Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00209/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSE RODRIGUEZ, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CONRAD GRABER, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-209-TUC-DCB (BPV) 

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1) Petitioner alleges that the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) denied his participation in furloughs, work release, and

other community based rehabilitative programs, through application of Program

Statement P5100.08’s management variable “V,” without notice, hearing, or an

opportunity to defend against the allegations supporting the classification. (Id., p.4)

Respondent filed a Return and Answer to Order to Show Cause why Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus Should Not be Granted (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) with Exhibits 1 and 2,

(Docs 12-14) and sealed Exhibit 2, Attachment 4 (Doc. 16) attached. Respondent

contests the Petition, arguing Petitioner has no legitimate statutory or constitutional

entitlement sufficient to invoke due process, and inmates have neither protectable

liberty interests nor property interests in custodial classifications. (Answer, p. 4-5)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 5) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order denying the Petition.

Case 4:10-cv-00209-DCB Document 27 Filed 05/06/11 Page 1 of 11
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1 References to Chapter 6 of the Program Statement can be found at

Respondent’s Answer, Ex. 2, Attachment 1. Respondent did not attach the

entirety of the Program Statement to the Answer. Accordingly, for

background purposes, the Court takes judicial notice of the entire Program

Statement P5100.08, which can be accessed on the BOP's website at:

http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time of filing of this action, Petitioner was an inmate incarcerated at the

Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Safford, Arizona. (Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 2) Petitioner

is presently incarcerated in FCI Texarkana, a low security facility. (See Doc. 25)

Jurisdiction over this § 2241 is still proper, however, because jurisdiction is in this

District is not destroyed by a transfer of the Petitioner and the accompanying custodial

change. See Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2005)(jurisdiction attaches on

the initial filing for habeas corpus relief).

Plaintiff is currently serving a 196 month sentence, followed by 5 years of

Supervised Release. (Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 3) This sentence was imposed on January 23,

2002 in the Southern District of Texas, based on Petitioner’s conviction for possession

with intent to distribute in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 3; Attachment 2) 

Custody classification is a procedure whereby an inmate is assigned a level of

supervision according to their criminal history and institutional behavior/adjustment.

(Ex. 2, ¶ 2) The Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification system,

providing policy and procedure regarding the BOP inmate classifications is detailed

in Program Statement P5100.08 (the “Program Statement”).1

 Male inmates are

classified into four security levels: minimum, low, medium, and high. (Program

Statement, Chapter 1, p.2) Petitioner is presently a minimum security level inmate at

Case 4:10-cv-00209-DCB Document 27 Filed 05/06/11 Page 2 of 11
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2 Management variables rely on the professional judgment of Bureau staff

and are required when placement has been made and/or maintained at an

institution level inconsistent with the inmate’s security score which may

not completely or accurately reflect the inmate’s security needs. Program

Statement, Ch. 2, p 4.

3 This notation was factually incorrect, an error repeated often throughout

the classification and review process. While on escape status, Petitioner

was arrested on two state charges in Tennessee. Tennessee officials,

unaware of his escape status, discharged Petitioner from custody, and he

remained at large until his arrest on the escape charges. The current offense

was committed after he was released from custody on the escape charges.

(Answer, Ex. 2, Sealed Attachment 4; Doc. 1, Ex. A, p.1) David Duncan,

warden at FCI Safford, has acknowledged the incorrect notation during the

grievance process, but nonetheless denied his request for administrative

remedy based on Petitioner’s previous decision to walk away from SCP El

Reno. (Answer, Ex. 1, Attachment 3, Responses dated March 26, 2009,

March 11, 2008, ) 

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FCI-Safford, with a greater security management variable2

 applied. (Answer, Ex. 2, ¶

1) 

On October 21, 2009, during Petitioner’s annual custody review, he was

classified as a minimum security level inmate with a management security level of low.

(Answer, Ex. 2, ¶ 3 and Attachment 2.) On October 23, 2009, Petitioner’s case

manager and unit manager requested a greater security management variable be applied

in Petitioner’s case because Petitioner had a history of escape, and was charged with his

current offense while on escape status3

. (Answer, Ex. 2, Attachment 3) At Petitioner’s

most recent Program Review, on April 14, 2010, his recommendation for housing

remained at a low security level facility. (Answer, Ex. 2, Attachment 4)

Petitioner alleges that, much like the reclassification which occurred on October

23, 2009, the BOP has previously abrogated the Custody Classification through

application of the Program Statement’s management variable. (Petition, ¶¶ 1-2.)

Petitioner alleges that twice after he was classified and approved by his Unit

Classification Team on January 9, 2006 and February 13, 2007 for placement in a

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facility providing community based rehabilitative programs the BOP’s Designation

Sentencing Computation Center (“DSCC”) arbitrarily and capriciously abrogated the

classification through application of the management variable. (Id.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

A prisoner who wishes to challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a

sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.2000). A petitioner filing a petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial

district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672,677 (9th Cir.

1980).

