Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00107/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00107-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

EDDIE BRILEY PLAINTIFF 

ADC #116921 

V. No. 5:19CV00107-KGB-JTR 

DARRYL A. GOLDEN, et al. DEFENDANTS 

 RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition has been sent to United States 

District Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections to all or part of 

this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain 

the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of 

this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do 

not file objections, Judge Baker can adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may 

waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Introduction 

 In this pro se § 1983 action, Plaintiff Eddie Briley (“Briley”) alleges that 

Defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was a prisoner in the Delta 

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Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”).1 Doc. 2. Before 

Briley may proceed with this case, the Court must screen his claims.2

 

II. Discussion 

 Briley alleges that, on February 3, 2019, a non-party officer wrote a major 

disciplinary charging him with four disciplinary violations for “essentially defending 

[him]self” against another inmate who attacked him. Doc. 2 at 1. According to the 

disciplinary report, when officers arrived to investigate a fight in Briley’s barracks, 

they were unable to identify the two inmates who were fighting. Officers then 

reviewed video surveillance footage which showed that: (1) inmate Edward 

Howerton walked down the stairs “with his walking cane drawn”; (2) Briley walked 

down the stairs one minute later; and (3) Howerton approached Briley, and they 

“beg[an] fighting.” Id. at 7. In response to the charges, Briley gave the following 

written statement: “After the end of the Superbowl game, I went to my assigned rack 

 1

Briley is no longer incarcerated in the ADC. See Doc. 4. 

 2

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints 

seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are 

legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When 

making this determination, a court must accept the truth of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint, and it may consider documents attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011). Finally, a pro se 

complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

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..., and after putting my tablet down so that I could begin cleaning I was assaulted 

by inmate Howerton who used his cane and hands both on me. ... Inmate Howerton 

began assaulting me as I was setting my tablet down.” Id. at 7-8. 

 On February 12, 2019, Defendant Hearing Officer Keith Waddle (“Waddle”) 

conducted a disciplinary hearing on the charges against Briley arising from the fight 

with Howerton. Briley made the following statement to Waddle: “I told the inmates 

that I told the Sgt. they were not cleaning the barracks. He [Howerton] approached 

me with his cane.” Id. at 5. 

 Waddle convicted Briley of two of the four disciplinary charges: Code 05-5 

(provoking or agitating a fight), and Code 05-3 (assault, any threat to inflict injury 

upon another, directly or indirectly). In his decision, Waddle relied on the statement 

of the charging officer, and found that Briley was “[a]ssaulting and/or fighting with 

another inmate.” Waddle imposed punishment on Briley of sixty days of restricted 

commissary, phone and visitation privileges, twenty days in punitive isolation, and 

a reduction in his classification level. Id. at 5-6. 

 Briley later told Defendant Warden Darryl A. Golden (“Golden”) that he had 

been found guilty of the disciplinary charges even though there was no supporting 

evidence. According to Briley, Golden asked if he had fought the inmate who 

attacked him; Briley said, yes, he had defended himself; and Golden said that was 

the reason he was found guilty. Golden told Briley to submit an appeal. Briley 

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appealed Waddle’s disciplinary decision, which Golden affirmed on February 22, 

2019. Id. at 2. 

 In his Complaint, Briley alleges the following claims challenging his 

disciplinary convictions: (1) no evidence supported Waddle’s decision; (2) Waddle’s 

decision was based on “nothing but pure bias”; and (3) Waddle disregarded Briley’s 

statement, without giving any reasons. Id. at 2. Briley also alleges that he was 

improperly charged with violating Code 05-3, which is the “ADC threat[en]ing 

code.” According to Briley, he should have been charged with battery under Code 

4-8. Id. at 3. 

 Briley also claims that Golden “discriminated” against him and “treated [him] 

unfairly” because he affirmed Waddle’s decision. According to Briley, he was 

treated differently from inmate Ruffel Johnson, who was also written a disciplinary 

report for “defending [himself]” against another inmate. Briley alleges that, unlike 

in his case, when Johnson appealed his disciplinary conviction, Golden reversed it. 

