Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02606/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ulysses Herbert Grant,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-2606-PHX-PGR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on December 7, 2012 (Doc. 1). On April 29, 2013 Respondents filed their 

Response (Doc. 16). Respondents have also filed a Supplemental Exhibit (Doc. 20), 

and Supplemental Answer (Doc. 26). Petitioner has filed a Reply on May 31, 2013 

(Doc. 17), a first Supplemental Reply (Doc. 22), a second Supplemental Reply (Doc. 

28), and third Supplement (Doc. 29).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 1 of 55
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

summarized the factual background as follows:

The victim testified that he had met Defendant in April of 

2006, had visited with him on two occasions in the victim's 

apartment and that Defendant had been a passenger in the victim's 

car a couple of times. The victim said that Defendant came to his

apartment one night in May, the two visited for a while, and the

victim then went to take a shower. When he returned to the living 

room, Defendant was there but left soon after. The victim then 

decided to go to the store, found his car, missing, returned to his 

apartment, and found his spare keys were missing from a dresser 

drawer. He had never given Defendant permission to drive the car. 

The victim called police the next day. Police recovered the vehicle a 

week later, and when the victim claimed his car, his spare keys were 

in it.

A police officer testified that he noticed Defendant driving 

the victim's car, ran the out-of-state license plate, and learned that 

the car had been reported stolen. He arrested Defendant.

(Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08 at 3.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On March 5, 2007, Petitioner was indicted (Exhibit A) in the Maricopa County 

Superior Court on one count of theft of a means of transportation. The state alleged a 

series of historical priors (Exhibit C, Allegation; Exhibit D, Supplemental Allegation), 

and that the offense was committed while Petitioner was on release on another 

conviction (Exhibit C). 

Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a Motion in Limine (Exhibit E) to exclude, inter alia, 

evidence of Petitioner’s refusal to give his name and providing a false name, as well as 

his invocation of his right to remain silent., and a Supplemental Motion in Limine 

(Exhibit F) seeking to preclude any in-court identification by the victim, Stewart, based 

upon the victim’s vague description of the perpetrator (“Philip”, “black,” 6’2” and 150 

pounds) and his representation to police that he would not be able to identify him if he 

saw him again. 

It was then discovered that the victim had previously been shown a photo lineup 

during which he had identified the Petitioner. That fact had not been previously 

disclosed by the prosecution. Petitioner filed a Motion to Preclude (Exhibit H) evidence 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 2 of 55
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the photo lineup. 

The trial court granted in part the Motion in Limine, Supplemental Motion in 

Limine and Motion to Preclude, and the state filed a Motion to Reconsider (Exhibit J). 

The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue. The court initially ruled that 

not only would all evidence of the photo lineup be excluded, but that no in-court 

identification would be allowed. (Exhibit K, R.T. 7/11/7 at 11.) Eventually, however, 

“[t]he court concluded from the victim's testimony that he could identify Defendant 

without reliance on the lineup.” (Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08 at 3.) The trial 

court ruled: “IT IS ORDERED identification of Defendant in court by victim is denied, 

but allowed if given by independent means of prior meeting and not photo lineup.” 

(Exhibit L, M.E. 7/11/7 at 2.) 

The Court also ruled that evidence of the false name and invocation of the right to 

remain silent could not be introduced, based in part upon Petitioner’s assertion that he 

gave a false name because of fear of prosecution on outstanding warrant. (Exhibit K, 

R.T. 7/11/7 at 17-18. 

At trial, the victim identified Petitioner “[t]he guy that stole my car.” (Exhibit M, 

R.T. 7/12/7 at 29.) 

On cross examination, defense counsel attempted to challenge the victim’s 

identification:

Q And you described this associate of yours other than the 

information that you had provided to him you told the officer that 

you would not be able to visually identify this associate who you 

had in your apartment, correct?

A No.

Q You told him on that day you would not be able to 

identify anyone, correct?

A No.

Q Are you indicating that officer got your information 

wrong then?

A Evidently.

Q Okay.

A Why would I tell him who stole my car, but I can't 

recognize him because I told him that?

Q When he specifically asked you if you could identify the 

suspect, you indicated no, correct?

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 3 of 55
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A I don't recall saying no.

Q You didn't mention anything to the officer regarding this 

interaction that took place and someone going for a walk and 

whatnot, correct?

A I don't recall if I said that or not.

Q Okay. And yet today well over a year later now you're 

prepared to make an identification, correct?

A I've already made one a few months back, maybe six 

months.

Q Excuse me, if I could just --

THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to ask you if you would please 

respond to the question asked of you if you would, sir, thank you.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 43-44.)

The arresting officer testified that at the time of arrest, Petitioner was “beligerant” 

[sic], “wouldn’t say anything, wouldn’t tell me his name...I asked his name several 

times, he wouldn’t look at me or answer my questions.” (Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 70.) 

Petitioner was found guilty as charged (Exhibit P, Verdict) and was sentenced to 

11.25 years in prison (Exhibit T, Sentence; Exhibit S, R.T. 8/22/7 at 37). 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. Counsel was appointed, who filed a brief (Exhibit 

W) pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) evidencing an inability to find 

an issue for review.

Petitioner then filed a pro per Supplemental Opening Brief (Exhibit BB), 

challenging the photo lineup, reliance on one of the historical priors, and sentencing 

based on a historical prior arising from a probation improperly revoked. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals found that no evidence of the photo lineup was admitted at trial, and 

that trial court properly found that the victim could make an in-court identification 

independent of any taint from the photo lineup. The court rejected the other arguments 

as well, and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 

9/2/08.) 

Petitioner did not seek further direct review. (Exhibit CC, Order and Mandate, 

3/19/09.)

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 4 of 55
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On September 22, 2008, Petitioner commenced his first post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) proceeding by filing his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit DD). 

Counsel was appointed (Exhibit EE, M.E. 10/9/8), who eventually filed a Notice of 

Completion of Review (Exhibit GG) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review.

Petitioner filed a Request for Preparation of Post-Conviction Relief Record 

(Exhibit II), seeking inter alia transcripts of all pre-trial conferences and settlement 

conferences. The request was denied for lack of good cause, but Petitioner was granted 

an extension of time to file his petition. (Exhibit KK, M.E. 3/16/9.)

Petitioner then filed a Second Request for Post-Conviction Relief Records 

(Exhibit LL), again seeking the pre-trial conference records from July 3, 5, and 10, 2007. 

The PCR court found the transcript of the July 3, 2007 continuance hearing irrelevant, 

the transcript of the July 5, 2007 hearing available from counsel (who was ordered to 

forward it to Petitioner), and that no hearing had been held on July 10, 2007. A second 

extension to file a petition was granted. (Exhibit MM, M.E. 4/16/9.) 

Petitioner filed his Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit NN), arguing that 

at trial the victim had referenced a photo lineup “maybe six months” before trial (Exhibit 

M, R.T. 7/12/7), i.e. according to Plaintiff in February 2007, which would have been 

separate from the disclosed lineup occurring in approximately September, 2006.1

Petitioner asserted claims of: (1) prosecutorial misconduct based on failure to disclose 

the photo lineup and the potential second lineup and to correct the victim’s testimony; 

and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s inviting testimony about 

the photo lineup from the victim and then failing to object to the resulting testimony and

having it stricken.

2

 

 

1

The prosecution argued to the trial court that the photo lineup had been 

conducted “approximately three months after the date of the alleged crime.” (Exhibit J, 

Mot. Reconsider at 2.) The theft occurred on May 31, 2006. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

2

Petitioner filed a Supplement (Exhibit PP) to his PCR petition. Respondents 

have provided only the first page. That page explains that the supplement is to provide 

an annexed “Certification.” The undersigned presumes that this references the 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 5 of 55
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondents argued, inter alia ̧ that there was no second photo lineup. (Exhibit 

QQ, PCR Response.)

The trial court found the claims of prosecutorial misconduct based on the first 

photo lineup and failure to correct the victim’s testimony precluded by Petitioner’s 

failure to raise them on direct appeal. The trial court found the claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct based on a purported second photo lineup unsupported by the record. The 

trial court found that the claim of ineffective assistance was without merit because: (1) 

counsel properly moved to exclude evidence of the photo lineup and the in-court 

identification; (2) counsel could have made a reasonable strategic decision to not 

highlight the reference to the prior identification by further objecting to the victim’s 

reference to it; and (3) Petitioner failed to show prejudice given the circumstances of the 

involvement between Petitioner and the victim, and Petitioner’s arrest in possession of 

the vehicle and missing keys. (Exhibit SS, M.E. 1/28/10.) 

Petitioner moved for rehearing (Exhibit TT), which was denied (Exhibit UU, 

M.E. 6/24/10.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit VV), again arguing prosecutorial 

misconduct and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Petitioner then filed an “Amendment to 

the Post-Conviction Relief Petition” (Exhibit YY), arguing that the trial court erred in 

allowing the in-court identification and testimony about the prior identification. The 

court treated this as a motion to amend the petition for review, and denied it. (Exhibit 

ZZ, Order 1/25/12.) The court also denied a motion to consolidate the proceeding with 

Petitioner’s petition for review in his second PCR proceeding. (Id.) On June 1, 2012, 

the court summarily denied the Petition for Review. (Exhibit AAA, Order 6/1/12.) 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit BBB), 

which was summarily denied on September 13, 2012 (Exhibit CCC). 

 

certification required by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5 that all known grounds have been 

included in the petition.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 6 of 55
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PROCEEDING

On July 21, 2011, during the pendency of his Petition for Review in his first PCR 

proceeding, Petitioner filed a “Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief” (Exhibit 

DDD), asserting his actual innocence and newly discovered evidence based upon: (1) the 

abuse of discretion in the trial court permitting the testimony by the arresting officer 

about conversations with Petitioner after informing him of his Miranda rights; (2) 

prosecutorial misconduct on the issue; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel with 

regard to the issue.

