Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-14-06562/USCOURTS-ca4-14-06562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6562

KALVIN DONNELL COWARD,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

JOHN JABE, Deputy Director of Operations (VDOC); A. DAVID 

ROBINSON, Eastern Regional Director (VDOC); G. F. SIVELS, 

Eastern Regional Ombudsman (VDOC); GREGORY L. HOLLOWAY, 

Assistant Warden, General Population; CLYDE R. ALDERMAN, 

Assistant Warden, Work Center-Special Housing; R. WOODS, 

Institutional Ombudsman; C. HALL, Sergeant of the 

Institutional Investigation Unit,

 Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:10-cv-00147-LMB-TRJ)

Submitted: April 4, 2016 Decided: April 26, 2016

Before SHEDD, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Zachary Hudson, Robert M. Bernstein, BANCROFT PLLC, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of 

Virginia, Stuart A. Raphael, Solicitor General, Trevor S. Cox, 

Deputy Solicitor General, Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Matthew R. McGuire, Assistant Attorney 

General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, 

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Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Kalvin Donnell Coward, a Virginia inmate, appeals from the 

summary judgment entered against him. We dismiss the appeal for 

lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Coward professes to be a member of the Nation of Gods and 

Earths (“NGE”), which the Virginia Department of Corrections has 

classified as a gang. Contending that the Department is 

discriminating against him based on his religion, Coward asserts 

five causes of action against various Department officials. In 

the first four, Coward alleges violations of the Religious Land 

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). In the fifth, 

Coward alleges a claim of constitutional theological 

discrimination.

Among other things, Coward argues on appeal that the 

district court failed to address his theological discrimination 

claim in the summary judgment order. As he explains: “[O]ne 

searches the District Court’s opinion in vain for any indication 

that the court was even aware that Mr. Coward had raised a 

separate constitutional theological claim.” Reply Brief for 

Appellant, at 6. For this reason (and others), Coward contends 

that we should vacate the summary judgment and remand for 

further proceedings.

The Department disagrees with Coward’s assessment of the 

record. In moving for summary judgment, the Department expressly 

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listed Coward’s four RLUIPA claims, and it referenced the 

theological discrimination claim in a footnote appended to 

“Claim 1,” stating that Coward “added a claim #5 which more 

directly challenges the failure to recognize the NGE as a 

religion. Since [the district court] has construed this claim to 

be raised in claim 1, counsel has done likewise.” J.A. 306. The 

Department did not otherwise address the theological 

discrimination claim in a meaningful fashion in its summary 

judgment motion. Without pointing to any specific part of the 

summary judgment order, the Department now asserts that 

“[r]ather than ignoring Coward’s theological discrimination 

claim, the Department and district court treated it in tandem 

with his RLUIPA claim for purposes of the Department’s motion 

for summary judgment.” Brief of Appellees, at 61-62. The 

Department further asserts that because Coward cannot prevail on 

his RLUIPA claims, his theological discrimination claim 

necessarily fails.

Coward is correct that the district court did not expressly 

address the theological discrimination claim in the summary 

judgment order. Indeed, a plain reading of the order supports 

Coward’s contention that the court did not recognize that claim 

at the time of the decision. For example, the court introduced 

its analysis by noting that Coward’s claims arise under RLUIPA, 

and it stated that the Department moved for summary judgment on 

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“all four” of Coward’s claims. J.A. 449, 451. Later, the court 

listed and addressed Coward’s four claims, and its analysis 

involves RLUIPA only. There is simply nothing in the order to 

suggest that the court considered the theological discrimination 

claim when it ruled on the summary judgment motion.

Recently, in Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694, 696-97 (4th Cir. 

2015) (internal punctuation and citations omitted), we 

explained:

The parties to this appeal have not questioned 

our jurisdiction. But before we consider the merits of 

an appeal, we have an independent obligation to verify 

the existence of appellate jurisdiction. And that 

jurisdiction generally is limited to appeals from 

“final decisions of the district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 

1291 — decisions that end the litigation on the merits 

and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the 

judgment.

Ordinarily, a district court order is not final 

until it has resolved all claims as to all parties. In 

making that assessment, we look to substance, not 

form. Regardless of the label given a district court 

decision, if it appears from the record that the 

district court has not adjudicated all of the issues 

in a case, then there is no final order. . . .

[E]ven if a district court believes it has 

disposed of an entire case, we lack appellate 

jurisdiction where the court in fact has failed to 

enter judgment on all claims.

Given the state of the record before us, Porter compels the 

conclusion that we lack appellate jurisdiction.

As noted, nothing in the summary judgment order indicates, 

or even suggests, that the district court considered and ruled 

on the theological discrimination claim. Rather, the court 

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specifically addressed Coward’s “four” RLUIPA claims, and its 

analysis is based entirely on RLUIPA. Therefore, the theological 

discrimination claim is unresolved, and despite the fact that 

the summary judgment was entered and the litigation was ended 

below, we do not have a final decision to review. Accordingly, 

the appeal must be dismissed.

Because we are dismissing this appeal on jurisdictional 

grounds, we decline to comment on the merits of the parties’ 

appellate arguments. We note, however, Coward’s argument that 

the district court improperly granted summary judgment on a 

ground not raised by the Department. On remand, the court and 

the Department may wish to examine the record and, if necessary, 

take steps to ensure that Coward has had (or will have) ample 

opportunity to address any potentially dispositive grounds.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before us, 

and oral argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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