Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_06-cv-00207/USCOURTS-alnd-5_06-cv-00207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

---

Plaintiff alleges that the glass door at the Family Dollar Store located in Rogersville, 1

Alabama, closed on her hand, “causing Plaintiff to suffer laceration [sic] and broken bones in her

left hand and fingers.” Complaint (appended to Notice of Removal (doc. no. 1)) ¶ 3. 

As noted in the text accompanying note 8 infra, a state-court plaintiff’s fictitious party

2

claims normally are disregarded when determining whether a case was properly removed to federal

court on the basis of the parties’ diversity of citizenship, because there is no provision for fictitious

party practice under federal law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (last sentence) (stating that, for

purposes of removal, “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be

disregarded”); New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1094 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting

that plaintiff “conceded that fictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court and, thus, her

failure to name the parties required that the court strike the parties”); Murray v. Sevier, 50 F. Supp.

2d 1257, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (observing that there is “no provision for fictitious party practice

under federal law”); Wiggins v. Risk Enterprise Management Limited, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1279

n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (“[T]here is no fictitious party practice in the Federal Courts.”); Floyd v.

Allstate Insurance Company, 989 F. Supp. 1435, 1436 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (“[T]he fictitious

Defendants named in Plaintiff’s Complaint are due to be dismissed, there being no provision for

fictitious party practice under federal law.”); McCree v. Sam’s Club, 159 F.R.D. 572, 574 n.1 (M.D.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

SHIRLEY A. ROSE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-06-S-207-NE

)

FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Circuit Court for Limestone County,

Alabama, by filing a complaint stating claims for negligence and wantonness under

a premises liability theory against Family Dollar Stores, Inc., and six fictitious 1

defendants. Family Dollar Stores timely removed the action to this court, asserting 2 3

FILED

 2006 Jun-09 PM 03:26

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 1 of 15
Ala. 1995) (“there is no provision for fictitious party practice under federal law”). 

See doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal). 3

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) provides that: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 4

of all civil actions where the matter exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”

See doc. no. 5. 5

See doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal), at ¶¶ 6-7. 6

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federal jurisdiction based on satisfaction of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.

§1332(a)(1). Plaintiff subsequently moved to remand the case to state court, and 4 5

that is the motion addressed in this opinion. 

DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that the parties are of diverse citizenship: plaintiff is a resident

of Alabama, and Family Dollar Stores is a Delaware corporation that maintains its

principal place of business in the State of North Carolina. Thus, the outcome of the 6

motion to remand turns upon whether the requisite jurisdictional amount in

controversy has been satisfied. Unfortunately, plaintiff’s complaint is no model of

clarity on that issue. 

For example, the ad damnum clause following paragraphs 1-8 of plaintiff’s

state-court complaint, stating her claims against Family Dollar Stores, does not

demand a specific amount of damages: 

WHEREFORE, your Plaintiff demands judgment, for both

compensatory and punitive damages, against the Defendant in the

amount to be assessed by the jury impaneled int [sic] his [sic] case, and

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 2 of 15
State-court complaint (appended to doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal)) at unnumbered page 3 7

(emphasis supplied). 

See supra note 2. 8

State-court complaint (appended to doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal)) at unnumbered page 4 9

(emphasis supplied). Again, plaintiff’s reference to “the minimum jurisdictional amount of this

Court” applies to the Circuit Court for Limestone County, Alabama, and not the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 

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which amount shall exceed the minimum jurisdictional amount of this

Court [i.e., the Circuit Court for Limestone County, Alabama]. 

7

As previously noted, however, plaintiff’s state-court complaint also asserts claims

against six fictitious-parties. A state-court plaintiff’s fictitious-party claims normally

are disregarded when determining whether a case was properly removed to federal

court on the basis of the parties’ diversity of citizenship, because there is no provision

for fictitious party practice under federal law. Even so, it is more than just a little

8

interesting to note that, in the ad damnum clause following paragraphs 9-12 of

plaintiff’s complaint, she states a specific sum in damages claimed of all

“Defendants” (plural), “both named and unnamed”: i.e., 

WHEREFORE, your Plaintiff demands judgment, in the amount

of $50,000.00, for both compensatory and punitive damages, against the

Defendants, both named and unnamed at this time, to be assessed by the

jury impaneled in this case, said amount exceeding the minimum

jurisdictional amount of this Court. 

