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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 18, 2012 Decided March 1, 2013 

No. 11-5328 

MUWEKMA OHLONE TRIBE, 

APPELLANT

v. 

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND 

KEVIN K. WASHBURN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR INDIAN AFFAIRS, 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:03-cv-01231) 

Colin Cloud Hampson argued the cause for appellant. 

Harry R. Sachse and William F. Stephens were on brief. 

Maggie B. Smith, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. Robert P. Stockman, 

Attorney, was on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

 

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2 

 KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The 

Muwekma Ohlone Tribe (Muwekma) petitions this court to 

order the Secretary of the United States Department of the 

Interior and the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs 

(collectively Interior) to recognize it as an Indian tribe. 

Muwekma filed a “petition for acknowledgement” with 

Interior in 1995, which Interior denied in 2002. Muwekma 

challenged the denial in district court and, after Interior 

provided further explanation on remand, the district court 

granted Interior’s cross-motion for summary judgment and 

denied Muwekma’s summary judgment motion. Muwekma 

Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 813 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(Muwekma 2011). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm 

the district court. 

I. 

Federal recognition is a prerequisite to the receipt of 

various services and benefits available only to Indian tribes. 

25 C.F.R. § 83.2. During much of our nation’s history, the 

Congress recognized Indian tribes by treaty. See Golden Hill 

Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 57 (2d 

Cir. 1994). In 1871, this practice ended and tribal recognition 

occurred through executive orders and legislation. Roberto 

Iraola, The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the 

Courts, 38 AKRON L. REV. 867, 871 (2005). 

After the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 

1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended 

at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.), “recognition proceedings were 

necessary because the benefits created by it were made 

available only to descendants of ‘recognized’ Indian tribes.” 

Golden Hill, 39 F.3d at 57. In 1934, Interior began conducting 

proceedings to determine if a tribe should be recognized. Id.

From 1934 to 1978, Interior made recognition determinations 

on an ad hoc basis. Id. 

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 In 1978, pursuant to broad authority delegated by the 

Congress,1

 Interior promulgated regulations establishing a 

formal recognition procedure (Part 83 process). Id. (citing 25 

C.F.R. §§ 83.1-83.13). The Part 83 process is “intended to 

apply to groups that can establish a substantially continuous 

tribal existence and which have functioned as autonomous 

entities throughout history until the present.” 25 C.F.R. 

§ 83.3(a). It is available to groups that are not “already 

acknowledged” or “receiving services from the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs” (BIA). Id. § 83.3(b). 

To be recognized under the Part 83 process, the 

petitioning group “must satisfy” seven criteria by submitting 

“thorough explanations and supporting documentation.” Id. 

§ 83.6(c). Specifically, it must: 

(a) Establish that it “has been identified as an 

American Indian entity on a substantially 

continuous basis since 1900.” Identification 

must be shown “by other than the petitioner 

itself or its members.” 

(b) Establish that “[a] predominant portion” of its 

members “comprises a distinct community” 

that has existed “from historical times until the 

present.” 

(c) Establish that it “has maintained political 

influence or authority over its members as an 

 1 See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the 

Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 

1129 (2002) (“Congress has delegated to the executive branch the 

power of recognition of Indian tribes without setting forth any 

criteria to guide the exercise of that power.”) (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 

9). 

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autonomous entity from historical times until 

the present.” 

(d) Provide either a copy of its current governing 

document, including membership criteria, or a 

description of its governing procedures and 

membership criteria in lieu of a document. 

(e) Establish that its “membership consists of 

individuals who descend from a historical 

Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes 

which combined and functioned as a single 

autonomous political entity.” 

(f) Establish that its “membership . . . is composed 

principally of persons who are not members of 

any acknowledged North American Indian 

tribe.” 

(g) Establish that “[n]either the petitioner nor its 

members are the subject of congressional 

legislation that has expressly terminated or 

forbidden the Federal relationship.” 

Id. § 83.7(a)-(g). The group must show that “available 

evidence establishes a reasonable likelihood of the validity of 

the facts relating to [each] criterion” but conclusive proof is 

not required. Id. § 83.6(d). Interior must “take into account 

historical situations and time periods for which evidence is 

demonstrably limited or not available.” Id. § 83.6(e). 

 Section 83.8(d) relaxes section 83.7’s first three criteria 

for a group that was once recognized. Specifically, a 

previously recognized group need establish only the following 

to satisfy section 83.7(a)-(c): (1) it has been identified “since 

the point of last Federal acknowledgement . . . . by such 

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sources as the same tribal entity that was previously 

acknowledged or as a portion that has evolved from that 

entity”; (2) “it comprises a distinct community at present”; 

and (3) “political influence or authority is exercised within the 

group at present.” Id. § 83.8(d)(1)-(3). Alternatively, if the 

group cannot satisfy paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(3), it “may 

demonstrate alternatively that it meets the requirements of the 

criteria in § 83.7(a) through (c) from last Federal 

acknowledgement until the present.” Id. § 83.8(d)(5). Not 

every group must go through the Part 83 process to be 

recognized, however; Interior may waive the Part 83 process 

if waiver is, in Interior’s view, “in the best interest of the 

Indians.” Id. § 1.2. 

