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Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

COLORADO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION and ) 

STATE OF COLORADO, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LAWRENCE HARMON and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) 

OF ENERGY, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants, ) 

) 

---------------------------- ) ) 

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, VIRGINIA ) 

POWER COMPANY, TU ELECTRIC COMPANY, ROCHESTER ) 

GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION, PUBLIC SERVICE ) 

ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA POWER & ) 

LIGHT COMPANY, NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY, ) 

NORTHEAST UTILITIES, NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, ) 

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT ) 

COMPANY, DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY, COMMONWEALTH ) 

EDISON COMPANY, CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT ) 

COMPANY, BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, ) 

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION, ) 

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ) 

STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MICHIGAN, STATE OF) 

MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF TEXAS, ) 

STATE OF VERMONT, STATE OF VIRGINIA, STATE OF ) 

WASHINGTON, STATE OF WISCONSIN, NEW MEXICO ) 

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, THE ) 

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ) 

) 

Amici Curiae. ) 

FIL..:;D Umtsd ~ CGurt or App\:2-b Tenth Circui-t; 

DEC 18 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk · 

No. 89-1288 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-Z-1524) 

Kenneth Stern (~chael Jay Singer and Alfred Mollin, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C.; and Michael J. Norton, United States 

Attorney, and Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, on the 

briefs), Department of Justice, washington, D.C., for the 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appellate Case: 89-1288 Document: 01019326294 Date Filed: 12/18/1991 Page: 1 
Henry Gill and P. Benjamin Underwood, Office of General Counsel, 

Department of Energy; c. Dean McGrath, Jr., Acting General 

Counsel, Department of Transportation; and Barbara Betsock and 

Edward H. Bonekemper, III, Office of Chief Counsel, Research and 

Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, Of 

Counsel, for the Defendants-Appellants. 

Florence J. Phillips (Gale A. Norton, Attorney General; Raymond T. 

Slaughter, Deputy Attorney General; Timothy M. Tymkovich, 

Solicitor General; and Mana Jennings-Fader, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, with her on the briefs), Special 

Assistant Attorney General, Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton, Denver, 

Colorado, for the Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Harry H. Voigt, Leonard M. Trosten, and Margaret M. Mlynczak, 

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & Macrae, Washington, D.C., on the brief for 

amici curiae Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Virginia Power 

Company, TU Electric Company, Rochester Gas and Electric 

Corporation, Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Pennsylvania 

Power & Light Company, Northern States Power Company, Northeast 

Utilities, New York Power Authority, Georgia Power Company, 

Florida Power & Light Company, Duquesne Light Company, 

Commonwealth Edison Company, Carolina Power & Light Company, 

Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, American Electric Power Service 

Corporation, and Alabama Power Company. 

Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General, and Carl A. Sinderbrand, 

Assistant Attorney General, State of Wisconsin; and Neil F. 

Hartigan, Attorney General, Michelle Jordan, Chief, Environmental 

Control Division, and J. Jerome Sisul, Assistant Attorney General, 

State of Illinois, on the brief for amici curiae States of 

California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Texas, Ver.mont, 

Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and the New Mexico Health and 

Environment Department. 

Melinda Kassen, Senior Attorney, and Carolyn Doris, Legal Intern, 

Environmental Defense Fund, Boulder, Colorado, on the brief for 

amicus curiae The Environmental Defense Fund, State of Colorado. 

Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and ~, Circuit Judges. 

~, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellants appeal the district court's order granting summary 

judgment in favor of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission 

("CPUC") and the State of Colorado. On appeal, the Department of 

Energy ("DOE") argues that the Hazardous Materials Transportation 

Uniform Safety Act of 1990 ( "HMTUSA") and its implementing 

regulations preempt the CPUC's regulations requiring carriers of 

hazardous materials to carry the Colorado State Patrol telephone 

number and an inspection report in the vehicle, to obtain a state 

permit, and to provide the state with advance notification of 

shipment. DOE also asserts that the district court failed to give 

sufficient deference to an inconsistency ruling by the United 

States Department of Transportation ("DOT"). We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and reverse. 

BACKGROUND 

In 1975, Congress enacted the Hazardous Materials 

Transportation Act, 49 u.s.c. app. § 1801, et seq. ("HMTA"). The 

Act replaced a patchwork of state and federal laws and regulations 

concerning the transportation of hazardous materials with a scheme 

of uniform national regulations. Southern Pac. Transp. v. Public 

Serv. Comm'n of Nev., 909 F.2d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1990); Jersey 

Cent. Power & Light Co. ~ Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1112 (3d Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986). DOT, pursuant to the 

HMTA, promulgated the Hazardous Materials Regulations ("HMR"), 

which categorize and classify hazardous materials and impose 

various requirements on shippers and carriers for shipping papers, 

marking, labeling, transport-vehicle placarding, and packaging of 

~ hazardous materials. 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-179. 

