Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00562/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 On September 9, 2009, the District Court issued an order consolidating Case No. CV

08-0562-PHX-GMS and Case No. CV 09-1252-PHX-GMS, with Case No. CV 08-0562-PHX-GMS

as the lead case (Doc. 23). This Report and Recommendation addresses the claims originally raised

in Case No. 08-0562-PHX-GMS. The claims originally raised in Case No. 09-1252-PHX-GMS will

be addressed by separate Report and Recommendation.

2

 Unless otherwise noted, all referenced exhibits are those attached to Respondent’s

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 20).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RICHARD SCOTT JONGEWARD,

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES RYAN, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-08-0562-PHX-GMS (JJM)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Richard Scott Jongeward, presently incarcerated at the Great Plains

Correctional Facility, Hinton, Oklahoma, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Marshall for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court

are the Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondents’ Answer (Docs. 20, 27). The Magistrate Judge

recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss the

petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 22, 2004, Jongeward pled guilty to a Class 4 felony, taking the identity

of another with one historical prior conviction (CR2004-12799-001-SE). (Ex. NN.)2

 The

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3 Respondents waived a statute of limitations defense. (Doc. 20 at 12 n.7.)

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Maricopa County Superior Court sentenced him to 4.5 years imprisonment on November 18,

2004. (Ex. RR.)

Jongeward filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) in the superior court on

December 6, 2004. (Ex. SS.) Jongeward’s appointed PCR counsel found no viable issues

and moved for a time extension to allow Jongeward to file a pro se brief. (Ex. TT.)

Jongeward subsequently filed a pro se petition, which the court denied on August 17, 2005.

(Exs. UU, XX.) Jongeward filed a petition for review to the court of appeals, which the court

summarily denied on July 21, 2006. (Exs. AAA, CCC.)

DISCUSSION

On March 21, 2008,3 Jongeward filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging four

grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the

indictment, file appropriate pre-trial motions and object to the prosecutor’s conflict of

interest, and for allowing him to be pressured into the plea deal and not helping him

withdraw from the plea; (2) his plea was coerced in violation of due process by the actions

of the judge, the prosecutor and defense counsel; (3) the indictment violated due process and

equal protection; and (4) prosecutorial misconduct based on a conflict of interest, coercion

of a plea and selective prosecution. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner’s overarching issue is that he was

indicted and convicted for the felony of taking an identity when he should have been charged

only with the misdemeanor of providing false information to a police officer.

In their original answer, Respondents asserted that the Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to resolve the pending habeas petition because Jongeward’s sentence expired

before he signed the petition. (Doc. 20 at 13-15.) The Court requested supplemental briefing

on this issue. (Doc. 28.) In their supplemental answer, Respondents withdrew this argument

and conceded that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. (Doc. 29 at 3.)

Respondents continue to argue that all of Jongeward’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

(Doc. 20 at 15; Doc. 29 at 4-5.) As discussed below, the Court agrees.

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Exhaustion and Procedural Default Standard

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971). If a habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the state court,

it may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal claim

presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986).

Exhaustion requires that a petitioner clearly alert the state court that he is alleging a

specific federal constitutional violation. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (general appeal to due process

not sufficient to present substance of federal claim); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-

70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency of

evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury, and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked

specificity and explicitness required); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish

exhaustion”). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing

specific provisions of federal law or case law, Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670, or by citing state cases

that plainly analyze the federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153,

1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); cf. Fields v. Washington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005)

(mere citation to a state case that conducts both a state and federal law analysis does not, by

itself, satisfy exhaustion).

In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner

is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR

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petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) may be avoided

only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and

the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition or not presented in

a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a).

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state

court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present

it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims

in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)

(stating that the district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any

presently available state remedy). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32,

the claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732,

735 n.1; see also Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62.

