Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01021/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01021-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZACHARY L. WEIR,

Inmate No. 12548161 Civil

No. 

13cv1021 GPC (MDD)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

AND

(2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST DEFENDANTS WHO ARE

IMMUNE AND FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915(a)(1)

vs.

ROBERT M. SZUMOWSKI, Judge; KERRY

WELLS, Judge; CHARLES R. GILL, Judge;

FREDERIC McGUIRE, Judge; BRENDEN

McHUGH, Deputy District Attorney;

EUKETA OLIVER, Public Defender;

WILLIAM STEARNS; Supervising Public

Defender; WILLIAM STRALKA, Trial

Counsel, 

Defendants.

On April 16, 2013, Plaintiff, who is committed under the custody of the Department of

Mental Health at Atascadero State Hospital, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has

also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

(ECF No. 2.) On April 30, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Laporte determined

that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims arose in San Diego and therefore, transferred the action to

the Southern District of California. (ECF No. 4.) 

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted

an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Based upon

this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. Because

Plaintiff is a committee and not a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the Court will

waive the initial civil filing fee. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to sua sponte

dismissal to the extent it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that 

“the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a

district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). However, while liberal construction is “particularly important in 

civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court may not 

“supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents

of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court should grant

leave to amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

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defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

First, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on rulings made by San

Diego Superior Court Judges, these Defendants are absolutely immune. “Judges and those

performing judge-like functions are absolutelyimmune fromdamage liabilityfor acts performed

in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore,

as Superior Court Judges for the State of California, these Defendants have absolute immunity

from civil proceedings relating to these actions, which were performed within their judicial

discretion. 

Second, Plaintiff’s claims for money damages also challenge the validity of his criminal

conviction. In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, Plaintiff

must show that his criminal conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a

prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under §

1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). 

Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of

a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim for damages challenging the

legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable. Id. at 487;

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidityof anyoutstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,

the action should be allowed to proceed.

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Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds

in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims of “false imprisonment” will “necessarily imply the invalidity”

of his criminal conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Accordingly, because Plaintiff seeks

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional criminal conviction and because he has not alleged

that his conviction has already been invalidated, a claim for damages has not yet accrued. See

Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Deputy Public Defenders who represented him in his

criminal proceedings failed to provide him with adequate legal representation. However, a

person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power

‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with

the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys appointed to represent defendants

during trial and pretrial proceedings, do not generally act under color of state law because

representing a client “is essentially a private function ... for which state office and authority are

not needed.” Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442

n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when counsel are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients,

investigating possible defenses, presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not

act under color of state law for section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,

53 (1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under §

1983 because, so long as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his function,”

no matter how ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the interests of the state or county.”). 

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for seeking monetary

damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2) is

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. Plaintiff’s ComplaintisDISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary damages against an immune

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

3. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed

in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, this matter

will remain dismissed.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a Court approved § 1983

civil rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 13, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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