Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-00670/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-00670-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SAMUEL RASHAD GLOVER, #240049, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 1:09-CV-670-MEF

) [WO]

)

J. C. GILES, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Samuel Rashad Glover [“Glover”], a state inmate, on July 8, 2009. In this

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petition, Glover challenges a conviction for third degree robbery imposed upon him

pursuant to his guilty plea by the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on August 15,

2006. On this same date, the trial court sentenced Glover as a habitual offender to twentytwo years imprisonment. Glover did not properly file a direct appeal of this robbery

The Clerk stamped the habeas petition “received” on July 17, 2009. Documents filed simultaneously with

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the petition indicate Glover initially placed the petition in the prison mail system on July 8, 2009. Application for

Leave to Proceed In Forma Paupers - Court Doc. No. 2 at 2. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s petition

is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988);

Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 Cir. th th

1993). Glover, however, failed to sign the petition and the Clerk returned the requisite page of the petition to Glover

for his signature. Glover signed the petition on July 21, 2009 and immediately returned the signature page to the

court. Under the circumstances of this case and for purposes of this Recommendation, the court considers July 8,

2009, as the date of filing as this is the earliest filing date available to Glover. 

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conviction as he failed to respond to an order of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

requiring that he (i) certify specific issues reserved for review prior to entry of his guilty

plea, and/or (ii) present evidence showing he timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. See Respondents’ Exhibit 2 (September 19, 2006 Order of the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals) - Court Doc. No. 13-2. Glover’s third degree robbery conviction

therefore became final by operation of law on October 3, 2006.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed an answer in which they

argue that the instant federal habeas petition is barred by the one-year period of limitation

applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The respondents

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contend that because Glover’sthird degree robbery conviction became final in 2006 -- after

the effective date of the statute of limitations -- Glover must have filed his § 2254 petition

within a year of this conviction becoming final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed

state post-conviction action related to the conviction remained pending in the state courts.

The respondents concede that on November 9, 2006 Glover filed a state post-conviction

petition under Rule 32, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, which tolled the limitation

period. However, the respondents maintain that even allowing tolling of the federal

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Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”). 2

This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

The Rule 32 petition establishes Glover executed the petition on November 9, 2006 and this date is

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therefore the earliest date on which Glover could have submitted the petition to prison officials for mailing. 

Respondents’ Exhibit 4 - Court Doc. No. 13-4 at 13. As previously noted, a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed

in federal cases the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-272. “Alabama

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limitation period during the pendency of the Rule 32 petition the limitation period expired

prior to Glover filing this federal habeas petition. Respondents’ Answer - Court Doc. No.

13 at 8-9; Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11 Cir. 2003) (statutory tolling allowed

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only for the time during which a properly filed state post-conviction action is pending).

It is likewise clear that the motion to withdraw guilty plea filed by Glover with the

Alabama Court Criminal Appeals on September 21, 2006, had no affect on the running of

the limitation period as this motion was not filed within the time prescribed by state law.

See Respondents’ Exhibit 5 (Memorandum Opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on Appeal of Rule 32) - Court Doc. No. 13-5 at 1-2, n.1 (“[T]he motion [to

withdraw guilty plea] was not timely filed because [Glover] filed it more than thirty days

after he was sentenced. Therefore, we dismissed the appellant’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea.”); Allen v. State, 863 So.2d 737, 738 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003) (a motion to

withdraw guilty plea, which is the “functional equivalent” of a motion for new trial, must

be filed within 30 days of sentencing); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct.

1807, 1814 (2005) (“For purposes of determining what are ‘filing’ conditions, there is an

obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and

courts have [adopted the mailbox rule and] held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have

‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to

prison officials for mailing.” Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002); Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 373, 375

(Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (“[A] pro se incarcerated petitioner ‘files’ a Rule 32 petition when he hands the petition over

to prison authorities for mailing.”). Consequently, the prison mailbox rule applies to pro se Rule 32 petitions filed

in the state courts of Alabama and November 9, 2006, is therefore the appropriate date of filing for Glover’s Rule

32 petition.

