Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00335/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Meeks,

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Susan McClintock, Warden, 

Respondent.

No. CV 12-335-TUC-RCC (CRP) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Robert Meeks currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Safford, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 28 

U.S.C. § 2241. (Docs. 1, 4 (supplement)). Petitioner seeks to vacate his convictions 

under 18 U.S.C. ' 942(c). Respondent has filed an Answer (Doc. 10) and Petitioner has 

filed a Traverse (Doc. 11). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter 

was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation. For 

the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its 

independent review, dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Petitioner was convicted by jury in the Northern District of Illinois of the 

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following offenses: (1) three counts of Conspiracy/Attempt to Commit Robbery in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts 1, 3, 4); (2) one count of Distribution of Heroin in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); (3) one count of Conspiracy to Deprive the Civil Rights 

of Others in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241; and (6) two counts of Use of a Firearm in 

Relation to a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 6, 7). (Answer 

(Doc. 10), p. 2 (citing Exh. 1, &4); see also Answer, Exh. 1, Att. 2). Petitioner was 

sentenced on June 11, 1998 and is serving an aggregated 435-month sentence, with a 

projected release date of December 14, 2028, after application of projected Good 

Conduct Time sentence credits. (Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. 1, ¶ 3)). 

 Petitioner, a civilian, was convicted for crimes he committed with three Chicago 

police officers. United States v. Meachum, 182 F.3d 923, * 1 (7th Cir. July 15, 1999) 

(unpublished). Petitioner and his three co-defendants set up and executed robberies of 

drug dealers. Id. Petitioner would call drug dealers to arrange the drug transactions. Id. 

Petitioner’s three co-defendants would then meet the drug dealers and rob them of cash 

and drugs. Id. After Petitioner was found guilty, he appealed his convictions and 

sentences. 

 As part of his direct appeal, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in determining 

his violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 conspiracy/attempt to commit robbery and 18 U.S.C. § 

241 conspiracy to deprive the civil rights of others constituted “crimes of violence” under 

§ 924(c). Petitioner argued the jury, not the judge, should have determined whether these 

two crimes were “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The Seventh Circuit disagreed with 

Petitioner. It reasoned that whether an offense is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) is a 

question of law that can be suitably decided by the trial judge. Id. at *1-*2. The Seventh 

Circuit also rejected Petitioner’s argument that his sentence was excessive. Id. at *6. 

However, the appellate court remanded to the trial court a limited issue related to 

Petitioner’s sentence calculation. Id. at *6-*7. 

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 Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Meeks v. United States, 2003 WL 1989653, *1 (N.D. Ill. 

Apr. 30, 2003). In that action, Petitioner recapitulated many of his arguments raised on 

direct appeal. The District Court denied Petitioner relief. Petitioner appealed the decision 

to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the trial court’s decision denying relief. Meeks v. 

United States, 105 Fed. App’x. 834, 836, 2004 WL 1380545 (7th Cir. 2004). The U.S. 

Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari. Meeks v. 

United States, 546 U.S. 878 (2005). 

 On February 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Meeks v. Graber, 2011 WL 6722645 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2011), 

adopted by 2011 WL 6412561 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2011). Petitioner argued that a thenrecent United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Johnson, 559 U.S. 133 

(2010), invalidated his '924(c) conviction for his '241 crime. In sum, Petitioner argued 

that his violation of '241 could not be considered a “crime of violence” under '924(c) 

because the Government did not prove he used or attempted to use violent physical force 

to commit the crime. See Meeks, 2011 WL 6412561 at *4. To bring such a claim, 

Petitioner had to show that he fell within the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. ' 2255(e). The 

Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court deny the petition for lack of 

jurisdiction because Petitioner failed to show that he fell within the savings clause. See 

id. at *6. (holding that because Petitioner failed to show that Johnson constituted a 

relevant change of law, he, in turn, failed to show that had been denied an unobstructed 

procedural shot to bring his claim). The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation finding that Petitioner did not fall within the savings clause because 

Johnson was not new, relevant law. Meeks v. Graber, CV 10-71-TUC-RCC, 2011 WL 

6412561 at *1. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit 

remanded the matter to the District Court for the limited purpose of granting or denying a 

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certificate of appealability, and the District Court declined to issue a certificate of 

appealability and denied Petitioner’s Motion for Permission to Appeal In Forma 

Pauperis. (Docs. 40, 45, 46 filed in Meeks v. Graber, CV 10-71-TUC-RCC). 