9

Thus, it comes as no great surprise that, following removal, plaintiff attempted

to stipulate that, when she commenced this action in state court, she sought damages

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 3 of 15
See supra note 4. 10

Doc. no. 5 (plaintiff’s motion to remand), Exhibit A (Affidavit of Michael J. Bernauer), at

11

¶ 4. The affidavit also states, “Furthermore, . . . the Plaintiff’s attorney does assign a value of this

case in excess of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The court

concludes this sentence must contain a typographical error. Counsel must have intended to state that

he does not assign the case a value in excess of $75,000, as his present statement is inconsistent with

the remainder of his argument. 

See doc. no. 7. 12

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in an amount that is less than the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold of this court. She 10

offers the affidavit of her attorney,stating that “the amount in controversy in this case

will not exceed the sum of $75,000.00.” Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend her 11

complaint, in order to clearly specify that she seeks damages in an amount that is less

than this court’s $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. 

12

A. Determination of the Amount In Controversy

“When jurisdiction is premised on the diversity of the parties, the court is

obligated to assure itself that the case involves the requisite amount in controversy.”

Morrison v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted). 

Further, when determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under the

diversity statute, the district court must focus upon the amount that was in

controversy on the date the case was removed from state court. See, e.g., Burns v.

Windsor Insurance Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 n.13 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Jurisdictional

facts are assessed on the basis of plaintiff’s complaint as of the time of removal.”)

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 4 of 15
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(emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco, 253 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]he question of

diversity subject matter jurisdiction is determined on the plaintiff’s pleading at the

time of removal.”) (citing Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939)); Coker v.

Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir.1983) (“Removability should be

determined ‘according to the plaintiff’s pleading at the time of the petition for

removal.’”) (citations omitted); Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553,

1561 (11th Cir.1989) (same). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court held long ago, in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.

v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), that events or actions occurring after the date

of removal that have the effect of reducing the damages claimed in a plaintiff’s statecourt complaint to an amount that is less than the jurisdictional amount in

controversy, regardless of whether such events or actions are “beyond the plaintiff’s

control or the result of his volition, do not oust the district court’s jurisdiction once

it has attached”: 

And though, as here, the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by

affidavit, or by amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the

requisite [jurisdictional] amount [in controversy], this does not deprive

the district court of jurisdiction.

Thus events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the

amount recoverable, whether beyond the plaintiff’s control or the result

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 5 of 15
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of his volition, do not oust the district court’s jurisdiction once it has

attached. . . .

. . .

We think this well established rule is supported by ample reason.

If the plaintiff could, no matter how bona fide his original claim in the

state court, reduce the amount of his demand to defeat federal

jurisdiction, the defendant’s supposed statutory right of removal would

be subject to the plaintiff’s caprice. The claim, whether well or ill

founded in fact, fixes the right of the defendant to remove, and the

plaintiff ought not to be able to defeat that right and bring the cause

back to state court at his election. If he does not desire to try his case in

the federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the

jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more,

the defendant cannot remove.

Id. at 292-94 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied); see also Poore v. AmericanAmicable Life Insurance Co. of Texas, 218 F.3d 1287, 1289-91 (11th Cir. 2000)

(holding that “events occurring after removal which may reduce the damages

recoverable below the amount in controversy requirement do not oust the district

court’s jurisdiction”). 

When a plaintiff fails to specify the total amount of damages demanded in a

state court complaint, then “a defendant seeking removal based on diversity

jurisdiction must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement.” Leonard v. Enterprise

Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 6 of 15
See also, e.g., Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001); 13

Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001); Fuller v. Exxon

Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1298 (S.D. Ala. 1999); Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans, 75

F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259-60 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Lowe’s OK’d Used Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Co.,

995 F. Supp. 2d 1388, 1389 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Bolling v. Union National Life Insurance Co., 900

F. Supp. 400, 404 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (relying on decisions from the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits).

