Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00526/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00526-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Aminadab Orduno, 

 Orduno, 

vs. 

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV08-0526-TUC-FRZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Aminadab Orduno’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of 

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 1 of 18
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Orduno’s conviction, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

Orduno and an unknown accomplice [subsequently identified as Arturo 

Astorga] went to the home of Orduno’s former employer, M, while M 

was at work but his wife S, their children C and T, and the children’s 

nanny L were home. Orduno claimed M had sent them and forced his 

way into the home. At gunpoint, the intruders bound and blindfolded S 

and L with duct tape and threatened to harm C. Following her captor’s 

instructions, S telephoned M and told him to come home. Before he 

arrived, Orduno’s accomplice left with three-year-old C. As M walked 

into the house, he saw a masked man holding a gun. The gunman 

whispered instructions to S, who communicated to M that they had 

taken C and wanted $500,000 for his safe return. When M responded 

that he could only obtain $100,000 in cash, the gunman broke a 

ceramic pot and swore. M recognized the gunman’s voice as that of 

Orduno. Orduno threatened that, if M did not cooperate and return 

with the money in an hour, C would be returned “in little pieces.” 

 M left, contacted the police, and gave them Orduno’s name. 

Orduno later saw police outside the front of the house and apparently 

fled through the back of the house and out of the subdivision. Police 

found C at Orduno’s home being watched by Orduno’s wife and sisters. 

Orduno turned himself in the next day. He at first denied any 

involvement in C’s kidnapping and denied being in M’s house. He 

later admitted participating, but claimed he did so under duress. 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 2-3. 

 After a jury trial, Orduno was found guilty of three counts of kidnapping, 

three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, kidnapping a minor under 

fifteen, and first-degree burglary. Id. p. 1. Orduno was sentenced to a presumptive 

prison term of 17 years for kidnapping a minor, to be followed by concurrently 

presumptive terms, the longest being 10.5 years, for a total sentence of 27 years. Id., 

pp. 1-2. 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 2 of 18
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 Orduno raised five claims on direct appeal. He asserted that: (1) the trial court 

erred by rejecting a pre-trial plea agreement; (2) that the prosecution improperly 

delegated its authority to plea bargain to the victims; (3) that the trial court erred in 

denying his request for surrebuttal argument on his affirmative defense of duress; (4) 

that Arizona unconstitutionally places the burden on defendants to prove the 

affirmative defense of duress; and (5) that Arizona’s reasonable doubt instruction is 

unconstitutional. Id., Ex. A, pp. 3-7. By Memorandum Decision filed July 17, 2003, 

the Arizona court of Appeals rejected Orduno’s claims. Id., Ex. A. Orduno then 

sought review of the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review 

by order dated March 17, 2004. Id., Ex. K (Petition for Review); Ex. L (Order). 

 While his direct appeal was pending, Orduno began pursuing post-conviction 

relief (PCR). In April 2001, Orduno filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and in 

December 2002 he filed the supporting petition. Id., Ex. C, p. 2. Orduno raised 

several ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, contending that: (1) he was 

not effectively represented during his pre-trial incarceration period; (2) counsel failed 

to timely negotiate a plea agreement in the case; (3) trial counsel failed to provide a 

written motion for the court to accept a plea agreement or move for continuance of 

the trial; (4) trial counsel failed to effectively represent him at sentencing; and (5) 

trial counsel should have executed a written contract for Petitioner to testify in 

exchange for a lower sentence. Id., pp. 13-21. 

 In addition to the IAC claims, Orduno also alleged that the State had breached 

the parties’ agreement whereby Orduno would testify against Astorga and the parties 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 3 of 18
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

would seek a reduction of Orduno’s sentence. Id., Ex. G, pp. 21-24. Orduno also 

claimed that his sentences under the dangerous crimes against children statute, 

A.R.S. § 13-604.01, violated his constitutional right to a jury trial and that his class 2 

felony kidnapping conviction was unlawful under Arizona law because he had 

voluntarily released the kidnapped child before he held the child for ransom. Id. at 

pp. 7-11, 24-25. 

