Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-60562/USCOURTS-ca5-15-60562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

REVISED February 23, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60562

MARIA CAZORLA, ET AL,

 Plaintiffs

v.

KOCH FOODS OF MISSISSIPPI, L.L.C.; JESSIE ICKOM,

 Defendants

__________________________________________________

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant Cross-Appellee

v.

KOCH FOODS OF MISSISSIPPI, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellee Cross-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 27, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Hispanic employees of Koch Foods (“Koch”), a poultry processor, allege 

harassment and abuse on the job. Koch claims they made up the allegations in 

order to get U visas, which are available to abuse victims who assist in 

government investigations. The company sought discovery of any information

related to the employees’ U visa applications. Plaintiffs objected, pointing out 

that the discovery would reveal to Koch the immigration status of any 

applicants and their families. The district court allowed the discovery in part, 

and both sides appealed. We VACATE the district court’s certified discovery

orders and REMAND.

I

Koch Foods (“Koch”) operates a large poultry processing plant in Morton, 

Mississippi. This suit arises from events that allegedly took place in the plant’s 

debone department, where some eighty-five employees debone and package 

chicken thighs. The workers in this department, some of whom Koch 

apparently still employs, were overwhelmingly Hispanic. Most were illiterate 

and spoke little or no English, and many were undocumented aliens.1 Between 

2004 and 2008, they allegedly suffered routine abuse at work. Koch supervisors 

allegedly groped female workers, and in some cases assaulted them more 

violently;2 offered female workers money or promotions for sex; made sexist 

and racist comments; punched, elbowed, and otherwise physically abused 

workers of both sexes; and demanded money from them in exchange for 

permission for bathroom breaks, sick leave, and transfers to other positions. 

 

1 Plaintiffs seem to have implicitly conceded that many of the individual claimants are 

undocumented.

2 One female employee testified that a supervisor, Jessie Ickom, penetrated her vagina 

with his hand. Another testified that Ickom forced her against a wall and ran his hands under 

her shirt.

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Jessie Ickom (“Ickom”), a debone department supervisor, was allegedly 

responsible for much of the abuse, but other supervisors also allegedly 

participated. When workers complained or resisted, Koch managers allegedly 

ignored them, and some debone supervisors allegedly retaliated by docking 

their pay; demoting, reassigning, or firing them; and threatening to physically 

harm them or have them arrested or deported.

Koch calls these allegations “baffling,” “outrageous and extraordinary,” 

and “fantastic,” and claims that the “record show[s] that [they] were made to 

obtain immigration benefits under the U-visa program.” Since 2000, this 

program has offered temporary nonimmigrant status to victims of “substantial 

physical or mental abuse” resulting from certain offenses, including sexual 

assault, abusive sexual contact, extortion, and felonious assault.3 For a victim 

to receive a U visa, a law enforcement agency such as the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must certify that he or she is aiding an 

investigation into the alleged offenses, and the U.S. Customs and Immigration 

Service (USCIS) must conduct its own de novo review of relevant evidence and 

confirm the victim’s eligibility.4 U visas generally entitle their holders and 

their family members to four years of nonimmigrant status; holders may also 

apply for lawful permanent residence (a “green card”) after three years.5

Finally, aliens with “pending, bona fide” U visa applications may obtain work 

authorization.6

Koch claims that the claimants made up their accusations in hopes of 

securing U visas, and that the EEOC solicited and certified their false claims 

in order to build a high-profile, class-based discrimination suit against the 

 

3 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i), (iii); see Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 

Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533-35.

4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i); id. § 1184(p)(1), (4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2), (4)-(5).

5 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(p)(6), 1255(m)(1)(A). 6 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6).

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company. This appeal concerns Koch’s attempt to obtain concrete evidence of 

this malfeasance – namely, any and all records relating to the claimants’ 

speculated U visa applications – through discovery.7

Litigation over the alleged wrongdoing at the Morton plant began in 

2009, when ten workers filed Title VII discrimination charges with the EEOC 

alleging abuse by Ickom. In 2010 and 2011, several of the same workers sued 

Koch and Ickom in federal district court, alleging that Ickom’s abuse and 

Koch’s failure to remedy it violated federal and Mississippi law. The suit was 

stayed pending the resolution of their EEOC charges.

The EEOC investigated the workers’ discrimination charges, found 

reasonable cause to believe that Title VII violations had occurred, and 

attempted conciliation with Koch. The conciliation process failed, and in June 

2011, the EEOC filed its own suit against the company, alleging discrimination 

against the individuals that had filed charges as well as “an estimated class of 

50 to 75 other Hispanic men and women” who had worked at the Morton plant. 

The district court consolidated the EEOC’s suit with that of the individual 

employees. Several employees then intervened in the EEOC’s suit.

In August 2012, Koch served the agency and the individual plaintiffs 

with discovery requests. All plaintiffs moved for a Rule 26 protective order 

insofar as Koch sought information relating to the individual employees’ and 

class members’ (collectively, the “individual claimants” or “claimants”) 

immigration status and history. In response, Koch did not argue that the 

claimants might be lying in order to obtain U visas, instead citing other reasons 

why immigration status might be relevant to the case. A magistrate judge 

 

7 Koch also sought to discover any records related to other immigration benefits, 

including T visas (available to human trafficking victims), Violence Against Women Act 

benefits, and Temporary Protected Status benefits. On appeal, however, both parties focus 

on U visas.

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rejected Koch’s arguments and granted the order in relevant part, opining that 

“[a]ny relevance of immigration status is clearly outweighed by the in 

terror[e]m effect disclosure of this information would have in discouraging the

individual plaintiffs and claimants from asserting their rights in this lawsuit.”

In April 2013, after several months of discovery, Koch served a second 

set of discovery requests specifically demanding information and records 

relating to claimants’ efforts to obtain U visas. That discovery inevitably would 

have revealed the immigration status of any claimants who applied for U visas, 

as well as that of their families. The plaintiffs refused Koch’s demands on 

several grounds, including the magistrate judge’s protective order. The 

individual plaintiffs also rejected Koch’s demand that they execute waivers 

allowing the Department of Homeland Security to share information about 

them with Koch, claiming that 8 U.S.C. § 1367 protected such information from 

disclosure.

Koch moved to compel production and for reconsideration of the existing 

protective order. The magistrate judge granted the motion in relevant part, 

allowing discovery of U visa-related information:

[Koch] now focuses on one particular area not raised earlier: 

discovery concerning the individual plaintiffs’ and claimants’ 

attempts to obtain U visas [and] other immigration benefits that 

may be available to them because of the allegations they have 

made. It is Koch Foods’s contention that some of the allegations . . 

. are false and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining such 

benefits. . . . Koch Foods has raised a legitimate defense . . . . The 

relevance of this information clearly outweighs its in terror[e]m

effect, as any individuals who have applied for immigration 

benefits have, necessarily, already disclosed their immigration 

status to federal authorities.

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Plaintiffs moved for review of the magistrate judge’s order.8 After 

examining some of the information Koch sought in camera, the district court

upheld the order in part and modified it in part. The court found that 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1367 and its implementing regulation barred the EEOC from revealing any 

information related to the claimants’ U visa applications. Accordingly, it 

excused the agency from complying with Koch’s demand. However, the court 

found that § 1367 did not similarly excuse the claimants themselves. The court 

then determined that Rule 26 did not otherwise preclude U visa discovery from 

the individual claimants, reasoning that the discovery was relevant to the 

claimants’ credibility, that it might explain an “exponential jump in claims 

after the EEOC became involved,”9 and that the relevance of the information 

sought outweighed the in terrorem effect of producing it.10 In a subsequent 

order, the court clarified that Koch Foods could obtain U visa information from 

all claimants: that is, from both the workers who had separately sued Koch, 

and the workers whom the EEOC claimed had been harassed, but who had not 

joined the separate lawsuit. Nevertheless, the court emphasized that not all 

information about claimants’ immigration history was discoverable: discovery 

was to be “limited to information regarding efforts to obtain U Visas, or other 

immigration benefits, that arose out of the allegations in this civil action 

against Koch Foods.”

