Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_91-cv-00616/USCOURTS-caed-1_91-cv-00616-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS STANKEWITZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Acting Warden )

of San Quentin State Prison, )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. CIV. F-91-616-AWI-P

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Order Regarding Petitioner’s Pro

Se Motion for New Counsel (Doc.

526) and Counsels’ Motion to

Withdraw (Docs. 537 and 538);

Referral to Selection Board; Denial

of Respondent’s Motion to Expand

the Record (Doc. 542)

Petitioner Douglas Stankewitz (“Stankewitz”) filed a pro se request for

new counsel in his ongoing federal habeas proceedings February 6, 2006. 

Stankewitz asserts that he has lost confidence and trust in his appointed counsel

because they missed a deadline and did not adequately communicate with him. 

Stankewitz contends that counsels’ error denied him the opportunity to file a

petition for certiorari following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on his case. See

Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of

Stankewitz’s guilt phase claims and remanding for an evidentiary hearing

regarding the failure to investigate and present mitigation at penalty). The

United States Supreme Court denied the motion to file a late petition. Stankewitz

states that because of this missed deadline, as well as a breakdown in

Case 1:91-cv-00616-AWI Document 544 Filed 12/04/06 Page 1 of 6
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communication with counsel, their relationship cannot be reconciled.

Legal Standard

The question of what legal standard should govern a federal habeas

petitioner’s request to substitute appointed habeas counsel has not been

addressed by either the United States Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit. It is not obvious that the standard for analyzing a defendant’s

request for substitution of trial counsel in the context of federal criminal

prosecutions – which was crafted to ensure adequate protection of a defendant’s

Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel during trial – should apply

without modification in the very different context of a federal habeas corpus

death penalty proceeding. This proceeding is not a trial. The role of federal

habeas counsel differs significantly from the role of trial counsel. Unlike at trial,

Stankewitz has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in bringing this

habeas challenge to the validity of his state court conviction and sentence. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755-56 (1991); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425,

429 (9th Cir. 1993). To the extent that the standard governing motions for

substitution of trial counsel reflects the need to protect the fundamental

constitutional rights of a defendant in a criminal trial, see, e.g., United States v.

Williams, 594 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), that standard may not necessarily be

applied in its entirety in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.

Although the Constitution confers no right to habeas counsel, Congress

has created by statute “a mandatory right to qualified legal counsel and related

services” so that indigent condemned prisoners can obtain legal assistance in

challenging their convictions and death sentences in federal court. McFarland v.

Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854 (1994) (footnote omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (see also former

statute 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)). To date, only the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have

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considered what legal standard should apply to a petitioner’s request to

substitute habeas counsel appointed under this statute. Both have concluded

that the trial standard should also be employed in the habeas context. See Hunter

v. Delo, 62 F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1253-54

(10th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit reasoned the statute reflects a “congressional

mandate” for provision of qualified counsel, and that Congress must have

intended capital habeas attorneys to adhere to the usual professional standards

governing adequate representation of clients. Hunter, 62 F.3d at 274 (“We do not

think Congress had in mind a lawyer who would not communicate with his or

her client, or who would file a petition without consultation with or

authorization from the client.”). In an abundance of caution, and in the absence

of binding authority from the Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court,

the rationale of the two circuit courts who have addressed the issue is persuasive. 

For the purpose of addressing this request, the applicable standard is the one

employed in the context of a federal criminal trial.

Applying this legal standard, a conflict between a habeas petitioner and

appointed counsel requires a balancing of the petitioner’s need for counsel

against the government’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of

justice. United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1997). It must first

be determined whether the conflict between the petitioner and his appointed

counsel is so great that it will result in a total lack of communication preventing

counsel from providing adequate representation in the habeas corpus

proceeding. United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979). In balancing

the petitioner’s need for counsel against the State’s interest in the expeditious

resolution of this case, the Court should also consider the timeliness of the

request and the extent of any resulting inconvenience or delay. United States v.

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Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).

Required Inquiry

In order to conduct an adequate inquiry into the attorney-client

relationship between Stankewitz and his appointed counsel, the court ordered a

response by counsel regarding the conflict asserted by Stankewitz. On March 28

and 30, 2006, counsel filed ex parte, sealed responses detailing their view of the

current status of the attorney-client relationship, and addressing Stankewitz’s

allegations regarding the late filing of his petition for certiorari.

Upon recommendation by the Selection Board of the Eastern District of

California, on May 30, 2006, the Court appointed Lynne S. Coffin, Esq. as

independent advisory counsel to consult with Stankewitz and current federal

habeas counsel regarding the existence of any conflict. During a subsequent ex

parte hearing, Ms. Coffin stated that based on her communication with

Stankewitz and his current counsel, a conflict does exist. Current federal habeas

counsel, Mr. Arguimbau and Ms. Hart, filed motions to withdraw as counsel of

record for Stankewitz on October 3 and 4, 2006. Mr. Arguimbau stated that since

he has moved to Massachusetts, it is impossible to represent Stankewitz from

3,000 miles away, but did not reveal any details stating why continued

representation was impossible. Ms. Hart stated she was appointed second

counsel to assist in preparing for an evidentiary hearing and that she did not

contemplate ever serving as lead counsel on this case.

Counsel for Respondent Robert L. Ayers, Jr. (“the State”) opposes the

motions to withdraw as a source of needless delay. The State asserts it has

recently become clear that Stankewitz made critical factual assertions which are

false, and that trial counsel’s files from Stankewitz’s first trial, for which the State

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was granted partial discovery, will likely eliminate the need for an evidentiary

hearing and provide the basis for denial of Stankewitz’s remaining claim. In light

of current counsel’s familiarity with the record, the availability of electronic

filing, and Ms. Hart’s proximity to the Court, the State urges denial of the

motions to withdraw.

Mr. Arguimbau filed a supplement to his motion to withdraw on October

26, stating that medical reasons prevent him from continuing as Stankewitz’s

lawyer.

Analysis

In determining the extent of the conflict between Stankewitz and his

appointed counsel, the Court relies on the finding by independent counsel Lynne

Coffin that a conflict does exist. This finding is reinforced by Stankewitz’ pro se

filings and current counsels’ motions to withdraw from representation of

Stankewitz. Considering the government’s interest in the prompt and efficient

administration of justice, the Court is cognizant of the delay that granting current

counsels’ motions to withdraw will create. Balancing Stankewitz’ need for

counsel and the importance of federal habeas proceedings in ensuring the

constitutionality of state capital convictions, against the already significant delay

of nearly 29 years since the murder, the Court finds sufficient reason to justify the

grant of counsels’ motions to withdraw and Stankewitz’ pro se motion for new

counsel. Although appointment of new counsel will cause delay, there remains

only one claim to be resolved from Stankewitz’ petition and significant

investigation and expert consultation relating to that claim has already been

performed.

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Conclusion

Counsels’ motions to withdraw from representation of Stankewitz are

GRANTED. The orders appointing Nicholas Arguimbau and Katherine L. Hart

are vacated. Stankewitz’ pro se motion for appointment of new counsel is

GRANTED. This case is referred to the Selection Board of Eastern District of

California for recommendation of new counsel to represent Stankewitz.

In light of the temporary lack of representation for Stankewitz, the State’s

Motion to Expand the Record, filed November 21, 2006, is DENIED without

prejudice to raising it again after the appointment of new counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

b64h1h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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