Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-00710/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-00710-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IMMERSION CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT

AMERICA, INC., and SONY COMPUTER

ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 02-0710 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS'

RENEWED MOTION

FOR JUDGMENT AS

A MATTER OF LAW

OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE FOR

A NEW TRIAL AND

GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR STAY

Defendants Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc.,

(SCEA) and Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., (SCEI)

(collectively Sony) renew, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(b), their previous motions for judgment as a matter

of law, on the grounds that no reasonable jury could have found

that the patents were infringed under the doctrine of

equivalents; that the patents were not invalid as anticipated or

made obvious by the prior art or due to an inadequate written

description. In the alternative, Sony moves for a new trial on

infringement, invalidity and damages. Sony also moves for a

stay of accounting and of execution of the judgment pending

appeal. Plaintiff Immersion Corporation opposes the motions. 

The matter was heard on May 13, 2005. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the

motions, the Court denies Sony's motions for judgment as a

matter of law and for a new trial, but grants the motion for a

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stay.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background of this patent case

has been set forth in the Court's prior orders. See March 2,

2004 Order Resolving Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment

(hereinafter Summary Judgment Order); January 10, 2005 Order

Denying Parties' Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and

Addressing Other Matters (hereinafter JMOL Order). That

information will not be repeated here. 

The Court entered an amended judgment in favor of Immersion

on April 7, 2005 on its claims of infringement and on Sony's

counter-claims for declaratory judgment of non-infringement,

invalidity and unenforceability. The Court ordered that Sony

pay Immersion the $82,000,000.00 awarded by the jury as well as

prejudgment interest in the amount of $8,703,608.00. No escrow

account was required. The Court has since approved a

supersedeas bond in the amount of $102,500,000.00, secured by

Sony's transfer of that amount to the Court's Registry, in order

to satisfy the judgment in full, including any post-judgment

interest and costs. Sony intends to appeal the judgment against

it. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Judgment as a Matter of Law

A motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict

renews the moving party's prior Rule 50(a) motion for judgment

as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 50(b). The post-trial motion may be raised only as to

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the same claims and upon the same grounds as the prior motion. 

Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990);

Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1988).

Judgment as a matter of law after the verdict may be

granted only when the evidence and its inferences, construed in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, permits only

one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Where there is

sufficient conflicting evidence, or if reasonable minds could

differ over the verdict, judgment after the verdict is improper. 

See, e.g., Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 775

(9th Cir. 1990); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880

F.2d 176, 181 (9th Cir. 1989); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d

1244, 1252 (9th Cir. 1985); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL,

726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984).

II. New Trial

A new trial may be granted if the verdict is not supported

by the evidence. There is no easily articulated formula for

passing on such motions. Probably the best that can be said is

that the Court should grant the motion "[i]f, having given full

respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed." Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of

Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 11

Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2806, at 48-49).

The Ninth Circuit has found that the existence of

substantial evidence does not prevent the court from granting a

new trial if the verdict is against the clear weight of the

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evidence. Landes, 833 F.2d at 1371. "The judge can weigh the

evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and need not

view the evidence from the perspective most favorable to the

prevailing party." Id. Therefore, the standard for evaluating

the sufficiency of the evidence is less stringent than that

governing Defendants' Rule 50(b) motion for judgment after the

verdict.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of Sony's Rule 50(a) Motion

Immersion opposes Sony's "renewed" motion for judgment as a

matter of law as in large part procedurally barred because Sony

did not previously move for judgment as a matter of law on

invalidity issues. Sony disagrees, arguing that its Rule 50(a)

motions were sufficient to support fully the instant motion, and

that the form of its motions during the trial was required by

the Court's orders. 

In order to bring a post-verdict motion for judgment as a

matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), a

party must renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law before

submission of the case to the jury, pursuant to Rule 50(a). 

