Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15836/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; SIERRA CLUB; PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

RESPONSIBILITY; DESERT

SURVIVORS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT;

U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

BLUERIBBON COALITION;

CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF 4

WHEEL DRIVE CLUBS; SAN DIEGO

OFF ROAD COALITION; DESERT

VIPERS MOTORCYCLE CLUB; HIGH

DESERT MULTIPLE USE COALITION;

AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE

ASSOCIATION, DISTRICT 37; OFFROAD BUSINESS ASSOCIATION;

CALIFORNIA OFF-ROAD VEHICLE

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN SAND

ASSOCIATION,

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-15836

D.C. No.

3:03-cv-02509-SI

OPINION

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2 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 14, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 15, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Richard R. Clifton,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

SUMMARY*

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor

of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) in an action by

plaintiff environmental groups challenging BLM’s proposal

to expand access for off-road vehicle recreation in the

Imperial Sand Dunes Special Recreation Management Area

in Imperial County, California.

The Dunes contain a species of plant known as the

Peirson’s milkvetch that is categorized as a “threatened

species” under the Endangered Species Act. In 2013, BLM

adopted a new Recreation Area Management Plan under

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 3

which a tract would remain closed to off-road vehicle use, as

would 9,261 acres of milkvetch critical habitat, and the

remainder of the Dunes would be open to off-road vehicle

use. Pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species

Act, BLM consulted with the United States Fish and Wildlife

Service, which issued a Biological Opinion finding that the

2013 Recreation Area Management Plan was not likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of the milkvetch or the

desert tortoise.

The panel held that the Endangered Species Act did not

require the Biological Opinion to contain Incidental Take

Statements for threatened plants, such as the milkvetch.

The panel rejected plaintiffs’ claims that BLM’s decision

to open additional land to off-road vehicle use violated the

Clean Air Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management

Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the

Administrative Procedure Act. The panel held that the BLM

did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it relied on air

quality analysis demonstrating that emissions resulting from

visitors to the Dunes would not be increased impermissibly

by the land openings.

COUNSEL

Brendan R. Cummings (argued), Center for Biological

Diversity, Joshua Tree, California; Sarah Uhlemann, Center

for Biological Diversity, Seattle, Washington; for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Brian C. Toth (argued), Norman L. Rave, Jr., and Kevin W.

McArdle, Attorneys; Sam Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney

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4 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

General; Environment & Natural Resources Division, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Cheryll

Dobson and Erica Niebauer, United States Department of the

Interior, Office of the Solicitor; for Defendants-Appellees.

David P. Hubbard (argued), Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP,

Carlsbad, California; Paul A. Turcke (argued), Moore Smith

Buxton & Turcke, Boise, Idaho; Dennis L. Porter,

Sacramento, California; for Intervenors-DefendantsAppellees.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service, in reviewing the Bureau of Land

Management’s proposal to expand access for off-road vehicle

recreation in the Imperial Sand Dunes Special Recreation

Management Area, has complied with the requirements of the

Endangered Species Act.

I

Just north of the Mexican border, in Imperial County,

California, lies the Imperial Sand Dunes Planning Area, a

227,000-acre tract of desert, 214,930 acres of which is

managed by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). The

expanse is home to the Algodones Dunes, the largest active

sand dune system in the United States. A 138,111-acre

portion of the Planning Area, designated as the Imperial Sand

Dunes Special Recreation Management Area, is set aside for

the protection of plants and wildlife, as well as for outdoor

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 5

recreation. The Dunes consistently attract well over one

million visitors annually, particularly off-road vehicle

enthusiasts who flock to the area to take advantage of the

unique terrain and beautiful landscape.1

The current litigation, which has been ongoing for over a

decade, originates from BLM’s decision to reopen land

within the Imperial Sand Dunes Special Recreation

Management Area to off-road vehicle use. The Dunes contain

a species of purple-flowered plant known as the Peirson’s

milkvetch (Astragalus magdalenae var. peirsonii),

categorized as a “threatened species” for purposes of the

Endangered Species Act. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.

Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124–25 (N.D.

