Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08146/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08146-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

 Defendants do not seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal causes of action (Plaintiff’s First

through Third Claims for Relief) or state law equivalents under the Arizona Civil Rights

Statutes (Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mary H. Lombardi, a single woman,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Copper Canyon Academy, LLC, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. 09-CV-8146-PCT-PGR

 ORDER

Currently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Mary H.

Lombardi’s (“Ms. Lombardi”) state law claims (Claims Six through Twelve in the Second

Amended Complaint) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1

 This case arises

out of allegations made by Plaintiff of improper conduct by Defendants leading up to

Plaintiff’s discharge from employment. The motion is fully briefed and ready for

disposition. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Copper Canyon Academy, LLC ( the “Academy”) operates a behavioral school for

teen-aged girls who have difficulties with drugs, alcohol, and other behaviors. The Academy

is located in Rimrock and Camp Verde, Arizona, and has three housing dormitories used as

living quarters. The Academy is the legal subsidy of CRC Health Group, Inc. (“CRC”) and

Aspen Educational Group, Inc. (“Aspen”). 

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On November 10, 2003, Plaintiff was hired by the Academy as a residential coach and

was assigned to work in the Juniper House dormitory. Ms. Lombardi, as well as other

employees, were hired to provide treatment to adolescent girls at the Academy. Ms.

Lombardi’s annual job performance evaluations “were generally excellent with overall

ratings which mostly indicated she was a very good employee who exceeded expectations

and objectives.”

On June 4, 2008, Ms. Lombardi met with executive director of the Academy, Paul

Taylor (“Taylor”) and presented him with a letter dated June 2, 2008, which was signed by

Ms. Lombardi and some other employees of the Academy. The letter documented

complaints pertaining to violations by the Academy of the Family Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”) regarding her supervisor Jerry Dorrington (“Dorrington”) and his requested

FMLA leave, as well as complaints regarding the replacement of Dorrington (who was over

age 40) with a younger, inexperienced, 23 year old employee as Ms. Lombardi’s new

supervisor. Taylor read the letter in a meeting with Plaintiff, but he refused to comment on

it or any factual allegations therein. The Academy did not change its decisions. On June 12,

2008, Ms. Lombardi sent a letter signed by herself, as well as other employees, to CRC

management complaining about the selection of the 23-year old female as the replacement

for Dorrington. Thereafter, CRC management sent a Human Resources Department

employee to the Academy to interview Ms. Lombardi and other employees. Subsequent to

receiving the letter and conducting the interview, neither CRC nor the Academy made any

changes in personnel or otherwise.

According to Ms. Lombardi, also in June 2008, subsequent to submitting her

complaints, she, as an individual, was subjected to increased scrutiny and harassment by

Taylor, Josh White (“White”), program director of the Academy, and Anne Harmes

(“Harmes”), supervisor of the Juniper House. They allegedly participated in acts of

harassment against Ms. Lombardi, including, inter alia, closely monitoring her, reporting

false job performance corrective action complaints, defaming her, and instituting unfair

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schedule assignments with the intent to force her to quit her job. Plaintiff further alleges that

White instructed Harmes and other management to keep a file on her, “hoping to catch some

sort of violation.” White stated that Ms. Lombardi was the ringleader regarding complaints

to management and it would only be a matter of time before she would no longer be working

for the Academy. He also stated that “Mary (Lombardi) needs to go, she’s kinda getting up

there and she needs to just go.” Plaintiff further reports that White made statements that

older female employees should never have been hired because of their age.

On September 30, 2008, Ms. Lombardi wrote a letter to White and Harmes stating that

she believed “management was following a plan to force her to resign because she authored

letters to management in June and was considered a ringleader of disgruntled employees by

management.” On November 5, 2008, Ms. Lombardi was transferred to the Willow House

dormitory which, unlike the Juniper House dormitory, required the use of staircase for

access. Ms. Lombardi alleges that the transfer to Willow House dormitory “was designed to

make [her] work place unpleasant so that she would quit because White and Taylor knew

[she] had blood flow problems in her legs and joint arthritis which would make it difficult

for her to walk up and down stairs.” Ms. Lombardi contends that this was part of their

overall plan designed to force her to quit her job. 

