Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00323/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00323-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARTA ANGELICA HURTADO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF SCOTT R. 

JONES in his official capacity, DEPUTY 

DAVID CUNEO in his official and 

individual/personal capacity, DEPUTY 

GRANT HANEY in his official and 

individual/personal capacity, DEPUTY 

ERIC DUNCAN in his official and 

individual/personal capacity, and DOES 1-

100, Inclusive,1

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-00323 KJM KJN 

ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This matter is before the court on defendant Deputy David Cuneo’s motion for 

summary judgment of plaintiff Marta Hurtado’s excessive force claims. ECF No. 32-1. The 

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 The court has the authority to dismiss the Doe defendants sua sponte. Craig v. United 

States, 413 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1969). Because plaintiff has not identified or served any 

defendants in lieu of the Does originally named, all Doe defendants are dismissed. See ECF 21 at 

2 n.1.

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matter was submitted after a hearing on October 30, 2015, at which Nolan Berggren appeared for 

plaintiff Marta Hurtado while Wendy Motooka appeared for defendant Cuneo. ECF No. 42. As 

explained below, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion in part and DENIES it in part. 

II. JUDICIAL NOTICE 

As a preliminary matter, the court resolves requests for judicial notice. Defendant 

Cuneo requests the court judicially notice a plea of nolo contendere entered by plaintiff Marta 

Hurtado. Req. Jud. Not. at 4, ECF 32-3. The request is unopposed. 

As provided by Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may take 

judicial notice of an adjudicative fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either 

(1) generally known . . . (2) or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Images by Karen Marie v. Hartford Fin. 

Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 12–3005, 2013 WL 1832772, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2013). The court has 

authority to judicially notice relevant “documents on file in federal or state courts.” See Harris v. 

Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff Hurtado’s plea of nolo contendere is a matter of public record with the 

Superior Court of California. See Req. Jud. Not. at 4. The fact of the entry of plea is not subject 

to reasonable dispute, and is relevant to the analysis of plaintiff’s excessive force claims. 

Accordingly, the court takes judicial notice of the plea of nolo contendere. 

III. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

A. Noise Complaint at Birthday Party 

On April 20, 2013, plaintiff Marta Hurtado (“Ms. Hurtado”) attended a birthday 

party in Wilton, California. Hurtado Dep. 12:2–4, ECF No. 32-5. At least twenty-six people 

were present at this party, including Ms. Hurtado’s husband Octavio Palmas (“Mr. Palmas”). Id. 

at 12:10–11; 17:1–18:17. Mr. Palmas was the disk jockey at the party. Cuneo Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 

No. 32-4. 

Between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m., Sacramento County Sherriff Deputy David Cuneo, 

along with Deputies Eric Duncan and Grant Haney, came to the party in response to a noise 

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complaint. Cuneo Decl. ¶ 2. Upon arrival, the deputies informed Mr. Palmas they had received a 

noise complaint. Id. ¶ 3. Mr. Palmas agreed to turn down the music. Id. ¶ 3. 

A short while later, the deputies returned to the party in response to a second noise 

complaint Cuneo says they received. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. At approximately 11:40 p.m., the deputies 

again asked Mr. Palmas to turn down the music. Id. ¶ 6. In response, Mr. Palmas told the 

deputies they should leave because they had no right to be on his property. Id. ¶ 7. While Mr. 

Palmas was ordering the deputies to leave, Cuneo avers Mr. Palmas became irate and began 

acting in a disorderly fashion. Id. ¶ 8. As a result, Deputy Duncan arrested Mr. Palmas. Id. At 

the time this interaction occurred, Ms. Hurtado was away from the scene inside the house. 

Hurtado Dep. at 28:17–18, 38:13–14. 

A crowd started to form while Deputy Duncan arrested Mr. Palmas. Undisputed 

Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 4, ECF No. 37. The parties dispute whether the crowd started to yell 

at the deputies. Nonetheless, Deputy Cuneo stepped in as a buffer between Deputy Duncan and 

the crowd. UMF No. 3. Ms. Hurtado joined the crowd shortly after hearing of her husband’s 

arrest, coming within an arm’s length of Deputy Cuneo. UMF No. 6. 