Briley believes that Golden treated Johnson more favorably because Johnson was a 

“jail porter,” who cleaned around Golden’s office, and thus had daily contact with 

him. Id. at 2-3. 

 Finally, Briley alleges that Defendant ADC Director Wendy Kelley 

(“Kelley”) failed to properly train Waddle and Golden or implement safeguards to 

“to prevent such arbitrary actions.” Id. at 3. 

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 As relief, Briley seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He also requests 

the Court to “overhaul” the ADC’s disciplinary process. Id. 

A. Briley’s Official Capacity Claims 

 Although Briley seeks only damages from Defendants, he has named them in 

both their official and individual capacities. Doc. 2 at 1. 

 The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes Briley from obtaining 

monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. See Reid v. Griffin, 

808 F.3d 1191, 1192 (8th Cir. 2015); Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th 

Cir. 1997) (damages claims against state officials acting in their official capacities 

are barred “either by the Eleventh Amendment or because in these capacities they 

are not ‘persons’ for § 1983 purposes”). 

 Liberally construed, Briley’s request to “overhaul” the ADC’s disciplinary 

process might constitute a claim for injunctive relief. However, even if it were 

broadly construed in that way, it is now moot because Briley is no longer 

incarcerated in the ADC. See Smith v. Hundley, 190 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1999) 

(prisoner’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered moot by his 

transfer to another facility because he was no longer subject to the allegedly unlawful 

conditions); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (prisoner’s 

claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his transfer to another 

facility because such equitable remedies are “unavailable absent a showing of 

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irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of 

any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again”) 

 Accordingly, all of Briley’s claims against Defendants, in their official 

capacity, should be dismissed, without prejudice. 

 B. Briley’s Due Process Claim 

 To the extent that Briley raises a due process challenge to his disciplinary 

proceeding and subsequent convictions, his claim fails. The disciplinary papers 

attached to Briley’s Complaint make it clear that, at the most, he served twenty days 

in punitive isolation, with thirty days of restricted privileges. A prisoner may only 

maintain a due process challenge to a disciplinary proceeding or conviction if he is 

deemed to have a liberty interest at stake. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995); Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2003). A prisoner does not

have a liberty interest in avoiding temporary disciplinary segregation and the 

suspension of privileges, because such punishment does not create an “atypical and 

significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-86 (thirty days in disciplinary segregation); Phillips, 320 

F.3d at 847 (thirty-seven days in isolation and loss of privileges of contact visitation, 

exercise and chapel); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2002) 

(thirty days in punitive); Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 642-43 & n.2 (8th 

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Cir. 1996) (thirty days in punitive segregation, which included the suspension of 

mail, telephone, visitation and commissary privileges). 

 Similarly, a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in maintaining his 

classification level. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Sanders v. Norris, 

153 Fed. Appx. 403, 404 (8th Cir. 2005); Hartsfield v. Dept. of Correction, 107 Fed. 

Appx. 695, 696 (8th Cir. 2003); Carney v. Houston, 33 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1994); 

Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990). 

 Briley’s allegation that he was improperly charged, in violation of ADC 

policy, also fails. As a matter of law, the violation of prison policy, standing alone, 

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983. Moore 

v. Rowley, 126 Fed. Appx. 759, 760 (8th Cir. 2005); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 

427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997). In addition, it is well settled that prisoners do not have a 

due process right to enforce compliance with internal prison rules or regulations. 

Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847. 

 Accordingly, Briley has not pled a viable § 1983 due process claim against 

any Defendant. 

 C. Briley’s Equal Protection Claim Against Golden 

Briley alleges that Defendant Golden “discriminated” against him by 

affirming his disciplinary conviction, but reversing the conviction of inmate 

Johnson, who worked as a porter near Golden’s office. According to Briley, both he 

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and Johnson received their disciplinary charges simply “for defending 

[them]selves.” Doc. 2 at 2-3. 

 Briley does not allege that he is a “member of a protected class or that his 

fundamental rights” were violated. See Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 989-90 

(8th Cir. 2008). To plead a viable “class of one” equal protection claim, Briley must 

allege facts suggesting that: (1) Golden “systematically and intentionally” treated 

him differently from similarly situated prisoners; and (2) there was no rational basis 

for the difference in treatment. Id.; Phillips, 320 F.3d at 848. 

