Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01064/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01064-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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These counterdefendants have not yet appeared.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

AIRFX.com; Marc Lurie, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

AirFX LLC; 

Defendant/Counterclaimant,

vs.

 

AIRFX.com; Marc Lurie; Pedal Logic 

LP; Juno Holdings Inc., 

 Counterdefendants.

 

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CV 11-01064-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiffs'/counterdefendants' AIRFX.com and Marc Lurie's

partial motion to dismiss counterclaims (doc. 33). Defendant/counterclaimant AirFX LLC

did not respond, and the time for responding has expired.

This action arises out of a dispute over the domain name airfx.com, which is currently

registered to Marc Lurie. We denied AirFX LLC's motion to dismiss or transfer on October

20, 2011 (doc. 19). AirFX LLC answered the complaint on November 3, 2011 (doc. 20).

In addition, it asserted counterclaims against AIRFX.com and Lurie and new parties Pedal

Logic, LP and Juno Holdings, Inc.1

 AirFX LLC asserted a total of four counterclaims: (1)

Case 2:11-cv-01064-FJM Document 50 Filed 12/29/11 Page 1 of 3
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 The abuse of process count was mistakenly styled as count three. 

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trademark infringement; (2) cyber squatting in violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer

Protection Act; (3) intentional interference with prospective economic/contractual advantage;

and (4) abuse of process.2

 

Lurie and AIRFX.com move to dismiss the counterclaims for intentional interference

with prospective economic/contractual advantage (count three) and abuse of process (count

four) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. They argue that AirFX LLC has failed to

state a claim as to both counts. Because AirFX LLC failed to respond to the motion, we

construe the lack of a response as a concession and grant the motion summarily. See LRCiv

7.2(i) ("if. . . counsel does not serve and file the required answering memoranda. . . such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court

may dispose of the motion summarily"). 

In addition, we agree that AirFX LLC has failed to state a claim on counts three and

four. Under Arizona law, the elements of tortious interference with a business relationship

are

(1) The existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy;

(2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer;

(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the

relationship or expectancy; and

(4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been

disrupted.

Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 386, 710 P.2d 1025, 1041 (1985)

(superceded by statute in other respects). The interference must be improper as well as

intentional. Id. at 387-88, 710 P.2d at 1042-43. Here, AirFX LLC is alleging that Lurie's

purchase of the airfx.com domain name, despite knowing that AirFX was a registered

trademark, interfered with AirFX LLC's business interest in obtaining the same domain

name. AirFX LLC has not identified the existence of a valid contractual relationship

between it and a third party. And AirFX LLC has not alleged that it had a valid business

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expectancy with a third party. "Although the tort of tortious interference with a business

expectancy covers situations that the tort of intentional interference with a contract does not,

the former has only been available in those situations where the plaintiff can identify the

specific relationship with which the defendant interfered." Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406,

414, 167 P.3d 93, 101 (Ct. App. 2007). General allegations that Lurie interfered with a

business interest that AirFX LLC has in obtaining the airfx.com domain name are insufficient

to state a claim.

To prevail on an abuse of process claim, AirFX LLC must show "(1) a willful act in

the use of judicial process; (2) for an ulterior purpose not proper in the regular conduct of the

proceedings." Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 353, 651 P.2d 876, 881 (Ct. App. 1982).

 AirFX LLC alleges that Lurie and AIRFX.com have abused the litigation process. This

generalized allegation cannot support an abuse of process claim. See Crackel v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 208 Ariz. 252, 258, 92 P.3d 882, 888 (Ct. App. 2004) (claim "must be based on

something more than the opposing party's mere persistence in the litigation"). The only

specific action AirFX LLC identifies as improper is the filing of the complaint. But abuse

of process requires an act "beyond the initiation of a lawsuit." Joseph v. Markovitz, 27 Ariz.

App. 122, 126, 551 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1976). And AirFX LLC's allegation that Lurie

improperly filed a trademark application does not even involve the use of judicial process.

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiffs'/counterclaimants' AIRFX.com and Marc

Lurie's partial motion to dismiss (doc. 33). AirFX LLC's counterclaims for intentional

interference with prospective economic/contractual advantage (count three) and abuse of

process (count four) against plaintiffs/counterclaimants AIRFX.com and Marc Lurie are

dismissed.

DATED this 28th day of December, 2011.

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