Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01464/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01464-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1252(a)(2) Injunction for Deportation

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 This proceeding has been transferred to this Court for de novo review of Petitioner 

Leonardo Tapia-Felix‘s citizenship claim. Having carefully reviewed the evidence and 

the arguments of counsel, as presented at trial and in their written submissions, the Court 

issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

I. Findings of Fact1

Petitioner Leonardo Tapia-Felix was born on June 16, 1972. Petitioner’s mother, 

Rosa Maria Felix (“Felix”), was born in San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico on April 

5, 1957, and Petitioner’s father, Leonardo Tapia-Ambriz (“Tapia-Ambriz”), who is now 

deceased, was born on April 27, 1938. At the time of Petitioner’s birth, Felix was 15 

years old and Tapia-Ambriz was 34. 

 On July 24, 1972, Petitioner’s birth was registered in Mexico. The registration of 

 1

 Although the parties contest whether Petitioner is a U.S. citizen, the vast majority of the evidence in this case is undisputed and has been stipulated to by the parties. 

Leonardo Tapia-Felix, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

 Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV-15-01464-PHX-SPL 

ORDER 

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birth listed his birthplace as San Luis Colorado, Sonora, Mexico, and was signed by both 

Felix and Tapia-Ambriz, as well as by Petitioner’s maternal grandmother, Marcelina 

Felix, and his paternal aunt, Lilia Tapia, who signed as witnesses. 

 Growing up, Petitioner lived in both Mexico and the United States. In September 

of 1990, Felix and Tapia-Ambriz signed a registration of birth in California, which listed 

Petitioner’s birthplace as Santa Ana, California. Adelina Tapia, who is married to TapiaAmbriz’s brother, Sergio Tapia, also signed the registration as a supporting witness. On 

November 2, 1990, a Delayed Registration of Birth was issued. 

 On May 16, 2007, Petitioner obtained a United States passport. In 2008, 

Petitioner’s daughter, Blanca Nayeli Tapia Ochoa (“Ochoa”), obtained a certificate of 

U.S. citizenship based on her derivative status through Petitioner. 

 In 2008, Petitioner was charged with an unrelated crime in state court. At that 

time, an immigration check was performed that revealed he had been encountered by 

immigration officials on April 28, 1987 and on August 21, 1998. During those 

encounters, he had been determined to be a citizen of Mexico and was issued an alien 

registration number. An investigation pursued, and in 2009, immigration authorities 

obtained a copy of Petitioner’s Mexican registration of birth, Mexican birth certificate, 

and Mexican National Registration Card that was issued on September 10, 2000. On 

January 13, 2011, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Brian Wakefield 

interviewed Petitioner’s mother at her residence, which was conducted in the Spanish 

language. Wakefield also wrote a sworn statement in the Spanish language on Felix’s 

behalf, as he was illiterate. Felix signed the statement. The statement is purported to 

memorialize Felix’s interview and attests, among other things, that Petitioner was born in 

Mexico and was taken to the United States when he was 40 days old. 

On February 15, 2012, the U.S. Department of State issued a letter to Petitioner 

informing him that, having considered Petitioner’s Mexican birth certificate and Felix’s 

2011 statement, his United States passport was revoked. Ochoa’s citizenship has not been 

revoked. 

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 On July 31, 2012, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings, to which 

Petitioner asserted a claim of United States citizenship in response. In November 2012, 

an Affidavit to Amend a Record was submitted by two special agents to the California 

Office of Vital Records, which was appended to Petitioner’s California Delayed 

Registration of Birth. The affidavit stated “Delayed Reg. of Birth obtained fraudulently. 

Registrant’s original Mexican birth certificate obtained by U.S. Dept. of State.” (Exh. 

62.) 

