Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02774/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02774-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2774

___________

David Hughes, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Roger D. Stottlemyre, Colonel, in his * District Court for the Western

official capacity; James P. Ripley, as an * District of Missouri.

individual and in his official capacity; *

Eric Wilhoit, as an individual and in *

official capacity; Vincent Ellis, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: January 13, 2006

Filed: July 19, 2006 

___________

Before BYE, HEANEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

David Hughes was a sergeant with the Missouri State Highway Patrol (Patrol)

until May 2004, when he was demoted by Colonel Roger D. Stottlemyre to trooper

and transferred to the Patrol's Gaming Division. Hughes brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action, naming his immediate supervisors, Captain Vincent Ellis and Lieutenant James

Ripley, as well as Eric Wilhoit, an investigator in the Patrol's Professional Standards

Division. Hughes claims Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit violated his First Amendment free

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In October 2003, the consolidation plan was adopted over Hughes's objections.

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speech rights by retaliating against him for opposing proposed changes in Patrol

policy. Hughes named Stottlemyre in his official capacity as Patrol Superintendent

but does not contend he personally retaliated against him. 

The district court dismissed Hughes's claims finding he failed to present any

evidence tending to discredit the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons offered for his

demotion and transfer. On appeal, Hughes contends the district court applied the

wrong test in evaluating his retaliation claim, and granted summary judgment on a

basis not asserted by defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

I

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, Dush v. Appleton Elec.

Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment standard), are as

follows. In 2003, Hughes was a Zone Sergeant assigned to Bates County, Missouri.

His direct supervisor was Lieutenant Ripley who served in a supervisory role in Bates

County and Cass County, Missouri. Bates County and Cass County are located within

the boundaries of the Patrol's Troop A, which was commanded by Captain Ellis. In

June 2003, Hughes was told the Patrol was considering consolidating Bates and Cass

counties. Hughes attended a meeting with Ellis and Ripley to discuss the proposed

consolidation and expressed disagreement. To support his position, Hughes gathered

statistics and other information tending to show the change would increase trooper

response time and adversely impact public safety. As an alternative, Hughes

suggested one trooper from Bates County be reassigned to Cass County to relieve its

personnel problems. Ellis and Ripley favored consolidation, and Ripley voiced

dissatisfaction with Hughes's alternative plan. Following the meeting, Ellis chose to

delay consolidation and temporarily adopted Hughes's suggestion.1

 Following the

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meeting, Ripley was visibly angry at Hughes, and it is at this point, according to

Hughes, Ellis and Ripley began a campaign of retaliation.

Hughes alleges in the months following the meeting, Ripley repeatedly

summoned him to Ripley's office approximately forty-five miles away. Prior to the

meeting, Hughes had been called to Ripley's office on only one occasion.

Additionally, within a month of the meeting Hughes received two verbal reprimands.

One for arriving at work too early and a second for using sick leave while his father

was dying of cancer. During this same time, Hughes alleges Ripley told him he

disliked him. 

Hughes further alleges Ripley and Ellis retaliated by giving him a performance

evaluation decidedly more negative than those he had received for the preceding two

years. In 2001, his performance was ranked between "Meets Expectations" and

"Excels" in all categories, and the comments section contained primarily positive

comments. In 2002, his performance was again ranked between "Meets Expectations"

and "Excels," but the comments section carried some negative comments, including:

"Sergeant Hughes has become almost consumed with the notion that he is going to be

transferred to another division of the patrol." In 2003, after the consolidation plan was

adopted, Hughes's performance evaluation indicated he "Meets Expectations" or

"Excels," but carried additional negative comments directed at specific instances of

conduct. Among other comments, the evaluation stated: "If Sergeant Hughes does not

heed the suggestions he has been given the troop staff will have to give serious

consideration to his ability to be able to function in a supervisory role." Hughes

appealed the 2003 evaluation to Ellis, who rejected the appeal and advised him to

improve his job performance.

Next, Hughes contends a policy instituted by Ripley to have subordinates

evaluate their sergeants was retaliatory because Ripley discounted negative comments

directed at other sergeants, while relying on those directed at him.

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Senator Caskey is an attorney and represented Hughes in connection with the

first two complaints filed against him. After the third complaint was filed, Hughes

was ordered to have no further contact with Caskey. 

