Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-08-02117/USCOURTS-ca10-08-02117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WELDON LACKEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE; MIKE JOHANNS, in 

his official capacity as Secretary of the 

United States Department of Agriculture, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 08-2117 

(D. N.M.) 

(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-00842-JCH-RLP ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, PORFILIO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

Weldon Lackey seeks sanctions, authorized by 7 C.F.R. § 400.768(e) in 

appropriate cases, for what he claims was the United States Department of Agriculture’s 

(USDA) failure to timely provide a final agency determination (FAD) in response to his 

request for an interpretation of policy and procedure. The Risk Management Agency 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may 

be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 25, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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(RMA), a division of the USDA, did not specifically answer Lackey’s request for a 

policy interpretation. Instead it (timely) responded saying his request did not present a 

matter about which it could offer guidance—essentially, it lacked authority or 

responsibility to make a policy or procedure determination regarding his specific factual 

situation. Lackey availed himself of the intra-agency appeal process. The matter was 

presented to an agency hearing examiner who decided the RMA erroneously declined to 

offer policy guidance. Upon Lackey’s further appeal the USDA ultimately required the 

RMA to provide the requested guidance (which it timely did on remand). However, the 

USDA also concluded the RMA’s response to Lackey (saying his request was beyond its 

ken), while erroneous, was a “response” within the meaning of the statute and its 

implementing regulations. Therefore, it concluded, sanctions were not appropriate. 

Claiming the USDA’s conclusion incorrectly applied the pertinent regulations Lackey 

sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). He argued the 

regulations offered the RMA only a binary choice (seek clarification of the request or 

issue a FAD) and since it’s “response” to his inquiry was neither he is entitled to 

sanctions. In affirming the agency decision, the district court considered Lackey’s 

“neither fish nor fowl” argument, but decided USDA’s interpretation of its regulations 

was entitled to deference and, affording deference, its decision was neither incorrect nor 

unreasonable. We agree. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. USDA Regulations

The 1938 Federal Crop Insurance Act (“Act” or “FCIA”), 7 U.S.C. § 1501-24, is 

designed to “promote the national welfare by improving the economic stability of 

agriculture through a sound system of crop insurance and providing the means for the 

research and experience helpful in devising and establishing such insurance.” 

Id. § 1502(a). Congress created the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (“FCIC” or 

“Corporation”), a government-owned corporation which acts as an “agency of and within 

the Department [of Agriculture]” to administer the Act. Id. § 1503. Congress also 

created the Risk Management Agency (“RMA”) to supervise the FCIC and administer all 

programs authorized under the FCIA. 7 U.S.C. § 6933(a), (b)(1)-(3); 7 C.F.R. § 400.701. 

The RMA is headed by an Administrator appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture and 

who “also serve[s] as Manager of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.” 7 U.S.C. 

§ 6933(c). Thus, the RMA speaks for the USDA on matters relating to the FCIC. 

The Act empowers the FCIC to provide crop insurance directly to farmers or 

provide reinsurance “to the maximum extent practicable” to private entities providing 

such insurance. Id. § 1508(a)(1) & (k). It requires the FCIC to establish procedures for 

responding to specified types of inquiries from farmers and imposes a sanction if the 

response is not timely: 

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(1) Procedures required 

The Corporation shall establish procedures under which the Corporation 

will provide a final agency determination in response to an inquiry 

regarding the interpretation by the Corporation of this subchapter or any 

regulation issued under this subchapter. 

(2) Implementation 

[T]he Corporation shall issue regulations to implement this subsection. At 

a minimum, the regulations shall establish-- 

(A) the manner in which inquiries described in paragraph (1) are 

required to be submitted to the Corporation; and 

(B) a reasonable maximum number of days within which the 

Corporation will respond to all inquiries. 

(3) Effect of failure to timely respond 

If the Corporation fails to respond to an inquiry in accordance with the 

procedures established pursuant to this subsection, the person requesting 

the interpretation of this subchapter or regulation may assume the 

interpretation is correct for the applicable reinsurance year. 

7 U.S.C. § 1506(r). 

 FDIC implemented § 1506(r) by regulation found at 7 C.F.R. § 400.768. It 

provides: 

(a) FCIC will not interpret any specific factual situation or case, such as 

actions of any participant under the terms of a policy or any reinsurance 

agreement. 

