Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01799/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01799-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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1 The criminal matter was heard by the Honorable Earl H. Carroll.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Patrick T. Buckner, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 01-01104 PHX FJM

v. ) CIV 10-01799 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

United States of America, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On August 20, 2010, Mr. Patrick Buckner (“Movant”)

filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, regarding a criminal conviction

and sentence entered by the Court.1 Respondent filed a Response

to Motion to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on

December 2, 2010. See Civil Doc. 16. Respondent also filed a

notice of supplemental authority. See Civil Doc. 19. Movant

filed a reply to the response on March 08, 2011. See Civil Doc.

22.

I Procedural background

On June 12, 2003, Movant, codefendant John Reagan, and

five others were charged in a third superseding indictment with

federal offenses arising from a conspiracy and scheme to defraud

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2 The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict with regard to the

charges against Mr. Capehart and the charges against him were

dismissed. The charges against another co-defendant, Mr. Palminteri,

were dismissed without prejudice on the government’s motion,

apparently prior to trial. The criminal docket in Mr. Mesler’s case

indicates that he was not present at his trial.

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their employer, Boeing, a helicopter manufacturer located in

Mesa, Arizona. See Civil Doc. 2, Exh. A. Movant was named in

Count 1 (conspiracy), Counts 2, 3, 11 and 22 (wire fraud), Count

37 (money laundering) and Count 38 (making false statements).

Id. Movant does not challenge his convictions on Count 37 and

Count 38. 

Count 1 of the third superseding indictment charged a

multi-object conspiracy to defraud Boeing of money and property;

to deprive Boeing of honest services through kickbacks,

conversion of stolen property, and acting in competition with

Boeing; and to unlawfully transport stolen and converted Boeing

parts in interstate and foreign commerce. See id. Counts 2

through 25 charged wire fraud by false pretenses and deprivation

of honest services. Id. On April 20, 2004, after a trial

lasting thirty days, the jury convicted Movant of all charges

against them. See Civil Doc. 6, Exh. U. Movant and Mr. Reagan

were tried with their co-defendants Mr. Capehart and Mr. Mesler.2

Evidence introduced at Movant’s trial established that,

in exchange for monetary “kickbacks” from authorized Boeing

Service Centers, Movant provided the Service Centers with stolen

Boeing parts at no cost; that he authorized greater discounts on

Boeing parts than that to which the Service Centers were

entitled; and that he authorized credits to which the Service

Centers were not entitled. The evidence also indicated Movant

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set up a business (“Procurement Specialists”) that acted in

competition with Boeing. Through this business, it was alleged,

Movant sold stolen Boeing parts and “after-market” parts made by

Boeing competitors to Boeing customers and Boeing Service

Centers. 

The prosecution presented thirty-five witnesses at the

trial. Mr. Burnison testified as an expert witness for the

government. Extrapolating from reports referred to by the

parties as “the Burnison Report,” this witness testified that

from 1996 through 1999, EM Helilogistics (“EMHL”, a Boeing

Service Center) ordered and paid for $2,343,004.72 in Boeing

products and received $659,396.87 in free products during 1998

and 1999 alone. See Civil Doc. 2, Exh. B & Exh. C. Similarly,

orders by Helicopter Parts and Services (“HPS”, another Boeing

Service Center) totaled $5,608,608.88 for the years 1996 through

1999, yet during 1998 and 1999 this Service Center paid for only

$2.3 million in product, i.e., HPS received $1,070,509.50 in

free products. See id., Exh. B at 1661-62, 1666-68. According

to the testimony of John Giddings, Boeing’s director of

financial services, these free product numbers were excessive.

Id., Exh. B at 1713-14. 

Trial exhibits 43(a), (e), (f), (h)-(j), and (l)

(“Exhibit 43”) were admitted as self-authenticating records.

See Civil Doc. 17, Tab 3; Civil Doc. 2, Exh. B at 1447-52,

1629-33, 1774-75. Exhibit 43 included checks issued from or on

behalf of EMHL and HPS to Movant and Mr. Reagan, or on their

behalf. Each check was charged as an overt act of the

conspiracy. 

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On October 8, 2004, Movant filed a motion for new trial

on the basis of newly discovered evidence regarding the Burnison

Report. See Criminal Doc. 585 & 593; Civil Doc. 6, Exh. V.

