Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00578/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00578-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332ct Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT 

DISTRICT, a public corporation; and 

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal 

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY; SOLUTIA 

INC.; and PHARMACIA 

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-578-WQH-AGS

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment or, in the 

Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff San Diego Unified Port District

filed by Defendants Monsanto Company, Solutia Inc., and Pharmacia Corporation. (ECF 

Nos. 422-424).

I. BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2015, Plaintiffs San Diego Unified Port District (the “Port District”) 

and the City of San Diego (the “City”) initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (ECF No. 

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1). On August 3, 2015, the Port District and the City filed separate First Amended 

Complaints against Defendants Monsanto Company, Solutia Inc., and Pharmacia 

Corporation (collectively, “Monsanto”). (ECF Nos. 24, 25). In its First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”), the Port District brings claims against Monsanto for public nuisance, 

equitable indemnity, and purpresture relating to the alleged contamination of San Diego 

Bay (the “Bay”) from polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) manufactured by Monsanto. 

(ECF No. 25). The Port District alleges that Monsanto, the sole manufacturer of PCBs in 

the United States from 1935 to 1979, knew PCBs presented a health risk and “were causing 

widespread contamination of the environment.” (Id. ¶ 40). The Port District alleges that

Monsanto promoted the use and sale of PCB compounds despite this knowledge and 

“instructed its customers to dispose of PCB containing material in local landfills, knowing 

that landfills were not suitable for PCB contaminated waste.” (Id. ¶ 51). The Port District 

alleges that Monsanto’s instructions for improper disposal of PCBs resulted in pollution of 

the Bay. 

On September 28, 2016, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in 

part Monsanto’s Motion to Dismiss the Port District’s FAC. (ECF No. 81). The Court 

granted the Motion to Dismiss the Port District’s equitable indemnity claim and denied the 

Motion to Dismiss the Port District’s purpresture and public nuisance claims.

The parties engaged in fact and expert discovery. On August 2, 2019, Monsanto filed 

Motions for Summary Judgment against the Port District on the Port District’s request for 

an abatement remedy (ECF No. 422), the Port District’s purpresture claim (ECF No. 423),

and the Port District’s public nuisance claim (ECF No. 424). 

On October 1, 2019, the Port District filed Oppositions to Monsanto’s Motions for 

Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 450, 452, 453). The Port District also filed a Motion to 

Strike. (ECF No. 451).

On October 14, 2019, the Port District filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in 

support of its Oppositions to Monsanto’s Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 454). 

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On October 18, 2019, Monsanto filed Replies in support of its Motions for Summary 

Judgment (ECF Nos. 457, 459, 460), an Opposition to the Port District’s Motion to Strike 

(ECF No. 461), a Motion to Strike (ECF No. 462), and a Response to the Port District’s 

Notice of Supplemental Authority (ECF No. 463). 

On October 21, 2019, Monsanto filed an Amended Reply in support of its Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Abatement). (ECF No. 465).

On October 25, 2019, the Port District filed an Opposition to Monsanto’s Motion to 

Strike. (ECF No. 466). On October 31, 2019, Monsanto filed a Reply in support of its

Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 467).

On December 6, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on Monsanto’s Motions for 

Summary Judgment.

On January 27, 2020, Monsanto filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support 

of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Abatement). (ECF No. 478). On February 10, 2020, 

the Port District filed a Response to Monsanto’s Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF 

No. 480)

II. CONTENTIONS

Monsanto moves for summary judgment in its favor on the Port District’s public 

nuisance claim, purpresture claim, and request for an abatement remedy. Monsanto 

contends that there is an absence of evidence to support the public nuisance claim. 

Monsanto contends that the Port District identified three public-use impairments to the 

Bay: 1) the Campbell Shipyard sediment cap; 2) the Convair Lagoon sediment cap; and 3) 

the 2013 Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (“OEHHA”) Fish 

Consumption Advisory. Monsanto contends that the Port District failed to identify facts 

that demonstrate the sediment caps or the Fish Consumption Advisory impair the public’s 

use of the Bay. Monsanto contends that that the Port District may not recover damages on 

its purpresture claim because abatement is the only available remedy in this representative 

public nuisance action. Monsanto further contends that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the purpresture claim. Monsanto contends the Port District’s request for an 

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abatement fund is displaced by the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (the “PorterCologne Act”). Monsanto contends that the request for an abatement fund remedy is not 

ripe.

The Port District contends that admissible evidence demonstrates that Monsanto 

instructed users in the improper disposal of PCBs, causing pollution of Bay water and 

contamination of Bay fish. The Port District contends that this pollution constitutes a public 

nuisance under California law. The Port District contends that the Convair Lagoon and 

Campbell Shipyard sediment caps were erected as remedial measures designed to limit 

exposure to PCBs, and the caps obstruct boating in the Bay. The Port District contends that 

the Fish Consumption Advisory has led to a decline in fishing and that PCBs in fish tissue 

pose a threat to human health. The Port District contends it may recover damages on its 

purpresture claim as a title holder in trust of Bay lands. The Port District further contends 

that admissible evidence demonstrates that PCBs have polluted the Bay and constitute a 

purpresture. The Port District contends that the Porter-Cologne Act does not displace the 

Court’s ability to order an abatement remedy. The Port District contends that injury to the 

public has already occurred, and its claims are ripe for adjudication.

III. FACTS

From the 1930s onward, PCBs were released into the environment from Monsanto 

and its customers. PCBs are synthetic chemical compounds that were produced and used 

during the twentieth century for “hundreds of industrial and commercial applications.” 

(Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Website, http://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learnabout-polychlorinated-biphenyls-pcbs#healtheffects, Ex. 17, Declaration of Kenneth O. 

Corley in Support of Port District’s Opposition to Monsanto’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Public Nuisance) (“Corley Decl.”), ECF No. 450-24 at 2). According to the 

EPA’s 1976 Polychlorinated Biphenyl-Containing Wastes Disposal Procedures (“1976 

PCB Disposal Procedures”), PCBs were originally manufactured for “closed uses” as 

cooling and insulating fluids in heavy-duty electrical equipment, including capacitors and 

transformers. (Ex. 25, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-35 at 3). PCBs were also manufactured 

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for “open uses” in paints, caulks, adhesives, coatings, plasticizers, pesticide extenders, and 

carbonless copy paper. (Id.; Port District’s Nuisance Facts, ECF No. 450-1 ¶ 31). The

EPA’s 1976 PCB Disposal Procedures stated that “[t]he sole producer of PCBs in the 

United States is the Monsanto Company.” (Ex. 25, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-35 at 3). 

From 1927 to 1979, Monsanto produced and sold more than 1.4 billion pounds of PCBs, 

approximately 99% of the PCBs used in the United States. (Port District’s Nuisance Facts, 

ECF No. 450-1 ¶¶ 27-28).

In a July 22, 1971, Monsanto memorandum, “P. G. Benignus” stated that 

Monsanto’s “Askarel Inspection and Maintenance Guide” advised customers to discard the 

PCB product by “dumping or burying where it will not contaminate a water supply.” (Ex. 

64, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-74 at 2). P. G. Benignus stated:

Since the advent of the PCB pollution problem and as we now have an 

incinerator, [the discard instructions] [are] no longer adequate.

Please change [the discard instructions] to read, “Due to possible 

environmental pollution by PCB materials, scrap askarel must not be allowed 

to contaminate a water supply. The material needs to be destroyed by proper 

incineration at 2,000°F including facilities to neutralize hydrogen chloride 

gas. The user may ship the scrap to Monsanto Co., W. G. Krummrich Plant, 

Sauget, Illinois, Attention Supervisor Dept. A-245. It will be incinerated 

properly, at a charge of 3 cents a pound.”