 After Interior receives a petition, its Office of Federal 

Acknowledgement (OFA) evaluates it and prepares a 

summary for the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs 

(Assistant Secretary), who issues a “proposed finding.” Id. 

§ 83.10(h). The group may respond, submit additional 

documentation and request an on-the-record meeting with the 

Assistant Secretary. Id. § 83.10(i)-(k). After review, the 

Assistant Secretary issues a “final determination” that either 

recognizes the group as a tribe or denies the petition. Id. 

§ 83.10(l)(2). The group may then request reconsideration 

with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. See id. 

§ 83.11(a)(1). If it does not file the request within ninety days 

after the Final Determination is published in the Federal 

Register, “the Assistant Secretary’s decision shall be final for 

[Interior].” Id. § 83.11(a)(2). 

Muwekma is a group of American Indians from the San 

Francisco Bay area. Its members descended from a 

previously-recognized tribe called the Verona Band. Both 

parties agree that the Verona Band was previously recognized 

by the federal government between 1914 and 1927. 

Muwekma asserts that nine members of the Verona Band 

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were still alive and part of the Muwekma community in 1989 

and one remains alive today. Yet there is no evidence that the 

Verona Band or Muwekma remained federally recognized 

after 1927. Muwekma acknowledges that “sometime after 

1927 [Interior] ceased recognizing the Tribe for some 

purposes and substantially reduced the benefits, services and 

protection provided to the Tribe.” Compl. ¶ 2. Moreover, 

Muwekma has never appeared on the list of federallyrecognized tribes that Interior began publishing approximately 

every three years beginning in 1979 and now publishes 

annually. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Entities That Have a 

Government-to-Government Relationship with the United 

States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979); 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1. 

In 1989, Muwekma submitted to Interior a letter of intent 

to petition to become a recognized Indian tribe.2

 Interior 

directed Muwekma to submit a petition under the Part 83 

process, which Muwekma filed in 1995. After a preliminary 

review, Interior concluded that, because the Verona Band had 

previously been recognized and Muwekma directly descended 

from the Verona Band, it would evaluate Muwekma’s petition 

under the relaxed section 83.8 criteria for a previously 

recognized tribe. In 1998, Interior placed Muwekma’s petition 

on the list of petitions ready for consideration. 

One year later, Muwekma brought an action in district 

court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 

U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., to compel Interior to complete its 

review within one year. See Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 

F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2000). The court granted partial 

summary judgment in favor of Muwekma, ordering Interior to 

“submit to the court by July 28, 2000 a proposed schedule for 

 2

 Muwekma concedes that in 1989 it was not receiving federal 

benefits available to a recognized tribe. 

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resolving [Muwekma’s] petition.” Id. at 41-42. After Interior 

submitted a proposed schedule, which schedule did not 

include a date by which it intended to decide Muwekma’s 

petition, the court ordered Interior to, inter alia, act on the 

petition by March 11, 2002. Muwekma Tribe v. Norton, 206 

F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002). On July 30, 2001, Interior 

issued a proposed finding rejecting Muwekma’s recognition 

petition. In response, Muwekma submitted comments and 

additional evidence. On September 6, 2002 (after receiving 

several deadline extensions from the district court), Interior 

issued a 184-page Final Determination, adopting the 

conclusions of the proposed finding and providing additional 

analysis. 

The Final Determination found that Muwekma failed to 

satisfy the three criteria set forth in section 83.7(a) through 

(c), as modified by section 83.8. According to Interior, 

Muwekma failed to satisfy criterion (a)—that it has been 

identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 

continuous basis since 1927—because “the petitioning group 

was not identified as an Indian entity for a period of almost 

four decades after 1927, and for only a 6-year period during 

the 55 years between 1927 and 1982.”3

 Joint Appendix (JA) 

1506. It failed to satisfy criterion (b)—that it comprises a 

distinct community at present—because, while it showed 

some evidence of a distinct community existing as late as 

1950, it failed to submit “documents or oral histories dealing 

with the present day.” JA 1560. It failed to satisfy criterion 

(c)—that it exercises political authority over members from 

 3

 Interior concluded that Muwekma submitted sufficient 

evidence to be “identified as an Indian entity” from 1965 through 

1971 because “Rupert and Jeannette Henry Costo of the [American 

Indian Health Services] identified a contemporary Ohlone group 

between 1965 and 1971.” JA 1502. 

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its last recognition to the present—because, inter alia, 

“[s]ince 1990, participation in [Muwekma’s] activities has 

been mostly by a core group of 20 individuals” and “[a] 

predominant portion of [its] membership has not participated 

in the group’s activities.” JA 1600. 

