Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00551/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00551-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Pursuant to the court’s September 13, 2005, order, respondents were also invited 1

to file a supplement but have declined to do so. Petitioner has not filed a traverse.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES C. STRINGER, No. CIV S-04-0551-LKK-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. AMENDED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

MICHAEL HARRISON, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, brings this petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s

amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 11), respondents’ answer (Doc. 18), and

petitioner’s supplement (Doc. 23).1

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/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 2

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts2

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

Defendant Cherie Lee Forstein and her 13-year-old son Chad

moved to the Franklin Villa apartment complex in the summer of 1999. 

Conflicts arose with the neighbors, particularly between Chad and people

she described as “the local gangsters.” Forstein reported numerous threats

and assaults to the police. She did not move out of the complex because

she was unable to find a place that would accept Chad’s Rottweiler. 

Forstein told her mechanic, Dean Madeiros, and her employer, Frank

Munoz, that she would bring in some muscle to deal with the

neighborhood problems. She explained that her “ex” was a bail bondsman

who lived in San Francisco. 

Chad made friends with another teenager in the complex, the

assault victim LaMarr. The friendship soured when Chad lost his pager

and accused LaMarr of taking it. On another occasion, Chad sprayed – or

threatened to spray – LaMarr with mace his mother had given him.

During the same period, Forstein had several confrontations with

Wanda Frazier, LaMarr’s mother. After one incident, a friend informed

Frazier that Forstein said she was going to “get one-eyed Jimmy and come

back and kill” Frazier’s children. Another time, Forstein yelled at Frazier,

mentioned a gun, and said she would not take “this bullshit.” She

continued, “I’ll kill all these mother fuckers.”

On September 7, 8, and 9, 1999, Forstein left telephone messages

for Chad’s father, the 78-year-old defendant Curtis Howard. She

explained that Chad was in danger, and threatened to kill Howard if he

failed to pay the money he owed so she could move.

On Monday, September 20, 1999, Forstein stopped LaMarr outside

her apartment on his way home from school. She grabbed him by the

collar, pushed him against a tree, and told him Chad’s father was a bail

bondsman with a lot of power. Forstein said Chad’s father knew someone

named “one-eyed Jimmy,” and other “crazy people,” who would come to

Sacramento and kill for him. LaMarr testified the threats were directed

toward his brother and father.

At that point, Frazier came out of her apartment across the alley,

and the two women began yelling at each other. During the argument

Forstein said, “I’m tired of you black niggers disrespecting my house.” 

She told Chad to leave “the mother fuckers” alone because she was going

to kill them.

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Forstein, Chad, and Chad’s friend Keith Hodges went to Edna Jean

Finch’s house after the September 20 confrontation with Frazier. Morris,

LaMarr’s older brother, ran up to the door. Frazier, Morris’ mother,

stopped him from trying to get inside, saying “it’s not worth it.” Forstein

asked Chad to get the phone and call someone. The line was busy the first

time he tried to reach his father, but he tried again. Chad dialed the

number and handed the phone to Forstein. Hodges overheard part of the

conversation in which Forstein stated: “I got a job for you, come here as

soon as possible, I need you to get rid of these two black niggers . . .”

Frazier saw Forstein leave the complex 45 minutes or an hour after

the confrontation. Forstein returned 20 minutes later, and pulled into her

driveway. At that point, Howard Morris, Sr., young Morris’ father, pulled

up and got out of his car. He spoke with Forstein for a few minutes, and

drove away with LaMarr. Forstein followed them out of the complex. 

Robert Price, the security guard, overheard Forstein tell Howard Morris,

Sr., “[T]hat’s okay, I get my fellows to come down here and teach you

niggers something.” She also said, “I’m going to have one-eyed Jimmy

come over and kill a bunch of you mothers.”

Forstein and Chad went to San Francisco that night, and stayed

with Howard for two days. They returned to Sacramento on Wednesday,

September 22. Accompanying them in a separate car were Howard, and

his driver, defendant James Stringer, who was a skip tracer in the bail

bond business. Both Howard and Stringer were armed. 

Upon arriving at Franklin Villa, Forstein went to check her mail

near where LaMarr was sitting. She walked up to LaMarr, grabbed him

by the hand, and said, “[L]ook what [you got yourself] into.” Around the

same time, Forstein warned Finch and her son Donny that she had her

people with her and things were going to “come down.”

Shortly thereafter, Howard and Stinger got out of their car and

approached LaMarr. One of the men showed the boy a badge, and patted

him down. Both Howard and Stringer pointed their guns at LaMarr, and

one stuck a gun in the 13-year-old boy’s side. Howard told LaMarr he

was going to kick in his teeth. LaMarr started to walk away. Stringer

grabbed him and smashed his hand against the mailbox, breaking two

bones.

Forstein, Howard, Stringer, and Chad ended up at Forstein’s

apartment. Forstein cleaned up the mess the dog left in their absence. 

Chad and Stringer began playing Play Station. Howard brought the guns

from the car, put one gun under the mattress, kept the other gun with him,

and went back outside. 

