Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01076/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01076-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth Alan Conner, et al.,

Appellants,

v. 

Wilmington Trust NA,

Appellee.

No. CV-19-01076-PHX-DWL

AMENDED ORDER 

Appellants Kenneth and Deanna Conner (“the Conners”) have appealed the 

bankruptcy court’s order granting Appellee Wilmington Trust NA’s (“Wilmington”) 

motion to enforce a settlement agreement and dismissing the Conners’ adversary 

proceeding. For the following reasons, the order of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.1

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

This case stems from the 2014 foreclosure of the Conners’ Scottsdale residence. 

(Doc. 19 at 5.) The Conners, after living in the residence for several years, refinanced their 

mortgage in October 2005. (Doc. 19 at 3; Doc. 19-1 at 161.) To that end, the Conners 

executed a deed of trust that named First Magnus Financial (“First Magnus”) as the lender, 

Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) as the beneficiary, and Title Security 

1 The Conners have requested oral argument. That request is denied because the 

“facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the 

decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 

8019(b)(3). See also Fed. R. App. P. 34(A)(2)(c) (same).

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Agency of Arizona as the trustee. (Doc. 19-1 at 181-82.) After the Conners struggled to 

make their payments on the refinanced loan, it was modified twice by Aurora Loan 

Services, LLC. (Doc. 19 at 4.) 

In 2012, MERS purportedly assigned the deed of trust to Nationstar Mortgage LLC 

(“Nationstar”). (Doc. 19 at 4; Doc. 19-1 at 220.) After this assignment, the Conners 

submitted several applications to further modify their loan. (Doc. 19 at 4-5.) Nationstar 

modified the Conners’ loan once but otherwise denied these applications. (Doc. 19 at 4-5; 

Doc. 19-1 at 222.) As the Conners continued to negotiate for further loan modifications, 

they were purportedly told to discontinue payments so as to not “confuse the system.”

(Doc. 19-1 at 162-64.) 

Nevertheless, Nationstar filed a notice of trustee’s sale in December 2013. (Id. at 

163.) The sale was scheduled for March 24, 2014. (Id.) Nationstar denied another loan 

modification request in February 2014. (Doc. 19 at 9.) At that point, the Conners 

contracted with a third-party counseling agency, which would handle further negotiations 

with Nationstar, and Nationstar “verbally informed” the Conners that the March 2014 

trustee’s sale would be postponed to June 2, 2014. (Id.; Doc. 19-1 at 163.) 

In April 2014, the Conners received a letter from Nationstar stating they were 

delinquent on their loan. (Doc. 19 at 5.) When Mr. Conner called Nationstar to discuss 

the letter, he was informed that his latest modification application had been denied and that 

the June 2014 trustee’s sale date would be placed on hold. (Id.) Nationstar also promised 

to send a new sale date via mail. (Id.) 

The Conners continued to seek relief on their loan. (Doc. 19-1 at 163-64.) Their 

last option was a mortgage relief fund. (Id. at 164.) The application for that fund required 

a letter from Nationstar stating that the Conners had exhausted loan modification options.

(Id.) In light of the phone conversation with Nationstar, the Conners waited for a denial 

letter to be sent to them. (Id.) 

On May 30, 2014, and without the Conners’ knowledge, Nationstar transferred the 

deed of trust to Wilmington. (Doc. 19 at 5.) On June 2, 2014, the trustee’s sale went 

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forward, also without the Conners’ knowledge. (Id.) As the holder of the deed of trust, 

Wilmington placed a credit bid and ultimately purchased the property. (Id.) 

On June 20, 2014, the Conners received a letter stating that the trustee’s sale had 

taken place. (Id. at 6.) In August 2014, Wilmington sold the property to CSK Investments, 

LLC (“CSK”). (Id.) The Conners then received a notice of eviction. (Doc. 19-1 at 166.)

After receiving the notice, the Conners moved out of the residence. (Id.)

II. Procedural History

The Conners filed for bankruptcy in September 2014. (Doc. 19 at 6.) Later that 

month, they initiated an adversary proceeding against Nationstar, Wilmington, and CSK.