At this time, the crowd started to voice their distress, with members asking the 

deputies what was going on and why, telling deputies they were trespassing, and demanding the 

deputies leave. UMF No. 7. At the same time, Ms. Hurtado’s aunt was screaming, yelling, and 

cursing at the deputies. UMF No. 8. At the time of her deposition, plaintiff described this scene 

as one of “chaos.” UMF No. 9. 

B. Deputy Cuneo Pushes Ms. Hurtado to the Ground 

In the midst of the screaming and “chaos,” Ms. Hurtado tried to get Deputy 

Cuneo’s attention, specifically by raising her voice to be heard over the noisy crowd. UMF 

No. 10. Deputy Cuneo states he held up his hands and instructed Ms. Hurtado to stand back. 

Cuneo Decl. ¶ 11.2 After Ms. Hurtado made several attempts to get Deputy Cuneo’s attention, 

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 Ms. Hurtado disputes she received such an instruction. However, she does not cite 

evidence in support of her dispute. Therefore, the court construes Deputy Cuneo’s statement as 

undisputed. See Huynh v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 06–0001, 2008 WL 2789532, at *15 

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Deputy Cuneo pushed her away. UMF Nos. 12, 13. Ms. Hurtado fell backwards to the ground 

and flat on her back. UMF No. 14; Hurtado Dep. 59:7–8. Deputy Cuneo states in his declaration 

he did not think his push would be sufficient to cause Ms. Hurtado to fall, particularly because of 

her large size. Cuneo Decl. ¶ 12. Ms. Hurtado is approximately five feet and nine inches tall, and 

weighs approximately 300 pounds. UMF No. 16. 

C. Deputy Cuneo Barricades Ms. Hurtado with a Couch 

Shortly after her fall to the ground, Ms. Hurtado got up and proceeded to walk 

back to the house. UMF No. 17. Because Deputy Cuneo had pushed Ms. Hurtado to the ground, 

he needed to document his use of force. UMF No. 18. When seeing Ms. Hurtado walk back to 

the house, Deputy Cuneo states he directed plaintiff to stop and come back to him. Cuneo Decl. 

¶ 15. Plaintiff disputes that Deputy Cuneo gave her this instruction. Hurtado Dep. at 60:12. 

After Deputy Cuneo’s failed attempt to recall Ms. Hurtado, he followed Ms. Hurtado into the 

living room to arrest her for not complying with orders and for interfering with his ability to 

complete his report. UMF No. 21. 

From this point in the encounter, the parties’ versions diverge. Deputy Cuneo 

states when he entered the living room, he tried to speak with Ms. Hurtado but she kept circling 

around a couch. Cuneo Decl. ¶ 18. In order to stop Ms. Hurtado’s from circling, Deputy Cuneo 

says he pushed the couch against a wall in the living room, effectively barricading plaintiff. Id. 

Ms. Hurtado disputes the couch was pushed against the wall. Hurtado Dep. at 60:15–21. Instead, 

she avers the couch was shoved into her side. Id. After the couch was pushed, Deputy Cuneo 

stepped up behind Ms. Hurtado and handcuffed her, led her to a patrol car, and wrote her a 

citation. UMF Nos. 26, 27. On August 16, 2013, Ms. Hurtado pled nolo contendere to the 

charges of resisting arrest and disturbing the peace. Req. Jud. Not. at 4. 

 

(D. Ariz. July 17, 2008) (construing defendant’s material fact as undisputed when plaintiff did not 

cite to record in support of a dispute). 

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Ms. Hurtado avers Deputy Cuneo’s actions caused several injuries including a 

head concussion, bruising to her chest, bruising to her back, contusions and dizziness. Hurtado 

Dep. at 60:8–9; 79:11–24. 