Meanwhile, LaMarr ran to Shirley Hamilton’s apartment and

called 911. He told the dispatcher that two men had threatened to arrest

him and said they were coming to get his father and brother. LaMarr went

back outside to wait for an officer to arrive. One police car drove up, but

left immediately to take another call. At that moment, Morris walked up

with two friends. Morris was 5 feet 11 inches tall, and weighed 207

pounds. After hearing what had happened, Morris went inside Hamilton’s

apartment and called his mother. He then went to his own house, grabbed

a metal baseball bat, and headed for the door. LaMarr and the two other

young men tried to block his way, but Morris left through an open

window. One witness heard Morris yell for Chad to come out with his

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dog and nunchaks [sic]. 

There was conflicting testimony about the baseball bat. However,

the witnesses generally agreed Morris had nothing in his hands when he

walked toward Howard. The older man pulled out his gun and pointed it

at Morris. Morris held up his hands with his palms forward and began

backing up. Howard fired from a short distance away, and Morris fell to

the ground. Howard fired a second fatal shot at Morris’s head.

Howard reloaded his gun, and warned members of the gathering

crowd not to approach the victim. Shortly thereafter, he surrendered

peacefully to police officers. Officer Michael Galipeau recounted that

Howard stated as he approached, “[P]eople need to be getting killed on

this corner trying to hurt my son, all these people need to get a life.” 

Later, at the police station, Galipeau asked Howard whether he had any

sharp objects in his pockets. Howard said he did not, and continued, “I

would not want to hurt you, you have done nothing to me, I did what I

came here to do and I’m done.” 

At trial, Howard testified in his own defense. He admitted taking

the gun with him when he left Forstein’s house, and intentionally firing

the shot that killed Morris. However, he also stated, “I was afraid because

he wanted to catch me to take my gun, and if he take my gun he going to

kill me and Chad.” The defense introduced expert testimony that

defendant suffered a stroke in 1996 which resulted in dementia. 

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted of: (1) one count of second degree murder, in violation

of California Penal Code § 187; (2) one count of assault with a firearm, in violation of California

Penal Code § 245(a)(2); and (3) one count of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of California Penal Code § 12021(c)(1). With enhancements, petitioner was sentenced

to 27 years to life. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, which

affirmed in a reasoned opinion issued on October 1, 2002, and modified on denial of rehearing

on October 30, 2002. The California Supreme Court denied review without comment. 

/ / /

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to

reach petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

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erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot

necessarily be found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

is clearly erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises the following claims in his amended petition: (1) the evidence

was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction for second degree murder; (2) the admission

of numerous hearsay statements made by Forstein, who did not testify at trial, violated

petitioner’s right to confront and cross-examine; (3) the trial court erred in admitting edited

versions of recorded messages without allowing petitioner to introduce the entire recordings; (4)

the trial court erred with respect to jury instructions; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for

failing to request certain jury instructions; and (6) jury misconduct. Respondents concede that

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these claims are exhausted.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

second degree murder on a theory of natural and probable consequences. When a challenge is

brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus relief is available if it is found that,

upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under Jackson, the court must review the

entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on habeas. See id. It is the

province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “The question is not whether we

are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach

the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in the context of the substantive

elements of the criminal offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

In rejecting this argument, the California Court of Appeal reasoned:

Stringer argues that on the facts of this case, “the killing of

Howard Morris cannot, as [a] matter of law, be determined to have been a

natural and probable consequence of any conduct committed by, agreed

to, or aided and abetted by [him].” He insists that “there was no evidence

to establish that the shooting of LaMarr’s brother under the circumstances

in which it occurred, was reasonably foreseeable as to [him].” Thus, due

process requires reversal of his conviction. Based on the standard of

review applied in challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude

there is substantial evidence that Morris’s killing was a natural and

probable consequence of the assault on LaMarr.

Given the content of Forstein’s telephone messages, and the fact

she and Chad stayed with Howard in San Francisco for two days before

returning to Sacramento the day of the killing, the jury could reasonably

infer that Howard knew Forstein’s version of the circumstances

surrounding her claim LaMarr and his family were bullying Chad. Chad

told Howard that Howard Morris, Sr., Morris, and most of the people at

Franklin Villa had guns. The jury could also infer Howard conveyed at

least some of this information to Stringer while the two men were driving

to Sacramento. In these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the

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jury to assume Stringer was aware of the tension between the two families.

This record also supports the inference that a reasonable person in

Stringer’s position would have or should have known that the killing was

a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the assault on LaMarr. [citations

omitted]. Howard and Stringer told LaMarr they were police, and

threatened him at gunpoint. Stringer smashed LaMarr’s hand against the

mailbox, breaking two bones. In the subsequent call to 911, LaMarr told

the dispatcher that his assailants said they were going to get his father and

brother. They jury could infer Howard and Stringer believed the same

message would also be conveyed to Morris’s family. Howard prepared

for a response. He left one gun in the bedroom of Forstein’s apartment,

kept the other gun with him, and went outside. Forstein, Stringer, and

Chad waited inside the apartment. It was for the jury to decide whether

the 20-minute dely in Morris’s arrival at the scene broke the causal chain. 

On this record, we cannot say as a matter of law that it did. 

Because it is clear from the foregoing that the state court applied the correct legal rules, this

court must review petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claim under the more deferential

“unreasonable application of” standard.

