Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00840/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00840-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melissa L. Hatfield,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-22-00840-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Melissa L. Hatfield’s Application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits by the Social Security Administration under the Social Security Act. 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial, 

and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 11, Pl. Br.), Defendant Social 

Security Administration Commissioner’s Response Brief (Doc. 12, Def. Br.), and 

Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 13, Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative 

Record (Doc. 10, R.) and now reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision 

(R. at 1083–1105).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on June 10, 2014, for 

a period of disability beginning on April 28, 2014. (R. at 21.) Her claim was denied initially 

on November 17, 2014, and upon reconsideration on June 25, 2015. (R. at 21.) On April 27, 

2017, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ for a hearing regarding her claim. (R. at 21.) On 

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 1 of 10
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

August 18, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. (R. at 21–35, “2017 ALJ Decision.”) 

On July 13, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the 2017 

ALJ decision. (R. at 1–3.) Plaintiff’s date last insured for Social Security purposes was 

December 31, 2018. (Pl. Br. at 2 & n.2.) 

On August 8, 2019, District of Arizona Judge Steven P. Logan remanded Plaintiff’s 

application to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings, specifically 

requesting that the ALJ “reanalyze the opinion of Dr. Edelstein and Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony.” (R. at 1185–91, “2019 D. Ariz. Order.”) Plaintiff appealed Judge Logan’s 

decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the District Court abused its 

discretion in remanding for further proceedings instead of directing payment of benefits.

(R. at 1209–12, “2021 9th Cir. Decision.”) The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Logan’s 

decision, finding that further proceedings were necessary to determine whether Plaintiff 

can type, develop the record as to Plaintiff’s memory loss, and resolve any discrepancies 

between Dr. Edelstein’s opinion and Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (2021 9th Cir. 

Decision at 2–3.)

A second ALJ held a hearing and heard additional testimony from Plaintiff and a 

Vocational Expert (VE) on December 13, 2021. (R. at 1114–47.) That ALJ entered the 

second decision denying Plaintiff’s application on February 9, 2022. (R. at 1083–1105, 

“2022 ALJ Decision.”)1

The Court has reviewed the record and will discuss the pertinent medical evidence 

in addressing the issues raised by the parties. Upon considering the medical records and 

opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the severe impairments of 

asthma, Lupus, Sjogren’s Disease, fibromyalgia, coronary artery disease, history of 

congestive heart failure, and osteoarthritis in the bilateral knees. (R. at 1086.) 

Ultimately, the second ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and 

concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 1105.) In so doing, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

1 No review by the Appeals Council of the ALJ’s February 9, 2022 decision is found in the 

record.

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 2 of 10
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 1089.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the Residual 

Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform light work. (R. at 1093.) Accordingly, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff can perform work in the national economy, including as a cashier (with 

a stool), office helper, or parking lot attendant, such that Plaintiff is not under a disability 

as defined in the Social Security Act. (R. at 1105.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 

those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 

determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based 

on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is 

more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. 

Id.; see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). To determine whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id.

Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, 

one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas 

v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not 

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 3 of 10
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed 

in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, 

the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. 

Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity and 

determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id.

If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is 

not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises three arguments for the Court’s consideration, namely, (1) the ALJ

failed to give specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in declining 

to incorporate the assessments of Plaintiff’s treating and examining physicians in 

formulating Plaintiff’s RFC; (2) the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear and convincing 

reasons in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony; and (3) the ALJ failed “to support the stepfive finding with substantial evidence.” (Pl. Br. at 2.)

A. The Assessments of Dr. Edelstein

With regard to the Court’s review of an ALJ’s decision denying an Application for 

Disability Insurance Benefits filed prior to 2017, such as the one before the Court, while 

“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy among the 

sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians, those who examined but did not 

treat the claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither examined nor treated the 

claimant are nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

“The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given ‘controlling weight’ so long 

as ‘it is well–supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques 

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 4 of 10
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the record].”’ Trevizo v. Berryhill, 

871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). If a treating 

physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider the relevant 

factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) and determine the appropriate weight to 

give the opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. If a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by 

another doctor’s opinion, the ALJ cannot reject the treating physician’s opinion without 

“setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 

evidence in the record.” Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).

In the prior review of this case by the Court, Judge Logan found the first ALJ erred 

in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Joel Edelstein, Plaintiff’s long-time primary care physician, 

observing that,

[o]n March 31, 2017, in contrast to nonexamining physicians, Dr. Edelstein 

opined that Plaintiff experienced pain, fatigue, and weakness as a result of 

her impairments that would limit her ability to do the following in a work 

setting: concentrate, maintain interpersonal relationships, respond to 

customary work pressures or stress, and provide consistent effort. (R. at 990.) 

