Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01691/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01691-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, 

LOCAL 2203, DAVID ANDERSON, GLEN W. AYERS, 

DENNIS J. EULBERG, JEFFREY L. BYBEE, 

WILLIAM P. DOLAN, MICHAEL J. DUFFORD, 

SHAWN P. DUFFORD, TIM K. EKBERG, DANIEL P. 

FREY, LEONARD J. GRANT, KENNETH W. GUTHRIE, 

TIMOTHY G. HANLON, EDWARD T. HOBAUGH, JERRY 

KACZMARSKI, DAVID L. KELLN, WILSON T. 

LINDQUIST, HOWARD A. MacPHERSON, TERRYE. 

MALONE, MAHLON L. MILLER, RANDY MILLER, 

STANLEY CRAIG MOWRY, RUSSELL L. WILLIAMS, 

STEVEN PELSTER, DAVID A. RAMOS, CHARLES O. 

RUTENBECK, JAMES A. SCHANEL, JAMES E. 

SIMINGTON II, BOB SNIDER, KEVIN J. SWEENEY, 

MICHAEL L. TURNER, PAULE. VENETTE, ROBERT E. 

WESTLUND, BRUCE GINTHER, RICHARD RANDALL, 

TERRY TRAVIS, TROY BRANHAM, JIM MADDEN, 

DAVE NUSS, FLOYD COUCH, DENNIS DAY, and 

JOHN L. McNAIR, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

WEST ADAMS COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JUNO 91989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1691 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 87-F-16) 

Thomas B. Buescher (Ellen M. Kelman with him on the brief) of Brauer 

& Buescher, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Richard L. Shearer (Charles B. Hecht with him on the brief) of 

Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appellate Case: 88-1691 Document: 01019784932 Date Filed: 06/09/1989 Page: 1 
Victoria M. Bunsen, Assistant City Attorney, (Martin R. McCullough 

and Linda E. Smoke, Attorneys), City of Westminster, Colorado, filed 

an amicus curiae brief for the City of Westminster, Colorado. 

Before HOLLOWAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.* 

O'CONNOR, District Judge 

*Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1691 Document: 01019784932 Date Filed: 06/09/1989 Page: 2 
The International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 2203 

(Local 2203) brought this action against the West Adams County Fire 

Protection District (District), seeking a declaratory judgment that 

the District was wrongly providing its employees with compensatory 

time off in lieu of overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (FLSA), 29 u.s.c. § 207(0). The district court 

entered summary judgment for Local 2203, finding that (1) section 

207(0) is ambiguous, (2) the Department of Labor's interpretation 

of the section should be accepted, (3) under this interpretation and 

the undisputed facts, the District could not use compensatory time 

rather· than overtime, and (4) as interpreted, section 207(0) is 

constitutional. We affirm. 

The pertinent facts are as follows: The District, a local 

governmental entity organized under the laws of Colorado, is a 

public agency within the meaning of the FLSA. See 29 u.s.c. 203 (x). 

Since 1983, it has had a policy of providing employees compensatory 

time off rather than payment for overtime work. This policy was 

reiterated in late 1985 and early 1986. 

Local 2203 is a labor organization. In a letter and 

petition addressed to the chief of the District and dated November 

19, 1985, the District's employees designated Local 2203 as their 

representative to, among other things, negotiate with the District 

regarding the use of compensatory time. 

Although the parties disagree as to the extent of the 

negotiations, if any, between the District and Local 2203, they 

concur that no agreement regarding compensatory time was reached. 

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Nonetheless, the District continued to use compensatory time, and 

. \ in January 1987, this action was commenced. 

I. Interpretation of the FLSA. 

Generally, the FLSA requires employers to pay employees 

for overtime worked. However, section 207(0) allows public 

employers to provide employees with compensatory time in lieu of 

overtime in certain situations: 

(1) Employees of a public agency which is a 

state, a political subdivision of a State, or 

an interstate governmental agency may receive, 

in accordance with this subsection and in lieu 

of overtime compensation, compensatory time off 

at a rate not less than one and one-half hours 

for each hour of employment for which overtime 

compensation is required by this section. 

