Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00134/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Howard Ned McMonigal, III,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0134-TUC-RCC (DTF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Howard McMonigal, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State PrisonMeadows Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before the 

Court are the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 19), and a Reply (Doc. 25). 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the 

record, dismiss the Petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 McMonigal was convicted of one count of illegally conducting an enterprise, three 

counts of theft, one count of possessing a motor vehicle with an altered vehicle 

identification number, five counts of kidnapping, three counts of sexual assault, one 

count of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of methamphetamine. State v. 

McMonigal, No. 2CA-CR-2009-0099, 2010 WL 1631768, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 

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2010). He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment totaling 128.75 years. (Id.) 

McMonigal’s appeal was denied. (Id.) 

 McMonigal filed a Notice of Post-conviction Relief (PCR) and was appointed 

counsel. (Doc. 19, Ex. C.) Counsel filed a notice with the PCR court that he had not 

found any claims for relief to raise in a PCR petition. (Id., Ex. D.) McMonigal filed a pro 

se PCR petition. (Doc. 1-3 at 45 to 1-4 at 47.) After the trial court denied relief, 

McMonigal filed a petition for review. (Doc. 1-4 at 49 to 1-5 at 6; Doc. 1-5 at 8-38.) The 

appellate court remanded one ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim for an 

evidentiary hearing and denied the remainder of the claims. (Doc. 1-5 at 40-49.) After an 

evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied relief on the remanded claim. (Doc. 1-7 at 22-

25.) The court of appeals granted review but denied relief, and the Supreme Court denied 

review. (Doc. 1-7 at 44-47; Doc. 1-8 at 14.) 

 Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court of 

appeals set forth the following limited factual basis for McMonigal’s convictions: 

McMonigal and his codefendant brother, Ignacio Rimer, managed an extensive illegal enterprise involving trafficking in methamphetamine and stolen cars, as well as prostitution. Relevant to this appeal, he used several women to perform various duties as a part of his operation and, on several 

occasions, used threats, physical abuse, and rape as discipline when they did not comply with his demands. Specifically, he kidnapped, assaulted, and raped M., kidnapped and raped F. on two occasions, and kidnapped W. and L.

McMonigal, 2010 WL 1631768, at *1.

DISCUSSION

 McMonigal raises three claims in his Petition. Respondents contend that Claims 1, 

2, and a portion of Claim 3 are procedurally defaulted; Respondents address the 

remainder of Claim 3 on the merits. The Court evaluates exhaustion as to all three claims 

before addressing the merits as warranted. 

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 EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 

Principles of Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-

78 (1971). 

 In Arizona, a pleading defendant’s route to exhaust federal constitutional claims is 

through a PCR proceeding. A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal 

review in two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was 

actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural 

grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if 

the petitioner failed to present it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner 

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement 

would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also 

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court must 

consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). If 

no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” 

exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

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constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Procedural Default Analysis 

 Claim 1 

 McMonigal alleges he was denied a right to grand jury, notice, a fair trial, and due 

process arising from substantial amendment of the indictment shortly before trial. As to 

Counts 13-16, related to victim Foley, McMonigal alleges he was convicted on facts 

entirely different than those presented to the grand jury. Liberally construing the Petition, 

McMonigal also alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on 

appeal. 

 In his PCR petition, McMonigal alleged that his due process rights were violated 

by the amendment of the indictment. (Doc. 1-4 at 23-28.) The PCR court found all nonIAC claims precluded pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a). (Doc. 1-4 

at 50.) As McMonigal points out, the PCR court did not specify which subsection of Rule 

32.2(a) it relied upon to find this claim precluded. However, when McMonigal raised this 

claim to the appellate court (Doc. 1-5 at 22-25), the court interpreted the lower court’s 

ruling as relying upon Rule 32.2(a)(3), which precludes claims that were waived on 

appeal (Doc. 1-5 at 42). This determination was well-founded because all of the non-IAC 

claims raised in the PCR petition could have been, but were not, raised on appeal. 

McMonigal acknowledged this fact in his petition for review. (Doc. 1-5 at 34-35.) He 

then challenged the PCR court’s waiver finding, arguing that the claims were of sufficient 

constitutional magnitude such that any waiver had to have been knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent. (Doc. 1-5 at 34-36.) The court of appeals found this argument waived because 

it was not sufficiently developed and supported in the petition for review as required by 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c)(1). (Id. at 42-43.) 

 A habeas claim will only be barred from federal review based on a state court 

procedural default if the last court to consider the claim based its decision on a procedural 

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default. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). Here, even if the PCR court’s ruling 

was ambiguous the appellate court’s ruling was not. The appellate court found the claims 

precluded based on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and found 

McMonigal’s challenge to that ruling was waived based on a state procedural rule. 

Therefore, this portion of the claim is procedurally barred from review in this Court. 

