Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01548/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01548-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RUDOLPH HELENICK, )

) No. CIV 06-1548 PHX RCB (MEA)

Petitioner, ) 

) O R D E R

vs. ) 

)

Warden Walker, et. al., )

)

Respondents. ) )

This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June

16, 2006 by Petitioner Rudolph Helenick, currently incarcerated at

the Arizona State Prison in Florence, Arizona. An answer (doc. #

11) was filed on October 30, 2006, and Petitioner filed a timely

traverse (doc. # 15) on November 15, 2006. On November 16, 2006,

the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R")

(doc. # 16) recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed

in its entirety as time-barred under the one-year statute of

limitations established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a

Case 2:06-cv-01548-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/22/06 Page 1 of 8
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timely objection to the R&R (doc. # 17) as well as a motion seeking

appointment of counsel (doc. # 18). Also pending before the Court

is Petitioner's motion for default judgment (doc. # 14). Having

carefully reviewed the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 17, 1983, Petitioner was found guilty by jury verdict

in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County on six counts

of burglary in the first degree, six counts of armed robbery, and

nineteen counts of kidnaping. Answer (doc. # 11), Ex. G. On June

14, 1983, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 28 years on

each count of burglary in the first degree, kidnaping, and armed

robbery. Id., Ex. H. Three of the sentences were imposed

consecutively, effectively sentencing Petitioner to a term of

imprisonment of 84 years. See id.

On direct review, the Arizona Court of Appeals modified

Petitioner's sentence to reflect the presumptive term of

imprisonment of 20 years with respect to the three counts of

burglary in the first degree. Id., Ex. M. The Supreme Court of

Arizona denied further review on September 11, 1985. Id., Ex. S. 

Petitioner apparently did not seek a writ of certiorari from the

Supreme Court of the United States, but had 90 days to do so. See

Sup. Ct. R. 13. His conviction therefore became final on December

10, 1985. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003)

("Finality attaches when [the Supreme] Court affirms a conviction

on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of

certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition

expires.").

Petitioner first initiated post-conviction relief proceedings

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on February 20, 2001. Id., Ex. T. After his appointed counsel in

those proceedings informed the court he could find no meritorious

issues to raise on Petitioner's behalf, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for post-conviction relief on November 26, 2002. Answer

(doc. # 11), Ex. V, W. The court summarily denied that petition on

June 20, 2003. Id., Ex. Z. 

On June 16, 2006, Petitioner filed the present Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) in this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. He has also filed a motion for default judgment

(doc. # 14) and a motion for appointment of counsel (doc. # 18),

which the Court will address first.

II. MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Petitioner has requested default judgment, claiming that the

Court had improvidently granted the Government's first request for

an extension of time to respond to his Petition for Habeas Corpus. 

Mot. (doc. # 14). Petitioner believes that the Government did not

file its request until after the time to respond had lapsed, and

therefore should not have been granted any extension. See id. at

2. The Government had 40 days from the date of service of the

Petition within which to file its answer. Order (doc. # 3). The

Government was served on August 4, 2006. See Summons (doc. # 4). 

Therefore, the Government's 40 days began to run on August 5, 2006,

producing a deadline of September 13, 2006, the date on which it

filed its first request for an extension of time. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 6(a); Mot. (doc. # 7). Not only was the Government's request

timely, but it was completely reasonable given the reported

difficulties of locating the Petitioner's case file from 13 years

ago. See id. at 1-2. In short, Petitioner's motion for default

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judgment (doc. # 14) is without merit and will be denied.

Petitioner has also filed a motion requesting appointment of

counsel. Mot. (doc. # 18). There is no constitutional right to

appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents

of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). The court

has discretion to appoint counsel for a financially eligible habeas

petitioner when "the interests of justice so require". 18 U.S.C. §

3006A(a)(2)(B); see also La Mere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th

Cir. 1987). On careful review of the circumstances, the Court does

not find that the interests of justice require appointment of

counsel in this case. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's

assessment that Petitioner's pleadings are coherent and legible. 