At the district court’s direction, the magistrate judge entered a protective 

order to govern U visa discovery. That order prohibited use of the discovered 

 

8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a) (allowing such review, and requiring the district court to 

“modify or set aside any part of the [magistrate judge’s] order that is clearly erroneous or is 

contrary to law”).

9 Specifically, the court noted that “[t]his matter started with just eight complaining 

parties, but two-and-a-half years after the litigation began, the EEOC filed its Second 

Amended Complaint in which the number jumped to 117.”

10 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (d).

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information for business purposes unrelated to the lawsuit “unless . . . required 

by relevant law,” and barred Koch from sharing the information with law 

enforcement “unless a failure to do so would constitute a violation of criminal 

law.” The magistrate judge disregarded plaintiffs’ suggestions to require the 

use of anonymous identifiers and to allow disclosure only to Koch’s attorneys 

and not to the company itself.

The EEOC then sought interlocutory review of the district court’s 

discovery orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court certified the 

orders for interlocutory appeal and stayed proceedings in the meantime. We 

granted the parties’ ensuing petition and cross-petition for review.

II

We review the district court’s statutory interpretation de novo11 and its 

Rule 26 balancing analysis for abuse of discretion.12 A court engaging in a 

balancing analysis abuses its discretion “when a relevant factor that should 

have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or 

improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper 

factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those 

factors, commits a clear error of judgment.”13

III

We first confirm our jurisdiction. Koch raises two jurisdictional 

objections to plaintiffs’ appeals. Each fails.

 

11 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004).

12 Moore v. CITGO Ref. & Chems. Co., L.P., 735 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2013).

13 Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984), cited with approval by 

In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see generally United 

States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988) (“Whether discretion has been abused depends, of 

course, on the bounds of that discretion and the principles that guide its exercise. [If] 

Congress merely commit[s] the choice of remedy to the discretion of district courts, without 

specifying factors to be considered, a district court would be expected to consider ‘all relevant 

public and private interest factors,’ and to balance those factors reasonably.” (quoting Piper 

Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981))).

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First, Koch asks us to exercise our discretion not to review the district 

court’s Rule 26 balance on interlocutory review. We decline Koch’s late 

invitation. To be sure, outside the context of § 1292(b), Rule 26 balancing 

disputes do not normally merit interlocutory review.14 Nonetheless, by fully 

addressing this one, we may be able to hasten the end of this already longrunning litigation, e.g., by preventing post-trial appeals on the same topic and 

clarifying the permissible scope of U visa discovery, preventing further pretrial 

disputes.15 We therefore see fit to review the district court’s discovery order in 

its entirety.16

Second, Koch argues that “Individual Plaintiffs’ intervention is not 

proper because they failed to timely file a petition for permission to appeal.” 

We granted the EEOC’s petition for interlocutory review on August 12, 2015. 

The individual plaintiffs petitioned to intervene in the EEOC’s appeal twelve 

days later. In their petition, they acknowledged that no rule or precedent set 

forth deadlines for intervention in an interlocutory appeal, and suggested that 

 

14 See Honig v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 404 F.2d 410, 410 (5th Cir. 1968). But 

cf. Hyde Const. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 338-39, 342-44 (5th Cir. 1972) (accepting 

interlocutory appeal of a complex attorney-client privilege dispute “at the heart of a pending 

controversy,” and, after resolving the relevant legal issue, completing an “an independent 

examination of the 81 documents in question” and determining which ones were and were 

not privileged).

15 See, e.g., Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 380 & n.2 (5th Cir. 

2004) (addressing an element of the appeal other than the “controlling question of law” at

issue when doing so would “most expeditiously resolve th[e] litigation”). At least one other 

appellate court has exercised its discretion under § 1292 to review a district court’s Rule 26 

balancing analysis. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004).

16 The district court certified its order for interlocutory review because it found that 

its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367 was a “controlling question of law.” But as it correctly 

noted, an “appellate court may address any issue fairly included within [a] certified order 

because ‘it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the 

district court.’” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996) (quoting 9 

JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 110.25[1] (2d ed. 1995)); see also 

Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 

(collecting cases); Linton v. Shell Oil Co., 563 F.3d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 

(“[S]ection 1292(b) authorizes certification of orders for interlocutory appeal, not certification 

of questions.”).

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we apply a deadline of fourteen days from the initial petition for interlocutory 

review (i.e., the one to be joined), following Rule 4(a)’s timeline for intervention 

in an appeal as of right.17 A motions panel of this court allowed intervention in 

a summary order, thus implicitly accepting the individual plaintiffs’ 

proposal.18

Koch appears to argue that a deadline of ten days from the district court’s 

certification order should apply, following 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). But § 1292(b)’s 

ten-day deadline applies only to an initial application for interlocutory appeal, 

not a subsequent motion to intervene in such an appeal. Rule 4(a)’s deadlines 

are more apposite to plaintiffs’ petition to intervene: Rule 5 states that a 

petition for discretionary review, e.g., § 1292 interlocutory review,19 “must be 

filed within the time specified by the statute or rule authorizing the appeal or, 

if no such time is specified, within the time provided by Rule 4(a) for filing a 

notice of appeal,” and § 1292 specifies no deadline for the individual plaintiffs’ 

petition.20 We find that the individual plaintiffs timely intervened.

 

17 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal [as of right], 

any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice 

was filed.”).

18 But see In re Piperi, 108 F.3d 333, 1997 WL 73798, at *1 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) 

(unpublished table decision) (“[A] motions panel’s refusal to dismiss an appeal does not 

preclude the merits panel from reconsidering the existence of appellate jurisdiction.” 

(summarizing United States v. Bear Marine Servs., 696 F.2d 1117, 1119-20 & n.6 (5th Cir. 

1983))).

19 See Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 399 (“Interlocutory review under § 1292(b) 

is not mandatory; rather, it is discretionary.”).

20 See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(2). To hold otherwise – that is, to apply the same deadline 

to the initial application for interlocutory appeal and a subsequent effort to intervene – would 

be to treat interlocutory appeals differently from appeals as of right: the Rules impose 

different deadlines for one party’s initial notice of appeal as of right and another party’s 

subsequent attempt to join that appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1), (3). We see no reason why 

interlocutory appeals should be treated differently in this regard.

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IV

We turn to the appropriate legal standard and procedure for this 

discovery dispute. In allowing discovery from the individual claimants, the 

district court applied Rule 26(c)(1), which allows restrictions on discovery “for 

good cause . . . to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 

oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The court acknowledged plaintiffs’ 

burden to “show good cause, ‘which contemplates a particular and specific 

demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory 

statements,’” in order to prevent discovery. It found that they had not carried 

their burden, rejecting their arguments that 8 U.S.C. § 1367’s confidentiality 

provisions protected the individual claimants and that U visa discovery’s in 

terrorem effect would outweigh its relevance.

Plaintiffs dispute these conclusions, as discussed in the following 

sections. More generally, however, they also claim that the district court erred 

at the outset by allocating them the burden of showing good cause. As they put 

it, the district court should not have applied “standard Rule 26(c) procedure.” 

Instead, they “urge this Court to hold that U-visa information is . . .

presumptively sensitive information, and the party seeking this information 

always bears the burden of proving a particularized need for it.”21 They 

analogize U visa information to data that we and other courts have subjected

to similar standards, including tax returns, depositions of senior officials and 

 

21 Somewhat relatedly, they also argue that Koch had to plead fraud with particularity 

and that its failure to do so precludes U visa discovery here. But Koch is merely disputing 

claimants’ credibility, not arguing that they are defrauding the company. If Rule 9(b) applies 

here, it should presumably also apply in every case in which the defendant disputes the 

plaintiff’s claims. We decline to reach such an absurd result.

