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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LAKE COUNTRY FORD, An Oklahoma 

Corporation, 

Plaintiff~Appellee, 

v. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB O 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2766 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

{N. Dist. Okla.) 

{80-C-664-E & 81-0269-E) 

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 

Defendant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before MOORE, BARRETT and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

Ford Motor Company {Ford) appeals from a judgment entered in 

favor of Lake Country Ford, Inc. {LCF) following a jury trial and 

a final order denying Ford's motion for partial judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. A 

summary of the litigative history will facilitate our review. 

This action was initiated when Ford Motor Credit {FMC) 

brought a diversity action against James C. and ~adeline Wooley 

and their son and daughter-in-law, James s. and Jane A. Wooley, 

predicated on certain personal guarantees executed by them in . 

Appellate Case: 86-2766 Document: 01019962647 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 1 
connection with a car dealership owned and operated by LCF. At 

all times relevant hereto, the Wooleys owned LCF. 

Subsequently, LCF filed suit against Ford and FMC alleging 

federal antitrust violations and violations of the Automobile 

Dealers . Day in Court Act . (ADDCA), 15 U.S.C. S 1221, et seq. The 

two cases were consolidated for trial. During trial, the Wooleys 

stipulated to the entry of ju"dgment in favor of FMC in its 

diversity case and LCF moved to dismiss its ADDCA claim against 

FMC. LCF's motion was granted as was Ford's motion to dismiss 

LCF's antitrust claims. Thereafter, the case was submitted to the 

jury solely on LCF's ADDCA claims against Ford. 

At trial, LCF developed a significant portion of its case 

through the testimony of James C. Wooley (Wooley). Wooley 

testified, inter alia, that: prior to his retirement in August, 

1977, he had worked for over 17 years with various subsidiaries of 

FMC; after his retirement, he and his son, a practicing attorney, 

purchased the Ford dealership at Grove, Oklahoma, and formed LCF 

to own the dealership; LCF commenced operations on March 1, 1978, 

after receiving Ford's approval and meeting Ford's dealer 

investment guide for working capital; 1978 was a very profitable 

year for LCF; 1979 was a disaster for LCF because Ford had 

continued to manufacture larger, expensive, less fuel efficient 

cars which were difficult to sell during the fuel shortages of the 

late 1970's and early 1980's; Ford utilized zone "field managers" 

to sell vehicles to dealers Jn their respective zones; the field 

managers who called on LCF always presented Wooley with a preprepared order form; and that although Wooley resisted purchasing 

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the vehicles that had been ordered for LCF via the pre-prepared 

order forms, he was told he "had to take them." (R., Vol. III at 

p. 196). 

Wooley further testified that: under LCF's contracts with 

Ford, LCF was obligated to take the vehicles ordered for it (Id. 

at 201); Ford could cancel its contracts with LCF if LCF refused 

to cooperate, Id.; if LCF did not take the hard to sell cars 

ordered for it, it would not receive the more desirable, saleable 

cars; that LCF had to take cars it did not want in order to 

receive cars that it wanted, Id. at 256; coercive practices by the 

field managers caused LCF to order and accept 45 vehicles it did 

not want and to accept 38 vehicles it did not order and did not 

want, Id. at 159-62, 195, 273-77; Ford's branch sales manager had 

told him that LCF would have to pay a $150.00 back-haul charge for 

each vehicle it refused to accept; the unwanted vehicles continued 

to arrive despite his repeated complaints; LCF's cash flow became 

very restricted in early 1980; and on March 15, 1980, he paid his 

employees and "locked the doors" after FMC came to the dealership 

and picked up the keys and manufacturer's statement of right for 

all the new vehiGles in LCF's stock. (Id., at pp. 298-304; Vol. 

IV at pp. 313-15). 