(b) If, in the sole judgment of FCIC, the request is unclear, ambiguous, or 

incomplete, FCIC will not provide an interpretation, but will notify the 

requester that the request is unclear, ambiguous or incomplete, within 30 

days of such request. 

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(c) FCIC will provide a final determination of the interpretation to a request 

that meets all the conditions stated herein1

 to the requester in writing, and at 

FCIC’s discretion in the format in which it was received, within 90 days of 

the date of receipt by FCIC. 

(d) If a requestor is notified that a request is unclear, ambiguous or 

incomplete under section 400.768(b), the time to respond will be tolled 

from the date FCIC notifies the requestor until the date that FCIC receives a 

clear, complete, and unambiguous request. 

(e) If a response is not provided within 90 days, the requestor may assume 

the interpretation provided is correct for the applicable crop year. 

(f) All agency final determinations will be published by FCIC as specially 

numbered documents on the RMA Internet website. 

 

1

 The requestor obligations are listed in 7 C.F.R. § 400.767 as follows: 

(a) All requests for a final agency determination under this subpart must: 

(1) Be submitted: [listing the specific addresses for letter, facsimile, 

or electronic mail] 

 (2) State that it is being submitted under section 506(s) of the Act; 

(3) Identify and quote the specific provision in the Act or regulations 

for which a final agency determination is requested; 

 (4) State the crop year for which the interpretation is sought; 

(5) State the name, address, and telephone number of a 

contact person affiliated with the request; and 

(6) Contain the requester’s detailed interpretation of the 

regulation. 

(b) The requestor must advise FCIC if the request for a final agency 

determination will be used in a lawsuit or the settlement of a claim. 

(c) Each request for final agency determination under this subpart must 

contain no more than one request for an agency interpretation. 

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(g) All final agency determinations are considered matters of general 

applicability that are not appealable to the National Appeals Division.2

 

Before obtaining judicial review of any final agency determination, the 

person must obtain an administratively final determination from the 

Director of the National Appeals division on the issue of whether the final 

agency determination is a matter of general applicability. 

 At issue here is the agency’s interpretation of the term “response” in 

subsection (e). 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Lackey is a cotton farmer in Lea County, New Mexico. He purchased multi-peril 

crop insurance for his 2005 cotton crop from a private provider reinsured by the FCIC. 

On June 7, 2005, Lackey presented his insurer with a claim for disease and hail damage 

to his cotton crop. The insurance adjustor adjusted for the hail damage, but would not 

adjust for disease loss until the crop reached maturity when actual losses could be 

determined. The response was a sore spot with Lackey who did not want to bring a 

diseased crop to harvest or wait to collect insurance monies. He thought the crop should 

be adjusted based upon an agricultural expert’s report he provided to the insurance 

company. It said his cotton crop was diseased.3

 Notably the report was based on a small 

 

2

 “The National Appeals Division [NAD] reports directly to the Secretary of 

Agriculture and is independent of other parts of USDA. Its sole mission is to provide fair 

and timely hearings and appeals to USDA program participants.” 

http://www.nad.usda.gov

3

 Lackey’s report came from the New Mexico State University Plant Diagnostic 

Clinic. (Appx. Vol. II at 479-82.) Its diagnosis was apparently based on six plant 

samples Lackey submitted from his 2005 crop. The report identified the presence of 

“vercillium wilt” which is “a serious disease on cotton, especially in the Southwestern 

U.S. The disease is reported to cause loss of up to 75% in heavily infected crops.” (Id.

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sampling of his 2005 crop (six samples), did not analyze the degree of infestation and did 

not estimate the extent of expected loss. [Appx. Vol. I at 19-20, Vol. II at 481.]

On July 10, 2005, Lackey sent a written request to RMA entitled “Request for 

Determination of Failure to Comply with Policies and Procedures of Federal Crop 

Insurance Handbook.” (Appx. Vol. I at 19.) Lackey’s letter described his encounters 

with the insurance adjustors: 

I was systematically informed by [several insurance representatives] that 

the Loss Adjustment Standards manual makes no provisions for disease 

adjustment and that all green plants would be taken to harvest in their 

entirety or to harvest in designated strips. [The insurance adjustor] . . . 

proceeded to pull up green leafed cotton plants he did not consider “viable”. 

I refused his adjustment on the basis that he could not differentiate diseased 

versus non-diseased plants visually. I requested a more qualified 

adjuster . . . . 

