Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00606/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00606-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Petitioner is represented by individual counsel employed

by the firm of Quarles & Brady, who are acting in a pro bono capacity

through the Arizona Justice Project.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SEAN PATRICK WARD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-00606 PCT MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On March 19, 2007, Petitioner, through counsel, filed

a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.1 Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 13) on September 14, 2007.

Petitioner filed a reply (Docket No. 23) to the answer to the

petition on December 7, 2007. 

I Procedural History

On or about April 6, 2000, Petitioner was charged by a

Mohave County grand jury indictment with the first-degree murder

of Ms. Kristine McLaughlin. See Answer, Exh. A1. The

indictment alleged Petitioner had committed this crime on March

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26 or March 27 of 2000. Id., Exh. A1. 

Opening arguments in Petitioner’s jury trial began

February 22, 2001. Id., Exh. E. The state asserted in opening

argument that Ms. McLaughlin was murdered on the evening of

Sunday, March 26, 2000. Id., Exh. E at 9-10. The prosecution

alleged Petitioner had murdered Ms. McLaughlin because she had

ended their romantic relationship and because he was sexually

“obsessed” with Ms. McLaughlin. Id., Exh. E at 4. The state

alleged Petitioner had struck Ms. McLaughlin, then put a rope

through a hook in the ceiling and around Ms. McLaughlin’s neck,

hung her until she was dead, and then cut her down and leaned

her body against a laundry basket, and left the house. Id.,

Exh. E at 10. Petitioner’s defense counsel maintained in his

opening argument that the state would not be able to produce

enough evidence to allow the jury to find Petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., Exh. E at 24-27.

The evidence introduced at trial included the

following:

Ms. McLaughlin and Petitioner met in May of 1999;

Petitioner was in the process of a divorce at that time and was

not living with his estranged wife. Answer, Exh. M at 35-36 &

38. At that time, Petitioner was living with his parents and

working as a boat mechanic. Id., Exh. A, Document 174; Exh. M

at 34, 36, 40. Petitioner and Ms. McLaughlin began living

together approximately one month after they met, along with Ms.

McLaughlin’s children, Bryce, who was four and one-half years

old at the time of his mother’s death, and Brandon, who was

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2 Bryce was born on September 4, 1995, and Brandon was born

on January 7, 1997. See Answer, Exh. F at 37, 52 & Exh. G at 13–16.

Autumn was presumably born in 1993 or 1994 and died in January or

February of 1998 or 1999. Id., Exh F at 36 (Officer Koonce’s

testimony that Autumn died in February of 1999); Exh. L at 7 (Larry

Light’s testimony that Autumn’s birthday was October 12, 1993 and that

she started having health problems in January 1997); Exh. M at 83-84

(Petitioner’s testimony that Autumn died approximately one and onehalf years prior to his meeting Ms. McLaughlin in May of 1999). 

Brandon’s father is Will Stanley. See id., Exh. L at 11.

The record is not clear with regard to who fathered Bryce and Autumn.

See Answer, Exh. E at 43 & Exh. F at 36. Officer Koonce testified

that Mike Kinslow was Bryce’s father. Id., Exh. F at 36. Given the

rarity and the nature of the disease that caused Autumn and Alana’s

death, it is likely they both had the same father. Dianne Light,

Timothy Koonce, and Detective Spoerry testified Stacy Johnson was

Autumn’s father. Id., Exh. G at 14; Exh. F at 36; Exh. K1 at 34.

Autumn had the last name of Johnson. See id., Exh. F at 35-36.

Elsewhere in the record it appears that Mike Kinslow fathered Autumn

and that Mr. Kinslow told the presentence investigator that he had sex

with Ms. McLaughlin at about the time her daughter Alana, born in

January of 2000, was conceived. Id., Exh. A at Document 174. Ms.

McLaughlin married Mike Kinslow in 1995, after Autumn’s birth, and

they both separately filed for a divorce in February of 1996, after

Bryce’s birth; it appears the divorce was never granted prior to Ms.

McLaughlin’s death. (This information is gleaned from the public

record and the undersigned takes judicial notice.) Ms. McLaughlin

took an order of protection against Mr. Johnson in April of 1999,

shortly before she met Petitioner at about the time she became

pregnant with Alana. At approximately the same time Mr. Johnson was

charged with domestic violence, and in April of 2000 his case was set

for trial; however, Mr. Johnson fled and a bench warrant was issued

for his arrest in July 2000. (This information is gleaned from the

public record and the undersigned takes judicial notice.) 

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three years old at the time of his mother’s death. Id., Exh. F

at 37, 52 & Exh. G at 13–16; Exh. M at 4-42. Prior to meeting

Petitioner, Ms. McLaughlin’s daughter, Autumn, had died in 1998

at the age of four due to a rare genetic disease. See id., Exh.

A at Document 174; Exh. F at 36; Exh. M at 83-84.2

Petitioner and Ms. McLaughlin and her children lived in

Lake Havasu City in a house owned by her mother and step-father,

Mr. and Ms. Light, which was a short distance from their own

home. Answer, Exh. G1 at 17. Mr. and Ms. Light, who both

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3 Two witnesses inadvertently mentioned in passing during

their testimony that Petitioner had been in jail. Anticipating

Petitioner would testify and to avoid a mistrial by avoiding prejudice

to Petitioner, the jury was informed, and Petitioner testified, that

Petitioner had gone to jail for possession of drug paraphernalia.

Answer, Exh. H2 at 158-60 & 162-63, Exh. M at 35. Petitioner was

actually incarcerated because he violated the terms of probation

imposed for the paraphernalia conviction by committing assault and

causing criminal damage, charges arising from an incident involving

Petitioner’s father. Id., Exh. H2 at 158-60 & 162-63.

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testified at Petitioner’s trial, did not want Ms. McLaughlin to

have any other adult living with her in the home. Id., Exh. G1

at 22 & 95; Exh. L at 9-10. Testimony was presented that,

nonetheless, Ms. McLaughlin had several roommates in the house

after she began residing there in February of 1995, some of them

unknown to the Lights. Id., Exh. G1 at 22, 38-39, 94-97; Exh.

L at 9-10 & 12. Both of the Lights also testified they were

gone from their residence in Lake Havasu City and had little or

no contact with their daughter from June through October of

1999. Id., Exh. G1 at 20 & 93; Exh. L at 8.

 Approximately six or seven weeks after meeting Ms.

McLaughlin, in late June of 1999, Petitioner was jailed.

Answer, Exh. M3 at 207. Petitioner served time through October

of 1999 pursuant to his guilty plea for assault and criminal

damage, which events occurred while he was on probation.3 Id.,

Exh. M at 93. For several months throughout this time period,

until December of 1999 or January of 2000, an individual named

Troy Baker lived at Ms. McLaughlin’s residence. See, e.g., id.,

Exh. L at 58-59 & 173.

On January 15, 2000, approximately eight months after

meeting Petitioner, Ms. McLaughlin gave birth to a girl, Alana,

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4 It is unclear when Ms. McLaughlin and Petitioner became

aware, if not immediately, that Alana’s death was caused by the same

disease that caused Autumn’s death. Alana’s paternity was never

legally established. See, e.g., Answer, Exh. E at 28-29. The

extremely rare genetic disease which resulted in the deaths of both

Autumn and Alana only affects children who receive the subject gene

from each parent. See id., Exh. E at 29. See also Encyclopedia

Britannica (2007). Petitioner asserted in his interviews with the

police that Alana was his child and that Ms. McLaughlin intended to

have his name put on Alana’s birth certificate as the baby’s father.

Answer, Exh. H2 at 181-82.

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who died on March 11, 2000, as a result of the same rare genetic

disease that caused the death of Ms. McLaughlin’s daughter

Autumn.4 See, e.g., Answer, Exh. G1 at 27-28.

Testimony was presented at Petitioner’s trial which was

characterized by Respondents as showing Petitioner was jealous

and possessive of Ms. McLaughlin during their relationship. A

person who babysat for Ms. McLaughlin testified that Petitioner

was extremely possessive of Ms. McLaughlin and that he “kept

tabs” on her whereabouts after his release from jail in October

of 1999. See Answer, Exh. H2 at 109–14, 122–23, 126. The

babysitter testified Petitioner once became angry with Ms.

McLaughlin because she did not agree to leave Alana with the

babysitter overnight. See id., Exh. H2 at 122-23. The

babysitter also testified Petitioner had told her that he had

modified the doorknob of Bryce and Brandon’s bedroom door to

lock them in the bedroom from the outside. See id., Exh. H at

121. 

Two of Ms. McLaughlin’s female friends testified

Petitioner had refused Ms. McLaughlin “permission” to see her

female friends, that he interrupted and terminated telephone

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5 Petitioner’s trial counsel presented witnesses, including

Petitioner and Ms. McLaughlin’s roommate, Troy Baker, Mr. Baker’s

girlfriend Jeanne Jenkins, and their friend Wendy Fiscella, who all

testified Petitioner was more protective of Ms. McLaughlin than

jealous or possessive, especially after Alana’s death, that the two

had a good relationship, and that Petitioner was not jealous of Alana.

Answer, Exh. L at 59-61, 177-79, 213, 215, 224, 226-27. Petitioner’s

counsel discredited Kelly Hopson’s and Chris Schweitzer’s testimony

by, inter alia, soliciting on cross-examination that these witness had

used drugs during the time in question. Answer, Exh. G3 at 203 & 211;

Exh. H2 at 125.

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conversations between Ms. McLaughlin and her friends, and that

they left messages for Ms. McLaughlin with Petitioner which

messages she did not return or otherwise acknowledge. See

Answer, Exh G2 at 197-98; Exh. H at 85.5

 Testimony was introduced at trial regarding

Petitioner’s and Ms. McLaughlin’s sexual activity. Several

witnesses testified Petitioner told them he photographed Ms.

McLaughlin in the nude and that he used a video camera to make

pornographic videos of himself and Ms. McLaughlin, which videos

he and Ms. McLaughlin had discussed selling. Answer, Exh. G at

218–19; Exh. H1 at 88–90; Exh. H2 116–17; Exh. J at 50–58; Exh.

L at 97. Testimony was also introduced at the trial that

Petitioner had used ropes to bind Ms. McLaughlin’s hands during

sex. See id., Exh. G at 194, 204; Exh. H2 at 118–21; Exh. L at

98. A witnesses testified Petitioner had fabricated nooses and

also testified Petitioner told them that he used ropes to tie

Ms. McLaughlin to a bed during sex. See id., Exh. G2 at 191-94,

204; Exh. M at 240. Petitioner did not deny these acts during

his testimony but testified that he never did anything to hurt

Ms. McLaughlin and that she had always been a willing

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6

 Petitioner and Mrs. Ward’s divorce, after a thirteen-year

marriage, became final in December of 1999 and they remarried in

August of 2000. See Answer, Exh. J at 130-31; Exh. M at 34 & Exh. M2

at 195. Petitioner and Mrs. Ward have three children together. Id., Exh. J at 131; Exh. M at 35.

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participant in these activities. See id., Exh. M at 48-50 & 64-

65.

One end of the rope found noosed around Ms.

McLaughlin’s neck was attached to one of two hooks in the living

room ceiling of her home. Answer, Exh. DD at Slide 14.

Testimony was introduced at Petitioner’s trial that Petitioner

had installed hooks in the ceiling of the bedroom for use in

sexual activities. Id., Exh. H1 at 91. Although Petitioner

admitted at the trial that he had installed hooks in the bedroom

for sexual activity, he testified he had installed the hooks in

the living room of the home for a “Johnny Jumper” bouncing

device for Alana. Id., Exh. M at 58-63. Petitioner testified

that, when he installed the hooks in the living room, Ms.

McLaughlin, Bryce and Brandon were present, and that Bryce

helped him install the hooks. Id., Exh. M at 64. Troy Baker

testified the hooks in the living room were installed after he

moved out of the home in January of 2000. Id., Exh. L at 101.

Petitioner’s previous ex-wife, Ms. Janet Ward,

testified at his trial.6 See Answer, Exh. J. Ms. Ward testified

Petitioner had videotaped their sexual acts and that Petitioner

used rope to bind her hands and ankles during sex. Id., Exh. J

at 138 & 146. Ms. Ward testified Petitioner had previously

installed a ceiling hook in their bedroom for sexual purposes,

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although they never utilized the hook. See id., Exh. J at

138–39. Ms. Ward testified Petitioner had never done anything

of a sexual nature which she found painful or objectionable.

Id., Exh. J at 147-48. Ms. Ward testified Petitioner had

installed hooks in the ceiling of rooms in their homes for the

purpose of ceiling lamps, hanging plants, and to install a

Johnny Jumper device for their children. Id., Exh. J at 148-50.

Also introduced as evidence at Petitioner’s trial were

several drawings made by Petitioner in 1997 depicting nude women

with their hands tied, also depicting a rope suspended from

above their heads. See Answer, Exh. M3 at 232–34; Trial Exh.

