Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02280/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02280-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD SIALOI, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 11-CV-2280 JLS (KSC)

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

(ECF Nos. 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 

92)

Presently before the Court are Defendants City of San Diego; Allen Sluss; Bradley 

Phelps; Joseph Krawczyk; David Rohowits; Anthony Reese; Michael Hall; Edward 

Kaszycki; Corey Stasch; Miguel Garcia; Michael Hayes; Wade Irwin; Scott Smith; Kelvin 

Lujan; and John Carroll’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions in Limine. (ECF Nos. 83, 

84, 85, 86.) Also before the Court are Plaintiffs Edward Sialoi; Kelli Sialoi; Sialoi Sialoi, 

Jr.; September Sialoi; Foleni Sialoi; Gayle Pasi; Lago Sialoi; Liua Sialoi; Hardy Teo 

Falealili; Tapili Sofa; and minors G.S., T.O.S., T.A.S., T.R.S., and B.F.’s (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) Motions in Limine. (ECF Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91, 92.) Plaintiffs filed responses 

in opposition to Defendants’ Motions in Limine, (ECF Nos. 104, 105, 106, 107), and 

Defendants likewise filed responses in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine, (ECF 

Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101). A hearing was held on October 13, 2016. Having considered 

the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ first MIL 

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(ECF No. 83), GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ second MIL (ECF No. 84), GRANTS 

Defendants’ third MIL (ECF No. 85), DENIES Defendants’ fourth MIL (ECF No. 86), 

GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ first MIL (ECF No. 88), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ second MIL 

(ECF No. 89), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ third MIL (ECF No. 90), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ fourth 

MIL (ECF No. 91), and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ fifth MIL. The Court reiterates that these 

rulings may be revised during the trial for good cause.

Defendants’ first MIL seeks to exclude Plaintiffs from arguing that the jury should 

base its verdict on public or community safety—specifically, that a verdict for Plaintiffs 

will punish and deter the Defendants, thereby making the community safer. (ECF No. 83.) 

Defendants additionally seek to preclude Plaintiffs from making a “golden rule” 

argument—that is, asking the jurors to put themselves in Plaintiffs’ position and make a 

judgment based on that hypothetical reality. The Court finds that so-called “golden rule” 

arguments are irrelevant to the actual damages alleged in this case and have a substantial 

likelihood of unfairly prejudicing the jury because these arguments may encourage the jury 

to render a verdict based on personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence. 

However, Plaintiffs and Defendants will be allowed to generally discuss public or 

community safety because those issues are central to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and 

Defendants’ defenses to those claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART

Defendants’ first MIL (ECF No. 83), thereby precluding both Plaintiffs and Defendants 

from arguing that the jury should put itself in either party’s shoes when making their 

decision in the case (“golden rule” argument), but will allow both parties to generally 

discuss public or community safety. 

In their second MIL, Defendants ask the Court to exclude evidence of medical 

expenses in excess of those actually paid by Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 84.) First, Defendants 

ask the Court to generally exclude any evidence of, or making reference to, medical 

expenses in excess of those actually paid by Plaintiffs or their insurance company. Second, 

Defendants specifically ask the Court to exclude any evidence of Plaintiff Edward Sialoi’s 

medical expenses for his shoulder injury because while he has produced medical records 

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(including medical bills) for the injury, he has failed to provide Defendants with the amount 

he actually paid for the surgery. As to the first issue, the Court finds that evidence of 

medical expenses in excess of those actually paid by Plaintiffs is irrelevant to the actual 

damages Plaintiffs seek, and even Plaintiffs agree that “under California law only the 

amount actually paid is admissible,” (Pl.’s Opp’n 2, ECF No. 106). As to the second issue, 

the Court will allow Plaintiffs to introduce the amount actually paid by Plaintiff Edward 

Sialoi’s health insurer for treatment of his injuries ($18,558.05), which was made available 

to Defendants on February 24, 2014, (id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1)). Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ second MIL (ECF No. 84), thereby precluding Plaintiffs 

from offering evidence or otherwise referring to medical bills in excess of those actually 

paid for by Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ insurance, but allowing Plaintiffs to introduce only the 

amount actually paid by Plaintiff Edward Sialoi’s health insurer for treatment of his 

injuries.

