Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03533/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03533-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALISE MALIKYAR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN SRAMEK, BERNADETTE SRAMEK,

HAROLD M. JAFFE, John S. Sramek, Jr. and

Bernadette D. Sramek Revocable Living Trust,

and DOES 1–100, 

Defendants. /

No. C 07-03533 WHA

ORDER (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2)

DENYING AS MOOT

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO AMEND AND (3)

VACATING HEARING ON

SEPARATE MOTION

INTRODUCTION

In this action under the civil wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. 2511, et seq., defendants move

for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest and lacks standing

in this action. The action stems from defendants’ alleged use of illegally intercepted telephone

communications to place a lis pendens on property owned by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s husband filed

a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy, so this claim is community property belonging to the

bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, her husband is a necessary party to this action. Although this

motion is styled as a motion for summary judgment, the problem actually stems from

Malikyar’s lack of standing and failure to join her husband under Rule 19. Accordingly,

defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Malikyar will be given leave to amend. Since leave to amend

has been granted, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, set for hearing on

November 29, 2007, is DENIED AS MOOT. Seeing that no further argument is necessary, the

hearing on this motion is VACATED. 

Case 3:07-cv-03533-WHA Document 47 Filed 11/08/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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STATEMENT

Plaintiff pro se Alise Malikyar is currently being sued in a state-court lawsuit brought by

defendants John Sramek, Bernadette Sramek, Harold Jaffe, and the Sramek Revocable Living

Trust (Compl. ¶ 7). Robert Jacobsen, Malikyar’s husband, was overseeing the sale of some of

Malikyar’s property to pay her legal expenses (id. at ¶ 8). North American Title Insurance

Company was handling escrow for the property, and escrow was to conclude on Monday,

April 30, 2007 (id. at ¶¶ 9–10). Just before escrow was set to close, defendants filed yet another

state-court action against Jacobsen, Malikyar, and Coast Capital LTD, that alleged the same

facts as in the prior suit (id. at ¶ 11). Jaffe filed a notice of pending action which halted the

escrow. The notice of pending action contained the order number for the escrow. 

In this, the third lawsuit between the two sides, plaintiff alleges that the escrow order

number was not publicly-known information (id. at ¶ 13). Because of this, Jacobsen asked a

number of employees at North American Title Insurance if they had released any escrow

information to any party not involved in the transaction. They all answered no (id. at ¶¶ 14–17). 

Since the beginning of the first action, Jacobsen alleges that he noticed unusual static on the

phone line in his home office (id. at ¶ 19). He called his phone service provider who

investigated and found a recording device attached to his and Malikyar’s phone line (id. at ¶

20). As a result of the illegal wiretap, plaintiff alleges, defendants placed a lis pendens on the

property located at 2324 Tice Valley Boulevard, Walnut Creek, California, before the property

was sold. The lis pendens was expunged on July 30, 2007, pursuant to an order entered by the

Contra Costa County Superior Court (RJN Exh. 12). 

Jacobsen and Malikyar have stated under oath that they have been married since 1999

(Jaffe Decl. Exh. B–D). On July 17, 1999, they signed a prenuptial agreement that stated that

after-acquired property was to remain each spouse’s separate property. It also required that if

Malikyar and Jacobsen wished to acquire community property, they would have to express their

intent to do so in writing (Malikyar Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 1). They signed a supplemental “marital

agreement” on September 11, 2001, which listed the Tice Valley Boulevard property as

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Malikyar’s separate property (id. at Exh. 2). Plaintiff and Jacobsen lived in that property until

May 2007. 

In addition, Jacobsen is currently involved in bankruptcy proceedings. REJ Properties,

Inc., one of Jacobsen’s companies, filed for bankruptcy on March 13, 2007, in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada (RJN Exh. 4). On April 18, 2007, the bankruptcy

court entered an order to transfer the action to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Northern District of California (id. at Exh. 5). REJ’s petition was dismissed on June 4, 2007,

for filing in bad faith (id. at Exh. 6). 

On May 25, 2007, Jacobsen himself filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13 in the

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas (id. at Exh. 9). He filed his

schedules and statement of financial affairs on June 25, 2007, and did not list this action, filed

on June 11, 2007, as one of the assets of his bankruptcy estate (id. at Exh. 11). The bankruptcy

court entered a temporary restraining order and request for preliminary injunction to prohibit

the transfer of certain assets, including the Tice Valley Boulevard property (id. at Exhs. 13, 14). 

Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to convert Jacobsen’s petition from Chapter 13

to Chapter 7, and at the same time Jacobsen filed a motion to dismiss the petition. A hearing

was held on those motions on September 27, 2007. The hearing was not completed, so the

remainder was continued to November 21, 2007. 

Malikyar filed her complaint in Alameda County Superior Court on June 11, 2007. She

alleges claims under 18 U.S.C. 2511 et seq., for an illegal wiretap, and claims for conspiracy,

theft, and invasion of privacy. This action was removed from state court on July 6, 2007, on the

basis of federal-question jurisdiction. Defendants filed this motion on October 4, 2007. 

Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a plaintiff on October 24, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

Defendants caption this motion as a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the

facts show that Malikyar does not, by herself, have standing to bring this claim. In effect,

defendants are actually arguing that she has failed to join an indispensable party, either her

husband or the bankruptcy trustee. Under Rule 19(a)(1), “a person . . . whose joinder will not

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deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined in the

action if in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already

parties.” Defendants are actually arguing that Malikyar has failed to join a necessary party. 

