Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00589/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00589-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stanley Fishman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

AIG Insurance Co., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 07-0589-PHX-RCB

ORDER

Background Although the complaint is dated July 4, 2006, plaintiff,

acting pro se, did not file it until March 20, 2007 (doc. 1). A

few days later, on March 22, 2007, the court granted plaintiff’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 4). Among other

things, that order explicitly instructed plaintiff that he “shall

be responsible for service by waiver or of the summons and

complaint. Id. at 1. On April 4, 2007, the Clerk of the Court

issued a summons in this action and mailed a copy to plaintiff

(doc. 5). The “Return of Service” included with that summons is

blank. See id. at 2. However, on May 4, 2007, plaintiff filed a

letter from the United States Postal Service indicating that on

April 11, 2007 an unspecified “item” was delivered via certified

Case 2:07-cv-00589-RCB Document 11 Filed 11/30/07 Page 1 of 8
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1 It is unclear from that document whether “A.I.G. Insurance Co” was

written thereon by a Postal Service employee, plaintiff, or someone else,

although based upon plaintiff’s handwritten submissions, it appears to have been

written by him. 

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mail to “AIG Insurance Company,”1 16001 North 28th Avenue,

Phoenix, Arizona 85053 (doc. 6).

 When defendant did not answer or otherwise respond, on August

13, 2007, plaintiff filed a “motion” seeking “judgement [sic] and

punitive damages and [dismissal] with prejudice[.]” Doc. 7. He

filed a second similar “motion” that same day. Doc. 8. Stamped

on both motions is a notation from the Clerk of the Court that

those “DOCUMENT[S] [ARE] NOT IN PROPER FORM ACCORDING TO FEDERAL

AND/OR LOCAL RULES AND PRACTICES AND [ARE] SUBJECT TO REJECTION

BY THE COURT.” Docs. 7 and 8 (emphasis in originals). 

Thereafter, on September 10, 2007, plaintiff filed what the Clerk

of the Court deemed to be a “Notice” seeking an “answer and

judgement [sic][.]” Doc. 9. In contrast to the two motions,

plaintiff indicated on that “Notice” that it was mailed to

defendant. See id. A few weeks later, on September 27, 2007,

plaintiff filed a letter with the court “ordering and demanding”

the court to enter judgment in his favor and award punitive

damages. Doc. 10. As with the two motions, there is no

indication that this letter was ever served upon defendant. 

Defendant has not appeared, answered, or responded to plaintiff’s

motions in any way. 

Discussion

I. Service of Process

 The court construes plaintiff’s motions (docs. 7 and 8) as

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seeking a default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. 

Before addressing those motions, however, there is the more

fundamental issue of whether defendant has been properly served. 

This issue is critical because “[w]ithout a proper basis for

jurisdiction, or in the absence of proper service of process, the

district court has no power to render any judgment against the

defendant’s person or property unless the defendant has consented

to jurisdiction or waived the lack of process.” S.E.C. v. Ross,

2007 WL 2983707, at *6 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007) (citing, inter

alia, Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir.

1992)) (emphasis added). Simply put, “[a] judgment entered

without jurisdiction over the defendant is void.” Id.

 “‘A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a

defendant unless the defendant has been served in accordance with

FED. R. CIV. P. 4.’” Id. (quoting Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489,

492 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (“Service of

a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish

jurisdiction over the person of a defendant[.]”) In the present

case, the record does not reflect that plaintiff obtained a

waiver of service from defendant as Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) allows. 

In the absence of such a waiver, it was incumbent upon plaintiff

to serve defendant in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.

 Evidently defendant “AIG Insurance” is a business entity, and

as such Rule 4(h) governs service upon it. In accordance with

Rule 4(h)(1) a business entity which does not voluntarily appear

and defend may be served: 

 in a judicial district of the United States

in the manner prescribed for individuals by 

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2 Rule 4(e)(1) provides in pertinent part that “[u]nless otherwise

provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not

been obtained and filed, . . . , may be effected in any judicial district of the

United States: . . . pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court

is located, or in which service is effective, for the service of a summons upon

the defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the

State[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Because this district court is located within

the state of Arizona, the court looks to Arizona state law governing service of

process. The applicable Arizona rule is remarkably similar to Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(h)(1), and states as follows:

Service upon a domestic or foreign corporation . . . 

from which a waiver has not been obtained and 

filed, shall be effected by delivering a copy of the 

summons and of the pleading to a partner, an officer, a 

managing or general agent, or to any other agent 

authorized by appointment or by law to receive service 

of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute 

to receive service and the statute so requires, by also 

mailing a copy to the party on whose behalf the agent 

accepted or received service.

ARCP 4.1(k). 

