Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05700/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05700-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISIAH LUCAS, JR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-5700 ALA HC

vs.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden, 

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving two consecutive sentences of 25

years to life after being found guilty of two counts of receiving or concealing stolen property in

violation of California’s three strikes law. 

On August 5, 2002 and November 14, 2002 prison staff requested that Petitioner

submit DNA samples of blood and saliva as well as palm prints as mandated by California Penal

Code § 295. Both times Petitioner refused citing constitutional and religious reasons. As a

result Petitioner was denied “good time” credits. Petitioner challenged this action before the

Supreme Court of California, which denied his petition. Answer, Ex. C at 1. Petitioner now

asks this court to “have that of his “points” [be] restored back to that of the original state, as 18

points was (sic) added to Petitioner[‘s] custody status due to that of the [Displainary] (sic) action

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via the CDC 115[s].” Amended Petition at 1. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s

petition is denied. 

I

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits

in state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court

“may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of

the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

A federal court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the

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state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

court must independently review the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). On this

matter there is no reasoned state court opinion. Thus this court will conduct an independent

review of the record. 

II

In his petition, Petitioner references his personal and religious beliefs, the

constitutional restrictions on the powers of Congress, the Fourth Amendment protections against

unreasonable search and seizure, as well as the Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto

laws. What appears most central to Petitioner’s claim is that California Penal Code § 295

violated Petitioner’s federal due process rights. While Petitioner has not provided reasoned

support for these allegations, Petitioner seems to be impliedly arguing that he has a liberty

interest in freedom from the loss of good time credits. 

A protected liberty interest may arise under either the Due Process Clause itself or

a state statute or regulation. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

(1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). Petitioner does not have a protected liberty

interest in behavioral credits under the Due Process Clause itself. See Sandin v. Connor, 515

U.S. 472, 478 - 479 (1995); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Thus, he must show

that his liberty interest arises under state law. 

A liberty interest arises under state law when an inmate is subjected to restrictions

that impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The loss of credits “inevitably

affect[s] the duration of [Petitioner’s] sentence.” Id. at 487. Thus, the loss of credits involves a

right of “real substance,” which implicates Petitioner’s liberty interest under the Due Process

Clause. Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded on other

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grounds, 520 U.S. 1238 (1997) (loss of good time credits implicated a liberty interest under

Sandin); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (a prisoner’s interest in good time credit had “real

substance” and thus entitled him to the protection of the Due Process Clause). In this case,

however, Petitioner is serving consecutive sentences of 25 years to life with the possibility of

parole. Respondents contend that, under these circumstances, a credit loss would not effect the

length of Petitioner’s sentence because the duration of Petitioner’s sentence is solely within the

discretion of the Board of Prison Terms.

The possibility of denial of parole at some later date does not amount to the denial

of a liberty interest. In Sandin, the court concluded that a possible loss of credits due to a

disciplinary conviction was insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest where “[n]othing in

Hawaii’s code requires the parole board to deny parole in the face of a misconduct record or to

grant parole in its absence, (citation omitted), even though misconduct is by regulation a relevant

consideration.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. The Court noted, "[t]he decision to release a prisoner

rests on a myriad of considerations," and an inmate is generally "afforded procedural protection

at his parole hearing in order to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct record." Id. at

487. The Court held: "[t]he chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply

too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Id. After

Sandin, in order to demonstrate a liberty interest an inmate must show that a disciplinary

conviction will inevitably lengthen the duration of the inmate's incarceration. Id. Petitioner has

not made this showing. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief

under § 2254 is denied.

DATED: September 7, 2007

 /s/ Arthur Alarcón 

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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