(2) A public agency may provide compensatory 

time under paragraph (1) only --

(A) pursuant to --

(i) applicable provisions of a 

collective bargaining agreement, 

memorandum of understanding, or any 

other agreement between the public 

agency and representatives of such 

employees; or 

{ii) in the case of employees not 

covered by subclause ( i) , an agreement 

or understanding arrived at between 

the employer and employee before the 

performance of the work; 

In the case of employees described in clause 

(A) ( ii) hired prior to April 15, 1986, the 

regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, 

with respect to compensatory time off for such 

employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime 

compensation, shall constitute an agreement or 

understanding under such clause (A) (ii). Except 

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as provided in the previous sentence, the 

provision of compensatory time off to such 

employees for hours worked after April 14, 1986, 

shall be in accordance with this subsection. 

At issue is the interrelationship between subclauses (i) 

and ( ii) • Both subclauses allow an employer to provide compensatory 

time pursuant to an agreement. However, under subclause ( ii) , 

unlike subclause ( i) , a regular practice in effect on April 15, 

1986, constitutes an agreement. See 29 u.s.c. §· 207 (o) (2). In the 

instant case, there was no express agreement, but there was a 

regular practice. Thus, whether the District may use compensatory 

time depends on which subclause applies. 

We begin our determination of whether subclause (i) or 

( ii) applies by focusing on the language of the statute itself. 

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981). We find the language of 

section 207 (o) (2) to be ambiguous. Subclause ( ii) applies to 

"employees not covered by subclause (i). 11 However, given the 

wording of subclause (i), it is unclear whether this means employees 

who do not have a representative, or employees who are not subject 

to an agreement reached with a representative. 1 

1 The details of this ambiguity are as follows: Subclause (i) 

may be read as applying only to those employees who have a 

representative who has reached an agreement with the employer. In 

other words, employees are not covered by subclause (i) if (a) they 

have a representative, but the representative fails to reach an 

agreement with the employer, or (b) they have no representative. 

In either case, subclause (ii) applies, and the employer may use 

compensatory time pursuant to a regular practice in effect on April 

15, 1986. 

Alternatively, Subclause ( i) may be read as covering all 

employees who have a representative, even if the representative has 

not reached an agreement with the employer. Subclause (ii) 

addresses employees who have no representative. Therefore, for 

represented employees, including those whose representative has 

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Because of this ambiguity, we must resort to other sources 

to determine the proper construction of section 207(0) •

2 Initially, 

we note tbat the Department of Labor {Department) has promulgated 

regulations interpreting the section. The Department's 

interpretation is entitled to substantial deference by the court, 

United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979); Frontier 

Airlines. Inc. v. civil Aeronautics Board, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th 

cir. 1980); Clarkson Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety and 

Health Review Commission, 531 F.2d 451, 457 {10th Cir. 1976), and 

should be accepted if it is sufficiently reasonable. Blue Cross 

Association v. Harris, 664 F.2d 806, 810 (10th Cir. 1981); Frontier 

Airlines, 621 F.2d at 372 {citing Train v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council. Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 {1975). In fact, the Department's 

construction of the section, if reasonable, is controlling even if 

there is an equally reasonable construction which this court would 

have reached de novo. Blue Cross, 664 F.2d at 810; Clarkson 

Construction, 531 F.2d at 457. 

The pertinent regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 

553.20-553.28. Section 553.23, the most relevant section, provides 

as follows: 

{a) General. {l) As a condition for use 

of compensatory time in lieu of overtime payment 

failed to reach an agreement, subclause (ii) is inapplicable and an 

employer's regular practice does not constitute an agreement. 

2 Even if the section's language clearly manifested Congress' 

intent, we would be justified in reviewing the legislative history. 

Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 

(1976), cited in Miller v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 1274, 1282 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

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in cash, section 7(o) (2) (A) of the Act requires 

an agreement or understanding reached prior to 

the performance of work. This can be 

accomplished pursuant to a collective bargaining 

agreement, a memorandum of understanding or any 

other agreement between the public agency and 

representatives of the employees. If the 

employees do not have a representative, 

compensatory time may be used in lieu of cash 

overtime compensation only if such an agreement 

or understanding has been arrived at between the 

public agency and the individual employee before 

the performance of work. No agreement or 

understanding is required with respect to 

employees hired prior to April 15. 1986, who do 

not have a representative. if the employer had 

a regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, 

of granting compensatory time off in lieu of 

overtime pay. 

* * * 

(b) Agreement or understanding between 

the public agency and a representative of the 

employees. (1) Where employees have a 

representative, the agreement or understanding 

concerning the use of compensatory time must be 

between the representative and the public agency 

either through a collective bargaining agreement 

or through a memorandum of understanding or 

other type of oral or written agreement. In the 

absence of a collective bargaining agreement 

applicable to the employees, the representative 

need not be a formal or recognized bargaining 

agent as long as the representative is 

designated by the employees. Any agreement must 

be consistent with the provisions of section 

7(o) of the Act. 

* * * 

(c) Agreement or understanding between 

the public agency and individual employees. 

(1) Where employees of a public agency do not 

have a recognized or otherwise designated 

representative, the agreement or understanding 

concerning compensatory time off must be between 

the public agency and the individual employee 

and must be reached prior to the performance of 

work. This agreement or understanding with 

individual employees need not be in writing, but 

a record of its existence must be kept. (See 

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Appellate Case: 88-1691 Document: 01019784932 Date Filed: 06/09/1989 Page: 7 
§ 553.50.) An employer need not adopt the same 

agreement or understanding with different 

employees and need not provide compensatory time 

to all employees •••• 

29 C.F.R. § 553.23 {emphasis added). As we read the regulations, 

there are two keys to the Department's interpretation of section 

207{0) (2). First, if employees have a representative, an employer 

may use compensatory time only pursuant to an agreement between the 

employer and the representative. Second, employees are deemed to 

be represented under section 207{0) (2) if they merely designate a 

representative; the representative need not be recognized by the 

employer. 

We must examine the legislative history of section 

207(0) {2) to determine whether the Department's interpretation is 

reasonable. Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938, establishing minimum 

wage and maximum hours standards. Originally, the states and their 

political subdivisions were expressly exempted from the FLSA. 52 

Stat. 1060, 29 u.s.c. § 203(d) {1940). In 1966, Congress extended 

the FLSA's coverage to certain school, hospital, nursing home, and 

transit employees of state and local governments under the Fair 

Labor Standards Amendments of 1966. 80 Stat. 830-32, 29 u.s.c. § 

203(d) (1966). The Supreme Court upheld the extension in Maryland 

v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 {1968), stating that Congress acted within 

its power under the Commerce Clause. In 1974, Congress further 

extended the FLSA's coverage to nearly all employees of state and 

local governments under the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. 

88 Stat. 58, 29 u.s.c. §§ 203(d), 203(e), 203(x) (1974). In 1976, 

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the Supreme Court overruled Wirtz and held that the 1966 and 1974 

amendments were unconstitutional because the Commerce Clause does 

not empower Congress to enforce the FLSA against state and local 

governments "in areas of traditional governmental functions." 

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 855 (1976). 

In 1985, the Court overruled National League of Cities, stating that 

the traditional governmental function test was "unsound in principle 

and unworkable in practice." Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 

Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). As a result of Garcia, 

the FLSA was applicable to state and local governments. 

Against this background, Congress again undertook to amend 

the FLSA. Initially, the Senate passed Senate Bill 1570, which 

varied in wording and format, but was substantively similar to 29 

u.s.c. §§ 207(0) (1), 207(0) (2) .