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a court’s ability to consider that petition, and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars

at issue in Artuz [v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000)], which

go to the ability to obtain relief.... [I]t must be the case that a petition that cannot even be

initiated or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not ‘properly filed.’...

For these reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions.

[A state post-conviction motion which is] untimely, ... was not ‘properly filed,’ and

[petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitation period] under § 2244(d)(2).”);

Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 128 S.Ct. 7, 4 (2007) (“When a postconviction petition [or

motion] is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of

[statutory tolling of the limitation period under] § 2244(d)(2).”); Sweet v. Secretary,

Department of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11 Cir. 2006) (An untimely collateral

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motion “was not ‘properly filed’ under § 2244(d), and it could not toll the federal one-year

period of limitation.”). Hence, the respondents maintain Glover failed to file the instant

§ 2254 petition prior to expiration of the one-year period of limitation.

Based on the foregoing, the court entered an order advising Glover he failed to file

his federal habeas petition within the one-year limitation period established by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(d)(1). Order of September 14, 2009 - Court Doc. No. 14. This order also provided

Glover an opportunity to show cause why his habeas petition should not be barred from

review by this court as untimely filed. Id. at 5-6. In response to this order, Glover

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maintains that his lack of legal knowledge required that he rely on the assistance of more

knowledgeable inmates which required time to obtain, and these circumstances justify

equitable tolling of the limitation period. Petitioner’s November 30, 2009 Response -

Court Doc. No. 21 at 1-3.

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court record

and applicable federal law, the court determines no evidentiary hearing is required, Rule

8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and concludes

the present habeas petition is due to be denied as Glover failed to file the petition within

the applicable one-year period of limitation.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Federal Period of Limitation

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 became effective on

April 24, 1996 and amended the habeas corpus statute to include a one-year period of

limitation on petitionsfiled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thislimitation period is codified

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

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of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newlyrecognized bythe Supreme Court andmade retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

The statute clearly directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the time for

seeking direct review, whichever is later. Where a petitioner preserves his right to file a

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the statute of limitations

is tolled during the ninety-day period in which such action may be undertaken. Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the

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conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the

case or the time for seeking review has expired.”). Accordingly, a state court judgment of

conviction becomesfinal under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the Supreme Court denies certiorari

or the time to apply for certiorari expires. Id.

On August 15, 2006, Glover entered a guilty plea before the Circuit Court of

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Houston County, Alabama to third degree robbery and the trial court immediately imposed

sentence for this conviction. Glover attempted to file a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

issued an order “allowing [Glover] 14 days to certify ... the specific issues that were

reserved for appellate review before the plea of guilt was entered and/or to file a copy of

any timely-filed motion to withdraw the guilty plea or motion for new trial.” Respondents’

Exhibit 2 - Court Doc. No. 13-2. The appellate court “placed [Glover] on notice that

his/her failure to comply within the allotted time would result in this appeal being

dismissed” in accordance with state law. Id. Glover failed to file a response in compliance

with the directivesset forth in the order issued by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.

Based on Glover’s failure to file the requisite response, the state appellate court on

September 19, 2006 entered an order dismissing the appeal, id., and issued a certificate of

judgment. Respondents’ Exhibit 3 - Court Doc. No. 13-3.

Glover undertook no further action regarding appeal of his third degree robbery

conviction. Since Glover failed to file an application for rehearing and/or seek relief from

the Alabama Supreme Court, he could not petition the United States Supreme Court for

review of the third degree robbery conviction and the time for seeking review of this

conviction therefore lapsed upon expiration of the time for filing an application for

rehearing with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals-- fourteen (14) daysfrom issuance

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of the order dismissing his appeal. Rule 40(c), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure; see

Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129

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(2001); see also Rule 13.1, Rules of the United States Supreme Court (a petition for writ

of certiorari may only be filed to review a judgment or order entered by a state court of last

resort and must be filed within ninety (90) days of the action undertaken by such state

court); Jackson v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347, 1348-1349 (11

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Cir. 2002). Thus, Glover’s conviction for third degree robbery became final, at the latest,

on October 3, 2006 -- fourteen days after entry of the order of dismissal by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals on September 19, 2006. The one-year period of limitation

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) therefore began to run on October 4, 2006.