Professor Richard C. Burgess testified as a damage expert for 

LCF. He testified that: LCF incurred additional interest costs 

of approximately $28,000 in financi~g the 83 disputed vehicles 

received from Ford (R., Vol. XI at p. 1764); the primary cause of 

LCF's business failure was the interest charges for the unwanted 

vehicles, Id. at 1768; if the 83 -disputed vehicles had not been· 

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shipped, LCF could have stayed in business and enjoyed increasing 

profits; and that LCF could have been sold in 1989 for almost two 

million dollars. Professor Burgess also presented a damage model, 

Plaintiff's Exhibit 104, in which .he calculated the present value 

of LCF's total damages for lost profits and diminuation in 

of LCF as a going concern to be approximately $1,900,000. 

Vol. X at pp. 1631-33). 

by presenting evidence 

value 

(i., 

Ford developed its case which 

established that: Wooley was an experienced businessman with 

seventeen years at FMC and intimately familiar with the operations 

of a dealership; Wooley's son was a practicing attorney who, with 

his father, reviewed all the deaiership documents prepared by Ford 

and who, after reviewing the documents, signed them with his 

father; Wooley purchased the dealership with literally no money 

down; FMC withdrew its floor plan financing for LCF after LCF 

failed to remit required payments to FMC on seven new vehicles 

that it had sold to its customers; Wooley was not a good manager 

and was unable to operate the Grove dealership, which had been 

operated successfully at the same location since 1958; Wooley 

failed to control his books, and made improper payments out of the 

dealership; although Wooley admitted that he was familiar with 

Ford's Dealer Policy Board which was established to resolve 

disputes between Ford and its dealers, he never presented any 

grievances to the Board; and that its field managers did not force 

Wooley to ,take any cars he did not want or could not sell. Ford 

also presented the expert testimony of Professor .Robert F. Lusch 

who testified that the 83 disputed .vehicles actually resulted in a 

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benefit of over $20,000 to LCF rather than a loss. (R., Vol • . XV 

at pp. 2705-14). 

Stephen Lewis, one of the Ford field managers -who called on 

LCF, testified that: he filled out the monthly order forms for LCF 

and all the other dealers he called on in advance; he filled out 

the forms based on product avail~bility, Ford's SfStem for 

allocating vehicles and the dealer's individual needs; the orders 

were always open to negotiations; he never forced any dealers, 

including LCF, to buy vehicles that they did not want or could not 

sell; and Wooley did not complain to them about the size of his 

inventory. (R., Vol. XII at pp. 2066-2073). Dennis Guest, who 

replaced Mr. Lewis as LCF's field manager, also testified that LCF 

was not coerced into buying vehicles that it did not want and that 

Wooley did not complain to him about the size of LCF's inventory. 

Ford's damages expert, Professor Lusch, testified that: the 

83 disputed vehicles actually resulted in a benefit of over 

$20,000 to LCF; the 83 disputed vehicles did not cause LCF's 

demise; during the years in question LCF experienced declining 

profits in each of its departments while its expenses increased 

sigpificantly; and LCF could have reduced its losses its second 

twelve months of operation by approximately $43,000 if it had held 

the line on its expenses. Professor Lusch also compared LCF's 

performance with that of the previous dealer, which managed to 

maintain profitabi~ity when faced with the inevitable periodic 

downturns that occur in the demand for new cars. 

LCF's ADDCA claim went to the jury on special 

interrogatories. In returning a verdict in favor df LCF, the jury 

found: 

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1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence 

that during the period March 11, 1978 to March 20, 

1980 Ford Motor Company demanded that Lake Country 

Ford purchase certain types of vehicles that it did 

not want in order to be allowed to purchase certain 

other types of vehicles from Ford and/or that Ford 

Motor Company forced Lake Country Ford to accept 

unordered vehicles? 

(A) Ordered but unwanted vehicles 

Answer Yes or No Yes 

(B) Unordered vehicles 

Answer Yes or No Yes 

* * * 

2. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence 

that such demands were coupled with threats of 

sanctions if the demands were not complied with? 

An~wer Yes or No Yes 

* * * 

3. As a result of the demands and threats, do you find 

from a preponderance of the evidence that Lake 

Country Ford purchased vehicles from Ford Motor 

Company which it would not have otherwise 

purchased? 

