Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1

 For ease of reference, “petitioner” is used to reference both the actual petitioner himself

and/or his counsel. Generally, it is obvious where petitioner actually refers to Gerald Stanley and

where petitioner is simply a shorthand for “petitioner’s counsel.” When it becomes necessary in

the course of this order to differentiate petitioner from his counsel, the court will refer to

petitioner as “Stanley,” and counsel as “petitioner’s counsel.”

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD F. STANLEY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

vs.

JILL L. BROWN, Acting DEATH PENALTY CASE

Warden of the California State Prison

at San Quentin,

Respondent. ORDER RE: EVIDENTIARY HEARING ISSUES

 /

Introduction

Pursuant to the order of the court filed September 10, 2004, and modified several

times thereafter with respect to dates, petitioner1 was directed to file a motion for evidentiary

hearing, and:

Within that motion, petitioner shall attach such evidence as

necessary to demonstrate that materially disputed facts exist to

warrant an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner shall support in

evidentiary fashion the allegations of the petition. The court will

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2

 Although this case was commenced prior to the effective date of AEDPA, no petition

was filed until well after that date. The first document which could be considered a petition was

filed September 27, 1997. The court does not consider any of Stanley’s various filings, including

a “petition not to file a petition” as a petition under the habeas rules. See, Woodford v. Garceau,

538 U.S. 202, 207, 123 S. Ct. 1398 (2003) (for purposes of § 2254(d), an application for habeas

corpus relief is a filing that seeks “an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims”). 

2

accept references to the state record, admissible exhibits and

declarations of witnesses, including expert witnesses, for the

establishment of such facts. Petitioner need not prove his case on

each claim, but much like summary judgment, must submit

sufficient factual material to warrant the conclusion that an

evidentiary hearing is warranted.

Petitioner has filed his motion, but the satisfaction of the above requirements shall

be the subject of discussion below. Respondent filed an opposition, in part, and petitioner filed

his reply thereafter.

The claims in the operative amended petition filed September 30, 2002, upon

which petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing are: 1, 2, 4, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27. With

qualification (discussed below), respondent agreed that a hearing should be held on claims 21

and 24. 

Standards for an Evidentiary Hearing

The standards for an evidentiary hearing are those set forth in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.

2254 (e)(2) and relevant case law.2 However, nothing in that statute or the case law precludes the

undersigned from tasking the parties, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and 56, especially after a ten

year pendency of this case in federal and state court on post-conviction review, with

demonstrating up-front specificity and offers of proof constituting at least a prima facie case. 

Nothing in AEDPA or the case law directives requires a court to subject itself to numerous

hearings on claims where the petitioner cannot even make a minimal offer of proof that the claim

is colorable after he has been given essentially carte blanche in federal court to develop the facts

of his case.

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3

In general, prior to even arriving at the AEDPA standards for evidentiary hearing,

a petitioner must allege facts with specificity, demonstrating the real possibility of constitutional

error. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (n.7), 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977); Calderon v. USDC,

98 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 1996) (Schroeder, J., concurring). 

Assuming the initial specificity of non-conclusory facts, in the absence of any

scheduling requirements imposing an accelerated duty for a petitioner to demonstrate the

existence of material facts, a petitioner may have an evidentiary hearing if he was not at fault for

the non-development of the facts he would desire to present on collateral review, and one of the

reasons set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745 (1963) is applicable. 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the only ground with

potential applicability is the non-holding of a state court hearing on the claims alleged. The state

court did not hold any hearing on any claim in this case. And, respondent does not urge that

petitioner is “at fault” for not previously presenting facts which would have precluded a hearing

on any of petitioner’s requested claims. 

However, in a holding that has never been limited by the Supreme Court, and

which may not be limited or ignored by the circuit courts (no matter how many cases are cited by

petitioner in which further procedures were not at issue), the Supreme Court gave district courts

the authority to utilize civil case procedures to weed out insubstantial claims before substantial

resources are expended on evidentiary hearings.

This is not to say that every set of allegations not on its face

without merit entitles a habeas corpus petitioner to an evidentiary

hearing. As in civil cases generally, there exists a procedure whose

purpose is to test whether facially adequate allegations have

sufficient basis in fact to warrant plenary presentation of evidence. 

That procedure is, of course, the motion for summary judgment. 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. at 80, 97 S. Ct. at 1632. 

That is the very procedure, in a somewhat different and accelerated form, that the undersigned

ordered in this case: in light of the answer which, on the contested claims herein, has in essence

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3

 Respondent cited to the earlier version of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion which was

withdrawn and re-issued. In its re-issued opinion, the Ninth Circuit provided: “In fact, the

Magistrate Judge established an entirely reasonable process to deal with the claims for which

Rich sought discovery and a hearing. The process required Rich to identify which of his claims

remained unexhausted, which actually presented federal questions, and those as to which habeas

relief might be available if favorable evidence were developed. Despite being given more than

five months to investigate and prepare as well as a full day of argument to identify claims that

might colorably entitle him to relief, Rich was unable to do so.” The Magistrate Judge in Rich

was the undersigned, and the “entirely reasonable process” was a summary judgment type

procedure.

4

 The undersigned need not go into all the procedural context of the verification of the

petition by counsel, and Stanley’s subsequent attempted repudiation of the petition. However,

the petition is based, in part, and unknowable part, on “information and belief.” See Verification

page. Such a verification does not take the place of “sworn facts” which presume that the facts

are based on personal knowledge. 

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asserted that no material issue of fact exists which would preclude judgment in its favor,

petitioner was tasked with offering sufficient evidentiary materials to establish a material issue of

fact. “Petitioner need not prove his case on each claim, but much like summary judgment, must

submit sufficient factual material to warrant the conclusion that an evidentiary hearing is

warranted.” Order of September 10, 2004. The procedures developed by the undersigned were

expressly sanctioned by the Ninth Circuit in Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.

1999).3 In other words, the district court may employ procedures authorized by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure to determine whether a claim is “colorable.” See also Williams v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 567, 588 (9th Cir. 2004): “However, conclusory allegations by counsel that are

unsworn and unsupported by any proof or offer of proof do not provide an adequate basis to

obtain a federal evidentiary hearing.” The undersigned’s procedures were designed to elicit that

proof and/or offer of proof.4

Discussion

The undersigned will not repeat the background of this case as he has set this forth

in various orders and findings and recommendations already; in any event, for purposes of this

order, the background is well set forth in the state supreme court opinion, People v. Stanley, 10

Cal. 4th 764, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (1995).

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Claim 1

Claim 1, with its seven sub-claims is a pot pourri of asserted legal error and error

based upon factual allegations. It also overlaps somewhat with Claims 22, 23, and 24. The

undersigned will visit each of the sub-claims here, and will address later, to the extent not already

addressed with respect to Claim 1, the other related claims.

To the extent not based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, Claim 1 has been

procedurally barred for failing to have raised the issues on direct review. See Order of August 3,

2005, adopting the March 3, 2004 Findings and Recommendations. This applies to both

procedural and substantive incompetence theories. (However, as seen below, whether petitioner

was in fact incompetent (substantive due process) is part of the ineffective assistance of counsel

equation.)

