Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04185/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04185-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

E-Filed 9/23/15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUSCANY INVESTMENTS LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA 

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04185-HRL 

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 114, 123

Plaintiff Tuscany Investments LLC sues Daimler Trucks North America LLC, Winnebago 

Industries, Inc., and Lippert Components, Inc., for violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 

and related breach-of-warranty claims. Tuscany bases these claims on the purchase of an 

allegedly defective Itasca motorhome. The court, during a pretrial conference in January 2015,

deferred ruling on two motions in limine: Winnebago’s second and Lippert’s first. Dkt. Nos. 114, 

123. The court now resolves those two pending motions.

WINNEBAGO’S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE

Winnebago moves the court to prohibit any party from calling Winnebago a “supplier” 

rather than a “warrantor.” Dkt. No. 114. Winnebago argues that Tuscany has been precluded 

from labeling Winnebago as a supplier because Tuscany pled only that Winnebago is a warrantor.

Winnebago relies on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to argue that use of the word “supplier” would 

confuse the issues, mislead the jury, cause undue delay, and cause unfair prejudice. Winnebago 

also moves for a prohibition on any argument that Winnebago is jointly responsible with other 

defendants.

Tuscany responds that Winnebago would not be prejudiced by use of the word “supplier” 

because “this issue has been discussed extensively throughout this case and Winnebago is well 

aware that it meets the [supplier] definition” provided in 15 USC § 2301(4). Tuscany also argues 

Case 5:13-cv-04185-HRL Document 167 Filed 09/23/15 Page 1 of 3
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that supplier status is a legal issue to be drawn from underlying facts rather than a standalone 

factual issue. Dkt. No. 132.

The Magnuson-Moss Act defines a supplier as “any person engaged in the business of 

making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers.” 15 USC § 2301(4). A

warrantor may be a supplier at the same time. See 15 USC § 2301(5). Winnebago has admitted it 

“supplied and installed” parts in the allegedly defective motorhome. Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 2 

with Dkt. No. 7 at 1. The court finds Winnebago would not be unfairly prejudiced at trial if any 

party labeled Winnebago a supplier based on Winnebago’s admission. The court likewise finds no 

danger that use of the word “supplier” would confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause undue 

delay. The motion for an order prohibiting any party from calling Winnebago a supplier is denied.

Winnebago provides no real support for its secondary request. Winnebago’s introduction 

moves the court to prohibit any argument that Winnebago is jointly responsible with the other 

defendants, but the rest of the motion makes no attempt to explain why the request might be 

appropriate. The court denies the request at this time.

LIPPERT’S FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE

Lippert, in its first motion in limine, moves the court to exclude reference by any party to

“any and all other litigation” that involves Lippert. Dkt. No. 123 at 2. Lippert argues exclusion is 

appropriate under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 because any facts or issues that are not 

“identical” to the facts and issues of this case are irrelevant. Lippert also claims that references to 

allegations or evidence from a different case would be too confusing, unfairly prejudicial, and 

time-consuming. Winnebago responds that another case in this district—Collishaw Holdings, 

LLC, et al. v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. et al., 13-cv-5364-JCS—is substantially similar to this 

one, and therefore evidence about that case is relevant and should be admitted. Winnebago argues 

that both this case and Collishaw involve similar Magnuson-Moss Act claims based on the alleged 

failures of “identical components” in similar Itasca motorhomes.

A party must show “substantial similarity” before a court may conclude that evidence of 

some other event is relevant proof of a design defect. See Western Recreational Vehicles, Inc. v. 

Swift Adhesives, Inc., a Div. of Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 23 F.3d 1547, 1555 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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Winnebago has shown that the events alleged in Collishaw are substantially similar to the alleged 

facts of this case, and therefore those other events are relevant to prove design defects in the Itasca 

motorhome purchased by Tuscany. However, Collishaw ended with settlement and a voluntary 

dismissal, and the alleged facts were not conclusively proven one way or the other. The court 

finds that the probative value of references to Collishaw would be small and substantially 

outweighed by the danger of undue delay as well as the danger of unfair prejudice to Lippert. See

Fed. R. Evid. 403. The court therefore prohibits any party from referencing Collishaw.

CONCLUSION

The court denies Winnebago’s second motion in limine and grants Lippert’s first motion in 

limine.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/23/15

_____ ___________________

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:13-cv-04185-HRL Document 167 Filed 09/23/15 Page 3 of 3