(Doc. 19-1 at 72.) The complaint was later amended to include MERS and First Magnus. 

(Doc. 19-1 at 81 [first amended complaint]; Doc. 19-1 at 116 [second amended 

complaint].) Although the Conners’ theories of liability expanded with their successive 

amendments, the thrust of the Conners’ argument was that the parties involved in the 

foreclosure of their home lacked authority to pursue a foreclosure. (Doc. 19-1 at 72-79; 

98-99; 137-139.) Specifically, the Conners alleged that MERS was never a beneficiary of 

the deed of trust, so it lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust to anyone. (Doc. 19-

1 at 98-99; 137-139.) The assignment of the deed of trust from MERS to Nationstar, then, 

was void, as was every subsequent assignment. (Id.)

In March 2016, while a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint was 

pending, Nationstar, MERS, and the Conners entered into a settlement agreement. (Doc. 

19 at 6; Doc. 20 at 3; Doc. 19-1 at 283-87 [actual agreement].) The agreement provided

that the parties “wish[ed] to resolve their differences regarding the Complaint and the 

Dispute.” (Doc. 19-1 at 283.) The “Complaint” referred to the adversary proceeding 

initiated by the Conners. (Id.) The Complaint included the “Dispute,” which was:

[A]mong other things, that various documents related to the Debt and the 

Property were invalid or void, including but not limited to the Deed of Trust 

as well as all assignments and other recorded documents executed by parties 

including MERS and Nationstar, and that Nationstar had engaged in a variety 

of fraudulent or otherwise improper conduct regarding the Debt and the 

Trustee’s Sale. 

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(Id.) As part of the settlement agreement, the Conners agreed to “dismiss the Complaint 

with prejudice.” (Id. at 284.) Finally, in a portion of the settlement agreement entitled 

“The Debtors’ Release of Nationstar,” the Conners agreed that: 

The Debtors and each and all of his current, former, and future partners, 

affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, attorneys, employees, 

representatives and agents (the “Debtors Releasing Parties”) release and 

forever discharge Nationstar and each and all of its current, former and future 

parents, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, 

officers, directors, attorneys, shareholders, employees, representatives and 

agents (the “Nationstar Released Parties”), from any and all claims, charges, 

complaints, liabilities, obligations, promises, agreements, damages, causes 

of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, losses, debts and expenses (including 

attorneys’ fees) of any nature whatsoever, whether in law or equity, which 

the Debtor Releasing Parties now have or may have had against the 

Nationstar released Parties related to the Complaint and Dispute (the

“Released Matters”).

(Id.) Identical language was used to reflect the Conners’ release of MERS, MERS’srelease 

of the Conners, and Nationstar’s release of the Conners (with the appropriate substitutions

made to reflect which parties were in which position). (Id. at 284-85.) All parties to the 

agreement were represented by counsel. (Id. at 286.) The agreement was signed by the 

Conners, Nationstar, and MERS. (Id. at 287.)

On March 10, 2016, the Conners, Nationstar, and MERS notified the bankruptcy 

court that they had reached a settlement. (Doc. 20-1 at 12-13.) Accordingly, in May 2016, 

the bankruptcy court entered an order dismissing with prejudice the Conners’ “Second 

Amended Complaint and all claims in this action.” (Id. at 16-17.) Although the order 

directed the clerk to close the case, the adversary proceeding was reinstated shortly 

thereafter. 

In March 2017, the Conners filed a third amended complaint. (Doc. 19-1 at 158.) 

This version reiterated the factual allegations from the second amended complaint, and 

contained many of the same causes of action, but the only defendant was Wilmington. (Id.

at 158-78.) After “efforts to amicably resolve” the third amended complaint failed, 

Wilmington filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement against the Conners, or, in 

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the alternative, to dismiss the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 

20-1 at 41-56.) In that motion, Wilmington argued that, although it was not explicitly 

named in the settlement agreement, it was one of the “released parties.” (Id. at 45.) Even 

if the settlement agreement didn’t apply, Wilmington further argued, the third amended 

complaint failed to state legally cognizable claims under Arizona law. (Id. at 47-55.) 