43. The police seized the drawings when executing a search

warrant on the residence of Tim Ward, Petitioner’s brother.

Id., Exh. M3 at 234-35.

Ms. McLaughlin’s mother, Diane Light, testified she did

not know Ms. McLaughlin was pregnant again until October or

November of 1999 and that she seldom saw her daughter between

November of 1999 and mid-January of 2000. See Answer, Exh. G1

at 21. Ms. Light testified that, although she and Mr. Light did

not want Ms. McLaughlin living in the house with Petitioner,

they did not make an issue of the situation because Petitioner

appeared to be taking care of Ms. McLaughlin during her

pregnancy. Id., Exh. G2 at 101. Ms. Light testified that Ms.

McLaughlin was devastated by her baby’s death on March 11, 2000.

Id., Exh. G1 at 30. Ms. Light testified that approximately one

week after Alana died she began to visit her daughter daily as

a result of her daughter’s emotional distress. Id., Exh. G1 at

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28–32 & 106-07. 

All of the witnesses who testified at Petitioner’s

trial with knowledge of the subject stated Ms. McLaughlin had

been understandably very depressed in the weeks after Alana’s

death. See id., Exh. F at 43; Exh. H1 at 103; Exh. L at 25, 68

& 180; Exh. M at 84-85. These witnesses, including Petitioner

and Ms. Light, indicated Ms. McLaughlin’s home had not been

cleaned and was in a state of considerable disorganization in

the days between Alana’s death and Ms. McLaughlin’s death. See

id., Exh. G1 at 41; Exh. L at 81-87 & 181; Exh. M at 84-85. The

witnesses testified that, in the days after Alana’s death and

prior to her death, Ms. McLaughlin had been unable to get out of

bed on some days and that she appeared distant, vacant,

lethargic, or otherwise detached when they interacted with her.

See id., Exh. G2 at 105-06; Exh. L at 25; Exh. L at 68; Exh. M

at 83-85. Ms. Light testified her daughter was not eating after

Alana’s death until the weekend of her own death. Id., Exh. G1

at 32.

Petitioner testified he and Ms. McLaughlin had an

argument on the Wednesday night before her death. Answer, Exh.

M1 at 100 to Exh. M2 at 101. Petitioner testified Ms.

McLaughlin told him on that Wednesday night that she had been

unfaithful to him while he was in jail. See id., Exh. M2 at

146-47; Exh. M3 at 225. Petitioner testified that he and Ms.

McLaughlin had quarreled on Thursday night after he returned

home from work that evening, although he stated the quarrel was

not serious and did not escalate as had the quarrel on Wednesday

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7

 Mr. Light testified that, after Alana was born, he had

wanted both Ms. McLaughlin and Petitioner to move out of the house

owned by the Lights because he wanted to sell the house. Answer, Exh.

L at 12. Mr. Light testified they did not issue Ms. McLaughlin an

“ultimatum” or a “deadline” to move out. Id., Exh. L at 13 (“It was

if you guys stay together, find a place to live.”). Petitioner

testified that, on the Friday night before her death, he and Ms.

McLaughlin planned to move into their own home because the Lights did

not want them living together in the home owned by the Lights. Id., Exh. M at 106-07. Mr. and Mrs. Light’s son-in-law, Officer Koonce,

testified that, after Ms. McLaughlin’s death, Mr. and Mrs. Light moved

to live in their motor home at the Koonces’ residence. Id., Exh. F

at 38.

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night. See id., Exh. M at 103. Petitioner also testified the

couple had been arguing about birth control and about Ms.

McLaughlin’s mother. Id., Exh. M at 103-04.

Ms. Light testified that on Friday, March 24, 2000,

while Petitioner was at work, she and her daughter spent the

afternoon obtaining an application for unemployment benefits and

procuring groceries. See Answer, Exh. G1 at 33–34. Ms. Light

testified that, later on the night of Friday, March 24, 2000,

Ms. McLaughlin telephoned her and stated she had ended her

relationship with Petitioner. Id., Exh. G1 at 35, 115, 159–60.

Ms. Light went over to her daughter’s home after this telephone

call and told Ms. McLaughlin she and her sons could move in with

the Lights. See id., Exh. G1 at 35, 37-38.7 Ms. Light testified

that she and Mr. Light had wanted to sell Ms. McLaughlin’s house

and that they had told her that if she wanted to continue her

relationship with Petitioner, she would have to move out of the

house. Id., Exh. G1 at 38-39.

Ms. Light testified that at 4:45 a.m. on Saturday,

March 25, 2000, Ms. McLaughlin telephoned the Lights’ residence

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and asked to speak to Mr. Light. See id., Exh. G1 at 39–40.

See also Exh. L at 31. Mr. Light testified Ms. McLaughlin

discussed moving into the Lights’ home. Id., Exh. L at 32. Ms.

McLaughlin, Bryce, and Brandon went over to the Lights’

residence on Saturday morning after she called, at about 6 a.m.

See id., Exh. L at 32. Ms. McLaughlin and the two boys showered

and ate at the Lights’ home on Saturday morning before returning

to Ms. McLaughlin’s residence. See id., Exh. G1 at 41. Mr.

Light testified that was the last time he saw Ms. McLaughlin.

Id., Exh. L at 32.

Petitioner testified that, before leaving her home on

Saturday morning, Ms. McLaughlin awoke Petitioner and told him

that their relationship was over and told him the identity of

one of her sexual affairs. Answer, Exh. M2 at 109 & 146. Ms.

McLaughlin told Petitioner to move out of the home that day.

See id., Exh. M at 109 & 201–02. Petitioner testified that,

after gathering some work clothes, a camera, and hand tools in

a cardboard box, he left Ms. McLaughlin’s residence and went to

his parents’ house. See id., Exh. M at 109-10. Petitioner’s

father testified he did not let his son stay at his home at that

time because the father had established a good relationship with

Petitioner’s then-ex-wife, Janet Ward, in order to see his

grandchildren. Accordingly, Mr. Ward testified, he did not want

to engender trouble by having Petitioner at his home when Ms.

Ward might be there. See id., Exh. L at 241-42.

 Petitioner then went to the home of his brother, Tim

Ward, who agreed Petitioner could stay at his house. See

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8 Detective Harry testified Petitioner told him in a second

interview after Ms. McLaughlin’s death that he had gone over to Ms.

McLaughlin’s house on Saturday night and Ms. McLaughlin told him at

that time that her stepfather was the issue. Answer, Exh. H2 at 186.

Tim Ward testified Petitioner thought Ms. McLaughlin’s parents were

“pushing her” to end her relationship with Petitioner. Id., Exh. G3

at 225.

9 Ms. Gadjos testified that, at that time on Saturday night,

Tim Ward, Ms. Gadjos, and their children went out twice, once to

acquire dinner and once selecting a video. See Answer, Exh. N at 30-

31 & 35. She testified Petitioner left that night for approximately

45 minutes and that he left while they were out the second time. Id., Exh. N at 31.

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Answer, Exh. G3 at 221, 226; Exh. M at 115–16. Petitioner told

Tim Ward that Ms. McLaughlin had ended their relationship and

that she had admitted to multiple sexual affairs. See id., Exh.

G3 at 222–23 & 225–26. At that time, Tim Ward lived with his

girlfriend, Jennifer Gadjos, and their two children. See id.,

Exh. G2 at 216; Exh. N at 5-6.

Petitioner testified he went to Ms. McLaughlin’s on

Saturday night, admittedly uninvited. Answer, Exh. M2 at 133 &

136. Petitioner testified he was confused as to why Ms.

McLaughlin had ended their relationship and that he wanted to

talk to her about her reasons for doing so. Id., Exh. M2 at

133.8 Before going over to Ms. McLaughlin’s home, Petitioner

left his brother a note stating that he was looking for another

place to spend Saturday night. See id., Exh. G3 at 228–29; Exh.

N at 35.9 Petitioner testified that, on Saturday night, he went

to Ms. McLaughlin’s home, that she came outside, that they

talked for less than one hour, and that he then returned to his

brother’s home and spent the night there. See id., Exh. M at

133-37 & 138-39. Tim Ward and Jennifer Gadjos testified that

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10 The boat’s owner also testified that, when he saw

Petitioner on Saturday, Petitioner had stated Ms. McLaughlin was

“kicking him out and he said that the bitch is going out on me.”

Answer, Exh. I at 144. He also testified Ms. Light told him that day

that she did not want her daughter to continue her relationship with

Petitioner and that she was happy that they were breaking up. Id.,

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Petitioner spent Saturday night sleeping on their couch. See

id., Exh. G2 at 226; Exh. N at 35.

On Sunday Petitioner went to Ms. McLaughlin’s home.

See Answer, Exh. M at 140-41; Exh. M2 at 152. Petitioner went

to the house to move a boat stored there which belonged to a

third person, which boat he had agreed to repair for the owner.

See id., Exh. M at 140-41; Exh. M2 at 152. Petitioner was

accompanied on Sunday by a friend, Mr. Campbell. See id., Exh.

M at 140. Mr. Campbell and Petitioner both testified that, on

Sunday before they went to Ms. McLaughlin’s home, Petitioner

asked Mr. Campbell if he had been one of Ms. McLaughlin’s

affairs, that Mr. Campbell said yes, and that Petitioner’s

response to this information was more hurt or disappointed than

angry. Id., Exh. I at 166-67; Exh. M at 147-50. 

Petitioner, Ms. Light, and Mr. Campbell testified that

there was no fight or argument between the Petitioner and Ms.

McLaughlin on that date while the others were present. See id.,

Exh. I at 190; Exh. G2 at 128; Exh. M2 at 155-56. The owner of

the boat and his girlfriend were also at Ms. McLaughlin’s house

on Sunday. Id., Exh. I at 134, 138-40. The boat’s owner

testified that Petitioner had asked him five or six times on

Sunday “did Kristine tell you anything. What did she tell you.”

Id., Exh. I at 141.10

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Exh. I at 154.

11 With regard to the testimony offered by Ms. Light, defense

counsel stated: 

One of the key points that the State has been

trying to raise is that well, ropes mysteriously

appear because they weren’t there Sunday but

Dianne Light came back and saw them Wednesday.

Well, gee, how does that mean Sean did it.

Answer, Exh. K2 at 214.

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Ms. Light was at Ms. McLaughlin’s home on Sunday

helping her daughter clean the home and pack belongings. See

id., Exh. G1 at 45-46. Ms. Light testified that, on Sunday, her

daughter appeared to be feeling better emotionally and that she

had eaten and had attended to her appearance. See id., Exh. G1

at 45 & 46. Ms. Light testified that, on Sunday, Ms. McLaughlin

discussed taking Bryce to a pre-school program and that she had

discussed seeking a job. Id., Exh. G1 at 58-59. 

Ms. Light testified she and her daughter had looked for

rope at Ms. McLaughlin’s home on Sunday, for the purpose of

tying up a box of belongings to donate to charity, and that they

could find no rope in the house or garage. See id., Exh. G1 at

56-57.11 Ms. Light also testified that, when she remarked upon

seeing a video camera in the bedroom, Ms. McLaughlin

acknowledged that it was used for pornography, which Ms. Light

testified made her “sad.” See id., Exh. G1 at 80, 81-83. 

Ms. Light testified she left Ms. McLaughlin’s home at

approximately 4:45 p.m. on Sunday. See id., Exh. G1 at 46.

Upon cross-examination, Ms. Light testified she was not certain

as to the time and that she could have left her daughter as late

as 5:45 p.m. See id., Exh. G1 at 54. Ms. Light testified she

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12 Ms. McLaughlin did not have a phone messaging system, but

did have a caller ID box. E.g., Answer, Exh. K at 59-64. A chart

made of the information contained in the caller ID box was presented

at trial. See id., Exh. K at 60-65. The record from the caller ID

box indicated, in addition to the call from Tim Ward’s residence,

calls presumably from the Lights’ residence at 7:50 and 8:42 p.m. on

Sunday night. Id., Exh. K at 68.

13 Petitioner testified he talked to Wendy Fiscella for a

long time on Sunday night. See Answer, Exh. M2 at 171. Ms.

Fiscella’s testimony was confused as to whether she talked to

Petitioner on Saturday night and no testimony was elicited

specifically with regard to whether she spoke with Petitioner on

Sunday night. Id., Exh. L at 221-22. Mr. Campbell testified Brian,

Ms. Fiscella’s boyfriend, lived in the house with Ms. McLaughlin

before Troy Baker moved in with Ms. McLaughlin while Petitioner was

in jail. Id., Exh. I at 177-78. Ms. Fiscella testified she and Brian

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called her daughter twice that evening, first at approximately

“7:00 or 8:00,” and then stated that she called the second time

at about 8:30 or 9 p.m., and that the calls were not answered.

 Id., Exh. G1 at 62-63.12 

Petitioner testified that, after leaving Ms.

