Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03316/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03316-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DANIEL CASTILLO-ANTONIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SARA IQBAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03316-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 71

On July 22, 2014, Plaintiff Jose Daniel Castillo-Antonio filed the instant suit, alleging 

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and California civil rights statutes, 

specifically the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Disabled Persons Act, and California Health 

and Safety Code § 19955 et seq., California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, and 54.3, and California's 

Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Dkt. No. 1.) On October 17, 2016, Plaintiff moved for partial summary 

judgment. (Plf.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 71.) Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, 

as well as the arguments presented at the December 15, 2016 motion hearing, and for the reasons 

set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 2009, Plaintiff suffered a gunshot wound which caused permanent spinal injuries that 

require him to use a wheelchair. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 71-8.) On May 2, 2014 

and July 9, 2014, Plaintiff states that he visited the Union 76 gas station at issue in this suit, in 

order to buy food and lottery tickets. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 13, SAC, Dkt. No. 12.) 

Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 4.) The Union 76 gas station is located close to Plaintiff's residence, and 

is on the way to places that Plaintiff regularly visits, including Costco, a nearby dog park, and the 

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Bay where Plaintiff fishes. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 3.)

When Plaintiff visited the Union 76 gas station, Plaintiff alleges that he encountered 

barriers in the parking lot. Specifically, Plaintiff states that the designated handicapped parking 

spot was not in compliance with federal and state laws regarding handicapped spaces, including 

that: (1) the space was not 18 feet long, (2) the space had a slope of over 2%, (3) there was no 

discernable accessible path of travel from the space to the front entrance of the store, (4) the 

loading zone did not have a "no parking" sign painted in it, (5) the signage did not include a $250 

fine" warning, and (6) the handicapped symbol on the asphalt was faded. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. 

¶ 4(a).) As a result of these deficiencies, Plaintiff contends that he was concerned about parking 

safely and making his way to the front entrance through cross-traffic with his daughter, who was 

accompanying him. This was because to reach the front entrance, Plaintiff had to pass through an 

area that vehicles go through to park in non-disabled spots and access the gas pumps. Further, 

there was a slope that made getting in and out of his vehicle more difficult because his wheelchair 

could roll away. (Id.)

Plaintiff also used the restroom when he visited on July 9, 2014. (Castillo-Antonio Dep. at 

72:17-19, Dkt. No. 88-2; Sara Iqbal Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 88-3.) Plaintiff states that the restroom 

was not in compliance with federal and state laws regarding handicapped spaces, including certain 

specified distances between the toilet and wall, grab bar, and toilet paper dispenser. (CastilloAntonio Decl. ¶ 4(b).) The soap dispenser was also mounted too high, and the restroom door 

required more than five pounds of pressure to push open. As a result of these deficiencies, 

Plaintiff contends that the bars' wrong position caused him to strain and stretch more than he was 

able to stretch, that he was not able to use the toilet paper because he could not reach it, that he 

had difficulty using the toilet, and that he could not open the door without assistance. (CastilloAntonio Dep. at 73:22-24, 78:1-9; 78:19-79:1; Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 4(b).) There was also 

insufficient space at the doorway, making it more difficult to maneuver. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 

4(b).)

During Plaintiff's July 9, 2014 visit, Defendant Sara Iqbal admits to having followed 

Plaintiff around the premises, photographing and filming him. (Sara Iqbal Decl. ¶ 9.)

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On July 12, 2014, Defendant hired an inspector, Susan Pae, to inspect the Union 76 gas 

station. (Plf.'s Mot., Exh. 6, Pae Report at 3.) Ms. Pae found noncompliant conditions including 

the lack of an accessible path from the public sidewalk to the entrance; the exterior landing 

exceeding 2% maximum slope; accessibility problems with the toilet, grab bars, toilet paper 

dispenser, and soap dispenser; and the need for more than 5 pounds pressure to operate the 

restroom door. (Pae Report at 1-2.) 

