Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01339/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01339-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Isiah Romont Hill,

Petitioner, 

vs.

William White, et al.,

Respondents.

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No. CV-10-1339-PHX-PGR (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docs. 1, 7) Respondents have filed an Answer, doc.

30, to which Petitioner has replied, doc. 32. Petitioner has also filed several other motions

seeking default judgment and summary judgment. (Docs. 33-35, 37-39, 41) For the reasons

set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition and related motions be denied. 

I. Background

A. Charges, Plea and Sentencing

 On October 6, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in the Arizona Superior Court,

Maricopa County on over 80 counts of various criminal offenses pertaining to a prostitution

enterprise: Conspiracy, a class 3 felony (Counts 1, 81); Illegal control of an enterprise, a

class 2 felony (Counts 3-4); Illegal control of an enterprise, a class 3 felony (Counts 2-8);

Attempted illegal control of an enterprise, a class 3 felony (Counts 5-6); Operating or

maintaining a house of prostitution, a class 5 felony (Count 9); Attempted pandering, a class

6 felony (Counts, 11, 52); Kidnapping, a class 2 felony (Count 12); Sexual Assault, a class 2

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 1 The Honorable Thomas O’Toole presided. 

 2 The Honorable Michael D. Hintze presided for Barbara Spencer. 

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felony (Count 13); Attempted child prostitution, a class 3 felony (Counts 14, 35, 51, 80);

Sexual abuse, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children (Count 15); Use of wire

communication for electronic communication in drug related transactions, a class 4 felony

(Counts 18-23, 26, 29-30, 33, 36-39, 41-50, 53-74, 76, 79); Child prostitution, a class 2

felony (Count 24); Threatening or intimidating, a class 4 felony (Counts 27-28);

Transporting persons for purposes of prostitution, a class 5 felony (Count 34); Pandering, a

class 5 felony (Count 75); Operating/maintaining a house of prostitution, a class 1

misdemeanor (Count 77). (Respondents’ Exh. B) All of the offenses were alleged to have

occurred between November 15, 2004 and October 6, 2006. (Id.) 

On November 27, 2006, the State amended the indictment to allege Petitioner’s

prior felony convictions for aggravated assault-serious physical injury, a class 6 felony;

conspiracy to commit transportation and/or sell narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony; and

aggravated assault-serious physical injury, a class 3 felony. (Respondents’ Exh. C) 

On February 17, 2007, Petitioner’s counsel, Christopher Winchell, moved to

suppress evidence obtained by wiretaps. (Respondents’ Exhs. O, P, Q, R, S, T) After

hearing argument on the suppression issue, the court1

 denied the motion to suppress the

wiretap evidence. (Respondents’ Exh. U) 

On May 2, 2007, defense counsel filed a motion for a competency evaluation

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 11. (Respondents’ Exh. V) After a Rule 11 evaluation, the

court2

 found Petitioner criminally incompetent pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4510, and ordered

him committed to the Maricopa County Correctional Health Services Restoration Program

for treatment to restore competency. (Respondents’ Exh. W) On August 9, 2007, the

Honorable Barbara Spencer found that Petitioner had been restored to competency and

transferred the matter back to Judge O’Toole for further proceedings. (Respondents’ Exh.

X) 

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On November 9, 2007, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to a written

plea agreement, to the following offenses: two counts of conspiracy to illegally control an

enterprise, a class 2 felony with one prior felony conviction (Counts 3, 4); one count of

unlawful use of a wire or electronic communication, a class 4 felony with one prior felony

conviction (Count 67), one count of conspiracy to commit burglary, a class 3 felony with

one prior felony conviction (Count 81); one count of kidnapping, a class 2 felony (Count

12); one count of illegal control of an enterprise, a class 3 felony (Count 2); one count of

attempted child prostitution, a class 3 felony (Count 35), and one count of pandering, a class

5 felony (Count 75). (Respondents’ Exhs. D, E, Y) In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty

pleas, the State dismissed Counts 1, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19-30, 33, 34, 36-39, 41-66, 68-

74, 76, 77, 79, 80. (Respondents’ Exh. D) As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed

that Petitioner would be sentenced to the Arizona Department of Corrections for concurrent

terms between 14 and 16 years on Counts 3, 4, 67 and 81. The parties also agreed that on

