Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02203/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02203-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kathy Sandlin, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV-07-02203-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Kathy Sandlin’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc #11) and Defendant Michael Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration’s (“Defendant”) Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc #15). After

consideration of the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court finds the following. 

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on

May 25, 2001, claiming a disability onset date of April 23, 2001. (Tr. 52.) Plaintiff amended

her claim to a closed period of benefits from the onset date through July 12, 2005. (Tr. 377.)

The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 29-32.) A hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was held on November 2, 2005. (Tr. 450-66.) The ALJ

issued a written decision on December 28, 2005 finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 15-22.) This decision became Defendant’s final

decision when the Appeals Council denied review on February 9, 2005. (Tr. 6-8.) Plaintiff then

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commenced action with the Court on April 20, 2006. The Court remanded the matter on

December 13, 2006 to afford the ALJ an opportunity to address Plaintiff’s claims as outlined in

the Court’s first decision. (Tr. 497-506.) A supplemental hearing was held before the ALJ on

August 8, 2007. (Tr. 525-40.)

In a decision dated September 13, 2007, the ALJ again found that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 477-86.) The decision of the ALJ

became the final decision of the Commissioner on the sixty first day after issuance. (Tr. 475.)

Plaintiff commenced this second appeal for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3). 

B. The ALJ's First Decision, and Remand

The ALJ’s original decision found that Plaintiff has a severe affective mental disorder and

non-severe physical impairments related to her heart problems and back and knee pain. (Tr. 17,

21.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s affective disorder was not severe enough to meet or

medically equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 17, 21.) The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff was

able to perform a range of light work and that such work existed in significant numbers in the

national economy. (Tr. 20, 21.)

 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the first appeal was granted in part.

According to the Ninth Circuit, evidence should be credited and an action remanded for an

immediate award of benefits when the following three factors are satisfied: (1) the ALJ has

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence; (2) there are no outstanding

issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such

evidence credited. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). In the first

appeal, the Court found that the first factor was satisfied to allow an award of benefits, but

that the record did not provide sufficient evidence as to whether the second or third factors

were satisfied. The ALJ was ordered to clarify the reasons for rejecting Dr. Enoch Barrios’

opinion in addition to the other physicians in the record. (Tr. 483.) Specifically, the Court

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outlined four issues with the ALJ’s decision. First, the ALJ erroneously concluded that none

of Plaintiff’s physicians opined that she was unable to work. Second, the ALJ’s reasons for

rejecting Dr. Barrios’ opinions were neither clear and convincing nor supported by substantial

evidence. Third, without explanation, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to attend

college was “indicative of the possibility that she could have engaged in some sort of work

activity on a regular basis.” Fourth, Defendant’s statement that the ALJ relied on subjective

complaints from Plaintiff was not included in the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 498-503.)

The Court remanded the case to the ALJ to afford an opportunity to address Plaintiff’s

claims and provide additional reasons to support the rejection of Dr. Barrios’ conclusions. The

ALJ again ruled against Plaintiff, providing the additional reasoning discussed later in this

opinion. Plaintiff now brings this action in response to the ALJ’s decision alleging that

Defendant failed to give adequate weight to Dr. Barrios as an examining physician, and that

the ALJ inaccurately applied school attendance in the decision to reject Dr. Barrios’ treatment

notes. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a Social Security appeal, the decision of the Commissioner must be

affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct

legal standards. See Batson v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2004); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing factual

determinations by the Commissioner, acting through the Administrative Law Judge, this Court

affirms if substantial evidence supports the determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d

1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Howard ex rel.

Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,

459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable person

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion when the entire record is considered. 

Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th

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Cir. 1999). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Commissioner’s conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075

(9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in

medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v.

Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s determinations of law are

reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable

statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

Upon remand, the ALJ was afforded an opportunity to address Plaintiff’s claims and

provide additional reasons to support the rejection of Dr. Barrios’ conclusions. The Court

stated in the first appeal that “it is unclear from the record whether Plaintiff was disabled

through July 12, 2005.” (Tr. 504.) The issue now before this Court is whether the ALJ

introduced additional “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence in

the record to properly reject the conclusions stated by Dr. Barrios in his July 3, 2002 report.

(Tr. 329). “The ALJ may not reject the opinion of a treating physician, even if it is

contradicted by the opinions of other doctors, without providing ‘specific and legitimate

reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,

720 (9th Cir. 1998).

 The ALJ’s second decision sets forth specific and legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Barrios’ statements. When evidence

reasonably supports confirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, the Court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

Therefore, this Court affirms the judgement of the ALJ and the denial of Plaintiff’s benefits.