Rule 50(a) requires that such motions "specify . . . the law and

the facts on which the moving party is entitled to judgment." A

post-verdict motion for JMOL "may not be made on grounds not

included in the earlier motion." Duro-Last, Inc., v. Custom

Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Duro-Last,

the court found that a pre-verdict motion for JMOL directed to

inequitable conduct and the on-sale bar did not raise the issue

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of obviousness with enough specificity to meet the requirements

of Rule 50, because the pre-verdict motion "was not sufficient

to alert [the other party] to all the alleged deficiencies in

its obviousness defense." Id. at 1107. 

At the close of Immersion's case in chief, the Court,

consistent with its usual practice, deemed Sony to have "timely

made the customary motions" to be heard outside the presence of

the jury. Sony followed up with a September 7, 2004 brief

"supplement[ing] this motion to clarify the grounds upon which

its motion is made." Brief in Supp. Defs.' Mot. JMOL at 1 n.1. 

This brief specifically identified various issues of

infringement and challenged Immersion's claim for damages. Sony

contends that it could not have identified invalidity issues at

this point because it was still in the midst of presenting its

own case in chief, which included its invalidity defenses. At

the close of evidence, in the presence of the jury, Sony stated,

"we renew all of our JMOL motions previously made." Trial Tr.

3448:22-23. Sony submitted no further JMOL briefing until after

the verdict. 

Sony contends that it was complying with the Court's

instruction that motions for JMOL should not be raised in front

of the jury in tersely alluding to "all of our JMOL motions

previously made." The Court is unwilling to penalize Sony for a

good-faith attempt to comply with the Court's instructions. 

Furthermore, Immersion has not been prejudiced because Sony's

motion does not identify unanticipated gaps in Immersion's

defense to invalidity, but instead catalogs various invalidity

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issues raised at trial. Therefore, the Court finds that Sony's

motion properly renews a prior motion under Rule 50(a).

II. Invalidity

Sony moves for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds

that no reasonable jury could have found the patents-in-suit to

be valid. More specifically, Sony asserts that the patents-insuit are invalid as anticipated by patents issued to Craig

Thorner, by the AT&T joystick, and by the Cyberman prior art. 

In addition, Sony asserts that no reasonable jury could have

found the patents-in-suit not invalid for obviousness and lack

of written description. 

A patent is presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. A

party alleging that a patent is invalid bears the burden of

proof, id., and must overcome this statutory presumption of

validity by proving invalidity through clear and convincing

evidence, Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204

F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Where the only evidence of

invalidity is prior art already considered by the patent office,

the party alleging that the patent is invalid must overcome the

deference accorded the patent examiner, whose duty it is to

issue only valid patents, and who is presumed to have properly

done his or her job, to have expertise in interpreting the

references, and to be familiar with the level of skill in the

art. Id.

A. Thorner

Sony contends that no reasonable jury could have found that

the asserted claims are not anticipated by U.S. Patent Nos.

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5,669,818 (‘818 patent), 5,565,840 (‘840 patent) and 5,684,722

(‘722 patent), issued to Craig Thorner et al. (collectively, the

Thorner patents).

“A patent is invalid for anticipation when the same device

or method, having all of the elements contained in the claim

limitations, is described in single prior art reference.” Crown

Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1375

(Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Scripps Clinic & Research Fdn. v.

Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

("Invalidity for anticipation requires that all of the elements

and limitations of the claim are found within a single prior art

reference."). “An anticipating reference must describe the

patented subject matter with sufficient clarity and detail to

establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art and

that such existence would be recognized by persons of ordinary

skill in the field of invention.” Crown Operations, 289 F.3d at

1375. “The question of what a reference teaches and whether it

describes every element of a claim is a question for the finder

of fact.” Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta

AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The '818 patent discloses a “seat-based tactile sensation

generator capable of producing tactile sensation to a video game

player corresponding to activity portrayed in a video game.” 

‘818 patent, abstract. The ‘818 patent incorporates by

reference two previously filed applications that were issued as

the '840 and '722 patents. For a description of the Thorner

patents, see Summary Judgment Order at 6-8. The ‘840 and ‘722

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patents, but not the ‘818 patent, were disclosed to the Patent

and Trademark Office (PTO) during the prosecution of the ‘213

patent; all three Thorner patents were disclosed to the PTO

during the prosecution of the ‘333 patent.

