Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00620/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00620-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KNOLTS HUTCHINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00620-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Knolts Hutchinson (“Plaintiff”) is a disabled inmate at the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) California Medical Facility 

(“CMF”). Through counsel, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants CDCR, CMF

Warden Vimal Singh, and Correctional Officer M. Scott (collectively “Defendants”).

Plaintiff alleges violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) 

and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”). Presently before the Court is 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 29. Plaintiff filed an Opposition

(ECF No. 33), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 34). For the reasons that follow, 

Defendants’ Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

1

 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is paralyzed below the chest. He is unable to stand or walk, and he 

requires a wheelchair to ambulate at all times. He has use of his arms and hands, but 

has limited dexterity. He was housed at CMF, where Defendant Singh was the warden

and Defendant Scott was a correctional officer, at all times relevant to this action. 

Plaintiff was first issued a large in-cell locker to store his medical supplies. In

early October 2011, however, officials replaced the large locker in Plaintiff’s cell with a 

smaller one. On October 15, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a formal request to replace the

smaller locker with his previous locker because he could not reach down and access the 

small locker from its position on the floor. In response to this request, Defendant Scott 

placed the small, metal locker on plastic milk crates. On October 17, 2011, at 

approximately 4:15 a.m., Plaintiff attempted to access the small locker when it fell off of 

the milk crates and on top of him. He was trapped under the locker for over an hour. 

On October 28, 2011, prison officials delivered a larger replacement locker to 

Plaintiff’s cell. However, the officials positioned the new locker in such a manner that the

door opened toward and into Plaintiff’s bed, rendering the locker inaccessible to Plaintiff. 

When Plaintiff alerted prison officials that he could not access his locker, Defendants

responded by turning the locker upside down. Plaintiff again requested a new locker 

stating that the inverted locker was unstable. Prison officials responded by turning the

locker right side up and removing the door. Without a door on the locker, Plaintiff 

experienced problems with other inmates stealing his medical supplies when he was not 

in his cell and Plaintiff was forced to change his adult diapers and complete his bowel 

program in the full view of other inmates and correctional staff. 

Plaintiff proceeds on his ADA and Rehab Act claims. See ECF Nos. 1, 17. In the 

pending Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants seek summary judgment on both of 

Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 29. 

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and 

Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also 

demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. 

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In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 

ANALYSIS

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehab Act claims. 

The ADA and the Rehab Act both prohibit a public entity from discriminating against an 

individual because of his disability. Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2001). To prove that a public entity violated the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability,” (2) he was either excluded from 

participation in, or denied the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or 

activities, or otherwise discriminated against by the public entity, and (3) such exclusion, 

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Id. Furthermore, to 

recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a disabled plaintiff must prove that 

he or she was intentionally discriminated against by the defendant. Id. at 1138. 

Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. To 

prove that a public program or service violated § 504 of the Rehab Act, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate: (1) he is a disabled individual, (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the 

benefit, (3) he was denied benefits of the program solely because of his disability, and 

(4) the program receives financial assistance from the federal government. Id. Because

the elements of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are essentially the same,

the Ninth Circuit consistently analyzes them together. See, e.g., id.; Zukle v. Regents of 

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Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court analyzes 

the claims together in this Memorandum and Order. 

A. Disability and Public Entity Status 

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a disabled individual or that Defendant 

CDCR is a public entity. Thus, the first element and part of the second element of 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim are met. 

B. Discrimination

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because “there was no 

discrimination against Hutchinson based on the fact that his larger locker was replaced 

with a smaller one.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 4. Specifically, Defendants argue that 

because their official guidelines are void of any specific requirements to provide disabled 

inmates with lockers, there was no discrimination by replacing Plaintiff’s large locker with 

a smaller one. Id. 

Defendants read Plaintiff’s allegations too narrowly. Plaintiff’s claims are not 

confined to, nor do they focus on, Defendants’ initial decision to replace his large locker 

with a smaller locker. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that there is no objective discrimination 

in replacing an inmate’s large locker with a smaller one. ECF No. 33 at 8. Rather, 

Plaintiff contends that the denial of benefits and discrimination was in Defendants’ failure 

to provide Plaintiff with accommodations—specifically, an accessible locker—equivalent 

to that provided to nondisabled inmates in the custody of CDCR. Id. As a result of their 

mischaracterization of Plaintiff’s underlying claim, Defendants’ Motion does not address 

Plaintiff’s claim that he was not provided with accommodations equivalent to 

nondisabled inmates at CDCR. 

