Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14945/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14945-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14945

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-03986-KOB

GUY REDD, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(June 26, 2015)

Before HULL, MARCUS and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff-employee Guy Redd appeals from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of defendant-employer United Parcel Service, Inc. 

(“UPS”), on his claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the 

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Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3 (“Title VII”), and 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. After careful review of the record and briefs, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1984, defendant UPS hired plaintiff Redd, an African American man. In 

2006, after holding various positions with UPS, Redd became a Business Manager 

at UPS’s Birmingham, Alabama, package center. 

Redd’s claims of race discrimination and retaliation center on three alleged

“adverse employment actions” that occurred during his tenure as a Business 

Manager at the Birmingham package center—(1) UPS’s creation of a retaliatory 

hostile work environment by employing a “known serial harasser” as Redd’s 

superior, (2) Redd’s placement on a management performance improvement plan 

(“MPIP”), and (3) Redd’s subsequent demotion.

1 We describe the relevant events, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Redd.

A. October 2008: Redd’s Internal Race Discrimination Complaint

Each UPS Business Manager—including Redd—reports directly to a 

Division Manager who oversees multiple UPS facilities. Sometime in 2007 or 

2008, Dale Mowery, a Caucasian man, became Redd’s Division Manager. 

On October 23, 2008, Redd submitted an internal complaint to UPS human 

resources suggesting that Division Manager Mowery and another Caucasian UPS 

 1

Redd is still working for UPS, and this case is primarily about his demotion. 

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manager had discriminated against him on the basis of race. Although a human 

resources manager met with Redd regarding the complaint, there is no evidence 

that UPS ever followed up on the meeting or investigated Redd’s claims. 

Subsequently, in the summer of 2009, UPS demoted Division Manager

Mowery, transferring him out of Alabama. For a few months, Redd reported to an 

interim manager. 

B. September 2009: Beginning of Alleged Retaliatory Hostile Work 

Environment

In September 2009, Jaime Diaz, a Hispanic man, who UPS recently had 

transferred from Kansas to Alabama, became the Division Manager over Redd. 

During Diaz’s time as a manager in Kansas, more than one UPS employee had

complained of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by Diaz. 

Redd contends that UPS transferred Diaz, a “known serial harasser,” to 

Alabama in order to create a “hostile work environment” in retaliation for his 

earlier complaint against Mowery. Within a few months of Division Manager 

Diaz’s transfer to Alabama, UPS upper management began receiving complaints 

by multiple employees of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by Diaz. 

These complaints included allegations that Diaz discriminated on the basis of race. 

C. January 2010: the MPIP

At the time that plaintiff Redd began reporting to Division Manager Diaz, 

Redd was in charge of the Birmingham package center’s “preload operation,” the 

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process by which packages are unloaded from trailers and loaded onto the brown 

UPS trucks (called “package cars”) for delivery to customers. 

Division Manager Diaz believed that Redd was struggling with his 

responsibilities in the preload operation. For example, Diaz determined that the 

preload operation supervised by Redd was not meeting the “planned measurement 

for . . . pieces per hour.” As a result, Diaz reassigned Redd to oversee “local sort,” 

the late afternoon operation by which packages dropped off by customers are 

sorted onto feeder trucks for further processing. 

Even after plaintiff Redd’s reassignment to local sort, Diaz continued to see

deficiencies in Redd’s performance. Specifically, Diaz believed that Redd needed 

to improve his performance in the areas of (1) late and missed service issues; (2) 

the average time required to complete delivery of packages for Redd’s package 

center; (3) the distribution of package volume among the package cars for Redd’s 

package center; and (4) local sort pieces per hour. 

Accordingly, on January 15, 2010, Division Manager Diaz placed Redd on a 

MPIP. The MPIP outlined areas in which Diaz determined that Redd was 

deficient, corrective steps, and goals for improvement, with certain processes to be

in place by January 22, 2010, with a final review in 90 days. It is undisputed that 

the MPIP did not change Redd’s compensation, benefits, or assigned job duties. 

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In a declaration, plaintiff Redd stated, however, that the MPIP involved 

additional work and paperwork and “required [him] to work more hours in order to 

. . . satisfy the MPIP . . . [and] document [his] performance.” And in a deposition,

Robert Kibler, a former UPS employee who was never placed on a MPIP, testified 

that placement on a MPIP is “humiliating” and doubles a manager’s workload. 

