Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05366/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2006 Decided December 1, 2006

No. 05-5366

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00133)

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Paul J. Orfanedes argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was James F. Peterson. Michael J. Hurley entered

an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 1995, Judicial Watch,

Inc. filed an action in the District Court under the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking information

from the Department of Commerce (“DOC”) regarding DOC’s

selection of participants for foreign trade missions. In May

1995, following a search in response to Judicial Watch’s FOIA

requests, DOC produced approximately 28,000 pages of

nonexempt information and withheld about 1,000 documents as

exempt. Disputes arose between the parties over the adequacy

of DOC’s search, and Judicial Watch charged that some DOC

officials had destroyed or removed responsive documents. In

December 1998, following discovery, the District Court granted

partial summary judgment to Judicial Watch and ordered DOC

to perform a new search. In issuing this judgment, the District

Court concluded that DOC had wrongfully withheld, destroyed,

and removed responsive documents, and ordered further

discovery into the circumstances surrounding DOC’s first search

and the misconduct alleged by Judicial Watch. DOC then

conducted an exhaustive new search, and Judicial Watch

conducted extensive discovery. 

In March 2000, following the second search, DOC moved

for summary judgment. In November 2001, the District Court

issued an order allowing Judicial Watch to expand its discovery

into the circumstances of the second search. In September 2004,

the District Court finally granted DOC’s motion for summary

judgment, upholding DOC’s then-pending exemption claims. In

November 2004, Judicial Watch moved for an award of attorney

fees and costs under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), in the

amount of almost $950,000. In opposing the fee request, DOC

argued, inter alia, that there should be no award for fees

generated after December 1998, because Judicial Watch had

achieved no success on any of its claims following that date. In

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July 2005, the District Court awarded $897,331 to Judicial

Watch in fees and costs, including about $488,000 for work

performed after the court ordered a new search in December

1998. 

On appeal, DOC advances three interrelated claims. Its

principal claim is that “[a]n award of nearly half a million

dollars for work that produced no tangible benefit to Judicial

Watch amounts to a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the

District Court.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. DOC also contends that

Judicial Watch should not have been awarded fees and costs

incurred after December 1998 for discovery efforts on

“collateral issues.” Id. at 17. Finally, DOC argues that the

District Court “abused its discretion in awarding fees incurred

in discovery disputes that Judicial Watch pursued with third

parties,” id. at 20, noting that it “had no control over these

disputes, which eventually proved fruitless,” id. at 21. 

The District Court found a fee spanning the entire course of

the lawsuit justified, because Judicial Watch substantially

prevailed on its FOIA claim, and the post-1998 discovery was

an inseparable part of that claim. We affirm the District Court’s

judgment in part. A portion of the post-1998 discovery was

directly related to Judicial Watch’s successful FOIA claim, so

the District Court did not err in awarding fees for some of the

work associated with the post-1998 discovery. We decline to

entertain DOC’s belated claim that fees should not have been

awarded for some of the post-1998 discovery during which

Judicial Watch allegedly engaged in a “fishing expedition.” Id.

at 10. This claim was not properly raised and preserved by DOC

when it opposed Judicial Watch’s fee application before the

District Court; therefore, the claim is waived. DOC’s last claim

is meritorious, however. DOC correctly notes that a portion of

the post-1998 work for which Judicial Watch seeks fees relates

to protracted discovery disputes between Judicial Watch and

third parties who were not within the realm of DOC’s authority

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or control and with respect to issues not raised or pursued by

DOC. As explained more fully below, the District Court abused

its discretion in awarding fees generated by these so-called

third-party “litigation disputes.” 

I. BACKGROUND

Judicial Watch is a non-profit corporation whose professed

mission is to combat government corruption through legal and

other corrective action. In the mid-1990s, Judicial Watch sought

to determine whether DOC had sold seats on secretarial “trade

missions” in exchange for contributions to the Democratic

National Committee (“DNC”) in violation of campaign finance

law. Trade missions included trips to foreign countries led by

the Secretary of Commerce during which representatives of U.S.

companies met host nations’ governments and business leaders

and explored the potential for increasing trade. Judicial Watch

filed multiple FOIA requests with DOC, seeking a wide array of

material concerning several such trade missions. When DOC

failed to respond, Judicial Watch filed suit in the District Court

seeking relief under FOIA. The District Court’s decisions in

this case fully recount the decade-long legal battle between

Judicial Watch and DOC, see, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t

of Commerce (Partial Summary Judgment Decision), 34 F.