The court pauses to discuss the procedural bar ruling based on In re Dixon, 41

Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953). Respondent raised this defense in its answer filed July 29, 2003. As

pointed out by petitioner now, but not in its opposition to application of the Dixon bar,

respondent’s assertion of the defense was ambiguous. On page 3 of the answer, respondent did

limit the defense to Claim 1(a). However, on page 100 of the answer, respondent indicated that

the Dixon bar was being presented here just as the California Supreme Court had so stated. The

opposition to the procedural bar made no mention of this conundrum, nor petitioner’s present

Waltreus position; indeed, the Dixon part of the discussion in petitioner’s opposition matched the

brevity of respondents: less than one page. If petitioner thought respondent’s assertion of the bar

was ambiguous, or limited, or that Waltreus somehow limited the court’s ability to impose the

Dixon bar, petitioner should have informed the court of his position in the proceedings related to

the procedural bar motion. Nevertheless, the court will review on their merits claims which were

actually raised before the California Supreme Court, and will not consider them procedurally 

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5

 Petitioner raised the fact that Claim I had also been barred by In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d

218, 225 (1965) insofar as Claim I asked for re-adjudication on claims already presented on

direct review. Waltreus is not a bar to federal review since by definition the federal court will be

reviewing the claims which were decided on the merits on direct review, i.e., the habeas petition

re-alleging the claim is superfluous. See Nunnemaker v. Ylst, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S. Ct. 2590

(1991). Although petitioner never mentioned Waltreus at the time of the procedural bar motion

in its briefing as a reason why claims should not be procedurally defaulted, the court agrees that

two sub-claims were reviewed on direct appeal in the state supreme court and will be reviewed

here on their merits (sub claim 1(c) (appointment of counsel to advocate Stanley’s competency)

and 1(d) (whether Stanley was competent to waive any rights at his competency hearing). 

However, as seen in the text of this order, such claims are legal issues not requiring an

evidentiary hearing. They will be decided on final Findings and Recommendations. Claims 1(a)

and 1(g) are procedurally barred because they were not raised on direct appeal, but could have

been. The court disagrees with petitioner that Claim 1(g) was raised on direct review.

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barred. Further discussion of the effect of Waltreus on Claim 1 is discussed in footnote 5 below.5

Sub-claim 1(a) of the operative petition asserts that “information known to the

court” revealed that petitioner may have been incompetent at various stages of his capital case

proceedings. Since this allegation proceeds on “known,” of record, information, the California

Supreme Court barred this claim for not having raised it on direct appeal.

 Petitioner alleges, in sub-claims 1(b) and 1(e) that his counsel were ineffective in

several regards in not asserting petitioner’s lack of competency earlier in the proceedings and

during the competency proceedings, i.e., failure to object to certain proceedings or evidence,

testifying in the competency proceeding. As is well known, a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel proceeds on two prongs: (1) were counsel’s actions unreasonable; (2) did petitioner

suffer prejudice as a result of the unreasonable actions of counsel, prejudice being defined as an

undermining of the court’s confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

Petitioner does not set forth evidence, only allegations in the petition, that his

counsel acted unreasonably. That is, petitioner presents no factual explanations from counsel for

the criticized actions. However, the court accepts for purposes of ordering an evidentiary hearing

the allegations that counsel’s actions were deficient on their face. The court now turns to

prejudice.

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6

 As stated at hearing, petitioner is especially not prejudiced by the court not hearing subclaim 1(a) on its merits (the “straight” Dusky claim) because petitioner repeated this sub-claim in

Claim 22.

7

Prejudice mirrors the substantive due process “retrospective competency hearing”

that has been procedurally barred. In other words, petitioner would have to show that counsel’s

unreasonable actions fostered a situation where petitioner was demonstrably unable to assist his

counsel or comprehend the proceedings at whatever stage of his state court proceedings. See

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788 (1960). Obviously, if petitioner were not

competent to proceed in state court, the court’s confidence in the outcome of the proceedings are

undermined as a matter of law. In a sense, what has been procedurally barred as a “straight”

claim under 1(a) may be adjudicated in the prejudice inquiry of ineffective assistance.6 

In the factual prelude to all the sub-claims, petitioner sets forth a detailed, of

record, factual chronology which he believes posits examples of his incompetency at various

stages of the criminal proceedings. If this were the only factual presentation, the undersigned

would simply decide the matter as of record. However, petitioner allies this chronology with two

outside sources, the declaration of Dr. George Woods (Exhibit 10 to the state court exhaustion

petition) and the declaration of Marcia Morrissey, Esq. (Exhibit 1 to the state court exhaustion

petition). 

The Dr. Woods declaration, an extensive rendition of expertise and opinion,

qualifies as the presentation of facts sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The purpose of

this order is not to express an opinion on the substance of the Woods testimony, and indeed, the

undersigned expresses no such opinion directly or by intimation. However, it does present

material issues of fact with respect to the issues of sub-claims (b) and (e). Respondent is

incorrect insofar as she believes that expert mental health testimony would be irrelevant to

Stanley’s actions or inactions at trial. A trained observer can assist the court in translating

actions or speech which might mean nothing to the untrained observer. Or, a trained observer

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7

 The trial judge will not be held, however, to the standard of a Board certified

psychiatrist. Petitioner will have to show that laypersons should have been aware of what Dr.

Woods points out.

8

from respondent’s camp may debunk petitioner’s expert’s strained analysis (as respondent would

argue), and show that the actions or speech are nothing more than amateur manipulation. The

court cannot say that such testimony may not be presented by the advocates for each side at

evidentiary hearing. Nor can the court definitively assess all the bases for Dr. Woods’ opinions. 

They may be based, as is proper for retrospective competency hearings, at least in part, on

contemporaneous medical records and contemporaneous actions of Stanley in court.7

Nevertheless, in order that petitioner not misunderstand his burden at this hearing,

petitioner cannot forget that the trial court held a jury trial on petitioner’s competence in which

the verdict rendered was—competent. This finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness,

and may not be disregarded in the absence of clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1), or proof of other error, e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel during the competency

proceedings, which prejudicially tainted the proceedings. Nor does it matter that the competency

hearing was held after the guilt phase and prior to completion of the penalty phase. Petitioner’s

counsel do not allege that Stanley was ever competent during his state trial court proceedings;

rather, petitioner alleges that the circumstances which made him incompetent existed at all times. 

Therefore, as far as the presumption of correctness is concerned, it does not matter when the

competency trial was held, or when counsel should have recognized it. Petitioner’s counsel

cannot point, and have not pointed, to anything different, in terms of the temporal nature of their

mental acuity allegations, which would not have been at issue during the competency trial had

such trial been held at the beginning of the guilt phase, during the guilt phase, at the beginning of

the penalty phase, when it was actually held, or later in the penalty phase. If the court were to

retrospectively find Stanley incompetent, it would necessarily have to apply to the entire

trial—all three phases. Finding counsel ineffective for not having recognized this fact would

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8

 The state of the record, outside of the competency trial itself, in this case is less clear

with respect to competency, and the court is desirous to hear from trial counsel in this regard.