(Id. at 20.) A second adjustor was sent to view the crop who again began to pull up 

plants. When Lackey objected, he was told “the only way they would adjust for disease 

was at harvest in the form of lost production.” (Id.) Referring to the definition of “live 

plant” found on page 16 of the Loss Adjustment Standards handbook, Lackey’s letter 

continued: 

Correctly interpreting the meaning of live plant with substantiated 

laboratory results by an Agricultural Expert should allow adjustment for 

diseased plants. When there is Agricultural Expert evidence of disease 

throughout a unit, with or without a quantifiable amount, deference should 

be given to the expert opinion and therefore to the insured . . . . Their 

position is that no one, not even experts, can accurately predict yield of 

 

at 479.) The report also identified a fungus commonly known as “wet weather blight” 

which “is rarely serious, but occasional serious losses have been reported.” (Id. at 481.) 

It further explained techniques to mitigate damage from the diseases. The report did not 

say his crop was heavily infected. 

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diseased plants, therefore they want to go to harvest for accurate yields. 

Ironically, I too believe that no one, not even experts, can accurately predict 

yield of diseased plants, therefore, since I have proof of diseased plants . . . 

I should not have my risk increased by additional farming costs [or] forced 

to take a chance of any unit with compromised plants. 

(Id. at 20-21.) He closed with the following request: “Please define policy and 

procedure in this matter.” (Id. at 21.) 

On September 30, 2005, the RMA Deputy Administrator for Compliance wrote to 

Lackey referring to a telephone conversation between them on July 25, 2005. In his 

letter, he explained Lackey’s request dealt with a dispute between Lackey and his insurer 

and that RMA “does not normally get involved in such disputes.” (Id. at 192.) See

7 C.F.R. § 400.768(a). “FCIC will not interpret any specific factual situation or case, 

such as actions of any participant under the terms of a policy or an reinsurance 

agreement.” The Deputy Administrator continued: “However, RMA is frequently asked 

to provide policy or procedure interpretations. There is a mechanism for requesting such 

interpretations contained at 7 C.F.R. part 400, subpart X or 7 C.F.R. subpart K.” (Id.) He 

closed with the following statement: “If you think there is an issue regarding the 

interpretation of policy or procedure, you can request such interpretation from RMA.” 

(Id. at 193.) 

On October 5, 2005, Lackey e-mailed the RMA stating: 

Please be advised that I continue to request a final agency determination on 

this matter. In accordance with my Multi Peril Crop Insurance Policy, “if 

the dispute in any way involves a policy or procedure interpretation . . . 

either you or we must obtain an interpretation from FCIC in accordance 

with 7 CFR part 400, subpart X” . . . . Furthermore, in accordance with 

7 CFR Subpart X 400.768(c), please note the 90 day time frame ends 

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October 18, 2005. The following is my original request as submitted 

previously. Please advise if there are errors, omissions or any other 

information needed to complete this matter timely. 

(Id. at 16.) The RMA denied his request for a final agency determination on October 17, 

stating in relevant part: 

Neither your letter of July 10 nor e-mail message of October 5 qualifies as a 

request for a final agency determination (FAD) under the regulations 

published at 7 C.F.R., Part 400, Subpart X. A FAD can only provide an 

interpretation of provisions of the Federal Crop Insurance Act . . . or 

regulations issued under the authority of the Act. Since your request 

involves a dispute over whether the loss adjustor properly identified “live” 

plants, and not an interpretation of the Act or regulations issued there 

under, your request does not qualify for a FAD. 

Your July 10 letter cites specific disagreements with your insurance 

provider concerning the determinations made during the stand reduction 

appraisal of your cotton. Specifically, you appear to question if the 

insurance provider could accurately determine the “live” plants that 

ultimately contribute to the lint. You are not questioning the meaning of 

the procedure. Therefore, your request also does not qualify for an 

interpretation of procedures by RMA under the provisions of section 20 of 

your policy. 

