Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02667/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02667-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM CONSIGLIO,

CDCR #H-35969

Civil No. 11cv2667 JAH (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

[ECF No. 2] 

AND 

(2) DISMISSING CASE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEE REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

vs.

K. RODRIGUEZ.

Psychologist,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, has filed this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he

has submitted a certified copy of his Prison Trust Account Statement which the Court construes

as Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[ECF No. 3].

/ / / 

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I.

Motion to Proceed IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil

litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the

privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,

“[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP

status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers,

128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were

dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,”

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles

such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of

the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has

accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP

action in federal court unless he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception

for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent

danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

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While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and

other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a

strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews

further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or

importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has

ascertained that he makes no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Therefore, Plaintiff may be barred from proceeding IFP in this action if he

has on three prior occasions had civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious or

for failing to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court takes judicial notice

that Plaintiff has had at least three prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They are:

1) Consiglio v. Przytulski, Civil Case No. 92-00339 K (S.D. Cal. March 4, 1992)

(Order Dismissing Case under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) [as frivolous or malicious])

(strike one); 

2) Consiglio v. Roache, Civil Case No. 92-00153 B (BTM) (S. D. Cal. July 2, 1992)

(Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim) (strike

two);

3) Consiglio v. County of San Diego, Civil Case No. 92-0572 G (BTM) (S.D. Cal.)

(September 4, 1992) (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [for failure to

state a claim]) (strike three).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes”

pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced imminent

danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not entitled to the

privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169

F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing

the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from

continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not

right.”).

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III.

Conclusion and Order

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [ECF No. 2] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and DISMISSES this action without

prejudice for failure to pay the $350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 23, 2011 _________________________________________ 

 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

 United States District Court

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