(Id.).

The EPA’s 1976 PCB Disposal Procedures stated that “[t]he chemical properties that 

make PCBs desirable industrial materials”—their stability and nondegradability—“also 

make them highly persistent in the environment.” (Ex. 25, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-35 

at 3). The EPA advised that PCBs cannot be “destroyed by usual waste treatment methods” 

and should be disposed of by “high temperature incineration” in a specialized incinerator.

(Id. at 4). The EPA stated that if PCBs cannot be disposed of by proper incineration, they 

may be disposed of in a “secure chemical waste landfill.” (Id.). The EPA advised:

Wastes containing PCBs should not be disposed of with other mixed wastes 

in a sanitary landfill . . . . Characteristics of transport of PCBs through the soil 

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are not definitively established. The interaction with other decomposing 

wastes is not well understood. Some landfills may contain or accept wastes 

which could cause the release of PCBs.

(Id.). The EPA stated that after concern arose in 1970 about the persistence of PCBs in the 

environment and potential health risks, Monsanto “voluntarily restricted domestic sales of 

PCBs to use in transformers and capacitators (closed systems).” (Id. at 3). In 1979, 

Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., banning the 

manufacture of PCBs. (Id. at 2).

a. Regional Board Cleanup and Abatement Orders

PCBs are present in sediment, water, and fish in the Bay. On October 17, 1986, the 

San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (the “Regional Board”) issued Cleanup 

and Abatement Order No. 86-92 to Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical for “discharge into the

Convair Lagoon portion of San Diego Bay.” (Ex. 40, Omnibus Declaration of Robert M. 

Howard in Support of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (“Howard Decl.”), 

ECF No. 425-45 at 3). The Regional Board determined that Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical 

“use[d] electrical transformers and capacitors which use fluids containing polychlorinated 

biphenyls (PCBs).” (Id. at 2). The Regional Board stated that “[s]torm runoff from the 

Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical facility. . . discharges into the San Diego Bay east of Convair 

Lagoon,” causing “elevated levels of PCBs in the San Diego Bay sediments” and 

concentrations of PCBs in mussel tissue at the “highest ever measured in the history of the 

State Mussel Watch Program.” (Id. at 3-4). The Regional Board determined that the PCBs 

in Convair Lagoon impair beneficial uses and create “a condition of pollution.” (Id. at 5). 

Specifically, the Regional Board stated that “the San Diego County Health Department has 

quarantined the Convair Lagoon portion of San Diego Bay to prevent the collection of 

shellfish for human consumption . . . result[ing] in the impairment of the shellfish 

harvesting beneficial use of the [Bay].” (Id.). The Regional Board further found:

Discharges of PCBs into San Diego Bay also threaten to impair other 

beneficial uses of the waters in San Diego Bay. These include Water Contact 

Recreation, Ocean Commercial and Sport Fishing, Saline Water Habitat, and 

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Marine Habitat. The presence of PCBs in the environment at certain 

concentrations have been found to cause toxic effects in man and animals, 

particularly if repeated exposures occur.

(Id.). The Regional Board considered cleanup and abatement options including dredging 

and capping. The Regional Board explained that the cleanup was “not based on any finding 

that all possible effects related to PCB contamination will be eliminated.” (Addendum No. 

4 to CAO No. 86-92 (Jun. 1, 1992), Ex. 40, Howard Decl., ECF No. 425-45 at 20).

However, cleanup would “likely result in a significant reduction in the amount of PCBs 

available to shellfish and other biota from PCB contaminated sediment.” (Id. at 21). “The

Port was the permitting authority [for remediation] under the California Coastal Act and 

responsible for conducting an environmental review under CEQA.” (Monsanto’s Nuisance 

Facts, ECF No. 424-2 ¶ 77). “At the end of the environmental review process, the Port 

adopted CEQA findings approving a sand cap covered with eelgrass” at the Convair 

Lagoon site. (Id. ¶ 79).

On May 24, 1995, the Regional Board issued Cleanup and Abatement Order No. 95-

21 to Campbell Industries for the Campbell Shipyard site, leased from the Port District. 

The Regional Board determined that Campbell Industries conducted industrial processes 

“over San Diego Bay waters or very close to the waterfront.” (Ex. 41, Howard Decl., ECF 

No. 425-46 at 5). The Regional Board stated that “ship hydraulic system and repair and 

paint application activities” caused PCBs to enter the Bay. (Id. at 24). As a “direct result” 

of Campbell Industries’ activities, the Regional Board found elevated sediment 

concentrations of copper, zinc, lead, tributyltin, high molecular weight polynuclear 

aromatic hydrocarbons, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and PCBs. (Id. at 9, 24). “The Port 

served as the CEQA lead agency for the remediation at Campbell Shipyard, and it 

evaluated, designed, funded, approved, permitted, and constructed the Campbell Cap.” 

(Monsanto’s Nuisance Facts, ECF No. 424-2 ¶ 63). “In 2004, the Port issued to itself a 

Coastal Development Permit to construct the Campbell cap.” (Id. ¶ 69).

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In 2006, and each following year, the Regional Board has “listed the Bay as 

‘impaired’ for PCBs under Clean Water Act Section 303(d).” (Monsanto’s Purpresture 

Facts, ECF No. 423-2 ¶ 41; Regional Board 2016 Clean Water Act Sections 305(B) and 

303(D) Integrated Report, Ex. 6, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-12 at 39).

On October 30, 2015, the Regional Board issued Cleanup and Abatement Order No. 

R9-2015-001B to Ryan Aeronautical Company and its successors for PCB wastes 

discharged from storm water conveyance systems (“SWCS”) to the Bay. The Regional 

Board found that “[s]ome of the highest concentrations of total PCBs found in San Diego 

Bay sediment have been found adjacent to the 30-inch SWCS outfall.” (Ex. 11, Corley 

Decl., ECF No. 450-17 at 4). The Regional Board stated that the SWCS outfall “is likely 

one of the sources of the PCBs found in fish tissue in San Diego Bay.” (Id.). The Regional 

Board explained that “PCBs can cause cancer and other health effects in humans” and 

ordered Ryan Aeronautical Company to remediate. (Id. at 2).

On April 4, 2017, the Regional Board issued Cleanup and Abatement Order No. R9-

2017-0021 to Lockheed Martin Corporation for waste discharged to the East Basin of the 

Bay. The Regional Board determined that “[a] transformer existed adjacent to the 

laboratory building that could have leaked fluids containing PCBs.” (Ex. 9, Corley Decl., 

ECF No. 450-15 at 4). The Regional Board stated that “PCBs and mercury were discharged 

from the former Tow Basin and Railway facilities to the East Basin, contributing to the 

unhealthy levels of these pollutants in San Diego Bay fish tissue.” (Id. at 6-7). The Regional 

Board found:

The concentrations of pollutants in the sediments of the East Basin of San 

Diego Bay are at levels that may have an impact on human health and the 

benthic community, and may have an impact on aquatic-dependent wildlife, 

thus creating a condition of pollution and nuisance in waters of the State.

(Id. at 7). 

///

///

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b. Fish Consumption Advisories

According to the EPA, PCBs enter the environment through disposal of PCBs into 

poorly maintained hazardous waste sites, illegal or improper dumping of PCB wastes, leaks 

or releases from electrical transformers containing PCBs, disposal of PCBs into landfills 

not designed to handle hazardous waste, and burning PCB wastes in industrial incinerators. 

