Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02154/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02154-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Petitioner was convicted of one count each of first-degree murder (Count 1),

attempted murder (Count 2), and reckless endangerment (Count 6) and three counts of

drive-by shooting (Counts 3–5). (Doc. 20, Exhibit. P.) Petitioner was sentenced to death on

Count 1, and the trial court imposed 12-year sentences on Counts 2 through 5, and a

1.25-year sentence on Count 6. Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court reduced Petitioner’s

death sentence to a term of natural life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frank S. Roque,

Petitioner, 

v.

Charles L. Ryan, et. al.,

Defendants. 

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No. 08-CV-2154-PHX-PGR (MEA)

 ORDER

(NON-DEATH PENALTY)

Currently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Aspey (Doc. 53), which is based on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

on November 20, 2008, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed an amended petition

on February 5, 2009.1

 The Court will now consider de novo the Petition, the Report and

Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Aspey, the Petitioner’s Objections thereto, and

the Respondents’ Response to the Petitioner’s Objections.

Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey recommends that Petitioner’s habeas petition be

denied and dismissed with prejudice and that a Certificate of Appealability be denied because

Petitioner failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Case 2:08-cv-02154-PGR Document 59 Filed 10/20/10 Page 1 of 9
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2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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In response to Magistrate Judge Aspey’s recommendations, Petitioner filed objections

asserting that the Report and Recommendation erroneously: (1) concluded that Petitioner

failed to exhaust the claim raised in Ground 12 resulting in its procedural default; (2) denied

Petitioner’s Brady2

 violation claim pertaining to the State’s alleged failure to disclose a blood

alcohol test (Ground 1); (3) rejected Petitioner’s claim that he was prejudiced by the State’s

disclosure violation (Ground 2); (4) failed to find reversible error regarding Petitioner’s claim

of juror misconduct (Ground 3); (5) rejected Petitioner’s claim that he was incompetent to

stand trial (Ground 4); (6) denied Petitioner’s assertion that the State’s presentation of

evidence violated his right to confrontation (Ground 5); and (7) concluded that the State did

not violate his due process rights by introducing evidence regarding Petitioner’s 1983

conviction for attempted robbery (Ground 8). 

After de novo review of the record and careful consideration Petitioner’s objections

and the responses thereto, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Aspey did not err in his

findings. As to Petitioner’s first objection, the Court agrees that based upon the record, the

claim of faulty indictment is procedurally defaulted. Moreover, in reviewing the merits of

the claim, based upon both United States Supreme Court and Arizona state case law,

aggravating factors need not be specified or alleged in the indictment. Poland v. Arizona,

476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986) (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981));

McKaney v. Foreman ex rel. County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268, 272 (2004); see State v.

Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 141 (1993) (“[A defendant] has no due process right to receive notice

of aggravating factors prior to trial.”). As to Petitioner’s second objection, Respondents are

correct that Petitioner has failed to establish the existence of the requisite favorable evidence,

that the State withheld such evidence, or that had the State disclosed the evidence Petitioner

alleges exists, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different.

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3 The State properly disclosed Dr. Potts as a witness pursuant to Rules 15.1(a)(1) and

(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and disclosed a copy of his report and

evaluation, which included his investigation into Petitioner’s blood alcohol content (BAC).

Dr. Potts concluded that Petitioner’s BAC was most likely less that .08, but he could not

determine a specific calculation. (Doc. 20 at Exhibit D, at 156.)

4

 The Court notes that when the defense objected to Dr. Ben- Porath’s expanded

testimony, the trial court offered the defense a continuance providing an opportunity for it

to re-interview Dr. Ben-Porath, and to consult again with defense experts. The defense

refused the opportunity. Furthermore, despite the refusal of the continuance, the defense was

nevertheless able to thoroughly impeach Dr. Ben-Porath’s testimony during

cross-examination after having twice interviewed him, thus curing any alleged prejudice. See

United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir.1996).

