Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-08-04488/USCOURTS-ca3-08-04488-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, United States District *

Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by

designation.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-4488

 

FORESTAL GUARANI S.A.,

 Appellant

v.

DAROS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-03-cv-04821)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 16, 2010

Before: FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges,

and PRATTER, District Judge.

*

(Filed: July 21, 2010)

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2

Eugene M. Banta, Jr.

322 East 86th Street

New York, NY 10028

Counsel for Appellant

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

At issue in this appeal is the interpretation of the United

Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of

Goods as it relates to a contract dispute between two

corporations, one based in the United States and the other in

Argentina. The Convention contains a provision allowing a

contract to be proved even if it is not in writing but also

authorizes a signatory state to make a declaration opting out of

that and related provisions. The United States has not made

such a declaration; Argentina has. The District Court concluded

that Argentina’s declaration imposed a writing requirement and

that the absence of a written contract in this case precluded the

plaintiff’s claim. We disagree with that approach. We conclude

that where, as here, one party’s country of incorporation has

made a declaration while the other’s has not, a court must first

decide, based on the forum state’s choice-of-law rules, which

forum’s law applies, and then apply the law of the forum

designated by the choice-of-law analysis.

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The first word in the appellant’s name is variably spelled 1

in the record as “Forestal” and “Forrestal.” For the sake of

consistency, we adopt the former spelling.

Because this is an appeal from the grant of summary 2

judgment, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to

Forestal, the nonmoving party. See Fagan v. City of Vineland,

22 F.3d 1296, 1299 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).

3

We cannot decide on this record whether New Jersey or

Argentine law applies here. Furthermore, because the parties

have not briefed the issue and the District Court did not address

it, we are reluctant to determine whether the claim asserted here

would survive under either jurisdiction’s laws. Accordingly, we

will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for

the defendant and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Forestal Guarani S.A. is an Argentina-based 1

manufacturer of various lumber products, including wooden

finger-joints. Daros International, Inc., is a New Jersey-based 2

import-export corporation. In 1999, Forestal and Daros entered

into an oral agreement whereby Daros agreed to sell Forestal’s

wooden finger-joints to third parties in the United States.

Pursuant to that agreement, Forestal sent Daros finger-joints

worth $1,857,766.06. Daros paid Forestal a total of

$1,458,212.35. Forestal demanded the balance due but Daros

declined to pay. In April 2002, Forestal sued Daros in the

Superior Court of New Jersey, asserting a breach-of-contract

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After this appeal was docketed, Daros’ counsel moved 3

to withdraw from its representation of Daros. The Clerk of this

Court granted that motion. Daros has not obtained new counsel

4

claim based on Daros’ refusal to pay. Daros thereafter removed

the case to the United States District Court for the District of

New Jersey. In its answer, Daros admitted that it had paid

Forestal $1,458,212.35 in exchange for the finger-joints but

denied that it owed Forestal any additional money. Discovery

ensued.

In June 2005, Daros moved for summary judgment,

arguing that the parties lacked a written agreement in violation

of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the

International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No.

98-9 (1983), 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980), reprinted at 15 U.S.C. App.

(1998) (“CISG”), and that Forestal could not otherwise

substantiate its damages claim with credible evidence. The

District Court summarily denied the motion, concluding that

genuine questions of material fact existed. The Court later held

a conference with the parties and ordered briefing on several

specific questions regarding the applicability of the CISG. Both

parties complied and agreed that the CISG governed Forestal’s

claim. In October 2008, the District Court granted Daros’

summary judgment motion, concluding that the CISG governed

the parties’ dispute and barred Forestal’s claim because the

parties’ agreement was not in writing. The Court also found that

Forestal had not adduced any other evidence of its alleged

agreement with Daros. Forestal has timely appealed the District

Court’s ruling.3

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and has not submitted an appellate brief. Its former counsel has

indicated that Daros rests on its filings with the District Court to

support its position in this appeal.

5

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our

review of the District Court’s denial of summary judgment is

plenary. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd.

of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009). We apply the same

test the District Court should have used. Oritani Sav. & Loan

Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d

Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and

any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

III.