(EPA Website, Ex. 17, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-24 at 3). Once released into the 

environment, PCBs bind to soil and sediment and bioaccumulate in fish and wildlife. (Id.

at 9). The Surface Water Ambient Monitoring Program’s (“SWAMP”) 2009-2010 

Summary Report on Contaminants in Fish from the California Coast, published in 2012, 

concluded that PCBs in the Bay have “reached concentrations in fish tissue that pose 

potential health concerns . . . . PCBs may cause cancer, damage the liver, digestive tract, 

and nerves; and affect development, reproduction, and the immune system.” (Ex. 5, ECF 

No. 450-11 at 12). SWAMP reported in 2012 that PCBs in fish tissue cause “significant 

risks” to fish-eating birds, in addition to the effects on humans. (Id. at 83). 

In 2013, OEHAA published a Fish Consumption Advisory for fish from the Bay due 

to mercury and PCBs. (Ex. 1e, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-7 at 2). The Fish Consumption 

Advisory provides: 

Several programs collected fish from San Diego Bay and analyzed them for 

chemicals of potential concern for human health. The Office of Environmental 

Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) evaluated the results of these studies 

and found mercury and PCBs in some fish species at levels of concern for fish 

consumers. OEHHA is providing these guidelines to help people choose 

which types of fish are safer to eat.

(Id.). The Fish Consumption Advisory states that PCBs enter fish through the food they eat 

and are “passed up the food chain.” (Id.). “Because [PCBs] do not break down easily, they 

stay in the environment for a long time.” (Id.). The Fish Consumption Advisory warns that 

“PCBs affect many body functions resulting in a variety of health problems, including 

effects on the nervous system.” (Id.). The Fish Consumption Advisory warns that “PCBs 

can cause cancer.” (Id. at 5).

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The Fish Consumption Advisory states that women 45 years of age and under and 

children between the ages of 1 and 17 should never consume barred sand bass, spotted sand 

bass, shiner perch, topsmelt, yellowfin croaker, leopard shark, or gray smoothound shark 

from the Bay. (Id. at 4). Women 45 and younger and children 1 to 17 may consume either 

two servings per week of diamond turbot, spotted turbot, black perch, pile surfperch, 

rainbow surfperch, or California lizardfish, or one serving per week of Pacific chub 

mackerel, round stingray, or shovelnose guitarfish from the Bay. (Id.). “Women over 45 

years and men can safely eat more fish.” (Id. at 5). Women over 45 and men should never 

consume shiner perch or topsmelt from the Bay. (Id.). Women over 45 and men may 

consume either two servings per week of diamond turbot, spotted turbot, black perch, pile 

surfperch, rainbow surfperch, California lizardfish, round stingray, or shovelnose 

guitarfish, or one serving per week of spotted sand bass, barred sand bass, yellowfin 

croaker, pacific chub mackerel, leopard shark, or gray smoothhound shark from the Bay. 

(Id.). “PCBs are in the fat and skin of the fish.” (Id. at 4-5). People should “[e]at only the 

skinless fillet” and “[r]emove and throw away the skin before cooking.” (Id.).

In 2017, the San Diego Water Board concluded that PCBs are “present at levels of 

concern in fish from the San Diego Bay.” (February 2017 Monitoring & Assessment, Ex. 

75, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-85 at 3). In 2018, OEHAA amended the Fish Consumption 

Advisory “because additional mercury and PCB data became available.” (Ex. 1b, Corley 

Decl., ECF No. 450-4 at 2). The amended Fish Consumption Advisory states that, “[w]hile

banned in the 1970s, [PCBs] persist for many years in the environment and are still found 

in the air and water from spills, leaks, and improper disposal.” (Id.). The amended Fish 

Consumption Advisory adds Pacific chub mackerel to the list of Bay fish that women 45 

and under and children 1 to 17 should never consume. (Ex. 1a, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-

3 at 2). The amended Fish Consumption Advisory recommends women 45 and under and 

children 1 to 17 limit consumption of black perch to one serving per week, instead of the 

two servings per week in the 2013 Fish Consumption Advisory. (Id.). The amended Fish 

Consumption Advisory relaxes the limitation on pile surfperch and rainbow surfperch for 

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women over 45 and men, stating that they may consume up to seven servings per week. 

(Id.). The amended Fish Consumption Advisory states that “[e]ating fish with higher levels 

of chemicals like mercury or PCBs may cause health problems in children and adults.” 

(Id.). The amended Fish Consumption Advisory states that “PCBs can build up to very 

high levels in the skin, fat, and some internal organs of fish.” (Ex. 1b, Corley Decl., ECF 

No. 450-4 at 2). According to the 2018 OEHHA Health Advisory and Guidelines for Eating 

Fish from San Diego Bay, PCBs are a “potential concern for people who eat fish because 

of their toxicity and their ability to accumulate in fish tissue.” (Ex. 1d, Corley Decl., ECF 

No. 450-6 at 12). 

The EPA states that “PCBs are one of the most widely studied environmental 

contaminants. Many studies in animals and human populations have been performed to 

assess the potential carcinogenicity of PCBs.” (EPA Website, Ex. 17, Corley Decl., ECF 

No. 450-24 at 8). The EPA states that PCBs “cause a variety of adverse health effects.” (Id.

at 7). The EPA states that “[s]tudies in animals provide conclusive evidence that PCBs 

cause cancer.” (Id. at 8). “[T]he data strongly suggest that PCBs are probable human 

carcinogens.” (Id.). The EPA states that studies in animals and humans “support evidence 

for potential [ ] non-carcinogenic effects of PCBs,” including serious “effects on the 

immune system, reproductive system, nervous system, endocrine system and other health 

effects.” (Id. at 7). The EPA states that “the types of PCBs likely to be bioaccumulated in 

fish and bound to sediments are the most carcinogenic PCB mixtures.” (Id. at 9). The EPA 

states that “people who ingest PCB-contaminated fish or other animal products and contact 

PCB-contaminated sediment may be exposed to PCB mixtures that are even more toxic 

than the PCB mixtures contacted by workers and released into the environment.” (Id.).

c. Port District’s Jurisdiction Over Bay Lands

Prior to January 1, 2020, the Port District held title in trust to 29% of the water acres 

in the Bay. The State of California held title to 61% of the water acres in the Bay, and the 

military held title to the additional 10%. The “State of California and Fish and Wildlife 

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Service have primary authority over fish kills and fish habitat.” (Monsanto’s Nuisance 

Facts, ECF No. 424-2 ¶ 103). 

On September 27, 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill No. 507 (“S.B. 

507”). S.B. 507, which became effective on January 1, 2020, “add[s] Section 5.7 to the San 

Diego Unified Port District Act.” (S.B. 507 Legislative Counsel’s Digest, Ex. A, Port 

District’s Supplemental Authority, ECF No. 454-1 at 2). Section 5.7 provides, in relevant 

part:

There is hereby granted in trust to the district all the right, title, and interest of 

the State of California, held by the state by virtue of its sovereignty, in and to 

all those remaining tidelands and submerged lands not previously granted, 

whether filled or unfilled, within the San Diego Bay lying northerly of the 

following described line:

Beginning at NGS monument Road 2 (PID DC1690), thence S 68°07’54” W 

8,621.00 feet to NGS monument North Island NAS Shoran Tower (PID 

DC1727) . . . .

(Id. at 4). The Port District is now the majority title holder of Bay lands.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or 

the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall 

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose 

existence might affect the outcome of the suit. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The materiality of a fact is determined 

by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986).

