Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00101/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00101-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's surreply is

DENIED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP CHAMPION,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-0101 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO

DISMISS AND

DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Defendant United States of America moves, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction the complaint filed by Plaintiff

Phillip Champion. In the alternative, Defendant moves for

summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motion and moves for

partial summary judgment. The matters were heard on May 27,

2005. Having considered the parties' papers1, the evidence cited

therein and oral argument on the motions, the Court GRANTS

Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for partial summary

judgment. 

BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute that, during the early morning

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of June 8, 2001, Plaintiff was injured while riding his offhighway vehicle (OHV) on property known as the Scott's Creek

Parcel. The Scott's Creek Parcel was, at the time of

Plaintiff's accident, owned by the United States Army Corps of

Engineers (COE). It borders the South Cow Mountain OHV

Recreation Area, which was, and still is, owned and maintained

by the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for the

purpose of recreational OHV use. The parties also do not

dispute that, at the time of Plaintiff's accident, neither the

BLM or COE monitored or maintained any roads or trails for

recreational use on the Scott's Creek Parcel. BLM had entered

into an agreement with COE in February, 1995 whereby COE agreed

to transfer the Scott's Creek Parcel to BLM. That transfer was

not completed until March, 2004.

Plaintiff was injured when he encountered a large bush that

was hanging over Walnut Grove Road, an unmarked trail that runs

along Scott's Creek. According to Plaintiff's sworn

declaration, just after he maneuvered his OHV under the bush,

his OHV fell through a portion of the trail that had been washed

away, and Plaintiff and his vehicle fell fifteen feet onto the

streambed below. Walnut Grove Road is located on the Scott's

Creek Parcel. According to Plaintiff's evidence, prior to his

accident, he had been driving his OHV on Mendo-Lake Road, and

had turned onto Walnut Grove Road approximately one hundred

yards before the accident site. 

Plaintiff offers evidence that there was no sign warning

recreational users of the South Cow Mountain Recreation Area

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United States District Court

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that Walnut Grove Road was not part of the BLM-maintained

recreation area. Plaintiff submits further evidence that the

road washout was caused by improper maintenance of a portion of

Mendo-Lake Road that is located on the South Cow Mountain OHV

Recreation Area. Conversely, Defendant proffers evidence that

Mendo-Lake Road was properly maintained by the BLM, that it did

not exhibit signs of erosion or downslope movement, and that it

is not located directly uphill from the accident site, so it is

unlikely that the washout was caused by downward runoff from

Mendo-Lake Road onto Walnut Grove Road. In addition, the

Scott's Creek Parcel was not part of the designated route system

of the South Cow Mountain OHV Recreation Area; it was marked as

"out of bounds" on maps of the area provided by the BLM to OHV

users.

On January 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed his complaint, which

alleges that Defendant willfully and maliciously failed to guard

or warn against a dangerous and unsafe condition. The complaint

further alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The parties

concluded fact discovery on March 18, 2005. On April 22,

Defendant filed this motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment. On May 6, 2005, Plaintiff opposed the motions and

moved for partial summary judgment that Defendant is legally

responsible for his injuries. On May 13, Plaintiff filed an

amended opposition and summary judgment motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

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I. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal subject matter jurisdiction

must exist at the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of

Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d

1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the sufficiency of the

pleadings to establish federal jurisdiction, or allege an actual

lack of jurisdiction which exists despite the formal sufficiency

of the complaint. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs.

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v. Corrothers,

812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987).

Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which goes

to the power of the court to hear the case. Therefore, a Rule

12(b)(1) challenge should be decided before other grounds for

dismissal, because they will become moot if dismissal is

granted. Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975).

A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter

jurisdiction until the contrary affirmatively appears. Stock

West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.

1989). An action should not be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction without giving the plaintiff an opportunity

to amend unless it is clear that the jurisdictional deficiency

cannot be cured by amendment. May Dep’t Store v. Graphic

Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980).

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II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th

Cir. 1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is

no material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard

as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by

affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford

Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary

judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may

affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law will

identify which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The

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moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the

absence of a material fact on such issues, nor must the moving

party support its motion with evidence negating the non-moving

party's claim. Id.; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497

U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404,

1409 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 

Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a

prima facie showing in support of its position on that issue. 

See UA Local 343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471

(9th Cir. 1994). That is, the moving party must present

evidence that, if uncontroverted at trial, would entitle it to

prevail on that issue. See id.; see also Int’l Shortstop, Inc.

v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). Once

it has done so, the non-moving party must set forth specific

facts controverting the moving party's prima facie case. See UA

Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's "burden of

contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not negligible." 