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opposing counsel, nonparty personnel files, and presentence investigation 

reports.22

Plaintiffs’ argument, however compelling, is waived. They do not appear 

to have presented anything like it to the district court, and the district court 

did not appear to detect it in what they did offer.23 Burden-shifting, 

presumptions of sensitivity, references to tax-return cases, and the like are 

wholly absent both from the district court’s opinion and from plaintiffs’ motions 

opposing U visa discovery. In their appeal briefing, plaintiffs reference several 

points in the record where they purportedly pressed their argument, but each 

shows, at most, that plaintiffs occasionally used the term “need” and advocated 

a balancing approach in contesting whether Koch was entitled to the discovery 

it sought. This did not suffice to preserve the more elaborate theory they 

advance on appeal.

V

Finally, we turn to the merits of the parties’ appeals. We begin with their 

dispute over 8 U.S.C. § 1367. That statute states, in relevant part:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, in no case may 

the Attorney General, or any other official or employee of the 

Department of Justice, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 

Secretary of State, or any other official or employee of the 

Department of Homeland Security or Department of State 

(including any bureau or agency of either of such Departments)—

[. . .]

 

22 See, e.g., Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1411 

(5th Cir. 1993) (personal tax returns); United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 

1995) (presentence investigation reports); Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 

(8th Cir. 1986) (depositions of opposing counsel).

23 See AG Acceptance Corp. v. Veigel, 564 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Under this 

Circuit's general rule, arguments not raised before the district court are waived and will not 

be considered on appeal unless the party can demonstrate ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that extraordinary circumstances are present here.

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(2) permit use by or disclosure to anyone . . . of any 

information which relates to an alien who is the beneficiary 

of an application for relief under paragraph (15)(T), (15)(U), 

or (51) of section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act . . . .

U visa applications arise from paragraph (15)(U) of section 101(a) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act and therefore fall within the scope of 

§ 1367(a)(2).24 In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 214.14, which implements the U visa 

program, provides that “[a]gencies receiving information under this section . . . 

are bound by the confidentiality provisions and other restrictions set out in 

8 U.S.C. 1367.” The EEOC asserts, and Koch does not dispute, that it is an 

“agency receiving information under” § 214.14.

As noted above, the district court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1367 and 8 C.F.R. 

§ 214.14 collectively precluded discovery of U visa records from the EEOC, but 

that discovery from the individual claimants and plaintiffs could proceed. We 

address each ruling, but turn first to the issue of waiver.

1. Koch’s waiver argument

Koch argues that plaintiffs waived their § 1367 claims by not expressly 

alleging in their discovery responses that they fell within the statute’s 

protection. We are not persuaded. First, some of plaintiffs’ discovery responses 

did explicitly cite § 1367.25 Second, Rule 26(b)(5), on which Koch relies, states 

only that “[w]hen a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by 

claiming that the information is privileged . . . the party must expressly make 

 

24 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U); see 

also 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e)(1) (“The use or disclosure . . . of any information relating to the 

beneficiary of a pending or approved petition for U nonimmigrant status is prohibited.”).

25 Specifically, in addressing Koch’s request that they sign privacy waivers authorizing 

the Department of Homeland Security to release their U visa files (if any), the individual 

plaintiffs “object[ed] . . . to the extent [the request] [sought] personal and private information 

that is expressly protected by federal law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2).”

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the claim.” Plaintiffs did so: they claimed that the information Koch sought 

was exempt from discovery under the magistrate judge’s original protective 

order, which was then in effect, and various other privileges.26 We reject Koch’s 

waiver claim.

2. Section 1367’s application to the EEOC

The district court found that § 1367’s text, coupled with that of 8 C.F.R. 

§ 214.14, was unambiguous: because the EEOC is an “agenc[y] receiving 

information” under the U visa program, it is “bound” by § 1367’s confidentiality 

provisions, and in turn, it may not “permit use by or disclosure to anyone . . . 

of any information which relates to” a U visa applicant. To comply with Koch’s 

discovery requests would necessarily violate this command.

Koch disputes this straightforward reading on several grounds.27 First, 

Koch argues that § 1367 does not explicitly mention discovery or state that it 

 

26 If Koch is arguing that plaintiffs’ references to the protective order were insufficient 

because they did not use the word “privilege,” we find its argument unconvincing. See 

Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“privilege” can simply refer to “the right 

to prevent disclosure of certain information in court”); cf. infra note 29 (citing cases holding 

that a statute need not use the word “privilege” to create an evidentiary privilege).

27 In addition to the reasons discussed below, Koch appears to argue in its reply brief 

that 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 is invalid insofar as it purports to create a privilege or to extend 

§ 1367’s confidentiality provisions to the EEOC. That argument is waived. See Cinel v. 

Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“An appellant abandons all issues not raised 

and argued in its initial brief on appeal.”). Koch’s initial brief also included a somewhat 

confusing citation to an unrelated statute. Koch significantly expands on its citation in a 

footnote in its reply brief, explaining that it was actually analogizing the cited provision to 

§ 1367, and that the provision evinces Congress’s intent to allow U visa disclosure pursuant 

to court order notwithstanding § 1367. This argument is also waived. See id.; de la O v. Hous. 

Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 417 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Judges are not like pigs,

hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 

(7th Cir. 1991)). It is also dubious: if anything, the fact that Congress explicitly permitted 

disclosure pursuant to court order in other confidentiality provisions of VAWA suggests an 

intent not to allow such disclosure in § 1367, which has no such text.

The EEOC contends that Koch waived its argument on this issue by failing to 

specifically state in its opening brief that the district court’s ruling forbidding discovery from 

the EEOC violated Koch’s substantial rights. See Green v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 754 F.3d 

324, 329 (5th Cir. 2014) (we will vacate a district court’s decision to limit discovery only “if it 

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creates an evidentiary privilege. That is so, and as Koch correctly notes, the 

Supreme Court and others have observed that Congress is usually explicit 

when it creates an evidentiary privilege.28 But as a purely textual matter, it is 

unclear why a provision broadly barring any “disclosure” would have to specify 

“including in discovery” in order to have effect. In Baldrige v. Shapiro, the 

Supreme Court held that a statute barring disclosure of census records without 

explicitly mentioning evidentiary privilege nonetheless prevented civil 

discovery of the records.29 Koch claims that an earlier decision of the Court, St. 

Regis Paper Co v. United States, supports its reading, but that case is 

distinguishable. In St. Regis, the Court held that a provision barring 

government officials from disclosing certain Census Bureau reports did not 

excuse a private company from disclosing the same reports in discovery.30

Here, Koch seeks disclosure from the same officials subject to § 1367’s 

confidentiality requirements.31

We find the D.C. Circuit’s decision in In re England to be persuasive. In

England, the D.C. Circuit construed a provision barring “disclos[ure]” of 

certain military promotion records “to any person not a member of the 

 

affected the substantial rights of the appellant”). Because we find that Koch’s § 1367 

argument fails on the merits, we need not consider this claim.

28 See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218 (1961) (“[W]hen Congress 

has intended [data] not to be subject to compulsory process it has said so.”); Jicarilla Apache 

Nation v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 611, 613 & n.1 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (collecting statutes).

29 455 U.S. 345, 354-61 (1982) (“[Section] 8(b) and § 9(a) of the Census Act embody 

explicit congressional intent to preclude all disclosure of raw census data reported by or on 

behalf of individuals. This strong policy of nondisclosure indicates that Congress intended 

the confidentiality provisions to constitute a ‘privilege’ within the meaning of the Federal 

Rules.”); see also In re England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.) (dismissing 

a proposition essentially identical to Koch’s). See generally PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 

661, 689 (2001) (“[T]he fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly 

anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.” (quoting 

Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998))).

