Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00073/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00073-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AIRHAWK INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a 

California Limited Liability Company,

Plaintiff,

v.

ONTEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a 

New Jersey Corporation; and DOES 1 

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00073-MMA-AGS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. No. 139]

Plaintiff Airhawk International, LLC (“Airhawk”) brings this action against 

Defendant Ontel Products Corporation (“Ontel”) asserting claims of: (1) Trademark

Infringement, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); (2) Common Law

Trademark Infringement; (3) False Designation of Origin and False Description, in

violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (4) Unfair Competition, in

violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17000 et seq. and 17500 et seq. 

See Compl., Doc. No. 1. On January 2, 2020, the Court granted partial summary 

judgment for Ontel on the issue of Airhawk’s request for disgorgement of profits, finding 

that Airhawk “fail[ed] to provide evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether 

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Ontel willfully infringed its mark.” See Doc. No. 130 at 41.

1

 Airhawk now moves for 

reconsideration, arguing that (1) good cause exists to grant reconsideration of partial 

summary judgment on the issue of disgorgement of profits, see Doc. 139-1 at 8-10, and 

(2) an intervening change in the law after the United States Supreme Court decided 

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., (2020) 590 U.S._, Case No. 18-1233 

(“Romag”) requires reconsideration. See Doc. No. 143. Ontel filed an opposition to the 

motion, to which Defendant replied. See Doc. Nos. 140, 141. Ontel also filed a response 

to Airhawk’s supplemental brief in support of its motion for reconsideration. See Doc. 

No. 144. The Court found the matters suitable for determination on the papers and 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 141. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Airhawk’s motion for reconsideration. 

BACKGROUND

Airhawk is the owner of United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)

Registration No. 4,009,225 (hereinafter “the Airhawk word mark”) for the standard

character mark bearing the word “AIRHAWK.” See Compl., Ex. A. The Airhawk word

mark was first used in 1997 and has been used continuously for goods or services related

to truck and motorcycle seat cushions and/or related products. See id. Airhawk is also 

the owner of PTO Registration Nos. 4,009,228 and 4,977,720 for the configuration of a 

hawk design and a hawk design located between the words “AIR” and “HAWK,” 

respectively. See id., Ex. B.2

 

Ontel develops, markets, and distributes a wide variety of consumer products, 

which it sells through a direct-to-consumer market, commonly referred to in the industry 

as “As Seen on TV.” In 2016, Ontel developed a portable, battery-operated, handheld, 

automatic air compressor to inflate tires. The air compressor product

 

1 The Court’s citations to electronically filed documents refer to the pagination assigned by the 

document’s author, rather than the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system.

2 Airhawk’s word and design marks are collectively referred to as Airhawk’s “marks.”

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launched in January 2017. Ontel selected the name “Air Hawk” for its air

compressor. On December 12, 2016, Ontel filed a trademark application with the PTO 

for its “AIR HAWK” logo in connection with air compressors. The PTO approved

Ontel’s application, finding no conflicting marks that would bar registration. Ontel 

maintains that it had no knowledge of Airhawk’s marks at the time it selected

the AIR HAWK name for its product. Airhawk opposed registration of Ontel’s

application on December 18, 2017 before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. The

opposition is suspended pending the outcome of this action.

Airhawk claims that Ontel’s use of the name “Air Hawk” has created confusion 

among consumers, causing damage to Airhawk’s business, reputation, and goodwill. 

Airhawk asserts that Ontel’s marketing campaign related to the introduction of Ontel’s air 

compressor product in early 2017 caused Airhawk to experience a decline in sales. In 

February 2017, Airhawk’s intellectual property counsel sent a letter to Ontel regarding 

Ontel’s pending trademark application for “AIR HAWK” and highlighted the similarities 

between the parties’ marks. On March 24, 2017, Ontel’s intellectual property counsel 

responded and identified the differences between the parties’ products and trade channels. 

Airhawk did not respond to Ontel’s March 2017 letter.