On December 18, 2008, Defendants fired Ms. Lombardi, age 74 years, citing

“reduction in force” as the reason. Ms. Lombardi contends that this reason is merely

pretextual for Defendants’ discriminatory animus because (1) on December 5, 2008, three

similarly situated employees were hired to do the same work that Ms. Lombardi did and

Academy advertised for residential coach positions in November and December 2008, as

well as January 2009; (2) two of the employees hired on December 5, 2008 were under the

age of 40 years old and significantly younger than Ms. Lombardi; (3) two additional

residential coaches were hired by Academy in January and February 2009; and (4) two other

employees who signed letters of complaint in June 2008 were also fired at the same time as

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2 Ms. Lombardi’s causes of action are as follows: Retaliation for Exercise of Rights

protected by FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); Violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1);

Violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); Violation of Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S.

§ 41-1463; Violation of Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1464; Wrongful Discharge

in violation of A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b); Wrongful Discharge in violation of public policy

established in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370 (1985); Breach of

the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Intentional Interference with

Contractual Relations; Breach of Contract; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

3

 Ms. Lombardi brings the state and federal claims against Copper Canyon, LLC, CRC

Health Group, Inc., Aspen Educational Group, Inc., Paul Taylor and “Jane Doe” Taylor, Josh

White and “Jane Doe” White, and Anne Harmes and “John Doe” husband. 

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Ms. Lombardi. They too received unjustified, false job performance evaluations in an effort

to force them to quit.

Ms. Lombardi filed charges of age discrimination and retaliation for opposing age

discrimination with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”)

on June 15, 2009. On the same day, she filed the same charges with the Arizona Civil Rights

Division (“ACRD”) of the Arizona Attorney General’s Office. On December 11, 2009, the

EEOC issued Ms. Lombardi a notice of right to sue. On December 23, 2009, the ACRD

issued Ms. Lombardi a notice of right to sue.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in the Superior Court of

Arizona, Yavapai County. Thereafter, on September 1, 2009, Defendants properly removed

the action to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and it is now before

this Court. Plaintiff’s original Complaint and First Amended Complaint were dismissed

(Docs. 27 and 42) with leave to file amended complaints. 

Ms. Lombardi filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging twelve causes

of action2

 against six different defendants (“Defendants”).3 Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for Wrongful Discharge in violation

of A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b), Wrongful Discharge in violation of public policy established in

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Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370 (1985), Breach of the Covenant

of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, Breach

of Contract, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress. Defendants seek dismissal of the aforementioned state claims under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because all

claims are preempted by the National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (“NLRA”)

and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(2) (“FMLA”). In the

alternative, Defendants contend that Ms. Lombardi has failed to state a claim for which relief

can be granted and therefore, the state claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P

12(b)(6). At this time, Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims

(Plaintiff’s First through Third Claims for Relief) or state law equivalents under the Arizona

Civil Rights Statutes (Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(1)

Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction. The authority of federal courts

to assert jurisdiction to hear a particular case extends only to subject matter authorized by the

Constitution or by statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

In federal court, the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting

jurisdiction. See Id. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if the complaint fails to allege

grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction, as required by rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th

Cir.2003).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) can be facial or factual. Safe Air For

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2003). A facial challenge asserts that the

complaint, on its face, fails to allege facts that would invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. A

factual attack disputes the veracity of allegations in the complaint that would, if true, invoke

federal jurisdiction. Id. In a factual challenge, the court may consider evidence outside the

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4 Where a factual challenge is asserted, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial

court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177

(quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1983)) (internal

quotations omitted).

5 While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

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pleadings to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Autery v. United States,

424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.2005).4

Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As the

Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), Rule 8 does

not require detailed factual allegations. However, “it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A pleading that merely provides “labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555. Furthermore, a complaint that provides strictly “naked assertion[s]” devoid of

“further factual enhancement” will not suffice.5

 Id. at 557. Thus, to survive a 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, that when accepted

as true, states “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556.

(Emphasis added). The plausibility standard requires showing more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Despite having to take all of the factual

allegations in the complaint as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court is not

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“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (internal

quotation marks omitted). Id. at 555. 

