Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00796/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00796-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Don and Thelma Dillon, husband and

wife,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

State of Arizona; et al.

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-796-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiffs Don and Thelma Dillon filed a complaint in Arizona Superior Court on

December 20, 2007, asserting five tort claims under Arizona law and violation of Plaintiffs’

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants

unlawfully removed three brothers from their foster care by, among other things, failing to

provide them with adequate notice. Defendants removed the case to this Court and filed a

motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state law claims for failure to comply

with Arizona’s notice of claims statute. Doc. 6; Doc. 17 at 4-7. 

On October 14, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the

only remaining cause of action, violation of § 1983. Doc. 14. The Court denied the motion

because there were questions of fact as to whether Defendants “were compelled to conduct

the removal without notice . . . out of concern for potential harm to the brothers” and whether

Plaintiffs “were prospective adoptive parents” under applicable law. Doc. 39 at 7-8.

Case 2:08-cv-00796-DGC Document 117 Filed 08/19/10 Page 1 of 9
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On November 6, 2009, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

remaining claims. Doc. 60. The Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Doc.

73. The Court denied summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Defendants

Michelle Heermans and Eric Hobson, but granted summary judgment to Defendants on all

other claims. Id. at 12.

The only claim currently pending is the § 1983 claim against Defendants Heermans

and Hobson. The claim is that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment by removing the brothers from Plaintiffs’ foster care without prior

notice or a hearing. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs contend that they had a liberty interest in

maintaining their relationship with the three brothers based on the United States Constitution

and Arizona law. At summary judgment, the Court held that “Plaintiffs have no liberty

interest in keeping foster children based on the Constitution or federal law,” but noted that

Plaintiffs might be able to show a liberty interest based on state law. Doc. 73 at 5-6. As a

result, the only liberty interest, if any, that Plaintiffs had in maintaining their relationship

with their foster children arose out of Arizona law.

On June 29, 2010, in light of issues raised in the parties’ proposed final pretrial order,

the Court directed the parties to brief four issues: (1) Defendants’ legal argument that

Plaintiffs can prove no liberty interest because a liberty interest can be created only by state

substantive law, not state procedural law; (2) Defendants’ legal argument that they are

entitled to qualified immunity because the alleged liberty interest was not “clearly

established” at the time of the relevant events in this case; (3) Defendants’ legal argument

that the post-removal process afforded Plaintiffs satisfied due process; and (4) whether

Defendants waived their right to raise issues (1)-(3) by failing to assert them in their motion

for summary judgment. 

The Court has reviewed the briefing on issues (1)-(4) and finds that these issues are

legal issues proper for determination by the Court. For reasons discussed below, the Court

finds that Defendants have not waived their right to raise these arguments. The Court further

Case 2:08-cv-00796-DGC Document 117 Filed 08/19/10 Page 2 of 9
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1

 Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ only remaining claim must fail because

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court will not consider Defendants’ other

two arguments.

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finds that the liberty interest alleged by Plaintiffs was not “clearly established” at the time

of the relevant events in this case. As a result, Defendants are protected by qualified

immunity, and Plaintiffs’ only remaining claim must fail.1

I. Waiver.

The first question before the Court is whether Defendants waived their right to raise

issues (1)-(3) by failing to raise them in their summary judgment motion. Defendants argue

that they did not waive their right to raise these issues because they have consistently claimed

that Plaintiffs had no liberty interest in their relationship with the foster children, that

qualified immunity applies to protect Defendants, and that Defendants provided Plaintiffs

with sufficient due process. Doc. 114 at 9-12. Defendants further note that they “are aware

of no rule or requirement that a Defendant must file a summary judgment motion on every

potentially dispositive issue.” Id. at 12. They argue that if this case goes to trial, Plaintiffs

still have the burden of proving a constitutional violation, and Defendants have the right to

present evidence and make arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ claim. Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants cannot make arguments (1)-(3) now because they

made them and similar arguments in their summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs argue that

the Court, by allowing Defendants to present these arguments now or at trial, would merely

be allowing a motion for reconsideration, which is not proper. Id. at 11-12 (“Defendants’

inclusion of these arguments in the pretrial memorandum was improper as this court had

previously considered and rejected these arguments. Revisiting these arguments is nothing

more than a motion for reconsideration.”). The Court disagrees.

