Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00059/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00059-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOUTH YUBA RIVER CITIZENS 

LEAGUE, a non-profit corporation, and 

FRIENDS OF THE RIVER, a non-profit 

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES 

SERVICE; REBECCA M. BLANK, as 

Acting Secretary of Commerce; 

RODNEY MCINNIS, as Regional 

Administrator of the NMFS Southwest 

Region; UNITED STATES ARMY 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS; JOHN 

MCHUGH, as Secretary of the Army; 

COLONEL WILLILAM J. LEADY, P.E., 

as District Commander, Sacramento 

District,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00059-MCE-EFB

ORDER

This environmental litigation concerns implementation of a 2012 biological opinion 

(“BiOp”) prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”). That BiOp

addresses the continued operation of two different dams maintained by the Army Corps 

of Engineers (“Corps”) and located along the upper portions of the Yuba River in 

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Northern California. Plaintiffs South Yuba River Citizens League and Friends of the 

River (“Plaintiffs”) allege that by extending certain deadlines contained in the 2012 BiOp 

at the request of the Corps, the NMFS has exacerbated the risk to certain threatened 

fish and in so doing has violated provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1531, et seq. (“ESA”). Plaintiffs have sued the NMFS, the Corps, and various 

governmental officials (collectively referred to as “Federal Defendants” unless otherwise 

noted). According to Plaintiffs, their objective was to compel NMFS and the Corps to 

implement all the measures called for in the 2012 BiOp. Pls.’ Compl., ¶¶ 41-46.

The Federal Defendants moved to stay Plaintiffs’ case on grounds that because 

the NMFS had already agreed to prepare a new BiOp that had the potential to obviate 

the need for all or part of this litigation, a stay was appropriate pending issuance of that 

new BiOp. By Memorandum and Order filed August 13, 2013, this Court agreed with the 

Federal Defendants and stayed Plaintiffs’ case. That Order also denied the concurrently 

pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs. Moreover, given the stay 

imposed, the Court further denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 

moot, while permitting that motion to be reinitiated should the stay be lifted.1 

Through the Motion presently before the Court, Plaintiffs move to dismiss the 

case now that the new BiOp was issued by the NMFS on May 12, 2014. Plaintiffs further 

move for attorneys’ fees and costs, calculated at $465,227.95 in fees and $2,764.83 in 

costs as of the filing of the Motion. Moreover, by the time of the filing of their Reply, 

Plaintiffs allege that their fees had risen by some $106,155.00 for time incurred in 

drafting the reply and supporting documentation, bringing the total fees claimed for some 

$571,383.07. While not opposing Plaintiffs’ request for dismissal, the Federal 

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover fees and costs because they 

 1 The August 13, 2013 Memorandum and Order also stayed Yuba County Water Agency v. 

National Marine Fisheries Service, et al., Case No. 2:13-cv-00042-MCE-EFB (“YCWA”), which was related 

to the present matter by Order dated June 27, 2013. That case challenged the effects of water and 

hydroelectric interests of the measures designed to restore fish habitat as contemplated by the 2012 BiOp, 

and this Court’s stay order also denied as moot a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff 

in that case. The present motion pertains to the environmental lawsuit only. On September 15, 2014, this 

Court approved a stipulation dismissing the YCWA action, with each side bearing its own fees and costs. 

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cannot be considered a prevailing party. The Court agrees. Consequently, while the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ unopposed request that their case be dismissed, Plaintiffs

concurrent requests for fees and costs are DENIED.2 

The ESA allows the court to award costs of litigation to any party when, upon 

issuance of a final order, “the court determines such award is appropriate.” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(g)(4). These provisions were “meant to expand the class of parties eligible for 

fee awards from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties—parties achieving some 

success, even if not major success.” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 

(1993) (emphasis in original). A party achieves the requisite degree of success if he 

succeeds “on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit 

sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Nonetheless, 

insofar as the ESA’s fee shifting provisions operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity, 

they must be “construed strictly in favor of” the government. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 

685. As the Supreme Court has noted, “trivial success on the merits, or purely 

procedural victories,” fail to qualify for a fee award. Id. at 688 n.9. A party seeking fees 

must show that the lawsuit made “a substantial contribution to the goals of [the ESA] to 

be entitled to attorneys’ fees.” Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy v. Sec’y of the 

Interior, 748 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 1984). Alternatively, fees may be awarded under 

the ESA if the plaintiff obtains a “judicial imprimatur” of “success on the merits” that 

“alter[ed] the legal relationship of the parties.” Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 

1092 1096 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. 