1. Claim 7 of the ‘213 Patent

Sony contends that the Thorner patents disclose all of the

elements of claim 7 of the ‘213 patent. In its Summary Judgment

Order, the Court found that a dispute of fact existed as to the

following element of claim 7,

transmitting said activating signals to said mass-moving

actuators for individually activating each of said massmoving actuators to produce a complex tactile sensation as

a result of varying the frequency and amplitude of said

vibration. 

The Court construed this limitation to require that more than

one mass-moving actuator be activated individually in order to

produce collectively a single complex tactile sensation. 

Although the Thorner patents teach both the individual

activation of mass-moving actuators and the varying the

frequency and amplitude of the vibrations, Sony was not able to

identify any passage in the Thorner patents that teaches

combining these techniques to use the individual activation of

multiple actuators to create a complex tactile sensation. 

Summary Judgment Order at 8-9. 

Sony now argues that Immersion's expert Dr. Robert Howe

testified that the host dependent and independent circuits could

be used in combination to product multiple activating signals

and, in turn, a complex tactile sensation. However, Dr. Howe's

testimony that Thorner explicitly teaches combination of the two

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circuits refers to using them at the same time to "drive

different parts of the display," not to combine to create a

single complex sensation. Trial Tr. 3041:4-6. This explanation

is consistent with the patents, which state merely that the two

circuits "can be alternatively used or used in combination." 

'818 patent at 3:20-21. According to Dr. Howe, the hardware

implementation of the Thorner patents involved actuators

separated by a distance and set in foam rubber, and a vibrationabsorbing material, ensuring that each actuator would "generate

a separate localized sensation." Trial Tr. 2964:23-24. This

physical evidence, while not necessarily dispositive, would have

supported a reasonable jury's belief that the "transmitting said

activating signals . . . to produce a complex tactile sensation

. . ." element was not disclosed by Thorner. Sony therefore has

not shown by clear and convincing evidence that any reasonable

jury would have found claim 7 of the '213 patent anticipated by

Thorner, nor does the clear weight of the evidence show that

this claim is anticipated. 

2. ‘213 Patent "Decoupling" Claims

The Court found in its Summary Judgment Order that a

dispute of fact existed as to whether the Thorner patents

disclose all of the elements of claims 41 through 46, 49, 50, 53

and 54 (the decoupling claims) of the ‘213 patent. Claim 41 is

representative of the decoupling limitation disputed at trial, 

the magnitude of the tactile sensation being controlled by

modulating the power sent to the motor, the frequency of

the tactile sensation being controlled independently of the

magnitude by repeating pulses of current sent to said motor

at a selected rate.

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Immersion's expert Dr. Howe testified that the Thorner

patents did not recognize as an issue the decoupling of

amplitude and frequency, and therefore did not teach a solution

to that problem. Trial Tr. 2974:16-19. Sony's expert Dr.

Kenneth Salisbury also testified that Thorner did not disclose

the decoupling of frequency and magnitude. Trial Tr. 2802:9-18. 

Dr. Salisbury's other testimony that Thorner teaches repeated

pulses of current at an optionally adjustable rate, id. at

2496:14-2497:12, though a technique that is relevant to

decoupling, falls short of proving that Thorner anticipated the

invention. A reasonable jury could easily have found that the

decoupling claims were not anticipated by Thorner. 

3. Claim 14 of the ‘333 Patent

The parties' dispute with respect to claim 14 of the '333

patent focuses on whether Thorner teaches the second element,

"enabling control of said plurality of rotating-mass actuators

to create in combination a vibration upon said user with an

amplitude that is non-uniform over a duration of said

vibration." 

