Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00562/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERRANCE WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 05-0562-CG-M

JEFF DUNN, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This

action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the

undersigned on the motion for summary judgment of Defendants,

Jeff Dunn, Randall Younce, and Doug Phillips (Docs. 13, 14), and

Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto (Docs. 15, 17, 24). For the

reasons stated below, it is recommended that the motion for

summary judgment of Defendants Dunn, Younce, and Phillips be

granted and that Plaintiff’s action against these Defendants be

dismissed without prejudice. 

I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

From its review of the record, the Court summarizes the

parties’ allegations that are material to the issues addressed in

this Report and Recommendation. On February 12, 2004, Baldwin

County Deputies Doug Phillips and Randall Younce observed

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Plaintiff driving a 1984 Chevy Caprice on the Causeway in Baldwin

County, Alabama. (Doc. 4 at 4; Doc. 14, Ex. 2 at 2-3 and Ex. 3

at 2). Deputy Phillips, who was running radar, registered

Plaintiff’s speed at sixty-one m.p.h. in a fifty-five m.p.h.

zone. (Doc. 14, Ex. 2 at 2). In addition, Deputy Younce

observed the vehicle operating without a tag light and pulled out

behind Plaintiff’s vehicle, activating his emergency lights. 

(Id., Ex. 3 at 2). Plaintiff pulled his vehicle into the Ramada

Inn parking lot and stopped, and Deputies Phillips and Younce

approached the vehicle. (Id.). Deputy Younce informed Plaintiff

of the reason for the stop and asked to see Plaintiff’s driver’s

license. (Id.). After inspecting the driver’s license, Deputy

Younce asked Plaintiff to get out of the vehicle, and Deputy

Phillips frisked Plaintiff. (Id.). Deputy Phillips felt a

plastic bag in Plaintiff’s front, right pocket, containing a

powdery substance which he believed to be drugs. He removed the

contents of the pocket and found two plastic bags containing a

white powdery substance which field tested positive for cocaine. 

(Id., Ex. 2 at 2-3). Deputy Phillips contacted Narcotics

Investigator Dunn who responded to Plaintiff’s location in the

parking lot. (Id., Ex. 1 at 3). Baldwin County Sheriff’s

Narcotics Investigator Burke also responded to a request for

assistance and arrived on the scene. (Id.). Investigator Burke

read Plaintiff his Miranda rights, and Plaintiff responded that

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he understood those rights. (Id.). Upon questioning, Plaintiff

admitted to Investigator Dunn that the plastic bags contained

cocaine that he was delivering to an individual at the Ramada

Inn. (Id.). Investigator Dunn field tested and weighed the

substance in the plastic bags. It tested positive for cocaine

and weighed approximately thirty-five grams. (Id.). Plaintiff

was then arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. 

(Id.). 

On December 7, 2004, Plaintiff was convicted of trafficking

in cocaine and sentenced to twenty years in prison. (Doc. 4 at

6). Plaintiff appealed his conviction in state court, and that

appeal is still pending. (Id. at 4). Neither Plaintiff’s

conviction nor his sentence has been reversed, expunged, or

invalidated. (Id. at 6). 

II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE

On October 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed his Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). On October 20, 2005, the Court ordered

Plaintiff to refile his Complaint on this Court’s form, which he

did on November 10, 2005, claiming that Defendants Dunn, Younce,

and Phillips violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by

unlawfully searching him without a warrant. (Doc. 4 at 5-6). 

According to Plaintiff, Defendants “ma[d]e a warrantless search

for narcotics,” which resulted in Defendants finding cocaine on

his person, leading to his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. 

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1 Plaintiff does not specify whether he is suing Defendants

in their official or individual capacities or both. Thus, the

Court will consider both. Defendants, Baldwin County Narcotics

Investigator Dunn, Baldwin County Sheriff’s Deputy Younce, and

Baldwin County Sheriff’s Deputy Phillips are state officers and,

thus, are absolutely immune from suit for damages in their

official capacities. See Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d

1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state officials sued in their

official capacities are protected from suit for damages under the

Eleventh Amendment); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d

1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997) (“deputy sheriffs are state officials

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued in their

official capacities.”). Moreover, “[q]ualified immunity protects

government officials performing discretionary functions from

suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct

violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Dalrymple v.

Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In determining whether qualified

immunity is appropriate in a given case, “[t]he court must first

ask the threshold question whether the facts alleged, taken in

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show that the

government official’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” 

Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001)). Having found herein that Plaintiff’s allegations do

not establish a constitutional violation, “there is no necessity

for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

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(Id.). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.

at 7). 