Answer Yes or No Yes 

* * * 

4. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence 

that plaintiff, Lake Country Ford, has suffered any losses or damages as a direct and proximate result 

of Defendant's actions as to: 

(A) Ordered but unwanted vehicles 

Answer Yes or No Yes 

(B) Unordered vehicles 

Answer Yes or No Yes 

If you answer is "No" sign and return your finding to 

the Court. · If your answer to either is "Yes," you must 

proceed to determine the amount of damages from the 

evidence. You are to separately determine the amount of 

each type ·of damages claimed by Plaintiff Lake Country 

Ford; Lost Fut.ure Profits, and the Diminuation of the 

Value of Lake Country Ford as a Going Concern at the end 

of the lost profit period. 

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Damages for Lost Future Profits 

D~mages for Diminuation of the 

value of Lake Country Ford as 

a going concern at the end of the 

$200,000.00 

lost profit period $ 83,000.00 

{R., Supplemental Volume I at Tab 128, pp. 1-3). 

Ford ' s motion ~or partial summarr judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, was denied. 

On appeal, Ford contends (1) Ford was entitled to judgment on 

LCF's claim that Ford violated the ADDCA by forcing LCF to accept 

unordered vehicles, and (2) Ford is entitled to a new trial on 

all of the claims raised by LCF. 

At the outset, both parties acknowledge, citing to Hurd v. 

American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 499 {10th Cir. 1984), 

that the district court, in addressing Ford's motion for a 

directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict, was required to determine whether there was sufficient 

evidence to support each element of LCF's claim upon which the 

jury could properly find in favor of LCF. Both parties also 

acknowledge that the district court, in making such a 

determination, "must view the evidence most favorably to the 

party against whom the motion is made, and give that party the 

weight of all reasonable inferences." Hurd v. American Hoist & 

Derrick Co., at p. 498. See also Gruntmeir v. Mayrath Industries 

!.!!S, 841 F.2d 1037, 1040 {10th Cir. 1988). 

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I. 

a. 

Ford contends that it was entitled to judgment on LCF's 

. claims that it violated the ADDCA by forcing LCF to accept 

unordered vehicles. Under S 1222 of the ADDCA, it is possible 

that a dealer may bring suit against an automobile manufacturer 

without respect to the amount in controversy and shall recover 

damages sustained by failure of the manufacturer to act in good 

faith in performing or complying with the terms or conditions of 

the franchise. S 1221 defines "good faith" as: 

The term "good faith" shall mean the duty of each party 

to any franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents 

thereof to act in a fair and equitable manner toward 

each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from 

coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or 

intimidation from the other party: Provided, That 

recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, 

urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a 

lack of good faith. 

Ford argues, citing Howard v. Chrysler Corporation, 705 F.2d 1285 

(10th Cir. 1983), that under the ADDCA, a dealer is obligated to 

prove that it has been treated unfairly and that the manufacturer 

has acted in a coercive or intimidating manner. We agree. Ford 

contends that LCF failed to prese~t evidence from which a 

reasonable juror could infer that LCF had been coerced or 

intimidated into accepting unordered vehicles. 

Howard v. Chrysler Corporation was reaffirmed in Fox Motors, 

Inc. v. Mayden Distributors, 806 F.2d 953, 959 (10th Cir. 1986). 

("This circuit has interpreted the statutory language as requiring 

· proof of both unfair treatment and some measure of coercion or 

intimidation to support a claim.") 

observed: 

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In Fox Motors, we also 

Appellate Case: 86-2766 Document: 01019962647 Date Filed: 02/06/1989 Page: 8 
The existence of coercion or intimidation depends upon 

the circumstances arising in each particular case and may 

be inferred from a course of conduct. H.R. Rep., No. 

2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code 

Cong. & Ad. _News 4596, 4603. 

* * * 

Withholding scarce vehicles from some dealers through a 

discriminatory allocation scheme, with forced termination 

as the intended result; is thus conduct undertaken in bad 

faith in violation of the Act. 

ao6 F.2d at 959-960. 