 While his removal proceedings were ongoing, on May 8, 2012, Petitioner, through 

counsel, petitioned the Superior Court in San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico for an 

order declaring his Mexican birth certificate to be null and void. The petition was granted 

and the court entered a judgment of nullification that became final on December 11, 

2012. The registration of birth was annotated by the Office of Civil Registry to reflect the 

court’s judgment on December 13, 2012. 

 After several rounds of hearings and decisions, on May 10, 2013, an immigration 

judge ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico. Petitioner appealed, and the case was 

remanded by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to allow Petitioner to offer 

additional evidence in support of his citizenship claim. Following a hearing on remand, 

on June 24, 2014, the immigration judge again found Petitioner to be removable as 

charged, and the decision was affirmed by the BIA on December 12, 2014. Petitioner 

sought review of that decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit 

found a genuine issue of material fact existed as to Petitioner’s claim of United States 

citizenship, and the case was transferred to this Court for a de novo review of his 

citizenship claim. 

 On December 1, 2016, a bench trial on the merits of this action was held. The 

Court heard the testimony of Petitioner, Felix, Agent Wakefield, Avelina Tapia, and 

Sergio Tapia. 

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II. Conclusions of Law2

A. Burden of Proof 

 At issue is a judicial determination of the nationality of Petitioner, in the nature of 

a declaratory judgment claim brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(5)(B) (if a “petitioner claims to be a national of the United States and the court 

of appeals finds that a genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is 

presented, the court shall transfer the proceeding to the district court... for a new hearing 

on the nationality claim and a decision on that claim as if an action had been brought in 

the district court under section 2201 of Title 28”). 

 There are “two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.” 

Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423-34 (1998). Here, Petitioner claims only citizenship 

by birth. Respondent Loretta E. Lynch (the “Government”) has presented evidence of 

Petitioner’s foreign birth that gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage, shifting 

the burden to Petitioner to establish a valid claim to citizenship. See Mondaca-Vega v. 

Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 419 (9th Cir. 2015); Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 572 F.3d 736, 737 

n. 3 (9th Cir. 2009); Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1029 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2001). The parties 

have stipulated that because Petitioner was issued a U.S. passport and his daughter 

obtained a certificate of U.S. citizenship based on his purported status as a U.S. citizen, 

Petitioner has produced “substantial credible evidence” of his U.S. citizenship. See 

Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d at 419. Therefore, the parties agree that the ultimate 

burden rests with the Government to prove that Petitioner is removable by clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing evidence.3 Id. 

 2

 To the extent any the Court’s conclusions of law are more properly characterized as findings of fact, they should be treated as such. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Money Now Funding LLC, No. CV-13-01583-PHX-ROS, 2014 WL 11515626, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 

10, 2014). 

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 “Respondent disagrees with Mondaca-Vega and believes that case’s holding shifting the burden of proof to the Government to be contrary to applicable statutes and precedents, and that its transplantation of burdens of proof in administrative removal 

proceedings to a § 1252(b)(5)(B) district-court nationality hearing to be improper. Nevertheless, Respondent acknowledges that, at this time, under Mondaca-Vega, the 

Government arguably has the burden of proof...” (Doc. 85 at 7, § F.) 

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 “Clear and convincing evidence requires greater proof than preponderance of the 

evidence. To meet this higher standard, a party must present sufficient evidence to 

produce ‘in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual 

contentions are highly probable.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 866 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). See also Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422 (holding 

that the Government’s burden to establish alienage by “clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing” evidence signifies the same intermediate standard as “clear and 

convincing”). “Evidence only clearly and convincingly supports a conclusion when it 

does so in the aggregate considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and despite 

the evidence that fairly detracts from that conclusion.” Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 

F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

B. The Government Has Carried Its Burden 

The Court finds that the evidence presented by the Government is clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing evidence of Petitioner’s alienage, and that evidence is 

sufficient to warrant disregard of the evidence of U.S. citizenship furnished by Petitioner. 

Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 420; Lee Hon Lung v. Dallas, 261 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 

1958). 