A. National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (“NLRA”)

In her SAC, Plaintiff asserts state law claims for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of

A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b) (Count Six); Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing (Count Eight), Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations (Count Nine); and

Breach of Contract (Count Ten). In response, Defendants contend that the National Labor

Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., preempts all such claims. Thus, the Court will examine

the NLRA as it pertains to the pending matters.

The NLRA preempts any claim for relief in federal or state court based on conduct

which is prohibited by its provisions. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.

236 (1959). In Garmon, the Supreme Court declared the general rule concerning the

preemptive effect of the NLRA and the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board

(“NLRB”).

When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as

well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the

National Labor Relations Board if the danger of interference with national

labor policy is to be averted.

Id. at 245. The Garmon court explained that:

To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim

of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power

asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it

mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general

application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of

industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the states to

control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create

potential frustration of national purposes.

Id. at 244. State law claims are not preempted where the activity regulated is merely a

peripheral concern of the NLRA or “where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply

rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional

direction, it could not infer that Congress deprived the states of the power to act.” Id. at 243-

44. 

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In deciding a preemption issue under the NLRA, a court must first determine “whether

there is an arguable case for preemption; if there is, it must defer to the Board, and only if

the Board decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the

litigation.” Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 397(1986). The NLRA

protects employees who engage in “concerted activities” for the purpose of “mutual aid or

protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Accordingly, if the Plaintiff has participated in a concerted

activity for the mutual aid or protection of others and that is what has caused her termination

and thereby given rise to this lawsuit, the NLRA is triggered. 

Thus, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff was and is participating in a

concerted activity. Although the term “concerted activities” is not defined in the statute, case

law explains that “it clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined

together to achieve common goals.” NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830

(1984). An employee must act “with or on behalf of other employees, and not solely by and

on behalf of the . . . employee himself” in order for the action to be considered a concerted

activity. NLRB. v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.2d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Pac.

Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 261 F.2d 310, 310 (9th Cir. 1966)). More specifically, Ms.

Lombardi’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and termination are not based on her

exercise of rights protected by the NLRA. She does not contend that Defendants terminated

her because she and her co-workers collectively complained about the alleged mistreatment

in the workplace. She has alleged that she, as an individual, was terminated because she

opposed FMLA violations and because of age discrimination she experienced. She has not

asserted any rights or claims on behalf of any other individuals, group(s), or otherwise.

These claims are not grounded in labor disputes protecting the right to act as a group for the

benefit of a collective unit or even another employee. Rather, they are based upon Ms.

Lombardi’s rights as an individual not to be discriminated against, retaliated against, or

unjustly terminated. Plaintiff has not filed this action before the NLRB for concerted

activities, lost, and then “artfully re-pled” her action for concerted activities as state claims.

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Moreover, such state claims of age discrimination and FMLA retaliation may involve deeply

rooted local interests which are often reserved for the courts.

Furthermore, the Court finds significant that the Supreme Court held NLRA

preemption under Garmon does not act to preempt state law claims if the claims would affect

union and non-union employees equally and neither encourage nor discourage the collective

bargaining processes that are the subject of the NLRA. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755-58 (1985). The NLRA does not preempt state laws and

claims that are not incompatible with the general objectives of the NLRA. Id. at 753-58.

The objectives of the NLRA are to protect the freedom of workers to practice collective

bargaining and protect workers’ rights to freedom of association, self-organization, and

designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purposes of negotiating terms

of employment or other mutual aid or protection. Id. See also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.

Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20 (1987)(“NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining

process, not with the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining.” The NLRA

does not provide for a statutory preemption. The Court specifically held in Metropolitan

Life, 

Where the preemptive effect of federal enactments is not explicit, ‘courts

sustain a local regulation unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate

the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the

circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the

States.’

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747, quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.

202, 209 (1985); Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).