D. March 2010-April 2010: Redd’s EEOC Charge and Subsequent 

Meeting with Management

On March 5, 2010, plaintiff Redd filed an Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) charge, claiming race discrimination and retaliation by 

Division Manager Diaz based on, in relevant part, Redd’s placement on the MPIP. 

In April 2010, UPS demoted Division Manager Diaz and transferred him to 

Tuscaloosa, Alabama. After Diaz’s transfer, Stan Garrett, an African American 

man, became the Division Manager who oversaw the Birmingham package center

and to whom plaintiff Redd reported. 

Also in April 2010, Division Manager Garrett and two members of UPS’s 

human resources management met with Redd concerning his March 2010 EEOC 

charge. At the meeting, the two human resources managers indicated that “they 

wanted [Redd] to drop [his] EEOC charge[] because they felt if [he] did, others 

would drop theirs.” 

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E. June 2010: Serious Service Failure

On June 3, 2010, while Division Manager Garrett was away on vacation, a 

“serious service failure” occurred during the local sort operation under Redd’s 

management. A “serious service failure” involves a failure to make timely 

delivery of a substantial volume of packages entrusted to UPS. 

The service failure began with a mechanical problem that caused the sort to

fall behind. When another UPS employee called Redd, who was off premises, and 

notified him of the problem, Redd returned and took steps to address the issue. 

Based on information he received from the other UPS employee, Redd called

Operations Manager Linda Nelson and reported that 114 packages were affected 

by the service failure. Nelson asked Redd to advise her of any change to the 

estimated number of affected packages. After this call, Redd left the building 

without walking through to confirm the number of affected packages. 

The next day, June 4, 2010, at 7:00 a.m., another UPS Business Manager 

informed Redd that the number of affected packages was actually more than 300. 

This total included approximately 162 air packages—for which customers paid a 

premium for next-day delivery—that had not been included in Redd’s original 114-

package estimate given to Nelson. When he learned this information, Redd, 

however, did not notify Operations Manager Nelson, did not go to the sorting area 

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to confirm the status of the packages, and did not order scans of the additional 

packages. 

After Nelson learned about the additional affected packages from the other 

Business Manager, she confronted Redd at 8:45 a.m. that morning. Nelson 

realized that Redd had known about the additional packages for an hour and fortyfive minutes without notifying her, and she accused Redd of hiding the additional 

packages and requested that an investigation be launched.2

 

F. July 2010: Redd’s Demotion

When Division Manager Garrett returned from vacation, he received the 

materials gathered during the investigation of the June 2010 service failure. As 

part of the investigation, Garrett had Redd prepare his own written report of the 

service failure. In Garrett’s judgment, in the written report, Redd failed to 

acknowledge Redd’s own responsibilities and shortcomings as to the service 

failure and therefore Garrett instructed Redd to prepare a second report 

acknowledging and addressing those issues. 

Based on all the information Garrett received in connection with the June 

2010 service failure, he determined that “Redd’s performance was deficient both 

on the night of June 3, 2010 and the following morning.” Redd acted properly in 

returning to the Birmingham facility when he was notified of the mechanical issue 

 2

The record does not reveal Nelson’s race.

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that prompted the service failure, but then “he did not manage the situation 

properly thereafter.” In particular, Redd did not determine the correct number of 

affected packages, gave inaccurate information to Operations Manager Nelson, and 

did not update Nelson when he learned of additional affected packages. Garrett 

believed that Redd’s mishandling of the service failure and the errors of the 

employees for whom Redd was responsible “compounded” the original problem. 

On July 19, 2010, Garrett demoted Redd from Business Manager to 

Supervisor. In his deposition, Garrett testified that Redd was demoted generally 

“because he didn’t perform the duties that he needed to perform as a manager” and 

“he had some service issues that occurred under his management,” including the 

June 2010 service failure and his mishandling of that service failure. Then, in 

Garrett’s declaration, Garrett provided more detail as to Redd’s other “service 

issues” referenced in Garrett’s deposition. Garrett explained that Redd was 

responsible for two other serious service failures—one in January 2010 that 

affected more than 2,400 packages and one in March 2010. Redd was the only 

Business Manager under Garrett’s supervision that experienced three serious 

service failures in less than six months. As to the June 2010 service failure in 

particular, Garrett also considered in his decision to demote Redd the fact that 

Redd “did not seem to acknowledge that he was accountable” for the service 

failure. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 30, 2012, Redd filed the instant suit against UPS, alleging 

claims of race discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII and § 1981. 

