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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 2016 Decided July 29, 2016

No. 15-5109

BLUE WATER NAVY VIETNAM VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC.

AND MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY, INC.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-01187)

John B. Wells argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. 

William E. Havemann, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief 

were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH, and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Blue Water Navy Vietnam 

Veterans Association and Military-Veterans Advocacy appeal

the district court’s dismissal of their complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Because Congress stripped the 

district court of jurisdiction over their claims, we affirm. 

I

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States used an 

herbicide known as Agent Orange to clear heavily forested 

areas in Vietnam. See S. REP. NO. 100-439, at 64 (1988). 

Concerns about the long-term health effects of exposure to 

Agent Orange led Congress to pass the Agent Orange Act of 

1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (codified in scattered 

sections of Title 38 of the U.S. Code). The Act instructs the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to presume that 

veterans who “served in the Republic of Vietnam” between 

January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975, were exposed to Agent 

Orange. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(1). The VA’s regulations track 

this statutory language. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii)

(providing that veterans who “served in the Republic of 

Vietnam” during the same window are “presumed to have 

been exposed” to Agent Orange and similar herbicides). If 

these veterans develop certain diseases linked to Agent 

Orange, this presumption allows them to receive disability 

compensation without proving they were exposed to the 

herbicide during their military service. See id.; Haas v. Peake, 

525 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

The VA interprets the phrase “served in the Republic of 

Vietnam” to exclude veterans who served on ships offshore 

without entering inland waterways or setting foot on 

Vietnamese soil. VA Op. Gen. Counsel Prec. 27-97, at 3-5 

(1997); see Disease Associated with Exposure to Certain 

Herbicide Agents: Type 2 Diabetes, 66 Fed. Reg. 23,166, 

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23,166 (May 8, 2001). Instead, to be considered eligible for 

certain benefits, these “blue-water” veterans must prove on a 

case-by-case basis that they were exposed to Agent Orange

during their military service—an extremely difficult task, see 

LeFevre v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 66 F.3d 1191, 

1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Congress [established presumptions 

of exposure] because it recognized that ordinarily it would be 

impossible for an individual veteran to establish that his 

disease resulted from exposure to herbicides in Vietnam.”).

The VA articulated its policy denying the presumption of 

exposure to blue-water veterans in a 1997 opinion by its 

General Counsel, see VA Op. Gen. Counsel Prec. 27-97, 

which was precedential and therefore binding upon the 

agency, see 38 C.F.R. § 14.507(b). And it reiterated its stance 

in, among other documents, an agency policy manual. The 

agency then declined to reconsider the policy in a 2012 notice 

published in the Federal Register, see Presumption of 

Exposure to Herbicides for Blue Water Navy Vietnam 

Veterans Not Supported, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,170 (Dec. 26, 

2012), and again in a 2013 letter to Military-Veterans 

Advocacy (“2013 Denial Letter”). The VA treated its 2013 

Denial Letter as a denial of a request for rulemaking under 5 

U.S.C. § 553(e). 

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association and 

Military-Veterans Advocacy (“Appellants”) challenged the 

agency’s policy in district court. They argued that the VA’s 

policy was arbitrary and capricious and otherwise unlawful

under the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2). They asked the district court to issue a declaratory 

judgment that the policy violated the APA and to order 

injunctive and mandamus relief to prevent the VA from 

denying the presumption of Agent Orange exposure to bluewater veterans. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, citing 38 U.S.C. § 511(a), which

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bars review in district court of VA decisions “under a law that 

affects the provision of” veterans benefits. 

This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the district court’s dismissal de 

novo. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 578 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). We affirm.

II

We start from the presumption that agency action is 

reviewable. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 

476 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1986). But this presumption can be 

overcome by “specific language” that is “a reliable indicator 

of congressional intent” that courts lack the power to hear a 

challenge to agency action. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 

U.S. 340, 349 (1984). We permit such a challenge to proceed 

“where substantial doubt about the congressional intent 

exists.” El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1272, 

1276 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 672 n.3).

Here, we have no doubt about Congress’s intent.