McLaughlin’s home on Sunday afternoon, he had a meal and a beer

with Mr. Campbell at a local restaurant, and that he then

returned to his brother’s home, where he watched television and

napped on the couch. See Answer, Exh. M2 at 164-65 & 166; Exh.

I at 173. Petitioner initially told Detective Harry he called

Ms. McLaughlin twice from Tim Ward’s home between 5 p.m. and 6

p.m. on Sunday evening. Id., Exh. M at 241. Petitioner

acquiesced to the record introduced at trial indicating he had

called Ms. McLaughlin’s residence at 7:06 p.m. on Sunday

evening. Id., Exh. K at 67; Exh. M at 241–42; Exh. M3 at 242.

Petitioner testified Ms. McLaughlin did not answer the phone

when he called Sunday evening. Id., Exh. M3 at 241-42.13

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lived with Ms. McLaughlin for a short time before Christmas of 1999.

See id., Exh. L at 207-08 & 220.

14 Detective Spoerry testified that he was present at the

autopsy performed by Dr. Nelson. See Answer, Exh. K2 at 97-99.

Detective Spoerry testified that Dr. Nelson did not administer “any

type of examination to determine the time of death or window of

death.” Id., Exh. K2 at 99. The detective testified that, on the

afternoon of the Ms. McLaughlin’s death, he “had a window. I probably

told the doctor what it was but I didn’t see the doctor perform any

test to determine what that window was. No.” Id., Exh. K2 at 99.

Ms. McLaughlin’s body was removed from the home by a mortician and not

by police. See id., Exh. K1 at 81; Exh. J at 161. Detective Spoerry

testified he did not have any personal knowledge as to how the body

was maintained after being removed from the home by the funeral home

personnel. Id., Exh. K2 at 99-100.

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The undersigned notes that no specific time of death

was ever established. A crime scene technician testified Ms.

McLaughlin’s body was stiff at noon on Monday. Id., Exh. J at

221; Exh. L2 at 143. Dr. Nelson testified that given the status

of rigor mortis, i.e., Ms. McLaughlin’s body was still in mild

rigor, which was starting to wane, and livor, Ms. McLaughlin was

likely deceased 12 to 36 hours before he examined her body at

4:30 or 5 p.m. on Monday. Id., Exh. L2 at 131-32. Pursuant to

Dr. Nelson’s testimony, Ms. McLaughlin could have died as early

as 5 a.m. on Sunday or as late as 5 a.m. on Monday.14

Accordingly, Ms. McLaughlin presumably died after 4:45 or 5:45

p.m. Sunday afternoon, when she was last seen by her mother, and

5 a.m. Monday morning.

Petitioner testified that, after approximately 3 p.m.

he did not leave his brother’s home on the night of March 26 and

early morning of March 27. See Answer, Exh. M2 at 167-68 & 171.

Tim Ward testified that, except for two closely proximate trips

to a local mini-mart, he was present at his home on Sunday with

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Petitioner, and his two children, after 4 p.m. See id., Exh. G3

at 231-35, 240-41. Tim Ward testified that on one of the

occasions he went to the mini-mart he took one child with him

and left the other with Petitioner. See id., Exh. G3 at 237-38

& 239. Petitioner testified Tim Ward made three trips to the

mini-mart, one for cigarettes around 5:30 p.m. and two closely

proximate trips at about 6:30 p.m. for dinner items. Id., Exh.

G3 at 238 & 252. Id., Exh. M2 at 169-70 

Testimony was introduced from an employee of the minimart that Tim Ward was in the store at least twice on Sunday,

first around 3 p.m. and again at 8 p.m. See Answer, Exh. F at

61-62. The employee testified Mr. Ward’s son accompanied him

the second time. Id., Exh. F at 62. This individual testified

that she did not remember seeing Petitioner that evening. Id.,

Exh. F at 64. A tape taken from the mini-mart video camera

indicated Petitioner was at the mini-mart at approximately 4:26

p.m., and that Tim Ward was at the mini-mart at approximately

7:21 and 7:36 p.m. Id., Exh. M at 221 & 223.

Tim Ward’s girlfriend, Ms. Gadjos, who was called as a

defense witness, testified she worked from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m.

on that Sunday. Answer, Exh. N at 24, 28–39. Ms. Gadjos

testified that, when she called her home from work that evening

to talk to Tim Ward at approximately 6:30 and again at

approximately 7:30 or 8 p.m., Petitioner answered the phone.

See id., Exh. N at 22-23. Ms. Gadjos testified that Tim Ward

was just returning from the mini-mart when she called the second

time. Id., Exh. N at 23. Ms. Gadjos also testified that, when

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she came home from work at approximately 10 p.m. on Sunday

night, Petitioner was asleep on the couch and that he remained

there until she went to bed at 10:45 p.m. See id., Exh. N at

24-25. She also testified that Petitioner was on the couch,

apparently asleep, at approximately 4 a.m., when she got up to

turn down the heat. See id., Exh. N at 26. Ms. Gadjos and Tim

Ward testified that Petitioner appeared “normal” early on Monday

morning, that he was on the couch at 6:30 a.m., had coffee with

Mr. Ward at about 7 a.m., and went to work at approximately 7:45

a.m. See id., Exh. G3 at 260-62; Exh. N at 27-28.

The prosecution argued that Petitioner’s car, a Ford

Pinto, was available for him to make the approximately 30-minute

round-trip to Ms. McLaughlin’s house on the night of her death.

See id., Exh. I at 171–72, 191, 194; Exh. J at 38–39; Exh. K at

51–52. Petitioner’s brother Tim Ward testified that, on that

Sunday, his vehicle did not have any gas in it and that it was,

therefore, inoperable. See id., Exh. G3 at 237, 243, 250.

Accordingly Tim Ward testified he had used Petitioner’s Ford

Pinto to go to the grocery store on both occasions on Sunday

evening. See id., Exh. G2 at 237, 243, 250. Testimony was also

introduced that on Sunday Petitioner had drained gas from a boat

motor, i.e., the boat removed from Ms. McLaughlin’s garage, to

put in the Ford Pinto. Id., Exh. I at 171-72; Exh. M2 at 358-

59. 

One of Tim Ward’s neighbors testified that she was up

on Sunday night at approximately 1:30 or 2 a.m. and again Monday

morning at 4 or 4:30 a.m. tending to an infant and a puppy. See

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15 Officer and Mrs. Koonce were separated at the time he

testified at Petitioner’s trial. See Answer, Exh. F at 7. Bryce and

Brandon went to live with Officer and Mrs. Koonce immediately after

their mother’s death. Id., Exh. F at 29 & 48. 

16 Bryce and Brandon were presumably dressed in street

clothes, rather than pajamas, when Officer Koonce saw them on Monday

morning. The trial testimony from Ms. Light, Mr. Light, and Officer

Koonce is silent as to this point, however, these individuals do not

mention dressing Bryce and Brandon prior to putting them in Officer

Koonce’s cruiser, or prior to their being taken for a forensic

interview, and Bryce is seen in street clothes in the video-tape of

the interview. 

-19-

Answer, Exh. L at 165 & 168. This witness testified she saw

Petitioner’s car outside Tim Ward’s residence on each occasion

when she was up and that she did not observe anyone coming or

going from the residence. See id., Exh. L at 165-66 & 168-69.

A neighbor of Ms. McLaughlin’s testified that she walked past

Ms. McLaughlin’s house between 5 and 6 p.m. on Sunday and that

she did not see anything unusual and that there were no cars

parked outside the residence at that time. See id., Exh. E at

31. Detective Harry testified that he had “canvas[sed]” both

Tim Ward’s neighborhood and Ms. McLaughlin’s neighborhood to

determine if anyone had seen anything but that he did not get

“useful information” from this endeavor. Id., Exh. H3 at 213-

14.

Ms. McLaughlin’s body was discovered by her brother-inlaw on March 27, 2000, a Monday, at approximately 8 a.m.15 Ms.

McLaughlin’s brother-in-law, a Fort Mohave Tribal Police

Officer, Tim Koonce, drove by her house that morning and saw

Bryce and Brandon playing outside the house without supervision.

See Answer, Exh. F at 19.16 Officer Koonce stopped his patrol

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17 In his petition for habeas relief Petitioner asserts that,

during Dr. Nelson’s pre-trial interview with defense counsel, Dr.

Nelson told Petitioner’s trial counsel that neither of the vertebrae

were broken. See Petition at 16. Dr. Nelson also X-rayed Ms.

McLaughlin’s neck and found no fractures. Id. The autopsy indicated

the hyoid bone was unbroken. Id. This evidence was not introduced

via Dr. Nelson’s or Dr. Keen’s testimony at Petitioner’s trial, which

Petitioner asserts supports his contention that his trial counsel was

-20-

car and asked his nephews where their mother was. Id., Exh. F

at 20. Officer Koonce testified that Bryce’s response, “Mommy

died,” prompted him to investigate. Id., Exh. F at 20. He

testified that, upon entering the home, he found Ms.

McLaughlin’s body “sitting on the ground” in the living room,

slumped forward on her knees and elbows. Id., Exh. F at 22-23.

Officer Koonce testified “I seen lividity...” Id., Exh. F at

22.

Officer Koonce testified he immediately noticed a rope

around Ms. McLaughlin’s neck, as well as a length of rope

hanging from one of two hooks in the living room ceiling. Id.,

Exh. F at 22-23. The prosecution presented evidence from a

forensic expert that the rope had been cut. Id., Exh. H1 at 13-

14. Petitioner’s counsel brought a motion in limine to exclude

the introduction of the forensic expert’s conclusion the rope

had been cut. Id., Exh. H at 4-6.

The Mohave County Medical Examiner, Dr. Nelson,

examined Ms. McLaughlin’s body on March 27, 2000, the same day

that she was found dead, at approximately 4:30 or 5:00 p.m.

Answer, Exh. K2 at 97; Exh. L2 at 131. During his autopsy, Dr.

Nelson completely dissected Ms. McLaughlin’s neck and removed

the upper two vertebrae. Id., Exh. L2 at 136.17 Dr. Nelson

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unconstitutionally ineffective.

The hyoid bone (lingual bone) is a bone in the neck at

approximately the junction of one’s chin and throat. It is supported

by the muscles of the neck and in turn supports the root of the

tongue. It is the only bone in the human skeleton not articulated to

any other bone and, due to its position, the hyoid bone is not usually

easy to fracture. In cases of suspicious death, a fractured hyoid is

a strong sign of strangulation. See, e.g., Webster’s New World

Medical Dictionary, 3d ed. 2008.

-21-

testified he had determined that the cause of death was by

asphyxiation. Id., Exh. L2 at 124 & 137. However, he could

not conclude whether the manner of death was homicide, suicide,

or accident. Id., Exh. L2 at 125 & 137-38 (Dr. Nelson testified

the evidence was “not inconsistent with suicidal hanging but []

not inconsistent with other scenarios”). Dr. Nelson further

testified that there was a blood clot in Ms. McLaughlin’s left

nostril and that blood came out of her nose at about the time of

her death. Id., Exh. L2 at 141.

Detective Spoerry was present at the autopsy performed

by Dr. Nelson. Id., Exh. K2 at 97. Dr. Nelson indicated to

Detective Spoerry at the time of the autopsy that he could not

conclude that the manner of death was homicide because of the

condition of Ms. McLaughlin’s neck. Id., Exh. K2 at 103. 

Dr. Nelson testified: 

We did an anterior neck incision and found

very little trauma to the soft tissue of the

neck. I took some skin incisions over the

area of the ligature and again they showed

minimal what are called cellular abrasions to

the red cells within the soft tissue of the

neck.

Id., Exh. L2 at 116-17.

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The police were not satisfied with Dr. Nelson’s

findings. Answer, Exh. K2 at 102-103. The police sent Ms.

McLaughlin’s body, without the neck tissue or the hyoid bone, to

Maricopa County’s Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Keen, for the

purpose of doing a second autopsy. Dr. Keen conducted the

second autopsy three days after Ms. McLaughlin’s death, on the

30th. See id., Exh. K2 at 86, 103-04. 

At trial, Dr. Keen allowed that he had not examined

“the soft tissues of the neck, which would include the voice

box, the larynx, the hyoid bone, thyroid cartilage, esophagus

and trachea.” Answer, Exh. I at 89, 103. Dr. Keen testified at

trial he had concluded that the manner of death was homicide,

based on what he characterized as various “defensive” bruises on

the body, including two bruises to Ms. McLaughlin’s “left

frontal scalp visible only on the deep surface of the scalp

reflecting it.” Id., Exh. I at 95 (peeling back the skin from

her skull and looking at the underside). He opined that the

effect of the two bruises “could be anything from just the wince

from the discomfort of being struck to even loss of

consciousness,” or that the effect “could” stun somebody. Id.,

Exh. I at 99. 

