Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05681/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05681-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL MAGUIRE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF AMERICAN CANYON, ET AL.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C-06-05681 JCS

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff, Paul Maguire, has sued the City of American Canyon and its Director of Public

Works in his official capacity, challenging the constitutionality of a city ordinance that was enacted

by the city council on August 17, 2006, limiting the posting of political campaign signs. On

February 14, 2007, the Court conducted a non-jury trial in the above matter. The Court issued its

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on March 1, 2007. Subsequently, the City of American

Canyon brought a motion to amend or alter judgment [Docket No. 51] in which it offered new

evidence. In a separate Order [Docket No. 71], the Court held that it would consider the new

evidence and further, that it would amend some of its factual findings and legal conclusions based

on the new evidence. The Court now issues its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), incorporating these amended legal and factual

conclusions.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Factual Background

1. Paul Maguire (“Maguire”) is a resident and registered voter in the City of American

Canyon, Napa County, California. 

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2. The City of American Canyon (“the City” or “American Canyon”) is a municipal

corporation of the State of California, located in Napa County, California. 

3. Maguire ran for the American Canyon city council in 2004 and for Mayor of

American Canyon in 2006. Maguire filed his nomination papers for the office of Mayor of

American Canyon on August 11, 2006, 88 days prior to the November 7, 2006 election.

4. On August 17, 2006, the City adopted Ordinance 2006-04 (“the Ordinance”). 

Ordinance 2006-004 added to the City Code a section entitled “Regulation of Political Signs” (City

Code Section 19.23.035), which provided as follows:

In addition to those signs exempt from regulation pursuant to City

Code section 19.23.030, political signs as defined by City Code

section 19.23.120 shall also be exempted subject to compliance with

all of the rules and all of the regulations set forth in subsection (A)

herein.

A. Regulations. The placement or installation of political signs in the

City of American Canyon shall in all respects comply with the

following:

(1) No political signs shall be installed or displayed sooner than

ninety (90) days preceding the election for which the sign is

intended;

(2) No political sign shall be lighted either directly or indirectly;

(3) No political sign shall be placed on private property, vacant or

otherwise, without the permission of the owner of said property;

(4) No political sign shall be posted on any public property or in

the public right-of-way;

(5) No political sign shall be posted in violation of any other

provisions of the Municipal Code;

(6) All political signs shall be removed within ten (10) days and

recycled by the Department of Public Works after the date of

the election except that a sign on behalf of a candidate who is

successful in a primary election may be retained for the general

election. Removal of political signs shall be responsibility of

the property owner;

(7) The Director of Public Works and the Chief of Police shall

have the right to remove all signs which obstruct visibility on

City streets or could contribute to a dangerous condition of

public property;

(8) The Director of Public Works shall have the right to remove all

signs placed contrary to any provisions of this section;

(9) The City Council shall from time to time establish procedures

by resolution providing for forfeitable deposits by candidates

posting political signs within the City of American Canyon.

B. Unauthorized Removal of Political Signs. No person shall remove,

destroy, relocate, or otherwise disturb any political sign without the

permission of the party who erected the sign. It shall be presumed, as

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 City Code Section 19.23.090 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

B. The planning director shall remove or cause the removal of any sign constructed, altered

or maintained in violation of this chapter.

1. Such removal may occur fifteen days after the date of mailing of registered or certified

written notice to the owner of the sign, if known, at the last known address or to the

owner of the property as shown on the latest assessment roll, or to the occupant of the

property at the property address. The notice shall describe the sign and specify the

violation involved, and indicate that the sign will be removed if the violation is not

corrected within fifteen days.

3

to signs for political candidates, that the political candidate or his or

her representative is the party who erected the sign. It shall further be

assumed that the committee who has registered with the Secretary of

State to support a position on a ballot proposition is the party who

erected the sign taking the position on a ballot measure. Nothing in

this subsection shall prohibit the owner of real property, or his or her

authorized representative, from removing a sign from his or her

property when the political sign has been erected without his or her

consent; and provided further, nothing in this subsection shall prevent

the Director of Public Works or his authorized representatives from

taking action to abate sign violations pertaining to political signs

pursuant to section 19.23.090 of this chapter.1

 

Ordinance 2006-004 also repealed the provision that previously had governed political campaign

signs, City Code Section 19.23.030(O). That provision stated as follows:

The following signs shall be exempt from regulation under this

chapter:

(O) Signs pertaining to an election in which a candidate or ballot measure

will be voted on and not exceeding a total sign area of thirty-two

square feet in sign area. Such signs shall not be displayed earlier than

ninety days prior to the election and shall be removed within ten days

thereafter, except that a sign on behalf of a candidate who is successful

in a primary election may be retained for the general election. No

such sign shall be a roof sign. Removal of political signs shall be the

responsibility of the property owner. 

