Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01578/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01578-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Louis Curry, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

R. James Nicholson, Secretary of United

States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-06-1578-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 53) and

statement of facts (doc. 55), plaintiff’s response (doc. 64) and statement of facts (doc. 66),

and defendant’s reply (doc. 77). The court also has before it plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment (doc. 56) and statement of facts (doc. 57), defendant’s response (doc. 61) and

controverting statement of facts (doc. 63), and plaintiff’s reply (doc. 78). 

Additionally, the court has before it defendant’s supplemental memorandum (doc. 85),

motion to seal (doc. 86), and attachments (doc. 87), and plaintiff’s supplemental

memorandum (doc. 88), motion to seal (doc. 93), and attachments (doc. 89, ex. 1–22). The

court also has before it defendant’s supplement to court ordered briefing (doc. 91) and notice

of supplemental authority (doc. 96), plaintiff’s objection to defendant’s supplement to court

ordered briefing (doc. 95), and defendant’s response (doc. 110). 

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

For the reasons stated in our order of January 25, 2008 (doc. 69), the motions to seal

are granted. Because we invited supplemental briefing from the parties (doc. 80), we

overrule plaintiff’s objection to defendant’s supplement to court ordered briefing, and we

have considered the document. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment is denied, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

I

This is an employment matter. Plaintiff has worked for the Carl T. Hayden Veterans

Affairs Medical Center (“VAMC” or “defendant”) in Phoenix since 1990. He began as a

housekeeper aide and has been promoted several times. Around July 1996, he got a position

billing insurance companies and stayed in that role for one to two years. After a stint in a

different position, he returned to billing in October 1998.

Plaintiff’s tenure at VAMC has been contentious. This is his second action in the

United States District Court against his employer. He has also filed at least a dozen

complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and many union

grievances. Some of these incidents are relevant to this action. 

In May 2002, plaintiff’s supervisor issued an official reprimand to plaintiff for

conducting union business while on duty. Plaintiff grieved the reprimand and prevailed. It

was determined that the reprimand would be set aside and removed from his personnel file

and that a less serious “letter of counseling” would be issued in its place. The letter of

counseling was issued August 9, 2002, but the reprimand was not removed. 

Plaintiff had an action pending in United States District Court, filed in April 2001,

alleging racial discrimination. That action was terminated in September 2003 by a settlement

agreement, pursuant to which VAMC agreed to remove the August 2002 letter of counseling

from plaintiff’s personnel file. In 2005, plaintiff discovered that the May 2002 reprimand

was still in his file. He filed a grievance, and VAMC agreed to remove the reprimand,

calling it an oversight. 

Also pursuant to the September 2003 settlement, plaintiff was promoted to his

current position as an administrative officer of the day (“AOD”). As an AOD, plaintiff

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

checks patients in and out of the emergency room and handles clerical work, generally on

“off hours”—evenings, nights, and weekends. Plaintiff contends that the scheduling has

been unfair and that he has been required to work every holiday except one since the

promotion. Defendant, meanwhile, contends that plaintiff has had several holidays off and

that the difficult schedule is characteristic of the AOD position. Plaintiff grieved his

AOD work schedule in June 2005, and an arbitrator ultimately decided that there was no

violation of federal law.

Soon after receiving his promotion to AOD, plaintiff was notified that he had to

discontinue union activities because the position was a non-bargaining management

position, though it had been mistakenly identified as non-management in certain documents.

Defendant contends that the position’s bargaining unit status (“BUS”) code meant that

it had been non-bargaining for many years. Plaintiff contends that defendant changed the

AOD position’s BUS code in order to stop his union activity. Plaintiff, through the union,

challenged the classification, and an administrative law judge ultimately determined that the

position was non-management. Therefore, in March 2005, all AOD positions, including

plaintiff’s, were reclassified as bargaining.