The Government has offered evidence which includes, among other things: 

Petitioner’s Mexican birth certificate; a Mexican Clave Única de Registro de Población 

card; documents from Petitioner’s A-file relating to Petitioner’s historical encounters 

with immigration officials and investigative reports; and the citizenship application 

packet of Petitioner’s daughter, which includes her Mexican birth certificate that lists 

Petitioner’s nationality as Mexican. However, at the heart of the Court’s conclusion is 

Petitioner’s authenticated Mexican registration of birth. 

 The authenticity and admissibility of Petitioner’s Mexican registration of birth, 

along with its corresponding translation, is undisputed. The registration of birth, recorded 

39 days after Petitioner’s birth, provides that he was born on June 16, 1972 at 3:00 a.m. 

in San Luis Rio Colorado, Mexico. It states that Petitioner was the first born child of 

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Felix, who was a 15 year old homemaker, and Tapia-Ambriz, who was a 34 year old day 

laborer. The registration reflects that Felix and Tapia-Ambriz resided together in Mexico, 

but were not married. The registration of birth was witnessed by Felix’s mother and 

Tapia-Ambriz’s sister. 

The Mexican registration of birth bears sufficient indicia of trustworthiness and is 

close in time, if not contemporaneous, as to be conclusive evidence of Petitioner’s birth 

in Mexico. See Coronoa-Paloma v. INS, 661 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1981); Zerri v. Gonzales, 

471 F.3d 342 (2nd Cir. 2006); Venercion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1986); 

Mah Toi v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1955) (“Neither law nor reason justifies 

holding an order to be of greater evidentiary value than a certificate in establishing the 

place and time of birth when such facts are in issue in a proceeding concerned with 

United States citizenship.”); Pinto-Vidal v. Attorney General of U.S., 680 F. Supp. 861, 

862 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding a Mexican birth certificate was a contemporaneous record 

of birth where it indicated that the birth had been registered on April 18, 1967, 39 days 

after the petitioner was born on March 10, 1967); Liacakos v. Kennedy, 195 F. Supp. 630, 

631 (D. D.C. 1961) (“a record of birth contemporaneously made by governmental 

authority in official records would be almost conclusive evidence of birth.”). The 

Mexican registration of birth contains specific information that forms a coherent and 

reliable account of Petitioner’s birth, and the other facts contained within the record of 

registration are consistent with the evidence presented in this case. 

Petitioner has offered a copy of a Mexican judgment nullifying the Mexican 

registration of birth and birth certificate, which the Court finds is facially valid. The 

judgment however is not entitled to comity. Nor does it cast doubt on the validity of 

Petitioner’s Mexican registration. Unlike here, no evidence was provided before the 

Mexican court that contradicted Petitioner’s position; the Government did not have notice 

or an opportunity to be heard in the Mexican proceeding. See Int’l Transactions, Ltd. v. 

Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003) (a 

foreign court’s judgment on a matter is conclusive and entitled to comity when the 

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relevant parties had an opportunity to be heard).4 The Mexican court did not engage in 

the same legal determination. (See Exh. 7, p. 7 (stating that the determination was 

whether the evidence tended to support the petitioner’s position).) Nor did the Mexican 

court consider the same body of evidence. For example, the judgment reflects that it was 

supported by the testimony of PATRICIA BECERRA LUNA 

and ALICIA GARCIA JIMENEZ, who at the hearing of October Five, two thousand and twelve... stated that they 

know for a fact the LEONARDO TAPIA FELIX WAS 

BORN IN THE City of Santa Ana, Orange County, 

California, and that he was registered again in this City due to his parents’ ignorance, who believed that by so doing he would obtain dual citizenship. 

(Exh. 7, p. 9.) These named individuals did not testify before this Court, nor are they 

claimed to have been among those present at or near the time of Petitioner’s birth. 

Therefore, they could not have known with certainty that Petitioner was born in the 

United States. See United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Personal 

knowledge means knowledge produced by the direct involvement of the senses.”).