The Conners filed their response in January 2018. (Doc. 20-1 at 58.) In that 

response, the Conners argued that Wilmington was not a released party. (Id. at 61.) 

Additionally, the Conners asserted that they had new evidence that would give rise to new 

claims. (Id. at 59.) This evidence, discovered after the Conners retained an “expert in 

mortgage-backed securities research and foreclosure forensics,” purported to show that 

“the very basis of foreclosure was faulty.” (Id. at 59-60.) In light of the expert’s report, 

the Conners claimed they could show that “Nationstar could not assign to Wilmington 

Trust an interest in property that was greater than Nationstar’s—and Nationstar had no

interest from MERS, or MERS from the original lender.” (Id. at 64.) In a nutshell, the 

Conners argued that Wilmington never acquired an interest in the property that would allow 

it to foreclose. (Id.) Consequently, the Conners stated that they planned to file a fourth 

amended complaint. (Id. at 61.) 

Although the Conners had indicated in this January 2018 filing that they would file 

their fourth amended complaint “shortly” (id. at 68), there was no activity in the case for 

eight months. (Doc. 20 at 4.) Eventually, the bankruptcy court issued an order informing 

the parties that dismissal of the case was imminent. (Doc. 20-1 at 72.) After the Conners 

failed to file anything in response, the bankruptcy court dismissed the action in October 

2018. (Id. at 75.)

Only then did the Conners act, and they asked the bankruptcy court to reopen the 

case. (Doc. 20 at 4.) During a November 2018 hearing, counsel for the Conners informed 

the court that he had overlooked the due date for his motion to keep the case active. (Doc. 

20-1 at 83.) After recounting the basics of practicing in bankruptcy court, the court 

“conclude[d] in [its] discretion that that dismissal is not warranted” and reopened the case. 

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(Doc. 20-1 at 82-89, 100.) The Conners pledged to have a motion for leave to amend, as 

well as a fourth amended complaint, in front of the court the week after the court reopened 

the case. (Id. at 89.)

The complaint was not filed the next week. Instead, it was filed January 15, 2019—

the night before a hearing on Wilmington’s motion to dismiss. (Doc 20 at 4.) The motion 

for leave to amend was filed three hours before the hearing. (Id.; Doc. 20-1 at 168.) 

At the hearing, Wilmington largely reiterated the arguments made in its motion to 

enforce. (Doc. 20-1 at 146-68.) Wilmington asserted that the Conners’ claims against it 

were barred by the settlement agreement, and even if they weren’t, the third amended 

complaint failed to state a claim. (Id.) When counsel for the Conners began his argument, 

he urged the court to consider the motion for leave to amend and the fourth amended 

complaint before making a ruling. (Id. at 168-70.) The court declined to do so. (Id. at 

170-71.) 

On the merits, the Conners reiterated their argument that, because Wilmington was 

not a party to the settlement agreement, none of the releases applied to it. (Id. at 176-82.) 

The Conners also continued to argue that Wilmington had no authority to foreclose on their 

residence. (Id. at 184.) Finally, the Conners presented further argument on why the claims 

in the third amended complaint should survive a motion to dismiss. (Id. at 187-92.)

The court ruled from the bench on Wilmington’s motion. (Id. at 204.) The court 

concluded that, “by the expressed language of the settlement, the claims against 

Wilmington Trust related to the assignment or Nationstar’s improper conduct regarding the 

trustee sale were released.” (Id. at 205-206.) The court based this determination on the 

settlement agreement’s definitions of “dispute,” “complaint,” and “the released parties.” 

(Id. at 204-205.) 

