Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00308/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00308-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

B. Spain, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 07-0308-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

EMC Mortgage Company, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

By order entered March 18, 2008, among other things, the court

granted plaintiff pro se B. Spain “leave to file an amended

complaint within thirty (30) days of the entry date of th[at]

order.” Spain v. EMC Mortgage Company, 2008 WL 752610, at *9

(D.Ariz. 2008) (“Spain I”). Computing time in accordance with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 6(a), plaintiff had until April 17, 2008, by which to

file his second amended complaint (“SAC”). He did not do that. 

Instead, on that date plaintiff filed a “motion to vacate[,]”

asserting that Spain I is “facially void[.]” Mot. (doc. 122) at 1. 

In quick succession, the Poli & Ball defendants, the EMC 

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The court is continuing to group the numerous defendants based upon

their shared counsel, as it did in Spain I. See Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *1

n.1.

- 2 -

defendants, the NBI defendants, defendant Bank of America (“BOA”),

the Pite & Duncan defendants,1 and defendant Werner either filed a

response to that motion to vacate, or joined in a response filed by

other defendants. See Docs. 123; 124; 126; 127; 128; and 133. 

Plaintiff did not file a reply, timely or otherwise, to any of

those responses or joinders. Instead, as will be more fully

discussed herein, plaintiff filed three additional motions and

lodged a SAC with the court.

Background

After the filing of plaintiff’s motion to vacate and before he

lodged his SAC, on May 2, 2008, defendant BOA lodged a proposed

order of dismissal with prejudice (doc. 129). BOA proceeded in

that way because plaintiff had not timely filed and served his SAC

in accordance with Spain I. Thereafter, on May 7, 2008, plaintiff

filed a “Motion to Rule on [his] April 17th Objection[,]” i.e. his

motion to vacate Spain I. Mot. (doc. 130). On May 12, 2008,

plaintiff filed yet another motion - this time to enlarge the time

to file his SAC. Mot. (doc. 131). He requested “an additional 60

days . . . , or until May 17th[,]” by which to file that complaint. 

Id., attachment 1 thereto (doc. 131-2) at 1. 

The next day, May 13, 2008, plaintiff filed yet another

motion, denoted as a “Motion to Set Aside Order[.]” Doc. 134. On

that same date, plaintiff also lodged his proposed SAC with the

court (doc. 135). Then, on May 15, 2008, plaintiff filed a reply

to the EMC defendants’ opposition to his motion to enlarge time

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

(doc. 136). 

Discussion

I. Rule 60(b)(4) Motion

In moving to vacate Spain I, plaintiff invokes Rule 60(b)(4),

which allows for relief from “a final judgment, order, or

proceeding” where “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)

(emphasis added). Under the plain language of that Rule, relief

may not be sought with respect to a non-final order. Clearly the

order in Spain I which, among other things, granted dismissal with

leave to amend is not final in any respect. See WMX Technologies,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

(“[W]hen a district court expressly grants leave to amend, it is

plain that the order is not final.”) Therefore, plaintiff’s

reliance upon Rule 60(b)(4) is wholly misplaced. 

When construing a motion the Ninth Circuit favors substance

over form, however. Andersen v. U.S., 298 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing, inter alia, Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc.

V. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 880 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

label attached to a motion does not control its substance.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In accordance

with that principle and because plaintiff is pro se, the court will

construe his motion to vacate as a motion for reconsideration. The

court is construing plaintiff’s motion in that way because,

stripped of its rhetoric, apparently that is the relief which

plaintiff is seeking. Indeed, it appears that plaintiff himself

views this as a reconsideration motion, because in all three of 

his later filed motions, he specifically asks this court to

“reconsider it’s [sic] earlier order[,]” i.e. Spain I. See Mot. to

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Rule (doc. 130) at 1; and Mot. to Enlarge (doc. 131) at 1; and Mot.

to Set Aside (doc. 134) at 1. 

The court denies plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration

because he did not comply with LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1) governing the “form

and content” of such motions. The Rule unequivocally states, in

part:

The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for

reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of 

manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal 

authority that could not have been brought to its

attention earlier with reasonable diligence. Any 

such motion shall point out with specificity the 

matters that the movant believes were overlooked or

misapprehended by the Court, any new matters being 

brought to the Court’s attention for the first time 

and the reasons they were not presented earlier, and 

any specific modifications being sought in the Court’s

Order. 

LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiff did none of that in

his “motion to vacate.” Instead, from what the court is able to

glean from this largely incomprehensible motion, plaintiff simply

disagrees with its rulings in Spain I. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction

is not a proper basis for reconsideration, however. See O’Neal v.