Cal. 2006). In 2000, the Center for Biological Diversity (“the

Center”) sued BLM, claiming that it had violated the

Endangered Species Act by failing to enter into formal

consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service before

adopting a management plan for the Dunes. Id. at 1123. As a

result, BLM agreed to close temporarily portions of the

Dunes to off-road vehicles until it could implement a new

Recreation Area Management Plan (“RAMP”). Id. at 1124. In

2005, the Center successfully challenged a BLM plan to

reopen the closed areas. Id. at 1121. The District Court for the

Northern District of California at that time held, inter alia,

that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s “Biological Opinion” for

a 2003 BLM RAMP violated the Endangered Species Act in

several respects relating to its evaluation of the potential

impact on the Peirson’s milkvetch and the desert tortoise,

another threatened species. Id. at 1121–22.

1 A 26,098-acre tract within the Planning Area, known as the North

Algodones Dunes Wilderness, is permanently off-limits to off-road

vehicle recreation.

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6 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

In response to the court’s order, the Fish and Wildlife

Service issued a new critical habitat designation for the

milkvetch in 2008, which the Center unsuccessfully

challenged. In 2013, BLM adopted a new RAMP. Under the

new plan, the 26,098-acre North Algodones Dunes

Wilderness tract would remain closed to off-road vehicles, as

would 9,261 acres of milkvetch critical habitat. The

remainder of the Imperial Sand Dunes Special Recreation

Management Area—over 127,000 acres—would be open to

off-road vehicle use. BLM additionally prepared an

Environmental Impact Statement analyzing the 2013 RAMP,

and consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to

section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act. As a result,

the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a new Biological

Opinion finding that the 2013 RAMP was not likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of the milkvetch or desert

tortoise.

The Center once again mounted a challenge, asserting

various claims under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1531 et seq., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.,

the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.

§§ 1701–1785, the National Environmental Policy Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706 et seq. Specifically, the Center alleged

that: 1) the 2012 Biological Opinion was deficient because it

did not include an Incidental Take Statement for the Peirson’s

milkvetch; 2) the Fish and Wildlife Service had unreasonably

delayed issuance of a recovery plan for the Peirson’s

milkvetch under section 4(f) of the Endangered Species Act;

3) the 2013 Environmental Impact Statement violated the

National Environmental Policy Act by failing to take a “hard

look” at impacts on wilderness areas; and 4) BLM violated

the Clean Air Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 7

Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the

Administrative Procedure Act by failing to evaluate properly

the impacts of the 2013 RAMP on air quality.

The District Court for the Northern District of California

granted summary judgment in favor of BLM on all but the

second issue.2

The Center timely appealed and argues that the plain

language of the Endangered Species Act requires an

Incidental Take Statement for plants rather than for just fish

and wildlife. The Center additionally renews its claim that

BLM failed to comply with the Clean Air Act, the Federal

Land Policy and Management Act, the National

Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure

Act by failing to evaluate properly the impacts of the 2013

RAMP on air quality.

II

The Center first avers that the Endangered Species Act

requires Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinions to

contain Incidental Take Statements for threatened plants. In

contrast, BLM maintains that Incidental Take Statements are

required solely for fish and wildlife.

We review an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is

charged with administering under the two-step framework set

forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. Salazar, 695 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir. 2012). We

2 BLM does not challenge on appeal the district court’s disposition of

this issue in favor of the Center.

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must first determine whether “Congress has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is

clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. “[I]f the

statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue,” however, “the question for the court is whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.” Id. at 843. “If a statute is ambiguous, and if the

implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron

requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of

the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the

court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” Ctr. for

Biological Diversity, 695 F.3d at 902 (quoting Nat’l Cable &

Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,

980 (2005)).

A

Enacted in 1973, the Endangered Species Act authorizes

the Secretary of the Interior to designate certain species as

“endangered” or “threatened.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home

Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995).

Section 9(a)(1) of the Act provides, among others, the

following protection for species so designated: “[W]ith

respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed

pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any

person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . .

take any such species within the United States or the

territorial sea of the United States.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1)(B). The Act defines “take” as “to harass, harm,

pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or

to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1532(19). Section 9(a)(2) lists separate protections for

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 9

endangered or threatened plants, but notably does not use the

term “take.” See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2).