Movant claimed to have discovered “through inside sources” that

“the vast majority” of zero-dollar shipments reflected in the

Burnison Report for the year 1999 were, in fact, legitimate

shipments by Boeing. Criminal Doc. 593; Civil Doc. 6, Exh. V.

The trial court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in

March of 2005 on the defendants’ multiple post-trial motions.

See Criminal Docs. 642 & 643; Civil Doc. 6, Exh. W. Movant’s

counsel called David Hagstrom in support of the motion regarding

the Burnison Report. See Criminal Doc. 642 at 6-13, 163-218;

Criminal Doc. 643 at 229-92. The government presented witnesses

in response.

The Court took the motions for a new trial based on

newly discovered evidence and the motion for a new trial at

Criminal Doc. 585 under advisement and denied the motions in a

written order issued January 4, 2007. See Criminal Doc. 684;

Civil Doc. 17, Tab 5 at 110-16. The Court found: (1) that

defense witness David Hagstrom, a Boeing employee who was

previously supervised by Movant, had assisted the defendants in

reviewing the Boeing documents alleged to be “newly discovered”

prior to trial; (2) the government provided a copy of the

Burnison Report to the defendants in mid-January 2004 and Mr.

Hagstrom had a copy of the Burnison Report when he reviewed the

Boeing records in February 2004, and Mr. Burnison did not

testify until March 11, 2004; (3) the Boeing records were not

“newly discovered” because they were “available and could have

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3 Movant and Mr. Reagan were released during the pendency of

their trial, their sentencing, and the conclusion of their direct

appeal proceedings. On August 28, 2009, Movant and Mr. Reagan were

ordered to surrender.

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been reviewed in exercising due diligence well before Burnsion

testified;” (4) “[t]he Boeing records, with possibly three minor

exceptions in more than a hundred instances, fully supported the

Burnison Report;” and (5) Mr. Hagstrom was a defense witness at

trial and the focus of his testimony was Rotor Wing, Hawaii,

Inc., i.e., there was no reference to the Burnison Report in his

testimony. Criminal Doc. 684 at 2-4. The trial court (Judge

Carroll) concluded that “[m]uch, if not all, of the ‘Newly

Discovered’ evidence at issue” was arguably cumulative or only

valuable for impeachment, that the evidence “would not lead to

an acquittal of either Defendant in the event of a new trial[,]”

and that the interests of justice did not require the granting

of a new trial as to either defendant. Id. at 6-7.

On January 31, 2008, more than three years after his

conviction, Movant was sentenced to a term of 41 months

imprisonment and a term of 36 months of supervised release. See

Criminal Doc. 751. Movant was also ordered to forfeit $140,000

to the United States. See id. Movant remained on release from

custody at that time. See Criminal Doc. 747.3

Movant took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. See Criminal Doc. 754. His appeal was consolidated

with that of his co-defendant, Mr. Reagan. Movant and Mr.

Reagan raised six issues in their joint appeal. They argued,

inter alia, that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the “Burnison Report”; (2) the trial court erred by

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admitting a series of checks issued to the defendants by Boeing

Service Centers EMHL and HPS; and (3) the trial court erred by

declining to use the defendants’ proffered special verdict

forms. The defendants did not appeal the denial of the new

trial motion based on “newly discovered” evidence allegedly

discrediting the Burnison Report.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s

conviction and that of Mr. Reagan, finding that the data

underlying the Burnison Report “would have been admissible as

business records[,]” that “the Government made the records

available to Defendants for inspection prior to trial[,]” and

that “any possible inaccuracies or manipulation of the

underlying data went to the weight of the report, not its

admissibility ... and Defendants had the opportunity to ‘alert

the jury to any alleged discrepancies’ between the report and

the underlying data[.]” Criminal Doc. 835. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals also determined that the “kickback checks” from

EMHL and HPS were properly admitted as “substantive evidence of

wire fraud and overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy[.]”

Id. The appellate court also rejected Movant’s argument

regarding special verdict forms, finding that such forms are

neither required nor favored within the Ninth Circuit’s

jurisdiction, and that the “[district] court provided a specific

unanimity instruction for each of the offense elements for which

a guilty verdict might possibly have rested on alternative

grounds, and that the jury is presumed to have followed” those

instructions. Id.