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... . 

In 1986, Colorado enacted the Colorado Nuclear Materials 

Transportation Act of 1986 ("CNMTA"), codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. 

S 40-2.2-101, et seq. In May, 1987, the CPUC adopted implementing 

regulations, which are codified at 4 Colo. Code Regs. §§ 723-725 

("NT-Regulations"). Under the CNMTA and the NT-Regulations, 

transporters of nuclear materials must obtain a permit from and 

pay a fee to a State agency. To obtain a permit, the applicant 

must submit driver training certificates (including proof of 

training for mountainous roads), proof of liability insurance, a 

nuclear incident plan, and a vehicle equipment failure plan. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2.2-201. The CNMTA also requires the 

carrier to carry the permit with the shipping papers that must be 

carried pursuant to federal regulation. Id. S 40-2.2-203. 

~ Further, the CNMTA mandates prenotification of all shipments, 

including the identity of the shipper, carrier, and receiver, a 

description of the shipment, the routes to be used, and estimated 

l 

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t~es of arrival and departure. Id. S 40-2.2-209. 

In 1988, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. S 107.203, DOE requested an 

advisory opinion from DOT as to whether the CNMTA and the NTRegulations were preempted by federal law. 1 DOT found that a 

number of Colorado's regulations, including all of the regulations 

at issue in this appeal, were preempted. 

In September 1988, the CPUC and Colorado filed an action in 

the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 

against DOE, seeking a declaratory judgment that the CNMTA and the 

1 Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. S 107.205, a concerned state may submit 

comments regarding the application for an inconsistency ruling. 

Colorado declined to submit comments in this case. 

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NT-Regulations are constitutionally valid and are not preempted by 

federal law. On January 11, 1989, DOE filed a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which subsequently was 

converted into a motion for summary judgment. Colorado and the 

CPUC filed a cross motion for summary judgment. After oral 

argument, at which counsel for both parties conceded that no 

factual disputes existed, the district court granted Colorado's 

motion, denied DOE's motion, and ruled that the CNTMA and the NTRegulations were not preempted by the HMTA. 2 The district court 

held that there was no preemption because it was not impossible to 

comply with both sets of regulations simultaneously and because 

Colorado's regulations promote safety -- a predominant goal of the 

HMTA. 

DOE subsequently filed a notice of appeal in order to 

challenge four of the NT-Regulations. However, before the appeal 

could be heard, Congress amended the ·HMTA by enacting the HMTUSA, 

49 u.s.c. app. §§ 1801-1819. When Congress amended the HMTA, it 

expressly specified the standard for determining whether the 

statute or its implementing regulations preempt state regulations 

that regulate in the same area. Congress also strongly reaffirmed 

that uniformity was the linchpin in the design of the statute. We 

must now decide whether the HMTUSA and its implementing 

regulations preempt four of Colorado's NT-Regulations. 

2 The district court also ordered that the words 11Within 

Coloradan be stricken from 4 Colo. Code Regs. § 723-725 NT1(d)(4). The district court stated that "nuclear materials used 

for medical or research purposes shall be excluded regardless of 

whether or not they are used in Colorado." Because neither party 

raises this issue on appeal, we do not address it here and allow 

this part of the district court order to stand. 

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DISCUSSION 

We review summary judgment orders de novo, using the same 

standards the district court applies. Osgood ~ State Far.m Mut. 

Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). Summary 

judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, 

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); ~Anderson ~ Liberty 

Lobby, 477 u.s. 242, 247-48 (1986). 

I. Preemption Standards Under the BMTOSA 

The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution 

provides Congress with the power to preempt state law. Congress 

can preempt state law in several ways -- one of which is express 

preemption. Express preemption occurs when Congress, in enacting 

a federal statute, announces a clear intent to preempt state law. 

Jones~ Rath Packing Co., 430 u.s. 519 (1977). Express 

preemption may result not only from action taken by Congress 

itself; a federal agency acting within the scope of its 

congressionally delegated authority also may preempt state law. 

Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n ~De La Cuesta, 458 u.s. 

141 (1982); State Corp. Comm'n of Kan. ~FCC, 787 F.2d 1421, 1425 

(lOth Cir. 1986). 

The HMTUSA, like its predecessor, grants the Secretary of 

Transportation broad powers to promulgate regulations governing 

the transportation of hazardous materials: "The Secretary shall 

~ issue regulations for the safe transportation of hazardous 

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materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce. The 

regulations issued under this section shall govern any aspect of 

hazardous materials transportation safety which the Secretary 

deems necessary or appropriate." 49 u.s.c. app. § 1804(a)(l). 