In 1978, Congress added a provision to the Act requiring

federal agencies wishing to engage in action that may

adversely affect an endangered or threatened species to

consult first with the Secretary of the Interior to “insure that

any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency

. . . does not jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species or threatened species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such

species.” Pub. L. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752 (codified

as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). Consultation results

in a “Biological Opinion, summarizing the relevant findings

and determining whether the proposed action is likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of the species.” Ariz.

Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d

1229, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)). In

1982, Congress amended section 7 (as well as section 10) of

the Act, adding provisions governing “incidental taking,”

which are takings that are “incidental to, and not the purpose

of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” See Pub.

L. 97-304, §§ 4(a), 6(1), 96 Stat. 1411, 1418, 1422 to 1423;

Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 729. Under the amended version of

section 7, the Fish and Wildlife Service “must issue an

Incidental Take Statement if the [Biological Opinion]

concludes no jeopardy to listed species or adverse

modification of critical habitat will result from the proposed

action, but the action is likely to result in incidental takings.”

Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.

2007). The statute requires BLM to issue an “Incidental Take

Statement” that:

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(i) specifies the impact of such incidental

taking on the species,

(ii) specifies those reasonable and prudent

measures that the Secretary considers

necessary or appropriate to minimize such

impact,

(iii) in the case of marine mammals,

specifies those measures that are necessary to

comply with section 1371(a)(5) of this title

with regard to such taking, and

(iv) sets forth the terms and conditions

(including, but not limited to, reporting

requirements) that must be complied with by

the Federal agency or applicant (if any), or

both, to implement the measures specified

under clauses (ii) and (iii).

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C).

Here, though the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 2012

Biological Opinion found that off-road vehicle use “could

result in direct death or injury of Peirson’s milk-vetch due to

crushing, uprooting, or burial of plants and seeds, and by

reducing reproductive output of those that survive,” the

Service did not issue an Incidental Take Statement for the

plant.

B

The Center argues that the plain language of section 7’s

Incidental Take Statement provision requires Incidental Take

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Statements for both plants and animals. As the Center

observes, consultation between the Fish and Wildlife Service

and BLM is required for “any endangered species or

threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis

added). This is why the resultingBiological Opinion included

an analysis of the impact of off-road vehicles on the

milkvetch. Under the statute, when the Fish and Wildlife

Service concludes in its Biological Opinion that “the taking

of an endangered species or a threatened species incidental to

the agencyaction will not” jeopardize the continued existence

of a species, but will nevertheless adversely impact a species,

it must issue a statement that “specifies the impact of such

incidental taking on the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). The

Center contends that the use of the term “species,” rather than

a different term that might restrict the provision to fish or

wildlife, signifies that an Incidental Take Statement is

required for all species, including plants.

When one reads section 7 in isolation, the Center’s

argument seems plausible. Indeed, there is nothing

specifically in that provision to indicate that Congress

intended to limit the term “species” to fish or wildlife.

Section 7, however, “must be read in [its] context and with a

view to [its] place in the overall statutory scheme,” Food &

Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of

Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)), because an act should

“be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory

scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent

meaning throughout,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,

569 (1995).

Here, context matters. Section 9 prohibits the taking of

“fish or wildlife” only:

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[W]ith respect to any endangered species of

fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533

of this title it is unlawful for any person . . . to

. . . take any such species within the United

States or the territorial sea of the United

States [or] take any such species upon the

high seas.

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). Section 9(a)(2) contains separate

protections for plants, but does not use the term “take.” See

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2). Section 9 thus demonstrates that

when Congress uses the word “take,” it means to describe an

adverse action against animals, not plants. And, as the district

court noted, unlike the section 9(a)(1) protections for “fish or

wildlife,” the section 9(a)(2) prohibitions relating to plants

require “deliberate or malicious conduct.” Incidental takings,

by definition, are not deliberate. Given that one cannot be

held liable for the taking of a plant, it is difficult to conceive

how an incidental take “safe harbor” would be necessary for

plants.

The Center counters that the Endangered Species Act

defines “take” in a manner that does not exclude plants.