Specifically, Redd alleged race discrimination based on his placement on the MPIP 

and his demotion. He also asserted that UPS retaliated against him for his October 

2008 internal complaint of race discrimination by transferring Diaz to be his 

Division Manager, as Diaz created a hostile work environment. Finally, he alleged 

retaliation based on his July 2010 demotion following his March 2010 EEOC 

charge. 

Following discovery, the district court granted UPS’s motion for summary 

judgment and entered final judgment. This timely appeal follows.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing 

all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owen v. I.C. 

Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).

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IV. RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

On appeal, plaintiff Redd argues that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment to UPS on his race discrimination claims based on his 

placement on the MPIP and his demotion. 

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging, or otherwise 

discriminating against, an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment because of his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). The elements of a § 1981 race-discrimination claim are the same as a Title 

VII disparate-treatment claim and therefore need not be analyzed separately. See

Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000).

When a plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence to prove a Title VII 

claim, as plaintiff Redd does here, we generally use the analytical framework 

established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 

1181 (11th Cir. 2010). 

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination through 

circumstantial evidence by showing that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he 

was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 

(4) he was replaced by a person outside his protected class or was treated less 

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favorably than a similarly situated individual outside his protected class. Maynard 

v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). 

An adverse employment action requires a significant change in employment 

status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 

different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. 

Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). To prove the 

existence of an adverse employment action, an employee must also show a serious 

and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Id. 

The employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the 

employer’s action is not controlling. Id. Rather, the employment action must be 

materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person under the same 

circumstances. Id. 

A. Redd’s Race Discrimination Claim Based on MPIP

Here, as the district court did, we need discuss only the third element of 

Redd’s prima facie case as to his race discrimination claim based on his MPIP—

whether he was subjected to an adverse employment action. See Maynard, 342 

F.3d at 1289. We conclude that Redd failed to create a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether his placement on the MPIP constituted an adverse employment 

action. Redd did not present any evidence that the MPIP resulted in a serious and 

material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment. See

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Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239. Specifically, in his deposition, Redd testified that the 

corrective steps and goals in the MPIP all involved existing responsibilities of his 

position as a Business Manager and that the MPIP did not result in any change in 

pay or benefits. 

On appeal, Redd points to his declaration statements that the MPIP involved 

additional work and paperwork and “required [him] to work more hours in order to 

. . . satisfy the MPIP . . . [and] document [his] performance,” and former UPS 

employee Robert Kibler’s testimony that placement on a MPIP is “humiliating” 

and doubles a manager’s workload. However, these conclusory and vague 

references to additional paperwork and unspecified increased work and hours are

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the MPIP 

resulted in a serious and material change to the terms and conditions of Redd’s 

employment. And Kibler’s subjective view of the humiliation of being placed on a 

MPIP is not controlling. See id. In sum, the district court properly granted 

summary judgment to UPS on Redd’s race discrimination claim based on the 

MPIP.

B. Redd’s Race Discrimination Claim Based on Demotion

In this case, the district court found, and neither party disputes, that Redd 

established a prima facie case of race discrimination based on his demotion. Under 

the McDonnell Douglas framework, once a plaintiff-employee establishes a prima 

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facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Wilson v. B/E 

Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). 

A defendant’s burden of production in articulating a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason is “exceedingly light.” Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, NA, 

36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). The employer need not 

persuade the district court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason. 

Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. If the employer satisfies its burden, then the burden of 

production shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that the employer’s proffered

reason is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id. 

The plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions” in the proffered 

reason that a reasonable factfinder could find it unworthy of credence. Springer v. 

Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quotation omitted). In attempting to rebut an employer’s proffered legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, a plaintiff is not 

allowed to recast the employer’s reason or substitute his business judgment for the 

employer’s judgment. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). As long as the proffered reason is one that might motivate a 

reasonable employer, “an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, 

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and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that 

reason.” Id.

Here, the district court determined that (1) UPS articulated a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for Redd’s demotion, and (2) Redd failed to establish 

that UPS’s reason for demoting him was a pretext for discrimination. We agree. 

