Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06283/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE TORRES GRIMALDI-GARCIA, )

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Petitioner, )

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vs. )

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

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Respondent. )

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No. CV-F-04-6283 OWW

(No. CR-F-03-5049 OWW) 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE

OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

On September 20, 2004, petitioner Jose Torres GrimaldiGarcia timely filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Petitioner was charged by Superseding Information with one

count of misdemeanor illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §

1325(a)(1) and with one count of felony illegal entry in

violation of Section 1325(a)(1). Petitioner pleaded guilty

pursuant to a written Plea Agreement to both counts. The Plea

Agreement provided in pertinent part:

III. Agreements by Defendant.

Case 1:04-cv-06283-OWW Document 4 Filed 11/22/06 Page 1 of 5
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...

(c) Defendant expressly, knowingly and

voluntarily waives his Constitutional and

statutory rights to appeal, including any

rights to appeal his conviction and sentence

on any ground and any appeal right conferred

by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Defendant further

agrees not to contest his sentence in any

post-conviction proceeding, including, but

not limited to, any proceeding under 28

U.S.C. § 2255;

...

(e) Defendant agrees that he shall be

sentenced to the statutory maximum of two (2)

years as to Count Two on the information and

the statutory maximum of six (6) months as to

Count One of the Information and that the

sentence on Count One is to run consecutive

to the sentence on Count Two for a total term

of 30 months. 

Petitioner was sentenced on November 17, 2003 to 30 months

incarceration. Petitioner did not file a Notice of Appeal.

The Section 2255 motion asserts two grounds for relief. 

First, that petitioner was denied the effective assistance of

counsel “during process” because “[a] new rule of constitutional

law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme

Court that was previously unavailable.” Second, that the

“Guidelines are unconstitutional” and that

Defendant pleaded guilty, because the

government charged defendant with past

criminal history. That would put defendant,

under the guideline range of 20 years. If

the took [sic] to trial.

Petitioner’s motion is without merit. 

First, Petitioner waived his right to bring a Section 2255

motion in the Plea Agreement and makes no contention or showing

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that the waiver in the Plea Agreement was unknowing and

involuntary. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th

Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1778 (2006).

 Second, petitioner has not demonstrated ineffective

assistance of counsel. Claims asserting the ineffective

assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-prong test

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As

explained in United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.2d 1344,

1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996):

According to Strickland, there are two

components to an effectiveness inquiry, and

the petitioner bears the burden of

establishing both ... First, the

representation must fall ‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness.’ ... Courts

scrutinizing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s conduct must examine counsel’s

‘overall performance,’ both before and at

trial, and must be highly deferential to the

attorney’s judgments ... In fact, there

exists a ‘strong presumption that counsel

“rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.”’ ... In

short, defendant must surmount the

presumption that, ‘under the circumstances,

the challenged action “might be considered

sound trial strategy.”’ ... Thus, the proper

inquiry is ‘whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or

omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.’ ....

If the petitioner satisfies the first prong,

he must then establish that there is ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

would have been different ....’

Where a petitioner enters a guilty plea upon the advice of

counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends upon whether the

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petitioner received effective assistance of counsel. In order to

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the

[petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985). 

 Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) has been

overruled. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the

Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. 

The Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)

and in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) again

exempted the fact of a prior conviction from its holdings. See

United States v. Quintana-Quintana, 383 F.3d 1052 (9 Cir.2004), th

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1130 (2005); United States v. Asberry, 394

F.3d 712 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 198 th

(2005); See also United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1079

n.16 (9 Cir. 2005)(“Although recent Supreme Court jurisprudence th

has perhaps called into question the continuing viability of

Almendarez-Torres ..., we are bound to follow a controlling

Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled by that

Court.”). Therefore, counsel was not ineffective by failing to

speculate as to the future course of the law.

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ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. Petitioner Jose Torres Grimaldi-Garcia’s motion to

vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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