Under California law, to find a defendant guilty under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, the jury must determine: (1) whether the defendant aided, promoted,

encouraged, or instigated the commission of any target crime, with knowledge of the

confederate’s unlawful purpose, and with the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating

the commission of the target crime; (2) whether the defendant’s confederate committed an

offense other than the target crime; and (3) whether the other offense committed by the

confederate was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime that the defendant

encouraged or facilitated. See People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 (1996). Even where the

defendant’s specific intent only extends to assault with a firearm, a conviction for murder under

the natural and probable consequences theory is proper if the murder was foreseeable. See

People v. Bunyard, 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1231-32 (1988). Finally, it is for the jury – not the court – to

determine whether the murder was foreseeable. See People v. Gardner, 37 Cal.App. 4th 473,

483 (1995). 

/ / /

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In light of the foregoing, the question for this court is whether the jury could have

reasonably concluded that the murder was foreseeable. For the same reasons articulated by the

state court, this court concludes that a reasonable jury could have made the inferences necessary

in this case. Or, to put it another way, the record does not establish that no rational jury could

have concluded the murder was foreseeable. Therefore, the state court’s decision was not an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

In his supplement, addressing the applicability of Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262

(9th Cir. 2005), to this case, petitioner argues that “the state court engaged . . . in speculation

when it ruled that because Forstein made threatening phone calls to Curtis Howard and because

petitioner drove Howard to Sacramento that ‘at least some of this information’ had been

conveyed to petitioner by Howard.” Petitioner concludes, therefore, that the jury could not have

reasonably drawn the inference, as described by the state court, that “a reasonable person in

Stringer’s position would have or should have known that the killing was a reasonably

foreseeable consequence of the assault on LaMarr.” In support of his argument, petitioner

contends that “there was no evidence to show that petitioner had any kind of relationship to

Howard or his family that provided a motive for [petitioner] to become involved in an effort to

hurt much less kill. . . .” Petitioner also asserts that “there was no evidence to indicate that

[petitioner] was aware of the tensions between the families or that he was accompanying Howard

as anything other than a driver. 

The court disagrees. While petitioner is correct that a reasonable inference must

be based on a logical connection from one fact to another, petitioner is incorrect in asserting that

such a logical chain does not exist in this case. The question is whether petitioner knew enough

about the situation with Forstein and her son to support the conclusion that the murder

committed by Howard was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. The court

finds there is sufficient evidence to establish the logical chain necessary to support the inferences

required to conclude that the murder was a natural and probable consequence. Specifically, the

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following facts support the inference:

1. Forstein said that she was going to “get my fellows to come down here

and teach you niggers something;” 

2. Forstein also said, “I’m going to have one-eyed Jimmy come over and kill

a bunch of you mothers;” 

3. Forstein said Chad’s father [Howard] knew someone named “one-eyed

Jimmy,” and other “crazy people,” who would come to Sacramento and

kill for him;

4. Petitioner is friends with Howard, having worked together in the bail bond

business;

5. Forstein told Howard about the problems at the apartment complex;

6. Forstein and Chad went to stay with Howard in San Francisco for two

days;

7. Just after this visit, Howard and petitioner returned with Forstein and

Chad to Sacramento;

8. Both Howard and petitioner were armed on this return trip;

9. Forstein told Finch and her son that she had “her people” with her and that

things were going to “come down;”

10. Both Howard and petitioner confronted LaMarr and pointed their guns at

him; 

11. Petitioner smashed LaMarr’s hand on the mailbox; and

12. After this, Howard, Forstein, Chad, and petitioner returned to Forstein’s

apartment together. 

Because both petitioner and Howard were armed on their trip to Sacramento following Forstein’s

visit, it is reasonable to infer that they were both returning for the same reason – to “take care” of

LaMarr and his mother. Supporting this inference is the fact that, upon arriving at the apartment

complex in Sacramento, both Howard and petitioner actually drew their guns on LaMarr. In

addition, petitioner smashed LaMarr’s hand. Finally, petitioner, Howard, Forstein, and Chad all

returned to the same apartment (Forstein’s) after this confrontation. It is clear from all this that

petitioner was far more than simply Howard’s driver. If he were just a driver, he would not have

also brought a gun, drew it on LaMarr, or smashed LaMarr’s hand. Moreover, Forstein would

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not have referred to “her people” – an obvious reference to more than one person – if only

Howard was going to make things “come down.” In sum, the court concludes that a reasonable

jury could infer from these facts that petitioner was brought along as Howard’s “muscle” and

that petitioner intended to fulfill that role. 

B. Admission of Hearsay

Petitioner argues that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted. In particular,

petitioner complains about out-of-court statements made by Forstein in the form of phone

messages she left on Howard’s answering machine and statements she made to family and

friends. The state court offered the following description of the hearsay at issue:

Forstein’s statements were a major focus of pretrial motions. They

included: (1) messages left by Forstein on Howard’s telephone recorder on

September 7, 8, and 9, 1999; (2) statements made in the presence of Dean

Madeiros and Frank Munoz on how Forstein planned to deal with

problems in her neighborhood, which were admitted only as to Forstein;

(3) statements made by Forstein to people in her neighborhood before

September 20, 1999; (4) statements made by Forstein before and during

the September 20, 1999, confrontation with LaMarr and his mother,

Wanda Frazier; (5) statements made by Forstein in a September 20, 1999,

telephone conversation overheard by Keith Hodges; and (6) statements

made by Forstein to the Finches just before the shooting.