On January 11, 2018, Airhawk commenced the instant action alleging trademark

infringement of PTO Registration Numbers 4,009,225, 4,009,228, and 4,977,720. 

Compl. ¶ 10. Airhawk further asserts that sales of Defendant’s goods utilizing the name

“AIR HAWK” constitute a false designation of origin, deceptive trade practices, and

unfair competition. Id. ¶ 22. Airhawk seeks damages and permanent injunctive relief, 

including “an order requiring Defendants, and each of them, to account for and pay 

AIRHAWK all illegal profits from their sale and/or distribution of infringing products.”

See Compl. at 11.

As noted above, the Court previously granted partial summary judgment for Ontel 

on the issue of Airhawk’s request for disgorgement of profits. Airhawk moves for 

reconsideration, arguing that (1) good cause exists to grant reconsideration of partial 

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summary judgment on the issue of disgorgement of profits, see Doc. 139-1 at 8-10, and 

(2) an intervening change in the law requires reconsideration. See Doc. No. 143. Ontel 

contends that the motion is untimely, improper under Rule 60(b), and fails on the merits, 

even though Romag changed the law with respect to willfulness as a required showing for 

a plaintiff seeking disgorgement of profits under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). See Doc. Nos. 140 

at 1-8; 144 at 1-3.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for 

reconsideration. However, a motion for reconsideration may be construed as a motion to 

alter or amend a final judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. 

Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Dev. Co., 42 F.3d 

1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, a motion for reconsideration is proper under 

Civil Local Rule 7.1.i.1. See CivLR 7.1.i. 

Reconsideration under Rule 60 may be granted in the case of: (1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) fraud; 

or if (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) for any other 

reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Under Rule 60, a motion for “relief from a 

final judgment, order or proceeding” may be filed within a “reasonable time,” but must 

be filed “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the 

proceeding” for reasons (1), (2), and (3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Under the Local 

Rules, “[e]xcept as may be allowed under Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any motion . . . for reconsideration must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days 

after the entry of the ruling, order or judgment sought to be reconsidered.” CivLR 7.1.i.2.

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests 

of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “Ultimately, however, the decision on a motion for 

reconsideration lies in the Court’s sound discretion.” Labastida v. McNeil Techs., Inc., 

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No. 10-CV-1690-MMA (CAB), 2011 WL 767169, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2011) (citing 

Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003)). Airhawk bases its motion 

for reconsideration on the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6). See Doc. No. 47 at 6. 

2. Analysis

Airhawk argues that its motion for reconsideration is timely made, and in any 

event the Court should reach the merits as any delay was not unreasonable. See Doc. No. 

139-1 at 6-8. Airhawk further argues that the Court granted partial summary judgment 

for Ontel based on evidence that Ontel has since stipulated it will not rely on “in any way 

before the Court—including testimony, evidence, argument, and written submissions—to 

support its ‘innocent intent’ or ‘good faith’ affirmative defenses.” See Doc. No. 139-1 at 

8-10 (citing Doc. No. 109 at 2:14-18). Airhawk also asserts that an intervening change in 

the law requires reconsideration and reversal of the Court’s order granting Ontel partial 

summary judgment on disgorgement of profits. See Doc. No. 143 at 2-3. Ontel responds 

that Airhawk’s motion is untimely under the Local Rules and fails on the merits. See 

Doc. No. 140 at 1-8. Ontel also argues that while the Supreme Court’s Romag decision

admittedly changed the applicable law, Romag nevertheless supports this Court’s grant of 

partial summary judgment on Airhawk’s request for disgorgement of profits. See Doc. 

No. 144 at 1-3. The Court will address these arguments in turn.