Supp. 2d 28, 29-41 (D.D.C. 1998); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t

of Commerce (Final Merits Decision), 337 F. Supp. 2d 146,

156-57 (D.D.C. 2004), so we will only summarize the events

that are most relevant to this appeal. 

Shortly after Judicial Watch filed suit, DOC produced

approximately 28,000 documents. Following the District

Court’s resolution of numerous disputes over withheld

documents, DOC moved for summary judgment in favor of

Judicial Watch. The District Court denied DOC’s motion,

declared DOC’s first search “inadequate, unreasonable, and

unlawful,” granted sua sponte partial summary judgment for

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Judicial Watch, and ordered DOC to conduct a second search

under extremely “restrictive and rigorous” requirements. Partial

Summary Judgment Decision, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 42-46. In

reaching this result, the District Court rested on its findings that

DOC had “wrongfully withheld documents, destroyed

documents, and removed or allowed the removal of others, all

with the apparent intention of thwarting the FOIA and [court]

orders.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce (Interim

Relief Decision), 34 F. Supp. 2d 47, 48-49 (D.D.C. 1998). 

Given the unique circumstances of this case, the District

Court reasoned that even a comprehensive, closely monitored

second search by DOC would not afford adequate relief for

Judicial Watch. On this point, the trial court noted: 

There is substantial evidence that the DOC has destroyed

documents and removed documents from its control in an

effort to avoid releasing them to Judicial Watch. If the

Court were to grant the DOC’s motion and merely order a

new search, these documents would not be found even by

the most exhaustive of searches, and the DOC would have

succeeded in circumventing the FOIA.

The DOC recognizes this situation and proposes in its

motion a plan for retrieving jettisoned information. The

DOC offers to mail letters to former employees of three

offices within the DOC and request that the former

employees determine whether they may have removed

documents from the DOC when they left and, if so, that

they search the documents for information responsive to

Judicial Watch’s FOIA requests. While this plan is a step

in the right direction, the remedy for the government’s

misconduct in this case must have more “teeth” than the

DOC proposal offers. The courts cannot be powerless to

remedy FOIA violations where the agency simply discards

potentially damaging responsive documents. There must be

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some mechanism by which the courts can keep the agencies

from circumventing the FOIA by simply removing

responsive documents from [their] control.

Partial Summary Judgment Decision, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 42. The

District Court thus concluded that “further discovery is

required” and authorized Judicial Watch “to inquire into any

discoverable information related to the destruction or removal

of documents” during the first search, including “some inquiry

into the creation and handling of documents.” Id. at 46. The

District Court appointed a Magistrate Judge to supervise

discovery, but cautioned that “Judicial Watch should not be

allowed to stray from inquiries that might be reasonably

calculated to lead to evidence of unlawful destruction or removal

of documents.” Id. Based on a suspicion of additional

wrongdoing, later determined to be unfounded, the District

Court authorized Judicial Watch to inquire into the

circumstances of the second search as well. Judicial Watch, Inc.

v. Dep’t of Commerce, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2001). 

Judicial Watch conducted extensive discovery (both before

and after DOC completed its second search in March 2000),

issuing numerous document requests and deposing nearly 20

individuals, including current and former employees of DOC

and the DNC, as well as suspected trade mission participants.

Deposition questioning covered DOC’s alleged misconduct

during the first search; inquired about possible locations of

missing documents; and probed circumstances surrounding the

creation of documents, the trade missions themselves,

background information about the deponents, and a number of

tangential issues. The Magistrate Judge routinely overruled

DOC’s objections to the scope of the questioning. 

