Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02751/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02751-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

WILLIAM JOSEPH WATSON, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 13-cr-2988-L 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, or CORRECT 

SENTENCE UNDER 28 U.S.C. 2255, 

and 

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

 Petitioner, William Joseph Watson (“Petitioner”) filed a motion pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. Respondent filed a Response 

and Opposition to the Motion, and Petitioner has filed a Supplemental Traverse in 

response. The Court has reviewed the record, the submissions of the parties, and the 

supporting exhibits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s 

Motion without prejudice. 

// 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Watson was a licensed Doctor of Osteopath (D.O.) in the State of 

California and was also registered as a physician with the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA). These designations allowed him to prescribe controlled 

substances to patients including Oxycodone, Hydrocodone, and Xanax. The prescription 

of controlled substances for pain is subject to guidelines promulgated in a policy 

statement enacted by the Medical Board of California. Included in the guidelines is the 

requirement that a prescribing physician take a medical history and conduct a physical 

exam for patients, which includes substance abuse history. Physicians are directed to 

develop a treatment plan and keep patient records. The State of California also maintains 

a Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES) to monitor 

all Schedule I through IV, and some Schedule V, controlled substance prescriptions 

dispensed by pharmacies in California. CURES is managed by the California 

Department of Justice, and is used by law enforcement and regulatory agencies to 

monitor the patterns and practices of physicians prescribing controlled substances in 

California. When law enforcement reviewed Petitioner’s CURES reports, they 

discovered that he had been prescribing large quantities of controlled substances. 

Petitioner was aware that some of the individuals to whom he prescribed Oxycodone 

were using the prescriptions to obtain and sell Oxycodone to various customers. During 

the time period in question, Petitioner wrote prescriptions for the distribution and 

dispensing of Oxycodone in an amount equal to or exceeding 105,000 milligrams of 

actual Oxycodone without any legitimate medical purpose and was compensated for 

doing so by those to whom he provided or agreed to provide the prescriptions. 

 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged in a 41-count indictment on August 13, 2013, with: Count 

1, Conspiracy to Distribute and Dispense Oxycodone without a Legitimate Prescription, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 846; and Counts 2 through 41 with Distributing and 

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Dispensing Oxycodone Without Legitimate Medical Purposes, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

On August 26, 2016, Petitioner pled guilty to Count 1 of the indictment pursuant to 

a plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to waive any 

right to appeal or to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, provided the court did 

not impose a custodial sentence greater than the high end of the guidelines range 

recommended by the Government. See, Plea Agreement, 8-9 [ECF NO. 55.] In 

exchange, the Government agreed to recommend a base offense level of 30, a 2-level 

safety valve departure pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) 

§§ 2D1.1(b)(6) and 5C1.2 if applicable, a 2-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility pursuant to USSG § 3E1.1, along with a 2 level increase for abuse of 

position under USSG § 3B1.3. Id. at 6. 

At sentencing, the prosecution requested a sixty-three month sentence, the low-end 

of the Guideline Range. On December 8, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced by this Court to 

57 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, and three years supervised release. 

[ECF NO. 65.] 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sentencing Error 

Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment due process rights were violated when 

the prosecutor wrongly claimed that the drugs prescribed by Petitioner caused Gabriel 

Nussbaum’s death of a drug overdose. (Mot. 2). Although the prosecutor knew that 

Nussbaum’s autopsy report showed no opiates in his system, he argued that “it’s by the 

grace of God that [Petitioner] isn’t looking at manslaughter charges” which would carry a 

twenty year minimum mandatory sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). (Id. at 3; 

Traverse at 3). As a result of the prosecutor’s presentation of false and inflammatory 

evidence, Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated under Alcorta v. State of 

Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) and 

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Napue v. Illinois, 369 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). (Supp Traverse 3-4). Petitioner contends 

that the prosecutor’s statements caused the Court to believe the sentencing 

recommendation in the plea agreement was sufficiently lenient in light of the seriousness 

of the offense, and resulted in a higher sentence. (Id.) Although Petitioner agreed to 

waive his appeal and collateral attack rights, he did not believe he was also waiving his 

right to challenge prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during sentencing proceedings, 

therefore he contends his waiver of appeal and collateral attack were invalidated by the 

Government’s misconduct. (Id.) 