The court heard argument and reviewed the proffered evidence

over a period of four days. It ruled that many of Forstein’s statements

were “relevant and admissible for purposes of arguing the existence of the

conspiracy, the defendant Forstein’s intention to put others together with

her to accomplish a conspiracy, and it explains then arguably why

defendant Stringer acted the way he did on that date.” Some of the

statements were admissible under the [California] Evidence Code section

1250 exception to the hearsay rule as evidence of “state of mind, future

intent, plan, motive, et cetera, to arguably prove . . . conduct.” The court

admitted other statements as declarations of a party under [California]

Evidence Code section 1220. As to the taped telephone messages, the

court admitted only part of what was offered by the prosecution, ruling

that “. . . the portions that reflect Forstein’s animosity towards the victims

are relevant and otherwise admissible, . . . The portions that belittle

defendant Howard for not protecting the son and causing the son to be in

danger are relevant and admissible at least where that’s all she states

within the sequence. . . . The portions that accuse defendant Howard of

other wrongdoing are not admissible and are not relevant, and even if they

were arguably relevant, [it] would exclude them under [California]

Evidence Code section 352. . . .”

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The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant from unreliable hearsay evidence

being presented against him during trial. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI. Prior to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the admission of

hearsay evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause where the hearsay fell within a firmly

rooted exception to the hearsay rule or otherwise contained “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,

66 (1980). In Crawford, however, the Supreme Court announced a new rule: Out-of-court

statements by witnesses not appearing at trial that are testimonial are barred under the

Confrontation Clause unless the witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a chance to

cross-examine, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the trial court. See 

541 U.S. at 51. If error occurred, the next question is whether such error was harmless. 

See Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1022 (applying harmless error analysis). 

While the Supreme Court in Crawford “left for another day any effort to spell out

a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’” the Court provided some guidance. 541 U.S. at 68. 

The Court observed that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers

bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does

not.” Id. at 51; see also Davis v. Washington, ___U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006) (holding that

law enforcement interrogations directed at establishing the facts of a past crime or in order to

identify the perpetrator are testimonial). 

The Ninth Circuit held in Bockting v. Bayer that the Crawford rule should be

applied retroactively on collateral review. See 399 F.3d 1010, as amended on denial of rehearing

by 408 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the court held that retroactive application of

Crawford does not violate the non-retroactivity principle set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

/ / /

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In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court held that new constitutional rules of 3

criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new

rules are announced unless they fall within two exceptions to the general rule. See 489 U.S. 288

(1989). The two exceptions are if the new constitutional rule of criminal procedure would “place

certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of criminal-law making

authority...” or “require the observance of ‘those procedures that...are ‘implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty.’” Id. at 307; see also, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990). In Bockting,

the Ninth Circuit held that Crawford applied retroactively because it altered the understanding of

the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. See 399 F.3d at 1019-

20.

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288 (1989). However, on February 28, 2007, the United States Supreme Court announced its 3

decision in Whorton v. Bockting, ___ U.S. ___ (Feb. 28, 2007), reversing the Ninth Circuit’s

holding. The Supreme Court concluded that Crawford does not apply retroactively to cases on

collateral review. 

As to the challenged hearsay, the state court held:

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Forstein’s out-of-court statements as evidence against Howard and

Stringer. The court properly ruled that the challenged statements came

within the . . . .state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, and therefore

posed no confrontation problem.

As to relevance, the court stated:

The first question was whether the proffered statements were

relevant. . . . [¶] The court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that

Forstein’s statements were relevant. The taped telephone messages

demonstrated Forstein’s fear for Chad’s safety, animosity toward the

victims, and efforts to goad Howard into giving her money to move – all

tending to establish a motive for later conspiring to injure or kill LaMarr

and his family. Forstein’s subsequent statements were relevant as

evidence of her plan to bring Howard and others from San Francisco to

kill the Morrises. The conversation overheard by Hodges identified the

time Forstein brought Howard into the plan. The existence of the plan to

harm the Morris family was also relevant to Stringer’s liability as an aider

and abettor. Thereafter, a jury could find Stringer knew about the criminal

enterprise, drove Howard back to Sacramento, knew Howard took guns

with him, and joined Howard in confronting LaMarr upon their arrival at

Franklin Villa. 

/ / /

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As to petitioner’s argument that admission of the hearsay violated his right to confront witnesses

against him, the state court said:

The second question was whether Forstein’s relevant out-of-court

statements were admissible against Howard and Stinger without violating

their right to confrontation. “‘The central concern of the Confrontation

Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal

defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an

adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.’ [Citation.]” Lilly v.

Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999). “[T]he veracity of hearsay

statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of

such statements against an accused when (1) ‘the evidence falls within a

firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or (2) it contains “particularized

guarantees of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be

expected to add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability.” Lilly,

supra, at 124-25. . . .

The state court continued with an analysis of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule:

The [California] Evidence Code section 1250 state of mind

exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted in California’s decision and

statutory law. (citations omitted). Included within this hearsay exception

are statements offered to show the declarant’s intent to do a future act,

such as draw others into a plot to rob a restaurant or to commit murder. 