Finally, Ordinance 2006-004 amended City Code Section 19.23.120, containing definitions for the

chapter, to add definitions for the terms “Political Signs” and “Public Right of Way.” “Political

Signs” is defined as “a sign erected prior to an election to advise or identify a candidate, campaign

issue, election proposition, or other related matter.” “Public Right of Way” is defined as follows:

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 In support of this finding, the Court relies on the Declaration of Paul Maguire as Trial

Testimony, ¶ 3. The City’s objection to this portion of the Maguire Declaration as “argumentative,

speculative and self-serving” is overruled. The evidence shows that Maguire has been active in

American Canyon politics for years, including running for political office at least twice and posting

signs in connection with those campaigns. In this context, the Court finds Maguire’s representations

about his future intentions to be credible.

4

[A]ny area of real property dedicated to or owned in fee by the City or

the public or any other public body, or over which the City or the

public or any other public body holds an easement for public street,

alley, sidewalk, pedestrian, equestrian, or public utility purposes

which is within the City boundaries excluding areas of real property

which are on, or adjacent to, the side or rear yard of any parcel or any

area within the curtilage of any parcel.

5. On September 5, 2006, the City passed an Urgency Ordinance that states that

“questions have arisen as to whether the Director of Public Works and Chief of Police are the

appropriate City individuals to enforce provisions regulating the placement and removal of political

signs and it has determined that a more appropriate individual would be the City Manager and his or

her designee.” Accordingly, subsections A(7) and A(8) of City Code Section 19.23.035 were

amended to replace the words “Director of Public Works and Chief of Police” (subsection A(7)) and

“Director of Public Works” (subsection A(8)) with “the City Manager and his or her designee.”

6. On September 8, 2006, a campaign sign that Maguire had posted at the intersection of

Theresa Avenue and Eucalyptus Street in American Canyon was taken down by Public Works

Superintendent Fred Simonson. Simonson removed the sign because he believed that it was a safety

hazard. He did not contact Maguire prior to removing the sign because he could not find a contact

number for Maguire but he left a message for Maguire a few days later, on September 11, 2006, at

Maguire’s office informing him that his sign had been removed and that it could be picked up at the

City’s corporation yard.

7. Maguire intends to run again for the office of Mayor of American Canyon, either in

the scheduled 2008 election or in an earlier recall election to replace the current mayor. He would

like to post temporary campaign signs prior to the 90-day period leading up to either election.2

 In

addition, he would like to post some of his temporary campaign signs on public property in specific

locations which he has identified. These locations are the locations on which another candidate, J.T.

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 In support of this finding, the Court relies on the Declaration of J.T. Miller as trial testimony,

and, in particular, Miller’s representations that: 1) in the November 2006 election for the American

Canyon City Council, he posted temporary political signs in specific identified locations; 2) those signs

were removed; 3) Miller received an e-mail (also in evidence) from the superintendent of public works

threatening to remove some of his signs because they were in the public right-of-way and referencing

the Ordinance; 4) subsequently, Miller’s signs were removed; and 5) Miller was able to retrieve some

of his signs at the City Corporations Yard. The Court rejects the City’s objection that the Miller

Declaration is irrelevant because Miller is not a plaintiff in this case. Miller’s experience is relevant to

the question of whether Maguire has a reasonable fear that the Ordinance will be enforced against him

if he places signs on the same locations Miller did, as Maguire states he would like to do. Finally, the

Court notes that the City stipulated at trial that in the fall of 2006 the City, did, in fact, remove campaign

signs that Miller had posted on public property.

4

 At trial, Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of his claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1985. Accordingly,

that claim is dismissed with prejudice.

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Miller, placed signs prior to the November 2006 election in American Canyon. Miller’s signs were

removed from these locations in October 2006. One or more of Miller’s signs was removed by the

City because it was posted on a public right of way in violation of City Code Section

19.23.035(A)(4).3 Because of Miller’s experience, Maguire refrained from posting campaign signs

in these locations in the period leading up to the November 2006 election because he feared they

would be removed pursuant to City Code Section 19.23.035(A)(4).

 8. The City Council has authorized the defense of this litigation but has taken no formal

position as to the enforcement of Ordinance 2006-004 or whether it may amend the Ordinance prior

to the next election. Similarly, the City Attorney has expressed no opinion as to whether he intends

to enforce the Ordinance in its current form. However, counsel for the City stated at trial that he

presumes the City will enforce the Ordinance. Based on the City’s removal of Miller’s campaign

signs from public property in the period leading up to the November 2006 election, as well as its

failure to disavow any intention of enforcing Ordinance 2006-004, the Court finds that there is a

credible threat that the City will enforce the Ordinance if Maguire posts campaign signs more than

90 days prior to the next election or on public property.

