Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00951/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00951-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JACK LOUMENA,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAMELA KENNEDY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING

PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 29, 30, 33

Before the Court is: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Walter P. Hammon 

(“Hammon”) and Travis I. Krepelka (“Krepelka”), ECF No. 21; (2) a Motion to Dismiss and to 

Declare Plaintiff Jack Loumena (“Plaintiff”) a Vexatious Litigant filed by Defendants Chicago 

Title Co. and Jeanie O’Connor (collectively, “Title Co.”) (with Hammon and Krepelka, 

“Defendants”), ECF No. 30; (3) Title Co.’s Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiff, ECF No. 29; 

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions against Title Co., ECF No. 33; and (5) requests for judicial 

notice filed by all parties, ECF Nos. 23, 26, 30-2, 34.

Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this 

case, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, GRANTS Title Co.’s Motion 

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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for Sanctions, DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, and DECLARES Plaintiff a vexatious 

litigant.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case arises out of the state court divorce proceedings between Plaintiff’s mother, 

Wylmina E. Hettinga (“Hettinga”), and father, Timothy Loumena (“Loumena”). The state divorce 

case has been ongoing since 2005. ECF No. 23 (Hammon’s and Krepelka’s Request for Judicial 

Notice, “HK RJN”) Ex. E (“Aug. 25, 2014 Order”); ECF No. 30 (Title Co.’s Request for Judicial 

Notice, “Title RJN”) Ex. H (same). 

The instant complaint alleges facts and a cause of action nearly identical to a previous case 

brought by Plaintiff against the same defendants. See HK RJN Ex. I (Complaint in Loumena v. 

Kennedy, et al. (“Kennedy I”), No. 14-CV-04165-LHK, or “Kennedy I Compl.”); Title RJN Ex. M 

(same). As in Kennedy I, Plaintiff’s complaint here alleges one cause of action: a violation of 

Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”); see also Kennedy I Compl. 

Also as in Kennedy I, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants acted under the color of law to 

deprive Plaintiff of his property in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights.1 Compl. ¶¶ 32-36; see also Kennedy I Compl. ¶¶ 25-30. The instant complaint additionally 

alleges that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his property in violation of federal tax laws. Compl. 

¶ 36 (citing 26 U.S. §§ 7205(1),(5)(A)).

 

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The complaint fails to claim a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, although 

Plaintiff cites the Fourteenth Amendment in Plaintiff’s briefs. See Compl. ¶¶ 32-34; ECF No. 25 

(“Opp.”). However, Plaintiff clearly intends to state a claim against a state official. See 

McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 764 & n.12 (2010) (noting that the Fourteenth 

Amendment applies the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation clause and the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the states). The Court 

will construe the complaint as claiming a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment 

rights, as applied to state actors by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” (internal citations omitted)).

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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The factual allegations in the instant complaint mirror the allegations in Kennedy I. 

Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of the state-court-ordered sale of the Hettinga-Loumena family 

home (“the Property”). Compl. ¶ 11; HK RJN Ex. A (“The family residence located at 21251 

Almaden Road, San Jose, CA is treated as community property.”); Title RJN Ex. A (same). 

Plaintiff, who is pro se, alleges that Defendants acted under the color of law and in an “agency 

relationship” to transfer the Property to Loumena, who then sold the Property to third parties. 

Compl. ¶¶ 14, 21, 25; see also Kennedy I Compl. ¶¶ 17-18, 21. According to the complaint, the 

Property was sold to third party bidders even though Pacific Almaden Investments, LLC (“PAI”) 

was the highest bidder. Id. ¶ 26. 

PAI “is a limited liability corporation which was originally owned, at least on paper, by . . . 

Timothy Tibbott. Mr. Tibbott was the former live in boyfriend of [Hettinga].” Aug. 25, 2014 

Order at 5. PAI also appears to involve Hettinga’s brother, Joel Hettinga. Id. at 4. From 2010 to 

2012, Hettinga attempted to transfer her interest in the Property to PAI by executing quitclaim 

deeds signed only by herself or her brother and not by Loumena. Id. at 4. The state court found 

that “the transfers executed by [Hettinga] in her attempts to transfer title to the former family 

residence violated the Automatic Temporary Restraining Orders” under Family Code § 2040. Id.

at 6. The transfers were also in violation of Hettinga’s fiduciary duty to Loumena. Id. at 7. 

Accordingly, the state court found “that the series of deeds . . . were void and of no force and 

effect.” Id. at 12. 

Documents from the state court divorce case—the same documents before this Court in 

Kennedy I—reveal that the state court repeatedly ordered the Property to be sold, with the 

proceeds to be placed in a trust account. In an order filed January 23, 2013, the state court wrote:

This Court previously ordered this property sold on 1 September 2011 (order filed 

28 March 2012). Under that Order, Respondent Timothy Loumena was to select 

the realtor, both parties were to sign any and all necessary paperwork, and the net 

proceeds were to be placed into an interest-bearing trust account. The Court 

reiterates and modifies that Order as follows:

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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(a) The property shall be listed and sold forthwith. The listing agent shall be 

the individual named on the record by Mr. Loumena—Scott Raley of Customer 

Service Realty. Mr. Loumena shall be the sole lister of the property.

(b) Mr. Loumena shall work with the realtor to prepare the property for sale and 

make decisions concerning the appropriate list price, what to do with offers 

received, and any other necessary elements of the sales process. . . . As to any 

documents requiring any signatures from Ms. Hettinga, . . . Mr. Loumena shall 

provide them, and those parties shall promptly sign and return the documents to 

Mr. Loumena. If three (3) days after presenting the documents, Mr. Loumena 

has not received the necessary signatures, he may bring the documents to 

Department 83 for the Court Clerk to sign as elisor on behalf of Ms. Hettinga, 

. . . .

(c) All net sales proceeds shall be immediately placed in a blocked, interestbearing trust account, and shall not be released in any fashion absent further 

Court Order.

(d) The Court expressly reserves jurisdiction over all parties’ respective 

interests, if any, in the proceeds, which shall be determined after the sale and 

deposit of proceeds into a trust account.

Title RJN Ex. C at 2 (“Jan. 23, 2013 Order”); see also HK RJN Ex. B (“Mar. 28, 2012 Order”) 

(“The house at 21251 Almaden Road, San Jose, CA shall be sold with Respondent charged with 

selecting the Real Estate Agent to facilitate the sale. . . . Net proceeds shall be placed into an 

interest bearing trust account. A court order will be required to disburse the funds from the 

account.”).

Pursuant to the January 23, 2013 state court order, Loumena was required to have the 

Superior Court Clerk, Defendant Pamela Kennedy (“Kennedy”), sign as elisor on behalf of 

Hettinga and PAI. See Compl. Ex. M (recorded Grant Deed showing transfer from PAI to 

Loumena, signed by Kennedy); HK RJN Ex. F (recorded Grant Deed showing transfer from 

Hettinga to Loumena, signed by Kennedy). The Property was then sold by Loumena to a third 

party. Compl. ¶ 25. The state court later found that “the sale to the third party buyers was proper, 

final, and in full compliance with all prior orders to sell the subject property.” Aug. 25, 2014 

Order at 3. The state court also divided the proceeds of the sale between Loumena and Hettinga. 