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Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here a plaintiff has made an

unspecified demand for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not

exceeds the [$75,000] jurisdictional requirement.”), overruled on other grounds by

Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000)). 

13

In summary, the general rule is that “events occurring after removal which may

reduce the damages recoverable below the amount in controversy requirement do not

oust the district court’s jurisdiction.” Poore, 218 F.3d at 1291 (emphasis supplied).

1. The subtle, but significant distinction between post-removal events or

actions that “reduce” the damages claimed in a plaintiff’s state-court

complaint to an amount that is less than the jurisdictional amount in

controversy, and those that “clarify” the amount originally claimed

when commencing the state court action 

The general rule does not apply in this case, however, because there is a subtle,

but significant distinction between post-removal events or actions that “reduce” the

damages claimed in a plaintiff’s state-court complaint to an amount that is less than

the jurisdictional amount in controversy, and those that “clarify” the amount

originally claimed when commencing the state court action. 

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 7 of 15
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The affidavit proffered by plaintiff in this case merely clarifies the ad damnum

clause of her state-court complaint, and does not “reduce” her original demand for

damages. 

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama faced a

similar situation in Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299

(M.D. Ala. 2001). There, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for fraud in state court

seeking compensatory damages in the amount of $74,500, as well as an unspecified

amount of punitive damages. The defendant removed to federal court, asserting the

$75,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy had been satisfied. The plaintiffs

subsequently moved to remand, and filed an affidavitstating: “(1) they did not intend

to seek recovery of more than $74,500 when they filed their complaint; (2) they will

never claim or accept more than $74,500; and (3) they agree to a court order capping

their damages at $74,500.” Id. at 1300 (emphasis supplied). 

As a result of those stipulations, the Brooks court framed the issue for decision

as being “whether a court can remand a case when a plaintiff’s post-removal

stipulation limits the scope of an ad damnum clause to less than $74,500.” Id. The

court held that it could rely on plaintiff’s post-removal stipulation, reasoning as

follows: 

In Moss v. Voyager Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Ala.

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 8 of 15
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1999), this court remanded a case when a plaintiff irrevocably stipulated

neither to seek nor accept more than $75,000, even if a jury verdict

exceeded that amount. The stipulation “clarifie[d] the Complaint by

identifying” the true amount in controversy, and satisfied the court that

this amount would never exceed the jurisdictional minimum. Id. at

1303. Other courts have routinely given effect to binding, post-removal

stipulations. See, e.g., Grubbs [v. Pioneer Hous., Inc.], 75 F. Supp. 2d

1323, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1999); McGhee v. Allstate Indem. Co., 928 F.

Supp. 1102, 1104 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Taylor v. Campbell, 852 F. Supp.

978, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Moore v. Toyota Motor Corp., 64 F. Supp.

2d 612, 614 (N.D. Miss. 1999); Adkins v. Gibson, 906 F. Supp. 345, 347

(S.D. W.Va. 1995) [(abrogated on other grounds by McCoy v. Erie

Insurance Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D. W.Va. 2001))].

Brooks, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. 

As the Brooks court recognized, however, some federal courts will retain

jurisdiction, even after a plaintiff limits an unspecific demand for damages in a statecourt complaint to an amount that is less that the federal jurisdictional threshold.

Such courts usually advance two primary reasons for doing so.

The first is that such limitations ostensibly are inconsistent with St. Paul

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290, 58 S. Ct. 586,

82 L. Ed. 845 (1938), which teaches that courts must determine

jurisdiction as of the moment of filing rather than on the basis of

subsequent events. See, e.g., Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d

868, 873 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir.

1992) (per curiam). The second is that post-removal damages

limitations may possibly lead to forum shopping by parties who might

“unfairly manipulate proceedings merely because their federal case

begins to look unfavorable.” Rogers, supra at 872; see also McCoy v.

Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (discussing

“unseemly forum gaming, which has occurred frequently in the wake”

of Adkins, supra). 