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Hughes also contends four disciplinary complaints initiated in 2004 were

brought in retaliation for his criticism of the consolidation plan. The first involved an

incident on December 13, 2003, when a trooper under Hughes's supervision shot

across a Missouri highway to kill a coyote and trespassed on private land to retrieve

it. The complaint, initiated by Corporal Kevin Fisher who was under Hughes's

supervision, alleged Hughes told him to report the incident to Ripley but not to

volunteer any details. Additionally, the complaint alleged Hughes advised the trooper

not to talk with investigators without having a lawyer present.

 

The second complaint, alleged Hughes ordered an on-duty trooper to transport

his children to and from school on various occasions between 2001 and 2003. The

complaint further alleged Hughes had from time to time used his patrol car to

transport his children to and from school. No complaint was leveled at the trooper

who transported Hughes's children. 

 

The third complaint, alleged Hughes, at the behest of state senator Harold

Caskey, ordered one of his troopers to retrieve license plates from a private vehicle

being held at an impound lot. The owner of the lot had not been paid for the towing

or storage charges and complained to Hughes. When interviewed by the investigator,

the owner stated Hughes was rude and told him not to "mess with Senator Caskey."2

Finally, the fourth complaint involved an incident on March 22, 2004, when

Hughes entered Fisher's residence to retrieve the keys to Fisher's patrol vehicle.

Hughes's patrol vehicle had been damaged in a collision with a deer en route to a

serious traffic accident and he needed a substitute. Fisher was off duty and his patrol

vehicle was parked at his home only a few miles away. Hughes drove to Fisher's

home, and, when he discovered Fisher was not there, entered the locked home using

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the keypad access code and located the vehicle keys. Fisher admitted giving Hughes

the access code to his home on a previous occasion but indicated he had not otherwise

given Hughes permission to enter his home.

 

Each of these complaints was initiated based on information provided by Fisher

but was signed by either Ripley or Ellis because Patrol rules do not permit a

subordinate to sign a complaint involving a superior. Each of the instances of alleged

misconduct was investigated by Wilhoit in his role as an investigator with the

Professional Standards Division of the Patrol. In each instance, Wilhoit interviewed

Hughes who admitted much of the factual basis underlying each complaint.

Nevertheless, Hughes contends Ripley and Ellis used the complaints as an opportunity

to retaliate against him, and enlisted the aid of Wilhoit to further their plan. 

As further evidence of retaliation, Hughes alleges in September 2003, Ripley

solicited one of Hughes's subordinates for negative information about Hughes, and

told Hughes if there was any way to reassign him he would. In March 2004, Hughes

alleges Ripley approached another patrol member about accepting a promotion to

Bates County and replacing Hughes as Zone Sergeant. In April 2004, Ripley removed

Hughes from the state fair detail; a position Hughes had held for twelve years. 

Finally, Hughes alleges he was retaliated against when he was 1) refused a

position as a narcotics officer, 2) required to work more Wednesdays and Sundays,

and 3) docked 3.5 hours compensatory time for attending a training session out of

uniform. 

On March 25, 2004, Hughes filed this action against Stottlemyre, Ripley and

Wilhoit, alleging these actions constituted adverse employment actions taken in

response to his opposition to the consolidation plan. In early May 2004, Stottlemyre

convened a staff meeting, which included a Lieutenant Colonel, five majors, Wilhoit,

Ellis and Ripley, to determine whether any disciplinary action should be taken in

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response to the complaints. Wilhoit and Ripley were not asked to make a

recommendation as to discipline. Ellis and all but one of the remaining officers in

attendance recommended termination. Stottlemyre initially agreed, but reconsidered

and chose to demote Hughes and transfer him to the Gaming Division. Ellis

complained to Stottlemyre that Hughes should be terminated and insisted he be

prohibited from returning to Troop A. On May 11, 2004, Hughes filed an amended

complaint adding Ellis as a defendant, and alleging the four complaints which caused

his demotion and transfer were punishment for his exercise of protected speech. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Hughes failed to make

out a prima facie case of retaliation. As to the four complaints which Hughes alleges

led to his demotion and transfer, the district court assumed Hughes had made a prima

facie showing of retaliation against Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit. The court concluded,

however, Hughes failed to show that the legitimate non-retaliatory reason given by

Stottlemyre for his demotion and transfer, i.e., the complaints, was pretextual. As to

the other alleged adverse employment actions, the district court concluded Hughes

failed to make a prima facie showing. On appeal, Hughes argues the district court 1)

applied the wrong test for determining whether he had made a prima facie showing

of retaliation, and 2) erred in reaching the issue of pretext because the defendants only

argued he failed in his prima facie showing. 