9

 The undersigned is not so presumptuous as to say that he does not need assistance in the

endeavor of retrospective competency determinations; he is saying that he has the legal assistance

he needs with counsel in this case. At hearing, counsel stated that Ms. Morrissey would testify to

the legal standards facing California lawyers at the time of Stanley’s trial. However, those

standards will be set forth for the most part in applicable statutes, cases, treatises and the like.

9

appear to be of no consequence once the finding of incompetence has been made. The fact alone

of incompetence is all that Stanley needs to prevail on the prejudice prong—difficult as it may be

to prove.

In addition, the presumption of correctness is buttressed by the great reluctance of

courts to hold retrospective competency adjudications. Petitioner has a difficult burden indeed. 

See Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the retrospective

competency opinion of Dr. Woods—petitioner’s expert in this case—, without evidentiary

hearing because it was not based on contemporaneous medical records, and the record indicated

that petitioner was competent).8

The declaration of Ms. Morrissey is another matter. There is no doubt that the

declaration of Ms. Morrissey presents herself as a well qualified counsel. However, appointed

counsel in this case are qualified as well. Ms. Morrissey’s declaration is a legal brief, which any

of petitioner’s counsel would be competent to present and argue. The primary purpose of the

declaration, and hence Ms. Morrissey’s testimony before the undersigned, is to argue the legal

significance of what she perceives to be facts demonstrating petitioner’s incompetence at trial. 

Appointed counsel will perform this task. Partially for the reasons set forth by respondent, and

pursuant to the discretion that the undersigned maintains to take legal argument in the form of

expert testimony, see Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 612 (n.17), the undersigned exercises

that discretion to decline to hear this testimony, nor will the record be expanded to include the

declaration/argument. The declaration does not present material issues of fact.9

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10 The contention is also probably flawed. Adjudications of incompetency have their

adverse effects on a defendant. Some defendants do not want their trials forever delayed while

they lay in a legal limbo of incompetency status. Favorable evidence may also be lost in the

meantime. An indefinite incarcerated status before trial may have a tendency to “wear out” a

defendant. Therefore, the fact that a defendant may want to advocate for a finding of competence

does not mean that he is incompetent. Moreover, if petitioner’s counsel were correct, a

defendant would not be entitled to testify on his own behalf or decide to represent himself. The

court sees great difficulty in petitioner’s counsel’s position, but makes no final ruling on this

issue.

10

Sub-claim 1(c) alleges that the trial court erred in determining to appoint an

counsel to advocate Stanley’s position that he was in fact competent. This issue is clearly a legal

issue inappropriate for evidentiary hearing.

Sub-claim 1(d) also posits a legal issue—the ability of a defendant whose

competence is questioned to make any decisions in his [competency] trial. Although petitioner’s

counsel’s present position that Stanley was unable to assert that he was indeed competent at his

competency trial raises a rather Catch-22 situation, this issue is one of law.10 

Sub-claim 1(f) is simply a catch-all claim that if any of the claims within Claim

one are successful, the court can find that they would have been successful if made at other

portions of the trial. This sub-claim is wholly dependent on sub-claim 1(e) for which an

evidentiary hearing has been ordered. None of the other sub-claims make sense as part of 1(f).

Sub-claim 1(g) has to do with a jury instruction(s) at the competency phase which

was not given. Of course, the propriety of jury instructions, whether given or not, are legal issues

for which no evidentiary hearing is appropriate. In addition, because this “lack of giving an

instruction” as phrased was not raised on direct review (only instructions given were addressed,

see People v. Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th at 815-818, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574-75), this issue could have

been raised on direct appeal and has been been procedurally barred. 

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Claim 2

Petitioner asserts in Claim 2: 

“The extended hiatus in the penalty phase and the publicity of the

competency trial created a significant risk that members of the jury

may have been exposed to prejudicial extraneous information

about the case...

Amended Petition para. 273

 ***

Had the court permitted voir dire [at the recommencement of the

penalty phase], the parties would have discovered prejudice

stemming from the hiatus....

Amended Petition, para. 278

After a decade plus of the pendency of this case, years after the exhaustion process, and years

after the filing of the operative petition, we know as much factually about the conclusions of

Claim 2 as we know now. Petitioner did not even mention Claim 2 in his initial briefing for

evidentiary hearing, and conceded, more or less, at hearing that this claim was not properly

subject to evidentiary hearing. No proffer of any facts have been made outside the bare

allegations of hiatus. Nor can petitioner claim that he has not been given sufficient time or

resources to investigate this claim. Petitioner has had a figurative blank check for investigation

because the Federal Defender has been co-counsel in this case. The Federal Defender does not

have to ask the court for investigative funds; those funds are available as the Federal Defender

sees fit. The court’s procedure for ferreting out claims that need an evidentiary hearing is

confirmed by this claim. The court will not hold an evidentiary hearing on the speculative

premise that something will fall out of the sky which might be of benefit to petitioner. 

Finally, petitioner asserts that Claim 2 is allied with Claim 21 alleging specific

instances of juror misconduct. Therefore, according to the argument, an evidentiary hearing

should be held on Claim 2. The undersigned disagrees. The prima facie facts set forth in Claim

21, which in part raise material issues of fact for that claim, rise or fall on their own merits. 

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11 Petitioner adds a one liner that publicity about the competency trial, a trial held in a

different county than the penalty phase, somehow infected the penalty phase. This one-liner is

completely unsupported as it applies to the jury as a whole. This does not rule out, however, that

a particular juror disobeyed the court’s instructions and sought out, or otherwise was provided

with such publications. Prejudicial pre-trial publicity is a different claim than juror misconduct. 

See Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1574 (n.1) (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).

12

Argument that those alleged instances of misconduct were caused by the hiatus in the penalty

phase case, a hiatus which petitioner concedes was necessary under California law, is sheer

speculation. No facts have been proffered which would establish such a connection. 

The undersigned makes no ruling here whether, as a matter of law, there is a time

period in which a penalty phase must be held after the end of the guilt phase. Petitioner is still

free to make that argument should he so desire. However, there will be no evidentiary hearing on

Claim 2.11

Claim 4

In this claim, petitioner asserts that his motions to suppress on Fourth

Amendments grounds were not adequately reviewed by the state supreme court, and that in any

event, the judge hearing the motions was biased. To the extent that petitioner claims that this

“state process” of review violates due process, this claim has been procedurally barred. To the

extent that petitioner is alleging that Stone v. Powell should not apply to the Fourth Amendment

claims he did raise, because he did not receive a fair hearing, petitioner is wrong as a matter of

law. In any event, neither assertion warrants an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner first claims that the preclusion of review of Fourth Amendment issues

as set forth in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), does not apply to capital

cases. Case law holds differently. 

There is nothing within the language of Stone v. Powell itself upon

which to base a distinction between capital and non-capital

collateral review. We have applied Stone without hesitancy to

capital cases. See, e.g., Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230, 114 S.Ct. 2730, 129 L.Ed.2d 853

(1994). Indeed, the principles of comity that underlie Stone v.

Powell, as well as the cost-benefit analysis postulated in

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Stone--i.e., the deterrent value vis-a-vis those tempted to violate

the proscriptions against illegal search and seizure weighed against

the risk that risk that trustworthy evidence would be

excluded--militate against the distinction Marshall would have us

draw. 

Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 81 (n.34) (3rd Cir.2002) .