The reticence of third parties to be deposed led to protracted

disputes, which in turn caused the parties to submit numerous

filings leading to memorandum opinions by both the Magistrate

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Judge and the District Court. For example, the DNC objected to

the scope of the original subpoena served upon it by Judicial

Watch. The District Court limited the order’s scope, but Judicial

Watch, unsatisfied with the documents produced, requested that

the Magistrate Judge restore the scope of the discovery order

and appealed the Magistrate’s refusal to do so. The District

Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate Judge for

reconsideration in light of newly discovered documents. The

DNC submitted a letter to the Magistrate Judge accusing

Judicial Watch of obtaining the new documents in contravention

of congressional confidentiality protocols. The Magistrate

Judge granted Judicial Watch’s motion to strike the letter for

failure to comply with the Local Rules of the District Court, but

then granted the DNC leave to refile. The DNC refiled and the

Magistrate Judge decided sua sponte to consider the DNC’s

allegations. Judicial Watch asked the District Court to set aside

the Magistrate’s order and filed with the Magistrate Judge a

motion to strike the DNC’s second filing. The District Court

granted the motion to strike the DNC filings, vacated the

Magistrate’s order, and again remanded the matter to the

Magistrate Judge. The DNC filed a motion for reconsideration

in the District Court. In a published opinion, the District Court

denied this motion but granted the DNC’s motion to file a

declaration and once again remanded the matter to the

Magistrate. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 127

F. Supp. 2d 224, 225-28 (D.D.C. 2000). The DNC is just one of

several parties with whom Judicial Watch engaged in “collateral

disputes” that “sidetracked” the case. Id. at 227. These thirdparty disputes were neither initiated nor pursued by DOC, and

DOC had no control over either the third parties or their disputes

with Judicial Watch.

In September 2004, having found that DOC had “engaged

in an exhaustive second search,” the District Court granted

DOC’s motion for summary judgment and denied Judicial

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Watch’s request for further discovery. This judgment

effectively disposed of the merits of the FOIA case. Final

Merits Decision, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 159, 161, 182. Judicial

Watch then moved for attorney fees under FOIA. DOC opposed

an award of fees for post-1998 discovery, reasoning that it had

produced nothing of consequence to the litigation. The District

Court agreed that, “[w]hile Judicial Watch unearthed some

further evidence of improprieties during the first search, Judicial

Watch was largely unsuccessful at that task and was unable to

reconstruct or locate lost or destroyed responsive documents”

during the discovery conducted after December 1998. Judicial

Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce (Fees Decision), 384 F. Supp.

2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2005). Nonetheless, the District Court

rejected DOC’s argument that the lack of “tangible results”

prevented Judicial Watch from recovering fees. Id. at 171.

Rather, the District Court held that the post-1998 discovery gave

effect to the court’s order granting Judicial Watch “a full and

fair opportunity, through additional discovery, to reconstruct or

discover documents . . . destroyed or removed . . . during the

DOC’s first search.” Id. The District Court thus refused to

distinguish between pre- and post-1998 discovery. The District

Court also refused to “reduce Judicial Watch’s award for the

time it spent addressing post-1998 discovery motions and related

matters with third-parties.” Id. On this latter point, the District

Court noted that FOIA “only requires that fees be ‘reasonably

incurred,’ which leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff’s

interactions with a third party might, in limited circumstances,

subject the government to a fee assessment.” Id. at 171 n.2.

DOC now appeals, arguing that the District Court abused its

discretion in awarding fees for work that did not result in any

measurable success for Judicial Watch and for the time spent by

Judicial Watch addressing discovery disputes with third parties.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Eligibility and Entitlement to Attorney Fees Under FOIA

Subject to specified statutory exclusions and exemptions, 5

U.S.C. § 552(b), (c), “the Freedom of Information Act requires

federal agencies to make agency records available to the public

upon reasonable request,” United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359

F.3d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2004). FOIA also provides that a court

may award “reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs

reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the complainant

has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). 

A FOIA plaintiff is eligible for fees if it has substantially

prevailed on the merits of its claim. Edmonds v. FBI, 417 F.3d

1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Church of Scientology of Cal. v.

Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1981). And in order to

“substantially prevail,” a party must obtain court-ordered relief

on the merits of its FOIA claim. See Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 1325

(holding that the plaintiff was eligible for fees because she

“received not just a declaration of her right to expedited

processing [of her FOIA claim], but an order that ‘changed the

legal relationship between the parties’” (quoting Select Milk

Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 946 (D.C. Cir.

2005))).

Eligibility for fees does not necessarily mean that a party is

entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. See Edmonds, 417 F.3d at

1327. “In determining whether a ‘prevailing’ FOIA plaintiff is

entitled to fees, the district court [must] assess[] four factors:

‘(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial

benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in

the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s

withholding.’” Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 166-67 (D.C. Cir.