3 Next, the House passed House Bill 

3 Senate Bill 1570 stated: 

(o) (1) Employees of a public agency that is a State, 

a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate 

governmental agency may receive overtime compensation 

in the form of compensatory time off at a rate not 

less than one and one half hours for each hour of 

employment for which overtime compensation is required 

by subsection (a) of this section pursuant to 

(A) applicable provisions of a collective 

bargaining agreement, memorandum of 

understanding, or any other agreement 

between the public agency and representative 

of such employees, or 

(B) in the case of employees not covered 

by clause (A), an agreement or understanding 

arrived at between the employer and employee 

before the performance of the work. 

(2) In the case of employees described in clause 

(B) of paragraph (1) hired prior to April 15, 1986, 

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3530, an amended version of the Senate bill which included language 

nearly identical to 29 u.s.c. §§ 207(o)(l), 207(0) (2). 4 See H.R. 

3530, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. H9235 (1985). Because 

of the disagreement between the houses, 5 the bills were referred to 

conference. Following consideration by the Joint Committee on 

Conference, the Senate receded with its disagreement to the House 

amendment with an amendment which was a substitute for the original 

Senate bill and the House amendment. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 357, 

99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. 

& Ad. News 668. This amended Senate bill was enacted as Public Law 

99-150. See 29 u.s.c. § 201 et seq. 

the regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with 

respect to compensatory time off in lieu of the 

receipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an 

agreement or understanding under such clause (B). 

s. 1570, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 207(0) (1), 207(0) (2), 131 Cong. 

Rec. Sl4044 (1985). 

4 The only variation was in section 207(0) (2) (A) (i) of House 

Bill 3530, which stated: 

applicable provisions of a collective bargaining 

agreement between the public agency and 

representatives of such employees; or 

H.R. 3530, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. H9235 (1985). 

5 The variations in the language of sections 207(0) (1) and (2) 

were not major sources of disagreement. In fact, the conference 

report lacks any reference to these variations in its explanation 

of the differences between the Senate and House versions of the 1985 

amendments. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 357, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-

9 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 668-71. 

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We consider the Senate report, which is set forth most 

prominently in the legislative history, see 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & 

Ad. News 651, and which accompanied a bill substantively similar to 

sections 207(0) (1) and (2), to be relevant in our examination of the 

legislative history. Further, we consider the House bill, which 

included language virtually identical to that in sections 207(0) (1) 

and (2), to be pertinent. 8 

Based on the indications of legislative intent included 

in these reports, we examine the reasonableness of the Department's 

determination that if employees have a representative, an employer 

may use compensatory time only pursuant to an agreement with the 

representative. The Senate and House reports each include 

statements which lend strong support to the Department's 

construction. The Senate report states that "[w]here employees have 

a recognized representative, the agreement or understanding must be 

between that representative and the employer ..•• " S. Rep. No. 

99-159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code 

8 In addition to the reports accompanying the bills, the court 

has examined the record of the floor debates in both houses and the 

committee hearings. However, our opinion will focus on the 

committee reports, as they are more reliable indicators of 

congressional intent. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 n.13 

(1986) (comments made at hearings, which were not statements of 

Congressional members and were not included in the official reports, 

are insignificant in determining legislative intent); In re Kelly, 

841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (committee reports provide the 

authoritative expression of intent; stray comments from legislators 

are not reliable indicators of legislative intent); Mills v. United 

States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 

1069 (1984) (committee reports are the most reliable indicators of 

congressional intent); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 

624, 629 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (committee reports carry greater 

weight than other legislative history). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1691 Document: 01019784932 Date Filed: 06/09/1989 Page: 11 
Cong. & Ad. News 658. The House report states that 11 (w] here 

employees have selected a representative, . the agreement or 

understanding must be between the representative and the employer 

•••• 11 H.R. Rep. No. 99-331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, reprinted 

in 13656 U.S. Cong. Serial Set (Oct. 24, 1985). Moreover, both 

reports include statements which indicate that an employer's regular 

practice may constitute an agreement only as to employees who have 

no representative. Sees. Rep. No. 99-159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 

11, reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 659; H.R. Rep. No. 