The ADDCA was designed to curtail that coercion and 

intimidation made possible by the parties' relative economic 

inequality. Colonial Ford, Inc. v. Ford ·Motor Company, 592 F.2d 

1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979). 

However, the ADDCA "specifically eliminates as a violation from 

its provisions the 'recommendation, endorsement, exposition, 

persuasion, urging, or argument' on the part of the manufacturer." 

Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, 433 F.2d 708, 712 (10th 

Cir. 1970). A cause of action exists under the act "only when the 

unfair and inequitable conduct of the manufacturer amounts to 

coercion or intimidation." Id. Mere arbitrariness on the part of 

manufacturer does not give rise to a violation of the ADDCA. Gage 

v. General Motors Corporation, 796 F.2d 345, 351 (10th Cir. 1986). 

On the other hand, forcing a dealer to take unwanted cars does 

give rise to a violation of the ADDCA: 

There existed sufficient evidence to support a jury 

finding that pressure was brought to bear on plaintiff 

to take unwanted cars. Such action by a manufacturer 

comes clearly within .the statute as is reflected by the 

legislative history of the Act mentioned above and thus 

amounts to coercive or intirnidative acts and is 

sufficient to support a finding of lack of 'good faith.' 

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American Motors Sales Corporation v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192 (10th 

Cir. 1967) at 197. 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, and mindful 

that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to LCF, 

we hbld that LCF presented sufficient evidence from which a jury 

could determine · that Ford engaged in unfair treatment of LCF and 

that LCF had been coerced or intimidated into accepting unordered 

vehicles in violation of the ADDCA. Under such circumstances, we 

hold that the court did not err in denying Ford's motion for a 

directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

b. 

Ford argues that "[i]f judgment should have been entered 

against LCF with respect to the 'unordered' vehicles, then Ford 

should also have been granted a new trial on the remaining 

claims." (Brief of Defendant-Appellant at p. 20). Having 

determined that Ford was not entitled to have judgment entered 

against LCF with respect to the unordered vehicles, inasmuch as 

there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on LCF's claims, 

we need not consider Ford's allegation that it should have been 

granted a new trial on the remaining claims. 

II. 

Ford argues that "[r]egardless of this Court's ruling with 

respect to the 'unordered' vehicles •.• Ford is entitled to a 

new trial in light of the inadequacies in the instructions, the 

insufficiency of the evidence, and the compromise nature of the 

jury's award." (Brief of Defendant-Appellant at p. 22). 

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a. 

Ford argues, quoting Tyler v. Howell, Inc. 274 F.2d 890, .897 

( l .0th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 ( 1960) · that the trial 

court has "the inescapable duty to fully and correctly instruct 

the jury on the applicable law of the case, and to guide, direct, 

and assist them toward an intelligent understanding of the legal 

and factual issues involved in their search for the truth," and 

that we must look to the entire charge to determine its adequacy 

and to reverse "[i]f the charge as a whole leaves us with 

substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been 

properly guided in its deliberations." Pierce v. Ramsey Winch 

Co., 753 F.2d 416, 425 (5th Cir. 1984). Predicated thereon, Ford 

contends that the district court's instructions on good faith and 

damages, and its refusal to give three instructions tendered by 

Ford, left the jury without proper guidance on the issues of 

violation and causation and constituted reversible error. 

Specifically, Ford contends that: while technically correct, 

the court's instruction on good faith was far too general; the 

court erred in refusing to give Ford's proffered instructions on 

unorde.red vehicles, proper mix of vehicles, proximate cause and 

substantial factor; and that the court's damage instruction, while 

technically correct, failed to adequately apprise the jury of the 

limitations on its power to award damages to LCF for failure of 

the dealership. 

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In reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, w~ consider 

the instructions given as a whole, mindful that no particular form 

of words is essential if the instructions, as a whole, convey the 

, 

correct statement of the applicable law. Furr v. AT&T 

Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (10th Cir. 1987). In 

~ssessing the effect of an erroneous instruction, we consider not 

only the instructions as a whole but also the opening statements, 

the evidence, and the closing statements. U.S. Industries, Inc. 

v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988). An 

erroneous instruction requires reversal only if we conclude that 

it affected substantial rights of the parties. Id. at 1252. 

