Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-92-05509/USCOURTS-caDC-92-05509-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 10, 1994 Decided December 2, 1994

No. 92-5509

THOMAS J. TOBEY,

APPELLANT

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civil Action No. 92-413)

Joseph V. Kaplan argued the cause for the appellant.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. On

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorneys, and Eric G. Moskowitz, Deputy Assistant General Counsel,

National Labor Relations Board.

Before EDWARDS, GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Thomas J. Tobey appeals the district court's

dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. Tobey brought suit against his employer, the

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and two NLRB employees for allegedly violating the

Privacy Act (Act). 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Specifically, Tobey alleged that the defendants, without giving

proper notice in the Federal Register, maintained a "system of records," retrieved information from

it and used the information against him in a grievance proceeding. The district court concluded that

the information retrieved was not a record within the meaning of the Act and accordingly dismissed

the complaint. Because the information was not "about" Tobey, we agree that it was not a record

within the Act's scope and thus affirm the district court.

I.

USCA Case #92-5509 Document #87839 Filed: 12/02/1994 Page 1 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Under the PrivacyAct, any agency that maintains a "systemofrecords" must publish annually

in the Federal Register a notice of the existence and character of the system. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4).

A system of records means "a group of any records under the control of any agency from which

information is retrieved by the name of the individual." Id. § 552a(a)(5). A record is "any item,

collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including,

but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment

history and that contains his name." Id. § 552a(a)(4).

The NLRB employs a computer system capable of tracking and monitoring unfair labor

practice and representation case data, including case names, allegations made, dates of significant

events and the initials or identifying number of the field examiner assigned to the case. The system

is called the Case Handling Information Processing System (CHIPS). Apparently, the NLRB has

historically used the system primarily to produce tables for its annual report to Congress. See Brief

for Appellees at 2. Nevertheless, an experienced user of the system can, by use of a field examiner's

initials, retrieve files on cases assigned to that field examiner. The files retrieved, however, contain

only the aforementioned data and no express evaluation of the field examiner's work.

The timeliness or efficiency with which a field examiner processes cases, including his ability

to meet time goals, is one of four critical elementsthe NLRB usesin evaluating a field examiner'sjob

performance. While the time goals themselves are not obtainable through the CHIPS data base, an

NLRB official reviewing a case file retrieved through CHIPS could determine whether the assigned

field examiner had met applicable time goals and might thereby draw inferences about the field

examiner's job performance. The NLRB recognized this potential and in May 1989 announced its

intent to give Federal Register notice regarding the existence and character of CHIPS in anticipation

of using the system to evaluate examiner performance. Appendix at 38. The system had not been

so used previously. Id. In October 1991 the NLRB circulated a memorandum to its supervisors

directing them not to use CHIPS for employee evaluation untilsuch notice was published. Id. at 50.

To date, the NLRB has not given notice in the Federal Register of the existence and character of

CHIPS.

USCA Case #92-5509 Document #87839 Filed: 12/02/1994 Page 2 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Appellant Tobey works for the NLRB as a field examiner. In connection with a grievance

arbitration involving, among other things, Tobey's deletion froma promotion roster, NLRB Regional

Director Joseph Solien, a defendant, conducted a CHIPS search of cases assigned to Tobey over a

three-year period. He retrieved the data by means of a field search using Tobey's initials. The search

results included the dates of significant activity for each case to which Tobey was assigned.

Tobey brought suit in district court against the NLRB and two NLRB employees, Solien, and

Tobey'ssupervisor,JerryM. Hunter, alleging that, without notice, theymaintained and used a system

of records (CHIPS) to retrieve personal information about him and disclosed that information to

others. In addition, his complaint sought damages for the harm he allegedly suffered as a result of

the use of the information against himin the grievance proceedings. The district court found that the

NLRB had not met the notice requirements of the Privacy Act but concluded that the data retrieved

were not "records" within the meaning of the Act. Tobey v. NLRB, 807 F. Supp. 798, 800-01

(D.D.C. 1992). The court therefore granted the NLRB's motion to dismiss. Id. at 801.

On appeal Tobey argues that the information retrieved was a record within the meaning of

the Act. First, he contends that the district court improperly defined "record." Second, he argues

that, even under the district court's improper definition, the information was a record.

II.

Our inquiry begins, as it should, with an analysis of the Act'slanguage. Under the Act, those

agencies "maintain[ing] a systemofrecords" must publish notice ofthe existence and character ofthe

system in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4). A "system of records" is, of course, made up

of "records." See id. § 552a(a)(5). The Act defines "record" as:

any item, collection, or grouping ofinformation about an individual that is maintained

by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions,

medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or

the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the

individual, such as a fingerprint or voice print or a photograph.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (emphases added).