Defendants did not argue issues (1), (2), or (3) in their summary judgment motion.

See Doc. 60. They argued several similar points, but they did not actually argue – nor did

the Court decide – issues (1)-(3). See id. at 7 (Defendants arguing an issue similar to issue

Case 2:08-cv-00796-DGC Document 117 Filed 08/19/10 Page 3 of 9
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2

 Plaintiffs point out that they moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, and note that the Court denied that

motion summarily on the ground that it was untimely. Doc. 75. They argue that the Court,

by accepting what is, in effect, an untimely motion for reconsideration by Defendants, would

be acting unfairly. As discussed above, however, the Court does not consider the courtordered briefing on these issues from Defendants to be a motion for reconsideration.

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(1) – that the possession of a foster care license is not a constitutionally protected liberty

interest under the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 14 (Defendants arguing an issue similar to

issue (2) – that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they relied on the judgment

of specialists); id. at 6 (Defendants arguing an issue similar to issue (3) – that Plaintiffs

received appropriate process for the revocation of their foster care license). The Court agrees

that Defendants could have made arguments (1)-(3) in their summary judgment motion. But

the fact that Defendants neglected to make these arguments does not mean that they waived

the arguments for trial. Indeed, Plaintiffs have pointed to no authority – and the Court knows

of none – holding that a defendant waives a right to argue a point of fact or law at trial if he

neglects to raise it in a summary judgment motion.

The Court further finds that Defendants are not asking for reconsideration of the

Court’s summary judgment ruling. As discussed above, Defendants did not make arguments

(1)-(3) in their summary judgment motion and, as a result, the Court has not yet ruled on

these arguments.2

 

The Court requested briefing on issues (1)-(4) because they are legal issues that are

proper for resolution by the Court. Moreover, they are issues that may obviate the need for

a trial. 

II. Clearly Established Law.

Defendants contend that they are protected from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim because they

are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. Qualified immunity protects a defendant

from liability when the official did not contravene clearly established law. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987). The question of whether qualified immunity

applies is a three-step process. First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the

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defendant violated his constitutional rights. See Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th

Cir. 2001); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, if the plaintiff proves a

constitutional violation, the plaintiff must prove that the law was clearly established. See

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the Court determines that the law was not clearly established,

the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. If the Court determines that the law was

clearly established, the Court then must determine whether, based on the circumstances, the

defendant made a reasonable mistake regarding what the law required. See Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 205; Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007). If the Court finds

a reasonable mistake, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have made clear that the Court can decide

whether the claimed constitutional right was clearly established without first determining

whether the right was violated. See James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009)). The Court therefore

will first consider whether the constitutional right claimed by Plaintiffs was clearly

established. Plaintiffs bear the burden “of proving that the rights [they] claim[] were clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817 (9th Cir.

2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

As this Court has previously noted, Plaintiffs had no liberty interest in keeping foster

children based on the U.S. Constitution or federal law. Doc. 73 at 5-6. As a result, the only

liberty interest that could have been clearly established is one based on state law. Wilkinson

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63

(1989) (state can create a liberty interest by enacting a statute that establishes substantive

predicates to govern official decisionmaking and uses explicitly mandatory language). 

For such a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Plaintiffs note that in order for this Court to find that

the law was clearly established, “we need not find a prior case with identical, or even

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materially similar, facts,” but instead must “determine whether the preexisting law provided

the defendants with fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.” Flores v. Morgan Hill

Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation

omitted). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants had a clear and fair warning that their conduct was

unconstitutional based on A.R.S. § 8-515.05 and Smith v. Organization of Foster Families

for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The Court does not agree.

The Court cannot find that Smith put Defendants on notice that they would deprive

Plaintiffs of their due process rights if they removed the foster children without notice. Doc.

