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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 13-2063 

LISA J. BARR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 

WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 10-cv-1199 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2015

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Lisa Barr was a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University from the fall of 

2007 through the spring semester 2010, when the University 

declined to retain her for the next academic year. Barr contends that the nonrenewal decision was in retaliation for 

complaints she made in 2008 about racial discrimination at 

the school. In March 2010 she sued the University alleging 

Case: 13-2063 Document: 43 Filed: 08/12/2015 Pages: 9
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retaliation in violation of Title VII. Service of this suit was 

never perfected, however. 

A few months later, in June 2010, Barr filed a second lawsuit—this time against the University’s Board of Trustees—

alleging that the decision not to renew her contract was both 

retaliatory and the product of age discrimination. In the 

meantime, a magistrate judge recommended that the district 

court dismiss Barr’s first suit for failure to prosecute. And so 

it was dismissed, with prejudice, in August 2010. 

During discovery in the second case, the Board of Trustees learned of Barr’s prior lawsuit. The Board promptly 

amended its answer to raise res judicata as an affirmative 

defense. A motion for judgment on the pleadings soon 

followed. Barr responded that her first suit didn’t end in a 

judgment on the merits and the claims differed in the two 

cases. The district court rejected these arguments, granted 

the Board’s motion, and dismissed the case on res judicata 

grounds. 

We affirm. A dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates 

as an adjudication on the merits,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and 

Barr’s two suits involved the same parties and core of operative facts. Res judicata was properly applied. 

I. Background 

Barr joined the faculty at Western Illinois University as 

an assistant professor of journalism in the 2007–2008 academic year. As a tenure-track professor, she was subject to 

annual retention evaluations through her sixth year of 

teaching, at which point she could apply for tenure. 

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No. 13-2063 3 

In 2008 Barr complained that the University refused to 

hire a professor of Nigerian descent because of his race. She 

contends that the University responded to this complaint by 

harassing her and subjecting her to unfavorable working 

conditions. On November 19, 2009, she lodged a retaliation 

complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 

declined to take action and in December 2009 issued a rightto-sue letter. That same month the University informed Barr 

that she would not be reappointed the following academic 

year. 

On March 3, 2010, just before the 90-day window to sue 

closed, Barr filed a pro se complaint against the University 

alleging that it violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. In it she claimed that the 

nonrenewal was in retaliation for her complaint about racial 

discrimination at the University.1

 

1 Barr’s statement of her claim was labeled “Retaliation for EEOCprotected activities” and stated that she was “[n]ot retained/allowed to 

advance to PY4 of tenure track process, despite having met retention 

criteria.” She elaborated: 

I was non-renewed—not allowed to advance to PY4 of 

tenure track process, despite having met retention criteria. I was and remain an exemplary, high-achieving employee, whose immediate supervisor wanted retained 

[sic]. 

Other employees have advanced much further than I 

through the tenure track process with far less-exemplary 

performance. This, I will show, was retaliation for 

EEOC-protected activities. 

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Two days later Barr filed a second charge of retaliation 

with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. This one 

alleged that the University retaliated against her based on 

her prior EEOC charge; she also claimed that her contract 

was not renewed because of sex and age discrimination. On 

March 30 the EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on these 

claims. On June 25 Barr filed a second suit against the University’s Board of Trustees alleging claims for retaliation 

under Title VII and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 

et seq. In this second suit, Barr was represented by counsel. 

While all this transpired, the first case languished without service on the University. Accordingly, on August 4, 

2010, a magistrate judge recommended that the district court 

dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. The magistrate 

judge noted that Barr had failed to serve the University 

within the 120-day period specified in Rule 4(m) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, after she missed 

the July 1 deadline, the magistrate judge had reminded Barr 

of the service requirement and ordered a status report by 

July 27. Barr neither responded nor served the University, so 

the magistrate judge recommended dismissal. On August 25 

the district court dismissed the first suit, with prejudice, for 

failure to prosecute. 

As discovery proceeded in the second case, the Board of 

Trustees learned about the first suit and amended its answer 

to assert res judicata as an affirmative defense. The Board 

then moved for judgment on the pleadings, see FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(c), arguing that res judicata blocked the second suit. 

Barr objected, pointing out that when she filed her first suit, 

she did not have a right-to-sue letter in hand on the claims 

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No. 13-2063 5 

alleged in the second. She also argued that the elements of 

res judicata were not satisfied. 

The district court rejected these arguments, noting that 

Barr easily could have amended her first complaint to 

include the age- and sex-discrimination claims contained in 

her second EEOC charge once the second right-to-sue letter 

arrived. The court held that res judicata applied because 

Barr’s first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits 

and the two cases involved the same parties and the same 

core of operative facts. The court accordingly granted the 

Board’s motion and entered judgment dismissing the case. 

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s order granting 

judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(c); Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 

2012). 

“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an 

action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating 

issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” 

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The aim of the 

doctrine is to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of 

multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by 

preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 

adjudication.” Id. “Res judicata promotes predictability in 

the judicial process, preserves the limited resources of the 

judiciary, and protects litigants from the expense and disruption of being haled into court repeatedly.” Palka v. City of 

Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011). 

