Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05341/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05341-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 2011 Decided December 9, 2011

No. 10-5341

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-CV-00548)

Norman D. James argued the cause for the appellants.

Duane J. Desiderio entered an appearance.

Katherine J. Barton, Attorney, United States Department

of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Andrew J. Doyle

and Aaron P. Avila, Attorneys, were on brief. R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

*

*

As of the date the opinion was published, Judge Ginsburg had

taken senior status.

USCA Case #10-5341 Document #1346791 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 1 of 14
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

2

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The National

Association of Home Builders and its member organizations,

Southern Arizona Home Builders Association and Home

Builders Association of Central Arizona, appeal the dismissal of

their lawsuit challenging the determination (Determination) by

the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (collectively,

Agencies) that two reaches of the Santa Cruz River in southern

Arizona constitute “traditional navigable water[s]” (TNW)3

 so

as to come within the Agencies’ regulatory authority under the

Clean Water Act (CWA).4 NAHB challenges the TNW

2

Circuit Judge Kavanaugh concurs in the opinion except for Part

II.B.1.

3

The “traditional definition” of “ ‘navigable waters’ . . . required

that the ‘waters’ be navigable in fact, or susceptible of being rendered

so.” See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730 (2006)

(plurality) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563

(1871)); see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (Congress has “traditional

jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or

which could reasonably be so made.”); Consol. Hydro, Inc. v. FERC,

968 F.2d 1258, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The Supreme Court has

held that waterways are ‘navigable’ if they form ‘in their ordinary

condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued

highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other

States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such

commerce is conducted by water.’ Moreover, ‘once found to be

navigable, a waterway remains so.’ ” ) (quoting The Daniel Ball, 10

Wall. at 563).

4

The three affiliated appellants make their arguments collectively

as “Home Builders.” For convenience, we treat them as a single entity

under the parent organization’s acronym, NAHB.

USCA Case #10-5341 Document #1346791 Filed: 12/09/2011 Page 2 of 14
3

Determination as both procedurally and substantively defective. 

The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction on the ground the CWA precludes a preenforcement challenge to a TNW Determination. We affirm the

dismissal on the alternative jurisdictional ground that the

appellants lack standing under Article III of the United States

Constitution. See Moms Against Mercury v. Food & Drug

Admin., 483 F.3d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Where both

standing and subject matter jurisdiction are at issue . . . , a court

may inquire into either and, finding it lacking, dismiss the

matter without reaching the other.”) (citing Ruhrgas AG v.

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999)).5

I.

The CWA provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by

any person”—i.e., “any addition of any pollutant to navigable

waters from any point source”—“shall be unlawful” unless it

complies with one of several enumerated CWA provisions,

including sections 402 and 404. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),

1362(12).6 Section 404 and 402 authorize the Agencies to issue

permits, after notice and an opportunity for public hearing, to

discharge into navigable waters dredged and fill material and

other pollutants. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1342; see Nat’l Ass’n of

Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 459, 461

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (under CWA section 404, Corps issues

5

Accordingly, we express no opinion regarding the district court’s

or this court’s jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge.

6

The CWA defines “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste,

incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,

chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,

wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,

municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(6). 

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permits to discharge dredged and fill material and under section

402, EPA issues permits to discharge other pollutants). The

CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United

States, including the territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), a

definition that has been construed to include certain adjacent

waters and wetlands that are not themselves navigable. See

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006).7

On May 23, 2008, the Corps issued a memorandum reciting

that the two “[Santa Cruz] Reaches are navigable-in-fact, and

thus a TNW, susceptible to use in interstate commerce

associated with recreational navigation activities” and,

7

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the term ‘navigable’ is

of ‘limited import’ and that Congress evidenced its intent to ‘regulate

at least some waters that would not be deemed “navigable” under the

classical understanding of that term.’ ” Solid Waste Agency of N.

Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)

(quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.