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action on July 22, 2014. Pursuant to General Order No. 56, the parties 

conducted a joint inspection on March 20, 2015. (Cortez Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. No. 71-10.) Following 

the March 20, 2015 inspection, Plaintiff's expert, Mr. Roberto Cortez, produced a report finding 

noncompliant conditions including that the parking space was in excess of 2%, accessibility 

problems with the hand towel dispenser and grab bar location. (Cortez Decl., Exh. 2, Cortez 

Report Item Nos. 4.7, 8.18, 8.39, 8.41.) Mr. Cortez also found noncompliant conditions in the 

store, such as the counter being too high. (Cortez Report Item No. 5.3.) The parties also 

conducted a follow-up inspection on October 19, 2015, where Mr. Cortez found that the cross 

slope of the loading zone still exceeded 2%. (Cortez Decl., Exh. 3, Cortez Follow-Up Report at 

2.) 

On October 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the 

following issues: (1) that certain barriers existed at Defendants' Union 76 gas station when 

Plaintiff visited the business on May 2, 2014 and July 9, 2014; (2) that Plaintiff personally 

encountered these barriers; and (3) that one barrier still exists, entitling Plaintiff to an injunction, 

damages, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff also seeks an award of statutory damages under the Unruh 

Act. (Plfs.' Mot. at 20.) Defendants filed their opposition on November 4, 2016. (Defs.' Opp'n, 

Dkt. No. 88; Defs.' Mem. of Opp'n, Dkt. No. 88-4.) Plaintiff filed his reply on November 9, 2016. 

(Plf.'s Reply, Dkt. No. 89.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part 

of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

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Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate discovery, there is no genuine issue as to 

material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a 

material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 

basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the 

moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. 

City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003).

On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party may discharge its burden of production by either (1) "produc[ing] evidence negating an 

essential element of the nonmoving party's case" or (2) after suitable discovery, "show[ing] that 

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense 

to discharge its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. 

Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth 

specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. "A party opposing summary judgment may not 

simply question the credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment." Far Out Prods., 

Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001). "Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond 

the pleadings and by its own evidence set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 

for trial." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The non-moving party must produce "specific 

evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 

Bhan v. NMS Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). Conclusory or speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to 

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defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 

730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was passed in order "to provide clear, 

strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). Title III prohibits discrimination by public 

accommodations, stating: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 

the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases 

to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). In order to prevail on a 

Title III claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: "(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public 

accommodations; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant 

because of her disability." Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007).

As to this third element, "[t]he concept of 'discrimination' under the ADA does not extend 

only to obviously exclusionary conduct . . . . Rather, the ADA proscribes more subtle forms of 

discrimination—such as difficult-to-navigate restrooms and hard-to-open doors—that interfere 

with disabled individuals' 'full and equal enjoyment' of places of public accommodation." 

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, "discrimination 

by public accommodations includes 'a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that 

no individual with a disability is excluded [or] denied services . . . unless the entity can 

demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, 

facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue 

burden.'" Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 

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2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)); see also Molski 481 F.3d at 730 ("Discrimination 

includes a failure to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities where such removal is 

readily achievable") (internal quotation and modifications omitted). In particular, the ADA 

Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG") "lay out the technical structural requirements of places of 

public accommodations," providing objective standards for architectural features. Fortyune v. Am. 

Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2004).

i. Plaintiff's ADA Claim

In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of 

the ADA, or that Defendants' property is a place of public accommodation. (Plf.'s Mot. at 14; 

Defs.' Mem. of Opp'n at 4.) As to the third element, Plaintiff has provided a declaration stating

that on his visits to Defendants' property, he encountered certain barriers at the parking lot and the 

restroom, which were not in compliance with accessibility requirements. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. 

¶ 4.) Plaintiff has also provided expert reports, including one conducted by an expert hired by 

Defendant two days after Plaintiff's second visit to the facility, which confirm the existence of 

noncompliant conditions that Plaintiff encountered, as well as additional barriers in the store. (See

Pae Report Item Nos. 3 (exterior landing at convenience store entry doors exceed 2% maximum 

slope), 9 (toilet was too far from side wall), 11-12 (grab bars incorrectly positioned), 13 (toilet 

paper dispenser incorrectly located), 14 (soap dispenser incorrectly located) 15 (restroom door 

required more than 5 pounds of pressure to operate), 19 (coffee and microwave counter out of 

accessible reach range); Cortez Report Item Nos. 4.7 (accessible parking space had a slope in 

excess of 2%), 8.18 (hand towel dispenser too high), 8.39, 8.41 (grab bar incorrectly positioned).)