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Rather, the record reflects the contrary- testimony by Dr. Potts3 that Petitioner was not insane

at the time he committed the crimes and no forensic blood-alcohol determination test

evidence exists. As to Petitioner’s third objection, Magistrate Judge Aspey correctly notes

that a federal court is limited in conducting habeas review to issues of whether a conviction

violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). The violation of a state rule of criminal procedure

does not, by itself, constitute a violation of a defendant’s federal constitutional. Thus, to be

entitled to habeas relief, Petitioner must establish that the admission of the evidence was so

arbitrary or prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass,

45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). In the pending matter, Petitioner has not established that

the failure to disclose the full extent of Dr. Ben-Porath’s testimony was so arbitrary or

prejudicial that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.4

 As to Petitioner’s fourth objection,

the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Aspey’s recommendation to uphold the State court’s

finding that Petitioner was not denied a fair trial as a result of juror misconduct. Petitioner’s

argument that the juror’s statement was “moot” is without merit. Next, Petitioner argues in

his fifth objection that Magistrate Judge Aspey erred in determining that at the time of trial,

there was no evidence before the trial court illustrating irrational conduct by Petitioner such

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5 All parties, including Petitioner, stipulated that the trial court could determine

Petitioner's competency based upon the reports of Dr. Potts and Dr. Michael Colfield. Both

the state and defense experts found Petitioner competent to stand trial. During

post-conviction relief proceedings, Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of supporting his

claim of incompetence with relevant in-time medical records or affidavits. See Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.5. 

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that it would call into question his ability to stand trial. This Court agrees with Magistrate

Judge Aspey’s finding that there is nothing in the record creating a “bona fide doubt”

regarding Petitioner’s competency to stand trial and Petitioner has failed to provide any

evidence rebutting the trial court’s finding.5 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180

(1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). In Petitioner’s sixth objection, he argues

that Magistrate Judge Aspey erred in concluding that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s

Confrontation Clause claim regarding statements his wife made to police was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. Although there is what seems to be a

typographical error in the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 53, p. 47), upon review, this

Court nevertheless finds that the evidentiary statements at issue were not offered for the truth

of the matter asserted, and thus did not constitute hearsay. Accordingly, they did not violate

the Confrontation Clause. Finally, as to Petitioner’s seventh objection, Petitioner reasserts

his claim that his due process rights and right to a fair trial were violated when the trial judge

permitted an expert to testify regarding his reliance on Petitioner’s admission that he had a

1983 conviction for attempted robbery in assessing Petitioner’s mental health. The Court

finds that the trial court properly admitted the 1983 attempted robbery evidence, as it was

relevant to rebut the Petitioner’s insanity defense. Moreover, because Petitioner admitted

doing the acts that constituted the underlying basis for the crimes for which he was charged

in the present trial, evidence of the 1983 conviction had minimal prejudicial effect because

the jury did not have any reason to rely on it to conclude that Petitioner may have acted in

conformity therewith in committing the present crimes. 

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- 5 -

Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, Petitioner’s objections lack merit

in all seven instances and Magistrate Judge Aspey did not err in his Report and

Recommendation.

The Court will now address the claims that Petitioner did not formally object todespite his recent untimely notice to the Court of his desire to file such objections. First,

Petitioner argues that he was denied the ability to assist and confer with defense counsel

because he was required to wear a stun belt during trial. Petitioner contends that wearing the

belt inhibited his ability to confer with his defense attorney. To be entitled to habeas relief

on this claim the Court must conclude that the jury saw or was aware of the restraint and that

the restraint was not justified by state interests. See Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132

(9th Cir. 2002). For unjustified restraint to rise to the level of a constitutional trial error,

Petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of the restraint. See id.;

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 592-93 (9th Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d

897, 903 (9th Cir. 2003). There is no evidence in the record of complaints, comments, or

objections on the part of Petitioner regarding the stun belt. Moreover, defense counsel has

conceded that the jury was never aware of any such device. 

In his next claim, Petitioner contends his due process rights were violated by the

introduction of autopsy photographs of Mr. Sodhi. The prosecutor introduced the

photographs as evidence to demonstrate the entrance wounds of the bullets to illustrate that

Petitioner intended to kill the victim, thus relevant to establish premeditation. The

admissibility of evidence is generally a matter of state law, which is not cognizable in a

federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68; Middleton v. Cupp, 768

F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Without more, the failure to comply with state rules of

evidence is not a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief. To rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, the introduced evidence must be of such quality that necessarily

prevents a fair trial. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991),

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6

 The Arizona Supreme Court found that of all of the allegations of prosecutorial

misconduct, only one warranted discussion-the State’s failure to disclose the scope of Dr.

Ben-Porath’s testimony. On that point, the State Supreme Court concluded that “***the

defense did not make a good faith effort to resolve that discovery dispute. As a result, we

cannot now assess the prejudice the defendant may ultimately have suffered. The cumulative

effect of the incidents of misconduct in this case thus does not warrant reversal.”