Additionally, Dr. Edelstein believed Plaintiff’s impairments would likely 

produce good days and bad days, and he estimated Plaintiff would miss more 

than four days of work per month as a result of her impairments or treatment 

for the same. (R. at 990.)

. . . In [assigning “little weight” to Dr. Edelstein’s opinion], however, the 

ALJ failed to cite evidence in the record that explains how [the results of 

Plaintiff’s physical examinations] undermine Dr. Edelstein’s conclusions 

regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s pain, fatigue, and weakness and the 

limitations caused thereby. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–22 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set 

forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, 

are correct.”) Because the ALJ failed to explain how her reasoning is 

supported by evidence in the record, it cannot serve as specific and legitimate 

reasoning to reject Dr. Edelstein’s opinion.

(2019 D. Ariz. Order at 4–5.)

In the second ALJ decision, although Dr. Edelstein has stated he has treated Plaintiff 

for more than 25 years, the ALJ gives Dr. Edelstein’s assessment of Plaintiff’s work 

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 5 of 10
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

limitations “no weight,” citing numerous sections of Plaintiff’s medical treatment record 

to conclude they contradict Dr. Edelstein’s opinion. (R. at 1094–99.) But the record does 

not bear that conclusion out. For example, the ALJ cites “4F, 16–17, 6F 1–2, 7–8, 11F, 47–

49” as instances in which Plaintiff “has denied headaches.” (R. at 1099.) A reading of those 

records reveals the opposite. The first citation is to Dr. Edelstein’s December 22, 2014 

examination of Plaintiff, in which he notes “migraine headache” as one of Plaintiff’s 

“active problems.” (R. at 434 (4F at 16).) The second citation is to the treatment notes of 

Siama Chohan, M.D., the rheumatologist Plaintiff sees for the treatment of Lupus. The ALJ 

cites Dr. Chohan’s February 3, 2016 treatment notes, but in those notes, Dr. Chohan 

actually states that Plaintiff continues to suffer from “diffuse headaches (despite use of 

butalbital; these are worse than her typical headaches).” (R. at 550–53 (6F at 1–4).) The 

third citation is to Dr. Edelstein’s March 31, 2017 examination of Plaintiff, in which he 

again lists “migraine headache” as one of Plaintiff’s “active problems.” (R. at 1031 (11F 

at 48).) 

While Dr. Edelstein’s notes also indicate that Plaintiff was not suffering from 

migraine headaches at certain appointments (R. at 434, 1031), those observations do not 

constitute Plaintiff’s denial of chronic migraine headaches—as the ALJ concludes (R. at 

1099)—when they are followed by a note that migraine headaches continue to be an active 

problem. Again, one of the ALJ’s citations—to Dr. Chohan’s treatment notes—actually 

indicates Plaintiff’s headaches are worse than usual. (R. at 551–52.) While the ALJ’s 

opinion states she “can only look at the evidence in the record,” the Court finds no 

evidentiary support in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “has denied 

headaches.” (R. at 1099.)

2 The ALJ’s use of that unsupported finding to discount 

Dr. Edelstein’s evaluation of Plaintiff was thus legal error, that is, a failure to give specific 

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008).

2 Dr. Edelstein stated he saw Plaintiff 22 times from 2013 to 2017 to try to “help her joint 

pains, muscle weakness, and poor sleep and fatigue.” (R. at 1423.) The Court finds no 

instances within the treatment records of those visits in which Plaintiff “denied headaches.”

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 6 of 10
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Consistent with his initial assessment of Plaintiff, in the follow-up assessment 

provided after remand, Dr. Edelstein opined that Plaintiff’s “mental functioning [is] 

severely impaired with migraines which occur 10–15x a month which do not respond to 

triptens. Neurology consult confirms.” (R. at 1422.) In the absence of legally sufficient 

reasons to discount the opinion of Plaintiff’s primary care provider regarding Plaintiff’s 

chronic migraine headaches, the ALJ erred in giving it no weight. 

In contrast to the nonexamining physicians’ opinions, Dr. Edelstein also opined that 

Plaintiff’s activities were limited by pain, fatigue, and weakness (R. at 990), and again the 

treatment record supports that conclusion. The record is replete with treatment notes 

chronicling Plaintiff’s fatigue associated with Lupus and treatment therefor. In response to 

Judge Logan’s Order, the ALJ provided citations to the record and stated they showed 

inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s reports of pain, fatigue, and weakness (R. at 1094–1100), but

those citations again do not substantiate that conclusion. Indeed, they principally 

corroborate Dr. Edelstein’s assessment, or at most indicate that Plaintiff was not suffering 

severe pain or fatigue at a certain medical appointment; they do not show that Plaintiff did 

not suffer chronic pain or fatigue at all. Taking the ALJ’s first citation as but one example 

(R. at 1098), it is to Dr. Chohan’s July 17, 2014 treatment notes (1F at 3–8). There, Dr. 