On June 6, 2003, Muwekma filed a second action in 

district court, challenging Interior’s determination. Muwekma 

brought six causes of action, claiming that Interior’s Final 

Determination (1) “unlawfully withdrew . . . recognition” of 

Muwekma; (2) violated Muwekma’s right to equal protection; 

(3) violated Muwekma’s right to due process; (4) was 

“arbitrary and capricious as a result of bias”; (5) was 

produced by conflicted Interior Staff in violation of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 554(d); and (6) “was arbitrary and capricious because of 

failure to apply the standards required by the department’s 

regulations, misinterpretation of law, and failure to follow 

well-established department precedent established in other 

recognition cases.” Compl. ¶¶ 34-47. 

Muwekma’s principal claim was that Interior denied 

Muwekma equal protection by requiring Muwekma to 

proceed under the Part 83 process despite summarily 

recognizing two other Indian tribes—the Ione Band of Miwok 

(Ione) and the Lower Lake Rancheria of California (Lower 

Lake)—outside the Part 83 process. See Muwekma Ohlone 

Tribe v. Kempthorne, 452 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110-11 (D.D.C. 

2006). Muwekma contended that it, like the Ione and Lower 

Lake tribes, was previously recognized and therefore entitled 

to the same summary approval granted to the latter two tribes. 

After both parties moved for summary judgment, the district 

court explained that it was “unable to discern [Interior’s] 

rationale for requiring Muwekma to proceed through the Part 

83 tribal acknowledgment procedures while allowing other 

tribes that appear to be similarly situated to bypass the 

procedures altogether.” Id. at 125. Accordingly, it remanded 

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the case to Interior to supplement the record with a “detailed 

explanation of the reasons for its refusal to waive the Part 83 

procedures.” Id. at 124. 

On November 27, 2006, Interior filed a Supplemental 

Explanation with the district court. Interior explained that its 

decisions to summarily recognize Ione and Lower Lake “were 

not based merely on a finding that those groups were 

previously recognized by the Federal Government at some 

time in the past.” JA 106. Rather, unlike Muwekma, both Ione 

and Lower Lake had government-to-government interactions 

with the federal government decades after 1927. For example, 

the government held land in trust for Lower Lake until 1956, 

having surveyed Lower Lake’s population in 1950 and 

consulted with Indians living on the land about selling it in 

1953. Additionally, in 1980, Interior considered including 

Lower Lake on the list of federally-recognized tribes. 

Regarding the Ione tribe, in 1941, the government considered 

Ione’s petition for the purchase of land; in 1970, two Ione 

members asked Interior about the status of their tribal land; 

and in 1972, California Indian Legal Services successfully 

brought a quiet title action on behalf of Ione which caused 

Interior to issue a letter “accept[ing] by relinquishment of title 

or gift [a] parcel of land to be held in trust for the Ione Band 

of Miwok Indians.” JA 111-12, 524-25. By contrast, Interior 

explained, “there is no evidence of any Federal dealings with 

a Muwekma group or Verona band after 1927.” JA 107 

(emphasis added). As the district court summarized, “[u]nlike 

the evidence proffered by the Muwekma, which at best 

demonstrated interactions between the federal government 

and individuals that descended from the Verona Band, the 

evidence in the supplemental administrative record reflects 

dealings between the federal government and the Ione and 

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Lower Lake tribes as entities.” Muwekma 2011, 813 F. Supp. 

2d at 199 (emphasis in original).4

Both parties again moved for summary judgment. After a 

procedural dispute over whether the district court’s earlier 

order constituted the law of the case on the “similarly 

situated” issue,5

 on September 28, 2011, the district court 

granted Interior’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Id. at 

199. 

II. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Bush 

v. District of Columbia, 595 F.3d 384, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

 4

 Interior also noted that Ione had pre-1927 dealings with the 

federal government involving the purchase of land. Interior 

explained that the government attempted to purchase land for Ione 

in the 1910s and 1920s and that, in 1927, an Interior Superintendent 

stated that he “had ‘been considering the purchase of a tract for the 

Indians at Ione for the past several years.’ ” JA 111. 

5

 On September 30, 2008, after the parties cross-moved for 

summary judgment, the district court criticized the Supplemental 

Explanation, stating that its earlier order had found that Muwekma 

was similarly situated to Ione and Lower Lake and that the finding 

arguably constituted the law of the case. The district court then 

stayed the motions for summary judgment and ordered the parties 

to brief whether the “similarly situated” finding was the law of the 

case and, if so, whether there was a compelling reason to depart 

from it. In subsequently granting summary judgment to Interior, the 

district court acknowledged that “[u]pon further reflection, the 

Court[’s] September 30, 2008 Order incorrectly represented the 

ruling in its September 21, 2006 Memorandum Opinion. . . . 

[which] did not decide the question of whether the Muwekma was 

‘similarly situated’ to the Lower Lake and Ione.” Muwekma 2011, 

813 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 

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Summary judgment is appropriate only when “ ‘there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact.’ ” McCready v. 

Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the 

evidence, “ ‘viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party,’ ” could support a reasonable jury’s verdict 

for the non-moving party. Id. (quoting Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 

635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 

Muwekma mounts several challenges to the district 

court’s judgment which we discuss seriatim. 