The parties do not dispute that the CISG governs their

dispute. While Daros does not deny that it had a contract with

Forestal, the thrust of Daros’ argument is that the parties do not

have a written contract and that, under the CISG, the absence of

a writing precludes Forestal’s claim. While conceding that the

CISG applies generally, Forestal contests the District Court’s

ruling on the ground that the lack of a writing, in its view, is

inconsequential in light of the parties’ course of dealing, as

evidenced by Forestal’s delivery of finger-joints to Daros and

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The CISG lists several exceptions to its applicability, 4

none of which is relevant here. See 15 U.S.C. App., Art. 2.

6

Daros’ remittance of payments to Forestal, as well as an

accountant’s report and invoices Forestal claims show that

Daros owes it money.

The CISG “applies to contracts of sale of goods between

parties whose places of business are in different States . . . when

the States are Contracting States[.]” 15 U.S.C. App., Art.

1(1)(a); see Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333

F.3d 440, 444 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003). The United States ratified the

CISG on December 11, 1986, Argentina ratified it on July 19,

1983, and it became effective in both countries on January 1,

1988. John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales

Under the 1980 United Nations Convention 693-94 (2d ed.

1991). Because both the United States, where Daros is based,

and Argentina, where Forestal is based, are signatories to the

CISG and the alleged contract at issue involves the sale of

goods, we agree with the parties that the CISG governs

Forestal’s claim. See, e.g., Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. 4

v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 387 (7th Cir. 2002).

To resolve the parties’ dispute, we turn to the text of the CISG

itself, see, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1983,

1990 (2010) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the

interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” (quoting

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008)); see also Chicago

Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d

894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp.,

71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995), giving effect to its plain

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The CISG vests private parties with a private right of 5

action. BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de

Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Delchi

Carrier, 71 F.3d at 1027-28). As a treaty to which the United

States is a signatory, the CISG, as opposed to state law,

ordinarily controls. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; see also David

Frisch, Commercial Common Law, the United Nations

Convention on the International Sale of Goods, and the Inertia

of Habit, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 495, 503-04 (1999). As we shall see,

however, that default rule gives way under certain

circumstances.

7

language “absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence,”

Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185

(1982).5

“The CISG strives to promote certainty among

contracting parties and simplicity in judicial understanding by

(1) reducing forum shopping, (2) reducing the need to resort to

rules of private international law, and (3) establishing a law of

sales appropriate for international transactions.” A. E. Butler,

A Practical Guide to the CISG: Negotiations through Litigation

§ 1.08, at 1-15 (2007 Supp.) (footnote omitted). These goals are

explicitly enshrined in the CISG. Article 7 directs a court, in

interpreting the CISG, to be mindful of “its international

character and . . . the need to promote uniformity in its

application and the observance of good faith in international

trade.” 15 U.S.C. App., Art. 7(1). In furtherance of these

principles, as relevant here, the CISG dispenses with certain

formalities associated with proving the existence of a contract.

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8

Specifically, Article 11 instructs that “[a] contract of sale need

not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject

to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any

means, including witnesses.” Id., Art. 11. Similarly, Article 29

permits a contract modification to be proved even if it is not in

writing. Id., Art. 29. And Part II of the CISG, titled “Formation

of the Contract,” outlines requirements governing offer and

acceptance but does not impose a writing requirement.

Article 11’s elimination of formal writing requirements

does not apply in all instances in which the CISG governs.

Article 96 of the CISG carves out an exception to Article 11,

Article 29 and Part II. It says that

[a] Contracting State whose legislation requires

contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced

by writing may at any time make a declaration in

accordance with article 12 that any provision of

article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention,

that allows a contract of sale or its modification or

termination by agreement or any offer,

acceptance, or other indication of intention to be

made in any form other than in writing, does not

apply where any party has his place of business in

that State.

Id., Art. 96.

Article 12, to which Article 96 refers, states that

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Argentina’s declaration reads as follows: 6

In accordance with Articles 96 and 12 of the

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the

International Sale of Goods, any provisions of

[A]rticle 11, Article 29 or Part II of the

Convention that allows a contract of sale . . . to be

made in any form other than in writing does not

apply where any party has his place of business in

the Argentine Republic.

15 U.S.C. App. at 390 n.1.

9

[a]ny provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II

of this Convention that allows a contract of sale

. . . to be made in any form other than in writing

does not apply where any party has his place of

business in a Contracting State which has made a

declaration under article 96 of this Convention.