Id. at 3, 5. 

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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These same allegations and state court orders were before this Court in Kennedy I. See

generally HK RJN Ex. J (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in Kennedy I, or “Kennedy I 

Dismissal”); Title RJN Ex. N (same). The only new allegations in the instant complaint relate to 

Plaintiff’s claims to ownership of the Property. Plaintiff now alleges that Hettinga gifted the 

Property to Plaintiff in 2006. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff also alleges that, at some later point, Hettinga 

transferred the Property to PAI, and, at some point, PAI’s ownership transferred to Plaintiff. Id.

¶ 12 (alleging that Plaintiff is “the sole member of PAI”). Additionally, Plaintiff now alleges that 

PAI purchased the Property in a foreclosure sale. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19. In the August 25, 2014 Order, the 

state court found that “[t]he foreclosure sale did not occur . . . . PAI never acquired title by 

purchasing the property in a foreclosure sale.” Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 12. The state court further 

noted, “There are no deeds transferring title by virtue of a foreclosure,” leaving PAI without any 

interest in the Property. Id. at 13. 

B. Prior Litigation Involving the Hettinga-Loumena Divorce

1. Overview of Hettinga-Loumena Divorce Litigation

This is now the twelfth case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

California filed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s company PAI, Hettinga, or Plaintiff’s brother regarding the 

divorce proceedings of Hettinga and Loumena. See Loumena v. Hammon, et al. (“Hammon II”), 

No. 15-CV-03613-NC; M.L. v. Nichols, et al. (“Nichols II”), 15-CV-02303-BLF; Hettinga v. 

Paliwal, No. 15-CV-02246-BLF; Loumena v. Nichols, et al. (“Nichols I”), No. 15-CV-01372-

BLF; M.L. v. Barth, No. 14-CV-05423-LHK; Kennedy I, No. 14-CV-04165-LHK; Pacific 

Almaden Invs., LLC v. Hettinga, et al. (“PAI”), 14-CV-01631-RMW; Hettinga v. Loumena

(“Loumena II”), No. 13-CV-02217-RMW; Hettinga, et al. v. Loumena, et al. (“Loumena I”), No. 

10-CV-02975-JSW; Hettinga v. Orlando, et al., No. 09-CV-00253-JW; Hettinga v. Hammon, et 

al. (“Hammon I”), No. 09-CV-06040-JW. 

Six different judges of the Northern District have heard these twelve cases. Seven of these 

cases have been the subject of a motion to dismiss, and all seven were dismissed for lack of 

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, including Kennedy I. See Nichols

I, No. 15-CV-01372-BLF (dismissing case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and collecting 

previous cases). Two of the dismissed cases have been summarily affirmed by the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See PAI, 14-CV-01631-RMW; Orlando, No. 09-CV-00253-JW.

The California Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal have each declared 

Hettinga a vexatious litigant. Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 8. The U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California has also declared Hettinga a vexatious litigant. Loumena II, No. 13-CV02217-RMW, 2014 WL 4955187, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014). As a result, Hettinga is 

subject to a pre-filing review of all her future filings in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California. Id. Specifically, “[t]he Clerk of this court may not file or accept any further 

complaints filed by or on behalf of Wylmina Hettinga as a named plaintiff that arise out of facts 

related to plaintiff’s divorce case.” Id. at *5.

2. Plaintiff’s First Case: Kennedy I

Including the instant case, Plaintiff has filed four of the twelve cases in this district 

involving the Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings. Plaintiff filed his first suit, Kennedy I, on 

September 16, 2014. Kennedy I Dismissal at 4. As discussed above, Kennedy I and this case 

present virtually identical allegations against the same defendants. See generally Compl.; 

Kennedy I Compl. The instant case adds only some new allegations about Plaintiff’s and PAI’s

ownership of the Property. See generally Compl.; Kennedy I Compl. In Kennedy I, as in the 

instant case, Plaintiff argued that the sale of the Property to a third party, the execution of the grant 

deed by Kennedy, and the distribution of the proceeds from the sale violate Plaintiff’s Fourth, 

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Kennedy I Dismissal at 8. On February 27, 2015, this

Court dismissed Kennedy I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. Id. at 9. 

Kennedy I, and the instant case, overlap substantially with two earlier suits by Hettinga. 

First, on May 15, 2013, Hettinga sued Loumena and Kennedy and alleged that she or PAI owned 

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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the Property and Kennedy granted the Property to Loumena in violation of Hettinga’s Fourth, 

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Loumena II, No. 13-CV-02217-RMW. On September 

30, 2014, Hettinga’s suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine and Hettinga was declared a vexatious litigant. Id. Hettinga’s suit is on appeal 

with the Ninth Circuit. ECF No. 27 (Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, or “PRJN 1”) (Order 

of the Ninth Circuit in Case No. 14-17135 denying summary affirmance); ECF No. 34 (Plaintiff’s 

Request for Judicial Notice, or “PRJN 2”) Ex. B (same).

Second, on April 9, 2014, PAI sued Hettinga, Loumena, Kennedy, Scott Raley (“Raley”), 

and O’Connor. HK RJN Ex. H (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in PAI, No. 14-CV-01631-

RMW, or “PAI Dismissal”); Title RJN Ex. L (same). Hettinga filed a cross complaint, naming 

PAI, Loumena, Kennedy, Raley, O’Connor, and Chicago Title Co as defendants. Id. The Court 

noted, “The complaint and cross-complaint allege similar facts and claims, all of which are nearly 

identical to the claim brought by Hettinga in an earlier case in this district against the same 

defendants,” referring to Loumena II. Id. at 2. PAI and Hettinga alleged that the sale of the 

Property to a third party, the execution of the grant deed by Kennedy, and the distribution of the 

proceeds from the Property’s sale were in violation of Hettinga’s and PAI’s Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 2-3. On October 1, 2014, the Court dismissed the complaint 

and cross-complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 5. 

Hettinga appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which denied Hettinga in forma pauperis status because 

“the appeal is frivolous.” PAI, 14-CV-01631-RMW. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the 

district court on April 16, 2015, noting that “the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial 

as to not require further argument.” Id.

3. Plaintiff’s Second Case: Nichols I

On March 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed his second suit arising out of the Hettinga-Loumena 

divorce proceedings, this time against Hammon and a retired Santa Clara County Superior Court 

Judge. Nichols I, No. 15-CV-01372-BLF. Plaintiff challenged the Superior Court Judge’s

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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January 6, 2015 refusal to hear any more requests for declaratory relief from a state court order 

that required Plaintiff to be in the care of Loumena and have limited contact with Hettinga. Id. 

On August 3, 2015, the Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. 