 ***

As a result, under the clear language of Stone v. Powell, [FN26]

the district court did not err in holding that it lacked authority to

review these claims. [FN27] Devier urges that this doctrine does

not apply to capital cases. This court, however, has applied this

doctrine to capital cases in the past, [FN28] and we see nothing in

the language or reasoning of Powell itself or the Supreme Court’s

more recent pronouncements to support such a distinction.

Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1455 (11th Cir. 1993) (footnotes omitted).

See also McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1332 (6th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds, In

re Abdur Rahman, 392 F.3d 174 (6th Cir. 2004).

Petitioner next posits that even if Stone v. Powell applies in capital proceedings,

he did not receive the required fair opportunity to litigate his suppression claims. No inkling of

the specific Fourth Amendment claims at issue are set forth by petitioner. However, petitioner is

simply wrong that he did not receive a fair opportunity to litigate his claims. As set forth in

People v. Stanley, petitioner’s litigation of Fourth Amendment issues in the trial court, the

suppression proceedings, filled over 3,500 pages of transcript. The trial court outcome was then

heard (as appropriate under California law) on petitions for writ of mandate by the Court of

Appeal, and review was denied by the Supreme Court. Id, 10 Cal. 4th at 786, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

554. This alone bespeaks a fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment issues, and there is

not a scintilla of legal authority that suggests that this state process denied due process. But, the

issue was raised again on direct review of the judgment in the state supreme court, and after

finding that the law of the case doctrine barred further review, the state supreme court reviewed

the Court of Appeal rulings to determine whether they resulted in any substantial injustice. It

found none. Petitioner’s Stone v. Powell argument is meritless.

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In a discovery motion reprise, petitioner next contends in his operative petition in

Claim 4 that the trial judge who heard the suppression motion was biased on account of his dual

role as adviser to the grand jury who was reviewing yet another murder attributed to petitioner. 

Petitioner does not mention Claim 4 in the motion for evidentiary hearing, except to summarily

lump it with other claims to which petitioner claims entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. At a

discovery hearing wherein petitioner requested an opportunity to discover this claim, the

undersigned found as follows:

Petitioner asserts that he was denied a fair opportunity to have

adjudicated his motion to suppress on account of judicial bias. 

Petitioner paints a picture that Judge Patton, the judge who

presided at the motion, and one borrowed from Colusa County,

was actively seeking the indictment of petitioner in Colusa County

for the murder of Sheryl Wright. Petitioner alleges that: “Judge

Patton took it upon himself to pursue an indictment and to

determine why none had been obtained already.” Ultimately no

indictment occurred, notwithstanding Judge Patton’s insistence. 

In requesting voluminous and difficult discovery of Grand Jury

records, all correspondence of County Officials related to the

Wright murder/prosecution, amidst other requests, petitioner

proffers not a single fact supportive of the notion that Judge Patton

“pursued an indictment.” Despite the years of investigation,

petitioner’s counsel have not presented a single declaration

attesting to any conduct on the part of Judge Patton which might

even infer impropriety, much less recount it. Yet, the court is

asked to let loose a discovery barrage into events transpiring over

twenty years ago. Counsel did not even know at hearing whether

Judge Patton was alive at the present time to respond to any

requests.

In his discovery motion, petitioner exacerbates the problem by

making further improbable conclusions, i.e., that Judge Patton

encouraged the Grand Jury to investigate the District Attorney who

was declining to prosecute petitioner, and that he “sent the Grand

Jury legal authorities supporting its decision to try to force Mr.

Stanley to be prosecuted.” Again, no facts supporting this

assertion, even obliquely, are presented. Rather, the uncontested

facts set forth by respondent indicate that Judge Patton was the

single judge in Colusa County at the time of the Lake County

suppression motion, and part of his duties were responding to

requests of the Colusa County Grand Jury. It does appear that the

Colusa County Grand Jury was at odds with the District Attorney

over the Wright murder; it asked Judge Patton general questions

about the Grand Jury’s rights and authority in the matter. Judge

Patton generally advised the grand jury about its prerogatives. See

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12 Evidence relating to Ms. Wright’s murder was introduced in petitioner’s penalty phase,

but the motion to suppress did not involve facts pertinent to Ms. Wright’s murder.

15

Exhibit 46 to the state habeas petition.

The court in no way finds the facts of this matter as it stand before

the court to even possibly suggest that Judge Patton acted in a

manner which biased him in respect to his duties as the visiting

suppression judge in Lake County in the murder at issue for

petitioner’s conviction (Cindy Rogers (Stanley)).12 Petitioner is not

entitled to “‘explore [his] case in search of its existence.’” Rich v.

Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999). As respondent

aptly observed: “Petitioner could just as easily have claimed that

Judge Patton was a relative of one of Petitioner’s victims or had

been bribed by one of Petitioner’s enemies. Although any of those

claims, if true, would support an allegation of judicial bias, the

claim Petitioner has made is just as barren of specific supporting

allegations as those suggested at random by Respondent.” 

Opposition at 3-4. 

Order at 2-3.

This order was affirmed by the district judge on November 18, 2004. In this order, the

Honorable Frank Damrell thoroughly re-reviewed the entire Judge Patton question. He

concluded that:

“The magistrate judge correctly concluded that Judge Patton

complied with existing California law permitting grand juries to

elicit the advice of the court, or the judge thereof. Cal. Penal Code

§§ 917-918, 934. Here, the proffered documents suggest that

Judge Patton, the only superior court judge in Colusa County,

simply responded to the grand jury’s repeated requests for legal

advice regarding its authority to investigate the case and question

the District Attorney. Although Judge Patton contacted Deputy

Attorney General Tuton directly, petitioner fails to provide specific

allegations that this contact was anything but proper. In fact, the

inquiry supports respondent’s contention that Judge Patton merely

attempted to provide the grand jury with the information requested.

Order at 12-13.

Judge Damrell also concluded that Judge Patton was not required to recuse

himself under California law (even assuming a violation of this law would have stated a federal

issue).

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13 The court will not discuss shackling here in that shackling is the subject of a specific

claim. That claim is discussed infra. 

14 As to the need for a hearing.

16

Conversely, in the present case, petitioner fails to demonstrate that

Judge Patton’s actions would have resulted in disqualification....

Petitioner has failed to provide statutory or case law supporting his

contention that his former Lake County attorney should have been

notified that Judge Patton was providing advice to the jurors in via

(sic) purported “ex parte communication. The facts simply do not

support disqualification. Judge Patton acted within his authority

when upon request, he provided advice to [grand] jurors. 

Order at 15-16.

In seeking an evidentiary hearing, petitioner adds not one colorable fact which

would entitle him to evidentiary hearing despite this court’s scheduling order requirements. The

undersigned again notes petitioner’s years long access to investigators who could have contacted

any of the “players” in this alleged improper conduct. The record is completely silent as to such

investigation. The court can only conclude that having an evidentiary hearing would simply

replay the already known facts—this replay would not result in a different ending for petitioner.

Accordingly, because Claim 4 has been procedurally barred, and is without merit,

i.e., is not a colorable claim at this juncture, no evidentiary hearing will be ordered for Claim 4.

