Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00096/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00096-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BEN TAVAKOLI, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CBS OUTDOOR INC. and DOES 1-10, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-07-0096 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

 Plaintiff Ben Tavakoli brings this claim against 

defendant CBS Outdoor Inc. to invalidate a lease for defendant’s 

billboard on plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff argues that the 

lease and an addendum are unenforceable and that the addendum 

should be cancelled. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all 

claims. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the motion 

to dismiss. 

I. 

 In May 1993, defendant’s predecessor-in-interest, National 

Advertising Company, entered into a written lease with Fred 

Case 2:07-cv-00096-JAM-EFB Document 11 Filed 07/10/07 Page 1 of 7
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Cullincini Sr. for the operation and maintenance of an outdoor 

advertising sign on Cullincini’s property along Highway 99 in 

Stockton, California.1 The lease had an initial term of ten 

years, was renewable at the option of the lessee for a second 

term of ten years, and thereafter ran year-to-year. 

On an unspecified date before February 1997, Cullincini 

died. In October 2006, Maxwell and Maria Burton purchased the 

property from Cullincini’s heirs. The same month, the Burtons 

signed an addendum to the 1993 billboard lease, extending the 

lease 20 years and establishing new rent rates. In December 

2006, plaintiff purchased the property from the Burtons. 

Defendant provided plaintiff a copy of the lease and addendum 

“at or near the time of purchase.” 

Plaintiff alleges that the addendum should be cancelled 

because (1) the underlying lease expired before the addendum was 

signed; (2) plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest did not 

accept the terms of the lease or approve the assignment of the 

lease to defendant from its predecessor-in-interest; (3) 

defendant did not submit a probate claim regarding the lease 

following the original lessor’s death; (4) the billboard lacks 

necessary government approval; (5) the billboard is a nuisance; 

 

1

 Plaintiff attached the lease and addendum to his complaint. 

The court considers these documents as part of the complaint for 

purposes of defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Knievel v. ESPN, 

393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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and (6) plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest signed the addendum 

based upon a mistaken belief that the underlying lease was 

valid. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and cancellation of 

the addendum. Defendant now moves to dismiss all claims or, in 

the alternative, for a more definite statement. 

II. 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to avoid 

dismissal a plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1960 (2007). The court “must accept 

as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), but 

need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters 

properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,” see Sprewell 

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 

or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 

legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff claims as to the 

unenforceability of the lease and addendum are discussed 

individually below. 

First, plaintiff argues that the underlying lease expired 

before the addendum was signed. Plaintiff assumes that the 

lease only ran from May 6, 1993 for two ten-year terms. The 

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lease, however, states that following the second ten-year term, 

it runs “from year to year, on the same terms.” The lease does 

not prescribe a specific manner for acceptance, so the lessee 

may employ any mode. Cal. Civ. Code § 1582. Plaintiff does not 

dispute that defendant continued to pay rent according to the 

lease’s terms and maintained the billboard after May 6, 2003. 

These actions are sufficient to constitute acceptance of the 

lease’s year-to-year option. Id. at § 1584. Therefore, 

plaintiff fails to state a claim as to the expiration of the 

lease. 

Second, plaintiff argues that neither the Burtons nor 

plaintiff accepted the terms of the lease or approved the 

lease’s assignment from defendant’s predecessor-in-interest to 

defendant. The lease, however, specifically states that it 

binds all successors and assigns. As successive owners of the 

property, the Burtons and plaintiff did not need to accept the 

terms of the lease to be bound by it. Hudson Oil Co. v. 

Shortstop, 111 Cal.App.3d 488, 496 (1980) (“The use of the 

general [binding upon successors] language evinces an intent to 

burden with the restriction all successors in interest of the 

[original owners], including successive owners.”). Moreover, 

plaintiff provides no authority or lease language requiring 

approval by the lessor for an assignment of the lease by the 

original lessee. The lease requires the lessor to notify the 

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lessee of any change in ownership of the property and to notify 

the new owner of the lease. Contrary to plaintiff’s claim, the 

lease requires nothing of an assigning lessee. 

Third, plaintiff argues that defendant’s predecessor-ininterest never submitted a probate claim regarding the lease 

after Cullincini, the original lessor, died. According to the 

terms of the lease attached to the complaint, however, no 

probate claim was necessary. See Wright v. Superior Court, 85 

Cal.App.2d 151, 153-54 (1948) (holding a probate claim to be 

unnecessary when a party does not make a legal demand for money 

to be paid out of the estate). The original parties agreed that 

the lease “shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the 

parties hereto and to their respective tenants, heirs, 

successors, personal representatives, executors, administrators, 

and assigns.” Under its terms, the lease became binding upon 

Cullincini’s heirs upon his death. 

Fourth, plaintiff argues that the lease is invalid because 

the billboard lacks appropriate government approval. Plaintiff 

alleges no factual basis to support the claim that the billboard 

does not comply with government standards. Pleading legal 

conclusions is not sufficient to avoid dismissal on a 12(b)(6) 

motion. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 

(9th Cir. 1981). 

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Fifth, plaintiff argues that the lease is invalid because 

it is a nuisance. As with plaintiff’s government approval 

claim, the argument is a legal conclusion lacking factual 

support in the complaint or opposition. On a motion to dismiss, 

the court does not “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely 

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624. 

Sixth, plaintiff argues that predecessor-in-interest Burton 

signed the addendum based upon the mistaken belief that the 

underlying lease was valid.2

 However, as discussed above, 

plaintiff’s factual allegations, when considered in light of the 

documents attached to the complaint, cannot sustain a finding 

that the underlying lease was invalid at the time of the 

addendum’s signing. See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (holding that 

the court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by 

attached exhibits). Therefore, the factual predicate to 

Burton’s alleged mistake does not exist. 

 

2

 The court does not consider the declaration of Maxwell 

Burton attached to plaintiff’s opposition. The declaration is 

neither signed nor dated. See 28 U.S.C. 1746. 

 

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Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 

declaratory relief or cancellation of the addendum, the court 

GRANTS the motion to dismiss.3 

III. 

For the reasons above, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s 

claims as to the enforceability of the lease and addendum. The 

court GRANTS plaintiff twenty-one days to amend the complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2007. 

s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

 

3

 Plaintiff argues in his opposition that the lease is an 

illusory contract. Although plaintiff attached a copy of the 

lease to the complaint, he did not raise the illusory contract 

argument in the original pleading. Merely attaching a document 

to a complaint does not give plaintiff the right to raise new 

arguments concerning the document’s language at any point. To 

challenge the lease as an illusory contract, plaintiff must 

amend the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 

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