On October 23, 2006, Defendants filed their Answer and

Special Report, denying any violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights and asserting the defenses of absolute and

qualified immunity.1 (Docs. 13, 14). On February 7, 2007, the

Court converted the Answer and Special Report to a motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 21). On November 8, 2006, December 11,

2006, and March 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed responses to the Answer

and Special Report, reasserting his Fourth Amendment claim

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against Defendants. (Docs. 15, 17, 24). These motions are now

before the Court. 

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment,

the Court begins with these basic principles. The Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure grant this Court authority under Rule 56 to

render “judgment as a matter of law” to a party who moves for

summary judgment. “[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .’” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

The Court must view the evidence produced by “the nonmoving

party, and all factual inferences arising from it, in the light

most favorable to” that party. Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d

923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, Rule 56(e) states that:

an adverse party [to a motion for summary

judgment] may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

pleading, but the adverse party’s response,

by affidavits or as otherwise provided in

this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. If the adverse party does not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,

shall be entered against the adverse party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

325-27. “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is

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sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to

return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely

colorable, . . . or is not significantly probative, . . . summary

judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary

judgment may be granted against a party who fails to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahawneh, 2001 WL 530424, *1 (S.D.

Ala. May 11, 2001) (unreported) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249-50).

IV. DISCUSSION

In this action, Plaintiff seeks redress for an alleged

constitutional deprivation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section

1983 provides that: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. . . . 

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, Narcotics

Investigator Dunn, Deputy Younce, and Deputy Phillips, violated

his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully searching him without a

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warrant after stopping him for speeding and operating his vehicle

without a tag light and, further, that Defendants unlawfully

seized two plastic bags of cocaine located in Plaintiff’s front,

right pocket, which directly resulted in Plaintiff being arrested

for and convicted of trafficking in cocaine. (Doc. 4 at 4-6). 

As discussed above, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive

damages for this alleged violation. (Id. at 7). The United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), governs this case. 

In Heck, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule established

in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), that “habeas corpus

is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the

fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or

speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the

literal terms of § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. A claim by a

prisoner seeking to obtain injunctive relief to end or shorten

his confinement is simply not cognizable under § 1983. Unlike

the plaintiff in Preiser, however, the plaintiff in Heck sought

only monetary damages for the alleged unlawful conduct that led

to his arrest and confinement. Faced with only a damages claim,

the Heck court held:

We hold that, in order to recover damages for

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

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sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid

by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for

damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in

a § 1983 suit, the district court must

consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if

it would, the complaint must be dismissed

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added, in

part). In Heck, the court reasoned that, by establishing the

basis for his damages claim, Heck would “necessarily imply” the

invalidity of his conviction. Id. at 487, 490. Therefore, his

damages claim was not cognizable under § 1983 until the

conviction or sentence had been appropriately invalidated. Id.

In the present action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

searched him without a warrant and seized thirty-five grams of

cocaine from his pocket, leading to his immediate arrest and

subsequent conviction for trafficking in cocaine. (Doc. 4 at 4-

6). While Plaintiff does not seek to be released from prison or

to recover damages for a wrongful conviction, he does seek to

recover damages for harm caused by Defendants’ alleged unlawful

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2 Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for “pain and

suffering” and “impairment of enjoyment of life.” (Doc. 4 at 7).

3 Even if this action were not barred by Heck, Defendants

would be entitled to summary judgment inasmuch as Plaintiff has

failed to establish any Fourth Amendment violation related to

Defendants’ search and seizure of the cocaine in his pocket. 

See, e.g., U.S. v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 778-79 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(“During a Terry stop, a police officer may conduct a limited

search for concealed weapons, if the officer believes that a

suspect may be dangerous. . . . If a police officer lawfully

pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose

contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there

has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already

authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is

contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the

same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view

context.”).

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search and seizure of the cocaine in his pocket.2 (Id. at 7). 

Without question, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claim

for damages for Defendants’ alleged unlawful search and seizure

of the thirty-five grams of cocaine would “necessarily imply” the

invalidity of his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Heck,

512 U.S. at 487. Because Plaintiff’s conviction has not been

reversed, expunged, or invalidated (Doc. 4 at 6), the instant

collateral attack on that action is prohibited by Heck. 

Having considered Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants

Dunn, Younce, and Phillips and the undisputed evidence in this

action, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is

premature under Heck. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint, in its entirety.3

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the motion

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for summary judgment of Defendants, Jeff Dunn, Randall Younce,

and Doug Phillips (Docs. 13, 14), be granted and that Plaintiff’s

action against these Defendants be dismissed without prejudice.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this

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action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a

transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that

transcription is necessary is required before the United States

will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 11th day of April, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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