B. Procedural Background 

9. On September 15, 2006, Maguire filed the complaint in this action, asserting claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.4

 In his complaint, Maguire alleged that Ordinance 2006-04

violates his rights to free speech and association, equal protection, and due process under the First

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 Because the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claims on the merits, the request for entry of a

preliminary injunction is now moot. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s October 13, 2006 motion is denied on that

basis.

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and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In addition to suing the City of

American Canyon, Maguire named as a defendant the Director of Public Works of the City of

American Canyon, who Maguire sued in his official capacity based on his authority to enforce the

challenged statute. Maguire requested entry of declaratory judgment and a temporary restraining

order, preliminary injunction and/or permanent injunction prohibiting the City of American Canyon

from enforcing the challenged ordinance. 

10. On October 13, 2006, Maguire filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, noticed for

hearing on November 17, 2006. Before that motion was heard, on October 27, 2006, Maguire filed a

declaration in support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction in which he requested, for the first

time, a temporary restraining order. In a telephonic hearing held on October 31, 2006, the Court

denied Maguire’s request for a temporary restraining order. In addition, the Court vacated the

November 17, 2006 hearing date on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and scheduled a trial on

the merits, to be held February 14, 2007.5

11. Maguire challenges Ordinance 2006-04 on three grounds: 1) the 90-day durational

limitation that applies to all political signs, found in City Code Section 19.23.035(A)(1),

impermissibly infringes his First Amendment right to free speech; 2) the right of the Public Works

Director to remove political signs that violate “any provision” of § 19.23.035 without any notice

requirement violates his right to Due Process; and 3) the ordinance violates the Equal Protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it treats commercial speech more favorably than

political speech, in particular, by banning political campaign signs from public property but allowing

other types of signs, such as special events signs, to be posted on such property under some

circumstances. Maguire seeks a declaration by the Court that Ordinance 2006-004 is

unconstitutional for the reasons stated above and a permanent injunction enjoining the City from

enforcing the ordinance. He also requests an award of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

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 In its opening trial brief, the City argued that the Director of Public Works was entitled to

qualified immunity and therefore, that the claims against him should be dismissed. The City also argued

that the Director of Public Works should be dismissed because he is no longer the official responsible

for removing political signs under the sign ordinance. Now that the City Manager has been substituted

for the Director of Public Works, the second argument is moot. The first argument fails – assuming the

City wants to assert it on behalf of the City Manager – because the doctrine of qualified immunity does

not apply to actions that seek prospective relief only. See San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm. v.

Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[i]t is settled law . . . that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

an action seeking prospective relief from enforcement of an unconstitutional statute”). The City

implicitly concedes this point by dropping this argument in its reply trial brief.

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At trial, the parties stipulated that the City Manager, in his official capacity, should be

substituted for the Public Works Director in light of the September 5, 2006 Urgency Ordinance

shifting the authority to remove political signs under Section 19.23.035 from the Public Works

Director to the City Manager.6

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standing, Mootness, and Ripeness

12. The City advances four, closely related arguments in support of its position that

Maguire does not have standing to challenge Ordinance 2006-004. First, the City asserts that

Maguire does not have standing because Ordinance 2006-004 has never been enforced against him

and therefore, he has not been harmed. In particular, the one sign that was removed, the City asserts,

was removed for safety reasons and not because it violated the provisions Maguire challenges. 

Second, even if the sign had been removed because it violated one of the challenged provisions, the

City contends, Maguire’s case is moot because the election for which the sign was posted has

already occurred. Third, the City argues that to the extent Maguire’s claims are based on threatened

future injury, Maguire has not demonstrated that he has a reasonable fear of prosecution. Finally, the

City argues that the factual record is insufficient to adjudicate Maguire’s claims – in large part

because the Ordinance has not actually been enforced against Maguire – and therefore, even if there

is Constitutional standing, Maguire’s claims are not ripe for adjudication. 

Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a “case or

controversy” in order to have standing to assert an action in federal court. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 506 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). To meet this requirement, plaintiffs must show “at an

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irreducible minimum that they personally have suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result

of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant . . . and that the injury fairly can be traced to the

challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (quotations and citations

omitted). 

 In Babbit v. United Farm Workers National, 442 U.S. 289, 299 (1979), the Court explained

that a plaintiff who wishes to engage in conduct that is proscribed by statute and has a Constitutional

dimension is not required to wait until he is prosecuted to seek legal redress. Id. “That one should

not have to risk prosecution to challenge a statute is especially true in First Amendment cases, ‘[f]or

free expression – of transcendant value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights

– might be the loser.’” Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Dombrowski

v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)); see also LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146,1155 (9th Cir.

2000) (“when the threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the inquiry tilts

dramatically toward a finding of standing”). On the other hand, Babbit also made clear that this

principle does not apply where the plaintiff has “no fears of state prosecution except those that are

imaginary or speculative.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

In distinguishing between a “credible threat” and a fear that is “imaginary and speculative,”

courts have made clear that “enforcement history alone is not dispositive.” LSO, 205 F.3d at 1155.