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 9 of 15
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Brooks, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. The Middle District opinion in Brooks nevertheless

rejected the rationale of those courts, saying that 

these unpersuasive decisions have improvidently expanded the holding

of St. Paul and have given unduly narrow consideration to basic

principles of federal jurisdiction. 

Initially, the court stresses that St. Paul did not hold that postremoval stipulations are unallowable per se. In St. Paul, the plaintiff

brought a complaint for indemnity of $3,000, which exceeded the

jurisdictional minimum. The defendants removed, and the district court

retained jurisdiction even though the plaintiff later submitted a bill of

costs showing that it really expected to receive a verdict of less than

$3,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the plaintiff’s later

statement was “not inconsistent with the making of a claim in good faith

for over $3,000 when the suit was instituted.” St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 296,

58 S. Ct. 586. The Court relied on Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198,

200, 14 L. Ed. 660 (1853), which likewise held that a plaintiff who

scaled back his demand, but did not disavow an intent to seek beyond

the jurisdictional limit when he filed, could not avoid federal court. A

crucial fact in both St. Paul and Kanouse is that the plaintiffs

acknowledged that their complaints triggered the amount in controversy

at the time of removal. In this case, on the other hand, Plaintiffs have

submitted affidavits bearing on their initial demand and showing that

federal jurisdiction has never properly attached. See Moss, 43 F. Supp.

2d at 1303. There is a difference, of course, between a court’s choice to

divest itself of jurisdiction and its finding that it lacks jurisdiction. No

controlling precedent requires the court to retain jurisdiction despite

Plaintiff’s explicit assurance that his Complaint proves that he “does not

desire to try his case in the federal court.” St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 294, 58

S. Ct. 586. 

Brooks, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-01 (emphasis supplied). 

In addition, the Middle District of Alabama in Brooks recognized four

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 10 of 15
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“bedrock principles of federal jurisdiction” that require district courts to give effect

to post-removal stipulations clarifying an unspecific demand for damages in a

state-court complaint: 

First, federal courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction. Second,

the diversity statute is strictly construed because of the significant

federalism concerns raised by federal courts passing on matters of state

law. Third, a plaintiff is the master of her complaint, and a plaintiff

suing diverse defendants can avoid federal court by limiting her prayer

for damages to less than $75,000. Fourth, a plaintiff is charged with

knowledge of her complaint, and the amount of damages that she seeks.

See Gardner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (M.D.

Ala. 2001). None of these interests are furthered when a federal court

keeps a diversity case because of some doctrinaire reading of judicial

dicta that is divorced from congressional will and any legitimate policy

interests. 

Brooks, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1301-02. 

Other district courts within this circuit have followed the reasoning of the

Middle District of Alabama in Brooks. For example, in Little Bend River Co. v.

Molpus Timberlands Management, L.L.C., No. CA 05-0450-C, 2005 WL 2897400

(S.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2005), the Southern District of Alabama held that a plaintiff’s postremoval stipulation — stating that plaintiff would neither seek nor accept more than

$75,000 in damages, even if the jury awarded more than that amount — established

the requisite amount in controversy. Id. at *3. The Little Bend court noted that

“district courts in the Eleventh Circuit characterize a post-removal amount-inCase 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 11 of 15
Doc. no. 5 (plaintiff’s motion to remand), at ¶ 3 (emphasis in original). 14

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controversy stipulation as a clarification permitted by St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.

v. Red Cab Co., rather than an amendment or post-removal action forbidden by the

Supreme Court in St. Paul.” Id. at *3 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing Sierminski v.

Transouth Financial Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000); Brooks, 153 F. Supp.

2d at 1301; Moss, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1303). See also Lacey v. Dollar General Corp.,

No. Civ.A.2:05CV1041-D, 2005 WL 3240708, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 30, 2005). 

This court finds the reasoning of the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama

to be persuasive, and not only consistent with, but supportive of, the general principle

that “[r]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor

of remand.” Lowe’s OK’d Used Cars,Inc. v. Acceptance Insurance Co., 995 F. Supp.

1388, 1389 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.

1996)); see also Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. 

