Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01663/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01663-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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28 1 This defendant was incorrectly named as "JPMorgan Chase."

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles E. Dugay, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 06-1663-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

JPMORGAN CHASE (formerly )

Bank, One), and [sic] New )

York Corporation, and DOES )

1-10, inclusive )

)

Defendants. ) )

Pending before the court is a motion by defendant JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMC"),1 to dismiss this action with prejudice

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because it was not timely

filed (doc. 5). 

Background

On approximately January 11, 1999, plaintiff Charles E. Dugay, 

"was hired as a Customer Service Associate in [JPMC's] . . . 

Phoenix office[.]" Doc. 1, exh. A thereto (Co.) at 2, ¶ 10. 

Case 2:06-cv-01663-RCB Document 8 Filed 12/22/06 Page 1 of 13
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Plaintiff alleges that several years later, in mid-June 2003, he

was physically assaulted by a male JPMC co-worker. Id. at 2, ¶ 11. 

The next day, when plaintiff complained to JPMC's Human Resources

Office, allegedly he was advised that "the co-worker would not be

reassigned or disciplined." Id. at 3, ¶ 15. 

About ten months later, in early April 2004, plaintiff told

his supervisor that the co-worker who had previously assaulted

plaintiff was continuing to harass him. Id. at 3, ¶ 16. Plaintiff

further informed his supervisor that he was experiencing pain from

that assault. Id. In mid-July 2004, plaintiff "was granted

medical leave" of roughly one week "for his injuries." Id. at 3, ¶

18. Plaintiff was granted a second medical leave for nearly three

months, commencing on August 25, 2004. Id. at 3, ¶ 19. Allegedly

those injuries include "degenerative disease of [the] lumbar

spine[,] . . . nerve root compression[,] . . . uncontrollable

hypertension[,]" and "mild depression." Id. at 3, ¶¶ 21-24. 

On approximately February 2, 2005, plaintiff was terminated

from JPMC. Id. at 3, ¶ 20. Roughly a month later, on 

approximately March 1, 2005, plaintiff filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the Arizona Civil Rights Division of the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging

that defendant JPMC violated the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). Id. at 3, ¶ 25; see also Doc.

5, exh. A thereto; and Doc. 6, exh. A thereto. In that Charge,

plaintiff further alleged that he had been "retaliated against for

opposing practices made unlawful under the [ADA]." Doc. 5. exh. A

thereto at 2. 

On June 28, 2005, the EEOC mailed a Notice of Right to Sue,

Case 2:06-cv-01663-RCB Document 8 Filed 12/22/06 Page 2 of 13
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expressly issued at plaintiff's request. Id., exh. B thereto. In

that Notice it warns aggrieved persons such as plaintiff that

"[his] lawsuit under . . . the ADA must be filed in federal or

state court WITHIN 90 DAYS of [his] receipt of th[at] Notice or

[his] right to sue based on this charge will be lost." Id.

(emphasis in original). That Notice further advised plaintiff that

"[t]he time for filing suit based on a state claim may be

different." Id. The EEOC mailed plaintiff this Notice on June 28

2005. See id. Thus, based upon the plain and unequivocal language

of the EEOC Notice of Right to Sue, plaintiff had until

approximately September 28, 2005, in which to file the present

action. 

However, plaintiff did not file this action until about eight

months later, on March 1, 2006, when he filed a complaint in

Arizona state court, alleging one "count" of retaliation and a

"count" under the ADA. Doc. 1, exh. A thereto at 3 and 4. As to

the latter, plaintiff alleged that he was suffering from a "serious

medical condition" in the form of "depression [and] hypertension,"

and that JPMC did not provide him with a "reasonable accommodation"

for those conditions. Id. at 4, ¶ 29. Instead, according to

plaintiff, JPMC terminated him. Id. Plaintiff's retaliation claim

is less clear. Without specifying whether he is asserting such a

claim under the ADA, or some other form of retaliation, plaintiff

alleges that because he complained to his superiors about the

assault by his co-worker, he was terminated. See id. at 4, ¶ 27. 

On June 29, 2006, JPMC removed the action to this court based upon

federal question jurisdiction and, alternatively, diversity

jurisdiction. 