First, UPS’s articulated reason for Redd’s demotion—his failure to properly 

manage the June 3, 2010 serious service failure within the context of concerns 

generally about his performance—was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that 

would motivate a reasonable employer to demote Redd. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 

1087; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. To the extent that Redd argues that UPS did 

not meet its burden because the evidence underlying UPS’s reason for demoting 

him was inconsistent, this argument is relevant instead to pretext and does not 

show that UPS failed to meet its “exceedingly light” burden to articulate a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See Turnes, 36 F.3d at 1061.

Second, Redd failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

UPS’s reason for demoting him was a pretext for discrimination. Redd does not 

dispute that a serious service failure occurred in the operations for which he was 

responsible on June 3, 2010, or that he underreported the number of affected 

packages to management in its aftermath. He instead contends that he took all the 

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necessary steps to address the service failure and that he should not have been held 

accountable for the failure in the first place. 

The relevant inquiry, however, centers on the beliefs of Division Manager

Stan Garrett, the decision maker, and whether Garrett was dissatisfied with Redd 

for the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so. See

Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“The inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s 

beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision 

maker’s head. . . . The question is whether [plaintiff’s] employers were dissatisfied 

with her for these or other non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or 

unfairly so, or instead merely used those complaints about [plaintiff] as cover for 

discriminating against her because of her Cuban origin.”). 

Moreover, to the extent that Redd argues his actions in addressing the June 

2010 service failure were unworthy of demotion, Redd cannot substitute his 

business judgment for that of Garrett, who testified that Redd’s actions as well as 

his lack of accountability were factors in Garrett’s decision to demote him. See

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. 

Nor has Redd shown that UPS’s reasons for demoting him were inconsistent 

and therefore unworthy of credence. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348. Redd argues 

that Division Manager Garrett’s deposition testimony suggested that Redd was 

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demoted solely based on the June 2010 service failure, while Garrett’s subsequent 

declaration stated that Redd’s demotion was based on multiple serious service 

failures over a six-month period. We disagree with Redd’s characterization of

Garrett’s testimony. In his deposition, when Garrett testified about Redd’s 

demotion, he explained generally that Redd “had some service issues that occurred 

under his management” and discussed specifically the June 2010 service failure. 

Then, in Garrett’s declaration, Garrett provided more detail as to Redd’s earlier 

“service issues” referenced in Garrett’s deposition, describing the two other service 

failures that occurred under Redd’s supervision in less than six months. 

On appeal, and in the district court, Redd also attempts to show pretext 

based on a January 2010 “Scorecard,” prepared by UPS, that ranks Alabama’s 

package centers for a one-month period. Redd contends that the “Scorecard” 

shows that he was actually performing well as Business Manager because it ranks 

the Birmingham package center as ninth out of Alabama’s thirty-three package 

centers. We agree with the district court that the January 2010 “Scorecard” does 

not create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. 

For starters, in his deposition, Redd conceded that the “Scorecard” ranked 

package centers as a whole, not individual managers. In addition, Diaz explained 

in a declaration that “many of the elements reflected on the scorecard do not 

correlate to things within an individual manager’s control and there are factors that 

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might improve or reduce the ranking of areas of operation listed on the [scorecard] 

for which a Business Manager has no accountability or right to claim credit.” 

Finally, Redd attempts to identify other managers who were responsible for 

multiple service failures but who were not demoted. However, he does not present 

evidence that another manager under Garrett’s supervision was accountable for a 

serious service failure where that manager made additional mistakes—such as 

inaccurately reporting the number of affected packages—that compounded the 

problem. As Garrett explained in his declaration, Redd did not properly manage 

the June 2010 service failure and, afterward, did not take responsibility for the 

service failure. 

In sum, we cannot say that Redd has demonstrated “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions” in UPS’s

proffered reason for his demotion as to create a genuine dispute about whether it 

was worthy of credence. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348. 

V. RETALIATION CLAIMS

Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed 

any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he 

has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing [thereunder].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

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A plaintiff-employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation under Title 

VII by showing that: (1) he engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) he 

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Crawford v. 

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). “[A] plaintiff making a retaliation 

claim under § 2000e-3(a) must establish that his . . . protected activity was a butfor cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 

Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). 

To demonstrate a causal connection, the plaintiff must show that (1) the 

decision maker knew of his protected activity, and (2) the protected activity and 

adverse action were not wholly unrelated. Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 

292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002). The relatedness between the protected activity 

and adverse action may be demonstrated by a close temporal proximity between 

them. Id. at 716-17. The temporal proximity must be very close, however, if the 

plaintiff lacks other evidence of causation. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 

506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). 