INSTANT HABEAS PETITION. Petitioner now files a second habeas petition pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. ' 2241 seeking to vacate his convictions under '924(c). (Petition (Doc. 1)). 

Petitioner claims in Ground I that under the 2003 decision in United States v. Colvin, 353 

F.3d. 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), he is factually and actually innocent of “using or 

carrying” a firearm under 18 U.S.C. ' 924(c) “to commit an agreement in violation of 18 

U.S.C. '241.” (Id. at p. 4). In Ground II, Petitioner claims that '2255 is inadequate or 

ineffective because Colvin is not a Supreme Court decision made retroactive, his claim of 

factual and actual innocence is not grounded upon newly discovered evidence, and his 

claim is not based on a new rule of constitutional law. (Id. at p. 5). In his third and final 

Ground for relief, Petitioner claims that neither the abuse of the writ doctrine or the law 

of the case precludes consideration of the instant '2241 Petition. (Id. at p. 6). Petitioner 

elaborates on his claims in the Memorandum attached to his Petition (Doc. 1-1) and he 

also filed Supplement wherein he argues that §241 cannot be considered a crime of 

violence for purposes of §924(c). (Supplement (Doc. 4)). 

 Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

(Answer (Doc. 10)). 

DISCUSSION

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. A federal prisoner is generally required 

to exhaust his federal administrative remedies before filing a habeas petition. See e.g. 

Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1991). This rule, however, is intended to 

apply when a § 2241 petition challenges the execution of a prison sentence. The 

exhaustion requirement is also judicially created and not a statutory requirement. See 

Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds, Reno v. 

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Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995). Although Respondent argues Petitioner has failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies regarding the claims raised in his Petition, Respondent also 

concedes that the Bureau of Prisons could not remedy Petitioner’s claim. (Answer, p. 5). 

Therefore, requiring Petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile. 

Accordingly, the Petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. 

JURISDICTION: THE SAVINGS CLAUSE. 

 A federal prisoner challenging the legality of a sentence must generally do so by 

motion raised in the sentencing court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Harrison v. 

Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.2008). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of the execution of his sentence must bring a petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 

861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). However, an exception to these general rules is created by § 

2255(e), also known as the “savings clause” or “escape hatch.” The savings clause 

permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas petition under § 2241 to challenge the legality 

of a sentence when the prisoner’s remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to 

test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). If the prisoner’s claims fall within 

the savings clause of §2255(e), then the prisoner may challenge the legality of his 

sentence through a §2241 petition filed with the custodial court, Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 

865, which in this case is the District of Arizona. 

 Respondent asserts this Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Petitioner’s 

§ 2241 Petition because Petitioner fails to qualify for relief under the savings clause of 

'2255(e). Petitioner argues that he properly filed his Petition pursuant to § 2241 in this 

District because the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test his 

claim of “actual innocence” based on Colvin. 

The savings clause applies “where a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual 

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innocence and (2) has not had an ‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting that claim.” 

Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Alaimalo v. United 

States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). The savings clause is a narrow doctrine to be 

used in extremely limited circumstances. United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th 

Cir.1997). Petitioner has the burden of persuading the Court that a § 2255 petition is 

inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir.1963). If a 

petitioner proceeding under '2241 fails to meet his burden of demonstrating that the 

remedy under '2255 is inadequate or ineffective, then the '2241 petition will be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

 Additionally, to proceed under '2241, a petitioner must also show that he is 

unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h) that would allow the petitioner to 

bring a second and successive § 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. 2255(h); see Stephens, 464 F.3d 

at 898. The gatekeeping provision prohibits the filing of a second § 2255 motion unless 

there is newly discovered evidence that is clear and convincing evidence to a reasonable 

factfinder that the petitioner is not guilty or there is a new rule of constitutional law. 28 

U.S.C. '2255(h). 

