Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-15845/USCOURTS-ca9-18-15845-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL

COMMITTEE; DSCC, AKA

Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Committee; THE ARIZONA

DEMOCRATIC PARTY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MICHELE REAGAN, in her official

capacity as Secretary of State of

Arizona; MARK BRNOVICH,

Attorney General, in his official

capacity as Arizona Attorney

General,

Defendants-Appellees,

THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN

PARTY; BILL GATES,

Councilman; SUZANNE KLAPP,

Councilwoman; DEBBIE LESKO,

Sen.; TONY RIVERO, Rep.,

Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.

No. 18-15845

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-01065-DLR

OPINION

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2 DNC V. REAGAN

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 20, 2018

San Francisco, California

Filed September 12, 2018

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and

Carlos T. Bea and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Dissent by Chief Judge Thomas

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DNC V. REAGAN 3

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, entered

following a bench trial, in an action challenging under the

First, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and § 2 of the

Voting Rights Act, two state of Arizona election practices: 

(1) Arizona’s requirement that in-person voters cast their

ballots in their assigned precinct, which Arizona enforces by

not counting ballots cast in the wrong precinct; and (2) House

Bill 2023, which makes it a felony for third parties to collect

early ballots from voters, unless the collector falls into one of

several exceptions.

The panel held that the district court did not err in holding

that H.B. 2023 and the out of precinct policy did not violate

the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the provisions

imposed only a minimal burden on voters and were

adequately designed to serve Arizona’s important regulatory

interests. The panel also concluded that the district court did

not err in holding that H.B. 2023 and the out of precinct

policy did not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The panel

held that given the minimal burden imposed by these election

practices, plaintiffs failed to show that minority voters were

deprived of an equal opportunity to participate in the political

process and elect candidates of their choice. Finally, the

panel concluded that that the district court did not err in

holding that H.B. 2023 did not violate the Fifteenth

Amendment because plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 DNC V. REAGAN

showing that H.B. 2023 was enacted with discriminatory

intent.

Dissenting, Chief Judge Thomas stated that Arizona’s

policy of wholly discarding—rather than partially

counting—votes cast out-of-precinct had a disproportionate

effect on racial and ethnic minority groups. He stated that the

policy violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and it

unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote guaranteed by

the First Amendment and incorporated against the states

under the Fourteenth Amendment. He further wrote that H.B.

2023, which criminalizes most ballot collection, served no

purpose aside from making votingmore difficult, and keeping

more African American, Hispanic, and Native American

voters from the polls than white voters.

COUNSEL

Bruce V. Spiva (argued), Alexander G. Tischenko, Amanda

R. Callais, Elisabeth C. Frost, and Marc E. Elias, Perkins

Coie LLP, Washington, D.C.; Sarah R. Gonski and Daniel C.

Barr, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Joshua L. Kaul,

Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, Wisconsin; for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Dominic E. Draye (argued), Joseph E. La Rue, Karen J.

Hartman-Tellez, Kara M. Karlson, and Andrew G. Pappas,

Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Defendants-Appellees.

Brett W. Johnson (argued) and Colin P. Ahler, Snell &

Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.

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DNC V. REAGAN 5

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

The Democratic National Committee (DNC) and other

appellants1sued the state of Arizona,2raising several

challenges under the First, Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments, and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965

(VRA), 52 U.S.C. § 10301, against two state election

practices: (1) Arizona’s longstanding requirement that inperson voters cast their ballots in their assigned precinct,

which Arizona enforces by not counting ballots cast in the

wrong precinct (referred to by DNC as the out-of-precinct or

OOP policy), and (2) H.B. 2023, a recent legislative

enactment which precludes most third parties from collecting

early ballots from voters. After a lengthy trial involving the

testimony of 51 witnesses and over 230 evidentiary exhibits,

the district court rejected each of DNC’s claims. Democratic

Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan,—F. Supp.3d —, No. CV-16-01065-

PHX-DLR, 2018 WL 2191664 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2018).

1

 The appellants here (plaintiffs below) are the Democratic National

Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the

Arizona Democratic Party. For convenience, we refer to the appellants as

“DNC.”

2 The appellees here (defendants below) are Arizona Secretary of

State Michele Reagan, in her official capacity, and Arizona Attorney

General Mark Brnovich, in his official capacity. The intervenordefendants/appellees are the Arizona Republican Party; Debbie Lesko, an

Arizona member of the U.S. House of Representatives; Tony Rivero, a

member of the Arizona House of Representatives; Bill Gates, a member

of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors; and Suzanne Klapp, a City

of Scottsdale Councilwoman and Precinct Committeewoman. For

convenience, we refer to the appellees as “Arizona.”

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In deciding this case, the district court was tasked with

making primarily factual determinations. For instance, a First

and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an election rule

involves the “intense[ly] factual inquiry” of whether a

plaintiff has carried the burden of showing that challenged

election laws impose a severe burden on Arizona voters, or a

subgroup thereof. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1050

(9th Cir. 2007). A Fifteenth Amendment claim involves the

“pure question of fact” of whether the plaintiff has carried the

burden of showing that the state legislature enacted the

challenged law with a discriminatory intent. PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287–88 (1982). And in a

VRA challenge, we defer to “the district court’s superior factfinding capabilities,” Smith v. Salt River Project Agric.

Improvements & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

1997), regarding whether the plaintiff has carried the burden

of showing that an election practice offers minorities less

opportunity “to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); see

also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991). We must

affirm these factual findings unless they are “clearly

erroneous.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573

(1985).

In its detailed 83-page opinion, the district court found

that DNC failed to meet its burden on these critical factual

questions. Its analysis on these factual inquiries was

thorough and evenhanded, with findings well-supported by

the record. Given the district court’s extensive factual

findings, much of DNC’s appeal amounts to a request that we

reweigh and reevaluate the evidence in the record. But we

may not “duplicate the role of the lower court” or reject

factual findings that, as here, are not clearly erroneous. Id. at

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DNC V. REAGAN 7

573. Nor did the district court err in identifying and applying

the correct legal standard to each of DNC’s claims.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not

err in holding that H.B. 2023 and the OOP policy did not

violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments because they

imposed only a minimal burden on voters and were

adequately designed to serve Arizona’s important regulatory

interests. We also conclude that the district court did not err

in holding that H.B. 2023 and the OOP policy did not violate

§ 2 of the VRA. Given the minimal burden imposed by these

election practices, DNC failed to show that minority voters

were deprived of an equal opportunity to participate in the

political process and elect candidates of their choice. Finally,

we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that

H.B. 2023 did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment, because

DNC failed to carry its burden of showing that H.B. 2023 was

enacted with discriminatory intent. We reject DNC’s urging

to toss out the district court’s findings, reweigh the facts and

reach opposite conclusions. As such, we affirm the district

court.

I

The district court’s order denying DNC’s claims sets forth

the facts in detail, Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *1–9, so we

provide only a brief factual and procedural summary here. 

The district court’s factual findings are discussed in detail as

they become relevant to our analysis.

A

We begin by reviewing Arizona’s election system. 

Arizona permits voters to vote either in person on Election

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Day or by early mail ballot. Id. at *7, *12. The vast majority

of Arizonans vote by early ballot. For instance, only about

20 percent of the votes in the 2016 general election were cast

in person. Id. at *12.

Most Arizona counties conduct in-person voting through

a precinct-based system. Arizona gives each county the

responsibility to “establish a convenient number of election

precincts in the county and define the boundaries of [those]

precincts.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-411(A). Before an election,

the County Board of Supervisors (the County’s legislative

unit) must designate at least one polling place per precinct. 

Id. § 16-411(B). Arizona law provides some flexibility for

counties to combine precincts if each county’s board of

supervisors makes specific findings. See id. § 16-411(B)(2).

Arizona has long required in-person voters to cast their

ballots in their assigned precinct and has enforced this

system, since at least 1970, by counting only votes cast in the

correct precinct. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-122, 16-135, 16-

584 (codified in 1979); 1970 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 151, § 64

(amending Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-895); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

102 (1974). If an Arizona voter’s name does not appear on

the voting register at the polling place on Election Day (either

because the voter recentlymoved or due to inaccuracies in the

official records), the voter may vote only by provisional

ballot. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-122, 16-135, 16-584. Later, the

state reviews all provisional ballots and counts those votes

cast by voters confirmed to be eligible to vote. Id. §§ 16-

135(D), 16-584(D). A provisional ballot cast outside of the

voter’s correct precinct is not counted. Id. (As mentioned

above, DNC refers to Arizona’s rejection of improperly cast

ballots as Arizona’s OOP policy.)

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DNC V. REAGAN 9

Recently, Arizona has permitted counties to choose

between the traditional precinct model and “voting centers,”

wherein voters from multiple precincts can vote at a single

location. Id. § 16-411(B)(4). Each voting center must be

equipped to print a specific ballot, correlated to each voter’s

particular district, that includes all races in which the voter is

eligible to vote. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *9. Six rural

and sparsely populated counties—Graham, Greenlee,

Cochise, Navajo, Yavapai, and Yuma—have adopted the

voting center model. Id.

As noted above, most Arizona voters (roughly 80 percent

in the 2016 general election) do not vote in person. Arizona

law permits “[a]ny qualified elector” to “vote by early

ballot.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-541(A).3 Early voting can

occur by mail or in person at an on-site early voting location

in the 27 days before an election. See id. § 16-542(D). All

Arizona counties operate at least one on-site early voting

location. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *7. Voters may also

return their ballots in person at any polling place without

waiting in line, and several counties additionally provide

special drop boxes for early ballot submission. Id. 

Moreover, voters can vote early by mail, either for an

individual election or by having their names added to a

permanent early voting list. Id. An early ballot is mailed to

every person on that list as a matter of course no later than the

first day of the early voting period. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

544(F). Voters may return their early ballot by mail at no

cost, id. § 16-542(C), but it must be received by 7:00 p.m. on

Election Day, id. § 16-548(A).

3 A “qualified elector” is any person at least eighteen years of age on

or before the date of the election “who is properly registered to vote.” 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-121(A).

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Since 1992, Arizona has prohibited any person other than

the voter from having “possession of that elector’s unvoted

absentee ballot.” See 1991 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 310, § 22

(S.B. 1390) (West). In 1997, the Arizona legislature

expanded that prohibition to prevent any person other than

the voter from having possession of any type of unvoted early

ballot. See 1997 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 5, § 18 (S.B. 1003)

(West) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-542(D)). As

explained by the Supreme Court of Arizona, regulations on

the distribution of absentee and early ballots advance

Arizona’s constitutional interest in secret voting, see Ariz.

Const. art. VII, § 1, “by setting forth procedural safeguards to

prevent undue influence, fraud, ballot tampering, and voter

intimidation,” Miller v. Picacho Elementary Sch. Dist. No.

33, 179 Ariz. 178, 180 (1994) (en banc).

Arizona has long supplemented its protection of the early

voting process through the use of penal provisions, as set

forth in section 16-1005 of Arizona’s statutes. For example,

since 1999, “[a]ny person who knowingly marks a voted or

unvoted ballot or ballot envelope with the intent to fix an

election for that person’s own benefit . . . is guilty of a class

5 felony.” 1999 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 32, § 12 (S.B. 1227)

(codified as amended at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(A)). And

in 2011, Arizona made offering or providing any

consideration to acquire a voted or unvoted early ballot a

class 5 felony. See 2011 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 105, § 3 (S.B.

1412) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(B)).

Since at least 2002, individuals and groups in Arizona

have collected early ballots from voters. While distribution

of early ballots had been strictly regulated for decades, see

1997 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 5, § 18 (S.B. 1003) (West)

(codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-542(D)), ballot collection by

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DNC V. REAGAN 11

third parties was not. This changed in 2016, when Arizona

revised its early voting process, as defined in section 16-

1005, by enacting H.B. 2023 to regulate the collection of

early ballots. This law added the following provisions to the

existing penalties for persons abusing the early voting

process:

H. A person who knowingly collects voted or

unvoted early ballots from another person is

guilty of a class 6 felony. An election official,

a United States postal service worker or any

other person who is allowed by law to

transmit United States mail is deemed not to

have collected an early ballot if the official,

worker or other person is engaged in official

duties.

I. Subsection H of this section does not apply

to:

1. An election held by a special taxing

district formed pursuant to title 48 for the

purpose of protecting or providing

services to agricultural lands or crops and

that is authorized to conduct elections

pursuant to title 48.

2. A family member, household member

or caregiver of the voter. For the purposes

of this paragraph:

(a) “Caregiver” means a person who

provides medical or health care

assistance to the voter in a residence,

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nursing care institution, hospice

facility, assisted living center, assisted

living facility, assisted living home,

residential care institution, adult day

health care facility or adult foster care

home.

(b) “Collects” means to gain

possession or control of an early

ballot.

(c) “Family member” means a person

who is related to the voter by blood,

marriage, adoption or legal

guardianship.

(d) “Household member” means a

person who resides at the same

residence as the voter.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H)–(I).

This amendment to section 16-1005 makes it a felony for

third parties to collect early ballots from voters unless the

collector falls into one of several exceptions. See id. The

prohibition does not apply to election officials acting as such,

mail carriers acting as such, any familymembers, any persons

who reside at the same residence as the voter, or caregivers,

defined as any person who provides medical or health care

assistance to voters in a range of adult residences and

facilities. Id. § 16-1005(I)(2). H.B. 2023 does not provide

that ballots collected in violation of this statute are

disqualified or disregarded in the final election tally.

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DNC V. REAGAN 13

B

We next turn to the history of this case. In April 2016,

DNC and other appellants sued the state of Arizona,

challenging H.B. 2023 and Arizona’s OOP policy.

In separate motions, DNC sought preliminary injunctions

against H.B. 2023 and the OOP policy, respectively. On

September 23, 2016, the district court denied the motion to

preliminarily enjoin enforcement of H.B. 2023. The district

court subsequently denied DNC’s motion for a preliminary

injunction pending appeal. On October 11, 2016, the district

court likewise declined to issue a preliminary injunction with

respect to the OOP policy.

DNC appealed both denials. A motions panel denied

DNC’s request to issue an injunction pending appeal of the

district court’s ruling on the challenge to H.B. 2023, but the

two appeals were expedited and calendared for arguments

before a three-judge panel on October 19 and 26, 2016,

respectively. The expedited appeals proceeded at a rapid

pace. On October 28, 2016, a divided panel affirmed the

district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to H.B.

2023. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office (Feldman

I), 840 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2016). The case was called en

banc the same day, and on November 2, 2016—after a highly

compressed five-day memo exchange and voting period—a

majority of the active judges on this court voted to hear the

appeal of the district court’s denial of a preliminary

injunction against H.B. 2023 en banc. Two days later, the en

banc panel reconsidered the motions panel’s earlier denial of

an injunction pending appeal and granted DNC’s motion for

an injunction pending a resolution of the preliminary

injunction appeal. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s

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14 DNC V. REAGAN

Office (Feldman III), 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

In so doing, the six-judge majority stated that “we grant the

motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal

essentially for the reasons provided in the dissent in [Feldman

I].” Id. at 367 (citing Feldman I, 840 F.3d at 1085–98). The

Supreme Court summarily stayed this injunction pending

appeal the next day. See Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office v.

Feldman, 137 S. Ct. 446, 446 (2016) (mem.) (“The injunction

issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit on November 4, 2016, in case No. 16-16698, is stayed

pending final disposition of the appeal by that court.”).4

The appeal of the district court’s denial of a preliminary

injunction as to the OOP policy also proceeded apace. On

November 2, 2016, a divided panel affirmed the district court. 

See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office (Feldman II),

842 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2016). Two days later a majority of

active judges voted to hear the OOP policy appeal en banc,

and the en banc panel denied DNC’s motion for an injunction

pending resolution of the appeal. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y

4 Although Feldman III referenced the dissent in Feldman I, it did not

incorporate it nor adopt any specific reasoning from the dissenting

opinion, Because Feldman III did not provide a “fully considered

appellate ruling on an issue of law,” we are guided by our general rule that

“decisions at the preliminary injunction phase do not constitute the law of

the case.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers

of Am. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (first

quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller Federal Practice and

Procedure § 4478.5 (2002); then citing S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson

County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, the Supreme

Court’s immediate stay of Feldman III’s injunction pending appeal

“undercut[s] [Feldman III’s] theory or reasoning” to a significant extent. 

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Therefore, we conclude that Feldman III’s reference to the dissent in

Feldman I does not make that dissent law of the case or of the circuit.

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DNC V. REAGAN 15

of State’s Office, 840 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2016) (mem.) (per

curiam) (en banc). As a result of these proceedings, both

H.B. 2023 and the OOP policy remained in effect for the

November 2016 election. The en banc panel did not reach the

merits of DNC’s appeal of the district court’s denial of the

preliminary injunctions against H.B. 2023 and the OOP

policy.

5

DNC’s challenge proceeded in district court. DNC

argued that H.B. 2023 imposed undue burdens on the right to

vote, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

DNC also claimed that H.B. 2023 violated § 2 of the VRA

because it resulted in a discriminatory burden on voting rights

prohibited by that section. Finally, DNC claimed that H.B.

2023 was enacted with discriminatory intent, in violation of

the Fifteenth Amendment. DNC raised similar claims that the

OOP policy imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right

to vote and violated § 2 of the VRA, but did not claim that the

OOP policy had a discriminatory purpose.

The district court developed an extensive factual record

on all five claims. Over the course of a ten-day bench trial in

October 2017, the parties presented live testimony from

7 expert witnesses and 33 lay witnesses, in addition to the

testimony of 11 witnesses by deposition. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *2–7. The district court also considered over

230 exhibits admitted into evidence.

Seven months later, on May 10, 2018, the district court

issued its amended 83-page findings of fact and conclusions

5 After the district court rendered its decision on the merits and final

judgment, the en banc panel dismissed the interlocutory appeals of the

denied preliminary injunctions as moot.

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of law, holding that DNC had failed to prove its constitutional

and VRA claims. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664.

DNC timely appealed that same day. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(B). It also moved for an injunction pending

resolution of its appeal. The en banc panel voted not to

exercise jurisdiction over the appeal, and the case was

assigned to the original three-judge panel. We granted

DNC’s motion to expedite the appeal in light of the upcoming

2018 election.6

II

The district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

Following a bench trial, we review de novo the district

court’s conclusions of law and review its findings of fact for

clear error. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d

1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “The clear error

standard is significantly deferential.” Cohen v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 586 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2009). “[T]o be clearly

erroneous, a decision must . . . strike [a court] as wrong with

the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” 

Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 500, 502

(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v.

Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)). “This

standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse

the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced

6 We deferred consideration of DNC’s motion for an injunction

pending appeal. Because we affirm the district court, we now DENY that

motion as moot.

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DNC V. REAGAN 17

that it would have decided the case differently.” Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. at 573. “If the district court’s account of the

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though

convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would

have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. at 573–74. That

is, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence,

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly

erroneous.” Id. at 574.

III

We first address DNC’s challenges to H.B. 2023. DNC

argues that (1) H.B. 2023 unduly burdens the right to vote, in

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) H.B.

2023 disproportionately impacts minority voters in a manner

that violates § 2 of the VRA; and (3) H.B. 2023 was enacted

with discriminatory intent, in violation of the Fifteenth

Amendment.7 We address each claim in turn.

A

We begin with DNC’s claim that H.B. 2023 violates

Arizona voters’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

1

The Constitution vests the States with a “broad power to

prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections

7 DNC does not “specifically and distinctly” argue that H.B. 2023 was

enacted with a discriminatory purpose in violation of § 2 of the VRA, and

therefore we do not consider this issue. Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971,

977 (9th Cir. 1994).

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for Senators and Representatives.’” Clingman v. Beaver,

544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (quoting U.S. Const., art. 1, § 4, cl.

1). This power under the Elections Clause to regulate

elections for federal offices “is matched by state control over

the election process for state offices.” Id. “Governments

necessarily ‘must play an active role in structuring

elections,’” Pub. Integrity All., Inc. v. City of Tucson,

836 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)), and “as a

practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of

elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of

order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic

processes,” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 

However, when a state exercises its power and discharges its

obligation “[t]o achieve these necessary objectives,” the

resulting laws “inevitably affect[]—at least to some

degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to

associate with others for political ends.” Anderson v.

Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).

Because a state has the authority and obligation to

manage the election process, “not all election laws impose

constitutionally suspect burdens on that right.” Short v.