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Spears v.

Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). "Summary

judgment is proper where the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, indicates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

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A. Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on the First Amendment, a

plaintiff must allege and prove he engaged in conduct protected by the First

Amendment and the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the

employer's decision to take the adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy City Sch.

Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872,

878 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting the same test applies to both First Amendment and Title

VII retaliation cases). If the employee makes a successful prima facie showing, the

burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate the same action would have been taken

even in the absence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. This is

the test the district court applied. Accordingly, we reject Hughes's claim the district

court applied the wrong standard.

1. Protected Activity

The district court concluded Hughes's opposition to the consolidation plan was

protected activity because he expressed concerns over the impact to public safety. On

appeal, defendants do not contest the district court's holding. Thus, we assume,

without deciding, that Hughes's stated opposition to the consolidation plan was

protected under the First Amendment. 

2. Adverse Employment Action

To constitute an adverse employment action, the employer's decision must

effect a material change in the terms or conditions of employment. Bechtel v. City of

Belton, 250 F.3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 2001). Hughes alleges his 2003 performance

evaluation constitutes an adverse employment action. The district court rejected the

contention because Hughes failed to present any evidence showing it resulted in any

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material change to the terms or conditions of his employment. We agree. Hughes has

presented no evidence tending to show the evaluation was relied upon to effect any

material change in the terms or conditions of his employment. See Spears, 210 F.3d

at 854 (holding a negative performance review is not in itself an adverse employment

action, and is actionable only if the employer subsequently uses the review to alter the

terms or conditions of employment to the detriment of the employee.) Therefore, we

conclude the 2003 performance review does not constitute an adverse employment

action.

The district court also concluded Hughes's complaints about working Sundays

and Wednesdays, and the policy requiring troopers to review their sergeants, did not

constitute adverse employment actions because Hughes failed to allege any impact on

the terms or conditions of his employment. Hughes does not respond directly to the

district court's findings. Instead, he agues we should view his allegations

cumulatively and find in sum they are sufficient to allege an adverse employment

action. We disagree. 

Although actions short of termination may constitute adverse employment

actions within the meaning of the statute, "not everything that makes an employee

unhappy is an actionable adverse action." Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116

F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997). We have held a reasonable jury could conclude

negative references to potential employers constitutes sufficient adverse action to state

a retaliation claim. Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1997).

Conversely, we have also held the loss of status and prestige that accompanied

replacement of a supervisor's staff, when her salary and position remained the same,

did not constitute a sufficient adverse employment action. Ledergerber v. Stangler,

122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997). In other words, "[c]hanges in duties or working

conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage . . . are insufficient to

establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case." Harlston v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). Here, there is no

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evidence to suggest Hughes suffered a materially significant disadvantage by having

to work more Sundays and Wednesdays or by having his performance reviewed by

his subordinates. Therefore, we affirm the district court's holdings on these issues.

The district court concluded the remaining allegations, i.e., the four complaints

and resulting investigations; loss of compensatory time; and failure to transfer Hughes

to narcotics; were sufficient to allege adverse employment actions. On appeal,

defendants do not contend these allegations are insufficient to satisfy the adverse

employment action prong of Hughes's prima facie case. Thus, we assume, without

deciding, that Hughes suffered an adverse employment action. 

3. Causation

 The third and final element of Hughes's prima facie case is causation. To

prove a causal connection under the third element, a plaintiff must prove an

employer's retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action. Kipp

v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 280 F.3d 893, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2002).