Applying these standards, we hold that the challenged instructions 

given by the court did not give rise to reversible error. The 

instructions were not only technically correct, as Ford concedes, 

but were also adequate to properly charge the jury. 

b. 

Ford contends that the jury verdict in favor of LCF was 

against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that a new 

trial should have been granted on the insufficiency of the 

evidenc~. Ford argues that LCF's evidence with respect to the 38 

unordered vehicles was so lacking that it was error for the court 

to have submitted the issue to the jury and that LCF's evidence 

with respect to the 45 ordered but unwanted vehicles "was almost 

as flimsy." (Brief of Defendant-Appellant at p. 29). 

While acknowledging that "[a] threat to withhold desirable 

vehicles that would otherwise be allocated to the dealer unless 

the dealer agrees to take unde~irable vehicles as well would 

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constitute 'coercion' within the meaning of the Act," id., p. 30, 

Ford argues that Wooley's testimony that LCF was compelled to take 

whatever vehicles the field managers ordered for it was incredible 

on its face. Ford concludes that the evidence relative to 

coercion and causation, when considered by "a reasonable juror," 

"is so lacking that a judgment in favor of LCF was contrary to the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence." Id.~- 33. 

Not unexpectedly, LCF responds that the jury verdict was more 

than adequately supported by the evidence and that Ford's 

contention is without merit. LCF argues that Wooley was 

repeatedly coerced into accepting ordered but unwanted vehicles 

and unordered and unwanted vehicles, and that the evidence on 

causation established that Ford's treatment of LCF gave rise to 

cash flow problems and unsaleable inventory which lead to LCF's 

closing. 

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial only for 

abuse of discretion. McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 

F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988): Suggs v. State Farm Fire and 

Casualty Company, 833 F.2d, 883, 887 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. 

denied, U.S. (1988). If a reasonable basis exists for the 

jury's verdict, we will not disturb the district court's ruling. 

Id. pp. 886-87. 

Our review of the record convinces us that there was 

sufficient evidence to support LCF's ADDCA claims, and that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ford's 

motion. As set ·forth~ supra, Wooley repeatedly testified that he 

was coerced into accepting vehicles that he did not want and LCF's 

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expert testified in detail relative to the effect of the 

dealership's receipt of the unwanted vehicles. 

c. 

Ford contends that the damage award must be reversed because 

· it is wholly unrelated to the evidence and it gave LCF double 

damages. Ford argues that the damage award of only $283,000 

suggests that the jury reached a compromise verdict and that 

reversal is clearly required. Ford also argues that since LCF's 

computerized damage model was the only evidence presented to the 

jury that quantified the alleged harm to LCF, there was no way 

that the jury could have arrived at an alternative measure of 

damages except through speculation and guess work, in which case 

the jury verdict must be reversed. Lastly, Ford argues that the 

special interrogatories presented to the jury provided the jury 

with the opportunity to award damages for both lost profits and 

diminuation of the value of LCF and that, as such, the jury was 

virtually required to award double damages to LCF. 

In response, LCF argues that Ford's contention of a 

compromise verdict has no basis and that although the award was 

small, it was not in conflict with the damage proof. LCF also 

challenges Ford's contention on double damages. LCF argues that 

since its dam~ge analysis projected profits for ten years and the 

selling of the 4ealership at the end of the ten year term, damages 

for lost profits and diminuation of value were both properly 

included in the special interrogatories. LCF describes Ford's 

double damage argument as "a sophistic exercise designed to reduce 

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the damage .award, .which had some apparent effect." 

Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 28). 

(Brief of 

Ford argues, citing National Railroad Passenger Corporation 

v. Kodh Industries, Inc., 701 F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1983) that 

a new tr~al must be · held as to all issues wheri, as here, it 

appears that the jury rendered a compromise verdict. Ford 

contends that the jury's damage award of $283,000, as ·compared to 

LCF's damage claim of $1.9 million, supports its position that the 

jury rendered a comp~omise verdict, in which it resolved its 

doubts as to Ford's liability by reducing the damage award. 