 The Court also finds that the purported documentary evidence of Petitioner’s birth 

in the United States does not displace the evidentiary value of the valid Mexican birth 

record. Petitioner’s California delayed registration of birth was issued almost twenty 

years after his birth. While a delayed registration of birth can be probative of a claim of 

United States citizenship even in the face of a contemporaneously filed foreign birth 

certificate, the strength of the record depends on the evidence relied upon by the state 

officials who issued it. See Reyes v. Neelly, 264 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1959) (when a 

certificate is based upon evidence furnished by a plaintiff, the certificate can “have no 

greater standing or force than that evidence on which the determination was based”); 

Nagle v. Dong Ming, 26 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir. 1928) (“Public record of a birth, if 

 4

 Further, giving preclusive effect to the Mexican judgment finding that Petitioner was born in California would be contrary to the United States’ exclusive authority over the regulation of immigration. See Montemurro v. Immigration and Naturalization 

Service, 409 F.2d 832, 832 (9th Cir. 1969) (“under comity - as contrasted with full faith 

and credit - our courts have power to deny even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons”). 

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contemporaneously made pursuant to law, would be entitled to great weight; but, in the 

absence of a special statute, a record made, as in the case here, 25 years after the event 

has no legal status, and is without substantial probative value. The verified statement 

upon which it was entered may be considered as an affidavit, but the record itself is 

without efficacy.”); see also Mah Toi v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1955) 

(rejecting state’s delayed birth certificate as conclusive proof of birth); BustamanteBarrera v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 388, 400 (5th Cir. 2006) (citizenship “is determined by 

federal law; it is not dependent on the law of any particular state.” (emphasis in 

original)).

 Here, the delayed registration of birth reflects that the registering officials relied 

on a baptismal certificate that showed Petitioner had been baptized on December 17, 

1972 at Our Lady Queen of Angels Church in Los Angeles, California, and was born in 

Santa Ana, California on June 16, 1972. (See Exhs. 1, 72.) This evidence is uncertain in 

both authenticity and evidentiary trustworthiness.

5

 No evidence surrounding the creation 

of the baptismal register or the certificate of baptism has been offered. No copy of the 

baptismal register has been provided, and the certificate of baptism itself is merely an 

unauthenticated copy of a testimonial record. 

 The certificate of baptism, which does not contain a seal, is a black and white copy 

of a form that appears to have been completed by typewriter. Therein, a “Rev. Albert 

Vazquez CMF” is purported to summarize information appearing “from the Baptismal 

Register of [the] Church.” At the bottom of the document, the “[c]urator of the files,” 

whose name is illegible, certifies by signature that the document is a copy of the original 

certificate kept in the parish files. Notably, “Rev. Albert Vazquez CMF” did not sign the 

certificate of baptism. Nor does the certificate contain the signature of “Rev. Eugenio 

Ortega,” who purportedly baptized Petitioner on December 17, 1972. The document does 

not indicate who recorded the baptism, or the date on which it was recorded in the 

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 The state’s reliance on the baptismal record does not have a preclusive effect in these proceedings. Nor is the Government’s stipulation to the fact of baptism binding on the findings of this Court. 

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baptismal register. The document does not reflect what date the unnamed curator certified 

the copy. Most troublesome is the fact that the copy of the certificate of baptism that is 

before this Court is not, and could not be, the baptismal certificate that was provided to 

the Office of the State Registrar in 1990. In the certificate, “Rev. Albert Vazquez CMF” 

summarizes information in the registrar as it appeared on August 26, 2002. The 

California delayed registration of birth however reflects that it relied on a baptismal 

certificate that was issued on August 6, 1987. In the absence of any verifiable evidence, 

these factors collectively give rise to a reasonable inference that the baptismal record is 

not what is purports to be and is fraudulent. 