A

Section 511(a) clearly bars the district court from 

adjudicating Appellants’ challenge. In full, that provision 

reads:

The [VA] Secretary shall decide all questions of law and 

fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law 

that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to 

veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans. 

Subject to [enumerated exceptions], the decision of the 

Secretary as to any such question shall be final and 

conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official 

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or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of 

mandamus or otherwise.

38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (emphasis added). One enumerated 

exception to this bar allows litigants to appeal individual 

benefits determinations through the VA’s administrative 

machinery and ultimately to the Federal Circuit. See id. 

§ 511(b)(4); see also id. §§ 7104, 7252, 7261, 7292. Another 

exception permits direct review of notice-and-comment 

rulemakings and certain other VA actions of “general” 

applicability exclusively in the Federal Circuit. See id. 

§ 511(b)(1); see also id. § 502 (cross-referencing 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 552(a)(1), 553). Notably, both of these routes bypass 

district courts.

We have interpreted section 511(a) to “preclude[] judicial

review in [district] courts of VA decisions affecting the 

provision of veterans’ benefits.” Price v. United States, 228 

F.3d 420, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Or to put it 

another way, review in the district courts is barred when 

“underlying the claim is an allegation that the VA 

unjustifiably denied [] a veterans’ benefit.” Id.; see also 

Broudy v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(explaining that section 511(a) forbids district court “review

[of] the Secretary’s actual decision[] that veterans were not 

entitled to the benefits they sought” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 974-75 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (recognizing that section 511(a) precludes district 

court review when a “denial of benefits underlies” the 

plaintiff’s allegations (internal quotation marks and brackets 

omitted)).

Appellants have not established that the district court has 

jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims. See Khadr v. United 

States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he party 

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claiming subject matter jurisdiction . . . has the burden to 

demonstrate that it exists.”). They undoubtedly challenge a 

decision “affecting the provision of veterans’ benefits,” Price, 

228 F.3d at 421, because they seek review of the validity of a

VA policy that leads directly to the denial of certain benefits 

for most, if not all, of the veterans it affects, see LeFevre, 66 

F.3d at 1197 (recognizing that it is nearly “impossible” for 

veterans to prove exposure on a case-by-case basis). 

Indeed, Appellants do not dispute that a “denial of 

benefits underlies” their allegations. Thomas, 394 F.3d at 974-

75 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Nor do 

they contest that their challenge would require the district 

court to adjudicate questions decided by the Secretary that are

“necessary” to the Secretary’s decision to deny the Agent 

Orange presumption. 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Instead, Appellants

argue that despite its broad language, section 511(a) bars the 

district court from hearing only challenges to individual 

benefits determinations—not challenges alleging that the VA 

improperly interpreted its statutory and regulatory obligations. 

But section 511(a) is not so narrow. Not only does the 

text of section 511 make no mention of such a limitation, but 

its structure belies Appellants’ assertion. As the district court 

observed, one of the exceptions to section 511(a)’s bar 

permits review exclusively in the Federal Circuit of certain 

VA actions of general applicability, see 38 U.S.C. 

§ 511(b)(1), including “substantive rules of general 

applicability,” LeFevre, 66 F.3d at 1196 (explaining that the 

Federal Circuit “may directly review” such actions under 38 

U.S.C. § 502). Congress would have had no need to exempt 

agency actions of “general” applicability from the bar to 

judicial review set out in section 511(a) if it understood that 

bar to encompass only VA decisions regarding individual

benefits determinations.

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Appellants point to different statutory provisions to 

support their argument. In 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104 and 7105, 

Congress provided that an “appellant”—defined by regulation 

as a “claimant,” see 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(c)—may appeal to the 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals “questions in a matter which 

under section 511(a) of this title is subject to decision by the 

Secretary.” Appellants note that “claimant” refers to an 

individual veteran who submits benefits claims. We take 

Appellants to argue that Congress instructed in these sections 

that the only “matter[s] . . . subject to decision by the 

Secretary” under section 511(a) are those involving individual 

claimants. But we will not read the word “only” into the 

statute “when Congress has left it out.” Keene Corp. v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993). These provisions merely 

envision that some “matter[s] . . . subject to decision by the 

Secretary” under section 511(a) will involve individual 

claimants. And this reading is consistent with language in 

section 511(a) that contemplates appeal of individual benefits 

determinations. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (“Subject to [the 

exceptions in] subsection (b), the decision of the Secretary . . . 

shall be final[.]” (emphasis added)), (b)(4) (excepting appeals 

of individual determinations). 