The parties may not derogate from or vary the

effect of this article.

Id., Art. 12.

The United States has not made an Article 96 declaration,

so Article 11 governs contract formation in cases involving a

United States-based litigant and a litigant based in another nondeclaring signatory state. Argentina, however, has made a

declaration under Article 96, thereby opting out of Article 11,

Article 29 and Part II.

6

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The only decision from a court in the United States 7

directly on point that we have unearthed is by a magistrate judge

in the Southern District of Florida. See Zhejiang Shaoxing

Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co. v. Microflock Textile Group

Corp., No. 06-22608, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40418 (S.D. Fla.

May 19, 2008). The District Court in this case relied on

Zhejiang to support its conclusion.

See 15 U.S.C. App. at 372 (reproducing an August 30, 8

1983, letter from the Secretary of State to the President

accompanied by a Department of State legal analysis supporting

the choice-of-law approach); C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell,

10

Our research has turned up almost no case law from

courts in the United States informing how to address a case,

such as this one, in which one state has made an Article 96

declaration and the other has not. Courts in foreign 7

jurisdictions and commentators alike are divided over how to

proceed in such a scenario. See UNCITRAL Digest of Case

Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale

of Goods 46, 48 (2008) (outlining the conflict). According to

one school of thought, a court must at the outset conduct a

choice-of-law analysis based on private international law

principles to determine which state’s law governs contract

formation, and then apply that law to a party’s claim. See, e.g.,

Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not

Resolved by the CISG, 20 J.L. & Com. 155, 167 (2001) (citing

various commentators and a decision by a Hungarian court).

Our study of the available sources on the subject establishes this

position as the clear majority view. In contrast, under what 8

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Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna

Sales Convention 126-27 (1987); Franco Ferrari, Writing

Requirements: Article 11-13, in The Draft UNCITRAL Digest

and Beyond: Cases, Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the U.N.

Sales Convention 213-14 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2005); John

O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the

1980 United Nations Convention 186-91 (4th ed. 2009); Albert

H. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United

Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of

Goods 143 (1989); Joseph Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG:

A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations Convention on

Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 174-75 (3d ed.

2008); Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Commentary

on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods

(CISG) 169-70 (2d ed. 2005); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several

Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on

Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the

Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & Com. 187, 196-

97 (1998); Mather, 20 J.L. & Com. at 166-67 (describing this

position as the “prevailing view”); Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The

Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of

Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus.

299, 323-24, 327-28 (2004).

11

appears to be the minority view, a court should simply require

the existence of a writing without reference to either state’s law,

though it is unclear what form such a writing would have to take

to be considered sufficient. See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca,

Implementation of Contract Formation Statute of Frauds, Parol

Evidence, and Battle of Forms CISG Provisions in Civil and

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Without saying so explicitly, the District Court here 9

adopted the minority view, reasoning that where, as here, a

country has opted out of Article 11 a contract must be in writing

and that because Forestal had not produced a writing, its claim

failed as a matter of law. In a footnote, the Court noted

alternatively that a choice-of-law analysis would produce the

same result, explaining that New Jersey’s statute of frauds

imposes a writing requirement and that Argentina’s decision

itself to opt out of Article 11 signified that country’s writing

requirement. The District Court did not conduct a choice-of-law

analysis and did not explicitly consider the respective form

requirements, or exceptions to those requirements, of either New

Jersey or Argentine law. Instead, the District Court evidently

presumed that a country’s Article 96 declaration automatically

translates into a requirement that a contract be in writing. But,

as we explain below, the CISG does not say as much. It says

only that its freedom-from-form requirements do not apply

where a country has made an Article 96 declaration. Indeed, if

the District Court’s approach were correct, courts would have a

hard time determining what precisely constitutes an adequate

“writing” under these circumstances. Is it a professionally

drafted document with paragraph symbols, signed and dated by

both parties? Is it a scribbling on the back of a napkin? Where,

as here, an Article 96 declaration makes Articles 11 and 29 and

Part II of the CISG inapplicable, the CISG is silent on this point.