A. Timeliness

As an initial matter, Ontel argues that Airhawk’s motion is untimely for failure to 

comply with Local Rule 7.1.i.2. See Doc. No. 140 at 1-2. The Court issued its summary 

judgment order on January 2, 2020. See Doc. No. 130. Because Airhawk did not file its 

motion for reconsideration until March 4, 2020, see Doc. No. 139, its motion is untimely

under Local Rule 7.1.i.2. See Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0604-GPCKSC, 2015 WL 3539702, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 2015) (motion for reconsideration was 

untimely when filed outside of Local Rule 7.1.i.2’s 28-day window). Airhawk argues 

that Rule 60’s “reasonable time” standard governs, as opposed to Local Rule 7.1.i.2’s 28-

day window, and in any event, the Court should exercise its discretion to consider the 

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merits of Airhawk’s motion. See Doc. 139-1 at 7-8.

The Court finds that Airhawk did not file its motion for reconsideration within a 

reasonable time. As an initial matter, Airhawk could have brought the underlying 

evidentiary issue to the Court’s attention shortly after Ontel filed its August 5, 2019 

stipulation “not [to] use its attorney-client communications concerning its trademark 

search and related documents in any way before the Court . . ..” Doc. No. 109 at 2:14-18. 

At that time, Ontel’s motion for summary judgment was fully briefed and pending before 

the Court. Airhawk could have sought leave to file a supplemental brief objecting to 

Ontel’s reliance on evidence falling under the umbrella of “attorney-client 

communications” and “related documents.” 

Moreover, even giving Airhawk the benefit of Rule 60’s “reasonable time” 

standard, Airhawk should have filed its motion in a timely fashion after the Court issued 

its summary judgment ruling. Nevertheless, Airhawk waited until March 4, 2020 to file 

its motion for reconsideration. According to Airhawk, the reason for the delay is because 

it interpreted this Court’s order to schedule a mandatory settlement conference “to mean 

the Court did not intend to entertain any further motions by the parties until they first 

attended the [conference].” Doc. No. 139-1 at 7. However, the Court finds it

unreasonable to interpret an order to schedule a conference as implying that the Court 

would not entertain a motion for reconsideration within the 28-day window specified in 

the Local Rules. 

Nevertheless, because the parties agree that there has been an intervening change 

in the relevant underlying law, the Court will exercise its discretion to consider 

Airhawk’s motion on its merits under Rule 60(b). 

B. Effect of Ontel’s Stipulation

Airhawk argues that the Court granted partial summary judgment to Ontel on the 

issue of a profit-based remedy “almost exclusively on evidence that has since been 

rendered subject to an exclusionary order at trial.” Doc. No. 139-1 at 8. Ontel replies 

that Airhawk cannot meet the Rule 60(b) standard since the Court’s partial summary 

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judgment order is not a “final judgment”, and in any event, its basis for seeking 

reconsideration is without merit. See Doc. No. 140 at 2-8. 

By its express terms, Rule 60(b) applies to “final judgment[s], order[s], or 

proceeding[s] . . ..” “Final decisions end[ ] the litigation on the merits and leave[ ] 

nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar 

Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This 

Court’s order granting partial summary judgment for Ontel is not a final judgment. See 

id. (“An order granting partial summary judgment is usually not an appealable final order 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it does not dispose of all of the claims.”). The Court’s 

order did not dispose of all claims, as Airhawk may proceed in seeking to recover actual 

damages as a result of the alleged trademark infringement. See Doc. No. 130 at 44. 

Airhawk neglects to address the standard of finality in briefing its motion for 

reconsideration and thereby implicitly concedes that it cannot meet this standard. 

Even assuming arguendo that the partial summary judgment order is “final” for 

purposes of reconsideration under Rule 60(b), Airhawk also fails to show it is entitled to

relief from the Court’s ruling. Its asserted basis, that this Court granted partial summary 

judgment “almost exclusively” based on evidence that will now be excluded at trial, is 

erroneous. The Court granted partial summary judgment because Airhawk “fail[ed] to 

provide evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant willfully 

infringed its mark.” Doc. 130 at 41. Contrary to Airhawk’s assertion, the evidence that 

the Court considered in granting partial summary judgment for Ontel has not since been 

excluded. As Ontel recognizes, the two key pieces of evidence that the Court 

considered—(1) Ontel’s counsel’s March 2017 letter to Airhawk’s counsel regarding the 

parties’ respective marks and (2) the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 

acceptance of Ontel’s trademark applications—“have nothing to do with the attorneyclient communications that were” the subject of Ontel’s stipulation. Doc. No. 140 at 7. 

