Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01439/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01439-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 153
Nature of Suit: Recovery of Overpayments of Vet Benefits
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 11/14/2006** 

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ROBERT ELROY SMITH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

HYANG SOOK KIM, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05-01439 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS CORRECTED SECOND

AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND

[re: docket no. 45]

I. BACKGROUND

On April 8, 2005, Plaintiff Robert Elroy Smith (“Smith”) filed a complaint against his exwife, Hyang Sook Kim (“Kim”), the United States of America (“United States”), and various

federal departments and agencies. Smith alleged that the United States and the other federal

defendants made improper disbursements of his Social Security benefits to Kim pursuant to a

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Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

judgment (“Judgment”) of the San Mateo Superior Court (“Superior Court”) after Kim made

false statements to the Superior Court during marriage dissolution proceedings. Smith asserted

four claims for relief: (1) indemnification for overpayments; (2) fraud; (3) petition for writ of

mandamus (against the United States); and (4) conversion (against Kim). On January 24, 2006,

this Court issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by the United States and the other

federal defendants. The Court dismissed the claims alleged against the departments and agencies

without leave to amend on the ground that any tort claim naming as a defendant any federal

agency (rather than the United States itself) is subject to dismissal. The Court dismissed the

claims alleged against the United States with leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Because Smith had failed to allege exhaustion of

administrative remedies, this Court did not have jurisdiction over the claims. Because Smith had

alleged neither that the Judgment, pursuant to which payments were made to Kim, was not

“regular on its face” nor every element of a tort claim, Smith’s complaint failed to state a claim.

On February 13, 2006, Smith filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in which he

alleged the same four claims for relief alleged in his original complaint, against Kim and the

United States. The only substantive additions to the complaint were allegations that “[t]he

judgment upon which payment were [sic] made to defendant Kim was irregular on its face” and

that all appropriate tort claims and administrative claims were filed with the applicable agencies

consistent with the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). On May 15, 2006,

this Court issued an Order granting the second motion to dismiss filed by the United States on

multiple grounds. First, Smith’s claims against the United States were dismissed because the

administrative tort claim Smith filed with the Social Security Administration had been denied

only after this action had commenced and thus did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement that

the administrative remedies be exhausted before the initiation of an action pursuant to the FTCA. 

 Second, Smith alleged only a legal conclusion that the Judgment is not “regular on its face,”

which was insufficient to state a claim because “it is generally true that a judgment by a court of

competent jurisdiction bears a presumption of regularity.” Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438

(1940). Finally, Smith had failed to allege all of the elements of any tort, and it was not clear

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2

 The Court initially set a deadline for supplemental briefing of October 13, 2006. On

October 18, 2006, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation extending this deadline until October

20, 2006. On October 30, 2006, the Court denied Smith’s motion to continue the hearing, but

extended the deadline for supplemental briefing until November 3, 2006. At oral argument on

November 9, 2006, Smith represented that he had not been able to file supplemental briefing

because the provided time had not allowed him to analyze the two missing pages in his version of

the record. The Court extended the deadline for Smith to file supplemental briefing until

November 13, 2006. 

The Court need not consider the supplemental briefing beyond its discussion of the two

missing pages of Smith’s version of the record, because Smith has represented that the missing

pages were the sole reason for his delay. However, in light of the disposition of the instant

motion, the Court has considered all of the arguments made by Smith in his supplemental

briefing. 

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Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

from the face of the FAC what tort was alleged.

On June 15, 2006, Smith filed a Corrected Second Amended and Supplemental

Complaint for Damages (“SASC”). The only substantive additions to the complaint are specific

allegations as to how the Judgment purportedly was irregular on its face. On July 3, 2006, the

United States moved to dismiss the SASC or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. It

argued that Smith still has failed to allege the elements of any tort, that the Judgment is regular

on its face, and that Smith’s claims for funds paid more than two years prior to the filing of the

complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Smith opposed the motion. The

Court heard oral argument on September 1, 2006. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court

ordered the United States to obtain the record underlying the Judgment from the Superior Court

and to serve it upon the parties. The United States requested judicial notice of the Superior Court

file pertaining to the dissolution and child support case between Smith and Kim (“Superior Court

file”) on September 29, 2006, and filed supplemental briefing on October 20, 2006. The Court

heard further oral argument on November 9, 2006. Smith filed supplemental briefing on

November 13, 2006.2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for one of two

reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal

theory. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, all allegations

of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995);

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994).

“A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Clegg, 18 F.3d at

754. The court, however, “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Id. at

754-55. A court’s review is limited to the face of the complaint, documents the complaint

referenced, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac

Elecs. Sec. Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950

F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991).

Motions to dismiss generally are viewed with disfavor under this liberal standard and are

granted rarely. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). Leave to

amend must be granted unless it is clear that amendments cannot cure the complaint’s

deficiencies. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, when

amendment would be futile dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d

386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996); Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1988); Beezley v.