The Court is satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was denied 

the benefits of Defendants’ services or otherwise discriminated against because he was 

the only inmate who was not afforded an accessible locker. As Plaintiff has been a 

paraplegic since 1990, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s disability when they 

replaced his large locker with a smaller one. Defendants were thus aware that Plaintiff’s 

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disability would make it difficult for him to reach down and access a small locker. If 

Defendants were not so aware, they were made aware when Plaintiff submitted an 

administrative request to provide him with his old, large locker because the new, small 

locker was inaccessible to him. Rather than provide Plaintiff with a large locker, 

Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s request by stationing the new, small locker on top of 

plastic milk crates. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 33-1, at 2. While attempting to access the 

small locker, it fell on top of Plaintiff and trapped him beneath it for over an hour. Id. at 

3.

According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ lack of concern for accommodating Plaintiff’s 

disability did not stop there. Two weeks after the small locker fell on Plaintiff, 

Defendants provided him with a large locker but positioned it in such a manner that it 

was inaccessible to him. Id. As detailed above, the locker was then flipped upside 

down, rendering it unstable and inaccessible, and then positioned right side up with the 

locker door removed. Id. Without a locker door, other inmates were able to steal 

Plaintiff’s medical supplies and Plaintiff was forced to complete his bowel program and 

change his adult diapers in full view of other inmates and prison guards. Id.

 Defendants do not contend that non-disabled inmates were subject to the same 

or similar treatment that Plaintiff received. Rather, it appears this treatment was unique 

to Plaintiff. If Plaintiff was not disabled, Defendants’ actions would not have been 

problematic. However, Plaintiff is disabled and confined to a wheelchair, limiting his 

ability to access his cell locker relative to non-disabled inmates in the custody of CDCR. 

Thus, construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that 

a reasonable jury could determine Defendants’ actions amounted to a denial of CDCR’s 

services, programs, or activities, or otherwise amounted to a form of discrimination 

against Plaintiff, thereby satisfying the second element of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. 

C. The Basis of the Discrimination

To succeed on his ADA and Rehab Act claims, Plaintiff must also prove that the 

discrimination he suffered was “by reason of his disability.” Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 

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260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court is satisfied that a reasonable jury could 

conclude that this element is met because were it not for Plaintiff’s disability, he would 

not have suffered the alleged discrimination.2

Defendants proffer two reasons for why Plaintiff’s locker was replaced, arguing 

neither was because of Plaintiff’s disability. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 5. First, 

Defendants contend that their actions were pursuant to and consistent with a penological 

policy of phasing out large lockers in favor of smaller lockers at all CDCR institutions. Id. 

Defendants maintain that because the large lockers were replaced irrespective of 

whether the inmate was disabled, there was no discrimination against Plaintiff due to his 

disability. Id.

Again, Defendants read Plaintiff’s allegations too narrowly. Plaintiff does not base 

his claims on the replacement of his large locker. Rather, Plaintiff maintains that 

Defendants’ failure to account for his disabled status resulted in a denial of benefits and 

discrimination when Defendants: (1) replaced his large locker with a smaller locker, 

(2) positioned the small locker on top of plastic milk crates, (3) positioned the 

replacement locker too close to his bed, (4) turned the locker upside down, and finally (5) 

when Defendants removed the door of his locker. 

In addition, Plaintiff disputes that his locker was replaced solely because of CDCR 

policy. Defendants maintain that CDCR’s policy of phasing out large lockers was in 

place as of 1995. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 5. All of the events relevant to the 

alleged denial of benefits and discrimination suffered by Plaintiff occurred between

October 2011 and December 2011. Because of the lapse in time between Defendants’

alleged policy of replacing large lockers and Defendants’ actual steps in replacing 

Plaintiff’s locker, a jury could reasonably conclude that the decision to replace 

Defendants’ large locker was not based on CDCR’s policy. Instead, a jury could 

reasonably conclude that the alleged denial of benefits and discrimination surrounding 

the replacement of Plaintiff’s locker was due to his disability, thereby satisfying the third 

 2

 Stated otherwise: the lockers were inaccessible to Plaintiff because of his disability. 

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element of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. 