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A. Dr. Barrios’ Conclusion that Plaintiff was Unable to Work is Inconsistent with

Other Treatment Notes

On July 3, 2002, Dr. Barrios opined in his treatment notes that Plaintiff was unable to

work because she could not handle the pressure. (Tr. 329.) On the same day, Dr. Barrios

opined in a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment that Plaintiff was severely

impaired with respect to her ability to respond appropriately to supervision and customary

work pressures. (Tr. 331-32.) In his first decision, and again in his second decision, the ALJ

ruled against Plaintiff. The ALJ found that Dr. Barrios’ assessment of the severity of

Plaintiff’s limitations was inconsistent with his general treatment notes. The ALJ based his

decision on several notes within a close time period describing Plaintiff’s general

improvement, success with medicines prescribed by Dr. Barrios, and evidence of work

activity and school attendance by Plaintiff. Thus, the ALJ ruled against Plaintiff despite Dr.

Barrios’ notes from July 3, 2002 regarding Plaintiff’s limitations. The record revealed

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding of inconsistent treatment notes. (Tr. 483-

84.)

Dr. Barrios’ initial evaluation of Plaintiff was on June 29, 2000. (Tr. 358.) Plaintiff

described her past depression symptoms, family history, and history of substance abuse. Dr.

Barrios examined Plaintiff once more on August 8, 2000. (Tr. 357.) During neither of these

occasions did Dr. Barrios opine that Plaintiff was unable to work. Almost two years elapsed

before Dr. Barrios conducted his next assessment–at issue here–on July 3, 2002. None of the

physicians who examined Plaintiff in the interim opined that Plaintiff was unable to work.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff alleges an onset date of April 23, 2001. 

Inconsistency is clearly present in the record, and begins at the treatment note of July

3, 2002 completed by Dr. Barrios on the same day he completed Plaintiff’s RFC. Dr. Barrios

stated that Plaintiff was severely impaired with respect to her ability to respond appropriately

to supervision and customary work pressures and unable to handle the pressure. (Tr. 329-32.) 

In the July 3, 2003 treatment note, however, Dr. Barrios reported that Plaintiff showed mild

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improvement. (Tr. 329.) Plaintiff stated that she had been “feeling better with current

medications,” and had been “doing better in school.” (Tr. 329.) Dr. Barrios documented

Plaintiff’s improvement in the August 14, 2002 treatment note, when Plaintiff reported she

was “less anxious and less depressed,” and was “more calm and relaxed.” (Tr. 328.) The

Court finds the most substantial evidence of inconsistency in the treatment note from

September 25, 2002, less than three months after Dr. Barrios opined that Plaintiff was unable

to work. Dr. Barrios noted on that day that Plaintiff “works for a professor at the university,

doing spreadsheets.” (Tr. 327.) The same treatment note established that Plaintiff was

concurrently attending classes. Plaintiff also “denied symptoms of depression.” Dr. Barrios

reported that she was “showing a good response to the use of psychotropic medications.” (Tr.

327.) Similarly, Dr. Barrios logged in his treatment note on November 11, 2002 that Plaintiff

“still goes to school and works as hard as she can.” (Tr. 326.) There was no statement by Dr.

Barrios after the July 3, 2002 note to Plaintiff that she should not be working and attending

school at the same time, or was unable to do so. This documentation supports the ALJ’s

statement that Plaintiff’s “activities have, at least at times, been somewhat greater than

[Plaintiff] has generally reported.” (Tr. 484.)

Although the record does not prove continuous employment throughout Plaintiff’s

alleged closed claim of disability, the ALJ made a valid and reasonable determination

supported by substantial evidence in the record that Dr. Barrios’ treatment notes were 

inconsistent regarding his statement of Plaintiff’s limitations. 

B. The ALJ’s Introduction of Additional Reasons to Support a Rejection of Dr.

Barrios’ Conclusions

The Court previously dismissed Defendant’s argument that the ALJ could have

rejected Dr. Barrios’ statements because they were based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

(Tr. 503.) The ALJ had not included this reasoning in his first decision, nor had he provided

clear and convincing evidence to support this assertion. This Court must review the adequacy

of the reasons specified by the ALJ, not the post hoc contentions of Defendant. See Connett v.

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Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the reasons the

ALJ asserts. It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on

evidence that the ALJ did not discuss.”); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[W]e cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a ground that the agency did not

invoke in making its decision. Thus, if the Commissioner’s contention invites this Court to

affirm the denial of benefits on a ground not invoked by the Commissioner in denying

benefits originally, then we must decline.”) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196

(1947)); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“As we have

previously recognized, a reviewing Court should not be forced to speculate as to the grounds

for an adjudicator’s [decision].”) (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.

