Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01367/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01367-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lucinda Tomchee, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles Ryan,

Respondent.

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CIV 09-1367-PHX-NVW (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Lucinda Tomchee, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexPerryville, in Goodyear, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus through counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. #1.) Respondent filed an Answer on September 9,

2009. (Doc. #10.) Despite having an opportunity to do so, Petitioner did not file a reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 28, 2003, at approximately 1:16 a.m., Phoenix Police Officers Keith

Young and Josh Adams were investigating a burglary near the intersection of Chandler

Boulevard and the I-10 overpass. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at 37.) They had parked their patrol cars,

on the side of the road, with their lights on. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at 37.) Officer Adams was in

the driver’s seat of his car, seeking information on his computer; Officer Young was standing

in the doorway of Adams’ vehicle, which had the driver’s door open. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at

37.)

Petitioner was driving her vehicle eastbound on Chandler Boulevard. (Doc. #1, App.

7 at 37.) Earlier that evening, she had been at Serrano’s Restaurant with Elmer Roanhorse,

and had been drinking margaritas and tequila. (Doc. #1, App. 6 at 77-78, 82-84, 90.) The

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bartender allegedly told Petitioner and Mr. Roanhorse that he believed Petitioner had too

much to drink, and Mr. Roanhorse assured the bartender that he would be driving. (Doc. #1,

App. 6 at 90-92.) Petitioner and Mr. Roanhorse left the bar at approximately 9:30 or 10:00

p.m.; Petitioner and Mr. Roanhorse were together in Petitioner’s vehicle until approximately

11:15 or 11:30 p.m., when Mr. Roanhorse left the vehicle to walk home. (Doc. #1, App. 6

at 81-83, 90-91.)

Petitioner drove her vehicle into the back of Officer Adams’ police car, sideswiped

it, striking Officer Young and endangering Officer Adams. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at 37.) Officer

Young sustained severe injuries to his head, back, and legs. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at 37-38.)

Petitioner continued driving. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at 38.) Officer Adams could not start

his vehicle, so he entered Officer Young’s vehicle and pursued Petitioner. (Doc. #10, Exh.

A at 1.) After subsequently detaining Petitioner, officers attempted to administer field

sobriety tests, but Petitioner was deemed too intoxicated to continue. (Doc. #10, Exh. A at

1.)

When interviewed by the police, Petitioner claimed that she had only one margarita.

(Doc. #10, Exh. A at 1.) She initially admitted striking a vehicle, but later claimed that she

did not remember a collision. (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 1.) Also, she could not explain why she

did not stop after the collision. (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 1.)

The police found various items in Petitioner’s vehicle, including: (1) a marijuana

cigarette; (2) bindles commonly used for carrying cocaine; (3) a brown vial; (4) two bags

containing marijuana or marijuana residue; (5) a metal spoon that could be used for taking

narcotics; (6) an Advil bottle containing marijuana; (7) a “Trails” lighter; (8) a glass pipe of

a type commonly used for smoking marijuana; (9) “rolling papers”; (10) two straws; and (11)

a bag containing a white powdery substance that was later determined to be cocaine. (Doc.

#1, App. 6 at 70-74; Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.)

Three vials of blood were taken from Petitioner; a forensic analysis of contents

revealed BAC levels of .192, .174, and .157. (Doc. #1, App. 6 at 6.) Lab tests also reported

that byproducts of marijuana and cocaine were in her system. (Doc. #1, App. 6 at 43-44.)

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Officer Young was transported to a medical center and placed in a medically-induced

coma. (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.) He sustained fractures to his face, skull, spine, ribs, and

fibula. (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.) Officer Young also suffered paralysis in the lower

extremities and an eye injury of undetermined severity. (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.)

The State charged Petitioner with: one count of aggravated assault; three counts of

endangerment; one count of leaving the scene of a serious injury accident; one count of

possession or use of narcotic drugs; one count of possession or use of marijuana; and one

count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (Doc. #1, App. 4.) Petitioner entered into a plea

agreement, in which she plead guilty to one count of aggravated assault, one count of

endangerment, and one count of leaving the scene of a serious injury accident. (Doc. #10,

Exh. B.) The state court accepted the guilty pleas. (Doc. #10, Exhs. C, D.)

Prior to her sentencing, Petitioner told the pre-sentence report writer that she only had

“a margarita and a shot of tequila.” (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.) She claimed not to recall her

actions after leaving the bar, and added that she “believes she might have been drugged

sometime prior to the collision.” (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.)

