Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02179/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02179-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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1 As the caption now accurately reflects, all other defendants have been

terminated from this action. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James K. Trueman, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 09-2179-PHX-RCB(DKD)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Jason Johnson, Unknown Avena, )

and Unknown Molina, )

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

Plaintiff James K. Trueman is confined in the Saguaro

Correctional Center (“SCC”), a Corrections Corporation of America

(“CCA”) facility in Eloy, Arizona. This matter arises following

the court’s review of plaintiff’s pro se civil rights action filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has yet to serve the

remaining defendants, Unknown Avena, Jason Johnson and Unknown

Molina,1 with the first amended complaint (“FAC”). Nonetheless, as

Case 2:09-cv-02179-RCB Document 32 Filed 12/21/11 Page 1 of 18
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) permits, for the reasons set forth below, the

court grants plaintiff one final opportunity to serve those

defendants. 

Background

Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2007, he sustained back 

injuries when he slipped on “wet linoleum floor” in the facility

dining hall. Amend. Co. (Doc. 17) at 3, ¶ 3. Plaintiff timely

filed his original complaint on September 22, 2009, which this

court dismissed albeit with leave to amend. Ord. (Doc. 11). On

August 16, 2010, plaintiff filed his FAC. Thereafter, on October

4, 2010, this court, among other things, ordered unserved

defendants Avena, Johnson, and Molina to answer count II of the

FAC. Additionally, under the terms of that order, plaintiff had

until approximately December 20, 2010, at the latest, by which to

obtain a waiver of service or complete service upon those three

defendants. See Ord. (Doc. 18) at 6, ¶ (5). 

Complying with that order, plaintiff timely returned the

service packets to the Clerk’s Office for service by the United

States Marshals Service. On each of the United States Marshal

Service forms (“USM-285 forms”) plaintiff named the defendant to be

served, indicated that they should be served at the SCC, and 

provided the facility address. See Docs. 19, 20, and 21. On

December 2, 2010, the three USM-285 forms were returned as

unexecuted; and each had the same notation: “11/29/2010 - Moved to

RS[;] 11/30/10 - Spoke with Tracy Thompson (Warden Secret[a]ry),

she stated [Avena/Molina/Johnson] no longer works at [SCC]

facility.” Id. Docs. 19, 20, and 21. 

Because it was “unclear” as to whether any of these defendants

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had “been transferred to another facility[,]” United States

Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan “required . . . defense counsel 

. . . to advise the court and Plaintiff regarding this matter.” 

Ord. (Doc. 22) at 1:17-208. The Magistrate Judge further ordered

defendants to notify plaintiff if they “are still employed with the

ADOC [Arizona Department of Corrections][.]” Id. at 1:20. Finally,

he granted plaintiff an extension of time until February 16, 2011,

in which to complete service. Id. at 2:, ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff then moved to compel the provision of defendants’

names and addresses. Mot. (Doc. 23). Because it did not appear

that an attorney of record had entered an appearance for

defendants, the Magistrate Judge ordered the law firm of Jones

Skelton & Hochuli (the “Jones firm”), which “routinely represents 

. . . [CCA] and [its] employees[,]” to provide plaintiff, under

seal, with defendants’ “work . . . or home addresses[.]” Ord.

(Doc. 24) at 1:20-23; 2:4-5. 

On February 4, 2011, the Jones firm “advis[ed] that Defendants

are not and were not employees of CCA.” Not. (Doc. 25) at 1:24-25;

2:4-5. The Jones firm did advise, however, that defendants “are or

were employees of an entity called Canteen Correctional Services,

which contracted with CCA to provide canteen serves at CCA’s

Saguaro Correctional Center during times relevant to Plaintiff’s

Complaint.” Id. at 1:25-28. The Jones firm also provided the

address for Canteen Correctional Services’ parent corporation in

Charlotte, North Carolina. Id. at 2:1-5. On February 4, 2011, the

Jones firm also mailed a copy of that notice to plaintiff. Id. at

2:15-19. 