30 368 U.S. at 217-20.

31 St. Regis is highly relevant to the individual claimants’ assertions of privilege, 

however. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.

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[promotion] board” to forbid civil discovery of the records.32 Then-Judge 

Roberts’s opinion for the court deemed this text unambiguous, but noted for 

good measure that discovery would inhibit Congress’s purpose in enacting the 

provision – to encourage “frank and open discussion” of inherently sensitive 

information.33 Section 1367’s similar text and analogous purpose counsel the 

same result here as in England.

3. Section 1367’s application to the individual claimants

Section 1367 and its implementing regulation clearly preclude discovery 

from the EEOC, but they just as clearly do not preclude discovery from the 

individual claimants. As the district court noted, the statute applies only to 

certain enumerated government officials, and says nothing about whether 

other individuals may disclose U visa information.34 It must therefore be read 

not to preclude such disclosure.35

Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They primarily 

argue that interpreting § 1367 not to bar discovery from the individual 

claimants would frustrate the statute’s goal of fostering reporting of abuse. But 

because § 1367’s text is unambiguous, any exploration of purpose is beside the 

 

32 375 F.3d 1169, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.) (interpreting 10 U.S.C. § 618(f), 

repealed, Pub. L. 109-364, § 547(a)(2), 120 Stat. 2216).

33 Id. at 1177-78.

34 The same is true of 8 C.F.R. § 214.14’s confidentiality provision. See id. § 214.14(e).

35 See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (“Where Congress 

explicitly enumerates certain exceptions . . . additional exceptions are not to be implied, in 

the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”).

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point.36 This follows from basic principles of statutory interpretation37 and 

from the Court’s decision in St. Regis. On similar facts, the St. Regis Court 

rejected an essentially identical argument:

[T]he prohibitions against disclosure [in the Census Act] . . . run 

only against the officials receiving [certain reports] and do not 

purport to generally clothe census information with secrecy. The 

Solicitor General admits that ‘literally construed’ the restrictions 

of the statute go no further. But he insists that since the purpose 

of the statute is to encourage the free and full submission of 

statistical data to the Bureau, this can be accomplished only 

through the creation of a confidential relationship which will 

extend the privilege to the petitioner [a private company] and like 

reporting companies. . . . We fully realize the importance to the 

public of the submission of free and full reports to the Census 

Bureau, but we cannot rewrite the Census Act. It does not . . . grant

copies of the report not in the hands of the Census Bureau an 

immunity from legal process. Ours is the duty to avoid a 

construction that would suppress otherwise competent evidence 

unless the statute, strictly construed, requires such a result. That 

this statute does not do. Congress did not prohibit the use of the 

reports per se but merely restricted their use while in the hands of 

those persons receiving them, i.e., the government officials.38

 

36 In any event, the scant evidence of Congress’s intent in enacting and amending 

§ 1367 (as distinguished from its broader intent in enacting the U visa program as a whole) 

does not clearly support plaintiffs’ purpose-based argument. See 151 CONG. REC. E2605-04 

(Dec. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers), 2005 WL 3453763 (in discussing enhancements 

to 8 U.S.C. § 1367’s confidentiality protections, omitting specific mention of civil discovery 

while explicitly stating that the provision prevents “abusers using DHS to obtain information 

about their victims, including the existence of a VAWA immigration petition” (emphasis 

added), but also stating more generally that the provision prevents abusers from “interfering 

with or undermining their victims’ immigration cases”).

37 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) “[W]hen [a] statute’s language is 

plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 

not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. 

v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)); see also Pierce County., Wash. v. Guillen, 

537 U.S. 129, 144 (2003) (“We have often recognized that statutes establishing evidentiary 

privileges must be construed narrowly because privileges impede the search for the truth.”). 38 St. Regis, 368 U.S. at 217-18.

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St. Regis squarely supports the district court’s reading of § 1367. The 

subsequent Baldridge case offers plaintiffs no support because the only issue 

before the Court in Baldrige was whether the Census Bureau itself could claim 

privilege.39

In addition to that analysis, plaintiffs offer two textual arguments. First, 

they claim that the district court’s reading of § 1367 not to preclude discovery 

from individuals renders the provision meaningless, since it allows litigants 

like Koch to obtain from individuals the same information they might have 

sought from the officials and agencies within the statute’s scope.40 This is a 

variant of the purpose argument: both insist that discovery from individuals 

undermines the statutory confidentiality of U visa applications. And indeed, 

Koch appears able to get most, if not all, of the information it wants from the 

individual claimants.

Plaintiffs’ argument has weight, and as we discuss below, the harm 

Koch’s desired discovery might cause to Congress’s purposes is highly relevant 

to our Rule 26 analysis. But from a purely interpretive standpoint, plaintiffs’ 

argument is questionable: § 1367’s confidentiality protections are not 

meaningless without similar protections for individuals. In turn, there is no 

need to depart from the straightforward text of the statute (i.e., by implying an 

additional privilege not explicitly set forth) in order to save it from 

superfluity.41 There are many situations in which § 1367, as we read it, could 

provide a layer of confidentiality that cannot be circumvented by subpoenaing 

 

39 Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1982).

40 See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997) (“It is the cardinal principle 

of statutory construction that it is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 

of a statute.” (internal alterations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted) (quoting United 

States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955))).

41 Cf. Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 21-22 (2006) (declining to 

apply the canon against superfluity where phrases alleged to have been rendered superfluous 

“[did] a small amount of additional work”). 

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individuals. Most obviously, discovery assumes a lawsuit; without one, an 

individual presumably has the right not to disclose U visa information, and 

§ 1367 cuts off additional potential sources of the information in barring 

federal officials from doing so. Even within litigation, it might be more 

burdensome for an individual to disclose the records than for an agency to do 

so, potentially enabling the individual to avoid discovery pursuant to Rule 

26(b)(1) where an agency could not.42 And U visa-related information might be

protected by other privileges, e.g., attorney-client, in the hands of an individual 

but not in those of a federal official. 

In any event, St. Regis forecloses plaintiffs’ meaninglessness argument. 

The party seeking discovery in that case attempted essentially the same “end 

run” as Koch: it sought discovery of certain information from an individual 

litigant, circumventing a statute preventing federal officials in possession of 

the same information from disclosing it. But the St. Regis Court allowed this 

maneuver. In so doing, it implicitly but necessarily held that the “end run” did 

not render the relevant confidentiality statute meaningless.43 We see no 

principled way to avoid applying its logic in this highly analogous case.

Second, plaintiffs argue that because another subsection of the statute, 

§ 1367(b)(4), allows U visa applicants to free federal officials from the statute’s 

constraints by consenting to disclosure, individual applicants must also have 

the power to refuse a subpoena seeking that information directly from them, 

otherwise (b)(4) is meaningless.44 Again, we disagree. The right to regulate a 

third party’s disclosure of one’s information is logically distinct from the right 

 

42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (the scope of discovery depends in part on “whether the 

burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). 

43 The canon against superfluity was just as well established at the time of St. Regis

as it is now. See, e.g., Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538-39; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 

(1883); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115 (1879).

44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1367(b)(4).

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not to personally disclose that information; conceptually, it is possible, if 

perhaps unusual, that someone might have one but not the other.45 Thus, the 

district court’s reading does not render § 1367’s consent provision superfluous.

4. Summary

The district court correctly interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1367. The statute bars 

discovery of U visa records from the EEOC, but it does not bar discovery of the 

records from the individual claimants. Their protection, if any, lies in the basic 

constraints of the discovery process – constraints we now consider.