(Id. at 4.)4

 

Lackey appealed from the RMA’s determination to the USDA’s National Appeals 

Division (NAD). Upon due consideration the hearing officer concluded in relevant part: 

 

4

 A FAD is required within 90 days if “a request . . . meets all the conditions” 

enumerated in 7 C.F.R. § 400.767, reproduced infra at FN1. Lackey’s July request 

clearly did not meet all the regulatory requirements. It did not mention its purpose was to 

request a final agency determination, it did not state it was being submitted under 

§ 506(s) of the Act, and it did not identify and quote a specific provision in the 

regulation. We do not base our decision here on Lackey’s failure to comply with these 

requirements. Rather, we note the failings of his request only as it assists our 

interpretation of the regulatory language. The hearing officer concluded the request 

“admittedly” was “unclear” and the RMA should have notified Lackey of that fact. 

(Appx. Vol. I at 64.) 

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On July 10, 2005, appellant sent a letter to RMA requesting a FAD. 

Appellant claimed that a provision in the Adjustment Standards means that 

a separate adjustment could be made for plants killed by disease. RMA did 

not respond. Appellant sent an e-mail to RMA on October 5, 2005, again 

requesting a FAD. By letter of October 17, 2005, RMA finally responded to 

Appellant, stating that neither Appellant’s letter nor e-mail qualified as a 

proper request for a FAD. 

(Id. at 62 (emphasis added.)) The hearing officer held that because Lackey’s October 5 

e-mail referenced his insurance policy provisions which were “set out in [their] entirety 

in Section 457.8” of the FCIC regulations, the insurance policy provisions were properly 

subject to a request for a final agency determination. (Id. at 64.) The insurance policy 

provisions/FCIC regulations require a final agency determination stating “whether a 

specific policy or procedure is applicable to the situation, how it is applicable, or the 

meaning of any policy or procedure . . .” which then becomes binding on the parties in 

subsequent dispute resolution procedures. (Id.) Therefore, the RMA erred in 

characterizing the request as a factual dispute and in failing to notify Lackey that his 

request was “unclear, ambiguous, or incomplete.” (Id. at 65.) 

Lackey requested the Director of NAD to review the hearing officer’s 

determination. Specifically he wanted a decision making clear that, because the RMA 

did not notify him that his request was unclear, ambiguous or incomplete within 30 days5

or issue a final agency determination within the 90 days allowed by regulation, 

§ 400.768(e), he was entitled to the regulatory sanction—he could assume his 

 

5

 Lackey does not claim the failure to timely notify him that he must amend his 

request would, by itself, trigger the statutory sanctions. He maintains that, in the absence 

of such notice, the RMA must issue a FAD within 90 days. 

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interpretation of policy (that he should not be required to bring his crop to harvest before 

it could be adjusted for loss) was correct for the 2005 crop year. He also requested the 

Director to grant equitable relief for the maximum policy amount, $167,154, pursuant to 

7 C.F.R. § 11.9(e). [Id. at 108.] 

The NAD Director issued a decision affirming the hearing officer’s findings and 

conclusions except its conclusion that the RMA did not timely respond to Lackey’s 

request for a FAD. The Director stated the “RMA met its obligation to respond to 

[Lackey’s] FAD requests with its letter dated September 30, 2005 and the October 17, 

2005 adverse decision.”6

 (Id. at 152.) Thus: 

The Hearing Officer’s determination that RMA’s response was erroneous, 

because it misinterpreted Appellant’s request, means that RMA is now 

obliged to issue a new response to Appellant’s request for a FAD. The 

90-day period for RMA to respond to a request begins from the date it 

receives a clear, complete, and unambiguous request. I reiterate that RMA 

has indicated that it is in the process of issuing a FAD in accordance with 

the Hearing Officer’s Appeal Determination. If that new response is 

adverse to Appellant, he may appeal it pursuant to the applicable 

regulations. 

(Id.) The decision also concluded because the crop insurance program was not a 

“covered” program under 7 U.S.C. § 7996(a)(2)(B), NAD lacked jurisdiction to grant 

 

6

 “The Director may delegate his or her authority to conduct a review under this 

paragraph to any subordinate official of the Division other than a Hearing Officer. In any 

case in which such review is conducted by such a subordinate official, the subordinate 

official’s determination shall be considered to be the determination of the Director and 

shall be final and not [administratively] appealable.” 7 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)(3). Accordingly, 

we refer to “the Director” whether the decision was issued by the Director or an 

appropriate subordinate. 

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equitable relief. 7 (Id.) Lackey then filed a request for reconsideration. The Director 

denied the request, stating: “That the RMA response was erroneous does not render it 

nonexistent. However, since it was erroneous, you are entitled to a new response . . . .” 