The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding the petition untimely 

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a), and unqualified for any exception, including those for 

actual innocence and newly discovered evidence. (Exhibit EEE, M.E. 9/26/11.)

Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit FFF) and Motion for Writ of 

Mandamus (Exhibit GGG), which the PCR court denied. (Exhibit III, M.E. 1/5/12)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit HHH), and a Reply (Exhibit JJJ). 

In the latter, he sought to refute the assertions of the state that his claims did not amount 

to actual innocence or newly discovered evidence claims.

The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition for review as untimely, 

prior to the PCR court’s ruling on the motion for rehearing. (Exhibit UUU, Order 

11/29/11.) Upon issuance of the PCR court’s order, the Court of Appeals reinstated the 

petition for review. (Exhibit KKK, Pet. Rev. at Attachment, Order 1/25/12; Exhibit 

VVV, Order 4/11/13.) 

On May 30, 2013, during the pendency of this proceeding, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review but denied relief. The Court found that the claims actually 

raised in his PCR petition were procedurally barred, stating:

We find no error in the court's determination-Grant's claims could 

have been raised on appeal or in his first post-conviction

proceeding, or were raised in those proceedings and rejected. Thus, 

they are precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a).

(Exhibit SA-A, Order 5/30/13 at 2.) The court also found that Petitioner’s passing 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 7 of 55
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

references to actual innocence and newly discovered evidence were unsupported by the 

actual allegations and claims raised, and that his claims about the lack of legal resources 

in prison was not a challenge to his conviction or sentence, and thus not cognizable. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Mandate on September 26, 2013. (2nd Suppl. Reply, 

Doc. 29 at Exhibit.) 

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 7, 2012 (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

1. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges prosecutorial misconduct based on the 

prosecution’s failure to disclose Brady material in violation of the Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

2. In Ground Two, he alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

3. In Ground Three, he alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion in limine in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. 

4. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that his rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona were violated.

Response - On April 29, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 16). Respondents argue that portions of Ground One, and the corresponding parts 

of Ground Three, are without merit, and that the balance was procedurally barred on 

independent and adequate state grounds. Respondents argue that the portion of Ground 

Two based on counsel’s failure to attack admission of the victim’s in-court identification 

is without merit, and the portion based on counsel’s failure to request a Donald hearing 

at the settlement conference was procedurally barred on an independent and adequate 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 8 of 55
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

state ground. Respondents argue that the claims in Ground Four were barred on an 

independent and adequate state ground.

Reply – Petitioner filed his original Reply (Doc. 17) on May 31, 2013. Petitioner 

argues generically that he presented his claims “at all levels,” and argues the merits of 

his claims.

Supplemental Exhibit – On June 19, 2013, Respondents filed a supplemental 

exhibit consisting of the May 30, 2013 decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

arguing that it did not change the analysis in the Answer.

First Supplemental Reply- On June 24, 2013, the Court gave Petitioner an 

opportunity to supplement his reply to address the Respondents’ supplement. (Doc. 21.) 

On July 9, 2013, Petitioner filed his Supplemental Reply (Doc. 22). Petitioner argues 

that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural defaults based on failures of 

the state courts to address his motions for rehearing, and the denial of his motions to 

consolidate. Petitioner argues that the state ruling rejecting his motion in limine claims 

as waived were in error because the motion in limine preserved the claim. Petitioner 

argues as cause his lack of access to legal materials and dependence on other inmates. He 

asserts that he has only recently discovered the case law on which his claims are based.

Finally, as to his actual innocence, Petitioner now asserts:

The Petitioner was told that there [were] groceries in the back of the 

vehicle, and if he could get them because Petitioner’s daughter was 

visiting and had a birthday party. The Petitioner just came from 

work and did not know or have reason to know said vehicle was 

stolen.

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 22 at 8.) 

Supplemental Answer – On July 25, 2013, the Court observed that although the 

PCR court had rejected Petitioner’s Miranda claim (raised herein in Ground Four) as 

untimely, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected them because they “could have been 

raised on appeal or in his first postconviction proceeding, or were raised in those 

proceedings and rejected.” (Exhibit SA-A, Mem. Dec. 5/30/13 at 2.) Because the 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 9 of 55
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Arizona court failed to delineate which claims were raised and rejected and those which 

were not raised, the undersigned made a tentative finding that the claim had not been 

barred on independent and adequate state grounds, and thus was not barred. 

Respondents were directed to supplement their answer to address the merits of Ground 

Four.

On August 27, 2013, Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and 

Supplemental Answer (Doc. 26), arguing that any reference to “raised and rejected” or 

“precluded” should be ignored as surplusage, because the state record supports only the 

conclusion that the claim had been waived by failure to present it earlier, not precluded 

be presentation earlier. Nonetheless, Respondents addressed the merits of Ground Four 

and argue that the claim is without merit because: (1) after being arrested, Petitioner did 

not effectively invoke his right to remain silent and instead “elected to yell and swear at 

the arresting officer, refused to give his name, and ultimately provided a false name” 

(id.at 11), and (2) in light of the overwhelming evidence against Petitioner, he fails to 

show a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.

The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, but directed that the arguments 

in support of the motion be deemed part of the supplemental answer. (Order 8/27/13, 

Doc. 27.) 

Second Supplemental Reply – On September 25, 2013, Petitioner filed his 

second Supplemental Reply (Doc. 28). Petitioner argues his Ground Four should not be 

deemed procedurally barred because: (1) he raised the issue at trial; (2) he attempted to 

have it raised by appellate counsel who was ineffective for failing to pursue it; (3) he 

attempted to present it in his petitions for rehearing and for consolidation of his petitions 

for review; (4) he attempted to raise the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in his PCR 

petition; (5) one appellate judge had ruled that his untimeliness had been cured; and (6) 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court of the failure to consolidate his 

petitions for review. Petitioner argues that the claim has merit because: (1) he timely 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 10 of 55
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

objected at trial; (2) despite being instructed not to, the State’s witnesses related his 

provision of a false name; and (3) the evidence was prejudicial.

Third Supplemental Reply – On October 2, 2103, Petitioner filed a Motion to 

Supplement and Amend the Supplemental Reply (Doc. 29), providing a copy of the 

mandate of the Arizona Court of Appeals, issued September 28, 2013, and arguing that it 

reflects his claims were not procedurally barred or defaulted. The Court granted the 

motion to the extent of accepting the additional exhibit and arguments, but denying it to 

the extent that Petitioner attempted to raise new claims of a denial of procedural due 

process by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Order 10/3/13, Doc. 30.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND INDEPENDENT AND 

ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS

Respondents argue that most of Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally 

defaulted or were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and 

thus are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 11 of 55
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

16 at 15, n. 8.)

3

 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, 

direct appeal is no longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

 

3

The Court’s scheduling Order directed that “that any allegations of procedural 

default or application of an independent and adequate state ground shall include an 

indication of the specific state rule(s) and/or authorities alleged to bar the affected 

claim(s).” (Order 2/15/13, Doc. 6 at 2.) Respondents’ footnote reference to Rules 

32.2(a) and 32.4(a) meets the letter of that direction, but not its spirit.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 12 of 55
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). 

Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court 

identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) 

waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among 

those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.4 Claims 

based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of 

the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver, e.g. the fairness of 

identification procedures and objections to admission of evidence, etc..

 

4

Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the 

type of waiver required include: right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by 

omission), Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer 

(waived by omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double 

jeopardy (waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); 

illegal sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); 

judge conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 

(App. 2008).

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 13 of 55
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 14 of 55
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to Petitioner’s procedural claims.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 15 of 55
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a. Ground One – Brady Violations – In his Ground One, Petitioner asserts a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose Brady

material, i.e. “two purported photo lineup(s),” and the victim’s description of the 

perpetrator, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.5 (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents concede that the portion of this claim based upon the admitted 

photo-lineup was raised on direct appeal and is thus properly exhausted. Respondents 

contend that the portions related to the second, purported, photo lineup was disposed of 

in Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief on the merits. Finally, Respondents 

contend that the portion of the claim based on the victim’s description has not been fairly 

presented to the state courts and is now procedurally defaulted.

The undersigned agrees that the portions pertaining to disclosure of the first 

admitted photo lineup and the second purported photo lineup were properly exhausted, 

and will address the merits of those claims hereinafter. The procedural status of the 

remaining portion related to the victim’s description will be addressed.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the victim had described the perpetrator as 

“named Phillip, as a black male, 6’2” tall at 150 lbs at approximately 35 years old.” 

(Exhibit BB, Supp. Open. Brief at 5.) Petitioner described this as a “clearly wrong 

description.” (Id.) However, Petitioner did not argue that there was any failure of the 

prosecution to disclose this issue. At most, he argued it as indicia of the inaccuracy of 

 

5 Although Petitioner describes his claim related to the victim’s description as a 

failure to disclose, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the victim’s prior 

description had not been timely disclosed. Defense counsel was aware of the 

description and its apparent defects, at least as of the time of his Supplemental Motion in 

Limine (Exhibit F at 1) and the hearing on the motion in limine. (See Exhibit K, R.T. 

7/11/7 at 9.) No assertion was made at that time that the description given had not been 

properly disclosed with the police report. 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 16 of 55
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the original description of the perpetrator to establish the unreliability of the photo lineup 

and resulting in-court identification. (Id. at 13.) The Arizona Court of Appeals did not 

address it as a separate claim. (Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08.) 