In April 2004, plaintiff was working as AOD when a mentally disturbed patient

became agitated because an ambulance was not immediately available to take him back to

his rehabilitation facility. Plaintiff contends that the physician on duty told him to send the

discharged patient home in a taxi. The physician denied giving those instructions, saying he

ordered transport by ambulance. Plaintiff sent the patient by taxi, but he did not make it all

the way home. The patient was ultimately found confused and wandering around the

grounds of the rehabilitation facility. Plaintiff’s supervisor credited the physician’s version

of events and proposed a five-day suspension as discipline for plaintiff’s conduct. Plaintiff

successfully grieved the proposed discipline, and it was cancelled in May 2005.

In October 2004, plaintiff applied for a position as a supervisory program specialist,

or “billing supervisor.” Several candidates applied for the advertised position. The decision

maker in the hiring process was Brad Curry, who had been plaintiff’s supervisor for

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

approximately one year. Ultimately, Brad Curry selected a different candidate, Meleanie

Hardy, for the billing supervisor position and contends that he believed she was more

qualified. Plaintiff, meanwhile, contends that Meleanie Hardy was not qualified for the

position and that he was passed over for discriminatory and retaliatory reasons.

Though he does not number them in the complaint, plaintiff asserts six counts.

Plaintiff alleges racial discrimination (count one) and retaliation for participation in protected

activity (count two), in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-16. Plaintiff also alleges

breach of contract (count three), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

(count four), promissory estoppel (count five), and negligent misrepresentation (count six),

under state law.

II

We first address counts three through six. Plaintiff has not moved for summary

judgment on these counts, but VAMC has. As stated above, plaintiff, through a union

grievance, had a May 2002 official reprimand set aside and a less serious August 2002

“letter of counseling” issued in its place. In the September 2003 settlement agreement that

terminated plaintiff’s first action in the district court, VAMC promised to “withdraw from

plaintiff’s personnel file a letter of counseling dated August 2002.” PSOF in Support of

Response at BL00104. 

On April 28, 2005, plaintiff received a letter confirming that “a reprimand dated

5/28/02” had not been removed from his file. Id. ¶ 23; Id. Ex. 4. He contends that the

“Letter of reprimand is the letter of counseling,” id. ¶ 24, and that VAMC breached the

settlement agreement “by failing to remove the derogatory letter” from his personnel file.

Id. ¶ 25. Counts three, four, and five are contract claims, and count six a tort claim, based

on these contentions. 

There is a basic problem with these claims. The settlement agreement specifically

calls for the removal of the August 2002 letter of counseling, yet plaintiff alleges only that

the May 2002 reprimand was left in his file. The evidence makes clear that the reprimand

and the letter of counseling are two different documents. Plaintiff’s contention that they are

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Even if sovereign immunity did not bar the contract claims, they are not properly

brought in this court if we are to credit plaintiff’s first supplemental disclosure statement, in

which he alleges $20,000 in contract damages. DSOF, Ex. F. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1), confers exclusive jurisdiction on the United States Court of Federal Claims for

contract actions against the government exceeding $10,000. M-S-R Public Power Agcy.

v. Bonneville Power Admin., 297 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff retreats to a lesser

demand in his responsive memorandum. Plaintiff’s Response at 15. 

- 5 -

one in the same is without support in the record. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that the

“intent” of the settlement agreement was to have all of the related disciplinary documents

removed from his file. Plaintiff’s Response at 15–16. By its plain terms, the settlement

was not breached by the failure to remove the May 2002 reprimand. And even if there were

a breach of the intent of the settlement, counts three through six fail for other reasons. 

The United States and its agencies are immune from suit unless there has been an

unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th Cir.

1997). Congress expressly waived the sovereign immunity of federal agency employers for

claims brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. However, plaintiff provides no

authority that this waiver extends to contract claims for money damages based on breach of

a Title VII settlement agreement. See Frahm v. United States, 492 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir.