See R&R (doc. # 16) at 7. Moreover, given the lack of complexity

of the issues raised by this Petition and the Court's liberal

construction of pleadings by pro se litigants, this is not a case

warranting court-appointed counsel. See La Mere, 827 F.2d at 626;

Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984). The motion

(doc. # 18) will therefore be denied.

III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Regardless of the date of Petitioner's conviction, this case

is governed by the AEDPA because it was filed after April 24, 1996. 

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA requires a state prisoner to seek

federal habeas corpus relief within one year after the state

conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Even if a

prisoner's conviction became final before the AEDPA's enactment, as

in Petitioner's case, the limitations period still applies through

a one-year grace period expiring on April 24, 1997 within which the

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prisoner may file a federal petition. See Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The AEDPA's one-year statute

of limitations is strictly applied; a petitioner who takes

advantage of a longer state statute of limitations in exhausting

state remedies will be barred from seeking federal relief. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

In this case, Petitioner's conviction became final on December

10, 1985. See Answer (doc. # 11), Ex. S; Sup. Ct. R. 13; Clay, 537

U.S. at 527. Therefore, the AEDPA applies, and Petitioner had

until the expiration of the one-year grace period on April 24, 1997

to file for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Woodford, 538 U.S.

at 210; Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336; Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. 

Petitioner did not file this Petition until more than nine years

after the grace period had expired. Although the AEDPA's one-year

limitations period is subject to statutory tolling during the

pendency of a properly filed state petition for post-conviction

relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1247,

Petitioner did not bother to initiate state post-conviction

proceedings until February 20, 2001, more than fifteen years after

his conviction had become final and long after his grace period had

lapsed. This Petition is time-barred.

Petitioner does raise a question regarding a period beginning

on or about May 26, 1996 during which he suffered from a stroke,

which may entitle him to equitable tolling of the AEDPA's

limitations period. See Objection (doc. # 17), Ex. B. The Supreme

Court recently stated that, if the AEDPA's statute of limitations

may be equitably tolled, the proponent must show "(1) that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

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extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, ___, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814, 1815 n.8, 161 L. Ed. 2d

669, 678, 679 n.8 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citing Irwin v. Dep't

of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); accord Brambles v.

Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The one-year

statute of limitations prescribed in the AEDPA may be equitably

tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.") (internal

quotations omitted).

In Pace, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third

Circuit to reverse the district court's allowance of equitable

tolling, finding that the petitioner had not been diligent in

pursuing his claims. See Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1815. The Court

noted that although the petitioner's claims were available in 1986

and 1991, he "waited years, without any valid justification" to

assert those claims in an untimely state petition. See id. at

1810, 1815. Because the petitioner "[sat] on his rights for years

before he filed his [state] petition" and "also sat on them for

five more months after his [state] proceedings became final before

deciding to seek relief in federal court," the Court concluded that

the petitioner's lack of diligence precluded equitable relief. Id.

at 1815; see also McQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 14, 19

(1874) ("Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been

gross laches in the prosecution of rights").

The instant case presents even longer delays than those in

Pace. Like Pace, Petitioner filed his second state petition long

after the claims asserted had been available to him. See Pace, 125

S. Ct. at 1810. Even accepting Petitioner's account of his stroke

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in 1996, there is no explanation for the delay of more than ten

years during which he made no effort to pursue state postconviction relief. Petitioner not only sat on his rights for ten

years before deciding to seek relief in state court, but sat on

them for nearly five more months after his state post-conviction

proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal

court. The Supreme Court found Pace ineligible for equitable

tolling based on five years of delay in filing his state petition,

followed by five months of delay in filing his federal petition. 

Id. at 1815. By the same principle, this Court finds that

Petitioner's unexplained and lengthier delay constitutes gross

laches and exhibits a lack of diligence that makes equitable

tolling inappropriate in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court adopts the reasoning and conclusions of the R&R

(doc. # 16) in their entirety. For those reasons, as well as the

reasons discussed in this Order, the Court finds that Petitioner's

claims are barred by the AEDPA's statute of limitations, and that

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation (doc. # 16) is ADOPTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (doc. # 1) is DENIED.

DATED this 22nd day of December, 2006.

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Copies to counsel of record and Petitioner pro se

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