Appellants also point to a number of cases that, in their

view, show that section 511(a) bars review in the district court 

only of individual benefits determinations. For example, they

rely on Broudy v. Mather, where we explained that section 

511(a) “does not give the VA exclusive jurisdiction to 

construe laws affecting the provision of veterans benefits or to 

consider all issues that might somehow touch upon whether 

someone receives veterans benefits. Rather, it simply gives 

the VA authority to consider such questions when making a 

decision about benefits . . . and . . . prevents district courts 

from ‘review[ing]’ the Secretary’s decision once made.” 460 

F.3d at 112. According to Appellants, this language means 

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that district courts are barred from reviewing only individual 

benefits determinations. We disagree. To the extent our 

opinion in Broudy might be read to suggest that section 511(a) 

bars review only of individual determinations, we take this 

occasion to clarify that opinion’s scope. Broudy presented us 

with no opportunity to consider whether section 511(a)

applies to VA policies of general applicability, such as 

regulations or interpretations. Instead, we examined whether 

the Secretary had actually decided certain questions when 

denying the plaintiffs’ claims in individual determinations. Id.

at 110, 114. In other words, Broudy focused on the 

requirement of a “decision of the Secretary,” and not on what 

kinds of secretarial decisions fall within section 511(a)’s bar.

It thus presents no obstacle to affirming the district court’s 

dismissal here.

Appellants further contend that if we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal, we will “do precisely what the Broudy court 

seemed to warn against: give the VA exclusive jurisdiction to 

construe laws affecting the provision of veterans benefits.” 

Appellants’ Br. 18. This concern is misplaced. We recognized 

in Broudy that section 511(a) does not confer such exclusive 

jurisdiction upon the VA; rather, it merely bars review in the 

district court of decisions that the Secretary has actually 

made. 460 F.3d at 112. Nothing in this opinion changes that 

conclusion.

Appellants next urge that Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 

970 (D.C. Cir. 2005), Anestis v. United States, 749 F.3d 520 

(6th Cir. 2014), and Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 

678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), show that actions 

“that d[o] not require the individual determination of 

benefit[s]” can be brought in district court. Appellants’ Br. 16.

To be sure, these cases explained that section 511(a) 

precludes judicial review of individual benefits 

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determinations in district court. But they neither held nor 

suggested that section 511(a) bars review only of individual 

determinations. Rather, they referred to individual benefits 

determinations simply because in each case, the VA argued 

that the petitioner was challenging such a determination and 

that judicial review was therefore barred.

In Thomas, for instance, we agreed with the VA that 

section 511(a) precluded challenges to the adequacy of 

medical services provided to the plaintiff. 394 F.3d at 975. 

These claims required the district court to “decide whether 

Thomas was entitled to medical treatment in the face of a 

prior VA determination that he was not.” Broudy, 460 F.3d at

115 (discussing Thomas). But we reached a different 

conclusion as to Thomas’s claims that the VA had wrongfully 

failed to inform him of his diagnosis. The “questions of law 

and fact” relevant to those claims dealt with “whether the 

alleged withholding of the diagnosis state[d] a tort claim, and

resolution of those questions [wa]s not ‘necessary’ to the 

benefits determination.” Thomas, 394 F.3d at 974. In other 

words, because “no denial of benefits ‘underl[ay]’ Thomas’s 

failure-to-inform allegations,” section 511(a) did not prevent 

him from advancing those claims. Id. at 974-75. Thus, the 

decisive factor in Thomas was not whether the district court 

would have to review an individual benefits determination, 

but whether it would have to review a benefits determination 

at all. Accord Anestis, 749 F.3d at 527 (holding that the tort 

claims at issue were “wholly independent[]” of any benefits 

determination).