As accurately noted by Plaintiff, the relevant state law claims at issue involve statutes

and state common law which provide for individual causes of action for discrimination,

retaliation, and discharge. They are based on allegations that Defendants engaged in

wrongful conduct against Plaintiff as an individual, including discrimination and retaliation

for opposing age discrimination and violations of FMLA, as well as discriminatory

discharge. Said claims do not involve activity related to the NLRA such as organizing,

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collective bargaining, or concerted activities on behalf of another, nor do they “purport to

regulate any conduct subject to regulation by the NLRB.” Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482

U.S.1 at 22. With regards to the relevant state law claims, the Court finds that they do not

implicate the NLRA. It has not been established that Congress intended to preempt the

relevant state laws raised by Plaintiff, and the state laws do not conflict with or frustrate the

objectives of the NLRA. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 6 and 8-

10 on the ground that they are preempted by the NLRA is DENIED. 

B. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(2)

Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by the Family

and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(2). Defendants cite to numerous district courts

cases (inter alia, O’Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16 F. Supp. 2d 868, 894 (S.D. Ohio

1998); Kiely v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Center, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3156 (W.D. Pa.

2000); See also Alvarez v. Hi-Temp Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4755 (N.D. Ill. 2004)) to

support their contention that Congress intended that the specific remedies set forth in § 2167

of the FMLA would be the exclusive remedies for a violations of the FMLA. However,

Defendants have wholly failed to provide this Court with any binding or persuasive authority

supporting their position that this Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff’s state law claims on

the basis of FMLA preemption and Congressional intent. There is no indication that this

Court or any Court in this district or circuit subscribes to the minority view as espoused by

Defendants or the cases proffered by Defendants. The Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff’s

state law claims on the grounds of preemption under FMLA is DENIED.

C. Wrongful Discharge

1. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b) (Count Six)

In her sixth claim for relief - wrongful discharge in violation of the Arizona

Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”), A.R.S. § 23-1501, Ms. Lombardi contends that she

was wrongfully discharged contrary to the public policies of Arizona for her opposition to

Defendants’ violations of the FMLA. 

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6

Pursuant to the AEPA, it is the public policy of Arizona that employment

relationships are contractual in nature. Absent a contract complying with the requirements

outlined in the AEPA, an employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either party.

A.R.S. § 23-1501(1), (2).

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The AEPA sets forth the public policies of this state6 and enumerates the distinct

circumstances under which an employee may bring a wrongful discharge action in Arizona.

See A.R.S. § 23-1501. One such circumstance is when an employer violates “a statute of this

state” or “the public policy set forth in or arising out of the statute.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b).

Another is when the employer discharges someone from employment in retaliation for

refusing to violate Arizona law or for reporting violations of Arizona law to the employer’s

management or other investigative authority. A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(i),(ii).

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain this claim because the AEPA

does not encompass violations of federal regulations. Thus, the first issue is whether Ms.

Lombardi has stated a claim under the AEPA with regard to her claim grounded in

oppositions to violations of the FMLA. More specifically, whether allegations of violations

of the FMLA are necessarily violations of Arizona public policy for purposes of the AEPA.

The Court turns to Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., a case in which the Arizona Court

of Appeals considered whether the legislature intended to include federal regulations in the

public policy to be vindicated by the AEPA. Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz.

290 (2003).

The Court in Galati explained that the language chosen by our legislature for the

AEPA is clear and unequivocal. Section 23-1501(3)(b) provides a remedy if “[t]he employer

has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in violation of a statute of this

state.” (Emphasis added). Section 23-1501(3)(c)(i) provides a remedy if the employee is

terminated in retaliation for refusing to commit an act or omission “that would violate the

Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” (Emphasis added). Section

23-1501(3)(c)(ii) provides a remedy if the employee is terminated for disclosing to the

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7 The Court notes that when determining whether claims survive a motion to dismiss,

the Court looks to the SAC in its entirety, not merely to the count as articulated. Thus, the

Court must consider if there are any plausible claims that can be maintained from the

allegations asserted, not just the specific statute alleged. For example, in the case sub judice,

Plaintiff alleged violations of FMLA in Count Six as the basis for her claim under AEPA.

However, if the SAC as a whole demonstrates a violation of AEPA, the claim should not be

dismissed for failure to cite the correct section of the AEPA that was violated or failure to

state which source statute was violated under the AEPA. Based on the SAC in its entirety,

the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for wrongful discharge under A.R.S.

§ 23-1501. 