121, 133 (1985)); see supra note 2. The Court has not reached

consensus, however, on the extent of the term’s jurisdictional reach.

In Rapanos, four justices limited “navigable water[s]” to “[o]nly those

wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are

‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there is no clear

demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.” 547 U.S. at 742 (Scalia,

J., plurality opinion). The four dissenting justices would have upheld

the Corps’s interpretation that extended coverage to “all traditionally

navigable waters; tributaries of these waters; and wetlands adjacent to

traditionally navigable waters or their tributaries.” Id. at 792 (Stevens,

J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy drew the line somewhere between,

extending coverage to waters or wetlands that “possess a ‘significant

nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could

reasonably be so made.” Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J. concurring in

judgment) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at

167). In 2007, the EPA and the Corps jointly issued a new guidance

adopting a “significant nexus” standard. See Precon Dev. Corp. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 633 F.3d 278, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2011).

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accordingly, they “are subject to the jurisdiction of Section 404

of the CWA.” May 23, 2008 Memorandum for the Record of

Col. Thomas H. Magness, Dist. Dir., U.S. Army, at 5-6 (Compl.

ex. 2). On December 3, 2008, the EPA issued a letter setting out

its own “determination to affirm the [Corps’s] designation of the

two reaches as TNWs.” Dec. 3, 2008 Letter to John Paul

Woodley, Jr., Asst. Sec’y of the Army (Civil Works), from

Benjamin H. Grumbles, Asst. Adm’r, EPA, at 2 (Compl. ex. 1). 

NAHB filed this action in March 2009, challenging the

TNW Determination insofar as it “has the effect of expanding

the agencies’ jurisdiction over dry desert washes, arroyos and

other water features within the Santa Cruz River watershed

under the Clean Water Act.” Compl. ¶ 2. The complaint sets

out two claims, asserted both on NAHB’s own behalf and in its

representational capacity on behalf of individual members.

Count 1 challenges the TNW Determination as violative of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.,

because the Agencies provided no notice or opportunity to be

heard before issuing the TNW Determination. Count 2

challenges the substance of the TNW Determination as

unlawful. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,

requesting that the district court (1) declare the TNW

Determination to be invalid and (2) “set aside the TNW

Determination[] . . . and enjoin the Corps and EPA from relying

on the TNW Determinations in any future jurisdictional

determinations in the Santa Cruz River watershed.” Compl. 19-

20.

On August 18, 2010, the district court granted the Agencies’

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1) on the ground the CWA precludes pre-enforcement

judicial review of a TNW Determination. See Nat’l Ass’n of

Home Builders v. U.S. EPA, 731 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2010).

In light of its disposition, the court declined to reach the

Agencies’ alternative grounds for dismissal, including NAHB’s

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lack of Article III standing. NAHB filed a timely notice of

appeal.

II.

“Because Article III limits the constitutional role of the

federal judiciary to resolving cases and controversies, a showing

of standing ‘is an essential and unchanging’ predicate to any

exercise of our jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94

F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation

omitted)). “The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing

contains three elements’: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and

(3) redressability.” Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. U.S. Dep’t of

Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560-61 (quotation marks omitted)). “Thus, to establish

standing, a litigant must demonstrate a ‘personal injury fairly

traceable to the [opposing party’s] allegedly unlawful conduct

and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’ ” Id. (quoting

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (alteration in Allen)). 

We conclude that NAHB has not demonstrated an injury in fact

traceable to the TNW Determination to establish standing—

either in its own right or on behalf of its members. 

A. Organizational Standing

To establish organizational standing, NAHB must “allege[]

such a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the controversy as to

warrant the invocation of federal-court jurisdiction”; that is, it

must demonstrate that it has “ ‘suffered injury in fact,’ including

‘[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s

activities—with [a] consequent drain on the organization's

resources—constitut[ing] . . . more than simply a setback to the

organization’s abstract social interests.’ ” Nat’l Taxpayers

Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,

378-79 (1982)). This NAHB has not done.