Plaintiff’s younger brother filed a virtually identical suit on May 21, 2015 against 

Hammon and the same Superior Court Judge. Nichols II, 15-CV-02303-BLF. Plaintiff’s younger 

brother challenged the Superior Court Judge’s January 6, 2015 refusal to hear more requests for 

declaratory relief from an order that barred Plaintiff’s younger brother from Hettinga’s custody. 

Id. This suit remains pending. 

Nichols I and Nichols II follow a December 28, 2009 suit by Hettinga on behalf of herself, 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s younger brother, and Hettinga’s other minor children, in which Hettinga 

challenged the state court’s limitation of her visitation rights. Hammon I, No. 09-CV-06040-JW. 

On April 1, 2010, Hettinga’s case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id.

4. Plaintiff’s Third Case: Hammon II

Plaintiff filed his third case arising out of the Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings on 

August 6, 2015. Hammon II, No. 15-CV-03613-NC. Plaintiff sued Hammon and Krepelka for 

distributing Plaintiff’s money from the proceeds of the sale of the Property, held in an interestbearing trust account, to themselves and their clients and colleagues. Id.; ECF No. 45 (Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Relate). Plaintiff’s third case remains pending.

C. Procedural Background

On February 27, 2015, this Court dismissed Kennedy I for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Kennedy I Dismissal at 9. Three days later, 

on March 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint. ECF No. 1. The complaint names the 

same six defendants from Kennedy I: Kennedy, Clerk of the Santa Clara County Superior Court; 

Hammon, an attorney appointed by the state court to represent Hettinga and Loumena’s four 

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Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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minor children; Krepelka, Loumena’s attorney; Raley, the court-appointed real estate listing agent; 

Chicago Title Co., which was involved in the sale of the Property; and Jeanie O’Connor, who has 

some relationship with Chicago Title Co.

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Defendants Hammon and Krepelka filed a Motion to Dismiss and Request for Judicial 

Notice on May 22, 2015. ECF Nos. 21, 23. Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss and filed a

Request for Judicial Notice on June 4, 2015. Opp.; PRJN 1. Defendants Hammon and Krepelka 

replied on June 11, 2015. ECF No. 31.

Title Co. filed a Motion for Sanctions on June 10, 2015. ECF No. 29. That same day, 

Title Co. moved to dismiss the complaint and to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. ECF No. 30. 

Additionally, Title Co. filed a Request for Judicial Notice. ECF No. 30-2. On June 18, 2015, 

Plaintiff opposed all of Title Co.’s motions. ECF No. 33 (“Opp.2”). Plaintiff also filed a second 

Request for Judicial Notice. PRJN 2. Title Co. did not reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The party asserting federal subject 

matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto 

Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). The party carries that burden by putting forth “the 

manner and degree of evidence required” by whatever stage of the litigation the case has reached. 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires a 

 

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Summons were issued for each defendant on April 13, 2015. ECF Nos. 4-9. No proofs of 

service have been filed. Defendants Raley and Kennedy have not yet appeared in the case.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, see 

Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look beyond the plaintiff’s 

complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion 

for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor must the 

Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Mere 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).

C. Rule 11 Sanctions

“Rule 11 requires the imposition of sanctions when a motion is frivolous, legally 

unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose.” Conn v. 

Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992). “The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter 

baseless filings . . . .” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 

244, 254 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990)). 

An “improper purpose” is a purpose to “harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 

in the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). The test for improper purpose is an objective 

one. G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003).

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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Courts also use an objective standard to address the other conditions for Rule 11 sanctions 

by looking to whether a reasonable basis for the challenged position existed in law and fact at the 

time the position was adopted. Conn, 967 F.2d at 1421; see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 

Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 554 (1991) (establishing the “objective standard of 

reasonable inquiry” imposed by Rule 11). In determining whether an objectively reasonable basis 

exists, whether the pleader is correct in his perception of the law is not critical. Conn, 967 F.2d at 

1421. Thus, if a court finds that a party made a reasonably arguable claim at the time of filing the 

complaint, the court should not apply Rule 11 sanctions.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court first addresses the parties’ requests for judicial notice. Although a district court 

generally may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 

the Court may take judicial notice of documents referenced in the complaint, as well as matters in 

the public record, without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Lee 

v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. 

Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Court may take 

judicial notice of matters that are either “generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other 

court documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). Records filed with a county recorder are also judicially noticeable as 

undisputed public records. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 

861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice

First, in support of Hammon’s and Krepelka’s Motion to Dismiss, Hammon and Krepelka

request judicial notice of various orders and filings by the parties, including complaints, in related 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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state and federal court proceedings. See HK RJN. Plaintiff does not oppose Hammon’s and 

Krepelka’s request. The Court GRANTS Hammon’s and Krepelka’s Request for Judicial Notice, 

as these are filings in related state and federal court proceedings. See Black, 482 F.3d at 1041.

Second, Title Co. requests judicial notice in support of Title Co.’s Motion to Dismiss and 

to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant. Title Co.’s Request for Judicial Notice is largely 

duplicative of Hammon’s and Krepelka’s request. See Title RJN Exs. A-B, G, H-J, L-N (orders 

and party filings in related state and federal cases). However, Title Co. requests judicial notice of 

additional state court orders, id. Exs. C-E, and Hettinga’s cross-complaint in PAI, No. 14-CV01631-RMW, id. Ex. K. Finally, Title Co. requests judicial notice of the “Vexatious Litigant List” 

maintained by the California Judicial Council. Id. Ex. F. 

In response to Title Co.’s request, Plaintiff opposes only judicial notice of Exhibit A, a 

Superior Court order filed on January 10, 2008 that found the Property was community property. 

The Court notes that it granted judicial notice of this document in response to Hammon’s and 

Krepelka’s Request for Judicial Notice, which Plaintiff did not oppose. Plaintiff argues that Title 

Co. should have notified this Court of a state Court of Appeal remand order altering part of the 

Superior Court’s order in Exhibit A. Opp.2 at 4. However, Title Co.’s Exhibit H included a 

description of the remand order. Title RJN Ex. H. Moreover, Plaintiff relies on Title Co.’s 

Exhibit H as evidence of the remand order. Opp.2 at 4. Further, Plaintiff does not argue that 

Exhibit A is an inaccurate copy of the Superior Court’s ruling as issued. Additionally, the remand 

order appears to have almost entirely affirmed the state court order in Exhibit A. See Compl. Ex. 

L (noting the remand order affirmed that the house was community property, except for a small 

portion that Hettinga had separately contributed); Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 1. The Court GRANTS 

Title Co.’s Request for Judicial Notice, as these are filings in related state and federal court 

proceedings or other public records. See Black, 482 F.3d at 1041; Rupert v. Bond, No. 12-CV05292-LHK, 2013 WL 5289617, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013) (granting request for judicial 

notice of the California Vexatious Litigant List).