Pursuant to this section, the Secretary's regulations establish 

requirements for, among other things, highway routing, driver 

training, placarding, and shipping papers. 

When it enacted the HMTUSA, Congress specified the standards 

for preemption under the Act by creating three different standards 

for separate areas of regulation. Section 1819 establishes the 

highest preemption standard. Pursuant to this section, after the 

Secretary enacts regulations with regard to motor carrier 

registration and permitting forms for states that register persons 

who transport hazardous material by motor vehicle, "no State [may] 

establish, maintain, or enforce any requirement which relates to 

the subject matter of such regulation unless such requirement is 

the same n such regulation." 49 u.s.c. app. § 1819(e) (emphasis 

added). 

The second standard applies to certain "covered subjects." 

Congress stated that "unless otherwise authorized by Federal law, 

any law, regulation, order, ruling, provision, or other 

requirement of a State or political subdivision thereof or an 

Indian tribe, which concerns a subject listed in subparagraph (B) 

["covered subjects"] and which is not substantively the~ n 

any provision of this Act or any regulation under such provision 

which concerns such subject, is preempted." Id. § 1804(a)(4) 

~ (emphasis added). Any regulation issued by the Secretary of 

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Transportation concerning a "covered subject" has the same 

preemptive effect. Id. § 1804(a)(S). 

Finally, unless the Secretary waives preemption or the 

regulation is otherwise authorized by federal law, any regulation, 

regardless of the subject matter, 

is preempted if-- (1) compliance with both the State or 

political subdivision or Indian tribe requirement and 

any requirement of this chapter or of a regulation 

issued under this chapter is not possible, (2) the State 

or political subdivision or Indian tribe requirement as 

applied or enforced creates an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of this chapter or the 

regulations issued under this chapter, or (3) it is 

preempted under section 1804(a)(4) of this Appendix or 

section 1804(b) of this Appendix. 

Id. § 1811(a).3 The·enactment of these standards demonstrates 

that Congress clearly intended to preempt state law under certain 

circumstances. 4 We first must examine the subject matter of the 

NT-Regulations at issue to determine which of the three preemption 

categories applies; then we must det~r.mine whether each regulation 

is preempted under that standard. 

3 This standard replaces the "inconsistency" determination 

under the HMTA. It codifies the Secretary's regulation relating 

to preemption that was promulgated to assist in determinations of 

inconsistency. In turn, this standard derives from Supreme Court 

precedent that established a way to resolve preemption questions 

when a conflict arises between federal and state law. See Hines ~ Davidowitz, 312 u.s. 52 (1941). 

4 The HMTUSA does not leave state or local governments without 

recourse when its requirements are preempted. The HMTUSA also 

provides that the Secretary, upon application of "(a]ny State or 

political subdivision or Indian tribe," may waive preemption of a 

requirement "upon a determination that such requirement-- (1) 

affords an equal or greater level of protection to the public than 

is afforded by the requirements of this chapter or regulations 

issued under this chapter, and (2) does not unreasonably burden 

commerce." 49 u.s.c. app. § 1811(d). Colorado has not made such 

an application with respect to the NT-Regulations at issue here. 

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II. Application of the BMTUSA's Preemption 

Standards 

DOE challenges four regulations: NT-3(a), NT-S(c)(S), NT-8, 

and NT-9. NT-3(a) requires a carrier of hazardous materials to 

carry the Colorado State Patrol telephone number in the vehicle. 

NT-S(c)(S) requires an inspection report to be retained in the 

vehicle while transporting hazardous materials within Colorado. 

NT-8 requires each carrier to obtain a permit, for which a fee 

must be paid, and to submit the following information as part of 

the permit application: a copy of the carrier's driver training 

program; proof of liability insurance; a nuclear incident plan; 

and a vehicle equipment failure plan. NT-9 requires the carrier 

to provide the state with advance notification of the shipment. 

Preemption Under S 1819 

Because the Secretary has not yet promulgated regulations 

related to motor carrier registration and permitting for.ms, we do 

not address the most restrictive preemption standard under § 1819. 

Therefore, we next look to the § 1804 standard related to "covered 

subjects." 