Defendants do not dispute the accuracy of these reports, and admit that "some of the areas 

of their business identified in Plaintiff's motion are not in exact technical specifications as required 

by the applicable Federal and State laws." (Defs.' Opp'n at 4; Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n at 6-7.) 

Defendants also do not appear to suggest that removal of the barriers encountered by Plaintiff was 

not readily achievable.1 Instead, Defendants argue that regardless of the existence of the barriers, 

 

1 Based on Mr. Cortez's follow-up report, many of the noncompliant conditions have been 

corrected, with the exception of the cross slope of the loading zone still exceeding 2%. (Cortez 

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and Plaintiff's encounter of those barriers, there is a factual dispute over: (1) whether Plaintiff 

actually visited Defendants' business on May 2, 2014, and (2) whether Plaintiff was denied full 

and equal enjoyment of Defendants' business, as he was still able to use the business's services on 

his visits. (Id. at 2; Defs.' Mem. of Opp'n at 4.)

With respect to Plaintiff's visit to Defendants' business on May 2, 2014, the Court finds 

there is no dispute of material fact. Defendant has not provided any evidence to show that 

Plaintiff did not visit Defendants' business on May 2, 2014. At most, Defendant Sara Iqbal 

provides a declaration which states that she was at the business on May 2, 2014, but that she does 

not remember Plaintiff being present. (Iqbal Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) The fact that Ms. Iqbal does not 

remember whether Plaintiff was present is not evidence that Plaintiff did not visit; it simply means 

Ms. Iqbal does not remember. Moreover, Ms. Iqbal testified at deposition that she did not 

remember what hours she was at the business on May 2, 2014, meaning that Plaintiff could very 

well have visited while she was not present. (Plf.'s Reply, Exh. 1, Sara Iqbal Dep. at 20:21-24.) 

By contrast, Plaintiff has provided an affirmative declaration stating unequivocally that he was 

present on May 2, 2014, which Defendants provide no evidence to contradict. (Castillo-Antonio 

Decl. ¶ 4.) Thus, given Plaintiff's uncontroverted statement that he visited Defendants' business 

on May 2, 2014 there is no dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff visited on May 2, 2014.

As to Defendants' argument that Plaintiff was not denied full and equal enjoyment, the 

Court finds that this is ultimately a challenge to Plaintiff's standing, not to the merits of Plaintiff's 

ADA claim. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff met barriers when visiting Defendants' 

business, or that those barriers cannot be readily removed; rather, Defendant disputes whether

Plaintiff was impacted by those barriers, i.e., prevented from being "able to do what he needed to 

do." (Defs.' Mem. of Opp'n at 5.) In short, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not injured by 

the presence of barriers because he was able to "transact his business and leave," and therefore 

lacks standing to seek relief on his ADA claim. (Id.)

Defendants' argument is contrary to Ninth Circuit authority. In Chapman, the Ninth 

 

Follow-Up Report at 2.) Thus, there can be no genuine dispute that the removal of those barriers 

was not readily achievable.

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Circuit explained that "[u]nder the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an accessibility 

barrier violating its provisions, it is not necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely 

preclude the plaintiff from entering or using a facility in any way." 631 F.3d at 947; see also 

Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a disabled 

person does not need to be "prevented from attempting to enter a place of public accommodation 

altogether"). Instead, "the barrier need only interfere with the plaintiff's 'full and equal enjoyment' 

of the facility." Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947. Applying Chapman, the Ninth Circuit in Oliver v. 

Ralphs Grocery Co. found that there was sufficient evidence of injury in fact where the plaintiff 

filed a sworn declaration that he had visited a Food 4 Less's restroom and found it difficult to use 

the accessible stall due to the lack of proper hardware, the position of the grab bar, and the 

position of the soap dispenser and hand dryer. 654 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2011). "These 

undisputed facts demonstrate that [the plaintiff] personally encountered barriers at the Food 4 Less 

store that impaired his full and equal enjoyment of the facility due to his particular disability." Id. 