Fremont Indem. Co., 804 F.2d 530, 531 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 

III. DISCUSSION

1. Failure to state a claim

Smith’s SASC alleges three “claims” against the United States: (1) indemnification for

overpayments, (2) fraud, and (3) petition for writ of mandamus. However, it is not entirely clear

what legal theories Smith asserts against the United States. Smith’s claims for indemnification

and fraud both allege that “the federal government has made excessive payments extracted out of

money that was rightfully [Smith’s], i.e., military pensions, retirement funds, etc.” SASC ¶ 14. 

Smith’s claim for a writ of mandamus alleges: “From the year 2000 to the present, defendant

United States government has been a legally [sic] garnishing from plaintiffs in military pension

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Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

and retirement and giving it to defendant Kim despite plaintiffs repeated admonition and advice

to defendant US government that Kim was making fraudulent statements and demanding monies

far in excess of what she was legally entitled to. The judgment was irregular on its face and

should not have been used as the foundation for payments to defendant Kim.” Id. ¶ 26.

To the extent that Smith alleges a claim for fraud against the United States, this claim is

precluded because 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) excepts “any claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation

[or] deceit” from the federal government’s waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to the FTCA. 

See also, Pauly v. U.S. Dept. of Agri., 348 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To determine

whether a claim is barred by section 2680(h), we ‘look[ ] beyond the labels used’ by the plaintiff.

Rather, we ‘examine whether the conduct upon which the claim is based constitutes one of the

torts listed in § 2680(h).’ ‘[T]he essence of an action for misrepresentation, whether negligent or

intentional, is the communication of misinformation on which the recipient relies.’”) (internal

citations omitted). Smith does not offer any opposition to this argument.

It is also possible to infer that Smith may be attempting to allege a claim for negligence. 

Under California law, “[t]o prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that the

defendant owed and breached a legal duty to the plaintiff and that the breach was a proximate

cause of damages sustained by the plaintiff.” Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d

977, 981 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666 (1993)). 

Although Smith argues in opposition that “the simply [sic] fact is the defendant owned the

plaintiff a duty to protect that money and to make proper payments to him” and that when “the

defendant paid that money to another person, and breach that duty it was negligence,” Smith has

not set forth the elements of a claim for negligence in the SASC itself. In its previous two

Orders, this Court informed Smith that the original complaint and FAC failed to state the

elements of any tort claim. Despite having had clear notice of the complaint’s failure to set forth

the nature or the elements of any alleged tort, Smith has not made any modification to his

complaint that would cure this fatal defect. Accordingly, the Court will grant this aspect of the

instant motion to dismiss without leave to amend.

2. The Superior Court Judgment

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3

 The Superior Court file is extensive. The documents that Smith challenges for the

purposes of this motion are the Judgment, filed on February 14, 1994, and the Marital Settlement

Agreement, dated May 28, 1993, that the Superior Court incorporated into the Judgment. The

Judgment and the Marital Settlement Agreement are located within the last half-inch of the

physical file. They are also reproduced as Exh. A to the United States’ request for judicial notice

dated July 3, 2006. 

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Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

The United States is not liable for payments made pursuant to a legal proceeding when

the legal proceeding was “regular on its face.” 42 U.S.C. § 659(f)(1). Smith has amended his

complaint to allege specific ways in which the Judgment purportedly is not regular on its face. 

He alleges that “it did not inform the parties the date on which it was to expire or that it was

subject to expiration,” “it was inherently contradictory in that portions of said order commanded

plaintiff to pay child support for his two kids until they reached age eighteen while another

portion of said order had no expiration date for child support,” and “because it did not say that

child support for plaintiff’s two children would expire when the children reached age 18 and thus

were no longer minors.” SASC ¶¶ 6, 11, 14, 29.

The United States requests that this Court take judicial notice of the Superior Court file. 

September 29, 2006, Request for Judicial Notice 1.3 Although courts ordinarily do not consider

evidence at the pleading stage, a court may consider judicially noticed materials in connection

with motions to dismiss and to strike. See, e.g., In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405

n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (regarding motions to dismiss); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1528

(9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (regarding motions to strike). 

Because the Judgment is referred to expressly in the SASC and it is a matter of public record, the

Court may take judicial notice of it. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.

1994) (“documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party

questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th

Cir. 1986) (“On a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record

outside the pleadings.”). This Court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters

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Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The Superior Court file has been properly authenticated, and the Court

will take judicial notice of it.

The Court concludes that none of the irregularities of the Judgment alleged in the SASC

is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to a judgment by a court of

competent jurisdiction. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438 (1940). First, Smith cites no

legal authority in his opposition for his argument that the Judgment is irregular because it did not

inform the parties of the date on which it would expire. See SASC ¶ 6. Second, while Smith

alleges that “it was inherently contradictory in that portions of said order commanded plaintiff to

pay child support for his two kids until they reached age eighteen while another portion of said

order had no expiration date for child support,” SASC ¶ 11, the Court has been unable to locate

such contradictory statements in the Judgment. Third, Smith contends that it was irregular for

the Judgment to require child support payments after the children reached age eighteen. SASC ¶

14. Indeed, the Judgment does require that Smith and Kim shall assist with college expenses

until “completion of four years of post-secondary schooling or at age 25, whichever comes first.” 