Under the definitions section of the Act, “[t]he term ‘take’

means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,

capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such

conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). According to the Center, the

definition “does not distinguish between animals and plants

. . . . It defines only the act, not the victim or the crime.” As

the district court noted, however, the take definition in the

statute was part of the original Act. Before the 1982

amendments adding the incidental take provisions of sections

7 and 10, section 9 contained the only provision in which the

term “take” was used, and there it was unquestionably limited

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 13

to animals—to “fish or wildlife.” In drafting the take

definition, Congress necessarily had exclusively “fish or

wildlife” in mind because those were the only categories of

species at the time protected from takings.

Putting the history of the Act aside for a moment, the text

of the take definition supports the same conclusion. The

majority of the words on the list most naturally describe

actions that cannot be directed against plants. For example,

one does not pursue a tree; one does not typically shoot a

shrub. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Conversely, there are no

words in the definition that could be applied exclusively to

plants, such as “uproot.” See id. The principle of noscitur a

sociis here guides our reading: “That several items in a list

share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other

items as possessing that attribute as well.” Beecham v. United

States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994). Words such as “harm” or

“collect,” though ordinarily applicable to actions taken

against both animals and plants, are best construed in a

manner similar to those words that surround them—namely,

words describing conduct affecting animals.

Our decision in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Association

lends further support to the proposition that “take” applies to

animals only. In that case, we held that the Fish and Wildlife

Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it issued an

Incidental Take Statement “where there either was no

evidence that the endangered species existed on the land or no

evidence that a take would occur if the permit were issued.”

Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1233. In reaching

our conclusion, we reasoned that section 7’s incidental take

provision was in essence a “safe harbor” for section 9; if an

approved activity might incidentally result in a taking, those

engaging in the activity need not fear section 9 liability so

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14 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

long as they comply with the terms of the Fish and Wildlife

Service’s Incidental Take Statement. Id. at 1239–40. Because

there can be no incidental taking if there is no threat of a

section 9 taking, there necessarily is only “one standard for

‘taking’ within both Section 7(b)(4) . . . and Section 9.” Id. at

1239. Consequently, we “reject[ed]the argument that ‘taking’

should be applied differently” between the two sections. Id.

at 1240.3

The Center parries Arizona Cattle Growers’ Association

with Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar. In Center for

Biological Diversity, when the Fish and Wildlife Service first

listed the polar bear as “threatened,” it issued a rule applying

most of section 9’s protections but excluded the section 9

“take” prohibitions. 695 F.3d at 910. We held that an

Incidental Take Statement was nevertheless required. Id. As

we explained:

[E]xemption from Section 9 take liability ‘is

not the sole purpose of the [Incidental Take

Statement]. If the amount or extent of taking

specified in the [Incidental Take Statement] is

exceeded, reinitiation of formal consultation

is required . . . . Thus, the [Incidental Take

Statement] serves as a check on the agency’s

3 Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act (the other incidental take

provision) authorizes the Secretary to permit “any taking otherwise

prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) [section 9] of this title if such taking

is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise

lawful activity.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1). That the provision considers an

incidental taking to be a subset of the takings referred to in section 9

further supports the Fish and Wildlife Service’s contention that Incidental

Take Statements exist to protect “fish or wildlife,” 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1),

not plants.

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 15

original decision that the incidental take of

listed species resulting from the proposed

action will not [jeopardize the continued

existence of the species].’ [Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129,

1182 (N.D. Cal. 2003)]. Accordingly,

exemption from Section 9 take prohibitions

does not negate the separate requirement that

the Service ‘will provide’ an [Incidental Take

Statement] along with its [Biological

Opinion]. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1).

Id. at 911 (some alterations in original).

As the district court recognized, one could perceive

tension between Arizona Cattle Growers’ Association and

Center for Biological Diversity. While Arizona Cattle

Growers’ Association makes clear that there cannot be a

section 7 incidental taking where there is no section 9 taking

prohibition, Center for Biological Diversity divorces section

7’s incidental taking statements from section 9 taking

prohibitions in holding that the section 7 provision serves a

purpose beyond merely removing liability for otherwise

prohibited takings. Fully reconciling the two cases,

fortunately, is not necessary to resolve the issue at hand.

