Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00823/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00823-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD VILLAPANDO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CDCR, 

Defendant.

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1:14cv00823 LJO DLB PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Document 14)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF AN 

EXTENTION OF TIME TO FILE AN 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Richard Villapando (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prison inmate proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff 

filed this action on May 30, 2014. 

On July 7, 2014, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed it with leave to 

amend.

On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of certain portions 

of the screening order.

LEGAL STANDARD

Reconsideration motions are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. 

Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 

441 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A party seeking reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly 

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse a prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water 

Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part 

on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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This Court reviews a motion to reconsider a Magistrate Judge’s ruling under the “clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(a). As such, the court may only set aside those portions of a Magistrate Judge’s order that are 

either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also Grimes v. City and 

County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir.1991) (discovery sanctions are nondispositive pretrial matters that are reviewed for clear error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)). 

A magistrate judge’s factual findings are “clearly erroneous” when the district court is 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Security Farms v. 

International Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997); Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 

485, 489 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The “‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly deferential.” 

Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for 

Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 623, 113 S.Ct. 2264 (1993).

The “contrary to law” standard allows independent, plenary review of purely legal 

determinations by the magistrate judge. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3rd 

Cir.1992); Green, 219 F.R.D. at 489; see also Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, 

case law, or rules of procedure.” Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 254 F.R.D. 553, 

556 (D. Minn. 2008); Rathgaber v. Town of Oyster Bay, 492 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 

2007); Surles v. Air France, 210 F.Supp.2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see Adolph Coors Co. v. 

Wallace, 570 F.Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

“Pretrial orders of a magistrate under § 636(b)(1)(A) . . . are not subject to a de novo 

determination. . . .” Merritt v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 

1981). “The reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding 

court.” Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241; see Phoenix Engineering & Supply v. Universal Elec., 104 F.3d 

1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1997) (“the clearly erroneous standard allows [for] great deference”). A 

district court is able to overturn a magistrate judge’s ruling “‘only if the district court is left with 

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the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Computer Economics, Inc. v. 

Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 980, 983 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Weeks v. Samsung Heavy 

Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, “[m]otions for reconsideration 

are disfavored, however, and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in 

their original briefs.” Hendon v. Baroya, 2012 WL 995757, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 

Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001); Northwest Acceptance Corp. 

v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of two rulings in the screening order: the dismissal of 

CDCR as a Defendant, and the Court’s finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the 

Fourteenth Amendment based on his grandfather-clause argument.

A. CDCR as Defendant

Plaintiff named CDCR as the sole Defendant based on his contention that CDCR is 

responsible for generating and implementing the regulation at issue. The Magistrate Judge 

explained, however, that CDCR is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 

regardless of the relief sought. Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 

740 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012); Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010).

In moving for reconsideration, Plaintiff first argues that CDCR is a proper Defendant 

where Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a regulation and seeks injunctive relief. In 

support, Plaintiff cites a 2006 decision from this Court. However, more recent Ninth Circuit case 

law holds that under section 1983, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions against the state 

for either damages or injunctive relief. Buckwalter, 678 F.3d at 740, n.1. 

Of course, as the Magistrate Judge explained, Plaintiff may name a state official to obtain 

prospective relief. “A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege 

a named official’s personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 

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(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991)). “Rather, a plaintiff 

need only identify the law or policy challenged as a constitutional violation and name the official 

within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 

1127 (citing Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S.Ct. 447, 452, 454 (2010)).

Insofar as Plaintiff contends that CDCR is the proper Defendant for prospective relief 

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the Magistrate 

Judge did not specifically discuss proper defendants under RLUIPA because Plaintiff did not 

state a claim under RLUIPA. Nonetheless, Plaintiff is correct. Last month, the Ninth Circuit 

definitively held that a RLUIPA claim may not be maintained against prison officials in their 

individual capacities. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014). As Plaintiff was granted 

leave to amend his RLUIPA claim and the Magistrate Judge did not discuss the issue, the Court 

will not grant reconsideration on this claim. Plaintiff is permitted to amend his complaint and 

name the proper defendant. 

B. Equal Protection Claim

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly found that his 

grandfather-clause argument did not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In his 

complaint, Plaintiff argued that the lack of a grandfather clause in NCR 13-01, the regulation at 

issue, violates the Equal Protection Clause because other inmates are permitted to keep nonreligious items that become disapproved under different regulations. As an example, he explains 

that inmates who possess non-religious items such as keyboards and certain televisions, were 

permitted to keep the items after they were no longer approved for possession.

In explaining that Plaintiff did not state a claim, the Magistrate Judge explained that his 

claim did not compare similarly situated individuals. “In other words, there is no relationship 

between Plaintiff’s inability to keep non-allowed religious items and other inmates’ ability to 

keep non-religious, non-allowable items.” ECF No. 11, at 7. 

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The Magistrate Judge was correct in finding that Plaintiff is attempting to compare 

groups that are not similarly situated. If the action in question does not involve a suspect 

classification, a plaintiff may establish an equal protection claim by showing that similarly 

situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a 

legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San 

Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. 

Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004); SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 

F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Court understands his argument, but it remains that he is comparing different sets of 

prisoners that were subject to different regulations. While it is true that these inmates all had 

property that eventually became non-allowable pursuant to various regulations, the inmates are 

not similarly situated where they were subject to different regulations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration on this basis is denied.

ORDER

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Plaintiff is 

GRANTED an extension of time of thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order within 

which to file an amended complaint.1 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2014 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

1

Insofar as Plaintiff requests that he be permitted to refer back to the exhibits attached to his original complaint, his 

request is denied. Local Rule 220 requires an amended pleading be complete in itself without reference to the prior 

or superseded pleading. Plaintiff is advised, however, that exhibits are not necessary in the federal system of notice 

pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Court strongly suggests to Plaintiff that they should not be submitted where (1) 

they serve only to confuse the record and burden the Court, or (2) they are intended as future evidence. If this action 

reaches a juncture at which the submission of evidence is appropriate and necessary (e.g., summary judgment or 

trial), Plaintiff will have the opportunity at that time to submit his evidence.

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