Brown, 893 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2018). There is no

“‘litmus-paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid

restrictions.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (quoting Storer,

415 U.S. at 730). Rather, “a more flexible standard applies.” 

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. “A court considering a challenge

to a state election law must weigh [1] ‘the character and

magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the

First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to

vindicate’ against [2] ‘the precise interests put forward by the

State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’

taking into consideration [3] ‘the extent to which those

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interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” 

Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). This framework is

generally referred to as the Anderson/Burdick balancing test.

The first prong of this test, the magnitude of the burden

imposed on voters by the election law, “is a factual question

on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” 

Democratic Party of Haw. v. Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1122–24

(9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones,

530 U.S. 567 (2000)); Gonzalez, 485 F.3d at 1050 (noting

that whether an election law imposes a severe burden is an

“intense[ly] factual inquiry”). In addition to considering the

burden on the electorate as a whole, courts may also consider

whether the law has a heavier impact on subgroups, Pub.

Integrity All., 836 F.3d at 1025 n.2, but only if the plaintiff

adduces evidence sufficient to show the size of the subgroup

and quantify how the subgroup’s special characteristics

makes the election law more burdensome. Thus, Crawford v.

Marion County Election Board acknowledged the argument

that a voter photo identification (ID) requirement might

impose a heavier burden on “homeless persons[,] persons

with a religious objection to being photographed,” and those

“who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate,” but

declined to undertake a subgroup analysis because the

evidence was insufficient to show the size of such subgroups

or to quantify the additional burden on those voters. 553 U.S.

181, 199, 200–03 (2008). Accordingly, it is an error to

consider “the burden that the challenged provisions uniquely

place” on a subgroup of voters in the absence of “quantifiable

evidence from which an arbiter could gauge the frequency

with which this narrow class of voters has been or will

become disenfranchised as a result of [those provisions].” 

Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 631

(6th Cir. 2016).

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After determining the severity of the burden, the court

must then identify the state’s justifications for the law, and

consider whether those interests make it “necessaryto burden

the plaintiff’s rights.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. As we

have emphasized, this inquiry does not necessarily mean that

the state is “required to show that its system is narrowly

tailored—that is, is the one best tailored to achieve its

purposes.” Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir.

2011). Rather, this step involves a “balancing and means-end

fit framework.” Ariz. Green Party v. Reagan, 838 F.3d 983,

988 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pub. Integrity All., 836 F.3d at

1024). The severity of the burden dictates the closeness of

the fit required, and the more severe the burden, the “more

compelling the state’s interest must be.” Id.

By contrast, “when a state election law provision imposes

only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s

important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to

justify’ the restrictions.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788); see also Ariz. Green Party,

838 F.3d at 988. In conducting this analysis, we are

particularly deferential when “the challenge is to an electoral

system, as opposed to a discrete election rule.” Dudum,

640 F.3d at 1114.

2

Applying the Anderson/Burdick framework, the district

court found that H.B. 2023 did not unconstitutionally burden

the right to vote. First, the court found that H.B. 2023 posed

only a minimal burden on Arizona voters as a whole. Twenty

percent of Arizonans voted in person in the prior 2016

general election, and so were wholly unaffected. Reagan,

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2018 WL 2191664, at *12. As to the 80 percent of Arizonans

who voted by mail, the district court noted that there were no

records of the number of voters who returned their ballots

with the assistance of third parties. Id. After presenting

various witnesses on this issue, DNC’s counsel’s “best

estimate of the number of voters affected by H.B. 2023 based

on the evidence at trial” was “thousands . . . but I don’t have

a precise number of that.” Id. The court found that the

evidence suggested that “possibly fewer than 10,000 voters

are impacted” out of over 2.3 million voters. Id. Therefore,

the vast majority of Arizona voters were unaffected by the

law. Id.

Second, the district court found that H.B. 2023 imposed

a minimal burden on even the small number of voters who

had previously returned ballots with the assistance of third

parties. Because “[e]arly voters may return their own ballots,

either in person or by mail, or they may entrust a family

member, household member, or caregiver to do the same,”

the burden imposed by H.B. 2023 “is the burden of traveling

to a mail box, post office, early ballot drop box, any polling

place or vote center (without waiting in line), or an authorized

election official’s office, either personally or with the

assistance of a statutorily authorized proxy, during a 27-day

early voting period.” Id. Therefore, the court found that H.B.

2023 “does not increase the ordinary burdens traditionally

associated with voting.” Id.

The district court then considered whether DNC had

shown that H.B. 2023 had a more severe impact on particular

subgroups of Arizona voters who have some common

circumstance that would cause them to face special

difficulties in voting without ballot collection services, such

as “communities that lack easy access to outgoing mail

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services; the elderly, homebound, and disabled voters;

socioeconomically disadvantaged voters who lack reliable

transportation; [and] voters who have trouble finding time to

return mail because they work multiple jobs or lack childcare

services.”8Id. at *14. The court determined that the

plaintiffs had not made such a showing, because there was

“insufficient evidence from which to measure the burdens on

discrete subsets of voters” or to “quantify with any degree of

certainty” how many voters had previously used ballot

collection services. Id. Moreover, the district court could not

determine the number of those voters who used those services

merely “out of convenience or personal preference, as

opposed to meaningful hardship,” and therefore could not

evaluate whether any of them would face a substantial burden

in relying on other means of voting offered by Arizona. Id.

Having identified these major gaps in DNC’s evidence,

the district court evaluated the evidence presented.

According to the district court, “the evidence available

largely shows that voters who have used ballot collection

services in the past have done so out of convenience or

personal preference.” Id. The court discussed five voters

who testified, Nellie Ruiz, Carolyn Glover, Daniel Magos,

Carmen Arias, and Marva Gilbreath, explained their

individual circumstances and noted that each had successfully

returned their ballot except for Gilbreath, who simply forgot

8 DNC also identified as a potential subgroup “voters who are

unfamiliar with the voting process and therefore do not vote without

assistance or tend to miss critical deadlines.” Reagan, 2018 WL2191664,

at *14. The district court found that remembering relevant deadlines was

not a burden on the right to vote, and therefore not a basis for finding a

special burden. Id.

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to timely mail her ballot.9 Id. at *15. The district court also

found that Arizona provides accommodations to subgroups of

voters whose special characteristics might lead them to place

a greater reliance on ballot collection. Id. at *14. 

Specifically, for voters with mobility issues, Arizona requires

counties to provide special election boards, which, upon

timely request, will deliver a ballot to an ill or disabled voter. 

Id. While finding that “relatively few voters are aware of this

service,” the district court pointed out that DNC could

educate voters as to its availability. Id. Further, Arizona

permits polling places to offer curbside voting, allowing

voters to pull up to the curb by a polling place and have an

election official assist them at their car. Id. Arizona law also

requires employers to give their employees time off to vote in

person if an employee is scheduled for an Election Day shift

without at least a three-hour window to vote. Id. at *15. 

Finally, the district court noted the many exceptions in H.B.

2023, allowing voters to give their early ballots to family

members, household members, caregivers, or election

officials. Id.

Because the court found that H.B. 2023 imposed only a

minimal burden on Arizonans’ First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, it held that defendants had to show only

that H.B. 2023 served important regulatory interests. As

summarized by the district court, Arizona advanced two

regulatory interests: (1) “that H.B. 2023 is a prophylactic

measure intended to prevent absentee voter fraud by creating

9 The district court expressed “concerns about the credibility” of the

deposition testimony of a deceased witness, Victor Vasquez. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *16. “When findings are based on determinations

regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater

deference to the trial court’s findings.” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 575.

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a chain of custody for early ballots and minimizing the

opportunities for ballot tampering, loss, and destruction”; and

(2) “that H.B. 2023 improves and maintains public

confidence in election integrity.” Id. at *18. The court found

that these interests were important. Id. at *19.

Turning to a means-end fit, the court found that given the

de minimis nature of the burden imposed by H.B. 2023, it did

not need to be “the most narrowly tailored provision,” so long

as it reasonably advanced the state’s interests. Id. at *20. 

Finding that it did so, the court held that H.B. 2023 did not

violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at *18–20.

3

We conclude that the district court did not err in its

Anderson/Burdick analysis. First, the district court’s

determination that H.B. 2023 imposes only a de minimis

burden on Arizona voters was not clearly erroneous. See

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (holding that “the inconvenience”

of the process of going to the state Bureau of Motor Vehicles

to obtain an ID “does not qualify as a substantial burden on

the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over

the usual burdens of voting”). DNC does not directly dispute

this conclusion.

Rather, DNC argues that H.B. 2023 imposes severe

burdens on subgroups of voters unable to vote without the

third-partyballot collection services prohibited byH.B. 2023. 

This argument fails. The district court did not clearly err in

finding that there was “insufficient evidence from which to

measure the burdens on discrete subsets of voters,” Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *14, which is a threshold requirement

to conducting a subgroup analysis. See Crawford, 553 U.S.

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at 200–03. The record shows that DNC’s witnesses could not

specify how many voters would have been unable to vote

without ballot collection services. For instance, a Maricopa

County Democratic Party organizer, Leah Gillespie, testified

that some voters who used ballot collection services told her

that they had no other means of voting, but her only example

was of a friend whose husband was supposed to deliver her

ballot but forgot it at home.10 Similarly, Arizona State

Senator Martin Quezada stated that his campaign received

ballot collection requests after H.B. 2023 took effect and had

been unable to provide rides to the polling place or other

assistance to all such voters. But he did not know “how many

of those people had family members who could have turned

in their ballot,” and could only give his sense “that several of

them lacked anybody” who could do so. Moreover, DNC

failed “to produce a single voter to testify that H.B. 2023’s

limitations on who may collect an early mail ballot would

make voting significantly more difficult for her.” Only one

voter (Marva Gilbreath) testified that she did not vote in the

2016 general election, because she “was in the process of

moving,” had no mailbox keydue to “misunderstandings with

the realtor and things like that,” and “didn’t know where the

voting place was.” This witness’s highly idiosyncratic

circumstances do not indicate that H.B. 2023 imposes a

severe burden on an identifiable subgroup of voters. Rather,

burdens “arising from life’s vagaries are neither so serious

nor so frequent as to raise any question about the

constitutionality of [the challenged law].” Id. at 197.

10 Of course, had the husband not forgot, but had delivered the vote,

there would have been no violation of H.B. 2023, which exempts family

members. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H)–(I).

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In sum, DNC’s evidence falls far short of the necessary

“quantifiable evidence from which an arbiter could gauge the

frequency with which this narrow class of voters has been or

will become disenfranchised as a result of [H.B. 2023].” Ne.

Ohio Coal., 837 F.3d at 631; cf. Crawford, 553 U.S. at

201–02 (declining to conduct a subgroup analysis despite

evidence of one indigent voter who could not (or would not)

pay for a birth certificate and one homeless woman who was

denied a photo ID card because she lacked an address.).

The dissent disagrees, but its disagreement here—as with

the district court’s opinion generally—is based on throwing

out the district court’s factual findings, reweighing the

evidence, and reaching its own factual conclusions. This

approach is not only contrary to the most basic principles of

appellate review, but is an approach that the Supreme Court

has frequently warned us to avoid. See Bessemer City,

470 U.S. at 574–75 (holding that the rationale for deference

to the trial court’s finding of fact is based not only on “the

superiority of the trial judge’s position to make

determinations of credibility,” but also on the judge’s

expertise in determination of fact, and ensuring that “the trial

on the merits should be ‘the main event . . . rather than a

tryout on the road’”) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.

72, 90 (1977)).

Here, for instance, the dissent seeks to revisit the district

court’s conclusion that DNC failed to carry its burden of

showing that H.B. 2023 imposed a heavy burden on Native

Americans. Dissent at 121–22. Conducting its own factual

evaluation, the dissent claims that H.B. 2023 imposes a heavy

burden on Native Americans because a majority of them lack

home mail service. Dissent at 121. The dissent then

speculates that many Native Americans may have trouble

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getting to post offices, and may have different family

relationships than are indicated in H.B. 2023. Dissent at

121–22. Of course, the dissent’s determination that “it would

have decided the case differently” does not make the district

court’s findings clearly erroneous. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

at 573. Indeed, even evidence that third-party ballot

collection is more useful to Native Americans than to other

voters does not compel the conclusion that H.B. 2023

imposes a heavy burden on Native Americans’ ability to vote. 

Most tellingly, the dissent does not meaningfully address the

district court’s most notable factual finding: that not a single

voter testified at trial that H.B. 2023’s limitations would

make voting significantly more difficult. Although the

dissent insists that there was evidence to this effect, Dissent

at 122, it cites only to the testimony of a third-party ballot

collector who conceded that his organization had not

attempted to determine whether the voters they served could

have returned their ballots some other way. There is thus no

basis for holding that the district court’s findings were clearly

erroneous, and the dissent errs in arguing otherwise.

The dissent also faults the district court’s decision not to

conduct a subgroup analysis because it “could not determine

a precise number of voters that had relied on ballot collection

in the past or predict a likely number in the future.” Dissent

at 122. According to the dissent, this decision was based on

a misunderstanding of Crawford, and therefore constitutes

legal error. We disagree. The district court correctly relied

on Crawford in concluding that “on the basis of the evidence

in the record it [was] not possible to quantify either the

magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the

portion of the burden imposed on them that [was] fully

justified.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *14 (quoting

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200). Accordingly, the court properly

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held that DNC did not carry its burden of showing the

existence of a relevant subgroup.

Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that any

burden imposed by H.B. 2023 was further minimized by

Arizona’s many accommodations available for those

subgroups of voters that DNC claims are burdened by H.B.

2023.11 Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *14. For instance, the

district court reasonably found that the subgroup of voters

who are “confined as the result of a continuing illness or

physical disability,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-549(C), could

request ballots from special election boards, and the burden

of doing so was minimal, see Short, 893 F.3d at 677 (“To the

extent that having to register to receive a mailed ballot could

be viewed as a burden, it is an extremely small one, and

certainly not one that demands serious constitutional

scrutiny.”). The district court did not clearly err in finding

that it was irrelevant whether voters were widely aware of

this alternative, as nothing prevented DNC from informing

voters of and facilitating this procedure. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *14.

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in

finding that DNC had failed both to quantify the subgroups

purportedly burdened by H.B. 2023 and to show that

Arizona’s alternatives did not ameliorate any burden on them. 

Accordingly, there was no clear error in the district court’s

finding that H.B. 2023 imposed only a minimal burden.

11 Given that DNC did not meet its burden of showing how large the

subgroup of specially burdened voters might be, see Democratic Party of

Haw., 833 F.3d at 1122–24, its unsupported claims that Arizona’s many

accommodations cannot adequately serve an unquantified number of

voters are unpersuasive.

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4

Next, DNC and the dissent contend that the district court

clearly erred in finding that H.B. 2023 serves Arizona’s

important regulatoryinterests becauseArizona did not adduce

any direct evidence of voter fraud. We reject this argument.

DNC does not dispute—nor could it—that Arizona’s

interest in “a prophylactic measure intended to prevent

absentee voter fraud” and to maintain public confidence are

facially important. Id. at *18; see Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196

(“There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of

the State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible

voters.”); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006)

(explaining that “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral

processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory

democracy” and noting “the State’s compelling interest in

preventing voter fraud”).

Further, a state “need not show specific local evidence of

fraud in order to justify preventive measures,” Voting for Am.,

Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2013), nor is such

evidence required to uphold a law that imposes minimal

burdens under the Anderson/Burdick framework, see Munro

v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986)

(explaining that legislatures are “permitted to respond to

potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight

rather than reactively”). For example, in Crawford, the

challenged law addressed only in-person voter fraud, and

“[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence of any such fraud

actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”

553 U.S. at 194. Yet the controlling opinion concluded that

the law served Indiana’s interests in preventing fraud, citing

evidence of in-person and absentee voter fraud in other

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jurisdictions and in historical examples. Id. at 195–96 &

nn.11–13. Accordingly, H.B. 2023 serves Arizona’s

important interest in preventing voter fraud even without

direct evidence of ballot collection voter fraud in Arizona.12

The dissent proposes several meritless distinctions

between H.B. 2023 and the voter I.D. law in Crawford. First,

the dissent argues that unlike H.B. 2023, Crawford’s voter

I.D. law was “tied to ‘the state’s interest in counting only the

votes of eligible voters.’” Dissent at 124 (quoting Crawford,

553 U.S. at 196). But H.B. 2023’s regulation of third-party

ballot collectors is likewise tied to the state’s interest in

ensuring the integrity of the vote. As explained by the district

court, Arizona could reasonably conclude that H.B. 2023

reduced “opportunities for early ballots to be lost or

destroyed” by limiting the possession of early ballots to

“presumptively trustworthy proxies,” and also lessened the

potential for pressure or intimidation of voters, and other

forms of fraud and abuse. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*20; see infra at 32–33. Second the dissent argues that

Crawford is distinguishable because the legislature in that

case was motivated in-part by “legitimate concerns,” while

here the Arizona legislature was “motivated by

discriminatory intent,” or by solely partisan interests. Dissent

12 DNC’s reliance on a vacated Sixth Circuit opinion is unpersuasive. 

See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th

Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1,

2014). The Sixth Circuit has explained that any persuasive value in Ohio

State Conference’s analysis of this point is limited to cases involving

“significant although not severe” burdens, Ohio Democratic Party v.

Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ohio State

Conference, 768 F.3d at 539), and not those involving “minimal” burdens,

id. (explaining that the district court’s reliance on Ohio State Conference

was “not sound”).

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at 124. Again, we reject the dissent’s factual findings

because the district court found that the legislature was not

motivated by discriminatory intent and only partially

motivated by partisan considerations, and these findings are

not clearly erroneous. Moreover, a legislature may act on

partisan considerations without violating the constitution. 

See infra at 53–54.

Similarly, a court can reasonably conclude that a

challenged law serves the state’s interest in maintaining

“public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process,”

even in the absence of any evidence that the public’s

confidence had been undermined. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197. 

As several other circuits have recognized, it is “practically

self-evidently true” that implementing a measure designed to

prevent voter fraud would instill public confidence. Ohio

Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 633 (6th Cir.

2016) (citing Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197); see Frank v.

Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that

Crawford took “as almost self-evidentlytrue” the relationship

between a measure taken to prevent voter fraud and

promoting voter confidence). The district court did not clearly

err in finding that H.B. 2023 also serves this important state

interest.

5

DNC next argues that Arizona could have used less

burdensome means to pursue its regulatory interests and H.B.

2023 could have been designed more effectively. This

argument also fails. Burdick expressly declined to require

that restrictions imposing minimal burdens on voters’ rights

be narrowly tailored. See 504 U.S. at 433. Consistent with

Burdick, we upheld an election restriction that furthered the

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interest of “ensuring local representation by and geographic

diversityamong elected officials” even though less-restrictive

means could have achieved the same purposes. Pub. Integrity

All., 836 F.3d at 1028. Similarly, in Arizona Green Party, we

rejected the argument that the state must adopt a system of

voting deadlines “that is the most efficient possible,” in light

of the “de minimis burden” imposed by the existing

deadlines. 838 F.3d at 992 (citation omitted).

Here, the district court found that H.B. 2023 imposed a

minimal burden, and that it was a reasonable means for

advancing the state’s interests. It concluded that “[b]y

limiting who may possess another’s early ballot, H.B. 2023

reasonably reduces opportunities for early ballots to be lost or

destroyed.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *20. The district

court also observed that H.B. 2023 “closely follows,” id., the

recommendation of a bipartisan national commission on

election reform to “reduce the risks of fraud and abuse in

absentee voting by prohibiting ‘third-party’ organizations,

candidates, and political party activists from handling

absentee ballots,” id. (quoting Building Confidence in U.S.

Elections § 5.2 (Sept. 2005)).13 These findings were

13 The district court took judicial notice of the report of the

Commission on Federal Election Reform chaired by former President

Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *20 n.12. The district court noted that the report

was cited favorably in Crawford, which remarked that “[t]he historical

perceptions of the Carter-Baker Report can largely be confirmed.” 

553 U.S. at 194 n.10. The relevant portion of the report provides:

Fraud occurs in several ways. Absentee ballots remain

the largest source of potential voter fraud. . . . Absentee

balloting is vulnerable to abuse in several ways: . . .

Citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes, at the

workplace, or in church are more susceptible to

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sufficient to justify the minimal burden imposed by H.B.