In its Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that, due to

internal inconsistencies, whether the Thorner patents actually

disclosed this limitation to a person of ordinary skill in the

art was a disputed issue of fact. As explained in Section

II(A)(1), Dr. Howe testified that the vibrations in Thorner were

distributed spatially and thus did not teach enabling a

"plurality of rotating-mass actuators to create in combination a

vibration upon said user." A reasonable jury could therefore

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have concluded that claim 14 of the '333 patent was not

anticipated by Thorner, and the clear weight of the evidence

does not show that claim 14 was anticipated. 4. Claims

15 and 17 of the ‘333 Patent

The parties dispute whether Thorner anticipates the final

limitation of claim 17 of the '333 patent: 

enabling activations of said plurality of rotating-mass

actuators, each of said activations having an amplitude

profile difference from said other activations to create a

tactile sensation upon the user that has a non-uniform

amplitude over a duration of said tactile sensation. 

Claim 15 contains a similar limitation that is contested for the

same reason, and dependent claims 16 and 18 are also placed at

issue here. In light of Immersion's position that this

limitation may be met by two motors vibrating at different

amplitudes, Sony argues that the fact that Thorner teaches the

individual activation of actuators, and separately teaches that

vibrations may vary, means that no reasonable jury could have

found that this claim limitation was not met. 

The Court in its Summary Judgment Order found that a

dispute of fact existed as to whether Thorner's disclosure of

the ability to control actuators individually would cause one of

ordinary skill in the art to understand that the actuators could

be activated with different frequencies. At trial, Dr.

Salisbury testified that the '818 patent's disclosure of the

individual activation of actuators in sequence did result in

disclosure of all elements of the disputed claims of Immersion's

'333 patent, using as illustration Thorner's "sword slash

event." Trial Tr. 2522:5-20. Dr. Howe, examining the same

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event, testified that it involved using the host dependent

circuit to activate motors according to binary, on-off controls

that did not meet the claim limitations. Trial Tr. 2960:4-

2961:23. The jury was faced with dueling experts who each had a

different opinion about the scope of the Thorner patents. Sony

does not provide any grounds to support its implied assertion

that a reasonable jury would necessarily have accepted Dr.

Salisbury's testimony and rejected Dr. Howe's. The Court finds

that a reasonable jury could have reached the converse

conclusion, and that the clear weight of the evidence does not

show that claim 17 and similar claims were anticipated by

Thorner. 

B. AT&T Joystick

Sony contends that no reasonable jury could have found that

the asserted claims are not anticipated by the AT&T Joystick, as

exhibited at trial, described in the article by Brian Schmult

and Robert Jebens, "Application Areas for Force Feedback" (the

Schmult article) and demonstrated in the force feedback joystick

video. The Schmult article was disclosed to the PTO during

prosecution of both the '213 and the '333 patents. 

Immersion contended at trial that the AT&T Joystick did not

anticipate the patents-in-suit because it was not an "eccentric

mass" motor device as required by the patents. See, e.g., '213

patent, claim 7 at 18:48-51. Dr. Howe testified that although

the rotating links of the AT&T Joystick are masses and are

eccentric, Trial Tr. 3079:19, they nevertheless would not have

been recognized as an "eccentric mass" motor device, as

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described in the Immersion patents, by one skilled in the art at

the time. Trial Tr. 2979:9-13. Nor, according to Dr. Howe,

would one skilled in the art have realized that the control

techniques of the AT&T Joystick could be used with the smaller

and cheaper eccentric mass motors. Id. 2986:13-2987:7. Dr.

Salisbury conceded that in the past he had categorized the AT&T

Joystick as a ground-based device rather than an eccentric mass

motor device. Id. 2819:12-17; 2820:4-12. The jury could

reasonably have decided that this difference was significant and

meant that Sony had not proved by clear and convincing evidence

that the AT&T Joystick anticipated Immersion's patents. For the

same reasons, the clear weight of the evidence does not show

that the patents-in-suit were anticipated by the AT&T Joystick. 