 In a ruling filed March 19, 2008, the trial court found Orduno’s claims 

meritless and dismissed the petition. Id., Ex. H. Orduno then sought a rehearing on 

the petition and, on May 23, 2008, the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to 

relief. Id., Ex. I. Orduno then sought review of his post-conviction petition in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Ex. J. By Memorandum Decision filed January 7, 

2009, the Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. Id., Ex. K. 

 In the instant petition, Orduno raises five claims. In Ground One he asserts 

that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to secure the beneficial plea offer, 

failed to meet with Orduno regularly before trial, failed to obtain a psychological 

examination and present mitigation evidence, and failed to finalize an agreement with 

the State whereby Orduno’s sentence would be reduced in return for his cooperation 

in the prosecution of his co-defendant. In Ground Two, Orduno argues that the trial 

court’s rejection of the plea agreement violated his right to due process. In Ground 

Three, Orduno contends that the “improper procedures surrounding plea negotiations 

. . . created sentences that were impermissibly disparate between” Orduno and 

Astorga. Ground Four alleges that Orduno’s rights under the Fifth Amendment were 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 4 of 18
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

violated because Arizona law impermissibly places the burden of proof on a 

defendant to prove duress. In Ground Five, Orduno argues that the reasonable doubt 

instruction given in his case unconstitutionally diminished the State’s burden of 

proof. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Exhaustion/Preclusion 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion 

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been 

procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been 

“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories 

on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. 

Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). The operative facts must be presented in 

the appropriate context to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation 

requirement is not satisfied, for example, when a claim is presented in state court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered in the absence of special 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 5 of 18
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact correlation of the claims in both 

state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the 

federal claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 

36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 

 A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court 

found his claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims 

in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 

693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack 

his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen 

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 1. Ground Two 

 Respondents assert that Orduno did not exhaust Ground Two of the Petition. 

In that claim, Orduno alleges the trial court denied him due process by rejecting a 

plea agreement that the parties did not proffer until the first day of trial, in 

contravention of a local superior court rule. Petition, p. 7. Respondents contend that 

the state courts found the claim procedurally defaulted under Arizona law and, 

therefore, it is precluded from federal habeas review under the independent state 

ground doctrine. Answer, pp. 9-10. In reply, Orduno contends that the claims were 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 6 of 18
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

presented and addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals on both direct appeal and 

in relation to his petition for post-conviction relief. Traverse, p. 7. 

 While Orduno is correct that the Court of Appeals addressed Ground Two on 

direct appeal and in PCR proceedings, he ignores the fact that in both decisions the 

claim was determined to be barred from review. In his direct appeal, Orduno was 

found to have waived the claim because he was obligated to raise it by special action 

after it was rejected by the trial court. As the Court of Appeals explained: 

Orduno did not seek special action relief from this interlocutory 

decision. He instead chose to proceed to trial and attempted to secure a 

favorable outcome. Consequently, we conclude he has waived this 

argument on appeal. See State v. Espinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29P.3d 278 

(App. 2001) (had defendant timely challenged withdrawal of plea offer, 

either party could have sought special action relief from court’s ruling) 

. . . , cf State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 13-14, 770 P.2d 313, 317-18 

(1989). 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 3-4. In his PCR proceedings, the trial court and the Court of 

Appeals rejected Orduno’s contention that a significant change of the law had 

occurred and that he was thus entitled to review of the claim under Rule 32.1(g), 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. Answer, Ex. C. 