When asked at Petitioner’s trial about Dr. Keen’s

findings, Dr. Nelson testified he had spoken with Dr. Keen after

reviewing his autopsy results. Dr. Nelson testified that, after

becoming aware that Dr. Keen had concluded that Ms. McLaughlin’s

death was a homicide, Dr. Nelson again reviewed the body to

satisfy himself that his own conclusion was correct. Id., Exh.

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18 Officer Koonce testified that he observed livor at the

time he discovered Ms. McLaughlin’s body, see Answer, Exh. F at 22,

and the crime scene photographs indicate Ms. McLaughlin’s blood had

pooled in her lower arms and legs at the time the photos were taken

at about noon on Monday. Id., Exh. AA.

19 Ms. McLaughlin’s body was released by the state trial

court on August 15, 2000. See Answer, Exh. D at 21-22.

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L2 at 126-27 & 135. He also reviewed Dr. Keen’s report, but

after a review of both the body and Dr. Keen’s report, Dr.

Nelson did not find any reason to change his opinion regarding

the manner of death. Id., Exh. L2 at 127. Dr. Nelson opined

that the bruises which Dr. Keen testified could have made Ms.

McLaughlin “compliant” were actually livor, the discoloration of

the body after death. Id., Exh. L2 at 127 & 135. Dr. Nelson

opined this conclusion was consistent with the description of

Ms. McLaughlin’s body position when she was found, i.e., with

her forehead touching the floor. Id., Exh. L2 at 127 & 135.18

After receiving the conflicting reports from Dr. Nelson

and Dr. Keen, Petitioner’s trial counsel, Mr. Engan, contacted

Dr. Peters, the Pima County Chief Deputy Medical Examiner.

Answer, Exh. Y at 14. Dr. Peters told Petitioner’s trial

counsel that a third examination of the body would not likely

reveal any new information. Id., Exh. Y at 14.19

After ascertaining that Ms. McLaughlin was deceased,

Deputy Koonce placed his nephews inside his patrol car, with his

own son who had been in the car, and called 911. See Answer,

Exh. F at 23–24. Deputy Koonce testified that, at the time, he

did not know if Ms. McLaughlin’s death was a suicide, murder, or

accident, and that he was “really shook up.” Id., Exh. F at 27-

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20Brandon did not testify at trial. Dr. Goldstein testified

that, when she asked Brandon if “daddy” was home last night, Brandon

answered no. See Answer, Exh. H at 47-48 & 61. He also told her that

“daddy mad.” Id., Exh. H at 62. Brandon never mentioned Petitioner

by name during his interview with Dr. Goldstein. Id., Exh. H at 72-

73. At one point when asked who “did that” to his mother, Brandon

says “Mimi,” the term her grandchildren used to refer to Ms. Light.

Id., Exh. H at 72.

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28. Deputy Koonce also testified that, after calling the police

and while waiting for officers to arrive, he called Mr. and Mrs.

Light to inform them of their daughter’s death. Id., Exh. F at

24. 

After the police had arrived at Ms. McLaughlin’s

residence, at the request of Detective Wolf, Deputy Koonce drove

Bryce and Brandon to meet a child therapist, Dr. Goldstein.

Id., Exh. F at 27– 28. Deputy Koonce testified he said nothing

about their mother’s death to his nephews during the ride. Id.,

Exh. F at 28.

Dr. Goldstein, a child therapist and forensic

interviewer, testified at Petitioner’s trial. Answer, Exh. H.

Dr. Goldstein’s interviews with Bryce and Brandon the morning of

their mother’s death were video-taped and the jury was shown the

videotape of Dr. Goldstein’s interviews with each boy.20 Id.,

Exh. H at 41, 43, 45, 46-47. Dr. Goldstein testified that,

before she interviewed Bryce and Brandon, she spoke to Detective

Wolf. Id., Exh. H at 35–39; Exh. J at 85–87. Detective Wolf

advised Dr. Goldstein that Ms. McLaughlin’s death appeared to be

a suicide. Id., Exh. H at 39. Neither Detective Wolf nor

Deputy Koonce told Dr. Goldstein that Ms. McLaughlin’s death

involved the use of rope. Id., Exh. J at 36, 39–40; Exh. J at

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86–87. Although the detective told Dr. Goldstein the names of

Petitioner and Ms. McLaughlin and her sons, no one informed Dr.

Goldstein that the boys called Petitioner “Daddy”. Id., Exh. H

at 39; Exh. J at 86.

Dr. Goldstein testified at trial that Bryce told Dr.

Goldstein that Petitioner had been at his house the previous

night, and that his mother had been sad. Id., Exh. H at 55–56;

Exh. EE at Trial Exh. 5. During the taped interview, when Dr.

Goldstein asks Bryce for his daddy’s name, Bryce stated

Petitioner’s first name. Id., Exh. H at 55–56; Exh. EE at Trial

Exh. 5. 

At Petitioner’s trial, several witnesses testified that

Bryce called more than one adult male “daddy.” See Answer, Exh.

I at 178-79; Exh. L at 66-67, 175, 211. Troy Baker testified

that he had tried to get Bryce to stop this habit, and that he

had succeeded only in getting Bryce to call him “daddy Troy.”

Id., Exh. L at 64-65.

Dr. Goldstein testified that Bryce had a speech

impediment and below average verbal skills for a boy his age.

See Answer, Exh. H at 42. Dr. Goldstein testified that she did

not hear or understand some of Bryce’s responses during the

interview and that at times Bryce was non-responsive. Id., Exh.

H at 51-52, 56. Several family members and friends of

Petitioner and Ms. McLaughlin testified that Bryce’s speech was

at times difficult to understand. Id., Exh. G at 58; Exh. L at

16, 63, 174. 

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21 The scene was changed from a possible suicide to a crime

scene and the investigators and technicians ordered out of the house

by their superiors until they could get a search warrant at

approximately 9 or 10 a.m., based on Bryce’s statements to Dr.

Goldstein. Answer, Exh. J at 224.

22 Detective Spoerry had previously investigated five

homicides in his 17 years with the Lake Havasu City Police Department.

Answer, Exh. K1 at 72. Detective Spoerry was given Petitioner’s name

as someone who lived in the house by Larry Light, Ms. McLaughlin’s

stepfather, when Mr. Light arrived at Ms. McLaughlin’s residence on

the morning of her death. Id., Exh. K1 at 77.

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Ms. McLaughlin was fully clothed, including a

brassiere, at the time the crime scene photographs were taken.

See Answer, Exh. K1 at 22; Exh. DD. A sexual assault kit was

performed on Ms. McLaughlin, but no evidence of semen was found.

See Answer, Exh. K1 at 22 & Exh. K2 at 154. A small amount of

blood was found on her shorts and samples containing both blood

and “some tissue” were found on fingernail clippings. Id.,

Exh. K 2 at 154-59. A forensic pathologist testified that DNA

analysis indicated that the blood and tissue was Ms.

McLaughlin’s. Id., Exh. K2 at 157 & 159.21

Detective Spoerry testified as to crime scene

photographs on the seventh day of Petitioner’s trial. Answer,

Exh. K1.22 Detective Spoerry testified that a rope was found

just inside Ms. McLaughlin’s bedroom on the floor and a noosed

rope was found on a bureau in the dining area of the home. Id.,

Exh. K1 at 9-10. The jury was told that pornographic videotapes

were found in the bedroom. Id., Exh. K at 10. Detective

Spoerry testified that photos of the deceased Ms. McLaughlin

taken at the site of her death showed lividity. Id., Exh. K1 at

11-12. Detective Spoerry testified that Ms. McLaughlin was

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fully clothed when she was found and that there were no signs of

torn clothing “or anything like that.” Id., Exh. K1 at 22.

Detective Spoerry testified that there were laundry baskets and

piles of folded clothing in the living area, but “you would be

correct saying everything else was strewn about in the house,”

although he testified there was no sign of a struggle. Id.,

Exh. K1 at 79-81. Detective Spoerry testified he found one

“larger [knife] lying on the floor of Ms. McLaughlin’s bedroom”

and one in a box in the bedroom. Id., Exh. K1 at 85 & 88.

 Petitioner was brought into police headquarters and

interviewed by Detective Harry in the early afternoon of March

27, 2000, the day Ms. McLaughlin was discovered, before the

first autopsy was performed. Answer, Exh. H2 at 147.

Petitioner was Mirandized prior to the interview and the

interview was video-taped. Id., Exh. H2 at 149-51. A portion

of the videotape was played at Petitioner’s trial. Id., Exh. H2

at 166; Trial Exh. 6. The video recording of this interview was

introduced into evidence, but the jury was not allowed to bring

the videotape into the jury room for deliberations. Id., Exh.

H2 at 154. 

Detective Harry testified that Petitioner told him on

Monday that, on Sunday night, Tim Ward had been test-driving a

vehicle with Mr. Gadjos, Jennifer’s father. Id., Exh. H2 at

177. Petitioner told Detective Harry that, on Sunday night, he

had left Tim’s house once to go to the mini-mart. Id., Exh. H

at 177. When questioned about the hooks in the living room

ceiling of Ms. McLaughlin’s home on that date, Petitioner stated

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23 Detective Spoerry testified it was his “Sergeant

supervisor’s decision” to conduct the Boychuk-Spears interview.

Answer, Exh. D at 41-42.

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he had put the hooks in the ceiling. Id., Exh. H2 at 220.

During the interview Petitioner professed his love for Ms.

McLaughlin. Id., Exh. H2 at 174. Petitioner was not arrested

at that time.

The next day, on March 28, 2000, Dr. Tascha

Boychuk-Spears conducted a second videotaped interview with

Bryce. Answer, Exh. K1 at 24-25 Detective Spoerry testified he

personally took Bryce to Mesa to see Dr. Boychuk-Spears because

she was “one of the best known forensic interviewers that I am

aware of.” Id., Exh. K1 at 24.23 Mr. and Mrs. Light also

accompanied the detective and Bryce to see Dr. Boychuk-Spears.

Id., Exh. K1 at 25. The videotaped interview was shown to the

jury at Petitioner’s trial and Dr. Boychuk-Spears testified at

Petitioner’s trial regarding the interview. See Answer, Exh.

K1. 

Prior to the interview, Dr. Boychuk-Spears reviewed

Bryce’s interview with Dr. Goldstein. Id., Exh. K1 at 26-27.

Dr. Boychuk-Spears testified at trial that Bryce had a speech

problem and that he was difficult to understand at times. Id.,

Exh. K1 at 20, 60. Dr. Boychuk-Spears testified that, during

the interview, Bryce drew a picture and said daddy put a rope

around his mother’s neck. Id., Exh. K1 at 28-30. The doctor

testified Bryce also said “daddy had put mom on a hook.” Id.

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24 At trial the defense presented the testimony of an expert

pointing out the flaws in the techniques used by Dr. Goldstein and Ms.

Boychuk-Spears when interviewing Bryce. See Answer, Exh. N1 at 8-94.

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At Petitioner’s trial, Dr. Boychuk-Spears admitted

asking Bryce leading questions and repeating over fifteen times

during the interview a phrase approximating “daddy putting the

rope around mommy’s neck.” Id., Exh. I at 57. She also

testified that, when she asked Bryce if “Sean” was his daddy, he

said “no.” Id., Exh. I at 57. She testified he said that “he

put the rope on mom neck and went back to work.” Id., Exh. I at

6. Bryce also told Dr. Boychuk-Spears that Brandon cut the rope

with a knife or scissors and then his mother fell. Id., Exh. I

at 204.24

Petitioner was again interviewed by Detective Harry on

March 31, 2000. See Answer, Exh. H2 at 196-97. At that time,

the detective played the taped interview of Dr. Boychuk-Spears

and Bryce, inculpating Petitioner in Ms. McLaughlin’s death.

Id., Exh. H2 at 196-97. Petitioner told Detective Harry that

not knowing why Ms. McLaughlin had ended their relationship had

made him “insane.” Id., Exh. M at 188. 

Petitioner was arrested the next day, on April 1, 2000,

for the murder of Ms. McLaughlin, and released pending trial on

his own recognizance on July 3, 2000. Answer, Exh. A at

Document 174. Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel

for approximately six weeks, and then he retained private

counsel, Mr. Engan, in mid or late May of 2000. Id., Exh. M at

120. Petitioner’s appointed counsel, Mr. Weiss, had the

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25 Detective Spoerry testified at a pretrial hearing on

August 15, 2000, that when he had a videocamera set up in his office

and he “asked Mr. Smith [the district attorney] if I should videotape

the interview,” and “He said ‘I wouldn’t.’ He gave his opinion

stating the fact he would not tape him.” Answer, Exh. D at 47.

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assistance of an investigator who was employed by the Mohave

County Public Defense office. Id., Exh. M at 13-17. The

investigator accompanied appointed counsel to Ms. McLaughlin’s

residence on April 20, 2000. See id., Exh. M at 13-17. The

investigator testified at Petitioner’s trial only as to the

locks on the interior doors of Ms. McLaughlin’s residence

shortly after her death. Id., Exh. M at 13-17. 