Thus, the record is absent any credible documentary evidence issued in close 

proximity to the time of Petitioner’s birth that might detract from the evidentiary value of 

Petitioner’s Mexican birth certificate. Petitioner has no contemporaneous United States 

birth certificate. The earliest record of presence in the United States outside of 

Petitioner’s baptism is his encounter with immigration officials in April 1987 – 15 years 

after he was born. This further discredits the veracity of the baptismal record itself and 

undercuts the reliability of the delayed registration of birth. Petitioner’s encounter in 

1987 preceded the issuance of the baptismal certificate, which was obtained several 

months later in August 1987.6

 Indeed, Petitioner’s testified that when he was 15 or 16 

years old - in 1987 or 1988 - he started having problems crossing the border, and asked 

his father to help him obtain paperwork.7

 (Tr. 103:20 – 140:16.) 

 The remainder of documentary evidence in the record is either not suggestive of 

Petitioner’s birth in the United States, or was derivatively obtained by use of Petitioner’s 

baptismal record or delayed registration of birth. Thus, in viewing the documentary 

evidence of record, there is no documentary evidence that detracts from Petitioner’s valid 

Mexican birth certificate. 

 6

 Absent the record of baptism, there is no evidence of record that shows Felix was 

present in the United States in 1972. 

7

 While Petitioner testified that his father hired an attorney to register his birth in California, no explanation as to how the certificate of baptism was obtained. 

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 Further, the testimonial evidence offered does not displace or undermine the 

evidentiary effect of Petitioner’s valid Mexican birth record. The Court does not find that 

the testimony offered by Felix to be credible. See Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d at 

427. Felix testified that she came with Tapia-Ambriz to the United States when she was 

three months pregnant with Petitioner. At the time of Petitioner’s birth, Felix and TapiaAmbriz were living at an unidentified location in Oxnard, California. On the day of his 

birth, Tapia-Ambriz took Felix and his sister in law, Avelina Tapia, to Santa Ana, 

California to run an errand. Felix testified that Tapia-Ambriz then dropped the two 

women off at a house, which was either owned or inhabited by a woman named Domita 

Perez.8

 Felix does not know why she was left at the house. In any event, she testified that 

she gave birth to Petitioner later that evening. Domita, Avelina, and an unknown woman 

were present at the time of birth. Felix testified that Tapia-Ambriz returned to the house 

approximately four days later, at which point he drove Felix and Petitioner to Oxnard.9

Sometime thereafter, Petitioner’s grandparents took him to a hospital. Felix further 

testified that when Petitioner was 39 days old, she and Tapia-Ambriz took him to Mexico 

to register his birth because Tapia-Ambriz wanted Petitioner to have dual citizenship. In 

1990, at the request of Tapia-Ambriz, Felix traveled to California to register Petitioner’s 

birth. 

The Court does not find Felix’s testimony regarding the circumstances 

surrounding Petitioner’s birth to be credible. Felix’s account was vague and disjointed. 

For example, the Court is unable to glean from her testimony exactly where she and 

Tapia-Ambriz lived at the time Petitioner was born. Felix testified that when they came to 

the United States, they lived for “a while [at] his mom and dad’s and then [they] went to 

 8

 Petitioner’s California Delayed Registration of Birth reflects that a Domita Perez 

“assisted” with the birth; her “whereabouts [] unknown.” (Exh. 1.) The fact that the 

preparer of the delayed registration of birth notes that this information is unknown in 

itself “generates some suspicion about the trustworthiness of the information.” In re 

E.D.R., 772 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. 2001). 

9

 Avelina testified that she was picked up from the house by her husband Sergio Tapia. Sergio testified that he picked up Avelina from the house in Santa Ana the day after Petitioner was born. 

