Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00112/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00112-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVESTER STRONG, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

A.P.KANE, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-cv-00112-OWW-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The instant petition was filed on December 13, 2004, in the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California. (Doc. 1). The case was transferred to the Eastern District

of California on December 30, 2004. Petitioner challenges his sentence of a maximum of

eighteen years based on a conviction for second degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon

on October 21, 1988. (Doc. 1, p. 2). The petition raises two grounds for relief: (1) breach of the

plea agreement; and (2) misrepresentation of the plea agreement. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it

plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule

4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990).

Otherwise, the Court will order Respondent to respond to the petition. Rule 5 of the Rules

governing § 2254 Cases.

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I. AEDPA’s One-Year State of Limitations.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may raise the statute of limitations sua

sponte and dismiss the petition on those grounds. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-44 (9th

Cir. 2001) (indicating that once a petitioner is given adequate notice and opportunity to respond

to allegations that his petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to AEDPA's statute of limitations,

petitioner has the burden of providing an adequate response).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on December 13, 2004; thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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II. The Petition Was Filed After The Limitations Period Expired.

Here, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted on October 21, 1988. It appears that a

notice of appeal was filed on December 20, 1988, but there is no other indication in the petition

or attached documents concerning the outcome, if any, of that appeal or indeed whether the

appeal was pursued, dismissed, or abandoned. Thus, the Court cannot determine the precise date

when direct review would have terminated since Petitioner has provided insufficient information

regarding the dates for his direct review, if any, in the California Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court. 

For petitioners whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment on April 24,

1996, as is the case here, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run on April 25,

1996, the day of AEDPA’s enactment. Petitioner would then have had one year from that date,

absent applicable tolling, or until April 25, 1997, within which to file his federal petition for writ

of habeas corpus. Malcolm v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2002); Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001). The

instant case was not filed until December 13, 2004, more than seven years after the one-year

limitations period would have expired. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (the Court held that a petitioner

is normally entitled to one “full round” of collateral review in state court without federal

interference. While the “full round” is properly in progress, the AEDPA’s one-year statute is

tolled). Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) cert. denied by Welch v. Carey, 2004

U.S. LEXIS 3930 (June 1, 2004). 

Petitioner’s documents indicate that he commenced a “round” of state habeas corpus

proceedings on October 8, 2003 in the Fresno County Superior Court, raising the same issues

contained in the instant petition. (Doc. 1, attachments). It appears that this “round” of habeas

proceedings terminated when the California Supreme Court denied his habeas petition on

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1The Court also notes that the two claims, as presently framed, raise issues of state law only, not federal law. 

Generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67

(1991)(“We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-349 (1993)(O’Connor, J.,

concurring)(“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be

corrected on federal habeas”). Because a petition filed beyond the one-year limitations period must be dismissed,

the Court does not at this time address the fact that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable under federal habeas law.

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November 10, 2004. (Id.). However, as discussed above, the one-year limitation period expired

on April 25, 1997, more than six years before Petitioner commenced his “round” of state habeas

proceedings. 

Thus, although Petitioner apparently filed collateral challenges in state court regarding his

conviction and sentence, those proceedings would not have operated to toll the statute of

limitations here. It is well-established that when the limitations period has already expired at the

time a Petitioner commences a round of state court habeas petitions, those collateral challenges

have no tolling consequences for purposes of the one-year limitation in AEDPA. Green v.

White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the

limitations period has already run prior to filing state habeas proceedings); see Webster v. Moore,

199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (petitioner

fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year

limitations period.). Hence, the instant petition appears to have been untimely.1

III. AEDPA’s Tolling Provisions.

Petitioner, however, may avail himself of statutory tolling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), which states that the limitation period shall run from “the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence,” if Petitioner can establish that he is entitled to such tolling. The

objective standard in determining when time begins to run under Section 2241(d)(1)(D) is “when

the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the

prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2001),

quoting, Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.2000). 

Here, based on this limited record, it is unclear precisely when Petitioner could have

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discovered, with the exercise of due diligence, the claims he now asserts. However, since both

claims relate to the terms of the plea bargain, it would seem probable that Petitioner either knew

or could have discovered the salient factual predicates for his claims well prior to the expiration

of the one-year limitations period in 1997, which was nine years after his guilty plea, conviction,

and sentence. 

The limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing, Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, Berellez v. Alvarez-Machain, 522

U.S. 814 (1997); Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be

available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary

circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time"). "When

external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, equitable tolling applies only where a petitioner has

diligently pursued his claims, but has in some "extraordinary way" been prevented from asserting

those claims.

Here, Petitioner has not contended that the limitations period should be equitably tolled,

nor does he provide any explanation for the delay in filing his federal petition from 1988 until the

commencement of his state habeas “round” in 2003. The Court cannot find in the present record

any basis on which to equitably toll the limitations period.

Thus, it appears that the instant petition was filed beyond the one-year limitations period. 

If this information is correct, the Court will recommend that the petition be dismissed. If this

information is incorrect, Petitioner should inform the Court and present supporting

documentation. Petitioner may also, if he wishes, provide the Court with any explanation of his

delay or provide any other information that bears upon the applicable statutory and equitable

tolling provisions discussed above.

///

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 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that Petitioner is GRANTED THIRTY (30)

days from the date of service of this Order, to SHOW CAUSE why the petition (Doc. 1) should

not be dismissed for failing to comply with the one-year limitations period. 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order will result in a

Recommendation that the petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2005 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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