Thus, under Chapman, the plaintiff "had standing to sue as to those barriers as well as all other 

barriers related to his disability." Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Like the plaintiff in Oliver, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration explaining how the 

barriers made it difficult for him to use the facilities. Specifically, Plaintiff states that he was 

affected by the parking conditions because he was concerned about parking safely, making his 

way to the front door through cross traffic, and had additional challenges getting in and out of his 

vehicle due to the slope as his wheelchair could roll away. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 4(a).) 

Furthermore, when Plaintiff used the restroom on July 9, 2014, he states that he was required to 

strain and stretch more than he was able to stretch due to the noncompliant position of the bars, 

that he had difficulty getting on and off the toilet, that he was not able to use the toilet paper 

because he could not reach it, and that he could not open the door without another person's 

assistance. (Castillo-Antonio Dep. at 73:22-24, 78:1-9; 78:19-79:1; Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶

4(b).)

Defendants do not provide any evidence contradicting Plaintiff's declaration or deposition 

testimony. Instead, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff was able to purchase the candy and 

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beverage he had gone to the business to purchase, he had full and equal enjoyment of Defendants' 

business, regardless of whether Plaintiff had difficulty with the parking conditions or using the 

restroom.

2

 (Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n at 4-5.) Defendants would essentially require that a disabled 

individual be unable to access or use a facility at all before they are able to seek relief; Defendants 

provide no legal authority for this position, which conflicts with binding Ninth Circuit authority. 

Simply because a disabled individual is able to carry out their intended purpose in visiting a 

business does not mean they have full and equal enjoyment; if a disabled individual is forced to

overcome difficulties that a non-disabled individual does not, as is the case here, they do not have 

full and equal access. Additionally, to the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff is required to 

seek assistance during his visits, Defendants provide no case law suggesting that a disabled 

individual is required to complain to a business about a potential ADA violation prior to filing a 

lawsuit.3 (See Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n at 6.)

Taking Defendants' arguments to their logical extreme, a disabled individual would always

have full and equal access as long as she is able to send another person into a store to purchase the 

goods she had wanted to purchase, even if the store has barriers that prevent the disabled 

individual from entering the store altogether.4 Such a conclusion is contrary to the purpose of the 

ADA.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has established that he is a disabled individual who visited 

Defendants' business, a place of public accommodation. While visiting Defendants' business, 

Plaintiff encountered barriers that were not in compliance with federal and state law. There is no 

evidence that these barriers could not be easily removed. Moreover, these barriers caused Plaintiff 

 

2 Defendants also focus heavily on the fact that Plaintiff has filed over 80 other lawsuits alleging 

ADA violations, including suing 9 other businesses for visits he made on May 2, 2014. (Defs.' 

Opp'n at 2-3.) These other lawsuits are not relevant to the merits of the instant case, namely 

whether Plaintiff encountered barriers when he visited Defendants' business.

3

Even if that was the case, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he did require assistance to get 

the restroom door open. (Castillo-Antonio Dep. at 78:23-79:6.)

4

Indeed, Defendants appear to suggest that this would be sufficient when they focus on Plaintiff's 

uncle being present at the store visits, and that Plaintiff could have gotten out of the vehicle to buy 

the snacks that Plaintiff wanted to purchase at Defendants' business. (See Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n at 

3-4.)

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difficulty in using the facilities, including at the parking lot and in the restroom. Accordingly, the 

Court concludes that Plaintiff has established an ADA claim.

ii. Injunctive Relief

After establishing an ADA claim, private parties "may obtain injunctive relief against 

public accommodations with architectural barriers, including an order to alter facilities to make 

such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." Molski, 481 F.3d 

at 730 (internal quotation omitted). "Monetary damages are not available in private suits under 

Title III of the ADA . . . ." Id. "Because a private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e., 

for removal of the barrier) under the ADA, a defendant's voluntary removal of alleged barriers 

prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff's ADA claim." Oliver, 654 F.3d at 903. In 

order to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of future injury. 

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946. Sufficient likelihood of future harm can be established when a 

plaintiff shows that "he intends to return to a noncompliant place of public accommodation where 

he will likely suffer repeated injury," or that "he is deterred from visiting a noncompliant public 

accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his disability there." Id. at 948, 

949.