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II The parties’ arguments

In his section 2255 petition Movant asserts two grounds

for relief. Movant argues his convictions for conspiracy and

wire fraud are contrary to the recent United States Supreme

Court decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896

(2010), which limits conduct that may be prosecuted under a

“deprivation of honest services” theory of criminality. Movant

also asserts his trial counsel’s performance was

unconstitutionally ineffective because he failed to conduct an

adequate investigation and review of the documents in counsel’s

possession that undermined the accuracy and reliability of the

Burnison Report.

Respondent contends that Movant procedurally defaulted

a claim that the honest services statute pursuant to which he

was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, i.e., a Skilling

claim, by failing to raise it in his direct appeal and,

accordingly, that Movant is not entitled to relief based on the

claim unless he can show cause for and prejudice arising from

the default. Respondent asserts: 

Buckner did not argue below that honest

services fraud was void for vagueness or that

it should be limited to bribes or kickbacks,

nor does he claim to have done so.

Accordingly, he cannot satisfy the

cause-and-prejudice standard. Nevertheless,

a defendant who is unable to demonstrate both

cause and prejudice may still obtain relief

on collateral review if he can show that he

is “actually innocent.” Id.; Carriger v.

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc) (holding that a prisoner’s

freestanding innocence claim must

“affirmatively prove that he is probably

innocent”...

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Civil Doc. 16 at 10. Respondent contends that Movant is not

actually innocent of the crime of honest services fraud,

notwithstanding the decision in Skilling. 

With regard to Movant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, Respondent maintains:

Although Buckner fails to acknowledge it, his

current argument has already been considered

and rejected by the Ninth Circuit on direct

appeal. See United States v. Reagan, et al, 2009 WL 1185666 at *1 (9th Cir. May 4, 2009)

(unpublished memorandum decision) (finding

that data underlying the Burnison Report

“would have been admissible as business

records[,]” that “the Government made the

records available to Defendants for

inspection prior to trial[,]” and that “any

possible inaccuracies or manipulation of the

underlying data went to the weight of the

report, not its admissibility... and

Defendants had the opportunity to ‘alert the

jury to any alleged discrepancies’ between

the report and the underlying data[.]”)

Id. at 20.

In reply to the response to his section 2255 motion,

Movant asserts:

(1) that because Skilling was unexpected, he

did not procedurally default the claim and

need not prove his “actual innocence”;

instead his Skilling claim is controlled by

the more deferential “cause and prejudice”

standard; (2) Buckner’s Sixth Amendment claim

is not procedurally barred because a

different standard of review applies to Sixth

Amendment claims and the outcome is not

dependent upon the law of the case; and (3)

lastly, Buckner provides more specific

instances of deficient performance. 

Doc. 22 at 2.

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III Analysis

A. Movant’s Skilling claim

Because “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and

will not be allowed to do service for an appeal,” Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998),

absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a section 2255 movant

procedurally defaults all claims which were not raised in his

direct appeal, other than claims asserting that the movant was

deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct.

1584, 1594 (1982); United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 964

(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945

(9th Cir. 1993). 

“[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to

which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted

defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double

procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from

the errors of which he complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68,

102 S. Ct. at 1594. See also Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 964. The

cause and prejudice test for excusing the failure to raise a

claim on direct appeal is met when the movant’s claim rests upon

a new legal or factual basis that was unavailable at the time of

his direct appeal. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645-46 (1986).

A petitioner who fails to show cause and prejudice can

still obtain review of a claim on collateral attack by

demonstrating the likelihood of his “actual,” i.e., factual,

innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at 1611-12;

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United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007).

To establish actual innocence the movant must demonstrate that,

in light of all the evidence, including new evidence that might

be introduced by both sides, it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him. See Ratigan, 351

F.3d at 964, quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at

1611. Additionally, a movant is actually innocent when he was

convicted for conduct not prohibited by law. Cf. Alaimalo v.

United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (using this

test for actual innocence in the context of a petitioner seeking

relief on the basis of a claim that was not raised in the

petitioner’s direct appeal or first section 2255 action,

pursuant to the section’s “savings clause”). 

Respondent contends that Movant procedurally defaulted

his opportunity to challenge his honest services fraud

convictions under Skilling because he did not raise a legal

claim similar to that raised in Skilling during his trial or in

his direct appeal. Respondent concedes that the doctrine of

procedural default does not bar consideration of the merits of

the claim if Movant establishes cause for his default and actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged violation.