Defendants’ third MIL asks the Court to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert Jack Smith’s 

opinion that the San Diego Police Department failed to follow the law by neglecting to take 

a personnel complaint from Plaintiff Junior Sialoi because it is not supported by sufficient 

facts or data. (ECF No. 85.) The Court finds that, regardless of whether Plaintiff Junior 

Sialoi did in fact attempt to make a complaint to Internal Affairs, this purported fact is 

irrelevant to any issue in the case (for example, Plaintiffs do not allege a Monnell claim) 

and would thus likely confuse the jury. Moreover, Plaintiffs concede that their “expert 

Jack Smith will not offer a legal conclusion regarding whether SDPD committed 

misconduct by not acting on Mr. Sialoi’s personnel complaint.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 1, ECF No. 

105.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ third MIL (ECF No. 85), thereby 

precluding Plaintiffs’ expert Jack Smith from testifying about the San Diego Police 

Department’s failure to follow the law based on Plaintiff Junior Sialoi’s alleged attempt to 

make a complaint to Internal Affairs.

Defendants’ fourth MIL asks the Court to issue an order requiring Plaintiffs to prove 

punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence because it is the proper standard for 

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determining punitive damages. (ECF No. 86.) However, while California law requires a 

plaintiff to prove punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence for California state 

law claims,1 Defendants present no binding authority stating that Plaintiffs must prove 

punitive damages for their § 1983 claims by “clear and convincing evidence” as opposed 

to the general “preponderance of the evidence” standard used for federal claims.2 Although 

the same factual conduct underlies Plaintiffs’ state law and federal law claims, the Court 

finds that the jury will not be confused over different burdens of proof for each damages 

claim. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ fourth MIL (ECF No. 86). As such, 

Plaintiffs will not be required to prove punitive damages for their § 1983 claims by clear 

and convincing evidence.

Plaintiffs’ first MIL asks the Court to preclude Defendants’ expert witnesses from 

offering legal conclusions on: (1) whether force was excessive or unconstitutional; (2) 

whether exigent circumstances existed to justify entry of the home; (3) whether the 

detentions and pat-down searches were constitutional; and (4) whether any of the 

detentions ripened into an “arrest” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF 

No. 88.) Defendants agree with Plaintiffs that it would be inappropriate for experts to state 

legal conclusions, such as whether police actions or force were “unconstitutional” or 

“excessive.” (Def.’s Opp’n 5, ECF No. 97.) Accordingly the Court GRANTS IN PART 

Plaintiffs’ first MIL (ECF No. 88), thereby precluding Defendants’ expert witnesses from 

offering legal opinions, such as whether police actions or force were “unconstitutional” or 

“excessive,” or whether any of the detentions ripened into an “arrest” within the meaning 

 

1

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in 

addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing 

the defendant.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294.

2

 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff'd, 379 F. App'x 

647 (9th Cir. 2010) (“First, Plaintiffs did not have to prove by clear and convincing evidence as, 

Defendants contend, that they were entitled to punitive damages for the federal claims. All they needed to 

show under federal law was a preponderance of the evidence.”).

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of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court will allow Defendants’ expert witnesses to 

opine generally on whether exigent circumstances existed, as well as whether pat-downs 

and use of handcuffs were appropriate under the general policies of the police department. 