The Government counters that Petitioner waived his right to collaterally challenge 

his sentence via a section 2255 Motion when he knowingly and voluntarily waived that 

right in his plea agreement. (Opposition at 9). By the terms of that agreement, the 

United States and Petitioner contemplated that he would not file any collateral attacks on 

his conviction and sentence if the United States abided by its promise to recommend a 

low-end sentence, which the Government did. (Id. at10). Petitioner has not argued that 

his waiver of appeal and collateral attack was not knowingly and voluntarily made, and 

the record supports this claim. (Id.) For this reason, the Government claims the Court 

should enforce Petitioner’s waiver and dismiss the petition. (Id. at 11). 

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and the plain language of the agreement 

will generally be enforced if it is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. 

Jeronimo, 398 F. 3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) overruled on other grounds by United 

States v. Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc). In contrast, the right to 

collaterally attack a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is statutory in nature, and a 

defendant may therefore waive the right to file a § 2255 petition. See, e.g., United States 

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (by entering plea agreement waiving right 

to appeal sentencing issues, defendant relinquished his right to seek collateral relief from 

his sentence on the ground of newly discovered exculpatory evidence). An appellate 

rights waiver “is enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to 

appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” 

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Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1153. To determine whether a guilty plea, and plea agreement, 

were knowing and voluntary, the court looks to the Rule 11 plea colloquy. Jeronimo, 398 

F.3d at 1157 n. 5. Such a waiver might also be ineffective where the sentence imposed is 

not in accordance with the negotiated agreement, or if the sentence imposed violates the 

law. United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). Finally, a waiver 

may not “categorically foreclose” defendants from bringing § 2255 proceedings 

involving ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntariness of waiver. Abarca, 985 

F.2d at 1014; United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, the prosecutor’s remarks regarding Nussbaum’s death did not violate 

Petitioner’s due process rights and invalidate his appellate and collateral attack waiver. 

During sentencing proceedings, defense counsel acknowledged that Petitioner had 

overprescribed drugs, but recommended a sentence of 5 months incarceration and 5 

months home confinement, with the ability to work or do volunteer service outside the 

home. (Sentencing Transcript at 4 [ECF NO. 67]). Counsel argued that Petitioner was a 

gifted healer who would better serve society by being able to help individuals as a 

massage therapist. (Id.) 

To counter this mitigation evidence, the prosecutor emphasized that Petitioner had 

been overprescribing “tens of thousands of pills” which had significant consequences. 

(Id.) To illustrate this point, the prosecutor described a few of Petitioner’s clients 

including: 

Gabriel Nussbaum, who was getting 25 Oxycodones a day by this defendant, 

written in his name and his mother's name. And when that wasn't enough, he 

switched over to Ambien and Soma, until Gabriel Nussbaum, at 24 years 

old, was found dead of an overdose from the pills this individual had 

prescribed. It's by the grace of God that he isn't looking at manslaughter 

charges because he was overdosing on Schedule IV substances that aren't 

covered by the code. 

(Id. at 10). 

Defense counsel responded by stating he was concerned about Nussbaum 

and did extensive investigation into that situation, but his conclusion was 

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Nussbaum had a medical condition which caused a lot of pain and for which he 

had been prescribed many of the same drugs by multiple doctors, including 

Petitioner. (Id. at 13). The Court considered this and other mitigation evidence 

provided by Petitioner, including a medical report which diagnosed Petitioner with 

significant mental health issues. (Id.) After considering this evidence, the Court 

reduced his sentence by 1 point, resulting in a guideline range of 57 to 71 months. 

(Sentencing Transcript at 19 [ECF NO. 67]). Rather than sentencing Petitioner to 

63 months as requested by the Government, the Court sentenced him to the lowend of the amended guideline range of 57 months. (Id.) 