In his first PCR proceeding, Petitioner argued in his original petition that he 

suffered from prosecutorial misconduct related to the identification processes, but did not 

address the victim’s description. (Exhibit NN, PCR Pet.) In his Petition for Review, he 

noted the victim’s description (Exhibit VV, Pet. Rev. at 5), and argued that its inaccuracy 

established the suggestiveness of the undisclosed photo-lineups. (Id. at 10.) He did not, 

however, argue that the description had not been timely disclosed.

In his second PCR proceeding, Petitioner again referenced the identification 

(Exhibit DDD at 6), but argued a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in his petition only 

with regard to: (1) the prosecution presenting evidence the trial court had ruled 

inadmissible, e.g. Petitioner’s statements to the police; and (2) presenting the wrong case 

agent to the jury. (Id. at 4, 5.) In his Petition for Review, he again referenced the 

description (Exhibit HHH, Pet. Rev. at 5), but did not assert a claim based on 

prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose. Rather, his claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct were based on testimony and argument in violation of Petitioner’s Miranda

rights. In his Reply, Petitioner again raised the description, but in the context of the 

challenging the identification on the basis of the undisclosed photo lineup. (Exhibit JJJ, 

Reply Brief at 5.) 

A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if petitioner has 

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). While the 

petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 

404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim were before the state courts. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per 

curiam).

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 17 of 55
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the portion of Ground One based upon a 

failure to disclose the victim’s prior description was not fairly presented to the state 

courts, and his state remedies were not properly exhausted. Moreover, the undersigned 

concludes, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, that the claim is now procedurally 

defaulted.

b. Ground Two – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – In Ground Two,

Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for: (1) failing to 

request a Dessurealt hearing or to properly object to the reference by the victim at trial to 

the photo lineup identification; and (2) failing to request a Donald hearing at the 

settlement conference. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.0 Respondents argue that the first part of 

the claim is properly exhausted to the extent it was raised in Petitioner’s first PCR 

proceeding. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 20.) Respondents argue that the second part, 

concerning the Donald hearing, was never presented to the state courts and is now 

procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 20-21.) 

The undersigned agrees that the Dessereault portion of the claim was properly 

exhausted. Petitioner raised the claim in his first PCR petition. Petitioner cited the Sixth 

Amendment, and various federal authorities, including Strickland, in support of his 

ineffectiveness claims. (Exhibit NN, PCR Pet. at 7.) He specifically argued trial 

counsel’s failure to object to the victim’s testimony about the identification. (Id. at 11, 

15.) And, he specifically argued counsel’s failure to move for a Dessurealt hearing. 

(Id.at 15.) In his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued 

that “counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion for a Dessurealt Hearing 

to see crucial identification procedure.” (Exhibit VV, Pet. Rev. at 3.) (See also id. at 

16.) He cited the 6th and 14th Amendments and Strickland in support of his claim. (Id.)

As for the failure to request a Donald hearing, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner did not fairly present such a claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The 

reference to a “Donald Hearing” apparently is intended to reference a hearing on the 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 18 of 55
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

record to demonstrate that the defendant understands the plea offer and makes a knowing 

and voluntary decision to reject it. See e.g. Rivera-Longoria v. Slayton, 225 Ariz. 572, 

573, 242 P.3d 171, 172 (App. Div. 1 2010), vacated on other grounds, 228 Ariz. 156, 

158, 264 P.3d 866, 868 (2011).6 The closest Petitioner came to raising such a claim was 

his general assertion that trial counsel “was ineffective at Settlement Conference for not 

adequately informing defendant whether to accept the plea or proceed to trial.” (Exhibit 

VV, Pet. Rev. at 3.) While related, these two claims are fundamentally separate – the 

one presented focused on counsel’s advice to Petitioner, the one raised herein focuses on 

counsel’s failure to have the court become involved in the advisements.

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was limited to claims arising out of 

testimony about Petitioner’s statements to the arresting officer. Petitioner’s direct appeal 

was limited to claims concerning the photo lineup and sentencing issues.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the portion of Ground Two related to the 

Donald Hearing was not fairly presented, and Petitioner’s state remedies are now 

procedurally defaulted for the reasons discussed hereinabove. 

c. Ground Three – Denial of Motion in Limine – In Ground Three, Petitioner 

alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing testimony concerning the 

photo lineup in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Petition, Doc. 

1 at 8.) Respondents apparently concede exhaustion, and address this issue on the merits 

in conjunction with the related claim in Ground One concerning the Brady violation 

associated with the photo lineup. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 21.) 

Indeed, Petitioner argued in his direct appeal that admission of the identification 

was “constitutionaly [sic] prejudicial error,” and cited Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 

 

6

The Donald court did not provide for such a hearing. Rather, the only type of 

hearing anticipated in Donald was a hearing to establish, post-trial, counsel’s 

ineffectiveness with regard to a proffered and rejected plea agreement. See Donald, 198 

Ariz. at 413, 10 P.3d at 1200. Nonetheless, the phrase “Donald hearing” appears to 

uniformly refer to a pre-trial hearing to confirm the desire to reject the plea. See e.g.

State v. Svanoe, 2009 WL 5149956, 2 (Ariz.App. Div. 1, 2009); and State v. Miramon, 

2009 WL 2581882, 2 (Ariz.App. Div. 2, 2009). Its function appears to be primarily a 

defensive measure for defense counsel (to avoid a malpractice claim), and/or for the 

prosecution (to avoid a post-trial claim of ineffective assistance).

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 19 of 55
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1972), the leading federal case on the admissibility of identifications. (Exhibit BB, 

Supp. Open. Brief at 12.) 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim 

properly exhausted.

d. Ground Four – Miranda Violations - In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that 

his rights under Miranda v. Arizona were violated when the trail court failed to strike 

testimony that Petitioner refused to speak to the arresting officers. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

9.) Respondents argue that this claim was only raised in Petitioner’s Second PCR 

proceeding and the claims were procedurally barred on adequate and independent state 

grounds. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 21.) 

Indeed, Petitioner argued to the PCR court in his second PCR proceeding that the 

trial court abused its discretion “for allowing jury to consider evidence on testimony 

provided by prosecutor’s witness concerning defendant's ‘right to remain silent’ 

(Miranda rights).” (Exhibit DDD at 4.) Petitioner again raised this argument in his 

second PCR Petition for Review. (Exhibit HHH at 8.) 

The PCR court plainly rejected all of Petitioner’s claims in his second PCR 

petition as untimely. 

Defendant cannot raise these claims in an untimely Rule 32

proceeding because an untimely notice may only raise claims 

pursuant to Rule 32.l(d), (e), (t), (g), or (h). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a).

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting 

substantive grounds which bring him within the provisions of the 

Rule in order for the Court to grant relief. State v. Manning, 143 

Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 318, 320 (1984). Defendant fails to state a 

claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32

proceeding. Rule 32.4(a).

(Exhibit EEE, M.E. 9/26/11.) 

Had the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted that reasoning, the procedural bar 

would be plain. However, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, and held – not 

that the claim was untimely – but that it was either not presented earlier or presented 

earlier.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 20 of 55
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On review, Grant repeats several of his claims but does not address 

the trial court's conclusion that those claims are precluded. We find 

no error in the court's determination-Grant's claims could have been 

raised on appeal or in his first postconviction proceeding, or were 

raised in those proceedings and rejected. Thus, they are precluded 

pursuant to Rule 32.2(a).

(Exhibit SA-A, Mem. Dec. 5/30/13 at 2.) The Arizona Court of Appeals failed to 

delineate which claims were raised, and those which were not. 

A finding of preclusion, i.e. that the claims have been raised before, “does not 

provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 

1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996).7 Where an Arizona Court asserts both conditions apply to a 

group of claims without delineating which applied to which, it “did not clearly base its 

decision on independent and adequate state law grounds.” Id. See also Calderon v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of California (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 

1996); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2002) (“By failing to 

specify which claims were barred for which reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not 

clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.’”); and Koerner 

v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2003). To avoid habeas review, a state 

court decision must “clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state 

ground.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).

Respondents contend that this Court should look beyond the pronouncement of 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, to the decision of the PCR court and the procedural 

history, and conclude that the true decision was one that the claims had not been raised, 

were thereby waived, and thus procedurally barred on that ground. 

Respondents acknowledge the rule that a procedural bar must be clearly and 

expressly applied, but assert that the application in these instances is “unwarranted” 

 

7

The Arizona courts often reference both its waiver bar (e.g. that the claims were 

not raised earlier, when they could have been) and its preclusion bar (i.e. that the claims 

actually were raised earlier and adjudicated on the merits) as resulting in the claims 

being “precluded”. This likely results from the pronouncement in Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Proceudre 32.2(a) that with both types, the “defendant shall be precluded from 

relief under this rule.”

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 21 of 55
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because there is no uncertainty in this case which rule the Arizona court was applying

(because the record purportedly shows that the claim actually not been raised 

previously). 

In Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), the Court was faced with a state appellate 

decision which disposed of a federal claim on the mistaken basis that it had been 

previously presented. The record reflected that the claim had clearly not been presented 

or passed on in any prior proceeding. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held: “When a 

state court declines to review the merits of a petitioner's claim on the ground that it has 

done so already, it creates no bar to federal habeas review...When a state court refuses to 

readjudicate a claim on the ground that it has been previously determined, the court's 

decision does not indicate that the claim has been procedurally defaulted.” 556 U.S. at 

466-67. The Court further rejected the state’s request to treat the rejection as a 

procedural bar based upon the state’s waiver rule. “Although we have an independent 

duty to scrutinize the application of state rules that bar our review of federal claims, we 

have no concomitant duty to apply state procedural bars where state courts have 

themselves declined to do so. The Tennessee courts did not hold that Cone waived his 

Brady claim, and we will not second-guess their judgment.” 556 U.S. at 468-69.