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is 

proper. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153 (1970). Where the party moving 

for summary judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, “the burden on the moving 

party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there 

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is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

325; see United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“[O]n an issue where the plaintiff has the burden of proof, the defendant may move 

for summary judgment by pointing to the absence of facts to support the plaintiff’s claim. 

The defendant is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact with respect to an issue where the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Nor 

does Rule 56(c) require that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other 

similar materials negating the nonmoving party’s claim.” (citations omitted)). 

If the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party 

to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 322, 324. The nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by 

demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 

475 U.S. at 586; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of 

evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient.”). The 

nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quotations 

omitted). The nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 

are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – PUBLIC NUISANCE

Monsanto moves for summary judgment on the Port District’s public nuisance claim. 

Monsanto contends that the Port District lacks standing and has failed “to demonstrate 

through discovery a genuine issue of material fact supporting its claim that a public 

nuisance from PCBs exists in San Diego Bay.” (ECF No. 424 at 2).

The Port District contends that PCBs have polluted the Bay and constitute a public 

nuisance. The Port District contends that it has standing to pursue this representative public 

nuisance action.

///

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a. Public Nuisance in the Bay

Monsanto contends that the Port District identified

no more than three alleged public-use impairments from PCBs in San Diego 

Bay: (1) the sediment cap at Convair Lagoon . . . ; (2) the sediment cap at the 

former Campbell shipyard . . .; and (3) a 2013 limited fish advisory issued by 

California’s Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (“OEHHA”) 

. . . . 

(ECF No. 424-1 at 4-5). Monsanto contends that the sediment caps, as a matter of law, 

cannot be a public nuisance because the Port District “expressly approved” the caps. (Id.

at 24). Monsanto asserts that “fish populations and fishing in the Bay are thriving, and the 

Port cannot show any ‘substantial harm’ from the 2013 OEHHA fish advisory.” (Id. at 25).

Monsanto asserts that the Fish Consumption Advisory is not a nuisance per se because “no 

statute ‘expressly defines’ the Port’s alleged harm—the existence of OEHHA’s 2013 

advisory based on the lawful sale of a useful product ending over 40 years ago—to be a 

public nuisance.” (Id. at 28).

The Port District contends that pollution of the water, sediment, and fish in the Bay

constitutes a public nuisance caused by Monsanto’s promotion of PCBs and instructions 

for improper disposal. The Port District contends that there is significant evidence that 

PCBs in the Bay cause health risks to humans, ecological risks to fish and birds, and 

substantial interference with “the public’s free and comfortable use of the Bay.” (ECF No. 

450 at 21). The Port District asserts that the sediment caps and the Fish Consumption 

Advisory are “example[s] of the type of harm Monsanto’s PCBs cause in the Bay.” (Id. at 

21). The Port District asserts that consumption of fish from the Bay poses a threat to human

health. The Port District further asserts that fish consumption advisories are “de facto 

harm” and “lead to a decline in the benefits associated with recreational fishing, as anglers 

forgo fishing entirely, choose alternate sites, decline consumption of fish caught, and/or 

enjoy the fishing experience less.” (Id. at 28).

Under section 3479 of the California Civil Code, a nuisance is

[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal 

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sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an 

obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable 

enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, 

in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, 

or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway . . . .

“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or 

neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the 

annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3480.

The interference “must be both substantial and unreasonable.” People ex rel. Gallo v. 

Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1105 (1997). A substantial interference is “a ‘real and appreciable 

invasion of the plaintiff’s interests,’ one that is ‘definitely offensive, seriously annoying or 

intolerable.’” Id. (quoting Rest. 2d Torts § 821f, coms. c & d, pp. 105-06). “The 

unreasonableness of a given interference represents a judgment reached by comparing the 

social utility of an activity against the gravity of the harm it inflicts . . . .” Id. The question 

is “whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and 

objectively, would consider it unreasonable.” San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior

Court, 13 Cal. 4th 893, 938 (1996) (quotation omitted). 

Civil Code section 3479 sets forth the acts which constitute a nuisance in the 

present tense. Under its terms, anything that “is” injurious to health, indecent 

or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property is 

defined as a nuisance. Despite the use of the present tense, . . . an affected 

party need not wait until actual injury occurs before bringing an action to 

enjoin a nuisance.

Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1213 (1996).1

 

1 The plaintiff in a public nuisance claim is required to prove causation—that “the defendant created or 

assisted in the creation of the nuisance.” City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 

4th 28, 38 (2004). Monsanto does not move for summary judgment on the Port District’s public nuisance 

claim based on a lack of evidence to support causation. Accordingly, the Court does not address causation 

in this Order. 

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“Pollution of water constitutes a public nuisance” under California law. Newhall 

Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 334, 341 (1993) (citing Carter v. 

Chotiner, 210 Cal. 288, 291 (1930) (“There is no doubt that pollution of water constitutes 

a nuisance and in a proper case will be enjoined.”); Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose 

Wood Preserving Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1619 (1990)). “In fact, water pollution 

occurring as a result of treatment or discharge of wastes in violation of Water Code section 

13000 et seq. is a public nuisance per se.” Id. (citing Cal. Wat. Code § 13050(m) (defining 

public nuisance)). 

In this case, the Regional Board has determined that the Bay is polluted by PCBs 

under the California Water Code. In 1986, the Regional Board found “elevated levels of 

PCBs in the San Diego Bay sediments” at Convair Lagoon and “lipid weight levels of 

PCB’s in mussel tissue planted at Convair Lagoon . . . [at] the highest ever measured . . . 

.” (CAO No. 86-92, Ex. 40, Howard Decl., ECF No. 425-45 at 4). The Regional Board 

found that the discharge of PCBs into Convair Lagoon from the Teledyne Ryan 

Aeronautical property impaired shellfish harvesting and threatened the public’s health and 

use of the Bay, “creat[ing] a condition of pollution, as defined by the California Water 

Code.” (Id. at 5; see Cal. Wat. Code § 13050 (“(1) ‘Pollution’ means an alteration of the 

quality of the waters of the state by waste to a degree which unreasonably affects either of 

the following: (A) The waters for beneficial uses. (B) Facilities which serve these 

beneficial uses. (2) ‘Pollution’ may include ‘contamination.’”); see also Cal. Wat. Code § 

13050(k) (“‘Contamination’ means an impairment of the quality of the waters of the state 

by waste to a degree which creates a hazard to the public health through poisoning or 

through the spread of disease. ‘Contamination’ includes any equivalent effect resulting 

from the disposal of waste, whether or not waters of the state are affected.”)). In 1995, the 

Regional Board determined that “[c]oncentrations of PCBs in bay sediments are above 

background levels along the Campbell shoreline.” (CAO No. 95-21, Ex. 41, Howard Decl., 

ECF No. 425-46 at 24). Based on the elevated levels of PCBs and other chemicals, the 

Regional Board found that “[t]he contaminated bay sediments present at Campbell 

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Shipyards have caused or threaten to cause a condition of pollution as described in 

California Water Code Section 13050 . . . [and] may adversely affect San Diego Bay 

beneficial uses.” (Id. at 24-25). 

In 2015, the Regional Board determined that “[s]ome of the highest concentrations 

of total PCBs found in San Diego Bay sediment have been found adjacent to the 30-inch 

SWCS outfall that drains a portion of the former TDY facility.” (CAO No. R9-2015-001B 

Ex. 11, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-17 at 4). The Regional Board determined that the “PCBladen sediment discharged from the former TDY facility . . . is likely one of the sources of 

the PCBs found in fish tissue in San Diego Bay,” which exists at “unhealthy levels.” (Id.). 