Claim 21

This claim, involving juror misconduct, by partial agreement of the parties, will be

the subject of evidentiary hearing. However, the precise issues for which hearing will be held

must be set forth.

Petitioner asserts that in Claim 21 the allegations of juror misconduct herein

involve the guilt phase, penalty phase, and competency phase jurors. Respondent agreed that a

hearing was necessary for the competency trial jurors. 

The issues upon which an evidentiary hearing will be held are13:

1. Voir Dire Responses of Juror Mitts (undisputed)14

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2. Improper communications and contact with trial outsiders by Juror Mitts

(undisputed)

3. Experiment by Juror Forbes

4. Penalty Phase Juror – Herbert (learning of competency verdict from outside

source)

5. Juror Franich – threatening note (Robinson also)

6. Juror Franich – staying with her mother – discussing with her mother facts of

the case

No evidentiary hearing will be held on:

7. Juror Schmedth belief that Franich felt intimidated by Stanley

8. Discussion of meaning of LWOP

9. Juror Expertise – Juror Robinson

10. Sleeping Juror

11. Discussion of Extraneous Victim Impact (interests of the victims)

12. Juror Note Taking

The court chooses to discuss the issues in the order set forth below. No

discussion will be made on those juror misconduct issues whose necessity to be aired at an

evidentiary hearing is undisputed.

Discussion of Meaning Of LWOP – #8 above

Petitioner alleges that the jurors in this case discussed the meaning of LWOP (life

without the possibility of parole), and whether that really meant life without parole. To the

extent that petitioner refers to the juror discussion of the subject itself as “extrinsic” because it

violated court instructions or misconstrued the law, the claim is non-actionable. However, to the

extent that the jurors brought evidence into the jury room, pertinent to the subject of the meaning

of LWOP, such a claim would be actionable. Petitioner presents no facts as to this latter

scenario.

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18

This case proceeds under AEDPA, and one looks first to established Supreme

Court authority for direction. That direction is found in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,

107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987), in which the Supreme Court refused evidence elicited from a juror that

her co-jurors had consumed alcoholic beverages during the trial. The Supreme Court, concerned

that post-verdict investigation into the jury’s verdict to see, inter alia, whether instructions had

been followed, whether jurors had “played nice,” and the like, would not permit the jury system

to survive the constant scrutiny to perfect the system. Any review of juror deliberations could

only be authorized where information truly “external” had been presented or sought out. Thus, a

failure to follow jury instructions (commenting on defendant’s failure to testify) in deliberations

is non-actionable, United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004), as is improper

comment on the absence of a co-defendant, United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir.

1983). Juror statements on feelings whether availability of therapy warranted a life sentence are

unreviewable. Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 591 (n.22) (2003). Fed. R. Ev. 606(b)

which codifies the exclusion of impeachment of verdict testimony by jurors is fully applicable in

habeas corpus proceedings, Fed. R. Ev. 1101(e), in the absence of habeas rules or established

case law which directs otherwise. Petitioner’s cited case of Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825,

834 (9th Cir. 2004) is not to the contrary in that the issues there did not involve jury discussion

per se of the meaning of LWOP, but rather “because the jurors may have used extrinsic evidence

in ascertaining the meaning of ‘life without parole.’” Id. Finally, Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393

F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004) is also inapposite to petitioner’s contention in that the court refused to

permit an evidentiary hearing on juror comments: (1) that the juror had been through this before,

and the defendant was guilty; (2) that the juror referred to her own medical expertise in opining

that the defendant was mentally ill; (3) that an insanity defense should have been mounted; (4)

that the defendant, if convicted, would receive adequate health care. Although Grotemeyer

expressed concern about statements regarding sentencing during guilt deliberations in a noncapital case, id. at 880, this is also inapposite in that the jurors in petitioner’s case were rightfully

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discussing sentence at the penalty phase of a capital case.

Petitioner presents evidence that several jurors did not believe that life without

parole really meant such. Petitioner, having fully investigated the juror’s statements, produces no

evidence that, for example, an outside magazine article was brought in, or a T.V. show opining

the same was discussed. Rather, all petitioner brings forward is that the jurors did not believe

that “life meant life.” Conclusions based on general life experience are not susceptible to postverdict review. Grotemeyer supra. An alleged failure to follow instructions is not actionable. 

Petitioner is silent about any extraneous evidence concerning such, and the pretrial scheduling

order required a proffer. The court can only find that no such evidence exists, and that an

evidentiary hearing on such would be a waste of resources.

No evidentiary hearing will be held on this sub-claim. 

Experiment by Juror Forbes – #3 above

No party takes issue with the premise, in the abstract, that a juror who performs an

experiment outside the confines of the courtroom has engaged in jury misconduct. Respondent

relies on a declaration by the juror that the experiment was attempted long after the verdict. 

Petitioner has presented evidence that the experiment may have been performed during the

course of the competency proceedings. Petitioner is correct that an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to sort this out.

Juror Robinson’s Use of Expertise – # 9 above

Accepting petitioner’s proffered facts as true, the court finds that the denial of this

claim by the California Supreme Court was correct on its merits. Hence, no evidentiary hearing

need be held.

Petitioner has proffered the following facts from two declarations by Juror

Robinson:

I learned about Jerry Stanley’s cleft palate from the video tape of

him that was shown in court. Other than the video little was

explained about his cleft palate. I work as a Speech Therapist, and

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have worked with students with cleft palates that have not been

seriously affected by this disability. I gave a simple explanation

about cleft palates to the other jurors.

 ***

That in my employment as a speech therapist, I am familiar with

individuals who have cleft palates. That during the jury

deliberations, I believe I provided the other jurors a simple

anatomical explanation of what a cleft palate is. However, due to

the passage of time, I do not recall exactly what I said, whether the

comment was made during the guilt or penalty phase of the trial,

which jurors were present when the comment was made, and at

which stage of deliberations this occurred at.

Petitioner’s Brief at 34.

Petitioner’s case is directly on point with Grotemeyer v. Hickman, supra (a case which petitioner

does not cite in this section). In Grotemeyer, a juror, who happened to be a medical doctor,

opined that Grotemeyer’s mental disorders caused him to commit his crime and that he would

receive treatment as part of his sentence.

As to these issues, Grotemeyer has cited no Supreme Court case,

and we have found none, holding that such conduct amounts to a

violation of his right of confrontation, of his right to an impartial

jury, or of any other constitutional right. It is, of course, well

established law that a juror may not bring into the jury room

evidence developed outside the witness stand such as the results of

a juror’s experiment conducted while the jury was on a weekend

recess, or legal research performed during the trial in an attempt to

supplement inadequate instructions from the judge. But what the

jury foreman did here, assuming that she should not have, did not

rise to the level of these constitutional violations.

 The mere fact that the jury foreman brought her outside experience

to bear on the case is not sufficient to make her alleged statements

violate Grotemeyer’s constitutional right to confrontation. Counsel

ordinarily learn during voir dire what a veniremember does for a

living, and use peremptory challenges to avoid jurors whose

experience would give them excessive influence. Dr. Papadakis’s

experience was not shared by the entire jury--it would be

extraordinary to have a jury of twelve physicians--but there is

nothing wrong with her using it. Juries have long been instructed,

in state and federal courts, to do precisely what the foreman did.

