Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00325/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00325-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenneth Troutman, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael Astrue, Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-00325-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Kenneth Troutman filed an application for disability benefits on May 27, 

2009. Tr. 90-98. His claim was denied initially on July 22, 2009 (Tr. 63-65), and upon 

reconsideration on October 7, 2009 (Tr. 67-69). Following an administrative hearing on 

January 20, 2011 (Tr. 30-45), the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s 

claims on February 16, 2011 (Tr. 51-59). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review (Tr. 1-3), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision for purposes of judicial 

review. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a). Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 13. The parties have not requested oral argument. For reasons 

that follow, the Court will remand for further proceedings. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff completed high school, served in the Navy during the Vietnam War, and 

worked for 23 years as a metal fabricator. Tr. 118, 150. He suffered a left leg fracture in 

1978 that left him with permanent knee damage. Tr. 34, 265. Due to the severity of the 

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knee injury, his treatment was limited to nonsurgical bone malunion. Tr. 265. Plaintiff 

also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) (Tr. 160, 202-06) and social 

isolation (Tr. 200). 

 Plaintiff retired from his metal fabricator position on January 2, 2002. Tr. 150. 

On May 5, 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs assigned Plaintiff service 

connection for PTSD with an evaluation of 50 percent, effective February 19, 2008 

(Plaintiff’s “VA rating”). Tr. 86-89. Although Plaintiff did not experience “many of the 

symptoms associated with a 50 percent evaluation,” the examiner nonetheless concluded 

that he was “fully socially impaired.” Tr. 88. Veterans Affairs assigns an evaluation of 

50 percent for “occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and 

productivity[.]” Tr. 88. “A higher evaluation of 70 percent is not warranted unless there 

are deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, 

or mood[.]” Tr. 89. 

 Plaintiff alleges a disability onset date of December 31, 2007, which coincides 

with his date last insured.1

 Doc. 13, at 6; Doc. 14, at 2; Tr. 92. 

II. Standard of Review. 

 Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. To determine whether substantial 

evidence supports Defendant’s decision, the Court must review the administrative record 

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that 

detracts from it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is 

sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its 

 

1

 In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must establish a 

disability on or before his date last insured. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.101, 404.120, 404.315; 

see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (a claimant “must establish 

a disability on or prior to” the date last insured for disability benefits). 

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own determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. Analysis. 

 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to find his impairments severe, 

(2) failing to make a required inference or, alternatively, failing to call on a medical 

advisor to assist in determining Plaintiff’s disability onset date, and (3) failing to evaluate 

multiple medical opinions. Doc. 13, at 2. 

A. Severity of Plaintiff’s Impairments. 

The ALJ found that “there is insufficient evidence demonstrating that the 

claimant’s limitations were severe prior to his last date insured.” Tr. 56. Plaintiff argues 

that this finding was erroneous given the evidence in the record. Doc. 13, at 4-5. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of showing a severe impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 146 n.5 (1987). 

 An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” within the meaning of 

the Social Security Act if it significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic 

work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 404.1521. Basic work activities include 

responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; dealing 

with changes in a routine work setting; understanding, carrying out, and remembering 

simple instructions; and using judgment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(3)-(6). 

 At his administrative hearing, Plaintiff reported constant leg pain at a level seven 

on a scale of zero to ten, and indicated that his pain worsened with physical activity. 

Tr. 38; Doc. 13, at 5. A June 23, 2009 leg MRI showed distortion of Plaintiff’s left tibia 

from his old, healed leg fracture, some fluid in the soft tissue not involving the bone 

marrow, prominent left knee joint effusion with a prominent lobular Baker’s cyst, and a 

suggestion of osteoarthritis of the left knee. Tr. 260-61; cf. Doc. 13, at 5 (“The June 23, 

2009 leg MRI tells a story of long standing and degenerative disease resulting in chronic 

inflammation and tissue destruction”). Plaintiff also cites a note by Dr. Laura 

Vandenheede describing bone-on-bone degenerative joint disease of Plaintiff’s left knee. 

Tr. 264; Doc. 13, at 5. Plaintiff claims that these symptoms and diagnosis support a 

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finding of severe impairment relating to his left leg. Doc. 13, at 5. 