Accepting Center for Biological Diversity’s holding that an

Incidental Take Statement can be required where taking is not

prohibited, the concept of “taking” nevertheless continues to

derive its meaning from section 9 and the Act’s definition of

“take.” To understand what it means to incidentally take a

species, one must understand what it means to take a species;

to understand what it means to take, one necessarily looks to

section 9. Because section 9 applies to animals only, it

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16 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

follows that one can neither “take” nor “incidentally take” a

plant.

It is no wonder then that district courts have assumed that

the incidental take provisions apply to animals only. See, e.g.,

Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. Norton, No. 01CV1742 DMS

(JMA), 2004 WL 1118537, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2004)

(“In the absence of a prohibition on the ‘take’ of plant

species, Defendants are correct that ‘such take cannot occur,

and no incidental take statement is needed.’”); N. Cal. River

Watch v. Wilcox, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (N.D. Cal.

2008), aff’d, 633 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[S]ection

10—allowing a private party to apply for an incidental take

permit—applies only to fish and wildlife; there is no section

10 incidental take permit provision for endangered plants.”).

C

Read in context, the text of the statute is clear: the

Endangered Species Act does not requireBiological Opinions

to contain Incidental Take Statements for threatened plants.

We therefore need not consider separately the Fish and

Wildlife Service’s interpretation of the statute. See Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842–43. Nonetheless, our reading of the law is

consistent with the Service’s longstanding interpretation of

the incidental take provision not to require the issuance of

Incidental Take Statements for threatened plants. See

Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973,

51 Fed. Reg. 19926-01, 19935 to 19936 (July 3, 1986)

(codified at 51 C.F.R. pt. 402) (defining an incidental taking

as a taking that results from activities that violate “the

prohibition against taking in section 9 of the Act”); U.S. Fish

and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service,

Final ESA Section 7 Consultation Handbook 6–10 (1998)

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(stating that an Incidental Take Statement is required as part

of formal consultation “except for plant species”).

Accordingly, we would have deferred to the agency’s

reasonable interpretation of the statute and reached the same

result had the application of Chevron deference been

necessary in this case.

III

The Center next argues that BLM’s decision to open

additional land to off-road vehicle use violated the Clean Air

Act (“CAA”), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act

(“FLPMA”), the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”), and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

In reaching its decision, BLM relied on an air quality analysis

demonstrating that emissions resulting from visitors to the

Dunes would not be increased impermissibly by the openings.

We must reject each of the Center’s challenges unless we are

persuaded that BLM’s analysis was “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (APA); see Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A.,

671 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012) (reviewing CAA challenge

under APA standard); Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Connell,

725 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing FLPMA

challenge under APA standard); Ocean Advocates v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 858 (9th Cir. 2005)

(reviewing NEPA challenge under APA standard). An

agency’s analysis is arbitrary and capricious if it has “relied

on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,

offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of

agency expertise.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund

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18 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

United Stockgrowers of America v. U.S. Dept. of Agric.,

499 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

43 (1983)). “This standard of review is ‘highly deferential,

presuming the agency action to be valid and affirming the

agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision.’”

Id. (quoting Indep. Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d

1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000)).

As with the Center’s first challenge, we begin with a

review of the statutory scheme governing BLM’s air quality

analysis.

A

1

The CAA was enacted “to protect and enhance the quality

of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public

health and welfare and the productive capacity of its

population.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). The Act authorizes the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to establish

“national ambient air qualitystandards” for certain designated

pollutants. Id. § 7407. These pollutants include ozone

precursors, such as volatile organic compounds and nitrogen

oxides, and particulate matter with a diameter greater than 10

microns (“PM-10”). See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21; see generally

40 C.F.R. pt. 50. Under the scheme, States are divided into

“air quality control regions.” Id. § 7407. The governor of

each State is responsible for designating an area—an entire

air quality control region or portion thereof—as

“nonattainment” if it fails to meet national ambient air quality

standards. Id. Nonattainment areas are further classified as

“Marginal,” “Moderate,” “Serious,” “Severe,” and

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 19

“Extreme,” based on the severity of pollution present. Id.

§ 7511. The agency must undertake a full “conformity

determination . . . for each criteria pollutant or precursor

where the total of direct and indirect emissions of the criteria

pollutant or precursor in a nonattainment or maintenance area

caused by a Federal action would equal or exceed” listed de

minimis quantities. 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(b).