~ Preemption Under S 1804 == Covered Sub1ect Preemption 

Shipping documents are a "covered subject" under 

§ 1804(a)(4)(B); therefore, any state requirements that "concern" 

shipping documents must be substantively the same as the federal 

regulations. Accordingly, if Colorado's regulations pertain to 

shipping documents, they are preempted unless they are 

substantively the same as the federal regulations. DOE asserts 

that "shipping documents., is a broad term and that NT-3(a), NTS(c)(S), and NT-8 (except the driver training program) all pertain 

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/ 

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to shipping documents. It contends that "shipping documents" must 

be understood to extend to any document that a shipper is required 

to generate, possess, or secure as a condition of transporting a 

shipment of hazardous materials. After reviewing the statute and 

regulations, we conclude that such an interpretation is without 

support. 

~though the HMTUSA does not define shipping documents, the 

implementing regulations contain extensive requirements that 

govern "shipping papers." One such regulation defines a "shipping 

paper" as a "shipping order, bill of lading, manifest or other 

shipping document serving a similar purpose and containing the 

information required by (regulation.]" 49 C.F.R. § 171.8 

(emphasis added). Further, in 49 u.s.c. app. § 1805(b)(6)(I), 

Congress authorizes the Secretary to require "training of its 

hazmat employees" in the area of "[p]reparation of shipping 

documents for transportation of hazardous materials." (Emphasis 

added.) This reference to "shipping documents," coupled with the 

previous section's (§ 1804) explanation of the contents and 

maintenance of "shipping papers," suggests that Congress did not 

intend a different meaning for the two terms. Thus, from the 

statute and regulations, we conclude that the terms "shipping 

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document" and "shipping paper" are used interchangeably. 5 

Therefore, we examine the regulations relating to "shipping 

papers" to determine the scope of the term "shipping documents" 

and whether Colorado's regulations seek to regulate in the 

"shipping documents" arena. 

The Secretary's regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 172.200-172.205, 

177.800-177.826, require that shipping papers contain a detailed 

description of the transported hazardous materials, an emergency 

response telephone number, and other matters not relevant here. 

Further, the regulations require that the shipping papers 

accompany any carrier that transports hazardous materials on 

public highways. Id. § 177.817(a). These regulations do not 

govern inspection reports, proof of liability insurance, the 

carrying of a nuclear incident report, or the carrying of a 

vehicle equipment failure plan. Thus, NT-S(c)(S) and NT-8 do not 

regulate in the same arena as DOT's shipping paper regulations. 

However, NT-3(a) does fall within the scope of the shipping 

paper regulations. NT-3(a) requires the carrier to carry the 

Colorado State Patrol telephone number along with instructions to 

5 Although the meaning of ••shipping documents" is not 

completely clear in the legislative history of the HMTUSA, it 

appears that Congress used the terms .,shipping papers" and 

"shipping documents" interchangeably. The "Section-by-Section 

Analysis" of House Report No. 101-444(!) uses the term "shipping 

documents" and states that "consistency in all aspects of such 

documents will promote more precise and easier identification of 

any hazardous material, improve systems for handling hazardous 

materials, and enhance capabilities for dealing with emergencies 

associated with the transportation of hazardous materials ... H.R. 

Rep. No. 444 (part I), at 34. These concerns are the same as 

those that Congress mandated that the Secretary consider when 

determining the contents of "shipping papers." See 49 u.s.c. app. 

§ 1804(g). 

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"call that number in the event of any incident, accident, or 

breakdown of equipment." DOT's regulations provide extensive 

requirements concerning what type of emergency numbers must be 

carried on the shipping papers. First, the Secretary's 

regulations require the transporter of hazardous materials to 

maintain an emergency response number on a shipping paper. Id. 

§ 172.604(a)(3); see also id. § 172.602(b)(3). Second, the 

federal regulations sp~cify that the number must be "[t]he number 

of a person who is either knowledgeable of the hazards and 

characteristics of the hazardous material being shipped and has 

comprehensive emergency response and incident mitigation 

information for that material, or has immediate access to a person 

who possesses such knowledge and information." Id. 

~ § 172.604(a)(2). NT-3(a), on the other hand, requires the motor 

vehicle operator to carry the number of the Colorado State Patrol 

with the shipping papers. 

Under S 1804(a)(4), we must decide whether NT-3(a)'s 

requirement is "substantively the same" as the federal 

regulations. Although "substantively the same" has not yet been 

defined, 6 it clearly mandates a higher preemption standard than 

the dual compliance/obstacle standard defined in§ 181l(a). 

Indeed, the term itself denotes that state regulations must 

contain the same substance as the federal regulations. The 

Secretary's regulations, unlike Colorado's requirements, do not 

6 DOT has proposed that "substantively the same" be defined as 

"conforming in every respect." A number of illustrations are 

provided with the notice of proposed rulemaking, all of which 

indicate that only minor editorial changes would not be preempted. 

See 56 Fed. Reg. 36992-01. 