 The federal courts which have considered the issue have

determined that Skilling is applicable on collateral review to

cases which became final prior to the date the decision was

issued in 2010. See Stayton v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 2d

1260, 1268 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (so holding in a case wherein the

government had argued procedural default and conceded

prejudice); United States v. Jennings, 2011 WL 3609298, at *5

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4

The Court concludes that a certificate of appealability

should issue here. Courts applying Skilling on collateral

review have reached disparate results regarding the scope

and application of that decision. Compare, e.g., United

States v. Panarella, Crim. A. No. 00–655, 2011 WL 3273599

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2011) (granting writ of error coram nobis

and vacating defendant’s conviction for honest-services

fraud based upon Skilling), and Stayton v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (vacating conviction

on § 2255 motion in light of Skilling), with Ryan, 2011 WL

2624440 (denying relief from honest-services fraud

conviction under § 2255), and Rodrigues, 2011 WL 529158

(same). Although the Court believes its decision here is

firmly grounded in and supported by law, the facts of this

case, and Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent, the

case law recited above suggests the Skilling issue is

“debatable among reasonable jurists” and is “adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).

United States v. Jennings, 2011 WL 3609298, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 15,

2011).

5

The Supreme Court seems to have indicated that it is

intended to apply retroactively, by granting IFP, granting

a writ of certiorari, and vacating and remanding several

judgments based on the honest services provision in light

of the decision in Skilling. See e.g., Hargrove v. United

States, --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 3543, 177 L.Ed.2d 1121,

177 L.Ed. 1120 (Jun. 29, 2010) (No. 09-929); Redzic v.

United States, --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 3543, 177 L.Ed.2d

1121 (Jun. 29, 2010) (No. 09-7560).

DeGuzman v. United States, 2011 WL 777934, at * 2 (W.D. Tex. 2011).

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(D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2011) (denying section 2255 relief but

granting a certificate of appealability)4; DeGuzman v. United

States, 2011 WL 777934, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011).5 Some

federal courts which have considered the issue have also

concluded that, because Skilling marks such a “clear break” with

previous decisions, a section 2255 movant has established

“cause” for their procedural default of a Skilling claim. See

Stayton, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1265-66 (“Skilling represents just

the sort of clear break with the past that the United States

Supreme Court contemplated as giving rise to cause.” (internal

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6

The Court finds that Petitioner cannot establish the

presence of “cause” for his procedural default. Other

defendants in honest services actions asserted and

preserved the constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1346

despite the fact that existing case law was decidedly

against their position. See, Skilling v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S. Ct. 2896, [] (2010); Weyhrauch v.

United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2971, [] (2010);

Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 916–17 (7th Cir.

2011). Petitioner is not, however, without recourse because

he still has an avenue of relief under § 2241 should he be

able to establish “actual innocence.”

Walker v. Rivera, 2011 WL 4480170, at *3 (D.S.C. 2011).

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citations omitted)). But see Walker v. Rivera, ___ F. Supp. 2d

___, 2011 WL 4480170, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2011).6

Movant’s case became final in 2009. Allowing for the

most generous application of the relevant law, because some

courts have found Skilling applicable on collateral review to

cases final before the date it was issued in May of 2010, Movant

may raise a Skilling claim in this section 2255 action without

a showing of cause and prejudice. Additionally, should the

Court conclude to the contrary, i.e., that a Skilling claim may

not properly be raised because it is procedurally precluded, the

Court may follow the federal courts that have concluded that the

decision in Skilling constitutes adequate cause to allow a

federal court to proceed to the merits of a procedurally

defaulted “Skilling” claim. 

However, Movant cannot establish the “prejudice” prong

of the cause and prejudice test, nor that he is “actually

innocent”, because Movant is not entitled to relief pursuant to

the holding in Skilling. The theory of honest services fraud

voided in Skilling is not the theory of honest services fraud

pursuant to which Movant was convicted. Accordingly, neither is

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Movant entitled to relief on the merits of a Skilling claim.

The mail fraud statute reads in part as follows:

Whoever, having devised ... any scheme or

artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money

or property by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations or promises ...

[uses the mails in furtherance of the scheme

shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or

both].