In similar fashion, FLPMA requires the Secretary of the

Interior, in developing and revising land use plans, to

“provide for compliance with applicable pollution control

laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other

pollution standards or implementation plans.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1712(c)(8).

Finally, before undertaking a proposed action, NEPA

requires federal agencies to take a “hard look” to determine

the potential impact an agency action may have on the

environment; such a review requires a “full and fair

discussion of significant environmental impacts.” Western

Watersheds Project v. Abbey, 719 F.3d 1035, 1047 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1).

2

The Imperial CountyAir Pollution Control District,which

contains the Dunes, is classified as a “moderate”

nonattainment area for ozone and a “serious” nonattainment

area for PM-10, largely as a result of high winds and

particulate matter drifting across the border from nearby

Mexicali, Mexico. Under such classifications, BLM would be

required to undertake a full conformity determination

pursuant to EPA regulation if execution of BLM’s 2013

RAMP would result in an increase of 100 tons per year for

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20 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

ozone emissions or 70 tons per year for PM-10. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 93.153(b). BLM initially concluded in its Draft

Environmental Impact Statement that implementation of its

preferred plan would increase volatile organic compound

emissions by 352 tons per year (generated primarily by

vehicle exhaust) and PM-10 emissions by 36,768 tons per

year (generated primarily by dust kicked up from

vehicles)—both well over the de minimis thresholds that

require conformity analyses under 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(b).

Following the issuance of its draft statement for public

comment, BLM revised its analysis by changing certain

underlying assumptions supporting the initial conclusion that

the planned expansion would result in emissions exceeding de

minimis quantities. Specifically, BLM changed its

assumptions regarding the expected increase in the number of

vehicles to the Dunes, the manner in which they would be

used, and the amount of dust theymight generate. As a result,

the Final Environmental Impact Statement concluded that

pollution resulting from BLM’s planned openings would not

increase ozone emissions and would actuallydecreasePM-10

emissions.

B

The Center first argues that the assumptions supporting

BLM’s ultimate conclusion that implementation of the 2013

RAMP would not increase ozone emissions were arbitrary

and capricious. Specifically, the Center takes issue with

BLM’s assumptions regarding the number of individuals who

will visit the Dunes and how an average visitor will spend his

time recreating.

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 21

1

In its Final Environmental Impact Statement, BLM

assumed, for purposes of its emissions analysis, that its plan

to open additional areas of the Dunes to off-road vehicle use

would not lead to an overall increase in the number of

visitors: “[V]isitor use of the Planning Area will remain the

same as current levels for all alternatives, and there would be

no incremental change in GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions

from the baseline.” The Center argues that such an

assumption cannot possibly be correct—that opening

additional areas to off-road vehicle use will necessarilyattract

an increased number of off-road vehicle enthusiasts.

Yet in litigation surrounding BLM’s 2003 RAMP, the

Center challenged BLM’s contention that the closing of

certain areas would result in a decline in visitors. The district

court agreed with the Center, concluding that “there is no data

in the record linking the interim closures to any reduced OHV

[off-highway vehicle] visitation levels at the Dunes.” Ctr. for

Biological Diversity, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. BLM argues

that no data has surfaced since the previous litigation

demonstrating that opening or closing such areas would

change the number of visitors to the Dunes.

Facts and data in the record tend to support the assertion

that opening further acreage to off-road vehicle use would not

lead to an increased number of visitors. Much of the area

scheduled to be opened is quite remote—far from camping

and staging areas and lacking in amenities such as restrooms.

And fluctuations in the number of visitors appear to be tied

more closely to historical trends and economic conditions

than to acreage. For example, after previous closures

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visitation to the planning area increased initially, before

decreasing during a subsequent economic downturn.

BLM’s analysis, of course, is not immune from criticism.

Of particular note is the inconsistency between BLM’s

emissions analysis and its economic analysis, the latter of

which assumed that opening additional acreage would in fact

result in an increased number of visitors. Nevertheless, the

existence of such an inconsistency is insufficient proof that

the emissions analysis was arbitrary and capricious. Indeed,

BLM had the discretion to apply different models and

assumptions in different circumstances. See San Luis &

Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 610 (9th

Cir. 2014) (“[W]e give the [Fish and Wildlife Service] great

deference in its choice of scientific tools . . . .”). And, of

course, the assumption supporting the economic analysis may

simply be wrong—that it differs from the one contained in the

emissions analysis does not compel the conclusion that the

emissions analysis was flawed.