Rather, the evidence is non-privileged information bearing on Ontel’s mental state with 

respect to its infringement of Airhawk’s marks. Furthermore, the Court’s key finding 

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remains true: Airhawk failed to carry its burden of raising a triable issue of fact as to 

whether Ontel acted with a mental state demonstrating that disgorgement of profits is an 

appropriate remedy.

In sum, even if the Court’s partial summary judgment order is reviewable under 

Rule 60(b), the Court based its ruling on evidence that is not subject to exclusion at trial

under the terms of the August 5, 2019 stipulation.

C. Romag

Airhawk next argues that under Romag, Ontel is not entitled to summary judgment 

on Airhawk’s claim for disgorgement of profits. See Doc. No. 143. Ontel replies that 

Romag does not affect the Court’s ruling, but rather supports a finding that it was “proper 

and appropriate.” Doc. No. 144 at 1-2. 

In Romag, the Supreme Court held that willfulness was not an “inflexible 

precondition” for a trademark plaintiff seeking disgorgement of profits from a defendant 

for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Slip Op. at 6-7. However, the Court recognized 

that given the tradition that considering a defendant’s mental state is relevant to assigning 

an appropriate remedy, “a trademark defendant’s mental state is a highly important 

consideration in determining whether an award of profits is appropriate.” Id. at 7. 

As discussed above, in reaching its ruling, the Court relied on two key pieces of 

evidence that were relevant to whether Ontel acted with a culpable mental state in 

infringing Airhawk’s mark. Romag recognized that such evidence of Ontel’s mental state 

was a “highly important consideration” for the Court in exercising its discretionary and 

equitable authority as to whether Airhawk should be awarded disgorgement of Ontel’s 

profits. Id. at 7 (“[I]t is a principle long reflected in equity practice where district courts 

have often considered a defendant’s mental state, among other factors, when exercising 

their discretion in choosing a fitting remedy.”) (citations omitted); see also Retractable 

Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 919 F.3d 869, 883 (5th Cir. 2019)

(“[D]isgorgement is ultimately an equitable remedy subject to the district court’s sound 

discretion.”). 

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Moreover, the Court’s consideration of Ontel’s mental state was especially 

appropriate here because Airhawk sought this profit-based remedy not for compensatory 

purposes, but as a restitutionary measure of damages. See Doc. No. 130 n. 17. The 

Restatement recognizes that disgorgement of profits is typically appropriate in cases 

involving “conscious wrongdoers;” in these cases, plaintiffs, like Airhawk here, seek 

disgorgement of profits not necessarily to be made whole, but to prevent the defendant 

from retaining gains made possible by its wrongdoing. See Restatement (Third) of 

Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51 (2011) (“This profit-based measure of unjust 

enrichment determines recoveries against conscious wrongdoers and defaulting 

fiduciaries. Recovery so measured may potentially exceed any loss to the claimant.”). 

“This is not a case, moreover, where the defendant violated the Lanham Act and emerged 

unscathed,” Retractable Techs., 919 F.3d at 884, as Airhawk may proceed against Ontel

for a recovery of any actual damages it can prove at trial. See Doc. No. 130. 

In short, reconsideration is not warranted here. In opposing Ontel’s motion for 

summary judgment, Airhawk failed to make any showing that disgorgement of profits

was appropriate in light of Ontel’s mental state and the facts surrounding the alleged § 

1117(a) violation. Therefore, the Court exercised its sound discretion in granting partial 

summary judgment on the issue of disgorgement of profits.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Airhawk’s motion for reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2020

_____________________________

HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO

United States District Judge

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