In 2017, the Regional Board determined that “PCBs and mercury were discharged from 

the former Tow Basin and Railway facilities to the East Basin, contributing to unhealthy 

levels of these pollutants in San Diego Bay fish tissue.” (CAO No. R9-2017-0021, Ex. 9, 

Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-15 at 6-7). The Regional Board stated:

The concentrations of pollutants in the sediments of the East Basin of San 

Diego Bay are at levels that may have an impact on human health and the 

benthic community, and may have an impact on aquatic-dependent wildlife, 

thus creating a condition of pollution and nuisance in waters of the State.

(Id. at 7). In all cases, the Regional Board ordered the dischargers of the PCBs to study and 

take remedial measures to reduce the effects of PCBs at certain sites in the Bay, including 

constructing sediment caps. 

Based on the Regional Board’s Cleanup and Abatement Orders, the Port District 

placed sediment caps at Campbell Shipyard and Convair Lagoon to “isolat[e] [ ] pollutants 

in existing sediments” and protect against “bioturbulation.” (See Regional Board Order No. 

R9-2004-0295 (Oct. 13, 2004), Ex. 10, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-16 at 5). The sediment 

caps obstruct the Bay at Convair Lagoon and Campbell Shipyard; boats cannot anchor 

where caps are present, and fishing is not allowed. (See Exhibits to Declaration of Paul 

Brown, Ex. 22, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-29 at 5-8 (photographs of buoys at cap locations 

stating, “DO NOT ANCHOR,” “NO FISHING ALLOWED,” and “DO NOT DISTURB . 

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. . SUBMERGED OBSTRUCTIONS ARE PRESENT”)). Because the Port District 

expressly authorized construction of the sediment caps, the caps cannot be deemed a 

nuisance. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3482 (“Nothing which is done or maintained under the 

express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance.”); Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. 

Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying section 3482 to a water quality 

board permit). However, the nuisance in this case is the alleged pollution of the Bay, not 

the sediment caps.

The Port District has come forward with evidence that the Bay is polluted or 

contaminated by PCBs. The Bay is listed as “‘impaired’ for PCBs under Clean Water Act 

Section 303(d).” (Monsanto’s Purpresture Facts, ECF No. 423-2 ¶ 41; Regional Board 

2016 Clean Water Act Sections 305(B) and 303(D) Integrated Report, Ex. 6, Corley Decl., 

ECF No. 450-12 at 39). SWAMP published a report in 2012 that concluded that the Bay 

has one of the “most severe PCB contamination” levels on the California coast, and PCBs 

in the Bay have “reached concentrations in fish tissue that pose potential health concerns . 

. . .” (Ex. 5, ECF No. 450-11 at 12, 57). In 2013, OEHAA published a Fish Consumption 

Advisory for fish from the Bay due to mercury and PCBs, finding “mercury and PCBs in 

some fish species at levels of concern for fish consumers.” (Ex. 1e, Corley Decl., ECF No. 

450-7 at 2). PCBs in fish tissue also cause “significant risks” to fish-eating birds as they 

are “passed up the food chain.” (SWAMP Report, Ex. 5, ECF No. 450-11 at 83; 2013 

OEHHA Fish Consumption Advisory, Ex. 1e, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-7 at 2). In 2017, 

the San Diego Water Board concluded that PCBs are “present at levels of concern in fish 

from the San Diego Bay.” (February 2017 Monitoring & Assessment, Ex. 75, Corley Decl., 

ECF No. 450-85 at 3). In 2018, OEHAA made the fish consumption guidelines even more 

restrictive for women 45 and under and children. (See Ex. 1b, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-

4). The Regional Board stated that “the OEHHA consumption advisory warrants not 

delisting San Diego Bay for impairment (Category 5) [under Clean Water Act Section 

303(d)] due to PCBs in fish tissue . . . .” (Clean Water Act Sections 305(B) and 303(D) 

Integrated Report, Ex. 6, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-12 at 39).

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The Port District has come forward with evidence that PCBs in the Bay threaten to 

interfere with the public’s health or interfere with the public’s right to use the Bay. The 

EPA has concluded that “[s]tudies in animals provide conclusive evidence that PCBs cause 

cancer.” (EPA Website, Ex. 17, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-24 at 8). “[T]he data strongly 

suggest that PCBs are probable human carcinogens.” (Id.). The EPA states that “[s]tudies 

of PCB workers found increases in rare liver cancers and malignant melanoma. The 

presence of cancer in the same target organ (liver) following exposure to PCBs both in 

animals and humans . . . adds weight to the conclusion that PCBs are probable human 

carcinogens.” (Id. at 9). The EPA states:

The types of PCBs that tend to bioaccumulate in fish and other animals and 

bind to sediments happen to be the most carcinogenic components of PCB 

mixtures. As a result, people who ingest PCB-contaminated fish or other 

animal products and contact PCB-contaminated sediment may be exposed to 

PCB mixtures that are even more toxic than the PCB mixtures contacted by 

workers and released into the environment.

(Id.). The EPA states that studies in animals and humans “support evidence for potential [ 

] non-carcinogenic effects of PCBs,” including serious “effects on the immune system, 

reproductive system, nervous system, endocrine system and other health effects.” (Id. at 7; 

see also SWAMP Report, Ex. 5, ECF No. 450-11 at 12 (“PCBs may cause cancer, damage 

the liver, digestive tract, and nerves; and affect development, reproduction, and the immune 

system”); 2013 OEHHA Fish Consumption Advisory, Ex. 1e, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-

7 at 5 (“PCBs can cause cancer.”)). According to the EPA, studies in animals “were not 

able to identify a level of PCB exposure that did not cause effects on the immune system.” 

(EPA Website, Ex. 17, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-24 at 11). 

OEHHA issued its original Fish Consumption Advisory in 2013 because of the 

“potential concern for human health” due to mercury and PCBs. (Ex. 1e, Corley Decl., 

ECF No. 450-7 at 2 (“OEHHA found mercury and PCBs in some fish species [in the Bay] 

at levels of concern for fish consumers. OEHHA is providing these guidelines to help 

people choose which types of fish are safer to eat.”)). In addition to restricting the number 

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of servings of Bay fish that consumers should eat per week, the Fish Consumption 

Advisory, as amended in 2018, identifies eight species of Bay fish that women 45 and 

under and children should never consume, and two species that women over 45 and men 

should never consume, due to the presence of PCBs and mercury. For women 45 and under 

and children, the list of do-not-eat fish includes the Pacific chub mackerel, the “largest or 

most consumed fish in the San Diego Bay.” (Deposition of William Desvousges 

(“Desvouges Dep.”), Ex. 15, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-21 at 9:20-10:10). According to 

Monsanto’s expert, William Desvousges, between 65% and 81% of the fish caught in the 

Bay are precluded from consumption by women 45 and under and children.2(Id. at 7:19-

8:5; see People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 399-400 (1897) (holding that “it is 

not open to serious question” that polluting the waters of a river, destroying the fish therein, 

interferes with the public right to “wild game” and constitutes a nuisance)).

The Court finds that the Port District has presented evidence of specific facts that

could support the conclusion by a reasonable trier of fact that PCBs have polluted the Bay 

and caused substantial harm to either human health or the use and enjoyment of the Bay.

///

///

 

2 Desvousges stated:

Q. Based off of the analysis you have done, in your opinion would 81% of the fish caught 

in San Diego Bay be subject to a do-not-eat fish advisory for women under 45 and children?