 Although McMonigal alleged in his petition for review that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the amendment of the indictment (Doc. 1-5 at 25-26), 

he did not raise it in is PCR petition (Doc. 1-3 at 45 to 1-4 at 47). Therefore, the appellate 

court declined to address it. (Doc. 1-5 at 45 n.2.) This claim arguably is procedurally 

defaulted in two ways. First, because this claim was not presented to the PCR court, it 

was not fairly presented to the appellate court in a procedurally appropriate manner. If 

McMonigal were to return to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found 

waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, this claim is technically exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. Alternatively, the state court found the claim procedurally defaulted because 

McMonigal waived the claim by not raising it in the PCR court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(c)(ii) (petition for review shall contain “[t]he issues which were decided by the trial 

court and which the defendant wishes to present to the appellate court for review”); see 

also State v. Ramirez, 616 P.2d 924, 928, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, (Ct. App. 1980) (issues 

may not be raised for first time in petition for review). 

 In sum, the entirety of Claim 1 is procedurally defaulted. 

 Claim 2 

 First, McMonigal alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by knowingly 

presenting the false testimony of Leticia Knutson, Maggie Kopp, Whitney Hosler, and 

Jessica Foley. Second, McMonigal alleges appellate counsel failed to raise this claim. 

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Third, McMonigal alleges that, in closing arguments, the prosecutor vouched for Kopp 

and argued facts not in evidence.1

 With respect to the first portion of this claim, in his PCR petition, McMonigal 

argued the prosecutor knowingly presented the false testimony of the four victims.2

 (Doc. 

1-4 at 32.) The PCR court found all non-IAC claims precluded by Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a). (Doc. 1-4 at 50.) McMonigal raised this claim in his petition 

for review. (Doc. 1-5 at 35.) As discussed above with respect to a portion of Claim 1, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals found this claim procedurally defaulted based on Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.9(c)(1). (See Doc. 1-5 at 34-35, 42-43.) 

Therefore, this portion of the claim is procedurally barred from review in this Court.3

 With respect to the second portion of this claim, McMonigal did not allege in the 

PCR proceeding that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the 

prosecutor presented perjured testimony.4

 (See Doc. 1-3 at 45 to 1-4 at 47; Doc. 1-5 at 8-

38.) Thus, this portion of the claim was not fairly presented in state court. If McMonigal 

were to return to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found waived and 

 

1

 Respondents failed to acknowledge this portion of the claim, which is raised in 

paragraph 31(d) of McMonigal’s Petition. (Doc. 1-1 at 13.) 

2

 In the Reply before this Court, McMonigal suggests he raised part of this claim in Section IV of his appellate brief. The Court disagrees. Section IV alleged that denial of an interview of Hosler violated his confrontation rights. (Doc. 1-3 at 14-18.) The brief cursorily mentions that this may have led to the presentation of perjured testimony and that the prosecutor vouched for Hosler, but that is tangential to the claim raised. 

3

 McMonigal argues this claim was not properly raised on appeal because it required evidence from outside the record. Although he cites the fact that there were 

exhibits attached to his PCR petition, McMonigal does not identify what extra-record evidence was necessary for this claim. Further, Arizona courts have looked at claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct based on the presentation of perjured testimony on appeal. See 

State v. Linden, 664 P.2d 673, 684, 136 Ariz. 129, 140 (Ct. App. 1983). After review of McMonigal’s PCR petition with attached exhibits, the state court determined this claim 

should have been raised on appeal. Additionally, as discussed below in Claim 3(d), the 

claim has no merit. 

4

 Respondents contend McMonigal raised this claim in the petition for review from denial of his PCR petition, citing Doc. 1-5 at 32 ¶¶ 63-65. The Court disagrees, as those paragraphs allege only IAC of trial counsel. 

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untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 

32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, this IAC claim is technically exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. 

 With respect to the third portion of this claim, on appeal, McMonigal argued the 

prosecutor’s closing argument violated his right to due process, citing Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). (Doc. 1-2 at 50.) The appellate court ruled on 

the merits of this due process claim. (Doc. 1-3 at 31-34.) Accordingly, the Court will rule 

on the merits of this portion of Claim 2 based on prosecutorial misconduct during closing 

argument. 

 Claim 3 

 McMonigal alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at trial 

when counsel failed to: (a) challenge an unlawful August 9, 2007 search and seizure; 

(b) call witnesses Ashley Delima and Anice Fraser; (c) challenge amendment of the 

indictment; (d) challenge perjury by the State’s witnesses; and (e) impeach the testimony 

of Ms. Knutson based on her mental health issues. 

 McMonigal properly exhausted subparts (a) and (c)-(e) before the state courts. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 47-48; Doc. 1-4 at 2, 22-23, 40-42, 46; Doc. 1-5 at 22-34, 45-48.) 

Respondents do not challenge exhaustion as to these subclaims. 

 Respondents argue that McMonigal failed to fairly present subpart (b) of the 

claim, as to Anice Fraser, because he did not include this allegation in his petition for 

review. The Court disagrees. In his PCR petition, McMonigal alleged his counsel was 

ineffective in failing to call Fraser to testify. (Doc. 1-4 at 6, 44.) He also alleged counsel 

was ineffective in failing to do the correct paperwork to bring Delima to testify at trial. 

(Doc. 1-4 at 12, 44, 45.) Liberally construing McMonigal’s petition for review, he raised 

the entirety of this claim in his petition for review. (Doc. 1-5 at 19-22 & n.6.) This 

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conclusion is in accord with the court of appeals’ ruling on the merits of the claim. (Doc. 

1-5 at 44, 45, 49.) 

 The Court will review the entirety of Claim 3 on the merits. 

