Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-13-15896/USCOURTS-ca11-13-15896-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-15896

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cv-00318-RH-CAS

JOSE A. QUINTERO, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(July 30, 2015)

Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Jose Quintero, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

pro se Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) motion. Quintero’s motion argued 

USCA11 Case: 13-15896 Date Filed: 07/30/2015 Page: 1 of 3
2

that the district court should reopen his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of 

habeas corpus so that he could challenge the district court’s denial of an 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim as procedurally defaulted, based on 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (recognizing a limited, 

equitable exception to the general rule that issues not raised before the district 

court are procedurally barred), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 

1911(2013) (extending Martinez to states that effectively prohibit defendants from 

raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal).1

We review the district court’s denial of Quintero’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion for 

an abuse of discretion. Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 628 (11th Cir. 2014). 

“Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will leave undisturbed a district 

court’s ruling unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of 

judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, 

or proceeding if “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is 

based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 

prospectively is no longer equitable.” 

 1 The State argues on appeal that Quintero did not file his Rule 60(b)(5) motion in a reasonable 

time, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and that he had to request counsel in his state post-conviction 

proceedings to obtain relief under Martinez. Because these arguments were never raised in the 

district court, they are waived. See Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1120 n.3 (11th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam).

USCA11 Case: 13-15896 Date Filed: 07/30/2015 Page: 2 of 3
3

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Quintero’s Rule 

60(b)(5) motion. Quintero’s argument—that the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) 

permits him to raise his Martinez argument—is foreclosed by binding precedent. 

See Griffin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 787 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2015)

(holding that the third clause of “Rule 60(b)(5) applies in ordinary civil litigation 

where there is a judgment granting continuing prospective relief, such as an 

injunction, but not to the denial of federal habeas relief”). We therefore do not

address whether Quintero meets the requirements for relief under Martinez and 

Trevino.

2

AFFIRMED. 

 2 Quintero also argues that he is entitled to relief under the second clause of Rule 60(b)(5). 

Though this Court’s holding in Griffin forecloses only Quintero’s argument about the third 

clause of Rule 60(b)(5), his argument about the second clause is waived because he raised it for 

the first time in his reply brief. See Henry v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 750 F.3d 1226, 

1232 (11th Cir. 2014).

USCA11 Case: 13-15896 Date Filed: 07/30/2015 Page: 3 of 3