C. Cyberman

Sony contends that no reasonable jury could have found that

claim 41 of the '213 patent was not anticipated by the Cyberman

device, as demonstrated by video at trial and described by its

inventor, James Barnes, the Cyberman SWIFT manual and Cyberman

promotional materials. Cyberman was not disclosed to the PTO

during prosecution of the patents-in-suit. The Court concluded

after a bench trial that Immersion's failure to disclose

Cyberman to the PTO during prosecution of the '333 patent did

not constitute inequitable conduct. See March 24, 2005 Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4-14 (finding Sony failed to

show that Cyberman met materiality criteria and describing the

Cyberman technology). 

Claim 41 discloses a "method of decoupling control over the

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magnitude and frequency components of the tactile vibration

sensations generated by an eccentric mass-based vibrotactile

unit." 

The parties dispute whether Cyberman discloses the "decoupling"

limitation, i.e. "the frequency of the tactile sensation being

controlled independently of said magnitude." Sony asks the

Court to find that a reasonable jury would have to find that

claim 41 had been anticipated, based on the testimony of Dr.

Salisbury and Mr. Barnes as well as the Cyberman materials. 

However, Dr. Salisbury himself conceded that, prior to rendering

his invalidity opinion, he did not see or test Cyberman, Trial

Tr. 2832:23-2832:10, and that he did not learn of a way to

decouple frequency and magnitude based on his study of the

Cyberman materials. Trial Tr. 2829:4-2830:5. Sony points to

the inventor's testimony that Cyberman could be used to vary the

speed of the single motor, id. at 1870:7-15, but does not

identify either testimony or documentary evidence to prove that

Cyberman anticipated the decoupling of frequency and magnitude. 

Sony has not shown that any reasonable jury would have found

clear and convincing evidence that Cyberman anticipated claim

41, or that the jury ignored the clear weight of the evidence. 

D. Obviousness

Sony contends that no reasonable jury could have found that

the patents-in-suit were not rendered obvious by the Thorner

patents, the AT&T Joystick and Cyberman, in combination or as

combined with personal massager inventions. 

A patent is invalid for obviousness if the differences

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between it and the prior art “are such that the subject matter

as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was

made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 35 U.S.C.

§ 103(a). To determine if a patent is invalid for obviousness,

the court must consider the scope and content of the prior art,

the difference between the patented invention and the prior art,

and the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co.,

383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); see also Crown Operations, 289 F.3d at

1375. “Determinations of obviousness cannot be based on the

hindsight combination of components selectively culled from the

prior art to fit the parameters of the patented invention.” ATD

Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

“There must be a teaching or suggestion within the prior art,

within the nature of the problem to be solved, or within the

general knowledge of a person with ordinary skill in the field

of the invention, to look to particular sources, to select

particular elements, and to combine them as combined by the

inventor.” Crown Operations Int’l, 289 F.3d at 1376; see also

Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371-72,

1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Immersion argues inter alia that Sony has not shown that

any reasonable jury would have found, by clear and convincing

evidence, motivation to combine the personal massager patents

with the other prior art. The only evidence Sony identifies to

support its contention that one skilled in the art would be

motivated to combine video game and personal massager technology

is the post-hoc testimony of Dr. Salisbury. See, e.g., Trial

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Tr. at 2635:24-2637:8 (Q: "If you were facing the other problem

that Immersion identified . . . where would you look in the

prior art to address these problems? A. Well, I would look

someplace where people had applied vibration to the body for

perhaps longer periods of time. And massage devices we've

talked about are certainly good examples of that . . ."). Dr.

Salisbury's general statements are insufficient to show that any

reasonable jury would have found clear and convincing actual

evidence of a "clear and particular" motivation to combine. 

Teleflex, Inc., v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1334

(Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Furthermore, Immersion presented substantial evidence of

several secondary indicia of non-obviousness. Immersion has

successfully licensed its patents to other, although not all,

third-party manufacturers. Trial Tr. 1295::20-25; Trial Ex.

423A. Meanwhile, other vibrating video game prior art,

including the AT&T Joystick and Cyberman, failed to achieve

commercial success. In arguing that the Playstation system owes

its success to a variety of factors, Sony attacks a strawman;

even if complex vibration is only one of many Playstation

features that attract consumers, it may still be commercially

significant. 