D. Procedural Background 

Ms. Hurtado filed this action on January 30, 2014. ECF No. 1. On August 30, 

2014, she filed her first amended complaint. ECF No. 14. To the extent relevant to this motion, 

the first amended complaint alleges Deputy Cuneo committed excessive force in violation of the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. On September 24, 2015, 

Deputy Cuneo filed a motion for summary judgment. Mot., ECF No. 32-1. Plaintiff filed a 

response. Opp’n, ECF No. 35. Defendant Cuneo filed a reply. Reply, ECF No. 40. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

When deciding whether an asserted evidentiary dispute is genuine, the court inquires whether a 

jury could reasonably find in the nonmovant’s favor from the evidence presented. Emeldi v. 

Univ. of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 730 (9th Cir. 2012). The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there 

are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they 

may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “there is an 

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish that there 

is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must “cit[e] to particular parts 

of materials in the record . . . ; or show [] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[The 

nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

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material facts.”). In addition to any cited material, the court may consider record materials not 

called to its attention by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). In requiring there be no genuine 

issue of material fact, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

247–48. 

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court does not weigh evidence or 

assess the credibility of witnesses; rather, it simply determines which facts the parties do not 

dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242. From the undisputed facts, the court draws all inferences 

and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. 

at 587–88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine 

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

V. DISCUSSION 

The court first considers whether Deputy Cuneo’s push to the ground and push of 

the couch constituted excessive force. The court next determines whether Deputy Cuneo is 

immune from suit on grounds of qualified immunity. As explained below, the court concludes no 

reasonable factfinder could conclude Cuneo’s push to the ground constitutes excessive force. On 

the other hand, disputed facts preclude a finding of summary judgment as to Deputy Cuneo’s 

push of the couch, analyzed both in terms of the excessive force claim and the qualified immunity 

defense. 

A. Deputy Cuneo’s Push to the Ground 

As noted, Ms. Hurtado claims Deputy Cuneo committed excessive force in 

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Opp’n at 4–6. Deputy Cuneo disputes the 

claim, arguing the undisputed material facts show his use of force was objectively reasonable 

under the circumstances. Mot. at 6–8. 

The court begins by identifying the specific constitutional right infringed by the 

challenged application of force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Not every 

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interaction between a police officer and a citizen calls for analysis under the Fourth Amendment, 

because not every interaction constitutes an arrest or seizure for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998). A Fourth 

Amendment seizure occurs only when (1) there is a governmental termination of freedom of 

movement through means intentionally applied, and (2) a reasonable person would believe she is 

not free to leave. Id.; United States v. Al Nasser, 555 F.3d 722, 728-29 (9th Cir. 2007). If the 

Fourth Amendment applies, a plaintiff’s excessive force claim will be judged under an objective 

reasonableness standard, which requires a balancing of the intrusion onto the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interest at stake. Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396. 

If a claim is not covered by the Fourth Amendment, it will be subjected to a 

substantive due process analysis. Cf. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843 (“Substantive due process analysis is 

. . . inappropriate . . . only if respondents’ claim is covered by the Fourth Amendment.”). The 

substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is 

violated only when law enforcement actions “shock the conscience” in that such actions are so 

“brutal” and “offensive” as to not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency. Id. at 

847. This is a particularly high threshold, as activity likely rising to the conscience-shocking 

level only includes conduct reflecting deliberate indifference or intent or purpose to injure in 

some way that cannot be justified by any government interest. Id. at 849–51. A showing of 

“deliberate indifference” does not shock the conscience when accompanied by proof that “actual 

deliberation” was impractical. Id. at 851. In those instances, only “purpose” or “intent” to injure 

shocks the conscience. Id. at 853. Even when evidence of purpose or intent to injure is shown, 

the intent to inflict force must be unrelated to the legitimate object of law enforcement. Porter v. 

Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The court has an independent duty to apply the correct legal standard, lest it abuse 

its discretion. See United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It is an abuse of 

discretion to apply the wrong legal standard.” (citation omitted)). Both parties assume a Fourth 

Amendment seizure occurred, and engage in a Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness 

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analysis without determining as a threshold matter whether the reasonableness analysis applies 

here. Mot. at 6; Opp’n at 4. Neither party shows how or why the Fourth Amendment applies 

given the facts of this case. As a threshold matter, therefore, the court itself determines whether 

the Fourth Amendment is properly invoked when assessing Deputy Cuneo’s push. See F.D.I.C. 

v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 379 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (identifying and applying 

the correct legal standard sua sponte). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court 

concludes the Fourth Amendment is not applicable to Deputy Cuneo’s push of Ms. Hurtado to the 

ground. It may be true the deputy used force to terminate Ms. Hurtado’s freedom of movement 

by prohibiting her from coming closer than an arm’s length to him. That act, however, does not 

constitute the type of stifled movement required to establish a seizure or detention for purposes of 

the Fourth Amendment. See Al Nasser, 555 F.3d at 728 (officer’s conduct must constitute a 

willful detention); see also Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 

2001) (concluding push by school administrator of student that propelled her backwards into a 

door jam was not the “type of detention or physical restraint that we require to effectuate a 

seizure” under the Fourth Amendment). Additionally, in the absence of evidence that Deputy 

Cuneo intended to detain Ms. Hurtado, no reasonable person in her situation would think she was 

not free to leave. Indeed, Ms. Hurtado did in fact leave the scene and walk back to her house. No 

seizure occurred for purposes of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Accordingly, 

plaintiff’s excessive force claim must satisfy substantive due process analysis to survive. 

Under substantive due process analysis, however, Ms. Hurtado’s claim based on 

the push cannot survive summary judgment. While it is true Deputy Cuneo’s force was strong 

enough to push her to the ground, such an exertion of force here does not rise to the conscienceshocking level. This is because the push took place amidst great noise and “chaos.” UMF No. 9. 

In that environment, actual deliberation to effectuate order would have been impractical, for the 

situation was “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396−97. In light of 

the circumstances, Ms. Hurtado must show Deputy Cuneo intended to cause harm. Lewis, 523 

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U.S. at 853. Considering Ms. Hurtado’s size, her fall to the ground, and the resulting injuries,3 a 

reasonable factfinder could conclude Deputy Cuneo intended to push Ms. Hurtado to the ground. 

Assuming intent, the evidence shows the minimally intrusive push was related to a 

legitimate law enforcement purpose. See Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140; Jimenez v. City of Costa 

Mesa, 174 Fed. Appx. 399, 402 (9th Cir. 2016). At the time of Mr. Palmas’ arrest, Deputy Cuneo 

served as a buffer between the deputies and the crowd. UMF No. 3. Deputy Cuneo’s serving as a 

buffer was for no reason other than to efficiently effectuate the arrest as well as calm the crowd. 

See Cuneo Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9. Considering the undisputed facts, no reasonable factfinder could 

conclude Deputy Cuneo’s push was for a reason other than to effectuate Mr. Palmas’ arrest and to 

calm the crowd, legitimate objects of law enforcement. 

Deputy Cuneo’s actions in this regard do not rise to the conscience-shocking level 

for purposes of substantive due process. Deputy Cuneo’s motion for summary judgment with 

respect to the push to the ground is GRANTED. 

B. Deputy Cuneo Barricades Ms. Hurtado with a Couch 

Ms. Hurtado contends Deputy Cuneo’s act of barricading Ms. Hurtado with a 

couch constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Opp’n at 4. Deputy Cuneo 

disputes the claim, arguing his use of force here as well was objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. Mot. at 7. 