12

Common Law Countries, 25 J.L. & Com. 133, 138-39 (2005)

(citing decisions by courts in Russia and Belgium).9

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13

Although none of the supporters of what we perceive as

the majority view have explained their reasoning in any detail,

we conclude that the majority has it right. Our conclusion is

compelled by the CISG’s plain language. Cf. Maximov v.

United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (interpreting a treaty

according to its plain language); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S.

317, 331-32 (1912) (similar). The CISG says that “[q]uestions

concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not

expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the

general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such

principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the

rules of private international law [i.e. choice of law].” 15

U.S.C. App., Art. 7(2). Because Argentina has opted out of

Articles 11 and 29 as well as Part II of the CISG, the CISG does

not “expressly settle” the question whether a breach-of-contract

claim is sustainable in the absence of a written contract. So

Article 7(2) tells us to consider the CISG’s “general principles”

to fill in the gap. We have already outlined some of the general

principles undergirding the CISG, but we fail to see how they

inform the question whether Forestal’s contract claim may

proceed. Indeed, given the inapplicability in this case of any of

the CISG’s provisions relaxing or eliminating writing

requirements, we do not believe that we can answer the question

presented here based on a pure application of those principles

alone. Given that neither the CISG nor its founding principles

explicitly or implicitly settle our inquiry, Article 7(2)’s reference

to “the rules of private international law” is triggered. In other

words, we have to consider the choice-of-law rules of the forum

state, in this case New Jersey, to determine whether New Jersey

or Argentine form requirements govern Forestal’s claim. See,

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Although the CISG’s plain language obviates the need

10

for resort to its drafting history, we note nonetheless that that

history buttresses our conclusion. As one commentator has

written,

the sole fact that one party has its place of

business in a State that made an Article 96

reservation does not necessarily make applicable

the form requirements of that State. . . . Rather,

the rules of private international [law] of the

forum should dictate whether any form

requirements have to be met. The legislative

history of the Convention appears to corroborate

this view, since at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic

Conference a proposal was rejected pursuant to

which the form requirements of a State that had

made an Article 96 reservation had to be applied.

Ferrari, supra, at 213 (footnotes omitted).

14

e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 231

(1996).10

In making a choice-of-law determination in a breach-ofcontract case, New Jersey courts ask which forum has the most

significant relationship with the parties and the contract. See

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d

488, 491-92 (N.J. 1980); Keil v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 710

A.2d 563, 569-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). To that end,

the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the principles set

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15

forth in § 188 and § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts

of Laws. See Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co.,

629 A.2d 885, 888 (N.J. 1993). Section 188 directs courts to

consider, among other things:

(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of

negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of

performance, (d) the location of the subject matter

of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence,

nationality, place of incorporation and place of

business of the parties.

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 188(2) (1971).

Section 6 lists the following nonexclusive factors

relevant to a choice-of-law analysis:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international

systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states

and the relative interests of those states in the

determination of the particular issue, (d) the

protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic

policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of

result, and (g) ease in the determination and

application of the law to be applied.

Id. § 6(2).

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16

We ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided by

a district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider

them in the first instance. See, e.g., In re Montgomery Ward &

Co., 428 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2005); Montrose Med. Group

Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 778 (3d Cir.

2001). This case bolsters the rationale behind our reluctance to

wade into matters that the parties have not joined and that a

district court has not addressed, as the record here sheds

practically no light on many, if not most, of the choice-of-law

considerations listed above.

It is true that we can affirm a district court’s ruling on

any ground supported by the record. See Travelers Indem. Co.

v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 256 n.12 (3d Cir. 2010).

There is no dispute here that Forestal’s contract with Daros was

verbal at best, so we could feasibly skip a choice-of-law analysis

and apply both New Jersey and Argentine law to Forestal’s

claim to test its viability. New Jersey’s statute of frauds

provides that “a contract for the sale of goods for the price of

$500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense

unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract

for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the

party against whom enforcement is sought . . . .” N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 12A:2-201(1). While Forestal’s claim might fail under that

provision, the statute also makes several exceptions to the

general rule. See id. § 12A:2-201(3). The parties have not

briefed, and the record in this case prevents us from concluding

definitively, whether any such exception is applicable here. As

for Argentine law, we may safely assume that it requires some

sort of writing, as Article 96 of the CISG permits a country to

opt out of Article 11 only if its domestic law “requires contracts

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17

of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing . . . .” 15

U.S.C. App., Art. 96. We have looked at the Argentine Civil

Code; it contains several provisions governing contract

formation and ways of proving a contract. Forestal’s offer of

proof may or may not suffice under those provisions. In the end,

we think it unwise either to venture into this choice-of-law

thicket – the outcome of which is determinative of this case – or

to engage in a largely speculative exercise about the viability of

Forestal’s claim under either jurisdiction’s law without the

benefit of either any briefing whatsoever by the parties or any

analysis by the District Court on this point. Because these issues

deserve a full airing, we conclude that remand is a better course

of action.