2023. DNC’s reliance on Common Cause Indiana v.

Individual Members of the Indiana Election, 800 F.3d 913,

928 (7th Cir. 2015) as requiring a closer means-ends fit is

misplaced. As the Seventh Circuit concluded, the election

law in that case imposed a severe burden on the right to vote,

and therefore it was appropriate to apply strict scrutiny. Id.

at 927.

We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that

DNC did not succeed on its Anderson/Burdick claim as to

H.B. 2023.

B

We next consider DNC’s claim that H.B. 2023 violates

§ 2 of the VRA. We begin by providing some necessary legal

background.

pressure, overt and subtle, or to intimidation. Vote

buying schemes are far more difficult to detect when

citizens vote bymail. States therefore should reduce the

risks of fraud and abuse in absentee voting by

prohibiting “third-party” organizations, candidates, and

political party activists from handling absentee ballots.

Building Confidence in U.S. Elections § 5.2 (Sept. 2005),

https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Exhibit%20M.PDF. The district court did

not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the report publicly

available on the website of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. See

Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We may

take judicial notice of records and reports of administrative bodies.”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no dispute as to

the report’s authenticityor that it contained the cited recommendation, and

DNC was not unfairly surprised, given that counsel indicated at trial that

he was well acquainted with it and its contents.

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1

“Inspired to action by the civil rights movement,”

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to improve

enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment.14Shelby County

v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013). Section 2 of the Act

forbade all states from enacting any “standard, practice, or

procedure . . . imposed or applied . . . to deny or abridge the

right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of

race or color.” Id. (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2,

79 Stat. 437). Section 5 of the Act prevented states from

making certain changes in voting procedures unless the states

obtained “preclearance” for those changes, meaning they

were approved by either the Attorney General or a court of

three judges. Id. at 537.

“At the time of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of

1965, § 2, unlike other provisions of the Act, did not provoke

significant debate in Congress because it was viewed largely

as a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment.” Chisom,

501 U.S. at 392. In 1980, black residents of Mobile, Alabama

challenged the city’s at-large method of electing its

commissioners on the ground that it unfairly diluted their

voting strength. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58

(1980). A plurality of the Supreme Court held that the

electoral system did not violate § 2 of the VRA because there

was no showing of “purposefully discriminatory denial or

abridgment by government of the freedom to vote ‘on

14 The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of

the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United

States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of

servitude,” and authorizes Congress to enforce the provision “by

appropriate legislation.” U.S. Const. amend. XV.

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account of race, color or previous conditions of servitude.’” 

Id. at 65.

In response to Bolden, “Congress substantially revised § 2

to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing

discriminatory effect alone.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.

30, 35 (1986). In order to show actionable discriminatory

effect, Congress enacted the “results test,” applied by the

Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), see

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35, namely “whether the political

processes are equally open to minority voters.” S. Rep. No.

97-417, at 2 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,

205.

As amended, § 2 of the VRA provides:

§ 10301. Denial or abridgement of right to

vote on account of race or color through

voting qualifications or prerequisites;

establishment of violation

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to

voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall

be imposed or applied by any State or political

subdivision in a manner which results in a

denial or abridgement of the right of any

citizen of the United States to vote on account

of race or color, or in contravention of the

guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of

this title, as provided in subsection (b).

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established

if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is

shown that the political processes leading to

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nomination or election in the State or political

subdivision are not equally open to

participation bymembers of a class of citizens

protected by subsection (a) in that its

members have less opportunity than other

members of the electorate to participate in the

political process and to elect representatives

of their choice. . . .

52 U.S.C. § 10301.

Thus, § 2(a) prohibits a state or political subdivision from

adopting a practice that “results in a denial or abridgement”

of any U.S. citizen’s right to vote on account of race, color,

or membership in a language minority group, “as provided in

subsection (b).” Id. § 10301(a). Subsection (b), in turn,

provides that a plaintiff can establish a violation of § 2(a) if

“based on the totality of circumstances,” the members of a

protected class identified in § 2(a) “have less opportunity than

other members of the electorate to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Id.

§ 10301(b).

Thornburg v. Gingles further clarified that in analyzing

whether a state practice violates § 2, a court must engage in

a two-step process. First, the court must ask the key question

set forth in § 2(b), whether “as a result of the challenged

practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal

opportunity to participate in the political processes and to

elect candidates of their choice.” 478 U.S. at 44 (quoting S.

Rep. No. 97-417, at 28). Second, a court must assess the

impact of the practice on such electoral opportunities in light

of the factors set forth in the Senate Report, which

accompanied the 1982 amendments and “elaborates on the

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nature of § 2 violations and on the proof required to establish

these violations.” Id. at 43–44.15

In the wake of Gingles, some lower courts interpreted the

key question set forth in § 2(b) (whether as a result of the

challenged practice plaintiffs do not have an equal

opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect

candidates of their choice) as “provid[ing] two distinct types

of protection for minority voters.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396

(citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434

v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). 

These courts held that a “vote denial” claim, meaning a claim

that a particular state election practice denied or abridged a

minority group’s right to vote, turned on whether members of

that protected class had “less opportunity . . . to participate in

the political process.” By contrast, a “vote dilution” claim,

15 As explained in Gingles, the Senate Factors include the extent of

any history of official discrimination, the use of election practices or

structures that could enhance the opportunityfor discrimination, the extent

to which voting is racially polarized, and the extent to which minorities

bear the effects of discrimination in education, employment and health. 

478 U.S. at 36–37. The factors are not exclusive, and “the question

whether the political processes are equally open depends upon a searching

practical evaluation of the past and present reality, and on a functional

view of the political process.” Id. at 45 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at

30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208). Because the

“essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure

interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the

opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred

representatives,” 478 U.S. at 47, if a court determines that a challenged

practice does not cause unequal opportunities, it need not consider the

practice’s interaction with the Senate Factors. Because we affirm the

district court’s finding that DNC failed to carry its burden of satisfying

step one of the § 2 analysis for either H.B. 2023 or the OOP policy, we do

not review in detail its factual findings that DNC also failed to carry its

burdens at step two.

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meaning a claim that a state election practice diluted the

effectiveness of a minority group’s votes, turned on whether

those members had “less opportunity . . . to elect

representatives of their choice.” Id. at 388, 395–96 (citing

Clements, 914 F.2d at 625).

The Supreme Court flatly rejected this interpretation. In

Chisom, the Supreme Court explained that § 2(b) “does not

create two separate and distinct rights.” Id. at 397. The

Court reasoned that if members of a protected class

established that a challenged practice abridged their

opportunity to participate in the political process, it would be

relatively easy to show they were also unable to elect

representatives of their choice, because “[a]ny abridgment of

the opportunity of members of a protected class to participate

in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to

influence the outcome of an election.” Id. By contrast,

evidence that members of a protected class are unable to elect

representatives of their choice does not necessarilyprove they

had less opportunity to participate in the political process. Id.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the two-pronged

results test required by the 1982 amendment “is applicable to

all claims arising under § 2,” and “all such claims must allege

an abridgment of the opportunity to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of one’s choice.” Id. at

398; see also Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs

Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 314 (3d Cir. 1994)

(“Section 2 plaintiffs must demonstrate that they had less

opportunity both (1) to participate in the political process, and

(2) to elect representatives of their choice.” (emphasis added)

(citing Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397)).

In reaching this conclusion, the Chisom majority rejected

Justice Scalia’s argument in dissent that requiring a plaintiff

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to prove both less opportunity to participate and less

opportunity to elect representatives would prevent small

numbers of voters from bringing a § 2 claim. According to

Justice Scalia, the Court should have read “and” in § 2(b) to

mean “or,” so that if “a county permitted voter registration for

only three hours one day a week, and that made it more

difficult for blacks to register than whites, blacks would have

less opportunity ‘to participate in the political process’ than

whites, and § 2 would therefore be violated—even if the

number of potential black voters was so small that they would

on no hypothesis be able to elect their own candidate.” 

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 408 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority

rejected this argument, however, stating that it had “no

authority to divide a unitary claim created by Congress.” Id.

at 398.16

In light of Chisom, plaintiffs cannot establish a § 2

violation without showing that an electoral practice actually

gives minorities less opportunity to elect representatives of

their choice. This requires plaintiffs to show that the state

election practice has some material effect on elections and

their outcomes. As Gingles explained, “[i]t is obvious that

unless minority group members experience substantial

difficulty electing representatives of their choice, they cannot

prove that a challenged electoral mechanism impairs their

ability ‘to elect.’” 478 U.S. at 48 n.15 (quoting 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b)). It is “the usual predictability of the majority’s

16 The majority also rejected Justice Scalia’s “erroneous assumption

that a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of an

election,” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 n.24, although it did not explain what

evidence would be necessary to establish that an election practice that

affected only a small group of voters deprived minorities of an equal

opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.

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success” which distinguishes a structural problem “from the

mere loss of an occasional election.” Id. at 51. If an election

practice would generally “not impede the ability of minority

voters to elect representatives of their choice” there is no § 2

violation; rather a “bloc voting majority must usually be able

to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,

geographically insular minority group.” Id. at 48–49.

In a § 2 challenge, a court’s focus must be on the question

whether minorities have less opportunity to elect

representatives of their choice; therefore, evidence that a

particular election practice falls more heavily on minority

than non-minority voters, or that electoral outcomes are not

proportionate to the numbers of minorities in the population,17

is not sufficient by itself to establish a § 2 violation. As we

have previously explained, “a bare statistical showing of

disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy

the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595. 

Rather, “plaintiffs must show a causal connection between

the challenged voting practice and [a] prohibited

discriminatory result,” i.e., less opportunity to participate in

the political process and elect representatives. Id. (quoting

Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 312). Because “[n]o state has exactly equal

registration rates, exactly equal turnout rates, and so on, at

every stage of its voting system,” Frank, 768 F.3d at 754,

were it enough to merely point to “some relevant statistical

disparity” implicated by the challenged law, Salt River,

17 The VRA itself states that “nothing in this section establishes a

right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to

their proportion in the population.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

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109 F.3d at 595, then § 2 would “dismantle every state’s

voting apparatus,” Frank, 768 F.3d at 754.18

If a challenged election practice is not burdensome or the

state offers easily accessible alternative means of voting, a

court can reasonably conclude that the law does not impair

any particular group’s opportunity to “influence the outcome

of an election,” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 n.24, even if the

practice has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. 

For instance, in Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

plaintiffs argued that Virginia’s photo ID law violated § 2

because more minorities than non-minorities lacked the

necessary IDs, and “the process of obtaining photo IDs

requires those voters to spend time traveling to and from a

registrar’s office.” 843 F.3d 592, 600 (4th Cir. 2016). The

18 Directly contrary to this longstanding precedent, the dissent insists

that if a challenged practice disproportionately impacts members of a

protected class, then it per se constitutes a violation under the first step of

the § 2 test. See Dissent at 83 (arguing that because DNC showed that

minorities are over-represented among those who cast out-of precinct

ballots, “[t]he analysis at step one of the § 2 results test ought to end at this

point”); id. at 83–84 (asserting that the district court’s finding that “OOP

ballot rejection has no meaningfully disparate impact on the opportunities

of minority voters to elect their preferred representatives” is “irrelevant to

step one of § 2’s results test, which focuses solely on the differences in

opportunity and effect enjoyed by groups of voters”); id. at 86 (arguing

that under § 2, a state must correct any disparities that can be attributed to

socioeconomic factors); id. at 118 (arguing that because H.B. 2023

imposes a disparate burden on members of protected classes, it meets step

one). The dissent’s argument is not only contrary to our precedent, but is

inconsistent with the plain language of § 2, and to the Supreme Court’s

interpretation of the VRA. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 (§ 2 plaintiffs must

show more than “the mere loss of an occasional election”); Chisom,

501 U.S. at 398 (“For all such [§ 2] claims must allege an abridgement of

the opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of one’s choice.”).

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Fourth Circuit rejected this argument. Observing that the

state provided the option for voters without ID to cast a

provisional ballot and obtain a free ID to verify their identity,

the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “every registered voter in

Virginia has the full ability to vote when election day

arrives,” and therefore the election practice “does not

diminish the right of any member of the protected class to

have an equal opportunity to participate in the political

process.” Id.

In sum, in considering a § 2 claim, a court must consider

whether the challenged standard, practice, or procedure gives

members of a protected class less opportunity than others

both “to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397

(quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)). The plaintiff must show a

causal connection between the challenged voting practice and

the lessened opportunity of the protected class to participate

and elect representatives; it is not enough that the burden of

the challenged practice falls more heavily on minority voters. 

See Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595. Rather, the challenged

practice must “influence the outcome of an election,” Chisom,

501 U.S. at 397 n.24, and create some “substantial difficulty”

for a protected class to elect representatives of its choice, not

just the “mere loss of an occasional election.” Gingles,

478 U.S. at 48 n.15, 51. If this sort of discriminatory result

is found, then the practice must be considered in light of the

Senate Factors, which are “particularly” pertinent to vote

dilution claims, but “will often be pertinent” to other § 2

claims as well. Id. at 44–45.19

19 Our two-step analysis, derived from the language of § 2, and

Supreme Court precedent, is consistent with the two-step framework

adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits (and, in part, the Seventh

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2

We now turn to the district court’s determination here. 

We review the district court’s legal determinations de novo,

Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 406 (9th Cir. 2012), but

defer to “the district court’s superior fact-finding

capabilities,” and review its factual findings for clear error,

Salt River, 109 F.3d at 591.

In analyzing the first step of a § 2 claim, the district court

first found that DNC had provided no quantitative or

statistical evidence showing how many people would be

affected by H.B. 2023 and their minority status, noting that it

was “aware of no vote denial case in which a § 2 violation

has been found without quantitative evidence measuring the

Circuit):

[1] [T]he challenged standard, practice, or procedure

must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a

protected class, meaning that members of the protected

class have less opportunity than other members of the

electorate to participate in the political process and to

elect representatives of their choice, [and]

[2] [T]hat burden must in part be caused by or linked to

social and historical conditions that have or currently

produce discrimination against members of the

protected class.

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240

(4th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Veasey

v. Abbott (Veasey I), 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016); Ohio Democratic

Party, 834 F.3d at 637; Frank, 768 F.3d at 754–55 (adopting the test “for

the sake of argument”). The first prong tracks the language of § 2, as

interpreted by the Supreme Court, and the second prong implicates the

Senate Factors.

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alleged disparate impact of a challenged law on minority

voters.” Reagan, 2018 WL2191664, at *30. Despite the lack

of any statistical evidence establishing a disproportionate

impact of H.B. 2023 on minorities, the court stated that it

would not rule against DNC on this ground. Id. at *31. 

Instead, it considered DNC’s circumstantial and anecdotal

evidence, and tentativelyconcluded that “prior to H.B. 2023’s

enactment minorities generically were more likely than nonminorities to return their early ballots with the assistance of

third parties,” emphasizing the caveat that it could not “speak

in more specific or precise terms than ‘more’ or ‘less.’” Id. at

*33.

Having inferred, based on DNC’s circumstantial and

anecdotal evidence, that H.B. 2023 likely impacted more

minority voters than non-minority voters, the district court

nevertheless concluded that DNC’s evidence did not establish

that H.B. 2023 gave members of a protected class less

opportunity than other members of the electorate both to

participate in the political process and to elect representatives

of their choice. Id. at *32–34. The district court provided

two reasons. First, the court reasoned that the evidence

presented indicated that only “a relatively small number of

voters” used ballot collection services at all. Id. at *33. By

logical extension, that meant that only a small number of

minorities used ballot collection services to vote, and the vast

majority of minority voters “vote without the assistance of

third-parties who would not fall within H.B. 2023’s

exceptions.” Id. Because only a small number of minority

voters were affected to any degree by H.B. 2023, the court

found “it is unlikely that H.B. 2023’s limitations on who may

collect an early ballot cause a meaningful inequality in the

electoral opportunities of minorities as compared to nonminorities.” Id.

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Second, the court reasoned that even for the small number

of minority voters who were affected by H.B. 2023 (i.e., who

would use third-party ballot collectors no longer permitted by

H.B. 2023 if they could), the evidence did not show that H.B.

2023 gave minorities less opportunity than other members of

the electorate to participate in the political process and elect

representatives. Id. at *34. While H.B. 2023 might make it

“slightly more difficult or inconvenient for a small, yet

unquantified subset of voters to return their early ballots,” the

court found that there was no evidence that H.B. 2023 “would

make it significantly more difficult to vote,” particularly

given that no individual voter had testified that H.B. 2023 had

this impact. Id. Therefore, the district court found that DNC

had not carried its burden at the first step of the § 2 analysis. 

Id.

Although the district court did not need to reach the

second step, it nonetheless reviewed the relevant Senate

Factors in order to develop the record and concluded that

DNC had likewise failed to carry its burden at step two. Id.

at *36–40.20

3

The district court’s conclusion that the burden on a

protected class of voters is so minimal that it would not give

them less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice

20 As noted above, supra at 37 n.15, because the district court

correctly determined that H.B. 2023 does not satisfy step one of the § 2

analysis, we need not evaluate the district court’s analysis of these factors

in detail. Nevertheless, the district court’s factual conclusions were not

clearly erroneous, and as explained below, see infra at 72 n.32, we reject

the dissent’s factual reevaluations.

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is not clearly erroneous. DNC produced anecdotal testimony

that various sources collected between fifty and a few

thousand ballots but DNC’s counsel could not articulate an

estimate more precise than that “thousands” of people used

this opportunity. Id. at *12. Accordingly, the district court

did not clearly err in estimating that fewer than 10,000 voters

used ballot collection services in each election. Moreover,

the district court even considered a more generous, although

“unjustified,” number of 100,000 voters, but nonetheless

found that this was “relatively small” in relation to the 1.4

million early mail ballots and 2.3 million total voters. Id. 

The district court’s view was, at minimum, a permissible

view of the evidence. See Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573. 

Given these small numbers, the district court did not clearly

err in concluding that the unavailability of third party ballot

collection would have minimal effect on the opportunity of

minority voters to elect representatives of their choice.

Further, as explained in the Anderson/Burdick analysis,

the evidence available indicated that the burden on even those

few minority voters who used third-party ballot collection

was minimal, because those voters had “done so out of

convenience or personal preference, or because of

circumstances that Arizona law adequately accommodates in

other ways,” rather than from necessity. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *14. As the district court pointed out, not a

single voter testified at trial that H.B. 2023 made it

significantly more difficult to vote, despite the fact that H.B.

2023 was in place for two 2016 elections. Id. at *34.21

21 In arguing that H.B. 2023 had a disparate impact on the ability of

minorities to participate in the political process, the dissent fails to address

this key fact.

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In challenging the district court’s conclusion, DNC and

the dissent argue that under § 2, the total number of votes

affected is not the relevant inquiry; the proper test is whether

any minority votes are burdened. This argument is meritless. 

As we have explained, a “bare statistical showing” that an

election practice “has a disproportionate impact on a racial

minority does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” Salt

River, 109 F.3d at 595. Rather, the test under § 2 is whether

the “members [of a class of protected citizens] have less

opportunity than other members of the electorate to

participate in the political process and to elect representatives

of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added).22

To determine whether a challenged law will result in

members of a class having less opportunity to elect

representatives of their choice, a court must necessarily

consider the severity and breadth of the law’s impacts on the

protected class.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that

DNC failed to establish that H.B. 2023 results in less

opportunity for minority voters to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of their choice, and

therefore H.B. 2023 did not violate § 2 of the VRA. 

C

Finally, we consider DNC’s claim that H.B. 2023 violated

the Fifteenth Amendment.

22 While DNC cites extensively to the dissent in Chisom in arguing

that they need not prove members of a protected class have less

opportunity to elect representatives of their choice, we are bound by the

majority, which rejected this argument. 501 U.S. at 397 & n.24.

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1

Plaintiffs can challenge a state’s election practice as

violating their Fifteenth Amendment rights by showing that

“a state law was enacted with discriminatory intent.” Abbott

v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). Discriminatory intent

“implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of

consequences.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.

256, 279 (1979). Rather, plaintiffs must show that a state

legislature “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of

action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its

adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. Thus,

although racial discrimination need not be the “dominant” or

“primary” factor underlying a legislative enactment, it must

be a “motivating factor.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).