2006) (quoting Tax Analysts v. Dep’t of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092,

1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 

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A plaintiff’s overall success on the merits also must be

considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee award.

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (citing Tex. State

Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793

(1989)). Thus, when a plaintiff presents “distinctly different

claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal

theories,” the limit on awards to “prevailing parties requires that

these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in

separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for

services on the unsuccessful claim.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983). In some cases, however, 

claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will

be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel’s time

will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole,

making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a

claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as

a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should

focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by

the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on

the litigation. 

Id. at 435. Finally, “[t]he plaintiff who has proven both

eligibility for and entitlement to fees must submit his fee bill to

the court for its scrutiny of the reasonableness of (a) the number

of hours expended and (b) the hourly fee claimed.” Long v. IRS,

932 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 

B. The Applicable Standard of Review and DOC’s Principal

Claims on Appeal 

We review the District Court’s fee entitlement

determination for abuse of discretion, Davy, 456 F.3d at 167,

deferring to that court’s “intimate[] associat[ion] with the case”

and “continuing relationship with the parties throughout the

suit,” Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,

706, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437

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(“[T]he district court has discretion in determining the amount

of a fee award. This is appropriate in view of the district court’s

superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of

avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are

factual matters.”).

In this case, DOC does not contend that Judicial Watch is

ineligible for fees under FOIA. Nor does DOC contest the

District Court’s analysis of the four factors that are weighed to

determine whether a prevailing party is entitled to fees. See

Davy, 456 F.3d at 166-67. Rather, DOC raises three objections

premised on its contention that Judicial Watch should not have

been awarded fees for discovery efforts undertaken after

December 22, 1998. First, DOC argues that since the post-1998

discovery produced no tangible benefits for Judicial Watch, no

fees should be awarded for any time spent in discovery after

December 22, 1998. Second, DOC argues that much of the post1998 discovery addressed matters that were “collateral” to

Judicial Watch’s FOIA request and therefore should not have

been counted in the determination of fees. In other words, DOC

suggests that Judicial Watch engaged in a “fishing expedition”

in conducting discovery pursuant to the District Court’s

December 1998 order. Appellant’s Br. at 10, 17. Finally, DOC

argues that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding

fees incurred in connection with litigation disputes that Judicial

Watch pursued with third parties over whom DOC had no

control and with respect to issues that had not been raised or

pursued by DOC. In DOC’s view, “[t]he government and the

American taxpayers should not be obligated to pay Judicial

Watch’s fees incurred to explore avenues that had nothing to do

with the FOIA requests at issue and to respond to a party other

than the government.” Id. at 22. 

DOC’s three claims are obviously related. Indeed, the first

claim subsumes the second and third claims, and the “fishing

expedition” claim overlaps with DOC’s challenge to the fees

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incurred in connection with “third-party” disputes. Each claim

raises slightly different considerations, however. We will

therefore address each claim separately in assessing the merits

of DOC’s appeal.

C. Fees Generated by Post-1998 Discovery

DOC’s principal claim is that Judicial Watch should not

have been awarded any fees and costs for unsuccessful

discovery efforts after December 22, 1998. More precisely,

DOC argues that “[i]f a plaintiff achieves only partial success,

it can be an abuse of discretion to award full fees.” Appellant’s

Br. at 13. In DOC’s view, “after December 22, 1998, Judicial

Watch achieved no measure of success that was relevant to the

final outcome of the case,” Appellant’s Br. at 14, so no fees

should have been awarded for any work done after that date.

We disagree.

Apparently intending to harken to the Court’s holding in

Hensley, DOC’s theory obviously rests on the assumption that

the post-1998 discovery was unrelated to Judicial Watch’s

principal FOIA claim, because it was undertaken in pursuit of

“distinctly different claims for relief” and “based on different

facts and legal theories.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35. On this

view of the case, DOC suggests that FOIA’s limit on awards to

“prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated

as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no

fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.” Id.

DOC’s premise is wrong, and its reliance on Hensley is

misplaced.