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require that the shipping papers contain the telephone numbers of 

specific officials of any local jurisdiction through which the 

material may be transported. Therefore, because Colorado's 

regulation imposes different requirements than the federal 

regulation, NT-3(a) is not "substantively the same" and is 

preempted under§ 1804(a)(4). 7 

~ Preemption Under § 1811(a) == The Obstacle Test 

Because the remai~ing regulations at issue on this appeal do 

not pertain to covered subjects, we look to § 1811(a) to determine 

whether Colorado's regulations are preempted. Under§ 1811(a), a 

state requirement is preempted if it is impossible to comply with 

both the state and federal regulation or if the state requirement 

creates an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives and 

purposes of the HMTUSA and the HMR. 

In deciding this issue, we first address what weight to 

accord the Secretary of Transportation's advisory, nonbinding 

opinions. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen faced with a 

problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great 

deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers 

or agency charged with its administration. • When the 

construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute 

is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order." Udall Y.!.. 

Tallman, 380 u.s. 1, 16 (1965); ~also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. 

7 We note that a state may require the transporter of hazardous 

materials to maintain emergency telephone numbers on or with the 

transporter's route plan. 49 C.F.R. § 177.82S(c). Colorado's 

regulation is preempted because it requires the carrier to carry 

the Colorado State Patrol number with the shipping papers, not the 

route plan. 

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v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Nev., 909 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1990). We 

defer to an administrator's construction of his own regulations 

unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 

regulation." Robertson~ Methow Valley Citizens Counsel, 109 s. 

Ct. 1835, 1850 (1989) (quoting Bowles~ Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 

325 u.s. 410, 414 (1945)). 

In addition to deference with regard to an agency's 

interpretation of stat~tes and regulations, we have held that 

"courts should defer to the judgment of an administrative agency 

with reference to topics within the agency area of expertise." 

Mitzelfelt ~ Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1296 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). DOT's expertise, in part, lies in determining the 

scope and coverage of its regulations and whether Colorado's 

regulations cover the same subject matter. However, a preemption 

determination involves matters of law -- an area more within the 

expertise of the courts than within the expertise of the Secretary 

of Transportation. See Piper~ Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 u.s. 

1, 41 n.27 (1977) (agency's "presumed 'expertise' in the 

securities-law field is of limited value when the narrow legal 

issue is peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution, namely 

whether a cause of action should be implied"); Jicarilla Apache 

Tribe~ F.E.R.C., 578 F.2d 289, 292-93 (lOth Cir. 1978) (great 

deference not required when administrative decision is not based 

on expertise in a particular field, but on general common law 

principles). Therefore, we defer to DOT's determinations that its 

regulations overlap with Colorado's regulations, but we 

~ independently review the legal issue of preemption. 

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... , J 

In its inconsistency ruling, DOT directly addressed the 

regulations remaining at issue on this appeal-- NT-S(c)(S), NT-8, 

and NT-9. 8 With regard to NT-8 (Colorado's per.mit regulation that 

requires proof of driver training), the Secretary found that "the 

Department, through promulgation of 49 C.F.R. § 177.825, has 

established a near total occupation of the field of training 

requirements relating to the transportation of radioactive 

materials." See IR-27, 54 Fed. Reg. 16326-01 (April 21, 1989) 

(quoting IR-8 (appeal), 52 Fed. Reg. 13000-06 (Apr. 20, 1987)). 

The Secretary found that NT-9 (Colorado's prenotification 

requirement) "requires greater prenotification than the NRC 

regulations, which are incorporated into the HMR by 49 C.F.R. 

§ 173.22." Id. The Secretary also found that NT-5(c)(5), which 

requires a carrier to carry an inspection report, creates a 

requirement in excess of the HMTA's or the HMR's requirements. 

Id. Implicit in all of these rulings is that the NT-Regulations 

and the HMR seek to regulate in the same arena. After reviewing 

the NT-Regulations and the HMR, we conclude that the Secretary's 

determinations are reasonable, and we agree that Colorado's 

regulations and the Secretary's regulations overlap. 

We now must deter.mine whether preemption of Colorado's 

regulations occurs under§ 1811(a). Under§ 1811(a), preemption 

8 The Secretary has delegated his authority to make initial 

administrative decisions about applications for Inconsistency 

Rulings and about applications for exemptions from preemption to 

the Director of the Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation, 

Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of 

Transportation. 49 C.F.R. § 107.209. The Director made these 

particular inconsistency determinations. Administrative appeals 

are available before the Administrator of the Research and Special 

Programs Administration. 49 C.F.R. § 107.211. 