A. Equal Protection and APA Claims 

Muwekma asserts that Interior denied it the equal 

protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution because Interior summarily recognized 

Lower Lake and Ione outside the Part 83 process but did not 

do the same for Muwekma. Muwekma’s APA claim similarly 

alleges that Interior’s failure to recognize Muwekma was 

arbitrary and capricious because it failed to follow Interior 

precedent established in other recognition cases. 

To prevail on an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must 

show that the government has treated it differently from a 

similarly situated party and that the government’s explanation 

for the differing treatment “does not satisfy the relevant level 

of scrutiny.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 

1102 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Here, the relevant level of scrutiny is 

rational basis because Interior’s action does not target a 

suspect class or burden a fundamental right. Tucker v. 

Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“A . . . 

classification that does not burden either a fundamental right 

or a suspect class must be reviewed under the rational basis 

test.”); see also Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005) (“[T]he 

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recognition of Indian tribes remains a political, rather than 

racial determination. Recognition of political entities, unlike 

classifications made on the basis of race or national origin[,] 

are not subject to heightened scrutiny. Consequently, we 

apply rational basis review . . . .”). We apply a similar 

analysis under the APA. Agency action is arbitrary and 

capricious if “the agency offers insufficient reasons for 

treating similar situations differently.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. 

Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quotation 

marks and brackets omitted). “If [an] agency makes an 

exception in one case, then it must either make an exception 

in a similar case or point to a relevant distinction between the 

two cases.” Westar Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 473 F.3d 1239, 

1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Because Muwekma is not similarly 

situated to Lower Lake and Ione, its constitutional and APA 

claims fail. 

Muwekma asserts that, “[l]ike Lower Lake [and] Ione . . . 

, Muwekma (1) was federally recognized during the 20th 

century . . . ; (2) was never terminated by any Act of Congress 

or court order; (3) for some unknown reason was forgotten 

and mistakenly left off of the BIA’s list of recognized tribes; 

and (4) continued to exist and to seek reaffirmation.” Br. of 

Appellant 36. As Interior’s twenty-one-page Supplemental 

Explanation makes clear, however, the Lower Lake and Ione 

tribes, unlike Muwekma, had multiple post-1927 governmentto-government interactions with the United States. We agree 

with the district court’s conclusion that Interior “viewed its 

interactions with the Ione and Lower Lake tribes as evidence 

that the federal government dealt with these entities as 

tribes.” Muwekma 2011, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (emphasis 

added). 

Interior’s emphasis on government-to-government 

interaction as a distinguishing characteristic is not arbitrary. 

Indeed, government-to-government interaction is a common 

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characteristic of a recognized tribe. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 

(defining federal acknowledgement of tribe as “action by the 

Federal government . . . indicating clearly the recognition of a 

relationship between that entity and the United States”); id. 

§ 83.2 (federally recognized tribes obtain immunities and 

privileges “by virtue of their government-to-government 

relationship with the United States”); id. § 83.7(c) (group 

seeking tribal recognition must have “maintained political 

influence or authority over its members as an autonomous 

entity”). Interior therefore exercised its broad authority 

properly by making exceptions for Ione and Lower Lake but 

not for Muwekma on this basis. See 25 C.F.R. § 1.2 

(authorizing exception to Part 83 process “in all cases where 

permitted by law and the Secretary finds that such waiver or 

exception is in the best interest of the Indians”). 

Muwekma emphasizes that its members enrolled in the 

California Claims Act in the 1930s, 1950s and 1970s6

 and that 

Muwekma children attended BIA schools in the 1930s and 

1940s. Like the district court, however, we believe that 

interaction between Muwekma members and the federal 

government does not equate to tribal interaction with the 

 6

 The California Claims Act, Pub. L. 70-423, 45 Stat. 602 

(1928) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.) authorized 

the attorney general of California to bring suit in the federal court 

of claims on behalf of the “Indians of California,” defined as “all 

Indians who were residing in the State of California on June 1, 

1852, and their descendants now living in said State.” Id. § 1, 45 

Stat. at 602. The Act originally provided that “[a]ny person 

claiming to be entitled to enrollment may within two years after the 

approval of this Act, make an application in writing to the Secretary 

of the Interior for enrollment.” Id. § 7, 45 Stat. at 603 (emphasis 

added). Section 7 was repeatedly amended to allow subsequent 

revisions to the roll of individually enrolled Indians. See 25 U.S.C. 

§ 657. 

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federal government on a government-to-government basis. 

Muwekma points to its tribal community activities and social 

interaction, including its “formal constitution,”7

 the fact that 

ninety-nine percent of its members are descendants of the 

Verona Band and the fact that Verona Band members were 

involved in Muwekma activities into the 2000s. Muwekma 

points out several purported weaknesses in Ione’s and Lower 

Lake’s applications, including certain gaps in evidence, 

conflicting membership lists and genealogy and the fact that 

Ione did not have a formal constitution until after Interior 

reaffirmed it as a tribe in 1994. Yet none of these points 

addresses the key distinction between Muwekma and Ione and 

Lower Lake: government-to-government interactions. 