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some friends’ houses. [They went] different places. [They] were not steadily in one 

place.” (Tr. 156:19-21.) The lack of specificity in Felix’s description of Petitioner’s birth 

was markedly dissimilar to the vast majority of her testimony. For example, unlike the 

story of Petitioner’s birth, Felix offered detailed, specific facts surrounding her interview 

with Agent Wakefield; she clearly and confidently testified as to what he had said to her, 

what she said to him, and what she was thinking or feeling at the time. See MondacaVega v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (“trial courts are generally permitted 

to evaluate credibility of testimony by assessing its level of detail”) adhered to on reh’g 

en banc sub nom. Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2015); Sparkman v. 

Comm’r, 509 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The Tax Court, describing [a witness’] 

testimony as ‘vague, contrived, and non-credible,’ plainly did not believe her, and the 

Tax Court, like any other court, may disregard uncontradicted testimony by a taxpayer 

where it finds that testimony lacking in credibility.” (some internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

The unexplained inconsistences in her account also lead the Court to find her story 

of Petitioner’s birth in the United States to be improbable. See Mondaca-Vega v. Holder, 

718 F.3d at 1085 (“It is well settled that a fact-finder may rely on inconsistencies to 

support an adverse credibility determination”); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 

829 (9th Cir. 2011). The Government has presented the contemporaneous birth certificate 

of America Tapia, Felix’s daughter, who was born in a hospital in Oxnard, California the 

year after Petitioner was born. (Exh. 78.)10 On one hand, Felix was unable to identify 

where she lived in Oxnard at the time of Petitioner’s birth, and testified that she did not 

go to the hospital with Petitioner after he was born because Petitioner’s grandparents 

“said [Felix] was very young and Leonardo the father... could get in trouble” due to her 

age. (Tr. 160: 4-6.)11 Yet, when questioned with regard to America’s birth, Felix 

 10 The authenticity of the record is undisputed. 

11 The Court also observes that although Felix testified that Petitioner’s grandparents took him to the hospital after he was born, no hospital records or other post-natal records have been provided to the Court. The absence of supporting documentary evidence from 

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responded that at “[t]hat time [she] was at the home of Leonardo Tapia Ambriz’s mom 

and dad and when [she] went into labor, they took [her] to the hospital.” (Tr. 162: 12-14.) 

Similarly, Felix did not offer a credible explanation regarding Petitioner’s 

registration in Mexico that undermines the Court’s confidence that it is evidence of his 

alienage. Felix testified that Tapia-Ambriz took Petitioner to Mexico to register his birth 

because he wanted him to obtain dual citizenship. Yet, Petitioner’s birth was not also 

registered in the United States at that time.12 Felix was unable to offer any explanation as 

to why dual citizenship in Mexico was pursued for Petitioner, but not for his sister who 

was born in the United States the following year. The testimony of expert witness 

Gretchen Kuhner does not compel a different outlook. Kuhner testified that there are a 

variety of reasons why parents register U.S. born children in Mexico which make it a 

common practice, such as for extended travel in Mexico, for fear that they will be in 

trouble for removing a child to Mexico, or in order for the child to be admitted to school. 

While Kuhner’s testimony is credible, it is not probative in this case. Felix did not testify 

that Petitioner was registered in response to some occurrence in Mexico; Petitioner was 

residing in the United States, was taken to Mexico for the purpose of being registered 

there, and was returned to the United States immediately thereafter. In fact, the only 

specific testimony Felix offered on the subject was just the opposite; Felix testified that 

no documentation was required when Petitioner was later enrolled in school in Mexico. 

To the extent Kuhner testified that it is common for Mexican families to register the birth 

of U.S. born children in Mexico because it is generally misconceived that they can, that 

testimony is not admissible. See U.S. v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1078-79 (9th 

 the time of Petitioner’s birth further undermines Felix’s account in light of the record that 

was made of America’s birth. 

12 Felix previously testified in immigration court that she did not register Petitioner in the United States at the time of birth because she did not have immigration status. However, she was unable to provide any explanation as to why Tapia-Ambriz, who did have immigration status, did not register Petitioner’s birth in the U.S. at the same time he 

registered Petitioner’s birth in Mexico. (IJ Tr. 75:2-21 (Sep. 21, 2012).) Again, this reasoning cannot be reconciled with the hospital birth and contemporaneous registration of America the following year. 