On the record in this case, the post-1998 discovery cannot

reasonably be viewed as divorced from or unrelated to Judicial

Watch’s principal FOIA claim. The District Court certainly did

not intend to terminate the FOIA litigation when it granted

interim relief on December 22, 1998. See Interim Relief

Decision, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (holding that “the case will now

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proceed with limited discovery under the supervision of a

Magistrate Judge”). The District Court determined that, due to

DOC’s misconduct in its initial response to Judicial Watch’s

FOIA request, a closely monitored second search by DOC

would not suffice. The court therefore ordered a second search

by DOC and appointed a Magistrate Judge to oversee further

discovery. See Partial Summary Judgment Decision, 34 F.

Supp. 2d at 46. This action was taken to ensure that Judicial

Watch receive any responsive documents that had been removed

from DOC’s premises but not destroyed. In other words, the

post-1998 discovery was authorized solely to allow Judicial

Watch to pursue matters directly related to its FOIA claim. The

District Court’s December 22, 1998 Partial Summary Judgment

Decision and Interim Relief Decision did not initiate a new

action pursuant to which Judicial Watch was authorized to

pursue “distinctly different claims for relief . . . based on

different facts and legal theories,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434,

divorced from the complaint then before the court. DOC’s

suggestion to the contrary is specious.

Indeed, as counsel for DOC acknowledged during oral

argument, the partial summary judgment issued in Judicial

Watch’s favor on December 22, 1998 did not result in a final

appealable order. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S.

737, 744 (1976) (“[Grants] of partial summary judgment . . . are

by their terms interlocutory, and where assessment of damages

or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never

been considered to be ‘final’ . . . .”) (citation omitted). Had

more documents been uncovered after December 1998, the

District Court could have entered a further judgment in favor of

Judicial Watch on its FOIA claim. The claim on the merits of

Judicial Watch’s FOIA claim did not terminate until September

2004, when the District Court granted DOC’s March 2000

motion.

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Rather, as the District Court made clear, the second search

and related discovery were required to give effect to the court’s

order granting Judicial Watch “a full and fair opportunity,

through additional discovery, to reconstruct or discover

documents . . . destroyed or removed . . . during the DOC’s first

search.” Fees Decision, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 171. In other words,

the post-1998 discovery was intended to facilitate Judicial

Watch’s lawful pursuit of its principal FOIA claim. In the

analogous situation where fees are incurred monitoring

compliance with a consent decree, the Supreme Court instructs

that “measures necessary to enforce the remedy ordered by the

District Court cannot be divorced from the matters upon which

[the plaintiff] prevailed in securing the consent decree.”

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean

Air, 478 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1986); see also Sierra Club v.

Hankinson, 351 F.3d 1358, 1361-64 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A district

court may award fees for post-judgment monitoring of a consent

decree.”); Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738-39 (1st Cir.

1984) (same). Contrary to DOC’s suggestion, the post-1998

discovery was not ordered by the trial court to allow Judicial

Watch to pursue new claims.

On the record at hand, we hold that the District Court did

not abuse its discretion in concluding that the post-1998

discovery was intended to be in furtherance of, and therefore

directly related to, the FOIA claim upon which Judicial Watch

substantially prevailed. The District Court did not err in

concluding that at least some of the work related to the post1998 discovery could be counted in the calculation of attorney

fees due to Judicial Watch.

D. Judicial Watch’s Alleged “Fishing Expedition” in

Conjunction with Post-1998 Discovery 

DOC charges that Judicial Watch’s post-1998 discovery

was employed to engage in a “fishing expedition” that was

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unrelated to its FOIA lawsuit. We decline to entertain this

claim, because it was not properly preserved with the District

Court. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (as a

general rule, “a federal appellate court does not consider an

issue not passed upon below”); Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d

1494, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“In general, an appellate court

cannot consider issues not raised before the district court.”). We

agree with Judicial Watch that, “in opposition to the fee

application below, DOC never made the argument that fees

should be denied because of allegedly irrelevant lines of

questions asked in certain depositions.” Appellee’s Br. at 24.

The argument is therefore waived.

There is no doubt that DOC repeatedly objected on

relevance grounds during the depositions before the Magistrate

Judge. See, e.g., Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 644, 647-50, 675-77,

902, 951, 957, 960-61, 966-67, 977, 979, 982, 984. However,

in its “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Partial

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees,” J.A.