99-331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, reprinted in 13656 U.S. Cong. 

Serial Set (Oct. 24, 1985). Thus, in light of the legislative 

history, the Department reasonably determined that if employees are 

represented, an employer's use of compensatory time is conditional 

on an agreement with the representative. 

Next, we address the reasonableness of the Department's 

determination that employees who have designated a representative 

are deemed to be represented under section 207(0) (2), even if the 

employer has failed to recognize the representative. The Senate 

report does not support the Department's construction. The report 

states that 11 [w]here employees have a recognized representative, 

the agreement or understanding must be between the representative 

and the employer," s. Rep. No. 99-159 at 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Ad. News 658 (emphasis added), and that an employer may 

use compensatory time pursuant to a regular practice "[i]n the case 

of employees who have no recognized ·representative." Id. at 11, 

reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 659 (emphasis 

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added) • However, the House report bolsters the Department's 

interpretation. It states that "[w]here employees have selected a 

representative, which need not be a formal or recognized collective 

bargaining agent as long as it is a representative designated by the 

employees, the agreement or understanding must be between the 

representative and the employer •••• 11 H.R. Rep. No. 99-331 at. 

2 O, reprinted in 13 656 U.S. Cong. Serial Set ( emphasis added) . 

Unfortunately, the report of the committee of conference fails to 

address these variations in the reports of the two houses of 

Congress. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 357, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10 

(1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 668-71. 

Nonetheless, because of the support of the House report, we find 

that the Department reasonably determined that employees are 

represented if they have merely designated a representative whom the 

employer has failed to recognize. 

II. Application of the FLSA Amendments. 

Under the above-discussed interpretation of section 

207 (o) (2), Local 2203 is a representative as designated by the 

employees' November 19, 1985, letter and petition sent to the 

District chief. The District's assertion that Local 2203 was not 

recognized and thus has no legal status under Colorado law is 

inapposite. The employees• designation, rather than the employer's 

recognition, of a representative is the event which triggers the 

application of section 207(0) (2) (A) (i), thereby precluding the use 

of overtime pursuant to a regular practice. 

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III. The Tenth Amendment Issue. 

Next, we address the District's assertion that our 

construction of section 2 07 ( o) ( 2) renders it unconstitutional. 

Essentially, the District contends that our interpretation 

implicitly requires state and local governments to engage in 

collective bargaining with employee representatives, and that such 

a requirement violates the tenth amendment. 7 

Tenth amendment analysis is controlled by the Supreme 

Court's opinion in Garcia. In National League of Cities, the Court 

held that the FLSA was inapplicable to state and local governments 

"in areas of traditional governmental functions." National League 

of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. Garcia rejected this approach and 

overruled National League of cities, stating that with rare 

exceptions, the Constitution does not "carve out" specific, 

substantive areas of state sovereignty which Congress may not 

supplant. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550. Rather, the Cons ti tut ion 

7 The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 

reads as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United States 

by the Cons ti tut ion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 

reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 

Local 2203 asserts that we need not address the tenth 

amendment issue because under the FLSA amendments, public employers 

are not required to engage in collective bargaining; they may 

altogether avoid it simply by paying overtime. However, public 

employers I access to the compensatory time benefit provided by 

congress cannot be conditioned on the sacrifice of a constitutional 

right. See Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 568 (1st Cir. 1985) 

(citing Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1925)). 

If the decision to engage in collective bargaining is protected from 

federal influence by the tenth amendment, the District is correct 

that it should be free to choose its own course regarding collective 

bargaining, without Congress enticing it down a certain path with 

the carrot of compensatory time. Thus, we address the tenth 

amendment issue. 