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NAHB alleges it has “spent considerable staff time and

monetary resources in the quest to clarify CWA jurisdiction,”

such as submitting comments to the EPA and to the Corps,

testifying before the United States Senate and participating in

“numerous court cases,” including this one. Compl. ¶ 21; Decl.

of Thomas J. Ward, NAHB Vice President of Litig. & Legal

Servs. ¶¶ 8, 17-19 (filed Feb. 4, 2010) (Ward Decl.). But these

claims do not suffice. First, this litigation’s expenses do not

qualify as an injury in fact. See Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc.,

899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“An organization cannot, of

course, manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a suit from

its expenditure of resources on that very suit.”). As for the other

expenditures claimed, NAHB has not shown they were for

“operational costs beyond those normally expended” to carry out

its advocacy mission. Nat’l Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at 1434

(association’s “self-serving observation that it has expended

resources to educate its members and others regarding

[challenged statutory provision] does not present an injury in

fact”); id. (“The mere fact that an organization redirects some of

its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to

actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart

standing upon the organization.” (quotation marks omitted));

Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Here, the only ‘service’ impaired is pure

issue-advocacy—the very type of activity distinguished by

Havens.” (citing Havens, 455 U.S. at 379)). Because NAHB has

not asserted the alleged violation “perceptibly impaired” a nonabstract interest, we conclude it has not shown organizational

standing sufficient to satisfy Article III. See Havens, 455 U.S.

at 379. 

B. Representational Standing

NAHB also claims representational standing on behalf of its

members. To establish representational standing, an association

must demonstrate that “ ‘(a) its members would otherwise have

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standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to

protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)

neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’ ” Ass’n of

Flight Attendants, 564 F.3d at 464 (quoting United Food &

Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,

517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (quotation marks omitted)). To obtain

injunctive relief in particular, as NAHB seeks to do, it must

show under the first prong of the test that at least one of its

members “is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is

concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; it “must be fairly

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”—namely the

TNW Determination—and “it must be likely that a favorable

judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.” Summers v.

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (quoting Friends of

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

180-81 (2000)). While the burden of production to establish

standing is more relaxed at the pleading stage than at summary

judgment, a plaintiff must nonetheless allege “ ‘general factual

allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct’ ”

(notwithstanding “the court ‘presum[es] that general allegations

embrace the specific facts that are necessary to support the

claim’ ”). Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898-99 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (alteration in Sierra

Club)). NAHB has not carried this burden because it has neither

sufficiently alleged nor persuasively demonstrated any threat of

injury in fact to any of its members that is “fairly traceable to”

the TNW Determination.

1.

The complaint alleges that “[m]any of [NAHB’s] members

have or will attempt to obtain permits under Section 404 that

authorize discharges of fill materials into waters within the

federal CWA jurisdiction in connection with their projects” and

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“have an interest in the manner in which such regulation takes

place, including the types of watercourses that are subject to the

agencies’ regulatory jurisdiction.” Compl. ¶ 30. NAHB does

not explain, however, how the TNW Determination adversely

affects either the “manner” of regulation or, with any specificity,

the “types of watercourses” subject to regulation. NAHB does

not here contest “whether the Santa Cruz River itself may be

subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction—an issue that is not

raised in this action.” Compl. ¶ 2. Yet this is the only issue the

TNW Determination in fact resolved. See Compl. exs. 1, 2. It

did not determine whether any particular “watercourse” other

than the two reaches of the Santa Cruz River itself (“dry desert

washes, arroyos and other water features,” Compl. ¶ 2) is

jurisdictional and therefore subject to the CWA’s permit

requirements. The Agencies decide through an individual sitespecific “jurisdictional determination” whether a particular

watercourse in the Santa Cruz River watershed is within their

CWA jurisdiction, using the jointly developed “Rapanos

Guidance” document8

 and based on the particular watercourse’s

“nexus” to waters the Agencies have determined to be TNW (in

this case the Santa Cruz’s two reaches). See Precon Dev. Corp.

v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 633 F.3d 278, 282-83 (4th Cir.