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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2. Plaintiff’s Requests for Judicial Notice

First, in opposition to Hammon’s and Krepelka’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff requests 

judicial notice of an order filed in Ninth Circuit Case No. 14-17135, two exhibits submitted in the 

same Ninth Circuit case, and an excerpt from a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in an 

unnamed case. PRJN 1. Plaintiff also requests notice of an affidavit filed by Hettinga. Id.

Defendants Hammon and Krepelka oppose Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice. ECF No. 31. 

The Court GRANTS judicial notice of the order filed by the Ninth Circuit in Case No. 14-

17135, as it is a filing in a related court proceeding. See Black, 482 F.3d at 1041. However, the 

Court DENIES judicial notice of the two exhibits submitted in the Ninth Circuit case and the 

memorandum. For each of these three documents, Plaintiff submitted only a single page from an 

apparently longer document. Each page fails to identify the document of which it is part and the 

document’s authorship. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to explain the relevance of these out-of-context 

pages. The Court finds these documents are not sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned and that they are not relevant to an issue presented. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Flick v. 

Liberty Mut. Fire Inc. Co., 205 F.3d 386, 392 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Hettinga’s affidavit. This document includes hearsay and 

statements about documents that are not attached. Moreover, Hettinga has an interest in the 

outcome of this action. As a result, the Court finds Hettinga’s affidavit is not a source whose 

accuracy cannot be reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Second, Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial Notice in opposition to Title Co.’s Motion to 

Dismiss and to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant. Plaintiff again requests notice of the Ninth 

Circuit’s order in Ninth Circuit Case No. 14-17135, see PRJN 2 Ex. B, which the Court GRANTS 

for the reason stated above. Plaintiff also requests notice of excerpts from a reply brief and a 

memorandum filed in other cases, a declaration by PAI lawyer Michael Stone (“Stone”) filed in a 

state court case, a letter sent to PAI by Loumena, and a grant deed executed by Chicago Title Co. 

PRJN 2 Exs. A, C-F. Title Co. does not oppose Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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The Court GRANTS judicial notice of the grant deed, as it is a public record. See Black, 

482 F.3d at 1041. The Court DENIES the remainder of Plaintiff’s request, as the documents are 

not sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The brief 

and memoranda are out-of-context one-page excerpts from longer documents, without any

identifying information. The Stone Declaration includes hearsay and statements about documents 

that are not attached. Further, PAI has an interest in the outcome of this action and thus is not a 

source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Finally, the Loumena letter is not 

notarized or authenticated in any way.

B. Motions to Dismiss

All defendants move to dismiss on two grounds: (1) no defendant is a state actor; and (2) 

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Additionally, Title Co. asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing. Because the Court finds that it lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court need not address 

Defendants’ other arguments.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court has no authority to review the 

final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 

“The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack. Because 

district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, they must decline 

jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence called upon to review the state court decision.’” Doe & 

Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Feldman, 460 

U.S. at 482 n.16). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes not only review of decisions of the 

state’s highest court, but also those of its lower courts. See Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court, 

23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994). A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a challenge 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

1998).

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when a plaintiff in federal court alleges a “de facto 

appeal” by (1) asserting errors by the state court as an injury, and (2) seeking relief from the state 

court judgment as a remedy. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“A federal action constitutes such a de facto appeal where ‘claims raised in the federal court action 

are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the 

federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the 

application of state laws or procedural rules.’” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 

859 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

In this case, Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim based on the state court’s alleged violation of 

federal tax laws and Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in ordering and 

executing the sale of the family property. Compl. ¶¶ 32-36. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of 

monetary damages and an injunction barring Defendant Kennedy from being a Court Clerk of any 

court in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.

As in Kennedy I, Plaintiff appears to challenge (1) the state court’s order to sell the 

Property, (2) the execution of the sale of the Property to third-party buyers, and (3) the distribution 

of the proceeds from the sale. As before, the Court finds all three challenges barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff also challenges the “seizure” of PAI’s interest in the Property. 

This challenge is also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

First, to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging the sale of the Property, that would 

constitute a collateral attack on the state court’s order directing the property to be sold. The state 

court ordered, “The house at 21251 Almaden Road, San Jose, CA shall be sold with [Loumena]

charged with selecting the Real Estate Agent to facilitate the sale.” Mar. 28, 2012 Order. The 

state court also ordered, “The property shall be listed and sold forthwith. The listing agent shall be 

the individual named on the record by Mr. Loumena—Scott Raley of Customer Service Realty.” 

Jan. 23, 2013 Order. In order to review the propriety of the sale of the Property, this Court would 

have to review the state court’s March 28, 2012 and January 23, 2013 Orders. However, “when a 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the 

allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of 

that court, the federal suit is a forbidden de facto appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 2003). This is exactly the case here, where Plaintiff, arguably “losing” in state court, asserts 

that the orders to sell the Property violated his Constitutional rights. Compl. ¶ 36. The case is “a 

forbidden de facto appeal.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1156. 

Second, Plaintiff challenges the execution of the sale on the grounds that the Property was 

sold to third party buyers instead of PAI and the sale documents were improperly signed by 

Kennedy. The state court expressly ruled that “the sale to the third party buyers was proper, final, 

and in full compliance with all prior orders to sell the subject property.” Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 3. 

Additionally, the state court noted that “the Court ordered that the Clerk of the Court would be 

authorized to sign documents required to complete the sale in the event that [Hettinga] refused to 

sign the required documents.” Id.; see also Jan. 23, 2013 Order (setting out procedure for the

Court Clerk to sign sale documents). Given the state court’s express ruling approving the sale to 

third party buyers, this Court cannot review whether PAI was a higher bidder or whether the Court 

Clerk should have signed the documents. Such a review is forbidden by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. “A federal action constitutes such a de facto appeal where claims raised in the federal 

court action are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication 

of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the 

application of state laws or procedural rules.” Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859 (citation omitted). 

“Where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the 

plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably intertwined” and the action is properly 

dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Doe & Assocs., 252 F.3d at 1030.

Third, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges the distribution of the proceeds from the sale, 

that is a challenge to the state court’s order requiring that the funds be placed in a trust and 

distributed at the court’s direction. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, generally speaking, bars a 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 suit to remedy an injury inflicted by the state court’s decision.” 

Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Rhodes v. Gordon, No. CV 12-2863-

JGB(DTB), 2013 WL 3780378, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (“A plaintiff may not avoid the 

Rooker-Feldman bar by styling his attack on the state court’s ruling as a civil rights action.” 

(citing Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995))). The state court divided the proceeds 

of the sale between Loumena and Hettinga, and directed that Loumena’s attorney distribute the 

funds only in accordance with the state court’s order. Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 3, 22. Thus, this 

Court cannot review the state court’s distribution of funds. See Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859. 