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross,

468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure to properly

exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Exhaustion and Procedural Default Analysis

Petitioner’s PCR petition is cursory and is comprised solely of a state court form with

no attached pages. (Ex. UU.) Therefore, the Court finds it most expedient to set forth

exactly what he presented in that petition and compare it to the claims set forth in his federal

petition. In the section of the PCR petition form providing possible reasons why Petitioner

was eligible for relief, he checked only the box stating, “[t]he introduction at trial of evidence

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4 After the August 17, 2005 denial of his PCR petition, but likely prior to Jongeward’s

receipt of the ruling, he filed additional allegations in support of his PCR petition. (Ex. YY.) This

filing is irrelevant to the Court’s fair presentation analysis because it was filed after the PCR petition

was dismissed and there is no indication it was considered by any state court. Additionally,

Petitioner did not raise any federal claims in that document. (Id.)

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obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest.” (Id. at 2.) In the section that allowed him to write

in any other grounds for relief, Petitioner stated “original arrest was (false reporting) Judge

on arraignment date verified facto-nolo.” (Id. at 3.) The form directed Petitioner to include

supporting facts in an attachment, however, he did not attach anything. (Id.) Petitioner

requested a new trial, correction of sentence and “[r]elief under statutes of probable cause

clause and arresting or detainment of originality.” (Id. at 5.)

There is only one similar factual issue asserted in both the PCR petition and the

federal habeas petition and it is not specific to any claim – that Jongeward was originally

arrested for false reporting but was convicted of identify theft. (Ex. UU; Doc. No. 1 at 6, 8.)

Petitioner did not assert in state court the factual basis for any of the claims alleged here –

ineffective assistance of counsel, coerced plea, unlawful indictment or prosecutorial

misconduct. Two of these options were listed on the PCR petition form as available bases

for relief, denial of competent representation and an unlawfully induced guilty plea; however,

Jongeward did not mark these options on the form. (Id. at 2-3.)

Regardless of the factual allegations, the most critical information revealed by review

of the PCR petition is that Jongeward did not assert any federal constitutional violations

before the PCR court. The form provided as an available basis for relief, “[t]he abridgment

of any other right guaranteed by the . . . constitution of the United States.” (Doc. No. 20 at

3.) Jongeward did not mark this box or otherwise alert the PCR court that he was alleging

any federal claims. Therefore, Jongeward failed to fairly present Claims 1 to 4 to the PCR

court.4

 See Gray, 518 U.S. at 163.

In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner alleged

additional facts, many of which overlap with the facts asserted in his federal petition.

(Compare Ex. AAA, with Doc. No. 1.) However, he did not assert any federal constitutional

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5 In the petition for review, Jongeward cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), as possible grounds for relief. (Ex. AAA

at 3.) These cases are irrelevant to the claims before this Court, therefore, their citation has no

bearing on fair presentation. Further, Jongeward mentions freedom of speech in support of his

assertion that a four-and-a-half year sentence is excessive for lying. Again, Petitioner does not

assert before this Court a claim founded on this legal basis. (Id.)

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claims relating to those facts.5 (Ex. AAA.) More importantly, exhaustion requires properly

raising and fairly presenting a claim at every appropriate state court level. See Casey v.

Moore, 386 F.3d at 915-16. In Arizona, a PCR petition must present every known ground

for relief. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. Language to that effect was included in the PCR petition

form used by Jongeward. (Ex. UU at 1.) Further, a petition for review from denial of a PCR

petition in Arizona is a forum to request relief from the PCR court’s actions, not to raise new

claims. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Therefore, raising claims for the first time to the appellate

court was insufficient to fairly present any claims to the Arizona state courts.

Claims 1 to 4 were not fairly presented to the Arizona state courts. If Jongeward were

to return to state court now to litigate these claims, they would be found waived and untimely

under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because they

do not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h).

Therefore, Claims 1-4 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Jongeward has

not alleged cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome these

defaults. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

The Court finds that Claims 1 to 4 are procedurally defaulted, and Jongeward has not

established cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the

defaults.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an

order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

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parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: CV-08-0562-PHX-GMS. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 6th day of August, 2010.

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