Muwekma alternatively contends that we cannot consider 

Interior’s Supplemental Explanation’s explication of the 

differences between Muwekma on the one hand and Ione and 

Lower Lake on the other because it represents a post hoc 

rationale. It is true that “an agency’s action must be upheld, if 

at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). But it is entirely proper for an 

agency to provide an explanation if directed to do so on 

remand. See, e.g., Burlington Res. Inc. v. FERC, 513 F.3d 

242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (considering agency’s explanation 

on remand for its differing treatment of natural gas 

producers).8

 

 7

 While a formal constitution is evidence of at least one of the 

Part 83 criteria, see JA 1021 (referring to 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(d)), it is 

not dispositive of the recognition inquiry because a tribe must 

satisfy all seven Part 83 criteria. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(c), (d). 

8

 Muwekma relies on our decision in Food Marketing Institute 

v. ICC, 587 F.2d 1285, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which we 

declared that “[p]ost-hoc rationalizations by the agency on remand 

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In sum, we agree with the district court that Interior’s 

Supplemental Explanation adequately explained why 

Muwekma is not similarly situated to Ione or Lower Lake 

and, accordingly, Muwekma’s equal protection claim fails.9

 

are no more permissible than are such arguments when raised by 

appellate counsel during judicial review.” But the statement does 

not mean that an agency cannot explain itself on remand. Rather, 

Food Marketing Institute simply explains that “we must recognize 

the danger that an agency, having reached a particular result, may 

become so committed to that result as to resist engaging in any 

genuine reconsideration of the issues” and that “[t]he agency’s 

action on remand must be more than a barren exercise of supplying 

reasons to support a pre-ordained result.” Id. Muwekma contends 

that Interior ran afoul of Food Marketing Institute because the 

reasons it gave in its Supplemental Explanation for distinguishing 

Ione and Lower Lake were not listed in the recognition letters sent 

to those tribes. The letters, however, did not purport to describe all 

of the factors Interior considered in reaching its decisions.

9

 Muwekma also refers to a 2012 press release issued by 

Interior in which it summarily reaffirmed the Tejon tribe after 

concluding that it had erroneously omitted Tejon from the list of 

recognized Indian tribes. Press Release, United States Dep’t of the 

Interior, Echo Hawk Issues Reaffirmation of the Tejon Indian 

Tribe’s Government-to-Government Status (Jan. 3, 2012), available 

at http://bia.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/text/idc015898.pdf. 

The press release on its face does not purport to explain Interior’s 

reasoning regarding Tejon. On the other hand, a separate Interior 

memorandum explains that “[i]t was not necessary for the Tejon 

Indian Tribe to go through the Federal acknowledgement process . . 

. because its government-to-government relationship had neither 

lapsed nor been administratively terminated.” Memorandum from 

Interior Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, to Regional Director, 

Pacific Region & Deputy Director, Office of Indian Services on 

Reaffirmation of Federal Recognition of Tejon Indian Tribe 1 (Apr. 

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B. Termination of Recognition Claim 

Muwekma next argues that, because it is the direct 

descendant of the Verona Band, Interior’s finding that 

Muwekma is not an Indian tribe is the equivalent of 

terminating Muwekma’s recognition. It argues that “only 

Congress has the authority to terminate a tribe’s federal 

recognition.” Br. of Appellant 21. The district court 

concluded that this claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations. We disagree that the claim is time-barred, but find 

that it fails on the merits. 

28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) provides that “every civil action 

commenced against the United States shall be barred unless 

the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action 

first accrues.” A claim accrues when a party can “institute and 

maintain a suit in court” once it “has exhausted all 

administrative remedies whose exhaustion is a prerequisite to 

suit.” Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 56-57 

(D.C. Cir. 1987). The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 

hear a claim barred by section 2401(a). Id. at 55. 

In James v. U.S. Department of Health & Human 

Services, 824 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a faction of an 

unrecognized Indian group “took the position that the [group] 

. . . was already federally recognized” and “therefore did not 

file a petition for federal acknowledgement, but rather sought 

. . . a declaration ordering the Department of the Interior to 

add the [group] to the list of federally recognized tribes.” Id.

at 1136-37. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 

complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 

explaining that “[t]he purpose of the regulatory scheme set up 

 

24, 2012), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/ 

documents/text/idc-018480.pdf (emphasis added). 

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17 

by the Secretary of the Interior is to determine which Indian 

groups exist as tribes[ and t]hat purpose would be frustrated if 

the Judicial Branch made initial determinations of whether 

groups have been recognized previously or whether 

conditions for recognition currently exist.” Id. at 1137 

(citation omitted). We further noted that dismissal served the 

primary purposes of exhaustion, to wit: “allowing the agency 

the opportunity in the first instance to apply its expertise . . . 

and correct its own errors,” “aid[ing] judicial review” through 

factual development and “promot[ing] judicial economy by 

avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial 

factfinding, and by perhaps avoiding the necessity of any 

judicial involvement at all if the parties successfully vindicate 

their claims before the agency.” Id. at 1137-38. 