The Court specifically addressed allegations made by the Government 

concerning Nussbaum’s death, stating, “I am not here to decide whether your drugs 

caused the specific death of the one individual or the other, but I have to believe it 

added to the cause, and as a result, that’s really just as serious.” (Id. at 19). While 

it was not the sentence requested by Petitioner, it was evident that the Court did not 

make a determination about Petitioner’s responsibility for Nussbaum’s death when 

pronouncing Petitioner’s sentence, although it was weighed and considered. 

Petitioner would like the Court to believe that the prosecutor’s statements 

violated his due process rights as defined in Napue and its progeny. The Court does 

not agree. Under Napue, “a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, 

known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” 360 U.S. at 269. To prevail on a Napue claim, “the petitioner must 

show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution 

knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) that the 

false testimony was material. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71. Evidence is material 

if there is “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 

the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In 

Hayes, the Ninth Circuit determined that the prosecutor’s knowing presentation of 

false evidence and failure to correct the record during trial violated the defendant’s 

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due process rights, noting that “[t]here is nothing redemptive about the sovereign’s 

conspiring to deceive a judge and jury to obtain a tainted conviction.” 399 F.3d at 

981. Similarly, in Alcorta, the defendant’s due process rights were violated during 

trial when the prosecutor told a key witness not to volunteer damaging 

impeachment evidence of which the prosecutor was aware and sat by while the 

witness committed perjury, leading to a reversal. 355 U.S. 28, 30-32 (1957). 

Unlike Napue, this case does not concern a conviction obtained through the use of 

knowingly false evidence, but rather, the impact of allegedly false and misleading 

evidence during sentencing proceedings. As indicated in Hayes, it is unquestionable that 

the utilization of false evidence to obtain a conviction invokes grave due process 

concerns, however the posture of a defendant who has pled guilty pursuant to a 

negotiated plea agreement with the advice of counsel and agrees that his waiver of 

appellate rights was knowingly and voluntarily given is in a much different position. See

Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (“safeguarding 

the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state, embodies the 

fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political 

institutions.”) 

Even if the prosecutor’s statement concerning Nussbaum was in whole or part 

factually incorrect, the evidence did not adversely affect Petitioner’s sentence because 

Petitioner’s sentence fell below the anticipated plea agreement range. Such a sentence 

cannot constitute a miscarriage of justice that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings” as defined in Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. 

Finally, there is no merit to Petitioner’s argument that his waiver is invalid on the 

basis that he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to allow the Government to present 

false evidence during sentencing proceedings. Petitioner contends that a defendant is 

entitled to know the entire scope of the rights he is forfeiting when he agrees to waive his 

collateral attack rights, which did not happen here. However, Petitioner’s only authority 

for this proposition is the dissent in Jeronimo, 398 F. 3d at 1158, which the Court does 

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not find persuasive. Instead, the Court finds that Petitioner was properly advised of the 

rights he was foregoing when he executed the plea agreement, including the waiver of his 

right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence. During the plea colloquy, the Court 

confirmed that Petitioner and his attorney had “gone over each and every page of the 

agreement” and that he understood the terms and conditions of the agreement, asking: 

THE COURT: Do you also understand if I pronounce sentence in 

accordance with the terms of the agreement, you have waived your right to 

appeal the sentence or at a later date, collaterally attack the sentence. Is that 

clear? 

MR. WATSON: Yes. 

(Change of Plea Transcript at 6-7 [ECF NO 75.]) 

 Because Petitioner agreed that he understood the rights he was waiving, the Court 

finds his waiver valid and enforceable. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1157 n. 5 (A waiver is 

considered knowing and voluntary where the plea colloquy satisfies Rule 11, and the 

record reveals no misrepresentation or gross mischaracterization by counsel that tainted 

the plea.) 

For these reasons, the Court finds the prosecutor’s statements did not violate 

Petitioner’s due process rights during sentencing proceedings. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing 

The right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment exists 

during sentencing proceedings. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012). To establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that: (1) the assistance provided by counsel fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To 

satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland test, the Petitioner must show that his 

counsel’s performance was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys 

in criminal cases.” Id. at 687 (quoting in part McMahan v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 

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771 (1970). In considering this issue, there pis a “strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct falls within a wide range of professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689. Moreover, courts typically find that post hoc complaints about the strategy or tactics 

that defense counsel employed are insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. 