Smithkline Beecham Corp., 2008 WL 1721891, at *4 (E.D.Cal. 2008)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Plaintiffs[’]

assert[ion][] with great vehemence and a degree of disdain, that

they disagree with the court’s findings[] . . . is not grounds for

. . . grant[ing] . . . reconsideration.”); see also Dennis v.

Ayers, 2008 WL 1989304, at *1 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (Petitioner’s

disagreement “with the Court’s prior resolution of the claim . . .

is, of course, [an] insufficient [basis] for . . . granting] a

motion for reconsideration.”) 

Further, in direct contravention of LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1),

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Substantively, this “Motion to Set Aside Order” is virtually identical

to plaintiff’s “Motion to Enlarge.” Therefore, the court will jointly consider the

two motions. 

- 5 -

plaintiff “repeat[ed] . . . argument[s]” which he made in

connection with Spain I. That Rule further expressly provides that

“[f]ailure to comply with th[at] subsection may be grounds for

denial of the motion.” Id. Exercising its discretion under LRCiv.

7.2(g)(1), the court denies plaintiff’s “motion to vacate,” which

it deems a motion for reconsideration, for failure to fully comply

with Rule. 

II. BOA’s Proposed Order of Dismissal

After BOA lodged its proposed order of dismissal, plaintiff

filed what he entitled “Motion to Rule on Plaintiff’s April 17th

Objection and Brief in Support” (doc. 130). Focusing on the

substance of that motion, plaintiff is challenging the validity of

BOA’s lodged order because when he filed this “motion,” the court

had not yet ruled on his “motion to vacate.” In any event, now the

court has ruled on that “motion to vacate.” Because the court has

denied that motion, it denies as moot plaintiff’s “Motion to Rule,”

etc. (doc. 130). 

Turning to BOA’s lodged order of dismissal, the court will not

order the filing of that lodged proposed order because, as will be

seen, it is granting plaintiff an extension of time in which to

file and serve his SAC. 

III. “Motion to Enlarge time to File 2nd Amended Complaint” & 

“Motion to Set Aside Order”2

Plaintiff is requesting an additional 60 days, “or until May

17th[,]” to file his SAC. Mot. (doc. 131) at 1. Evidently

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 As it did when lodging its proposed order of dismissal, BOA notes that

that motion did not impact the finality of the court’s order in Spain I. To

support this assertion, BOA notes that in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(2),

a motion brought under subsection (b) of Rule 60 “does not affect the judgment’s

finality or suspend its operation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(2). Of course, as

previously discussed, plaintiff’s motion to vacate was not a Rule 60(b) motion. 

Hence, BOA’s reliance upon Rule 60(c)(2) is misplaced. 

- 6 -

referring to the “numerous apparent defects” with his first amended

complaint noted in Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *8, plaintiff is

seeking this extension to “correct[]” those defects. See Mot.

(doc. 131) at 1. The EMC and the Pite Duncan defendants oppose an

extension asserting, with no explanation, that plaintiff has not

shown “good cause” as to why he could not file his SAC by the court

ordered deadline. Resp. (doc. 132) at 1; and Resp. (Doc. 142) at

1. 

Relying upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), BOA contends that “[n]o

good cause exists to warrant” granting plaintiff an extension of

time. Resp. (doc. 139) at 2. That Rule states in relevant part as

follows:

 When an act may or must be done within a 

specified time, the court may, for good cause, 

extend the time: . . .

on motion made after the time has expired if 

the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). BOA contends that because plaintiff

has shown neither good cause nor excusable neglect, the court

should deny his motion for an extension of time. Plaintiff cannot

meet that two prong standard, BOA maintains, because he did nothing

until April 18, 2008 – 31 days after entry of the court’s order in

Spain I. Moreover, even at that time plaintiff did not file his

SAC, but instead filed a motion to vacate.3 BOA further argues

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

that plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule 6(1)(B) because he

did not lodge his SAC until 25 days after the deadline for so

doing. Likewise, plaintiff did not file his motion for an

extension until after the time for filing the SAC had passed. 

Good cause for allowing an extension has been shown, plaintiff

counters, because: (1) supposedly this action is complex; (2) he

had to make many revisions to his FAC; and (3) he is appearing pro

se. Plaintiff also contends that an extension of time will “sav[e]

Judicial Resources and the Court’s Time[,]” because if an extension

is not granted, he will “wast[e] judicial resources and the Court’s

time[,]” by refiling the SAC in yet another action. Resp. (doc.

136). Plaintiff’s ready willingness to “wast[e] judicial resources

and the Court’s time[]” is troubling to say the least. See id.