Similarly, in Veterans for Common Sense, the Ninth 

Circuit did not interpret section 511(a) as barring review only 

of individual benefits determinations. There, the court 

concluded that a challenge by a veterans’ group to systemwide delays in benefits processing was barred under section 

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511(a) because it would require the district court to review 

thousands of individual benefits determinations. Veterans for 

Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1027, 1030. But in reaching this 

conclusion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the breadth of 

section 511(a)’s preclusion, concluding that it “extends not 

only to cases where adjudicating veterans’ claims requires the 

district court to determine whether the VA acted properly in 

handling a veteran’s request for benefits, but also to those 

decisions that may affect such cases.” Id. at 1025 (emphasis 

added) (citing Thomas, 394 F.3d at 974; Broudy, 460 F.3d at 

114-15). Far from strengthening the argument that section 

511(a) applies only to individual claims, this language 

suggests just the opposite: that under section 511(a), the 

district court cannot review a VA policy, like the one at issue 

here, that “affects” veterans’ requests for benefits.

B

Appellants raise three additional counterarguments, but 

none succeeds.

First, they contend that even if the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to order the VA to rescind its policy, it had 

jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201, to declare the policy arbitrary and capricious. But the 

language of both section 511(a) and the Declaratory Judgment 

Act forecloses this argument. Section 511(a) bars judicial 

review “by an action in the nature of mandamus or 

otherwise.” 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Appellants fail to explain why 

this broad language does not encompass a declaratory 

judgment. And the Declaratory Judgment Act permits a 

district court to issue declaratory judgments only “[i]n a case 

of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201; see also 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT et al., FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3655 (4th ed. 2016) (“Resort to 

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the Declaratory Judgment Act will not fill a gap in subject 

matter jurisdiction[.]”). Because Appellants’ challenge is not 

within the district court’s jurisdiction, the district court lacked 

power to issue a declaratory judgment just as surely as it 

lacked power to order the VA to act. 

Second, Appellants argue that the district court’s decision 

leaves veterans without a remedy, in violation of the 

command of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 

(1803), that individuals have a “right . . . to claim the 

protection of the laws” when they “receive[] an injury.” Id. at 

(1 Cranch) 163. According to Appellants, the Administrative 

Procedure Act provides a “default safety net” in such cases. 

Reply Br. 17.1 But it is not true that Appellants, or the 

veterans they represent, lack a remedy. To the contrary,

section 511 leaves open several routes for veterans or 

organizations to challenge the VA’s denial of the Agent 

Orange presumption.

For one, an exception to section 511(a)’s bar permits 

litigants to petition for direct review in the Federal Circuit—

and only the Federal Circuit—of VA regulations and certain 

 1 The government appears to believe Appellants are arguing 

that they are entitled to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 704, a 

provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that explains that 

“final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in 

a court [is] subject to judicial review.” See Appellee’s Br. 22-23. 

We do not understand Appellants to advance an argument under 

this provision. Even if they made such a claim, however, we need 

not decide whether they have an “adequate remedy in a court,” 

because 5 U.S.C. § 704 does not apply if “statutes preclude judicial 

review,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). The provision is therefore 

inapplicable here, because section 511(a) precludes judicial review 

of Appellants’ challenge. 

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other generally applicable actions pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 

§ 502. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(b)(1). Appellants say that this 

direct-review exception extends only to VA regulations and 

not to “interpretations” like the agency actions they challenge. 

But Federal Circuit case law makes clear that an agency 

policy need not be promulgated as a regulation, via notice and 

comment, to be reviewable under section 502. To the 

contrary, the Federal Circuit has explained that section 502 

permits it to directly review a wide range of “rules

promulgated by the Department of Veteran[s] Affairs, 

including substantive rules of general applicability, statements 

of general policy and interpretations of general applicability.”

LeFevre, 66 F.3d at 1196; see also Military Order of the 

Purple Heart of the USA v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 580 

F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the VA’s 

procedural change, adopted in a letter and not via notice-andcomment rulemaking, was a “rule” subject to review under 

section 502).