A law is not infected by discriminatory intent merely

“because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than

of another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 

Rather, “[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory

purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry

into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may

be available.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. This

inquiry is guided by factors set forth in Arlington Heights. Id.

at 266–68; see Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62, 72–74 (holding that a

facially neutral law “violates the Fifteenth Amendment only

if motivated by a discriminatory purpose” and applying

Arlington Heights in an analysis of discriminatory intent).

Under the Arlington Heights framework, “the following,

non-exhaustive factors” are relevant “in assessing whether a

defendant acted with discriminatory purpose: (1) the impact

of the official action and whether it bears more heavily on

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one race than another; (2) the historical background of the

decision; (3) the specific sequence of events leading to the

challenged action; (4) the defendant’s departures from normal

procedures or substantive conclusions; and (5) the relevant

legislative or administrative history.” Arce v. Douglas,

793 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2015). Because of “the

presumption of good faith that must be accorded legislative

enactments” and the “evidentiary difficulty” in determining

whether race was a motivating factor, courts must “exercise

extraordinary caution” when engaging in this inquiry. Miller

v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).

Discriminatory intent “is a pure question of fact” subject

to review for clear error. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at

287–88; Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2326. “It is not a question of

law and not a mixed question of law and fact.” PullmanStandard, 456 U.S. at 288.

Given this standard, we must determine whether the

district court’s finding that the Arizona legislature did not

have discriminatory intent is clearly erroneous. We consider

the district court’s findings on each Arlington Heights factor.

2

We start with two of the Arlington Heights factors, the

historical background and legislative history of the

enactment. Arce, 793 F.3d at 977. According to the district

court, Arizona’s history was “a mixed bag of advancements

and discriminatory actions.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*38. Although there was evidence of discrimination and

racially polarized voting, there was also evidence of

improvement. While Arizona was subject to § 5

preclearance, “the DOJ did not issue any objections to any of

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[Arizona’s] statewide procedures for registration or voting.” 

Id. at *37. Moreover, Arizona enacted an Independent

Redistricting Commission to combat problems with

discrimination in drawing statewide redistricting plans. Id. at

*38.

The district court also noted the relevant legislative

history of H.B. 2023, including “farfetched allegations of

ballot collection fraud” made by one legislator, Arizona State

Senator Don Shooter, id. at *41, and a video (referred to as

the “LaFaro Video”) which “showed surveillance footage of

a man of apparent Hispanic heritage appearing to deliver

early ballots,” id. at *38.23 However, the court concluded that

the legislature was not motivated by discriminatory intent. 

Rather, the court found that “Shooter’s allegations and the

LaFaro Video were successful in convincing H.B. 2023’s

proponents that ballot collection presented opportunities for

fraud that did not exist for in-person voting, and these

proponents appear to have been sincere in their beliefs that

this was a potential problem that needed to be addressed.” Id.

at *41.

The district court’s conclusion is well supported by the

legislative record, which shows that legislative discussion

focused on the danger of fraud. For example, the bill’s

sponsor, Senator Michelle Ugenti-Rita, stated that H.B. 2023

was designed to “limit fraud” in ballot collection, which “is

23 The district court found that the narration by Maricopa County

Republican Chair A.J. LaFaro “contained a narration of ‘Innuendos of

illegality . . . [and] racially tinged and inaccurate commentary by . . .

LaFaro.’” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *38. The video was first

introduced in 2014, but became “prominent in the debates over H.B.

2023.” Id. at *39.

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important to maintaining integrity in our electoral process”

because the ballot collection practice “is ripe to be taken

advantage of.” Senator Steve Smith testified that ballot fraud

is “certainly happening,” and Michael Johnson, an African

American who had served on the Phoenix City Council,

testified that he had constituents call to complain about ballot

collectors in minority communities. Senator Smith cited this

testimony in a speech supporting the law. Senator Sylvia

Allen expressed concern that “we do not know what happens

between the time the ballots are collected and when they’re

finally delivered.” This concern was confirmed by State

Election Director Eric Spencer, who testified that “there is a

huge imbalance in the amount of security measures that are

in place for polling place voting compared to early voting.” 

Even though “77 percent of all the votes cast in Arizona” are

early votes, there are “almost no prophylactic security

procedures in place to govern that practice, whereas, at the

polling place, where only 23 percent of the votes are taking

place, we have every security measure in the world.”

The legislature also heard testimony that other states had

implemented similar security measures related to ballot

collection. According to the legislative record, at the time

H.B. 2023 was considered by the Arizona legislature,

“California, New Mexico, Colorado, [and] Nevada all ha[d]

laws that restrict or prohibit ballot collection,” and therefore

Arizona was “a little bit out of the norm especially among our

neighbors.” The legislature also heard that the California law

was more draconian than H.B. 2023: it prohibited all ballot

collection except by members of the household, family

members, and spouses, and did not count votes in ballots that

had been improperly collected.

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DNC and the dissent claim that the district court erred in

giving weight to this evidence because there was no evidence

of actual fraud. According to DNC, this evidentiary gap

established that the legislators’ expressed concerns regarding

fraud in ballot collection were merely a facade for racial

discrimination. This argument fails. The Arizona legislature

was free to enact prophylactic measures even when the

legislative record “contains no evidence of any such fraud

actually occurring.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194. Moreover,

as the district court noted, “H.B. 2023 found support among

some minority officials and organizations,” including

Michael Johnson, the African American councilman, and the

Arizona Latino Republican Association for the Tucson

Chapter, which undermines DNC’s claim that concerns about

fraud were a mere front for discriminatory motives. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *41.

DNC argues that the district court erred in not giving

sufficient weight to the evidence that the LaFaro video had

racial overtones. The district court’s decision to give this

evidence less weight was not a legal error, however, because

the district court was not obliged to impute the motives of a

few legislators to the entire Arizona legislature that passed

H.B. 2023. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66. 

“What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a

statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to

enact it.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384

(1968).24 The Sixth Circuit recently recognized this point,

24 DNC relies onMasterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. ColoradoCivil Rights

Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), for the principle that courts should

put more weight on discriminatory statements of individual

decisionmakers, but that case is not on point. In holding that statements

of individual commissioners were relevant to determine whether a law

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holding that the clearly discriminatory statements and motive

of one legislator did not show that the enacting legislature

“acted with racial animus.” Ne. Ohio Coal., 837 F.3d at 637.

The district court also did not err in giving little weight to

evidence that “some individual legislators and proponents

were motivated in part by partisan interests.” Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *43. The record shows that State

Senator Shooter’s concerns about ballot collection arose after

he won a close election, that Michael Johnson complained

that ballot collection put candidates without an effective getout-the-vote effort at a disadvantage, and a 2014 Republican

candidate for the Arizona House of Representatives claimed

that he lost his election because of ballot collection activities. 

Id. Although DNC and the dissent seem to argue that, as a

matter of law, legislators should be deemed to have a

discriminatory intent for Fifteenth Amendment purposes

when they are motivated by partisan interests to enact laws

that disproportionately burden minorities, this is incorrect. 

Fifteenth Amendment plaintiffs must show that the legislature

acted with racial motives, not merely partisan motives. See,

e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473 (2017) (“[A]

trial court has a formidable task: It must . . . assess whether

the plaintiffs have managed to disentangle race from politics

intentionally discriminated on the basis ofreligion, the Court distinguished

the adjudicatory context from the legislative context. See id. at 1730. 

Masterpiece Cakeshop explained that while “[m]embers ofthe Court have

disagreed on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may

properly be taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally

discriminates on the basis of religion,” the remarks in this case were made

“in a very different context—by an adjudicatory body deciding a particular

case.” Id. Because our case involves a legislature enacting a general

statute, rather than adjudicating a specific case, Masterpiece Cakeshop is

not applicable.

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and prove that the former drove a district’s lines.”); Easley v.

Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001) (evaluating the district

court’s critical finding “that race rather than politics”

motivated the districting map). The “intent to preserve

incumbencies” is not equivalent to racially-discriminatory

intent, and only the latter supports a finding of intentional

discrimination. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d

763, 771 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). Even when “racial

identification is highly correlated with political affiliation,”

Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473 (quoting Easley, 532 U.S. at 243),

plaintiffs must still carry their burden of showing that the

former was a motivating factor. Id. Accordingly, the

determination whether racial or political interests motivated

a legislature is one of fact subject to review for clear error. 

See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473–74. Here the district court

disentangled racial motives from partisan motives, and its

factual finding that even those few legislators harboring

partisan interests did not act with a discriminatory purpose is

not clearly erroneous.25 Therefore, the historical and

legislative history factors support the district court’s

conclusion.

3

We next turn to the Arlington Heights factors of the

“sequence of events” leading to the challenged action and

“departures from normal procedures.” Arce, 793 F.3d at 977. 

25 Contrary to the dissent, the district court did not find that “partisan

self-interest [] absolve[d] discriminatory intent.” Dissent at 110. Rather,

the district court determined that the Arizona legislature did not act with

discriminatory intent, and passed H.B. 2023 in spite of any potential

disparate-impact on minority voters, not because of it. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *41.

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First, the district court found that the Arizona legislature

followed its normal course in enacting H.B. 2023, and

therefore the legislative process itself did not raise an

inference of discriminatory intent. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *42–43. This conclusion is supported by the

record; there is no evidence that the legislature used unusual

procedures or unprecedented speed to pass a law, N.C. State

Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214, 228

(4th Cir. 2016), which other courts have deemed raise such an

inference, see, e.g., Veasey I, 830 F.3d at 238 (holding that

the Texas legislature’s unwonted procedure of designating the

bill “as emergency legislation,” cutting debates short, passing

it without the ordinary committee process, and suspending a

two-thirds voting rule to get the bill passed, weighed in favor

of a finding of discriminatory intent).

Second, in considering the historical sequence of events,

the district court held that neither of the two prior efforts to

limit ballot collection, S.B. 1412 (enacted in 2011) and H.B.

2305 (enacted in 2013), weighed in favor of finding that the

legislature had a discriminatory intent in enacting H.B. 2023. 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *42–43. The record showed

that S.B. 1412 was subject to § 5 preclearance, and that after

the DOJrequested additional information regarding the ballot

collection provision, the Arizona Attorney General

voluntarily withdrew the provision. Id. at *42. Two years

later, the legislature enacted H.B. 2305, which also regulated

ballot collection. Id. After citizen groups organized

referendum efforts against the law, the legislature repealed it. 

Id. The court held that while these circumstances were

somewhat suspicious, they“have less probative value because

they involve different bills passed during different legislative

sessions by a substantially different composition of

legislators.” Id.

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The district court did not clearly err in giving little weight

to these prior enactments. Even if the bills had been informed

by a discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has made clear

that “[p]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original

sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.”

Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74). 

The intent of a prior legislature cannot be imputed to a new

legislature enacting a different bill “notwithstanding the

previous drafter’s intent.” Veasey v. Abbott (Veasey II), 888

F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 2016). Indeed, it is a clear error to

presume that any invidious intent behind a prior bill

“necessarily carried over to and fatally infected” the law at

issue. Id. Further, “meaningful alterations” in an amended

statute may render even a previously discriminatory statute

valid. Id. (citation omitted). Because Arizona’s previous

laws on ballot collection were different rules, passed by

different legislatures, and H.B. 2023 is “more lenient than its

predecessors given its broad exceptions for family members,

household members, and caregivers,” these prior enactments

do not materially bear on the legislature’s intent in enacting

H.B. 2023. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *43.

Moreover, the district court did not err in finding that

neither S.B. 1412 or H.B. 2305 was enacted with racially

discriminatory intent. Regarding S.B. 1412, the record shows

only that the DOJrequested more information, but its primary

concern was the law’s “impact on minority voters,” Feldman

III, 843 F.3d at 369 (emphasis added), not the intent of the

legislature in enacting it.

26 And as to H.B. 2305, the record

26 To support its claim, DNC points to Representative Ruben

Gallego’s statements to the DOJ that S.B. 1412 was motivated by

discriminatory intent. But Gallego opposed S.B. 1412, and “[t]he

Supreme Court has . . . repeatedly cautioned—in the analogous context of

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does not disclose why citizens opposed the law or whether the

referendum sought to combat a discriminatory purpose. The

lack of evidence of past discrimination further undermines

DNC’s argument that the legislature had discriminatoryintent

in passing H.B. 2023.

4

In reviewing the final Arlington Heights factor (whether

the law would have a disparate impact on a particular racial

group), Arce, 793 F.3d at 977, the district court found that

“the legislature enacted H.B. 2023 in spite of its impact on

minority [get out the vote] efforts, not because of that

impact,” and concluded that “proponents of the bill seemed

to view these concerns as less significant because of the

minimal burdens associated with returning a mail ballot,”

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *43.

The district court did not clearly err in reaching this

conclusion. Multiple senators expressed their view that H.B.

2023 imposes only a slight burden on voters. For instance,

Senator Michelle Ugenti-Rita stated that voters have “[l]ots

of opportunities” to vote in the 27 day early-voting window,

and expressed her view that there is no reason to presume a

voter who previously used ballot collection would have

statutory construction—against placing too much emphasis on the

contemporaneous views of a bill’s opponents” in determining a

legislature’s intent. Veasey I, 830 F.3d at 234 (quoting Butts v. City of

New York, 779 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1985)). DNC also points to

statements by Amy Chan (formerly Amy Bjelland) to the DOJ, but the

district court reasonably interpreted her statements as merely explaining

that the impetus for S.B. 1412 was an accusation of voter fraud in San

Luis, a predominately Hispanic area in the southern portion of Arizona. 

Feldman III, 843 F.3d at 384.

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trouble voting. Given that these voters have already asked

“that their ballot be mailed to them,” Senator Ugenti-Rita

stated “logic would tell you they are perfectly capable and

understand that, in order to then get their ballot in, they need

to put it back in to the mailbox or drop it off.” Another

proponent of the bill, John Kavanaugh, expressed a similar

view: “The only way you get an early ballot is to have it

delivered to you by mail, and the way you’re supposed to

return an early ballot is to reverse that process. And it’s hard

to imagine how, when you have an early ballot, somewhere

in the area of 30 days, you somehow can’t do that.” Again,

the record does not contain the sort of evidence that has led

other courts to infer the legislature was acting with

discriminatory intent, such as evidence that the legislators

studied minority data and targeted the voting methods most

used by minority voters. Cf. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 220. In

fact, no voters, minority or non-minority, testified that they

faced a substantial obstacle to voting because of H.B. 2023. 

Accordingly, we find no clear error in the court’s holding that

“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances,” DNC had “not

shown that the legislature enacted H.B. 2023 with the intent

to suppress minority votes.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*43.

In sum, the district court carefully weighed the evidence

of discriminatory purpose and found the Arizona legislature

was not motivated by an intent to discriminate. The findings

supporting this conclusion are not clearly erroneous, and

neither was the ultimate balancing of the Arlington Heights

factors.

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5

Because discriminatory intent is a “pure question of fact,”

a court must defer to the district court’s fact-finding unless it

is clearly erroneous. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288. 

But the dissent once again reviews the record de novo,

reweighs the evidence, and reaches its own conclusion. For

instance, the district court referenced Senator Shooter’s

allegations and the LaFaro video, but concluded, based on its

review of the record, that the legislature was not motivated by

discriminatory intent. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *41. 

The dissent simply reaches the opposite conclusion, based on

the same evidence. Dissent at 111–13. Similarly, the dissent

claims “the district court was wrong to determine that a law

is not racially motivated if any people of color support it.” 

Dissent at 113. But that mischaracterizes the district court’s

holding. Rather, after reviewing the evidence in the record,

the district court found that H.B. 2023 was supported by

minority officials and organizations. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *41. The district court did not err in considering

that fact, among others, in determiningwhetherthe supporters

of H.B. 2023 were motivated by racial discrimination, and the

district court need not have concluded, as does the dissent,

that such evidence “simply demonstrates that people of color

have diverse interests.” Dissent at 113. The Supreme Court

has long held that an appellate court may not reject a district

court’s findings as clear error even when the court is

“convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would

have weighed the evidence differently.” Bessemer City,

470 U.S. at 574. The dissent’s approach contradicts this rule.

Further, the dissent supports its conclusion that “H.B.

2023 was enacted for the purpose of suppressing minority

votes” by creating its own per se rules that a legislature’s

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anti-fraud motive is pretextual when there is no direct

evidence of voter fraud, and that a legislature’s partisan

motives are evidence of racial discrimination. Dissent at 107,

110–12. The dissent cites no support for these new rules,

likely because Supreme Court precedents contradict them:

Crawford rejected the idea that actual evidence of voter fraud

was needed to justify restrictions preventing voter fraud,

553 U.S. at 195–96 & nn.11–13; and Cooper made clear

plaintiffs must “disentangle race from politics and prove that

the former drove” the legislature, 137 S. Ct. at 1473. The

dissent’s attempt to reframe the evidence does not make the

district court’s resolution of this purely factual question

clearly erroneous. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287–88.

IV

We now turn to DNC’s challenges to the OOP policy. 

DNC argues that (1) the OOP policy violates the First and

Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the OOP policy violates § 2

of the VRA.

A

We begin with DNC’s claims that the OOP policy

violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an

unconstitutional burden under the Anderson/Burdick test.

1

As an initial matter, we agree with the district court’s

characterization of these claims as constituting a challenge to

the precinct voter system. As discussed, most Arizona

counties use a precinct-based system for the 20 percent of

voters who vote in person on Election Day. In-person voters

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must cast their ballots in their assigned precinct, or their votes

will not be counted. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-122, 16-135,

16-584 (codified in 1979); 1970 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 151,

§ 64 (amending Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-895); Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 16-102 (1974). This rule does not apply to voters who cast

their ballots in a county that use a vote center system, or who

use other methods to vote.

On appeal, DNC argues that it is not challenging the rule

requiring voting within a precinct, but rather Arizona’s

enforcement of the rule by not counting ballots cast in the

wrong precinct (which it calls disenfranchisement).27 This

argument is sophistical; it conflates the burden of complying

with an election rule with the consequence of noncompliance. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a state

has an obligation to structure and organize the voting process

within the state through a system of election rules. Storer,

415 U.S. at 730. For instance, states typically have election

rules that require voters to register to vote and to cast their

votes in person during the hours when polls are open. These

rules impose certain minimal burdens on voters—the ordinary

burdens of registering to vote and showing up on time. If

voters fail to comply, they may be unable to vote or their

ballots may not be counted. But it is the election rules that

impose a burden on the voter—not the enforcement of those

rules. Under DNC’s theory, a state could not enforce even a

27 This is a misnomer. A state disenfranchises voters (for example,

pursuant to a felon disenfranchisement law) by depriving certain

individuals of their right to vote, not by requiring voters to comply with

an election rule in order to have their votes counted. As the Supreme

Court has explained, an election rule, such as the requirement to have a

valid photo ID in order to vote, may be valid, even if a voter’s

noncompliance with such a rule means that the voter’s ballot will not be

counted. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 187, 189.

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rule requiring registration, because the state’s failure to count

the vote of a non-registered voter would “disenfranchise” the

noncompliant voter.

Rather than adopt DNC’s fallacious approach, we are

guided by the Supreme Court’s approach in Crawford. 

Crawford considered a state’s election rule which provided

that in-person voters who did not have valid photo ID, and

did not thereafter verify their identities, were unable to have

their votes counted. 553 U.S. at 186. In conducting its

Anderson/Burdick analysis, Crawford held that this photo ID

rule imposed the burden of obtaining the requisite

identification by “making a trip to the [issuing agency],

gathering the required documents, and posing for a

photograph,” id. at 198, and potentially could impose a

heavier burden on subgroups, such as the homeless or those

lacking birth certificates, id. at 199. The Court’s analysis

would make little sense if the relevant burden were the state’s

enforcement of the photo ID rule; under that view, all voters

would be subject to the same burden—that of having their

non-compliant votes discounted. Accordingly, like the

district court, we conclude that the appropriate analysis is

whether compliance with the voter requirement in

question—here, the requirement to vote in an assigned

precinct—imposes an undue burden. See also Serv. Emps.

Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 344 (6th Cir.

2012) (explaining that courts cannot “absolve[] voters of all

responsibility for voting in the correct precinct or correct

polling place by assessing voter burden solely on the basis of

the outcome—i.e. the state’s ballot validity determination”).