Counts 2, 12, 35, and 75, Petitioner would be placed on concurrent terms of supervised

probation to begin upon his physical release from prison. (Respondents’ Exhs. D, E) 

On December 13, 2007, the Honorable Thomas O’Toole sentenced Petitioner to

aggravated terms of 16 years’ imprisonment on Counts 3, 4 and 81; and 6 years’

imprisonment on Count 67, to run concurrently. On Counts 2, 12, 35, and 75, the court

ordered Petitioner to serve five years of supervised probation, to run concurrently upon his

physical release from the Arizona Department of Corrections. (Respondents’ Exh. F) The

sentences were consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. (Respondents’ Exhs. D, E,

Y) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On October 16, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, asserting the following claims:

1. Law enforcement, without evidence or court authorization, placed a pen

trap/trace on Petitioner’s phone, and later used that illegally obtained 

information to establish probable cause to obtain a court-ordered wiretap

for Petitioner’s phone.

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 3 Before pursuing post-conviction relief in the Maricopa Superior Court, Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Pinal County Superior Court. (Doc. 1 at 32) The Pinal

County court denied the petition and transferred the matter to Maricopa County to be treated

as a motion for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 33) Petitioner appealed the denial of his state

petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two. On February

10, 2010, the appellate court denied relief. (Doc. 1 at 32-36) 

 4 The Honorable Warren J. Granville.

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2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately challenge “any

search warrant applications,” and counsel’s ineffective assistance resulted

in Petitioner’s unknowing, unintelligent guilty plea.

3. Prosecutorial misconduct and vindictive prosecution arising of the

prosecutor’s knowledge that police had conducted illegal electronic 

surveillance of Petitioner’s phone, and that the subsequent application for 

a wiretap was based on illegal surveillance.

4. Inadequate pre-trial discovery that did not pertain to trap/trace order 

or information related to the “pen trap/trace application/warrant for DNA/

arrest warrants or warrant for GPS systems.”

5. Affidavit in support of search warrant was defective “on its face/and

incomplete,” and included “stale information.”

6. Petitioner was denied any Brady discovery.

7. Petitioner was denied the right to be sentenced based on accurate

information.

(Respondents’ Exh. G)3

 

After the motion was fully briefed, on January 12, 2009, the trial court4

dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief finding that:

In his colloquy, at his change of plea, [Petitioner] advised Judge O’Toole

that he read and understood his plea agreement. Paragraph 6 of the plea

agreement states that [Petitioner] “waives and gives up any and all motions,

defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could

assert hereafter[.”] Thus, [Petitioner] knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived all but his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

[Petitioner’s] ineffective assistance of counsel clam stems from his trial

counsel’s losing a wiretap suppression motion. Such a claim meets neither

prong of Strickland. 

In his reply, [Petitioner] argues that he was not competent to plead guilty. 

In fact, [Petitioner] had been found competent. Moreover, after a lengthy

change of plea colloquy, Judge O’Toole found that [Petitioner’s] plea 

was knowingly and intelligently made. 

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 5 The Petition, filed June 25, 2010, included four grounds for relief. (Doc. 1) On July 19,

2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint to add Ground Five. (Doc. 7) On

September 1, 2010, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion and deemed that Ground Five asserted

in docket 7 be Ground Five of the Petition. (Doc. 9 at 2, 4-5) 

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(Respondents’ Exh. J) 

On February 6, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals which omitted his claim that he was denied the right to be sentenced based on

accurate information, but otherwise raised the same claims he had asserted in his petition for

post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. K) After the matter was fully briefed, on March

11, 2010, the Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Respondents’ Exhs. L, M, N)

Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review in June 2010. (Doc. 1 at 5) 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Thereafter, on June 25, 2010, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus asserting the following five grounds for relief:5

Ground One: Prosecutorial misconduct/vindictive prosecution because the

prosecution obtained a grand jury indictment on the basis of evidence that 

was obtained by illegal electronic surveillance. Thus, the grand jury 

indictment is void and, therefore, all actions of the trial court are invalid.

Ground Two: Petitioner was, and is, mentally incompetent. The doctor’s

report finding that he had been restored to competency illegally placed 

Petitioner “back in the criminal court.” 

Ground Three: Petitioner “was never advised [of] his constitutional rights

he had [and] would forego by entering a plea bargain.” Petitioner “was

never advised he had the right not to plead guilty/the right to go to trial/

and he would be waiving all defenses/motions/objections/Blakely . . . .” 

