Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02468/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02468-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:30505-30510 Exoneration, Limitation of Liability

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In the matter of the Complaint of

HORNBLOWER FLEET, LLC,

HORNBLOWER YACHTS, LLC, and

HORNBLOWER CRUISES AND

EVENTS,

Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

CASE NO. 16cv2468 JM(JMA)

ORDER DENYING CLAIMANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS;

COMPELLING PLAINTIFFS TO

POST A BOND

_______________________________

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS.

Claimants Ana Helvie, Kyle Helvie, and Susan Pendergast (“Claimants”) move

to dismiss Petitioners’ Limitation of Liability action or, alternatively, to require

Plaintiffs to post a bond. Petitioners Hornblower Fleet, LLC, Hornblower Yachts,

LLC, and Hornblower Cruises and Events (collectively “Hornblower”) oppose the

motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters presented

appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the

court denies the motion to dismiss as moot and instructs Plaintiffs to post an

appropriate bond acceptable to the Clerk ofCourt in the amount of $4,270,549.20, with

interest at six percent per annum from the date of commencement of this action. 

Plaintiffs shall deposit the bond within 21 days of entry of this order.

- 1 - 16CV2468

Case 3:16-cv-02468-JM-LL Document 129 Filed 10/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2016, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to limit their 

liability pursuant to the Limitation of LiabilityAct (“LOLA”), 46 U.S.C. §30501 etseq. 

On March 31, 2016, one of Plaintiffs’ vessels, the M/V Adventure Hornblower, allided

with a pier in San Diego Harbor when the directional control system malfunctioned. 

The vessel was returning from a whale-watching cruise when the vessel allided with

the pier, causing injuries to some passengers. Claimants, and eight other individuals,

filed claims in this action, seeking compensation for their injuries.

On March 30, 2016, Claimants reserved and purchased four tickets from

Plaintiffs for the next day’s whale-watching tour. The ticket did not identify the name

of the vessel and allowed Plaintiffs “the sole right to choose any vessel in its fleet for

the whale watching tour on March 31, 2016.” (Helvie Decl.). Claimant Ms. Helvie

represents that she suffered a spinal injury, underwent extensive back surgery and

incurred in excess of $467,000 in medical bills. Claimant Ms. Pendergast represents

she suffered an injury to her spine, underwent spinal surgery, and incurred about

$200,000 in medical expenses. 

On December 13, 2016,upon application of Plaintiffs, the court entered an Order

Directing Issuance of Monition and Injunction; Issuing Notice; and Approving Ad

Interim Stipulation for Value [$4,270,549.20] (“Order”). Plaintiffs provided

publication notice, as well as direct mail service to potential claimants. On April 12,

2017, the Clerk of Court entered default against all potential claimants who failed to

timely file a claim pursuant to the Order. On July 19, 2017, the court vacated default

against claimant Dana McCoy, permitting her to file a claim. To date, 11 individuals

have filed claims. 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

- 2 - 16CV2468

Case 3:16-cv-02468-JM-LL Document 129 Filed 10/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, __550 U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must

“plausibly suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

1937 (2009) (under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court

to infer the mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to

a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id. The defect must appear on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts

may not consider extraneous material in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v.

Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991). The courts may, however,

consider material properly submitted as part of the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.

v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Motion to Dismiss

Claimants move to dismiss this LOLA action for failure to post a bond under

Supplemental Rule F(1) or, alternatively, to have Plaintiffs post an appropriate bond. 

The court deniesthe motion to dismiss asmoot because, pursuant to Supplemental Rule

- 3 - 16CV2468

Case 3:16-cv-02468-JM-LL Document 129 Filed 10/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F(1), the court instructs Plaintiffs to file an appropriate bond acceptable to the Clerk

of Court in the amount of $4,270,549.20, including interest at a rate of six percent per

annumcalculated fromthe date of commencement of this action (September 30, 2016). 

Plaintiffs shall file the bond within 21 days of entry of this order.

The Flotilla Doctrine

Claimants contend the amount of the bond should be increased to include the

value of all seven of Plaintiffs’ vessels operating in the San Diego area under the socalled flotilla doctrine. This argument is not persuasive.

While the Ninth Circuit has yet to adopt a specific test for application of the

flotilla doctrine, federal courts have applied two different tests. Under the flotilla

doctrine, the value of the limitation fund is increased to include the value of all vessels

engaged in the same common enterprise or common venture asthe vessel aboard which

the injury was sustained. See Sacramento Navigation Co v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 332

(1927) (concluding that the vessel owner's liability for the lost cargo included both the

barge involved in the collision and the attendant steamer because both vessels were

needed for the execution of the relevant shipping contract). The first test requires all

vessels to be (1) owned by the same person, (2) engaged in a common enterprise, and

(3) under a single command. See e.g., Cenac Towing Co. v. Terra Resources, 734 F.2d

251, 254 (5th Cir. 1984). Under the second test, all vessels that are necessary to the

performance ofthe relevant contract are considered to be engaged in a common venture

with the offending vessel, thereby triggering the flotilla doctrine. See, e.g., United

States Dredging Corp. v. Krohmer, 264 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.

932 (1959); 2 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-7 (5th ed. 2016)); Matter of C and C Boats,

Inc., 2014 WL 12567148 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2014).

Under either test, Claimants fail to establish that the seven vessels comprising

Plaintiffs’ fleet in San Diego Harbor were engaged in a single enterprise at the time of

Claimants’ injuries. Plaintiffs were on a whale-watching cruise aboard the M/V

Adventure Hornblower. The cruise was independent from the cruises offered by the

- 4 - 16CV2468

Case 3:16-cv-02468-JM-LL Document 129 Filed 10/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

other vessels operated by Plaintiffs. While Plaintiffs’ other vessels also provided

whale-watching cruises, the cruises did not operate as a unit in a common enterprise. 

Accordingly, the flotilla doctrine does not apply under the circumstances and the

limitation amount calculated based only upon the value of the M/V/ Adventure

Hornblower.

In sum, the court denies the motion to dismiss and requires Plaintiffs to post an

appropriate bond acceptable to the Clerk of Court in the amount of $4,270,549.20,

including interest at a rate of six percent per annum calculated from the date of

commencement of this action (September 30, 2016). Plaintiffs shall file the bond

within 21 days of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 23, 2017

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

- 5 - 16CV2468

Case 3:16-cv-02468-JM-LL Document 129 Filed 10/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5