1983)). 

In his second decision, the ALJ set forth several additional reasons why Dr. Barrios’

statements should be discounted because they relied on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

These reasons are supported by substantial evidence in the record. First, the ALJ explained

that Dr. Barrios provided a conclusory opinion, “without substantial support from the other

evidence of record.” Dr. Barrios provided “very little explanation of the evidence relied on in

forming that opinion.” (Tr. 483.) “The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician,

including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported

by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, the

ALJ explained that Dr. Barrios’ opinion was based “solely on [Plaintiff’s] subjective

complaints and not significant objective medical findings.” (Tr. 483.) The ALJ explained

further that Dr. Barrios appeared to rely quite heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and

symptoms in his determination of Plaintiff’s limitations. (Tr. 482.) Third, the ALJ expanded

on his statement that Dr. Barrios’ opinion does not accurately consider Plaintiff’s success in

school. Plaintiff started school towards the beginning of her alleged onset date, completed her

courses, and earned a business associate’s degree in 2005 with a 3.2 grade point average. (Tr.

484.) Although school attendance is not alone sufficient to prove that a Plaintiff is not

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disabled, when combined with Plaintiff’s other daily activities and work after her onset date, it

may be considered because it impacts her limitations as stated by Dr. Barrios. Macri v.

Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an ALJ may consider enrollment in and

completion of job training course). Finally, in response to Dr. Barrios’ assessment that 

Plaintiff was unable to work, the ALJ correctly states that the physician is not qualified to

assess what kinds of low pressure jobs exist in the workplace. A doctor’s opinion as to a

medical condition clearly is different from an opinion as to an individual's actual functional

performance in a job setting. Katz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 972 F.2d 290,

293 (9th Cir. 1992). 

C. The ALJ’s Response to the Court’s Remand

 At the first appeal, the Court found four issues with the ALJ’s decision to warrant

remand. First, the ALJ erroneously concluded that none of Plaintiff’s physicians opined that

she was unable to work. Second, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Barrios’ opinions were

neither clear and convincing nor supported by substantial evidence. Third, without

explanation, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to attend college was “indicative of the

possibility that she could have engaged in some sort of work activity on a regular basis.” (Tr.

19.) Fourth, Defendant’s statement that the ALJ relied on subjective complaints from Plaintiff

was not included in the ALJ’s discussion for the decision. The Court therefore remanded the

case to the ALJ to afford an opportunity to address Plaintiff’s claims and provide additional

reasons to support the rejection of Dr. Barrios’ conclusions. The ALJ again ruled against

Plaintiff, providing the additional reasoning discussed above. Plaintiff now brings this action

in response to the ALJ’s decision alleging that Defendant failed to give adequate weight to Dr.

Barrios as an examining physician, and that the ALJ inaccurately applied school attendance in

the decision to reject Dr. Barrios’ treatment notes. 

Regarding the ALJ’s response to the remand, the Court finds the following. To the first

issue, although the ALJ twice erred in his statements that none of the physicians opined that

Plaintiff was unable to work, it they were mere misstatements. The ALJ in fact acknowledges

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1

 Defendant submits that these were mere misstatements on the part of the ALJ as they are at

odds with his direct dispensation of Dr. Barrios’ findings, in which the ALJ discusses Dr. Barrios’

findings of disability, and how a finding of disability is one reserved for the Commissioner (Tr. 483).

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Dr. Barrios’ opinion to the contrary in his argument for non-disability. This was harmless

error, as suggested by Defendant.1

 As to the second issue, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr.

Barrios in the second decision are this time clearly stated and supported by substantial

evidence as previously discussed. As to the third issue, the ALJ expanded his reasoning for

rejecting Dr. Barrios’ testimony in part based on Plaintiff’s attendance in school in the second

decision. (Tr. 484.) As to the fourth issue, discussed above, the ALJ thoroughly included his

reasoning for rejecting Plaintiff’s statements as subjective complaints to Dr. Barrios in the

second decision. (Tr. 483.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the decision of the ALJ is

supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, summary judgement in favor of Defendant is

appropriate as a matter of law. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003);

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Kathy Sandlin’s Motion for Summary

Judgement (Doc. #11) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Michael Astrue’s Cross Motion for

Summary Judgement (Doc. #15) is GRANTED.. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgement

accordingly and terminate this matter. 

DATED this 4th day of June, 2008.

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