Usually the boilerplate instruction reads something like, “You are

to base your verdict only on the evidence received in the case. In

your consideration of the evidence received, however, you are not

limited to the bald statements of the witnesses or to the bald

assertions in the exhibits.... You are permitted to draw from the

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facts which you find have been proved such reasonable inferences

as you feel are justified in the light of your experience and common

sense.” [FN17] We have said in obiter dicta, and now hold, that “a

juror’s past personal experiences may be an appropriate part of the

jury’s deliberations.” [FN18] “Indeed, ‘50% of the jurors’ time [is]

spent discussing personal experiences,’” according to one

researcher.

 

The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to an “impartial” jury,

not to an ignorant one. That a physician is on the jury does not

deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to an impartial jury,

even though the physician will doubtless have knowledge and

experience bearing on any medical questions that may arise. Many

trials, including this one, boil down to a question of who is lying. 

It is hard to know who is lying without some understanding, based

on past personal experience, of the circumstances of the witnesses.

For example, Wigmore cites a case that a prosecutor lost because

his witness testified that a “ready-made pine door” cost ten dollars.

As the foreman of the jury--a carpenter by trade--explained,

“‘Well, he said ten dollars--and I knew he was a liar. A door like

that don’t cost but four-fifty!’” Often, jurors identify lies by

comparing the testimony, to the extent it deals with the familiar,

with what they already know to be true.

 ***

Because no impermissible extrinsic evidence was discussed, the

state court did not act improperly by denying the motion for a new

trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. 

Grotemeyer, 393 F.3d at 878-881 (footnotes omitted).

The present allegations are indistinguishable from those in Grotemeyer. 

Therefore, the undersigned can in no way say that the state court denying petitioner an

evidentiary hearing in this case and deciding the claim adversely to petitioner on the record

constitutes an “unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority.” No evidentiary hearing is

necessary on this claim.

Juror Herbert’s Statements Re Competency Verdict– # 4 above

Petitioner alleges, based on a declaration submitted in state court, that Juror

Herbert had heard about the competency verdict from an outside source and therefore put the

matter of petitioner’s mental health out of her mind at the penalty phase. Respondent has

introduced a declaration from Herbert that rebuts much of what she said. An evidentiary hearing

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is necessary on this claim.

Sleeping Juror – # 10 above

The parties submit conflicting evidence about the propensity of one juror,

identified as “noodle neck,” to sleep through portions of the trial. This claim was denied on its

merits by the state supreme court. As recounted above, in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,

107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987), defendant had sought to introduce evidence about alcoholic beverage

intake by certain jurors causing them to fall asleep at trial in the afternoon. The Supreme Court

affirmed the denial of an evidentiary hearing holding that the juror could not give testimony

about their perception of jurors either in court or during deliberations. Petitioner does not

contend that he has evidence of sleeping outside of the juror declarations. Therefore, given the

closeness of the allegations here to those in Tanner, the state supreme court’s determination on

the merits cannot possibly be an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

law. No evidentiary hearing will be held.

Feelings of Juror Intimidation Occasioned by Stanley – #7 above

The facts here are vague and inconclusive. Petitioner has proffered evidence that

a female juror, at one time sitting in close proximity to Stanley, felt intimidated. The evidence is

presented through the declaration of a male juror (Schmedth) who at one time was asked by a

bailiff to change seats with the female juror. Allegedly, the female juror told Schmedth that she

felt intimidated. Respondent takes issues with the facts, and posits that the female juror incident

was separate and apart from any incident in which jurors were asked to switch seats.

In any event, the factual controversy does not matter, because once again,

petitioner relies upon a juror’s statement about his perceptions of another juror’s state of mind

occasioned by what took place in the courtroom. As such, petitioner’s allegations run afoul of

Fed. R. Ev. 606(b). The situation here is no different than had the juror informed all other jurors

in the deliberation room that she was voting for the death penalty because she felt intimidated by

Stanley. Whatever the cause of the intimidation, e.g., the facts of Stanley’s senseless and cruel

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15 Petitioner does not ask for an evidentiary hearing on the allegation that “During the

course of trial male jurors in the case told her that she looked like one of Petitioner’s former

wives, and they told her that they would protect her from becoming another murder victim.” 

Amended Petition at 170. Therefore, that sub-claim will be denied at the appropriate time.

23

multiple murder history of females, or looks that Stanley may have given her, the court will not

accept testimony to impeach the verdict based on a juror’s internal thought process.

The undersigned emphasizes that this is not a situation where the juror

communicated her significant fears to the judge, and the judge took no action whatsoever,

including actions to ensure that the affected jurors could remain fair and impartial. See generally

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450 (1954); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

567, 624-628 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner does not cite to any record where the judge was

informed about any alleged intimidation. The facts presented by petitioner, even assuming their

truth, do not make out a colorable claim, and hence no evidentiary hearing is necessary.

Juror Franich – Claim #’s 5 and 6 above

Petitioner first alleges that this juror stayed with her mother while the trial was

underway and she spoke to her mother about the proceedings. Petitioner alleged in the Amended

Petition at page 170:

Franich stayed with her mother off and on during the course of the

trial, and she spoke with her mother about the testimony in the case

while the testimony was ongoing. Her mother told her that

Petitioner was a really bad person, whereupon Franich agreed with

her mother.15

The allegation is asserted based on petitioner’s “investigation,” and petitioner

belatedly produced the declaration of the investigator setting forth what would appear to be

inappropriate comments by Juror Franich. An evidentiary hearing will be held on this sub-claim.

The second Franich allegation does have substance derived from the record. 

There is no dispute that a threat to this juror, and one other, was sent and received by Franich’s

parents. Police reports have been submitted which verify these facts. The police reports indicate

that Franich’s parents agreed not to tell her about the note. However, petitioner has submitted

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facts which indicate that some jurors were aware of “something” in that some jurors discussed

their awareness of police surveillance. The facts here are insufficiently clear to rule one way or

the other whether petitioner’s jury, or some jurors, were aware of death threats, whether the

threats were seriously taken, etc. An evidentiary hearing will be held on this sub-claim.

Extraneous Victim Impact – # 11 above

Petitioner asserts that during deliberations a juror argued in favor of a death

sentence because death was the only way to vindicate the interests of the victims or the victims’

families. Citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), petitioner argues that

the Supreme Court has proscribed such evidence from being considered at trial. Petitioner

confuses what evidence may not be permitted during the course of trial with juror misconduct. 

Petitioner presents a case of quintessential juror deliberations which may not be inquired about at

evidentiary hearing. If the system permits such interrogation of jurors after the fact on every

possible errant thought that a juror might have, we might as well place video and tape recorders

in the jury room, and inform the jurors they are being watched at all times for any mistake. Of

course, as Tanner pointed out, we would then destroy the jury system through qualitative

oversight. Based on the authority set forth above of Rule 606(b), petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing on this topic is denied. 

Juror Note-Taking – # 12 above

Petitioner asserts that the jury relied too much on the notes of one juror who

happened to be a copious, if not excessive, note taker. Although the undersigned is aware of jury

instructions that caution a juror about reliance, or excessive reliance, on the notes of other jurors,

the undersigned is aware of no Supreme Court authority that establishes that such reliance on the

notes of others constitutes a constitutional violation. Nor is the court convinced that petitioner’s

argument is anything on a variant of several other attempts to intrude on the deliberations of the

jurors. An evidentiary hearing on this sub-claim will be denied.