 In finding that Plaintiff’s knee pain was not severe, the ALJ noted that, despite 

Plaintiff’s allegations of worsening knee pain since his injury in 1978, Plaintiff’s work 

history shows that he was able to perform medium to heavy work on a consistent basis 

for over 23 years, until January 2, 2002. Tr. 56; see Tr. 150 (Plaintiff’s work 

background). Although approximately six years elapsed from the time Plaintiff stopped 

working until his date last insured, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s daily activities were 

inconsistent with his allegations of worsening knee pain . Tr. 56. In July 2008, Plaintiff 

reported that he hauled 800 gallons of water per day to keep his trees alive and to have 

water for his house. Tr. 182. In October 2008, Plaintiff reported that he was in the 

process of building a cabin on his property. Tr. 177. In November 2008, Plaintiff 

reported that he passed time by cutting firewood. Tr. 176. The ALJ also took note of the 

paucity of objective evidence and treatment notes prior to December 2007 showing that 

Plaintiff suffered severe left knee pain. While February 2010 x-rays of his left knee 

showed medial degenerative joint disease, earlier studies only showed knee effusion. 

Tr. 56, 208-09 (June 23, 2009 MRI). 

 With respect to his mental limitations, Plaintiff claims that he suffers from hyper 

vigilance, exaggerated startle response, anger, road rage, sleep disturbances, fear, anxiety, 

forgetfulness, and flashbacks. Doc. 13, at 5 (citing Tr. 196, 200, 205). He also suffers 

from social isolation. Tr. 200. He lives “off the grid” and has limited interpersonal 

contacts. Doc. 13, at 5; see Tr. 204 (Plaintiff lives “out of town and off the road,” and 

uses solar and wind power for electricity.) Plaintiff argues that these symptoms support a 

finding of severe impairment as it relates to his PTSD. 

 The ALJ found that although Plaintiff alleged longstanding symptoms of PTSD 

since his involvement in the Vietnam War, he made no effort to seek mental health 

services, participate in counseling, or take psychiatric medication prior to December 31, 

2007. Tr. 56-57. Although Plaintiff alleged that he was unable to afford treatment until 

after that date, he also testified that upon retiring in 2002 he was paid a pension. Tr. 57. 

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The ALJ concluded that it was not for lack of financial resources that Plaintiff did not 

seek psychiatric treatment. Id. When Plaintiff did seek treatment in 2008, his progress 

notes indicated likely “longstanding” PTSD, but with only “mild” symptoms. Tr. 285; 

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). In spite of the symptoms that Plaintiff allegedly 

suffered as a result of his PTSD, the ALJ noted that he worked for 23 years without 

incident. Tr. 57. Although Plaintiff alleged social isolation, the ALJ noted that he had 

lunch with the captain of his swift boat over the Fourth of July weekend in 2009 and that 

“it was an enjoyable experience,” that he spent time with his family, including 

grandchildren, that he has a “couple [of] neighbor friends” and friends who “do visit 

pretty often,” that he talks to former co-workers when he sees them, that he feels a strong 

sense of responsibility and attachment to others, and that he has a girlfriend and is 

capable of maintaining a long-term relationship. Id.; see Tr. 171, 182, 195, 205. 

 The ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff’s knee pain and PTSD symptoms are not severe 

is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 911 F.2d at 184. The medical record does 

not establish any work-related limitations as a result of Plaintiff’s physical or mental 

impairments. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 

2008) (upholding nonsevere finding where the medical evidence did not establish any 

work-related limitations as a result of an impairment). 

B. Disability Onset Date. 

Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to Social Security Regulation 83-20 (“SSR 83-20”), 

the ALJ erred by failing to make the required inference of Plaintiff’s disability onset date, 

or alternatively, by not calling on a medical advisor to help determine the onset date. 

Doc. 13, at 5-7. Defendant responds that SSR 83-20 is inapplicable because a finding of 

disability is a prerequisite to the requirement that the ALJ determine the onset date of that 

disability, and there has been no finding of disability. Doc. 14, at 14. See Sam v. Astrue, 

550 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (because ALJ found petitioner Sam was not disabled at 

any time through the date of the decision, the question of when he became disabled did 

not arise and the procedures prescribed in SSR 83-20 did not apply); Scheck v. Barnhart, 

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357 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The ALJ did not find that Scheck was disabled, and 

therefore, there was no need to find an onset date. In short, SSR 83-20 does not apply.”). 