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2

Applying the Anderson/Burdick framework to the proper

characterization of DNC’s challenge, the district court found

that the precinct voting rule did not unconstitutionally burden

the right to vote. As with H.B. 2023, the district court first

observed that Arizona’s OOP policy has no impact on the

vast majority of Arizona voters because 80 percent of them

cast their ballots through early mail voting. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *21. The court also noted that the

policy has no impact on voters in Graham, Greenlee, Cochise,

Navajo, Yavapai, and Yuma counties, rural counties that

adopted the vote center model. Id.

As to those few Arizonans who vote in person outside of

the vote center counties, the district court found that the

burden of voting in the correct precinct was minimal. The

district court acknowledged that people who move frequently

may fail to update their voter registration in a timely manner

and, as a result, may not have their early ballot forwarded to

their new address, and that “changes in polling locations from

election to election, inconsistent election regimes used by and

within counties, and placement of polling locations all tend to

increase OOP voting rates,” as well as incorrect information

provided by poll workers. Id. at *22. The district court

nevertheless concluded that “the burdens imposed on voters

to find and travel to their assigned precincts are minimal and

do not represent significant increases in the ordinary burdens

traditionally associated with voting.” Id. at *24. Moreover,

the district court found, “Arizona does not make it needlessly

difficult for voters to find their assigned precincts,” citing the

myriad ways Arizona provides that information to voters:

direct mailings, multiple state and county websites, town

halls, live events, and social media and other advertising. Id.

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at *23–24 This information is generally provided in both

English and Spanish. Id. at *24. Further, the court found that

“for those who find it too difficult to locate their assigned

precinct, Arizona offers generous early mail voting

alternatives.” Id. In light of these measures, the district court

did not clearly err in finding that the burden of voting in the

correct precinct was minimal.

Considering the electorate as a whole, the court found that

the number of out-of-precinct votes was “small and everdwindling.” Id. Only 14,885 of the 2,320,851 Arizonan

votes cast in the 2008 general election were cast outside of

the correct precinct—just 0.64 percent of total votes. Id. at

*21. That number dropped to 10,979 ballots in the 2012

general election—0.47 percent of total votes. Id. By the

2016 general election, only 3,970 votes were cast in the

wrong precinct in Arizona—just 0.15 percent of the

2,661,497 total votes. Id. The small and decreasing number

of out-of-precinct votes confirms the district court’s

conclusion that the burden of identifying the correct precinct

is minimal.

We conclude that the district court’s finding that the

requirement to vote in the correct precinct is a minimal

burden is not clearly erroneous. As the district court noted,

precinct-based voting is an established method of conducting

elections and is used in a majority of states. Id. at *8; see

also Serv. Emps., 698 F.3d at 344 (precinct-voting system);

Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565,

568 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“One aspect common to

elections in almost every state is that voters are required to

vote in a particular precinct. Indeed, in at least 27 of the

states using a precinct voting system, including Ohio, a

voter’s ballot will only be counted as a valid ballot if it is cast

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in the correct precinct.”). And a majority of the states that

use precinct voting do not count out-of-precinct ballots. 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *8. The requirement to use

mail voting or locate the correct precinct and then travel to

the correct precinct to vote does not “represent a significant

increase over the usual burdens of voting.” Crawford,

553 U.S. at 198.

DNC’s arguments to the contrary are meritless. First,

DNC argues that the burden imposed by Arizona’s policy of

not counting ballots cast outside of the proper precinct is not

minimal because the ratio of Arizona voters who cast ballots

outside of the correct precinct compared to total votes cast inperson on Election Day is higher than in any other state. This

statistic is misleading, because the vast majority of Arizonans

vote early by mail—not in-person on Election Day. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *21. More important, the relative

difference between Arizona and other states does not shed

any light on the only relevant issue: the size of the burden

imposed by Arizona’s precinct voter system.28

28 The dissent offers similarly misleading statistics to support its

assertion that “Arizona voters are far likelier to vote [out of precinct] than

voters of other states.” Dissent at 77. The dissent’s graph, Dissent at 78,

shows only that the small subset of Arizona voters who cast their ballots

in-person on Election Day are more likely to vote outside their precinct

than voters in other states. Dissent at 78. The vast majority of Arizona

voters, however, vote early by mail. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *21. 

Further, the dissent mentions the total number of votes cast out of precinct

in the 2012 election, but not the more recent data from the 2016 election,

which supports the district court’s conclusion that the number of votes cast

out of precinct is an “ever-decreasing fraction of the overall votes cast in

any given election.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *35.

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Second, DNC points to the evidence in the record

regarding the external factors that contribute to out-ofprecinct voting in Arizona, such as residential mobility,

polling place locations, and pollworker training, and argues

that such external factors impose a heavier burden on

minorities.29 But even if DNC presented evidence showing

that the burden of finding the correct precinct fell more

heavily on minorities than nonminorities, such evidence

would not establish that the burden is any more than de

minimis. DNC does not cite evidence that would allow a

court “to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on [any

such] class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on

them that is fully justified,” id. at 200; nor does DNC directly

contest the evidence on which the district court relied in

determining the burden was minimal. For instance, the

district court cited substantial evidence in the record showing

that in “Arizona counties with precinct-based systems, voters

generally are assigned to precincts near where they live, and

county officials consider access to public transportation when

assigning polling places,” and that “Arizona voters also can

learn of their assigned precincts in a variety of ways,” by

accessing multiple websites operated by Arizona or various

counties, by being mailed notice of any changes in polling

places, or by calling the county recorder, among numerous

other methods. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *23. Further,

the district court relied on a 2016 Survey of Performance of

American Elections in which no Arizona respondents stated

that it was “very difficult” to find their polling place, and

29 As the district court noted, DNC did not challenge the manner in

which individual counties locate polling places, or the manner in which

Arizona trains its poll workers or informs voters of their assigned

precincts, thus undercutting any argument that such practices violated § 2. 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *23.

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94 percent of Arizona respondents reported that it was “very

easy” or “somewhat easy” to find their polling place. Id. 

Accordingly, we decline the invitation by DNC and the

dissent to reweigh the same evidence considered by the

district court and reach the opposite conclusion. See

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573. Instead, we affirm the

district court’s determination that the Arizona precinct voter

rule imposed only minimal burdens.

3

We next consider the district court’s conclusion that

Arizona had important regulatory interests for requiring

precinct-based voting. The court found that this precinct

system serves an important planning function by allowing

counties to estimate the number of voters who may be

expected at any particular precinct, allowing for better

allocation of resources and personnel. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *24. A well-run election increases voter

confidence and reduces wait times. Id. Second, the precinct

voting system ensures that each voter receives a ballot

reflecting only the races for which that person is entitled to

vote, which “promotes voting for local candidates and issues

and helps make ballots less confusing by not providing voters

with ballots that include races for which they are not eligible

to vote.” Id.

The court concluded that the OOP policy was sufficiently

justified by Arizona’s important interests in light of the

minimal burdens it imposes, and held that Arizona’s practice

did not need to be the narrowest means of enforcement. Id.

at *24–26. The court therefore rejected DNC’s arguments

that Arizona should be required to adopt a more narrowly

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precinct, i.e., “counting only the offices for which the OOP

voter is eligible to vote.” Id. at *25. Moreover, the court

concluded that such a requirement would have significant

impacts. If Arizona no longer enforced in-precinct voting,

the court reasoned, people would “have far less incentive to

vote in their assigned precincts and might decide to vote

elsewhere.” Id. at *25. Voters could also “be nefariously

directed to vote elsewhere,” id., as detailed in N.C. State

Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 461

(M.D.N.C. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 831 F.3d 204 (4th

Cir. 2016). Further, partially counting ballots would burden

candidates for local office, who would have to persuade

voters to vote in-precinct. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*25. Finally, it would “impose a significant financial and

administrative burden on Maricopa and Pima Counties

because of their high populations.” Id. Accordingly, the

court concluded that Arizona’s rejection of ballots cast outof-precinct does not violate the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.

We agree with the district court’s analysis. The interests

served by precinct-based voting are well recognized. As the

Sixth Circuit has explained:

The advantages of the precinct system are

significant and numerous: it caps the number

of voters attempting to vote in the same place

on election day; it allows each precinct ballot

to list all of the votes a citizen may cast for all

pertinent federal, state, and local elections,

referenda, initiatives, and levies; it allows

each precinct ballot to list only those votes a

citizen may cast, making ballots less

confusing; it makes it easier for election

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officials to monitor votes and prevent election

fraud; and it generally puts polling places in

closer proximity to voter residences.

Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party, 387 F.3d at 569.

DNC does not dispute these legitimate interests, but

argues that the OOP policy is not justified because it is

administratively feasible to count ballots cast out-of-precinct,

pointing to 20 other states which partially count out-ofprecinct ballots. But restrictions such as the OOP policy that

impose minimal burdens on voters’ rights need not be

narrowly tailored, see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, and thus

Arizona is not required to show that its electoral system “is

the one best tailored to achieve its purposes.” Dudum,

640 F.3d at 1114. Moreover, as the district court pointed out,

DNC’s “requested relief essentially would transform

Arizona’s precinct-based counties, including its two most

populous, into quasi-vote-center counties.” Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *26. The mere fact that a minority of

jurisdictions adopt a different system does not mean that

Arizona’s choice is unjustified. Where, as here, the plaintiff

“effectively ask[s] the court to choose between electoral

systems,” we ordinarily reject such challenges. See Dudum,

640 F.3d at 1115. “[A]bsent a truly serious burden on voting

rights,” we have held that we must have “respect for

governmental choices in running elections,” particularly

where “the challenge is to an electoral system, as opposed to

a discrete election rule (e.g., voter ID laws, candidacy filing

deadlines, or restrictions on what information can be included

on ballots).” Id. at 1114–15 (emphasis omitted). As we have

recognized, such variations are “the product of our

democratic federalism, a system that permits states to serve

‘as laboratories for experimentation to devise various

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solutions where the best solution is far from clear.’” Pub.

Integrity All., 836 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Ariz. State

Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.

2652, 2673 (2015)).

DNC also contends that there is insufficient evidence that

more voters will vote out-of-precinct if Arizona began

partially counting out-of-precinct ballots. But just as with

fraud prevention, Arizona does not need to produce

“elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of [its]

asserted justifications.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New

Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997); see also Munro, 479 U.S. at

195 (“To require States to prove actual voter confusion, ballot

overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies as a

predicate to the imposition of reasonable ballot access

restrictions would invariablylead to endless court battles over

the sufficiency of the ‘evidence’ marshaled by a State to

prove the predicate.”). Courts wisely do not require “that a

State’s political system sustain some level of damage” before

it can impose “reasonable restrictions” on the electoral

process.30 Munro, 479 U.S. at 195. Therefore, we affirm the

district court’s holding that the OOP policy is valid under the

Anderson/Burdick framework.

30 The dissent also challenges the wisdom of Arizona’s OOP policy,

labeling as “illogical” Arizona’s concern that without the policy voters

may not have an incentive to identify and vote in their correct precinct. 

Dissent at 104. In reaching this conclusion, the dissent relies only on its

own view of proper policy, a view that contradicts a majority of states,

which each adopt the same approach as Arizona. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *8. We therefore reject this argument.

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B

Finally, we address DNC’s claim that the OOP policy

violates § 2 of the VRA.

As noted above, at the first step, DNC must carry its

burden of showing that the challenged practice (here

Arizona’s requirement that in-person voters vote in the

correct precinct) gives members of a protected class less

opportunity than other members of the electorate both “to

participate in the political process and to elect representatives

of their choice.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 397 (quoting 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b)).

The district court held that DNC did not carry its burden

at the first step of its § 2 claim. Although finding that

“minorities are over-represented among the small number of

voters casting OOP ballots,”31the court also found that outof-precinct “ballots represent . . . a small and ever-decreasing

fraction of the overall votes cast in any given election.” 

Reagan, 2018 WL2191664, at *34–35. As noted above, only

3,970 out of 2,661,497 total votes, or 0.15 percent, were cast

in the wrong precinct during the 2016 general election. Id. at

31 For example, among all counties that reported out-of-precinct

ballots in the 2016 general election, roughly 99 percent of Hispanic,

African American, and Native American voters cast ballots in the correct

precinct, while the other 1 percent voted in the wrong precinct. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *34. By comparison, 99.5 percent of non-minority

voters voted in the correct precinct, with 0.5 percent casting out-ofprecinct ballots. Id. While this data shows, as Arizona notes, that

minority voters were “twice as likely” to cast OOP ballots as non-minority

voters, the relative percentages of voters in each group who vote in the

correct and incorrect precincts are far more meaningful. See Frank,

768 F.3d at 752 n.3.

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*35. Further, as in its Anderson/Burdick analysis, the court

found that the burden of identifying the correct precinct was

minimal. The court noted that DNC had not challenged “the

manner in which Arizona counties allocate and assign polling

places or Arizona’s requirement that voters re-register to vote

when they move.” Id. Nor had DNC claimed that there was

“evidence of a systemic or pervasive history” of

disproportionately giving minority voters misinformation as

to precinct locations, or evidence “that precincts tended to be

located in areas where it would be more difficult for minority

voters to find them, as compared to non-minority voters.” Id. 

Because the number of votes cast out of precinct by any

voters was small and decreasing, and because the burden of

finding the correct precinct was minimal (and the state had

not made the burden more difficult for minorities), the district

court concluded that the OOP policy did not give minority

voters less opportunity than the rest of the electorate to

participate in the political process and elect their preferred

representatives. Id. at *36. Therefore, the court concluded

that DNC had failed to carry its burden at the first step of

§ 2.32

32 Having reached this conclusion, the district court did not need to

reach step two, but nonetheless analyzed both challenged election

practices together and found that, although some of the Senate Factors

were present, DNC’s causation theory was too tenuous to meet its burden. 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *36–40. These findings are not clearly

erroneous. In arguing to the contrary, the dissent again engages in

appellate fact-finding, emphasizing some parts ofthe extensive record and

ignoring others. For example, the district court found that DNC did not

carry its burden of proving that “there is a significant lack of

responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs

of the members of the minority groups.” Id. at *27. This conclusion is

supported by substantial evidence in the record, including evidence of

outreach efforts by the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission to

increase minority voter education and participation, and evidence that

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The district court did not clearly err in reaching this

conclusion. Although DNC argues that minorities are more

likely to cast out-of-precinct ballots, and that there have been

close elections where out-of-precinct ballots could have made

a difference, the fact that a practice falls more heavily on

minorities is not sufficient to make out a § 2 violation. Salt

River, 109 F.3d at 595. Rather, there must be a showing that

the challenged practice causes a material impact on the

opportunity provided to minorities to participate in the

political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 

“[U]nless minority group members experience substantial

difficulty electing representatives of their choice, they cannot

prove that a challenged electoral mechanism impairs their

ability ‘to elect.’” Gingles, at 48 n.15 (quoting 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b)). A precinct voting system, by itself, does not

have such a causal effect. Such a common electoral practice

is a minimum requirement, like the practice of registration,

that does not impose anything beyond “the usual burdens of

voting.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198. As with other laws that

impose such minimal burdens, a court can reasonably

conclude that this background requirement, on its own, does

not cause any particular group to have less opportunity to

“influence the outcome of an election.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at

Arizona had the sixteenth-highest minority representation ratio in the

country. Although the dissent points to other evidence in the record, e.g.,

evidence that Arizona has the fourth-poorest health insurance coverage for

children, and isranked second-lowest overall per-pupil spending for Fiscal

Year 2014, Dissent at 94–95, our proper role is to determine whether “the

district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record

viewed in its entirety,” Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574, not to substitute

our own evaluation of the record. Here, the district court’s view of the

evidence was clearly permissible, and we therefore disregard the dissent’s

impermissible reweighing of the evidence.

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397. Indeed, DNC has not adduced any evidence to the

contrary.

In arguing that the district court erred, the dissent relies

primarily on its erroneous view that any disparate impact on

minorities constitutes a violation of step one of § 2. See

supra at 41 n.18. Based on this misunderstanding, the dissent

argues that “the district court legally erred in determining that

a critical mass of minority voters must be disenfranchised

before § 2 is triggered.”33 Dissent at 84. But it is the dissent

that errs in arguing that evidence that an election rule has any

disparate impact on minorities is sufficient to succeed on a

§ 2 claim. Dissent at 88. As the Supreme Court pointed out,

to meet the language of § 2, “all such claims must allege an

abridgement of the opportunity to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of one’s choice,” Chisom,

501 U.S. at 398, and must prove more than “the mere loss of

an occasional election.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. Here, the

district court was faithful to the language of § 2. 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301 (b).34

33 Of course, as explained above, supra at 61 n.27, an election rule

requiring voters to identify their correct precinct in order to have their

ballots counted does not constitute a “disenfranchisement” of voters.

34 In the alternative, the dissent argues that “in this instance, a critical

mass has been shown.” Dissent at 84 n.2. The record provides no support

for this statement. Rather, the evidence shows that approximately

99 percent of Hispanic, African American, and Native American voters

cast ballots in their correct precinct. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *34. 

In 2016 only 3,970 votes were cast out of precinct—0.15 percent of the

total votes cast—and the record is silent on what number of those ballots

were cast by minority voters. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *34–35. 

The dissent’s only support for its claim is its brief reference to the dissent

in Feldman II, 842 F.3d at 634, which in turn references two close primary

elections in Arizona (one Republican, one Democrat) in 2012 and 2014,

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This is not to say that plaintiffs could never carry their

burden of showing a precinct-based voting system gave

minority voters less opportunity. For instance, it is possible

that a state could implement such a system in a manner that

makes it more difficult for a significant number of members

of a protected group to discover the correct precinct in order

to cast a ballot. This could occur, for instance, if the state did

not provide necessary information in the language best

understood by a language minority. But here, the district

court found that DNC did not present any evidence of this

sort of practice. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *23–24. 

DNC does not contest this finding on appeal, nor does it

challenge any other elements of Arizona’s precinct voting

system, such as individual counties’ location of polling

places, as unlawful.

Therefore, the district court correctly determined that the

precinct voter system did not lessen the opportunities of

minorities to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice, and did not clearly err in

rejecting DNC’s argument that it need not provide evidence

of this factor so long as there is evidence of some disparity in

out-of-precinct voting.

V

After an exhaustive ten-day bench trial involving the

testimony of 51 witnesses and over 230 exhibits, the district

court made two key factual findings. First, it found that

and five other close races over the course of the past 100 years (from 1916

to 2012). Dissent at 84 n.2. This certainly does not compel a conclusion

that the district court’s view of the relevant evidence was clearly

erroneous.

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neither Arizona’s precinct voter system nor H.B. 2023

imposed more than a minimal burden on voters or increased

the ordinary burdens traditionally associated with voting. 

Second, it found that the Arizona state legislature was not

motivated by a discriminatory purpose in enacting H.B. 2023. 

These findings, which were not clearly erroneous, effectively

preclude DNC’s claims. The finding that Arizona’s two

election practices place only the most minimal burden on

voters necessarily leads to the conclusion that the practices

did not result in less opportunity for minority voters to

participate in the political process and elect representatives of

their choice for purposes of § 2 of the VRA. Further, in light

of the court’s finding that the burden imposed on voters by

the two election practices was minimal, Arizona easily

carried its burden under the Anderson/Burdick test to show

that its election practices were reasonably tailored to achieve

the State’s important regulatory interests. Finally, the court’s

finding that the legislature had no discriminatory purpose in

enacting H.B. 2023 effectively eviscerates DNC’s Fifteenth

Amendment claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s determination that Arizona’s election practices did not

violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments or § 2 of the

VRA, and H.B. 2023 did not violate the Fifteenth

Amendment.

AFFIRMED.

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THOMAS, Chief Judge, dissenting:

“No right is more precious in a free country than that of

having a voice in the election of those who make the laws

under which, as good citizens, we must live.” Wesberry v.

Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). Our right to vote benefits

government as much as it benefits us: a representative

democracy requires participation, and the people require

representatives accountable to them. Arizona’s electoral

scheme impedes this ideal and has the effect of 

disenfranchising Arizonans of African American, Hispanic,

and Native American descent.

Arizona’s policy of wholly discarding—rather than

partially counting—votes cast out-of-precinct has a

disproportionate effect on racial and ethnic minority groups. 

It violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), and it

unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote guaranteed by the

First Amendment and incorporated against the states under

the Fourteenth Amendment.

H.B. 2023, which criminalizes most ballot collection,

serves no purpose aside from making voting more difficult,

and keeping more African American, Hispanic, and Native

American voters from the polls than white voters.