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protects state interests through procedural and structural 

safeguards which assure state participation in federal governmental 

action. Id. at 552, 556. The Court stated: 

[W] e are convinced that the fundamental 

limitation that the constitutional scheme 

imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 

"States as States" is one of process rather than 

one of result. Any substantive restraint on the 

exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its 

justification in the procedural nature of this 

basic limitation, and it must be tailored to 

compensate for possible failings in the national 

political process rather than to dictate a 

"sacred province of state autonomy." 

Insofar as the present cases are concerned, 

then, we need go no further than to state that 

we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimumwage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to 

[the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 

Authority], that is destructive of state 

sovereignty or violative of any constitutional 

provision. 

Id. at 554 (citations omitted). 

Given this analysis, we focus not on whether the decision 

to collectively bargain is a fundamental, traditional, or integral 

function of state and local governments, 8 but on the national 

political process surrounding the enactment of the 1985 FLSA 

amendments to determine whether there was a breakdown which denied 

state and local governments the opportunity to participate. 

Although the Supreme Court has declined to define or identify 

8 The decision on whether to engage in collective bargaining 

is not one of the rare, express elements of state sovereignty 

included in the Constitution. Compare the article IV, section 3 

guarantee of state territorial integrity mentioned in Garcia, 469 

U. s. at 550, as a rare example of an explicit area of state 

sovereignty "carved out" by the Constitution. 

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breakdowns which would invalidate congressional enactments, see 

South Carolina v. Baker, 99 L.Ed.2d 592, 603 (1988), we are 

confident that in the instant circumstances, the political process 

did not operate in a defective manner. 9 State and local governments 

were intensely involved in the proceedings leading to the FLSA 

amendments, 10 and thus, the amenaments do not violate the tenth 

amendment. 

IV. Attorney's Fees. 

Local 2203 asserts that it is entitled to its attorney's 

fees expended on appeal under 29 u.s.c. § 216(b). That section 

provides that an employer which violates section 207 is liable to 

the employees affected in the amount of the unpaid minimum wages or 

9 The District tacitly concedes this point by failing to allege 

that state and local governments were in any way precluded from 

participating in the national political process. 

10 Prior to the passage of the amendments, the Senate 

Subcommittee on Labor held three public hearings. Persons 

testifying included three governors, a lieutenant governor, a state 

senator, a representative of a state department of public safety, 

three mayors, two city managers, a sheriff, a police and fire 

commissioner, and representatives of numerous associations of public 

employers. See s. Rep. No. 99-159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 

(1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 656-58. 

The House Subcommittee on Labor Standards convened a hearing 

at which those testifying included a mayor, a state legislator, and 

a county executive, each of whom represented a national association 

of public employers. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-331, 99th Cong., 1st 

Sess. 28, reprinted in 13656 U.S. Cong. Serial Set (Oct. 24, 1985). 

Moreover, numerous letters from representatives of state and 

local governments were read on the floors of both houses and were 

made-a part of the Congressional Record. 

In short, state and local governments participated 

substantially in the actions giving rise to the 1985 FLSA 

amendments. 

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overtime compensation, plus liquidated damages. It further states 

that the court shall award prevailing plaintiffs attorney's fees and 

costs. If an FLSA case is appealed, the appellate court has 

discretion to award attorney's fees expended on an appeal. See 

Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1557 (10th Cir. 

1988) (a case involving a claim under the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act, which incorporates the remedial provisions of the 

FLSA, including section 216); Montalvo v. Tower Life Building, 426 

F.2d 1135, 1150 (5th Cir. 1970) (an FLSA case); see also Handler v. 

Thrasher, 191 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir. 1951) (an FLSA case declining 

to award attorney's fees expended on appeal in addition to the fees 

awarded by the trial court); cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 

328 (an Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 case stating that based 

on the legislative history of the act, the phrase "' shall be 

.granted' is less mandatory than a literal reading might suggest"). 

No appellate court has previously interpreted section 

207(0) (2); the District's appeal was reasonable. For this reason, 

we decline to award Local 2203 attorney's fees expended on appeal. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1691 Document: 01019784932 Date Filed: 06/09/1989 Page: 17