Ground Four: The Arizona Court of Appeals found the facts and grounds

“cognizable” and referred to “the offenses as alleged offenses because they

had been predicated on illegal [wire] taps and render[ed] void his conviction

and sentence.” Petitioner further alleges the “Court of Appeals ordered the

[Attorney] General to chall[en]ge these facts. The [Attorney General’s] 

Office refused to [involve] itself with this: State agree[]d/co[n]ceded:

prosecutor misconduct, vindictive prosecution” and therefore the “State has

precluded itself and waived chall[en]ge to Petitioner (release)/facts.” 

Ground Five: Trial counsel was ineffective which resulted in an “involuntary/

unintelligent plea of guilty” where the conviction was based on illegally 

obtained evidence. 

(Docs. 1, 7) 

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Respondents concede that the Petition is timely filed in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. 30 at 11) Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed

because Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted and barred from habeas corpus

review or lack merit. (Doc. 30) Petitioner opposes Respondents’ assertion. (Doc. 32) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the merits of a claim

which has been exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842,

(1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal

habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of

the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally

correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer,

395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in cases arising in

Arizona in which the sentence imposed is not a capital sentence, the “highest court”

requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, either on direct appeal or on post-conviction review. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Paige v. Schriro, 648 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1168-69

(D.Ariz. 2009); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925, 932 (D.Ariz. 2007).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still

has the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available when a

petitioner files a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, it is satisfied if the petitioner is

procedurally barred from pursuing his or her claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. If the habeas petitioner’s claim is

procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See Woodford, 548 U.S. 81.

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The Ninth Circuit recognizes two types of procedural bar: express and implied.

An express procedural bar occurs when the petitioner has presented his claim to the state

courts and the state courts have relied on a state procedural rule to deny or dismiss the claim.

An implied procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Where a petitioner’s claims are procedural defaulted, habeas corpus review is

barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice resulting

therefrom or that a failure to consider the defaulted claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). 

II. Analysis

A. Ground One 

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts a claim of prosecutorial misconduct/vindictive

prosecution based on the State’s reliance on illegal wiretap evidence to obtain an indictment. 

He claims that, because the wiretap evidence was obtained illegally, the indictment which

was based on that evidence was void and, in turn, any actions of the trial court were also

void. Citing the language of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, 32.4, and 32.0,

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground One are procedurally

defaulted because those claims were “waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral

proceeding.” (Doc. 30 at 19) To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must describe both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory so that the state courts have a “fair opportunity”

to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Kelly

v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). In cases not carrying the death penalty,

claims are exhausted once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. See Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999). Respondents Answer does not fully explain

their procedural bar argument, but merely cites Arizona law related to post-conviction

proceedings and some general principles regarding exhaustion. (Doc. 30 at 19) Moreover,

Respondents do not properly apply these principles to the circumstances of this case. 

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28 6

 The Honorable Warren J. Granville presided. 

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Significantly, Respondents do not mention, in their discussion of Ground One, that

Petitioner presented the claims asserted in Ground One to the trial court and appellate court

on post-conviction review, which is sufficient to fairly present a claim for purposes of

exhaustion. Respondents argue in the alternative that Petitioner is precluded from raising his

claims asserted in Ground One pursuant to Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

The Court finds the Respondents’ alternate argument well taken. Accordingly, the Court

does not reach the issue of procedural bar.

The record reflects that Petitioner presented the claims asserted in Ground One to

the trial court on post-conviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. G) Petitioner presented

“Claim Three” entitled “prosecutor misconduct/vindictive prosecution/malicious

prosecution.” (Respondents’ Exh. G at 5) Although the title of Petitioner’s claim three

referred to vindictive prosecution, the argument pertaining to Claim Three challenged the

authority of police to conduct electronic surveillance of his telephone. (Respondents’ Exh.

G at 5) Petitioner argued that the application presented to Judge Keppel was a “fraud.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. G at 5-6) Petitioner further argued that the “County Atty (sic) Office”

was aware the application for the wiretaps did not comply with Arizona law. (Id. at 6)

Petitioner did not include any other arguments pertaining to his claim of vindictive

prosecution. 

The trial court6

 found that, with the exception of a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, Petitioner waived all of the claims asserted in his petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to his plea agreement which provided that defendant “waives and gives up

any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could

assert hereafter.” (Respondents’ Exh. J) The post-conviction court did not specifically

address each claim. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. K, N) Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s determination

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was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, federal law. Accordingly, he is

not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground One. 