VI

Having determined that § 1367 did not preclude U visa discovery from 

the individual claimants, the district court proceeded to analyze whether there 

was nonetheless reason to forbid such discovery under Rule 26(c). Rule 26(c) 

allows the court, “for good cause, [to] issue an order” restricting discovery “to 

protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 

undue burden or expense.” “[T]he federal courts have superimposed a 

somewhat demanding balancing of interests approach to the Rule. Under the 

balancing standard, the district judge must compare the hardship to the party 

against whom discovery is sought against the probative value of the 

information to the other party.”46 Courts also weigh relevant public interests 

in this analysis.47

 

45 The reasons for this arrangement would presumably be similar to those for allowing 

the agency, but not the individual, to refuse discovery in the first place. See supra notes 41-

42 and accompanying text.

46 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.101[1][c] (3d ed. 

2011); see, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th

Cir. 2001). 47 See, e.g., Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 209 & n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting 

that “a request to depose opposing counsel generally would provide a district court with good 

cause to issue a protective order,” and citing in support another court’s observations that such 

depositions “disrupt[] the adversarial system, lower[] the standards of the profession, add[] 

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The district court ruled that Rule 26 allowed discovery of U visa 

information from the individual claimants. The court’s balancing analysis 

turned on three basic determinations.48 First, although there were prior cases 

to support both allowing and denying the discovery under Rule 26, none of 

them were binding and most seemed distinguishable. Second, the discovery 

Koch sought had significant probative value. Third, the discovery’s relevance 

outweighed any possible harm from allowing it.49 We address each 

determination in turn.

1. Relevant case law

The district court’s analysis of precedent was accurate: this dispute 

presents an issue of first impression in our circuit, much of the precedent the 

parties deem relevant is not, and what remains is equivocal.

Although courts have often barred discovery of immigration-related 

information, in many of these cases, immigration benefits were not alleged to 

have motivated or shaped the claims at issue and did not otherwise affect the 

plaintiffs’ right to relief.50 In such cases, courts have frequently rejected the 

 

to the already burdensome time and costs of litigation, and detract[] from the quality of client 

representation” (quoting Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986))); 

Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,

23 F.3d 772, 787-89 (3d Cir. 1994); 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 46, at ¶ 26.101[1][c].

48 As discussed above, plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should not have 

applied the usual Rule 26 balancing analysis is waived.

49 The court did limit discovery to “information regarding efforts to obtain U Visas, or 

other immigration benefits, that arose out of the allegations in this civil action against Koch 

Foods” and specifically excused the claimants from revealing prior crimes.

50 Many of the parties’ cases are distinguishable on this basis, including In re Reyes, 

814 F.2d 168, 169-71 (5th Cir. 1987) (barring discovery of petitioners’ immigration status 

because their entitlement to relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act did not depend on 

that status, which apparently was not at issue in any other way in the appeal); Rivera, 364 

F.3d at 1069-72, 1074-75 (barring discovery of employment discrimination complainants’ 

immigration status where that status was legally irrelevant to the issue of liability, its 

relevance to the issue of remedies was conjectural, and remedies, if any, could be addressed 

in a separate proceeding); E.E.O.C. v. DiMare Ruskin, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-158-FTM-99, 2012 

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notion that immigration status is itself important enough evidence of plaintiffs’ 

broader credibility to be discoverable.51

But where immigration status and benefits have related more directly to 

the parties’ claims, defenses, and credibility, as here, district courts have 

reached divergent results. Some have disallowed it. Most analogous to this 

case, in David v. Signal International, the defendant employer, accused of 

human trafficking, stressed “the self-evident, overwhelming temptation to 

fabricate or to exaggerate evidence to gain entry to this country for oneself and 

one's wife and children” in seeking discovery of plaintiffs’ T and U visa 

applications.52 The Eastern District of Louisiana forbade the discovery, 

 

WL 12067868, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2012) (similar to Reyes); Demaj v. Sakaj, No. 3:09 

CV 255 JGM, 2012 WL 476168, at *3-6 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2012) (in Hague Convention child 

abduction case, disallowing discovery of mother’s U visa application; reasoning that 

production was not necessary to resolve the legal issue to which the application was 

purportedly relevant, and was not justified in order to allow the father to check the mother’s 

account of abuse for consistency); Castillo v. Hernandez, No. EP-10-CV-247-KC, 2011 WL 

1528762, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2011) (similar to Reyes); EEOC v. Willamette Tree 

Wholesale, Inc., No. CV 09-690-PK, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 97380, at *13 (D. Or. July 8, 2010) 

(refusing defendant employer’s request for production of immigration documents in order to 

enable an exploration of plaintiffs’ employment history, where such history “had no bearing” 

on plaintiffs’ claims and, insofar as employers’ defenses were concerned, would at best 

duplicate facts already in the record); Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 

F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (similar to Rivera); E.E.O.C. v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 

1085, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006) (barring discovery of Title VII complainant’s immigration status 

where that status was legally irrelevant to the defendant’s asserted defense, and might 

otherwise be relevant only at a distant stage of the litigation, if then); Topo v. Dhir, 210 

F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (barring discovery of plaintiffs’ immigration status where that 

status was “a collateral issue not relevant to any material aspect of the case”); Zeng Liu v. 

Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (similar to Reyes); De La 

Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 239 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (similar to Reyes); and 

several of the cases cited infra note 51. 51 See, e.g., DiMare Ruskin, 2012 WL 12067868, at *5; Widjaja v. Kang Yue USA Corp., 

No. 09 CV 2089, 2010 WL 2132068, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010); Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. 

Maint. Indus., Inc., 267 F.R.D. 257, 276-77 (D. Minn. 2007); Avila-Blum, 236 F.R.D. at 192;

E.E.O.C. v. Bice of Chi., 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (rejecting “Defendants’ 

argu[ment] that the charging parties’ credibility is directly relevant and therefore, they 

should be able to inquire about falsification of identity and immigration status”); GalavizZamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 502 (W.D. Mich. 2005). 

52 David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 735 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (E.D. La. 2010).

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reasoning that “any inquiry into plaintiffs’ current immigration[] status . . . 

will most assuredly strike paralyzing fear in the plaintiffs sufficient to chill 

any inclination they may have had to prosecute their pending claims,” thus 

“impos[ing] an undue burden on private enforcement of employment 

discrimination laws,” and that “defendants’ opportunity to test the credibility 

of plaintiffs does not outweigh the public interest in allowing employees to 

enforce their rights.”53 However, the David court allowed discovery of sworn 

statements attached to the applications, as such discovery would not reveal 

plaintiffs’ immigration status.54

In a few other such cases, however, district courts have permitted 

discovery of sensitive immigration-related information. For example, in a labor 

case involving allegations of numerous torts and federal and state labor law 

violations, the District of Colorado allowed discovery of T and U visa materials 

because they were relevant to many of plaintiffs’ diverse claims and to “the 

issue of motivation and fabrication of each of the Plaintiffs’ testimony.”55

 

53 Id. at 444, 447 (E.D. La. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing and 

reaffirming David v. Signal Int'l, LLC, 257 F.R.D. 114, 124 (E.D. La. 2009), objections 

overruled, No. CIV.A. 08-1220, 2009 WL 2030382 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009)); see also id. at 444

(“Signal argues that bias and prejudice taint the [visa] applications in that plaintiffs will 

exaggerate their claims to allow their wives and children to remain in the country.”).

54 Id. at 448. See also E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406-07 

(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (barring disclosure of plaintiffs’ immigration status without rebutting 

defendants’ claim that their status was relevant to the issue of damages); Flores v. Albertsons, 

Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (“even 

assuming” immigration documents’ relevance to the issue of damages, barring discovery in 

light of the in terrorem effect of production).