Our conclusion that remand is appropriate is also driven

by the posture in which this case reaches us. Forestal is

appealing from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

for Daros on Daros’ motion. In other words, although it did not

say so explicitly, the District Court determined that Daros had

met its initial burden of showing that there remained no genuine

questions of material fact and that Daros was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. As we read Daros’ moving papers,

we understand Daros to have sought to meet that burden by

advancing two main arguments. First, Daros argued that

summary judgment was proper because, in its view, the CISG

requires a writing in light of Argentina’s Article 96 declaration

and Forestal did not produce a formal written contract. We have

concluded, however, that such a position is wrong as a matter of

law. As we have explained, the resolution of this case requires

a choice-of-law analysis to determine whether New Jersey or

Argentine form requirements govern as well as an inquiry into

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18

whether Forestal’s offer of proof is adequate under whichever

forum’s law that analysis designates. In other words, Daros

could not have met its initial summary judgment burden of

showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law when

there was, in effect, no law to apply.

Second, Daros contended that Forestal had submitted no

“credible evidence” of a contract with Daros. The District Court

agreed with that contention, concluding that there was no

evidence that the parties ever had any contract at all. It is

undisputed, however, that Forestal sold wooden finger-joints to

Daros and that Daros gave Forestal money in exchange. Indeed,

Daros nowhere denies that the parties at the very least had a

verbal contract for those sales. Furthermore, Forestal submitted

an accountant’s certification, with supporting documentation, as

well as invoices in an effort to substantiate its claim that it is

owed money. There is also deposition testimony indicating that

the parties had a contract. The District Court did not expressly

refer to some of these materials in its opinion, and we do not

know why it evidently disregarded them. The Court also

rejected Forestal’s reliance on the invoices Forestal submitted,

but did so based on New Jersey law alone – that is, with no

parallel analysis under Argentine law – without explaining its

reference to that state’s law when the Court had already decided

that the CISG controlled this case. In short, we cannot say at

this stage that there is no genuine question of material fact as to

whether the parties had or did not have some sort of contractual

relationship and whether Forestal can prove as much under

whatever law actually controls this case. As a consequence, we

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Our dissenting colleague does not believe that we 11

should remand this case for a choice-of-law analysis. He would

hold that Forestal waived its right to pursue such an analysis by

failing to press it in the District Court. To be sure, as we have

noted, the parties did not address this issue in the District Court

and that court did not reach it. The dissent overlooks, however,

that the waiver doctrine is founded on equitable principles and

that its enforcement is within our discretion. We think it would

be particularly unfair to apply it against a party whose adversary

elected not even to participate in this appeal. Moreover, as we

have also pointed out, the District Court did not reach this issue

in error; that omission does not bar us from considering it.

19

are not persuaded that Daros met its initial summary judgment

burden on the record as it now stands.11

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District

Court’s grant of summary judgment for Daros and remand for

further proceedings. On remand, the District Court may

determine, based on New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules, whether

New Jersey or Argentine law governs and then apply that

forum’s law to this case. Our disposition does not suggest that

a trial is necessarily warranted. Summary judgment, or some

other pretrial disposition, including a venue transfer, may be

appropriate on a more developed record.

Case: 08-4488 Document: 003110223111 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/21/2010
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting

I believe that the issues addressed at some length by the

Court have not been properly preserved for appellate

consideration. With respect to the merits, I have serious doubts

as to the validity of the approach actually adopted by the

majority. I therefore must respectfully dissent. 