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is only appropriate if compliance with federal regulations and 

Colorado's regulations is impossible or if compliance with 

Colorado's regulations would create an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of the HMTUSA or its implementing 

regulations. DOE concedes that compliance with both sets of 

regulations is not impossible. Therefore, we only analyze 

preemption under the obstacle test. 9 

In determining preemption under the obstacle test, the 

Supreme Court has examined whether the state law "'stands as an 

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 

and ob1ectives of Congress.'" Hillsborough County~ Automated 

Medic. Labs., 471 u.s. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting Hines~ 

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (emphasis added); see also 

National Tank Truck Carriers. Inc. ~ City of New York, 677 F.2d 

270, 275 (2d Cir. 1982). Further, "(a] state law also is 

preempted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal 

statute was designed to reach this goal." International Paper Co. 

~Ouellette, 479 u.s. 481, 494 (1987); Michigan Canners & 

Freezers Ass'n ~Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 

u.s. 461, 477 (1984). Therefore, we must identify and understand 

the goals and purposes of the HMTUSA. 

When it enacted the HMTUSA, Congress made a number of 

findings that relate to the transportation of hazardous materials 

9 Because§ 1811(a)'s obstacle test codifies a judicially created test for determining when a federal statute impliedly 

preempts state law, see Hines~ Davidowitz, 312 u.s. 52 (1941), 

the line of cases developing the obstacle test is instructive to 

our application of§ 18ll(a). 

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. '. 

and the importance of uniform regulations governing the 

transportation of hazardous materials. Congress stated: 

(3) many States and localities have enacted laws and 

regulations which vary from Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous materials, 

thereby creating the potential for unreasonable hazards 

in other jurisdictions and confounding shippers and 

carriers which attempt to comply with multiple and 

conflicting registration, permitting, routing, 

notification, and other regulatory requirements, 

(4) because of the potential risks to life, property, 

and the environment posed by unintentional releases of 

hazardous materials, consistency in laws and regulations 

governing the transportation of hazardous materials is 

necessary and desirable, 

(5) in order to achieve greater uniformity and to 

promote the public health, welfare, and safety at all 

levels, Federal standards for regulating the 

transportation of hazardous materials in intrastate, 

interstate, and foreign commerce are necessary and 

desirable. 

~ 49 u.s.c. app. § 1801 (congressional declaration of policy); cf. 

National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. ~ Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 824 

(1st Cir. 1979) (analyzing the HMTA and stating that .,there is 

strong support for the notion that a primary Congressional purpose 

intended to be achieved through the legislation was to secure a 

general pattern of uniform national regulations"). 

Congressional committees echoed the importance of uniform 

safety regulations. The report of the House Committee on Energy 

and Commerce noted that the House Bill .,reflects the view that a 

high degree of uniformity of Federal, State, and local laws is 

required in order to promote safety and to encourage the free flow 

of commerce ... H.R. Rep. No. 444 (Part 1), lOlst Cong., 2d Seas., 

at 22 (1990). The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 

~ Transportation, which reported the bill that amended HMTA, stated 

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, " 

that the "original intent of the HMTA was to authorize the 

Department of Transportation with the regulatory and enforcement 

authority . • • to preclude a multiplicity of State and local 

regulations and the potential for varying as well as conflicting 

regulations ... s. Rep. No. 449, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., at 2 (1990), 

reprinted in 1990 u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4595, 4596. 

Further, the debate on the floor of Congress reveals that Congress 

determined that uniformity would ensure safety. See 136 Cong. 

Rec. 813645-03 (remarks of Rep. Luken) ("This bill provides for 

uniform Federal, State, and local laws in certain technical areas, 

thus ensuring the safe and efficient transportation of hazardous 

materials throughout the country."); 136 Cong. Rec. H13645-03 

(remarks of Rep. Hammerschmidt) ( 11 this bill will provide a strong 

framework for uniform regulation in critical areas such as 

classification, marking, and handling of hazardous materials"). 

Thus, in enacting new preemption standards, Congress expressly 

contemplated that the Secretary would employ his powers to achieve 

safety by enhancing uniformity in the regulation of hazardous 

materials transportation. Given this congressional purpose, we 

must determine whether Colorado's regulations create an obstacle 

11 tO the accomplishment and execution .. of the HMTUSA or the HMR. 

49 u.s.c. app. § 1811(a). 

~ NT-8 == Permit Requirements 

We begin by analyzing NT-8, which requires a carrier to 

obtain a permit before it may transport hazardous materials. In 

order to obtain a permit, the carrier must submit a copy of the 

~ carrier's driver training program (including training for 

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,. 

>, • 

mountainous driving), proof of liability insurance, a nuclear 

incident plan, and a vehicle equipment failure plan. 