(Id. at 162.) The decision further stated: “This is a final determination of the National 

Appeals Division, for which judicial review is available pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 6999.”8

 

(Id. at 163.) 

Lackey sought judicial review of NAD’s interpretation of the required “response.” 

The district judge referred the matter to a magistrate judge who issued a report 

recommending the USDA’s interpretation of its regulations be affirmed. Lackey 

objected, claiming the clear language of the regulation required the RMA to respond in 

one of two ways: either it must issue a FAD within 90 days or it must provide notice 

(within 30 days) that the request needs to be clarified. He claimed a failure to timely do 

one or the other triggers the sanction he seeks (accepting his interpretation of FDIC 

policy). Lackey pointed to the regulation’s enabling statute, which provides “[t]he 

Corporation shall establish procedures under which the Corporation will provide a final 

agency determination in response to an inquiry regarding the interpretation by the 

Corporation of this subchapter or any regulation issued under this subchapter.” 7 U.S.C. 

§ 1506(r)(1) (emphasis added). According to Lackey, this sentence plainly demonstrates 

 

7

 Lackey does not challenge the USDA’s jurisdictional decision. 

8

 “A final determination of the Division shall be reviewable and enforceable by any 

United States district court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with chapter 7 of 

Title 5.” 7 U.S.C. § 6999. 

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Congressional intent to define a “response” as a “final agency determination.” Because 

the agency’s determination of its regulation is inconsistent with the enabling statute, he 

maintained it is not entitled to any deference.9

 The district judge rejected Lackey’s 

objections and adopted the magistrate’s recommendation, concluding RMA’s September 

and October letters amounted to a timely “response to an inquiry,” thus sanctions were 

inappropriate. [Appx. Vol. II, tabs 3, 4 & 5.] 

III. DISCUSSION 

Our standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, which governs judicial review of agency actions, is well-known. 

[W]e review the lower court’s decision de novo . . . [and] set aside the 

agency’s action . . . if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.’ We will also set aside an agency 

action if the agency has failed to follow required procedures . . . . The duty 

of a court reviewing agency action under the ‘arbitrary or capricious’ 

standard is to ascertain whether the agency examined the relevant data and 

articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the decision 

made. Furthermore, [i]n reviewing the agency’s explanation, the reviewing 

court must determine whether the agency considered all relevant factors 

and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. A presumption of 

validity attaches to the agency action and the burden of proof rests with the 

appellants who challenge such action. 

Citizen’s Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008) 

(quotations and citations omitted). “We give great deference to [an agency’s] 

 

9

 His claim that the regulation or the USDA’s interpretation is contrary to legislative 

intent was raised for the first time in his objection to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendations, which did not mention the issue. In ruling on his objections the 

district court did not address the legislative argument. Nor will we as it came too late. 

“In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s 

report are deemed waived. See Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir.1996).” 

United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001). 

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interpretation of its own regulations, and we will only reject those interpretations when 

they are unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the regulation’s plain 

meaning.” Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(quotations omitted). “Thus, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one [and we are] 

not empowered to substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency.” Id. (quotations 

omitted). 

Lackey contends (as he always has) 7 C.F.R. § 400.768, read in its entirety, can be 

construed only one way—the agency must either respond that his request was unclear, 

incomplete or ambiguous within 30 days of his request or it must issue a final agency 

determination within 90 days of his request.10 As he reasons, since the RMA did not 

notify him that his request was wanting, it was required to issue a FAD within 90 days 

and its letter rejecting his request was obviously not a FAD. Ergo, there was no timely 

response and he is entitled to the sanction dictated in 7 U.S.C. § 1506(r) and 

§ 400.768(e)—he may assume his interpretation is correct for the crop year. We are not 

persuaded. 

 

10 He claims the agency’s interpretation rendered the enforceability provision 

meaningless, is inconsistent with the clear and specific terms of the regulation, is 

internally inconsistent and is contrary to legislative intent. We reject the former 

arguments and do not reach the last one. See FN9, supra. In any event, the best measure 

of legislative intent is the words of the statute. Here those words are not ambiguous, “If 

the Corporation fails to respond to an inquiry in accordance with the procedures 

established pursuant to this section, the person [is entitled to sanctions].” 7 U.S.C. 

§ 1506(r) (emphasis added). 