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employer, its representative, or an investigatory body a violation of “the Constitution of

Arizona or the statutes of this state.” (Emphasis added). There is no mention of any federal

provision, statute, or regulation. The language contemplates only transgressions of Arizona

law as violative of Arizona public policy. Accordingly, in Galati, the court did not find that

a statutory public policy exception exists for whistle-blowing associated with federal

regulations. Moreover, it affirmed the trial court’s finding that the legislature did not violate

the Arizona Constitution by excluding federal regulations from public policy under the

AEPA.. Galati, 205 Ariz. at 294, citing Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531 (1999) (The

Arizona supreme court addressed the constitutionality of the AEPA holding that employees

asserting wrongful termination claims against their employers for violating the Arizona Civil

Rights Act were limited under the AEPA to the statutory remedies set forth that act.) The

Cronin Court also found that the AEPA does not violate the equal privileges clause, the

impairment of contract clause, the anti-abrogation clause, the non-limitation clause or the

separation of powers clause. Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531 (1999). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s allegations involving FMLA violations are not within the parameters of the AEPA

and therefore fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.7

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain her sixth claim under the AEPA

based upon violations of the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”) either because “the [A]EPA

does not provide a back door method of suing [employers] in tort for the wrongful

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8 Wrongful termination and wrongful discharge are used interchangeably in case law

and statutory law, and likewise in this order.

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termination in violation of ACRA or its public policy.” Taylor v. Graham County Chamber

of Commerce, 201 Ariz. 184, 188 (2001). To determine whether Plaintiff’s claims are

authorized under the AEPA, the Court must look to the pertinent language of the statute.

Pursuant to AEPA, an employee has a claim in tort for wrongful termination8

 against an

employer if “the employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in

violation of a statute of this state.” But note that, “if the statute provides a remedy to an

employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee for a violation

of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy

set forth in or arising out of the statute, including the following: (i) The civil rights act

prescribed in title 41, chapter 9. *** ” § 23-1501(3)(b). The question then becomes, does

this language prohibit a plaintiff from bringing the cause of action at all or does it merely

limit a plaintiff’s remedies. The parties have failed to address this issue. The Court will not

dismiss the claim without further analysis of this critical issue because it cannot be

established, based upon the papers before the Court, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

An employee also has a claim in tort for wrongful termination under the AEPA if “the

employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in retaliation for,”

inter alia, 

The disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the employee has

information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an employee of the

employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona

or the statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of the

employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial or

supervisory position and has the authority to investigate the information

provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations of the

Constitution of Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public

body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a public body or

political subdivision.

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A.R.S. § 23-1501 (3)(c). In the present matter, Ms. Lombardi has alleged sufficient facts in

her SAC to assert a claim that her termination was at least in part the result of retaliation

against her for opposing age discrimination. For the reasons stated above, the Motion to

Dismiss is DENIED. 

2. Common Law Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy (Count

Seven)

In her SAC, Plaintiff asserts that she was wrongfully discharged on December 18,

2008, in violation of public policy as established by common law in Wagenseller v.

Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370 (1985). Defendants move to dismiss this claim

on the ground that the Arizona legislature enacted the AEPA in effect to supercede

Wagenseller. In Wagenseller, the Arizona supreme court held that an at-will employee of

a hospital could bring a wrongful termination suit alleging that she was fired in violation of

Arizona’s public policy. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 389. The court said that “an employer

may fire for good cause or for no cause. He may not fire for bad cause-that which violates

public policy.” Id. at 378. The court defined public policy to include violations of our

statutory, constitutional, and common law. Id. at 378-80. 

The Arizona legislature enacted the AEPA in 1996 in direct response to Wagenseller

because “it took express exception to the court’s indication that it rather than the legislature

had the authority to define public policy.” See Galati, 205 Ariz. at (2003), quoting

Employment Protection Act Ch. 140, § 1, para. A, 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 683, 684. It was

the intent of the legislature to limit the availability of wrongful termination for the violation

of public policy. Therefore, as established above, the AEPA limited the circumstances under

which a discharged employee may sue an employer to those situations involving either

qualifying written contracts or an employer violating the public policy of the state as

enunciated in the state constitution and statutes. Johnson v. Hispanic Broadcasters of

Tucson, Inc., 196 Ariz. 597, 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).(Emphasis added) 

In her seventh claim for relief, Ms. Lombardi specifically alleges that as a result of

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the Defendants’ actions, they are liable to her for wrongful discharge in violation of common

law public policy as established in Wagenseller. She cites Logan v. Forever Living Prod.