Id. This standard does not change merely because resolution of

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the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." See id.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the

California Recreational Use Statute (CRUS). CRUS states that a

private land owner owes no duty of care to keep its property

safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, and

owes no duty to warn of hazardous conditions. Cal. Civ. Code §

846. The statute provides for two exceptions: (1) in cases of

willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a

dangerous condition, and (2) in cases in which permission was

granted by the property owner for recreational use in exchange

for consideration. Id. In Morgan v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 37

Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012 (1974), cited with approval in Rost v.

United States, 803 F.2d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1986), the court

established a three-part test for willful misconduct: (1) actual

or constructive knowledge of the danger, (2) actual or

constructive knowledge that injury is a probable result of the

danger, and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril.

Defendant notes that there is no evidence of willful or

malicious failure, on the part of any COE employee, to guard or

warn against the condition that caused Plaintiff's accident. 

And, Defendant provides evidence that COE was not aware of any

dangerous conditions on its property, or of any prior accidents

in the Scott's Creek Parcel. Plaintiff argues that, even if

CRUS does confer immunity upon COE, BLM is not immune because it

was not the owner of the land and it helped to create the

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hazardous condition. However, even if BLM were responsible for

creating the allegedly dangerous condition on Walnut Grove Road,

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that BLM had actual or

constructive knowledge of the fallen bush or the washed out

trail, that it had actual or constructive knowledge that injury

was probable due to the danger, or that it consciously failed to

act to repair the condition. Thus, even if BLM did, as

Plaintiff argues, have a legal obligation to maintain the

Scott's Creek Parcel due to the land transfer agreement between

the BLM and COE, Plaintiff has failed to show that BLM was

willful or malicious in failing to guard against the condition

that allegedly caused Plaintiff's accident. 

Plaintiff does not argue that he falls into the second

exception of section 846; he does not contend that he exchanged

consideration for permission to use the COE land for

recreational purposes. And, as Defendant notes, even if

Plaintiff did make that argument, Plaintiff would nevertheless

not fall under the invitee exception because there was no

consideration given in exchange for his use of the COE land. 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's claim is barred by

the CRUS; thus, his claim must be dismissed because the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's claim is

dismissed with prejudice.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Even if the Court did have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

claim, Defendant would be entitled to summary judgment. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment that, inter alia,

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Plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries because OHV riding is

an inherently dangerous activity. The parties do not dispute

that a defendant land owner has no duty to protect a plaintiff

participating in a sport from risks inherent in the sport

itself. See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296 (1992). Plaintiff

notes that a defendant does owe a duty not to increase

unreasonably the risk to a plaintiff above those inherent in the

particular sport. Id. at 315. Thus, the critical question here

is whether encountering a washed out road or trail is an

inherent and assumed risk of riding OHV vehicles.

In support of its argument that Plaintiff assumed the risk

of his accident, Defendant cites O'Donoghue v. Bear Mountain Ski

Resort, 30 Cal. App. 4th 188 (1994). In O'Donoghue, a plaintiff

sought damages for injuries suffered when he skied off of a

groomed ski run and into a ravine filled with boulders. 30 Cal.

App. 4th at 191. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling

that granted the defendant summary judgment under the doctrine

of primary assumption of risk. Id. at 194. Noting that the

plaintiff was an experienced skier, the court ruled as follows:

"It is an inherent risk of skiing that a skier might encounter

hazardous natural forest obstacles, such as rough terrain,

trees, rocks and ravines if he or she enters the natural forest,

departing from the ski run." Id. at 193. In his opposition

papers, Plaintiff acknowledges that "naturally occurring,

unmarked washouts might be an inherent risk of OHV riding," but

he nevertheless argues that washouts which are caused by the

actions of a landowner are not.

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Plaintiff's argument is not persuasive; it is irrelevant

whether the government's negligence caused the washed out trail

if the risk of encountering that condition is one that is

inherent in OHV riding. Id. at 192-93. The facts in this case

are fundamentally no different than the facts in O'Donoghue. 

Plaintiff is an experienced OHV user who, despite his knowledge

of the designated trails in the South Cow Mountain OHV

Recreation Area, was riding on an unmarked trail outside of the

BLM-owned land when he was injured. There is no material

dispute that one inherent risk of OHV riding is that a rider may

encounter washed out trails and difficult terrain. Plaintiff's

accident was the unfortunate realization of that risk.

For the foregoing reasons, even if the Court did have

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim, Defendant would be entitled

to summary judgment that Plaintiff assumed the risk of his

injuries.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

(Docket No. 28), DENIES Plaintiff's motion for partial summary

judgment, and DENIES Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's

surreply (Docket No. 58). The Clerk shall enter judgment and

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/15/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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