In accordance with the Magistrate Judge’s order, plaintiff

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“ha[d] fourteen (14) days to return the service packets[]” to the

Clerk’s Office for service. Ord. (Doc. 24) at 5-6. Because

plaintiff received a copy of that notice via mail, he had until

February 22, 2011, by which to return the completed service packet

to the Clerk’s Office. Plaintiff was a week late; the Clerk’s

Office received his service packets on March 1, 2011. Doc. (March

1, 2011). Plaintiff did name the defendant to be served on each

USM-285, but he did not provide an address for any of them. See

Docs. 26, 27 and 28. 

About four and a half months later, on July 21, 2011, those

service packets were all returned as unexecuted. Those USM-285

forms uniformly indicate that the server “spoke” with a “manager at

Canteen Corrections who stated subject no longer works there” and

the forwarding addresses were “unknown.” Id.

Based upon this series of events, on August 1, 2011, the

Magistrate Judge noted that it had “been nearly a year and

Defendants ha[d] not been served. OSC (Doc. 29 at 2:12). 

Consequently, he ordered that “Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)

days from [that date] to show good cause why this case should not

be dismissed pursuant to LRCiv 41.1, . . . , for want of

prosecution and Rule 4(m), Fed.R.Civ.P.” Id. at 2:16-19. That OSC

concluded: “If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, this

action shall be dismissed.” Id. at 2:2:19-20. 

Although plaintiff did not directly respond to that OSC prior

to the August 31, 2011 deadline, on August 16, 2011, he did file a

“Motion for Leave to Amend, and Stay of Execution for Cour[t]’s

Order to Show Cause[.]” Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 30) at 1. Based upon his

“belief” that defendants “still reside[] in the State of

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Arizona[,]” plaintiff “request[ed]” that the court not . . .

dismiss his complaint for lac[k] of service against the

defendants.” Id. On October 26, 2011, the Magistrate Judge denied

plaintiff’s motion in its entirety. Ord. (Doc. 31) at 1:22-23.

Discussion

Upon its sua sponte review of this case, and with notice

having been given to plaintiff by the Magistrate Judge’s OSC, the

issue is whether or not to grant plaintiff an extension of time to

serve defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). “A federal court

is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the

defendant has been served in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.” 

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1183, 1135

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Rule (m) specifically provides in relevant part that:

 If a defendant is not served within 120 days 

after the complaint is filed, the court – on motion 

or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must 

dismiss the action without prejudice against the 

defendants or order that service be made within a 

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause 

for the failure, the court must extend the time for 

service for an appropriate period.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). This “deadline for service is designed to force

parties and their attorneys to be diligent in prosecuting their

cause of action.” Golf Savings Bank v. Walsh, 2010 WL 3222112, at

*2 (D.Or. Aug. 13, 2010) (citing, inter alia, Fimbres v. United

States, 833 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

There are “two avenues for relief[]” under Rule 4(m). Lemoge

v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009). “The first

is mandatory[.]” Id. (citation and footnote omitted). Based upon

the plain language of that Rule, “the district court must extend

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time for service upon a showing of good cause.” Id. (citation and

footnote omitted). “The second is discretionary[.]” Id. (citation

omitted). Notwithstanding Rule 4(m), “if good cause is not

established, the district court may extend time for service upon a

showing of excusable neglect.” Id. (citation omitted).

Engaging in the “two-step analysis” which the Ninth Circuit

“requires[,]” the court will first consider whether on this record

there is good cause, thus mandating an extension of time for

service under Rule 4(m). See In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512. 

Courts must determine whether good cause “has been shown on a case

by case basis.” Id. (citation omitted). 

I. Mandatory Extension of Time

 “Good cause to avoid dismissal may be demonstrated by

establishing, at minimum, excusable neglect.” Lemoge, 587 F.3d at

1198, n. 3 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). For the moment,

the court will assume arguendo the existence of excusable neglect. 

Based upon that assumption, now it will address the other factors

“a plaintiff may be required to show . . . to bring the excuse to

the level of good cause: 

(1) the party to be served personally received 

actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant 

would suffer no prejudice; and (c) plaintiff 

would be severely prejudiced if his complaint 

were dismissed. 

Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1198. 

A. Actual Notice

It is undisputed that none of the three remaining defendants

have “personally received actual notice of th[is] lawsuit” in that

they have not been served with process. See id. Evidently

defendants also have not “personally received actual notice of

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th[is] lawsuit” by any means, as they have never appeared or in any

way contacted the court. See id. Therefore, the actual notice

factor does not support a finding of good cause.

B. No Prejudice to Defendants

In contrast, the seeming lack of prejudice to defendants

weighs in favor of a finding of good cause. “[W]hile the Lemoge

court described good cause and excusable neglect as two distinct

standards, it also indicated that the two standards overlap.” Golf

Savings, 2010 WL 3222112, at *3. Given that “overlap” and the

“conflation” of those two legal standards[,]” id., although the

court now is evaluating good cause, it will look to case law

discussing prejudice to a defendant in the excusable neglect

context. In so doing, the court is fully cognizant that “[l]ack of

prejudice by itself is not sufficient to establish good cause.” 

United States v. 2,164 Watches, More or Less, Bearing a Registered

Trademark of Guess?, Inc., 366 F.3d 776, 773 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Prejudice to defendants “requires greater harm than simply

that relief would delay resolution of the case.” Lemoge, 587 F.3d

at 1196 (citations omitted). Allowing plaintiff an extension of

time to serve would mean that defendants “would have lost a quick

victory,” which they would obtain if this court were to dismiss

this action for failure to timely serve. See Bateman, 231 F.3d at

1225. The loss of such a quick victory is not sufficiently

prejudicial to deny relief, however. See id. Further, “[m]erely

being forced to litigate on the merits is not prejudicial in this

context[,]” where, as explained below, there is far greater

prejudice to plaintiff Trueman because it appears that the statute

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2 State law provides the applicable statute of limitations in a section

1983 action, but “[f]ederal law . . . governs when [that] claim accrues.” Fink v.

Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A section 1983 claim

“accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis

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of limitations would bar re-filing. See In re Beck, 2011 WL

4623937, at *4 (Bankr.D.Ariz. Sept. 29, 2011)(citing Lemoge, 587

F.3d at 1196). Thus, any prejudice to the defendants here is

relatively minor. 

C. Severe Prejudice to Plaintiff

 The third good cause factor – severe prejudice to plaintiff

upon dismissal of his complaint – weighs heavily in plaintiff

Trueman’s favor. “A dismissal for untimely service is required to

be a dismissal without prejudice.” 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d at 773

(citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “Such a

dismissal ordinarily enables the plaintiff to refile the complaint

and effect timely service.” Id. In the present case, however, a

dismissal without prejudice would severely prejudice plaintiff

because it appears that the statute of limitations would bar his

section 1983 claim. 

In a section 1983 action such as this, the applicable statute

of limitations “is the personal injury statute of limitations of

the state in which the cause of action arose.” Alamed Books, Inc.

v. City of Los Angeles, 631 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing, inter alia, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct.

1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007)). Arizona has a two year statute of

limitations for personal injury claims. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v.

Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing, inter alia,

Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542). Because plaintiff Trueman’s section 1983

claim accrued on December 6, 2007,2

 borrowing that Arizona statute

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of [his] cause of action.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, as the FAC details,

plaintiff Trueman was aware on December 6, 2007, that he had slipped on an

allegedly wet floor and purportedly sustained back injuries as a result. His

section 1983 cause of action therefore accrued on that date. The two year statute

of limitations thus expired two years later, on approximately December 6, 2009. 

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of limitations, it appears that dismissal of this case for failure

to serve would prevent him from re-filing this action. That

inability to re-file constitutes severe prejudice to plaintiff

Trueman, which, in turn, weighs in favor of a finding of good

cause. See Quinn v. Cornerstone Strategic Advisors, L.L.C., 2007

WL 2462112, at *6 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (severe prejudice shown,

supporting good cause, where plaintiff would be “severely

prejudiced if motion [to dismiss for failure to timely serve] is

granted because a significant portion of his claims will be [time]

barred[]”); see also Alamzad v. Lufthansa Consulting GMBH, 2005 WL

1869400, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 4, 2005) (good cause existed to

extend plaintiff’s time for service because, inter alia, plaintiff

would suffer severe prejudice by dismissal given that “the statutes

of limitations appear to have expired[]”). 