MR. MILLER: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: [Desvousges:] Well, this is based on the data for the intercepts in San 

Diego Bay from RecFIN. It’s not based on the overall data because the overall data is 65%. 

So the 81% is what would be observed from the intercept data. So we have two different –

we’ve provided both of those numbers. So I would say it’s either 65 or 81.

(Desvouges Dep., Ex. 15, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-21 at 7:19-8:5). The fish consumption advisory is 

the same for women 45 and under and children. (See 2013 OEHHA Fish Consumption Advisory, Ex. 44, 

Howard Decl., ECF No. 425-49 at 4). Monsanto’s objection to the form of the question is overruled.

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b. Port District’s Standing to Bring Public Nuisance Claim

Monsanto contends that the Port District lacks standing to pursue a public nuisance 

claim based on the Fish Consumption Advisory because the Port District’s jurisdiction is 

limited to a fraction of the Bay, and the Port District does not own or manage the fish 

populations. 

The Port District contends that it has standing to pursue this representative public 

nuisance action because the legislature “expressly authorized [the Port District] to bring a 

public nuisance action to ‘protect, preserve, and enhance’ the Bay by seeking abatement of 

a public nuisance.” (ECF No. 450 at 30).

Section 731 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides:

A civil action may be brought in the name of the people of the State of 

California to abate a public nuisance, as defined in Section 3480 of the Civil 

Code, by the district attorney or county counsel of any county in which the 

nuisance exists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which the 

nuisance exists. Each of those officers shall have concurrent right to bring an 

action for a public nuisance existing within a town or city.

In the Court’s September 28, 2016, Order on Monsanto’s Motion to Dismiss the Port 

District’s FAC, the Court concluded that “the Port District has standing to bring a 

representative cause of action under section 731.” (ECF No. 81 at 10-11). The Court 

explained:

In 1963, through the Port Act, the State of California and the cities of San 

Diego, Chula Vista, Coronado, National City, and Imperial Beach granted and 

conveyed “all right, title and interest” in the tidelands and submerged lands 

around San Diego Bay to the Port District. See Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1 §§ 

4, 5, 5.5. The Port District was granted the authority over “control, regulation, 

and management of the harbor of San Diego upon the tidelands and lands 

lying under the inland navigable waters of San Diego Bay.” Id. § 4. The Port 

Act provides the authority to “sue and be sued in all actions and proceedings 

in all courts and tribunals of competent jurisdiction.” Id. § 23. The Port 

District was given the power to “protect, preserve, and enhance,”

(1) The physical access to the bay.

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(2) The natural resources of the bay, including plant and animal life.

(3) The quality of water in the bay.

Id. § 4.

. . . .

The Legislature granted the Port District “all powers theretofore vested in the 

county or each such city or exercisable by its officers, which are by the 

provisions of this act granted to the district or are exercisable by its officers.” 

Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1 § 70. This includes, the power to “protect, 

preserve, and enhance” the Bay. Id. § 4. Before the conveyance of the Bay to 

the Port District, the State of California and the cities of San Diego, Chula 

Vista, Coronado, National City, and Imperial Beach had the authority to bring 

a public nuisance claim to protect the Bay. Because the authority of the State 

and cities to bring a public nuisance claim was specifically transferred to the 

Port District, the Court concludes that the Legislature expressed its intention 

in specific and clear terms to grant the Port District the power to abate a 

nuisance. See Lamont, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (“[W]hen the Legislature has 

intended to grant the power to abate a nuisance, it has done so specifically and 

in clear terms.”). The Court concludes that the Port District has standing to 

bring a representative cause of action under section 731.

(Id.). 

The Court’s conclusion has not changed. The Port Act grants the Port District the 

power to “protect, preserve, and enhance” the “animal life” in the Bay, in addition to the 

water quality. Cal. Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1 § 4. As of January 1, 2020, the Port District 

holds the title in trust to a majority of the water acres of the Bay. (S.B. 507 Legislative 

Counsel’s Digest, Ex. A, Port District’s Supplemental Authority, ECF No. 454-1 at 2, 4;

Monsanto’s Nuisance Facts, ECF No. 424-2 ¶ 93; Port Master Plan, Ex. 29 to 30(b)(6) 

Deposition of David Michael Johns, Ex. 43, Howard Decl., ECF No. 425-48 at 19; see also 

Cal. Harb. & Nav. Code Appx. 1 § 5 (providing that the Port has “power and authority” 

over the areas of the Bay conveyed to it)). To the extent that the Port District seeks relief 

related to a portion of the Bay that physically falls outside the portion of the Bay the Port 

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holds title to in trust, that inquiry is relevant to the abatement remedy. The Court finds that 

the Port District has standing to bring this representative cause of action under section 731.

Monsanto’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Public Nuisance) (ECF No. 424) is 

denied.

VI. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PURPRESTURE

Monsanto contends that the Court should grant summary judgment in its favor on 

the Port District’s “representative purpresture claim to the extent [the Port District] seeks 

‘damages,’ which are unavailable as a matter of law.” (ECF No. 423-1 at 2). Monsanto 

contends that the Port District’s purpresture claim “is simply a type of representative public 

nuisance claim.” (Id. at 5). Monsanto contends that the Port District may not recover 

damages on its purpresture claim because abatement is the only remedy in a representative 

public nuisance action. Monsanto further contends that the Port District cannot succeed on 

the merits of its purpresture claim. Monsanto contends that PCBs do not physically intrude 

into the Bay, and case law does not support a purpresture claim based on “the presence of 

dilute chemicals in water bodies.” (Id. at 23). Monsanto contends that neither the Convair 

Lagoon nor Campbell Shipyard sediment cap is a purpresture because the Port District and 

state approved the construction of the caps.

The Port District contends that “PCBs in the San Diego Bay are both a public 

nuisance and a purpresture.” (ECF No. 453 at 10). The Port District contends that it brings 

its purpresture claim “in its own right as a title holder” in “trust of the tidelands and 

submerged lands in and along the San Diego Bay.” (Id. at 11, 13). The Port District 

contends it can maintain separate claims for purpresture and public nuisance because it 

brings only the public nuisance claim in its representative capacity. The Port District 

contends that its “purpresture claim is not simply a representative action for abatement. 

While Monsanto’s pollution of the Bay with PCBs does, indeed, impair the public’s right 

to free use of the Bay and its resources, it undeniably also encumbers and has damaged 

property [held] by the Port District.” (Id. at 13-14). The Port District contends that PCBs 

have contaminated the sediment, water, and fish of the Bay and constitute a purpresture. 

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The Port District contends that damages are an available remedy for purpresture. The Port 

District contends that an encroachment need not be visible to be a purpresture. The Port 

District contends that the sediment caps are necessary efforts to address the PCBs, which 

obstruct the free use of the Bay and caused the Port District to lose revenue.

“A purpresture exists where one incloses or makes several to himself that which 

ought to be common to many.” People ex rel. Britton v. Park & O. R. Co., 76 Cal. 156, 

160 (1888). A purpresture is an unlawful encroachment, intrusion, or obstruction of a 

public highway, navigable waterway, or other public land. People v. Gold Run Ditch & 

Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 146-47 (1884). A purpresture is often a public nuisance; however, 

it is possible to have a purpresture that is not a public nuisance. People by Pixley ex rel. 