~ Driver training requirements 

In order to receive a State permit, a carrier must submit "a 

copy of the company's driver training program," and "[i]f the 

route to be traveled includes mountain driving (i.e., travel west 

of I-25 into or through the mountains), describe the training 

program which specifically involves the preparation for driving on 

mountainous roads under all types of weather conditions." 40 

Colo. Regs. § 2.2-201, NT Appendix 8-A. Colorado contends that 

NT-8(a) furthers the HMTUSA's goals by ensuring safety and 

enforcement of the driver training requirement. 

The Secretary's regulations concerning training for drivers 

transporting radioactive materials are extensive; coverage 

includes training in the requirements of the federal rules, "the 

properties and hazards of the radioactive materials being 

transported," and emergency procedures. 49 C.F.R. § 177.825(d). 

The Secretary's regulations do not require a carrier to undergo 

mountain training or to submit proof of the completion of a driver 

training program to local authorities. Thus, Colorado's 

regulations go far beyond the HMR. 

~ Insurance requirements 

Colorado requires carriers to submit proof of insurance to 

the CPUC as part of the permit application. The Secretary's 

regulations do not, unlike Colorado's requirements, require the 

carrier to provide proof of insurance to officials of any of the 

various local jurisdictions through which hazardous materials are 

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transported. We also note that the Secretary, in regulations 

promulgated under the Motor Carrier Safety Act, requires a motor 

carrier to retain proof of required insurance at his principal 

place of business and allow any member of the public to review 

10 this information. 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(d) & (e). Therefore, 

Colorado's proof-of-insurance requirement causes a carrier of 

hazardous materials to submit more documentation than contemplated 

in the HMTUSA or other federal acts related to transportation. 

~ Nuclear incident clean-up plan 

Colorado requires the carrier to submit a plan to local 

officials that includes provisions for removing a truck and its 

cargo from an accident scene, preventing or minimizing 

radioactivity releases, and decontaminating the environment. This 

requirement specifically overlaps the provisions of 49 C.F.R. 

§ 177.825(d), which provides that a driver must be trained in the 

procedures to follow in case of an accident or emergency. 

Colorado's regulations expand on federal regulations, requiring a 

carrier to generate more documentation and then supply that same 

documentation to a local authority. 

~ Vehicle equipment failure plan 

Colorado requires the carrier to submit to the CPUC a plan 

for replacing or repairing equipment that has been placed out of 

10 Colorado asserts that the Motor Carrier Safety Act ( "MCSA") 

authorizes Colorado's insurance requirement because the Act does 

not preempt such a requirement. Colorado then concludes that this 

court must apply the preemption standards utilized under the MCSA 

to this regulation. We disagree. Section 181l(a) exempts a state 

regulation from preemption if it is "otherwise authorized by 

Federal law." The fact that the MCSA does not preempt Colorado's 

requirement cannot be construed as an authorization of the 

regulation. 

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service or that has become inoperative for other reasons. Vehicle 

equipment is regulated by the HMR only to the extent the HMR 

incorporates the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations by 

reference. 49 C.F.R. § 177.804. Although the Secretary's 

regulations establish requirements for driver training and require 

drivers to carry certificates of completion of the required 

training, 49 C.F.R. § 177.825(d), the regulations do not, unlike 

Colorado's requirement~, require drivers to submit these 

documents, in advance, to officials in the various jurisdictions 

through which they transport hazardous materials. 

All four of these provisions require carriers to generate and 

to submit documentation to local authorities that is in excess of 

the HMR's documentation requirements. The Secretary's regulations 

contain hundreds of information and documentation requirements, 

all of which have been established by the Secretary to ensure the 

health and safety of citizens in every jurisdiction. Congress 

specifically found that additional documentation and information 

requirements in one jurisdiction create "unreasonable hazards in 

other jurisdictions" and could confound "shippers and carriers 

which attempt to comply with multiple and conflicting 

regulations." 49 u.s.c. app. § 1801. 

Colorado's regulations clearly exceed the information and 

documentation requirements set forth in the Secretary of 

Transportation's regulations governing the transportation of 

radioactive materials. The enactment of separate information and 

documentation requirements in even a few of the thousands of local 

jurisdictions across the country would lead to the multiplicitous 

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regulations Congress sought to avoid by enacting the HMTUSA. 11 

Because Colorado's regulation forces transporters of hazardous 

materials to generate and maintain additional documentation and 

information, we conclude that it is likely to confound shippers 

and carriers and to increase the potential for hazards in other 

jurisdictions. Colorado's regulations simply do not further the 

federal purpose of promoting safety through uniformity. 