Dep’t of Health, 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001).

Three different BiOps issued by the NMFS between March 27, 2002 and 

November 21, 2007 concluded that the Corps’ activities in operating and maintaining the 

Daguerre and Englebright dams along the upper Yuba River did not jeopardize the 

viability of three ESA-listed anadromous fish species, the Central Valley spring-run 

 2 Having determined that oral argument was not of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs in accordance with E.D. Local Rule 230(g).

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Chinook Salmon, the Central Valley steelhead and the southern green sturgeon. Then, 

following separate litigation involving the propriety of the third 2007 BiOp, the Corps 

reinitiated consultation with the NMFS which resulted in issuance of a fourth BiOp in 

2012. Unlike its predecessors, the 2012 BiOp concluded that the Corps’ activities in 

maintaining the two dams blocked access to suitable habitat and spawning areas for the 

fish species at issue. The BiOp recommended reasonably prudent alternative (“RPA”) 

proposals that the NMFS believed would help safeguard fish viability and included 

measures like near and long-term fish passage, gravel injection to improve spawning 

habitat, predator control, channel restoration and species monitoring. On November 27, 

2012, after the Corps expressed both scientific and technical concerns about 

implementing the measures as proposed, the NMFS extended several of the deadlines 

contemplated by the 2012 BiOp. That decision prompted Plaintiffs herein to file the 

present action, which seeks to compel implementation of the 2012 BiOp, on January 11, 

2013.

In the meantime, on February 26, 2013, the Corps formally requested reinitiation 

of consultation proceedings under Section 7 of the ESA and agreed to continue 

implementing certain actions that would benefit the subject fish species during that 

additional consultation. The NMFS agreed to the requested reinitiation and, on April 11, 

2013, committed to develop a schedule that envisioned completion of a new BiOp on or 

before May 12, 2014, provided that the Corps provided the underlying biological 

assessment by October 22, 2013.

As stated above, given those reinitiation proceedings, this Court agreed that a 

stay made sense in order to avoid litigating the propriety BiOp that was already in the 

process of being superseded. The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ request that additional 

measures be taken, beyond those that the NMFS already agreed to take. It did order, 

consistent with the timetable advanced by Federal Defendants, that the Corps submit its 

final biological assessment by October 22, 2013, and that a new biological opinion be 

issued by May 12, 2014. The Court further ordered that the Federal Defendants 

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continue to engage in the mitigation measures it had already agreed to take to safeguard 

fish populations, stating as follows:

During the pendency of reinitiation proceedings, which will 

conclude with issuance of NMFS’ final biological opinion, the 

Corps is directed to continue its ongoing efforts to ameliorate 

any adverse projects of the project on the subject fish. Said 

measures are to include a) inspection and maintenance of 

the Daguerre fish ladders; b) placement and monitoring of 

5,000 tons of gravel for spawning habitat; c) salmonid red 

surveys as specified in the 2012 BiOp; and d) placement and 

monitoring of large woody material between Englebright and 

Daguerre, as also called for in the 2012 BiOp.

August 13, 2013 Mem. and Order, ECF No. 42, 20:9-15.

The NMFS issued its new BiOp on May 12, 2014, in accordance with the Court’s 

Order, and consistent with the Order the previously imposed stay was lifted at that time. 

As indicated above, in the wake of that new BiOp, Plaintiffs now move to both dismiss 

their case premised on the 2012 BiOp and to recover the fees and costs they incurred in 

litigating that case. Federal Defendants oppose any fee or costs entitlement, arguing 

that Plaintiffs’ “won no favorable rulings on the merits of any claim; did not prevail on any 

disputed factual or legal issue” and ”achieved none of the goals of their litigation.” Defs.’ 

Op’n, 5:13-16. 