Teschemacher v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379, 390 (1866); see Park & O. R. Co., 76 Cal. at 161 

(holding that a railroad unlawfully constructed in a public park is a purpresture but “may 

or may not be a nuisance”). A purpresture is a physical obstruction. See, e.g., Davidson, 30 

Cal. at 383, 387 (wharf erected in San Francisco Bay was purpresture); Coburn v. Ames, 

52 Cal. 385, 391, 399 (1877) (road, wharf, and chute on shore of Pacific Ocean beyond the 

high-water mark was a purpresture); Park & O. R. Co., 76 Cal. at 161 (railroad tracks 

constructed over Golden Gate Park was a purpresture); Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 

Cal. 138 at 146-47 (discharge of mining debris consisting of boulders, sand, earth, and 

waste materials in the Sacramento River was a purpresture); Cty. of Lake v. Smith, 228 Cal. 

App. 3d 214, 229 (1991) (dredge and fill encroaching on lake was a purpresture); Marshall 

v. Standard Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 19, 30 (1936) (oil derricks and wells on public street 

was a purpresture). By contrast, physical obstruction is not necessary for a public nuisance. 

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3480; Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. at 146 (“An 

unauthorized invasion of the rights of the public to navigate the water flowing over the soil 

is a public nuisance; and an unauthorized encroachment upon the soil itself is known in 

law as a purpresture.”). A purpresture is also a public nuisance where it “unlawfully 

obstructs the free passage or use in the customary manner” of the land by the public. Park 

& O. R. Co., 76 Cal. at 161; Marshall, 17 Cal. App. 2d at 30.

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In this case, the Port District has not come forward with evidence that PCBs “inclose[

] or make[ ] several to [Monsanto] that which is common to many.” Park & O. R. Co., 76 

Cal. at 160. The EPA website states, “PCBs are a group of man-made organic chemicals 

consisting of carbon, hydrogen, and chlorine atoms.” (Ex. 17, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-

24 at 2). PCBs “range in consistency from an oil to a waxy solid.” (Id.). Once released into 

the environment, “the composition of PCB mixtures changes.” (Id. at 9). PCBs “cycl[e] 

between air, water, and soil,” bioaccumulate in small organisms and fish, and bind to 

sediments. (Id. at 3, 9). The Port District has not presented evidence that PCBs prevent 

physical access to any water, sediment, or fish in the Bay. See Coburn, 52 Cal. at 394 

(explaining that “defendants had no authority in law to appropriate [public highways] to 

their exclusive use and dominion to the exclusion of the public” (emphasis added)). To the 

extent the Port District seeks to prove that the sediment caps at Campbell Shipyard and 

Convair Lagoon constitute a purpresture, the Port District approved erection of the caps.

(See Monsanto’s Purpresture Facts, ECF No. 423-2 ¶ 53 (“Following a lengthy 

environmental review process, the Port approved and permitted the sediment caps at 

Campbell Shipyard and Convair Lagoon.”)). The caps are not an “erection [ ] without 

license . . . upon the property of the sovereign” and do not constitute a purpresture. Alaska 

Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 240 F. 274, 284 (9th Cir. 1917).

Monsanto’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Purpresture) (ECF No. 423) is granted.

VII. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – ABATEMENT

Monsanto moves for summary judgment in its favor “regarding any ‘abatement 

fund’ the Port seeks, and any effort to seek a declaratory judgment about Defendants’ 

responsibility for unknown future costs.” (ECF No. 422-1 at 10). Monsanto contends that 

the remedy requested is displaced by the Porter-Cologne Act and is not ripe. 

The Port District contends that its request for an abatement remedy is not displaced 

by the Porter-Cologne Act, and its claims are ripe for adjudication.

///

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a. Porter-Cologne Act Displacement

Monsanto contends that the Port District’s request for an “abatement fund” is 

displaced by the Porter-Cologne Act. Monsanto contends that the Regional Board has “the 

exclusive role of determining whether and when dredging and filling operations in the Bay 

are or are not appropriate, including to abate any alleged nuisance.” (Id. at 22). Monsanto 

contends that the Porter-Cologne Act does not allow recovery of an abatement fund for

prospective dredging. Monsanto contends the Port District is not entitled to declaratory 

relief regarding Monsanto’s responsibility for future costs because the Regional Board has 

the exclusive authority to determine the party responsible for remediation. 

The Port District contends that it seeks “an equitable order requiring Monsanto to 

prospectively abate the damage it created . . . indirectly through setting up a fund . . . [or] 

to abate directly.” (ECF No. 452 at 6). The Port District contends that the Porter-Cologne 

Act does not displace the Port District’s authority to seek abatement; rather, it “recognizes 

and protects the Port District’s right to seek abatement.” (Id. at 18). The Port District 

contends that it “only seeks declaratory relief in the alternative.” (Id. at 22). The Port 

District contends that declaratory relief is an appropriate remedy, and the Port District “will 

be prepared to present evidence demonstrating the appropriate scope of such relief at trial.” 

(Id. at 14-15).

“The general rule is that statutes do not supplant the common law unless it appears 

that the Legislature intended to cover the entire subject or, in other words, to ‘occupy the 

field.’” I. E. Assocs. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 285 (1985). “[G]eneral and 

comprehensive legislation, where course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations 

and exceptions are minutely described, indicates a legislative intent that the statute should 

totally supersede and replace common law dealing with the subject matter.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). “[T]he common law is not repealed by implication or otherwise, if there is no 

repugnancy between it and the statute, and it does not appear that the legislature intended 

to cover the whole subject.” Gray v. Sutherland, 124 Cal. App. 2d 280, 290 (1954) (quoting 

15 C.J.S., Common Law, § 12, p. 620).

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“The federal Clean Water Act [ ] (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) places primary reliance 

for developing water quality standards on the states.” San Joaquin River Exch. Contractors 

Water Auth. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 183 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1115 (2010). 

California implements the Clean Water Act through the Porter-Cologne Act, California 

Water Code §§ 13000 et seq., which establishes “a statewide program for the control of the 

quality of all the waters of the state.” Cal. Wat. Code § 13000; San Joaquin River Exch., 

183 Cal. App. 4th at 1115. Through the Porter-Cologne Act, the legislature intended “that 

the state board and each regional board shall be the principal state agencies with the 

primary responsibility for the coordination and control of water quality.” Cal. Wat. Code 

§ 13001. 

The Porter-Cologne Act “gives the Board the authority and responsibility to abate 

nuisances affecting the state’s water resources.” Karuk Tribe of N. Cal. v. Cal. Reg’l Water 

Quality Control Bd., 183 Cal. App. 4th 330, 351 (2010) (citing Cal. Wat. Code §§ 

13050(h), (m); 13225; 13241; 13263(a); 13340; 13377). The Porter-Cologne Act 

establishes a regulatory process and certification standards for environmental dredging. See 

Cal. Wat. Code § 13377 (“[T]he state board or the regional boards shall, as required or 

authorized by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, issue waste discharge 

requirements and dredged or fill material permits which apply and ensure compliance with 

all applicable provisions of the act . . . together with any more stringent effluent standards 

or limitations . . . to prevent nuisance.”). The Port District must obtain “certification 

pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act” from the Regional Board in order to 

perform dredging in the Bay. Cal. Wat. Code § 13396.

Although the Regional Board’s authority is broad, the Porter-Cologne Act provides:

No provision of this division or any ruling of the state board or a regional 

board is a limitation: . . .

(b) On the power of any city or county or city and county to declare, prohibit, 

and abate nuisances. . . .

(e) On the right of any person to maintain at any time any appropriate action 

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for relief against any private nuisance as defined in the Civil Code or for relief 

against any contamination or pollution.