From this definition at least two requirements emerge. First, in order to qualify as a record,

information must be "about" an individual. Second, in addition to being "about" an individual, the

USCA Case #92-5509 Document #87839 Filed: 12/02/1994 Page 3 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

information must contain the individual's name or other identifying particular. The second

requirement leads to an obvious conclusion about the first: the fact that information contains an

individual's name does not mean that the information is "about" the individual. If it did, the first

requirement would be surplusage. A fundamental principle of statutory construction mandates that

we read statutes so as to render all of their provisions meaningful. E.g., Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v.

Unites States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993). It is readily evident, therefore, that

the information must both be "about" an individual and include his name or other identifying

particular.

Focusing on the first requirement, we conclude that CHIPS is not a "system of records"

because its files contain no records, that is, no information "about" individuals. Rather, they contain

information "about" NLRB cases, such as the case name, the allegations made, the number of

private-sector employeesinvolved and the date ofsettlement, hearing, dismissalor closing ofthe case.

Admittedly, the systemalso includesthe number and initials ofthe field examiner assigned to the case.

But this no more means the information is "about" the individual than it means the information is

"about" the date on which the case settled. Cf. Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1449 (9th

Cir. 1985) (observing that letter written by appellant was not about appellant). The number and

initials of the examiner assigned are part of the overall case information.

In urging a broad definition of "record," Tobey cites "by analogy" our decision in New York

Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). See Brief of Appellant at 14, 18 n.9.

We find his analogy inapt.

In New York Times we analyzed exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

which excepts from FOIA disclosure "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

Echoing the United States Supreme Court, we characterized the threshold test for what constitutes

"similar files" under exemption 6 as a "minimal" one, requiring only that they contain " "information

which applies to a particular individual.' " Id. at 1004-05 (quoting Department of State v.

Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982)). This approach, while well-suited to the exemption

USCA Case #92-5509 Document #87839 Filed: 12/02/1994 Page 4 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1For example, while the recording of the astronauts' last words in New York Times "convey[ed]

additional information that applie[d] to the astronauts in the throes of their deaths," 920 F.2d at

1005 (emphasis added), it did not provide information that described the astronauts. 

6 analysis, does not translate well to the Privacy Act notice context. On its face, the Privacy Act

protects information that is "about" an individual, not that which simply "applies to" him. The latter

category is a broad one, encompassing virtually all data that relate to an individual; the former,

however, includes only information that actually describes the individual in some way.1 The

distinctionwe draw here, while perhapssomewhat technical, is necessarygiventhe different functions

that exemption 6 and the Privacy Act fulfill.

As the New York Times Court explained, "there is ... a very good reason why the exemption

6 threshold was set at a low level: information that fails to cross that threshold must be released

without regard to any invasion of personal privacy that may result, and without regard to whether

there is a sufficient public interest in its release to warrant the harm caused by that invasion of

privacy." Id. at 1006. The exemption 6 analysis does not end, however, with the "applies to" test

but requires the agency (or the court) to further examine each file that satisfies the low "similar files"

threshold, balancing "the privacy interest of the person to whom it applies ... against the public

interest in releasing it" to determine whether disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy" so as to come within the exemption's protection. Id. at 1009. The

Privacy Act notice requirement provides for no comparable bifurcated analysis that would justify a

similarly low threshold for defining "records." Once documents are determined to constitute a

"system of records" under the Act because they are "about an individual" and include his name or

other identifying particular, the agency's inquiry is at an end and it must provide Federal Register

notice of the system without consideration of the extent of the privacy interest in the records.

Without attempting to define "record" more specifically than we must to resolve the case at

bar, we observe that the definitions of "record" offered by other circuits appear either too broad or

too narrow. The Third Circuit, for example, has stated that information "could still be included within

a "record' asstatutorily defined and protected by the Act if that piece ofinformation were linked with

an identifying particular (or was itself an identifying particular) and maintained within a system of

USCA Case #92-5509 Document #87839 Filed: 12/02/1994 Page 5 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

records." Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1992). To the extent that this definition fails

to require that information both be "about" an individual and be linked to that individual by an

identifying particular, we reject it. For information to qualify as a record it must, at a minimum,

satisfy both requirements. We similarly reject, as too narrow, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits'

definitions which require that information in the records "reflect some quality or characteristic" ofthe

individual involved. Unt, 765 F.2d at 1449; Boyd v. Secretary of the Navy, 709 F.2d 684, 686 (11th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). So long as the information is "about" an individual,

nothing in the Act requires that it additionally be about a "quality or characteristic" of the individual.

In sum, we conclude that CHIPS, as maintained by the NLRB, is not a system of records "about"

Tobey that required Federal Register notice. In so holding, we do not ignore Tobey's assertion that

NLRB employees could use data from CHIPS in combination with other information to draw

inferences about his job performance, as Solien apparently did. That possibility, however, does not

transform the CHIPS files into records about field examiners. The judgment of the district court

dismissing the action is therefore Affirmed.

USCA Case #92-5509 Document #87839 Filed: 12/02/1994 Page 6 of 6