 To satisfy the requirement that a claim be “fairly presented,” the petitioner 

must present the claim “through the proper vehicle.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 

F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005). As the claim was presented in state court in procedural 

contexts where its merits could not properly be considered, the fair presentation 

requirement is not satisfied. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 7 of 18
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 Orduno’s contention that the merits were addressed despite the application of 

the procedural bar is true but unhelpful to his cause. The state court may reach “the 

merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding” and still avoid habeas review, “as 

long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule.” Harris v. Reed, 

489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989). The Court of Appeals, on both direct and PCR 

review, explicitly invoked the rules prohibiting Orduno’s claim, explaining on direct 

appeal that a defendant facing such circumstances must seek special action relief, and 

that a change of law was necessary before Rule 32.1(g) could be invoked. As such, 

this Ground 2 is unexhausted. 

 II. Ground 3

 In Ground 3, Orduno states that after he was convicted and sentenced, he was 

offered a sentence reduction in return for testifying against his co-defendant, Astorga. 

The agreement was never fully consummated and Astorga was eventually sentenced 

to probation, thereby resulting in what Orduno alleges were “sentences that were 

impermissibly disparate.” Petition, p. 8. Respondents contend that this claim is 

procedurally defaulted and precluded from federal review. Specifically, Respondents 

allege that, in denying this claim, the state court invoked adequate and independent 

state grounds for doing so and, additionally, that the claim was not raised as a federal 

claim. 

 This claim was not raised by Orduno on direct appeal. Answer, Ex. H (Brief 

on Appeal). In post-conviction proceedings, Orduno raised the claim, but it was 

argued and decided on state law grounds. Answer, Ex. G (Rule 32 Petition), pp. 21-

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 8 of 18
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24; Ex. C (Memorandum Decision), pp. 9-10. Additionally, the post-conviction 

court found the claim procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct 

appeal. Id., Ex. C, p. 9. Thus, as was the case with Ground 2, Ground 3 was not 

fairly presented through the proper vehicle. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

668 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Moreover, Ground 3 was not federalized. The Ninth Circuit has held that a 

“general appeal to a constitutional guarantee, such as due process, is insufficient to 

satisfy fair presentation requirements.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th

Cir.2000) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). “Exhaustion 

demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an underlying 

federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2005). 

Moreover, “mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient 

to establish exhaustion.” Shumway, 223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted). Under 

these standards, Ground 3 is not exhausted. The context shows that Orduno raised 

his equal protection claim as a purely state law matter and cited only state case law. 

Answer, Ex. G, p. 24. The cited case is not explained or applied. Orduno’s “driveby” citations, without some explanation or argument, are insufficient to establish fair 

presentment. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (“It is not enough to make a general appeal 

to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the ‘substance of such 

a claim to a state court.”). 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 9 of 18
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 3. Ground IV

 In Ground IV, Orduno argues that the state court improperly burdened him 

with proving duress and also improperly prohibited him from presenting a surrebuttal 

argument on the issue. Petition, p. 9. Respondents agree that these claims were 

raised in the state courts, but that the surrebuttal claim was challenged only on state 

law grounds. Answer, p. 11. Respondents are correct. Orduno mentioned no federal 

authority in arguing this claim on direct appeal. Id., Ex. H, pp. 18-19. As such, this 

claim is not exhausted. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1003. 

 4. The unexhausted claims are procedurally barred 

 Respondents contend and Orduno does not contradict, that Orduno is 

procedurally barred from now raising these claims in State court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 32] based upon 

any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding.”) Because Orduno did not properly present any of these claims to the 

Arizona courts, the claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). As such, the merits of the claims need not be addressed unless Orduno 

establishes cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has 

occurred. Orduno has not attempted to do so, and the Court recommends that 

Orduno’s non-exhausted claims be denied. 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 10 of 18
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground 1: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 In Ground 1 of the Petition, Orduno alleges several instances of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. The operative legal standard applicable to these claims is a 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 11 of 18
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

familiar one, addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The standards enunciated there by the Court are 

applied unless there is other Supreme Court precedent directly on point. See Wright 

v. Van Patten, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Under Strickland, Orduno must show both 

deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation 

was ineffective. 466 U.S. at 687. In the context of habeas claims evaluated under § 

2254(d)(1) standards, the question “is not whether a federal court believes the state 

court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable– a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473 (2007). 