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16 Stanley has overwhelmed the court with correspondence, and the court’s general

practice pursuant to previous order was to disregard such correspondence. However, this letter

posits facts, among other things, within the personal knowledge of Stanley. The letter was filed

in the public record, scanned, and the deputy attorney general would have had knowledge of this

letter. Certainly, the deputy attorney general could present this letter with a request to expand the

record. Since the letter is now “of record,” the court sees no need to expand it.

25

Claim 25 – Shackling

The operative petition alleges that Stanley was shackled at some point during the

competency hearing. Petitioner’s counsel presents evidence from juror declarations which

suggest, vaguely, that “a number of jurors” saw Stanley in shackles at some point during the

competency trial, but judging from subsequent declarations, it is not at all clear whether such a

sighting was in the courtroom or on the way to the courtroom. Without discussing all the law on

shackling herein, normally, an evidentiary hearing would have to be held.

However, Stanley himself has filed statements where he retracts this claim and

unequivocally asserts that he was never shackled during the trial itself, and perhaps, never

shackled at any time he was in the courthouse. Letter of June 6, 2005.16 Also, petitioner’s

counsel point to no discussion of shackling in the record—a point which almost would have to

have been discussed had shackling in the courtroom been permitted. Counsel assiduously avoid

any reference to trial counsels’ past or present observations in this regard.

Because neither petitioner, nor his counsel, assert that Stanley is incompetent to

proceed in this habeas action, the court will accept Stanley’s retraction as it is based upon a

percipient fact within Stanley’s knowledge and does not require expertise; it also appears

credible due to the absence of any contemporaneous comment by court personnel. No

evidentiary hearing will be held on this claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Claims 1, 22, 23, 24, 26

The ineffective assistance issues for Claim 1 have been adjudicated in the section

discussing Claim 1, supra, and will not be repeated here.

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Claim 22 is only an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in part. The first part

of the claim is that the presiding judge in the guilt and penalty phases should have know

petitioner was incompetent. This claim mirrors Claim 1(a), which was procedurally barred;

however, for whatever reason, this claim was not procedurally barred. By repetition, petitioner

has overcome the bar to a retrospective competency hearing. The court has also previously

addressed this assertion in Claim 1 insofar as petitioner will be granted an evidentiary hearing to

attempt to prove retrospective incompetency within the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance

of counsel. However, most of this part of Claim 22, i.e., the “judge should have known” will be

decided on the record, unless judges are now held to the expertise standards of Board certified

psychiatrists. The court does not find, however, that expert testimony will be useless on this

point.

The second part of Claim 22 also mirrors Claim 1 in that petitioner claims that his

counsel were ineffective in not “sooner” recognizing that petitioner was incompetent. As related

earlier, an evidentiary hearing will be held. In either case, the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim will rise and fall with this determination. 

Claim 23 asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the

penalty phase presentation. Petitioner argues that counsel did not inform their expert(s)

sufficiently for them to arrive at opinions that would have “undermined” confidence in the death

verdict. 

Respondent is correct in that no claim of ineffective assistance of expert exists.

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1519-1522 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting such a claim within a

Teague analysis). Moreover, an attorney cannot be faulted for relying upon the informed opinion

of his experts—no matter whether other experts believe the opinion to be wrong. Hendricks v.

Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Boyde v. Brown, supra, 404 F. 3d at

1168. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that counsel have duties to supply their capital case

experts with sufficient information, to which presumably the expert does not have ordinary

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access, Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1117-1118 (9th Cir. 1999), and duties to present

factual evidence which corroborates the basis for the expert’s opinion. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at

1044. 

The court needs to hear from trial counsel as to the background investigated,

accepted, provided to experts and/or rejected. If deficient in one of these areas, the court will

need to assess expert evidence on the prejudice issue. An evidentiary hearing must be held on

this aspect of Claim 23.

Finally, the court turns to Claim 24. Petitioner collectively asserts herein that

petitioner’s mental deficits indicates that he is “not guilty,” i.e., actually innocent, and that he

was not competent in any aspect of his trial. The former claim is not actionable on latter day

expert opinion, Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d at 1168. The latter claim has been thoroughly hashed

out in the previous claims, and an evidentiary hearing will be held, or not, as indicated. The

court will order an evidentiary hearing on Claim 24, along with the other claims for these

reasons. 

Claim 26 is a catch-all ineffective assistance. No evidentiary hearing will be held

on this claim, except, of course, as other individual claims of ineffective assistance warrant a

hearing as previously discussed.

Prosecutorial Suppression of Material Information – Claim 27

Claim 27 has two aspects to it – (a) allegations that the prosecution suppressed the

“evidence” of a district attorney’s opinion at the penalty phase trial; (b) the threatening note sent

to a juror’s (or jurors’) family was not disclosed to the defense. No one disagrees with the

proposition that the prosecution has a duty to turn over “exculpatory” or “impeaching” evidence. 

With respect to the latter aspect of the threatening note (b), an evidentiary hearing

has been ordered in another context, see above, and therefore, an evidentiary hearing is ordered

for this aspect of the claim as well.

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17 The California Supreme Court used the letter “C” for Cheryl’s first name. The

undersigned will do likewise.

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However, no hearing will be ordered for the former aspect (a), i.e., the District

Attorney opinion, because such opinion would not be relevant evidence, even in a penalty phase

where the rules of evidence are relaxed with respect to the presentation of mitigating evidence.

This issue of the District Attorney opinion came about with respect to introduction

of aggravating evidence in the penalty phase—the introduction of unadjudicated violent activity

on the part of petitioner involving the uncharged murder of Cheryl Renee Wright.17 To place this

issue in context, the court repeats the summary of evidence set out by the state supreme court:

The prosecution presented evidence showing defendant murdered

Cheryl Renee Wright on August 10, 1980. Beverly Johnston,

Wright’s mother, testified she spoke with Wright at 6:30 p.m. that

day. Wright was then at her sister Rhonda’s house in Sacramento.

Rhonda testified Wright left to return to her apartment in Redding

around 7:15 or 7:30 p.m., dressed in a wine-colored strapless

jumpsuit in a flowered pattern. She had no more than $50 with

her. Johnston attempted to reach Wright in Redding at 10 p.m.

Wright’s boyfriend, Randy Orum, was waiting there for her.

Wright had called him at the apartment around 8 p.m. and again

within the hour. Johnston called Wright’s apartment again around

midnight and still later, at 2 a.m., and then called the Highway

Patrol.

Around 9 p.m. two employees of a service station in Williams saw

defendant drive into the station in a light-colored Camaro. He was

with a girl identified as Wright. She made several phone calls and

changed her clothes. Defendant discussed with the service station

employees how to fix the tire on her Vega. Defendant had

previously been seen at the station driving a brown and tan pickup

truck with an Oakland Raiders sticker. Defendant and Wright

discussed towing her car. He claimed he had a friend about six

miles out in the country who had a Vega, and that he could get two

tires and wheels so she could get her car fixed. The tow service

operator had been in the area for 22 years and knew almost

everyone; according to him, no one in the area owned a Vega. 