In this case, Petitioner challenges the application of a management variable to

his custody classification in violation of his right to due process. The management

variable prevents Petitioner from participating in community based rehabilitative

programs. Petitioner is challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is

being executed. Thus, his petition is proper under 28 U.S.C. §2241.

B. Exhaustion

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging

any circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies.

Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir.1986). The Government concedes

Petitioner has exhausted his available administrative remedies. (Answer, p.3). 

C. Mootness and Exhaustion

Though Respondent concedes that Petitioner has raised the issue and exhausted

it through available administrative remedies, their own exhibits indicate that, as to

Petitioner’s specific claim – that after approval in 2006 and 2007 for placement in a

facility providing community based rehabilitative programs, the BOP DSCC relied on

management variables to abrogate the classification, without notice, hearing or

providing the Petitioner an opportunity to respond – that particular claim became moot

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after Petitioner’s most recent classification. Petitioner argues, however, that “[w]ithout

the guaranteed protections of due process, the Bureau of Prisons abusive behavior could

continue indefinitely thus creating an unacceptable cycle as is demonstrated herein.”

(See Petition, p.4) Because of the one year duration of custodial classifications, the

likelihood that Petitioner will be subject to similar application of the management

variable each year, and the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases capable of

repetition, yet evading review, the Magistrate Judge finds that the controversy is not

moot. 

Finally, while as a prudential matter the Court requires that habeas petitioner’s

exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under §

2241, petitioners are not specifically required to exhaust direct appeals before filing

petitions for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Recognizing Petitioner’s diligent

attempts to administratively exhaust this issue each time it arises, and Respondent’s

acknowledgment of exhaustion, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court exercise its judicial discretion to reach the merits of the claim. See Brown v.

Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, Reno v. Koray,

515 U.S. 50, 54, 55 (1995) (“[b]ecause exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not

jurisdictional.”).

D. Merits

1. Classification of Inmates and Program Statement P5100.08

Congress authorizes federal correctional institutions to develop a classification

system that segregates inmates based on "the nature of the offenses committed, the

character and mental condition of the prisoners, and such other factors as should be

considered in providing an individualized system of discipline, care, and treatment of

the persons committed to such institutions." 18 U.S.C. § 4081. The BOP classification

procedure is within the discretion of the Attorney General as delegated to the Director

of the BOP. See 18 U.S.C. § 4081; 28 C.F.R. § 0.96; Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78,

88 n. 9 (1976) (dicta). 

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The BOP's policy and procedures for classifying inmates are set forth in the

Program Statement. The intent of the Custody Classification system is to permit staff

to use professional judgment within specific guidelines. (Program Statement, ¶ 2,

Program Objective). An inmate's custody classification is determined when he enters

BOP custody (approximately seven months upon arrival at the institution), and is used

to place each inmate in the most appropriate security level institution that also meets

their programs needs and is consistent with the BOP’s mission to protect society. (Id.,

¶ 1; Id., Ch. 6, p.1). The custody classification is re-calculated annually during the

inmate's institutional Program Review. (Id.) 

The classification procedure involves consideration, through a numerical scoring

system, of a range of factors to determine the proper security and custody classification.

These factors include severity of the current offense, length of the current sentence,

criminal history, history of violence, history of escape and escape attempts, number and

type of detainers, involvement with drugs and alcohol, mental or psychological

stability, institutional adjustment, number and frequency of incident reports, and

personal responsibility. (Id., Ch. 6, pp.2-15). 

BOP also has the option of adding a third "score" to the classification analysis.

(Id., Ch. 6, p. 16). When the resulting "scored security level" of an inmate does not

reflect the inmate's assessed security needs, a management variable can be added to the

inmate's classification. (See Id. Ch.5). A management variable overrides the inmate's

scored security level. (Id., Ch.6, p.16). A management variable can effect placement at

either a higher security or lower security institution than the scored security level

indicates. (Id., Ch.5) Application of a management variable requires review and

approval by the DSCC. (Id., Ch. 5, p. 1). Prison staff must complete a written request

asking DSCC to review an inmate's file and apply a management variable. (Id., Ch. 5,

p.1). There are various management variables; specific to this case, a "V" management

variable represents "Greater Security" and applies when "[t]here may be security

concerns which are not adequately reflected in the classification scheme." (Id., Ch. 5,

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p.5). The greater security (“V”) management variable requires up to a 24 month

expiration date. (Id.) 

E. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to prisoners. Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The

Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving an inmate of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. The Due Process

Clause is designed to protect the individual against arbitrary government action. See

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220-24 (2005) (Due

Process Clauses prohibits government from infringing on prisoner’s liberty interest

without due process of law). It is well settled that in order to be entitled due process

there must be some legal entitlement, right or liberty interest that is protected under

state or federal law. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976); Montanye v.

Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir.

1995)(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Therefore, Petitioner

must establish that he had either a liberty interest or a property interest sufficient to

trigger due process protection. 