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Discussion

I. Defendant JPMC

A. Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence

Preliminarily, the court must consider the scope of the

matters which it will consider on this motion to dismiss. "Because

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the 'sufficiency' of a claim - and not the

claim's substantive merits - 'a court may [typically] look only at

the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss.'" 

Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and County

of San Francisco, No. C 06-2351 MHP, 2006 WL 3462879, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 30, 2006) (quoting Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network,

Inc. 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002)). There are exceptions to

this general rule, however. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion a court "may

consider documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon

but not attached to the complaint when the authenticity of those

documents is not questioned, and other matters of which the Court

can take judicial notice." Humboldt Baykeeper v. Union Pacific

Railroad Company, No. C 06-02560 JSW, 2006 WL 3411877, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 27, 2006) (citing, inter alia, Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d

449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Galbraith

v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, on this

motion the court will consider the EEOC Charge, as JPMC urges. 

Although that Charge is not attached to the complaint, the

complaint references it, doc. 1, exh. A thereto at 3, ¶ 25; and the

parties do not dispute its authenticity. In fact, both the

plaintiff and JPMC include the Charge as an exhibit to their

respective motion papers. See Doc. 5, exh. A thereto; and Doc. 6,

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2 Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) requires a court to take judicial

notice "if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary

information." 

3 At least since the date of removal, June 29, 2006,

plaintiff Dugay has been appearing pro se.

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exh. A thereto. In addition, also as JPMC urges, as it must the

court will take judicial notice of the EEOC Notice of Right to

Sue,2 despite the fact that that Notice is not attached to the

complaint and not referenced therein. See Mack v. South Bay Beer

Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (court may

take judicial notice of records and reports of administrative

bodies without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary

judgment), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); and Gallo v. Board of

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 916 F.Supp. 1005, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 1995)

(court may consider EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter in deciding

a motion to dismiss either as a matter attached to the complaint or

as records subject to judicial notice). 

In its reply, JPMC requests that the court not consider

certain other evidence and factual assertions which plaintiff

includes in his response. In particular, JPMC asks the court to

disregard a copy of a $1,200.00 check dated March 1, 2006, and made

payable to plaintiff's then-attorney.3 That check is an exhibit to

plaintiff's Response. See Doc. 7, exh. B thereto. JPMC further

requests that the court decline to consider the purported

statements by two employees of the "Office [o]f [t]he Attorney

General (Civil Rights Division) in Tucson," that, in effect,

plaintiff had until March 1, 2006, in which to file this action. 

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4 For ease of reference, the court took the liberty of

numbering the pages of plaintiff's response.

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See Doc. 6 at 1.4 These claimed statements are discussed in

plaintiff's Response. JPMC maintains that the court should not

consider the foregoing because they "are not alleged or

incorporated by reference in the Complaint." Doc. 7 at 3. JPMC's

position is well-taken.

Both the copy of the check and the purported statements by

Attorney General Office employees are outside the scope of what is

proper to consider on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The check is not

attached to the complaint. Nor are the statements attached to the

complaint in the form of affidavits, for example. Likewise, there

is no mention in the complaint of either the check or these

employee statements. Further, in contrast to the Right to Sue

letter, the attorney's check and the employees' statements are not

matters of public record of which this court could take judicial

notice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201. Thus, in resolving this

motion, the court will limit its consideration to the complaint,

the EEOC Charge which is referenced therein, and the Right to Sue

Notice, which is an administrative record of which the court may

take judicial notice. Having so found, there is no need to address

JPMC's additional argument that the court should not take into

account the statements purportedly made by Attorney General

employees because such statements are "unsworn inadmissible

hearsay[.]" Doc. 7 at 3 (citations omitted). 

. . .

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B. Statute of Limitations

1. ADA

To pursue discrete claims of employment discrimination or

retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must first file a timely

charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating

Title VII's enforcement procedures, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); see also

Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000). 

"After the EEOC . . . has issued notice of the right to sue, the

complainant has 90 days to file a complaint in this Court[.]"