Int’l, 203 Ariz. 191, 194-95 (2002) and Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290,

294 (2003) to support her argument that the tort of wrongful discharge based upon common

law public policy of Arizona still exists. 

In Logan, the plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful termination alleging they were

discharged by their employer for not selling their property to him at the price he demanded.

Logan, 203 Ariz. at 192. The superior court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim

and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the decision of

the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 195. The court held

that the plaintiffs in fact stated a claim for wrongful termination under the AEPA. Id. The

court explained that one of the express purposes of the AEPA is to provide protection to

employees from employers exacting “fees, gratuities, commissions, kickbacks, or other forms

of remuneration from employees as a condition of continuing employment or as a condition

to obtaining employment in the first instance.” Id. at 194. Thus, because the court found that

the Logans’ claim fell directly within the parameters of the AEPA, the court explained, “we

need not reach the question, raised by our associate in a separate concurring opinion, whether

a common law cause of action of the kind asserted by the Logans may still be asserted

independent of the AEPA.” Id. at 195. As such, the court did not affirmatively decide the

question; rather it merely left open the possibility that a cause of action for common law

wrongful termination may still exist. 

Likewise, in Galati, the court did not foreclose the idea that a common law tort of

wrongful discharge based upon public policy remains in Arizona in the post-Wagenseller era.

Galati was employed by America West Airlines (“AWA”) as a flight attendant until he was

discharged in January 1999. He filed suit against AWA asserting that he was wrongfully

terminated for being a whistle-blower; and his claims were based on violations of Federal

Aviation Administration regulations. AWA filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

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9 When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1993). Accordingly,

the facts considered by this Court are gleaned directly from the allegations of Plaintiff’s

SAC. Upon careful review, the Court has determined that based on the conduct alleged,

there is sufficient factual content in the SAC for the Court to infer a plausible claim of

wrongful discharge. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiff is cautioned that since the

inception of the AEPA, common law wrongful discharge claims based upon public policy

are limited, as the legislature now favors the comprehensive statutory scheme of the AEPA.

The motion to dismiss stage is merely the threshold, Plaintiff still bears the burden of

establishing a prima facie case with authoritative support therefor.

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viable claim under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) arguing that Galati had failed

to plead a violation of Arizona statutory or constitutional law as required by the AEPA. The

trial court dismissed the case. It found that Galati’s claims, grounded in federal violations,

did not fall within the scope of A.R.S. § 23-1501. Galati timely appealed. The court of

appeals held that (1) a statutory public policy exception did not exist for whistle-blowing

associated with federal regulations and (2) the Airline Deregulation Act preempted the flight

attendant’s state cause of action. It further explained, with great significance to the present

case, “[w]hether a common law tort for wrongful termination still exists after the AEPA is

an open and much debated question in Arizona law.” Id. at 294. Both Logan and Galati

remain good law in Arizona and establish support for Plaintiff that, contrary to the

Defendants’ steadfast assertion otherwise, Plaintiff’s common law tort for wrongful

termination claim is not foreclosed as a matter of law merely based upon the enactment of

the AEPA. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count Seven of Plaintiff’s SAC is

DENIED.9

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

In Count Eleven, Plaintiff contends that the Defendants’ conduct was “intentional,

outrageous, and unconscionable in its scope and severity, and Defendants either intended to

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cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that such distress would

result from their conduct. Furthermore, this conduct was without legal justification. Such

actions caused severe emotional distress to Lombardi.” Plaintiff maintains that “she has

suffered and will continue to suffer for the rest of her life emotional distress, mental anguish,

anxiety, anger, pain and suffering, stress, insecurity, shame, and depression.” As stated,

Plaintiff was 73 years old when she made the complaints in June 2008 and 74 years old in

December 2008 when she was discharged.