(citations omitted). Statements within this exception are admissible

against confederates as well as declarants. (citations omitted). [¶] We

independently review the trial court’s ruling on this “fact-intensive, mixed

question of constitutional law,” Lilly, supra, and conclude it properly

found that Forstein’s statements fell within the . . . state of mind exception

to the hearsay rule. The taped telephone messages showed Forstein’s fear

of her neighbors, concern for Chad’s safety, and anger at Howard for not

paying her the money she said he owed. The remaining statements reveal

Forstein’s intent to bring Howard and his confederates from San Francisco

to kill LaMarr and his family. Her warning to the Finches show

knowledge of what was about to happen. 

Because the state court applied the Lilly/Ohio test, which was the correct test at the time, this

court must review the state court’s determination under the deferential “unreasonable application

of” standard. 

Under California Evidence Code § 1250, statements concerning the declarant’s

“then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan,

motive, design mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay

rule when” (1) the evidence is offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or

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It is undisputed that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is firmly 4

rooted. 

16

physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or

(2) the evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” This exception 4

is subject to a limitation under California Evidence Code § 1252 if the “statement was made

under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.”

If Forstein’s out-of-court statements fall under § 1250's hearsay exception, or if

they are otherwise reliable, then the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s Confrontation Clause

claim was not an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. See Lilly,

527 U.S. at 123-24; Ohio, 448 U.S. at 66. Under California law, for statements to fall under 

§ 1250, they must be offered for the specific purposes described in § 1250 and they must be

reliable. Thus, if the hearsay falls under § 1250, both of the conditions outlined by the Supreme

Court for acceptable admission of hearsay are met. 

The record reflects that Forstein made the following out-of-court statements:

1. Forstein told her mechanic, Dean Madeiros, and her employer, Frank

Munoz, that she would bring in some muscle to deal with the

neighborhood problems and that her “ex” was a bail bondsman who lived

in San Francisco;

2. Forstein had confrontations with Wanda Frazier, LaMarr’s mother and,

after one incident, Forstein said she was going to “get one-eyed Jimmy

and come back and kill” Frazier’s children;

3. On September 7, 8, and 9, 1999, Forstein left telephone messages for

Curtis Howard explaining that Chad was in danger;.

4. Forstein told LaMarr that Chad’s father knew someone named “one-eyed

Jimmy,” and other “crazy people,” who would come to Sacramento and

kill for him;

5. Keith Hodges overheard part of a telephone conversation in which

Forstein told Howard: “I got a job for you, come here as soon as possible,

I need you to get rid of these two black niggers . . .;”

/ / /

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6. Robert Price, the security guard, overheard Forstein tell Howard Morris,

Sr.: “[T]hat’s okay, I get my fellows to come down here and teach you

niggers something” and “I’m going to have one-eyed Jimmy come over

and kill a bunch of you mothers;” and

7. Forstein warned Finch and her son Donny that she had her people with her

and things were going to “come down.”

Because “muscle” would not be required for any lawful approach to the neighborhood situation,

these statements go to the existence of intent, plan, motive, and design to form a conspiracy with

her “ex” and “some muscle” to use deadly force. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1250(a). The

statements also tend to prove or explain Forstein’s later conduct of actually arranging for

Howard and petitioner to come with her from San Francisco. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1250(a)(2). 

The last requirement for statements to be admissible under the § 1250 hearsay

exception is that they must be reliable. As to reliability, the state court concluded:

The sheer volume and consistency of Forstein’s statements argue

in favor of trustworthiness. She repeatedly expressed fear for Chad’s

safety, anger at Wanda Frazier and her family for bullying Chad,

frustration at Howard’s failure to protect his son from danger, and the

intent to do something about the problem. The threats recounted by

neighbors and coworkers before September 20, 1999, may have included

an element of “puffing” that she knew tough guys in San Francisco. 

However, Forstein’s statements in the September 20 argument with

LaMarr and his mother, and the subsequent phone call to Howard, clearly

expressed the anger and fear of the moment. 

This court cannot say that the state court’s analysis resulted in an unreasonable application of

federal law. In particular, each of the out-of-court statements identified above relates to the

same thing – a conspiracy to use deadly force. Forstein told Howard of her fear that Chad was in

danger. Forstein consistently referred to individuals whom she could arrange to come to the

Franklin Villa apartment complex. This is not the case of a one-time statement which could have

been taken out of context or misunderstood and, therefore, would not be reliable. Rather,

Forstein’s statements were consistent in their content and were repeated on several occasions to

several people. 

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Because the statements were properly admitted under § 1250, which contains a

requirement that the statements be reliable, the state court’s adjudication of this claim did not

result in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law at the time. 

C. Admission of Edited Tape Recordings

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by admitting edited versions of tape

recorded phone messages Forstein left on Howard’s answering machine. Petitioner asserts that

the entire tape recordings should have been presented to the jury in order to present a complete

picture of Forstein’s state of mind. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

only on the basis of a transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.

1983). It is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. 

Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987);

Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized

to try state issues de novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Because federal habeas

relief does not lie for state law errors, a state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d

971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see

also Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994). In order to raise such a claim in

a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage

of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293, 294-

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95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

To prevail, petitioner must demonstrate that admission of the edited tape

recordings, as opposed to the complete records, rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 

Petitioner argues that the ruling was fundamentally unfair because it precluded him from

presenting a defense by preventing the jury from seeing relevant defense evidence (i.e., the full

recordings). Specifically, petitioner claims that, had the jury heard the entire tape recordings,

they would have concluded that they were the desperate rantings of an out-of-control woman. 

However, the court cannot say that admission of the edited tapes resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice. Even if the jury believed that Forstein was ranting and out of control,

they could also reasonably have concluded that she solicited Howard as “muscle.” One does not

necessarily exclude the other. 

D. Jury Instructions

Petitioner raises five claims relating to jury instructions. First, he argues that the

trial court erred in modifying CALJIC No. 6.24. Second, petitioner argues that the trial court

erred in modifying CALJIC No. 6.10.5. Third, petitioner argues that the court failed to instruct

the jury under CALJIC No. 6.21. Fourth, petitioner contends that the trial court failed to instruct

the jury under CALJIC No. 6.16. Finally, petitioner claims that the trial court erred with respect

to the self-defense instructions.

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright,

786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Thus, a challenge to jury

instructions does not generally give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768

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F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury

instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

/ / /

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It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).

1. Modification of CALJIC No. 6.24

CALJIC No. 6.24 reads:

Evidence of a statement made by one alleged conspirator other

than at this trial shall not be considered by you as against another alleged

conspirator unless you determine:

1. That from other independent evidence that at the time the

statement was made a conspiracy to commit a crime existed;

2. That the statement was made while the person making the

statement was participating in the conspiracy and that the person against

whom it was offered was participating in the conspiracy before or during

that time; and

3. That the statement was made in furtherance of the objective

of the conspiracy. 

The word “statement” as used in this instruction includes any oral

or written verbal expression or the nonverbal conduct of a person intended

by that person as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression.

The trial court modified this instruction by adding the following language:

However, statements of intent to do a future act may be considered

for any purpose or against any defendant. 

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Petitioner argues that this modification improperly allowed all of Forstein’s out-of-court

statements to be admitted and concludes, therefore, that the modification violated his right to

confront witnesses against him. The court finds no constitutional error because, as discussed

above, none of Forstein’s out-of-court statements were testimonial in nature. Therefore, the

Confrontation Clause could not have been offended by admission of any of her statements. For

this reason, the modification of CALJIC No. 6.24 could not have resulted in violation of

petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. 

2. Modification of CALJIC No. 6.10.5

Petitioner claims that the trial court erroneously modified CALJIC No. 6.10.5 in

such a way that the target crime was left to the jury’s imagination, thereby reducing the

prosecution’s burden on the conspiracy charge. As to CALJIC No. 6.10.5, the state court said:

In Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th at 267-68, the Supreme Court held that

instructions on aiding and abetting must identify the target crime or crimes

the defendant is alleged to have assisted or encouraged to assist the jury in

determining whether the crime charged was a natural and probable

consequence of some other criminal act. Where the natural and probable

consequences doctrine applies, “a conviction may not be based on the

jury’s generalized belief that the defendant intended to assist and/or

encourage unspecified ‘nefarious’ conduct.” The Court acknowledged

that the natural and probable consequences doctrine applies equally to

aiders and abettors and conspirators. 

Here, the court identified the target crime as that “committed

against LaMarr Morris” in its instructions on aiding and abetting. The

instructions also informed the jury that Stringer and Howard were charged

in count two with assault with a firearm . . ., which included the lesser

crime of battery. . . . The court identified LaMarr as the victim in count

two on at least two occasions. Stringer’s counsel acknowledged in closing

argument that with respect to the aiding and abetting instructions, “there’s

only two crimes that are defined for you. One is the . . . assault with a

deadly weapon, and the other is a battery.”

With respect to conspiracy, the court modified CALJIC No. 6.10.5

. . . which read: “A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more

persons with the specific intent to commit the crime of ______________,

and with the further specific intent to commit that crime, . . .” Instead, it

instructed the jury that “a conspiracy is an agreement between two or

more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit a crime and with

the further specific intent to commit that crime.” (emphasis added in

original). 

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Stringer maintains the modified version of CALJIC No. 6.10.5

failed to satisfy the Prettyman standard. The instruction “provided no

guidance to the jury about what the object of this alleged agreement

among the defendants might have been.” He contends the instruction was

erroneous “because it left the imagined target to the jury’s imagination,

and the other instructions did not correct the possibility that the jury

would rely on noncriminal conduct.”

We emphasize once again that instructional error “‘“cannot be

predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt taken from the

instructions . . . since, in order to determine the correctness . . . in their

relations to and with each other and in the light of the instructions as a

whole and whether a jury has been correctly instructed is not to be

determined from a consideration of a part of an instruction or one

particular instruction, but from the entire charge of the court.”’” (citations

omitted). The instructions on aiding and abetting and the charges in count

two informed the jury of the target crimes. The court identified LaMarr as

the victim in count two, and in no other count. Indeed, the jury convicted

Stringer of assault with a firearm in count two, and could not have

mistaken the relationship between that finding and application of the

natural and probable consequences doctrine. Accordingly, we conclude

that the instructions adequately informed the jury of the target crimes. 