Here, Plaintiff has provided Cortez's Follow-Up Report from the October 19, 2015 

inspection, which found that the accessible path of travel had been improved, that the accessible 

parking stall had been repaired, that proper signage was installed, and that the restroom was 

acceptable for accessibility. (Cortez Follow-Up Report at 1-2.) The Report, however, finds that 

"the cross slope of the loading zone still exceeds the 2% required by code," which is not compliant 

with the Federal ADA Standards for Accessible Design § 503.4. (Id. at 2; see also Cortez Report 

Item No. 4.7.) Defendants do not provide any evidence that this barrier has been fixed, and 

conceded at the hearing that the loading zone was still not in compliance. Thus, the only evidence 

in the record is that there is a remaining barrier as of October 19, 2015, and that this barrier has not 

been removed. Further, Plaintiff has provided a declaration stating that he passes by Defendants' 

business regularly when he goes from his home to Costco, Point Isabel, and the Bay, suggesting a 

high likelihood that he will return to Defendants' business and thus establishing sufficient 

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likelihood of future harm. (Castillo-Antonio Decl. ¶ 3.) The Court therefore concludes that 

Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief under the ADA, specifically to remove the 2% slope at the 

cross slope.

B. Unruh Civil Rights Act

Plaintiff also brings a claim under California statutes, including the Unruh Civil Rights Act 

and the California Disabled Persons Act. The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[i]n the disability 

context, California's Unruh Civil Rights Act operates virtually identically to the ADA," such that 

"[a]ny violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Molski, 481 F.3d 

at 731; see also Cal. Civil Code § 51(f) ("A violation of the right of any individual under the 

federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 shall also constitute a violation of this section"). 

Unlike the ADA, however, the Unruh Act does allow for monetary damages, stating that: 

"Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to 

Section 51 . . . is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages . . . up to a maximum of 

three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000) 

and any attorney's fees that may be determined by the court . . . ." Cal. Civil Code § 52(a). A 

victim of discrimination, however, "need not prove she suffered actual damages to recover the 

independent statutory damages of $4,000." Molski, 481 F.3d at 731. Furthermore, "no showing of 

intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA 

violation" to award damages under the Unruh Act. Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 

370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). 

As discussed above, Plaintiff has established a violation of the ADA based on his visits on 

May 2, 2014 and July 9, 2014. Because Plaintiff has established a violation of the ADA, he has 

necessarily established a violation of the Unruh Act, and is therefore entitled to statutory damages 

of $8,000 ($4,000 for each visit), as well as attorney's fees.5

 

5

Like the Unruh Act, the California Disabled Persons Act also states that a violation under the 

ADA constitutes a violation of the California Disabled Persons Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c). The 

statute also entitles a plaintiff to damages of no less than $1,000 per violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 

54.3(a). A person cannot, however, be held liable for damages under both the California Disabled 

Persons Act and the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3(c). Thus, Plaintiff seeks only the statutory 

damage award provided by the Unruh Act. (Plf.'s Mot. at 20.)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, and finds that: (1) 

Plaintiff has established an ADA violation, (2) Plaintiff has established an Unruh Act violation, 

based on the ADA violation, and (3) a barrier exists on Defendants' business property. The Court 

therefore finds that Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, and Defendant is hereby ordered to

remove the remaining barrier. Further, Plaintiff is entitled to $8,000 in statutory penalties under 

the Unruh Act, based on his encountering barriers during his May 2, 2014 and July 9, 2014 visits. 

Plaintiff is also entitled to attorney's fees under the Unruh Act.

The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer by January 20, 2017 regarding the amount 

of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. In the event the parties are able to reach an agreement 

on the foregoing, they shall submit a stipulation and proposed order for the Court's review. If no 

agreement is reached, Plaintiff shall file a motion for attorney's fees. The proposed stipulation or 

motion for attorney's fees is due by February 3, 2017. During the hearing on this matter, Plaintiff 

also indicated that he would be dropping any remaining claims in this case; Plaintiff shall 

therefore also file a notice of voluntary dismissal of any remaining claims by February 3, 2017. 

The Court VACATES the trial date and any pre-trial deadlines, per the parties' agreement that the 

February 6, 2017 trial date should be vacated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2016

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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