2007) (concluding that it does not); accord Lindstrom v. United States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1194

(10th Cir. 2007). And, clearly, the government has not waived sovereign immunity for a

cause of action based on promissory estoppel. Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1070

(9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, we grant summary judgment for defendant on count three

(breach of contract), count four (breach of good faith and fair dealing), and count five

(promissory estoppel).1

Count six, negligent misrepresentation, sounds in tort and is also barred by sovereign

immunity. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 710–11, 81 S. Ct. 1294, 1302–03 (1961).

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives the sovereign immunity of the United States

for tort liability, but misrepresentation claims are specifically excluded from the waiver. 28

U.S.C. § 2680(h). Furthermore, plaintiff’s claim fails because, under the FTCA, the United

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

States is the only proper defendant in a tort action against a federal agency, 28 U.S.C. §

2679(a), and filing an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action in the

district court, Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). Defendant is entitled

to summary judgment on count six.

III

A.

We now turn to plaintiff’s Title VII counts, racial discrimination (count one) and

retaliation (count two). Title VII claims are subject to “rigorous administrative exhaustion

requirements.” Vinieratos v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 1991)

(quoting Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 833, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1968 (1976)). Before bringing

an action in the district court, an employee must first file a charge with the EEOC, giving the

agency an opportunity to investigate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Sommatino v. United States,

255 F.3d 704, 707–08 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff initiated the administrative process with an informal interview at the Veterans

Affairs Office of Resolution Management on December 22, 2004. DSOF, Ex. A-6. He

alleged “that he was not selected for the [billing supervisor] position, based on his prior EEO

activities.” Id. According to the interview notes, plaintiff discussed a prior EEO complaint

(the one leading to the first action in the district court) and “stated that he believes he is the

best qualified candidate for the [billing supervisor position]” Id. Then, “as background

information” and “to validate that he is being constantly retaliated against,” plaintiff

discussed the BUS code issue and VAMC’s discipline of him for sending the mentally

disturbed patient home by taxi. 

On January 24, 2005, plaintiff signed a formal Complaint of Employment

Discrimination, alleging “reprisal for prior EEO activity,” specifically “non-selection

supervisory program specialist.” DSOF, Ex. A-7. On March 24, 2005, he submitted a

written affidavit in support of his “non-selection” claim, which had been accepted for EEO

investigation. DSOF, Ex. A-8. The content of the affidavit is similar to that of the initial

interview, except that plaintiff stresses that all of VAMC’s top management, including Brad

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 We note that plaintiff did not comply with LRCiv 56.1, requiring a party opposing

a motion for summary judgment to file a controverting statement of facts that specifically

addresses, paragraph by paragraph, the movant’s statement of facts. Instead, plaintiff filed

in response a new statement of facts, which is not helpful.

- 7 -

Curry, knew of his previous EEO complaints and the first action in the district court. Id.

Defendant contends, and plaintiff concedes by his silence, that the initial interview, the

formal complaint, and the written affidavit comprise the only information that plaintiff

provided for his EEO charge. DSOF ¶ 104.

2

 The EEOC issued a decision in May 2006, but

the parties have not informed us of its conclusions.

 Though plaintiff had previously filed EEO complaints of racial discrimination, there

is absolutely no indication that racial discrimination was anywhere alleged in the most

recent charge. Because plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies for a racial

discrimination claim, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on count one. 

We turn to count two. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must

show 1) that he engaged in a protected activity, 2) that he suffered an adverse employment

action, and 3) that there is a causal nexus between the two. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d

1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). Count two consists of what are essentially four distinct claims

of retaliation, based on four alleged adverse actions: 1) plaintiff has been given unfair work

schedules as AOD; 2) VAMC reclassified his AOD position so that he could not participate

in the union; 3) VAMC instituted discipline, later cancelled, for the taxi incident; and

4) he was passed over for promotion in favor of an unqualified candidate. Plaintiff’s Motion

at 12–13; Plaintiff’s Response at 13–14.

Plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies for all allegations of retaliation

merely by using the word “reprisal” in his EEO charge. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified

Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 2002). Allegations not included in an administrative

charge “may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or

reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police

Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). In making that

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

determination it is proper to look at the specific factual allegations, not just the general legal

theory of the claim. See id.; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

114, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2073 (2002) (“[Each] retaliatory adverse employment decision

constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’”). At the very least, for

administrative remedies to have been exhausted, the allegations must “fall within the scope

of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation that could reasonably be

expected to grow out of the [administrative] charge.” Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d

634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the claim that VAMC retaliated by

giving plaintiff an unfair work schedule. This allegation was nowhere raised in plaintiff’s

EEO charge; therefore, administrative remedies have not been exhausted. 

Defendant is also entitled to summary judgment on the claims that VAMC retaliated

by reclassifying the bargaining status of the AOD position and by disciplining plaintiff for

the taxi incident. Though plaintiff mentioned these matters in his EEO interview and again

in the written affidavit, they were presented as “background information,” not as allegations

that the EEOC was expected to investigate. Indeed, under the Federal Labor-Management

Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–35, plaintiff could not have based his EEO charge on these

matters, because he had already grieved them through union procedures. Id. § 7121(d);

Vinieratos, 939 F.2d at 768 (“Under the terms of the Act, a federal employee who alleges

employment discrimination must elect to pursue his claim under either a statutory procedure

or a union-assistance procedure; he cannot pursue both avenues, and his election is

irrevocable.”).

B.

Plaintiff’s only exhausted retaliation claim is that VAMC retaliated by not promoting

him to billing supervisor. Plaintiff contends that the denial of promotion was retaliation for

his challenging the BUS code of the AOD position through union grievance procedures.

Plaintiff’s Motion at 13. Plaintiff satisfies the first element of the prima facie case, because

filing a union grievance is protected activity. See Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff also satisfies the second element, because denial of

promotion qualifies as an adverse employment action. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360

F.3d 1103, 1125 n.19 (9th Cir. 2004).

For the final element of the prima facie case, plaintiff must establish a causal nexus

between his union grievance and the denial of promotion. Plaintiff contends that causal

nexus can be inferred from proximity in time: “Less than 30 days after the FLRA determined

that the Bus Codes should not have been changed Louis is denied a promotion to Supervisory

Program Specialist.” Plaintiff’s Motion at 13. Yet, according to the record, the FLRA made

its decision on the AOD position on March 18, 2005—after plaintiff was denied promotion

on December 21, 2004. Plaintiff’s Motion, Ex. 10 ; id., Ex. 13. However, the causal nexus

element of the prima facie case is not particularly rigorous, and nexus could perhaps be

inferred from the sheer number of plaintiff’s EEO complaints and union grievances of which

VAMC was aware prior to denying him the promotion. See E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach

Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Assuming plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden

shifts to VAMC to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment action,

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987), which they have done. Brad

Curry, who hired the new billing supervisor, contends that he selected Meleanie Hardy

(of the same race as plaintiff) because she was the most qualified candidate. Therefore, the

burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that this explanation is pretextual. Bergene v. Salt

River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001).

First, plaintiff contends that Hardy was “not qualified for the position.” Plaintiff’s

Response at 13. It appears that this contention is based primarily on an argument that Hardy

was not technically eligible for promotion to the billing supervisor position under federal

guidelines. Plaintiff’s Motion at 8–10. Hardy was awarded the billing supervisor position

at the GS-7 level, and plaintiff contends that she did not have sufficient experience to

qualify for that level. We disagree. 

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Under the United States Office of Personnel Management Operating Manual, to

qualify for a GS-7 position an employee must have “specialized” experience of “1 year

equivalent to at least GS-5” (doc. 87, ex. E-1). Similarly, under the Code of Federal

Regulations, advancement to a GS-7 position requires “a minimum of 52 weeks in positions:

(1) No more than two grades lower (or equivalent).” 5 C.F.R. § 300.604(b). When Hardy

applied for the billing supervisor position, she had eight months of experience at GS-5, three

months at GS-6, and eight months at GS-7 (doc. 87, ex. E-3)—more than enough to qualify

under both the Manual and the federal regulations. 

Plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary are without merit. With no authority he asserts

that “training time” does not count for calculation of experience under the Manual, and he

misquotes the Federal Regulations as stating that candidates for advancement “must have

completed a minimum of 52 weeks in [their present] position.” Plaintiff’s Supplementary

Briefing at 9–10.

Brad Curry considered plaintiff and Hardy the top two candidates for the billing

supervisor position, and he had some discretion in choosing between the two. In a report

filed with the EEO counselor (doc. 55, ex. A-5) and in his deposition (doc. 55, ex. B), he was

asked to account for his reasons for selecting Hardy. Plaintiff contends that Brad Curry’s

stated reasons are “unworthy of credence” and therefore suggest retaliation. Plaintiff’s

Response at 9.

Brad Curry stated that he selected Hardy because she was the best applicant. He

stated that Hardy was a superior biller and had better management skills, even though

plaintiff had more experience. Brad Curry reported an exceptional working experience with

Hardy and noted that she took a lot of initiative, needed limited guidance, and was a good

leader. Plaintiff challenges this description by denigrating some of Hardy’s former positions

as “secretarial in nature” and not indicative of “exceptional skill and ability to lead.”

Plaintiff’s Response at 10. These are petty objections. Hardy has held a number of positions,

with varied responsibilities, at VAMC since 1990, and there is no evidence that she has not

performed at a high level. 

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Regarding plaintiff, Brad Curry stated that he was a good worker, with whom he had

a good working relationship. However, Brad Curry also stated that plaintiff required

guidance, was not a self-starter, often questioned assignments, and completed projects on his

own time. Plaintiff challenges the characterization of his qualifications by Brad Curry. He

points out that Brad Curry, as plaintiff’s supervisor, consistently rated him “successful” on

performance evaluations, with no negative comments, and even gave him an award in August

2003 for work on a special project. On the award, Brad Curry indicated plaintiff’s initiative,

creativity and innovation, unusual effort, and exceptional teamwork (doc. 66, ex. 24). 

 The performance evaluations are hardly controlling, as they only gave Brad Curry the

choice to rate an employee as “successful”or “unsuccessful,” and he testified that “to be

unsuccessful, you have to be really unsuccessful” (doc. 55, ex. B at 44). True, Brad Curry

had the opportunity to specifically record any shortcomings on the evaluations and he did not

do so, but these forms did not demand the kind of nuance that would be useful in evaluating

employees for a promotion. There is a discrepancy between Brad Curry’s commendation of

plaintiff in the August 2003 award and his description of plaintiff’s qualifications in

explaining the denial of promotion, but again this strikes us as barely probative. Brad Curry

never said that plaintiff was a bad employee, only that he was not the most qualified for a

particular promotion. This is not inconsistent with Brad Curry’s giving plaintiff an award

for his work on an earlier project, even one couched in superlative terms.

Plaintiff contends that he has presented “persuasive direct evidence that Defendant’s

legitimate non-discriminatory explanations are unworthy of credence.” Plaintiff’s Response

at 10 (emphasis in original). However, there is certainly no “direct” evidence of pretext.

What plaintiff has put forth is the definition of circumstantial evidence, which “must be

specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgment.” Bergene, 272 F.3d at 1142.

We conclude that plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient. Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on the retaliation claim.

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

IV

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (doc. 53) and DENYING plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment (doc. 56). For the reasons in our order of January 25, 2008 (doc. 69), IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the motions to seal (docs. 86 & 93). The clerk is

directed to enter final judgment.

DATED this 5th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-01578-FJM Document 113 Filed 05/07/08 Page 12 of 12