Finally, Plaintiff challenges the seizure of PAI’s interest in the Property. Plaintiff claims 

that, at some point prior to the sale to third party buyers, PAI purchased the Property in a nonjudicial foreclosure. Compl. ¶ 16. However, the state court ruled that, “The foreclosure sale did 

not occur . . . PAI never acquired title by purchasing the property in a foreclosure sale.” Aug. 25, 

2014 Order at 12. The state court further noted, “There are no deeds transferring title by virtue of 

a foreclosure.” Id. at 13. This Court cannot review PAI’s alleged ownership without reviewing 

the state court’s August 25, 2014 Order. District courts “must decline jurisdiction whenever they 

are ‘in essence called upon to review the state court decision.’” Doe & Assocs., 252 F.3d at 1030. 

Thus, this Court cannot review PAI’s ownership through the foreclosure sale.

Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply for three reasons. First, 

Plaintiff contends that he was not a party in the state court proceedings and that PAI was not 

notified of any state court proceedings. Opp. at 7; Opp.2 at 3. Plaintiff relies on Lance v. Dennis, 

546 U.S. 459, 461 (2006) (per curiam), in which several citizens challenged a Colorado Supreme 

Court decision requiring Colorado to use a court-ordered congressional redistricting plan. The 

district court found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the citizens’ federal challenge 

because the citizens were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly, who was the plaintiff 

before the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 462. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that 

the federal plaintiffs’ claims were not barred because the federal plaintiffs had not been “in a 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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position to ask this Court to review the state court’s judgment.” Id. at 465.

Lance bears little relation to this case. Here, Plaintiff was represented in the state court 

proceedings by a court-appointed attorney. See, e.g., HK RJN Ex. C (listing Defendant Hammon 

as Plaintiff’s attorney). Plaintiff does not argue—and there is no indication in the record—that his 

attorney was unable to participate in the state court proceedings or to challenge the state court 

orders. See Mar. 28, 2012 Order (noting Hammon was present at hearing); see also Lance, 546 

U.S. at 465. Additionally, Plaintiff claims ownership of the Property through his ownership of 

PAI, and seeks to restore PAI’s interest in the Property. PAI was joined to the state court divorce

action in August 2012. Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 6. Although Plaintiff asserts that PAI was not 

notified, the state court found that “PAI was properly joined” in the state court proceeding and that 

PAI failed to appear for a hearing “even though they were noticed for it.” Id. at 17-18. In fact, 

PAI appealed the January 23, 2013 Order directing that the Property be sold and the proceeds 

placed into a trust account. See id. at 22. To the extent that Plaintiff disputes PAI’s joinder in the 

state court action, that is a challenge to the state court’s August 25, 2014 Order and is barred by 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1156.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to federal cases 

brought “after the state proceedings ended,” while Plaintiff originally filed a federal lawsuit on 

September 16, 2014. Opp. at 7. Although Plaintiff’s argument is not clear, the Court believes 

Plaintiff is pointing out that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar parallel state and federal 

proceedings. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)

(noting that in Rooker and Feldman, “the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after 

the state proceedings ended”). However, Plaintiff points to no parallel state and federal 

proceedings. The state court orders essentially challenged by Plaintiff here are final court orders 

issued before Plaintiff filed this proceeding on March 2, 2015. ECF No. 1.

Third, Plaintiff contends that this Court has jurisdiction over any lawsuit between Plaintiff 

and the IRS over a tax form that the IRS may issue for the sale of the Property. Opp. at 6. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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Plaintiff fails to explain why an IRS action would affect the application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to this case. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege the IRS has actually issued any tax forms 

or taken any action regarding the Property.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is a challenge to the final order of a state court. Such 

a claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Freeman v. 

Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that dismissal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction should be without prejudice).

C. Motion for Sanctions

Title Co. asks for Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000. ECF No. 

29. Title Co. contends that Plaintiff’s complaint is meritless and duplicative of previous suits, and

was filed to harass Title Co. ECF No. 29-1. In response, Plaintiff requests sanctions against Title 

Co.’s attorney in the amount of $102,000, based on alleged inconsistency in Title Co.’s 

representations to the Court about PAI’s ownership. Opp.2 at 2-3. The Court addresses the two 

motions in turn.

1. Title Co.’s Request for Sanctions

“The key question in assessing frivolousness is whether a complaint states an arguable 

claim . . . .” Conn, 967 F.2d at 1421; Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 

1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (noting a pleading is frivolous if it is “both baseless and made 

without a reasonable and competent inquiry”). For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes 

the instant complaint is frivolous.

This is essentially the fourth time a district court in the Northern District of California has 

heard this claim, and the fourth time that this claim is being dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. The sale of the Property was first addressed in Loumena II, filed on May 15, 2013. 

No. 13-CV-02217-RMW. Hettinga sued Loumena and Kennedy for transferring the Property to 

Loumena and accused Kennedy of improperly signing the grant deed. Id. U.S. District Judge 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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Ronald Whyte dismissed Loumena II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine on September 30, 2014. Id. Appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit.

Judge Whyte next addressed the disposition of the Property when PAI sued Hettinga, 

Loumena, Kennedy, Raley, and O’Connor on April 9, 2014. See PAI Dismissal. Hettinga filed a 

cross complaint, naming PAI, Loumena, Kennedy, Raley, O’Connor, and Chicago Title Co as 

defendants. Id. Judge Whyte noted, “The complaint and cross-complaint allege similar facts and 

claims, all of which are nearly identical to the claim brought by Hettinga in an earlier case in this 

district against the same defendants,” referring to Loumena II. Id. at 2. PAI and Hettinga alleged 

that the sale of the Property to a third party, the execution of the grant deed by Kennedy, and the 

distribution of the proceeds from the sale violated Hettinga’s and PAI’s Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 2-3. Judge Whyte found that the complaint and crosscomplaint were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissed the case on October 1, 

2014. Id. at 5. Hettinga appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which denied Hettinga in forma pauperis 

status because “the appeal is frivolous.” PAI, 14-CV-01631-RMW. The Ninth Circuit summarily 

affirmed the district court on April 16, 2015, noting that “the questions raised in this appeal are so 

insubstantial as to not require further argument.” Id.

On September 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed Kennedy I. Kennedy I Dismissal at 4. Plaintiff also 

claimed that the sale of the Property to a third party, the execution of the grant deed by Kennedy, 

and the distribution of the proceeds from the sale were in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 8. On February 27, 2015, like Judge Whyte in Loumena II

and PAI, this Court dismissed Kennedy I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. Id. at 9.

Despite the rulings in Loumena II, PAI, and Kennedy I, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint 

just three days after the dismissal of Kennedy I. ECF No. 1. As explained above, this suit mirrors 

Kennedy I. There are very few new allegations in the instant complaint, none of which 

substantively alter Plaintiff’s Kennedy I allegations about Defendants’ conduct in selling the 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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Property. The instant case raises the same challenges to the sale of the Property, the execution of 

the grant deed, and the distribution of the proceeds that this Court considered in Kennedy I. 

Moreover, the new allegations Plaintiff did make about Plaintiff’s and PAI’s ownership of the 

Property were squarely contradicted by the state court. Plaintiff alleged that PAI purchased the 

Property in a foreclosure sale, see Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, but the state court’s August 25, 2014 Order 

expressly ruled that “[t]he foreclosure sale did not occur . . . PAI never acquired title by 

purchasing the property in a foreclosure sale.” Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 12. Plaintiff was well 

aware of the state court’s August 25, 2014 Order, as the Court discussed this same state court 

order when applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Kennedy I. See Kennedy I Dismissal at 9. 