Cal. Wat. Code § 13002. The term “person” includes “any city, county, district, the state, 

and the United States . . . .” Cal. Wat. Code § 13050(c). California courts and courts in this 

circuit have consistently held that “[t]here is nothing in the [Porter-Cologne Act] which 

expressly or impliedly places in the state board or any regional board the exclusive power 

to declare that a nuisance exists or to take action to abate a nuisance.” People v. City of Los 

Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 2d 494, 502 (1958) (discussing the previous iteration of the PorterCologne Act, the “Dickey Act”), superseded by statute on other grounds.

To the contrary the power of any city or county to declare, prohibit or abate 

nuisances is expressly reserved to them by Water Code, section [13002] . . . . 

This express reservation of the rights of the plaintiff cities to prosecute the 

subject action clearly negatives any intent to give the control boards the 

exclusive right to determine either what does or does not constitute a nuisance 

or to invoke the equity powers of the courts of this state to abate a public 

nuisance.

Id. at 502-03; see also People of Cal. v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 569 F. 

Supp. 2d 1073, 1081-82 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he Water Boards’ administrative authority, 

while extensive, does not displace the court’s own substantial jurisdiction to declare 

nuisances and grant damages to injured property owners . . . . The fact that the Regional 

Board has the power to order a defendant to do something does not deprive a court the 

power to enjoin the same acts.” (citing City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 2d at 502)). The

Porter-Cologne Act does not displace this Court’s authority to declare a nuisance and take 

action to abate the nuisance. 

Nothing in the Porter-Cologne Act provides that the state or Regional Board is the 

only authority that may determine the party responsible for remediation. See Cal. Wat. 

Code § 13002(e) (“No provision of this division . . . is a limitation . . . [o]n the right of any 

person to maintain at any time an appropriate action for relief against any private nuisance 

. . . or for relief against any contamination or pollution.”). The Court may grant declaratory 

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relief, where appropriate, regardless of whether the Port District requested declaratory 

relief. Arley v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1967); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(c) (“Every . . . final judgment . . . should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, 

even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”). The Porter-Cologne Act 

does not displace the Court’s ability to issue a declaratory judgment.

b. Ripeness

Monsanto contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the Port District’s 

“request for an abatement fund is . . . not ripe.” (ECF No. 422-1 at 28). Monsanto contends 

that the Port District’s requested remedy will require the Court to speculate that the 

Regional Board will permit dredging in the Bay. Monsanto contends that the costs of

abatement are speculative. Monsanto further contends that the Port District is not entitled 

to declaratory relief because the requested remedy is unripe and speculative.

The Port District contends that “the injury to the public—PBCs throughout the Bay 

well above levels that pose a risk to human health and the environment is not some future 

possibility, the injury exists today.” (ECF No. 452 at 23). The Port District contends that 

its requested abatement remedy is ripe because the Port District does not need Regional 

Board approval for sampling and studying PCBs in the Bay or for implementing mitigation 

projects. The Port District contends that its experts’ cost estimates are reasonable 

approximations of the cost of abatement.

The case or controversy clause of Article III of the United States Constitution “limits 

federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction by requiring, inter alia, that plaintiffs have 

standing and that claims be ‘ripe’ for adjudication.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 598 F. 3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 

(1984)). “Standing addresses whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the matter to 

the court for adjudication.” Id. (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 

2.3.1 (5th ed. 2007)). “The related doctrine of ripeness is a means by which federal courts 

may dispose of matters that are premature for review because the plaintiff’s purported 

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injury is too speculative and may never occur.”3Id. (citing CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 2.4.1). 

In determining whether an action is ripe for judicial review, the court is required to evaluate 

“the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of 

withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). “The 

‘central concern [of the ripeness inquiry] is whether the case involves uncertain or 

contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” 

Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997) (alteration in 

original) (quoting 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 3532, at 112 (2d ed. 1984)), cert. denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5627 (Oct. 5, 

1998) and 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7622 (Nov. 30, 1998).

In this case, the purported injury to the public exists today. Monsanto’s asserted role 

in creating the injury is ready for adjudication. The “abatement alternatives” proposed by 

the Port District require further study. (Port District’s Second Amended Damages and 

Abatement Disclosures, Ex. 35, Declaration of Micheal W. Dobbs in Support of Port 

District’s Opposition to Monsanto’s Motions for Summary Judgment (Abatement & 

Purpresture) (“Dobbs Decl.”), ECF No. 452-63 at 12 (“The group of projects finally 

proposed by the Port District may differ after a full scoping and analysis is performed.”); 

see Expert Report of Paul Fuglevand, Ex. 3, Dobbs Decl., ECF No. 452-5 at 4 (“Any actual 

remediation would require feasibility studies and design evaluations which may change the 

assumptions and impact the cost estimates up or down.”)). However, a final abatement plan

is not necessary before the case proceeds to trial. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods.

Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 133-34 (2017) (“[T]he court’s estimate of the amount that would 

be necessary for [abatement] was just that: an estimate . . . . The abatement fund . . . was a 

 

3 On January 27, 2020, Monsanto submitted a Notice of Supplemental Authority in support of its Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Abatement), attaching the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2020). (ECF No. 478). In Juliana, the court 

addressed standing and held that the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries were not redressable by an Article III 

court. See No. No. 18-36082, slip op. at 21, 32. The court did not address ripeness.

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reasonable method of prefunding the remediation . . . [and] an appropriate abatement 

injunction.”).

The Court concludes that the issues in this case are “fit[ ] . . . for judicial decision.” 

Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. The Port District has proposed funds for investigation to 

determine the scope of a final abatement remedy, which may or may not include dredging

and/or capping. The record demonstrates that the Regional Board has previously approved 

investigation, dredging, and capping to abate PCBs in the Bay. (See generally Regional 

Board Order No. R9-2004-0294, Ex. 10, Corley Decl., ECF No. 450-16). Requiring a final 

abatement plan prior to trial would force the Port District to incur costs that it will be unable 

to recoup in the event it prevails at trial. “‘A public entity may not recover in a 

representative public nuisance action any funds that it has already expended to remediate 

a public nuisance.’” (See Order on Port District’s Motion for Leave to File Supplement to 

FAC, ECF No. 245 at 8 (quoting ConAgra Grocery Prods., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 132)).

Under the facts of this case, the doctrine of ripeness does not prevent the Port District from 

proceeding to trial and attempting to prove that abatement is necessary and feasible and 

that an abatement fund is a proper remedy. 

Monsanto’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Abatement) (ECF No. 422) is denied.4

The Port District is entitled to proceed to a bench trial on its “suit to abate a public 

nuisance.” See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 298 (1951) (“The 

right of trial by jury did not exist at common law in a suit to abate a public nuisance. Hence 

it is not a constitutional right now.” (quotation and internal citation omitted)).

///

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4 The Port District moves to strike the Expert Reports of Jason Conder, Ph.D., Gary H. London, and 

Richard G. Luthy, Ph.D. (ECF No. 451). Monsanto moves to strike the Declaration of David Gibson. 

(ECF No. 462). The Court does not rely on the Expert Reports of Jason Conder, Gary H. London, or 

Richard G. Luthy or the Declaration of David Gibson in ruling on the Motions for Summary Judgment. 

Accordingly, the Motions to Strike are denied as moot.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Monsanto’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Public Nuisance) (ECF No. 424) is denied. Monsanto’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Purpresture) (ECF No. 423) is granted. Monsanto’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Abatement) (ECF No. 422) is denied. The Port District’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 451) 

is denied as moot. Monsanto’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 462) is denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final pretrial conference is set for October 15, 

2020, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 14B before the Honorable William Q. Hayes. The parties 

shall lodge the proposed pretrial order on or before September 1, 2020.

Dated: March 26, 2020

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