The court, as a threshold determination, concludes Deputy Cuneo’s acts with 

respect to the couch do constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In 

line with the Fourth Amendment principles articulated above, the undisputed material facts show 

Deputy Cuneo intended to terminate Ms. Hurtado’s freedom through means intentionally applied, 

and a reasonable person under these circumstances would not feel free to leave. Shortly before 

Deputy Cuneo barricaded Ms. Hurtado against the wall with a couch, he was determined to arrest 

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 Again, Ms. Hurtado’s injuries she says stem from Deputy Cuneo’s acts included a head 

concussion, bruising to her chest, bruising to her back, contusions, and dizziness. Pl. Depo. at 

60:8–9, 79:11–24. The evidence presented does not make clear whether such injuries stemmed 

from Deputy Cuneo’s push to the ground, his push of the couch, or both. The court cannot find as 

a matter of law Ms. Hurtado’s injuries stemmed only from the push to the ground. 

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or cite Ms. Hurtado for not complying with his orders and for interfering with his ability to 

complete his report regarding the push. UMF No. 21. Whether or not Deputy Cuneo pushed the 

couch into the wall or into the plaintiff, both parties agree Ms. Hurtado was effectively 

“barricaded” by Deputy Cuneo’s actions. UMF No. 25. A reasonable factfinder could find these 

actions restricted Ms. Hurtado’s movement, and a reasonable person would not have felt free to 

leave. A factfinder could thus find Deputy Cuneo’s actions constituted a “seizure” within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“[U]se of force to effect an arrest is subject to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 

unreasonable seizures.”). The constitutionality of the deputy’s actions thus will be assessed under 

the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. 

The objective reasonableness standard requires a balancing of the intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interest at 

stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This balance involves the consideration of factors such as 

(1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. These factors are not exclusive; in assessing 

reasonableness, courts examine the totality of the circumstances and consider “whatever specific 

factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed in Graham.” Franklin v. 

Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994). As noted above, reasonableness determinations must 

allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make “split-second judgments in 

circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. In 

assessing reasonableness, the extent and severity of plaintiff’s injuries can be a factor in 

determining whether the force administered was excessive, particularly if the suspect posed no 

physical threat to anyone. See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] jury 

could reasonably conclude that there was little or no need for the application of force against 

Santos and that in light of his serious injury, the force used was both substantial and excessive.”). 

It is undisputed Ms. Hurtado committed a crime. Ms. Hurtado pled nolo 

contendere to charges of resisting arrest and disturbing the peace. Req. Jud. Not. at 4. However, 

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Deputy Cuneo does not contend Ms. Hurtado’s crime was severe. No reasonable factfinder 

would conclude Ms. Hurtado was particularly aggressive or threatening when circling around the 

couch before Deputy Cuneo used it to barricade her. 

In the same vein, no reasonable factfinder would conclude Ms. Hurtado’s actions 

threatened officer or bystander safety. At no time did Ms. Hurtado physically or verbally threaten 

Deputy Cuneo, even if she may have been uncooperative in the face of Deputy Cuneo’s orders. 

The undisputed material facts do not establish Ms. Hurtado posed a potential threat to deputies’ or 

others’ safety, much less an “immediate threat.” See Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 444 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (plaintiff’s lack of cooperation did not pose a threat to officer safety). 

Regarding whether Ms. Hurtado was “actively resisting arrest,” a reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that in circling the couch, Ms. Hurtado was evading arrest. Mot. at 7. 

Ms. Hurtado’s evasion or resistance to arrest, however, did not involve any violence or threat of 

violence toward the deputies or to bystanders. The nonviolent or nonthreatening nature of the 

crime at issue makes it more likely a reasonable factfinder could find Deputy Cuneo’s use of 

force was unjustified. 

However, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances and consider 

whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed in 

Graham. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 445. At the time Deputy Cuneo pushed the couch in an attempt to 

barricade Ms. Hurtado, there were several people in the room, some of whom were yelling. UMF 

No. 24. These facts evidence a tense, rapidly evolving situation in which Deputy Cuneo may 

have been forced to make a split-second judgment as to the amount of force properly 

administered. This reasonably justifies his use of some force. See Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 

546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding rapidly evolving situation justified the use of force). 