In the alternative, the court determined that the third amended complaint failed to 

state a claim. (Id. at 206.) The court found the Conners’ statutory claims unavailing and 

rejected their state-law tort claims. (Id. at 206-211.) Finally, because the court determined 

that the settlement agreement foreclosed the Conners’ claims against Wilmington, it 

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determined there was “no reason to amend the complaint or to consider the motion to 

amend the complaint or to consider the fourth amended complaint or its allegations.” (Id.

at 210-11.) The court entered an order reflecting its decision on January 31, 2019. (Doc. 

19-1 at 398.) 

On February 14, 2019, the Conners filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. 1 at 1.) That 

notice was timely under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)(1). After several extension requests 

(Docs. 6, 12, 13, 21), the matter is now fully briefed (Docs. 19, 20, 23).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Conners raise three issues. (Doc. 19 at 5.) First, they challenge the 

bankruptcy court’s determination that the settlement agreement barred their claims against 

Wilmington. (Id.) Assuming the court was incorrect on that issue, they next argue that the 

bankruptcy court erred in declining to consider the motion to amend. (Id.) Finally, they 

argue that the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing their third amended complaint. (Id.) 

Whether the second and third issues need be reached turns on the answer to the first 

issue. Accordingly, the Court begins its analysis with the settlement agreement.

I. Standard of Review

In reviewing the scope of the settlement agreement, the Court is faced with an issue 

of contract interpretation. The parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review. The 

Conners argue that a de novo standard applies. (Doc. 23 at 3.) In contrast, Wilmington 

argues that the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard applies. (Doc. 20 at 2-3.)

The Court need not resolve this issue. Even assuming the Conners are correct, and 

that de novo review is required, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the 

Conners’ claims against Wilmington are foreclosed by the settlement agreement.

II. Merits

A. Contract Interpretation

The central question is whether the settlement agreement precludes claims against 

Wilmington related to the 2014 foreclosure on the Conners’ home. Although Wilmington 

was not a party to the settlement agreement, it contends it was covered by the agreement’s 

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release as to Nationstar. 

When interpreting a settlement agreement, state law applies. Botefur v. City of 

Eagle Point, 7 F.3d 152, 156 (9th Cir. 1993). Under Arizona law, the Court’s “purpose in 

interpreting a contract is to ascertain and enforce the parties’ intent.” ELM Retirement Ctr., 

LP v. Callaway, 246 P.3d 938, 941 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “To determine the parties’ intent, 

we look to the plain meaning of the words as viewed in context of the contract as a whole.” 

Id. at 941-42. Further, “each section of an agreement must be read in relation to each other 

to bring harmony, if possible, between all parts of the writing.” Chandler Med. Bldg. 

Partners v. Chandler Dental Grp., 855 P.2d 787, 791 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). A provision 

in a contract will not be read so as to render another provision meaningless. Id.

These principles guide the Court’s interpretation of the releases. Although 

Wilmington is not explicitly mentioned in the agreement, the provision releasing 

Nationstar from claims also includes all of Nationstar’s “former and future partners, 

affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, attorneys, employees, representatives and 

agents.” (Doc. 19-1 at 284.) Because Nationstar assigned the deed of trust to Wilmington, 

and that assignment formed part of the Conners’ theory of liability as to Nationstar and 

Wilmington (Doc. 19-1 at 164 ¶ 49), the meaning of “assign” serves as a starting point in 

determining whether Wilmington is included in the released parties. 

The settlement agreement uses “assign” as a noun. When used as a noun, “assign” 

refers to an “assignee.” Assign, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Although “[u]se 

of the term is so widespread that it is difficult to ascribe positive meaning to it with any 

specificity,” it generally reflects the transfer of some interest from one party to another. 

Assignee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Whether one is an assignee also relies 

on “the intent of the assignor and assignee.” Id.

Under this definition, Wilmington is an “assign” of Nationstar. The settlement 

agreement does not provide a definition that would suggest an alternate or more narrow 

meaning of “assign,” and the intent of the parties is clear—Nationstar fully meant to assign 

the deed of trust to Wilmington, thus making Nationstar an assignor and Wilmington an 

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assignee.

2

This comports with other portions of the settlement agreement. The agreement 

required the Conners, without qualification, “to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.” 