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subdivision (e)(1),2 or by delivering a copy of 

the summons and of the complaint to an officer, 

a managing or general agent, or to any other

agent authorized by appointment or by law to 

receive service or process and, if the agent 

is one authorized by statute to receive service 

and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 

copy to the defendant[.] 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1) (footnote and emphasis added). As just

described then, service of process is sufficient if it conforms

either to the applicable federal or state rule. Thus, to

determine whether defendant was properly served in this case, the

court will look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and,

because this court is located in Arizona, it also will look to

that state’s service of process rules. 

 A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

 As previously alluded to, evidently plaintiff attempted to

effect service by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to

defendant. When serving a business entity pursuant to Rule 4(h),

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3 The court observes that the Arizona Corporation Commission listings

do not include an entity named “A.I.G. Insurance Company,” although there are

several entities with similar names which also appear to be in the insurance

business. See Arizona Corporation Commission, http://www.cc/state/az/us/ (last

visited Oct. 18, 2007). Further, none of the listed AIG entities indicates that

their address is 16001 North 28th Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85053 – the address

to which plaintiff supposedly mailed the summons and complaint. 

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however, “personal service on someone at” that entity is

“require[d] . . . and service by mail to a general corporate

address is not sufficient.” Belle v. Chase Home Finance LLC,

2007 WL 1518341, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2007) (citing, inter

alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) advisory committee’s note to 1993

Amendments)). In the present case, at best it appears that

plaintiff mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to a

“general corporate address.”3 See id. Plainly this is

insufficient to properly effect service under Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(h)(1). 

 B. Arizona Law

 Nor does the record establish that defendant was properly

served in accordance with Arizona law. Arizona allows service by

mail upon parties “outside the state[.]” ARCP 4.2©. It does not

appear as though this defendant is “outside the state” however. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s attempted service by mail was ineffective. 

Even if defendant is “outside the state,” nonetheless plaintiff

did not properly serve defendant under that Rule because he did

not file an acknowledgment signed under oath or affirmation by

the defendant. See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Corral

Restaurants, Inc., 925 P.2d 260 (Ariz. 1996) (court lacked

jurisdiction over corporation served by mail where no

acknowledgment of receipt of service under oath was returned and

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4 Rule 4(m) requires service of the summons and complaint upon the

defendant within 120 days “after the filing of the complaint[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(m). Here, because the complaint was filed on March 20, 2007, plaintiff had 120

days thereafter in which to serve the summons and complaint. 

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filed as ARCP 4.1(c)(2) requires), supplemented on

reconsideration, 930 P.2d 1001 (Ariz. 1997). Thus, defendant was

not properly served by mail under Arizona law.

 Assuming, as it appears, that plaintiff was attempting to

serve defendant pursuant to ARCP 4.1(k), for the same reason that

service was defective under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1), it is also

defective under that state rule. Service by mail alone does not

satisfy ARCP 4.1(k). 

 To summarize, because plaintiff has not properly served

defendant under either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or

pursuant to Arizona law, this court’s power over defendant

“remain[s] nothing more than a potentiality.” See S.E.C. v.

Ross, 2007 WL 2983707, at *7. Thus, as this juncture the court

has two options. It may either dismiss the action without

prejudice or quash service. S.J. v. Issaquah School Dist. No.

411, 470 F.3d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 2006). Because it appears

that proper service may be effected, the court sua sponte quashes

any purported service upon defendant. See Grand Canyon Resort

Corp. v. Drive-Yourself Tours, Inc., 2006 WL 1722314, at *7 (D.

Ariz. 2006) (citing Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30-31 (3rd

Cir. 1992)) (“If it appears that proper service may be effected,

quashing service is preferred.” ) Further, although the 120 day

filing period has passed in this case,4

 taking into account

plaintiff’s pro se status, in the exercise of its discretion

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), plaintiff has sixty (60) days from

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the date of this order in which to either (1) properly serve

defendant in accordance with the applicable law, or (2) file a

waiver of service as Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) allows. Failure to

properly and timely serve defendant or to properly and timely

file a waiver will result in dismissal of this action. 

II. Default Judgment

 Because defendant has not been properly served, the court

lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s motions for default

judgment. Accordingly, the court denies those motions without

prejudice to renew (docs. 7 and 8). Plaintiff is advised,

however, that in the event he seeks default judgment at a later

date, he must comply with the detailed procedures for seeking

such relief as set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 and the case law

construing that Rule; and his papers must also be in proper form.

Conclusion

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that 

 (1) the service of process upon defendant is QUASHED; 

 (2) plaintiff’s motions for default judgment (docs. 7 and 8)

are DENIED, without prejudice; and

 (3) plaintiff has sixty (60) days from the date of this

order in which to either (1) properly serve defendant in

accordance with the applicable law, or (2) file a waiver of

service as Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) allows. 

 DATED this 29th day of November, 2007.

 

Copy to AIG National Insurance Company, Inc.

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c/o Corporation Service Company

2338 West Royal Palm Road, Suite J

Phoenix, AZ 85021

Case 2:07-cv-00589-RCB Document 11 Filed 11/30/07 Page 8 of 8