It is well established that this Court generally refuses to

consider an argument or issue that a party has failed to raise in

the District Court. See, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist.,

— F.3d —, 2010 WL 2038871, at *11 (3d Cir. May 25, 2010)

(finding that due process claim was never asserted in district

court and refusing to address merits of constitutional argument

raised for first time on appeal); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust

Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that, in

absence of exceptional circumstances, we will not consider

issues raised for first time on appeal and explaining that party

must present argument at appropriate time and with sufficient

specificity); In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003)

(“We need not address the merits of Surrick’s third and final

argument – that the state court’s ruling violates his First

Amendment rights and therefore constitutes a grave injustice

pursuant to RAC II(D) – as he failed to adequately raise it

before the District Court.” (citing Brenner v. Local 514, United

Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d

Cir. 1991))). Similarly, we usually refrain from addressing an

argument or issue not properly raised and discussed in the

appellate briefing. See, e.g., Surrick, 338 F.3d at 237 (“Further,

to the extent that Surrick’s reply brief may be read to challenge

the District Court’s finding of waiver with respect to the First

Amendment argument that was asserted below, we conclude

that his failure to identify or argue this issue in his opening brief

constitutes waiver of this argument on appeal.” (citing Kost v.

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993))).

Both before the District Court and now on appeal,

Forrestal has failed to raise the various issues resolved by the

majority. Specifically, it has failed to raise the issue of whether,

in cases where one party’s country of incorporation has made an

Article 96 declaration under the CISG while the country of the

Case: 08-4488 Document: 003110223111 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/21/2010
2

other party to the alleged contract has not done so, a court must

initially decide, based on the forum’s choice-of-law rules,

which country’s law applies and then apply the substantive law

of the applicable jurisdiction. Likewise, the parties have not

briefed the specific question of whether New Jersey or

Argentine law applies here. The majority itself acknowledges

that the District Court did not conduct a choice-of-law analysis

and did not explicitly consider any form requirements, or any

exceptions to those requirements, recognized under either New

Jersey or Argentine law. In a letter dated May 7, 2010, this

Court even went so far as to direct Forrestal’s counsel to

respond to the following two questions:

1. Is it your contention that a choice of

law analysis must be conducted under New Jersey

law (as the law of the forum state) in order to

decide whether the contract laws of Argentina or

the contract laws of New Jersey govern here? If

so, please explain in detail why such an analysis

was required? And please explain where you

raised and preserved this contention below?

2. Is it your contention that the contract

law of Argentina would provide you with a legal

claim even in the absence of a written contract?

If so, why? Also please explain where you raised

and preserved this contention below? 

Through its counsel, Forrestal eventually submitted a document

that I believe is, at best, non-responsive to our letter and

ultimately unhelpful. 

I believe that it would be inappropriate for this Court to

consider these CISG and choice-of-law issues at this juncture.

In fact, the complexity and outright novelty of the CISG issue

clearly weigh in favor of following our usual approach to nonpreserved arguments and issues. The majority itself notes that

it has uncovered almost no case law indicating how we should

address the situation in which one state has made an Article 96

declaration under the CISG (i.e., Argentina) and the other state

Case: 08-4488 Document: 003110223111 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/21/2010
3

has not made an equivalent declaration (i.e., the United States).

In turn, it further observes that courts in other countries as well

as various commentators are divided over how to proceed in

such circumstances and that even the supporters of the position

ultimately adopted in the majority opinion have not explained

their own reasoning in any real detail. We should be especially

reluctant to address a totally novel yet important issue of

international law where we do not have the benefit of full and

proper briefing by the parties.

Finally, considering arguendo the merits of these issues

(which the Court should not), I would still have considerable

difficulty agreeing with the majority’s holding that a choice-oflaw analysis is required here because such an approach appears

to be at odds with the CISG itself. I acknowledge that the

majority has clearly given this novel question a great deal of

attention and has thoroughly, fairly, and competently explained

its own reasoning. However, it still appears that, given the plain

language of this international treaty, its structure, and its

purposes, a written contract is required where, as here, one of

the relevant countries has exercised its right to make an Article

96 declaration. In turn, because Forrestal has clearly failed to

produce the requisite written agreement, its contractual claim

must accordingly fail as a matter of law. Nevertheless, I

reiterate that we should not reach the merits of this complicated

issue at this time. 

Case: 08-4488 Document: 003110223111 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/21/2010