When filing the instant complaint, Plaintiff had no “arguable claim” that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine would not also apply to bar the Court’s consideration of the instant complaint. See Conn, 

967 F.2d at 1421.

The Court recognizes that “[w]hat is objectively reasonable for a pro se litigant and for an 

attorney may not be the same.” Rupert, 2013 WL 5289617, at *4. However, it is inescapable that 

a reasonably competent litigant would not, in good faith, file a complaint based on the same facts 

and claims that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California has already rejected 

three times. See Conn, 967 F.2d at 1421. Plaintiff knew that this Court dismissed Kennedy I, a

virtually identical complaint, just three days before the instant case was filed. As discussed above, 

Plaintiff made no changes to the complaint that would lead an objectively reasonable person to 

believe the instant complaint warranted a different result than Kennedy I. 

Further, the Court recently dismissed substantially similar suits by Plaintiff’s mother and 

Plaintiff’s company PAI. Although the record does not reflect when PAI’s ownership transferred 

to Plaintiff, Plaintiff is now the “sole member” of PAI, see Compl. ¶ 12, and likely was aware of 

PAI’s lawsuit and the lawsuit’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, Plaintiff 

shares Hettinga’s phone and fax numbers, and Kennedy I listed Plaintiff’s email as 

wylmina@live.com. See ECF No. 29-2 (Declaration of Dave M. McGraw). It strains credulity 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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that Plaintiff was not aware of Hettinga’s lawsuit or the lawsuit’s dismissal, also under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff certainly would have been aware of the lawsuits—and the 

lack of legal foundation for the instant case—with a reasonably competent investigation. See 

Conn, 967 F.2d at 1421. Plaintiff’s complaint warrants sanctions because it is “clearly frivolous,” 

“legally unreasonable or without legal foundation,” and was brought without a reasonably 

competent inquiry into the claim’s merits. See Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 

F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).

Additionally, it appears that this complaint was brought for the improper purpose of 

harassing Defendants. See G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc., 326 F.3d at 1110 (“[W]ithout question, 

successive complaints based upon propositions of law previously rejected may constitute 

harassment under Rule 11.”). As discussed, Plaintiff brought successive complaints “based on 

propositions of law clearly rejected by the Court.” See id. Plaintiff filed the instant case just three 

days after the dismissal of Kennedy I and “failed to allege anything other than the same argument 

repeatedly rejected by this Court.” See id. Defendants have been forced to respond to virtually 

the same frivolous complaint four different times in five years. See id. (affirming grant of 

sanctions based on improper purpose when party filed four motions based on the same rejected 

argument). Moreover, the similarities of the complaints filed by Plaintiff and Hettinga, as well as

Plaintiff’s and Hettinga’s shared contact information, suggest to the Court that Hettinga may be

attempting to circumvent the three orders declaring her a vexatious litigant by filing suits through 

Plaintiff. See Loumena II, 2014 WL 4955187, at *4-5 (declaring Hettinga a vexatious litigant); 

Aug. 25, 2014 Order (noting Hettinga was declared a vexatious litigant in the California Superior 

Court and the California Court of Appeal). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s successive 

baseless filings constitute harassment. See id. (affirming that successive motions were both 

frivolous and harassing when the motions relied upon law rejected by the court).

The Court desires to deter Plaintiff from repeated “baseless filings” and harassment of 

Defendants. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362. However, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is pro se. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Title Co.’s Motion for Sanctions in the amount of $300. 

Plaintiff must pay the penalty to Title Co. within thirty (30) days of the filing of this order. The 

Court cautions Plaintiff that filing another complaint based on these same facts and claims may 

result in greater sanctions.

2. Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff requests $102,000 in sanctions against Title Co.’s attorney because “Defendants 

previously fraudulently claimed that prior lawsuits brought by [PAI] were in fact lawsuits brought 

by Wylmina E Hettinga” and Defendants “fraudulently” switched ownership of PAI between 

Hettinga and Plaintiff. Opp.2 at 2-3. However, the local rules of this Court require that all 

motions for sanctions be separately filed. Civ. L.R. 7-8(a). Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, 

included within Plaintiff’s opposition to Title Co.’s Motion to Dismiss, does not comply with this 

requirement. See Harr v. City of Mountain View, No. 10-CV-02995, 2010 WL 4919478, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (denying motion for sanctions because it was not separately filed).

Moreover, Plaintiff makes no substantive argument as to why the actions of Title Co.’s 

attorney warrant sanctions. To support Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, Plaintiff cites a 

memorandum of which the Court declined to take judicial notice. The memorandum is an 

unlabeled one-page excerpt of a longer document without any identifying information. However, 

even if the Court took notice of this memorandum, which includes one instance in which Title Co. 

referred to PAI as Hettinga’s company, the memorandum does not demonstrate that Title Co.

fraudulently misrepresented PAI’s ownership to the Court. Nor does the memorandum

demonstrate that Title Co. has in any way made a frivolous filing or filed a motion for an improper 

purpose. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). There is simply no evidence in the record supporting a 

sanctions award against Title Co. Plaintiff’s motion is frivolous. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.

D. Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant

District courts have the inherent power under the All Writs Act to declare a party a 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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vexatious litigant and impose upon him appropriate pre-filing restrictions. See Ringgold-Lockhart 

v. Cnty. of L.A., 761 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). “Out of regard 

for the constitutional underpinnings of the right to court access, ‘pre-filing orders should rarely be 

filed.’” Id. at 1062 (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“Nevertheless, ‘flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one 

person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious 

claims of other litigants.’” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 

2007) (brackets omitted) (quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148) .

“When district courts seek to impose pre-filing restrictions, they must: (1) give litigants 

notice and ‘an opportunity to oppose the order before it [is] entered’; (2) compile an adequate 

record for appellate review, including ‘a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district 

court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed’; (3) make substantive findings of 

frivolousness or harassment; and (4) tailor the order narrowly so as ‘to closely fit the specific vice 

encountered.’” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062 (alteration in original) (quoting De Long, 

912 F.2d at 1147-48). “The first and second of these requirements are procedural, while the latter 

two factors are substantive considerations that help the district court define who is, in fact, a 

vexatious litigant and construct a remedy that will stop the litigant’s abusive behavior while not 

unduly infringing the litigant’s right to access the courts.” Id. (alterations omitted). The Court 

addresses each requirement in turn.

1. Adequate Notice

As to the first factor, “[t]he requirement that the plaintiff receive an opportunity to be heard 

does not require an oral hearing; ‘the opportunity to brief the issue fully satisfies due process 

requirements.’” See Reddy v. MedQuist, Inc., No. CV 12-01324 PSG, 2012 WL 6020010, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (quoting Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059). Here, Plaintiff filed written 

opposition to the motion to declare him a vexatious litigant. Opp.2. Accordingly, Plaintiff had 

adequate notice and opportunity to oppose this order. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058 (finding 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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adequate notice when the court’s order was prompted by defendants’ motion and served on 

plaintiff’s counsel). 