As the state court reasoned, other instructions and the charges themselves made it

clear to the jury that the target crimes were assault with a deadly weapon or the lesser offense of

battery. Moreover, it was clear to the jury that LaMarr was the victim of the target offense. 

Therefore, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, these items were not left to the jury’s imagination. 

3. Failure to Instruct Under CALJIC No. 6.21

Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on when the

conspiracy ended and argues that this deprived him of his defense that the conspiracy ended “at

the time LaMarr was sent back inside after his encounter with petitioner and Howard.” With

respect to CALJIC No. 6.21, the state court concluded:

Under well-established law, a conspiracy “usually comes to an end

when the substantive crime for which the coconspirators are being tried is

either attained or defeated. [Citations.] It is for the trier of fact –

considering the unique circumstances and the nature and purpose of the

conspiracy of each case – to determine precisely when the conspiracy has

ended [Citations.]” (citations omitted).

“A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to a[n] instruction

‘pinpointing’ the theory of his defense.” (citations omitted). As a defense

to criminal liability under the prosecution’s conspiracy theory, Stringer

argued that if there was a conspiracy at all, it ended after the assault on

LaMarr. He was playing video games with Chad at the time of Howard’s

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encounter with Morris. Stringer argues on appeal that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to request

CALJIC No. 6.21. That instruction reads: “No act or declaration of a

conspirator committed or made after the conspiracy has been terminated is

binding upon co-conspirators, and they are not criminally liable for any

such act.” 

We conclude other instructions adequately covered the principles

set forth in CALJIC No. 6.21. These include CALJIC Nos. 6.16, 6.17,

6.19, and 6.20. Accordingly, Stringer suffered no prejudice from his

counsel’s failure to request CALJIC No. 6.21.

While petitioner’s federal claim is not couched in terms of ineffective assistance

of counsel, the state court’s reasoning is equally applicable. Specifically, this court agrees with

the state court that other jury instructions pinpointed petitioner’s defense theory regarding

liability for acts occurring after the conspiracy ended. The record reflects that the trial court

instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:

A member of a conspiracy is liable for the acts and declarations of

his or her co-conspirators until he or she effectively withdraws from the

conspiracy or the conspiracy has terminated.

This is the converse of the instruction petitioner contends should have been read and conveys the

same law – a conspirator is not liable for the acts of co-conspirators taken after the conspiracy

has terminated. Therefore, there is no merit to this claim.

4. Failure to Instruct Under CALJIC No. 6.16

Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct under CALJIC No.

6.16, which reads:

Where a conspirator commits an act or makes a declaration which

is neither in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy nor the natural and

probable consequence of an attempt to attain that object, [he][she] alone is

responsible for and is bound by that act or declaration, and no criminal

responsibility therefor attaches to any of [his][her] confederates. 

As respondents note, however, this instruction was in fact given. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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5. Self-Defense Instruction

Finally, petitioner claims that the trial court’s self-defense instructions essentially

created strict liability. The trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC Nos. 5.54 and 5.55,

which read:

The right of self-defense is only available to a person who initiated

an assault if he has done all the following:

1. He has actually tried in good faith to refuse to continue

fighting;

2. He has clearly informed his opponent that he wants to stop

fighting; and

3. He has clearly informed his opponent that he has stopped

fighting.

The right of self-defense is not available to a person who seeks a

quarrel with the intent to create a real or apparent necessity of exercising

self-defense. 

The state court addressed this claim as follows:

Counsel for Stringer . . . asked the court to remove CALJIC No.

5.54, self-defense by an aggressor, from the packet of written instructions

given to the jury, and inform the jury that it did not apply to the facts of

the case. The prosecution argued the instruction was appropriate because

there was evidence Howard was the aggressor. “[Howard’s] the one that

pulled out a gun, not the victim. The victim is just walking across the

street.” The court declined to withdraw CALJIC No. 5.54, acknowledging

the possibility the jury could find that Howard was the aggressor. 

On appeal, Stringer argues that the court erred in reading CALJIC

Nos. 5.54 and 5.55 “because Curtis Howard was not the aggressor in the

contact with Howard Morris. These instructions improperly restricted

defendant Howard’s right of self-defense and thus his murder conviction

cannot stand. Because [Stringer’s] liability is derivative of Howard’s,

[his] conviction must also be reversed.” He says the error was

exacerbated by the prosecution argument that self-defense was not

available to Howard because of the earlier confrontation with LaMarr. 

The principal difficulty with Stringer’s argument is that there was

conflicting evidence regarding the respective roles played by Howard and

Morris in the confrontation that resulted in Morris’s death. Contrary to

Stringer’s contentions, the earlier assault on LaMarr was relevant to

Howard’s claim of self-defense, and the level of his criminal liability for

the killing. There is evidence Morris was in a rage when he heard what

had happened to LaMarr. He grabbed a baseball bat, climbed through the

window of his home, and went to Shirley Hamilton’s to call his mother. 