See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 956 (2d. Cir. 1991) (holding that 

appellant’s displeasure with strategy employed by trial counsel was insufficient to 

establish ineffectiveness). 

Petitioner contends his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was 

violated by defense counsel’s failure to thoroughly research and present evidence to 

counter the Government’s introduction of inflammatory evidence regarding Nussbaum’s 

death. (Mot. 2-4). Counsel’s failure to introduce Nussbaum’s autopsy and toxicology 

reports constituted deficient performance because, without the reports, it made it appear 

that the plea agreement was fair by limiting the Government’s sentencing 

recommendation to a sixty-three month sentence for conduct which otherwise would 

expose Petitioner to a mandatory prison sentence of twenty years. (Supp. Traverse at 6). 

Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by receiving a much higher sentence as a result of 

counsel’s deficient performance. (Id.) 

In response, the Government argues that Petitioner was represented by experienced 

counsel who raised and advocated mitigating evidence with enough force to convince the 

Court to depart downward from the agreed upon range in the plea agreement. (Oppo. 

12). 

During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued for a minimal amount of 

custody by illustrating how Petitioner had been a successful medical professional who 

helped many people with pain management during the course of his practice, prior to his 

mental health issues deteriorating. (Sent. Tr. 13). Defense counsel acknowledged that 

Petitioner was prescribing large amounts of drugs to young people, but argued that 

Petitioner was manipulated by some of these addicts because he was a naïve, kindhearted person. (Id.) Counsel stated that Petitioner knew what he did was wrong, that he 

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accepted responsibility, and understood he was going to be punished. (Id.) With regard 

to the statements about Nussbaum’s death, defense counsel said:

I am concerned about the statements he [ASUA] made about Mr. Nussbaum. 

Of course, I was concerned about Nussbaum and did a lot of investigation 

into the situation. Mr. Nussbaum had suffered from a syndrome called 

Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, which causes an individual to have a lot of pain. 

He had been treating with many physicians and was basically receiving the 

same drugs that Dr. Watson was prescribing for him. 

. . . 

I have reviewed the autopsy report. There was an accidental overdose of 

drugs. Nussbaum was receiving drugs from lots of sources. So there seems 

to be an implication that they can't prosecute Dr. Watson for this, and the 

reason they shouldn't be able to prosecute was that the family just doesn't 

feel that he is responsible for it, for Gabriel Nussbaum's death. 

(Id. 13-14). 

Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, defense counsel conducted investigation into 

Nussbaum’s death, and determined it was an accidental overdose with no clear causation 

attributable to Petitioner. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (duty to 

conduct investigation into mitigating evidence exists during sentencing). Counsel referred 

to Nussbaum’s autopsy report in response to the allegations made by the Government and 

noted that Petitioner was not being prosecuted for Nussbaum’s death, which contradicted 

the implication made by the prosecutor that Petitioner was lucky he wasn’t facing 

manslaughter charges. Far from being deficient performance, defense counsel’s conduct 

was “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Because Petitioner fails to satisfy the deficiency prong of 

Strickland, the Court need not address whether he suffered prejudice, though it is relevant 

to note that Petitioner received a lower sentence than contemplated by the plea agreement 

due in part to defense counsel’s introduction of medical reports which outlined 

Petitioner’s ongoing mental health struggles. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has 

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not demonstrated he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing 

proceedings. Accordingly, the Court DENIES his claim. 

A. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A certificate of appealability is authorized “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 

meet this standard, Petitioner must show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the 

district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the 

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Petitioner does not have to show “that he should 

prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor.” Lambright v. Stewart, 220 

F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 

Having reviewed the matter, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right and the Court is not 

persuaded that jurists could disagree with the Court’s resolution of his claims or that the 

issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED . 

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion under section 2255 is DENIED 

without prejudice. Further, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

Dated: March 7, 2018 

 

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