Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01535/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 22, 2015*

Decided December 22, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1535

EARNEST L. JOHNSON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL MARINE TERMINALS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13-CV-490-JPS

J.P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

Earnest Johnson sued his former employer, Federal Marine Terminals, Inc., 

claiming under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, 

that the company had discriminated against him because he is African American. The 

district court granted summary judgment to FMT on the ground that Johnson had not 

filed a timely administrative charge against the company and thus could not bring a 

lawsuit under Title VII. We affirm the judgment.

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-1535 Page 2

The following facts are undisputed, except as noted, and are presented in the light 

most favorable to Johnson, the party opposing summary judgment. See Kvapil v. 

Chippewa Cnty., 752 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014). FMT employed Johnson as a 

longshoreman from 2002 to 2007. Johnson, a member of the International 

Longshoremen’s Association, Local 815, filed an administrative charge of race 

discrimination against the union with the Equal Rights Division of the Wisconsin 

Department of Workforce Development and the EEOC. That charge, which named only 

the union, alleged that, because of his race, the union had refused to refer him for job 

assignments at FMT’s facility in Milwaukee and that coworkers had subjected him to 

racist slurs. (Johnson also submitted administrative charges to the National Labor 

Relations Board.) The state agency dismissed Johnson’s charge in July 2009, and the 

EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on August 21, 2009. Johnson then sued the union under 

Title VII three months later. The district court granted summary judgment for the union,

and in March 2013 we upheld that ruling on appeal. Johnson v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 

Local 815, No. 09-CV-1094 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2012), aff’d, 520 F. App’x 452 (7th Cir. 2013).

A month after our decision in Johnson’s suit against the union, he turned his 

attention to FMT and commenced this action. (At the time he commenced this suit, 

Johnson was incarcerated, having been sentenced by a Wisconsin court in 2010 to seven 

years’ imprisonment. His conviction is unrelated to the events alleged in his complaint.) 

Johnson alleged that FMT likewise had discriminated against him and asserted that the 

company’s discriminatory treatment had occurred as late as August 21, 2007.

FMT moved for summary judgment, arguing that Johnson’s lawsuit was 

untimely because he had not filed an administrative charge of discrimination naming the 

company within 300 days of the alleged misconduct, as required by 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(e)(1). Moreover, FMT argued, even if the EEOC charge that Johnson had filed 

against his union could be read to encompass FMT, the plaintiff’s lawsuit still was 

untimely because he did not sue FMT within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s 

right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Johnson countered that he never received 

that August 2009 letter because he had changed addresses. Later, after briefing on FMT’s 

motion was concluded, Johnson submitted evidence that he had filed an administrative 

charge against FMT with the Department of Workforce Development and the EEOC in 

December 2014, and had received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in January 2015.

In granting FMT’s motion for summary judgment, the district court reasoned that 

Johnson had not filed an administrative charge against FMT within 300 days of any 

alleged discrimination, nor had he sued FMT within 90 days of receiving the 

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No. 15-1535 Page 3

August 2009 right-to-sue letter. The court disregarded Johnson’s assertion that he had 

never received that letter, noting that Johnson had sued the union within 90 days of the 

issuance of the letter, which suggested that in fact he had received it. The court did not 

discuss Johnson’s recently filed administrative charge, which had not even been 

submitted to the Department of Workforce Development and the EEOC until 19 months 

after this lawsuit was filed in the district court.

On appeal, Johnson contends that the order granting summary judgment for FMT 

is erroneous for many reasons, but we need not discuss any question other than the 

timeliness of his federal complaint. Johnson continues to assert that he did not receive 

the August 2009 right-to-sue letter, but now explains that this is because he never 

updated his address on file with the EEOC. He also emphasizes that he did receive in 

January 2015 a right-to-sue letter naming FMT.

Johnson’s contentions are without merit. A plaintiff is not entitled to sue under

Title VII unless he filed a timely administrative charge (within 180 days of the alleged 

discriminatory conduct or within 300 days if the administrative charge is submitted first 

to a state agency). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 210 

(2010); Volovsek v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade and Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 686–87 

(7th Cir. 2003). “Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC precludes a subsequent 

lawsuit under Title VII.” Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2007).

Moreover, “a party not named as the respondent in the charge may not ordinarily be 

sued in a private civil action under Title VII.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 

666 (7th Cir. 2013). Johnson offered no evidence suggesting that he had filed an 

administrative charge naming FMT within 300 days of FMT’s allegedly discriminatory 

conduct, all of which occurred by August 2007. Johnson’s administrative charge naming 

his union, which resulted in the August 2009 right-to-sue letter, was not effective against 

FMT. And even if it had been effective, Johnson admits that he did not update his 

address with the EEOC, which means that he cannot argue that not receiving the letter 

kept him from having “actual notice” of his right to sue. See Reschny v. Elk Grove Plating 

Co., 414 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2005); Bobbitt v. Freeman Cos., 268 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 

2001). Finally, the charge that does name FMT was not filed until December 2014, six 

years too late.

We have considered Johnson’s other arguments, but none has merit.

AFFIRMED.

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