Sentencing took place on June 11, 2004. On Count One, aggravated assault,

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated sentence of 15 years. (Doc. #10, Exh. D. at 3.)

On Count Two, endangerment, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of three years,

to run concurrently with the sentence of Count One. (Doc. #10, Exh. D. at 3.) On Count

Three, leaving the scene of a serious injury accident, the state court suspended the imposition

of sentence and placed Petitioner on probation for five years, beginning with her release from

prison. (Doc. #10, Exh. D. at 3.)

On August 27, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. #10,

Exh. E.) Counsel was appointed, and on April 17, 2006, filed a petition for post-conviction

relief, raising five issues: (1) that the sentencing was contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) that the State failed

to provide adequate notice of its intent to seek an aggravated sentence; (3) that she was

denied her right to the effective assistance of counsel; (4) that newly discovered evidence

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would have altered her decision to enter into the plea agreement; and (5) that the factual basis

was insufficient to support her guilty plea to aggravated assault and the “dangerousness”

sentence enhancement factor. (Doc. #10, Exh. F.) Attached to her post-conviction relief

pleadings, was the deposition of Liliano Castro in support of Petitioner’s newly discovered

evidence claim. (Doc. #10, Exhs. F, G, L.) Petitioner argued, “[t]he deposition was taken

on October 29, 2004 and its transcript was sent to the defense on May 18, 2005. It contains

testimony that ... lends credibility to Petitioner’s impression that she was surreptitiously

dosed with intoxicants.” (Doc. #10, Exh. F at 11.) The State filed a subsequent motion to

strike the Castro deposition claiming that “the deposition was never attached to [Petitioner’s]

original [p]etition ... [and] violates not only Rule 32, but also settled precedent designed to

promote fairness in litigation.” (Doc. #10, Exh. L.)

On January 29, 2007, the state court issued a minute entry granting the State’s motion

to strike the Castro deposition, finding that Petitioner had failed to state a colorable claim for

post-conviction relief, and summarily dismissing the petition. (Doc. #10, Exh. G.) Petitioner

then filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals raising the same five issues

presented in her petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. #10, Exh. H.) The appellate court

denied review on February 5, 2008. (Doc. #1, App. 12.) The court then granted Petitioner’s

motion to reinstate the petition, and again denied the petition for review on August 5, 2008.

(Doc. #1, App. 12.)

On July 2, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition alleging five grounds for

relief. In Ground One, she alleges a violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

rights pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington. (Doc. #1 at 6-9.) In

Ground Two, she asserts a violation of her federal due process rights based on the State’s

failure to properly notice the intent to seek an aggravated sentence. (Doc. #1 at 9-10.) In

Ground Three, Petitioner alleges she was denied the effective assistance of counsel in

connection with her guilty plea in violation of her Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. (Doc. #1 at 10-12.) In Ground Four, she alleges that her plea should be set aside

based on newly discovered evidence. (Doc. #1 at 13-16.) In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges

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that the factual basis for the plea was insufficient to support her guilty plea. (Doc. #1 at 16-

19.)

Respondent filed an Answer on September 9, 2009 (Doc. #10). Petitioner has not

filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

In his Answer, Respondent contends that all five of Petitioner’s claims either fail on

the merits or are not cognizable on federal habeas review. As such, Respondent requests that

the Court deny and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice.

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court decision was (1) contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion

of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review). “When applying these standards, the

federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson v.

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

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A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the state court violated her Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by imposing an aggravated sentence on Count One without having a jury

determine the aggravating factors.

The record demonstrates that the state court imposed an aggravated sentence, 15

years, on Count One, a dangerous offense. (Doc. #10, Exh. D at 2-3.) It found numerous

aggravating factors with regard to Count One, including: Petitioner’s 1993 misdemeanor

DUI conviction in New Mexico; her being severely impaired by alcohol; her minimizing her

responsibility; her endangering others besides Officer Young; her possessing cocaine and

marijuana at the time of the offense; her having metabolites of cocaine and marijuana in her

system; her possessing drug paraphernalia; the extreme emotional trauma to the Young

family; and the “horrific” physical and emotional trauma suffered by Officer Young. (Doc.

#1, App. 6 at 136-38.)

Here, the Court finds that Apprendi/Blakely was not violated since one of the

aggravating factors found by the state court was a prior conviction, which is exempt from

Blakely. After one Blakely-exempt or Blakely-compliant factor has been established, an

Arizona judge can impose any sentence within the statutory sentencing range. See State v.

Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 624 (Ariz. 2005); State v. Burdick, 125 P.3d 1039, 1042 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2005). The fact that Petitioner’s had a prior misdemeanor conviction does not affect

the analysis; prior misdemeanor convictions are Blakely-exempt. See State v. Molina, 118

P.3d 1094, 1097-99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Aleman, 109 P.3d 571, 580 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2005).

Accordingly, the state court’s consideration of the aggravating factors and imposition

of an aggravating sentence did not violate Apprendi/Blakely and was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly-established federal law. The Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground One be denied.

///

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B. Ground Two

In her second ground for relief, Petitioner asserts a violation of her federal due process

rights based on the State’s failure to properly notice its intent to seek an aggravated sentence.

Petitioner appears to argue, citing to Apprendi and State v. Nichols, 33 P.3d 1172 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2001), that sentencing enhancements should be charged in the indictment or noticed no

later than 20 days before trial pursuant to Rule 16.1(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

The Court finds Petitioner’s reliance on Ariz.R.Crim.P. 16.1(b), which provides that

“[a]ll motions shall be made no later than 20 days prior to trial” misplaced. Rule 16.1(b)

applies to pre-trial motions, and Petitioner cites no authority supporting any possible

contention that it also applies to the State’s notice of alleged aggravating factors.

Additionally, although Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15.1(i)(2), imposes a notice requirement for

aggravating factors in capital cases, the criminal rules contain no such requirement for

noncapital cases. Furthermore, in State v. Nichols, the court reiterated that sentencing

enhancements need not be alleged in the charging document and stated that notice need only

comport with “Arizona’s traditional notice requirements for alleging sentence

enhancements.” 33 P.3d at 1176.

In any event, the Court finds that Petitioner had more than adequate notice of the

possibility of an aggravated sentence and of the aggravating circumstances. For instance, on

Count One, the parties bargained for a possible sentencing range of 7 to 15 years, when the

presumptive sentence is 10.5 years. (Doc. #10, Exh. B.) The state court informed Petitioner

of the range of sentences before she pled guilty. (Doc. #10, Exh. C.) The pre-sentence report

recommended greater than presumptive sentences (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 5), and the State’s

sentencing memorandum listed eight possible aggravating circumstances (Doc. #10, Exh. I

at 5-10). Petitioner’s sentencing memorandum acknowledged that the State’s sentencing

memoranda had listed eight aggravating circumstances, and disputed them. (Doc. #1, Apps.

6, 8.) Accordingly, the notice Petitioner received satisfied due process. See State v. Jenkins,

970 P.2d 947, 953 (Ariz. Ct. App.1998) (in second-degree murder case, notice of aggravating

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factors in state’s presentencing memorandum satisfied due process); State v. Marquez, 617

P.2d 787, 789 (Ariz. Ct. App.1980) (no error when trial court sua sponte found aggravating

circumstances from record even though “prosecutor had neither alleged nor attempted to

separately prove” them); State v. Ford, 606 P.2d 826, 827 (Ariz. Ct. App.1979) (presentence

report provided adequate notice of aggravating circumstances).

The state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted

in Ground Two be denied.

C. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges she was denied effective assistance of counsel in

connection with her guilty plea in violation of her Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Petitioner contends that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective in five

respects.

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

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some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14.

“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The two-prong test set forth in Strickland also applies to challenges to guilty pleas

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A

defendant who pleads guilty based on the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel

fell below the level of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See id. at 56.

To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, “the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

In reviewing a state court’s resolution of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

the Court considers whether the state court applied Strickland unreasonably:

For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], ...

he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’stest if his

claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1),

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it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he

must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause,

a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather,

it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts

of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted).

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the state court did not unreasonably

apply Strickland. The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground

Three be denied.

1. Adequate explanation of defense

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for not adequately advocating her

position that she was given a date rape drug.

The Court finds neither deficient performance nor prejudice. First, counsel’s

sentencing memorandum did assert that something precluded Petitioner from recalling what

happened after she left Serrano’s. (Doc. #1, App. 8 at 4-5, 8.) The pre-sentence report

further stated that Petitioner “believes she might have been drugged sometime prior to the

collision.” (Doc. #10, Exh. A at 2.) Counsel also argued at sentencing that Mr. Roanhorse

had given Petitioner something so that he could have sex with her. (Doc. #1, App. 6 at 105-

07.) Counsel further requested that National Medical Services screen the blood sample for

the presence of “date rape drugs.” (Doc. #1, App. 10 at 180.) Counsel, however, presented

no evidence, and Petitioner still has presented no evidence that Petitioner was actually

administered a date rape drug prior to the incident in question.