Respondents contend that this Court should nonetheless rely upon the dissent in 

Koerner, wherein Judge Beezer argued that the reference to an ”ambiguous” order 

“should be understood in light of the state court opinion and the record in that case, 

rather than looking solely to the face of the state court’s opinion.” 328 F.3d 1039, 1056 

(Beezer, J. dissenting). 

However, Judge Beezer’s dissent plainly acknowledged the import of the majority 

decision in Koerner:

Today's opinion holds that a federal court may only look to the state 

court opinion at issue in determining whether a state court opinion 

relies on a procedural default. If a state court opinion is ambiguous 

on its face, today's opinion makes it impossible to find a procedural 

default because any such state court opinion does not “clearly and 

expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.” 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 22 of 55
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir.2002) (citation 

omitted).

Koerner, 328 F.3d at 1056 (Beezer, J. dissenting). Thus the portion of Judge Beezer’s 

dissent on which Respondents rely was not a statement of what the law in the Ninth 

Circuit is, but Judge Beezer’s assertion of what it ought to be. But see McElyea v. 

Schriro, 2009 WL 222375, CV-06-0884-PHX-SMM(HCE) (D. Ariz. 2009) (looking 

beyond state court opinion, based on pre-Koerner 9

th Circuit cases doing so, citing 

Koerner, but without noting Beezer’s dissent). Respondents point to no authority 

permitting this Court to reject Judge Beezer’s analysis of the majority’s holding in 

Koerner, nor the effect of that holding.

Here, the opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals is ambiguous on its face, 

proposing two mutually exclusive reasons for disposing of the claim. It’s ambiguity is 

increased by the fact that the trial court had, in fact, not rejected the claim on either 

preclusion or waiver grounds, but on timeliness grounds. (See Exhibit EEE, M.E. 

9/26/11.) According to Koerner, this Court is not free to look beyond that ambiguity 

and attempt to ascertain the true basis for disposing of the claim. 

Thus, this Court may not find that the claim was procedurally barred on an 

independent and adequate state ground.

e. Summary Re Exhaustion – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on: (1) the portion of Ground One 

based upon a failure to disclose the victim’s prior description; and (2) the portion of 

Ground Two based upon the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to request a 

Donald hearing at the settlement conference.

Also based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner properly 

exhausted his remedies as to: (1) the portion of Ground One based upon the admitted 

photo-lineup; (2) the portion of Ground Two based upon the ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel in failing to request a Dessurealt hearing or to properly object to the 

reference by the victim at trial to the photo lineup identification; (3) all of Ground Three; 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 23 of 55
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and (4) all of Ground Four. 

B. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

In his Supplemental Reply (Doc. 22), Petitioner argues that this Court should find 

cause to excuse his procedural defaults based on: (1) failures of the state courts to 

address his motions for rehearing, and the denial of his motions to consolidate; (2) the 

state ruling rejecting as waived his motion in limine claims were in error because the 

motion in limine preserved the claim; (3) his lack of access to legal materials and 

dependence on other inmates; and (4) that he has only recently discovered the case law 

on which his claims are based. 

State Court Procedural issues – Petitioner complains that the PCR court failed 

to respond to two motions for rehearing, resulting in a determination that his petition for 

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals was untimely. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 22 at 4.) It is 

true that the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition for review as 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 24 of 55
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

untimely, prior to the PCR court’s ruling on the motion for rehearing. (Exhibit UUU, 

Order 11/29/11.) However, upon issuance of the PCR court’s order, the Court of 

Appeals reinstated the petition for review. (Exhibit KKK, Pet. Rev. at Attachment, 

Order 1/25/12; Exhibit VVV, Order 4/11/13.) Ultimately, on May 30, 2013, during the 

pendency of this proceeding, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied 

relief. (Exhibit SA-A, Order 5/30/13.) Petitioner proffers no explanation why this 

procedural quirk precluded him from fairly presenting his procedurally defaulted claims 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Perhaps, had the appellate court’s timeliness ruling 

been left un-amended, there would have been some cause for complaint. The ruling did 

not stand, however, and Plaintiff’s petition for review was ultimately heard, albeit 

unsuccessfully.

Petitioner also attempts to show cause by pointing to the denial of his Motion to 

Consolidate his second PCR proceeding with his still pending petition for review on his 

first PCR Proceeding. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at Attachment C7; Exhibit ZZ, Order 

1/25/12.) However, Petitioner fails to show how this denial precluded him from properly 

exhausting his state remedies. Perhaps Petitioner believes that had the consolidation 

been granted, any claims rejected as waived in the first proceeding would have been 

subject to review on the merits. However, this fails to show cause for two reasons. 

First, the claims found herein to be procedurally defaulted had been found 

defaulted in the first PCR proceeding as a result of Petitioner’s failure to raise them on 

direct appeal. Consolidation of the two PCR proceedings would not have cured this 

defect. 

Second, Petitioner fails to show any defect in the rejection of his motion to 

consolidate. Petitioner cannot simply point to a refusal of the state court to permit 

Petitioner to employ procedural sleight of hand to avoid procedural default as cause for 

procedural default. This is hardly the kind of “interference” referenced in Murray. 

Indeed, if such tactics were to work, any procedural default could be avoided by simply 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 25 of 55
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

asking the state court to ignore the default, no matter how baseless the justification for 

the request.

The undersigned finds no cause based on these rulings.

Errors regarding Motion in Limine – Next, Petitioner argues that the state 

ruling rejecting as waived his motion in limine claims were in error because the motion 

in limine preserved the claim. However, only Ground Three was founded upon the 

denial of denial of Petitioner’s motion in limine, and that claim has not been found to be 

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner proffers no explanation how this argument relates to 

his procedurally defaulted claims.

Lack of Legal Resources – Petitioner complains that he lacks legal resources and 

is forced to rely upon other inmates for assistance, and that he has only recently 

discovered the case law on which his claims are based. Here, however, Petitioner’s two 

procedurally defaulted claims in Grounds One and Two were procedurally defaulted in 

either his direct appeal or his first PCR proceeding. In both proceedings, Petitioner was 

represented by counsel. Thus, he was not dependent upon his own resources to present 

his claims. Therefore, any deficiencies in the resources available to Petitioner in prison 

would not show cause for his procedural defaults. 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

/ /

/ /

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 26 of 55
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS CAUSE 

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc., §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup gateway.” 

Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner asserts:

The Petitioner was told that there [were] groceries in the back of the 

vehicle, and if he could get them because Petitioner’s daughter was 

visiting and had a birthday party. The Petitioner just came from 

work and did not know or have reason to know said vehicle was 

stolen.

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 22 at 8.) Petition proffers no support for his contention, and no 

details. For example, he does not identify who asked him to get the groceries, or how 

they came to be in possession of the vehicle, nor does he show that this explanation was 

contemporaneously offered. Moreover, Officer Strong’s testimony was not merely that 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 27 of 55
28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner was found in the vicinity of the vehicle, but that he had observed Petitioner 

driving the vehicle, and doing so in a suspicious manner. (Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 59-

61.) Moreover, Petitioner proffers nothing to explain away the victim’s identification of 

him as the person who disappeared from the victim’s home at the same time as the car 

and its keys. (See Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 46-47.) 

Petitioner fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror would have found him 

guilty based on his explanation for his possession of the vehicle. Accordingly his 

procedurally defaulted claims must be dismissed. 

D. STANDARDS FOR RELIEF

Standard Applicable on Habeas - While the purpose of a federal habeas 

proceeding is to search for violations of federal law, not every error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 28 of 55
29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

E. MERITS OF GROUND ONE: PHOTO-LINEUP

In his Ground One for relief, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor violated his due 

process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to timely disclose 

material facts of two purported lineups, the first conducted 3 months after the initial 

crime and the second conducted 6 months prior to trial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

With regard to the “first” lineup, Respondents argue that while the delay in 

disclosure may have been a violation of state rules, it was not a Brady violation because: 

(1) the material was not favorable to the defense, the victim having identified Petitioner 

as the thief; and (2) therefore any failure to timely disclose was harmless. With regard to 

the “second” lineup, Respondents argue that the PCR court properly found that there had 

been no such lineup, and that Petitioner was merely misconstruing the victim’s trial 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 29 of 55
30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony about the timing of the lineup. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 26-28.) 

Petitioner replies that prejudice accrued because the lineup was tainted, and thus 

affected the in-court identification by the victim. He further argues that the lack of 

disclosure concerning the “first” lineup leaves open the question whether a second lineup 

occurred. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 8-9.) 

State Court Decision - The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual 

background as follows:

Before trial...Defendant also moved to preclude the victim's 

in-court identification of Defendant because the victim told police 

that he would be unable to identify the perpetrator. Defense counsel 

later learned that a photographic lineup had occurred but that the 

State had not disclosed it. Counsel moved to preclude all evidence 

of the lineup.

At trial, the court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the 

victim's ability to identify Defendant. The court concluded from the 

victim's testimony that he could identify Defendant without reliance 

on the lineup.

(Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08 at 2-3.) The court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that the 

line-up was tainted because Petitioner was not represented at the post-indictment lineup, 

finding that the lineup was not introduced, and the trial court properly found that there 

was a source independent of the lineup to support an in-court identification, i.e. the 

month long acquaintance between the victim and Petitioner. (Id. at 4-5.) 

However, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not further address the merits of

Petitioner’s Brady claim.