Aside from a challenge to the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea

itself, the entry of a guilty plea on advice of counsel generally forecloses all collateral

attacks with the exception of jurisdictional claims. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-67 (1973)

(“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of

the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating

to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”);

see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (stating that a guilty plea forecloses

consideration of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700

(9th Cir.1994) (as amended) (foreclosing pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claim);

Mitchell v. Superior Court, 632 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that “as a general rule,

one who has voluntarily and intelligently pled guilty to a criminal charge may not

subsequently seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations.”).

Pre-plea error is “jurisdictional,” when it implicates the government’s power to

prosecute the defendant. United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1019 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1999);

see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1989). For example, Tollett does not

foreclose a claim that: a defendant was vindictively prosecuted, Blackledge v. Perry, 417

U.S. 21, 30-31; the indictment under which a defendant pled guilty placed him in double

jeopardy, Menna v. New York, 432 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per curiam); or the statute under

which the defendant was indicted is unconstitutional or unconstitutionally vague on its face,

United States v. Garcia-Valenzuela, 232 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, in Ground One, Petitioner contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct/

vindictive prosecution by presenting to the grand jury wiretap evidence that was obtained in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. He further argues that this conduct rendered the grand

jury proceeding void and deprived the court of jurisdiction. The post-conviction court found

that Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct/vindictive prosecution were waived

pursuant to his plea agreement which specifically provided that Petitioner “waives and gives

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up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or

could assert hereafter.” (Respondents’ Exh. J) The State court’s decision is not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Review of the petition

for post-conviction relief reveals that, although Petitioner used the terms “prosecutor

misconduct/vindictive prosecution/malicious prosecution,” the core of his argument was that

the electronic surveillance and wiretaps were obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 5-6). The Supreme Court has held that, for purposes

of federal habeas corpus review, alleged Fourth Amendment violations do not affect the

validity of the guilty plea or conviction. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983)

(“[W]hen a defendant is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a trial, the validity

of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged Fourth Amendment violation because the

conviction does not rest in any way on the evidence that may have been improperly

seized.”). Accordingly, habeas corpus claims based on Fourth Amendment violations are

barred under Tollett by virtue of the petitioner’s guilty plea. See, e.g., Ortberg v. Moody, 961

F.2d 135, 136-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (guilty plea barred habeas consideration of claims

alleging, among other things, an unlawful search). Here, Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial

misconduct/vindictive prosecution, was based on his assertion that the wiretap evidence was

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Petitioner merely used the term

vindictive prosecution, but then discussed the propriety of the application for the wiretaps.

In view of Petitioner’s emphasis on the legality of the wiretaps, which amount to a Fourth

Amendment claim, the State court’s determination that Petitioner’s claim was waived by the

plea agreement is not an unreasonable application of federal law.

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim of vindictive prosecution/prosecutorial misconduct

lacks merit. The government has broad discretion to initiate, conduct or delay criminal

prosecutions. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Bordenkircher v.

Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir.

1985). Federal courts may review a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, however, and grant

relief if the decision was based on an unconstitutional motive. See Wade v. United States,

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504 U.S. 181, 184-86 (1992); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982);

Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. Vindictive prosecution occurs when a prosecutor ‘brings

additional charges solely to punish the defendant for exercising a constitutional or statutory

right,’ such as a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial.” United States v. Doran, 182 F.3d

1077, 1082 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir.

1996)). 

“To establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must

show either direct evidence of actual vindictiveness or facts that warrant an appearance of

such.” United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1299 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n. 12 (suggesting that “a

defendant might prove through objective evidence an improper prosecutorial motive” in

order to establish a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,

27-29 (1974) (holding that vindictiveness could be presumed where prosecutors brought

additional charges after a defendant appealed his conviction). If the defendant provides

“[e]vidence indicating a realistic or reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness” this “give[s]

rise to a presumption of vindictiveness on the government’s part.” United States v.

Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir.1993) (citation omitted); see Blackledge, 417 U.S.

at 27. To obtain relief based on the presumption, a petitioner must present something more

than generalized allegations about the prosecutor’s improper motive. See Wade, 504 U.S. at

186; United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.1982). 