Second, any further attempt by defense counsel to blame Petitioner’s three crimes on

unproven involuntarily intoxication could have backfired by further alienating the trial judge,

who found Petitioner’s failure to accept responsibility as an aggravating circumstance. (Doc.

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#1, App. 6 at 137.) Three samples of Petitioner’s blood were analyzed, returning BAC

results from .157 to .192. (Doc. #10, Exh. I.) Thus, whether or not she was given any sort

of date rape drug, she was still seriously intoxicated by alcohol. Moreover, two different lab

tests (one by DPS and one by National Medical Services) showed the presence of metabolites

of cocaine and marijuana in Petitioner’s blood. (Doc. #1, App. 10; Doc. #10, Exh. I.) That

fact, coupled with police finding cocaine and marijuana in Petitioner’s car, along with

numerous items of drug paraphernalia – the judge would have questioned counsel

aggressively pursing an unproven defense that Petitioner’s crimes resulted from the

involuntary administration of a date rape drug.

2. Timely assertion of Blakely/Apprendi claim in Rule 24.3 motion

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for not timely filing the Rule 24.3 motion

raising the Blakely/Apprendi issue. Petitioner is correct – that defense counsel filed an

untimely motion to correct the sentence, and that said motion was denied as untimely. (Doc.

#10, Exh. J; Doc. #1, App. 9.) Although such conduct can constitute deficient performance,

there was no prejudice.

An attorney’s failure to make a meritless objection or motion does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)). “To show prejudice under

Strickland from failure to file a motion, a defendant must show that (1) had his counsel filed

the motion, it is reasonable that the state court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2)

had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more

favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-75 (1986) (so stating with respect to failure to file a motion

to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds). The motion requested a correction of the

sentence due to an alleged Blakely error. (Doc. #10, Exh. J.) As discussed in connection

with Ground One, there was no such error. Since the motion, even if timely, would have

been denied, there was no prejudice to Petitioner.

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3. Failure to obtain a more favorable blood test

Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance because counsel did not get “a true re-analysis

of Petitioner’s blood completed, in order to detect the level of alcohol and the possible

presence of metabolites of possible date rape drugs.”

The State submitted a report showing that Petitioner’s BAC levels after the accident

went from .192 to .174 to .157. (Doc. #10, Exh. I.) Petitioner agreed with the statement in

the factual basis that she had a BAC of .192 at approximately 5:00 a.m. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at

38.) The State submitted to the court two reports, one from the DPS lab and one from

National Medical Services, regarding the presence of metabolites of cocaine and marijuana

in her blood. (Doc. #10, Exh. I.) Petitioner does not dispute the test results, but merely

complains that there was no “independent” defense test.

First, it was not deficient performance not to request a re-test of the blood samples

because, in view of the other overwhelming evidence of alcohol intoxication and drug use,

such re-testing would have been of limited value. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d

926, 948 (9th Cir. 2001). Second, she has not established prejudice, because neither she nor

the expert who submitted an affidavit on her behalf showed what more testing would have

revealed, or how it would have made any difference to her case.

4. Lack of advice re Apprendi

Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective in not advising her that the State has to

prove aggravating circumstances to a jury. Counsel’s performance was not deficient because

there was no Blakely/Apprendi defect at sentencing, for the reasons previously discussed.

Thus, it would have been futile for counsel to advise Petitioner about any need for jury

findings on the aggravating circumstances. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.

1996) (“the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance”). In addition,

there is no prejudice because the Blakely/Apprendi claim is meritless. Moreover, even if

Petitioner had a valid Blakely/Apprendi claim, she does not show that she would not have

pled guilty if counsel had advised her about the jury finding aggravating circumstances. See

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985).

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5. Lack of language in plea agreement regarding Apprendi

Lastly, Petitioner argues ineffective assistance because the plea agreement lacked

language that might have indicated that she had constitutional rights regarding sentencing

under Blakely/Apprendi. Again, counsel’s performance was not deficient because there was

no Blakely/Apprendi issue with the sentencing, and there is no prejudice because the

Blakely/Apprendi claim is meritless. Accordingly, it would have been futile to include

further language in the plea agreement. See Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445.

D. Ground Four

Petitioner’s fourth ground for relief alleges that her plea should be set aside based on

newly discovered evidence. The newly discovered evidence to which Petitioner refers

appears to be a portion of the deposition of Liliano Castro.