The district court found that Muwekma’s termination of 

recognition claim was distinct from a claim under the Part 83 

process and therefore was not subject to administrative 

exhaustion. We disagree. In fact, the Part 83 process applies 

to a petition of a previously recognized tribe that seeks current 

recognition on that basis. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.8(a) 

(“Unambiguous previous Federal acknowledgment is 

acceptable evidence of the tribal character of a petitioner to 

the date of the last such previous acknowledgment.”); see also 

James, 824 F.2d at 1138 (“The Department of the Interior’s 

Branch of Acknowledgment and Research was established for 

determining whether groups seeking tribal recognition 

actually constitute Indian tribes and presumably to determine 

which tribes have previously obtained federal recognition”). 

The Part 83 process allowed Interior to engage in factfinding 

bearing on Muwekma’s termination of recognition claim, 

provided Interior an opportunity to correct any error in not 

previously placing Muwekma’s name on tribal recognition 

lists and potentially could have resolved this case without 

judicial involvement. Accordingly, we find that Muwekma’s 

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termination of recognition claim was subject to administrative 

exhaustion and thus did not accrue until September 6, 2002 

when Interior issued its Final Determination. Therefore, 

Muwekma’s claim, asserted in its 2003 complaint, is not 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

Nevertheless, Muwekma’s termination claim fails on the 

merits because Interior did not terminate Muwekma’s 

recognition. While Muwekma—like the Verona Band—may 

have previously been a recognized tribe, a once-recognized 

tribe can fade away. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(“It is . . . obvious that Indian nations, like foreign nations, 

can disappear over time . . . whether through conquest, or 

voluntary absorption into a larger entity, or fission, or 

dissolution, or movement of population.”), cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 1129 (2002). Interior found that Muwekma had, in 

effect, faded away. There is no dispute that Muwekma was 

recognized in 1927 (as the Verona Band). But, when 

Muwekma contacted Interior in 1989 via the petitioning 

process, it was not on Interior’s list of recognized Indian 

tribes nor was it receiving any services or benefits from the 

government. In addition, Interior concluded that Muwekma 

did not merit current recognition under the Part 83 process 

based on its failure to establish that it had exercised political 

authority over members, see 25 C.F.R. § 83.8(d)(3), and the 

fact that it had not been identified as an Indian tribe for an 

extended period of time, see id. § 83.8(d)(1), and did not 

“comprise[] a distinct community at present” (since 1984), 

see id. § 83.8(d)(2). Accordingly, Muwekma’s termination of 

recognition claim fails. 

C. Due Process Claim 

Muwekma argues that “as a previously recognized tribe” 

it had a due process right to a “formal adjudicatory hearing in 

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19 

any proceeding that could result in the loss of that 

recognition.” Br. of Appellant 44. Muwekma also contends 

that Interior violated Muwekma’s due process rights by 

improperly allowing Interior staff with a conflict of interest to 

evaluate its petition. Both arguments fail. 

A “threshold requirement of a due process claim” is “that 

the government has interfered with a cognizable liberty or 

property interest.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 

479-80 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 

860 (2013). But, for the same reasons Muwekma’s 

termination of recognition claim fails, whatever due process 

interest Muwekma might have had as a previously-recognized 

tribe disappeared because that previously-recognized tribe no 

longer exists. See Miami Nation, 255 F.3d at 346; see also 

United States v. 8 Gilcrease Lane, Quincy, Fla. 32351, 638 

F.3d 297, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (individual no longer 

possesses due process right to challenge seizure of property 

that is “voluntarily forfeited”). Moreover, as discussed above, 

because Muwekma was not receiving any government 

services or benefits in 1989 when it began the petitioning 

process, Interior’s Final Determination did not cut off 

government services or benefits. Cf. Greene v. Babbitt, 64 

F.3d 1266, 1271-73 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding due process 

interest in tribal financial benefits that were cut off); see also

Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (“We have never 

held that applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already 

receiving them, have a legitimate claim of entitlement 

protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Bd. of Regents of 

State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (due process 

“is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has 

already acquired in specific benefits”) (emphasis added). 

Muwekma also asserts that Interior violated the APA by 

allowing several Interior lawyers and staff who participated in 

defending Interior in litigation brought by Muwekma in 2000 

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20 

and 2001 to participate in drafting Interior’s 2002 Final 

Determination. Muwekma’s argument is based on 5 U.S.C. 

§ 554(d), providing that an agency employee who takes an 

adversarial role in one case “may not, in that or a factually 

related case, participate or advise in the [agency’s] decision . . 

. except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.” Section 

554(d), however, applies only to an “adjudication required by 

statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an 

agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (emphasis added). 

