in the TAC but not attached 

thereto, and the parties do not dispute its authenticity. 

9

 Section 13.2 of BHA’s personnel rules states: “An employee 

may be terminated involuntarily for reasons that may include 

poor performance, misconduct, or other violations of BHA’s rules 

of conduct, policies or procedures. In such cases, the employee 

. . . shall have access to the grievance procedure (See Section 

15 and Appendix 3). Nothing in this policy shall effect BHA’s 

right to terminate or demote any employee at-will, with or 

without cause . . .” 

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implicated in the employment termination context if the charge 

impairs a reputation for honesty or morality.”). To state a 

liberty interest due process claim, a plaintiff must show that 

“1) the accuracy of the charge is contested; 2) there is some 

public disclosure of the charge; and 3) the charge is made in 

connection with termination of employment.” Brady, 859 F.2d at 

1552; Mustafa, 157 F.3d at 1179. “‘[W]hen the government 

dismisses an individual for reasons that might seriously damage 

his standing in the community, he is entitled to notice and a 

hearing to clear his name.’ ‘To implicate constitutional liberty 

interests, however, the reasons for dismissal must be 

sufficiently serious to ‘stigmatize’ or otherwise burden the 

individual so that he is not able to take advantage of other 

employment opportunities.’ Moreover, to infringe upon a 

constitutionally protected liberty interest, the charges must be 

published.” Portman, 995 F.2d at 907 (citations omitted); see

Roley v. Pierce County Fire Protection Dist. No. 4, 869 F.2d 

491, 495 (1989) (a protected liberty interest in employment 

arises when a government charge seriously damages one’s standing 

and associations in the community such as when one’s good name, 

reputation, or integrity is at stake or when the government 

stigmatizes a person, foreclosing his freedom to pursue other 

employment opportunities). 

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In order to prevail on a claim that a liberty interest has 

been denied without due process, a plaintiff must plead and 

prove both that the government’s charges were published or 

publicly disseminated and that the charges were stigmatizing. 

Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (a public employee who 

is terminable at the will of the employer is not deprived of a 

“liberty” interest when there is no public disclosure of the 

reasons for discharge). A government employee is entitled to a 

name-clearing hearing “‘if the employer creates and disseminates 

a false and defamatory impression about the employee in 

connection with his termination.’ ” Brady, 859 F.2d at 1553; 

see Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (remedy mandated by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for claim based 

on stigmatization during discharge from employment is a nameclearing hearing). 

In the instant case, the TAC does not allege that the 

charges against Evans were published or publicly disseminated. 

Nor does the TAC allege that BHA’s charges seriously damaged 

Evans’ standing and associations in the community placing his 

good name, reputation, or integrity at stake, or that BHA’s 

charges stigmatized him, foreclosing his freedom to pursue other 

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employment.10 Moreover, even assuming that the charges against 

Evans were contested, published or publicly disseminated, and 

construed to place his good name, reputation, or integrity at 

stake, or to stigmatize him, foreclosing his freedom to pursue 

other employment, he cannot state a cognizable due process claim 

because it is undisputed that he was provided an opportunity to 

“clear his name,” i.e., refute the stigmatizing charge. Here, 

it is undisputed that, following his termination on or about 

June 16, 2005, Evans engaged in both informal and formal 

grievance procedures, including the opportunity to participate 

in an appeal proceeding addressing the denial of his formal 

grievance. It is further undisputed that the purpose of the 

appeal proceeding was to provide Evans an opportunity to “clear 

his name” by addressing whether he had committed misconduct. 

For these reasons, Evans’ procedural due process claim is 

dismissed. Because amendment would be futile, this claim is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 

10 Nor, as a general matter, does the TAC allege facts 

contesting the accuracy of the charges against Evans. Rather, 

the TAC acknowledges that Evans did attempt to remove BHA files 

from the workplace as well as seek to recover for unauthorized 

overtime for work performed on May 13, 2005. The only charge 

that Evans appears to contest is the accuracy of whether he 

sought unauthorized overtime for work performed on April 1, 

2005. In this regard, the TAC alleges that overtime on this 

date was implicitly authorized by Peterson because she observed 

him working before 8:00 a.m. and did nothing about it. 

 

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G. Seventh Claim: False Claims Act 

 Evans seeks to state a claim under the False Claims Act 

(“FCA”). However, because public entities are not subject to 

lawsuits under the FCA, he cannot state a cognizable claim for 

relief under the FCA. The FCA was enacted in 1987 and “is 

designed to supplement governmental efforts to identify and 

prosecute fraudulent claims made against state and local 

governmental entities by authorizing private parties (referred 

to as qui tams or relators) to bring suit on behalf of the 

government.” State ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of America Corp., 126 

Cal. App. 4th 225, 236 (2005). The FCA defines covered “persons” 

to “include[ ] any natural person, corporation, firm, 

association, organization, partnership, limited liability 

company, business, or trust.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12650(b)(5). 

Agencies of state and local governments are not “persons” 

subject to suit under the FCA. See Wells v. One2One Learning 

Foundation, 39 Cal. 4th 1164, 1190-91 (2006) (holding that 

public school districts were not “persons” subject to suit under 

FCA because the enumerated list of covered “persons” under the 

statute does not include any words associated with public 

entities). Here, because the BHA is a statutorily authorized 

government entity, established pursuant to California Health & 

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Safety Code § 34240 et seq. and created as a state agency,11 it 

is not a “person” subject to suit under the FCA. See Wells, 39 

Cal. 4th at 1193 (governmental agencies may not be sued under 

California’s false claims statute). 

 For this reason, Evans’ FCA claim against BHA is dismissed. 

Because amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

H. Eighth Claim: Breach of Contract – Express Agreement 

 Evans seeks to state a claim for breach of contract 

(employment contract) premised upon BHA’s purported breach of an 

employment letter prohibiting BHA from terminating him for 

reasons other than misconduct without 14-days notice. However, 

as discussed above, because Evans is a public employee, the 

terms of his employment are governed entirely by statute, not by 

contract, and hence there can be no express contract between 

plaintiff that restricts the manner or reasons for termination 

of his employment. See Portman, 995 F.2d at 905. 

 For this reason, this claim is dismissed. Because 

amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

 

11 See People v. Holtzendorff, 177 Cal. App. 2d 788, 798 

(1960) (observing that a housing authority is a public 

corporation created as a state agency).

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I. Ninth Claim: Breach of Contract – Grievance Procedure 

 Evans seeks to state a claim for breach of contract 

(employment contract) premised upon BHA’s purported failure to 

provide him effective or meaningful participation in the 

grievance procedure. Again, because Evans is a public employee, 

the terms of his employment are governed entirely by statute, 

not by contract, and hence there can be no express contract 

between plaintiff and which restricts the manner or reasons for 

termination of his employment. See Portman, 995 F.2d at 905. 

 For this reason, this claim is dismissed. Because 

amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss is 

GRANTED. Evans’ first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, 

eighth and ninth claims for relief are dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2007. 

/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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