Thus, past enforcement, while significant, is not required to establish a credible threat of future

prosecution. Id. Conversely, even where there has been past enforcement, there may not be a

credible threat of future prosecution where there is affirmative evidence that the government does

not intend to prosecute. Id. For example, where the government expressly disavows any intent to

prosecute, courts have found that the likelihood of prosecution is too speculative to create standing. 

See, e.g., Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2006) (dismissing action challenging a flag

abuse statute for lack of standing where the district attorney had provided direct assurances that he

did not intend to prosecute the plaintiff under the challenged statute); Lawson v. Hill, 368 F.3d 955,

960 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge a flag-abuse statute

where the County prosecutor had expressly instructed local law enforcement not to pursue

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investigations against individuals – including the plaintiff – who had altered American flags as part

of an anti-war protest).

 In contrast to an express disavowal of intent, however, where a government or prosecutor

fails to rule out the possibility of enforcement, courts have taken this as evidence that a plaintiff’s

fear of prosecution is reasonable – especially where the law has been recently enacted. See LSO,

205 F.3d at 1155 (holding that where the government “refuses to rule out use of the challenged

provision, [that] failure to disavow ‘is an attitudinal factor the net effect of which would seem to

impart some substance to the fears of [plaintiffs]”) (quoting American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir. 1991)). For example, in Babbit, the court held

that there was a credible threat of enforcement even though the challenged statute had never been

enforced. 442 U.S. at 302. The Court noted that the statute, on its face, applied to “‘any person . . .

who violates any provision’ of the Act” and further concluded that the plaintiffs were “not without

some reason in fearing prosecution” because “the State has not disavowed any intention” of

enforcing the law. Id. at 303.

Similarly, in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 US 383 (1988), the plaintiffs

challenged a recently-enacted statute limiting the display of materials “harmful to juveniles” even

though the statute had never been enforced. The Court held that the plaintiffs had standing

nonetheless, reasoning as follows:

We are not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of this suit. The

State has not suggested that the newly enacted law will not be

enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise. We conclude that

plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law

will be enforced against them. Further, the alleged danger of this

statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be

realized even without an actual prosecution.

Id. at 393.

The Ninth Circuit relied on Virginia v. American Booksellers in Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d at

737. There, the court held that a plaintiff had standing to challenge a civil statute that prohibited

certain types of automated telephone advertising – even though the statute had never been enforced. 

Id. The court relied in large part on the fact that the Attorney General had not disavowed an

intention to enforce the statute, rejecting the state’s argument that the plaintiff did not have standing

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because the Attorney General’s office “ha[d] not brought or indicated that it would bring any action”

under the statute. Id. The court stated, “this is far short of a disavowal of enforcement.” Id. The

court also pointed to the fact that the law had been enacted only six years before and “ha[d] not

fallen into desuetude.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit addressed the question of standing by a plaintiff challenging a city sign

ordinance in Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). In Baldwin, the court 

addressed whether a property owner, resident and registered voter had standing to challenge an

ordinance regulating temporary signs. 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). The plaintiffs had sued the

city a month prior to a general election, challenging the sign ordinance on constitutional grounds on

the basis that it had prevented them from erecting signs of the size and in the locations they desired

in support of a particular candidate for the City Council, Melvin Kerwin. Id. at 1364. The city

argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the challenge because by the time of the trial,

the election was over, Kerwin had lost, and he did not intend to run for office again. Id. The court

rejected the city’s position, however, finding that there was a controversy of sufficient immediacy

and reality to justify issuance of a declaratory judgment:

[The plaintiff] testified that he was engaged actively in politics in the

Redwood City area for nearly 20 years. He has participated, and made

use of political signs, in both partisan and nonpartisan elections,

including elections for the Redwood City Council and the board of the

Redwood City high school. He has supported candidates other than

Melvin Kerwin indeed, has been a candidate himself. He testified that

there would be future occasions in which he would want to use such

political posters in a manner prohibited by the challenged provisions. 

The district court found that Redwood City Officials would continue

to enforce the challenged provisions against [the plaintiff] or other

persons wishing to erect political campaign posters in future municipal

elections. Thus, the record established the [plaintiff’s] continuing

interest in local political campaigns involving the use of such signs

and a continuing determination on the part of Redwood City officials

to enforce the ordinance. On these facts, a future confrontation is

likely; an immediate and real controversy exists.

Id. at 1365.

