Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05246/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILB D 

United Stat~s Court of A~;cr:.b Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 2 G 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROB~:R.T L. HOECKER 

Cle!l: · 

MARGARET SLADE, for the estate of 

LAWRENCE SLADE, deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 90-5246 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-C-192-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael James King, M. Jean Holmes of Winters, King & Associates, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jesse L. Butler, Assistant General Counsel, James A. Friedman of 

the Office of Labor Law, Washington, D.C., and Tony M. Graham, 

United States Attorney, Kathleen Bliss Adams, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

Appellate Case: 90-5246 Document: 01019336468 Date Filed: 12/26/1991 Page: 1 
34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

FACTS 

In 1971, Plaintiff, a black male, began his quest for 

employment with the United States Postal Service (USPS) by taking 

a written examination. His name was placed on the employment 

register. Early in 1975, he took the clerk-carrier examination, 

and his name was placed on the USPS clerk-carrier register. In 

1975 he was called for training, but was rejected because he was 

on probation for a misdemeanor conviction. Thereafter, he 

obtained a release from probation and was accepted into 

pre-employment training. He was again called for employment in 

April 1976, but was not hired because, in the interim, he had 

received a third misdemeanor conviction. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint with the 

Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC), asserting that he 

was unjustly denied employment. Various appeals between the EEOC 

and the EEO Division of the Postal Service ensued. The events 

pertinent to this appeal are set forth below. 

An EEOC complaint examiner issued findings that the USPS's 

policy of basing a decision not to hire on an applicant's criminal 

convictions had an adverse impact on black applicants because more 

blacks than whites had arrest records. She concluded that 

Plaintiff had been denied employment due to his race and 

recommended that Plaintiff be offered employment and awarded back 

pay, benefits, and attorney's fees. The USPS rejected the 

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Appellate Case: 90-5246 Document: 01019336468 Date Filed: 12/26/1991 Page: 2 
recommendation on the ground that Plaintiff had shown no evidence 

of disparate treatment or racial discrimination. 

Plaintiff appealed the USPS's decision to the EEOC. The EEOC 

found that the USPS had discriminated against Plaintiff on the 

basis of his race and ordered the USPS to implement the corrective 

action of reevaluating Plaintiff's convictions to determine 

whether they were job related. No back wages or attorney's fees 

were awarded to Plaintiff. On March 18, 1987, the USPS issued its 

report stating that it had reviewed 

had found them to be job related. 

Plaintiff's convictions and 

The USPS determined that the 

convictions would have made Plaintiff unfit for employment in 

1976. The USPS also determined that since the convictions were by 

then over ten years old, they would not be considered if Plaintiff 

chose to submit a current application for ,,-,:ployment. 

On the date of the USPS's written reevaluation of Plaintiff's 

convictions, Plaintiff filed his Title VII case in federal 

district court seeking past wages and attorney's fees. The 

district court dismissed the action because (1) Plaintiff had 

failed to name the proper defendant, Postmaster General of the 

United States, and (2) Plaintiff had not served the Defendant 

within the limitations period. This court reversed, concluding 

that because Plaintiff served the Attorney General by mailing the 

Summons and Complaint on the last day of the limitations period, 

the requirements were met for relation back of the amendment of 

pleadings changing a party. Slade v. United States Postal Serv., 

875 F.2d 814 (lOth Cir. 1989)(per curiam). 

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After remand, the USPS moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff 

then withdrew his claim for lost wages because "after time to 

consider the matter, it appear[ed] that the hiring policies and 

procedures of the u.s. Postal Service [were] no longer 

discriminatory toward plaintiff. Therefore plaintiff [withdrew] 

his claim for lost wages." District Court Order at 5, (citing 

Plaintiff's response brief to summary judgment motion), 

Appellant's App. 

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment for attorney's fees, 

claiming he was a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 

The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the case for lack of 

jurisdiction over what was at that point a bare claim for 

attorney's fees. Without addressing the jurisdictional issue, the 

district court dismissed Plaintiff's case, with prejudice, on the 

ground that he was not a prevailing party under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 2000e-5(k). 1 Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim for 

attorney's fees. 

SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY 

The USPS moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that 

Plaintiff died before entry of the district court's order, and 

substitution of a personal representative was not made in the 

1 No final judgment was entered by the district court. The 

judgment is nonetheless final and appealable since there is no 

question about the finality of the court's decision. Aviles v. 

Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 n.l (lOth Cir. 1989). Technical 

compliance with the rules for entry of a judgment may be waived by 

the parties. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 

(1978); Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775, 776 n.l (lOth Cir. 

1980). 

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district court. The Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of 

Jurisdiction is denied. 

Plaintiff died on August 5, 1990. The district court entered 

its order dismissing the action on October 16, 1990. On 

November 13, 1990, Plaintiff's attorney of record filed a Notice 

of Appeal. On March 5, 1991, Plaintiff's wife filed her motion in 

this court requesting that she be substituted as Plaintiff. No 

personal representative of Plaintiff's estate has been appointed. 