Therefore, we hold that NT-8 is preempted. 12 

~ NT-9 == Prenotification Requirements 

The Secretary requires advance notification to the Governor 

of a state or his designee by shippers of "irradiated reactor 

fuel" or in circumstances where such notification is required by 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 49 C.F.R. § 173.22(c); 10 

C.F.R. § 73.37. NT-9, however, requires prenotification by those 

who transport other categories of nuclear materials as well. 

Further, Colorado's prenotification requirements are extensive, 

requiring "(t]he name, address, and telephone number of the 

11 In addition to obstructing Congress' objective that safety be 

achieved through uniformity, the expense of overburdensome 

documentation and information requirements also is contrary to 

Congress' intent that regulation of hazardous materials 

transportation be as cost-effective as possible. In its findings 

accompanying the enactment of the HMTUSA, Congress mentioned the 

need for "reasonable, adequate and cost-effective protection from 

the risk posed by the transportation of hazardous materials." 49 

u.s.c. app. § 1801 (Congressional Findings) (emphasis added). 

Congress also stated that "the movement of hazardous materials in 

commerce is necessary and desirable to maintain economic vitality and meet consumer demands, and shall be conducted in a safe and 

efficient manner." Id. 

12 DOE does not contend that Colorado's permit fees are 

unreasonable. Therefore, we do not reach this issue. Instead, we 

hold that because the underlying requirements of NT-8 constitute 

obstacles to the HMTUSA, the regulation is preempted. 

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.. ;. I \ ,. 

. ,, •' 

. )' 

shipper, carrier, and receiver," a description of the materials to 

be transported, a listing of routes, the transport index, and the 

estimated dates and times of arrival and departure. 

Congress expressly found that state "notification" 

requirements that "vary from Federal laws and regulations" create 

"unreasonable hazards" and pose "a serious threat to public health 

and safety." 49 u.s.c. app. § 1801. Colorado's prenotification 

requirement varies from federal law, poses a threat to uniformity, 

and thereby threatens public safety and obstructs the purpose and 

objective of Congress and the Secretary. Therefore, we conclude 

that NT-9 is preempted. 

~ NT-S(c)(S) ==Inspection Reports Requirements 

NT-S(c)(S) requires the carrier to retain an inspection 

report in the vehicle while transporting hazardous materials. The 

Secretary's regulations require the owner and the motor carrier to 

retain a copy of the inspection report, 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(b), 13 

but do not require the report to be carried in the vehicle. The 

Secretary's regulations require only that a limited amount of 

documentation be carried in the vehicle, which avoids carrier 

confusion and promotes quick access to critical documentation. 

Colorado's requirement of additional information could create 

confusion in an emergency situation and could thereby increase the 

potential hazard of transporting nuclear waste. Therefore, we 

also conclude that NT-S(c)(S) obstructs the congressional purpose 

and is preempted. 

13 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(b) is incorporated by reference to the HMR. 

49 C.F.R. § 177.804. 

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. . f q 

III. Conclusion 

We do not doubt that Colorado's regulations were implemented 

to enhance safety in the State of Colorado. However, "[t]he 

relative importance to the State of its own law is not material 

when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers 

of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail." 

Fidelity Fed. Sav. ~ Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 u.s. 141, 153 

(1982) (quoting Free~ Bland, 369 u.s. 663, 666 (1962)). 

Congress enacted the HMTUSA to enhance safety throughout the 

country. To accomplish this purpose, Congress concluded that 

uniform standards are necessary and desirable. Uniformity and 

safety are not at odds. We must not balance one against the 

other. Rather, Congress stated unequivocally that the "Federal 

standards for regulating the transportation of hazardous 

materials" were necessary "to achieve greater uniformity and to 

promote the public health, welfare, and safety at all levels." 

49 u.s.c. app. § 1801. 14 

With this statement, Congress directed that safety be 

achieved through uniformity. Colorado's regulations inhibit and 

obstruct unifor.mity by mandating extensive information and 

documentation requirements that are likely to confound the 

transporters of hazardous materials, thereby increasing the 

potential for unreasonable hazards throughout the country. 

14 In the context of other federal statutes, courts have 

recognized that when Congress adopts uniformity as a method for 

achieving the goal of safety, state remedies or regulations that 

interfere with Congress' uniform scheme are preempted. See Wood ~General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (1st. Cir. 1988); Kelly ~Carr, 691 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1980). 

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• v ~ •. , A 

4 ....... 

i ,. 

~ 

~ 

~ 

Because Colorado's regulations obstruct the purposes and 

objectives of Congress, we conclude that they are preempted by the 

HMTUSA and the HMR. 

To the extent that the district court held that NT-3(a), NTS(c)(S), NT-8, and NT-9 are not preempted, we REVERSE. 

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