We are confident that the Center could demonstrate

persuasively numerous ways in which BLM’s emissions

analysis could be improved. Mere differences in opinion,

however, are not sufficient grounds for rejecting the analysis

of agency experts. See Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d

652, 656 (9th Cir. 2009). Because BLM’s assumptions

regarding visitation were supported by substantial evidence,

they deserve deference. See Ursack, Inc. v. Sierra

Interagency Black Bear Grp., 639 F.3d 949, 958 n.4 (9th Cir.

2011).

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2

In addition to criticizing BLM’s estimate of the number

of expected visitors, the Center attacks BLM’s assumptions

contained in its Final Environmental Impact Statement

relating to how visitors spend their time at the Dunes.

Specifically, the Center argues that BLM underestimated the

number of hours per day an average rider uses his off-road

vehicle, the distance he rides, and the speed at which he

travels (the numbers for these variables were significantly

higher in BLM’s Draft Environmental Impact Statement). As

with BLM’s prediction of the number of visitors, such

assumptions are entitled to deference so long as they are

supported by “substantial evidence.” See San Luis & DeltaMendota Water Auth., 747 F.3d at 608.

For purposes of our analysis, however, BLM’s revised

assumptions regarding vehicle use are irrelevant. A

conformity analysis must be prepared only if the emissions

caused by the federal action—here, BLM’s “preferred

alternative” in the 2013 RAMP—exceed listed de minimis

levels. See 40 C.F.R. 93.153(b). BLM applied the same

assumptions relating to vehicle use to its preferred alternative

as to the baseline conditions against which BLM compared its

plan. The Center does not argue that opening more acreage to

off-road vehicles would affect the manner in which the

average visitor would use his off-road vehicle; it contends

instead that BLM’s assumptions regarding vehicle use, which

apply equally to all proposed alternatives, are wrong.

However, as the district court observed, if BLM’s assumption

that the number of visitors would not increase is correct, the

number of hours per day an average rider uses his off-road

vehicle, the distance he rides, and the speed at which he

travels have absolutelyno effect on the calculation of whether

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24 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

opening additional acreage to off-road vehicles will increase

emissions. The same logic undercuts the Center’s argument

that BLM failed to account for other sources of emissions,

such as campfires and generators. Absent an increase in

visitation, overall pollution will not change.

C

The Center additionally challenges the “fugitive

particulate emissions” (PM-10) portion of BLM’s air-quality

analysis—specifically BLM’s procedure for evaluating the

characteristics of the soil found throughout the Dunes. Unlike

the assumptions regarding vehicle usage, a change in soil

evaluation methods is relevant even if the number of visitors

remains constant because soil characteristics vary throughout

the Dunes. PM-10 emissions thus depend on which portions

of the Dunes are open for off-road vehicle use.

1

Vehicles kick up dust. As a general rule, greater silt

content in soil results in greater PM-10 emissions from

vehicle traffic. Conversely, when soil contains a greater

concentration of sand, PM-10 emissions are reduced. In its

original analysis, contained in the Draft Environmental

Impact Statement, BLM relied upon “standard assumptions”

regarding silt content to determine the amount of airborne

PM-10 off-road vehicles operating in the Dunes might

produce. After publishing the draft statement, BLM revisited

its analysis and “determined the standard assumptions that

were used greatly overestimated emissions.” BLM was

instead persuaded that actual soil samples would provide a

better foundation for the analysis and so officials proceeded

to test soil throughout the Dunes: “Sites were visited and

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 25

approximately 800 gram samples were collected. These

samples were returned to the office where they were sieved

and weighed to determine the various fractions of silt and

sand in the sample.” The testing demonstrated that soils on

the Dunes were predominantly sand, with over 75 percent of

each sample not passing through a mesh screen. Silt content

proved to be low, constituting less than 0.5 percent. Such

findings, when incorporated into the analysis, yielded a PM10 figure below the de minimis threshold. Indeed, because

BLM’s proposed openings would shift off-road vehicle use to

areas of the Dunes with lower silt content, and would

incorporate proposed mitigation measures, the new analysis

predicted a decrease in PM-10 emissions from the baseline.