Plaintiff does not address the applicability of SSR 83-20 in his reply. Instead, he 

suggests that because the Department of Veterans Affairs found him disabled by 50 

percent effective February 19, 2008, and because the record is void of intervening events 

between his December 31, 2007 date last insured and February 19, 2008, he likely 

experienced the onset of disabling PTSD prior to his date last insured. Doc. 15, at 3. 

 The ALJ did not commit legal error by not inferring a disability onset date or by 

not calling a medical expert to help establish an onset date. SSR 83-20 is inapplicable 

because the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff was disabled at any time from the alleged 

disability onset date through the date last insured.2

 Tr. 59. Furthermore, the ALJ 

properly considered Plaintiff’s VA rating in her decision, pursuant to McCartey v. 

Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]lthough a VA rating of 

disability does not necessarily compel the SSA to reach an identical result, the ALJ must 

consider the VA’s finding in reaching [her] decision.”) (citation omitted). The ALJ 

considered Plaintiff’s VA rating of 50% disabled, but also noted that the rating dates 

from February 19, 2008, after Plaintiff’s date last insured. Tr. 56. The ALJ did not 

commit legal error by concluding that Plaintiff’s VA rating was not dispositive of his 

alleged disability for purposes of SSA benefits, which requires that Plaintiff establish 

disability on or before his date last insured. See McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076 (“Because 

the VA and SSA criteria for determining disability are not identical . . . the ALJ may give 

less weight to a VA disability rating if [she] gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons for 

doing so that are supported by the record.”). 

 C. Medical Opinions. 

 The ALJ evaluated only the medical opinion of Dr. Vandenheed. Tr. 58. Plaintiff 

claims that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the opinions of his consultative 

 

2

 December 31, 2007 is both the alleged disability onset date and the date last insured. Tr. 59, 92. 

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examiners, Dr. Ronald Teed and Dr. Joseph Ring. Doc. 13, at 8. Dr. Teed opined in 

September 2010 that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties with attention, concentration for 

extended periods, and interacting appropriately with others and with supervisors. 

Tr. 229. Dr. Teed’s notes indicate that Plaintiff reported working as a high pressure 

welder for 23 years before he got “burned out.” Tr. 226. Dr. Ring examined Plaintiff in 

September 2010. He opined that Plaintiff could stand or walk for two hours and sit for 

six to eight hours in an eight-hour work day, did not need an assistive device, could lift 

up to 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, and would be occasionally 

restricted in climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, and was unrestricted 

in reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling. Tr. 235-36. Defendant argues that the 

ALJ’s omission of Dr. Teed’s and Dr. Ring’s opinions was harmless because her reasons 

for discounting Dr. Laura Vandenheed’s opinion (which Plaintiff does not challenge) 

apply equally to the opinions of Dr. Ring and Dr. Teed. Doc. 14, at 13. 

 Social Security Regulations provide that the ALJ will evaluate every medical 

opinion received, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). While 

“[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless,” Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court cannot consider an error harmless 

“unless it can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the 

testimony, could have reached a different disability determination,” Stout v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court cannot so conclude, 

especially considering that Dr. Vandenheed’s opinion extended only to Plaintiff’s 

physical limitations, not his mental limitations. See Tr. 58, 266-68. Consequently, the 

ALJ’s failure to evaluate the medical opinions of Drs. Ring and Teed cannot be viewed as 

harmless error.3

 

3

 Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert, Mr. Kelman, testified that a hypothetical person with limitations based on Dr. Teed’s opinion could not perform any work in the national economy. Doc. 13, at 8. The Court notes that Mr. Kelman testified 

only that those limitations “would preclude past relevant work or work for which [the 

hypothetical person] would have transferrable skills.” Tr. 43. Furthermore, Mr. 

Kelman’s testimony is not dispositive of Plaintiff’s disability determination because the 

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IV. Remand. 

 Remand for further proceedings is appropriate where there are outstanding issues 

that must be resolved before a determination can be made and it is not clear from the 

record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence 

were properly evaluated. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, it is not clear that Plaintiff’s impairments would be severe, or that he would 

ultimately be found disabled, if all of the medical evidence were considered. On remand, 

the ALJ should evaluate the opinions of Drs. Teed and Ring, as well as the other medical 

opinions in the record. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s decision denying benefits is reversed. 

 2. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 Dated this 7th day of September, 2012. 

 ALJ did not reach that step of the sequential evaluation process. The ALJ’s analysis terminated at step two because she found that Plaintiff’s impairments were not severe. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step.”); § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (“At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . we will find that you are not disabled.”). 

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