Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02932/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02932-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Hopkins did not oppose the Defendants’ motion on his claims that the

Defendants allegedly violated his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, to be

free from interference with his zone of privacy, and to be free from inclusion in permanent

government records branding an innocent citizen as a suspect of criminal activity. At the

hearing he conceded that the Defendants are entitled to judgment on those aspects of his

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

OFFICER A. BONVICINO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-02932 JSW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for summary

judgment filed by Defendants Armand Bonvicino (“Bonvicino”), David Buelow (“Buelow”),

Nick Nguyen (“Nguyen”) (collectively the “Defendant Officers”), and the City of San Carlos

(“City”) (collectively “Defendants”). Having considered the parties’ pleadings, relevant legal

authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court HEREBY GRANTS IN PART

AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2005, Hopkins filed his complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the Defendants. Hopkins claims that the Officer Defendants violated his constitutional

rights: (1) to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) to be free from arrest without

probable cause; and (3) to be free from the use of excessive force.1 The City’s liability for these

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Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to those claims.

2 Hereinafter, the Court shall refer to the excerpts of Mr. Hopkins deposition

that have been submitted by Defendants as “Master Decl., Ex. A at page:line.”

2

actions is premised on Monell v. Dep’t of Social Sevcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Hopkins’ claims

arise from an incident that occurred on August 22, 2003.

On that date, Hopkins stopped at the American Legion and had three to four sixteenounce beers. (Declaration of Todd Master (“Master Decl.”), Ex. A (Deposition of Bruce

Hopkins) at 58:21-60:2.)2 Although Hopkins does not recall what time he left the American

Legion, on the way home he was involved in a traffic accident and hit a car driven by a woman

named Waheeda Talib. (See, e.g., id. at 65:10-22, 67:18-70:2.) After the accident, Ms. Talib

followed Hopkins to his home. (See, e.g., id. at 69:19-70:2; Declaration of Nick Nguyen

(“Nguyen Decl.”), Ex. A.) When Hopkins arrived at his home, he discovered Ms. Talib had

followed him. She accused him of drinking and hitting her car. Hopkins noted that she was on

her cell phone and went inside his house. (Master Decl., Ex. A at 69:19-70:2, 73:22-76:8.) 

Once inside his house, Hopkins went to his furnished basement room and drank another four to

five beers. (Id. at 84:21-25, 94:24-95:16.) 

Ms. Talib apparently called the police, advised them that she had been involved in an

accident and that she suspected the person who hit her had been drinking. Shortly thereafter, the

Defendant Officers arrived at the scene. (Declaration of Carol Clark (“Clark Decl.”), ¶ 4, Ex.

A.) According to the police reports prepared at the time, Ms. Talib’s suspicions were based on

the fact that she smelled “the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his person.” 

(See Declaration of Armand Bonvicino (“Bonvicino Decl.”), Ex. A.)

Officer Bonvicino knocked on Hopkins’ front door, but he received no response. (Id.) 

Officer Buelow arrived on the scene, and the Defendant Officers agreed that Officer Nguyen

would remain with Ms. Talib while Officers Bonvicino and Buelow would continue to try and

contact Hopkins. The latter two officers proceeded to the side of the house, knocked on a screen

door, and announced their presence. After again receiving no response, they entered Hopkins’

home by cutting a hole in the screen door and opening it. (See, e.g., Bonvicino Decl., Ex. A;

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Clark Decl., Ex. A.) Hopkins attests that did not hear the Defendant Officers before they

entered his home. (Master Decl., Ex. A at 96:14-16.) The Defendant Officers claim they

entered the home because they were concerned that Ms. Talib may have mistaken the smell of

alcohol on Hopkins’ breath for a fruity odor associated with a diabetic coma. The Defendant

Officers based this concern on their training, rather than on any further information they

received from Ms. Talib. (Bonvicino Decl., ¶ 8, Buelow Decl., ¶ 6; Bonvicino Depo. 77:7-11,

113:8-114:24.)

Having received no response, Officers Buelow and Bonvicino entered the house with

their guns drawn. (Bonvicino Depo. at 118:14-24, 138:11-22.) They eventually located Mr.

Hopkins in his room. Hopkins testified that both officers pointed their guns at him. (Master

Decl., Ex. A at 70:3-16, 93:23-94:1, 103:15-19.) 

Bonvicino and Buelow placed Hopkins in handcuffs and took him outside. Ms. Talib

then identified Hopkins as the driver of the vehicle that hit her vehicle. Hopkins was arrested for

a violation of California Vehicle Code § 20002(a), upon Ms. Talib’s decision to make a

citizen’s arrest. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9-13; Nguyen Decl., Ex. C.) Hopkins also was arrested for

violation of California Vehicle Code § 23152, after Bonvicino conducted field sobriety tests and

after his breath tests registered a blood alcohol content of .20 and .18. (Bonvicino Decl., ¶¶ 13,

15-17, Exs. A, B.) 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence

for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case.

Id. at 248. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

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most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997). 