After Petitioner’s arrest, on April 20, 2000, Detective

Spoerry conducted a third interview of Bryce, this time at the

police station. Answer, Exh. K1 at 31.25 At trial, Detective

Spoerry told the jury that he had the capacity to video-tape the

interview with Bryce on April 20, but that he had not taped the

interview. Id., Exh. K1 at 39-40 & 45-46. Detective Spoerry

testified he had asked for the prosecutor’s opinion on this

matter prior to deciding not to tape the interview with Bryce.

Id., Exh. K1 at 46. 

At Petitioner’s trial, Detective Spoerry testified that

the photo lineup he had shown Bryce on April 20, 2000, included

both a picture of Petitioner and a picture of “one of Kristine’s

ex-boyfriends [Stacy Johnson].” Id., Exh. K1 at 34 & 38.

Detective Spoerry testified that Bryce pointed to the photograph

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26 Prior to trial, the trial court stated: 

I don’t wish to make this sound as if nothing of

what you all do matters but I am sure it is not

going to come as a surprise to you that I have

pretty much made a decision as to what I think

the law in this area is and will tell you that if

you were able to establish that the Detective

made the inconsistent statements that you are

attributing to him, it is not going to make any

difference to my decision.

Answer, Exh. D at 58-59. 

The trial court, after hearing argument during this pretrial hearing, denied defense counsel’s motion to dismiss based on the

bad faith of the prosecution in not preserving exculpatory evidence,

stating that it could not be error for failing to make a tape of an

interview, i.e., Detective Spoerry’s interview with Bryce. Answer,

Exh. D at 64-68.

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of Petitioner and said “daddy.” Id., Exh. K1 at 42.26

The detective testified that the distance between Tim

Ward’s and Ms. McLaughlin’s house was about 10 miles and that it

took about 14 to 16 minutes to drive from one residence to the

other. Answer, Exh. K1 at 51-52. The detective testified that

the caller ID box taken from Ms. McLaughlin’s home indicated a

phone call from Tim Ward’s home at 7:06 p.m. on the relevant

Sunday evening. Id., Exh. K1 at 67. The caller ID box also

indicated a call to Ms. McLaughlin’s residence from a different

location at 7:49 p.m. that Sunday evening. Id., Exh. K1 at 67.

The caller ID box also indicated calls to Ms. McLaughlin’s

residence from a private number at 7:50 and 8:42 p.m. that

Sunday evening, presumably made from the Lights’ residence.

Id., Exh. K1 at 68. The caller ID box also indicated calls to

Ms. McLaughlin’s residence on Monday morning from a private

number at 7:15 and 7:16 a.m. Id., Exh. K1 at 68. Detective

Spoerry also testified about nude pictures of Ms. McLaughlin

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27Petitioner’s counsel brought a pre-trial motion to preclude

Bryce’s testimony, arguing that he was not a competent witness. Bryce

was interviewed by the state trial judge in the courtroom at a hearing

on that motion August 15, 2000. See Answer, Exh. D. Only the judge

was allowed to question Bryce at the pretrial hearing. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner was not present in the courtroom for the hearing but was

allowed to listen to the hearing through teleconferencing. Id., Exh.

D. The transcript reveals Bryce was somewhat incoherent at least to

the court reporter. Id., Exh. D. Bryce did know his colors, day from

night, a real duck from a toy duck, and the sounds animals make. Id., Exh. D. After questioning was completed and Bryce was excused,

neither counsel had additional questions they wanted the judge to ask

Bryce. Id., Exh. D. After hearing arguments, the trial judge

concluded that, following state law precedent, to find Bryce

incompetent to testify, he would have to find “no trier of fact could

reasonably believe the prospective witness could have observed,

communicated, remembered or told the truth with respect to the event

in question.” Id., Exh. D at 20. He then stated: “I certainly

wouldn’t relish being a prosecutor knowing that Bryce would be my star

witness.” Id., Exh. D at 20. The trial court ruled that Bryce was

competent, stating: “it is going to be up to the jury to decide what

significance or what weight or credibility to attach to his

testimony.” Id. at 20-21.

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found at her home, showing her engaged in sex with an

unidentified male, including a picture of her tied up spreadeagled to a bed. Id., Exh. K1 at 71-72.

Bryce was the last witness for the prosecution.27 He

testified that Brandon was his cousin and his brother, and that

he was five years old. Answer, Exh. K2 at 169-70. Bryce

correctly identified coins and family members, and stated that

he knew the difference between boys and girls. Id., Exh. K2 at

172-75. Bryce testified his mother was in heaven. Id., Exh. K2

at 177.

In response to the question, “What happened to your

mom,” Bryce stated: “Her had a neck in rope and hook on up a

wall.” Id., Exh. K2 at 178. Bryce testified:

Q: Okay, what happened to [your mother’s]

neck?

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A: Blood fall down her nose.

Q: What color was the blood?

A: Red.

. . .

Q: Can you tell us what happened to mommy’s

neck?

A: Sean he tied rope up.

Q: He tied the rope up?

A: Yes.

. . .

Q: When he was doing this, was Sean happy or

mad?

A: He mad.

Q: Okay, where did he put the rope?

A: On her neck.

. . . Answer, Exh. K at 178-79.

Bryce testified that Brandon was in their bedroom

playing when this occurred, and that he came out of his room

because he wanted a drink of juice. Answer, Exh. K3 at 180.

During his testimony at trial, the prosecutor had Bryce “draw a

picture of your mommy like she was the night you saw something

happen to her.” Id., Exh. K3 at 180. Bryce indicated a rope

around his mother’s neck and said Sean put the rope there and

then put the rope on a hook on the wall. Id., Exh. K3 at 181-82

& Exh. B (Photocopies of Trial Exhibits, Exh. 8). Bryce

testified that after Sean put the rope around his mother’s neck,

Sean “[G]o to work.” Id., Exh. K3 at 182-83. Bryce repeated

the “go to work” phrase three times. Id., Exh. K3 at 182-83.

Bryce also testified that he tried to “save” his mother, and

that he was able to wake her up. Id., Exh. K3 at 184. He then

testified that she did not ever wake up. Id., Exh. K3 at 184.

On cross-examination, in response to the question “When

did you ever come to court before,” Bryce responded “I saw mom.

I already open the door and I saw her.” Answer, Exh. K3 at 185.

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Bryce also stated he had met “Matt” five times, and Matt had

shown him pictures and “taught me.” Id., Exh. K3 at 197. Bryce

further stated he had two daddies, one named Stacy and one named

Sean. Id., Exh. K3 at 201.

In response to defense counsel’s question regarding how

his mother got “down from the hook,” Bryce initially responded:

“Nothing.” Answer, Exh. K3 at 201. He then stated: “I said

nothing. I can’t see because -- because I can see mom and the

hook. I want see my crayons because got to work.” Id., Exh. K3

at 201. He then elaborated: “I said -- I said I already hold

the crayons and you hold the toy. The toy can’t do anything

either.” Id., Exh. K3 at 202. Upon further questioning about

how his mother “got down,” Bryce responded: “Said nothing get

down. I saw nothing. Sean already put hook on the neck and

Brandon already sawed it so I -- and then we hold the toy

knife.” Id., Exh. K3 at 202. Bryce stated that Brandon “cut

the rope” with a “big pink knife. Sharp.” Id., Exh. K3 at 203-

04. Bryce then also testified that Brandon “cut with the -- on

this and cut it and my mom fall.” Id., Exh. K3 at 204. 

During the cross-examination of Bryce, the judge

interrupted the proceedings to admonish the jury to resist the

“temptation” to “confer and for you to indicate what you think

[Bryce] is saying. Please do not do that.” Id., Exh. K3 at

193.

At the close of Bryce’s testimony, the prosecution

rested and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict. Id.,

Exh. K2 at 212. Petitioner’s counsel noted Bryce was easily led

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and that Bryce had been “coached by the State to give certain

responses.” Id., Exh. K2 at 213. Counsel argued that “no

reasonable jury on the basis of the evidence which has been

submitted could find my client guilty.” Id., Exh. K2 at 213.

The trial court concluded that Bryce’s testimony, “if believed

by the jury[,] is sufficient probably to convict the Defendant

of at least something in this case.” Id., Exh. K2 at 216. The

trial court denied the motion because it determined there was

sufficient evidence presented to enable reasonable jurors to

conclude the defendant acted with premeditation to cause Ms.

McLaughlin’s death. Id., Exh. K2 at 218.

Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court

further stated: 

I am wondering whether there isn’t the

argument that could be made that this

happened in the morning and this is why I was

interested in evidence that we never heard.

That’s any estimate regarding the time of

death. ...

That was a question about whether the boys

were in pajamas or were dressed and I thought

to myself, these are kids at an age that

probably don’t dress themselves and would

have to be dressed by an adult person and I

found myself wondering whether there is

necessarily any accounting for where the

Defendant is after he leaves and goes to work

... and the time that Tim Koonce came by. I

have the impression that this is maybe

inconsistent with the testimony about

lividity. ...

Answer, Exh. K2 at 217. The trial court then stated that the

physical evidence did not support the theory that Ms. McLaughlin

had committed suicide. Id., Exh. K at 218. 

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The last day of testimony was March 9, 2001. See id.,

Exh. N. Closing arguments were presented to the jury on

Thursday, March 15, 2001. See id., Exh. P1. The state argued:

He had been there the night before without

being invited and he went back there again on

Sunday and when he went over there, he went

over with bad intentions. He was angry.

They had been fighting since the baby had

died. He had this anger amplified by the

fact Thursday night he found out that she had

cheated on him while he was away.

Exh. P2 at 3. The prosecution alleged Petitioner struck Ms.

McLaughlin “multiple times.” Id., Exh. P2 at 3. The prosecutor

continued:

Then he got a rope. A rope that he had put

together. A rope that he knew exactly where

it was in that house. He put one end of that

rope around her neck and the other end around

a hook hanging from the ceiling in the living

room. A hook that he had himself installed

for their sex games. A hook that he had

himself put ropes on in the past. After he

strangled her with that rope, he left her to

hang in her own living room. He left her

there in her living room with her two little

boys [] to spend the night with their dead

mother.

Then he leaves and goes back to his brother’s

house to make a rather poor attempt at

establishing an alibi in this case. You have

seen the problems with that.

Id., Exh. P1 at 3 (emphasis added).

Petitioner’s counsel argued to the jury, inter alia,

that the police had rushed to the conclusion that Petitioner

caused Ms. McLaughlin’s death and that they failed to properly

investigate her death. Id., Exh. P1 at 6. Counsel asserted the

state had introduced irrelevant facts and testimony to prejudice

the jury against his client. Id., Exh. P1 at 6-7. Counsel

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28 One of the defense theories was that Mr. Light might have

committed the crime. Troy Baker testified he went to the Lights’

residence several days after Ms. McLaughlin died to express

condolences and that, at that time, Mr. Light told him the last time

he had seen Ms. McLaughlin was Sunday and that they had argued.

Answer, Exh. L at 80-81. Mr. Light denied making this statement.

Id., Exh. L at 20 & 37. Petitioner’s father and sister testified that

Mr. Light had stated in a telephone conversation with Mr. Ward,

overheard by Ms. Ward, that the last time he had seen Ms. McLaughlin

they had quarreled. Id., Exh. L at 245-46; Exh. M at 26-27. Mr.

Light denied making this statement. Id., Exh. L at 20-21.

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emphasized that the only person who had allegedly seen

Petitioner at the crime scene during the relevant time period

was Bryce, who’s testimony could not be relied upon to establish

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., Exh. P1 at 23-24.

Counsel reminded the jury there was no DNA evidence establishing

Petitioner had harmed or killed Ms. McLaughlin. Id., Exh. P1 at

24. Counsel also noted the testimony of the defense expert who

opined that Ms. McLaughlin’s seemingly brighter demeanor on the

day of her death could have indicated she had decided to commit

suicide. Id., Exh. P1 at 27.28 Counsel also argued as discussed

more fully, infra.

On rebuttal, the state argued:

State’s Exhibit Number 15 shows that there

was a call at 7:06 p.m. so that works two

ways. Either he killed her right before then

he got back home and called to help establish

his alibi that night or he called at 7:06

p.m. She didn’t answer the phone and he is

mad. What is she up to. Who is she with.

Is there somebody else that she is cheating

on me again. He goes over there at that

time...

Id., Exh. P1 at 69. Defense counsel noted the jury heard

testimony Bryce and Brandon were in street clothes on Monday

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morning and argued that fact and the fact that Ms. McLaughlin

did not answer the phone when her mother called after 7:30 p.m.

on Sunday night indicated she was killed before that time. Id.,

Exh. P1 at 70.

After closing arguments, on Thursday, March 15, the

jury was instructed on first-degree premeditated murder, and

second-degree murder and manslaughter. Id., Exh. O at 4-8.