In National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Koch 

Industries, Inc., supra, we defined a compromise judgment as "one 

reached when the jury, unable to agree on liability, compromises 

that disagreement and enters a low award of damages." 701 F.2d at 

110. We also held: 

To determine whether a verdict is a compromise verdict, 

a court looks for a close question of liability, a 

damages award that is grossly inadequate, and other 

circumstances such as length of jury deliberation .••. 

While a grossly inadequate award of damages by itself 

does not require retrying the liability issue, suspicion 

should be aroused if the jury awards only nominal 

damages •... (citations omitted) 

701 F.2d at 110. 

Applying these guidelines to the facts herein, we hold that the 

jury's verdict did not constitute a compromise verdict. 

Initially, the special interrogatories submitted to and 

answered by the jury establish beyond cavil that the jury was 

convinced of Ford's liability. Secondly, the damage amount of 

$283,000, while considerably less than the $1.9 million claimed, 

cannot be considered "grossly inadequate." Third, the jury 

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deliberated five hours prior to returning its verdict. Nothing in 

the record suggests that the length of the jury's deliberations 

was inadequate. 

We have previously observed that a defendant whose wrongful 

conduct has caused difficulty in assessing damages cannot complain 

that the damages are speculative. Brunswick Corporation v. Spinit 

Rell Company, 832 F~2d 513, 526 (10th Cir. 1987). In assessing a 

challenge to the damages awarded in Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. 

v. Nissan Motor Corporation, 533 F.2d 510, 517-18 (10th Cir. 

1976), we observed: 

On appeal, Nissan argues that the evidence was not 

sufficient to support the damage claims. • • We are 

mindful that computations by experts cannot be based on 

conjecture or be unsupported by the record •.•• 

While damage claims may not be speculative, they 

also do not have to be mathematically precise; it is 

sufficient if damages are proved to a reasonable 

certainty. Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 202 

F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962), reversed on other grounds, 

318 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir. 1963); Cecil Corley Motor Co., 

Inc. v. General Motors Corp., supra. And where the 

defendant's wrongdoing created the uncertainty, it must 

bear the risk of that uncertainty and cannot complain. 

Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 66 S. Ct. 

574, 90 L. Ed. 652 (1946); Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, 

Inc •. 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970); Garvin v. American 

Motors Sales Corp., supra. Given a finding by the Jury 

that Nissan discriminated in the allocation of cars, 

that wrong contributed substantially to the uncertainty 

regarding the number of cars that Randy's would have 

received without the discrimination; Nissan, then, is 

in an unfavorable position to complain of an uncertainty 

created by its own wrongdoing. 

No lesser standard should be applied in this case. We decline to 

adopt Ford's contention that the damages awarded herein were 

wholly unrelated to th~ evidence. 

We also reject Ford's allegation that the special 

interrogatories presented to the jury provided the jury with the 

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• 

, 

opportunity to award damages for both lost profits and diminuation 

of the value of LCF and that; as such, the jury was virtually 

required to award double damages to LCF. As set forth supra, 

LCF's expert Dr. Burgess presented a damage model which ·calculated 

the present value of LCF's total damages for lost profits and for 

diminuation in value of LCF as a going concern to be approximately 

$1,900,000. This damage model was admttted in evidence without 

objection (R., Vol. XI at p. 1,645). 

After the damage model was admitted in evidence, Dr. Burgess 

was subject to vigorous cross-examination by Ford. Inasmuch as 

the model was admitted without objection, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in submitting a special interiogatory to 

the jury, which clarified that under LCF's damage model, damages 

could be awarded to LCF for lost profits and/or diminuation in 

value. When Ford opted not to object to the damage model, which 

included damages for both lost profits and diminuation in value, 

the jury was at liberty to accept or reject it in arriving at its 

verdict. Under such circumstances, we decline to hold that the 

special interrogatory clarifying LCF's damage request improperly 

gave _rise to an award of double damages. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

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