2. Record for Review

Under the second factor, the Court must compile an adequate record for review, including 

“a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a vexatious order 

was needed.” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. The Court has already detailed Plaintiff’s prior 

lawsuits, as well as the lawsuits filed by Plaintiff’s company PAI, Hettinga, and Plaintiff’s brother. 

To complete the record, however, the Court will briefly summarize Plaintiff’s litigation history.

Plaintiff has filed four lawsuits arising out of the Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings, 

including the instant case. Hammon II, No. 15-CV-03613-NC; Nichols I, No. 15-CV-01372-BLF; 

Kennedy I, No. 14-CV-04165-LHK. Plaintiff’s first suit, Kennedy I, presented virtually identical 

allegations against the same defendants as the instant case. See generally Compl.; Kennedy I 

Compl. The instant case adds only some new allegations about Plaintiff’s and PAI’s ownership of 

the Property. See generally Compl.; Kennedy I Compl. Kennedy I and the instant case raise the 

same claim that the sale of the Property to a third party, the execution of the grant deed by 

Kennedy, and the distribution of the proceeds from the sale violate Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Kennedy I Dismissal at 8. Kennedy I, like the instant case, was 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 9. Moreover, Plaintiff filed the instant case 

three days after this Court dismissed Kennedy I.

Kennedy I, and the instant case, followed similar suits filed by Plaintiff’s company PAI

and Hettinga. In Loumena II, Hettinga sued Loumena and Kennedy and alleged that she or PAI 

owned the Property and that Kennedy granted the Property to Loumena in violation of Hettinga’s 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Loumena II, No. 13-CV-02217-RMW. In PAI, 

PAI sued Hettinga, Loumena, Kennedy, Raley, and O’Connor while Hettinga filed a crosscomplaint against PAI, Loumena, Kennedy, Raley, O’Connor, and Chicago Title Co. PAI

Dismissal. The Court in PAI found that the “complaint and cross-complaint allege similar facts 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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and claims, all of which are nearly identical to the claim brought by Hettinga in an earlier case in 

this district against the same defendants,” referring to Loumena II. Id. at 2. Both Loumena II and 

PAI were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in 

2014. As discussed in detail above, this Court examined this litigation history and concluded that 

the instant complaint was frivolous, harassing, and warrants sanctions. See supra Part III.C.1.

Plaintiff’s second suit in this district challenged a Superior Court Judge’s January 6, 2015 

refusal to hear any more requests for declaratory relief from a state court order requiring Plaintiff 

to be in the care of Loumena and have limited contact with Hettinga. Nichols I, No. 15-CV01372-BLF. Like Kennedy I, Plaintiff’s second suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Further, like Kennedy I, Plaintiff’s second suit 

overlaps substantially with other lawsuits filed by Plaintiff’s family members. Plaintiff’s younger 

brother filed a virtually identical suit challenging the same Superior Court Judge’s January 6, 2015 

refusal to hear more requests for declaratory relief from an order barring Plaintiff’s younger 

brother from Hettinga’s custody. Nichols II, 15-CV-02303-BLF. Additionally, Hettinga filed a 

lawsuit on behalf of herself, Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s younger brother, and Hettinga’s other minor 

children challenging the state court’s limitation of Hettinga’s visitation rights. Hammon I, No. 09-

CV-06040-JW. Although Plaintiff’s brother’s suit remains pending, Hettinga’s suit was dismissed 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on December 28, 2009.

Plaintiff filed his third case arising out of the Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings on 

August 6, 2015. Hammon II, No. 15-CV-03613-NC. Plaintiff sued Hammon and Krepelka—both 

defendants in the instant case—over the distribution of Plaintiff’s money from the proceeds of the 

sale of the Property. Id.; ECF No. 45 (Plaintiff’s Motion to Relate). Plaintiff’s third case remains

pending.

Thus, Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s company PAI, Hettinga, and Plaintiff’s brother have filed eight 

substantially overlapping lawsuits in this district. Plaintiff’s mother and brother have filed an 

additional four lawsuits arising out of the Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings. See Paliwal, 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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No. 15-CV-02246-BLF; Barth, No. 14-CV-05423-LHK; Loumena I, No. 10-CV-02975-JSW; 

Orlando, No. 09-CV-00253-JW. Of the twelve total cases in this district arising from the 

Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings, eight cases, now including this one, have faced a motion 

to dismiss. All eight have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Nichols I, 

No. 15-CV-01372-BLF (collecting cases). Two of the dismissed cases have been summarily 

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. PAI, 14-CV-01631-RMW; Orlando, No. 09-CV-00253-JW; see 

also Loumena II, No. 13-CV-02217-RMW (appeal pending).

Additionally, Hettinga has been declared a vexatious litigant in this district and in the state 

Superior Court and the state Court of Appeal. See Loumena II, 2014 WL 4955187, at *4-5 

(declaring Hettinga a vexatious litigant); Aug. 25, 2014 Order at 8. This record, the Court 

concludes, is adequate for review. See Sephry-Fard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., et al., No. 

14-CV-05142-LHK, 2015 WL 1063070, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (finding the second 

factor met where the court discussed the relevant federal court suits and motions).

3. Substantive Finding

Under the third factor, a district court must make a substantive finding that the party’s 

litigation has been either frivolous or harassing. Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1064. “To 

determine whether the litigation is frivolous, district courts must look at both the number and 

content of the filings as indicia of the frivolousness of the litigant’s claims.” Id. There is no 

numerical baseline for frivolousness, but a district court must find that the litigant has filed an 

“inordinate” number of actions. Id. “Litigiousness alone,” the Ninth Circuit has said, “is not

enough.” Id. As to the content of the filings, the party’s claims must “be patently without merit.” 

Id. Litigation is harassing, moreover, where “the litigant’s filings show a pattern of harassment.” 

Id. Courts should “be careful not to conclude that particular types of actions filed repetitiously are 

harassing, and must instead discern whether the filing of several similar types of actions 

constitutes an intent to harass the defendant or the court.” Id. (alterations omitted).

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has identified five factors courts should consider in 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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determining whether a party’s litigation qualifies as frivolous or harassing:

(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, 

harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation, 

e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) 

whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused 

needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts 

and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect 

the courts and other parties.

Id. at 1062.

Having considered these five factors, as well as the standards detailed above, the Court 

concludes Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. The first and second factors weigh heavily in favor of 

declaring Plaintiff vexatious. Again, Plaintiff has filed at least four lawsuits aimed at undermining 

state court orders on issues arising out of the Hettinga-Loumena divorce proceedings. Plaintiff has 

not prevailed in any. Further, Plaintiff’s lawsuits are “duplicative.” Id. Plaintiff filed the instant 

lawsuit three days after the dismissal of Kennedy I, which was virtually identical. Both Kennedy I 

and the instant lawsuit are duplicative of previous lawsuits filed by Plaintiff’s company PAI and 

Hettinga. Plaintiff lacked “an objective good faith expectation of prevailing” in the instant case. 