When defendant left the station, he drove toward the northbound

I-5 ramp, which also led to Highway 20.

Wright’s Vega, with a badly damaged rear tire and low left tire,

was found north of Williams at 2:40 a.m. on August 11, 1980.

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18 As the reader will recall, this murder figured in the Judge Patton issue above, i.e.,

whether he abused his office in seeking to influence the grand jury to override the District

Attorney’s decision. That issue has been adversely decided to petitioner.

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On August 17, 1980, Wright’s body was found buried under gravel

at an abandoned oil well on Bear Valley Road off Highway 20. 

She had died as a result of a head wound inflicted by a .25-caliber

bullet fired from a semiautomatic pistol. Death had occurred

between two days and two weeks earlier; the exact time of death

could not be determined due to deterioration of the body.

Police collected samples of the gravel that covered the body and of

the gravel that covered the floorboards on the driver’s side of the

Camaro defendant was driving on August 10. John Rapp, a

geologist for the California Division of Mines and Geology and a

specialist in rock identification, examined the samples and

concluded the gravel from the well site and the gravel from the

Camaro were virtually identical. He testified that kind of gravel

was not indigenous to Colusa County, being native only to

Southern California. The gravel at the well site and in defendant’s

car matched a kind of gravel dug in Bakersfield and delivered to

the mine by Coastal Engineering Company of Bakersfield in May

1979. Coastal Engineering Company had never delivered gravel

from that source anywhere else north of Sacramento.

During the search of Mrs. Stanley’s house police found .25-caliber

ammunition in the bedroom defendant had used, as well as in the

garage and master bedroom. 

People v. Stanley, 10 Cal. at 782-83, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552.

The California Supreme Court dealt with issues arising under state law concerning

use of this unadjudicated conduct which are not at issue in this motion. Here, the parties inform

the court that the District Attorney of Colusa County in reviewing this and/or other evidence did

not bring charges against Stanley for this murder.18 Petitioner’s habeas counsel assert, somewhat

ambiguously, that the decision of the District Attorney not to bring charges was “suppressed”

from the defense.

Respondent and petitioner miss the point of this issue. Each party speculates as to

why the District Attorney may not have brought charges—ranging from insufficient evidence to

“costs too much.” If the court were tasked with figuring out the reason for the District Attorney’s

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decision, no doubt an evidentiary hearing would be necessary. However, even assuming

petitioner’s theory, i.e., the District Attorney chose not to bring charges because he believed that

the evidence was insufficient for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, such an opinion by an

attorney, evidently disputed by the district attorney trying the capital case, is not admissible even

in the penalty stage—it is simply not reliable or relevant.

First, the court understands that with respect to mitigating evidence, generally

character or background, “relaxed standards govern the admission of mitigating evidence during

the penalty phase of a death penalty trial.” Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1996)

In so holding, the district court also relied upon our own decision

in Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507

U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 1363, 122 L.Ed.2d 742 (1993), where we said

that a court can exclude evidence at the penalty phase if it is

irrelevant, but cannot preclude “any relevant mitigating evidence.”

970 F.2d at 623, (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4,

106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)).

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d at 1440.

The court will even assume that rebuttal to aggravating evidence might be

considered mitigating evidence, although such is stretching the point of the above cases. The

court will assume that mitigating evidence would be considered exculpatory or impeaching. But

even making all these assumptions in petitioner’s favor, the court cannot find any prejudicial

error in not disclosing an attorney advocate’s opinion on the facts of the case. 

In California, in the penalty phase of a death penalty case, the prosecution must

prove unadjudicated violent, criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kennedy,

36 Cal. 4th 595, 636, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 196-197 (2005). Such a case is made out, or not, on

the facts presented to the jury. Petitioner can point to no case where it is constitutionally

mandated that the jury receive opinions from lawyer advocates on the sufficiency of the

evidence. One can just imagine the circus a penalty phase would degenerate into if both sides

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19 Each side could call the celebrity “talking heads” lawyers we all see on cable news; the

facts could then be lost within a sea of celebrity. Cross-examination would predominate on the

facts and circumstances of the celebrity lawyer’s preparation; perhaps we would be treated to

“war stories” of similar cases, and what happened to the jury verdicts therein.

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started presenting lawyer opinions on the ultimate factual issues a capital jury must decide.19

Certainly, the prosecution is forbidden in the first place to vouch for the evidence. This does not

mean that the defense can present legal opinions on evidence sufficiency unchecked. An

advocate’s opinion for either side on innocence or guilt, even on charges pertinent to a penalty

phase, is simply not relevant. Moreover, it would be difficult for any person in a close case

(given the burden of proof) from having a relevant opinion on the facts presented to the jury,

unless the advocate heard those facts in person—just as the jury does. Thus, a district attorney

who has simply screened evidence in a potential case months or years before is not qualified to

speak on the merits of what was later presented in court in a proceeding with which he had

nothing to do.

Nor would the defense have a right to the work product of that prosecutor. 

Petitioner here had no more right to the opinion on the evidence of a prosecutor in Colusa County

than he had the right to listen in to strategy sessions of the prosecutor trying his case.

The only information asserted in Claim 1 that arguably was not

previously known to the defense is the existence of prosecutorial

theories and suspicions, rather than knowledge of facts or

evidence. Prosecutors are under no obligation to disclose their

theories, thought processes, or even all investigatory work. 

Siripongs v. Calderon, 167 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1999).

For example, what if the prosecutor ever doubted the merits of his case. Would

he then have to disqualify himself, confess his doubt to the defense, and thereby become the

defense witness? Of course, not. There is not a [good] attorney alive who has not questioned his

case and chances for success in difficult or close cases. Such moments of doubt on the part of

advocates are not relevant mitigating evidence.

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Petitioner does not claim that any facts of the unadjudicated murder were withheld

from him, or which his attorneys could not have reasonably discovered on their own. The

undersigned will rely on the presumption that the jury understood the jury instruction

requirement not to use this unadjudicated criminal, violent conduct unless it was established

beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that an attorney, if called as a witness, might disagree is

irrelevant. Because it is irrelevant, it follows that any “suppression” did not occur with respect to

material evidence. No evidentiary hearing will be permitted.

Conclusion

An evidentiary hearing is ordered as provided above. 

If the parties seek reconsideration, because of the necessity to stay on track to the

completion of this case, the undersigned will not grant any request for stay or for change of dates

based on the request for reconsideration. There is sufficient agreement on the need for an

evidentiary hearing such that insufficient prejudice will accrue to either party if the present

schedule is maintained. Petitioner can rather easily be prepared for added claims in time for

evidentiary hearing given the amount of work performed on those claims thus far; insufficient

prejudice will accrue to respondent in having to prepare for a claim which may ultimately be

found to be inappropriate for evidentiary hearing in that a good deal of the preparations have

probably been performed already. Most importantly, further delay in this many years old case

would be far more prejudicial than either side could legitimately present.

Any request for a stay made to the district judge shall include a quoted, verbatim,

reference to the preceding paragraph.

DATED: 9/2/05 

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 __________________________________

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

stan1500.evi

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