(Id. at 284.) This suggests the parties intended the settlement agreement to encompass all

of the claims the Conners had asserted during the adversary proceeding, including their 

claims against Wilmington. 

Notwithstanding all of this, the Conners argue that “assign” does not include 

Wilmington. They contend that “‘assigns’ is clearly meant in the corporate context, not 

just because Wilmington Trust received a (void) assignment.” (Doc. 19 at 18.) They 

further contend that, because “assigns” appears near “affiliates” and “predecessors” in the 

release, “assigns” is “clearly in reference to other entities that became either Nationstar and 

MERS, or entities that Nationstar and MERS might become.” (Id. at 17.) This is 

essentially a noscitur a sociis argument—the definition of “assign” is determined by the 

company the word keeps. See, e.g., Estate of Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State, 266 P.3d 

349, 352 (Ariz. 2011). 

This argument is unavailing because it ignores the full context of the release. The 

release covers not only “affiliates,” “predecessors,” and “assigns,” but also “former and 

future partners,” “attorneys,” “employees,” “representatives,” and “agents.” The full list 

covers a variety of legal relationships with Nationstar, not just “corporate” relationships. 

The closest, “affiliate,” is “[a] corporation that is related to another corporation by 

shareholdings or other means of control; a subsidiary, parent, or sibling corporation.” 

Affiliate, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Even that definition, though, is not 

limited to a company that either became Nationstar or descends from Nationstar. 

Further, the Conners’ argument would render other portions of the agreement

nonsensical. The Conners’ released parties also include their affiliates and predecessors. 

2 This conclusion also defeats the Conners’ argument that, because Wilmington is not 

a third-party beneficiary to the settlement agreement, it cannot seek to enforce it. (Doc. 19 

at 18-19.) As the Conners acknowledge, this argument is premised on the assumption that 

“Wilmington Trust is . . . not among the ‘Released Parties.’” (Id.) But as discussed in this 

order, Wilmington is a released party. 

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(Doc. 19-1 at 285.) Under their definition, only entities legally indistinguishable from the 

Conners could fall under these categories. Because the Conners are actual people, though, 

that category would be limited to them and them alone, rendering the inclusion of 

“affiliates” and “predecessors” meaningless. The Court will not interpret the agreement in 

that way. Chandler Med. Bldg. Partners, 855 P.2d at 791.

In their reply, the Conners advance a slightly different argument. They argue the 

settlement agreement does not include Wilmington because “Wilmington Trust produced 

no evidence that either Nationwide or MERS assigned their rights under the 2016 

settlement agreement to Wilmington Trust.” (Doc. 23 at 6.) According to the Conners, 

because Wilmington was an assignee before the settlement agreement was executed, it 

cannot possibly be an “assign” under the terms of the agreement. (Id. at 5.) Again, this 

argument is unsupported by the plain text of the word “assign”—its use in the agreement 

doesn’t contemplate such a narrow construction. More important, this argument ignores 

the rest of the release, which includes “each and all of [Nationstar’] current, former, and 

future . . . assigns.” (Doc. 19-1 at 284, emphasis added.) The Conners’ argument would 

read the agreement to simultaneously include and exclude certain parties. Such a 

construction is impermissible. 

A broad definition of “assign” disturbs the Conners. (Doc. 19 at 18.) In their view, 

including Wilmington as an “assign” means “Nationstar and MERS could shield anyone 

from claims by the Conners simply by assigning them an unspecified right,” which would 

“apply the release even beyond this litigation.” (Id.) True, the releases are broad. But they 

are not as limitless as the Conners claim. Even if the releases extended to any entity that 

“has done business” with Nationstar or MERS, as the Conners claim (Doc. 19 at 18), the 

rest of the settlement agreement limits the extent of the release. The releases are limited to 

claims “related to the Complaint and Dispute.” (Doc. 19-1 at 284-85.) The Complaint is 

limited to the adversary proceeding initiated by the Conners at issue here, and the Dispute 

is a subset of the Complaint. (Id. at 283.) Thus, the releases only extend as far as the 

allegations in the Conners’ adversary complaint. This context provides an important 

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limitation that defeats the Conners’ concerns. ELM Retirement, 246 P.3d at 941-42.3

At bottom, the meaning of “assign” is clear in this case. That meaning includes 

Wilmington. This is not a matter, as the Conners contend, of the bankruptcy court being 

“more interested in reading intent into the agreement (and clearing its docket).”4(Doc. 23 

at 6.) Instead, it is a straightforward interpretation of the plain meaning of the words of the 

contract. The bankruptcy court correctly determined that the settlement agreement released 

the Conners’ claims against Wilmington.