Here, the threat of enforcement is even more immediate than in Baldwin. Not only does

Maguire have a history of involvement in American Canyon politics; he has declared his intention to

run for Mayor in 2008, or even earlier. He would like to post signs on public property in locations

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he has identified – indeed, locations on which he posted political signs in past campaigns, prior to

the enactment of the new political sign ordinance – and he would like to do so more than 90 days

before the election. Further, Maguire’s fear that the Ordinance will be enforced against him is

reasonable: the City’s failure to disavow enforcement of the Ordinance, and the absence of any

affirmative evidence that it does not intend to enforce the Ordinance, places this case squarely in the

line of cases in which Courts have found a credible threat of prosecution. Although Maguire might

have been deprived of standing if the City had expressly disavowed any intention to enforce the

Ordinance, it chose not to do so. Rather, it has pursued this litigation aggressively throughout. 

Moreover, the challenged ordinance is not one that has been languishing on the books, unenforced,

for many years but is, instead, recently enacted. It was even was the subject of an additional

Emergency Ordinance, suggesting that the issue of political campaign signs is of some concern to

the American Canyon City Counsel. 

While the Court’s finding that the City has already enforced the Ordinance as to Miller lends

further support to its conclusion that Maguire has standing, even if there had been no past

enforcement of the Ordinance, the City’s failure to disavow any intent to enforce the Ordinance, in

combination with the circumstances discussed above, is sufficient to show a credible threat of

enforcement. 

The Court rejects the City’s assertion that because the 2006 election has passed, Maguire’s

claims are moot. The City relies on Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), in which the Supreme

Court held that a plaintiff’s challenge to an ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills was moot

because the plaintiff’s “sole concern” was distributing handbills relating to a particular candidate

who subsequently was appointed to the state supreme court and therefore, was very unlikely to run

for political office again. In Baldwin, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the defendant’s reliance

on Golden v. Zwickler, distinguishing the facts of that case on the basis that the plaintiff desired to

engage in the proscribed conduct only as to a single candidate, in contrast to the plaintiffs in

Baldwin, who continued to be actively engaged in politics. Similarly, in this action, the controversy

is not moot because, in contrast to the facts in Golden v. Zwickler, it is very likely that Maguire will

engage in conduct in the near future that will result in a confrontation with the City.

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Next, the Court addresses whether Maguire’s claims are ripe for adjudication. Even where a

party has standing, a court may decline to adjudicate an issue if it concludes that the timing is not

appropriate for judicial intervention. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991). “When considering

ripeness, we must determine whether the federal court is the most appropriate institution to address

the plaintiffs’ claims at this particular time.” American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.

Thornburgh, 970 F.2d at 510 (citations omitted). Courts consider two factors when determining

whether a question is ripe for judicial intervention: “1) whether the issues are fit for judicial

decision; and 2) whether the parties will suffer hardship if we decline to consider the issues.” Id. 

With respect to the first factor, the court in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.

Thornburgh noted that “[e]ven in the case of a pre-enforcement challenge . . . the exercise of

jurisdiction without proper factual development is inappropriate.” Id. at 511. 

These principles are illustrated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Renne, on which the City

relies. In Renne, the plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional a provision in the California

constitution prohibiting political parties from endorsing candidates for nonpartisan office. 501 U.S.

at 314. They particularly objected to the City Attorney’s policy of deleting party endorsements from

candidate statements in the government printed voter pamphlets. Id. at 315. In support of the

claims, an affidavit by the chairman of the Republican Committee was submitted stating that “[i]t is

the plan and intention of the Republican Committee to endorse candidates for nonpartisan office in

as many future elections as possible.” Id. at 317. The Court held that the issue was not ripe for

review, explaining its conclusion as follows:

Respondents do not allege an intention to endorse any particular

candidate, nor that a candidate wants to include a party’s or committee

member’s endorsement in a candidate statement. We possess no

factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the statute]

sufficient to present the constitutional issues in “clean-cut and

concrete form.” . . . We do not know the nature of the endorsement,

how it would be publicized, or the precise language petitioners might

delete from the voter pamphlet. To the extent respondents allege that a

committee or committee member wishes to “support” or “oppose” a

candidate other than through endorsements, they do not specify what

form that support or opposition would take.

Id. at 321-322. The Court went on to conclude that deferring adjudication would not impose a

“substantial hardship” on the plaintiffs because voters could learn of party endorsements through

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means other than the voter pamphlets and if the parties desired to include a particular endorsement in 

a voter pamphlet, the constitutionality of the City Attorney’s refusal to include that endorsement

could be litigated at that time “in the context of a concrete dispute.” Id. at 323.

Here, the Court concludes that Maguire’s challenge relating to the 90-day limitation is ripe,

but that his challenges to the notice requirements and the public property prohibition is not. With

respect to the 90-day limitation, Renne is not on point because the issue before the Court is

straightforward: Maguire would like to post his signs prior to the 90-day period and if he does so,

there is a reasonable likelihood the Ordinance will be enforced against him. The City has not

pointed to any particular factual issues that needs to be developed in order to adjudicate this issue,

which the Court finds ripe for adjudication.