Edwards v. Tacoma Public Schools, No. C04-5656 RBL, 2006 WL

3000897, at *2 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 20, 2006)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1)). "Therefore, if a claimant fails to file the civil ADA

action within the ninety-day period, the action is time-barred." 

Leduc v. Micron Technology, Inc., No. CV-04-531-S-BLW, 2005 WL

2847427, at *2 (D.Idaho Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Santa Maria, 202

F.3d at 1176) (footnote omitted). That 90 day period "runs from

the date that notice of right to sue is given to the claimant." 

Edwards, 2006 WL 3000897, at *2. 

Even though the EEOC mailed plaintiff his Notice of Right to

Sue on June 28, 2005, see doc. 5, exh. B thereto, plaintiff did not

file the present action until March 1, 2006 -- well beyond the 90

day statute of limitations for ADA claims. In his Response,

plaintiff readily acknowledges that he did not file the present

action until March 1, 2006. See Doc. 6 at 2. Despite that fact,

plaintiff argues that the court should deny JPMC's motion to

dismiss on statute of limitations grounds because allegedly

plaintiff was told not once, but twice, by Attorney General

employees that he "had until March 1, 2006[,]" to file his

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discrimination lawsuit. See id. The court declines to consider

those statements, however, for the reasons set forth above. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he received the EEOC's Notice

of Right to Sue, although he does not indicate precisely when. The

record evidence is that on June 28, 2005, Chester V. Bailey, an

EEOC District Director, mailed that Notice to plaintiff at "1709

East Greenway Circle[,] Phoenix, AZ[,] 85042[,]" doc. 5, exh. B

thereto, the address which plaintiff also uses in this action. In

light of the foregoing, presumably plaintiff received that Notice

"sometime shortly after" the June 28, 2005, mailing date, i.e. on

or about July 1, 2005. See Veronda v. California Department of

Forestry & Fire Protection, No. C 99-5244 MMC, 2002 WL 1578879, at

*4 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2002), aff'd without written opinion, 58

Fed. Appx. 363 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. Baldwin County Welcome Center

v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n. 1 (1984)(presumed date of receipt of

Right to Sue Notice was January 30, 1981 – three days after its

mailing by the EEOC) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e)("Whenever a party

has the right or is required to do some act or take some

proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a

notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is

served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the

prescribed period.")). Thus, plaintiff Dugay had until 90 days

later, approximately October 1, 2005, by which to timely file this

ADA action. Obviously, plaintiff did not do that because he filed

the present action five months later, on March 1, 2006. 

Consequently, because plaintiff did not file the present action

within 90 days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, to the

extent he is seeking relief under the ADA, this action is time

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barred. Accordingly, the court grants JPMC's motion to dismiss

plaintiff's ADA claims on statute of limitations grounds. 

The court hastens to add that even if the statements which

plaintiff attributes to the two Attorney General Office employees

were properly before the court, that would not change the result

here. That is so because plaintiff is claiming that those

employees advised him of the March 1, 2006, filing date after the

expiration of the 90 day statute of limitations. More

specifically, plaintiff Dugay contends that in November 2005 the

Attorney General employees first advised him of the purported March

1, 2006, filing date See id. at 2. Allegedly in January 2006 the

Attorney General employees again advised plaintiff of that March 1,

2006, filing date. See id. Therefore, because the ADA statute of

limitations expired on approximately October 1, 2005, because he

did not contact the Attorney General's Office until after that

date, as JPMC is quick to point out, plaintiff could not have

relied upon representations from employees of that Office to save

his otherwise time-barred ADA claims. 

The court is well aware that "[b]ecause the ninety-day period

is a statute of limitations, it is subject to the doctrine of

equitable tolling." Leduc, 2005 WL 2847427, at *2 n.2 (citing

Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 383 (9th Cir.

1997)). Plaintiff has not made an equitable tolling argument,

however, and the court can conceive of none. The Notice of Right

to Sue leaves no doubt as to plaintiff's obligations thereunder in

terms of explicitly informing him of the 90 day time frame in which

he had to timely commence this ADA action. Even though he knew

enough to request a Notice of Right to Sue, after that plaintiff

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simply was not diligent in pursuing his rights under the ADA. 

