Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00850/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE McCREE, #177502, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-850-TMH

) [WO]

)

JACK A. BLUMENFIELD, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Willie McCree [“McCree”], a state inmate, complains 

his appointed attorney, Jack A. Blumenfield, provided ineffective assistance during

proceedings related to a 2008 conviction imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Houston

County, Alabama. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 2-3. McCree seeks

declaratory relief and modification of his sentence. Id. at 4. McCree names Mr. Blumenfield

and the Public Defendant Office as defendants in this cause of action. 

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this case prior to

service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).1

 The court granted McCree leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this civil action. Order of October 12,

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2011 - Court Doc. No. 3. A prisoner allowed to proceed in forma pauperis will have his complaint screened under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) which requires this court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if

it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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 II. DISCUSSION

A. The Claims Against Jack A. Blumenfield

McCree complains Jack A. Blumenfield, the attorney appointed to represent him on

a criminal charge before the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, deprived him of

effective assistance in violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court

Doc. No. 1 at 2-3. Specifically, McCree alleges “Mr. Jack Blumenfield ... misled me the

whole time he was appointed to me. On May 21, 2008 [before the Circuit Court of Houston

County,] Mr. Jack Blumenfield had me to copp out to a life sentence [and] never tried to put

up a defense fight for me. He never came to me with a decent plea.... I got a life sentence

because of his lack of reviewing my case....” Id. In accordance with applicable federal law,

the allegations presented in the complaint against Mr. Blumenfield entitle McCree to no

relief in this cause of action.

An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is that a person acting under color

of state law committed the asserted constitutional deprivation. American Manufacturers

Mutual Ins. Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999);

Willis v. University Health Services, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11 Cir. 1993). th

To state a [viable] claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [a

plaintiff] must establish that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was

committed under color of state law.... [T]he under-color-of-state-law element

of § 1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful,’” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct.

2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68

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S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)).... [Consequently,] state action requires both

an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or

privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or

by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and that “the party charged

with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state

actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73

L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98

S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).” 

American Manufacturers, 526 U.S. at 49-50, 119 S.Ct. at 985 (footnote omitted) (emphasis

in original). 

The law is well settled that an attorney who represents an accused in criminal

proceedings does not act under color of state law. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312

(1981); Mills v. Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5 Cir. 1988) (“[P]rivate th

attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors and ... are not subject

to suit under section 1983.”). Since the conduct about which McCree complains was not

committed by a person acting under color of state law, the claims of ineffective assistance

asserted against defendant Blumenfield are frivolous as such claims lack an arguable basis

in law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In light of the foregoing, the 2

plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendant Blumenfield with respect to the

assistance he provided in state criminal proceedings are due to be summarily dismissed in

accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

 Although Neitzke interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2), the

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analysis contained therein remains applicable to the directives contained in the present statute.

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B. The Public Defendant Office

The office of a public defender is not a legal entity subject to suit or liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11 Cir. 1992). Moreover, as

th

previously stated, a public defender is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983. Mills,

837 F.2d at 679. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims lodged against the Public Defendant Office are

likewise subject to summary dismissal. Id. 

C. The Challenges to Plaintiff’s 2008 Conviction

To the extent the claims set forth by McCree challenge the validity of a 2008 

conviction/sentence imposed upon him pursuant to his guilty plea by the Circuit Court of

Houston County, Alabama, these claims presently provide no basis for relief in this cause of

action. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages challenging the legality of

a prisoner’s conviction or sentence is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “unless and

until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant

of a writ of habeas corpus” and complaints containing such claims must therefore be

dismissed. 512 U.S. at 483-489. Under Heck, the relevant inquiry is “whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 

512 U.S. at 487. The Court emphasized that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a

... prisoner who challenges” a conviction or sentence, “even though such a claim may come

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within the literal terms of § 1983” and, based on the foregoing, concluded that Heck’s

complaint was due to be dismissed as no cause of action existed under section 1983. 512

U.S. at 481. In so doing, the Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning that a section 1983

action should be construed as a habeas corpus action. 

In Balisok, the Court concluded that a state prisoner’s “claim[s] for declaratory [or

injunctive] relief and money damages, ... that necessarily imply the invalidity of the

punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983 ...” unless the prisoner can demonstrate

that the challenged action has previously been invalidated. 520 U.S. at 648. Moreover, the

Court determined that this is true not only when a prisoner challenges the judgment as a

substantive matter but also when “the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such

as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment.” Id. at 645. The Court reiterated the

position previously taken in Heck that the “sole remedy in federal court” for a prisoner

challenging the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence is a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645. Additionally, the Court “reemphasize[d] ... that a claim

either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable

and should be dismissed.” Id. at 649. 

The ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the instant complaint implicate

the constitutionality of a conviction and resulting sentence imposed upon the plaintiff by the

Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama. A judgment in favor of McCree on these claims

would necessarily imply the invalidity of this conviction and sentence. It is clear from the

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complaint that the conviction and sentence from which McCree’s claims arise have not been

invalidated in appropriate proceedings. Consequently, any collateral attack under § 1983 on

the conviction and sentence imposed upon McCree is prohibited and subject to summary

dismissal by this court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Balisok,

520 U.S. at 645; Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-490. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims against the defendants be dismissed with prejudice prior to

service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

2. To the extent the complaint presents claims which challenge the constitutionality

of a 2008 conviction and sentence imposed upon the plaintiff by the Circuit Court of Houston

County, Alabama, the complaint be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as such claims are not properly before the court at this time. 

3. This case be dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the directives

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before October 28, 2011, the parties mayfile objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

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that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 14 day of October, 2011.

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/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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