After focusing on the three other factors pertinent to a

finding of good cause (and again assuming excusable neglect), it is

a close call as to whether good cause has been shown here, so as to

“force a mandatory extension of time” to serve defendants under

Rule 4(m). See Golf Savings, 2010 WL 3222112, at *3. Dismissal

would result in severe prejudice to plaintiff Trueman, and there is

no readily apparent prejudice to defendants. Nonetheless, given

defendants’ lack of actual notice of this lawsuit, erring on the

side of caution, this court cannot find that good cause exists, so

as to justify a mandatory extension of time under Rule 4(m). That

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does not end the court’s inquiry, however. 

II. Discretionary Extension of Time to Serve

In the absence of good cause, the court must proceed to the

second step of the analysis, and decide whether, in its discretion,

to extend the prescribed time for service of the FAC. “The Ninth

Circuit has declined to “articulate a specific test that a court

must apply in exercising its discretion under Rule 4(m)[,]” noting

“that, under the terms of the rule, the court’s discretion is

broad.” Gill v. Waikiki Lanai, Inc., 2011 WL 3648772, at *7

(D.Hawai’i Aug. 18, 2011) (quoting In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 513

(citation omitted)). In part, that broad discretion derives from

the fact that Rule 4(m)’s 120-day time frame for service “operates

not as an outer limit subject to reduction, but as an irreducible

allowance.” Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 661, 116

S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “On its face, Rule 4(m) does not tie the hands

of the district court after the 120-day period has expired. 

Rather, Rule 4(m) explicitly permits a district court to grant an

extension of time to serve the complaint after that 120-day

period.” Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)

(emphasis added by Mann court)). 

A court’s discretion under Rule 4(m) is not “limitless[,]”

however. Id. It must be predicated upon a finding of excusable

neglect. See Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1197 (citation omitted) (emphasis

added) (“[I]f good cause is not established, the district court may

extend time for service upon a showing of excusable neglect.”). 

“To determine whether a party’s failure to meet a deadline

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constitutes ‘excusable neglect,’ courts must apply a four-factor

equitable test[]” based upon Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick

Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993);

and Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir.

1997). Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Pioneer involved excusable neglect

under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b), and Briones

involved a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The Ninth

Circuit applies the Pioneer/Briones factors in a variety of

contexts, though, including in deciding whether excusable neglect

has been shown under Rule 4(m). See Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1198. 

That four factor equitable test requires, at a minimum,

examination of: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party;

(2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial

proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the

movant acted in good faith.” Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1261

(citations omitted). Those four enumerated factors are “not an

exclusive list[,]” however. Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1195 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “In some circumstances, the

prejudice a denial would cause to the movant must also be

considered, but it is not a fact that must be assessed in each and

every case.” S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d

1072, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Thus, “what sorts of neglect will be considered

‘excusable’ . . . is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of

all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” 

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. 

Mindful that “a district court abuses its discretion if it

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does not consider each of the four Pioneer factors separately[,]”

PLU Investments, 2011 WL 1376192, at *2 (citing, inter alia,

Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1261), this court will proceed in exactly

that way. In so doing, the court is keenly aware that while

“balancing the Pioneer/Briones factors[,]” it “may not apply per se

rules.” See Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1261 (citation omitted). 

A. Pioneer/Briones Factors

1. Prejudice to Opposing Party

Here, any prejudice to the defendants is relatively minimal,

as already discussed. Additionally, it is noteworthy that “losing

the benefit of [the] expiration of the statute of limitations” does

“not constitute prejudice within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).” 

 Alamzad, 2005 WL 1869400, at *2 (citing Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d

756, 758 (3rd Cir. 1997)). “While not binding in the Ninth

Circuit,” this court agrees that “Boley is persuasive authority for

the proposition that the running of the statute of limitations

period does not assist” defendants in this equitable analysis. See

id. Rather, the lack of prejudice to defendants tips decidedly in

favor plaintiff, especially when contrasted to the severe prejudice

he is likely to sustain absent an extension of time for service. 