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B. Equitable Tolling

Case law directs the limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart

from those specified in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with

diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir. 1999); see also Steed

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v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11 Cir. 2000); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11

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Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time

will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it

In computing the federal period of limitation, “exclude the day of the event that triggersthe period[.]” Rule

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6(a)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9 Cir.1997). Such tolling applies only in truly extraordinary circumstances.

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Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-1040 (11 Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department

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of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). “The burden of establishing

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entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d

at 1286; see Helton v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314

(11 Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002).

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Glover argues that equitable tolling is justified because he has limited knowledge

of the law and, after loss of the services of the inmate initially assisting him with his habeas

petition “it took several weeks to locate another inmate having sufficient legal knowledge

and skill,” to continue preparation of his habeas petition. Petitioner’s November 30, 2009

Response - Court Doc. No. 21 at 2. The law is well settled that an inmate’s lack of legal

knowledge, his failure to understand legal principles and/or the inability to recognize

potential claims for relief at an earlier juncture do not constitute extraordinary

circumstancessufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period. United States

v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4 Cir. 2004) (pro se status and ignorance of the law do not

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justify equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8 Cir. 2000), cert.

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denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122 S.Ct. 145, 151 L.Ed.2d 97 (2001) (lack of legal knowledge or

legal resources, even in a case involving a pro se inmate, does not warrant equitable

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tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

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1194, 121 S.Ct. 1195, 149 L.Ed.2d 110 (2001) (petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of

the law are insufficient to support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations); Felder v.

Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 622, 148

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L.Ed.2d 532 (2000) (ignorance of the law and pro se status do not constitute “rare and

exceptional” circumstances justifying equitable tolling); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13,

17 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 63 (2000) (petitioner’s nd

pro se status throughout majority of limitation period does not merit equitable tolling);

Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504,

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145 L.Ed.2d 389 (1999) (unfamiliarity with the legal process during the applicable filing

period did not merit equitable tolling); Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d

967, 969 (11 Cir. 1997) (ignorance of the law “is not a factor that can warrant equitable

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tolling.”).

To the extent that Glover asserts his lack of knowledgeable inmate assistance as a

basis for equitable tolling, this assertion fails to justify such tolling. A petitioner has no

right to legal assistance in a habeas action and, thus, neither his perceived need to rely nor

actualreliance on the assistance of an inmate clerk establishes extraordinary circumstances

necessary to excuse the untimely filing of a petition. See Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d

1266, 1267 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 834 (1990) (poor advice from inmate law

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clerks during collateral proceedings will not establish petitioner’s claim of cause for a

procedural default as there is no right to legal counsel in such proceedings); Marsh, 223

F.3d at 1220 (“The fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting [pleadings] does

not relieve [petitioner] from the personal responsibility of complying with the law.”).

C. Statutory Tolling

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this section.” The limitation period began to run on October 4, 2006, and ran for 36 days

until Glover filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on

November 9, 2006. This state collateral action tolled the running of the federal limitation

period from its inception until finality of judgment upon issuance of the certificate of

judgment by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on June 27, 2007. Respondents’

Exhibit 7 - Court Doc. No. 13-7. At this time, Glover had 329 days remaining within

which to timely file a federal habeas petition with this court. As previously determined,

infra at 8-11, Glover is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period.

Consequently, the requisite federal period of limitation began to run again on June 28,

2007, and ran without interruption from either equitable or statutory tolling until its

expiration on May 21, 2008.

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D. Expiration of the Limitation Period

Under the circumstances of this case, the one-year period of limitation contained in

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expired on May 21, 2008. Glover filed the instant petition for

federal habeas relief in July of 2009, over a year after expiration of the federal limitation

period. Glover has failed to demonstrate that this federal habeas petition should not be

dismissed as untimely filed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas relief filed by Samuel Rashad Glover be denied as it was

not filed within the one-year period of limitation mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 28, 2011, the parties may file objections

to the Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled mustspecifically identify the findingsin the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

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Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 14 day of September, 2011.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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