ANALYSIS. As a threshold matter, the Court must assess whether '2255(h) applies to 

permit Petitioner to file a successive '2255 motion. In Ground II of the instant Petition, 

Petitioner concedes that his current claim is not based on a new rule of constitutional law 

or on newly discovered evidence. (Petition, p.5). Thus, because Petitioner does not meet 

the requirements of '2255(h), he cannot raise his instant claims in a successive § 2255 

motion under that provision. Consequently, Petitioner may proceed here if he is able to 

establish that he satisfies the requirements of the savings clause set out at '2255(e). 

Petitioner contends that he falls within the savings clause in light of the Colvin decision. 

UNOBSTRUCTED PROCEDURAL SHOT. Like the Ninth Circuit in Ivy and Stephens, this 

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Court begins the '2255(e) savings clause analysis with the second factor, which 

considers whether Petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claims 

by way of direct appeal or a § 2255 motion. To satisfy this prong of the test, “it is not 

enough that the petitioner is presently barred from raising his claim of innocence by 

motion under § 2255. He must never have had the opportunity to raise it by motion.” Ivy, 

328 F.3d at 1060. See also Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5, 13 L.Ed.2d 6 (1964) (a court's 

denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate); Holland v. 

Pontesso, 234 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 2255 not inadequate or ineffective because 

Petitioner misses statute of limitations); Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162-63 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 

petition inadequate). 

 When determining whether a petitioner has not had an “unobstructed procedural 

shot,” the Ninth Circuit “consider[s] ‘(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim 

‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and 

(2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim after that first 

§2255 motion.’” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960). 

 In Colvin ̧ the case on which Petitioner bases his Petition, the defendant was 

convicted on charges arising out of his role in a cross burning. Colvin was convicted of, 

inter alia, conspiracy to threaten or intimidate persons in the free exercise or enjoyment 

of housing rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. '241, use of fire (cross burning) in the 

commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1), and using or carrying a 

firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. ' 924(c). Colvin, 353 F.3d at 

571. The Seventh Circuit concluded that 18 U.S.C. ' 241 could not be used as predicate 

felony to support a conviction under '844(h)(1) “for using fire to commit a felony...”, 

overruling two earlier Seventh Circuit cases. Colvin, 353 F.3d at 576. The court so held 

based on the reasoning that an overt act is not required under '241 and, therefore, 

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“[b]ecause the conspiracy offense is the agreement alone, and because fire was not used 

in this case to form that agreement, fire could not have been used to commit the '241 

conspiracy.” Id. Thus, the Colvin court concluded that “the '241 offense is the 

agreement, and one cannot use fire to form an agreement unless, for example, the 

conspirators ‘communicated across the Mississippi River by smoke signals or by hanging 

a lantern in a belfry.’” Colvin, 353 F.3d at 575-75 (quoting United States v. Corona, 108 

F.3d 565, 573 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

 Petitioner stresses that under Colvin, '241 does not require an overt act. 

(Memorandum (Doc. 1-1), pp. 9-10; Supplement (Doc. 4), p. 2). He goes on to argue that 

because he did not use or possess a firearm to form the agreement under '241, his 

conviction under '241 cannot be used as the predicate offense for his convictions under 

18 U.S.C. '924(c). (Memorandum, (Doc. 1-1), pp. 9-10; Supplement (Doc. 4), pp. 2-3). 

 Respondent agrees that “Petitioner’s argument is facially compelling.” (Answer, 

p. 8). Respondent concedes that “[t]he original versions of '924(c) and '844(h) were 

substantially identical in language, as Congress patterned the latter after the former.” (Id.