Cause and Prejudice

 McMonigal argues that the default of any portions of Claims 1 and 2 was caused 

by the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. As an initial matter, appellate counsel could 

not have raised on appeal a claim that he was ineffective. Therefore, IAC of appellate 

counsel could not operate as cause to excuse the default of McMonigal’s claims that 

appellate counsel was ineffective. 

 Before ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may be used to establish cause for any 

procedural default, it must have been presented to the state court as an independent claim.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 489. McMonigal did not properly exhaust in a PCR petition a claim 

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to fairly present any portions of Claims 1 

and 2. (Doc. 1-3 at 45 to 1-4 at 47; Doc. 1-4 at 49 to 1-5 at 6; Doc. 1-5 at 8-38.) 

Ineffectiveness claims regarding counsel are now foreclosed in state court by Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a). Because the Arizona state courts have 

not had a fair opportunity to rule on McMonigal’s ineffectiveness of appellate counsel 

claims alleged as cause, and McMonigal may not exhaust these claims now, they are 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62;

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Therefore, McMonigal’s allegation of IAC on appeal 

cannot operate as cause to excuse the default of Claims 1 and 2 unless he establishes 

cause and prejudice to excuse the default of the appellate IAC claim. See Edwards v. 

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (ineffective counsel as cause can itself be 

procedurally defaulted). McMonigal has made no argument that there is cause to excuse 

the default of a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to fairly present 

these claims. Therefore, IAC on appeal cannot operate as cause to excuse the default of 

Claims 1 and 2. 

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Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 McMonigal alleged that he is actually innocent of kidnapping Knutson, based on 

the testimony at trial. To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice based on 

factual innocence, a petitioner must show that a constitutional violation has probably 

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)). To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must demonstrate with 

new reliable evidence that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324, 327. McMonigal looks only 

to trial testimony and does not identify any new evidence of his innocence of the 

kidnapping charge. Further, McMonigal makes no argument that he is innocent of any of 

the other 11 counts of which he was convicted. Therefore, McMonigal fails to establish a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the default of Claims 1 and 2. 

MERITS 

The Court found a portion of Claim 2 and the entirety of Claim 3 were properly 

exhausted. Those claims are reviewed on the merits. 

 Legal Standards for Relief under the AEDPA 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) created a 

“highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demand[ing] that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). Under the 

AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the 

merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The last relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state 

decision regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 

F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The threshold test under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule 

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state 

court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 

U.S. 70, 74 (2006). 

 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of 

§ 2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the 

Supreme Court’s clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 

8 (2002) (per curiam). Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal habeas court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing 

legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 

particular . . . case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] 

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend 

the principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a 

federal court to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent 

“unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely 

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incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25. “A state court’s determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘“fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. 

Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. 

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). In considering a challenge under 

§ 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a 

petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing 

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. 

at 240. 

Claim 2 

 McMonigal alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 

arguments when he vouched for Maggie Kopp and argued facts not in evidence. 

 The Court does not have a transcript of the closing arguments; therefore, this 

factual summary is taken from McMonigal’s appellate brief and the appellate ruling on 

this claim. Kopp testified that she was held at McMonigal’s trailer and raped. (Doc. 1-2 at 

19; Doc. 1-3 at 30.) A person named Johnny came to the window and pulled the wroughtiron bars away so she could crawl out; there was no screen in place; and she weighed 98 

pounds. (Doc. 1-2 at 19-20; Doc. 1-3 at 30.) The owner of the trailer (McMonigal’s 

mother) testified that the bars were “melted” to the window frame and could not be 

removed, and the screen in the photographs had remained there since she purchased the 

trailer. (Doc. 1-2 at 31-32.) 

 In closing, McMonigal’s counsel argued that Kopp was not credible because the 

bars could not have been pulled away from the window and the paint on the screen 

indicated it had been in place on the date Kopp testified to escaping out the window. 

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(Doc. 1-3 at 31.) In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor discussed a photograph of the 

window stating, “the bars are not flush to the window, they give. Even Maggie Kopp, 

thin, would squeeze out of those bars, firmly secured.” (Id.) He went on to argue the 

following: 

We have the testimony . . . from the defendant’s mom that what happened . 

. .she herself climbed up to paint the frame, and that she got paint on the 

bars and paint on the screen, and the screen that she knows was up there when she did the painting was nailed in the frame of the . . . window . . . . 

Now, the testimony that came from the defendant, and as best as Maria 

knew, is that these bars were never moved and the screen was never 

replaced after she painted it, and therefore the defense wants you to believe that Maggie can’t be telling the truth that these bars ever moved. That’s the 

defense testimony. If it were true, it would be powerful evidence that Maggie, as was told you in argument, is lying about something. That doesn’t make any sense unless everything she is saying isn’t true. On the other hand, ladies and gentlemen, if there is evidence from these defense 

exhibits that these bars were moved after . . . Maria painted it, then that is powerful evidence that Maggie is telling the truth, and that, again, Howard McMonigal’s evidence is false, and false because he knows she is telling the truth. 

(Doc. 1-2 at 43-44.) The prosecutor went on to explain that the photographs demonstrated 

the bars were replaced after Maria painted them. (Id. at 44.) 