In contrast, the record regarding the notice required for removal of signs under City Code

Section 19.23.035 is less clear. On one hand, the plain language of City Code Section

19.23.035(A)(8), as amended by the September 5, 2006 Urgency Ordinance, appears to grant

summary authority to the City Manager to remove political signs that violate the political sign law. 

That authority appears to be independent of the authority of the Director of Public Works found in

City Code Section 19.23.090 – which does contain a notice requirement – and affirmed in Section

19.23.035(B). Were the City to interpret City Code Section 19.23.035 to allow such summary

removal, City Code Section 19.23.035 might well run awry of the requirements of due process. See

Baldwin, 540 F.2d at 1373 (holding that provision that allowed summary removal of political signs

even when they were neither abandoned nor hazardous was unconstitutional). 

On the other hand, the City takes the position that it is required, under the current statutory

framework, to notify those who post political signs of its intent to remove non-compliant political

signs prior to removing those signs. Further, there is scant evidence in the record regarding the

City’s actual practice with respect to notice under City Code Section 19.23.035. Maguire’s sign was

removed by the Director of Public Works because it was seen as a safety hazard, not because it

violated either the 90-day limitation or the prohibition against posting political signs on public

property. Thus, the lack of prior notice as to that sign sheds little light on what sort of notice might

be provided regarding removal of political signs for violation of those provisions. Further, there is

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little evidence in the record regarding the circumstances under which Miller’s signs were removed or

the efforts, if any, the City made to contact Miller prior to their removal. 

Given that the record is poorly developed as to what notice, if any, the City has given in the

past or will give in the future, prior to removal of political signs under City Code Section 19.23.035,

the Court concludes that it is premature to address Maguire’s due process challenge. 

In addition, the new evidence offered by the City regarding the public property ban

persuades the Court that this issue also is not currently ripe. The new evidence offered by the City

shows that many of the locations from which Miller’s signs were removed are not on City right-ofways and/or that signs placed on some of these locations would be subject to immediate removal by

CALTRANS rather than the City. Further, while it is evident to the Court that the City removed at

least one of Miller’s signs from a public right-of-way, the precise locations of the sign or signs that

were removed is unclear. Because of these uncertainties, it is also unclear which of the locations on

which Maguire seeks to post campaign signs – which he says are the same as Miller’s – would fall

under the Ordinance. Under these circumstances, the Court is in a poor position to determine

whether the Ordinance’s prohibition on posting of political signs on public property constitutes an

equal protection violation. 

While the Court is cognizant that Maguire may suffer some hardship as a result of its

decision to defer ruling on these issues, the very poorly developed factual record persuades the Court

that adjudication of these issues would be improper. 

Accordingly, the Court addresses below the constitutionality of the 90-day limitation in City

Code Section 19.23. 035. 

C. The 90-day Limitation

13. Maguire argues that the 90-day limitation found in City Code Section

19.23.035(A)(1) violates the First Amendment, relying primarily on a decision by Judge Schwarzer

of this Court, City of Antioch v. Candidates’ Outdoor Graphic Serv. (“City of Antioch”), 557 F.

Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The reasoning in that case is set forth here in some detail as it is

particularly pertinent to the issues currently before the Court. In City of Antioch, a local ordinance

limiting the posting of campaign signs to 60 days before the election was challenged by an

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individual who lived in the city and wished to post signs outside of that period and by an

organization that prints and posts political signs. Id. at 53 n. 1. Like Maguire, the plaintiffs in that

case sought a declaratory judgment that the law violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and

an injunction enjoining its enforcement. Id. at 54. 

The court in City of Antioch began by addressing whether it should treat the ordinance as a

law regulating “time, place and manner” of speech or rather, whether it should apply the more

stringent test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.

1981). Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Linmark Associates v. Willingboro Township, 431

U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that ordinance prohibiting posting of “For Sale” signs could not be

considered a “time, place and manner” regulation because it allowed the posting of other types of

signs), the court concluded that the 60-day limitation was not a “time, place and manner” restriction

because it did not “attempt to determine whether and at what times the exercise of First Amendment

rights [was] compatible or incompatible with the normal uses of a particular forum or place . . . [but

rather] impose[d] a general ban on the posting of signs promoting the candidacy of certain

individuals or advocating a certain viewpoint on an upcoming ballot proposition” throughout the city

for all but two months a year. Id. at 56. Because the law “single[d] out political speech for special

treatment,” the court concluded that the standards set forth in Rosen were the appropriate ones to

apply.

In Rosen, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance regulating the

distribution of literature at the Portland Airport. 641 F.2d 1243, 1244-1245 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Beginning with the premise that any law that regulates or infringes the exercise of First Amendment

rights “‘must survive the most exacting scrutiny,’” id. at 1246 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,

64 (1976)), the court laid out the general principles to be applied in analyzing such statutes:

First, the law is presumptively unconstitutional and the state bears the

burden of justification. . . . Second, the law must bear a substantial

relation . . . to a weighty governmental interest. . . . The law cannot be

justified by a showing of some legitimate governmental interest. . . .