I respectfully dissent.

I

No state rejects more out-of-precinct (“OOP”) votes than

Arizona. As the district court recognized, Arizona voters are

far likelier to vote OOP than voters of other states. 

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DLR, 2018 WL 2191664, at *21 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2018)

(hereinafter Reagan). Indeed, “[i]n 2012 alone more than one

in every five Arizona in-person voters was asked to cast a

provisional ballot, and over 33,000 of these—more than

5 percent of all in-person ballots cast—were rejected.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The

following graph compares the rate at which Arizona rejects

OOP ballots to that of other states, showing just how much of

an outlier Arizona is:

Arizona voters are likely to vote OOP for a constellation

of reasons, the most striking of which is the frequency with

which polling locations change, particularly in the highly

populated urban areas. Id. at *22. Between 2006 and 2008,

at least 43 percent of all polling places in Maricopa

County—where approximately two-thirds of Arizona’s

registered voters live—changed locations, and 40 percent

moved again between 2010 and 2012. Id. In 2016, Maricopa

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County went from 60 vote centers for the presidential

preference election to 122 polling locations for the May

special election to over 700 assigned polling locations in the

August primary and November general elections. Id. In

other words, the paths to polling places in the Phoenix area is

much like the changing stairways at Hogwarts, constantly

moving and sending everyone to the wrong place. The

effect? Voters whose polling location changed were forty

percent likelier to vote OOP. Id.

Additionally, polling locations are often counterintuitive,

further driving up OOP rates. Polls are likely to be placed on

the edge of the precinct, and they are frequently clustered

together—sometimes even in the same building. 

Unsurprisingly, voters who live further from their assigned

polling location than from a location nearest to them or who

are close to more than one location are likelier to end up

casting a discarded ballot. Indeed, one-quarter of OOP voters

cast their ballots in locations closer than their assigned

polling place to their homes.

Worse, voters left confused by Arizona’s labyrinthian

system often miss out on the opportunity to cast a ballot in

their assigned location, where it will be counted. At trial, all

but one of the affected witnesses testified that they were

never informed that they were voting OOP and that their

ballot would not be counted. And the one witness who was

given this crucial information was nonetheless unable to vote;

he could not make it to his assigned location before the polls

closed.

There is no question that Arizona’s practice of discarding

OOP ballots is also a practice of disproportionatelydiscarding

ballots cast by minority voters. The district court recognized

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as much. Id. at *4, *34. Indeed, although rates of OOP

voting decreased in the last election, the disparity between

white and minority voters remains constant. In the 2016

general election, Hispanic, African American, and Native

American voters were twice as likely as white voters to vote

OOP. Id. at *34.

Race and ethnicity intersect with the socioeconomic

conditions that drive up OOP voting. It is frequently more

difficult for minority voters to locate and vote in their

assigned polling locations. As the district court noted, “OOP

voting is concentrated in relatively dense precincts that are

disproportionately populated with renters and those who

move frequently. These groups, in turn, are

disproportionately composed of minorities.” Id. at *35.

Moreover, minority voters are far likelier to face

significant barriers in traveling to the polls, barriers that

compound the difficulty faced by the voter who is informed

that she is in the wrong location and therefore needs to travel

to a different precinct. The evidence showed that African

American, Hispanic, and Native American voters in Arizona

are more likely to work multiple jobs and to lack reliable

transportation and childcare resources. Id. at *31. Given that

voters may wait as long as five hours in line just to cast a

ballot, it is not difficult to see how socioeconomic conditions

may increase the significance of barriers to ballot access.

Native American voters, many of whom live on sovereign

lands, face unique challenges. Navajo voters in Northern

Apache County, for example, are not assigned standard

addresses; their polling locations are assigned according to

“guesswork.” Id. at *35. And they often have different

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polling locations for tribal elections and state and federal

elections. Id.

Despite these startling indicators, the district court

concluded that Arizona’s policy of discarding OOP ballots

violates neither § 2 of the VRA nor the First Amendment,

applicable to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth

Amendment. I respectfully disagree on both counts.

II

Arizona’s practice of discarding OOP ballots violates § 2

of the VRA. The practice “results in a denial or abridgement

of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on

account of race or color,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a), and, “based

on the totality of circumstances,” members of protected

classes “have less opportunity than other members of the

electorate to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice,” id. § 10301(b).

The VRA “should be interpreted in a manner that

provides ‘the broadest possible scope’ in combating racial

discrimination.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403

(1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,

567 (1969)). There are two routes to vindication of a § 2

claim—a plaintiff may satisfy either the “intent test” or the

“results test.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 44

(1986). DNC has not alleged that the challenged practice was

initiated for a discriminatory purpose, as required to satisfy

the intent test. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982)

(requiring a showing of “invidious discriminatory purpose”).

Thus, the operative question is whether, under “the

totality of circumstances,” members of a racial or ethnic

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minority “have less opportunity than other members of the

electorate to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).1

Under the results test, a challenged law or practice violates

§ 2 of the VRA if: (1) it “impose[s] a discriminatory burden

on members of a protected class, meaning that members of

the protected class have less opportunity than other members

of the electorate to participate in the political process and to

elect representatives of their choice”; and (2) that burden is

“in part . . . caused by or linked to social and historical

conditions that have or currently produce discrimination

against members of the protected class.” League of Women

Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir.

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio State

Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 553 (6th Cir.

2014)); accord Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir.

1 The use of the conjunction “and” in the quoted language did not

create a new and more rigorous two-part test, as the majority’s reading of

Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) suggests. See Op. 38–42. 

Rather, in Chisom, the Court explained why it rejected the notion that

voters could not bring a vote dilution claimfor judicial elections. Chisom,

501 U.S. at 396–97. The Court clearly understood that the VRA does not

demand a showing that the challenged provision may be outcomedeterminative: “Any abridgment of the opportunity of members of a

protected class to participate in the political process inevitably impairs

their ability to influence the outcome of an election.” Id. at 397. Indeed,

the Court wrote that it was a relatively “mere[ ]” thing to show that voters

are denied the ability to influence an election’s outcome; the greater

hurdle is to show that voters are not allowed to fully participate. Id. at

396–97 (rejecting the position that “a . . . practice . . . which has a

disparate impact on black voters’ opportunity to cast their ballots under

§ 2, may be challenged even if a different practice that merely affects their

opportunity to elect representatives of their choice to a judicial office may

not.”).

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2016); Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 637

(6th Cir. 2016).

Our responsibility is to interpret the law in accordance

with Congress’s “broad remedial purpose of ‘ridding the

country of racial discrimination in voting,’” Chisom,

501 U.S. at 403 (alteration omitted) (quoting South Carolina

v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)). Here, we know

that African American, Hispanic, and Native American

Arizonan voters are twice as likely as white voters to be

disenfranchised by Arizona’s OOP policy, and we know that

the problem could be easily remedied. I would hold the

challenged practice in violation of § 2 and enjoin Arizona

from wholly discarding OOP ballots.

A

As the district court recognized, DNC “provided

quantitative and statistical evidence of disparities in OOP

voting.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *34. That evidence

was “credible and shows that minorities are over-represented

among the small number of voters casting OOP ballots.” Id. 

Indeed, in 2016, whites were half as likely to vote OOP as

African Americans, Hispanics, orNative Americans, a pattern

displayed in all counties save one, which is predominately

white. Id. The analysis at step one of the § 2 results test

ought to end at this point, as DNC clearly met its burden of

demonstrating that Arizona’s practice of discarding OOP

ballots places a “discriminatory burden” on African

Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. League of

Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240.

The district court discredited this disparity, writing:

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decreasing fraction of the overall votes cast in any given

election, OOP ballot rejection has no meaningfully disparate

impact on the opportunities of minority voters to elect their

preferred representatives.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*35. However, this consideration is irrelevant to step one of

§ 2’s results test, which focuses solely on the differences in

opportunity and effect enjoyed by groups of voters. 

52 U.S.C. § 10301. Thus, the district court legally erred in

determining that a critical mass of minority voters must be

disenfranchised before § 2 is triggered.2See Chisom,

501 U.S. at 397 (“Any abridgment of the opportunity of

members of a protected class to participate in the political

process inevitably impairs their ability to influence the

outcome of an election.”).

The district court also determined that, “as a practical

matter, the disparity between the proportion of minorities

who vote at the wrong precinct and the proportion of nonminorities who vote at the wrong precinct does not result in

minorities having unequal access to the political process.” 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *35. But when, as a result,

proportionately fewer of the ballots cast by minorities are

counted than those cast by whites, that is precisely what it

means.

Under the standard applied by the district court, a poll tax

or literacy test—facially neutral, evenly applied across racial

2 What is more, in this instance, a critical mass has been shown. As

I wrote when this case was last before us, regarding DNC’s request for a

preliminary injunction, the record demonstrates vote margins as thin as

27 votes in a 2016 partisan primary and about 10,000 votes in the 2002

gubernatorial general election. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office,

842 F.3d 613, 634 (9th Cir. 2016).

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and ethnic lines—could withstand scrutiny. After all,

regardless of race, individuals who pay the tax or pass the test

get to vote. However, the § 2 results test rejects this line of

thinking. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-

417, at 28 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,

206) (“The ‘right’ question, . . . is whether ‘as a result of the

challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an

equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and

to elect candidates of their choice.’”).

Similarly, it is inappropriate to require, as the district

court did, that DNC demonstrate a causal connection between

Arizona’s policy of not counting OOP ballots and the

disparate rates of OOP voting. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664,

at *35–36. The district court misstated the burden by

concluding that DNC is challenging the voters’ own behavior

rather than the state’s policy of not counting OOP ballots. 

Because the challenged practice is Arizona’s wholesale

rejection of OOP ballots, it does not matter whether such

rejection increases the rates of OOP voting.

3

Moreover, the VRA does not demand the causal

connection required by the district court. Rather, it is

violated by a law that “impose[s] a discriminatory burden on

members of a protected class” when that burden is “in part

. . . caused by or linked to” discriminatory conditions. 

League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 240. The district court

flipped the requisite connection between the burden alleged

and the conditions of discrimination by demanding DNC to

3 For the same reason, I disagree that we must be more deferential to

the State on the grounds that “the challenge is to an electoral system, as

opposed to a discrete election rule.” Op. 20 (quoting Dudum v. Arntz,

640 F.3d 1098, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011)).

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show that the burden of having votes go uncounted leads to

the socioeconomic disparities that in turn lead to OOP voting.

Applying the appropriate causation requirement leads to

a different conclusion. The evidence showed the existence of

a “causal connection between the challenged voting practice

and [a] prohibited discriminatory result.” Smith v. Salt River

Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir.

1997) (quoting Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm’rs

Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1994)); see

also id. at 595 (“Only a voting practice that results in

discrimination gives rise to § 2 liability.”) (emphasis added). 

Here, the challenged practice—not counting OOP ballots—

results in “a prohibited discriminatory result”; a substantially

higher percentage of minority votes than white votes are

discarded. Id. at 586.

The district court recognized that socioeconomic

disparities between whites and minorities increase the

likelihood of OOP voting. In the district court’s words,

“OOP voting is concentrated in relatively dense precincts that

are disproportionately populated with renters and those who

move frequently. These groups, in turn, are

disproportionately composed of minorities.” Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *35. It also recognized that

“Hispanics, Native Americans, and African Americans . . .

are significantly less likely than non-minorities to own a

vehicle, more likely to rely upon public transportation, [and]

more likely to have inflexible work schedules.” Id. at *32.

I cannot accept the proposition that, under § 2, the State

is absolved of any responsibility to correct disparities if they

can be attributed to socioeconomic factors. See Gingles,

478 U.S. at 63 (“[T]he reasons black and white voters vote

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differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of § 2.”). 

When we look at the evidence through this lens, the district

court’s findings give rise to certain logical inferences. For

one, when a polling location is situated on one end of a

precinct—as often occurs—it is disproportionately difficult

for minorities to get to that location. And, in the event that a

poll worker informs the voter that she is in the wrong precinct

and her ballot will be uncounted, she is likelier to have the

opportunity to successfully travel to and vote at her assigned

polling location if she is white. The district court erred by

requiring DNC to show that “Arizona’s policy to not count

OOP ballots is . . . the cause of the disparities in OOP

voting.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *35. The VRA

imposes no such requirement.

The district court also erred by discounting the

significance of its determination that “[p]olling place

locations present additional challenges for Native American

voters.” Id. As the trial court itself noted:

Navajo voters in Northern Apache County

lack standard addresses, and their precinct

assignments for state and county elections are

based upon guesswork, leading to confusion

about the voter’s correct polling place. 

Additionally, boundariesfor purposes of tribal

elections and Apache County precincts are not

the same. As a result, a voter’s polling place

for tribal elections often differs from the

voter’s polling place for state and county

elections. Inadequate transportation access

also can make travelling to an assigned

polling place difficult.

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Id. Remedying the legal error committed by the trial court in

imposing an overly onerous burden on the plaintiffs, the

court’s own findings demonstrate that African American,

Hispanic, and Native American voters are far likelier than

white voters to vote OOP and see their votes go uncounted.

In sum, I take no issue with the district court’s findings of

fact. Rather, I disagree with the application of law to the

facts, and the conclusions drawn from them. In particularly,

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the

findings—which conclusively demonstrate the existence of

disparate burdens on African American, Hispanic, and Native

American voters—can be discounted on the grounds that

there are not enough disenfranchised voters to matter. See

Salt River Project, 109 F.3d at 591 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (noting “the [court’s] power to

correct errors of law, including those that may infect a socalled mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that

is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of

law”).

B

As required at step two of the results test, DNC has shown

that, under the “totality of circumstances,” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b), the disparate burden of disenfranchisement is “in

part . . . caused by or linked to social and historical conditions

that have or currently produce discrimination against

members of the protected class,” League of Women Voters,

769 F.3d at 240 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). This step “provides the requisite causal link

between the burden on voting rights and the fact that this

burden affects minorities disparately because it interacts with

social and historical conditions that have produced

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discrimination against minorities currently, in the past, or

both.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 244. “[T]he second step asks not

just whether social and historical conditions ‘result in’ a

disparate impact, but whether the challenged voting standard

or practice causes the discriminatory impact as it interacts

with social and historical conditions.” Husted, 834 F.3d at

638 (emphasis removed).

In 1982, Congress amended the VRA in response to

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), in which the Supreme

Court held that the VRA—like the Civil Rights

Amendments—was indifferent to laws with a disparate

impact on minority voters. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. 

Consistent with Congress’s intent, courts consider a nonexhaustive list of factors outlined in the Senate Report

accompanying the 1982 amendments. Id. As relevant here,

courts consider: (1) the history of official discrimination

connected to voting; (2) racially polarized voting patterns;

(3) whether systemic discrimination disproportionately

affects minority group’s access to the polls; (4) racial appeals

in political campaigns; (5) the number of minorities in public

office; (6) officials’ responsiveness to the needs of minority

groups; and (7) the importance of the policy underlying the

challenged restriction. Id. at 36–37 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-

417, at 28–29).

Here, each of the listed factors weigh in DNC’s favor.

1

Courts are to consider “the extent of any history of

official discrimination in the state . . . that touched the right

of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or

otherwise to participate in the democratic process.” Gingles,

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478 U.S. at 36–37 (1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at

28–29). The district court classified this factor as a “mixed

bag,” but the evidence—even as it was described by the

court—points overwhelmingly in the DNC’s favor.

The district court recognized Arizona’s “history of

discrimination against Native Americans, Hispanics, and

African Americans” throughout the entirety of its statehood. 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *36–38. For example, Native

Americans could not legally vote until 1948, when the

Arizona Supreme Court held the disenfranchisement of

Native Americans unconstitutional. Id. at *36. From the

state’s inception until Congress passed the VRA, literacytests

enacted specifically to limit “the ignorant Mexican vote”

prevented Hispanics, Native Americans, and African

Americans from full participation in the electoral franchise. 

Id. The state discriminates against minorities in other ways

which ultimately limit voting participation, too, particularly

by undereducating nonwhite residents and refusing to offer

appropriate Spanish translations, practices that continue into

the present day and likely serve to widen the racial and ethnic

gaps in OOP voting. Id. at *37.

The district court noted that “discrimination against

minorities in Arizona has not been linear.” Id. However, the

fact that “[d]iscriminatory action has been more pronounced

in some periods of state history than others . . . [and] each

party (not just one party) has led the charge in discriminating

against minorities over the years” does not support the district

court’s conclusion that this factor is inconclusive. Id. at *38. 

Rather, despite some advancements, most of which were

mandated by courts or Congress, Arizona’s history is marred

by discrimination. What is more, while evidence of sustained

improvement must be considered, “sporadic[] and

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serendipitous[]” indicators of improvement are not grounds

for discounting a long history of discrimination. Gingles,

478 U.S. at 76.

Additionally, the district court discounted some evidence

on the grounds that “[m]uch of the discrimination that has

been evidenced may well have in fact been the unintended

consequence of a political culture that simply ignores the

needs of minorities.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *38. 

The results test avoids such a chicken-or-the-egg inquiry. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63. When Congress amended the VRA

in 1982, it did so in recognition that discrimination need not

be intentional to disenfranchise minority groups.

2

Courts are also tasked with considering “the extent to

which voting in the elections of the state . . . is racially

polarized.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-

417, at 28–29). The district court correctly concluded that

“Arizona has a history of racially polarized voting, which

continues today.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *38. This

factor was never in dispute.

However, it bears mentioning the degree to which

Arizona politics are racially polarized. In reasonably

contested elections, 59% of white Arizonans vote Republican,

in contrast to 35% of Hispanic Arizonans and an

undetermined minority of African American and Native

American voters. Arizona politics are even more polarized

along the lines of the candidate’s ethnicity; in non-landslide

district-level contests between a Hispanic Democratic

candidate and a white Republican candidate, 84% of Hispanic

voters, 77% of Native American voters, 52% of African

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American voters, and only 30% of white voters select the

Hispanic candidate.

3

Similarly, there is no dispute that “members of the

minority groups[s] in the state . . . bear the effects of

discrimination in such areas as education, employment and

health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in

the political process[.]” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting

S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29). As the district court noted,

“[r]acial disparities between minorities and non-minorities in

socioeconomic standing, income, employment, education,

health, housing, transportation, criminal justice, and electoral

representation have persisted in Arizona.” Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *38. Although the district court’s order only

briefly mentions this factor, the evidence is overwhelming. 

Indeed, compared to white Arizonans, black Arizonans are

over twice as likely to live in poverty, Hispanic Arizonans are

nearly three times as likely, and Native Americans are almost

four times as likely. Id. at *31.

4

Arizona politicians have a long history of making “overt

or subtle racial appeals,” and that history extends to the

present day. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-

417, at 28–29). As the district court noted, candidates have

relied on racial appeals since the 1970s. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *38. For example, during Raul Castro’s

successful gubernatorial run in the 1970s, his opponent’s

supporters called on the electorate to choose the candidate

who “looked like a governor,” and a newspaper printed Fidel

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Castro’s face below a headline reading, “Running for

governor of Arizona.” Id.

More recently, too, during his winning campaign for State

Superintendent of Public Office, John Huppenthal, a white

candidate running against a Hispanic competitor, ran an ad

touting that he was “one of us,” that he was opposed to

bilingual education, and that he “will stop La Raza,” an

influential Hispanic civil rights organization. Id. And when

former Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas ran for

governor, one of his ads included an image of the Mexican

flag with a red line striking through it. Id. Moreover, as I

discuss at length below, racial appeals were made specifically

in regard to H.B. 2023. These racial appeals “lessen to some

degree the opportunity of [minorities] to participate

effectively in the political processes and to elect candidates

of their choice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 40.

5

Also relevant is “the extent to which members of the

minority group[s] have been elected to public office in the

jurisdiction.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep. No.

97-417, at 28–29). The district court noted that “the disparity

in the number of minority elected officials in Arizona has

declined.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *39. However, a

“decline” does not translate to equity. Gingles, 478 U.S. at

76. While nonwhites compose 44% of Arizona’s total

population, only two minority statespersons—one Hispanic

governor in 1974 and one African American Corporation

Commissioner in 2008—have been elected to statewide

positions in the last 50 years. Id. There are currently no

minorities in statewide office. Minorities hold only 22% of

state congressional seats and 9% of judgeships.