Arguing Facts Not in Evidence 

 Clearly established federal law provides that the appropriate standard of federal 

habeas review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, 

and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 

181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). Therefore, in 

order to succeed on this claim, McMonigal must prove not only that the prosecutor’s 

remarks were improper but that they “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id.; see Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 

930 (9th Cir. 1995) (relief on such claims is limited to cases in which the petitioner can 

establish that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in actual prejudice) (citing Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)). 

In determining if McMonigal’s due process rights were violated by the 

prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument, a reviewing court “must consider the 

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probable effect of the prosecutor’s [comments] on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence 

fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). During closing argument, 

“prosecutors are allowed reasonably wide latitude and are free to argue reasonable 

inferences from the evidence.” United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 1507 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the state courts have substantial 

latitude when considering prosecutorial misconduct claims because “constitutional line 

drawing [in prosecutorial misconduct cases] is necessarily imprecise.” Donnelly, 416 

U.S. at 645. 

 The appellate court denied the claim that the prosecutor’s argument was based on 

facts not in evidence: 

 Insofar as McMonigal argues that nothing in the photographs alone permits the inference that the bottom of the bars could be pulled away from the window as M. described, we agree. But we do not agree the prosecutor’s statement that the bars “give” was misconduct warranting a new trial. First, before stating the bars “give,” the prosecutor described the bars as not being “flush” with the window, then immediately stated M. 

could squeeze through the “firmly secured” bars. Thus, it is not entirely clear that, by using the word “give,” the prosecutor intended to suggest the photographs permitted an inference the bars could be bent or pulled away from the window. Read in context, it appears equally likely the prosecutor, albeit inartfully, used the word “give” in reference to the gap between the bottom of the bars and the window. But, even if the prosecutor meant to suggest the bars could be pulled away from the window, the state presented evidence McMonigal’s brother did precisely that. Such evidence certainly would provide sufficient factual support for the prosecutor to argue in good faith that the bars had “give” to them. 

 . . . . 

 Finally, we find no merit in McMonigal’s argument that the 

prosecutor improperly suggested the bars had been “tampered with” by someone . . . . The prosecutor argued the photographs permitted the jury to conclude the bars had been moved or altered after B. had painted them because they showed paint missing from around the bolts connecting the bars to the trailer. He additionally suggested the screen depicted in the photographs had been added after B. had painted the trailer because there was no paint on the screen. The photographs support these inferences, and the prosecutor in no way suggested these changes had been made at the behest of the defense to discredit M.’s testimony. 

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(Doc. 1-3 at 33-34.) The court concluded that the argument was not improper and, if it 

was, it did not rise to a due process violation. (Id. at 33.) 

 The appellate court’s interpretation of the prosecutor’s use of the term “give” is 

thorough and well-reasoned. As the Supreme Court has directed, “a court should not 

lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging 

meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from 

the plethora of less damaging interpretations.” DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 647. Further, 

the prosecutor did not offer his personal opinion of McMonigal’s guilt or argue facts not 

in evidence, as charged by McMonigal. Rather, in responding to defense counsel’s 

closing argument, the prosecutor drew reasonable inferences from the photographs to 

argue that Kopp’s testimony was credible and the evidence did not support McMonigal’s 

interpretation. The prosecutor’s remarks were a “fair response” to defense counsel’s 

arguments. See McChristian, 47 F.3d at 1506. As the Supreme Court has held, a 

prosecutor “may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, 

while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.” Berger v. United 

States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The prosecutor’s arguments were not foul and the 

appellate court’s denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court law. 

Vouching 

“Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness 

through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not 

presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” United States v. Necoechea, 986 

F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993). Habeas relief on a claim of prosecutorial vouching is 

available only if the state court unreasonably determined that the vouching did not “so 

infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). 

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 The appellate court summarily rejected the idea that the prosecutor’s closing 

argument constituted vouching, because he did not place the prestige of the government 

behind Kopp or argue that information unknown to the jury supported her testimony. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 31 n.1.) Review of the closing argument, as quoted above, fully supports this 

ruling. Contrary to McMonigal’s argument (Doc. 1-1 at 13 ¶ 31(d)), the prosecutor did 

not state “Maggie is telling the truth.” To counter arguments made by the defense, the 

prosecutor drew inferences from admitted evidence to support the credibility of Kopp’s 

testimony. Because there is no basis to find the prosecutor vouched for Kopp, the 

appellate court’s ruling was not contrary to Supreme Court law. 

Claim 3 

 Standard for IAC claims 

 IAC claims are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id.

at 687-88. 

 The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at 

the time.” Id. at 689. Thus, to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, deficient performance, a 

defendant must overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. “A failure to raise untenable issues 

on appeal does not fall below the Strickland standard.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 

872 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Because an IAC claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the reviewing court 

“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id. at 697 (“if 

it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

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prejudice . . . that course should be followed”). A petitioner must affirmatively prove 

prejudice. Id. at 693. To demonstrate prejudice, he “must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

 Claim 3(a) 

 McMonigal alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 

August 9, 2007 search of his residence. McMonigal contends the police entered his 

residence before obtaining a search warrant, at which time they discovered three people 

inside. Further, he argues the search warrant was only as to the vehicles and the persons 

present, not his residence; however, the police searched his residence. 