55 Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-CV-00772-MSK-MJW, 2012 

WL 5931716, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2012). The court further concluded, without analysis, 

that “any in terrorem effect is outweighed by the . . . Defendants’ compelling need to obtain 

this relevant information.” Id. at *2; see also Fragoso v. Builders FirstSource Se. Grp. LLC, 

No. 4:10-503-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 767442, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2011) (allowing discovery of 

personal injury plaintiff’s immigration status because, among other things, plaintiff’s claim 

for past and future wage loss damages would be undermined if he were not “lawfully eligible 

for past and future work in the United States,” and rejecting without analysis plaintiff’s 

arguments based on “privacy concerns and . . . harassment”). In another Title VII case Koch 

cites, the Eastern District of Washington allowed discovery of T visa applications, finding 

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In sum, the case law on this issue is nonbinding, mostly distinguishable, 

and equivocal even where relevant. Although existing authorities may inform 

our Rule 26 inquiry, the district court correctly recognized that none provide 

definitive guidance.

2. The probative value of U visa discovery

Finding nothing binding in the case law, the district court set out on its 

own Rule 26(c) balancing analysis. It first found that Koch had an appreciable 

interest in obtaining the discovery, since the claimants’ “motive [was] 

relevant.” The court explained that the number of claimants against Koch 

appeared to have “spike[d]” once the EEOC became involved, and because the 

EEOC has the authority to issue U visas, this was at least some evidence that 

the claimants may have lied in hopes of obtaining them.

We discern no fundamental error in the district court’s analysis, nor in 

its conclusion that the discovery sought might well have significant probative 

value. To be sure, the court’s “spike in claims” datum, on its own, is not 

 

relevance for reasons similar to those offered in Camayo. E.E.O.C. v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 

No. CV-11-3045-EFS, 2013 WL 3940674, at *5-6 (E.D. Wash. July 31, 2013). That case is 

distinguishable, however, because the potential in terrorem effect from discovery was limited: 

every claimant’s immigration status was known and undisputed when discovery was sought, 

unlike in this case. Id. at *6; see also Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P’ship, No. CIV.A. 06-

CV-01043WY, 2007 WL 951781, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2007) (allowing discovery of plaintiff 

guest workers’ immigration history because that history was “material” to several claims and 

defenses in dispute, and because defendant employer had already been obligated to report 

them to immigration authorities on account of their absconding from the workplace).

A compromise approach is illustrated in Perez v. Seafood Peddler of San Rafael Inc., 

No. 12-cv-00116 WHO (NC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190839, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013) 

(“[D]efendants may not ask questions of witnesses regarding U Visas unless (1) there is a 

factual basis showing that plaintiff [the Department of Labor] offered, provided, or was 

requested to provide, U Visa certification to any Seafood Peddler employee in connection with 

the investigation or prosecution of this case; (2) that employee’s testimony will be relied upon 

by plaintiff in this case; and (3) the employee is not a U Visa beneficiary within the meaning 

of § 1367(a)(2).”).

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particularly suggestive of mass fraud.56 The EEOC’s involvement could have 

caused the case’s ranks to swell for any number of legitimate reasons; most 

obviously, the EEOC may have discovered additional harassment claimants 

during the pre-suit conciliation and investigation processes. Moreover, 

although Koch marshals what it characterizes as unequivocal evidence of 

claimants’ duplicity, on the whole, the parties’ briefing indicates genuine 

ambiguities in the still-developing factual record. We further note that the U 

visa process contains numerous protections against fraud,57 which should 

deter claimants from lying in their U visa applications and the EEOC from 

abetting applications that it knows or suspects to be fraudulent.58 Finally, we 

reject Koch’s repeated suggestions that plaintiffs’ claims are so outlandish as 

to be unbelievable. In fact, substantial evidence suggests that serious abuse is 

all too common in many industries reliant on immigrant workers, including 

the modern-day poultry industry.59

 

56 Plaintiffs claim that the district court’s “spike in claims” observation was factually 

erroneous. But as the court correctly explained, this action began with a suit by eight 

individual claimants; the EEOC’s separate suit eventually brought in over a hundred others.

57 Specifically, although the EEOC can certify U visa applications for further 

consideration, it is USCIS that has the power to grant each application, and it does so only 

after a de novo review of all relevant evidence. Moreover, USCIS can revoke U visas and 

initiate deportation proceedings if application fraud is uncovered. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(c)(1), (c)(4), (h)(2), (i).

58 If the EEOC solicited and certified applications that USCIS then found to be 

questionable or fraudulent, the claimants would be denied visas and possibly deported, 

despite having cooperated with the agency and revealed significant personal information. 

Such a result would hardly encourage future claimants to do the same, even if their claims 

were valid. Perhaps more importantly, the EEOC’s own credibility with USCIS would suffer, 

making approval of future EEOC-certified U visa applicants less likely and further eroding 

the agency’s ability to take advantage of the program. And the EEOC’s credibility and 

reputation might also suffer in other contexts, harming the agency and its mission more 

broadly.

59 See, e.g., No Relief: Denial of Bathroom Breaks in the Poultry Industry, OXFAM 

AMERICA (2016), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/No_Relief_Embargo.pdf; 

Lives on the Line: The Human Cost of Cheap Chicken, OXFAM AMERICA (2015), 

https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Lives_on_the_Line_Full_Report_Final.pdf;

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But although plaintiffs’ claims are facially credible, and although the 

possibility that immigration benefits may have induced some claimants to step 

forward does not necessarily suggest that their claims are false, we find it

plausible that some undocumented immigrants might be tempted to stretch 

the truth in order to obtain lawful status – and perhaps even lawful permanent 

status – for themselves and their families.60 U visa applicants are analogous

to testifying informants in criminal trials, and in that context, as one court has 

pithily observed, “[a]ny competent lawyer would . . . know[] that . . . special 

immigration treatment by [law enforcement agencies] [is] highly relevant 

impeachment material.”61 Given this, and given the considerable deference we 

owe the district court in its discovery rulings,62 we cannot conclude that the 

 

Tom Fritzsche et al., Unsafe at These Speeds: Alabama’s Poultry Industry and its Disposable 

Workers, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR. (2013), https://www.splcenter.org 

/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/Unsafe_at_These_Speeds_web.pdf; 

Mary Bauer et al., Injustice On Our Plates: Immigrant Women in the U.S. Food Industry, 

SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR. (2010), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files 

/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/Injustice_on_Our_Plates.pdf; Lance Compa et al., 

Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants, HUMAN RIGHTS 

WATCH (2004), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0105.pdf. See generally 

Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An 

Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1085-89, 1125 (2014) (immigrant workers in urban 

environments); Bernice Yeung & Grace Rubenstein, Rape in the Fields: Female Workers Face 

Rape, Harassment In U.S. Agriculture Industry, PBS: FRONTLINE (June 25, 2013, 2:39 AM), 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/social-issues/rape-in-the-fields/female-workersface-rape-harassment-in-u-s-agriculture-industry (immigrant fieldworkers); Grace Meng et 

al., Cultivating Fear: The Vulnerability of Immigrant Farmworkers in the US to Sexual 

Violence and Sexual Harassment, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 2012),

https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0512ForUpload_1.pdf (immigrant 

fieldworkers).

60 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. Indeed, it appears that U visa fraud is 

not unheard of, although there is little to suggest it is common. See, e.g., Mark Becker, 9 

Investigates: Illegal Immigrants Faking Crimes to Stay in Charlotte, WSOC-TV (Nov. 11, 

2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/special-reports/9-investigates-illegalimmigrants-faking-crimes-st/113455640.

61 United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 392 (9th Cir. 2004).

62 See, e.g., Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A trial court 

enjoys wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery. It is, in fact, unusual 

to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters.” (citations omitted)).

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district court abused its discretion in finding U visa discovery relevant and 

potentially probative of fraud.

3. Plaintiffs’ and the public’s interest in preventing U visa discovery

After finding U visa discovery relevant, the court turned to the other side 

of the ledger, analyzing whether the discovery would create an undue burden. 