Chohan writes that Plaintiff “reports approximately 4 [months] ago she began to develop 

diffuse neck (anterior and posterior) swelling with pain.” (R. at 266 (1F at 4).) Dr. Chohan 

observed, “Currently with pain with moving her head and limitation of [range of motion], 

diffuse headaches.” (R. at 266 (1F at 4).) In sum, the ALJ also erred by failing to give 

specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Edelstein’s assessment that Plaintiff’s work 

activities would be limited by pain, fatigue, and weakness.

B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

The second ALJ also erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom testimony for many of 

the same reasons the Court discussed above with regard to the weighing of Dr. Edelstein’s 

evaluation.

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 7 of 10
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 

pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the ALJ 

evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an impairment 

“which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged.” 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

If the claimant presents such evidence, then “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony 

about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15 (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 

(9th Cir. 1996)). “In evaluating the credibility of pain testimony after a claimant produces 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a 

claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 

2005). But the ALJ may properly consider that the medical record lacks evidence to support 

certain symptom testimony. Id. at 681.

The Ninth Circuit, in its review of this case, observed “inconsistencies between 

[Plaintiff’s] testimony and Dr. Edelstein’s opinion” that it advised the second ALJ to

resolve, notably regarding Plaintiff’s ability to sit and for how long. (2021 9th Cir. Decision 

at 3.) In this regard, the second ALJ stated that although Plaintiff “alleges she cannot sit 

very long,” she also alleges “she can watch a 2.5 hour movie.” (R. at 1101.) The logical 

disconnect is obvious; nothing in the record identifies in what position Plaintiff watches a 

movie or whether it is equivalent to the seated position over an extended period of time in 

a workplace, and indeed Plaintiff also testified among other things that she must elevate 

her legs regularly at the direction of her doctors. (R. at 1101.) See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 

F.3d 1044, 149–50 (9th Cir. 2001) (the ALJ may err in evaluating symptom testimony by 

failing to substantiate that a substantial part of a claimant’s typical day is spent doing an 

activity that would transfer to a work environment).

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 8 of 10
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The other instances in which the ALJ characterized Plaintiff’s testimony as 

contradictory generally suffer the same logical disconnect. (R. at 1101.) With regard to 

whether Plaintiff can type—a skill needed in many jobs in the national economy—the 

Ninth Circuit advised that additional evidence demonstrating whether Plaintiff can type or 

not “may be critical to resolving this case.” (2021 9th Cir. Decision at 2–3.) No new 

evidence testing Plaintiff’s ability to type is presented in the second ALJ’s decision, but 

the ALJ states that Plaintiff’s use of a cell phone and iPad is equivalent to typing because 

they all require hand/eye coordination. (R. at 1101.) While that may be true, typing may 

very well require a higher level of hand/eye coordination than Plaintiff possesses. The 

evidence in the record does not clearly and convincingly refute Plaintiff’s testimony that 

she cannot type. In any event, the disposition of this case does not turn on Plaintiff’s ability 

to type, considering the evidence of other limits in Plaintiff’s ability to perform substantial 

work activity on a regular and continuing basis.

C. Credit as True

The remaining question is the proper remedy. Plaintiff argues her case should be 

remanded for a calculation of benefits under the credit-as-true rule. The credit-as-true rule, 

if applied, results in a remand of Plaintiff’s case for a calculation and payment of benefits.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). It applies if each part of a threepart standard is satisfied. Id. First, the record must have been fully developed and further 

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Id. Next, the ALJ must have 

failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting claimant’s testimony or medical opinions. 

Id. Finally, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, then the ALJ would 

be required to find the claimant disabled. Id. 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s case presents the “rare circumstances” in which the 

credit-as-true rule applies. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099. First, the record in this case was 

fully and extensively developed and further proceedings would be unproductive. Next, as 

discussed above, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the 

assessment of Dr. Edelstein, Plaintiff’s treating physician. The ALJ also failed to properly 

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 9 of 10
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

weigh Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Finally, if the improperly discredited evidence were 

credited as true, then considering the whole record, including the testimony of the 

Vocational Experts (R. at 71–72, 1143–45), the ALJ would be required to find that Plaintiff 

is disabled. 

Defendant has not identified any useful purpose that would be served by remanding 

this case for an ALJ to evaluate Dr. Edelstein’s assessment or Plaintiff’s credibility for a 

third time. The Court therefore will remand this case for a calculation and entry of benefits.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED reversing the February 9, 2022 decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (R. at 1083–1105).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this case to the Social Security 

Administration for a calculation and entry of benefits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and 

close this case.

Dated this 22nd day of September, 2023.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

Case 2:22-cv-00840-JJT Document 14 Filed 09/22/23 Page 10 of 10