“A three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression 

and the adverse employment action is not enough.” Id. In contrast, this Court has

found that a seven-week gap between a protected activity and an adverse 

employment action was sufficiently proximate to create a nexus for purposes of 

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establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. See Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins.

Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a causal nexus was 

established based on the supervisors’ knowledge of an EEOC charge and the 

employee’s termination seven weeks later). 

A. Retaliation Claim Based on Demotion

On appeal, plaintiff Redd argues that the district court erred in granting UPS 

summary judgment on his retaliation claim based on his allegation that he was 

demoted because of his EEOC charge. 

We reject Redd’s arguments that the district court erred in finding that he 

failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The district court found, and 

the parties do not dispute, that Redd met the first two elements of his prima facie

case by showing that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, filing an EEOC 

charge, and that he suffered a materially adverse action, a demotion. As a result, 

we consider only whether Redd demonstrated a causal connection between the 

two. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. 

As an initial matter, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Redd, Garrett knew about Redd’s March 5, 2010 EEOC charge because he was 

present at the April 2010 meeting during which other management personnel 

allegedly encouraged Redd to drop the charge. However, Redd failed to present

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find any causal connection between 

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his March 2010 EEOC charge and his demotion four months later in July 2010. 

See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. This four-month disparity between the protected 

activity and the adverse employment action falls squarely within the “three to four 

month” range that this Court has held is insufficient alone to show causation. See

id. 

On appeal, Redd contends that the relevant date under the temporal 

proximity analysis is not the date he filed his EEOC charge, but the date of the 

April 2010 meeting in which Redd was “intimidated and pressured to dismiss his 

EEOC charge but opposed this action by failing to dismiss his charge.” To begin 

with, Redd mischaracterizes the record evidence of this meeting, as Redd testified 

in his deposition only that management personnel indicated at the meeting that

they wished Redd to drop his EEOC charge.3

 There is no record evidence that 

Redd was “intimidated and pressured.” In any event, even assuming that Redd 

engaged in protected activity during the meeting under the meaning of § 2000e3(a), this three-month disparity alone is insufficient to create a causal nexus. See

id. 

 3

In their depositions, the management personnel denied that Redd was in any way 

encouraged to drop his EEOC charge during the meeting. 

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Therefore, in the absence of other evidence of causation, Redd failed to 

demonstrate a causal connection by showing that his protected activity and his 

demotion were related. See Shannon, 292 F.3d at 716.

4

B. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment Claim

Plaintiff Redd’s final argument on appeal is that the district court erred in 

granting UPS summary judgment on his retaliatory hostile working environment 

claim. Redd contends that UPS transferred Diaz, “a known serial harasser with 

pending EEOC charges against him,” to Redd’s division in order to create a hostile 

work environment in retaliation for Redd’s October 2008 internal complaint

against former Division Manager Mowery.

5

We agree with the district court that UPS was entitled to summary judgment 

on Redd’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim. Redd again has failed to 

show a causal connection between his protected activity and the alleged adverse 

employment action. To the extent that Redd alleges that Division Manager Diaz’s 

actions while overseeing the Birmingham package center created a hostile work 

 4

Alternatively, for all the reasons discussed above as to pretext with regard to Redd’s race 

discrimination claim based on his demotion, see discussion supra Part IV.B, we reject Redd’s 

arguments that he showed that UPS’s proffered reason for his demotion was a pretext, see

Shannon, 292 F.3d at 715 (explaining that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 

retaliation and the defendant produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the 

plaintiff must show that the reason the defendant gave was pretextual). 

5

This Court recognizes a retaliatory hostile work environment claim. See Gowski v. 

Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2012). The relevant question is whether a reasonable 

jury could find that the defendant subjected the plaintiff to a hostile work environment in 

retaliation for protected activity. See id. at 1312. 

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environment, there was no evidence that Diaz knew about Redd’s protected 

activity in making the October 2008 internal complaint. See Shannon, 292 F.3d at 

716. To the extent that Redd argues that UPS transferred Diaz to his package 

center to create a hostile work environment in retaliation for Redd’s protected 

activity, Redd has failed to show temporal proximity between the protected activity 

and the allegedly adverse action. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Redd filed his 

internal complaint in October 2008, almost a year before UPS transferred Diaz to 

Redd’s package center in Fall 2009. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we find no reversible error in the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of UPS. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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