The burden then shifts to the prosecution to show that “‘independent reasons or

intervening circumstances dispel the appearance of vindictiveness and justify its decisions.’”

Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1299 (quoting United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 633 (9th

Cir.1981)); see Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374, 102 S.Ct. 2485 (suggesting that a presumption of

vindictiveness “may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying” an

official’s conduct).

The Supreme Court has noted that courts should rarely apply a presumption of

vindictiveness to a prosecutor’s pretrial decisions because a “prosecutor should remain free

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before trial to exercise [that] broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the

societal interest in prosecution.” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382. Additionally, “[o]rdinarily,

[courts] presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties.” Banks

v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (citations omitted). As such, where a defendant

contends that a prosecutor made a charging decision in violation of the Constitution, the

defendant’s “standard [of proof] is a demanding one.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.

456, 463 (1996).

Petitioner has provided no evidence of actual vindictiveness, or facts that create

the appearance of vindictiveness. Moreover, Petitioner fails to identify either a constitutional

or statutory right, the exercise of which motivated the prosecutor to prosecute him. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of vindictive prosecution lacks merit. 

 Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct/vindictive prosecution is based on

allegedly illegal electronic surveillance of Petitioner’s phone upon which law enforcement

relied to obtain a wiretap, and upon which the prosecutor relied to obtain an indictment. 

During the underlying criminal proceedings, Petitioner raised a Fourth Amendment

challenge to the wiretap evidence which was denied after briefing and oral argument. The

pending habeas corpus proceeding is not an appropriate vehicle for Petitioner to relitigate

the Fourth Amendment issue. 

When the state provides an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth

Amendment claim at trial and on direct review, the federal court will not grant habeas

corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained through unconstitutional search or seizure

was introduced at his trial. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), r’hrg denied, 429

U.S. 874; Mitchell v. Goldsmith, 878 F.2d 319, 323 (9th Cir. 1989); Caldwell v. Cupp, 781

F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986). Stone only requires the initial opportunity for a full and fair

hearing. Caldwell, 781 F.2d at 715. “Such an opportunity for a fair hearing forecloses this

court’s inquiry, upon habeas corpus petition, into the trial court's subsequent course of

action.” Caldwell, 781 F.2d at 715.

The record reflects that the State provided an opportunity for full and fair

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 The Honorable Thomas O’Toole. 

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litigation of Petitioner’s claim that the wiretaps violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Petitioner’s counsel moved to suppress the evidence and was granted leave to amend that

motion to include additional information. (Respondents’ Exhs. O, P, T, U) After the motion

was fully briefed, the trial court7

 conducted a suppression hearing at which it considered oral

argument. (Respondents’ Exh. U) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the

motion. (Respondents’ Exh. U) 

Petitioner also had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue on postconviction review. Because Petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment

claim, that claim is not cognizable on habeas corpus review. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez,

81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claims

asserted in Ground One. 

B. Grounds Two and Three

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he was, and is mentally, incompetent and

that the doctor’s report finding him restored to competency illegally placed him back in

criminal court. (Doc. 1 at 7) In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that he was never advised

of his constitutional rights and the rights he would forego by entering a guilty plea. He

further alleges he was not advised that, by entering a guilty plea, he would waive all

“defenses, motions, objections.” (Doc. 1 at 8, 27) 

As Respondents argue, Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground Two and Three are

procedurally barred. The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the merits of

a claim which has been exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842;

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must

afford the state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the

claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille, 489

at 351; Rose, 395 F.3d at 1110. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in

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cases arising in Arizona in which the sentence imposed is not a capital sentence, the “highest

court” requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal or on post-conviction review. See Swoopes, 196 at

1010. See also Paige v. Schriro, 648 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.Ariz. 2009); Crowell v.

Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925, 932 (D.Ariz. 2007). 

In this case, the record reflects that Petitioner did not present his claims asserted

in Grounds Two and Three on post-conviction review. (doc. 30 at 20; Respondents’ Exhs.

G, J) Petitioner’s claims raised in Grounds Two and Three are technically exhausted and

procedurally barred, because a return to state court to present those claims would be futile as

they are procedurally barred under Arizona law. Petitioner is time-barred from raising these

claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for filing a notice

of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for

post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct

appeal, whichever is later.”). Additionally, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, a defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been

raised on direct appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. See State v. Curtis, 185

Ariz. 112, 113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded from

seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been raised

and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State v.

Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant’s claim

that his sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by

defendant’s failure to raise issue on appeal). 

Because Grounds Two and Three are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas

corpus review of those claim is barred absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” To establish “cause,”a petitioner must establish that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-492 (1986). The following

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objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual harm that results from the

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Where petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

Petitioner offers no arguments to overcome the procedural bar. (Doc. 32) 

Petitioner’s status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for his

failure to fairly present his claims to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that an illiterate pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that petitioner’s arguments

concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause.) 

Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show that failure to consider the defaulted

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court will only review a

procedurally defaulted habeas claim on the merits if petitioner demonstrates that failure to

consider the merits of the claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298

(1995). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies to a “narrow class of

cases” in which a petitioner makes an extraordinary showing that an innocent person was

probably convicted because of a constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 231. 

Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that a “constitutional violation has resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 327. To establish the `requisite

probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

at 324, 327. New evidence presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice

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claim may include “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or

critical physical evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell,

547 U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must

involve evidence that the trial jury did not have before it).

Petitioner has not offered any new evidence, or asserted that, in light of any

newly discovered evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. 

Because Petitioner has not established any basis to excuse his procedural default,

Grounds Two and Three are barred from federal habeas corpus review.

C. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals found the

facts and grounds “cognizable” and referred to “the offenses as alleged offenses because

they had been predicated on illegal [wire]taps and render[ed] void his conviction and

sentence.” (Doc. 1 at 9, 28) Petitioner further alleges that the “Court of Appeals ordered

the Att[orne]y General to chall[en]ge these facts. The [Attorney General’s] Office refused

to [involve] itself with this: State agree[]d/co[n]ceded: prosecutor misconduct, vindictive

prosecution/malicious prosecution” and therefore the “State has precluded itself and waived

chall[en]ge to Petitioner (release)/facts.” (Doc. 1 at 29) 

As Respondents argue, Ground Four does not present a claim that is cognizable

on federal habeas corpus review. Petitioner’s argument in Ground Four refers to the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the Pinal County Superior Court’s denial of

his State petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1 at 32-36) The appellate court affirmed

the Pinal County Superior Court’s transfer of Petitioner’s state petition for writ of habeas

corpus to the Maricopa County Superior Court, to be treated as a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Doc. 1 at 32-35) In its decision, the appellate court

stated:

Although [Petitioner] has attempted to characterize his claim as relating

to the convicting court’s jurisdiction, his claims only relate to the 

regularity of the proceedings against him — the evidence used to indict

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him, his competency at the time he entered his change of plea, and his 

ultimate claim that his convictions and sentences are void. Therefore,

the trial court properly concluded his claims “relate[d] to the conduct

in the court proceedings that le[d] to his incarceration” and that it was 

required, pursuant to Rule 32.3, to “transfer the matter to the Court in 

which the convictions occurred.” 

Because [Petitioner] has not established that he was entitled to habeas

corpus relief and only raised claims properly cognizable under Rule 32, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief and subsequent transfer of

[Petitioner’s] petition to the Maricopa County Superior Court. 

(Doc. 1 at 34-35) (emphasis added). In the pending motion, Petitioner interprets the

appellate court’s use of the term “cognizable” to mean that his claims have merit. Petitioner

argues that, because the Arizona Court of Appeals found his claims “cognizable,” he is

entitled to habeas corpus relief and Respondents are precluded from challenging his claims. 

Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, in the context to the appellate court’s decision, the word

cognizable only meant that a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32 was the proper vehicle for Petitioner’s claims. See F.D.I.C. v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (stating that “[c]ognizable ordinarily means “[c]apable of

being tried or examined before a designated tribunal; within [the] jurisdiction of [a] court or

power given to [a] court to adjudicate [a] controversy.”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

259 (6th ed. 1990)). 

Moreover, Ground Four does not assert a federal claim. A state prisoner can

obtain federal habeas relief only if he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the

laws and treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119 (1982). Federal habeas relief does not lie for alleged violations of state law or

procedure or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 67-68 (1991); Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Because Ground Four does not present a federal claim, it is not cognizable on federal habeas

corpus review. 

D. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective and that

ineffective assistance resulted in Petitioner entering into an “involuntary/unintelligent plea

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of guilty” because the “conviction was based on illegally obtained evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 17) 

Petitioner presented this claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, and in his petition

for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, as Respondents concede, this

claim is properly before the Court on federal habeas corpus review. 