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 & Supp. 2011). The wire fraud statute

is, in pertinent part, identical. See id. § 1343. 

In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S. Ct.

2875 (1987), the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory

language of section 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to apply only to

deprivations of property. In response to McNally, Congress

broadened the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes by

enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346. That section provides:

For the purposes of this chapter [including

§ 1341 and § 1343], the term “scheme or

artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or

artifice to deprive another of the intangible

right to honest services.

18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000 & Supp. 2001). 

Thus, § 1346 brought schemes to deprive

another of honest services within the scope

of the mail and wire fraud statutes. In

Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court

addressed the scope and constitutionality of

§ 1346, concluding that the statute

criminalizes only “fraudulent schemes to

deprive another of honest services through

bribes or kickbacks.” Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at

2928, 2931.

United States v. Redzic, 627 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 2010).

In Skilling the Supreme Court held that, for purposes

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, the term “scheme or artifice to

defraud” in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (the “honest services” provision),

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7

In June 2010, the Supreme Court decided Skilling v. United

States, ---U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 2896, [] (2010). Vacating

the conviction of Jeffrey Skilling on charges that grew out

of the Enron collapse, the Supreme Court held there that

“honest services” mail fraud encompasses only “paradigmatic

cases of bribes and kickbacks.” 130 S. Ct. at 2933.

Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 978-79 (N.D. Ill. 2010).

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applies only to bribes and kickbacks.7 See Skilling, 130 S. Ct.

at 2905-06 (as compared to the loss of “intangible rights” such

as “honest services”, for example, by a public official’s

undisclosed self-dealing). The Supreme Court concluded that

“there is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to reach at

least bribes and kickbacks” because the “vast majority” of

pre-McNally honest services cases involved bribery or kickback

schemes. Id. at 2930-31 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

The Skilling opinion states that “[c]onstruing the

honest-services statute to extend beyond that core meaning,”

such as to reach undisclosed conflicts of interests, “would

encounter a vagueness shoal.” Id. at 2907. Accordingly, “[t]o

preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional

limitations,” the Supreme Court held that section 1346

“criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the

pre-McNally case law.” Id. at 2931. The Court reasoned that

construing section 1346 to encompass bribery and kickback

schemes did not raise the notice and arbitrary-prosecution

concerns underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine, id., 130 S.

Ct. at 2933-34, stating: “whatever school of thought concerning

the scope and meaning of § 1346, it has always been as plain as

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a pikestaff that bribes and kickbacks constitute honest-services

fraud, and the statute’s mens rea requirement further blunts any

notice concern.” Id. at 2933 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

In the Skilling case the charged conspiracy contained

three objects: honest-services wire fraud, money-or-property

wire fraud, and securities fraud. Id. Because the government

did not allege that the defendant had solicited or accepted a

bribe or kickback in exchange for making misrepresentations

about the corporation to shareholders, the Supreme Court

concluded that “[he] did not commit honest-services fraud.” Id.

However, explicit in the Supreme Court’s decision is the

conclusion that fraud convictions based on both an invalid

honest-services theory and a separate, valid money-property

theory are subject to harmless error analysis and “do[] not

necessarily require reversal.” Id., citing Hedgpeth v. Pulido,

555 U.S. 57, 129 S. Ct. 530 (2008). 

Movant acknowledges the government argued a theory of

honest-services prosecution which is still viable after

Skilling, i.e., that he received kickbacks from third parties to

the detriment of Boeing. He alleges, however, that it is

impossible to determine whether the jury convicted him based on

the kickback theory of liability because the government

“consistently” alleged he also deprived Boeing of his honest

services by acting contrary to Boeing’s interests and acting in

competition with Boeing, theories invalidated by Skilling.

Movant argues that special verdict forms were the only way to

determine the basis of liability and the trial court declined to

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use them, therefore, his convictions must be vacated.

Respondent argues:

Buckner is mistaken. A review of the record

establishes that neither the holding in

Skilling nor the lack of special verdict

forms provide a basis for disturbing his

convictions for conspiracy or honest services

wire and mail fraud. As will be demonstrated

below, the jury convicted Buckner of the

substantive crimes of (1) wire fraud

involving only a legally-valid kickback

theory of honest-services fraud, (2) mail

fraud involving a scheme to deprive Boeing of

money and property and of honest services

through the theft and conversion of its

property, and (3) interstate transportation

of stolen and converted property. By

convicting Buckner of those substantive

counts, the jury must necessarily have found

beyond a reasonable doubt those specific,

legally-valid, objects of the conspiracy.

