Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02228/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02228-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVE MORGAN, on behalf No. 2:03-cv-2228-MCE-JFM

of himself and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF YOLO, a political

subdivision of the State of 

California, E. G. PRIETO, 

individually and in his

capacity as Sheriff for the 

County of Yolo,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present lawsuit, Plaintiff Dave Morgan

(“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial determination that enforcement of

his Employment Contract with Defendant County of Yolo would

violate the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

(“FLSA”) as well as the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

various state laws. 

///

///

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

2

Both the County of Yolo and the remaining named Defendant,

Sheriff E. G. Prieto, now move for judgment on the pleadings

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on grounds that the 1

County has dismissed, with prejudice, its lawsuit seeking to

enforce the contractual provisions objected to by Plaintiff. 

Because the whole of Plaintiff’s lawsuit derives from the alleged

impropriety of said provisions, Defendants contend that this

entire matter has been rendered moot and request that judgment

accordingly be entered on their behalf. As set forth below, the

Court agrees that since Defendants have definitively abandoned

any further attempts to enforce the employment contract against

Plaintiff, Plaintiff no longer has any justiciable controversy

for which any relief can be afforded. Judgment on the pleadings

will therefore be granted.

BACKGROUND

In 2001, after working as a non-sworn correctional officer

for Defendant County of Yolo for some nine years, Plaintiff

applied for and was offered a position as a higher-paying entry

level Deputy Sheriff position. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 16). As a

precondition to that offer, Plaintiff was asked to sign and did

execute an employment contract pursuant to which he agreed to

repay the County for both academy training and background

investigation costs in the event he terminated his employment

within thirty-six months. 

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The amount of those costs was described in the contract as

totaling $6,682.00 (and was broken down to $5,062.00 for basic

academy training and $1,062.00 for the requisite background

check). The amount of repayment varied according to how far

Plaintiff’s period of employment fell short of three years. (Id.

at ¶ 17; see Employment Contract attached as Exhibits “A” and “B”

to Pl.’s Compl). Plaintiff signed the Employment Contract on

November 5, 2001, the same day he was sworn into the Deputy

Sheriff position. Id.

On or about August 8, 2002, less than one year after signing

the above-described agreement, Plaintiff left his employment with

Yolo County and moved to Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 19. Thereafter,

on August 28, 2002, the County filed suit in Yolo County Superior

Court seeking to enforce the reimbursement provisions of

Plaintiff’s Employment Contract. Plaintiff countered by filing

the instant federal action on October 27, 2003. The present

action seeks, inter alia, a judicial declaration that Plaintiff’s

Employment Contract is void, restitution of any seized or unpaid

wages, liquidated damages under the FLSA, and compensatory

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff further requests

injunctive relief, both personally and on behalf of others

potential FLSA class members he purports to represent.

By Order filed January 23, 2004, the Court stayed any

further proceedings in this action until such time as a final

determination was made in the parallel state lawsuit, on grounds

that disposition of that case would directly impact the issues

presented by the case at bar. Plaintiff appealed that

determination to the Ninth Circuit. 

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Smith Declaration requests that various related 2

pleadings be judicially noticed, including the amended complaint

in the state court action, the dismissals of that action, and the

Ninth Circuit’s Memorandum Disposition. That request is

unopposed and is hereby granted pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. Plaintiff’s request that other documents generated

by the state court action, including the motion for award of

statutory attorney’s fees and costs and the order entered

thereon, is also unopposed and thereby granted.

4

While that appeal was pending, the County of Yolo dismissed the

state court action without prejudice. That prompted the Ninth

Circuit to conclude, by Memorandum Disposition filed November 15,

2005, that Plaintiff’s appeal from the stay order was moot. The

Court nonetheless declined to find that the entire case had been

mooted, explaining as follows:

“The dismissal of the County’s action without prejudice does

not preclude it from continuing to press its contract claim,

and does not meet the stringent mootness standards regarding

the case itself. Also, the controversy that Morgan has with

the County and the Sheriff is not resolved.”

(Mem. Dispo., p. 3, Ex. “C” to the Decl. of J. Scott Smith).

Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the County amended its

dismissal of the state court action to dismiss the case “with

prejudice”. (Smith Decl., Ex. “D”). Plaintiff’s subsequent 2

refusal to voluntarily dismiss this action prompted Defendants to

file the present motion.

STANDARD

After the pleadings are closed, any party may move for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

///

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

A Rule 12(c) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the

opposing party’s pleadings and operates in much the same manner

as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Irish Lesbian and

Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2nd Cir. 1998). The

primary distinction between a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and a motion

for judgment on the pleadings is one of timing. Rule 12(b)(6)

motions are typically brought before the defendant files an

answer, while a motion for judgment on the pleadings can only be

brought after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c);

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). 