 The appellate court held that the scope of the warrant was exceeded; however, 

McMonigal failed to establish prejudice. (Doc. 1-5 at 46-47.) In particular, the court 

found McMonigal failed to show what evidence would have been suppressed if counsel 

had filed a motion. (Id. at 47.) 

 First, even if the police entered his home prior to obtaining a warrant, McMonigal 

has not established any prejudice arising from this entry. He alleges three people were 

discovered inside, but he does not contend this evidence was used against him in any 

way. Although it may have been mentioned in seeking the search warrant, there is no 

reason to believe this influenced the issuance of the warrant. Most critically, if counsel 

had raised this argument, there is not a reasonable probability any evidence would have 

been suppressed or the outcome of his trial would have been different. 

 Second, the Court finds the officers did not exceed the scope of the search 

warrant.5

 After the judge found probable cause for the warrant, the officer read the 

 

5

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search warrant (Doc. 19 at 24-25 & Ex. J), not the August 2007 warrant that McMonigal challenges. McMonigal submitted the telephonic warrant that is the subject of this claim and the Court relies upon that document for its analysis. 

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warrant into the record. (Doc. 26 at 2-4.) It included the following, “I am satisfied that 

there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known as 2640 South Cottonwood 

Lane, Number 1 in the County of Pima, State of Arizona there is now possessed, or 

concealed certain property, or things described as . . . “ (Id. at 4-5.) In making his 

argument, McMonigal relies on the subsequent language, which directs the police to 

“make a search of the person(s) and/or vehicles listed . . . .” (Id. at 5.) Because the judge 

had already found probable cause as to the residence, the subsequent language appears to 

be nothing more than a typographical error. At a minimum, it was not ineffective for 

counsel not to challenge the warrant because it clearly identified the address of 

McMonigal’s residence in the probable cause finding. The appellate court’s denial of this 

claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. 

 Claim 3(b) 

 McMonigal argues trial counsel was ineffective for not calling Anice Fraser and 

Ashly Delima to testify at trial. 

Fraser 

 McMonigal argues that Fraser had no criminal record, and was willing and able to 

testify. At trial, Hosler testified that Fraser was her best friend and witnessed her 

kidnapping. McMonigal alleges that Fraser refuted this testimony in a pre-trial interview. 

However, at the time of the PCR proceeding, Fraser had moved and McMonigal did not 

obtain an affidavit from her to substantiate her alleged willingness to testify or the 

testimony she would have given. 

 With respect to Fraser, the PCR court and the appellate court held that McMonigal 

failed to rebut the presumption that counsel’s decision was a strategic one. (Doc. 1-5 at 4, 

44.) Similarly, McMonigal presents no argument to this Court to establish that this 

finding was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. 

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Delima 

 In conjunction with his PCR petition, McMonigal submitted an affidavit from 

Delima avowing that several of McMonigal’s victims had lied at trial and the assaults to 

which they testified had not occurred. (Doc. 1-5 at 45; Doc. 1-7 at 46.) After the PCR 

court denied this claim, the appellate court remanded it for a hearing. (Doc. 1-5 at 45.) 

 After the hearing, the PCR court concluded that counsel made a strategic decision 

not to call Delima and that the decision was reasonable. (Doc. 1-7 at 24.) The Court 

relied on testimony from counsel that she did not call Delima based on her demeanor at a 

pre-trial interview, her assessment of Delima’s ability to withstand cross-examination, 

and that her testimony would have corroborated the incriminating testimony of one of the 

victims. (Id.) The court also noted that Delima was an admitted daily methamphetamine 

user and had a past sexual relationship with McMonigal. (Id.) 

 The court further concluded that McMonigal failed to establish prejudice – that he 

would not have been convicted as to any charge if she had testified. The PCR court 

summarized Delima’s testimony: she never witnessed McMonigal mistreat Foley; she 

never witnessed McMonigal sexually assault Kopp but Kopp told her that McMonigal 

raped her; she did not witness McMonigal sexually assault Knutson although she had 

heard rumors to that effect; and the victims could have been at McMonigal’s home at 

times she was not present. (Id. at 25.) In refuting McMonigal’s claim that Delima’s 

testimony would have been particularly damaging to Foley’s credibility, the PCR held: 

Ms. Foley’s trial testimony indicated that she specifically did not tell Ms. Delima about the sexual assault by Petitioner because Ms. Foley knew Ms. Delima was in a relationship with Petitioner. Additionally, Ms. Foley testified that Ms. Delima had been in the shower when Petitioner 

approached her prior to the sexual assault. Overall, Ms. Delima’s testimony would not have been enough to change the outcome of the trial, and thus 

Petitioner was not prejudiced as a result of her failure to testify. 

(Id.) The Court concluded that the absence of Delima’s testimony at trial merely had 

“some conceivable effect” on the outcome, which does not meet the Strickland standard. 

(Id.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. (Doc. 1-7 at 44-47.) 

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 First, the Court reviews the state courts’ factual finding that trial counsel made a 

strategic decision and assesses whether that finding was objectively unreasonable. See 

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). Counsel 

testified to several rational reasons she did not call Delima as a witness, relating to her 

assessment of Delima’s effectiveness as a witness and the possible negative implications 

of her testimony. The only evidence to suggest it was not a strategic decision is that 

counsel made an error in the writ she initially drafted to have Delima brought to court. 