Plaintiffs’ second MIL asks this Court to preclude Defendants from introducing 

evidence or testimony relating to: (1) the fact that Officer Irwin was shot by a gunman

several years after the Sialoi incident; (2) other specific instances of violence against police 

officers that took place elsewhere; and (3) specific instances of gang conduct and police 

encounters at the apartment complex that were not known to officers on the night of the 

incident. (ECF No. 89.) As to the first issue, Defendants do not oppose this portion of the 

motion. (Def.’s Opp’n 3, ECF No. 98.) As to the second issue, specific incidents of 

violence that occurred “elsewhere” have little probative value on the state of mind of the 

officers on the night of the incident “at the apartment complex”; and, in any event, that 

probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to Plaintiffs and may 

mislead the jury. As to the third issue, specific instances of gang conduct and police 

encounters at the complex that “were not known to officers” on the night of the incident 

obviously have no relevance to their state of mind. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiffs’ second MIL, thereby precluding Defendants from introducing evidence or 

testimony regarding any of the specific instances mentioned above.

Plaintiffs’ third MIL asks the Court to preclude Defendants from introducing 

evidence or testimony relating to prior arrests, police contacts, or criminal convictions of 

any Plaintiff. (ECF No. 90.) The Court finds that such evidence is irrelevant to any issue 

in the case and, even if relevant, is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to 

Plaintiffs, would confuse the issues and mislead the jury, and waste the Court’s time. 

Additionally, such evidence would be inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404. 

Moreover, Defendants do not oppose this motion to exclude evidence of Plaintiffs’ other 

police contacts and arrests. (Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 99.) Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ third MIL, thereby precluding Defendants from introducing evidence 

or testimony relating to prior arrests, police contacts, or criminal convictions of any 

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Plaintiff.

Plaintiffs’ fourth MIL asks the Court to preclude Defendants from introducing into 

evidence the “findings and conclusions” section of their internal affairs investigation. 

(ECF No. 91.) Although Defendants produced the record of their internal affairs 

investigation during discovery, Defendants redacted the findings and conclusions section. 

Thus, Defendants are barred from introducing this evidence at trial pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ fourth 

MIL (ECF No. 91), thereby precluding Defendants from introducing into evidence the 

“findings and conclusions” section of their internal affairs investigation.

Plaintiffs’ fifth MIL asks this Court to preclude Defendants from introducing 

evidence or testimony that Plaintiff Foleni Sialoi was (1) the victim of a shooting when he 

was a teenager in the City of Compton, and (2) terminated from a job he had as a code 

compliance officer for the City of Compton. (ECF No. 92.) The Court finds that such 

evidence is irrelevant to any issue in the case, and, even if relevant, is substantially 

outweighed by unfair prejudice to Plaintiffs, would confuse the issues and mislead the jury, 

and waste the Court’s time. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ fifth MIL (ECF 

No. 92), thereby precluding Defendants from introducing evidence or testimony that 

Plaintiff Foleni Sialoi was (1) the victim of a shooting when he was a teenager, and (2) 

terminated from a job he had as a code compliance officer for the City of Compton. 

However, if Plaintiffs introduce any testimony regarding Plaintiff Foleni Sialoi’s previous 

job as a code compliance officer, Defendants will be allowed, on cross-examination, to 

elicit testimony regarding his termination for purposes of impeaching the witness’s 

character for truthfulness.4

 

3

“If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is 

not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, 

unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

4 Defendants argue that the “facts surrounding Mr. Sialoi’s termination are certainly probative of his 

character for truthfulness. Mr. Sialoi was terminated for improperly using a city code to rent a car for his 

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CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ first MIL (ECF 

No. 83), GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ second MIL (ECF No. 84), GRANTS 

Defendants’ third MIL (ECF No. 85), DENIES Defendants’ fourth MIL (ECF No. 86), 

GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ first MIL (ECF No. 88), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ second MIL 

(ECF No. 89), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ third MIL (ECF No. 90), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ fourth 

MIL (ECF No. 91), and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ fifth MIL.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 18, 2016

 

personal use, i.e., fraud. If Mr. Sialoi is allowed to represent to the jury that he was a City of Compton 

Code Compliance Officer, which may bolster the jury’s opinion of his credibility, the interests of justice 

dictate that the jury also hear the circumstances of his termination from that position.” (Def.’s Opp’n 5, 

ECF No. 101.)

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