In the present case, plaintiff has stipulated that “the amount in controversy is

less than the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.00 as is required for removal under

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Although the Plaintiff did not seek a specific amount of

damages in her ad damnum clause, but does state [sic] that her claim will not exceed

the sum of $75,000.00.” The affidavit of plaintiff’s counsel states that plaintiff 14

agrees “that the amount in controversy in this case will not exceed the sum of

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 12 of 15
Bernauer Affidavit, at ¶ 4. 15

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$75,000.00.” These statements indicate that plaintiff — both at the time she 15

commenced this action in state court, and on the date of removal — did not intend

to assert damages in excess of $75,000. The court accepts these statements as the

binding agreement of plaintiff to neither seek nor accept damages greater than

$75,000. See Moss, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03 (stating that a stipulation must

“specifically bind” the plaintiff to accept no more than $75,000 in damages in order

to defeat federal jurisdiction). 

Thus, plaintiff’s stipulation is a clarification of the amount of damages

demanded in her original, state-court complaint, and not an improper post-removal

reduction of that demand. Accordingly, the stipulation can be considered in

determining the amount in controversy. 

The primary case relied upon by defendants, Davis v. Franklin Life Insurance

Co., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (M.D. Ala. 1999), is distinguishable. There, the plaintiff

filed suit in state court, asserting claims for misrepresentation, suppression, and

breach of contract, and making a demand for an unspecified amount in compensatory

and punitive damages. Id. at 1198. The defendant removed to federal court, asserting

that it had satisfied its burden of proving the jurisdictional amount in controversy by

showing that similar cases within the same jurisdiction had resulted in damage awards

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 13 of 15
The other, non-binding, cases cited by defendant — e.g., Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 16

233 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2000), and Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2000) —

also are distinguishable, because they stand for the proposition that post-removal stipulations will

not be considered when they do not bear on satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount in controversy

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in excess of $75,000. Id. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit in an effort to establish

that the amount in controversy did not exceed $74,999. The district court rejected the

plaintiff’s affidavit, and held that the amount in controversy had been satisfied. Id.

at 1200. It stated:

The Plaintiff has also provided the affidavit of the attorney for the

Plaintiff in which he states that the Plaintiff is not “currently seeking

and will not currently accept more than $74,999 in damages.” . . . This

statement by the Plaintiff’s attorney does not establish that at the time

the Complaint was filed, nor at the time of removal, the Plaintiff did not

intend to seek the jurisdictional amount. That is the time when the

jurisdictional amount is judged, and the Plaintiff cannot reduce her claim

thereafter to defeat federal court jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury

Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293-94, 58 S. Ct. 586, 82

L. Ed. 2d 845 (1938). Nor does this affidavit establish that she will not

so seek in future proceedings in this case. 

Davis, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (emphasis supplied). 

In contrast, plaintiff’s affidavit in the present case does not say that she is

“currently seeking” damages in an amount that is less than the jurisdictional

threshold. It does not leave open the possibility that plaintiff may alter her demand

in the future. Instead, plaintiff’s affidavit establishes that, when she filed her

complaint in the state court, and, on the date of removal, plaintiff neither sought nor

intended to seek damages exceeding the $75,000 jurisdictional amount. 

16

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 14 of 15
as of the date of removal. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that the court takes her stipulation forlimited damages very seriously, 17

and will not be pleased to learn that plaintiff has later increased her demand after remand to state

court. See Brooks, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (“The court emphasizes that, while it does not call into

question the integrity of Plaintiffs’ damages stipulation, should Plaintiffs disregard their demand and

pursue or accept damages in excess of $75,000, then upon motion by opposing counsel, sanctions

will be swift in coming and painful upon arrival.”) (citation omitted). 

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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing discussion, and in light of plaintiff’s stipulation,

defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy on the date this action was removed from state court exceeded $75,000,

exclusive of interests and costs. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for remand is due to

be granted, and this case remanded to the state court from which it was removed.17

An appropriate order to that effect will be entered contemporaneously herewith. 

DONE this 9th day of June, 2006.

______________________________

United States District Judge

Case 5:06-cv-00207-CLS Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 15 of 15