The PCR court determined that counsel could easily have corrected the writ but chose not 

to because she did not want to call Delima. (Doc. 1-7 at 24.) The PCR court’s 

determination that counsel made a strategic decision was not objectively unreasonable. 

 Next, the Court must review the objective reasonableness of the state courts’ 

ruling that counsel’s strategic decision fell within reasonable professional judgment under 

Strickland. See Wood, 558 U.S. at 302-03 & n.3. McMonigal has presented no evidence 

that counsel’s decision was unreasonable, no opinion from another attorney or prevailing 

norms from attorney guidelines. See Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 

2009) (finding that defendant presented no evidence of unreasonableness that could 

satisfy “heavy burden” of proving that trial strategy was deficient). Rather, McMonigal 

disagrees with the decision and has established that Delima’s testimony might have been 

helpful as to some of the charges. However, counsel was concerned that any benefit could 

be countered by Delima corroborating some of the victim testimony. Further, counsel had 

valid concerns about whether Delima would present well as a witness. Overall, it was 

reasonable for counsel not to call Delima as a witness. The state courts’ denial of this 

claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. 

 Further, because Delima’s testimony would have consisted primarily of stating 

only that she did not witness McMonigal engaging in sexual assaults or kidnappings, 

there is not a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different if she had testified. Because McMonigal has failed to establish either prong 

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under Strickland, it was not objectively unreasonable for the PCR court to deny this 

claim. Claim 3(c) 

 McMonigal alleges trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to improper 

amendments of the indictment regarding charges involving victim Jessica Foley. 

 The prosecutor moved to dismiss two counts of sexual assault charged as having 

occurred in September 2007, because during deposition Foley testified no assault 

occurred during that time period. (Doc. 19, Ex. I at 73.) Trial counsel objected because 

she wanted to point out to the jury the victim’s inconsistent statements and the fact that 

McMonigal was indicted based on her withdrawn statements. (Id. at 73-75.) When the 

judge assured her she could use this evidence to impeach Foley, counsel did not object to 

the dismissals. (Id. at 76.) The prosecutor further moved to amend a count of sexual 

assault and a count of kidnapping that were charged as occurring in March 2007 to reflect 

that they occurred in May 2007. (Id. at 77.) The prosecutor stated that the date confusion 

was created by the interviewing detective – Foley had stated that the incidents occurred 

five months prior to the October interview and the detective erroneously listed the 

assaults as occurring in March. (Id.) Defense counsel strongly objected, arguing that the 

detective was not confused; rather, the issue was that Foley had substantially recanted her 

statements and these changes would prejudice the defense’s ability to impeach her. (Id. at 

79-80.) The court granted the amendment, assuring counsel that she could use those 

statements of Foley and the detective to impeach their credibility. (Id. at 80; Ex. N at 7.) 

Finally, the prosecutor moved to amend the indictment as to five July 2007 charges 

(sexual assault and kidnapping) involving victim Foley. The indictment had charged two 

separate incidents involving Foley, one in early July and one in late July. (Doc. 19, Ex. N 

at 7-8.) During deposition, Foley stated there was only one event in July. Therefore, the 

prosecutor moved to dismiss three of the charges, and to amend two of them (one sexual 

assault and one kidnapping charge) to reflect that they occurred during the month of July, 

not on a specific date. (Id.) Counsel did not object to the amendments, with the 

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understanding that she would be allowed to point out the change in allegations during 

trial. (Id. at 9.) 

 The PCR court found the amendments were done solely to change the date of the 

offenses, which was proper; therefore, McMonigal was not prejudiced by counsel’s 

actions. (Doc. 1-5 at 3.) The appellate court held that McMonigal failed to identify how 

the amendments prejudiced him or impeded his ability to defend himself. (Doc. 1-5 at 45-

46.) 

 McMonigal alleges counsel was ineffective in that she failed to object to the 

amendments as constructive not technical. In particular, he contends counsel failed to 

alert the court that the victim’s (proposed) trial testimony on which he was ultimately 

convicted was entirely different than the factual basis for his grand jury indictment. 

McMonigal contends he was prejudiced by this failure because it violated his right to 

indictment by a grand jury; his right to be informed of the charges against him; and his 

right to protection against double jeopardy.6

 First, McMonigal argues that the amendments were constructive not technical. An 

Arizona grand jury indictment may be amended only “to correct mistakes of fact or 

remedy formal or technical defects.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(b). A defect is considered 

formal and subject to amendment if it does not change the nature of the offense nor 

 

6

 McMonigal argues counsel’s deficient performance was demonstrated by something that happened at trial. Counsel began to ask Foley if she knew that McMonigal had been indicted when the trial court interrupted and called counsel to the bench. (Doc. 19, Ex. K at 186.) The court stated that Foley was not the proper avenue to introduce evidence of indictments but he would take judicial notice of indictments if she requested that he do so. (Id. at 186-87.) The judge instructed counsel that requesting judicial notice was properly done “before you argue the case.” (Id. at 187.) 

McMonigal reads this portion of the transcript as the court instructing counsel that she should have addressed the indictments prior to trial. That is not how this Court reads 

the transcript. The trial court was informing counsel that if she wanted the court to take 

judicial notice of the indictments she should make a request before the beginning of closing arguments of the trial. The Court does not know if this was done; regardless, McMonigal is not arguing that failing to do so was ineffective. Further, at the time the 

amendments were sought, counsel confirmed that the court would allow her to introduce 

the original indictments at trial. Therefore, the Court finds this argument does not demonstrate that counsel was ineffective with regard to the amendments. 