See id.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s second lawsuit challenging the state court visitation order is 

virtually identical to a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff’s younger brother, and both of those lawsuits 

overlap with a lawsuit filed by Hettinga. See id. at 1064 (noting litigant may be declared 

vexatious when the filings “show a pattern of harassment”).

None of the lawsuits filed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s company PAI, Hettinga, or Plaintiff’s 

brother have been successful on the merits. Rather, eight of the twelve lawsuits filed by these 

litigants, including the instant lawsuit, have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Nichols I, No. 15-CV-01372-BLF (collecting cases). 

These cases have been “patently without merit.” See Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1064. Thus, 

that Plaintiff has filed only four lawsuits as a named plaintiff does not undermine the Court’s 

conclusion that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. See Sepehry-Fard, 2015 WL 1063070, at *9 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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(declaring plaintiff vexatious based on eleven lawsuits).

Further, the similarities of the complaints filed by Plaintiff and Hettinga suggest to the 

Court that Hettinga may be attempting to circumvent the order of the U.S. District Court, the 

California Superior Court, and the California Court of Appeal declaring Hettinga a vexatious 

litigant by filing suits through Plaintiff. Plaintiff shares Hettinga’s phone and fax numbers, and in 

a previous case listed Plaintiff’s email as “wylmina@live.com.” See ECF No. 29-2 (Declaration 

of Dave M. McGraw). This further bolsters the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s litigation is 

filed to harass Defendants.

The fourth factor also weighs in favor of declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. As 

discussed, Plaintiff’s four suits have been duplicative of other lawsuits filed by Plaintiff’s 

company PAI, Hettinga, and Plaintiff’s brother. The twelve cases of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s company 

PAI, Hettinga, and Plaintiff’s brother have raised similar claims against similar groups of 

defendants. For example, Hammon has been a defendant in nine cases, including all four of 

Plaintiff’s cases. These lawsuits have required Defendants, and the Court, to duplicate effort to 

address similar claims before six different judges in the Northern District of California. Plaintiff 

“without question” has “caused unnecessary expense to [his] opposing parties and ha[s] posed an 

unnecessary burden on the courts.” See Sepehry-Fard, 2015 WL 1063070, at *10. 

Plaintiff does not address these factors or defend his litigation history. Instead, Plaintiff 

claims that “Defendants previously fraudulently claimed that prior lawsuits brought by [PAI] were 

in fact lawsuits brought by Wylmina E Hettinga” and Defendants “fraudulently” switched 

ownership of PAI between Hettinga and Plaintiff. Opp.2 at 2-3. As discussed above, Plaintiff 

does not demonstrate that Defendants fraudulently misrepresented PAI’s ownership to the Court. 

Further, Plaintiff does not explain why the alleged improper behavior by Title Co. affects 

Plaintiff’s declaration as a vexatious litigant. Lastly, Plaintiff does not dispute that Hettinga and 

PAI—and Plaintiff himself—have filed substantially similar lawsuits about the sale of the 

Property. 

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The third and fifth factors do not counsel a different result. “[P]ro se litigants are not 

immune from a vexatious litigation finding.” Sepehry-Fard, 2015 WL 1063070, at *11. 

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant, the record amply shows that his litigation 

has been frivolous and harassing. Plaintiff’s suits are “preempt[ing] the use of judicial time that 

properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 

1057. Furthermore, the Court does not believe that other sanctions would adequately protect the 

courts and prospective defendants. It appears to the Court that Hettinga may be attempting to 

avoid the orders of the U.S. District Court, the California Superior Court, and the California Court 

of Appeal declaring Hettinga a vexatious litigant by filing suits through her children. Given this 

potential disregard of the orders declaring Hettinga a vexatious litigant and the repeated 

duplicative filings by Plaintiff, the Court finds that other remedies would not be “adequate to 

protect the courts and other parties.” See Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062. The Court 

concludes that a narrowly tailored pre-filing order is the most appropriate remedy in this instance.

4. Narrowly Tailored Remedy

“Finally, pre-filing orders must be narrowly tailored to the vexatious litigant’s wrongful 

behavior.” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1066. A narrowly tailored order, thus, should restrain 

the “plaintiff from filing only the type of claims [he] had been filing vexatiously.” Id.; see also 

Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061.

Here, Plaintiff’s abusive behavior is the filing of duplicative lawsuits arising out of the sale 

of the Property at 21251 Almaden Road, San Jose, CA and the distribution of the proceeds. The 

Court therefore enjoins Plaintiff from filing any documents in this case or from filing any new 

action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California arising out of facts related 

to sale of the Property at 21251 Almaden Road, San Jose, CA or to the distribution of the proceeds

from the sale, without passing a pre-filing review. By requiring pre-filing review of Plaintiff’s 

future actions related to the sale of the Property and the distribution of the proceeds, the Court 

seeks to preclude Plaintiff from further harassing the individuals involved in the sale and to ensure 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

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respect of the Court’s order declaring Hettinga a vexatious litigant.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows:

 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice;

 The Court GRANTS Title Co.’s Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiff in the 

amount of $300, which Plaintiff must pay to Title Co. within thirty days of the 

filing of this order;

 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions against Title Co.; and 

 The Court DECLARES Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant.

This order is not a bar to Plaintiff bringing lawsuits; it merely requires pre-filing review. 

Plaintiff does not currently file electronically. Plaintiff must file at the office of the Clerk of this 

Court. The Clerk may not file or accept any further documents in this case or any new complaints 

filed by or on behalf of Plaintiff as a named plaintiff that arise out of facts related to the sale of the 

Property at 21251 Almaden Road, San Jose, CA or to the distribution of the proceeds from the 

sale. If Plaintiff wishes to file a document in this case or a complaint arising out of facts related to 

the sale of the Property or to the distribution of the proceeds, Plaintiff shall provide a copy of any 

such document or complaint and a copy of this order to the Clerk of this Court. The Clerk shall 

then forward the document or complaint and a copy of this order to the Duty Judge for a 

determination whether the document or complaint should be accepted for filing. If the Duty Judge 

determines that the document or complaint is duplicative or frivolous, it will not be filed and will 

be returned to Plaintiff. If the document or complaint is neither duplicative nor frivolous, it will 

be given to the Clerk with instructions to file it. Any violation of this order will expose Plaintiff to 

a contempt hearing and appropriate sanctions, and any action filed in violation of this order will be 

subject to dismissal with prejudice.

The Clerk shall close the case file.

Case 5:15-cv-00951-LHK Document 47 Filed 10/13/15 Page 31 of 32
32

Case No. 15-CV-00951-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, GRANTING TITLE CO.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:15-cv-00951-LHK Document 47 Filed 10/13/15 Page 32 of 32