Perhaps when read in isolation, the court would be willing to

overlook this statement. When read in conjunction with plaintiff’s

motion to vacate, with its vituperative tone, the court finds that

once again “plaintiff is dangerously close to crossing the line

from permissible use of the judicial process to flagrant abuse[.]”

See Spain I, 2008 WL 752610, at *8. 

Because Rule 6(b)(2) “‘is a rule of general application,

courts are given broad discretion in granting or denying

extensions[]’” thereunder. United States v. Pourmohamad, 2007 WL

1176629, at *1 (N.D.Cal. 2007) (quoting Rutledge v. Elec. Hose &

Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1975)). The burden is on

the party seeking an extension of time to show “excusable neglect”

and “good cause” under that Rule. See id. It appears that in the

Ninth Circuit the movant may meet this burden “by a showing of good

faith coupled with a showing that there was a reasonable basis for

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

not complying with the time specified.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Four factors are relevant in “determin[ing] whether neglect is

excusable . . . : (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing

party; (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on the

proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the

movant acted in good faith.” In re Veritas Software Corp.

Securities Litigation, 496 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has

explained, this “is an equitable [determination], taking account of

all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” 

Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S.

380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). 

An examination of those factors here shows that plaintiff

Spain has made a showing, albeit weak, of excusable neglect. 

First, the danger of prejudice to the opposing parties is not great

as is evidenced by, among other things, the fact that three days

after lodging of the SAC, the Poli & Ball defendants filed a

“Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for More Definite

Statement” (doc. 138). Second, the length of the delay caused by

the untimely filing and service is not significant. Likewise, the

potential impact of that delay upon this litigation also is minimal 

in that the SAC has already been drafted and lodged. What is more,

as just noted, even though the SAC has not been filed or served,

the Poli & Ball defendants have already filed a dismissal motion. 

Likewise, the NBI defendants have already filed a motion for

summary judgment and joined in that motion to dismiss. See Doc.

146. Third, plaintiff’s proffered reasons for delay, primarily the

number of defects in his FAC which he was trying to cure, is a

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 This leniency includes overlooking plaintiff’s failure to comply with

LRCiv. 7.3(a) which requires, among other things, a statement indicating whether

any “previous extensions have been granted concerning the matter for which an

extension is sought.” 

- 9 -

valid reason for this relatively short delay. 

Accepting at face value plaintiff’s assertions that he needed

the additional time to file and serve his SAC due to “the numerous

corrections that are requested,” this is sufficient to demonstrate

good faith - the fourth excusable neglect factor. See Mot. (doc.

131) at 1. Bolstering this good faith finding is the fact that

plaintiff filed a motion to vacate by the date on which he should

have filed his SAC. Further, because he is pro se, plaintiff could

have been under the mistaken impression that the time by which he

had to file his SAC did not commence running until the court ruled

on that motion to vacate. Plaintiff’s filing of a motion

specifically requesting that the court rule on his motion to vacate

lends further support to the view that he was under the mistaken

impression that he did not need to file his SAC until the court

ruled on his motion to vacate. Finally, as in Bateman v. U.S.

Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000), because at

this juncture it appears that plaintiff Spain’s delayed filing did

not result “from deviousness or willfulness[,]” the court is

willing to give him some leeway. 

For all of these reasons, the court, in its discretion, grants

plaintiff an extension of time in which to file and serve his SAC. 

Despite the court’s leniency this time,4

 plaintiff is forewarned

that it will not look so favorably upon similar future motions. 

Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s “Motion to Vacate” (doc. 122)

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

is DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s “Motion for Ruling”

(doc. 130) is DENIED as moot;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s “Motion for Extension

of Time to File Second Amended Complaint” (doc. 131) is GRANTED;

and the Clerk of the Court is directed to file that lodged

complaint (doc. 135) on the date of entry of this order. Plaintiff

shall then have thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this

order by which to serve that second amended complaint; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within five days of the date of

service of that second amended complaint, the plaintiff shall file

with the court proof of such service upon each of the defendants;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to timely serve the second

amended complaint or failure to timely file the required proof of

service may result in dismissal of the second amended complaint;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Poli & Ball defendants and the

NBI defendants do not need to refile and reserve their respective

motion to dismiss (doc. 138) and motion for summary judgment and

joinder in the motion to dismiss (doc. 146); however, in their

discretion, those parties may elect to file and serve new motions

if they deem it necessary upon service and filing of the second

amended complaint; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s “Motion to Set Aside

. . . 

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Order” (doc. 134) is GRANTED. 

DATED this 4th day of June, 2008.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 149 Filed 06/04/08 Page 11 of 11