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prejudice the defendant. State v. Barber, 653 P.2d 29, 34, 133 Ariz. 572, 577 (Ct. App. 

1982). A court evaluates whether the defendant had notice of the charges against him and 

if acquittal of the amended charge would provide a double jeopardy defense to the 

original charge. Id. 

 The relevant counts in the original indictment were as follows: 

COUNT NINETEEN: (SEXUAL ASSAULT, A CLASS TWO FELONY) 

During the month of March, 2007, HOWARD NED MCMONIGAL, III 

committed sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging in an act of sexual intercourse with JESSICA FOLEY, a person fifteen years of age or older, without her consent, by inserting his penis into the victim’s vulva, in violation of . . . 

COUNT TWENTY: (KIDNAPPING, A CLASS TWO FELONY) 

During the month of March, 2007, HOWARD NED MCMONIGAL, III 

kidnapped JESSICA FOLEY, with the intent to inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on her, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a 

felony or to place her or a third person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to her or to a third person, in violation of . . . 

COUNT TWENTY-ONE: (SEXUAL ASSAULT, A CLASS TWO 

FELONY) 

On or about the 1st day of July, 2007 through the 7th day of July, 2007, HOWARD NED MCMONIGAL, III committed sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging in an act of sexual intercourse with 

JESSICA FOLEY, a person fifteen years of age or older, without her consent, by penetrating the victim’s vulva with his penis and/or other objects, in violation of . . . 

 . . . . 

COUNT TWENTY-THREE: (KIDNAPPING, A CLASS TWO FELONY) 

On or about the 22nd day of July, 2007 through the 28th day of July, 2007, HOWARD NED MCMONIGAL, III kidnapped JESSICA FOLEY, with 

the intent to inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on her, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a felony or to place her or a third person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to her or to a third 

person, in violation of . . . 

(Doc. 19, Ex. O.) Counts 19 and 20 were amended to change the date from March to May 

2007. Counts 21 and 23 were amended to change the date of occurrence to July 2007. 

Amendments for date changes to conform to the evidence generally are considered 

formal allowable amendments if the defendant is not prejudiced. See State v. Bruce, 610 

P.2d 55, 57, 125 Ariz. 421, 423 (1980). 

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 McMonigal argues only very generally that he did not have sufficient notice but 

does not allege that his ability to prepare and present his defense actually was impacted 

by the amendments. The variances on which McMonigal focuses are specific facts 

surrounding the sexual assaults and kidnappings (presented to the grand jury) rather than 

the actual elements as charged in the indictment. McMonigal was on notice of the alleged 

victim and the criminal charges (including the specific sexual acts alleged). He defended 

against these claims by impeaching Foley’s credibility based on her inconsistent 

statements. That defense was not undermined by the amendments. See State v. Jones, 937 

P.2d 1182, 1192, 188 Ariz. 534, 544 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding no prejudice from 

amendments when only defense was that the victim was lying, which the jury rejected), 

overturned on other grounds by State v. Ferrero, 274 P.3d 509, 229 Ariz. 239 (2012). 

 A double jeopardy defense is not limited to the four corners of the indictment but 

includes the record as a whole. See Bruce, 610 P.2d at 57-58, 125 Ariz. at 423-24. 

Viewing the record in entirety, if McMonigal had been acquitted on any of these charges, 

the acquittal would have provided a defense to trial on the charges in the original 

indictment. 

 Finally, McMonigal argues that counsel’s failure caused prejudice because it led to 

a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. Indictment by 

grand jury, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, is not one of the due process guarantees 

applicable to state criminal defendants. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 

(1972) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)). 

 In sum, McMonigal has not established that the amendments were improper. 

Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the amendments as 

constructive rather than technical. Further, McMonigal has not established that he was 

actually prejudiced by the amendment as required for an IAC claim.7

 7

 McMonigal argued counsel’s errors were prejudicial per se. However, 

McMonigal must affirmatively establish prejudice arising from counsel’s actions or omissions. There are narrow exceptions to this rule, not present here, when a criminal 

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 Claim 3(d) 

 McMonigal alleges trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to perjured 

testimony and effectively cross-examine witnesses. The PCR court found that counsel 

conducted extensive cross-examination highlighting inconsistent statements by the 

State’s witnesses, impeaching their credibility. (Doc. 1-5 at 3.) Because credibility was 

properly left to the province of the jury, the court determined McMonigal failed to 

establish either prong of Strickland. (Id.) The appellate court rejected this claim finding it 

could not evaluate counsel’s performance because McMonigal failed to adequately 

support his allegations. (Doc. 1-5 at 47-48.) 

 First, in the Petition, McMonigal repeats that there can be “little doubt” that the 

prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony of Knutson, Kopp, Hosler, and Foley. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 9 ¶ 17; 13 ¶ 30; 16 ¶ 53.) However, what he relies upon are numerous 

inconsistent statements of the witnesses. (Doc. 1-1 at 7-17.) There is no evidence the 

prosecutor knowingly presented perjured testimony nor that counsel should have known 

and objected to such testimony. See State v. Ferrari, 541 P.2d 921, 931, 112 Ariz. 324, 

334 (1975) (finding that prosecution is not precluded from presenting witness who made 

inconsistent pretrial statements as credibility determination is left to the jury); State v. 