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His reading fails to account for the language of 7 C.F.R. § 400.768(a), quoted

infra page 4, which precludes FCIC from interpreting specific factual situations or cases. 

That is a threshold determination. If the requested interpretation is not one permitted by 

the regulations the procedural requirements that follow, including time lines, matter not. 

Here the RMA concluded Lackey’s request for a policy or procedural interpretation was 

not, to borrow a phrase, justiciable in that forum. It erred, according to the hearing 

officer and the NAD. But that does not make the RMA’s decision a nullity, entitling 

Lackey to a retroactive sanction. It simply means, as the NAD and the District Court 

determined, the RMA must, on remand, timely respond to his request by either deciding 

to seek clarification or issue a FAD. The time to do so necessarily runs from the date of a 

remand to the RMA, which came only after Lackey fully exhausted his agency appeal 

rights. When it finally came the RMA timely issued a FAD.11 We see no ambiguity in 

the regulations; the FCIC cannot issue a FAD if the request for an interpretation is not 

within its cognizance regardless of how clear, unambiguous or complete the request may 

be. In any event Lackey was timely notified of RMA’s determination. To the extent a 

response was required its response was sufficient.12

Lackey claims that unless a “response,” as he defines it, is required the USDA’s 

interpretation allows the RMA to “simply communicate in any arbitrary form or fashion 

 

11 The FAD was issued on September 21, 2006. See http://www.rma.usda.gov/fcic: 

FAD-059. Lackey did not appeal from the FAD. 

12 Lackey’s first letter was dated July 10, 2005. On July 25, 2005 the RMA Deputy 

Administrator for Compliance spoke with him about it by phone, explaining RMA’s 

position that it did not have authority to address his request. 

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with the requestor, and, in the event that RMA fails to issue a timely FAD, the requestor 

would be left without recourse.” (Appellant’s Br. at 16-17.) Hyperbole! 

The September 30, 2005 letter clearly notified Lackey that the RMA did not 

perceive he was requesting a FAD. Indeed, the RMA’s response directed him to the 

procedures to do so if, in fact, that is what he wanted. Accordingly, the RMA rejected a 

request to intercede in what it considered to be a factual dispute, beyond its authority to 

resolve. Under these circumstances neither the statute nor the regulations mandate the 

specific “response” Lackey demands. 

“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, 

words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” 

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). The common definition of “response” is 

“1: an act of responding 2: something constituting a reply or reaction.” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2006). Contrary to Lackey’s assertions, the 

NAD did not hold that any communication from RMA would qualify as a response. It 

held the September 30, 2005 letter and the October 17, 2005 adverse decision qualified as 

responses. These communications directly addressed the substance of Lackey’s claims as 

understood by the RMA. There is no indication the RMA was being disingenuous in its 

interpretation of Lackey’s request. The Director of the NAD was correct: “[t]hat the 

RMA response was erroneous does not render it nonexistent.”13 (Appx. Vol. I at 162.) 

 

13 In his reply brief, Lackey argues we should take judicial notice that the RMA has 

issued a public statement (last modified on January 1, 2006) which interprets “the 

regulation at issue in a manner supporting Lackey’s interpretation.” (Reply Br. at 1.) He 

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Lackey’s claim that the interpretation leaves him without remedy is without merit. 

Lackey appealed from the October 17, 2005 adverse determination (received within 

90 days of his inquiry) and at the end of the day received a favorable decision—the RMA 

originally erred and should have issued a final agency determination. He ultimately 

received the requested FAD, albeit after considerable effort and delay resulting from 

unusual circumstances. 

While Lackey’s interpretation of the regulation is not patently unreasonable, the 

agency’s interpretation is equally, if not more, reasonable. It provides the RMA the 

ability to craft a response it deems most appropriate to each discrete inquiry. The fact 

that, in this instance, its perception was incorrect does not lead to a conclusion that it 

must now be sanctioned. Lackey failed to demonstrate the final decision of the USDA is 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered by the Court: 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

United States Circuit Judge 

 

argues the public statement negates the deference we owe the USDA in this matter. The 

“public statement” Lackey refers to is merely a reiteration of the language in 7 C.F.R. 

§ 400.768 and sheds no light on the regulatory interpretation at issue here. 

Appellate Case: 08-2117 Document: 01018447533 Date Filed: 06/25/2010 Page: 17