 Orduno’s first claim is that his counsel’s performance was ineffective because 

he did not timely present the plea agreement to the trial court and it was therefore 

rejected. Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is entitled to effective assistance 

of counsel during plea bargaining. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). 

Counsel can be found to be ineffective in cases where a defendant has lost benefits he 

“would have received in the ordinary course but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.” 

Id. However, as explained below, even if Orduno’s counsel was ineffective due to 

the untimely presentation of the plea agreement to the trial court, the state court 

reasonably determined that the trial court would not have accepted the plea even if it 

had been timely presented. 

 In the last reasoned decision on this claim, the Court of Appeals appropriately 

identified the Strickland standards to evaluate Orduno’s counsel’s performance, and 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 12 of 18
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

went directly to the prejudice prong as it is entitled to do. See Jackson v. Calderon, 

211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000). In rejecting the claim, the court stated: 

 The claim that counsel had been ineffective for failing to present 

the plea agreement earlier than the day of trial necessarily fails because, 

even if deficient, counsel’s performance cannot be characterized as 

prejudicial in light of the court’s finding that it would not have 

accepted a plea in these circumstances. 

Answer, Ex. C. pp. 5-6. The circumstances to which the Court of Appeals refers are 

those underlying Orduno’s conviction, which it summarized as follows: “Orduno 

and his codefendant had terrorized a family, holding a mother, her two small 

children, and the babysitter at gunpoint, demanding money. They then kidnapped the 

older child.” Id., p. 4. 

 Orduno argues that the trial court, in initially rejecting his plea, relied solely 

on its untimeliness and made no mention of other grounds for rejecting the plea. 

However, at the hearing on his PCR petition, the trial judge affirmed his rejection of 

the plea agreement and expressly stated that: “I still find based upon the facts of this 

case, particularizing this case, the extreme and egregious behavior from [Orduno] did 

not warrant this kind of plea agreement.” Id., Ex. B, p. 14. Surmounting Strickland's

high bar is never . . . easy.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) 

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). Establishing that a state 

court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is even more 

difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” and because Strickland's

general standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. Harrington, 131 

S.Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). Although, Orduno is correct that the trial court, 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 13 of 18
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

when it initially rejected the plea agreement, made no mention of the egregious 

nature of the crime as influencing his decision, given the standards of review, this 

Court cannot find the decision unreasonable. As the Court of Appeals noted, the 

nature of the crime was such that a trial judge could reasonably reject the plea 

agreement reached before trial. Given that the record reflects that he would have 

done so, Orduno cannot show prejudice and this claim must be denied. 

 Orduno next contends that his counsel was ineffective because he did not 

speak with him until he had “been incarcerated for 126 days and met with him only 

one other time four months later.” Petition, p. 6. As Respondents point out, 

Orduno’s trial counsel was not appointed to his case until more than two months after 

Orduno’s initial appearance because Orduno had successfully moved for a change of 

counsel. Answer, Ex. D., pp. 72-76. Additionally, Orduno does not explain the 

prejudice that resulted from the delay and, in fact, recalls that he spoke to trial 

counsel on the phone, but does not remember the dates. Id., p. 76. Under Strickland, 

Orduno must show both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish that 

counsel’s representation was ineffective. 466 U.S. at 687. As the Court of Appeals 

reasonably determined, id., Ex. C, p. 6, nothing in the facts presented by Orduno on 

this claim support a finding of deficient performance or prejudice. 