Even where split-second judgment calls are required, and “not every push or 

shove, even if it may seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers” is a violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 

omitted), it is equally true that even where some force is justified, the amount actually used may 

be excessive, P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, it is a disputed issue of 

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fact whether Deputy Cuneo pushed the couch into the wall or directly into Ms. Hurtado. Deputy 

Cuneo does not address Ms. Hurtado’s deposition testimony regarding the injuries she says she 

suffered as a result of his actions in pushing the couch. Specifically, Ms. Hurtado stated she 

sustained several injuries, including a head concussion, bruising to her chest, bruising to her back, 

contusions, and dizziness. Pl. Depo. at 60:8–9, 79:11–24. No evidence in the record allows the 

court to conclude those injuries arose only and entirely as a result of Deputy Cuneo’s first push. 

Evidence of Ms. Hurtado’s injuries, in addition to evidence of Deputy Cuneo’s shoving the couch 

toward her, may allow a jury to conclude Deputy Cuneo’s force was excessive. That this 

conclusion is possible precludes a finding of summary judgment. 

C. Qualified Immunity 

Even if the force was unreasonable, the doctrine of qualified immunity can protect 

a government official from suit. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A government 

official such as Deputy Cuneo may be immune from liability insofar as his conduct does not 

violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.” Id.

The qualified immunity test is two-fold. Under one prong, the court considers 

whether alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, show defendant’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Under the second 

prong, the court determines whether the constitutional right was “clearly established.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). If no constitutional right was violated, defendant is entitled 

to qualified immunity without further analysis. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“If the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right, then the Defendants are 

entitled to immunity and the claim must be dismissed.”). Courts in their sound discretion can 

address the two prongs in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Under the “clearly established” prong, the touchstone question is whether it would 

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) ( “[T]he . . . question in this case is, was the 

law such that it should have been clear to Detective Rogers that he was required in the situation 

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he confronted to give pre-deprivation and post-deprivation notice to an absent father.” (emphasis 

in original)). For purposes of qualified immunity, the right at issue must be defined at “the 

appropriate level of generality . . . [the court] must not allow an overly generalized or excessively 

specific construction of the right to guide [its] analysis.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 

1288 (9th Cir. 2000); see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“We have repeatedly 

told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high 

level of generality.” (citation omitted)); Thomas v. Dillard, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 1319765, at *16 

(9th Cir. 2016) (noting Supreme Court’s admonition). 

Here, the court has concluded above that no violation arose from Deputy Cuneo’s 

push of Ms. Hurtado to the ground. Accordingly, the court need not consider Deputy Cuneo’s 

entitlement to qualified immunity with regard to the first push. Deputy Cuneo’s push of the 

couch, however, is an issue properly considered under the qualified immunity analysis. Deputy 

Cuneo argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were “neither incompetent, 

not a knowing violation of the law.” Mot. at 9. In support, Deputy Cuneo cites Taylor v. Barkes, 

___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015), for the proposition that “qualified immunity protects 

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” See Mot. at 8. As noted 

above, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the circumstances surrounding Deputy 

Cuneo’s push of the couch, and whether Deputy Cuneo pushed the couch into the wall or directly 

into Ms. Hurtado. While use of the couch solely as a barricade to hem Ms. Hurtado in might well 

avoid liability, a jury could find that using the couch as an instrument to harm Ms. Hurtado 

violated her constitutional rights. If a jury believes Hurtado’s narrative, Deputy Cuneo would not 

be entitled to qualified immunity given that it was clearly established law at the time of the events 

that where there is no need for force, the use of force, including the form of a push greater than 

necessary, is objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Jimenez, 174 Fed. Appx. at 404; Cable v. City 

of Phoenix, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2016 WL 1380913, at *2 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Defendant’s motion in this respect is DENIED. 

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VI. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, this court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to plaintiff’s first claim of excessive force. The court DENIES the 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s second claim of excessive force. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 12, 2016. 

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