The second reason proffered by Defendants for replacing Plaintiff’s locker is an 

allegation that Plaintiff was hiding behind the door of his large locker while smoking in 

his cell. Defendants also cite this as the reason for removing the door on Plaintiff’s 

replacement locker when it was returned to its upright position. Plaintiff, however, 

adamantly disputes this allegation and emphasizes that Defendants failed to provide any 

disciplinary actions or rules violations reports in support of it. This amounts to a genuine 

dispute of a material fact. Accepting Plaintiff’s denial of this allegation to be true, a jury 

could reasonably conclude that the locker door was not removed for Defendants’

proffered reason and take this as further evidence of discrimination against Plaintiff. 

On balance, the facts before the Court lead it to believe that a reasonable jury 

could conclude that the alleged denial of benefits and discrimination was by reason of

Plaintiff’s disability. The small locker would have been accessible if Plaintiff was not 

disabled, as he would have had the ability to easily bend over and access the material in 

his locker. Similarly, if Plaintiff were not disabled he may have been able to maneuver 

his body to access the replacement locker when it was positioned with the door opening 

into his bed. Although Defendants took action in response to Plaintiff’s complaints, they 

failed to provide what Plaintiff actually requested: an accessible locker. On Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must construe all of Defendants’ actions in 

replacing Plaintiff’s locker in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Applied here, a jury 

could reasonably conclude that Defendants’ actions subjected Plaintiff to “discrimination 

by reason of his disability,” thereby satisfying the third element of Plaintiff’s ADA claim.

Duvall 260 F.3d 1135. 

D. Intentional Discrimination

To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a disabled plaintiff must 

prove that he or she was intentionally discriminated against by the defendant. Duvall v. 

Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit applies the 

deliberate indifference test to determine whether there was intentional discrimination by 

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a defendant. Id. Generally, the deliberate indifference test “requires both knowledge 

that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon 

that [] likelihood.” Id. at 1139 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1988)). 

The Ninth Circuit has applied that standard in the context of ADA and Rehab Act claims. 

When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for 

accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is 

obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity 

is on notice that an accommodation is required, and the 

plaintiff has satisfied the first element of the deliberate 

indifference test.

Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. The second element of the deliberate indifference test is met 

if the public entity fails “to undertake a fact-specific investigation to determine what 

constitutes a reasonable accommodation.” Id. Moreover, “a public entity does not ‘act’

by proffering just any accommodation: it must consider the particular individual’s need 

when conducting its investigation into what accommodations are reasonable.” Id.3 

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has put forth 

enough evidence for a jury to conclude that Defendants subjected him to intentional 

discrimination. Applying the first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s test for deliberate 

indifference when assessing claims under the ADA and the Rehab Act, Plaintiff 

repeatedly alerted Defendants of his need for an accommodation by requesting that he 

be given an accessible locker. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 33, at 2-3. Defendants were thus 

on notice that an accommodation was required. Because all Defendants were acting on 

behalf of CDCR and CDCR qualifies as a public entity, Plaintiff has satisfied the first 

prong of the deliberate indifference test. 

Applying the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s test for deliberate indifference

under the ADA and the Rehab Act, Defendants’ following actions may reasonably be 

 3

 Defendants advance arguments that are unrelated to the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 

deliberate indifference test in the context of ADA and Rehab Act claims. Defendants’ arguments rely on 

application of the deliberate indifference test in the context of Eighth Amendment claims. See Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 29-1, at 7. Here, Plaintiff alleges violations of the ADA and Rehab Act, not his Eighth 

Amendment rights. Thus, Defendants’ analysis of their conduct under the Eighth Amendment test for 

deliberate indifference does not aid the Court in resolving the pending Motion. 

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construed by a jury as evidence of failure to undertake a fact-specific investigation of

what constitutes a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff: (1) replacing the large locker 

of a disabled inmate in favor of a small locker without accounting for the disabled 

inmate’s inability to access the new locker; (2) placing the small locker on top of milk 

crates in response to Plaintiff’s complaint that the locker was inaccessible and his 

request for a large locker; (3) replacing the small locker with a large locker only after the 

small locker fell from the milk crates fell and trapped Plaintiff beneath it; (4) placing the 

large locker in such a position that it was inaccessible to Plaintiff; (4) flipping the locker 

upside down thereby making the locker unstable in response to Plaintiff’s complaint of 

inaccessibility due to the proximity of the locker to Plaintiff’s bed; and (5) placing the 

large locker right side up and removing the door, thus exposing Plaintiff’s valuables and 

medical supplies to the prison population and forcing Plaintiff to change his adult diapers 

and complete his bowel program in the full view of the prison population. 