2. Length of Delay and Impact

The second Pioneer/Briones factor, too, supports a finding of

excusable neglect. Pursuant to Rule 4(m), initially plaintiff had

until roughly December 14, 2010, in which to serve his FAC. Later,

plaintiff was granted an extension for time to serve until February

16, 2011. Defendants have yet to be served though. While not

inconsequential, given the procedural posture of this case and

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3 Of course, that status does not excuse plaintiff from “follow[ing] the

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

5856, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

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mindful of plaintiff’s pro se status,3 the length of delay and its

impact upon this litigation, also favors plaintiff. 

First, admittedly granting an extension of time to serve would

cause further delay, but this action is in its infancy. It thus

stands in sharp contrast to, for example, Khalafala v. Crowther,

2011 WL 5974627 (D.Ariz. Oct. 26, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 5974537

(D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2011); and Halloum v. Ryan, 2011 WL 5572622

(D.Ariz. Sept. 21, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 557206 (D.Ariz. Nov. 6,

2011), where granting an extension of time in which to serve new

defendants augured against a finding of excusable neglect. In both

of those cases, unlike here, granting such an extension would have

meant “resetting the schedule[s]” in cases “nearing completion.” 

Khalafala, 2011 WL 5974627, at *3; Halloum, 2011 WL 5572622, at *2. 

No scheduling orders for discovery or motion practice have been

entered in this case, much less such “deadlines [which] are about

to expire[.]” See Halloum, 2011 WL 5572622, at *2 (citation

omitted). 

Additionally, another significant difference between Khalafala

and Halloum and the present action is that it has not been

proceeding apace with other served defendants. Any further delay

thus is unlikely to substantially impact this litigation. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the length of delay, particularly

when coupled with the minimal impact upon this proceeding, supports

a finding of excusable neglect. Contra Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1041

(abuse of discretion to grant inmate plaintiff, who “was

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represented by counsel for a significant portion of the seven

years,” extension of time in which to serve defendant guards where

“the length of the delay was extraordinary[]” – seven years);

Quinn, 2007 WL 2462112, at *7 (declining to grant discretionary

extension of time because, inter alia, plaintiff did not effect

service until nearly three years after filing of the complaint).

3. Reason for Delay

Evidently the reason for the delay in service is that this pro

se inmate plaintiff has been unable to locate defendants. 

Plaintiff did undertake one effort to ascertain defendants’

whereabouts when, on January 4, 2011, he filed a motion to compel

their names and addresses. Plaintiff could have been more diligent

in pursuing defendants’ addresses through discovery. So although

plaintiff’s inability to locate defendants is a “reason” for

delay, that reason does not support a finding of excusable neglect

taking into account all of the Pioneer/Briones factors and other

relevant considerations.

4. Good Faith

Turning to the fourth Pioneer/Briones factor, there is no

basis for concluding that plaintiff acted in bad faith, or was

engaging in gamesmanship, as opposed to simply being dilatory. 

Therefore, this factor likewise favors plaintiff.

5. Severe Prejudice to Plaintiff

As explained in discussing good cause, dismissing the FAC now

would, it appears, mean that the statute of limitations bars refiling. Under these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has “expanded

the scope of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry when conducting analysis under

Rule 4(m) to include the prejudice that would be suffered by a

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plaintiff in the event of a dismissal for failure to timely

serve[.]” Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1195. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has

expressly recognized that “[t]he district court's discretion is not

diminished when the statute of limitations would bar re-filing of

the suit if the district court decided to dismiss the case instead

of grant an extension.” Mann, 324 F.3d at 1090. “To the contrary,

the advisory committee notes explicitly contemplate that a district

court might use its discretion to grant an extension in that very

situation: ‘Relief may be justified, for example, if the applicable

statute of limitations would bar the re-filed action.’” Id. at

1090-91 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 4, Advisory Committee Note to 1993

Amendments, Subdivision (m)); see also De Tie v. Orange Cty., 152

F.3d 1109, 1111 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that an extension

may be warranted if the statute of limitations has run). 