Defense counsel objected to the inclusion of an instruction on

the lesser offenses as not being supported by the evidence.

Id., Exh. N at 106-18. The jury deliberated for four or five

hours that afternoon. Id., Exh. O at 14 & 23-25. The next

morning, Friday, March 16, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of

guilt on the offense of second degree murder. Id., Exh. A at

Document 168.

 On April 13, 2001, after a hearing, Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of 22 years imprisonment pursuant to this

conviction. Id., Exh. R.

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of

appeal from the judgment and sentence. See Answer, Exh. A, Item

178. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in his

direct appeal. Id., Exh. A at Document 187. Petitioner raised

eleven issues, including a due process claim regarding the

prosecutor’s closing arguments and the failure to video-tape the

police station photo line-up interview with Bryce. Id., Exh. S.

On September 26, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals

rejected all of Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his conviction

and sentence in a memorandum decision. See Answer, Exh. V.

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With regard to Petitioner’s due process claim, the Court of

Appeals concluded the investigators had “no duty to

electronically record interviews, and no evidence was lost or

destroyed.” Id., Exh. V at 6. The appellate court also noted

a tape of the interview could not have been exculpatory because

by that time Bryce had twice identified “Sean” as “daddy” and

“daddy” and “Sean” as the person who had harmed his mother.

Id., Exh. V at 6. 

Petitioner sought review of the decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on March 18, 2003. 

See Petition at 2. Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari

from the United States Supreme Court.

On May 20, 2003, Petitioner initiated a timely action

seeking state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Answer, Exh. A, Item

204. The same appointed counsel who had represented Petitioner

in his direct appeal was appointed to represent him in his Rule

32 proceedings. Id., Exh. W. In his action for post-conviction

relief Petitioner raised three general arguments, including an

allegation that his trial counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective. Id., Exh. W.

The Mohave County Superior Court found that

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was

colorable and conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding

Petitioner’s claims on April 23, 2004. See Answer, Exh. A, Item

249. 

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29 Dr. Peters also testified that, in his opinion, it was

possible that Ms. McLaughlin sustained the two ovoid bruises on her

left temple by falling onto the oval feet of the Buzz Light Year

action figure toy, which the crime scene photographs depicted as being

situated on the mattress on the left side of her body. Answer, Exh.

Y at 37-38.

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At the hearing, neither Petitioner’s post-conviction

counsel nor the state called Petitioner’s trial counsel to

explain whether or to what degree the acts or omissions charged

as errors were matters of trial strategy. Neither postconviction counsel nor the state had Mr. Engan provide an

affidavit as to the alleged errors, i.e., whether the alleged

errors were a matter of his professional trial strategy.

 Post-conviction counsel presented the testimony of Dr.

Peters, the coroner who had been consulted by trial counsel

before the trial. See Answer, Exh. Y at 10-56. Dr. Peters

stated he had examined the autopsy reports of Dr. Nelson and Dr.

Keen after Petitioner’s trial.29 Id., Exh. Y at 15-16. Dr.

Peters testified at the hearing that he disagreed with Dr.

Keen’s conclusion that homicide was the cause of Ms.

McLaughlin’s death. Id., Exh. Y at 34-35 & 50. Dr. Peters

further testified that he found the means of death to be

inconclusive, i.e., that he agreed with Dr. Nelson’s opinion.

Id., Exh. Y at 50. Dr. Peters admitted that he had performed

only 600 autopsies, fewer than Dr. Nelson and many fewer than

Dr. Keen, at the time of Petitioner’s trial. See id., Exh. Y

at 10-56.

Deputy Koonce testified at the hearing regarding the

reason he placed two 911 calls on the morning of Ms.

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McLaughlin’s death and whether Bryce could have overheard his

statements to the dispatcher regarding his mother’s death and

the rope. See Answer, Exh. Y at 58-68. An investigator

employed by the Mohave County Public Defender’s Office testified

Petitioner’s retained defense counsel should have investigated

whether Ms. McLaughlin’s footprints were on an upside-down green

toy box found near her body, which would have suggested that she

stood on the box to suspend the rope from the ceiling hooks.

Id., Exh. Y at 75-77. The investigator also stated defense

counsel should have determined whether the Buzz Lightyear doll

found on the mattress near Ms. McLaughlin had caused the ovoid

subcutaneous bruises on her forehead. Id., Exh. Y at 76-77.

Janet Ward, who remarried Petitioner after Ms.

McLaughlin’s death, testified at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing about her pretrial consultations with defense counsel,

Mr. Engan. Id., Exh. Y at 95-98. She also testified as to

rumors that a deceased man had “confessed” killing Ms.

McLaughlin to a third party. Id., Exh. Y at 91-100.

Petitioner’s mother also testified at the post-conviction

hearing about the recitals of a person named Tana Hamlin, an

unavailable witness, to the effect that a person named Ray Viera

had confessed to Ms. Hamlin that he had killed Ms. McLaughlin.

Id., Exh. Y at 101-05. Petitioner’s mother testified Mr. Engan

had decided not to present a suicide theory at trial. Id., Exh.

Y at 99. Dr. Anna Scherzer also offered testimony at the

hearing about post-partum depression and the alleged defects in

the forensic interviews with Bryce. Id., Exh. Y at 115-55. 

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On May 17, 2004, the trial court issued a lengthy order

denying post-conviction relief. See Answer, Exh. A, Item 249;

Exh. AA.

Petitioner filed a timely petition for review with the

Arizona Court of Appeals. See id., Exh. C. On October 17,

2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review of

the trial court’s denial of relief. See id., Exh. AA.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which was denied on May 25, 2006. See id., Exh. BB.

On March 19, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant habeas

petition. Respondents allow the petition is timely filed and

that the claims have been properly exhausted. 

II Applicable law

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007);

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68

(2005); Cook v. Schriro, 516 F.3d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim,

the Court must analyze the last reasoned decision to determine

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if the state’s denial of relief on the claim was clearly

contrary to federal law. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085,

1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041

(2006). Petitioner bears the burden of proving his

constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g., Cook, 516 F.3d

at 816.

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

The standard of review, i.e., the “unreasonable

application” prong of the statute, is not the same as the “clear

error” standard applied by United States Courts of Appeal when

reviewing the decisions of lower courts. See Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70–71, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1172-73 (2003).

“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to

state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id., 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S. Ct. at 1175.

See also Martinez v. Garcia, 379 F.3d 1034, 1037-38 (9th Cir.

2004); Hall v. Director of Corr., 343 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir.

2003); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003). 

If the United States Supreme Court has not addressed

the issue raised by Petitioner in its holdings, the state

court’s adjudication of the issue cannot be contrary to, or an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007),

citing Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408

(2006). See also House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir.

2008) (“Musladin has now dispelled the uncertainty: The absence

of clearly established federal law is dispositive under §

2254(d)(1).”). Accordingly, if the issue raised by the

petitioner “is an open question in the Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus

on the basis that the state court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law by rejecting the precise claim presented

by the petitioner. Cook, 516 F.3d at 818, quoting Carey, 127 S.

Ct. at 654; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.

2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).

The conclusion that a state court decision was contrary

to or an unreasonable application of federal law does not ipso

facto warrant granting of the writ. See Frantz v. Hazey, 513

F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). If the Court determines that

the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established law, the Court must review

whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e.,

the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to

the state court’s decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Panetti,

127 S. Ct. at 2858-59; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390, 125 S. Ct. at

2467-68; Frantz, 513 F.3d at 113-15. See also Larson v.

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30

Under AEDPA, a federal court is permitted to

grant habeas relief only if the state court

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To prevail, the

petitioner must demonstrate “that the state

court’s application of Supreme Court precedent to

the facts of his case was not only incorrect but

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.

Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)). If the state

court reaches the merits without providing

reasoning for us to review, however, “we

independently review the record to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law.” Brazzel v.

Washington, 491 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).30 

These guiding principles were recently reaffirmed by

the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:

As to claims which we do consider, we “shall

not” grant the writ on any claim that was, in

fact, considered on the merits in the state

court, unless the state court decision was

contrary to or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States

Supreme Court, or resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

376, 120 S. Ct. 1495, [] (2000). The Court

has recently reemphasized that a state

court’s application of clearly established

law is acceptable, even if it is likely

incorrect, so long as it is reasonable.

Wright v. Van Patten, --- U.S. ----, 128 S.

Ct. 743, [] (2008). If, however, the state

court decision is “contrary to” or an

“unreasonable application of” clearly

established federal law as determined by the

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Supreme Court, then our consideration is de

novo. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.

Ct. 2527, [] (2003); see also Williams, 529

U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

Johnson v. Loftus, 518 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 2008).

III Analysis of Petitioner’s claims for relief

A. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel

To be awarded habeas relief based on a claim that they

were denied their Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that his

attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency

prejudiced the petitioner’s defense. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984);

Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001). To

prevail on the merits of a Sixth Amendment claim, “it is the

habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied

Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively

unreasonable manner. An unreasonable application of federal law

is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”

Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations

omitted). 

The petitioner must overcome the strong presumption

that his counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable

professional assistance required of attorneys in that

circumstance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

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challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. 

“A standard of reasonableness applied as if one stood

in counsel’s shoes spawns few hard-edged rules,” and the merits

of counsel’s investigative choices may often be “subject to fair

debate.” Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381, 125 S. Ct. at 2462. “A

fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,

to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective

at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at

2066. 

To establish prejudice, the second prong of Strickland,

the petitioner must show that, but for their counsel’s error,

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of their

criminal proceedings would have been different. See Pinholster

v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 757 (9th Cir. 2008). A “reasonable

probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine the

Court’s confidence in the outcome of the state criminal

proceedings. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct.

at 2068. “When a defendant challenges a conviction, the

question is whether there is a reasonable probability that,

absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable

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31 The Superior Court’s written opinion in Petitioner’s

action for post-conviction relief is also attached to the petition for

habeas relief as Exhibit B.

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doubt respecting guilt.” Richter v. Hickman, 521 F.3d 1222,

1229-30 (9th Cir. 2008). In assessing prejudice to Petitioner

from his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, the District

Court must “evaluate the totality of the evidence--both that

adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas

proceeding[s].” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 536, 123 S. Ct.

2527, 2543 (2003). See also Stephens v. Hall, 294 F.3d 210, 218

(1st Cir. 2002).

Petitioner alleges his counsel failed to interview

potential alibi or corroborative witnesses and failed to hire an

investigator or request that an investigator be appointed to

assist him. He further alleges his trial counsel failed to

investigate crime scene evidence and, accordingly, that his

counsel misinterpreted the available evidence. Petitioner also

contends his counsel failed to understand the medical examiner’s

evidence, which he asserts “strongly supported a suicide

scenario,” and that counsel failed to adequately question his

own expert to support this defense. Petitioner further argues

he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failures. 

The ineffective assistance claims asserted in the

federal habeas petitioner were raised in Petitioner’s first

action for post-conviction relief. After the evidentiary

hearing conducted in this matter, the state court denied relief.

See Answer, Exh. A, Document No. 249.31 The state court noted

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that the standard stated in Strickland v. Washington governed

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

The trial court stated:

The Court makes an initial and, admittedly,

entirely subjective observation. Trial

counsel in this case, Mr. Engan, has been

trying cases in this Court since 1996. As of

this date he has tried 16 cases to juries

before this Court, the Defendant’s trial

being the 12th. Four of those cases were

homicides. ... Four of those trials resulted

in defendants being convicted of nothing ...

The Court points out the above not to suggest

that Mr. Engan’s performance at trial must or

even may be gauged by what he has done in

other trials before and since the Defendant’s

trial. The Court simply offers this as

historical background for its opinion

regarding Mr. Engan. This Court finds Mr.

Engan to be an aggressive, assertive, zealous

advocate for his criminal clients who seldom

concedes anything to the prosecution and is

generally willing to contest everything that

the State proposes to do. ...

The Court recalls this case as one of the

most contentious it has ever presided over,

both before, during and after the trial...

Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 2-3.

The trial court noted, inter alia, that defense counsel

had succeeded in “getting” an evidentiary hearing regarding

Bryce’s competency to testify and that counsel had “obtain[ed]

several pretrial rulings in evidentiary issues that were

favorable to his client.” Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 3

The trial court then continued: “Having said all this, the Court

is aware, and will consider Defendant’s claim in the light of

the fact, that any one instance of deficient performance by Mr.

Engan in this case which affected the eventual outcome would

require granting relief.” Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 3-

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32 The state post-conviction court eventually concluded that,

even if counsel’s performance had been deficient with regard to any

single alleged error, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the alleged

error. Answer, Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 5-13. 

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4.32

With regard to Petitioner’s assertion concerning

counsel’s failure to hire an investigator, the trial court

determined that the act was a “conscious decision” “rather than

a failure to understand the law or applicable procedures...”

Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 4. The trial court concluded it was

not prepared to make a blanket finding that

no defense attorney could ever himself do as

good a job investigating a case for trial as

could a court-appointed investigator. The

Court does not believe that choosing to

forego the use of an investigator ... is in

and of itself a deficient performance failing

to meet prevailing professional standards.

To the extent that it would have been

relevant, the Defendant has presented no

evidence to establish a minimal level of

professionalism which his trial attorney

failed to attain. 

Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 5. 

The trial court additionally concluded that Petitioner

was not prejudiced by the “lack of an investigator at trial.”

Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 5. The trial court noted the

testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding “what

a qualified investigator could have done in this case ... and

note[d] that it is familiar with some of the local private

investigators in this area that would have been available to Mr.

Engan and wonders whether they would have been as qualified as”

the expert who testified at the hearing (who was employed by the

Mohave County Public Defender’s Office). Id., Exh. A, Document

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No. 249 at 5. The trial court concluded that the expert’s

suggestions, including requesting the tape of Mr. Koonce’s

initial 911 call, “would have been of marginal value.” Id.,

Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 5.

The court further stated: 

The victim in this case was Bryce’s mother,

so victims rights could be asserted on behalf

of him. The Court doubts that the victim’s

family would have consented to numerous

further interviews and a walk-through of the

scene where he saw his mother die in addition

to what the police had already done.

Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 6.

The trial court stated a 

critical aspect of the defense [was] that the

victim committed suicide. Mr. Bernard at the

evidentiary hearing proposed a plausible

theory that the victim could have placed the

rope in position while standing on the green

toy box shown in the photographs, could have

asphyxiated herself by leaning forward

against the rope as opposed to dangling from

it, and could have fallen against the Buzz

Lightyear doll shown in the photographs ...

Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 6.

The trial court noted that: “With the passage of time,

it is unlikely that testing of these items would yield any

meaningful results, even if they were still available.” Id.,

Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 6. The trial court “sympathize[d]

with the difficulty the defense has several years later in

trying to prove that what an investigator could have done would

have made a difference, but it is the defense who has the burden

of proof on this issue.” Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 7. 

The Court’s position is that the Defendant

has simply come up with another theory as to

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how the victim could have committed suicide.

... The Court is unable to conclude that his

theory ... was any less believable than Mr.

Bernard’s theory. This case, in addition,

did not solely hinge upon whether the death

was a homicide or a suicide. The State

relied upon other evidence to support its

theory of murder, including circumstantial

evidence and what was apparently the eyewitness testimony of the victim’s son.

Arguing Mr. Bernard’s theory to the jury ...

would not have appreciably increased the

likelihood of the jury concluding that this

was a suicide rather than a homicide. The

Court determines that the Defendant failed to

show by a preponderance of the evidence that

trial counsel was ineffective by virtue of

failure to obtain and use an investigator.

Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 7.

Addressing Petitioner’s other specific allegations of

ineffective representation, the trial court stated: 

What is interesting about this case is that

the claims for relief which the Court found

most compelling in ruling that a colorable

claim had been made turned out to be the

claims which were for all intents and

purposes abandonned (sic) at the evidentiary

hearing granted because of those claims...,

including the claim that counsel failed to adequately interview

“unbiased” neighbors to corroborate Petitioner’s alibi and the

failure to “present unbiased neighbors to corroborate the theory

of suicide.” Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 7 & 8. 

With regard to the assertion that counsel erred by

failing to further investigate the differences in the coroner’s

opinions with Dr. Peters prior to Petitioner’s trial, the trial

court stated: “With the benefit of hindsight one can argue that

Mr. Engan should have gone one step further and asked Dr. Peters

whether reviewing the records and asking him to render an

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opinion based thereon, as opposed to actually doing another

autopsy, might yield something productive.” Id., Exh. A,

Document No. 249 at 8. The trial court concluded that this did

not satisfy the Strickland standard and noted that defense

counsel already had the opinion of Dr. Nelson that the manner of

death could not be determined. Id., Exh. A, Document 249 at 8-

9.

The trial court also determined any error was not

prejudicial because it was likely “the jury would have found

more persuasive the testimony of Dr. Keen, whose experience,

whether measured by years, autopsies or levels of

responsibility, far exceeded that of both Dr. Nelson and Dr.

Peters combined.” Id., Exh. A, Document No. 249 at 9.

The undersigned has scrupulously and meticulously

examined the entire and extensive record in this matter. The

undersigned concludes that counsel’s performance was not

unconstitutionally deficient and that the state court did not

err in determining that trial counsel’s performance was not

unconstitutionally deficient and that Petitioner was not

prejudiced by any alleged deficiency in counsel’s performance.

The primary evidence against Petitioner was Bryce’s testimony

and Bryce’s pre-trial statements, including the forensic

interview tapes and the testimony of the forensic interviewers.

If the jury believed Bryce’s testimony, it could reasonably find

Petitioner guilty of causing Ms. McLaughlin’s death. 

Petitioner’s counsel vigorously challenged the

introduction of Bryce’s testimony and Detective Spoerry’s

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evidence regarding Bryce’s identification of Petitioner as the

person who had put a rope around his mother’s neck. Counsel

also did an excellent job of cross-examining Bryce and the

forensic interviewers, and indicating for the jury why Bryce’s

statements should not be believed. The jury believed the

testimony of Bryce and the credibility of witnesses is within

the province of the jury.

 Counsel also did an adequate job of emphasizing to the

jury that there was no independent eyewitness testimony or other

convincing evidence placing Petitioner at the scene of Ms.

McLaughlin’s death during the “window” of opportunity

established by the medical evidence. Nonetheless the jury,

could also reasonably disbelieve the testimony of Timothy Ward,

Petitioner’s primary alibi witness, or concluded that Petitioner

had left Mr. Ward’s home and gone and returned to Ms.

McLaughlin’s home without his brother’s knowledge. Counsel’s

apparent trial strategy of emphasizing the weaknesses in Bryce’s

recitation of events, the absence of physical evidence to

establish the state’s theory of the case, i.e., that a fight or

sexual activity had occurred, the opportunity others had to

cause Ms. McLaughlin’s death, and the absence of any eyewitness

testimony other than Bryce’s placing Petitioner at Ms.

McLaughlin’s house on the night in question, was not the

selection of a strategy that was per se below the standard of

reasonable professionals in that circumstance. The fact that

the jury ultimately believed Bryce’s testimony and the other

evidence implicating Petitioner does not render counsel’s

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performance below that required by Strickland. 

Petitioner further alleges counsel did an inadequate

job of establishing Ms. McLaughlin had committed suicide and

establishing there was insufficient evidence of murder as a

manner of death. The evidence offered by Dr. Peters at the

post-conviction hearing must be considered along with the

evidence presented at trial, i.e., that of Dr. Keen and Dr.

Nelson. Dr. Keen, who was presented to the jury as being the

more experienced pathologist, was positive Ms. McLaughlin had

been murdered. Neither Dr. Nelson nor Dr. Peters was willing to

conclusively state that suicide, rather than homicide, was the

manner of death. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably find

that the manner of death was homicide, balancing the nonconclusive statements of Dr. Peters and Dr. Nelson with the

positive opinion from Dr. Keen combined with the non-medical

testimony and evidence, such as Bryce’s testimony. 

The undersigned again notes the failure of postconviction counsel and the state to not provide the state court

with any record in this matter regarding trial counsel’s

strategy in light of the errors alleged by Petitioner. Because

Mr. Engan was not called at the post-conviction hearing, nor was

an affidavit provided at the state court level, the undersigned

must divine from the record whether the state trial court’s

decision determining the Strickland claims was correct or

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33 A defendant who collaterally attacks their criminal

conviction and sentence raising a claim they were denied their federal

constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial counsel

thereby waives his right to the attorney-client privilege with regard

to his communications with his trial defense counsel. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 959 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v.

Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1178 (11th Cir. 2007); Arizona v. Cuffle, 171

Ariz. 49, 51-52, 828 P.2d 773, 775-76 (1992). 

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incorrect without the benefit of this information.33 

For example, Janet Ward, Petitioner’s wife, testified

at the post-conviction hearing that Mr. Engan made a decision

prior to the trial not to press the theory that Ms. McLaughlin

committed suicide. It appears from the trial record in this

matter that Mr. Engan made a strategic decision to insert

reasonable doubt on the state’s case by implying Mr. Light, Ms.

McLaughlin’s step-father, had killed Ms. McLaughlin.

Emphasizing the assertion that Ms. McLaughlin had committed

suicide would have been inconsistent with forwarding the theory

that Mr. Light murdered Ms. McLaughlin. Mr. Engan presented

testimony that Mr. Light had told at least two people he had

seen Ms. McLaughlin on Sunday night and that they had argued

that night. By virtue of its verdict the jury did not,

apparently, believe these witnesses and did not find that

reasonable doubt existed as to Petitioner’s guilt.

The undersigned’s conclusion in this matter, after a

serious, minute, and thoughtful perusal of the record, is that,

at the end of the day, the jury believed Bryce when he said

“Daddy did it” and that “Daddy” meant Petitioner. Petitioner’s

counsel was not unconstitutionally ineffective for his failure

to win an acquittal for Petitioner in the face of the jury’s

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specific role, which is to determine the credibility of

witnesses.

1. Petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to

investigate potential witnesses 

Petitioner alleges his counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel did not locate, interview, or subpoena

Ms. McLaughlin’s neighbors, Yvonne Johnson or Philip Enoch, who

he asserts had relevant exculpatory information regarding

Petitioner’s alibi defense, and each of whom gave statements to

the police. The state trial court implicitly stated in it’s

decision denying post-conviction relief that Petitioner’s trial

counsel’s performance would have been found deficient if he had

failed to interview witnesses. The state court went as far as

stating its belief that this was Petitioner’s strongest

ineffective assistance of counsel argument. The state court

noted this claim was the basis for its granting of a postconviction evidentiary hearing. However, the state court

decision then determines that Petitioner “abandoned” this claim

by not pursuing it further during the evidentiary hearing.

The undersigned concludes trial counsel’s performance

was not deficient in this regard nor was any such deficiency

prejudicial because the evidence provided by Yvonne Johnson or

Philip Enoch would have, at best, been cumulative to the other

alibi evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial, i.e., that of

Tim Ward, Jennifer Gadjos, and Sherri Jacobs. It is also

unlikely that the jury would have been more swayed by testimony

from “unbiased neighbors” that Ms. McLaughlin was so distraught

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in the days after Alana’s death that she committed suicide, as

compared to the testimony offered by her family, friends, and

former roommates, that she was depressed, vacant, listless, and

not eating, in the interval between Alana’s death and her own,

and the testimony of an expert witness about potential suicide

after the death of an infant.

2. Petitioner contends counsel’s failure to hire an

investigator or request funds for a court-appointed investigator

constituted prejudicial deficient performance in violation of

his Sixth Amendment rights.

Petitioner asserts the evidence presented at the

hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief established

that trial counsel’s investigation of his defense was

inadequate. Petitioner produced expert testimony at the hearing

that counsel’s investigation was inadequate and that, had

counsel procured a professional investigator, the investigator

would have cured this deficiency. The expert testified that a

professional investigator would have conducted: an analysis of

the Buzz Lightyear toy found next to Ms. McLaughlin’s head to

see if her blood or tissue was on the toy and an analysis of the

green toy box found near Ms. McLaughlin’s body to see if it had

her footprints on it, indicating she had climbed on the box and

thus supporting the suicide theory. The expert also testified

a professional would have requested production of Officer

Koonce’s initial 911 call indicating Ms. McLaughlin had

committed suicide. Additionally, the expert investigator stated

he had learned Petitioner’s car had an oil leak at the time in

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question and that photos of Ms. McLaughlin’s driveway did not

show fresh oil, which fact supported Petitioner’s contention he

did not drive to the home that night in his car. 

The guarantees afforded by the United States

Constitution require trial counsel to make “reasonable”

investigations or to make a “reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. See also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523,

123 S. Ct. at 2536 (explaining that whether counsel’s

investigation was reasonable requires “a context-dependent

consideration of the challenged conduct as seen ‘from counsel’s

perspective at the time’”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has concluded counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally

deficient “where he neither conducted a reasonable investigation

nor made a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so

...” Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2002).

But see Johnson v. Loftus, 518 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2008)

(state court’s decision was not error because it could presume

counsel’s choice was strategic in the absence of evidence to the

contrary).