431-59, DOC never raised any specific objections claiming that

certain of the fees claimed by Judicial Watch were excessive due

to inappropriate “fishing expeditions.” DOC did make a general

claim that some of the post-1998 discovery “delved into

‘collateral issues,’” but this argument was raised in the context

of DOC’s claim that, because the post-1998 discovery produced

no tangible benefits for Judicial Watch, no fees could be based

on work done after December 1998. J.A. 443. This was not

sufficient to put the District Court on notice that, in opposing

fees, DOC wished to renew specific objections to the scope and

relevance of some of the lines of inquiry pursued by Judicial

Watch while taking depositions after December 22, 1998. 

Unsurprisingly, having received no specific “fishing

expedition,” relevance, or scope of discovery objections in

DOC’s opposition to Judicial Watch’s fee application, the

District Court did not address these matters. Rather, the District

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Court merely noted that it had “policed Judicial Watch’s

discovery to ensure that discovery remained within the scope

authorized by the Court.” Fees Decision, 384 F. Supp. 2d at

171. The court concluded that, because it had carefully

“supervised post-1998 discovery to ensure relevancy, [it had] no

occasion to reduce Judicial Watch’s award.” Id. DOC raised no

specific objections below to contest this conclusion. Therefore,

we can find no grounds on this record to overturn the District

Court’s judgment on this point. 

E. Fees Generated by Judicial Watch’s Disputes with Third

Parties

Finally, DOC argues that the District Court “abused its

discretion in awarding fees incurred in discovery disputes that

Judicial Watch pursued with third parties.” Appellant’s Br. at

20. DOC offers some examples to support its claim:

Some extensive disputes with third parties occurred.

For example, between December 22, 1998, and December

30, 2000, the docket reflects thirty-six filings concerning

non-party Democratic National Committee [DNC]

(including three Court orders). J.A. 38-66. The filings

concerned discovery Judicial Watch was attempting to

obtain from the DNC. Yet DOC had no control over these

disputes, which eventually proved fruitless.

Similarly, during that same period the docket reflects

27 docket entries concerning Judicial Watch’s attempt to

take the deposition of Charlie Trie. Id. Mr. Trie never

worked for DOC and had nothing to do with the FOIA

requests or the search for responsive documents.4

4

Numerous witnesses were represented by private

counsel and motions made on their behalf by

private counsel were not joined by DOC. E.g.,

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J.A. 41-44 (Docket Nos. 420, 421, 424, 431, 472,

475).

The list goes on.

Appellant’s Br. at 21. 

DOC’s principal argument here is that time spent by a FOIA

claimant in litigation disputes with third parties, who are not

within the government’s authority or control, with respect to

litigation issues that were neither raised nor pursued by the

government, cannot form the basis of a fee award under 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(E). “It would be manifestly unfair,” in DOC’s

view, “to charge DOC for litigation costs over which it had no

control. Accordingly, fees for such work should not have been

assessed against DOC.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. In other words,

according to DOC, such fees are not “reasonable” as required by

FOIA. On the facts of this case, we agree.

Although neither party cites any case law addressing this

“third-party” issue, there is authority supporting the proposition

that an award of attorney fees against the government is not

appropriate for those phases of litigation in which the plaintiff

is opposed solely by third parties. This principle was noted but

not applied in Anderson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,

80 F.3d 1500, 1505 (10th Cir. 1996). In Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d

1492 (9th Cir. 1991), however, the court held that the

government was not required to pay fees attributable to the

plaintiff’s opposition to a third party’s motion to stay a

preliminary injunction granted on behalf of plaintiff. Id. at

1495. The court in Love noted that the Fifth Circuit reached a

similar result in Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 786

F.2d 631 (5th Cir.1986):

Avoyelles involved the interpretation of the Clean Water

Act, which authorizes the court to award “costs of litigation

(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to

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18

any party, whenever the court determines such award is

appropriate.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). The court held that

attorney’s fees are only appropriate for portions of the

litigation made necessary by government opposition to

legitimate claims of the party seeking the award. Id. at 632.

The court further held that an award is not appropriate for

a phase of the litigation in which the party seeking an award

was opposed only by other, non-governmental parties, and

put the burden on the plaintiffs to show that “their claimed

expenses were incurred in opposing improper government

resistance to their rightful demands.” Id. at 636 (emphasis

added).

