Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01506/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01506-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SHAW, SR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1506 MCE GGH P

vs.

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,

Respondent, ORDER

 /

Petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration of the undersigned’s order

denying an evidentiary hearing. Order of September 20, 2007. For the following reasons, the

request for reconsideration is granted, but upon reconsideration the motion for evidentiary

hearing remains denied. 

Standards for Reconsideration and Ruling

 Parties seeking reconsideration should demonstrate “new or different facts or

circumstances [which] are claimed to exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what

other grounds exist for the motion.” E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230 (k); see United States v. Alexander,

106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 508 U.S. 951, 113 S. Ct. 2443, 124 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1993)) (reconsideration appropriate

for a change in the controlling law, facts, or other circumstances, a need to correct a clear error,

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or a need to prevent manifest injustice). “After thoughts” or “shifting of ground” are not

appropriate bases for reconsideration. Fay Corp. v. BAT Holdings I, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 307, 309

(W.D. Wash.1987), aff’d, 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir.1990). The standards “reflect[ ] district

courts’ concern for preserving dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency.” Costello

v. United States Government, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal.1991). 

Based upon these standards, and the presentation of a substantive declaration, one

which perhaps counsel thought unnecessary based on the availability of intoxication evidence in

the record, the court will grant the motion to reconsider insofar as the court will undertake

another review of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. 

Discussion

In the order denying evidentiary hearing, the undersigned denied an evidentiary

hearing based upon the lack of evidence presented herein (and in the state court) concerning the

effects of methamphetamine and/or alcohol on the victim at the time of the crime (rape) for

which petitioner had been convicted. The court also noted the statement of petitioner to the

police asserting that the victim had ingested a drug (most probable methamphetamine) after the

alleged crime making the proffered inability of the victim to accurately perceive reality all the

more speculative. Importantly, the undersigned recounted the California Court of Appeal’s

reliance on the physical evidence (vaginal tearing) and strangle marks which corroborated the

victim’s account of events on the night in question. Finally, the victim’s pre-rape testimony was

corroborated in the main by other percipient witnesses, thereby making it unlikely that the victim

was perceiving events which did not take place, or, at least, grossly misconstruing them.

Petitioner persists in his argument that an expert could have testified that the

victim was so intoxicated that she could not distinguish reality from fiction. However, this time,

petitioner presents the declaration of Dr. Stephen Pittel who concludes, based on the undisputed

toxocological evidence, that: “the combination of both drugs would have severely impaired [the

victim’s] ability to perceive and/or recall the events to which she testified at trial.” Pittel

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 Respondent attacks the credentials of this expert on the grounds that he is not a medical 1

doctor. However, Dr. Pittel is a psychologist specializing in substance abuse issues. The court

finds that he would be qualified to render an opinion on the physiological effects of drug usage. 

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Declaration at para. 4. 1

There is no doubt that such an opinion, along with its basis, could be argued to

affect the credibility of the victim. However, the issue here, from a prejudice standpoint, is

whether the court’s confidence in the outcome of petitioner’s conviction is sufficiently

undermined to require a new trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 2068 (1984). This is sometimes phrased as whether the outcome of the proceeding would

probably be different. Id.

Petitioner urges that the court’s ultimate conclusion in this matter be delayed until

after hearing all the evidence. Petitioner relies upon those cases in the Ninth Circuit which

seemingly, inflexibly hold that a hearing must be commenced if the allegations state a colorable

claim, and petitioner did not have a hearing on the factual matters in state court. See e.g.,

Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903, (9th Cir. 2003). However, there exist exceptions to this

rule within the Ninth Circuit, and the one is particularly applicable here: Where the district court

concludes that “‘[a full evidentiary] hearing would not offer any reasonable chance of altering

[the court’s] view of the facts,’” as presented by the record and any expansions thereto, a trial

type hearing will not be necessary. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 591 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Such is the case here.

The record facts, as explicated by the Court of Appeal, are what they are, and

substantially detract from the above Pittel opinion. As seen from the perspective of

corroborating witnesses, the victim did in fact remember, and accurately so, many of the facts

which immediately preceded the attack. In any retrial, the jury would have to ponder the opinion

of memory impairment with the facts that it was not actually impaired. In addition, the physical

signs of attack, not consent, heavily weigh against the impact of the opinion and the accuracy of

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 The court’s statement at hearing to the effect that petitioner might be out of the 2

“consent” frying pan and into the “rape of an intoxicated person” fire, plays no part in the

determination here. Petitioner was prosecuted on a forcible rape basis and the prosecutor would

not have been able to change charges mid-trial. Thus, petitioner could have been able to present

intoxication opinion evidence at his trial with no down-side of being charged with rape of an

intoxicated person. However, whether petitioner could be charged on the basis of rape of an

intoxicated person on an amended pleading should the matter go back for retrial is an entirely

different question. See Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(3). Indeed, the more intoxicated petitioner

would make the victim here, the more problem he might have with amended charges on retrial. 

 The court’s conclusion here should not be read as an indication that the other claims in 3

the petition will be denied. This adjudicated claim pits the allegations of being too intoxicated

to perceive events correctly, or at all, against the objective facts demonstrating adequate

perception. The matter of credibility here is in reality a claim involving the competency of the

witness aspect of credibility, i.e., it does not go to traditional aspects of credibility and whether a

witness is purposefully embellishing or fabricating testimony. Petitioner raises other colorable

claims regarding the victim’s credibility in the thus far unadjudicated portions of the petition

which implicate traditional credibility.

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the victim’s perceptions. Further, if drugs were ingested after the event, even in part, as urged by

petitioner at one time, the ability to assess the victim’s being under the influence at the time of

the alleged rape is greatly diminished. And, as set forth in the initial order, petitioner’s

credibility would now be in tatters before any new jury. He told the police that nothing untoward

occurred that evening, i.e., there was simply consensual sex; now in this habeas action (and his

declaration could be used against him at a new trial) he admits to roughing up the victim after the

sex act, including efforts to strangle her, because of a money dispute. Petitioner would be hard

pressed not to testify in a new trial proceeding – after all, that is how his story would come out – 

but he would be substantially impeached. In all truth, the undersigned, after re-examining the

matter, cannot conclude that his determination of Strickland prejudice would be altered taking

into account the medical opinion.2

For the above reasons, even expanding the record to accept the opinion of Dr.

Pittel for impeachment purposes, the courts’s confidence in the outcome is not undermined.3

Conclusion

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is granted insofar as the court will again

review the matter of evidentiary hearing, but upon reconsideration, the motion for evidentiary

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hearing remains denied.

The court’s order denying an evidentiary hearing will lead to a denial of the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In the event petitioner desires to challenge this order,

that challenge may be made within objections to the final Findings and Recommendations which

will be issued shortly. No time limit to seek district judge reconsideration on this order will run

until issuance of the Findings and Recommendations.

DATED: 12/20/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

shaw1506.rec

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