Third, the law must be the least drastic means of protecting the

governmental interest involved; its restrictions may be no greater than

necessary or essential to the protection of the governmental interest. 

Id. at 1246 (citations and quotations omitted).

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Having concluded that the more stringent standards set forth in Rosen applied, the court in

City of Antioch proceeded to address the plaintiffs’ specific claims, that is, that the challenged

ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and the First

Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. Regarding the equal protection challenge, the court looked

to two Supreme Court cases that address the question of equal protection in the First Amendment

context, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (“Metromedia”) and Police

Dep’t of the City of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 

In Metromedia, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance that permitted

billboards that advertised goods or services offered on the property (“onsite billboards”), prohibited

advertising of goods and services produced elsewhere and prohibited non-commercial advertising

unless it fell under one of the ordinance’s specified exceptions. 453 U.S. at 502. A plurality of the

Court concluded that the ordinance violated equal protection because instead of affording

noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection than commercial speech, as the Supreme

Court’s commercial speech cases instruct, the ordinance “effectively invert[ed] this judgment, by

affording a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech.” Id. at 513. 

The plurality explained, “[t]here is a broad exception for onsite commercial advertisements, but

there is no similar exception for noncommercial speech.” Id. 

In Police Dep’t of the City of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (“Mosely”), the Court

addressed the constitutionality of a city ordinance that prohibited peaceful picketing within 150 feet

of a school but made an exception for picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute. The Court

held that the ordinance violated equal protection and the First Amendment. Id. at 96. The Court

explained:

[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First

Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to

people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing

to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not

select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public

facilities. There is an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” and

government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be

heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some

groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or

speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions

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from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not

be justified by reference to content alone.

Id. at 97. The Court went on to hold that while a regulation may satisfy First Amendment and equal

protection requirements if it is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest, the

challenged regulation did not meet those requirements. Id. at 101-102. The Court stated, “[f]ar from

being tailored to a substantial governmental interest, the discrimination among pickets is based on

the content of their expression. Therefore, under the Equal Protection Clause, it may not stand.” Id.

at 102. 

Drawing on Metromedia and Mosely, the court in City of Antioch concluded that the 60-day

limitation on political signs did not satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause. The

court explained:

The Antioch political sign ordinance is content neutral in the sense

that it does not discriminate among political messages. But it imposes

severely restrictive time limits on the posting of political signs – limits

not imposed, for example, on temporary signs advertising upcoming

commercial, charitable or civic events. By singling out political signs

for restrictive treatment, the Antioch ordinance clearly conflicts with

the Metromedia plurality and the Mosely line of cases. Commercial

speech, although subject to other limitations in the city’s municipal

sign ordinance, is merely regulated in Antioch; political speech is

outlawed except during the sixty day period before an election.

557 F. Supp. at 58. 

The court in City of Antioch rejected the city’s reliance on Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418

U.S. 298 (1974) – a case on which the City of American Canyon also relies. In Lehman, a political

candidate sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief when the city of Shaker Heights,

pursuant to a long established policy, refused to allow him to purchase advertising space in the cars

of the city’s rapid transit system. Id. at 300-302. The plaintiff argued that the refusal violated his

right to equal protection and his First Amendment rights because commercial advertisements were

permitted in the cars. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, focusing on the fact that the streetcar

audience is a “captive audience.” Id. at 302. The court explained that the city is engaged in a

“commercial venture”: it “must provide rapid, convenient, pleasant and inexpensive service to the

commuters of Shaker Heights.” Id. As a result, the Court concluded, the situation was “different

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from traditional settings where First Amendment values unalterably prevail.” Id. The court in City

of Antioch concluded that because Lehman addressed a “‘unique fact situation involving government

created forums,’” 557 F. Supp. at 57-58 (quoting Metromedia plurality, 453 U.S. at 514 n. 19), it did

not apply to the 60-day limitation that was being challenged in that case.

Turning to First Amendment principles, the Court in City of Antioch concluded that the 60-

day limitation was not “the least drastic means of protecting its governmental interest” under the

Rosen test. Id. at 58. The court did not dispute that the government’s interest in “keep[ing] the

community’s streets, sidewalks, parks and business and residential districts attractive, clean and

visually uncluttered” was a “legitimate” government objective. Id. at 59. Nonetheless, it concluded

that banning temporary political signs for all but two months of the year “does not adequately

accommodate [the city’s] aesthetic and environmental goals to the public’s right to be informed

about upcoming elections.” Id. The court explained,

The temporary political sign offers special advantages to the candidate

seeking public office and to the advocate promoting a particular

position on a state ballot measure. These signs are a relatively

inexpensive means of campaigning. Their use can be localized so that

certain areas which the advocate wishes especially to reach may be

targeted. A candidate or partisan can use the temporary sign to place a

name or an issue before the public. In a campaign for political office,

political posters can be effectively utilized to build up the candidate’s

name recognition and to establish him as a serious contender. The

temporary political sign has special value to the non-incumbent or

relatively unknown candidate who can use the signs to identify his

name among the electorate. The less well-known candidate can test

the waters to see whether his candidacy is viable before going to more

expensive media such as television or radio.