The Supreme Court has limited Garmon-preemption in the context of intentional

infliction of emotional (IIED) distress based on its interpretation of the NLRA. It has

explained that the NLRA does not preempt all claims brought by an employee against an

employer. In an often cited case, the Supreme Court explained,

[i]nflexible application of the doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the

State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the

State’s interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal

regulatory scheme. With respect to [the employee’s] claims of intentional

infliction of emotional distress, we cannot conclude that Congress intended

exclusive jurisdiction to lie in the Board.

Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 430 U.S. 290, 302

(1977) . The Court continued, “[n]o provision of the National Labor Relations Act protects

the ‘outrageous conduct’ complained of by [the employee]....” 

In Farmer, the Supreme Court held that a claim for IIED was not preempted by the

NLRA. The court explained that in order for such a claim to avoid preemption, “it is essential

that the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the

particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather

than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination itself.” Id. at 305. (Emphasis

added). The employee’s cause of action depended on the “outrageousness” of the conduct

and whether the manner of conduct was proper or was beyond the scope of labor relations

regulated by federal law. The Court concluded that the state’s interest in protecting its

citizens from the kind of abuse of which the employee in Farmer complained outweighed any

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minimal potential for interference with the federal scheme of regulation. Id. at 302-304.

The “unrelated to employment discrimination” prong of the Farmer test, “is equivalent

to a requirement that the facts not be ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a labor law duty

established by the collective bargaining agreement.” Truex v. Garret Freightliners, Inc., 784

F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Bloom v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Local 468, 752 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1984)). Ms. Lombardi’s claims for intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress, however, are wholly independent from the terms

of any collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the claims are based on the discrete

incidences of alleged wrongful conduct of Defendants. The claims are specific to the

individuals as opposed to the employment institution, unrelated to any collective bargaining

agreement, and were particularly outrageous given her age, the length of time for which the

conduct was committed, and the nature of the conduct itself. Furthermore, although the

alleged actions by Defendants took place in the employment environment, they do not

concern matters within the scope of federal labor policy. 

The Court finds further support that this claim is not preempted in that the alleged

infliction of emotional distress upon a single employee as described in the SAC is at best a

“peripheral” concern of the NLRB, and instead is a concern best suited for this Court. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for IIED (Count

Eleven) and NIED (Count Twelve) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction

based on NLRA preemption is DENIED.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

In the alternative, Defendants claim that assuming the Court does have jurisdiction

over the emotional distress claims, they should nevertheless be dismissed, as Ms. Lombardi

has failed to state a claim (for IIED and NIED) upon which the Court can grant relief. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Having determined that the Court does have jurisdiction over these two

claims, the Court will now consider whether Plaintiff has validly stated her claims under

R.12(b)(6). 

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1. IIED

Under Arizona law, a Plaintiff must prove the following three elements to successfully

establish a claim for IIED: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be “extreme” and “outrageous”;

(2) the defendant must either intend to cause the emotional distress or recklessly disregard

the near certainty that severe distress will result from the conduct; and (3) severe emotional

distress must occur as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Ford v. Revlon, 153 Ariz. 38, 43

(1987). To satisfy the first element, “[a] plaintiff must show that the defendant’s acts were

‘so outrageous in character and so extreme a degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”

Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing, Int’l, 183 Ariz. 550, 554 (App. 1995). Quite notably, “[i]t

is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of

outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of [IIED].” Mintz, 183

Ariz. at 554. Even when a defendant’s conduct is wrongful and unjustifiable, it does not

necessarily rise to the level of “atrocious” beyond all possible bounds of decency such that

it would cause an average member of the community to believe that it was extreme or

outrageous. Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 181 Ariz. 188, 199 (App. 1984). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court has held that Rule 8 does not

require detailed factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. Here, Plaintiff

has set forth sufficient factual allegations in her SAC to permit the Court to draw reasonable

inferences to support plausible claims of IIED and NIED for the Court. Id. at 556.

Moreover, determination of such fact-intensive claims is generally based upon the

sufficiency of evidence, testimony, and may often depend upon the credibility of witnessesall to be weighed by the fact-finder, not the Court. Unless it is a matter of clearly established

law, the Court will not dismiss such a claim at this stage of the litigation without further

inquiry and discovery.