Marital Settlement Agreement § v(a). However, this provision is expressly permitted by

California Family Code § 3587, which provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of

law, the court has the authority to approve a stipulated agreement by the parents to pay for the

support of an adult child or for the continuation of child support after a child attains the age of 18

years and to make a support order to effectuate the agreement.” 

Smith argues that the Judgment is irregular in several additional respects. Although the

Court need not consider these additional allegations of irregularity because they were not alleged

in the SASC, the Court notes that none of the additional alleged irregularities establishes a valid

contention that the Judgment is irregular on its face. Smith argues that the Judgment is a

“default” judgment, which, Smith asserts, is inconsistent with the fact that the Judgment

incorporates a settlement signed by Smith and Kim. Opposition 2, 11. However, Smith

misstates the character of the Judgment, which indicates that it was “default or uncontested.”

Judgment 1. It is entirely consistent for an uncontested judgment to incorporate a signed

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4

 Smith makes the following allegations in his supplemental briefing:

“1. Plaintiff Smith’s Bankruptcy Court order (“Discharge of Debtors”) of June 5,

1996, negates and invalidates all prior orders of the superior court of San Mateo

County and therefore, a fortiori, it negates all “support” orders of the superior

court, and hence defendant United States of America (“USA”) should not have

garnished any money of plaintiff or given it to Kim. Defendant USA had

constructive notice of the Bankruptcy Court order, and Smith also sent USA a

copy of it, to there is actual ken [sic] as well.

2. The August 31, 2001 order of the San Mateo County Superior Court (“SMSC”)

is irregular on its face because it contradicts the bankruptcy court discharge order

and other orders.

3. The October 15, 2003 “stipulation and order” is irregular on its face because it

was not signed by any judge or judicial officer and it contradicts what USA has

been garnished.

4. The SMSC order of March 30, 1995 is irregular on its face for it finds plaintiff

guilty of contempt for non-payment of child support (“CS”) despite the fact that

defendant USA was withholding and garnishing plaintiff’s money and giving it to

Kim.

5. The order described in our initial brief (1994) is irregular on its face.”

Smith Supplemental Briefing 1.

5

 Order of United States Bankruptcy Court, June 5, 1996. This order is included in the

Superior Court file in a series of Exhibits and Attachments shortly before the midpoint of the file. 

It is listed as “Exhibit 11” although it is not clear to which filing these exhibits are attached.

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Case No. C 05-01439 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

settlement agreement. Smith also argues that the Judgment is irregular because it was signed by

a “temporary judge;” there are no check marks in the boxes that would indicate the presence of

the petitioner, respondent, or their attorneys in court; the settlement agreement was signed on the

same date that the Superior Court acquired jurisdiction over Smith, which was nine months prior

to the date of the Judgment; and the words “property division order” do not appear on the

Judgment. Opposition 2-4, 9-13. Smith cites no legal authority holding that any of these facts

render the Judgment irregular on its face. 

Smith’s allegations in the supplemental briefing also fail to establish a valid contention

that the Judgment is irregular on its face.4 None of the assertions pertain to the Judgment at issue

here, so they cannot establish its facial irregularity. In fact, Smith provides no authority

supporting his claims that any of the challenged orders is irregular on its face. Smith also

misrepresents the contents of the June 5, 1996, bankruptcy order5 by failing to note that it

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 The bankruptcy order declares any future or past judgments null and void as a

determination of the personal liability of Smith with respect to “(a) debts dischargeable under 11

U.S.C. Section 523; (b) unless heretofore or hereafter determined by order of this Court to be

non-dischargeable, debts alleged to be excepted from discharge under clauses (2), (4), (6) and

(15) of 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a); (c) debts determined by this Court to be discharged.” 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(5) provides that a bankruptcy debtor is not discharged of his obligation to pay “for a

domestic support obligation.” Similarly, a debtor is not discharged of his obligation to pay a debt

“to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5)

that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a

separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, or a determination made

in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 

Accordingly, the bankruptcy order does not disturb the Judgment at issue in the instant motion. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

includes express limits on its scope.6 Even if taken as true, Smith’s other assertions do not show

that the Judgment was irregular on its face and do not affect the presumption of regularity

afforded to the Judgment.

Because Smith has been unable to allege that the Judgment is irregular on its face after

having been given several opportunities to do so, and because it concludes that there is no

reasonable likelihood that Smith can cure this defect if given further opportunity to amend, the

Court will grant this aspect of the instant motion without leave to amend. 

3. Motion for Summary Judgment

In light of the foregoing, the Court does not reach Defendant’s alternative motion for

summary judgment. 

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the instant motion to

dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

DATED: November 14, 2006

_____________________________ 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Chinhayi J. Coleman chinhayi.j.coleman@usdoj.gov 

Stanley G. Hilton FROG727@AOL.COM, mscarver@aol.com;

loucasloukas@yahoo.com; chaffeej@pacbell.net;

STAVROS3589@AOL.COM; frogg@e-garfield.com

Notice will be delivered by other means to: 

Hyang Sook Kim

1030 Magnolia Avenue, Apt. #5

Millbrae, CA 94030

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