Id. 

The court in City of Antioch also pointed to two other decisions in which courts had found

similar time limits to be unconstitutional: Van v. Travel Info. Council, 52 Or. App. 399 (1981) and

Orazio v. Town of Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). In Van, the plaintiff challenged

the constitutionality of a statute that limited the posting of political campaign signs on land

bordering state highways to 60 days before the election. 52 Or. App. at 411. The court held that the

provision violated the First Amendment, finding that the state’s interest in aesthetics was not

sufficient to justify the significant restriction imposed by the regulation. Id. at 412. The court noted,

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“[t]he process of acquainting the public with new candidates is a slow one. Two months is simply

not enough time to allow a relatively unknown person to achieve household name familiarity.” Id. at

413. Similarly, in Orazio, the court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that allowed political

signs to be posted only six weeks before an election. 426 F. Supp. at 1149. The court found the

city’s professed interest in aesthetics to be legitimate but concluded that the measure was not

narrowly tailored to that objective because it discriminated based on content. Id. The court rejected

the city’s reliance on Lehman, concluding that that decision was limited to “the captive audience

situation.” Id. Finally, the court went on to hold that “no time limit on the display of pre-election

political signs is constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.” Id. The court opined,

“politics is an important business, and it is difficult to perceive what governmental interest is served

by placing time limits on the public’s opportunity to be informed about candidates who are seeking

public office or organizations which support them.” Id.

Finding the decisions in Van and Orazio to be persuasive, and based on the reasoning set

forth above, the court in City of Antioch concluded that the 60-day limitation violated the First

Amendment. 557 F. Supp. at 60. It noted that not all measures to regulate temporary signs were

necessarily unconstitutional and that some less drastic measures that might be permissible would be

“institut[ing] clean up or removal requirements,” “provid[ing] more stringent regulations for the

areas of the City more in need of protection” and “regulat[ing] the size, design and construction of

the posters.” Id. at 61. The court did not suggest that extension of the time to post political signs,

for example, from 60 to 90 days before the election, would be a permissible alternative.

The City of American Canyon asserts that City of Antioch does not apply because the

limitation at issue in this case is 90 days rather than 60 days. According to the City, this longer time

period covers the entire period between the last date to register as a candidate and the election and 

therefore, adequately balances Maguire’s First Amendment interests with the City’s legitimate

interest in aesthetics. The Court disagrees.

Having enacted an ordinance that bans political campaign signs outright for three quarters of

the year, the City bears a heavy burden to demonstrate this limitation is consistent with the

requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to the equal protection

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concerns raised by the 90-day limitation, the Court finds that City has presented no evidence that

justifies treating political campaign signs differently from other types of signs for all but 90 days

prior to the election. Indeed, the fact that other types of signs are permitted year-round supports the

conclusion that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to the City’s interest in aesthetics. Therefore,

the Court concludes that here, as in City of Antioch, the City’s durational requirement violates the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Court also concludes that the slightly longer time period in this case is not enough to

meet the City’s burden of showing the Ordinance represents an appropriate balance between the

City’s legitimate interest in aesthetics and the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. While

the 90-day limit may be more reasonable than the 60-day limit in City of Antioch, the Court

nonetheless concludes that the reasoning in City of Antioch is applicable here as well. The City has

not demonstrated that it could not have addressed its aesthetic concerns with less drastic, contentneutral measures, such as the ones mentioned in City of Antioch. Nor has the City presented any

evidence that political signs detract from the aesthetics of the City more than other signs that are

permitted to stand for longer periods. See Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1409 (8th Cir.

1995) (striking down regulation limiting temporary political campaign signs to 30 days before the

election and noting that a requirement that all signs be removed or replaced after 90 days would

address the city’s interest in aesthetics and likely pass constitutional muster because a candidate

could simply remove a sign one day and install another the next day). Therefore, the Court

concludes that the provision is not narrowly tailored to the City’s interest in aesthetics.

The 90-day limit is unconstitutional. Enforcement of the 90-day limit is enjoined.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that City Code Sections 19.23.035(A)(1) is

unconstitutional. Enforcement of this provision is enjoined. However, this injunction is stayed for

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180 days from the date of the Court’s previous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed

March 1, 2007, to allow the City Council to address the constitutional defects in Ordinance 2006-

004. The Court retains jurisdiction to review any changes adopted by the City Council for

compliance with this Order and with the restrictions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 28, 2007 ___________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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