For these reasons, Sony has failed to show that no

reasonable jury could conclude that the Thorner patents, AT&T

Joystick and Cyberman, in combination with the personal massager

patents, did not render the asserted claims of the patents-insuit obvious, nor does the weight of the evidence clearly favor

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Sony. 

E. Inadequate Written Description

Finally, Sony contends that no reasonable jury could have

found that the decoupling claims of the '213 were not invalid

for inadequate written description. In order to fulfill the

written description requirement, patent specifications must

clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize

that the inventor invented what is claimed. Gentry Gallery,

Inc., v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

Sony argues that the '213 patent describes two methods of

decoupling amplitude and frequency of vibration but fails to

describe the pulsing method used by Sony's products. Dr.

Salisbury testified that one of ordinary skill in the art would

not have understood this method of "short vibrations separated

in time" to be in the possession of the inventors. Trial Tr.

2403:8-21. Sony also notes that named inventor Dr. Mark Yim

testified that this pulsing method was not disclosed in his

inventor notebook, id. at 455:21-456:2; 456:9-13, and 457:12-

458:13; however, Dr. Yim's testimony does little to further

Sony's argument because he said generally that no method of

decoupling was referred to in those pages of his notebook. 

Immersion, on the other hand, points to several references

in the patent's specifications that it says refer to the pulsing

method of decoupling. See, e.g., '213 patent at 2:25-26

(explaining that "[f]or a small number of rapid rotations, the

rotating force vector feels like a single impulse"); 4:2-9

(explaining a technique referred to as "amplitude modulation"). 

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Dr. Colgate testified that the accused Sony products decouple

frequency from amplitude "as taught by the Immersion patents,"

and that one skilled in the art would have understood the '213

patent to teach decoupling of Sony's unidirectional drive signal

motors. Trial Tr. 3159:16-3160:1. In light of the conflict

between Dr. Colgate's and Dr. Salisbury's testimony, a

reasonable jury could therefore find that Sony had failed to

meet its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the decoupling claims of the '213 patent were invalid due to

inadequate written description. The Court also finds that the

evidence does not clearly weigh in Sony's favor. 

For these reasons, Sony's motion for judgment as a matter

of law on the issue of invalidity, or in the alternative for a

new trial, is denied. 

III. Infringement

Sony moves for a new trial on the grounds that the jury's

findings of direct infringement by SCEA and inducement of

infringement by SCEI are contrary to the weight of the evidence. 

Sony further moves for judgment as a matter of law, or in the

alternative a new trial, on the issue of infringement under a

doctrine of equivalents theory. Immersion opposes the motions. 

A. Direct Infringement

Sony argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the

clear weight of the evidence shows that (1) SCEA did not

infringe the patents by using the Playstation system; (2) SCEA

did not sell the accused Playstation console, controller and

games as a complete and operable system; and (3) the accused

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products do not practice certain claim requirements. These

arguments are addressed in turn. 

Sony notes that there was no direct evidence that SCEA

employees encountered the accused vibrations while testing the

games or operating kiosks at trade shows. However, Sony fails

to address the Court's earlier finding regarding circumstantial

evidence of infringement. See JMOL Order at 6-7 (finding

sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational jury to infer

direct infringement). The Court does not find that an inference

of direct infringement by SCEA contradicts the clear weight of

the evidence. 

Sony also challenges the jury's finding of direct

infringement based on sales, pointing to the fact that only one

accused game was sold bundled with the PlayStation console and

Dualshock controller. Again, Sony does not explain how the

Court's earlier finding -- that a reasonable jury could have

found that the accused consoles, controllers and games were

indeed sold as an operable system based on Sony marketing and

game instructions -- is contrary to the clear weight of the

evidence. 