While this case involves the EAJA, not the Clean

Water Act, we find the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in

Avoyelles persuasive. The Avoyelles court found that where

plaintiffs are litigating an issue and are opposed only by

private defendants, a fee award against the government

would be “manifestly unfair and contrary to historic

fee-shifting principles.” Id. Similarly, an award against the

government for fees incurred by NWFPA in opposing the

stay is unjust because the government did not join the

intervenors’ motion to stay, and NWFPA has not shown

that the attorney’s fees attributable to fighting the stay were

incurred in opposing government resistance. Consequently,

the award of fees by the district court for the opposition to

the stay was error.

Love, 924 F.2d at 1495-96; see also Watson v. County of

Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]

plaintiff can be awarded fees incurred opposing intervention

[only] if the defendant either joined the intervenor’s motion or

if the intervenor’s acts were made necessary by [the defendant’s]

opposition to legitimate claims of the party seeking the award”)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Chem. Mfrs.

Ass’n v. EPA, 885 F.2d 1276, 1280 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the

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19

Avoyelles principle). Although some of these cases involve

different fee-shifting statutes, the decisions are nonetheless

instructive in construing the applicable “reasonable” standard

that applies to fee awards under FOIA. “There are over 100

separate statutes providing for the award of attorney’s fees; and

although these provisions cover a wide variety of contexts and

causes of action, the benchmark for the awards under nearly all

of these statutes is that the attorney’s fee must be ‘reasonable.’”

Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 562.

Following the principle enunciated in Avoyelles and Love,

we hold that DOC should only have been liable for fees related

to third parties insofar as they “were incurred in opposing

government resistance.” Love, 924 F.2d at 1496; see also

Avoyelles, 786 F.2d at 636. Therefore, in those situations when

(1) the litigation disputes between Judicial Watch and the third

parties were not initiated or pursued by DOC, (2) the third

parties were not represented by DOC, and (3) DOC had neither

authority nor control over the third parties, no fees should have

been awarded.

 It is important to emphasize here that “litigation disputes”

should not be confused with authorized depositions of third

parties taken by Judicial Watch. DOC contests only the former,

not the latter. This was confirmed in an exchange between

government counsel and one of the Judges during oral argument

in this case:

Judge: I need to ask you just one question. As a matter of

law, one of your arguments is that the government should

not be required to pay for depositions of third parties, that

is, non-government employees. Do you cite — I don’t

recall you citing anything for that proposition. 

Counsel for DOC: No your Honor, may I — if I might

clarify. What we said was that we shouldn’t be required to

pay for litigation disputes between Judicial Watch and third

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20

parties. So for example, there were numerous motions

about John Huang and the fact that he was pleading the

Fifth Amendment. We had to brief whether or not he was

allowed to plead the Fifth Amendment. There were

motions about the subpoena — whether or not he had to

come from California and who would pay his costs. What

we said was that we shouldn’t have to pay for litigation that

was done by Mr. Huang’s attorneys over which we had no

control. 

Judge: You were — then I misunderstood — you were not

arguing that if a third party is properly deposed that the

government never has to — 

Counsel for DOC: No no. We had no per se argument

like that. It was litigation that was done that we had no

control over — the government should not have to pay. 

See Recording of Oral Argument at 27:06.

Our decision here is limited to what DOC describes as

Judicial Watch’s litigation disputes with third parties, excluding

Judicial Watch’s depositions of third parties. In other words,

having lost its general challenge to fees generated by post-1998

discovery, the government does not challenge the authority of

the District Court to require third-party depositions, nor does it

challenge the fees that were generated by this work. Therefore,

we have no need to address this issue.

At bottom, we hold that the District Court, without adequate

justification, went too far in requiring the government to pay

fees for the time spent by Judicial Watch litigating disputes with

third parties in those situations in which (1) the litigation

disputes between Judicial Watch and the third parties were not

initiated or pursued by DOC, (2) the third parties were not

represented by DOC, and (3) DOC had neither authority nor

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control over the third parties. We remand the case so that the

fee award can be recalculated and reduced accordingly.

III. CONCLUSION

 We hereby affirm the judgment of the District Court in

part, reverse in part, and remand for further consideration

consistent with this opinion. 

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