Petitioner argues, “[t]he deposition was taken on October 29, 2004 and its transcript

was sent to the defense on May 18, 2005. It contains testimony that ... lends credibility to

Petitioner’s impression that she was surreptitiously dosed with intoxicants.” The “testimony”

to which Petitioner refers constitutes, in its entirety, the following question from the

examining attorney: “We had a report here from some people that went into the bar and their

job is to watch and make sure everybody is doing their job right. And they indicated in their

report, and this is like two days after the 27th of August 2003, that Taylor [Massey] poured

extreme amounts of alcohol in the drinks. Did you ever see anything like that?”

As set forth previously, Petitioner attached the Castro deposition to her postconviction relief pleadings to support her newly discovered evidence claim. The State filed

a motion to strike claiming that “the deposition was never attached to [Petitioner’s] original

[p]etition ... [and] violates not only Rule 32, but also settled precedent designed to promote

fairness in litigation.” On January 1, 2007, the state court issued a minute entry granting the

State’s motion and striking the Castro deposition.

First, the Court notes that Petitioner appears to argue a violation of state law in that

she is objecting to the state court’s ruling on her newly discovered evidence and claiming that

the state court erred by not granting her a new trial or an evidentiary hearing based upon the

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alleged new evidence. Federal habeas relief is not available to redress errors in state postconviction proceedings. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]

petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable through

habeas corpus proceedings.”); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998)

(“[F]ederal habeas relief is not available to redress alleged procedural errors in state postconviction proceedings”); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (errors

committed during state post-conviction proceedings are not cognizable in a federal habeas

action); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (claim that petitioner

“was denied due process in his state habeas corpus proceedings” was not cognizable on

federal habeas review). This is because a habeas petitioner must allege that his or her

detention violates the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty. See Franzen,

877 F.2d at 26; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). An attack on the petitioner’s state post-conviction

proceedings “is an attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention

itself.” Nicholas v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1275 (5th Cir. 1995). “Errors or defects in the state

post-conviction proceeding do not ... render a prisoner’s detention unlawful or raise

constitutional questions cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings.” Williams v. Missouri,

640 F.2d 140, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1981).

To the extent that Petitioner’s claim can be construed as one presenting a freestanding

claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence to this Court, the claim may

also be denied. The Supreme Court has never recognized a freestanding claim of actual

innocence based on newly discovered evidence. “Claims of actual innocence based on newly

discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent

an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state proceeding.”

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (“[T]he existence merely of newly discovered

evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas

corpus.”). The Ninth Circuit recognizes an exception where a defendant produces

“affirmative proof of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.” Turner v.

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the Ninth Circuit also requires that

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a habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding claim of actual innocence make a “stronger

showing than insufficiency of the evidence to convict” showing adopted by the Supreme

Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d

463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). The required showing must go “beyond demonstrating doubt about

[the petitioner’s] guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.” Id.

(citation omitted). Post conviction evidence serving only to “undercut the evidence presented

at trial” does not suffice to meet this standard. Id. at 477; see also Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d

971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (habeas relief unavailable where “the totality of the new evidence

does not undermine the structure of the prosecution’s case”); Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373,

1384-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (newly-discovered evidence warrants habeas relief only when it bears

on the constitutionality of the conviction and probably would produce an acquittal) (citations

omitted).

Petitioner’s free standing claim of actual innocence on the basis of newly discovered

evidence without any constitutional error at trial does not establish grounds for federal

habeas relief. Further, there is no clearly established federal right to new trial or evidentiary

hearing on the basis of newly discovered evidence.

Even if she was not so precluded, Petitioner does not provide sufficient support for

her newly discovered evidence claim to warrant habeas relief. Initially, the Court notes that

Petitioner mischaracterizes the Castro deposition. When asked if she had ever heard a report

or was aware that Mr. Massey poured extreme amounts of alcohol in the drinks he made, Ms.

Castro answered, “No.” (Doc. #1, App. 2 at 52.) Ms. Castro also stated that the bartender

did not even mix margaritas because they were pre-made, and that, to her knowledge, he used

a “measurer” provided by the bar to measure the amount of tequila poured into drinks. (Doc.

#1, App. 2 at 49-51.)

Even assuming that Mr. Massey poured strong drinks for Petitioner, she nevertheless

made the decision to drive, knowing that she was under the influence of alcohol. Her own

investigator reported that Mr. Roanhorse stated that he “had tried to take the car keys from

her, but that she would not allow him to get them and she drove off.” (Doc. #10, Exh. K at

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3.) The bartender was concerned that Petitioner had too much to drink, and obtained

confirmation from Mr. Roanhorse that he would be driving. (Doc. #1, App. 6 at 90-92.)

