Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAI FOU SAECHAO.,

Petitioner,

v.

GISELLE MATTESON,

Respondent.

No. 2:23-cv-00909 DB P

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and also requests a stay under 

the procedure of Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005) (“Rhines”). 

Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 

the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a).

For the reasons set forth below, petitioner fails to meet the requirements for a stay and 

abeyance under Rhines. Thus, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s amended motion 

to stay under the Rhines procedure be denied. Since petitioner may be entitled to relief if the 

claimed violation of constitutional rights is proved, respondent will be directed to file a response

to the fully exhausted first amended habeas petition (ECF No. 6).

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I. Background

Petitioner challenges his felony murder conviction in the Sacramento County Superior 

Court. Petitioner initiated this action with a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion to stay 

filed on May 15, 2023. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Prior to any screening of the petition by this court, 

petitioner filed a first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus and an amended motion to stay

on May 31, 2023. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) Good cause appearing, the court deems the first amended 

petition filed on May 31, 2023, to be the operative petition, and the court will consider the 

amended motion to stay.

The first amended petition raises three grounds for relief as follows: (1) insufficient

evidence to support felony murder conviction; (2) instructional error in the failure to instruct on 

theft as the target of the underlying felony; and (3) violation of Double Jeopardy by use of the 

same conduct to support the offense and elevate the sentence. (ECF No. 6 at 2-3.) Petitioner 

raised these grounds on direct appeal. (Id. at 20.) The state appellate court denied relief and 

affirmed the conviction. (Id. at 20.)1

In the amended motion to stay, petitioner seeks a stay under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 

269, 276 (2005), to return to state court to exhaust the following additional claims: (1) ineffective 

assistance of counsel; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) newly discovered evidence. (ECF No. 

7 at 1-2.)

II. Applicable Law

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), habeas relief may not be granted unless a petitioner has 

exhausted the remedies available in state court. A district court may not adjudicate a federal 

habeas corpus petition unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies on each of the claims 

raised in the petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). A petitioner satisfies the 

exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to 

consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 

276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021

1 According to the original petition, the California Supreme Court denied a petition for review of 

these three claims. (See ECF No. 1 at 2-3.)

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(1986). A “mixed petition,” meaning a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted 

claims, is subject to dismissal. Id.; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991).

The United States Supreme Court permits a district court to stay all the claims in a petition 

while the petitioner returns to the state courts to exhaust his already pled but unexhausted claims. 

See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. A Rhines stay is “available only in limited circumstances” 

because it “undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing 

a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition.”

Id. In order to warrant a Rhines say, a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of three factors: 

(1) “good cause” for the failure to exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; 

and (3) the petitioner did not intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. Id.

Although good cause under Rhines does not require a showing of “extraordinary 

circumstances,” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2005), “unspecific, unsupported 

excuses for failing to exhaust—such as unjustified ignorance—[do] not satisfy the good cause 

requirement,” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2014). Rather, “good cause turns on 

whether the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to 

justify his failure to exhaust his claims.” Id. at 982.

III. Discussion

Here, there is no indication petitioner has been expeditious in seeking relief or that there 

are other circumstances that could satisfy the good cause requirement. Petitioner does not explain 

why the unexhausted claims were not developed and raised previously. District courts in this 

circuit have found that “good cause is lacking when a pro se petitioner has not filed any relevant 

state habeas petitions, particularly when there is evidence that the petitioner has not been 

expeditious in seeking relief.” Stacy v. Gastelo, No. CV 17-5482-RGK (JPR), 2018 WL 1750622, 

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-5482-RGK 

(JPR), 2018 WL 1750554 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2018); see Sangurima v. Montgomery, No. 2:17-

cv-05022-PSG-KES, 2017 WL 7371168, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2017) (same). 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected the notion that petitioners proceeding 

without counsel may be excused from the exhaustion requirement because they cannot be 

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expected to understand or comply with the exhaustion requirement. Rejecting a dissenting view 

that exhaustion “will serve to ‘trap the unwary pro se prisoner,’” the Court long ago stated plainly 

that the exhaustion rule:

provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before 

you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken 

each one to state court. Just as pro se petitioners have managed to use 

the federal habeas machinery, so too should they be able to master 

this straightforward exhaustion requirement.

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982).

For these reasons, lack of counsel to assist with state habeas review, alone or in 

combination with a petitioner’s legal inexperience, does not amount to good cause for failure to 

exhaust. See generally Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 

issuing routine stay and abey orders would be contrary to Rhines’ instruction that district courts 

only stay mixed petitions in “limited circumstances”). Because petitioner has not shown good 

cause shown for the failure to exhaust, the motion for a stay under the Rhines procedure should 

be denied.

2 Nevertheless, nothing in this order prevents petitioner from proceeding with his 

additional claims in state court. If the state court issues a ruling on petitioner’s additional claims 

while this action is pending, petitioner should file a “Notice of Exhaustion” in this court along 

with a copy of the state court ruling.

2 Petitioner does not request a stay under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Kelly”), 

which does not require a showing of good cause. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2009). Under Kelly, the court can stay and hold in abeyance a fully exhausted petition while a

petitioner has the opportunity to exhaust further grounds for relief; once additional grounds are

exhausted in state court, then the petitioner can attempt to add those grounds. See Kelly, 315 F.3d 

at 1070-71 (citing Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Under Kelly, however, a newly exhausted claim must be “timely” when amendment is sought. 

See King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. To be timely, a claim must either (1) meet AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)6 or (2) “relate back” to claims contained in the 

original petition that were exhausted at the time of filing. See King, 564 F.3d at 1143; Mayle v. 

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). A claim that simply arises from “the same trial, conviction, or 

sentence” does not necessarily relate back to the initial claims. See Mayle, 545 at U.S. 659. To 

“relate back,” the new claim must share a “common core of operative facts” with the claims in the 

pending petition. Id. The undersigned expresses no opinion as to whether petitioner would be able 

to meet either requirement to add any additional ground following a stay under Kelly. Petitioner 

is cautioned that unlike filing an application for state habeas relief, filing a federal habeas claim 

does not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001).

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Since petitioner may be entitled to relief if the claimed violation of constitutional rights is 

proved, respondent will be directed to file a response to petitioner’s first amended habeas petition.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. That a District Judge be randomly assigned to this matter.

2. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

3. The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 6) is deemed the 

operative petition, and respondent is directed to file a response to the petition within sixty days 

from the date of this order. See Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. An answer shall be accompanied 

by all transcripts and other documents relevant to the issues presented in the petition. See Rule 5, 

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254;

4. If the response to the habeas petition is an answer, petitioner’s reply, if any, shall be 

filed and served within thirty days after service of the answer;

5. If the response to the habeas petition is a motion, petitioner’s opposition or statement 

of non-opposition to the motion shall be filed and served within thirty days after service of the 

motion, and respondent’s reply, if any, shall be filed and served within fourteen days thereafter; 

and

6. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this order, the form Consent to Proceed 

Before a United States Magistrate Judge, and a copy of the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on Tami Krenzin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.

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In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s amended motion to stay 

(ECF No. 7) under the procedure set forth in Rhines, 544 U.S. 269, be DENIED.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one (21) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Findings and 

Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 28, 2023

DLB7

saec0909.100.rhines.fr

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