The USPS maintains that substitution can be had only if the 

party dies after judgment was entered by the district court or 

after the notice of appeal is filed. Fed. R. App. P. 43(a) 

states, however, that if a party entitled to appeal shall die 

before filing a notice of appeal, the notice of appeal may be 

filed by that party's attorney of record if there is no personal 

representative. This court is not divested of jurisdiction where 

a party has died prior to entry of judgment in the district court 

but substitution was not requested in the district court. See 

Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 193 n.1 (2d Cir. 

1987)(party died before entry of trial court's judgment; court of 

appeals ruled on merits of appeal). 

Rule 43(a) further provides that "[a)fter the notice of 

appeal is filed substitution shall be effected in the court of 

appeals in accordance with this subdivision." Any party may 

suggest a death on the record if the deceased party has no 

representative, and proceedings shall then be had as the court of 

appeals may direct. Rule 43 (a) . Therefore, Rule 43(a) 

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Appellate Case: 90-5246 Document: 01019336468 Date Filed: 12/26/1991 Page: 5 
contemplates the filing of a notice of appeal and substitution of 

a party after the death of the party. 

Accordingly, Mrs. Slade may be substituted as Plaintiff if 

the action survives his death. "The question of the survival of 

an action grounded in federal law is governed by federal common 

law when, as here, there is no expression of contrary intent." 

Smith v. Department of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 834 (lOth Cir. 

1989). "[I]f federal law does not provide a rule of decision in a 

civil rights case, federal law will incorporate the appropriate 

state law, unless that law is 'inconsistent with the Constitution 

and laws of the United States.'" Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 

67 (7th Cir. 1987)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The relevant law 

here is the state statute for survival of personal injury actions. 

See id. at 67-68. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1051 (West 1988) 

states that a cause of action for injury to the person shall 

survive the claimant's death. Accordingly, the pending claim in 

this case survived the Plaintiff's death, and Plaintiff's wife, 

Margaret A. Slade, is substituted as Plaintiff. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal 

standard employed by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there exists 

no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The subject matter 

jurisdiction of the district court is a question of law reviewable 

de novo on appeal. Downtown Medical Center v. Bowen, 944 F.2d 

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756, 762 (lOth Cir. 1991); accord Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 

126, 128 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

JURISDICTION 

The USPS argues that the district court was without 

jurisdiction in this case because after he abandoned his claim for 

back wages, the only relief requested by Plaintiff was attorney's 

fees. The issue presented is: If a plaintiff brings a Title VII 

action for both back wages and attorney's fees, including 

attorney's fees for administrative proceedings, and then 

voluntarily abandons the back wages claim, does the district court 

have jurisdiction over the claim for attorney's fees. 

The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the action on 

the ground that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's attorney's fees claim. Report and 

Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate at 3, Appellant's App. The 

district judge did not address the jurisdictional issue in ruling 

that Plaintiff was not a prevailing party and therefore not 

entitled to attorney's fees under§ 2000e-S(k). 

The USPS relies on North Carolina Department of 

Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 u.s. 6 

(1986) for its position that an independent suit solely for 

attorney's fees is not authorized. The attorney fee statute 

applied in Crest Street was 42 u.s.c. § 1988, which provides for 

attorney's fees to the prevailing party in "any action or 

proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . [T]itle VI of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... " Id. at 12 (quoting § 1988). In 

its holding that an independent action for attorney's fees is not 

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authorized by § 1988, the Court considered the plain language of 

the statute, "in the action or proceeding to enforce the civil 

rights laws listed " Id. (emphasis in original). 

Here, Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees was brought 

pursuant to § 2000e-5(k), which provides for attorney's fees to 

the prevailing party "[i]n any action or proceeding under this 

subchapter [2000e]." The applicable statute here does not require 

that the federal court proceeding be brought to enforce the laws 

set forth in § 2000e. Therefore, Crest Street is not dispositive 

of the issue of jurisdiction in this case. 

In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), 

the civil rights plaintiff sued in federal court alleging that the 

defendant violated Title VII by failing to hire her because she 

was black. She had previously filed administrative and judicial 

proceedings in the state system, resulting in orders directing 

defendant to offer plaintiff employment and back wages, but not 

awarding attorney's fees. Plaintiff's federal suit also requested 

attorney's fees incurred in both state and federal proceedings. A 

settlement on the merits was reached before trial in the federal 

lawsuit, leaving for judicial resolution only the issue of 

attorney's fees. 

The Court concluded that "[42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1)]'s 

authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit 

solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done 

in state and local proceedings." Id. at 66 (footnote omitted). 

The Court noted that if fees were authorized only where plaintiff 

had grounds independent of those for attorney's fees to bring suit 

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under Title VII, such independent grounds usually would not be 

difficult to find. An incentive to proceed to federal court as 

soon as possible, such as the availability of a fee award, would 

undermine the congressional intent to encourage full use of state 

remedies. Id. at 66 n.6. 