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549 at 69 (1970)). Nonetheless, Respondent challenges 

Petitioner’s position by relying on the 1998 amendment to '924(c) “which prescribe[d] 

an additional sentence for anyone who ‘uses or carries a firearm...in furtherance of’ of a 

crime of violence.” (Answer, p. 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. '924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis in 

original)). Respondent points out that Colvin did not address '924(c)’s post-1998 

amendment language imposing “the far more lenient ‘possession in furtherance of’ 

standard...” than that set out in '844(h). (Answer, p. 9). Therefore, Respondent argues 

that although Petitioner “may indeed be correct that he did not use or carry a firearm to 

commit the '241 conspiracy[,]...there is no question that Petitioner by virtue of the 

conduct of his co-defendants, did indeed use or carry a firearm in furtherance of the '241 

conspiracy.” (Id. (citing Meachum, 1999 WL 511431 at *2)) (emphasis in original). 

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 However, Petitioner correctly points out that he was sentenced in June 1998, prior 

to the November 1998 amendment to '924(c) relied upon by Respondent. (Traverse, 

(Doc. 11), p. 2; see also Answer, Exh. 1, &4 & Att. 2); see also Pub. L. No. 105-386 

(Nov. 13, 1998), amending 18 U.S.C. '924. Instead, the version of '924(c) applicable to 

Petitioner provided an additional sentence for a defendant who: 

during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 

(including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for 

an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous 

weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United 

States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment 

provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced 

to imprisonment for five years,.... 

18 U.S.C. '924(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998). This is also evident by the fact that at 

Petitioner’s trial, the jury instructions addressing the '924(c) counts tracked the preamendment language. (See Petition, Exh. A, pp. 3242-43 (Doc. 1-1, pp. 20-21)). 

 Consequently, Respondent’s reliance on the 1998 amendment to '924(c) has no 

bearing whatsoever on Petitioner’s case. Further, Respondent’s argument concedes that 

prior to the 1998 amendment, '924(c) and '844(h) were “substantially identical in 

language.” (Answer, p. 8). Nor does Respondent provide a basis for distinguishing 

Colvin in this case but, instead, has agreed that “[l]ike the defendant in Colvin, 

[Petitioner] may indeed be correct that he did not use or carry a firearm to commit the 

'241 conspiracy.” (Id. at p. 9) (emphasis omitted). 

 Like defendant Colvin, Petitioner was convicted of '241 and Petitioner contends 

that conviction served as the predicate crime for additional sentences under a statute 

employing “substantially identical...language” (Answer, p. 8), as the statute at issue in 

Colvin. To qualify for the savings clause “[a]n intervening court decision must ‘effect a 

material change in the applicable law’ to establish unavailability[]”, and not “simply 

‘provide[] further clarification’ of the statute of conviction....” Alaimalo 645 F.3d at 

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1047 (quoting Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960). In Colvin, the Seventh Circuit made clear for 

the first time in that circuit that '241 did not require an overt act in furtherance of the 

agreement, but instead, “the conspiracy offense [was] the agreement alone....” Colvin,

353 F.3d at 576. Moreover, the court overruled prior cases that had relied on violation of 

'241 as the predicate felony for application of '841(h)(1). Id. Under the instant 

circumstances, it is arguable that Colvin, by extension, represents a material change in the 

law relevant to Petitioner’s claim. If that is the case, then Petitioner is closer to falling 

within '2255(e)’s saving clause. 

 However, cutting against Petitioner’s attempt to qualify for the savings clause is 

the fact that the record does not suggest that a claim under Colvin was unavailable to 

Petitioner during the course of his first '2255 motion given that Colvin was decided 

while Petitioner’s '2255 motion was on direct appeal.1

 See Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 

F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004) (petitioner, whose '2255 motion was pending in the district court 

when the Supreme Court effected a material change in the applicable law, had an 

unobstructed chance to raise his actual innocence claim in the pending '2255 action). 