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Cir. 2005). 

The Court’s conclusion that Felix’s testimony concerning Petitioner’s Mexican 

registration is less than credible is reinforced by her admission that she signed two 

conflicting registrations of birth – one which stated Petitioner was born in Mexico, and 

one filed eighteen years later stating that he was born in the United States. Felix was 

unable to explain why Petitioner’s birth was registered in the United States in 1990, and

the statements that Felix does offer in connection with the delayed registration of birth 

only give rise to further suspicion. For example, Felix testified that in 1988 she began her 

paperwork to become a lawful permanent resident, and moved to Yuma, Arizona. (IJ Tr. 

53:6-114 (Sept. 21, 2012).) In a sworn statement submitted in support of Blanca’s 

citizenship application, Felix stated that she had been a resident of the U.S since 1989, 

and in 1992, Petitioner had been residing with her in Yuma, Arizona. (Exh. 72.) Yet, in 

the delayed registration of birth issued in 1990, Felix stated that she was living in 

Mexico.

 The Court also heard the testimony of Avelina and Sergio Tapia, who were offered 

as percipient witnesses. While Avelina’s testimony was consistent with Felix’s account, it 

does not detract from the evidence that shows Petitioner was born in Mexico. Avelina’s 

limited testimony was cursory and conclusory. She offered no specific independent facts 

or personal observations that make Felix’s vague and improbable account more plausible. 

Therefore, her testimony is not credited as evidence of Petitioner’s birth in Mexico. Nor 

is Sergio’s testimony entitled to any evidentiary weight. While Sergio testified that he 

picked Avelina up the day after Petitioner was born, he did not testify that he was present 

for the birth or encountered Petitioner or Felix at that time. See United States v. Lopez, 

762 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Personal knowledge means knowledge produced by 

the direct involvement of the senses.”). 

 Therefore, because the testimonial evidence of Petitioner’s birth in the United 

States is neither credible nor corroborated by any reliable documentary evidence, it does 

not undermine the Court’s confidence in the Government’s evidence that proves he was 

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not. See DeBrown v. DOJ, 18 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding mother’s testimony and 

affidavits from two witnesses to birth did not rebut Mexican birth certificate); Pinto-Vidal 

v. Attorney General of the United States, 680 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding 

father’s testimony that he filed a false Mexican registration of birth and a baptismal 

certificate did not rebut Mexican birth certificate). 

Lastly, the Court observes that it does not assess the credibility of Agent 

Wakefield nor weighs the evidentiary value of Felix’s 2011 sworn statement. Assuming 

without deciding that the sworn statement written by Agent Wakefield on Felix’s behalf 

was not an accurate memorialization of their interview, that finding would say little about 

what was said. And an inverse reading of Felix’s 2011 statement, which Petitioner 

maintains should be read to support his claim that he was taken to Mexico from the 

United States when he was 40 days old, would be entitled to no greater weight than 

Felix’s already discredited testimony. Likewise, if assuming that the sworn statement was 

an accurate memorialization of Felix’s interview and was made of her own volition, it 

would not bolster the Government’s case. The Court has found Felix not to be credible. 

For the same reasons Felix’s testimony does not serve as evidence of Petitioner’s birth in 

California, her 2011 statement cannot be accepted as a reliable account that proves that 

Petitioner was born in Mexico. 

 After considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and weighing the 

evidence that fairly detracts from its conclusion, the Court finds that the Government’s 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports a conclusion that Petitioner was not born in 

the United States. 

III. Conclusion 

 Having conducted an evidentiary hearing and a de novo review of the complete 

record pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B), 

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECLARED that Respondent has 

shown by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is not a national of the United 

States. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly, terminate this action, and transmit a copy of the Order to the Clerk of Court 

for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

 Dated this 10th day of March, 2017.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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