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Res judicata blocks a second lawsuit if there is (1) an 

identity of the parties in the two suits; (2) a final judgment 

on the merits in the first; and (3) an identity of the causes of 

action. Id. Of the third element, we have said that “two 

claims are one for purposes of res judicata if they are based 

on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.” 

Hermann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., 999 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 

1993); see also Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 736 

(7th Cir. 2014) (“Whether there is an identity of the cause of 

action depends on ‘whether the claims comprise the same 

core of operative facts that give rise to a remedy.’” (quoting 

Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 649 F.3d 

539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011))); Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 

633 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011) (There is res judicata where 

“allegations in [two lawsuits] are essentially the same.”). 

There is no dispute here that the first two elements of res 

judicata are satisfied. Although Barr sued the University in 

the first suit and the University’s Board of Trustees in the 

second, the nominal difference in the defendants has no 

significance; everyone agrees there is an identity of parties. 

And the first suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute, 

which operates as a merits judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) 

(involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as 

an adjudication on the merits”); see also Tartt v. Nw. Cmty. 

Hosp., 453 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute “amounts to a 

final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes”). The 

only dispute is whether there was an identity in the causes 

of action in the two suits. Barr says there wasn’t because 

each suit rested on different legal theories and factual predicates—as authorized by the separate EEOC right-to-sue 

notices. 

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This argument is squarely foreclosed by a long line of our 

decisions applying preclusion doctrine to block just this kind 

of claim-splitting in the employment-discrimination context. 

See, e.g., Palka, 662 F.3d at 437–38; Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 549–

51; Hermann, 999 F.2d at 225. The basic principle underlying 

these cases is that a plaintiff cannot evade preclusion by 

“identify[ing] a slightly different cause of action with one 

element different from those in the first, second, or third 

lawsuits between the same parties arising from the same 

events.” Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 550. And the requirement to 

exhaust administrative remedies is no excuse for claimsplitting in this context. We’ve repeatedly explained that a 

plaintiff in this situation—that is, a discrimination claimant 

who is waiting for a right-to-sue letter on new claims that 

are factually linked to an earlier suit—can easily ask the 

district court to stay the first case until the EEOC letter 

arrives. See, e.g., Palka, 662 F.3d at 438; Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 

550–51. 

These principles apply here to preclude Barr’s second 

suit. Yes, the second case is a little different from the first in 

that it complains about age discrimination and presents a 

different theory of retaliation. Yes, Barr needed to get her 

right-to-sue letter before she could bring claims in the second suit. But both suits arise out of the same main event: the 

University’s decision not to retain Barr on its faculty. 

Barr insists that the first case was about harassment, not 

termination. But she’s stuck with her complaint, which, as 

we’ve noted, was indeed based on her termination or “nonrenewed” status. True, it mentioned (though failed to attach) 

her EEOC charge relating to harassment, but the cause of 

action actually alleged in the complaint stemmed from the 

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nonrenewal of Barr’s faculty appointment. And even if her 

legal theory changed between the first and second suits, both 

cases alleged wrongful nonrenewal and thus shared the 

same core factual basis for res judicata purposes. See, e.g.,

Palka, 662 F.3d at 437 (“[T]here is an identity of the causes of 

action because the Title VII claims are premised on the 

Palkas’ termination by their respective municipal employers—the same transactions at issue in their § 1983 cases.”); 

Smith v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1987) (“We 

have regarded as the law of this [c]ircuit that ‘[e]ven though 

one group of facts may give rise to different claims for relief 

upon different theories of recovery, there remains a single 

cause of action.’” (quoting Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 

200 (7th Cir. 1982))). 

Barr argues that because her first suit was dismissed for 

lack of service, the policies underlying res judicata aren’t 

implicated here. She points out that the use of judicial 

resources in the first case was “modest” and the University 

hasn’t actually had to defend multiple rounds of litigation. 

But the rule against claim-splitting applies even if the plaintiff’s first suit was short-lived. See Palka, 662 F.3d at 437 

(explaining that claim-splitting is “a litigation tactic that res 

judicata doctrine is meant to prevent”). 

Finally, Barr reminds us that she filed her first suit without the benefit of counsel. But she soon obtained a lawyer, 

who filed the second suit two months before the first suit was 

dismissed. If, as Barr claims, res judicata is a legal “gotcha 

game” for unrepresented plaintiffs, the “gotcha” part ended 

when Barr hired an attorney to pursue her case against the 

University. 

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We close by noting that Barr’s first suit probably should 

have been dismissed without prejudice. See Lowe v. City of 

East Chicago, Ind., 897 F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 1990). But the 

remedy for that possible error was a motion under Rule 59 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or an appeal. For 

reasons we don’t know, Barr and her attorney pursued 

neither course and instead plowed ahead with the second 

lawsuit. So the dismissal of Barr’s first suit remains an 

undisturbed final decision on the merits, and thus res judicata precludes the second case. 

AFFIRMED. 

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