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The

party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Id. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for

the moving party. Id. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party

must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party must “identify

with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan,

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251

(7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that it is not a district court’s task to “scour the record in search of a

genuine issue of triable fact”). If the non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. Legal Standards Applicable to the Defense of Qualified Immunity.

The Defendant Officers assert that they are qualifiedly immune from suit on Hopkins’

Section 1983 claims. Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other

burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is an

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Id. As a result, the Supreme Court

has repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible

stage in litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 227 (1991). In Saucier, the Supreme Court stated that a court called upon to rule on the

issue of qualified immunity must ask the following threshold question: “Taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right?” See id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). “If

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no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id.

However, if the Court finds that the facts would show the violation of a constitutional

right, the next inquiry is to determine “whether the right was clearly established.” Id. A

constitutional right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes if “the contours of the

right [are] sufficiently clear that [at the time of the alleged unlawful action is taken] a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citing Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “In other words, an officer who makes a reasonable

mistake as to what the law requires under a given set of circumstances is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Boyd v. Benton Co., 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Saucier, 533

U.S. at 205).

C. The Defendant Officers Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Hopkins’ Fourth

Amendment Claims Relating to the Warrantless Entry and Subsequent Arrest.

1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure.

Hopkins claims the Defendant Officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

entering when they entered his home without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment guarantees

citizens the right “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the

person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In addition, it is well established that

“‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” 

LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Because it is undisputed that the Defendant Officers entered

Hopkins’ home without a warrant, unless a recognized exception to that requirement justifies

their entry, Hopkins can establish the violation of a constitutional right.

The Defendant Officers rely primarily on the emergency exception to the warrant

requirement to assert they were justified in entering Hopkins’ home. See Martin v. City of

Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 888

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3

In Cervantes, the Ninth Circuit set forth a three part test to determine whether

the emergency exception applied. The second prong of that test required a court to examine

the subjective intent of the officer who effected the warrantless entry. Cervantes, 219 F.3d at

888, 890. Well after Hopkins’ arrest in this case, the United States Supreme Court in

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006) effectively abrogated that portion of the

Cervantes test and concluded that court’s must focus on the objective circumstances known

to the officers. Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1948.

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(9th Cir. 2000).3 As an alternative to the emergency exception, the Defendant Officers rely on

the fact that a warrantless entry may be justified when “the officers have probable cause and are

presented with exigent circumstances.” LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 954 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at

590); see also United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir.1978) (“[A]bsent exigent

circumstances, police who have probable cause to arrest a felony suspect must obtain a warrant

before entering a dwelling to carry out the arrest.”).

The Court finds there are disputed issues of material fact as to the state of the

Defendants Officers’ knowledge at the time they arrived on scene at Hopkins’ home. This

precludes the Court from resolving the issue of whether they are entitled to qualified immunity

on the basis that the warrantless entry was justified by the existence of probable cause and

exigent circumstances. The Court also concludes that even if it were to accept all of the facts as

true, there are insufficient facts on this record for the Court to conclude that the Defendant

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the basis of the emergency exception to the

warrant requirement. As such, the Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to this claim.

2. No probable cause to arrest.

Hopkins also contends he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the

Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” 

Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Larson v.

Neimi, 9 F.3d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1993). “In evaluating a custodial arrest executed by state

officials, federal courts must determine the reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law

governing the arrest.” United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993). Under

California law, probable cause to arrests exists when facts known to the arresting officer “would

lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and

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strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” People v. Adams, 175 Cal. App. 3d 855,

861 (1985). The test under California law “is very similar to the Fourth Amendment test

applied by [the Ninth Circuit], which provides that ‘[p]robable cause exists when, under the

totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have

concluded that there was a fair probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.’” Peng v.

Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d

834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999)).

As the Court has noted above, there are disputed issues of material fact as to the state of

the Defendants Officers’ knowledge at the time they arrived on scene at Hopkins’ home. Again,

this precludes the Court from resolving the issue of whether they are entitled to entitled to

qualified immunity on the basis that the warrantless entry was justified by the existence of

probable cause. Because any other evidence supporting a probable cause determination was

obtained only after what might possibly have been an illegal entry into Hopkins’ home, the

Court cannot determine at this time that the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified

immunity on Hopkins’ Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, and the Defendants’ motion is

DENIED on this basis.

D. The Motion for Summary Judgment on the Excessive Force Claim is Denied as to

Officers Buelow and Bonvicino. 

Hopkins’ final claim against the Defendant Officers is that they used excessive force

when they arrested him. However, Hopkins concedes that Officer Nguyen is not liable on this

claim. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED solely as to Officer Nguyen on the excessive

force claim.

With respect to Officers Buelow and Bonvicino, it is clearly established that the use of

excessive force by police officers in an arrest violates the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right to

be free from unreasonable seizure. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Hopkins bases his excessive force claim on the assertion that both Officers Bonvicino and

Buelow pointed their weapons at Hopkins when they entered his room. (Master Decl., Ex. A at

70:3-16, 93:23-94:1, 103:15-19.) The Ninth Circuit has held that a claim for excessive force

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28 4 The Defendant Officers have not suggested that Hopkins was not “seized” at

the time.