Whether Defendant CDCR undertook a fact-specific investigation to determine 

what constituted a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff Hutchinson is a material fact 

of which there is a genuine dispute between the parties. Plaintiff alleges that all of 

Defendants’ actions relating to replacing his locker demonstrate a failure to undergo a 

fact-specific investigation into what constituted a reasonable accommodation for his 

disability. Defendants, on the other hand, did not claim to have conducted a fact-specific 

investigation when filing their Motion; it was not until their Reply that they claimed to 

have based their responses to Plaintiff’s complaints on fact-specific investigations. 

Resolution of this disputed fact will very likely affect the outcome of this suit because the 

evidence of whether Defendant conducted a fact-specific investigation into reasonable 

accommodations for Hutchinson is “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Thus, believing Plaintiff’s evidence, 

Plaintiff may be entitled to monetary damages under the ADA. 

Furthermore, Defendants’ arguments that there was no intentional discrimination 

are unpersuasive. In the relevant part of the Motion, Defendants narrowly focus on the 

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absence of discrimination after Defendants placed Plaintiff’s small locker on top of plastic 

milk crates and that locker fell on top of Plaintiff. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 7. 

Defendants admit that the injuries Plaintiff suffered when the small locker fell on him 

would meet the objective component of deliberate indifference under their view of the 

law, but argue that there was no deliberate indifference after the small locker was 

replaced. Id. By conceding that some of their actions could objectively be considered 

evidence of deliberate indifference, Defendants concede that a reasonable jury could 

find that Plaintiff was subjected to intentional discrimination, thereby satisfying the Ninth 

Circuit’s requirement for monetary damages under the ADA. In addition, this analysis 

isolates each of Defendants’ actions in connection with Plaintiff’s locker as a separate 

and distinct event. However, Plaintiff points to Defendants’ actions as a whole as 

evidence that he was intentionally discriminated against by being provided with fewer 

accommodations than the rest of the prison population. 

The Court is satisfied that these actions could lead a reasonable jury to conclude 

that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to intentional discrimination. As the Court is equally 

satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has fulfilled all the elements of his 

ADA and Rehab Act claims, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as 

to those claims. 

E. Dismissal of Individual Defendants 

Although the conduct underlying Plaintiffs claims is attributed to all of the 

Defendants, Defendants Singh and Scott are named as individual defendants separate 

and distinct from CDCR. Defendants argue that neither Title II of the ADA nor § 504 of 

the Rehab Act authorize suits against individuals. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes 

clear that he is suing Defendants Singh and Scott in their official capacities, not their 

individual capacities. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2. 

The statutory language of Title II of the ADA does not foreclose suits against 

public officials in their official capacities. Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-

88 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the Ninth Circuit has allowed suits against public officials in 

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their official capacities to proceed only when the suits involved requests for injunctive 

relief. See, e.g., id.; Parks v. California, No. CIV.S-05-1397LKKDADP, 2006 WL 

3097965, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2006). Here, Plaintiff is not seeking injunctive relief

from Defendants Scott or Singh; rather, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Accordingly, 

Defendants Scott and Singh must be DISMISSED from this action. 

That does not mean, however, that Defendant CDCR is exempt from liability for 

the actions of Defendant Singh or Defendant Scott. Claims against persons in their 

official capacity are considered suits against the entity of which the person serving in the 

official capacity is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Moreover, 

when a Plaintiff files suit under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehab Act, “the public 

entity is liable for the vicarious acts of its employees.” Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 

1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). 

Consequently, the Ninth Circuit applies the doctrine of respondeat superior to claims 

brought against a public entity under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehab Act. Id.

Thus, Defendant CDCR, as a public entity, is liable for the vicarious acts of its

employees, Defendant Singh and Defendant Scott. 

Accordingly, Defendants Scott and Singh are dismissed from this action. Their 

conduct will be imputed to Defendant CDCR when assessing whether Plaintiff was 

subjected to intentional discrimination. If it is determined that Plaintiff was subjected to 

intentional discrimination, he will be entitled to receive monetary damages from 

Defendant CDCR, not Defendants Singh and Scott. 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED to the 

extent it seeks dismissal of Defendants Singh and Scott; those Defendants are hereby 

DISMISSED from this action. However, the Motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehab 

Act. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 7, 2016

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