2

Under the CAA, States (and by delegation, local

governments) may develop individualized regulatory

programs called “state implementation plans” that specify

emissions limitations, in addition to other measures designed

to satisfy national ambient air quality standards for each

pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Federal agencies may not

“engage in, support in anyway or provide financial assistance

for, license or permit, or approve, any activity which does not

conform to an implementation plan.” Id. § 7506(c)(1).

The Center argues that the soil sample method employed

by BLM was impermissible because it failed to conform to

Imperial County’s Implementation Plan. Rule 800 of the

Implementation Plan, entitled “General Requirements for

Control of Fine Particulate Matter (PM-10),” prescribes a

method for analyzing soil characteristics. Rule 800, section

G.1.e specifically governs the determination of silt content

for “Unpaved Roads and UnpavedVehicle/Equipment Traffic

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26 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

Areas.” The Center avers that because BLM ignored such

rule, the results of its analysis are void. BLM counters that

the Center’s proposed method is used solely to determine

whether a road is considered a “stabilized unpaved road” and

was therefore inapplicable for BLM’s purposes, viz. to

estimate PM-10 emissions from off-road vehicle usage.

Rule 800, section G.1.e directs agencies to employ

methods contained in appendix B, section C of the Rule to

determine the silt content for “Unpaved Roads and Unpaved

Vehicle/Equipment Traffic Areas.” The appendix explains

that the purpose of such methods is “to determine whether an

area has a Stabilized Surface.” Rule 800, app. B, § A. Indeed,

the procedure culminates in a finding as to whether a surface

is “stable”: “If the average silt loading is less than 0.33 oz/ft2,

the surface is STABLE.” Id. app. B, § C.10 (“Step 9:

Examine Results.”). As BLM argues, the aim of testing under

appendix B, section C, is to determine whether a surface is in

fact a “Stabilized Unpaved Road,” which Rule 800 defines as

“[a]ny Unpaved Road or unpaved vehicle/equipment traffic

area surface which meets the definition of Stabilized Surface

as determined by the test method.” Id. § C.38. Rule 800

makes use of the “stabilized unpaved road” standard in

section F.5.c, where it requires those overseeing lands on

which off-road vehicles are used to employ methods such as

watering, paving, or speed restrictions to ensure that a surface

does not cease being a “stabilized unpaved road”—that is, to

ensure that excessive dust is not generated.

Simply put, a “stabilized unpaved road” under Rule 800

is a standard—a surface over which vehicles travel without

kicking up excessive amounts of dust; one determines

whether the standard is met by using the test prescribed by

appendix B, section C. Contrary to the Center’s assertion, the

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CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM 27

test prescribed by appendix B is not a procedure for gauging

PM-10 emissions generally. BLM’s use of an alternative

method for estimating PM-10 emissions was therefore

permissible.

D

Finally, the Center argues that BLM impermissibly

disregarded concerns raised by EPA and the Imperial County

Air Pollution Control District regarding potential impacts on

the environment. We reject this argument for three reasons.

First, ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance with

applicable laws lies with the agencyundertaking the proposed

action—here, BLM. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c). Second, that

another agency might prefer a different approach is

insufficient to demonstrate that BLM acted unreasonably. See

Edwardsen v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 268 F.3d 781, 786 (9th

Cir. 2001). Third, the record indicates that BLM did indeed

consider and respond to criticisms and concerns raised by

other agencies, as well as those from the general public.

BLM’s handling of input from other agencies was therefore

neither unlawful nor arbitrary and capricious.

E

In challenging an agency determination such as this, the

Center had a steep hill to climb as “[r]eview under the

arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow”—a court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Ecology Ctr.,

574 F.3d at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the

record demonstrates that BLM “considered the relevant

factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts

found and the choices made.” Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d

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28 CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. BLM

1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ranchers Cattlemen

Action Legal Fund, 415 F.3d at 1093). Under the

circumstances, the Center has failed to demonstrate that

BLM’s emissions analysis was arbitrary and capricious under

this deferential standard.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

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