Petitioner alleges the BOP violated his due process rights when prison officials

assigned him a management variable of greater security without notice, a hearing, and

the opportunity to present a response. Petitioner seeks an order declaring BOP’s use of

the Program Statement, in the way it is currently being used without prior notice,

hearing, or opportunity to respond, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process

clause and unconstitutional. The Court finds the BOP is not required to provide

Petitioner with any notice, hearing, or an opportunity to be heard prior to applying a

management variable because Petitioner does not have a protected liberty interest in

discretionary custody classifications or in eligibility determinations for rehabilitative

programs. 

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In Moody, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that prisoner classification and

eligibility for rehabilitative programs in the federal system are matters delegated by

Congress to the "full discretion" of federal prison officials. 429 U.S. at 88 n. 9. Inmates

do not have "legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due

process" regarding their classification. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court held the

transfer of a state prisoner to a less favorable institution without an adequate

fact-finding hearing does not in itself deprive the prisoner of liberty without due process

of law. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. In Meachum, the Court expressed concern that

finding a liberty interest in the transfer of prisoners would trigger procedural protections

of due process that "would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary

actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of

the federal courts." Id. The Court was "unwilling to go so far" as to find a liberty

interest when transfers between institutions are made for a variety of reasons including

institutional security or the safety and welfare of the inmate. Id. The Ninth Circuit also

held that prisoners have no constitutional right to a particular classification status.

Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Moody, 429 U.S.

at 88 n. 9). In Hernandez, the prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging state prison

officials improperly classified him based on false statements in his file without giving

him due process to argue against those statements. Id. The Ninth Circuit disagreed;

holding Petitioner did not have a due process right in his classification status nor was

he deprived of liberty by the presence of challenged statements in his record. Id. 

In support of his claim, Petitioner cites a non-binding Second Circuit case,

Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990 (2nd Cir.1975). In Cardaropoli, the Second

Circuit held a petitioner was entitled to some procedural protections of due process

before the BOP could designate him as a "special offender". Id. at 994-995. The

program statement in effect set forth eight broad categories for special offenders

including non-federal prisoners, members of organized crime, protection cases, extreme

custody risks, subversives, notorious individuals, persons who have threatened high

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government officials, and any other offender who requires 'especially close

supervision.'" Id. at 993. In reaching its conclusion that some due process was required

before designating an inmate as a "special offender", the Second Circuit noted the

consequences of a "special offender" designation were significant and could include

delays or preclusion of social furloughs, release to half-way houses and transfers to

other correction institutions and a possible bar on early parole. Id. at 994. Significant

to the court was the total or partial loss of eligibility for substantial benefits normally

afforded every inmate. Id. at 995, n. 11. The court in Cardaropoli specifically

distinguished the "special offender" classification from other classifications, including

the security risk classification of "maximum", "medium", or "minimum", because

"special offender" classification cannot be mitigated or removed by reason of the

inmate's subsequent behavior. Id.

Cardaropoli is not binding on this Court and it also addresses a designation

"special offender" that is not at issue in this case. Unlike the "special offender"

designation, Petitioner's management variable classification has an expiration date.

Under the Program Statement, Petitioner's management variable classification expires

after twenty-four months and prison staff must reapply to the DSCC Administrator to

reevaluate the case if they seek further management variable classification. (Program

Statement, Ch. 5, p.1). Also different, the designation of a management variable does

not result in the loss of eligibility for benefits afforded to other inmates. A management

variable does effect where Petitioner falls in the classification system but it is not a

separate designation that places him outside the classification system. A management

variable classification is closer to the classification of "maximum", "medium", or

"minimum" custody identified by the Second Circuit as distinguishable from the

"special offender" designation. Cardaropoli is not binding on this Court and is also

distinguishable from this case.

In conclusion, the Magistrate Judge finds no basis for a due process claim.

Prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs are matters delegated

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by Congress to the discretion of federal prison officials, and thus implicate “no

legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process”

Moody, 429 U.S. at 88, n. 9. Petitioner has failed to establish that he has a protected

liberty interest or property interest in discretionary custody classifications or in

eligibility determinations for rehabilitative programs. Accordingly, BOP’s use of the

greater security management variable to classify a prisoner without prior notice,

hearing, or an opportunity to respond is not in violation the Fifth Amendment’s due

process clause. 

Respondent also addresses in the answer that “Petitioner indicates he would like

the Court to order a transfer to a minimum security Federal Prison Camp so he may

participate in furloughs, work release and other community based rehabilitative

programs.” (Answer, p.6) Respondent does not cite the basis for this request from the

Petition, and the Magistrate Judge has reviewed the Petition and cannot establish the

basis for this response. Nonetheless, Respondent is correct that Petitioner has no right

to be housed at any particular prison, and transfers, like custodial classifications, are left

to the discretion of prison officials. See 18 U.S.C. 4082(b); Grayson v. Rison, 945 F.2d

1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1978). 

The petition should be denied. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter an order

DENYING the petition on the merits. (Doc. 1.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: No. CV-10-209-TUC-DCB.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to

the Petitioner and the Respondent. 

DATED this 6th day of May, 2011.

Case 4:10-cv-00209-DCB Document 27 Filed 05/06/11 Page 11 of 11