Defendants argue that Malikyar does not, by herself, have standing to bring this action

because Jacobsen, as Malikyar’s husband, is an indispensable party to this action. Jacobsen is

currently in bankruptcy. According to defendants, this action is a post-petition claim so it

actually belongs to the bankruptcy estate. Plaintiff disagrees and argues that the Tice Valley

Boulevard property is her separate property, so this claim is as well. In the alternative, she asks

that she be allowed to substitute the proper parties. Plaintiff brings this action under 18 U.S.C.

2520, which provides a private right of action for illegal wiretapping or other interception of

communications. 

***

Upon filing a petition for bankruptcy, the property of the bankruptcy estate includes “all

legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11

U.S.C. 541(a)(1). This includes legal claims. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S.

198, 203–04, 205, n.9 (1983). As a result, a debtor’s pre-petition personal injury claims become

property of the estate. Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 789 F.2d 705, 709

(9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, virtually all community property within a marriage is included in

the estate. In re Bouzas, 294 B.R. 318, 321 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Tchaikovsky, J.). When a debtor

files a petition under Chapter 13, however, the debtor, not the bankruptcy trustee, remains in

possession of all property of the estate, unless a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan

indicates otherwise. 11 U.S.C. 1306. 

In general, property interests are created and defined by state law. Butner v. United

States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). Under California law, all property acquired during the marriage

is presumptively community property. Cal. Fam. Code § 760. Subject to a few exceptions that

do not apply here, “money and other property received or to be received by a married person in

satisfaction of a judgment for damages for personal injuries, or pursuant to an agreement for the

settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages, is community property if the cause of

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action for the damages arose during the marriage.” Cal. Fam. Code § 780. Neither side

disputes that Malikyar’s claim accrued during her marriage. She and Jacobsen were married in

1999, while the events that gave rise to this action occurred in 2006. Accordingly, Malikyar’s

claim is presumptively community property. Since the claim was filed after the bankruptcy

petition, the claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate. 

Plaintiff and defendants argue for many pages over whether the Tice Valley Boulevard

property itself is community property or Malikyar’s separate property. What matters here,

however, is the status of the claim, not the status of the property. The statute under which

Malikyar brings her claims provides a civil remedy for wiretapping or intercepting electronic

communications and prohibits the interception of communications. 18 U.S.C. 2520. It allows

individuals to recover damages for the invasion of their privacy from an illegal wiretap. See

Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 520–21 (9th Cir. 1978). Standing is independent of any

particular location. For instance, intercepting a colleague’s voicemail messages at work can

violate the Wiretap Act. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998). By

extension, if Malikyar had been outside her home or if she had only been staying at the property

temporarily, she could still bring this claim. Malikyar’s claim is presumptively community

property. Thus it is presumptively the property of Jacbosen’s bankruptcy estate.

Defendants suggest that Malikyar lacks standing because she did not join the bankruptcy

trustee in this action. Defendants forget, however, that Jacobsen filed a Chapter 13 petition, not

a Chapter 7 petition. He, as the debtor, is currently in control of the estate. In a Chapter 13

petition, the debtor has full authority to represent the estate. In re DiSalvo, 219 F.3d 1035, 1039

(9th Cir. 2000). The real party-in-interest here is Jacobsen. In support of her argument that she

has standing on her own, Malikyar cites Kelsey v. Waste Management, 76 Cal. App. 4th 590,

595–96 (1999). In that decision, a California appellate court held that the plaintiff, a debtor in a

Chapter 13 petition, had standing to pursue post-petition tort claims. According to plaintiff, this

means that since her husband, as a debtor, could pursue his claim, then she could pursue her

own claim as well. This assumption does not follow since the claim, as community property, is

presumptively property of the bankruptcy estate. What this does mean is that Jacobsen could

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pursue this claim. Accordingly, Malikyar must join Jacobsen to proceed. Since she does not

have standing on her own to sue, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

Malikyar asks that if this motion is granted, she be allowed leave to amend to add any

indispensable parties. Additionally, she filed a separate motion to amend her complaint to add

Jacobsen as a party. It is worth noting here that the status of Jacobsen’s bankruptcy petition is

in flux. Jacobsen filed a motion to dismiss the petition, and the bankruptcy trustee filed a

motion to convert his Chapter 13 petition into a Chapter 7 petition. Both of these motions are

still pending, and an additional hearing on them is scheduled for November 21, 2007, in the

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Malikyar likely could join Jacobsen at this

time, but given the status of his bankruptcy petition, it is not clear that this would do any good

going forward. If the trustee’s motion to convert is granted, then Malikyar may need to join the

trustee. If Jacobsen’s motion to dismiss is granted, then presumably Malikyar can pursue this

claim on her own again. Accordingly, Malikyar will be granted leave to amend to name any

indispensable parties, but she should not do this until after the bankruptcy court issues an order

on these motions. Because this order grants leave to amend her complaint, Malikyar’s seperate

motion for leave to amend is DENIED AS MOOT. The hearing on that motion, scheduled for

November 29, 2007, at 8:00 a.m., is VACATED. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Plaintiff will be allowed leave to amend to add indispensable parties, if any, after an

order issues in her husband, Robert Jacobsen’s bankruptcy petition. This should be done no

later than MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 2008. Seeing that no further argument is necessary, the

hearing on this motion is hereby VACATED. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended

complaint is DENIED AS MOOT. The hearing on that separate motion, scheduled for November

29, 2007, is VACATED as well. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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