However, because Petitioner’s '2255 action was pending before the appellate court when 

Colvin was decided, it is not clear what recourse he would have had to amend his motion 

to add a claim under Colvin, and Respondent does not suggest that such amendment was 

viable.2

 Nor does Respondent specifically address the timing of the Colvin decision in 

 

1

 The trial court issued its decision denying Petitioner’s '2255 motion on April 30, 2003, Colvin was decided on December 24, 2003, the Seventh Circuit entered its decision 

affirming the denial of Petitioner’s '2255 motion on June 17, 2004, and the Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari on October 3, 2005. 

2

 The fact that Petitioner previously filed a '2241 petition with this Court in 2010 

and failed to raise a claim under Colvin is also troubling and brings into question the abuse of the writ doctrine which “‘forbids the reconsideration of claims that were or 

could have been raised in a prior habeas petition.’” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530, 538 (en banc), overruled on other 

grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). However, “[t]he government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ” id. (citation omitted), and it did not do so 

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relation to Petitioner’s '2255 motion. 

 At bottom, Respondent relies on a version of '924(c) that does not apply to 

Petitioner in order to distinguish the case on which Petitioner bases his claim and to argue 

that Petitioner has failed to establish that he was denied an unobstructed procedural shot 

at presenting his claim of actual innocence. By solely relying on the 1998 amendment to 

'924(c), Respondent has failed to provide any pertinent or persuasive reason to support 

the conclusion that Plaintiff fails to show that he was denied an unobstructed procedural 

shot to present his claim. However, even assuming that Petitioner has satisfied this 

portion of the test, to fall within the savings clause, he must also show that he is actually 

innocent of the challenged offenses, see Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047, and Respondent 

persuasively argues that Petitioner fails to meet this requirement. 

ACTUAL INNOCENCE. To establish actual innocence Petitioner “‘must demonstrate that, 

in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him.’” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898). 

Respondent points out that “[t]he Seventh Circuit acknowledged in Petitioner’s direct 

appeal that '924(c) accounted for the bulk of Petitioner’s sentence, ‘because the jury 

found that the officers robbed at least two drug dealers at the points of their service 

revolvers’ and Petitioner is ‘accountable for the acts of his partners in crime.’” (Answer, 

p. 10 (quoting Meachum, 1999 WL 511431 at *2)). The trial court in Petitioner’s case 

instructed the jurors that Petitioner could be convicted under '924(c) if he committed a 

'19513

 violation or a '241 violation. See Meachum, 1999 WL 511431 at *1. (See e.g. 

Petition, Exh. A, pp. 3242-43 (Doc. 1-1, pp. 20-21)). “A jury is presumed to follow its 

instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 

 here. 

3

 Count 1 alleged conspiracy to commit robbery, Count 3 involved a robbery on or about November 15, 1996 and Count 4 involved a robbery on or about December 4, 1998. (See Petition, Exh. A). 

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481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). Given that Petitioner was convicted of the '1951 counts, it is 

reasonable to conclude that two of these counts could form the predicate offenses for the 

two '924(c) convictions. See e.g. United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006) 

('1951 used as predicate offense for '924(c) conviction); United States v. Mendez, 992 

F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that conspiracy to rob in violation of '1951 is a 

crime of violence under the substantial risk definition of '924(c)(3)(B)). Therefore, in 

light of the fact that the jury found Petitioner guilty of the '1951 counts, Petitioner cannot 

say that no reasonable jury would have convicted him of successive '924(c) violations. 

Cf. Colvin, 353 F.3d at 576-77 (declining to find plain error warranting reversal because 

even though '241 could not qualify as a predicate offense for a '844(h) conviction, it was 

“highly unlikely that the jury convicted Colvin under '844(h)(1) based on the '241 

conspiracy alone...” given that he was also convicted under another statute that 

constituted a predicate offense under '844(h)). 