Linden, 664 P.2d 673, 684, 136 Ariz. 129, 140 (Ct. App. 1983) (same); State v. Jordan, 

No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0134-PR, 2012 WL 1965869, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 1, 2012) 

(holding that inconsistent statements by government witnesses does not establish 

knowing use of perjury). McMonigal fails to establish either prong of Strickland with 

respect to the alleged perjured testimony. 

 Second, McMonigal provides very limited allegations regarding the deficiencies of 

counsel on cross-examination. He alleges that counsel’s “attempted impeachment . . . was 

so far below prevailing norms that she had to be repeatedly interrupted and instructed by 

the court. At one point she was ‘sanctioned’ by the court and ‘serious[ly] admonish[ed] . . 

 defendant has no counsel during a critical stage of trial. See United States v. Cronic, 466 

U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984). 

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. for the possible prejudicial affect her questions could have on her client.” (Doc. 1-1 at 

21 ¶ 45.) This allegation is contradicted by the PCR court finding that counsel conducted 

extensive cross-examination and impeached the State’s witnesses. 

 McMonigal fails to establish that counsel’s lack of cross-examination as to every 

inconsistency in each witness’s multiple statements was not a strategic decision. For 

example, with respect to the charges involving victim Kopp, McMonigal notes that the 

defense presented by counsel – that Kopp lied about exiting McMonigal’s trailer through 

the window – demonstrated his innocence even though it did not involve identifying 

every inconsistency in her statements. (Id. at 13 ¶ 31.) Further, McMonigal identifies 

inconsistencies in Hosler’s statements about sexual abuse that counsel did not raise 

during trial. (Doc. 1-1 at 15.) However, McMonigal was indicted for kidnapping Hosler 

not sexually abusing her (see Doc. 19, Ex. O); therefore, counsel could reasonably have 

limited cross-examination to topics relevant to that charge. Finally, McMonigal 

acknowledges that counsel identified various inconsistencies in witness testimony during 

cross-examination. (See Doc. 1-1 at 8-9 ¶ 16; 16 ¶ 52.) 

 Deficient performance requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious “that 

counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 687. McMonigal has not satisfied this burden because he has failed 

to overcome the presumption that counsel’s actions were sound trial strategy. Id. at 689-

90. Although counsel may not have been perfect, the state court’s finding that her actions 

were not below professional norms was not objectively unreasonable. See Dows v. Wood, 

211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (counsel’s representation is not required to be 

“flawless or to the highest degree of skill.”) 

 Further, McMonigal has not argued that he was actually prejudiced by counsel’s 

conduct of cross-examination. In many respects, McMonigal is arguing there was not 

sufficient evidence for him to have been found guilty, in light of the victims’ testimony. 

However, that claim is not before this Court. 

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 The state courts’ denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable 

application of Strickland. 

 Claim 3(e) 

 McMonigal alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Knutson 

based on her mental health issues: 

Counsel also failed to raise, address, or seek expert testimony with regards to Ms. Knutson’s severe mental illnesses. . . . And how being diagnosed as schizoaffective and having borderline personality disorder would relate to 

her uncorroborated and inconsistent allegations, even prior to trial. Nor did 

counsel pursue the issue of the prosecution’s illegal influencing of Ms. Knutson’s testimony. . . . Or how easily one with her mental impairments could be so easily influenced, as noted by her favorable answers to which ever party was asking. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 21 ¶ 44.) McMonigal states that Ms. Knutson was diagnosed with these 

mental illnesses in 2006 and is prescribed anti-depressant and anti-psychotic medications. 

(Id. at 8 ¶ 9.) 

 The appellate court concluded that McMonigal had not identified any reasons to 

conclude that counsel’s decision – not to use this evidence in questioning Knutson – was 

anything but tactical. (Doc. 1-5 at 48.) Thus, the court found counsel’s conduct did not 

fall below professional norms. (Id.) 

 McMonigal fails to establish that he was actually prejudiced by counsel not using 

this information. He has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that if counsel had 

explored Knutson’s mental health issues he would not have been convicted of any 

charges. McMonigal alleges that Knutson’s mental health issues caused her to make 

inconsistent statements and to respond favorably to questions asked by either party. 

Review of counsel’s cross-examination of Knutson reveals her many inconsistencies and 

equivocal answers to questions. (Doc. 19, Ex. P at 128-42, 147-50, 153-60; Ex. Q at 5-

41.) Thus, the jury was presented with the information McMonigal contends was 

important to evaluate Knutson’s credibility. Counsel also asked Knutson about her 

lengthy history of drug use. (Doc. 19, Ex. P at 150-52.) McMonigal fails to establish 

prejudice. The appellate court’s denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. 

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RECOMMENDATION 

 Claim 1 and Claim 2, in part, are procedurally defaulted. McMonigal has not 

established cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the 

defaults. The remainder of Claim 2 and Claim 3 are without merit. Based on the 

foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court DISMISS the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party=s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-15-0134-TUC-RCC. 

 Dated this 15th day of June, 2016. 

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