Therefore, all of his convictions remain

valid post-Skilling, and he is entitled to no

relief.

Doc. 16 at 12.

Respondent further asserts:

A plain reading of the instructions fairly

compels the conclusion that [Movant] could be

convicted of wire fraud only if the jury

found beyond a reasonable doubt that he

participated in a kickback-scheme to defraud

Boeing. ...

*** 

It is clear the indictment, the jury

instructions, and the prosecutor’s carefullycompartmentalized argument ensured that the

jury understood that Counts 2-25 were based

exclusively on a kickback theory of

honest-services fraud. Thus, because the jury

necessarily must have convicted Buckner on a

kickback theory of honest-services wire fraud

he cannot establish actual innocence; the

conduct for which he was convicted remains

criminal after Skilling. His motion must be

denied with respect to wire fraud. (Counts

7,9,10,13,14,16-20,23-25).

Id. at 15.

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Skilling applied harmless error analysis to the

challenged jury instruction regarding conviction on an

impermissible legal theory. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has held that the harmless error standard applies in section

2255 actions wherein the adequacy of or confusion regarding jury

instructions are challenged on the basis that they allowed the

jury to convict on an improper legal theory. See, e.g., United

States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, in applying the above standard to the instant case,

the Court must examine the findings made by the jury. The

allegedly erroneous jury instruction, i.e., purportedly allowing

the jury to convict based on an interpretation of the statute

which violates the holding in Skilling, was harmless error

unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence”

on the jury’s determination. See Hedgpeth, 55 U.S. at 59-62,

129 S. Ct. at 531-33.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this matter,

including the pleadings currently before the Court and the

attached transcripts of the trial and exhibits, the indictments,

the jury instructions, and the transcripts of the opening and

closing arguments, the Magistrate Judge concludes that the

government established Movant’s guilt by participation in a

bribery kickback scheme involving money and property, a theory

of guilt clearly preserved in Skilling. Any error in the

challenged jury instruction was harmless and, accordingly,

Movant is not entitled to relief on the basis of the Supreme

Court’s holding in Skilling. Skilling limited the scope of

honest services fraud to its historic “core,” defining the

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“core” of honest services fraud to include “only the types of

bribery and kickback schemes that were criminalized in cases

prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. United

States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987).”

United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2011). 

 In Skilling itself, the Supreme Court distinguished

conventional fraud from § 1346 honest-services fraud as follows:

Unlike [conventional] fraud in which the

victim’s loss of money or property supplied

the defendant’s gain, with one the mirror

image of the other, the honest-services

theory targeted corruption that lacked

similar symmetry. While the offender

profited, the betrayed party suffered no

deprivation of money or property; instead, a

third party, who had not been deceived,

provided the enrichment.

130 S. Ct. at 2926. 

The jury was presented with sufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction for fraud under the money-or-property

theory. Because the jury was instructed on a valid theory of

guilt, of which sufficient evidence was presented, the

challenged instruction was harmless. See United States v. Black,

625 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2010) (submission of honest services

fraud charge to the jury did not contaminate defendant’s

conviction for obstruction of justice because evidence was

sufficient to convict defendant); United States v. Johnson, 463

F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2006).

B. Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

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ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

2005).

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “a

reasonably competent attorney, whose advice is within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). In order to find that

Movant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and

grant him relief on this claim pursuant to section 2255 the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was deficient and that

the deficient performance prejudiced Movant. See United States

v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2011). Movant

bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the

Court can conclude his counsel’s representation was

unconstitutionally ineffective. Id. 

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

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2065. See also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th Cir.

2002). There is a “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s

conduct and strategy falls “within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina,

934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Movant contends that his trial counsel’s performance

was deficient because counsel failed to review all of the

documents underlying the Burnison Report prior to trial. Movant

asserts that evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for

new trial demonstrates the Burnison Report was not a summary of

otherwise admissible business records, but “[r]ather, it was a

list of data specifically selected based on very limited

criteria set forth by the Government to manipulate shipments to

EMHL and HPS, and improperly suggest that it constitutes ‘free

product.’” Movant argues he was prejudiced by his counsel’s

lack of review because it resulted in his counsel’s failure to

expose the Burnison Report’s vulnerability to being excluded as

evidence or “the defense would have been able to destroy its

credibility on cross-examination and squarely refute the

Government’s suggestion that it demonstrated $1.7 million loss

to Boeing in ‘free’ parts.”