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2. NIED

Ms. Lombardi’s final cause of action is for NIED. Ms. Lombardi alleges that

Defendants’ conduct was such that it unintentionally caused her emotional distress which

they should have realized involved an unreasonable risk of causing the alleged distress. The

conduct included “harassment by close monitoring, false job performance corrective action

complaints, defamation about Lombardi to students, unfair schedule assignments, moving

Ms. Lombardi to another dormitory that would be unpleasant to her because of physical

limitations, and complaints about her age” over the course of approximately six months.

These actions by Defendants allegedly caused Ms. Lombardi to suffer “emotional distress,

mental anguish, anxiety, anger, pain and suffering, stress, insecurity, shame, and depression.”

Moreover, she has alleged that it caused her such distress that it prompted her to write a letter

to management regarding her fear that she might lose her job.

Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Arizona’s Workers’

Compensation Act, A.R.S. § 23-1022 (A), is the exclusive remedy against the employer for

work-related injuries. Arizona Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy

for employees who are accidentally injured in the course of their employment. A.R.S. § 23-

1021. (Emphasis added). The statute provides, “[t]he right to recover compensation

pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee ... is the exclusive remedy

against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment[.]” A.R.S.

§ 23-1022 (A) (Emphasis added). “A mental injury ...shall not be considered a personal

injury by accident ... and is not compensable ... unless ...unexpected, unusual or extraordinary

stress ... was a substantial contributing cause.” A.R.S. § 23-1043.01(B). More specifically,

concern over job security is not compensable under worker’s compensation because this type

of stress is not the result of any “unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress related to the

employment.” La Pare v. Industrial, 154 Ariz. 318 (App. 1987). 

In the pending matter, Plaintiff has alleged a mental injury caused by the stress,

anxiety, and surrounding distress resulting from her fear of losing her job. Plaintiff further

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alleged that the injury was not unexpected, as Defendants knew or should have known that

their conduct created an unreasonable risk of such mental distress and Defendants devised

a plan to force Plaintiff to quit said job prior to discharging Plaintiff. The Court finds that

based on the allegations set forth in the SAC, assuming Plaintiff can prevail on her claim,

she has demonstrated that her distress was not unexpected. Accordingly, Arizona Workers’

Compensation Act does not apply to this claim and the Court has jurisdiction to hear this

claim.

In Arizona, to recover for the tort of NIED, a plaintiff must have been in the zone of

danger so that the negligent defendant created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to

plaintiff and the emotional distress inflicted by defendant’s negligent conduct “must be

manifested as a physical injury.” Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 304

(App. 1988). Ms. Lombardi alleges that Defendants’ conduct caused her, inter alia, anxiety,

pain and suffering, and depression. In Arizona, short-lived physical manifestations do not

sufficiently constitute physical injury for purposes of a NIED claim. Burns v. Jaquays

Mining Co., 156 Ariz. 375, 379, (holding that headaches, weeping, muscle spasms,

depression, and insomnia were transitory physical phenomena that do not sustain a cause of

action for emotional distress). However, physical injury and long-term physical illness or

mental disturbance constitute sufficient bodily harm to support a claim of NIED. Monaco

v. Health Partners of S. Arizona, 196 Ariz. 299, 303 (App. 1999) (holding that Plaintiff stated

a claim for NIED when he suffered from nightmares, depressive syndrome, sleepless nights,

and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder). It is clear based upon Arizona

precedent that long-term physical illness or mental disturbance constitutes sufficient bodily

harm to support a claim of NIED. Id. at 304. Weighing the evidence to determine whether

Plaintiff’s specific circumstances give rise to such a claim is reserved for the fact-finder after

sufficient discovery has been conducted. Nevertheless, based on the allegations that she has

suffered the foregoing injuries over the course of time, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim

for NIED. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s NIED claim is DENIED.

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for

wrongful discharge in violation of A.R.S. §23-1501 (Count Six); wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy (Count Seven); breach of implied duty of good faith and fair

dealing (Count Eight); intentional interference with contractual relations (Count Nine);

breach of contract (Count Ten); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Eleven);

and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Twelve) is DENIED.

DATED this 21st day of September, 2010.

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