Muwekma’s recognition petition did not trigger a statutorilymandated hearing. Muwekma argues that “ ‘hearings 

necessitated by the Constitution are included in the scope of 

hearings that are covered by section 554 of the APA.’ ” Br. of 

Appellant 51 (quoting Collord v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 154 

F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Wong Yang Sung v. 

McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1950). The Constitution, 

however, requires a hearing only if Muwekma can show 

deprivation of a property interest. Collord, 154 F.3d at 936 

(finding hearing necessary because “[t]he Collords’ mining 

and milling site claims are property interests”). Because we 

conclude that Muwekma has no cognizable property interest, 

its section 554(d) argument fails. 

D. Arbitrary and Capricious Claim 

Finally, Muwekma argues that Interior’s Final 

Determination was arbitrary and capricious for several 

reasons. We disagree. 

The APA instructs the court to “hold unlawful and set 

aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Although the 

scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is 

narrow and the court is not empowered to substitute its 

judgment for that of the agency, Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 

USCA Case #11-5328 Document #1423023 Filed: 03/01/2013 Page 20 of 26
21 

588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the agency must 

provide a “ ‘rational connection between the facts found and 

the choice made’ ” so as to afford the reviewing court the 

opportunity to evaluate the agency’s decision-making process. 

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 

Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). While “we 

have long held that agency determinations based upon highly 

complex and technical matters are entitled to great 

deference,” Domestic Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 333 F.3d 239, 248 

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and brackets omitted), “we 

do not defer to the agency’s conclusory or unsupported 

suppositions.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the 

Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

1. Decade-by-Decade and Conclusive Proof Tests 

Muwekma claims that Interior improperly required it to 

“meet a decade-by-decade test for continuity [under 25 C.F.R. 

§§ 83.7(a), 83.8(d)(1)] that is not found in the Part 83 

regulations,” Br. of Appellant 55, and also required that 

Muwekma provide “conclusive proof” rather than merely a 

“reasonable likelihood of the validity of the facts relating to 

[the Part 83 criteria],” 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(d). Yet nowhere in its 

Final Determination does Interior apply such tests. In fact, the 

Final Determination repeatedly refers to the “reasonable 

likelihood” standard. See JA 1476, 1492, 1495, 1501, 1503. 

Additionally, Interior does not claim that Muwekma’s claim 

was rejected simply because Muwekma failed to establish 

continuity for each decade; rather, Interior found that 

Muwekma “was not identified as an Indian entity for a period 

of almost four decades after 1927, and for only a 6-year 

period during the 55 years between 1927 and 1982.” JA 1506. 

While Muwekma cites to peripheral matters (including a 

former Interior assistant secretary’s testimony at an unrelated 

hearing) that it contends casts doubt on which tests Interior in 

fact used, Muwekma has failed to overcome the presumption 

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22 

of regularity, that is, that agencies follow their own 

regulations. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 

148 (D.C. Cir. 2006); La. Ass’n of Indep. Producers & 

Royalty Owners v. FERC, 958 F.2d 1101, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (per curiam) (“The Coalition cannot, by sheer 

multiplication of innuendo, overcome the strong presumption 

of agency regularity.”).

2. Difficulties in Compiling Historical Evidence 

Muwekma also claims that Interior erred because it did 

not consider the difficulties “tribes may have in compiling 

comprehensive historical evidence” and did not consider 

Muwekma’s pre-1927 evidence to close gaps in Muwekma’s 

post-1927 evidence. Br. of Appellant 56; see also 25 C.F.R. 

§ 83.6(e) (Interior “shall take into account historical situations 

and time periods for which evidence is demonstrably limited 

or not available”). But Muwekma fails to explain what pre1927 evidence is relevant and how it would have explained 

post-1927 record deficiencies. It appears Muwekma’s 

argument is that Interior should have considered the fact that 

California tribes suffered a “particularly horrible experience” 

and that Muwekma lacked a “landbase.” Muwekma 2011, 813 

F. Supp. 2d at 192 (quotation marks omitted). But as the 

district court found, Muwekma failed to explain how this 

history affected its ability to retain documentation of its 

existence after 1927. Id. at 194. Muwekma complains that 

“[i]n following this regulatory rule in a decision for another 

tribe, Interior accepted evidence about an influenza pandemic 

and the loss of the tribe’s reservation, relying on those 

hardships (from the years 1918 to 1928) to excuse the tribe’s 

‘administrative obscurity’ in the later years 1940 until 1968.” 

Br. of Appellant 56 (citing JA 599). But it is reasonable for 

Interior to relax evidentiary rules during the years following a 

pandemic inasmuch as the demographic trauma suffered by 

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23 

the tribe during the pandemic likely inhibited evidence 

collection. Muwekma presents no comparable evidence. 

3. Provision of Educational Services 

 Muwekma further asserts that Interior arbitrarily rejected 

the fact that Muwekma children attended BIA schools in the 

1930s and 1940s as evidence of Muwekma’s identification by 

an external source. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a).10 Interior 

explained, however, that it rejected this evidence because 

school admission did not require tribal membership. 