Respondent alleges Movant is simply re-urging an

argument rejected in the motion for a new trial and rejected by

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Movant’s direct appeal.

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Respondent contends that, because Movant presents no facts which

were not considered by the trial court (in the motion for a new

trial) and in his direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals’ decision regarding this issue is law of the case and

that the Court should not re-examine the issue in the context of

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Whether pursuant to a “law of the case” theory or the

application of section 2255, as a general rule, “[i]ssues

disposed of on a previous direct appeal are not reviewable in a

subsequent § 2255 proceeding.” United States v. Currie, 589

F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1979). A section 2255 petitioner may,

in limited circumstances, raise claims of trial court error that

were previously raised and decided on direct appeal. See

Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis

added), citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8,

89 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 n.8 (1969).

The scope of this exception has been

clarified by Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

case law. The guiding principles may be

summarized as follows: When a district court

is confronted by a repetitive claim in a §

2255 Motion, the court may refuse to consider

the claim and may give controlling weight to

the court of appeals’ determination if (1)

the “same ground” presented in the § 2255

Motion was previously determined adversely to

the petitioner; (2) the prior determination

was “on the merits;” and (3) the “ends of

justice” would not be served by reaching the

merits of the claim in the subsequent § 2255

Motion. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,

15, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077, [] (1963); Molina v.

Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989);

Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1135

(9th Cir. 1976).

United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 974 F. Supp. 1311, 1317 (S.D.

Cal. 1997).

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“[A] ground is successive if the basic thrust or

‘gravamen’ of the legal claim is the same, regardless of whether

the basic claim is supported by new and different legal

arguments.” Molina, 886 F.2d at 1129 (citations omitted). The

“ends of justice” require consideration of an issue determined

by the Court of Appeals only when there has been a change in the

law or “manifest injustice” will result if the petitioner is not

excused for failing to advance in the earlier proceedings the

arguments he raises in the section 2255 motion. See id. at

1131; Polizzi, 550 F.2d at 1135; Olmos-Esparza, 974 F. Supp. at

1317.

Movant is procedurally barred from relitigating the

question of his counsel’s alleged failure to adequately examine

the records underlying the Burnison Report because Movant

effectively litigated the prejudicial effect of the issue in his

motion for a new trial and on direct appeal. Accordingly,

Movant may not revisit the issue for a third time by way of

collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

See Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 537 F.2d 1182, 1183 (4th Cir.

1976); Higgs v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 2d 479, 525 (D. Md.

2010). See also United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343

(11th Cir. 2000) (“‘[O]nce a matter has been decided adversely

to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a

collateral attack under section 2255.’”, quoting United States

v. Natelli, 553 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1977)); United States v.

Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2005); Jackson v. United

States, 638 F. Supp. 2d 514, 571 (W.D.N.C. 2009).

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Presuming that the issue of counsel’s alleged

unconstitutional ineffectiveness is properly before the Court,

and not foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’

decision in Movant’s direct appeal, Movant cannot establish that

any “failure” by his counsel was prejudicial. When examining

the underlying argument regarding the vulnerability of the

Burnison Report, the trial court concluded: “The Boeing records,

with possibly three minor exceptions in more than a hundred

instances, fully supported the Burnison Report.” Doc. 16, Tab

5 at 112; Criminal Doc. 684. The Magistrate Judge concludes

that any deficiency in counsel’s performance was not prejudicial

because it is extremely unlikely that the Burnison Report would

have been excluded or that any additional diminution of the

report’s validity would have resulted in an acquittal.

IV Conclusion

Movant is not entitled to relief on the merits of his

Skilling claim because any error in instructing the jury in this

matter which might have allowed the jury to convict on the

theory of guilt invalidated by the holding in Skilling was

harmless error. Additionally, Movant is not entitled to relief

on his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Buckner’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

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appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

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wrong. Should Movant seek a certificate of appealability, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the request be denied.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2011.

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