As part of her involuntary intoxication claim, Petitioner attempts to justify her actions

by renewing the claim that Mr. Roanhorse sexually assaulted her in the subject vehicle.

Petitioner submits her own statements contending that Mr. Roanhorse is a mere

“acquaintance” and that she had an appointment with a different man on August 28, 2003.

The record demonstrates, however, that Plaintiff’s claim of sexual assault is not a new

allegation; defense counsel argued at sentencing that Petitioner failed to stop after the

accident because of a “post-rape” mental state. (Doc. #1, App. 6 at 105-07.) Also,

Petitioner’s sentencing memorandum claimed that she was “fleeing from some type of sexual

activity perpetrated upon her prior to the accident.” (Doc. #1, App. 8 at 6.) In any event,

whether Petitioner was sexually assaulted is irrelevant to her crimes, which occurred because

she chose to drive while intoxicated.

Petitioner also cites to an affidavit and supporting documents from Dr. Walter Frajola

regarding independent testing of her blood sample. At best, the “evidence” shows that

National Testing Services did not perform a proper independent test on Petitioner’s blood

sample. Petitioner, however, has not demonstrated that further testing would have yielded

different results. Dr. Frajola’s affidavit does not demonstrate what further testing would have

revealed, or that further testing would have made any difference in this case.

The Court finds that Petitioner neither alleges an independent constitutional violation

nor presents affirmative proof of her innocence. In fact, she argues only that the newly

discovered evidence contains testimony that “lends credibility to [her] impression that she

was surreptitiously dosed with intoxicants” – not evidence which conclusively establishes

that would have produced an acquittal if Petitioner had chosen to reject the plea agreement

and go to trial.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision to reject this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground Four be denied.

E. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Petitioner contends that the factual basis for the plea was insufficient

to support her guilty plea. Petitioner relies on Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.3 to support her argument.

Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, federal law. As such, the Court will recommend

that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground Five be denied.

 Petitioner pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement which the trial court

accepted. Where a defendant pleads guilty, review is limited to whether the underlying plea

was counseled and voluntary. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); Tollett

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted

in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense of which he is charged, he may not

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel

was [deficient.]”).

The record demonstrates that Petitioner “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”

pled guilty pursuant to the terms of the plea agreements. (Doc. #1, App. 7 at 40.)

Significantly, Petitioner attested to the accuracy of the factual bases for her guilty plea.

(Doc. #1, App. 7 at 39.) A petitioner’s “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity.” United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987)

(rejecting claim of involuntariness of guilty plea). In accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea, the

court noted that Petitioner had acknowledged that she was guilty of the charges set forth in

the plea agreement and that there was a factual basis for Petitioner’s plea. (Doc. #1, App.

7 at 37-40.)

Assuming, however, that the factual basis was flawed, it would nonetheless not give

rise to a Constitutional violation. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and Arizona Rule

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17.3 require that there be a factual basis for the plea. Neither rule of procedure, however, is

“constitutionally mandated.” McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (citing Waddy v.

Heer, 383 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1967)). If a plea is otherwise intelligent and voluntary, a state

court is not required by the Constitution to establish a factual basis. See North Carolina v.

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (“Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver

of trial and an express admission of guilt, the later element is not a constitutional requisite

to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,

knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is

unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”); Rodriguez

v. Ricketts, 777 F.2d 527, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (rejecting petitioner’s claim

that he should be granted habeas corpus relief because his guilty plea was not supported by

a factual basis on the grounds that, although a factual basis is required under Arizona law,

“relief under section 2254(a) can be granted only for a violation of the United States

Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty” and “the due process clause does not impose on

a state court the duty to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea absent special

circumstances”).

Thus, Petitioner’s claim that her rights were violated based on the allegedly

insufficient factual basis is not a valid Constitutional claim, because no right to a sufficient

factual basis exists under the United States Constitution. As a result, Petitioner’s claim is

based only on the state court’s failure to comply with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

17.3, which, as a state law claim, is not subject to habeas corpus review. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (emphasizing that “it is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court decisions on state-law questions”).

CONCLUSION

Having determined that all five of Petitioner’s claims either fail on the merits or are

not cognizable on federal habeas review the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1) be DENIED and DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. An objection or a response to an

objection shall not exceed seventeen (17) pages, exclusive of attachments. Failure to timely

file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DATED this 9th day of April, 2010.

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