Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01364/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01364-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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NO. C 10-1364 RS 

ORDER REMANDING CASE

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

*E-Filed 06/07/2010* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

PETER SZANTO, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SZANTO REVOCABLE TRUST OF 1991, 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C 10-1364 RS 

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

I. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT FACTS 

Peter Szanto (“Peter”) attempts to remove to federal court a probate matter filed in May of 

2006 in the Superior Court of California, San Mateo County. That case was filed by petitioners Paul 

and Victor Szanto as trustees of the Klara Szanto Revocable Trust. The petitioners initiated the state 

court matter with a petition to confirm transfer of a residence belonging to Klara and Paul Szanto 

into the Trust. Peter, the eldest son of Paul and Klara, sought permission to oppose the petition and 

to assert a right to Trust assets without effectively “contesting” his mother’s will. The superior 

court denied his request. An appellate court affirmed and observed that Peter was not actually a 

Trust beneficiary. Peter thereafter filed a petition to change venue to Orange County. This petition 

was denied. On January 25, 2010, Peter filed yet another petition seeking declaratory relief and 

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NO. C 10-1364 RS 

ORDER REMANDING CASE

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claiming rights to his parents’ assets. On March 2, one of the trustees sought to declare Peter a 

vexatious litigant. Peter filed a new complaint in the Central District of California on March 29, 

2010, alleging that the attorneys and various judges involved in the probate matter violated certain 

provisions of the Civil Rights Act. He then removed this matter to federal court on March 31. He 

claims his section 1983 averments advanced in the Central District hail, at least in part, from the 

trustee’s vexatious litigant allegations. In this sense, he seems to fashion himself a “defendant” in 

the probate matter for purposes of the federal removal statute. This matter is appropriately resolved 

without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the motion hearing set for 

June 10, 2010 is vacated. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION 

The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), permits a defendant to remove to federal 

court “only [those] state court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court . . . .” 

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Absent diversity of citizenship, federalquestion jurisdiction is required. Id. The party invoking section 1441 bears the burden of 

establishing federal question jurisdiction and a district court strictly construes the statute against 

removal. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal question 

jurisdiction analysis necessarily begins with the well-pleaded complaint rule: “Whether a case is one 

arising under the Constitution or a law . . . of the United States . . . must be determined from what 

necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim . . . .” Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 

74, 75-76 (1914). 

While Peter repeatedly classifies himself in his papers as a “plaintiff,” he also contends that 

he may remove the probate matter to federal court as a “defendant” in light of the trustee’s vexatious 

litigation motion. It is this allegation, he contends, that gives rise to his section 1983 claims. That 

said, he raised these claims not in the probate matter at all but in a separate lawsuit filed in the 

United States District Court for the Central District of California. Even assuming Peter had filed a 

proper counter-claim in this case that raised the Civil Rights Act issue, he could not rely on it to 

remove the probate matter to federal court. There are two reasons. First, resolution of the probate 

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issues does not involve any cognizable federal claim, nor does the vexatious litigant issue involve 

federal law. Second, removal is a defendant’s procedural option and the grounds for it must arise 

from the plaintiff’s complaint. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). A defendant cannot 

rely on federal claims raised in his or her own counter or cross complaint. Rath Packing Co. v. 

Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Removability cannot be created by defendant 

pleading a counter-claim presenting a federal question under 28 U.S.C. [section] 1331.”). 

Accordingly, the probate matter must be remanded to state court. 

An order remanding a removed case to state court “may require payment of just costs and 

any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1447(c); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005). The Trust seeks such an 

award here. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may 

award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively 

reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees 

should be denied.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 141. While it is true that there is no substantive basis to 

support Peter’s removal, he does aver that he at least believed his section 1983 claim was properly 

raised and warranted removal. As a pro se litigant, Peter’s lack of understanding as to the 

specialized procedural hurdles involved in removal jurisdiction is understandable. Accordingly, the 

Trust’s motion for attorney fees is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 06/07/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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NO. C 10-1364 RS 

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A HARD COPY OF THIS ORDER WAS MAILED TO: 

Peter Szanto 

P.O. Box 10451 

Newport Beach, CA 92658 

DATED: 06/07/2010 

 /s/ Chambers Staff 

 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg 

* Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to any co-counsel who have not 

registered with the Court’s electronic filing system. 

 

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