 Petitioner cites the Double Jeopardy Clause to counter Respondent’s reliance on 

his convictions under '1951 to challenge his Petition. According to Petitioner, even if 

the Court found that the conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of '1951 could be a 

predicate for the '924(c) convictions, “this Court cannot use Count (1) to give Petitioner 

both '924(c) convictions because it will violate Petitioner’s [rights under the Double 

Jeopardy Clause]...to convict him on two '924(c) counts based on one conspiracy.” 

(Petition, p. 10 (citing United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir. 1994); see 

also Traverse, p. 7 (citing cases for the premise that multiple convictions under '924(c) 

must be supported by separate predicate offenses)). 

Cappas held that a defendant could not be convicted of multiple counts of '924(c) 

for using multiple guns in a single offense. Cappas, 29 F.3d at 1188-90. However, 

Cappas, like much of the authority cited in Petitioner’s Traverse, does not prevent the 

linking of multiple '924(c) violations to multiple predicate acts. Id. at 1190. As 

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Respondent correctly points out, the jury in Petitioner’s case found that firearms were 

used in connection with two separate robberies. Thus, Petitioner’s successive '924 

convictions related to the two robberies of which he stands convicted do not run afoul of 

Cappas and do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See e.g. United States v. Curtis,

324 F.3d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that “where two separate predicate 

offenses exist, there is no problem with imposing two enhancements under § 924(c)” and 

distinguishing Cappas which “address[ed] an entirely different problem...[involving] the 

imposition of multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions for each gun attributable to a defendant, 

even if the gun was ‘carried or []used’ in the same place and at the same time as other 

targeted guns.”); see also United States v. Beltran, 556 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (a 

defendant may be convicted of multiple violations of '924(c) so long as each is supported 

by a separate predicate offense). Petitioner’s further reliance on United States v. 

Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1989) is equally unavailing given that Rosenberg

addressed the Double Jeopardy Clause protection against a second prosecution for the 

same offense after conviction, which is not the case here. 

 On the instant record, even if '241 cannot qualify as a predicate offense for 

Petitioner’s successive '924(c) convictions, Petitioner has failed to show he is actually 

innocent of violating '924(c) in light of his '1951 convictions. 

CONCLUSION

 Because Petitioner fails to show that he is actually innocent of violating § 924(c), 

he fails to satisfy the criteria to file this '2241 action under the savings clause. 

Consequently, the only proper course for Petitioner to raise the claims advanced in the 

instant Petition is by way of a motion under § 2255. Such a motion is properly filed in 

the Northern District of Illinois where Petitioner was sentenced. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 

864. This Court may transfer the action if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) 

this Court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at 

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the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. 

§1631; see also Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865 n.6 (“the proper transfer statute [for a §2241 

petition that fails to qualify for the savings clause] would be §1631 which allows transfer 

to cure want of jurisdiction.”). In the instant case, transfer is inappropriate given that 

Petitioner has already filed one motion pursuant to § 2255, thus, he would be required to 

seek the approval of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals before the district court could 

accept another '2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § § 2255, 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Balcar v. 

Ives, 2012 WL 2259163 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) (declining to transfer motion to 

sentencing court where the sentencing court would lack jurisdiction over the motion 

“because petitioner would first be required to obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit 

to file a ‘second or successive’ §2255 motion....”); Scales v. Chavez, 2008 WL 4174869 

(D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2008) (same). On the instant record, Petitioner’s §2241 Petition should 

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Stephens, 464 F.3d at 899 (affirming district 

court’s dismissal of §2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction where petitioner failed to 

“properly invoke[] the ‘escape hatch’ [i.e. savings clause] exception of §2255 that would 

permit him to file a petition of habeas corpus under §2241.”). 

RECOMMENDATION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) for lack of jurisdiction. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days 

after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond 

to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from 

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the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following 

case number: CV 12-335-TUC-RCC. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the 

issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 

denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

 Dated this 28th day of August, 2014. 

 

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