The post-conviction court denied relief on this claim finding that Petitioner’s

“ineffective assistance of counsel claim stems from his trial counsel’s losing a wiretap

suppression motion. Such a claim meets neither prong of Strickland.” (Respondents’ Exh. J

at 3) The Arizona Court of Appeals also found that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on

this claim, summarily denying review of the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. N) 

As set forth below, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

1. Background Relevant to Ground Five

On February 17, 2007, defense counsel Christopher Winchell filed a “Motion to

Suppress Wiretaps/Request for Hearing,” arguing that: (1) the State’s applications for the

wiretap were based on stale information; (2) the State had not satisfied the necessity

requirement; and (3) the State lacked probable cause for the issuance of the wiretaps. 

(Respondents’ Exh. O) The State responded in opposition to the motion. (Respondents’

Exh. P) Defense counsel subsequently moved to amend the motion to suppress to “include

additional information pertaining to false statements made in the wiretap affidavits” by the

detectives involved in the investigation. (Respondents’ Exhs. P, Q) On April 6, 2007,

defense counsel filed a second motion to amend the motion to suppress. (Respondents’ Exh.

R) The State moved to strike the amended motions to suppress. (Respondents’ Exhs. S, T)

On April 7, 2007, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to amend and heard

argument on the suppression issue. The court ultimately denied Petitioner’s motion to

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suppress the wiretap evidence. (Respondents’ Exh. U) On November 9, 2007, Petitioner

pled guilty to two counts of Conspiracy to Illegally Control an Enterprise, a class 2 felony

with one prior felony conviction (Counts 3, 4); one count of Unlawful Use of a Wire or

Electronic Communication, a class 4 felony with one prior felony conviction (Count 67);

one count of Conspiracy to commit burglary, a class 3 felony with one prior felony

conviction (Count 81); one count of Kidnapping, a class 2 felony (Count 12); one count of

Illegal Control of an Enterprise, a class 3 felony (Count 2); one count of Attempted Child

Prostitution, a class 3 felony (Count 35); and one count of Pandering, a class 5 felony (Count

75). (Respondents’ Exh. D) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate prison sentence of 16

years, to be followed by a probationary term of five years to begin upon his physical release

from the Department of Corrections. (Respondents’ Exh. F) 

At the commencement of the change of plea proceedings, the trial court noted

that Petitioner had been through a Rule 11 competency evaluation and asked Petitioner if he

was currently taking any medication. (Respondents’ Exh. Y.) Petitioner responded that he

was taking medication given to him by Correction Health Services which did not impair his

understanding of the current proceeding. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 4) Petitioner affirmed

that he had read the plea agreement, discussed it with counsel, and understood the

agreement. (Id. at 4-5) Petitioner further stated that counsel had sufficiently answered all of

his questions about the plea agreement. (Id.) Petitioner also avowed that he had not been

threatened or pressured into signing the agreement. (Id.) Finally, Petitioner stated that he

was satisfied with defense counsel’s “assistance and advice.” (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 6) 

The court next discussed the charges to which Petitioner was pleading guilty, the

rights he was foregoing by entering a plea, the sentencing provisions in the plea agreement,

and the fact that Petitioner was agreeing that the trial court would make any determination

regarding aggravating factors. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 6-14) Thereafter, Petitioner

“knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” entered his guilty plea. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at

22) 

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At sentencing, the court imposed an aggravated sentence based on the following

aggravating factors: (1) Petitioner had five prior felony convictions; (2) Petitioner has

previously been imprisoned four times; (3) Petitioner conducted his business for pecuniary

gain; (4) many of the victims Petitioner recruited for his business were juveniles; and (5)

Petitioner’s conduct constituted “preying on young girls and [having] used on a regular basis

violence and intimidation towards these people to not only run [his] business, but to . . .

avoid prosecution.” (Respondents’ Exh. X at 39-40) 

2. Standard of Review

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for any claim adjudicated on the merits

in state court, unless it is shown that the earlier state court’s decision “was contrary to”

federal law then clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, §

2254(d)(1); or that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or

that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record

before the state court, § 2254(d)(2). Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785

(2011); see also Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). At issue in this case,

is § 2254(d)(1) which permits “relitigation where the earlier state decision resulted from an

‘unreasonable application of’ clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To

determine whether a state court ruling involved an “unreasonable application” of federal

law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time

of the state court’s decision. Richter, ___U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett,

559 U.S. ___, (2010) (slip. op. at 11-12)). 

In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The decision whether to accept a plea offer is a critical stage of the prosecution at which the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 879 (9th Cir.