With regard to the prejudice prong of the Strickland

test in these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has held prejudice from defense counsel’s failure to adequately

investigate is more likely when the prosecution’s case against

the defendant is weak. See, e.g., Avila, 297 F.3d at 924

(collecting the cases so holding). However, as long as trial

counsel made reasonable choices, what further investigations

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might have uncovered is irrelevant. Williams v. Woodford, 384

F.3d 567, 615-16 (9th Cir. 2004). The duty to investigate is

not limitless. Cf. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533, 123 S. Ct. at 2541

(holding in the context of a sentencing hearing that an attorney

need not “investigate every conceivable line of mitigating

evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist

the defendant.”). See also Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d

706, 719 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Ninth Circuit concluded in Avila that counsel’s

performance is unconstitutionally deficient if counsel fails to

adequately investigate and to introduce at trial evidence

demonstrating the defendant’s factual innocence, or if counsel

fails to introduce evidence that could have raised sufficient

doubt as to a factual question which would undermine confidence

in the verdict. See 297 F.3d at 918-19, quoting Hart v. Gomez,

174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding defense counsel’s

performance deficient because he failed to review or introduce

at trial documents corroborating a defense witness’ testimony).

See also Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1112-13; Lord, 184 F.3d at 1093.

Petitioner’s trial counsel did not fail to introduce

evidence that could have raised sufficient doubt as to a factual

question which would undermine the jury’s verdict. Some of the

evidence would be cumulative to the defense theories presented

to the jury, i.e., the theory of suicide. With regard to the

“discovery” and introduction of the 911 tape, information was

presented to the jury that the police, i.e., Officer Koonce, did

not initially determine whether Ms. McLaughlin’s death was

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murder or suicide. It is unlikely that further testimony

regarding what caused the bruises on Ms. McLaughlin’s forehead,

i.e., the potential they were caused by the Buzz Lightyear toy,

would have out-weighed the jury’s opinion of Dr. Keen’s or Dr.

Nelson’s testimony on this issue. 

It is at least arguable whether any evidence of oil in

the driveway would have swayed the jury because Petitioner’s car

had been at the residence one day before the murder and he could

have parked the car other than in the driveway on the night in

question. This evidence would also have been cumulative to the

defense witness who testified she did not see anything unusual

occurring at Ms. McLaughlin’s between 5 and 6 p.m., which is

close to the time of death propounded by the prosecution.

Petitioner’s counsel did not request an investigator to

assist him in interviewing witnesses, interpreting the crime

scene photographs, or in collecting evidence. Although trial

counsel presented two alternative theories of death, i.e.,

suicide or another assailant, the theories were presented

primarily, with the exception of Dr. Scherzer, through the

examination of witnesses called by the prosecution. However,

counsel did call Dr. Scherzer to discount the forensic

interviews with Bryce and to support the theory that Ms.

McLaughlin could have committed suicide. Trial counsel also

cross-examined prosecution witnesses regarding their potential

biases against Petitioner and ulterior motives the witnesses may

have had with regard to their testimony against Petitioner.

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Accordingly, the state court’s conclusion that counsel

did not err by failing to hire an investigator and that such

error was not prejudicial, was not objectively unreasonable

application of federal law. Compare Sanders v. Rattelle, 21

F.3d 1446, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding defense counsel’s

performance deficient because he failed to investigate or

introduce at trial evidence implicating someone who previously

confessed to the shooting, and finding the deficiency prejudiced

the defendant despite the fact that five witnesses testified at

trial that the petitioner was the shooter). 

3. Petitioner asserts his counsel’s performance was

deficient because he inadequately examined both his own expert

and the state’s expert, depriving the jury of important

information relating to the cause of death.

It is very difficult for a petitioner to succeed on a

claim that his counsel’s examination of witnesses constituted

prejudicial deficient performance because of the strong

presumption of competence granted counsel in this regard by

Strickland. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct.

2574, 2586 (1986) (stating the petitioner bears a heaving,

though not insurmountable, burden of persuasion on this issue).

Because there is no obvious bright-line standard for judging how

competent counsel would question a specific witness in a

specific case, counsel’s questioning of witnesses must be taken

as competent as long as their approach “might be considered

sound trial strategy.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106

S. Ct. 2464, 2474 (1986). The undersigned concludes, after a

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thorough review of the trial transcript, that counsel’s

examination of the expert witnesses was neither deficient nor

prejudicial and the state court did not err in determining that

Petitioner was not deprived of his right to the effective

assistance of counsel with regard to this specific assertion of

error.

4. Petitioner contends his counsel failed to adequately

argue the evidence in counsel’s closing argument.

The right to effective assistance extends to

closing arguments. [] Nonetheless, counsel

has wide latitude in deciding how best to

represent a client, and deference to

counsel’s tactical decisions in his closing

presentation is particularly important

because of the broad range of legitimate

defense strategy at that stage. Closing

arguments should sharpen and clarify the

issues for resolution by the trier of fact,

[] but which issues to sharpen and how best

to clarify them are questions with many

reasonable answers. Indeed, it might

sometimes make sense to forgo closing

argument altogether. []. Judicial review of

a defense attorney’s summation is therefore

highly deferential-and doubly deferential

when it is conducted through the lens of

federal habeas.

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003)

(internal quotations and citations omitted), reversing Gentry v.

Roe, 320 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Yarborough, the Supreme Court held that, because

defense attorneys must make strategic decisions as to what

arguments to include in closing arguments and they may choose to

acknowledge the “shortcomings” of their client’s case in order

to build credibility with the jury, the acknowledgment of

inculpatory evidence in closing argument does not constitute

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deficient performance. See Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 906

(9th Cir. 2006).

After a thorough review of the entire record, the

undersigned cannot say that Petitioner’s counsel “ignored”

beneficial evidence during his closing argument. Although

defense counsel addressed the prosecution’s evidence against his

client, including the inflammatory evidence regarding

Petitioner’s and Ms. McLaughlin’s sexual activity, counsel

highlighted many of the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case in

his closing argument and also argued to the jury that the

inflammatory evidence was not evidence of Ms. McLaughlin’s

murder. Nonetheless, counsel’s closing argument comports with

the constitutional standard of competence stated in Yarborough.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision denying this claim was

not an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Petitioner asserts his counsel’s behavior is analogous

to that criticized by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in

Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1300 (10th Cir. 2002). In that

case the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held defense counsel’s

performance was below an objectively reasonable standard because

counsel was, inter alia, hostile to his client and his client’s

interests and defense counsel displayed sympathy for the state’s

case and failed to advance any defense theory, including failing

to make a closing argument at all. The Tenth Circuit noted

that, in that case, defense counsel had badgered his own client

on the stand, asked his client “entirely inappropriate

questions,” and was “generally hostile towards his own client.”

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Id., 282 F.3d at 1300.

Petitioner’s counsel was not hostile to his client.

Although counsel commented on evidence which a majority of

citizens might view as distasteful, the written record in this

matter does not indicate that counsel was hostile to his client

during questioning and counsel apparently mentioned the

distasteful evidence for the purpose of arguing, as a sufficient

defense would be required to do, that Petitioner’s predilection

for photographing or videotaping consensual sexual acts and for

engaging in bondage, did not establish that he was a murderer,

was not deficient performance. Accordingly, the state court’s

conclusion in this regard was not clearly contrary to federal

law and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim.

B. Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief

because the state violated his right to due process and a fair

trial by failing to tape Detective Spoerry’s interview with

Bryce.

Petitioner asserts he was denied his constitutional

right to due process of law because the state, in bad faith,

failed to preserve or create possibly exculpatory evidence,

i.e., Detective Spoerry did not tape the police station

interview with Bryce McLaughlin and he purposefully did not tape

the interview so that Bryce’s statements to Detective Spoerry

could not be impeached at trial. 

In denying relief in Petitioner’s direct appeal, the

state Court of Appeals concluded:

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A defendant’s right to due process can be

violated if the State, acting in bad faith,

fails to preserve or destroys evidence that

is constitutionally material.[] Evidence is

constitutionally material if it had

exculpatory value apparent to the police when

it was lost or destroyed, but the police have

no duty to electronically record interviews,

and no evidence was lost or destroyed. See

State v. Havatone, 159 Ariz. 597, 600, 769

P.2d 1043, 1046 (App. 1989). 

Also, it is doubtful that a recording would

have been exculpatory. By the time when

[Bryce] readily chose Ward’s picture out of

both line-ups and referred to Ward as “Daddy,

“ [Bryce] already had consistently identified

Ward as “Daddy” and “Sean” and as the person

who had hurt his mother.

Answer, Exh. V at 5-6.

Although the Supreme Court has established that the bad

faith failure to preserve or to collect potentially exculpatory

evidence is a violation of the defendant’s right to due process

of law, there is no United States Supreme Court opinion holding

that the prosecution’s bad faith failure to create potential

impeachment evidence, i.e., to video-tape a photographic lineup, as compared to the failure to preserve a videotape once

created or to not conduct a photographic line-up if they believe

it is more likely it might be exculpatory, is a violation of the

defendant’s right to due process of law. Compare Villafuerte v.

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625-26 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller v.

Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989); Schad v. Schriro,

454 F. Supp. 2d 897, 914-15 (D. Ariz. 2006). Cf. United States

v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The mere

failure to preserve evidence which could have been subjected to

tests which might have exonerated the defendant does not

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34

Because our cases give no clear answer to the

question presented, [whether counsel’s pretrial

hearing appearance by speaker-phone was a

violation of the Cronic doctrine], let alone one

in [the petitioner’s] favor, “it cannot be said

that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed]

clearly established Federal law.’” Musladin, 549

U.S., at ----, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Under the explicit terms of

§ 2254(d)(1), therefore, relief is unauthorized.

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constitute a due process violation.”). Accordingly, the state

court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s federal constitutional

right to a fair trial was not violated by the failure to videotape Detective Spoerry’s interview with Bryce was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).34 

C. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because the prosecutor made improper comments during his

closing argument which violated Petitioner’s right to due

process of law.

Petitioner alleges that, during the state’s closing

rebuttal argument, the prosecutor vouched for his witnesses,

insinuated additional knowledge of the case, and made other

inappropriate comments which violated his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process of law and a fair trial. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor’s

closing arguments constituted misconduct in violation of his

right to due process of law, the Arizona Court of Appeals

stated:

To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must

demonstrate that the misconduct “so infected

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the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due

process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79

126, 969 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1998) (quoting

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643

(1974) ). In reviewing the transcript of the

prosecutor’s closing argument, we find two

instances of impermissible conduct. At one

point, the prosecutor referred to defense

counsel in perjorative terms: “I believe Mr.

Engan does not have any interest in looking

at the truth in this case.” See Hughes, 193

Ariz. at 85 759, 969 P.2d at 1197 (finding

counsel cannot make insinuations not

supported by the record). 

On another occasion, the prosecutor

essentially vouched for his case: Anybody

here think that I or [the detective] or the

police department don’t have things better to

do than just say gee, I think that I will

prosecute Sean Patrick Ward today. You think

that you don’t have better things to do with

your time.” See State v. Leon, 190 Ariz. 159,

162, 945 P.2d 1290, 1293 (1997) (putting

prestige of government behind case). While

these remarks were arguably in response to

statements made about the police by defense

counsel in his closing argument, they were

nonetheless improper. However, Ward did not

object to any of the statements to which he

points on appeal, and we cannot say that the

prosecutor’s remarks deprived Ward of a fair

trial. 

Answer, Exh. V at 18-19.

When a federal habeas petitioner asserts that

prosecutorial misconduct violated their right to due process,

the Court must consider whether the alleged error infected the

entire proceeding such that the proceeding was rendered

completely unfair. See Hardnett v. Marshall, 25 F.3d 875, 879

(9th Cir. 1994).

On federal habeas review, we do not ask

whether the prosecutor’s remarks were

undesirable or even universally condemned.

Improper argument does not, per se, violate

a defendant’s constitutional rights. If

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prosecutorial misconduct is established, and

it was constitutional error, we then apply

the Brecht harmless error test. The relevant

question is whether the prosecutor’s comments

so infected the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.

Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1108-09 (9th Cir.

2002)(internal citations and quotations omitted).

The state court concluded that, although the prosecutor

had made statements in violation of Petitioner’s rights, the

errors were harmless with regard to the overall fairness of

Petitioner’s criminal proceedings. This decision was not

clearly contrary to federal law. The Court concludes the

statement of the prosecutor did not so infect the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a violation of

due process. See Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir.

1998); Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1996)

(denying habeas relief based on a due process claim regarding a

prosecutor’s comments in closing argument because, in part, the

jury returned a verdict of second degree murder rather than

first degree murder).

IV Conclusion

After a comprehensive review of the entire record

supplied to the Court in this matter, including the forensic

interviews of Bryce McLaughlin, and careful and thorough

consideration of the pleadings submitted by counsel, the

undersigned concludes that the state court’s decision denying

the claims raised by Petitioner in his federal habeas petition

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of

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federal law. Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was not

deficient and Petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged

deficiency, nor was Petitioner’s right to due process of law

violated in his criminal proceedings.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Ward’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Pursuant to Rule

7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona, without the

permission of the Court Petitioner’s objections to the Report

and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in

length. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which

to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

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Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2008.

Case 3:07-cv-00606-MHM Document 24 Filed 09/30/08 Page 71 of 71