Morris had calmed down a bit when he took off his shirt, started across the

alley, and said in a loud voice, “shouldn’t be F’ing with my family.” One

witness heard Morris yell for Chad to come out with his dog and

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nunchaks. At the same time, the witnesses generally agreed Morris was

unarmed when he approached Howard. Indeed, Howard himself testified

he saw nothing in Morris’s hands. When Morris got close to Howard, the

older man pulled out a gun and shot him. 

There was also conflicting evidence on the question whether, as

argued by Stringer, there was a “complete break in the chain of events” –

that is, between the assault on LaMarr and the killing of Morris. As we

explained, it was for the jury to decide whether “a particular criminal act

was a natural and probable consequence of another criminal act aided and

abetted by a defendant . . . .”

On this record, we cannot say that the challenged self-defense

instructions did not apply as a matter of law. It was left to the jury to

decide what happened, and to apply CALJIC Nos. 5.54 and 5.55 if

appropriate to the facts of the case. 

As the state court observed, petitioner’s claim arises from the incorrect

characterization of the facts as being conclusive as a matter of law that Howard was not the

aggressor and that Morris was. This is not the case. While the witnesses tended to agree that

Morris did not have anything in his hands as he approached Howard, other witnesses said he had

grabbed a baseball bat. It was for the jury to decide who was the aggressor and to apply the

instructions based on that factual finding. The instructions did not mislead the jurors into

believing that they had to conclude any particular person was the aggressor. This court,

therefore, cannot say that the state court’s decision was either “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” federal law. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request

instructions under CALJIC Nos. 6.16 and 6.21. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective

assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating

ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a

petitioner must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the

acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional

judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must then determine whether, in light of all the

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circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional

competent assistance. See id. In making this determination, however, there is a strong

presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that

he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v.

Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim [for] lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.”

Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

As to CALJIC No. 6.16, this instruction was given. As to CALJIC No. 6.21, for

the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that the trial court’s other instructions conveyed

the same legal concept. Therefore, petitioner was not prejudice by counsel’s failure to request

either instruction. 

F. Jury Misconduct

Finally, petitioner claims jury misconduct. The state court provided the following

background:

Here, the claims of misconduct arose on the tenth day of trial, when

the bailiff informed the court that three female jurors felt uncomfortable

because of the way Stringer was looking at them. The court and counsel

discussed the matter the following morning outside the presence of the

jury. Forstein’s counsel moved to exclude Juror Nos. 4 and 5, and alternate

No. 3 for cause. 

Questioning of the three jurors by the court and counsel revealed

that the women were bothered by Stringer’s attempt to make eye contact

with them, and by his body language in response to witness testimony. 

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Juror No. 4 had noticed the problem the week before. All three admitted

speaking with each other before they approached the bailiff with their

concerns. They also questioned Juror No. 11. Juror Nos. 4 and 5, and

alternate No. 3 stated they could remain objective about the facts of the

case as long as the court was aware of Stringer’s conduct, and something

was done to stop it. Juror No. 11 said she mentioned eye contact with a

defendant to Juror No. 4. She told the court the eye contact was with

Forstein. However, Juror No. 11 told the court that the incident caused her

no concern. She had not heard any juror other than Juror No. 4 mention the

issue. 

The state court then addressed petitioner’s argument:

On appeal, Forstein and Stringer contend the court erred in ruling

there was no jury misconduct and no further action was warranted. They

argue the court should have replaced three of the jurors because the

reactions they reported amounted to information outside the record that

affected their ability to be impartial. Forstein and Stringer also maintain

the court abused its discretion in failing to question all the jurors after four

jurors admitted that they had discussed their observations and reactions

with each other. 

. . . We conclude the record supports the court’s finding there was

no misconduct, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motions to excuse specific jurors, for mistrial, and for new trial. 

* * *

Here, the court emphasized that the discussion among the jurors did

not involve “any of the facts, testimony and issues of the trial other than

their uncomfortable feeling and reaction to a defendant’s conduct and what

to do about it.” Moreover, Juror Nos. 4 and 5, and alternate Juror No. 3

assured the court that Stringer’s and Forstein’s attempts to make eye

contact would not affect their ability to judge defendants fairly, as long as

the conduct stopped. Juror No. 11 said the incident caused her no concern. 

There is no evidence the defendants continued their efforts to make eye

contact with jurors after the conduct was brought to the court’s attention. 

. . . After questioning Juror Nos. 4, 5, and 11, and alternate No. 3,

the court was satisfied they could continue to be fair and objective. 

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Irvin v.

Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.1990). If even a

single juror is “unduly biased or prejudiced” the defendant has been denied his right to an

impartial jury. See Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 523-24. To establish misconduct in the context of

failing to answer voir dire questions, petitioner must demonstrate that the juror failed to answer

honestly, and that a correct response would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause. See

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id. at 524.

However, not every incident of juror misconduct or bias requires a new trial. See

United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974). “The test is whether or not the

misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.” Id. 

On collateral review, if misconduct occurred, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “‘had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993)); see also Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 699 (1990).

In this case, petitioner cannot establish the requisite bias or prejudice. All the

jurors in question specifically stated that they could remain fair and objective as long as

petitioner’s conduct stopped, which it did. Therefore, the state court’s adjudication of this claim

was neither “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” federal law. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment

and close this file. 

These amended findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

ten days after being served with these amended findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge's Amended Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 7, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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