Application of Law - In Brady v. Maryland, the Court held that “the suppression 

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Since Brady, the Court has 

held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no 

request by the accused. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (federal 

prosecution); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (applying Agurs to state 

prosecution). They have also extended the duty to encompass impeachment evidence as 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 30 of 55
31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 

However, it is only “material” evidence that triggers Brady protections. Evidence 

is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 

682. The difference to be shown need not be a different verdict or sentence, but a 

difference in the fairness of the trial such that the trial result is worthy of confidence. 

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Once a reviewing Court has found a failure 

to disclose “material evidence,” no further harmless-error analysis is required. Id. at 

435.

“There are three components of a Brady claim: (1) the evidence at issue must be 

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) 

the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; 

and (3) prejudice must have ensued.” Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 509 (9th Cir.2010).

Favorability – Here, Petitioner fails to show that the undisclosed evidence was 

favorable. The “first” lineup itself was not favorable, the witness having identified 

Petitioner as the perpetrator. At best, Petitioner offers speculation that there was 

something amiss in the “first” lineup that might have tainted the in-court identification,8

and speculation that the “second” lineup occurred and that it too was somehow improper. 

However, speculation will not support a Brady claim. Rather, Petitioner bears the burden 

of affirmatively establishing that the evidence would have been favorable. Runningeagle 

v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 769 (9

th Cir. 2012). Because Petitioner has not met the burden, 

this claim is without merit.

Suppression – Petitioner also bears the burden of establishing that the evidence 

was “suppressed.” However, Petitioner shows no favorable material which was not 

known to the defense in ample time to be used at trial. 

 

8

The Arizona Court of Appeals noted the absence of defense counsel at the postindictment photo lineup as an argument raised to them. However, a defendant has no 

right to counsel at even a post-indictment photo lineup. See U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 

(1973); and State v. McDonald, 111 Ariz. 159, 164, 526 P.2d 698, 703 (1974).

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 31 of 55
32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner complains that the disclosure of the “first” lineup was delayed. “The 

Government's misconduct in failing to promptly disclose exculpatory evidence, however, 

does not automatically warrant reversal of a defendant's conviction.” U.S. v. Miller, 529 

F.2d 1125, 1128 (9

th Cir. 1976). Where a disclosure is delayed, but comes in time to be 

fully used, no Brady violation has occurred. “To escape the Brady sanction, disclosure 

‘must be made at a time when disclosure would be of value to the accused.’” U.S. v. 

Gordon, 844 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). At least five days prior 

to trial, Petitioner’s counsel filed a Motion to Preclude (Exhibit H), seeking to exclude 

evidence of the photo lineup, indicating his awareness of the information at least by that 

date. Petitioner points to no additional defense that could have been mounted had the 

disclosure been provided earlier.

As to the “second” lineup, Petitioner fails to show that the lineup occurred, and 

thus fails to show that it was “suppressed.” Petitioner bases his assumption of the 

existence of such a lineup upon the following testimony by the victim:

Q When [the officer] specifically asked you if you could

identify the suspect, you indicated no, correct?

A I don't recall saying no.

Q You didn't mention anything to the officer regarding this 

interaction that took place and someone going for a walk and 

whatnot, correct?

A I don't recall if I said that or not.

Q Okay. And yet today well over a year later now you're 

prepared to make an identification, correct?

A I've already made one a few months back, maybe six 

months.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/07 at 43-44.) Thus, the victim was recalling the identification as 

occurring sometime in January to May, 2007. In seeking reconsideration on Petitioner’s 

Motion to Preclude, the prosecution represented that the photo-lineup occurred “three 

months after the date of the alleged crime.” (Exhibit J, Motion to Reconsider at 2.) The 

victim testified that the theft occurred on May 26, 2006. (Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/07 at 34.) 

Thus, according to the prosecution, the photo-lineup was conducted around late August, 

2006, some 4 months sooner than the victim’s estimation.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 32 of 55
33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The PCR court rejected Petitioner’s claim about the “second” lineup, finding:

The defendant's third claim of prosecutorial misconduct is that there 

was a second identification procedure never disclosed by the State. 

Defendant has presented no evidence of such an identification 

procedure, but rather infers the existence of such an identification

procedure from the victim's testimony. However, after reviewing the 

record, the Court finds that it does not support defendant's inference. 

The victim was clearly referring to the first, suppressed lineup 

during his testimony. (R.T. of July 12, 2007, at 44).

(Exhibit SS, M.E. 1/28/10 at 2.) While the undersigned might not characterize the 

victim’s testimony as “clearly” referring to the “first” lineup, the undersigned cannot 

find that the testimony supports a finding that a second lineup was conducted. All of the 

testimony and briefs in the case reference a single lineup, not two. The victim was 

plainly uncertain about the time period, alternately referring to it as a “few” and “maybe 

six” months previously. Thus, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to meet his 

burden of showing that a “second” photo lineup was conducted. Necessarily, the 

undersigned finds that no such lineup was suppressed.

Even if this Court were inclined to Petitioner’s interpretation of the testimony, the 

undersigned cannot say that the state court’s determination was unreasonable “in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Moreover, that factual determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and 

Petitioner has not proffered “clear and convincing evidence” to overcome it. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1).

Having concluded that the second lineup did not occur, this Court must conclude 

that no material evidence concerning it was suppressed by the prosecution in violation of 

Brady. 

Prejudice – Petitioner fails to proffer anything to support a finding of prejudice

from any purported suppression. The “first” lineup was disclosed, and Petitioner 

proffers no explanation for any prejudice from any delay. Similarly, Petitioner proffers 

nothing about the purported “second” lineup to show that had he known of its existence 

the results of the proceeding would have been different. 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 33 of 55
34

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As noted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the photo lineup itself was never 

introduced in evidence. (Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08 at 4.) Although, the victim did 

make his oblique reference to having made an identification previously, the reference 

was a single sentence, without elaboration, and even without indication that it was a 

lineup identification. (Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/07 at 44.) 

Petitioner argues that the lineup had somehow tainted the victim’s in court 

identification. However, as recognized by the Arizona Court of Appeals, even if there 

was some impropriety in the pre-trial lineup, the in-court identification may stand if the 

court is convinced based upon the circumstances that the in-court identification is 

nonetheless reliable. (See Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08 at 4-5.) See Neil v. Biggers, 409 

U.S. 188 (1972). For example, here, the victim was familiar with the perpetrator, having 

been with him for several hours on several occasions over the course of a month, twice 

in the victim’s home. (See Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/07 at 30-31.) Thus, any defect in the 

photo lineup would not have had the same impact as, for example, an identification of an 

unknown perpetrator who was encountered only at the time of the crime. See U.S. v. 

Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 511, n. 2 (6th Cir. 2001) (“In determining whether an 

identification was reliable, it is material whether the witness was familiar with the 

defendant, because the more familiar the person, the more reliable the identification.”).

Most importantly, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that a sooner disclosure of the 

“first” photo-lineup would have altered the conclusion that the in-court identification 

was admissible.9

Further, the prosecution’s case did not stand alone on the victim’s identification, 

but also upon Petitioner’s possession (and driving) of the vehicle and the keys taken 

from the victim. Petitioner’s proffered explanation for his possession was wholly 

 

9

To show that the in court identification was unreliable, Petitioner points to 

evidence that the victim originally told police he would be unable to identify the 

perpetrator, and gave a description of the perpetrator that did not match Petitioner. Such 

arguments are directed at the state court’s decision to permit the in-court identification in 

the face of the photo lineup, but are unrelated to the conduct of the photo lineup and do 

not establish prejudice from any “suppression” (i.e. delayed disclosure) of the photolineup, the issue relevant to Petitioner’s Brady claim.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 34 of 55
35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unsupported. See e.g. State v. Valencia, 2 Ariz. App. 301, 408 P.2d 234 (App. 1965) 

(although possession of stolen goods alone is insufficient, failure to adequately explain 

possession of stolen goods may be evidence of guilt). Thus, there is no reason to 

believe that a sooner disclosure might have resulted in an acquittal.

Thus, not only has Petitioner failed to show the suppression of favorable 

evidence, but also any prejudice resulting therefrom.

Accordingly, the properly exhausted portion of Petitioner’s Ground One is 

without merit and must be denied.

F. MERITS OF GROUND TWO: DESSEREAULT HEARING 

For the properly exhausted portions of Ground Two, Petitioner argues that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Dessurealt hearing or to properly object 

to the reference by the victim at trial to the photo lineup identification. (Petition, Doc. 1 

at 7.) 

In State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384, 452 P.2d 951, 955 (1969), the 

Arizona Supreme Court laid out the process for evaluating challenges to identification 

procedures:

First, if at the trial the proposed in-court identification is 

challenged, the trial judge must immediately hold a hearing in the 

absence of the jury to determine from clear and convincing evidence 

whether it contained unduly suggestive circumstances. In this the 

burden is on the prosecution to establish from all the circumstances 

surrounding the pretrial identification that it was not such as to be 

unduly suggestive.

Second, if the trial judge concludes that the circumstances of 

the pretrial identification were unduly suggestive or that the 

prosecution has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that they were not, then it is the prosecution's burden to satisfy the 

trial judge from clear and convincing evidence that the proposed incourt identification is not tainted by the prior identification.

Dessureault, 104 Ariz. at 384, 453 P.2d 951, 955 (Ariz. 1969). 

Respondents argue this claim is without merit because: (1) counsel had already 

undertaken substantial efforts to prevent the victim from identifying Petitioner; (2) the 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 35 of 55
36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

victim’s reference to the lineup was a single, unsolicited, unexpected reference, and 

counsel could have reasonably concluded to minimize the impact by not objecting; (3) 

given the other evidence against Petitioner, there was no prejudice. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 

-35.) 