"[E]vidence that gives rise to an inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of the

employer is sufficient to prove a causal connection." Id. at 897 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The district court concluded Hughes failed to make any showing of causation

with respect to the loss of compensatory time because he presented no evidence of a

Patrol policy allowing him to attend the training session out of uniform, and admitted

he had no proof another trooper was not docked pay for attending out of uniform. As

for the Patrol's failure to transfer him to narcotics, the district court noted Hughes

failed to identify any of the persons involved in the decision making process and

failed to offer any evidence showing the failure to transfer him was in any way related

to his exercise of protected speech. On appeal, Hughes fails to address these issues.

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Because Hughes offers no proof these employment actions were causally related to

his speech, we affirm the district court's holdings. 

As for the four complaints and investigations, the district court assumed for

purposes of summary judgment Hughes had shown causation because they led to his

demotion and transfer. Defendants argue the district court erred because there was

insufficient evidence as to any of the defendants to show that pursuit of the four

complaints and investigations was causally related to his exercise of protected speech.

a. Stottlemyre

Stottlemyre contends there is no evidence he was aware Hughes had spoken out

against the consolidation plan, and therefore, there can be no inference of a causal

connection between Hughes's speech and Stottlemyre's decision to demote and

transfer him. Hughes, citing, among other cases, Darnell v. Ford, 903 F.2d 556, 561-

62 (8th Cir. 1990), argues Stottlemyre was only sued in his official capacity as a

representative of the Patrol and the Patrol can be held liable regardless of Stottlemyre's

personal knowledge of Hughes's exercise of protected speech. We disagree. 

"[I]t is well settled that § 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability."

Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of

Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)), and nothing in the cases cited by Hughes

changes this longstanding rule. For example, in Ford, a Missouri Highway Patrol

Major (Ford) recommended Captain William Darnell be disciplined for failing to

report misconduct by another patrol member. 903 F.2d at 557. Darnell sued, arguing

Ford recommended discipline because Darnell opposed Ford's candidacy for patrol

superintendent. Id. A jury found in favor of Darnell and awarded substantial

damages. Id. On appeal, Ford argued the jury erred in finding causation because his

recommendation was not directly responsible for Darnell's discipline. Id. at 561.

Instead, the decision rested with the patrol superintendent. Id. at 561-62. This court

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rejected Ford's argument, stating "causation can be established by direct personal

participation in the deprivation or by participation setting in motion a series of acts by

others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict

constitutional injuries on third parties." Id. at 562 (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). Ford may be useful to Hughes in arguing his claims against

Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit, but it lends no support to his claim against Stottlemyre. We

find the remaining cases cited by Hughes equally inapposite

. 

b. Ellis/Ripley/Wilhoit

Hughes alleges Ellis and Ripley strongly favored the proposed consolidation

plan, but when Hughes questioned its impact on public safety they were forced to

reconsider the plan. Following the June 2003 meeting, Hughes alleges Ripley was

visibly angry, and, when Hughes spoke with him several months later, Ripley

continued to voice dismay at Hughes's opposition to the plan. Because of his

unwillingness to accede to the plan, Hughes contends Ellis and Ripley began the

campaign of retaliation outlined above, including their pursuit of the four complaints

and investigations which led to his demotion and transfer. 

Ellis and Ripley contend they played no part in initiating the complaints.

Instead, their only role was to – in accordance with Patrol policy – sign the complaints

which were initiated by Corporal Fisher. According to Ellis and Ripley, because the

complaints were initiated by Fisher and investigated by Wilhoit, Hughes cannot show

they set into motion the series of events which led to his demotion and transfer. As

evidence, they point to a statement by Wilhoit indicating he discovered the

information leading to the second and third complaints during an interview with

Fisher conducted in connection with the first complaint. 

Hughes disputes Wilhoit's version of those events, and offers a transcript of

Wilhoit's interview of Fisher which contains no reference to the incidents involved in

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the second and third complaints. He also disputes the usefulness of an affidavit

prepared by Fisher which indicates Fisher was the source of the second and third

complaints because it does not indicate to whom he reported the incidents. 

Hughes also alleges the third complaint – involving Senator Caskey who had

represented him in the first two complaints – was initiated to prevent Caskey from

continuing to serve as legal counsel. As evidence the third complaint was fueled by

an improper motive, Hughes states Caskey told him the Missouri Department of

Revenue (MDOR) informed Caskey the license plates were the property of the state

and could be seized by the Patrol. According to Hughes, he provided this information

to Wilhoit during the investigation, but Wilhoit refused to contact Caskey or MDOR.