115 at 7. As the Court stated in its previous order, the Supreme Court in Smith “never

decided the question of whether foster parents have a distinct liberty interest in foster

relationships.” Doc. 39 at 8. Smith therefore did not notify Defendants that removing the

children without notice would be unlawful. Moreover, in several other cases, the Ninth

Circuit has declined to recognize a liberty interest in foster parents’ continuing relationship

with foster children. Gibson v. Merced County Dep’t of Human Res., 799 F.2d 582, 587-88

(9th Cir. 1986); Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court

accordingly cannot find that any Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court cases put Defendants on

notice that their conduct would violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Nor can the Court find that A.R.S. § 8-515.05 provided such notice. The statute

generally provides that CPS must “inform the licensed foster parent of [its] intent to remove

a child and place the child in another foster care placement.” Plaintiffs argue that this statute

created a liberty interest in a continuing relationship with their foster children and that the

statute was sufficient to inform Defendants that violating it would also mean they were

violating Plaintiffs’ right to due process of law. But Plaintiffs have failed to cite any

authority suggesting that A.R.S. § 8-515.05 created a liberty interest in foster family

relationships. While it is true that a state statute can give rise to a liberty interest in certain

circumstances, the Court cannot find that Defendants were on notice of any liberty interest

created by A.R.S. § 8-515.05.

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The vast majority of the cases cited by Plaintiffs and Defendants consider laws

pertaining to conditions of confinement in prisons, not laws pertaining to foster families. See

Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 490 U.S. at 462-63 (court finding that Kentucky prison regulations did

not give inmates a liberty interest in receiving visitors); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-

84 (1985) (court holding that Hawaii’s prison regulation did not afford prisoner a protected

liberty interest that would entitle him to procedural protections before being sentenced to

disciplinary segregation); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (court holding that

Hawaii’s prison regulations did not create a liberty interest in avoiding an interstate prison

transfer); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (court holding that Pennsylvania statute

conferred a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population); Conn.

Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981) (holding that a Connecticut practice

of granting commutations to most life inmates was not sufficient to create a protectable

liberty interest); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976) (court finding that state law

did not confer a due process right in connection with a prisoner’s transfer); Carver v.

Lehman, 558 F.3d 869, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2009) (court finding that a Washington statute did

not create a liberty interest in early release for certain offenders); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) (court holding that a California statute giving an accused the right

to two defense attorneys in a capital case did not create a due process right); Smith v. Sumner,

994 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (consent decrees can create liberty interests for inmates).

These cases are not sufficiently similar to Plaintiffs’ situation to put Defendants on notice

that a statute governing removal of foster children would create due process rights that could

be violated by the removal of children without notice. 

Only three cases cited by the parties address the question of whether a state statute

unrelated to prison conditions can confer a liberty interest: James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646

(9th Cir. 2010); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Long v. Holtry,

673 F. Supp. 2d 341 (M.D. Pa. 2009). These cases do not convince the Court that there was

a clearly established due process right at the time Defendants acted in this case. 

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In James, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against several CPS officials on the

ground that they violated his procedural due process rights by failing to notify him when they

took his daughter into temporary custody. He argued that two California statutes required

the CPS officials to notify him of taking his daughter into custody and that a failure to

comply violated his right to due process. The Ninth Circuit held that the statutes, while

requiring notice, did not “establish any substantive predicates or mandate any outcomes,”

and, as a result, did not create a due process right. “[W]hen a state establishes procedures

to protect a liberty interest that arises from the Constitution itself – like a parent’s liberty

interest here – the state does not thereby create a new constitutional right to those procedures

themselves, and non-compliance with those procedures does not necessarily violate the Due

Process Clause.” James, 606 F.3d at 657.

Long was decided in 2009 – well after the removal of the boys from Plaintiff’s

custody in 2005 – and therefore could not have established the right on which Plaintiffs rely.

Long and McLaughlin did hold that state statutes regarding the removal of foster children

conferred a due process right on foster parents, but both cases dealt with Pennsylvania

statutes and were decided under Third Circuit law. The Court simply cannot conclude that

decisions based on Pennsylvania and Third Circuit law, one of which was decided four years

after the events in this case, clearly established a constitutional right under A.R.S. § 8-

515.05. The Pennsylvania decisions are too remote in time and subject matter to have placed

reasonable Arizona officials on notice that their removal of the boys in this case would

violate due process. 

Because the right claimed by Plaintiffs was not clearly established, Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45. Judgment must therefore be

entered in favor of Defendants as a matter of law on the only remaining claim in this case.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants.

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2. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 18th day of August, 2010.

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