B. Fraud In The Inducement

In addition to debating the definition of “assign” in the settlement agreement, the 

Conners allege the settlement agreement was induced by fraud. (Doc. 19 at 19; Doc. 23 at 

7-8.) In their view, they were deprived of the “true facts” behind the settlement agreement, 

which “cloud[s] the validity” of the agreement. (Doc. 19 at 15.) 

Even if the Conners’ assertion is accurate, it does not require reversal. Like contract 

interpretation, whether a contract is enforceable is governed by state law. Jeff D. v. Andrus, 

899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989). Under Arizona law, a party alleging fraudulent 

inducement has two options: it may seek rescission of the contract or it may affirm the 

contract and sue for damages. Hennesy Equip. Sales Co. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 543 P.2d 

123, 124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Jennings v. Lee, 461 P.2d 161, 165 (Ariz. 1969); 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164 (1981) (stating that a fraudulently induced 

3 Additionally, Wilmington presented evidence to the bankruptcy court that, when the 

parties were negotiating the settlement agreement, the Conners initially requested a “carve 

out” for future claims against Wilmington, this request was rejected, and the Conners then 

signed the settlement agreement despite its absence. (Doc. 19-1 at 280 ¶ 4.) Although the 

Court need not rely on this evidence, because the text of the settlement agreement provides 

sufficiently clear evidence of the parties’ intent, it provides further support for the 

bankruptcy court’s conclusion. Cf. Associated Students of the Univ. of Ariz. v. Ariz. Bd. of 

Regents, 584 P.2d 564, 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (“The acts of parties under a contract, 

before disputes arise, are the best [extrinsic] evidence of the meaning of doubtful contract 

terms.”).

4 The Court questions the prudence of attributing ill intent to the bankruptcy court. 

Not only is it unpersuasive and in bad taste, it is belied by the record in this case. The 

bankruptcy court, in its discretion, allowed the Conners to reopen a case that had been 

dormant for close to a year. (Doc. 20-1 at 100.) In reaching that decision, the court 

generously chose to overlook several of the procedural missteps committed by the 

Conners’ counsel and offered advice to make further proceedings go more smoothly. (Id.

at 82-88.) Whatever the failings in this case, they are not the bankruptcy court’s. 

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contract is voidable, but not void).

During the proceedings in bankruptcy court, the Conners’ counsel stated that, 

although he might prefer to seek rescission of the settlement agreement, that was “not an 

option” because the Conners did not want to “have to return the settlement payment.”

(Doc. 19-1 at 42.) That means that, even if the Conners have a valid fraudulent inducement 

claim, their only remaining option is to affirm the agreement and sue for damages. The 

merits of such a case are not before the Court, but the bottom line is that the settlement 

agreement is still in effect.

* * *

The meaning of the settlement agreement is clear. The word “assign” in the 

agreement’s release as to Nationstar includes Wilmington. Accordingly, the agreement 

precludes further claims against Wilmington. Given this conclusion, there is no need to 

review the bankruptcy court’s analysis concerning the sufficiency of the claims asserted in 

the Conners’ third amended complaint or the bankruptcy court’s resolution of the Conners’ 

request for leave to submit a fourth amended complaint.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 

(1) The decision of the bankruptcy court dismissing the Conners’ third amended 

complaint without leave to amend is affirmed; and

(2) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this 

action.

Dated this 28th day of February, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-01076-DWL Document 28 Filed 02/28/20 Page 12 of 12