Muwekma argues that Interior’s rejection of this evidence is 

inconsistent with its consideration of similar evidence 

submitted by the Cowlitz and the Ione tribes. Specifically, 

Interior determined that Cowlitz had not been absorbed into 

surrounding tribes because it received services from the 

federal government, including “attendance by Cowlitz 

children at BIA operated schools.” Record of Decision for the 

Cowlitz Indian Tribe, available at http://www.bia.gov/idc/ 

groups/mywcsp/documents/text/idc012719.pdf at 99 (Dec. 17, 

2010). But Interior’s Cowlitz decision relied in part on a BIA 

superintendent’s letter to a BIA-operated school asking about 

the welfare of Cowlitz students who, he explained, were 

under his jurisdiction. Id. This fact, plainly probative of 

external identification, distinguishes Cowlitz from Muwekma. 

With respect to Ione, Muwekma contends that “[w]hen 

Interior officials sought to determine in 1970 if Ione had ever 

been federally recognized, one of the first questions Interior 

 10 25 C.F.R. § 83.8(d), which modifies 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) for 

previously recognized tribes, requires, inter alia, that a group show 

it has been identified by an outside source “since the point of last 

Federal acknowledgement. . . . as the same tribal entity that was 

previously acknowledged or as a portion that has evolved from that 

entity.” 

USCA Case #11-5328 Document #1423023 Filed: 03/01/2013 Page 23 of 26
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asked was whether the BIA ever accepted Ione children in its 

schools.” Muwekma cites a letter in which Interior asked Ione 

a number of different questions pertaining to federal 

recognition, including: “Has the Bureau of Indian Affairs 

extended services to them at any time, accepted their children 

in Bureau schools or supplied JOM payments11 for them?” JA 

532. The letter does not state that evidence of school 

attendance, without more, is probative. More importantly, the 

letter was written in 1973—years before Interior promulgated 

Part 83. 

4. California Claims Act 

Muwekma asserts that Interior erroneously rejected the 

fact that its members or their ancestors enrolled in the 

California Claims Act, see supra n.6, as evidence that 

Muwekma had been externally identified. We agree with the 

district court that this evidence does not constitute external 

identification of Muwekma. Muwekma 2011, 813 F. Supp. 2d 

at 192. Enrollment in the California Claims Act did not 

require tribal affiliation. Instead, it was available to “all 

Indians who were residing in the State of California on June 

1, 1852, and their descendants now living in said State.” 25 

U.S.C. § 651. Muwekma claims that, as a matter of practice, 

tribal affiliation was required because applicants had to 

answer the following question: “What is your degree of 

Indian blood and to what Tribe or Band of Indians of the State 

 11 “JOM payments” refers to the Johnson-O’Malley Act of 

1934, Pub. L. No. 73-167, 48 Stat. 596 (codified as amended at 25 

U.S.C. § 452-54), which authorizes the Interior Secretary to, inter 

alia, “enter into a contract or contracts . . . and to expend under 

such contract or contracts, moneys appropriated by Congress for the 

education, medical attention, agricultural assistance, and social 

welfare, including relief of distress, of Indians in [a] State or 

Territory.” 25 U.S.C. § 452. 

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of California do you belong?” See JA 1478. But Interior 

reasonably interpreted this question to refer to tribal ancestry, 

not to contemporary membership. Interior’s interpretation is 

bolstered by two approved applications that listed the tribe or 

band as “unknown.” Interior reasoned that “an individual’s 

active tribal membership would not be unknown to him or 

her, while his or her specific tribal ancestry back to 1852 

could be unknown.” JA 1478-79. We agree with the district 

court that Interior’s explanation is not “wanting in logic.” 

Muwekma 2011, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93. 

5. Survival of Verona Band Members 

Muwekma argues that Interior erroneously failed to 

consider the fact that “in 1989 nine individuals who were 

from the Verona Band were still alive and very much a part of 

the Muwekma community” and that one of those individuals 

remains alive today. Br. of Appellant 58. Muwekma asserts, 

without citation, that “[t]his should be sufficient, without 

more, to support an inference of a continuing tribal 

community” necessary to satisfy section 83.7(b). Id. at 58-59. 

While it is true that Interior’s Final Determination does not 

expressly treat this evidence, it does consider the connection 

between Verona Band and Muwekma and the activity of 

Verona Band members over time, which takes this evidence 

into account. In any event, this is not ipso facto evidence that 

Muwekma has satisfied section 83.7(b). See Miami Nation, 

255 F.3d at 351 (explaining that tribe can cease to exist).12

 12 In fact, evidence that members of the Verona Band were 

alive in 1989 and participating in Muwekma activities relates more 

to the genealogical considerations of section 83.7(e) (requiring that 

“membership consists of individuals who descend from a historical 

Indian tribe . . . .”) than to section 83.7(b)’s requirement that a 

predominant portion of Muwekma’s members comprise and have 

comprised a distinct community. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to Interior. 

So ordered. 

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