2002). Therefore, the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)

applies to a claim that counsel was ineffective in advising a defendant to accept or reject a

plea offer. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d

1045, 1051-53 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting attempt to limit Hill to acceptance of plea offer).

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First, petitioner must establish that counsel’s advice was deficient, meaning it was not

“‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Hill, 474 U.S.

at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). There is a “strong

presumption” that counsel’s representation is within the “wide range” of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477

U.S. 365, 381 (1986). “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to

incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms’, not whether it deviated from best

practices or most common custom.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 690). In advising a defendant, “[c]ounsel cannot be required to accurately predict what

the jury or court might find, but he can be required to give the defendant the tools he needs

to make an intelligent decision.” Turner, 281 F.3d at 881 (counsel who advised defendant to

reject offer of 15-years-to-life was not deficient where evidence showed that petitioner

informed of potential death penalty at trial, and counsel had allowed petitioner to think about

offer overnight); see also Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1053-54 (failure to accurately convey terms of

plea offer).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial.” Premo v. Moore,___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 733, 743 (2011) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at

59). “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). Establishing that a

state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is even more

difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” and because Strickland’s general

standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788

(citations omitted). The issue under § 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were

reasonable, but “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

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3. Analysis

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues that defense counsel was ineffective and that his

ineffective assistance resulted in Petitioner entering an “involuntary/unintelligent plea of

guilty.” (Doc. 1 at 30; Doc. 7 at 2) Petitioner contends that he was “damaged” by counsel’s

advice that he enter the plea agreement because the court never had jurisdiction due to the

illegal electronic surveillance. (Doc. 7 at 2) Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance is

premised on his allegation that the wiretaps obtained by law enforcement were illegal, and

consequently, all proceedings resulting from the grand jury indictment were “void” due to

“lack of jurisdiction.” (Doc. 1 at 12, 30; Doc. 7 at 2) 

The record reflects that counsel fully challenged the wiretap evidence. Counsel filed

an initial motion to suppress the wiretaps, and later filed two amended motions to

supplement the initial motion. (Respondents’ Exhs. O, Q, T) The trial court granted the

amendments and considered those arguments, and oral argument, before ruling on the

motion to suppress. (Respondents’ Exh. U) 

Petitioner has not provided any facts or information to support his assertion that the

wiretaps were illegal or that counsel should have taken further action to challenge the

wiretap evidence. Thus, his claim of ineffective assistance based on the wiretap evidence

fails. See Felman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (stating that “[w]here defense

counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal

allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must [first] prove that his Fourth Amendment

claim is meritorious . . . .”); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003)

(stating that to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim based

on defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment issue, petitioner “must first

show that a motion to suppress . . . would have been meritorious if brought in the first

instance by trial counsel.”).

Here, counsel challenged the wiretap evidence and moved to suppress that evidence.

The trial court’s denial of that motion does not render counsel’s assistance deficient. 

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Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s rejection of his claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel was based on an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Petition should be denied and dismissed because

Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review, are not

cognizable on habeas corpus review, or lack merit. After filing his Petition, Petitioner filed

numerous related motions which, although identified as seeking default judgment, summary

judgment, or similar relief, assert the variations on the claims asserted in the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus and, largely challenge the wiretap evidence. (Docs. 33, 34, 35, 37,

38, 39, 41) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, Respondents’ Answer was timely filed and

there is no basis for entering default against Respondents. Additionally, in view of the

recommendation that the Petition should be denied, Petitioner’s various motions seeking

summary judgment, which raise essentially the same issues asserted in the Petition, should

be denied as moot. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, docs.

1 and 7, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Default

Judgment, doc. 33, be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Notice to the Court, doc. 34;

Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 35; Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 37;

Second Notice Motion, doc. 38; Second Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 39;

and Legend Emergency Motion, doc. 41, be DENIED at moot.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have (14) fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28

U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties

have (14) fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to

file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. 

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a

waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment

entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

DATED this 4th day of April, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-01339-PGR Document 45 Filed 04/04/11 Page 24 of 24