2011); 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (“Approved jurisdictional

determination means a Corps document stating the presence or

absence of waters of the United States on a parcel or a written

statement and map identifying the limits of waters of the United

8

EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Clean

Water Act Jurisdiction after Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v.

United States, http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Documents/cecwo/

reg/cwa_guide/cwa_juris_2dec08.pdf (dated December 2, 2008)

(visited November 30, 2011); see also EPA and Army Corps of

Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by

the Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,479 (May 2, 2011) (notice of

availability of and request for comments on proposed new guidance).

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States on a parcel.”). Unless and until such a jurisdictional

determination applies the TNW Determination to particular

property (and its watercourses) and finds a sufficient nexus—or

the Agencies use the TNW Determination in an enforcement

action against a party discharging without a permit—the owner

or developer of the property suffers no incremental injury in fact

from the TNW Determination and any challenge to it is

therefore premature. In the meanwhile, NAHB members face

only the possibility of regulation, as they did before the TNW

Determination: Any watercourse on their property may (or may

not) turn out to be subject to CWA dredging permit

requirements because of a nexus (or not) with the two Santa

Cruz reaches. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“[T]he plaintiff must

have suffered an injury in fact . . . which is (a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” (citations and quotation marks omitted). Even

before the TNW Determination, property owners and developers

were aware the two Santa Cruz reaches could be so designated

and other watercourses could, in turn, be considered CWA

“navigable waters” because of their nexus to the Santa Cruz

reaches. It was in part because of landowners’ inquiries about

their properties’ jurisdictional status that the Corps undertook to

perform the TNW Determination. See Mem. from Chip Smith,

Asst. for Env’t, Tribal & Regulatory Affairs, Office of the Asst.

Sec’y of the Army (Civil Works), at 1 (June 13, 2008) (Smith

Mem.). In the TNW Determination, the Agencies announced

the jurisdictional status of the two Santa Cruz reaches—but

without a jurisdictional determination (or enforcement action)

based thereon, an individual property remains unaffected by the

TNW Determination, which does not purport to apply to any

watercourse thereon.

Citing no authority, NAHB argues that the TNW

Determination “foreclos[es] the issue of the nearest TNW for

site-specific [jurisdictional determinations] within the

watershed.” Appellants’ Br. 59. We see no reason, however,

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that an individual landowner or developer may not contest the

TNW Determination in a challenge to a site-specific

jurisdictional designation under the judicial review provisions of

the CWA and implementing regulations. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(b) and 33 C.F.R. § 326.5 (providing for judicial actions

by Agencies to enforce compliance or cease-and-desist order or

to obtain penalties); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) and 33 C.F.R. § 326.6

(providing for judicial review of penalties); see, e.g., Rapanos

v. United States, supra (reviewing Corps jurisdictional

determinations in proceeding arising from both enforcement

actions against developers and appeal of property owner’s

permit denial). Nor are we swayed by NAHB’s assertion that its

members now face “the choice of applying for a permit for

activities that are outside the scope of the agencies’ authority

under the CWA or face significant civil or criminal enforcement

penalties for failing to do so.” Appellants’ Br. 59. These are the

same statutory and regulatory alternatives NAHB members

faced before the TNW Determination. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319; 33

C.F.R. § 326.1-326.6. Without an additional allegation that the

TNW substantially increased the risk of regulation or

enforcement relating to particular property, we have no basis to

conclude the TNW caused a “concrete and particularized” and

“actual or imminent” threat to any landowner, let alone any

particular NAHB member. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

2.

