Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00357/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00357-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martin Gavino Guzman,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV-09-357-TUC-DCB (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Martin Gavino Guzman, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison

Complex, South Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1), Respondents’ Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 8) and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc.

No. 11). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss the petition on

the ground that it is time barred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of molestation of a

child, four counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, and one count of continuous

sexual abuse of a child, all dangerous crimes against children. (Answer, Ex. A.) On June

26, 1996, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive twenty-eight and seventeen-year

Case 4:09-cv-00357-DCB Document 12 Filed 11/04/09 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 According to the trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Petition,

Petitioner filed his First Rule 32 Petition on February 19, 1999 and the trial court denied it on

November 2, 1999. (Answer, Ex. E.) The First Rule 32 Petition is not included in the record,

nor does the record include the trial court’s order denying the First Rule 32 Petition.

2

 Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus presents various arguments within each

“Ground for Relief” and is difficult to decipher.

2

terms of imprisonment for the molestation convictions and consecutive terms of

imprisonment for life with no possibility of parole for thirty-five years for the remaining

convictions. (Answer, Ex. B.)

On December 4, 1997, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed all but one of

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Answer, Ex. G.) Petitioner petitioned for review

by the Arizona Supreme Court; the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition on September

24, 1998. (Answer, Ex. H.)

On May 13, 1998, Petitioner initiated post-conviction relief proceedings pursuant to

Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P., by filing a notice of post-conviction relief (“First Rule 32

Proceedings”). (Answer, Ex. I.) He later filed a petition for post conviction relief.1

(Answer, Ex. C.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Proceedings, and

Petitioner petitioned for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id.) On May 18, 2000,

the Court of Appeals denied the petition for review. (Id.)

On December 26, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“Second

Rule 32 Proceedings”). (Answer, Ex. D.) On January 8, 2009, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Proceedings. (Answer, Ex. E.) Petitioner petitioned for review

by the Arizona Court of Appeals; the Court of Appeals denied the petition on June 3, 2009.

(Answer, Exs. A, F.)

On June 29, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal

court, in which he presents three grounds for relief:2

Ground 1: Petitioner’s Fifth & Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he

received illegally enhanced multiple sentences;

Ground 2: Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated when (a) his sentence

was enhanced by facts neither found by a jury nor admitted by Petitioner; (b) the trial court

Case 4:09-cv-00357-DCB Document 12 Filed 11/04/09 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

sentenced Petitioner based on statements of witnesses whom Petitioner did not have an

opportunity to confront; (c) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (d)

Petitioner was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him; and

Ground 3: Petitioner’s Due Process and Equal Protection rights were violated when

he was selectively prosecuted and the state withheld exculpatory evidence.

DISCUSSION

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations

begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Of these possible starting dates, only the first, second and third are relevant to the

present action. Petitioner does not allege that his Petition is predicated on newly-discovered

evidence that could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence.

The judgment against Petitioner became final on December 23, 1998, 90 days after

the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision on appeal. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that

the period within which a petitioner could have sought direct review of his conviction

includes the ninety-day period within which petitioner could have filed a petition for a writ

of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court); see also 28 U. S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

(stating that a judgment becomes final at the later of either the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review). Under ordinary circumstances, the

Case 4:09-cv-00357-DCB Document 12 Filed 11/04/09 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

one- year statute of limitations would have began to run on that date. However, on May 13,

1998, before the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the Court

of Appeals’ decision, Petitioner initiated his First Rule 32 Proceedings. When a properly

filed state post-conviction relief request is pending, the proscribed one year statute of

limitations may be tolled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Since Petitioner properly filed his

First Rule 32 Proceedings, the one-year statute of limitations was tolled until May 18, 2000,

when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s

First Rule 32 Proceedings. The statutory period then ran for one year, from May 19, 2000

to May 19, 2001, when it expired. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001) (calculating the 1-year period using the “anniversary method” of Rule 6(a), Fed. R.

Civ. P.).

Petitioner alleges in his Reply, however, that the statute of limitations should not

begin to run from the date that his judgment became final because he claims he was impeded

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United Statesfrom timely filing

his federal Petition. The “state action” that Petitioner alleges, however, is that the title of the

AEDPA is confusing and led Petitioner to believe that it only applies to cases involving

terrorism and/or the death penalty, not his own criminal proceedings. Section 2244(d)(1)(B)

applies only to impediments created by state action that violate the Constitution or laws of

the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1088

n. 4 (9th Cir.2005). In order “[t]o obtain relief under section 2244(d)(1)(B), the petitioner

must show a causal connection between the unlawful impediment and his failure to file a

timely habeas petition.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney Gen., 499 F .3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007). Petitioner’s lack of understanding of the law is not “unlawful state action” within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and is not grounds for statutory tolling.

Case 4:09-cv-00357-DCB Document 12 Filed 11/04/09 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The Court construes Petitioner’s claim in Ground 2 that “Petitioner's Sixth Amendment

rights were violated when his sentence was enhanced by facts neither found by a jury nor

admitted by Petitioner,” as a claim brought pursuant to Blakely.

5

Petitioner also alleges that his sentence violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004).3

 Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. See 542 U.S. 296 (2004). If Blakely

recognized a new constitutional right and made that right retroactive to cases on collateral

review then, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Petitioner's statute of limitations began to

run on June 24, 2004. However, Blakely does not apply retroactively on collateral review.

See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the statute of

limitations began to run on May 19, 2000, the date that Petitioner’s conviction became final

and was no longer tolled by pending Rule 32 Proceedings, not on the date that the Blakely

decision was issued. 

The filing of Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Proceedings does not affect this Court’s

conclusion that Petitioner’s limitations period is expired. It was not filed until December 26,

2008, well after the federal statute of limitations had expired. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of

the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed).

 Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases. Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir.1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner has not argued that he was unable to

timely file the pending petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

The last day of the limitations period was May 19, 2001. The instant petition was

filed on June 26, 2009. It is therefore time-barred. 

Case 4:09-cv-00357-DCB Document 12 Filed 11/04/09 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-09-357-TUC-DCB.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 4th day of November, 2009.

Case 4:09-cv-00357-DCB Document 12 Filed 11/04/09 Page 6 of 6