Finally, Sony argues that it is entitled to a new trial

because the clear weight of the evidence shows that certain

limitations of each asserted claim were not practiced by the

accused products. The Court is unpersuaded by Sony's argument,

which simply lists claim limitations on which Dr. Salisbury

offered expert opinion testimony. See Renewed Mot. for JMOL at

23:11-21. The jury also heard extensive opinion testimony from

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Dr. Colgate, who testified that, based on his careful study of

the claims, Sony's products did practice the art of the

inventions. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 724:7-725:1. The clear weight

of the evidence does not favor Sony. 

For these reasons, the Court denies Sony's motion for a new

trial on the issue of infringement by SCEA. 

B. Indirect Infringement

Sony argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the

clear weight of the evidence shows that the accused products

have non-infringing uses and there is no evidence that SCEI

specifically induced infringing usage. In light of the jury's

finding with respect to SCEA's direct infringement, which the

Court found above was not inconsistent with the clear weight of

the evidence, a finding that SCEA's parent company is liable for

inducement of that direct infringement does not warrant a new

trial. Sony provides no evidence, much less the clear weight of

the evidence, to prompt the Court to dismiss an inference that

SCEI encouraged SCEA's Playstation efforts, including SCEA's

testing and selling in such a way as to exploit the accused

vibration feature. 

For these reasons, the Court denies Sony's motion for a new

trial on the issue of infringement by SCEI. 

C. Doctrine of Equivalents

Sony moves for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, on the grounds

that Immersion failed to provide sufficient evidence or argument

on equivalents at trial. Immersion opposes the motion. 

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As the Court found in its JMOL Order, a reasonable jury

could have found that there was sufficient evidence that SCEA

directly infringed and that SCEI induced infringement of the

patents-in-suit. Moreover, in Section III(A) above, the Court

found that the clear weight of the evidence does not contradict

a finding that the limitations of each asserted claim were

practiced by the accused products under a theory of literal

infringement. 

Sony has not shown that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on the issue of infringement despite its failure

to challenge successfully the sufficiency of the jury's literal

infringement findings. The cases it cites are inapposite. Lear

Siegler, Inc., v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan, Inc., 873 F.2d

1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989), did not involve a general verdict

question, but a challenge to the sufficiency of a jury's finding

of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents where the jury

specifically found no liability for literal infringement. 

Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 2002 WL 1022509 (D. Del.

May 15, 2002), in which a district court decided to grant a

motion for a new trial upon determining that its doctrine of

equivalents instruction was in error, is not persuasive where,

as here, the Court has found evidence of literal infringement to

be sufficient. 

Here, as in Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH v. Biocorp,

Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the jury did not

specify whether it found literal infringement or infringement

under the doctrine of equivalents. Because the Court concludes

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"that substantial evidence supports a finding of literal

infringement, it is not necessary for [it] to address the issue

under the doctrine of equivalents." Id. Therefore, Sony's

motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is denied as

moot. 

IV. Damages

Sony argues that it is entitled to a new trial on the issue

of damages or, in the alternative, to remittitur. 

Sony acknowledges that its motion reiterates arguments made

in its JMOL brief, explaining that the standard for a new trial

is lower. However, Sony does not address the substance of the

Court's JMOL ruling, which noted that Immersion had produced

evidence that the accused games were very popular. The Court is

not persuaded that Sony is entitled to a new trial on damages or

to remittitur, and its motion is accordingly denied. 

V. Motion for Stay

Sony moves for a stay of accounting and execution of

judgment in this case pending appeal. Immersion opposes the

motion. 

Immersion identifies no reason to force Sony to incur the

costs of the supersedeas bond filed with the Court instead of

placing the $102,500.00 into an interest-bearing escrow account

at Sony's bank, Chase Manhattan. Therefore, the Court grants

Sony's request for a stay of execution of the judgment pending

appeal, subject to the parties filing a stipulation as to the

conditions for the escrow account. Until the Court receives

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such a stipulation, the supersedeas bond will remain in effect. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Sony's motion

for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial (Docket No.

1654) and GRANTS Sony's motion for a stay of execution of the

judgment (Docket No. 1666). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/17/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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