The case docket indeed shows that Plaintiffs failed to prevail on any of the 

motions filed in this matter: they unsuccessfully opposed the Federal Defendants’ stay 

request, their motion for a preliminary injunction was denied on the merits, and the 

motion for partial summary judgment they offered was denied as moot once the matter 

was stayed. Rather than enforce the provisions of the 2012 BiOp as Plaintiffs sought by 

way of their lawsuit, their case in fact concluded with the issuance of a new BiOp over 

Plaintiffs’ vigorous objection. Despite their lack of objective success, Plaintiffs 

nonetheless contend that they achieved the requisite success on the merits by:

1) obtaining a court order requiring the Corps to implement mitigation measures that it 

had already agreed to take; 2) reducing to a date certain the deadlines the Federal 

Defendants had already agreed to take with regard to preparation of the biological 

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assessment and BiOp; 3) achieving an automatic lift of the stay once the new BiOp 

issued; and 4) providing the catalyst for the Corps to conduct a reconnaissance study of 

fish passage alternatives on the Yuba River. Pls.’ Mot, 1:22-2:7.3

With respect to Plaintiffs’ first claim that it should be entitled to fees and costs 

because it reduced certain actions, already proposed by the Federal Defendants, to a 

court order, the Court disagrees. The Declaration of Randy Olsen submitted by the 

Federal Defendants in support of their Motion to Stay makes it clear that the Corps “will 

undertake” certain mitigation measures “to ensure that adverse effects to species and or 

designated critical habitat are minimized,” including “continu[ing] the existing 5,000 tons 

annual gravel placement monitoring program” and continuing to implement and monitor 

the placement of “large woody material,” both as described in the 2012 BiOp. ECF 

No. 23-3, ¶ 39. Given the Corps’ unequivocal representation that these mitigation 

measures would continue during the consultation period, the fact that the Court reduced 

that assurance to order form is insufficient to comprise any appreciable success on 

Plaintiffs’ part, let alone significantly change the respective position of the parties. While 

Plaintiffs argue that a court order permits Plaintiffs to advocate contempt proceedings in 

the event of noncompliance, that potentiality is not enough under the particular 

circumstances present here to support an award of fees and costs. 

Plaintiffs’ argument that Federal Defendants failed to always distribute, on an 

annual basis, gravel and large woody material into the Yuba River between 2008 and 

2012 is also not enough to tip the scales in Plaintiffs’ favor when the BiOps in effect at 

that time did not require such placement on an annual basis. Decl. of Randy P. Olsen, 

ECF No. 60-6, ¶¶ 8-11. With regard to Plaintiffs’ compliance with the 2012 BiOp, the 

 3 Plaintiffs also claim they successfully opposed the Federal Defendants’ October 2, 2013 Motion 

to Extend the Stay (ECF No. 43). That Motion, however, was made because of an unanticipated 

September 30, 2013 lapse in the appropriations act for funding executive agencies (causing a virtual 

shutdown of the federal government) and because the Federal Defendants did not know at that time when 

funding would be restored by Congress. In fact, however, appropriations were restored on October 17, 

2013, allowing the Corps to provide its biological assessment to the NMFS prior to the October 22, 2013 

deadline. Consequently, the Federal Defendants voluntarily withdrew their extension request on that basis 

prior to the scheduled October 31, 2013 hearing. ECF No. 45, 3:5-13. Under those circumstances, the 

Court rejects Plaintiffs’ claim that they were responsible for the deadline being satisfied.

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evidence shows that the Corps injected 500 tons of gravel in both 2012, 2013 and 2014. 

Id. at ¶ 10. 

With regard to the large woody placement, the 2007 BiOp required only that the 

Corps development and implement a long-term program to replenish such woody 

material in the lower Yuba River within four years of the date of the November 2007 

BiOp. Id. at ¶ 12. Consistent with that timetable, a Large Woody Material Management 

Plan was submitted by the Corps to the NMFS for approval on December 19, 2011. Id.

at ¶ 13. Wood placement was scheduled to begin on an annual basis in 2012. Because 

heavy rains in late 2012 made road providing access to the wood supply impassable, 

and since the United States Forest closed the roads until Spring 2013, the Corps notified 

the NMFS of the corresponding delay. The required woody placement thereafter did not 

occur until December 2013, with a second annual placement to occur in late 2014. Id. at 

¶ 15. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs’ claim that the Corps had “a long history of 

filling to implement” the requirements for placement of large woody material (and gravel), 

and that Federal Defendants would fail to implement those measure absent a court 

order, simply does not comport with the facts. 