Additionally, Wilhoit did not include this information in his report or inform

Stottlemyre. Finally, Hughes alleges Wilhoit made unsubstantiated accusations of

public corruption against Caskey, and, in an attempt to determine if Hughes had

contacted Caskey, tried unsuccessfully to obtain Hughes's cellular telephone records

without a subpoena or proper authorization. 

Viewing all of the alleged actions in the light most favorable to Hughes, we are

satisfied there is evidence suggesting a retaliatory motive on the part of Ellis, Ripley

and Wilhoit, sufficient to prove a causal connection. Moreover, we reject the

defendants' argument under Ford that any alleged wrongdoing did not cause or

contribute to Hughes's demotion and transfer. 

In Ford, Ford recommended Darnell be disciplined for his violation of patrol

policy. Id. at 557. Later, Ford argued his recommendation did not cause Darnell's

discipline because the final decision was made by the patrol's superintendent. Id. at

561-62. This court disagreed, finding ample evidence in the record to demonstrate the

patrol's superintendent always followed recommendations for discipline. Id. at 562.

Therefore, but for Ford's recommendation, Darnell would not have been disciplined.

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Here, there is no evidence Hughes would have been demoted and transferred

but for the four complaints. Assuming those complaints were initiated and pursued

for retaliatory purposes, it is apparent Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit "set[] in motion a

series of acts by others which [they] knew or reasonably should know would cause

others to inflict constitutional injuries on third parties." Id. (citing Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d at 743). Accordingly, as to Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit, we find Hughes has

made out a prima facie showing of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment

rights. As to Stottlemyre, we conclude Hughes has failed in his prima facie showing

and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 

B. Legitimate Non-retaliatory Reason/Evidence of Pretext

The district court found the Patrol had advanced a legitimate non-retaliatory

reason for demoting and transferring Hughes because he admitted most of the

underlying facts. It further concluded Hughes had presented no evidence suggesting

the Patrol's reasons were a pretext for unlawful retaliation. On appeal, Hughes argues

the district court's reasoning went beyond the arguments advanced by defendants in

their summary judgment motion. Hughes contends the defendants only argued against

his prima facie showing of retaliation and never discussed any legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. Accordingly, he contends the district court

should have limited its analysis to the issues raised in the summary judgment motion

to which he was given an opportunity to respond. Defendants concede they did not

raise the issue in their motion for summary judgment. They contend, however, the

district court's holding was no surprise to Hughes because their brief argued Hughes

was terminated on the basis of the complaints, not for his speech. 

Hughes should not have been required to anticipate the district court would

grant summary judgment on a basis defendants admit was not raised. Therefore, we

conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, we

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reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further

proceedings. 

III

The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of

Colonel Stottlmyre in his official capacity is affirmed. The judgment of the district

court granting summary judgment in favor of Ellis, Ripley and Wilhoit is reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The court holds that this case must be remanded for further proceedings with

respect to three of the four defendants because the district court granted summary

judgment “on a basis defendants admit was not raised.” Ante, at 14. I respectfully

disagree with this conclusion, and I would affirm the judgment of the district court as

to all of the defendants.

The court’s decision is premised on Hughes’s contention that in the district

court proceedings, “the defendants only argued against his prima facie showing of

retaliation and never discussed any legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for their

actions.” Ante, at 13. This assertion by Hughes is incorrect. The defendants argued

in support of their motion for summary judgment that “[t]here is no dispute that Mr.

Hughes was under investigation for serious violations of Patrol policy,” (J.A. at 162),

and that “[t]he uncontroverted material facts establish that it was this misconduct, and

not a random comment by Mr. Hughes a year earlier at a private planning meeting,

that resulted in Mr. Hughes being disciplined.” (Id. at 163-64). The brief continued

that “[t]he evidence is clear and unequivocal that the Plaintiff was demoted and

transferred by Stottlemyre because he engaged in serious misconduct, based on what

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Mr. Hughes admitted he did.” (Id. at 164). That these arguments appeared under a

heading asserting “[n]o causal connection” did not delimit the argument to a refutation

of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. “Causal connection” is a necessary element of the

claim, not merely of a prima facie case, see Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th

Cir. 2004), and the defendants’ brief in the district court never restricted its argument

to defeating a prima facie case.