In fact, the Ninth Circuit has found that plaintiffs sustained 

“the ultimate prejudice of being forever barred from pursuing their

claims[,]” absent a Rule 4(m) “because the statute of limitations

on their claim ha[d] run.” Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1197. Absent an

extension of time to serve, plaintiff Trueman will suffer that same

“ultimate prejudice” because presumptively, at this juncture, the

two year statute of limitations has run on his section 1983 claim. 

Consequently, although “[a] dismissal for untimely service is

required to be . . . without prejudice[,]” 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d

at 773 (citation omitted), “[t]hat purpose would be frustrated”

where, as here, evidently “the statute of limitations has already

run[]” because “a dismissal intended to be without prejudice under

Rule 4(m) would essentially be with prejudice.” See Carrillo v.

Internal Revenue Service, 2006 WL 167558, at *4 (D.Ariz. Jan. 24,

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2006) (citing, inter alia, 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d at 773). Thus,

“a Rule 4(m) dismissal would effectively cut off Plaintiff’s right

to redress.” Id. 

The concern that the statute of limitations is a bar to

refiling in this case arguably carries even more weight given that

“the public policy favoring resolution on the merits is

‘particularly important in civil rights cases[]’” such as this

section 1983 action. See Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d

393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132,

1137 (9th Cir. 1987)). As is abundantly clear, dismissing the FAC

for failure to timely serve pursuant to Rule 4(m) would result in

not only “severe prejudice” to plaintiff Trueman, but in the words

of the Ninth Circuit, he would sustain “the ultimate prejudice[.]”

See Lemoge, 587 F.3d at 1196. Therefore this aspect of the

prejudice inquiry heavily weighs in favor of a finding of excusable

neglect. 

Balancing the equities in light of the four explicit

Pioneer/Briones factors, only one – the reason for delay, does not

support a finding of excusable neglect. The other three factors,

particularly when coupled with the severe prejudice to plaintiff,

convince the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to grant

plaintiff Trueman an extension of time in which to serve defendants

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. That extension is not without

limits, however. 

The court is fully aware that plaintiff is incarcerated and

proceeding pro se. It remains his responsibility, however, to

provide the United States Marshal with accurate and sufficient

information to effect service. See Boulware v. Ervin, 2010 WL

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5110445, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 8, 2010)(“[I]t is ultimately

[P]laintiff's responsibility to provide a name and address for each

defendant to be served in order for the Court to direct the Marshal

to serve process on a defendant.”) (internal quotation and

citations omitted); see also Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422

(9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (requiring a

pro se prisoner plaintiff to have “furnished the information

necessary to identify the defendant”) (internal citation omitted). 

To that end, plaintiff is not precluded from attempting to

ascertain the full names and also the addresses of defendants

Unknown Avena, Jason Johnson, and Unknown Molina through discovery. 

The court therefore grants plaintiff the opportunity to conduct

discovery for the limited purpose of ascertaining the foregoing

information. Plaintiff shall have sixty (60) days from the date of

this order in which to complete that discovery. Within that sixty

day time frame plaintiff shall file with the court a notice

indicating either: (1) that he has ascertained the names of

defendants and their addresses; (2) or that he has not. Once

plaintiff provides the names and addresses to the court for

service, the court shall issue an order directing service. If

plaintiff does not comply with that time frame, this case shall be

dismissed “without prejudice,” subject to any statute of

limitations defense. The court expects full and complete

compliance with this order, as well as all court orders going

forward, and cautions plaintiff that it will not allow any further

extensions of time in which to serve defendants.

. . . 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m),

plaintiff is GRANTED sixty (60) days from the date of this Order in

which to conduct discovery as to the names and addresses of

defendants Unknown Avena, Jason Johnson and Unknown Molina, and to

provide written notice to this court as to the foregoing, or that

plaintiff was unable to discover that information. 

DATED this 21st day of December, 2011.

Copies to plaintiff pro se and counsel of record

Case 2:09-cv-02179-RCB Document 32 Filed 12/21/11 Page 18 of 18