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Minorities are seriously underrepresented in public office

in Arizona, and the problem is most severe at the statewide

level. Significantly, because Arizona could not be required

to count votes for which an OOP voter is not qualified to

vote, Arizona’s practice of wholly discarding OOP ballots

only has an effect on top-of-the-ticket races, where

representation is at its lowest.

6

A § 2 claim is likelier to succeed where “there is a

significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected

officials to the particularized needs of the members of the

minority group[s].” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. Rep.

No. 97-417, at 28–29). The district court found that DNC’s

evidence was “insufficient to establish a lack of

responsiveness on the part of elected officials to

particularized needs of minority groups.” Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *39. It bolstered its conclusion with evidence

that the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission

engages in outreach with minority populations, but

engagement by one entity is not conclusive, especially in the

face of overwhelming evidence of government

nonresponsiveness.

The district court ignored evidence that Arizona

underserves minority populations. For example, it failed to

recognize that Arizona was the last state in the nation to join

the Children’s Health Insurance Program, which mayexplain,

in part, why forty-six states have better health insurance

coverage for children. Similarly, it ignored evidence that

Arizona’s public schools are drastically underfunded; in fact,

in 2016 Arizona ranked 50th among the states and the District

of Columbia in per pupil spending on public elementary and

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secondary education. Given the well-documented evidence

that minorities are likelier to depend on public

services—evidence generally credited by the district

court—Arizona’s refusal to provide adequate state services

demonstrates its nonresponsiveness to minority needs.4

Indeed, the district court’s finding is directly contradicted

by its recognition, later in its order, that Arizona has a

“history of advancing partisan objectives with the unintended

consequence of ignoring minority interests.” Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *43. And, as I discuss below, there is

significant specific evidence of the legislature’s disregard for

minority needs in the legislative history leading to the

passage of H.B. 2023. The district court failed to consider

important facts and overstated the significance of one minor

item of evidence. It clearly erred in finding that this factor

does not support DNC. See, e.g., Myers v. United States,

652 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district

court clearly erred when it ignored evidence contradicting its

findings).

7

Courts may also consider “whether the policy underlying

the state . . . practice . . . is tenuous.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37

4 Rather than discuss the evidence supporting DNC, the district court

simply discredited the testimony of one of DNC’s experts, Dr. Allan

Lichtman, on the grounds that he “ignored various topics that are relevant

to whether elected officials have shown responsiveness, and he did not

conduct research on the issues in Arizona.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664,

at *39. However, the court also found “Dr. Lichtman’s underlying

sources, research, and statistical information [to be] useful.” Id. at *2. 

Thus, my analysis incorporates only Dr. Lichtman’s “underlying sources,

research, and statistical information.”

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(quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28). In its analysis of this

factor, the district court erroneously misstated the inquiry as

whether the precinct-based system—rather than the practice

of wholly discarding OOP votes—is justified. Finding the

precinct-based system well-supported, the district court

determined only that “Arizona’s policy to not count OOP

ballots is one mechanism by which it strictly enforces this

system to ensure that precinct-based counties maximize the

system’s benefits.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *39. 

However, the district court attempted no further explanation,

fully adopting the state’s explanation for its practice of

discarding votes without considering its logic.

Arizona’s OOP policy does not serve any purpose beyond

administrative ease. Simply put, it takes fewer resources to

count fewer ballots. There is no indication that there is any

correlation between the precinct-based model and the OOP

policy. Because the analysis of this factor is essentially no

different than the analysis under step two of the

Anderson/Burdick test, I will not discuss it at length here. 

Because it misstated DNC’s challenge, the district court

clearly erred in its finding regarding the justifications for the

OOP policy. There is no indication that the precinct-based

electoral scheme runs more effectively because Arizona

refuses to count OOP votes.

8

Summing up its analysis, the district court found that

“[some] of the germane Senate Factors . . . are present in

Arizona and others are not.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*40. Because DNC showed that each of the relevant factors

was satisfied, the district court’s characterization of the

evidence was clearly erroneous.

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Further, the district court took issue with the Senate

Factors themselves, writing that DNC’s “causation theory is

too tenuous to support [its] VRA claim because, taken to its

logical conclusion, virtually any aspect of a state’s election

regime would be suspect as nearly all costs of voting fall

heavier on socioeconomically disadvantaged voters.” Id. 

However, the results test was not on trial here; Congress

specifically amended the VRA in response to such concerns. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43–44 (“The Senate Report which

accompanied the 1982 amendments . . . dispositively rejects

the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55

(1980), which required proof that the contested electoral

practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the

intent to discriminate against minority voters.”).

DNC demonstrated that Arizona’s practice of not

counting OOP ballots “results in a denial or abridgement of

the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account

of race or color,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a), and that, “based on

the totality of circumstances,” members of protected classes

“have less opportunity than other members of the electorate

to participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice,” id. § 10301(b).

III

Arizona’s practice of wholly discarding OOP votes also

violates the First Amendment, which applies to the states

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In deciding

otherwise, the district court made several legal errors,

discussed below. Upon correcting the district court’s errors

and applying the Anderson/Burdick test to the uncontested

facts, the record compels a contrary conclusion. See United

States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1998)

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(citation omitted) (clear error standard met when appellate

court is left with the “definite and firm conviction” that a

mistake was made). Arizona unconstitutionally infringes

upon the right to vote by disenfranchising voters unable to

find or travel to the correct precinct, even as to those contests

for which the voter is qualified to vote.

The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect individual

voting rights by limiting state interference with those rights. 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964); Tashjian v.

Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). While

“the right[s] to vote in any manner and . . . to associate for

political purposes” are not “absolute,” Burdick v. Takushi,

504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992), neither is the state’s

constitutionally designated authority to regulate the “Times,

Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and

Representatives,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Williams v.

Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (a state’s power to regulate

elections is “subject to the limitation that [it] may not be

exercised in a way that violates other . . . provisions of the

Constitution.”). Thus, “[t]he power to regulate the time,

place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more,

the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to

vote.” Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217.

Courts apply the Anderson/Burdick test, a “flexible”

balancing test, to determine whether a voting regulation runs

afoul of the First Amendment right to associate. Burdick, 504

U.S. at 434. The Court must “weigh ‘the character and

magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights . . . that the

plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put

forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed

by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which

those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s

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rights.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,

789 (1983)). There is no substitute for the “balancing and

means-end fit framework” required under Anderson/Burdick;

even if a burden is minimal, it must be justified. Pub.

Integrity All., Inc. v. City of Tucson, 836 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th

Cir. 2016) (en banc).

A

The burden imposed by Arizona’s refusal to count OOP

votes is severe. The district court and the majority

mischaracterize that burden as the burden of complying with

the State’s general requirement that individuals vote in their

assigned precinct. However, the burden here is the burden of

disenfranchisement suffered by those voters whose votes are

discarded even as to those elections in which the voter is

qualified to vote. DNC brought suit alleging that Arizona’s

practice of discarding OOP ballots unconstitutionally

infringes upon individual voting rights. They sought an

injunction barring Arizona from continuing that practice. 

They did not challenge Arizona’s precinct-based system in its

entirety.

1

The defendants and intervenors relyon semantics, casting

the discarding of OOP ballots as the “consequence” of

Arizona’s precinct system. However, whollydiscardingOOP

ballots is not a fundamental requirement of—or even a logical

corollary to—a precinct-based model. Instead, Arizona’s

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practice of discarding such ballots is exactly that—a practice. 

And it can change.5

The district court legally erred when it restated the burden

along the lines urged by the defendants and intervenors.6

Concluding that the burden was that of voting in the correct

precinct, the district court determined that Arizona’s voters

are themselves partially responsible for any burden because

they are so likely to change residences and to rent rather than

own their homes. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *22. 

However, if such a consideration were permissible, a poll tax

could be upheld on the grounds that poor voters could simply

earn more money or spend the money that they do earn

differently—propositions that have, thankfully, been rejected. 

See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

(1966).

The court also rejected DNC’s challenge because “there

is no evidence that it will be easier for voters to identify their

correct precincts if Arizona eliminated its prohibition on

5

Indeed, the district court determined in its analysis of standing,

which has not been contested on appeal, that the alleged injury—not

counting OOP ballots—is redressable. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at

*10.

6

I respectfully disagree with the majority that the district court rightly

restated DNC’s challenge because “under DNC’stheory, a state could not

enforce even a rule requiring registration, because the state’s failure to

count the vote of a non-registered voter would ‘disenfranchise’ the

noncompliant voter.” Op. 61–62. The Anderson/Burdick test is a

balancing test. If a basic registration requirement imposes a burden on

voters—and it does—it will still be upheld if that burden is justified—and

it is. DNC has merely asked us to apply the Anderson/Burdick framework

to its challenge; it has not asked for a per se rule striking any policy or law

under which votes go uncounted.

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counting OOP ballots.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *23. 

But the problem is not with the voters, who are dealing with

a system insensitive to their needs; the problem is with an

electoral system that refuses to acknowledge and respond to

the needs of the State’s voting population. A democracy

functions only to the degree that it fosters participation.

The district court also legally erred when it equated

Arizona’s policy of discarding OOP votes with similar

policies in other states, policies which were not on trial in this

lawsuit. Voting rights claims demand an “intensely local

appraisal.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78 (quoting White v.

Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973)). What is more, the

constitutionality of these other states’ policies has not been

affirmatively decided. Thus, the fact that those other states

also have policies of not counting votes cast OOP is not

indicative of the constitutionality of Arizona’s policy.

Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law in

determining that “[t]hough the consequence of voting OOP

might make it more imperative for voters to correctly identify

their precincts, it does not increase the burdens associated

with doing so.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *22. The

burden identified by DNC and faced by the voter is

disenfranchisement.

2

The burden is severe. Because the district court misstated

the burden, it also miscalculated its severity. For example,

the district court determined that the burden is slight based on

its finding that “there is no evidence that it will be easier for

voters to identify their correct precincts if Arizona eliminated

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its prohibition on counting OOP ballots.” Id. at *23. But that

reasoning turns the appropriate legal framework on its head.

Under the first prong of the Anderson/Burdick test, the

issue is the severity of the burden faced by voters whose

ballots are discarded because they voted OOP. Pub. Integrity

Alliance, 836 F.3d at 1024 n.2 (“[C]ourts may consider not

only a given law’s impact on the electorate in general, but

also its impact on subgroups, for whom the burden, when

considered in context, may be more severe.”). Perhaps

Arizona’s electoral scheme justifies that burden, no matter its

severity. If so, however, that determination comes in under

step two of the Anderson/Burdick analysis.

For those whose votes go uncounted, “there can be no doover and no redress.” League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at

247. To determine the burden, the Court looks not to the

voters unaffected by the practice, as the district court did,

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *21 (“Arizona’s rejection of

OOP ballots . . . has no impact on the vast majority of

Arizona voters.”), but to those who suffer the burden,

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186

(2008) (plurality opinion); Pub. Integrity All., 836 F.3d at

1024 n.2. And those voters are effectively rendered unable to

vote in elections for which they are qualified and in which

they cast otherwise legitimate ballots. There is no burden

more severe in the voting rights context.

However, even if the district court had properly stated the

burden alleged, its ultimate finding would be clearly

erroneous. The district court found that Arizona makes it

easy for voters to find their precincts. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *23. The district court’s finding is inconsistent

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with the evidence presented and generally credited by the

court.

The government bears responsibility for the high rate of

OOP voting. First, precincts appear to change polling

locations and practices even more often than residents change

homes. Id. at *22 (“[I]n Maricopa County, between 2006 and

2008 at least 43 percent of polling locations changed from

year to the next[.]”). Second, polling places are often in

counterintuitive locations, far from some residents’ homes. 

Id. And third, the district court noted (and did not discredit)

evidence that election workers fail to inform voters that they

are in the wrong precinct and that a provisional ballot will not

be counted. Id. Thus, the district court clearly erred in

determining that Arizona does all it should to prevent OOP

voting.

B

The severe burden faced byOOP voters is not outweighed

by a sufficiently important government interest. Pub.

Integrity All., 836 F.3d at 1024. Because the district court

misstated the burden, it also overstated the government

interest by focusing on the “numerous and significant

advantages” of a precinct-based voting model. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *24. The inquiry should instead be

whether the state can justify the interests served by the

challenged practice of not counting OOP ballots. It cannot.

As the district court itself found, “[c]ounting OOP ballots

is administratively feasible.” Id. at *25. This is demonstrated

by: (1) the methods used by the 20 states that use a precinctbased system and nonetheless count OOP ballots; and

(2) Arizona’s readily transferable method “to process certain

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types of ballots that cannot be read by an optical scan voting

machine” and “some provisional ballots cast by voters who

are eligible to vote in federal elections, but whom Arizona

does not permit to vote in state elections.” Id. Certainly,

Arizona can count the votes cast by all qualified voters.

The district court determined that, although OOP votes

could be counted, Arizona nonetheless could justify its policy

on the basis of assumptions regarding what could happen if

the state counted all of the ballots that it received. Voters

may “decide to vote” out of precinct or “incorrectly believe

that they can vote at any location and receive the correct

ballot.” Id. Worse, they could “be nefariously directed to

vote elsewhere.” Id. This reasoning is illogical and

unsupported by the facts. There is no demonstrated increase

in OOP voting in states where those votes are counted than in

Arizona (where, of course, OOP voting is at its highest level). 

And “nefarious” interests would be far better served by

misdirecting voters if their out-of-precinct vote would not be

counted at all than if it were partially tallied.7

Arizona’s interest in administrative ease does not

justify the severe burden of disenfranchisement. I would

hold Arizona’s practice of discarding OOP ballots

unconstitutional.

7 Under the current system, for example, a Democrat could

conceivably misdirect likely Republican voters to the wrong precinct in

order to render their ballots null. However, if OOP ballots counted, the

Democrat would have less incentive, as the Republicans’ choices for

statewide and federal office would still register.

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IV

Next, DNC challenges a recently enacted law, H.B. 2023,

which criminalizes most ballot collection. Under the law, a

person who collects another’s ballot commits a felony unless

the collector is an official engaged in official duties or the

voter’s family member, household member, or caregiver. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H)–(I).

H.B. 2023 was not Arizona’s first attempt to limit ballot

collection. Prior to Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529

(2013), Arizona was subject to the VRA’s § 5 preclearance

requirements. In 2011, Arizona passed S.B. 1412, which

criminalized the collection of more than ten ballots by any

one individual. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *42. Arizona

submitted the bill to the DOJ for preclearance, and the DOJ

“precleared all provisions except for the provision regulating

ballot collection,” about which the DOJ requested further

information in order to ensure that the provision had neither

the purpose nor the effect of limiting minority participation

in voting. Id. Arizona did not proffer the requested

information, instead withdrawing the provision before

formally repealing the law. Id. With good reason: the State

Elections Director, who helped draft the bill, told the DOJ

that the law was “targeted at voting practices . . . in

predominantly Hispanic areas” and that state officials were

expecting § 5 review. Withdrawing a provision was not

standard procedure for Arizona, which fully or partially

withdrew only 6 of its 773 preclearance provisions. Id.

In 2013, the legislature tried a new approach. It passed

H.B. 2305 “along nearly straight party lines in the waning

hours of the legislative session.” Id. The law “banned

partisan ballot collection and required other ballot collectors

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to complete an affidavit stating that they had returned the

ballot.” Id. The public outcry was immediate, with “citizen

groups organiz[ing] a referendum effort and collect[ing]more

than 140,000 signatures to place H.B. 2305 on the ballot for

a straight up-or-down vote” in the next election. Id. “Rather

than face a referendum,” which would have barred further

related legislation without a supermajority vote, “Republican

legislators again repealed their own legislation along party

lines.” Id. At the time, then-State Senator Michele Reagan

(now Secretary of State and defendant to this action), who

sponsored the bill, stated that the legislature would

reintroduce the bill, but in smaller fragments. Id.

As the district court noted, H.B. 2023 was passed not only

“on the heels of” these earlier bills, but also “in the context of

racially polarized voting” and “increased use of ballot

collection as a Democratic [get-out-the-vote] strategy in . . .

minority communities.” Id. at *41. Legislators supporting

the bill were particularlymotivated by two items of evidence:

the wildly irrational testimony of then-State Senator Don

Shooter, and a racist video prepared by former Maricopa

Republican Party Chair A.J. LaFaro, in which LaFaro claims

that a Hispanic man engaged in a lawful get-out-the-vote

ballot collection effort is a “thug” breaking the law. Id. at

*38–39, *41.

DNC brings three challenges to H.B. 2023. It argues that

the provision was motivated by racial animus, in violation of

the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and § 2 of the

VRA. It claims that it has a discriminatory effect, also in

violation of § 2. And, finally, it contends that the law

unreasonably burdens voters’ First Amendment rights. I

agree on all counts and would hold the provision invalid

under the VRA and the United States Constitution.

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V

H.B. 2023 was enacted for the purpose of suppressing

minority votes, in violation of § 2 of the VRA and the

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although lawmakers

were also motivated by partisanship, their intent to reduce the

total number of Democratic votes does not render the law

constitutional.

Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and § 2

of the VRA, a law passed with the intent to discriminate

against racial or ethnic minorities cannot stand. The law

imposes a high burden on plaintiffs, who must show “[p]roof

of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.” Vill. of

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,

265 (1977). Voting regulations are unconstitutional when

they are “‘conceived or operated as purposeful devices to

further racial discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling out

or diluting the voting strength of racial elements in the voting

population.” Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617 (quoting Whitcomb v.

Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)). A plaintiff need not show

that officials acted solely to further a racially motivated

agenda, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, but the ultimate

issue is whether “the legislature enact[ed] a law ‘because of,’

and not ‘in spite of,’ its discriminatory effect,” N.C. State

Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220 (2016)

(quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279

(1979)).

“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may

often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts . . . .” 

Rogers, 458 U.S. at 618 (quoting Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). “Thus determining the existence

of a discriminatory purpose ‘demands a sensitive inquiry into

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such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be

available.’” Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). 

Courts consider the Arlington Heights factors, a nonexhaustive list of considerations, to determine whether a law

was enacted to satisfy a motive to discriminate: (1) the

historical background and sequence of events leading to

enactment; (2) substantive or procedural departures from the

normal legislative process; (3) relevant legislative history;

and (4) the impact of the law on a particular racial group. 

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68.

Here, all four factors weigh in favor of DNC.

A

The historical background of a challenged provision is an

important evidentiary source, “particularly if it reveals a

series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” Id. at

267. As the district court recognized, “H.B. 2023 emerged in

the context of racially polarized voting, increased use of

ballot collection as a Democratic [get-out-the-vote] strategy

in low-efficacy minority communities, and on the heels of

several prior efforts to restrict ballot collection.” Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *41. And as discussed below, in my

analysis of § 2’s results test, a longer view of history

similarly weighs in favor of DNC. Quite simply, the

historical background suggests that the restriction was

enacted in order to prevent minority ballots from being

counted.

The fact that the minority votes would help Democratic

candidates does not alter the analysis. See id. (suggesting that

because “some individual legislators and proponents were

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motivated in part by partisan interests”8they were not

motivated by racially discriminatory interests). Indeed, if that

were the case, consideration for racially polarized voting

patterns—a constant in VRA and constitutional voting

regulation challenges—would be impermissible or weigh in

favor of upholding a regulation. By nature of the political

process, an unconstitutionally discriminatory voting

regulation is a law enacted by the political party in power in

order to maintain power by preventing minorities from

voting, assuredly because they belong to the other political

party.

The first Arlington Heightsfactor suggests discriminatory

motive.

B

Under Arlington Heights courts consider “the defendant’s

departures from its normal procedures or substantive

conclusions.” Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport

Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Arlington

Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68). The district court recognized

that “the circumstances surrounding” H.B. 2023 were

“somewhat suspicious.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *42. 

This is an understatement. H.B. 2023 flowed directly out of

the Arizona legislature’s two prior attempts to limit ballot

8 The majority concludes that the district court “did not err in giving

little weight to evidence that ‘some individual legislators and proponents

were motivated in part by partisan interests.’” Op. 53 (quoting Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *43). But the court did not discredit this evidence. 

Rather it relied on it to show proof of nondiscrimination.

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collection.9 The law enacted does not cure the intent to

discriminate demonstrated by its precursors; rather, H.B.

2023 was part of the same general strategy of limiting the

minority vote by limiting ballot collection.

This Arlington Heights factor suggests discriminatory

motive.