Petitioner replies that the identification was a crucial issue, the lineup serving “to 

crystallize the witnesses’ identification of the defendant.” (Reply, Doc. 17 at 10-11.) 

State Court Decision – The PCR court denied, this claim, finding: (1) that a 

Dessureault hearing had been conducted; and (2) an objection to the testimony would 

have highlighted the testimony, and thus not doing so was sound trial strategy. (Exhibit 

SS, M.E. 1/28/10 at 3.) The PCR court further found that Petitioner failed to show 

prejudice because of the other evidence connecting Petitioner with the crime, e.g. the 

victim’s in-court identification, and Petitioner’s possession of the missing car and keys. 

(Id.)

Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims – Generally, claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, petitioner must show: (1) deficient 

performance - counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for 

reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. at 687 88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject 

his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the 

claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

In determining whether counsel performed deficiently, the court must focus on 

whether the attorney's actions were appropriate under the circumstances existing at the 

time. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Moreover, there is a strong presumption counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 36 of 55
37

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). The court 

should “presume that the attorneys made reasonable judgments and decline to second 

guess strategic choices.” United States v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

No Deficient Performance – Petitioner complains counsel did not do enough to 

keep out references to the photo lineup, and to preclude the in-court identification. 

Pretrial Failings - Prior to trial, counsel obtained a ruling that evidence of the 

photo lineup identification would not be allowed due to the delayed disclosure. (Exhibit 

K, R.T. 7/11/07 at 7.) The trial court ruled:

IT IS ORDERED [the motion in limine regarding] 

identification of Defendant in court by victim is denied, but allowed 

if given by independent means of prior meeting and not photo 

lineup.

(Exhibit L, M.E. 7/11/07 at 2.) 

Moreover, as noted by the PCR court, the trial court “did conduct a pretrial 

hearing regarding the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant.” (Exhibit SS, 

M.E. 1/28/10 at 3 (citing R.T. 7/11/07 at 52-57).) At the hearing, the victim was 

examined as to his familiarity with the perpetrator, his present ability to identify him, the 

lack of affirmation by officers of his selection at the photo-lineup. (Exhibit K, R.T. 

7/11/7 at 52-55.) The victim was cross-examined by defense counsel as to the nature of 

his relationship with the perpetrator, and the police report’s indication that he had said he 

would be unable to identify the perpetrator. (Id. at 55-56.) The trial court opined:

THE COURT: Thank you. Based on the testimony provided 

by Mr. Stewart, I do find that there is a basis for an in-court 

identification, if the witness is able to do so, and I’m going to allow 

him to proceed.

So the Court will proceed under the premise that there is a 

basis, based on Mr. Stewart’s testimony, for him to make an 

independent identification of the individual.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 37 of 55
38

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If he is able to make the identification in court, then I’m 

going to allow it to proceed under that basis. The Court is 

persuaded that he has had sufficient contact with the individual.

That he had three different occurrences or 3 different 

occasions to be with the defendant. That that would have created a 

sufficient basis for the identification to take place.

(Id. at 56-57.) 

Petitioner points to nothing else trial counsel could have done under Dessureault

to challenge the in-court identification.

Moreover, Petitioner fails to establish that the photo lineup was unduly 

suggestive. Therefore, he cannot show that counsel would have been successful in 

keeping out either the photo lineup or the in-court identification. “If we find that a 

challenged procedure is not impermissibly suggestive, our inquiry into the due process 

claim ends.” U.S. v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 1985). It is only after finding it 

unduly suggestive, that the court is required to consider the Biggers factors to determine 

if an in-court identification should also be excluded. Id. See also State v. Taylor, 27 

Ariz. App. 330, 333, 554 P.2d 926, 929 (Ariz. App. 1976).

“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Because Petitioner bears the burden of proof, this Court must conclude that any further 

action by counsel to preclude the photo lineup or in-court identification on due process

grounds would have been futile, and thus was not deficient performance.

Violation of Order – It is true that the trial court precluded any evidence of the 

photo lineup, and when the victim testified about his prior identification, counsel did not 

object. 

Having already obtained a definitive ruling on the motion in limine, trial counsel 

was not required to interpose an objection to preserve the issue of any violation of that 

order for appeal. Ariz. R. Evid. 103(b). Cf. Fed.R.Evid. 103(b). Accordingly, insofar as 

any objection might have been founded upon the previously granted motion under 

Brady, no renewed objection was necessary for appeal. In contrast, any objection 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 38 of 55
39

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

founded upon the suggestiveness of the photo lineup had not been previously addressed, 

and would have had to have been raised by counsel.

However, the testimony was given on cross-examination by defense counsel, was 

uninvited, and any objection would have been after-the-fact. Defense counsel and the 

trial court immediately took pains to caution the witness to respond to the questions 

asked. 

A I've already made one a few months back, maybe six 

months.

Q Excuse me, if I could just --

THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to ask you if you would 

please respond to the question asked of you if you would, sir, thank 

you.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/07 at 44.) The only thing more defense counsel could have done 

would have been to either move for an order striking the testimony and directing the jury 

to disregard it, or for a mistrial. See e.g. State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439, 72 P.3d 

831, 839 (2003). But such is not always the most tactically favorable approach, since it 

can serve to highlight testimony that might otherwise be inconsequential to the jury.

An attorney's failure to object to the admission of 

inadmissible evidence is not necessarily ineffective...A defendant 

seeking to prove ineffective assistance of counsel “must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”...Under the 

circumstances of [the] case, an effective advocate could have 

reasonably decided not to object...We need not determine the actual 

explanation for trial counsel's failure to object, so long as his failure 

to do so falls within the range of reasonable representation.

Morris v. State of Cal., 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9

th Cir. 1991). Indeed, the state court 

concluded that it could have been a reasonable trial tactic for Petitioner’s counsel to 

leave the matter alone. Petitioner points to nothing to counter this conclusion. 

Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, a motion for a mistrial would have been 

futile, given the lack of a probability that the testimony influenced the jury.

No Prejudice – The PCR court also concluded that Petitioner failed to show 

prejudice from any deficiencies in counsel’s performance, given the combination of the 

victim’s identification and Petitioner’s possession of the stolen vehicle and keys. 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 39 of 55
40

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

With regard to the reference by the victim to the photo lineup, the undersigned 

agrees that there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different had counsel challenged the statement. The trial court could have 

either stricken the testimony or declared a mistrial. Given the other evidence at trial, 

striking this oblique reference would not likely have impacted the jury’s decision. For 

the same reason, while a mistrial may have ultimately resulted in a dismissal or acquittal 

at a new trial, there is nothing to suggest a likelihood that one would have been granted. 

“The trial court must consider two factors in determining whether to grant a motion for a 

mistrial based on a witness's testimony: (1) whether the testimony called to the jurors' 

attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict 

and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced 

the jurors.” State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439, 72 P.3d 831, 839 (2003). For the 

reasons discussed hereinabove, the undersigned cannot find a probability that the 

mention of the prior identification influenced the jury. Thus, the undersigned concludes 

that an order striking would have been ineffective to change the verdict, and a mistrial 

would not have been granted.

With regard to the exclusion of the in-court identification, the undersigned is 

troubled by what seems to be an eliding over the necessity of the identification to the 

conviction. Had counsel successfully challenged the in-court identification, there appears 

to be at least a reasonable probability that a conviction would not have been possible. 

See e.g. State v. Valencia, 2 Ariz. App. 301, 408 P.2d 234 (App. 1965) (possession of 

stolen goods alone is insufficient to convict for theft). However, that assumes that 

further challenge would have been successful. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to 

show that further action by counsel had any likelihood of succeeding, where his existing 

efforts had failed.

Conclusion re Ineffective Assistance – Petitioner has failed to show deficient 

performance, and has failed to show resulting prejudice. Therefore, this Court must 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 40 of 55
41

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conclude that his Ground Two is without merit, and it must be denied.

G. MERITS OF GROUND THREE: TESTIMONY RE LINEUP

In his Ground Three, Petitioner turns his attentions from the actions of counsel to 

those of the trial court, and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 

victim to testify about the photo lineup, after previously ruling to exclude such 

testimony. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

Respondents argue that: (1) Petitioner fails to show that any such abuse of 

discretion amounted to a violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Fourteenth or Sixth 

Amendments; (2) no prejudice resulted because of the overwhelming evidence from the 

in-court identification; (3) Petitioner fails to show that the photo lineup was suggestive, 

and it was only excluded based upon the late disclosure; and (4) Petitioner had no right 

to have counsel present at the photo lineup. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 35-37.) 

Petitioner replies that: (1) the trial court originally ruled that any identification 

was tainted by the photo lineup; (2) the victim’s identification was flawed because it was 

based on a presumption that the victim’s visitor took the vehicle, the victim’s description 

of the weight did not match Petitioner, the visitor had a different name, he denied having 

additional identifying information and denied an ability to identify the perpetrator; (3) 

the trial court prevented defense counsel from objecting when the testimony about the 

photo lineup occurred. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 11-13.)

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that no constitutional 

violation or denial of a fair trial had occurred with regard to the photo lineup because the 

“jury never learned that a lineup had taken place.” (Exhibit CC, Mem. Dec. 9/2/08 at 4.)

Analysis – Here, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion in limine on the 

testimony about the photo lineup. Thus, Petitioner’s present claim necessarily turns to 

the trial court’s actions once the oblique reference to the lineup occurred at trial. 

No Objection - Petitioner, in essence, argues that the trial court should have acted 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 41 of 55
42

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

upon the victim’s reference to the lineup. However, the trial court had no objection to 

rule upon. After the victim referenced the prior identification, counsel spoke, but made 

no objection.