The mere fact that an order was forthcoming in the wake of Federal Defendants’ 

assurances that mitigation measures would continue did not, contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim, 

contribute substantially to the implementation of the ESA so as to justify an award of 

fees and costs. 

Plaintiffs’ second and third claims, that obtaining a date certain for issuance of a 

new BiOp and lifting of the court’s stay also constituted the requisite success on the 

merits, are equally unavailing. The Federal Defendants’ own proposed order submitted 

in support of its motion to stay or remand the related YCWA case proposed the following 

schedule for the ESA consultation: “By October 22, 2013, the Corps shall submit to 

NMFS the final biological assessment...Within 201 days of receipt by the Corps of the 

biological assessment [i.e., by May 12, 2014] NMFS shall issue a final Biological Opinion 

on the Corps’ proposed action.” YCWA, ECF No. 44-2, 2:1-7. Significantly, after the 

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Federal Defendants moved for a corresponding stay in this case, the Court adopted the 

same deadlines already proposed by the Federal Defendants in YCWA. ECF No. 42, 

20:2-8. Moreover, the Federal Defendants’ own Motion to Stay sought “a stay of all 

proceedings in the above-captioned litigation pending completion of the ongoing ESA 

Section 7 consultation process between NMFS and the Corps.” ECF No.23, 2:9-10. 

Therefore this Court’s adoption of the consultation schedule and stay advanced by the 

Federal Defendants hardly had anything to do with Plaintiffs’ own efforts, or their 

success thereon, so as to support any entitlement to fees and costs.

Plaintiff’s fourth and final grounds for arguing they achieved success on the merits 

rests with their contention that the threat of ongoing litigation, once the stay was lifted, 

provided the necessary “catalyst” for the Corps to finally conduct a reconnaissance 

study of fish passage alternatives on the Yuba River in 2014. Under a “catalyst” theory, 

however, there must be a causal link between the relief obtained (here the 

reconnaissance study) and the lawsuit. Or. Natural Resource Council v. Turner, 

863 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Or. 1994). The requisite causal connection exists where 

the litigation was a “material factor” in the resulting actions. Ass’n of Cal. Water 

Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2004).

Although the Corps was required to conduct studies related to fish passage past 

the dams in the 2012 BiOp, the delay in commencing the reconnaissance study had 

nothing to do with the lawsuit. As the Declaration of Cheree Peterson explains, the 

Corps may not initiate any reconnaissance study without first receiving appropriations 

from Congress. ECF No. 60-4, ¶ 3. In March of 2010, the Corps began efforts to initiate 

a study as it submitted its Fiscal Year 2012 budget proposals. The Corps’ February 

2011 budget submission sought $100,000.00 funding to assess fish passage at the 

Daguerre and Englebright Dams. Id. at ¶ 6, 7. Nonetheless, the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act for 2012, P.L. 112-74, did not contain funding for the so-called Yuba 

River Reconaissance Study. Id. at ¶ 8. The Fiscal Year 2013 Budget renewed the 

$100,000.00 study request, but again no funding was provided. It was not until 

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January 17, 2014, that an appropriation for the study (ultimately in an increased amount 

of $150,000.00) was finally made. As Ms. Peterson, Chief of the Civil Works Integration 

Division for the Corps’ South Pacific Division, explained, it was the delay in receiving the 

required appropriations, which had been sought long before this lawsuit was initiated in 

2013, as opposed to anything relating to this lawsuit itself, that ultimately permitted the 

study to proceed. See id. at ¶ 6. Accordingly the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that 

there was any causal connection between their lawsuit and authorization for the study.

For all of the above reasons, this Court determines that it would not be 

appropriate to award Plaintiffs the costs of litigation they incurred pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(g)(4). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Dismissal and for Attorneys’ Fees and 

Costs (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.4 The Motion is granted 

with regard to Plaintiffs’ unopposed request for dismissal but denied with respect to fees 

and costs. This matter having been concluded in its entirety, the Clerk of Court is 

directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2015

 4 The Court notes that the Federal Defendants also have filed a Motion to Strike, or in the 

Alternative for Leave to File Sur-Reply, given Plaintiffs’ claim, as set forth in their reply papers to the 

instant motion, that they are entitled to an additional $106,155.00 for fees incurred in drafting the reply. 

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees and costs of any kind, that Motion 

(ECF No. 68) is DENIED as moot.

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