C

“The legislative . . . history may be highly relevant,

especially where there are contemporary statements by

members of the decisionmaking body . . . .” Arlington

Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. The district court found evidence

of racial animus in the legislative history but discounted its

significance, suggesting that anyinitial discriminatorymotive

was cured because some legislators acted either out of selfinterest or an unfounded but sincere belief that voter fraud

was likely.

The district court’s reasoning is clearly erroneous. First,

partisan self-interest cannot absolve discriminatory intent. If

we were to allow racially motivated voting schemes

whenever those schemes serve partisan interests, the

exception would swallow the rule, and there would be no

prohibition on enacting laws in order to discriminate. 

Second, the sincerity of the legislators’ belief in a wholly

9 While it is true that discriminatory intent as to an earlier law does

not necessarily carry through to any other provision on the subject, Op. 56,

we do not have to suspend common sense. The recency of the earlier

provisions, coupled with relevant public statements and the weak

legislative record supporting H.B. 2023, places H.B. 2023 on one end of

an unbroken line beginning just a few years earlier with S.B. 1412.

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theoretical risk of voter fraud is—as the district court itself

suggested—indicative of discriminatory intent. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *41 (describing legislators’ motives as

“perhaps implicitly informed by racial biases”).

Moreover, the district court’s own specific factual

findings belie its ultimate conclusion on the third Arlington

Heights factor. The district court determined that the

proponents of H.B. 2023 voted for the bill in response to two

pieces of evidence: (1) the “demonstrably false,” “unfounded

and often farfetched allegations of ballot collection fraud”

made by former Arizona State Senator Don Shooter; and

(2) a “racially-tinged” video created by Maricopa County

Republican Chair A.J. LaFaro (the “LaFaro Video”). Id.

Because there was “no direct evidence of ballot collection

fraud . . . presented to the legislature or at trial,” the district

court understood that Shooter’s allegations and the LaFaro

Video were the reasons the bill passed. Id. (“Shooter’s

allegations and the LaFaro Video were successful in

convincing H.B. 2023’s proponents that ballot collection

presented opportunities for fraud that did not exist for inperson voting . . . .”).

Both of these evidentiary items demonstrate racial

animus. As the district court made clear, Senator Shooter’s

testimony regarding the existence and prevalence of voter

fraud was not only incorrect but in fact “unfounded and often

farfetched.” Id. If Senator Shooter was sincere, his distorted

view of reality is explainable only by what the district court

downplayed as being “implicitly informed by racial

biases,”—or, in starker terms, by racism. Id. An unfounded

and exploited fear that members of minority groups are

“engage[d] in nefarious activities,” id., supports a finding of

racial animus. And if Senator Shooter was insincere, he

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purposefully distorted facts in order to prevent Hispanics—

who generally preferred his opponent—from voting. Id.

(“Due to the high degree of racial polarization in his district,

Shooter was in part motivated by a desire to eliminate what

had become an effective Democratic [get-out-the-vote]

strategy. . . . Indeed, Shooter’s 2010 election was close: he

won with 53 percent of the total vote, receiving 83 percent of

the non-minority vote but only 20 percent of the Hispanic

vote.”).

The LaFaro Video is even more damning. The video

shows a Hispanic man, a volunteer with a get-out-the-vote

organization, delivering early ballots to the polls. The video

is itself wholly mundane; it is eight soundless minutes of a

man moving completed ballots from a cardboard box to the

ballot box. It markedly “did not show any obviously illegal

activity.” Id. at *39. However, LaFaro provided a voice-over

narration, “includ[ing] statements that the man was acting to

stuff the ballot box; that LaFaro did not know if the person

was an illegal alien, a dreamer, or citizen, but knew that he

was a thug; and that LaFaro did not follow him out to the

parking lot to take down his tag number because he feared for

his life.” Id. at *38. It is LaFaro’s narration—not the dull

raw material showing a Hispanic man dropping off

ballots—that “became quite prominent in the debates over

H.B. 2023.” Id. at *39. As the district court recognized, the

LaFaro Video evidences racial animus.

After recognizing the existence of discriminatory intent,

the district court seems to have determined that intent was

later cured because the bill “found support among some

minority officials and organizations” and because some

lawmakers opposed H.B. 2023 for reasons other than that it

being grounded in racial discrimination. Id. at *41. The

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district court’s reasoning is incorrect. As the Supreme Court

has stated, there is no room for judicial deference “[w]hen

there is . . . proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a

motivating factor in the decision.” Arlington Heights,

429 U.S. at 265–66.

Moreover, the district court was wrong to determine that

a law is not racially motivated if any people of color support

it. Rather, the evidence that particular Hispanic and African

American Arizonans supported H.B. 2023 simply

demonstrates that people of color have diverse interests, some

of which may outweigh potential concerns that a law was

enacted with the intent to discriminate. And although one

lawmaker “testified that she has no reason to believe H.B.

2023 was enacted with the intent to suppress Hispanic

voting,” the district court also recognized that “some

Democratic lawmakers accused their Republican counterparts

of harboring partisan or racially discriminatory motives.” 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *41. Again, a diversity of

perspectives is neither surprising nor particularly telling,

especially when the operative legal test recognizes that a law

may be unconstitutionally discriminatory even if it is not

driven solely by racial animus: “legislators . . . are properly

concerned with balancing numerous competing

considerations.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.

The district court’s concerns were also assuaged because

Shooter’s “demonstrably false” allegations and “the raciallytinged LaFaro Video . . . spurred a larger debate in the

legislature about the security of early mail voting as

compared to in-person voting.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664,

at *41. The court’s finding is neither here nor there. The

legislature did not act to limit all early voting, but it targeted

a specific practice known to be popular among minority

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voters, despite the absence of any evidence that ballot

collection was less secure than other early voting methods.

This Arlington Heights factor weighs in favor of DNC.

D

“The impact of the official action whether it ‘bears more

heavily on one race than another’” is “important” to the

analysis of whether a law was enacted to serve a

discriminatory motive. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266

(quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.) The district court wholly

failed to measure H.B. 2023’s impact on minority voters in its

discussion of Arlington Heights. Rather, it counterintuitively

concluded that concerns about the law’s effect on minority

groups “show[] only that the legislature enacted H.B. 2023 in

spite of its impact on minority [get-out-the-vote] efforts, not

because of that impact.” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *43. 

The district court’s determination is not only illogical but also

out of place in its discussion of the fourth Arlington Heights

factor. As I will discuss in my analysis of the § 2 results test,

H.B. 2023 disproportionately affects minority voters.

Like the first three factors considered, the fourth and final

factor supports a conclusion that the law is motivated by

racial animus. Thus, under the purpose test of § 2 of the

VRA and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, H.B.

2023 cannot survive.

VI

Like Arizona’s practice of discarding OOP votes, H.B.

2023 imposes an unlawful discriminatory burden on minority

voters. As discussed above, § 2 of the VRA provides that

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“[n]o voting . . . standard, practice, or procedure shall be

imposed or applied . . . in a manner which results in a denial

or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States

to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).

Under the results test, “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that

a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with

social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the

opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters to elect

their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. The

test is one of the “totality of circumstances.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43. In this instance, the

totality of the circumstances conclusively demonstrates that

H.B. 2023 disproportionately burdens minority voters, and

that burden can be traced directly to historical and social

conditions of discrimination. League of Women Voters,

769 F.3d at 240.

A

The first prong of the results test “inquires about the

nature of the burden imposed and whether it creates a

disparate effect.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 244.

The district court suggested that DNC’s challenge ought

to fail at step one because of a lack of quantitative evidence,

but it ultimately based its disposition on its determination that

“Plaintiffs’ circumstantial and anecdotal evidence is

insufficient to establish a cognizable disparity under § 2.” 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *31. The district court erred

as a matter of law when it determined that although, “prior to

H.B. 2023’s enactment minorities generally were more likely

than non-minorities to give their early ballots to third

parties,” id., it could not find for DNC because it could not

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“speak in more specific or precise terms than ‘more’ or

‘less.’” Id. at *33.

While it is true that a plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating the existence and extent of a disparity,

Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) (en

banc), it is not true that the plaintiff is required to do so with

statistical evidence, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (providing that

relevant inquiry is into “the totality of circumstances”). The

question is simply whether members of the affected ethnic

and racial minority groups “have less opportunity than other

members of the electorate to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Id.

§ 10301(b).

The evidence presented at trial weighed overwhelmingly

in DNC’s favor. For political and socioeconomic reasons,

H.B. 2023 is far likelier to affect African American, Hispanic,

and Native American Arizonan voters than white voters. As

the district court recognized, minority voters used ballot

collection services more than white voters. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *31. The disparity is not caused solely

by geography, as the socioeconomic conditions leading

minority voters to depend on ballot collection “exist in both

urban and rural areas.” Id. at *32.

The witnesses with direct experience in collecting ballots,

without exception, testified at trial that racial and ethnic

minority voters were far likelier to vote with the help of ballot

collection services. For example, one individual who worked

in several ballot collection groups testified that “the

overwhelming majority” of voters with whom he worked

were Hispanic or African American. Another stated that the

“vast majority of the ballot pickups” done by the Maricopa

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County Democratic Party are in “[m]ajority-minority

districts.” Democratic State Senator Martin Quezada

described requests for ballot collection, testifying that “[t]he

large majority of those requests came from the lower income

and the neighborhoods that were a larger percentage Latino

than others.”

No one had a clear statistical analysis of the disparity. 

Nor could anyone, as the state would be the only entity in a

position to collect such evidence, and it has not done so. 

However, one ballot collector testified as to what she termed

a “case study” showing the extent of the disparity. In 2010,

she and her fellow organizers collected “somewhere south of

50 ballots” in one particular district. The area was

redistricted before the next election to add a heavily Hispanic

neighborhood, Sunnyslope, and in 2012, the organization

“pulled in hundreds of ballots, vast majority from that

Sunnyslope area.”

Not only is there no evidence in the record of any

significant reliance on ballot collection by white voters, but

the evidence is also replete with evidence explaining why a

disparity is natural. For example, in rural Somerton and San

Luis, both of which are over 95% Hispanic, voters lack home

mail service and are unlikely to have access to reliable

transportation. Id. at *32. In urban areas, too, Hispanic

voters are less likely to have access to mail services and, due

to mail theft, less likely to trust mail-in voting. Id.

As the district court rightfully noted, the “problems are

particularly acute in Arizona’s Native American

communities.” Id. Indeed, uncontroverted expert testimony

showed that “the majority of Native Americans in nonmetropolitan Arizona do not have home mail delivery” and

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that non-Hispanic white voters are 350% more likely to have

home mail service than Native American voters. Id. In fact,

only 18% of Native Americans outside of Pima and Maricopa

Counties have home mail service—in contrast to 86% of nonHispanic whites. And residents of sovereign nations often

must travel 45 minutes to 2 hours just to get to a mailbox. In

the district court’s words, “for manyNative Americans living

in rural locations, especially on reservations, voting is an

activity that requires the active assistance of friends and

neighbors.” Id.

In contrast, none of the evidence discussed by the district

court suggested that there was no disparate burden or that any

such disparity was minor. In short, the district court

summarized the overwhelming evidence showing a disparate

burden and then concluded that because it couldn’t pin down

the difference with exactitude, it could not find for DNC.

The district court also suggested that it could not find for

DNC because too few voters rely on ballot collection for a

restriction on ballot collection to matter. Id. at *33–34. To

the degree that this finding matters, it is a consideration under

the Anderson/Burdick analysis, not under step one of the

VRA analysis. Moreover, the district court’s analysis ignores

that the VRA exists to protect minority groups—those groups

least likely to have their voices heard. Thus, the precise

number of affected voters is not particularly helpful.

Because it misstated the legal requirements for

establishing a disparity, the district court clearly erred in

concluding that DNC failed to meet their burden. I would

hold that H.B. 2023 imposes a disparate burden on members

of protected classes.

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B

As detailed earlier, within my application of the § 2

results test to the OOP policy, the Senate Factors demonstrate

the existence of social and historical conditions of

discrimination in Arizona. Those determinations have equal

force here, and I will not belabor the point by repeating my

analysis here. Instead, I will focus on the ways in which H.B.

2023 is directly connected to those conditions of

discrimination.

For example, one of the Senate Factors considers the

state’s history of racial discrimination. Gingles, 478 U.S. at

36–37. Not only does Arizona have a history of official

discrimination, as I have discussed, but the history of H.B.

2023—passed after one provision was rejected under § 5 of

the VRA and after the people of Arizona demonstrated

concern with another—powerfully links the statute to that

history. Similarly, as to racially polarized voting patterns, as

the district court noted, one of the most vocal proponents for

criminalizing ballot collection, Senator Shooter, did so in part

because he was facing a close election in which Hispanic

voters were highly unlikely to vote for him.

Perhaps most significantly, there is direct evidence of

racial appeals being made in the context of this very issue. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37. In the LaFaro video, a Hispanic

get-out-the-vote volunteer gives no indication that he is

violating election law but is nonetheless described as a “thug”

likely to physically harm a white political figure. Reagan,

2018 WL 2191664, at *38–39. That video figured

“prominently” in public debates about voter fraud and ballot

collection, even though it showed no illegal activity. Id. at

*39. The Senate Factors clarify that even “subtle” racial

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appeals are significant under the § 2 analysis, but the subtext

of the LaFaro video does not demand decoding. Gingles,

478 U.S. at 37 (1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29).

Additionally, the legislative record demonstrates a

“significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected

officials to the particularized needs of the members of the

minority group[s].” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (1986) (quoting

S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29). Legislators were apprised of

concerns that H.B. 2023 would place an especial burden on

minority voters. Their response? In the words of the bill’s

sponsor: “not my problem.” And in those of another state

senator supporting the measure, “I don’t know why we have

to spoon-fe[e]d and baby them over their vote.”

H.B. 2023 “interacts with social and historical conditions

to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by

[minority] and white voters to elect their preferred

representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. DNC has

conclusively met its burden of showing that H.B. 2023 limits

African American, Hispanic, and Native American Arizonan

voters’ ability to fully participate in the political process and

to elect representatives of their choice.

VII

Finally, H.B. 2023 cannot be reconciled with the First

Amendment, which applies to the states under the Fourteenth

Amendment and which guarantees that the right to vote will

not be unreasonably burdened. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.

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A

The burden is identified by looking to those affected by

the challenged provision. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (“The

burdens that are relevant to the issue before us are those

imposed on persons who are eligible to vote but do not

possess a current photo identification that complies with the

requirements.”). Here, then, the relevant burden is that faced

by individuals who vote with the assistance of others who are

not family members, household members, or caregivers.

“[C]ourts may consider not only a given law’s impact on

the electorate in general, but also its impact on subgroups, for

whom the burden, when considered in context, may be more

severe.” Pub. Integrity All., 836 F.3d at 1024 n.2. And,

indeed, the Court recognized this principle in Crawford by

noting that “a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a

limited number of persons.” 553 U.S. at 199. A

determination of the severityof that burden takes into account

socioeconomic situations. Id. (considering “persons who

because of economic or other personal limitations may find

it difficult either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or

to assemble the other required documentation to obtain a

state-issued identification”).

Here, there is a heavy burden on, at minimum, Native

Americans living in rural Arizona, 82% of whom lack home

mail service. Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *32. Many of

these individuals without home mail access may have serious

difficulties getting to the post office due to distance,

socioeconomic conditions, and lack of reliable transportation.

Id. Additionally, as the district court recognized, the State’s

definition of a family relationship, codified in H.B. 2023,

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does not track with family relationships in Indian Country. 

Id. at *33.

The district court erred by failing to consider a significant

body of evidence demonstrating the burdens faced by voters. 

The district court wrote that it “ha[d] insufficient evidence

from which to measure the burdens on discrete subsets of

voters” because it could not determine a precise number of

voters that had relied on ballot collection in the past or predict

a likely number in the future. Id. at *14. Its reliance on

Crawford for this assertion is legallyerroneous. In Crawford,

the Court did not set forth a rigorous evidentiary standard

requiring the production of quantifiable evidence; instead, the

Court simply said that DNC did not produce anything

sufficiently reliable to demonstrate who would be burdened

or to what degree. 553 U.S. at 200–02.

DNC presented a much better case than the plaintiffs in

Crawford. First, here, unlike in Crawford, the district court

did not reject the plaintiff’s evidence as “utterly incredible

and unreliable.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200. Second, also

distinguishable from Crawford, here, there is evidence that

some will be unable to vote under H.B. 2023. For example,

an individual who collected ballots for the Maricopa County

Democratic Party testified that even though the organization

only collected ballots for voters with “no other option,” she

nonetheless witnessed its collection of 1,200 to 1,500 ballots. 

Here, there was no evidentiary failure.

That said, even if the district court properly classified the

burden as minimal at step one of the Anderson/Burdick

analysis, H.B. 2023 nonetheless fails at step two.

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B

H.B. 2023 was and is not supported by the “adequate

justification” of “reduc[ing] opportunities for earlyballot loss

or destruction,” Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *40, or of

“maintain[ing] public confidence in election integrity,” id. at

*18. Rather, the legislative history uncontrovertedly

indicates that the best justification offered by the legislators

voting for the measure was a generic concern regarding voter

fraud—a solution in search of a problem. Even after the bill

was passed and a trial was held, the trial court could find “no

direct evidence that the type of ballot collection fraud the law

is intended to prevent or deter has occurred.” Id.10 H.B.

2023’s foundation is not only shaky, it’s illusory.

Even if the district court had been correct to classify the

burden imposed by H.B. 2023 as minimal, the law does not

withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. “However

slight [a] burden may appear, . . . it must be justified by

relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to

justify the limitation.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (quoting

Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)).

“‘[E]venhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and

reliability of the electoral process itself are not invidious and

satisfy the standard.” Crawford, 553 U.S. 181, 189–90

(quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). Here, no legitimate

interest justifies H.B. 2023.

Crawford is not a blank check for legislators seeking to

restrict voting rights with baseless cries of “voter fraud.” In

10 Nor was there any suggestion that legislators had reason to believe

that public faith in the system had been shaken, as the district court notes. 

Reagan, 2018 WL 2191664, at *18.

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Crawford, the Court held that the state’s interest in deterring

voter fraud was legitimate despite the record’s absence of

“evidence of any [in-person] fraud actually occurring . . . at

any time in its history,” but the case is distinguishable for at

least two reasons. Id. at 194. First, the voter I.D. restriction

considered in Crawford was tied to “the State’s interest in

counting only the votes of eligible voters,” particularly given

the extreme disorganization of Indiana’s voter rolls. Id. at

196. On the other hand, the nature of the relationship

between the voter and the person submitting a ballot has no

similar logical connection to that interest. The same

safeguards—e.g., “tamper evident envelopes and a rigorous

voter signature verification procedure”—are in place for

voters who give their ballots to their sister as for those who

participate in a get-out-the-vote effort. Reagan, 2018 WL

2191664, at *19.

Second, the Court in Crawford was untroubled by its

determination that the legislature was motivated by

partisanship because it determined that the legislature was

also motivated by legitimate concerns. Crawford, 553 U.S.

at 204 (“[I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid

neutral justifications, those justifications should not be

disregarded simply because partisan interests may have

provided one motivation for the votes of individual

legislators.”). Here, however, the legislature was motivated

by discriminatory intent, as I have discussed.

Moreover, even in the absence of discriminatory intent,

given the precision of H.B. 2023 toward Democratic get-outthe-vote operations, “partisan considerations” did not simply

“play[] a significant role in the decision to enact [the law]”

but rather “provided the only justification for [the restriction

on ballot collection].” Id. at 203. In Crawford, the plurality

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“assume[d]” that such a law would be held unconstitutional. 

Id. The Court’s assumption was based in Harper v. Virginia

State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, in which the Court

struck a poll tax requirement. Harper is instructive. There,

the Court wrote that “the interest of the State, when it comes

to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications.” Id. at

668. Just as “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not

germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the

electoral process[,]” neither is political affiliation. Id. at 668.

VIII

As Isaid in the previous appeal in this case, voting should

be easy in America. It is not in Arizona, and the burden falls

most heavily on minority voters. In my view, the district

court should have granted an injunction as to both of DNC’s

challenges. Arizona’s practice of discarding OOP votes

violates § 2 of the VRA and the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. And H.B. 2023 cannot withstand scrutiny

under § 2 and the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth

Amendments.

I respectfully dissent.

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