Q [by Defense counsel] Excuse me, if I could just --

THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to ask you if you would 

please respond to the question asked of you if you would, sir, thank 

you.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 44.) 

Petitioner counters that the court interrupted counsel and prevented an objection. 

It is true that the trial court interjected. However, there is nothing in the record to 

indicate that counsel was prevented from then asserting any objection. Rather, the trial 

court properly acted to cutoff further offending testimony by the victim. See e.g. 

Ariz.R.Evid. 103(d) (“To the extent practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial so 

that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means.”) See also Fed. R. 

Evid. 103(d) (same). The trial court did not, however prevent objections or motions 

founded upon the testimony which had already occurred. Following the trial court’s 

comments, counsel could have moved to strike the comments or for a mistrial.10

Sua Sponte Action not Required - Perhaps, Petitioner believes that the trial court 

should have acted sua sponte to strike the offending testimony or to declare a mistrial. 

Petitioner points to no authority for such a proposition, and the undersigned knows of 

none. See 75 Am. Jur.2d Trial § 384 (2013) (“Furthermore, a trial court does not err by 

failing to strike or exclude testimony subject to eradication in the absence of a request 

therefore by the defendant.”); and 88 C.J.S. Trial § 250 (“ordinarily it is the better and 

safer practice for the court to defer action on the admission or rejection of evidence until 

a proper objection is made by the party interested in having the evidence excluded”). 

Indeed, such action may have been improper to the extent it was founded upon the Brady

ruling. See e.g. Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 381 (Alaska 1996) (“A judge should 

 

10 That is not to suggest that counsel should have done so, merely that the trial court did 

not preclude it.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 42 of 55
43

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not intervene if the evidence is reliable and valuable and is only inadmissible due to 

technical exclusionary rules or a privilege protection.”) (citing 1 John W. Strong, 

McCormick on Evidence § 55, at 224 (4th ed. 1992)).

Suggestiveness Not Shown – To the extent that Petitioner’s theory is founded 

upon the argument that the photo lineup was unduly suggestive, Petitioner fails to 

support his thesis. 

Petitioner points to a number of factors in support of his argument, e.g. questions 

about the certainty of the witness’s identification based on prior mismatched descriptions 

and disclaimers of ability to identify the visitor and the assumption that the visitor was 

the perpetrator. Each of these things indicate that the victim’s identification may have 

been unreliable. But due process does not prevent the introduction of lineup 

identifications just because they may be unreliable. Such issues are adequately dealt 

with by cross-examination. Rather, due process is only concerned with the unduly 

suggestive lineup. See U.S. v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussed 

supra). 

In Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.s 3777 (1968), the Court identified some of types of 

suggestive procedures which increase the likelihood of a misidentification and thus give 

rise to due process concerns:

This danger will be increased if the police display to the witness 

only the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the 

person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons 

among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is 

in some way emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also 

heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they have other 

evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the crime.

390 U.S.at 383. Petitioner points to no such defects in this case. 

Thus, even had the trial court had a duty to sua sponte act when the witness 

obliquely referred to the photo lineup, Petitioner has not show that the trial court could 

have concluded that the testimony would have resulted in a due process violation as 

unduly suggestive.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 43 of 55
44

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Brady Violation Not Shown - Moreover, as discussed supra, Petitioner has failed 

to show that the delayed disclosure resulted in a Brady violation because Petitioner 

cannot show that the photo lineup information was favorable or that it had been 

suppressed to a point that it hindered the defense. Thus, the trial court could not have 

found constitutional error in the admission on that basis.

Rules Violation Not Cognizable – The only basis under which the admission of 

the testimony was erroneous was the extent to which it flowed from a violation of the 

Arizona disclosure rules or the order of the trial court. Neither of those bases are 

cognizable on federal habeas review. A state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or 

treaties of the United States. Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in 

the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).

Conclusion – Petitioner fails to show that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte

strike the victim’s oblique reference to the photo lineup, or to declare a mistrial based 

upon the reference, amounted to a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Ground Three 

must be denied as without merit.

H. MERITS OF GROUND FOUR: MIRANDA VIOLATION

For Ground Four of his Petition, Petitioner argues that his right to remain silent 

was violated when the trial court permitted testimony about Petitioner’s provision of a 

false name to the arresting officer and his silence. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Factual Background - Prior to trial Petitioner argued:

When Mr. Grant was arrested, he refused to give his name and 

invoked his right to not incriminate himself. At one point the

Officer alleges he gave an alternative name. Mr. Grant is not 

charge[d] with providing false information to an Officer, a crime, so 

any reference to this would be incredibly prejudicial and unfair. 

After being read his Miranda rights, Mr. Grant further refused to

provide information to Officers and any comment from the State or 

any of the witnesses regarding Mr. Grant's refusal to provide any 

information goes directly against his constitutional rights.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 44 of 55
45

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Exhibit E, Mot.in Lim. at 2.) At the hearing on the motion, the defense avowed to the 

Court that Petitioner had provided a false name and declined to provide his true name 

because he believed he had an arrest warrant outstanding, and so believed his name 

would serve to incriminate him.

The trial court ruled that the prosecution could not introduce evidence on the 

refusal to provide a name, provision of a false name, or invocation of the right to remain 

silent. (Exhibit K, R.T. 7/11/7 at 17-18.) In discussing the provision of a false name, the 

trial court did not rely upon any Fifth Amendment grounds, but on a hearsay exclusion. 

The court originally concluded that the evidence was admissible under Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 803(3) permitting testimony of the declarant’s “then-existing state of mind”. 

The court alternated on whether it would permit the false name evidence:

THE COURT: I think it goes to existing mental state. I'm 

going to allow it in. I'm going to amend my previous order that the 

State is allowed to ask the police officer what happened when they 

asked Mr. Grant to identify himself.

I will allow that in. I think it is exception under 8033. I think 

it goes to existing mental state. 

(Exhibit K, R.T. 7/11/7 at 7.) Eventually, however, the defense represented that the false 

name was provided because of fear of prosecution on an outstanding warrant. The trial 

court then again reversed its ruling.

THE COURT: He thought he had an outstanding warrant 

against him?

MS. DE LA TORRE: He did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think that changes my ruling. I think.

MS. CORASINITI: I think, Your Honor, the State can agree 

not to have any speculation why did he give a false name.

THE COURT: Not even going to bring up the fact he gave a 

name. He can talk about the police. Can talk about his behavior, his 

demeanor. They cannot go into the fact that he gave a false name. A 

different name to the police.

Not going to allow it based on the avowal that counsel has 

just stated on the record.

If he was concerned that there was an outstanding warrant 

and that might compromise his status on that outstanding warrant, 

that's reasonable to preclude it.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 7/11/7 at 17.) 

At trial, on direct examination by the prosecution, the arresting officer testified, in 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 45 of 55
46

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pertinent part, as follows:

Q Now, during this incident, do you recall what the 

defendant's demeanor was?

A It wasn't he happy. He was very beligerant [sic] at times. 

For the first 20 minutes in the back the car, he wouldn't say 

anything, wouldn't tell me his name.

Q How about -- one moment, Your Honor, please. When 

you first met up with, you said he was unhappy?

A After I put him in handcuffs and told him he was driving 

a stolen car, and put him in the back of the police car, he became 

very beligerant [sic] and yelling. And I asked his name several 

times, he wouldn't look at me or answer my questions.

(Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 70.) Thus, the officer plainly testified about Petitioner’s 

silence, in addition to testifying about Petitioner’s demeanor.

At closing, however, the prosecution limited itself in its chief argument to 

asserting Petitioner’s statements (other than giving a false name). (SeeExhibit O, R.T. 

7/19/7 at 32-33.) The prosecution limited itself on rebuttal to Petitioner’s demeanor:

There is some testimony also in defense counsel's closing 

that Mr. Grant he did comply, he didn't run from the police, he got 

on the ground even though the pavement was hot, but you also 

heard Officer Strong testify that Mr. Grant was quite belligerent. 

His demeanor was very uncooperative. He had attitude toward the 

officer and he swore at them several times.

And you were just told that Officer Strong didn't do any 

further investigation, it was case closed, done, defendant is guilty. 

Well, keep in mind it's very difficult to conduct an investigation 

when the person you're trying to speak to is very rude towards you, 

is uncooperative toward you, is belligerent and just swears [at] you. 

It's hard to get anywhere when that happens. It doesn't mean that 

investigation was not conducted.

(Exhibit O, R.T. 7/19/7 at 43.) 

Parties’ Arguments - Respondents argue: “During trial, the State...did not once

comment on Petitioner’s invocation of his right to remain silent or mention the fact that 

Petitioner gave a false name.” (Supp. Answer, Doc. 26 at 7.) Respondents argue that 

Petitioner’s belligerent and uncooperative demeanor was properly testified to, and 

argued to the jury. Further, Respondents argue that in any event no constitutional 

violation occurred because Petitioner did not effectively invoke his right to remain silent, 

and was, in fact, not silent. Finally, Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to show 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 46 of 55
47

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that any error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. (Supp. Answer, Doc. 

26.)

Petitioner replies that the state courts failed to rule on the merits of his Miranda

claim, and the prosecution had been precluded from presenting evidence that Petitioner 

provided an “alternative name to police when they first initiated contact with him.” 

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 28 at 22-23.) Petitioner argues that prejudice resulted from all the 

various errors in the trial. (Id. et seq.)

State Court Ruling – The trial court ruled that the prosecution could not 

introduce evidence on the refusal to provide a name, provision of a false name, or 

invocation of the right to remain silent. (Exhibit K, R.T. 7/11/7 at 17-18.) 