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based on the fact that a weapon was pointed at a suspect in the context of a seizure can give rise

to a claim for excessive force.4 See, e.g., Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th

Cir. 2002). Whether an officer’s conduct was reasonable is an objective one, however, asking

“whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The Court must consider whether the totality of the circumstances

justifies the force used, examining particularly severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). “The ‘reasonableness’ of the particular use of force must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-22). 

As noted, Hopkins contends that both Officers Bonvicino and Buelow were pointing

their weapons at him. (Master Decl., Ex. A at 70:3-16, 93:23-94:1, 103:15-19.) Officer

Bonvicino testified that he did not have his weapon pointed at Hopkins but instead had it in the

“low ready” position. Officer Bonvicino also testified that he did not point his weapon at

Hopkins because he did not perceive a lethal danger from him and that it would not have been

appropriate for him to have pointed a weapon at him. Officer Bonvicino also testified he did not

know whether Officer Buelow pointed his weapon at Hopkins. (Bonvicino Depo. at 128:17-23,

143:2-144:14). The Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether Officer

Bonvicino engaged in conduct that could support an excessive force claim, such that the Court

cannot conclude that he is entitled to qualified immunity at this time. 

In contrast, Officer Buelow acknowledges that he pointed his weapon at Hopkins. 

(Buelow Depo. at 78:16-19.) At that time, Hopkins was suspected of either leaving the scene of

an accident, driving while intoxicated, or being in a diabetic coma. Although the Defendant

Officers entered into the home without knowing if anyone else was present, they also testified

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that they received no response to their inquiries, and did not suggest that they heard any

movement that could have suggested someone was present. When they encountered Hopkins,

the facts suggested he was cooperative and did not attempt to flee from them or resist arrest. 

Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Hopkins, the Court concludes that in opposing

Defendants’ motion, he has sufficiently alleged a violation of his right to be free from excessive

force. The Court also concludes that given the holding in Solano, the law was clearly

established at the time of Hopkins’ arrest. Thus, based on the current state of the record, the

Court cannot conclude at this time that, as a matter of law, Officer Buelow is entitled to

qualified immunity. 

For the above stated reasons, the motion is DENIED on the excessive force claim as to

Officers Buelow and Bonvicino.

E. The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment Must Be Denied.

Hopkins contends that the City is liable under Section 1983 pursuant to Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Municipalities are only liable for injuries

that arise from an official policy or custom. Id. at 694. As the party with the burden of proof on

this claim, Hopkins must show “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was

deprived; (2) that the [City] had a policy; (3) that the policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’

to [Hopkin’s] constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the

constitutional violation.’” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (in turn quoting City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). “There also must be a ‘direct causal link’ between the policy or

custom and the injury,” and Hopkins “must be able to demonstrate that the injury resulted from

a ‘permanent and well settled practice.’” (Id. (quoting McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141

(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted)). A municipality may not be held liable under

Section 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred. Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001). The failure to train or supervise may give rise to

a “policy or custom” sufficient to impose liability on the City. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-

90.

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Because Hopkins’ Monell claim is based in part on his allegations relating to the

warrantless entry into his home, and because the Court cannot determine on the facts presented

whether Hopkins was deprived of a constitutional right, the City’s motion is DENIED on this

aspect of Hopkins’ section 1983 claim.

However, Hopkins also premises his Monell claim on his theory that the City failed to

supervise Officer Buelow with respect to preparing reports on pointing firearms at suspects, and

that Officer Buelow, in turn, trained his recruits to not follow the proper procedures. In

opposing the City’s motion, Hopkins submits a document entitled “Use of Deadly Force -

Firearms, General Order 2.03,” which provides:

Sidearms shall remain holstered at all times. The drawing of any firearm

shall take place only when an officer perceives a dangerous situation to

exist, where self-protection or the protection of others is necessary. If an

officer points his/her weapon at a person for the purpose of restricting that

person’s movements and no crime report is written, then the officer shall

complete a memorandum, outlining the drawing and pointing of their

weapon and forward it to the appropriate Division Commander, via their

immediate supervisor. The officer shall complete and forward the memo

prior to the end of their duty day.

(Boskovich Decl., Ex. F.) Officer Buelow admits that he did not prepare a report in accordance

with this policy. Rather, he denies that this was a violation the policy and testified that it was a

“common practice” for the officer preparing a report to include that information, and that he

assumed that Officers Bonvicino or Nguyen would have included the information in their

reports. (Buelow Depo., 76:9-80:24.) 

The Court concludes that Hopkins has put forth sufficient evidence regarding his theory

that the alleged failure to supervise Officer Buelow led to the alleged deprivation of a

constitutional right. Accordingly, the City’s motion on this aspect of Hopkins’ section 1983

claim must also be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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