On behalf of defendant Ripley, the brief filed in the district court disputed

Hughes’s theory that he was targeted for discipline because he disagreed with Ripley.

The brief argued that “Plaintiff’s habit of misconduct and laziness were altered upon

the arrival of a new corporal, Kevin Fisher,” that “Fisher reported Plaintiff’s

misconduct,” and that Ripley signed the complaints “because he was Plaintiff’s

supervisor, and he was told to sign by Professional Standards.” (J.A. at 165-66).

With respect to defendant Ellis, the brief likewise argued that he signed a complaint

that “was generated by Corporal Fisher, who objected to Plaintiff entering his

residence without authorization,” and that Hughes’s efforts to justify his actions were

largely irrelevant, because “what is determinative is that Fisher initiated the

complaints against Plaintiff.” (Id. at 166-67 & n.6). As for defendant Wilhoit, the

brief urged that Hughes’s speech was not “a motivating factor in Wilhoit’s actions

because Wilhoit was unaware of that activity.” (Id. at 168).

Not surprisingly, Hughes responded to these arguments by attempting to

generate a factual dispute concerning whether he was really demoted and transferred

for misconduct and violations of patrol policy. He argued that “[i]n their efforts to pin

the investigation of those incidents on Fisher, and thereby shield themselves from

responsibility, defendants lied.” (Id. at 283). He asserted that “[t]he Patrol did not

discipline others as harshly,” and attempted to marshal evidence of similarly situated

employees who were punished less severely for actions that Hughes asserted were

comparable. (Id. at 284-85). Hughes’s argument regarding Ripley, Ellis, and Wilhoit

sought to question the credibility of their explanations. (Id. at 287-88).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in organizing these arguments

under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). See Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 1999)

(applying McDonnell Douglas to § 1983 First Amendment claim). The McDonnell

Douglas method was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic,” Furnco

Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978), and there is no requirement

that parties use “magic words” to express their argument that the evidence generates

no genuine issue of fact for trial. The substance of the arguments presented to the

district court involved whether Hughes was demoted and transferred for a legitimate

reason independent of his allegedly protected speech. With respect, the “admission”

made by the appellees concerning their filings in the district court will not bear the

weight assigned to it by the court. While the appellees “admit that they did not state

their position in the same language as that used by the District Court,” they assert it

is “untrue and unfair to assert that the District Court’s analysis was a surprise to the

Appellant.” (Br. of Appellees at 22) (emphasis added). The brief of the appellees

devotes five pages to demonstrating how the issue whether the defendants acted

against Hughes for a legitimate reason was indeed fully aired before the district court.

The court’s opinion, finding that Hughes has satisfied the “low threshold” of

a prima facie case, see Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, 417 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2005),

should not preclude the defendants on remand from pursuing a renewed motion for

summary judgment based on the contention that Hughes did not engage in protected

activity, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), or that Hughes was demoted

and transferred for legitimate reasons. See Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1051

(8th Cir. 2000) (providing that although court would not consider arguments raised

for the first time on appeal, “defendants may raise these issues on remand in a

renewed motion for summary judgment, or at some other appropriate juncture, if they

wish”). Because I find no procedural error by the district court, however, I would

reach the merits and affirm the district court’s conclusion that there is no genuine

issue of fact for trial. Even assuming that Hughes engaged in protected speech, he

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admitted the misconduct underlying the disciplinary complaints that led to his

demotion and termination. He failed to produce evidence of similarly-situated

employees who were treated differently, and it is undisputed that complaints by

Corporal Fisher were the catalyst for the disciplinary complaints against Hughes. It

is further undisputed that Lieutenant Wilhoit concluded two investigations,

substantially completed a third, and received the assignment for a fourth before he was

even aware of Hughes’s alleged protected activity. For the reasons stated in the

district court’s thorough opinion, I would affirm the judgment dismissing the

complaint. See Hughes v. Stottlemyre, No. 04-4053, 2005 WL 1279027 (W.D. Mo.

May 27, 2005).

______________________________

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