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Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, a due process

violation occurs only if there was no permissible inference that the jury could draw from the

evidence. Id. at 920. (Emphasis added.) Here, although Petitioner asserts the photographs

were admitted solely to “inflame” the jury, the prosecutor has established that there is a

permissible inference the jury could draw from the photographs. 

Next, Petitioner alleges prosecutorial misconduct. To be entitled to relief, Petitioner

must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments “had [a] substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776. (!946) The Supreme Court

has concluded that habeas relief for this type of claim is not appropriate unless the prosecutor

manipulated or misstated the evidence or implicated other specific rights of the defendant,

such as his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

168, 181-82 (1986).6

 Based on the record, Petitioner is unable to establish that the

statements made by the prosecutor so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a violation of due process. See Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th

Cir. 1998); Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner further claims that he was denied a fair trial as a result of Dr. Jack Potts’

testimony. He claims that Dr. Potts perjured himself by testifying that Petitioner told him he

had been to one of the gas stations the day or week previous to September 15, 2001. As has

been previously established, under the law, said testimony alone is not sufficient to render

Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair under the law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

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7 For example, eyewitnesses did testify that they saw Petitioner alone in his truck

setting down a weapon immediately after the shots were fired apparently from his truck into

the subject residence in Mesa and at the Mobil station. Significantly, ballistics experts

testified that tests had determined that the shots fired at each of the three relevant locations,

including the five shots fired at Mr. Sodhi, were fired from weapons found in Petitioner’s

home. Petitioner told each psychiatrist or psychologist who examined him that he had

committed the crimes. The Court finds that any rational trier of fact could have found these

facts critical in determining the essential elements of the crime.

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Next, Petitioner argues that his trial and appellate counsel were unconstitutionally

ineffective. This Court finds that based on Arizona State court’s objective and reasonable

application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), its Rule 32 decision that

Petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief from his claim. 

Petitioner also contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to

support his convictions for drive-by shooting and a finding of premeditation on the charge

of attempted first-degree murder. To determine whether sufficient evidence was introduced

at trial to support a habeas petitioner’s conviction, the Court must decide if, “viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 468-469 (9th Cir. 1994).

(Emphasis added). A federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports

conflicting inferences must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor

of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. In the instant

matter, despite the fact that there were no eyewitnesses that testified that they actually saw

Petitioner shooting a weapon, the Court finds that the record is replete with evidence

supporting a finding that a reasonable jury could find Petitioner guilty of attempted

first-degree murder and the drive-by shootings.7

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Finally, Petitioner asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated

because a judge, rather than a jury, found aggravating factors used to enhance his non-capital

sentences under state sentencing statutes. This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Aspey’s

analysis of Arizona’s sentencing scheme and its application to the case sub judice. The

Arizona courts have interpreted Blakely v. Washington to allow for the imposition of an

aggravated sentence based partially on facts found by a judge if at least one aggravating

factor is found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. See Arizona v. Martinez, 210 Ariz.

578 (2005) (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)); Arizona v. Henderson, 210

Ariz. 561 (2005). In the present matter, the jury found that in the commission of the murder

of Mr. Sodhi, Petitioner knowingly caused a grave risk of death to Mr. Ledesma. In Arizona,

a defendant may receive an aggravated sentence based on a single aggravating factor, see

Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 13-702(B). Thus, this and other federal courts

conclude that if a single Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt aggravating factor establishes

the facts that are “legally essential,” a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial is not

violated if other factors are found by a judge in the context of sentencing the defendant. See,

e.g., Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397, 402-03 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, Petitioner was

not denied his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial merely because the judge found some

aggravating factors used to enhance his non-capital sentences under state sentencing statutes.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Aspey’s Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 53) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED by the Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is DISMISSED and DENIED with prejudice. (Docs. 14.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING a Certificate of Appealability and

DENYING leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because Petitioner has not made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

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8 The Court notes that Petitioner’s Motion (Doc. 57) was entitled “Emergency

Supplemental Notice of Objection to the Magistrate Report and Combination Motion to

Appoint Counsel and Stay Proceedings.” The Court has reviewed the record de novo and

assessed the merits of each of the claims, including those for which Petitioner did not file and

objection. The Court finds that based upon the totality of the record, Magistrate Judge Aspey

did not err in his conclusions. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel.

(Doc. 57.)8

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

DATED this 20th day of October, 2010.

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