"Equitable tolling is granted only in limited situations[.]"

Hargrow v. Federal Express Corporation, No. 03-0642-PHX-DGC, 2006

WL 269958, at *2 n.4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2006), reconsideration

denied in part, 2006 WL 1273833 (D.Ariz. May 9, 2006). Further,

"courts have been generally unforgiving . . . when a late filing is

due to claimant's failure to exercise due diligence in preserving

his legal rights," Nelmida, 112 F.3d at 384 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); and that is precisely the situation

in which plaintiff Dugay finds himself. Accordingly, the court

finds that this is not a case which warrants equitable tolling. 

2. Retaliation

The exact bases for plaintiff's retaliation cause of action is

not clear from the complaint. As previously noted though, in his

EEOC Charge plaintiff specifically asserted, inter alia, an ADA

retaliation claim. To the extent such a retaliation claim can be

inferred from plaintiff's complaint, for the reasons just

discussed, this particular cause of action is also time barred.

Assuming, as JPMC does, that perhaps plaintiff is attempting

to assert a claim under Arizona state law for wrongful termination,

this claim, too, is barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. "A wrongful termination claim under Arizona law, . .

. must be brought within one year after the cause of action

accrues." Kennedy v. Honeywell Aerospace, Inc., No. CV-05-3613-

PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 1599608, at *1 (D.Ariz. June 5, 2006) (citing,

inter alia, A.R.S. §§ 12-541(4)), reconsideration denied, 2006 WL

2850034 (D.Ariz. Sept. 29, 2006). Such a cause of action accrues

when a plaintiff is terminated. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers Local

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790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976). Here,

plaintiff Dugay was terminated on February 2, 2005. Doc. 1, exh. A

thereto at 3, ¶ 20. Thus because this action was filed a month

after the statute of limitations had expired for a wrongful

termination claim, this claim is also time barred. 

II. "Doe" Defendants

In addition to JPMC, in his complaint plaintiff designates

"DOES 1-10, inclusive[]" as defendants. Doc. 1, exh. A thereto at

1. Plaintiff alleges that these unidentified defendants "are

liable to [him] for some or all of the matters . . . alleged" in

the complaint, but that he "is presently unaware of the true names

and capacities of said Defendants[.]" Id. at 2, ¶ 7. Not

surprisingly, none of the Doe defendants were served either before

or after removal. "Indeed, it is virtually impossible to serve Doe

Defendants because of their anonymity." Elmore v. Schriro, No. CV

05-1222-PHX-MNM (LOA), 2006 WL 2355398, at *14 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4,

2006). The record is silent as to whether plaintiff has made any

efforts to identify the Doe defendants, but given the complete lack

of discovery to date, it is safe to assume that he has not.

"Generally, the use of anonymous type appellations to identify

defendants is not favored." Id. In fact, "Rule 10(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to include

the names of the parties in the action." Id. By the same token

though, "[t]he Ninth Circuit has [long] held that where identity is

unknown prior to the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be

given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown

defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the

identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other

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grounds." Id. (citing Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163

(9th Cir. 1999), citing in turn Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d

637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). In the present case, because 

plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations, it would be futile to give him the opportunity to

identify and serve the unnamed Doe defendants. Thus, the court

will sua sponte dismiss plaintiff's claims against these

defendants.

Conclusion

To summarize, because it is clear that plaintiff Dugay did not

timely commence this action, and because it is equally clear that

equitable tolling principles do not apply here, the court hereby

GRANTS the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

brought by defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. See Morales v. City

of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) ("The district court may

grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on statute of limitations

grounds only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the

required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that

the statue was tolled.") The court further sua sponte dismisses

this action as against the unnamed defendants "DOES 1-10,

inclusive[.]" See Doc. 1, exh. A thereto at 1. 

IT IS ORDERED that defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s

motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) id GRANTED

(doc. 5). 

. . .

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against the defendants

"DOES 1-10, inclusive" are dismissed sua sponte.

DATED this 20th day of December, 2006.

Copies to Plaintiff, pro se, and counsel of record

Case 2:06-cv-01663-RCB Document 8 Filed 12/22/06 Page 13 of 13