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, assuming the

truth of all materials facts pled in the complaint, the moving

party is nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d

1542, 1550 (9 Cir. 1989). In addition to considering the th

allegations of the complaint, like a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)

the court may also take into account materials to which it can

take judicial notice. Heliotrop Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

189 F.3d 971, 981 (9 Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(c) Motion for th

Judgment on the Pleadings may consequently be granted if, after

assessing both the complaint, plus matters for which judicial

notice is proper, it appears “beyond doubt that the [non-moving

party] cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for

relief...” R. J. Corman Derailment Services, LLC v. Int’l Union

of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 335 F.3d 643, 647

(7 Cir. 2003). th

///

///

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

ANALYSIS

Examination of Plaintiff’s Complaint show that both damages,

declaratory relief and injunctive relief are requested, all

stemming from the reimbursement provisions contained in

Plaintiff’s Employment Contract. For a First Cause of Action,

Plaintiff alleges that his Employment Contract with the County of

Yolo violates the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”). The FLSA’s wage and hour provisions operate to ensure

that certain minimum hourly wages, plus additional overtime

compensation, are paid. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207; Mid Continent

Pipeline v. Hargrave, 129 F.2d 625, 658 (10 Cir. 1942). th

Plaintiff claims that the Employment Contract runs afoul of the

FLSA because, to the extent it may require that wages be repaid

upon termination, the Court could impermissibly reduce those

wages to below minimum levels. The damage provisions of the

FLSA, however, make it clear that damages are payable only to

recover “unpaid minimum wages”. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) states as

follows:

“Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 6 or

Section 7 of this Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 206 or 207) shall be

liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount

of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime

compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal

amount as liquidated damages.”

Now that Defendants have dismissed their state action to

collect for reimbursement under the terms of Plaintiff’s

Employment Contract, with prejudice, there obviously can be no

“minimum unpaid wages” for which liability can attach under the

FLSA. 

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Consequently judgment as to the First Cause of Action is proper.

The remaining claims pled in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

also fail because they are factually predicated on the same

underlying controversy with respect to the Employment Contract –

a controversy that is now resolved with the County’s dismissal

with prejudice of its reimbursement lawsuit. Plaintiff alleges

that enforcement of the Contract would also constitute a

deprivation of his civil rights under 29 U.S.C. § 1983 (Second

Cause of Action), and that the Employment Contract similarly

violates various provisions of California law, as alleged in the

Third through Eighth Causes of Action. All these claims either

challenge enforcement of the provisions of Plaintiff’s Contract

or allege that the County’s requirement that the Contract be

executed was unlawful in the first instance. 

Under either alternative, the County’s abandonment of the

Employment Contract as to Plaintiff entirely moots any contract

he may have with the County. The Ninth Circuit did not dispose

of the entire lawsuit on mootness grounds only because the

County’s initial dismissal was made without prejudice, such that

the County could potentially have reactivated its claims against

Plaintiff. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s tortured reading of the

Court’s language to suggest anything otherwise. Read as a whole,

that language unmistakably indicates that dismissal of prejudice

would extinguish the entire lawsuit.

Dismissal is completely compatible with the fundamental

judicial maxim that federal jurisdiction is limited to a

justiciable case or controversy. See Friends of the Earth v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

While Plaintiff attempts to identify recoverable damages 3

apart from any unpaid minimum wage under the FLSA, his attempt to

do so is unavailing. Plaintiff argues that he should be entitled

to recover some $32,883.50 in attorneys fees and costs incurred

in litigating the state action. (Pl.’s Opp., 8:23-25). As

Plaintiff’s own request for judicial notice makes clear, however,

the state court has already denied that request. (See Pl.’s

Request for Judicial Notice as to Exhibits “A” and “B” attached

to the Decl. of Jon Webster). Principles of res judicata prevent

Plaintiff from now attempting to relitigate his entitlement to

those same expenses in this lawsuit. 

8

When a case becomes moot, the resulting lack of such a case or

controversy deprives the court of any ongoing jurisdiction. See

Kremens v. Bartley, 430 U.S. 119, 128-29 (1977). Mootness occurs

when the issues presented are either no longer live, or when the

parties otherwise lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome of the litigation. City of Erie v. Paps A.M., 529 U.S.

277, 287 (2000). If, for example, effective relief can no longer

be had, the case is moot. Or. Bureau of Labor and Indus. v. U.S.

W. Communications, Inc., 288 F.3d 414, 416 (9 Cir. 2002). th

In the present case, it is plain that Plaintiff is no longer

entitled to any effective relief given the County’s dismissal of

their claims against him under the Employment Contract. In the

wake of that dismissal, Plaintiff no longer has any legally

cognizable interest in the outcome of these proceedings, as he

must in order to avoid mootness as to his particular case. He

cannot recover damages under the FLSA as stated above. As an 3

individual, Plaintiff also has no standing to seek injunctive

relief under the FLSA, a fact he concedes. (Pl.’s Opp., 9:14-

16). 

///

///

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Any request for declaratory relief as to Plaintiff’s Employment

Contract is moot since there is no longer any ongoing attempt to

enforce that agreement, making needless a declaration from the

Court as to the existing rights of the parties thereto. 

Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgt., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015-16

(9 Cir. 1990). The same mootness doctrine dooms Plaintiff’s th

attempted claim under Section 1983, which alleges that his

constitutional rights would be violated by enforcement of the

Contract, as well as his attempted claims under state law also

stemming from the Contract. Finally, while Plaintiff attempts to

make FLSA class action allegations aimed at others who have been

saddled with similar employment agreements, since he no longer

has any viable FLSA claim himself he lacks standing to pursue

claims on behalf of others. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 4

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

10

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to judgment

on the pleadings since Plaintiff no longer has any justiciable

controversy with respect to any of the claims advanced against

them. Defendants’ Motion is accordingly GRANTED. No leave to 4

amend will be permitted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 29, 2006 

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02228-MCE -JFM Document 45 Filed 06/29/06 Page 10 of 10