However, as discussed hereinabove, the parties have pointed to no subsequent 

state court decision addressing the merits of this claim, despite the alternative ruling by 

the Arizona Court of Appeals that the claim had been raised. 

Application of Law – Although Petitioner engages in far ranging attacks on the 

admissibility of various testimony arising out of the events at his arrest, his claim in 

Ground Four is based upon the purported violation of his right to remain silent with 

regards to his refusal to provide a name and provision of a false name. 

“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person... shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ This right to remain silent carries an 

‘implicit...assurance’ that silence will carry no penalty... Moreover, the government may 

not burden that right by commenting on the defendant's post-arrest silence at trial.” U.S. 

v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001). “Miranda gives the 

defendant a right to choose between speech and silence.” Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 

U.S. 523, 529 (1987). When a defendant choses to remain silent, that silence may not be 

used against him. 

Lies Are Not Silence – Petitioner makes repeated references to improper use of 

his having given a false name. The Ninth Circuit has rejected attempts to equate 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 47 of 55
48

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

falsehoods as silence. In Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004), the defendant 

asserted Fifth Amendment challenges to the admission of his pre-trial statements to 

investigators in which he attempted to explain away various evidence against him. He 

argued the statements were tantamount to silence. The court concluded that the 

defendant was “confusing true silence with lies” and that “talking is not silence.” Id. at 

827.

Here, Petitioner is similarly confusing lies with silence. In providing a false 

name, he was not silent. Thus, even had the prosecution inserted testimony or argument 

about provision of a false name, this Court could not conclude that it resulted in a Fifth 

Amendment violation.11

More importantly, Petitioner fails to show any reference at trial to his having 

given a false name. The undersigned has not been able to find any.

Demeanor Is Not Silence; Silence is not Demeanor – To the extent that Petitioner 

intends to complain that the prosecution improperly introduced evidence about his 

demeanor or physical actions, his claim is without merit. “The Supreme Court has 

distinguished ‘physical’ and ‘demeanor’ evidence from ‘testimonial’ evidence, holding 

that evidence of the former does not engender Fifth Amendment protection.” U.S. v. 

Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 

496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990)). 

Here, the prosecution introduced testimony of the arresting officer that Petitioner 

was “very beligerant [sic] and yelling.” (Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 70.) Such testimony 

is not affected by the Fifth Amendment.

On the other hand, where the demeanor evidence is simply a failure to react, then 

it is tantamount to silence and may not be used. Id. at 1031. “Whether the government 

argues that a defendant remained silent or describes the defendant's state of silence, the 

 

11 Perhaps the introduction of such evidence would have, as determined by the 

trial court, amounted to impermissible hearsay. But Petitioner does not raise such a 

claim.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 48 of 55
49

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

practical effect is the same—the defendant's right to remain silent is used against him at 

trial.” Id. at 1032. 

Here the arresting officer also testified that Petitioner “wouldn't say anything, 

wouldn't tell me his name...he wouldn't look at me or answer my questions.” (Exhibit 

M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 70.) This was plainly not demeanor testimony, but the use of 

Petitioner’s silence.

Petitioner Not Wholly Silent – Respondents argue that Petitioner was not entitled 

to the protections of the Fifth Amendment because he did not remain silent, but 

continued to communicate with the officer on various issues. However, “[a] defendant 

may selectively waive his Miranda rights by agreeing to answer some questions but not 

others.” U.S. v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds in 

U.S. v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001)).12 

Invocation of Right – Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to Fifth 

Amendment protection because he did not expressly invoke his right to remain silent. 

There is no testimony of record (as opposed to argument) reflecting such an invocation. 

There was, however, at least a presumption by the trial court that Petitioner did, at some 

point during his arrest, invoke his right to remain silent. 

THE COURT: ....And I’m not going to allow the officer to 

testify regarding what information was relayed to him or, again, that 

he invoked his right to remain silent.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 7/11/7 at 17-18.) It is, however, unclear when that invocation occurred, 

or whether it was express or just Petitioner’s failure to answer.

 

12 Of course, where Petitioner did respond, the admissibility of those statements 

depended upon their timing, i.e. were they pre-Miranda or post-Miranda, and were they 

pre-invocation or post-invocation. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) 

(“Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on warning a 

suspect of his rights: failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights 

before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained”). 

Petitioner offers nothing to show that any of his statements were pre-Miranda or postinvocation. (The record reflects that Petitioner was placed under arrest prior to any of 

his statements to police. (See Exhibit M, R.T. 7/12/7 at 68-70.) Accordingly, none of 

his statements were pre-custodial.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 49 of 55
50

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013), the Court13 recently held that to 

be entitled to rely upon his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent to exclude 

prosecutorial use of silence, a defendant must have expressly invoked that right, and 

cannot simply remain silent. “A suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put 

police on notice that he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Salinas v. Texas, 

133 S.Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013).14

However, Salinas dealt with the propriety of police continuing questioning after 

what the defendant argued was a tacit invocation of his right to remain silent in a precustody, pre-Miranda setting. At least one state court has concluded post-Salinas that in 

situations involving “post-arrest, post-Miranda silence,” (rather than the pre-arrest, preMiranda silence in Salinas) an explicit invocation is still not required. Coleman v. State, 

434 Md. 320, 334, 75 A.3d 916, 924 (2013). 

The courts have long found different standards apply based upon whether the 

silence was pre- or post-arrest, and pre- or post-Miranda warnings (and whether it is 

offered as evidence of guilt or for impeachment). See e.g. U.S. v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 

F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the Salinas decision recognized that no invocation is 

required post-arrest, pre-Miranda. “[I]n Miranda, we said that a suspect who is subjected 

to the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an unwarned custodial interrogation need not 

invoke the privilege.” Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2180.

It is true that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used against a defendant for 

 

13 Salinas was a plurality decision, with only three justices (Alito, Roberts and 

Kennedy) joining in the opinion. Justices Thomas and Scalia joined in the judgment, 

believing that the Fifth Amendment never precludes comments on silence. Four justices 

(Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) joined in a dissent, arguing that the 

defendant’s silence was a plain, albeit implicit, invocation of the right to remain silent, 

and thus the prosecution could not comment on his silence.

14 Respondents also point to Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) for the 

proposition that silence is not sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent. However, 

Berghuis did not deal with prosecutorial use of silence, but upon the obligation of police 

to cease questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (“If the 

individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he 

wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”) Here, the argument by Petitioner 

is that the prosecution improperly used his silence, not that questioning did not cease 

when required under Miranda. 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 50 of 55
51

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

impeachment purposes. “In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in 

the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to

permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the 

stand.” Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982). See also Brecht v. Abramson, 507 

U.S. 619, 628 (1993). But here, Petitioner did not testify. And, the prosecution may not 

use a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence against him in its case-in-chief. U.S. 

v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, neither Petitioner’s post-Miranda silence nor his pre-Miranda

silence could be used against him without violating Petitioner’s right to remain silent. 

The testimony by the arresting officer about Petitioner’s refusal to respond and provide 

his name was just such a violation.

No Prejudice - A violation of the right to remain silent is not a get-out-of-jail-free 

card. Rather, a defendant has a burden of showing that the error “affected the outcome 

of the [trial] court proceedings.” Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 639 (quoting U.S. v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). “When deciding whether a prosecutor's reference to a defendant's 

post-arrest silence was prejudicial, this court will consider the extent of comments made 

by the witness, whether an inference of guilt from silence was stressed to the jury, and 

the extent of other evidence suggesting defendant's guilt.” Guam v. Veloria, 136 F.3d 

648, 652 (9th Cir.1998).

Here, the comments by the arresting officer were not extensive, and were part of a 

larger, permissible narrative that Petitioner’s demeanor was that of a belligerent, cursing, 

yelling, and uncooperative person. Cf. Veloria, 136 F.3d at 652 (prejudice found where 

testimony on silence was only reason to call witness). 

And, while the prosecution certainly echoed the belligerence and 

uncooperativeness of Petitioner, no explicit reference was made to Petitioner’s silence. 

Rather, the tenor of the prosecutions’ argument at closing was to counter the assertion 

made by defense counsel in his closing argument that Petitioner had been cooperative 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 51 of 55
52

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with the police. 

Perhaps most importantly, here there was strong and convincing evidence of 

Petitioner’s guilt, including the victim’s identification of Petitioner and narrative of 

Petitioner’s presence shortly before the car and keys were discovered missing, and 

Petitioner’s possession of the car and keys at the time of arrest. On the other hand, the 

only significant exculpatory evidence was the purported disparities between the victim’s 

statements to police and his in-court identification, and the vagueness of his original 

description of Petitioner. Under these circumstances, the undersigned cannot conclude 

that the limited references to Petitioner’s silence affected the outcome of the trial 

proceedings.

Accordingly, Ground Four is without merit and must be denied.

I. SUMMARY

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust, and now has procedurally defaulted, his state 

remedies on: (1) the portion of Ground One based upon a failure to disclose the victim’s 

prior description; and (2) the portion of Ground Two based upon the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in failing to request a Donald hearing at the settlement 

conference. These claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

The remainder of the Petition is without merit, and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 52 of 55
53

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner=s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(ACOA”) is whether the applicant has Amade a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.”28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). AWhere a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court=s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under 

the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not 

“find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 53 of 55
54

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed December 7, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE as to : (1) the portion of Ground One based upon a failure to disclose the 

victim’s prior description; and (2) the portion of Ground Two based upon the ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in failing to request a Donald hearing at the settlement 

conference.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed December 7, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 54 of 55
55

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 9, 2013

12-2606r RR 13 07 23 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:12-cv-02606-PGR Document 31 Filed 12/09/13 Page 55 of 55