 In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008), the 

Court limited the circumstances in which a plaintiff can maintain a class-of-one 

equal protection claim: 

There are some forms of state action ... which by their nature involve 

discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, 

individualized assessments. In such cases, the rule that people should 

be “treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions” is not 

violated when one person is treated differently from others, because 

treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the 

discretion granted. In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the 

arbitrary singling out of a particular person would undermine the very 

discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.

Id. at 603. 

 Due to the inherently discretionary and individualized nature of the decisions 

made by state actors charged with managing and caring for prisoners, courts have 

recognized that prisoners’ class-of-one claims alleging arbitrary treatment by prison 

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officials generally are not cognizable under Engquist. See Howard v. Koeller, 756 

Fed. Appx. 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming the denial of a prisoner’s “class-ofone” equal-protection challenge to disciplinary decision-making because of its 

“inherently discretionary” nature); Glassey v. Ryan, No. CV12-01490, 2016 WL 

6080672, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2016) (collecting cases); Atkinson v. MacKinnon, 

No. 14cv736, 2015 WL 506193, at *1 (W.D. Wisc. Feb. 6, 2015) (“It is well 

established that choosing when and how to apply [prison] discipline are 

discretionary decisions falling under Engquist[.]”); Dawson v. Norwood, No. 

1:06cv914, 2010 WL 2232355, at *2 (W.D. Mich. June 1, 2010) (“[T]he class-ofone equal protection theory has no place in the prison context where a prisoner 

challenges discretionary decisions regarding security classifications and prisoner 

placement.”). 

 Prison disciplinary decisions are case-by-case determinations that are based 

on discretionary, subjective and individualized assessments. Although Briley claims 

that his case was identical to Johnson’s because they were both “defending 

[them]selves,” their respective disciplinary decisions required Golden to exercise his 

discretion in considering a host of factors that were specific to their individual 

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situations.3 Thus, under Engquist, Briley has failed to state a viable class-of-one 

equal protection claim against Golden. 

 Finally, even if Briley’s equal protection claim was deemed to be viable, one 

instance of unequal treatment is not sufficient to show that Golden “systematically 

and intentionally” treated Briley differently from similarly situated prisoners, as is 

required in a class-of-one equal protection case. See Nolan, 521 F.3d at 989-90 

(explaining that a “class-of-one plaintiff” must provide “a special and detailed 

account” of how a defendant intentionally treated him differently from similarly 

situated others); Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1041, 1051 (8th Cir. 1997) (“A few 

individual examples of unequal treatment are insufficient to provide more than 

minimal support to an inference of classwide purposeful discrimination.”). 

 Accordingly, Briley has failed to state a viable equal protection claim against 

Defendant Golden. 

D. Briley’s Failure to Train Claim Against ADC Director Kelley

 Because Briley has failed to demonstrate an underlying constitutional 

violation, his supervisory liability claim against Defendant Kelley fails as a matter 

of law. See Mendoza v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 849 

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For example, in responding to a grievance Briley filed about Golden’s allegedly “blatant 

discrimination,” Golden stated that he had affirmed Briley’s disciplinary conviction “due to the 

fact that video evidence shows [Briley] and I/M Howerton squaring off before [they] began 

fighting” and Briley was “a willing participant in the altercation.” Doc. 2 at 10-11. Nothing 

suggests that similar evidence existed in Johnson’s disciplinary proceedings. 

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F.3d 408, 420 (8th Cir. 2017) (supervisory liability claims “automatically fail for 

lack of an underlying constitutional violation”); Williams v. Davis, 200 F.3d 538, 

539 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Absent a constitutional violation, there [is] no basis for section 

1983 liability on the part of [supervisors].”). 

III. Conclusion 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

 1. Briley’s Complaint (Doc. 2) be DISMISSED, WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

 2. This dismissal be counted as a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

 3. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in 

forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommendation would not be

taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 25th day of November, 2019. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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