It reasoned that the claimants did not need to fear being fired once Koch 

discovered that they sought U visas, since most of them no longer worked for 

the company and others “may have other protection” or could be sheltered by 

a protective order. Moreover, the claimants did not need to fear that Koch 

would report them to criminal or immigration authorities, because a protective 

order could bar Koch from doing so and because any claimants who had sought 

U visas would already have revealed their undocumented status to federal 

officials. And the court stressed that it was not allowing a “fishing expedition,” 

but only limited discovery of information related to U visas only. For these 

reasons, the court concluded, the relevance of the discovery sought outweighed 

any burden it might impose.63 Below, we address the district court’s stated 

reasons, then discuss factors it did not consider.

a. Claimants’ fears of being fired

Plaintiffs don’t dispute that few of the claimants still work for Koch. 

However, they emphasize that some still do, and that Koch said earlier in the 

litigation that it will fire them if it turns out they are undocumented. Koch’s 

statement is unsurprising: it is illegal to knowingly employ an undocumented 

worker, and U visa discovery would necessarily show Koch which of its 

 

63 The court also noted claimants’ fear that U visa discovery might reveal their 

criminal histories, and responded by barring discovery of “prior crimes that may be reflected 

in their applications.”

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employees are undocumented.64 The district court apparently believed that a 

protective order could protect the employees from being fired. But it is unclear 

whether the protective order ultimately entered in this case does so, because it 

allows use of U visa discovery for purposes unrelated to this litigation if 

“required by relevant law.” It is uncertain whether a protective order could 

protect the employees in the way the district court envisioned: doing so might 

force Koch to violate the law.65

Koch responds, correctly, that any workers with U visas are authorized 

to work in the United States, and that even workers with pending U visas may 

receive work authorization.66 That should indeed reduce claimants’ fear of 

being fired. But assuming that some claimants did apply for U visas, their 

applications may still be pending or may have been rejected, so they may not 

be authorized to work.67 In turn, despite the protective order and the 

 

64 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2).

65 This assumes that the knowledge of Koch employees privy to the U visa discovery 

would necessarily be imputed to the company for purposes of the Immigration and 

Naturalization Act, an issue we do not address here.

66 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6).

67 It seems less likely that U visa applicants in this case (if any) would have been 

rejected outright, both because of the program’s relatively high acceptance rate and because 

there is currently a years-long backlog of U visa applicants. Number of I-918 Petitions for U 

Nonimmigrant Status (Victims of Certain Criminal Activities and Family Members) by Fiscal 

Year, Quarter, and Case Status 2009-2016, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES

(Dec. 2015), 

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immi

gration%20Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2016_qtr1.pdf (at the end of fiscal 

year 2015, 10,026 applications were approved, 2,715 were denied, and 63,762 were pending 

(all excluding derivative applications)). As for applicants whose applications remain pending 

– probably most of them, given the backlog – the U visa statute says that they “may” receive 

work authorization, but the record and briefs do not indicate how many pending applicants 

are in fact authorized. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6); see also Krisztina E. Sabo et al., Early Access 

to Work Authorization For VAWA Self-Petitioners and U Visa Applicants, NAT’L IMMIGRANT 

WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJ. at 7 (Feb. 12, 2014), http://niwap.org/reports/Early-Access-toWork-Authorization.pdf (asserting that “[w]hile express statutory authority to grant work 

authorization to U visa applicants who have met bona fide determination exists, this has not 

been implemented for all U visa applicants” (emphasis omitted)).

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protections of the U visa program itself, there remains a risk that U visa 

discovery will cause some claimants or family members to lose their jobs.

This is a serious risk, but also a highly speculative one. It is unclear how 

many claimants remain employed by Koch, and how many will still be working 

for the company by the time U visa discovery takes place.68 Moreover, it is 

uncertain how many in that group may have applied for or received U visas; 

put differently, because the U visa applications in this case are entirely 

hypothetical, the in terrorem effect of discovering them is hypothetical as well. 

Nonetheless, if claimants have applied for U visas, their jobs may still be on 

the line, contrary to the district court’s apparent belief.

b. Claimants’ fears of being reported

Although few claimants need to fear termination, all could fear that Koch 

will report them and their families to immigration authorities if it learns of 

their U visa applications. Of course, the protective order in place does not allow 

this: although Koch cannot knowingly employ undocumented workers, nothing 

suggests that it would legally have to report current or former employees upon 

learning that they are undocumented. Nevertheless, the claimants might fear 

that Koch will violate the order and turn them in anyway. And employers 

commonly and unlawfully retaliate against irksome workers by reporting or 

threatening to report them to immigration authorities.69 A protective order 

 

68 In early 2014, plaintiffs asserted that “30 of the Aggrieved Individuals in this action, 

as well as dozens of their family members, are still employed by Defendant Koch Foods.” 

However, employee turnover rates are high in the poultry processing industry. See Compa et 

al., supra note 59, at 108.

69 See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 886-87 (1984); Rivera v. NIBCO, 

Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases); Stephen Lee, Private 

Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1122-23 (2009) (discussing 

empirical studies indicating a link between employers’ anti-union animus and their use of 

immigration-related intimidation); Fritzsche et al., supra note 59, at 4-5; Meng et al., supra 

note 59, at 7, 48, 81; Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations 

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would not necessarily quell claimants’ fear of suffering the same fate, 

regardless of Koch’s intent to comply with the order.70

In downplaying claimants’ asserted fears of being reported, the district 

court stressed that any claimants who submitted U visa applications have 

already revealed their undocumented status to the EEOC and possibly USCIS. 

But as Plaintiffs note, claimants might not have feared revealing their status 

only to federal officials who process U visa applications, since those officials 

apparently are not involved in immigration enforcement. An abuse victim 

might well be willing to disclose sensitive information to a few sympathetic 

officials, yet nonetheless fear that his or her abuser might obtain that 

information and spread it far and wide.71 In other words, the claimants 

reasonably might fear disclosure of their status to certain authorities, but not 

others, so their having submitted U visa applications does not rule out an in 

terrorem effect from further disclosure, as the district court apparently 

believed.72

 

of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, NATL. EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJ. 24-25 

(2009), http://nelp.3cdn.net/ e470538bfa5a7e7a46_2um6br7o3.pdf.

70 See, e.g., David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 257 F.R.D. 114, 126 (E.D. La. 2009) (“Even 

under the umbrella of a protective order, the danger of intimidation would inhibit plaintiffs 

in pursuing their rights in this case.”). Cf. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 n.5 (“The fact that NIBCO 

has pledged not to use the plaintiffs’ immigration status to retaliate against them does not 

eliminate the substantial risk of chilling the rights of these and future plaintiffs. . . . [T]he 

existence of post hoc legal remedies for retaliation do[es] not necessarily provide adequate 

protection when plaintiffs anticipate retaliation that would result in extraordinarily 

burdensome consequences.”).

71 Undocumented immigrants can and do distinguish between revealing their status 

to U visa authorities and other officials: tens of thousands apply for U visas each year. See 

Number of I-918 Petitions, supra note 67. 72 Plaintiffs also point out that an immigrant need not be undocumented to fear U visa 

discovery. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 (“Even documented workers may be chilled by the 

type of discovery at issue here. Documented workers may fear that their immigration status 

would be changed, or that their status would reveal the immigration problems of their family 

or friends; similarly, new legal residents or citizens may feel intimidated by the prospect of 

having their immigration history examined in a public proceeding. Any of these individuals, 

failing to understand the relationship between their litigation and immigration status, might 

choose to forego civil rights litigation.”).

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c. The extent of additional discovery

In allowing U visa discovery, the district court acknowledged that 

besides potentially revealing sensitive information, U visa discovery “at this 

late date will delay[] the resolution of this matter and creat[e] an enormous, 

costly hardship on Plaintiffs.” On appeal, plaintiffs claim that this delay and 

hardship are undue regardless of the sensitivity of the information at issue.

Their arguments have force, but do not suggest an abuse of discretion.