One of the primary purposes of Congress in enacting 

§ 2000e-5(k) was to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited 

means to bring a meritorious suit." Id. at 63 (quoting 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 u.s. 412, 420 (1978)). In 

order to accomplish that goal, the federal courts retain the 

"ultimate authority" to enforce Title VII. Jones v. American 

State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Manders 

v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health, 875 F.2d 263, 267 

(lOth Cir. 1989)("The Carey Court reasoned that to effectuate 

Congress' purpose in enacting [42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(k)] -making it 

easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious 

suit - attorneys' fees 

efforts in required 

must be available to compensate counsels' 

administrative proceedings to prevent 

plaintiffs from being deterred from pursuing meritorious claims by 

the prospect of having to pay fees."). 

Therefore, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees, including fees 

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incurred in required administrative proceedings, 2 in this lawsuit 

brought under Title VII. 

PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS A "PREVAILING PARTY" 

The provision for counsel fees in 42 u.s.c. § 1988 was 

patterned upon the attorney's fees provisions of 42 u.s.c. 

§§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-5(k). Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 

758 n.4 ( 1980). Therefore, cases addressing prevailing party 

status under§ 1988 govern cases brought pursuant to§ 2000e-5(k). 

See Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 130 

(lOth Cir. 1980)(same standard is to be applied in awarding fees 

under sections 1988 and 2000e-5(k)). 

Plaintiff asserts that he is a prevailing party because of: 

(1) the reversal on appeal of the district court's dismissal of 

Plaintiff's case for failure to name the proper defendant and to 

timely serve the USPS in Slade v. United States Postal Service, 

875 F.2d 814 (lOth Cir. 1989)(per curiam); (2) the EEOC Complaint 

Examiner's Recommended Decision, issued March 19, 1984, finding 

that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his race 

when he was removed from the USPS's hiring register due to his 

arrest and conviction record; and (3) the final decision of the 

EEOC dated February 17, 1987, finding that the USPS had 

discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of race when it 

removed him from the hiring register because of his criminal 

2 New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at 61-62 n.2 

("In cases involving federal employees, all the Courts of Appeals 

that have considered the question have upheld fee awards under 

[§ 2000e-5(k)] for work done in federal administrative proceedings 

that must be exhausted as a condition to filing an action in 

federal court." (Citations omitted)). 

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Appellate Case: 90-5246 Document: 01019336468 Date Filed: 12/26/1991 Page: 10 
record without considering the specific circumstances of the 

convictions to determine if they were job related. 

Plaintiff's successful appeal does not establish him as a 

prevailing party because the only relief afforded to Plaintiff was 

to permit the case to go forward on the merits. Unless a party 

has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of 

his claims, he is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of 

attorney's fees. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 u.s. at 757. 

Accordingly, 

establish him 

Plaintiff's success in his prior appeal does not 

as a prevailing party within the meaning of 

§ 2000e-5(k). 

Plaintiff 

March 19, 1984, 

also was not a prevailing party by virtue of the 

recommended decision of the EEOC Complaint 

Examiner. Because the EEOC's interim recommendation was not a 

final decision and because the USPS rejected the interim 

recommendation, Plaintiff was not a prevailing party. 

29 C.F.R. § 1613.220(d). 

Plaintiff finally claims prevailing party status because the 

last decision of the EEOC found that the USPS had discriminated 

against Plaintiff on the basis of race and because the USPS 

eventually evaluated his convictions under a nondiscriminatory 

standard. "[A]t a minimum, to be considered a prevailing 

party ... , the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution 

of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between 

[him]self and the defendant. . [A] technical victory may be so 

insignificant . . . as to be insufficient to support prevailing 

party status." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. 

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School Dist., 489 u.s. 782, 792 (1989); accord Estate of Farrar v. 

Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1991). The ordinary language of the 

attorney's fees statute requires that a plaintiff "receive at 

least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said 

to prevail." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 u.s. 755, 760 (1987). 

Here, the outcome of the case did not change the legal 

relationship between Plaintiff and the USPS. Plaintiff was deemed 

ineligible for employment prior to the filing of a complaint. 

Plaintiff was deemed to have been ineligible for employment at the 

conclusion of the proceedings. The USPS was not required by the 

EEOC or the court to offer Plaintiff employment, or to pay back 

wages or benefits. Furthermore, if Plaintiff had pursued his 

lawsuit, he could not have prevailed on his claim for back wages 

because he admits that the USPS's reevaluation was not 

discriminatory. 

Plaintiff 

obtained the 

maintains that he is a prevailing party because he 

right to be evaluated by the USPS based on 

nondiscriminatory 

purely technical. 

formulation" of 

criteria. Plaintiff's success, however, was 

Therefore, he did not satisfy even a "generous 

prevailing party status. Texas State Teachers, 

489 u.s. at 792. Because Plaintiff was not a prevailing party, he 

is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 

§ 2000e-5(k). See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 u.s. at 761-62 (plaintiff 

not a prevailing party because "[a]s a consequence of the present 

lawsuit, [the plaintiff] obtained nothing from the defendants"). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

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