Indeed, the Federal Circuit has reviewed as a substantive 

rule a VA “notice” similar to the 2012 notice that Appellants 

challenge. See LeFevre, 66 F.3d at 1196 (citing Disease Not 

Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents, 59 

Fed. Reg. 341 (Jan. 4, 1994)); see also 77 Fed. Reg. at

76,170-71. And the Federal Circuit has held that section 502 

allows it to review the denial of a petition for rulemaking. See 

Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345, 1352 

(Fed. Cir. 2011). The VA treated its 2013 Denial Letter as 

precisely this type of action. Appellants offer no reason why, 

in light of this case law, they cannot seek relief in the Federal 

Circuit for agency actions other than regulations.

2

 2 We decline to speculate whether any action brought in the 

Federal Circuit would be timely, as the issue is not before us on 

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Moreover, another exception to section 511(a)’s bar 

permits individual veterans to appeal benefits determinations 

through the administrative process and eventually to the 

Federal Circuit. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(b)(4); see also id. 

§§ 7104, 7252, 7261, 7292. An individual veteran challenged 

the VA’s Agent Orange policy via this route—and lost—in 

Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There, the

Federal Circuit deemed the agency’s requirement that a 

claimant must have served on Vietnamese soil or in inland 

waterways to qualify for the presumption “a permissible 

interpretation of the statute and its implementing regulation.” 

Id. at 1172. 

Appellants assert that the administrative appeal process is 

insufficient, pointing to Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 313 

(2015). In Gray, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

reviewed the VA’s determination that a particular harbor in 

Vietnam was an offshore waterway and that veterans who 

served there were not entitled to the presumption of exposure 

to Agent Orange. The court held that the decision was 

arbitrary and capricious, vacated the agency’s policy, and 

 

appeal. And although we rest our holding on section 511(a), we 

also observe that to the extent Appellants challenge documents that

fall within the purview of section 502, that provision would appear 

independently to bar district-court review. See 38 U.S.C. § 502 

(providing for review “only” in the Federal Circuit); Veterans for 

Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1023 (explaining that if a “claim comes 

within either” section 511(a) or an exception in section 511(b) 

providing for exclusive review elsewhere, “the district court is 

divested of jurisdiction that it otherwise might have exercised”); 

H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 28 (1988) (noting congressional intent to 

“vest[] jurisdiction of challenges brought under the APA solely in 

the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit” and thereby “deprive[] 

United States District Courts of jurisdiction to hear such matters”).

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remanded the issue to the VA for reconsideration. See id. at 

326-27. In Appellants’ view, this vacatur and remand shows 

that the court lacked the power to order the VA “to grant the 

presumption of exposure to the entire spectrum of Blue Water 

Navy veterans.” Appellants’ Br. 19. Appellants read too much 

into the Gray opinion. That the court vacated unsupported 

agency action does not reveal any structural failing on its part; 

to the contrary, vacatur is the “normal remedy” for such 

deficiencies, even in Article III courts like ours. Allina Health 

Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2014). And

the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did not say that it 

was vacating and remanding the policy because it lacked 

power to order the VA to act; instead, it explained that it did 

so because it “decline[d] to usurp the Agency’s authority and 

impose its own” definition of inland waterways. McDonald, 

27 Vet. App. at 326. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims has previously observed that it “has authority 

to issue extraordinary writs in aid of its jurisdiction pursuant 

to the All Writs Act,” including writs of mandamus ordering 

the VA to act. Ebert v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 434, 437 (1993)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).

Appellants further argue that the VA’s slow pace in 

reconsidering the definition vacated in Gray underscores the 

inadequacy of the administrative appeal process. But veterans 

and organizations are not without a remedy for delay by the 

VA. They may bring an action in the Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims to “compel action of the Secretary 

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7261(a)(2). We cannot ignore the limits Congress has 

imposed on district courts’ jurisdiction merely because we 

might prefer the VA to move at a faster pace.

Finally, Appellants assert that if we affirm the district 

court’s reading of section 511(a), we will produce “an absurd 

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result” by divesting various tribunals—including the Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme 

Court—of jurisdiction to review the VA’s actions. See

Landstar Express Am., Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 569 F.3d 

493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A statutory outcome is absurd if 

it defies rationality.”). We disagree. As we have explained, 

statutory exceptions to section 511(a)’s bar allow these bodies 

to review certain VA decisions. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(b)(1), 

(4). Our conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction 

to hear Appellants’ challenge does not bar review in these 

other fora.

IV

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’

complaint.

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