Plaintiffs’ main argument is that Koch does not need U visa discovery 

because the company has other material with which to undermine the 

claimants’ allegations. That may be true, but U visa applications would be 

novel and significant impeachment evidence, as we noted.73 Assuming that 

that discovery is permissible, it should not be barred simply because other 

impeachment evidence exists.

Plaintiffs further argue that the district court has in principle authorized 

dozens more depositions and subpoenas; that this new discovery will follow an 

already lengthy and intensive initial round; and that they lack resources to 

engage in such arduous additional discovery, unlike Koch. Their arguments 

have weight, especially since the limited written discovery explicitly approved 

by the district court would presumably give Koch the basic information it needs 

to argue its U visa fraud theory. Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ arguments implicate 

the quantity of additional discovery, rather than the substantive scope of 

additional discovery. And the quantity of additional discovery remains within 

the district court’s discretion to control. Although that court stated that U visa 

discovery was not necessarily limited to the written discovery it specifically 

discussed, it also emphasized that it was not allowing a “fishing expedition” 

and appeared sympathetic to plaintiffs’ concerns about time, expense, and 

 

73 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.

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logistical complication. Plaintiffs can seek from the district court relief from 

any unduly burdensome demands.

d. The burden on non-claimants

The district court’s analysis of the harm that U visa discovery might 

cause the claimants was imperfect, but not critically so. More pressing is that 

the district court did not address how U visa litigation might intimidate 

individuals outside this litigation, compromising the U visa program and law 

enforcement efforts more broadly.

These dynamics jeopardize the EEOC’s interests and those of the 

broader public. The district court could and should have weighed them in its 

Rule 26 analysis. But its analysis considered only the immediate chilling effect 

of U visa discovery on the individual claimants in this case. Those individuals 

are not the only ones who might be affected by the disclosure of the claimants’ 

U visa information. Thousands apply for U visas each year, and they do so with 

the assurance that federal authorities will keep their applications 

confidential.74 Allowing U visa discovery from the claimants themselves in this 

high-profile case will undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of those 

Congressionally sanctioned assurances and may sow confusion over when and 

how U visa information may be disclosed, deterring immigrant victims of abuse 

 

74 See, e.g., Immigration Options for Victims of Crimes: Information for Law 

Enforcement, Healthcare Providers, and Others, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 

SERVICES (Feb. 2010), 

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Battered%20Spouse,%20Chil

dren%20%26%20Parents/Immigration%20Options%20for%20Victims%20of%20Crimes.pdf

(brochure stating that “all agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

including USCIS, are legally prohibited from disclosing that a victim has applied for VAWA, 

T, or U immigration benefits”); U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Privacy Waiver 

Authorizing Disclosure to a Third Party, ICE Form 60-001 (Feb. 2011), at 1-2, 

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/forms/pdf/60-001.pdf (“[Y]ou are under no obligation 

to consent to the release of your information to any third party. . . . If you have applied for or 

received [a U visa], you are legally entitled to confidentiality.”).

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– many of whom already mistrust the government75 – from stepping forward 

and thereby frustrating Congress’s intent in enacting the U visa program.

This is a serious concern for plaintiff EEOC, amicus NLRB, and the 

federal and state departments of labor, all of which certify U visa 

applications.76 Considerable evidence suggests that immigrants are 

disproportionately vulnerable to workplace abuse and, not coincidentally,

highly reluctant to report it for fear of discovery and retaliation.77 And threats 

of deportation are among the most familiar and dreaded means by which 

unscrupulous employers retaliate against immigrant employees.78 Thus, if the 

 

75 See, e.g., Alexander & Prasad, supra note 59, at 1101 & n.10; Stephen Lee, 

Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1100-03 (2011); Meng et al., 

supra note 59, at 72-76.

76 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2); The U Visa: A Potential Immigration Remedy for 

Immigrant Workers Facing Labor Abuse, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJ. at 3-4 (Mar. 2014), 

http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/UVisa.pdf.

77 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 59 and 69; Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and 

the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 676-79 (2003) (collecting evidence that 

undocumented workers underreport labor violations); Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented 

Workers: Crossing the Borders of Immigration and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.

POL’Y 611, 616-17 (2012) (a 2008 survey of 4,387 low-wage immigrant workers in three cities 

suggested that immigrants are disproportionately likely to experience wage and hour 

violations); Chirag Mehta et al., Chicago’s Undocumented Immigrants: An Analysis of Wages, 

Working Conditions, and Economic Contributions, UNIV. OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO CTR. FOR 

URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT at 27-29 (Feb. 2002), https://cued.uic.edu/wpcontent/uploads /undoc_wages_working_64.pdf (in an analysis of 1,186 Chicago immigrant 

workers, finding that “undocumented workers more often experience unsafe working 

conditions than do immigrants with legal status,” that they file claims less frequently than 

would be expected given their rates of reported serious injury and unsafe working conditions, 

and that there is a strong and statistically significant correlation between undocumented 

status and wage and hour complaints). But see Alexander & Prasad, supra note 59, at 1087, 

1090, 1092, 1127-29 (in an analysis of 2008 survey conducted by Griffith, failing to find 

statistically significant correlations between immigration status and reports of workplace 

problems, likelihood to make a complaint related to a workplace problem, and employer 

retaliation for such complaints).

78 On employers’ use of threats of deportation and similar immigration consequences, 

see supra note 69; see generally 151 CONG. REC. E2605-04 (Dec. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 

Conyers), 2005 WL 3453763 (in discussing amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1367, noting that 

“[t]hreats of deportation are the most potent tool abusers of immigrant victims use to 

maintain control over and silence their victims and to avoid criminal prosecution”). On 

employees’ fear of such consequences, see Compa et al., supra note 59, at 103-04, Lives on the 

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agencies cannot credibly assure potential U visa seekers that their sensitive 

information will be kept private, they may become much less able to use the 

program to solicit cooperation from those most in need of their help. Protective 

orders will not necessarily reassure potential claimants.79 Nor can the agencies 

easily reassure potential claimants that although U visa discovery was allowed 

in this case, it will not be allowed in their cases. Most of Koch’s and the district 

court’s reasons for allowing U visa discovery here – e.g., that U visas provide a 

motive to fabricate abuse, that a protective order could be entered, that U visa 

applicants already would have revealed their status to federal authorities, and 

that the evidence of abuse is debatable – are likely present in virtually every 

immigrant-abuse case in which the EEOC or a similar agency is involved.

In sum, allowing discovery of U visa information may have a chilling 

effect extending well beyond this case, imperiling important public purposes. 

The district court, while thoughtful, confined its focus to the interests of the 

individuals before it. We agree with most of the district court’s careful 

consideration of the sensitive issues presented. But having weighed all of the 

problems U visa discovery may cause against Koch’s admittedly significant 

interest in obtaining the discovery, we are compelled to conclude that the 

discovery the district court approved would impose an undue burden and must 

be redefined. 

VII

Rather than impose an order of our own, we remand to the district court 

to devise an approach to U visa discovery that adequately protects the diverse 

and competing interests at stake. Our discussion indicates the basics of that

 

Line, supra note 59, at 28; Fritzsche et al., supra note 59, at 38; Bauer et al., supra note 59, 

at 23, 42, 49-51; supra note 59; Meng et al., supra note 59, at 19, 49; Mehta et al., supra note 

77, at 28-29.

79 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

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approach. Beyond these broad contours, we leave the management of U visa 

discovery to the district court. Rule 26(d) gives that court wide discretion to 

craft flexible and nuanced terms of discovery.80

In light of the above, we VACATE the district court’s certified discovery 

orders and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 

opinion.

 

80 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A)-(H); Granger v. Slade, 90 F. App’x 741, 742 

(5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (Rule 26 protective orders are “designed to shape the changing 

needs of the litigation and subject to continued modification by the district court”).

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