NAHB also cites supporting declarations to establish its

members’ standing. One declarant recites he is “personally

aware of NAHB members that recently applied for and received

authorization to discharge stormwater under CWA Section 402

in connection with construction activities on lands within the

Santa Cruz River watershed and where the receiving water was

identified as the Santa Cruz River.” Ward Decl. ¶ 9. But the

declarant fails to explain whether the TNW Determination

motivated the landowner to seek an application for a permit or

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how the relief NAHB seeks—declaratory and injunctive

relief—would remedy the past injuries the members may have

already incurred in applying for the permits. See City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (plaintiff’s “standing

to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was

likely to suffer future injury”; allegation of past injury “does

nothing to establish a real and immediate threat ” justifying

injunctive relief) (emphasis added). Another declarant claims

“personal knowledge of at least one [member] that owns land

within the Santa Cruz River watershed and is applying for a

Clean Water Act permit in connection with development

activities on its land”; she does not explain, however, why the

member’s decision to apply is directly traceable to the TNW

Determination, which applies only to the two Santa Cruz reaches

themselves and not to any other watercourse within the river’s

watershed, including any watercourse that may be on the

unidentified land belonging to the unidentified member. Decl.

of Jessica D. Whyde, Southern Arizona Home Builders

Association President ¶ 11. The declaration says nothing about

the property, the watercourse affected by the landowner’s

project or the greater likelihood of regulation, if any, after than

before the TNW Determination. The declarant further avers

generally that “many . . . members are homebuilders and real

estate developers” who “regularly” undertake construction

projects which “cannot be conducted without impacting desert

washes and other ephemeral drainage features . . . found on

many parcels of land within the Santa Cruz River watershed in

Pima County”; other members “own land within th[e] area, and

thus will be impacted by the agencies’ declaration that the two

segments of the Santa Cruz River are traditional navigable

waters.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 10. The declarant does not assert, however,

that any member plans in fact to discharge contaminants into a

likely jurisdictional watercourse anytime soon. Thus, the

declarations “fall short of establishing certainly impending

dangers for any particular member of the petitioners’

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associations.” Am. Chem. Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d

810, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see id. at 819-20 (“[i]t is not enough

to allege that petitioners’ associations comprise the majority” of

affected individuals; without submissions of affidavits from

individual members, “[w]e decline to assume missing links”);

see also Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 901-02 (counsel’s allegation

of injuries not within personal knowledge “are not evidence”

and “serve[] only to illustrate why we require more than

representations of counsel in order to establish a complainant’s

standing”); id. at 902 (maps of affected area showing location of

members and list of mailing addresses insufficient to

demonstrate injury to any particular member).

C. Procedural Standing

Finally, NAHB claims that even if it has not established a

substantive injury to support its standing, it nonetheless has

“procedural” standing to challenge the Agencies’ failure to

provide notice and an opportunity to submit comments pursuant

to the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). This argument fails as

well and for the same reason—no imminent injury in fact has

been alleged. 

In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Supreme Court

made clear that “deprivation of a procedural right without some

concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a

procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III

standing.” 555 U.S. at 496. Yet this is precisely what NAHB

claims here—a right in a void. That the Congress has accorded

a procedural right “can loosen the strictures of the redressability

prong of our standing inquiry”—so that standing may exist even

if the right to comment likely would not have succeeded in

persuading the agency to change its mind. Id. at 497. “Unlike

redressability, however, the requirement of injury in fact is a

hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by

statute.” Id. Without an imminent threat of injury traceable to

the challenged action, that floor stands as a ceiling. See United

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Transp. Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(“[B]efore we find standing in procedural injury cases, we must

ensure that there is some connection between the alleged

procedural injury and a substantive injury that would otherwise

confer Article III standing. Without such a nexus, the

procedural injury doctrine could swallow Article III standing

requirements.”). And, as we have already explained, NAHB has

identified no such injury. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,

555 U.S. at 495-96 (affidavit failing to identify particular project

affecting member’s enjoyment of forest lands did not

sufficiently allege concrete injury under Defenders of Wildlife

v. Lujan).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of NAHB’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the

alternative ground that it lacks Article III standing to challenge

the Agencies’ TNW Determination. 

So ordered.

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