 Also in Claim 1, Orduno asserts that his counsel’s performance was deficient 

because he did not seek to have Orduno’s psychological condition more extensively 

examined. There are a number flaws that are fatal to this argument. As a threshold 

matter, Orduno fails to establish what prejudice resulted from these alleged 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 14 of 18
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

shortcomings. He does not explain how further examination of his suicidal behavior 

would have benefited him and does not explain what mitigating evidence could have 

been presented to benefit him at sentencing. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals 

stated, the trial court evaluating and rejected this claim, implicitly finding that 

“nothing counsel might have presented at sentencing, particularly through a 

psychological evaluation, would have changed the sentences and the [trial] court’s 

view that they were appropriate for the crimes committed.” Answer, Ex. C., pp. 5-6. 

Given the state of the record, and the dearth of evidence Orduno presents, the Court 

cannot find that the Court of Appeals determination on this claim was unreasonable. 

 Orduno’s final ineffective assistance claim relates to the purported agreement 

between Orduno and the state whereby Orduno would testify against Astorga, his codefendant, in exchange for a reduction of his sentence. Petition, p. 6. In relation to 

this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded: 

the [trial] court found, first at the end of the September 26 hearing and 

again after the December 5 hearing, that the parties never had reached a 

binding “contract” regarding Orduno’s cooperation with the state and 

possible resentencing. This finding is apparently based on and 

supported by [trial counsel] Martin’s December 5 testimony and the 

information that had been provided through counsel during the 

September hearing. Orduno has not persuaded us on review that the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying relief on this claim. 

Answer, Ex. C., p. 8. Orduno has not explained how this determination was 

unreasonable or identified facts that would contradict the state courts’ conclusion on 

this claim. Thus, he has not satisfied the requirements that he show both deficient 

performance and prejudice under Strickland, or even approached establishing that the 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 15 of 18
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

state courts’ application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d). 

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788. 

 2. Ground 4: Duress 

 Orduno contends that his due process rights were violated because Arizona 

law, A.R.S. § 13-205(A), impermissibly imposed upon him the burden of proving his 

affirmative duress defense. Petition, p. 9. In denying this claim, the Court of 

Appeals reiterated that: 

We recently rejected this argument in State v. Jeffrey, 203 Ariz. 111, 

¶11, 50 P.3d 861, ¶11 (App. 2002), stating “because the absence of 

duress is not an element of the offense, the legislature may 

constitutionally impose upon the defendant the burden of proving it.” 

 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 6. As Respondents assert, this holding is entirely consistent with 

clearly established federal law. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the 

Supreme Court, addressing the burden of proof in relation to the affirmative defense 

of insanity, noted that, “once the facts constituting a crime are established beyond a 

reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence including the evidence of the defendant's 

mental state, the State may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity unless 

demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 206. Orduno does not 

identify any element of a charge against him that required the state to prove the 

absence of duress. Thus, the requirement that Orduno prove duress was consistent 

with Patterson. 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 16 of 18
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 3. Ground 5: Jury Instruction

 Orduno asserts that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt 

“unconstitutionally diminished the state’s burden of proof, violating due process . . . 

.” Petition, p. 9. The language used in the jury instruction is drawn from the 

reasonable doubt instruction adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. 

Portillo, 182 U.S. 592 (1995). In summarily denying this claim in Orduno’s direct 

appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on two then-recent Arizona Supreme 

Court cases which approved of the instruction: State v. Prince, 204 Ariz. 156, 61 

P.3d 450 (2003) and State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 984 P.2d 16 (1999). 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 7. The appeals court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 

 It has been repeatedly noted that the jury instruction given in this matter is a 

nearly a verbatim copy of the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt adopted by 

the Federal Judicial Center. See Van Adams, 194 Ariz. At 418, 984 P.2d at 26 

(noting instruction based on FJC instruction). The Ninth Circuit has upheld language 

that is identical or substantially similar to the FJC's pattern instruction. See Himes v. 

Thompson, 336. F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals' decision denying this claim was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law and Orduno is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of 

this claim. 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 17 of 18
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Orduno’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 08-526-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc).\ 

 Dated this 14th day of January, 2013. 

 

Case 4:08-cv-00526-FRZ Document 18 Filed 01/14/13 Page 18 of 18